Volume 6, Tome I: Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries - Philosophy: Tome I: Philosophy (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources) [1 ed.] 9780754661825, 9781138273269, 0754661822

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KierKegaard and His german Contemporaries tome i: pHilosopHy

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 6, Tome I

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the søren Kierkegaard research Centre

General Editor Jon stewart Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board Katalin nun K. Brian söderquist Advisory Board istvÁn CzaKÓ david d. possen Joel d. s. rasmussen HeiKo sCHulz

This volume was published with the generous financial support of the danish agency for science, technology and innovation

Kierkegaard and His german Contemporaries tome i: philosophy

Edited by Jon stewart

First published 2007 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Jon stewart 2007 Jon stewart has asserted his right under the Copyright, designs and patents act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice .. Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kierkegaard and his german contemporaries tome 1: philosophy. - (Kierkegaard research : sources, reception and resources ; v. 6) 1. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813-1855 2. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813-1855 - Friends and associates 3. philosophy, german 19th century 1. stewart, Jon (Jon Bartley) 198.9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kierkegaard and his german contemporaries / edited by Jon stewart. tome 1: philosophy p. cm. -- (Kierkegaard research ; v. 6) includes bibliographical references and index. isBn 978-0-7546-6182-5 (hardcover) 1. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813-1855. 2. philosophy, german--19th century. i. stewart, Jon (Jon Bartley) B4377.K4552 2007 198'.9--dc22 Cover design by Katalin nun. isBn 9780754661825 (hbk) isBn 9781138273269 (pbk)

2006034593

Contents List of Contributors Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Baader: the Centrality of original sin and the difference of immediacy and innocence Peter Koslowski

vii ix xiii xv

1

Karl Bayer: Kierkegaard’s attempt at social philosophy J. Michael Tilley

17

Feuerbach: a malicious demon in the service of Christianity István Czakó

25

i.H. Fichte: philosophy as the most Cheerful Form of service to god Hartmut Rosenau

49

J.g. Fichte: From transcendental ego to existence David J. Kangas

67

Hegel: Kierkegaard’s reading and use of Hegel’s primary texts Jon Stewart

97

Herder: a silent Background and reservoir Johannes Adamsen

167

Kant: a debt both obscure and enormous Ronald M. Green

179

vi

Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries

lichtenberg: lichtenberg’s aphoristic thought and Kierkegaard’s Concept of the “subjective existing thinker” Smail Rapic

211

schelling: a Historical introduction to Kierkegaard’s schelling Tonny Aagaard Olesen

229

schopenhauer: Kierkegaard’s late encounter with His opposite Simonella Davini

277

schubert: Kierkegaard’s reading of gotthilf Heinrich schubert’s philosophy of nature Stefan Egenberger

293

trendelenburg: an ally against speculation Darío González

309

werder: The Influence of Werder’s Lectures and Logik on Kierkegaard’s thought Jon Stewart

335

Index of Persons Subject Index

373 378

list of Contributors Johannes Adamsen, afdeling for systematisk teologi, det teologiske Fakultet, aarhus universitet, tåsingegade 3, 8000 Århus C, denmark. István Czakó, pázmány péter Catholic university, Faculty of Humanities, department of philosophy, 2087 piliscsaba, egyetem u. 1. pf. 33, Hungary. Simonella Davini, Faculty of Foreign languages and literature, via s. maria, 85, 56126 pisa, italy. Stefan Egenberger, Johann wolfgang goethe-universität, Fachbereich evangelische theologie, systematische theologie und religionsphilosophie, grüneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am main, germany. Darío González, søren Kierkegaard research Centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 Copenhagen K, denmark. Ronald M. Green, department of religion, thornton Hall, dartmouth College, Hanover, nH 03755, usa. David J. Kangas, Florida state university, department of religion, tallahassee, Florida 32306-1520, usa. Peter Koslowski, department of philosophy, Free university amsterdam, de Boelelaan 1105, 1081 Hv amsterdam, Holland. Tonny Aagaard Olesen, søren Kierkegaard research Centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 Copenhagen K, denmark. Smail Rapic, universität Köln, philosophische Fakultät, pädagogisches seminar, münstereifeler str. 23, 50937 Köln, germany. Hartmut Rosenau, institut für systematische theologie der Christian-albrechtsuniversität, leibnizstr. 4, 24118 Kiel, germany. Jon Stewart, søren Kierkegaard research Centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 Copenhagen K, denmark. J. Michael Tilley, department of philosophy, university of Kentucky, lexington, Ky 40506, usa.

preface due to linguistic, historical and geographical reasons, german culture in the nineteenth century was closely connected to danish culture of the same period. the danish Kingdom included a number of southern provinces where german was the primary language. moreover, many danish intellectuals at the time were bilingual or very close to it. a study trip to a german university was considered absolutely obligatory for young danish scholars who hoped to enter upon an academic career. due to the close linguistic and cultural relations prior to the sleswig wars, the culture of Germany and Prussia exerted a tremendous influence on theologians, writers and philosophers of the danish golden age. indeed, the danish golden age was, ironically enough, in part constituted by this foreign influence. the present volume aims to explore in detail Kierkegaard’s various relations to his German contemporaries. Kierkegaard read German fluently and made extensive use of the writings of german-speaking authors. it can certainly be argued that, apart from his contemporary danish sources, the german sources were probably the most important in the development of his thought generally. this volume thus represents source-work research dedicated to tracing Kierkegaard’s readings and use of the various German-speaking authors in the different fields. The goal has been in the first line to trace these influences in a way that is as clearly documented as possible. an invaluable resource to all of the authors in this volume has been the extensive explanatory notes in the new danish edition of Kierkegaard’s writings, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, published by the søren Kierkegaard research Centre. the commentators and editors of this edition have already located and identified the many quotations and allusions to german authors in Kierkegaard’s texts. these useful notes were then made the point of departure for many of the articles featured here. with respect to organization, the volume has been divided into three tomes reflecting Kierkegaard’s main areas of interest with regard to the German-speaking sources, namely, philosophy, theology and a more loosely conceived category, which has here been designated “literature and aesthetics.” The first tome treats the German philosophical influences on Kierkegaard. The dependence of danish philosophy on german philosophy is beyond question. in a book review in his Hegelian journal Perseus, the poet, playwright and critic, Johan ludvig Heiberg (1791–1869) laments the sad state of philosophy in denmark, while lauding german speculative philosophy.1 moreover, Kierkegaard’s lifelong enemy, the theologian Hans lassen martensen (1808–84) claims without exaggeration that Johan ludvig Heiberg, “recension over Hr. dr. rothes Treenigheds- og Forsoningslære,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, pp. 3–7. (reprinted in Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11. Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 2, pp. 1–9.) 1

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Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries

the danish systems of philosophy can be regarded as the “disjecta membra” of earlier german systems.2 all of the major german idealist philosophers made an impact in Denmark: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and, most significantly, Hegel. Kierkegaard was widely read in the german philosophical literature, which he made use of in countless ways throughout his authorship. the second tome of the present volume is dedicated to Kierkegaard’s main theological influences. In theology as well, the German and the Danish traditions had long been closely connected via their common source: luther. in Kierkegaard’s time the main influence on theology was probably German philosophy and specifically Hegelianism. most all of the german theologians were in some way in a critical dialogue with this movement. Another important influence was Schleiermacher, who visited Copenhagen in 1833 and was important for several golden age thinkers. From his student days Kierkegaard kept abreast of the german theological literature, from which he drew much inspiration. The third and final tome is dedicated to the German literary sources that were significant for Kierkegaard. These articles feature primarily well-known authors from german classicism and romanticism. important forerunners for many of Kierkegaard’s literary motifs and characters can be found in the german literature of the day. His use of pseudonyms and his interest in irony were both profoundly influenced by German Romanticism. Moreover, many of Kierkegaard’s views of criticism and aesthetics were decisively shaped by the work of german authors. While the present volume has a fairly clear general concept, some qualifications are nonetheless necessary. it will be noted that the title, Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, is somewhat misleading on a couple of counts. First, a few of the thinkers explored here cannot, strictly speaking, be considered Kierkegaard’s “contemporaries” since they died before his birth. nonetheless they can be considered contemporaries in the sense that they belong generally to the same age, and their works continued to play central roles in contemporary intellectual life. These figures, Kant, Hamann and schiller, were still at the center of important discussions and debates during Kierkegaard’s time and can thus be considered contemporaries in this wider sense. second, the use of the designation German contemporaries is problematic since a number of the thinkers presented here are not, strictly speaking, german, but rather austrian, prussian, swiss, and so on. moreover, at the time there was no united germany, but rather there were Bavarians, westphalians, schleswegians, swabians, and so on. the term “german” is used here primarily as a linguistic designation. the authors featured here are distinguished by the fact that they all wrote primarily in the german language. thus, this anthology might instead be called “Kierkegaard’s german-speaking sources.” But this designation would not be entirely accurate for chronological reasons; in other words, he made use of any number of thinkers writing in german at a much earlier period than the one featured here, for example, luther

Hans lassen martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. af J. l. Heiberg, lærer i logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, vol. 16, 1836, p. 515f. 2

Preface

xi

or leibniz. thus, the most accurate title would be something like “Kierkegaard’s german-speaking contemporary and almost contemporary sources.” the instructions to the commissioned authors in this volume were to write the definitive article on Kierkegaard’s use of the featured figure. The articles aim, on the one hand, to provide a more or less systematic overview of the places in Kierkegaard’s authorship where he quotes or alludes to the given source in some way and, on the other hand, to argue for some kind of critical thesis about his general use of or relation to that source. the bibliographies that accompany each of the articles were compiled jointly by the authors and the editor with the invaluable assistance of Katalin nun. their goal is to provide a framework for further research. while an attempt has been made to cover all of the main sources that Kierkegaard used, some omissions unfortunately have been necessary due to considerations of length. the hope is that this volume will encourage future source-work on Kierkegaard’s relation to german authors, for which the present articles will serve as important points of departure.

acknowledgements this volume owes a tremendous debt to many people, who have helped with its realization in many ways. First and foremost, i would like to express my profound gratitude to richard purkarthofer for his enormous assistance in the early stages of both this volume and this series as a whole. without his inspiration, hard work, fruitful suggestions, and sound advice, this series would never have been possible. a special thanks is owed to the sponsor of this series, the danish agency for Science, Technology and Innovation. Its generous financial assistance has made this project feasible. i would also like to thank niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Bjarne laurberg olsen and the søren Kierkegaard research Centre at the university of Copenhagen—the host institute of the project—for all their efforts. i am most grateful for the fruitful cooperation with paul Coulam and Kate Brown at ashgate. their support of this series has been greatly appreciated. this project also owes much to the help of many individuals. i would like to thank Heiko schulz, daniel Conway, david d. possen, Joel d.s. rasmussen, Finn gredal Jensen, tonny aagaard olesen, and Brian söderquist for their invaluable suggestions and criticisms. their efforts have improved the quality of this volume and this series vastly. i would also like to express my gratitude to grete tornberg Hansen and Karsten Kynde for their help with some of the computer work involved in this project. This project would never have been realized if it were not for the selfless efforts of Katalin nun, who stepped in at an absolutely critical phase and took over a number of important tasks such as editing, formatting and bibliographical work. due to her efforts, this project was rescued in its darkest hour. Cynthia lund’s overwhelming help and hospitality was profoundly appreciated. she made possible a very productive stay at the Hong Kierkegaard library at st. olaf College, during which much of the bibliographical work of this volume was done. Finally, I must thank all of the contributors for their help and infinite patience. despite the many delays and unforeseen problems involved in the production of this volume, they were always kind and understanding of our difficulties. Although i doubtless caused them many inconveniences with my constant requests and questions, they never lost patience with me. to them i say thank you very much for sharing with me the vision of the significance of this volume and this series generally for Kierkegaard studies.

list of abbreviations Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. i–ii, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1953–54.

Bl.art.

S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by rasmus nielsen, Copenhagen 1857.

EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by H.p. Barfod and Hermann gottsched, Copenhagen 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i to Xi–3, ed. by peter andreas Heiberg, victor Kuhr and einer torsting, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. i to Xi–3, by niels thulstrup, vols. Xii to Xiii supplementary volumes, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. Xiv to Xvi index by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols 1–28, K1–K28, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim garff, Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup, Copenhagen: gads Forlag 1997ff.

SV1

Samlede Værker, ed. by a.B. drachmann, Johan ludvig Heiberg and H.o lange, vols. i–Xiv, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1901–06. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1955.

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by H.p. rohde, Copenhagen: the royal library 1967.

xvi

Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries

BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by reidar thomte in collaboration with albert B. anderson, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an introduction and notes by lee m. Capel, london: Collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP1

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP2

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

EO1

Either/Or, part i, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, part ii, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: penguin Books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, among others: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, trans. by Julia watkin, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

Abbreviations

xvii

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by alastair Hannay, london and new york: penguin Books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, assisted by gregor malantschuk, vols. 1–6, vol. 7 index and Composite Collation, Bloomington and london: indiana university press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1944.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by Henrik rosenmeier, princeton: princeton university press 1978 (a translation of B&A).

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

P

Prefaces/Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. with introductions and notes by alastair Hannay, london and new york: penguin Books 1996.

PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by william mcdonald, tallahassee: Florida state university press 1989.

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by david F. swenson and walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1941.

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Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by walter lowrie. new york and london: oxford university press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

SUDP

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by alastair Hannay, london and new york: penguin Books 1989.

TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

WL

Works of Love, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, princeton: princeton university press 1995.

Baader: the Centrality of original sin and the difference of immediacy and innocence peter Koslowski

Franz von Baader’s (1765–1841) singular importance for the development of Kierkegaard’s thought has been observed in the past.1 in the auction catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library, works by Baader form one of the single largest group of books from one author, comprising 27 titles. Kierkegaard owned more works by Baader than by Hegel. in fact, he possessed almost all of Baader’s books and certainly all of his important ones. Baader’s mature works were published between 1827 and his death in 1841. His Vorlesungen über religiöse Philosophie, which was the publication of his first lectures of the year 1826 at the university of munich, appeared in 1827,2 the first volume of his Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik in 1828,3 his Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie4 and his Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen in 1837,5 his Über die Vernünftigkeit der 3 Fundamentaldoctrinen des Christenthums in 1839,6 and his Revision der Philosopheme der Hegelschen Schule

1 marie mikulová thulstrup, “Baader,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1982 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), pp. 170–76, see p. 174: “Kierkegaard learned from Baader the basic principles of speculative idealism and the criticism thereof long before he read the works of Fichte, Hegel, and schelling.” 2 Franz von Baader, Vorlesungen, gehalten an der Königlich-Bayerischen LudwigMaximilians-Hochschule über religiöse Philosophie im Gegensatze der irreligiösen, älterer und neuer Zeit, vol. 1, munich: giel 1827 (ASKB 395). 3 Baader, Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik, vol. 1, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1828 (ASKB 396) [vols. 2–5, münster: theissing 1830–38]. 4 Baader, Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie, würzburg: stahel 1837 (ASKB 412). 5 Baader, Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung, vols. 1–3, würzburg: stahel 1837 (vols. 1–2, ASKB 409–410; vol. 3, ASKB 413). 6 Baader, Über die Vernünftigkeit der 3 Fundamentaldoctrinen des Christentums vom Vater und Sohn, von der Wiedergeburt und von der Mensch- oder Leibwerdung Gottes, nürnberg: Campe 1839 (ASKB 415).

2

Peter Koslowski

in 1839.7 this period coincides with Kierkegaard’s formative years leading to The Concept of Anxiety of 1844 in which Baader’s influence is most conspicuous. I. Martensen’s Introduction of Baader and Schelling to Kierkegaard one of Kierkegaard’s main philosophical and theological teachers, Hans lassen martensen (1808–84), had studied at the university munich with Baader and schelling (1775–1854). martensen gave his “lectures on the introduction to speculative dogmatics” at the university of Copenhagen in 1837–38, which followed the title of Baader’s book on speculative dogmatics. we owe to martensen one of the best descriptions of Baader and schelling in the years 1826–40 when they both taught at the same time at the newly founded university of munich. His characterization of Baader and schelling is even more remarkable since it contradicts the opinion common in germany at that time and even more so today about the relative weight of the two thinkers. martensen’s judgment was that Baader was a very bad teacher and speaker and schelling a very good one, but that Baader was the deeper thinker: “although Baader comes second after schelling in formal respect, he stands high above schelling, if what is at issue is the ideas, the doctrinal content itself, its purity, its concordance with Christianity, with the Holy scripture.”8 martensen summarizes his recollection of his years of study with Baader and schelling and their rivalry and hostility towards each other in the brilliant statement that they were like two important individuals who “are a thorn in each other’s flesh and must cause pain to each other for their mutual castigation and education.”9 what is important about martensen’s characterization of Baader and schelling and their “religious philosophy” (Baader) or “philosophy of revelation” (schelling) is that he understood the importance of both of them for the formation of a philosophy of Christianity and that he had a clear judgment about their relative weight in achieving this task. martensen recognized that schelling was more brilliant as a philosophical author but, like Hegel, did not achieve or not even intend a philosophy of Christianity, whereas Baader was not an erudite and elegant philosophical author but a deep thinker of a religious philosophy bridging philosophical and theological thought. martensen judges that schelling, like Hegel, subjected the content of Christianity to the concepts and logic of his own system of identity, even in its late form as a philosophy of revelation that aimed at the inclusion of Christianity in his system of philosophy. in Hegel and in schelling, the logic of the system overruled the dogmatic content of Christianity. schelling and Hegel were, in contrast to Baader, not interested in “speculative dogmatics,” the reconstruction of the dogmatic content Baader’s works are quoted from the edition of his complete works, entitled Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, vols. 1–16, ed. by Franz F. Hoffmann and Julius Hamberger et al., leipzig: Bethmann 1851–60 (reprinted aalen: scientia 1963; 2nd reprint 1987). 8 Hans lassen martensen, Aus meinem Leben, Karlsruhe and leipzig: H. reuther 1883, p. 175 (originally published as Af mit Levnet, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1882, p. 151f). 9 ibid., p. 180. 7

Baader: The Centrality of Original Sin

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of Christianity with the help of speculative philosophy, but “dogmatic speculation,” the adaptation of some propositions of Christianity to the dogmatic logic of their philosophical system. Baader, however, was less of a systematic philosopher but deeper in his striving for a reconciliation of philosophical speculation and the dogmatic content of Christian theology. Kierkegaard was introduced to Baader by martensen in the spirit of the statement quoted. a deep correspondence can be found between the positive aims of the two authors, between Kierkegaard’s aim of a philosophical and free understanding of Christianity and Baader’s aim of a speculative or philosophical theology of Christianity. there is also a profound agreement between Baader and Kierkegaard in their critical statements, in the critique of idealism as a philosophical system, particularly of Hegel’s metaphysical logic and its application to Christian theology. Kierkegaard had been introduced to Baader’s critique of Hegelianism before he developed his own critique of Hegel’s philosophy.10 the critique of the two danish philosopher/theologians, Kierkegaard and martensen, of Hegel and schelling demonstrates that idealism was not the unquestioned philosophical orthodoxy of the first half of the nineteenth century as it is often presented today. it also shows the agreement between the danish and the german theistic philosophers of the age of which Baader certainly was the most important but not the only one. Kierkegaard was also familiar with the other important theistic thinker of Baader’s time, immanuel Hermann Fichte (1797–1879)—the son of the older and more famous Johann gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814)—many of whose works Kierkegaard owned.11 Kierkegaard’s thinking and his critique of idealism, and particularly Hegelian idealism, must be understood in their connection with the criticism of Baader and the other theistic thinkers of the first decades of the nineteenth century. Both philosophies, Kierkegaard’s and Baader’s, form an important element in the philosophical attempts to analyze the shortcomings of idealism and overcome it with a philosophy which is more adequate to Christianity. II. the Concept of anxiety and Baader’s Influence Kierkegaard’s first truly original work treats the problem of original sin. Baader’s whole philosophical oeuvre is also centered around the problem of original sin and the fall of humankind. Kierkegaard and Baader share the critique of the transformation of original sin into a necessary stage of human and cultural development as argued in

For Baader’s critique of Hegel, see Koslowski, Philosophien der Offenbarung. Antiker Gnostizismus, Franz von Baader, Schelling, paderborn et al.: F. schöningh 2001, pp. 543–62; for the critique of Hegelianism, see Koslowski, “philosophische epen. Über die universellen synthesen von metaphysik, poesie und mythologie im Hegelianismus, gnostizismus und in der romantik,” in Die Folgen des Hegelianismus. Philosophie, Religion und Politik im Abschied von der Moderne, ed. by peter Koslowski, munich: Fink 1998, pp. 371–97. 11 see Hartmut rosenau’s article on i.H. Fichte in this volume. 10

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german idealism.12 Baader and Kierkegaard agree that the fall of humankind cannot be interpreted as a necessary stage of cultural development since this interpretation would render it absurd to call it original sin and guilt. it would make god the seducer of humankind, who, by necessity, leads humankind through the temptation of original sin to a higher cultural development. the transformation of the doctrine of original sin into a necessary stage of the higher development of humankind is the most central transformation that idealism makes on the dogmatic content of Christianity. important elements of the idealist system like the centrality of logic and of negativity as the motor of the development [Entwicklung] of totality, the identity of negativity and evil, the necessity of passing through evil/negativity and through its sublation [Aufhebung] are dependent upon the transformation of sin into negativity and of hereditary sin into the never ending urge to sublate negativity. Kierkegaard criticizes all of these central “dogmatic” positions of idealism by developing alternative positions from a philosophy that is in concordance with the Christian doctrine of hereditary sin. at many points, he uses Baader’s arguments in which the latter criticizes idealism. Kierkegaard introduces, however, a highly original reconstruction of original sin that is different from Baader’s in two central points that will be developed below. Kierkegaard opens his discourse on original sin with a critique of the Hegelian idea that actuality is the end of metaphysical logic. in contrast to Hegel, Kierkegaard contends that neither actuality nor contingency can enter logic which deals with intellectual necessity, not with existence.13 it is, therefore, also a mistake to call faith something immediate, that has to be sublated or annulled by the mediation of conceptual thinking. It is right that no one can stay in the immediate in reflection. what is right in logic, that is, that the logical is the sublation of the immediate, becomes idle talk in dogmatic theology where the immediate is not the unreflected but where the immediate are the historical presuppositions of faith.14 it is absurd to take logic for the doctrine of the dogmatic logos since the two are completely different in kind.15 the confusion of logic and dogmatics is further increased when the negative is taken for evil, or evil for the logically negative. “as a result, confusion is in full swing.…one can see how illogical the movements must be in logic, since the negative is the evil, and how unethical they must be in ethics, since the evil is the negative.”16 the confusion of the logically negative and the ethically evil annuls the logical and the ethical. moreover, as i.H. Fichte objected to Hegel’s metaphysical logic, it makes evil into be the origin and moving force of being. Cf. Koslowski, “sündenfälle. theorien der wandelbarkeit der welt,” in Die Wirklichkeit des Bösen. Systematisch-theologische und philosophische Annäherungen, ed. by Friedrich Hermanni, peter Koslowski, munich: Fink 1998, pp. 99–131. 13 SKS 4, 318 / CA, 10. 14 ibid. 15 Baader called the Hegelians “die logisch Verrückten,” the “logically insane” or the “logically displaced.” 16 SKS 4, 321 / CA, 13. 12

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sin does not belong in any science. ethics in a second sense, however, can deal with the revelation or the becoming open and manifest of sin, but it cannot deal with its origin and coming into existence.17 “Sin came into the world by a sin.”18 sin did not come into the world by something else, by something that is not sin. if sin was the result of something else, it would be something accidental which one would not have to explain. science, and in this case psychology, explores the real possibility of sin whereas dogmatic theology explains hereditary sin.19 sin deals with innocence and guilt and not with immediacy and mediation or the sublation of immediacy. immediacy and innocence are not, as Hegel contended, the same, and, therefore, both of them must not be annulled. only immediacy “must” be annulled. this Hegelian sentence is, however, not even logically true. “For the immediate is not to be annulled, because it at no time exists.”20 it is logically false to say that immediacy must be annulled, but it is worse to say that innocence must be lost. “it is indeed unethical to say that innocence must be annulled, for even if it were annulled at the moment this is uttered, ethics forbids us to forget that it is annulled only by guilt.”21 someone who says that innocence must be lost forgets that it can only be lost by guilt, not by mediation or sublation [Aufhebung]. immediacy is annulled by reflection or sublation; innocence is annulled by guilt. “Innocence is lost only by guilt.”22 It is not lost by reflection. “Just as Adam lost innocence by guilt, so every man loses it in the same way. if it was not by guilt that he lost it, then it was not innocence that he lost.”23 Kierkegaard quotes the smalcald articles that “hereditary sin is so profound and detestable a corruption in human nature that it cannot be comprehended by human understanding, but must be known and believed from the revelation of the scriptures (ex scripturae patefactione).”24 Kierkegaard accepts the opaqueness of hereditary sin but maintains that some rational understanding of hereditary sin is possible. that the smalcald articles emphasize that hereditary sin cannot be comprehended by reason is due to the fact that they want to underline the immediacy of original sin, its presence in every individual at every moment of time in contrast to the idea that hereditary sin is a historical event of the past and therefore a phenomenon that can be understood historically. at this point, the difference between Kierkegaard and Baader becomes visible. Baader’s philosophy tries to make the idea of original sin plausible by empirical and speculative arguments. the human and the world are not original but deteriorated, and this can be comprehended, according to Baader, from the present condition of the human and of the world. Baader gives a theory of the necessity of temptation. Man could not have been created as a finalized and confirmed being but had to pass 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

SKS 4, 329 / CA, 21. SKS 4, 338 / CA, 32. SKS 4, 330 / CA, 23. SKS 4, 314f. / CA, 35. ibid. SKS 4, 342f. / CA, 36. SKS 4, 342 / CA, 35. SKS 4, 333 / CA, 26.

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a temptation and confirmation of his freedom. He failed in this confirmation. This does not mean that his failing the confirmation was necessary but that the process of temptation was necessary. 25 Kierkegaard rejects this idea, although he expressly acknowledges Baader’s “usual vigor and authority.”26 He discusses expressly Baader’s idea that temptation is freedom’s other but rejects it. He remarks that “Franz Baader has overlooked the intermediate terms. the transition from innocence to guilt merely through the concept of temptation easily brings god into an almost imaginatively experimenting relation to man.”27 Baader’s interpretation of original sin as the failure to be confirmed by resisting the temptation overlooks the fact that temptation presupposes the knowledge of good and bad. But this knowledge was missing in adam and eve who acquired this knowledge only by sin. “innocence is ignorance. in innocence, man is not qualified as spirit but is psychologically qualified in immediate unity with his natural condition. the spirit in man is dreaming.”28 anxiety is the state of this ignorance since ignorance begets anxiety. the Bible denies that man in his innocence has knowledge of the difference between good and evil. the origin of sin cannot be a failed temptation since man did not know the difference between good and evil when he had to face the temptation. the Bible “denounces all the phantasmagoria of Catholic meritoriousness.”29 original sin is not the failed opportunity of the good or meritorious work to pass the temptation. since the human did not know good and evil when facing this temptation, even the mastering of the temptation would not be a meritorious work. when it is stated in genesis that god said to adam, “only from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you must not eat,” it follows as a matter of course that adam really has not understood this word, for how could he understand the difference between good and evil when this distinction would follow as a consequence of the enjoyment of the fruit?30

it is necessary that adam had knowledge of freedom because he desired to use it. “the prohibition induces in him anxiety, for the prohibition awakens in him freedom’s possibility.”31 in adam is “the anxious possibility of being able.”32 anxiety is a presupposition of hereditary sin but not this sin itself. the text in James 1:13–14 that says “god tempts no one” stands against Baader’s explanation of original sin as a temptation not mastered.33 the second part of the text from James that god is not tempted or tested by any one stands against the explanation of original sin as the temptation by the serpent which Baader also Cf. Baader, Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 111. 26 SKS 4, 345n / CA, 39n. 27 SKS 4, 346n / CA, 39n and following. Translation slightly modified. 28 SKS 4, 347 / CA, 41. 29 ibid. 30 SKS 4, 350 / CA, 44. 31 ibid. 32 ibid. 33 SKS 4, 353 / CA, 48. 25

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asserts.34 “For the serpent’s assault upon man is also an indirect temptation of god, since it interferes in the relation between god and man.”35 the fact that man can be thought neither of being tempted by god nor of being tempted by the serpent, leads to the conclusion that he can only be tempted by himself. “and one is confronted by the third statement, that every man is tempted by himself.”36 Kierkegaard’s argument against Baader is not completely conclusive since an admission or toleration of a testing of the human by someone else is not the same as god being tested by a third in his relationship with the human. it is, however, true that the idea of god tolerating a temptation leading to such disastrous consequences as original sin causes problems of theodicy and of the admission of evil in the world by god. Kierkegaard discusses the thesis whether the prohibition caused the original sin and the desire to breach the prohibition. if this position is taken, the prohibition creates concupiscentia, inordinate desire, and the fall of man would become something necessary and successive.37 it would not be a sin and guilt but the effect of a cause outside of sin. if humankind is tempted by itself, psychology cannot explain the fall as the effect of another cause. the fall comes into being by a qualitative leap.38 the consequence of this leap is that sin came into the world and that sexuality was posited.39 sexuality came into the world with sin since man is already in his original state a synthesis of soul and body. if he were not this synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit, “the sexual could never have come into the world with sinfulness.”40 since sexuality and sensuousness are derivative phenomena, since they are the consequence and not the cause of sin, “sinfulness is by no means sensuousness, but without sin there is no sexuality, and without sexuality no history.”41 a perfect spirit has neither sexuality nor history. the actuality of sin is preceded by freedom’s possibility. “However, freedom’s possibility is not the ability to choose the good and the evil.”42 this is impossible since man acquired the knowledge of good and evil only by the fall. the possibility is to be able. in a logical system, it is convenient to say that possibility passes over into actuality. However, in actuality it is not so convenient, and an intermediate term is required. the intermediate term is anxiety, but it no more explains the qualitative leap than it can justify it ethically.43 Baader even demands it as a task of speculative theology to demonstrate the fall that happened before the fall of man in his Vorlesungen über Speculative Dogmatik, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 152. 35 SKS 4, 353 / CA, 48. 36 ibid. 37 SKS 4, 346 / CA, 40. 38 SKS 4, 353 / CA, 48. 39 ibid. 40 ibid. 41 SKS 4, 354 / CA, 49. 42 ibid. 43 ibid. 34

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Kierkegaard introduces here the intermediate term that is missing, according to his opinion, in Baader’s explanation of the fall as failed confirmation of freedom. an intermediate term between sensuousness and free choice or liberum arbitrium of good and evil is needed, and that intermediate term is the concept of anxiety. “anxiety is neither a category of necessity nor a category of freedom.”44 it is an intermediate between necessity and freedom: it is entangled freedom, where freedom is not free in itself but entangled, not by necessity, but in itself. if sin has come into the world by necessity (which is a contradiction), there can be no anxiety. nor can there be any anxiety if sin came into the world by an act of an abstract liberum arbitrium (which no more existed in the world in the beginning than in a late period, because it is a nuisance for thought).45

sensuousness as sin is not the cause of the fall but its consequence. “after sin came into the world, and every time sin comes into the world, sensuousness becomes sinfulness. But what it becomes is not what it first was.”46 Kierkegaard follows here a thought of Baader.47 “Franz Baader has often protested against the proposition that finitude and sensuousness as such are sinfulness.”48 Baader’s defence of finitude as the possibility of good and bad finitude was directed against Hegel’s equation of finitude with limitedness and infinity with perfection, his defense of the sensual and material against the identification of sensuousness and materiality with sin and the origin of sin in the gnostic systems as well as against the disdain for material nature in Hegel’s idea that nature is the fall (and refuse) of the idea away from itself [Abfall der Idee von sich]. Baader goes even further by saying that sensuousness is often a limiting factor of sin since the exhaustion of the body prevents humans from sinning infinitely, whereas the spirit can, at least in principle, commit infinite sins since it is not exhausted by the material. Kierkegaard does not follow this thought of Baader. He rather takes again an intermediate position in the question of concupiscentia as the origin of sin as he already took it in the question of whether choice was the origin of sin. since the origin of sin is an intermediate state between being seduced and having chosen, a leap out of anxiety, concupiscentia is and is not the origin of sin. Kierkegaard grants the correctness in the view of the protestant orthodoxy which uses concupiscentia as “the strongest, indeed the most positive expression…for the presence of hereditary sin in man” and quotes the Confessio Augustana, the augsburg Confession (i, 2, i.): “Omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascuntur cum peccato h.e. sine metu dei, sine fiducia erga deum et cum concupiscentia.” [all men begotten in a natural way are born with sin, i.e., without the fear of god, without trust in god,

ibid. ibid. 46 SKS 4, 363 / CA, 58f. 47 Cf. Baader, Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel’schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christenthum. Nebst zehn Thesen aus einer religiösen Philosophie, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 9, pp. 327f. and p. 334. 48 SKS 4, 363 / CA, 59. 44 45

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and with concupiscence].49 But he also insists with Baader: “we do not say that sensuousness is sinfulness, but that sin makes it sinfulness.”50 the solution is that the accumulation of sin in history creates the inclination of sensuousness to sin, but that each individual by positing sin makes sensuousness sinful. Baader’s position that there is no element of sin in sensuousness is in danger of having pelagianism emerge “from an entirely different side”51 by separating sinfulness and sensuousness completely. it is Baader’s mistake not to take the history of sin into account. “Franz Baader, however, did not take into account the history of the race. in the quantitation of the race (i.e., nonessentially), sensuousness is sinfulness, but in relation to the individual, this is not the case until he himself, by positing sin, again makes sensuousness sinfulness.”52 individually, it is sin that makes desire, concupiscentia, sinful, but in the collective and in the history of humankind there is a hereditary disposition for sinful desire or concupiscentia. like Baader, Kierkegaard contends that the fall affected not only humankind but the whole creation.53 “By coming into the world, sin acquired significance for the whole creation. this effect of sin in nonhuman existence i have called objective anxiety.”54 like Baader, Kierkegaard recognizes a deeply equivocal nature of the culture of greek antiquity in which sensuousness and the beauty of the body, although not linked to sinfulness, nevertheless are accompanied by a melancholy that is part of the greek adoration of the body. Christianity increases the melancholy to a contradiction: “after Christianity had come into the world and redemption was posited, sensuousness was placed in a light of opposition such as was not found in paganism, which serves to confirm the proposition that sensuousness is sinfulness.”55 Kierkegaard shares with Baader the opposition to idealism’s claim to be a presuppositionless science [voraussetzungslose Wissenschaft] whereas Christianity is said to be full of presuppositions and the stage of mere representation or Vorstellung. if one looks closer, idealism appears not to be as “presuppositionless” at it claims. the term “transition” [Übergang] is used by the Hegelians in logical and no less in historical–philosophical inquiries. “However, no further explanation is given.”56 although there is so much talk about the most complete absence of presuppositions, there is no embarrassment at all over the use in Hegelian thought of the terms “transition,” “negation,” “mediation.”…if this is not a presupposition, i do not know what a presupposition is. For to use something that is nowhere explained is indeed to presuppose it.57 SKS 4, 347 / CA, 41. SKS 4, 377 / CA, 73. 51 SKS 4, 363 / CA, 59. 52 ibid. 53 Cf. Baader, Vorlesungen über Speculative Dogmatik, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 142. 54 SKS 4, 362 / CA, 57. 55 SKS 4, 378 / CA, 74. 56 SKS 4, 384 / CA, 81. 57 ibid. 49 50

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Kierkegaard objects, like Baader, to the aggrandisement of the terms “sublation” [Aufhebung] and “mediation” [Vermittlung] to central omnipotent categories, the ambiguity of which serves not as an objection against them but as the proof of their cognitive omnipotence.58 they become the secret service agents of the system that can be used for any purpose. negation, transition, mediation are three disguised, suspicious, and secret agents [agentia] that bring about all movements. Hegel would hardly call them presumptuous, because it is with his gracious permission that they carry on their ploy so unembarrassedly that even logic uses terms and phrases borrowed from transition in time.59

the power of negation is linked to the presupposition that the transition from nonbeing to being, from nothingness to existence, is easy. “greek philosophy and the modern alike maintain that everything turns on bringing non-being into being, for to do away with it or to make it vanish seems extremely easy.”60 Hegel’s transition from nothingness to being by becoming is the most conspicuous example. By contrast, Christianity recognizes a hiatus between nothingness and being that is hard to transcend. the Christian view takes the position that non-being is present everywhere as the nothing from which things were created, as semblance and vanity, as sin, as sensuousness removed from spirit, as the temporal forgotten by the eternal; consequently, the task is to do away with it in order to bring forth being.61

Finally, Kierkegaard and Baader share the theory that time is “an infinite succession” lacking the dimension of presence.62 man is “a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.”63 life that is in time has no dimension of presence, only the eternal is the present.64 only in so far as the eternal and temporal meet in man does he experience presence. if one summarizes the agreements between Kierkegaard and Baader, it becomes evident that both aim at a Christian philosophy. in such a Christian philosophy, the question of hereditary sin plays a central role as the Christian answer to the question of the origin of evil and its admission by god, to the problem of theodicy. the For Baader’s critique that Hegel’s concept subsumes very different sublations, like annulment, cancellation, raising, and debasing, under the one equivocal concept of “Aufhebung,” see his Über die sich so nennende rationelle Theologie in Deutschland, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 515f. note. this book of Baader is not found in the auction catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library. 59 SKS 4, 384f. / CA, 82. 60 SKS 4, 386n / CA, 83n. 61 ibid. 62 Baader develops his theory of time in Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 55 and in Elementarbegriffe über die Zeit als Einleitung zur Philosophie der Societät und der Geschichte, in Franz von Baader’s Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 29 [1831]. 63 SKS 4, 388 / CA, 85. 64 SKS 4, 389 / CA, 86. 58

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doctrine of original sin is also central for the question of the origin of being. if nonbeing or nothingness is the origin of being and negation, the transition from nothing to being, then negativity is the driving force of being, and evil only negativity’s intensified form. Kierkegaard’s familiarity with Baader’s texts shows that the sharp critique of Hegel and Hegelianism that they share is not only a matter of their personal philosophical preference but marks a deep ontological divide between the impersonal dialectical systems of idealism and the personalist form of a systematic Christian philosophy. it is an ongoing philosophical divide of the greatest philosophical and religious impact. Hegel is, for Kierkegaard and Baader, not the “the consummation of Christianity” as which walter schulz describes Hegel’s philosophy.65 By moving negativity to the center of being and thereby “getting rid of the concept of sin” (Heinrich Heine), Hegel represents a new dialectical dogmatics that tries to assimilate Christianity in a superficial way but in fact moves away from it to the monist idealism of his metaphysical logic. Hegel’s transformation of the doctrine of original sin plays a central role in his transfiguration of the Christian interpretation of evil and sin and of their origin. Both Baader and Kierkegaard have seen with their philosophical genius that the way in which philosophy conceptualizes the question of the origin of evil is decisive for the shape of its philosophical system. Hegel’s claim that the dogma is proven in the whole of a philosophy is right. Kierkegaard and Baader recognized, however, that the dogma that Hegel proves in his philosophy is not the dogmatics of Christianity but the new monist dogma of negativity that dialectically moves nothingness through becoming to being. not only in The Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard criticized the totalization of negativity and of the sublation and mediation of negativity, but also in Either/Or from an existentialist and a systematic philosophical point of view. the demand for an either/or is the counterpart to the eternal mediating and permanent Aufhebung of the Hegelian system. as such, Kierkegaard’s either/or is not only an existential postulate but the demand for a systematic philosophy that is not lost in mediation of negativity. Kierkegaard tried, as did Baader, not only to vindicate the existential mood, but also the central dogmatic propositions of Christianity in philosophy.66 Kierkegaard stands on Baader’s shoulders, not as a dwarf on the shoulders of a giant, but as a giant on the shoulders of another giant. in two central points, Kierkegaard sees further than Baader in the theory of original sin. Kierkegaard walter schulz, Johann Gottlieb Fichte—Sören Kierkegaard, 2nd ed., pfullingen: neske 1977, p. 68. 66 The differences between Baader and Kierkegaard in their affirmation and renunciation of “speculation” in philosophy cannot be treated here. these differences concerning the speculative method also point, like their differences in the theory of original sin, to their different denominational backgrounds in Catholicism and lutheran protestantism. Baader’s “semi-pelagian” theory of temptation corresponds to his plea for speculative thinking, and Kierkegaard’s “anti-meritorious” theory of original sin out of a leap from anxiety to his scepticism towards speculation and mysticism. it would be an interesting question that must be left open here to ask whether it would have been meritorious or again only by grace, “sola gratia,” if man would not have sinned. the problem that arises if there had not been merit in adam’s not sinning is that there might be also no guilt in the original sin. 65

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surpasses Baader, first, in introducing the intermediate term of anxiety between the idea that human beings are driven by concupiscentia and the idea that human beings are driven by their freedom in not mastering the temptation when they sin, and, secondly, in his emphasis that, although concupiscentia is not the origin of individual sin, it is a driving force for sin in the history of the human race and, therefore, part of hereditary sin.

Bibliography I. Baader’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Ueber den Bli[t]z als Vater des Lichts. Aus einem Schreiben an den geheimen Hofrath von Jung, [nuremberg: Campe 1816] (ASKB 391). Ueber das pythagoräische Quadrat in der Natur oder die vier Weltgegenden, [tübingen] 1798 (ASKB 392). Beiträge zur dinamischen Philosophie im Gegensa[t]ze der mechanischen, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1809 (ASKB 393). Fermenta Cognitionis, nos. 1–5, Berlin: reimer 1822–24 (ASKB 394). Vorlesungen, gehalten an der Königlich-Bayerischen Ludwig-MaximiliansHochschule über religiöse Philosophie im Gegensatze der irreligiösen, älterer und neuer Zeit, vol. 1, Einleitender Theil oder vom Erkennen überhaupt, munich: Jakob giel 1827 (ASKB 395). Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik, vol. 1, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1828 (ASKB 396) [vols. 2–5, münster: theissing 1830–38]. Über den Begriff des Gut—oder positiv—und des Nichtgut—oder negativ— gewordnen endlichen Geistes, luzern: meyer 1829 (ASKB 397). Vierzig Sätze aus einer religiösen Erotik, munich: georg Franz 1831 (ASKB 398). Ueber ein Gebrechen der neuen Constitutionen, munich: georg Franz 1831 (ASKB 399). Philosophische Schriften und Aufsätze, vols. 1–2, münster: theissing 1831–32 (ASKB 400–401). Ueber das Verhalten des Wissens zum Glauben, Auf Veranlassung eines Programms des Hrn. Abbé Bautain: Enseignement de la Philosophie en France. Strasbourg. 1833, münster: theissing 1833 (ASKB 402). Über eine bleibende und universelle Geistererscheinung hienieden, münster: theissing 1833 (ASKB 403). Ueber das dermalige Missverhältniss der Vermögenslosen oder Proletairs zu den Vermögen besitzenden Klassen der Societät in Betreff ihres Auskommens, sowohl in materieller, als intellektueller Hinsicht, aus dem Standpunkte des Rechts betrachtet, munich: Franz 1835 (ASKB 404). Ueber den christlichen Begriff der Unsterblichkeit im Gegensatze der ältern und neuern nichtchristlichen Unsterblichkeitslehren, würzburg: stahel 1835 (ASKB 405). Über das Leben Jesu von Strauß, munich: Franz 1836 (ASKB 407). Vorlesungen über eine künftige Theorie des Opfers oder des Kultus, münster: theissing 1836 (ASKB 408).

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Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung, Sendeschreiben an den Herrn Professor Molitor in Frankfurt, vols. 1–3, würzburg: stahel 1837 (vols. 1–2, ASKB 409–410; vol. 3, ASKB 413). Ueber die Incompetenz unsrer dermaligen Philosophie, zur Erklärung der Erscheinungen aus dem Nachtgebiete der Natur. Aus einem Sendschreiben an Justinus Kerner, stuttgart: Brodhag 1837 (ASKB 411). Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie, würzburg: stahel 1837 (ASKB 412). Ueber mehrere in der Philosophie noch geltende unphilosophische Begriffe oder Vorstellungen mit Berücksichtigung älterer Philosopheme, besonders des Philosophus Teutonicus, aus einem Sendeschreiben an Herrn Niembsch von Strehlenau genannt Lenau, münster: theissing 1838 (ASKB 414). Über die Vernünftigkeit der 3 Fundamentaldoctrinen des Christentums vom Vater und Sohn, von der Wiedergeburt und von der Mensch- oder Leibwerdung Gottes, nürnberg: Campe 1839 (ASKB 415). Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel’schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christenthum. Nebst zehn Thesen aus einer religiösen Philosophie, stuttgart: liesching 1839 (ASKB 416). Über die Thunlichkeit oder Nichtthunlichkeit einer Emancipation des Katholicismus von der römischen Dictatur in Bezug auf Religionswissenschaft, nürnberg: Campe 1839 (ASKB 417). Ueber die Nothwendigkeit einer Revision der Wissenschaft naturlicher, menschlicher und göttlicher Dinge, in Bezug auf die in ihr sich noch mehr oder minder geltend machenden Cartesichen und Spinozistischen Philosopheme, erlangen: palm und enke 1841 (ASKB 418). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Baader erdmann, Johann eduard, Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837, p. 111 (ASKB 479). —— Natur oder Schöpfung? Eine Frage an die Naturphilosophie und Religions– philosophie, leipzig: Friedrich Christian wilhelm vogel 1840, pp. 85f.; p. 89 (ASKB 482). Fichte, immanuel Hermann, Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie, stuttgart and tübingen: J. g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1826, pp. 47f. (ASKB 501). —— Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, Heidelberg: akademische Buchhandlung von J.C.B. mohr 1846 (vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie), p. 274 (ASKB 509) [vols. 1–2 (ASKB 502–503)]. —— System der Ethik, vols. 1–2.1, leipzig: dyk 1850–51, vol. 1, Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht, Staat und Sitte in Deutschland, Frankreich und England von der Mitte des Achtzehnten Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, 1850, pp. 447–52 (ASKB 510–511) [vol. 2.2, leipzig: dyk 1853, (ASKB 504)].

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Fischer, Carl philipp, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus speculativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, pp. xx–xxi; p. xxv; p. xxviii (ASKB 512). günther, anton, Vorschule zur speculativen Theologie des positiven Christenthums. In Briefen, vols. 1–2, vienna: wallishausser 1828–29, vol. 1, pp. 143–58 (ASKB 869–870). —— Die Juste-Milieus in der deutschen Philosophie gegenwärtiger Zeit, vienna: Beck 1838, p. 242n; p. 421n (ASKB 522). günther, anton and Johann Heinrich pabst, Janusköpfe. Zur Philosophie und Theologie, vienna: wallishausser 1834, p. 112; p. 176; p. 196n (ASKB 524). Hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich, Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet, and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840–45, vol. 1, pp. xxv–xxvii (ASKB 561–563). marheineke, philipp, Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1827, p. xxv; p. xxvii (ASKB 644). martensen, Hans lassen, Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849, p. 250 (ASKB 653). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 1, pp. 160ff.; pp. 306ff.; vol. 3, pp. 75ff. (ASKB u 79). michelet, Carl ludwig, “Baader,” in his Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel, vols. 1–2, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837–38, vol. 2, pp. 482–505 (ASKB 678–679). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 (vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57), vol. 1, p. 165n; vol. 2, p. 97; p. 110; p. 255 (ASKB 358–363). rosenkranz, Karl, Erinnerungen an Karl Daub, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837, p. 22; p. 44 (ASKB 743). —— Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 266; p. 284 (ASKB 744). —— Schelling: Vorlesungen; gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: gerhard 1843, pp. 43–4; p. 144; p. 311; p. 320 (ASKB 766). rudelbach, andreas, De ethices principiis hucusque vulgo traditis, disquisito historicophilosophica, quæ systematum ethicorum secundum primas causas amplioris criseos introductionem continet, Copenhagen: Hartv. Frid. popp 1822, p. 96n (ASKB 750). schlegel, Friedrich, Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806, vols. 1–2, ed. by Carl Josef H. windischmann, Bonn: weber 1836, vol. 2, p. 461 (ASKB 768-68a). schubert, gotthilf Heinrich, Die Symbolik des Traumes, 2nd ed., Bamberg: Kunz 1821 [1814], p. 120n (ASKB 776). steffens, Henrich, Christliche Religionsphilosophie, vols. 1–2, Breslau: im verlage bei Josef max und Komp. 1839 [vol. 1, Teleologie; vol. 2, Ethik], vol. 1, p. 315 (ASKB 797–798).

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III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Baader Hirsch, emanuel, Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, pp. 24–5 [pp. 470–71] (reprinted, vaduz, liechtenstein: toposverlag 1978. First published in Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode, nos. 29, 31, 32, 36, 1930–33. The reprint retains the pagination of the first publication, giving the page numbers of the 1933 edition in square brackets). reuter, Hans, S. Kierkegaards religionsphilosophische Gedanken im Verhältnis zu Hegels religionsphilosophischem Systems, leipzig: verlag von quelle & meyer 1914 (Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, no. 23), see pp. 63–8. thulstrup, marie mikulová, “Baader,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1982 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), pp. 170–76.

Bayer: Kierkegaard’s attempt at social philosophy J. michael tilley

Although the major figures of the nineteenth century serve as the primary background for understanding Kierkegaard’s main projects and aims, there are many minor figures who receive little to no attention within contemporary philosophical circles and yet who nevertheless played a very important role in shaping critical components of his thought. One such figure is Karl Bayer. Although Kierkegaard only references Bayer twice, both of these references are about friendship and community, and these positive comments about Bayer’s social philosophy give an indication of Kierkegaard’s own social thought which has been relatively unexplored in recent scholarship. this article examines this topic as it relates to Kierkegaard’s understanding of Karl Bayer and his theory of community. the article is divided into three sections: (1) a brief overview of Karl Bayer’s life with emphasis on his political and philosophical achievements; (2) a description of Kierkegaard’s first-hand knowledge of Bayer’s works which focuses on two journal entries from 1846; and (3) an account of how Kierkegaard’s positive portrayal of Bayer’s work on community sheds new light on how Kierkegaard can make contributions to social philosophy. I. Short Overview of Bayer’s Life and Main Works Karl Bayer was born on 2 april 1806, and he died on 28 december 1883.1 He was a German philosopher and teacher who became an important political figure in Bavaria in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Bayer studied philosophy and theology at both erlangen and Berlin from 1825–30, obtaining his doctorate in philosophy in 1829. He worked with both Friedrich schleiermacher and g.w.F. Hegel. He began his career teaching at a Gymnasium in nuremburg and then in erlangen. He then became the deputy headmaster at the Gymnasium in Hersbruck. in 1839, Bayer began teaching at the university level in erlangen not long after ludwig Feuerbach had been dismissed from his post there.2 Bayer also taught at Hof and schweinfurt before retiring in 1876. All historical references in the first two paragraphs are based on Bayer’s written work and on information provided in the Dictionary of German Biography, vols. 1–10, ed. by walther Killy and rudolf vierhaus, munich: K.g. saur 1995–2003, vol. 1, p. 359. 2 Feuerbach published three different reviews of Bayer’s works in which the “Hegelian” position is defended against Bayer’s critiques. ludwig a. Feuerbach, “die idee der Freiheit” 1

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Bayer, however, is better known for his political and philosophical contributions than for his teaching. politically, Bayer was a proponent of liberalism up until the 1848 revolution. He was extremely concerned that the state respect the interests of the individual. But after the 1848 revolution, Bayer gravitated more toward the left and became a strong proponent of Jewish emancipation.3 Bayer’s two most influential political actions were giving a series of speeches to the citizens’ council in erlangen, which were published in 1848 as Der Sieg der Freiheit und die deutsche Volksbildung, and serving as a member of the erlangen-Fürth constituency in the Bavarian landtag from 1849–55. Bayer made a name for himself philosophically by writing books such as Betrachtungen über den Begriff des sittlichen Geistes und über das Wesen der Tugend, and by publishing regularly in some of the more prominent philosophical journals in the mid-nineteenth century such as the “anti-Hegelian” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie.4 although it is quite evident that Bayer’s thought deviates substantially from Hegel, it is equally true that Bayer was heavily influenced by Hegel’s thought and methodology. This is evident in the types of questions Bayer addressed (for example, the relationship between freedom and thought, and the relationship between community and morality) as well as the dialectical approach he employed.

[1838], in Sämtliche Werke, vols. 1–10, ed. by wilhelm Bolin and Friedrich Jodl, stuttgart: Fromman verlag 1903–22, vol. 2, pp. 111–20; Feuerbach, “ueber den Begriff des sittlichen geistes” [1840], in Sämtliche Werke, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 121–30; Feuerbach, “Betrachtungen über den Begriff des sittlichen geistes und über das wesen der tugend” [1839], Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–12, ed. by werner schuffenhauer, Berlin: akademie-verlag 1967–76, vol. 2, pp. 82–99. 3 “Jewish emancipation” is a term that can imply different and contradictory political positions. For a much more detailed discussion of Jewish emancipation in nineteenth-century germany, see Christopher Clark, “german Jews,” The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, ed. by rainer liedtke and stephan wendehorst, manchester and new york: manchester university press 1999, pp. 122–47. 4 Bayer, “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al. eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 13, 1844, pp. 69–102 (ASKB 877–911); Bayer, “die idee der wahrheit als wissenschaftliches problem,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 10, 1843, pp. 226–54; Bayer, “die innere wahrheit der religion,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 129–159; Bayer, “das system der sittlichen gemeinschaften,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol. 18, 1847, pp. 47–81. the name of the journal was changed in vol. 17 from Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie to Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik (vols. 17–165, Halle and saale: pfeffer 1847–1918). For a brief description of the changes that accompany this change, see Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol. 17, 1846. Niels Thulstrup identifies the journal as an organ for “speculative theism” and also as an “anti-Hegelian” journal because of the primary contributors to the journal. see his Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980, p. 280n.

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II. Kierkegaard’s References to Bayer Kierkegaard only appears to have been marginally acquainted with Karl Bayer’s works. He references Bayer’s article, “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft” in two journal entries.5 Both journal entries are undated though they were written between January and september of 1846. although there is no clear indication of the length of time between these two particular journal entries, it is most likely that Kierkegaard wrote them within a short period of time since the two entries appear so close together in a journal which was written from January through september 1846. although Kierkegaard only mentions this one article, there are some good reasons for thinking that Kierkegaard was at the very least acquainted with four other works by Bayer. First, in one of the two references to “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft” there is an allusion to one of Bayer’s previous works Die Idee der Freiheit; thus, Kierkegaard was most likely aware of this particular work even though there is no evidence that he actually read it. second, Kierkegaard subscribed to the Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie where “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft” as well as three other Bayer articles were published. thus, it is likely that he was also aware of these other three articles, even though they are never mentioned. despite the possibility that Kierkegaard was aware of Bayer’s other works, one can only reasonably assume that Kierkegaard read and studied “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft.”6 since Kierkegaard paid close attention to “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft” in both journal entries that reference Bayer, it will serve as the focal point for the following discussion of Kierkegaard’s use of Bayer’s text. The first line of the first entry, “the dialectic of community or society is as follows” indicates the theme for this passage.7 in this entry, Kierkegaard develops his own dialectic of community, though it leaves much to be desired in terms of a coherent development of a distinct theory of community. Kierkegaard’s primary aim in this entry is to show how the individual becomes progressively more important as the community develops. ultimately, the dialectic culminates in a stage where the individual is more important than the individual’s relations. Kierkegaard explains this concept by pointing out how the god-relation is more important than other relations but then stresses that this does not undermine one’s other relations. nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s development here is unclear and provides very little in terms of a positive account of SKS 18, 283, JJ:430 / JP 4, 4110. SKS 18, 284f., JJ:433 / JP 5, 5883. It may be possible to make a more definite statement about this topic by examining Kierkegaard’s own copy of Bayer’s second article in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie volumes 10, 11. (although the article is continued in volume 18, in the successor journal, there is no evidence that Kierkegaard owned a copy of this. depending on the markings in the text, if there are any, one could determine more precisely if Kierkegaard examined Bayer’s second article in more detail than i suggest here. i do not know of any way to determine more fully whether Kierkegaard read Bayer’s other work, Die Idee der Freiheit, since Kierkegaard did not own the text. i have not cited Die Idee der Freiheit because i was unable to locate it prior to publication.) 7 SKS 18, 283, JJ:430 / JP 4, 4110. 5 6

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community. Kierkegaard does, however, provide two helpful clues for understanding his presentation of the dialectic of community. First, he suggests that we look at a passage in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which says, “the task is not to move from the individual to the race but from the individual through the race to reach the individual.”8 this reference establishes that the race, the universal, the community are not only ends in themselves but also a means for developing the individual. thus, this passage emphasizes Kierkegaard’s conception of the development of self as a process, but it still fails to provide a genuine theory of community. the second suggestion Kierkegaard gives for deciphering this passage is a reference to Bayer. Kierkegaard specifically suggests that we “See an article by Dr. Bayer, ‘der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft’ (in Fichte’s journal, 1844, vol. 13, p. 80). His tripartition is: Beziehung, Bezug, Einheit. (see pp. 80–81.)”9 not only does this suggestion provide a clue for understanding what Kierkegaard is trying to accomplish in this passage, but it also shows that Kierkegaard is not directly comparing his dialectic of community to Hegel’s in The Philosophy of Right. while the comparison to Hegel’s dialectic of community might seem initially plausible (and it may be quite philosophically fruitful), it is quite clearly not Kierkegaard’s source or inspiration for the passage.10 the second journal entry dealing with Bayer references a particular passage in “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft” about the stoics’ view of friendship.11 in this entry, Kierkegaard gives a short account of the choice between preaching in a way that the individual leaves the congregation wanting to hear the one who preached again, or preaching in such a way so as to anger the listener and thereby provoke her to pray to God. Kierkegaard says that in the first case, the preacher’s “assistance to the truth would have become the deception,” whereas in the second case, the very deception “would have assisted him to the truth” and would have thereby “benefited him the most.”12 this is a rather standard explanation of the need for indirect communication, but then Kierkegaard continues and explains how a person still needs other people. He describes this need, not as a lack on the part of the individual but, like the stoics, as a duty of the individual toward others. Kierkegaard quotes Bayer quoting a stoic, a wise man has no particular need, and yet he has need in many instances. accordingly, although a wise man may be content with himself, yet he needs friends, not that he may have someone to sit by his side when he is in distress but that he may have someone

SKS 18, 283, JJ:430 / JP 4, 4110. SKS 7, 389.28 / CUP1, 428. SKS 18, 283, JJ:430 / JP 4, 4110. 10 if one were to compare these two distinct dialectics of community, then one should be clear about the structural differences between them. in Hegel’s view, the stages in the dialectic represent the development of a particular type of freedom and the reconciliation of unity and individuality. Kierkegaard’s conception, however, focuses on the development of the individual in her relation to others. 11 SKS 18, 284f., JJ:433. Kierkegaard records the page number to Bayer’s “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft” as p. 86. the passage Kierkegaard is referring to is actually on p. 88. 12 SKS 18, 284, JJ:433 / JP 5, 5883. 8 9

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by whose side he may sit when he is in dire need, one for whom he can give his life willingly.13

the context of the passage in Bayer’s text contributes very little, if at all, towards understanding this particular journal entry. it does not deal either implicitly or explicitly with indirect communication. nevertheless, the clear meaning of this passage illustrates that even if one is fully satisfied and content, whether in the God relationship or simply with oneself, there is still a duty to the other. III. Kierkegaard’s Contributions to Social Philosophy in both journal entries, Kierkegaard comments positively on Bayer’s theory of community. In the first entry, Bayer serves as the primary source of inspiration for Kierkegaard’s own dialectic of community, and in the second, Kierkegaard quotes a passage and indicates that the stoics and Bayer have understood the sense in which a person “needs” other people. since these two entries deal with issues of community and friendship, these topics will be the primary point of emphasis in developing an account of how Kierkegaard was affected by his encounter with Bayer. First, i will examine the importance of the individual for both Bayer and Kierkegaard. this similarity shapes each of their critiques of other theories of community. second, I will outline the specific similarities between Bayer’s threefold classification of community and Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community. this will help establish my prior assertion that Bayer is the most likely source for Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community. And finally, I argue that Kierkegaard’s understanding and use of the second journal entry about the stoics’ view of friendship vindicates Kierkegaard’s controversial claim in the third stage of the dialectic of community that the godrelation does not undermine one’s relation to others. Bayer emphasizes the importance and place of the individual within the social, just as Kierkegaard does. Bayer is critical of attempts to reduce community to mechanical or organic forms of unity because both of these types of union lack a developed notion of the individual.14 He thinks that mechanistic views of community, such as an account of human community based solely in terms of economic laws and principles, improperly conceive of individuals as mere parts of the whole. Bayer is also critical of “organic” theories of communities where solidarity arises out of “common values.” He claims that the “space” of community is the individual, and that the individual is essential if one is to achieve a genuine sense of unity.15 this claim is a direct critique of organic theories of community where land and territory SKS 18, 285, JJ:433 / JP 5, 5883. the quotation is originally in latin in both Bayer’s and Kierkegaard’s text. the translation given in the text is from Hong and Hong. the latin is as follows: “Sapientem nulla re indigere, et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse.—Ergo quamvis se ipso contentus sit sapiens, amicis illi opus est, non ut habeat, qui sibi aegro assideat, sed ut habeat aliquem, cui ipse assideat, pro quo mori possit.” Bayer, “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft,” op. cit., p. 88. 14 Bayer, “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft,” op. cit., p. 74. 15 ibid., p. 83. 13

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were the critical elements in the structure and development of Gemeinschaft. For many of Bayer’s contemporaries, notions of german land and soil were extremely prominent in the articulation of german life and its folkways. Bayer undermines this notion by positing the free individual as the space of the community. the community is not realized in a particular geographical location; rather, it is realized in and through individuals. Kierkegaard is very sympathetic to this type of critique as is evident in his criticism of grundtvig’s emphasis on scandinavian nationalism and “common values.”16 these similarities, however, only indicate broad agreements between Kierkegaard and Bayer. a closer comparison of the two thinkers can be made by analyzing Bayer’s threefold classification of the different forms of being-together and Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community. Bayer’s threefold classification of “Beziehung, Bezug, Einheit” represents different forms of being-together, and the development from connection to unity constitutes Bayer’s dialectic of community. “Connection” [Beziehung] is the type of relation that exists merely externally in nature, and Bayer gives the example of a system of a planet where entities are related to one another simply because they are on the same planet.17 “relation” [Bezug], for Bayer, is the relationship that exists in a living community. within this type of community, there is a unifying principle which directs all of the members of the community toward the same ultimate end.18 although Bayer does not say this explicitly, he seems to have animal communities in mind, that is, an ant colony or a wolf pack. The final type of community is characterized by a relationship of “unity.” this type of community is the only fully realized and genuine community. Bayer says that this type of community is realized in the realm of spirit. it is the moral–spiritual community grounded in the free acts of its members.19 This threefold classification is similar to Kierkegaard’s dialectic of community which suggests that Bayer is, if not the source of, then at least the inspiration for Kierkegaard’s dialectic. Kierkegaard’s three stages of community represent the development of the individual in her relation to others. In the first stage, the relation to others is more important than the individual (as in the relation of parts of the body to the whole). By contrast, in the second stage, the individual and the relation to others are equally valued (as in the relation of “earthly love”). The first stage is comparable both to Bayer’s organic view of community as well as his account of the community grounded in “connection” [Beziehung], whereas the second stage is comparable to Bayer’s mechanistic view of community in addition to his community grounded in “relation” [Bezug]. In Kierkegaard’s third and final stage, the individual is more important than the relation to others. Kierkegaard’s explanatory comment about the third stage, however, suggests that there is still no ultimate conflict between the individual and the community. He writes, “the individual is primarily related to god and then to the community, but this primary relation is the highest, yet he does not neglect the second.”20 this is a very odd claim, since as many have pointed out, if one is 16 17 18 19 20

Cf. SKS 20, 193, nB2:131 / JP 4, 4121. Bayer, “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft,” op. cit., p. 80. ibid., p. 81. ibid. SKS 18, 283, JJ:430 / JP 4, 4110.

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fundamentally related only to god, then all relations to others are merely secondary, that is, god could require that an individual give up her relationships with others.21 There are two responses to this type of criticism: first, it could be that Kierkegaard’s notion of the self is inherently intersubjective. there may be good reasons for holding this view independently of how it helps resolve the dilemma presented above.22 Furthermore, this is precisely how Bayer conceives of the individual. Bayer holds both that intersubjectivity or the being-in-unity is the proper characterization of an individual and that this notion of individuality lays the groundwork for a community.23 this notion of the mutually constitutive character of the individual and community could provide some insight into Kierkegaard’s claim about how one’s individuality can be primary and yet not demean one’s relationships with others. If a person’s individuality is inherently relational, then there is no conflict between the individual and the community. this argument is an appropriate response to the challenge for Bayer since his account of the relational self is not predicated on an account of a unique one-to-one relation between an individual and god, but this is why this response ultimately fails for Kierkegaard. a second response, which is more effective for Kierkegaard, can be found in his second journal entry about Bayer. the clear meaning of the second passage about the Stoic’s view of the “need” for others illustrates that even if one is fully satisfied and content, whether in the god relationship or simply with oneself, there is still a duty to the other. and therefore, even if the individual is higher than her relation to others, this merely heightens her duties to those people rather than undermining those duties. thus, the second passage provides an indication of how one could explain and defend Kierkegaard’s illustration about how the primary relation, that is, the god-relation, does not undermine the secondary relation, the relation to the community. in fact, on this interpretation the primary relation would only serve to reinforce and undergird one’s duties to the community. the most important contribution gleaned from studying Kierkegaard’s use of Karl Bayer is that it provides a crucial element for understanding Kierkegaard’s complex social philosophy, which all too often seems non-existent or undeveloped. the closest Kierkegaard comes to expressing a detailed account of community is in his journal entry on the dialectic of community, and the meaning of this passage can only be understood in light of Bayer’s discussion of the topic. it is clear that Bayer’s work is much more important for understanding the passage on the dialectic of community than the journal entry on the stoic’s view of friendship. nevertheless, in the argument above, this second journal entry provides an important clue for understanding Kierkegaard’s claim that the god-relation does not undermine one’s relation to others. Cf. martin Buber’s critique of Kierkegaard in “the question to the single one,” in Between Man and Man, trans. by ronald gregor smith, new york: macmillan 1948, pp. 46–93. 22 C. stephen evans, for example, has argued that the view of the self presented in The Sickness unto Death is inherently relational. see his article: “who is the other in Sickness unto Death? god and Human relations in the Constitution of the self,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1997, pp. 1–15. 23 Bayer, “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft,” op. cit., p. 74. 21

Bibliography I. Bayer’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library “die idee der wahrheit als wissenschaftliches problem,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 10, 1843, pp. 226–54 (ASKB 877–911). “die innere wahrheit der religion,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 129–59. “der Begriff der sittlichen gemeinschaft,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 69–102. “das system der sittlichen gemeinschaften,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 18, 1847, pp. 47–81. II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Bayer Hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 25n (ASKB 534). rosenkranz, Karl, Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 237 (ASKB 744). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Bayer none.

Feuerbach: a malicious demon in the service of Christianity istván Czakó

Among the philosophical influences that affected Kierkegaard’s thinking, the most significant were certainly those of the late Schelling and Hegel; therefore, it is not by chance that Quellenforschung even today pays particular attention to his relations to these figures.1 Although the influence of the philosophies which developed in the wake of the dissolution of the Hegelian school looks to be of secondary significance when compared to the effect of the main thinkers of german idealism, nevertheless it is of some historical interest to examine how far and in what way Kierkegaard assimilated the contemporary post-Hegelian thought. this essay—focusing on one crucial point within this context—attempts to explore the circumstances of Kierkegaard’s reception of ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy and to reconstruct Kierkegaard’s view of Feuerbach in the light of the published works and the Nachlaß. I. Short Overview of Feuerbach’s Life and Main Works ludwig andreas Feuerbach was born in landshut, Bavaria, on 28 July 1804, as the fourth son of the distinguished (in 1813, ennobled) jurist, paul Johann anselm von Feuerbach (1775–1833).2 His parents were determined to protect ludwig from the strong, traditional Catholicism of southern germany by giving him a solid lutheran upbringing. during his years of study at the secondary school in ansbach, he had a deep, scripture–oriented piety, receiving private tutoring in ancient Hebrew to supplement his studies of the Bible. By the end of his studies he decided to enter the university of Heidelberg to prepare for the ministry. there, beginning in 1823, he attended the lectures of church historian Heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus this article has been supported by the Hungarian ministry of education. 1 see, for example, Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003; and Kierkegaard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit, ed. by Jochem Henningfeld and Jon stewart, Berlin and new york: walter de gruyter 2003. 2 For a general introduction to the life and works of Feuerbach, see eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, london: routledge & Kegan paul 1970, pp. 15–32; marx w. wartofsky, Feuerbach, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1982, pp. xiiff. For a study of the religious philosophy of Feuerbach, see van a. Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1997.

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(1761–1851) and speculative theologian Karl daub (1765–1836). daub’s lectures on dogmatics represented the new “speculative theology,” which was strongly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel as well as the theology of Schleiermacher and marheineke. since it was the Hegelian categories in daub’s work that attracted Feuerbach, it was not long before the idea of learning these first–hand dawned on him. although he convinced his father to support the continuation of his study for the ministry in Berlin because of the great theologians in residence there, when he arrived in 1824, he was no longer sure that he wanted to become a minister. while still a theological student, Feuerbach attended Hegel’s lectures regularly and with enthusiasm; he became a Hegelian and, feeling that he could no longer reconcile studies in theology with his interest in philosophy, he changed his field of study from theology to philosophy. Because of financial difficulties, Feuerbach left Berlin in 1826 and went to erlangen. He obtained his degree there in 1828 with a thesis entitled, Reason: Its Unity, Universality and Infinity, published in the same year.3 in 1829 he became an instructor in philosophy at erlangen, lecturing on the history of modern philosophy, later on logic and metaphysics as well. in 1830 Feuerbach published anonymously his Thoughts on Death and Immortality.4 this work, though strongly Hegelian in form, was understood to deny the immortality of the soul, to affirm that man’s only dwelling-place was on this earth and that the only immortality lay in human culture. its authorship was soon recognized, and this was enough to bar Feuerbach from university posts in the future. it also put the seal on Feuerbach’s hopes of a literary career, and he turned thereafter to philosophical work. in 1834 Feuerbach met Bertha löw, who had inherited a share in a porcelain factory in Bruckberg after the death of her father in 1822. in 1837 the two were married at Bruckberg. For the next 23 years, they were to live modestly but comfortably in rural seclusion in the castle at Bruckberg, relying on the profits from the porcelain factory and the proceeds from Feuerbach’s writings. Feuerbach did most of his important work in this retirement, having given up once and for all any prospect of a professorial life with its many demands. in 1839, his “towards a Critique of Hegel’s philosophy” was published,5 which marked an open break with his previous Hegelian period; it showed him to be an independent and fundamental critic of idealism in general ludwig Feuerbach, De ratione una, universali et infinita, dissertation, erlangae 1828. Feuerbach [anonymous], Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit aus den Papieren eines Denkers, nebst einem Anhang theologisch-satyrischer Xenien, herausgegeben von einem seiner Freunde, nüremburg: Johann adam stein 1830. [in english as Thoughts on Death and Immortality. From the Papers of a Thinker, along with an Appendix of Theological-Satirical Epigrams, Edited by One of His Friends, trans. by James a. massey, Berkeley: university of California press 1980.] 5 “zur Kritik der Hegelschen philosophie,” in Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst, ed. by arnold ruge and theodor echtermeyer, 1839, no. 208, pp. 1157–60; no. 209, pp. 1165–68; no. 210, pp. 1673–77; no. 211, pp. 1681–84; no. 212, pp. 1689–93; no. 213, pp. 1697–1702, no. 214, pp. 1705–09; no. 215, pp. 1713–18; no. 216, pp. 1721–25. [in english as “towards a Critique of Hegel’s philosophy,” in The Young Hegelians. An Anthology, ed. by lawrence s. stepelevich, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1983, pp. 95–128.] 3 4

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and of Hegelian philosophy in particular. The Essence of Christianity two years later sealed this reputation and made Feuerbach the most discussed philosopher in germany, among both radicals and their theological opponents.6 it was during this period, in the early 1840s, that he became the theoretical leader of the left-Hegelian school. in 1842 and 1843 respectively, the explicitly empiricist–materialist works appeared: “provisional theses for the reformation of philosophy”7 and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future.8 in 1846, The Essence of Religion followed.9 although Feuerbach had given some articles to the young-Hegelian arnold ruge for his radical Annals, he held himself somewhat at a distance from the activity of ruge, the young Karl marx and others who were anxious to brandish the weapon of criticism in the periodical press. For the most part, Feuerbach kept to his studies in the field of religion, revising The Essence of Christianity, and defending or explaining it in the light of criticism. Feuerbach took a curiously passive and skeptical attitude toward the revolution of 1848, even though he was lionized by the students and radical intellectuals of the time. at the invitation of the revolutionary student body, Feuerbach gave public lectures from 1 december 1848 to 2 march 1849, at the City Hall in Heidelberg. after the 1849 reaction, he was in despair over the state of political and intellectual freedom in germany and thought seriously of migrating to the united states, where he had friends and a circle of readers and admirers. in 1860, his life was seriously uprooted. His wife’s factory in Bruckberg went bankrupt, and he found himself, at the age of 56, once again in poverty and without a source of income. He moved to rechenberg, near nüremburg, where he lived until his death. in 1868, he read, with enthusiasm, marx’s Capital, published a year before, and in 1870 he joined the german social democratic party. two years later, on 13 september 1872, Feuerbach died and was buried in nüremburg.10

6 Das Wesen des Christentums, leipzig: otto wigand 1841 (2nd ed. 1843, ASKB 488). [in english as The Essence of Christianity, trans. by george eliot, new york: Harper & row 1957.] 7 “Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie,” in Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik, vols. 1–2, ed. by arnold ruge, zürich and winterthur: verlag des literarischen Comptoirs 1843 (ASKB 753), vol. 2, pp. 62–86. [in english as “provisional theses for the reformation of philosophy,” in The Young Hegelians. An Anthology, op. cit., pp. 156–71.] 8 Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, zürich: verlag des literarischen Comptoirs 1843. [in english as Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. by manfred H. vogel, indianapolis: Hackett publishing Company 1986.] 9 Das Wesen der Religion in the journal Die Epigonen, ed. by otto wigand, vol. 5, part 1, leipzig 1846, pp. 119ff. 10 new german critical edition of his works: ludwig Feuerbach, Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–22, ed. by werner schuffenhauer, Berlin: akademie verlag 1967–96. other english translations: The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, trans. by Zawar Hanfi, garden City, new york: anchor Books 1972; The Essence of Faith According to Luther, trans. by melvin Cherno, new york: Harper & row 1967.

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II. The Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Feuerbach Historically it is interesting to see that the first study on the subject of Kierkegaard’s relation to Feuerbach was published as early as 1845—that is, in the midst of Kierkegaard’s extremely busy activities as an author—with the title “parallel between two philosophers of the most recent time.”11 the author was Christian Fenger Christens (1819–55), a theologian and personal acquaintance of Kierkegaard, who demonstrates above all the untenable arguments against Feuerbach which were put forth in a dissertation in 1844.12 But at the same time the work deals with the comparison of the philosophy of Kierkegaard and Feuerbach.13 the main similarity between the two thinkers—according to Christens—is to be seen in their polemical relation to Hegel, that is, in their polemic against the Hegelian system; otherwise, he thinks, “the direction of their interest is rather different.”14 theologian and church historian andreas listov (1817–89), in his article “Kierkegaard’s relation to Feuerbach” from 1888, took the opposite standpoint; he cited some of the expressive passages from Kierkegaard’s late journals (then published, beginning in 1869, as Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer), from The Moment, as well as from the “preface” of Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity, stressing only the parallels between the sharp critique of Christianity of the two philosophers, without any indication of the essential differences between them.15 although twentieth-century Kierkegaard research paid relatively little attention to the danish thinker’s reception of Feuerbach, some relevant studies have appeared nonetheless.16 it is conspicuous that in these comparative studies, the authors Christian Fenger Christens, “en parallel mellem to af den nyere tids philosopher,” For Literatur og Kritik, vol. 3, 1845, pp. 1–17. this article is, from a historical point of view, probably the first one which makes a comparison of the thought of Kierkegaard and another philosopher at all. in general, Christens refers very positively to both of them, though sometimes he is also critical of Feuerbach. It is interesting that in the article one finds an “X” in place of Kierkegaard’s name. it seems to me plausible that this phenomenon may be interpreted in connection with Kierkegaard’s vehement protest in 1842 against the position of andreas Frederik Beck in his book Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form (Copenhagen: philipsen 1842–43) to which we will return later. Cf. Kierkegaard, “aabenbart skriftemaal” [“public Confession”], Fædrelandet, no. 904, 12 June 1942 (SV1 Xiii, 405 / COR, 10). 12 peter michael stilling, Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844 (ASKB 801). 13 the comparison became especially topical because of the contemporary danish reception of the liberal Hegelianism. 14 Christian Fenger Christens, “en parallel mellem to af den nyere tids philosopher,” op. cit., p. 9. 15 andreas listov, “s. Kierkegaards Forhold til Feuerbach,” Theologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 5, 1888, pp. 194–206. 16 see george e. arbaugh, “Kierkegaard and Feuerbach,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 7–10; Jean Brun, “Feuerbach et Kierkegaard,” Cahiers de Sud, vol. 50, no. 371, 1963, pp. 34–43; leonardo Casini, “singolo, genere umano e storia universale. un confronto tra Feuerbach e Kierkegaard,” Filosofia e teologia, vol. 2, 1990, pp. 317–28; m. Cristaldi, “struttura del paradosso kierkegaardiano,” Teoresi, vol. 12, 1957, pp. 115–33; John william 11

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concentrate primarily on the exploration of the similarities while the negative sides of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Feuerbach remain largely unattended.17 Elrod even believes that he has discovered “astonishing affinities”18 between the two thinkers: he considers both to be young-Hegelians.19 arbaugh in his short but thorough study—in a slightly more moderate way—also draws our attention to the conspicuous parallels existing in their thinking and use of concepts.20 Hannay simply calls Kierkegaard “Feuerbachian.”21 It is also significant that Vergote gave the title “Feuerbach’s inspiration” to the section of his monograph, Sens et répétition, which discusses the relation between the two thinkers.22 in what follows—with the results of contemporary Kierkegaard research in view—i would like to roughly outline the circumstances of Feuerbach’s reception in denmark in the 1840s and 1850s along with Kierkegaard’s relationship to the danish young-Hegelian movement. then i will analyze those parts of Kierkegaard’s writings where the effect of Feuerbach can be detected either explicitly or implicitly. i hope that using Quellenforschung and textual analysis together will provide an appropriate basis for a new reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s conception of Feuerbach. elrod, “Feuerbach and Kierkegaard on the self,” The Journal of Religion, vol. 56, 1976, pp. 348–65; alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard, 2nd ed., london and new york: routledge 1991, see pp. 302–28; gregor malantschuk, “Begrebet Fordoblelse hos søren Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2, 1957, pp. 43–53; luigi pareyson, Esistenza e persona, turin: taylor 1950, pp. 11–46; adolf sannwald, Der Begriff der “Dialektik” und die Anthropologie. Eine Untersuchung über das Ich-Verständnis in der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus und seiner Antipoden, munich: Chr. Kaiser 1931, see pp. 215–70; Henri-Bernard vergote, Sens et répétition. Essai sur l’ironie kierkegaardienne, vols. 1–2, paris: Cerf/orante 1982, vol. 2, see pp. 245–85. 17 also the well-known monographs on Feuerbach by Kamenka and wartofsky emphasize the similarities and the influence of Feuerbach on Kierkegaard’s thinking. Cf. Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, op. cit., p. 150; wartofsky, Feuerbach, op. cit., p. 169. Harvey deals with this problematic as well. regarding the philosophical standpoints of the two thinkers, he outlines the similarities based on their anti-Hegelian attitude. However, in the field of the philosophy of religion, Harvey also points out the essential differences between the two positions. see Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion, op. cit., p. 23; p. 116; p. 119; p. 123; pp. 129ff.; pp. 140ff. 18 Elrod, “Feuerbach and Kierkegaard on the Self,” op. cit., p. 349: “The affinities between the two are astonishing. Both are left-wing Hegelians.” 19 it is notable that the famous historian of philosophy, Karl löwith, also ranks both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard among the young-Hegelians: Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 10th ed., Hamburg: Felix meiner 1995, pp. 78–136 [in english as From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. by david green, new york: doubleday 1967]. 20 arbaugh, “Kierkegaard and Feuerbach,” op. cit., p. 7: “…there also exist striking parallels in their thought and existential concerns.” 21 Hannay, Kierkegaard, 2nd ed., london and new york: routledge 1991, p. 174: “[i]n this respect [that is, in emphasizing individuality] Kierkegaard is clearly Feuerbachian.” it should be noted that afterwards Hannay also clearly stresses the important differences between the two thinkers; see pp. 326ff. 22 “§ 1. l’inspiration feuerbachienne,” in vergote, Sens et répétition, op. cit., p. 245.

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III. The Influence of Feuerbach on Danish Philosophy in the 1840s and 1850s it is well known that following Hegel’s death in 1831 a split arose among his disciples,23 mainly because of religious, philosophical,24 then—after 1840—political reasons. while none of the developing schools, neither the conservative old-Hegelians nor the liberal young-Hegelians, formed a homogeneous movement, they were unified regarding their relation to Hegel’s spiritual heritage. The representatives of the radical left-wing of the Hegelian school strove to supersede the epigonal Hegelinterpretation; they placed philosophy unambiguously above religion, criticized the prussian state in the spirit of enlightenment, and considered the critical, dialectical method to be the heart of Hegelian philosophy. Feuerbach—who first, under the effect of his university years in Berlin, joined the old-Hegelians and then later supported (though with some qualifications) the young-Hegelians led by Arnold Ruge—became one of the greatest philosophical authorities of the german opposition movement through his study “towards a Critique of Hegel’s philosophy” published in 1839 in the Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst,25 in which he summarized his reservations concerning the Hegelian system. it is noteworthy that the reception of Feuerbach in denmark was closely connected to the very lively debate about Hegel’s philosophy.26 Hegelian philosophy had its effect in denmark from the 1820s, above all through the works of the well-known philosopher, poet, literary critic and playwright Johan ludvig Heiberg (1791–1860).27 the split is usually dated to 1835–36 when david Friedrich strauss’ two-volume work was published in tübingen with the title Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet, in which the author used the method of the Hegelian history of spirit to examine the new testament. He reduced the religious concepts to myths and exposed the question of the truth of the gospels to historical criticism. strauss called his own standpoint “left-wing,” the orthodox views of Karl Friedrich göschel and georg andreas gabler “right-wing,” and the position of Karl rosenkranz “middle.” 24 One of the most important first steps in this religious-philosophical debate was Feuerbach’s Thoughts on Death and Immortality. as mentioned above, although the book had been published anonymously, its author was soon discovered, and its denial of personal immortality was the primary reason why Feuerbach was never able to obtain a professorship in germany. even poul martin møller (1794–1838), Kierkegaard’s beloved, prematurely deceased professor, took part in the dispute which followed Feuerbach’s book, with a study representing a moderate viewpoint, entitled “tanker over muligheden af Beviser for menneskets udødelighed, med Hensyn til den nyeste derhen hørende litteratur,” Maanedskrift for Litteratur, vol. 17, 1837, pp. 1–72; pp. 422–53. 25 “zur Kritik der Hegelschen philosophie,” Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst, op. cit. 26 For an account of the danish Hegelians and critics of the Hegelian philosophy, see stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, op. cit., pp. 50–89. 27 He published the first Danish language study inspired by Hegel on human liberty, and by often referring to Hegel and citing from his books, Heiberg was the one who effectively introduced Hegel into danish philosophical life. Cf. Om den menneskelige Frihed. I Anledning af de nyeste Stridigheder over denne Gjenstand, Kiel: i universitets Boghandlingen 1824. one year later it was followed by another work written about contingency, in which he discusses the problems of chance, probability and contingency from a Hegelian perspective. Cf. Der Zufall, 23

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The first more prominent station of the debate28 was marked by Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854), who criticized the Hegelian category of mediation and the critique of the principium exclusi tertii of classical logic.29 Both mynster’s essay and Heiberg’s response attracted great attention,30 and many of the contemporary figures in Danish intellectual life took a stand on the issue. Hans lassen martensen (1808–84), philosopher, theologian and later (after mynster’s death) bishop, was—compared to Heiberg—a more moderate, critical, but in the beginning no less committed representative of Hegel’s philosophy. However, from the beginning of the 1840s he was driven to change his point of view radically, as a result of the appearance of the young-Hegelians’ ideas of religious criticism, especially those of Feuerbach and strauss, in denmark.31 Feuerbach’s thoughts on the philosophy of religion, despite their radicalism, did not generate such an intensive debate in denmark as Hegel’s philosophy. andreas Frederik Beck (1816–61) was the first Danish left-wing Hegelian who, as a young theologian, supported the radical school of tübingen. the radicalism of his thinking can best be seen in his work, The Concept of Myth or the Form of the Religious Spirit (which was published one year after the first edition of The Essence of Christianity).32 this work deals with Feuerbach’s views in many places and outlines his principles of religious philosophy.33 it is worthy of note that Beck many times refers to Kierkegaard’s idea of myth described in his doctoral thesis, The Concept aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet. Als Einleitung zu einer Theorie des Zufalls, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1825. His most important work aimed at spreading Hegelianism is titled On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age. Cf. Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuvœrende Tid, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833 (ASKB 568). [in english as On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age and Other Texts, ed. and trans. by Jon stewart, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2005, pp. 83–119.] 28 For an account of this debate, see stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, op. cit., pp. 347–55. 29 Jakob peter mynster, “rationalisme, supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Literatur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 249–68. (reprinted in mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53, vol. 2, 1853, pp. 95–115 (ASKB 358–363) [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57].) 30 Johan ludvig Heiberg, “en logisk Bemærkning i anledning af H. H. Hr. Biskop dr. mynsters afhandling om rationalisme og supranaturalisme i forrige Hefte af dette tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Literatur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 441–56 (reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 2, pp. 167–90). 31 Cf. s.v. rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1966, pp. 15–26. strauss’ work titled Die christliche Glaubenslehre was published at this time in danish, translated by Hans Brøchner: Fremstilling af den christelige Troeslœre i dens historiske Udvikling og i dens Kamp med den moderne Videnskab, Copenhagen: H.C. Klein 1842–43. 32 andreas Frederik Beck, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: philipsen 1842. 33 ibid., p. 6: “Ludwig Feuerbach fatter Religionens Princip i dets Immanents i den menneskelige Selvbevidsthed, hvorved det hele abstrakte, transcendente Væsen eller Uvæsen absorberes i Aanden, fattes som dennes indre Proces og Bestemmelse. Theologien bliver saaledes Anthropologie.” From this passage it is clear that Beck has correctly understood and interpreted the basic idea of Feuerbach.

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of Irony.34 the fact that Kierkegaard knew Beck’s work35—and what is more, even protested against some of its findings which applied to himself36—shows that he knew Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity at least indirectly at this early period. Thus, Malantschuk’s claim is in need of modification when he asserts, “it is possible that Kierkegaard obtained the first more detailed information about Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity through arnold ruge.”37 the fact that Kierkegaard, in the columns of Fœdrelandet, quickly and clearly protested against the statements Beck had made about him is important, not only because it shows that Kierkegaard knew Beck’s work but also because, at the same time as his polemic, he radically distances himself from liberal Hegelianism and explicitly from Feuerbach as well. Keeping this distance from the young-Hegelian religious criticism is characteristic of Kierkegaard in his whole literary activity, including the Nachlaß. even if we meet astonishing statements such as, “the free-thinkers’ version [sc. of Christianity] is closer to the truth than that of the so-called Christian Church, especially in protestantism, especially in denmark,”38 there is no sign on any real assimilation of Feuerbach’s conception of religion in the thinking of Kierkegaard. this statement does not contradict the viewpoint of malantschuk39 or vergote,40 who say that Kierkegaard’s concept of “reduplication” [Fordoblelse] derives from Feuerbach because, while this term in Feuerbach—who uses the “genetic-critical method”—unambiguously has a negative content, in Kierkegaard’s opinion it makes the positive definition of Christian possible.41 thus, in Kierkegaard there is only a formal appropriation ibid., p. 31; p. 53; p. 77. Cf. ASKB 424. 36 Cf. SV1 Xiii, 405 / COR, 10f.: “in the book Herr doktor recently published, i see that he has most incredibly thrust me in among the straussians. in formation with Strauss, Feuerbach, Vatke, Bruno Bauer, i must, whether i want to or not, keep step with them while dr. B. counts: ein, zwei, drei.” 37 gregor malantschuk, “Har Kierkegaard læst marx?” in his Den kontroversielle Kierkegaard, vinten: stjernebøgernes Kulturbibliotek 1976, p. 65. 38 Pap. Xi–1 a 559 / JP 6, 6912. 39 malantschuk thinks that Kierkegaard met the term “reduplication” [Verdoppelung] for the first time in Arnold Ruge’s lengthy review of The Essence of Christianity: “die neue wendung der deutschen philosophie,” in Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 3–61. Cf. gregor malantschuk, “Begrebet Fordoblelse hos søren Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2, 1957, p. 46. it is true that the expression “Verdoppelung” can be found formally in ruge’s text (“Verdoppelung des Wesens,” vol. 2, p. 27); however, Feuerbach—in the first edition of The Essence of Christianity—rather uses the forms “duality” [Duplicität] and “double” [gedoppeltes] (cf. Das Wesen des Christenthums, op. cit., p. 308; p. 312), while in the second, significantly modified edition—the one that Kierkegaard possessed—we can meet the verbal form “doubling” (verdoppelt sich). Cf. Das Wesen des Christenthums, op. cit., p. 124. 40 vergote, Sens et répétition, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 247. 41 SV1 Xii, 381 / FSE, 98: “...everything essentially Christian is a redoubling…” Pap. Xi–2 a 65 / JP 3, 3664: “everything essentially Christian has a double meaning, is a redoubling.” the concept of “reduplication” is rich in meaning and quite often appears in Kierkegaard’s writings, and its usage is not limited to the definition of Christianity. Regarding the question of the Feuerbach reception, it is absolutely worth mentioning that there is a 34 35

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of the term “reduplication,” the essential elements of which—in a philologically demonstrable way—had been present in his thinking previously. if we follow the chronology of the Feuerbach reception in denmark, then after Beck’s book the next work is a thesis from 1844, written by peter michael stilling (1812–69) with the title Modern Atheism, or the Consequences of the so-called Neo-Hegelianism,42 which—as we have seen—was much criticized by Christens in the columns of the journal, For Litteratur og Kritik.43 stilling was introduced to Hegelian philosophy by martensen in his university years, and at the beginning he was an enthusiastic student; later, however—not least of all, under the effect of some of the works of Kierkegaard—he became estranged from both Hegelianism and martensen.44 stilling makes it clear right in the introduction of Modern Atheism that within Hegelianism “it was Feuerbach who realized the nihilistic direction with the most energy and talent, and therefore he deserves the greatest attention.”45 true to this statement, we can find the description and critique of Feuerbach’s philosophy of religion in many places in this work. the picture of Feuerbach outlined by stilling is so one-sided that Christens rightly calls it “a caricatured distortion”46 in his article published in the next year, and it can hardly be called euphemistic when he states that both stilling’s study and the verbal dispute “reveal a total ignorance of the significance of Feuerbach.”47 rudolf varberg (1828–69) appeared as an “enlightened humanist” against all possible forms of the theological view of life.48 in his short book—entitled A Battle between Ørsted and Mynster or between Science and the Official Theology,

passage in the unpublished Book on Adler where Kierkegaard refuses adler’s reference to self-revelation in a way that reminds one of Feuerbach’s argumentation. Cf. Pap. vii–2 B 235 / BA, 119. However, naturally it does not follow at all from the foregoing that Kierkegaard would have identified with Feuerbach’s “reduplication-theory.” On the one hand, he really made himself familiar with Feuerbach’s conception, and, on the other hand, he found it useful while arguing against the heterodoxy represented by adler. 42 peter michael stilling, Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844 (ASKB 801). 43 in the same year mynster also published an article, in which he alludes on Feuerbach very ironically: “‘Det kommer, det nye Evangelium,’ siger man os allerede i mere end et halvt Aarhundrede; og nu høre vi endog af nogle Stemmer den Jubel: det er kommet.—Hvor? I I. F. [sic!] Feuerbach’s Religion der Zukunft? Eller, dersom man skammer sig ved at nævne dette usle Skrift, og viser os hen til de andre, til hvilke det med al Kiekhed har sluttet sig, og i hvis Kreds det synes broderligen optaget: er da her et Evangelium? Ja, for dem, der have ‘udsørget’ (ἀπηληκοτες, Eph. 4, 19), udsørget den dybe Sorg, hvori det Ædlere forsvinder for det tvivlende Sind, for dem, der tykkes sig frie, naar de kunne blive ‘frie for Retfærdighed.’” Jakob peter mynster, “Kirkelig polemik,” in Blandede Skrivter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 468f. (this article first appeared in Heiberg’s Intelligensblade, vol. 4, nos. 41–42, 1 January 1844, pp. 97–114.) 44 Cf. rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, op. cit., pp. 184–86. 45 stilling, Den moderne Atheisme, op. cit., pp. 3–4. 46 Christens, “en parallel mellem to af den nyere tids philosopher,” op. cit., p. 1. 47 ibid. 48 rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, op. cit., p. 187.

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published in 1851 under a pseudonym—he clearly makes a stand for Feuerbach’s approach to Christianity.49 although varberg does not touch on the review of Feuerbach’s religious criticism in detail, he clearly states that Feuerbach represents that “revolutionary direction” of the “approach to the new truths” which “reveals [new] ideas,”50 and that in The Essence of Christianity it became absolutely clear that the religious concepts are only the developmental forms of human consciousness, and god-consciousness is only a psychic phenomenon.51 although Kierkegaard did not possess varberg’s work, it turns out from a journal entry from 1851 that he knew it.52 in the study, On Humility,53 by the polemical theologian and pastor Frederik ludvig zeuthen (1805–74) we can see very clearly in what manner the religious philosophy of Feuerbach was criticized in the orthodox circles of contemporary danish protestant theology. this criticism was at that time very current since Feuerbach’s Lectures on the Essence of Religion was published just a year before (1851).54 However, because the main topic of the book is not the religious criticism of the german thinker, who is for the author “the most famous atheist of our time,”55 there are in the text only a few passages about this matter.56 it is clear from the citations and references that zeuthen has studied the religious philosophy of Feuerbach. the author also discusses some of Kierkegaard’s works,57 but he does not compare the positions of the two thinkers. although the study, entitled Introduction to Rational Ethics by the philosopher poul sophus vilhelm Heegaard (1835–84),58 only appeared in 1866, that is, 11 years after Kierkegaard’s death, it seems to contain the most detailed considerations about Kierkegaard’s relation to Feuerbach from this period.59 the main topic of Heegaard’s rudolph varberg, Striden mellem Ørsted og Mynster eller Videnskaben og den officielle Theologi, Copenhagen: philipsen 1851. 50 ibid., p. 14. 51 ibid., p. 53: “I ‘das wesen des Christentums’ har L. Feuerbach med indtrængende Klarhed vist, hvorledes disse Forestillinger ere et Udviklingsled for den menneskelige Bevidsthed, hvorledes Gudsbevidstheden kun ere et potenseret Reflex af Individets Selvbevidsthed, som ad Fantasiens Vei gives en Skinvirkelighed.” 52 Pap. X–4 a 282 / JP 2, 1798: “They scoff at prayer (as in the little piece, “The Conflict between Ørsted and mynster,” by H—t).” 53 Frederik ludvig zeuthen, Om Ydmyghed, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852 (ASKB 916). 54 Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion, nebst Zusätzen und Anmerkungen, leipzig: otto wigand 1851. [in english as, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, trans. by ralph manheim, new york: Harper & row 1967.] 55 zeuthen, Om Ydmyghed, op. cit., p. 4. 56 ibid., p. 4; p. 28; pp. 54–9. 57 namely, Practice in Christianity of 1850 and For Self-Examination. Recommended to the Present Age, which was published in the same year as the work of Feuerbach. zeuthen examines Kierkegaard’s position in detail (see p. 24; p. 138; p. 140; pp. 143f.; p. 148; pp. 152f.; pp. 159f.; p. 180) and with some criticism. 58 Heegaard studied philosophy under rasmus nielsen’s guidance from 1859. His sympathy for nielsen and also for Kierkegaard is clear from his book. 59 poul sophus vilhelm Heegaard, Indledning til den rationelle Ethik, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel 1866, pp. 368–84; pp. 410–38. 49

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work is the presentation and critique of the most important ethical conceptions of his time. Both Kierkegaard and Feuerbach (and also rasmus nielsen) are treated by the author as representatives of “subjective-objective ethics.”60 Heegard finds some similarities between the two thinkers, but he emphasizes mainly the essential differences. For Heegaard, their point of departure and their presupposition are not only similar but identical inasmuch as for both of them Christianity is based upon the paradox.61 He notes that Kierkegaard and Feuerbach also agree that religion is a subjective fact,62 and that both of them have a polemical and exclusive disposition towards theology.63 Considering the main differences, Heegaard points out that while Kierkegaard’s ethics is genuinely Christian,64 and can be termed “antirational– religious ethics,”65 by contrast, Feuerbach’s position is a pure naturalistic,66 rational– atheistic ethics.67 Heegaard sees “qualitative contradictions”68 between the two positions: for Kierkegaard, the standpoint of the scandalized or offended69 Feuerbach is “spiritless and irreligious.”70 also the existence of god has a quite different meaning for them; namely, while for Kierkegaard it has an existential-ethical relevance, for Feuerbach, it means nothing other than the existence of any given thing.71 after all this, it is surely not surprising that Heegaard treats Kierkegaard’s position with great sympathy72 and Feuerbach’s conception with biting criticism.73

Heegaard reconstructs the ethical conception of Feuerbach on the basis of his The Essence of Christianity and Pierre Bayle, nach seinen für die Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit interessanten Momenten dargestellt und gewürdigt and Kierkegaard’s position on the basis of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Practice in Christianity and The Sickness unto Death. 61 Heegaard, Indledning til den rationelle Ethik, op. cit., p. 376: “Kierkegaard og Feuerbach, hvad det Videnskabelige angaaer, ere enige i deres Udgangspunkt og Forudsætning, og dog forholder det sig virkelig saaledes. For dem begge staaer det klart, at Christendommen hviler i Paradoxet.” 62 ibid., p. 379: “Kierkegaard og Feuerbach ere enige i at opfatte Religionen som et absolut subjektivt Anliggende.” 63 ibid., p. 383. 64 ibid., p. 13. 65 ibid., p. 409. 66 ibid., p. 13. 67 ibid., p. 408. 68 ibid., p. 419. 69 ibid., pp. 419f.: “Kierkegaard seer Forargelsen som det nødvendige Gjennemgangspunkt for Troen, den er Troens Mulighed, dog saaledes, at denne Mulighed bestandig ophæves. Feuerbach naaer ogsaa til Forargelsen, men forvandler dens egen Mulighed til Virkelighed og bliver staaende ved og i den virkelige Forargelse.” 70 ibid., p. 425. 71 ibid., p. 422: “For Kierkegaard betyder Guds Existens, at Syndsforholdet er sat i Kraft, for Feuerbach betyder Guds Existens det Samme som en Tings Existens.” 72 ibid., p. 438: “…i at fastholde og gjennemføre den christelige Ethik som Existensethik har han [Kierkegaard] ikke sin Lige.” 73 ibid., p. 418: “Hans Udvikling af Kjærligheden som Grundlag for Moralen afgiver et saa løst og ubestemt, ja næsten ubestemmeligt Begreb, at man ofte kan være i Tvivl om, 60

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Hans Brøchner’s (1820–75) book, entitled About the Religious in its Unity with the Human, was published in 1869,74 and its relevance for the contemporary danish Feuerbach reception makes it important to discuss here. Brøchner’s retrospective evaluation of the Feuerbach interpretations of the previous decades in denmark is instructive: “those statements that appeared about Feuerbach in this country… reveal not only the fact that his works are quite incompletely known, but also that the characteristics of his theory are insufficiently understood.”75 Brøchner acquits only C.F. Christens of this negative conclusion whose article, entitled “parallel between two philosophers of the most recent time,” has been discussed above. in Brøchner’s book there is a whole subsection dealing with the detailed and systematic, but not uncritical, review of Feuerbach’s philosophy.76 Brøchner thinks that there is great value in Feuerbach’s religious philosophy, namely, the clear critique which Feuerbach uses when discussing theology and those philosophical “mixed forms” which try to reconcile philosophy and Christianity. at this point there is a conspicuous parallel to Kierkegaard’s or Johannes Climacus’ view as stated in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript regarding the radical disjunction between faith and knowledge, Christianity and philosophy. the similarity is certainly not accidental. Brøchner was an enthusiastic reader of Kierkegaard’s writings,77

hvorvidt Feuerbach kan siges at repræsentere noget eiendommelig ethisk Standpunkt, eller om han ikke snarere udvikler en genial, men principløs Eklekticisme.” 74 Hans Brøchner, Om det Religiøse i dets Enhed med det Humane. Et positivt Supplement til “Problemet om Tro og Viden,” Copenhagen: philipsen 1869. about the relationship between Brøchner and Kierkegaard, see Bruce Kirmmse, Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, princeton: princeton university press 1996, pp. 225– 52; Kalle sorainen, “Brøchner,” in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8), pp. 198–203, and also Erindringen om Søren Kierkegaard. Samlet Udgave ved Steen Johansen, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980, pp. 91–117. 75 ibid., p. 97. (this statement by Brøchner seems to be quite disputable regarding Heegaard’s work.) it is interesting that 14 years later a philosophical and also a theological dissertation about the German thinker appeared. This first one is the book by the philosopher and later politician Carl nicolai starcke (1858–1926) which deals with the systematic analysis of Feuerbach’s philosophy: Ludwig Feuerbach. En Monografi, Copenhagen: i Kommission hos e.l. thaarup. o.C. olesen & Co. 1883, published also in german in a supplemented edition in 1885. the author of the second one is the theologian louis w. schat petersen (1851–1903), and his book is entitled, Ludwig Feuerbach og Kristendommen. En religionsfilosofisk Afhandling, Copenhagen: i Kommission hos H. Hagerup 1883. schat Petersen finds similarities but also essential differences between the two thinkers: “Han [Feuerbach] minder i sin principielle Opfattelse af Forholdet mellem Tro og Viden om S. Kierkegård [sic!], som imidlertid fra en anden Side set er hans polare Modsætning, idet han netop stiller sig på Troens Standpunkt og derfra gør Front mod Videns Overgreb.” ibid., p. 329. 76 ibid., pp. 97–126. 77 Brøchner belonged to those few who were on good terms with Kierkegaard, and otherwise they were also distant relatives.

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and he set forth an especially highly valued Hegel critique in the “interlude” of Philosophical Fragments.78 IV. Kierkegaard and the Danish Young Hegelians on the part of the contemporary danish young-Hegelians (especially in the case of Brøchner and Christens),79 there certainly seemed to be a kind of sympathy for and appreciation of Kierkegaard; what is more, in some of their writings the effect of Kierkegaard’s philosophy also appears, particularly in connection with his Hegel critique, his judgment on the established Church, and his denial of the attempts which try to mediate between religion and philosophy (for example, martensen’s theology). in my view, Beck’s attempt to discuss Kierkegaard’s idea of myth in a liberal Hegelian context also allows one to conclude that he had a certain sympathetic intention.80 From the perspective of the history of philosophy, the most important lesson of Kierkegaard’s determined distance-keeping from Beck’s—failed—attempt is that the parallels between the radical young-Hegelian thinking and Kierkegaard’s philosophy do not authorize us to ignore the ab ovo existing fundamental differences between them. some journal entries provide particular standpoints for discussing this theme: in these notes Kierkegaard makes—quite surprisingly—positive statements about the liberal Hegelian “free-thinkers” who are opposed to Christianity.81 in a note dated from 1854 he says: “in a way it is good that Christianity still has enemies, because for the longest time they have been the only ones from whom it has been possible to get any trustworthy information about what Christianity is.”82 what is more, he predicts: “it may almost be said that the free-thinker in our time suffers persecution from the government—because he proclaims Christianity.”83 the reason for these statements is that in Kierkegaard’s eyes the enthusiastic scandal or offense of the free-thinkers—as an existential movement—expresses an “unhappy”84 but true relationship between them and the paradox of Christianity, whereas the valid, subsidized, mediocre Christianity [Christenhed] and theology—trying to mediate between belief and knowledge, Christianity and philosophy—imply the falsification of the original Christianity [Christendom].

rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, op. cit., p. 65. like Brøchner, Christens was also a friend of Kierkegaard, especially during Kierkegaard’s first stay in Berlin (1841–42). Rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, op. cit., pp. 186–87. 80 Cf. Beck, Begrebet Mythus, op. cit., p. 31; p. 53; p. 77. 81 The positive reflections on the “free-thinkers” are conspicuously concentrated in those journal entries which were written in the last two years (1854–55) of Kierkegaard’s life, and they are—without exception—in each case set in opposition to the contemporary danish state church which represents Christianity in an inauthentic way. 82 Pap. Xi–1 a 161 / JP 3, 3337. Cf. also Pap. Xi–1 a 559 / JP 6, 6912. 83 Pap. Xi–2 a 119 / JP 2, 1276. 84 Cf. Climacus’ interpretation of the category of the scandal or offense [Forargelse] in Chapter iii (“the absolute paradox”) of the Philosophical Fragments. 78 79

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V. Kierkegaard’s Picture of Feuerbach obviously without a study of the contemporary Feuerbach reception in denmark, Kierkegaard’s picture of Feuerbach can only be partially reconstructed by tearing it from its historical context. At the same time it is also clear that the reflection on the background of the history of philosophy can only be a prelude to the exposition of the theme, the basis of which is given by the systematic analysis of Kierkegaard’s writings. A. Feuerbach’s “Textual Presence” in Kierkegaard’s Writings Here i will analyze those passages from Kierkegaard’s published works and the Nachlaß where Feuerbach’s name or the term “free-thinker” [Fritænker] appears. this term is relevant because, although this expression has quite a broad meaning,85 and its usage is not limited only to mark Feuerbach in Kierkegaard’s writings,86 nevertheless for him, it is Feuerbach who represents the paradigmatic figure of the “free-thinker” who is offended by the paradox of the Christian religion.87 However, with this method the limits of my research become fixed, since hints of Feuerbach can thus be found in many places in Kierkegaard’s writings without the appearance of his name or the term “free-thinker”; the problem of the reception of the concept of “reduplication” (which i reviewed in the third part of this essay) is a good example of this. This difficulty, however, is an inevitable part of any research of this kind. In my opinion this systematic review (with its own incompleteness) of Kierkegaard’s œuvre is nevertheless a suitable method for exploring those outlines which characterize the danish thinker’s Feuerbach reception—regarding its historical and contextual references.88 if we suspend for a moment our aversion towards approaching the texts by analyzing their “statistical data,” we find an illuminating picture. Feuerbach’s name appears 13 times in Kierkegaard’s writings: first in 1842 in his written response

For the history of the concept, see g. gawlick, “Freidenker,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vols. 1–12, ed. by Joachim ritter et al., Basel et al.: schwabe 1971–2004, vol. 2, 1972, columns 1062–63. 86 in this sense Kierkegaard mentions several times strauss and Bauer together as well, as the opponents of the orthodox supporters of the official Christianity (SV1 Xiii, 405 / COR, 10. Pap. viii–2 B 19. Pap. viii–2 B 27). 87 SKS 22, 335ff., nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523. 88 except for The Essence of Christianity Kierkegaard possessed two other works by Feuerbach: the Geschichte der neuern Philosophie: Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnitz’schen Philosophie, ansbach: Brügel 1837 (ASKB 487), and the Abälard und Heloise oder der Schriftsteller und der Mensch: Eine Reihe humoristisch-philosophischer Aphorismen, ansbach: Brügel 1834 (ASKB 1637); however there are no cross-references to these books in the Kierkegaard texts. in addition to arnold ruge’s Anekdota and stilling’s magister dissertation, Kierkegaard owned a copy of Julius schaller’s monograph entitled Darstellung und Kritik der Philosophie Ludwig Feuerbach’s, leipzig: Hinrichsschen 1847 (ASKB 760), a work from the contemporary secondary literature regarding Feuerbach. 85

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to Beck’s book,89 then seven times in 1844,90 when he bought The Essence of Christianity, four times in 1847 (of these, three times in the reflections connected to adler),91 and finally once in 1849, in the journal entry entitled, “The Position of Christianity at the present moment.”92 From this time on the term “free-thinker” appears quite frequently in Kierkegaard’s writings, altogether seven times,93 although Feuerbach’s name does not come up any more. B. Kierkegaard’s Reflections on the essence of Christianity the notes from 1844 undoubtedly prove that Kierkegaard studied Feuerbach’s main work: it clearly comes to light from the reference to Feuerbach’s theory of the “sex difference” [Geschlechtsdifferenz],94 or from the explicit mention of The Essence of Christianity.95 the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments published in 1846 still reveals the impressions of Kierkegaard’s Feuerbach readings;96 after that, however, there are no more explicit references to the german philosopher’s texts.97 regarding Kierkegaard’s Feuerbach reception from a textual point of view, we can say that his interest in the german philosopher historically is limited to a relatively short period. If we consider those texts where we find reflections on The Essence of Christianity, it turns out that Kierkegaard neither identifies himself with Feuerbach’s

SV1 Xiii, 405 / COR, 10. SKS 6, 417.33 / SLW, 452. SKS 6, 424.27 / SLW, 460. SKS 18, 206.9–13, JJ:208 / JP 1, 45. Pap. v B 1. Pap. v B 9. Pap. v B 74. Pap. v B 148. 91 Pap. vii–2 B 235. SKS 20, 260.9, nB3:32 / JP 3, 3477. Pap. viii–2 B 19. Pap. viii–2 B 27. 92 SKS 22, 336, nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523. 93 SV1 Xii, 125 / PC, 133 (translated here as “atheist”). SV1 Xiv, 39 / M, 33 (translated here as “atheists”). Pap. Xi–1 a 70 / JP 1, 546. Pap. Xi–1 a 332–333 / JP 1, 555–556. Pap. Xi–1 a 559 / JP 6, 6912. Pap Xi–2 a 119 / JP 2, 1276. Pap. Xi–2 a 267 / JP 2, 1822. the term “free-thinker” appears only four times before 1849: SKS 3, 252.12 / EO2, 265. SKS 4, 442.36 / BA, 142. SKS 7, 540.19f., 24, 31 / CUP1, 595 (translated here as “atheist”). Pap. X–2 a 163 / JP 6, 6523. 94 SKS 18, 206.8–13, JJ:208 / JP 1, 45: “even plato assumes that the genuinely perfect condition of man means no sex distinction (and how strange this is for people like Feuerbach who are so occupied with affirming sex-differentiation, regarding which they would do best to appeal to paganism).” Cf. ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, op. cit., pp. 135–6. 95 Pap. v B 148. 96 SKS 7, 526.30 / CUP1, 579. We may find here the reminiscence of Feuerbach’s famous theory that “the true sense of theology is anthropology” (“al Theologie [er] Anthropologie”). Cf. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. by george eliot, new york: Harper & row 1957, p. xxxvii. Kierkegaard might have come across this thesis already while reading arnold ruge’s Anekdota (op. cit., p. 39) or in Beck’s Begrebet Mythus, op. cit., p. 6. 97 This naturally does not preclude the possibility of finding remarks in the texts after 1846 which might concern Feuerbach’s philosophy. in my opinion one such remark is that—quoted below—from the The Point of View for My Work as an Author (SV1 Xiii, 572n / PV, 88n). 89 90

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philosophical viewpoint, nor argues against it.98 rather, he apprehends the results of the german religious critic with the interest and neutrality of an “observer.” the reason for Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion not being too much affected by Feuerbach is the fact that in 1844, when Kierkegaard was reading Feuerbach’s works, he had already developed his own conception of Christianity. obviously, it would be rash to draw far-reaching conclusions from the small number or limited nature of the references to The Essence of Christianity. nevertheless it is conspicuous that these reflections are not too frequent,99 and they do not demonstrate that Kierkegaard studied the work systematically. in this respect there is a statement which appears among the reflections on Adler which is especially worth mentioning. Kierkegaard says that Feuerbach wants to do away “with all religion.”100 Feuerbach, however, according to his own interpretation of his philosophy, has not the slightest intention of eliminating religion altogether: this is clear from the introduction to The Essence of Christianity.101 naturally one can say that, in Kierkegaard’s opinion, Feuerbach’s anthropotheism is after all atheism, but, based on the quoted remark, it can also be stated that Kierkegaard in fact did not become absorbed in studying the german philosopher’s critique of religion. C. An Offended Free-Thinker in the Defense of Christianity regardless of those four texts which contain unambiguous references to The Essence of Christianity,102 it seems to me that it is not the philosophical theses of the german religious criticism which forms the real center of Kierkegaard’s interest in Feuerbach but his very existence.103 in other words, in the case of Feuerbach the “offense” if we consider that the principle of the human “species being” [Gattungswesen] is such an important question in Feuerbach’s interpretation of religion, we do find a critical allusion referring—not only—to the german philosopher in The Point of View for My Work as an Author: “i have tried to express that to apply the category ‘human race’ to what it means to be a human being, especially as a term for a highest, is a misunderstanding and paganism, because the human race, humankind, is different from an ‘animalkind’ not only by the advantages of race but by this humanness, that every individual in the human race (not just outstanding individual, but every individual) is more than the race. this has its basis in the god-relationship…because to relate oneself to god is far superior to relating oneself to the race or through the race to god.” (SV1 Xiii, 572n / PV, 88n.) 99 arbaugh comes to a similar conclusion in this theme: “Kierkegaard has remarkably little to say about the central themes of Das Wesen des Christentums.” in arbaugh, “Kierkegaard and Feuerbach,” op. cit., p. 9. 100 Pap. viii–2 B 27 / BA, 5. 101 “Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed, only in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of religion. it is therefore divided into two parts, of which the first is, as to its main idea, positive, the second, including the appendix, not wholly, but in the main, negative….” Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit., p. xxxvi. 102 SKS 6, 424.27ff. / SLW, 460. SKS 7, 526.30ff. / CUP1, 579. SKS 18, 206.9–13, JJ:208 / JP 1, 45. Pap. v B 148. 103 this seems to be proved by the fact that his Book on Adler—undoubtedly containing the most lengthy reflections on Feuerbach—does not deal with the theses of the German critic of religion either, but with his “external” attack against Christianity (for adler means 98

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[Forargelse], as a possibility of existence, appears with a paradigmatic clarity in Kierkegaard’s eyes. there is a journal entry from 1844 which is a pregnant textual manifestation of this: here Kierkegaard writes about the indirect service towards Christianity performed by Feuerbach as an offended individual,104 or there is another passage from Stages on Life’s Way where the author compares the offended person (here apart from Feuerbach, Börne and Heine are also mentioned) to an “unhappy, jealous lover” who after all has some knowledge of “the erotic,”105 but we can also read about Feuerbach as the offended one in the reflections on Adler.106 Feuerbach represents a thinker for Kierkegaard who is undoubtedly aware of what Christianity is.107 the reason for this is the fact that in the enthusiastic existential movement of the offense Feuerbach came into real, authentic contact with it, even if in itself it is an “unhappy relation” between sense and paradox. this is why he is different from the philosophers and theologians living under the spell of the Hegelian system, and from the orthodox, official supporters of Christianity, who while trying to mediate between belief and sense in order to solve the “either-or” arising through the paradox, eliminate exactly the thing they want to protect. therefore, it is understandable that in Kierkegaard’s writings—especially in the notes written after 1849, and quite pointedly during the polemic started in 1854—the free-thinkers, as the ones who really know and defend “Christianity against contemporary Christians,”108 always appear in opposition to the church and its orthodox supporters. in the eyes of Kierkegaard, the free-thinker, anti-Christian Feuerbach—through his offense at the paradox of Christianity—without being Christian, is much more a supporter of Christianity (since he preserves and expresses the paradox at each and every moment) than the philosophers and theologians representing and approving the civil mediocrity. there is a relevant example of this tendency of interpreting Feuerbach in a positive way: while the Concluding Unscientific Postscript refers to the german philosopher as the sarcastic critic of Christianity,109 a journal entry written in 1849 considers him “only” a critic of the existing—in Kierkegaard’s eyes—false Christianity and of the “internal” attacker for Kierkegaard), and he approaches Feuerbach’s character from the category of offense. Cf. Pap. vii–2 B 235. Pap. viii–2 B 19. Pap. viii–2 B 27. 104 “Feuerbachs indirecte Fortjeneste af Chrstd. som forarget Individualitet…” Pap. v B 9. the Philosophical Fragments was published in the same year with the particularly detailed analysis of the category of the “offense” [Forargelse] in it—integrating it into the exposition of Climacus’ conception of faith. it is conspicuous that the only passage in the Nachlaß where The Essence of Christianity with its title is mentioned also talks about Feuerbach’s offense: “Feuerbach i Wesen des Christentum forarges over Pascals Levnet, at det er en Lidelseshistorie” (Pap. v B 148). Cf. SKS 6, 424.27f. / SLW, 460; ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, op. cit., p. 425. 105 SKS 6, 418.6f. / SLW, 452. 106 Pap. vii–2 B 235 / BA, 45. 107 this real knowledge of Christianity is a common feature of the religious criticism of Feuerbach and the “religious writer” Kierkegaard, who once describes himself in the following way: “I know what Christianity is; i myself acknowledge my defects as a Christian—but i do know what Christianity is” (SV1 Xiii, 505 / PV, 15). 108 SKS 22, 336, nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523. Cf. also Pap. Xi–2 a 267 / JP 2, 1822. 109 SKS 7, 558.1 / CUP1, 614.

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the contemporary Christians.110 this idea is shown in all the entries referring to the “free-thinkers” written after 1849. obviously all this is connected with the fact that from that period on Kierkegaard himself was looking at the danish state Christianity of his own time with growing disdain, and although he did not share the freethinkers’—among them Feuerbach’s—religious and philosophical views regarding their content nonetheless he eminently agreed with them about the cutting critique of the existing Christianity. in addition, there was the “service”111 for Christianity which, in Kierkegaard’s opinion, was provided—even if unintentionally—by the “offended free-thinkers.” the following passage from his journal written in the last year of his life is also affected by this attitude: “that the ‘free thinker’ in a certain sense is a great boon to Christianity cannot be denied. He stresses that aspect of Christianity by which it is an offence.”112 VI. The Ambiguity of Kierkegaard’s Feuerbach Picture Those texts which contain reflections on Feuerbach’s religious philosophy and personality provide an opportunity for us to reconstruct an overall view of Feuerbach in Kierkegaard’s mind. it must have appeared from the above that the view is polarized and in no way uniform: it includes both positive and negative outlines. the positive part of Kierkegaard’s bipolar view of Feuerbach is the following: the german critic of religion realizes a true existence possibility as opposed to those who only “play Christianity.”113 in Kierkegaard’s eyes the free-thinker—who is enthusiastically offended by the paradox of Christianity—as an existence, has a much more authentic relationship to Christianity than its orthodox supporters and the contemporary secularized, demoralized Christianity. on the other hand—following from the above—Feuerbach is “useful for tactical purposes,”114 for Kierkegaard, since such a “traitor”115 is “needed” for real Christianity since he clearly proves the falseness of the existing Christianity.116 SKS 22, 336, nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523: “[i]t is wrong of established Christendom to say that Feuerbach is attacking Christianity; it is not true, he is attacking the Christians by demonstrating that their lives do not correspond to the teachings of Christianity.” 111 Pap. v B 6. 112 Pap. Xi–2 a 267 / JP 2, 1822. 113 Pap. Xi–1 a 70 / JP 1, 546. in this passage dated from 1854, Kierkegaard describes the difference between the free-thinkers and the orthodox Church by stating that although all of them regard Christianity as a myth and poetry, only the free-thinkers admit it. 114 SKS 22, 336, nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523. 115 it appears from this passage of the Nachlaß (Pap. X–2 a 163 / JP 6, 6523) that Kierkegaard—characteristically—uses the concept of “traitor” in a dialectical way: in such a context where we are talking about the betrayal of Christianity [Christendom] by Christianity [Christenhed] not only the devil but god himself also possesses “god-fearing traitors” — for his own service. it is remarkable that in The Point of View for My Work as an Author Kierkegaard also identifies himself as a “spy” in the service of providence (“[w]ith my sights on the concept to exist and then on the concept Christendom, i am like a spy in a higher service, the service of the idea.”) (SV1 Xiii, 571 / PV, 87). 116 SKS 22, 336, nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523. 110

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there are some texts which are less complimentary regarding Feuerbach. Kierkegaard calls him a “malicious demon” [malitieus Dæmon]117 who is “irreligiously obsessed,” who “want[s] to do away with Christianity,”118 and what is more who wants to “do away with all religion.”119 naturally, it might constitute the subject of a debate whether these latter statements accurately reflect Feuerbach’s actual philosophical intentions or not. it is, however, obvious that the quoted texts show a negative standpoint regarding Feuerbach’s critical conception of religion. it seems to me that this ambiguity is not accidental. even if the author of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript “delighted reading” Feuerbach’s anti-Christian vituperations,120 even if Kierkegaard—being also an outsider—felt sympathy towards the german philosopher of religion who stood outside the academic circles and argued against Hegel, nonetheless he could not identify with the essence of Feuerbach’s views.121 this obvious fact determines the nature of the danish thinker’s Feuerbach reception which—according to the examined texts—is quite limited and, with regard to its content, does not show any sign of a real assimilation. Certainly, a profound study of the texts of Kierkegaard based on Quellenforschung must provide more data which will make it possible to create a more differentiated picture. Scarcely can we find someone whom Kierkegaard opposed so radically that he did not take over some of his ideas, as—quoting him—“ab hoste consilium.”122

Pap. X–2 a 163 / JP 6, 6523. the monograph of vergote titled Sens et répétition analyzes in detail the application of the category “demon” to Feuerbach in the light of the published works and the Nachlaß. Cf. Henri-Bernard vergote, Sens et répétition, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 273–85. 118 Pap. viii–2 B 27 / BA, 5. 119 Pap. viii–2 B 27 / BA, 5. 120 Cf. SKS 7, 558.1ff. / CUP1, 614. 121 By a special providence it was poul Kierkegaard (1842–1915), the son of Kierkegaard’s bishop brother, peter Christian Kierkegaard, who translated The Essence of Christianity into Danish for the first time (although the book did not appear for lack of a publisher). see ib ostenfeld, Poul Kierkegaard. En skæbne og andre studier over religion og atheism, Copenhagen: nyt nordisk Forlag arnold Busk 1957, p. 45. 122 SKS 22, 336, nB13:92 / JP 6, 6523. 117

Bibliography I. Feuerbach’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Geschichte der Neuern Philosophie. Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnitz’schen Philosophie, ansbach: Brügel 1837 (ASKB 487). Das Wesen des Christentums, 2nd ed., leipzig: otto wigand 1843 (ASKB 488). “Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie,” in Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik, vols. 1–2, ed. by arnold ruge, zürich and winterthur: verlag des literarischen Comptoirs 1843, vol. 2, pp. 62–86 (ASKB 753). Abälard und Heloise oder der Schriftsteller und der Mensch. Eine Reihe humoristischphilosophischer Aphorismen, ansbach: Brügel 1834 (ASKB 1637). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Feuerbach Beck, Frederik, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1842 (ASKB 424). [Kein Berliner], “luther als schiedsrichter zwischen strauß und Feuerbach,” in Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik, vols. 1–2, ed. by arnold ruge, zürich and winterthur: verlag des literarischen Comptoirs 1843, vol. 2, pp. 206–8 (ASKB 753). Biedermann, a. emanuel, Die freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christenthum in Streit und Frieden, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1844, p. 3, pp. 31–2; p. 34; p. 49; p. 80 (ASKB u 20). Brøchner, Hans, Nogle Bemærkninger om Daaben, foranledigede ved Professor Martensens Skrift: Den christelige Daab, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1843, pp. 27–31; pp. 35f.; p. 51; p. 60 (ASKB u 27). —— Om det jødiske Folks Tilstand i den persiske Periode, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1845, p. 7n (ASKB 2037). Bruch, Johann Friedrich, Die Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften, Hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1842, p. 17n (ASKB 439). Chalybäus, Heinrich moritz, “philosophie der geschichte und geschichte der philosophie in Bezug auf: [among others] Hegels Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte…l. Feuerbach Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 1, 1837, pp. 301–38 (ASKB 877–911).

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Fichte, immanuel Hermann, “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart.…[review of among others] l. Feuerbach, [Das] Wesen des Christenthums. leipzig, o. wigand 1841…,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 9, 1842, pp. 93–149. —— “die philosophische litteratur der gegenwart. neunter artikel. die radikalen in der spekulation, mit rücksicht auf [among others] ludwig Feuerbach, Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft. zürich und winterthur, 1845,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 298–304. —— Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, Heidelberg: akademische Buchhandlung von J.C.B. mohr 1846 [vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie], p. 242; p. 249 (ASKB 509) [vols. 1–2 (ASKB 502–503)]. Hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 155n; p. 157n; p. 158n; p. 164n (ASKB 534). Hundeshagen, C. v., “den tydske protestantisme, dens Fortid og dens nuværende livsspørgsmaal” [1847], Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, ed. by Henrik nikolai Clausen and matthias Hagen Hohlenberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833–52, vol. 16, 1848, pp. 125–240 (ASKB u 29). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 (vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57), vol. 1, p. 469 (ASKB 358–363). nielsen, rasmus, Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845, pp. 193–4; p. 240; p. 263; p. 266 (ASKB 699). rosenkranz, Karl, Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 377 (ASKB 744). ruge, arnold, “neue wendung der deutschen philosophie. Kritik des Buchs: Das Wesen des Christenthums, von ludwig Feuerbach,” in his Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik, vols. 1–2, zürich and winterthur: verlag des literarischen Comptoirs 1843, vol. 2, pp. 3–61 (ASKB 753). schaller, Julius, Darstellung und Kritik der Philosophie Ludwig Feuerbach’s, leipzig: Hinrichsschen 1847 (ASKB 760). [schmidt, Karl], Das Verstandesthum und das Individuum, leipzig: otto wigand 1846 (ASKB 868). stilling, peter michael, “den ‘moderne videnskab’ i relation til sig selv, eller dens indre Historie gjennem michelet, strauss og Feuerbach,” in his Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844, pp. 48–74 (ASKB 801). —— Om den indbildte Forsoning af Tro og—Viden med særligt Hensyn til Prof. Martensens “christelige Dogmatik,” Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, p. 72n; p. 73n (ASKB 802). —— “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart. die jüngere Hegelsche schule. die Hallischen Jahrbücher. Feuerbach. strauß. Frauenstädt,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 7, 1841, pp. 103–50.

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strauß, david Friedrich, Fremstilling af den christelige Troeslære i dens historiske Udvikling og i dens Kamp med den moderne Videnskab, vols. 1–2, trans. by H.[ans] Brøchner, Copenhagen: Forlagt af H.C. Klein 1842–43, p. 4n; p. 15; p. 17; p. 22 (ASKB 803–804). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 276n; vol. 2, p. 360n (ASKB 843). weiße, Christian Hermann, “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart. die monadologischen systeme,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 7, 1841, pp. 255–304. zeuthen, ludvig, Humanitet betragtet fra et christeligt Standpunkt, med stadigt Hensyn til den nærværende Tid, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1846, p. 3; p. 18; p. 35 (ASKB 915). —— Om Ydmyghed. En Afhandling, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel 1852, pp. 54–9 (ASKB 916). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Feuerbach ameriks, Karl, “the legacy of idealism in the philosophy of Feuerbach, marx, and Kierkegaard,” in The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, ed. by Karl ameriks, new york and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2000, pp. 258–81. arbaugh, george e., “Kierkegaard and Feuerbach,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 7–10. Brun, Jean, “Feuerbach et Kierkegaard,” Cahiers de Sud, vol. 50, no. 371, 1963, pp. 34–43. Casini, leonardo, “singolo, genere umano e storia universale. un confronto tra Feuerbach e Kierkegaard,” Filosofia e teologia, vol. 2, 1990, pp. 317–28. Christens, Christian Fenger, “en parallel mellem to af den nyere tids philosopher,” For Literatur og Kritik, vol. 3, no. 1, 1845, pp. 1–17. Cristaldi, m., “struttura del paradosso kierkegaardiano,” Teoresi, vol. 12, 1957, pp. 115–33. Czakó, istván, “Kierkegaards Feuerbach-Bild im lichte seiner schriften,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 396–413. Duncan, Elmer H., “The Influence of Feuerbach,” in his Sören Kierkegaard, waco, texas: word Books, publisher 1976, pp. 76–82. elrod, John william, “Feuerbach and Kierkegaard on the self,” The Journal of Religion, vol. 56, 1976, pp. 348–65. Hannay, alastair, “the ‘abstract’ individual,” in his Kierkegaard, london et al.: routledge & Kegan paul 1982, pp. 302–28. Heegaard, poul sophus vilhelm, Indledning til den rationelle Ethik, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel 1866, pp. 368–84; pp. 410–38. larrañeta olleta, rafael, Feuerbach y Kierkegaard. Significado teológico de dos interpretaciones criticas y antihegelianas de la religión, salamanca: Ciencia tomista 1976. listov, andreas, “s. Kierkegaards Forhold til Feuerbach,” Theologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 5, 1888, pp. 194–206.

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malantschuk, gregor, “Begrebet Fordoblelse hos søren Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2, 1957, pp. 43–53. —— “problemer omkring selvet og udødeligheden i søren Kierkegaards Forfatterskab,” in his Frihed og Eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards Tænkning, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn and paul müller, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980, pp. 114–27, see especially p. 126. mátrai, l., “three antagonists of Hegel: Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, marx,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 115–19. ostenfeld, ib, “l. Feuerbach, en eksistentialist før Kierkegaard,” in his Udenfor Alfarvej. Samliv med Ideer og Mennesker, Copenhagen: nyt nordisk Forlag arnold Busck 1963, pp. 93–100. pareyson, luigi, Esistenza e persona, turin: taylor 1950, pp. 11–46. preti, giulio, “Kierkegaard, Feuerbach e marx,” Studi Filosofici, vol. 10, no. 3, 1949, pp. 187–208. sannwald, adolf, “Kierkegaard und Feuerbach in der abhängigkeit von und im Kampf mit der idealistischen dialektik,” in his Der Begriff der “Dialektik” und die Anthropologie. Eine Untersuchung über das Ich-Verständnis in der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus und seiner Antipoden, munich: Christian Kaiser 1931, pp. 215–70. tomasoni, Francesco, “la morte como paradosso tra Feuerbach e Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard. Filosofia e teologia del paradosso. Atti del convegno tenuto a Trento il 4–6 dicembre 1996, ed. by michele nicoletti and giorgio penzo, Brescia: morcelliana 1999, pp. 251–64. torralba roselló, Francesc, “Kierkegaard contra Feuerbach,” in his Amor y diferencia. El Misterio de dios en Kierkegaard, Barcelona: ppu, promociones y publicaciones universitarias 1993, pp. 176–83. vergote, Henri-Bernard, “Feuerbach à défaut de J. Climacus,” in his Sens et répétition. Essai sur l’ironie kierkegaardienne, vols. 1–2, paris: Cerf/orante 1982, vol. 2, pp. 263–73.

i.H. Fichte: philosophy as the most Cheerful Form of service to god Hartmut rosenau

within the common historiography of theology and philosophy, immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879) is—if at all—regarded as a not very original successor to german idealism and Classicism, as epigone and “speculative comrade”1 of georg wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). together with his younger friend Christian Hermann weiße (1801–66), a philosopher from leipzig, i.H. Fichte is one of the representatives of the so-called “late idealism.” The prefix “late” also designates the usually disparaging assessment of his thinking. This widespread confirmation of his philosophical insignificance can surely—at least on the face of it—also be put down to the inadequacy of his works and writings. although they amount to a considerable number of volumes including his unfinished works, there exist hardly any modern editions—not to mention a general edition, which has still not been edited even until today.2 the study of i.H. Fichte’s thought can mainly be based on the articles in the journal Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, which he published together with weiße from 1837 onwards.3 apart from his merits as a biographer and 1 emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, vols. 1–5, gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1949–54, vol. 5, pp. 275–81: “spekulativer Seitengänger.” 2 see Hermann ehret, Immanuel Hermann Fichte. Blütenlese aus seinen Werken, rendsburg: lohengrin-verlag 1994, p. 11. ehret names altogether approximately 36 volumes. 3 among i.H. Fichte’s most important and well-known works are: Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1833–36 (ASKB 502–503); vol. 3, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1846 (ASKB 509) (vol. 1, Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen; vol. 2, Die Ontologie; vol. 3, Die spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre); “zur spekulativen theologie. erster artikel,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 4, 1839, pp. 167–210 (ASKB 877–911); Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer, elberfeld: Büschler’sche verlagsbuchhandlung und Buchdruckerei 1834 (ASKB 505) (2nd ed., 1855); Anthropologie. Die Lehre von der menschlichen Seele, Neubegründet auf naturwissenschaftlichem Wege, leipzig: Brockhaus 1856, (2nd ed., 1860; 3rd ed., 1876); Die theistische Weltansicht und ihre Berechtigung, leipzig: Brockhaus 1873. Hermann ehret, Immanuel Hermann Fichte, op. cit., has published a commentated anthology.

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publisher of the works of his famous father, Johann gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), immanuel Hermann Fichte was granted an occasionally even impassioned esteem within anthroposophist and esoteric circles—similar to his friend ignaz paul vital troxler (1780–1866), a swiss theosophical writer.4 whether the disparagement within received philosophy or whether the anthroposophist esteem of i.H. Fichte is justifiable, cannot and need not be decided here.5 the following essay is aimed at a problem-oriented sketch of some of his main thoughts, provided that they can be related to the thinking of Kierkegaard or were related by him respectively. i.H. Fichte himself calls his position “speculative theism.”6 there can be no doubt that Fichte, who was born in Jena on 18 July 1796, was strongly influenced by his father in his younger years during the time of his studies in Berlin from 1813 to 1818. the family had moved to Berlin as a result of the ill-fated dispute over atheism in 1799, which concerned his father’s religious– philosophical criticism of the common idea of god as a person. i.H. Fichte initially uses his father’s transcendental–idealist train of thought, which he, however (in contrast to Hegel’s classification), later characterizes as an “objective” idealism which he wants to overcome speculatively by means of an “original synthesis” of all philosophical systems (similar to Hegel).7 in addition to the concentration on the not only fascinating but also inscrutable mysteries of human self-awareness, in which all knowledge is founded, which he develops in one of his early works, Das Erkennen und das Selbsterkennen, his thinking also includes mainstream Christian mysticism, passed on to him by his mother Johanna Fichte, née rahn. proof of this is found in his philosophical dissertation on Plotinus and neo-Platonism in its significance for Christian mysticism.8 the dissertation was supervised by Hegel, who had only just been offered a chair in Berlin in 1818. With this dissertation Fichte finished his philosophical, philological and theological studies. in this context the younger Fichte studied—as did Friedrich wilhelm Josef schelling (1775–1854)—the enigmatic works of the protestant mystic Jakob Böhme (1575–1624), a shoemaker from görlitz, to which he was introduced by Franz von Baader (1765–1841). not least of all, he took over from Baader an acute sensitivity to the reality of evil and his relation to god as a solution to the problem of theodicy. this was a topic which his father had also intensively discussed in his Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters.9 Cf. Hermann ehret, Der Philosoph Immanuel Hermann Fichte. Der Erbe und Weiterbildner des Idealismus und der Klassik, tellingstedt: lohengrin-verlag 1997. 5 Cf. the latest more extensive german monograph by stefan Koslowski, Idealismus als Fundamentaltheismus. Die Philosophie Immanuel Hermann Fichtes zwischen Dialektik, positiver Philosophie, theosophischer Mystik und Esoterik, vienna: passagen-verlag 1994. 6 For example, in the title of his work, Über die Bedingungen eines spekulativen Theismus, elberfeld: Büschler 1835 (ASKB 506). 7 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Die Ontologie, op. cit., p. 183: “ursynthesis”; also Über Gegensatz, Wendepunkt und Ziel heutiger Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1832–46, introduction. 8 the exact title of this dissertation, which is preserved only in part, is as follows: Über den Ursprung und die Quellen der neuplatonischen Philosophie, Berlin 1818. 9 J.g. Fichte, Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters: dargestellt in Vorlesungen, gehalten zu Berlin, im Jahre 1804–1805, Berlin: verlag der realschulbuchhandlung 1806. 4

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when the mystics behold the immediate unity of god, self and world (unio mystica), and evil is not simply ontologically disqualified as “privatio boni,” it thus has to be attributed to god’s omnipresence, whereby god cannot be dualistically accompanied by an evil principle. this disconcerting and unorthodox answer to the classical question of the origin of evil in the face of an almighty and good god by no means leads i.H. Fichte to a through and through pessimistic world view, which, for example, can be found in the thinking of his older Berlin colleague, arthur schopenhauer (1788–1860). Both i.H. Fichte and schopenhauer were the first appointed lecturers of philosophy at the—at that time—only recently founded royal Friedrich-wilhelms-universität in Berlin.10 However, after their independent and critical analysis of the absolute idealism of Hegel and schelling, they ultimately developed opposite points of view. nonetheless, both of them emphasized the will as a metaphysical principle (voluntarism). His rather unsuccessful colleague favored a Buddhist view and regarded the world as a wretched place which one could only escape by means of asceticism and art in order to extinguish the ominous will. in contrast to schopenhauer, i.H. Fichte held the view that a triumphant and progressive reconciliation of everything—as it is well founded in the resurrection of Christ—would eliminate the reality of evil within the philosophy of history.11 i.H. Fichte’s emphasis differed considerably from the traditional protestant theologia crucis, which concentrated on god’s debasement and humiliation concerning the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. i.H. Fichte had to leave the Berlin university in 1822 on suspicion of forbidden activity in a fraternity in the wake of the so-called Carlsbad decrees in 1819 which put the prussian universities under state supervision and censorship. Fichte thereafter worked as a grammar school teacher in saarbrücken (1822–26) and in düsseldorf (1826–36). during that time he was offered a professorship at the university of Kiel, which, though thankful for the offer, he nonetheless refused. From 1836 onwards he taught philosophy at the university of Bonn as an associate professor, which was changed into a full professorship in 1840. Finally, he was offered a professorship at the university of tübingen, where he lectured from 1842–63. He spent his retirement years in stuttgart where he died on 8 august 1879. although he would never have compared himself with his highly energetic, strong-willed and politically ambitious father, for whom morality was the ultimate concern, i.H. Fichte nonetheless concerned himself more than only theoretically with the political changes that accompanied the civil revolution of 1848 in germany. unlike his friend ludwig uhland (1778–1862), a poet and literary specialist from tübingen, who was an active member of the Frankfurt parliament, Fichte participated only as an interested observer in the sessions. still he was able to summarize the essential problems in a way that was to the point: “there are three questions which have to be solved immediately; otherwise everything will be no more than a passing fancy: see i.H. Fichte’s Habilitation thesis: De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio [on the principles of Contradiction, identity and the excluded third], Bonn: litteris Caroli georgi 1840. 11 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, op. cit., pp. 534f. 10

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(1) the religious question, (2) the social question, (3) the educational question.”12 Fichte must have regarded this as an order of priority since he was convinced that every life—including politics and culture—cannot take place aside from, opposed to or even completely without, but pantheistically within god. this was a view he shared with his father, as can be found, for example, in J.g. Fichte’s late work, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben.13 For this reason, i.H. Fichte’s philosophical creed can be described with a quotation from his “speculative theology” as follows: and this is what we regard as the progress of speculation which has now been made necessary: to show the Christian concept of god, incidentally free from all dogmatic forms and connections, which it has maintained so far, as the only thorough and sufficient center of philosophy, and thus imparted to establish it as the indispensable foundation for any science and free education.14

However, this so-called progress of speculation marks the difference between or continuation of Hegel’s speculative thought, the absolute cognition of reason, the unity of all contradictions between sensual ideas and the concept of reason, between thinking and being, subjectivity and objectivity, particularity and universality. For, according to i.H. Fichte, Hegel is mistaken in his pantheistic lifting of Christian faith into an absolute term and therefore also in his reversal of religion’s priority over philosophy. this reveals philosophy’s failure concerning the contents of Christian faith and thus also concerning the validity of its own system, not least of all by means of its incapability to develop a personal understanding of god in a theistic sense. For this reason i.H. Fichte is able to ironically quote goethe against Hegel: “a professor is somebody and god nobody?”15 in contrast to Hegel as well as to his father’s earlier position concerning the aforementioned dispute over atheism, in which god was not regarded as a person, that is, as a finite and limited being among others, but was thought of only atheistically, i.H. Fichte attaches an increasing importance to the philosophical authorization of a personal, theistic (in the end also pantheistic) concept of god. such a concept of god inevitably requires a critical rehabilitation

quoted from ehret, Der Philosoph Immanuel Hermann Fichte, op. cit., p. 178: “Drei Fragen sind sofort zu lösen, wenn nicht alles in einem leeren Strohfeuer der Begeisterung untergehen soll: 1. die religiöse Frage, 2. die soziale Frage, 3. die Erziehungsfrage.” 13 Johann gottlieb Fichte, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religions-lehre: In Vorlesungen gehalten zu Berlin, im Jahre 1806, Berlin: verlag der realschulbuchhandlung 1806. 14 i.H. Fichte, Die spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, op. cit., p. 178: “Und dies halten wir für den jetzt notwendig gewordenen Fortschritt der Spekulation, den christlichen Gottesbegriff, übrigens losgelöst von allen dogmatischen Formen und Beziehungen, welche er bisher behalten hatte, als den einzig gründlichen und genügenden Mittelpunkt der Philosophie aufzuweisen, dadurch vermittelt aber zugleich zur unabdingbaren Grundlage aller Wissenschaft und freien Bildung zu machen.” 15 quoted from i.H. Fichte, Die Seelenfortdauer und die Weltstellung des Menschen, Eine anthropologische Untersuchung u. ein Beitrag zur Religionsphilosophie wie zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte, leipzig: Brockhaus 1867, p. 128. 12

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of the category of the individual in order to protect it against absorption in Hegel’s system—a concern Kierkegaard shares with i.H. Fichte. moreover, i.H. Fichte’s speculative theism also opposes schelling’s philosophical reconstruction of the Christian contents of faith in his late Philosophie der Offenbarung, which schelling had last explained during his famous lecture course in Berlin in 1841–42, a part of which Kierkegaard attended. i.H. Fichte regards Schelling’s thinking as far too uncritical and far too affirmative with respect to traditional dogmatics. Finally, as seen with the aforementioned quotation, i.H. Fichte gives proof not only of his vital interest in science and education but also of his criticism of the rising utilitarianism and positivism of the flourishing natural sciences in the nineteenth century. thus, while taking into account all the success of the empirical method, which i.H. Fichte continually emphasized as an indication of the times, he claims it ultimately amounts to no more than a fatal dismissal of a Christian world–view as such, which alone can guarantee the necessary organic unity of science and religion. this is the only remedy for the deformation of mankind as a consequence of a one– sided, abstract, mechanical and schematic self-understanding under the predominance of a natural–scientific and technical world–view in favor of a holistic view. For this reason, i.H. Fichte favors the reuniting of the—until today—diverging oppositions of natural sciences and humanities to a common (Christian) world–view. i.H. Fichte self-ironically labeled himself a “natural scientist of the mind,”16 especially when critically analyzing the rising Darwinism. This enabled him to find his position between right-wing and left-wing supporters of Hegel, between metaphysics of the will and positivists, critics of religion and cultural protestants of the second half of the nineteenth century in germany. as far as interpersonal relations as well as metaphysical principles and regional ontologies of the ideal and real are concerned, i.H. Fichte principally emphasizes the central themes of reconciliation, love and peace. He explicitly uses the same mythical categories as Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) as well as words from the magical– idealistic, late romantic poetry of novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772–1801). I.H. Fichte finds especially in Novalis his poetic soulmate, in the same way in which he groups schiller with Kant and goethe with schelling. the reference to poetry in the sense of the most intimate self-articulation is valid in so far as i.H. Fichte’s Christian philosophy advocates the value and the significance of the individual and personal—of god and man—also in its inscrutability, and not abstract principles and powers, which depend on logic and necessity. Here, where the individual is concerned, i.H. Fichte places the domain for development and process, an area which Hegel quite incorrectly claimed for speculative logic—actually a static metaphysics. only when considering the free development of personality does it become evident that categorical views for an understanding of reality are not substantive, but—as J.g. Fichte programmatically pointed out in his early Grundlage der gesammten

ehret, Der Philosoph Immanuel Hermann Fichte, op. cit., p. 47: “naturwissenschaftler des geistes.”

16

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Wissenschaftslehre17—are to be understood as activities: it is not the conditions of substance and accident, subject and object which are categorically decisive, but the interaction of causes and counter causes. in this respect, i.H. Fichte already supports—in his own way and not least of all on account of his firm roots within the Christian tradition—a relational ontology instead of a classical aristotelian metaphysics of substance, including its modern turn towards the subject by means of the Copernican system. this is why i.H. Fichte does not regard god as the logically necessary assumed absoluteness, as he states in contrast to Hegel, but as a personality that reveals its nature freely and without pressure in love. therefore, the world is not a result of a necessary relinquishment of the absolute mind, but—as the late schelling emphasizes in contrast to Hegel—the result of god’s free will and action, of his “not pre-thinkable being” (schelling). “it may well be proven with necessity that in this case there is no logical necessity and that its significance becomes invalid.”18 therefore—following Judeo-Christian tradition—the world and every human life in it must be interpreted as a creation as opposed to god as the creator and not as pantheist emanation or deterministic clockwork. the world is the result of god’s love, the highest and absolute personality, which is, according to i.H. Fichte, the only acceptable understanding of god. this conception is neither necessary nor coincidental, but contingent and therefore at least a possible locus, where people can find meaning, home and fulfillment, without having to idolize or condemn it. However, this determined belief in a theist instead of a pantheist or deist world view—whereby he philosophically includes the Judeo-Christian belief in creation— does not correspond to i.H. Fichte’s proclaimed ideal of mankind’s development into a “incorporeal and timeless being”19 on the problematic condition that consciousness or the “genius” is not essentially dependent on his own body.20 in this context the reservations do not aim at the supposed contradiction between an emphasized personality and individuality, on the one hand, and the ideal of an existence without a body, on the other. this has to be seen against the backdrop of the aristotelian– scholastic argument which regards materiality and corporeality as the foundation of individuality and thus the distinction of others as one concerning time and space (material est principium individuationis). in contrast to this, we as beings of spirit and reason, have a shared purpose—since “2 + 2 = 4” is valid for every thinking spirit. For it is against this tradition that i.H. Fichte simply reverses the references of matter and spirit, individuality and universality: when regarded as a corporeal being, a human being is a universal being, and when regarded as a spiritual being, a human being is an individual being, namely a unique being in terms of a spiritually J.g. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre: als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer, leipzig: Christian gabler 1794–95. 18 i.H. Fichte, Die Ontologie, op. cit., § XXXi: “Wohl kann mit notwendigkeit gezeigt werden, daβ hier der logische Denkzwang aufhört und in seiner Bedeutung erlischt.” 19 ehret, I. H. Fichte. Blütenlese aus seinen Werken, op. cit., p. 14: “leib- und zeitfreies Wesen.” 20 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Vermischte Schriften zur Philosophie Theologie und Ethik, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Brockhaus 1869, vol. 2, Unsterblichkeit, p. 233. 17

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formed personality. “the corporeal organic side of a human is individualized by spiritual peculiarity (‘genius’) and not the other way around.”21 the corporeal, which is understood to be what differentiates between individuals, is resistant in relation to the relational–ontological interrelation of everything and anything; it is thought which overcomes the boundaries of the disassociated, finite and coincidental.22 However, it is this ideal of personality development that retrospectively challenges the acceptance of the world as creation, because creation essentially comprises materiality; and human corporeality, initally praised by i.H. Fichte, becomes lost in a platonizing dichotomy of body and soul. i.H. Fichte’s devaluation of the corporeal in favor of a development of the human soul as a unity of thinking, feeling and desire may of course be possible to explain retrospectively to the extent that in addition to his religious guiding themes of peace, love and reconciliation, he also concerns himself with a reconciliation of ideality and reality of human existence, which, in his opinion, do not have to remain locked in an unreconciled dichotomy (for example, of will and ability, according to romans 7:14ff.). such a reconciliation of ideality and reality would, however, not be possible if it were assumed that a human is essentially bound to a corporeal being and therefore to time and space—at least not as a result of continuous development of a human personality but perhaps as a divine act of merciful new creation in the eschaton. in fact, i.H. Fichte also claims, “what we are per se according to our understanding and nature is not immediately obvious to us factually.”23 and, “whilst strangely enough the human being is understood and required to be the most perfect being among all known beings, in reality it is the most imperfect and therefore enigmatic being.”24 However, the desired harmony of ideality and reality, being and existence, in essence “being,” as human salvation, is, according to i.H. Fichte, not the result of an act of divine salvation “extra nos,” but, borrowing from the gnostic doctrine of the divine spark inside us, he states, “we must become it through self-development.”25 this is the reason why i.H. Fichte feels a kinship with Johann wolfgang goethe, whom he deems a “normal human,” that is, the definitive man of his time. “We can grant salvation to he who strives and endeavors.”26 this focusing on a human being’s self-development towards his eschatic salvation, however, does not mean that i.H. Fichte at the same time supports contra intentionem, i.H. Fichte, Anthropologie. Die Lehre von der menschlichen Seele, op. cit., p. 144: “Von der geistigen Eigentümlichkeit aus (Genius) ist die leiblich-organische Seite des Menschen individualisiert, nicht umgekehrt.” 22 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen, op. cit., p. 200. 23 i.H. Fichte, Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen, op. cit., p. 9: “Was wir an sich, dem Begriffe und Wesen nach, sind, ist uns faktisch und unmittelbar nicht gegeben.” 24 i.H. Fichte, Die theistische Weltansicht und ihre Berechtigung, op. cit., p. 268: “Der Mensch ist—merkwürdigerweise—unter allen bekannten Geschöpfen zwar dem Begriffe und der Forderung nach das vollkommenste, der Wirklichkeit nach aber das unvollkommenste, darum rätselhafteste Wesen.” 25 i.H. Fichte, Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen, op. cit., p. 9: “wir müssen es werden durch Selbstentwicklung.” 26 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Vermischte Schriften, vol. 2, Auferstehung, Geisterreich, op. cit., p. 88: “Wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen.” 21

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a Pelagianism which would in the end render the existence of a God superfluous. according to his view, consciousness does not develop under a perennial imperative of morality to the absolute and divine, but it simply permeates and takes shape in the “image” of the absolute and divine, which for its part is regarded as non-deceivable reality in contrast to free certainty. in relying on the Christian imago dei doctrine in the same way as his father, i.H. Fichte releases the conscious self of its principle position and characterizes it instead as a derived principiate of god. this means that i.H. Fichte does not talk at all about a titanic, hybrid anthropocentrism but endorses a transcendental theocentrism, which lies with god and not with the human being due to the necessary conditions of the possibility of free personality development and formation. However, in so far as theocentric conditions of the possibility of our human consciousness and its potential to develop are concerned, according to i.H. Fichte, god and human being, creator and creation, absolute and image, principle and principiate are not opposed to one another externally, but all consciousness and realization occur theonomically in god, and therefore everything our consciousness captures is recognized in god. i.H. Fichte’s “speculative theism” is therefore a philosophic declaration of a conception of god as a person, but, in contrast to orthodox, non-speculative theism of Christian dogmatism, it is a pantheistic combination of the opposites of god and human being, without blurring their ontological, categorical differences in respect of principle and principiate. in this regard, for i.H. Fichte, “speculation” means the adequate thinking of the notion of god, but not as for Hegel the a priori construction of the notion of god prior to creation. For this notion of god is not accessible to a human a priori, but only a posteriori by means of a path of experience. this results in a consistent symbiosis between the ontological emphasis on the personal, individual and unique, on the one hand, and the methodical evaluation of empiricism as a medium of an appropriate awareness of god, on the other. i.H. Fichte follows the paradoxical path of speculative empiricism in order to recognize the world as a creative act of god, which also provides a home for evil. in doing so, unlike, for example, Hegel, i.H. Fichte does not have to functionalize it as “bonum per malum” by requiring it, as a negative power, to progress further in the history of freedom. rather, it is necessary to accept what is not meant to be and to dispose of it in the knowledge of salvation through a Christianization of the world in a truly ecumenical sense. according to i.H. Fichte, this is the only way to approach and solve the social problems of the time. For it is not a contradiction but a difference which has been overcome, the love which advances all worldly affairs. Fichte advocates a Christianization which does not try to establish a firm trust in an incomprehensible authority and which does not uncritically adhere to traditions. Fichte’s Christianization finds its fulfillment in a reformed and energetic thinking and desire which finally aims at the Kingdom of the Holy Spirit. For this reason, the truth of faith is not guaranteed by those seemingly more or less certain facts such as life, death or the resurrection of Christ, but it is the ideal Christ inside everyone, which motivates life.27 with this objective, i.H. Fichte endorses a transposed chiliasm (concerning the philosophy of history), indeed, in the same way as Kierkegaard. 27

Cf. i.H. Fichte, Spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, op. cit., p. 354.

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It proves problematic that his chiliasm finds continuity between penultimate and ultimate matters, this world and hereafter, this world and the Kingdom of god, and does not consider the categorical difference between proton and eschaton. instead, it regards cultural progress as a presence of god’s spirit in history. this proto as well as eschatic continuum of a constant progression, aiming at the reconciliation of everything organically, links the next world to this world, whereby death as life’s ultimate turning-point loses any “real significance.”28 one does not have to be afraid of death as a breaking off of life with all its possibilities since it is nothing more than a soft transition to new possible development. also the so-called σῶμα πνευματικόν (spiritual body), which Christians hope for in future (1 Cor 15:46), already exists as a hidden but still forming power of the earthly body, and does not have to be expected only after death and judgment as a new creature.29 there will neither be a “sudden salvation” nor eternal damnation, but a constant progress with many intermediate stages and levels.30 every stage makes it possible to turn back, and it is ontologically impossible to drop out of god. this is why i.H. Fichte rules out the dogmatic doctrine of the eternal damnation of sinners and godless people for reasons concerning not only ontology and Christology but also psychology and ethics. with all due sensitivity for the reality of evil in the world, the younger Fichte says, “...the phenomenon of evil, at least in the way it is manifest in mankind, human evil by no means bears any markers of the eternal, definitive and irreparable.”31 the individual is therefore not “radically evil,” as Kant put it, because evil cannot be original. it only comes to life by means of the power of good, whose possibility the individual can seize at any time. i.H. Fichte is convinced that there will be a cultural progress of the individual and society, by means of which the power of god’s love will continuously assert itself until its transparent manifestation as the destination of history. For Fichte’s agapism, the end of the individual’s history is not the threat of judgment and damnation but the reconciliation of everything, the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων: “love is actually the immanent, all-reconciling goal,”32 history’s telos in universal salvation. Fichte’s optimism concerning the philosophy of history or theology respectively should not be taken as a superficial enthusiasm for culture and naive belief in progress. according to Fichte, the criteria and reasons for the understanding of such an agapist progress cannot be found in superficial success and splendor, least of all can it be worked out in the sense of a Calvinist practical syllogism. For Fichte, it is only the personal salvation of the individual which counts. this salvation is characterized by a reconciliatory spirit which has managed the transcendental–critical and also religious change from self-certainty to a certainty of God which fulfills all knowledge. As i.H. Fichte, Anthropologie. Die Lehre von der menschlichen Seele, op. cit., p. 449: “keine reale Bedeutung.” 29 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Vermischte Schriften, vol. 2, Unsterblichkeit, op. cit., p. 233. 30 Cf. ibid., p. 260: “plötzliche Seligkeit.” 31 i.H. Fichte, Die Seelenfortdauer und die Weltstellung des Menschen, op. cit., p. 437: “das Phänomen des Bösen, wie es wenigstens am Menschen sich darlegt, das menschlich Böse trägt durchaus keine Merkmale des Ewigen, Definitiven und Irreparablen an sich.” 32 i.H. Fichte, Spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, op. cit., p. 534f.: “Die Liebe ist in Wahrheit der immanente, allversöhnende Zweck.” 28

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such, this corresponds to J.g. Fichte’s late works (from 1800 onwards) and also to F.w.J. schelling in a change from negative to positive philosophy, from mythology to revelation. The self-confident ego therefore remains a heuristic principle but no longer an absolute principle of reality. in this respect, i.H. Fichte’s approach, in contrast to Hegel, does not eliminate the morality of man, but virtually demands it in order to combine the ideal with the reality of a human being, as Fichte also critically notes against the rising social-darwinism. According to Fichte, there is a boundary at the end of all self-confident speculation, which critically reminds us of humility and which limits the human-finite means of knowledge: “speculation is never able to replace or even anticipate creative life.”33 in this respect german idealism returns to Kant’s criticism also in i.H. Fichte’s work, which is why i.H. Fichte can surely also be regarded as a precursor of neoKantianism. when Fichte conjures up the spirit of reconciliation, philosophy, as any knowledge, turns into the “most cheerful form of service to god,” as it shows that the contradiction, which a human being must often painfully experience during his life, “is not the split but only the wealth of life.”34 For this reason a philosopher has to be neither a pessimist and critic of culture nor an advocate of progress, while simply trying to discover about truth as such: “a philosopher neither praises nor reprimands the present, nor does he wish it different from the way it is; he has to recognize its signature and maturity.”35 this sentence especially contradicts the therapeutic request of ludwig Feuerbach’s (1804–72) criticism of religion; however, i.H. Fichte does not polemically and aggressively condemn it lock, stock and barrel since he would never do so with any approach in accordance with his proclaimed spirit of reconciliation. instead, he is able to respect or even integrate its true aspects in the sense of a “deeper consideration of what is relatively noteworthy also in an opponent.”36 intellectual opponents are not enemies but only “those having a different opinion.” and to “accuse someone means to have studied him inadequately.”37 Fichte’s onto-theology and metaphysics as well as the findings of the natural sciences and manifold philosophical systems stress the importance and relevance of special and individual matters. it is necessary to start with special and individual matters in order to develop inductively a notion of the whole and not vice versa. with regard to these individual, personal and special matters, everything is infinitely connected. Due to the maintenance of the individual will, every individual matter functions “as a guarantee for all others.”38 everything is joined together in an organism, which has its life and existence in god’s personality. with all due criticism 33 i.H. Fichte, System der Ethik, vols. 1–2.1, leipzig: dyk 1850–51 (ASKB 510–511), vol. 2.2, leipzig: dyk 1853 (ASKB 504); vol. 2.2, p. 475: “Die Spekulation vermag nie an die Stelle des schöpferischen Lebens zu treten und dies zu antizipieren.” 34 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Über die Bedingungen eines spekulativen Theismus, op. cit., p. 36. 35 i.H. Fichte, “zukunft der theologie,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 3, 1839, p. 200: “Der Philosoph lobt oder tadelt nicht die Zeit, noch wünscht er sie anders als sie ist, er soll ihre Signatur und Reife erkennen.” 36 i.H. Fichte, Die theistische Weltansicht und ihre Berechtigung, op. cit., p. vi. 37 Cited from ehret, Der Philosoph Immanuel Hermann Fichte, op. cit., p. 53. 38 i.H. Fichte, Die Ontologie, op. cit., p. 187.

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of rigid dogmatics, i.H. Fichte can reply to the critics of religion following Feuerbach’s approach: “This is why it seems to me so infinitely ridiculous, when people say that Christianity has expired or even imagine that their hollow scribbling has managed to erase it.”39 However, he reminds theology not to seclude and immunize itself from the rising natural sciences. a united understanding of reality requires Christian faith to be in accordance with or compatible with the natural scientific education of its time. the analysis of the methodically strictly atheistic natural science as well as the analysis of the criticism of religion does not present a danger to the speculative theist. I.H. Fichte is convinced that only superficial speculation leads away from god, but a sound analysis leads to god as the origin of everything.40 and if the spirit of reconciliation leads to a relational connection between god and world, science and religion, in the end between everything, mankind is linked in solidarity with all its individual beings, whereby i.H. Fichte also includes those already dead. therefore, Fichte’s thinking strictly opposes national egoism and any elitist claim to the absolute truth. therefore, regardless of his criticism of Hegel’s absolute idealism and panlogism, i.H. Fichte remains true to Hegel’s general claim for a system according to which everything, including especially the contradicting systems of philosophy, only determines the one system of philosophy, in which also Christianity is in the end the natural course and not opposed to systematic thinking.41 this latter point already names a decisive difference between i.H. Fichte and Kierkegaard, regardless of how close they are in their criticism of Hegel and in the range of speculation, even if so for different reasons. in the end i.H. Fichte remains true to the idealist systematic thinking as the ideal of knowledge, just like schelling, at least in this respect.42 Kierkegaard in principle wants to depart from this in favor of his existential dialectic and not only because of some deficiencies in the execution. Both emphasize the importance of the individual. Kierkegaard, however, places the individual in a paradox and absurd position in the relation between the absolute and god, which is decisive for a successful existence. in contrast to him, i.H. Fichte understands individual matters as an organic shaping and realization of god’s highest personality. painful enigmatic rifts, desperate leaps and sudden discontinuities of human existence are therefore unknown to him, even if he does not turn a blind eye i.H. Fichte, “Brief an pfarrer Christian w. l. thamm (dresden) vom 22.10.1847.” quoted from ehret, I. H. Fichte. Blütenlese aus seinen Werken, op. cit., p. 129: “Deshalb erscheint es mir auch so unendlich lächerlich, wenn die Leute meinen, das Christentum habe sich ausgelebt, oder gar sich einbilden, durch ihre hollen Schreibereien es vertilgt zu haben.” 40 Cf. i.H. Fichte, Psychologie: die Lehre vom bewußten Geiste des Menschen oder Entwicklungsgeschichte des Bewußtseins; begründet auf Anthropologie und innerer Erfahrung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Brockhaus 1864–73, vol. 2, p. 86. 41 Cf. ehret, Der Philosoph Immanuel Hermann Fichte, op. cit., p. 31. 42 i.H. Fichte was therefore regarded as a representative of the so-called neoschellingianism by his contemporaries. Cf. tonny aagaard olesen, “Kierkegaards schelling. eine historische einführung,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, Berlin and new york: walter de gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 8), pp. 1–102, especially p. 29. 39

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to the reality of evil and the discrepancy between the ideal and the reality of human existence. according to him, the world continuously progresses to a reconciliation of everything. Kierkegaard and i.H. Fichte differ in their emphasis of a determined belief in Christian faith and a theist and personal understanding of god, although both of them promote it. Kierkegaard endorses the Christological paradox of god in time, a theologia crucis of Lutheran influence, and the revelation of God’s salvation sub contrario, with which he stands in stark contrast to i.H. Fichte, who endorses the speculation of the glory of the ideal Christ’s resurrection. this contrast can also be applied to i.H. Fichte’s anthropological degradation of the human corporeality compared to the essentially also corporeal and therefore also chronological synthesis of the self as Kierkegaard understands it. there are hardly any explicit comments of Kierkegaard concerning i.H. Fichte. the rather vague similarities between i.H. Fichte and Kierkegaard in their criticism of Hegel (whereby Kierkegaard was probably influenced by Friedrich A. trendelenburg (1802–72) and the not to be underestimated danish Hegel critics, for example, sibbern and poul martin møller)43 and the rather substantial differences concerning anthropology, Christology and eschatology render it highly improbable that Kierkegaard was strongly influenced by I.H. Fichte in his criticism of Hegel (for example, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). although not in principle impossible, it is at least very difficult to justify this thesis, which has hardly ever been discussed among researchers.44 in december 1837 Kierkegaard subscribed to the journal Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, which, as noted, was published by i.H. Fichte and weiße. He took notes to the articles and essays which i.H. Fichte had written, especially the article entitled, “speculation and revelation,”45 with the aforementioned criticism of Hegel concerning the relation between philosophy and Christianity which he shared. this is why he respectfully comments on i.H. Fichte’s concern.46 Kierkegaard had already read and consented to i.H. Fichte’s essay concerning the Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen

Cf. Heiko schulz, “Kierkegaard über Hegel. umrisse einer kritisch-polemischen aneignung,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 21, 2000, pp. 152–78. 44 Cf. emanuel Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, gütersloh: Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, pp. 62–83 [pp. 508–29]. (reprinted, vaduz, liechtenstein: toposverlag 1978. First published in Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode, nos. 29, 31, 32, 36, 1930– 33. The reprint retains the pagination of the first publication, giving the page numbers of the 1933 edition in square brackets. this convention is followed here.) see also the critical response by niels thulstrup, Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1969, pp. 110ff. apart from this i know of no other studies on Kierkegaard’s relation to i.H. Fichte. 45 i.H. Fichte, “spekulation und offenbarung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 1, 1837, pp. 1–31. 46 Cf. SKS 17, 250, dd:91 / JP 5, 5282. Cf. niels thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, princeton: princeton university press 1980, pp. 127–32; niels thulstrup, Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, princeton: princeton university press 1984, pp. 62–9. 43

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Fortdauer in march 1837.47 with regard to content, this essay was also directed against Hegel and his sublation of the concept of an individual postmortal existence. Kierkegaard owned i.H. Fichte’s early work, Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie,48 his Grundzüge zum Systeme der Theologie,49 as well as the System der Ethik,50 the programmatic essay, Über die Bedingungen eines spekulativen Theismus,51 Fichte’s Habilitation thesis, De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio,52 the Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Des Cartes und Locke bis auf Hegel,53 and finally Die spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre.54 later, in august 1837 Kierkegaard critically comments on i.H. Fichte’s chiliastic philosophy of history.55 In July 1839 he critically and aloofly comments on I.H. Fichte’s understanding in the essay, “Concerning the Future of theology, in its relation to speculation and mythology,”56 which he developed in the third volume of the mentioned journal in 1839.57 Kierkegaard writes, if one looks at philosophy’s latest endeavors (in Fichte, et al.) with reference to Christianity, one cannot deny an earnest endeavor to recognize the uniqueness in Christianity.... nevertheless, in all this the endeavors of philosophy obviously tend toward a recognition of Christianity’s harmony with the universally human consciousness....But the true Christian view, that universally human existence does not explain Christianity...this is not understood.58

in this respect Kierkegaard does not regard Christianity as something which can be taken for granted, but in the end Christian faith is and remains a miracle and rarity. i.H. Fichte, Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer, elberfeld: Büschler’sche verlagsbuchhandlung und Buchdruckerei 1834. Cf. SKS 17, 41–2, aa:22 / JP 2, 1190. 48 Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1826 (ASKB 501). 49 Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1833– 36 (ASKB 502–503). 50 i.H. Fichte, System der Ethik, op. cit. 51 Über die Bedingungen eines spekulativen Theismus, elberfeld: Büschler 1835 (ASKB 506). 52 De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn: litteris Caroli georgi 1840 (ASKB 507). 53 Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Descartes und Locke bis auf Hegel, 2nd ed., sulzbach: J.e. seidel’sche Buchhandlung 1841 (ASKB 508). 54 Die spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1846 (ASKB 509). 55 Cf. SKS 17, 257, dd:124 / JP 5, 5332. 56 i.H. Fichte, “Über die zukunft der theologie, in ihrem verhältnisse zu spekulation und mythologie,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 3, 1839, pp. 199–286. 57 Cf. SKS 18, 51–2, ee:147 / JP 3, 3276, 3277, 3278. 58 SKS 18, 51–2, ee:147 / JP 3, 3276. 47

Bibliography I. I.H. Fichte’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1826 (ASKB 501). Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1833– 36 (ASKB 502–503); vol. 3, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1846 (ASKB 509) (vol. 1, Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen; vol. 2, Die Ontologie; vol. 3, Die spekulative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre). System der Ethik, vols. 1–2.1, leipzig: dyk 1850–51 (ASKB 510–511), vol. 2.2, leipzig: dyk 1853 (ASKB 504). Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer, elberfeld: Büschler’sche verlagsbuchhandlung und Buchdruckerei 1834 (ASKB 505). Über die Bedingungen eines spekulativen Theismus, elberfeld: Büschler 1835 (ASKB 506). De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn: litteris Caroli georgi 1840 (ASKB 507). Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Des Cartes und Locke bis auf Hegel, 2nd revised ed., sulzbach: J.e. seidel’sche Buchhandlung 1841 (ASKB 508). “spekulation und offenbarung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 1, 1837, pp. 1–31 (ASKB 877–911). “ueber das verhältniß der erkenntnißlehre zur metaphysik,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 1, 1837, pp. 115–38. “ueber das verhältniß des Form- und realprincipes in den gegenwärtigen philosophischen systemen,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 2, 1837, pp. 21–108. “neue systeme und alte schule,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 2, 1837, pp. 230–88. “aphorismen über die zukunft der theologie, in ihrem verhältnisse zu spekulation und mythologie,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 3, 1839, pp. 199–285. “ueber das princip der philosophischen methode, mit Bezug auf die erkentnißlehre,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 4, 1839, pp. 30–73. “recensionen. das fromme Bewußtsein in seinem verhältnisse zu wissenschaft und spekulation; mit Bezug auf ‘ed. schmidts, professor der philosophie zu rostock, umrisse zur geschichte der philosophie, Berlin, dümmler 1839,’ ” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 4, 1839, pp. 103–31.

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“zur spekulativen theologie. erster artikel,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 4, 1839, pp. 167–210. “die voraussetzungen des Hegelschen systemes,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 4, 1839, pp. 291–306. “zur spekulativen theologie. zweiter artikel. Begriff der metaphysik,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 5, 1840, pp. 91–113. “zur spekulativen theologie. zweiter artikel. schluß,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 5, 1840, pp. 91–113. “andeutungen über den ursprung der religion im Bewußtsein und in der weltgeschichte. (Fragment aus einem ungedruckten werke.),” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 5, 1840, pp. 256–75. “Zur spekulativen Theologie. Dritter Artikel. Ueber die spekulative Begreiflichkeit gottes,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 5, 1840, pp. 156–80. “offenes schreiben an Hern dr. paulus in Bezug auf dessen ‘Beleuchtung des verhältnisses, welches zwischen professor Fichte dem vater und dr. paulus bei dem atheismusstreit der letztern stattfand.’ (neuer Cophronizon, i. mittheilung. 1841),” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 7, 1841, pp. 151–5. “einige Bemerkungen über den unterschied der immanenten und der offenbarungstrinität nach lücke und nitzsch, auch mit Beziehung auf Hegel und strauß,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 7, 1841, pp. 224–54. “zur spekulativen theologie. vierter artikel,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 8, 1841, pp. 212–30 and vol. 9, 1842, pp. 1–78. “zur spekulativen theologie. Fünfter artikel. die idee der schöpfung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 9, 1842, pp. 196–240. “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart.…[review of among others] l. Feuerbach, [D]as Wesen des Christenthums. leipzig, o. wigand 1841…,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 9, 1842, pp. 93–149. “der Begriff des negativ absoluten und der negativen philosophie,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 10, 1843, pp. 255–90. “zusatz zu dem aufsatze über das negativ absolute,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 10, 1843, pp. 319–20. “der bisherige zustand der praktischen philosophie in seinen umrissen. ein kritischer versuch.…i. Kant, J.g. Fichte, Hegel, schleiermacher,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 161–202. “der bisherige zustand der anthropologie und psychologie. eine kritische uebersicht,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 12, 1844, pp. 66–105. “der bisherige zustand der anthropologie und psychologie. eine kritische uebersicht. Fortsetzung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 12, 1844, pp. 243–78.

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“zur spekulativen theologie. sechster artikel. die idee der weltschöpfung und welterhaltung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 103–21. “Hegel’s philosophische magister-dissertation und sein verhältniß zu schelling. nachtrag zum ausatze im vorhergehenden Hefte: ‘zu Hegel’s Characteristik,’ ” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 142–54. “die philosophische litteratur der gegenwart. neunter artikel. die radikalen in der spekulation, mit rücksicht auf ludwig Feuerbach…Friedrich Feuerbach… Bruno Bauer…edgar Bauer…Friedrich von Callet…C.l. michelet,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 298–304. “Herbart’s monadologisches system und der idealismus in ihren principien verglichen; anhang zum vorigen aufsatze,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 14, 1845, pp. 107–35. “J.g. Fichte und schleiermacher, eine vergleichende skizze,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 15, 1846, pp. 112–46. “vorschläge zu einer philosophenversammlung. offenes sendeschreiben an die philosophen deutschlands,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 16, 1846, pp. 135–48. “die autorität und die wissenschaft. nachschrift zum vorhergehenden aufsatze,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 16, 1846, pp. 179–81. “religion og philosophie i deres nærværende gjensidige Forhold, af i.H. Fichte, professor i philosophien i Heidelberg,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 1–20, ed. by Henrik nikolai Clausen and matthias Hagen Hohlenberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833–52, vol. 2, 1834, pp. 626–51 (ASKB u 29). “speculation og aabenbaring,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, op. cit., vol. 5, 1837, pp. 747–77. “nogle Bemærkninger om Forskjellen imellem den immanente trinitet og aabenbaringstriniteten, efter lücke og nitzsch, samt med Hensyn til Hegel og strauß,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, op. cit., vol. 10, 1842, pp. 546–76. [ed.] Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Sämmtliche Werke, vols. 1–11, Berlin: veit 1844–46 (ASKB 489–499). [ed.] Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46 (ASKB 877–911). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss I.H. Fichte Bruch, Johann Friedrich, Die Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften, Hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1842, p. 141n; p. 171n (ASKB 439). Fischer, Carl philipp, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus speculativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, p. xxv; p. xxviii (ASKB 512).

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günther, anton, Vorschule zur speculativen Theologie des positiven Christenthums. In Briefen, vols. 1–2, vienna: wallishausser 1828–29, vol. 1, pp. 32–41; pp. 59– 69; vol. 2, pp. 1–34 (ASKB 869–870). günther, anton and Johann Heinrich pabst, Janusköpfe. Zur Philosophie und Theologie, vienna: wallishausser 1834, pp. 371–413 (ASKB 524). Heiberg, Johan ludvig, Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 3, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1843 [vol. 3, in Johan ludvig Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1841–43 which is part of Johan ludvig Heiberg’s Samlede Skrifter consisting of Skuespil, vols. 1–7, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1833–41 and Digte og Fortællinger, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1834–35], p. 373 (ASKB 1560). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 1, pp. 323ff. (ASKB u 79). møller, poul martin, “tanker over muligheden af Beviser for menneskets udødelighed, med Hensyn til den nyeste derhen hørende literatur,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian winther, F.C. olsen and Christian thaarup, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 158–272, see pp. 247–56; see also vol. 3, p. 283; p. 331 (ASKB 1574–1576). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57], vol. 2, p. 93; p. 111; p. 116; p. 118; p. 124; p. 129; p. 133 (ASKB 358–363). rosenkranz, Karl, Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 188 (ASKB 744). schaller, Julius, Die Philosophie unserer Zeit. Zur Apologie und Erläuterung des Hegelschen Systems, leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs 1837, pp. 107–32; pp. 273–82 (ASKB 758). steffens, Henrich, Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben, vols. 1–10, Breslau: Josef max und Comp. 1840–44, vol. 4, p. 152; p. 167 (ASKB 1834–1843). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 27n; p. 44n; p. 82n; p. 92; pp. 13–137; p. 310n; p. 311n; vol. 2, p. 154n; p. 186n; p. 190n (ASKB 843). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, pp. 4f. (ASKB 1379– 1380). —— Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: C.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1833, p. 184n; p. 366n (ASKB 866).

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III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to I.H. Fichte Hirsch, emanuel, “immanuel Hermann Fichte,” in his Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, pp. 62–83 [pp. 508–29]. (reprinted, vaduz, liechtenstein: toposverlag 1978. First published in Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode, nos. 29, 31, 32, 36, 1930–33. the reprint retains the pagination of the first publication, giving the page numbers of the 1933 edition in square brackets.) thulstrup, niels, “Kierkegaard and i.H. Fichte’s Treatise on Speculation and Revelation,” in his Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980, pp. 127–32. —— Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1969, pp. 110ff.

J.g. Fichte: From transcendental ego to existence david J. Kangas

Kierkegaard’s relation to “the elder Fichte” can be stated simply: on the one hand, he venerated Fichte as “a thinker in the noble greek sense,”1 but, on the other hand, he never stopped criticizing the basic thrust of Fichte’s thought as Wissenschaft. to understand the impact of Fichte upon Kierkegaard’s thought it is necessary to clarify this ambiguity. it will be a question of seeing how Kierkegaard could both appropriate and criticize Fichte’s project—and, in particular, his conception of subjectivity. Fichte’s thinking, what Hegel called his “subjective idealism,” unquestionably gave Kierkegaard the conceptual resources to break from an ontological description of the subject in favor of one pursued through categories of self-consciousness: namely, those of reflection, act, will, freedom. “Existence” [Existents], Kierkegaard’s privileged theme, is unthinkable without Fichte’s radical post-Kantian innovations; and yet “existence” strictly speaking, from Kierkegaard’s point of view, never appears in Fichte’s texts themselves. to clarify Kierkegaard’s relation to Fichte is, however, to confront a substantial difficulty: his references to Fichte are sparse and allusive; there are hints and indications, but no explicit or sustained engagement with the crucial texts. it remains unclear which texts of Fichte Kierkegaard actually read. not only this, but Fichte’s thought itself evolved in a quite dramatic way from the early Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge2 to the later more religious writings such as The Way toward the Blessed Life.3 one of the few certainties about Kierkegaard’s engagement Pap. vii–2 B 270. Johann gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre: als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer, Jena and leipzig: Christian ernst gabler 1794. [in english as Science of Knowledge, trans. by peter Heath and John lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1982, see p. 93.] see also Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s sämmtliche Werke, vols. 1–8, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin: veit 1845–46, vol. 1, pp. 83–328 (ASKB 489–499). Hereafter cited as SW. 3 J.g. Fichte, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre: In Vorlesungen gehalten zu Berlin, im Jahre 1806, Berlin: verlag der realschulbuchhandlung 1806. [in english as The Way toward the Blessed Life, trans. by william smith, from vol. 2 of The Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 4th ed., london: trubner & Co. 1889, reprinted in the series, Significant Contributions to the History of Psychology 1750–1920, ed. by daniel robinson, washington: university publications of america 1977, pp. 291–496.] see also SW vol. 5, pp. 397–574. 1 2

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with Fichte’s actual texts is that by the year 1835 he had read a text from the midpoint of Fichte’s development: The Vocation of Man.4 though the data is modest, close attention to what is there nevertheless will allow a reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s relation to Fichte. Fichte may very well be the most overlooked resource for Kierkegaard’s thought. arguably, Fichte is as important as Hegel and more important than Kant in shaping the contours of Kierkegaard’s thought. The essay will proceed as follows. I shall first provide a relatively exhaustive résumé of Kierkegaard’s references to Fichte in the journals and notebooks as well as in the published works. this will fashion the basis for a more conceptual evaluation of the relation between the two thinkers. on this score, i will identify a set of important points of convergence between Fichte and Kierkegaard concerning the priority of subjectivity and faith—in general the priority of interest—to all disinterested knowledge. the convergences between these two giants of the nineteenth century occur, however, only under the critical caveat that, for Kierkegaard, Fichte’s transcendental ego, the “I=I” (which Fichte named the “first, absolutely unconditioned principle”5), signifies finally an abstraction. Existential subjectivity appears in Kierkegaard’s sense only where existence is thought, not as a ground of reality, but as itself ungrounded. I. Résumé of References to Fichte: Journals and Notebooks The first mention of Fichte is from the 1835 “Gilleleje” passage from the Journal AA. Kierkegaard writes: But in the midst of nature where man, free from life’s often suffocating air, breathes more freely, here the soul opens itself willingly to every noble impression. Here man steps forth as nature’s master, but he also feels that in nature something higher is manifested, something he must bow before. He feels a need to surrender to this power that rules it all….Here he feels himself at once great and small, and without going as far as the Fichtean remark (in his Bestimmung des Menschen) about a grain of sand constituting the world, a statement very close to madness.6

probably the most important thing about the above passage is that it gives direct evidence that Kierkegaard had read The Vocation of Man. one of Fichte’s “popular” writings, the text constitutes a midpoint between the earlier Fichte of the Wissenschaftslehre and the later, more explicitly religious Fichte of The Way toward the Blessed Life. The Vocation of Man recapitulates Fichte’s transcendental idealism in the context of a presentation of nature that is essentially spinozistic. But it does more than that: moving beyond but including the transcendental horizon of the Wissenschaftslehre, it explicitly begins to think an absolute will, not identical to J.g. Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen, Berlin: in der vossischen Buchhandlung 1800. [in english as The Vocation of Man, trans. by peter preuss, indianapolis: Hackett publishing Company 1987.] see also SW vol. 2, pp. 165–319. 5 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 93. 6 SKS 17, 15f., aa:6. 4

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the spontaneity of the transcendental ego, as the origin of reality; it moves toward a religious problematic.7 But let us return to Kierkegaard’s comment and situate it with respect to The Vocation of Man as a whole. the “grain of sand” Kierkegaard alludes to refers to a passage from part one of Fichte’s text, entitled “doubt.” the overall movement of Vocation of Man moves from “doubt” (which recapitulates spinoza), through “Knowledge” (a restatement of Kant’s transcendental idealism and his own radicalization of that standpoint in the Wissenschaftslehre), to “Faith.” in “doubt” Fichte considers the consequences of a mere grain of sand occupying a different place than it does in order to show nature in its quality as a radically interconnected, purely determinate totality. Fichte writes: at every moment of its duration nature is an interconnected whole; at every moment every particular part of it has to be as it is because all the rest are what they are; and you could shift no grain of sand from its spot without thereby, perhaps invisibly to your eyes, changing something in all parts of the immeasurable whole.8

the consequence Fichte draws from this consideration of the inter-determination of all things is typically radical: were the merest thing, the grain of sand, different from what it actually is, nothing else would be what it is. a change in the slightest part is a change in the totality of being. everything is exposed to this radical contingency and inter-determination. such an experience of nature is, as Kierkegaard observes, no longer sublime, as Kant may have suggested—it is closer to madness. as such Kierkegaard’s reference to Fichte gives no real clue as to his engagement with the ideas expressed in The Vocation of Man. a few days after writing the above passage, however, Kierkegaard wrote the following: what i really need is to be clear about what I am to do, not what i must know, except in the way knowledge must precede all action. it is a question of understanding my own destiny, of seeing what the Deity really wants me to do; the thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die.9

given the context—Kierkegaard’s mention of The Vocation of Man immediately before—this passage can be read as echoing the primary theme of part three of Fichte’s text, that is, “Faith.” Fichte’s understanding of faith involves the discovery of the spiritual vocation of the self, that for which one is willing to live and die. the priority Fichte cedes to faith is bound up with the priority he cedes to practical reason over theoretical reason. thus in The Vocation of Man Fichte writes: “we do not act because we know, but we know because we are meant to act; practical reason is the root of all reason.”10 prior to the theoretical attitude, and serving as its ground, is a “need to act,” an interest,11 which bears finally upon the spiritual vocation of the self to produce itself 7 8 9 10 11

Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 106 / SW, vol. 2, p. 298. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 10 / SW, vol. 2, p. 178. SKS 17, 24, aa:12. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 79 / SW, vol. 2, p. 263. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 73 / SW, vol. 2, p. 256.

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or singularize itself. Fichte’s main argument in “Faith” is that self-activity, the act of putting oneself into existence, precedes and serves as the condition for knowledge. thus, anticipating Kierkegaard’s need to discover what he is to do, Fichte writes: “there is in me a drive to absolute independent self-activity.”12 even if the gilleleje entries do not explore the details of Fichte’s text, then they nevertheless radiate much of the tone of The Vocation of Man. moreover, as we shall see further below, Kierkegaard’s thought generally registers the profound shift in Fichte’s thought toward the radical priority of practical reason, of interest, over theoretical reason. the idea, what philosophy aims at, is not simply something to contemplate, but something for which to live and die. in addition, Fichte’s prioritization of practical reason in the context of a development of the meaning of faith links the ethical and the religious together as tightly as possible. this too will find its echo in Kierkegaard’s thought. The next significant mention of Fichte in the journals and notebooks is from 1842–43. at that time Kierkegaard was working on Philosophical Fragments and De Omnibus. the latter text contains an important discussion of the nature of consciousness, reflection, ideality, language and spirit.13 in this context, Kierkegaard endorsed Fichte’s revision of the Cartesian ego cogito. He writes: descartes…constructed thought, not freedom, as the absolute. obviously this [that is, the latter] is the position of the elder Fichte—not cogito ergo sum but i act ergo sum, for this cogito is something derived or it is identical with “i act”; either it is the consciousness of freedom in the action, and then it should not read cogito ergo sum, or it is the subsequent consciousness.14

either the ego is the act, the self-positing of consciousness, or it is a state that derives from this primordial act. either way, the ego is not something—at least not originally—that stands in a contemplative relation to itself. the practical, again, precedes the theoretical. thus Kierkegaard here endorses this primary Fichtean motif. we shall see that this has enormous implications in terms of an ethical–religious understanding of truth. additional references to Fichte in the journals and notebooks are worth mentioning but not terribly significant. Kierkegaard links Fichte to “the formal striving of the age,”15 “the whole idealist development” in philosophy in which the existential subject is robbed of its concreteness,16 and he comments, with great admiration and even “veneration,” upon the extraordinary dialectical power of Fichte’s thinking. thus he compares Fichte to simon the stylite—who was also, it may be remembered, the original pseudonym envisioned for Fear and Trembling— as a thinker whose “dialectical movements” were so incomparable they could only

Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 68 / SW, vol. 2, p. 251. see pars secunda of Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus dubitandum est: Pap. iv B 1, pp. 141–50 / JC, pp. 166–72. 14 SKS 19, 386, not13:8 / JP 3, 2338. 15 Pap. i B 2, p. 172. 16 SKS 18, 80, FF:26 / JP 2, 1189. 12 13

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be parodied by others.17 in a similar vein he points to the supple power of Fichte’s thinking by comparing him to a spider spinning its whole web from the “slightest hold.”18 all in all, these references from the journals and notebooks articulate the basic pattern of the Fichte–Kierkegaard relation: appropriation and critique, admiration and chastisement. II. Fichte in the Published Works we turn now to the published works. while the published works do not contain any extensive analysis of Fichte’s texts, they do provide some important hints about Kierkegaard’s assessment of Fichte. i shall organize my comments around three motifs: (a) Kierkegaard’s critique of the abstract nature of the Fichtean ego, (B) his comments concerning Fichte’s critique of repentance, and (C) his positive endorsement of Fichte’s account of the imagination in the constitution of experience. A. Critique of the Abstract Nature of the Fichtean Ego the most extended discussion of Fichte’s thought occurs in Kierkegaard’s dissertation, The Concept of Irony (1841). it is in that text that Kierkegaard begins to elaborate a criticism of Fichte that he never altered: namely, that the Fichtean ego does not coincide with the existing self. the dissertation has two parts: in part one Kierkegaard treats socratic irony and in part two modern, that is, romantic irony, which is irony “after Fichte.” Fichte’s thought—and in the dissertation he restricts his discussion to the Wissenschaftslehre— is thus taken up in order to frame the conceptual context of romantic irony. as lee Capel sensed, however, Kierkegaard’s discussion of Fichte, which restricts itself to general indications of a historical nature, is largely derivative upon Hegel’s presentation in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.19 though this somewhat reduces the value of the discussion for our assessment of the Fichte–Kierkegaard relation since it remains unclear whether Kierkegaard had read Fichte’s text himself, Kierkegaard’s presentation does nonetheless contain certain accents that become important. Kierkegaard’s discussion, following that of Hegel, centers upon the metaphysics of the ego in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. the crucial turn Fichte makes, by way of radicalizing Kant’s notion of transcendental consciousness (the unity of apperception), was to take the ego as the constitutive ground of reality. virtually echoing Hegel, Kierkegaard notes this turn: “as has so frequently been discussed, [Fichte] wanted to construct the world. the I became the constituting entity.”20 Pap. i a 252. Pap. i a 231 / JP 2, 1187. 19 see the notes to his translation of The Concept of Irony, Bloomington: indiana university press 1971, pp. 417–19. 20 SKS 1, 309 / CI, 273. For the related passage in Hegel, see Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols 1–3, trans. by e.s. Haldane and Frances H. simson, lincoln: university of nebraska press 1995, vol. 3, p. 483. 17 18

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not only does Kierkegaard echo Hegel’s presentation, but he also shares Hegel’s assessment of the Fichtean ego: namely, that it constitutes a merely negative infinity. thus Kierkegaard writes: “[Fichte’s] Wissenschaftslehre infinitized knowledge. But he infinitized it negatively, and thus instead of truth he obtained certainty, not positive but negative infinity in the I’s infinite identity with itself;”21 or, as Hegel had said, the Fichtean ego “expresses only the absolute certainty of itself and not truth.”22 in these terms, though it may be true that Fichte achieved an “absolute beginning”23 for philosophy, and to this extent his position is justified, it nevertheless constitutes— according to both Hegel and Kierkegaard—a purely contentless, abstract beginning. Thus Kierkegaard writes: “Fichte went no further than the infinite, elastic molimina toward a beginning. He has the infinite urge of the negative…but as an infinite power that still accomplishes nothing.”24 But this critique is really Hegel. Kierkegaard in fact deepens the Hegelian dimension of his critique of Fichte by pointing to the necessity of situating the ego in its concrete world. Kierkegaard says: “in order for thought, or subjectivity, to acquire fullness and truth, it must let itself be born; it must immerse itself in the depths of substantial life.”25 “substantial life,” in the terms of Hegel’s thought, is historical, social–political life—the life contoured by the Sittlichkeit of a people. the actual ego can be grasped only on condition that subjectivity acknowledge its own historical givenness, its concreteness, the way in which it does not constitute the origin of itself. Fichte’s thought, and along with it romantic irony,26 eliminates the situatedness and finitude of the ego. That is its limit. this critique of the abstract nature of the Fichtean ego reappears implicitly and virtually unchanged in a number of passages in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) in which Johannes Climacus attacks the “i=i.” For example he writes: “the I-I is a mathematical point that does not exist at all….the fantastical I-I is not infinitude and finitude in identity [as Fichte argues in his Wissenschaftslehre], since neither the one nor the other is actual; it is a fantastical union with a cloud, an unfruitful embrace.…”27 Once again, the I=I, Fichte’s “first, unconditional principle” of his Wissenschaftslehre, is understood, not as the origin and font of actuality, but precisely as an abstract, “mathematical point” that exists nowhere. the point is that existence is not yet captured; it cannot emerge as a problematic, in terms of the ibid. ibid., 486. 23 SKS 1, 309 / CI, 273. 24 SKS 1, 310 / CI, 274. 25 SKS 1, 310 / CI, 274. 26 Kierkegaard’s further critique of romantic irony, which also largely derives from Hegel, is that the romantics have badly misconstrued the meaning of Fichte’s idealism. in two ways: (1) they blur the distinction in Fichte between the empirical and transcendental ego, and (2) they confuse “metaphysical” with “historical” actuality. thus Kierkegaard writes: “Fichte wanted to construct the world, but he had in mind a systematic construction. schlegel and tieck wanted to obtain [skaffe tilveie] a world,” SKS 1, 311 / CI, 275. Fichte, in short, wants to account for the world as given; the romantics want a new world to be given through poesis. 27 SKS 7, 180 / CUP1, 197. see also SKS 7, 114, 177, 314 / CUP1, 117, 193, 306. 21 22

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distinction between the transcendental and the empirical ego. to the extent that Fichte’s entire thought operates within the terms of this distinction, then, it remains abstract. we shall see more of what this means below. even if Kierkegaard shared Hegel’s critique of Fichte, and even if he largely derived it from Hegel, this should not mislead one into thinking that he considered Fichte’s standpoint somehow essentially surpassed. on the contrary, as we shall see below, Kierkegaard’s thought rejoins Fichte’s on a number of important fronts. as a general statement, one could say Kierkegaard consistently preserves Fichte’s prioritization of the act over theory. to this extent, he will remain far more Fichtean than Hegelian. B. Comments on Fichte on Repentance on several occasions Kierkegaard took note of Fichte’s critique of repentance. in The Concept of Anxiety, for example, he writes: repentance is the highest ethical contradiction, partly because ethics requires ideality but must be content to receive repentance, and partly because repentance is dialectically ambiguous with regard to what it is to remove, an ambiguity that dogmatics for the first time removes in the atonement, in which the category of hereditary sin becomes clear. moreover, repentance delays action, and action is precisely what ethics requires. at last, repentance must become an object to itself, inasmuch as the moment of repentance becomes a deficit of action. It was, therefore, a genuine ethical outburst, full of energy and courage, when the elder Fichte said there was no time for repentance.28

to what does this passage refer? Fichte hints at a critique of repentance in The Vocation of Man,29 develops the point more fully in his The Way towards the Blessed Life (1806),30 and he sketches a similar critique in his answer to Jacobi’s “an open letter to Fichte” (1799).31 Unfortunately, however, Kierkegaard all too typically refers to no specific text. in all likelihood, though, as the editors of the Kommentar volume to Begrebet Angest suppose,32 this is because Kierkegaard was not actually referring to one of Fichte’s text but rather to Hans lassen martensen’s Outline to a System of Moral Philosophy (1841). martensen refers to “philosophers like spinoza and Fichte” who “reject repentance because a done deed cannot be changed and the human does not have time to repent.”33 Kierkegaard’s remark reflects Martensen’s text much more closely than it does any Fichtean text. while the above text, then, can help calibrate

SKS 4, 421 / CA, 118. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 117. 30 Fichte, The Way towards the Blessed Life, op. cit., pp. 476–7; SW, vol. 5, p. 550. 31 Fichte, Nachgelassene Werke, vols. 1–3, ed. i.H. Fichte, Bonn: adolph marcus 1834–35, vol. 3, p. 394. 32 SKS K4, 487–8. 33 Cf. Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, trans. by Curtis l. thompson and david J. Kangas, atlanta: scholars press 1997, p. 278. 28 29

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Kierkegaard’s thought in relation to Fichte in a general sense, it does not really reflect any genuine engagement with Fichte’s thought itself. the same could probably also be said for Kierkegaard’s reference to Fichte’s critique of repentance in his later Stages on Life’s Way (1845). He remarks that “it seems inexplicable how that powerful thinker Fichte could assume that there was no time for the man of action to repent.…”34 This probably constitutes a later reflection on the same comment from martensen. this passage, however, registers a more complex judgment about Fichte than one finds in The Concept of Anxiety. Fichte’s critique of repentance is hard to understand, Kierkegaard’s author continues, because Fichte—said here to be an “honest philosopher in the noble greek sense”—“had a great conception of a person’s actions taking place only in the internal.” He goes on to explain: yet this may be explained by the fact that with his [that is, Fichte’s] energy he did not particularly realize (at least not in his earlier period) that this internal action is essentially a suffering, and that therefore a person’s highest inward action is to repent. But to repent is not a positive movement outwards or off to, but a negative movement inwards, not a doing but by oneself letting something happen to oneself.35

we shall have to return to this discussion of repentance as we try to assess Kierkegaard’s overall relation to Fichte’s thought. For the moment we can simply note the following: whatever Kierkegaard’s relation to Fichte’s actual texts themselves, his focus upon the issue of repentance does indeed raise an issue of fundamental difference between the two thinkers. at stake is the meaning of subjectivity and inwardness. Fichte’s critique of repentance and Kierkegaard’s counter-assertion that it constitutes the “highest act” of the subject reflect radically different conceptions of inwardness. For Fichte, the inwardness of the ego lay in its absolute spontaneity, its originary action [Thathandlung] of positing itself. inwardness is not a state of being, it is action. moreover, it is action that is not directed at some object or toward some end; it relates to nothing “outward,” but rather the action of the will willing itself—as Kierkegaard said above, an action “taking place only in the internal.” yet, Kierkegaard corrects Fichte: more originary than spontaneity is the act of letting-happen. Kierkegaard will point to a passivity at the very foundation of a self that cannot be thought within Fichtean terms. more on this below. C. Endorsement of Fichte on the Productive Imagination The last significant and explicit mention of Fichte in the published works is from The Sickness unto Death. In section C of Part One of that text Kierkegaard clarifies the “forms of the sickness” of despair in terms of its dialectical factors. recall that despair is, in terms of its radical possibility, rooted in the relational or reflexive nature of the self. the self is, according to the famous formula at the beginning of The Sickness

34 35

SKS 6, 438 / SLW, 476. SKS 6, 438 / SLW, 476.

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unto Death, “a relation that relates itself to itself.”36 the self is doubled up upon itself, self-relating, but in such a way that it relates to itself as something always already there, “posited by another.” the very inwardness of the self is something passively given, something that must actively be taken up. this sets up the condition of despair, which Kierkegaard defines in all strictness as the (impossible) “desire to be rid of oneself.”37 despair is that the self suffers its own self, that it cannot escape or flee itself, that it remains originally and passively bonded to itself in everything it does. a self cannot simply be; it must work at being. As we shall see, Kierkegaard’s reflexive account of the self, in particular the way in which it is always given to itself, will decisively complicate his endorsement of Fichte’s active ego. nevertheless, when Kierkegaard works out the “dialectical factors of despair,” he finds it necessary and appropriate to refer to Fichte. In the section titled “Infinitude’s Despair is to Lack Finitude,” he writes: As a rule, imagination is the medium for the process of infinitizing; it is not a capacity, as are the others—if one wishes to speak in those terms, it is the capacity instar omnium. when all is said and done, whatever of feeling, knowing, and willing a person has depends upon what imagination he has, upon how that person reflects himself—that is, upon imagination (Phantasien). Imagination is infinitizing reflection, and therefore the elder Fichte quite correctly assumed that even in relation to knowledge the categories derive from the imagination.38

as usual, Kierkegaard provides no direct reference to Fichte. Fichte’s most explicit discussion of the imagination as the origin of the categories, however, occurs in his text Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre.39 it seems quite likely, then, that this Fichtean text, which was a kind of explanatory supplement to the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, is Kierkegaard’s reference.40 if Kierkegaard is referring to an actual Fichte text, which seems quite probable, this would constitute a significant and rare reference, even if indirect, to a primary text. For this reason it is necessary to look closely at the role of the imagination in Fichte and, in particular, consider why Kierkegaard found it necessary to refer to Fichte at just this point in his exposition in The Sickness unto Death. The specific passage from Fichte’s Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre would no doubt be the following: For Kant, the categories were originally generated as forms of thought, and from his point of view he was quite right. But in order to make possible the application of these categories to objects, Kant required the schemata produced by the imagination. For Kant, therefore, as well as for us, the categories are worked up by the imagination and are accessible to

SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13. SKS 11, 136 / SUD, 20. 38 SKS 11, 148 / SUD, 31. 39 J.g. Fichte, Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen, Jena and leipzig: gabler 1795. 40 in any case, this reference does not appear to be based upon martensen’s lectures on the history of speculative idealism. 36 37

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David J. Kangas it. according to the Wissenschaftslehre [however], the categories arise together with the objects, and, in order to make the objects possible at all, they arise in the imagination.41

at stake here is Fichte’s rewriting of Kant’s transcendental deductions from the Critique of Pure Reason. as is known, Kant’s treatment of the categories involves their displacement from being ontological determinations, as in aristotle, to being formal, organizing modalities of the transcendentally spontaneous subject (the unity of apperception). Kant’s transcendental deductions aim to show the necessity of some categories at all in order to accomplish the unifying work of self-consciousness. nevertheless—and this is where Fichte’s rewrite in the above passage becomes relevant—Kant understood the categories in a rigid way as “forms of thought.” opposed to the categories of the understanding was the materia of sensibility. whereas the categories are universal and necessary, the material of sensibility was of itself disjointed, chaotic, particular, a manifold. now, from the earliest version of the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte’s basic revision of Kant was to surpass the implied dualism between form and matter, the understanding and sensibility. the “thing in itself,” origin of sensations, was diagnosed as a precritical vestige. Fichte moves beyond Kant, however, by radicalizing certain elements already contained in his thought. 42 Kant already saw the necessity for articulating some third element between the understanding and sensibility—something mediating—such that the sensible manifold could be subsumed under the categories without losing its particularity. Kant called the mediating links between categories and raw sensibilia the “schemata,” whose origin he found in the imagination.43 The original work of the imagination for Kant is thus not merely to reflect a given reality, but rather to bring objects into givenness in the first place. The work of the “productive” imagination, through an activity whose “true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves,”44 stands at the origin of experience as to its initial givenness. what Fichte suggests is that the categories themselves must have their origin in the imagination. His intention is absolutely clear: in order to carry through the standpoint of the Wissenschaftslehre, whose principle is that “nothing pertains to the i except what it posits within itself,”45 self-consciousness must constitute the radical origin not only of experience but also of the very conditions for the possibility of experience.

see Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. by daniel Breazeale, ithaca: Cornell university press 1988, p. 288; SW, vol. 1, p. 387. 42 the essential difference between Kant and Fichte on this question is that Kant’s “subject,” the “transcendental unity of the apperception,” constitutes the mere condition for the possibility of consciousness of objects. Kant denies what for Fichte becomes absolutely central: the ego’s intuition of itself. on Fichte’s understanding of his relation to Kant’s thought, see especially his “second introduction to the science of Knowledge,” in Science of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 38–62 / SW, vol. 1, pp. 463–8. 43 see Critique of Pure Reason, B 179/a 140–B 187/a147. 44 ibid., B 181. 45 see Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p. 246 / SW, vol. 1, p. 333. 41

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according to Fichte the categories arise together with, or more exactly at the same time as (zugleich), the objects which they make possible. the object and the conditions of the object arise equiprimordially within the imagination. this is why, as Kierkegaard noted above, “even in relation to knowledge”—that is, with respect to experience in Kant’s sense—“the categories derive from the imagination.” the pure ego not only organizes inchoate sense data (a priori) according to formal determinations (categories and also pure forms of intuition) that are somehow—who knows how?—already given, but it also organizes its very manner of organizing the data. this is the work of the imagination. only through this radical conception of the imagination does Fichte fully liberate the critical element of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, for only in this way would the ego constitute the absolute, unconditioned ground of experience. on the basis of this understanding of Fichte, let us return to Kierkegaard. what does Kierkegaard’s positive appraisal show about his relation to Fichte? Heinrich schmidinger, for one, considers Kierkegaard’s reference to Fichte here to be nothing but a mere historical notice, similar to his use of Fichte in The Concept of Irony. in other words, he thinks it indicates no substantive engagement with Fichte’s thought.46 Yet I would argue, on the contrary, that it reveals a significant convergence and even appropriation of Fichte’s thought. The imagination, Kierkegaard said, is “infinitizing reflection” and “the possibility of any and all reflection.” It is the capability or power instar omnium—in other words, it is not one capability amongst others the self employs, but rather the capability through which there is a self at all, the capability of capability. to this extent, the self is its imagination: “The self is reflection, and the imagination is reflection, is the rendition of the self as the self’s possibility.”47 As a reflexive relation to itself the self only is—only exists—in rendering itself, that is, in projecting itself. the imagination is this originary power to project possibility. a self is able to be as a self, that is, as reflective self-relation, only through the imagination as a “process of infinitizing”—in other words, on the basis of its power to separate itself from its own being, its own givenness. it can now be made clear why Kierkegaard endorses Fichte: the crucial importance of Fichte’s idea that the categories themselves, that is, the very modalities of a being in its beingness, are emergent from the subject, is to demand that the self be analyzed in wholly different terms than one analyzes a being. strictly speaking, a self is not a being—a self is a relation to itself. the self is a subject that is not a substance: it is neither a transcendental ego standing opposed to a thing in itself (Kant), nor a self-mediating substance (Hegel). Thus relational or reflexive categories replace ontological ones. Fichte liberates the ego from being. it is this aspect of Fichte that Kierkegaard endorses in the above passage. A self “is” only through “infinitizing reflection,” through the projection of itself in possibility. The possibilities of a self do not pre-exist it, as some kind of essence, but emerge within the act of projecting them. The self is its own infinitude. This basically Fichtean thought brings us to the very edge of Kierkegaard’s problematic of existence. 46 47

Heinrich schmidinger, “Kierkegaard und Fichte,” Gregorianum, no. 62, 1981, p. 524. SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 31.

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in sum, then, Kierkegaard applies Fichte’s argument that the imagination stands at the origin of the categories to the relation the self has to its own possibilities. in each case, it is a question of thinking the radical priority of the subject and its capability to what is given. the possibilities of a self emerge through the imagination of the self just as the categories of theoretical knowledge. this point, then, constitutes a powerful agreement with Fichte. of course, Kierkegaard has used Fichte for his own purposes; he turns Fichte into a moment, so to speak, in the elaboration of his own dialectic of despair. to be exact, he thinks the authentic dialectic of the self not merely in terms of its power to project itself in possibility—that is, not merely in the power to infinitize itself—but also in terms of its movement back into its own finitude. The self must not merely liberate itself from its givenness, it must turn receptively towards its own givenness and “become concrete.” Kierkegaard says: “the progress of the becoming must be an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the self, and an infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process.”48 The Fichtean ego lives in the infinitude of its tasks, purely through its own spontaneity; the Kierkegaardian self lives in the infinite movement of receiving its own finitude. The concrete self allows itself to become transparent about its own ontological poverty, or groundlessness, wherein it “grounds itself transparently in god.”49 Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the Fichtean account of the imagination thus involves both appropriation and critique. in this sense, it is a good emblem for his relation to Fichte in general. i turn now to the task of elaborating that relation. III. Comparative Analysis of Fichte and Kierkegaard although, with the exception of The Vocation of Man and a couple of passages, Kierkegaard’s references to Fichte are allusive and spotty, there can be no doubt that, in an indirect way, Fichte’s impact upon Kierkegaard was enormous. the Fichtean influence upon Kierkegaard has unquestionably been under-appreciated in the scholarship on Kierkegaard. greater focus on the Fichtean stratum of Kierkegaard’s thought has the potential to reshape the understanding of his basic concepts and strategies. Fichte’s thought, indeed, reshaped the very meaning and trajectory of modern philosophy by ceding radical priority to subjectivity, the will, freedom, spontaneity. He assigned transcendental subjectivity the role of ground of reality. this was epoch-making: not only romanticism, but also Hegel, schopenhauer, marx, and nietzsche, all of whom prioritize the act over being, owe a debt to Fichte. Fichte set forth the priority of interest, of a freedom that does not merely submit to, but constitutes reality, over all theoretical concerns.50 this decisive turn unquestionably constitutes something essential to Kierkegaard’s thought as well. For the remainder SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30. SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30; translation modified. 50 He writes in the “First introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre” that “the highest interest and the ground of all others is self-interest…the desire not to lose, but to maintain and assert [oneself] in the rational process.” Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 15 / SW, vol. 1, p. 433. 48 49

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of this essay i want to elaborate a set of convergences and then divergences between the two thinkers. this will show Kierkegaard’s appropriative critique of Fichte in more detail. A. Convergences between Fichte and Kierkegaard i shall suggest several important and positive points of convergence between Fichte and Kierkegaard: (1) on the central role given to subjectivity or interiority in the question of truth; (2) on the ontological conditions for truth, which both think in terms of a “duplication” of reality; (3) on the thought that striving must be, for a human being, essentially infinite; (4) on the priority of “faith” or interest to theoretical reason; and (5) on the necessity of a strategy of indirect communication. pointing to these will not be to say that there is, necessarily, any direct genealogical link between Fichte and Kierkegaard. it is more a matter of Fichte having opened certain themes up and made them available for further development. (1) Truth is subjectivity. the most immediate way in which the Fichtean turn impacted Kierkegaard’s thought was in his notion that “truth is subjectivity.”51 one may think this theme would be the very opposite of Fichte’s texts insofar as they aim to constitute a science. However, it is not so. Fichte thought subjectivity for the first time as the origin of truth; or, to put it differently, he thought subjectivity as an essential and irreducible element underlying all objective knowledge. “truth is subjectivity” or “interiority” is unthinkable without this Fichtean turn. indeed, it is quite impossible to understand Kierkegaard’s statement otherwise than a statement of the crudest subjectivism without its Fichtean context. thinking, for Fichte, is an effort to retrace the genesis of objectivity by showing its constitutive origin in transcendental spontaneity. according to its very essence, then, such thinking cannot be a mere presentation of results. it cannot aim at or rest on objectivity. on the contrary, to think philosophically is to accomplish within oneself and for oneself the very event through which objectivity is first given; it is to think subjectivity in its constitutive power. Thus, the first line of his “First introduction” to the Wissenschaftslehre is the following: “attend to yourself: turn your attention away from everything that surrounds you and towards your inner life; this is the first demand philosophy makes of its disciple.”52 philosophy demands the turn toward interiority, the turn away from given objectivity. it seeks the origin of objectivity. This turn to the subject is the very first condition of doing philosophy. Kierkegaard’s entire problematic of existence presupposes this new and radical validation of the interior. First of all, to say that “truth is subjectivity” is not merely to oppose subjective truth to objective truth. what is at stake for both Fichte and Kierkegaard in prioritizing interiority or subjectivity is to uphold, not some subjective content of truth, but the conditions for any objectivity. Both thinkers were seized by the profound conviction that objective truth constitutes a derivative mode of truth. thus Kierkegaard notes 51 52

SKS 7, 174–95 / CUP1, 189–210. Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 6, SW, vol. 1, p. 422.

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of Fichte: “the authentic philosopher [and here he refers to Fichte] is in the highest degree sub-objective.”53 prior to objective truth, which can be formulated as simple content and as results, is the sub-objective truth of consciousness or existence—in other words, the relation to reality that allows there to be an appearing to and hence objects at all. interiority or subjectivity is not some substantial base, some hypostasis, but rather the relation to reality that occurs prior to the relation to objects; to think philosophically is to clarify this prior (subjective) relation to reality. For Fichte, to be sure, this takes shape as the systematic elaboration of the science of consciousness; it is a genetic work. For Kierkegaard, by contrast, it occurs as a phenomenological elaboration of moods such as melancholy, anxiety and despair. there is a profound difference here, to be sure, but this should not obscure the deep link between the two thinkers on the priority of interiority and “subjective truth.” (2) Reduplication as the condition for truth. that “truth is subjectivity” signifies that there is a prior relation to reality that cannot be grasped as the subject– object relation. as both Fichte and Kierkegaard make clear, however, the question of truth cannot arise at all except on condition of a “reduplication.” the condition for any objectivity is that reality has been doubled up, “reduplicated”54 [fordoblet] in Kierkegaard’s language, so that it not only is but appears to be. Fichte had already explicitly pointed to doubleness as a condition of truth in his “First introduction” by speaking of a “double series”: “in the intellect, therefore…there is a double series, of being and of seeing, of the real and of the ideal; and its essence consists in the inseparability of these two…[even though] they inhabit two worlds between which there is no bridge.”55 the intellect, what Kierkegaard would prefer to call “consciousness” or “existence,” is constituted as a synthesis—not a mediation, as Hegel will say—between the two irreducible orders of reality and ideality. it is only in terms of this doubling of the real, its splitting into a non-identical synthesis of the real and the ideal, that truth can emerge as something essentially distinct from mere being (or immediacy). in part two of his fragmentary text De Omnibus dubitandum est, Kierkegaard retraces this Fichtean problematic on ground that is Hegelian. thus, working out the problem of consciousness as spirit, Kierkegaard posits a double series between the irreducible orders of reality and ideality: “immediacy is reality; language is ideality; consciousness is contradiction. the moment i make a statement about reality, contradiction is present, for what i say is ideality.”56 to say consciousness is contradiction is to say it holds together two things that remain absolutely different. precisely because the question of truth emerges in a duplication of reality between its ideal and its real moment, and because these two orders, though synthesized,

53 54 55 56

SKS 17, 25n, aa:12. SKS 7, 116 / CUP1, 192. Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 17, SW, vol. 1, p. 436. see Pap. iv B 1, p. 146 / JC, 168.

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are never mediated, truth becomes something projected into the future—a matter of infinite striving.57 i shall come to this in a moment. First, however, it is necessary to point out that, even if Fichte and Kierkegaard situate the question of truth vis-à-vis an instant of reduplication, they nevertheless differ sharply on the question of the origin of reduplication. Fichte tends to think reduplication as a work of the ego, namely, as its originary reflection upon itself. For Kierkegaard, however, reduplication is not only something produced by consciousness. one must also say that consciousness is itself produced by, or rendered possible by, reduplication. this is where the difference lies. reduplication is not for Kierkegaard a form of negation that consciousness itself would have posited but that whereby there first is consciousness. Kierkegaard thinks consciousness, in other words, as itself emergent only on condition of a prior negation. thus he says that consciousness is a “contradiction that is produced by a duplicity and that itself produces a duplicity.”58 Because consciousness not only produces but itself is produced by duplicity it will remain, for Kierkegaard, exposed to a non-negatable form of negation. this, we shall see, will constitute a fundamental difference from Fichte. (3) Infinite striving as essential; the ethical moment of existence. truth, for both Fichte and Kierkegaard, is found in the “how” of infinite striving rather than in the “what” of some definite content. From this point of view, it is almost certain that Hegel would have leveled the same charge against Kierkegaard that he laid against Fichte: namely, that he was a thinker of the “bad infinite.” Yet it is equally certain that Kierkegaard’s response to Hegel would have been understood by Fichte: namely, that the failure to recognize the essential futurity (or ideality) of the truth was a failure to respect the ethical moment of existence. Kierkegaard famously accused Hegel of not having an ethics59—and this in spite of the very obvious counterpoint that Hegel wrote a (rather large) Philosophy of Right! this critique will strike one as simply obtuse until one grasps its Fichtean background. the ethical moment in Fichte is not something that would follow from a prior theoretical moment—for example, the clarification of some first principle—but rather is itself the primary moment. ethics precedes theory. theory is thus conditioned by praxis in Fichte, albeit a “transcendental” praxis, rather than, as in almost the entire western tradition, the other way around. thus Fichte argued, and he paves the way for Kierkegaard in this regard, that one accesses reality, meaning and purpose, that is, true being, for the first time only in activity, in the resolution of the will. Fichte writes: “[the act] is the point to which the consciousness of all reality is connected.”60 this is to say that actuality is at the beginning, in the resolution, and not, as the

on the theme of striving in Kierkegaard, see SKS 7, 81f., 90–91, 129–31 / CUP1, 80f., 91–2, 138–40. Fichte develops this theme most extensively in part three of The Vocation of Man. 58 Pap. iv B 1, p. 146 / JC, 168. 59 SKS 7, 116 / CUP1, 119. 60 Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 69 / SW, vol. 3, p. 250. 57

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entirety of Hegel’s dialectic suggests, at the end of a process of mediation.61 the actual signifies freedom in its power to begin rather than reality gathered up in its systematic wholeness; it is in opening not in closure. Kierkegaard echoes this in commenting upon the beginning of philosophy: “every beginning, when it is made… does not occur by virtue of immanental thinking but is made by virtue of a resolution, essentially by virtue of faith.”62 For both Fichte and Kierkegaard, then, philosophy—a discourse on the actual— begins with the free act, within subjectivity or inwardness, and not through the reduction to absolute being (as in Hegel’s Logic). if Hegel did not have an ethics, then, it was because he did not grasp the priority of the ethical moment, the resolution of the will, to the moment of theory. inasmuch as his ethics constitutes a theoretical reflection upon freedom as the result of the world–historical process, it constitutes an ethics without an ethical moment. (4) The priority of faith. From this prioritization of the ethical Fichte draws an implication that finds a profound echo in Kierkegaard’s thought: “What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of [person] one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we can reject or accept as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person who holds it.”63 any “system” of philosophy is already the expression of a prior decision and a prior interest. what is absolutely primary in thinking, according to Fichte, is the decision to validate freedom—in other words, to validate becoming, activity, movement— or to suppress it by submitting to being as simply given. this is the difference, in Fichte’s terms, between the “idealist” and the “dogmatist.” Freedom as decision for freedom is always either suppressed or upheld as the first moment of thought. One’s philosophy expresses one’s fundamental choice—one’s faith. Faith, for both Fichte and Kierkegaard, precedes philosophy. once again this statement carries the risk of serious misreading. unless one keeps clear about the Fichtean coordinates of this notion, it will be difficult to separate it from some kind of fideism or “leap of faith” (a phrase that does not occur in Kierkegaard’s texts). Faith has nothing to do with fideism; it pertains to the originary decision to exist, the beginning par excellence, rather than to the affirmation of some objective content for which no good evidence can be given. it is an eminent act of the subject, not a supplementary detour in knowledge. in Fichte the priority of faith emerges with special clarity in The Vocation of Man, a text, we have seen, Kierkegaard studied in 1836. the reason for this prioritization is the same for both thinkers: the dialectic of knowledge has as its telos, not certainty, but doubt and despair. Knowledge involves grasping the given, the sphere of objectivities, in terms of its foundation in some prior given. But there is no end to what is prior; one ground gives way always to another ground. Knowledge breeds skepticism, the infinite proliferation of reasons. Fichte writes: “No knowledge can be

61 62 63

schmidinger makes this point as well. see his “Kierkegaard und Fichte,” op. cit., p. 529. see especially SKS 7, 174 / CUP1, 189. Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 16 / SW, vol. 1, p. 435.

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its own foundation and proof; every knowledge presupposes something still higher as its foundation, and this ascent has no end.”64 This skeptical abyss of knowledge, proceeding infinitely toward ever further conditions, is overcome, according to Fichte, not by any kind of absolute knowledge (as Hegel would argue), but rather through a resolution to act that Fichte calls “faith” [Glaube]. Kant, of course, as well as the Fichte of the Wissenschaftslehre, attempted to overcome this skepticism by setting forth the transcendentally spontaneous ego as the ground of reality. yet the Fichte of The Vocation of Man found reason to doubt here too: once the transcendental ego is the ground, all reality is reduced to phenomenality, to images: “a system of knowledge is necessarily a system of images, without any reality, meaning, and purpose.”65 Faith, going beyond knowledge, proceeds for Fichte from the spiritual locus of the self, das Gemüt, the place in the soul in which the call of conscience resonates. the call—and here there is a link between the thematics of the voice [die Stimme] and vocation [die Bestimmung]—is a summons to subjectivity to take itself up as a singular task, a task that no one can take up for me. it is an appeal not merely to exist as given, as immediate, but to transform my immediacy through the spontaneity of my freedom. Knowledge, then, can never be absolute. it cannot respond to the interest the subject has in its own existence; it leads the subject away from itself. Faith, on the other hand, constitutes the act through which the subject exists absolutely. it is the health of decision, the living connection to actuality, the opposite of despair. But again, faith does not here stand in opposition to knowledge. on the contrary, it constitutes the condition through which knowledge first receives a context. Fichte writes: “Faith is no knowledge, but a decision of the will to recognize the validity of knowledge.”66 Faith constitutes the living connection to actuality, opening in the act of existence itself, which must be presupposed, in terms of its condition, in any and all knowledge. Interested subjectivity (the practical) is thus radically prior to, and the condition of, disinterested subjectivity (the theoretical). Faith coincides with freedom’s original actualization, freedom’s willing freedom. For both Fichte and Kierkegaard, then, the “ethical” dimension of this moment is inseparable from its “religious” dimension. (5) Indirect communication. Let me consider one final linkage between Fichte and Kierkegaard before clarifying their differences. the doubling involved in truth carries, as its presentational correlate, a demand for “double reflection” or an “indirect communication.” the Fichtean text, precisely because the truth it concerns is the truth of the origin of objectivity (that is, the truth of the subject), demands, Fichte says, the reader’s performative involvement.67 what it means to understand Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 71 / SW, vol. 2, p. 254. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 65. 66 Fichte, The Vocation of Man, op. cit., p. 71, SW, vol. 3, p. 254. 67 in his “a Crystal Clear report” Fichte explicitly indicates this necessity: “i do not appeal to your memory but to your understanding; my purpose here is not that you take heed of what i have said, but rather that you yourself think and, god willing, think just as i have 64 65

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a Fichtean text is not merely to grasp an objective content or result, but to be able to reproduce it inwardly; to understand the text is to perform it. similarly, and for the same reasons, Kierkegaard posits the necessity of a “double reflection” in the communication of all “essential truth.” A first reflection formulates an ideal content, a “what.” A second reflection, however, “renders the existing communicator’s own relation to the idea.”68 Otherwise obscure, this second reflection gains in clarity as soon as one sees it in relation to Fichte. In what does the “second reflection” necessary for communicating essential truth consist? any presentation of truth must involve, according to the very structure of its presentation, an appeal to the reader’s own capability toward resolution. philosophical presentation, whose content is freedom, must appeal to freedom. Freedom, that is, the subject’s capability to resolve itself and decide concerning itself, must be both the form and content of philosophy. this is the fundamental insight that dominates both Fichte’s and Kierkegaard’s texts—and this in spite of the fact that Fichte aims at nothing short of Wissenschaft and system! granted, the “form” that philosophy actually takes differs dramatically between Fichte’s various efforts at a science of consciousness and Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous texts (which are pointedly “unscientific”). No doubt this reflects fundamental differences concerning the final meaning of interiority, not to mention freedom. We shall say more about this below. yet it is essential to see how Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication” reprises Fichte’s notion that the philosophical text of itself must stand essentially open to the reader’s involvement. Fichte judged a “scientific” presentation to be the best way to accomplish this; Kierkegaard, for reasons that are essential, demands something more “artistic.” we come to those reasons now. B. Divergences between Fichte and Kierkegaard in the discussion of Kierkegaard’s references to Fichte within the journals, notebooks and published works, fundamental differences between the two thinkers were already alluded to. now it is time to clarify these. Heinrich schmidinger demonstrates an unquestionable perspicacity in pointing to the following: in spite of everything, Fichte and Kierkegaard maintain a “radically different understanding of actuality.”69 as schmidinger observes, this appears most forcefully with respect to the human being’s fundamental act of self-constitution: in Fichte, who cedes radical priority to the transcendentally spontaneous ego, it becomes necessary to speak of an ego which is absolute and unconditioned.70 Fichte takes this thought to the limit in the notion of a pure act of self-positing [sich selbst setzen]: the thought.” see “a Crystal Clear report to the general public concerning the actual essence of the newest philosophy: an attempt to Force the reader to understand,” in The Philosophy of German Idealism, trans. by don Botterman and william rasch, ed. by ernst Behler, new york: Continuum 2002, p. 44. 68 SKS 7, 76 / CUP1, 76. 69 schmidinger, “Kierkegaard und Fichte,” op. cit., p. 529. without a doubt, schmidinger’s article is the single best resource concerning the question of Kierkegaard’s relation to Fichte. 70 ibid.

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ego as such is pure act, pure to the point that one cannot, properly, even speak yet of an active subject.71 a pure doing precedes any being. this transcendental “subject” thus constitutes precisely the ground or unconditioned first principle of any and all phenomena. the result of taking the transcendental ego as unconditioned ground is that the concrete ego must consider itself ultimately as founded upon itself. as Fichte says in his The Vocation of Man: “i am thoroughly my own creation.”72 For Fichte, then, the ego must be thought finally in terms of an auto-genesis. Fichte extends Kant’s principle of autonomy into an ontological ultimate. By contrast, Kierkegaard aims to think subjectivity, as schmidinger suggests, in terms of its “radical finitude.”73 Kierkegaard formulates an understanding of radical finitude in the carefully layered analysis of the self in the opening pages of The Sickness unto Death. a self is a relation that relates itself to itself—in other words that posits itself—but it does so only “in the relation,” that is, vis-à-vis some prior self-relationality that it did not posit. a self always precedes itself in its being with a precedence that cannot be surmounted. It remains, then, passively fixed to itself— the condition of despair—rather than primordially active. the most radical fact of existence is that the self is doubled up against itself and unable to be rid of itself. this is to say that the ego’s relation to itself is not originally constituted as a presence to itself; rather, it discovers itself already given, “posited by an other” [sat ved et Andet], and consequently must relate to itself first of all as a task to be taken up. put simply, the self in Kierkegaard stands in the predicament of not being able to possess or coincide with its own enabling conditions. the self is given from an other, not from or through itself. the self does not constitute its own origin; it does not create itself or found itself. on the contrary, a self is what cannot found itself. What finally separates Kierkegaard from Fichte—not to mention from Kant, the early schelling and Hegel—is therefore that Kierkegaard thinks the meaning of the self, starting from the inner diremption or contradiction that makes a self first possible as a self-reflexive relation. Interiority in Kierkegaard does not signify the subject’s presence to itself or identity with itself (Fichte’s i=i), but rather that doubling up or reduplication of being which allows, in general, the possibility of any and all self-consciousness. But this is to say, with Schmidinger, that finally the principle of identity has unconditioned precedence in Fichte over that of contradiction (or difference), whereas with Kierkegaard it is the other way around.74 thus even if Kierkegaard recognizes, with Fichte, the fundamentality of resolution (or of the act), to the point even that resolution is understood as the very beginning of philosophy, he nevertheless allows for an instant of existence that would fall essentially prior to the beginning of any conceptual discourse—prior, even, to the reflexive relation a self could have toward itself, and hence prior to anything like an act at all. at stake here is to think a relation to “the other” as falling prior to the self’s relation to itself. 71 72 73 74

Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 21 / SW, vol. 1, p. 440. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, p. 73 / SW, vol. 3, p. 256. schmidinger, “Kierkegaard und Fichte,” op. cit., p. 529. ibid., p. 530.

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For Fichte, any “other” (any transcendence) would be derivative upon and ultimately subsumable within the ego’s identity with itself. the “other” to which Kierkegaard refers, however, signifies the “power” [Kraft] that posits, or enables, the self-reflexive turn of the self toward itself. In these terms, nothing could be further from Kierkegaard than the Fichtean notion that “i am thoroughly my own creation.” the self’s very relation to itself, though wholly singular and original, is nevertheless a “derived” relation inasmuch as the self must in some sense already be before it can be: it relates to itself and so constitutes itself as self-consciousness, only in a prior self-relation. one could say that at the interior of Kierkegaard’s self there is something like a temporal delay, a break in presence, which could not be conceived within Fichte’s Thathandlung or intellectual intuition. Fichte’s ego coincides with itself absolutely; it constitutes the unconditioned ground of all reality. Kierkegaard’s self lags behind itself from the very beginning. For Kierkegaard, this lagging behind itself is an index of the self’s createdness. to be exact, it refers to that instant in which god, “who constituted [the human being] a relation, releases it from his hand, as it were.”75 to be, that is, to relate to oneself, is always already to have been released into selfhood. god creates by letting go. most typical of Kierkegaard, however, is that he pursues this theme of createdness, not through a positive (ontological) account of god as creative cause of the world, but through what could be called a “negative phenomenology”76 of the self. one’s creatureliness thus appears in the phenomena that become central to Kierkegaard’s thought: anxiety, despair, boredom, melancholy, grief, and so on. each of these concretely realizes the temporal delay, or originary difference, between the self and itself. it is a striking fact that Fichte, who consistently condemned the notion of creation ex nihilo as an absurdity, could only diagnose such phenomena as symptomatic of laziness. in addition, through his attentiveness to the unique temporality of the self Kierkegaard was able to grasp the self’s fundamental historicity in a way that could never have been accomplished by Fichte. the “other” to which the self is bound prior to its relation to itself is not simply god. the self is also bound to its own worldly context in this way. to exist is also to lag behind the world; it is to have to take up one’s own existence within a world one did not posit, a world “under way.”77 this “thrownness” of the self (to use a Heideggerian term) stands directly opposed to its unconditionedness, or pure spontaneity. it is for this reason that, as schmidinger points out, the fundamental moment in Kierkegaard’s thought is not so much an act [Thathandlung] as a choice [et Valg]—that is, insofar as a choice presupposes the prior givenness of what is chosen.78 SKS 11, 139 / SUD, 16. i take this term from arne grøn’s book Subjectivitet og Negativitet: Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: reitzel 1997. 77 perhaps the most powerful statement of the uncanniness of being-in-the-world in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship is from the 11 october letter of the young man in Repetition: “One sticks a finger into the ground to smell what country one is in; I stick my finger into the world—it has no smell. Where am I? What does it mean to say: the world?” See SKS 4, 68 / R, 200. 78 schmidinger, “Kierkegaard und Fichte,” op. cit., p. 532. on this point see also the passages concerning the self’s choice of itself as a chooser in SKS 3, 155–6, 160–5, 214–7 / EO2, 75 76

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it is vis-à-vis this fundamental historicity of the self, finally, that one can grasp what is at stake in Kierkegaard’s critique of Fichte’s critique of repentance. For Fichte, what defines the reality of the self is its link to absolute life: either as the transcendental spontaneity of the act in the Wissenschaftslehre, or as the transcendent life of the divine in The Invitation to the Blessed Life. either way, Fichte interprets concrete, temporal reality as a manifestation of absolute reality. absolute divine life, in itself eternal, “employs the personal Dasein of humanity as its instrument”79— namely, as the locus in which to achieve actuality, existence, manifestness. in these terms, evil simply cannot be thought as a positive reality. and if evil is not real, then repentance has no basis. Fichte writes: “in him [that is, the person who manifests divine life] there is no fear for the future…no repentance over the past, for insofar as he was not in god he was nothing, and this is now at an end.”80 to repent is to give reality to what has no reality. it would be to break with most of the western tradition for which only being is, non-being is not. Fichte refuses such infidelity to the philosophical tradition; Kierkegaard embraces it. to repent of nothing, he suggests, is the “highest wisdom.” to repent of nothing would signify the self’s becoming transparent to itself concerning its own radical lack of foundation, its own radical finitude. It would signify existence becoming transparent to itself as precisely not a modality of absolute life. such an act, thinking nothing as the very positive reality of the self, would put the self into touch, not with a ground [Grund], but an abyss [Af-grund]. to repent of nothing would be to know oneself as “floating over an abyss of 70,000 fathoms.” Thus, even if Kierkegaard speaks of the self “grounding itself in the power that posited it,”81 this way for a self to ground itself does not operate according to the logic of the ground found in Fichte’s texts (or in other idealist texts). The self grounds itself finally on an abyss. But to recognize the self’s radical lack of foundation in this way is basically to reverse the entire Fichtean trajectory of thinking the self as foundation.

157–8, 163–9, 223–6. of particular importance is that the self’s choice of itself is interpreted precisely as despair. 79 Fichte, The Way towards the Blessed Life, p. 464 / SW, vol. 5, p. 550. 80 Fichte, The Way towards the Blessed Life, p. 476 / SW, vol. 5, p. 563. 81 SKS 11, 136 / SUD, 14.

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—— Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben, vols. 1–10, Breslau: Josef max und Comp. 1840–44, vol. 3, p. 318; pp. 326–7; vol. 4, p. 4; p. 64; pp. 79–80; pp. 121–3; p. 146; pp. 152–67; p. 254; p. 261; vol. 5, p. 165; pp. 272–9; vol. 6, p. 111; p. 140; p. 175; pp. 273–4; vol. 8, p. 437; vol. 10, p. 10; p. 33 (ASKB 1834–1843). thiersch, Friedrih, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, pp. 19f. (ASKB 1378). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 82; p. 97; p. 195; p. 273; vol. 2, pp. 346–7 (ASKB 843). —— “Fichte,” in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846, pp. 297–313 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855 not in ASKB]. waitz, theodor, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, Braunschweig: Friedrich vieweg und sohn 1849, p. 6; p. 9; pp. 29f.; pp. 51ff.; p. 422 (ASKB 852). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. xi; p. 33n; p. 82 (ASKB 1379–1380). —— Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: C.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1833, p. 30n; p. 204n (ASKB 866). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Ueber Religion und Theologie. Erläuterungen zu seinem Lehrbuche der Dogmatik, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1815, p. 20; p. 25; p. 138 (ASKB a i 34). —— Christliche Sittenlehre, vols. 1–3, Berlin: g. reimer 1819–23, vol. 3, p. 56n (ASKB u 110). wirth, Johann ulrich, “Formaler idealismus,” in his Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritischdogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’scher verlag 1845, pp. 345–66; see also p. 18; p. 63; p. 318 (ASKB 876). wolff, oskar ludwig Bernhard, Handbuch deutscher Beredsamkeit enthaltend eine Uebersicht der Geschichte und Theorie der Redekunst, zugleich mit einer vollständigen Sammlung deutscher Reden jedes Zeitalters und jeder Gattung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Carl B. lorck 1845–46, vol. 2, pp. 169–81 (ASKB 250–251). zeuthen, ludvig, Humanitet betragtet fra et christeligt Standpunkt, med stadigt Hensyn til den nærværende Tid, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1846, p. 34 (ASKB 915). —— Om Ydmyghed. En Afhandling, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel 1852, p. 19; p. 92 (ASKB 916). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Fichte adorno, theodor w., Kierkegaard. Construction of the Aesthetic, minneapolis: university of minnesota press 1989, pp. 27–9; p. 49; p. 70; p. 73, p. 77; p. 102. anz, wilhelm, “selbstbewußtsein und selbst. zur idealismuskritik Kierkegaards,” in Kierkegaard und die deutsche Philosphie seiner Zeit, Copenhagen and munich: wilhelm Fink verlag 1980 (Text und Kontext, sonderreihe, vol. 7), pp. 47–61.

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goggi, giulio, “il ‘non-io’ di Fichte e l’‘ignoto’ di Kierkegaard. analogie,” in Il religioso in Kierkegaard: atti del convegno di studi organizzato dalla Società Italiana per gli Studi Kierkegaardiani tenutosi dal 14 al 16 dicembre 2000 a Venezia, ed. by isabella Adinolfi, Brescia: Morcelliana 2002 (Filosofia. Nuova serie, vol. 5), pp. 421–35. Hirsch, emanuel, “die einwirkung Johann gottlieb Fichte,” in his KierkegaardStudien, vols. 1–2, gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, pp. 25–31 [pp. 471–7]. (reprinted, vaduz, liechtenstein: toposverlag 1978. First published in Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode, nos. 29, 31, 32, 36, 1930–33. the reprint retains the pagination of the first publication, giving the page numbers of the 1933 edition in square brackets). Hochenbleicher-schwartz, anton, Das Existenzproblem bei J.G. Fichte und S. Kierkegaard, Königstein: Forum academicum 1984 (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, vol. 225). Janke, wolfgang, “das phantastische und die phantasie bei Hegel und Fichte im lichte von Kierkegaards pseudonyme schriften,” in his Entgegensetungen. Studien zu Fichte-Konfrontation von Rousseau bis Kierkegaard, amsterdam, atlanta: editions rodopi 1994, pp. 159–86. Kloeden, wolfdietrich v., “Kierkegaard und J.g. Fichte,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 114–43. Omine, Akira, ”Das Problem der Reflexion bei Kierkegaard und Fichte,” in FichteStudien. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Systematik der Transzendentalphilosophie, vol. 7: Subjektivität, ed. by Klaus Hammacher, richard schottky, and wolfgang H. schrader, amsterdam and atlanta, georgia: editions rodopi 1995, pp. 59–70. rasmussen, anders moe, “Kierkegaard’s notion of negativity as an epistemological and an anthropological problem,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2004, pp. 252–264, see pp. 262–264. ricoeur, paul, “philosophy after Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, ed. by Jonathan rée and Jane Chamberlain, oxford: Blackwell 1998 pp. 9–25; see p. 11, p. 17, p. 22.. schmidinger, Heinrich, “Kierkegaard und Fichte,” Gregorianum, vol. 62, 1981, pp. 499–541. —— Das Problem des Interesses und die Philosophie Sören Kierkegaards, Freiburg: alber 1983. schulz, walter, Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Sören Kierkegaard, pfullingen: neske 1977. tielsch, elfriede, “die stellung von Kierkegaards wertschöpferischem glauben, der seine ‘zweite’ ethik ausmacht, zu der ‘autonomen,’ imperativistischen soll- und gesetzesethik seiner zeit, zu Freud, schleiermacher und Fichte,” in her Kierkegaards Glaube. Der Aufbruch des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts in das Zeitalter moderner, realistischer Religionsauffassung, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1964, pp. 43–50.

Hegel: Kierkegaard’s reading and use of Hegel’s primary texts Jon stewart

Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel is one of the great hobbyhorses of nineteenth-century philosophy. the way in which this story has traditionally been told is, however, entirely one-sided. according to the standard view, Kierkegaard rejected every aspect of Hegel’s thought and was one of the most virulent anti-Hegelians in the history of philosophy. this view was articulated most clearly in niels thulstrup’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel.1 in a recent work i have tried to call this view into question in part by means of a study of Kierkegaard’s relations to some of the main figures of the Danish Hegel reception.2 Kierkegaard’s view of Hegel was profoundly shaped by his view of then contemporary danish Hegelians and by an extensive and quickly growing body of secondary literature on Hegel at the time. the inordinate size of that body of material, both in Danish and in German, makes it an almost inexhaustible field of study. it is not possible in a short article of this kind to treat this material in a way that does it justice. what i wish to do instead is explore Kierkegaard’s direct relation to Hegel, that is, his relation to Hegel’s primary texts in contrast to his indirect relation via various danish or german Hegelians. thus, i wish to trace as carefully as possible the various references, quotations, paraphrases or allusions to Hegel’s works that appear in Kierkegaard’s œuvre. i have generally tried to limit myself to passages which clearly and unambiguously refer to Hegel’s primary texts. passages where Kierkegaard uses Hegelian language or methodology will not be dealt with since the absence of a direct citation or quotation makes it difficult to unambiguously identify Kierkegaard’s source. Hegelian jargon and motifs were common currency in the philosophical language of the day, and Kierkegaard’s occasional use of them may well have been inspired by secondary sources rather than Hegel’s primary texts. thus, while there may well be passages that is, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1967. Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980. german translation: Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835–1846, stuttgart: verlag w. Kohlhammer 1972. 2 Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003. 1

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of this sort which can be interpreted as reactions to or commentaries on specific passages in Hegel, i have omitted mentioning them here unless their actual source in Hegel’s primary texts can be unambiguously established. i will proceed chronologically by tracing the references to Hegel’s works that can be found in both Kierkegaard’s published texts and in his journals and notebooks. Kierkegaard cites Hegel extensively until 1843, but after Either/Or unambiguous references to his primary texts all but disappear. while he owned several of Hegel’s primary texts, he does not appear to have made a careful study of them before working on his dissertation. thus, the actual period of Kierkegaard’s use of Hegel’s primary texts as sources is surprisingly short, that is, from around 1840 to 1843. this thesis will strike many as counterintuitive since his great polemic with Hegel is usually considered to have reached its culmination in 1846 with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, but that work evinces no evidence of any renewed study of any of Hegel’s primary texts. On the basis of the texts he cites I will argue that Hegel’s influence on Kierkegaard is, generally speaking, quite positive: Kierkegaard makes productive use of a number of analyses in Hegel’s primary texts. Further, i wish to argue that Kierkegaard tended to read Hegel in an ad hoc fashion. in other words, he never made an exhaustive study of any one of Hegel’s works but rather carefully explored individual sections and passages in Hegel’s texts which were relevant for his own intellectual agenda. Hegel was thus an important interlocutor and source of inspiration in the development of Kierkegaard’s authorship. I. The Early Journals AA-KK and the notebooks 1–7 there are scattered references to Hegel in the journals AA,3 BB,4 and CC,5 but none of these contains quotations or paraphrases of any of Hegel’s works and thus evidence no first–hand familiarity with them. In Journal DD Hegel appears in a handful of entries.6 this journal contains Kierkegaard’s reading notes to Karl rosenkranz’s article, “eine parallele zur religionsphilosophie.”7 in this context Hegel is named twice in reference to his philosophy of religion.8 in one of these passages Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is quoted.9 While this represents the first direct reference to SKS 17, 19, aa:12. SKS 17, 42, aa:22. SKS 17, 49, aa:36. SKS 17, 49, aa:37. SKS 17, 119, BB:25. SKS 17, 121, BB:32. 5 SKS 17, 200, CC:12. 6 Here one finds Kierkegaard’s familiar complaint about people who try to go beyond Hegel (SKS 17, 262, dd:141) and his comparison of Hegel with Johannes Climacus (SKS 17, 277, dd:203). 7 Karl rosenkranz, “eine parallele zur religionsphilosophie,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Bruno Bauer, Berlin: dümmler 1836–38, vol. 2, no. 1, 1837, pp. 1–31 (ASKB 354–357). see SKS K17, p. 371. 8 SKS 17, 220–1, dd:10. 9 Hegel, PhS, pp. 292f. / Jub. vol. 2, p. 371. there he quotes the following (which is itself quoted by rosenkranz): “in this knowledge of himself as the sum and substance of all actual powers, this lord and master of the world is the titanic self-consciousness that 3 4

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a primary text by Hegel, it is clear from the context that Kierkegaard’s information is second–hand since he quotes rosenkranz’s quotation of Hegel. Just after this there is a marginal note with a reference to the concept of pure being in Hegel.10 later there is an allusion to what Hegel calls “Ernsthaftigkeit.”11 these too are based on rosenkranz’s article. in another passage, in a marginal note Kierkegaard quotes Hegel. there he writes, “just like the gymnosophists among the indians: ‘naked Fakirs wander about without any occupation, like the mendicant friars of the Catholic Church; they live from the alms of others, and make it their aim to reach the highest degree of abstraction.’ Cf. Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 183.”12 the gymnosophists were ascetic wise men of india, whom Hegel discusses in his lectures. while, it is true, this is a direct quotation from Hegel’s posthumously published Lectures on the Philosophy of History, it is doubtful that Kierkegaard made a systematic study of this work at this time. the undated marginal entry was most likely added around 1840 or 1841 when Kierkegaard, while working on his dissertation The Concept of Irony, had occasion to read these lectures carefully.13 Kierkegaard wrote the Journal DD from the front and then turned it around and wrote from the back the student comedy, The Conflict between the Old and the New Soap-Cellar. The cast of characters includes “A fly who has wisely wintered for many years with the late Hegel and who has been so fortunate as to have sat on his immortal nose several times during the composition of his work, Phänomenologie des Geistes.”14 it is generally conceded that this satire is directed primarily against the danish Hegelians. in any case, this reference to the Phenomenology of Spirit and

thinks of itself as being an actual living god. But since he is only the formal self which is unable to tame those powers, his activities and self-enjoyment are equally monstrous.” (PhS = Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by a.v. miller, oxford: Clarendon press 1977. Jub. = Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, edited by Hermann glockner, stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann verlag 1928–41.) 10 SKS 17, 222, dd:11.a. 11 SKS 17, 239, dd:50.a. 12 SKS 17, 266, dd:161.b. quoted from Hegel, Phil. of Hist., p. 150 / Jub. vol. 11, p. 205. (Phil. of Hist = The Philosophy of History, trans. by J. sibree, new york: willey Book Co. 1944.) 13 in a footnote in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard quotes the following passage from the same analysis in Hegel’s lectures: “in the episode nala, in the poem of mahabharata, we have a story of a virgin who in her twenty-first year—the age in which the maidens themselves have a right to choose a husband—makes a selection from among her wooers. there are five of them; but the maiden remarks that four of them do not stand firmly on their feet, and thence infers correctly that they are gods. She therefore chooses the first, who is a veritable man.” SKS 1, 245n / CI, 199n. quoted from Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 2nd edition, ed. by Karl Hegel, Berlin 1840, p. 185. Phil. of Hist, p. 151 / Jub., vol. 11, p. 207. 14 SKS 17, 281, dd:208 / EPW, 106.

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a later one to Hegel’s well-known doctrine of the bad infinity15 are not enough to support the claim that Kierkegaard studied his works directly at this time. there are three references to Hegel respectively in Journal EE16 and Journal FF,17 none of which refers to a primary text. the long Journal JJ contains several references to Hegel, but no primary text is mentioned or quoted.18 Hegel makes only a single appearance in the Journal KK,19 in the context of Kierkegaard’s reading notes to Julius schaller’s work on strauss’ The Life of Christ.20 Notebooks 1–7 follow the pattern of the early journals in that the references to Hegel are second–hand and appear in the context of Kierkegaard’s readings of other authors. in Notebook 4, for example, Hegel is mentioned in lecture notes to martensen’s Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics,21 reading notes to erdmann’s Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen,22 and reading notes to Christian Hermann weiße’s review of Julius schaller’s book on Hegel’s philosophy.23 Notebook 5 twice mentions Hegel’s relation to schelling and the doctrine of the immanent movement of thought,24 but neither mention offers evidence of any detailed study of his texts.

SKS 17, 295.10–15, dd:208 / EPW, 122. (translated in EPW as the “spurious infinity.”) 16 SKS 18, 14, ee:26 / JP 2, 1576. SKS 18, 17, ee:35 / JP 2, 1577. SKS 18, 34f., ee:93 / JP 2, 1578. (while i have consistently referenced JP, many of the quoted passages are my own translations.) 17 SKS 18, 96, FF:108 / JP 2, 1571. SKS 18, 109, FF:176 / JP 2, 1572. SKS 18, 113, FF:196 / JP 2, 1574. 18 SKS 18, 193, JJ:165 / JP 5, 5697. SKS 18, 200, JJ:187 / JP 2, 1604. SKS 18, 202, JJ:194 / JP 1, 704. SKS 18, 224, JJ:265 / JP 2, 1605. SKS 18, 225, JJ:267 / JP 2, 1941. SKS 18, 231, JJ:288 / JP 3, 3300. SKS 18, 233, JJ:293 / JP 5, 5768. SKS 18, 235f., JJ:303 / JP 3, 3303. SKS 18, 299, JJ:478 / JP 3, 3327. SKS 18, 302f., JJ:488 / JP 1, 1042. 19 SKS 18, 324.9, KK:2. 20 Julius schaller, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie. Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig 1838 (ASKB 759). see SKS K18, p. 489. 21 SKS 19, 127, not4:4. SKS 19, 128, not4:5. SKS 19, 136, not4:9. 22 SKS 19, 145f., not4:14. Johann eduard erdmann, Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie gehalten und auf den Wunsch seiner Zuhörer herausgegeben, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837 (ASKB 479). see SKS K19, pp. 199f. 23 SKS 19, 170f., not4:46. Christian Hermann weiße, “die drei grundfragen der gegenwärtigen philosophie. mit Bezug auf die schrift: Die Philosophie unserer Zeit. Zur Apologie und Erläuterung des Hegelschen Systemes. von Julius schaller. leipzig, Hinrichs. 1837,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, ed. by i.H. Fichte, vol. 1, no. 1, 1837, pp. 67–114; vol. 1, no. 2, 1837, pp. 161–201 (ASKB 354–357). see SKS K19, pp. 217f. 24 SKS 19, 185, not5:18 / JP 2, 1593. SKS 19, 185, not5:21 / JP 2, 1590. 15

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II. From the papers of one still living In Kierkegaard’s first published book, From the Papers of One Still Living, from 1838, Hegel is referred to four times in the first few pages, albeit without any clear or direct textual references. On the very first page, Kierkegaard writes the following: if we meet this phenomenon in its most respectable form, as it appears in Hegel’s great attempt to begin with nothing, it must both impress and please us: impress us, in view of the moral strength with which the idea is conceived, the intellectual energy and virtuosity with which it is carried out; please us, because the whole negation is still only a movement inside the system’s own limits, undertaken precisely in the interest of retrieving the pure abundance of existence.25

with this strikingly positive statement, Kierkegaard refers to a point of much discussion at the time, namely the proper, logically justified beginning of philosophy. Here he does little more than simply state his agreement with Hegel’s account of this beginning (presumably that given in the Science of Logic or the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences). He also goes out of his way to laud the immanent nature of Hegel’s dialectical movement, which, of course, lies at the heart of his dialectical and systematic thinking. these highly positive comments must have been quite striking for contemporary readers given that Hegel’s philosophy was being discussed quite critically in denmark at the time. thus, Kierkegaard’s statements here were inevitably taken to be an expression of a party affiliation with the Hegelians.26 Kierkegaard refers to Hegel’s account of the beginning of philosophy again in the context of a critical discussion of contemporary literature: the extraordinary willingness and readiness, the almost gracious obligingness, with which thousands in our own day, as soon as a reasonable word has been spoken, ever stand ready to misunderstand it, has also been in tireless activity here. its extent can easily be determined by everyone who has observed that the entire recent literature is, on the one hand, so completely preoccupied with prefacing and writing introductions. it has forgotten that the beginning with nothing of which Hegel speaks was mastered by himself in the system and was by no means a failure to appreciate the great richness actuality has.27 SKS 1, 17 / EPW, 61. Both H.C. andersen and Henrik Hertz, upon reading this work, took Kierkegaard to be a Hegelian. andersen writes, From the Papers of One Still Living was “somewhat difficult to read because of the Hegelian heaviness of expression.” Hans Christian andersen, Mit Livs Eventyr, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1855, p. 198. (reprinted in andersen’s Samlede Skrifter, vols. 1–15, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1876–80, vol. 1, p. 188.) see Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen By His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, p. 28. similarly, Hertz warns, “those who have picked up on the german philosophy are completely incapable of practicing it in danish. their text teems with words of which no dane knows the meaning. [Kierkegaard’s] work on andersen shows what language we can expect from this philosophy.” ibid., p. 218. 27 SKS 1, 18 / EPW, 62. Kierkegaard refers to Hegel again somewhat cryptically in a footnote to this passage: SKS 1, 18n / EPW, 62n: “the Hegelians, however, must not be taken altogether literally when they mention their relation to actuality, for when in this respect they refer to their master’s immortal work (his Logic), it seems to me to be like the rules 25 26

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particularly striking here is Kierkegaard’s laudatory assessment of “the great richness” of actuality in Hegel’s system. usually, Kierkegaard is known for his criticism of Hegel’s thought for being too abstract or for forgetting actuality and existence. Here he lauds him for just the opposite. the same two points—Hegel’s account of the beginning of philosophy and his immanent dialectic—are referred to again in another passage a few pages later. Kierkegaard again favorably contrasts Hegel to a modern view he wishes to criticize. the modern view under scrutiny is characterized thus: a sorrier form of the same delusion...is to be seen in the main trend of the age in the political sphere. This form misunderstands the deeper significance of historical evolution and clings curiously enough, as if in a fight for its life, to the cliché that the world always becomes wiser, understood, please note, with a reasoning favorable to this moment but parodic.28

the point seems to be that the modern age holds the past in contempt, arrogantly ascribing to itself a knowledge superior to that of past ages; however, it fails to see that its own achievements are in fact built on the failures of past ages. Kierkegaard then adds: “like Hegel, it [the tendency] begins, not the system but existence, with nothing, and the negative element, through which and by virtue of which all the movements occur (Hegel’s immanent negativity of the Concept), is distrust, which undeniably has such a negative force that it...must end by killing itself.”29 Kierkegaard refers to Hegel’s dialectical method according to which the positive is produced from the negative and vice versa. thus, Hegel is more even-handed in his assessment of the past since he realizes that past ideas which are now discredited were necessary for the evolution of the current views which refute them. there is value in the past, which the modern age, in its rush towards improvement and innovation, fails to see. the references to Hegel in the text focus on issues from the Science of Logic, but these issues—the beginning of philosophy and the immanent dialectic—were generally familiar to most students of theology or philosophy at the university of Copenhagen at the time and thus do not necessarily presuppose any profound knowledge of Hegel’s work. yet if these references to Hegel evince no close study of his primary texts, they do nonetheless evince a general interest in his thought, especially given that they have little to do with the actual subject matter of From the governing rank and precedence, in which, beginning with secretaries (Seyn, pure being), one then through ‘other secretaries’ (das Andre, das Besondre, Nichts—therefore it is also said that other secretaries sind so viel wie Nichts)—lets the category ‘actual secretaries etc.’ appear, without therefore being entitled to conclude that there is in actuality a single ‘actual secretary.’” For an explanation of this complicated reference, see the commentary to this passage in SKS K1, 83, “Rangforordning.” a precursor to this passage is SKS 17, 49, aa:37. this is as close as Kierkegaard comes to a direct textual reference in this work. But even here it is not clear if by the “immortal work” he means to refer to the Science of Logic or the first volume of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which is of course also dedicated to logic. 28 SKS 1, 18f. / EPW, 63. Translation slightly modified. 29 SKS 1, 20 / EPW, 64. Translation slightly modified.

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Papers of One Still Living. in addition to these direct references to Hegel, it has often been noted that much of the language of the work itself is Hegelian. III. the Concept of irony søren Kierkegaard’s 1841 master’s thesis, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, directly cites and makes extensive use of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History,30 Lectures on the History of Philosophy,31 Lectures on Aesthetics,32 the Philosophy of Right33 and Hegel’s review of solger’s posthumous writings.34 much of the language of The Concept of Irony is Hegelian, and many of the analyses closely follow those found in the aforementioned works. Kierkegaard’s short introduction is clearly indebted to the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. although Kierkegaard is usually associated with criticisms of abstraction, his introduction calls for balancing the abstract and the empirical: “if there is anything that must be praised in the modern philosophical endeavor in its magnificent manifestation, it certainly is the power of genius with which it seizes and holds on to the phenomenon.”35 this encomium contrasts noticably with his later criticisms that it is precisely the concrete phenomenon which speculative philosophy at best fails to grasp and at worst simply forgets or ignores. the introduction begins by discussing the respective roles of philosophy and history vis-à-vis one another. in this context he likens philosophy to a confessor, who hears the confession of history.36 But this image does not necessarily indicate that he believes philosophy is superior to history. He ultimately argues for the importance of

Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. by eduard gans, Berlin 1837, vol. 9 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Förster, eduard gans, Karl Hegel, leopold von Henning, Heinrich gustav Hotho, philipp marheineke, Carl ludwig michelet, Karl rosenkranz, Johannes schulze, Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1832–45. 31 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, i–iii, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833–36, vols. 13–5 (ASKB 557–559) in Hegel’s Werke, op. cit. 32 Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, i–iii, ed. by Heinrich gustav Hotho, Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1835–38, vols. 10–1, 10–2, 10–3 (ASKB 1384–1386) in Hegel’s Werke, op. cit. 33 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, ed. by eduard gans, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833 (2nd ed., 1840), vol. 8 (ASKB 551) in Hegel’s Werke, op. cit. 34 “Über Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel. Herausgegeben von ludwig tieck und Friedrich von raumer. erster Band 780 s. mit vorr. Xvi s. zweiter Band 784 s. leipzig, 1826,” Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, erster artikel (march 1828), nos. 51–2, pp. 403–6, nos. 53–4, pp. 417–28; zweiter artikel (June 1828), nos. 105–6, pp. 838–48, nos. 107–8, pp. 849–64, nos. 109–10, pp. 865–70. reprinted in Vermischte Schriften, i–ii, ed. by Friedrich Förster and ludwig Boumann, Berlin 1834–35, vols. 16–17 in Hegel’s Werke, op. cit., vol. 16 (1834), pp. 436–506 (ASKB 555–556). in Jub. vol. 20, pp. 132–202. 35 SKS 1, 71 / CI, 9. Translation slightly modified. 36 SKS 1, 72 / CI, 10. 30

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both, the abstract idea and the concrete historical event, and the need for both sides of this dialectical relation to receive their due: [philosophy and history] ought to have their rights so that, on the one hand, the phenomenon has its rights and is not to be intimidated and discouraged by philosophy’s superiority, and philosophy, on the other hand, is not to let itself be infatuated by the charms of the particular, is not to be distracted by the superabundance of the particular. the same holds for the concept of irony: philosophy is not to look too long at one particular side of its phenomenological existence and above all at its appearance but is to see the truth of the concept in and with the phenomenological.37

Here Kierkegaard in effect states that he wishes to employ Hegel’s dialectic in his approach to the historical concept of irony. what is surprising is that this champion of concrete actuality and existence warns against becoming too fixated on the empirical and the particular and urges that the investigation keep to the abstract or, more specifically, that it see the abstract concept in the actual empirical entities. This could hardly be said better by Hegel himself. In the first chapter, “The View Made Possible,” Kierkegaard plays the role of the philologist, examining and comparing the different portrayals of socrates with an eye towards the characterization of his use of irony. generally speaking, Hegel plays a rather minimal role in this chapter, although his doctrine of the bad infinity38 and his characterization of irony as “infinite, absolute negativity”39 are mentioned. nonetheless Kierkegaard demonstrates a keen awareness and understanding of his dialectical method. in one passage he contrasts plato’s dialectic unfavorably with Hegel’s speculative method: at this point i cannot elaborate on the relation between a dichotomy as found in plato and the kind of trichotomy the modern and in a stricter sense speculative development insists on...presumably the socratically disciplined dialogue is an attempt to allow the thought itself to emerge in all its objectivity, but the successive conception and intuition, which only the dialectical trilogy makes possible, is, of course, lacking.40

Kierkegaard thus reiterates Hegel’s criticism that the platonic dialectic stops with the negative and contains no positive element. Kierkegaard later draws an analogy between the socratic ἔλεγχος and the negative dimension in the Hegelian dialectic and praises the immanent nature of Hegel’s dialectical method,41 which requires SKS 1, 72f. / CI, 10f. see also SKS 1, 71 / CI, 9: “therefore, even if the observer does bring the concept along with him, it is still of great importance that the phenomenon remain inviolate and that the concept be seen as coming into existence through the phenomenon.” 38 SKS 1, 82 / CI, 21. SKS 1, 83 / CI, 22. SKS 1, 85 / CI, 23. see also SKS 2, 281 / EO1, 292. SKS 3, 34 / EO2, 26. SKS 7, 109f. / CUP1, 112f. SKS 7, 309 / CUP1, 338. SKS 18, 17, ee:35 / JP 2, 1577. SKS 18, 45, ee:119 / JP 2, 1579. SKS 20, 67, nB:76 / JP 3, 2811. SKS 17, 247, dd:77 / JP 4, 3857. 39 SKS 1, 87 / CI, 26. see also SKS 1, 297 / CI, 259. SKS 1, 299 / CI, 261. 40 SKS 1, 93f. / CI, 32. 41 SKS 1, 96 / CI, 35: “in this sense, socratic questioning is clearly, even though remotely, analogous to the negative in Hegel, except that the negative, according to Hegel, is a necessary 37

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nothing external. Kierkegaard makes it clear that he prefers Hegel’s dialectic to plato’s. For example, he writes, in the second case [sc. of socratic dialectic], the subject is an account to be settled between the one asking and the one answering, and the thought developed fulfills itself in this rocking gait (alterno pede), in this limping on both sides. this, too, is of course a kind of dialectical movement, but since the element of unity is lacking, inasmuch as every answer contains a possibility of a new question, it is not the truly dialectical evolution. this understanding of questioning and answering is identical with the meaning of dialogue, which is like a symbol of the greek conception of the relation between deity and man, where there certainly is a reciprocal relation but no element of unity (neither an immediate nor a higher unity), and genuine duality is really lacking also....42

truly dialectical progress requires negations or oppositions to be generated immanently by the original position; when they come from the outside, there is no necessary relation between the original position and the contradiction that arises. Hegel’s dialectic, unlike plato’s, can continue to advance without outside assistance.43 this initial chapter also contains two direct references (both in Kierkegaard’s account of aristophanes) to Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. in the first he quotes Hegel presumably to support his point that one should resist the temptation to interpret the past in terms of the issues and categories of one’s present age, which in the case at hand would presumably lead to a critical condemnation of the sophists.44 one of Kierkegaard’s central theses is that socrates had no positive

element in thought itself, is a determinant ad intra; in plato, the negative is made graphic and placed outside the object in the inquiring individual. in Hegel, the thought does not need to be questioned from the outside, for it asks and answers itself from within; in plato, thought answers only insofar as it is questioned, but whether or not it is questioned is accidental, and how it is questioned is not less accidental.” 42 SKS 1, 97 / CI, 35f. see also his account of “the negative element” which is “the propelling element in thought” (SKS 1, 159 / CI, 106). 43 later Kierkegaard underscores the same point again when he writes, “we have not, therefore, a genuinely platonic dichotomy, which, as noted earlier, suffers from all the troubles of a dichotomy because it has the negative outside itself and the unity achieved can never hypostasize itself.” SKS 1, 160 / CI, 107. see also: “...while the essentially philosophical dialectic, the speculative, unites, the negative dialectic, because it relinquishes the idea, is a broker who continually makes transactions in a lower sphere; that is, it separates.” SKS 1, 200f. / CI, 151. 44 SKS 1, 186n / CI, 135n: “in this exposition i have mainly focused on the intellectual aspect, because this obviously is closest to greek culture. to be sure, a similar dialectic, the arbitrary, manifests itself in an even more lamentable form in the ethical sphere, but in this respect i also believe that the characteristic features of one’s own age are sometimes given too much attention in interpreting the transitional period of greek culture in aristophanes’ day. Hegel is quite correct in saying (Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 70): ‘we must not blame the sophists because, in the aimlessness of their time, they did not discover the principle of the good.’ ” Kierkegaard quotes Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 70. see Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 406 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 70. (Hist. of Phil. i–iii =

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doctrine but rather represented sheer negativity. He cites the Lectures on the History of Philosophy in support of his position: Hegel, after having shown how the Socratic dialectic destroys all the concrete qualifications of the good at the expense of the good itself as the empty, contentless universal, and with the aid thereof, also notes that it is aristophanes who has understood socrates’ philosophy merely from its negative side (Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 85). But, of course, if there had been a platonic positivity in socrates, then, however much freedom the greeks allowed their comedy writers, aristophanes undeniably has overstepped the boundary, the boundary the comic itself possesses, the requirement that it must be true to the comic point of view.45

Here Kierkegaard refers again to Hegel’s account of socrates, where one reads, “aristophanes regarded the socratic philosophy from the negative side, maintaining that through the cultivation of reflecting consciousness, the idea of law had been shaken, and we cannot question the justice of this conception.”46 Kierkegaard thus agrees with Hegel’s judgment that aristophanes was correct to characterize socrates as wholly negative. He then interprets the absence of protests against aristophanes’ characterization as evidence that it (and Hegel) are correct. in his second chapter, entitled, “the actualization of the view,” Kierkegaard departs from his philological analysis of the various depictions of socrates and focuses on the content of those portrayals. while, for obvious reasons, Hegel played little role in the philological considerations in the first chapter, Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the meaning of the historical socrates draws freely on Hegel’s accounts of socrates in particular and the greek world in general. Kierkegaard’s analysis of socrates’ daimon47 amounts to little more than stringing together quotations from Hegel’s texts. He quotes directly the Lectures on the Philosophy of History48 and from the Philosophy of Right.49 most importantly, however, his account is largely derivative from Hegel’s treatment of the same issue in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, which are also quoted several times.50 Kierkegaard introduces Hegel into this discussion with a quotation from the Lectures on the Philosophy of History: one of Hegel’s statements expresses in a general sense and yet very pregnantly how to understand the daimon: “socrates, in assigning to insight, to conviction, the determination Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–3, trans. by e.s. Haldane, lincoln and london: university of nebraska press 1995.) 45 SKS 1, 202n / CI, 152n and f. 46 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 85. see Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 426 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 85. 47 SKS 1, 207–15 / CI, 157–67. 48 SKS 1, 211 / CI, 161. Hegel, Phil. of Hist., vol. 1, pp. 269–70 / Jub., vol. 11, pp. 350–351. 49 SKS 1, 211 / CI, 162. Hegel, PR, § 279, remark / Jub., vol. 7, pp. 385–6. (PR = Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H.B. nisbet, ed. by allen wood, Cambridge and new york: Cambridge university press 1991.) 50 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 421–5 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 89–100.

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of men’s actions, posited the individual as capable of a final moral decision, in contraposition to country and customary morality, and thus made himself an oracle in the greek sense. He said that he had a δαιμόνιον within himself, which counselled him what to do, and revealed to him what was advantageous to his friends.”51

also by way of introduction to Hegel’s treatment of the issue, the Philosophy of Right is quoted as follows: in the Philosophy of Right also, Hegel discusses this daimon of socrates. see § 279: “in the daimon of socrates, we can see how the will which in the past had simply projected itself beyond itself began to turn in upon itself and to recognize itself from within, which is the beginning of a self-knowing and hence genuine freedom.”52

Kierkegaard quotes these two texts here at the outset and then goes on to make extensive use of Hegel’s most detailed treatment of this issue in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.53 Kierkegaard follows Hegel by interpreting the socratic daimon as a new and destructive influence on traditional Greek morality and religion. According to Hegel, prior to the appearance of Socrates and critical reflection, the Greeks lived in a state of pure immediacy, regarding their customs and traditions as the natural order of things. the web of religious belief, cultural values, and tradition, which Hegel designated by the term “Sittlichkeit,” so thoroughly enveloped the individual that it never occurred to anyone to question it. Kierkegaard quotes Hegel, as follows, “the standpoint of the greek mind was natural morality, in which man did not yet determine himself.”54 people simply obeyed traditional laws and customs without reflection and thereby displayed no subjective element of personal freedom. one manifestation of traditional religion and morality is the oracle, which represents an absolute, objective truth. Kierkegaard again quotes from Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy: this element, the fact that the people had not the power of decision but were determined from without, was a real factor in greek consciousness; and oracles were everywhere essential where man did not yet know himself inwardly as being sufficiently free and independent to take upon himself to decide—and this is a lack of subjective freedom.55

the greeks allowed nature or the external world as interpreted in the form of the statements of the oracle to determine their actions, individuals not daring to make a decision and to act on their own accord. By contrast, socrates represented the incipient force of subjective freedom. His relentless questioning of his contemporaries called into question traditional notions of truth and justice. He asked for rational and SKS 1, 211 / CI, 161. Hegel, Phil. of Hist., pp. 269f. / Jub., vol. 11, pp. 350f. translation slightly modified. 52 SKS 1, 211 / CI, 162. Hegel, PR, § 279, p. 320 / Jub., vol. 7, p. 385. 53 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 421–5 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 89–100. 54 SKS 1, 212 / CI, 163. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 422f. / Jub., vol. 18, p. 96. 55 SKS 1, 212f. / CI, 163. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 423 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 97. Translation slightly modified. See PhS, pp. 340–342 / Jub., vol. 2, pp. 542–4. 51

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discursive justifications for the truth of the established state religion and traditional morality. a new principle of reason was introduced in the sense that an individual could attain truth on his own with the use of critical reason and thus free himself from the state of culturally determined immediacy. socrates’ daimon represented a private version of the traditional oracles. Just as the gods speak to human beings through the oracle, so also socrates’ private god, the daimon, speaks to him directly. the oracle required a priest or priestess to proclaim the will of the gods; however, socrates received this information directly from his daimon without the intermediary of a priest. in addition, the oracle was the organ of the universal; it addressed the people as a whole, and it was asked questions in the name of the people. By contrast, socrates’ daimon was purely particular. it told him personally how to manage his own personal affairs. the oracle was external; it existed outside in the world. By contrast, socrates’ daimon dwelt in his body and revealed itself directly to his mind. while the daimon was clearly antagonistic to traditional morality, it did not represent modern radical individualism. it was different from socrates’ own will and to that extent still represented a principle of objectivity like the oracle. it often discouraged socrates from doing things he wanted to do, and he respected its counsels as coming from a foreign principle in the same way that the people subjected themselves to the will of the oracle. in a passage quoted by Kierkegaard, Hegel expresses this as follows: “the daimon of socrates stands midway between the externality of the oracle and the pure inwardness of the mind.”56 Kierkegaard thus follows Hegel’s account of the daimon by means of a long string of quotations. His addition to this discussion is to interpret the daimon as a manifestation of socratic irony. For this reason he must defend the view that the daimon is purely negative and never positively commands or enjoins action but instead warns and forbids. a positive element would undermine his conception of irony as purely negative. thus, Kierkegaard can fully embrace Hegel’s account of the daimon as an incipient form of what will later become full-blown subjective freedom. the daimon is a negative and destructive force for Hegel just as irony is for Kierkegaard. this point of agreement is doubtless the reason why Kierkegaard is so positively disposed towards Hegel’s analysis.57 Hegel is clearly Kierkegaard’s most important source for the account of the daimon in socrates. on this interpretive point Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel without qualification. the second half of this chapter draws on Hegel’s account of socrates’ trial in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. two references are of particular interest. in the first of these Kierkegaard praises Hegel’s treatment of the charge that Socrates

SKS 1, 213 / CI, 164. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 425 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 99. Translation slightly modified. 57 see SKS 1, 214 / CI, 165: “this concludes my exposition of Hegel’s presentation, and, here as always when one has Hegel along…i have thereby acquired a footing from which i can safely start out on my own excursion to see whether there might be some particular worthy of note to which i can safely return whether or not i have found anything.” 56

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seduced the athenian youth,58 and paraphrases Hegel’s lectures.59 Hegel argues the relation between parent and child is sacred: the worst thing which can happen to children in regard to their morality and their mind, is that the bond which must ever be held in reverence should be loosened or even severed, thereby causing hatred, disdain, and ill-will. whoever does this, does injury to morality in its truest form. This unity, this confidence, is the mother’s milk of morality on which man is nurtured; the early loss of parents is therefore a great misfortune.60

then turning to socrates’ particular case with the son of anytus, Hegel continues, we may very well conjecture that if socrates had to do with him [sc. anytus’ son], he strengthened and developed in him the germ of the feeling of incongruity. socrates remarked on the subject of his capacities, saying that he was fit for something better, and thus established a feeling of dissatisfaction in the young man, and strengthened his dislike to his father, which thus became the reason of his ruin. Hence this accusation of having destroyed the relationship of parents and children may be regarded as not unfounded, but as perfectly well established.61

Kierkegaard generally agrees with this, noting that socrates’ argument about some people being more competent than others to judge does not give him license to appoint himself to this position as he wishes, especially when it contravenes the rights of the parents. Kierkegaard later gives a brief account of Hegel’s critical treatment of socrates’ refusal to propose a serious punishment, as was his option, once he had been found guilty of the charges. He writes, Hegel relates in detail what was wrong with socrates’ conduct. He shows that socrates was deservedly condemned to death, that his crime was refusing to recognize the sovereignty of the nation and asserting instead his subjective conviction over against the objective judgment of the state. His refusal in this respect may very well be regarded as moral greatness, but he nevertheless brought his death upon himself; the state was just as SKS 1, 231f. / CI, 184: “Hegel’s treatment of this particular charge is so excellent that i shall be as brief as possible about everything on which we can agree, lest i bore the more knowledgeable readers with what they already know from him. against meletus’ general charge that he seduced the youths, socrates stakes his whole life; the charge is then made more specific—that he weakened children’s respect for their parents. This is elucidated further by a special exchange between socrates and anytus with respect to anytus’ son. socrates’ defense essentially ends up with the general thesis that the most competent ought to be preferred to the less competent. For example, in the choosing of a general, preference would be given not to the parents but to the experts in warfare. thereupon Hegel propounds as indefensible in socrates’ conduct this moral interference of a third party in the absolute relation between parents and children, an intrusion that seems to have prompted...the young man mentioned above, Anytus’ son, to become dissatisfied with his position. This is as far as Hegel goes and we with him, for we have actually come quite far with this Hegelian view.” 59 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 436–8 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 109–11. 60 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 437 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 110. 61 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 438 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 110f. 58

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in a footnote to this passage Kierkegaard cites a particular lecture63 in which Hegel claims that, given the historical development at the time, the athenians were perfectly correct to condemn socrates.64 the jury had to react as it did in response to socrates’ introduction of the principle of subjective freedom. Chapter 3, entitled “the view made necessary,”65 explores the role of socrates in relation to other greek philosophical movements. Following Hegel’s assessment of the profound impact of socrates on the development of world history, Kierkegaard designates him “a turning point”66 and compares greek culture before and after socrates. in his introductory comments Kierkegaard quotes Hegel twice. the first is a simple anecdote that caught his eye in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy,67 which he quotes without referring to him by name or giving any textual reference: “But socrates did not grow like a mushroom out of the ground; on the contrary, he stands in definite continuity with his time,” a certain man says; but despite this continuity, one must remember that he cannot be completely explained by his past, that if we in one sense regard him as a logical conclusion to the premises of the past, there is more in him than was in the premises, the Ursprüngliche that is necessary if he is truly to be a turning point.68

Here “a certain man” is Hegel.69 the point is the same methodological caveat issued in the introduction to the book, namely that in exploring a historical phenomenon like socrates, one should avoid, on the one hand, tearing the phenomenon out of its immediate historical context and reducing it to a mere abstract idea, and, on the other hand, focusing fixedly on the concrete historical circumstances at the expense of any general understanding. The methodological goal lies, as with Hegel, in finding the idea in the empirical and in keeping the balance between the two elements. after these brief introductory comments, Kierkegaard, turning to his actual analysis, notes that he will confine his discussion of Greek philosophy before socrates to the sophistic movement. in a long footnote he states:

SKS 1, 240 / CI, 193. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 440–448 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 113–21. 64 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 444 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 117: “now because...this new principle [sc. of subjective freedom] by effecting an entrance into the greek world, has come into collision with the substantial spirit and the existing sentiments of the athenian people, a reaction had to take place, for the principle of the greek world could not yet bear the principle of subjective reflection. The Athenian people were thus, not only justified, but also bound to react against it according to their law, for they regarded this principle as a crime.” 65 SKS 1, 244–62 / CI, 198–218. 66 SKS 1, 245 / CI, 200. 67 SKS 1, 245 / CI, 199. 68 ibid. 69 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 384 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 42. 62 63

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Here again Hegel has provided excellent expositions. yet it seems to me that the more prolix study in his Geschichte der Philosophie does not always hang together and at times has the character of a collection of random comments that frequently do not quite fall under the stated rubrics. But to the short sketch (in his Philosophie der Geschichte), as related to the more prolix presentation, a remark Hegel himself made somewhere is applicable: the mind is the best epistomiser. this sketch is so pertinent and clear that i shall quote it.70

Kierkegaard’s compliant about the poor organization or discontinuity of Hegel’s lectures was a common one, since the lectures in their published form were cobbled together by Hegel’s editors from student notes from different courses from different years. Kierkegaard follows Hegel in characterizing the sophists as a negative force, which tore down established customs and values. they thus helped to set into motion the critical assessment of customary ethics and long-held religious beliefs. However, he disagrees with Hegel, who regards the sophists as a wholly negative and destructive force. this is a problem for Kierkegaard since, given his own thesis that Socrates is purely negative, it makes it difficult for him to distinguish Socrates from the sophists. thus, Kierkegaard is anxious to point out the second, positive SKS 1, 247n / CI, 201n. Kierkegaard then goes on to quote the following long passage from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History: “with the sophists began the process of reflection on the existing state of things, and of ratiocination. That very diligence and activity which we observed among the greeks in their practical life, and in the achievement of works of art, showed itself also in the turns and windings which these ideas took; so that, as material things are changed, worked up and used for other than their original purposes, similarly the essential being of spirit—what is thought and known—is variously handled; it is made an object about which the mind can employ itself, and this occupation becomes an interest in and for itself. the movement of thought—that which goes on within its sphere [without reference to an extrinsic object]—a process which had formerly no interest—acquires attractiveness on its own account. The cultivated Sophists, who were not erudite or scientific men, but masters of subtle turns of thought, excited the admiration of the greeks. For all questions they had an answer; for all interests of a political or religious order they had general points of view; and in the ultimate development of their art, they claimed the ability to prove everything, to discover a justifiable side in every position. In a democracy it is a matter of the first importance, to be able to speak in popular assemblies—to urge one’s opinions on public matters. now this demands the power of duly presenting before them that point of view which we desire them to regard as essential. For such a purpose, intellectual culture is needed, and this discipline the greeks acquired under the sophists. this mental culture then became the means, in the hands of those who possess it, of enforcing their views and interests on the demos: the expert sophist knew how to turn the subject of discussion this way or that way at pleasure, and thus the doors were thrown wide open to all human passions. a leading principle of the sophists was that ‘man is the measure of all things’; but in this, as in all their apophthegms, lurks an ambiguity, since the term ‘man’ may denote spirit in its depth and truth, or in the aspect of mere caprice and private interest. the sophists meant ‘man’ simply as subjective, and intended in this dictum of theirs, that mere liking was the principle of right, and that advantage of the individual was the ground of final appeal.” Kierkegaard quotes Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 2nd edition (1840), op. cit., pp. 327f. Phil. of Hist, pp. 268f. / Jub., vol. 11, pp. 349f. 70

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step in the sophists’ program, namely the reestablishment of beliefs and customs. in the context of this same discussion,71 Kierkegaard again quotes at length from Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy: the notion, which reason has found in anaxagoras to be real existence is the simple negative into which all determination, all that is existent and individual sinks. Before the notion nothing can exist, for it is simply the predicateless absolute to which everything is clearly a moment only; for it there is thus nothing so to speak permanently fixed and sealed. the notion is just the continual change of Heraclitus, the movement, the causticity, which nothing can resist. Thus the Notion which finds itself, finds itself as the absolute power before which everything vanishes; and thereby all things, all existence, everything held to be secure, is now made fleeting. The firm ground—whether it be a security of natural being or the security of laws—becomes vacillation and loses its stability. as universal, such principles, etc., certainly themselves pertain to the notion, yet their universality is only their form, for the content which they have, as determinate, falls into movement. we see this movement arising in the so-called sophists.72

like socrates, the sophists tear down without building up again afterwards. Kierkegaard comments on the passage as follows: it seems, however, that Hegel makes the sophistic movement too grandiose, and therefore the distrust one may have about the correctness of his view is strengthened even more by the presence, in his subsequent discussion of sophistry, of various points that cannot be harmonized with it; likewise, if this were the correct interpretation of sophistry, there is much in his conception of socrates that would make it necessary to identify socrates with them.73

insofar as he interprets both as wholly negative, Hegel’s interpretation makes socrates look too much like the sophists. Kierkegaard cannot square this interpretation with plato’s portrayal of socrates as diametrically opposed to the sophists. to distinguish them, Kierkegaard must identify some positive element in the sophists, which is not present in socrates. Kierkegaard interprets socratic irony as the key to his purely negative disposition. it played an important role in the development of world history since it signaled the introduction of a new principle of subjective freedom and the collapse of the old order of traditional values and customs: “But irony is the very incitement of subjectivity, and in socrates irony is truly a world-historical passion. in socrates, one process ends and with him a new one begins.”74 For Kierkegaard the “world-historical validity”75 of irony is what distinguishes socrates from the sophists. it will be noted that this is an elaboration of Hegel’s own thesis about the role of socrates in the development of history. Kierkegaard seems to wholly agree with Hegel’s assessment that socrates represents the principle of subjective freedom; he elaborates on it in a 71 72 73 74 75

SKS 1, 251 / CI, 206f. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 352 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 5. SKS 1, 251 / CI, 207. SKS 1, 256 / CI, 211. ibid.

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slightly different way by emphasizing irony, which, although treated by Hegel, does not play the central role for him. what Kierkegaard understands by socratic irony is part of what Hegel calls the principle of subjective freedom. thus, there is room for debate about the significance of Kierkegaard’s modification here. Having completed his account of the sophists, Kierkegaard investigates how it could be possible for so many later schools to claim socrates as their forerunner if in fact he had no positive doctrine. He again starts with Hegel’s view of the matter: “Hegel (Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 126) notes that socrates had been reproached for the derivation of so many diverse philosophies from his teaching; he replies that this was an account of the indefiniteness and abstraction of his principle.”76 Kierkegaard’s commentary to this is as follows: to upbraid socrates for this simply indicates the desire that he should have been different from what he actually was. in other words, if the socratic position had included the limitation that every intermediate positivity must necessarily have, then it most certainly to all eternity would have been impossible that so many descendants could try to claim their right of primogeniture. If, however, his position was infinite negativity, then it is easily explained, since this contains within itself the possibility of everything, the possibility of the whole infinity of subjectivity.77

Kierkegaard thus agrees with Hegel that the absence of any determinate positive doctrine in Socrates opened the door to numerous schools finding inspiration in him for their own doctrines. this would not have been possible if socrates had a clearly defined set of principles which would exclude other ones. Since his indeterminacy rules out nothing, differing or even contradictory positions can claim to trace their lineage back to him. Kierkegaard then continues his discussion of Hegel’s view by noting that Hegel seems to be in agreement with him with respect to the negativity of socrates: in discussing the three socratic schools (megaric, Cyrenaic, and Cynic), Hegel notes (p. 127) that all three schools are very different from one another and adds that this alone clearly shows that socrates had no positive system. not only did he have no positive system, but he was also devoid of positivity. i shall try to show this later in connection with the way in which Hegel reclaims for him the idea of the good; here it suffices to say that even the good he had only as infinite negativity. In the good, subjectivity legitimately possesses an absolutely valid goal for its striving, but socrates did not start from the good but arrived at the good, ended with the good, which is why it is entirely abstract for him.78 SKS 1, 260 / CI, 215. Here Kierkegaard refers to the following passage in Hegel: “the most varied schools and principles proceeded from this doctrine of socrates, and this was made a reproach against him, but it was really due to the indefiniteness and abstraction of his principle.” Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 449 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 125. 77 SKS 1, 260 / CI, 215. 78 SKS 1, 260 / CI, 216. in a footnote to this passage Kierkegaard quotes Hegel directly: “Hegel, too, seems to agree, but he is not always consistent (p. 124): ‘socrates himself did not come so far that he expressed for consciousness generally the simple essence of self-thought, the good, and investigated the determinate concepts of the good, whether they properly expressed that of whose essence they should express, and whether the matter was determined 76

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Kierkegaard argues that Hegel’s view is self-contradictory since it simultaneously attributes and denies positive content in socrates. Kierkegaard does not straightforwardly disagree with Hegel but rather regards his account as incomplete: But if Hegel’s comments are restricted in this way, they must be extended by stressing the prodigious elasticity inherent in this infinite negativity. It does not suffice to say that from the heterogeneity of the socratic schools the conclusion may be drawn that socrates had no positive system; but it must be added that by its pressure the infinite negativity has made all positivity possible and has been an infinite incitement and stimulation for positivity.79

Kierkegaard here seems to argue that it was the very negativity of socrates which compelled the later schools to work out a positive doctrine. His argument presupposes that history operates according to the Hegelian dialectic with each concept evolving into its opposite. But since socrates’ position was an indeterminate negativity, there was no single determinate opposite, and thus he produced not one but “a multiplicity of beginnings.”80 Hegel plays a pivotal role in “the view made necessary.” Kierkegaard clearly takes his account as the model and point of departure for his own analysis. even when he disagrees on points such as Hegel’s portrayal of the sophists as wholly negative and his portrayal of socrates as containing a positive element, he tends to overstate his case in order to distinguish his view from that of Hegel. He agrees with Hegel’s interpretation of the role of socrates in world history and in a sense can be seen as expanding Hegel’s analysis by further developing Hegel’s account of socratic irony and understanding it in terms of the Hegelian principle of subjective freedom. a special appendix following part one, entitled “Hegel’s view of socrates,” discusses Hegel’s methodology in a way that recalls the introduction to the book as a whole. this is followed by a general assessment of Hegel’s interpretation, which is discussed under the heading, “in what sense is socrates the Founder of morality.” He explains, Hegel clearly provides a turning point in the view of socrates. therefore, i shall begin with Hegel and end with Hegel, without giving attention to his predecessors, since they, insofar as they have any significance, have been corroborated by his view, or to his successors, since they have only relative value in comparison with Hegel. Just as his presentation of the historical usually cannot be charged with wasting time on wrangling about minutiae, so it focuses with prodigious intellectual intensity upon specific, crucial, central battles. Hegel apprehends and comprehends history in its large formations. thus socrates is by no means permitted to stand still like ein Ding an sich, but must step forth whether he wishes to or not.81 by them. the good was made the end of the man acting. He thereby left the whole world of idea, objective existence in general, resting by itself, without seeking a passage from the good, from the essence of the conscious as such to the thing, and without recognizing the essence as the essence.’ ” SKS 1, 260n / CI, 216n. Kierkegaard quotes Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 449 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 124. 79 SKS 1, 260f. / CI, 216. Translation slightly modified. 80 SKS 1, 261 / CI, 217. 81 SKS 1, 264 / CI, 220f.

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However, Kierkegaard’s approbation is apparently qualified, for he goes on to criticize Hegel for not being as philologically exacting as he should have been. Kierkegaard explains, The difficulty implicit in the establishment of certainty about the phenomenal aspect of socrates’ life does not bother Hegel. He generally does not acknowledge such trivial concerns….although he himself observes that with respect to socrates it is a matter not so much of philosophy as of individual life, there is nothing at all in his presentation of socrates in Geschichte der Philosophie to illuminate the relations of the three different contemporary views of socrates. He uses one single dialogue from plato as an example of the socratic method without explaining why he chose this particular one. He uses Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Apology, and also plato’s Apology, quite uncritically. on the whole, he does not like much fuss, and does not cast a benevolent eye even upon schleiermacher’s efforts to order the platonic dialogues so that one great idea moves through them all in successive development.82

Hegel is thus too quick to reach sweeping conclusions based on highly selective data. He is thus operating at a level which is too abstract and thereby fails to capture the truth of actuality and existence. Kierkegaard sees his role as correcting these oversights by exploring the actual historical phenomena in more detail. after excerpting a handful of quotations from Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he notes simply, “these separate observations are in complete agreement with what i tried to point out in the first section of this study. But since they are such casual remarks, I cannot appeal to them.”83 everything in the appendix up to this point can be regarded as introductory. Kierkegaard now begins his actual analysis of Hegel’s treatment of socrates in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. after quoting a few passages from Hegel that touch on themes such as the daimon and the role of the subject in the determination of morality, Kierkegaard gets to what he regards as the main issue: However, when i consider the Hegelian account in its totality and consider it in relation to the modification I have advanced, I believe that it all can best be dealt with under one rubric: in what sense is socrates the founder of morality? under this rubric, the most important elements of Hegel’s view will be discussed.84

It is significant that Kierkegaard refers not to his criticism of Hegel but to his “modification” of him. The rubric that he chooses is itself in fact a quotation from Hegel. in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, one reads, ...it was in Socrates, that at the beginning of the peloponnesian war, the principle of subjectivity—of the absolute inherent independence of thought—attained free expression. He taught that man has to discover and recognize in himself what is the right and good,

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SKS 1, 265f. / CI, 221f. SKS 1, 267 / CI, 223. Translation slightly modified. SKS 1, 268 / CI, 225.

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Here Hegel of course does not mean that the greeks had no morality prior to socrates since they clearly had customary morality or Sittlichkeit.86 what he means is rather that socrates introduced the principle of modern morality by placing the locus of ethical action and decision in the individual subject. Kierkegaard explains the well-known distinction in Hegel87 between customary ethics or Sittlichkeit and modern ethics of the individual, called by Hegel, “morality”: [Hegel] distinguishes between morality [Moralitet] and ethics [Sædelighed]. But ethics is in part unreflected ethics such as ancient Greek ethics, and in part a higher determination of it such as manifests itself again after having recollected itself in morality. For this reason, in his Philosophie des Rechts he discusses morality before proceeding to ethics. and under morality he discusses in the section “the good and Conscience” the moral forms of evil, hypocrisy, probablism, Jesuitism, the appeal to the conscience and irony. Here the moral individual is the negatively free individual.88

Kierkegaard refers to the section, “the good and Conscience,” where Hegel treats different forms of subjectivity or relativism, which he regards as characteristic of the modern world. Kierkegaard goes on to quote from it and then gives the following commentary: In the old Greek culture, the individual was by no means free in this sense but was confined in the substantial ethic; he had not as yet taken himself out of, separated himself from, this immediate relationship, still did not know himself. socrates brought this about, but not in the sense of the sophists, who taught the individual to constrict himself in his own particular interests; he brought the individual to this by universalizing subjectivity, and to that extent he is the founder of morality. He maintained, not sophistically but speculatively, the importance of consciousness. He arrived at being-in-and-for-itself as the being-in-andfor-itself for thought; he arrived at the definition of knowledge that made the individual alien to the immediacy in which he had previously lived. the individual should no longer act out of fear of the law but with a conscious knowledge of why he acted. But this, as we Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 328. Phil. of Hist, p. 269 / Jub., vol. 11, p. 350. 86 see Hegel’s account of customary ethics: “But if it is simply identical with the actuality of individuals, the ethical [das Sittliche], as their general mode of behavior, appears as custom [Sitte]; and the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the original and purely natural will and is the all-pervading soul, significance, and actuality of individual existence.” PR, § 151 / Jub., vol. 7, p. 233. 87 Hegel, PR, § 33, remark / Jub., vol. 7, p. 85: “ ‘morality’ [Moralität] and ‘ethics’ [Sittlichkeit], which are usually regarded as roughly synonymous, are taken here in essentially distinct senses. yet even representational thought seems to distinguish them; Kantian usage prefers the expression ‘morality,’ as indeed the practical principles of Kant’s philosophy are confined throughout to this concept, even rendering the point of view of ethics impossible and in fact expressly infringing and destroying it.” Translation slightly modified. 88 SKS 1, 270 / CI, 228. 85

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shall see, is a negative definition, negative toward the established order as well as negative toward the deeper positivity, which, as speculative, conditions negatively.89

this must be regarded as a straightforward appropriation of Hegel’s view. in addition to the Hegelian content of the passage, Kierkegaard also freely avails himself of Hegelian jargon to describe the view. Kierkegaard then extensively quotes Hegel’s assessment of aristotle’s account of Socrates to show that Socrates determined virtue in terms of reason or reflection, and he thus eliminated the passions, impulses or other empirical elements.90 the result was that the good was determined as something wholly abstract. it became a formal principle, lacking concrete content. Kierkegaard quotes Hegel as follows: but the main point with Socrates is his knowledge for the first time reached this abstraction. the good is…the universal….it is a principle, concrete within itself, which, however, is not yet manifested in its concrete development, and in this abstract attitude we find what is wanting in the Socratic standpoint, from which nothing that is affirmative can, beyond this, be adduced.91

this principle cannot be made real without taking on some particular content; but whatever content it assumes will be subject to merciless rational scrutiny. socrates differed from the sophists in that his principle was a universal one, whereas the Sophists were mere relativists arguing for finite, particular ends. However, socrates’ principle was defective since it is purely abstract and empty of content. as Kierkegaard puts it, “socrates had advanced the universal only as the negative.”92 the result is in many ways the same as with the sophists. an abstract, formal principle must be filled with some concrete content if it is to be actualized. Since the individual is given no clear determination about this content the vacuum is often filled with his arbitrary impulses and desires.93 thus the socratic principle of the good reduces to arbitrariness in practice. this analysis is important for Kierkegaard since it demonstrates that Hegel did in fact ascribe something positive to socrates, namely an abstract principle. Kierkegaard rounds off this discussion by indicating how his account of socratic irony is wholly consistent with Hegel’s account, with the implication being that his account can be regarded as a supplement to Hegel’s. He writes,

SKS 1, 270f. / CI, 228. SKS 1, 271 / CI, 229: socrates “places all the virtues in judgment (cognition). Hence it comes to pass that he does away with the irrational-feeling part of the soul, that is, inclination and habit.” Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 412 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 77. 91 SKS 1, 274 / CI, 232. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 406–7 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 70–71. Translation slightly modified. 92 SKS 1, 275 / CI, 233. 93 SKS 1, 275 / CI, 234. see also SKS 1, 270 / CI, 228: “He is free because he is not bound by another, but he is negatively free precisely because he is not limited in another. When the individual by being in his other is in his own, then for the first time he is in truth (that is, positively) free, affirmatively free. Therefore, moral freedom is arbitrariness; it is the possibility of good and evil.” 89 90

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Here Kierkegaard rightly points out that what he refers to as irony Hegel refers to as a lack of earnestness or “dissemblance” and “duplicity.”95 even if one knows full well that one is acting arbitrarily in accordance with one’s personal impulses, an attempt is made to keep up the facade of acting in accord with the abstract principle of the good. there is thus a kind of dishonesty at work in the discontinuity between the abstract principle that the individual ostensibly claims to be following and the purely subjective actions that he in fact performs. this anticipates Kierkegaard’s account of the modern ironic subject, for whom no action is really taken seriously. Kierkegaard’s most straightforwardly critical passage comes toward the end of the appendix. while Hegel ascribes to socrates an abstract conception of the good and thereby something positive, Kierkegaard argues that he misconceives this. He writes, The real difficulty with Hegel’s view of Socrates is centered in the continual attempt to show how socrates interpreted the good, and what is even more wrong in the view, as i see it, is that it does not accurately adhere to the direction of the trend in socrates’ life. The movement in Socrates is toward arriving at the good. His significance in the world development is to arrive there (not to have arrived there at some time).96

Hegel is too focused on the metaphysical Socrates who stands fixedly with some abstract concept of the good. the real socrates, for Kierkegaard, was dynamic. He was not static and fixed on an abstract principle but rather was always trying to move with his interlocutors towards it, though never reaching it. once he had brought his interlocutors out of their complacency and immediacy, his job was done. thus, Kierkegaard’s socrates is a nihilist, and his main objection to Hegel is that he makes socrates into a tame metaphysician by ascribing to him the abstract idea of the good. Hegel thus deprives socrates of his radicality. Kierkegaard begins part two by explaining that he has completed his account of the historical sources of socrates. now his analysis will switch to a more philosophical or conceptual account of irony itself. He begins by listing a series of modern thinkers who have made use of irony or helped to introduce it as a concept: 94 95 96

SKS 1, 275f. / CI, 235. see Hegel, PhS, pp. 374–83 / Jub., vol. 2, pp. 471–84. SKS 1, 276 / CI, 235.

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Kant, Fichte, Friedrich schlegel, tieck and solger.97 at the end of this series, he writes, “Finally, here irony also met its master in Hegel. Whereas the first form of irony was not combated but was pacified by subjectivity as it obtained its rights, the second form of irony was combated and destroyed, for inasmuch as subjectivity was unauthorized it could obtain its rights only by being annulled.”98 Here Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge Hegel’s services in criticizing the excesses of modern irony. He further foreshadows his claim that while socratic irony had a certain legitimacy and was historically justified, Romantic irony, by contrast, was “unauthorized.” Kierkegaard then observes that although irony has become something of a fashion in modern romantic circles, its meaning in the different authors is very diffuse. noting that other authors have made similar complaints, he quotes, in a footnote,99 from Hegel’s review of solger’s posthumous writings: solger has met up with the same: he does not mention irony at all in the speculative expositions of the highest idea, which he presents in the aforementioned treatise with the innermost mental seriousness, irony which joins itself most intimately with enthusiasm and in which depths art, religion, and philosophy are to be identical. there especially, one would have believed, must be the place where one would find cleared up what the philosophical case might be with the noble secret, the great unknown—irony.100

what seems to have caught Kierkegaard’s eye here is simply the characterization or irony as “the great unknown” and Hegel’s complaint that solger did not make an effort to explain or define irony in the work in question, which otherwise is so sober. Kierkegaard then continues by discussing those who have complained about the lack of clarity in the use of the term “irony” among romantic authors: since they all lament, why should i not also lament? my lament is that it is just the reverse with Hegel. At the point in all his systems where we could expect to find a development of irony, we find it referred to. Although, if it all were copied, we would have to concede that what is said about irony is in one sense not so inconsiderable, in another sense it is not much, since he says just about the same thing on every point....yet i am far from being able to lament justifiably over Hegel as Hegel laments over his predecessors. There are excellent observations especially in his review of solger’s posthumous writings.... and even if the presentation and characterization of negative positions...are not always as exhaustive, as rich in content, as we could wish, Hegel knows all the better how to deal with them, and thus the positivity he asserts contributes indirectly to his characterization.101 SKS 1, 282 / CI, 242. ibid. 99 SKS 1, 283f. / CI, 243n and f. 100 Hegel, “Über Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel. Herausgegeben von ludwig tieck und Friedrich von raumer. erster Band 780 s. mit vorr. Xvi s. zweiter Band 784 s. leipzig 1826,” Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, zweiter artikel (June 1828), no. 107–8, p. 858. reprinted in Vermischte Schriften, op. cit., vol. 16, (1834) p. 492. MW, pp. 389f. / Jub. vol. 20, p. 188. (MW = Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel, ed. by Jon stewart, evanston: northwestern university press 2002.) 101 SKS 1, 283f. / CI, 244. 97 98

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Kierkegaard seems to view Hegel as an authority on the new form of irony just as he was an authority on socratic irony. as before, he simultaneously lauds Hegel for his scattered flashes of insight while at the same time criticizing him for not offering more detailed analyses. Kierkegaard then explains Hegel’s significance in the discussions about romantic irony as follows: while the schlegels and tieck had their major importance in the polemic with which they destroyed a previous development, and while precisely for this reason their position became somewhat scattered, because it was not a principal battle they won but a multitude of skirmishes, Hegel, on the other hand, has absolute importance by defeating with his positive total view the polemic prudery, the subjugation of which, just as queen Brynhild’s virginity required more than an ordinary husband, required a sigurd.102

this passage clearly suggests that Kierkegaard is highly sympathetic to Hegel’s criticism of the romantics. The first substantial chapter in Part Two, “The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the irony of socrates,”103 continues the discussion of the methodological issues that were raised in the introduction. the main issue in this chapter is a comparison of socratic irony with romantic irony according to the criterion of what Kierkegaard calls their historical “validity.” While Socratic irony was directed against specific truth claims, romantic irony, by contrast, is universal and thus directed indiscriminately against the entire existing order, which Kierkegaard refers to as “actuality.”104 while the former is “world-historically justified”105 insofar as there are always institutions and practices deserving of irony’s criticism, the latter is indiscriminate and thus never justified. in order to capture the purely negative disposition of the ironist, Kierkegaard avails himself of the concept of “infinite absolute negativity,” which he borrows from the introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics.106 there one reads, “in this process [solger] came to the dialectical moment of the idea, to the point which i call ‘infinite absolute negativity.’ ”107 according to Hegel, solger, who is treated with more sympathy than the other romantics, denied all truth and beauty. He has negated the idea of truth in history and has put his own private whim on a par with the most sacred beliefs. the romantic ironist continually recreates truth and beauty SKS 1, 284 / CI, 244. SKS 1, 297–308 / CI, 259–71. in this section Kierkegaard refers primarily to Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, pp. 397–406 / Jub., vol. 18, pp. 58–70. 104 SKS 1, 297 / CI, 259. 105 SKS 1, 308 / CI, 271. 106 SKS 1, 299 / CI, 261. Here it is defined as follows: “It is negativity because it only negates; it is infinite, because it does not negate this or that phenomenon; it is absolute, because that by virtue of which it negates is a higher something that still is not.” this is a formulation that appears repeatedly in The Concept of Irony: SKS 1, 87 / CI, 26. SKS 1, 292 / CI, 254. SKS 1, 297 / CI, 259. SKS 1, 299 / CI, 261. SKS 1, 307 / CI, 271. SKS 1, 309 / CI, 273. SKS 1, 343 / CI, 312. SKS 1, 352 / CI, 323. 107 Hegel, Aesthetics i, p. 68 / Jub., vol. 12, p. 105. (Aesthetics i–ii = Hegel’s Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art, vols. 1–2, trans. by t.m. Knox, oxford: Clarendon press 1975, 1998.)

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only in order to destroy it and start over again. For Hegel, as for Kierkegaard, this amounts to pure flippancy and has no justification, world – historical or otherwise. The historical significance of irony has to do with the fact that it is a characteristic of the principle of subjectivity, which first entered the world stage with the Greeks. Kierkegaard explains, “But if irony is a qualification of subjectivity, then it must manifest itself the first time subjectivity makes its appearance in world history. Irony is, in fact, the first and most abstract qualification of subjectivity. This points to the historical turning point where subjectivity made its appearance for the first time, and with this we have come to socrates.”108 needless to say, this claim about the historical import of irony is a simple extension of Hegel’s account of the introduction of the principle of subjective freedom in history. as if to acknowledge this, Kierkegaard quotes directly Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy: But by destroying actuality by means of actuality itself, he [sc. the ironist] enlists in the service of world irony. in his Geschichte der Philosophie (ii, p. 62), Hegel says, “all dialectic allows as valid that which is to be valid as if it were valid, allows the inner destruction to develop in it—the universal irony of the world,” and in this the world irony is correctly interpreted.109

the passage quoted comes from Hegel’s discussion of socratic ironic where he then suddenly refers to schlegel and modern irony in a polemical manner. Kierkegaard seems to laud Hegel’s characterization of the historical role of irony. up to this point in the chapter Kierkegaard has made very positive use of Hegel. the second half of the chapter, however, contains his criticism. after summarizing the results of his own analysis of socratic irony in part one of the book, Kierkegaard contrasts this to Hegel’s view: Hegel always discusses irony in a very unsympathetic manner; in his eyes, irony is anathema. Hegel’s appearance coincides with schlegel’s most brilliant period. But just as the irony of the schlegels had passed judgment in esthetics on an encompassing sentimentality, so Hegel was the one to correct what was misleading in the irony. on the whole, it is one of Hegel’s great merits that he halted or at least wanted to halt the prodigal sons of speculation on their way to perdition.110

Kierkegaard’s assessment is thus mixed. He lauds the criticism of the romantics as one of Hegel’s “great merits,” but he notes that Hegel’s polemical disposition shaded his criticism and blinded him from correctly understanding the legitimate use of irony: But the fact that Hegel became irritated with the form of irony closest to him naturally impaired his interpretation of the concept....in no way does this mean that Hegel was not right about the schlegels and that the schlegelian irony was not on a very dubious wrong road. All that it says is that Hegel has surely conferred a great benefit through the SKS 1, 302 / CI, 264. SKS 1, 300 / CI, 262. Hegel, Jub., vol. 18, p. 62. this sentence has been omitted in the english translation of Hist. of Phil. where it should appear in vol. 1, p. 400. 110 SKS 1, 302 / CI, 265. 108 109

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again Kierkegaard’s ambivalence is evident. although he regards Hegel’s polemic against the Romantics as justified, the unfortunate result is that this polemic has prevented Hegel from understanding the phenomenon of irony in a more nuanced manner and has led him to reject it tout court. what is behind this criticism is of course Kierkegaard’s own conception of “controlled irony,” which he presents at the end of the book as the solution to the problem. Kierkegaard then addresses the question of the abstract and the concrete in socrates and argues that Hegel has misunderstood socratic irony and reversed these terms. He continues, Hegel then points out that this socratic irony seems to contain something false but thereupon shows the correctness of his conduct. Finally he shows the real meaning of socratic irony, the greatness in it—namely, that it seeks to make abstract conceptions concrete and developed. He goes on to add (p. 62): “in saying that i know what reason is, what belief is, these remain but quite abstract conceptions; in order to become concrete, they must indeed be explicated and presupposed to be unknown in terms of what they really are. socrates effected the explication of such conceptions, and this is the truth of socratic irony.”112

For Hegel the service socratic irony performs is the movement from abstract idea to the concrete instantiation. Kierkegaard’s objection to this is that it fails to appreciate the historical significance of Socratic irony. Further, Hegel seems to transfer his antipathy towards romantic irony to socratic irony: But this confuses everything; the description of socratic irony completely loses its historical weight, and the passage quoted is so modern that it hardly reminds us of socrates. to be specific, Socrates’ undertaking was by no means one of making the abstract concrete, and the examples cited are certainly very poorly chosen because i do not think that Hegel would be able to cite analogies of this unless he were to take the whole of plato and plead the continual use of Socrates’ name in Plato, whereby he would come into conflict with both himself and everyone else. socrates’ undertaking was not to make the abstract concrete but to let the abstract become visible through the immediately concrete.113

the claim that socratic irony involves a movement from the abstract to the concrete gives socrates a positive dimension insofar as he helps arrive at a positive result, that is, the concrete. given Kierkegaard’s investment in the claim that socrates is pure negativity, he is anxious to argue that Hegel’s examples of this may well be representative of plato’s view, but they cannot be regarded as stemming from see SKS 1, 303 / CI, 265. SKS 1, 304 / CI, 266f. Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 400 / Jub., vol. 18, p. 62. Translation slightly modified. 113 see SKS 1, 304 / CI, 267. 111

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socrates. on the contrary, the movement in socrates is from the concrete to the abstract. ever the conscientious student, Kierkegaard is careful to locate the different places in Hegel’s corpus where these questions are treated. He writes, in his review of the works of solger, Hegel again points out on page 488 the difference between schlegelian irony and socratic irony. that there is a difference we have fully conceded and shall point out in more detail in the appropriate place, but it is by no means to be concluded from this that socrates’ position was not irony. Hegel upbraids Friedrich schlegel because, with his lack of judgment with regard to the speculative and his neglect of it, he has wrenched the Fichtean thesis on the constitutive validity of the ego out of its metaphysical context, wrenched it out of the domain of thought, and applied it directly to actuality, “in order to deny the vitality of reason and truth and to relegate these to an illusory status in the subject and to illusion for others.”114

Here Kierkegaard follows Hegel’s account, according to which romantic irony has misappropriated Fichte’s doctrine of the self-positing “i” and applied it to actuality and everyday life. in short, for Kierkegaard, socratic irony, while radically different as a historical phenomenon, nonetheless has some things in common with romantic irony. this is what Hegel denies. in the penultimate chapter of the book, entitled, “irony after Fichte,”115 Kierkegaard treats in order, the origins of romantic irony in Fichte’s account of the self-positing “i,” and its appropriation by Friedrich von schlegel, ludwig tieck and solger. Both Kierkegaard’s understanding of the romantic movement and his criticisms of the individuals who comprised it are indebted to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics.116 Kierkegaard begins by tracing the connection between Fichte’s theory of the subject and romantic irony. He states: the producing “i” is the same as the produced “i.” “i = i” is the abstract identity. By so doing [Fichte] infinitely liberated thought. But this infinity of thought in Fichte is, like all Fichte’s infinity (his ethical infinity is ceaseless striving for the sake of this striving itself; his esthetic infinity is ceaseless producing for the sake of this producing itself; God’s infinity is ceaseless development for the sake of the development itself), negative infinity, an infinity in which there is no finitude, an infinity without any content.117

Here Kierkegaard explains Fichte’s theory of the self-positing “i” as an attempt to resolve the paradoxes that resulted from the Kantian model of appearance and thingin-itself. Fichte eliminates the alien, external other, and draws everything into the sphere of the subject. nothing outside the subject has any independent existence. the language of Kierkegaard’s description is Hegelian. He characterizes Fichte’s conception of infinity as the “negative infinity” which does not have finitude as its contrastive term. this is, of course, the way in which Hegel talks of the bad 114 115 116 117

SKS 1, 305 / CI, 268. Hegel, MW, p. 387 / Jub., vol. 20, p. 184. Translation modified. SKS 1, 308–52 / CI, 272–323. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, pp. 64–9 / Jub., vol. 12, pp. 100–6. SKS 1, 309 / CI, 273.

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or spurious infinity, that is, the never-ending addition of a new unit. By contrast, Hegel’s view of infinity is dialectical; it has finitude as its dialectical other, and the two together constitute a single conceptual entity. Kierkegaard points out that the romantics appropriated Fichte’s theory of the subject for their own purposes. By doing so, they transferred it from the sphere of epistemology and metaphysics to that of action in the real world. He writes, “this Fichtean principle that subjectivity, the ‘i,’ has constitutive validity, is the sole omnipotence, was grasped by schlegel and tieck, and on that basis they operated in the world.”118 the romantics thus seem to take his theory to offer some sort of metaphysical grounding of a way of life or a general disposition towards the world. Kierkegaard borrowed this account quite straightforwardly from Hegel’s lectures. the introduction to the Lectures on Aesthetics offers a similar theory of the roots of modern irony. there Hegel states, Fichte sets up the ego as the absolute principle of all knowing, reason, and cognition, and...the ego...remains throughout abstract and formal. Secondly, this ego is therefore in itself just simple, and, on the one hand, every particularity, every characteristic, every content is negated in it, since everything is submerged in this abstract freedom and unity, while, on the other hand, every content which is to have value for the ego is only posited and recognized by the ego itself.119

Fichte’s theory of the ego or self-positing subject is thus the forerunner of the ironic subject since it negates everything. since it posits itself as what is true, it regards the world and all institutions and values as arbitrary and subjective. thus, the external world of objectivity loses its claim to truth, and, as with socrates, the criterion for truth is moved from this outward sphere to the inwardness of the particular subject. the criticism that Hegel raises against this is the same one that Kierkegaard hinted at in the passage quoted above, namely, the subject is simply a formal principle with no concrete content. at some level the ironic subject knows this and thus comes to take an ironic stance even towards its own statements, actions and beliefs. the subject arbitrarily fills this abstract principle with whatever given content it happens to desire at that particular moment. The ego’s lack of any fixed determinate content thus lends itself to arbitrariness. Kierkegaard’s account follows Hegel’s treatment without criticism or variation. with regard to Hegel’s criticism of the romantics, Kierkegaard writes, “we also perceive here that this irony was totally unjustified and that Hegel’s hostile behavior toward it is entirely in order.”120 a few pages later, in connection with schlegel, Kierkegaard continues in the same tone: it was against this judging and denouncing conduct on the part of Friedrich schlegel that Hegel declaims in particular (Werke, Xvi, p. 465). in this connection, Hegel’s great service to the understanding of the historical past cannot be sufficiently acknowledged. He

118 119 120

SKS 1, 311 / CI, 275. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 64 / Jub., vol. 12, p. 100. Translation slightly modified. SKS 1, 311 / CI, 275.

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does not reject the past but comprehends it; he does not repudiate other scholarly positions but surpasses them.121

Here Kierkegaard refers to Hegel’s review of solger’s posthumous writings as reprinted in Hegel’s collected works.122 according to Hegel’s account, which is seconded by Kierkegaard, the romantics transformed Fichte’s self-positing “i” into a way of “forming one’s life artistically,” as it is put in the following passage from the Lectures on Aesthetics: the ego is a living, active individual, and its life consists in making its individuality real in its own eyes and in those of others, in expressing itself, and bringing itself into appearance. For every man, by living, tries to realize himself and does realize himself. now in relation to beauty and art, this acquires the meaning of living as an artist and forming one’s life artistically. But on this principle, i live as an artist when all my action and my expression in general, in connection with any content whatever, remains for me a mere show and assumes a shape which is wholly in my power.123

one lives artistically by rejecting all conventional norms and ways of living in favor of practices that appear striking or even offensive. By an act of one’s own will, the ironic individual can give the world meaning and truth. this is, however, forever changing in accordance with the ironist’s whim. For Hegel, the romantic individualist assumes a condescending disposition towards everyone else, who are regarded as mindless and unreflective slaves to custom and tradition. what Hegel calls “forming one’s life artistically” corresponds to what Kierkegaard calls “living poetically.”124 the result of this approach to life is that the ironist has no stable character. in this Kierkegaard, while using his own terms, such as “infinite poetic freedom,”125 once again follows Hegel’s analysis. in the Lectures on Aesthetics, the ironist’s attempts at self-creation are described as follows: irony loves this irony of loss of character, for true character implies, on the one hand, essentially worthy aims, and, on the other hand, a firm grip of such aims, so that the whole being of its individuality would be lost if the aims had to be given up and abandoned. This fixity and substantiality constitutes the keynote of character. Cato can live only as a roman and a republican.126

Kierkegaard makes the same point about the lack of character in the romantic ironist in his analysis. He begins, however, with a discussion of the Christian in whom God has planted a specific nature which is to be developed in the course of life. Kierkegaard writes, the Christian “is supposed to develop the seeds god himself has placed in man, since the Christian knows himself as that which has reality for

121 122 123 124 125 126

SKS 1, 314 / CI, 278. Translation slightly modified. Hegel, MW, pp. 372f. / Jub., vol. 20, p. 161. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 65 / Jub., vol. 12, p. 101. SKS 1, 316 / CI, 280. SKS 1, 317 / CI, 281. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, pp. 67–8 / Jub., vol. 12, pp. 104–5.

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god.”127 Kierkegaard then draws an analogy between this divinely given essence and the Kantian thing-in-itself: But just as commonplace people do not have any an sich but can become anything, so also the ironist has none. But this is not simply because he is merely a product of his environment, but in order really to live poetically, really and thoroughly to be able to create himself poetically, the ironist may have no an sich.128

if the ironist is completely free to create himself, he has no permanent character. thus, the ironic view reduces to a play of moods: “as the ironist poetically composes himself and his environment with the greatest possible poetic license, as he lives in this totally hypothetical and subjunctive way his life loses all continuity. He succumbs completely to mood. His life is nothing but moods.”129 Kierkegaard acknowledges his debt to Hegel in this analysis by noting, “it is especially for this that Hegel criticizes tieck, and it is also present in his correspondence with solger. at times he has a clear grasp of everything, at times he is seeking; at times he is a dogmatician, at times a doubter, at times Jacob Böhme, at times the greeks, etc.— nothing but moods.”130 while Hegel plays only a minor role in Kierkegaard’s analysis of schlegel and Tieck, he figures prominently in the discussion of Solger. Here Kierkegaard makes use of the Lectures on Aesthetics and Hegel’s book-review of solger’s posthumous writings in the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik. Both texts are quoted directly at the outset of Kierkegaard’s discussion.131 Kierkegaard follows Hegel in seeing solger as understanding irony as an abstract principle of negation, in contrast to the other romantics who sought in it an active principle for life. as is well known, Hegel’s dialectical methodology makes use of the negative as a productive force to propel the analysis forward. First, something is posited; then it is negated; and then the negation itself is negated and something positive results. His criticism of solger is that he stops at the second step and never arrives at the speculative truth of negation. in the Lectures on Aesthetics, he states, “To this negativity Solger firmly clung, and of course it is one element in the speculative idea, yet interpreted as this purely dialectical unrest and dissolution of both infinite and finite, only one element, and not, as solger will have it, the whole idea.”132 Kierkegaard takes up this same point in his characterization of solger’s account of irony. He begins by complaining, “solger has gone completely SKS 1, 316 / CI, 280. SKS 1, 317 / CI, 281. Translation slightly modified. 129 SKS 1, 319 / CI, 284. 130 SKS 1, 320 / CI, 285. see also SKS 1, 318f. / CI, 283: “Here we have come to the point that has been the particular object of Hegel’s attack. everything established in the given actuality has nothing but poetic validity for the ironist, for he, after all, is living poetically. But when the given actuality loses its validity for the ironist in this way, it is not because it is an antiquated actuality that must be replaced by a truer actuality, but because the ironist is the eternal i for which no actuality is adequate.” 131 SKS 1, 340 / CI, 308. 132 Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, pp. 68f. / Jub., vol. 12, p. 106. 127 128

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astray in the negative.”133 when, some pages later, he expands on this criticism, he unmistakably follows Hegel’s analysis: “throughout this whole investigation, solger seems to have a dim notion of the negation of the negation, which in itself contains the true affirmation. But since the whole train of thought is not developed, the one negation erroneously slips into the other, and the true affirmation does not result.”134 He continues, “[solger] does have the negation of the negation, but still there is a veil in front of his eyes so that he does not see the affirmation.”135 if it were not already obvious that Kierkegaard has borrowed this criticism from Hegel, he indicates this himself directly.136 Given these points of influence, there can be little doubt that Kierkegaard used the introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics as his point of departure in “irony after Fichte” and expanded on Hegel’s compact analysis on certain points. Kierkegaard himself acknowledges as much. moreover, his discussion of the german romantics does little more than repeat Hegel’s critique. With respect to the Romantics’ flippant irony, he writes, “We also perceive here that this irony was totally unjustified and that Hegel’s hostile behavior toward it is entirely in order.”137 thus, Hegel’s accounts of these two phenomena serve as Kierkegaard’s primary model for both main parts of the work, on socratic irony and on romantic irony respectively. IV. The notebooks 8–15 Notebook 8 (from 1841) and Notebook 10 (from 1841–42) contain extensive reading notes to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics. they address two main themes: the relation of philosophy to what Kierkegaard calls “actuality” and Hegel’s theory of drama. in the first passage, Kierkegaard notes: “An observation which contributes to the question of the relation of philosophy to actuality according to Hegel’s thought, which one frequently grasps best in his occasional utterances, is found in his Æsthetik, iii, p. 243.”138 Here Kierkegaard refers to the following passage in Hegel: thinking, however, results in thoughts alone; it evaporates the form of reality into the form of the pure Concept, and even if it grasps and apprehends real things in their particular character and real existence, it nevertheless lifts even this particular sphere into the element of the universal and ideal wherein alone thinking is at home with itself. Consequently, contrasted with the world of appearance, a new realm arises which is indeed the truth of reality, but this is a truth which is not made manifest again in the real world itself as its formative power and as its own soul. thinking is only a reconciliation between reality and truth within thinking itself. But poetic creation and formation is a reconciliation in the form of a real phenomenon itself, even if this form be presented only spiritually.139 SKS 1, 341 / CI, 309. SKS 1, 348 / CI, 317. 135 SKS 1, 352 / CI, 323. 136 SKS 1, 348 / CI, 317: “Hegel perceived this very clearly and therefore articulates it explicitly on page 470.” 137 SKS 1, 311 / CI, 275. 138 SKS 19, 245, not8.51 / JP 2, 1592. 139 Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 976 / Jub., vol. 14, pp. 242f. 133 134

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this passage presumably drew Kierkegaard’s attention because Hegel seems to recognize that something significant is lost in the attempt to reduce reality to the Concept. Further, he seems to acknowledge that art and poetry can reconcile truth and reality in a way that philosophy or conceptual thinking cannot. in another entry, Kierkegaard notes a similar passage from Hegel’s lectures: “a passage where Hegel himself seems to suggest the deficiency of pure thought, that not even philosophy is alone the adequate expression for human life, or that consequently personal life does not find its fulfillment in thought alone but in a totality of kinds of existence and modes of expression. Cf. Æsthetik, iii, p. 440, bottom of page.”140 the passage Kierkegaard has in mind comes at the end of Hegel’s discussion of lyric poetry, entitled “the general Character of lyric.” after extolling the virtues of lyric poetry, Hegel compares it with philosophical thinking: But thirdly, there is a form of the spirit which, in one aspect, outsoars the imagination of the heart and vision because it can bring its content into free self-consciousness in a more decisively universal way and in more necessary connectedness than is possible for any art at all. i mean philosophical thinking. yet this form, conversely, is burdened with the abstraction of developing solely in the province of thinking, that is, of purely ideal universality, so that man in the concrete may find himself forced to express the contents and results of his philosophical mind in a concrete way as penetrated by his heart and vision, his imagination and feeling, in order in this way to have and provide a total expression of his whole inner life.141

art presents the Concept to the faculty of sensibility or perception. this stands in contrast to philosophical cognition, which eliminates the sensible aspect and grasps the structure of the Concept on its own. But, this said, Hegel seems here to recognize the irreducibility of certain aspects of sensible intuition and grant them their due. another entry in Notebook 8 concerns the question of passion. most Kierkegaard readers will immediately be reminded of the criticisms in the Postscript of the speculative thinker for lacking passion.142 Here, however, Kierkegaard praises Hegel’s aesthetics for directing attention to the element of passion. At first he writes, “passion is still the main thing; it is the real dynamometer for men. our age is so shabby because it has no passion.”143 then in a note to this entry he writes, “How beautifully Hegel says it in his Æsthetics, iii, p. 362: ‘For the chief right of these great characters consists in the energy of their self-accomplishment, because in their particular character they still carry the universal, while, conversely, commonplace moralizing persists in not respecting the particular personality and in putting all its energy into this disrespect.’ ”144 Here Kierkegaard quotes from Hegel’s account of epic,145 apparently lauding Hegel’s description of the substantiality and moral

140 141 142 143 144 145

SKS 19, 246, not8.53 / JP 2, 1593. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, pp. 1127f. / Jub., vol. 14, pp. 440f. For example, SKS 7, 182–187 / CUP1, 199–204. SKS 7, 522–5 / CUP1, 575–8. see SKS 19, 237, not8:39 / JP 1, 888. see SKS 19, 237, not8:39.1 / JP 2, 1591. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 1068 / Jub., vol. 14, p. 362.

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fiber of the characters in epic poetry (in contrast to the moral lassitude of his contemporaries). The first entry in Notebook 10 contains rather detailed reading notes to Hegel’s sections on epic, lyric and dramatic poetry.146 it appears along with references to other works which treat sophocles’ Antigone. Kierkegaard’s interest in this text can be explained by the fact that he was writing Either/Or at the time. while working on his analysis of sophocles’ tragedy Antigone, which was to appear in the chapter, “the Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama,” Kierkegaard decided to have a look at Hegel’s interpretation of the work. the notes in this journal are generally limited to the section in the Lectures on Aesthetics where Hegel treats Antigone. thus, this chapter of Either/Or was Kierkegaard’s immediate occasion to read Hegel’s lectures. Hegel also appears in Kierkegaard’s lecture notes to the courses he attended in Berlin. Notebook 9 and Notebook 10 contain his extensive notes to marheineke’s lectures, where reference is made to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.147 Notebook 11 contains his notes to schelling’s celebrated lectures entitled, The Philosophy of Revelation. Here, as is well known, schelling treats Hegel extensively.148 These entries, however, reflect primarily the ideas of Marheineke and schelling rather than Kierkegaard. Finally, Notebook 13 (from 1842–43), entitled “philosophica,” contains several references to Hegel, most of which are concerned with his treatment of the different metaphysical categories. in a passage which foreshadows his criticism of necessity in history in Philosophical Fragments,149 Kierkegaard mentions Hegel’s account of possibility and necessity.150 in a quite complex entry he refers to Hegel’s understanding of the differing nature of the categories at the three different stages of logic (Being, essence and the Concept);151 and in a passage which foreshadows the SKS 19, 285f., not10:1 / JP 5, 5545. it should also be noted that in Notebook 12, entitled “Aesthetica,” Kierkegaard makes a fleeting reference to Hegel’s account of comedy. SKS 19, 375, not12:7 / JP 2, 1738. 147 SKS 19, 255, not9:1. SKS 19, 296, not10:9. 148 SKS 19, 312–22, not11:9–15. SKS 19, 338–40, not11:24. SKS 19, 346–8, not11:29. 149 SKS 4, 275–84 / PF, 75–88. 150 SKS 19, 405, not13:40 / JP 2, 1245: “is the past more necessary than the future? this can be significant with respect to the solution of the problem of possibility—how does Hegel answer it? in logic, in the doctrine of essence. Here we get the explanation that the possible is the actual, the actual is the possible. it is simple enough in a science, at the conclusion of which one has arrived at possibility. it is then a tautology. this is important in connection with the doctrine of the relation between the future and god’s foreknowledge. the old thesis that knowledge neither takes away anything nor adds. see Boethius, pp. 126–27, later used by leibniz.” 151 SKS 19, 415, not13:50 / JP 2, 1602: “in the doctrine of being everything is which does not change. (this is something which even werder admitted. see the small books.) / in the doctrine of essence there is Beziehung. —the irregularities in Hegel’s logic. essentially this segment is only dichotomies—cause-effect—ground-consequent—reciprocal effect is a problem, perhaps belongs somewhere else. / the concept is a trichotomy. / Being does not belong to logic at all. / It ought to begin with dichotomy.” Translation slightly modified. 146

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analysis of motion in Repetition,152 reference is made to Hegel’s account of mediation and the transition of one category to another.153 There is also a fleeting reference in Kierkegaard’s reading notes to a german translation of leibniz’s Theodicy,154 where he notes that Hegel probably misunderstood the debate between leibniz and Bayle. Notebook 13 contains direct references to two primary texts, the first of which is the Phenomenology of Spirit. Kierkegaard writes: “the secret of the whole of existence, movement, Hegel explains easily enough, for he says somewhere in the Phenomenology that something goes on behind the back of consciousness (see introduction, p. 71).”155 He refers to the following passage where Hegel explains his dialectical methodology: “But it is just this necessity itself, or the origination of the new object, that presents itself to consciousness. thus in the movement of consciousness there occurs a moment of being-in-itself or being-for-us which is not present to the consciousness comprehended in the experience itself.”156 the other primary text that Kierkegaard refers to is Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic, published posthumously in Karl rosenkranz’s edition. Kierkegaard writes: what is a category? As far as is known, modern philosophy has not supplied any definition, at least not Hegel. with the help of his inverse process he always leaves it to the reader’s virtuosity to do what is most difficult, to gather multiplicity into the energy of one thought. the only place in Hegel i have found anything is in the little encyclopaedia published by rosenkrantz, p. 93; he is completely arbitrary in his terminology, which is quite obvious in the classification he makes. Category has thus obtained a place it should not have, and the next question to be asked is: what is it, now, which encompasses this tripartition?157

SKS 4, 25 / R, 148. SKS 4, 56–7 / R, 186. SKS 19, 415, not13:50 / JP 1, 260: “Hegel has never justified the category of transition. It could be of importance to compare the Aristotelian doctrine of κίνησις with this. / in mediation the zero point, or is it a third? does the third itself emerge through the immanent motion of the two, or how does it emerge?—The difficulty appears especially when one seeks to transfer it to the world of actuality.” Translation slightly modified. 154 SKS 19, 391, not13:23 / JP 3, 3074. in another entry he writes the following note about Hegel: “Despite all the assurances about the positivity which lies in Hegel’s system, he still had arrived only at the point where in olden days they began (for example, leibniz).” SKS 19, 409, not13:44 / JP 2, 1601. 155 SKS 19, 399, not13:34 / JP 2, 1594. 156 Hegel, PhS, p. 56 / Jub. vol. 2, pp. 79f. 157 SKS 19, 406, not13:41 / JP 2, 1595–96. the entry continues: “is being, then, a category? it is by no means what quality is, namely, determinate being, determinate in itself; the accent lies on determinate, not on being. Being is neither presupposed nor predicated. in this sense Hegel is right—being is nothing; if, on the other hand, it were a quality, then one could wish enlightenment on how it becomes identical with nothing. the whole doctrine about being is a fatuous prelude to the doctrine of quality. / why did Kant begin with quantity, Hegel with quality?” SKS 19, 406, not13:41 / JP 2, 1598 and 1600. in the margin below this there is a reference to “Hegel’s Propedeutic p. 96. 97.” SKS 19, 406, not13:41a / JP 2, 1598. 152 153

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Here reference is made to a passage in which a distinction is made between (1) categories, (2) determinations of reflection and (3) concepts in accordance with the three main parts of Hegel’s logic (Being, essence and the Concept). Kierkegaard seems to regard these divisions as artificial. The common theme of these various entries about the logical categories seems to be the question of movement and transition, which is of course related to the question of immanence and transcendence. these are issues that would exercise Kierkegaard in many of his pseudonymous works in the years to come. V. either/or while Hegel is mentioned a handful of times in Either/Or,158 there are only two direct references to his primary texts. The first of these appears in the chapter, “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama,” from Part One. as was seen in the previous section, Kierkegaard’s notebooks evidence a study of Hegel’s account of tragedy while writing Either/Or. in his discussion Kierkegaard’s esthete quotes directly from the Lectures on Aesthetics in order to explore Hegel’s view of the role of compassion in tragedy: it is well known that aristotle maintains that tragedy should arouse fear and compassion in the spectator. i recall that Hegel in his Aesthetics picks up this comment and on each of these points makes a double observation, which, however, is not very exhaustive...Hegel notes that there are two kinds of compassion, the usual kind that turns its attention to the finite side of suffering, and the truly tragic compassion. This observation is altogether correct but to me of less importance, since that universal emotion is a misunderstanding that can befall modern tragedy just as much as ancient tragedy. But what he adds with regard to true compassion is true and powerful: “das wahrhafte Mitleiden ist im Gegentheil die Sympathie mit der zugleich sittlichen Berechtigung des Leidenden.”159

the esthete continues by contrasting his own approach to that of Hegel: “whereas Hegel considers compassion more in general and its differentiation in the difference of individualities, i prefer to stress the difference in compassion in relation to the difference in tragic guilt.”160 He seems to want to supplement or modify Hegel’s account rather than to criticize it. Hegel’s section, “the difference Between ancient and modern drama,”161 from the Lectures on Aesthetics seems to be the main source of the analysis of tragedy in Either/Or. the essential difference is, according to Hegel, that the ancient world lacks subjective reflection or subjective freedom. The esthete follows closely Hegel’s description of the Greek world: “the ancient world did not have subjectivity reflected in itself. even if the individual moved freely, he nevertheless rested in substantial determinants, in the state, the family, in fate. this substantial determinant is the

158 159 160 161

For example, SKS 2, 58 / EO1, 50. SKS 2, 61 / EO1, 53. SKS 2, 146f. / EO1, 147. SKS 2, 147 / EO1, 147. Hegel, Aesthetics ii, pp. 1205–8 / Jub., vol. 14, pp. 540–4.

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essential fateful factor in greek tragedy and is its essential characteristic.”162 Hegel had identified the institutions of family and state (represented by Antigone and Creon) as among those which came into conflict in Greek tragedy and civilization. The esthete likewise follows Hegel’s characterization of tragedy in the modern world: “in the modern period situation and character are in fact predominant. the tragic hero is subjectively reflected in himself, and this reflection has not only reflected him out of every immediate relation to state, kindred, and fate but often has even reflected him out of his own past life.”163 While ancient tragedy lacks reflection, modern tragedy is characterized by it. Hegel takes Hamlet as the modern parallel to Antigone; obsessed with reflection, he is the modern tragic figure par excellence. Characters in modern drama have a sense of individuality, whereas those of ancient drama are less individuals than embodiments of general forces or principles. the esthete takes this characterization of the difference between ancient and modern tragedy as the point of departure for his discussion. His goal is to modify sophocles’ Antigone in order to turn it into a modern tragedy in accordance with Hegel’s definition. His primary modification entails shifting the tragic conflict from an external one to an internal one. Whereas the conflict in the ancient Antigone was, according to Hegel’s famous analysis, between the family and the state, the esthete removes the conflict from the external world and places it in the mind of Antigone herself. The esthete’s simple modification of the plot is merely that Oedipus’ crimes of killing his father and marrying his mother are known only to his daughter antigone, while the rest of thebes believe his rule and his marriage to be legitimate. the esthete’s antigone is thus characterized by the modern emotion of anxiety. He follows Hegel in referring to Hamlet as the paradigm case of a modern tragic figure characterized by this emotion.164 in the chapter entitled, “the unhappiest one,” also from Either/Or, part one, reference is made to Hegel’s analysis of the unhappy consciousness in the “self-Consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit.165 one reads, “in all of Hegel’s systematic works there is one section that discusses the unhappy consciousness.”166 much of Kierkegaard’s analysis is concerned with the temporal dimensions of unhappiness. one can be unhappy with respect to the past by obsessively recollecting what has been and what one either regrets or longs to return to. or one can be unhappy with respect to the future by obsessively hoping for a time to come in which events are more favorable. in either case one forgets to live in the present. Kierkegaard acknowledges Hegel’s analysis as the source of this idea: the unhappy one is the person who in one way or another has his ideal, the substance of his life, the plentitude of his consciousness, his essential nature, outside himself. the unhappy one is the person who is always absent from himself, never present to himself. But in being SKS 2, 143 / EO1, 143. see also SKS 2, 148 / EO1, 149. SKS 2, 152 / EO1, 154. SKS 2, 154f. / EO1, 155–6. 163 SKS 2, 143 / EO1, 143. 164 SKS 2, 154 / EO1, 155. 165 Hegel, PhS, pp. 126–38; Jub. 2, pp. 166–81. 166 SKS 2, 215f. / EO1, 222. 162

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absent, one obviously can be in either past or future time. the whole territory of the unhappy consciousness is thereby circumscribed. For this firm limitation, we thank Hegel….167

Here reference is made to Hegel’s portrayal of the source of the unhappy consciousness’ unhappiness in its separation from the divine. the unhappy consciousness longs for the past since it wishes to see Christ with its own eyes and follow in his footsteps. this, however, remains an impossibility, and the unhappy consciousness is ridden with guilt and sin for the way in which humanity persecuted its savior. similarly, the unhappy consciousness longs for the second coming of Christ in the future and a communion with the divine in heaven. But these events lie similarly in a distant time, and the unhappy consciousness is obsessed with the thought of this future and regrets that it must live out its life in the corrupt and sinful world of the present. these temporal aspects of Hegel’s analysis are taken up by Kierkegaard and generalized from Hegel’s strictly religious account. some years later Kierkegaard returned to Hegel’s analysis in his own phenomenological account of the forms of despair in The Sickness unto Death.168 VI. Johannes Climacus, or de omnibus dubitandum est Kierkegaard’s fragmentary story, Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est, concerns issues such as the proper beginning of philosophy and skeptical doubt, which were much discussed in Hegelian contexts at the time. But Hegel’s name appears just once in a footnote which refers to the “Consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. in the footnote, Kierkegaard writes, the terminology of modern philosophy is often confusing. For example, it speaks of sinnliches Bewußtsein, wahrnehmendes B[ewußtsein], Verstand, etc., although it would be far preferable to call it “sense perception,” “experience,” for in consciousness there is more. it would be interesting to see how Hegel would formulate the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness to reason. when the transition consists merely of a heading, it is easy enough.169

the words Kierkegaard writes in german are references to the three parts of the “Consciousness” chapter, that is, “sense-Certainty,” [“Die sinnliche Gewißheit”], “perception,” [“Die Wahrnehmung”], and “Force and the understanding” [“Kraft und Verstand”]. The references in the second part of the passage are to the first three chapters of the Phenomenology, that is, “Consciousness,” “self-Consciousness” and “reason.” Kierkegaard’s subsequent analysis is indebted to the “sense-Certainty” section from the “Consciousness” chapter.170 Hegel’s analysis in “sense-Certainty” is a SKS 2, 216 / EO1, 222. in a draft Kierkegaard says of sections a and B of The Sickness unto Death, “Both forms are forms of an unhappy consciousness” (Pap. viii–2 B 150.8 / SUD, supplement, p. 150). 169 Pap. iv B 1, p. 148n / JC, 169n. see Pap. iv B 10.12 / JC, supplement, p. 258. 170 Hegel, PhS, pp. 58–66 / Jub. vol. 2, pp. 81–92. 167 168

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refutation of common sense realism, which claims that what is immediately given is true. this view is refuted by the realization that one must appeal to a universal, that is, an object of thought, every time one wishes to describe the purportedly predetermined external object. Hegel concludes that the external object cannot be independent or predetermined but rather is determined in part by the human mind. in De Omnibus, Kierkegaard’s protagonist, Johannes Climacus, follows just this reasoning. He writes, He [Johannes Climacus] asked what the nature of consciousness would be when it had doubt outside itself. there is consciousness in the child, but it has doubt outside itself. How, then, is the child’s consciousness qualified? It is actually not qualified at all, which can also be expressed by saying that it is immediate. Immediacy is precisely indeterminateness. in immediacy there is no relation, for as soon as there is a relation immediacy is cancelled. Immediately, therefore, everything is true, but this truth is untruth the very next moment, for in immediacy everything is untrue.171

this recalls Hegel’s discussion of immediacy in terms of the category of pure being. At first, it appears this category is the most abstract and the most basic thing that can be thought. it is immediately given to the knowing subject. However, without further determination, it remains an empty indeterminate concept. to overcome this indeterminacy, it must interact with other categories. only in this way can it become more determinate and more concrete, but the mediation of the other categories undermines the claim that it is absolutely primary and immediately given. in Hegel’s analysis the contradiction is, as always, between the particularity of experience and the universality of thought. the contradiction comes to the fore when one attempts to articulate a particular, for in order to do so, one must appeal to the universals of language. Kierkegaard writes, “immediacy is reality; language is ideality; consciousness is contradiction. the moment i make a statement about reality, contradiction is present, for what i say is ideality.”172 He continues, therefore, it is language that cancels immediacy; if man could not talk he would remain in the immediate. this could be expressed, he [Johannes Climacus] thought, by saying that the immediate is reality, language is ideality, since by speaking i produce the contradiction. when i seek to express sense perception in this way, the contradiction is present, for what i say is something different from what i want to say. i cannot express reality in language, because i use ideality to characterize it, which is a contradiction, an untruth.173

Kierkegaard clearly makes use of Hegel’s analysis in this passage. Hegel speaks of the contradiction of consciousness involved in meaning one thing (the particular) and saying another (the universal). Both Kierkegaard and Hegel agree that language cannot capture the particular. Here again Kierkegaard incorporates a part of Hegel’s philosophy, reworks it and places it into his own context.

171 172 173

Pap. iv B 1, pp. 145f. / JC, 167. Translation slightly modified. Pap. iv B 1, p. 147 / JC, 168. Pap. iv B 14.6 / JC, supplement, p. 255.

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VII. Fear and trembling Hegel is alluded to at the beginning of each of the three “problemata,” which constitute the main body of Fear and Trembling. in “problema i,” Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author refers directly to a section in the Philosophy of Right as the object of his criticism.174 (the importance of this text for Kierkegaard is evidenced by the fact that he mentions it earlier in The Concept of Irony, where he quotes from it seemingly with approval,175 and later in Practice in Christianity.176) Johannes de silentio explains Hegel’s ethics as focused on the universal and then writes, “if this is the case, then Hegel is right in ‘The Good and Conscience,’ where he defines man only as a ‘moral form of evil’ (see especially The Philosophy of Right), which must be sublated in the teleology of the moral in such a way that the single individual who remains in that stage either sins or is immersed in spiritual trial.”177 an ethics founded on the universal must disregard the moral judgment of the individual which is dismissed as arbitrary. This is significant when one recalls the famous thesis of this problema about the so-called “teleological suspension of the ethical,” according to which the individual recipient of a divine revelation is placed above the universal, understood as social ethics or the accepted laws and practices of a people. Johannes de silentio argues that Hegel’s universal ethics leaves no room for the teleological suspension of the ethical. the logical conclusion of the abraham and isaac story would, on Hegel’s view, be to regard abraham as a criminal because his action violates accepted custom and law: “But Hegel is wrong in speaking about faith; he is wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly against abraham’s enjoying honor and glory as a father of faith when he ought to be sent back to a lower court and shown up as a murderer.”178 Hegel’s view is too inflexible to see that an act which must be condemned from the perspective of universal ethics and civil law can at the same time be a sign of the highest faith. Hegel’s account of the moral conscience in “the good and Conscience” is too one-sided in its criticism of the different forms of romantic individualism or subjectivity. in the Journal NB2 from 1847 Kierkegaard writes,

Hegel, PR, §§ 129–41 / Jub. 7, pp. 187–225. SKS 1, 270 / CI, 227f. quoted above. 176 SV1 Xii, 83 / PC, 87: “why has Hegel made conscience and the state of conscience in the single individual ‘a form of evil’ (see Rechts-Philosophie)? Why? Because he deified the established order. But the more one deifies the established order, the more natural is the conclusion: ergo, the one who disapproves of or rebels against this divinity, the established order—ergo, he must be rather close to imagining that he is god. very likely it is by no means the person in question who declares something blasphemous about himself (and if he is a true witness to the truth, then it certainly is not that person). no, the blasphemy is actually a projection from the impiety with which one venerates the established order as the divine, an acoustic illusion occasioned by the established order’s tacitly saying to itself that it is the divine, and now through the witness to the truth comes to hear this, but hears it as if it were he who said he was more than human.” 177 SKS 4, 148f. / FT, 54. Translation slightly modified. 178 SKS 4, 149 / FT, 54f. 174 175

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“the impiety (the abolition of the relationship of conscience) is the fundamental damage done by Hegelian philosophy.”179 This affords another example of the way in which Kierkegaard takes specific points from Hegel’s analysis in one context (political philosophy) and uses them in a quite different context in his own work. He is interested in and sympathetic to Hegel’s criticism of the abuses that romantic individualism can lead to and attempts to steer the difficult middle course between the Scylla of Romantic relativism and the Charybdis of Hegelian universalism. He wants to defend a form of individualism in the sphere of religion, but he is acutely aware of the dangers of slipping into relativism that this presents. there are a number of parallelisms between the moral conscience analyzed by Hegel and the picture of abraham presented by Kierkegaard. each must reject accepted custom and law, the romantic due to arbitrary egoism and abraham due to the teleological suspension of the ethical. each must regard his individual conscience as absolute, the romantic again due to arbitray egoism and abraham due to the divine revelation. Kierkegaard’s task is thus to distinguish abraham as a legitimate form of individualism from the numerous illegitimate forms found in then recent romanticism. Johannes de silentio wants to make room for the individual to deviate from social norms and act subjectively without this being condemned as arbitrary and illegitimate. He writes, For if the ethical—that is, social morality—is the highest and if there is in a person no residual incommensurability in some way such that this incommensurability is not evil (that is, the single individual, who is to be expressed in the universal), then no categories are needed other than what greek philosophy had or what can be deduced from them by consistent thought. Hegel should not have concealed this, for after all, he had studied greek philosophy.180

In this admittedly difficult passage Johannes de silentio seems to suggest that, for Hegel, there is always a transparency between the individual and the universal. this view eliminates the possibility of someone like abraham, who has inwardly been blessed by a revelation and the paradox of faith which he cannot communicate outwardly. this foreshadows the allusion to Hegel in the next chapter. Johannes de silentio begins “Problema II” first by granting that Hegel’s view is appropriate from the perspective of a universal conception of ethics and then by SKS 20, 207, nB2:166 / JP 2, 1613. Cf. SKS 21, 229f., nB9:51 / JP 1, 684: “it is presupposed and stated that every human being has a conscience—yet there is no accomplishment (neither in the physical, like dancing, singing, etc., nor in the mental, such as thinking and the like) which requires such an extensive and rigorous schooling as is required before one can genuinely be said to have a conscience. Just as gold in its original state is found alloyed with all sorts of worthless and miscellaneous components, so it is with conscience in its immediate state, which contains elements which are the very opposite of the conscience. / Herein lies the truth of what Hegel says about conscience being a form of the evil. But in another sense Hegel says this without justification. He ought rather have said: what many, indeed most, people call conscience is not conscience at all, but moods, stomach reflexes, vagrant impulses, etc.— the conscience of a bailiff.” 180 SKS 4, 149 / FT, 55. 179

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criticizing this view in connection with the story of abraham and isaac. He writes, “if there is nothing incommensurable in a human life, and if the incommensurable that is present is there only by an accident from which nothing results insofar as existence is viewed from the idea, then Hegel was right.”181 according to the universal view, there is always a harmony between the universal and the particular, and thus there is no incommensurability between the two spheres. But Johannes de silentio continues, But [Hegel] was not right in speaking about faith or in permitting abraham to be regarded as its father, for in the latter case he has pronounced judgment both on abraham and on faith. in Hegelian philosophy, das Äußere (die Entäußerung) is higher than das Innere…. But faith is the paradox that interiority is higher than exteriority, or, to call to mind something said earlier, the uneven number is higher than the even.182

Kierkegaard previously touched Hegel’s view of the dialectical relation between the outer and the inner in the opening line of Either/Or: “it may have occurred to you, dear reader, to doubt somewhat the accuracy of that familiar philosophical thesis that the outer is the inner and the inner is the outer.”183 this portrayal of the concepts as being in a necessary dialectical relation to one another is probably a more accurate account of Hegel’s actual view than the one presented in Fear and Trembling, which attributes to Hegel a preference for the outer. in any case, the point for Johannes de silentio is that the two categories are sometimes incommensurable. abraham’s inward revelation simply cannot be understood from without. Johannes de silentio accuses Hegel of overlooking the crucial inward components of religious life. Here again Kierkegaard makes use of Hegel’s categories, the inner and outer, in a context quite foreign to that which Hegel intended. Hegel is concerned with them as, for example, categories of reflection in logic,184 or as terms to describe the human body in the philosophy of nature,185 but not in the context of religious faith. to his credit, Kierkegaard makes no mention of any particular text by Hegel in this connection, and thus seems to be addressing what he perceives as a general Hegelian principle. the third “problema” deals with how one can justify oneself to others. the personal nature of the revelation permits only inward justification, and Abraham would not be able to justify his actions by discursive argumentation. Johannes de silentio writes, “the ethical as such is the universal; as the universal it is in turn the disclosed. The single individual, qualified as immediate, sensate, and psychical, is the hidden. thus his ethical task is to work himself out of his hiddenness and to become disclosed in the universal.”186 A universal ethic can be justified with SKS 4, 160f. / FT, 68. SKS 4, 161 / FT, 68f. 183 SKS 2, 11 / EO1, 3. 184 Hegel, SL, pp. 518–28 / Jub., vol. 4, pp. 648–61. EL, §§ 138–41 / Jub., vol. 8, pp. 313– 9. (SL = Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. by a.v. miller, london: george allen and unwin 1989.) (EL = The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. by t.F. gerats, w.a. suchting, H.s. Harris, indianapolis: Hackett 1991.) 185 PhS, pp. 160–72 / Jub., vol. 2, pp. 208–23. see also his criticism of physiognomy and phrenology: PhS, pp. 185–210 / Jub., vol. 2, pp. 239–71. 186 SKS 4, 172 / FT, 82. 181 182

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discursive, reasoned arguments. For the subjective believer, however, this is not possible since faith entails an inward element which cannot be made the object of reasoned discussion. Johannes de silentio then mentions Hegel again: if there is no hiddenness rooted in the fact that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal, then abraham’s conduct cannot be defended, for he disregarded the intermediary ethical agents.…the Hegelian philosophy assumes no justified hiddenness, no justified incommensurability. It is, then, consistent for it to demand disclosure, but it is a little bemuddled when it wants to regard abraham as the father of faith and to speak about faith.187

since the outer is equivalent to the inner for Hegel, there is no incommensurability and thus, in principle, nothing that cannot be articulated and discussed. For Kierkegaard, however, the inner paradox of faith cannot be articulated. in this text Hegel is continually reintroduced as a contrasting point of view to the one Johannes de silentio wishes to set forth. the reference to Hegel’s “the good and Conscience” is the key to understanding the parameters of the entire text. there Hegel sets forth his own universal ethic while criticizing relativism and subjectivism. Kierkegaard’s goal is to steer a middle course between these two positions and carve out an independent sphere for a religiosity that is subjective but not arbitrary or relativist. VIII. Hegel in the Authorship after 1843 although the Concluding Unscientific Postscript from 1846 is generally understood to represent the apex of Kierkegaard’s Hegel critique, there is no evidence that Kierkegaard ever returned to Hegel’s primary texts after 1843. works such as Philosophical Fragments (1844), The Concept of Anxiety (1844) and Prefaces (1844), occasionally mention Hegel’s name directly or contain Hegelian elements, but do not quote or refer explicitly to any of his primary texts. But in the absence of direct textual references, the interpretive challenge becomes considerably more difficult. after 1846 Hegel all but disappears from the authorship. if we ignore for the moment The Book on Adler due to its special status as a posthumous work, Hegel is almost never mentioned after the Postscript. He appears in only scattered entries in the nB journals, that is, the journals Kierkegaard kept during the second half of his authorship from after 1846, and most of those references are either wholly incidental or refer to figures in the Danish Hegel reception and not Hegel’s own texts.188 although The Sickness unto Death (1849) follows a dialectical pattern that SKS 4, 172 / FT, 82. SKS 20, 39, nB:36 / JP 5, 5937. SKS 20, 44, nB:42 / JP 2, 1611. SKS 20, 46f., nB:47 / JP 5, 5944. SKS 20, 89f., nB:128 / JP 2, 1612. SKS 20, 207, nB2:166 / JP 2, 1613. SKS 20, 262, nB3:34 / JP 1, 184. SKS 20, 264, nB3:38 / JP 5, 6079. SKS 21, 76, nB7:3 / JP 2, 1375. SKS 21, 189f., nB8:108 / JP 1, 224. SKS 21, 225, nB9:42 / JP 6, 6310, p. 95. SKS 21, 229f., nB9:51 / JP 1, 684. 187 188

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has much in common with many of Hegel’s analyses, there is no evidence of a renewed study of any of Hegel’s primary texts during the time of its writing. Kierkegaard’s use of Hegel can perhaps be characterized as divided into four periods. The first period runs from the earliest journal entries and newspaper articles in 1834 until around 1840 when Kierkegaard began serious work on The Concept of Irony. during this period Kierkegaard appears to have had some awareness of Hegel’s philosophy but not yet to have made any serious study of it. His writings from this period contain general discussions of certain Hegelian ideas but no references to actual texts. the second period begins with The Concept of Irony in 1841 and runs through Fear and Trembling in 1843. this period is characterized by a thorough study of carefully selected texts by Hegel, such as the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, which are used extensively in The Concept of Irony, the section of tragedy from the Lectures on Aesthetics, which is used in Either/Or, the sections on the “unhappy Consciousness” and “sense-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit, which are used in Either/Or and De Omnibus respectively, and the section “the good and Conscience” from the Philosophy of Right, which is used in Fear and Trembling. the third period, running from 1844 through 1846, is characterized by an ongoing interest in Hegel but with no renewed study of any of his primary texts. Kierkegaard’s polemics during this period are aimed less at Hegel per se than at the danish Hegelians such as Johan ludvig Heiberg, Hans lassen martensen and adolph peter adler. the references to Hegel during this period tend to repeat the same basic ideas, which can again be taken as evidence that Kierkegaard was then working with his prior knowledge of Hegel’s thought without revisiting the primary texts. the fourth period covers the entire second half of the authorship, from 1847 until Kierkegaard’s death in 1855. Kierkegaard’s interest in Hegel clearly dried up by this point. Hegel is rarely mentioned, and there are no new references to any of the primary texts. Kierkegaard’s actual study of Hegel was thus limited to a fairly short period of time from his dissertation in 1841 to Fear and Trembling in 1843. in this context it is somewhat surprising that there is no evidence that he ever studied the text from Hegel’s corpus which would seem to have been the most relevant for his interests, namely the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. although Kierkegaard owned a copy of this work, which was much discussed and debated at the time, he seems not to have taken the time to make a study of it. one could also mention Hegel’s early essay “Faith and Knowledge,” which would certainly have been of great interest to Kierkegaard, but there is no evidence that he was familiar with it, although he owned a copy of it in michelet’s edition of Hegel’s Philosophische Abhandlungen (1832). Kierkegaard’s readings of Hegel were highly selective and almost always dictated by his own interests. His study of Hegel seems to be ad hoc in the sense that instead of reading entire books from cover to cover, he went directly to the individual chapters and analyses that he could use for his own purposes: Hegel’s analysis of socrates and the greek world, his criticism of romanticism, the moral conscience and irony, his discussion of Antigone and greek tragedy, and his treatment of common sense

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realism under the heading of “sense-Certainty.” this ad hoc use clearly indicates a receptive disposition towards Hegel since it shows that, with his own agenda more or less set ahead of time, Kierkegaard consciously and actively sought inspiration in Hegel’s works. If Kierkegaard looked to Hegel for inspiration, he rarely confined himself to merely parroting him. instead, he appropriated Hegel’s ideas for his own purposes by changing them slightly and placing them in new contexts. thus, Kierkegaard was by no means an uncritical follower of Hegel—indeed, this tendency is what he so often criticized among his contemporaries—but by the same token he was no rabid anti-Hegelian. instead, Kierkegaard, like most all scholars from the period, was in a critical and indeed probably more or less inevitable dialogue with the towering philosophical figure of the age.

Bibliography I. Hegel’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. by Karl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832 (vol. 1 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 549). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Johann schulze, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832 (vol. 2 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 550). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, ed. by eduard gans, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833 (vol. 8 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 551). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833–34 (vols. 3–5 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 552–554). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s vermischte Schriften, vols. 1–2, ed. by Friedrich Förster and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1834–35 (vols. 16–17 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 555–556). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 557–559). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophische Propädeutik, ed. by Karl rosenkranz, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840 (vol. 18, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 560). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840–45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 561–563).

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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 564–565). Hegels Philosophie in wörtlichen Auszügen, ed. by C. Frantz and a. Hillert, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1843 (ASKB 578). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by Heinrich gustav Hotho, Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 1384–1386). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Hegel adler, adolph peter, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842 (ASKB 383). [anonymous] [Buhl, ludwig], Hegel’s Lehre vom Staat und seine Philosophie der Geschichte in ihren Hauptresultaten, Berlin: Förstner 1837 (ASKB 566). Baader, Franz von, Fermenta Cognitionis, vols. 1–5, Berlin: reimer 1822–24, vol. 1, 1822, p. vi; pp. 18–20; p. 23; pp. 66–9; vol. 2, 1823, p. 15; p. 17; p. 38; p. 40; p. 56; vol. 3, 1823, pp. 8–9; p. 13; p. 32; vol. 4, 1823, p. 5; p. 9; pp. 12–3; p. 35; pp. 41–3; vol. 5, 1824, pp. 15–7; p. 19–26; pp. 31–2; p. 58; pp. 82–3 (ASKB 394). —— Vorlesungen, gehalten an der Königlich-Bayerischen Ludwig-MaximiliansHochschule über religiöse Philosophie im Gegensatze der irreligiösen, älterer und neuer Zeit, vol. 1, munich: giel 1827, p. 9n; p. 17n; p. 23; p. 27; p. 33; p. 36; p. 60; p. 63; p. 72n; p. 75; p. 77; p. 95; p. 98; p. 102n (ASKB 395). —— Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik, vol. 1, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1828 (ASKB 396) (vols. 2–5, münster: theissing 1830–38), vol. 1, 1828, p. 57n; vol. 2, 1830, p. 40; p. 46; pp. 50–1; p. 53; p. 55n; vol. 3, 1833, p. 28; p. 38n; p. 60; vol. 4, 1836, p. 10; p. 16; p. 62; p. 65; p. 69; pp. 94–5; pp. 109–12; p. 118; pp. 124–6; p. 139n; p. 142n; p. 143; vol. 5, 1838, p. 11n; p. 20; p. 27; p. 46n; p. 63; p. 68; p. 90; p. 98. —— Philosophische Schriften und Aufsätze, vols. 1–2, münster: theissing 1831– 32, vol. 2, p. iv; p. vi; pp. viii–xii; p. xiv, p. xvi; p. xviii; p. xxviii; p. 9n; p. 18n; p. 25n; p. 40; p. 43n; p. 44; p. 66n; p. 90; p. 104; p. 132; p. 144; p. 158n; p. 163n; p. 175n; p. 197n; p. 205; p. 207n; p. 213; p. 217; p. 367; p. 440 (ASKB 400–401). —— Vorlesungen über eine künftige Theorie des Opfers oder des Kultus, münster: theissing 1836, p. 15; p. 95; p. 100 (ASKB 408). —— Ueber die Incompetenz unsrer dermaligen Philosophie, zur Erklärung der Erscheinungen aus dem Nachtgebiete der Natur, stuttgart: Brodhag 1837, p. 7; p. 18; pp. 29f. (ASKB 411).

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—— Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung. Sendeschreiben an den Herrn Professor Molitor in Frankfurt, vols. 1–2, würzburg: in Commission der stahel’schen Buchhandlung 1837, vol. 1, p. 18; p. 23; vol. 2, p. 55n (ASKB 409–410); vol. 3, 1837, p. 55n (ASKB 413). —— Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel’schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christenthum. Nebst zehn Thesen aus einer religiösen Philosophie, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839 (ASKB 416). —— Ueber die Nothwendigkeit einer Revision der Wissenschaft natürlicher, menschlicher und göttlicher Dinge, in Bezug auf die in ihr sich noch mehr oder minder geltend machenden Cartesichen und Spinozistischen Philosopheme, erlangen: bei J.J. palm und ernst enke 1841, p. 8n; p. 11; pp. 21–2 (ASKB 418). Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Die christliche Gnosis: oder, die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwiklung, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835, pp. 668–735 (ASKB 421). —— Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus. Eine religionsphilosophische Untersuchung, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1837, p. 19n; pp. 22–4; p. 28; p. 30; p. 34; p. 44; p. 68n; p. 80n; p. 138n; pp. 139–40; p. 143; p. 144n; p. 152 (ASKB 422). —— “die vermittlung der beiden momente eingeleitetet durch schelling” and “die vermittlung derselben in der Hegel’schen philosophie,” in his Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste, tübingen: osiander 1838, pp. 709–18 (ASKB 423). Beck, andreas Frederik, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1842 (ASKB 424). Berg, Carl, Grundtrækkene af en philosophisk Propædeutik eller Erkjendelseslære, tilligemed Poul Møllers kortfattede formelle Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839 (ASKB 426). Biedermann, a. emanuel, Die freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christenthum in Streit und Frieden, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues. 1844, p. 106 (ASKB u 20). Brøchner, Hans, Nogle Bemærkninger om Daaben, foranledigede ved Professor Martensens Skrift: Den christelige Daab, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1843, pp. 24–6 (ASKB u 27). —— Om det jødiske Folks Tilstand i den persiske Periode, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1845, p. 50n (ASKB 2037). Bruch, Johann Friedrich, Die Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften, Hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1842, p. 2; p. 7; p. 8n; p. 9; pp. 15–6; p. 18n; p. 19n; pp. 31–3; p. 38n; p. 49n; pp. 123–4; p. 126; p. 171; p. 184 (ASKB 439). Carriere, moriz, “die Hegelsche philosophie und deren überwindende Fortbildung,” in his Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit in ihren Beziehungen zur Gegenwart, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’scher verlag 1847, pp. 739–48 (ASKB 458). Chalybäus, Heinrich moritz, Historische Entwickelung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, dresden: Ch. F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1837, pp. 261– 340 (ASKB 461).

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—— Historisk Udvikling af den speculative Philosophie fra Kant til Hegel, trans. by s. Kattrup, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1841, pp. 252–376 (ASKB 462). —— “philosophie der geschichte und geschichte der philosophie in Bezug auf: [among others] Hegels Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte…l. Feuerbach Geschichte der neurern Philosophie,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 1, 1837, pp. 301–38 (ASKB 877–911). —— System der speculativen Ethik, oder Philosophie der Familie des Staates und der religiösen Sitte, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1850 (ASKB 463–464). Cousin, victor, Über französische und deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert Beckers. Nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn Geheimenraths von Schelling, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1834, pp. 37–42 (ASKB 471). erdmann, Johann eduard, Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie gehalten und auf den Wunsch seiner Zuhörer herausgegeben, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837, p. 15; p. 68; p. 111; p. 180; pp. 270–1 (ASKB 479). —— Leib und Seele nach ihren Begriff und ihrem Verhältniß zu einander. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der philosophischen Anthropologie, Halle: schwetschke 1837, pp. 70–71 (ASKB 480). —— Grundriss der Psychologie. Für Vorlesungen, leipzig: Fr. Chr. vogel 1840 (ASKB 481). —— Natur oder Schöpfung? Eine Frage an die Naturphilosophie und Religionsphilosophie, leipzig: Friedrich Christian wilhelm vogel 1840, p. 83; p. 114; p. 125 (ASKB 482). —— Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik, Halle: lippert 1841 (ASKB 483). Feuerbach, ludwig, Geschichte der Neuern Philosophie. Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnitz’schen Philosophie, ansbach: Brügel 1837, p. 60; p. 133; p. 225 (ASKB 487). Fichte, immanuel Hermann, Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1833–36, vol. 1, pp. iv–ix; p. 7; pp. 65f.; p. 86; p. 91; p. 95; p. 105; pp. 141f.; p. 156; p. 185; pp. 187–8; p. 192; p. 203; p. 300; pp. 303–304; p. 306; pp. 308–309; vol. 2, p. vii; pp. 11–2; p. 14; p. 16; p. 27; p. 31; p. 56; pp. 62– 3; p. 65; p. 76n; p. 87; p. 90; p. 108n; p. 125; p. 131; p. 159; pp. 166–7; pp. 180–1; p. 192; pp. 194–6; p. 229; p. 247; p. 261; pp. 283–4; p. 308; pp. 374–5; p. 388; p. 454; pp. 463–4; p. 476; p. 494; p. 519 (ASKB 502–503) [vol. 3 (ASKB 509)]. —— Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer, elberfeld: Büschler’sche verlagsbuchhandlung und Buchdruckerei 1834 (ASKB 505). —— “die voraussetzungen des Hegelschen systemes,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 4, 1839, pp. 291–306. —— De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn: litteris Caroli georgii 1840 (ASKB 507). —— Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Des Cartes und Locke bis auf Hegel, 2nd revised ed., sulzbach: J.e. seidel’sche Buchhandlung 1841, pp. 782–1032 (ASKB 508).

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—— “einige Bemerkungen über den unterschied der immanenten und der offenbarungstrinität nach lücke und nitzsch, auch mit Beziehung auf Hegel und strauß,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 7, 1841, pp. 224–54. —— “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart.…[review of among others] l. Feuerbach, [D]as Wesen des Christenthums. leipzig, o. wigand 1841…,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 9, 1842, pp. 93–149. —— “nogle Bemærkninger om Forskjellen imellem den immanente trinitet og aabenbaringstriniteten, efter lücke og nitzsch, samt med Hensyn til Hegel og strauß,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vols. 1–20, ed. by Henrik nikolai Clausen and matthias Hagen Hohlenberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833–52, vol. 10, 1842, pp. 546–76 (ASKB u 29). —— “der bisherige zustand der praktischen philosophie in seinen umrissen. ein kritischer versuch.…i. Kant, J.g. Fichte, Hegel, schleiermacher,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 161–202. —— “der bisherige zustand der anthropologie und psychologie. eine kritische uebersicht,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 12, 1844, pp. 66–105. —— “der bisherige zustand der anthropologie und psychologie. eine kritische uebersicht. Fortsetzung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 12, 1844, pp. 243–78. —— “Hegel’s philosophische magister-dissertation und sein verhältniß zu schelling. nachtrag zum aufsatze im vorhergehenden Hefte: ‘zu Hegel’s Characteristik,’ ” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 142–54. —— Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, Heidelberg: akademische Buchhandlung von J.C.B. mohr 1846 [vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie], p. 24; pp. 39ff.; pp. 67ff.; pp. 70ff.; p. 79; p. 91; p. 96; p. 154; p. 159; p. 161; p. 164; p. 173; pp. 196ff.; p. 209; p. 213; p. 221; pp. 236f.; p. 243; p. 250; p. 255; p. 263; p. 265; p. 287; pp. 365ff.; p. 489; p. 491; p. 572 (ASKB 509) [vols. 1–2 (ASKB 502–503)]. —— “georg wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–31),” in his System der Ethik, vols. 1–2.1, leipzig: dyk 1850–1851, vol. 1, Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht, Staat und Sitte in Deutschland, Frankreich und England von der Mitte des Achtzehnten Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, 1850, pp. 182–232; vol. 2.1, Die allgemeinen ethischen Begriffe und die Tugend- und Pflichtenlehre, 1851, p. 81n; vol. 2.2, pp. 64–5; pp. 111–2; p. 116; p. 125n; p. 135; p. 195; p. 213; p. 247; p. 267; pp. 350f.; p. 439 (ASKB 510–511) (vol. 2.2, leipzig: dyk 1853, see ASKB 504). Fischer, Carl philipp, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus spekulativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: verlag liesching 1839, p. iv; p. x; p. xv; p. xx; p. xxvi; p. xxxii; pp. 15–40; p. 44; p. 56; pp. 60–61; p. 79n; p. 95n (ASKB 512).

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—— “der uebergang von dem idealistischen pantheismus der Hegel’schen philosophie zum theismus, mit besonderer rücksicht auf die schrift: Die Hegel’sche Philosophie. Beiträge zu ihrer richtigen Beurtheilung von georg andreas gabler. i. Heft. Berlin 1845,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 10, 1843, pp. 291–319. Fischer, Friedrich, Die Metaphysik von empirischen Standpunkte aus dargestellt, Basel: schweighauser’sche Buchhandlung 1847, p. 9; pp. 17–18; p. 53; pp. 74–6; p. 94; p. 110; p. 133; p. 144 (ASKB 513). Frauenstädt, Julius, Briefe über die Schopenhauer’sche Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1854 (ASKB 515). guerike, Heinrich ernst Ferdinand, Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Halle: in der gebauerschen Buchhandlung 1838, vol. 2, p. 1096 (ASKB 158–159). günther, anton, Die Juste-Milieus in der deutschen Philosophie gegenwärtiger Zeit, vienna: Beck 1838, pp. 5–6; p. 11; pp. 49–50; p. 52; p. 54; pp. 59–60; p. 71; pp. 81–2; p. 85; pp. 114–5; p. 274; pp. 350–3; p. 390; p. 409 (ASKB 522). —— “K.F.e. trahndorff, wie kann der supranaturalismus sein recht gegen Hegels religionsphilosophie behaupten? eine lebens- und gewissensfrage an unsre zeit; Berlin, bei Fr. Hentze 1840,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 8, 1841, pp. 131–54; pp. 271–308. —— Euristheus und Heracles, Meta-logische Kritiken und Meditationen, vienna: Fr. Beck’s universitäts-Buchhandlung 1843, pp. 2–3; pp. 15–18; pp. 23–4; p. 31; p. 34; p. 51; p. 59–60; pp. 78ff.; p. 95; p. 97; pp. 99–100; p. 110; p. 124; p. 152; p. 162; p. 357 (ASKB 523). günther, anton and Johann Heinrich pabst, Janusköpfe. Zur Philosophie und Theologie, vienna: wallishausser 1834, p. 14; p. 23; p. 29; p. 106; p. 344; pp. 367f. (ASKB 524). Hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 5n; p. 8; p. 28; p. 49; p. 53n; p. 61n; p. 86; p. 112; p. 124 (ASKB 534). Hahn, august (ed.), Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, leipzig: Friedrich Christian wilhelm vogel 1828, p. 260 (ASKB 535). Harms, Friedrich, “ueber die möglichkeit und die Bedingungen einer für alle wissenschaften gleichen methode. ein Beitrag zur logik,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by i.H. Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 14, 1845, pp. 1–49 (ASKB 877–911). Hase, Karl, Kirkehistorie. Lærebog nærmest for akademiske Forelæsninger, trans. by C. winther and t. schorn, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837, pp. 603ff.; p. 617 (ASKB 160–166). —— Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. Ein dogmatisches Repertorium für Studirende, 4th revised ed., leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel 1839, pp. 2f.; p. 5; p. 51; p. 53; p. 63; p. 73; p. 111; p. 124; p. 129; p. 139; p. 141; p. 147; p. 174; p. 204; p. 239; p. 267; p. 331 (ASKB 581). Hebbel, Friedrich, Mein Wort über das Drama! Eine Erwiderung an Professor Heiberg in Copenhagen, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1843, p. 7 (ASKB u 54).

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Heiberg, Johan ludvig, Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid. Et Indbydelses-Skrift til en Række af philosophiske Forelæsninger, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833 (ASKB 568). —— [Christen trane], “Breve til en landsbypræst,” Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, 1834, i, no. 22 [pp. 93–5]; ii, no. 23 [pp. 98–100]; iii, no. 24 [pp. 101–4] (see ASKB 1606–1607; u 55). —— “recension over Hr. dr. rothes treenigheds- og Forsoningslære,” in Perseus, vols. 1–2, ed. by Johan ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837–38, vol. 1, pp. 1–90, see pp. 8–9; p. 12; p. 22; p. 35; p. 38–40 (ASKB 569). —— “det logiske system,” Perseus, vols. 1–2, ed. by Johan ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837–38, vol. 2, pp. 1–45, see pp. 4–5; pp. 44–5 (ASKB 569). —— “lyrisk poesie,” in Intelligensblade, nos. 25–26, 1843, ed. by Johan ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1843, vol. 3, pp. 25–72, see p. 49. (ASKB u 56, includes nos. 24, 26, 27.) —— Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 3, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1843 [vol. 3, in Johan ludvig Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1841–43], p. 354; pp. 370–1 (ASKB 1560). Heine, Heinrich, Die romantische Schule, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1836, pp. 174–76; p. 183; p. 186; p. 344 (ASKB u 63). Helfferich, adolph, Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen, vols. 1–2, gotha: Friedrich parthes 1842, vol. 1, p. 15; p. 26; pp. 37–8; p. 55; p. 99; p. 106; p 169; p. 192; p. 198 (ASKB 571–572). Hotho, Heinrich gustav, Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst, stuttgart and tübingen: Cotta 1835, p. 150; pp. 383ff. (ASKB 580). Hundeshagen, C.v., “den tydske protestantisme, dens Fortid og dens nuværende livsspørgsmaal” [1847], Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, op. cit., vol. 16, 1848, pp. 125–240. martensen, Hans lassen, De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta, Copenhagen: i.d. quist 1837, pp. 130–5 (ASKB 648). —— Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1841 (ASKB 650). —— Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie i vor Tids dogmatiske Theologie, trans. by l.v. petersen, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1841, pp. 105–10 (ASKB 651). —— Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849, p. 86; p. 100; p. 127; p. 189; p. 192; p. 197; p. 208; p. 268; p. 298 (ASKB 653). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 1, pp. 280ff.; pp. 314ff. (ASKB u 79). michelet, Carl ludwig, “allgemeiner standpunkt Hegels,” in his Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel, vols. 1–2, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837–38, vol. 2, pp. 602–801 (ASKB 678–679). —— Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die ewige Persönlichkeit des Geistes, Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1841, p. 255 (ASKB 680).

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møller, poul martin, [review of] “Om Poesie og Kunst i Almindelighed, med Hensyn til alle Arter deraf, dog især Digte-, Maler-, Billedhugger- og Skuespillerkunst; eller: Foredrag over almindelig Æsthetik og Poetik af F.C. sibbern,” in his Efterladte Skrifter, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian winther, F.C. olsen, and Christian thaarup Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, 1842, pp. 105–26; see also pp. 160–61; pp. 184–86; p. 197; p. 199; p. 235; p. 238; pp. 268–9; p. 287 (ASKB 1574–1576). —— “ontologien eller Kategoriernes system,” in his Efterladte Skrifter, vols. 1–3, op. cit., vol. 3, 1843, pp. 331–50; see also p. 206; p. 216; p. 218; p. 224; p. 227; p. 240; p. 253; p. 255; pp. 287–8; p. 290; p. 326; p. 331; pp. 335f. (ASKB 1574–1576). müller, Julius, “Bemærkninger angaaende den hegelske philosophies Forhold til den christelige tro,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, op. cit., vol. 2, 1834, pp. 85–106. —— Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Breslau: Josef max und Komp. 1849, vol. 1, pp. 536–55; vol. 2, pp. 239–43 (ASKB 689–690). mynster, Jakob peter, Om Hukommelsen. En psychologisk Undersögelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1849, p. 4n; p. 20 (ASKB 692). —— Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 (vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57), vol. 1, p. 206n; pp. 224f.; p. 257; p. 267; vol. 2, pp. 79f.; pp. 88–94; pp. 113f.; p. 118 pp. 123–33 passim; p. 142 (ASKB 358–363). nielsen, rasmus, De speculativa historiæ sacræ tractandæ methodo, Copenhagen: Fabritius de tengnagel 1840 (ASKB 697). —— Forelæsningsparagrapher til Kirkehistoriens Philosophie. Et Schema for Tilhørere, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1843, pp. 89–93 (ASKB 698). —— Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845 (ASKB 699). —— Evangelietroen og Theologien. Tolv Forelæsninger holdte ved Universitetet i Kjøbenhavn i Vinteren 1849–50, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 87–8 (ASKB 702). —— Dr. H. Martensens Dogmatiske Oplysninger, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 17ff.; p. 29; p. 54 (ASKB 703). Ørsted, anders sandøe, Af mit Livs og min Tids Historie, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1851–52 [vols. 3–4, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1855–57], vol. 1, p. 40 (ASKB 1959–1960). petersen, august, Die Idee der christlichen Kirche. Zur wissenschaftlichen Beantwortung der Lebensfrage unserer Zeit. Ein theologischer Versuch, vols. 1–3, leipzig: bei Friedr. Christ. wilh. vogel 1839–46, vol. 1, pp. 209–14 (ASKB 717–719). rauch, Friedrich august, Vorlesungen über Goethe’s Faust, Büdingen: Heller 1830, p. 16; p. 36; p. 44n; p. 54n; p. 61; p. 118n; p. 129 (ASKB 1800). romang, Johann peter, Ueber Willensfreiheit und Determinismus, mit sorgfältiger Rücksicht auf die sittlichen Dinge, die rechtliche Imputation und Strafe, und auf das Religiöse. Eine philosophische Abhandlung, Bern: C.a. Jenni, sohn 1835, pp. vi–vii; p. ix; p. 57; p. 137n; p. 182; p. 270 (ASKB 740). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, Halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831 (ASKB 35).

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—— “eine parallele zur religionsphilosophie,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Bruno Bauer, Berlin: dümmler 1836–38; vol. 2, no. 1, 1837, pp. 1–31 (ASKB 354–357). —— Erinnerungen an Karl Daub, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837, p. 3; p. 7; p. 9; pp. 14f.; p. 17; pp. 20f.; p. 22; p. 24; pp. 37f.; pp. 40f.; pp. 43f.; pp. 46f.: pp. 49f. (ASKB 743). —— Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 25; p. 97; p. 99; p. 146; p. 149; pp. 168–177 passim; pp. 187–201 passim; p. 229; p. 241; p. 245; p. 276; p. 280; p. 304; p. 313; pp. 322–3; pp. 336–7 (ASKB 744). —— Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems, Königsberg: Bornträger 1840 (ASKB 745). —— Schelling: Vorlesungen; gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: gerhard 1843, p. x; p. xii; pp. xxi–xxii; p. 75; pp. 192–205 passim; pp. 223–39 passim; pp. 247–8; pp. 266–76 passim; p. 317; p. 327; pp. 352–75 passim (ASKB 766). —— “Hegel’s levnet,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, op. cit., vol. 12, 1844, pp. 511–636. schaller, Julius, Die Philosophie unserer Zeit. Zur Apologie und Erläuterung des Hegelschen Systems, leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs 1837 (ASKB 758). —— Darstellung und Kritik der Philosophie Ludwig Feuerbach’s, leipzig: Hinrichs 1847 (ASKB 760). schopenhauer, arthur, Ueber den Willen in der Natur, Frankfurt am main: schmerber 1836 (ASKB 944). —— Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, p. 471; p. 482; vol. 2, p. 14; p. 69; p. 85; p. 587 (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.w. Hayn 1851, p. 19; pp. 21–2; pp. 27–8; p. 137; p. 147; p. 149; pp. 153–4; pp. 165–6; p. 169; p. 173; vol. 2, p. 8; pp. 404–5; p. 431; p. 456; p. 515 (ASKB 774–775). sibbern, Frederik Christian, Logik som Tænkelære fra en intelligent Iagttagelses Standpunct og i analytisk-genetisk Fremstilling, 2nd enlarged and revised ed., Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens Forlag trykt hos Fabritius de tengnagel 1835, p. 155; p. 241 (ASKB 777). —— Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1838, pp. 79–92 (ASKB 778). —— Dikaiosyne: eller Bidrag til Politik og politisk Jurisprudents for Danske, i statsretlig, kirkelig og historisk Henseende, vol. 1, Copenhagen 1843, p. 15; p. 84n (ASKB 4105). —— Om Philosophiens Begreb, Natur og Væsen. En Fremstilling af Philosophiens Propædeutik, Copenhagen: Forfatterens eget Forlag 1843, pp. 3f.; p. 50; p. 85 (ASKB 779). —— Speculativ Kosmologie med Grundlag til en speculativ Theologie, Copenhagen: Forfatterens eget Forlag 1846, p. 7; p. 60 (ASKB 780).

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—— Om Forholdet imellem Sjæl og Legeme, saavel i Almindelighed som i phrenologisk, pathognomonisk, physiogonomisk og ethisk Henseende i Særdeleshed, Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens eget Forlag 1849, pp. 28–9; p. 46 (ASKB 781). staudenmaier, Franz anton, Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems. Aus dem Standpunkte der Christlichen Philosophie, mainz: Florian Kupferberg 1844 (ASKB 789). —— “Fremstilling og Kritik af det Hegel’ske system,” [1844], Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, op. cit., vol. 13, 1845, pp. 92–140. steenstrup, mathias g.g., Historisk-kritisk Oversigt over Forsøgene paa at give en Historiens Filosofi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1854, p. 14; pp. 112–33; pp. 135–7 (ASKB 792). steffens, Henrich, Christliche Religionsphilosophie, vols. 1–2, Breslau: im verlage bei Josef max und Komp. 1839 [vol. 1, Teleologie; vol. 2, Ethik], vol. 1, pp. 17–19; p. 46; p. 71; vol. 2, p. 51 (ASKB 797–798). —— Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben, vols. 1–10, Breslau: Josef max und Comp. 1840–44, vol. 4, p. 312; p. 436; vol. 6, p. 76; vol. 8, p. 372; vol. 10, p. 56; p. 235; p. 238; p. 290; p. 292 (ASKB 1834–1843). —— Nachgelassene Schriften. Mit einem Vorworte von Schelling, Berlin: e.H. schroeder 1846, p. 208 (ASKB 799). stilling, peter michael, Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844 (ASKB 801). —— Om den indbildte Forsoning af Tro og—Viden med særligt Hensyn til Prof. Martensens “christelige Dogmatik,” Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 8–9; pp. 11–12; p. 18; p. 31n; p. 57; p. 66 (ASKB 802). strauß, david Friedrich, Fremstilling af den christelige Troeslære i dens historiske Udvikling og i dens Kamp med den moderne Videnskab, vols. 1–2, trans. by Hans Brøchner, Copenhagen: Forlagt af H.C. Klein 1842–43 (ASKB 803–804). thiersch, Friedrih, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, p. 21; p. 24 (ASKB 1378). thomsen, grimur, Om den nyfranske Poesie, et Forsøg til Besvarelse af Universitetets æsthetiske Priisspørgsmaal for 1841: “Har Smag og Sands for Poesi gjort Frem- eller Tilbageskridt i Frankrig i de sidste Tider og hvilken Aarsagen?” Copenhagen: paa den wahlske Boghandlings Forlag 1843, p. v; pp. xvi–xvii; p. xxvi, p. xxxii; p.xlii, p. 23; p. 57n; pp. 58–9; p. 67; p. 718; p. 101n; p. 117; p. 152 (ASKB 1390). trendelenburg, Friedrich adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, pp. 22–99 passim; pp. 133f.; pp. 188–95 passim; p. 214n; pp. 218–20; p. 235n; p. 236; p. 238n; pp. 245–56; p. 272; p. 277; p. 278n; p. 280; p. 293; pp. 299–300; vol. 2, p. 37n; pp. 52–5; pp. 60–2; p. 81; p. 101n; p. 122; pp. 131–7; p. 144; p. 172n; p. 180; p. 186; pp. 190f.; pp. 193–207 passim; p. 217n; pp. 251–82 passim; p. 288n; pp. 312–30 passim; p. 341; p. 363 (ASKB 843). —— Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System. Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1843 (ASKB 846).

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—— “Hegel,” in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846, pp. 355–62 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855 not in ASKB]. ulrici, H., “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart. achter artikel. die neuesten werke zur geschichte der philosophie von Brandis, Hillebrand, Branitz, Biedermann, michelet und Chalybäus,” in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 293–311. —— “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart. achter artikel. die neuesten werke zur geschichte der philosophie von Brandis, Hillebrand, Branitz, Biedermann, michelet und Chalybäus. Fortsetzung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 12, 1844, pp. 132–65 (ASKB 877–911). waitz, theodor, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, Braunschweig: Friedrich vieweg und sohn 1849, p. 4; p. 6; p. 30; p. 35; p. 276n; p. 289; p. 333; p. 544 (ASKB 852). weis, Carl, “om statens historiske udvikling,” in Perseus, Perseus, vols. 1–2, ed. by Johan ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837–1838, vol. 2, pp. 49– 99, see pp. 52–54; p. 71; p. 79 (ASKB 569). —— Staten og dens Individer. Indledning i Retsvidenskaben, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1845, p. 46; p. 112 (ASKB 922). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. xii; pp. 3f.; p. 15; p. 25; p. 27n; p. 32n; p. 33n; p. 38; pp. 55–6; p. 84; p. 102; p. 106n; p. 121; p. 203n; p. 222n; p. 247; p. 304n; vol. 2, p. 326n; p. 464n; p. 522n (ASKB 1379–1380). —— Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: Ch.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1833, p. iii; pp. vi–vii; p. 15n; p. 24; p. 30n; p. 31; p. 61n; pp. 125f.; p. 138n; p. 142n; p. 145n; p. 149n; p. 222; pp. 223–33; p. 259; p. 289 (ASKB 866). —— “die drei grundfragen der gegenwärtigen philosophie. mit Bezug auf die schrift: Die Philosophie unserer Zeit. Zur Apologie und Erläuterung des Hegelschen Systemes. von Julius schaller. leipzig, Hinrichs. 1837,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 1, 1837, pp. 67–114 and pp. 161–201. —— “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart. erster artikel. schleiermacher. Hegel. steffens,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 6, 1840, pp. 267–309. —— “die Hegel’sche psychologie und die exner’sche Kritik,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 258–97. —— “Hegel und das newtonische gesetz der Kraftwirkung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 1–36. werder, Karl, Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, Berlin: verlag von veit und Co. 1841 (ASKB 867). wirth, Johann ulrich, “ueber den Begriff gottes, als princip der philosophie, mit rücksicht auf das Hegel’sche und neu-schelling’sche system,” in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 235–92.

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—— Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’scher verlag 1845, p. 18; p. 72, p. 82; pp. 121–2; p. 126f.; p. 143n; p. 161n; p. 189n; p. 213; p. 229; p. 241n; p. 244n; p. 318; p. 337; pp. 371–99; p. 413; p. 418; p. 444 (ASKB 876). —— “die philosophische litteratur der gegenwart. zehnter artikel. [review of among others] Speculative Characteristik und Kritik des Hegel’schen Systems und Begründung der Umgestaltung der Philosophie zur objectiven Vernunftwissenschaft, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte der Philosophie von dr. Karl phil. Fischer, ordentl. professor der philosophie an der universität erlangen. 1845,” in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 16, 1846, pp. 103–34 and pp. 219–47. zeuthen, ludvig, Humanitet betragtet fra et christeligt Standpunkt, med stadigt Hensyn til den nærværende Tid, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1846, pp. 17–18 (ASKB 915). —— Om Ydmyghed. En Afhandling, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel 1852, p. 88 (ASKB 916). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel acone, g., “l’opposizione kierkegaardiana ad Hegel,” Rivista di Studi Salernitani, vol. 1, 1968, pp. 189–205. allison, Henry e., “Christianity and nonsense,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 20, 1967, pp. 432–60. reprinted in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Josiah thompson, garden City, new york: anchor Books 1972, pp. 289–323. andersen, vagn, “paradoksi og dialektik—Kierkegaard og Hegel endnu engang,” Fønix, vol. 15, no. 2, 1991, pp. 87–104. ansbro, John Joseph, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Hegel—An Interpretation, ph.d. thesis, Fordham university, new york 1964. anz, wilhelm, “Hegel und Kierkegaard,” in his (ed.) Humanismus und Christentum, Hamburg: agentur des rauhen Hauses 1955 (Schriftenreihe der Evangelischen Akademie Hamburg, vol. 8), pp. 27–33. —— Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus, tübingen: J.C.B. mohr 1956. Baeumler, alfred, “Hegel und Kierkegaard,” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, vol. 2, no. 1, 1924, pp. 116–30. Barrio, Jaime Franco, Kierkegaard frente al Hegelianismo, valladolid: universidad de valladolid 1996. Behler, ernst, “Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony with Constant reference to romanticism,” in Kierkegaard Revisited, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Jon stewart, Berlin and new york: walter de gruyter 1997 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 1), pp. 13–33. Bense, max, Hegel und Kierkegaard. Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung, Cologne: staufen 1948. Berthold-Bond, daniel, “lunar musings? an investigation of Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s portraits of despair,” Religious Studies, vol. 34, 1998, pp. 33–59.

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Biagio, Giovanni de, “Kierkegaard ed Hegel. (Riflessione in margine ad una recente traduzione italiana),” Atti dell’Accademia Nazionale di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli, vol. 75, 1964, pp. 1–43. Blanchette, oliva, “the silencing of philosophy,” in Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1993 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 6), pp. 29–65. Bogen, James, “remarks on the Kierkegaard-Hegel Controversy,” Synthese, vol. 13, 1961, pp. 372–89. Bohlin, Torsten, “Uppenbarelse och historia i den hegelska religionsfilosofin och hos Kierkegaard,” in his Kierkegaards dogmatiska åskådning i dess historiska sammanhang, stockholm: svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag 1925, pp. 354–440 [in german as “offenbarung und geschichte in der Hegelschen religionsphilosophie und bei Kierkegaard,” in his Kierkegaards dogmatische Anschauung in ihrem geschichtlichen Zussamenhange, gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1927, pp. 429–539]. Bruaire, Claude, “Hegel et Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard, ed. by Jean Brun, [special number of] Obliques, paris: eurographic 1981, pp. 167–175. Caputo, John d., “repetition and Kinesis: Kierkegaard on the Foundering of metaphysics,” in his Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project, Bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 1987, pp. 11–35. Castellano, wanda, “la crisi del modello hegeliano in soeren Kierkegaard,” in Saggi e ricerche di filosofia, ed. by ada lamacchia, lecce: edizioni milella 1972, pp. 43–57. Chestov, leon, “Job ou Hegel? À propos de la philosophie existentielle de Kierkegaard,” La Nouvelle Revue Française, vol. 23, 1935, pp. 755–62. Christiansen, lars, “om Hegel: forholdet mellem metode og system,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 125–42. —— “die Kategorie der geschichte bei Hegel und bei Kierkegaard,” Nerthus, vol. 3, 1972, pp. 57–71. Cirell Czerna, r., “a experiência romântica em Kierkegaard e Hegel,” Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, no. 6, 1956, pp. 38–58. Cloeren, Hermann J., “the linguistic turn in Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegel,” International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 17, 1985, pp. 1–13. Collins, James d., “Kierkegaard’s Critique of Hegel,” Thought, vol. 18, 1943, pp. 74–100. —— “the mind of Kierkegaard: the attack upon Hegelianism,” Modern Schoolman, vol. 26, 1949, pp. 219–51. —— “the attack upon Hegelianism,” in his The Mind of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press 1983, pp. 98–136. Comstock, w. richard, “Hegel, Kierkegaard, marx on ‘the unhappy Consciousness,’” Internationales Jahrbuch für Wissens- und Religionssoziologie, vol. 11, 1978, pp. 91–119. Crites, stephen, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and Religion, Chambersburg, pennsylvania: american academy of religion 1972.

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Cruysberghs, paul, “Beyond world History: on Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s interest in ethics and religion,” History of European Ideas, vol. 20, nos. 1–3, 1995, pp. 155–60. —— “Hegel Has no ethics. Climacus’ Complaints against speculative philosophy,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2005, pp. 175–91. Cullen, Bernard and robert l. perkins, “Hegel on the Human and the divine, in light of Criticisms of Kierkegaard,” in Hegel and his Critics. Philosophy in the Aftermath of Hegel, ed. by william desmond, albany: suny press 1989, pp. 93–110. deuser, Hermann, Sören Kierkegaard. Die paradoxe Dialektik des politischen Christen. Voraussetzungen bei Hegel. Die Reden von 1847/48 im Verhältnis von Politik und Ästhetik, munich: Chr. Kaiser verlag and mainz: matthias-grünewaldverlag 1974. dingstad, ståle, “om å lese—Hegel i lys av Kierkegaard,” Agora, vol. 12, nos. 3–4, 1994, pp. 261–71. dunning, stephen n., “Kierkegaard’s ‘Hegelian’ response to Hamann,” Thought, vol. 55, no. 218, 1980, pp. 259–70. —— Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness. A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages, princeton: princeton university press 1985. earle, william, “Hegel and some Contemporary philosophies,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 29, 1960, pp. 352–64. edgar, m., “deer park or the monastery? Kierkegaard and Hegel on unhappy Consciousness, renunciation, and worldliness,” Philosophy Today, vol. 46, 2002, pp. 284–99. Fabro, Cornelio, “la dialettica della libertà e l’assoluto (per un confronto fra Hegel e Kierkegaard),” in Kierkegaard e Nietzsche, by e. paci, Corneli Fabro, F. lombardi et al., milan and rome: Fratelli Bocca 1953 (Archivio di Filosofia, vol. 3), pp. 45–69. —— “Kierkegaard critico di Hegel,” in Incidenza di Hegel. Studi raccolti nel Secondo Centenario della Nascità del Filosofo, ed. by Fulvio tessitore, naples: morano 1970, pp. 499–563. —— “la critica di Kierkegaard alla dialettica hegeliana nel Libro su Adler,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, vol. 9, 1978, pp. 1–32. Farré, luis, “Hegel, Kierkegaard y dos españoles: ortega y gasset y unamuno,” in his Unamuno, William James y Kierkegaard y otros ensayos, Buenos aires: editorial la aurora 1967, pp. 151–60. Fenger, Henning, “Hegel, Kierkegaard og niels thulstrup,” in his Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder, odense: odense universitetsforlag 1976, pp. 109–22. (in english as: “Hegel, Kierkegaard and niels thulstrup,” in his Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, trans. by George Schoolfield, New Haven and London: yale university press 1980, pp. 132–49.) geismar, eduard, “Forholdet til tidens aandelige strømninger,” in his Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, Copenhagen: gads 1927, vol. 1, første del, pp. 88–103; see also vol. 1, tredie del, pp. 5–21, pp. 44–91.

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gerdes, Hayo, Das Christusbild Sören Kierkegaards. Verglichen mit der Christologie Hegels und Schleiermachers, düsseldorf and Cologne: diederichs verlag 1960. Gigante, Marcello, “Il messagio esistenziale di Kierkegaard e la filosofia hegeliana,” in Asprenas, vol. 17, 1970, pp. 392–412. gisladottir, gigja, Kierkegaard Contra Hegel: Either/Or, A Caricatured Fascimile of the Phenomenology of Mind, ph.d. thesis, the university of texas, austin 1991. grøn, arne, “Kærlighedens gerninger og anerkendelsens dialektik,” Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 54, 1991, pp. 260–70. —— “Kierkegaards phänomenologie?” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1996, pp. 91–116. —— “Kierkegaard, Hegel og danske hegelianere,” Teol-information, vol. 29, 2004, pp. 37–40. —— “ambiguous and deeply differentiated: Kierkegaard’s relations to Hegel,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 23, 2005, pp. 179–200. grunnet, sanne elisa, Ironi og Subjectivitet. En Studie over Søren Kierkegaards Disputats Om Begrebet Ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1987, see pp. 37–46. guarda, victor, Kierkegaardstudien: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses Kierkegaards zu Hegel, meisenheim am glan: verlag anton Hain 1975. Hagen, eduard von, Abstraktion und Konkretion bei Hegel und Kierkegaard, Bonn: Bouvier 1969. Hannay, alastair, “turning Hegel outside-in,” in his Kierkegaard, london: routledge & Kegan paul 1982, pp. 19–53. Hansen, olaf, The Problem of Alienation and Reconciliation. A Comparative Study of Marx and Kierkegaard in the Light of Hegel’s Formulation of the Problem, ph.d. thesis, princeton theological seminary, princeton, new Jersey 1956. Hartnack, Justus, “Kierkegaards angreb på Hegel,” in Sprogets mesterskab. Festskrift til Johannes Sløks 70-årsdag, ed. by Kjeld Holm and Jan lindhardt, viby: Centrum 1986, pp. 30–39. (in english as “Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegel,” in Thought and Faith in the Philosophy of Hegel, ed. by John walker, dordrecht, Boston and london: Kluwer academic publishers 1991, pp. 121–32). Hass, Jørgen, “entfremdung und Freiheit bei Hegel und Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard und die deutsche Philosophie seiner Zeit, ed. by Heinrich anz, peter Kemp and Friedrich schmöe, Copenhagen: text & Kontext. munich: wilhelm Fink verlag 1980 (Text und Kontext, sonderreihe, vol. 7), pp. 62–83. Heiss, robert, Die großen Dialektiker des 19. Jahrhunderts: Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Cologne and Berlin: verlag Kiepenheuer & witsch 1963. (in english as Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Three Great Philosophers whose Ideas Changed the Course of Civilization, trans. by e.B. garside, new york: delacorte press 1975.) Hirsch, emanuel, “ihr [die erstlingsschrift] verhältnis zu Hegel”; “der zweifache einsatz wider das Hegeltum 1840,” in his Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 1, pp. 13–25 [pp. 13–25]; vol. 2, pp. 122–33 [pp. 568–79]. (reprinted, vaduz, liechtenstein: toposverlag 1978. First published in Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode, nos. 29, 31, 32, 36, 1930–33. The reprint retains the pagination of the first publication, giving the page numbers of the 1933 edition in square brackets.)

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Hofe, gerhard vom, “Kunst als grenze. Hegels theorem des ‘unglücklichen Bewußtseins’ und die ästhetische erfahrung bei Kierkegaard,” in Invaliden des Apoll: Motiv und Mythen des Dichterlieds, ed. by Herbert anton, munich: wilhelm Fink verlag 1982, pp. 11–34. Holm, sören, “sören Kierkegaard og Hegel,” Nordisk Tiskrift, vol. 44, pp. 68–81. Hösle, vittorio, “Kann abraham gerettet werden? und: Kann søren Kierkegaard gerettet werden? eine Hegelsche auseinandersetzung mit ‘Furcht und zittern,’” in his Philosophiegeschichte und objektiver Idealismus, munich: verlag C.H. Beck 1996, pp. 206–39. Hyppolite, Jean, “Hegel et Kierkegaard dans la pensée française contemporaine,” in his Figures de la pensée philosophique. Écrits 1931–1968, vols. 1–2, paris: presses universitaires de France 1971, vol. 1, pp. 196–208. Janke, wolfgang, “das phantastische und die phantasie bei Hegel und Fichte im lichte von Kierkegaards pseudonymen schriften,” in his Entgegensetzungen. Studien zu Fichte-Konfrontationen von Rousseau bis Kierkegaard, amsterdam and atlanta: rodopi 1994, pp. 159–86. Joest, wilfried, “Hegel und Kierkegaard. Bemerkungen zu einer prinzipiellen untersuchung,” in Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Heinz-Horst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971 (Wege der Forschung, vol. 179), pp. 81–9. Johansen, udo, “Hegel und Kierkegaard,” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, vol. 7, no. 1, 1953, pp. 20–53. Kangas, david, “the logic of gift in Kierkegaard’s Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843),” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2000, pp. 100–120. Karowski, walter, “Kierkegaard über Hegel,” Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie, vol. 15, 1938, no. 4, pp. 602–16. Kern, walter, “menschwerdung gottes im spannungsfeld der interpretation von Hegel und Kierkegaard,” in Wegmarken der Christologie, ed. by anton ziegenaus, donauwörth: auer 1980, pp. 81–126. Kleinert, markus, “leere und Fülle. möglichkeiten der läuterung bei Hegel und Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2003, pp. 168–88. —— Sich verzehrender Skeptizismus. Läuterungen bei Hegel und Kierkegaard, Berlin and new york: walter de gruyter verlag 2005 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 11). Klindt-Jensen, Henrik, “Krisen som erkendelsesbetingelse hos Hegel—med sideblik til Kierkegaard og Jung,” Philosophia, vol. 19, nos. 3–4, 1990, pp. 134–48. Koch, Carl Henrik, En flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1990. —— Kierkegaard og ‘Det Interessante.’ En studie i en æstetisk kategori, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1992, see pp. 84–101. Kodalle, Klaus-m., “Hegels geschichtsphilosophie—erörtert aus der perspektive Kierkegaards,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 24, 1982, pp. 277–94. Krizek, J., “Kierkegaard’s understanding of Hegel,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review, vol. 21, 1966, pp. 233–44. Kroner, richard J., “Kierkegaard or Hegel?” Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 6, 1952, pp. 79–96.

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mátrai, l., “three antagonists of Hegel: Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, marx,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 115–9. mcdonald, william, “retracing the Circular ruins of Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments,” ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 12), pp. 227–45. mcinerny, ralph, “Kierkegaard and speculative thought,” New Scholasticism, vol. 40, 1966, pp. 23–5. mcKinnon, alastair, “similarities and differences in Kierkegaard’s account of Hegel,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 117–31. mclaughlin, wayman Bernard, The Relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, Boston university, Boston 1958. melchiorre, virgilio, “Kierkegaard ed Hegel. la polemica sul ‘punto di partenza,’” in Studi Kierkegaardiani, ed. by Cornelio Fabro, Brescia: morcelliana 1957, pp. 243–66. —— Saggi su Kierkegaard, genua: Casa editrice marietti 1998 [1987] (Collana di Filosofia, vol. 68), see p. 5; pp. 13–17; p. 21; p. 24; pp. 26–8; p. 34; p. 38; p. 39n; p. 43; p. 63; p. 64n; p. 68; p. 73; p. 76n; p. 77; p. 79n; pp. 96–103; pp. 108–9; p. 110n; p. 117n; p. 119n; pp. 137–8; p. 151; p. 154; p. 184n; p. 196; p. 200n; p. 201n; p. 205; p. 213; p. 216. metzger, Hartmut, “das Christus-ereignis im geschichtsverständnis Hegels und Kierkegaards,” in his Kriterien christlicher Predigt nach Sören Kierkegaard, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1964 (Arbeiten zur Pastoraltheologie, vol. 3), pp. 38–52. milano, andrea, “il ‘divenire di dio’ in Hegel, Kierkegaard e san tommaso d’aquino,” Studi Tomistici, iii: San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno Saggi, Città nuova: Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d’Aquino 1974, pp. 284–94. mollo, gaetano, “mondo della cultura e cultura di caattere. un confronto fra Hegel e Kierkegaard,” in Il problema della cultura: atti del 21. Convegno di assistenti universitari di filosofia : Padova 1976, padova: gregoriana 1977, pp. 65–76. mooney, edward F., “art, deed and system: the prefaces to Fear and Trembling,” in Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1993 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 6), pp. 67–100. mortensen, Finn Hauberg, “Kierkegaard og Hegel—en kompositionsanalytisk tilgang,” in Scandinavian Literature in a Transcultural Context. Papers from the XV IASS Conference. University of Washington. August 12–18, 1984, ed. by sven H. rossel and Birgitta steene, seattle: university of washington 1986, pp. 104–10. mueller, g., “Kierkegaard y Hegel,” Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, vol. 4, nos. 9–10, 1949, pp. 353–87. müller, philippe, “Kierkegaard lecteur de Hegel,” Studia Philosophica, vol. 33, 1973, pp. 157–71. nadler, Käte, Der dialektische Widerspruch in Hegels Philosophie und das Paradoxon des Christentums, leipzig: Felix meiner 1931.

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newmark, Kevin, “Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: the space of translation,” Genre, vol. 16, 1983, pp. 373–87 (reprinted in Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Harold Bloom, new york: Chelsea House publishers 1989, pp. 219–31). pellegrini, alessandro, “il ‘sistema’ e gli eretici [Hegel and Kierkegaard],” Archivio di Storia della Filosofia Italiana, vol. 4, 1935, pp. 159–65. perkins, robert lee, Kierkegaard and Hegel: The Dialectical Structure of Kierkegaard’s Ethical Thought, ph.d. thesis, indiana university, indiana 1965. —— “the Family: Hegel and Kierkegaard’s Judge wilhelm,” Hegel-Jahrbuch, 1967, pp. 89–100. —— “two nineteenth-Century interpretations of socrates: Hegel and Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaard-Studiet, vol. 4, 1967, pp. 9–14. —— “Hegel and Kierkegaard: two Critics of romantic irony,” in Hegel in Comparative Literature, ed. by Frederick g. weiss, Jamaica, new york: st. John’s university 1970 (Review of National Literatures, vol. 1, no. 2, 1970), pp. 232–54. —— “Beginning the system: Kierkegaard and Hegel,” in Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie, wien, 2–9. september 1968, vi, vienna: Herder 1971, pp. 478–85. —— “review: In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Christendom, by stephen Crites,” The Owl of Minerva, vol. 4, no. 3, 1973, pp. 3–7. —— “the Constitution of the self in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and in Kierkegaard’s Sickness unto Death” and “Comment on ‘the Constitution of the self in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and in Kierkegaard’s Sickness unto Death,’” in Method and Speculation in Hegel’s Phenomenology, ed. by merold westphal, atlantic Highlands new Jersey: Humanities press and sussex: Harvester press 1978, pp. 95–107 and pp. 109–15 respectively. —— “abraham’s silence aesthetically Considered,” in Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1993 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 6), pp. 155–76. —— “what a Hegelian Fool i was,” in International Society for the Study of European Ideas, third international Conference. aalborg university, workshop 29: Kierkegaard: A European Thinker in History of European Ideas, vol. 20, nos. 1–3, 1995, pp. 177–81. pieper, annemarie, Geschichte und Ewigkeit bei Sören Kierkegaard. Das Leitproblem der pseudonymen Schriften, meisenheim am glan: verlag anton Hain 1968, see pp. 170–77. Pluzański, Tadeusz, “Kierkegaard contra Hegel,” Czlowiek i swiatopoglad, vol. 6, 1969, pp. 47–67 and vol. 9, 1969, pp. 65–84. pöggeler, otto, “mozart zwischen Hegel und Kierkegaard,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 25, 2000, pp. 139–51. politis, Hélène, “socrate, fondateur de la morale, ou Kierkegaard commentateur de Hegel et historien de la philosophie,” in Autour de Hegel. Hommage à Bernard Bourgeois, ed. by François dagognet and pierre osmo, paris: vrin 2000, pp. 365–78. pomerlau, wayne paul, Perspectives on Faith and Reason. Studies in the Religious Philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, northwestern university, evanston, illinois 1977.

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poole, roger C., “indirect Communication: 1. Hegel, Kierkegaard and sartre,” New Blackfriars, vol. 47, 1966, pp. 532–41. —— “Hegelian Lego: Multiple Redefinition of Terms,” in his Kierkegaard. The Indirect Communication, Charlottesville and london: university press of virginia 1993, pp. 49–60. pyper, Hugh, “the lesson of eternity: Christ as teacher in Kierkegaard and Hegel,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 129–45. radermacher, Hans, Kierkegaards Hegelverständnis, Cologne: Hans radermacher 1958. ramsey, robert paul, “Existenz and the existence of god: a study of Kierkegaard and Hegel,” Journal of Religion, vol. 28, 1948, pp. 157–76. rauscher, erwin, Von Hegel zu Kierkegaard: Verwirklichung des Christseins (Geist als Liebe), ph.d. thesis, vienna 1973. read, lawrence mcKim, Hegel and Kierkegaard: A Study in Antithetical Concepts of the Incarnation, ph.d. thesis, Columbia university, new york 1967. reinhardt, Kurt F., “the Cleavage of mind: Kierkegaard and Hegel,” Commonweal, vol. 24, 1936, pp. 523–4. reuter, Hans, Søren Kierkegaards religionsphilosophische Gedanken im Verhältnis zu Hegels religionsphilosophischem System, erfurt: g. richter 1913. rinaldi, Francesco, “della presenza schellinghiana nella critica di Kierkegaard a Hegel,” Studi Urbinati di Storia, Filosofia e Letteratura, vol. 43, 1969, pp. 243–62. ritschl, dietrich, “Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegels logik,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 11, no. 6, 1955, pp. 437–65 (reprinted in Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by HeinzHorst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971 (Wege der Forschung, vol. 179), pp. 240–72). rizzacasa, aurelio, “opposizioni e continuità tra Kierkegaard ed Hegel,” in his Kierkegaard. Storia ed esistenza, rome: edizioni studium 1984, pp. 18–36. rooey, marc van, “Kierkegaard en Hegel. paradox en bemiddeling,” in Acta Comparanda IX FVG, antwerp: Faculty for the Comparative study of religions 1998, pp. 51–60. rozema, david l., “Hegel and Kierkegaard on Conceiving the absolute,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 9, 1992, pp. 207–24. rudolph, arthur w., “the Concept of man in Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in ITA Humanidades, vol. 8, 1972, pp. 55–71. schmidt, Klaus J., “Hegelauffassungen—dargestellt von Kierkegaardinterpreten,” Hegel-Studien, vol. 7, 1972, pp. 378–90. —— “review: niels thulstrup: Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus. 1835–1846. Historisch-analytische Untersuchung, stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1972. 320 s,” Hegel-Studien, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 309–11. schulz, Heiko, “Kierkegaard über Hegel. umrisse einer kritisch-polemischen aneignung,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 21, 2000, pp. 152–78. schulz, walter, “sören Kierkegaard. existenz und system,” in Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Heinz-Horst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftlcihe Buchgesellschaft 1971, pp. 297–323.

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—— “Kierkegaard: der gegenzug gegen Hegels verweltlichung der philosophie,” in his Philosophie in der veränderten Welt, pfullingen: neske 1972, pp. 276–84. schweppenhäuser, Hermann, Kierkegaards Angriff auf die Spekulation. Eine Verteidigung, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1967 and munich: edition text + Kritik 1993. sciacca, michele Federico, L’esperienza religiosa e l’io in Hegel e Kierkegaard, palermo: palumbo 1948. —— “Kierkegaard hegeliano anti-hegeliano,” in his Dallo Spiritualismo critico allo Spritualismo cristiano, ii, milan: Carlo marzorati editore 1965, pp. 304–7. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995. shearson, w.a., “the Fragmented middle. Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in Fackenheim. German Philosophy and Jewish Thought, ed. by louis greenspan and graeme nicholson, toronto: university of toronto press 1992, pp. 64–89. shestov, lev, “Job and Hegel,” in his Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy, trans. by elinor Hewitt, athens, ohio: ohio university press 1969, pp. 29–39. smith, Kenneth ray, Dialectical Conceptions of the Spirit: Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, ph.d. thesis, yale university, new Haven, Connecticut 1973. söderquist, K. Brian, “the religious ‘suspension of the ethical’ and the ironic ‘suspension of the ethical’: the problem of actuality in Fear and Trembling,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2002, pp. 259–76. solomon, robert C., “the secret of Hegel (Kierkegaard’s Complaint): a study of Hegel’s philosophy of religion,” Philosophical Forum, vol. 9, 1977–78, pp. 440–58. start, lester J., Kierkegaard and Hegel, ph.d. thesis, syracuse university, syracuse 1953. steiger, lothar, “det er jo meine zuthat (sv. iv 210). Kierkegaards erfahrung über Hegel oder etwas über des Johannes Climacus Philosophische Bissen,” Evangelische Theologie, vol. 38, 1978, pp. 372–86. steiner, george, “section 5,” in his Antigones, oxford: Clarendon press 1984, pp. 51–66. stewart, Jon, “Hegel und die ironiethese zu Kierkegaards Über den Begriff der Ironie,” Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung, vol. 3, 1997, pp. 157–81. —— “Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of despair in The Sickness unto Death,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1997, pp. 117–43. —— “Hegel als quelle für Kierkegaards wiederholungsbegriff,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1998, pp. 302–17. —— “Hegel’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Antigone,” Persona y Derecho, vol. 39, 1998, pp. 195–216. —— “Hegel’s view of moral Conscience and Kierkegaard’s interpretation of abraham,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 58–80. —— “Kierkegaard as Hegelian,” Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofía, no. 29, 1998, pp. 147–52.

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—— “Hegel’s presence in The Concept of Irony,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1999, pp. 245–77 (reprinted in Søren Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, vols. 1–4, ed. by daniel w. Conway, london: routledge 2002, vol. 1: Authorship and Authenticity, pp. 221–49.) —— “Kierkegaard and Hegel on Faith and politics,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 20, 1999, pp. 251–4. —— “Hegel and adler in the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 43–77. —— “Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel—et filosofi-historisk topos,” trans. by thor arvid dyrerud, AAR. Idéhistorisk Tidsskrift, nos. 1–2, 2001, pp. 84–91. —— “Kierkegaard’s Criticism of martensen in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, vol. 45, nos. 1–2, 2001, pp. 133– 48. —— “Hegel, Kierkegaard és a közvetítés a Filozófiai morzsákban” [“Hegel, Kierkegaard, and mediation in the Philosophical Fragments”], trans. by Áron telegdi, Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, nos. 1–2, 2003, pp. 217–31. —— “Kierkegaard and Hegelianism in golden age denmark,” in Kierkegaard and his Contemporaries: The Culture of Golden Age Denmark, ed. by Jon stewart, Berlin and new york: verlag walter de gruyter, 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series, vol. 10), pp. 106–45. —— Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003. —— “the paradox and the Criticism of Hegelian mediation in Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2004, pp. 184–207. Stucki, Pierre-André, “Hegel ou la fin de la philosophie chrétienne,” and “La réaction contre Hegel,” in his Le christianisme et l’histoire d’après Kierkegaard, Basel: verlag für recht und gesellschaft 1963, pp. 45–56 and pp. 72–6 respectively. suances marcos, manuel, Sören Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, madrid: universidad nacional de educación a distanca 1997, vol. 2 (Trayectoria de su pensamiento filosófico), pp. 35–9. subramanian, sharada, “existence and essence. Kierkegaard and Hegel,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2, 1993, pp. 17–26. sussman, Henry, “søren Kierkegaard and the allures of paralysis,” in his The Hegelian Aftermath: Readings in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Freud, Proust, and James, Baltimore and london: the Johns Hopkins university press 1982, pp. 63–158. taylor, mark C., “Journeys to moriah: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard,” Harvard Theological Review, vol. 70, 1977, pp. 305–326. —— “love and Forms of spirit. Kierkegaard vs. Hegel,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 95–116. —— “dialectics and Communication: Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard and Dialectics, ed. by Jørgen K. Bukdahl, aarhus: institute for ethics and the philosophy of religion 1979, pp. 5–52. —— Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: university of California press 1980 (reprinted new york: Fordham university press 2000 (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, no. 14)).

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—— “aesthetic therapy: Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, ed. by Joseph H. smith, new Haven, Connecticut and london: yale university press 1981 (Psychiatry and the Humanities, vol. 5), pp. 343–80. theunissen, michael, “die dialektik der offenbarung. zur auseinandersetzung schellings und Kierkegaards mit der religionsphilosophie Hegels,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 72, 1964–65, pp. 134–60. thomas, John Heywood, Subjectivity and Paradox, oxford: Basil Blackwell 1957. —— “indirect Communication. Hegelian aesthetic and Kierkegaard’s literary art,” in Kierkegaard on Art and Communication, ed. by george pattison, new york: st. martin’s press 1992, pp. 114–24. thompson, Curtis l., “the end of religion in Hegel and Kierkegaard,” Sophia, vol. 33, 1994, pp. 10–20. thulstrup, marie mikulová, “Kierkegaards møde med mystik gennem den spekulative idealisme,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 7–69. (in english as “Kierkegaard’s encounter with mysticism through speculative idealism,” in Liber Academiae Kierkegaardiensis, ed. by niels thulstrup, tomus v, 1983, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1984, pp. 31–91). thulstrup, niels, “Kierkegaards verhältnis zu Hegel,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 13, 1957, pp. 200–226. —— “den principielle uoverensstemmelse mellem Kierkegaard og Hegel,” in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, ed. with introduction and Commentary by niels thulstrup, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1962, vol. 2, pp. 103–14. (in english as “Kierkegaard versus Hegel,” in his Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by robert J. widenmann, princeton: princeton university press 1984, pp. 91–101.) —— “Kierkegaard og den filosofiske idealisme,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4, 1962, pp. 88–104. —— “le désaccord entre Kierkegaard et Hegel,” Kierkegaard-Studiet, vol. 4, 1964, pp. 112–24. —— “sören Kierkegaard, historien de la philosophie de Hegel,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 27, 1965, pp. 521–72. —— Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1967. (in english as Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980; in german as Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835–1846, stuttgart: verlag w. Kohlhammer 1972.) —— Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, stuttgart: verlag w. Kohlhammer 1969. —— (ed.), Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4). —— “Kierkegaard’s approach to existence versus Hegelian speculation,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 98–113. —— “the system and the method of Hegel,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 52–97.

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—— “Hegel’s stages of Cognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit and Kierkegaard’s stages of existence in Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Liber Academiae Kierkegaardiensis Annuarius, tom. ii–iv, 1979–81, ed. by alessandro Cortese and niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel and milan: vita e pensiero 1982, pp. 61–9. —— “a ghost-letter Caused by mark C. taylor’s Journeys with Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in Liber Academiae Kierkegaardiensis, tomus v, 1983, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1984, pp. 94–101. —— Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by robert J. widenmann, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1984 (originally as Søren Kierkegaard. Afsluttende uvidenskabelige Efterskrift udgivet med Indledning og Kommentar af Niels Thulstrup, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1962). toeplitz, Karol, “Kierkegaard ein nachkomme Hegels?” in Hegel im Kontext der Wirkungsgeschichte, XVIII. Internationaler Hegel-Kongress 1990, ed. by Karol Bal, wroclaw: wydawnictwo uniwersytetu wroclawskiego 1992, pp. 125–40. töjner, poul erik, “Kierkegaard Hegel-kritikájának és politika-bírálatának aspektusai” [aspects of Kierkegaard’s Hegel Critic and political Judgments], in Kierkegaard Budapesten. A Kierkegaard-hét előadásai 1992 december 1–4 [Kierkegaard in Budapest. papers from the Kierkegaard week, december 1–4, 1992], ed. by andrás nagy, Budapest: Fekete sas Kiadó 1994, pp. 103–17. van der Hoeven, J., “Kierkegaard en marx als dialectische critici van Hegel, i–ii,” in Philosophia Reformata, vol. 34, 1969, pp. 84–100; vol. 35, 1970, pp. 101–18; vol. 36, 1971, pp. 125–50 (summary, pp. 150–4). vandiest, Julien, “Hegel, nietzsche en Kierkegaard,” De Nieuwe Stem, vol. 20, 1965, pp. 385–407 and pp. 465–79. vobis, Bonaventura, “Hegel, marx und Kierkegaard in ihrem Beitrag zum thema ‘der einzelne und die gemeinschaft,’” Franziskanische Studien, vol. 35, 1953, pp. 87–90. voigt, Friedrich adolf, “Climacus. Kierkegaard gegen Hegel, der subjective denker gegen das philosophische system und die systematische theologie,” in his Sören Kierkegaard im Kampfe mit der Romantik, der Theologie und der Kirche, Berlin: Furche-verlag 1928, pp. 255–75. wahl, Jean, “Hegel et Kierkegaard,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, vol. 56, 1931, tome 112, nos. 11–12, pp. 321–80. —— “Hegel et Kierkegaard,” in Verhandlungen des dritten Hegelkongresses vom 19. bis 23. April 1933 in Rom, ed. by B. wigersma, tübingen: J.C.B. mohr 1934, pp. 235–49. —— “la lutte contre le hégélianisme,” in his Études Kierkegaardiennes, paris: Fernand aubier [1938] (Philosophie de l’Espirit), pp. 86–171. —— Kierkegaard. L’Un devant l’Autre, paris: Hachette littératures 1998, see pp. 97–118. watts, michael, Kierkegaard, oxford: oneworld publications 2003, see pp. 133–47. westphal, merold, “abraham and Hegel,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, Huntsville: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 61–84.

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—— “A Dialectic of Dialecticians: Reflections on Hegel and Kierkegaard,” Clio, vol. 13, 1984, pp. 415–24. —— Becoming a Self. A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, west lafayette, indiana: purdue university press 1996. —— “Kierkegaard and Hegel,” The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair Hannay and gordon d. marino, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1998, pp. 101–24. whittemore, robert C., “pro Hegel, contra Kierkegaard,” Journal of Religious Thought, vol. 13, 1956, pp. 131–44. wilde, Frank-eberhard, “die entwicklung des dialektischen denkens bei Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 7–55. zimmerman, r.l., “Kierkegaard’s immanent Critique of Hegel,” Philosophical Forum, vol. 9, 1977–78, pp. 59–474. zwanepol, K., “Kierkegaard, Hegel en de theologie,” Communiqué, vol. 8, no. 3, 1992, pp. 23–34.

Herder: a silent Background and reservoir Johannes adamsen

although Johann gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) was much read in the 1830s and the 1840s, today he can hardly be regarded as à la mode or fashionable. Few if any had been so influential or so much discussed during their own lifetime; however, he faded out of the public eye already at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a disappearance which began in the 1790s while he was still living. I. Herder was an imposing and very learned writer who, for most of his life, was active as a preacher as well as author. For the latter half of his life he was a lutheran bishop (Generalsuperintendent) in the little principality of sachsen-weimar, where he received a position in 1776 with the help of his friend, the government minister Johann wolfgang goethe. Born in mohrungen in today’s poland (formerly prussia), he left his hometown at an early age to study in Königsberg. there he met the philosopher immanuel Kant (1724–1804), long before he was famous as the author of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). in Königsberg he also established a lifelong friendship with the somewhat older Johann georg Hamann (1730–88). after two years at the university (1762–64), the still very young Herder was offered an appointment as pastor and teacher in riga, where he remained until 1769. in may 1769 Herder embarked on a journey by ship via denmark to Bordeaux in France. He travelled to Paris and further via Amsterdam to Hamburg and finally to strasbourg (1771). in strasbourg, he underwent an operation and met goethe, then 21 years old and five years his junior. After negotiations with the university in göttingen, he accepted an appointment as court preacher in Bückeburg in the small principality of schaumburg-lippe (where incidentally the organist was Johann Christoph Friedrich Bach, a son of the famous Johann sebastian Bach). He spent five years in Bückeburg, from May 1771 to October 1776. He married Caroline Flachsland from darmstadt while living in Bückeburg, and there he published a number of influential books, especially on history and the Bible. He died in Weimar in 1803, only 59 years old. It is difficult to give a concise presentation of Herder as a writer. As a kind of literary one-man-army, he did work on aesthetics, folk-songs, literary studies, education, linguistics, antiquities, history, anthropology, science, philosophy and

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theology; the range of his learning was truly astounding. Furthermore, he collected and translated several songs and poems from a variety of languages. even though it is far from sufficient, one might tentatively present him as the author of the famous, though unfinished, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.1 He was a forerunner of romanticism, while still belonging to the enlightenment, a position one could characterize as a sympathetic critique of the enlightenment. the principal questions, for Herder, are connected to the concept of humanity: in order to capture this concept in all its nuances, Herder outlined his philosophy of history. Humanity should be understood not as something which simply exists but as something which must be worked out: the human race is imperfect and therefore every human being has to seek his or her—relative—perfection in the formation of his or her character. as a result, Herder became the great thinker or philosopher of understanding, so to speak, a hermeneutician by principle.2 II. A first approach towards a description of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Herder might be to find out which of Herder’s books Kierkegaard had in his library. unfortunately for this investigation, he had the collected works,3 but he also had separate editions of Herder’s Lieder der Liebe and Volkslieder, which were probably bought first.4 apart from the fact that we know Kierkegaard had been sufficiently interested in Herder to buy his collected works, this presents some interpretive difficulties. In order to systematize the following, I will first mention some references to Herder in Kierkegaard’s texts, both published and unpublished. afterwards i shall indicate why Herder did not influence Kierkegaard very much, even though he was Johann gottfried von Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, vols. 1–4, riga and leipzig 1784–91. 2 the Herder whom Kierkegaard had the possibility to know and the Herder whom we can know today are not quite the same. in this connection one should mention the publication of different editions of his letters, most recently Briefe. Gesamtausgabe 1763–1803, vols. 1–9, ed. by Karl-Heinz Hahn et al., weimar: Hermann Böhlaus nachfolger 1977–88, together with many letters written to Herder. For a fuller and more adequate presentation of Herder one must also take into account his Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts (1774–76) and his Christliche Schriften (1794–98); Cf. günter arnold, “situationen und annäherungen— probleme einer aktuellen Herder-Biographie,” in Johann Gottfried Herder, Geschichte und Kultur, ed. by martin Bollacher, würzburg: Königshausen & neumann 1994, pp. 403–14. 3 Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke, vols. 1–60, 2nd ed., tübingen and stuttgart: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1827–30. this work is divided into the following sections: Zur Religion und Theologie (vols. 1–18, ASKB 1676–1684 and ASKB a i 105–113); Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst, (vols. 1–20, ASKB 1685–1694 and ASKB a i 125–133); and Zur Philosophie und Geschichte (vols. 1–22, ASKB 1695–1705 and ASKB a i 114–124). 4 Cf. Johann gottfried von Herder, Lieder der Liebe. Die ältesten und schönsten aus dem Morgenlande. Nebst vier und vierzig alten Minneliedern, leipzig: weygand 1778 (ASKB 1474); Herder, Volkslieder, vols. 1–2, new ed., introduction by Johannes Falk, leipzig: weygand 1825 (ASKB 1487–1488). 1

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a natural figure in the literary background of Golden Age Copenhagen. I do not pretend to exhaust the matter; there might well still be hidden quotations or allusions to themes or loci which are taken from Herder’s voluminous writings. in Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks Herder is mentioned or quoted several times. in a note from between october 1835 and march 1836 the then 22 year old student writes on the wisdom—or on the result of a life-examination—of “great individualities”: “a Herder, for example, in a little poem in the english style where he relates that only two flowers remain for him—Liebe und Freundschaft.”5 the poem was not published by Herder himself, but in the first edition of his collected works (Kierkegaard owned the second edition). it seems reasonable to assume that Kierkegaard cites from memory. in a collection of books published by Herder from 1785–92, Zerstreute Blätter, Kierkegaard also found something worth noting: each syllable even, each tone of the song colors the pictures of the imagination each in its own way; it is seldom that one picture can be transferred perfectly to another….How bad then is it with every slavish imitation, with each learned theft of alien allegories and pictures, even with each poetical harvest and stockpile wherein one collects foreign patches for future application. unfortunate practice for youngsters who have become used to such image mongering.6

Just afterwards, in a marginal entry, Kierkegaard notes: “what is actually said here? and how far have i just made the same error that Herder criticizes?”7 these quotations are not immediately very useful since they just show a reflective young Kierkegaard commenting on a text. still there are clear indications that the young Kierkegaard was interested in fundamental aesthetic questions. the phrase quoted is from one of Herder’s most interesting aesthetic writings, Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel,8 in which he investigates the relationship between artistic genres and the human senses. His main intention is connected with an old project of working out an anthropology. the passage begins by denying that human beings have a simple Pap. i a 121 / JP 4, 4386. the poem is found in the collection, Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst, vol. 3, pp. 214–6. it is called “die Blume des lebens.” 6 SKS 19, 99, not3:1. “Jedes Sylbenmaas sogar, jeder Ton des Liedes schatiert die Bilder der Phantasie auf eigne Weise, es wird sich selten aus Einem ins andre ein Gemählde volkommen übertragen lassen....Wie schlecht sieht es altso mit aller knechtischen Nachahmung, mit jedem gelehrten Diebstal fremder Allegorien und Bilder, endlich gar mit jenem poetischen Blumenlesen und Vorrätsschränken aus, in denen man sich fremde Lappen für zukünftigen Gebrauch sammelt. Unselige Uebung für Jünglinge, die zu solcher Bieldkrämmerei gewöhnt werden.” Kierkegaard does not quote from his own edition, which tells us both that Kierkegaard read Herder before he acquired the collected works and that after the first reading in 1836 he still found it useful to buy the collected works. Kierkegaard does not cite precisely, cf. SKS K19, 147. in the Pap. edition the note was dated to 1836 (Pap. i C 67), but SKS situates it in 1842. evidently Kierkegaard read and perhaps reread Herder several times. 7 SKS 19, 99, not3:1.a. 8 see Herder, Werke in zehn Bänden, vols. 1–10, ed. by martin Bollacher, Frankfurt am main: dt. Klassiker-verlag 1985–2000, vol. 4, 1994, pp. 631–77. 5

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condition because they have a complex character [ein zusammengesetzt-künstliches Wesen].9 actually, a human being is a microcosmos; with this Herder borrows leibniz’s idea of individuality. it might be tempting to argue that Kierkegaard’s later struggle against systematic thinking in general has its origin here. But his self-reflective comment suggests a more romantic interpretation. this more romantic mood with its overtone of tentative isolation can be seen from the fact that in the passage Kierkegaard leaves out Herder’s disclaimer: Kierkegaard quotes the text as if it were almost impossible to pass from one individuality to another, but Herder makes an extremely important exception. and this exception in fact is part and parcel of the entire Herderian philosophy of history. Herder writes that only seldom is it possible to transfer from one genre to another “unless it is animated by a new spirit and created as anew.”10 leaving out this qualification makes it difficult for Kierkegaard to cross over the different genres at different times.11 But this lies outside his interest. most interesting is a quotation from 1842: “‘write,’ the voice said, and the prophet answered ‘for whom?’ the voice said ‘for the dead, for them you loved in the former world.’ ‘will they read me?’ ‘yes, they shall come back as posterity.’”12 what is interesting about this is that Kierkegaard originally planned to use exactly this quotation as a second motto to Fear and Trembling, after the quotation by Hamann, which was actually used. He wrote it in danish translation in the clean copy of the manuscript. Kierkegaard wrote this twice, but instead of referencing Herder, he first indicates that it was “An old saying,” and then that it was “An old saying slightly altered.”13 the change is in the last line. instead of answering “yes, they shall come back as posterity,” the second version simply says “no!”14 Considering the enigmatic challenge indicated in the quotation from Hamann about tarquinius superbus, one can regard this quotation from Herder as a position wavering between pessimism and irony.

ibid., p. 639. ibid., p. 639. 11 this assertion is only true at the theoretical level (and it does not account for his considerations in Philosophical Fragments); it would, of course, be nonsense to claim that Kierkegaard in fact could not move freely between different epochs. 12 SKS 18, 146, JJ:7 / JP 5, 5560. “ ‘Schreibe’ sprach jene Stimme und der Prophet antwortete ‘für wen?’ Die Stimme sprach ‘für die Todten, für die, die Du in der Vorwelt lieb hast’. ‘Werden sie mich lesen’. ‘Ja, denn sie kommen zurück als Nachwelt.’” this is from Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst, vol. 16, p. 114. (in the margin of the notebook, Kierkegaard refers to the same volume. He indicates that he should look closer at the early fifth-century bishop Synesius from Cyrene, whom Herder quotes at length, cf. Herder, Werke in zehn Bänden, op. cit., vol. 7, 1991, pp. 444–6. it is unclear just what inspired Kierkegaard here.) Curiously enough grundtvig also quoted this passage in his periodical Dannevirke, 1817, p. vi. it is doubtful that Kierkegaard read this passage in grundtvig. to be sure, the quotation itself is from Herder, and in grundtvig the quotation, though in german, looks like a paraphrase. 13 Pap. iv B 96:1 / JP 2, 1550. 14 Pap. iv B 96:1 / JP 2, 1550. 9

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But a closer look at the context does hint that there is something to be learned. the quotation is from Herder’s Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität,15 letter 95. in this letter Herder discusses oral speech, writing and printing. one of his many points is that the simultaneity of different historical and geographical layers in contemporary books makes it very difficult to discern the uniqueness of the single voice. So the advantage that arises from the sheer mass of books should not hide the disadvantage in the threat of the destruction of cultural distinctiveness. this point refers to the reception of books. on the other side, there is the problem of production: the author does not primarly have himself in mind as reader and judge but writes for the public in the market. But then the risk arises that no one will listen, which explains, according to Herder, why rousseau and pascal have but few real readers. as conclusion Herder gives the words Kierkegaard quotes. an interpretation of Herder’s intention with the passages must take account of the source in psalms 102:19. there a sense of destruction and hopelessness pervades the psalm, and the prophet (the author of the psalm) demands to write for the coming generation that, even amid destitution and hopelessness, the lord will once again arise and rebuild the country and its people. without mentioning the source, Herder plays on this but transforms it into his own philosophy of history. His aim is to restore confidence in Providence, the point being that if one writes relying on the renewal of the spirit, then of course the past, in this renewal, can return as future.16 as a most perceptive reader, Kierkegaard could not possibly have missed the point. He deliberately transforms it into a negation of renewal; even though one writes in good faith, one may well be a voice in the desert. But, as noted, Kierkegaard chose not to use the quotation or its modified version as the motto to Fear and Trembling. thus, there are the few scattered references to Herder in Kierkegaard’s papers. Not much more can be drawn from the printed works. There it is also possible to find sparse evidence that Kierkegaard did read some Herder. For instance, in Repetition, Kierkegaard quotes from a folk–song collected by Herder.17 and in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard quotes—unacknowledged—from Herder: “similarly, the human act of walking, so the natural scientists inform us, is a continuous falling.”18 this, in spite of the reference to the scientists, is a quotation from Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. we thus notice an extensive reading of Herder’s writings, but it is clear that the influence is limited to Kierkegaard’s attempt to find a good expression or turn of phrase; there is no real substantial influence from Herder’s theology or philosophy. this is evident if one takes a look at the context in the original Herder text. Herder writes on the theme of reason, balance [Billigkeit] and well-being. His interest in this is part of his philosophy of history, and he wants to account for how the human race can pass through several steps in history. the question arises about what the constant laws are in the changing world, and Herder identifies what he takes to be certain laws, the most interesting being reason and 1793–97. quotation from Werke in zehn Bänden, op. cit., vol. 7, 1991, p. 530. note that in Herder love is given as a hermeneutical premise: “die du in der Vorwelt lieb hast.” (my emphasis: “that you love in the past.”) 17 SKS 4, 48 / R, 174. 18 SKS 4, 243 / PF, 37. 15 16

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balance. in this connection he writes that human history cannot be considered a quiet flow, due to human passions; it might be much better to compare human history with a waterfall tumbling down from the mountains. and he then continues with these words: “as our way of walking is a continuous fall to the right and to the left, and anyway we come further by each step, so is the progress of culture in generations and whole peoples.”19 even apart from the reference to the author of the quotation as “natural scientists,” it is obvious that Kierkegaard completely changed the context and intention of the passage. in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard uses an abridged version of this once more polemically against the Hegelians. indeed, they know nothing of the continuous falling, because their “progress, after all, is a matter of mediation.”20 thus a person is always falling who merely “follows his nose.”21 III. it can safely be stated that Kierkegaard read some of Herder’s basic works, including the Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität. assuming that Kierkegaard was a very perceptive reader, one can point out an intimate familiarity with Herder’s main reflections on the concept of the formation of character. This raises the intricate problem of his complex relation to that idea. Instead of rushing into this and other difficult areas such as, for example, the relationship between the different aesthetic forms of expression or the use of genres in relation to the senses (music–ear/picture–eye) or Kierkegaard’s understanding of the concept of myth, i believe it would be more fruitful to state their respective interpretations of Christianity. i think this difference most comprehensively explains the other ones. Herder interpreted Christianity as a principal part of european culture, but, due to new insights into science and nature, Christianity had to be interpreted anew. From the outset he saw culture as Christian, though the Christianity of the culture had to be understood in relation to a broader interpretation of both culture and religion. the main argument in this connection is the reformation view that true Christianity is closely bound up with personal conviction and, accordingly, that dogmas are secondary to religious engagement. this point of view though was a part of a total interpretation of nature and history, which was bound up with two basic ideas: god as Creator and man as created in the image and likeness of god. Kierkegaard in a sense could sympathize with these basic ideas but could not possibly interpret his age as Christian. indeed, he was convinced that he had to introduce Christianity into Christendom, that is, that he had to teach people who saw Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, part iii, Book 15, Chapter iii, cf. Werke in zehn Bänden, op. cit., vol. 6, 1989, p. 655. “Wie unser Gang ein beständiges Fallen ist zur rechten und zur linken und dennoch kommen wir mit jedem Schritt weiter: so ist der Fortschritt der Kultur in Menschengeschlechtern und ganzen Völkern.” this quotation has been identified by Prof. Peter Widmann, Aarhus University. 20 SKS 4, 243 / PF, 37. 21 SKS 4, 243 / PF, 37. 19

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themselves as Christians actually to be Christians. Hence, his insistence on indirect communication. The reason why Herder did not influence Kierkegaard more profoundly is partly due to this shift in interpretation. Moreover, the influence of Herder was dramatically minimized due to the revolution in german philosophy that was originated by Herder’s former teacher in Königsberg, immanuel Kant. Kierkegaard, born ten years after the death of Herder, could not easily take up Herderian themes which had been thoroughly investigated in german idealism, partly by schelling, and especially by Hegel. the indications of a romantic mood in his interpretations of Herder point to both german idealism and romanticism as a general milieu for self-understanding. this, of course, did not prevent Kierkegaard from taking up other themes from Herder’s contemporaries, notably lessing and Hamann. Kierkegaard did read Herder’s writings quite extensively and hence was well acquainted with his general ideals of formation of character (Bildung) and of culture, but the influence of that reading was limited. Kierkegaard uses Herder particularly as collector of folk–songs and elegant turns of phrase, that is, in line with, for instance, Horace. Herder was used mostly as a reservoir of catchy and colorful figures of speech. this indicates a romantic mood with free admission to the minds of peasants and the common people in the shape of adventures, stories, fables, folk–songs, and proverbs.22 Here we have a distinct characteristic, which separates him from later modernity and gives his thinking and writing a peculiar freshness and lucidity.23

recent research indicates that much of the alleged “commonality” in the above mentioned genres is not really connected to creations of some original and unspoiled common people but has its background in the nobility. 23 it must be mentioned, furthermore, that the same “romantic tone” might also be responsible for the faint trace of anti-intellectualism in Kierkegaard’s philosophy and theology—but this is a complicated matter, though it is perhaps in tune with themes in Herder’s philosophy too. 22

Bibliography I. Herder’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Lieder der Liebe. Die ältesten und schönsten aus dem Morgenlande. Nebst vier und vierzig alten Minneliedern, leipzig: weygand 1778 (ASKB 1474). Volkslieder, vols. 1–2, new ed., leipzig: weygand 1825 (ASKB 1487–1488). Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1827–30 (ASKB 1676–1684 and ASKB a i 105–113). Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst, vols. 1–20, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1827–30 (ASKB 1685–1694 and ASKB a i 125–133). Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Philosophie und Geschichte, vols. 1–22, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1827–30 (ASKB 1695–1705 and ASKB a i 114–124). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Herder [Becker, Karl Friedrich], Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummers Forlag 1822–29, vol. 10, p. 549; p. 559 (ASKB 1972–1983). döring, Heinrich, Joh. Gottfr. von Herder’s Leben, 2nd enlarged and revised ed., weimar: w. Hoffmann 1829 (ASKB a i 134). Fischer, Carl philipp, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus speculativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, p. 11; p. 35 (ASKB 512). Flögel, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte der komischen Litteratur, vols. 1–4, liegnitz and leipzig: david giegert 1784–87, vol. 1, p. 279 (ASKB 1396–1399). Frauenstädt, Julius, Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluß auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1855, pp. 58–9 (ASKB 516). guerike, Heinrich ernst Ferdinand, Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Halle: in der gebauerschen Buchhandlung 1838, vol. 2, p. 1093 (ASKB 158–159). Hagenbach, K. r., “det 18de og 19de aarhundredes Kirkehistorie,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, ed. by Henrik nikolai Clausen and matthias Hagen Hohlenberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel, vol. 11, 1843, pp. 583–644 (ASKB u 29).

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[Hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–1843, vol. 3, p. 303; p. 338; p. 343; pp. 364–8 passim; vol. 5, pp. 11-4 passim; p. 28; p. 32; p. 37; p. 39; p. 44; p. 69; p. 84; p. 89; pp. 94–108 passim; p. 119; p. 140; p. 142; pp. 159f.; p. 170; pp. 181–2; p. 186; p. 210; pp. 236f; p. 282; vol. 6, pp. 72–3; pp. 93–6 passim; p. 107; p. 134; p. 156; p. 168; p. 175; p. 185; p. 192; p. 197; p. 233; p. 242; p. 245; p. 257; p. 278; p. 347; vol. 7, pp. 136–7; p. 152; p. 167; pp. 192f.; p. 198; p. 258; p. 262; p. 271; p. 278; p. 349; p. 359; p. 383 (ASKB 536–544). Hase, Karl, Kirkehistorie. Lærebog nærmest for akademiske Forelæsninger, trans. by C. winther and t. schorn, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837, p. 534; p. 602 (ASKB 160–166). [Hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von Heinrich gustav Hotho, Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, p. 287; p. 407; p. 435 (ASKB 1384–1386). —— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840– 45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832– 45), vol. 1, pp. 270–2 (ASKB 561–563). Heiberg, Johan ludvig, Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 3, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1843 [vol. 3, in Johan ludvig Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: J.H. schubothes Boghandling 1841–43], pp. 236f. (ASKB 1560). Heine, Heinrich, Die romantische Schule, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1836, pp. 34ff.; pp. 121f. (ASKB u 63). [Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich], Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Werke, vols. 1–6, leipzig: gerhard Fleischer 1812–25, vol. 3, 1816, pp. 471–84; pp. 552–62 (ASKB 1722– 1728). martensen, Hans lassen, Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849, p. 249 (ASKB 653). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 2, pp. 106ff.; vol. 3, pp. 310ff. (ASKB u 79). michelet, Carl ludwig, “Herder,” in his Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel, vols. 1–2, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837–38, vol. 1, pp. 318–39 (ASKB 678–679). møller, Jens, “Johan gotfred Herder. et mindeskrift,” Nyt theologisk Bibliothek, ed. by Jens møller, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin, vol. 12, 1827, pp. 1–158 (ASKB 336–345). —— “tillæg til mindeskriftet over J.g. Herder,” Nyt theologisk Bibliothek, ed. by Jens møller, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin, vol. 17, 1830, pp. 156–65 (ASKB 336–345).

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mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57], vol. 1, p. 110; p. 114; p. 463; vol. 2, p. 340; vol. 3, p. 175 (ASKB 358–363). rauch, Friedrich august, Vorlesungen über Goethe’s Faust, Büdingen: Heller 1830, p. 53; p. 46n (ASKB 1800). reinhard, Franz volkmar, System i den christelige Moral, vols. 1–5, trans. by andreas Krag Holm, Copenhagen: Hegelundske Boghandlings Forlag, p. 4n; p. 141n (ASKB 730–734). [richter, Johann paul Friedrich], Jean paul, Vorschule der Aesthetik nebst einigen Vorlesungen in Leipzig über die Parteien der Zeit, vols. 1–3, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1813, vol. 1, p. 133; p. 15o; p. 172; p. 177; p. 304; vol. 2, p. 390; p. 486; p. 490; p. 524; p. 541; p. 564; p. 604; p. 607; p. 610; p. 615; p. 618; p. 630; p. 635; p. 643; p. 665n; p. 678; p. 717; p. 719; vol. 3, p. 782; p. 788; p. 791; p. 868; p. 873; pp. 917–919; p. 965; pp. 1001f.; p. 1019; p. 1026 (ASKB 1381–1383). rosenkranz, Karl, Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 22 (ASKB 744). —— (ed.), Schelling. Vorlesungen, gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: Fr. sam. gerhard 1843, p. 43; p. 61 (ASKB 766). roth, Friedrich (ed.), Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, see the relevant entries in index in vol. 8.2 (ASKB 536–544). rudelbach, andreas g., Om Psalme-Literaturen og Psalmebogs-Sagen, Historiskkritiske Undersøgelser, vol. 1, Copenhagen: C.g. iversen 1854, pp. 70ff.; pp. 172–4 (ASKB 193) [vol. 2, 1856]. schlegel, Friedrich, Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Alterthumskunde, Heidelberg: mohr und zimmer 1808, p. 200n (ASKB 1388). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, p. 45; vol. 2, p. 590 (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.w. Hayn 1851, vol. 2, p. 103; p. 418 (ASKB 774–775). sihler, w., Die Symbolik des Antlitzes, Berlin: F. laue 1829, p. 91 (ASKB 784). [solger, Karl wilhelm Ferdinand], K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.w.l. Heyse, leipzig: Brockhaus 1829, pp. 30f. (ASKB 1387). steenstrup, mathias g.g., Historisk-kritisk Oversigt over Forsøgene paa at give en Historiens Filosofi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1854, pp. 92–104; p. 135 (ASKB 792). steffens, Henrich, Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben, vols. 1– 10, Breslau: Josef max und Comp. 1840–44, vol. 2, p. 234 (ASKB 1834–1843). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: in der weidmannschen Buchhandlung 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 18; p. 81; p. 82; p. 94; pp. 111–2; p. 186; p. 301; p. 408; pp. 632–4; p. 650; vol. 2, p. 150; p. 171; p. 198; p.

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234; p. 383; p. 662; p. 666; vol. 3, p. 41; p. 95; p. 209; p. 344; p. 391; pp. 446–7; p. 602; p. 742; vol. 4, 396 (ASKB 1365–1369). thiersch, Friedrih, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, pp. 15–16; p. 18 (ASKB 1378). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 73 (ASKB 843). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit. In drei Büchern, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. 24; p. 131n; p. 181n (ASKB 1379–1380). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Ueber Religion und Theologie. Erläuterungen zu seinem Lehrbuche der Dogmatik, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1815, p. 64 (ASKB a i 34). —Christliche Sittenlehre, vols. 1–3, Berlin: g. reimer 1819–23, vol. 2, p. 124n; p. 310n (ASKB u 110). wolff, oskar ludwig Bernhard, Handbuch deutscher Beredsamkeit enthaltend eine Uebersicht der Geschichte und Theorie der Redekunst, zugleich mit einer vollständigen Sammlung deutscher Reden jedes Zeitalters und jeder Gattung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Carl B. lorck 1845–46, vol. 1, pp. 150–67 (ASKB 250–251). zeuthen, ludvig, Om den christelige Tro i dens Betydning for Verdenshistorien. Et Forsøg, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1838, p. 4 (ASKB 259). —Humanitet betragtet fra et christeligt Standpunkt, med stadigt Hensyn til den nærværende Tid, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1846, p. 1; p. 2; p. 4 (ASKB 915). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Herder mertin, Jörg, Hiob—religionsphilosophisch gelesen: Rezeptionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Hioblektüre Herders, Kants, Hegels, Kierkegaards und zu ihrer Bedeutung für die Hiobexegese des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, ph.d. thesis, university of paderborn, paderborn 1991. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, see p. 5, n6; p. 10, n1; p. 14, n35; p. 20.

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Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant is at once obscure and enormous. there are only 17 explicit references to Kant in the works published by Kierkegaard during his lifetime. this compares with over 300 references to Hegel, 55 to aristotle and over 90 to Kierkegaard’s danish philosophical contemporary Hans lassen martensen. But despite this paucity of overt references, Kant is a major presence in some of Kierkegaard’s most important pseudonymous books, including Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript. Kant’s thought also figures predominantly in two of Kierkegaard’s most important religious discourses, Works of Love and Purity of Heart. in what follows, i will suggest that although Kierkegaard clearly rejected some aspects of Kant’s rationalist philosophy, he more often used it as the philosophical platform on which to construct his own unique religious authorship. even though Kant was going out of vogue among danish intellectuals during Kierkegaard’s university years, there is no doubt that Kierkegaard paid close attention to the german philosopher’s writings. Fifteen of the 99 questions on Kierkegaard’s 1840 oral examination for the theological degree [Attestats] were directed at ethics and philosophy of religion, with Kant named explicitly in two of them and his work alluded to in most of the others.1 the Auktionsprotokol, or auction catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library at the time of his death, indicates that Kierkegaard’s library included the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment as well as an edition of Kant’s minor treatises (vermischte Schriften) edited by Johann Heinrich tieftrunk and published in 1799 in Halle. on the basis of many references, it is highly likely that he owned and perused Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone as well. there are many intersecting signs that Kierkegaard carefully read most of Kant’s principal writings, as well as some of his lesser-known essays.2 some of these works are mentioned by name or clearly alluded to in Kierkegaard’s journals and papers. perhaps the most important of them for our understanding of the impact of Kant

this record is published in B&A, vol. 1, pp. 9–12 / LD, document 12, pp. 10–16. For a fuller discussion of Kierkegaard’s readings in Kant, see my Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, albany: state university of new york press 1992, Chapter 1. 1 2

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on Kierkegaard is Kant’s 1798 work The Conflict of the Faculties.3 other works by Kant make their influence known by Kierkegaard’s use of or reliance on important terms and concepts present in them. thus, although Kierkegaard never explicitly references Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, whole sections of the Philosophical Fragments evidence his knowledge of this work’s critique of the ontological proof of god’s existence, right down to Kierkegaard’s appeal to Kant’s humorous illustrations. similarly, Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone makes its presence known in Kierkegaard’s thinking through his occasional reference to the Religion’s concept of “radical evil.” in my book Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt i try to systematically develop all the points of contact and deeper engagements between Kierkegaard and Kant. i do not intend to retrace all those matters here. instead, i want to use the arguments in several of Kant and Kierkegaard’s key writings to illustrate the extraordinary degree of Kierkegaard’s indebtedness to Kant both as an intellectual adversary and as a teacher. The Conflict of the Faculties is a good place to begin. published near the end of Kant’s life and five years after the Religion, it represents Kant’s most mature treatment of the relationship between revealed religion and rational philosophy. the issue is treated in the first (and longest) part of the book entitled “The Conflict of the philosophy Faculty with the theology Faculty.”4 Kant’s purpose in this treatise is to provide some broad principles for adjudicating recurrent disputes about the meaning of revealed (biblical) religion that arise between “biblical theologians,” on the one hand, and rationalist philosophers (like himself), on the other. these include such matters as how we are to understand the doctrines of the trinity, the resurrection of Christ, or the teaching of predestination. Kant’s solution to such conflicts is to insist on the right of philosophy to establish the rational limits of revealed teachings. “in matters of religion, reason is the highest interpreter of scripture.”5 it follows that when scriptural teachings appear to contradict moral reason, they must be “reinterpreted in the interests of practical reason.”6 applying this methodological approach, the balance of the argument of The Conflict of the Faculties then turns to the development of two interrelated themes: the significance of divine grace and the role of belief in the historical bestowal of that grace in our moral salvation. Kant’s view is clear: divine grace is a rationally acceptable concept, but it must never be understood in ways that impugn man’s moral freedom and responsibility. in The Conflict, Kant does not make the argument that a concept of grace is rationally permissible and perhaps even rationally required. that argument has been developed extensively in the predecessor work, Religion within the Limits all quotations from this work are from the following edition: The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. and introduced by mary J. gregor, new york: abaris Books 1979. 4 the remainder of the The Conflict of the Faculties, which looks at the conflicts between the philosophy faculty of the university and the faculties of law and medicine, is briefer and contains nothing of religious importance. 5 The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 71. 6 ibid., p. 65. 3

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of Reason Alone, to which i will turn shortly. But he does here summarize his earlier conclusions: “If man’s own deeds are not sufficient to justify him before his conscience (as it judges him strictly), reason is entitled to adopt on faith a pure supernatural supplement to fill what is lacking to his justification….”7 nevertheless, this concession to divine activity in the economy of our moral salvation must never be interpreted so as to license an abandonment of man’s obligation to constant moral striving: actions must be represented as issuing from man’s own use of his moral powers, not as an effect [resulting] from the influence of an external, higher cause by whose activity man is passively healed. the interpretation of scriptural texts which, taken literally, seem to contain the latter view must therefore be deliberately directed toward making them consistent with the former view.8

in the ensuing development of this theme, Kant takes seriously a host of views associated with various protestant sects in his day (pietists and moravians) that wrestle with the question of how we can think of divine grace as being integrated with the experience of moral self-renewal. ultimately, Kant dismisses these views as so much useless speculation on matters that are essentially beyond our ken (because they deal with supersensible realities that transcend the bounds of human knowledge). He also judges them to be irrelevant since all that needs to concern us is our own renewed moral striving. the presence of such striving, Kant argues, is both our evidence of divine grace and our most appropriate response to it. we can put aside the speculative question of how such striving is possible for us. Having laid out his own views on the agency of grace, Kant observes that “reason has its own objections”9 to his position. one of these goes to the heart of his claim that as rational beings we are warranted in assuming divine grace as a needed supplement to our imperfect moral efforts. Objection: To believe that God, by an act of kindness, will in some unknown way fill what is lacking to our justification is to assume gratuitously a cause that will satisfy the need we feel (it is to commit a petitio principii); for when we expect something by the grace of a superior, we cannot assume that we must get it as a matter of course; we can expect it only if it was actually promised to us, as in a formal contract. so it seems that we can hope for that supplement and assume that we shall get it only in so far as it has actually been pledged through divine revelation, not as a stroke of luck.10

Kant immediately replies to this objection. the reply embraces several familiar Kantian themes. First, that as creatures whose knowledge is always linked to sensory experience, we are cognitively unequipped to recognize a divine bestowal of grace: “a direct revelation from god embodied in the comforting statement ‘your sins are forgiven you’ would be a supersensible experience, and this is impossible.”11 second, 7 8 9 10 11

ibid., p. 75. ibid., pp. 73–5. ibid., p. 81.

ibid., p. 83. ibid.

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he insists that in a matter of practical reason like this, the knowledge that we have received such forgiveness is both unnecessary and undesirable. as frail creatures striving with all our might to fulfill what we recognize as our duty “there is no other way we can conceive the unyielding decrees of a holy and benevolent law-giver” than to assume that we are eligible for his forgiveness. Furthermore, “if, without the aid of a definite, empirically given promise, we have a rational faith and trust in His help, we show better evidence of a pure moral attitude and so of receptivity to the manifestation of grace we hope for than we could by empirical belief.”12 i must intervene in the middle of Kant’s argument here to observe that the themes he is exploring and issues he is engaging are pervasive in Kierkegaard’s writings and are absolutely central to Kierkegaard’s concerns in two of his most important pseudonymous works, Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Both works deal with the question of whether human beings can complete the task of their moral salvation on their own through the use of rational concepts, or whether they must transcend these concepts in a leap of faith to admit the possibility of god’s historically bestowed grace. Kant’s insistence in The Conflict that although we may presume a role for grace in our salvation, we have all that we need in our own rational conceptions of god and morality to surmount moral failure and sin places him squarely in the camp of rationalist philosophy and ethics. Kant thus epitomizes the “socratic” viewpoint that Kierkegaard presents and transcends in the Fragments. the relevance of Kant’s discussion here for Kierkegaard is signaled by a remark by Kant somewhat earlier in the treatise. distinguishing pure religious faith, which is based on “mere reason,” from ecclesiastical faith, which is based entirely on revealed statutes, Kant dismisses the latter outright: The biblical theologian says: “Search the Scriptures, where you think you find eternal life.” But since our moral improvement is the sole condition of eternal life, the only way we can find eternal life in any Scripture whatsoever is by putting it there. For the concepts and principles required for eternal life cannot really be learned from anyone else: the teacher’s exposition is only the occasion [veranlassung] for him to develop them out of his own reason.13

in the Fragments, of course, Johannes Climacus offers as the hallmark of the socratic position that the teacher is nothing more than an occasion (he uses the cognate danish word, Anledning) for the student’s own recollection of what is eternally true. Climacus uses this term over 40 times there in connection with the socratic standpoint, and explicitly attributes it to socrates, whom he presents as introducing it in the Meno.14 But while a pedagogical relationship is assumed in the famous portion ibid. ibid., p. 63. the italics in the translated passage are my own. the german for the latter part of this passage reads: “…weil die dazu erforderlichen Begriffe und Grundsätze eigentlich nicht von irgend einem andern gelernt, sondern nur bei Veranlassung eines Vortrages aus der eigenen Vernunft des Lehrers entwickelt werden müssen” (ibid., p. 62). 14 Kierkegaard cites the passage as “80, near the end.” (SKS 4, 218 / PF, 9) the explicit discussion of this matter actually extends from pp. 82–6. 12 13

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of the Meno where the young slave is made to “recollect” the truths of geometry, the term “occasion” is never used. similarly, this conjunction of terms is not found elsewhere in plato’s writings or in any of the rationalistic philosophers preceding Kierkegaard—except for Kant. Can it be merely coincidental that Kierkegaard chooses the very same term to describe the rationalist view of saving knowledge that Kant uses to contrast his own rationalist position with a historically and scripturally based revelational position? the importance for Kierkegaard of Kant’s discussion in The Conflict becomes even more apparent when Kant applies his general dismissal of supernatural agency to the issue of the need for historical faith. this theme, which occupies the remainder of the discussion of religion in The Conflict, follows from the discussion of grace. since we have inherent rational concepts that enable us to rededicate our moral lives, what good is served by scriptural testimonies to god’s intervention in history? Kant’s answer, essentially, is “none at all.” “[w]e must regard the credentials of the Bible as drawn from the pure spring of universal rational religion dwelling in every ordinary man; and it is this very simplicity that accounts for the Bible’s extremely widespread and powerful influence on the hearts of the people.”15 the Bible itself is thus merely “the vehicle of religion,” whose spirit is its universally accessible rational moral content. the letter of its decrees “do not belong to what is essential in it (principale) but only to what is associated with this (accessorium) [additional element].” it follows from this that “no historical account can verify the divine origin of such a writing. the proof can be derived only from its tested power to establish religion in the human heart.”16 Kant closes this discussion with a direct attack on the appeal to the authority of revealed text itself: “[i]t is superstition [Aberglaube] to believe that historical belief is a duty and essential to salvation.”17 it is not hard to see that Kant here is forcefully enunciating the very position that Kierkegaard attributes to socrates and challenges in the Fragments and Postscript. a discussion appearing only a page before the above remarks furnishes a powerful further reminder that it is Kant’s articulation of this position (not socrates or anyone else) that is on Kierkegaard’s mind. Here Kant voices the most bitter criticism of abraham found anywhere in the philosophical tradition up to that time. the occasion for this criticism is Kant’s acknowledgement that a law book of god’s statutory, revealed will harmonizing perfectly with morally practical reason would be an effective organ for guiding men and citizens to their temporal and eternal wellbeing, “if only it could be accredited as the word of god and its authenticity could be proved by documents.” But, Kant quickly adds, “there are many difficulties in the way of validating” such a law book. The first difficulty rests on Kant’s denial that human beings can ever “know” supersensible truths: “if god should really speak to man, man could still never know that it was god speaking. it is quite impossible for man to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and recognize it as such.”18 The second difficulty is that the Bible appears to contain 15 16 17 18

The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., pp. 115–7. ibid., pp. 115–7. ibid., p. 119. ibid., p. 115.

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teachings that run directly contrary to human moral reason. in such cases, says Kant, “man can be sure that the voice he hears is not god’s” and “he must consider it an illusion.”19 a footnote here takes us directly to the text that Kant has in mind: We can use, as an example, the myth of the sacrifice that Abraham was going to make by butchering and burning his only son at god’s command (the poor, child, without knowing it, even brought the wood for the fire). Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: “that i ought not to kill my good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are god—of that i am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice rings down to me from (visible) heaven.”20

Kant’s criticism of the abraham “myth” (and with it of abraham himself, the biblical narratives and, perhaps, the god portrayed in them) is essentially moral in nature. it is not hard to imagine its impact on Kierkegaard, whose pseudonym, Johannes de silentio, in Fear and Trembling will take up the challenge of defending Abraham, God and Biblical revelation. But the significance of Kant’s criticism of the genesis 22 narrative for Kierkegaard goes far beyond the narrow moral issues at stake. For as Kant well knows and makes clear in another footnote just several pages further on in The Conflict, the Abraham story has fundamental significance for Christian thought. there Kant alludes to an idea he reports as prevalent among Jesus’ immediate Jewish followers that greeks and romans could also be regarded as admitted into the new Jewish covenant if they believed in Abraham’s sacrifice of his only son and interpreted it “as the symbol of the world-savior’s own sacrifice.”21 Kant immediately rejects this idea, however, adding that “if a church commands us to believe such a dogma, as necessary for salvation, and we believe out of fear, such belief is superstition.”22 this equation of the father–son pair abraham and isaac with god and Christ is a staple of Christian theology, having its scriptural beginning in new testament texts.23 this tells us that the issue at stake for Kant here is not simply abraham’s ethics: it is the relevance of the historical reports found in scripture to our salvation. this impression is reinforced when we note that Kant also treats genesis 22 in the Religion in the context of two discussions of the reliability of historical human reports in matters of faith and ethics. one discussion denies historical reports of miracles any place in the formation of faith and concludes by saying that it is essential that “in the use of these historical accounts, we do not make it a tenet of religion that the knowing, believing or professing of them are themselves means whereby we

ibid. ibid. there is a typographical error in mary gregor’s english text “not even is this voice” that i have corrected here. 21 ibid., p. 121. 22 ibid. 23 Hebrews 11:17–19. For a fuller account of this tradition, see david lerch, Isaaks Opferung christlich gedeutet, tübingen: J.C.B. mohr 1950. Kierkegaard’s familiarity with this tradition before writing Fear and Trembling is evidenced by a journal entry for 1839— SKS 18, 62, ee:184 / JP 1, 298. 19 20

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can render ourselves well-pleasing to god.”24 genesis 22 is then introduced as a “theistic miracle” that “flatly contradicts morality” and as such, “cannot, despite all appearances, be of god.”25 Further on in the text, Kant rejects the position of “an inquisitor” who appeals to a “supernaturally revealed divine will” to ground his persecution of heretics. such a person, Kant says, certainly acts in a way that moral reason can never countenance, “but that god has ever uttered this terrible injunction can only be asserted on the basis of historical documents and is never apodictically certain.”26 even if god had directly spoken to the inquisitor, as he did to abraham in telling him “to slaughter his own son like a sheep,” there is still the chance “that in this instance a mistake has prevailed.”27 we can see, therefore, that for Kant the import of the genesis 22 narrative goes beyond the moral question of the relative priority of religious commands versus obedience to moral reason. rather, that issue contributes to his general rejection of the authority of historically based revelational claims. precisely because we possess everything we need in ourselves to make judgments concerning our “temporal and eternal well-being,” we have no essential need of scriptural guidance or promises, and these can even mislead us. it is not hard to see that the Fragments and large portions of the Postscript dealing with historical faith can be viewed as rejoinders to Kant. if we also keep in mind the possibility, as i have argued for elsewhere,28 that Fear and Trembling deals less with the theme of ethics than of soteriology, that it uses the figure of abraham to defend a pauline–lutheran claim that god can suspend ethical judgment by entering history to forgive human sin, then three of Kierkegaard’s major pseudonymous works can be seen as being provoked by Kant’s discussion in The Conflict of the Faculties. anyone who has followed my argument to this point and found it persuasive might conclude that Kierkegaard was stimulated to embark on his defense of historical Christian faith because of his ardent opposition to the position outlined by Kant in The Conflict of the Faculties. But that conclusion would miss the most important and positive aspects of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Kant. For while Kierkegaard strenuously disagreed with Kant’s views on the importance of historical faith, that disagreement was largely built on Kantian foundations. Kierkegaard did not just disagree with Kant. He actively drew on Kant’s writings on epistemology and ethics to construct his own unique defense of historical Christian faith. i could trace multiple lines of borrowing here, but two in particular stand out: one ethical; the other epistemological. the ethical debt derives from Kant’s development of the concept of “radical evil” in the Religion. to understand the importance of this concept, we must see that with it, the arch-rationalist enlightenment philosopher, 24 Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by theodore m. greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, new york: Harper and row publishers 1960, p. 80. 25 ibid., p. 82. 26 ibid., p. 175. 27 ibid., p. 175. 28 “‘developing’ Fear and Trembling,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair Hannay and gordon marino, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1998, pp. 257–81; “enough is enough! Fear and Trembling is not about ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1993, pp. 191–209.

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whose constant emphasis is on human moral autonomy and human moral initiative, comes to acknowledge the inevitable and utter failure of even the best and most concerted moral efforts. so striking is Kant’s rejection here of man’s ability to achieve the goal of moral righteousness that some commentators have seen it as either Kant’s cowardly concession in his old age to pressures from religious orthodoxy or an incoherent afterthought to his rationalist philosophy inspired by Kant’s Christian upbringing.29 neither interpretation is correct. the Religion’s concept of radical evil is well prepared in the second part (or “dialectic”) of the Critique of Practical Reason. there, after having constructed his ethical position in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the first part (or “Analytic”) of this second Critique, Kant opened the way to his whole philosophy of religion by developing the understanding that no one is rationally required to adopt the standpoint of judgment represented by the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative. that imperative asks us to subordinate all our volitions and possible actions to a rule of universal acceptability as law. in choosing to act, we must put aside our own inclinations and ask whether the policy implicit in our proposed action (maxim) is something we could raise to the level of a law for all rational persons and is the kind of policy all such persons might rationally accept.30 this standpoint of judgment can obviously run counter to my real interests. For example, it may require me to forego making and then breaking a promise if, in doing so, i can advance my interests. in such instances, the question arises, why should i adopt this rational standpoint? in a powerful series of arguments in passages of the second Critique, Kant recognizes that all previous arguments defending the moral point of view either reduce it to some misleading form of enlightened self-interest or beg the question by presuming the very standpoint they seek to commend.31 this leads Kant to the conclusion that we possess a radical degree of freedom with respect to morality. not only are we free from outer coercion in this area—this follows from our very freedom to make moral choices—but we are also free from the rational necessity to be moral. in the second section (“dialectic”) of the second Critique Kant offers a complex argument for the role of religious faith in addressing this problem and facilitating human moral choice. sometimes mistakenly called his “moral proof” of the existence of god, the argument is more properly thought of as an exploration of the conceptual presuppositions of rational moral commitment. each of us as a human it is a chestnut of Kant lore to view the Religion as Kant’s effort to please his aging manservant Lampe. For the development of the view that Kant’s concepts of grace reflect his unassimilated pietist background, see gordon e. michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1990. 30 For a fuller development of Kant’s conception of the categorical imperative, see my article “the First Formulation of the Categorical imperative as literally a ‘legislative’ metaphor,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, 1991, pp. 163–79. 31 For a more complete discussion of these issues, see my Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief, new york: oxford university press 1978, and my Religion and Moral Reason: A New Method for Comparative Study, new york: oxford university press 1988. 29

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being, says Kant, is positioned between the unbending edicts of our rational moral conscience and our rational need to seek the fulfillment of our personal wishes in order to achieve happiness. morality often imposes a stark choice between these two conflicting rational standpoints, and when this happens, it seems that we cannot make a choice in either direction without a sense of harsh self-judgment from our moral or prudential rational faculties. But, says Kant, this seeming “antinomy” of reason is not absolute. Although we can never rationally justify a selfish defection from morality, we can choose morality if we believe that, despite worldly appearances, obedience to moral duty and happiness are always aligned. this may be true if a morally wise supreme ruler of the world exists who is able to bend nature to his purposes. in that case, my sacrifice of happiness now in the name of moral integrity may be more than compensated in some future state, in or beyond the world. a religious belief of this sort is theoretically permissible, Kant argues, since, as his epistemological work in the first Critique had shown, we have no knowledge, either for or against, such a supersensible agency. since moral obedience itself is not strictly required by reason, it is obvious that such morally inspired religious belief is also not rationally required. Kant describes it as “a voluntary decision of our judgment…itself not commanded” by reason.32 nor does this belief amount to knowledge, since it reaches beyond the realm of supersensible experience and assumes a supreme moral causality whose existence cannot be demonstrated. in Kant’s words, this belief constitutes a moral “faith” that can “often waver even in the well disposed but can never fall into unbelief.”33 Kant concludes the second Critique by suggesting that it is even a good thing that this morally stimulated religious belief does not rise to the level of knowledge. if we were assured of god’s reality and power, he says, we would lose the opportunity for genuine moral commitment: [I]nstead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with the inclinations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, god and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes….thus most actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, none from duty.34

in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that his purpose in that work is “to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.”35 He accomplished this by demolishing the traditional rational proofs of god’s existence in that first Critique, and by developing the moral bases of rational faith in the second. If space allowed, I would try to indicate how influential in Kierkegaard’s thinking Kant’s project was. By moving religious belief out of the realm of epistemology, Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by lewis white Beck, indianapolis: Bobbsmerrill 1956, p. 151. 33 ibid. 34 ibid., p. 152. see also immanuel Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. by allen wood, ithaca, new york: Cornell university press 1973, p. 123. 35 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by norman Kemp smith, new york: st. martin’s press 1965, p. 29 (B xxx). 32

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where theology had confined it for centuries, and by grounding it in the realm of morality, Kant helped make possible Kierkegaard’s efforts to move faith away from philosophical “speculation” and re-center it in the ethical-religious existence sphere. But my purpose here is not to trace all the lines of influence between Kant and Kierkegaard. what is most important about Kant’s argument in the second Critique is that it leads directly to his conception of radical evil in the Religion. Having exposed how free we are in each moment of choice to abandon the moral point of view, Kant now realizes how fatal the implications of this insight are for our moral self-regard. Coaxed away from adherence to the moral law by the innocent but constant tug of our human inclinations to happiness, free even from rational necessitation to be moral, and aware that even a single departure from strict obedience to that law is morally unacceptable, each one of us is forced to conclude that we are radically evil: evil at the root of our willing.36 a key component of Kant’s argument here in the Religion is the insight that moral self-judgment will not permit a single, free departure from strict obedience to the moral law. in order to judge myself as morally good, i must always obey the moral law without exception. even a single departure from moral obedience must lead me to the conclusion that i am totally lacking in moral worth. in the opening pages of the Religion, as he develops this point, Kant questions whether this disjunction is correct: whether we might not assert that man is by nature neither good nor evil but is at once both, in some respects good, in other respects evil. He adds, “experience actually seems to substantiate the middle ground between the two extremes.”37 But Kant rejects this mode of assessment. “it is…of great consequence to ethics in general to avoid admitting, so long as it is possible, of anything morally 38 intermediate, whether in actions…or in human characters.” Behind his adoption of what Kant himself acknowledges is a “rigorist” view lies a more basic moral apprehension. since for Kant moral choice is always free and can never be thought of as necessitated by any inner or outer constraints, someone who has even once chosen to defect from the moral law reveals an underlying ground of choice (what Kant calls a maxim) that is not firmly committed to morality. The underlying maxim may be to respect morality in most cases while reserving the right to defect when moral obedience becomes too “costly” in terms of personal happiness. However, just as the promise of someone who crosses his fingers behind his back is really no promise at all, so a contingent commitment to morality is no commitment. Honest self-estimate thus imposes the conclusion that if i have even once defected from the moral law (and who, over the course of a life can assert that he has not?), i must regard my underlying moral disposition as worthless. Kant draws from this analysis the most unsparing conclusions for human being’s estimate of themselves and for their self-conceived place in a morally governed universe.

36 37 38

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, op. cit., p. 30. ibid., p. 18. ibid.

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now this moral evil (transgression of the moral law, called sin when the law is regarded as a divine command) brings with it endless violations of the law and so infinite guilt.… It would seem to follow, then, that because of this infinite guilt all mankind must look forward to endless punishment and exclusion from the kingdom of god.39

in the Religion and The Conflict of the Faculties this harsh conclusion leads Kant to a renewed and prolonged examination of the concept of divine grace and its role in human moral redemption. since human beings seem to be hopelessly mired in sin, with each new choice only an occasion for further moral wrongdoing, where can they find the resources to enable them rationally to renew moral efforts? Kant answers that an admission of the possibility of divine assistance in the completion of our moral efforts is rationally allowable and perhaps rationally necessary. But even as he concedes this, Kant insists that we should put aside speculation on the how and why of grace and concentrate instead on constant rededication to moral obedience. the very stirrings of the moral law within us and our internal call to renewed effort, he concludes, are all the signs or knowledge of grace we need. In a reflection of his deep rationalist opposition to religious dogmas and “ecclesiastical faith,” Kant insists that “actions must always be represented as issuing from man’s use of his own moral powers, not as an effect [resulting] from the influence of an external higher cause by whose activity man is passively healed.”40 He particularly rejects emphasis here on the role of Jesus Christ as an historical figure in our redemption. Although Christ may represent the “archetype” of a human nature that is well pleasing to god, and hence a rationally conceivable possibility for us,41 the idea of the godhead actually becoming one with a single human being is not only unnecessary but morally undesirable: “For if we think of this god-man…as the divinity ‘dwelling incarnate’ in a real man and working as a second nature in him, then we can draw nothing practical from this mystery: since we cannot require ourselves to rival a god, we cannot take him as an example.”42 Kant’s analysis of ethics and its relationship to human sin and redemption in the Religion and The Conflict of the Faculties had a pronounced influence on Kierkegaard. In terms of appropriation, it finds expression in his repeated affirmations of the “ideality” of ethics and the connection between ethics and the awareness of sin. in The Concept of Anxiety, for example, we read, ethics points to ideality as a task and assumes that every man possesses the requisite conditions. thus ethics develops a contradiction, inasmuch as it makes clear both the difficulty and the impossibility….The more ideal ethics is, the better. It must not permit itself to be distracted by the babble that it is useless to require the impossible. For even to listen to such talk is unethical.43

39 40 41 42 43

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, op. cit., p. 66. The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 73. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, op. cit., p. 54 The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 67. SKS 4, 324 / CA, 16f.

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these ideas, of course, have a long pedigree, going back to st. paul’s treatments of the law. But if we keep in mind that Kant rigorously developed a powerful theory of ethics in his concept of the categorical imperative and had shown how this concept leads to human moral self-condemnation, we can see its importance in Kierkegaard’s intellectual formation. Here was the leading moral philosopher of his age (and perhaps of all times) providing rigorous logical proofs of a key doctrine of Christian orthodoxy. If Kierkegaard clearly profited from Kant’s analyses of ethics and sin (and there are many other signs in his writings that he did so44), he could not agree with Kant’s solution to the problem: self-initiated moral renewal that is conceptually indifferent to its grounding and possibility and that ignores the role of god’s active redemptive activity on our behalf. not only did Kierkegaard actively resist Kant’s rationalistic presentation of the incarnation in the Fragments and elsewhere, but also, in sharp disagreement with Kant, he stresses the absolute importance of god’s intervention into history to renew our wills by providing us the “condition” for our moral renewal. remarkably, Kierkegaard did not merely disagree with Kant. He appears, in two important ways, to have drawn on Kant’s own arguments to defeat him. we can only surmise and reconstruct the first of these efforts: Kierkegaard’s possible perception of the poverty of Kant’s arguments as a basis for constructing his own defense of the idea of the importance of an historical savior. i have already touched on aspects of the Kantian arguments, but let me sketch them more fully here. Kant believed that while divine grace may be necessary to accomplish our moral rebirth, we are better off not dwelling on how this is done. such speculation not only takes us beyond the realm of possible human knowledge but it also raises profound and perplexing moral questions. For example, how can we bring our conception of moral freedom and accountability together with the idea of a divine agency that enters into and transforms our will? this idea is not impossible, since moral freedom and causal determination (which we must ascribe to ourselves as phenomenal creatures) co-reside in every instance of human willing. But it is best not to engage in such transcendental inquiries if we do not have to. all we need for moral renewal is our conscience and inner commitment to reform, which we may take as signs of a divine presence and whose operation we do not need to further understand. Kant adds to this conception of grace a deliberate rejection of any role for a historical savior in its accomplishment. We saw that he believed that such a figure can only serve as a negative example for us since the union of god and man would create a person beyond the sphere of our own moral experience and not subject to our frailties. should god dwell in a human being (something Kant’s epistemology does not strictly rule out since the union of the eternal and temporal is an aspect of there is substantial consensus among Kierkegaard scholars that Kantian thinking deeply influences the ethical position developed by Kierkegaard in Works of Love and Purity of Heart. For discussions of this, see Jeremy d.B. walker, To Will One Thing: Reflections on Kierkegaard’s ‘Purity of Heart,’ montreal and london: mcgill-queen’s university press 1972, and m. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, new york: oxford university press 2001. 44

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our own moral willing), we can also never know that this is the case because our knowledge is always confined to phenomena and appearances. Finally, in a remark i have already partially quoted in connection with Kant’s reply to objections against his rationalist conception of grace, Kant states that god’s entry into time to offer us salvation is unnecessary, because…there is no other way we can conceive the decrees of a holy and benevolent law-giver with regard to frail creatures who are yet striving with all their might to fulfill whatever they recognize as their duty; and if, without the aid of a definite, empirically given promise we have a rational faith and trust in His help, we show better evidence of a pure moral attitude and so of our receptivity to the manifestation of grace we hope for than we could by empirical belief.45

the weakness and inappropriateness of Kant’s arguments here are glaring and surely must have seemed so to Kierkegaard. Having developed the depths of human sinfulness in the Religion and the awareness that even one act of wrongdoing can point to a corrupt underlying will, Kant now offers more of the same moral striving as the remedy for corruption and as the sign of divine grace. But if every single act of willing is tainted, why should we think better of these renewed (and possibly selfdeceiving) stirrings? we are reminded here of Kant’s own assertion in the Religion that “man is never more easily deceived than in what promotes his good opinion of himself.”46 worse, there is a degree of presumption in Kant’s position that is morally offensive and self-condemning. it amounts to saying that because i need grace to overcome my own iniquity, i can be sure that i will receive it. the imaginary rationalist philosopher whose objection Kant had sketched, and to whom the remark above was meant as a reply, makes this clear in his objection when he says: To believe that God, by an act of kindness, will in some unknown way fill what is lacking to our justification is to assume gratuitously a cause that will satisfy the need we feel (it is to commit a petitio principii); for when we expect something by the grace of a superior, we cannot assume that we must get it as a matter of course; we can expect it only if it was actually promised to us.47

Far from answering this objection, Kant has only shown his insensitivity to its force. Finally, Kant’s assertion that “we are better off morally by not having confidence in the definite, empirically given promise” of grace because it heightens our 48 rational faith and trust in god and evidences “a pure moral attitude” represents an inappropriate application of one of Kant’s better insights. we encountered this insight at the end of the second Critique, where it was used to illuminate the value of our cognitive distance from god’s agency in rewarding virtue and, hence, our need to choose morally without any certainty that our actions will lead to our happiness. In that instance, religious uncertainty purifies moral striving. But in the case at 45 46 47 48

The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 83. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, op. cit., p. 62. The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 83. ibid., p. 83.

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issue here, where we confront our bondage to sin and justified eternal perdition, of what benefit is the absence of any concrete token of God’s mercy? How does God’s absence here purify or renew moral striving? if anything, it would seem that this is one place where our whole moral consciousness cries out for some concrete sign of divine support. a careful reading of the Religion and The Conflict of the Faculties, then, would certainly have inspired Kierkegaard to an ardent defense of traditional Christian concepts. indeed, in Kant’s arguments in these two books, which Kierkegaard presumably poured over in preparation for his Attestats examination, he would have found many of the conceptual timbers he needed to begin construction of his own religious authorship. a second (and epistemological) aspect of Kant’s arguments might also have served Kierkegaard well. Kant’s rhetorical debate between himself and a rationalist objector in The Conflict of the Faculties reveals a deeper problem in Kant’s position on grace. the objector, we saw, indicates that there is an important difference between expecting that something be given to us and actually getting it. otherwise said, it is one thing rationally to postulate an occurrence as necessary for us, but it is quite another to say that that occurrence has happened and that the state of affairs to which it points actually exists. the difference between logical necessity and real existence (the givenness of something in our experience) is, of course, at the heart of Kant’s rejection of the ontological and teleological proofs of God’s existence in the first Critique. there Kant had shown that existence cannot be treated as a predicate in such a way that something is made more perfect possessing it: by existing rather than not existing. the predicative use of existence was at the heart of the classical ontological proof, where god, the all-perfect being who possesses all predicates of value, was said necessarily to have the attribute of existence. But the use of existence as a predicate is wrong, says Kant. Existence is “a copula of a judgment” that affirms the objects’ presence, with all its predicates, in our experience. in any description of a thing, Kant tells us: the small word “is” adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. if, now, we take the subject (god) with all its predicates…and say “god is,” or “there is a god,” we attach no new predicate to the concept of god, but only posit the subject itself with all its predicates and indeed posit it as an object that stands in relation to my concept....otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. a hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers....My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them....49

a bit further on, Kant adds, if we think in a thing every feature of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my saying the defective thing exists. on the contrary, it exists with the same defect

49

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 505 (a 598/B 627).

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with which i have thought it, since otherwise what exists would be something different from what i thought.50

readers of Kierkegaard should have no problem identifying his debt here to Kant. arguments about the difference between concept existence and real existence abound throughout Kierkegaard’s writings. in the “interlude” of the Fragments, we find whole paragraphs that evoke Kant’s arguments. Thus, in a passage resonant with the Kantian language, Climacus tells us that “[i]f that which comes into existence does not itself remain unchanged…then the coming into existence is not this coming into existence.”51 even Kant’s summary quip about the hundred thalers (a quip that Kierkegaard clearly appreciated because he cites it several times in his writings52) is alluded to when Climacus resumes his own position by saying, “A fly, when it is, has just as much being as the god.”53 i will not rehearse arguments that i have made elsewhere that the “interlude” of the Fragments is absolutely permeated by Kantian epistemological points.54 the more interesting question is why Kierkegaard feels compelled at this point in his authorship to return so explicitly to Kant in the course of an argument about history and salvation. my answer to that question is that here, Climacus-Kierkegaard is turning Kant’s epistemology against Kant’s denial of the need for a historical savior in the economy of our salvation. The first part of the Fragments develops the “socratic” position that we have everything we need to accomplish our own redemption: the teacher is only the “occasion” for our moral learning. this is precisely the view Kant defends in the Religion and The Conflict. Having knowledge of our sin, we also know that we may reasonably presume the divine assistance required for overcoming it. in other words, when we properly understand the concepts of ethics, we at once understand sin and the redemption from sin, because “[a]s frail creatures striving with all our might to fulfill what we recognize as our duty, there is no other way we can conceive the unyielding decrees of a holy and benevolent law-giver”55 than to believe we might be eligible to receive god’s grace. But Kant is wrong. as his rationalist objector observes, there is an enormous difference between expecting something by the grace of a superior and actually getting it. Between the two lies the difference of existence. Have we or have we not been redeemed? Has god’s ability to act on his presumably benevolent will really been manifest in our experience? Has it been manifest in history? remarkably, Kant, for all his insistence on the sheer givenness and non-necessity of existence, seems to miss this point, although Kierkegaard has not. the long epistemological “interlude” of the Fragments calls Kant to account on the basis of Kant’s own philosophy. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 505 (a 600/B 628). SKS 4, 273 / PF, 73. 52 Pap. viii–2 B 81 / JP 1, 649; Pap. viii–2 B 82 / JP 1, 650; SKS 22, 215, nB12:121 / JP 3, 3558. 53 SKS 4, 247n / PF, 41n. 54 “Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments: a Kantian Commentary,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994, pp. 169–202. 55 The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 83. 50 51

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a small, but especially interesting sign of this is Climacus-Kierkegaard’s use of the term accessorium in a preceding discussion of the concept of “existence” in the Fragments.56 although there is no reference to Kant in the text, Kierkegaard’s papers show that he knowingly borrowed the term from Kant.57 But where in Kant? remarkably, Kant apparently never uses this term in his epistemological writings. But he does use it, as we saw above, in The Conflict to identify the historically given, and hence not rationally necessary elements of scripture. Hence, the single use of this term provides evidence that Kierkegaard associated Kant’s epistemological arguments about existence with Kant’s treatments of the question of historical revelation. the issue goes deeper still. a close reading of Kant’s Religion, and his analysis of radical evil, indicates the importance of phenomenal experience—experience in time—for Kant’s understanding of sin. Kant is very clear that our root propensity to evil does not derive from the fact that we are phenomenal creatures with finite needs and inclinations. these inclinations (the sum of whose satisfaction constitutes our happiness) can as easily lead to moral obedience as disobedience. no, Kant says, there is nothing necessary about sin. it derives from the exercise of our freedom: from a choice identifiable from the earliest exercises of our wills to place self over others, the particular over the universal. Kant’s rejection of the necessity of sin means that in each moment of choice we remain free to choose for or against morality. experience shows that we sometimes choose immorally, and, as we have seen, even a single instance of mischoice, because of its possibly eternal import as evidence of the underlying maxim of all our choices, is fatal for our self-estimate. But even though a single instance of choice potentially has timeless consequences, it still occurs in time. it is choice in time, whether for good or for evil, that dictates our moral destiny. it follows from this that choice in time must be equally important for our moral salvation. For if that salvation could be developed out of necessary concepts, then the original choice that determined it would lose significance. We might be constituted so as to be capable of freely defecting from morality, but that defection would be inconsequential because it would be eternally remedied by our Creator’s necessary provision of moral redemption. that this is not the case, that the Creator has graciously chosen to enter time and history to redeem us, tells us that he could have done otherwise. As a result, our free choice remains infinitely consequential because it could lead to redemption or perdition. in contrast, the rationally necessary redemption that Kant argues for radically minimizes the importance of our wrongful choice and suggests that these choices make really no difference in the shape of our final moral destiny. Thus, our moral freedom requires God’s freedom, and God’s SKS 4, 245 / PF, 40. “i never reason in conclusion to existence (for in that case i would be mad to want to reason in conclusion to what i know), but i reason in conclusion from existence and am so accommodating to popular opinion as to call it a demonstrative argument. thus the connection is somewhat different from what Kant meant—that existence is an accessorium [addition]— although therein he undeniably has an advantage over Hegel in that he does not confuse.” Pap. v B 5.3 / PF, supplement, p. 190. 56 57

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freedom is shown in the givenness and non-necessity of his redemption of us in history. whether god has in fact entered history in this way, therefore, is of absolute importance for our eternal salvation. But, of course, these ideas are among the leitmotifs of Kierkegaard’s whole authorship. There is so much more that could be said here. If the first part of the Fragments deals with Kant’s socratic challenge, and the “interlude” invokes his epistemology and ethics against him, the third part, dealing with the contemporary believer relies heavily on Kant’s understanding that sense experience can never itself authenticate ethical and religious truths. the twist, of course, is that the truth that Kierkegaard wishes to defend is not an eternal logical necessity but the reality of the god in time and the unique bestowal by the god of “the condition” that redeems. once that happens and once that historical fact is accepted, however, Kierkegaard himself tells us, “everything is again structured socratically.”58 empirical/historical information about the redemptive event and even historical proximity to it do us no good, since, in Kantian terms, it is the conceptual act of faith, not sensible experience, that counts. as Kant tells us “if god should really speak to man, man could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for man to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and recognize it as such.”59 thus, the Fragments, at least, comes full circle: beginning as an argument against Kant, turning Kant’s own positions against him, it closes with a return to a transformed but still deeply Kantian assumption about the primacy of concepts in judging experience. the difference is that Kant’s concepts are self-developed, whereas Kierkegaard’s are bestowed by the god. I will stop here. I am confident that a reader who closely examines all of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings following a careful reading of Kant’s two Critiques, the Religion and The Conflict of the Faculties will be impressed by the range and extent of borrowings that extend from simple terms to whole arguments. this debt is evident despite the nearly total absence of explicit references to Kant. as many students of Kierkegaard have noted, it was typical of him for many reasons to ignore or obscure his sources. sometimes, he even used stalking horses when other unnamed but more relevant sources are in mind.60 what remains important is the fact that Kierkegaard was one of Kant’s best nineteenth–century students. in creating his authorship, Kierkegaard relied on key elements of Kant’s epistemology, ethics and philosophy of religion. these elements were picked up, transmuted and used by Kierkegaard to reinforce his own Christian convictions.

SKS 4, 267 / PF, 65. The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p. 115. 60 see Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003, Chapter 8. 58 59

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—— Vorlesungen über eine künftige Theorie des Opfers oder des Kultus, münster: theissing 1836, p. 72; pp. 111f. (ASKB 408). —— Ueber die Incompetenz unsrer dermaligen Philosophie, zur Erklärung der Erscheinungen aus dem Nachtgebiete der Natur, stuttgart: Brodhag 1837, p. 7; pp. 25f. (ASKB 411). —— Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung, vol. 3, würzburg: in Commission der stahel’schen Buchhandlung 1837, pp. 28–31; p. 52n; p. 57n (ASKB 413) (to vols. 1–2, see ASKB 409–410). Baur, Ferdinand Christian, “Kant und die der Kant’schen philosophie folgenden theologen,” in his Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste, tübingen: osiander 1838, pp. 565–614 (ASKB 423). —— Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel’schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christenthum. Nebst zehn Thesen aus einer religiösen Philosophie, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, p. 10; p. 30; p. 73n; p. 144; p. 181; p. 189 (ASKB 416). [Becker, Karl Friedrich], Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfired Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummers Forlag 1822–29, vol. 10, p. 566 (ASKB 1972–1983). Biedermann, a. emanuel, Die freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christenthum in Streit und Frieden, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1844, p. 31 (ASKB u 20). [Billroth, Johann gustav Friedrich], Vorlesungen über Religionsphilosophie gehalten von Dr. Joh. Gust. Friedr. Billroth, ed. by Johann eduard erdmann, leipzig: Friedrich Christian wilhelm vogel 1837, pp. 26–7 (ASKB 428). Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Versuch einer systematischen Entwickelung aller in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe nach den symbolischen Büchern der protestantisch-lutherischen Kirche. Nebst der Literatur, vorzüglich der neuern, über alle Theile der Dogmatik, leipzig: bei Johann ambrosius Barth 1805, p. 175; pp. 535f. (ASKB u 25). Brøchner, Hans, Nogle Bemærkninger om Daaben, foranledigede ved Professor Martensens Skrift: Den christelige Daab, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1843, pp. 23f.; p. 35 (ASKB u 27). Bruch, Johann Friedrich, Die Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften, Hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1842, p. v; p. x; p. 2; pp. 29–30; p. 38; p. 60n; p. 87; pp. 168–9; p. 181; p. 185; p. 280n (ASKB 439). Buhle, Johann gottlieb, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, vols. 1–6 (in 10 tomes), vols. 1–2, göttingen: Johann georg rosenbusch’s wittwe 1800; vols. 3–6, göttingen: Johann Friedrich röwer 1802–5 (abtheilung 6 in Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Von einer Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer ausgearbeitet, abtheilungen 1–11, göttingen: röwer and göttingen: rosenbusch 1796–1820), vol. 6, pp. 578ff. (ASKB 440–445). Chalybäus, Heinrich moritz, Historische Entwickelung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, dresden: Ch.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1837, pp. 19– 49 (ASKB 461).

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—— Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften, Frankfurt am main: Joh. Christ. Hermannsche Buchhandlung 1841 [includes, i. “ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen willens”; ii. “ueber das Fundament der moral”] (ASKB 772). —— “anhang. Kritik der Kantischen philosophie” and “von der erkennbarkeit des dinges an sich” in his Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, pp. 467–599 and vol. 2, pp. 193–203 respectively. see also vol. 1, pp. 6–7; p. 12; p. 18; p. 34; p. 37; p. 50; p. 55; p. 76; p. 81; p. 95; pp. 97–8; p. 121; pp. 135–7; p. 151; p. 169; p. 176; p. 193; pp. 195–8; p. 308; p. 326; p. 379; p. 417; vol. 2, p. 4; pp. 8–24 passim; pp. 34–5; pp. 39–56 passim; p. 64; p. 83; p. 87; p. 92; p. 138; p. 142; p. 144; p. 162; p. 167; pp. 174–5; p. 182; pp. 184–5; p. 244; pp. 276–7; pp. 286–7; pp. 290–1; pp. 303–5; p. 330; p. 337; p. 394; p. 427; p. 468; p. 478; p. 485; p. 491; p. 495; p. 524; p. 526; p. 533; p. 593 (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: druck und verlag von a.w. Hayn 1851, p. 4; p. 17; pp. 24–5; p. 36; pp. 40–1; pp. 71–121; p. 133; p. 141; p. 148; pp. 159–64; pp. 169–81 passim; p. 202; p. 210; vol. 2, p. 6; p. 8; p. 10; pp. 32–42 passim; p. 74; p. 77; p. 82; p. 88; p. 90; p. 92; p. 106; p. 108; p. 112; p. 137; p. 184; p. 186; p. 290; p. 313; pp. 376–83 passim; p. 408; pp. 456–7; p. 517 (ASKB 774–775). sibbern, Frederik Christian, Logik som Tænkelære fra en intelligent Iagttagelses Standpunct og i analytisk-genetisk Fremstilling, 2nd enlarged and revised ed., Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens Forlag trykt hos Fabritius de tengnagel 1835, p. 305 (ASKB 777). —— Om Philosophiens Begreb, Natur og Væsen. En Fremstilling af Philosophiens Propædeutik, Copenhagen: Forfatterens eget Forlag 1843, p. 3; pp. 32f.; p. 37; p. 43; p. 45; pp. 54f.; p. 70; pp. 72–4 (ASKB 779). —— Speculativ Kosmologie med Grundlag til en speculativ Theologie, Copenhagen: Forfatterens eget Forlag 1846, pp. 24f.; pp. 34f.; p. 67; pp. 78f. (ASKB 780). —— Om Forholdet imellem Sjæl og Legeme, saavel i Almindelighed som i phrenologisk, pathognomonisk, physiogonomisk og ethisk Henseende i Særdeleshed, Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens eget Forlag 1849, p. 23; p. 162; p. 187; pp. 199–200; p. 236; p. 242; p. 391; pp. 492–6; p. 507 (ASKB 781). [solger, Karl wilhelm Ferdinand], K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.w.l. Heyse, leipzig: Brockhaus 1829, pp. 31–40; p. 50; p. 65; p. 86; p. 99; p. 164; p. 310 (ASKB 1387). steenstrup, mathias g.g., Historisk-kritisk Oversigt over Forsøgene paa at give en Historiens Filosofi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1854, p. 103n; pp. 105–6 (ASKB 792). steffens, Henrich, Caricaturen des Heiligsten. In zwei Theilen, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1819–21, vol. 1, pp. 49–50; p. 182; vol. 2, p. 134 (ASKB 793–794). —— Anthropologie, vols.1–2, Breslau: Josef max 1822, vol. 1, pp. 1–7; pp. 12–14; p. 162; p. 262; vol. 2, 315–6; p. 325; p. 358; p. 368; pp. 415–6; p. 428; p. 441 (ASKB 795–796). —— Christliche Religionsphilosophie, vols. 1–2, Breslau: im verlage bei Josef max und Komp. 1839 [vol. 1, Teleologie; vol. 2, Ethik], vol. 1, p. 46; p. 66; p. 71; p. 158; p. 301; vol. 2, p. 11; p. 16 p. 76; p. 88; p. 115; pp. 118–9; p. 212 (ASKB 797–798).

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—— Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben, vols. 1–10, Breslau: Josef max und Comp. 1840–44, vol. 2, pp. 230–1; vol. 3, p. 228; p. 278; p. 281; p. 291; vol. 4, pp. 60–1; p. 143; pp. 149–50; pp. 164–5; vol. 6, p. 44; p. 46; pp. 101– 3; p. 135; vol. 8, pp. 478–9; vol. 10, p. 10; p. 21; p. 23; p 33 (ASKB 1834–1843). —— Nachgelassene Schriften. Mit einem Vorworte von Schelling, Berlin: e.H. schroeder 1846, p. 189; p. 207 (ASKB 799). stilling, peter michael, Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844, p. 117 (ASKB 801). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: in der weidmannschen Buchhandlung 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 56; vol. 2, p. 111; p. 113; p. 382; vol. 4, p. 312 (ASKB 1365–1369). thiersch, Friedrich, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, pp. 16f.; p. 28 (ASKB 1378). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 2, p. 17; pp. 43–52; p. 75; p. 94n; pp. 131–7 passim; pp. 170–7 passim; pp. 232–3; p. 239; p. 337; p. 340; pp. 344–7 (ASKB 843). —— “Kant,” in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846, pp. 268–97 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855 not in ASKB]. waitz, theodor, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, Braunschweig: Friedrich vieweg und sohn 1849, p. 19; p. 23; pp. 29f.; p. 35; p. 43; p. 51; p. 161; p. 498; p. 524; p. 534; p. 540; p. 579; pp. 605–6; p. 608; p. 618 (ASKB 852). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit. In drei Büchern, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. xii; p. 23; p. 34; p. 78; p. 81; p. 119; p. 143; p. 145; p. 149; p. 165; p. 167; vol. 2, p. 364n; p. 410n (ASKB 1379–1380). —— Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: Ch.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1833, p. 26; p. 29; p. 69; pp. 148f.; p. 150; p. 168; p. 192n; pp. 199–201; pp. 236–8; pp. 243–6; p. 296n; pp. 316–8 (ASKB 866). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Ueber Religion und Theologie. Erläuterungen zu seinem Lehrbuche der Dogmatik, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1815, pp. 19f.; pp. 123f.; p. 138; p. 141 (ASKB a i 34). —— Christliche Sittenlehre, vols. 1–3, Berlin: g. reimer 1819–23, vol. 1, p. 132n; p. 261n; vol. 2, p. 39; vol. 3, p. 138; p. 144; p. 305n (ASKB u 110). —— Vorlesungen über die Sittenlehre, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. reimer 1823–24, vol. 1, pp. 375–93 (ASKB i 30–31). wirth, Johann ulrich, “Kritischer idealismus,” in his Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritischdogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’scher verlag 1845, pp. 338–45; see also p. 41; p. 337 (ASKB 876). zeuthen, ludvig, Om den christelige Tro i dens Betydning for Verdenshistorien. Et Forsøg, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1838, p. 56 (ASKB 259)

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—— Om Ydmyghed. En Afhandling, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel 1852, p. 18; p. 27; pp. 87–8; pp. 105–7 (ASKB 916). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Kant Abbagnano, Nicola, “Filosofia della possibilità. Kant e Kierkegaard,” in his Esistenzialismo Positivo, 2nd ed., turin: taylor 1948, pp. 31–33. Baeumler, alfred, “Kierkegaard und Kant über die reinheit des Herzens,” Zwischen den Zeiten, vol. 3, no. 2, 1925, pp. 182–187. Berberich, gerta, La notion métaphysique de la personne chez Kant et Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, Fribourg (switzerland) 1942. Bok, Hilary, “‘the individual’ in Kant and Kierkegaard—a reply,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 107–21. Brunner, emil, “das grundproblem der philosophie bei Kant und Kierkegaard,” Zwischen den Zeiten, vol. 2, 1924, pp. 31–46 (reprinted in Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Heinz-Horst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971 (Wege der Forschung, vol. 179), pp. 1–18.) Buhle, Johann gottlieb, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, vols. 1–6, göttingen: Johann Friedrich röwer 1800–06, vol. 6, pp. 575–731; pp. 732–42 (ASKB 440–445). Clive, geoffry H., The Connection between Ethics and Religion in Kant, Kierkegaard, and F.H. Bradley, ph.d. thesis, Harvard university, Cambridge, massachusetts 1953. dekens, olivier, “initiation à la vie malheureuse: de l’impossibilité du pardon chez Kant et Kierkegaard,” Revue philosophique de Louvain, vol. 96. no. 4, 1998, pp. 581–97. despland, michael samuel, The Idea of Divine Education: A Study in the Ethical and the Religious as Organizing Themes for the Interpretation of the Life of the Self in Kant, Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, Harvard university, Cambridge, massachusetts 1966. duckles, ian muir, “Shipwrecked with the Aid of Repentance”: Sin, Ethics and Normativity in Kant and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, irvine: university of California 2004. duncan, elmer H., “Kantian duty and inclination,” in his Sören Kierkegaard, waco, texas: word Books, publisher 1976, pp. 58–62. evans, Charles stephen, Subjective Justifications of Religious Belief: A Comparative Study of Kant, Kierkegaard, and James, ph.d. thesis, yale university, new Haven, Connecticut 1974. —— Subjectivity and Religious Belief, washington d.C.: university press of america 1982. —— “Kant and Kierkegaard on the possibility of metaphysics,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 3–24.

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Fahrenbach, Helmut, “Kierkegaard’s ethische existenzanalyse (als ‘Korrektiv’ der Kantisch-idealistischen moralphilosophie),” in Materialien zur Philosophie Søren Kierkegaards, ed. by michael theunissen and wilfried greve, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1979, pp. 216–38. Fendt, gene, For What May I Hope? Thinking with Kant and Kierkegaard, new york: peter lang 1990 (American University Studies. Series V. Philosophy, vol. 104). Fenves, peter, “Chatter.” Language and History in Kierkegaard, stanford: California 1993, see pp. 68–75; pp. 151–60. Ferreira, m. Jamie, “making room for Faith—possibility and Hope,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 73–88. Firestone, Chris l. and stephen r. palmquist (eds), Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, Bloomington: indiana university press 2006. Friedman, r.z., “Kierkegaard: First existentialist or last Kantian?,” Religious Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 1982, pp. 159–70. —— “Kant and Kierkegaard: the limits of reason and the Cunning of Faith,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 19, 1986, pp. 3–22. —— “‘the individual’ in Kant and Kierkegaard,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 95–106. gill, Jerry H., “Kant, Kierkegaard and religious Knowledge,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 28, 1967, pp. 188–204 (reprinted in his Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. by Jerry H. gill, minneapolis: Burgess 1969, pp. 58–73). —— “Kant,” in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions, ed. by niels thulstrup and maria mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6), pp. 223–9. —— “the limits of the ethical in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety and Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,” in The Concept of Anxiety, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1985 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 8), pp. 63–87. —— “Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments: a Kantian Commentary,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 169–202. —— “Kierkegaard’s great Critique: Either/Or as a Kantian transcendental deduction,” in Either/Or I, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 4), pp. 139–53. —— “Faith not without reason. Kant, Kierkegaard and religious Belief,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 55–72. —— “Kant and Kierkegaard on the need for Historical Faith. an imaginary dialogue,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 131–52. glenn Jr., John d., “Kierkegaard’s ethical philosophy,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, 1974, pp. 121–8. goltz, Jason eugene, Law and Spirit: An Exploration of the Ethics of Kant and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, university of utah, salt lake City 2002.

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green, ronald m., “the limits of the ethical in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety and Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,” in The Concept of Anxiety, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1985 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 8), pp. 63–88. —— “the leap of Faith. Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant,” Philosophy and Theology, vol. 3, 1989, pp. 385–411. —— Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, albany: state university of new york press 1992. —— “Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments: a Kantian Commentary,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 169–202. —— “Either/Or as a Kantian transcendental deduction,” in Either/Or, part ii, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 4), pp. 139–54. —— “Fear and Trembling: a Jewish appreciation,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2000, pp. 137–49. Hauschildt, Friedrich, Die Ethik Søren Kierkegaards, gütersloh: gütersloher verlagshaus gerd mohn 1982 (Studien zur evangelischen Ethik, vol. 15). Hoffman, Karen denise, Forgiveness: Offense and Obligation in Kant and Kierkegaard, ph. d. thesis, saint louis university, st. louis 2000. Husted, Jørgen, Wilhelms brev. Det etiske ifølge Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1999, see pp. 181–98. Jones-Cathcart, andrew John, Freedom, Self-Knowledge, and Self-Deception: A Problematic in the Thought of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, university of south Carolina, Columbia 2002. Knappe, ulrich, Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard, Berlin et al.: walter de gruyter 2004 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 9). Kosch, michelle, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, oxford: oxford university press 2006. malantschuk, gregor, “Kant and idealistic systems,” in his Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence, trans. by Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong, milwaukee, wisconsin: marquette university press 2003 (Marquette Studies in Philosophy, vol. 35), pp. 232–50 (originally as “Kant og de idealistiske systemer,” in his Fra individ til den enkelte. Problemer omkring Friheden og det etiske hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978, pp. 238–58). martens, paul, “‘you shall love’: Kant, Kierkegaard and the interpretation of matthew 22:39,” in Works of Love, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 16), pp. 57–78. mehl, peter J., “Kierkegaard and the relativist Challenge to practical philosophy,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 14, no. 2, 1987, pp. 247–78. Mikołajczyk, Hubert, “Søren Kierkegaard—absolutyzacja istnienia ludzkiego” [søren Kierkegaard—the absolutism of the Human Being], in Słupskie Prace Humanistyczne, no. 6a, 1985, pp. 179–96. —— Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna [Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology], Słupsk: WSP 1990.

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—— Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle Kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej [Kierkegaard’s anthropology in the light of Kantian practical philosophy], Słupsk: WSP 1995. niemczuk, andrzej, Wolność egzystencjalna. Kant i Kierkegaard [existential Freedom. Kant and Kierkegaard], lublin: wydaw. uniwersytetu marii CurieSkłodowskiej 1995. oliveira, nythamar Fernandes de, “dialectic and existence in Kierkegaard and Kant,” Veritas, vol. 46, no. 2, 2001, pp. 231–53. palmqvist, stephen, “philosophy of religion after Kant and Kierkegaard,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 245–62. peck, william dayton, On Autonomy: The Primacy of the Subject in Kant and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, yale university, new Haven, Connecticut 1974. perkins, robert l., “For sanity’s sake: Kant, Kierkegaard and Father abraham,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, university, Huntsville: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 43–61. perl, paul, “down to earth and up to religion. Kantian idealism in light of Kierkegaard’s leap of Faith,” Dialogue, vol. 33, 1990, pp. 1–9. phillips, d.z. and timothy tessin (eds), Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, new york: st. martin’s press 2000. —— “why Kant and Kierkegaard?,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. xi–xxii. pomerleau, wayne paul, Perspectives on Faith and Reason. Studies in the Religious Philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard, ph.d. thesis, northwestern university, evanston, illinois 1977. rosenau, Hartmut, “erzählung von abrahams opfer (gen 22) und ihre Bedeutung bei Kant, Kierkegaard und schelling,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 27, no. 3, 1985, pp. 251–61. rosfort, rené Korsholm, “Forholdet mellem Kierkegaard og Kant med særligt henblik på indbildningskraften,” Teol-information, vol. 28, 2003, pp. 34–8. rudolph, enno, “glauben und wissen. Kierkegaard zwischen Kant und Bultmann,” in Die Rezeption Søren Kierkegaards in der deutschen und dänischen Philosophie und Theologie, munich: Fink 1983 (Text und Kontext. sonderreihe, vol. 15), pp. 152–70. ruhr, mario von der, “Kant and Kierkegaard on eternal life—a reply,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 207–37. schrader, george, “Kant and Kierkegaard on duty and inclination,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65, 1968, pp. 688–701 (reprinted in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Josiah thompson, new york: anchor Books 1972, pp. 324–41). Søltoft, Pia, “Der Gegenstand der Pflicht bei Kant und Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 65–81.

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tielsch, e., “Kierkegaards ethik im verhältnis zur ‘klassischen’ ethik, insbesondere der Kants,” in Festschrift H.J. de Vleeschauwer, pretoria: publications Committee of the university of south africa 1960 (Communications of the University of South Africa), pp. 131–49. torralba roselló, Francesc, “la dialéctica kantiana en Kierkegaard,” in his Poética de la libertad. Lectura de Kierkegaard, madrid: Caparrós editores 1998, pp. 59–62. verheyden, Jack, “Kant and Kierkegaard on eternal life,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 187–206. walker, Jeremy d.B., To Will One Thing: Reflections on Kierkegaard’s ‘Purity of Heart,’ montreal and london: mcgill-queen’s university press 1972. —— Kierkegaard’s Descent into God, Kingston and montreal: mcgill-queen’s university press 1985. weston, michael, “Kant and Kierkegaard on the possibility of metaphysics—a reply to professor evens,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by d.z. phillips and timothy tessin, op. cit., pp. 24–44.

lichtenberg: lichtenberg’s aphoristic thought and Kierkegaard’s Concept of the “subjective existing thinker” smail rapic

I. there are few authors Kierkegaard appreciated as unambiguously as georg Christoph lichtenberg (1742–99). in an early journal entry, he characterized him as a person who promulgated vigorously the enlightenment maxim, “dare to think on your own!”: “thank you, lichtenberg, thank you for saying that there is nothing more insipid than to talk with a so-called bibliognostic in scholarship, who himself has not thought but knows 1,000 literary-historical details. ‘Es ist fast als wie die Vorlesung aus einem Kochbuch, wenn man hungert.’ [it is almost like reading a cook-book, when one is hungry.]”1 a decade later, Kierkegaard again praised lichtenberg’s striving for authenticity—in a marginal note to the following (fragmentary) journal entry: what enormous, giant strides the race would make if one could depend on communications, if what is put down in writing were entirely true, if every author, especially every thinker, said outright and precisely what he meant. But this conventional lying, especially the clergy’s—how it has damaged spiritual life and the cause of Christianity.2

Kierkegaard adds in margin: “so far is the world nowadays from there that lichtenberg, thus, is one of the most sincere, for he made the decision to tell the course of his life like this.”3 lichtenberg did not record “the course of his life” in an autobiography. His statement, “For a long time i’ve been writing a history of my mind,”4 refers to his notebooks which he named “Sudelbücher” or waste books: SKS 17, 231, dd:29 / JP 4, 3855. SKS 20, 389f., nB5:42 / JP 1, 1015. 3 SKS 20, 389, nB5:42.a. 4 georg Christoph lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vols. 1–4, ed. by wolfgang promies, munich: Hanser 1967–69, vol. 1, no. F 810. “Ich habe schon seit langem an einer Geschichte meines Geistes…geschrieben.” 1 2

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Smail Rapic the merchants have their waste books; there they record from day to day what they buy and sell, all pell-mell, without any order; from there they transfer it into the journal, where it is written more systematically. This should be imitated by the savants. At first a book, where i note down everything as i see it or as my thoughts prompt me to, then the notes can be moved around, and where the materials are separated, set in order.5

In his popular and satirical essays Lichtenberg made use of many flashes of wit noted down in his “waste books.” the bulk of his aphorisms which disclose the “history” of his mind were not published until after his death. during his lifetime, lichtenberg was a well-known essay-writer and physicist—goethe attended one of his lectures in göttingen. today he is acknowledged as one of the most important german aphorists. while schleiermacher explained his aphoristic style by the author’s inability to develop lines of thought systematically,6 Kierkegaard noticed that lichtenberg’s style mirrors his endeavor to explore the authenticity of his own views. lichtenberg expected that the “grains of thought” disseminated in his “waste books” would bear fruitful results in the production of other authors.7 Kierkegaard’s writings prove that this expectation was well founded. He records in an early journal entry: i have often wondered how it could be that i have had such great reluctance to write down particular observations; but the more i come to know individual great men in whose writings one does not detect in any way a kaleidoscopic hustling together of a certain batch of ideas…and the more i recall that such a refreshing writer as Hoffmann has kept a journal and that Lichtenberg recommends it, the more I am prompted to find out just why this, which is in itself innocent, should be unpleasant, almost repulsive, to me. obviously the reason was that in each instance i thought of the possibility of publication, which perhaps would have required more extensive development, something with which i did not wish to be bothered, and enervated by such an abstract possibility…the aroma of fancies and mood evaporated.8

Reflecting on a future publication of the ideas occuring spontaneously to him, Kierkegaard reminds himself of lichtenberg’s advice to collect them in “waste books” in order to let them ripen. Kierkegaard overcame his “reluctance to write down particular observations”: many passsages of his books—for example, a great part of the “diapsalmata” in Either/Or I—are anticipated in his journals. in his published writings, Kierkegaard quotes only three of lichtenberg’s aphorisms. One of them is the motto to the first part (“In Vino Veritas”) of Stages on

Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, e 46. see schleiermacher’s review of lichtenberg in Erlanger Literatur Zeitung, no. 206, 20 october 1801, pp. 1642–48. (reprinted in wilhelm dilthey, Aus Schleiermachers Leben, vols. 1–4, Berlin: reimer 1858–63, vol. 4, pp. 561–67.) 7 Zum Parakletor, Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 525. “Ich habe überall Gedanken-Körner ausgestreut, die wenn sie auf einen guten Boden fallen zu Dissertationes aufkeimen und Systemata tragen können.” [i have disseminated grains of thought everywhere, which will be able to sprout dissertations and yield systems, if they fall on good soil.] 8 SKS 17, 229f., dd:28 / JP 5, 5241.

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Life’s Way: “such books are mirrors: when an ape looks in, no apostle can look out.”9 Kierkegaard picks up on this aphorism in the survey of his theretofore published works in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript10 and, once again, in an article in Fædrelandet mocking hypocritical readers and critics.11 in the second part of Stages on Life’s Way (“Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections by a Married man”), the pseudonymous author Judge william expresses Kierkegaard’s own anger by alluding to lichtenberg’s remark that some critics are, by one stroke of the pen, beyond “the boundary of sound reasoning.”12 in the third part of Stages on Life’s Way (“guilty?/not guilty?”), the pseudonymous author wilhelm afham cites one of lichtenberg’s crucial statements on religion: “god created man in his image, that means, presumably, man created god in his own.”13 The first and the last of these aphorisms deal with the problem of projection. the last one asks the question whether the idea of god is a projection of man’s own nature; the first one points to the fact that the reader’s individual background inevitably influences his understanding of a text. Since Kierkegaard emphasizes lichtenberg’s striving for authenticity, it seems reasonable to assume that he considers the aphoristic thought set down in the Sudelbücher as a remedy against the self-deception arising from one’s projections. the few quotations from lichtenberg in Kierkegaard’s published works, however, do not reveal the crucial significance of his aphorisms for Kierkegaard’s literary production. the central purpose of this article is to show that lichtenberg’s aphoristic thought is a main source of the concept of the “subjective existing thinker” in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript and, thus, of his basic idea of indirect communication. the fact that Johannes Climacus (the pseudonymous author of the book) attributes this concept to lessing—instead of lichtenberg—may be explained by the specific context in which it is introduced. It is embedded in an analysis of the problem of the truth of Christianity. lichtenberg’s critical attitude towards religious relevation could not be integrated into the construction of the Postscript (see below section v). the principles of his aphoristic style, which guide his interpretation of religion, however, are reflected in Kierkegaard’s indirect “ethical-religious” communication.14 SKS 6, 16 / SLW, 8. Über Physiognomik. Wider die Physiognomen, Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 3, 280. 10 SKS 7, 260 / CUP1, 285–6n. 11 SV1, 13, 422–31 / COR, 38–46. 12 SKS 6, 138 / SLW, 147. Cf. Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 2, g 32: “Wenn England eine vorzügliche Stärke in Rennpferden hat, so haben wir die unsrige in Rennfedern. Ich habe welche gekannt, die mit einem einzigen Satz über die höchsten Hecken und breitesten Gräben der Kritik und gesunden Vernunft hinübersetzten.” the autobiographical background of the polemics against critics in the Stages on Life’s Way is presumably Johan ludvig Heiberg’s reaction to Either/Or and Repetiton, which revealed a lack of understanding which Kierkegaard did not expect. Jon stewart outlines Kierkegaard’s complex relation to Heiberg in his book Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 57ff., 283ff. 13 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, d 201. Cf. SKS 6, 214 / SLW, 229f. 14 Pap. viii–2 B 89, p. 189f. / JP 1, 657, p. 307. 9

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II. lichtenberg outlines his aphoristic thought in the preface to a projected, but never published, “essay on man”: “i have composed this book, whose author is myself, of small observations which have been made mostly in places where they are normally seldom made.”15 At first glance, Lichtenberg’s statement that he is the author of the book which he intends to publish seems rather superfluous. Stressing a fact that every reader is already aware of produces an irritation. the way lichtenberg characterizes his authorship intensifies the reader’s amazement. The book does not emerge from a plan which directs the process of writing; by using the passive formulation that the observations the (projected) book is composed of “had been made” on several occasions, Lichtenberg gives the impression that his role as an author is confined to arranging a couple of statements uttered more or less spontaneously in various situations. this contradicts the contemporary view of an author and in particular the widespread comparison of the author with prometheus endowing his creatures with his inner spiritual life. Lichtenberg’s at first glance trivial remark that he is the author of the projected “Essay on Man” makes sense since it provokes the reader to reflect upon his understanding of an author. the problem of authorship arises at the very beginning of lichtenberg’s sketch of his aphoristic way of thinking. this problem is related to the central themes of the enlightenment which lichtenberg picks up in his project: our philosophers have to study the costume of natural man in order to write books for the natural man.…The artificial man…has with us taken such liberties over the natural one that—i fear—there will be no language left which the latter will grasp immediately.…if i shouted and if my words had the tone of the trump of doom: “listen, you are a man as well as newton, or a bailiff or a superintendent. your feelings, expressed sincerely in words and as well as you can, are valuable, too, in the council of men on error and truth. dare to think, take hold of your position!” if i shout like this, thousands of ears will hear me, but among these thousands there will be perhaps only few whom these words will penetrate, fructifying and animating that point which—once activated—in many cases makes a man a…thinker.…i have to point out once more that i make no authoritarian claims; my thoughts are those of a man, so I submit them to reflection.16

The “artificial man” whom Lichtenberg tries to conquer is influenced by “the shifting of fashion, custom” and “prejudices.”17 lichtenberg’s concept of the “natural man” is thus twofold: on the one hand, it embraces those aspects of our life which are rooted in the “eternal laws of nature,”18 and, on the other hand, it refers to our search for truth. the “essay on man,” which lichtenberg intended to write, represents in a double sense the spirit of the enlightenment. the “essay” was designed as a contribution to the enlightenment project of tracing the basic features of human existence and thus overcoming cultural divisions. By refraining from all authoritarian claims, lichtenberg’s “essay on man” should, moreover, encourage the reader to 15 16 17 18

Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 321. ibid. ibid. Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 138.

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“dare to think” on his own (“sapere aude!”), to “take hold of his position” in “the council of men on error and truth.”19 Here one finds an initial explanation for why Lichtenberg minimalizes his role as an author. He is not keen on convincing the reader that he has attained the correct insight into the essence of man. He endeavors, however, to contribute to the common search for truth by submitting his thoughts to public examination. lichtenberg’s description of his projected “essay on man” as an arrangement of “observations” [Betrachtungen] made in various situations is inspired by the inductive method of natural science which starts with collecting data in order to formulate well-grounded hypotheses. lichtenberg counts himself among the “observers of men” [Beobachter des Menschen].20 the german term “Betrachtungen” alludes to the sphere of senseperception, but includes the aspect of “reflection.” A similar ambivalence appears in the title of david Hartley’s Observations on Man (1749)—a chief work of empiricist psychology, which lichtenberg studied thoroughly. By using the passive formulation, “observations had been made,” lichtenberg gives the reader to understand that he strives to collect, in an objective manner, an empirical groundwork for a valid cognition of human nature. the reader is obliged to examine whether lichtenberg’s “observations” were influenced by his subjective views or even by prejudices. among the eighteenth-century authors who followed alexander pope’s maxim, “the proper study of mankind is man,”21 Hartley is the one who claimed most radically that the method of natural science has to be adopted in the humanities.22 lichtenberg estimated Hartley’s psychology highly;23 however, he did not share the conviction that natural science gives a sufficient answer to the question of who we are (was der Mensch ist24): “unfortunately, the observers of man are in bad circumstances, and they have more reason to complain about the lack of a sufficiently solid position than the voyaging astronomers and astrologers altogether. where we are right now, our good genius may know; we do not know it.”25 the search for a “solid position” is of utmost importance for mainstream modern epistemology. descartes contended that the ego cogito is the fundamentum inconcussum of all our cognition. He counted the results of natural science among the Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 321. ibid. 21 alexander pope, Essay on Man, epistle ii, line 2. quoted from alexander pope, Selected Poetry and Prose, ed. and introduced by william K. wimsatt, Jr., new york et. al.: Holt, rinehart and winston 1964, p. 138. 22 david Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations, vols. 1–2, london 1749, vol. 1, p. 6. (reprinted, Hildesheim, zürich and new york: georg olms verlag 1967.) “the proper method of philosophizing seems to be, to discover and establish the general laws of action affecting the subject under consideration from certain select, well defined and well attested phenomena and then to explain and predict the other phenomena by these laws. this is the method of analysis and synthesis recommended by sir isaac newton.” lichtenberg cites Hartley’s methodological principle in the “waste book” entry in Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, e 508. 23 ibid., F 34. 24 ibid., B 321. 25 ibid. 19 20

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perceptiones clarae et distinctae, which—according to his Meditationes—convey true knowledge of the world. lichtenberg’s assessment that the “observers of man” are lacking a “sufficiently solid position” is directed against the attempt to erect a system of knowledge based on a sole methodological principle. lichtenberg’s contention, “where we are right now, our good genius may know; we do not know it,” elucidates the content of his metaphorical assessment that “the observers of man…have more reason to complain about the lack of a sufficiently solid position than the voyaging astronomers and astrologers altogether.” with this assessment, lichtenberg connects the endeavor to specify man’s nature with the question of how the present epoch is to be located in the history of mankind. there is no doubt that he considers the enlightenment the basic feature of the age. Comparing the genesis of his projected “essay on man” with the inductive method of natural science, he grants the progress of scientific knowledge a decisive role in the process of enlightenment. His remark, namely that an impassioned expression of the maxim to take hold of one’s position in the “council of men on error and truth” might resemble “the trumpet of doom,” ironically calls into question the biblical idea of the last Judgement. His caveat about “authoritarian claims” includes a critique of the view that human understanding has to submit to religious revelation. lichtenberg, however, does not dismiss religion: the theological Faculty is an entity that may, of course, utter its convictions, just like a German club or a corporation or a sect. “That is my opinion”: this statement justifies its author in a republic like that of the learned; for why should a philosopher be annoyed at reading the conviction of a being that is allowed and is able to have convictions? He must appreciate it as long as he has a grain of curiosity, which a philosopher must keep by right, like Vestals’ fire.26

the future role of religion is a crucial part of the problem “where we are right now.” the progress of astronomy has proven a biblical statement to be false—namely, that the sun revolves around the earth.27 the claim that the Bible rests in toto on divine revelation can, therefore, no longer be accepted: “the Bible is a book written by human beings, like all other books—by human beings who differ from ourselves since they lived in slightly different times...a book…containing something true and something false, something good and something bad.”28 Does scientific progress fundamentally threaten the religious tradition? lichtenberg considers that one day religion might be considered mere superstition: “Our world will become so refined that it will be as ridiculous to believe in God as it is nowadays to believe in ghosts.”29 since lichtenberg concedes that there is truth in the Bible, his vision of the “refined” era to come has an ironic element: the “refined” people whom he has in mind have the view that the existential problems, which religion tries to solve, ibid., B 297. Cf. lichtenberg’ s essay “nicolaus Copernicus,” Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 162, p. 171. 28 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, J 17. 29 ibid., B 329. 26 27

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have altogether disappeared due to the progress of science and civilization. these problems are not confined to metaphysical questions concerning the origin of the universe, the existence (or non-existence) of an immortal soul, and so on, but extend to the sphere of ethics—since religion claims that there is an absolute moral standard. The Vienna Circle—which was influenced by Lichtenberg, albeit in a one-sided manner30—contends that all questions transcending the realm of natural science are senseless ones.31 according to those who share this view, there is no place left for religion in an “enlightened” era. the question, “where we are right now,” is closely related to the problem of who we are since it involves the issue of whether religion is an essential part of humanity or will fade away in the course of scientific progress. The controversy between theologians and traditional philosophers, on the one hand, and strict materialists, on the other hand, about the question of whether there are some meaningful problems which are out of reach of natural science obviously cannot be resolved by means of natural science. with his view that the “observers of men” are lacking a “solid position,” lichtenberg points to the fact that they do not agree at all upon the methods which the study of man should adopt. lichtenberg’s statement that we do not “know” where we are right now is true insofar as we cannot give a generally accepted answer to this question. We are facing various conflicting interpretations of the signature of the age. thus, it makes no sense to utter pathetically the appeal to take hold of one’s position in the “council of men on error and truth.” if lichtenberg’s voice resembled the “trumpet of doom,” then those who listen to his message would be animated to bring forward their convictions in the same manner. if everybody sticks to his opinion, any discussion of the controversial issue of what the significance of religion is in the age of enlightenment will be fruitless since neither the theologians nor the materialists can prove that they are right. By reflecting upon his role as an author, Lichtenberg tries to find a way out of the aporetic controversies: “Before I continue to write, i have to ask myself: from where have i taken the thoughts i’m writing down? is the truth in you what you’re saying, or is it just the tone of the lustrum you’re writing in?”32 The problem of authorship which Lichtenberg raises already in the first sentence of the preface to his (projected) “essay on man” is, thus, related to that of authenticity. the issue of to what extent the opinions i am uttering are authentically mine is an additional aspect of the passive formulation which he uses in the first sentence, “observations had been made” —since lichtenberg avoids claiming that their offspring is his (true) self. Perhaps it is the “artificial man” in him which brings I have traced some aspects of this influence in my book Erkenntnis und Sprachgebrauch. Lichtenberg und der Englische Empirismus, göttingen: wallstein 1999, pp. 15ff., pp. 107ff. 31 Cf. rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, otto neurath, “wissenschaftliche weltanschauung— der wiener Kreis,” in Logischer Empirismus—Der Wiener Kreis, ed. by Hubert schleicher, munich: Fink 1975, pp. 208ff. 32 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 321. in ancient rome lustrum was a period of five years which culminated in a religious sacrifice. 30

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forward these views. By raising this problem, lichtenberg motivates the reader to call his or her own opinions into question—and, thus, to strive for an understanding of those who hold different views. Lichtenberg’s aphoristic type of writing reflects this concern since he does not attempt to construct a monolithic position but rather takes into account a variety of views and perspectives, following the maxim: “one has to experiment with ideas.”33 By relating the “observations” to be arranged in his projected “essay on man” to the situations [Gelegenheiten] which they are rooted in, lichtenberg tries to disclose the genesis of his opinions: “I wished so often to find a spot, from where I—unaffected by the changes of fashion, custom and prejudices—could observe the particular development of that inner system.”34 the “inner system”35 which lichtenberg refers to embraces the opinions [Meinungs-System],36 the character [Charaktersystem]37 and even the sentiments [Empfindungssystem]38 of a person. lichtenberg uses the term “inner system” in both a broad and a specific sense. In the broad sense, the term “inner system” means the individual world view of a person. If our “inner system” has been influenced by prejudices, it will not be a coherent whole, that is, a “system” in the literal sense. many people are reluctant, according to lichtenberg, to scrutinize their own opinions and thus fail to realize that their world view is a medley of heterogenous or even incompatible views: “they are aided by (implicit) faith and superstition, and present at any moment a finished ‘system.’”39 It will be difficult or even impossible to convince other people with arguments, if their emotions control their reasoning: In [a] controversy where feeling hides behind reasoning and fights by means of ambush, there is enough room for pride to feel secure in a sort of self-conviction. that people do not want to be convinced does not always indicate they are right…what philosopher will make so little use of the world that he—in order to refute a person—does not study the sometimes rather repugnant anatomy of that person’s system of opinions and thoughts, and—once he knows it—is not patient enough to hand over the remedy to him.40

with his aphoristic writing, lichtenberg examines the authenticity and coherence of his “inner system”—hoping thus to stimulate the reader to scrutinize his or her own opinions and enter into a fruitful discussion on controversial topics in the “council of men on error and truth.” aphoristic writing promotes the author’s self-knowledge in two different ways: (1) by “experimenting with ideas,” that is, testing different views, including some alternatives to the opinions which one has held hitherto—in order to establish a maximally coherent set of convictions; (2) by tracing one’s own 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 2, K 308. ibid. Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 140. ibid., C 194. ibid., J 967. ibid., B 321. ibid. ibid., B 290.

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thoughts and opinions back to the situations and experiences which have influenced them—in order to elucidate the role of “fashion” and “custom” in the genesis of one’s world view. The first aspect is oriented towards the future, the second one towards the past. Lichtenberg’s at first glance irritating remark that he is the author of his projected “Essay on Man” thus has a twofold significance. On the one hand, Lichtenberg reminds both himself and the reader of the obligation resulting from the fact that the various “observations” which are to be arranged in his projected book have been written down by one person. the author’s decision to publish them obliges him to arrange them in a manner which enables the reader to discover a coherent structure in the author’s “inner system.” since “experimenting with ideas” is a basic feature of Lichtenberg’s aphoristic writing, he does not present a finished scientific system but discloses the processuality of thought, aiming at a coherent position. on the other hand, lichtenberg points out that his “observations” belong to an individual with a particular biography, related to a particular cultural environment. By tracing his thoughts back to the circumstances which influenced them, the author makes himself an object of biographical investigation. with his statement, “my thoughts are those of a man, so i submit them to examination,”41 lichtenberg stresses that “errare humanum est.” He who holds prejudices does not know that he holds them. He may thus regard an incoherent set of opinions as coherent and is unable to reconstruct adequately the influence of fashion and custom on his world view. the author’s endeavor to scrutinize the coherence and authenticity of his “inner system” has, therefore, to be accomplished by the reader. In order to fulfill this task, the reader must overcome his or her own prejudices. since no one can observe the development and “anatomy” of his “inner system” from a neutral position, the reader himself must submit the results of his self-investigation to public examination. doing so, he joins the common search for truth in the “council of men.” III. in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the concept of the “subjective existing thinker” is introduced in the chapter entitled “possible and actual theses by lessing.”42 in part 3 and part 4 of this chapter Climacus cites some of lessing’s “classic” statements: “lessing has said…that contingent historical truths can never be a demonstration of eternal truths of reason, also…that the transition whereby one will build an eternal truth on historical reports is a leap.”43 “Wenn Gott in seiner rechten Hand die Wahrheit und in seiner linken das beständige Streben danach hielte, wählte er das letztere.”44 However, in Part 1, where the figure of the “subjective existing thinker” is set forth, there is no quotation from lessing at all. Climacus 41 42 43 44

ibid., B 321. SKS 7, 72ff. / CUP1, 72ff. SKS 7, 92 / CUP1, 93. SKS 7, 103 / CUP1, 106.

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admits that he does not dare to refer to lessing directly as his “guarantor.”45 thus, he intimates to the reader that he does not intend to interpret lessing’s writings in a philologically correct manner. He sketches what lessing might have said—or should have said. Climacus contrasts the “subjective existing thinker” with an “objective” way of thinking: whereas objective thinking is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker as existing is essentially interested in his own thinking, is existing in it. Therefore, his thinking has another kind of reflection, specifically, that of inwardness, of possession, whereby it belongs to the subject and to no one else. whereas objective thinking invests everything in the result and assists all humankind to cheat by copying and reeling off the results and answers, subjective thinking invests everything in the process of becoming and omits the results, partly because this belongs to him, since he possesses the way, partly because he as existing is continually in the process of becoming, as is every human being who has not permitted himself to be tricked into becoming objective.46

lessing can be counted among the forerunners of the idea of the “subjective existing thinker” since he stresses that we do not possess a secure knowledge of the world but are bound to a permanent search for truth. the insight that we can never reach definite “results” is a common feature of the epistemology of the Enlightenment; it can be traced back to pre-socratic philosophy.47 among lessing’s writings, there is no specific text anticipating Climacus’ exposition of the “subjective existing thinker” in the same detailed manner as lichtenberg’s preface to his projected “essay on man” does. Climacus’ statement that the “subjective” thinker endeavors to acquire the “universal” in the “inwardness” of his existence describes exactly the crucial reflection from Lichtenberg’s preface. His “Essay on Man” shall elucidate the universal question “who man is.” lichtenberg wants to clarify to what extent the various thoughts and memories occurring to him when he is sketching his individual answer are stamped by the “tone of the lustrum” he is living in. the “subjective” thinker, as defined by Climacus, tries to prevent the “cheat[ing]” resulting from “copying and reeling off the results and answers”—by exhibiting the “way” leading to a specific result. The “subjective” thinker, thus, submits the assertions which he puts forth to public examination by reconstructing their genesis. Climacus’ statement that the “subjective” thinker “invests everything in the process of becoming” and “omits the result” suggests that all our knowledge of the world is located in the sphere of probability and is thus open to revision. the subjective thinker is, according to Climacus, “a learner” and “continually striving.”48 the “cheat[ing]” that Climacus has in mind consists in an “illusory termination” 49 of our cognition: “Certainty is

SKS 7, 72; CUP1, 72. SKS 7, 73 / CUP1, 72f. 47 Xenophanes, Fragment 45, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 7th ed., vols. 1–3, by Hermann diels, ed. by walther Kranz, Berlin: weidmann 1954, vol. 1, p. 138. 48 SKS 7, 84 / CUP1, 85. 49 SKS 7, 81 / CUP1, 81. 45 46

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impossible for a person in the process of becoming, and is indeed a deception.”50 By “copying and reeling off the results and answers,” the “conventional lying”51 of “artificial man” (Lichtenberg) is passed on to the next generation. The “double reflection”52 of the “subjective” thinker tries to find the adequate “form of communication” which represents the processuality of cognition.53 the “subjective” thinker cannot formulate his message directly: the declaration “that the way is the truth that the truth is only in the becoming” is self-contradictory since it claims to express a timeless “result.”54 Climacus tries to solve this problem with his concept of an indirect, “artistically, maieutically” oriented communication which he traces back to socrates.55 the motto of the Postscript is taken from the Greater Hippias: “But i must ask you, socrates, what do you suppose is the upshot of all this? as i said a little while ago, it is the scraping and shavings of argument, cut up into little pieces.”56 By recording this reproach, plato—the author of the dialogue— intimates to the reader that the sophist Hippias misses the point of socrates’ maieutic enterprise. Hippias expects him to give “speeches.”57 therefore, he is disappointed when socrates does not offer any results. Hippias does not realize that he himself has to contribute to the investigation of the issues which socrates is dealing with, by exposing his personal convictions to a dialogical process of argumentation and critique. since Hippias’ reproach reveals his fundamental misunderstanding of socrates’ maieutic method, the motto of the Postscript calls to mind that of Stages on Life’s Way: “such books are like mirrors, when an ape looks in, no apostle can look out.” lichtenberg’s preface to his projected “essay on man” focuses on the issue of how to communicate properly to the reader that he is a competent member of the “council of men on error and truth,” as long as he utters sincerely his individual convictions and accepts rational standards of argumentation. lichtenberg’s preface, thus, sets forth a “double reflection” in the sense of the Postscript. like Climacus, lichtenberg is aware of the fact that his message would be spoiled if he uttered it directly.58 the reader can only understand this message by joining actively the common search for truth in the “council of men.” lichtenberg’s aphoristic thought and Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication” both have their roots in the maieutic method of socrates’ dialogues. By using Hippias’ contention that socrates presents nothing but “the scrapings and shavings of argument” as the motto of the Postscript, Kierkegaard gives the reader to understand that this criticism might be applied to SKS 7, 75 / CUP1, 74. Cf. lichtenberg, “Nichts setzt dem Fortgang der Wissenschaften mehr Hindernis entgegen, als wenn man zu wissen glaubt, was man noch nicht weiß.” [nothing hinders the progress of science more than the conviction of knowing something one does not know yet.] 51 SKS 20, 390, nB5:42 / JP 1, 1015. 52 SKS 7, 74 / CUP1, 73. 53 ibid. 54 SKS 7, 78 / CUP1, 78. 55 SKS 7, 76 / CUP1, 80. 56 Greater Hippias, 304a; SKS 7, 8 / CUP1, 3. 57 Greater Hippias, 304a. 58 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 321; see above section ii. 50

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his own literary production—in the same way that Schleiermacher finds lacking a systematic line of thought in Lichtenberg’s “waste books.” Lichtenberg’s reflections on religion disclose the similarities between his aphoristic writing and Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication” as it is articulated in his pseudonymous works. IV. lichtenberg’s “waste book” entries concerning religion illustrate his methodological maxim: “one has to experiment with ideas.” the aphorism cited by Kierkegaard, “god created man in his image, that means, presumably, man created god in his own,” points to the basic concern of Lichtenberg’s attempt to sketch various conflicting views of religion. By quoting a fundamental statement of the Bible, lichtenberg alludes to the standpoint of traditional believers and theologians. in the second part of the aphorism, he introduces the opposite view held by the philosophers of the enlightenment who consider the idea of god to be a human projection.59 lichtenberg is personally convinced that anyone who studies natural science seriously will lose the belief in a “wise being governing the world,”60 which he himself had adopted in his childhood (his father was a pastor). By the words, “that means, presumably,” combining the two parts of the aphorism cited above, lichtenberg counts himself, on the one hand, among the atheist philosophers but concedes, on the other hand, that there is no definitive answer to the question whether the belief in a personal God is right or wrong. pointing to this fact, lichtenberg implicitly advocates tolerance. His polemic against “the damned scrawling of the priests”61 aims at the alliance between the Church and a repressive state governing europe from the last centuries of roman empire until the epoch of the enlightenment. lichtenberg is, at the same time, aware of the danger that in the “refined” times to come the believers themselves might meet an intolerant attitude from the atheists.62 lichtenberg does not content himself with an appeal for mutual tolerance: he is interested in a dialogue between believers and atheists in the “council of men on error and truth.” In his reflections on religion, Lichtenberg makes the hypothesis that the idea of a personal god is a projection of man’s own nature. the central problem he tries to solve is whether this hypothesis leads to the result that the content of traditional belief is completely based on errors. lichtenberg tries to avoid this consequence. given the hypothesis, “man created god in his own image,” he suggests two interpretations of religion’s “true core.” He outlines the first one in the following “waste book” entries: the inversion of traditional perspectives is a standard topos of lichtenberg’s aphoristic writing. Cf., for example, Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 2, g 183: “Der Amerikaner, der den Kolumbus zuerst entdeckte, machte eine böse Entdeckung.” [the american who first discovered Columbus made a bad discovery.] Cf. Gerhard Neumann, Ideenparadiese. Untersuchungen zur Aphoristik von Lichtenberg, Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis und Goethe, munich: Fink 1976. 60 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, J 855. 61 ibid., J 295. 62 ibid., B 329; see above. 59

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i believe at the bottom of my soul and after the most mature reasoning that the doctrine of Christ, purged of the damned scrawling of the priests and properly grasped and formulated, is the most perfect system for promoting peace and happiness quickly, vigorously, securely and in general. However, i also believe that there is another system which arises totally from pure reason and leads to the same [result]; it is, however, reserved for trained thinkers. Christ submitted according to the situation, and the way he did it obliges even the atheist to admire him. (every thinker will feel the way in which i use the word “atheist.”)63 god has said, “thou shalt not steal.” this has a greater effect than all demonstrations of the perniciousness of theft, and god, whoever He may be, has said it. the philosopher respects the nature of such things, but not the rabble. if, thus, i say there is a being which created the world or is the world, which rewards virtue and punishes vice, then that will all be true, and how can i strike people with awe more quickly than by personifying it? one has to keep in mind all the time...that there are no upright atheists among the ordinary people.64

according to these “waste book” entries, the basic claim of religion consists in the thesis that moral conduct will be rewarded by peace and happiness. lichtenberg contends that this claim can also be accepted by those who do not believe that there is a personal god, who “strikes [me] wildly when i act unjustly.”65 a rational analysis of the “nature of things” reveals that a general acceptance of moral rules (like “thou shalt not steal, kill, lie,” and so on) is an indispensable precondition for “the welfare of the great society which you are a part of.”66 By applying the notion of god to “the nature of things,” lichtenberg alludes to “spinoza’s god.”67 lichtenberg asserts that Christ had to adopt the idea of a personal god, who rewards virtue and punishes vice, since the rational insight that moral behavior promotes the welfare of society does not motivate the “rabble” to act morally. lichtenberg believes that, in the course of the progress of science and civilization, the power of rational incentives will increase. in a “waste book” entry, he declares that we will end up one day with a “purely rational religion”—a kind of “spinozism.”68 in other “waste book” entries, however, he sketches a totally different view: “it is a question of whether reason alone, without the heart, would ever have thought of a god.”69 “anyway, our heart recognizes a God, and it is really difficult, if not even impossible, to make reason comprehend that.”70 there is a crucial ambiguity in the interpretation of religion outlined at the beginning of this section. this ambiguity appears in the following entry: “according to what i think about religion, it is a collection of prescriptions for happiness,

ibid., J 295. ibid., J 238. 65 ibid., l 275. 66 ibid., l 196. 67 Cf. “goldpapierheft,” no. 58; Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 221. lichtenberg, thus, declares himself an “atheist” in the sense in which the word is applicable to spinoza. 68 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 2, H 143. 69 Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, l 276. 70 ibid., l 275. 63 64

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which the investigating part of mankind (its representatives) impose upon the noninvestigating part until they have come up with something better.”71 lichtenberg suggests in this record that the ethical commands which religion imposes on its followers are prescriptions for individual happiness. the thesis that moral conduct promotes “peace and happiness in the world”72 will, however, be false, if one applies it to the lives of all individuals. in a vicious society, the virtuous are bound to suffer. the interpretation of religion sketched at the beginning of this section thus turns out to be incoherent. the claim that virtue will be rewarded and vice punished has to be reduced to the thesis that the general obedience to moral rules promotes the welfare of society in toto. When one transforms Lichtenberg’s first interpretation of religious belief in this way, a crucial aspect of religion disappears, namely, that it addresses each individual as individual, promising that he or she can trust in god’s grace. lichtenberg sketches an alternative interpretation of religion’s “true core” in the following note: “One of the most difficult skills is probably that of encouraging oneself. i have known people whose happiness was their god. they believed in happiness, and faith encouraged them. Courage gave happiness to them and happiness courage.”73 although lichtenberg himself no longer shares traditional faith, he nonetheless calls to mind the spirit of courage he attributes to believers when he remembers the religious chants he sang in his childhood: “when i reach the line ‘if you have resolved it…’ what courage do i often feel! what a new ardour in abundance! what confidence in God! I wanted to jump into the sea without drowning in virtue of my faith; i would not fear all the world having just one good deed in mind.”74 lichtenberg gives a hint at the correct understanding of these notes in the following one: “the belief in god is an instinct; it is as natural as walking on two feet; sometimes, however, it gets modified, sometimes it is even stifled.”75 whoever accomplishes a “good deed” hopes that his endeavor is not in vain. He, thus, believes that the world is not thoroughly corrupt—that it makes sense to strive for a better life. this belief is a natural implication of any virtuous effort—a kind of “instinct” guiding our moral conduct. By pointing out that a natural belief in the vitality of the good is an indispensable incentive for any moral act, lichtenberg presents a starting point for an analysis of religion which can be accepted by both materialists and theologians. From a materialist perspective, this belief has to be explained by its anthropological function: it supports the construction of a well-organized society which promotes our individual welfare. the true object of this belief is, according to this view, “the nature of things.”76 From a theological perspective, the natural belief which lichtenberg talks about shows that man has been created in god’s image. lichtenberg does not intend to prove that 71 72 73 74 75 76

ibid., J 125. ibid., J 295. ibid., J 855. Schriften und Briefe, op. cit., vol. 1, B 98. ibid., J 281. ibid., J 238; see above.

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the materialist interpretation is the right one. His aim is to contribute to the mutual respect of materialists and theologians, which is the basis of practical tolerance. V. in his pseudonymous writings, Kierkegaard outlines various attitudes towards religion. like lichtenberg in his “waste books,” he makes “experiments with ideas” by sketching heterogenous views. in Either/Or, part two, the approach of Judge william to religion resembles that of lichtenberg. their common background is protestantism.77 neither of them is a traditional believer. Judge william’s religious declarations are ambiguous. He often appeals to a personal god; occasionally, however, he addresses the “divine” element in man’s own nature.78 His assertion that there is an “eternal power that…pervades all existence”79 can be read from a spinozistic perspective. Judge william postulates a “rational order of things.”80 His conviction that the good has an indestructible vital power shapes his perception of social reality. He does not show any understanding for the emotional and moral breakdown of workers hit by economic depression and widespread unemployment.81 By disclosing the “anatomy” (lichtenberg) of his world view, Kierkegaard intimates to the reader that the rationalist interpretation of traditional religion, focusing on the incorruptibility of the world’s order, has been influenced by the specific social background of the Enlightenment philosophers, scientists and men of letters, who largely belonged to the bourgeois middle-class. a comparison of Either/Or and The Concept of Anxiety reveals that Judge William’s approach to religion is one-sided. He underestimates the significance of the notion of sin which is—according to The Concept of Anxiety 82 and Kierkegaard’s journals83—the very core of biblical faith. vigilius Haufniensis (the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety) tries to reformulate the doctrine of sin in order to reconcile it with the spirit of the enlightenment. He rejects the “dogma…of the sacred scripture.”84 according to traditional faith, the origin of hereditary sin is adam and eve’s offence against God’s command. However, it is difficult to give a lucid explanation of the consequences of their deed.85 By quoting luther’s Smalcald articles, Haufniensis shows that traditional dogmatics was aware of this difficulty: “hereditary sin is so profound and detestable a corruption of human nature that it cannot be comprehended by human understanding but must be known and believed from the revelation of the wilfried greve describes Judge william’s protestant heritage in his book, Kierkegaards maieutische Ethik, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1990, pp. 133ff. 78 SKS 3, 239 / EO2, 250: “the divine in him.” Cf. greve, ibid., pp. 86f., pp. 103f. 79 SKS 3, 164 / EO2, 167. 80 SKS 3, 277 / EO2, 292. 81 SKS 3, 123f. / EO1, 124f. 82 SKS 4, 317ff. / CA, 9ff. 83 Pap. X–2 a 455 / JP 1, 789. 84 SKS 4, 327 / CA, 20. 85 SKS 4, 333 / CA, 26. 77

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scriptures.”86 according to Haufniensis, traditional dogmatics is unable to solve the problem of hereditary sin: one would try to “explain hereditary sin in terms of its consequences. However, the explanation is not suitable for thought.”87 a decisive feature of sin is personal guilt rooted in our free will. traditional dogmatics contends that our evil acts are the offspring of adam’s and eve’s deed. this deed is thus considered the cause of our evil decisions. this is a contradictio in adjecto: there is no causal influence on our free will. According to Haufniensis, this self-contradiction obliges us to abandon the traditional notion of hereditary sin. His reinterpretation of the idea of sin is inspired by the concept of guilt in greek tragedy.88 Climacus’ approach to religious revelation differs fundamentally from that of Haufniensis. He rejects the historical analysis and critique of biblical texts which arose in the epoch of the enlightenment.89 Climacus admits that the Christian doctrine of sin and forgiveness seems to be absurd. He emphasizes that one enters the realm of faith only by a “leap.” this is the reason why he relates his concept of the “subjective existing thinker” to lessing instead of lichtenberg. in his conversation with Jacobi quoted by Climacus, lessing resists Jacobi’s urgings that he “leap” into faith, but he does not condemn the idea of such a “leap.”90 according to lichtenberg, however, our reason is authorized—even obliged—to apply its standards to the content of religious revelation.91 lichtenberg’s understanding of the “council of men on error and truth” contradicts the idea of a “leap” into faith by casting off rational standards. His aphoristic thought, which focuses on the notion of the “council of men,” cannot, therefore, be made consistent with the specific interpretation of religious belief developed in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

ibid. SKS 4, 333 / CA, 26. 88 SKS 4, 399ff. / CA, 96ff. 89 SKS 7, 31ff. / CUP1, 24ff. 90 SKS 7, 101 / CUP1, 103: “He does not attempt to convince Jacobi that there is no such thing as the leap.” 91 Kant holds this claim, too (cf. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and The Conflict of the Faculties). see above section iv. 86 87

Bibliography I. Lichtenberg’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Vermischte Schriften, vols. 1–9, ed. by ludwig Christian lichtenberg and Friedrich Kries, göttingen: dieterich 1800–1806 (ASKB 1764–1772). G.C. Lichtenberg’s Ideen, Maximen und Einfälle. Nebst dessen Characteristik, vols. 1–2, ed. by gustav Jördens, 2nd ed., leipzig: Klein 1830–31 [1827] (ASKB 1773–1774). Auserlesene Schriften, Baireuth: lübeck 1800 (ASKB 1775). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Lichtenberg Flögel, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte der komischen Litteratur, vols. 1–4, liegnitz and leipzig: david giegert 1784–87, vol. 3, pp. 546–8 (ASKB 1396–1399). Frauenstädt, Julius, Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluß auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1855, p. 57 (ASKB 516). [Hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840–45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, p. 175; p. 181 (ASKB 561–563). [anonymous] [Heiberg, Johan ludvig], “lichtenbergs Betragtninger over den tyske roman,’” Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, 1837, June 2, no. 129 [pp. 522–4] (see ASKB 1606–1607; ASKB u 55). [Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich], Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Werke, vols. 1–6, leipzig: gerhard Fleischer 1812–25, vol. 3, 1816, pp. 197–243 (ASKB 1722–1728). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 3, pp. 44ff.; pp. 280ff. (ASKB u 79). [richter, Johann paul Friedrich], Jean paul, Vorschule der Aesthetik nebst einigen Vorlesungen in Leipzig über die Parteien der Zeit, vols. 1–3, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1813, vol. 2, p. 403n; p. 405 (ASKB 1381–1383). rosenkranz, Karl, Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 169; pp. 171–2 (ASKB 744).

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— (ed.), Schelling: Vorlesungen; gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: gerhard 1843, p. 44; p. 47 (ASKB 766). [schlegel, Friedrich], Friedrich Schlegel’s Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806. Nebst Fragmenten vorzüglich philosophisch-theologischen Inhalts. Aus dem Nachlaß des Verewigten, vols. 1–2, ed. by C.J.H. windischmann, Bonn: weber 1836–37, vol. 1, p. 457 (ASKB 768-768a). schopenhauer, arthur, Ueber den Willen in der Natur, Frankfurt am main: schmerber 1836 (ASKB 944). — Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: Brockhaus 1844 [1819] (ASKB 773–773a). — Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.w. Hayn 1851 (ASKB 774–775). steffens, Henrich, Anthropologie, vols.1–2, Breslau: Josef max 1822, vol. 2, p. 183; p. 256 (ASKB 795–796). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: in der weidmannschen Buchhandlung 1792–99, vol. 2, p. 211; vol. 4, p. 209 (ASKB 1365–1369). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. 242n (ASKB 1379–1380). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Lichtenberg oksenhalt, svein, “Kierkegaard’s lichtenberg: a reconsideration,” Proceedings of the Pacific-Northwest Conference on Foreign Languages, no. 16, 1965, pp. 50–56. vetlesen, alf, “søren Kierkegaard og georg Christoph lichtenberg,” Edda, vol. 21, no. 34, 1934, pp. 235–40.

schelling: a Historical introduction to Kierkegaard’s schelling tonny aagaard olesen

as a historical introduction, the present work will attempt to present all the material relevant for understanding Kierkegaard’s relation to schelling. the hermeneutical function of this introduction is to delimit and open up the texts which will be introduced, the former, by giving an overview of the primary material, the latter, by tracing and presenting a historical context to serve as the background for an immediate understanding and appropriation of the concrete textual passages. the goal is to lead the reader to the historical horizon of experience of the text, instead of immediately using the text as a springboard for other interpretations. the goal is to underscore our factual, positive knowledge about the relevant texts, and thus provide a general introduction to more systematizing and applied studies. the following presentation is a historical introduction to Kierkegaard’s schelling, that is, schelling, as he appeared in Kierkegaard’s historical context and in Kierkegaard’s writings. it is thus not intended as an introduction to schelling’s philosophy; schelling’s works are discussed only to the degree demanded by the immediate context. However, in the footnotes and bibliography the reader will find references to the relevant secondary literature that can be used for further study. thus, this work, as an introduction, is intended as a point of departure, the goal of which is to lead the reader further. This introduction consists of three sections. The first gives an overview of Kierkegaard’s possible conception of schelling in the period up to 1840 with the background of the historical context, both danish and german. the second section treats Kierkegaard’s stay in Berlin during winter semester 1841–42, including his notes to schelling’s lectures. in the third section the reader can follow schelling’s possible influence on Kierkegaard’s later thought.

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I. Schelling as a Parenthesis around Hegel1 the view that Hegel is a parenthesis in schelling seems to be more and more manifest; we are only waiting for the parenthesis to be closed.2

Kierkegaard entered the above statement in one of his notebooks in 1840. seen in the light of history, it undeniably contains a prophetic anticipation of the lectures which schelling was to give in Berlin the next year, just as it clearly implies the expectations which Kierkegaard might have had for schelling when he traveled to Berlin in winter semester 1841–42 to attend his lectures. yet read in the perspective of 1840, the entry at first appears quite surprising. the entry was written when Hegelianism was enjoying its heyday. in Berlin many scholars were still working energetically to publish, develop and promulgate Hegel’s thought.3 a review of the contemporary philosophical literature makes it clear that Hegel’s philosophical hegemony lasted well into the 1840s. of course, criticisms of his philosophy of religion began appearing in the 1830s and criticisms of his logic at the beginning of the 1840s. But even this anti-Hegelian literature, which Kierkegaard knew well, does not seem to have given rise to a new philosophy capable of putting Hegel in parentheses. the reception in denmark was similar to that in germany. in the 1830s Johan ludvig Heiberg had been active in spreading Hegelian philosophy, in part by means of his speculative journal Perseus (1837–38), in which he presented Hegel’s logic.4 1 this article is an abridged version of “Kierkegaards schelling. eine historische einführung,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, Berlin and new york: walter de gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 8), pp. 1–102. the translation is based on the original danish text and not on this german translation. an attempt has been made here to indicate where significant omissions have been made. 2 SKS 19, 185, not5:18 / JP 2, 1589. 3 the edition of Hegel’s Werke, which appeared in the period from 1832–45 (2nd ed., 1840–47) had a subtitle, “vollständige ausgabe durch einen verein von Freunden des verewigten.” 4 The first Hegelian work in Danish was Johan Ludvig Heiberg’s Om den menneskelige Frihed (1824). in connection with his instruction at the military College from 1830–36, he published, among other things, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie, eller den speculative Logik, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1832, and Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen: J.H. Schubothes Boghandling 1835. Thus the Danish officiers during this period received instruction in Hegel’s logic: “they were in large part the ones who won the war in 1848–50, whereas later classes of officers, who did not receive this ballast, were defeated in 1864,” Flemming Conrad, Smagen og det nationale. Studier i dansk litteraturhistorieskrivning 1800– 1861, Copenhagen: museum tusculanums Forlag 1996, p. 152. later Heiberg published his Perseus. Journal for den speculative Idee, of which only volume 1 (1837) and volume 2 (1838) were ever published. The first volume contains, among other things, Heiberg’s critical review of v.H. rothe’s treatise, inspired by schelling, Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg (1836). the second volume contains, among other things, Heiberg’s “det logiske system.”

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it is true that Heiberg’s promotion of Hegel’s cause occasioned, in 1838, a response by the professor of philosophy, Frederik Christian sibbern,5 which is perhaps the most significant criticism of Hegel in all of Danish literature—apart from Kierkegaard’s later attack. But in spite of sibbern’s criticism, danish Hegelianism was still in its early stages. with Hans lassen martensen’s lectures on the history of philosophy, moral philosophy and speculative dogmatics, held at the university of Copenhagen from 1837 onward, Hegel’s philosophy reached its greatest prominence.6 martensen’s lectures caused something of a sensation at the time; they were highly popular and served to make Hegel something of a fashion among the students.7 to be sure, martensen had some reservations with regard to Hegel’s philosophy of religion, but he thought that in order to go beyond Hegel, his philosophy, which he regarded as the greatest of the age, had to be carefully appropriated. most danish literature on Hegel, including a translation of his Lectures on the Philosophy of History and two presentations of his logic, appeared from the late 1830s to the mid-1840s, after which his popularity began to wane.8

it was Heiberg’s criticism of rothe’s treatise which caused sibbern to develop a solid criticism of Hegel’s philosophy in a series of articles, published in the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, vols. 19–20, 1838. The first three of these articles were published as an independent monograph with the title, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1838 (ASKB 778). Kierkegaard remarks about this work that here sibbern truly accomplished something (Pap. v B 47.5, 96.8). when Kierkegaard later traveled to Berlin and heard schelling’s criticism of Hegel, he was thus already well prepared. 6 an overview of the lectures that martensen gave at the philosophical Faculty and especially the theological Faculty can be found in skat arildsen’s Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, Copenhagen: g.e.C. gads Forlag 1932, pp. 156–8. 7 there are many scattered sources which document this. Here i mention only skat arildsen’s Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen, op. cit., pp. 162–4, and H.C.a. lund, Studenterforeningens Historie 1820–70. Dansk Studenterliv i det 19. Aarhundrede, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen 1896–98, vol. 1, pp. 452–4. see also leif grane’s section “Hegelianismen,” in Københavns Universitet 1479–1979, vol. 5, Det Teologiske Fakultet, ed. by leif grane, Copenhagen: g.e.C. gads Forlag 1980, pp. 360–9. 8 see søren Kattrup’s translation, Hegel’s Forelæsninger over Historiens Philosophie, Copenhagen 1842. presentations of Hegel’s logic can be found in rasmus nielsen, Den speculative Logik i dens Grundtræk, nos. 1–4, Copenhagen 1841–44, which was criticized by, among others, p.m. stilling in his treatise, Philosophiske Betragtninger over den speculative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, and by a.p. adler in his Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842 (ASKB 383). in Hans Frederik Helveg’s indispensable overview, “Hegelianismen i danmark,” in Dansk Kirketidende (nos. 51–2, 1855, pp. 825–37, and pp. 841–52), a picture of danish Hegelianism, written from the perspective of a necrologue, is presented, which, according to Helveg, ended with Kierkegaard as the last Hegelian with whom Hegelianism was brought down. a more recent account is found in s.v. rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1966, pp. 159–88; see also Carl Henrik Koch’s work on adler, En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1990. 5

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Kierkegaard’s 1840 entry was written at the height of the Hegelian period. Kierkegaard knew Heiberg’s works and had been an auditor in martensen’s lecture hall.9 in 1840, he was also working on his most Hegelian work, his master’s thesis, The Concept of Irony (1841).10 at the time there was little discussion of schelling other than as an intermediary figure in the history of philosophy in the development from Kant to Hegel. thus, schelling plays no role in The Concept of Irony11 and is almost completely absent from Kierkegaard’s early journals and notebooks. the only time Kierkegaard mentions him by name during this period is in an 1837 reflection on the younger Fichte’s Idee der Persönlichkeit.12 this raises the question of what prompted Kierkegaard to grant such importance to schelling in his 1840 entry. schelling had not published a philosophical work in Kierkegaard’s entire lifetime to that point,13 and the many promises and the expectation of an immanent publication, which for decades had been in the air, had been disappointed again and again. in 1834 schelling surprised readers with his foreword—which was critical of Hegel—to the german translation of victor Cousin’s book on French and german philosophy,14 and the expectations of a see, for example, valdemar ammundsen, Søren Kierkegaards Ungdom. Hans Slægt og hans religiøse Udvikling, Copenhagen: universitetstrykkeriet 1912, p. 126, where it is written that in winter semester 1837–38 Kierkegaard heard martensen give his lecture, “introduction to speculative dogmatics.” see Kierkegaard’s notes in SKS 19, 125–43, not4:3–12. among Kierkegaard’s papers there was also found a set of notes to martensen’s lectures on “the History of more recent philosophy from Kant to Hegel” (1838–39), which, however, is not written in Kierkegaard’s own hand (Pap. ii C 25, in vol. Xii). there are also notes to lectures on “speculative dogmatics” (1838–39), which are written in part by Kierkegaard himself (cf. Pap. ii C 26–27, printed in vol. Xiii). 10 on the genesis of the text of Kierkegaard’s master’s thesis, see søren Bruun and Johnny Kondrup’s “Critical account of the text” to Om Begrebet Ironi in SKS K1, 125–9. the claim that The Concept of Irony is Kierkegaard’s most Hegelian work is examined in my article, “Kierkegaard’s socratic Hermeneutic in The Concept of Irony,” The Concept of Irony, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2001 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 2), pp. 101–22. 11 He is mentioned only once, and this is in connection with a discussion of a letter from solger to tieck, in which solger disapproves of schelling’s attempt in the Freiheitsschrift to show that perfect being is in existence: SKS 1, 344 (see also the corresponding commentary) / CI, 312. 12 see SKS 17, 41f., aa:22 / JP 2, 1190. in søren Bruun’s “Critical account of the text” to Begrebet Angest in SKS K4, the entries ii a 1–30 are regarded as earlier drafts to Begrebet Angest. the entry ii a 31 also belongs to this series. 13 schelling’s Freiheitsschrift marks an end, but also an important supplement to the early philosophy of identity. the Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen, des Herrn Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi und der ihm in derselben gemachten Beschuldigung, eines absichtlich täuschenden, Lüge redenden Atheismus (1812), displays more unambiguously a new theological–philosophical orientation. after 1813, the year of Kierkegaard’s birth, schelling published only a single work, namely Die Gottheiten von Samothrake (1815), which has more the character of a work on the history of religion than the philosophy of religion. 14 victor Cousin, Über französische und deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert Beckers. Nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn Geheimenraths von Schelling, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1834 (ASKB 471), pp. iii–xxviii. 9

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comeback on the philosophical scene were at their peak. But schelling again lapsed into silence. in 1834 the rumors were circulating that he would take over the professorship vacated by Hegel, but this likewise came to nothing. undaunted, schelling continued his quiet work in munich and left it to georg andreas gabler in Berlin to carry philosophy further in the Hegelian direction.15 in 1840 there was thus still no public indication that schelling would soon create a sensation in Berlin by attempting to oppose Hegelianism in its own stronghold. in a letter from the summer of 1840, the diplomat C.C.J. Bunsen informed schelling of the newly crowned King Friedrich wilhelm iv’s desire to bring him to Berlin. But their negotiations lasted several months, and it was not until the spring of 1841 that schelling actually made his decision.16 what was it then that Kierkegaard was referring to in his entry? to answer this question we must consider a possible overlooked context, which was present for Kierkegaard in 1840 and may help illuminate his later response to schelling’s lectures. we know that schelling had for a long time worked on a philosophy which in fact claimed to put a parenthesis around Hegel’s philosophical activity. However, this work, which proved quite extensive, was only published by schelling’s son posthumously in 1856–61.17 a knowledge of schelling’s philosophy thus had to be communicated by the auditors who attended his lectures in munich (1806–20, 1826–41), and in erlangen (1820–26). this is the clue which must be followed in what follows. in other words, this chapter will investigate whether Kierkegaard could have had any idea about schelling’s late philosophy. right away two perspectives present themselves: first there is the Danish Schelling reception. How much familiarity with schelling was there in Kierkegaard’s Copenhagen? then there is the german literature up through the 1830s. Could Kierkegaard have been familiar with the theme which was later expressed with the ambiguous heading: “Schelling nach Hegel”?18 Hegel’s Lehrstuhl remained empty for a long time after his death in the fall of 1831 since a qualified successor could not be found. In the summer of 1834 there were negotiations with schelling about the position, but these never came to anything. a year later, amidst several protests, the Hegelian georg andreas gabler was appointed as Hegel’s successor. a description of these developments can be found in max lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, vols. 1–2.2, Halle: verlag der Buchhandlung des waisenhauses 1910–18, vol. 1, pp. 474–83. 16 these negotiations with schelling are treated in max lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, op. cit., vol. 2.2, pp. 9f. and pp. 42–4; they are printed in manfred Frank, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42, 3rd ed., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1993, pp. 477–80. Friedrich Wilhelm IV only signed the final order in Council on 17 February 1841. that the news spread quickly is attested by a longer article in Le Semeur. Journal religieux, politique, et littéraire, vol. 10, no. 9, 1841, p. 66; published in a german translation in manfred Frank, op. cit., pp. 488–90. 17 see F.W.J. Schellings sämmtliche Werke, vols. 1–14 (series 1, vols. 1–10; series 2, vols. 11–14), ed. by Karl F. august schelling, stuttgart and augsburg: Cotta 1856–1861. 18 immediately after the news of schelling’s appointment in Berlin, arnold ruge exclaims to Feuerbach on 11 February 1841: “Schelling ist nach Berlin berufen: Schelling nach Hegel!” (manfred Frank, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., p. 521.)—two long sections which appear here have been omitted from the present translation. The first treats the Danish Schelling reception, and the second explores the German neo15

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II. Schelling as a Travel Destination Had schelling not lectured in Berlin, i would not have gone, and had schelling not been so nonsensical, i would probably never have traveled again.19

A. The Stay in Berlin when Kierkegaard arrived in Berlin around 27 october 1841,20 he had behind him more than ten years of studies at the university. He passed his theological examination in the summer of 1840, and then he participated in the exercises of the pastoral seminar in winter semester of 1840–41 and summer semester of 1841. He successfully defended his thesis, The Concept of Irony, on 29 september 1841 and was awarded his master’s degree on 26 october. with his master’s thesis completed, Kierkegaard had reached the point in his academic career where a study trip appeared to be a natural progression. the fact that on 11 october, the same day that winter semester began in Berlin, he had dissolved his engagement with regine olsen, which he had “worked on” parallel with the treatise on irony, could well have given him an extra motivation for putting some distance between himself and Copenhagen. Kierkegaard had originally planned for his journey abroad to last a year and a half,21 but it ended up being reduced to four and a half months in Berlin. He chose Berlin for the express purpose of hearing schelling. it is doubtful whether he would have travelled to munich in order to hear schelling reveal his positive philosophy, but to hear schelling complete his parentheses around Hegel in the philosophical stronghold of Berlin was certainly an irresistible opportunity. the Friedrich-wilhelms-universität in Berlin also had other things to offer.22 in addition to schelling’s course Kierkegaard attended philipp marheineke’s lectures on “die Christliche dogmengeschichte,” which he took extensive notes to.23 He also heard steffens lecture on anthropology, but was so disappointed that he not only gave up attending the lectures but also avoided paying a personal visit to steffens, schelling movement. these two sections attempt to answer the question that is posed here at the end of this first section. 19 B&A, vol. 1, 110 / LD, letter 70, 141. letter to peter Christian Kierkegaard presumably from February 1842. 20 Kierkegaard departed from Copenhagen on 25 october, at 11:00 am; he arrived at stralsund a day later, and he rode with carriage from there until he arrived in Berlin presumably on 27 october. Cf. peter tudvad’s commentaries to notebook 8:2 and 8:9 in SKS K19, 307–9. 21 see SKS 19, 437, not15:4. 22 in a letter to F.C. sibbern dated 15 december 1841, Kierkegaard notes “Berlin is probably the only place in germany worth visiting for scholarly reasons” (B&A, vol. 1, 85 / LD, letter 55, 108). 23 this series of lectures began on 17 october, 1841. these notes—with introduction and commentary—are published as Notebook 9 and Notebook 10 in SKS K19. See also the final entries of Notebook 8. marheineke visited Copenhagen in connection with the celebration of the reformation that took place in 1836 and was later a well-known name in theological circles. this is evidenced by the two translations: Udkast af den praktiske Theologie, nykjöbing: w. laub 1841, and C.H. Kalkar’s Udsigt over den christne Kirkes Historie. Udarbeidet, efter Marheineke, nærmest til Brug for lærde Skoler, odense: s. Hempel 1841.

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which would have otherwise been quite natural.24 Finally, he heard “the virtuoso” Karl werder lecture on “logik und metaphysik mit besonderer rücksicht auf die bedeutendsten älteren und neueren system.”25 although we have no evidence that he heard other lectures, this cannot be entirely ruled out. Before martensen began his educational journey abroad, mynster had paradoxically observed that the best thing about a trip abroad for young people was that they had time to get something done.26 these words could just well have been intended for Kierkegaard, most of whose time in Berlin was devoted to the writing of Either/Or, from which his lecture attendance appears to have served as a kind of diversion.27 on 6 February 1842 Kierkegaard writes to his friend emil Boesen, This winter in Berlin will always have great significance for me. I have done a lot of work. when you consider that i have had three or four hours of lectures every day, have had a daily language lesson, and have still gotten so much written (and that regardless of the fact that in the beginning i had to spend a lot of time writing down schelling’s lectures and making fair copies), and have read a lot, i cannot complain.28

Kierkegaard certainly nourished great expectations for schelling’s appearance in Berlin, but he was far from being alone in this. schelling’s philosophical comeback was, as Karl Jaspers put it 100 years later, “das letzte große Universitätsereignis,” not only an academic sensation but also a media event. regarded philosophically, schelling had himself raised expectations with his 1834 criticism of Hegel in munich. in Berlin, however, his lectures would address an auditorium full of Hegelians. regarded theologically, there were expectations that schelling would advocate a positive Christian point of departure for thought at the expense of Hegel’s negative philosophy. many Hegelians were prepared to contest this anticipated Christian reaction under the banner of free thinking. regarded politically, this expected Christian reaction was supported by the official, that is, by the newly appointed prussian King Friedrich wilhelm iv’s conservative intention with schelling’s appointment. there was something ambiguous in the fact that schelling was thus almost sponsored by the political forces; he received an unheard of high salary and

see the description in the letter to sibbern, B&A, vol. 1, 83f. / LD, letter 55, 106f., and in the letter to spang dated 18 november 1841, B&A, vol. 1, 77 / LD, letter 51, 97. 25 Cf. SKS K19, 382. the entries concerning werder’s lectures are found in Notebook 9 in SKS 19, 278–82; see also the final entries in Notebook 8. see further the description of werder in the letter to sibbern (B&A, vol. 1, 84 / LD, letter 55, 107) as well as the letter to spang dated 8 January 1842 (B&A, vol. 1, 93 / LD, letter 61, 119). p.m. stilling also attended werder’s lectures later. see his account in Jens Holger schjørring, Teologi og filosofi. Nogle analyser og dokumenter vedrørende Hegelianismen i dansk teologi, Copenhagen: g.e.C. gads Forlag 1974, pp. 54f., p. 61. 26 see Hans lassen martensen, Af mit Levnet, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1882–83, vol. 1, pp. 94f. 27 Kierkegaard wrote hundreds of pages of Either/Or during his stay in Berlin. Cf. Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup’s account of the genesis of the work in the “Critical account of the text” to Enten–Eller, in SKS K2–3, 38–58. 28 B&A, vol. 1, 107 / LD, letter 68, 138. 24

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advanced to a quite noble placement in the order of ranks.29 all of this was fodder for sensationalism. From Schelling’s arrival in Berlin one week before the official beginning of the semester until the end of winter semester in the spring, there was great discussion of the event in the german press.30 also in denmark people followed along with the events.31 the sources on Kierkegaard’s stay in Berlin are not extensive. apart from his lecture notes, there is only a single notebook with 53 entries, which were written from 25 october 1841 until around Christmas, in which Kierkegaard put down his few impressions about the journey.32 the notebook contains primarily literary drafts inspired by the broken engagement, but there is also a handful of entries concerning werder’s and marheineke’s lectures along with reading notes to Hegel’s Lectures

the privileged conditions of schelling’s appointment are described in max lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, op. cit., vol. 2.2, pp. 42–4; this information is also printed in manfred Frank’s edition, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 477–80. see also Helmut pölcher, “schellings auftreten in Berlin (1841) nach Hörerberichten,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, vol. 3, 1954, p. 197, where it is noted that the “8000 talers” that schelling received was still in 1918 the highest salary that any instructor in Berlin had ever received. in one of the letters to peter Johannes spang dated 8 January 1842 it is clear that Kierkegaard was quite attentive to schelling’s ambiguous situation: “schelling’s position is not a comfortable one. He has become involved in Court interests, which makes his conduct rather detested and is, of course, as is every external consideration, detrimental at all times. the Hegelians are fanning the flames. Schelling looks as sour as a vinegar” (B&A, vol. 1, 92 / LD, letter 61, 118). in a later letter Kierkegaard ironically refers to schelling as the “Geheimeraad,” see B&A, vol. 1, 103 / LD, letter 67, 132. 30 a large part of this material is printed in the three appendices in manfred Frank’s F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit. 31 thus less than a week before his departure, Kierkegaard could read the following notice in the newspaper: “Berlin, october 10. geheimeraad v. schelling arrived here on the 4th with his family and has taken up residence in an inn. our papers report his arrival under their official rubric, a distinction, which, as far as we know, has not been granted to any scholar here except for alexander v. Humboldt. But Humboldt is certainly also the only scholar in prussia, who, as such, has the title of actual geheimeraad. people are looking forward with great desire to schelling’s public appearance: whatever he comes to lecture on at our university—the ceremonial hall will certainly not be large enough to accommodate everyone who wishes to attend. also among the Hegelians, following a very natural sense of decency, every opposing opinion has been put on hold out of respect that is owed to the authority of this great worldencompassing man, and every judgment is withheld until schelling himself has spoken” (Dagen, 19 october 1841). an interesting account of how H.p. Kofoed-Hansen, who would later become a follower of Kierkegaard, sought in vain to come to Berlin in order to attend schelling’s lectures, but instead had to resign himself to excerpting newspaper reports about the lectures for the members of Fünen’s literary society in odense, is found in p.p. Jørgensen, H.P. Kofoed-Hansen (Jean Pierre) med særligt Henblik til Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendalske Boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1920, pp. 98–101. even KofoedHansen’s disposition to schelling is reported in the newspaper; see Berlingske politiske og Avertissements-Tidende, Friday, 24 december 1841, no. 301. 32 this appears as Notebook 8 in SKS 19, 223–46. 29

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on Aesthetics.33 only one of these entries refers to schelling.34 the main source of information is therefore the 22 surviving letters which Kierkegaard sent from Berlin, more than half of which mention schelling.35 in addition, there are various testimonies from other danes who were staying in Berlin at the time; many of them, like Kierkegaard, had traveled from Copenhagen in order to hear schelling lecture. none of Kierkegaard’s surviving writings mentions his fellow danes in Berlin by name. But he observes that when they were all gathered at Christmas at the restaurant Belvedere, “where we usually eat,” their “number is as incredible as that of the grasshoppers in egypt.”36 He writes to sibbern: “the danes here get the newspapers, but i do not read them.”37 to his friend emil Boesen he sketches his lively and clever intercourse among the apparently omnipresent danes.38 who are these people that he is referring to? in his recollections about Kierkegaard, Hans Brøchner lifts the veil somewhat: s.K. met many danes in the winter he spent in Berlin. many of them had gone there in order to hear schelling. among them was my late friend Christian Fenger Christens. s.K. spoke of him with great appreciation; later he told me that Christens was the brightest of all the danes who had been in Berlin that winter, and among them were such men as the jurist a.F. Krieger (later Cabinet minister) and Judge advocate Carl weis (now administrative head of the ministry of religion and Culture).39 the last four entries of the notebook are concerned with werder, marheineke and Hegel’s aesthetics. it is not without interest that in not8:53, Kierkegaard notes a passage in Hegel’s aesthetics which contradicts schelling’s polemic, according to which Hegel transferred everything to thought. Kierkegaard’s study of Hegel’s aesthetics is further confirmed by a few entries in Notebook 10. 34 the following oft-quoted passage about schelling and regine olsen appears in Notebook 8: “i am so happy to have heard schelling’s second lecture—indescribably. i have been pining and thinking mournful thoughts long enough. the embryonic child of thought leapt within me…when he mentioned the word ‘actuality’ in connection with the relation of philosophy to actuality. i remember almost every word he said after that. Here, perhaps, clarity can be achieved. this one word recalled all my philosophical pains and sufferings.— and so that she, too, might share my joy, how willingly i would return to her, how eagerly i would coax myself to believe that this is the right course.—o, if only i could!—now i have put all my hope in schelling—but still, if i knew that i could make her happy, i would leave this very evening” (SKS 19, 235, not8:33 / JP 5, 5535). 35 see B&A, vol. 1, 71–101, and 102–10 / LD, letters 49–65 and 67–71. schelling is mentioned in 12 of the letters, namely, letters 49, 51, 54–6, 61–3 and 67–70. 36 B&A, vol. 1, 87 / LD, letter 58, 111. this letter is addressed to michael lund and contains a postmark dated Berlin, 28 December (translation slightly modified). 37 B&A, vol. 1, 85 / LD, letter 55, 108. this letter is dated 15 december (translation slightly modified). 38 B&A, vol. 1, 95 / LD, letter 62, 122. this letter is dated 16 January. 39 Hans Brøchner’s recollections, which were written in 1871–72, are printed in Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen By His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, pp. 225–48. section 9, pp. 230f. is about Kierkegaard’s stay in Berlin. Christens (1819–55), who became a theological candidate in the same year as Kierkegaard, had already made himself noticed by making an oral opposition at Kierkegaard’s dissertation defense of The Concept of Irony, and in 1845 he 33

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His friendship with Christens permits Brøchner to relay some anecdotes concerning Kierkegaard in Berlin, for example, about how Kierkegaard in philosophical discussions enjoyed bringing peter Conrad rothe (1811–1902) onto thin ice. none of the four danes Kierkegaard is known to have associated with in Berlin appears to have left any first-hand accounts. One can find more information in the memoirs of Viggo Rothe (1814–91), a public servant with philosophical interests. He recalls that in winter semester 1841–42 he traveled to Berlin in order to study industry and trade, and there he attended, among others, stahl’s lectures on prussian constitutional law.40 in this context, he mentions “a whole colony of young danish students,” to which, apart from those mentioned above, belonged the theology students Jens Christian Juulsgaard gammeltoft (1818– 73), Johan nicolai lange (1814–65), ingvard Henrik linnemann (1818–92), Johan alfred Bornemann (1813–90) and a certain “schmidt,” which presumably refers to the philologist of slavic languages Caspar wilhelm smith (1811–81). Further, one can name three polytechnic students: Carl Ferdinand wessel Brown (d. 1879), peter martin lindberg (born 1815) and Christen thomsen Barfoed (1815–89) along with the student of pharmacology emil Holm (1819–1917). rothe relates that the danish students, some of whom lived under the same roof,41 were especially interested in theological and philosophical studies: it was in particular Hegel’s philosophy, which people studied with great zeal at that time, but which was criticized for a certain unchristian element in its content, for which reason professor schelling, who was actually employed at the university of munich and had remained very withdrawn during the period in which the Hegelian philosophy took over, while his own philosophy was taken to strike out in a more Christian direction, was appointed in Berlin in winter 1841–42. His lectures attracted so many students that it was difficult to gain entrance to the auditorium. 42

rothe offers no information regarding the extent to which he himself attended schelling’s lectures. One finds a more lively account about this period in Berlin in the letters from Caspar wilhelm smith.43 He stayed in Berlin from may until august 1841, and again published an interesting article entitled, “en parallel mellem to af den nyere tids philosopher,” that is, ludwig Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, which appeared in For Literatur og Kritik, vol. 3, odense 1843, pp. 1–17. andreas Frederik Krieger (1817–93) and Carl mettus weis (1809–72) were both law students. 40 viggo rothe, Mit Livs Erindringer, part 1, Copenhagen: slagt og venner 1888 (2nd printing, J.d. qvist & Komp.). the description of the stay in Berlin is found on pp. 83–102. 41 ibid., pp. 89f.: “most of these students lived near each other in Friederichstraße in the downtown of the city, not far from the university, the Castle and the museums, and some of them lived together in a pension, so that they in a sense constituted a danish colony in the german city. only søren Kierkegaard lived in relative isolation; he lived in another part of the city than the rest of us, and we saw him less often.” 42 ibid., p. 91. 43 H.d. schepelern, “Filologen Caspar wilhelm smiths rejsebreve 1841–1845,” in Danske Magazin indeholdende Bidrag til den danske Histories Oplysning, 7th series, vol. 5, Copenhagen 1949–53, pp. 81–172.

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from october 1841 until midsummer 1842. smith gives many insights into Berlin customs and formalities, for example, about the difficulty of obtaining permission to attend lectures.44 Five of his letters date from the period when Kierkegaard was in Berlin. in a letter dated 29 november 1841, he writes to assistant Chief Constable, J.H.G. Tauber: “For you must know, since we Danes are now fifteen men strong, we have also become so haughty, that we have subscriptions to both Fædrelandet and the Corsair and, in addition, even borrow Dagen from steffens. i say, by Jove, what a barnburner we are going to have on Christmas eve!”45 on 28 december he writes to his mother: i must with shame confess that i am not attending schelling’s lectures, for gabler’s aforementioned lectures take place at the same time, and i am so obdurate that i prefer the deeply thought-out, thorough Hegelian psychology to the new schellingian castles in the air. the few times i attended the famous man’s lectures, i was admittedly impressed with their beautiful form but was unable to pass judgment on the content, particularly as i did not hear it in context. most of my countrymen still attend his lectures, and so i will certainly come to read everything about it when it is over.46

apparently several danes besides Kierkegaard took notes to schelling’s lectures, but it must be the task of future research to discover whether any of these survived. one short loose set of notes has been traced. they were written by the aforementioned J.a. Bornemann, whose stubborn character is described in smith’s letters.47 B. Kierkegaard’s Notes to Schelling’s Lectures although incomplete, Kierkegaard’s notes to schelling’s lectures in winter semester 1841–42 are among the most extensive of those which survive. in spite of their potential significance for both Schelling and Kierkegaard research, their editorial history tells only of years of neglect. They were first brought to public attention in 1911 in the third volume of Søren Kierkegaards Papirer. However, the actual notes were not printed here, but for the entry C 27 the editors simply wrote the on 30 may 1841 smith wrote to his mother: “in order to get enrolled one must run back and forth six times between the rector and the university administrator, a worldly person, who is placed alongside the academic senate, in order to take care that the professors do not lead the students astray to what is bad for the King of prussia, since, as is well known, one cannot trust learned people. if one wants to attend a lecture, then in order to pay the honorarium one must run back and forth five times between the Qvaestor and the instructor” (schepelern, “Filologen Caspar wilhelm smiths rejsebreve 1841–1845,” op. cit., p. 91). 45 Ibid., p. 111. From another letter it is clear that five of the Danes shared a flat—as viggo rothe also reported—just opposite smith’s. see ibid., p. 112. 46 ibid., p. 111. smith, who many times declares himself to be a Hegelian, was also a loyal auditor at werder’s lectures (see pp. 96f.). He also gives a few portrayals of Kierkegaard, who “went into spargnapani to drink a cup of philosophical chocolate and meditate undisturbed upon Hegel” (ibid., p. 111). these descriptions of Kierkegaard are found in Bruce H. Kirmmse’s Encounters with Kierkegaard, op. cit., pp. 58–9. 47 a section which appears here has been omitted from the present translation. the section treats J.a. Bornemann’s account of schelling’s lectures and J.p. mynster’s reaction. 44

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datings in Kierkegaard’s notes along with a few individual section headings. the actual text was apparently deemed by the editors, p.a. Heiberg and victor Kuhr, of insufficient interest to warrant wider publication. The notes were readily available at the Kierkegaard archive in Copenhagen’s royal library, and alois dempf called for their publication in 1957.48 His wish remained unfulfilled until 1962 when Eva Schlechta-Nordentoft first published them in their entirety, albeit in a German translation.49 this disgrace for danish Kierkegaard research was not corrected until 1970 when niels thulstrup published the entire set of notes in volume Xiii of the second edition of Søren Kierkegaards Papirer.50 they appeared again in 2001 as Notebook 11 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, with an improved text-critical dress with a philological account of the text, an introduction, and a more extensive commentary apparatus than before. Kierkegaard’s notes were certainly written with great effort. He himself writes about the first lecture: “Schelling has commenced, but amidst so much noise and bustle, whistling, and knocking on the windows by those who cannot get in the door, in such an overcrowded lecture hall, that one is almost tempted to give up listening to him if this is to continue,” and he adds: “i happened to sit between notable people— prof. werder and dr. gruppe.”51 Kierkegaard’s characterization of the immediate surroundings of the lecture can be supplemented by the many testimonies about

alois dempf, “Kierkegaard hört schelling,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch der GörresGesellschaft, vol. 65, 1957, pp. 147–61; p. 147. 49 nordentoft’s translation was printed in anton mirko Koktanek’s Schellings Seinslehre und Kierkegaard, munich: r. oldenbourg 1962, pp. 98–179. later it was reprinted in manfred Frank’s F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 391–467. 50 after this another 19 years passed before Howard v. Hong and edna H. Hong could present an english translation, which not only corrected some mistaken readings in thulstrup’s edition, but which it must also be said—in spite of Thulstrup’s sporadic efforts—was the first edition of Kierkegaard’s schelling notes with commentaries. the Hongs’ translation is found in volume 2 of Kierkegaard’s Writings, under the title, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, together with Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1989. 51 B&A, vol. 1, 77 / LD, letter 51, 97–8. the letter, which is dated 18 november 1841, was written to p.J. spang. no attempt has as yet been made to completely reconstruct who was present in schelling’s auditorium, but some of the best known names are listed in manfred Frank’s F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit. Joakim garff writes in his Søren Kierkegaard. A Biography (trans. by Bruce H. Kirmmse. princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2005, p. 209), “the auditorium in which, incidentally Karl marx also was sitting, trying to follow along as best he could.” this piece of information with all its polemical strength seems to rest on either free fantasy or heretofore unknown source material. see, for example, manfred Kliem’s otherwise credible study, Karl Marx und die Berliner Universität 1836 bis 1841, Berlin: Humboldt-universität 1988, which surveys marx’s studies at the university of Berlin, including also marx’s excerpts from steffens’ lectures on anthropology in 1837. if marx had been present, which he was not, then he would hardly have had any difficulty in understanding the lectures as Garff implies. See, for example, Helga Kuhnert’s dissertation, Materialistische Aspekte der Hegel-Kritik in der positiven Philosophie des späten Schelling, Frankfurt am main: dissertation: Fachbereich philosophie 1978. 48

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the lectures which have been collected by Helmut pölcher,52 Xavier tilliette53 and manfred Frank.54 it emerges from this material how the largest auditorium in the university was filled to bursting point: “290 Studenten haben nur Plätze bekommen können, außerdem nimmt die Blüthe der Professoren aus allen Fakultäten Antheil an seinen Vorlesungen. Sodann wurden noch allen 140 Stehplätze für Hospitanten vergeben.”55 the struggle for the last places to stand, the noise from the many people who could not come in, and the racket from the packed lecture hall presumably placed great demands on the concentration of those attempting to follow schelling’s lecture. it was in this atmosphere that Kierkegaard used two notebooks to write down what schelling said. His notes, which are primarily in danish, were then meticulously recopied when he returned to his apartment in Berlin. Kierkegaard’s notes consist of 40 entries, each of which reproduce an individual lecture of an hour’s duration,56 until 1 February 1842 when schelling began to lecture for two hours at a time.57 the last entry contains only the date of 4 February and thus suggests Kierkegaard gave up the time-consuming work of writing notes—not to mention of rewriting them at home. He continued to attend the lectures58 but returned to Copenhagen, setting off on 4 march before they were completed.59 the final lecture of Schelling’s course took place on Friday, 18 March and was celebrated

Helmut pölcher, “schellings auftreten in Berlin (1841) nach Hörerberichten,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, vol. 6, no. 3, 1954, pp. 193–215. 53 Xavier tilliette (ed.), Schelling im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen, turin: Bottega d’erasmo 1974, pp. 435–66. 54 see “anhang iii” in manfred Frank’s F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 495–581. 55 see adolf Hilgenfeld’s letter to his father (dated 15 november 1841), in which there is a picturesque description of the first lecture (published in Pölcher, “Schellings Auftreten in Berlin (1841) nach Hörerberichten,” op. cit., pp. 193–5; tilliette (ed.), Schelling im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen, op. cit., pp. 440f.; Frank, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 525f. 56 the lectures took place in the afternoon from 5:00–6:00 pm. 57 Kierkegaard thus notes in entry number 37, which he calls, following schelling’s chronology “37 and 38,” that schelling was lecturing two hours each time. thus Kierkegaard calls entry 38 “39 and 40,” while the next entry, that is, number 39, merely has the heading “41,” just as the last entry, which consists only of the date, is designated “42.” it must, however, be assumed that schelling continued his double lectures, while Kierkegaard merely gave up taking notes when he got to the 41st lecture. many of Kierkegaard’s letters witness a great irritation at the fact that schelling lectured for so long. see B&A, vol. 1, 103 / LD, letter 67, 132; B&A, vol. 1, 110 / LD, letter 70, 141. 58 in a letter to emil Boesen dated 6 February 1842 Kierkegaard writes, “i have completely given up on schelling. i merely listen to him, write nothing down either there or at home” (B&A, vol. 1, 107 / LD, letter 68, 138). 59 we know that Kierkegaard arrived in Copenhagen on 6 march and if we calculate the return trip to have lasted two days (as his trip to Berlin did), then he must have left Berlin on 4 march. 52

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by the students with a torchlight procession.60 at that time he had given in all 62 lectures.61 Kierkegaard’s notes are not critical and do not offer commentary. they merely attempt to record what was said, often with direct quotations. they thus tell us not Kierkegaard’s words and thoughts but schelling’s. what is interesting about Kierkegaard’s notes is therefore what he heard and not his opinion about what he heard. we know his opinion only from his letters and from the aforementioned entry from Notebook 8. a more precise characterization of the content of the notes, however, requires use of additional source material about schelling’s lectures in Berlin in winter semester 1841–42. there are several testimonies to the fact that schelling read from a manuscript, yet captivated his audience with his lively lecture style, which was often seasoned with pointed excursus. From the catalogue of his Nachlass which schelling dictated in 1853, we know that he hid the manuscript to the lectures on Philosophie der Offenbarung (1841–42),62 which was eventually lost during the second world war.63 it was, however, available to schelling’s son, Karl, when he published the second part of the Sämmtliche Werke shortly after his father’s death.64 the second section consists of two volumes of the Philosophie der Mythologie, followed by two volumes of the Philosophie der Offenbarung, of which only the third volume is of interest here. apart from the editor’s foreword and an extensive table of contexts, the third volume consists of two books, the first with the title Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begründung der positiven Philosophie (lectures 1–8, pp. 1–174) and then Der Philosophie der Offenbarung erster Theil (lectures 9–20, pp. 175–530). Karl schelling says in his foreword that schelling, both in 1841–42 and in 1844– 45, lectured on Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung, and he adds: “Die davon herrührenden Manuscripte wurden hier noch unter Beziehung eines dritten, Begründung der positiven Philosophie betitelten, angewendet.”65 the editor thus seems to have used all three manuscripts, and how far and to what extent the text in

Karl august varnhagen von ense writes in his diary on 18 march 1842: “Es wurde erzählt, Schelling habe heute seine Vorlesungen geschlossen, und ihm werde ein Fackelzug gebracht, der von obenher veranstaltet worden, und zu dem sich die Studenten immer willig finden” (quoted from tilliette, Schelling im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen, op. cit., p. 459). 61 this information is supplied by alois dempf, “Kierkegaard hört schelling,” op. cit., p. 147. After this Kierkegaard’s notes lack the final 20 lectures, but no information is given about whether these were one– or two–hour lectures. Between 4 February and 18 march there were 36 possible lecture days.—a few paragraphs which appear here have been omitted from the present translation. The most significant omission is an overview of the fourty lectures with corresponding dates and entry numbers in Kierkegaard’s notes. 62 schelling’s “Übersicht meines künftigen handschriftlichen nachlasses” is printed with commentaries by Horst Fuhrmans in “dokumente zur schellingforschung iv,” KantStudien, vol. 51, no. 1, 1959–60, pp. 14–26. 63 ibid., p. 20. 64 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämmtliche Werke, ed. by Karl schelling, part 2, stuttgart and augsburg: Cotta, vol. 1 (1856), vol. 2 (1857), vols. 3–4 (1858). 65 ibid., part 2, vol. 3, p. viii. 60

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Sämmtliche Werke expresses what was said in the lectures from 1841–42 is a question which can only be answered by comparing it with the surviving student notes. the most extensive and the best-known notes, which were possibly written by alexis schmidt,66 were published in 1843 by H.e.g. paulus in a work with the grandiose title, Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Entstehungsgeschichte, wörtlicher Text, Beurtheilung und Berichtigung der v. Schellingischen Entdeckungen über Philosophie überhaupt, Mythologie und Offenbarung des dogmatischen Christenthums im Berliner Wintercursus von 1841–42. Der allgemeinen Prüfung vorgelegt von Dr. H.E.G. Paulus. the notes to schelling’s lectures in this edition are divided into different chapters, accompanied by paulus’ verbose presentation and criticism of his philosophy. similarly, paulus added his critical remarks in brackets in the text itself in addition to numerous commentaries to it. if one removes—as manfred Frank has done67—paulus’ additions to the text, then one has the lecture notes themselves which do not seem particularly polemical or philosophically or theologically colored.68 the fact that schelling tried to prevent the publication of this edition can hardly come as a surprise,69 but we also know that schelling ascribed a certain, albeit negative, function to the paulus notes.70 a year earlier in 1842, Julius Frauenstädt had published a work which contained “eine stark paraphrastische Transskription” of schelling’s lectures.71 these, in conjunction with the paulus notes, and a series of lesser notes to individual lectures, combine to afford a good overview of schelling’s actual lectures in

see walter e. ehrhardt, “zum stand der schelling-Forschung,” in Hans Jörg sandkühler (ed.), F.W.J. Schelling, stuttgart: J.B. metzler 1998, p. 48. 67 manfred Frank prints only the notes in F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 87–325. 68 this is said merely to counter the well-known view according to which the notes contain both a theistic trace and a polemic against this. see, for example, walter e. ehrhardt, “zum stand der schelling-Forschung,” op. cit., p. 48. this assertion is certainly not documented, and here we keep to the text in manfred Frank’s edition. 69 schelling tried to sue paulus, but he lost the case in court. the legal documents were published by Julius eduard Hitzig in Vollständige Acten in der wider mich auf Denuntiation des Criminalgerichts zu Berlin eingeleiteten fiscalischen Untersuchung wegen angeblicher Beleidigung dieses Gerichts durch öffentliche Kritik einer von ihm in der SchellingPaulus’schen Angelegenheit erlassenen Verfügung, leipzig: weber 1844–45. 70 schelling notes himself about his manuscript from 1841–42: “Sonst versteht sich, daß dieses Manuscript durchaus verglichen, und nun bei der Haupthandschrift benützt werden müßte. Ob Zeit dazu gefunden wäre, den Paulus’schen Abdruck damit zu vergleichen und dessen Fälschungen oder Auslassungen bemerklich zu machen, steht dahin” (schelling, “Übersicht meines künftigen handschriftlichen nachlasses,” op. cit., p. 17). 71 Julius Frauenstädt, Schelling’s Vorlesungen in Berlin, Darstellung und Kritik der Hauptpunkte derselben, mit besonderer Beziehung auf das Verhältniß zwischen Christenthum und Philosophie, Berlin 1842. the notes found here on pp. 68–92 and pp. 130–41 are reprinted by manfred Frank, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 353–90. the aforementioned description of the Frauenstädt notes comes from manfred Frank, p. 46. 66

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1841–42.72 moreover, Horst Fuhrmans has further pointed out that the preussische staatsbibliothek Berlin houses a set of notes containing 216 pages, which future scholars must publish and introduce into the research, and the university library in erlangen purportedly contains a set of notes of the part of the lectures which were given after the Christmas break.73 By comparing the published student notes, one can conclude that the notes published by paulus as well as by Kierkegaard are generally reliable, although in individual cases one can always find individual misunderstandings and larger omissions. This of course lies in the nature of the genre. The first 21 of Paulus’ 35 thematically organized sections correspond to Kierkegaard’s 40 entries,74 and even if the paulus notes are almost twice as long as Kierkegaard’s,75 there is nothing to indicate that Kierkegaard skipped a lecture. with these two sets of notes, which on the whole do not contradict each other, we can agree with Karl schelling when he says that the text presented in Sämmtliche Werke is not identical to the manuscript from 1841–42,76 but it is also possible, with some degree of certainty, to point out parts of this text which were presumably the foundation for schelling’s actual lectures. although there are certain points of agreement in Kierkegaard’s entries 3–5 with schelling’s fourth lecture, the differences are so great that one cannot assume the Schelling text reflects the authentic manuscript in our context. By contrast, it seems reasonable to assume that schelling’s lectures 6–8, which conclude the introduction, these are found in “anhang i: auszüge aus anderen vorlesungsnachschriften und streitschriften,” in manfred Frank, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 327–467. 73 in his introduction to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie. Münchner Vorlesung WS 1832/33 und SS 1833 (turin: Bottega d’erasmo 1972), Horst Fuhrmans describes the two hand-written manuscripts as follows (p. 41): “Eine andere Nachschrift des Kollegs ist im Besitz der ehemaligen Preussischen Staatsbibliothek Berlin. (Ms. Germ. ort. 712), 216 Seiten. Nennt sich: ‘Die Philosophie der Offenbarung von Schelling. Vorgetragen zu Berlin im Winterhalbjahr 1841/42 Abschrift eines von Joh. Heinr. Koosen ausgearbeiteten Heftes. Adolf Peters.’ Die ‘Nachschrift’ gibt Schellings Vorlesung nur im grossen Zügen wieder. Den zweiten Teil dieser Vorlesung gibt uns eine recht genaue Nachschrift von Fr.L. Steinmeyer wieder, die im Besitz der Universitätsbibliothek Erlangen ist (Titel: ‘Schelling, über Offenbarungsphilosophie’); die Nachschrift ist ohne Jahrsangabe, Vergleiche aber zeigen, daβ es sich um den 2. Teil der 1. Berliner Vorlesung handelt, d.h. um alles, was Schelling nach den Weihnachtsferien im Januar 1842 vorgetragen hat.” 74 even if there are great differences between paulus’ notes and those of Kierkegaard, it has nonetheless been possible to work out a usable concordance. such a concordance can be found in Koktanek’s Schellings Seinslehre und Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 82, and in SKS K19, pp. 435–6. Both of these make use of the paulus edition from 1843, but the latter edition can be compared with this with the help of the concordance which is found in manfred Frank, F.W.J. Schelling: Philosophie der Offenbarung, op. cit., pp. 582–4. 75 in the paulus notes, the numbering begins with the second lecture since schelling’s inaugural lecture was printed as an introduction. in manfred Frank’s edition, Kierkegaard’s notes fill 77 pages, while the corresponding section containing the Paulus notes fills 137 pages. 76 see also Fuhrmans, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 41f. 72

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constitute the lecture manuscript, which Kierkegaard gives an account of in entries number 15–22. Further, schelling’s text from the middle of his 17th lecture up to and including the 19th lecture seem to be in agreement with Kierkegaard’s entries 35–39.77 anyone who wishes to gain an impression of the quality of the student notes can thus undertake a collation of the lectures in Sämmtliche Werke. i will not go further into these matters here but merely note that, in relation to schelling’s own outline, he had not finished with the introduction before Christmas, but had to give the 22nd lecture on 3 January before completing it! a more precise account of the content of schelling’s lectures in 1841–42 requires attention to recent scholarly developments with respect to his late philosophical system.78 in munich schelling had lectured and developed his system by means of a series of lectures consisting of four parts: the first is an introduction concerning the history of philosophy in which room is made for a new positive philosophy by means of a criticism of the rationalist and empiricist traditions. in the second lecture series there follows what is traditionally called “gottes- und schöpfungslehre.” the third part was the “philosophie der mythologie,” after which the lecture cycle was concluded with the “philosophie der offenbarung.” what schelling lectured on in Berlin in 1841–42 was thus a condensed version of the complete system, that is, the four successive parts.79 If one transfers these parts onto Kierkegaard’s notes, then one finds a general outline in three parts,80 since the notes stop in the middle of the “philosophie der mythologie”; Kierkegaard thus did not hear the lectures on the “philosophie der offenbarung.”81 The first difficulty which arises is to point out the precise transitions, partly because schelling, Kierkegaard and the paulus notes operate with different principles of division, and partly because the transitions are not sharp, but, on the since both the points of linguistic agreement and content are so great, the quoted passages in Sämmtliche Werke, part 2, vol. 3, are included in the concordance which is found in SKS K19, pp. 435f. But it is up to future Schelling research to confirm this result. 78 see Horst Fuhrmans’ aforementioned introduction, Xavier tilliette, Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir, vols. 1–2, paris: vrin 1970 [2nd ed., 1992], and ralf Borlinghaus’ aforementioned Neue Wissenschaft. Schelling und das Projekt einer positiven Philosophie. it should, however, be noted that the reconstruction of schelling’s philosophical development is in large part based on student notes, and since these are constantly being discovered and published, new discoveries in the philological survey are constantly happening. 79 Cf. Fuhrmans, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 40–42, where an account is given of the so-called “Berlin introduction,” which schelling is supposed to have conceived with a view to the Hegelian audience in Berlin. 80 there are, of course, other ways of dividing Kierkegaard’s notes. the organization which is found in Koktanek (op. cit., p. 82), is repeated with a few small deviations in niels thulstrup’s “Kierkegaard and schelling’s philosophy of revelation,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzels Boghandel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), p. 145. this can be compared with the organization by steen Brock and anders moe rasmussen, which follows the paulus notes and is printed in SKS K19, 423. 81 it is not clear when schelling began on “the philosophy of revelation,” but since Kierkegaard departed on 4 march he presumably did not hear this. 77

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contrary, evidence a systematic continuity. although it is tempting to regard the philosophical–historical introduction as extending to and including Kierkegaard’s entry 21, schelling’s own systematic division calls for the inclusion of entry number 22, which, with regard to content, is not reasonable; this must thus remain a matter of opinion. In what follows the first option is chosen solely due to pragmatic considerations; this division is also indicated in the paulus notes.82 Kierkegaard’s notes can thus be divided into the following parts: i. schelling’s introduction, including the inaugural lecture (entries 1–21); ii. “gottes- und schöpfungslehre” (entries 22–35); iii. “philosophie der mythologie” (entries 35–39).83 if we now make use of the thematic chapter headings which are found in the paulus notes,84 then with respect to the long philosophical–historical introduction, Kierkegaard heard the following lectures prior to Christmas: i. ii. iii.

allgemeine einleitung. die prinzipien der vernunftwissenschaft. Betrachtung über die allgemeine natur und den schlusspunkt der reinen vernunftwissenschaft. iv. schellings rückblick auf die identitätsphilosophie. v. schelling über Hegel und die identitätsphilosophie. vi. negative und positive philosophie schon in der geschichte der philosophie. vii. Über die verschiedene stellung der rationalen und der positiven philosophie zum empirismus. viii. Kant’s antithetik der reinen vernunft; nach v. schelling. iX. Über das bestimmte verhältnis der beiden philosophien. X. Übergang zur positiven philosophie. Beneath these headings is hidden, among other things, a presentation of the classical philosophical distinction between what something is and that it is. on the one hand, schelling shows how “what”-philosophy is actually negative, and how it is articulated in traditional rationalist systems, including how it is constituted in the philosophy of identity, founded by schelling himself, and how Hegel developed this one side of philosophy to the point that he ultimately believed that it was all of thus it is noted after the end of the tenth chapter in the paulus notes from 1843, p. 440: “Dies war der Schluss der v. Schellingischen Vorlesungen vor Weihnach 1841. Die Hälfte des mit hochgespannten Erwartungen eröffneten Wintercursus war vorbei; und was hatten bis dahin die aus allen gebildeten Classen wissbegierig Herzugekommenen erhalten?” this is not included in manfred Frank’s edition. 83 Kierkegaard writes at the end of entry number 35: “Here is the place where the transition from philosophy to mythology must be made.” this corresponds to section XiX in the paulus notes: “skizze der philosophie der mythologie.” 84 in what follows the chapter headings are used from manfred Frank’s more easily adapted version; likewise, the numeration of chapters from this edition is used. in the paulus notes from 1843 Chapter 8 appears twice; this is corrected in Frank’s edition. 82

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philosophy. on the other hand, a criticism is given of traditional empiricism, whose unmediated “that-ness” cannot count as true positivity. in his confrontation with the metaphysical positions of the tradition, Schelling thus negatively defines a space for his positive philosophy, primarily through a brief sketch of the doctrine of potency. His auditors’ notes suggest his extensive criticisms of Hegel awakened the sympathy of the auditorium, but these criticisms could nevertheless only really be evaluated after schelling revealed the content of his own positive philosophy. there were thus high expectations for schelling’s resumption after the Christmas vacation. in the 14 lectures of the second part, which were given from 3–29 January 1842, Kierkegaard then heard “gottes- und schöpfungslehre,” which, according to the paulus notes, consisted of the following: Xi. Xii.

schellings Fortsetzung seiner positiven philosophie.85 das “unvordenkliche sein” und die möglichkeit, von ihm aus weiter zu schreiten. Xiii. wie gott durch den prozeß ein von ihm verschiedenes sein in wirklichkeit setzte.86 Xiv. das endziel der schöpfung. Xv. Über den Begriff des monotheismus. Xvi. die dreieinigkeit, auf weitere entwicklung des theogonischen prozesses hinweisend. Xvii. die potenzen werden persönlichkeiten. der theogonische prozeß. Xviii. die entstehung der außergöttlichen welt. veränderungen im theogonischen prozeß. in connection with his doctrine of potency schelling introduced “das unvordenkliche Seyn”87 and the basic features of his concept of god. Here schelling enumerates god’s properties, particularly in His capacity as creator; schelling presents forms for and instances of monotheism (pantheism, theism, “atheism”), and here the doctrine of potency offers a foundation for the speculative development of the Christian dogma of the trinity. although Kierkegaard did not hear schelling’s last part, “philosophie this quite short chapter in paulus concludes with the words: “Nunmehr beginnt uns der allgemeine Teil der positiven Philosophie,” which seems to refer to the first part. It is clear from this section, as noted above concerning the dating of the paulus notes, that the Christmas vacation took place after Chapter 10. 86 this chapter corresponds to the third section in Kierkegaard’s entry 26, where he writes: “now we come to something new” (SKS 19, 342, not11:26 / SLB, 382). 87 In a letter to his 15 year old nephew Michael Lund, dated 16 January 1842, one finds the following obscure joke: “your letter has arrived safely, and i am beginning my reply on this page because an artist has let das unvordenkliche Seyn, das allem Denken zuvorkommt, precede. as you probably do not understand what i mean, please be good enough to show this quotation to uncle peter and tell him that it is Geheimeraad schelling’s favorite expression and that i hope that on the basis of this he will be able to imagine the progress s. believes he has made beyond the philosophy of identity” (B&A, vol. 1, 98f. / LD, letter 63, 127). 85

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der offenbarung,” he nevertheless received an excellent overview of schelling’s theology. In the last five lectures covered by the notes, Kierkegaard heard the following from the “philosophie der mythologie”: XiX. XX. XXi.

skizze der philosophie der mythologie. die epochen des mythologischen prozesses. Über die griechischen mysterien.

Kierkegaard’s notes manage to sketch the basic principles in the “philosophie der mythologie” and the basic features of the epochs in the mythological process. in entry 41 the notes stop in the middle of the presentation of the greek mysteries, during—according to the Paulus notes—an analysis of the significance of Orpheus. the short length of the entry suggests Kierkegaard discontinued his notes in the middle of a lecture. III. Kierkegaard after Schelling However, since i have nothing to go by except my own opinion, it is not feasible to pursue this subject further.88

When Kierkegaard returned from Berlin, he concentrated first and foremost on completing Either/Or, which appeared on 20 February 1843. during the same period he began the philosophical satire, Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est, in which schelling shines in his absence. although this project capsized, it furnished Kierkegaard with reflections about the category of repetition. In May 1843 he again traveled to Berlin for a one-month stay.89 returning from his second trip, he brought with him a first draft of Repetition along with parts of Fear and Trembling, both of which appeared on 16 october 1843. afterwards Kierkegaard began work on his text most influenced by Schelling, The Concept of Anxiety. But before completing the final chapter of this work, he wrote Philosophical Fragments in the fall of 1844. the two works appeared in the middle of summer of the same year.90 in the short polemical work Prefaces, which appeared on the same day as The SKS 4, 328n / CA, 21n. this passage is quoted in its entirety below. in Henrik Blicher’s “Critical account of the text” to Gjentagelsen in SKS K4, 14, he notes that Kierkegaard had planned this trip for a year and a half; this is presumably based on a confusion between this trip and the first trip to Berlin. Kierkegaard took two further trips to Berlin: after the publication of Stages on Life’s Way he took his third trip to Berlin from 13–24 may 1845; a year later from 2 or 3 may until 16 may, he was in Berlin for the last time. although in august of 1847 he had considered “a proper journey abroad” (SKS 20, 186, nB2:113 / JP 5, 6035), nothing ever came of this. although schelling was still lecturing, Kierkegaard seems not to have had the time or the interest for university lectures during his later trips to Berlin. 90 Philosophical Fragments and The Concept of Anxiety appeared on, respectively, 13 and 17 June 1844. For an account of the genesis of this text, see the “Critical account of 88 89

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Concept of Anxiety, and the massive Stages on Life’s Way, which appeared on 30 april the following year, schelling seems to play no role, in any case not any explicit one.91 with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which appeared on 28 February 1846, Kierkegaard returned to what he had already considered in his original draft to Philosophical Fragments, and consolidated his authorship up to that point. in this period of hardly four years, Kierkegaard thus produced eight books. in addition, there are seven works, which together contain 21 discourses, which we can omit with respect to the issue of the immediate Schelling influence.92 alongside these published works Kierkegaard wrote, during the same period, a series of journals and notebooks, some of which contain allusions to schelling. in the works after 1846 there are no explicit references to schelling, although the extent to which his influence is present in, for example, The Sickness unto Death (1849) is of course an open question.93 How much of an influence Schelling had on Kierkegaard’s thought is difficult to adjudicate. in what follows we will attempt a partial answer by casting a glance at the immediate contemporary reception of schelling’s Berlin lectures and Kierkegaard’s relation to these reactions. What is of interest in the first instance is thus what we would call in the narrow sense Kierkegaard’s studies related to schelling. then we will trace the actual explicit references to schelling found in Kierkegaard’s works, that is, we will attempt to give an overview of the places in Kierkegaard’s works, journals and notebooks where schelling is named directly. A. Kierkegaard’s Reception of Schelling Kierkegaard’s book collection contained a number of schelling’s works. we can only guess at when he bought them, but since, as noted above, there is no evidence of interest in Schelling prior to his first stay in Berlin, it can be cautiously assumed that he bought them during or after his trips there. the books include Becker’s translation of Cousin from 1834,94 which contains schelling’s almost epoch-making foreword, which, however, is never discussed by Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard also owned schelling’s Philosophische Schriften from 1809, which contains, among the text” by Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup as well as that by søren Bruun in SKS K4, 181–94, 317–32. 91 it can always be discussed to what degree Kierkegaard with the expression, “Kant’s honest way” in Stages on Life’s Way (SKS 6, 142.25 / SLW, 152), alludes to schelling’s “den ehrlichen Weg Kants” in the Freiheitsschrift. see F.W.J. Schelling’s philosophische Schriften, vol. 1, landshut: Krüll 1809, p. 393. But there are no explicit references to schelling. 92 the 18 edifying discourses appeared in three collections in, respectively, 1843 and 1844, while Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions appeared on 29 april 1845. 93 see michael theunissen’s Der Begriff Verzweiflung. Korrekturen an Kierkegaard (Frankfurt an main: suhrkamp 1993, p. 19), where using as point of departure Kierkegaard’s distinction between the first and the second ethics in the Introduction to The Concept of Anxiety, the author writes, “In der geheimen Systematik der Schriften Kierkegaards nimmt die Krankheit zum tode die Stelle einer zweiten Ethik ein, deren Einordnung ins Ganze dem Vorbild der zweiten, der positiven Philosophie Schellings folgt.” 94 ASKB 471.

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other things, the only edition of schelling’s Freiheitsschrift which existed during Kierkegaard’s lifetime.95 the Freiheitsschrift has been the traditional focus of later research on Kierkegaard’s relation to schelling. the book collection also includes Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums,96 which Kierkegaard may have purchased in connection with marheineke’s lectures, where this work is discussed several times. there is also a second edition of the dialogue Bruno from 1842,97 a work which schelling himself includes in his 12th lecture. it can hardly be surprising that Kierkegaard also bought Schelling’s first lecture in Berlin,98 and that he later immediately after its publication in 1846 purchased steffens’ Nachgelassene Schriften with schelling’s foreword.99 By contrast, it is perhaps surprising that Kierkegaard had not purchased the important work System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800), which schelling, among other things, takes up in the seventh lecture, or the important treatise, “darstellung meines systems der philosophie” from 1801, which is alluded to in the tenth lecture, but may not have been widely available.100 one could probably also have expected to find Philosophie und Religion (1804), which appears in the 12th lecture, and which plays an important role in the early danish schelling reception. similarly, one can only be amazed at the absence of Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen, des Herrn Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi und der ihm in derselben gemachten Beschuldigung, eines absichtlich täuschenden, Lüge redenden Atheismus (1812), which was presumably discussed in the 14th lecture, and which indeed discusses an author and a work, with which Kierkegaard was intimately acquainted. we can also take ad notam that Kierkegaard was not attracted by the analyses of mythology and philosophy of religion in Ueber die Gottheiten von Samothrake (1815). Kierkegaard presumably bought and read a number of books during his first stay in Berlin, but we only know with some certainty that he bought Karl rosenkranz’s

F.w.J. schelling, Philosophische Schriften, vol. 1, landshut: Krüll 1809. ASKB 763. this volume, which never saw a sequel, contains the following works: 1. “vom ich als prinzip der philosophie, oder über das unbedingte im menschlichen wissen” (1795); 2. “philosophische Briefe über dogmatismus und Kriticismus” (1795); 3. “abhandlungen zur erläuterung des idealismus der wissenschaftslehre” (1796); 4. “ueber das verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu der natur. eine akademische rede” (1807); 5. “philosophische untersuchungen über das wesen der menschlichen Freyheit und die damit zusammenhängenden gegenstände” (1809). in his lectures in Berlin schelling refers only once (namely in lecture 14) to the second of these treatises. 96 F.w.J. schelling, Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums, 3rd ed., stuttgart and tübingen: Cotta 1830 (ASKB 764). Kierkegaard never refers to this work. 97 F.w.J. schelling, Bruno oder: Über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge, 2nd ed., Berlin: reimer 1842 [1802] (ASKB 765). Kierkegaard never refers to this work. 98 F.w.J. schelling, Schelling’s erste Vorlesung in Berlin, 15. November 1841, stuttgart: Cotta 1841 (ASKB 767). Kierkegaard never refers to this work. 99 Nachgelassene Schriften von H. Steffens mit einem Vorworte von Schelling, Berlin: e.H. schroeder 1846 (ASKB 799). 100 this was printed in the Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik, ed. by schelling, vols. 1–2, Jena and leipzig: gabler 1800–1801; vol. 2, no. 2, pp. iii–xiv, 1–127. 95

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Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems,101 which contains articles about the new schellingianism of the 1830s, and that, with the purchase of adolph Helfferich’s Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen,102 he apparently studied Christian mysticism, an interest which certainly is not foreign to schelling. However, it also appears reasonable that Kierkegaard would have immediately bought the second volume of Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, which appeared in december 1841. michelet’s introduction to this work contains a number of polemical diatribes against schelling, for which reason Kierkegaard and many others at the time expected that schelling would reply from the lectern.103 in the period from 1842–46 schelling’s Berlin lectures were zealously discussed in newspapers, journals, and various other works, which were typically polemical writings.104 it is not known how familiar Kierkegaard was with this literature, but some individual works were certainly significant for him. Critical works published in

Karl rosenkranz, Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems, Königsberg: Bornträger 1840 (ASKB 745). on the inside cover of Kierkegaard’s personal copy, it is written: “s. Kierkegaard. Berlin novb. 41.” Kierkegaard used this work immediately while working on Either/Or (see Pap. iii B 41.9—with reference to this work, pp. 308f.); in the same place there is also included a later note to Philosophical Fragments (see Pap. v B 14, pp. 71). 102 adolph Helfferich, Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen, vols. 1–2, gotha: perthes 1842 (ASKB 571–572). On the inside cover to the first volume of Kierkegaard’s personal copy, he wrote, “s. Kierkegaard. Berlin 1842.” 103 g.w.F. Hegel, Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, vols. 1–3, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840–45 (ASKB 561–563). in a letter to spang dated 8 January 1842 Kierkegaard writes: “the second volume of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia has just been published, and michelet has taken the liberty of writing a preface without showing it to the society. in it he attacks schelling fairly sharply. this occurred just before Christmas. i had expected schelling, who is very polemical in his lectures, to drop a few remarks about him, but this has not happened” (B&A, vol. 1, 92 / LD, letter 61, 118). 104 a few articles can be mentioned here: From the Zeitschrift für Philosophie und speculative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Chrsitian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al: eduard weber et al. 1837–46 (ASKB 877–911), one can mention C.H. weiße, “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart” (vol. 3, 1841, pp. 254–304), i.H. Fichte’s series of articles, “die philosophische litteratur der gegenwart,” of which the fifth article (vol. 5, 1842, pp. 93–149) reviews Schellings erste Vorlesung in Berlin, and the seventh article, reviews alexis schmidt’s aforementioned work on schelling (vol. 11, 1843, pp. 43–128). Finally, from this journal one can also mention J.u. wirth, “ueber den Begriff gottes, als princip der philosophie, mit rücksicht auf das Hegel’sche und neu-schelling’sche system” (vol. 11, 1843, pp. 234–92). From the Deutsche Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Kunst there is arnold ruge’s extensive review of engels’ anonymous works, Schelling und die Offenbarung (1842, no. 126 (29 may) to no. 128 (31 may)) and Schelling, der Philosoph in Christo (1842, begun in no. 129 (1 June), completed in no. 150 (25 June)) as well as Jules elysard, “die reaction in deutschland” (1842, begun in no. 247 (17 october), completed in no. 251 (21 october)). see also the register of articles in alfred estermann, Inhaltsanalytische Bibliographien deutscher Kulturzeitschriften des 19. Jahrhunderts, vols. 1–3, munich: saur 1995–96. 101

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1842 included two anonymous texts by Johann Karl glaser and Friedrich engels.105 Kierkegaard presumably did not read these, but he nevertheless knew some of them indirectly since they appear in a work by marheineke, which we will return to. a more sympathetic presentation of Schelling’s first lecture course was presented the same year by gotthilf Heine in Jahrbuch der deutschen Universitäten,106 but there is no trace of it in Kierkegaard. although Kierkegaard—in his later years and possibly in connection with the blooming interest in schopenhauer—was occupied with Julius Frauenstädt, as is evidenced by his book collection,107 nonetheless nothing indicates that he ever read Frauenstädt’s Schellings Vorlesungen in Berlin,108 which contains notes to schelling’s lectures. similarly, Kierkegaard nowhere mentions H.e.g. paulus’ extensive work from 1843 with the aforementioned notes; the same thing is true of the not uninteresting work of the presumed author of the notes, alexis schmidt.109 By contrast, Kierkegaard purchased in 1843, immediately after its publication, philipp marheineke’s Zur Kritik der Schellingschen Offenbarungsphilosophie, which

see Johann Karl glaser’s anonymous work, Differenz der Schelling’schen und Hegel’schen Philosophie, vol. 1, 1. abtheilung, leipzig: otto wigand 1842, which ends with the words (p. 209): “Als Resultat dieser Untersuchung also ergiebt sich: ‘Schelling hat kein neues Blatt in der Geschichte der Philosophie aufgeschlagen!”; Friedrich engels’ anonymous piece, Schelling, der Philosoph in Christo oder die Verklärung der Weltweisheit zur Gottesweisheit. Für gläubige Christen denen der philosophische Sprachgebrauch unbekannt ist, Berlin: eyssenhardt 1842, in which schelling’s biblical exegesis is taken up for polemical treatment, and engels’ anonymous Schelling und die Offenbarung. Kritik des neuesten Reaktionsversuchs gegen die freie Philosophie, leipzig: Binder 1842, which contains a critical presentation of schelling’s philosophy, including an account of the Berlin lectures. to this one can also add Karl alexander von reichlin-meldegg, Bedenken eines Süddeutschen Krebsfeindes über Schellings erste Vorlesung in Berlin (15. November 1841), Stuttgart, Cottaische Buchhandlung 1841, in Form eines offenen Sendschreibens an Herrn Geheimrath von Schelling in Berlin, stuttgart: Cast 1842. 106 gotthilf Heine, “schelling in Berlin” in Heinrich wuttke, Jahrbuch der deutschen Universitäten, vol. 2, “winterhalbjahr 1842–43,” leipzig: weidmann 1842, pp. 1–24. 107 Julius Frauenstädt, Die Menschwerdung Gottes nach ihrer Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit, Berlin: voss’sche Buchhandlung 1839 (ASKB 514); Briefe über die Schopenhauer’sche Philosophie, leipzig: Brockhaus 1854 (ASKB 515); Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluss auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: Brockhaus 1855 (ASKB 516). 108 Julius Frauenstädt, Schellings Vorlesungen in Berlin: Darstellung und Kritik der Hauptpunkte derselben mit besonderer Beziehung auf das Verhältniß zwischen Christenthum und Philosophie, Berlin: Hirschwald 1842. 109 alexis schmidt’s work, Beleuchtung der neuen Schellingschen Lehre von Seiten der Philosophie und Theologie: Nebst Darstellung und Kritik der früheren Schellingschen Philosophie, und seiner Apologie der Metaphysik, insbesondere der Hegelschen gegen Schelling und Trendelenburg, Berlin: athenaeum 1843, is a compact treatise of 342 pages, which presents a sympathizing or “impartial” discussion of schelling’s account of positive philosophy. 105

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he soon after used in The Concept of Anxiety.110 this work begins with a critical evaluation of schelling’s most recent philosophy; before discussing the categories he uses, and concluding with a general evaluation of the result of his efforts. another author whom Kierkegaard had an eye on was the Hegelian Carl ludwig michelet,111 but he does not appear to have given michelet’s extensive criticism of schelling from 1843 any attention.112 in 1843 the contemporary schelling reception was enriched further by a handful of works,113 just as in the following years there came more.114 But since there is nothing to indicate that Kierkegaard was acquainted with these works, marheineke, Zur Kritik der Schellingschen Offenbarungsphilosophie. Schluß der öffentlichen Vorlesungen über die Bedeutung der hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie, Berlin: enslin 1843 (ASKB 647). see Kierkegaard’s reference in The Concept of Anxiety (SKS 4, 364n / CA, 59n). schelling is also constantly present in marheineke’s Einleitung in die öffentlichen Vorlesungen über die Bedeutung der Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie (Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1842), which, however, is not mentioned by Kierkegaard. marheineke published only the beginning and the end of his lecture series, which took place over two semesters. 111 Kierkegaard owned a copy of C.l. michelet, Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Berlin: dümmler 1841 (ASKB 680). 112 in michelet’s Entwickelungsgeschichte der neuesten Deutschen Philosophie mit besonderer Rücksicht auf den gegenwärtigen Kampf Schellings mit der Hegelschen Schule. Dargestellt, in Vorlesungen an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin im Sommerhalbjahre 1842, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1843, he issues a Hegelian criticism against schelling; especially in the seventh and eighth lectures there is a thorough criticism of the late philosophy of schelling with particular reference to the Berlin lectures. 113 see emil Ferdinand vogel’s work, Schelling oder Hegel oder keiner von Beyden? Ein Separat-Votum über die Eigenthümlichkeiten der neueren deutschen Philosophie mit besonderer Beziehung auf die, vom Herrn GH. Prof. D. Friedrich Jacob Fries zu Jena in seiner ‘Geschichte der Philosophie’ neuerlich hierüber ausgesprochenen Ansichten, leipzig: Rein Verlag der Reinischen Buchhandlung 1843, which, however, does not specifically treat the late schelling. see also the anonymous piece, Schellings Offenbarungsphilosophie und die von ihm bekämpfte Religionsphilosophie Hegels und der Junghegelianer: drei Briefe, Berlin: verlag von Julis springer 1843, in which the philosophy of religion of the late schelling is compared with that of Hegel. see also Christian Kapp, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Tages von einem vieljährigen Beobachter, leipzig: verlag von otto wigand 1843; and not least of all Conrad von orelli, Spinozas Leben und Lehre. Nebst einem Abrisse der Schellingschen und Hegelschen Philosophie, aarau: sauerländer 1843, whose presentation of the philosophy of the late schelling after 1841 builds on Frauenstädt’s account, and which contains, among other things, the chapters: “schelling’s und Hegel’s verfahren gegen spinoza,” pp. 165–94, “schellings philosophie (anhang: Über den neu-schellingianismus),” pp. 262–92, and “schluß-vergleichungen (schelling—Hegel— spinoza),” pp. 357–84. 114 see especially marechal marquis de saldanha, Extrait d’un ouvrage du Marechal Marquis de Saldanha sur la philosophie de Schelling (vienna: p.p. mechitaristen 1845) and the anonymous work, Die Grundlehren der Neu-Schelling’schen und der Hegel’schen Philosophie in ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehung. Ein Beitrag zur objektiven Würdigung beider Philosophien, reutlingen: enßlin und laiblin 1847, in which, using as the point of departure the paulus notes, the author makes a comparision between schelling’s and Hegel’s account of god and creation. 110

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we must pass them by without comment, to consider the work which appears to have meant the most for Kierkegaard’s general appropriation of schelling’s writings. we have mentioned above how Kierkegaard in Berlin read the versatile author Karl Rosenkranz. Rosenkranz published two works on Schelling in 1843, first, Ueber Schelling und Hegel: Ein Sendschreiben an Pierre Leroux, which Kierkegaard does not discuss anywhere, and second, the classic monograph Schelling,115 which Kierkegaard bought immediately and read carefully. rosenkranz’s monograph on schelling gives an account of schelling’s philosophical development in his published works, which he goes through work by work. the late schelling is given less consideration since this material had yet to be published. in some of the places where Kierkegaard refers to schelling’s works, for example, in The Concept of Anxiety, and a number of journal entries, rosenkranz is named explicitly as the source. there is thus no doubt that Kierkegaard had received a large part of his knowledge of schelling’s works, including the Freiheitsschrift, by means of rosenkranz. the question then is whether it can be proven that Kierkegaard read schelling’s own texts. this is of course an important question since large parts of the research on Kierkegaard’s relation to schelling rest on the immediate assumption that Kierkegaard had an intimate first-hand knowledge of at least Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift. B. The Explicit References to Schelling although Kierkegaard worked on Either/Or at the same time he was attending schelling’s lectures, there is amazingly little schelling to be found in Kierkegaard’s first large pseudonymous work. There is only one explicit reference, namely, in “The esthetic validity of marriage,” where there is talk of the dialectical and historical development of the aesthetically beautiful as a movement from the categories of time to space: “This constitutes the transition and the significance of the transition from sculpture to painting, as schelling early pointed out.”116 Commentators have identified this as alluding to Schelling’s lecture, “Ueber das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu der natur.”117 Kierkegaard might have read this work, which he owned, and could have had in mente while he was working out the other parts of Either/Or, but it is also possible that his vague reference originated from some other source. apart from this reference, the commentators—until now—have only found two more or less probable allusions.118 as an oddity, one can mention that Kierkegaard rosenkranz (ed.), Schelling. Vorlesungen, gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: gerhard 1843 (ASKB 766). according to the bookstore’s receit, Kierkegaard bought this book on 30 april 1843. 116 SKS 3, 135 / EO2, 136. 117 see SKS K2–3, p. 295, where reference is made to F.W.J. Schelling’s philosophische Schriften, vol. 1, landshut: Krüll 1809 (ASKB 763, pp. 364f.). 118 the one allusion is the famous diapsalme: “what philosophers say about actuality [Virkelighed] is often just as disappointing as it is when one reads on a sign in a second-hand shop: pressing done Here. if a person were to bring his clothes to be pressed, he would be duped, for the sign is merely for sale” (SKS 2, 41 / EO1, 32). this has of course occasioned commentators to think of Kierkegaard’s aforementioned entry in Notebook 8 about schelling’s 115

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later—we do not know when—noted the following in his copy of Either/Or to the heading “actiones in distans” in “the seducer’s diary”: “see p. viii of the preface to the volume of schelling published by rosenkrantz in 1843.”119 in rosenkranz’s work one finds an association of Schelling’s late philosophy and Schopenhauer’s use of “eine ideelle actio in distans.” Before Kierkegaard traveled to Berlin the first time he had, in connection with his master’s thesis, studied thoroughly many of plato’s dialogues, particularly those which best reflected the historical Socrates. After his stay in Berlin, Kierkegaard began a systematic appropriation of the history of philosophy. He read not only a number of plato’s late dialogues, but, with the help of tennemann’s already classic Geschichte der Philosophie (1798–1819), he also read aristotle, stoicism and skepticism. it is worth noting, with regard to his relation to schelling, that he appears to have ignored scholastic metaphysics. However, he continued his studies of, among others, descartes, spinoza and leibniz by going directly to the primary sources. in an excerpt from around 1842–43 of the section on aristotle in tennemann, found in Notebook 13, Kierkegaard discusses the so-called πρωτη φιλοσοφια, by which he means that both aristotle and the more recent philosophy confuse ontology with theology. in the margin he notes: “in Berlin schelling maintained that logic ought to be πρωτη φιλοσοφια. See my manuscript.”120 the aristotelian distinction between a first and a second philosophy plays an essential role in Schelling’s lectures, and it is interesting to speculate on whether Kierkegaard’s newly awakened interest in the classics of philosophy may have been inspired by schelling. perhaps schelling’s introduction to the history of philosophy convinced Kierkegaard that he himself had to look into the matter. a central theme in Kierkegaard’s philosophical studies is the question of “movement” and its relation to thought, which also means, to logic, the immanent system. this theme is played out in several of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, for the first time in earnest in Repetition. in this short work there are no direct references to Schelling, and the commentators have not even managed to find any allusions. in his treatise, “the astronomical year,” which appeared in 1844 in Urania, Johan ludvig Heiberg has a long discussion of Repetition, in which he rebukes its author for attempting to apply “movement” to “the sphere of spirit,” which, according to Heiberg, is a concept from the philosophy of nature.121 Heiberg’s condescension immediately set Kierkegaard to work on a satirical response, which, although he wrote several pages, was never published. what is interesting in our context is that schelling seems to play a role in these unpublished drafts. second lecture, where mention is made of the relation of philosophy to “actuality” (SKS 19, 235, not8:33 / JP 5, 5535). the second reference is somewhat thinner; it appears in a passage in “the esthetic validity of marriage,” where mention is made of “a drama the deity is writing” (SKS 3, 136 / EO2, 137), which has led the commentators to think of a passage in schelling’s System des transcendentalen Idealismus, tübingen: Cotta 1800, pp. 436f. 119 Pap. iv a 232 / EO1, supplement, 558. 120 SKS 19, 394, not13:27a. / JP 5, 5599. 121 this treatise is reprinted in Johan ludvig Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 8, pp. 51–130; pp. 70f.

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Kierkegaard writes that the movement from possibility to actuality cannot be understood in the realm of logic, but only in the “sphere of freedom,” a point which aristotle already understood: in all of schelling’s philosophy, movement likewise plays a major role, not only in the philosophy of nature (stricte sic dicta), but also in the philosophy of spirit, in his whole conception of freedom. what gives him the greatest trouble is precisely this, to include movement. But it is also to his credit that he wanted to include it, not in the ingenious sense in which it later gained a place in logic in Hegelian philosophy and where it added to the confusion by signifying too much in logic and too little outside of it. But i must admit that there are very many problems remaining here.122

in another draft to the same section he writes: thus movement plays a major role in the whole schellingian philosophy, not only in his philosophy of nature (in the stricter sense), but also in his philosophy of spirit. so, also, in his treatise on freedom, in which he constantly struggles to include movement, partly through the use of Jacob Böhme’s terminology and partly by means of his own neologisms.123

one can probably conclude from these passages that schelling was one of Kierkegaard’s philosophical “concerns,” but it remains an open question to what extent Kierkegaard’s presentation here rests on a direct study of schelling’s Freiheitsschrift or whether he depends on the presentation given by rosenkranz.124 although schelling seems to be absent in Fear and Trembling, this work nevertheless provided an occasion for Kierkegaard to recall schelling. KofoedHansen in his book-review of Either/Or distinguished between, on the one hand, “the old-time Christianity” and “cobbler morality,” preached in the churches and, on the other, an up-to-date Christianity, capable of appeasing contemporary reflection and appealing to the educated people of the day.125 mynster found this highly objectionable. in 1844 he wrote in Heiberg’s Intelligensblade an article with the title “Church polemic,”126 in which he mentioned Fear and Trembling, which Kofoed-Hansen had also reviewed,127 in order to demonstrate that Kierkegaard did not approve of this distinction. mynster writes: thus, this struggle under fear and trembling does not have the least thing in common with the pleasing pandering with which the moral geniuses seek to demonstrate that they have not read Schelling in vain, by claiming that they are also able “einzig, göttlich zu Pap. iv B 117, 290 / R, Supplement, 310 (translation slightly modified). Pap. iv B 118.7 / R, Supplement, 322 (translation slightly modified). 124 in connection with the second passage the commentator in Søren Kierkegaards Papirer refers to Philosophische Schriften, pp. 397ff., but the information found in rosenkranz, pp. 307f., might well be as sufficient as a source. 125 see For Literatur og Kritik, vol. 1, odense: J. milo 1843, pp. 377–405; pp. 384f. 126 the article is reprinted in mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1852–53, vol. 1, pp. 461–73 (ASKB 358–363) [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandling 1855–57]. 127 see For Literatur og Kritik, vol. 2, pp. 373–91. 122 123

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handlen.” indeed, certainly no decent person will imitate them as “einzig,” and perhaps the crowd, which above all does not want to have morality in common with the simple citizenry, will call to them with a “Göttlich!” but with this they will be all the farther away from acting “divinely” [gudeligt].128

we know with certainty that Kierkegaard studied mynster’s article; among other things, he later alludes to a quotation from Jacobi, which mynster cites in the passage above. what is interesting, however, is that the theme mynster hits on in his article suddenly emerges in several places in Kierkegaard. in his copy of Jacobi’s Werke Kierkegaard, for example, underlined the following passage and wrote a question mark in the margin: “Der Glaube ist nicht, wie die Wissenschaft, Jedermanns Ding, das heiβt, nicht Jedwedem, der sich nur gehörig anstrengen will, mittheilbar.”129 at the foot of the same page he further notes: “and so faith again becomes only a matter of genius which is reserved for the individual, just like schelling’s genius for action. expressions of this sort often slip in when a total world-view is being forged.”130 this “genius for action” emerges again in The Concept of Anxiety.131 in 1843–44 Kierkegaard made two more explicit references to schelling in Journal JJ. In the first, he discusses the Aristotelian claim that God moves everything but is himself unmoved; to this he adds: “so far as i can remember, schelling pointed this out in Berlin.”132 indeed, schelling did note this in the 13th lecture in Berlin. in the second entry Kierkegaard writes: “In the Hegelian school, the system is a fiction similar to the one Schelling brought to the world in ‘the infinite epic,’ which in its time was quite successful.”133 The expression “the infinite epic” does not come from schelling himself but is found in rosenkranz’s edition, where Kierkegaard could have read schelling cited for “die Odyssee des Geistes.”134 as noted above, The Concept of Anxiety contains more references to schelling than any of Kierkegaard’s other works, but it is an open question whether these references result from Kierkegaard’s first–hand study of Schelling’s works, particularly his Freiheitsschrift, or, as emanuel Hirsch suggested long ago, whether Kierkegaard’s knowledge of this work by Schelling was filtered through the aforementioned work by rosenkranz.135 Certainly, the idea for The Concept of Anxiety itself did not come from Schelling. One finds an entry from as early as 1837 in Journal BB, which testifies to the early discovery of this set of themes in Kierkegaard, and in Journal JJ one can read an entry from 1842 about how the set of themes has now been mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 467. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Werke, vols. 1–6, leipzig: Fleischer 1812–25, vol. 4, 1, p. Xliv (ASKB 1722–1728). this is in Jacobi’s preface to the entire volume, which contains primarily Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelsohn. 130 Pap. v C 13.4 / JP 2, 1114 (translation modified). 131 SKS 4, 416. 132 see SKS 18, 192, JJ:160 / JP 2, 1332. 133 see SKS 18, 200, JJ:187 / JP 2, 1604. 134 rosenkranz, Schelling. Vorlesungen, op. cit, p. 133. see p. 187. 135 see Hirsch’s commentary to his translation of Begrebet Angest in Kierkegaard’s Gesammelte Werke, abteilung 11 and 12, düsseldorf: eugen diederichs verlag 1965, p. 250. Hirsch also mentions the aforementioned work by marheineke as the source. 128 129

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developed.136 moreover, the attentive reader of Either/Or will certainly have noted how “anxiety” appears everywhere in that work. schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, by contrast, mentions it in only a single place,137 which Kierkegaard would not have been aware of if indeed his knowledge of the work came from rosenkranz. But regardless of whether Kierkegaard read the Freiheitsschrift, it nonetheless contains a thematic family resemblance to The Concept of Anxiety sufficient to be of great interest for comparative studies. The first explicit reference to Schelling in The Concept of Anxiety is in the introduction, which makes it clear that Kierkegaard had not forgotten the lectures in Berlin. We have seen how the Aristotelian expression, πρωτη φιλοσοφια, in Kierkegaard’s excerpt from tennemann occasioned him to recall schelling’s lectures. the introduction follows schelling by opposing it to “secunda philosophia”138 and adds: schelling called attention to this aristotelian term in support of his own distinction between negative and positive philosophy. By negative philosophy he meant “logic”; that was clear enough. on the other hand, it was less clear to me what he really meant by positive philosophy, except insofar as it became evident that it was the philosophy that he himself wished to provide. However, since i have nothing to go by except my own opinion, it is not feasible to pursue this subject further.139

if Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author vigilius Haufniensis has only his “own opinion” of how to interpret schelling’s positive philosophy, modern scholars must often make do with their own opinions of Kierkegaard’s general reception of schelling. For although in the following we will continue to trace Kierkegaard’s explicit references to Schelling, it is nonetheless difficult to grasp what is in many ways the decisive question, namely, Kierkegaard’s reception of “the negative philosophy,” as it appears in Schelling. When Kierkegaard identifies negative philosophy with “logic” as if it were perfectly obvious, he does not mean merely classical logic but all of metaphysics, which, as an act of thought, is immanent recollection. there can be no doubt that there are striking points of commonality between Kierkegaard’s omnipresent satire of Hegelian speculation or the speculator and schelling’s unremitting criticism of Hegel’s chimerical metaphysics of essence, but there are no explicit, documented references to demonstrate a direct influence. the introduction goes on to note that Hegel has thought through Kant’s skepticism about the reality of thought, to which he adds: “something that might continue to remain a great question despite all that Hegel and his school have done with the help of the slogan ‘method and manifestation’ to conceal what schelling with the slogan ‘intellectual intuition and construction’ openly acknowledged as a 136

317–32.

see søren Bruun’s “Critical account of the text” to Begrebet Angest in SKS K4,

schelling speaks of “die angst des lebens,” which he transforms to “die allgemeine Nothwendigkeit der Sünde und des Todes,” Philosophische Schriften, op. cit., pp. 462f. this could well remind one of Kierkegaard. 138 see the third and the sixth lecture in Kierkegaard’s notes. 139 SKS 4, 328n / CA, 21n. 137

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new point of departure.”140 Here and later Kierkegaard uses schelling to go around Hegel. Kierkegaard may have first learned of this from Schelling himself, as can be seen from his notes to the tenth lecture, and could also have refreshed his memory with the help of rosenkranz.141 schelling next appears in Chapter i, § 2, where the theme is “movement” in logic, or the question of to what extent the quantitative can shift over to the qualitative. to this Kierkegaard remarks in a note: In recent philosophy, Schelling was the first to make use of a quantitative determination to account for all diversity. later he reproved eschenmayer for doing the same (in his doctoral disputation). Hegel made use of the leap, but in logic. rosenkranz (in his Psychology) admires Hegel for this. in his latest publication (dealing with schelling), rosenkranz reproves schelling and praises Hegel.142

as commentators have already noted, everything said here about schelling derives from rosenkranz.143 We find the passage most influenced by Schelling, however, in Chapter II, § 1, which treats “Objective Anxiety.” Here at first the following is written in the main text: “some men of schelling’s school have been especially aware of the alteration that has taken place in nature because of sin.”144 it is obvious from a draft that Kierkegaard does not have schelling himself in mind here; there this passage is formulated as follows: “some men, particularly of the schelling school, like schubert, eschenmayer, görres, steffens.”145 with this draft we are reminded that schelling’s approach to the philosophy of nature was followed by several other original spokesmen whose works Kierkegaard often had an intimate familiarity with: solger, Baader and daub could also be cited in this context. How schelling himself is related to this “schelling school” is discussed in a long note which Kierkegaard adds to this passage, and which is possibly the single most significant passage for interpreting Kierkegaard’s relation to Schelling. The entire passage is as follows: schelling himself has often spoken of anxiety, anger, anguish, suffering, etc. But one ought always to be a little suspicious of such expressions, so as not to confuse the consequence of sin in creation with what schelling also characterizes as states and moods in god. By these expressions, he characterizes, if i may say so, the creative birth pangs of the deity. By such figurative expressions he signifies what in some cases he has called the negative and what in Hegel became the negative more strictly defined as the dialectical (το ἑτερον). the ambiguity is also found in schelling because he speaks of a melancholy that is spread over nature, as well as of a depression in the deity. yet, above all, schelling’s main thought is that anxiety, etc., especially characterize the suffering of the deity in his SKS 4, 319 / CA, 11. rosenkranz, Schelling. Vorlesungen, op. cit, p. 367. SKS 4, 337n / CA, 30n. 142 143 see the commentaries in SKS K4, 395–7, and rosenkranz, Schelling. Vorlesungen, op. cit., pp. 58, 155 and 179–82 (as well as xxiii–xxx). 144 SKS 4, 363f. / CA, 59f. 145 Pap. v B 53.18 / CA, supplement, 187. 140 141

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Tonny Aagaard Olesen endeavor to create. In Berlin, he expressed the same thought more definitely by comparing god with goethe and Joh. von müller, both of whom felt well only when producing, and also by calling attention to the fact that such a bliss, when it cannot communicate itself, is unhappiness. i mention this here because his remark has already found its way into print in a pamphlet by marheineke, who treats it with irony. this, however, one ought not to do, for a vigorous and full-blooded anthropomorphism has considerable merit. the mistake, however, is a different one, and here is an example of how strange everything becomes when metaphysics and dogmatics are distorted by treating dogmatics metaphysically and metaphysics dogmatically.146

that Kierkegaard relies on rosenkranz for his claims about schelling in this note is demonstrated in the commentary in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, which need not be repeated here.147 However, there is reason to underscore the oddity that Kierkegaard refers to the discussion of müller and goethe in the Berlin lectures by means of marheineke, who himself quotes from Frauenstädt. goethe is not mentioned in Kierkegaard’s own notes to the 26th lecture, from which we may surmise that Kierkegaard did not avail himself of his own manuscript to the schelling lectures on this point. schelling surfaces again in Chapter iv, § 1, in the discussion “anxiety about Evil.” Here we find the following passage: However, for my own sake, as well as for the sake of thought and neighbor, i shall take care not to express it as schelling probably would, who speaks somewhere of a genius for action in the same sense as for music, etc. thus, without being aware of it, one can at times annihilate everything with an explanatory word.148

we have already discussed this “genius for action” in connection with Kierkegaard’s marginal note in his edition of Jacobi’s Werke. in the draft to this passage Kierkegaard has noted, “system des transcendentalen idealismus,”149 which could be an indication that he read this work. it is understandable that Kierkegaard’s commentators have given a specific page reference to this work, since it is the only place in Schelling where the expression, “genie zu Handlungen,” is to be found.150 Kierkegaard himself gives no page number, and so there is probably good reason to assume that he also here is relying on rosenkranz, who in fact quotes this passage in his account of System des transcendentalen Idealismus.151 Schelling’s final appearance in The Concept of Anxiety is in Chapter iv, § 2, where Kierkegaard writes: it is not my purpose to present a pretentious and bombastic philosophical deliberation on the relation between psyche and body and to discuss in which sense the psyche itself produces its body (whether this be understood in the greek way or in the german way) 146 147 148 149 150 151

SKS 4, 363f. / CA, 59n (translation slightly modified). see SKS K4, 423–28. SKS 4, 416 / CA, 114. Pap. v B 56, 6. see SKS K4, 486. see rosenkranz, Schelling. Vorlesungen, op. cit., p. 114.

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or, to recall an expression of schelling, in what sense the psyche itself, by an act of “corporization,” posits its own body. Here i have no need of such things. For my purpose, i shall express myself to the best of my ability: the body is the organ of the psyche and in turn the organ of the spirit.152

schelling never uses the expression “act of corporization,” but as commentators to this passage have noted, this is presumably an allusion to the discussion of corporization which is found in the Freiheitsschrift.153 But once again, Kierkegaard could also have read it in rosenkranz.154 Philosophical Fragments does not mention schelling by name but contains some indirect references and possible allusions. when, for example, mention is made of “a manifestation theory instead of construction theory,”155 it is reasonable to think that this refers to the aforementioned juxtaposition of Hegel and schelling. when in another place, in a note, mention is made of “ancient and modern speculation,”156 the latter, as thulstrup has demonstrated, is intended to refer to schelling.157 Further, the discussion of the aristotelian concept of god (as the unmoved mover158), as mentioned above, recalls Kierkegaard’s notes to the 13th lecture in Berlin. likewise, the emphasis on the beginning of philosophy with wonder159 could be influenced by schelling’s presentation in the 22nd lecture. we have already seen how schelling’s “intellectual intuition” is juxtaposed to Hegel’s “method” in the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety. in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript there are three explicit references to schelling, which all set forth the same juxtaposition. Schelling first appears in an interesting passage in which this set of themes is related to Fear and Trembling. Johannes Climacus says that in this work he was attentive to “the leap” and “the decision” which were decisive, for what is Christian and for every dogmatic category. this can be achieved neither through Schelling’s intellectual intuition nor through what Hegel, flouting Schelling’s idea, wants to put in its place, the method, because the leap is the most decisive protest against the inverse operation of the method. all Christianity is rooted in the paradox, according to Fear and Trembling—yes, it is rooted in the fear and trembling (which are specifically the desperate categories of Christianity and the leap)—whether one accepts it (that is, is a believer)‚ or rejects it (for the very reason that it is the paradox).160

SKS 4, 437 / CA, 136. see Philosophische Schriften, op. cit., p. 470; SKS K4, 503. 154 see, for example, rosenkranz, Schelling. Vorlesungen, op. cit., p. 312. 155 SKS 4, 279 / PF, 79. 156 SKS 4, 219n / PF, 10n. 157 see niels thulstrup, “die historische methode in der Kierkegaard-Forschung durch ein Beispiel beleuchtet,” in Symposium Kierkegaardianum, ed. by wilhelm anz et al., Copenhagen: munksgaard 1955 (Orbis Litterarum, vol. 10, nos. 1–2), pp. 281–318. thulstrup uses precisely this passage as his example. 158 SKS 4, 232 / PF, 24. 159 SKS 4, 280 / PF, 80. 160 SKS 7, 102f. / CUP1, 105. 152 153

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this passage is clearly a continuation of the one quoted above in The Concept of Anxiety (Chapter i, § 2), but the fact that Kierkegaard now explicitly relates the issue to Fear and Trembling undeniably opens the door for studies of schelling’s presence in that work. in his criticism of Hegel in the Berlin lectures, schelling particularly emphasized the problem of the beginning in Hegel’s negative philosophy. Kierkegaard opposes the two in several places in the Postscript, for example, when he writes with reference to Hegel: it is true that he has made light of schelling’s intellectual intuition (schelling’s expression for the beginning). He himself has said, and it has often been repeated, that his merit is the method, but he has never shown how the method is related to the intellectual intuition, whether or not a leap is again required here.161

and later he writes: Schelling halted self-reflection and understood intellectual intuition not as a discovery within self-reflection that is arrived at by rushing ahead but as a new point of departure. Hegel regards this as a mistake and speaks absprechend about intellectual intuition—then came the method. Self-reflection continues until it cancels itself; thinking presses through victoriously and once again gains reality; the identity of thinking and being is won in pure thinking.162

these three passages, which do not evidence a renewed study of schelling, represent Kierkegaard’s last explicit references to schelling, and so in this regard too the Postscript is concluding. in spring of 1846, Kierkegaard had become mixed up in a conflict with The Corsair, which presumably accelerated his changing his interest from the philosophical–experimenting dialectic, which we know in the pseudonymous works, to more direct social criticism, which commenced with A Literary Review, published on 30 march of the same year. in the midst of this situation Kierkegaard traveled to Berlin for the last time in may, where he presumably bought the newly published edition of steffens’ Nachgelassene Schriften,163 which, as noted above, contains a foreword by schelling. From this foreword comes the sole direct quotation from schelling cited by Kierkegaard. in the Journal JJ one finds an entry from 1846: “Schelling is right when he says in the preface to steffens’ Nachgelassene Schriften: ‘when it has come to the point where the majority decides what constitutes truth, it will not be long before they take to deciding it with their fists.’”164 Kierkegaard found this quotation so fitting that he considered using it as the motto for a satirical work, A Writing Sampler,165 which he was working on at the same time, but never completed. schelling’s late philosophy was in dialogue with Hegel, and there can be no doubt that Kierkegaard’s occupation with schelling was to a large extent the result of this dialogue. an entry from 1847 in the Journal NB1 contains a kind of status 161 162 163 164 165

SKS 7, 139n / CUP1, 150n. SKS 7, 306 / CUP1, 335. see peter tudvad’s commentary in SKS K18, 460f. SKS 18, 297, JJ:471 / JP 4, 4112. see Pap. vii–2 B 274.24.

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report on Kierkegaard’s conception of schelling and Hegel with reference to the philosophical issues which Kierkegaard had treated many times in his earlier works. Kierkegaard’s discussion of the issue of “movement” in schelling’s philosophy, which he had elaborated on in connection with Repetition, is given a new twist. Kierkegaard concludes: the relation between schelling and Hegel is really this: schelling got rid of the Ding an sich with the aid of the absolute, inasmuch as the Schattenspiel was abolished on the far side and everything appears on this side. But schelling stopped with the absolute, with indifference, with the zero point, from which he really did not proceed, which simply signified that beyond the Absolute is nothing. Hegel, however, intended to get back to the absolute on the far side so that he could get momentum. schelling’s philosophy is at rest; Hegelian philosophy is presumably in motion, in the motion of the method.166

after this discussion schelling no longer appears in Kierkegaard in any philosophically pregnant sense. in 1849, the same year that The Sickness unto Death appeared, schelling appears in three entries, which, each in its own way, can be regarded as Kierkegaard’s final farewell to Schelling. The first farewell is found in the Journal NB9, where Kierkegaard gives an account of his discussion with the danish King, Christian viii, who was very familiar with the political conditions surrounding schelling’s appointment in Berlin. Kierkegaard writes: then he asked me about schelling. with a few strokes i tried to give him a quick impression. He then inquired about schelling’s personal attitude to the court, his reputation at the university. i said that the same thing was happening to schelling as to the rhine at its mouth—it becomes stagnant water—in the same way he is deteriorating into a character of a royal prussian “excellency.” i talked a bit more about how Hegelian philosophy had been the state philosophy, and now schelling was supposed to be that.167

The final statement, “now Schelling was supposed to be that,” appears almost anachronistic since schelling’s activity in Berlin had at that point long since run its course in the public debate. His appearance in Berlin did not have the intended effect: he never published his system and had already ceased his lectures at the university by 1846. even if, when speaking to the King, Kierkegaard had dared to juxtapose philosophical activity and politics, schelling appears here simply as a lively theme for conversation and not as a new philosopher of current interest. the next farewell to schelling appears in the Journal NB11, where he writes: “‘Faith is not everyone’s business’—but this is a peculiar use of language by luther in his translation of II Thessalonians 3:2. Faith is thereby superficially defined as a kind of genius, a disposition, a talent. i also recall that schelling in his lectures said something to the effect that faith is a talent—and cited luther.”168 this entry suggests that Kierkegaard’s memory of schelling’s actual lecture was no longer what it had been earlier. it is true that schelling in a passage in his posthumously published 166 167 168

SKS 20, 89f., nB:128 / JP 2, 1612. SKS 21, 225, nB9:42 / JP 6, 6310. SKS 22, 67, nB11:121 / JP 3, 2495.

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Philosophie der Offenbarung discusses this biblical passage,169 but this discussion was not a part of the Berlin lectures which Kierkegaard attended, for which reason it is not mentioned in any of the surviving notes, including Kierkegaard’s own.170 By contrast, we already know that Jacobi is the one who mentions luther’s translation and that Kierkegaard, in his copy of that work, referred to the relevant statement by schelling. when martensen published his long-expected magnum opus, Christian Dogmatics, in 1849,171 Kierkegaard of course had to take a position on it. in this context schelling’s name appears for the last time in Kierkegaard’s writings, in the Journal NB12, where he writes sarcastically: “the trouble with martensen is this perpetual talk about Kant, Hegel, schelling, etc. it provides a guarantee that there must be something to what he says. it is similar to the journalistic practice of writing in the name of the public.”172 We can regard this as Kierkegaard’s third and final farewell to schelling. The Short Conclusion perhaps one could sum up this overview of the explicit appearances of schelling in Kierkegaard’s writings by asking about the “trouble,” that is, what was captivating for Kierkegaard in this relation to schelling. Kierkegaard’s writings contain only a single direct quotation from schelling, and there is no clear evidence that Kierkegaard even read any of schelling’s original works, not even the Freiheitsschrift. it is, of course, indisputable that Kierkegaard attended schelling’s lectures in Berlin, but the number of explicit references to these lectures is, as shown, quite modest. admittedly, all historical judgments must be based upon “approximation” rather than certainty. although there is nothing in schelling’s explicit appearances in Kierkegaard’s writings to rule out the possibility that Kierkegaard made a study of his primary texts, it appears more probable that he did not. However, when we return to the implicit commonality of themes between Kierkegaard and schelling, there are indications that the Berlin lectures left some impression on the philosophical themes of interest to Kierkegaard. this is true not least of all for his constant criticism and satire of Hegel’s “negative” philosophy, as expressed, for example, in ironic remarks such as: “Hegel’s philosophy is, of course, positive.”173 schelling’s criticism of Hegel has already been treated extensively in the secondary literature,174 which must thus be considered in connection with see F.W.J. Schellings sämmtliche Werke, op. cit., series ii, vol. 4, pp. 16–24. the reference given by the commentator in Søren Kierkegaards Papirer is to the 18th lecture in Kierkegaard’s notes, but this is incorrect. 171 Hans lassen martensen, Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849 (ASKB 653). 172 SKS 22, 163, nB12:35 / JP 6, 6456. 173 SKS 7, 283 / CUP1, 310. 174 of the many investigations of the late schelling’s criticism of Hegel, one can mention erhard oeser’s treatise, Die Antike Dialektik in der Spätphilosophie Schellings. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des Hegelschen Systems, vienna: r. oldenbourg 1965, in which there 169 170

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Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel. that said, there remains to consider whether Kierkegaard’s almost emblematic satire about “the system,” “speculation,” “the speculator,” “the positive,” “making promises,” “going further,” etc. are directed only against Hegel or whether there is also a dig at schelling here. to these satirical mottos also belongs “to go beyond Hegel,” which is probably at bottom an exact predicate for schelling’s late philosophy. However, all this falls outside the domain of this introductory investigation.175 Translated by Jon Stewart

is also a comparison with Kierkegaard; see. p. 107, pp. 116f., p. 136. see also Friedrich w. schmidt, Zum Begriff der Negativität bei Schelling und Hegel, stuttgart: metzler 1971; manfred Frank, Der unendliche Mangel an Sein. Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1975; 2nd ed., munich: Fink 1992; Klaus Brinkmann’s article, “schellings Hegel-Kritik,” in Die ontologische Option. Studien zu Hegels Propädeutik, Schellings Hegel-Kritik und Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Klaus Hartmann, Berlin, new york: walter de gruyter 1976, pp. 117–210; alan white, Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics, athens, ohio: ohio university press 1983; B.m.g. reardon’s article, “schelling’s Critique of Hegel,” Religious Studies, vol. 20, 1984, pp. 543–57; and peter wild, Die Selbstkritik der Philosophie in der Epoche von Hegel zu Nietzsche, Frankfurt am main: peter lang 1994, in which Kierkegaard is discussed; see p. 230. 175 a long section which appears here has been omitted from the present translation. this section treats the secondary literature on Kierkegaard’s relation to schelling and has been used as the basis for the following bibliography.

Bibliography I. Schelling’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library “vorrede” in victor Cousin, Über französische und deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert Beckers. Nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn Geheimenraths von Schelling, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1834, pp. iii–xxviii (ASKB 471). F.W.J. Schelling’s Philosophische Schriften, vol. 1, landshut: Krüll 1809 (ASKB 763). Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums, 3rd ed., stuttgart and tübingen: Cotta 1830 (ASKB 764). Bruno oder: Über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge. Ein Gespräch, 2nd printing, Berlin: reimer 1842 [Berlin: unger 1802] (ASKB 765). Schelling. Vorlesungen, gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, ed. by Karl rosenkranz, danzig: gerhard 1843 (ASKB 766). Schelling’s Erste Vorlesung in Berlin, 15. November 1841, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta 1841 (ASKB 767). “vorwort” in steffens, H.[enrich], Nachgelassene Schriften von H. Steffens mit einem Vorworte von Schelling, Berlin: e.H. schroeder 1846, pp. iii–lxiii (ASKB 799). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Schelling adler, adolph peter, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, p. 17 (ASKB 383). ast, Friedrich d., Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, landshut: Joseph thomann 1807, pp. 477–88 (ASKB 385). Baader, Franz von, Ueber das pythagoraeische Quadrat in der Natur oder die vier Weltgegenden, tübingen 1798, p. v; p. 33n; p. 35n; p. 42; p. 44; p. 49n (ASKB 392). —— Beiträge zur dinamischen Philosophie im Gegensatze der mechanischen, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1809, pp. 69–70; p. 80; p. 98; p. 100; p. 102; p. 105; p. 138 (ASKB 393). —— Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik, vol. 1, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1828 (ASKB 396) (vols. 2–5, münster: theissing 1830– 38), vol. 4, 1836, p. 61; p. 95n; p. 117; p. 139; p. 142n; vol. 5, 1838, p. 7; p. 27. —— Philosophische Schriften und Aufsätze, vols. 1–2, münster: theissing 1831– 32, vol. 1, pp. 69–70; p. 135; p. 140; p. 159; p. 255; vol. 2, p. xviii; p. 11 (ASKB 400–401).

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—— Ueber die Incompetenz unsrer dermaligen Philosophie, zur Erklärung der Erscheinungen aus dem Nachtgebiete der Natur, stuttgart: Brodhag 1837, p. 10 (ASKB 411). —— Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung, vol. 3, würzburg: in Commission der stahel’schen Buchhandlung 1837 (ASKB 413), p. 30 (vols. 1–2, see ASKB 409–410). —— Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel’schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christenthum. Nebst zehn Thesen aus einer religiösen Philosophie, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, p. 7 (ASKB 416). Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Die christliche Gnosis: oder, die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwiklung, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835, pp. 611–26 (ASKB 421). —— “die vermittlung der beiden momente eingeleitetet durch schelling,” in his Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste, tübingen: osiander 1838, pp. 709–12 (ASKB 423). Brøchner, Hans, Nogle Bemærkninger om Daaben, foranledigede ved Professor Martensens Skrift: Den christelige Daab, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1843, pp. 23f. (ASKB u 27). Bruch, Johann Friedrich, Die Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften, Hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1842, p. 2; p. 31; p. 33; pp. 123–4; p. 245n (ASKB 439). Chalybäus, Heinrich moritz, Historische Entwickelung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, dresden: Ch.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1837, pp. 157– 260 (ASKB 461). —— Historisk Udvikling af den speculative Philosophie fra Kant til Hegel, trans. by s. Kattrup, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1841, pp. 166–252 (ASKB 462). erdmann, Johann eduard, Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837, p. 12; p. 53; p. 68; p. 111; p. 249; p. 257; p. 269 (ASKB 479). —— Leib und Seele nach ihrem Begriff und ihrem Verhältniß zu einander. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der philosophischen Anthropologie, Halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1837, p. 101 (ASKB 480). Fichte, immanuel Hermann, Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1826, p. 121 (ASKB 501). —— Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Heidelberg: i.C.B. mohr 1833–36, vol. 1, pp. 113f.; vol. 2, pp. 14–15; p. 186; p. 225; p. 519 (ASKB 502– 503) [vol. 3 (ASKB 509)]. —— “die philosophische litteratur der gegenwart.…[review of among others] l. Feuerbach, [D]as Wesen des Christenthums. leipzig, o. wigand 1841…,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by i.H. Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 9, 1842, pp. 93–149 (ASKB 877–911). —— “Hegel’s philosophische magister-dissertation und sein verhältniß zu schelling. nachtrag zum ausatze im vorhergehenden Hefte: ‘zu Hegel’s Characteristik,’” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 13, 1844, pp. 142–54.

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—— Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Des Cartes und Locke bis auf Hegel, 2nd ed., sulzbach: J.e. seidel’sche Buchhandlung 1841, pp. 588–781 (ASKB 508). —— Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, Heidelberg: akademische Buchhandlung von J.C.B. mohr 1846 (vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie), p. 151; p. 159; p. 169; p. 172; pp. 264–5; p. 280; p. 283; p. 307; p. 365; p. 465; pp. 488–91; p. 522; p. 570 (ASKB 509) (vols. 1–2 (ASKB 502–503)). —— “Fried. wilh. Jos. schelling (geb. 1775),” in his System der Ethik, vols. 1–2.1, leipzig: dyk 1850–51, vol. 1, Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht, Staat und Sitte in Deutschland, Frankreich und England von der Mitte des Achtzehnten Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, 1850, pp. 169–82 (ASKB 510–511) (vol. 2.2, leipzig: dyk 1853, see ASKB 504). Fischer, Carl philipp, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus speculativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, pp. xxiv–xxv (ASKB 512). Fischer, Friedrich, Die Metaphysik von empirischen Standpunkte aus dargestellt, Basel: schweighauser’sche Buchhandlung 1847, p. 9; p. 30; p. 110; p. 129; pp. 132–3 (ASKB 513). Frauenstädt, Julius, Briefe über die Schopenhauer’sche Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1854 (ASKB 515). günther, anton and Johann Heinrich pabst, Janusköpfe. Zur Philosophie und Theologie, vienna: wallishausser 1834, pp. 20–21; p. 105; p. 216 (ASKB 524). Hahn, august (ed.), Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, leipzig: Friedrich Christian wilhelm vogel 1828, p. 8; p. 11; p. 259 (ASKB 535). Hase, Karl, Kirkehistorie. Lærebog nærmest for akademiske Forelæsninger, trans. by C. winther and t. schorn, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837, p. 603 (ASKB 160–166). —— Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. Ein dogmatisches Repertorium für Studirende, 4th revised ed., leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel 1839, p. 2; p. 5; p. 22; p. 35; p. 51; p. 53; p. 63; pp. 173f.; p. 204; p. 239; p. 249 (ASKB 581). Hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich, “differenz des Fichteschen und schellingschen systems,” in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832 (vol. 1 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45), pp. 159–296 (ASKB 549). —— “schelling,” in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45), vol. 3, pp. 646–83 (ASKB 557–559). —— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von Heinrich gustav Hotho, Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: verlag von duncker und Humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 82; vol. 2, p. 458 (ASKB 1384–1386).

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—— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840– 45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832– 45) (ASKB 561–563). —— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 106; p. 389 (ASKB 564–565). Heiberg, Johan ludvig, “det logiske system,” Perseus, vols. 1–2, ed. by Johan ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837–38, vol. 2, pp. 1–45, see pp. 4–5; pp. 44–5 (ASKB 569). —— “lyrisk poesie,” in Intelligensblade, nos. 25–26, 1843, ed. by Johan ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1843, vol. 3, pp. 25–72, see p. 49; p. 53; p. 55 (ASKB u 56, includes nos. 24, 26, 27). Heine, Heinrich, Die romantische Schule, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1836, p. 40; pp. 171–7; p. 183; p. 186; pp. 189–91; p. 241; p. 344 (ASKB u 63). Helfferich, adolph, Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen, vols. 1–2, gotha: Friedrich perthes 1842, vol. 1, p. 44 (ASKB 571–572). Jäger, Josef nikolaus, Moral-Philosophie, vienna: J.g. Heubner 1839, pp. 18–19 (ASKB 582). marheineke, phillip, Zur Kritik der Schellingschen Offenbarungsphilosophie. Schluß der öffentlichen Vorlesungen über die Bedeutung der hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie, Berlin: enslin 1843 (ASKB 647). martensen, Hans lassen, Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849, p. 82; p. 86; p. 100; p. 192; pp. 224–5; p. 237; p. 268; p. 291; p. 298 (ASKB 653). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 1, pp. 277ff.; pp. 292ff.; vol. 3, pp. 18ff. (ASKB u 79). michelet, Carl ludwig, “die schelling’sche philosophie,” in his Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel, vols. 1–2, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1837–38, vol. 2, pp. 209–416 (ASKB 678–679). —— Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die ewige Persönlichkeit des Geistes, Berlin: verlag von Ferdinand dümmler 1841, p. 254 (ASKB 680). —— “vorwort” to g.w.F. Hegel, Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1842, pp. v–xxvi (ASKB 561–563). [møller, poul martin], Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian winther, F.C. olsen and Christian thaarup, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1839–43, vol. 3, p. 204; p. 227; p. 258; p. 326; p. 335 (ASKB 1574–1576). müller, Julius, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Breslau: Josef max und Komp. 1849, vol. 1, pp. 434–59; vol. 2, pp. 126–35 (ASKB 689–690).

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steffens, Henrich, Caricaturen des Heiligsten, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1819–21, vol. 1, p. 375 (ASKB 793–794). —— Anthropologie, vols.1–2, Breslau: Josef max 1822, vol. 1, p. 40; p. 396; vol. 2, p. 249 (ASKB 795–796). —— Christliche Religionsphilosophie, vols. 1–2, Breslau: im verlage bei Josef max und Komp. 1839 [vol. 1, Teleologie; vol. 2, Ethik], vol. 1, p. 19; p. 104; p. 174; p. 206; p. 285; vol. 2, p. 39; p. 51; p. 59; p. 64; p. 144; p. 368 (ASKB 797–798). —— Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben, vols. 1–10, Breslau: Josef max und Comp. 1840–44, vol. 3, pp. 337–8; vol. 4, p. 22; pp. 75–8; pp. 85–90 passim; p. 103; p. 108; pp. 121–2; pp. 145–50 passim; p. 229; pp. 254–7 passim; p. 267; p. 278; pp. 292–6; p. 302; p. 312; p. 319; p. 411; p. 462; vol. 5, p. 138; p. 282; p. 301; vol. 6, p. 36; pp. 71–5 passim; p. 213; p. 240; p. 262; p. 274; vol. 8, p. 194; p. 341; pp. 356–7; pp. 366–78; p. 386; p. 391; vol. 9, p. 144; pp. 345–6; vol. 10, p. 7; p. 322; p. 329; p. 334 (ASKB 1834–1843). thiersch, Friedrich, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, pp. 20f. (ASKB 1378). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 97; p. 215; pp. 268–70; vol. 2, p. 80n; p. 169n (ASKB 843). —— Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846, pp. 313ff. (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855]. waitz, theodor, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, Braunschweig: Friedrich vieweg und sohn 1849, pp. 6f.; p. 495; p. 544 (ASKB 852). weiße, Christian Hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit. In drei Büchern, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.H.F. Hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. xi; p. 26; p. 45; p. 100; p. 108n; p. 120; p. 260n; vol. 2, p. 294n (ASKB 1379– 1380). —— Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: Ch.F. grimmer’sche Buchhandlung 1833, p. 77n; p. 174n; p. 204n; pp. 210–1; p. 223; p. 256; p. 280; p. 357n; p. 366n (ASKB 866). —— “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 3, no. 2, 1841, pp. 254–304. wirth, Johann ulrich, “ueber den Begriff gottes, als princip der philosophie, mit rücksicht auf das Hegel’sche und neu-schelling’sche system,” in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 11, 1843, pp. 235–92. —— “substanzieller idalismus,” in his Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta’scher verlag 1845, p. 18; pp. 366–71; see also p. 394; pp. 418–49 (ASKB 876).

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III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Schelling anz, wilhelm, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus, tübingen: J.C.B. mohr 1956. Bech, maximilian, “existentialism, rationalism, and Christian Faith,” The Journal of Religion, vol. 26, 1946, pp. 283–95. Bösch, michael, Søren Kierkegaard: Schicksal—Angst—Freiheit, paderborn, munich, vienna and zürich: schöningh 1994, pp. 85–94. Bösl, anton, Unfreiheit und Selbstverfehlung. Søren Kierkegaards existenzdialektische Bestimmung von Schuld und Sünde, Freiburg: Herder 1997 (Freiburger theologische Studien, vol. 160), pp. 116f. Brecht, Franz Josef, “Kierkegaards philosophiegeschichtliche stellung,” in his Vom lebendigen Geist des Abendlandes. Aufsätze und Vorträge, wuppertal: marees verlag 1948, pp. 249–61. Brock, steen, “self-liberation, reason and will,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 223–34. Challiol-gillet, marie-Christine, “la critique de la preuve ontologique selon schelling et Kierkegaard,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, no. 2, 2000, pp. 237–45. Colette, Jacques, “Kierkegaard et schelling,” in Kairos, vol. 10, 1997: Retour de Kierkegaard, retour à Kierkegaard: colloque franco-danois, sous la direction de H.-B. Vergote (actes du Colloque franco-danois, université de toulouse-le mirail, les 15 et 16 novembre 1995), pp. 9–31. dempf, alois, “Kierkegaard hört schelling,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres– Gesellschaft, vol. 65, 1957, pp. 147–61. deuser, Hermann, Kierkegaard. Die Philosophie des religiösen Schriftstellers, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1985, see pp. 138ff. dietz, walter, Sören Kierkegaard. Existenz und Freiheit, Frankfurt am main: Hain 1993, see pp. 353f. ejsing, anette, “Kierkegaard and schelling: the life of Becoming,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 24, 2004, pp. 113–25. Fehér, istván m., “schelling, Kierkegaard, Heidegger hinsichtlich system, Freiheit und denken. gemeinsame motive und philosopheme der nachhegelschen philosophie,” in Zeit und Freiheit, ed. by istván m. Fehér and wilhelm g. Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 17–36. Fehér, istván m. and wilhelm g. Jacobs (eds), Zeit und Freiheit. Schelling— Schopenhauer—Kierkegaard—Heidegger. Akten der Fachtagung der Internationalen Schelling-Gesellschaft Budapest, 24. bis 27. April 1997, Budapest: Kétef Bt. 1999. Fenves, peter, “the irony of revelation: the young Kierkegaard listens to the old schelling,” in The Concept of Irony, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2001 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 2), pp. 391–416. Figal, günter, “schellings und Kierkegaards Freiheitsbegriff,” in Kierkegaard und die deutsche Philosophie seiner Zeit, ed. by Heinrich anz, peter Kemp and Friedrich schmöe, Copenhagen and munich: wilhelm Fink verlag 1980 (Text und Kontext, sonderreihe, vol. 7), pp. 112–27.

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Fujita, masakatsu, “schelling und Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaard-Studiet (Kierkegaard study: søren Kierkegaard society in Japan, osaka), no. 24, 1994, pp. 5–13. grøn, arne, “das transzendenzproblem bei Kierkegaard und beim späten schelling,” in Kierkegaard und die deutsche Philosophie seiner Zeit, Copenhagen and munich: wilhelm Fink verlag 1980 (Text und Kontext, sonderreihe, vol. 7), pp. 128–48. gyenge, zoltán, “existenz und ewigkeit: Über die zeitauffassung von schelling und Kierkegaard,” Existentia, 1992, pp. 395–415. —— Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus [Kierkegaard and german idealism], szeged: ictus 1996. —— “Über die Begriffe der zeit und des seins in der philosophie schellings und Kierkegaards,” in Zeit und Freiheit, ed. by istván m. Fehér and wilhelm g. Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 107–16. Hatem, Jad, “angoisse et péché: schelling et Kierkegaard,” Annales de Philosophie (Beyrouth), no. 11, 1990, pp. 77–90. Hennigfeld, Jochem, “die wesensbestimmung des menschen in Kierkegaards ‘der Begriff angst,’” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 94, 1987, pp. 269–84. —— “die Freiheit der existenz. schelling und Kierkegaard,” in Zeit und Freiheit, ed. by istván m. Fehér and wilhelm g. Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 83–93. —— “angst—Freiheit—system. schellings Freiheitsschrift und Kierkegaards Der Begriff Angst,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 103–15. Hennigfeld, Jochem and Jon stewart (eds.), Kierkegaard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit, Berlin, new york: walter de gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 8). Hong, Howard v., “Historical introduction,” in søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, together with Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, Kierkegaards Writings, vol. 2, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press, 1989, pp. vii–xxv. Hühn, lore, “sprung im Übergang. Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegel im ausgang von der spätphilosophie schellings,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 133–83. Hutter, axel, “das unvordenkliche der menschlichen Freiheit. zur deutung der angst bei schelling und Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 117–32. Jarauta, Francisco, “nota sobre la recepción de schelling por Kierkegaard,” Filosofía, sociedad e incommunicación, special issue, Homenaje a Antonio García Martínez, 1983, pp. 175–83. Koktanek, anton mirko, Schellings Seinslehre und Kierkegaard. Mit Erstausgabe der Nachschriften zweier Schellingsvorlesungen G.M. Mittermair und Sören Kierkegaard, munich: r. oldenbourg 1962. Kosch, michelle, “‘actuality’ in schelling and Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 235–51. —— Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, oxford: oxford university press 2006. Krings, Hermann, “ursprung und ziel der philosophie der existenz,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 61, no. 4, 1951, pp. 433–45.

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majoli, Bruno, “la critica ad Hegel in schelling e Kierkegaard,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, vol. 46, no. 3, 1954, pp. 232–63. mcCarthy, vincent a., “schelling and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Fall,” in The Concept of Anxiety, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1985 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 8), pp. 89–110. melchiore, virgilio, Saggi su Kierkegaard, genua: Casa editrice marietti 1998 [1987] (Collana di Filosofia, vol. 68), see p. 6; p. 63; p. 111n; p. 196n; p. 197; pp. 201–9; pp. 213–7. oliver, richard lester, Schelling and Kierkegaard. Experimentations in Moral Autonomy, ph.d. thesis, university of oklahoma, norman 1977. otoshi, Hiroko, “sheringu to Kyerukegoru ni okeru Kami no sonzai-shoumei Hihan” [Criticism of the proof of god’s existence in schelling and Kierkegaard], Scheringu Nenpo (schelling gesellschaft Japan), vol. 7, 1999, pp. 82–9. pocai, romano, “der schwindel der Freiheit. zum verhältnis von Kierkegaards angsttheorie zu schellings Freiheitsschrift,” in Zeit und Freiheit, ed. by istván m. Fehér and wilhelm g. Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 95–106. rasmussen, anders moe, “the legacy of Jacobi in schelling and Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 209–22. reuter, Hans, S. Kierkegaards religionsphilosophische Gedanken im Verhältnis zu Hegels religionsphilosophischem Systems, leipzig: verlag von quelle & meyer 1914 (Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, no. 23), see pp. 63–8. rinaldi, Francesco, “della presenza schellinghiana nella critica di Kierkegaard a Hegel,” Studi Urbinati di Storia, Filosofia e Letteratura, vol. 43, 1969, pp. 243–62. rosenau, Hartmut, “die erzählung von abrahams opfer (gen 22) und ihre deutung bei Kant, Kierkegaard und schelling,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 27, 1985, pp. 251–61. —— “Wie kommt ein Ästhet zur Verzweiflung? Die Bedeutung der Kunst bei Kierkegaard und schelling,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 16, 1993, pp. 94–106. —— “system und Christologie. schellings und Kierkegaards Kritik des systematischen denkens,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, op. cit., pp. 185–208. schmied-Kowarzik, wolfdietrich, “marx—Kierkegaard—schelling. zum problem von theorie und praxis,” Schelling-Studien. Festgabe für Manfred Schröter zum 85. Geburtstag, ed. by a.m. Koktanek, munich & vienna: r. oldenburg 1965, pp. 193–218. (reprinted in his Bruchstücke zur Dialektik der Philosophie. Studien zur Hegel-Kritik und zum Problem von Theorie und Praxis, ratingen, Kastellaun and düsseldorf: a. Henn 1974, pp. 15–36.) soykan, ömer n., “Über die lesbarkeit der welt hinsichtlich der teologischen Betrachtung bei schelling und Kierkegaard,” in Zeit und Freiheit, ed. by istván m. Fehér and wilhelm g. Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 117–24. Spera, Salvatore, “L’influsso di Schelling nella formazione del giovane Kierkegaard,” Archivio di Filosofia, vol. 1, 1976, pp. 73–108. —— “la philosophie de la religion de schelling dans son développement et son rejet par Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard and Dialectics. Aarhus-Symposium 13.–16. September 1978, ed. by Jørgen K. Bukdahl, aarhus: the university of aarhus 1979, pp. 147–92.

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struve, wolfgang, “Kierkegaard und schelling,” in Kierkegaard Symposium: Orbis Litterarum, tome 10, Fasc. 1–2, ed. by steffen steffensen and Hans sörensen, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1955, pp. 252–8. suances marcos, manuel, Sören Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, madrid: universidad nacional de educación a distanca 1997, vol. 2 (Trayectoria de su pensamiento filosófico), pp. 39–45. theoharova, radosveta, “stadien auf des lebens weg und weltalter: mensch- und Kulturkonzepte bei schelling und Kierkegaard,” Bulgarian-Danish Kierkegaard Seminar, March-April, 1992, Sofia: Søren Kierkegaard Philosoph, Schriftsteller, Theologe, Sofia: Internationale Kyrill und Method-Stiftung 1992, pp. 28–36. theunissen, michael, “die dialektik der offenbarung. zur auseinandersetzung schellings und Kierkegaards mit der religionsphilosophie Hegels,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 72, 1964–65, pp. 134–60. thulstrup, niels, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1967, pp. 230–6. (in english as Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980, pp. 267–74; in german as Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835–1846, stuttgart: verlag w. Kohlhammer 1972, pp. 222–8.) —— “Kierkegaard and schelling’s philosophy of revelation,” Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 144–59. tillich, paul, “schelling und die anfänge des existentialistischen protestes,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 9, 1955, pp. 197–208. torralba roselló, Francesc, “la Filosofía de la revelación de schelling,” in his Amor y diferencia. El Misterio de dios en Kierkegaard, Barcelona: ppu, promociones y publicaciones universitarias 1993, pp. 308–11. trendelenburg, adolf, “schelling im transscendentalen idealismus,” in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846, pp. 313–38 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855 not in ASKB]. tuttle, Howard n., “schelling,” in his The Crowd is Untruth. The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset, new york et al.: peter lang 1996 (American University Studies, series v philsophy, vol. 176), pp. 8–10.

schopenhauer: Kierkegaard’s late encounter with His opposite simonella davini

The first time Kierkegaard mentions Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) in one of his writings is in Journal NB29, dated 5 may 1854, in a series of notes that run parallel to a reading of the main works of the danzig philosopher. the reading extends for some time, or at least leaves a trail of thoughts until october of the same year, as seen in the notes relating to schopenhauer in Journals NB30–32.1 therefore, Kierkegaard became familiar very late with schopenhauer’s work, indeed only in the last year of his life. in fact it is highly unlikely he had read anything beforehand by an author whom in 1854 he repeatedly defines as “very significant” and who “affect[ed him] so much” without leaving some trace both in his published writings and even more in his private papers. since Kierkegaard’s reading of schopenhauer’s work is so late in time, it is evident that Schopenhauer can have had no influence, even late, on Kierkegaard’s sensitivity, thinking or interests, which by that time were completely formed. For this reason a study of Kierkegaard’s relationship to schopenhauer can very well be limited to what Kierkegaard explicitly states about it, without needing to look for hidden reception that is undeclared or unconscious. it can therefore be said that, by reading schopenhauer, Kierkegaard makes no new discoveries but simply finds some of his own theses confirmed and reinforced in an author he, moreover, considers basically diametrically opposed to him.2 a couple of references to schopenhauer also appear in the Journal NB35, dated 3 december 1854 (Pap. Xi–2 a 202 / JP 4, 3970. Pap. Xi–2 a 204 / JP 4, 4917). 2 So I do not agree with what Eduard Geismar has to say about the influence, which, in his opinion, schopenhauer had on Kierkegaard. geismar states that while in Kierkegaard’s thinking on martyrdom “there is nothing that goes beyond the results of Kierkegaard’s previous thoughts,” there is, on the contrary, obviously “an external influence when he develops his thoughts on Christianity as an asceticism hostile to life and especially when his journal is full of disgusting attacks on marriage” (eduard geismar, Søren Kierkegaard, hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen: gads Forlag 1926–28, vol. 2, pp. 35–6; and on women: “it can be said that the Kierkegaard who writes Øieblikket is not the same Kierkegaard we know before 1854. a desire has arisen to accentuate the pessimistic tones and to deny that in general there is anything good and fine in life. And the need emerged to talk cynically of the relationship between man and woman” (ibid., p. 36). in all this, according to Geismar, “Schopenhauer’s influence is undeniable” (ibid.). Contrary to Geismar, I maintain that the condemnation of marriage and the misogyny in the late Kierkegaard are the direct result of his emphasizing the heterogeneity of Christianity, and that he, independently of 1

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even if he read nothing by him, Kierkegaard had certainly heard tell of schopenhauer before 1854. a reference to the danzig philosopher, for example, appeared in poul martin møller’s treatise on immortality from 1837,3 which Kierkegaard had read carefully and liked a lot, where schopenhauer’s masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, from 1819, is mentioned as the work where “more than in any other, the nihilistic side of modern pantheism is forcefully and consequently developed.”4 moreover, schopenhauer—added møller—had himself characterized “his philosophy, in the frankest terms, as anti-Christian and nihilistic.”5 so one comes to wonder why only much later, in 1854, did Kierkegaard feel the need or at least decide to buy and read schopenhauer’s writings. Because of the lack of concrete data, only hypotheses can be advanced. First, one should consider the late interest aroused by schopenhauer’s thinking, the fact that this philosopher began to be popular both at home and abroad only after the publication, in 1851, of his Parerga und Paralipomena, various writings on philosophy, literature, and law, written in a brilliant, understandable style. Briefe über die Schopenhauer’sche Philosophie, one of the first accounts of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, by his pupil Julius Frauenstädt (1813–79), is from 1854.6 Kierkegaard bought a copy, as seen from the auction catalogue of his library,7 and it is highly likely that his reading of the work encouraged him to study schopenhauer.8 second, as emerges from the 1854 notes and as we shall see better from what follows, Kierkegaard is not interested so much in schopenhauer’s basic tenet, what møller calls his atheist, nihilist vision, which he was antithetical to, as he is in what he says on certain themes that had become central for him at this period in his life. so it is the late Kierkegaard, a Kierkegaard that sharpens his criticism toward Christendom, insisting on Christianity’s heterogeneity schopenhauer, brings out the anti-worldly nature of Christianity, from the moment that traces of this are verifiable in the journal, which was well before he read Schopenhauer (cf., for instance, Pap. X–5 a 72 / JP 6, 6837; Pap. X–5 a 79 / JP 3, 3774 and Pap. X–5 a 89). as Kierkegaard himself points out, his theory of the female remained unchanged over the years and is the same one elaborated in his pseudonymous writings (cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 141, p. 98 / JP 4, 4998); what changes in the last period of his life is the evaluation Kierkegaard makes of the very close relationship that, according to his theory, woman has with finiteness and temporality: if Christianity is hatred of worldliness, it must also be hatred of woman and marriage and of everything that is an affirmation of this world. 3 poul martin møller, “tanker over muligheden af Beviser for menneskets udødelighed,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian winther, F.C. olsen and Christian thaarup, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 158–272 (ASKB 1574–1576). 4 ibid., vol. 2, p. 226. 5 ibid., p. 227. 6 Julius Frauenstädt was also the editor of the first lexicon on Schopenhauer: Julius Frauenstädt, Schopenhauer-Lexicon, Leipzig: Brockhaus 1871, and of the first edition of schopenhauer’s opera omnia: Arthur Schopenhauer’s sämmtliche Werke, vols. 1–6, leipzig: Brockhaus 1874. 7 Julius Frauenstädt, Briefe über die Schopenhauer’sche Philosophie, leipzig: Brockhaus 1854 (ASKB 515). 8 even if we do not actually know whether he read it since no mention of it is ever made in the journals.

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and anti-worldly force,9 who writes, “Christianity is a renunciation to this world,”10 who reflects on martyrdom, on the sacrifice that being a Christian requires,11 who praises chastity and celibacy and condemns marriage,12 an ever more misogynous Kierkegaard,13 who reads schopenhauer with interest and also pleasure. this would also explain why he fails to point out other, equally obvious connections and affinities between his and schopenhauer’s thinking, as, for example, between their respective aesthetic views, both based on the notion of idea, and those on music.14 all this is simply no longer important for him. as already mentioned, Kierkegaard describes schopenhauer, when he reads him in 1854, as an “undeniably significant author,”15 an opinion he repeats more than once,16 one that “has interested [him] very much,”17 and affirms that he was amazed “to find, in spite of a total disagreement, an author who affect[ed him] so much.”18 His interest and curiosity would seem indirectly confirmed also by the unusually detailed reading he seems to have made of schopenhauer’s writings, judging from the wide spectrum of quotations and references.19 as villy sørensen has shrewdly pointed out, “for an isolated thinker like Kierkegaard it must have been naturally very surprising and disturbing to discover...a philosopher who was just as anti-Hegelian,

Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 16 / JP 3, 2968; Pap. Xi–1 a 68 / JP 3, 3172, and Pap. Xi–1 a 263 / JP 3, 2764. 10 Pap. Xi–1 a 102 / JP 4, 4497. 11 Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 61 / JP 3, 2546; Pap. Xi–1 a 193 / JP 3, 2550; Pap. Xi–1 a 199 / JP 3, 3620. 12 Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 150 / JP 3, 2617; Pap. Xi–1 a 157 / JP 3, 2908; Pap. Xi–1 a 169 / JP 3, 2618; Pap. Xi–1 a 226 / JP 4, 5000; Pap. Xi–1 a 259 / JP 4, 3969; Pap. Xi–1 a 295 / JP 3, 2620. 13 Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 141 / JP 4, 4998; Pap. Xi–1 a 164 / JP 4, 4999; Pap. Xi–1 a 226 / JP 4, 5000; Pap. Xi–1 a 228 / JP 3, 3175; Pap. Xi–1 a 281 / JP 4, 5003. 14 For Kierkegaard’s conception of music, see “the immediate erotic stages or the musical-erotic” (SKS 2, 53–136 / EO1, 45–135); for schopenhauer’s cf. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, § 52. 15 Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 102 / JP 4, 3877, p. 26. 16 Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 138 / JP 4, 3881, p. 31 and Pap. Xi–1 a 537, p. 406 / JP 4, 3883, p. 33. 17 Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 102 / JP 4, 3877, p. 26. 18 ibid. Kierkegaard sees such antitheticality symbolically represented in the reverse order that exists between the initials of their names: “a.s. Curiously enough, i am called s[øren] a[abye]. there is no doubt we two stand in an inverse relation to each other” (ibid). 19 From the notes in the journals it can be seen that Kierkegaard certainly read schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, in the second edition (leipzig: Brockhaus 1844). this is an expanded edition containing a second volume of Supplements in 59 chapters (ASKB 773–773a); Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, Frankfurt am main: Hermann 1841 (ASKB 772), and Parerga und Paralipomena, kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: Hayn 1851 (ASKB 774–775). By contrast, we do not know if he read Ueber den Willen in der Natur (Frankfurt am main: schmerber 1836) (ASKB 944), which appears in his library, but no reference is ever made to it in the notes. 9

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anti-historical, anti-academic, as himself, yet having as much or even more aesthetic sense,”20 we might say “style.” Their affinity on certain topics is indeed embarrassing for Kierkegaard. In a short marginal note he actually says: “In one respect I find having begun to read schopenhauer almost unpleasant,” and explains: “i have such an indescribably scrupulous anxiety about using someone else’s expressions and so forth without acknowledgment. But his expressions are sometimes so closely akin to mine that in my exaggerated anxiety i perhaps end up ascribing to him what is my very own.”21 an emblematic case of this is certainly the expression “renters of opinions” as schopenhauer designates journalists in The World as Will and Representation,22 which might very well have been coined by Kierkegaard. this expression summarizes a view of public opinion and the journalists’ role that is completely Kierkegaardian: this expression of schopenhauer’s is really valuable, and he himself also understood its worth. He points out that while in the outer world the majority would be ashamed to go about in a hat, coat, etc. that someone else had discarded, this is not at all the case in matters of the mind. there everybody goes about in discarded clothing. of course, the great mass of men have no opinions, but—now it comes! the journalists, who live by renting opinions, take care of this deficiency. Naturally, as Schopenhauer rightly adds, what they get is of the same quality as costumes you can find rented out by those attending a masked ball.23

the journalist therefore, Kierkegaard comments, makes men doubly ridiculous. First by making them believe that it is necessary to have an opinion—and this is perhaps the most ridiculous aspect of the matter: one of those unhappy, inoffensive citizens who could have such an easy life, and then the journalist makes him believe that it is necessary to have an opinion. and then to rent them an opinion which despite its inconsistent quality is nevertheless put on and carried around as—an article of necessity.”24

another expression used very often and very effectively by schopenhauer “when he has to speak of the Hegelian philosophy and of the whole of professorial philosophy [Professor-Philosophi],” is the expression “Windbeutel” [windbag] that in fact gives Kierkegaard the idea for a comparison between the characters of the german and danish nations: this is why the germans have the word, because they need it all the time in germany. we danes do not have the word, nor is what it designates characteristic of us danes.the character of the danish nation does not really contain the possibility of being a windbag [Windbeutel].

20 21 22 23 24

villy sørensen, Schopenhauer. Biografittekst, Frederiksberg: Det lille Forlag 1995, p. 92. Pap. Xi–2 a 59 / JP 4, 3886 (translation modified). schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, op. cit., vol. 2, chapter 56. Pap. Xi–2 a 58 / JP 4, 3885 (translation modified). Ibid. (translation modified).

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on the other hand, we danes have another defect—alas, a mirror defect—for which the danish language indeed has a word, a word that is perhaps absent from the german language: Vindsluger [windsucker]. it is commonly used in connection with horses, but it can be applied more generally. and this is more or less the situation: a german is to make wind—and a dane to suck it in. germans and danes have long had this sort of relationship to one another.25

Kierkegaard can therefore conclude that whereas “a.s. had to deal with the ‘windbag,’ s.a. had to deal with the ‘windsuckers.’”26 in other words, schopenhauer fought against Hegel and the like, and Kierkegaard against Heiberg and his like. it is in general everything schopenhauer writes on the philosophy of professors that amuses Kierkegaard “beyond description”27: “he is charming,”28 “incomparably coarse in this connection,”29 “coarse as only a german can be,”30 and “it is absolutely true what he says,”31 as, for example, when he maintains the saying “docendo discimus” “is not unconditionally true—that there are many assistant professors who by lecturing continually ex cathedra are themselves prevented from learning anything.”32 notwithstanding these words of praise and “gratitude,”33 the comments are for the most part critical. As already said, Kierkegaard finds the similarities between him and schopenhauer much more surprising and noteworthy, given the “total disagreement” existing in their basic positions and their views of life [Livsanskuelser]. as we shall see, however, the objections he makes to schopenhauer in the journals from may to december 1854, although numerous and relevant for important aspects in his thinking, are not directed at the “heart” of his view of life: atheism and nihilism are not conclusions, but decisions, and, as such, cannot be refuted, but only rejected. Kierkegaard dwells above all on schopenhauer’s ethics, where he says he has “two objections” in particular.34 schopenhauer—Kierkegaard maintains—makes of “sympathy” [Sympathie; german: Mitleid], or, in schopenhauer’s language, going beyond the principium individuationis, the basis of ethical existence, where asceticism is the highest level (after justice and love). Kierkegaard summarizes:

Pap. Xi–1 a 183 / JP 2, 1621 (translation modified). ibid. 27 Pap. Xi–1 a 180 / JP 2, 1620 and Pap. Xi–1 a 183/ JP 2, 1621. 28 Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 104 / JP 4, 3877, p. 28. 29 ibid. 30 Pap. Xi–1 a 180 / JP 2, 1620. 31 ibid. 32 Pap. Xi–1 a 111 / JP 4, 3874. Kierkegaard also fully supports what schopenhauer affirms about “this honest world,” that is, more or less that “the only honest men in this world are the merchants, for they are still sufficiently honest to admit—that they cheat” (Pap. Xi–1 a 140 / JP 4, 3876). this biting statement by schopenhauer is recalled also in the article of 1855 “a result,” where, however, it is generically attributed “to a german author” (cf. SV1 Xiv, 70 / M, 61). this is the only reference to schopenhauer, albeit indirect, in Kierkegaard’s published writings. 33 Pap. Xi–1 a 537 / JP 4, 3883. 34 Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 102 / JP 4, 3877, p. 26. 25 26

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Simonella Davini His ethical view is as follows: the individual comes to discern the wretchedness of this whole existence through the intellect, consequently intellectually, or through sufferings (δευτερος πλους), and then decides to slay or mortify the lust for life; here we have asceticism, and through perfect asceticism a state of contemplation, quietism, is attained. and this the individual does out of sympathy (here is a.s.’s moral principle), out of sympathy because he sympathizes with all the misery which existence is, consequently sympathizes with all the misery of others, the misery which existing [at være til] is.35

Kierkegaard wonders—and this is his first objection—whether an individual of this sort who, either by intellectual or concrete means, that is, through sufferings actually experienced (the second means, δευτερος πλους, as Schopenhauer calls it), has reached intimate knowledge of the wretchedness that existing is and is not kept back from pursuing the very asceticism “on the very basis of sympathy.”36 or, in other words, he wonders whether sympathy does not induce or justify behavior opposed to that suggested by schopenhauer: Could not this very sympathy hold him back, keep him from going all the way, sympathy with these thousands and thousands who are unable to follow him, these thousands and thousands who live in the happy illusion that life is happiness—and whom he therefore will only trouble, make unhappy, without being able to help them out to where he is?37

For Kierkegaard, this is not a question–objection of purely theoretical interest but with something that touches him personally, as is seen from a note a little earlier, where he was already reflecting on the topic, independently of Schopenhauer. The note is entitled “the cloister” and in it Kierkegaard questions the moral value of the choice of withdrawing into a cloister from a new viewpoint: The usual interpretation is that it is cowardice which makes a person flee from the world into a cloister. well, perhaps it is the case sometimes that a person has doubts about being able to endure the bestial grinning and sniggering, the persecution and mistreatment, which are the necessary consequence of expressing “spirit” among animal creatures. Yet it can also be looked at from another side: he flees because he does not have the heart to trouble the others, who he very well knows cannot be brought all the way out, and to whom he therefore will only be an affliction. Or, if you were to be completely sincere, you who still prefer to delight in this life, enjoying it, bearing children who are also to enjoy it—would you really not prefer to get rid of a person who speaks of only one thing: to die, to die to the world? and would it not be a kind of consideration on his part to hide away, since the result of his remaining among you might be that you become far more guilty than you perhaps ever had thought possible, because the result would be that in order to protect yourself against such a person, you might have to persecute him bestially and thereby sink down to and into bestiality. when that idyllic enjoyment of life does not come in touch with “spirit,” it becomes something even more beautiful, but, alas, in relation to spirit it becomes either spirit itself or—bestiality.38 35 36 37 38

ibid. (translation modified). ibid. Pap. Xi–1 a 144, pp. 102–3 / JP 4, 3877, p. 27. Pap. Xi–1 a 85 / JP 3, 2761.

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after all, already in Fear and Trembling, under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio, Kierkegaard had reworked the figure of Faust, making him a sympathetic character who, in his love for man, decides to keep his own doubts, his own nihilism, to himself, knowing that by expressing it he might throw the world into unhappiness.39 Certainly, in the same way that opposite actions can be generated from sympathy, so sympathy can become a cover for less noble motives and can hide one’s selflove, as Kierkegaard, at times too clever at applying dialectic to motivations, knows well. Further, as he glosses his first objection to Schopenhauer’s ethics, he has no difficulty in admitting that in the decision to renounce asceticism out of sympathy for one’s neighbor, there can easily be hidden “the fraudulence which does not itself dare the uttermost and then gives itself the appearance of sympathy.”40 Kierkegaard’s second objection to schopenhauer’s ethics and what he considers “a chief objection” is the missing reduplication of thinking in life, the distance that in schopenhauer exists between theory and practice: “a complete reading of a. s.’ ethics makes it clear—he is, of course, that honorable—that he is not any such ascetic himself. Consequently he himself is not the contemplation attained by means of asceticism, but a contemplation which relates contemplatively to that asceticism.”41 “This is extremely shady,” affirms Kierkegaard, since “it is always shady to propound an ethic which does not exercise such power over the teacher that he expresses it himself.”42 From this point of view, schopenhauer himself is not totally exempt from the accusation he makes against “the professors,” namely, that of being a sophist. to be a sophist means not only to live off philosophy and to make a profitable job out of it. If we ask Socrates what he means by Sophist, we see—maintains Kierkegaard—that ...undoubtedly making profit on philosophy is enough to brand a man as a Sophist, but it does not follow that not making a profit is sufficient to indicate that one is not a Sophist. no, sophistry lies in the distance between what a person understands and what one is; a person who does not stand in the character of what he understands is a sophist. But this is the case with schopenhauer.43

therefore, from this point of view, and it is the fundamental one, schopenhauer is also a “professor” (with the sole difference that “he has wealth,”44 the patrimony he inherited from his father, that allowed him to live on a private income all his life); it is not by chance that he shows off as having been the first to assign asceticism a place in the system,45 but this is the typical attitude of a professor: Not without great self-satisfaction he says that he is the first one who has assigned asceticism a place in the system. alas, this is nothing but professor-talk: i am the first to Cf. SKS 4, 195ff. / FT, 107ff. Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 103 / JP 4, 3877, p 27. 41 ibid. 42 ibid. (translation modified). 43 Pap. Xi–1 a 537, pp. 407–8 / JP 4, 3883, p. 34. 44 Pap. Xi–1 a 537, p. 407 / JP 4, 3883, p. 34. 45 Cf. schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, op. cit., § 68; “Fragmente zur geschichte der philosophie,” in Parerga und Paralipomena, op. cit., vol. 1, § 14. 39 40

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Simonella Davini have assigned it a place in the system. to go on, is not the fact that asceticism now has a place in the system an indirect sign that its time is past? there was a time when one was an ascetic in character. then came the time when the whole business of asceticism was consigned to oblivion. Now someone boasts of being the first one to assign it a place in the system. But the very fact that he concerns himself with asceticism in this manner shows that it really does not exist for him.46

according to Kierkegaard, schopenhauer also showed he is not a thinker “in character” by his reaction first to his ostracism by the academic world and then to his recognition and popularity after 1851. Kierkegaard declares that not only schopenhauer’s work but also “his fate in germany” interested him a lot, in other words the indifference that the academic world and consequently the cultured public showed to his writings, a treatment Kierkegaard does not hesitate to define as “mean”:47 s. has properly learned by experience that there is a class of men in philosophy, just as there are clergymen in religion, who under the guise of teaching philosophy live off it, make a bread-and-butter-job of it, conspire with the whole secular world, which looks upon them as the true philosophers since, to be sure, they are philosophers by profession—that is, it is their bread and butter....s. has rightly seen that this professional vileness maintains itself by one means in particular—by ignoring what is not of the profession.48

Kierkegaard therefore recognizes in schopenhauer’s his own fate as a writer exiled in his own country. He too, like schopenhauer, was kept on the fringe and excluded from the Copenhagen literary world and cultural circles by being ignored by Johan ludvig Heiberg.49 But the analogies end here, because their way of reacting to this boycott of indifference was very different. on this point, Kierkegaard notes, “a.s. does not resemble s.a at all.”50 what did schopenhauer do? “How does s. live? He lives withdrawn and then once in a while sends out a thunderstorm of coarse epithets—which are ignored.”51 what should he have done, instead? He should have done what Kierkegaard did in Copenhagen, “in a smaller setting”; in other words, he suggests, go to Berlin, shift the stage for these scoundrels to the street, endure becoming the most notorious man of all, familiar to everyone. Keep up a personal kind of social intercourse with these scoundrels, be seen together with them on the street so that if possible everyone knows that you know one another. this, you see undermines that vileness of ignoring,52 [and thus] they with their ignoring become ridiculous.53 Pap. Xi–1 a 537, p. 407 / JP 4, 3883, p. 33. Cf. Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 106 / JP 4, 3877, p. 29. 48 ibid. 49 Cf. Joakim garff, SAK. Søren Aabye Kierkegaard. En biografi, Copenhagen: gads Forlag 2000, pp. 196–8. english translation by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2005, pp. 224–6. 50 Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 105 / JP 4, 3877, p. 28. 51 Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 104 / JP 4, 3877, p. 28 (translation modified). 52 ibid. 53 ibid. 46 47

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and what did schopenhauer then do, when, following a changed historical–political climate, he finally achieved fame and recognition? there can be no doubt, [writes Kierkegaard] that the situation in germany now—it is easy to see, because the literary hacks and porters, the journalists and two-bit authors have got busy with s.—is such that s. is now going to be lugged upstage and acclaimed, and i wager 100 to 1 that he will be slaphappy; it does not occur to him at all to cut the tripe to pieces—no, he will be delighted.54

But in this way he shows he is “concerned outright about recognition; this is what he has desired, this is what he hankers for,”55 and therefore he is not an ethical and religious character, whose story begins differently; it begins when “recognition on the largest possible scale is offered to him—he wants none of it, and here, then, comes the collision.”56 this is demonstrated above all by, “the ‘model,’ the only model, the savior of the world.”57 Kierkegaard continues, He begins with their wanting to make him king, but he will not have it; he wants—to be crucified. And yet he has to have that first [possibility] just to be able to demonstrate decisively the religious and to be able to wound his contemporaries decisively in the direction of the religious. If the first [possibility] were not in his grasp, then the question would always remain whether he was not, after all, just a human being who would still rather have been a king, perhaps even someone who in his aspirations was unlucky enough to be crucified instead of getting to be king.58

in other words, “the foreground is enormously important; it is decisive for the defining of ethical, religious character”:59 “one thing, however, is indisputable: a secular ambition which one makes a mess of is one thing—it is something quite different to reject the secular triumph which is offered and then to be sacrificed. Only the latter constitutes being sacrificed,”60 since it must be “clear that the suffering is a voluntary choice.”61 Here we have a powerful standard for judging schopenhauer’s fate: “Therefore it can indeed be said that S. is a low-order sacrifice to this whole professorial vileness, but ethically, religiously S. is not a sacrifice—for he would much rather be acclaimed.”62 this casts a shadow also on his pessimism, which appears, despite statements of principle, linked to contingencies, accidental and all in all opportunistic: surely what our vapid and effeminate age needed was a genuine pessimist in full character. But look more closely. s. is not a man who possessed the power to be successful, to win recognition—and then threw it away. no, perhaps against his will he was forced to miss 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 105 / JP 4, 3877, p. 29. ibid. ibid. Ibid. (translation modified). Ibid. (translation modified). Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 106 / JP 4, 3877, p. 30. ibid. Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 107 / JP 4, 3877, p. 30. Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 106 / JP 4, 3877, p. 30.

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Kierkegaard can therefore conclude on this point that however much “his life and career are a deep wound inflicted on professor-philosophy,”64 schopenhauer remains “an alarming sign of the times.”65 another group of objections that Kierkegaard has against schopenhauer is collected under the title “schopenhauer and Christianity.” in section 68 of The World as Will and Representation, which illustrates his theory of asceticism, schopenhauer recalls many examples of Christian saints, mystics and ascetics. now, according to Kierkegaard, Christian asceticism is vastly different from asceticism as theorized by Schopenhauer, which basically seems only to be a very refined form of eudaemonism, a further evolution of aestheticism. “Christian asceticism,” Kierkegaard explains, “is based on the thought that to exist is not in and by itself to suffer—thus there is meaning in asceticism.”66 But “if to exist is to suffer,” as schopenhauer maintains, “then asceticism easily becomes eudaemonism,”67 “the highest form of eudaemonism.”68 indeed, “if to exist is to suffer, eudaemonism of course cannot be sought in the direction of existing, or in the direction of intensifying ‘existence’; it must be sought in the direction of not existing, or in the direction of curtailing ‘existence,’ and the highest form of eudaemonism becomes the greatest possible Pap. Xi–1 a 537, pp. 406–7 / JP 4, 3883, p. 33. ibid. 65 Pap. Xi–1 a 537, p. 407 / JP 4, 3883, p. 33. Kierkegaard sees confirmation of the fact that schopenhauer is “after all a german thinker, eager for recognition” (Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 105 / JP 4, 3877, p. 28), in the scarcely ironic way. according to Kierkegaard, he took part in the 1839 philosophy competition announced by the norwegian society of sciences, which he won with the work, Ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, and a year later in a similar competition announced by the danish society of sciences with the work, Ueber das Fundament der Moral, which, by contrast, was not given a prize. in 1841 schopenhauer collected the two works in one volume entitled, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. For Kierkegaard there is a contradiction between schopenhauer’s “misanthropic view of life” and the fact that he is “extremely happy, actually happy in a deadly earnest way, that The Scientific society in trondheim (good lord, in trondheim!) has crowned his prize-essay—it does not occur to him that perhaps The Scientific Society rated it as a bit of rare luck that a German sent them a treatise. Pro dii immortales! and when Copenhagen does not crown a second-prize essay by s., he rages, quite earnestly, over it in the preface included in the published version” (Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 105 / JP 4, 3877, p. 29). “to me”—Kierkegaard continues—“this is inconceivable. i could understand if schopenhauer, in order to have some connection with these societies of scientists, had decided to enter the competition and had been amused at being crowned in trondheim, no less amused at not being crowned in Copenhagen. But this is not the way s. takes it all!” (ibid.). according to Kierkegaard, “it is inconceivable that such a brilliant mind as s., such an excellent author, is nevertheless so wanting personally in irony (for stylistically he has a lot), so deficient in the lightness of superiority” (Pap. Xi–1 a 144, p. 105 / JP 4, 3877, pp. 28–29). 66 Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 140 / JP 4, 3881, p. 32. 67 ibid. 68 Pap. Xi–1 a 182 / JP 4, 3882. 63 64

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approximation of not existing.”69 From this point of view, therefore, it is asceticism, which, according to Schopenhauer, “aims at attaining (through mortification of the will to live) a state where, although one exists, it is as if one did not exist—to such a degree asceticism means death to everything,”70 that constitutes the highest eudaemonism.71 what schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation says about stoic ethics,72 which not by chance justifies suicide (the maximum expression, however paradoxical, of the will to live, for schopenhauer), can then be said against his own concept of asceticism. it is still the principle of pleasure that guides the will even in its own negation, and the schopenhauerian ascetic, far from incarnating the highest ethical existence, at root is only a further evolution of the aesthete, the author of the “rotation of Crops” (from Either/Or I), the final version of an interesting man.73 schopenhauer’s thesis that to exist is to suffer not only frustrates the meaning of asceticism, depriving it of the aspect of renunciation and suffering to the extent that it identifies living and all worldly goods with evil, but in general it frustrates and eliminates Christianity itself, “in a way which s. perhaps does not have in mind.”74 Kierkegaard explains, Christianity proclaims itself to be suffering, to be a Christian is to suffer, but now if to exist at all, to be a human being, is to suffer, then Christianity is robbed of its dialectic, its foreground, an aid in making itself negatively identifiable, then Christianity becomes a pleonasm, a superfluous comment, chit-chat, for if to be a human being is to suffer, then it is certainly ludicrous to advance a doctrine that proposes the following definition: to be a Christian is to suffer. no, Christianity does not declare that to exist is to suffer. quite the reverse, and therefore it is erected directly upon Jewish optimism, utilizes as foreground the most intensified lust for life which has ever attached itself to life—in order to introduce Christianity as renunciation and to show that to be a Christian is to suffer, including having to suffer for the doctrine.75

ibid. ibid. 71 let us take the particular precept of poverty, which, according to schopenhauer, the ascetic must take upon himself. “Christianity,” observes Kierkegaard, “does not hold that wealth cannot in a certain sense be called a good, and this is precisely why it says: give everything to the poor. But if someone were to say: wealth is an evil, show your asceticism by giving away your wealth, there would be a self-contradiction here, for in this case it is not asceticism to give away one’s wealth” (Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 140 / JP 4, 3881, p. 32). 72 schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, op. cit., § 16. 73 Kierkegaard writes: “schopenhauer is so far from actually being a pessimist that he höchstens represents the interesting; in a way he makes asceticism interesting—the most dangerous thing possible for a pleasure-seeking age which will be damaged most of all by distilling pleasure even from—asceticism” (Pap. Xi–1 a 537, p. 407 / JP 4, 3883, pp. 33–4). 74 Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 140 / JP 4, 3881, p. 32. 75 Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 139 / JP 4, 3881, pp. 31–2 (translation modified). For Judaism as foreground for Christianity, see Pap. Xi–1 a 139 / JP 2, 2224; Pap. Xi–1 a 151 / JP 2, 2225; Pap. Xi–1 a 184 / JP 2, 2227. 69 70

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so that Kierkegaard sees here, as in so many areas, wherever there is a dialectic, an expression of that “zealousness which is so zealous in emphasizing the second that in its zeal it takes away the first and thereby basically makes the second impossible.”76 despite these reservations and although schopenhauer “belittles Christianity, jeers at it in comparison with the wisdom of india,”77 Kierkegaard maintains that schopenhauer is an author “who will also have his importance for Christianity.”78 Kierkegaard writes, “i have nothing against schopenhauer’s raging violently against this ‘vile optimism’ in which protestantism especially excels; i am very happy that he demonstrates that this is by no means Christianity.”79 this cannot help but be useful to Christianity because it will help to understand that “to be a Christian is to suffer.”80 schopenhauer’s pessimism can form a useful antidote against that real poison for Christianity which is “eudaemonistic protestantism, especially danish epicureanism.”81 therefore, Kierkegaard feels like giving this “sanitary” advice: Just as during epidemics people put something in the mouth in order to prevent, if possible, being infected by inhaling the noxious air, so theological students who must live here in denmark amid this nonsensical (Christian) optimism could be advised to take a daily dose of schopenhauer’s ethics to guard against being infected by this drivel.82

as for him, “it is a different matter”; he is “protected in another way”:83 he has made by himself the necessary antibodies, in the course of a life going against the current.

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 140 / JP 4, 3881, p. 32. Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 138 / JP 4, 3881, p. 31. ibid. Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 139 / JP 4, 3881, p. 31. Pap. Xi–1 a 181, p. 139 / JP 4, 3881, pp. 31–2. Pap. Xi–1 a 165 / JP 4, 3878. on danish protestantism, see Pap. Xi–1 a 166. Ibid. (translation modified). ibid.

Bibliography I. Schopenhauer’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften, Frankfurt am main: J.C. Hermannsche Buchhandlung 1841 (ASKB 772). Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: Brockhaus 1844 [1819] (ASKB 773–773a). Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.w. Hayn 1851 (ASKB 774–775). Ueber den Willen in der Natur, Frankfurt am main: schmerber 1836 (ASKB 944). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Schopenhauer Baader, Franz von, Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik, vol. 1, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1828 (ASKB 396) [vols. 2–5, münster: theissing 1830–38], vol. 4, 1836, p. 53. Carus, Carl gustav, Psyche. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Seele, pforzheim: Flammer und Hoffmann 1846, p. 329n (ASKB 459). Fichte, immanuel Hermann, “arthur schopenhauer,” in his System der Ethik, vols. 1–2.1, leipzig: dyk 1850–51, vol. 1, Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht, Staat und Sitte in Deutschland, Frankreich und England von der Mitte des Achtzehnten Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, 1850, pp. 394–415 (ASKB 510–511); vol. 2.2, leipzig: dyk 1853, p. 79n; p. 80; p. 87n (ASKB 504). Frauenstädt, Julius, Briefe über die Schopenhauer’sche Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1854, p. 109; pp. 124–5; pp. 128f.; p. 137; p. 143; p. 146; p. 150n; pp. 151–2; p. 155n; p. 156n; pp. 157–61; pp. 172–6 passim; pp. 186–97 passim (ASKB 515). —— Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluß auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1855, p. 22; p. 109; pp. 124–5; pp. 128–9; p. 146; p. 150n; p. 151n; p. 152; p. 156n; pp. 158–61; p. 170; pp. 172–4; p. 176; pp. 186–7; pp. 190–7 (ASKB 516). [møller, poul martin], Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian winther, F.C. olsen and Christian thaarup, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1839–43, vol. 2, p. 226; p. 230 (ASKB 1574–1576).

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III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Schopenhauer dietz, walter, “Servum arbitrium: zur Konzeption des willensunfreiheit bei luther, schopenhauer und Kierkegaard,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 42, no. 2, 2000, pp. 181–94. garff, Joakim, [review of] “Johannes sløk, Livets Elendighed. Kierkegaard og Schopenhauer,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 20, 1999, pp. 339–41. —— Søren Kierkegaard. A Biography, trans. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2005, pp. 707–13. geismar, eduard, Søren Kierkegaard, hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen: gads Forlag 1926–28; vol. 2, pp. 35–45. H [Hohlenberg, Johannes], “søren Kierkegaard og schopenhauer om staten,” Øjeblikket, vol. 1, no. 5, 1947, pp. 23–4. Hohlenberg, Johannes, “Kierkegaard og schopenhauer,” in his Den ensommes vej, Copenhagen: H. Hagerup 1948, pp. 303–9. Holm, søren, “schopenhauer und Kierkegaard,” Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, vol. 43, 1962, pp. 5–14. Johansen, Klara, “den fjärran brodern,” Res Publica, vol. 16, 1990, pp. 128–33. (previously printed in Det rika stärbhuset, stockholm: wahlström & widstrand 1947, pp. 180–7.) lansink, Cyril, “zelfontkenning en zelfaanvaarding: de betekenis van onthechting in het denken van schopenhauer en Kierkegaard [self-denial and self-acceptance: the meaning of detachment in schopenhauer and Kierkegaard],” Tidskrift voor filosophie, vol. 63, no. 1, 2001, pp. 87–106. leendertz, J.w., “Kierkegaard, schopenhauer nietzsche en de existentiephilosophie,” Philosophia, ed. by H. van oyen, vol. 2, 1949, pp. 337–78. leverkühn, andré, “schopenhauer: paradise lost,” in his Das ethische und das Ästhetische als Kategorien des Handelns. Selbstwerdung bei Søren Kierkegaard, Frankfurt am main et al.: peter lang 2000, pp. 168–71. Maceiras, Fafián, Schopenhauer y Kierkegaard. Sentimiento y pasión, madrid: Cincel 1985. nærup, Carl, “søren Kierkegaard og arthur schopenhauer,” Vor Verden, vol. 2, no 8, 1924–25, pp. 357–9. sløk, Johannes, Livets elendighed. Kierkegaard og Schopenhauer, viby (J): Centrum 1997. sørensen, villy, Schopenhauer. Biografi & tekst, Frederiksberg: det lille Forlag 1995 [1969], pp. 91–5. suances marcos, manuel, Sören Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, madrid: universidad nacional de educación a distanca 1997, vol. 2 (Trayectoria de su pensamiento filosófico), pp. 39–45. tortura, giuseppe, “Kierkegaard and schopenhauer on Hegelianism: ‘Primum vivere, deinde philosophari,’” in Metalogicon: Rivista Internazionale di Logica pura e Applicata, di Linguistica e di Filosofia, vol. 7, no. 1, 1994, pp. 69–84. urdanibia, Javier (ed.), Los Antihegelianos: Kierkegaard y Schopenhauer, Barcelona: antropos editorial del Hombre 1990.

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viallaneix, nelly, “a. s/s. a.: schopenhauer et Kierkegaard,” Romantisme, vol. 32, 1981, pp. 47–64. voigt, Friedrich adolf, “Kierkegaard und schopenhauer,” in his Sören Kierkegaard im Kampfe mit der Romantik, der Theologie und der Kirche, Berlin: Furcheverlag 1928, pp. 275–84. wolff, august, “søren Kierkegaard og arthur schopenhauer,” Nære og Fjern, vol. 7, no. 322, 1877–78, pp. 1–9. zijlstra, onno, “muziek, tijd en taal. Kierkegaard en schopenhauer,” Communiqué, vol. 11, 1994, pp. 59–75.

schubert: Kierkegaard’s reading of gotthilf Heinrich schubert’s philosophy of nature stefan egenberger

dream-interpretation, animal magnetism, somnambulism, and clairvoyance—the scientist and physician gotthilf Heinrich schubert (1780–1860) caused some sensation among the writers of the late romantic period in germany with these themes. while schubert’s impact on the romantics—especially on e.t.a. Hoffmann (1776–1822)—has long been acknowledged in the field of literary studies,1 the name schubert seems to be largely unknown to Kierkegaard research. even though only a few direct references to schubert can be discerned in Kierkegaard’s writings, these references shed some light on an important process of clarification regarding Kierkegaard’s understanding of nature. initially, Kierkegaard was interested in schubert’s concept of an “irony of nature” in connection with the development of his own understanding of irony. In this context, Kierkegaard engages in reflections of a fundamental kind on the relationship between nature and consciousness. These considerations become significant in Kierkegaard’s understanding of sin in particular. the ambivalence in Kierkegaard’s doctrine of sin is based on the fact that his general understanding of sin as a product of freedom runs counter to the experience of confrontations with destiny that characterize finite human nature. The latter aspect, which anticipates the question of the unconscious, can be understood against the background of Kierkegaard’s perusal of schubert. In order to examine Schubert’s influence in some detail, I will in the first section briefly introduce his œuvre. my account will focus primarily on Die Symbolik des Traumes, first published in 1814 and owned by Kierkegaard in the second edition of 1821. It can be identified as the source of his knowledge about Schubert.2 in the i would like to thank Birte Kiesbye, thomas rohde and Jay d. mininger for helping me with the english translation of this essay. 1 Cf. wilhelm lechner, G.H. v. Schuberts Einfluß auf H. v. Kleist, J. Kerner und E.T.A. Hoffmann, ph.d. thesis, Borna-leipzig: noske 1911; Franz rudolf merkel, Der Naturphilosoph Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert und die deutsche Romantik, munich: o. Beck 1913. 2 Kierkegaard bought schubert’s Die Symbolik des Traumes, 2nd. ed., Bamberg: Kunz 1821 [1814] (hereafter abbreviated as Symbolik), on 22 February 1836. all explicit references to schubert in Kierkegaard’s writings relate to this work. (see SKS 17, 134f., BB:42 / JP 1,

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second part i will focus on Kierkegaard’s perusal of schubert. First, i will elucidate the way Kierkegaard explicitly draws on schubert’s concept of an “irony of nature.” second, i will explore Kierkegaard’s less obvious indebtedness to schubert in the context of his theory of sin and the question of the unconscious. I. Schubert’s die symbolik des traumes schubert took up the study of medicine in 1800.3 in may, 1801 he was drawn to Jena where he heard schelling lecture on the philosophy of nature. He achieved some reputation with his Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaften, written in dresden and published in 1808. while he was head of the realinstitut nuremberg between 1809 and 1816, he wrote the Symbolik des Traumes. in 1819 schubert was appointed professor for natural history in erlangen; in 1827 he moved to munich. there he wrote his principal work, Die Geschichte der Seele. schubert was one of the most important representatives of a romantic speculative philosophy of nature. While Schubert’s work became anachronistic in a scientific community that increasingly tended to an exacting empirical method, his work on psychic anomalies was widely read and discussed by the poets of the late romantic period.4 schubert is generally regarded as a natural scientist in the tradition of schelling’s philosophy of nature. it certainly cannot be denied that schelling had a formative influence on his writings. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between them including the fact that schubert completely abstained from using his concept of nature as a foundation for a theory of consciousness. a considerable distance is also evident in schelling’s response to schubert’s œuvre: he criticizes schubert’s later writings that are suffused with pietistic thought, characterizing them as “unscientific.”5 in order to correctly determine schubert’s place in the world of thought of the early nineteenth century, we must, furthermore, consider the influences that informed his 91. SKS 17, 225, dd:18f / JP 2, 1695. SKS 1, 293f. / BI, 259f.) Because there are significant differences between the first and the second editions, I quote the Symbolik exclusively from the second edition, which Kierkegaard owned. Kierkegaard also possessed an edition of schubert’s Die Geschichte der Seele, vols. 1–2, stuttgart and tübingen: Cotta 1830 (ASKB u 97). However, there is no evidence of a deeper reading of this large work. nor can it be proved that Kierkegaard took note of schubert’s famous Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaften, (dresden: arnold 1808). 3 the best source for schubert’s life is his autobiography, Der Erwerb aus einem vergangenen und die Erwartungen von einem zukünftigen Leben. Eine Selbstbiographie, vols. 1–3, erlangen 1854–58. Cf. alice rössler, “einleitung,” in Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert. Gedenkschrift zum 200. Geburtstag des romantischen Naturforschers, erlangen: universitätsbund erlangen-nürnberg 1980, pp. 5–10. 4 Cf. gerhard sauder, “nachwort,” in gotthilf Heinrich schubert, Die Symbolik des Traumes, Heidelberg: l. schneider 1968 (reprint of the edition of 1814), pp. xxi–xxv; dietrich von engelhard, “schuberts stellung in der romantischen naturforschung,” in Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert. Gedenkschrift zum 200. Geburtstag des romantischen Naturforschers, op. cit., pp. 11–36, esp. pp. 24–32. 5 Cf. Aus Schellings Leben. In Briefen, vols. 1–3, ed. by g.l. plitt, leipzig: Hirzel 1869–70, vol. 2, p. 353.

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theory of nature, his medical or psychological education, his aesthetic and, finally, his religious thoughts. First, Schubert’s understanding of nature had been strongly influenced since his schooldays by Johann gottfried Herder who had been his private tutor and became an important mentor. Herder’s treatise, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, was quite influential for Schubert’s philosophy of nature and had a formative influence on his concept of nature as an organism. Second, Schubert was heavily influenced by the medical research of his time. in particular, early nineteenth-century thinking was deeply fascinated by the theory of animal magnetism associated with Franz anton mesmer (1733–1815), both in connection with the question of the interrelations between the animate and inanimate world and the question of natural processes inaccessible to consciousness. this is also the context that explains the general interest in dreams, hypnosis, and clairvoyance. third, to the same degree that schubert stimulated late romantic thinking, he was himself influenced by the ideas of early Romantic aesthetics and especially of the philosophy of nature presented by novalis. this is most evident in the fact that Schubert’s first publication after his thesis was a literary piece. The novel, Die Kirche und die Götter of 1804,6 which is clearly influenced by Novalis, deals with scientific and medical questions and delineates a strong mutual influence of the symbols of nature and poetry on each other.7 all his life, schubert took for granted a close connection between nature, that is, natural science, and poetry. as a natural scientist and physician, schubert came to regard the poeticization of the world that had been programmatically postulated by novalis as a therapeutic task. Fourth, we must acknowledge the influence of the pietistic background of schubert’s childhood which increasingly informs his writings from about 1810 onward. this rediscovery of religiousness was deepened by schubert’s growing affinity with the thoughts of mysticism under the influence of Franz von Baader (1765–1841). His preoccupation with Jakob Böhme (1575–1624) and louis-Claude de saint-martin (1743–1803), whose De l’Esprit des Choses8 he translated into German in 1812, clearly influenced Schubert’s mystic philosophy of history. All these different influences converge in Die Symbolik des Traumes.9 the Symbolik is intended to be—even more evidently in the second edition—edifying in that it aims to reveal an original spiritual world behind the fallen material world. in the symbols of dreaming schubert makes out rudiments of an original “language of god,”10 that used to express the organic unity of nature in a pure primordial state. the 6

1804.

g.H. schubert, Die Kirche und die Götter: ein Roman, vols. 1–2, penig: dienemann

7 with regard to schubert’s early novel and the interrelations beween natural science and aesthetics, see Hans-georg von arburg, “gotthilf Heinrich schuberts die Kirche und die götter (1804)—ein frühromantischer roman in literatur- und medizinhistorischer sicht,” Athenäum. Jahrbuch für Romantik, vol. 11, 2001, pp. 93–121. 8 louis-Claude de saint-martin, De l’Esprit des Choses, ou coup d’oeil philosophique sur la nature des êtres et sur l’objet de leur existence, paris: laran 1800. 9 gerhard sauder, “nachwort,” in schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., pp. viiif., reports the partly curious circumstances of the genesis of the Symbolik. 10 schubert, Symbolik, op, cit., p. 21: “Sprache Gottes.”

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principles of romantic aesthetics enable schubert to read the phenomena of nature. Thus, scientific insights do not necessarily have immediate religious meaning, but a natural phenomenon can serve as an “image” of the religious in that it “hints at” the religious substance of reality by means of analogy.11 The scientific phenomena collected by schubert somehow transcend the material world and thus serve as an analogy of the true spiritual human condition. the general set-up of the Symbolik des Traumes is based on the idea that the religious interpretation of the history of humanity and the world can be described as a succession of states—an original paradisiac state, the fall from this state and its restoration—by means of various linguistic symbolizations.12 schubert presupposes that the original state had been characterized by a natural language of “love of the divine.”13 accordingly, the Fall of man takes place as a confusion of tongues. if schubert sees “the acquired language of our waking state”14 as a linguistic representation of the fallen world, interpretation is based on the assumption that there is a close interrelation between the Fall of man and the birth of wakeful consciousness. our comprehension of the fact that the original state was lost and that we long to return is imparted through a presentiment [Ahnung] of this original language of nature. an intuitive comprehension of this original language of nature may occur in the state of dreaming due to the slumber of the “association of ideas of the waking consciousness.” in this state—but also in other psychological anomalies central to schubert’s work such as animal magnetism, insanity, and clairvoyance—a presentiment of the original spiritual world finds articulation. Thus, they bear analogies to “the actual and true clairvoyance of the spirit.”15 the soul is freed from its bodily ties and begins to “interact and interrelate” with “the breath of nature as a whole.”16 in this way, the fallen soul becomes “similar and akin to spirit, which in its striving and longing is not directed towards the particular and finite, but towards the infinite.”17 Another reason for the significance ascribed to the dream and the state of dreaming is to be found in romantic aesthetics. the romantics understood poetry as “a voluntary and wakeful mode of dreaming”18 in an attempt to capture what could otherwise not be expressed—the infinite character of the spiritual. Entirely in line with these tendencies, schubert ascribes to a “hidden poet” the understanding that ibid., p. 167. the mystical scheme of a congruence of the history of creation and the history of tongues that schubert knew from saint-martin constitutes the background of this idea. generally, it refers to the Biblical tale of confusion of tongues at Babel in genesis 11:1–9 and is based on the contemporary theories of the three ages of the world. 13 schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 142: “Liebe des Göttlichen.” 14 ibid., p. 141: “künstlich erlernte Sprache unseres Wachens.” 15 ibid., p. 173: “dem eigentlichen und wahren Hellsehen des Geistes.” 16 ibid., p. 169: “in Wechselwirkung und Wechselbeziehung”; “dem Lebensothem der gesammten Natur.” 17 ibid., p. 169: “dem Geiste, dessen Zug und Sehnen nicht auf ein Einzelnes und Endliches, sondern auf ein Unendliches gerichtet ist, ähnlich und gleichartig.” 18 august wilhelm schlegel, Die Kunstlehre, stuttgart: w. Kohlhammer 1963, p. 283: “ein freiwilliges und waches Träumen.” 11

12

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may be reached in the process of dreaming: “a way of reckoning and combining that you and i do not understand; a higher kind of algebra…that can only be handled by the hidden poet deep down inside of us.”19 it is precisely the obscurity or at least the partial unintelligibility of poetry and dreams that enables us to grasp the divine that cannot be expressed in words. accordingly, schubert describes the language of dream as a “hieroglyphic language [that] in some respects seems more appropriate to the nature of the soul than our ordinary language.”20 it is true that schubert assigns an essential role to the obscurity of dream imagery with respect to the representation of the divine. the fact, however, that dreams just like phenomena such as clairvoyance and animal magnetism belong “completely to the lower parts of the soul” lends a specific ambivalence to its imagery—the very symbols of fallen nature are supposed to stir up a yearning for the infinite.21 thus, the symbols of dreaming not only point to the infinite but always reflect their own finite nature at the same time. only because of this ambivalence could schubert’s observations have the vast impact on the late romantic period in germany that they did. Because of the fact that not only the romantics, but also Kierkegaard understands the interpretation of dreams as a sign of the experience of the finiteness of human existence, I will now take a closer look at two of schubert’s observations that spell out the nature of this experience in more detail. i present (a) schubert’s investigation of the unconscious and (b) his concept of irony of nature. (a) Schubert’s investigation of the unconscious becomes significant in the context of his diagnosis of a split personality.22 in states of somnambulistic clairvoyance this becomes obvious by the fact that the sphere of dream and the sphere of being awake are completely estranged to each other. schubert writes about a “phenomenon of two distinct but, in themselves, fully connected individualities

schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 5: “Eine Art zu rechnen und zu combinieren, die ich und du nicht verstehen; eine höhere Art von Algebra..., die aber nur der versteckte Poet in unserm Innern zu handhaben weiß.” 20 ibid., p. 4: “Hieroglyphensprache, [welche] der Natur der Seele in mancher Hinsicht angeeigneter erscheine, als unsere gewöhnliche Wortsprache.” 21 ibid., p. 163: “ganz in das untergeordnete Gebiet der Seele.” schubert judged the Symbolik in a later review quite critically: “[a]lready the connection of a phenomenon of such triviality and ambiguous origin as the dream with the spirit that communicates with man through the works of creation and revelation is, to say the least, quite inadequate.” (Der Erwerb aus einem vergangenen und die Erwartungen von einem zukünftigen Leben, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 481: “[S]o ist dennoch schon die Zusammenstellung einer solchen Erscheinung von niederem Rang und zweideutigem Herkommen, wie der Traum an sich es ist, mit dem Geiste, der zu dem Menschen durch die Werke seiner Schöpfungen und seiner Offenbarung redet, auf’s Gelindeste gesagt, eine höchst unziemliche.”) 22 with regard to schubert’s place in the history of the investigation of the unconscious, see Henry F. ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious. The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry, new york: Basic Books 1973, pp. 233–352. 19

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united in the same person in a peculiar way.”23 the conscious and the unconscious fall apart, verging on the symptoms of a split personality. the insane person cannot distinguish between these states of mind and “is prone to tell a fictitious but coherent story as his own.”24 schubert also regards the interaction between the lower sphere of body and soul and the higher sphere of the spirit as an effect of the unconscious. this becomes relevant in the concept of sin, for schubert suggests sin is related to physical and psychological illness.25 (b) When Schubert refers to the Romantic concept of irony, the finitude of human life becomes an issue in the context of its relationship to nature.26 irony points to an experience that arises as one senses the difference between wakeful consciousness and the hidden meaning found in nature, dreaming and poetry. this is “the very contradiction in which the poetical world stands with respect to the nonpoetical.”27 Here, in a slightly different way, we are confronted with the division of the personality into daytime and nocturnal sides. Schubert defines the irony that occurs in the deceptive signs of nature as an “irony of nature” [Ironie der Natur]. this is the form of irony referred to when, for example, coming events take place in contradiction with what was expected. that the contradictory phenomena of nature preclude their consistent comprehension leads to another appearance of an irony of nature that schubert is interested in. in this case, the way in which nature or dreams are represented causes the ironic distance. in the same way that symbols of dreaming violate ordinary codes of meaning, thinking, and logic in general, we can recognize a “peculiar association of ideas”28 in nature that shows an “arrangement of the widest contradictions”:29 “death and marriage, marriage and death are situated quite close to each other in the association of ideas in nature as in a dream: one seems to mean the other, one seems to cause the other, or presuppose it.”30 an example is the observation quoted by Kierkegaard in his journals and in the “diapsalmata” of Either/Or i: “the female of some kinds of insects kills her male right after copulation and cuts it into pieces.”31 in the following part i schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 183: “Phänomen zweier voneinander geschiedener, in sich selber wohl zusammenhängenden Individualitäten, die auf eine wundersame Weise in einer und derselben Person geeint sind.” 24 ibid., p. 192: “eine ganz erdichtete, wohl zusammenhängende Geschichte als ihre eigne zu erzählen weiß.” 25 Cf. ibid., pp. 186–90. 26 Cf. ingrid strohschneider-Kohrs, Die romantische Ironie in Theorie und Gestaltung, tübingen: niemeyer 1977, pp. 155f. 27 schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 24: “jenen Widerspruch, in welchem die poetische Welt mit der nicht poetischen steht.” 28 ibid., p. 38: “eigentümliche Ideenassociation.” 29 ibid., p. 41: “Zusammenstellung der entferntesten Gegensätze.” 30 ibid., p. 39: “Tod und Hochzeit, Hochzeit und Tod liegen sich in der Ideenassociation der Natur so nahe, wie in der des Traumes, eins scheint oft das andere zu bedeuten, eins das andere herbeizuführen oder vorauszusetzen.” 31 ibid., p. 41: “wenn das Weibchen mancher Insekten sein Männchen gleich nach der Begattung umbringt und zerstückt,” SKS 2, 28 / EO1, 20; cf. SKS 19, 209, not7:19 / JP 1, 805. 23

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will show that Kierkegaard was quite interested in these phenomena of the human experience of finitude. II. Kierkegaard’s Reading of Schubert Kierkegaard’s general understanding of nature is largely in line with romantic conceptions of nature. He conceives of nature as a living organism which imbues us with a presentiment of “the whole in its totality.”32 within this rather nondescript romantic understanding of nature, however, we can trace striking parallels with Schubert’s definition of nature, even though there is no positive evidence that he took his ideas directly from schubert.33 in Kierkegaard’s view, nature can become an “illustrated legend,” a “symbol,” or an “augury” of the eternal precisely by making the divine visible or perceptible.34 Kierkegaard’s explanation for this possibility of a higher form of experience is strikingly similar to schubert’s notion of a hieroglyphic language: he speaks of the “enigmatic speech”35 of nature and claims that nature becomes an “eternal symbol of eternity”36 precisely through its inaccessibility. in nature, we may apprehend what will always remain incommensurable with our ordinary language.37 we may well assume that Kierkegaard’s fondness for the twilight atmosphere of dusky evenings can also be attributed to this mysterious quality of nature: the “nocturnal mist” only allows for “semitransparency.”38 This definition of nature as a mysterious image of the divine is clearly in accordance with schubert. Furthermore, Kierkegaard comprehends presentiment, much like schubert does, as the form of the subjective perception of the meaning of nature.39 an explicit allusion to schubert can be found in the context of a discussion of an irony of nature in the journal entry dd:18 from 6 July 1837. in its second part, Kierkegaard elucidates the differences between the greek and modern approaches to life with regard to their respective understandings of irony. accommodating romantic conceptions of the relationship between classical antiquity and the modern age, Kierkegaard speaks of a beautiful harmony with nature in classical times. the modern age characterized by Christianity has radically broken with this idea, judging “all nature” as “corrupt.”40 it is not without a certain irony that Kierkegaard himself then describes the concept of an irony of nature that he had borrowed from Pap. i a 68 / JP 5, 5099. with regard to Kierkegaard’s understanding of nature in respect to schubert, see arild Christensen, Kierkegaard og Naturen, Copenhagen: graabrødre torv’s antikvariat. v. severin petersen 1964, especially pp. 9–55. 34 SKS 17, 7, aa:1 / JP 5, 5094. SKS 7, 215 / CUP1, 236. SKS 2, 431 / EO1, 444. 35 SKS 7, 214 / CUP1, 235. 36 SKS 7, 215 / CUP1, 236. 37 Cf. SKS 6, 24f. / SLW, 17f. 38 SKS 7, 214 / CUP1, 235; cf. SKS 6, 24 / SLW, 17f. 39 Cf. SKS 17, 248, dd:80 / JP 1, 92: “presentiment is the homesickness of earthly life for the higher, for the perspicuity which man must have had in his paradisic life.” 40 SKS 17, 225, dd:18 / JP 2, 1690. 32 33

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schubert as a form of “revenge” plotted by nature in response to this treatment.41 in its inherent irony, nature mirrors the spiritual longings of modern times. the irony of nature thus signifies an awareness of the division between nature and the human consciousness which results from the phenomena described by schubert. in The Concept of Irony Kierkegaard turns to these phenomena and cites two examples in more detail.42 even if Kierkegaard’s reading of schubert thus proves to be generally affirmative, it also contains an implicit criticism that can already be discerned in the journal entry mentioned above. Kierkegaard understands schubert’s account of an irony of nature historically, or relative to historic phenomena, when he states that this insight is “something the greeks knew nothing about.”43 already in this entry Kierkegaard suggests that the idea of an irony of nature depends on the state of the perceiving consciousness. “irony” is not an objective quality of nature but an attribute ascribed to nature by the reflecting subject. This cautious modification of Schubert’s philosophy of nature will later become the central point of Kierkegaard’s criticism of schubert in The Concept of Irony. there Kierkegaard explicitly rejects an objective understanding of an irony of nature, arguing that irony is a concept of the mind. irony is “conscious only to the one who has an eye for it.”44 Kierkegaard concedes that schubert has discovered ironic situations in nature. He differs from schubert, however, by explaining irony as a specifically Christian sort of understanding. “this discrepancy is not intrinsic to nature…but it appears in nature to the person who is ironically advanced.”45 the difference between the greek and the modern understandings of nature can only be adequately understood on the basis of a theory of subjectivity. i would now like to examine the wider context in which Kierkegaard discusses schubert’s concept of an irony of nature. this wider context is constituted by Kierkegaard’s doctrine of sin. the concept of an irony of nature and Kierkegaard’s doctrine of sin are connected by the attitude of humor. in journal entry dd:18, Kierkegaard already understands humor as the subjective attitude that causes an intuition of an irony of nature. Four years later, in the footnote in The Concept of Schubert had clarified that the irony of nature is her reaction to an attitude of mankind by observing that nature seems “to mock our miserable pleasure and our pleasant misery by laughing at us from the grave and sounding her mournful dirges by the bedside of the newlywed, curiously pairing lamentation with pleasure and jest with grief.” schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 38: “über unsere elende Lust und lustiges Elend zu spotten, wenn sie bald aus Gräbern uns anlacht, bald an Hochzeitsbetten ihre Trauerklagen hören läßt, und auf diese Weise Klage mit Lust, Fröhlichkeit mit Trauer wunderlich paart.” 42 SKS 1, 293f. / CI, 254f. First, Kierkegaard refers to the “voice of nature on Ceylon, the air music, which sings a frightful, merry minuet in the tone of a profoundly plaintive, heartrending voice” (cf. schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 38). Kierkegaard repeats this example in SKS 1, 295 / CI, 256; SKS 4, 304 / PF, 108; SKS 17, 21, aa:12 / JP 5, 5092; and Pap. Xi–1 a 247 / JP 3, 3623. second, in SKS 17, 225, dd:18f. / JP 2, 1695, he writes: “in nature’s association of ideas, the rational and moderate human being is immediately succeeded by the ridiculous ape” (cf. schubert, Symbolik, op. cit., p. 41). 43 SKS 17, 225, dd:18f. / JP 2, 1695. 44 SKS 1, 293 / CI, 254. 45 ibid. 41

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Irony referred to above, Kierkegaard establishes its connection with the doctrine of sin: “this irony in nature has been placed in a footnote because only the humorous individual actually perceives it, since it is actually only through the contemplation of sin in the world that the ironic interpretation of nature really emerges.”46 irony of nature thus is a result of a person’s consciousness that he or she acts in contradiction to the consciousness of an offense against the vocation of mankind. in order to draw some parallels with schubert, i will outline the development of Kierkegaard’s doctrine of sin with reference to the meaning of nature and the unconscious. Kierkegaard’s doctrine of sin, which is elaborated in detail in The Concept of Anxiety, is for the first time hinted at in the journal entry B:42.b, from early 1837. in a wider context, BB:42 explores a presentiment that causes a predisposition to fate with regard to a future event.47 Kierkegaard brings this reflection to bear on the question of the origin of sin. Here Kierkegaard refers to schubert. schubert understood the memory of a disease as “a sign of a renewed susceptibility to the same disease.”48 with this in mind, Kierkegaard draws a parallel between the fear that creates sin and the predisposition to disease. Furthermore, schubert mentions physical disease merely as an analogy for the susceptibility to spiritual longing. the wider context of the Symbolik elaborates this longing of the spirit as the possibility of either aiming at “something higher than itself,” or of aiming “downward.”49 the relationship to the future established by spiritual longing is therefore rather ambivalent in that it contains the possibility of either achieving or failing to achieve the spiritual vocation of man. Kierkegaard specifies this uncertainty by conceiving of fear as the anticipation of this offense. thus, Kierkegaard concludes, “every sin begins with fear.”50 since this anticipation of sin implies a susceptibility to sin, it becomes clear why Kierkegaard, with schubert in mind, characterizes fear as the beginning of sin. it also becomes clear that this susceptibility is based on a natural disposition or a fateful entanglement. Journal entry CC:15 gives us a more specific idea of what Kierkegaard regarded as a natural disposition. this entry is strongly reminiscent of the Symbolik even though Kierkegaard does not mention schubert. First, Kierkegaard describes fantasy as an image of a future reality that is already becoming real as it is being imagined.51 in a second step, Kierkegaard outlines this imaginary becoming as an experience of being overwhelmed, an experience out of the control of consciousness. what used to be imputed to the conscious life seems to arise from an unconscious sphere that is impervious to the will and therefore essentially unfree. “every time i want to say something, someone else says it at the same time.”52 Kierkegaard describes this SKS 1, 294 / CI, 255. Cf. SKS 17, 134, BB:42 / JP 1, 91: “a certain presentiment seems to precede everything which is to happen.” 48 schubert, Symbolik, p. 155: “ein Zeichen für die wieder eingetretene Empfänglichkeit für jene Krankheit.” 49 schubert, Symbolik, p. 153: “nach etwas Höherem als er selber ist”; “nach unten.” 50 SKS 17, 134f., BB:42e. 51 Cf. SKS 17, 205, CC:15 / JP 5, 5186: “the trouble is that as soon as one has thought up something, he becomes that himself.” 52 SKS 17, 205, CC:15 / JP 5, 5186. 46 47

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experience of the loss of conscious control of the will as a splitting up of personality: “it is just as if i were a double-thinker and my other ‘i’ continually anticipates me, or while i stand and talk everyone believes it is someone else.”53 even if we assign the figure of the double-thinker to Kierkegaard’s reading of E.T.A. Hoffmann, we find the presuppositions for this concept in then contemporary psychology that is represented by schubert’s Symbolik des Traumes.54 much like schubert, Kierkegaard implies the idea of another “i” that descends from the sphere of the unconscious and mysteriously precedes conscious life. Conscious life is forced into the role of a mere observer.55 i will now focus on what effect the unconscious has on Kierkegaard’s understanding of sin. We can find Kierkegaard’s first in-depth reflection on guilt and sin in Either/Or. the predetermination implied in destiny and a person’s natural disposition deeply influence the aesthete’s understanding of sin. The ethicist in the second part, by contrast, tries to rule out these influences. This tension can be regarded as the characteristic point of Kierkegaard’s doctrine of sin. Kierkegaard’s concepts of melancholy and depression (Tungsind) represent this ambivalence most strikingly.56 in journal entry CC:15, consciousness, while being brought into existence by presentiment, is confronted with its unconscious prerequisites. thus, the melancholy or depressive person faces a bodily and mental predisposition that he cannot control by willpower. the esthete integrates these unconscious prerequisites into his concept of “tragic guilt,” which vacillates “between guilt and guiltlessness.”57 on the one hand, tragic guilt is based on will and consciousness. on the other hand, the reasons that lead to this offense are not within the agent’s power. From this perspective, guilt shows an “aesthetic ambiguity.”58 in contrast to this, the ethicist interprets depression as a phenomenon of free will. depression becomes a major problem for the genesis of the ethical consciousness at the exact moment “when the spirit…wants to lay hold of itself as spirit.”59 as an ineluctable natural disposition, depression leads to a fundamental disturbance of the genesis of spirit. the ethicist agrees with the aesthete that “there is something ibid. Hoffmann, for his part, read schubert intensively. 55 another parallel with schubert can be discerned when Kierkegaard introduces the hermeneutics of insanity as a mode of self-knowledge: “no, i will not leave the world—i will go into an insane asylum, and i will see if the profundity of insanity will unravel the riddle of life” (SKS 17, 205, CC:15 / JP 5, 5186). this understanding of insanity as a perception of a different and higher sphere has its foundations in the psychological views expressed in schubert’s Symbolik. 56 michael theunissen tried to solve this ambivalence of Kierkegaard’s concept of melancholy and depression (Tungsind) by differentiating between these terms. the term “depression” is associated with the guilt of one’s own doing. By contrast, the concept of “melancholy” displays an inborn qualification. see “melancholie und acedia. motive zur zweitbesten Fahrt in der moderne,” in Entzauberte Zeit. Der melancholische Geist der Moderne, ed. by ludger Heidebrink, munich: C. Hanser 1997, pp. 16–41, here pp. 33–6. 57 SKS 2, 152 / EO1, 154. 58 SKS 2, 150 / EO1, 151. 59 SKS 3, 183 / EO2, 188. 53 54

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unexplainable in depression.”60 despite this diagnosis, the ethicist tries to control the despair of depression by interpreting it as sin. the offense of the human self as spirit in depression is interpreted as a result of his independent will. thus the ethicist asserts that “depression is sin.”61 therefore, ethical transparency is possible only if the ethical person accepts depression as sin. “tragic guilt” and “sin” are thus interpretive concepts for the aesthetic stage and the ethical–religious stage. Kierkegaard’s rejection of schubert’s ontological understanding of an irony of nature is here repeated at a higher level. accordingly, in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard also rejects an understanding of the genesis of sin as a natural occurrence on the basis of an ethical–religious interpretation, that is, in terms of the Christian doctrine. Especially in the first chapter, § 1, “Objective anxiety,” and the fourth chapter, § 2, “i. Freedom lost somatically-psychically,” Kierkegaard argues against a characterization of nature in and of itself—that is, of nature as independent of its conscious interpretation—as fallen. in this context Kierkegaard explicitly opposes “[s]ome men of schelling’s school;”62 and a footnote that was not printed explains that he was thinking of—among others—schubert.63 in these passages, Kierkegaard clearly disapproves of the assumption of sin as natural. in the passages where Kierkegaard considers a psychological investigation of the genesis of sin to be the prerequisite of its doctrinal understanding, however, there are strong parallels with schubert’s psychology in the Symbolik. Focusing on this psychological argumentation in The Concept of Anxiety, i will return to Kierkegaard’s understanding of the unconscious and to his conception of the interrelation between the sphere of body and soul, on the one hand, and the sphere of spirit, on the other. the ambivalence of sin—ambivalent in the sense that it is sometimes understood from a spiritual, Christian perspective, and sometimes from a psycho-social perspective—is systematically analyzed in The Concept of Anxiety. especially Kierkegaard’s examination of the state of consciousness in the moment of the genesis of anxiety is distinctly reminiscent of schubert. at this point, Kierkegaard makes use of schubert’s ambivalent interpretation of the dream, asserting that “[a]nxiety is a qualification of dreaming spirit.”64 schubert’s conviction that the spiritual world becomes partly visible in a dream,65 which functions as the “mirror of a higher, more powerful, superior spiritual order,”66 is expressed by Kierkegaard in a similar

SKS 3, 183 / EO2, 189. ibid. 62 SKS 4, 363 / CA, 59. 63 Cf. Pap. v B 53.18. 64 SKS 4, 347 / CA, 41. especially Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the ambiguity of dreaming refers to schubert’s Symbolik rather than to Karl rosenkranz’s Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, pp. 108–42 (ASKB 744), which Kierkegaard quotes frequently in The Concept of Anxiety. Furthermore rosenkranz also cites schubert’s Symbolik in his investigation of dreaming—even if the quotations are partly critical (cf. pp. 117, 121). 65 Cf. schubert, Symbolik, pp. 274–7. 66 schubert, Symbolik, p. 18: “spiegel einer höheren, mächtigern, ober ihr stehenden geistigen Ordnung zu sein.” Cf. pp. 152, 274. 60 61

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way: “dreamily the spirit projects its own actuality.”67 as in schubert, the dream thus negotiates between the unconscious and the conscious spheres, that is, between the unconscious sphere and the sphere of the life of spirit: “awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is an intimated nothing.”68 in this passage from The Concept of Anxiety, just as in schubert’s Symbolik, the dreaming consciousness points precisely to the ambivalence of the presentiment of spirit that arises from the fact that man can fail to achieve his real spiritual vocation due to his psycho-physical constitution. the possibility of this offense is based on human nature as a synthesis of the psychical and the physical. schubert recognizes the ambiguity of the genesis of the spirit in the fact that, while dreaming, the spirit is not represented in its own sphere but only in the sphere of the lower cognitive faculty. a dreaming intuition recognizes spirit as the other, that is, as a different principle that is separated from the psycho-physical. in his own words, Kierkegaard expresses the dreaming intuition of the spirit in such a way that the dreaming spirit “has itself outside of itself.”69 Furthermore, Kierkegaard describes “the difference between myself and my other”70 in dream as a duality in the self. in this duality, the unconscious psycho-physical unity faces spirit as an “anxious possibility.”71 while dreaming, we can apprehend the spirit as a “hostile” or as a “friendly power”—in any case, spirit seems to be a “foreign power” and therefore an “ambiguous power.”72 Kierkegaard reconstructs the concept of anxiety that results from the dreaming intuition of the spirit as the psychological prerequisite for the doctrine of sin.73 Kierkegaard’s treatise on anxiety investigates the space between the dreaming perception of the other found in finite consciousness and the reconciliation of the two spheres to which schubert only alludes. in the space between these two states, Kierkegaard describes anxiety toward freedom as the basic form of the human relationship to oneself as spirit. III. Conclusion summing up the preceding analysis, one can say that the concept of an irony of nature seems to be an obvious proof of Schubert’s influence on Kierkegaard, as are a number of passages from schubert’s Symbolik which Kierkegaard used on different SKS 4, 347 / CA, 41. SKS 4, 347 / CA, 41f. 69 SKS 4, 349 / CA, 44. Cf. SKS 4, 347f. / CA, 42: “the actuality of the spirit constantly shows itself as a form that tempts its possibility but disappears as soon as it seeks to grasp for it.” 70 SKS 4, 347 / CA, 41. 71 SKS 4, 350 / CA, 44. the possibility of spirit is anxious because the spirit “constantly disturbs the relation between soul and body” (SKS 4, 349 / CA, 42). 72 SKS 4, 349 / CA, 43f. especially the experience of the phenomenon of dream as a “hostile power” cannot be found in rosenkranz’s Psychologie. 73 thus, Kierkegaard takes up the aesthete’s understanding of guilt in The Concept of Anxiety. 67 68

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occasions. the irony of nature is an important aspect of Kierkegaard’s romantic understanding of nature. in contrast to schubert, however, Kierkegaard strives to found nature on a theory of consciousness. the fact that schubert abstains from a theory of subjectivity signifies the main difference between Kierkegaard and Schubert. Not quite as obvious is Schubert’s influence on Kierkegaard’s understanding of sin. as i have tried to demonstrate above, Kierkegaard’s presentation of the genesis of the self as spirit with regard to the question of the unconscious hints at various aspects of schubert’s Symbolik. First, Kierkegaard elaborated his conception of fear and anxiety on the basis of schubert’s understanding of the ambivalence of presentiment. second, for Kierkegaard sin manifests itself in the form of mental illnesses in which the psychology of the time was especially interested: depression, melancholy, and split personality. all these mental illnesses show phenomena of the unconscious. third, in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard uses the image of dreaming in accordance with schubert’s use in the Symbolik. it can be assumed that Kierkegaard developed his understanding of anxiety as a dreaming state of consciousness with regard to schubert’s psychology of dreaming. thus, even if Kierkegaard is not especially interested in Schubert’s scientific efforts, we can still suppose that Kierkegaard’s reading of schubert initiated some important processes of clarification that characterize Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relationship between nature, sin, and religious consciousness.

Bibliography I. Schubert’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Die Symbolik des Traumes, 2nd ed., Bamberg: Kunz 1821 [1814] (ASKB 776). Die Geschichte der Seele, vols. 1–2, stuttgart and tübingen: Cotta 1830 (ASKB u 97). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Schubert Baader, Franz von, Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik, vol. 1, stuttgart und tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1828 (ASKB 396) [vols. 2–5, münster: theissing 1830–38], vol. 5, 1838, p. 40; pp. 100–1. —— Philosophische Schriften und Aufsätze, vols. 1–2, münster: theissing 1831–32, vol. 2, p. xxv; pp. 34–5; p. 37; p. 46; p. 48n; p. 52n; 58n (ASKB 400–401). —— Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung. Sendeschreiben an den Herrn Professor Molitor in Frankfurt, vols. 1–3, würzburg: in Commission der stahel’schen Buchhandlung 1837, vol. 2, p. 8n (vols. 1–2, ASKB 409–410) (vol. 3, ASKB 413). erdmann, Johann eduard, Leib und Seele nach ihrem Begriff und ihrem Verhältniß zu einander. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der philosophischen Anthropologie, Halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1837, p. 17; pp. 115–16 (ASKB 480). —— Grundriss der Psychologie. Für Vorlesungen, leipzig: Fr. Chr. vogel 1840, p. 18 (ASKB 481). Fichte, immanuel Hermann, Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie, stuttgart and tübingen: J. g. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 1826, p. 129; pp. 186f.; p. 225; p. 235 (ASKB 501). —— Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer, elberfeld: Büschler’sche verlagsbuchhandlung und Buchdruckerei 1834, p. 157 (ASKB 505). günther, anton and Johann Heinrich pabst, Janusköpfe. Zur Philosophie und Theologie, vienna: wallishausser 1834, p. 102 (ASKB 524). Hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1833–34 [vols. 3–5 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832– 45], vol. 1, pp. 335–6 (ASKB 552–554).

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—— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840– 45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1832– 45), vol. 2, pp. 645f. (ASKB 561–563). Helfferich, adolph, Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen, vols. 1–2, gotha: Friedrich parthes 1842, vol. 1, p. 38 (ASKB 571– 572). menzel, wolfgang, Die deutsche Literatur, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart: Hallberg’sche verlagshandlung 1836, vol. 1, pp. 216ff.; pp. 313ff.; vol. 2, pp. 50–53; pp. 60ff. (ASKB u 79). mynster, Jakob peter, Om Hukommelsen. En psychologisk Undersögelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1849 (ASKB 692). —— Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 (vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57), vol. 1, p. 221n (ASKB 358–363). rosenkranz, Karl, Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, Königsberg: Bornträger 1837, p. 9; p. 68; p. 113; p. 117; p. 126 (ASKB 744). —— (ed.), Schelling. Vorlesungen, gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: Fr. sam. gerhard 1843, p. xviii; p. xxii; p. 10; p. 92; p. 233 (ASKB 766). schopenhauer, arthur, Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.w. Hayn 1851, vol. 1, p. 243 (ASKB 774–775). sibbern, Frederik Christian, Om Forholdet imellem Sjæl og Legeme, saavel i Almindelighed som i phrenologisk, pathognomonisk, physiogonomisk og ethisk Henseende i Særdeleshed, Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens eget Forlag 1849, p. 219; p. 455; p. 498; p. 502 (ASKB 781). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Schubert Christensen, arild, Kierkegaard og Naturen, Copenhagen: graabrødre torv’s antikvariat. v. severin petersen 1964, pp. 9–55. tjønneland, eivind, Ironie als Symptom. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Søren Kierkegaards Über den Begriff der Ironie, Frankfurt am main, new york: peter lang 2004, pp. 254–62.

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Kierkegaard’s references to trendelenburg’s works constitute an excellent example of the complexity of his relationship to contemporary philosophical positions. on the one hand, he designates the german logician as the modern philosopher from which he “most profited,” and he regrets not having attended his lectures while he was in Berlin;1 on the other, he incorporates some of trendelenburg’s arguments in his authorship, mainly for the purpose of underlining the importance of certain philosophical problems that he himself, however, does not investigate in a strictly systematic way. more importantly, Kierkegaard seems to recognize in trendelenburg’s works the development of some of his own philosophical intuitions. two journal entries from 1847 put the question of Kierkegaard’s debt to trendelenburg in the correct terms: “What I have profited from Trendelenburg is unbelievable; now I have the apparatus for what i had thought out years before.”2 And later in the first of the nB journals, at the time i wrote Repetition i had not yet read anything of his—and now that i have read him, how much more lucid and clear everything is to me. my relationship to him is very special. part of what has engrossed me for a long time is the whole doctrine of the categories (the problems pertaining to this are found in my older notes, on quarto pieces of paper).3

it is probable that the older papers referred to in this passage correspond to a set of reading notes from the years 1842–43, that the former edition of Kierkegaard’s Papirer includes under the section “philosophica.”4 they have the form of a series of unanswered questions starting with the entry: “Can there be a transition from a quantitative to a qualitative determination without a leap? and does not the whole of life rest in that?”5 trendelenburg is not mentioned in this context, but an entry from 1844 shows that Kierkegaard had read some of his works in order to explore SKS 20, 93, nB:132 / JP 5, 5978. SKS 19, 420, not13:55 / JP 5, 5977. 3 SKS 20, 93, nB:132 / JP 5, 5978. 4 as an example of this interpretation, see gregor malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1968, p. 81. 5 Pap. iv C 87 / JP 1, 261. 1 2

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the possibility of developing what he himself calls a “theory of the leap.”6 His interest in the distinction between the different types of logical inference and in the discussion of the categories of quantity and quality clearly has to do with his attempt to find the philosophical “apparatus” for his own thought. It is true that the notions of “the leap” and “transition” are developed in a more systematic fashion in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in a context in which Kierkegaard refers twice to trendelenburg and even quotes a particular passage from his Logische Untersuchungen.7 But even in this case, as will be shown later, it cannot be said that Kierkegaard’s “theory” builds on trendelenburg’s theses. In order to arrive at a more exact evaluation of Trendelenburg’s influence on Kierkegaard’s thinking, one must pay attention to the different elements of this relationship, namely, the characteristics of trendelenburg’s authorship and the degree of Kierkegaard’s access to it, the internal reasons for Kierkegaard’s interest in trendelenburg’s philosophy, the limitations of that interest, and the reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s main arguments that are implicitly or explicitly related to trendelenburg’s ideas. the examination of specialized literature on the relationship between the two authors, and on their interpretation of modern and classical thinkers that constitutes the background for their works, will be integrated in our investigation of these various aspects. I. Trendelenburg’s Authorship Friedrich adolf trendelenburg (1802–72)8 started his studies in philosophy and philology at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität of Kiel in 1822. Among his first teachers during this period we have to mention Karl leonhard reinhold (1758– 1823) and his successor Johan erich von Berger (1772–1833). arguably, reinhold’s Kantianism and von Berger’s interest in the epistemology of the natural sciences influenced Trendelenburg’s career in a decisive way, although the name of Georg Pap. v C 12 / JP 3, 2352. Friedrich adolf trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: Bethge 1840 (ASKB 843). 8 as the most important contributions to the study of trendelenburg’s biography and philosophy, see ernst Bratuschek, “adolf trendelenburg,” in Philosophische Monatshefte, vos. 1–30, Berlin: reimer 1868–94, vol. 8, 1872, pp. 1–14 and pp. 305–510; Ferdinande trendelenburg, geb. Becker, Ein Lebensbild aus ihren Aufzeichnungen und Briefen zusammengestellt für ihre Enkel und Urenkel, Halle: verlag der Buchhandlung des waisenhauses 1896; max lenz, “trendelenburg,” in Geschichte der Königlichen FriedrichWilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, vols. 1–4, Halle a.d.s.: verlag der Buchhandlung des waisenhauses 1910, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 486–8; Friedrich trendelenburg, Geschichte der Familie Trendelenburg. Für Kinder und Enkel, Halle a.d.s.: Buchdruckerei des waisenhauses 1921; Friedrich trendelenburg, Aus heiteren Jugendtagen, Berlin: J. springer 1924; peter petersen, Die Philosophie Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburgs, Hamburg: Boysen 1913; Klaus Christian Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1986. see also richard purkarthofer, “trendelenburg. traces of a profound and sober thinker in Kierkegaard’s Postscript,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2005, pp. 192–207. 6 7

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ludwig König (1766–1848), rector of the Gelehrtenschule of eutin, is also mentioned as an earlier source of his Kantian inspiration. at the university, he also attended courses on theology, mathematics, physics, astronomy, and meteorology. it is in connection with his main interest in the study of greek philology that he established himself in leipzig during the academic year 1823–24, just before he moved to Berlin, where he pursued studies in philology and linguistics, and where he also had the occasion to attend the lectures of Hegel, steffens, and schleiermacher. after obtaining his degree with the dissertation, Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, in 1826,9 he worked for seven years as a private tutor for the son of the official Karl Ferdinand von Nagler (1770–1848) in Berlin. invited to contribute to the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik upon Hegel’s recommendation, trendelenburg already appeared as a critic of Hegelianism in his 1827 unpublished review of Karl michelet’s (1801–93) Die Ethik des Aristoteles.10 trendelenburg’s edition of aristotle’s De anima, which was prepared on the basis of medieval manuscripts, and De Aristotelis categoriis were both published in 1833.11 the same year he was awarded a position as extraordinary professor in practical philosophy and pedagogy at the university of Berlin, along with a position at the ministry of religion and Culture. in 1837 he was appointed as ordinary professor in the same discipline, a position he would maintain until his death in 1872. apart from being an indication of his interest in greek, particularly aristotelian philosophy, trendelenburg’s early publications are consistent with his efforts to underline the importance of classical studies in the secondary school. the editions Elementa logices Aristotelicae; in usum scholarum ex Aristotele excerpsit, convertit, illustravit,12 De Platonis Philebi consilio,13 and Erläuterungen zur den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, zunächst für den Unterricht in Gymnasien14 were intended for the same pedagogical purpose. the orientation of his own philosophical ideas is mainly indicated in the two volumes of his aforementioned Logische trendelenburg, Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, leipzig: vogel 1826. 10 Karl ludwig michelet, Die Ethik des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnisse zum System der Moral, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1827. 11 Aristotelis de anima libri tres. Ad interpretum græcorum auctoritatem et codicum fidem recognovit commentariis illustravit, ed. by Frider. adolph. trendelenburg, Jena: walz 1833 (ASKB 1079); De Aristotelis categoriis, ed. by Frid. ad. trendelenburg, Berlin: petsch 1833. 12 Elementa logices Aristotelicae: in usum scholarum ex Aristotele excerpsit, convertit, illustravit, ed. by Friedrich adolf trendelenburg, Berlin: Bethge 1836 (ASKB 844). also known under the title Excerpta ex organo Aristotelis, the edition contains a didactically ordered selection of texts from the Organon, predominantly from the Analytica priora, Analytica posteriora and Topica, but also a few passages of epistemological character taken from other works of aristotle, including De anima, Metaphysica, Ethica Nichomachea, De partibus animalium, and De coelo. 13 De Platonis Philebi consilio, ed. by Friedrich adolf trendelenburg, Berlin: Bethge 1837 (ASKB 842). 14 trendelenburg, Erläuterungen zur den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, zunächst für den Unterricht in Gymnasien, Berlin: Bethge 1842 (ASKB 845). 9

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Untersuchungen, in which he explores the logical foundations of scientific method and calls into question the validity of dialectical or speculative logic. the polemical tone of trendelenburg’s determination of the concept of logic is even clearer in Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System: Zwei Streitschriften,15 written as a response to the Hegelian critiques to the Logische Untersuchungen.16 when one takes into account both the philological work and the characteristics of the logical and epistemological discussions in which trendelenburg was engaged between 1833 and 1843, his Geschichte der Kategorienlehre can certainly be seen as the mature outcome of several years of investigation.17 during the following three decades, trendelenburg devoted a number of writings to the study of the philosophies of spinoza, leibniz, Kant, Herbart, and others. among his systematic works, apart from his writings on logic, the treatise on aesthetics Niobe: Einige Betrachtungen über das Schöne und Erhabene,18 and a later one on the theory of law, Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik,19 are worthy of mention. II. Framing Kierkegaard’s Reading of Trendelenburg: The “Greeks” and the “Hegelians” we can at least be certain that Kierkegaard knew a number of those of trendelenburg’s works published between 1826 and 1846. The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s personal library informs us that he owned eight texts written or edited by the german philosopher, namely, Elementa logices Aristotelicae, Erläuterungen zur den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrate, Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System, Logische Untersuchungen, Niobe, Aristotelis de anima libri tres, and Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. the first two of these texts were bought at the beginning of 1843, and Kierkegaard’s first significant reference to the author appears in the same year, in the form of a very succinct annotation in his own copy of his dissertation, The Concept of Irony: “socrates is mentioned as using the parable. aristotle, Rhetoric, ii, ch. 20. the same passage is usually cited as an example of an incorrect analogical conclusion.”20 More specifically, the papers from 1844 point to a thematic field whose delimitation had been made possible by the reading of Elementa logices Aristotelicae, Erläuterungen and Logische Untersuchungen, namely, the theory of inference and, particularly, the idea of negative or indirect inference: trendelenburg, Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System: Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1843 (ASKB 846). 16 Cf. in particular georg andreas gabler, Die Hegelsche Philosophie: Beitrage zu ihrer richtigeren Beurtheilung und Würdigung, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1843. 17 Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855]. 18 trendelenburg, Niobe: Einige Betrachtungen über das Schöne und Erhabene, Berlin: Bethge 1846 (ASKB 847). 19 trendelenburg, Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, leipzig: Hirzel 1860. 20 Pap. iv a 205 / JP 4, 4252. see trendelenburg, Erläuterungen zur den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, op. cit. 15

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Basic principles [De øverste Principer] can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively). this idea is frequently found and developed in trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen.…the possibility of concluding negatively far outweighs that of affirmation in modes of concluding; cf. Trendelenburg’s Erläuterungen to his Aristotelian Logic, p. 58. By analogy and induction the conclusion can be reached only by a leap. all other conclusions are essentially tautological.21

in another passage from 1844—a drafted and never used “note” corresponding to the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety—Kierkegaard refers to trendelenburg’s Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System as a direct denunciation of the “unwarranted use of the negative in logic.”22 parallel to the logical problem of “incorrect inference,” Kierkegaard’s writings from this period start by focusing on the discussion of the notion of movement (or κινησις), to which trendelenburg, for different reasons, had devoted an important section of his Logische Untersuchungen.23 even when, in 1847, Kierkegaard emphasizes the importance of trendelenburg’s Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, he has fundamentally in mind the fact that the aristotelian table of categories can be used as an analytical instrument in the investigation of the nature of movement.24 a closer examination of Kierkegaard’s early philosophical annotations, however, would show that the discussion of the notion of “movement” was already the guiding motif in his general approach to Greek texts. One of the first allusions to the problem is made in connection with his reading of the third volume of tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie: the transition from possibility to actuality is a change—thus tennemann translates κινησις; if this is correct, this sentence is of utmost importance (cf. p. 127). κινησις is difficult to define, because it belongs neither to possibility nor to actuality, is more than possibility and less than actuality.…25 SKS 18, 225, JJ:266 / JP 3, 2341. on the margin of the same annotation, Kierkegaard also refers to trendelenburg’s “Elementa, pp. 15 and different places in Logische Untersuchungen.” see trendelenburg, Erläuterungen zur den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, op. cit., § 30, pp. 57f.; Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 320ff. Cf. aristotle, Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 23, 41a 23; Book i, Chapter 25, 86b 33; Book i Chapter 26, 87a 1. 22 Pap. v B 49.6, p. 108 / CA, 181. 23 Pap. vi B 38 / CUP2, 33. 24 SKS 19, 420, not13:55 / JP 5, 5977: “kinesis in the diversity of the categories is as follows: in substance—γενεσις-φθορα; in quantity—αυξησις-φθισις; in quality— αλλοιωσις; in relation—φορα. see trendelenburg’s two treatises on the doctrine of categories, p. 188. see p. 163. see pp. 136–137. see p. 99”. 25 SKS 19, 395, not13:27 / JP 1, 258. Cf. wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–5, leipzig: Barth 1798–1805, vol. 3, 1801, p. 127: “Die Veränderung ist nun überhaupt, da sich bei jedem Dinge Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit unterscheiden läßt, die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, insofern es ist. Das heißt jedes Ding läßt sich als möglich und als wirklich denken, und wirklich ist es dann, wenn es von der Möglichkeit zur Wirklichkeit übergangen ist. Der Übergang nun von der Möglichkeit zur Wirklichkeit ist Veränderung (kinesis). Bestimmter würde man sich ausdrücken, wenn man sagte: Veränderung, Bewegung ist die Wirklichmachung des Möglichen, insofern es möglich ist.” Cf. aristotle, Physics, Book iii, Chapter 1. 21

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He then adds in the margin: “all this deserves attention with respect to the movements in logic.”26 the passage from tennemann’s treatise to which Kierkegaard refers in this entry is actually a comment on the Aristotelian definition of movement in the Physics. nevertheless, other fragments contained in some loose papers from approximately the same period indicate a use of the notion of movement in connection with a broader constellation of philosophical problems. the category to which i want to refer everything, inasmuch as it is the latent category in greek sophistry when it is seen from the perspective of universal history, is: movement (κινησις), which is maybe one of the most difficult problems in all philosophy. In the newest philosophy, it has found another expression, namely: transition and mediation.27

in these lines, “movement” or “change” seems to be also understood as historical becoming, and that is probably what Kierkegaard has in mind when, on another page of the same collection of notes, he asks himself: “What is the historical significance of the category?,” and “what about the world-historical development, which is so much used in these days?”28 the fact that “the newest philosophy,” according to the above quoted passage, interprets the greek concept of κινησις in terms of “transition and mediation,” has to do with the increasing attention paid to both the logical and the historical dimension of the problem of becoming. Kierkegaard’s encounter with trendelenburg’s ideas appears in this context, although it is not possible to determine whether the reading of tennemann’s chapter on aristotle was, in turn, motivated by even earlier philosophical readings. it is at least clear that Kierkegaard could expect to find in Trendelenburg’s writings an evaluation of the differences between the greek (aristotelian) and the modern (Hegelian) concept of becoming. in fact, the two themes that lie at the center of Kierkegaard’s reading of trendelenburg, namely, “inference” and “movement,” appear to be profoundly linked to each other as soon as they are placed under the light of both authors’ critique of Hegelian philosophy. moreover, the reading of aristotle’s texts through trendelenburg’s presentation and interpretation plays a decisive and complex role in this critique. Kierkegaard’s allusions to the various forms of “negative inference” and to the illegitimacy of certain applications of it in logic, is related to his refusal of the Hegelian use of “the negative” as “the impelling power to bring movement into all things.”29 what seems to be at issue here is the fact that a logical form of inference has been confused with real negation, or, as Kierkegaard phrases it, the fact that real movement has been surreptitiously introduced into logic.30 in this sense, the critique of dialectical logic could not be exclusively based on the distinction between valid and invalid forms of inference, but it was supposed to involve at the same time a more fundamental discussion of the relation between “thought” and “being.”

26 27 28 29 30

SKS 19, 395, not13:27.b / JP 1, 258. Pap. iv C 97 / JP 5, 5601. Pap. iv C 90, 92 / JP 1, 40, 1028. SKS 4, 320 / CA, 12. ibid.

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Beyond aristotle’s syllogistic thinking, aristotle’s realism seemed to be the key to an effective critique of Hegelian logic. the general “doctrine of categories” to which both trendelenburg and Kierkegaard attached so much importance is actually to be interpreted as the doctrine of the relation between thought and being. it is precisely one of the decisive questions formulated by Kierkegaard in the loose papers from 1843: “should the category be derived from thinking or from being?”31 against the background of the aristotelian understanding of the problem of categories, trendelenburg’s fundamental merit consisted, according to Kierkegaard, in showing that the theory of modal categories should be a central issue in modern philosophical discussions: very likely what our age needs most to illuminate the relationship between logic and ontology is an examination of the concepts: possibility, actuality, and necessity. it is hoped, meanwhile, that the person who would do something along this line would be influenced by the Greeks. The Greek sobriety is seldom found in the philosophers of our day, and exceptional ingenuity is only a mediocre substitute. good comments are to be found in trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen; but trendelenburg was also shaped by the greeks.32

the same sort of nostalgia towards the “greek” way of thinking is also recognizable in the first context in which Kierkegaard deals with the problem of “logical movement,” namely, The Concept of Anxiety. that treatise, which, incidentally, was dedicated to “professor poul martin møller, the happy lover of greek culture,”33 began with the motto: “the age of making distinctions is past. it has been vanquished by the system.”34 The “distinction” that Kierkegaard has in mind is first of all the “socratic” differentiation between what is known and what is unknown.35 But the same methodological problem could be expressed in terms of the distinction between thinking and being or, according to the previously quoted passage, “between logic and ontology.” the idea that trendelenburg was also “well-schooled” or “educated” by the Greeks appears both in the drafts and in the definitive version of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. in this last case, moreover, the opposition between “greek” and “Hegelian” is explicit, although Kierkegaard avoids referring to the peculiarities of trendelenburg’s interpretation of aristotle: on this point, however, i am very happy to be able to refer to a man who thinks soundly and fortunately is educated by the greeks (rare qualities in our age!); a man who has known how to extricate himself and his thought from every trailing, grovelling relation to Hegel…a man who has preferred to be content with aristotle and with himself—i mean trendelenburg….i cannot attempt here to show the relation of his conception to Pap. iv C 91 / JP 1, 241. Pap. vi B 54.19, p. 150 / JP 1, 199. 33 SKS 4, 311 / CA, 5. 34 SKS 4, 310 / CA, 3. 35 the author of The Concept of Anxiety points also to another aspect of the “socratic” style, namely, the importance of the dialogue (see SKS 4, 323 / CA, 16). The significance of dialogue as opposed to Hegelian dialectics has been underlined by Hermann diem, Die Existenzdialektik von Sören Kierkegaard, zürich: evangelischer verlag 1950, pp. 8ff. 31 32

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As in some other cases, Kierkegaard seems to recognize in Trendelenburg first of all a certain “style” of thinking characterized by its sobriety and modesty. it can even be argued that trendelenburg’s philological approach to the greeks and, consequently, to the classical problems of history of philosophy, was in Kierkegaard’s eyes a model clearly opposed to what he describes as the “confounded mendacity which entered into philosophy with Hegel, the endless insinuating and betraying, and the parading and spinning out of one or another single passage in greek philosophy.”37 But the accuracy of these remarks does not allow us to remain ignorant of the thematic connection between trendelenburg’s and Kierkegaard’s thoughts. this becomes evident even in passages in which the opposition between the greek–socratic and the speculative–Hegelian styles of thinking takes the form of the encounter between literary characters, as is the case in the fragment entitled, “the dialectics of Beginning.” in what is described as a “scene in the underworld,” the character of socrates appears seated “in the cool [of evening] by a fountain, listening,” whereas Hegel is sitting at a desk “reading trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen, ii, p. 198.”38 The double confrontation of Hegelianism with the figures of both socrates and trendelenburg should be carefully analyzed. let us remark that the point of controversy between the characters is indicated by socrates’ question as to how to “begin” thinking—to which the character representing Hegel responds that he prefers to start “with nothing,” that is, without presuppositions. apart from the ironically “socratic” objection, according to which to begin without presuppositions would be not to begin at all, the page of the Logische Untersuchungen alluded to in this passage contains the key to a philosophical critique of Hegelianism. III. “Immediacy” and the Beginning of Thinking: The Aristotelian Context the page in question corresponds to Chapter Xiv, “the Form of Judgment,” where trendelenburg characterizes the Hegelian dialectic as the method that, by virtue of mediation, seems to be able to move from immediacy “to the self-determined totality” [zum selbstbestimmten Ganze]. in terms of a theory of categories, that would imply to “start with the judgment of an accidental and sensuous quality” and to “complete itself in the apodictic judgment that, oriented towards the totality of the concept, represents a necessary connection between subject and predicate.”39 that is why trendelenburg can call attention to the fact that the immediate, with which the 36 37 38 39

SKS 7, 106f. / CUP1, 110. SKS 18, 231, JJ:288 / JP 3, 3300. Pap. vi a 145 / JP 3, 3306. trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 198.

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dialectical movement starts, “contains intuition [Anschauung],” something “that the logic of pure thought cannot yet know.”40 By pointing out the connection between “immediacy” and “the sensuous,” trendelenburg can call into question the presence of “the sensible in a logical development that has promised to move only within a thought divested of sensibility, without presuppositions.” thus, to the author of the Logische Untersuchungen, “the fraud of the pure dialectic without presuppositions” resides precisely “in the anticipated concept of the immediate.”41 In the fifth paragraph of the chapter on “the dialectical method” trendelenburg analyzes the role of this concept in Hegel’s Science of Logic. irreducible to aristotle’s view of the immediate as that which “is not deduced from something else,” the immediate can, in this context, designate only what is mediated in itself to the extent that the mediaton is sublated from the outside. thus, this is called “being-for-itself” since it relates to itself, immediacy….this meaning of immediacy, which is otherwise not in common usage, is only conceivable in dialectics. But the word soon falls back from its newly won meaning to the old, inherited one. the immediacy of intuition or perception, which the mediating logic knows nothing of, silently yields when, for example, existence is designated immediate determinacy.…42

Kierkegaard’s particular interest in this aspect of the critique of Hegel’s dialectic is confirmed by another journal entry, in which he not only observes that “in Hegelian philosophy the immediate is used partly arbitrarily and partly surreptitiously (as the sensuous),” but also refers to trendelenburg’s comments on page 109 of the Erläuterungen concerning “the double meaning of immediacy in aristotle.”43 at first sight, what seems to be at issue here is an expression directly taken from the Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 2. after having established that the premises of a demonstration “must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it,” aristotle observes that “prior” [πρότερα] and “better known” [γνωσιμώτερα] are ambiguous terms, for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. i mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man; objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense.44

trendelenburg includes this important passage in his Elementa § 19.45 the section of the Erläuterungen in which he mentions the double meaning of the immediate, however, does not refer explicitly to that fragment but to a later paragraph of the anthology (Elementa § 51) that reproduces the context of the aristotelian passage we ibid. ibid., p. 199. 42 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 57. the paragraph continues with the enumeration of nine other examples in which, from logic to philosophy of religion, the application of the category of immediacy presupposes intuition. 43 SKS 18, 225, JJ:267 / JP 2, 1941. 44 aristotle, Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 2, 71b33. 45 trendelenburg, Elementa logices Aristotelae, op. cit., § 20; trendelenburg, Elemente der aristotelischen Logik, munich: rowohlt 1972, pp. 22ff. 40 41

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quoted above. in this case, trendelenburg focuses on two parallel remarks, namely, that “not all knowledge is demonstrative,” since “knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of demonstration”;46 and, when demonstration is needed, “we must not only know the primary premises—some if not all of them—beforehand, but know them better than the conclusion.”47 the fact that Kierkegaard puts this discussion in connection with the Hegelian misuse of the concept of immediacy suggests that, according to the interpretation he tries to recognize in trendelenburg’s texts, dialectical logic is based on the confusion of demonstrative knowledge and knowledge involving sensuous intuition. the two meanings of immediacy seem to correspond, on the one hand, to the immediate as that which is not demonstrated through a middle term (ἀμέσων) and, on the other, to that which is prior and better known because it is “nearer to sense” (ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἴσθητον). as we have seen, objects nearer to sense are, according to aristotle, prior and better known “to man,” whereas objects further from sense are prior and better known “in the order of being.” the distinction is important in order to understand to which extent, as it is said at the beginning of the Analytica posteriora, “all instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.”48 the primary passage commented on by trendelenburg on page 109 of the Erläuterungen deals with the exceptional cases in which scientific definitions are not obtained on the basis of “terms that are prior.”49 The first case mentioned by Aristotle in the Topics is the one in which “an opposite (ἀντικειμένον) has been defined through its opposite, e.g., good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature.” the sense of this remark should be confronted with the arguments that both trendelenburg and Kierkegaard use in their critique of the dialectical method, since Hegel’s Logic “starts” precisely by recognizing the necessary relationship between being and nothing. But the analysis of this critique is to be undertaken against the background of what we have characterized above as the philosophical frame of Kierkegaard’s encounter with trendelenburg, namely, the doctrine of the relationship between logic and ontology. this will bring us back to a closer consideration of the question concerning the presence of “movement” in logic.

trendelenburg, Elemente der aristotelischen Logik, op. cit., § 51, pp. 52f., corresponding to aristotle, Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 3, 72b 18. 47 trendelenburg, Elemente der aristotelischen Logik, op. cit., § 51, pp. 52ff., corresponding to aristotle, Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 2, 72a 27. 48 trendelenburg, Elemente der aristotelischen Logik, op. cit., § 18, pp. 22f., correponding to aristotle, Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 1, 71a 1. trendelenburg places this passage immediately before the one in which aristotle introduces the distinction between the two meanings of “prior and better known” (Analytica posteriora, Book i, Chapter 2, 71b 33). 49 trendelenburg, Elemente der aristotelischen Logik, op. cit., § 59, pp. 60ff., correponding to aristotle, Topics, Book vi, Chapter 4, 141b25; 142a22. 46

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IV. Movement/Being/Thought: Trendelenburg’s philosophia Fundamentalis and the Doctrine of Modal Categories it is not at all surprising that arguments inspired by the reading of aristotle’s Organon and, in particular, the distinction between the order of being and the order of knowledge, have been used and developed within the modern critique of idealism. what is characteristically “modern” in this critique, however, is the fact that the discussion that takes place between “idealist” and “realist” positions is now related to the question concerning the role of philosophy itself as a science with respect to the empirical knowledge of particular sciences. in fact, as soon as the problem of the articulation between ontology and logic is posited in this context, we can no longer reduce the position of a philosopher like trendelenburg to the mere attempt to reestablish the aristotelian concept of metaphysics as science of being qua being. apart from having been “educated by the greeks” in his philosophical style, trendelenburg was certainly trying to respond to modern problems with the instrument of modern, post-Kantian thinking. as maurizio mangiagalli suggests, trendelenburg’s project can be interpreted as being “equi-distant to both aristotelianism and the Kantian critique,” to the extent that the “critical foundation of realism” was for him “the only legitimate form of realism after the then recent developments of the dialectical view.”50 it is noteworthy that, already in his short introduction to the Logische Untersuchungen, Trendelenburg not only defines systematically the task and goal of philosophy as “the knowledge of the particular on the basis of totality,” but also describes the situation in which philosophy finds itself in modernity. Insofar as each one of the many philosophical systems that have shown up in modern times “begins anew with the totality” and “puts all the accent on the totality,” knowledge of the individual content moves forward not through philosophy but rather through the steady course of the individual sciences. the mutual understanding among the philosophical systems becomes difficult to the degree that they have no recognized common property as the sciences do.51

in the 1840 edition of the treatise, which was the one known by Kierkegaard, the first chapter starts precisely with an analysis of the concept of logic introduced in modern philosophy “through Kant,” namely, a logic that “attempts to conceive of maurizio mangiagalli, Logica e metafisica nel pensiero di Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, milan: Cusl 1983, p. 103. quoted by F. longato, “trendelenburg tra aristotele, Kant e Hegel,” in Bolletino della Società Filosofica Italiana, nuova serie note 123, 1984, p. 28. richard purkarthofer has shown that even the use of the expression “prima philosophia,” that Kierkegaard will later refer back to aristotle, had been used by trendelenburg’s Kantian teachers, K.l. reinhold and J.e. von Berger, in the sense of a “fundamental philosophy,” “science of sciences” or “science of principles” (cf. purkarthofer, “trendelenburg. traces of a profound and sober thinker in Kierkegaard’s Postscript,” op. cit., pp. 193ff.). on the idea according to which the “aristotelian” elements of trendelenburg’s inspiration are determined by the leibnizian reception of aristotle’s philosophy, see petersen, Die Philosophie Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburgs, op. cit., and m. mangiagalli, Logica e metafisica nel pensiero di Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, op. cit., p. 134. 51 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 2. 50

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the forms of thought in and for itself, without considering the content in which those forms appear.” Formal logic, in other words, tries to understand “the concept, judgement, and inference only on the basis of the activity of thought as related to itself.”52 trendelenburg’s critique of the “dialectical method” in the second chapter and, specifically, the critic of “pure thinking” that was to be adopted by Kierkegaard, are based on this determination of formal logic. in the editions of the Logische Untersuchungen published after Kierkegaard’s death, the section on formal logic is preceded by another chapter, in which trendelenburg discusses the connection between “logic and metaphysics as fundamental science.”53 what is made explicit here is the idea that every particular science refers not only to logic from the point of view of method, but also to metaphysics from the point of view of the content of knowledge. the articulation of logic and metaphysics in a general “theory of science”54 or philosophia fundamentalis55 implies the view according to which the basic problems of philosophy are to be dealt with by a “logic in the wider sense,” following the model of plato’s “dialectic.”56 in Die Logische Frage in Hegel’s System, Trendelenburg will even affirm that “logic must become a metaphysic of the actual sciences, in the sense that it must comprehend their real principles in order to comprehend the act of thinking within its sphere, and thus to become a true logic.”57 the same text alludes to schleiermacher’s view of philosophy as a “central science,” just in order to assert that “there is no center except with reference to the circumference,” and that “the time has come…to bring about a living connection between the central and the peripheral sciences.”58 as Köhnke has observed, the redefinition of the goal of logic with respect to the empirical sciences and “the interest in method, principles, and concepts” is a feature that trendelenburg’s project has in common with “the logic of the disciples of schleiermacher,” although it clearly differentiates itself from them “in the evaluation of the potential import of speculative thinking.”59 The difficulty of a simply realist critique of Hegel’s dialectics would consist in the fact that his Science of Logic as such “promises to provide in abundance what

ibid., p. 4. trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 3rd ed., leipzig: Hirzel 1870, pp. 4–14. note the use of the word “Wissenschaft” in the singular. 54 ibid., p. 11. 55 ibid., p. 14. 56 ibid., p. 12; p. 14. 57 trendelenburg, Die Logische Frage in Hegel’s System, op. cit., p. 50; trendelenburg, “the logical question in Hegel’s system,” trans. thomas davidson, in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vols. 1–22, ed. by w.t. Harris, st. louis, missouri: george Knapp & Co. 1867–93, vol. 5, 1872, pp. 349–61; p. 355. 58 ibid. 59 Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, op. cit., pp. 36f. the philosophers mentioned by Köhnke are Heinrich ritter (1791–1869), Karl twesten (1820– 70), Christlieb Julius Braniss (1792–1873), Franz vorländer (1806–67), and Johann Friedrich leopold george (1811–73). 52 53

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we missed in formal logic,”60 namely, the recovery of the metaphysical dimension of thought. that is probably why trendelenburg’s analysis concentrates on the way Hegelianism conceives of the relationship between being and thought at the very “beginning” of the logical system: when formal logic seeks its greatness in the sharp distinction of form and content, the dialectical method asserts a self-movement of pure thought, which is at the same time the self-production of being.…one of the fundamental ideas of the Hegelian dialectic is that pure thought, without presuppositions, produces and knows the moments of being from the necessity of thought itself.…We ask first: is there such a presuppositionless beginning of logic in which thought has nothing but itself and spurns all representation and intuition, such that it deserves the name of pure thought?61

linked as it was to the principle according to which “pure being constitutes the beginning, for it is both pure thought and the indeterminate, simple immediate,”62 the idea of a beginning of thinking “without presuppositions” was one of the main targets of the attacks upon the dialectical method after Hegel’s death.63 trendelenburg’s critique consisted in showing that dialectical thinking does in fact presuppose something, namely, the movement by virtue of which thinking can “determine” itself: “…movement remains the presupposed vehicle of the dialectically productive thinking.”64 This hidden presupposition is pointed out first of all with respect to the logical triad corresponding to Hegel’s doctrine of quality—“being,” “nothing,” “becoming”—but the same is said later in relation to every single moment of the dialectical method. the illusion of obtaining metaphysical concepts via “pure thinking” corresponds to the fact that no attention is paid to the intuitions from which they are derived: “there where being and non-being must pass into becoming, there is the scheme of that spatial movement by virtue of which representation in general first becomes possible.”65 given that “intuition” is to be understood here as “the general activity” constantly presupposed by thinking, trendelenburg can legitimately affirm that “the presuppositionless logic…in secret possesses a picture which it condemns in public.”66 But, as we have seen, the rejection of the Hegelian method involves at the same time a critique of the dialectical concept of the “negation” of identity, that is, a negation that in itself constitutes a determination or a progress of thinking. the historical background of this critique is given by the debates that took place not only in

trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 23. ibid., pp. 23f. 62 g.w.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 86, in Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, vols. 1–20, ed. by Hermann glockner, stuttgart: Frommann 1964, vol. 8, p. 203. 63 Cf. Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, op. cit., p. 51. 64 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 26. 65 ibid. 66 trendelenburg, Die Logische Frage in Hegel’s System, op. cit., p. 48 (in english, “the logical question in Hegel’s system,” op. cit., p. 354). 60 61

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germany67 but also in denmark, concerning the validity of the law of contradiction.68 in fact, trendelenburg’s main argument consists in distinguishing between logical negation and real opposition, probably based on the aristotelian differentiation of contradictory and contrary terms. In the first case, the negative relation between two concepts does not give way to a third one: “neither between nor above the two terms of the contradiction is given a third one.” 69 in the second case, real opposition involves determination—and to this extent dialectical negation is interpreted as opposition70— but real opposition cannot be obtained “in a merely logical way.”71 the discussion of this subject is taken up again in the treatise on the doctrine of categories, where trendelenburg also examines the notion of “privation” as equivalent to contrariety. 72 parallel to trendelenburg’s own reference to aristotle’s distinction in the Metaphysics, Book 10, however, it would be possible to compare his concept of “real opposition” to the Kantian notion of “Realrepugnanz.”73 after a closer investigation, rossitto concludes that trendelenburg’s distinction “can by no means be traced back to aristotle,” and that he has received it, rather, from Kant, “who distinguished between logical opposition…and real opposition”: on the one hand, opposition “implying contradiction” and, on the other, opposition “without contradiction.”74 The main figures in the German debate were Johann Friedrich Herbart, De principio logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo commentatio, qua ad audiendam orationem...invitat, göttingen: dieterichianis 1833; immanuel Hermann Fichte, De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn: litteris Caroli georgii 1840 (ASKB 507). 68 The main figures in the Danish debate were Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Identitet og Forskjel,” from Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1832, §§ 86–87, pp. 40–47; Frederik Christian sibbern, “om den maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske skole, med mere, som henhører til de logiske grundbetragtninger,” in his Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel, pp. 79–92 (ASKB 778); Jakob peter mynster, “rationalisme, supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 249–68; Johan ludvig Heiberg, “en logisk Bemærkning i anledning af H. H. Hr. Biskop dr. mynsters afhandling om rationalisme og supranaturalisme i forrige Hefte af dette tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 441–56; Hans lassen martensen, “rationalisme, supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i anledning af H. H. Biskop mynsters afhandling herom i dette tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 456–73; Jakob peter mynster, “om de logiske principer,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 7, 1842, pp. 325–52. 69 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 31. 70 trendelenburg refers to § 81 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, where Hegel defines the “dialectical moment” as the point at which a determination passes into “its opposite” [ihre entgegengesetzte]. 71 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 32. 72 see trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Hildesheim: olms 1963, pp. 104ff. 73 Cf. longato, “trendelenburg tra aristotele, Kant e Hegel,” op. cit., p. 33. 74 Cristina rossitto, “negazione logica e negazione reale in F.a. trendelenburg: Significato della distinzione e suoi precedenti storici,” in Verifiche, vol. 10, nos. 1–3, 1981, 67

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in fact, trendelenburg’s approach to both the aristotelian canon and modern critical philosophy is first of all oriented by the attempt to underline the distinction between the logical and the real order. as the result of an impossible combination of real and logical opposition, Hegel’s concept of negation seems to operate as the principle by virtue of which the dialectical method renders that very distinction unnecessary, insofar as the abstract concept of negation allows the passage from being to becoming, from becoming to determinate being, from quality to quantity, and so on, covering in this way the totality of the categories of scientific knowledge.75 Following the opposite way, trendelenburg’s interest in emphasizing the distinction between the logical and the real order corresponds to his attempt to solve the dualistic opposition of being and thinking by reference to a principle of unity that, simultaneously, can be relevant for the investigation of the method of the empirical sciences. that principle is precisely “movement,” which, as real dimension, is related to a material and “causal” substratum76 in the order of being, and presents itself as “constructive movement” in the order of thought.77 the strict unity of the two differentiated planes is confirmed by the purposive character of movement, based on an organic view of the totality. Here again, it is possible to appreciate to which extent the critique of the dialectical method and of the “formal logic” from which it derives, is shaped by trendelenburg’s appropriation of aristotelian concepts. as the element in which ontology and logic, being and thinking come to a unity, “movement” provides a concrete criterion for the critique of “pure thinking.”78 trendelenburg’s particular analysis of purposiveness is one of the keys to the comprehension of what he calls “logic in the wider sense.” in fact, along with the doctrine of movement that constitutes its basis, the logic of purposiveness shows in which way thought and being are related to each other. insofar as purposiveness is here not only the final cause of the thing but also the participation of the thing in the totality of nature, trendelenburg’s concept of purpose is another example of the integration of the aristotelian and modern perspectives. in a stricter sense, particular causes in general are not only related to a particular thing or to a single fact, but the same cause appears…as ground when it is raised to the universal and then placed under the law of organic life. therefore, the time relation, which dwells in the cause, also returns back to the ground. in ground, the blind chain of driving cause and effects is changed into a necessity in thought.79

p. 315. the author remarks that, in trendelenburg, no attention is paid to the difference, characteristic of aristotle’s view, between opposed terms and opposed propositions. see ibid., pp. 310ff. 75 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 84. 76 ibid., p. 365. 77 ibid., p. 111. 78 the fact that trendelenburg’s project, in this way, reproduces some of the characteristic features of Hegelianism, has been pointed out by several scholars. on this point, see Josef schmidt, Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik und ihre Kritik durch Adolf Trendelenburg, munich: Berchman 1977, pp. 14f. 79 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 99f.

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as is clear in this passage, the organic view of the causal processes of nature corresponds to the thought unity of a series of “grounds” under the category of necessity. the “logic in the wider sense,” in other words, is still an investigation of the forms of thinking, although, as Jacques message has underlined, trendelenburg can then make the significant point that “the forms of thinking are not to be understood as the forms of a thought related to itself.”80 thus, as was said at the beginning, the enlargement of the scope of logic actually depends on the revision of the doctrine of categories as the systematic context for the comprehension of the relationship between being and thinking. When Trendelenburg affirms that “no category touches more deeply the essence of thinking than modality, according to which judgments are presented as the judgments of actuality, possibility and necessity,”81 he has already in mind the simple but decisive question concerning the differentiated application of those categories in the order of being and in the order of thought: From the side of being, possibility wants to anticipate the actual and seeks it according to its innermost drive. From the side of thought, possibility prepares the necessity and presents to it the means, although the two apparently stand opposite one another like playfulness and seriousness.82

this character of anticipation, however, shows that “the possible,” even when it is “said of a thing as a property of it,”83 is “initially only something that is thought [nur ein Gedachtes],”84 which means that it is established through an analysis of the present and absent conditions that are supposed to be given for a thing to be produced. the determinant role of the constructive movement of thought with respect to possibility is confirmed when we pass from the question of “what is possible” to the question of “how something is possible”—or, in other words, from the question concerning “the actuality of the possible” to the question concerning “the possibility of the actual.” Trendelenburg specifically refers to this last aspect as the “inner possibility” of the thing.85 Thus we come to the point to which Kierkegaard seems to refer, when, five years after the publication of the Logische Untersuchungen, he alludes to the significance of the doctrine of modal categories and observes that “good comments are to be found” in trendelenburg’s treatise.86 nevertheless, in order to make clear the reasons for Kierkegaard’s interest in some of those arguments, we should start by considering his own view of the relationship between logic and ontology, or between “being” and “thinking,” particularly in the contexts in which the notion of movement as transition from possibility to actuality is involved.

Jacques message, “Kierkegaard, trendelenburg; la logique et les catégories modales,” in Kairos, vol. 10, 1997, p. 57. 81 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 15. 82 trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 113. 83 ibid., p. 105. 84 ibid., p. 107. 85 ibid., p. 109. 86 Pap. vi B 54.19, p. 150 / JP 1, 199. 80

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V. Kierkegaard: Towards a Theory of the Leap our previous examination of Kierkegaard’s references to the Logische Untersuchungen gave us the occasion to underline his critique of the introduction of movement in logic. His own view as to what logic should be in contrast to the dialectical method is clearly presented in The Concept of Anxiety: in logic, no movement must come about, for logic is, and whatever is logical only is. this impotence of the logical consists in the transition of logic into becoming, where existence and actuality come forth. so when logic becomes deeply absorbed in the concretion of categories, that which was from the beginning is ever the same. every movement, if for the moment one wishes to use this expression, is an immanent movement, which in a profound sense is no movement at all. one can easily convince oneself of this by considering that the concept of movement is itself a transcendence that has no place in logic. the negative, then, is immanent in movement, is something vanishing, is that which is annulled. if everything comes about in this manner, nothing comes about at all, and the negative becomes an illusion. nevertheless, precisely in order to make something come about in logic, the negative becomes something more; it becomes that which brings forth the opposition, not a negation but a contraposition.87

these lines written by Kierkegaard in 1844 do not seem to leave any room for the “logic in the wider sense” projected by trendelenburg. the problem of becoming is simply excluded from the domain of logic. the distinction between “abstract” movement, which is to his mind a misnomer, and “real” movement is present in the author of The Concept of Anxiety, and so is the idea that dialectical negation is the result of the confusion between negation and contraposition. But no mention is made of the fact that logic might attempt to comprehend the essence of becoming on the basis of its own constructive movement. in fact, the distinction between the real and the logical order is more radical for Kierkegaard than it is for trendelenburg, for whom movement itself appears as the principle of the correspondence between ontology and logic. on the basis of a journal entry from the same year, however, one would be inclined to think that Kierkegaard was able to appreciate the potential of a philosophy that attempts to overcome the order of immanence through teleology: “the view which sees life’s doubleness (dualism) is higher and deeper than that which seeks unity or ‘pursues studies toward unity’; the view which sees the eternal as τελος, and the teleological view in general, is higher than all immanence or all talk about causa sufficiens.”88 although trendelenburg is not mentioned here, it is interesting to observe that the possibility of a critique of Hegelian “monism” is connected in this passage to “the teleological view in general,” which in a sense applies to trendelenburg’s aristotelianism. on the other hand, the very idea of dualism as a view of life indicates a form of “contradiction” that no logic would be able to grasp. this is what Kierkegaard has in mind when, in the quoted passage from The Concept of SKS 4, 320f. / CA, 13. in a footnote to this passage Kierkegaard adds “the eternal expression for the logical is what the eleatics through a misunderstanding transferred to existence: nothing comes into being, everything is.” 88 SKS 18, 202 / JP 1, 704. 87

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Anxiety, he alludes to the “contraposition” that the dialectical method unsuccessfully attempts to introduce into logic. Beyond any reference to the aristotelian concept of contrariety as distinguished from logical contradiction, or to the Kantian distinction between real and logical opposition, which is also presupposed by trendelenburg, what is at issue here is the tension between immanence and transcendence as constitutive of human existence. the feature that Kierkegaard’s view shares with those philosophical distinctions consists only in the affirmation of something that is not reducible to logic. the same principle might be expressed by saying that, with respect to the concrete contradictions of existence and to the sort of “transitions” that take place between them, logic is the realm of identity. it remains an open question whether such contradictions and transitions can be interpreted in terms of aristotle’s “realism” or, in general, on the basis of a philosophy that focuses on the purposiveness of “natural” processes. With respect to the first point, Kierkegaard remarks that “the whole question of being and nonbeing” is “not found at all in aristotelian philosophy (his ουσια πρωτη and δευτερα, see Categories, are something else entirely),”89 which is at least an indication of the fact that the existential significance of the question cannot be grasped through these concepts. as to the second point, we have seen that Kierkegaard’s appreciation of the “teleological” views is not primarily related to any attempt at explaining natural movement but, rather, to the representation of “the eternal as τελος.” This brings us back to one of the motifs described in his earlier philosophical annotations, namely the possibility of considering the classical problem of movement “from the perspective of universal history,”90 that is, as historical becoming. in Kierkegaard’s terms, what we have characterized above as the concrete contradictions of existence can only be described as psychological or ethical tensions, which, in the final analysis, lead to a series of ethical–religious questions concerning the relationship between the historical and the eternal. this is also the context in which Kierkegaard sketches the structure of the “leap”: “actually everybody recognizes the leap and uses it in psychological and ethical expositions, but they explain it away in logic.”91 in a similar fashion, if we remember that Kierkegaard initially had tried to extract from the Logische Untersuchungen a conceptual basis for his own “theory of the leap,” his definitive evaluation of Trendelenburg’s contribution to such a theory can now be comprehended: trendelenburg resorts all too frequently to examples from mathematics and the natural sciences. Regrettably one finds almost no examples of the ethical in logic, which arouses in my thought a suspicion about logic and serves to support my theory of the leap, which is essentially at home in the realm of freedom, even though it ought to be metaphorically suggested in logic and should not be explained away, as Hegel does.92

89 90 91 92

SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / JP 4, 4107. Pap. iv C 97 / JP 5, 5601. Pap. v C 8. Pap. v C 12 / JP 3, 2352.

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This explains also why, in a journal entry from the same period, Kierkegaard affirms that “trendelenburg does not seem to be at all aware of the leap.”93 the organic view of the totality that characterizes trendelenburg’s philosophy does not leave any room for the sort of “transition” that Kierkegaard seems to associate with the notion of the “leap.” even what Kierkegaard calls in one of these passages “the realm of freedom” might be explained in trendelenburg’s terms as internal to the realm of necessity: while “freedom consists in being able to do otherwise [anders zu können] according to the circumstances and to formal considerations,” our “higher freedom” consists in “not being able to do otherwise on the basis of the content and of the willed purpose.”94 However, insofar as trendelenburg has shown the impossibility of the selfproductive movement of thought, some of his arguments could be used by Kierkegaard in order to suggest that movement as such has no place at all in logic. the idea of the logical as something that only has to do with “identity,” moreover, is consistent with the exclusion of analogy and induction as those forms of inference that, according to Kierkegaard’s reading of aristotle and trendelenburg, “can be reached only by a leap. all other conclusions are essentially tautological [er væsentligt Identitet].”95 to the extent that the dialectical method is not able to overcome the limitations of what trendelenburg calls “formal logic,” the deceptive “movement” of Hegelian dialectic is nothing but the return to an abstract identity. in this sense Kierkegaard asks himself whether the result of mediation is “the zero point” or “a third term.”96 even when, after the reading of trendelenburg, Kierkegaard alludes to the “modal” dimension of logic, he remains faithful to the principle according to which logic only deals with identity: “all logic is quantitative dialectic or modal dialectic, for everything is and the whole is one and the same. qualitative dialectic belongs in existence.”97 these last remarks give us an important indication as to the meaning that Kierkegaard attaches to the doctrine of categories, in particular those of quantity and quality. the equivalence between the logic of identity and a “quantitative dialectic” is already recognizable in the Diapsalmata, where we read that “tautology is and remains the highest principle, the highest maxim of thought,” and that the most usual version of tautology is based on a “quantitative conclusion,” as in the formula which states “when two objects are equal in size to one and the same third object, they are all of equal size.”98 Kierkegaard considers once again this problem when, in SKS 18, 225, JJ:266 / JP 3, 2341. trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 125. trendelenburg applies this distinction in the analysis of the famous sentence pronounced by luther before the diet of worms: “Ich kan nicht anderes.” a development of this example, and of the different ways in which trendelenburg and Kierkegaard deal with it, can be found in arnold B. Come’s monograph entitled, Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, montreal: inter editions 1991, pp. 80ff. 95 SKS 18, 225, JJ:266 / JP 3, 2341. 96 SKS 19, 415, not13:50 / JP 2, 1602. 97 SKS 18, 303, JJ:492 / JP 1, 759. 98 SKS 2, 47 / EO1, 38. Cf. g.w.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, in Jubiläumsausgabe, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 508ff and vol. 5, p. 139. 93 94

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the drafts to the Philosophical Fragments, he evokes Carneades’ critical argument concerning the above quoted formula, namely that “three mathematical objects that are absolutely equal to one another are not three, but the same object.”99 the role that the notion of tautology had in the context of the critique of Hegelian philosophy in Kierkegaard’s time can be appreciated, for instance, in a review of Johan ludvig Heiberg’s (1791–1860) Perseus, where the danish philosopher Frederik Christian sibbern (1785–1872) points out the “tautological character” of Hegel’s philosophy of nature.100 although the expression is not explicitly used in the same way by trendelenburg, one might argue that his critique of the dialectical concept of identity corresponds to a similar pattern. the point has been made by Hügli: when Kierkegaard wrote Either/Or, he had not yet read trendelenburg; but trendelenburg would have been able to confirm the correctness of his principle of tautology even then: Hegel’s speculative mediation in a “higher unity” deceptively pretends to be a higher principle, but in actuality this unity rests on a tautology. the identity, which, according to Hegel, should be a real or concrete unity of two opposite concepts, is—as trendelenburg shows—nothing other “than the reflection that of two things the one is the other and the other is the one.” 101

nevertheless, the passages in which Kierkegaard underlines the distinction between quantitative and qualitative dialectic constitute the key to a better evaluation of his relationship to trendelenburg’s logic. insofar as Kierkegaard’s “qualitative dialectic” does not belong in logic, the notion of quality as such lies at the center of his hypothetical “theory of the leap.” the movement that Kierkegaard interprets as being irreducible to logic is first of all the transition from the undifferentiated realm of quantity to quality. to the question as to “how a new quality appears through a sustained quantitative determination,” Kierkegaard answers that “every quality appears through a leap.”102 if it is true that logic should be able at least to “suggest” the structure of a leap that, actually, can only be dealt with in psychological or ethical terms, then it is probably because logic is also concerned with the relationship between the categories of quantity and quality, although quality itself is considered as a limit for logical thinking. according to Hermann diem’s interpretation, the “prototypical allusion” [vorbildliche Andeutung] to the leap that Kierkegaard expected from logic103 can be found in aristotle and plato, particularly in connection with the notions of “transition” and “the moment in time.”104 a complementary view of the problem is indicated by Klaus schäfer, who shows that “induction” and “analogy” constitute, in contrast to deductive logic, a “prototypical allusion to Pap. v B 5.5. Frederik Christian sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit. 101 anton Hügli, Die Erkenntnis der Subjektivität und die Objektivität des Erkennens bei Søren Kierkegaard, zürich, editio academica, 1973, p. 95. 102 Pap. v C 1. 103 Cf. Pap. v C 12 / JP 3, 2352, quoted above. Howard v. and edna H. Hong translate “forbilledligt” (prototypically) as “metaphorically.” 104 diem, Die Existenzdialektik von Sören Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 25. 99

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historical becoming as the form of movement that characterizes existence.”105 in any of the cases, even if plato’s dialectic and aristotle’s logic provide the “theory of the leap” with a series of conceptual instruments, the core of that theoretical attempt is to be found in Kierkegaard’s own interpretation and displacement of those philosophical problems. the same can be said of the philosophical “apparatus” that Kierkegaard believes he has taken from trendelenburg. in general terms, as ritschl has suggested, “trendelenburg’s kinesis becomes Kierkegaard’s leap.”106 But the displacement that takes place in the appropriation of trendelenburg’s arguments is to be underlined. in fact, whereas trendelenburg’s critique of the dialectical method consists in showing that logic “begins” with the presupposition of movement, Kierkegaard is concerned with the beginning, not of thinking, but of existence. that is actually the meaning of his critique of dialectical negation and of dialectical unity: that the principle of unity has abolished the principle of contradiction can be said only in the same sense as pythagoras taught that one is not a number. One is prior to discrimination and counting begins first with discrimination. Unity is prior to contradiction, and existence [Tilværelsen] first begins with contradiction.107

more importantly, the displacement of the problem of the “beginning” from the order of pure being to the order of existence or determinate being affects the very possibility of Kierkegaard’s dialogue with Hegelianism. diem puts it in the following terms: the problem of the beginning of the dialectical movement in Hegel consists in how the empirical “i” should become the subject of pure thought; and the question of the continuation of this movement was the problem of “mediation.” in Kierkegaard, by contrast, the issue is about how the existing thinker enters into conscious existence, in which he translates his possibility into the becoming of actuality. this happens…in the act of choice, with which the “i” chooses itself in conscious existence.108

the kind of “transition” that is related to this beginning of ethical existence can only be expressed on the basis of a specific understanding of time and historicity. Here, as we have seen, it is important to have in mind Kierkegaard’s remark about the superiority of the dualistic views of life. in The Concept of Anxiety, the interpretation of a platonic motif—a platonic “prototypical allusion” to the notion of the leap— leads to a particular definition of transition and of human existence:

Klaus schäfer, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, munich: Kösel 1968. 106 dietrich ritschl, “Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegels logik,” in Wege der Forschung: Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Heinz-Horst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971, p. 254. 107 SKS 18, 161, JJ:68 / JP 1, 703, pp. 328f. 108 diem, Die Existenzdialektik von Sören Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 22. 105

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diem points out that “the character of this intermediary moment” is exactly the key to Kierkegaard’s interest in the problem of transition.111 that is also why he remarks, while reading tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, that transition “belongs neither to possibility nor to actuality, it is more than possibility and less than actuality.”112 the same scheme seems to be present in his view of transition as something that both “is a state” and is “actual.” an earlier version of this idea is to be found in the Nachlass from 1840: after the system is complete and has reached the category of reality, the new doubt appears, the new contradiction, the last and the most profound: by what means does the metaphysical reality bind itself to historical reality…namely, the historical as the unity of the metaphysical and the accidental. it is the metaphysical, insofar as this is the eternal bond of existence, without which the phenomenological would disintegrate; it is the accidental, insofar as there is the possibility that every event could take place in infinitely many other ways; the unity of these (divinely regarded) is providence, and (humanly regarded), the historical.113

Not by chance several authors have referred to these definitions of historical existence as a “synthesis” in their interpretations of the relation between Kierkegaard and trendelenburg. if, on the one hand, Kierkegaard perhaps expected to recognize in trendelenburg’s logic the formal anticipation of his own concept of historical transition, on the other hand, the “accidental” and the “temporal” dimension of the historical synthesis could never be considered from the perspective of logical necessity. in a sense, the difference between Kierkegaard’s and trendelenburg’s projects consists not only in the irreducibility of the ethical and the historical to logic, but in the fact that trendelenburg’s “logic in the wider sense” is not accompanied by an ontology in the wider sense, namely, an ontology able to recognize the importance of facticity. schäfer, for instance, suggests that one of the reasons for the fact that Kierkegaard abandoned trendelenburg’s modal doctrine was that the german logician did not pay attention to the distinction “between factual being

109 110 111 112 113

SKS 4, 385 / CA, 82. SKS 4, 388 / CA, 85. diem, Die Existenzdialektik von Sören Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 25. SKS 19, 395, not13:27 / JP 1, 258. Pap. iii a 1.

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and essence as ‘the medium of thinking.’”114 Even the specific analyses devoted to “the accidental” in Logische Untersuchungen might be mentioned as a proof of the fact that trendelenburg’s modal determinations, as schäfer also points out, actually are “categories of reflection.”115 parallel remarks are to be found in arnold Come’s116 and Jacques message’s117 writings on Kierkegaard’s philosophical debt to trendelenburg.

schäfer, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, op. cit., p. 269. 115 ibid. 116 Come, Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, op. cit., pp. 62ff. the author insists particularly on the differences between trendelenburg’s view of necessity and Kierkegaard’s use of the same category in The Sickness unto Death. 117 message, “Kierkegaard, trendelenburg; la logique et les catégories modales,” op. cit., pp. 56ff. 114

Bibliography I. Trendelenburg’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840 (ASKB 843). Erläuterungen zur den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, zunächst für den Unterricht in Gymnasien, Berlin: Bethge 1842 (ASKB 845). Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System: Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1843 (ASKB 846). Niobe: Einige Betrachtungen über das Schöne und Erhabene, Berlin: Bethge 1846 (ASKB 847). Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855]. [ed.] Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrate, leipzig: vogel 1826 (ASKB 842). [ed.] Elementa logices Aristotelicae: in usum scholarum ex Aristotele excerpsit, convertit, illustravit, [new revised edition], Berlin: Bethge 1836 (ASKB 844). [ed.] Aristotelis de anima libri tres. Ad interpretum græcorum auctoritatem et codicum fidem recognovit commentariis illustravit, Jena: walz 1833 (ASKB 1079). II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Trendelendurg Fichte, immanuel Hermann, “die philosophische litteratur der gegenwart. siebenter artikel. die logische Frage zwischen trendelenburg und gabler. der gegenwärtige zustand der Hegel’schen schule. Kampf des ‘absoluten wissens’ gegen den ‘empirismus.’ neue systemansätze,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 11, 1843, pp. 43–128 (ASKB 877–911). —— Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, Heidelberg: akademische Buchhandlung von J.C.B. mohr 1846 (vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie), pp. 18–19; p. 25; p. 28; p. 34 (ASKB 509) (vols. 1–2, see ASKB 502–503). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1855–57], vol. 2, pp. 130–1 (ASKB 358–363).

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nielsen, rasmus, Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845, see pp. 212–18 (ASKB 699). sibbern, Frederik Christian, Bidrag til at oplyse nogle ontologiske Udtryk i Aristoteles’s Metaphysik. Indbydelsesskrift til Kjøbenhavns Universitets Fest i Anledning af Hans Majestæt Kongens Fødselsdag den 6te October 1848, Copenhagen: Jens Hostrup schultz 1848, p. 13; p. 15; pp. 24–31 (ASKB 1097). weiße, Christian Hermann, “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart. sechster artikel. neue metaphysische versuche. [review of] Logische Untersuchungengen. von adolf trendelenburg. 2 Bde. Berlin 1840. Metaphysik von Hermann lotze. leipzig 1841,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, op. cit., vol. 9, pp. 264–320. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Trendelenburg Come, arnold B., Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, montreal: inter editions 1991. diem, Hermann, Die Existenzdialektik von Sören Kierkegaard, zollikon-zürich: evangelischer verlag 1950. dietz, walter, “trendelenburg und Kierkegaard. ihr verhältnis im Blick auf die modalkategorien,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 34, 1992, pp. 30–46. Hügli, anton, Die Erkenntnis der Subjektivität und die Objektivität des Erkennens bei Søren Kierkegaard, zürich, editio academica, 1973. Коноплев, Н.С. и Рау, И.А. [Konoplev, N.S. and I.A. Rau], “Место А. Тренделенбурга в попытках преодоления ‘принципом субъективности’ С. Кьеркегора ‘объективного мышления’ Г.В.Ф. Гегеля” [The Role of A. trendelenburg in attempts to overcome the Hegelian “objective thinking” by means of the Kierkegaardian “subjectivity principle”], in Мир Кьеркегора: Русские и датские интерпретации творчества Кьеркегора [the world of Kierkegaard: russian and danish readings of Kierkegaard’s work], ed. by aleksandr ivanov, moscow: ad marginem 1994, pp. 45–8. magrì, giovanni, “il salto della libertà. la critica di trendelenburg alla dialettica hegeliana nella ricezione di Kierkegaard,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica, vol. 96, no. 1, 2004, pp. 87–143 message, Jacques, “Kierkegaard, trendelenburg; la logique et les catégories modales,” in Kairos, vol. 10, 1997: Retour de Kierkegaard, retour à Kierkegaard: colloque franco-danois, sous la direction de H.-B. Vergote (actes du Colloque franco-danois, université de toulouse-le mirail, les 15 et 16 novembre 1995), pp. 49–61. purkarthofer, richard, “trendelenburg. traces of a profound and sober thinker in Kierkegaard’s Postscript,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2005, pp. 192–207. ritschl, dietrich “Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegels logik,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 11, 1955, pp. 437–65 (reprinted in Wege der Forschung: Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Heinz-Horst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971, pp. 240–72).

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ruttenbeck, walter, Sören Kierkegaard. Der christliche Denker und sein Werk, aalen: scientia verlag 1979, see p. 12; p. 59; pp. 79ff.; p. 94; p. 98; p. 357. schäfer, Klaus, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, munich: Kösel 1968. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, see p. 38; p. 66; p. 72, n38; pp. 73–4; p. 75, n57; p. 106; p. 402. sponheim, paul, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence, new york and evanston: Harper & row, publishers 1968, see pp. 67–9. suances marcos, manuel, Sören Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, madrid: universidad nacional de educación a distanca 1997, vol. 2 (Trayectoria de su pensamiento filosófico), pp. 39–45. thomas, John Heywood, “logic and existence in Kierkegaard,” The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 2, no. 3, 1971, pp. 3–11. thulstrup, niels, Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by robert J. widenmann, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1984, see p. 65; p. 93; p. 184; p. 219; p. 224; pp. 226–67; p. 304; p. 319 (originally as Søren Kierkegaard. Afsluttende uvidenskabelige Efterskrift udgivet med Indledning og Kommentar af Niels Thulstrup, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1962). —— Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980, p. 276; p. 280; p. 285; pp. 314–16; p. 318; p. 359; p. 380.

werder: The Influence of Werder’s Lectures and Logik on Kierkegaard’s thought Jon stewart

the story has often been told of Kierkegaard’s trip to Berlin in the fall of 1841. His stay in the prussian capital lasted from 25 october 1841 to 6 march 1842. it has traditionally been assumed that the trip was motivated by his desire to attend the lectures of schelling (1775–1854). By that time near the end of a long and distinguished academic career, schelling had been appointed to the university of Berlin in 1841 by King Friedrich wilhelm iv of prussia (1795–1861) for the express purpose of extinguishing the dangerous spark of Hegelianism before it caught fire and spread.1 in the letter to schelling offering him a prestigious professorship at the university, the King’s representative Karl Freiherr von Bunsen (1791–1860) makes reference to the King’s desire to marshall schelling’s intellectual power and reputation into service against “the dragon seed of Hegelian pantheism.”2 since schelling’s lectures were highly critical of Hegel, it is often claimed that one of Kierkegaard’s main motivations for attending them was to obtain new weapons for his anti-Hegelian arsenal3 and that

see max lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, vols. 1–4, Halle: verlag der Buchhandlung des waisenshauses 1910–18, vol. 2.2, pp. 9ff. 2 see F.w.J. schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841–42, ed. by manfred Frank, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1977; third revised edition, 1993. anhang ii: “Historische Hintergründe der Berufung schellings; schellings auftreten in Berlin 1841,” p. 486. see also Kuno Fischer, Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre, Heidelberg: C. winther 1899, p. 239. 3 For example, Kaufmann: “Kierkegaard’s attacks were not based on his own reading of Hegel and were usually as wide of the mark as his remarks about goethe. His image of Hegel was derived from the lectures of the old schelling who had developed a profound resentment when Hegel’s fame eclipsed his own.” walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, notre dame: university of notre dame press 1978, pp. 288–9. “through Kierkegaard legions of twentieth-century readers who barely know schelling’s name have come to take for granted as historically accurate his spiteful caricature of Hegel” (ibid., p. 290). see also tom rockmore, Before and After Hegel. A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, Berkeley: university of California press 1993, p. 146. walter lowrie, Kierkegaard, london, new york, toronto: oxford university press 1938, p. 234f. see also reidar thomte, “Historical introduction,” in his translation of CA, p. vii. 1

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they were of great significance for Kierkegaard’s later authorship despite his wellknown disappointment with them.4 But this claim ignores the fact that, in addition to schelling’s lectures, Kierkegaard at the same time also attended the less celebrated lectures of the Hegelian theologian, philipp marheineke (1780–1846) and the Hegelian logician, Karl werder (1806–93). Kierkegaard’s notes to marheineke’s lectures are quite extensive, and their detail suggests that he was profoundly interested in the content.5 although his notes from werder’s lectures are less copious, these lectures were also, i wish to argue, important for him.6 in addition, Kierkegaard owned a copy of werder’s Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik,7 upon which the lectures were apparently in large part based. in any case, the fact that he was so anxious to learn from these two Hegelians clearly undermines the claim that his primary goal in Berlin was to find new critical tools with which to criticize Hegel. most readers of Kierkegaard are familiar with his, at times almost formulaic, criticisms of Hegel’s speculative logic.8 He criticizes, for example, the principle of mediation,9 the idea of movement in logic,10 the presuppositionless beginning,11

see, for example, anton mirko Koktanek, Schellings Seinslehre und Kierkegaard, munich: r. oldenbourg 1962. lore Hühn, “sprung im Übergang. Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegel im ausgang von der spätphilosophie schellings,” in Kierkegaard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit, ed. by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon stewart, Berlin, new york: walter de gruyter verlag 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 8), pp. 133–83. 5 these notes appear in his Notebook 9 and 10. SKS 19, 249–77, not9:1. SKS 19, 389– 401, not10:8–9. 6 these notes appear in his Notebook 8 and 9, and are alluded to in Notebook 13. SKS 19, 245, not8:50. SKS 19, 246, not8:52. SKS 19, 278–82, not9:2–9. SKS 19, 415, not13:50. Pap. v C 4. see the note “werders forelæsninger over ‘logik und metaphysik,’” in SKS K19, pp. 382–3. 7 Karl werder, Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. erste abtheilung, Berlin: verlag von veit und Comp 1841 (ASKB 867). (Hereafter Logik). this work has been photomechanically reprinted (Hildesheim: gerstenberg 1977). this is the only work by werder that appears in Kierkegaard’s library. 8 see dietrich ritschl, “Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegels logik,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 11, 1955, pp. 437–65. reprinted in Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Heinz-Horst schrey, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971, pp. 240–72. Justus Hartnack, “Kierkegaards angreb på Hegel,” in Sprogets mesterskab. Festskrift til Johannes Sløks 70– årsdag, ed. by Kjeld Holm and Jan lindhardt, viby (J): Centrum 1986, pp. 30–39. paul l. Holmer, “Kierkegaard and logic,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2, pp. 25–42. 9 For example, SKS 3, 166–72 / EO2, 170–6. see SKS 7, 173–81 / CUP1, 189–98. SKS 4, 25 / R, 148. Pap. iv B 117, pp. 288–9 / R, supplement, p. 308. SKS 19, 211, not7:22 / JP 3, 3072. SKS 19, 390, not13:23 / JP 3, 3073. SKS 18, 125, HH:2 / JP 2, 2277. SKS 4, 305–6 / PF, 109–10. SKS 4, 243 / PF, 37. SKS 4, 497f. / P, 35f. 10 For example, SKS 4, 320–2 / CA, 12–4. SKS 4, 384–8 / CA, 81–5. SKS 7, 106f. / CUP1, 109f. SKS 7, 109f. / CUP1, 113. SKS 7, 281 / CUP1, 308f. SKS 4, 56–7 / R, 186. 11 For example, SKS 9, 220f. / WL, 218. Pap. iii a 11 / JP 3, 3281. SKS 18, 217, JJ:239 / JP 3, 3299. SKS 7, 103–20 / CUP1, 106–25. 4

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dialectical transitions from category to category,12 the pretension of absolute Knowing,13 the unity of being and thought,14 and the speculative critique of the aristotelian laws of contradiction and excluded middle.15 given this apparently unambiguous negative assessment of Hegel’s logic, it seems somewhat odd that, when in Berlin, Kierkegaard would be interested in attending lectures on Hegel’s logic by a Hegelian logician. niels thulstrup suggests that Kierkegaard’s notes from werder’s lectures are critical in nature and thus evidence an anti-Hegelianism.16 thulstrup’s view seems to be that while Kierkegaard had not yet fully developed his objections to Hegelian logic at this point, they are nonetheless already present implicitly in his lecture notes to werder’s course. But neither the tone nor the content of the actual notes supports thulstrup’s position. in this article i will argue, contrary to thulstrup, that Kierkegaard’s comments concerning werder’s logic are generally uncritical and offer no evidence to support the position that Kierkegaard was an anti-Hegelian at the time of their writing. Further, there are at least a couple of quite startling and surprising points of influence of the relatively unknown Werder on Kierkegaard. I. Werder and the German Hegelians Karl Friedrich werder was born in Berlin on 13 december 1806.17 He studied philosophy under Hegel in the late 1820s during the period of Hegel’s greatest influence. He was presumably in attendance at one or more of the lecture courses on logic that Hegel gave every summer semester in Berlin from 1819 to 1831.18 in 1834, that is, three years after Hegel’s death, werder completed his Habilitationsschrift with For example, SKS 4, 384 / CA, 81. For example, Pap. iv B 1, pp. 121–6 / JC, 138–43. 14 For example, SKS 18, 13, ee:22 / JP 1, 195. SKS 7, 173–82 / CUP1, 189–99. SKS 7, 300–306 / CUP1, 329–35. 15 For example, SKS 4, 285n / PF, 86n. SKS 7, 277–82 / CUP1, 304–10. SKS 7, 363–84 / CUP1, 399–422. 16 niels thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980, pp. 275–6: “Kierkegaard is critical of the speculative developments of the Concept in werder....the familiar objections of Kierkegaard against Hegel’s logic in the Postscript and elsewhere, that he developed after he had studied trendelenburg and aristotle, he did not yet set forth in detail; but the tendency in the entries noted here is the same as later.” 17 For werder’s life and career see the following: albert Köster, “Karl Friedrich werder,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vols. 1–56, Berlin: duncker & Humblot 1967–71. Neudruck der 1. Auflage (1875–1912), vol. 44, pp. 479–85. Max Lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, op. cit., vol. 2.1, p. 484f. paul schlenther, “am grabe des alten werder,” Das Magazin für Litteratur, vol. 62, no. 16, 1893, pp. 249–53. 18 see Hans-Christian lucas, “Hegels vorlesungen über logik und metaphysik. mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Berliner zeit,” Hegel-Studien, vol. 26, p. 33. see also “Übersicht über Hegels Berliner vorlesungen,” in Hegel, Berliner Schriften, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix meiner 1956, pp. 743–9. 12 13

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the title De Platonis Parmenide.19 after that he held the position of Privatdocent at the university of Berlin, and in 1838 he became außerordentlicher Professor. He was never to attain the position of ordinarius due to unfavorable political conditions.20 perhaps in part because he had no chance of advancing his career, werder did not restrict his efforts to a narrow field of academic specialization. In addition to being a philosopher, he was also a dramatist and a critic. He wrote tragedies which never enjoyed more than moderate success. By contrast, he gave a series of highly popular lectures on the dramatic works of shakespeare,21 schiller22 and lessing23 among others. a volume of lyric poems was published posthumously.24 werder lived a long life and ultimately died in his home city on 3 april 1893. He enjoyed a modest reputation among the german Hegelians but was by no means one of the leading figures. This can probably be explained by the varied nature of his output and the limited role that philosophy played in it, taken as a whole. His early work on plato’s Parmenides and his Logik were his only published works of philosophy. in histories of Hegelianism, werder is usually summarily treated with a single line.25 He is mentioned briefly by, for example, Franz Anton Staudenmaier

Karl werder, De Platonis Parmenide, Berlin: petsch 1834. werder also discusses the Parmenides in his Logik, pp. 92–6. 20 the prussian minister of education, Karl Freiherr stein zum altenstein (1770–1840), had been well disposed towards Hegel’s students and helped to advance their careers. However, his successor, the reactionary Johann albrecht Friedrich eichhorn (1799–1856) regarded Hegel’s philosophy as a dangerous form of free-thinking. with eichhorn’s appointment, Werder’s chances for advancement in the field of philosophy in effect disappeared. See Max lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, op. cit., vol. 2.2, pp. 8ff. 21 Karl werder, Vorlesungen über Shakespeare’s Hamlet gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin (zuerst im Wintersemester 1859–60, zuletzt 1871–72), Berlin: Hertz 1875 (2nd ed., 1893). [in english as The Heart of Hamlet’s Mystery, trans. by elizabeth wilder, with an introduction by w.J. rolfe, new york: g.p. putnam’s sons 1907 and philadephia: r. west 1976.] Vorlesungen über Shakespeare’s Macbeth gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin (zuerst im Winter 1860 als Skizze, dann ausgeführt und mehrmals wiederholt), Berlin: Hertz 1885. 22 Karl werder, Vorlesungen über Schiller’s Wallenstein gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin (zuerst im Winter 1860–61, und später wiederholt), Berlin: Hertz 1889. 23 Karl werder, Vorlesungen über Lessings Nathan gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin (zuerst im Winter 1862, wiederholt 1864 und später), Berlin: Fontane 1892. 24 Karl Werder’s Gedichte, ed. by otto gildemeister, Berlin: Fontane 1895. 25 In Toews’ standard work on Hegelianism, Werder is mentioned only fleetingly. John edward toews, Hegelianism. The Path toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805–1841, Cambridge, new york, melbourne: Cambridge university press 1980, p. 87, p. 216, p. 230, p. 357. see also the brief blurb in Philosophen–Lexikon. Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen, vols. 1–2, by gertrud Jung and werner ziegenfuss, Berlin: walter de gruyter & Co. 1949–50, vol. 2, p. 858. 19

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(1800–56),26 Johann eduard erdmann (1805–92),27 and Kuno Fischer (1824–1907).28 From these accounts it seems that werder amounts to little more than a footnote not just in the history of philosophy but even in the history of Hegelianism. His philosophical efforts seem to have been regarded with great reservation by at least some of his contemporaries involved in the debates surrounding Hegel’s philosophy. this again evokes the question of what it was about werder’s lectures that interested Kierkegaard. II. Werder’s logik and Hegel’s Works on Logic To appreciate the significance and scope of Werder’s Logik, it will be necessary to say a few words about Hegel’s works on logic and their reception. Hegel’s main statement on logic is of course his massive Wissenschaft der Logik, which was published in three successive volumes in 1812, 1813 and 1816. each volume contains one “book” or main section: “the doctrine of Being,”29 “the doctrine of essence”30 and “the doctrine of the Concept.”31 a second edition was planned, but Hegel managed to revise only “the doctrine of Being” before his death on 14 november 1831. this

Franz anton staudenmaier, Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems. Aus dem Standpunkte der christlichen Philosophie, mainz: Kupferberg 1844 (ASKB 789), p. 434: “In etwas dichterischer Weise hat ein Anhänger der Schule den obschwebenden Gedanken von Sein und Nichts also vorstellig zu machen gesucht: ‘Im Nichts enthüllt sich der heilige Doppelsinn der Leerheit des Seins...weil es das nachte Sein ist, der Geist des Seins, das Sein im Sein.’” staudenmaier quotes from werder’s Logik, p. 41. 27 Johann eduard erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, zweiter und letzter Band, Philosophie der Neuzeit, Vierte Auflage bearbeitete von Benno Erdmann, Berlin: verlag von wilhelm Hertz 1896, § 344.8, p. 738f.: “K. werder’s (geboren 1806) logik, die sich als Kommentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Logik ankündigt (Berlin 1841), hat es bei der Lehre von der Qualität bewenden lassen, d.h. nur den neunten Teil der Logik gegeben.” see also § 346.15, p. 819: “Interessant ist es zu sehen, wie die Hegelsche Philosophie modifiziert wird, wo sie, namentlich durch die akademischen Vorträge werders und michelets, zur Kenntnis denkender Polen kommt, in denen damals, mehr oder weniger, panslavistische Ideen sich zu regen begannen.” (erdmann refers to Cieszkowski and trentowski in this context.) 28 Kuno Fischer, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, Erster Teil, Zweite Auflage, Heidelberg: Carl winter’s universitätsbuchhandlung 1911, p. 152: “Karl werder aus Berlin (1806–1893), der noch aus der unmittelbaren Schule Hegels hervorgegangen, aber erst einige Jahre nach dem Tode des Meisters als Dozent der Philosophie aufgetreten ist (Winter 1834), Philosoph und Dichter...er hat anregende Vorlesungen über Logik gehalten, auch über den ersten Abschnitt der hegelschen Logik (Qualität) eine etwas phantastische Schrift herausgegeben (1841)...” vol. 8.1 of Fischer’s Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vols. 1–10, Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universitätsbuchhandlung, Dritte Auflage 1898–1912. 29 that is, “die lehre vom seyn,” Jub., vol. 4, pp. 69–478. (Jub. = Hegel, Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, ed. by Hermann glockner, stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann verlag 1928–41.) 30 that is, “das wesen,” Jub., vol. 4, pp. 479–721. 31 that is, “die lehre vom Begriff,” Jub., vol. 5. 26

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revised text was included in the second edition, which was published in 1832.32 this second edition was the text that was used when the Wissenschaft der Logik was republished as a part of Hegel’s Werke.33 this text was edited by leopold von Henning (1791–1866) and appeared in three volumes from 1834–35.34 this was the text of Hegel’s Logik that Kierkegaard owned. Hegel’s other principal statement on logic is the first volume of his Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, which was originally published in Heidelberg in 1817.35 A final work worthy of mention is Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic, sometimes referred to as the Nürnberg Propaedeutic. this work is a series of lecture notes discovered by Karl Rosenkranz (1805–79) who edited and published them for the first time in 1840 as a part of Hegel’s Werke.36 Some of the material overlaps significantly with that of the Wissenschaft der Logik. This text is not of great significance in Hegel’s corpus when compared to the Wissenschaft der Logik or the first volume of the Encyclopädie, but it is worthy of note for our purposes since Kierkegaard owned a copy of rosenkranz’s edition of it, which he alludes to in Notebook 13.37 werder’s Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik was probably published shortly before Kierkegaard attended the lectures that were based on it.38 The first book of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, “the doctrine of Being,” is divided into three main sections: “quality,” “quantity,” and “measure.” werder’s Logik covers only the first section, that is, “Quality,” and thus deals with only one third of the first book. It ends with the transition to “Quantity.” That Werder originally planned on continuing the work is evident from the fact that on the title page the book is designated as “Erste Abtheilung.” This first part, however, turned out also to be the last, for no continuation was ever published. werder’s interest in and work on Hegel’s logic was by no means exceptional. at the time there were a number of other german scholars who wrote extended works explicitly on or in the spirit of Hegel’s logic. the most notable are Christian Hermann

See Helmut Schneider, “Zur zweiten Auflage von Hegels Logik,” Hegel-Studien, vol. 6, pp. 9–38. 33 ibid., pp. 30ff. 34 Wissenschaft der Logik, vols. i–iii, ed. by leopold von Henning, Berlin 1834–35, vols. 3–5 (ASKB 552–554) in Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. in Jub., vols. 4–5. a second edition of this text was published in unaltered form in 1841. 35 Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, reprinted as System der Philosophie, vols. i–iii, ed. by leopold von Henning, Carl ludwig michelet and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1840, 1842, 1845, vols. 6 (ASKB 561), 7–1 (ASKB 562), 7–2 (ASKB 563) in Hegel’s Werke. in Jub., vols. 8–10. 36 Hegel, Philosophische Propädeutik, ed. by Karl rosenkranz, Berlin 1840, vol. 18 (ASKB 560) in Hegel’s Werke. in Jub., vol. 3, pp. 1–227. 37 see SKS 19, 406. not13.41. 38 the date of publication for the work is 1841, but it is not known when in 1841 it appeared. werder’s lectures began sometime after 17 october of that year. 32

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weisse (1801–66),39 georg andreas gabler (1786–1853),40 and erdmann.41 Hegel’s conception of logic as speculative was extremely controversial, especially for its criticism of the laws of aristotelian logic. these scholars did their best to defend this new view against its critics, including schelling,42 Friedrich adolf trendelenburg (1802–72),43 Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841),44 and immanuel Hermann, “the younger,” Fichte (1797–1879).45 Hegel’s logic also drew considerable scholarly attention in denmark. Johan ludvig Heiberg’s (1791–1860) Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic, was, like Hegel’s Encyclopädie, a textbook used by its author as the basis for his lectures (given originally in 1831–32).46 This work, the first of its kind in the danish language, is a more or less complete paraphrase of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. also worthy of note is Heiberg’s shorter work, “the system of logic,” which appeared as an essay in the second number of his journal Perseus Christian Hermann weisse, Grundzüge der Metaphysik, Hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1835. 40 see his review of trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen in Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1841, nos. 65–72, pp. 513–74; 1842, nos. 81–7, pp. 641–94; nos. 114–9, pp. 905–50. see also his Die Hegelsche Philosophie. Beiträge zu ihrer richtigeren Beurtheilung und Würdigung, Berlin: duncker und Humblot 1843. 41 Johan eduard erdmann, Grundriß der Logik und Metaphysik, Halle: lippert 1841. 42 the preface to victor Cousin’s Über französische und deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert Beckers, nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn von Schelling, stuttgart and tübingen 1834, pp. iii–xxviii (ASKB 471). reprinted as “vorrede zu einer philosophischen schrift des Herrn victor Cousin,” in schelling’s Ausgewählte Schriften, vols. 1–6, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1985, vol. 4, pp. 617–40. see also the section “Hegel,” in “zur geschichte der neueren philosophie. münchener vorlesungen,” in Ausgewählte Schriften, ibid., vol. 4, pp. 542–80; in english as “Hegel,” in schelling’s On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. by andrew Bowie, new york: Cambridge university press 1994, pp. 134–63. see also “Fünfte vorlesung,” in “einleitung in die philosophie der offenbarung oder Begründung der positiven philosophie. Berliner vorlesungen,” in Ausgewählte Schriften, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 676–95, and “sechste vorlesung,” ibid., pp. 696– 716. see also Kierkegaard’s lecture notes: SKS 19, 312–22, not11:9–15 / SBL, 345–57. 43 Friedrich adolf trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: Bethge et al. 1840 (ASKB 843). Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System. Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig 1843 (ASKB 846). see Josef schmidt, Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik” und ihre Kritik durch Adolf Trendelenburg, munich: Johannes Berchmans verlag 1977. 44 Johann Friedrich Herbart, De principio logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo commentatio, qua ad audiendam orationem…invitat, göttingen : dieterich 1833. 45 immanuel Hermann Fichte, De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn: georgi 1840 (ASKB 507). Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Des Cartes und Locke bis auf Hegel, zweite, sehr vermehrte und verbesserte ausgabe, sulzbach: J.e. seidel’sche Buchhaudlung 1841 (1829) (ASKB 508). 46 Johan ludvig Heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1832. (reprinted as Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger over Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik ved den kongelige militaire Høiskole, in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 1, pp. 111–380.) 39

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in august of 1838.47 Heiberg’s great philosophical critic, Frederik Christian sibbern (1785–1872) gave extensive critical discussions of Hegel’s logic in his Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy, with Regard to our Age.48 Also significant for the Danish reception is Adolph Peter Adler’s (1812–69) highly readable work, Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic (1842),49 which covers the material corresponding to “the doctrine of Being” and “the doctrine of essence” from Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. this work was published after adler lectured on this topic at the university of Copenhagen in winter semester of 1840.50 the professor of philosophy, rasmus nielsen (1809–84), published two works on speculative logic. The first was his Speculative Logic in its Essentials,51 which appeared in four installments from 1841–44. this work was presumably the butt of Kierkegaard’s ongoing ridicule of an incomplete system,52 for the last installment stops in mid-sentence in the middle of “the doctrine of essence.” But this criticism is not entirely fair given that nielsen’s Propaedeutic Logic,53 published in 1845, overlaps significantly with Hegel’s “The Doctrine of the Concept,” the same

Johan ludvig Heiberg, “det logiske system,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, no. 2, 1838, pp. 1–45 (ASKB 569). (reprinted in Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 113–66.) 48 Frederik Christian sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser fornemmelig betræffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1838 (ASKB 778). this work is a reprint of articles i–iii of sibbern’s “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. udgiven af Johan ludvig Heiberg. nr. 1, Juni 1837. Kjøbenhavn. reitzels Forlag. Xiv og 264 s. 8º. priis 1 rbd. 84 skill. —(med stadigt Hensyn til dr. rothes: Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg i Anledning af Reformationsfesten.),” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, vol. 19, 1838, article i, pp. 283–360; article ii, pp. 424–60; article iii, pp. 546–82; vol. 20, 1838, article iv, pp. 20–60; article v, pp. 103–36; article vi, pp. 193–244; article vii, pp. 293–308; article viii, pp. 405–49. 49 adolph peter adler, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842 (ASKB 383). reviewed by Hans Friedrich Helweg, “a.p. adler Populære Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik. Kjøbenhavn 1842. Hos universitets-Boghandler reitzel. 173 sider. 8º,” For Literatur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1843, pp. 267–78. 50 For an account of this work see Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzels Forlag 1990, pp. 86–108. 51 rasmus nielsen, Den speculative Logik i dens Grundtræk, Copenhagen 1841– 44, no. 1 1841, pp. 1–64; no. 2 1842, pp. 65–96; no. 3 1843, pp. 97–144; no. 4 1844, pp. 145–96. reviewed by adolph peter adler, En Anmældelse, egentlig bestemt for Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842. also reviewed by peter michael stilling, Philosophiske Betragtninger over den speculative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben, Copenhagen 1842. reviewed by Johan Frederik Hagen, “Philosophiske Betragtninger over den speculative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben, ved p.m. stilling. Kjøbenhavn 1842. reitzel. 70 s. 8º,” Fædrelandet, vol. 3, no. 864, 1 may 1842, pp. 6925–9. 52 For example, SKS 7, 118 / CUP1, 122f. SKS 7, 103 / CUP1, 106. SKS 7, 104 / CUP1, 107. SKS 7, 112f. / CUP1, 216. SV1 Xiii, 399–400 / COR, 5–6. Pap. iii B 192 / JP 3, 3288. 53 rasmus nielsen, Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845 (ASKB 699). 47

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section which he failed to treat in his initial work. nielsen’s works were also used as textbooks or accompanying material to oral lectures. werder’s Logik itself appeared in a danish translation just one year after its original publication in german. this translation, under the title, Logik. Som Kommentar og Supplement til Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik,” was the work of an undistinguished rural dean by the name of vilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe (1811–78).54 Boethe’s translation was reviewed twice in Danish journals. The first review appeared on 26 march 1842 in the journal Fædrelandet and was signed with the simple pseudonym “B.”55 a second anonymous review appeared in the Nye Intelligensblade on 12 June 1842.56 in both of these reviews, the work is warmly recommended to the public and regarded as an important contribution to danish philosophical literature. Kierkegaard had an unmistakable interest in Hegel’s speculative logic. He owned copies of all three of Hegel’s main works on the subject: the Wissenschaft der Logik, the Encyclopädie, and the Philosophische Propädeutik.57 in addition to werder’s book he also owned a copy of erdmann’s Hegelian logic,58 as well as Heinrich moritz Chalybäus’ (1796–1862), Historische Entwickelung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel59 and staudenmaier’s Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems,60 both of which treat Hegel’s logic extensively. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when he acquired each of these works, and thus it is not easy to say whether his interest in Hegel’s logic antedates werder’s lectures or whether it arose later, perhaps as a result of them in the mid-1840s. at any rate, these works were published and available prior to or at the time of werder’s lectures. later Kierkegaard developed an interest in trendelenburg and acquired his Logische Untersuchungen and Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System. Zwei Streitschriften.61 He also owned the works of the Hegel critic immanuel Hermann Karl werder, Logik. Som Kommentar og Supplement til Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik.” Første Afdeling, trans. by w.J.J. Boethe, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842. 55 B., “K. werder: Logik. Som Kommentar og Supplement til Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Første afdeling. oversat af w.J.J. Boethe. reitzels Forlag. Kjøbenhavn 1842,” Fædrelandet, vol. 4, no. 1189, 26 march 1843, columns 9541–7. 56 [anonymous] review of “Logik. Som Kommentar og Supplement til Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik.” af K. werder. Første afdeling oversat af w.J.J. Boethe. 164 s. 8vo. reitzel. 1 rbdlr. 8 s,” Nye Intelligensblade, 12 June 1842, no. 11 [unpaginated]. 57 respectively, ASKB 552–554, ASKB 561–563, ASKB 560. 58 ASKB 483. 59 Heinrich moritz Chalybäus, Historische Entwickelung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, dresden: grimmer 1837 (ASKB 461). Hegel’s philosophy is treated in lectures 12–14, pp. 261–340. Hegel’s logic is treated in lecture 13, pp. 284–307. see also Historisk Udvikling af den speculative Philosophie fra Kant til Hegel, trans. by s. Kattrup, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsens Forlag 1841 (ASKB 462). in this translation, which is based on the second edition of Chalybäus’ work (Zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, Dresden and leipzig 1839), Hegel’s philosophy is treated in lectures 13–17, pp. 252–376. Hegel’s logic is treated in lectures 14–16, pp. 272–339. 60 Franz anton staudenmaier, Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems, op. cit., pp. 331–477 (ASKB 789). 61 ASKB 843 and 846. 54

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Fichte62 and most of the danish works on Hegel’s logic mentioned above.63 thus, his interest in werder’s logic seems to be consistent with his continuing interest in the discussions surrounding Hegel’s logic that were taking place in the 1830s and 1840s. III. Werder’s Lectures the catalogue of courses at the Friedrich-wilhelms-universität zu Berlin for winter semester 1841–42 (which began on 17 october 1841) lists two offerings by werder.64 the one Kierkegaard attended was entitled, “logik und metaphysik mit besonderer rücksicht auf die bedeutendsten älteren und neuen systeme,” the title of which recalls the courses on “logik und metaphysik” regularly offered by Hegel.65 werder’s course was given on mondays, tuesdays, thursdays and Fridays from 11:00–12:00. Marheineke’s course was offered five days a week from 10:00–11:00, that is, an hour earlier than werder’s. this explains why the most extensive part of Kierkegaard’s notes to werder’s lectures appears in the same notebook (that is, Notebook 9) in which he took notes to marheineke’s lectures. since Kierkegaard apparently went first to Marheineke’s lecture and then to Werder’s, it was convenient to use the same notebook to take notes for both courses. werder’s course is listed in the catalogue as “privatim” (a variant of the usual privatissime), meaning that it was not a large public lecture which was in principle open to anyone who wanted to come but rather was intended for a smaller, more select or advanced group, who presumably had to obtain werder’s consent and pay a small fee in order to attend. although werder’s lectures seem to be based primarily on his Logik, there are some significant differences.66 As noted, Werder’s book covers only the first third of the first book of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. Kierkegaard’s lecture notes, however, include an outline of the categories that covers all of Book one and most

ASKB 507 and 508. see ASKB 383, 569, 699, 778. 64 Verzeichniss der Vorlesungen, welche an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin im Winterhalbenjahre 1841–42 vom 17. October an gehalten werden, university archive of the Humboldt university, Berlin. the course which Kierkegaard chose not to attend had the cumbersome title, “Geschichte der neueren Philosophie von Cartesius an als Quellenstudium behandelt, mit besonders ausführlicher Darlegung des Schellingschen Systems und einer einheitlichen Uebersicht der gesammten Geschichte der Philosophie.” the course was given in the afternoon every monday, tuesday, thursday and Friday from 5:00–6:00. 65 see Hans-Christian lucas, “Hegels vorlesungen über logik und metaphysik,” op. cit., pp. 32–40. see also “Übersicht über Hegels Berliner vorlesungen,” in Hegel’s Berliner Schriften, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister, op. cit., pp. 743–9. 66 taylor confuses werder’s book with the lectures, taking the two to be completely synonymous. mark C. taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: university of California press 1980, p. 163: Kierkegaard’s “sketchy knowledge of the fundaments of Hegelian logic, acquired largely from the writings of Heiberg and martensen, deepened considerably when he heard Karl werder’s lectures, Logik: Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, during his stay in Berlin (1841–42).” 62 63

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of Book two.67 Kierkegaard’s notes contain individual reflections on some of the categories from the outline, which go beyond the material covered in werder’s book.68 The final entry in Kierkegaard’s notes before that with the outline of categories treats the fact in itself [die Sache an sich] and condition [Bedingung];69 these categories come from the last part of the chapter on “ground” in Book two of the Wissenschaft der Logik.70 werder’s lectures thus advanced much further into the Hegelian system than did his book. Kierkegaard’s notes on the categories, which are introduced in the second half of Hegel’s logic, are at best fragmentary and suggest that werder ended his lectures in winter semester at that point. a continuation of the course was announced in the catalogue for the subsequent summer semester, but by then Kierkegaard had returned to Copenhagen. the scope of werder’s book and the lectures which Kierkegaard attended thus compare to Hegel’s logic as a whole as follows:

Hegel’s Book Wissenschaft der Logik

Werder’s Lectures “Logik und Metaphysik”

Werder’s Book Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik

erstes Buch: seyn erster abschnitt: qualität zweiter abschnitt: quantität dritter abschnitt: das maaß

erstes Buch: seyn erstes Buch: seyn erster abschnitt: qualität erster abschnitt: qualität zweiter abschnitt: quantität dritter abschnitt: das maaß

zweites Buch: wesen zweites Buch: wesen erster abschnitt: das wesen als erster abschnitt: das wesen als Reflexion in ihm selbst Reflexion in ihm selbst zweiter abschnitt: erscheinung dritter abschnitt: die wirklichkeit drittes Buch: der Begriff erster abschnitt: die subjektivität zweiter abschnitt: die objektivität dritter abschnitt: die idee SKS 19, 280–2, not9:9. For example, Kierkegaard has notes on the categories of quantum (SKS 19, 278f., not9:5), measure (SKS 19, 279, not9:6), identity and difference (SKS 19, 279, not9:7), and the fact in itself [die Sache an sich] and condition [Bedingung] (SKS 19, 279, not9:8), none of which are treated in werder’s book. 69 SKS 19, 279, not9:8. 70 Hegel, SL, pp. 469–78; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 585–96. (SL = Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. by a.v. miller, london: george allen and unwin 1989.) 67 68

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given the fact that werder stopped at almost the exact midpoint of the material from the Wissenschaft der Logik, it is likely that he originally conceived these lectures as a two-semester course. werder apparently enjoyed some celebrity. in winter semester 1845, some four years after Kierkegaard’s visit, his fellow dane peter michael stilling (1812–69)71 attended werder’s lectures, apparently on the same subject.72 the philologist and linguist Caspar wilhelm smith (1811–81),73 who was in Berlin at the same time as Kierkegaard in fall 1841 and even mentions him in his letters,74 was also in attendence at werder’s lectures.75 Further useful information and interesting impressions come from Hans Brøchner (1820–75), who attended werder’s lectures on logic in 1846.76 all of these students praise werder’s skill as a lecturer. IV. Kierkegaard’s Statements about Werder Kierkegaard’s explicit statements about werder all come from the Nachlass and can be divided into four groups: (A) letters, (B) reflections on Werder’s lectures in Notebook 8, (C) actual notes to werder’s lectures in Notebook 9, and (d) two further brief comments, one in Notebook 13 and one on a loose paper. A. Letters in Berlin, far from friends and family, Kierkegaard wrote a number of letters which describe, often in some detail, his experiences at the university. these include three which discuss Werder. The first is dated 18 November 1841, that is, some three weeks after his arrival in Berlin and addressed to peter Johannes spang (1796–1846),77 priest at the Church of the Holy ghost. Kierkegaard describes the atmosphere of Schelling’s crowded first lecture and notes, “I happened to sit between notable stilling, often the target of Kierkegaard’s criticism, was the author of the following “Hegelian” works: Philosophiske Betragtninger over den speculative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842; Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844 (ASKB 801). see also his Om den indbildte Forsoning af Tro og Viden med særligt Hensyn til Prof. Martensens Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850 (ASKB 802). 72 see Jens Holger schjørring, “p.m. stilling,” in his Teologi og filosofi. Nogle analyser og dokumenter vedrørende Hegelianismen i dansk teologi, Copenhagen: g.e.C. gads Forlag 1974, p. 54f. 73 H.d. schepelern (ed.), “Filologen Caspar wilhelm smiths rejsebreve 1841–1845,” in Dansk Magazin indholdende Bidrag til den danske histories oplysning, 7th series, vol. 5, Copenhagen 1949–53, pp. 81–172, see p. 96f. 74 ibid., p. 111, p. 112. 75 H.d. schepelern (ed.), “Filologen Caspar wilhelm smiths rejsebreve 1841–1845,” op. cit., p. 96f. 76 Harald Høffding (ed.), Hans Brøchner og Christian K.F. Molbech. En Brevvexling (1845–1875), Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1902, p. 15, p. 19. 77 see Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen By His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, pp. 111f., p. 242. 71

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people—prof. werder and dr. gruppe.”78 it is understandable that werder and other faculty members would have attended these lectures since schelling’s course was a major event.79 schelling had not published anything for years, and the academic world was bristling with excitement to learn what philosophical standpoint he had arrived at. schelling’s inaugural lecture course, Philosophie der Offenbarung, which Kierkegaard attended, was much awaited and extremely popular. moreover, during that same semester werder himself was teaching a course “mit besonders ausführlicher Darlegung des Schellingschen Systems.”80 werder’s course was by necessity confined to treating Schelling’s early work, but he would presumably also have been interested in schelling’s more recent philosophical views. the second letter is dated about a month later on 15 december 1841. Kierkegaard writes to sibbern, his old dissertation advisor, of his enthusiasm for werder’s lectures: so here i am in Berlin going to lectures. i am attending lectures by marheineke, werder and schelling.…werder is a virtuoso; that is all one can say about him. i suspect that he must be a Jew, for baptized Jews always distinguish themselves by their virtuosity and of course do participate in all fields nowadays. Like a juggler, he can play and frolic with the most abstract categories and with never so much as a slip of the tongue even though he talks as fast as a horse can run. He is a scholastic in the old sense; he has found in Hegel what they found in thomas aquinas, not just the summa and the summa summae but the summa summarum. in this respect he is almost a psychological phenomenon for me. His life, his thought, the richness of the outside world almost seem meaningful to him only when they have reference to Hegel’s Logik. it is, however, very advantageous for the young people studying at the university to have such a man.81

Here werder seems to be praised primarily for his rhetorical abilities, that is, for his mastery of the technical jargon of Hegel’s philosophy and for his ability to employ it without hesitation or flaw in his analysis of the categories. The observation that werder “talks as fast as a horse can run” may explain why Kierkegaard’s notes to his lectures are not particularly detailed. It would have been difficult for him to note much more than fleeting observations and general headings, given that, in addition to the intrinsic difficulty of the subject matter itself, Werder was speaking so quickly in a language that was not Kierkegaard’s own. this letter also evidences a slight ambivalence towards werder. although werder seems to be “almost a psychological B&A, vol. 1, 77 / LD, 51. the other person mentioned by Kierkegaard is otto Friederich gruppe (1804–76), from 1844 professor of philosophy in Berlin and from 1863 the secretary of the academy of arts. why he is considered one of the “notable people” here in 1841 is unclear. see max lenz, Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, op. cit., vol. 2.2, p. 138f. 80 Verzeichniss der Vorlesungen, welche an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin im Winterhalbenjahre 1841–42 vom 17. October an gehalten werden, op. cit., “Geschichte der neueren Philosophie von Cartesius an als Quellenstudium behandelt, mit besonders ausführlicher Darlegung des Schellingschen Systems und einer einheitlichen Uebersicht der gesammten Geschichte der Philosophie.” 81 B&A, vol. 1, 84 / LD, 55. Translation slightly modified. 78 79

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phenomenon” due to his obsession with Hegel’s logic and his tendency to interpret everything through its prism, his teaching is nonetheless lauded as “very advantageous for the young people studying at the university.” thus, werder is by no means made the object of Kierkegaard’s scorn as a blind Hegelian parrot as, for example, Heiberg and martensen are later. The third and final letter is again addressed to P.J. Spang and dated 8 January 1842. there Kierkegaard writes at the end of the letter, werder juggles with the categories as the strong man in dyrehavn juggles with balls weighing twenty, thirty, forty pounds. it is terrifying to watch, and as in dyrehavn one is sometimes tempted to believe that they are paper balls. He is not only a philosopher but a poet as well. He has written a monstrously long play called Christopher Columbus, which lasts from 5:30 to 10 p.m. despite the censor’s having deleted some 600 lines. yet, in another sense it lasts even longer, for it spans fourteen years, and that being so, one should praise his brevity. It was performed for the first time last night, but it was impossible to get a ticket. my time is up, and i have werder’s example warning me to strive for brevity.82

In the first part of this passage Kierkegaard repeats more or less what he said to sibbern a month earlier, comparing werder with a juggler. what is new is the second half. Here Kierkegaard alludes to an entirely different aspect of werder’s activity, namely his drama Christopher Columbus.83 Here there is a tone of satire regarding the length of the piece, but Kierkegaard seems rather restrained in his critique. moreover, this satire has nothing to do with Hegel’s logic. B. notebook 8 werder is mentioned twice in Notebook 8 in a section with the heading, “Notanda. ad philosophiam pertinentia.”84 the sense that this is intended as an independent section is reinforced by the fact that, in addition to bearing this title, these entries are written in the notebook from the back.85 the other entries also included under this heading concern Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics,86 which Kierkegaard was apparently reading at the same time.87 B&A, vol. 1, 93 / LD, 61. Translation slightly modified. this was the work with which werder hoped to establish himself as a major dramatist in the German language. It was performed for the first time here in 1842, with subsequent performances in 1847 at the Charlottenburg Schloßtheater, in 1882 in Mannheim, and finally again in Berlin in 1892. unfortunately, this work never attained the critical acclaim that werder had hoped for. see albert Köster, “Karl Friedrich werder,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, op. cit., vol. 44, pp. 482–3. 84 SKS 19, 243, not8:49. 85 see leon Jaurnow and Jette Knudsen, “tekstredegørelse” to Notesbog 8 in SKS K19, p. 306. 86 SKS 19, 245, not8:51 / JP 2, 1592. SKS 19, 246, not8:53 / JP 2, 1593. 87 Hegel, Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, i–iii, ed. by Heinrich gustav Hotho, Berlin 1835– 38, vols. 10–1, 10–2, 10–3 (ASKB 1384–1386) in Hegel’s Werke. see for example, SKS 19, 285–6, not10:1 / JP 5, 5545. SKS 19, 237, not8:39.1 / JP 2, 1591. SKS 19, 375, not12:7 / JP 2, 1738. see also Pap. v B 60, p. 137 / CA, supplement, p. 207. Pap. v B 72.33 / CA, 82 83

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(1) The first entry that concerns Werder is dated 1 December [1841]. It can be broken down into three parts, which are separated in the text by dashes. (a) The first part begins as follows: “In what Werder has covered so far, there are two points which i believe are important for any understanding in dogmatics.”88 this indicates Kierkegaard’s primarily theological interest in the metaphysical categories that werder was discussing. He seems not interested in the categories for their own sake or for that of werder’s or Hegel’s speculative logic, but rather for their possible application to Christian dogmatics. the two points that he notes concern two different transitions in the categorial movements. Kierkegaard describes these in a very compact fashion as follows: the one is the transition from Werden to Daseyn; the other is the transition from changeableness to unchangeableness, finitude to infinitude. Entstehen (Nichts in Seyn) and Vergehen (Seyn in Nichts) are in each other: this expressed as rest, as product, is consequently not werden but was geworden ist, i.e., Daseyn.89

The first transition mentioned, that is, that from Werden to Daseyn corresponds to the section “Auflösung des Werdens” in werder’s Logik.90 The first triad of Hegel’s logic consists of the categories being, nothing and becoming. the transition in question is that between this initial triad and the second one, which consists of determinate being [Daseyn], finitude and infinity. In this transition the category of becoming is conceived as having two aspects or “moments”: coming-to-be [Entstehen] and ceasing-to-be [Vergehen]. each of these expresses the concept of becoming in its own direction or with its own vector, so to speak. Coming-to-be is becoming directed towards being, while ceasing-to-be is becoming directed towards nothing. their unity leads to the next category, determinate being. this is what is expressed in the passage with the otherwise cryptic statement: “Entstehen (Nichts in Seyn) and Vergehen (Seyn in Nichts) are in each other.”91

supplement, p. 213. Pap. iii B 28 / CI, supplement, p. 446. Pap. iii B 29 / CI, supplement, p. 447. 88 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. 89 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. 90 werder, Logik, pp. 108–11. this corresponds in Hegel to SL, pp. 106–8; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 119–21. see also EL, §§ 88–9; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 209–17. the second transition noted in the passage is that from changeableness to unchangeableness or finitude to infinitude and clearly corresponds to the section, “Auflösung der Veränderung” in werder’s book. werder, Logik, pp. 146–64. this corresponds in Hegel to SL, pp. 129–56; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 147–83. see also EL, §§ 92–5; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 219–27. (EL = The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. by t.F. gerats, w.a. suchting, H.s. Harris, indianapolis: Hackett 1991.) 91 Hegel explains this as follows in a passage from the Wissenschaft der Logik quoted in werder’s Logik, p. 98: “Both [scilicet: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be] are the same, becoming, and although they differ so in direction they interpenetrate and paralyze each other. the one is ceasing-to-be: being passes over into nothing, but nothing is equally the opposite of itself, transition into being, coming-to-be. this coming-to-be is the other direction: nothing passes over into being, but being equally sublates itself and is rather transition into nothing,

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the second aspect of this transition is when these two moments of the category becoming, that is, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, are considered to be at rest. this is when determinate being arises. all determinate beings are mutable, that is, they are always in a process of change somewhere in the movement of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. But these movements often take place over long periods of time and are not always clearly discernable. thus, when a thing is considered in this way, that is, as being at rest in this process, it is determinate.92 it has come into being without yet having ceased to be. Kierkegaard notes this in the passage thus: “this expressed as rest, as product, is consequently not werden but was geworden ist, i.e., Daseyn.” this wordplay appears at this transition in werder’s text and in Hegel’s Encyclopädie, albeit in the student additions.93 Kierkegaard’s comment on this first part of the entry is as follows: “This sounds good enough, but it involves sheer play with the concept of time, which is not given and which i think cannot be given in logic anyway.”94 the reference to “sheer play” seems to be to the last part of the passage just quoted. Kierkegaard seems to object to the wordplay involved in the verbal forms “werden” and “geworden ist,” which, as noted above, also figures prominently in Werder’s book.95 the claim that the concept is ceasing-to-be” (SL, p. 106; Jub., vol. 4, p. 119). see also Hegel, SL, p. 106; Jub., vol. 4, p. 119: “...becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being...” 92 the intended contrast here is clearly with the previous category of being, which is unchanging and eternal. pure being does not come-to-be or cease-to-be. it is. it exists eternally. 93 werder, Logik, p. 108f: “Verschwundenseyn seiner selbst, sein eignes: also ein Aufheben das innerhalb des Werdens bleibt; das Werden verschwindet — aber nur in sich. Es hört auf, es vergeht, als werden. Das heißt: es ist das vergangene Werden[,] es ist: Geworden. Was geworden ist, das ist da. Jedes Präteritum ist im Geiste ein Präsens. Werden als Geworden ist daseyn.” ibid., p. 109: “Im Werden ist die unbestimmte Ruhe, das Seyn, das abstracte Entstehen, aufgehoben; darum ist es rastlose Bewegung: Vergehen—welches als rastlose Bewegung selbst vergeht, und als die Bewegung des sich-selbst-Produzirens Entstehen und somit bestimmte in sich bewegte Ruhe: Geworden, Daseyn ist.” Hegel, EL, § 89, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 217: “Das Resultat aber dieses Processes ist nicht das leere Nichts, sondern das mit der Negation identische Seyn, welches wir daseyn nennen, und als dessen Bedeutung sich zunächst dieß erweist, geworden zu seyn.” n.B. this wordplay does not appear in the Wissenschaft der Logik (at least not at this transition). 94 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. 95 later in The Concept of Anxiety he objects to a similar wordplay from Hegelian logic with the words “Wesen” and “gewesen”: SKS 4, 320n / CA, 12n: “Wesen ist was ist gewesen; ist gewesen is a tempus praeteritum of Seyn, ergo, Wesen ist das aufgehobene Seyn, the Seyn that has been. this is a logical movement! if anyone would take the trouble to collect and put together all the strange pixies and goblins who like busy clerks bring about movement in Hegelian logic (such as this is in itself and as it has been improved by the school), a later age would perhaps be surprised to see that what are regarded as discarded witticisms once played an important role in logic.” see SKS K4, p. 363. For this wordplay in Hegel see EL, § 112, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 263: “As for the further significance and use of the category of essence, we can recall first at this point how the term ‘Wesen’ is employed to designate the past for the german auxiliary verb ‘sein’; for we designate the being that is past as ‘gewesen.’” see also PhS, p. 63; Jub., vol. 2, p. 88: “the now, as it is pointed out to us, is now that has

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of time cannot be captured in logic seems to anticipate what might be called the existential aspect of Kierkegaard’s later thinking, that is, his belief that the scholarly fields of “objective thinking” cannot in principle capture the existential aspects of the life of the individual. To return to Kierkegaard’s original comment about the possible significance of these categories for dogmatics, his concern appears to be with the dogma of the incarnation, which will become so important later in works such as Philosophical Fragments. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that in the other entry where werder appears in this notebook (discussed just below), he is mentioned in connection with marheineke’s lectures of dogmatics. there Kierkegaard names the doctrine of the incarnation explicitly.96 the connection seems to be something like the following: the idea that a transcendent god can become incarnated and appear in time corresponds to the movement from the category of being to that of determinate being. the category of being is, like the divine, eternal. By becoming incarnate, god becomes temporal, just like determinate being. to put it in purely speculative terms, the incarnation would be the coming-to-be and the crucifixion the ceasing-to-be, that is, in time. Kierkegaard has his pseudonym Johannes Climacus treat this in some detail in the Fragments, where he objects to claims for the purported dialectical necessity of such transitions. thus, his claim that the concept of time cannot be captured in logic seems to anticipate, among other things, his later doctrine of the paradox. (B) there follows a dash to indicate a break after which werder treats two further categories: something (Etwas) and other (Anderes). Kierkegaard writes the following: Etwas and Anderes are not merely in each other, but Etwas is only insofar as it is Anderes, and Anderes only insofar as it is Etwas; they fashion each other. the movement is a redoubling. on one side Etwas. as an sich it is Etwas; as being for another it is Anderes— Anderes is an sich Anderes; as a being for another it is Etwas. But thereby Etwas consequently is—through Anderes; and consequently Etwas is not only Anderes but nur Anderes, and this is expressed by Andersseyn, but this expressed as unity is change.97

In contrast to the first part of this entry just treated, this passage after the dash has much more the look of an actual note written during the lecture itself. the passage refers to the way in which the categories of something (Etwas) and other (Anderes) are related to one another dialectically in Hegel’s logic. the point is quite simply that any something implies an opposite, that is, something else, and, conversely, for something else to exist implies that it is compared with a previous something which was the original point of departure. the two concepts thus mutually determine and

been, and this is its truth; it has not the truth of being. yet this much is true, that it has been. But what essentially has been [gewesen ist] is, in fact, not an essence that is [kein Wesen]; it is not, and it was with being that we were concerned.” (PhS = Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by a.v. miller, oxford: Clarendon press 1977.) 96 SKS 19, 246, not8:52 / JP 3, 3285. 97 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257.

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imply each other.98 the last part of this passage about change being the expression of their unity is also found in werder’s book.99 (C) there is a third point at the end of this entry that Kierkegaard also notes: “Finitude is what am Ende ist; consequently the finite is was gewesen ist. But infinitude? It is finitude which is not itself (nonfinitude—both); consequently it is infinitude; was nicht gewesen ist.”100 this too has the look of an actual lecture note. What is at issue here is the dialectical relation that exists between finitude and infinity in Hegel’s logic.101 Hegel constantly polemicizes against what he refers to as “the bad infinity” (sometimes translated as “the spurious infinity”).102 this understanding of the concept is the common sense conception of adding or repeating a term endlessly in the way that we tend to think that numbers are infinite since we can always add one more. Hegel disapproves of this notion since it is not dialectical. thus, it leads nowhere and causes the dialectical movement to come to a halt, only to be replaced with a mechanical repetition. The true conception of infinity is one whereby infinity is conceived in its determinate opposition to finitude. In other words, the finite could not exist without the infinite and vice versa. This is expressed in the passage where Kierkegaard writes, “It is finitude which is not itself (nonfinitude—both); consequently it is infinitude.”103 the rest of the passage can be explained as follows. Cf. werder, Logik, pp. 126–33, especially p. 132f.: “Das Etwas ist für Anderes und das Andere ist für Etwas, was heißt das? Es heißt: das Etwas ist außerdem daß es Etwas und nicht das Andre ist, auch das Andre, und das Andre ist, außerdem daß es das Andre und nicht das Etwas ist, auch Etwas. Noch nicht total ist jedes das andre, sondern wie gesagt: nur momentan, d.h. auch. Sie sind in Einheit mit einander oder sind Eines als zwei.” this corresponds to Hegel’s SL, pp. 117–22; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 132–9. see also EL, §§ 90–5; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 217–27. 99 Cf. werder, Logik, p. 138: “Die Wahrheit des Etwas und des Anderen ist die Veränderung. Als Veränderung hat der Begriff des Daseyns sich realisirt. Das Daseyn seinem Begriffe nach ist die Gegenwart des Werdens. Dieses gegenwärtige daseyende Werden, das geworden als werdendes, als Werden seiner selbst, nennen wir die veränderung.” see also Hegel, EL, § 92; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 219–21. 100 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. 101 Cf. werder, Logik, p. 152: “Das Endliche mit sich zusammengehend vergeht; das worin es, warum es, kraft dessen es vergeht, ist also es selber als nicht es selber. Das aber sagt das Unendliche aus und sonst nichts...In dem worte: un - endlich liegt offenbart der gedanke des Unendlichen — der Gedanke, daß es das endliche selber als nicht es selber ist.” this corresponds to Hegel SL, pp. 129–50; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 147–75. see also EL, §§ 92–5; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 219–27. 102 see, for example, Hegel, EL, § 94; Jub., vol. 8, p. 222. SL, p. 139; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 160–61. Kierkegaard refers to this concept frequently: SKS 17, 248, dd:77 / JP 4, 3857. SKS 17, 295, dd:208 / EPW, 122. SKS 17, 247, dd:77 / JP 4, 3857. SKS 1, 82 / CI, 21f. SKS 2, 281 / EO1, 292. SKS 3, 34 / EO2, 26. SKS 7, 109f. / CUP1, 112f. SKS 7, 309 / CUP1, 338. SKS 18, 17, ee:35 / JP 2, 1577. SKS 18, 45, ee:119 / JP 2, 1579. SKS 20, 67, nB:76 / JP 3, 2811. 103 Compare this to the way it is phrased in werder’s Logik, p. 153: “So kann man sagen: Das Endliche selbst ist das Unendliche — und man sagt so, wenn man weiß, was man sagt. Das Endliche ‘selbst’ bedeutet: Das Endliche nicht — sondern das Vollendete. Denn das Endliche ist nicht selbst, da es als Endliches nicht ist, da sein Seyn das Nichtseyn ist, und es von Ewigkeit, noch bevor es anzufangen vermag als nur Endliches, schon vergangen als solches. 98

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A finite series of numbers is one which is complete or at an end, or as is written in the passage, “Finitude is what am Ende ist.” By contrast, an infinite series of numbers is one which has not yet been completed or “was nicht gewesen ist.” Kierkegaard’s critical comment on this is as follows: “insofar as this is to be the expression for the significance of finitude, it manifestly has not received its due.”104 He seems to be dissatisfied with the conception of finitude as being merely the opposite of the infinite. His dissatisfaction perhaps stems from the fact that such an account of finitude fails to consider sin, which he clearly regards as essential in the conception of finite human beings. (2) the other entry about werder from this notebook refers to some of the categories mentioned in the previous one and thus serves to shed light on the previous discussion. Here Kierkegaard writes, the doctrine of revelation as presented by marheincke in his Dogmatik serves to illuminate the philosophic volatilization of Christian doctrinal concepts—the logical proposition that the finite is the infinite, together with the explanation Werder gives, that the stress is on the last word. all this must be gone through meticulously in order, if possible, to bring clarity into the confusion. the doctrine of the image of god according to marheincke’s lecture is also such a volatilization.105

Here he refers to the final part of the previous entry concerning the dialectical relation of infinity and finitude. Kierkegaard’s objection to both Werder and Marheineke is to their dialectical conception of infinity, which makes it in a sense dependent upon finitude. This undermines it as an absolute other since it always stands in relation to the finite, as its opposite. Thus, it is easy to understand Kierkegaard’s objection to the paradoxical formulation that “the finite is the infinite.” In Werder (and Hegel) this formulation is simply meant to capture the dialectical interrelatedness of the two categories. But to formulate it in this way is, for Kierkegaard, to risk the danger of understanding it literally, which would mean that there is no difference between the two. this would of course have catastrophic consequences for dogmatics, which, for Kierkegaard, requires an “absolute difference”106 between God (infinity) and human beings (finitude) or God and the created world. Das heißt: es ist nur im Unvergänglichen. Das selbst des Endlichen ist das Unendliche. Daß das Nichtseyende sich manifestirt als nichtgewesenes, das ist die Manifestation des Seyns selber als des seyenden. Und grade als diese Manifestation ist das ewige Seyn das Werden seiner selbst. Denn so ist es sein eigner Reflex und schaut sich an, sein Anderes seyend in sich. Was heißt denn: nichtgewesenseyn? Seyn heißt es, ewiges absolutes seyn; der andre Ausdruck dafür ist es, sein andrer Ausdruck, sein eigner, sein Reflex, sein Wort, darin es sich schaut und vernimmt von Ewigkeit, es selber. Das heißt: das Endliche selbst ist das Unendliche.” 104 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. 105 SKS 19, 246, not8:52 / JP 3, 3285. 106 see SKS 7, 374f. / CUP1, 412: “But between god and a human being (let speculative thought just keep humankind to perform tricks with) there is an absolute difference; therefore a person’s absolute relationship with God must specifically express the absolute difference,

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the two entries in this notebook manifest clearly Kierkegaard’s agenda. although they appear in a section entitled, “Notanda. ad philosophiam pertinentia,” these notes on werder’s analyses of the logical categories are to be understood primarily in terms of their relevance for theology. this could also explain why Kierkegaard’s notes are not more extensive than they are. He only bothered to take notes for the categories which seemed to have some relevance for dogmatics. the other ones were simply not relevant or interesting for him. C. notebook 9 the actual notes that Kierkegaard took at werder’s lectures appear in Notebook 9, which also includes his notes to marheineke’s lectures107 (which are continued in Notebook 10).108 like the entries on werder in Notebook 8, these seem to be regarded as an independent section, although there is no distinct title or heading to introduce them. this is reinforced by the fact that the notes to marheineke’s lectures were written from the front of the notebook, while those to werder’s lectures were written from the back.109 there are in all only eight entries from werder’s lectures.110 the last of these is a fragmentary overview of the categories.111 Kierkegaard seems not to have made any attempt to take systematic notes to werder’s lectures in the way he did for those of marheineke and schelling. His notes follow the same general sequence as both werder’s book and Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, but there are a number of intermediary categories missing for which he took no notes. These notes are too complex to be treated exhaustively here, and so I will confine myself to examining just two of them which are of particular importance. the one entry is rather cryptic and runs as follows: “identity ist der mit sich identische Unterschied—Unterschied ist der von sich unterschied[en]e identity.”112 Here one can see Kierkegaard’s fondness for paradoxical formulations. what is at issue here is Hegel’s critique of the law of identity as nonsensical.113 statements such as, “the plant is the plant,” ultimately say nothing. The first part of the statement, “The plant is...” seems to promise a meaningful predicate which will provide new information, but the completion of the proposition disappoints this expectation. Hegel thus claims a new conception of identity is needed. He argues that the concept of identity is inherent in the propositional form itself, for example, “the plant is green.” Here, he claims, an assertion of identity is made by simply attributing the predicate to the and the direct likeness becomes impudence, conceited pretense, presumption, and the like.” see also PF, pp. 44–5; SKS 4, p. 249. 107 SKS 19, 249–77, not9:1. 108 SKS 19, 288–301, not10:8–9. 109 see Kim ravn and steen tullberg, “tekstredegørelse” to Notesbog 9–10 in SKS K19, p. 329. 110 SKS 19, 278–82, not9:2–9. in the Papirer edition these were presented as a single entry (Pap. ii C 29, in Pap. Xiii, pp. 330–3). these notes have never been translated into english. 111 SKS 19, 280–2, not9:9. 112 SKS 19, 279, not9:7. 113 see Hegel, SL, pp. 413–6; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 510–5. EL, § 115; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 268–9.

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subject. thus, “the plant is green,” is a statement of identity, but one which contains a difference within itself since the plant also has other properties and is not, as such, identical with the color green. This is the meaning of the first half of the statement: “identity ist der mit sich identische Unterschied.” the speculative concept of identity contains the concept of difference. the second half of the statement concerns the category of difference, which is central for Hegel’s famous criticism of the law of contradiction.114 parallel to his discussion of identity, Hegel argues that the concept of difference contained in the classical notion of contradiction is ultimately empty. when one says, “the rose is not red,” one has not said anything determinate since the rose could be any number of other colors.115 the correct speculative understanding of difference is that of opposites or contraries (Gegensätze), whereby a given thing is not its opposite, that is, north is not south, and being is not nothing. But in these complementary pairs, one can easily see a higher dialectical unity; the one is the mirror image of the other, and the one necessarily determines the other. this provides an aspect of identity to the concept of difference, that is, north is not south, but it is identical with south when considered as longitudinal direction. this is what is meant with the second half of Kierkegaard’s note, “Unterschied ist der von sich unterschied[en]e identity.” the speculative concept of difference is thus one that contains the concept of identity. The final entry is an elaborate table of categories.116 i have attempted to reconstruct this table with some slight modifications in order to make clear the relation between this table itself, werder’s Logik and Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. the words that appear in bold are the ones that appear in Kierkegaard’s entry. For the sake of simplicity i have changed Kierkegaard’s danish spellings of the german words to the standard german orthography of the day. moreover, for the few times where Kierkegaard has written the categories in danish, i have taken the liberty of changing them to the german as they appear in werder and Hegel. i have added in square brackets the missing chapter headings or categories, following werder’s Logik (until the point where it ends) and then Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. these appear in normal script. this arrangement makes it easy to see what fails to appear in Kierkegaard’s notes. on the right i have referenced the corresponding sections in werder’s Logik (until it ends) and then Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik.117

114

270–81.

see Hegel, SL, pp. 439–43; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 545–51. EL, §§ 116–20; Jub., vol. 8, pp.

it has, of course, rightly been pointed out that this is not an accurate statement of the aristotelian law of contradiction, which states it is not possible for a given thing to both have and not have the same property (at the same time and in the same respect). thus, it is not possible for a given rose to be both red and not red. see aristotle, Metaphysics, Book iv, Chapters 3–6; Book Xi, Chapters 5–6. 116 SKS 19, 280–2, not9:9. 117 the references to Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik are all to vol. 4 in Jub. 115

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Hegel’s werder’s Wissenschaft Logik der Logik [erstes Buch: seyn] [erster abschnitt: qualität] Seyn

Nichts

Werden

[29–96]

Entstehen

Vergehen

Daseyn

[91–111]

Realität

Negation

Etwas

[116–126]

Anderes

[87–89]

[127ff.]

An-sich-Seyn

Seyn-für-Anderes Grenze

[131–133]

Andersseyn

Veränderung

Unveränderlichkeit

[136–150]

Endlichkeit

Unendlichkeit

[151–164]

Realität

Negation

(Negations Negation) Idealität

[191–197]

Fürsichseyn

Fürsichseyendes Eins

[197–211]

[183–192]

Eins

Nichts Anderes

[211–216]

[192–218]

Einheit. Ein Eins

[132–147] [147–183]

[zweiter abschnitt: quantität] [1. Kapitel:] Quantität

[222–242]

[a.] Kontinuität

Diskretion

[222–223]

(Attraktion)

(Repulsion)

[222–223]

[B.] kontinuirliche [größe]

diskrete Größe

[239–240]

[C. Begrenzung der quantität]

[241–242]

[2. Kapitel:] Quantum

[242–389]

[a. die] Zahl [B.] extensive [größe]

[242–245] intensive Größe [=] Grad

[C.] quantitative Unendlichkeit [=] Sollen [3. Kapitel:] [das] quantitative Verhältniß

[262–267] [273–293] [389–402]

[dritter abschnitt:] [das] Maaß [zweites Buch:] Wesen [Erster Abschnitt: Das Wesen als Reflexion in ihm selbst]

[405ff.] [479ff.] [485ff.]

[1. Kapitel: der schein]

[485–504]

[2. Kapitel: Die Wesenheiten oder die Reflexionsbestimmungen]

[504–551]

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[a. die] Identität

[508–515]

[B. der] Unterschied

[515–534]

[1. der absolute unterschied]

[515–517]

[2. die] Verschiedenheit

[517–525]

Gleichheit, Ungleichheit

[517–525]

[3. der] Gegensatz

[525–534]

[C. der] Widerspruch

[535–551]

[das] Positive, [das] Negative

[535–551]

[3. Kapitel: der] Grund [zweiter abschnitt: die erscheinung]

[551–596] [597ff.]

[1. Kapitel: die] Existenz

[598–622]

[2. Kapitel: die erscheinung]

[622–639]

[a. das] Gesetz [der] Erscheinung

[624–630]

[B. die erscheinende und die an-sich-seyende welt]

[631–636]

[C. Auflösung der Erscheinung]

[636–639]

[3. Kapitel: das wesentliche] Verhältniß [a. das verhältnis des] Ganzen [und der] Theile

[639–661] [641–648]

Die Theile er i den Grad das Ganze, at enhver Theil er det Hele. Der Theil ist eo ipso die Theile. [B. das verhältnis der] Kraft [und ihrer] Aeußerung

[648–655]

[C. verhältnis des aeußern und innern]

[655–661]

[dritter abschnitt: die wirklichkeit]

[662ff.]

[1. Kapitel: das absolute]

[663–677]

[2. Kapitel: die] Wirklichkeit

[622–639]

[a.] Zufälligkeit [oder formelle wirklichkeit,] Möglichkeit [und nothwendigkeit]

[680–685]

[B. relative nothwendigkeit oder reale wirklichkeit, möglichkeit und nothwendigkeit]

[685–691]

[C. absolute nothwendigkeit]

[691–696]

[3. Kapitel: das absolute verhältniß]

[696–721]

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this chart covers two-thirds of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. Only the final third, “the doctrine of the Concept” is missing. note that the chart is very fragmentary towards the end. Only a few of the main headings are mentioned from the final section of “the doctrine of essence.” it is useful to compare this overview with the entries on the individual categories. First, such a comparision makes it evident that Kierkegaard’s individual entries do in fact follow the sequence of categories set forth here (albeit with some gaps). the place where Kierkegaard’s notes stop, that is, in the chapter on “grund,” corresponds to almost the exact midpoint of the work as a whole. this suggests that the material was divided into two equal halves which werder treated over two semesters. D. Further Allusions to Werder the Nachlass contains only two further references to Werder. The first appears in Notebook 13, which Kierkegaard names “philosophica.”118 as the title indicates, this is where he collected his reflections on philosophy along with the notes that he took while reading philosophical texts. the complete entry is as follows: in the doctrine of being everything is which does not change. (this is something which even werder admitted. see the small books.) in the doctrine of essence there is Beziehung. —the irregularities in Hegel’s logic. essentially this segment is only dichotomies—cause-effect—ground-consequent— reciprocal effect is a problem, perhaps belongs somewhere else. the concept is a trichotomy. Being does not belong to logic at all. it ought to begin with dichotomy.119

By “the small books” Kierkegaard is presumably referring to Notebook 8 and 9. the claim attributed to Werder seems to be limited to the first sentence and presumably does not include the rest of the entry. this original claim that “in the doctrine of being everything is which does not change,” refers to Hegel’s contrast between the categories in “the doctrine of Being” and those of “the doctrine of essence.”120 the former are considered alone in their immediacy; they simply exist. By contrast, the so-called categories of reflection are characterized not by the verb “to be” but rather “to have” since they have reciprocal parts. For example, an effect has a cause; a thing has properties. it is odd that Kierkegaard says that this is something that werder “admitted” given the fact that Hegel states it himself more or less explicitly. perhaps the meaning of this is to be found in Kierkegaard’s critical remarks in this entry. He makes a couple of critical comments about this organization of the categories, for example, that reciprocal effect (Vexelvirkning) does not belong to “the doctrine of essence,” that “Being does not belong to logic at all,” and that SKS 19, 383, not13:1. SKS 19, 415, not13:50 / JP 2, 1602. Translation slightly modified. 120 see Hegel, SL, pp. 409–11; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 504–8. EL, § 125; Jub., vol. 8, p. 292. Heiberg belabors this point in his main work on logic, the aforementioned Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik, op. cit., § 79, § 87. 118 119

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logic “ought to begin with dichotomy.” thus, to say that werder “admitted” the point about the categories in “the doctrine of Being” is a way of saying that werder is in agreement with this general way of organizing and understanding the categories and thus that he too is open to these criticisms. The second direct allusion to Werder, which is no less cryptic than the first, appears on an undated loose paper. there, based on a point in Hegel’s logic, Kierkegaard compares the works on logic of adler, werder and Heiberg. He writes: Hegel in the logic at the transition from the doctrine of measure. adler says: when the quantitative determination is indifferent, then a new quality appears—when? werder is more correct. Heiberg’s Perseus cf. a pencil mark in the margin to the first §§ of the logic.121

this entry, though undated, must have been written during or after 1842 since adler’s Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic122 did not appear until that year. moreover, the entry’s context suggests it was written in connection with the discussion of the leap that appears in The Concept of Anxiety, which of course appeared in 1844.123 The first sentence fragment refers to Hegel’s discussion of the doctrine of measure, which constitutes the transition from quantity to quality. this transition was important for Kierkegaard as a source for his celebrated doctrine of the leap. For Hegel, measure involves the quantitative increase or decrease in certain properties or aspects of a thing. these quantitative changes have, however, a natural limit. there can only be quantitative changes up to a certain point, after which there is a radical qualitative shift. in the Encyclopädie Hegel uses as an example the increase or decrease in the temperature of water: the temperature of water is, up to a point, indifferent in relation to its liquid state; but there comes a point in the increasing or decreasing of the temperature of liquid water where this state of cohesion changes qualitatively, and the water is transformed into steam, on the one hand, and ice, on the other.124

Hegel then designates the radical shift from one quality to another in terms of a leap. in the Wissenschaft der Logik, he writes: “on the qualitative side, therefore, the gradual, merely quantitative progress which is not in itself a limit, is absolutely interrupted; Pap. v C 4. see Koch’s discussion of this passage. Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse, op. cit., pp. 190ff. 122 adolph peter adler, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842 (ASKB 383). 123 see Jon stewart, “Hegel and adler in the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2001, pp. 43–77, see section “v. quantity, quality and the leap,” pp. 69–75. 124 Hegel, EL, § 108, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 255. Here Hegel defines the “leap” as follows: “‘leap’ here means qualitative distinction and qualitative alteration, which appear to take place without mediation, whilst, on the contrary, what is (quantitatively) gradual presents itself as something mediated.” Hegel, EL, § 35, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 110. 121

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the new quality in its merely quantitative relationship is, relatively to the vanishing quality, an indifferent, indeterminate other, and the transition is therefore a leap.”125 a journal entry shows Kierkegaard was familiar with this example from Hegel.126 when one sees how this issue is related to the idea of a leap, then it immediately becomes clear why Kierkegaard is so interested in this logical transition. the meaning of the reference to werder in this context is unclear. Kierkegaard’s comments on werder’s view of quantity and quality are limited to an entry from Notebook 9 which makes no reference to the leap.127 the category of measure is not treated in werder’s book, and Kierkegaard offers no further information. what he thought werder was right about and his reasons for his belief thus remain a mystery. given the analyses of the individual lecture notes and references to werder, we can now return to the original question of Kierkegaard’s general assessment of werder. as noted in the introduction, thulstrup and others have regarded Kierkegaard as being highly critical of werder, qua Hegelian logician. But this assessment does not square with the passages discussed here. the times when werder is mentioned in his letters, Kierkegaard is generally quite positive. there is a slightly ironical tone regarding werder, but despite this he is still lauded. in the actual lecture notes themselves in Notebook 9, there is no criticism whatsoever, either positive or negative. Further, regarding the two allusions to werder in the passages just examined, the first is too cryptic for one to say with certainty whether it contains a criticism. in the second werder’s account of the transition of quantity to quality is praised in comparison to that of Hegel and adler.128 although the reference is too cryptic to allow an interpretation of why Kierkegaard thinks that his account “is more correct,” nonetheless there can be no doubt that this is a positive criticism. given this, it seems that only in the two comments on werder’s lectures in Notebook 8 do there appear negative critical remarks. in any case, it seems that thulstrup’s claim is highly oversimplified. While Kierkegaard is critical of some individual aspects of werder’s logic, he is by no means overly critical or dismissive. on the contrary, there is considerable evidence for his appreciation of werder’s work and abilities.

Hegel, SL, p. 368; Jub., vol. 4, p. 458. see also SL, p. 370; Jub., vol. 4, p. 460. PhS, p. 6; Jub., vol. 2, p. 18. Hegel, EL, § 37, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 117. 126 Pap. v C 1 / JP 3, 2345: “How does a new quality emerge from a continuous quantitative determination?….a leap.…thus, every quality emerges with a leap. Are these leaps then entirely homogeneous. the leap by which water turns to ice, the leap by which i understand an author, and the leap which is the transition from good to evil. more sudden, lessing’s Faust, the evil spirit, who is as hasty as the transition from good to evil.” translation slightly modified. 127 SKS 19, not9:6, p. 279: “measure is quantitatively determined qualitative, and a qualitatively determined quantitative, it is to this extent qualitative as it is quantitative and vice versa. Here is determinacy.” 128 Pap. v C 4. see Koch’s discussion of this passage. Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse, op. cit., pp. 190ff. 125

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V. The Possible Influence of Werder’s logik on Kierkegaard’s Later Works Kierkegaard’s published authorship contains no direct references to werder or his Logik. thus, in contrast to the documentation just explored about werder’s lectures, any discussion of the importance of werder’s book for Kierkegaard must remain in large part guesswork. However, given that werder may be presumed to have used the book in his lectures and that Kierkegaard is known to have owned it, it is reasonable to assume that Kierkegaard was familiar with the book as well as the lectures. this assumption is supported by various points of contact between werder’s Logik and Kierkegaard’s works which seem to suggest a significant influence. A. either/or it was during his stay in Berlin that Kierkegaard began work on Either/Or, which he ultimately completed upon his return to Copenhagen.129 the title of this famous work was inspired by the ongoing debates about Hegel’s logic and specifically by Hegel’s criticism of the aristotelian law of excluded middle.130 However, werder’s use of this formulation seems also to be in the background for Kierkegaard. in a letter from Berlin dated 6 February 1842, when he was presumably still attending werder’s lectures, Kierkegaard wrote to his friend emil Boesen (1812–79) about the title of the book that he was currently working on: “‘either/or’ is indeed an excellent title. it is piquant and at the same time also has a speculative meaning.”131 By this Kierkegaard seems to refer to the implicit criticism of speculative mediation contained in this expression. the work presents two opposed positions, that of the aesthete and that of Judge wilhelm. these positions are presented as being in fundamental opposition to one another such that no mediation or compromise between them is possible. the reader must presumably opt for either the aesthete or Judge wilhelm. the pseudonymous editor of the work, victor eremita, writes the following in his preface: “a’s papers contain a multiplicity of approaches to an aesthetic view of life….B’s papers contain an ethical view of life. as i allowed my soul to be influenced by this thought, it became clear to me that I could let it guide me in determining the title. the title i have chosen expresses precisely this.”132 the contrasting views cannot be reconciled or sublated into a single higher position by means of Hegelian mediation. the work ends in a kind of aporeia, and no resolution ever comes about.133 the organization of Either/Or, captured so succinctly with the Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup, “tekstredegørelse” to Enten-Eller in SKS K2– 3, pp. 38–58. 130 For a more detailed examination of this see Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new york: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 184–95. 131 B&A, vol. 1, 107 / LD, 68. Cf. also SKS 7, 229 / CUP1, 252: “Either/Or, the title of which is in itself indicative, has the existence-relation between the aesthetic and the ethical materialize into existence in the existing individuality. this to me is the book’s indirect polemic against speculative thought which is indifferent to existence.” 132 SKS 2, 21 / EO1, 13. 133 SKS 2, 21 / EO1, 14: “these papers come to no conclusion.” see SKS 2, 21 / EO1, 14; SKS 2: “when the book is read, a and B are forgotten; only the points of view confront each 129

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title, can be seen as a part of a polemical dialogue with Hegel’s criticism of the laws of classical logic and his doctrine of speculative mediation. the formulation “either/or” had long been used as a kind of shorthand for the law of excluded middle before Hegel.134 Hegel himself often employs the term in a critical context. He argues that thinking characterized by the “either/or” is onedimensional and fails to see that opposites are necessarily dialectically related to one another. instead, it insists on one-sided dichotomies: one is either free or determined, the world is either finite or infinite, and so on. The very goal of Hegel’s speculative method is to grasp the whole of the world’s conceptual structure through an awareness of the necessary connections between opposing concepts of this kind. in the Encyclopädie, Hegel denigrates “either/or” thinking as “dogmatism,” which distorts the true meaning of concepts by isolating them. He writes, But in the narrower sense dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites. this is just the strict “either-or,” according to which (for instance) the world is either finite or infinite, but not both. on the contrary, what is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have any such one-sided determination in it and is therefore not exhausted by it; on the contrary, being a totality, it contains the determinations that dogmatism holds to be fixed and true in a state of separation from one another united within itself.135 other and expect no final decision in the particular personalities.” See SKS 7, 229 / CUP1, 252: “That there is no conclusion, and no final decision is an indirect expression for truth as inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth as knowledge.” 134 see for example, Kant: “in logic the ‘either-or’ always denotes a disjunctive judgment; for if one member is true, the other must be false. For instance, a body is either moved or not moved, i.e., at rest; for one speaks there simply of the relation of the cognition to the object.” Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. by James w. ellington, in Philosophy of Material Nature, indianapolis: Hackett 1985, p. 126n. 135 Hegel, EL, § 32, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 106. see also EL, p. 8 fn; Jub., vol. 8, p. 13: “one would always do better not to talk about philosophy at all as long as, in spite of one’s depth of feeling, one is still so deeply entangled in the one-sidedness of the understanding that one knows nothing better than the either-or.” EL, § 80, addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 189: “But again it is usually said also that the understanding must not go too far. this contains the valid point that the understanding cannot have the last word. On the contrary it is finite, and, more precisely, it is such that when it is pushed to an extreme it overturns into its opposite. it is the way of youth to toss about in abstractions, whereas the man of experience does not get caught up in the abstract either-or, but holds onto the concrete.” EL, § 65; Jub., vol. 8, p. 171: “this standpoint is not content when it has shown that mediate knowing, taken in isolation, is inadequate for the [cognition of] truth; its particularity is that immediate knowing can only have the truth as its content when it is taken in isolation, to the exclusion of mediation. — exclusions of this kind betray that this standpoint is a relapse into the metaphysical understanding, with its either-or.” EL, § 119, addition 2; Jub., vol. 8, p. 280: “instead of speaking in accordance with the law of excluded middle (which is a law of the abstract understanding), it would be better to say, ‘everything stands in opposition.’ there is in fact nothing, either in heaven or on earth, either in the spiritual or the natural world, that exhibits the abstract ‘either-or’ as it is maintained by the understanding. everything that exists at all is concrete and hence is inwardly distinguished and self-opposed.” translation slightly modified. (My italics.) See also Jub., vol. 1, p. 410.

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according to Hegel, dogmatism fastens on to the one or the other side of such opposite determinations and declares it to be the final truth. By contrast, speculative philosophy grasps the higher truth of such opposites by realizing their conceptual relation. it thus returns these concepts to their original dialectical context and restores them to their proper relation. prior to werder’s lectures, the formulation “either/or” was known to Kierkegaard if not from Hegel’s primary texts, then certainly from the danish debate about mediation that took place primarily in 1838 and 1839,136 in which participants on both sides of the issue employed the expression. the Hegel critics, Frederik Christian sibbern137 and Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854),138 used the latin version of the expression aut/aut against Hegel, while Heiberg used it in Hegel’s defense.139 Hegel’s other champion, Hans lassen martensen (1808–84) used not only the latin but also the danish expression which became Kierkegaard’s title.140 through this debate Kierkegaard was doubtless familiar with this expression and its meaning as a slogan critical of Hegel’s doctrine of mediation. while the For the whole discussion, see v. Kuhr, Modsigelsens Grundsætning, Copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendalske Boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1915. anton Hügli, “the principle of Contradiction,” in Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard, ed. by marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzels Boghandel 1980 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 3), pp. 272–80. skat arildsen, “striden om de logiske principer og om rationalismens og supranaturalismens Begreb,” Chapter 8 in his Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, Copenhagen: g.e.C. gads Forlag 1932, pp. 142–50. o. waage, “strid om de logiske principer og om rationalismens of supranaturalismens Begreb,” in his J.P. Mynster og de philosophiske Bevægelser paa hans Tid i Danmark, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1867, pp. 123–52. Henning Høirup, Grundtvigs Syn paa Tro og Erkendelse. Modsigelsens Grundsætning som Teologisk Aksiom hos Grundtvig, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1949, pp. 73–5, pp. 85–9. 137 Frederik Christian sibbern, “om den maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske skole, med mere, som henhører til de logiske grundbetragtninger,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, article ii, pp. 424–60, especially pp. 424–33. Frederik Christian sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1838, pp. 79–115, especially pp. 79–88 (ASKB 778). For the expression itself, see “om den maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske skole,” op. cit., p. 432; sibbern Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 87. see also sibbern’s “Hegel i Forhold til vor tid,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, article i, p. 313; sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 31. 138 Jakob peter mynster, “rationalisme, supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 267. (reprinted in mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen: den gyldendalske Boghandlings Forlag 1852–57, vol. 2, p. 114.) 139 Johan ludvig Heiberg, “en logisk Bemærkning i anledning af H. H. Hr. Biskop dr. mynsters afhandling om rationalisme og supranaturalisme i forrige Hefte af dette tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 444. (reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 2, p. 173.) 140 Hans lassen martensen, “rationalisme, supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i anledning af H. H. Biskop mynsters afhandling herom i dette tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 458, p. 467, p. 473. 136

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formulation itself is absent, the idea is clearly present in an entry from the Journal EE in 1838.141 moreover, the latin formulation, albeit not in any polemical context, appears in his dissertation The Concept of Irony, which was of course completed immediately before his trip to Berlin.142 it is thus clear that Kierkegaard was familiar with this slogan and its meaning before he attended werder’s lectures. yet it was not until his stay in Berlin that he formulated and began work on Either/Or, and for this reason it seems that werder must be privileged, if not as the original source, then as the proximate source for Kierkegaard’s use of it. although werder’s book does not reach the section in Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik where the laws of classical logic are criticized,143 he uses the formulation “either/or” in a polemical manner in other contexts. it will be recalled that werder wrote his Habilitation on plato’s Parmenides, a dialogue which Hegel had hailed as a masterpiece of dialectical argumentation.144 in one passage from his Logik, werder quotes a rather large section of the dialogue.145 a part of this quotation reads as follows: “But there is no time during which a thing SKS 18, 34f., ee:93 / JP 2, 1578: “all relative contrasts can be mediated; we do not really need Hegel for this, inasmuch as the ancients point out that they can be distinguished. personality will for all eternity protest against the idea that absolute contrasts can be mediated (and this protest is incommensurable with the assertion of mediation); for all eternity it will repeat its immortal dilemma: to be or not to be—that is the question (Hamlet).” 142 SKS 1, 139 / CI, 81: “on the front of the stage, then is socrates—not as someone who rashly brushes away the thought of death and clings anxiously to life, not as someone who eagerly goes toward death and magnanimously sacrifices his life; not as someone who takes delight in the alteration of light and shadow found in the syllogistic aut/aut when it almost simultaneously manifests broad daylight and pitch darkness, manifests the infinitely real and the infinitely nothing.” SKS 1, 140 / CI, 82f.: “at the end of the Apology, however, an attempt is made to show that to die is a good. But this observation is once again an aut/aut, and since the view that death is nothing whatever emerges in conjunction with the one aut, the extent to which one can share the joy that encircles both these continents like the ocean becomes somewhat doubtful.” 143 That is, the second chapter of the first section of “The Doctrine of Essence.” Hegel, SL, pp. 408–43; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 504–51. see also EL, §§ 115–20; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 267–81. 144 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 250; Jub., vol. 17, p. 308: “plato, in one of his dialogues, likewise accords the chief part to parmenides, and puts in his mouth the most lofty dialectic that was ever given...” see also Hegel, SL, p. 55f.; Jub., vol. 4, p. 53: “that which enables the notion to advance itself is the already mentioned negative which it possesses within itself; it is this which constitutes the genuine dialectical element. dialectic in this way acquires an entirely different significance from what it had when it was considered as a separate part of logic and when its aim and standpoint were, one may say, completely misunderstood. even the Platonic dialectic, in the Parmenides itself and elsewhere more directly, on the one hand, aims only at abolishing and refuting limited assertions through themselves, and, on the other hand, has for result simply nothingness.” (Hist. of Phil. i–iii = Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–3, trans. by e.s. Haldane, lincoln and london: university of nebraska press 1995.) 145 plato, Parmenides, 155e–157b. in english translation: Parmenides, trans. by F.m. Cornford, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, princeton: princeton university press 1961, pp. 947–8. 141

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can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.”146 this is a typical formulation of the law of excluded middle, which states that a thing must have either the predicate p or not-p, but not both. thus, a given rose must be either red or not red. in a footnote to this quotation, werder writes, “the fixed either or the fixed or is the character of finitude.”147 By this he seems to mean, with Hegel, that the kind of thinking characterized by this kind of “either/or” constitutes the finite understanding; speculative thought, by contrast, is infinite since it forms a circle of concepts, without stopping at any particular one. on the next page werder, still quoting plato, speaks not only of the “either/or” but also of the “neither/nor.” Here he cites the following from the Parmenides: “it [sc. the moment] occupies no time in making it [sc. the transition from a state of rest to a state of motion] and at that moment it cannot be either in motion or at rest.”148 werder’s comment on this is the following: “this neither/nor is the absolute either/or, the middle of the concept, the eternal limit.”149 Here the formulation “neither/nor” is applied to the platonic concept of the moment, which is neither in motion nor at rest. the moment itself is not in motion when it is taken as an isolated entity; however, a series of moments is clearly in motion. it might be argued that these formulations have a relatively minor significance since they appear as footnotes, which Werder uses to comment on quoted material from plato. However, these formulations appear again later in different contexts. werder continues this proliferation of odd formulations by introducing the “neither/nor” and “both/and” later in the work. discussing the concepts of something and other, he writes: But here it is necessary to forget what kind of a stamp something and another and neither/ nor and both/and have received also in interaction with sensuousness; it depends on becoming conscious of their memory. the change as the neither/nor of the only something and of the only another is its both/and, is the unity of both.150

the point here is much the same as before. the problem is how to explain change. First, a given thing must display some new aspect or property for change to have been said to take place at all. the assertion that a thing always remains itself appears to rule out the possibility of change. However, when a given thing changes, it does not simply become something else since then it would not be the same thing that changed. thus, change is likewise not simply the introduction of something else. Change thus requires a thing to be “both” itself “and” the thing it changes into. Everything that changes has first an aspect of self-identity, that is, it must be the plato, Parmenides, 156c. in english translation: Parmenides, op. cit., p. 947. werder, Logik, p. 94n. 148 plato, Parmenides, 156e. in english translation: Parmenides, op. cit., p. 948. 149 werder, Logik, p. 95n: “Hier aber galt es zu vergessen, welch ein Gepräge Etwas und Anderes und Weder-Noch und Sowo[h]l-Als auch im verkehr der Sinnlichkeit empfangen haben; darauf kam es an, um ihrer Erinnerung bewußt zu werden. Die Veränderung als das Weder-Noch des nur Etwas und des nur Andern ist ihr Sowo[h]l-Als auch, ist die Einheit beider.” 150 werder, Logik, p. 156. 146 147

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same thing that experiences change, and then an aspect of difference, that is, it must display some new aspect in order for change to be said to have taken place. the both/and is the unity of these two aspects. werder avails himself of the same formulations a few pages later in his discussion of finitude and infinity. There he writes, The revelation of the infinite is the revelation of the finite, and only this double explanation [Erklärung] is what we call a transfiguration [Verklärung]. Explanation is transfiguration. Both are only the concrete expression for that absolute both/and, which we have already encountered in a negative manner in the dissolution of change and which solely as neither/ nor is the self-affirming affirmation, the eternal unity of the living unchangeable or of the apparent infinite.151

This is a difficult passage, full of wordplays. The point seems to be that it is a mistake to think of finite things just as finite things. They are instead the incarnation or revelation of the infinite since the infinite expresses itself concretely in finite things. One must be attentive enough to recognize the infinite in the finite. In this way a given thing is “both/and,” that is, both finite and infinite. In the background of the discussion is clearly the Christian revelation as evidenced by the theological language of the wordplay that Erklärung (explanation) is Verklärung (transfiguration). Thus, Christ is both finite, that is, a human being, and infinite, the divine. Needless to say, this is a highly significant issue for Kierkegaard in a number of different texts. It is obvious that he would be highly attentive to it here given that he was explicitly looking for things from werder’s logic which he could use in a dogmatics.152 Here one can see werder’s love for catchy formulations such as either/or, both/ and, and neither/nor. while Hegel uses formulations of this sort occasionally, he does not do so with such frequency and certainly not with precisely these formulations. only the expression “either/or” is used by Hegel with any frequency, and its meaning is considerably more limited than in werder’s discussion. thus, it is highly probable that werder’s playful use of these formulations helped to inspire Kierkegaard in selecting the title for the work that he himself designates as the beginning of his authorship.153 B. The Moment the “moment,” sometimes translated as “the instant,” is a key concept in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. many commentators have assumed that he adopted it directly

werder, Logik, p. 160: “Des Endlichen Offenbarung ist die Offenbarung des Unendlichen, und nur diese gedoppelte Erklärung ist es, die wir die Verklärung nennen. Offenbarung ist Verklärung. Beides ist nur der concrete Ausdruck für jenes absolute Sowo[h]lAls auch, das wir in negativer Weise bei der Auflösung der Veränderung schon kennen gelernt haben und das einzig und allein als Weder-Noch die sich affirmirende Affirmation ist, die ewige Einheit des lebendig-Unveränderlichen oder des offenbar-Unendlichen.” 152 SKS 19, 245, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. 153 SV1 Xiii, 521 / PV, 10. 151

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from the Parmenides where it was introduced and discussed by plato.154 yet werder, whose Habilitation had been on that very dialogue, shared Kierkegaard’s interest in plato, and it is reasonable to assume that Kierkegaard, who had just completed his master’s thesis on socratic irony, would have been attentive to werder’s views on the subject. while there is no reason to doubt that Kierkegaard was familiar with this concept in Plato’s dialogue, it may have been Werder who first brought its full philosophical and theological implications to his attention.155 in the passage mentioned in the previous subsection, werder quotes from the Parmenides at length.156 there he quotes the following discussion of the moment from plato: the word “moment” appears to mean something such that from it a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions [sc. being at motion or at rest]. there is no transition from a state of rest so long as the thing is still at rest, nor from motion so long as it is still in motion, but this queer thing, the moment, is situated between the motion and the rest; it occupies no time at all, and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in motion, takes place to and from the instant.157

a few pages later, werder refers to the concept of the moment again in a discussion of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, the constituent parts of the category of becoming. He writes, if we are to grasp the matter in its profundity, it must happen in the following manner: becoming is coming-into being [Entstehen] and ceasing-to-be [Vergehen]—for it is being through itself, that is coming-into-being, coming-into-being grasped as infinite as all coming-into-being, as logical spirit of coming-into-being as it must be grasped here. and it is ceasing-to-be, for it is nothing other than transition [Übergehn] (plato’s “moment”).158

See Mihaela Pop’s outstanding study, “L’influence platonicienne sur le concept kierkegaardien de moment,” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, vol. 45, nos. 1–2, 2001, pp. 165–75. See also Bo Kampmann Walther, “Øjeblikke. Om en drilsk figur i Søren Kierkegaards forfatterskab,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 21, pp. 36–56. Jacques Colette, “l’instant,” in his Kierkegaard et la nonphilosophie, paris: gallimard 1994, pp. 157–70. david Humbert, “Kierkegaard’s use of plato and His analysis of the moment in time,” Dionysius, 7, 1983, pp. 149–83. robert J. widenmann, “plato and Kierkegaard’s ‘moment,’” in Faith Knowledge and Action, ed. by george l. stengren, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzels 1984, pp. 251–6. 155 the claim that werder is one of the sources for Kierkegaard’s concept of the moment has been made briefly by Klaus Schäfer, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, munich: Kösel-verlag 1968, p. 295, note 202. see also p. 259, note 130, and pp. 142–4. 156 werder, Logik, pp. 93–6. 157 plato, Parmenides, 156d-e. in english translation: Parmenides, op. cit., p. 947. Translation slightly modified. Quoted by Werder in Logik, p. 95. 158 werder, Logik, p. 100: “Soll die Sache in ihrer Tiefe ergriffen werden, so muß es folgendermaßen geschehn: Werden ist Entstehen und Vergehen—denn es ist Seyn durch sich selber, das heißt Entstehen, Entstehen als unendliches als alles Entstehen, als logischer Geist des Entstehens aufgefaßt, wie es hier aufgefaßt werden muß. Und es ist vergehen, denn es ist nichts als Übergehn (Platons ‘Augenblick’).” 154

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Here one finds the wordplay between ceasing-to-be (Vergehen) and transition (Ubergehen). This is signficant since Kierkegaard notes just this transition159 and just this wordplay.160 most importantly, the understanding of the moment as transition (Ubergehen) is precisely the point that Kierkegaard makes about this concept. later, in The Concept of Anxiety he writes explicitly, “the moment becomes the category of transition.”161 as a part of the same analysis, werder continues his wordplays, this time with the german word for “the moment.” He writes, only as the eternal eye of becoming looks out from nothingness—and this is true only for finite spirit, the learning spirit—may nothingness be called nothing else; but with nothing else one means only nothing else as being, only being, only becoming. thus one says much sooner and only: Nothing as becoming—that is, ceasing-to-exist. to change, to change in itself, that means to cease to exist—that means to come-into-existence, that means becoming, the essence of change, the eternal change, the transition.162

Here werder makes more or less the same point, again referring to the moment as a transition (Übergehen). However, in the first sentence, instead of writing the german word for “the moment,” that is, “Augenblick,” he uses a somewhat poetic verbal construction, which recalls the etymology of the word as “a twinkling of an eye”: “Nur ehe des Werdens ewiges Aug’ blickt aus dem Nichts,” that is, “only as the eternal eye of becoming looks out from nothingness...” it is clear that Kierkegaard would have been attentive to this kind of a formulation. In another passage towards the end of his analysis, Werder speaks for the first time of “moments” in the plural form. Here he makes a point about the nature of dialectical opposites, indicating one sense of the german word “Moment.” He writes, By contrast, if one takes “moments” [Momente] in the sense of moments of creations, of moments [Augenblicken], in which the totality, the infinite sees itself—for only the totality exists or each and everything exist only as totality, as infinity—then the expression is certainly the one which actually designates the opposite, that is, the totality in its life process.163 SKS 19, 245.4–9, not8:50 / JP 1, 257. SKS 19, 278.1–4, not9:2. 161 SKS 4, 386n–387n / CA, 83n. 162 werder, Logik, p. 102f.: “Nur ehe des Werdens ewiges Aug’ blickt aus dem Nichts— und dies ehe gilt nur für den endlichen Geist, den lernenden—mag Nichts heißen: Nichts Anderes; aber als Nichts Anderes heißt es ja nur: Nichts Anderes als seyn, nur seyn, nur werden. So heißt es vielmehr und einzig und allein: nichts als werden—das ist: Vergehn. Sich wandeln, wandeln in sich, das heißt Vergehen—das heißt Entstehen, heißt Werden, der Inbegriff des Wandels, der ewige Wandel, das Übergehn.” 163 werder, Logik, p. 107 : “Nimmt man hingegen Momente in der Bedeutung von Schöpfungsmomenten, von augenblicken, in denen die Totalität, das Unendliche—denn nur die Totalität ist oder Alles und Jedes ist nur als Totalität, als Unendlichkeit—sich erblickt, so ist der Ausdruck allerdings—der eigentlich bezeichnende für Entgegengesetzte, d.h. für die Totalität in ihrem Lebensprozesse.” 159 160

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Here werder emphasizes the word “Augenblicken” to indicate that he is using it in the technical sense as before. He contrasts the notion of dialectical “moments” (Momente) or contradictory aspects of a thing with “moments” (Augenblicke) in the temporal or platonic sense, a distinction which unfortunately cannot be rendered adequately in english. in any case, there can be no doubt that this is a key concept for werder which he has carried over from his work on the Parmenides. while Kierkegaard alludes to the Parmenides in The Concept of Irony,164 that is, prior to attending werder’s lectures, there is no mention of the concept of the moment until after them. In fact, the first mention of this concept appears in Either/Or, which he wrote in large part while attending the lectures. in Either/Or in the context of a discussion about the moment of choice,165 he has Judge wilhelm write, “this is the moment of deliberation, but, like the platonic moment, it actually is not at all, and least of all in the abstract sense in which you wish to hold onto it; and the longer one stares at it, the smaller it is.”166 plato’s concept is thus used and emphasized by Kierkegaard exactly as it had been used and emphasized by werder. later in the same work the moment is brought into the discussion of speculative mediation,167 where it continued to play a central role in later works. later, in Repetition, Kierkegaard writes, “the greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing, the explanation of ‘the moment,’ ‘non-being,’ etc. trumps Hegel.”168 the passage appears in a discussion of change, the same context in which both plato and werder treat this concept. However, as in Either/Or, Kierkegaard again juxtaposes the concept to Hegelian mediation, a move which again implies Werder’s influence.169 Kierkegaard’s main discussion of this concept comes in The Concept of Anxiety,170 in which his pseudonymous author polemicizes against the Hegelian concepts of transition, negation and mediation, which are, of course, of central importance for Hegel’s conception of speculative logic.171 it will be recalled that werder frequently uses the term “transition” (Übergehen) in the passages quoted above in his description of the dialectical relation to the categories. Kierkegaard then has vigilius Haufniensis juxtapose these concepts to plato’s notion of “the moment”: SKS 1, 174 / CI, 123. SKS 1, 177 / CI, 126. SKS 1, 305 / CI, 268. see also the reference in Notebook 13: SKS 19, 406.32–4, not13:41 / JP 3, 3324. 165 SKS 3, 160–4 / EO2, 163–8. 166 SKS 3, 160 / EO2, 163. 167 SKS 3, 169 / EO2, 173. 168 SKS 4, 25 / R, 148f. Cf. werder, Logik, p. 80f., where werder quotes Hegel on the eleatics. 169 another detailed treatment of this concept appears in the Philosophical Fragments. Here the moment is treated as the moment of the incarnation when the god became man, the eternal became temporal. For example, SKS 4, 222–30 / PF, 13–22. SKS 4, 232 / PF, 25. SKS 4, 235 / PF, 28. SKS 4, 237 / PF, 30f. SKS 4, 306 / PF, 111. Here the moment is associated with the paradox: SKS 4, 255–6 / PF, 51f. SKS 4, 258 / PF, 55. SKS 4, 260f. / PF, 58f. SKS 4, 264–6 / PF, 62–4. 170 SKS 4, 385–96 / CA, 82–93. see also Pap. v B 55.6 / JP 3, 2740. Pap. v B 72.16. see also the allusion to the platonic moment and the leap: Pap. v C 1, p. 371 / JP 3, 2345. 171 For a more detailed examination, see Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, op. cit., pp. 405–11. 164

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the term “transition” is and remains a clever turn in logic. transition belongs in the sphere of historical freedom, for transition is a state and is actual. plato fully recognized the difficulty of placing transition in the realm of the purely metaphysical, and for that reason the category of the moment cost him so much effort. To ignore the difficulty certainty is not to “go further” than plato.172

this reference to “the moment” is supplemented by a long footnote with a detailed discussion of this concept in the Parmenides. in this footnote it becomes clear why Kierkegaard places so much emphasis on this concept. He has his pseudonym write: “this category [sc. the moment] is of utmost importance in maintaining the distinction between Christianity and pagan philosophy, as well as the equally pagan speculation in Christianity.”173 it will be recalled that much of Kierkegaard’s polemical rhetoric against philosophy concerns the untoward encroachment of philosophical thinking into areas of religion. the footnote goes on to explain why he thinks the concept of the moment can perform this function: “Here again the importance of the moment becomes apparent, because only with this category is it possible to give eternity its proper significance, for eternity and the moment become the extreme opposites, whereas dialectical sorcery, on the other hand, makes eternity and the moment signify the same thing.”174 the idea seems to be that the concept of the moment maintains the essential opposition of eternity and temporality. How this opposition is overcome in the incarnation is simply a paradox which cannot be understood. Kierkegaard opposes speculative philosophy’s claim that the eternal and the temporal, or the eternal and the single moment are simply dialectical opposites which display a conceptual unity. this seems to be what Kierkegaard most violently objects to. He finds dialectical mediation of the two opposites inappropriate because it confuses the essential distinction between Christianity and secular philosophy. needless to say this is far removed from the original context of this concept in plato or later in werder. it has been noted that Hegel lauds the Parmenides for its dialectical argumentation. it is also in this sense that werder makes use of it, that is, to illustrate the speculative nature of logic. Specifically the paradoxical nature of the moment as being both in motion and at rest is intended to demonstrate the limitations of traditional logic and the need for speculative logic. it is thus curious to observe that when Kierkegaard uses this concept, it is not to support speculative logic but instead to criticize it. as was noted above, he favorably compares this concept to the notion of mediation or transition in Hegel’s speculative logic. Kierkegaard thus uses the platonic concept not as an indication of the need for a speculative logic but rather as designation of the limit of reason per se. this indicates a fundamental disagreement between Hegel and Kierkegaard. For Hegel, the paradox of the moment is a call for a new conception of logic as speculative, whereas for Kierkegaard it indicates that all attempts to grasp such a concept with reason must fail. He is thus critical of speculative logic which he regards as a failed attempt to solve with reason what in principle cannot be resolved. this is why he seems in some passages to regard speculative logic straightforwardly 172 173 174

SKS 4, 385f. / CA, 82f. SKS 4, 387n / CA, 84n. SKS 4, 387n–388n / CA, 84n.

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as sleight of hand. in this way Kierkegaard can regard himself as being genuinely socratic in the sense of claiming to know nothing and ending in aporeia, in contrast to Hegelian philosophy which takes up the challenge generated by the paradoxical concept and attempts to work out a logic more suited to it than classical logic. given the chronology of Kierkegaard’s references to this concept, it seems to have been Werder who first made him aware of it in Plato. Kierkegaard himself then went on to develop it and use it in his own way in the mature authorship. the original concept in plato is clearly philosophical and, for obvious reasons, has nothing to do with Christian dogmatics. likewise, werder uses this concept in order to illustrate the categories of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be and in order to highlight the methodology of speculative logic in general. while Kierkegaard is of course sensitive to these original contexts, he invariably makes use of the concept in a profoundly theological context. this is clear in, for example, the passages discussed from The Concept of Anxiety, where Haufniensis begins with a discussion of the moment specifically in Plato’s Parmenides and ends with the claim (one quite foreign to plato) that the moment “is of utmost importance in maintaining the distinction between Christianity and pagan philosophy.”175 thus, Kierkegaard’s interest in werder’s lectures appears to have been stimulated, at least in part, by a search for ideas he could apply in furthering his own agenda in the context of a dogmatics. The difficulty of Kierkegaard’s notes to Werder’s lectures and the other entries in which he is mentioned have discouraged research into this relation. However, a simple prejudice about Kierkegaard’s presumed negative relation to any Hegelian has doubtless also played a role. given the general view of thulstrup, that is, that Kierkegaard was in a constant polemic with Hegel and Hegelians and that he wholeheartedly rejected anything having to do with Hegel’s philosophy, one could hardly have any great motivation to explore the entries on werder examined here. to be sure, in Kierkegaard’s universe of thought Karl werder was only a minor constellation in comparison with, for example, Hegel or schelling. despite this, there are at least hints of a more lasting influence of Werder on Kierkegaard. Moreover, that influence seems to be far more positive than Thulstrup would like to admit.

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SKS 4, 387n / CA, 84n.

Bibliography I. Werder’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, erste abtheilung, Berlin: verlag von veit und Comp 1841 (ASKB 867) [no further installments were ever published]. II. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Werder rosenkranz, Karl, Schelling. Vorlesungen, gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universität zu Königsberg, danzig: Fr. sam. gerhard 1843, pp. 4–5 (ASKB 766). staudenmaier, Franz anton, Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems. Aus dem Standpunkte der christlichen Philosophie, mainz: Florian Kupferberg 1844 (see p. 434 (ASKB 789). trendelenburg, adolf, Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System: Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1843, pp. 20ff. (ASKB 846). weiße, Christian Hermann, “die philosophische literatur der gegenwart,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–16, ed. by immanuel Hermann Fichte and Christian Hermann weiße, Bonn et al.: eduard weber et al. 1837–46, vol. 8, 1841, pp. 95–130 (ASKB 877–911). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Werder Cappelørn, niels Jørgen and Jon stewart, “werders forelæsninger over ‘logik und metaphysik,’” in SKS K19, 382–3. (this introductory note is a part of the commentary apparatus to Notebook 9.) schäfer, Klaus, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, munich: Kösel-verlag 1968. (see pp. 142–4; p. 259 note 130; p. 295 note 202.) Stewart, Jon, “The Influence of Werder’s Lectures and Logik on Kierkegaard’s thought,” in Nutida Perspektiv på Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by lone Koldtoft, Jon stewart and Jan Holmgaard, göteborg and stockholm: makadam Forlag, pp. 244–90. thulstrup, niels, “werders Forelæsninger over ‘logik og metaphysik med særligt Hensyn til fremtrædende Systemer i ældre og nyere Filosofi,’” in his Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1967, pp. 236–7. (in english as “werder’s lectures on ‘logic and metaphysics with special reference to outstanding systems in ancient and modern philosophy’” in his Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton: princeton university press 1980, pp. 274–6.)

index of persons adler, adolph peter (1812–69), danish philosopher and theologian, 39, 40, 41, 342, 359, 360. anaxagoras, 112. aristophanes, 105, 106. aristotle, 76, 117, 255–8 passim, 261, 311–31, passim, 337, 341, 361. Baader, Benedict Franz Xaver von (1765– 1841), german philosopher, 1–16, 50, 259, 295. Barfoed, Christen thomsen (1815–89), danish chemist, 238. Bayer, Karl (1806–83), german philosopher, 17–24. Bayle, pierre (1647–1706), French protestant theologian, 130. Beck, andreas Frederik (1816–61), danish theologian, 31–33 passim, 37, 39. Berger, Johan erik von (1772–1833), german philosopher and astronomer, 310. Boesen, emil (1812–79), danish pastor, 235, 237, 361. Böhme, Jakob (1575–1624), german mystic, 50, 126, 256, 295. Börne, Carl ludwig (1786–1837), german journalist and critic, 41. Bornemann, Johan alfred (1813–90), danish theologian, 238, 239. Brøchner, Hans (1820–75), danish philosopher, 36, 37, 237, 238, 346. Brown, Carl Ferdinand wessel (d. 1879), danish student, 238. Chalybäus, Heinrich moritz (1796–1862), german philosopher, 343. Christens, Christian Fenger (1819–55), danish theologian and educational theorist, 28, 33, 36, 37, 237, 238.

Christian viii (1786–1848), danish king, 263. Cousin, victor (1792–1867), French philosopher, 232, 249. daub, Karl (1765–1836), german theologian, 26, 259. descartes, rené (1596–1650), French philosopher, 70, 215, 255. engels, Friedrich (1820–95), german philosopher and economist, 251. erdmann, Johann eduard (1805–92), german philosopher, 100, 339, 341, 343. eschenmayer, Carl august (1768–1852), german theologian, 259. Feuerbach, ludwig (1804–72), german philosopher, 17, 25–47, 58, 59. Thoughts on Death and Immortality (1830), 26. The Essence of Christianity (1841), 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 39, 40. Feuerbach, paul Johann anselm von (1775–1833), german jurist, 25. Fichte, immanuel Hermann, “the younger,” (1797–1879), german philosopher, 3, 4, 49–66, 232, 341, 344. Fichte, Johann gottlieb (1762–1814), german philosopher, x, 50–4 passim, 58, 67–95, 119, 123–5 passim. Fischer, Kuno (1824–1907), german philosopher, 339. Frauenstädt, Julius (1813–79), german philosopher, 243, 252, 260, 278. Friedrich wilhelm iv (1795–1861), King of prussia, 233, 235, 335.

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Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries

gabler, georg andreas (1786–1853), german philosopher, 233, 239, 341. gammeltoft, Jens Christian Juulsgaard (1818–73), danish student of theology, 238. goethe, Johann wolfgang von (1749–1832), german poet, author, scientist and diplomat, 52, 53, 55, 167, 212, 260. görres, Josef (1776–1848), german political writer, 259. grundtvig, nicolai Frederik severin (1783–1872), danish poet and theologian, 22. gruppe, otto Friedrich (1804–76), german philosopher, philologist and poet, 347. Hamann, Johann georg (1730–88), german philosopher, x, 167, 170, 173. Hartley, david (1705–57), english philosopher, 215. Heegaard, poul sophus vilhelm (1835–84), danish philosopher, 34–6 passim. Hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich (1770– 1831), german philosopher, x, 1–5 passim, 8–11 passim, 17, 18, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 37, 43, 49–54 passim, 56, 58, 59, 61, 67, 68, 73, 77–85 passim, 97–165, 173, 230–5 passim, 238, 246f., 258–64 passim, 281, 311, 314–6 passim, 318–29 passim, 335–73. Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), 98, 99, 130, 132–4 passim, 139. Science of Logic (1812–16), 82, 101, 102, 317, 318, 320f., 339–73. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), 101, 251, 322, 323, 340, 350, 359, 362. Philosophy of Right (1821), 20, 103, 106, 107, 116, 135, 139. “review of solger’s Posthumous Writings” (1828), 103, 111–27. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1832), 81, 129, 139. Lectures on Aesthetics (1835–38), 103, 120, 123–9 passim, 131, 139, 237, 348.

Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1833–36), 71, 72, 103–6 passim, 108–13 passim, 115, 121, 139. Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1837), 99, 103, 106, 107, 115f., 139. Philosophical Propaedeutic (1840), 130, 340. Heiberg, Johan ludvig (1791–1860), danish poet, playwright, critic and philosopher, ix, 30, 31, 139, 230–2 passim, 255, 256, 281, 284, 328, 341, 342, 348, 359, 363. Heidegger, martin (1889–1976), german philosopher, 86. Heine, Heinrich (1797–1856), german poet and author, 11, 41. Helfferich, adolph (1813–94), german philosopher and historian, 251. Henning, leopold von (1791–1866), german philosopher, 340. Heraclitus, 112. Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776–1841), german philosopher, 312, 341. Herder, Johann gottfried (1744–1803), german philosopher, 167–77, 295. Hoffmann, e.t.a. (1766–1822), german romantic author, jurist, composer, music critic and caricaturist, 293, 302. Hölderlin, Johann Christian Friedrich (1770–1843), german poet, 53. Holm, emil (1819–1917), danish student, 238. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743–1819), german philosopher, 226, 250, 257, 260, 264. Jaspers, Karl (1883–1969), german philosopher, 235. Kant, immanuel (1724–1804), german philosopher, x, 53, 57, 58, 68, 69, 71, 75–7 passim, 83, 85, 119, 123, 126, 167, 173, 179–210, 232, 258, 264, 310f., 312, 319, 322. Kierkegaard, søren aabye (1813–55) The Conflict between the Old and the New Soap-Cellar (ca. 1837), 99.

Index From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), 101–3. The Concept of Irony (1841), 31f., 71, 77, 103–27, 135, 139, 232, 234, 300, 301, 312, 364, 369. Schelling Lecture Notes, i.e., Notebook 11 (1841–42), 53, 129, 229–49, 258, 262, 264. Either/Or (1843), 98, 129, 131–3, 137, 139, 179, 212, 225, 235, 248, 254–6 passim, 258, 287, 298, 302, 327, 328, 361, 362, 364, 369. Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est (ca. 1842–43), 70, 80, 133–4, 138, 139, 248. Repetition (1843), 130, 171, 248, 255, 263, 309, 369. Fear and Trembling (1843), 70, 135–8, 139, 170, 171, 179, 184, 185, 256, 261, 262, 283. Philosophical Fragments (1844), 37, 70, 129, 171, 172, 179–85 passim, 190, 193–5 passim, 248, 249, 261, 328, 351, 371. The Concept of Anxiety (1844), 4–10 passim, 73, 74, 138, 189, 225, 248, 249, 253, 254, 257–62 passim, 301–5 passim, 313, 315, 325, 329, 359, 368, 369, 371. Prefaces (1844), 138, 248. Stages on Life’s Way (1845), 41, 74, 212f., 221, 249. Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), 20, 36, 39, 41, 43, 60, 72, 98, 128, 138, 179, 182, 183, 185, 213, 219–21 passim, 226, 249, 261, 262, 310, 315. A Literary Review (1846), 262. Works of Love (1847), 179. The Sickness unto Death (1849), 74, 75, 85, 133, 138, 249, 263. Practice in Christianity (1850), 135. The Moment (1855), 28. Kofoed-Hansen, Hans peter (1813–93), danish pastor, 256. Krieger, andreas Frederik (1817–93), danish jurist and politician, 237.

375

lange, Johan nicolai (1814–65), danish student of theology, 238. leibniz, Baron gottfried wilhelm von (1646–1716), german philosopher and mathematician, 130, 170, 255, 312. lessing, gotthold ephraim (1729–81), german writer and philosopher, 173, 213, 219, 220, 226, 338. lichtenberg, georg Christoph (1742–99), german physicist, satirist, and writer of aphorisms, 211–28. lindberg, peter martin (born 1815), danish student, 238. linnemann, ingvard Henrik (1818–92), danish pastor, 238. listov, andreas (1817–89), danish theologian, 28. luther, martin (1483–1546), german theologian, x, 225, 263, 264. marheineke, philipp (1780–1846), german theologian, 26, 129, 234, 236, 250, 252, 260, 336, 344, 347, 351, 353, 354. martensen, Hans lassen (1808–84), danish theologian, ix, 2, 3, 31, 33, 37, 73, 74, 100, 139, 179, 231, 232, 264, 348, 363. marx, Karl (1818–83), german philosopher and economist, 27, 28. mesmer, Franz anton (1733–1815), austrian physician, 295. michelet, Karl ludwig (1801–93), german philosopher, 251, 253, 311. møller, poul martin (1794–1838), danish poet and philosopher, 60, 278, 315. müller, Johann von (1752–1809), swiss historian and poltical journalist, 260. mynster, Jakob peter (1775–1854), danish theologian and bishop, 31, 235, 256, 257, 363. nielsen, rasmus (1809–84), danish philosopher, 35, 342. nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900), german philologist and philosopher, 78. novalis, Baron Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772–1801), german lyric poet, 53, 295.

376

Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries

pascal, Blaise (1623–62), French mathematician, physicist and philosopher, 171. paulus, Heinrich eberhard gottlieb (1761– 1851), german church historian, 25f., 243, 244, 252. plato, 104, 105, 112, 115, 122, 182f., 221, 255, 320, 328–330 passim, 338, 364–71 passim. plutarch, 316. pope, alexander (1688–1744), english poet, 215. reinhold, Karl leonard (1758–1823), german philosopher, 310. rosenkranz, Karl (1805–79), german philosopher and theologian, 98, 99, 130, 250f., 254–261 passim, 340. rothe, peter Conrad (1811–1902), danish pastor, 238. rothe, viggo (1814–91), danish student of philosophy, 238. rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712–78), French philosopher, 171. ruge, arnold (1802–80), german author, 27, 30, 32. saint-martin, louis-Claude de (1743–1803), French philosopher, 295. schaller, Julius (1810–68), german philosopher, 100. schelling, Friedrich wilhelm Joseph von (1775–1854), german philosopher, x, 2, 3, 25, 50, 51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 85, 100, 129, 173, 229–275, 294, 303, 335, 341, 346, 347, 354, 371. preface to Cousin’s Über französische und deutsche Philosophie (1834), 232, 249. The Philosophy of Revelation (1841–42), 53, 129, 229–49, 258, 262, 264, 347. schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von (1759–1805), german poet, x, 53, 338. schlegel, Friedrich von (1772–1829), german romantic writer, 119–26 passim.

schleiermacher, Friedrich (1768–1834), german theologian, x, 17, 26, 115, 212, 222, 311, 320. schopenhauer, arthur (1788–1860), german philosopher, 51, 78, 252, 255, 277–91. schubert, gotthilf Heinrich von (1780– 1860), german natural scientist, 259, 293–307. shakespeare, william (1564–1616), english dramatist, 338. sibbern, Frederik Christian (1785–1872), danish philosopher, 60, 231, 237, 328, 342, 347, 348, 363. smith, Caspar wilhelm (1811–81), danish philologist and linguist, 238, 239, 346. socrates, 104–123 passim, 182, 183, 221, 255, 283, 312, 316, 371. solger, Karl wilhelm Ferdinand (1780– 1819), german philosopher and aesthetic theorist, 119, 120, 123, 125–7 passim, 259. sophocles, 129, 132. spinoza, Baruch (1632–77), dutch philosopher, 68, 69, 73, 223, 255, 312. stahl, Friedrich Julius (1802–61), german jurist and politician, 238. staudenmaier, Franz anton (1800–56), german theologian, 338, 343. steffens, Henrik (1773–1845), norwegiandanish philosopher, 234f., 239, 250, 259, 262, 311. stilling, peter michael (1812–69), danish theologian and philosopher, 33, 346. strauss, gerhard Friedrich abraham (1786–1863), german theologian, 31, 100. tennemann, wilhelm gottlieb (1761–1819), german historian of philosophy, 255, 258, 313, 314, 330. tieck, Johann ludwig (1773–1853), german poet, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126. tieftrunk, Johann Heinrich (1759–1837), german philosopher and theologian, 179.

Index trendelenburg, Friedrich adolf (1802–72), german philosopher and philologist, 60, 309–34, 341, 343. troxler, ignaz paul vital (1780–1866), swiss writer, 50. uhland, ludwig (1778–1862), german poet, 51. varberg, rudolf (1828–69), danish author and politician, 33, 34. weis, Carl mettus (1809–72), danish jurist, 237.

377

weiße, Christian Hermann (1801–66), german philosopher and theologian, 49, 60, 100, 340f. werder, Karl Friedrich (1806–93), german philosopher and literary critic, 235, 236, 240, 335–73. Xenophon, 115. zeuthen, Frederik ludvig Bang (1805– 74), danish philosopher and theologian, 34.

subject index actuality (Virkelighed), 4, 7, 83, 84, 101, 102, 104, 115, 120, 121, 123, 127, 256, 315, 324, 325, 329. antigone, 129, 131. anxiety, 6, 8, 9, 12, 80, 86, 259, 303–5 passim. appropriation, 32f. augsburg Confession, 8. bad infinity, 81, 100, 104, 123f., 352. beginning of philosophy, the, 101, 102, 262, 316, 321, 329, 336. being, nothing, 10, 11. belief, see “faith.” Bible, James, 6. genesis, 6. romans, 55. 1 Corinthians, 57. psalms, 171. ii thessalonians 263f. Carlsbad decrees, 51. Christianity, 2f., 4, 9–11 passim, 28, 34, 37, 40–42 passim, 172, 173, 213, 278, 279, 286, 287, 299, 300, 370, 371. cogito ergo sum, 110ff. community, 17–24. contradiction, 85, 134, 322, 325, 326, 329, 337, 355. controlled irony, 122. Corsair, 262. daimon, 106–108 passim, 115. despair, 74, 75, 78, 80, 86, 133. dialectical method, 104. double reflection, 83, 84, 221.

ethical life, 151ff. ethics/morality, 35, 81–83 passim, 116, 118, 135, 136, 138, 179, 181, 186–90 passim, 194, 217, 224, 281, 283, 287, 326, 330. evil, 4, 7, 8–11 passim, 50, 51, 56, 57, 60, 87, 135, 180, 186, 188, 189, 194, 226, 287. existence, 67, 102, 104, 115, 192–194 pasim, 282, 287, 317, 325–9 passim. faith, 52, 59, 61, 68, 69, 82, 83, 135–8 passim, 182–8 passim, 195, 224, 263. Faust, 283. freedom (see also “subjective freedom”), 8, 12, 82–4 passim, 107, 112–4 passim, 121, 131, 180, 186, 194, 226, 256, 293, 302, 304, 326, 327, 330, 370. grace, 181, 182, 189–93 passim. greeks, the, 9, 10, 103–27, 131, 132, 315, 316, 319. history, 171, 172. humor, 300, 301. idealism, 3, 4, 9, 11. immediacy, 5, 107, 134, 316–8. incarnation, 351, 366, 370. indirect communication, 20, 21, 83, 84, 213, 221–2. inner/outer, 137. irony, 71, 104, 108, 112–4 passim, 117–27 passim, 170, 293, 294, 298–301 passim, 304, 305. Jewish emancipation, 18.

Index language, 134, 296, 297, 299. leap, the, 7, 82, 259, 261, 262, 309, 310, 313, 325–31, 359, 360. liberum arbitrium, 8. logic, 4, 129, 137, 255, 256, 258, 259, 312–31, 335–73. mediation, 5, 9–11 passim, 31, 80, 82, 130, 134, 172, 314–8 passim, 336, 361–5 passim, 370. melancholy, 9, 80, 86, 302, 305. moment, the, 366–70, 371. movement, 130, 255, 256, 259, 263, 313, 314, 318–29 passim, 336. natural science, 53, 59, 215–7 passim, 222, 293–305. necessity, 129, 315, 324, 327, 330. negation/negativity, 4, 9–11 passim, 72, 81, 102, 105, 106, 113, 114, 117, 120, 122, 126, 127, 314, 321–5 passim, 329. offense, 37, 38, 41, 42. pantheism, 52, 56. paradox, 37, 38, 41, 59, 60, 351, 370. pelagianism, 9, 56. poetry, 128, 129, 295, 297, 298. possibility, 315, 324, 329. presuppositionless science, 9.

379

protestantism, 288. psychology, 5, 7. reduplication, 32, 33, 38, 80, 81, 85. reflection, 5, 107. repentance, 73, 74, 87. resurrection, 51. revelation, 353, 366. sin, 3–12 passim, 133, 135, 185, 189, 191, 193, 194, 225, 226, 259, 293, 294, 298, 300–5 passim. smalcald articles, 5, 225. social philosophy, 17–24. sophists, the, 105, 110–4 passim, 117, 283. speculative philosophy/logic, 2f., 312, 336, 362–5 passim, 369–71 passim. speculative theology/dogmatics, 2f., 26, 52. stoicism, stoics, 20, 21, 23, 255, 287. subjectivity, 121. sublation, 4, 5, 10, 11. systematic philosophy, see “speculative philosophy” theodicy, 7, 10, 50. time, 10. tragedy, 131, 132. unconscious, the, 293, 294, 297, 298, 302–5 passim. unhappy consciousness, the, 132, 133. universal/particular, 134.