US Politics and the United Nations: A Tale of Dysfunctional Dynamics 9781626375710

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US Politics and the United Nations

US Politics AND THE

United Nations A Tale of Dysfunctional Dynamics

Alynna J. Lyon

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2016 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2016 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lyon, Alynna, 1969– author. Title: US politics and the United Nations : a tale of dysfunctional dynamics by Alynna J. Lyon. Other titles: United States politics and the United Nations Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016016852 | ISBN 9781626374560 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: United Nations—United States. | United States— Foreign relations—1945–1989. | United States—Foreign relations 1989– Classification: LCC JZ4997.5.U6 L96 2016 | DDC 341.23/73—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016016852

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

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To my family

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Preface

ix xi

2 Mapping Multilateralism

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4 Drifting Apart and the Politics of Estrangement, 1945–1988

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1 The Puzzles and Paradoxes of US-UN Relations 3 US Politics and the Founding of the United Nations 5 The 1990s: “The United Nations Has Become Fashionable Again” 6 The George W. Bush Administration and “Stealth Multilateralism”

7 Barack Obama and the Rhetorical Return to the UN

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95 129

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8 Exceptional Americanism and the Essentials of Cooperation

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Bibliography Index About the Book

215 241 251

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Tables and Figures

Tables 3.1 Organizations Favoring US Membership in a Postwar International Organization, 1944, Partial List 6.1 Requested and Authorized Contributions to International Organizations and Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities, 2001–2009 6.2 UN Reform Proposals from Secretary General Kofi Annan, 1997–2006 7.1 US Voting Record in the United Nations, 1988–2014 7.2 Authorized Contributions to International Organizations and International Peacekeeping, FYs 1999–2015 Figures 2.1 Qualities and Quantities of Multilateralism 2.2 Determinants of Conditional Multilateralism 4.1 US Public Opinion and the United Nations, 1951–1989 4.2 US Ratification of Multilateral Treaties, 1901–2010 5.1 Number of UN Peacekeeping Operations Created, by Decade 6.1 US Discretionary UN Spending, 2000–2010 6.2 US Contributions for International Organizations and International Peacekeeping Activities, 1999–2010 6.3 US Public Opinion and the United Nations, 1990–2016 8.1 US Voting Coincidence in the UN General Assembly by Presidential Party Affiliation, 1985–2014 8.2 Popular Support for US Cooperation with the United Nations, 1964–2014 8.3 Partisan Identification and UN “Good Job” Rating, 2000–2016

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154 182 184

20 32 78 79 120 146 146 151 199 203 204

Preface

Understanding how humans can cooperate is an essential puzzle of our time. We cannot thrive—or, in many cases, even survive—without working together. The United States helped create the United Nations to promote cooperation and address threats to international peace and security. The need for countries to cooperate and coordinate policy is growing as globalization brings more people together and interdependence creates shared challenges and threats that no one country can tackle alone. As I write this, efforts continue by both the United States and the United Nations to end the devastating violence in Syria, manage the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and mitigate extremist violence, climate change, and global pandemics. Indifference and discord at the global level threaten human security. International peace and stability depend on the ability of the United States, as a leading global power, to work with other nations, which makes the US-UN relationship an essential aspect of global governance. Writing a book about the relationship between the United States and the UN has been an incredible journey. The project really began with my commute to campus more than fifteen years ago, as I drove past yard signs reading “US out of UN” and “UN out of US.” What was so puzzling was that my conversations with my neighbors revealed that the people who posted these signs had very little understanding of the United Nations and its history, structures, mandates, and impediments. I wondered what had happened: How did the UN go from being heralded as a primary tool for the realization of global peace and security to being vilified as an adversary? I began looking at US public opinion, quickly realizing that elite cues were vital to understanding this downward trajectory. Then I became fascinated by the three-way relationship among the Bush and then the Obama administration, the US Congress, and the politicization of multilateralism. There was an interesting tale to tell in all of this—one that I hope is portrayed with balance and accuracy in the pages that follow. * * * xi

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Preface

I am humbled and grateful for the support of so many colleagues and friends. Several deserve extraordinary gratitude. Michelle Dillion convinced me that I had a book to write and then later read the entire manuscript. Margaret Karns provided guidance and mentorship throughout the process. James Muldoon was extremely generous with his time, and I am so grateful for his support and candid observations. My colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire have been helpful and supportive, generously allowing me to vet ideas and share dilemmas. Many participants on Academic Council of the United Nations System and International Studies Association panels also provided valuable feedback and perspective, as did the very thorough and perceptive anonymous reviewers. A National Science Foundation– sponsored ADVANCE grant and a Faculty Scholars Program award allowed me important time to write and think. So many whom I spoke with at the UN, in the Department of State, and in numerous offices in New York were generous, forthcoming, and supportive of the project. Several graduate students also assisted—notably, Kayleigh Mitchell, Christine Turner, and Roberto Rico. Michael Cole, Andrew Schaefer, and Molly Tetreault also lent perspective and technical assistance. My family was incredibly supportive and deserves a vacation in a warm, tropical location. Special gratitude goes to my mother, who inspired my fascination with the political world and optimism about the potential for progress. My husband, Dan, offered support, encouragement, and balance. And I am grateful to my children, McKayla and Madelyn, who have been very patient and who will, I hope, inherit a planet that is growing more peaceful and continuously moving away from human-created suffering.

1 The Puzzles and Paradoxes of US-UN Relations

In December 2012, Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) appeared on the floor of the US Senate to support the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The treaty was negotiated under the George H. W. Bush administration and modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act. More than 125 countries, including those of the European Union and the United States, had signed the convention, but it needed US Senate ratification. At age eighty-nine, Dole, the longest-serving Republican senator, emerged in a wheelchair to make a personal appeal for the treaty’s ratification. However, during Senate deliberations, paranoia about the treaty spread, and several senators claimed it would infringe on US sovereignty, arguing that it would “empower . . . United Nations bureaucrats”1 to meddle in domestic affairs, including homeschooling and people with disabilities. One senator declared, “I do not support the cumbersome regulations and potentially overzealous international organizations with anti-American biases that infringe upon American society.”2 Despite expectations of bipartisan support, the torrent of accusations won the day, and the final vote of 61 in favor and 36 opposed did not reach the 66-vote threshold needed for Senate ratification. Many within the United States and across the globe were shocked at this rejection of an international agreement modeled on a US law. Ironically, Dole had been instrumental in laying the foundations for the suspicions about the UN in general and the disabilities treaty in particular. Sixteen years earlier, when he was a Republican presidential candidate in 1996, his stump speeches on the campaign trail often referenced a growing threat of UN intrusions into domestic politics.3 The case of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is just one example of the challenges of domestic politics and its impact on US influence abroad. The United Nations, a largely US-fashioned organization, is the subject of debate, derogatory remarks, perpetual lack of funding, and even

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US Politics and the United Nations

obstructionism by the United States. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the US foreign policy community began to voice its mistrust of the United Nations. By 2003, the US-UN relationship had deteriorated to the point at which a sitting president declared the institution “irrelevant” and predicted that the UN was heading toward extinction.4 In 2012, presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoed this view when he said, “The United Nations has been an extraordinary failure.”5 Some academics also lament the inefficiencies and even pathologies of the UN.6 Within Congress and state legislatures, policymakers have introduced initiatives to “pull the US out of the UN and the UN out of the US.” As one scholar observed, the UN has been “beaten, battered, and abused by its primary creator—the United States.”7 Seventy years after its creation, the United Nations appears to be under attack. However, this is not just a tale of a dysfunctional organization. Politics within the US play a role in this dynamic. Highly politicized institutions, budget struggles between Congress and the president, declining public support, vocal yet extremist calls for rejecting the UN, and persistent strains of US exceptionalism all serve to impede US multilateralism and support for the United Nations. The US diplomatic trajectory is inconsistent. On the one hand, the United States serves as one of the greatest advocates of working with others. With its many partners, the United States has been at the ground level in creating several international institutions for the promotion of international peace and security, conflict resolution, economic cooperation, development, and human rights. On the other hand, the United States rejects many significant multilateral efforts. The denial of the Kyoto Protocol and the rejections of the International Criminal Court, the UN Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty all point to instances in which the United States rejected multilateral approaches to global governance. At the time of writing, the United States was the most frequent user of the veto in the UN Security Council, issuing sixteen between 1990 and 2015 (most of which were related to Israel and the Palestinian question). Even casual observers can find US ambivalence and hostility toward the United Nations. Many scholars have joined this chorus, noting the issues may be with the US as much as the UN and identify a “crisis of multilateralism,” as the United States appears to choose forceful unilateralism over international cooperative or coordinated policy initiatives.8 In examining the source of declining US-UN relations, it is quite popular to write about the shortcomings of the UN and bemoan its antiquated infrastructure, voting rules, and even membership—for example, former secretary of state Madeleine Albright once asked, “Who broke the United Nations?”9 Others fault the US approach toward multilateralism as being ambivalent, re-

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luctant, and self-serving, with one report even proclaiming, “The United States does not do multilateralism.”10 Organized and vocal campaigns frame the United Nations as a powerful and malicious threat to US sovereignty; the media then amplifies these messages and sends them rippling out into society. Dozens of state legislatures have considered legislation to block global initiatives and oppose even symbolic gestures sponsored by the United Nations, such as Agenda 21 and its commitment to the principles of environmental sustainability. Yet, there are also those who reject this argument and claim that the United States is “guided by a genuine philosophy of engagement.”11 Still others point out that the primary venues for engagement are changing, and the trajectory seems to indicate that the United States is moving farther away from both the UN and international collaboration.12 This dynamic presents a growing paradox, as policymakers are grappling with how to operate in a productive and cooperative manner to address many global issues. At this point, there are few alternatives to the UN. When it comes to an organization with almost universal country membership, access for civil society, and connections with the private sector, the UN is the only game in town. As Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, explains, “The United States can achieve few if any of its foreign-policy objectives via unilateral action. It is not simply that there are limits to American power and resources; it is that the challenges themselves are not amenable to being met by anything less than a collective response.”13 Indeed, many of the issues facing the United States—including terrorism, climate change, nuclear disarmament, building stable democracies, and combating mass atrocities—are insurmountable for one nation alone. Thus, many are tracing the development of alternative venues to the UN and increasing US participation in ad hoc coalitions.14 Here we find the puzzle of US multilateralism, as the United States pursues spotty engagement—particularly within the United Nations—while, at the same time, facing extensive global threats to security that require multilateral solutions. The United States appears to be avoiding—and in some cases even undermining—the very institutional frameworks it helped create to manage these demands. According to Margaret Karns, multilateralism (that is, instances of several countries working together) is now “the dominant form of diplomatic practice” yet in some cases, the United States is not only rejecting multilateralism but also actually blocking multistate cooperative efforts.15 The failure to cooperate, particularly through the UN, was most evident during the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003, when the level of hostility that was building for years reached an apex. Yet, this was not the first time the United States asserted itself unilaterally and rejected institutional multilateralism. In fact, even a quick glance at US-UN relations finds a long pattern of retreat and renewed engagement.

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US Politics and the United Nations

The Pillars of American Power and US Multilateralism The United States spearheaded the creation of the United Nations. In fact, in many regards, the UN was created by and for the United States. From its location in New York City to weighted voting in the Security Council to the Western/liberal legislative procedures of the main bodies, there is a long list of benefits of UN membership for the United States. The UN also supports several pillars of US power—military capacity, legitimacy, and norm diffusion. First and foremost, multilateralism offers extensive opportunities for burden sharing. For the first pillar of US influence—that is, hard power or military capacity—working through the UN was effective in both Korea (1950) and Iraq (1991), as well as in supporting post-conflict reconstruction efforts in many war-torn countries. The Persian Gulf War of the early 1990s provides a clear example of the benefits of cost sharing, the mantle of international legitimacy, and the increase in US soft power gained through the use of the UN.16 The UN also enhances the second pillar of US influence, as participation in the organization can enrich and circulate US appeal and legitimacy.17 According to Ian Johnstone, UN membership supports US legitimacy, as it provides the “imprint of multilateral legitimacy to escape charges of neo-imperialism.”18 In cases such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and of the Law of the Sea, US ratification would provide a level playing field for international economic competitiveness.19 As other countries adopt these provisions, America’s participation increases its competitiveness in industry and makes the United States more appealing to international business. The final pillar, which is related to enhancing US legitimacy, is found in American ideas and ideals. The United Nations can provide a vehicle for the international dispersion of US norms and ideological orientations. For decades, the UN has been a channel for norm development and expansion, and it helps disseminate what some might identify as Western values, including rule of law, democratic procedures, institutional methods of conflict resolution, and human rights. Regardless of strategic, economic, or normative orientations, there are advantages to active membership and even leadership within the UN. In recent years, US actions have compromised these pillars of power. A “go it alone” approach is pervasive in dialogue within the United States and cooperative endeavors are often viewed as weak. Furthermore, the growing disparities between what the United States claims it stands for at the international level and the actions it takes also undermine the appeal and credibility of American normative priorities. This dynamic is driven, in part, by what happens outside the United States or in the halls of the United Nations. The UN often gets caught in the ebb and flow of international events; the Cold War, the failed humanitarian ventures during President Bill Clinton’s administration, and the unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration all challenged the capacities of the UN. The situations deemed UN failures often overshadowed the successes. The result is

Puzzles and Paradoxes of US-UN Relations

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a view of the UN as ineffective, cumbersome, and unable to corral the relevant stakeholders. Although many of these observations are accurate, when the United States distances itself from the UN, that organization loses the institutional foundations of its international legitimacy and persuasive power. However, many of the tensions and failures are the product of politics within the United States. The United States seems to face a crisis of foreign policy in that its unilateral efforts are failures, and yet its multilateral efforts are not much better. For the United States, multilateralism is problematic, its efforts at cooperation have been spotty and faulty. Although there are moments of international cooperation, overall, there have been serious issues with the United States’ consensus about and commitment to working with the UN. Questions about this relationship hold implications for whether the pursuit of solutions through international partnerships are indeed in the interest of the United States. There are larger issues beyond what may appear to be the narrow focus of US-UN relations that concern the future of the UN, its capacities and credibility, and the ability of the international community at large to address the challenges of global governance. In an apparent swing of the pendulum, in 2009, newly elected President Barack Obama rhetorically embraced the UN, an organization that had been disparaged by his predecessor. Indeed, in a move symbolic of support and engagement, President Obama became the first sitting US president to chair a UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting.20 Yet, the Obama administration’s record is uneven.21 The March 2011 passage of UNSC Resolution 1973 and the subsequent intervention in Libya presents one example (albeit problematic) of multilateral cooperation. However, in November of that same year, the administration defunded the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), crippling the organization and bringing criticism of the Obama team’s commitment to multilateralism. Likewise, in the military campaign against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS), the Obama administration neglected to even mention the United Nations in its 2014 move to use air power in Iraq and Syria. Thus, although the George W. Bush administration’s overt hostility toward the UN has waned, the United States still has major issues in engaging with international partners to face such issues as the atrocities and chaos in Syria; instability in Egypt and Libya; the threats of Iran and North Korea; and the risks of climate change, mass migration, and global epidemics. In this regard, the book is in part an examination of the evolution of dysfunctional politics within the United States that shape and even undermine US efforts abroad. The Puzzles and Paradoxes of US-UN Relations Despite the strategic advantages of multilateralism and the productive relations with the UN, the United States often rejects such partnerships. US multilateralism is clearly changeable, with distinct levels of commitment at differ-

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US Politics and the United Nations

ent times.22 This book seeks to both plot and explain the episodic shifts in US multilateral engagement. Why does the United States sometimes drift away from organizations such as the United Nations, while at other times, it embraces multilateral institutions? Are these fluctuations in engagement simply the whims of the administration, or are larger factors at play? Few have asked why this relationship appears broken. Most scholars and observers do not understand when and under what circumstances the United States effectively engages the United Nations. Very little attention is paid to situations in which there is successful multilateralism. Edward Luck’s question remains relevant: “What has led to such a dramatic reversal, as America turned from being the greatest champion to the loudest detractor of the UN and other international organizations?”23 As the stalemate of the Cold War illustrates, politics at the international level can create gridlock and influence US multilateralism. Yet, changing dynamics at the international level hardly tell the entire story; domestic politics play a role as well. Within the United States are significant and growing impediments toward engaging the United Nations in many issue areas. Furthermore, the domestic politics surrounding the US relationship with Israel isolates the United States in the chambers of the UN General Assembly and influences relations with many Arab states. This book provides a focus on the dynamics of US politics that block American multilateralism. It asks: Under what circumstances is it politically feasible for the United States to engage in cooperative endeavors through the UN system specifically and the broader international community more generally? The project examines the US relationship with the UN’s primary institutions and several specialized agencies. Furthermore, it seeks to find a causal story: What drives trends in support, or lack thereof, for the United Nations? Why would a hegemonic superpower choose to engage in a complex and politicized venue such as the United Nations? Cooperation is not easy. Even in the best cases, when there is general agreement about goals, the process can be challenging and time consuming and can require compromise. The chapters that follow explore the sources of cooperation when it happens and attempt to establish whether cooperation is driven by the sitting administration’s perspectives and normative priorities or whether multilateralism is influenced by larger systemic trends within the international system as great power rivalries are played out in the chambers of the Security Council.24 Another possible explanation may lie with the United States and the United Nations, as institutional changes within the US government or the UN system make multilateralism less likely. Finally, some of the tensions may be attributed to political theater and rhetoric. The chapters that follow map the predominant factors that promote cooperative US global leadership and engagement through the UN system and identify the primary impediments to multilateralism at their source.

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This book proposes several answers to the questions posed above. First, when considering domestic politics, presidents and their party affiliation are significant, but the answer is not just whether a president is conservative or liberal. The US-UN relationship is often influenced by partisan struggles and the dysfunctional dynamics between Congress and the president. When one party controls the White House and another dominates the legislative branch, US commitments to the UN become highly politicized. In addition, the UN tends to take a beating on the campaign trail, as politicians’ efforts to pander to ideological views contribute to misinformation and misrepresentation about the UN’s mandates and capacities. This, in turn, affects public opinion and civil society, which, despite some support, often adds another domestic hindrance to US engagement at the UN. In fact, at first glance, it would appear that many US presidents, members of Congress, and US citizens do not find the UN effective or even pertinent. Finally, normative orientations pull the United States away from collaboration, as strains of American exceptionalism can dominate the domestic rhetoric about multilateralism and may impede cooperation through the UN. The international dynamics have changed in the past seventy years, and US policymakers are increasingly presented with issues that require engagement through the UN system. As the chapters that follow illustrate, when we dig a bit deeper, several areas of continued commitment to the UN appear. The United States is actually a consistent participant at the UN, and levels of engagement are really a matter of degree. However, recent US engagement at the UN is often quiet and even concealed. Seldom is the UN’s utility discussed in the US domestic political environment. Through the analysis, interesting patterns emerge that capture the multilayered dynamics within US-UN relations that have been present since the organization’s founding. Although domestic politics have always been a contributing factor to this relationship, more and more, the dysfunctional dynamics at the domestic level are the contributing factor in US relations with the UN. Politicized executive-legislative relations, divided government, and an increase in partisan politics are all undermining the ability of the United States to participate in global governance. Intermestic Politics, Surrendering Sovereignty, and Rhetoric vs. Reality Several themes carry through the following chapters, which highlight a number of dynamics that are evident across eras. First of all, from the founding of the UN to the Obama administration, the domestic landscape is an increasingly relevant factor as domestic politics and international politics have become more interconnected.25 The politics of multilateralism are now more “intermestic,”26 as domestic actors—including Congress, the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense, public opinion, civil society, and the

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media—influence the operational context that impedes or supports collaborative initiatives. Partisan politics and interest groups influence not only US funding of the UN but also voting patterns in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. A second theme explores the discrepancy between domestic rhetoric about US engagement with the UN and actual levels of US participation. Presidents and Congress must operate domestically and appease constituents, while also addressing the needs of allies and strategic partners abroad. The two are not always mutually compatible. This tension often produces bifurcated rhetoric in which presidents claim a particular approach to the UN, even as the evidence reveals inconsistencies in that posture. In fact, despite the vocal loss of support from many within the United States, presidents continue to work with the UN—albeit in a rather subdued and quiet fashion. Franklin Roosevelt, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton, both Bush administrations, and Obama all provide moments that illustrate these dynamics. This book also highlights two normative traditions that undermine USUN relations. Long before the creation of the UN, Americans were wary of institutionalism. Despite this, the United States is clearly a leader in both the creation and use of global institutions. Thus, there is a paradox as US internationalism meets US withdrawal. Tied into this normative tradition is American exceptionalism. The discussion in the chapters that follow provides a focus on the rhetoric about the United Nations used by presidents and their administrations, as well as the narratives coming from the legislative branch and civil society. Language has an impact on the public’s understanding and support of the UN. In some regards, this portion of the analysis borrows from the constructivist theories of international relations.27 The chapters examine the language of policymakers and explore areas in which perceptions may construct the parameters of political relationships. It is in this context that the negative rhetoric emanating from Washington, DC, and state capitals around the United States may be instrumental and damaging to US efforts at the United Nations and beyond. Pervasive negative rhetoric within the domestic context undermines the plausibility of international cooperation. In fact, the language is so toxic that Franklin Roosevelt’s hope for “world collaboration” may no longer be feasible. Research Approach Although there are many important books on the United Nations, the role of the United States is often subsumed into a single chapter or is treated with a brief, article-length examination. Likewise, of the many valuable books on US engagement in multilateralism, the United Nations is typically given limited attention. Among the notable exceptions are The United States and the United Nations, edited by Franz Gross;28 Edward Luck’s classic Mixed Messages;29

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Moore and Pubantz’s work on presidents and the United Nations;30 Robert Gregg’s work About Face? The United States and the United Nations;31 Rosemary Foot and colleagues’ US Hegemony and International Organizations;32 and John Ikenberry’s Liberal Leviathan.33 Yet, even for many of these works, a focus on US politics is a largely underexplored concentration.34 In Patrick and Forman’s survey of the United States and multilateralism, many chapters discuss the United Nations, but only in the broader context of multilateral engagement.35 A chapter by Karns and Mingst describes the United States as a “deadbeat” in terms of the UN financial crises. The authors point to trends in US relations at the UN and find discernible patterns of engagement and, thus, financial contributions. For example, when actors within the United States (i.e., members of Congress) perceive the UN as hostile, they withdraw financial support.36 Lise Morjé Howard examines two decades of US-UN relations, highlighting the role of presidential administration attitudes and Congress and presenting a continuum that captures the levels of US engagement at the UN.37 Overall, these authors provide an impressive foundation for this work. In researching this book, a mixed-methods approach was used, which included an examination of government documents, voting trends, budget data, and public opinion data, as well as interviews with policymakers and international observers from 2011 to 2016. The historical work is based on primary and secondary sources. Financial contributions and voting patterns in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council provide indicators of the level of policy coordination between the United States and the UN. To examine when and why the United States does seek engagement at the United Nations, I conducted more than forty interviews with policymakers at the US Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the US Department of State; members of the UN staff and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with a UN focus; interest group representatives; and US news reporters who have covered the UN for decades. These discussions (often under conditions of anonymity) provided a context in which to establish at what point in the policy process the UN is engaged, what issue areas are most conducive to US institutional multilateralism, and whether US presidential administrations find impediments from domestic sources that steer them away from the UN. In several places throughout the text, the themes discussed above are teased out by case studies (e.g., the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 1999 Kosovo operation, the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2011 Libya and 2013 Syria interventions). The broader policy issues of engagement, rather than the technical aspects of the relationship, are the focus of this book. In addition, for the most part, the analysis is of the UN system as a whole, rather than individual specialized agencies. Thus, the approach is largely holistic, rather than reductionist. Although some details are lost, the overall trends and patterns are revealed through a more panoramic view.

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US Politics and the United Nations

US Multilateralism and the UN: America’s UNdoing The first task in answering the questions posed above is to provide a framework to guide the analysis. To understand why the United States engages the United Nations in some cases and avoids it in others, this book identifies many of the forces that operate on domestic and international levels. Chapter 2 establishes a conceptual guide and identifies specific international factors (i.e., changes in great power dynamics) and the domestic context (including societal, institutional, and normative) that molds US multilateralism. Chapter 3 explores what turned the US domestic political environment to champion the creation of the United Nations in 1945. It traces those who encouraged this endeavor and how they convinced a reluctant public and obstructionist Congress of the need for an international organization with universal membership. Particular attention is given to the narratives used to coax civil society and Congress to accept an institutional approach to international security. Chapter 4 traces the early enthusiasm and support for the UN and its decline through the next four decades. The discussion also explores how a faction of conservatives of the 1960s pivoted away from internationalism and illuminates how decolonization and the rise of the developing world diluted and then undermined the sway of the United States at the UN. Peppered throughout the discussion is the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the dynamics of US relations at the UN. Chapter 5 examines the US-UN relationship as it awakens from its Cold War paralysis. It is during the 1990s that leaders from both ends of the political spectrum began a dysfunctional cycle of “UN bashing,” which ultimately undermined public support for the UN. During that time, the domestic political environment became more relevant and at times even dictated the qualities of the US-UN relationship. With the entrance of the second Bush administration in 2001, the US-UN relationship deteriorated to its lowest point in history; Chapter 6 traces this nadir. In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the UN was branded as irrelevant and useless. Yet, in a twist, the chapter reveals a wide contradiction between what the Bush administration said and what it did. The Bush administration’s public scorn ended with a brief period of quiet courtship of the UN to procure its engagement in the peacebuilding process in Iraq. Yet, despite the renewed efforts, severe damage to US-UN relations had been done. The Obama administration gave new prominence to multilateral policy coordination, though multilateral cooperative efforts were not the defining modus operandi. Chapter 7 highlights how the Obama administration’s rhetoric of the first few years was matched by spotty improvement within the UN framework. The chapter also explores US defunding of UNESCO, failures at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (2009), and missed opportunities in Syria (2011–). The final chapter returns to reflect on the dynamics and fluctuations in the US-UN relationship, concluding that many of the tensions and impediments to US multilateralism are not new. American excep-

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tionalism, fear of loss of sovereignty, and congressional obstructionism are all deeply rooted factors that can be traced back to before the 1945 ratification of the UN Charter. Yet, the increased partisanship and the dysfunctional legislativeexecutive relationship that spills over into the international arena have brought a new level of toxicity. The book concludes with a discussion on whether these dysfunctional dynamics suggest the diminished viability of international law and US credibility, a downward spiral of mistrust and American conceit, and an overall weakening of the UN system. US-UN Relations and Global Governance The US-UN relationship has important consequences for the United States in terms of the nation’s ability to engage with the rest of the world. Sour relations at the UN limit the ability of the United States to rally allies to share the responsibility of promoting international peace and security. In 2003, the United States was not able to convince even Mexico and Angola to cooperate with its efforts against Iraq.38 In similar fashion, Germany and Brazil both rejected the US-negotiated resolution on Libya in 2011. Without the United Nations, the United States must shoulder the sole cost of promoting stability and forgoes UN resources (personnel, financing, and knowledge). Unilateral military endeavors, in particular, carry greater risk without UN authorization, resources, and the safety net of diffused responsibility and blame. In addition, the reluctance to work within the UN Security Council in situations involving the use of force also carries considerable costs to America’s legitimacy and international standing on the global stage. There are also significant implications for the United States in terms of soft power, as was clearly demonstrated in a comment from the Chinese, criticizing US rejection of China’s veto of a 2012 UN Security Council resolution on Syria. The Chinese official, questioning US legitimacy and credibility, declared, “What moral basis does it [the US] have for this patronizing and egotistical super-arrogance and self-confidence?”39 The US-UN relationship also holds significant implications for the United Nations. As primary architect and financier, the United States is a key factor in UN viability. US relations with the organization directly affect the payment of UN dues, the support of peacekeeping initiatives, and the organization’s capacity for controlling nuclear proliferation, as well as many other multilateral initiatives. In 1958, Scott and Withey wrote, “The United Nations cannot succeed— cannot even survive in anything like its present form—without the participation of the United States, and American participation would end, or become merely nominal, if the American people turned their backs on the United Nations.”40 Politics within the United States are important in providing a context for UN engagement and may impede funding of both UN and US initiatives.

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UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon seemed keenly aware of these observations when he embarked on a 2008 tour of several US cities to “reach out” to US citizens.41 Congress’s 2011 cut of US funding for UNESCO (22 percent of its operating budget) demonstrates that domestic politics are relevant, influential, and potentially damaging. Assessing domestic actors provides guideposts for understanding US capacities to promote its own national security and to provide assistance to international peace and security, economic development, mitigation of climate change, and a myriad of other issues that the UN seeks to address. 1. Jennifer Steinhauer, “Dole Appears, but GOP Rejects a Disabilities Treaty,” New York Times, December 4, 2012. 2. Lindsay Wise and Dave Helling, “Senate Rebuffs Dole’s Appeal for Passage of UN Disability Treaty,” Seattle Times, December 5, 2012. 3. In 1996, Dole’s presidential campaign speeches often mentioned a threat of US military personnel serving under the command of the United Nations. 4. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in an Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. 5. “Romney Slams UN for ‘Failure,’” USA Today, October 17, 2007. 6. Thomas G. Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012). 7. Roger Coate, “The John W. Holmes Lecture: Growing the ‘Third UN’ for PeopleCentered Development—the United Nations, Civil Society, and Beyond,” Global Governance 15, no. 2 (2009): 154. 8. For the purposes of this work, unilateralism refers to “independent action taken without coordination with other states or international institutions.” See Stewart Patrick, “Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing US Multilateralism,” Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 40; Stewart Patrick, “The New ‘New Multilateralism’: Minilateral Cooperation, but at What Cost?” Global Summitry (2015): 115– 134; Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, “The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy,” The Review of International Organizations 8, no. 3 (2013); Edward Newman, A Crisis of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2007); James P. Muldoon Jr., JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan, eds., Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Westview Press, 2005); David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 9. Madeleine Albright, “Who Broke the UN?” Foreign Policy 195 (September/October 2012). 10. Caroline Bouchard and John Peterson, “Conceptualising Multilateralism: Can We All Just Get Along?” (Mercury E-paper no. 1, Edinburgh Europa Institute, Scotland, February 2010), 2. 11. Richard Gowan, The Obama Administration and Multilateralism: Europe Relegated (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2010), 3. 12. Stewart Patrick, “Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of US Ambivalence,” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

Notes

Puzzles and Paradoxes of US-UN Relations

13

13. Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008): 12. 14. Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism,” The Review of International Organizations 9, no. 4 (2014); Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity”; Patrick, “The New ‘New Multilateralism.’” 15. Margaret P. Karns, “Multilateralism Matters Even More,” SAIS Review 28, no. 2 (2008): 8. 16. Of the $61 billion total cost of the Persian Gulf War, US allies, working through the United Nations, contributed close to 90 percent, or about $53 billion. See US Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992), 59; see Appendix P for full accounting of contributions. 17. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 153–171. 18. Ian Johnstone, “US-UN Relations After Iraq: The End of the World (Order) as We Know It?” European Journal of International Law 15, no. 4 (2004): 814. 19. Scott G. Borgerson, “The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,” in Council Special Report, no. 46 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). 20. As US Ambassador to the United Nations, George H. W. Bush chaired the meetings in May 1972. Vice President Al Gore also served as chair in January 2000. Obama was the first sitting president to chair a meeting in September 2009; he did so again in 2014. See David E. Sanger, “Security Council Adopts Nuclear Arms Measure,” New York Times, September 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009 /09/25/world/25prexy.html?_r=1. 21. See David Skidmore, “The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?” International Studies Perspectives 13, no. 1 (2012): 43– 64; Alexandra Homolar, “Multilateralism in Crisis? The Character of US International Engagement Under Obama,” Global Society 26, no. 1 (2012): 103–122. 22. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 23. Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 2. 24. Craig N. Murphy, “The United States and the UN: A Return to the Fold?” in Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy, eds. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidg (New York: Routledge, 2014). 25. Robert Jervis, “Introduction,” in The New American Interventionism: Essays from Political Science Quarterly, ed. Demetrios James Caraley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 26. Bayless Manning, “The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals,” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 2 (1977). 27. Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Brian Frederking, The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2007); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 28. Franz B. Gross, The United States and the United Nations (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964). 29. Luck, Mixed Messages. 30. John Allphin Moore Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, To Create a New World: American Presidents and the United Nations (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1999). 31. Robert W. Gregg, About Face? The United States and the United Nations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

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32. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Micheal Mastanduno, eds., US Hegemony and International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 33. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 34. Brian Rathbun’s work provides a compelling examination on the domestic level with a focus on psychology. See Brian Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 35. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, “Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy,” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 36. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, “The United States as ‘Deadbeat’? US Policy and UN Financial Crisis,” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 37. Lise Morjé Howard, “Sources of Change in United States–United Nations Relations,” Global Governance 16 (2010): 485–503. 38. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). 39. “China Calls US Critique on Syria ‘Super Arrogant,’” BBC News China, February 27, 2012. 40. William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, The United States and the United Nations: The Public View, 1945–1955 (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958), 2. 41. United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, “Activities of SecretaryGeneral in Atlanta, Georgia, 7–9 May,” press release, May 13, 2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgt2604.doc.htm.

2 Mapping Multilateralism

Cooperation among states is much more common than war. —I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval1

The twenty-first century is defined by problems that require international negotiations and coordination. For more than seventy years, the United States has acted as a leader in trying to find ways to promote a more peaceful, developed, and equitable world. Yet, how to create international cooperation between and among states is an enduring puzzle—as of yet, no one has found a magic formula. Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace,” marks an early attempt to explain the factors that would bring countries together. Kant held an optimistic view that long-term state cooperation was feasible: states could seek more than just survival and national security.2 Although Kant acknowledged that there would be regressions, he credited international organizations, democracy, and the evolving “experience of cooperation” with creating a foundation for state collaboration.3 Kant’s insights about the sources of cooperation starting from within a country are part of a long tradition of scholars who note the impact of domestic politics on international relations.4 To map how and when a country such as the United States chooses multilateral diplomacy, the nature and origins of multilateralism need clarification. Is cooperation the product of strategic interests, as the realists claim? Is valuing collaboration the source, or is the utility of an institution the driving factor? With its political infighting, gridlock, and partisanship battles, is the domestic realm relevant? To consider these questions, it is essential to craft a framework that captures the key elements within the US political system, at the UN, and at the international level that push and pull US multilateralism. This chapter proceeds in two parts: First, it examines the quantities and qualities of multilateralism in order to refine our understanding of US collaboration, particularly through the UN. Three main approaches to multilateralism are highlighted—a state-based approach that considers interests as causal, 15

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an institutional-based approach that finds venue instrumental, and a third approach that emphasizes the value of collaboration. Following this discussion, a spectrum of multilateralism is presented with an eye to capturing the nuances of collaborative policymaking, as one policy may incorporate different levels of multilateralism at different times. The second part of the chapter surveys the international factors, domestic actors, and normative influences that drive levels of US multilateral engagement; it also offers a framework that identifies both the multipliers and the impediments to the nation’s multilateral engagement at the UN. Identifying Multilateralism: Strategies, Institutions, and Values In exploring the seasonal dynamics around US multilateralism, the first task is to establish what should be considered a multilateral engagement. Robert Keohane defines multilateralism as “the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.”5 Although this definition holds the benefit of parsimony, John Ruggie points out that it does not address the qualitative aspects of collaboration; as he explained, looking at only the number of parties misses important normative and tactical components. Ruggie instead identifies the essential elements as indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity as states pursue both short- and long-term goals.6 The fact that states will have to interact with each other repeatedly changes the incentives for cooperation.7 Together, the literature finds three primary factors when considering why states cooperate—state incentive, institutional capacities, and the normative value that leaders place on cooperative endeavors. Building on these traditions, what might be labeled as “strategic approaches” view multilateralism as the act of integrating policies among several states. Studies from this perspective focus on the inputs that produce cooperation, with multilateralism viewed as an outcome—that is the result of deliberate policy choices by state executives.8 From this perspective, concordant state interests, within a dynamic global context, bring countries together.9 For the most part, this approach regards multilateralism as a dichotomy—a toggle button that is either on or off. Although the incentives to engage in bilateral relations are rather evident, this approach points out that cooperation through international institutions such as the UN is more demanding, with both more to gain and more to lose. In this regard, the fate of institutionalized multilateralism is often closely tied to a state’s strategic interests and the distribution of power at the international level. As Arthur Stein explains, “The issues for any power are capability and cost. A state has the choice of acting on its own if it has the ability to do so and is willing to bear the cost.”10 With strategic interests as the priority, states may adopt an “à la carte” approach, in which collaboration is highly dependent on issue areas.11 For exam-

Mapping Multilateralism

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ple, the United States actively sought out partners and a UN agency to assist with the removal of chemical weapons from Syria in 2013; however, a year later, it overlooked the organization in efforts to block the militant so-called Islamic State from moving into northern Iraq. Some identify this trend as “minilateralism,” in which a few states with similar goals collaborate.12 Several scholars enhance this understanding by describing multilateralism as being either inclusive or exclusive.13 Stewart Patrick further added to this conceptualization of the qualities of engagement levels when he classified multilateralism as being either “thin or thick.”14 This view points to an important distinction between cooperative policymaking in an ad hoc, single-issue context versus that of rule-bound, more institutionalized multilateralism. States may engage in a hub-and-spoke approach, in which one country plays a central role in creating several collective bilateral agreements that work outside of organizations such as the UN. The result is coalitions of the willing rather than robust or thick multilateralism. Another tradition, the value-based approach, views multilateralism as a normative commitment that is prioritized and desired.15 In this regard, it is a cause or source of cooperation rather than the outcome. Geoffrey Wiseman identified it as a “norm of diplomatic culture,” with “dialogue that is as open and transparent as possible, and civility and tact as the essence of diplomatic discourse.”16 James Caporaso highlighted the idea of multilateralism as an -ism with ideological context.17 From a liberal approach, the United Nations is viewed as more than just a venue of state collaboration; rather, it symbolizes the value of diplomacy, peaceful resolution of conflict, and the creation of a safer, more democratic and equitable world.18 As Edward Newman explained, “The United Nations is the global symbol and embodiment of multilateralism, and all of its promise and limitations.”19 From a more critical view, the UN can be seen as a venue of distribution of power that fosters the hegemony of certain ideas and actors.20 Lisa Martin adds that countries may use either formal multilateral organizations or the institutions and norms of multilateralism; she points out that it is possible for a state to value multilateralism without engaging with a multilateral organization, and vice versa.21 This outlook offers a more nuanced view, as it is possible for the strategy and institutions of multilateralism to be in crisis even when the fundamental principles are not.22 For the United States, the level of normative commitment is debatable—particularly when compared to that of many European countries. As Robert Kagen argues: “Most Americans are not principled multilateralists. They are instrumental multilateralists. Yes, they want to win international support. They like allies, and they like approval for their actions. But the core of the American multilateralist argument is pragmatic.”23 An additional approach views the institutions themselves as a significant factor in a state’s decision to collaborate. Institutions provide legitimacy, decreased transaction costs, and increased access to expertise.24 There are sev-

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eral types of institutionalized multilateralism, as coordination can take place both in permanent institutions such as the UN and in ad hoc venues and conferences.25 In fact, Ruggie distinguishes state cooperation outside of international organizations as “multinationalism.”26 For this purpose, the focus of this book will be on cooperation through institutions—specifically, the United Nations and its conferences.27 International institutions must be compatible with governmental interests; but, as discussed below, societal values and interests are also part of the equation. Some scholars put forward that a state’s choice to engage in an international institution is normally fairly conservative in nature and usually influenced by risk aversion and habit. The focus in this case is on institutional functionality and bounded rationality. Only when an organization is viewed as problematic does a country veer away from its typical path of engagement.28 Thus, institutions themselves are a causal factor in the multilateralism formula. Within this approach, the United States takes a preeminent place, and its advocacy or ambivalence is a key determinant of the viability of institutions such as the UN. A plethora of voices lament the inefficiencies and even pathologies of international organizations—in particular, the UN.29 When combined with an “expanding ecosystem of alternative frameworks of collective action,” that provide more options, exclusive multilateralism may hold more appeal.30 Yet, even in the most unilateral of approaches, the United States may appreciate the emblematic value of the UN. Despite the wealth of work on multilateralism, some argue that it is rather underdeveloped as a concept.31 In moving beyond the toggle-button approach and building on the three approaches outlined above, this work proposes that multilateralism can be seen as resting on two continua—one, borrowed from Keohane, that indicates the quantity of actors (that is, 3 or more states and up to 193), and the second highlighting the qualities of engagement with those partners (in some regards building on Patrick’s and Ruggie’s works). For example, single-issue conferencing may have a low degree of institutionalization but many actors. Or the United States may engage many actors in an institutionalized venue, yet the level of commitment may be quite superficial. In fact, it is quite possible to find thinly veiled unilateralism or bilateralism within a multilateral context. Here, the “Peking formula,” with its emphasis on diplomacy, compromise, and finding middle ground, is replaced by what might be called the “New York formula,” in which the United States shows up, states its demands, and withdraws from the process if those demands are not met. This spectrum allows for the consideration of both isolationist tendencies and internationalist impulses. In terms of the qualities of US multilateralism, examining when multilateralism is employed provides insights into the qualities of the commitment or normative approach. Timing is important. A model that builds on the policy process offers insights into procedural multilateralism and considers engage-

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ment as a multistep process. Building on work from Lisa Martin and others, who find that the value of multilateralism may be present even as incentives to cooperate are diminished, this approach shows that there may be different incentives at different stages in the creation of policy. Understanding at what point the United States engages in multilateralism within the policy process (i.e., at the agenda-setting stage, policy formation, policy legitimation, policy adoption, or implementation) provides a finer instrument to measure levels of US multilateralism.32 For example, if the United States is actively engaged in the UN Security Council, does it use this venue during the policy-formation process (e.g., in considering responses to the March 2011 situation in Libya) or after bilateral negotiations are completed? Is the Security Council an authentic venue for policy adoption or merely a rubber stamp to attempt to legitimize a policy platform already agreed to (e.g., the march toward war with Iraq in 2003)? An organization’s value may rest in bestowing legitimacy and legality for a policy already crafted; yet, that same organizational value diminishes in the implementation of the policy. In US dealings with Iran to halt the latter’s development of a nuclear weapons program, the United States worked bilaterally with the Iranians and then multilaterally with the P5+1 (the Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany) and then bilaterally with Iran and Israel. Thus, the spectrum is helpful in plotting points of collaboration, as well as departures from coordinated efforts. Multilateralism includes defining global challenges, establishing potential remedies, fostering support for those initiatives, and building coalitions to approve and implement these enterprises. As a process, multilateralism is best conceptualized as a spectrum, not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality; the level of institutionalization is relevant, as is the point in the policy process at which the UN is engaged.33 Figure 2.1 illustrates these two spectrums. Figure 2.1 highlights multilateralism as a spectrum that considers both the number of actors engaged and the levels of that engagement. It is then possible to plot levels of engagement. The 2003 Iraq War demonstrates very little multilateral coordination, both in terms of number of countries engaged and the role of the UN in that policy process. In contrast, the 2011 intervention in Libya provides a case in which many actors engaged in several stages of the policy process. The chapters that follow pay particular attention to when in the foreign policy process partners are involved, as well as the depth of that engagement, specifically through the UN system. The spectrum of multilateralism is a heuristic device that provides a measure of outcomes. However, it lacks a causal story of why the United States chooses or rejects a multilateral framework. In addition, even with the view that multilateralism can vary qualitatively as well as quantitatively, most scholarship considers it a predominantly horizontal activity. The next section brings together a framework to understand the vertical or domestic factors and the UN attributes that influence US tendencies toward international cooperation.

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Figure 2.1 Qualities and Quantities of Multilateralism

Building a Theory: A Confluence of Contradictions Beyond charting the magnitude of US multilateralism, the next task is to explore what factors drive levels of engagement and estrangement. To do this, we must consider international factors, domestic dynamics, and norms and ideas.34 Is US cooperation at the UN determined by strategic power considerations, domestic politics, or the UN’s institutional attributes? The factors that create the utility of multilateral institutionalism in which the United States finds working through international organizations valuable are particularly intriguing. Why would a superpower choose to engage in a complex, politicized venue such as the United Nations? Do the incentives change as capacities change? What brings the United States to the table in a posthegemonic world?35 One place to look for explanation is within the primary theories of international relations. What are often presented as incommensurable paradigmatic camps—realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism—are all valuable in their contributions to understanding US multilateralism. They also loosely parallel the strategic, normative, and institutional approaches described earlier. Although strategic interests are important, constructivism also adds to the understanding that states are made up of multiple voices and multiple identities.36 Sidney Tarrow observes that pulling insights from each perspective is helpful: Like neorealists, I regard states as the enduringly major players in international politics, and the international system built on asymmetrical power re-

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lations among them. Like constructivists, I am interested in how states’ norms and identities affect their international behavior. . . . And like liberal institutionalists, I believe that states create international practices, regimes, and institutions to solve their collective action problems and monitor each others’ behavior.37

Rationality is clearly relevant, yet normative factors also influence US will and capacities to engage in the policy process at the UN. The next section explores power politics and dynamics among countries at the international level. From there, the discussion moves to looking at the United Nations itself and then at the political dynamics within the United States. The discussion builds a framework that also draws on insights from social movement theory and scholarship on foreign policy. Many scholars look to power politics at the international level to explain state behavior.38 Considering the relative capacities of the United States, it would seem logical to select a unilateral path when one is available. Yet there are cases when the United States chooses multilateral institutionalism. Abbott and Snidal provided an initial account of why states choose cooperation. They found that centralization eases negotiations among states; furthermore, the pooling of resources is significant. Institutional efficiencies decrease transaction costs and provide long-term, nonmaterial gains. In addition, multilateral institutionalism allows for “norm elaboration and coordination.”39 Multilateralism actually changes the “capabilities and the interests of states,”40 as power may be enhanced or constrained, and priorities may change. In addition, working through international institutions provides the stamp of legitimacy. Most states view UN Security Council resolutions as the general will of the “international community” and the product of international law. As discussed in the chapters that follow, there have been instances in which the United States found the legitimacy provided by the UN a clear incentive to engage in multilateralism. The power of the United States is unique. Its capacity to meet goals and influence outcomes is unusual. Thus, if the United States is in a position of significant power, it may not need the UN.41 There are very few examples of US multilateralism for altruistic reasons or of multilateralism as an end in itself. According to Moore and Pubantz, US “presidents have either ignored the United Nations or engaged it only when it could act as a pliable tool of US national interests.”42 In many situations, relative power concerns and issue areas determine whether the United States adopts a multilateral approach. For instance, the United States holds a continued commitment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as the weighted voting structures in these organizations ensure that the United States holds significant sway.43 At The United States, Power Politics, and Multilateralism

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the same time, the United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol (as it required a top-heavy burden sharing), and it shies away from the UN in times of robust opposition to the organization’s initiatives. Thus, US multilateralism is conditional; strategic goals and self-interest serve as preconditions for partnering with other countries. For the United States, multilateralism serves as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides the United States with legitimacy and stature. On the other hand, cooperation may require compromising autonomy and relinquishing control over policy agendas and implementation. Although viewed as a benefit, institutional restraint can also restrain the United States. Institutions such as the UN create a “constitutional order” that can boomerang against the United States and restrain its leverage.44 For the United States, cooperation through the United Nations may expand options and opportunities in some issue areas, while constraining its capacities in others. Beyond strategic considerations, the UN may also lack effectiveness in realizing policy goals. As Patrick explained, “Robust American unilateral action may be ethically preferable to flaccid multilateralism.”45 When exploring why the United States rejects multilateralism in some instances, again we find conditionality; it is evident that an administration will reject multilateralism when it is costly or viewed as ineffective. For some, multilateralism is the “weapon of the weak” and one the United States is not prone to employ as long as its position of power is secure.46 US power implies that it has more unilateral and bilateral options available. Overall, the diverse sources of US power allow great flexibility in types of engagement and, thus, options when it comes to working through international institutions. Multilateralism through the UN may also be helpful in sustaining US power when the international playing field is in transition.47 Recent changes— including the end of the Cold War, the power vacuum of the 1990s, and the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—move the UN into a more pertinent position. Although Susan Strange once chided scholars for perpetuating a myth of American decline, it is clear that the superpower status of the United States has eroded.48 Given this context, institutional multilateralism can be an important tool for mitigating declining US hegemony. As Keohane wrote, “American influence in international institutions has retarded rather than accelerated the erosion of American power.”49 The very same institutional restraint that might constrain US unilateralism may also limit the assertive tendencies of rising powers.50 What Traub labels a “post-hegemonic world” can enhance the appeal of the UN because it reflects a Western-based institutional order.51 In this regard, the UN becomes an important venue to the United States, and multilateralism becomes a path to keeping other competing powers engaged in a system of institutional constraint.

Mapping Multilateralism

The Institutional Dynamics of the United Nations: Partnerships and Pathologies

23

The institutional structures, agendas, and dynamics of the UN system are also factors driving US multilateralism. As discussed earlier, the dynamics of international politics often play out in the UN Security Council. However, the UN is an organization of organizations. Within the UN system, several different venues exist (e.g., the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, and the Economic and Social Council), each with its own internal dynamics and unique constraints. The United States has different relations with different agencies. For instance, the United States has never neglected to sit on the UN Security Council, yet it withdrew from UNESCO in 1984. After rejoining UNESCO years later, the United States had its voting rights suspended in 2013 after refusing to pay its dues. Within the United Nations, the political processes and agendas vary considerably, depending on the venue. The dynamics in the General Assembly, with 193 member-state representatives engaged in caucusing and voting, are very different from UN agencies that have an executive head and centralized decisionmaking.52 In addition to the plethora of agencies, there are at least three United Nations: the bureaucracy, the member-states, and civil society (or the “Third UN”).53 Inis Claude initially highlighted the dual nature of the UN as being both a venue for the 193 member-states and a group of professional international bureaucrats. He wrote, “Particular organizations may be nothing more than playthings of power politics and handmaidens of national ambitions.”54 Yet there is also value in thinking of the UN as a grouping of bureaucratic structures and processes with many autonomous agencies and programs.55 In this regard, these two UNs can work against each other, as member-states can pass resolutions that may harm the interests of the UN Secretariat, agencies, and programs. In 2011, this was the case with UNESCO, when member-states voted to recognize the Palestinian National Authority as a full member of that organization. This move was financially devastating to UNESCO (but not to the individual member-states that voted for it), as the United States cut close to $70 million in funding to the organization. The UN is often described as having institutional flaws, because agencies and agendas themselves can work at cross-purposes and hold incompatible objectives.56 Thomas Weiss described this as a “spaghetti junction” and identified several systemic pathologies, including a neurotic commitment to sovereignty, the North-South conflict, issues within the international civil service, and what he called a “feudal” structure.57 As a venue for states to engage each other, the UN creates an unequal hierarchy in which members of the Security Council—in particular, the Permanent Five—can dominate through the power of the veto. In other venues, such as the General Assembly, regional groups can dictate the agenda through the power of numbers. In addition, with 193

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states, each promoting its own agenda, the UN often presents a cumbersome process with countervailing pressures. As discussed in Chapter 4, multilateralism contains a risk that lesser powers may try to monopolize the process and undermine US capacities to set the agenda and shape a policy. Again, engaging the UN can be a precarious, time-consuming process and may not yield the desired result.58 Given these constraints, the United States does engage in venue shopping, as was apparent in 1999, when the UN Security Council (specifically China and Russia) did not provide support for a military operation in Kosovo and the United States instead found NATO a willing partner. The asymmetries of power and state-to-state politics, as they play out within the UN, provide insights. However, many parameters of multilateralism are not explained at the system level or by examining the global structures or obstacles of the UN itself. Even in situations with little leverage and weakened capacities, the United States has avoided the resources and legitimacy offered by the UN. Thus, power politics and the failings of the UN do not fully capture the dynamics of US-UN relations in the twenty-first century. Turning Inside Out: Domestic Politics and Multilateralism Domestic politics does not stop short of the “water’s edge”; rather, it seeps out. In 1988, Robert Putnam wrote: “We need to move beyond the mere observation that domestic factors influence international affairs and vice versa, and beyond simple catalogs of such influence, to seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of entanglement between them.”59 His puzzle of when and how the two realms interact remains relevant. This chapter’s analysis builds on Putnam’s two-level game approach, while, at the same time, moving to a perspective that also includes the values and ideas that foster US reluctance (or even contempt) or that push the United States to take initiatives within the UN system. In addition, changes within the UN system—such as the rise of the “Third UN” and other increased access points for members of civil society—provide a dynamic that enhances the impact of US domestic actors on the UN.60 The following sections review the domestic actors and dynamics that can affect the appeal and feasibility of US engagement at the UN. Realism tends to make assumptions about the consistencies in state objectives and the cohesiveness of policy process. However, the United States is not a unified, coherent actor. It is a collection of representative institutions and interests that include societal actors, interest groups, commercial sectors, and identity groups. This inclusive view is hardly new. In 1957, Samuel Huntington found that the level of threat perceptions inside the United States influenced policy.61 Graham Allison’s seminal work, The Essence of Decision (1971), also includes actors within a state; through this work, middle-range theories come into focus.62 Allison found that foreign policy is the product of

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a political process in which multiple agencies bargain, compete, and negotiate.63 This literature lends a rich body of scholarship that clearly contradicts the claims of a streamlined, rational actor model and emphasizes domestic constraints and inclinations as important contributors to state cooperation.64 In examining the domestic context that shapes US-UN relations, we immediately find the obvious actors. The administration, the Congress, the State Department, and civil society are each competing and engaging in bargaining positions. Election cycles, public opinion, and even campaign financing laws have all trickled into the mix and can affect multilateral relations. In addition, a domestic normative context deserves consideration, the tendency toward American exceptionalism may also impede multilateralism.65 The president is often seen as the locus of US foreign policy and the command center of international engagement. The president controls most information about international issues, has the power to appoint US ambassadors to the UN, and oversees the Department of State and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs that sits within that agency. Given these powers, presidents would seem to dominate. Their political affiliations, world views, and ideological orientations may all be relevant in the US-UN dynamics. Through agenda setting and issue framing, presidents can define not only US priorities and challenges but also the value of multilateralism in general and the UN in particular. Lise Morjé Howard presents a continuum of administration attitudes concerning multilateralism that ranges from unilateralism, to moderate unilateralism, to moderate multilateralism, to multilateralism. She argued that “multilateralism involves a commitment to both multilateral processes and multilateral outcomes.”66 In a keen observation, she noted that presidential priorities often change during their administration and that, regardless of initial presidential views toward the UN, those views are often moderated while in office. As discussed in Chapter 8, political party affiliation does matter. The empirical evidence indicates higher levels of engagement with the UN General Assembly during democratic presidencies and declining levels under republican presidents. It is also true that all presidents—UN adversaries and allies alike—tend to find the UN an important addition to an administration’s toolbox, though the rhetoric may not always reflect this priority. In addition, congressional activism and control over budgetary matters and treaty ratification can impede presidential initiatives and effectively block multilateral efforts. In fact, it is the dysfunctional dynamic between the two branches that is eroding US credibility and negatively affecting its capacities. The following section explores the role of Congress, public opinion, and normative factors in shaping context and expanding or diminishing opportunities for multilateralism. Executive Powers and the UN

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US Politics and the United Nations

Although presidents largely dominate the foreign policy process, Congress is not a weak actor. Although, typically, Congress is not considered a foreign policy actor, the “invitation to struggle” is there, as the US Constitution gives Congress the power to approve budgets and ratify treaties and thus sets the stage for a split between congressional and presidential priorities at the UN. Through treaty ratification and budget allocations, congressional scorn or support can affect the ability of an administration to do business at the United Nations. Luck called this a “destructive interplay” between Congress and the UN.67 Carter and Scott found that with the decline in the Cold War consensus, there is an increase in competition between the executive and legislative branches.68 This dynamic is particularly challenging in situations of divided government. Partisan politics intensifies turf battles, and the result is an increasingly toxic environment that can undermine US-UN relations specifically and multilateralism more generally. Divided government enhances conflict and increases the likelihood of challenging a president’s foreign policy agenda.69 In fact, according to Carter and Scott, contentious relations between a president and members of the opposite party in Congress make for “good politics,” because there are “electoral incentives” that increase with enhanced partisanship.70 In situations of divided government, there are very few incentives to “curry presidential favor”; in fact, the opposite may be the case. There may actually be significant incentives to challenge a president’s foreign policy agenda. The introduction of legislation (regardless of viability) can enhance a congress member’s profile and appeal to constituents. US budget allocations to the UN often reflect congressional inclinations rather than administration priorities. Congressional funding of the UN, for both assessed and discretionary items, serves as one indicator of the level of US support for the organization. Although there are pendulum swings in the Congress, it is important to note that Congress is not a neutral player. Since the 1970s, the US Congress has used selective budgeting to both diminish US contributions and mandate UN reforms. With the election of fiscal conservatives looking to cut federal spending in the 1980s, the United Nations became a visible target. As this book traces over seven decades, it presents many situations in which legislative activism blocked an administration’s agenda, undermined US-UN relations, and even damaged relations with allies. The legislative branch—at both the national and state levels—reflects rather negative appraisals of the UN. As discussed in Chapter 7, a wave of initiatives within state legislatures also proposed numerous bills and legislation calling for US withdrawal from the UN and blocking UN initiatives. The polarization of Congress—in which there are few members in the political center—is also an intermestic issue that is spilling over into international politics. Jesse Helms (R-NC), former chair of the Senate Foreign RelaThe Legislative Branch

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tions Committee, provides one example of a member of Congress who actually impeded US multilateralism. During his tenure, he was able to block US payments of dues to the UN to the point at which the United States was on the brink of losing voting rights in the General Assembly. In 1999, Congress again obstructed multilateral initiatives when the Senate rejected the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In a 48–51 vote, we find “the first time since the Treaty of Versailles that the Senate has defeated a major international security agreement.”71 In instances in which there may be administration initiatives to engage the UN system, legislative conflict and funding issues often constrain the ability to implement a policy direction.72 The legislative branch also holds financial oversight on the State Department’s funding of UN peacekeeping operations through the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA). Cumulatively, perpetual lack of funding and blocking of international initiatives—specifically, multilateral treaties—has a toll. In a poignant observation, Karns and Mingst found that “Washington has exacerbated the UN’s financial crisis and eroded its own credibility.”73 It is clear that political rivalries within the United States often spill over into the international realm. Congressional influence also comes from the ability to sway US public opinion, frame media coverage, and inform public debate.74 There is also an interactive dynamic among policy elites—specifically, among presidents, pundits, and candidates on the campaign trail—that frames the UN. In addition, as discussed below, civil society groups (e.g., some pro-Israel organizations) may actively lobby Congress regarding the UN. Beyond the halls of government offices in Washington, DC, and New York, civil society (including interest groups and public opinion) influences policy choices within both the executive branch and the legislative branch.75 There is considerable work on the impact that organized interest groups have on foreign policy outcomes,76 with case studies on defense policy indicating that domestic interests and bargaining influence foreign policy outcomes.77 Domestic groups use leverage (in the form of campaign contributions, votes, and threatened capital flight) to access the foreign policy arena. Because members of Congress typically have their eyes on the next election, public opinion in a home district can be very important. In fact, the United States did not sign a ban on light arms trade because domestic interest groups convinced legislators that it would violate the Second Amendment of the US Constitution. AnneMarie Slaughter suggested that the federal government is losing its monopoly on foreign policymaking, when she referred to “transgovernmentalism,” in which international networks of lawyers, agencies, legislatures, and bureaucrats serve as a primary source of US foreign policies.78 Civil Society and the UN

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US Politics and the United Nations

The focus on civil society brings several related questions forward. Is there support for the United Nations? For those who find it intolerable, why do they? What is driving this animosity, and does it have an impact on US capacities for multilateralism through the UN system? Do narratives and proclivities within civil society influence institutional choices? This issue is particularly relevant when considering that US public opinion, once a stronghold of support for the UN, is now only tepid at best. In terms of impact, the scholarship is mixed. Through the early 1970s, the research presented US public opinion toward the UN as apathetic, ill-informed, and moody.79 In the post–Vietnam War era, many began to see public opinion as more stable and more rational, yet with little impact on the policy process. Decades later, in a 1996 interview, Jeffrey Laurenti, former executive director of policy studies at the United Nations Association of the United States of America, argued that public opinion was not viewed as significant because foreign policy was the business of policy elites where “international affairs was assumed to be high diplomacy, not town hall politics.”80 More recently, scholars have found that public opinion is part of the operating environment through which leaders maneuver. At times, it facilitates a particular agenda and even legitimizes it; however, it may also present a barrier and therefore make certain policies riskier and politically expensive. Changes in public attitudes toward certain policies are usually followed by shifts in policy.81 This finding is particularly significant when there are large changes in public opinion (twenty points or more). In these cases, Page and Shapiro found that policy changes are compatible with changes in opinions 90 percent of the time. Today, most scholars find public opinion to be a significant and potent contributor to the shape and quality of US involvement in world politics. Scott and Withey wrote specifically about public opinion and the UN and as early as 1958 observed that “the public view of the United Nations is part and parcel of a complex of more general attitudes toward both domestic and foreign policy problems.”82 Patrick argued that US participation at the UN hinged on the attitudes of the public following World War II.83 In terms of specific influences, US public opinion may affect congressional authorization of payments of UN dues, support for peacekeeping initiatives, and issues related to the concerns of specific interest groups (e.g., the Turkish Lobby, the National Rifle Association, and pro-Israel groups). With declining public support for the United Nations demonstrated in the chapters that follow, there are several questions that emerge: Do critical voices against the UN affect US engagement within the UN system? Likewise, do favorable attitudes toward the United Nations influence US leaders to strengthen their commitment to the institution? It is notable that within the press and policy circles, there is significant misperception about the attitudes of the US public regarding the UN. In fact, some findings point out that policy elites consis-

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tently misread public opinion.84 To address these questions, public opinion is included in the multilateralism framework presented below. Throughout the chapters that follow, public opinion data on the UN are used not only as a barometer of public attitudes but also as a reflection of the signals coming from Washington, DC, about the UN’s effectiveness. As presidents and other politicians find scapegoating the UN a convenient tactic to deflect criticism of their foreign policies, public opinion data tend to echo these elite messages.85 At the same time, however, diverse views within civil society can have countervailing impacts. In the examination of domestic factors, beliefs and perceptions are also important. How the US public and leaders perceive themselves, their views of right and wrong, and their ideas about the role of the United States in the world all contribute to the recipe that fosters or impedes US engagement at the UN. Again, building on an approach that embraces theoretical pluralism, normative or ideational factors can influence US multilateralism. Likewise, US-UN relations are influenced by American exceptionalism. First, a belief in US uniqueness and even preeminence may interfere with compromise and collaboration and can isolate the United States from global institutions. Second, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, what may be described as “exceptional Americanism” and fears of loss of sovereignty due to the pressures of globalization can also undermine working with the UN. Within the United States views about the use, legitimacy, and efficacy of the UN are changing. The policy process is not independent of these normative assessments. Policy decisions are rarely rational and autonomous; instead, they are often highly interactive with previous policies and experiences.86 This diffusion of past experiences can be understood as a historical milieu, in which previous events shape and inform the public and policy elite’s understandings. Harold and Margaret Sprout suggest that policymakers function in an environment shaped by constant interactions with history, culture, economics, political institutions, ideology, and an array of other factors.87 Historical milieu enables us to build on James Rosenau’s conceptualization that “every decision is partly a response to past outcomes.”88 This idea holds particular relevance for the US-UN relationship, as perceived failures in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia in 1995 may contribute to branding the UN as inept in its ability to respond to future humanitarian crises. UN member-state reluctance to intervene in Syria was, in part, a consequence of the shadow of Libya (2011). A commitment to multilateralism emerges from interactions among international norms, historical imprints, and domestic values. This may explain the change of heart and levels of engagement with the UN during the Clinton administration, when the sting of Somalia interfered with the United States’s Normative Context and Historical Milieu

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compass regarding involvement in Rwanda. At the same time, this milieu is prone to an episodic dynamic. One scholar argued that the historical milieu of the George W. Bush administration may have actually produced a backlash: “Paradoxically, the Bush view may have resurrected the multilateral norm to the point where many rallied to it, the most important evidence being President Barack Obama’s election in 2008.”89 What this concept suggests is that there are cycles of multilateralism in which previous experiences (be they halos and positive views or hangovers and negative experiences) play a role in defining the values and context of US-UN relations. Social movement theory provides additional insights into how we conceptualize the timing of collaboration through multilateral venues. Some circumstances are more conducive than others for collective endeavors. By conceiving of multilateralism as a form of collective mobilization at the international level, we can further capture the dynamic, interdependent relationship between domestic and international politics. The concept of political opportunity addresses political realignments that can, at times, encourage cooperation and, at other times, shut down the likelihood of political action. This element considers the idea of political space opening up and facilitating multilateralism action.90 Particularly helpful is Sidney Tarrow’s definition of political opportunity structures as “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.”91 Political opportunity structures tend to change when there is a change in the political environment that subverts the previous relative power positions—either domestic or international. At the domestic level, this opening up of political space is present before elections when the agenda is being set, when a new administration takes over, or when a crisis or triggering event changes the political landscape. This concept considers the level of access and leverage that an actor may have to influence political outcomes and control debate. As Tarrow explained, “Political opportunities provide the major incentives for transforming mobilization potentials into action.”92 This concept can be used to capture the viability of the UN for the United States as a policy venue. Sometimes the opportunity structures are conducive to cooperation, whereas at other times, they impede multilateralism. For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, Cold War politics and the rivalry between two superpowers with veto capacity in the Security Council clearly constrained the ability of the United States to actively engage within this institution. Thus, political opportunity structures within the UN system provide yet another factor that may influence US propensity to engage in institutional multilateralism at the UN. One dramatic example is illustrated by the 1950 Soviet boycott of the Security Council, which allowed the United Political Opportunities

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States to push through the council’s first authorization of use of force against the North Korean forces. Opportunities for multilateralism change as leadership, economic standing, and normative orientations change. Institutions may become malleable or simply more amenable to a particular agenda (i.e., member-state configurations in the General Assembly and the Security Council or the reframing of an issue). In addition, different issue areas may have different opportunities; as Arthur Stein explained, “The world is arguably multipolar, rather than unipolar, and the United States cannot act as unilaterally on economic and financial issues as it can on military ones.”93 A consideration of political opportunity structures moves away from a “big bang” approach to multilateralism and allows a broader focus on long-term processes. In addition, it helps escape the typical bracketing of normal or institutional politics and non-institutional political activity to provide a more inclusive analysis.94 The idea of political space opening up and facilitating collective action provides an important component to the conditional multilateralism model presented below. Multilateralism is the culmination of dynamic historical, political, and even social/normative contexts. As evidenced by the chapters that follow, the processes of collaboration do not fit into a tidy parabolic pattern. As Luck pointed out over a decade ago, “There appears to be . . . substantial interactions between political developments on the international and domestic planes.”95 The different factors—systemic, power politics, domestic context, political opportunity structures, and historical milieu—provide a map to trace a causal story regarding when and why the United States chooses to work with others. These categories, as presented in Figure 2.2, highlight how institutional and non-institutional politics, as well as the international and domestic context, may affect decisions to use a multilateral approach. Although this framework presents individual factors as though they are discreet entities, it must be emphasized that there is an interactive dynamic among them. For the most part, these aspects are mutually reinforcing and part of multicausal models of state cooperation. The following chapters apply this framework to systematically examine the dynamics involved in US-UN relations and to assess the areas that block or facilitate multilateral engagement. Taken together, US collaboration with other countries through the UN is best explained by “conditional multilateralism,” wherein venue, context, issue area, and recent history affect the decision to employ institutional venues. In addition, the framework considers the political opportunity structures within the UN system and the United States. A complete picture of the determinants to US multilateralism must account for the synergy among domestic social forces, the policy elite, and the international strategic and normative context. Conditional Multilateralism

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US Politics and the United Nations

Figure 2.2 Determinants of Conditional Multilateralism

Although US foreign policy is made within Washington (and occasionally New York), global dynamics and imperatives both constrain and shape this process. In addition, the normative context alters this dynamic. In the case of US multilateralism, ideas and identity collide with strategic imperatives, historical ambiance, and domestic institutions. Alexandra Homolar identified several key indicators of multilateralism, which are used throughout the remaining chapters as barometers to assess changing levels of US engagement. At the executive level, the presence of the president at the UN (and other UN-sponsored venues) and his or her rhetoric about the UN, appointees, agendas, and symbolic actions are all measures of the level of the executive branch’s commitment to the UN. For Congress, passing legislation, budgeting for the UN, blocking or supporting cooperative approaches to global problems, treaty ratification, rhetoric, and symbolic actions all provide markers for both level of engagement with and orientation toward

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the UN.96 Other indicators used throughout this study include the level of public support and activism from civil society groups within the United States that concern the UN. This approach begins to chart an answer to the source of cooperation when it happens. It allows for consideration of ideological orientation and policy (e.g., the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations’ perspectives and normative priorities). The model also allows for an examination of trends within the international system as great power rivalries play out in the chambers of the Security Council, as well as of institutional changes within the US government or the UN system. The framework highlights that the “optimal” outcome of many states working together through an international organization depends on issue area, political feasibility within the United States, and the specific utility of the UN forum.97 Thus, tracing these dynamics calls for an approach that moves beyond Putnam’s two-level games to consider a dynamic threelevel game. The domestic factors within the United States, international dynamics, and the institutional factors within the UN are all relevant when assessing the likelihood of US multilateral engagement. The next chapter applies this framework to what may be the best example of robust US multilateralism. It explores the international context, domestic politics, partisanship, public opinion, and political opportunity structures found in the trail forged to the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the creation of the United Nations. 1. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1. 2. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885– 1992,” World Politics 52, no. 1 (1999). 3. Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 230. 4. Theodore J. Lowi, “Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. and trans. Henry Reeve (Cambridge, UK: Sever and Francis, 1863); Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 31, no. 4 (1977); Rufus Browning, Dale R. Marshal, and David H. Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 5. Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45 (1990): 731. 6. John Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 7. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 8. Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal, Institutional Choice and

Notes

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Global Commerce (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985); Zartman and Touval, International Cooperation. 9. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 10. Arthur A. Stein, “Incentive Compatability and Global Governance,” in Can the World Be Governed? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism, ed. Alan S. Alexandroff (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), 22. 11. The term à la carte multilateralism was used by Richard Haass in 2001 and earlier by Francesco Francioni, “Multilateralism à la Carte: The Limits to Unilateral Withholdings of Assessed Contributions to the UN Budget,” European Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2000); Allan Gerson, “Multilateralism à la Carte: The Consequences of ‘Pick and Pay’ Approaches,” European Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2000); Gerald Segal, “North-East Asia: Common Security or à la Carte?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 67, no. 4 (1991). 12. Moises Naim, “Minilateralism,” Foreign Policy, July/August 2009; Stewart Patrick, “The New ‘New Multilateralism,’” Global Summitry (December 18, 2015). 13. See Homolar, “Multilateralism in Crisis?”; Zartman and Touval, International Cooperation. 14. Stewart Patrick, “Beyond Coalitions of the Willing,” Ethics and International Affairs, 17, no. 1 (2003). 15. Amitav Acharya, “Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics,” in Multilateralism Under Challenge: Power, International Order, and Structural Change, ed. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006); Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill, Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World? (New York: Routledge, 2004). 16. James P. Muldoon Jr., JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan, eds., The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 5. 17. James Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (1992). 18. Michael G. Schechter, “Systemic Change, International Organizations, and the Evolution of Multilateralism,” in The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance, ed. James P. Muldoon Jr., JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011). 19. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman, Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), 5. 20. Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill, Multilateral Institutions: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2003). 21. Lisa Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992): 765–792. 22. Newman, Thakur, and Tirman, Multilateralism Under Challenge? 23. Robert Kagen, “Multilateralism, American Style,” Washington Post, September 13, 2002. 24. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32. 25. G. R. Berridge and Alan James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2003). It is important to point out that multilateral diplomacy is multilayered,

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with traditional state-to-state relations occurring in the midst of interactions with nonstate actors such as NGOs, as well as with the private sector. Wiseman refers to this as “polylateralism.” See Geoffrey Wiseman, “Norms and Diplomacy: The Diplomatic Underpinnings of Multilateralism,” in The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance, ed. James P. Muldoon, JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011). See also Brian Hocking, “Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Forms, Functions, and Frustrations,” Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities (Malta: DiploFoundation, 2006); Daryl Copeland, Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). 26. Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters. 27. Keohane defined institutional multilateralism as “multilateral arrangements with persistent sets of rules; they can be distinguished from other forms of multilateralism, such as ad hoc meetings and short-term arrangements to solve particular problems.” See Keohane, “Multilateralism,” 732–733. 28. Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional Choice and Global Commerce. 29. Thomas G. Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012). 30. Stewart Patrick, “Multilateralism à la Carte: The New World of Global Governance,” Valdai Papers 22 (2015): 2. 31. Homolar, “Multilateralism in Crisis?” 32. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy (New York: Harper Collins, 1984); Michael E. Kraft and Scott R. Furlong, Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010). 33. Lise Morjé Howard, “Sources of Change in United States-United Nations Relations,” Global Governance 16 (2010): 485–503. 34. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds., The United States and Multilateral Institutions (New York: Routledge, 1992). 35. James Traub, “The Point Guard,” Foreign Policy no. 195 (September/October 2012). 36. David P. Forsythe, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” in International Organization and Global Governance, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (New York: Routledge, 2014), 121. 37. Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20. 38. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Joseph M. Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union, and the Neo-Realist Research Programme,” Review of International Studies 21, no. 1 (1995); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 39. Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations.” 40. Keohane, “Multilateralism.” 41. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wolforth, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61 (2009). 42. John Allphin Moore Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, To Create a New World: American Presidents and the United Nations (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999), 2. 43. Patrick, “Beyond Coalitions of the Willing.” 44. Elke Krahmann, “American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International Security,” International Studies Review 7, no. 4 (2005). 45. Patrick, “Beyond Coalitions of the Willing,” 48.

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46. Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review 113 (June/July 2002): 4. 47. Kevin Slaten, “The Decline of US Hegemony: Regaining International Consent,” Journal of Politics & International Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009). 48. Susan Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organizations 41, no. 4 (1987). 49. Keohane, “Multilateralism.” 50. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds. International Organization and Global Governance, (New York: Routledge, 2014). 51. Traub, “The Point Guard.” 52. David Sanger, “Security Council Adopts Nuclear Arms Measure,” New York Times, September 2009. 53. Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly, “The ‘Third’ United Nations,” Global Governance 15, no. 1 (2009). 54. Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1964), 405. 55. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 56. Kirsten Haack, “Book Review: The Organization of International Organization(s),” Journal of International Organizations Studies 1, no. 1 (2010); Raymond F. Hopkins, “Complex Emergencies, Peacekeeping, and the World Food Programme,” in Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies, ed. Jim Whitman (New York: Routledge, 2013). 57. Thomas G. Weiss, “Renewing Washington’s Multilateral Leadership,” Global Governance 18, no. 3 (2012). 58. Karns and Mingst, The United States and Multilateral Institutions. 59. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988): 433. 60. Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly, “The ‘Third’ United Nations”; Roger Coate, “The John W. Holmes Lecture,” Global Governance 15, no. 2 (2009). 61. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957). 62. Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 63. Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics 33 (1981). 64. See Etel Solingen, “The New Multilateralism and Nonproliferation: Bringing in Domestic Politics,” Global Governance 1 (1995); Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, “The Choice for Multilateralism,” The Review of Internaitonal Organizations 8, no. 3 (2013); Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 65. Edward Luck, “American Exceptionalism in the 1990s,” in US Hegemony and International Organizations, eds. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil Macfarlane, and Micheal Mastanduno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 66. Howard, “Sources of Change in United States–United Nations Relations,” 487. 67. Luck, “American Exceptionalism in the 1990s.” 68. Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott, “Taking the Lead: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in US Foreign Policy,” Politics & Policy 32, no. 1 (2004): 36. 69. Ralph G. Carter, “Congress and Post–Cold War US Foreign Policy,” in After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World, 108–137, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

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70. Carter and Scott, “Taking the Lead,” 46. 71. Christopher Jones and Steve Hook, eds., Handbook of American Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge Press, 2011), 144. 72. Luck, “American Exceptionalism in the 1990s.” 73. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, “The United States as ‘Deadbeat’? US Policy and UN Financial Crisis,” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 268. 74. William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force,” International Organizations 59, no. 1 (2005): 209–232. 75. Keohane, After Hegemony; Keohane and Milner, Internationalization and Domestic Politics. 76. Allison, The Essence of Decision; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1974); Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision (New York: Longman, 1999). 77. John W. Dietrich, “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the China Mfn Debates,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1999); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 78. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997). 79. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960); James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York: Random House, 1961). 80. Barbara Crossette, “Does America Love or Hate the UN?” New York Times, September 23, 1996, A6. 81. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” American Political Science Review 77 (1983). 82. William Scott and Stephen Withey, The United States and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1958) 2. 83. Steward Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 84. I. M. Destler, “The Reasonable Public and the Polarized Policy Process,” in The Real and the Ideal: Essays on International Relations in Honor of Richard H. Ullman, eds. Anthony Lake and David Ochmanek (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 85. This research relies on volumes of polling data, including reports by Gallup, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, to serve as indicators of US-UN relations over time. 86. Alynna Lyon and Chris Dolan, “American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 1 (2007). 87. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “Environment Factors in the Study of International Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (1957). 88. Ibid. 89. Wiseman, “Norms and Diplomacy.” 90. For other discussions of political opportunity structures, see Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” American Political Science Review 67 (1973); Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Browning, Marshal, and Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough.

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91. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 82. 92. Ibid., 99. 93. Stein, “Incentive Compatability and Global Governance,” 25. 94. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 95. Luck, “American Exceptionalism in the 1990s,” 36. 96. Homolar, “Multilateralism in Crisis?” 112. 97. Although the goals and internal political feasibility concerns of other states are relevant, this analysis does not extend that far.

3 US Politics and the Founding of the United Nations

The United Nations was an innovation designed for the peaceful resolution of conflict, the dissemination of human rights, the self-determination of peoples, and the creation of international legal norms. Within the United States, Woodrow Wilson’s idealism, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s pragmatic eagerness, and Harry S. Truman’s vision of a “parliament of man” all culminated in 1945 to shape this global initiative. This was particularly remarkable, as only twenty-five years earlier, the United States had dismissed a similar project. The story of the demise of the League of Nations and the creation of the United Nations is also a story of US domestic politics, with all the drama of entrenched isolationism, fears of loss of sovereignty, a fickle US public, and a politicized relationship between the president and Congress over foreign affairs.1 Despite President Woodrow Wilson’s impassioned pleas, a group of senators, driven by isolationism and nationalism, defeated the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and US membership in the League of Nations. The appeal of isolationism and the denial of Wilson’s request shifted the orientation of the United States inward for several decades. The debates of the early 1900s set the ideological tone and reveal a pattern of dysfunction; together these dynamics illustrate how problematic domestic politics can hobble US multilateral engagement. In fact, it is here that we find the foundation for much of the tensions in the current US relationship with the United Nations. At the same time, however, the founding of the United Nations presents a model of how to bring divergent interests to consensus and to promote unparalleled US leadership. This chapter explores the confluence of international factors and domestic dynamics that prompted the US political elite and the public to champion the creation of the United Nations. How did Roosevelt convince a reluctant public and an obstructionist Congress of the need for membership in an international organization? To answer this question, the discussion presents two case studies: the first deals with the rejection of the league in 1919, and the second, with the road to ratification of 39

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the UN Charter in 1945. Through the historical lens, the chapter surveys the main players within the United States, as well as early ideological views and rhetoric. Building on the model presented in Chapter 2, the focus draws attention to Roosevelt’s ideas and tactics, congressional politics, the courting of civil society, and the framing of American exceptionalism as consistent with the UN. In the wake of world war, political opportunity structures open at both the international and domestic levels. The discussion extends to the international context and the two-level game that Roosevelt had to play in supporting the domestic initiatives to create the United Nations without compromising negotiations with the European powers and the Soviet Union. Overall, this case reveals a fascinating interplay among public opinion, the president, Congress, and international politics. The Irreconcilables and the League of Nations US support for international organizations and multilateral cooperation found increased relevance at several key points in US history, particularly in the periods before and after World War I, the post–World War II era, and the initial post–Cold War years.2 In the early years of the twentieth century President William McKinley supported the idea of international interdependence and the need to manage international relations collectively. In 1901 he proclaimed, “God and men have linked nations together.” According to McKinley: No nation can longer be indifferent to any other. And as we are brought more and more in touch with each other, the less occasion is there for misunderstandings, and the stronger the disposition, when we have differences, to adjust them in court of arbitration, which is the noblest form for the settlement of international disputes.3

The destruction of World War I motivated world leaders to search for a way to avert war and enhance cooperation and communication among countries. The idea of creating an international organization for settling disputes was based on several viewpoints. The first was a moral call to prevent “the destruction of the human inheritance.”4 The second element emphasized the need to protect economies and prevent the interruption of commerce. Finally, and perhaps the most ambitious, was the goal to change the destructive pattern of world politics and make peace the “the normal condition of nations.”5 A number of models were considered including the lofty goal of a highly institutionalized world government as well as a collection of loose bilateral, treaty-based agreements. Discussions about the scope of such an enterprise included such questions as, Would it involve international economic frameworks and mechanisms for promoting international justice and human rights? The issues of membership and enticements were also raised. Within the US, there was con-

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siderable debate about the role the country would play in an organized approach to international security. In these perspectives we find the emergence of several issues that have come to dominate discussions about multilateralism and US foreign policy. The Republican president Theodore Roosevelt also raised the issue of managing global relations during his 1902 State of the Union address, explaining, “The increasing interdependence and complexity of international political and economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.”6 The national discussion about creating an international organization of states really launched with Theodore Roosevelt’s 1910 Nobel Peace Prize speech, when he praised the creation of a Hague Tribunal as “a Magna Carta for the nations.”7 In this address, Roosevelt recommended three approaches to remediate war: first, the enhancement of “treaties of arbitration”; second, a strengthening of the Hague Tribunal system; and third, the creation of a “League of Peace” built around the consensus of great powers. At the same time, Roosevelt recognized the difficulties with this transition, explaining, “Each nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until the establishment of some form of international police power, competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations.”8 Four years later, in a series of magazine articles, Roosevelt elaborated on this idea, calling for a “World League for the Peace of Righteousness” that would serve as “a posse comitatus of powerful and civilized nations.”9 He also argued that the United States had to take a leadership role in securing such international peace. Within the United States, many of these ideas resonated with political and economic elites. Roosevelt’s ideas held great appeal for his friend and Republican colleague, Henry Cabot Lodge. Building on this idea, Lodge proclaimed in a 1917 speech, “The peace of the world can only be maintained as the peace and order of a single community are maintained, as the peace of a single nation is maintained, by the force which united nations are willing to put behind the peace and order of the world.”10 Together, many prominent political leaders, members of the business community, and publishers created the League of Peace to explore the idea of creating an international organization. The group, led by former president William Howard Taft, met in Independence Hall in Philadelphia and adopted a resolution proclaiming, “We believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace.”11 The initial idea was one of collective security in which a union of like-minded states could avert war, dissuading both members and nonmembers from the use of force. Another key component was the presence of the United States. The application of an international organization as a panacea for many of the dilemmas of world politics materialized again with Woodrow Wilson’s

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1918 Fourteen Point speech to Congress. In his address, Wilson translated the core domestic values of the United States into a foreign policy agenda pursuing democracy, transparency, free trade, and self-determination. Wilson’s advocacy of multilateralism is most evident in his final point: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”12 Here, in a key normative move, Wilson fused the ideas of national security, American exceptionalism, and American internationalism.13 In addition, he bundled the League of Nations proposal with the plan to end World War I. In some regards, this maneuvering proved brilliant; at the same time, however, it was also fatal. Wilson argued that a balance-of-power system was inherently unstable and would lead to war. To escape the vicious cycle of war, a new model based on collective security had to be created. He explained: “There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.”14 Every country would become vested in collective peace rather than individual power maximization. Thus, the creation of an international organization went beyond a venue for institutional governance; it was a reform of the entire system of international relations. Elements of American exceptionalism are found in the arguments of both those in favor of the league and those opposed. Wilson viewed America’s moral authority as a foundational source of power in a League of Nations; he held that “the Mission of America in the world is essentially a mission of peace and good will.” At the same time, the rhetoric of American exceptionalism also played to the isolationists, as they argued that the unique US system of governance would be corrupted by political engagement with contentious European politics. As the devil is usually in the details, the collective security agreement and the bundling of European peace with the league isolated many potential supporters. Domestic reaction to the plan came from both ends of the spectrum. Pacifists rejected the continued use of force within the league proposal. On the other end, nationalists feared the imposition on sovereignty and refused the idea based on fear that the United States would be forced into arbitration regarding its own foreign pursuits. A key issue in the debate over the League of Nations erupted over Articles 10 and 15, concerning the obligations of collective security and the requirements of international arbitration. In addition, the collective security approach was unclear, and questions surrounded the role of great powers. In November 1919, the League of Peace issued a response to the criticism about mandatory arbitration and inquiry: “The place for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the League of Nations is American to the core, American in theory, American in origin.”15 Yet, many in the US were not satisfied with this rebuttal. William Jennings Bryan, having just left his post as secretary of state, advocated for international engagement, and yet his vision elevated US power

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and American exceptionalism. He viewed the blueprint for the league as not going far enough and continuing to rely on the tools of warfare and argued that the league would take away domestic self-determination. Bryan was also wary of a “Council controlled by Europeans” and expressed grave reluctance to commit US lives or resources for the “settlement of European disputes.”16 Within the US Senate, momentum gathered for passage, with modifications. Yet, many in Congress were not comfortable with the original provisions of the treaty and were wary of the proposal. They expressed concerns that they would be drawn into foreign wars—despite the fact that all decisions in the proposed council and assembly required unanimity. The battle within Congress over the ratification of the League of Nations was fierce. At one point, thirty-five of the forty-nine Republicans in the Senate agreed to vote in favor of ratification of the treaty, with some provisions. Despite his earlier support for a similar approach, Lodge had a change of heart; by 1917, he was publically denouncing the benefits and feasibility of a League of Nations and led the opposition to any commitment to security agreements outside the United States. According to historian Ross Kennedy, Lodge and Roosevelt initially supported the League idea . . . because they saw it as a way to entice a predominantly indifferent public into supporting preparedness and an Allied victory in war. When they realized that Americans associated a collective security league with Wilson’s brand of preparedness rather than their own . . . they dropped the idea and denounced it.17

Lodge’s about-face was the result of tactical considerations and an effort to block Wilson from using the league to enhance the Democratic Party’s political power, electoral benefits, and ownership over the idea.18 With these strategic considerations came ideological rhetoric infused with fear and paranoia. Lodge’s understanding of the concept of sovereignty was narrow. He saw sovereignty as finite and zero sum—all or nothing. Any effort to move into international collaboration would be a threat to absolute national autonomy. As chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Lodge’s appeals for rejection of the treaty warned of loss of US autonomy and a future of entanglements: The United States is the world’s best hope, but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her power for good and endanger her very existence. Leave her to march freely through the centuries to come as in the years that have gone.19

Fourteen Republicans and two Democrats (who were largely ardent nationalists and isolationists) joined Lodge. This group, dubbed the “Irreconcilables,” held firm to their opposition and demanded significant limitations to

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the treaty. Opposition to ratification brought together several disparate Republican viewpoints on the war and international engagement. The Republican Party was initially divided between the Irreconcilables and those committed internationalists whose opposition was not to the league, but to the provisions in the Treaty of Versailles. But as David Mervin explained, “It is clear that the reservations policy had the great advantage of providing for the unity of the Republican Party and enhancing its electoral prospects.”20 Partisan politics contributed to the rejection of the League of Nations and after fifty-five days of intense and often heated debates, the Senate rejected membership in the League of Nations in a 38–53 vote. A contentious relationship between the president and Congress added to the drama and dysfunction. Although Wilson was offered a compromise deal, he rejected the modified proposals. Guided by his frustration over the Republicancontrolled Senate, he firmly rejected negotiations over any of the reservations. In the end, he actually advised the Senate Democrats not to vote for the treaty’s passage, posturing that the Republicans would be blamed for US failure to join the league. Another contributing factor to his decision was his bitter feud with Lodge. Wilson also failed in an essential aspect of securing support of the league through the “education of public opinion.”21 His efforts to rally Americans during a whistle-stop train tour came rather late in the game and played on the fear of war.22 In the end, the country that hoped to be champions of humanity failed to move beyond its own parochialism, patriotism, and partisanship. The League of Nations debate shifted and solidified America’s inward orientation for several decades. The question of multilateralism remained on the agenda, and in 1920, Franklin Roosevelt, the vice presidential nominee for the Democratic Party, held that the League of Nations was “the dominant issue of the campaign.”23 Yet, by 1932, the issue had faded from national discussions and US isolationism continued and kept the United States out of another international organization. In January 1935, the Irreconcilables triumphed again, when the Senate voted 52–35 to reject membership in the World Court.24 The lack of US ratification of the World Court was also a blow to the long-term viability of the League of Nations. US election cycles, partisan politics, and a fear of loss of sovereignty, along with a healthy dose of American exceptionalism, fused together to prevent American participation in a rather American innovation. Forging a Path to San Francisco During the 1930s, in the ashes of World War I and the failure of the League of Nations, the US public remained skeptical of two things: first, the value of pursuing international peace, and second, the need for US engagement to contribute to such peace. Franklin Roosevelt’s “Quarantine Speech,” delivered in

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October 1937, set the early narrative, pronouncing, “It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.”25 The speech demonstrates Roosevelt’s early efforts to combine pragmatic national interests with American exceptionalism. He effectively turned American exceptionalism on its head by justifying a need for international engagement as an extension of the practical US institutional approaches to governance applied at the international level. He continued: “There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.”26 Yet, at this point, his call to activism and international engagement was one seeking collective neutrality and non-belligerence. In the months before the outbreak of World War II, the attention on creating a “new league” did gain some momentum at both the domestic level and internationally, rising to the forefront of domestic political discussions. However, several factors had to come together. First, the architecture of a new organization needed to be designed; second, the international community had to be brought into the agreement; and third, the domestic environment had to be amenable to such an approach. To move from concept to policy, Secretary of State Cordell Hull tried to replicate several agreements made with Latin American states at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936. Those agreements upheld sovereignty, rejected war, and established international arbitration. Before 1942, the Roosevelt administration’s collaborative efforts focused on creating a collective neutrality organization with the idea of going “after the root causes of war.”27 These emerging efforts were rather ambitious as the program for peace attempted to tackle economic and financial structures, restrict the growth in armaments, and use institutional machinery to quell the growing embers of war. In 1937, progress was made with the British and the French; even Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini provided some indications that they would consider participating.28 When approached, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain indicated that the United Kingdom’s focus would remain on establishing a foundation for peace and that the economic structures and armaments reduction should wait. Yet, the US focus was on non-coercive mechanisms, as well as economic cooperation and disarmament; the United States preferred to leave the political and security issues to the Europeans. While the conflict over Hitler’s expansionism heated up in Europe, the United States encouraged the British, as well as other European powers, to pursue a collective approach to fostering stability. By the early 1940s and with the outbreak of war in Europe, many of the efforts at collaboration were sidelined. Roosevelt’s collaborative approach moved away from neutrality and was instead based on building on the Concert of Europe model, with a primary focus on great powers serving as an in-

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ternational police force. By 1942, the US State Department began to focus on reviving a blueprint largely created by South African Jan Smuts, which included a permanent secretary, a large representative body, and an executive council. Roosevelt quietly created the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, whose mandate quickly evolved from disarmament issues to crafting international political machinery. In early February 1942, the group convened within the State Department and began reworking the league’s design and advocated moving away from the league’s unanimity voting requirements. In addition to exploring different institutional models, Roosevelt continued a quiet campaign to sway the US public away from growing isolationism in the face of war in Europe. He appealed to morality as the foundation for US international engagement, while gently nudging European governments toward an institutional blueprint. Yet, for the US public, Roosevelt held his cards very closely and avoided any mention of an international organization or any hint of Wilsonian idealism. Domestically, Roosevelt needed to clear several hurdles in order to move the US public away from its isolationism. As Stephen Schlesinger explained, “Isolationist attitudes were . . . deeply embedded in the fabric of discourse.”29 In 1939, a Gallup poll asked, “Would you favor a conference of the leading nations of the world to try and end the present war and settle Europe’s problems?” Although 69 percent were in favor, when asked whether the United States should participate in such an organization, only 50 percent agreed.30 The strain of isolationism ran deep and foreign trade was perceived as a threat to US jobs and autonomy. Like Wilson before him, Roosevelt was pressured from both sides of the political spectrum. The America First movement, claiming 800,000 members, rejected internationalism and intervention due to fears of entanglement.31 Within civil society, popular figures such as aviator Charles Lindbergh lobbied against involvement in World War II and against embedding US interests with those of other countries. On the other side, the pacifists wanted a focus on disarmament and the creation of a supranational organization. To court public opinion, Roosevelt designed a campaign to prevent popular backlash and to slowly coax the isolationists from their protective shell. In a September 1939 “fireside chat,” he proclaimed that the United States would begin “seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate, as far as it is possible to do so, the continued use of force between nations.” He used this approach again two years later, in his Four Freedoms speech to Congress, his language further inched the country away from isolationism: Roosevelt’s call for “a world founded upon four essential human freedoms” contained elements of American exceptionalism when he proclaimed that American values were relevant for the rest of the world. Courting Public Opinion

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Within civil society, early advocates of an organizational approach began to emerge in the autumn of 1939, when the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) was formed, with James T. Shotwell at the helm. Other advocates for the creation of a new league included the Council of Foreign Relations and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.32 The CSOP brought together academics and community leaders to research and explore the issue of durable peace and to offer their own solutions. In some cases, summaries of these discussions were published and circulated within the State Department. The CSOP also knew it needed to nurture popular support for what was largely a shunned and passé idea. In its mandate, the group acknowledged that “popular education in this field is an essential part of the effort.” On radio broadcasts throughout the country, they promoted the idea of “A Lasting Peace” through an international organization.33 When France surrendered to Germany in June 1940, Americans began to take note of how serious the war in Europe was; many in the business community were particularly alarmed by the potential threats of a German victory. In August 1941, the United States and Great Britain signed the Atlantic Charter and declared their commitment to seek a collective post-war order. Yet, there remained no mention of a specific organization.34 The December 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor forced the United States out of its official neutrality and away from its protectionist stance toward Europe. In 1942, China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as twenty-two other countries, signed the Declaration by United Nations. In a series of meetings in Moscow, Cairo, Tehran, and Dumbarton Oaks (in Washington, DC) the parameters of the United Nations charter began to take shape. Within the United States, the isolationism of the 1930s proved costly to US business and industry. By 1940, world economic cooperation was more palatable, as international trade was viewed as less of a threat to US jobs and held the added possibility of promoting international peace and prosperity. At the same time, however, global political cooperation was not widely accepted by the US public.35 In crafting a new league, the preliminary initiatives by the Roosevelt administration had to be clandestine and vague.36 According to Robert Hilderbrand, early on, “Roosevelt . . . did not want to make it too clear that actual plans were being formulated. . . . Nor did he wish to alarm the large number of Americans who then opposed United States participation in a new world body.”37 Roosevelt, unlike Wilson, worked out the details of planning and negotiating a postwar international organization largely within the State Department. The 1942 congressional elections provided the Republicans with a gain of fifty-three House and Senate seats, with many core isolationists being reelected.38 The message to President Roosevelt and the Democrats was that the Roosevelt Walks a Tightrope

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US public was not ready for an international organization and that support for such endeavors could be politically costly. Before the war, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a leading Republican, had been a staunch isolationist who led efforts in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to block US entry into World War II. However, Pearl Harbor changed his view, and he began to advocate for a more active US role in global affairs. The Republican Party was becoming divided, with traditional isolationists, such as Senators Robert Taft (R-OH) and presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey, holding views opposite of interventionists such as Wendell Willkie, who advocated assistance for European powers. A 1942 Christian Science Monitor piece discussed “two deep currents” in the United States. Portions of the US public were beginning to support the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, while others remained committed to isolationism.39 Despite this progress, however, many still expressed concern that the plans for an international organization would “hold logic in the public’s favor” but still fail to gain public support.40 Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, in a telling New York Times article, pointed out two key issues. He first argued that the United States must relinquish some sovereignty or “let the world roll on into chaos.”41 His second point concerned public opinion and whether the “man on the street” was capable of comprehending the implications of such an organization and the value of its benefits. America’s pivot toward internationalism, both in Congress and in the US public, began in 1943. The White House began sowing the seeds of public support for an institutional solution to war. Roosevelt invited Forrest Davis, author of several Saturday Evening Post articles, to interview him and then reviewed drafts of the interviews before they appeared in print. Through his edits, Roosevelt carefully emphasized a more “practical” approach to international security. The Post published “Roosevelt’s World Blueprint,” in an April 1943 edition and the president made it clear that there was “no blanket surrender of sovereignty” in his plan. In addition, the article repeatedly rejected the idealism of Wilson and highlighted the need for bipartisan support to create a permanent peace. At the same time, there was still no mention of a formal organization.42 The interviews and article were an essential move to allay fears of an intrusive organization; in addition, because presidential elections were a year away, discussions about the United States joining an international organization had to be judicious. Congress, in some ways reacting to changes in public opinion and in other ways legitimizing and pushing the idea of an international organization, once again became a key player. An April 1943 poll of members of the Senate found twenty-four supportive of “a world police force,” forty uncommitted, and thirty-two opposed. A Milwaukee Journal article expressed “the evidence is Growing Internationalism

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that the American people are farther along than the Senators.”43 By early 1943, there was significant media coverage of the move toward planning for an international organization, and Congressman J. William Fulbright (D-AK) claimed that a majority of those in the House of Representatives supported such a move.44 And yet many of the ghosts of the league debate were still present, with members of both parties concerned about the United States “surrendering sovereignty.” Although bipartisan support was growing, some in the Republican Party remained firmly opposed to the creation of an international organization. As Congressman Walter Judd (R-MN) explained, “The Republican Party was still substantially dominated by people who thought that to be sound and conservative domestically meant that you had to be isolationist internationally.”45 The memoirs of Senator Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan and a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, demonstrate the division in the party and the concerns many had that such an organization would undermine long-term efforts to secure peace; he wrote, “I am hunting for the middle ground between those extremists at one end of the line who would cheerfully give America away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation which has come to be an impossibility.”46 In a key moment in August 1943 at the Mackinac Republican Leadership Conference, the Republican Party came to an agreement. Two factions within the Republican Party debated the terms sovereignty and organization, as they questioned whether membership in an organization meant relinquishing sovereignty. Some argued that membership in an international organization meant impending doom and compromised autonomy. However, Senator Warren Austin from Vermont held a less rigid view of the sovereignty issue. He argued, We can make a treaty with the other sovereign powers in the world which will assure, as much as human frailty can assure, security of all the members to the agreement, through justice administered in a court, through arbitration, or, if necessary, through the wielding of force, and make it without loss of our sovereignty, but rather in the exercise of our sovereignty to preserve our sovereignty.47

In the end, the Republican leadership moved to consensus and accepted the call for an organization. In fact, their agreement far exceeded any original commitment to postwar cooperation. The group issued a declaration in support of a “postwar cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to offer permanent peace with organized justice in a free world.”48 Many at the meeting believed that the language of the declaration, which called for “sovereign nations,” would actually fortify US independence.

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Also in the summer of 1943, a handful of senators and congressmen—all advocates of an international organization—came together to initiate a grassroots campaign and draft legislation in support of US membership in such an organization.49 At times, the group included Senator Harry Truman, who would later become vice president in 1944 and then would assume the reigns of the presidency just weeks before the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drafted the charter of the United Nations. The bipartisan group was referred to as the B2H2 group, which stood for the last initials of the main senators involved: Joseph Ball (R-MN), Harold Burton (R-OH), Carl Hatch (D-NM), and Lister Hill (D-AL). Together they formed a speaking tour focused on the Midwest that laid out the strategic and moral arguments in favor of an international institution. By the autumn of 1943, two resolutions calling for the creation of an international organization passed in Congress. The first bill was a House resolution, sponsored by Congressman Fulbright (H. Cong. Rec. 25, 78th Cong., 1st sess.), “favoring the creation of appropriate machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among nations of the world.”50 In records on the discussions, Fulbright noted that the legislation would arouse public interest and strengthen the president’s capacities to negotiate with the Allies, as well as push the Senate toward consensus.51 Yet, in the Senate, the resolution was controversial, and many were concerned that an international organization would compete with constitutionally assigned war powers. In a key move that paved the way for ratification of the UN Charter, Secretary of State Hull met with senators to smooth over concerns about relinquishing congressional powers and US sovereignty. In November 1943, the Senate passed the Connally Resolution in an 85–5 vote calling for the creation of an international organization to foster international peace and security. Many, including Secretary Hull, describe this resolution as a key development in moving the United States away from isolationism.52 President Roosevelt was wary of the congressional initiatives. Although he wanted congressional support, he was concerned that moving ahead too quickly would compromise potential ratification by triggering a countermovement from the lingering isolationists. In addition, he had concerns that the congressional initiatives would interfere with his negotiations with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. Roosevelt actually urged the B2H2 Senators sponsoring the bill to delay their efforts; but Fulbright and others refused to heed the president’s request.53 At the same time, members of Congress were aware of potential backlash and Senator Tom Connally (D-TX) refused to allow open hearings on the subject, and the House also strategically avoided any public hearings.54 By 1943, things were moving rapidly at the diplomatic level as well. The governments of the USSR, the United Kingdom, China, and the United States signed an agreement in late October 1943 that acknowledged “the necessity of

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establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security.”55 The group again affirmed this commitment in December in Tehran, when they agreed to the “four policemen” approach outlined by Roosevelt. The president conceived of an international organization that would house a council made up of the four great powers (the United States, United Kingdom, China, and Russia) each responsible for maintenance of peace and security within their spheres of influence. The first draft of the future UN Charter was crafted in the fall of 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks mansion in Washington, DC, where, during a two-phase meeting, the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China reached an agreement on the mandate and structure of a global institution whose focus would center on international security. 1944 Presidential Elections and Partisan Politics Roosevelt and Hull spent three years cultivating bipartisan support in Congress and the US public in a discreet and incremental manner.56 This approach changed in 1944, when the State Department launched an extensive public relations campaign to secure support for the Dumbarton Oaks agreements.57 In January 1944, the State Department created the Office of Public Information and tasked it with “orienting the public.” It created a public relations campaign that included sending 200,000 copies of the summaries of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal to 9,000 weeklies and 1,000 small-town news venues. In addition, the League of Women Voters provided its six hundred chapters with a discussion guide, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation mailed out 318,000 copies of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, and the American Legion sent 12,000 memos supporting the proposed UN Charter.58 The campaign also included a series of radio programs by department officials. In a letter to many civic groups and public organizations regarding an educational campaign, Clark Eichelberger wrote, “We have a ‘second chance’ to establish such an organization.”59 Table 3.1 lists many of the organizations that actively supported the creation of the United Nations in 1944, as well as many of those who served as official consultants to the San Francisco Conference. The 1944 presidential election and interagency politics slowed the momentum toward creating the United Nations. In early April 1944, a radio broadcast by Secretary of State Hull demonstrated the administration’s goal of appealing to the Republicans in Congress: “We are at a stage where much of the work of formulating plans for the organization to maintain peace has been accomplished. It is right and necessary that we should have the advice and help of an increasing number of Members of the Congress.”60 He went on to say that a bipartisan group had been formed to consult on the matter: “Congress in turn played an especially critical role in legitimizing the shift towards

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Table 3.1 Organizations Favoring US Membership in a Postwar International Organization, 1944, Partial List American Bar Association* American Council on Education American Farm Bureau Federation* American Jewish Conference American Legion* American Unitarian Youth* Catholic, Jewish and Protestant Declaration on World Peace* Chamber of Commerce of the United States* Congress of Industrial Organizations* Council on Foreign Relations Disabled Veterans of the World War Farmers Union Kiwanis International Lions International National Association for the Advancement of Colored People National Association of Manufacturers* National Congress of Parents and Teachers* National Education Association National Farmers Union* National League of Women Voters* Railway Labor Executives’ Association Rotary International Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States*

Source: List compiled primarily from US Department of State, “Public Attitudes on Foreign Policy,” nos. 32 and 37, August 16, 1944, and October 3, 1944. Note: * Groups also serving as official consultants to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco.

internationalism in general and for a permanent United Nations organization in particular.”61 In the fall of 1944, during the presidential election campaign, partisan bickering threatened to derail US efforts at Dumbarton Oaks; however, Secretary of State Hull was able to defuse most of these voices and managed to keep the United Nations issue out of the presidential race by bringing Roosevelt’s opponent, Thomas Dewey, into the discussions. Republicans were concerned that if the UN plan went through, Roosevelt would be given credit for the win, and the Democrats would benefit politically. In addition, with a divided party reeling from yet another failed attempt at the White House, there were concerns that the party would be left in the proverbial dust as a new approach to international relations emerged. One congressional member described the strategy used by the Roosevelt team to garner bipartisan support: Mr. Roosevelt was very shrewd not to grab it as just a Democratic measure because if they did, politics being what it is, some Republicans would say, “Well, we aren’t going to support it because it’s a Democratic proposal.” Very much in our mind when we developed this crusade was whether our

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President after the next election was to be a Republican or a Democrat. The fact was, as I put it, we had to have an American foreign policy.62

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Public opinion polls indicated that those who favored the “US joining a League of Nations after the War” had risen from 26 percent in October 1937 to 55 percent in November 1942 and then to a robust 72 percent by June 1944. Those reporting “no” dropped from 52 percent to 20 percent and then to 13 percent, respectively.63 One of the key turns in public opinion was the labeling of isolationism as naive and nostalgic. Isolationists were branded as trapped by the antiquated notion that the United States could safely avoid “entangling alliances” and partition itself from both the war at the time and long-term global politics.64 Public support was also shaped by the devastation of two world wars, as a war-weary electorate wanted to find a way out of international conflict. The political elite of the time were instrumental in shaping the palatability of the United Nations. Fulbright was a vocal advocate for an international organization and was influential in changing the discourse about sovereignty. In his attempt to quell public fears, he was quick to point out that “national sovereignty was in fact a trick, an illusion, especially in the world of airplanes, submarines, and atomic weapons.”65 The change in the debate over foreign affairs within the Republican leadership also demonstrates a shift in views over the creation of the United Nations. The struggle over the postwar order in the Republican Party was also evident in June 1944 as it debated the national platform on the floor of the Republican National Convention. The final document issued by the convention reflects a change in view and, according to one observer, Wendell Willkie managed to remove “the brand of isolationism from the Republican party.”66 The party adopted a statement declaring that it was committed to fostering “responsible participation by the United States in post-war co-operative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world.”67 Senator Taft, a well-known advocate of isolationism, also gave his tepid support to the organization, in large part due to his own political ambitions and the changing public tide turning away from isolationism.68 Taft’s orientation toward foreign policy provides key insights into the anti-UN conservatism of the day. In the Ohio senator, we find a strong expression of American exceptionalism, libertarian ideas about the role of government in protecting the individual, and an essential commitment to maintaining US independence and sovereignty.69 Part of Taft’s basic assumptions included the denial of significant international threats to US security; his narrative included referring to Nazi Germany as a “bugaboo to scare the American people into war.”70 With changes in public opinion and the attacks on Pearl Harbor, however, Taft came to support US participation in an international organization and voted for rat-

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ification of the UN Charter. His change of heart was deeply rooted in the idea of applying rule of law to countries.71 In early 1945, several key factors in the US ratification of the UN Charter came together. First, as explained earlier, public opinion had changed dramatically. In April 1945, when the Gallup organization asked, “Do you think the United States should join a world organization with police power to maintain world peace?” an impressive 81 percent supported the endeavor—moving from a tepid 56 percent in 1936.72 Second, the political elite—most important, members of the US Senate—were no longer riddled with fear of loss of sovereignty and isolationism. Third, Roosevelt and then Truman were able to forge a bipartisan consensus and, finally, the great powers came to an agreement about the Security Council and UN membership. When Roosevelt died unexpectedly on April 12, 1945, his demise had the potential to end the US leadership that was essential to the formation of the United Nations. Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-Shek were all shaken by the loss of the president.73 One of the initial questions posed to incoming president Harry Truman in his first press conference was whether the San Francisco Conference would be canceled or postponed. But the third paragraph of the New York Times’ coverage of the president’s death announced that Roosevelt’s policies would continue and the San Francisco Conference would go forward as planned.74 Fortuitously for the UN project, Truman held Roosevelt’s deep commitment to the creation of an international organization for the promotion of international peace and stability. In fact, prior to Truman’s ascending to the presidency, he had cosponsored a resolution in the Senate, calling on Roosevelt to support a global body; he had also participated in B2H2 speaking tours, advocating the merits of US membership in an organization such as the UN. Truman was able to capitalize on the changes in public opinion and crafted a deal with the Soviets and other great powers. In an effort to ensure bipartisan support, the San Francisco delegation included both Democrats and Republicans.75 Thus, the conference was truly an American endeavor, with members from both parties participating in a meaningful way. In addition, dozens of civil society organizations (see Table 3.1) attended the conference and participated in the deliberations. After the drafting process at San Francisco, however, Senate ratification cast a dark cloud over global optimism. Fears of US isolationism and sovereignty protectionism once again had the potential to derail ratification, as lingering holdouts appeared in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.76 But Truman was able to avoid the problems faced by Wilson in 1919. Whereas Wilson based his argument on moral claims with a bit of American exceptionalism thrown in, Truman took a more pragmatic approach. In his July 1945 address to Congress seeking ratifiA Consensus and a Commitment

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cation of the UN Charter, Truman stated, “The objectives of this Charter are clear. It seeks to prevent future wars. It seeks to settle international disputes by peaceful means. . . . It seeks to remove the economic and social causes of international conflict and unrest.”77 Unlike Wilson, Truman kept a keen eye on the Senate’s temperament and leveraged Roosevelt’s campaign to make the United Nations project a bipartisan one. In a 1945 radio address to the San Francisco Conference, he proclaimed, “With ever-increasing brutality and destruction, modern warfare, if unchecked, would ultimately crush all civilization. . . . The essence of our problem here is to provide sensible machinery for the settlement of disputes among nations.”78 Truman’s campaign for ratification in the Senate was well organized, was backed by public opinion, and contained significant bipartisan support. In an unprecedented moment, the country experienced significant consensus on the value of multilateralism and held great optimism in the capacities of the United Nations to address a variety of international issues, including economic stability, international order, and the pursuit of global justice. In a ringing endorsement, the Senate ratified the charter in a resounding 98–2 vote; the era of US isolationism was over.79 “A Lasting Peace” Unlike Wilson’s eleventh-hour crusade to garner support for the League of Nations, Roosevelt sowed the seeds to garner public approval years before the Senate vote on ratification of the UN Charter. By 1945, support from the warweary public was robust. The media also supported political messaging through books such as Willkie’s One World (1943) and the 1944 film Wilson— both of which sparked new interest in a “civilizing” organization to curtail the vices of world politics. Roosevelt restrained the idealistic narratives of 1919 and instead made his arguments on the pragmatic side. In addition, despite covertly working with the Allies and clearly directing the State Department to move forward with plans for creation of the United Nations, Roosevelt did not support the idea publicly until autumn 1944. He also avoided using terms such as organization or institution to prevent “stirring up the isolationists.” Instead, he promoted a “permanent system of general security” and “a Lasting Peace.”80 In their work, Hoopes and Brinkley pointed out that Roosevelt was deliberately elusive and vague, in part to provide the political space to woo and then work out the details with the Allies.81 While one hand quietly lobbied the Soviets, British, and Chinese, the other hand forged a discreet public relations campaign. The framing of the justification for multilateral institutionalism was a key element to Roosevelt’s and then Truman’s success. Within the country’s policy elite and the public at large, American exceptionalism was embraced almost

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universally, as these communities unquestionably perceived the United States as a model state.82 However, both those rejecting multilateral institutionalism and its advocates were able to use this narrative. Roosevelt, combined with groups in civil society and vocal supporters from Congress, served to turn the isolationist brand of American exceptionalism on its head. America’s democratic founding and dedication to institutionalism became a call for engagement and international leadership. Liberal narratives about American exceptionalism were invoked as a “folktale” and helped push reluctant publics and members of Congress into international engagement.83 In his book Diplomacy, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger explains, “[A] majority of the American leaders were convinced then as they are now that America has a special responsibility to spread its values as its contributions to world peace.”84 Another key factor within the changing narratives was the branding of isolationism as naive, nostalgic, and antiquated.85 Beyond American values, Roosevelt and Truman both highlighted the idea that membership in the United Nations was in the strategic interest of the United States, and would reduce the threat of war and increase US influence through institutional restraint of other powers. Again Roosevelt avoided Wilson’s more idealistic narratives that relied on goodwill to reform power-maximizing states. Instead, according to Roosevelt, the military might of the great powers would check power politics and the impetus for war. At the same time, the UN framework—in particular, the veto power of the Security Council— created an escape clause that checked the fear of onerous obligations imposed by the league’s approach. It is important to point out that many in Congress were vocal advocates of internationalism and were instrumental in changing the discourse about sovereignty. For example, Fulbright argued that isolationism was equivalent with “obsessive nationalism.” In this regard, Congress served an important role in legitimizing the idea of internationalism and advocating the specific parameters of the United Nations.86 Another key element to the acceptance of the San Francisco Charter was citizen participation within the United States. Americans were important not only in terms of their opinions and influence on members of Congress but also in terms of the civil society organizations they founded to advocate for the creation of the United Nations. Roosevelt and Hull had carefully “prepared the stage.”87 In terms of political parties, the creation of the United Nations was a joint endeavor. As early as 1940, Republican Wendell Willkie pushed for his party to support the creation of an international institution. In addition, both Roosevelt and Truman placed an extensive focus on crafting bipartisan support. As a colleague and friend of Truman explained: Bipartisanship

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History has proved that it was an extremely wise step to make our effort bipartisan, and to include both executive and legislative branches, and both House and Senate. This made it impossible for the San Francisco Conference, for example, to be thrust into partisan politics as the Versailles conference had been.88

Similarly, Secretary of State Hull was persistent in his inclusion of Republicans in both planning committees—at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and in San Francisco.89 Support within the Republican Party was also key, as individuals such as Willkie and Vandenberg effectively changed the view of sovereignty and the commitment to isolationism. In addition, given the changes in public opinion, it was politically astute to move away from isolationism. The US entry into the United Nations was an indigenous progression. It was not pressed upon either the US people or the Congress; instead, it was carefully nurtured through incremental appeals to change the approach to international conflict management. By 1945, the consensus and commitment to the ideas of rule of law at the global level, great power coordination, democratic representation of states, and an institutional approach to conflict resolution was robust. Further complicating the story of developing the “lasting peace” is the twolevel game that Roosevelt played in supporting the United Nations project without compromising his negotiations with the European powers and the Soviets. Here lies a fascinating interplay between domestic and international politics, as well as a story of contending narratives in exploring the justifications of creating the United Nations. That the drafting of the charter and the exploration of the idea of an international organization took place in the context of World War II presents a significant example of a two-level game. The war both motivated and inhibited moving forward. The real-time events of the war—Japan’s moves into Asia, Germany’s invasion of the USSR, and the attacks on Pearl Harbor—often interfered with the State Department’s planning efforts.90 Roosevelt viewed great powers as central to the organization. Through several conferences and drafts, his “four policemen” approach was a key way to distance the league from the future United Nations. The British were reluctant to follow this model, as they held particular concerns about the dismantling of colonial territories. Initially, Churchill viewed postwar planning as premature and advocated a more provincial approach to peace and security with regional organizations taking the lead. He also held that if there were to be an organization, his preference was for an independent organization with a focus on Europe, as he was also wary of Stalin and did not find China a comTwo-Level Games: Roosevelt and Stalin

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pelling partner. Yet China was key for Roosevelt in providing a countervailing force to Japan and demonstrating that the proposed organization would move beyond a Caucasian-centered approach.91 Although the regional approach was a priority for the Europeans, Roosevelt hoped to move away from this model, particularly in an effort to distance the organization from the shadow of colonialism. Overall, the Soviets, the British, and the Chinese were all less focused on the details of the organizational structure. Thus, the US draft, primarily conceived by Leo Pasvolsky, a State Department official, became the working document around which the great powers began to coalesce. As the State Department explored several different institutional models at the domestic level, the Allied powers created both progress and roadblocks at the diplomatic level. Whereas the British were only mildly reluctant, the Soviets presented several hurdles to the UN project. In 1940, the USSR was expelled by the League of Nations for invading Finland, and this experience left Stalin highly skeptical about membership in a new organization. In addition, the domestic/international tensions were particularly visible surrounding voting in the Security Council. Roosevelt proposed unanimity; the Soviets countered with a proposal for absolute veto on all matters, substantive and procedural. In addition, Stalin demanded that sixteen of the Soviet republics be granted membership, but Roosevelt knew this plan would not be palatable in the US Senate.92 In a memo to the conference at Yalta, Roosevelt expressed his concern that this approach “would gravely alienate many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide perfectionists and isolationists with a powerful weapon against American participation in the Organization.” He went on to say, “These factors might well jeopardize our chances for adequate public and Congressional support in this country.” As the details began to take shape, more controversies emerged, and the Soviet’s demands threatened to crumble the momentum within the United States and the emerging consensus among the Allied powers. Going into San Francisco, there were deep divisions between the US, British, and Soviet approaches, with many issues needing to be ironed out by the nearly three hundred delegates from forty-six other countries.93 But with the skillful maneuverings of Pasvolsky, special assistant to Cordell Hull, the US team helped resolve several key issues, including voting in the Security Council and membership of two Soviet republics. In late June 1945, the delegations in San Francisco drafted the United Nations Charter. Former Secretary of State Hull won the Nobel Prize for his efforts in creating the institution, giving extensive credit to Leo Pasvolsky. Hull called the charter “one of the great milestones in man’s upward climb toward a truly civilized existence.”94

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Conditional Multilateralism and the Founding The story of the founding of the United Nations is telling in several ways. First, it provides historical context and illustrates the foundational narratives that continue to drive much of the US relationship with the UN today. Second, it essentially presents two key case studies: one a classic case of the failure of US leadership to corral the country to pursue international cooperation, whereas the other provides what one might call a textbook example of how to garner popular and political support to engage in multilateral relations. Finally, it highlights the challenges of the two-level game as presidents must operate in two political arenas at the same time. Returning to the conditional multilateralism model presented in Chapter 2, in addition to the presidential orientation and support from both Congress and the public, the historical milieu and the political opportunity structures (at both the domestic and international levels) were ripe for the creation of the UN. With more than fifty million dead and the horrors of fascism in Germany and Italy, the scars of World War II brought to the surface the need to change the dynamics of international politics. Roosevelt and then Truman fostered the idea of the urgent need for stability and for international infrastructure to address threats to peace and security. As John Ikenberry explained, “The US was the leading champion and architect of global multilateral governance. It led the way in an unprecedented burst of global institution building.”95 Yet, Americans were accepting of the UN based on pragmatic concerns, not idealistic commitments to a world government. As stated earlier, the UN’s institutional design was unmistakably American—a reflection of American values, processes, and strategic goals. With the veto in the Security Council, the United States created a forum that would not impede its sovereignty, promoted institutional restraint for great powers such as the Soviet Union, and provided legitimacy and a version of inclusive politics at the global level.96 From a domestic perspective, the founding of the UN revealed the dark side of partisan bickering and shortsighted politics for immediate gain. At the same time, there was what one might call enlightened and inclusive leadership that created a rare moment of bipartisan collaboration. Although this analysis looks back into history and relies heavily on documents a century old, the topic holds relevance for today, given the era of declining public support for the UN and obstructionist factions within the United States. Several of the themes discussed throughout the book (sovereignty, protectionism, American exceptionalism, and the distinction between the rhetoric and reality of US multilateralism) are firmly rooted in the story of the demise of the League of Nations and the birth of the United Nations.

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1. Isolationism is defined as “an attitude of opposition to binding commitments by the United States government that would create new, or expand existing, obligations to foreign nations.” See Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 7. 2. John Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 93. 3. William McKinley, “The Last Speech of William McKinley,” Buffalo, New York, September 5, 1901. 4. H.G. Wells, “The Cause and Effect of the War,” Current History, 9 (1916): 203. 5. Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1917), xii–xv. 6. Theodore Roosevelt, “Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress, December 2, 1902” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1902), xxii. 7. Theodore Roosevelt, “Nobel Prize Address,” in The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910). 8. Ibid., 308–309. 9. John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 281. 10. Some credit Lodge with coining the name of the future United Nations. See Henry Cabot Lodge, “The Maintenance of Peace,” June 9, 1915, speech printed in “Lodge for a League,” New York Times, March 2, 1919. 11. The founders included an impressive list of names, including: Alexander Graham Bell, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, James Cardinal Gibbons, Harvard president Abbott Lawrence Lowell, and Edward Filene from the Chamber of Commerce. “A League to Enforce Peace Is Launched,” New York Times, June 15, 1918. 12. Woodrow Wilson, “Message to Congress” (Washington, DC: National Archives, Records of the United States Senate, 1918). 13. John Allphin Moore Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, To Create a New World (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999). 14. Woodrow Wilson, Why We Are at War: Messages to the Congress, January to April, 1917 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1917), 9. 15. “Reed Reservation Called Fatal,” New York Times, November 17, 1919, 1. 16. William Jenning Bryan, The League to Enforce Peace, World Peace: A Written Debate Between William Howard Taft and William Jennings Bryan (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917), 138. 17. Ibid., 63. 18. David Mervin, “Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations,” Journal of American Studies 4, no. 2 (1971): 204. 19. Henry Cabot Lodge, “The League of Nations Must Be Revised” (Washington, DC: Congressional Record, 1919), 3780. 20. Mervin, “Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations,” 207. 21. John Milton Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25. 22. Kennedy describes Wilson’s speeches as being deliberately vague in order to avoid questions surrounding the Monroe Doctrine and implications of collective security. Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2009), 46. 23. Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 2003), xvi.

Notes

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24. Thomas L. Stokes, “The World Court Faces Battle,” The Pittsburg Press, December 10, 1929. 25. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address at Chicago, 1937,” in The American Presidency Project (Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley), http://www.presidency .ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15476. 26. Dorothy Borg, “Notes on Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Political Science Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1957): 416. 27. Elliott Roosevelt, FDR: His Personal Letters, 1928–45, vol. I (New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1947), 664. 28. Borg, “Notes on Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” 409. 29. Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 29. 30. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971, vol. I (New York: Random House, 1972), 187. 31. Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–41 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953). 32. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 33. The CSOP also sponsored national broadcasts in which members of the group discussed foreign policy topics, including the creation of an international organization. It also sponsored student panels that aired on the radio, with the CSOP offering several $600 prizes for the “best recommendation on how to organize peace.” See CSOP pamphlet, cited in Smith Simpson, “The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,” The American Political Science Review 35, no. 2 (1941): 318. 34. The term United Nations was first used to describe the alliance between Great Britain and the United States. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, many names were suggested; however, the name United Nations was agreed to in honor of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. See US House of Representatives, “Problems of World War II and Its Aftermath” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 9. 35. Ibid., 10. 36. See Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, for a discussion of Roosevelt’s deliberate effort to avoid the pitfalls of Wilson’s approach leading to Versailles. 37. Ibid., 8. 38. Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). 39. “US Public Opinion Turning to Wilsonian Peace Formula?” Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 1942. 40. Edwin L. James, “Have Cooperationists Overshot Their Mark? Various Plans for World Organization Provide for Bodies Independent of National Governments,” New York Times, January 17, 1943, E3. 41. “Roberts Pictures Post-War Grouping,” New York Times, May 2, 1943. 42. Forrest Davis, “Roosevelt’s World Blueprint,” The Saturday Evening Post (April 10, 1943): 109. 43. “Connally Resolution Is Weak,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 29, 1943. 44. “Planning for Peace Seen Gaining in US,” New York Times, February 28, 1943, 33. 45. Jerry N. Hess, “Oral History Interview with Dr. Walter H. Judd,” April 13, 1970, Harry S. Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/judd.htm. 46. Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 55. 47. George Rothwell Brown, “Moscow League Pledge Backed by Senate Group,” Milwaukee Sentinel, November 4, 1943.

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48. Hank Meijer, “Hunting for the Middle Ground: Arthur Vandenberg and the Mackinac Charter, 1943,” Michigan Historical Review 19, no. 2 (1993): 19. 49. Hess, “Oral History Interview with Dr. Walter H. Judd.” 50. US House of Representatives, “Problems of World War II and Its Aftermath” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 277. 51. Ibid., 20. 52. Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillian, 1948), 1650. 53. Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN, 66. 54. Ibid.; US House of Representatives, “Problems of World War II and Its Aftermath.” 55. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Department of State, ed., A Decade of American Foriegn Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950). 56. Arthur Krock, “Roosevelt Would Avoid Wilson’s Two Mistakes,” New York Times, March 11, 1945. 57. “Program to Educate Public on New League Launched Here,” Washington Post, October 17, 1944, 4; Schlesinger, Act of Creation. 58. Dorothy B. Robins, Experiment in Democracy: The Story of US Citizen Organizations in Forging the Charter of the United Nations (New York: Parkside Press, 1971), 167. 59. Clark Eichelberger, “Letter Inaugurating Dumbarton Oaks Educational Campaign,” Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, September 29, 1944, cited in Robins, Experiment in Democracy, 178. 60. Cordell Hull, “Foreign Policy of the United States,” in Columbia Broadcasting System, US Department of State (April 9, 1944), 8. 61. US House of Representatives, “Problems of World War II and Its Aftermath,” 16. 62. Hess, “Oral History Interview with Dr. Walter H. Judd.” 63. Stephen B. Withey and William A. Scott, Public Reactions to the United Nations 1945–1954 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954), 15–24. 64. Justice D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 11–12. 65. Randall Bennett Woods, “Fulbright Internationalism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 491 (May 1987): 29. 66. James A. Hagerty, “Willkie Wins Republicans to His Anti-Isolation Stand: National Committee Unanimously Adopts a Resolution Affirming ‘Obligation to Assist’ in World Cooperation,” New York Times (April 21, 1942), 1. 67. Republican Party Platform of 1944, June 26, 1944, http://www.presidency .ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25835. 68. “Post-War Cooperation,” New York Times, June 27, 1943, E10; ibid.; Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1951). 69. Vernon Van Dyke and Edward Lane Davis, “Senator Taft and American Security,” Journal of Politics 14 (May 1952); John Moser, “Principles Without Program: Senator Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy,” Ashbrook Dialogues, September 1, 2001, http://ashbrook.org/publications/dialogue-moser/#5. 70. “Congressional Record,” US House of Representatives 87 no. 13 (1941). 71. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, 13. Disappointed in the dilemmas of the Korean War, Taft recommended a transatlantic association; this sentiment was echoed in Senator John McCain’s 2008 proposal to create a League of Democracies. Ibid.; Van

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Dyke and Davis, “Senator Taft and American Security”; Liz Sidoti, “McCain Favors a ‘League of Democracies,’” Washington Post, April 30, 2007. 72. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol. I, 497. 73. Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN, 183. 74. Arthur Krock, “President Roosevelt Is Dead; Truman to Continue Policies,” New York Times, April 12, 1945. 75. Krock, “Roosevelt Would Avoid Wilson’s Two Mistakes.” 76. Of the twenty-three members in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, several Democrats were associated with isolationism, including Robert Rice Reynolds (DNC), Frederick Van Nuys (D-IN), Guy M. Gillette (D-IA), and Bennett Champ Clark (D-MO). The Republican isolationists included Hiram W. Johnson (R-CA), Gerald Nye (R-ND), Arthur Capper (R-KS), and Henrik Shipstead (R-MN). See Thomas E. Hachey, “American Profiles on Capitol Hill: A Confidential Study for the British Foreign Office in 1943,” The Wisconsin Magazine of History 57, no. 2 (1973–1974). 77. Harry S. Truman, “Address Before the Senate Urging Ratification of the Charter of the United Nations,” 79th Cong., Document No. 70, July 2, 1945. 78. Harry S. Truman, “Address Broadcast from the White House to the Conference in San Francisco Drafting the United Nation’s Charter,” 1945. 79. Luck discusses how the ratification process in the Senate was so organized and tight that some accused the administration of coercing the process. See Edward Luck, Mixed Messages (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 258–260. 80. Warren B. Francis, “Roosevelt Takes Fourth-Term Oath and Vows Lasting Peace for US,” Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1945; Schlesinger, Act of Creation. 81. Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN. 82. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955). 83. John Gerard Ruggie, “The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 93. 84. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 33. 85. Doenecke, Not to the Swift, 11–12. 86. Ibid., 16. 87. Robins, Experiment in Democracy, 10. 88. Hess, “Oral History Interview with Dr. Walter H. Judd.” 89. Krock, “Roosevelt Would Avoid Wilson’s Two Mistakes.” 90. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks. 91. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 92. Schlesinger, Act of Creation, 50. 93. Major issues included control of Poland, Soviet republic membership, the powers of the General Assembly, the admission of Argentina, and voting in the Security Council. Issues surrounding the disbanding of the British, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial territories also threatened the progress of the drafting of the charter. 94. Quoted in Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN, 204. 95. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 80. 96. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

4 Drifting Apart and the Politics of Estrangement, 1945–1988

The United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace. —President John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, 1961

The signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco and its ratification were much-celebrated events for the United States. A war-weary America looked to the UN to create a new era of peace and enthusiastically supported the new organization. The country celebrated the historic event with hymns of praise and fanfare.1 The UN symbolized the end to extraordinary violence. For many, the UN was the creation of the “parliament of man,” in which “the wardrum throbb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d.”2 Early relations between the United States and the UN were so harmonious that the former invited the UN to take up permanent residence in a six-block area on the East River in New York City. The first two decades of the UN’s existence marked a time when national television carried US presidential addresses to the UN General Assembly in full, while local communities and schools often celebrated United Nations Day—October 24th—with parades, international dinners, and galas. Public opinion of the UN was extremely high, with one source in 1945 finding 85 percent of those surveyed supportive of US participation in the UN.3 The strongest endorsement of the UN in Gallup’s near-annual poll came in 1959, when 87 percent of the population expressed that the UN was doing a “good job.” Support for the UN was firm within the halls of Congress as well. A 1952 Gallup poll—seven years after the UN’s founding—proclaimed, “Partisan differences of opinion about the United Nations are remarkably absent. . . . Few organizations in history have ever started out with such overwhelming public support as the United Nations.”4 According to a Senate Foreign Relations report, broad partisan enthusiasm was robust for the first few decades of the UN’s existence.5 Almost a decade later, in 1961, Gallup reported that “US Faith in the United Nations Remains Unshaken.”6 Again, there was little distinction between political party identification and support. 65

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By the 1970s, however, this view had changed dramatically. Policy elites in Washington were part of a wave of disappointment regarding the UN, and as the decade progressed, bipartisan support was lost. In fact, many on both sides of the political aisle expressed grave disapproval of the UN. This loss of support was also found in public opinion; by 1975, only 33 percent of Americans surveyed found the UN doing a “good job,” while 51 percent actually gave it a “bad job” rank.7 What was responsible for this decay? What had destroyed the public support and bipartisan consensus that so many had worked so hard to create? As many have explained, Cold War politics divided the global playing field and closed political opportunity structures for multilateralism. This chapter traces the early optimism and the Korean War, the rough patches in relations during the Vietnam intervention, and then the sources of the embittered US-UN relations during the 1970s and 1980s. With a few exceptions, the United States began to pursue a focus on security concerns that often took a decidedly unilateralist stance. This discussion also highlights the occasional exceptions, when many of the factors leading to collaboration through the UN came together (namely, the Korean War and the 1956 Suez Canal crisis). However, it also explores how events surrounding Goa, Congo, Vietnam, and China tarnished both US taste for collaboration and UN capacities for engagement. At the global level, the cycles of violence and the emerging inextricable Arab-Israeli conflict also bruised the US-UN relationship. The discussion builds on the framework from Chapter 2, which described the dynamics between the international and the domestic. The UN’s institutional factors (the second gear of the conditional multilateralism framework presented in Figure 2.2 became restrained as the Security Council was immobilized by the Soviet veto and as the General Assembly gained a non-Western majority and lost its appeal. During the first few decades of the UN’s existence, its membership tripled as decolonization created new majorities in the General Assembly that forged a coordinated agenda that was viewed as running counter to the US agenda.8 As these dynamics played out, the US public responded to the shifting tone in Washington, and the support and optimism of the 1940s and 1950s began to fade away. Domestically, the US political elites expressed increasing skepticism of the UN. In the 1950s, McCarthyism and a faction within the conservative perspective began to reject the UN and questioned the UN’s legitimacy and utility. In the wake of Vietnam, the admission of Communist China to the UN, as well as the politicization of Zionism within the UN, ended the honeymoon period. By the 1980s, congressional consensus about the value of the UN declined and, with it, US financial commitments. As this chapter illustrates, the tensions in relations over these decades were a result of international politics, institutional changes at the UN, and general problems in US relations abroad.

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International Politics and Institutional Politics: The Cold War Stalemate The US-UN relationship was caught in the ebb and flow of the Cold War. Competition for spheres of influence and power politics between the US and the USSR crept into multilateral relations before the ink was dry on the UN Charter. Initially, the United States found the UN an ideal venue for norm creation, as “the State Department . . . aimed chiefly to foster a world community of nations which shared American democratic political values.”9 In addition, the United States viewed the UN as an important strategic tool in countering the growing threat of communism and Soviet expansion: “As the East-West political contest hardened in 1944 and 1945, it is at least clear that American policymakers increasingly designed the country’s United Nations policy as an adjunct to its Cold War strategy.”10 One example of this level of coordination was the 1950 Korean War (discussed below). Another example is in the longterm economic and political planning that came together in the architecture of the UN Charter. Not surprisingly, however, the Soviet Union also found the UN a useful venue to promote its agenda. Unfortunately, this brought stalemate to the Security Council and, eventually, US condemnation of the organization as a whole. As the Boston Globe explained, “When the United States and the Soviet Union are in accord, there is no need for the United Nations; and when these two cannot agree, the United Nations is helpless.”11 The institutional framework of the United Nations proved significantly flawed in the light of the Cold War. One of the major triumphs of the USSR in the negotiations going into the San Francisco Conference was requiring permanent member agreement in the Security Council. In effect, this requirement allowed great powers to judge their own cases. Although there are provisions in Chapter VI, Article 27, of the charter requiring parties to a dispute to refrain from voting, those provisions are hardly ever used.12 The design flaw in the Security Council was revealed as the Soviet Union issued 106 vetoes between 1946 and 1965.13 The great power collaboration of Roosevelt’s design was crippled. In response, the United States pushed for the General Assembly to assume a greater role with the Uniting for Peace Resolution, suggesting that if the Security Council was not able to come to agreement on issues of international peace and security, then seven members (in a procedural vote immune from the veto) could request that the General Assembly take up the matter. In 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed the initiative and the General Assembly adopted a motion granting it a greater role in issues of peace and security. However, US leverage in the General Assembly began to wane as the United States went from a position of holding an almost guaranteed majority to a clear minority. Between 1945 and 1970, the number of member-states more than doubled from 55 to 117; by 1991, UN membership had tripled to 166 member-states. The United States was torn: on the one hand, there was

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clear support for postcolonial power transition to independent states, while on the other hand, the membership of these new states led to greater vulnerability, as they opened the door for Soviet influence. With most of these states economically weak, North-South issues about development could easily become East-West issues that fed into the communist-capitalist rivalry. Cases such as Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Vietnam present a few examples in which the transition from former colonial status to independent states triggered US-Soviet rivalries that impeded multilateralism. As one observer pointed out in 1961, “We must never lose sight of the fact that there are now ninety-nine members instead of fifty-one, and the task of winning support for our policies and programs will be much greater than it used to be.”14 Along with the disparities in voting influence, there were also domestic concerns about the perceived disproportionate financial support that the United States provided the UN: “There is a haunting paradox about the American role in the organisation, the paradox of the rich member in the poor man’s club.”15 Early on, the United States quickly organized alternative venues, including its postwar initiatives through NATO, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan, all of which bypassed the UN. US multilateralism was branching out, and the UN would be only one of many international organizations in which the United States would participate. Strategic interests often called for venue shopping, and as such, the United States found that other forums were often more receptive of its agendas. In 1960, one observer wrote, “The United States remained officially and publically attached to the United Nations as a symbol of a better world. . . . But the main thrust of American diplomacy moved in the other direction.”16 In the early years, despite issue areas in which the United States chose not to engage at the UN, the foreign policy community maintained its rhetorical commitment to the United Nations. The Korean War and the Crisis in the Suez The first test of the UN and collective security came in June 1950, when the Soviet-backed North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea. The United States supported the South Koreans and went to the Security Council seeking a resolution authorizing use of force to repel the North Korean army. Because the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council in protest of lack of recognition of Communist China, the United States easily created a majority and secured the passage of several resolutions authorizing military action. In terms of the conditional multilateralism model, the stars aligned. Within the US, public support for the UN was still exceedingly strong with continued optimism concerning the UN capacities and its mandate for fortifying collective security. In Congress, however, partisan politics within the United States were bitter. Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) blamed the “loss” of Chiang Kai-Shek’s China on the State Department and

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accused the agency of being “thoroughly infested” with communists.17 Many Republicans joined the senator from Wisconsin and launched a full-scale attack on Truman and his secretary of state, thus shutting down potential domestic venues for authorization of use of force against Korea. Therefore, with public support, strategic interest, and the temporary opportunity to dominate the agenda of the Security Council, the UN became an excellent venue for Truman’s foreign policy. Korea presents a case study of effective multilateral policy formation and adoption. However, when it came to multilateral implementation of the policy, collaboration was shallow at best. Although the military intervention was labeled as being under UN command, the United States wielded complete control. In fact, most of the other countries contributing to the operation provided only token support. Critics argued that the UN served to “camouflage the unilateral nature of this operation.”18 Despite the marginalization of UN leadership, Secretary-General Trygve Lie wrote that, even though the UN oversight committee yielded little influence over operations on the ground in Korea, “its deeper purpose was to keep the United Nations ‘in the picture.’”19 UN Security Council Resolution 82, authorizing the use of force in Korea, provided the veneer of international legitimacy. As Franz Gross explains, “The sanction of the international organization permitted the United States to fight for the purposes of a concert of nations instead of being unjustly branded as waging a ‘colonial’ war.”20 Because the UN-authorized military action took place in the context of a momentary vacuum of great power politics, the implementation of the policy was only superficially multilateral. Yet, in the end, the UN gained legitimacy. It appeared that the United Nations had fulfilled its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, despite the fact that the United States had held the reigns the entire time. The 1956 Suez Canal crisis presents a second case in which the United States led the parade in employing UN participation.21 In light of an alliance of the French, British, and Israelis in coordinating a military intervention into Egypt, the United States found the UN eminently useful in deescalating the conflict. The Eisenhower administration presented the Security Council with a draft resolution calling for a cease-fire. However, with the threat of vetoes from the British and the French, the United States called for an emergency session and transferred the issue to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The General Assembly adopted Resolution 377 and, under the direction of Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson, created the UN Emergency Force (UNEF)—the first peacekeeping operation to monitor a cease-fire. Although the US public’s admiration for the UN was slightly tarnished by the events of the Korean conflict, the UN garnered consistent public support throughout the 1950s and 1960s. June and December 1951 Gallup polls found that when asked, “Do you think the US should give up its membership in the United Nations?” 73 percent of respondents declared that it should stay in the

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UN.22 In some ways, this is not surprising, as the UN was a key player in two successful interventions, including the Korean War and the demobilization of violence in the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Public support had also weathered the storm of McCarthyism and allegations that the UN was “filled with communists.” Congress in the 1960s: “Do We Rely Too Much on the UN?” Despite a growing decline in US influence in the General Assembly due to the increase in developing country membership, the public commitment to a US presence in the UN strengthened in the 1960s, with 86 percent supportive in January 1962 and 85 percent in August 1967. In 1962, Congress continued to fund the UN and called for punitive measures for those countries (specifically the Soviet Union and France) that deliberately withheld funds. Yet, by 1965, debate in Congress was beginning to stir with disagreement over Article 19 in the UN Charter, stipulating that voting privileges would be lost when members did not pay their dues. Domestic controversy also developed over issues regarding the possible admission of Communist China to the UN. Yet congressional support remained steady. As one member of the House of Representatives explained: “I think we pay too large a share of the UN bill. . . . But even if we paid it all, and it was accepted that the United Nations is the only bridge we have to peace, my constituents would support it just on that issue.”23 Given the significant policy coordination with the UN, another observer asked, “Do we rely too much on the UN?”24 In 1961, events in Goa triggered vocal criticism by Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the UN. When India launched a military effort to expel the Portuguese from Goa, the Security Council was incapable of responding as the Soviets issued their ninety-ninth veto. Stevenson held that lack of UN action in Goa “could end with its [the UN’s] death.”25 A few years later, voices of opposition to the United Nations developed around the Congo crisis. The United States was providing key assistance to a UN operation in an attempt to stabilize the war-torn African nation. The Kennedy administration’s request for funding from Congress to support the operation triggered a swell of criticism on both the Congo policy and the overall effectiveness of the UN, provoking allegations that the United States was bailing out the Soviets. A small group of congressmen, including Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), sent a telegram to President Kennedy, asking him to “withdraw support, both moral and financial, from the United Nations aggressions against Katanga.”26 There was also opposition to the US purchase of $100 million in UN bonds to pay for UN activities in the Suez Canal and Congo.27 Many also believed that the UN provided an international stage for unfriendly countries to voice their criticisms of the United States. The UN became a place where Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser,

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for example, could publically vilify the United States. Some began to question whether the UN was effective, and discussions about the utility of US membership emerged in several media sources and public debates.28 President Kennedy’s 1962 State of the Union address attempted to confront those critiques: Arms alone are not enough to keep the peace—it must be kept by men. Our instrument and our hope is the United Nations—and I see little merit in the impatience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world. For the troubles of a world organization merely reflect the troubles of the world itself. And if the organization is weakened, these troubles can only increase.29

Kennedy then outlined a strategy to strengthen the UN through increased financial support. The plan would “earmark” national armed forces to participate in on-call peacekeeping activities. Relations between the United States and UNESCO in the early 1960s highlight the growing trouble for the UN brewing in the US Congress as suspicions about UNESCO began to take on a tone of paranoia and disdain. The organization was accused of Communist infiltration and charged with planning “to control educational policy in the United States.”30 Several members of Congress accused the organization of racism, anti-Semitism, and subversive goals. In response to the rising opposition in Congress, the US ambassador to the UN, Stevenson, launched a campaign to counter these fears by “educating” members of congress about UN activities and by bringing them to visit the UN offices in New York. Yet, these efforts were not effective. As the next section illustrates, several key issues, including the US relationship with Israel and military involvement in Vietnam further isolated the United States from the United Nations. “Less Red and Less Dead” As mentioned earlier, during the 1960s, voices from US political leaders began rejecting the utility of the UN itself. The growing flickers of disdain were part of an emerging split within the Republican Party, as a more rightwing element emerged, particularly in the House of Representatives. Barry Goldwater’s (R-AZ) calls for a more limited UN became popular with some sections of the country.31 Reflecting the growing tensions, the mayor of Northampton, Massachusetts, ordered the removal of a UN flag flying outside city hall, citing “conflicting ideologies.”32 Student organizations such as the Young Republicans began passing resolutions calling for US withdrawal from UN membership. Yet the growing criticisms of the UN also provoked support for the organization from major news sources such as the New York Times, as well as congressional proposals to enhance funding.33 In fact, in 1962, the Senate

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approved, with a 70–22 vote, a bill to give the UN an extra $100 million (twenty-two Republicans and forty-eight Democrats supported the initiative). The funding bill also passed the House of Representatives in a 177–102 vote. Public awareness campaigns proclaimed that the UN was an important tool against the spread of communism and made the world “less red and less dead.”34 Picking up on some of the themes of the 1930s and 1940s from Senator Robert Taft, Goldwater began to foster a split in the Republican Party regarding the commitment to the UN in particular and internationalism in general.35 At one point he maintained, “I think the UN is a debating society at best. . . . [I]ts usefulness should be questioned in our Congress, where the most responsible decision regarding our membership can be made.”36 In his bid for the presidency, Goldwater repeatedly described the United Nations as a communist organization. However, by October 1964, only a few weeks before the presidential election, Goldwater softened his position considerably. It is noteworthy that Adlai Stevenson blasted Goldwater for hiding his “authentic view” of the UN and pandering to public opinion right before the election.37 Goldwater may have been aware of the strong public support for the United Nations. Gallup polls at the time, asking, “Do you think the US should give up its membership in the UN or not?” found that a resounding 79 percent advocated remaining a member.38 However, Goldwater’s attacks did find some traction, and public support fell by eleven points in one year.39 This volatility in the polling numbers provide an early indication of how susceptible the US public is to cues from the political elite regarding the UN.40 In the early 1960s, most of the voices in opposition to the UN were identified as peripheral or marginal actors on the fringes of the political spectrum.41 Goldwater was joined by the anticommunist John Birch Society— which was formed in 1958—and believed the UN was part of a one-world government plot to usurp US sovereignty and self-rule. Goldwater’s criticisms of the UN were often met with rebuttals from fellow Republican Nelson Rockefeller, who accused him of advocating an extremist policy of “dangerous belligerence.”42 Among mainstream members of the Republican Party, support for the UN remained secure through the 1960s; a 1966 Republican Coordinating Committee expressed ongoing commitment to the UN and acknowledged a need for a more flexible understanding of national sovereignty that, at times, may need to be softened for international stability.43 The Credibility Gap: “Biting the Hand That Feeds You” By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the China issue and the Vietnam conflict damaged both US reliability and the capacity of the UN to provide a multilateral forum for peace and security. Questions about recognizing Communist China began to weigh on the credibility and reputation of the United States in the UN, and the British advised the nation to soften its hard line against the

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People’s Republic of China. In addition, US military actions in Vietnam were perceived as violating the UN Charter’s Chapter I, Article II (4), and Chapter VII and echoing of neocolonialism. In addition to damaging US credibility as an advocate for restraint and legal parameters on the use of force, the country’s actions in Vietnam were seen as undermining the United Nations. SecretaryGeneral U Thant highlighted the UN’s ineffectiveness in the face of the conflict: “The Vietnam War has poisoned the atmosphere and strained international relations the world around. The strain is keenly felt at the United Nations where effective functioning has been impaired as a result.”44 Many in the UN feared escalation of the conflict. When U Thant expressed criticism of US involvement in Vietnam, the chair of the Armed Services Committee shot back that the United States should rethink its membership in the UN and quipped that the UN’s criticism was a “classic example of biting the hand that feeds you.”45 The Vietnam conflict also brought American disillusionment with the UN. The US public seemed to fault the UN for not brokering a cease-fire, and as such, support began to decline. In addition, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the UN (operating on the ground through UNEF) was stationed on the Egyptian side of the border with Israel, providing an uneasy deterrent to conflict between the Israelis and the Egyptians. When Egypt’s president Nasser requested UNEF’s withdrawal in 1967 (ahead of its attack on Israel), the UN reluctantly complied. In the wake of these two conflicts, confidence waned in the UN’s capacity to confront aggressors and secure international stability. US involvement in Vietnam had a dual negative consequence for the USUN relationship, as it triggered countervailing measures in the General Assembly and efforts to offset US unilateralism.46 In addition, the war destroyed the long-standing bipartisan consensus that had dominated the first two decades after World War II. This put an end to the “unity of the foreign policy establishment” and triggered a domestic struggle between Congress and the presidency over war powers and general foreign policy making.47 The Vietnam intervention also damaged the US commitment to internationalism that had been forged in the ashes of World War II. In late 1966, Arthur Goldberg, US ambassador to the UN, sensed waning support and restructured his offices to better “represent the UN to the American people.”48 Goldberg wrote that “the United Nations is the only available instrument” for addressing the threats of nuclear weapons. For Goldberg, the United States had lost its position of leadership in the UN for several reasons: Soviet abuse of the veto power, the view that double standards were applied to some countries regarding racial discrimination and human rights, and blatant failure to bring resolution to several large conflicts. Yet he argued, “The fault is not with the institution. The United Nations works very well whenever it is supported by . . . the great powers.”49 By 1968, enthusiasm for UN funding diminished in the congress, and by 1970, there was clear resentment about US

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funding of the organization, with allegations that the United States was playing “Uncle Sucker” to an organization full of “lofty ineptitude.”50 The barrage of criticism by Americans was felt at the UN. By the fall of 1967, the mood at the UN was described as full of cynicism, as many saw US military intervention in Vietnam as a direct blow to the commitment to great power coordination and global efforts to check unilateral use of force. When the upcoming presidential elections drove the Johnson administration to seek out the UN venue in an attempt to escape the quagmire of a losing cause in Vietnam, the UN shunned him. After being sidelined, UN officials were not sympathetic to the strategic concerns of a presidential reelection bid.51 US media coverage also changed its tone regarding the UN, particularly in the face of the Vietnam situation, at times advocating a unilateral path for the United States.52 Cold War politics and US actions in Vietnam undermined the credibility of the United Nations and the control of unilateral use of force—something Roosevelt and Truman had carefully fostered in the 1940s. Here we find a confluence of negative factors. Structurally, several things were going on within the UN. Bloc voting patterns in the General Assembly turned US influence from consistent to almost nonexistent. The Group of 77 (a caucusing group created in response to the Group of 7) formed the Non-Aligned Movement, calling for a “new international economic order,” which allowed the Soviets an opportunity to counter US influence.53 As Stephen Krasner pointed out, even with traditional Western European allies, the United States found cooperation through the UN strained. With lingering resentment from the Suez Canal crises, Great Britain held significant reservations toward multilateralism, and France refused to pay its allotted portion for the Congo operation. Adding to the tensions were criticisms of the organization from Portugal, Belgium, and South Africa. “Giving Them Hell at the UN” In the early 1970s, the UN faced a two-pronged crisis: a financial crisis and a crisis of credibility. Overt criticism of the UN came from another presidential candidate, when Richard Nixon proclaimed the United Nations “obsolete and inadequate.”54 Later, within the confines of the Oval Office, President Nixon proclaimed, “I’d just say to hell with the UN. What is it anyway? It’s a damned debating society. What good does it do? Very little. . . . They talk about hijacking, drugs, the challenges of modern society, and the rest of it is to give hell to the United States.”55 Reflecting this tone, the Nixon administration wanted a unilateral reduction in US financial contributions. In others areas, the United States appeared to flout international law. In just two examples, the United States purchased chrome from Rhodesia, despite a UN ban, and it placed a 10 percent import surcharge on dutiable imports that was prohibited by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements.56 At the UN’s

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twenty-fifth anniversary, President Nixon held a celebratory dinner paying tribute to the UN and its work; however, the tone was remarkably distinct from that of his predecessors. For Nixon, the UN’s utility was based simply on the rule of reason over the rule of force.57 Another black mark on UN credibility came as the Nixon administration tried to counter the Soviet threat by fostering closer relations with China. The White House, in its efforts to warm up to China and keep relations strong with Taiwan, pursued a rather contradictory and controversial policy. In 1971, President Nixon, under Henry Kissinger’s direction, established relations with Communist China. With these developments, George H. W. Bush (the US ambassador to the UN at the time) pushed for a “two China” policy at the UN, which advocated for the continued membership of Nationalist China as well as the admission of the People’s Republic of China. However, in an October 1971 General Assembly vote (76 to 35), Nationalist China was ejected from the UN, and the United States lost its campaign. The result was public outrage in the United States and a “tarnished American reputation for straightforwardness.”58 Thirty years before UN ambassador George H. W. Bush’s son, President George W. Bush, lambasted the UN as “ineffective,” 1971 newspapers penned the same accusation. One such article claimed that great powers declined to trust the UN with vital issues; middle powers and the newly independent states believed the UN “had failed them”; and the appointment of the Secretary-General was a search for “neutrality, blandness and inoffensiveness.”59 Ambassador Bush—in his dealings with the two-China issues, the rise of the G-77, and the fallout from Vietnam—was described as having his “finger in the dike” against a wave of anti-US sentiments coalescing in a UN voting bloc.60 Despite the barrage of attacks, there were cases of quiet multilateralism beneath the radar. Kissinger, long associated with security-centered realism, often pursued development issues at the UN and was a strong proponent of the Law of the Sea Treaty. He was also an advocate of a multilateral approach in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In this case, the United States relied heavily on the UN to deescalate the violence. Kissinger worked with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to construct a plan to send peacekeepers to monitor the Cairo-Suez border region. Despite the often-contentious negotiations, the United States and the USSR came to support the cease-fire agreement and created an emergency force (UNEF II) to oversee the truce. The plan brought back the UN observers, who had left the Suez Canal when the conflict had started, and prohibited great powers from contributing troops, in an effort to prevent any further escalation. In this case, the United States found that the UN was key in securing an end to the hostilities.61 As one observer noted, “Henry Kissinger then discovered this place [the UN] was a gold mine.”62 Although the UN was the primary venue for the negotiations, it is important to point out that throughout the deliberations, many

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other member-states in the Security Council perceived the discussions as merely bilateral—that is, between the United States and the Soviets.63 Congressional Condemnation The early 1970s marked a clear split in congressional support for the UN, with liberals and moderates remaining supportive, though without much enthusiasm, and a group of conservatives emerging as vocal critics. The China issue again fueled conservative voices; as Barry Goldwater proclaimed, “The time has come to cut off all financial help, withdraw as a member and ask the United Nations to find a headquarters location outside of the United States that is more in keeping with the philosophy of the majority of voting members, some place like Moscow or Peking.”64 There were also vocal critics within the Democratic Party as Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL) announced that the “proper solution is to get the United States out of the UN, and get the UN out of the United States.”65 In response to the expulsion of Nationalist China, many in the US Congress were furious, and a bipartisan coalition formed to cut funding to UN specialized agencies. Moreover, the US president and the US Permanent Mission to the UN were not exactly on the same page. In this case, we see a distinct split in US foreign policy, both between and within institutions, with White House policies toward China and congressional sentiment running in opposition to each other. These actions were not only damaging to the US reputation but also fueled domestic animosity toward the UN. The level of tension and mistrust peaked with the November 1975 passage of a UN General Assembly resolution declaring Zionism to be a form of racism. With a vote of 72 in favor to 35 opposed (32 countries abstained, and most Arab states and the Soviet Union voted in favor), the resolution shook the foundation of the US-UN relationship and provoked an angry outburst from the sitting US ambassador to the UN. Daniel Patrick Moynihan rebuked the General Assembly, stating that, “The United States does not acknowledge it, . . . will not abide by it, . . . will never acquiesce in this infamous act.”66 He went on to proclaim that the UN was a “dangerous place,” with the General Assembly containing a “tyranny of the new majority.”67 Henry Kissinger at the State Department attempted to moderate the tone, yet the public’s reaction to Moynihan’s rhetoric was extremely supportive.68 The January 26, 1976, edition of Time magazine featured a picture of Moynihan on its cover, with a caption reading, “Giving Them Hell at the UN.” The publicity triggered an outpouring of support for Moynihan, who was viewed as a political hero.69 His reaction was described as “patriotic indignation,” which gave a sense of American “justice and fair play”—something viewed as lacking at the UN. For the first time in history, the US ambassador directly responsible for interacting with the UN turned from a vocal advocate to a combative opponent. Moynihan proclaimed it was “time for the United States to go into the

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United Nations and every other international forum and start raising hell.”70 The Zionism resolution served as an American rallying cry against the UN; it brought together frustrations about declining US influence, the rise of the developing world, perceived Arab aggression, and relations with the USSR. As one observer wrote, “The fall of the UN in collective American esteem would be so complete and lasting, that it dulled American memories regarding how much faith so many of them once had in the UN before the 1970s.”71 In response to the Zionism resolution, Congress was quick to act, with both houses passing bills denouncing the UN resolution and with critics in both chambers calling for funding cuts and US withdrawal from the organization. The event also turned the US public against the UN; approval ratings of the UN fell to their lowest point ever. Although many at the UN believed that the Zionism resolution damaged the image of the UN, there were also those— both within the United States and among allies at the UN—who found that Moynihan’s condemnations threatened the very existence of the UN. Moynihan wrote in a Commentary article: The United States goes into opposition. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made little—nothing—of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about dazed that the world has changed. We toy with the idea of stopping it and getting off.72

Some credit Moynihan’s firestorm as the beginning of a neoconservative ideological orientation that called for the unapologetic defense of “American values and principals,” the absolute defense of Israel, a dogmatic rejection of communism, and a persistent view of the UN as hostile to US interests.73 Only a few years later, in fact, the Reagan administration picked up this rhetoric and policy orientation. Another important thread began to form along with labeling the UN as anti-Israeli—a narrative emerged that conflated Israeli governmental policies with Jewish national aspirations. The 1975 resolution became a turning point for Jewish movements to become increasingly active in the US political realm.74 Within the UN, however, many viewed the United States as being on the wrong side of the developing world’s biggest political concerns—specifically, the Palestinians and apartheid in South Africa. UN Bashing Makes Good Politics Combined, the Vietnam controversy, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the UN Secretary-General’s critiques of US policy resulted in declining US public approval of the UN. Ratings of the UN plummeted 25 points in three years, from 75 percent in 1964 to 50 percent in 1967.75 As indicated in Figure 4.1, from 1963 to 1970—a span of seven years—UN job approval ratings dropped almost 40 points, from 83 percent approval to 44 percent. For the next five

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Figure 4.1 US Public Opinion and the United Nations, 1951–1989

Sources: George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971, vol. I (New York: Random House, 1972); Alec Gallup, The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index: Public Opinion, 1935– 1997 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999).

years, there was another decline to a low of 32 percent in 1975, the same year the Zionism resolution was passed. It was during the 1970s that US politicians discovered that criticizing the UN was good for domestic politics. From this point on, several political leaders and political candidates took Moynihan’s lead and found that perpetuating anti-UN rhetoric helped garner domestic political support. One historian remarked on the utility of UN bashing for domestic political leverage: The Nixon presidency was the first US administration to recognize that there was a strong current of discontent in mainstream American society towards the United Nations, not just among the extreme right-wing organizations, such as the John Birch society, but among many average Americans—the socalled “Silent Majority.” What Nixon and his political advisers began to realize was that this discontent could be channeled into political domestic support. They also realized that US appointments to the United Nations could be valuable domestic political tools that could send a message to the US electorate.76

With declining support from the White House and Capitol Hill, the final group to give up support for the UN was the American public. Although public opinion was late in coming to the anti-UN table, once seated, it became firmly

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entrenched. This disdain from the public marks the beginning of a dangerous dynamic—that is, even when conditions are favorable for US multilateral collaboration within the United Nations, the domestic context (in particular, Congress and public opinion) does not provide the political space for an administration’s overt advocacy of the importance or utility of the UN. At the same time, the Nixon administration revealed that there was a gap between what the United States advocated in terms of international conduct and what it was actually practicing. The Carter Administration and the United Nations The Carter administration attempted to return to a more diplomatic tone with the UN. The Carter team shifted its approach and sought “a foreign policy that is consonant with the ideals of the United Nations.”77 However, the stage was already set within both the UN and the United States. This commitment did produce some success in that the number of multilateral treaties ratified by Congress between 1976 and 1980 was higher than at any other time in the previous seventy years (see Figure 4.2). Domestically, the US public held firm in its disapproval during the Carter administration, and there were few vocal supporters of the UN within the Figure 4.2 US Ratification of Multilateral Treaties, 1901–2010

Source: US Department of State, “Treaties in Force,” http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif. Note: The graph includes only treaties that were still in force as of 2000 and 2010 and, thus, may slightly undercount the number of treaties ratified in earlier decades.

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media or among members of Congress. As former UN ambassador under the Carter administration, Donald F. McHenry, explained, “As long as we’re in a go-it-alone, bilateral period, it is unlikely we’re going to use it [the UN] more.”78 One event in particular, before the 1980 presidential elections, highlights the interplay between the international and domestic dynamics, as well as the impact of the US-Israeli connection, on the US-UN relationship. In what appeared to be an administration blunder, the United States voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel for its settlement policies. The backlash against this move was severe within both Israel and the United States.79 In a presidential election year, the Carter administration quickly called the vote a mistake, arguing that the United States should have abstained. But by then, grave damage had already been done. According to an article in the Boston Globe, “Carter’s explanation was widely seen here as a panicked reaction to strong American Jewish condemnation of the vote and an attempt to win back Jewish votes in the Massachusetts primary.”80 The Reagan campaign was quick to accuse Carter as failing on a “moral imperative” to support Israel. That lack of support may have contributed to Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980—in the 1976 election, Carter held 67 percent of the Jewish vote, yet secured only 47 percent in 1980.81 Reagan and “Splendid Isolation” The Reagan administration marked a distinctly strained time in US-UN relations, as the nation’s posture again moved to hostility and the US ambassador to the UN adopted an openly aggressive stance. This tone was carried through in policy, leading to extensive cuts in UN funding and the actual withdrawal of the United States from a UN agency. After 1980, the United States repeatedly found itself in a clear minority—and often, a minority of one—as it denied UN concerns about a global population crisis and again rejected signing the Law of the Sea Treaty. The United States also cast the only vote against a World Health Organization provision to prevent the sale of infant formula to areas where its use could cause serious illness in infants when mixed with unclean water. For the first time in history, in a case regarding US involvement in Nicaragua, the United States refused International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction. The final move was the dramatic US withdrawal from UNESCO.82 This posture was also reflected in the multilateral treaty ratification numbers of the 1980s. Figure 4.2 illustrates a significant drop in Senate ratification of multilateral treaties, with a decline from 65 (between 1976 and 1980) to 37 (between 1981 and 1985). The Reagan appointee serving as US ambassador to the UN also reflected the conservative drift away from internationalism. Jeane Kirkpatrick, associated with the neoconservative faction within the Republican Party, built on Goldwater’s legacy and was part of a growing movement that regarded the United Nations as antagonistic to US interests. This view held that the UN was

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a propaganda machine for the Soviets and for radicals in the developing world. For Kirkpatrick, the pure numbers game in the General Assembly was insurmountable; the G-77 controlled the UN’s agenda, and the strength of the voting bloc would undermine every US initiative. As she explained: “The dominant ideology in the United Nations concerning economic regulation is a version of class war that has been developed by a kind of gross adaptation of Marxist categories to relations among nations.”83 She also claimed that there was “a kind of recognizable ‘iron triangle’ uniting nongovernmental organizations, third world representatives (particularly of the radical third world countries) and ideologically sympathetic international bureaucrats in quest of restrictive international health and safety regulations.”84 The United Nations, once a beacon of US values and power, was viewed as a collection of nations hostile to American interests. She also accused the UN of breeding “conflict extension, exacerbation and polarization.”85 Kirkpatrick’s views initiated a more public discussion on the UN’s overall utility. Some point to her time at the UN as the beginning of an active campaign to weaken and discredit the United Nations.86 Toward this effort, the attacks on the UN went beyond the diplomatic team and into civil society. During the early part of the 1980s, the Heritage Foundation began releasing reports on the destructive practices of the UN, including a paper titled, “How the UN Aids Marxist Guerrilla Groups.”87 In several reports, the UN was described as the “theatre of the absurd” and a “house of mirrors.”88 Relations at this point became so bad that, as one reporter described the situation, New York cab drivers, as a protest against UN condemnations of Israel, will often look the other way when they are hailed by people they suspect are UN diplomats. The mayor of New York City, Ed Koch, a critic of the UN, has withdrawn police protection for missions to the UN, ostensibly on financial grounds. Attacks in the US news media on alleged UN incompetence, bias, and fiscal mismanagement are rising in shrillness and intensity.89

When a minor controversy surfaced involving landing rights for Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, a US representative to the UN quipped that the UN should leave US soil and claimed that many Americans, as well as the staff of the US mission to the United Nations, “will be down at the dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail off into the sunset.”90 “Congress Out of Control” The toxic tone was obvious in Congress as well. The legislative branch followed the Reagan administration’s lead and passed punishing funding cuts of UN dues. These measures were accompanied by calls for weighted voting that would give more votes to those states contributing more in dues. In addition, the ideological orientation within the domestic political landscape meant that certain specialized UN agencies were purposely targeted. Funding for the

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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, was cut, reflecting the domestic controversy over abortion politics. In addition to the ideological split between the Reagan administration and much of the rest of the world were ongoing tensions within the administration, as neoconservatives pushed their social agenda forward in the UN. Yet, the story is more nuanced. The Reagan administration used Congress and its growing narratives about the UN as a bloated bureaucracy that wastes funds as leverage for reforms at the UN. In response to Kirkpatrick’s testimony to Congress about a lack of accountability in the UN, many in Congress also attempted to push forward initiatives to reform the UN system—in particular, its budgetary policy.91 Framing the UN as a place where the United States was subject to “taxation without representation,” the administration cut its UN funding request for assessed contributions, as well as voluntary contributions. The Kassebaum-Solomon amendment came out of this congressional reform initiative and slashed UN funds, and it highlighted the impact of domestic politics on the UN.92 Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-KS) claimed that “budget fat in the United Nations bureaucracy” provoked the need for her resolution cutting $42 million in funding.93 The amendment required a 20 percent reduction to regularly assessed dues, pending reform of the one-state, one-vote process to a more weighted voting system based on a country’s contributions. In an interesting stipulation, the amendment required the State Department to report on the level of vote coordination with other countries in the General Assembly to members of Congress. In some cases, the reporting on UN vote coordination (also referred to as vote coincidence) spilled over into US bilateral relations with other countries. Thus, rather than providing the United States with further opportunities for cooperation and leadership, the amendment provided a mechanism to identify those countries that were not cooperating with the US and to consider punitive measures.94 Congress found the UN an appealing target. For many, starving the UN served both political and fiscal goals. At one point Robert Dole (R-KS) proclaimed that the UN needed “to get off welfare and onto workfare.”95 In response, Edward Luck, in a New York Times article, declared that, “Congress is out of control.”96 Similarly, Representative Jim Leach (R-IA) explained that both political parties at the time had found “belittling” the UN politically appealing and argued that the Reagan administration is playing both ends . . . with statesmanlike speeches on the one hand and feeding the appetite of the political right on the other, indulging the get-theUS-out-of-the-UN syndrome. . . . This Administration uses the UN for strictly propaganda, and in 40 years I’ve never seen more neglect of the UN’s principles than these people show.97

The 1980s marked an end to the reliable financial relationship with the UN. In 1985, the Congress neglected to appropriate the fully assessed dues. In

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another move that proved devastating to the UN, the United States began to make its payments to the regular UN budget in October, even though assessed payments are due on January 31. The lag time in US payments forced the UN into a persistent cash flow crisis. These financial coercions were felt at the UN; by 1986, the UN Secretary-General reported that things were so bad that “it is not clear whether the United Nations will remain solvent throughout the remainder of the year.”98 In response to congressional pressures, the General Assembly created a nineteen-member High-Level Group to assess the efficiency of the UN. The group produced several recommendations, including a consensus-based budgeting process. Public Opinion In terms of public opinion, the negative rhetoric in Washington and New York translated into fading public support for the UN. In 1980, only 31 percent of the public surveyed indicated that the UN was doing a “good job” and 53 percent registered a “poor job” assessment (see Figure 4.1).99 The numbers softened a bit after that; by 1985, the “good job” evaluation rose seven points and the “poor job” ratings fell almost nine points. The 1980 polling numbers were the lowest recorded until 2006. Yet, despite the barrage of verbal attacks from the policy elite, public support for general US membership remained strong. A New York Times/CBS News Poll in September 1983 found that 89 percent of those surveyed wanted the United States to retain its membership in the UN, and 65 percent did not want the UN to leave the United States. It is interesting to note that by September 1983, Reagan’s approval ratings were also quite low, with a 47 percent disapproval rating for the administration’s conduct in foreign policy.100 Here we begin to see a compounding dynamic in which problems at the UN push away the United States, while, at the same time, dynamics within the United States push away the UN. According to Kurt Waldheim (SecretaryGeneral during the Reagan years), “It is not the organization that doesn’t work, but the attitude of governments toward the United Nations which creates the difficulties in the UN and world affairs right now.”101 In response to the torrent of condemnations on the UN from the Reagan administration, one UN official claimed, “If the US weakens this institution, it won’t be there when they need it.”102 The dynamics were so dysfunctional, the US withdrew from a UN organization, as discussed below, and UNESCO became a symbol of contentious relations. UNESCO and the “Den of Hostility” Since the inception of UNESCO, the United States has been slow to take to the idea of it, perceiving it as largely a European organization with communist tendencies. In this light, UNESCO became embroiled in Cold War politics— as the United States became focused on blocking Soviet influence within the

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organization.103 In terms of human rights, although UNESCO’s policy stances and pursuits were often in line with US policy preferences, the Reagan administration accused UNESCO of politicizing programs and of poor budgeting and management practices. Roger Coate explains, “Administration officials were frustrated at the inability to use UNESCO—and, indeed, the United Nations more generally—effectively as an instrument of US foreign policy.”104 UNESCO’s plan to create a New World Information and Communication Order also raised concerns within the United States that included “sensational and distorted” allegations of corruption and antidemocratic voices.105 As the United States disengaged from deliberations within the agency, the rhetoric and perception of UNESCO as a cohort of hostile nations hardened. Again, the administration adopted a reactive and negative approach. In December 1984, the United States withdrew its membership from the organization. Coate argued that the ultimate target of the Reagan administration’s withdrawal from UNESCO was the UN itself.106 In the 1980s, US disinterest in the UN evolved into isolation and then antagonism. In addition to his stance on UNESCO, Reagan also lambasted the ICJ and refused the “compulsory jurisdiction” that had been accepted by all of his predecessors in terms of the US mining of Nicaragua’s harbors to block the supply lines of the Sandinistas. The Reagan administration’s isolation from the UN is also evident in its voting record in the Security Council, where it issued thirty-one vetoes during its eight years—more than any other US administration in the history of the UN. The attacks on the UN continued to find traction as evidence of waste, corruption, and scandal trickled out. In response to such evidence, the Senate cut $500 million in US contributions to the UN. The negative rhetoric also seeped into the halls of the Capitol Building and into the minds of many Americans. From Kirkpatrick forward, conservatives within the Republican Party continued to view the UN as a hostile organization hosting spies, terrorists, and rogue states. The anti-UN posture became a cornerstone of what some describe as an “evangelical streak in American foreign policy.”107 With the US invasion of Grenada and military operations in Libya and Lebanon, the Reagan administration moved outside the circle of multilateralism. Reagan 2.0 Multilateral Moments Yet, the Reagan administration also marked the beginning of an interesting dynamic—the rhetoric from a US administration about the UN did not reflect the actual levels of US engagement at the UN. Despite all of the UN bashing, there were times, even in the administration’s early years, when Reagan’s team sought the UN’s assistance. After the 1981 Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, for instance, the UN provided both access and opportunity for negotiations with Iraq. With Secretary-General Waldheim serving as intermediary,

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the talks produced a council resolution with unanimous support. One news report found that the Security Council actions “demonstrated that the world organization can serve as an instrument of American foreign policy. . . . Washington can create majorities there too.”108 The administration also found utility in the UN during the summer of 1981, when it attempted to broker a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Special Envoy Philip C. Habib tried to convince Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to lay down arms; yet, the Reagan administration had to rely on Secretary-General Waldheim and Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart to secure a cease-fire agreement from the PLO. In Reagan’s second term, several factors led to a warming in the US-UN relationship. First, the ideological push from the neoconservatives lessened when Jeane Kirkpatrick left her post in early 1985 amid speculation that her posturing did not reflect the preferences of the more moderate White House and State Department. With her departure, criticism waned, and the Reagan administration found that the United Nations provided important traction on several issues—in particular, Lebanon. The administration also discreetly hushed other vocal opponents in the administration (i.e., Alan L. Keyes, the assistant secretary of state for international organizations). Also in 1985, with US hostages taken in Lebanon, the UN invoked the Geneva Conventions and offered its assistance. Another factor was Mikhail Gorbachev’s change of policy orientation within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev initiated a series of domestic reforms and changed from the aggressive posturing of his predecessors, thus warming relations between the United States and the USSR. An additional factor thawing US-UN relations came when a new Secretary-General took office. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar began several efforts to counter the perception of waste and bloated bureaucracy by initiating staffing and budget reforms. By 1987, the Reagan administration’s tone and approach toward the UN were considerably more supportive. UN peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon were particularly important in stabilizing that area and securing both Israeli and US interests. The UN presence there was valuable; as a New York Times article pointed out, “UNIFIL [the UN Interim Force in Lebanon] has a ‘reassuring and tranquilizing effect’ on the local population.”109 Yet, despite Reagan’s about-face, Congress was entrenched and refused to fund UNIFIL. In a moment that underlines the power of the domestic political situation on US-UN relations, members of the State Department were advising foreign ambassadors to take their appeals for payment of promised US support of UNIFIL to Congress.110 This unusual moment broke with diplomatic practice. Reagan’s attacks on the UN had backfired, and Congress declined to see the strategic value that the UN brought to places such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Kashmir, and the Iran-Iraq War. In addition, despite problems in the General Assembly, Congress seemed blind to the contributions of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children’s Emergency

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Fund (UNICEF). Thus, what made good domestic politics proved to be damaging international politics. Despite a reputation for aggressive unilateral posturing, there are moments in the Reagan administration where a multilateral approach through the UN was pursued. In discussions about the US contributions to the UN operation in Lebanon, Reagan remarked in 1988, “We’re very definitely a part of the United Nations.”111 The 1988 ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide presents another place of collaboration. Reagan advocated for its ratification in 1984, even though conservative critics at the time argued that he was pandering to “internationalists” prior to the presidential election.112 In his second term, Reagan recommitted to funding the UN, claiming that the administration’s fiscal pressures were effective in bringing about a reform of UN budgeting practices.113 The US refusal to pay dues had led the UN into the biggest financial crisis of its existence, and in 1986, Reagan signaled that he would appeal to Congress to pay its UN dues. In 1988, Reagan called on the State Department to create a multiyear plan for paying its $520 million debt (including funding for specialized agencies— specifically, the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization). The justification for the renewed funds was credited as a response to Pérez de Cuéllar’s reform efforts and the UN’s creation of the Committee for Programme and Coordination of the United Nations, which was framed as providing the United States and other larger donor states with elevated power over the UN budget. The domestic politics created by separate branches of government exacerbated US-UN relations. When the Reagan administration called for an increase in UN funding, Congress was not inclined to cooperate. In addition, although tensions between the administration and leadership at the UN were smoothed out later in Reagan’s term, member-states within the UN General Assembly were reluctant to implement reforms without assurances that congressional funding would actually come through. Likewise, Congress would not issue funds without proof that reforms were implemented at the UN. Therefore, despite the Reagan administration’s return to multilateralism in the twilight of his term, the hostility toward the organization solidified, especially for certain factions within Congress and a sector within US conservatives. For many in the United States, UN bashing had become a national pastime. International Dynamics and Domestic Politics: The Cold War Chill in US-UN Relations The politics of the Cold War went far beyond a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the international context was one in which geopolitical interests dominated, with little consideration of shared risk, or any need for collaborative policymaking. The United States, consumed by

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concerns of Soviet expansionism, intervened in Latin American, Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe, with little sense of the parameters of international law. As the Soviets meddled in North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, and Cuba, the struggle between the two superpowers became a global conflict. Political opportunity structures were closed, and normative orientations were pessimistic. Cold War dynamics played out in the UN, as well, as competing views and economic systems effectively shut down progress on development—even human rights discussions were polarizing. As UN membership grew, this polarization created problems for operating within the UN system, as its increased membership favored the developing world. As Stephen Krasner highlighted, in the United Nations, the developing world found a common voice with a coherent agenda. The unity among the developing member-states transformed many of the organization’s institutions into arenas for the North-South conflict. As Krasner wrote: “If the United Nations had not existed, it would have been impossible for the Third World to articulate a general program for altering international regimes.”114 These institutional factors were combined with the aforementioned declining morale and allegations of corruption.115 As the decades progressed, the voting blocs within the General Assembly became more and more entrenched. The Palestinian issue, combined with efforts to marginalize Israel in the General Assembly, also contributed to the declining relationship. Yet, thawing relations between the United States and the USSR during the Gorbachev era began nudging the Reagan administration back to the UN. Some of the drift away from multilateralism had been, in part, a result of politics in the UN but also, in part, a result of changes within the United States. As this chapter explains, the rise of neoconservatism—expressed through the voices of Moynihan and Kirkpatrick—revealed a growing ideological split between factions within the United States and the UN.116 The national rhetoric moved to a position that viewed the UN as not only flawed and cumbersome but also dangerous. At the domestic level, the national discourse rejected the UN’s utility and framed it as a den of hostile nations. Under both the Nixon and Reagan administrations, there was open hostility for the UN. The official government language moved from benign neglect—sprinkled with occasional statements about corruption and antiquation—to blatant opposition, with efforts to undermine UN capacities and calls for withdrawal. The policies followed the rhetoric, with the United States cutting funding and moving into the minority within the UN. In the end, this position undermined the nation’s ability to engage, as UN delegations and staff found working with the United States a prickly endeavor. As traditional US allies were also shunned, diplomatic goodwill eroded. Together, this erosion undermined the foundation for other multilateral endeavors. In many regards, Roger Coate’s observations about US relations with UNESCO hold for the general

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patterns in US-UN relations: “When American needs and interests were clearly articulated and US officials actively engaged in the decision processes of the organization, policy outcomes were largely satisfactory.”117 However, within the United States during the 1970s and 1980s (outside of the Carter years), there was consensus between policy elites, both in the White House and Congress, regarding the diminished value and capacity of the UN. This disparaging tone held lasting consequences. Public opinion followed suit, with the US public becoming disillusioned with the UN in the 1970s and continuing for the next two decades. Gallup’s “good job” numbers would not rise to over 50 percent for another fifteen years. The historical milieu shaped by the late 1960s and 1970s solidified neoconservative views that persist to this day. The more extreme perception was that the UN was damaging to US strategic interests, while the more mainstream perspective viewed the UN as feeble and incapable of responding to international threats to peace and security. Even when the United States needed to engage in multilateralism through the UN framework, it was difficult to do so. Many Americans were convinced that the organization was corrupt and weak. For US leaders, there was little political space to publically value the UN. In terms of the conditional multilateralism framework presented in Chapter 2, the international context and institutional dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s were largely unfavorable to cooperation. Cold War politics, changes in UN membership, and the rise of opposition voices from conservative factions in the United States tarnished the early sheen of optimism and commitment to the UN. Within the United States, the late 1960s presented the headwaters of what would emerge as a reoccurring narrative rejecting the UN. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the confluence of three factors impeded multilateralism: first, the ideological orientation of members of the Reagan administration (and hardline tactics from people such as Jeane Kirkpatrick); second, complex international dynamics (in particular, issues regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, and the split of the Arab world); and third, the lightning-rod challenges of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 1. “Quincy to Stage Public Celebration of ‘United Nations Day,’” Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 1945; Donald O. J. Messenger, “United Nations Week Beckons NE Folk to Aid World Order,” Christian Science Monitor, September 16, 1946; Nancy MacLennan, “UN Assembly Will Meet Here Sept. 23, Lie Confirms,” New York Times, September 5, 1946. 2. Robert W. Hill Jr., ed., Tennyson’s Poetry (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971). 3. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, cited in Gregory G. Holyk, “United States Leaders and Public Support for Multilateralism” (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2008), 24. 4. George Gallup, “Gallup Finds People Want UN Backed: Strong Mandate of Voters Seen for Next President,” Los Angeles Times, November 27, 1952, 16.

Notes

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5. Joe Byrnes Sills, ed., “Public Attitudes Toward the UN” (Washington, DC: Committee on Foreign Relations, 1977). 6. George Gallup, “US Faith in the United Nations Remains Unshaken,” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1961. 7. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol. I (New York: Random House, 1972), 612. 8. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 9. US House of Representatives, “Problems of World War II and Its Aftermath” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 15. 10. Ibid., 15. 11. “Middle East and Vietnam,” Boston Globe, March 26, 1968. 12. “The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto,” Security Council Report (November 2013). 13. Global Policy Forum, “Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council” (2008), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102 -tables-and-charts/32810-changing-patterns-in-the-use-of-the-veto-in-the-securitycouncil.html. 14. Francis O. Wilcox, “The United States and the United Nations,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 336 (1961): 119. 15. H. G. Nicholas, “The United Nations in Crisis,” International Affairs 41, no. 3 (1965): 443. 16. Lincoln Bloomfield, The United Nations and US Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 4. 17. Roger S. Whitcomb, The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1998), 282. 18. Ronda Hauben, “The Role of the UN in the Unending Korean War: ‘United Nations Command’ as Camouflage,” Global Research (2013). 19. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 334. 20. Hans Kohn, “Nationalism and the United Nations,” in The United States and the United Nations, ed. Franz B. Gross (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 31. 21. H. Field Haviland, “The United States and the United Nations,” International Organization 19, no. 3 (1965). 22. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol. II, 1028; National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, cited in Holyk, “United States Leaders and Public Support for Multilateralism,” 3. 23. Louis B. Fleming, “Goldberg Seeks Strong Support in Congress,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 1965, H24. 24. Henry M. Jackson and Harlan Cleveland, “Do We Rely Too Much on the UN?” New York Times, April 1, 1962, 206. 25. Thomas J. Hamilton, “US Plan Vetoed,” New York Times, December 19, 1961. 26. Peter Kihss, “Tshombe Support Rises in Congress,” New York Times, December 15, 1961, 1. 27. “Sen. Byrd Fights US Purchase of UN Bonds,” Boston Globe, January 7, 1962. 28. “The UN Question,” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 1962. 29. John F. Kennedy, “State of the Union 1962” (papers of John F. Kennedy, presidential papers, President’s Office Files, 1962). 30. Fred M. Hechinger, “UNESCO Is Target of New Attacks,” New York Times, January 1, 1962. 31. Robert C. Albright, “Republicans Fretting over Future of Party,” Washington Post, March 4, 1962.

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32. “UN Flag Is Removed: Mayor of Northampton Cites ‘Conflicting Ideologies,’” New York Times, January 23, 1962. 33. “What Good Is the UN?” New York Times, March 23, 1962. 34. William McPherson, “UN Makes World Less Red, Less Dead,” Washington Post, April 12, 1962. 35. Richard Bergholz, “Goldwater’s Record Reported in Detail,” Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1963. 36. “Goldwater Urges US Stay in UN,” Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 1963, 10. 37. Julian Hartt, “Stevenson Sees UN Reversal by Goldwater,” Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1964. 38. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol. III, 1853. 39. Ibid., 1954. 40. George Gallup, “Survey Shows Most People Approve UN,” Los Angeles Times, November 29, 1963. 41. Kihss, “Tshombe Support Rises in Congress.” 42. William S. White, “Taft, Goldwater Parallel Obvious,” Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1963. 43. “Republicans for the UN,” New York Times, July 16, 1966. 44. “Middle East and Vietnam,” 14. 45. “Rep. Rivers Assails Thant on Vietnam,” Washington Post, January 13, 1967, A6. 46. Edward Luck, Mixed Messages (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 109. 47. Godfrey Hodgson, “The Establishment,” Foreign Policy 10 (1973). 48. Louis B. Fleming, “Goldberg Expands Information at UN,” Washington Post, Octocber 9, 1966. 49. Arthur Goldberg, “US Self-Interest Dictated Support for the UN,” Los Angeles Times, September 15, 1968, K2. 50. James J. Kilpatrick, “Why Does Uncle Sucker Even Stay in the UN?” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1970. 51. James Reston, “United Nations: The Challenge of Philosophy,” New York Times, September 24, 1967. 52. “Vietnam and the UN,” New York Times, November 18, 1967; Darius Jhabvala, “Vietnam Issue Revival Considered Futile in UN,” Boston Globe, August 10, 1967. 53. The Group of 7 (G-7) was created in 1975 with Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States to promote economic cooperation and coordination. 54. Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–76 vol. I (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003). 55. Richard Nixon, “Conversation Between Nixon and McConaughy,” Nixon Presidential Material, Presidential Tape Recordings (Washington, DC: National Archives, 1971). 56. “United States and World Law,” New York Times, November 9, 1971. 57. It is interesting to note that at the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration, the Nixon White House initially intended to invite only men; after much criticism, invitations were extended to a few women. See Marie Smith, “Tipping the Crystal to Mark UN’s 25th Year: UN’s Anniversary,” Washington Post, July 11, 1970. 58. Robert S. Elegant, “US Didn’t Really Lose When UN Voted to Admit Peking, Expel Taiwan,” Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1971, C10.

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59. Hella Pick, “United Nations: A Steady Drift of Ineffectiveness,” Los Angeles Times, October 31, 1971, F2. 60. Marquis Childs, “George Bush at the UN: His Finger in the Dike,” Washington Post, December 8, 1972. 61. Kathleen Teltsch, “Kissinger Hopeful of a Syrian Pact,” New York Times, January 28, 1974. 62. Bernard D. Nossiter, “Questioning the Value of the United Nations,” New York Times, April 11, 1982, 16. 63. Kathleen Teltsch, “Action by Council: Unit Will Be Made Up of Soldiers from Smaller Nations,” New York Times, October 26, 1973. 64. John Finney, “Sentiment Developing in Congress to Reduce Financial Support to UN,” New York Times, October 27, 1971, 16. 65. S. J. Micciche, “Congress Thunders Threats of Financial Cuts,” Boston Globe, October 27, 1971. 66. Daniel P. Moynihan, “Speech to the United Nations General Assembly,” Congressional Record (Washington, DC: US Senate, 2001). 67. Patrick Moynihan and Suzanne Weaver, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). 68. Moynihan and Kissinger did not agree on the reaction and the approach; this may have resulted in Moynihan leaving the post as US ambassador. Michael Novak, “Plumbing the Moynihan-Kissinger Rift,” Wall Streeet Journal, March 3, 1976. 69. “A Fighting Irishman at the UN,” Time, January 26, 1976. 70. James M. Naughton, “Ford Pledges to Resist the Third World in the UN,” New York Times, July 1, 1975, 3. 71. Gil Troy, Moynihan’s Moment: America’s Fight Against Zionism as Racism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 182. 72. Daniel P. Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition,” Commentary 59, no. 3 (1975). 73. Troy, Moynihan’s Moment; John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” New York Times Magazine, February 19, 2006. 74. Troy, Moynihan’s Moment. 75. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, vol. I. 76. Edward C. Keefer, “The Nixon Administration and the United Nations: ‘It’s a Damned Debating Society,’” in 8e Conference Internationale Des Editeurs De Documents Diplomatiques, ed. Gabriel Robin (Oxford: European Interuniversity Press, 2008), 2 77. Jimmy Carter, “Address Before the UN General Assembly,” March 17, 1977, http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207272.htm. 78. Nossiter, “Questioning the Value of the United Nations,” 16. 79. George F. Will, “‘Accidental’ UN Vote: Yet Another Carter Blunder,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 10, 1980. 80. “The Israeli Government Yesterday Spurned the Diplomatic Olive Branch Offered by President Jimmy Carter,” Boston Globe, March 5, 1980, 1. 81. “Carter Post-Mortem: Debate Hurt but Wasn’t Only Cause for Defeat,” New York Times, November 9, 1980. 82. Ibid. 83. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Global Paternalism: The UN and the New International Regulatory Order,” Regulation 7, no. 1 (1983): 18. 84. Ibid., 21.

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85. Nossiter, “Questioning the Value of the United Nations,” 16. 86. Louis Wiznitzer, “Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick Ruffles UN Diplomats,” Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 1981, 10. 87. Thomas G. West, “How the U.N. Aids Marxist Guerrilla Groups,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 1982. 88. Juliana Geran Pilon, “Through the Looking Glass: The Political Culture of the UN,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, August 30, 1982. 89. David Winder, “United Nations Tries to Put Its House in Order,” Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 1982. 90. Francis Clines, “For UN at 40, Mixed Message from Reagan,” New York Times, September 17, 1985, A1. 91. Elaine Sciolino, “Kassebaum Bill Has UN Worried,” New York Times, October 6, 1985. 92. Congress also blocked funding of several UN programs based on political goals. These included the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, the West Africa People’s Organization, and funding for building a conference center in Ethiopia. In addition, in response to the resolution on Zionism and racism, Congress cut funding of the UN’s Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination program. 93. Clines, “For UN at 40, Mixed Message from Reagan.” 94. See T. Y. Wang, “US Foreign Aid and UN Voting,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999). 95. Paul Lewis, “State Dept. Promise of Emergency Funds for UN Provokes Dispute,” New York Times, December 1, 1987, A15. 96. Elaine Sciolino, “Reagan, in Switch, Will Bolster UN by Seeking Funds,” New York Times, September 14, 1986. 97. Clines, “For UN at 40, Mixed Message from Reagan.” 98. Elaine Sciolino, “Washington Talks: State Department; to Envoys: Go Directly to Congress,” New York Times, November 17, 1987. 99. Alec Gallup, The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 251. 100. David Shribman, “Foreign Policy Costing Reagan Public Support,” New York Times, September 30, 1983. 101. Michael McDowell, “UN Hindered, Waldhein Says,” The Globe and Mail, October 28, 1982. 102. Nossiter, “Questioning the Value of the United Nations,” 16. 103. Roger Coate, Unilateralism, Ideology, and US Foreign Policy: The United States In and Out of UNESCO (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988). 104. Roger Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO,” in The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence, ed. Margaret P. Karns and Karen Mingst (Boston: Unwim Hyman, 1990), 246. 105. William Preston, Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller, Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO, 1945–1985 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 106. Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict.” 107. David K. Shipler, “Sudden Gusts; Reagan Faces a New Diplomatic Climate,” New York Times, September 27, 1987. 108. Bernard D. Nossiter, “Look Who’s Talking to Whom at the UN,” New York Times, June 21, 1981, 2. 109. Sciolino, “Washington Talks.” 110. Ibid.

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111. Terence Hunt, “Reagan: US Won’t Leave Lebanon Observer Group,” The Telegraph, February 20, 1988. 112. Bernard Gwertzman, “Reagan Will Submit 1948 Genocide Pace for Senate Approval,” New York Times, September 6, 1984. 113. Don Shannon, “Reagan Releases UN Payments: Cites Fiscal Reforms, Peace Role; $188 Million Promised by Oct. 1,” Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1988. 114. Krasner, Structural Conflict, 8. 115. Although the developing world did hold a clear numerical majority, some argue that the rhetoric of a monopoly by the Third World is often an exaggeration. Factions within the developing world often emerge, and like most political associations, there were spectrums of radicals on both ends, with moderates making up the majority. When the rhetoric and posturing became too extreme, many in the developing world peeled off and did not support radical initiatives. See Winder, “United Nations Tries to Put Its House in Order.” 116. Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism. 117. Coate, “Changing Patterns of Conflict,” 241.

5 The 1990s: “The United Nations Has Become Fashionable Again” The 1990s presented a key decade that began with a “second honeymoon” of renewed US commitment to the UN and multilateral engagement.1 This era marks a period of restored optimism in the US-UN relationship as it emerged from its Cold War paralysis. Both the Soviets and the United States found new value in the organization, and by taking up the mantle of peacekeeping, the UN reestablished its relevance. As one reporter remarked, “The United Nations has become fashionable again.”2 Yet, over the course of ten years, after the fallout from tragedies in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo (to name a few), the millennium ended with openly hostile rhetoric from both the White House and members of Congress. It was during this time that leaders from both sides of the political spectrum began a dysfunctional cycle of UN bashing that ultimately reflected and undermined public and congressional support of the organization and decreased the appeal of multilateralism. The 1990s presents a mixed bag of cases in US-UN relations. The chapter traces the waxing and waning dynamics (including a focus on the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo) and highlights not only moments of success but also the growing decline in relations. Once again, the conditional multilateralism model informs the discussion, as it draws attention to the roles of Congress, public opinion, lobbying groups, and the normative context. During this period, the domestic political environment became more relevant and, at times, dictated the qualities of the US-UN relationship. Domestic views that opposed the UN hardened and supporters found it more difficult to advocate for the organization. Multilateral Agendas and President George H. W. Bush The first Bush administration is credited with a return to institutional liberalism. The US policies associated with the Persian Gulf War illustrate this view as the administration embraced multilateralism in its policy formation and 95

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used the United Nations Security Council as an important foreign policy tool in both Somalia and Iraq. Much of this progress in multilateralism was the result of the international context. As described in the preceding chapter, by the late 1980s, the dynamics of the bipolar system that had so paralyzed the UN were in flux. Mikhail Gorbachev ended the Soviet pattern of using the UN to counter US power.3 In addition, the developing world alliances that had dominated the General Assembly for two decades began to take a more pragmatic approach, alliances shifted, and the persistent blame on the developed world was a less prevalent narrative. The debt crisis in the developing world also prompted leaders from those countries to tone down their anti-Western rhetoric and pursue less radical solutions. The UN played a significant role in several conflicts at the time, including the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, mediation of an end to the Iran-Iraq War, and a dramatic increase in peacekeeping operations. The fluidity of the time opened the political opportunity structures for both a meaningful and a rhetorical embrace of the UN. “A United Nations That Performs as Envisioned by Its Founders” In August 1990, when 100,000 Iraqi troops invaded neighboring Kuwait, the United States deemed it a threat not only to its own strategic interests but also to regional stability and appealed to the United Nations for help in dealing with Iraq. President George H. W. Bush (former US ambassador to the UN under Nixon, 1970–1973) saw a central role for the organization: “We’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders. We owe much to the outstanding leadership of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. The United Nations is backing up its words with action.”4 The president’s words proved to be more than rhetorical. By working through the Security Council, Bush secured both a legal foundation and multilateral logistical and financial support for the 1991 Persian Gulf War, setting the stage for a robust, albeit conditional, commitment to multilateralism. Despite voices in the administration (i.e., National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft) that were prepared to go into Iraq without a UN endorsement, Secretary of State James Baker took a hands-on approach and was active in the negotiations at the UN, courting votes from Security Council members.5 The UN Security Council (UNSC)—with a rare agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—responded to Iraq’s aggression by passing a dozen resolutions. The high point came in November 1990, with UNSC Resolution 678, authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This was a moment of rare consensus; even Cuba supported most of the resolutions. After what was hailed as one of the most successful military campaigns in US history, the Persian Gulf War ended during the last week of February 1991.

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The operation was deemed a success particularly in terms of financial cost and troop burden sharing.6 As David Lake described the situation, the United States “successfully induced others to contribute to an extent seldom witnessed in international relations.”7 The troop contributions were multinational, with almost forty countries making some form of donation, including an impressive 60,000 troops from Saudi Arabia, 43,000 from the UK, and 20,000 from Egypt.8 With more than 500,000 military personnel, the US troop presence was twice that of any other state. In addition, the coalition paid for all but $6 billion of the $60 billion cost of the war.9 The Persian Gulf War provides a great example of a three-level game, as the progress at the UN leveraged domestic support. Congress did authorize the use of force, but only after the initial US deployment of 200,000 troops. Several observers note, “Once the UN Security Council had set an ultimatum for Iraqi withdrawal, Congress could not refuse to authorize force without badly undercutting US credibility.”10 At first glance, the Persian Gulf War appears to be an ideal case study of US multilateralism through the UN. Fourteen countries contributed more than a thousand troops, and seventeen other states provided military personnel to a UNSC-authorized operation. Many proclaimed it a symbol of a “new world order,” with Soviet-US hostilities at an end and the Security Council freed to preserve international peace and stability. However, this case actually presents yet another example in which the rhetoric of US leaders did not necessarily fit the actual levels of engagement. Implementation of the operation is more appropriately described as US unilateralism shrouded in international legitimacy. As Robert Hunter, a member of the National Security Council under Jimmy Carter, explained, “There’s been a facade of multilateralism, . . . but in practice it’s an American thing.”11 Another observer described the operation as “a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States.”12 Still another rejected the multilateral frame: Despite claims to the contrary, this war in the Gulf is not a UN war. . . . Yes, the Security Council did say that force could be used by the coalition forces, but the UN has absolutely no say in deciding when and how this force should be used—or when it should cease.13

As in the Korean War, the United States exercised a monopoly over command and control of the military operation. Thus, this poster child for US multilateralism is rather shallow. To see this, it is helpful to bifurcate multilateralism through the UN and make a distinction between the UN as an actor and the UN as a venue for state coordination. In terms of working with other states, the UN was an effective venue for multilateralism. However, in terms of working with the UN itself, the United States did not effectively engage the organization as an independent actor.

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Returning to the spectrum of multilateralism presented in Chapter 2 and to a more nuanced measure, once US forces were committed, the UN was relegated to observer status. One scholar claimed that the United States marginalized Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and forced him to act as a “file clerk and messenger boy.”14 Thompson argued that the Bush administration was not motivated by either the need for burden sharing or a commitment to upholding international law. He claimed that the multinational coalition was actually a “burden” that interfered with US military maneuvers and undermined strategic advantages.15 In terms of the rationale for going to the UN, the administration had concerns that unilateralism would provoke problems with the Soviets and with the developing world. The administration hoped that UN authorization would avoid triggering terrorist attacks against the United States.16 Secretary of State Baker explained that “our strategy beyond the merits was to point out that we had taken our case to the United Nations, traditionally a haven for the world’s have-nots, instead of striking out alone.”17 The case of the Persian Gulf War is an impressive example of policy adoption and multilateral diplomacy in that the United States was able to convince the Soviet Union, France, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and many other key players of the utility of use of force against Iraq and of the legitimacy authorized by the UN Security Council.18 The war presents an example of what it takes to accomplish even thin multilateralism through the UN system, as the United States engaged in considerable arm twisting with the Soviet Union, China, Colombia, and three African states.19 According to Bush and Scowcroft: Building an international response led us immediately to the United Nations, which could provide a cloak of acceptability to our efforts and mobilize world opinion. . . . Iraq provided us the opportunity to invigorate the powers of the Security Council and test how well it could contribute. We were, however, unsure of the council’s usefulness in a new role, . . . and we opposed allowing the UN to organize and run a war. It was important to reach out to the rest of the world, but even more important to keep the strings of control tightly in our hands.20

At the end of the conflict, the UN was revitalized by the US operation. In a statement to the nation, Bush declared, “This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, and for what is right.”21 James Baker and the administration found that the UN was perhaps more important after the war, in assisting with weapons inspection and economic sanctions, as the United States could not legitimately conduct weapons inspections and monitor Iraq’s military capacities.22 The result was a strengthening of UN capacities.23 It is during this time and with the successes of the Persian Gulf that the US president proclaimed the virtues of the United Nations system:

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Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. . . . A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.24

The Persian Gulf War marks a high point in US-UN relations, with the optimism about UN capacities returning to the American electorate. Iraq and Providing Comfort: An Unprecedented Intervention Institutional changes in the early 1990s marked an increase in both the UN agenda and expectations of its utility.25 Within the UN Charter, Chapter VII grants the Security Council the authority to determine specific threats to international peace and stability and to authorize the use of force and other mechanisms to “restore international peace and security.” During this period, the scope of those activities increased and included operations authorized under Chapter VII of the charter. Such operations include “peace enforcement” missions, or operations that include council-authorized actions employing coercive measures and enforcing a cease-fire or peace agreement. Somalia, Iraq, and Bosnia all saw military operations under UN auspices. In addition, the international normative and legal environment were changing, with the growing expectations of an international obligation to protect civilians from mass atrocities, and even in some cases bypass state sovereignty. The passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688 in 1991—authorizing use of force in northern Iraq for the protection of the Kurds—set a legal precedent and opened up the expectation that the use of force could be appropriate for protecting human security. Within weeks of the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, as the United States was pulling out of the region, Kurds in northern Iraq began an uprising against the government of Baghdad. It started when a handful of Kurds seized a military base and took control of the northern city of Erbil. This action accompanied another uprising in the city of Raniyah, when several Kurdish military personnel defected from the Iraqi army. On March 29, 1991, Saddam Hussein launched an air attack on Kirkuk, and Iraqi helicopter artillery and napalm quickly silenced the Kurdish rebellion. Memories of the 1988 Anfal campaign, prewar threats, and years of the systematic slaughter of Kurdish civilians sent many Kurdish civilians running for their lives. An estimated 750,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Iran; 280,000 went to Turkey; and another 300,000 were trapped in the mountains bordering Turkey when Ankara refused them asylum.26 At the first sign of civilian deaths and refugees, the Bush administration began a campaign of retractions. The president declared, “We’re not in there

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trying to impose a solution inside Iraq.”27 By April 1, more than 1.7 million Kurdish refugees had fled to Iran, and the international media flooded the airwaves with stories of hundreds of thousands of Kurds stranded in the 8,000-foot mountain range between Iraq and Turkey.28 Images of women and children, windblown and starving, tugged at the heartstrings of the Western world. On April 5, with domestic and international pressure building and after calls from France, Turkey, and Iran, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, declaring the Kurdish crisis a threat to international peace and security. This resolution was groundbreaking as it provided the legal framework for an unprecedented intervention into a domestic situation without the consent of the Iraqi government. Most of the displaced Kurds remained inside Iraq. Thus, in an extraordinary move, Resolution 688 set aside Iraq’s sovereignty in favor of protecting the population. This was the first time the UN had demanded that a country provide access to its population for humanitarian relief and began the process of legitimating humanitarian interventions and the “Responsibility to Protect” norm.29 In terms of organizing a relief effort, tensions among the United States, its allies, and the UN flared over reacting to the crisis. Initially, the Bush administration had no intention of committing US troops to the relief efforts and envisioned a strictly UN operation. The political infighting increased as the administration accused the UN of a “molasses pace” reaction. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar shot back: “Are UN police supposed to keep order and arrest lawbreakers inside the camps or throw out Iraqi authorities if they try to come in? The United States, Britain and France got themselves into a mess and now they’re trying to cover themselves with a UN flag.”30 With growing pressure and the realization that the UN did not have the logistical capacities to respond to the growing crisis, Washington announced that it would assist the Kurdish refugees with humanitarian supplies; the first of two relief operations was put into motion. At the urging of British prime minister John Major, the United States created Operation Safe Haven to establish a Kurdish refugee camp in northern Iraq to relieve the pressure on Turkey. In the last week of April 1991, the United States created Operation Provide Comfort, donating $150 million in relief supplies to the refugee camps.31 The administration also created a no-fly zone in northern Iraq to protect the deliveries of food and medicine to Kurdish refugees along the Turkish border.32 Great Britain, France, and the United States asserted that the zone was consistent with the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 688, though no explicit endorsement was stated.33 This operation coincided with the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the UN and Iraq, allowing the world organization to administer a civilian “humanitarian presence” throughout Iraq.34 Five hundred UN personnel were dispatched to protect UNHCR officials carrying out operations. Despite the commitment of resources, the operation faced several logistical issues.35

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In this case, US multilateralism and the policy process at the UN were inverted. The United States did not set the agenda for the intervention, and although it was part of a group of states that passed Resolution 688, it came to the table reluctantly and with no intention of committing US troops into what it viewed as a “quagmire.” However, as the crisis developed, with the logistical challenges of both the politics on the ground and the daunting task of ending the crisis, the United Nations became the primary tool for effective implementation. The case reveals an interesting twist of the United States not leading the charge. But it also shows the UN’s lack of ability—both legal and logistical—to conduct an effective intervention without the presence of US power. It is also an example of domestic and international opinion bringing the United States to the United Nations, as political opportunity structures were conducive to working through the UN. The Russians, in political turmoil themselves, did not push an agenda in the Security Council. Within the United States, public outrage over what was happening to the Kurds pushed the administration to go back to the UN. The operations that followed Iraq—Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo—marked key turning points in US-UN relations, with practical and bureaucratic tensions growing between the two. Together, these cases brought about the wellspring of dismay about UN capacities that once again changed the US narrative about the UN’s overall value. Somalia The model of a US-led UN operation was used a year after the events in northern Iraq, when the United States directed a multinational operation in Somalia.36 In response to a devastating famine, the United States began airlifting food and other supplies to the country in August 1992. Yet competing warlords often captured the relief supplies. When the violence and famine exploded, the UN was powerless to quell the growing anarchy. In response, the US Department of State advocated a more robust operation, with US troops safeguarding the distribution of humanitarian supplies. In the domestic arena, members of Congress, including Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), called for an intervention. In late November 1992, the Bush administration, in its twilight hours in office, informed the UN that it was willing to establish a military intervention in Somalia, in which US troops would operate under UN command, though many in the Defense Department advocated a US operation that did not involve the UN. In December, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794, which authorized efforts to “restore peace, stability and law and order.” The UN-authorized Operation Restore Hope entered Somalia in December 1992 to provide security for the UN relief effort. At the time, the goals of the United States were limited to humanitarian relief and did not include creating political solutions or peace restoration.37 However, once the operation was on

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the ground, the initial goal of relief aid expanded to include the use of military force and even direct engagement of the warring parties. Clinton and “Assertive Multilateralism” The enthusiasm of the first Bush administration for a revitalized UN carried into the Clinton administration. Early on, Clinton declared that foreign policy doctrine revolved around “assertive multilateralism” for burden and risk sharing.38 The term assertive multilateralism expresses a significant commitment to creating global partnerships, yet with US controlling the agenda. As Madeleine Albright explained, “When America acted with others, [America] should lead in establishing goals and ensuring success.”39 Although Albright defended this view as a strategic approach, not an end goal, it was criticized as being ideological.40 Regardless, the Clinton administration expressed a commitment to an active role in multilateral venues and thus elevated the US ambassador to the United Nations to a cabinet-level position. The White House repeatedly stated that US power came through its ability to lead within a community of nations. In his confirmation hearing as secretary of state, Warren Christopher signaled his optimism in UN capacities and the need for US engagement: The UN has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling its promise of collective security, in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the UN cannot be an effective instrument for sharing global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. And I will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations at the UN.41

Yet, the storms that had been brewing in Somalia put a damper on this optimism. Early on in their joint operations in Somalia, the United States and the UN disagreed about the scope of the operations and mandate.42 When the Clinton administration took office it expanded the operation’s authorization with UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) from May 1993 to March 1995, and the Council passed Resolution 814, calling for repatriation and “political reconciliation, including the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administrations.” After success in the distribution of food and medical supplies, the UN was slated to take over operations. However, the scope of responsibility was unclear, and disputes arose between the United States and the UN about whether the first operation was completed, whether the United States needed to go after warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed, and whether the mandate included participating in nation-building efforts. This US-UN operation revealed many issues with policy implementation, with two different visions of goals and strategy, which led to tensions between UN commanders and the US military operations on the ground.43

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When the violence in Somalia escalated in early 1993, accusations began to fly about who was at fault. Was it an overly ambitious Clinton administration or ineptitude on the part of the UN?44 Reports indicated that SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who came into that office in January 1992) was demanding that the United States assist in disarming Somali warlords.45 Boutros-Ghali began to openly criticize the United States for its lack of support, and issues arose over competing expectations. The Secretary-General persistently claimed that the United States had used him and the UN as a scapegoat. In a discussion about the tensions between a robust UN and a weak UN, he stated, You’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. . . . If you’re not trying to be authoritarian they’ll say there has to be a rearrangement of your administration, that there has to be a strong United Nations. Et cetera, et cetera. And when you try to have a strong United Nations, they say you are becoming a general and a Pharaoh.46

The operation in Somalia turned in October 1993, when eighteen US Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu. The joint venture ended in a blazing failure, with the UN withdrawing in March 1995. In 1994 and in the wake of the catastrophe, John Bolton wrote: “The United Nations works only when the United States leads the organization to a final conclusion. There is no multilateral system with a life and will of its own.”47 The events in Somalia had a profound influence on US relations with the UN.48 The Clinton administration denied knowledge of the Ranger mission and blamed the crisis on UN mismanagement.49 The events in Somalia also triggered a resurgent Congress, a media backlash against peacekeeping, and a battle between the White House and the UN Secretary-General. Public opinion soured on peacekeeping and the UN. One observer wrote, “Lost was the shallow and fragile US consensus on UN peace operations.”50 US participation in UN operations was now viewed as almost unpatriotic. The failures of the operation, the use of US troops, and quarreling with the UN proved unpalatable for both the US public and the Clinton administration. Unfortunately, the outcome to all of this proved to be most tragic for those in Rwanda in April 1994 and Bosnia in 1995. Rwanda The Rwandan genocide represents a joint failure in US multilateralism and UN efficacy. In early April 1994, the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were both killed in a plane crash just outside Rwanda’s capital city of Kigali. Only hours after the crash, mass killings began in Kigali and spread outward through the country. Rwanda erupted into the chaos of extreme ethnic-based violence. Within days, the violence escalated to the point of genocide. Overall,

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an estimated 800,000 people were killed in 100 days, and more than 25 percent of the population was uprooted from their homes between April and August and became refugees in Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and what was once Zaire.51 The 1994 genocide in Rwanda occurred under the watchful eye of the international community. There were considerable warnings of what was about to take place. The UN, with the UN Observer Mission UgandaRwanda (UNOMUR), the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), actively pursued conflict resolution within Rwanda. In addition, both France and Belgium had personnel on the ground. Many in the NGO community, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Red Cross, had been present since 1990. Despite this substantial commitment of international resources, the presence of outside powers did not ameliorate the suffering. On April 6, 1994, after the plane crash, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) barricaded the Kigali airport to prevent UNAMIR observers from investigating the wreckage, blamed the Tutsi-based Rwandan Patriotic Front for shooting down the plane, and called for retaliation against all Tutsis. Rwanda’s Radio Libre des Mille Collines (Free Radio of One Thousand Hills) began broadcasting and inciting anti-Tutsi propaganda, proclaiming, “You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh! We won’t let you kill! We will kill you!”52 Roadblocks were set up to inhibit movement, to check identity cards, and to kill anyone whose card indicated a Tutsi identity. Soon afterward, the violence spread into the countryside, where hundreds of thousands were massacred. Rivers became swollen with bodies, and the earth filled with mass graves. All the while, the UN was there; but the presence of UNAMIR did little to inhibit the violence. The UN team had extensive documentation of human rights violations and was aware of the volatile nature of the conflict, but it was not prepared to deal with such extensive brutality. As an observer explained: “The UN was monitoring the border but nobody paid them any serious attention. A handful of unarmed soldiers sitting in the bush with walkie-talkies and binoculars: all they could do was watch and report.”53 After Hutu militia members killed several Belgian soldiers, the former colonial power withdrew. Then, thirteen days after the killing began, the UN pulled out and justified its exit by saying it had little capacity to act and no member-state support. Later, in an extensive report, the UN claimed: “The capacity of the United Nations to reduce human suffering in Rwanda was severely constrained by the unwillingness of Member States to respond to the changed circumstances in Rwanda by strengthening UNAMIR’s mandate and contributing additional troops.”54 Inside the United States, spokespersons for the Clinton administration

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were directed to not refer to the events taking place inside Rwanda as “genocide.” Instead, the State Department maintained that “acts of genocide may have occurred”—a less alarming reference.55 This maneuver avoided triggering a mandatory intervention based on the 1948 Genocide Convention. US reluctance to become involved stemmed in part from its experience in Somalia.56 Furthermore, in the Security Council, the United States refused to support the enforcement of UNAMIR for fear that its failure might pull the nation into Rwanda indirectly. The US response after April 6, 1994, can be described as delayed avoidance, with bureaucratic obstacles placed to ensure there would be no US intervention. The United States orchestrated a slowdown in sending in UN troops. In May 1994, Madeleine Albright claimed that “sending a UN force into the maelstrom of Rwanda without a sound plan of operations would be folly.”57 After the violence had subsided, the United States did commit $280 million to Rwanda for humanitarian efforts and the rebuilding of the physical and financial infrastructure.58 Also in May 1994, the White House issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which reflected the growing pressures on the United States. The document provided a checklist establishing when, where, and how the US government would support UN peacekeeping operations. Many in the United States were frustrated with the growing UN missions and the financial burden these missions incurred; the prevailing view was that the UN had its hand in too many cookie jars around the world. Under PDD 25, Clinton unilaterally set forth “stricter standards” establishing when the United States would participate in peace operations, the parameters of command and control, and the financing. At the same time, PDD 25 emphasized the value of the UN; it proclaimed: Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves US interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can also provide a “force multiplier” in our efforts to promote peace and stability.59

The document presents a formal declaration of conditional multilateralism. The United States would engage the UN only with the US firmly in control of troop commands and only in cases where “domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled.”60 The policy also establishes strict criteria for engagement and a list of necessary UN reforms. Rwanda met none of the established measures. The recent historical milieu of Somalia provided a long shadow and created reluctance on the part of both the administration and the US public for involvement in Rwanda. The political opportunity structures were closed within the United States, and the Clinton administration effectively closed them within the UN.

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Bosnia Another case that triggered US-UN tensions developed over a series of tragic events in Bosnia. Violence erupted after Bosnia’s 1992 declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. Under reports of Serbian ethnic cleansing, what began as a largely European issue began to appear on the international stage. The newly elected Clinton administration pushed for a more robust UN presence under the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and established a no-fly zone enforced by the United States. Unfortunately, as the UN’s mandate increased within Bosnia, its capacities to protect civilians did not. The attacks on 7,000 civilians in Srebrenica in July 1995, with UN peacekeepers present, highlighted this disparity. Lack of resources, lack of political will from the international community, and a restrictive UN institutional mandate undermined the UN’s effectiveness. The Bosnian case reveals the institutional tensions within the UN to remain a “neutral” party and to act only within its delegated mandate. The Clinton administration began to find that “the UN force was part of the problem in Bosnia rather than part of the solution.”61 The strain between Congress and the president also played a role, as the legislative branch wanted to unilaterally lift an arms embargo on Bosnia—a move rebuking both the White House and the Security Council. The Srebrenica tragedy forced the administration to draft a plan to intervene militarily and to pursue negotiations that culminated under the Dayton Peace Accords. Yet, again, as in Somalia, the UN was seen as having failed in Bosnia. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), the top-ranking senator on the Foreign Affairs Committee, explained that “because of the misadventure in Somalia, it probably will be impossible to win Congressional support for a peacekeeping role in Bosnia, where American participation is critical.”62 The UN itself was extremely critical of its own inactions and mistakes: “Through error, misjudgment and the inability to recognize the scope of evil confronting us we failed to do our part to save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder.”63 Clinton’s own US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, was also disparaging of the UN, claiming that UN peacekeeping missions were often composed of “ill-equipped and often unprepared troops” and that UN financing resembled a “Byzantine and drawn-out budgetary decision-making process.”64 This failure, combined with the aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda, led to significant condemnations of the UN, and peacekeeping took on negative connotations. Rejecting and Returning to the UN: Kosovo US conditional multilateralism was again found in Kosovo in 1999; in this case, however, the US intervention bypassed the United Nations. In 1999, an escalation in violence and bloodshed within Kosovo grabbed the attention of the international community. Although tensions were present as early as 1981, in 1998, Slobodan Milošević, the appointed president of Serbia, began a pro-

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Serbian nationalist campaign and severely cracked down on ethnic Albanian separatists. Despite several warnings and UN sanctions, Milošević continued his campaign, and reports of ethnic cleansing and atrocities continued. It was estimated that 2,000 civilians died, 600,000 people were internally displaced, and thousands became refugees as they tried to flee the violence.65 In contrast to Rwanda, Kosovo was viewed as a threat to European security that could hurt US interests throughout the Mediterranean and into the Middle East, in part, because of Kosovo’s proximity to European allies. In addition, US allies in Europe put significant pressure on the Clinton administration to assist them in managing a conflict that was spilling over into Albania and Macedonia and even onto the streets of Paris, as over 60,000 refugees fled the violence.66 In response to these pressures, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became involved. In 1998, NATO laid out two goals within the Kosovo region—first, to bring about peaceful conflict resolution, and second, to promote regional stability with an eye toward Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. As threats from the international community proved ineffective, interested parties met in Paris and Rambouillet, France, to negotiate an end to the violence. In Rambouillet, foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and Italy organized a conference at which an interim peace agreement was drafted and later signed by the Kosovo Albanian delegation. Despite the months of international negotiations, however, the Serbs under Milošević refused to back down. A more assertive Russia threatened to veto any resolution through the UN Security Council that authorized use of force, forcing the Clinton administration and its European allies to sidestep the Security Council and work directly through NATO. With closing political opportunity structures in the Security Council, exclusive multilateralism began to take shape. On March 25, 1999, NATO, headed by the United States and eighteen other member-states, initiated an air campaign against Yugoslavia. NATO intervened under much controversy and accusations that the United States was violating international law. President Clinton asserted that the United States had a “moral imperative” to protect the people of Kosovo from the wrath of a nationalistic regime and to contain the horrors of ethnic conflict.67 The military action, which included 1,000 planes and more than 14,000 explosive shells, lasted for more than eleven weeks.68 After the withdrawal of the Serbian force, NATO ended its air campaign and established a cooperative peacekeeping mission. On June 12, 1999, a peace plan was in place, and the NATOrun Kosovo Force (KFOR) moved in. The Clinton administration then returned to the UN and asked for help with stabilization and refugee return and rebuilding Kosovo’s infrastructure. In this case, the Russians, wanting to be part of the process, reluctantly agreed with the need for engagement, and the Security Council created the UN In-

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terim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The UN was also called upon to build bridges, restore services, and construct a viable democratic political system. The UN Department of Peacekeeping described the engagement: “Its task was unprecedented in complexity and scope; the Council vested UNMIK with authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including all legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary.”69 Toward these efforts, the Council also called for the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The conditional multilateralism framework clarifies the Kosovo intervention and presents a fascinating case in which the United States circumvented the UN and employed NATO to realize its agenda in the Balkans. The institutional political opportunity structures in the Security Council were closed, with Russia and China blocking authorization of force to repel Milošević’s attacks.70 The Clinton administration viewed NATO as a second choice, after the UN. However, rather than being tossed aside with the ashes of the bombing campaign, the UN became more relevant as the United States returned to multilateralism through the UN in the reconstruction efforts. The Clinton administration did not want to rebuild the war-torn territory without the UN; therefore, after the military operations, the United States handed most of the reconstruction efforts to the UN. Yet, the mandate was largely unfunded. Although the Clinton administration wanted the UN to do most of the cleanup and heavy lifting associated with nation building, Congress dragged its feet on funding the peacekeeping bill and then declined to approve a supplemental appropriation.71 Again, the conditional multilateralism approach shows that, for the United States, the use of force through the UN is the exception. Domestic Dynamics: The United States Seeks a Secretary, not a General US-UN relations soured as the Clinton administration clashed with BoutrosGhali. Tensions began with Somalia and grew when the Secretary-General called for sanctions against Israel after a controversial Security Council resolution on Palestinian refugee return.72 This action provoked many US public officials to express openly negative views of the UN Secretary-General. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke described the relationship as “acrimonious,” and Robert Dole repeatedly referred to him as “Bootros Bootros-Ghali” in a demeaning tone that became a rallying point in his presidential campaign speeches. Madeleine Albright and others in the administration accused the Secretary-General of corruption and of being an obstacle to reform.73 At one point, the Secretary-General quipped, “The United Nations exists to help countries solve their problems. . . . If it helps the Americans solve theirs by blaming me, I’ll be a scapegoat.”74 The strife culminated when the United States ended Boutros-Ghali’s tenure as Secretary-General by casting a lone

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veto (in opposition to fourteen votes in favor) against the Egyptian’s bid for a second five-year term. The visceral tone from both political parties and the legislative and executive branches changed with Kofi Annan. In Clinton’s second presidential term, his first meeting with a foreign leader was with the new SecretaryGeneral. For Kofi Annan, it was his first visit with a head of state. The meeting reflected an interesting priority of the time. Two observers note, “Mr. Annan’s pilgrimage to the White House graphically displayed the success Clinton and his predecessors have had over the last eighty years in establishing and shepherding a vision of a new world and an international organization to sustain that vision on the basis of American principles.”75 With the entrance of the new Secretary-General, relations smoothed. Kofi Annan seemed to, at least rhetorically, buy into the US agenda, as he also expressed strong dissatisfaction with the UN and repeatedly vocalized desire for reform. In fact, Kofi Annan called for “fundamental, not piecemeal, reform.”76 In 1999, he publicly stated that the Security Council had failed in its inaction in both Rwanda and Bosnia.77 The Second Honeymoon Is Over: Congress and US Arrears to the UN Throughout the course of the 1990s, the US relationship with the UN had harmed relations between the president and Congress. President George H. W. Bush’s relationship with a Democratic-controlled Congress began with a relatively cooperative tone but ended on a sour note. The early legislative support of the UN, particularly during the Persian Gulf War, is reflected in William Broomfield’s (R-MI) statement: On occasion I have criticized the United Nations when it has not lived up to its promise, when it served to stress the differences that kept nations apart rather than the common interests that brought them together. Yet in the past few years, and especially during the current crisis in the Persian Gulf, the United Nations has demonstrated that it is indeed capable of fulfilling its original charter, that it has a unique and important role to play in upholding international law and preserving world peace.78

In 1993, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell (D-RI), echoed this rhetoric: “We now have an opportunity to re-claim the dream of the UN as an effective agent for world peace.”79 After Somalia, however, domestic criticisms of the UN grew and combined with previous tensions, resulting in Congress aggressively blocking UN funding. The brief second honeymoon was over, and within a decade, there were overt rejections of institutional liberalism as a guide to US foreign policy. The damage spilled into budgeting and a public narrative that persistently

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framed the UN as incompetent, hostile, and impeding. Within the legislative branches of the country, criticism of the UN was a consistent theme. The budget situation with Congress was particularly damaging. US financial support of the UN comes in three streams: assessed contributions, voluntary contributions, and peacekeeping. The General Assembly finances the operations of the organization and specialized agencies through a formula that assesses financial support based on considerations of a member-state’s “capacity to pay.” The assessed contributions on the United States have traditionally been the highest of any member-state, and in the first few decades of the UN’s existence, it contributed just under 40 percent of the UN’s regular budget with that number decreasing over time.80 In December 2000, the US reduced its assessed contribution to 22 percent of the UN’s regular budget. Voluntary contributions, however, are at the discretion of a presidential administration’s request and congressional approval. Despite the warming trends during the Bush years, the financial strains prevalent in the 1980s between the United States and the UN had taken a toll. As described above, in the early part of that decade, Congress began to assert itself in US-UN relations, particularly by blocking funding. At the time, US arrears were 79.2 percent; in contrast, those of the Soviet Union were only 0.1 percent.81 The United States owed $517.8 million to the United Nations, of that $365.1 million was outstanding for the regular budget, and $152.7 million for peacekeeping.82 Other states in default included South Africa ($40 million), Iran ($12 million), and Libya ($5 million). In 1990, President Bush requested a five-year plan to fully pay off the US debt to the UN and specialized agencies. John Bolton, serving as assistant secretary of state for International Organization Affairs, issued a statement to a congressional panel advocating fully funding the UN. He called for an end to the withholding of dues, which had almost crippled the UN and had led the United States to assume the label of the leading “deadbeat” in the UN.83 Although Congress did release some payments, it continued to bottleneck UN dues and failed to approve Bush’s five-year plan.84 In the fall of 1993, the United States owed $1 billion in peacekeeping payments and arrears. In 1994, working off the momentum of the Contract with America, a new Republican majority in the US House of Representatives passed a bill that fed off the fears of UN peacekeeping activities. Aggressive measures were passed, such as the National Security Revitalization Act of 1995, which called for a credit toward annual assessments for US support of UN peacekeeping operations, limits on US contributions to peacekeeping, and UN budgetary reforms. By that time, advocacy for the UN almost vanished within the US Congress. In late 1998, US arrears to the UN were $1.5 billion. The funding issue exploded under Clinton as the Republican Congress capped payments and used funding as leverage to force UN reforms. Again, with a delayed payment schedule (October rather than January), arrears, and

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US underpayments, the UN faced a major crisis in financing. The HelmsBiden agreement became a congressional compromise that allowed for some payments of US arrears; however, those payments were conditional on the UN implementing congressional mandate reforms. In one instance, the Congress mandated that the UN create a budget that would prohibit program expansions and adjustments for inflation. Even with the Helms-Biden agreement, relations deteriorated to such an extent that by 1999, the United States owed an estimated $1.7 billion to the UN and its specialized agencies.85 The nonpayment of dues resulted in member-states denying the United States a seat on the UN biennial budget committee.86 At one point, US eligibility to participate in the General Assembly was threatened as the UN disqualifies a country from voting after nonpayment of dues for two years. Republicans, Rhetoric, and Reform During the 1990s, the reluctance to pay UN dues stemmed from two sources—a fiscally conservative orientation, as voices in Congress alleged UN corruption and mishandling of resources, and an ideological view that feared UN intrusions. The first view was reflected in a report that called on the United States to champion UN reform efforts; the report made the accusation that “poor management, bad organization, and corruption plague the UN making the successful implementation of its goals unlikely.”87 Part of the scorn was directed at Clinton, while some targeted the UN directly. Congress, under control of a Republican majority and the leadership of Jesse Helms (RNC) in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attempted to “micromanage” what it viewed as a failed Clinton foreign policy.88 Some of the hostility built on the neoconservative rhetoric of the early Reagan years with an ideological rejection of the UN; other resentments came with the growing mantle of peacekeeping. The list of UN peacekeeping operations was expanding and driving fears within certain segments that the UN could potentially compete with US military forces. With US troops stationed in Bosnia, Iraq, Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda, Haiti, and Cuba to support UN peacekeeping operations, the “sovereigntist” narrative surfaced once again. Then Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri proclaimed that “US foreign policy should not be subcontracted to Kofi Annan or written at the United Nations. . . . America should not sacrifice another ounce of her sovereignty to the architects and acolytes of a one-world government.”89 Thus, rather than being a bastion of communism, the UN now took on mythical capacities that threatened US sovereignty. The situation in Bosnia revealed erosion of support from Democrats in Congress as well. In the summer of 1995, both houses of Congress passed resolutions by veto-proof margins that would end US participation in an embargo against the Muslim government of Bosnia (allowing it more capacities to de-

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fend itself). However, this was in direct contradiction to UN actions and would have dismantled the UN peacekeeping operation on the ground, as many European states, including the French, threatened to withdraw their peacekeepers if the embargo was lifted. Democrats, including Joseph Biden Jr. (D-DE), Tom Harkin (D-IA), and Carl Levin (D-MI), all supported the bipartisan proposal sponsored by Robert Dole and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT).90 Congressional efforts to reform the UN were also linked to an ideological agenda, as the United States banned the funding of any organizations that supported or lobbied for the expansion of abortion access. Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) described the link of UN payments to abortion provisions as putting “a wall of separation between abortion and family planning and ends most US funding of the abortion industry overseas.”91 In this case, the conservative social agenda spilled over into US-UN relations. For two years, this issue festered in a dispute between Congress and the president. In both 1997 and 1998, Clinton refused to sign the legislation that would fund the UN because it contained anti-abortion stipulations. Finally, under threat of loss of the US vote in the General Assembly, Clinton conceded to the bill with the abortion provisions. As Secretary of State Albright described the situation: For three years we fought as hard as we could to break this linkage and we made our case repeatedly to Congress and to the public that it is unwise, illogical and wrong to hold our obligations to the United Nations hostage to an extremist agenda on international family planning. . . . In the end, the Administration faced a no-win choice between protecting our national security interests at the UN and maintaining full support for programs that helped save women’s lives. Under the circumstances, we achieved the best settlement possible.92

The Clinton compromise ensured the incremental payments of more than $900 million in arrears to the UN. Yet, the payment of those dues also came with several conditions for UN reform and required the US secretary of state to certify that those changes were carried out before funds were released. The list of reforms reflected conservative narratives surrounding bureaucratic waste and the United States assuming too much of the burden for the UN budget. The most significant reform imposed a unilateral cap of 22 percent (down from 25 percent) of US regular assessments to the UN and a ceiling of 25 percent on peacekeeping contributions (down from 31 percent).93 Although some of the benchmarks were based on fiscally conservative priorities, the certifications themselves exposed the fear of the UN emanating from Congress and portions of civil society. The payments were made only in the case that: [The] UN has made no effort to establish a standing army; . . . they have taken no action causing the US to violate its Constitution or laws; they do not have external authority to borrow money; they do not challenge US sover-

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eignty; they do not tax US citizens; they have not charged interest on arrears; and they respect US property rights.94

These provisions show the myths of intrusion surrounding suspicions that the UN was creating an army, that the UN wanted to tax US citizens, and that the UN sought to impinge on US property rights. Each of these accusations ran counter to the UN’s principals of nonintervention in domestic politics outlined in Article 2.4 of the charter. The UN, as an institution, and its leadership held neither the desire nor the will nor the capacities to commit such intrusions. One critic described a “myopic, nationalistic Congress” that tried to tie the Clinton administration’s hands in terms of financing the UN and reform.95 Yet, as noted above, the Congress was not solely to blame; Clinton’s own actions also shackled the UN (specifically under PDD 25 and Rwanda). The decade ended with a moment that seemed absurd to many within the United Nations. In an effort to smooth the tensions, Richard Holbrooke (US ambassador to the UN at the time) invited Jesse Helms to speak to the UN Security Council. It was the first time a member of Congress had addressed the Council. Because the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held the purse strings, the olive branch was extended to Helms. Despite his stated goal of offering his “hand of friendship,” Helms’s words revealed a negative view of the UN: The American people do not want the United Nations to become an “entangling alliance.” That is why Americans look with alarm at UN claims to a monopoly on international moral legitimacy. They see this as a threat to the God-given freedoms of the American people, a claim of political authority over America and its elected leaders without their consent. . . . Forty years later, as the UN seeks to impose its utopian vision of an “international law” on Americans, . . . that seeks to impose its presumed authority on the American people without their consent begs for confrontation and, I want to be candid, eventual US withdrawal.96

Many found that his accusations and tone demonstrated a lack of consideration for the legal parameters of the organization and the mandate. In addition, as Helms scolded the organization, he revealed the cultural bedrock of American exceptionalism linked with fears of international organizations and their potential for intrusion into US domestic politics. As discussed in Chapter 3, the narrative was rooted in the dialogue of Henry Cabot Lodge and the Irreconcilables during the 1919 League of Nations debate and in a tradition that continued into the 1970s with Patrick Moynihan’s and Jeane Kirkpatrick’s allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Helms also illustrated a three-level game—even for a member of Congress—as he had to represent a tradition of independence and serve a conservative constituency that was suspicious of government. The antifederalist strains in the US electorate spilled over into anti-UN sentiments as the UN be-

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came yet another layer of intrusive government. At this point, the rhetoric of opposition to the UN moved out of the domestic realm for the promotion of political gain and courting votes in conservative circles and into international politics. Although only symbolic, the American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 1999 was introduced in the US House of Representatives (HR 1146), calling on the president to “terminate all participation by the United States in the United Nations.”97 Ron Paul (R-TX), with nine others, sponsored the bill. In his introductory speech, Paul accused the UN Charter of creating a supranational government that seeks to tax Americans and take away constitutionally granted freedoms. These views were followed by accusations that the UN supports terrorist organizations and provides a breeding ground for anti-Americanism.98 Although there was almost no support for the legislative initiative, the language reveals both the ideological orientation and the narrative of fear. The impact of congressional infighting with Clinton yielded a heavy toll. The credibility of the White House was compromised (both within the UN and in other multilateral venues). In another instance of a rejection of multilateralism, the Clinton administration pushed for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which President Clinton signed in 1996; however, in 1999, the Senate refused its ratification. With Helms’s speech and the congressional push for reforms, the UN was placed on the defensive and was forced to try to contort itself to appease an ideological faction within the United States. Civil Society and the Black Helicopters UN bashing became a favorite part of the stump speech from many conservative candidates in the 1996 presidential elections. Voices emerged claiming that the United Nations impedes US sovereignty; there were suspicions of “black UN helicopters” descending on midwestern towns and a vague notion that the organization was siphoning resources away from those needed at home. There was also fear of a UN tax and a UN standing army. A 1993 report from the Heritage Foundation reflected the increasing negative rhetoric: The UN is a poorly managed institution plagued by corruption. It is a haven for political patronage and suffers from a lack of management oversight. Moreover, because the UN played only a marginal role in world affairs for forty years, member states have had little incentive to press for management reforms.99

Boom to Bust: Public Opinion and Elite Cues US public opinion polls reflected the changing fortunes in the US-UN relations over the course of the 1990s. Gallup’s “good job/poor job” numbers fol-

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lowed the success of the Persian Gulf War, with only 38 percent registering a “good job” assessment in 1989, moving up to 54 percent in 1990, followed by a warm 67 percent in 1991. However, in March 1993, the approval numbers began to dip again, with 52 percent indicating a “good job” and 44 percent registering a “poor job” ranking; the numbers decreased again with only 36 percent of those polled giving a positive assessment in August of 1995. After the events of Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, a meager 35 percent indicated a favorable view of the UN (see also Figure 6.3).100 These numbers are echoed in several other public opinion surveys that asked, “Should the US cooperate fully with the UN?” In October 1993, almost 65 percent advocated full cooperation, up from a low of 47 percent in 1976. Yet, as the decade progressed, the numbers fell.101 With conservatives, the anti-UN message seemed to be particularly appealing and corresponded to the decline in the UN’s public approval ratings. For example, in the 1996 presidential campaign, Robert Dole declared in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, “When I am President, every man and every woman in our armed forces will know the President is their Commander in Chief. Not Boutros Boutros-Ghali or any other UN Secretary-General.”102 Dole’s rhetoric attributed the Clinton administration’s foreign policy failures to a usurpation of power by the United Nations in general and by Boutros-Ghali in particular. Furthermore, candidate Dole frequently made derogatory comments concerning the UN and, as a member of Congress, introduced legislation to block a fictitious UN-imposed “international travel tax” (which had never been proposed by the UN). Patrick Buchanan also received repeated applause in his presidential campaign by verbally attacking the United Nations. Steven Kull’s work supports the finding that American perceptions of US contributions far outweighed the reality of its commitments to the United Nations. For example, in a 1995 poll, he reported that the median respondent estimated that 22 percent of the US defense budget went to the UN and 40 percent of UN peacekeeping troops were US citizens. The actual 1995 numbers were 1 percent of the US defense budget going to the UN and about 5 percent of UN peacekeepers were US troops.103 Several conspiracy theories and myths about UN black helicopters invading US soil debuted in the 1990s, partially in response to an increase in UN operations, the number of personnel in peacekeeping operations, and conspiracy theories about the end of the millennium, which intersected with myths of international efforts to impede on US autonomy. In fact, the term black helicopter crowd is now bandied about to refer to a general right wing, anti-UN, antiglobalization approach. The 1990s also witnessed the emergence of several branches of conspiracy theories within the “sovereigntist” movement that saw a legal encroachment around the UN. Others saw an ideological threat of a UN filled with “communists” and “terrorists.”104

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Many Democrats joined the chorus of criticism. In a 1995 communication to Clinton, Howard Dean (then Democratic governor of Vermont) declared, “The efforts of the United Nations and NATO in Bosnia are a complete failure”; he called on the US government to sidestep the United Nations.105 Yet, there were also efforts to stem the tide of criticism and remediate the funding gaps. Ted Turner, owner of several national media outlets, donated $1 billion to the United Nations in September 1997. He also launched an effort to lobby Congress to keep funding the UN, and he supported the nonprofit United Nations Association of the USA. Turner also created the UN Foundation and its affiliated organization, the Better World Fund. The latter group focuses on repayment of the US debt to the UN, with direct lobbying of members of Congress, grassroots organizing, and working with the executive branch.106 Even at the high point of the US political elite’s use of demagoguery about the UN, however, most Americans did not accept the sovereigntist rhetoric. In a 1995 poll, when asked to choose the statement that was closest to their point of view of the UN, 58 percent indicated that “I am not afraid that the UN is becoming too powerful. The US has a veto in the UN Security Council and therefore the UN cannot dictate anything to the US”; however, 36 percent identified with the statement “I am afraid that things like UN peacekeeping are getting so big that the US is losing control of its foreign policy to the UN.”107 Combined, the problems in Somalia and Rwanda, as well as the damaging assessment from congressional Republicans and the White House, led to a decline in the UN job approval ratings. And yet, the US public did not seem to accept the argument that the UN was both weak and powerful. Interest Groups and Israel Civil society can be an active participant in the US-UN dynamic. One example is found in the role of some pro-Israel groups within the United States. During the 1990s, the Palestine-Israel conflict continued to influence US-UN relations. The first Bush administration launched a campaign to address the enduring tensions in the Middle East, using both a bilateral approach and a multilateral approach through the UN system. The resolution of the Palestinian situation was noted as part of Bush’s “New World Order.” Yet congressional support for Israel often competed with support for the UN. Early on, most supporters of Israel viewed the UN positively. Israel was born in the wake of World War II, and the UN was its midwife. However, after the 1973 war, the rise of the Arab state alliances in the General Assembly, and the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 declaring Zionism a form of racism, both the Israeli government and its supporters in the United States began to view the UN as hostile. The barrage of attacks against Israel by Arab states in the General Assembly, as well as the nation’s geographic and political isolation, created several active groups within the United States that saw the UN as a venue for rallying anti-Semitism and anti-Israel posturing.

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The complexities of this issue cut into US relations with the UN in two ways. First, supporters of Israel in close proximity to the UN vocalize their opposition and actively lobby the UN itself. Second, some pro-Israel organizations try to push this issue by influencing presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1982, pro-Israel political action committees (PACs) contributed $1.87 million to congressional candidates. At the time, close to 80 percent of these campaign contributions went to Democrats. In 1984, pro-Israel groups spent over $4 million on campaign contributions. By 1988, that amount had increased to $5 million. By 1990, estimates indicate that pro-Israel interests contributed over $100 million in individual, PAC, and soft money contributions. Pro-Israel groups are credited with having almost more influence than any other lobbyist organization, second only to AARP.108 As one source explained: “There are no benefits to candidates taking an openly anti-Israel stance and considerable costs in both loss of campaign contributions and votes from Jews and non-Jews alike. Potential candidates therefore have an incentive to be pro-Israel; this reinforces support for Israel in Congress.”109 Newhouse described the tactics of the pro-Israel lobby groups as “fivedimensional chess,” targeting the president, Congress, the bureaucracy, and both the Republican and Democratic parties.110 The most visible group—the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—is described as having significant influence in Washington. One observer claims, “Defying AIPAC can make life complicated for those in Congress who are looking toward their reelection.”111 Although it is a highly controversial point, Mearsheimer and Walt argued that “no lobby has managed to divert US foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that US and Israeli interests are essentially identical.”112 The US relationship with Israel affects US-UN relations in several ways. The first is congressional payment of UN dues, as pro-Israel lobbyists may target members of Congress regarding authorization of payments to the UN. A second, more visible area concerns voting in the Security Council, where the United States has vetoed more than thirty resolutions regarding Israel (more than any other issue). In addition, in the General Assembly, the United States is often alone on issues regarding Israel—in particular, because Arab states hold a numerical advantage and disproportionate sway. It is important to note that there are many different pro-Israel lobbyist groups with distinct agendas, and some are highly supportive of the UN. However, these pro-UN groups tend to lack the resources of AIPAC. Several pro-Israel groups are supported by neoconservatives and aligned with two former US ambassadors to the UN—Jeane Kirkpatrick and John Bolton.113 Because the issue is a sensitive one, the dynamic can run the other way as well. In fact there have been times when US actions in the Security Council

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provoked tensions with Israel. One example is the unanimous support for UN Security Council Resolution 672 of 1990, which addressed violence in Jerusalem and the death of twenty-one Palestinians. The United States also voted for a resolution condemning Israeli security forces for violations of the Geneva Conventions,114 with Israel’s government viewing the resolution as a critique by the Bush administration. Both the government of Israel and the US Jewish community were bruised and angered by the US vote.115 Returning to the framework introduced in Chapter 2, civil society, in the form of identitybased interest groups, does attempt to influence US-UN relations directly through lobbying campaigns and indirectly through campaign financing.116 The US voting record in both the Security Council and the General Assembly seems to indicate that pro-Israel interest groups within the United States are often influential on this issue. International and Institutional Factors: The Force Multiplier Outside of Congress and the White House, the striking hot-cold dynamics in US-UN relations during the 1990s were also driven by institutional factors at the UN and international forces pushing US foreign policy and multilateral efforts. At the international level, the political opportunity structures changed significantly with the fall of the Soviet Union and the events that followed. The decade was marked by US dominance in the void left by Soviet discord. Some proclaimed it a “unipolar moment.”117 Traditional allies, such as Germany and Japan, were growing economically, as were Security Council affiliates Great Britain and France. The institutional political opportunity structures at the UN—particularly within the Security Council—changed, and a flurry of activity reflected these dynamics. Between 1980 and 1989, the Security Council passed more than 180 resolutions; the 1990s, however, saw an exponential increase with more than 600 resolutions passed. The capacity for collective action and multilateral approaches were enhanced until Russia’s disagreements over Kosovo in 1999. Within this context, as a strategic actor, the UN became a force multiplier for the United States. It assisted with burden sharing and created international legitimacy. As with the Korean War, the Persian Gulf War illustrated the apex of this strategic approach. And yet, returning to the spectrum of multilateralism in Figure 2.1, the implementation was often quite exclusive and, in some cases, unilateralist, despite the institutional venue and inclusion of many actors. Regardless of its capacities to dominate the UN agenda, the United States was still reluctant to relinquish the reigns in terms of policy implementation, and Clinton’s assertive multilateralism built on this approach. His administration gave significant rhetorical support to the UN, and yet US engagement remained conditional. Although Clinton wanted to appear to be doing something about the problems abroad, he often rejected diplomatic efforts. According to Boys,

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The Clinton Administration saw this as a way to spread expenditure, casualties and the focus of hostility away from the United States and on to the shoulders of a global organization that had the potential to live up to its mandate in the post–Cold War era. However, this was predicated on the false belief that the American people would tolerate casualties in distant lands when no national interest was at stake and that Congress would continue its Cold War era support of the president in matters of world affairs.118

From a normative view, the early part of the decade revealed an optimism and renewed commitment to multilateralism at the UN. However, Somalia and Rwanda created a historical milieu that tarnished both the normative foundations for multilateralism and the institutional utilities. Maintaining international peace and security began to change. Perhaps for US-UN relations, the most impactful dynamic was the growth of intrastate conflict—Somalia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and East Timor are only a handful of the more than fifty conflicts that erupted during this decade. The bedrock of sovereignty began to erode with failed states such as Somalia, increased communications and technologies, and increased interactions that easily cleared state boundaries. Yet, the UN was ill equipped to address these growing dynamics. An Institution Under Pressure The last decade of the previous century saw an exponential increase in both the demands for and creation of peacekeeping operations. Of the sixty-nine total peacekeeping operations initiated by the UN, thirty-five were created between 1990 and 2000, far exceeding the total eighteen formed in the previous forty years. Figure 5.1 demonstrates this significant increase. In 1990, the peacekeeping budget was $490 million; by 2000, it had more than quadrupled to over $2 billion. Yet member-state arrears were over $1.9 billion, with the United States holding back the most in payments. Within the General Assembly, the thaw of Cold War tensions cascaded into a more productive atmosphere. In 1990, a State Department report reflected the renewed confidence: “The United States is winning greater support for its views on international issues as ideological rivalries ease.” The report found that close to 70 percent of the General Assembly resolutions on political issues were approved unanimously. These numbers were up from 64 percent in 1989, 60 percent in 1987, and only 58 percent in 1986. Thomas R. Pickering, the US permanent representative to the UN, declared: “Seventy percent of the world agrees with us all the time. . . . The 44th Assembly was one of the most constructive in recent memory.”119 The Security Council moved from paralysis to activism; from 1987 to 1994, it issued four times as many resolutions, established three times as many peacekeeping operations with over 70,000 forces, and had an annual budget that shot up from $200 million to $3.6 billion.120 This wave of peacekeeping

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Figure 5.1 Number of UN Peacekeeping Operations Created, by Decade

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, “List of Peacekeeping Operations,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.

initiatives illustrates that for much of the 1990s, “the international community wanted the UN.”121 Yet at the same time, the UN was finding that “its plate was increasingly full,” while “its cupboard was increasingly bare.”122 As discussed above, the US Congress imposed requirements that capped US contributions to UN peacekeeping (S. 248). This assessment level was imposed in 1995 and countered the average 31 percent peacekeeping assessment level requested by the UN. Boutros-Ghali also blamed much of the UN challenges on US funding: [W]e were, in a certain way, overloaded by this multiplicity of peacekeeping operations and with the financial problem. . . . The problem was that the United States was not paying their contribution, and this encouraged other countries not to pay their contribution. So what happened, we were not paying the country who sent blue helmets. In other words, we were borrowing money from those countries at the expense of the peacekeeping operation.123

For the UN, the challenges were not only financial. Brian Urquhart described peacekeeping operations prior to the 1990s as “simple, extremely small, and improvised.”124 But during the 1990s, not only the number but also the type of operations changed. Peacekeepers were called on to move away from the traditional role of neutral arbitrator to instead monitor security sectors, create viable governments in the ashes of violence, demobilize and disarm combatants, and reintegrate traumatized communities. The UN was ex-

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pected to move from peacekeeping to peace making, but with meager capacities. From East Timor to Rwanda to Haiti, the UN was given the task of building the foundations of peace in the most difficult of cases. By the middle of the decade, the UN began a series of assessments of its approaches and capacities to prevent further setbacks and failures. It is fair to say that both the United States and the UN underestimated the depth and complexities of the problems on the ground and overestimated the capacities of the UN to contain and calm several conflicts. It is here that the dynamics between the institution and domestic politics come into focus. The congressional and public critiques of the UN fed off the policy failures associated with the new mantle of peacekeeping. In fact, a 1995 poll found that 75 percent of respondents supported the idea that “UN peacekeeping operations are often ineffective and even dangerous.”125 The United States enjoyed a particularly powerful moment during the 1990s. The tradition of American exceptionalism, combined with a void in oppositional forces at the international level, meant that the United States had the opulence of picking and choosing both venue and level of engagement. Thus, the “Clinton administration’s mantra that Washington will act multilaterally when it can, but unilaterally when it must” meant that it had the luxury of occasionally shunning the UN.126 During the 1980s, the United States issued more than forty vetoes in the Security Council; this number fell to just five in the 1990s. In addition to the international context that provides opportunity and a safety net for the United States, the domestic situation was ripe for finding an international adversary; the UN proved a perfect target. According to Boutros-Ghali, “Being anti–United Nations was smart politics in America,”127 and this was particularly true for the Republican Party. The Secretary-General added, “The feeling behind the bipartisan founding of the United Nations was long gone.”128 The fiscally conservative views could not tolerate allegations of waste and corruption in the UN and thus aggressively looked to cut UN funding and force reforms. It is important to note that some academic work confirms issues with peacekeeping management, problematic mandates, and extensive lack of adequate training in many peacekeeping missions of the 1990s.129 Within the more ideologically oriented neoconservatives, the rise of UN peacekeeping triggered old fears and narratives about imposing world governments. Therefore, to be conservative—either fiscally or socially—meant to disregard the UN. In 1995, during the UN’s fiftieth anniversary celebration in San Francisco, not one congressional Republican was in attendance. According to Boutros-Ghali, although the right wanted “out” of the UN, the left wanted “in”—but only superficially. The Clinton administration faced significant obstacles that spiraled into a dysfunctional pattern. Domestic politics, combined with international pressures for governance and engagement in some of the most challenging con-

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flicts of the century, ran up against institutional limitations. The UN itself faced significant growing pains as the demands for peace operations grew amid limited resources. In light of all this, Congress became more and more wary of the UN, the rhetoric grew more damning, and public opinion turned. The various international factors combined in a destructive mix that eroded support for the UN at the same moment that it needed US leadership, resources, and validation. UN funding became a casualty in the struggle between the exectutive branch and the legislative branch. In addition, partisan politics between the Clinton administration and a reform-oriented Congress, with its “Contract with America,” inhibited the UN through delayed funding, forced reforms, and what some regarded as draconian budget cuts. By the end of the Clinton administration, a persistent narrative within the US political discourse dismissed the competence and relevance of the UN but, in the same breath, feared the UN’s power to intrude on US sovereignty. 1. Robert Gregg, About Face? (Boulder, CO): Lynne Rienner, 1993). 2. Fred Kaplan, “The Rise of the United Nations,” Boston Globe, August 3, 1988. 3. Paul Lewis, “Soviet Union, in Switch, Says It’s Paying UN All It Owes,” New York Times, October 16, 1987. 4. George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,” September 11, 1990. 5. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 356. 6. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994). 7. David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 230. 8. Glenn Frankel, “Britain Reclaiming Role as Top US Ally,” Washington Post, January 19, 1991. 9. Katsuaki L. Terasawa and William R. Gates, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications for the Future,” Defense Analysis 9, no. 2 (1993); Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993). It is important to note that lack of cooperation from other states within the Security Council trickled into bilateral relations. Yemen (which did not support Security Council Resolution 678) received a punitive cut of $70 million in US aid. See Thomas Friedman, “Mideast Tensions: How US Won Support to Use Mideast Forces,” New York Times, December 2, 1990. 10. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” 51. 11. Doyle McManus, “Bush’s Vision of a ‘New World Order’ Still Unclear Policy,” Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1991, 9. 12. Weston H. Burns, “Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy,” American Journal of International Law 85, no. 3 (1991): 517. 13. Dave Todd, “Deadbeat US Owes $567 Million to UN,” The Gazette, March 23, 1991, B5.

Notes

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526.

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14. Burns, “Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making,”

15. Alexander Thompson, Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and US Statecraft in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 53. 16. Ibid.; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed. 17. James Addison Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995), 54. 18. Thompson, Channels of Power; Terasawa and Gates, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf”; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997). 19. Thompson, Channels of Power, 54–56. 20. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 491. 21. Ibid., 486. 22. Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Thompson, Channels of Power. 23. Burns, “Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making.” 24. George H. W. Bush, The Public Papers of the President, 1990, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991). 25. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 26. Elaine Sciolino, “After the War; Kurds Will Die in Vast Numbers Without Swift Aid, Agencies Say,” New York Times, April 10, 1991. 27. Dan Balz, “Bush Criticizes Iraq’s Use of Helicopters on Rebels,” Washington Post, March 15, 1991. 28. “Kurds Head for Mountains Under Withering Iraqi Fire,” The Tennessean, April 2, 1991. 29. Alynna Lyon and Chris Dolan, “American Humanitarian Intervention” Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 1 (2007); Gary Klintworth, “‘The Right to Intervene’ in the Domestic Affairs of States,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 2 (1992); Howard Adelman, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurdish Refugees,” Public Affairs Quarterly 6, no. 1 (January 1992); Mark R. Hutchinson, “Restoring Hope: UN Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,” Harvard International Law Journal 34 (1993). 30. Elaine Sciolino, “The World; by Default, Iraq’s Kurds Are Wards of Military,” New York Times, May 5, 1991. 31. Carroll J. Doherty, “Bush, Congress in Agreement on Kurdish Refugee Relief,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 49, no. 27 (April 1991). 32. See “Remarks at a Meeting with Hispanic Business Leaders and an Exchange with Reporters,” April 5, 1991, in George H. W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 333. 33. When UN ground troops were withdrawn in mid-1991, the no-fly zone was left in place to support Kurdish control of Iraq’s three northern provinces. For more, see UN Security Council Resolution 688 at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc /RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement. 34. Letter dated April 21, 1991, from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22513, 22 April 1991, which contains, as an annex, Letter dated April 21, 1991, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General, and as an enclosure, the April 18, 1991, memorandum of understanding. 35. Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).

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36. Robert E. Sorenson, Operational Leadership Challenges in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997). 37. John G. Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia” (Washington, DC: National Defense University National War College, 2000). 38. Yet, the administration did not provide much clarity about what this meant in terms of policy. The phrase could have implied that the United States would be rather assertive within multilateral venues in realizing its own agenda, or, it could suggest that US participation in multilateral operations would be robust. 39. Madeleine Albright, Madame Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan Press, 2003), 176. 40. James D. Boys, “A Lost Opportunity: The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991–1993),” European Journal of American Studies 7, no. 1 (2012). 41. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Nomination of Warren H. Christopher” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 23–24. 42. Robert G. Patman, “Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention, 1992–1993,” African Affairs 96, no. 385 (1997). 43. Donatella Lorch, “The Somalia Mission: United Nations; Envoy, with Glass Half Full, Toasts Operation in Somalia Despite Critics,” New York Times, October 9, 1993. 44. Ibid. 45. Elaine Sciolino and Paul Lewis, “Mission in Somalia: Secretary Besieged—A Special Report; UN Chief Has to Direct Peace Efforts at US, Too,” New York Times, October 16, 1993. 46. Ibid. 47. John Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 66. 48. It is noteworthy that President Bush’s chronicle of his foreign policies with Brent Scowcroft (A World Transformed) makes no reference to the operation in Somalia. 49. Michael R. Gordon and John H. Cushman Jr., “Mission in Somalia; After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, US Is Blaming UN for Losses,” New York Times, October 18, 1993. 50. Chester A. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 5. 51. These figures are conservative, as some estimates find that as many as 1.2 million were killed in the violence between April and July 1994. US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, ed., “Background Notes: Rwanda” (Washington, DC: Office of Central African Affairs, 1996). 52. Alison Des Forges, The Silence (New York: Scalo Publishers, 1995), 7. 53. Fergal Keane, Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 36. 54. United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993–1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996), 4. 55. Thomas W. Lippman, “Administration Sidesteps Genocide Label in Rwanda,” Washington Post, June 11, 1994; Douglas Jehl, “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide,’” New York Times, June 10, 1994. 56. Lyon and Dolan, “American Humanitarian Intervention”; Douglas Jehl, “US Is Showing a New Caution on UN Peacekeeping Missions,” New York Times, May 18, 1994. 57. “Hobbling the United Nations,” Washington Post, May 5, 1994.

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58. John Shattuck, “US Commitment to Restoring Justice in Rwanda” [dispatch] (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1995), 449. 59. US Department of State, ed., “Presidential Decision Directives 25” (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 1994). 60. Ibid. 61. Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” Foreign Service Journal (December 1998), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles /1998/12/balkans-daalder. 62. Clifford Krauss, “Mission in Somalia: High Cost for Clinton on Somalia Vote,” New York Times, October 16, 1993. 63. Barbara Crossette, “UN Details Its Failure to Stop ’95 Bosnia Massacre,” New York Times, November 16, 1999. 64. Paul Lewis, “United Nations Is Finding Its Plate Increasingly Full but Its Cupboard Is Bare,” New York Times, September 27, 1993. 65. “The Air-Based War by NATO in Yugoslavia Was Messy,” World Press Review, August 4, 1999. 66. Gerald F. Seib and Carla Anne Robbins, “Why Kosovo and Not Rwanda or Chechnya? US Still Seems to Perceive a European Bond,” Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1999. 67. Jeffrey Fleishman and Lori Montgomery, “NATO, Yugoslavia ‘at the Brink,’” The State, March 23, 1999, A1. 68. David Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing (New York: The Free Press, 1999). 69. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, “UNMIK,” http://www.un.org /en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/mandate.shtml. 70. The intervention was legally precarious because it ducked the provisional guidelines for collaborative use of force outlined by the UN Charter. See Katharina Pichler Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 71. Colum Lynch, “Progress in Issuing US Funds for UN,” Washington Post, May 26, 2000; David Rogers, “House Approves Budget Bill That Curbs Clinton’s Spending on Technology, UN,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2000, A32. 72. Sciolino and Lewis, “Mission in Somalia.” 73. Eric Rouleau, “Why Washington Wants Rid of Mr. Boutros-Ghali,” Le Monde Diplomatique, November 1996. 74. Sciolino and Lewis, “Mission in Somalia,” 1.1. 75. John Allphin Moore Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, To Create a New World (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999), 1. 76. Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General’s Annual Report,” UN Chronicle 3 (1997), http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle-arch/1997/annual.htm. 77. Kofi Annan, “United Nations Press Release” (December 16, 1999), SG/SM/7263 AFR/196.. 78. “A Well-Earned Celebration for the United Nations,” Congressional Record, US House of Representatives, 136 Congress, no. 1 (October 26, 1990), E3473. 79. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Nomination of Warren H. Christopher.” 80. Alison Bond, “US Founding of the United Nations: Arrears Payments as an Indicator of Multilateralism,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 395 (2003): 704. 81. Paul Lewis, “US Gaining Ground at UN, State Department Study Says,” New York Times, April 10, 1990. 82. Paul Lewis, “Bush Would Pay Off UN Debt over 5 Years,” New York Times, February 3, 1990.

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83. “The UN’s Biggest Deadbeat,” New York Times, September 11, 1990; Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, “The United States as ‘Deadbeat’?” in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy, eds., Stewart Patrick and Shepard Froman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 84. Paul Lewis, “Congress Holds Up Part of UN Dues,” New York Times, April 8, 1990. 85. Christopher S. Wren, “US Told It Must Pay $550 Million or Risk Losing UN Vote,” New York Times, October 6, 1999. 86. Sean D. Murphy, “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,” American Journal of International Law 94, no. 2 (2000). 87. Andrew J. Cowin, “Setting Priorities at the United Nations,” The Heritage Foundation—Backgrounder 952 (July 22, 1993). 88. Michael Dobbs, “Domestic Politics Intrudes on Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, June 26, 1995. 89. Lawrence J. Goodrich, “Congress vs. UN: Rift Widens,” Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1998, 8. 90. Helen Dewar, “Senate Votes to Lift Bosnia Arms Ban; Democrats Join GOP in Handing Clinton a Defeat,” Washington Post, July 27, 1995. 91. David Stout, “A Deal Is Reached on Family Planning Money,” New York Times, December 1, 1999. 92. Madeleine K. Albright, “Press Remarks on Trip to Europe and International Family Planning” (Washington, DC: Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 1999). 93. US Department of State, “US Plan for Paying UN Arrears” [fact sheet] (Washington, DC: Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 1999). 94. Ibid. 95. “Hobbling the United Nations.” 96. Jesse Helms, “Address Before the United Nations Security Council” (January 20, 2000). 97. See Congress.gov, “H.R.1146 - American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 1999,” 106th Congress (1999–2000), https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress /house-bill/1146 98. “TV Campaign Urging: Kick UN Out of US,” WorldNetDaily, November 21, 2004, http://www.worldnetdaily.com. 99. Cowin, “Setting Priorities at the United Nations.” 100. Alec Gallup, The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999). 101. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “October 2005 News Interest Index” (November 2005): 105. 102. A. M. Rosenthal, “President Dole’s Duty,” New York Times, August 20, 1996, A19. 103. Steven Kull, “What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn’t,” Foreign Policy 101 (1995/96): 109. 104. Mike Hendricks, “Many Believe We’re Conspiracy Targets; Not Even Conservative Republicans Can Be Trusted, According to Some Far-Right Thinkers,” Kansas City Star, December 3, 1995. 105. Howard Dean, “Letter to President Clinton,” USA Today, July 19, 1995, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-01-14-dean-letter _x.htm. 106. Scott Kohler, United Nations Arrears Campaign, Case 91 (United Nations Foundation/Better World Fund, 1997), https://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/sites/default/files /descriptive/united_nations_arrears_campaign.pdf.

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107. World Public Opinion, “General Attitudes Toward the UN,” http://www .americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/un/un1.cfm. 108. James M. McCormick, ed., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 6th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). Two separate polls, one in 1997 in Fortune magazine and the other in 2005 by National Journal, queried members of Congress about which groups were most influential in Washington. AIPAC came in second in both surveys, with members of Congress and their staff ranking the pro-Israel lobbying groups more influential than the AFL-CIO and the National Rifle Association. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “Washington’s Power 25,” Fortune, December 8, 1997; Richard E. Cohen and Peter Bell, “Congressional Insiders Poll,” National Journal (March 5, 2005). 109. Mitchell Bard, “The Israeli and Arab Lobbies,” Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/lobby.html. 110. John Newhouse, “Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on US Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2009). 111. Ibid., 80. 112. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 30. 113. Ibid., 41; John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). 114. US-supported Security Council resolutions that opposed Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians include UNSC 672, 673, 681, 694, 726, and 799. 115. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 379. 116. David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990). 117. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990). 118. Boys, “A Lost Opportunity.” 119. Lewis, “US Gaining Ground at UN.” 120. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 6; Boutros BoutrosGhali, “Supplement to ‘An Agenda for Peace’” (position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, San Francisco, 1995). 121. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 6. 122. Lewis, “United Nations Is Finding Its Plate Increasingly Full but Its Cupboard Is Bare.” 123. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” Frontline, PBS (April 1, 2004). 124. Cited in Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 77. 125. Steven Kull, “The U.S. Public Isn’t Averse to Peacekeeping,” Christian Science Monitor 87, no. 144 (1995): 19; Program on International Policy Attitudes, “Reservations About the United Nations,” 1995, http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues /un/un6.cfm. 126. David Kaye, “Stealth Multilateralism,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (2013). 127. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A United Nations–United States Saga (New York: Random House, 1999), 232. 128. Ibid. 129. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s.

6 The George W. Bush Administration and “Stealth Multilateralism”

There are no circumstances where the UN can operate in opposition to the United States. —Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

At the beginning of the new century, the United Nations was battered and bruised. Tumultuous relations with the United States were partially to blame. Between the scathing criticism provoked by the catastrophe in Rwanda and the disregard in Kosovo, the US-UN relationship was scarred, and the UN’s image as a tool for administering international order was damaged. Chronic lack of funding and frequent congressional opposition were also part of the context going into the new millennium. With the entrance of the Bush administration in 2001, the relationship between the United States and the United Nations further deteriorated to a new low. This chapter traces the controversy over the Iraq War that isolated the United States from its allies and the UN. Despite attempts by Secretary-General Kofi Annan for mediation and continued arms inspections, the pleas for multilateral approaches fell on deaf ears in the United States. Domestic actors fueled the noxious dynamic as the Oil-for-Food Programme scandal erupted in the wake of congressional scorn. Yet, as the War on Terrorism progressed, strategic interests prevailed, and the United States quietly pursued assistance from the UN despite the lack of commitment to either the UN or multilateral engagement. With the appointment of a new US ambassador to the UN and the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq, the Bush administration returned to a level of functional engagement with the UN and incrementally enhanced its voluntary financial contributions. Unbeknownst to many, the Bush administration made gains at the UN on issues of terrorism, the US occupation of Iraq, sanctions on North Korea and Iran, and the expansion of peacekeeping operations.

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“Cowboy Diplomacy”: Unsigning the Rome Statute The forty-third president began his tenure championing a retractionist view and a clear hesitancy toward the UN. Quickly, the administration’s approach evolved into a campaign to block multilateral initiatives by other states and international organizations. Bush started by rejecting several treaties including the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on Climate Change, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed with the Soviet Union, and rejecting the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. One of the first indications of the bitter split with the UN came in May 2001, when the United States was voted off the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Labeled a “stunning rebuke,” this was the first time since the UN’s creation that the United States would not be represented on the commission. Observers claimed that the lack of support for US membership was in response to international grudges based on the US rejection of multilateral initiatives.1 Included in the list of grievances were US policies on the Middle East, the Bush administration’s opposition to the Kyoto Treaty, and the rigid position of the United States on a missile defense system. Then the administration declined to resubmit the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for ratification to the Senate, an action that many considered the most significant rejection of a treaty since the denial of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. For the first nine months of its time in office, the Bush administration also failed to secure the confirmation of a US ambassador to the UN. One report claimed that officials in the Bush administration could “barely tolerate the United Nations. Their only element of doubt is whether it is a farce or a menace.”2 In another move, the administration removed the position of US ambassador to the UN from the cabinet. The posturing, decisions on treaties, and ambivalence toward the UN signaled that the Bush administration preferred to “go it alone”—the approach was labeled “cowboy diplomacy.”3 This stance applied not only to the UN but also to many traditional US partners. For the first two years, even the facade of multilateralism was rejected. Within the United Nations and the broader NGO community, there was growing frustration with the administration about its neo-isolationist tones and rejection of international treaties. When the United States lost its seat on the Human Rights Commission, Joanna Weschler, the UN representative of the New York–based Human Rights Watch, claimed, “Washington should have seen it coming because there has been a growing resentment towards the United States and . . . [its] votes on key human-rights standards, including opposition to a treaty to abolish land mines and to the International Criminal Court and making AIDS drugs available to everyone.”4 Another area of discord came with a rejection—based on ideology—of the UN Population Fund. The Bush administration halted US annual payments of $34 million and charged the organization with promoting involuntary abortions and sterilization programs in China.5

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Voices within the international community accused the United States of turning its back on global leadership and rejecting international law. Nowhere was this more evident than the campaign to create the International Criminal Court (ICC). On December 31, 2000, President Bill Clinton had signed the Rome Statute that created the ICC. Six months later, in what became a clear point of contention, the Bush administration rejected the ICC and unsigned the treaty, marking the only instance in American history that the United States had pursued such an action. At the time, 139 countries were signatories to the Rome Statute, and 30 had ratified it. Bush supporters applauded the move as protecting US soldiers and diplomats from the menacing jurisdiction of an international court. The fear of losing US sovereignty was clear in the language justifying the withdrawal. Yet, for many observers, this move was a reversal of a tradition of US multilateral leadership and advocacy for international law rooted in the Nuremberg Trials of the 1940s. One observer claimed that the implications of this action went far beyond simply whether the United States should join the ICC: What is lost is costly. First, the rest of the world will regard this action as another unilateral rejection of engagement by the United States except when narrow US interests are involved. In turn, general US diplomatic leadership will also suffer. Worse, the US action sets a precedent for other nations who have signed but not ratified treaties to renounce any inclination to abide by the provisions of such treaties or to refrain from undermining their provisions when it suits their interests.6

The Bush administration insisted that the US troops participating in UN operations should be excluded from ICC jurisdiction. Yet, according to one observer, “It is ironic that the country leading a war on terror is weakening the very institution . . . to prevent the globe’s most serious crimes and bring to trial those who commit them.”7 The “Irrelevant Debating Society” and the Iraq War The controversy over the 2003 Iraq War created one of the most contentious moments between the United States and the United Nations, with spillover causing strife with many traditional US allies. Administration ideology and domestic politics played a role in this dynamic. Before the Bush administration’s march toward war, the Clinton administration had pursued various approaches to dealing with the Iraqi government, including “activities designed to help bring about such a new government in Baghdad.”8 The stated goal was “to contain” the threat from Iraq. Yet, after the events of September 11, 2001, Iraq appeared clearly in the crosshairs of several members of the Bush administration. In fact, as early as January 23, 2002, a White House report to Congress indicated, “We will continue to contain the threats posed by Iraq, but

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over the long term, the most effective and lasting way to end these threats is through a change of government in Baghdad.”9 It is striking that the report made an early case for action against the Iraq government using extensive reference to Security Council resolutions—in particular, UNSC Resolution 1382 that focused on improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and calling on that country to comply with previous council resolutions. When President Bush appeared in front of the General Assembly, almost one year to the day after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, elements of his speech implied a commitment to the UN and its affiliated organizations: The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective and respectful and successful. We want the resolutions of the world’s most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime.10

The speech also briefly referred to UNESCO and pledged that the United States would rejoin the organization after almost two decades. France’s foreign minister celebrated the event as a rejection of “the temptation of unilateral action.”11 While many in the international community were elated that Bush had grounded his accusation in Security Council resolutions and took his case to the United Nations, others found his tone derogatory and insulting.12 In fact, some found Bush’s speech disparaging and even threatening to the UN. His statement that if the organization did not accept the US agenda in Iraq, the UN would “fade into history as an ineffective, irrelevant debating society” was viewed as particularly offensive.13 The words clearly tied the US agenda in Iraq to the fate of the UN. According to Bush, The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment.14

Within the UN Security Council, significant efforts were made to find a nonviolent path to disarm Iraq. A September 2002 Council meeting launched several months of negotiations, resulting in the unanimous passage of Resolution 1441 in November 2002. The resolution called for Iraq’s “full, final, and complete disclosure” of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles development programs and called for complete compliance with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) investigations. In response to the resolution, Secretary-General Annan heralded the agreement: “The adoption represented an example of multilateral diplomacy serving the cause of peace and security.”15 However, according to two observers, “The passage of the resolution masked the onset of a crisis of legitimacy that was the longest and most extensive that the UN has faced in the post–Cold War period.”16

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On the surface, the United States seemed satisfied with the resolution, and the Security Council adverted the use of force. John Negroponte, US ambassador to the UN at the time, remarked: “This resolution contained no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with the use of force.”17 Yet, there were hints that the administration was willing to move forward into Iraq without the UN. As the US ambassador continued: And, one way or another, Iraq will be disarmed. If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.18

The provisions set forth by Resolution 1441 did not satisfy the United States. In early February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the Security Council with apparent documentation of an Iraqi weapons program in direct violation of several UN Security Council resolutions.19 The statement also included allegations of a link between Saddam Hussein and alQaeda. The United States made a case for military action against Iraq on two points. First, Iraq was not in compliance with UNSC 1441, and second, Iraq presented an “imminent threat” as the US accused Iraq of hiding weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 2003, there were discussions in US policy circles about regime change, making many allies question not only the legal foundations but also the intent behind a possible military action. Powell (again using a rather disparaging tone, consistent with Bush’s previous statement) charged, “This body [the UN] places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.”20 Within the UN Security Council, most members failed to find a clear connection between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda. Even close US allies, including France and Germany, did not find the evidence of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program convincing. In protest to the US government’s call for immediate action, the French became particularly confrontational and aligned with the Germans about the need for more time for inspections. They insisted that the United States work through the UN,21 which provoked Donald Rumsfeld to refer to the French and Germans as “a problem,” as he attempted to frame the opposition to expedited military approach as the creation of “old Europe.”22 The Bush administration claimed that previous Security Council resolutions authorized the use of force against Iraq. However, with so much opposition in the Security Council, it was clear that a previous authorization of force did not hold much legitimacy in March 2003. Despite attempts by Secretary-General Kofi Annan for mediation and continued arms inspections, the United Nations was branded as useless by the Bush administration. The United States was focused on removing Saddam Hussein from power and halting his alleged weapons of mass destruc-

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tion program, and the United Nations was framed as an impediment to international security. The administration engaged in a fascinating dual narrative. The first narrative connected the Iraqi government with the War on Terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001. It is here that the three-level game approach is illuminating. The frame connecting Iraq with terrorism was constructed for a domestic audience.23 Americans, in the wake of the September 11 tragedies, were looking for answers and for villains to blame. For the international audience, however, the administration’s narrative concerned an impetuous call for the enforcement of Security Council resolutions. In the face of significant opposition to the use of force in Iraq, the Bush administration justified its efforts as part of a campaign to strengthen Security Council resolutions. Yet, as many council resolutions are not enforced, this narrative revealed a weak logic.24 The contradiction between aggressive rhetoric and legal actualities was a problem for many countries considered allies of the United States. France called for a doubling or tripling of weapons inspectors and more time for Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspections team, and others to complete their work in Iraq. Many Council members claimed that Resolution 1441 was effective, pleaded for the United States to give the inspections more time, and expressed significant dismay that the push for war disregarded international law. Traditional US partners within the region—including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—also called for a diplomatic approach in line with the provisions set forth in UNSC 1441. The representative for Saudi Arabia proclaimed, “Whatever the reason for war, its results would be disastrous at all levels.”25 Despite grave opposition from many allies (specifically France, Germany, and Turkey), the administration was resolute. On March 20, 2003, the United States launched an air attack against Iraq that many viewed as an attack on multilateralism as well. The era of negotiations, diplomacy, and US leadership in establishing international law appeared to be over. The Iraq War was a clear statement of the new approach of the United States to international law and the use of force.26 The United States described the Iraq intervention as another Kosovo that was “illegal but legitimate”; the Clinton administration’s actions in 1999 provided a precedent for the 2003 use of force in Iraq. Bush presented unilateralism as an ethical choice and claimed its rejection of the UN Security Council was the only solution after “exhaustive efforts” to create a multilateral approach.27 The administration deflected the culpability for failure of multilateralism to the international community—the problem was the UN. The administration claimed it had no choice but to move forward on its own. The US move toward war against Iraq triggered extensive protests and demonstrations throughout the globe—on the streets of Washington, DC, Seville, London, Hong Kong, Ottawa, Seoul, Tokyo, and Stockholm, to name a few. With the exception of the United Kingdom, all other permanent mem-

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bers, plus Germany as a rotating member, pressed for a continued inspection process. Despite the British alliance, close to two million British citizens turned out in protest of the war.28 More than thirty-six million people across the planet participated in protests against the Iraq War.29 Yet, the Iraq War provoked many to blame the UN and question its relevance and capacity to manage international threats to peace and security. The UN Security Council as a multilateral forum of fifteen states had failed to curtail the United States and its determined unilateralism. In fact, there are reports that the French considered supporting a US-UK resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq “for the sake of ‘saving’ the UN from division,” though France declined this option as it was reluctant to “turn it [the UN] into a rubber stamp for the US.”30 The stain of irrelevance spread across the entire UN system and even into the parameters of international law. French President Jacques Chirac described the collapse: “The United Nations has just been through one of the most grave crises in its history,” and US actions “shook the multilateral system.”31 Bush’s words in 2002 about Iraq as “a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace” proved true—although not in the manner he originally meant. Inside the United States, the UN was branded as ineffective and irrelevant. Rumsfeld charged the UN with following the path of the League of Nations: “Those acts will be marked in the history of the UN as either the low point of that institution in retreat, or the turning point when the UN woke up, took hold of itself, and moved away from a path of ridicule to a path of responsibility.”32 Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense who served as chair of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee under Bush, issued a scathing perspective in an article titled “Thank God for the Death of the UN.” He applauded the end of “the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world order. As we sift the debris, it will be important to preserve, the better to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through international law administered by international institutions.”33 Yet Anne-Marie Slaughter countered this view, proclaiming, “The United Nations has never mattered more.”34 She argued that the UN could not be dismissed and that, as those who drafted the UN Charter anticipated, it was in the center of trying to resolve issues of international peace and stability. The administration’s unilateralist path also triggered some protest within the United States. John Brady Kiesling, who was serving in the US embassy in Greece, resigned from the State Department in February 2003, claiming, “The policies we are now asked to advance are incompatible not only with American values but also with American interests.” In his resignation letter to Secretary of State Powell, he wrote, Our fervent pursuit of war with Iraq is driving us to squander the international legitimacy that has been America’s most potent weapon of both of-

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fense and defense since the days of Woodrow Wilson. We have begun to dismantle the largest and most effective web of international relationships the world has ever known. Our current course will bring instability and danger, not security.35

Early polling found that most Americans (79 percent) supported the war with UN backing, and 58 percent opposed the war without UN authorization. In terms of party affiliation, 44 percent of Republicans supported the war without the UN stamp of approval, whereas only 15 percent of Democrats were willing to go into Iraq without the UN.36 Considering these numbers, the administration had to at least make it appear to the US public that they had attempted to work through the UN. Once the United States was denied support from Security Council members, lack of UN authorization was framed as having little to do with either the lack of a credible case or the administration’s efforts; the argument was that the problem was the UN itself.37 And after the bombing began, Americans did fault the UN. One poll taken in early March 2003 found that 58 percent saw the UN as doing a “poor job” in managing the Iraq crisis.38 According to David Malone, “The sidelining of the UN by the US prompted widespread criticism, not only of the US but also the UN. Many argued that there had been a twin failure on the part of the UN: failure to contain Iraq and the failure to contain the US.”39 The implications of the use of force against Iraq without UN authorization held significant implications for the United States. US claims about upholding international law and the failures of the UN Security Council to enforce its own resolutions presented a contradictory argument. The administration framed Iraq’s greatest violations as not adhering to the parameters set forth by the UN Security Council. However, the UN Secretary-General identified US efforts to remedy these grievances as in direct violation of the charter.40 The United States claimed that UNSC Resolution 1441 authorized its actions, that the operation was preemptive, and that it was justified based on norms governing humanitarian intervention. Yet, most legal scholars rejected these arguments. Richard Falk held that “the unilateral path is horribly destructive, and almost certain to be selfdestructive.” For Falk, the consequences went beyond US legitimacy and UN viability: “As a precedent, it’s horrible: An endless number of countries could invoke this kind of preemptive logic. China could use it against Taiwan, and it could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.”41 After the Fall of Baghdad After the fall of Baghdad in mid-April 2003, the administration issued contradictory messages about the continued relevance of the UN. Powell repeatedly explained that the UN would have a significant role in rebuilding Iraq; yet many in the administration continued to snub the organization. US allies pushed the United States to return to the UN, with France, Germany, Russia,

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and even the United Kingdom pressing for some sort of UN authorization of the US occupation. In May 2003, the United States returned to the Security Council with a request to lift sanctions on Iraq. The Council adopted Resolution 1483, recognizing both the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers in Iraq. Because Kofi Annan wanted to repair the damage and create a role for the UN, he offered the aid of UN agencies in rebuilding Iraq. Sérgio Vieira de Mello was chosen to act as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to Iraq, as the Secretary-General advocated a multilayered operation under the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The UN suggested that it could assist with nation building, tackling constitutional reform, restructuring the judicial system, police training, demobilization of the military, and economic development. However, in August 2003, tragedy struck when the UN headquarters in Baghdad was bombed—twenty-three people were killed, including Vieira de Mello. As the situation in Iraq grew more violent in the fall of 2003, the UN withdrew most of its personnel. UN officials were concerned that the United States might pull out of Iraq, leaving the entire situation to the UN. For the United States, the unilateral path was a costly one.42 The aftermath of the authorization of use of force presented a key moment in which the role of both domestic politics and the contradictions in the US-UN relationship became very clear. As violence in Iraq increased after the fall of Baghdad, the administration was split on the role the UN would play. The State Department advocated several key roles, whereas the Defense Department rejected any UN involvement.43 At the same time, the administration did want the UN to run the Oil-for-Food Programme to fund the reconstruction of Iraq. Necessity and US allies brought the United States back to the UN. The nation faced significant diplomatic isolation and found that going back to the UN was an important step in mending fences with allies such as France, Germany, and even Pakistan.44 In addition to reconciliation with allies, the UN provided essential benefits that the United States needed—in particular, legitimacy within Iraq.45 As Iraqi insurgents began to kill more and more Americans, the US government realized it needed legitimacy in creating a government within Iraq. It also needed financial assistance and sought international donors to help fund the nation-building project. Finally, as US casualties began to skyrocket, the government saw the UN as a way to secure troop donations from other countries.46 In some regards, the Iraq situation blew back in the face of the Bush administration; instead of proving the irrelevance of the UN, it did the opposite. The UN became essential for success in Iraq, as “made in the USA” was a label that actually hurt US efforts to bring stability to Iraq.47 Unlike the situation in Kosovo in 1999, however, there was no UN-sponsored donors’ conference; members of the Security Council were still reeling from the sting of March 2003, and no one was rushing forward to help the United States put Iraq back together again.

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John Bolton at the United Nations: “There Is No United Nations” A final strain in the US-UN relationship came from President Bush’s August 2005 nomination of John Bolton as interim US ambassador to the United Nations. Consistent with the drama and contradictions of US domestic politics, Bolton was never confirmed by the Senate. Bolton, a strong opponent of the UN system, once quipped, “There is no United Nations,”48 only “an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that’s the United States, when it suits our interests.”49 Although the ICC is not a UN affiliated organization, Bolton was extremely critical of the ICC prior to his ascendance as ambassador. As senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, Bolton made a statement to the Senate’s Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, in which he blatantly stated, “We should oppose any suggestion that we cooperate, help fund or generally support the work of the prosecutor. We should isolate and ignore the ICC. . . . This approach is likely to maximize the chances that the ICC will wither and collapse, which should be our objective.”50 Many NGOs were greatly disappointed by the move to not support the ICC, and Human Rights Watch accused the administration of an active “campaign against the court.”51 Under Bolton’s guidance, the Bush administration promoted a policy of direct opposition to the ICC. The United States not only pushed for immunity from ICC jurisdiction but also rejected it as even a possibility for crafting international justice. The administration created a multilayered approach to isolate itself from the court’s jurisdiction, including actively pursuing bilateral agreements granting the US immunity from ICC jurisdiction. Beyond this, the administration took steps to undermine the court itself and relentlessly blocked anything that merely mentioned the ICC. It also punitively froze military assistance to thirty-five countries that did not sign ICC exemption treaties with the United States. Many in and around the United Nations said that it was taboo to mention the ICC or any issue that might trigger even the most benign reference. One senior official of a human rights NGO explained that “the Bush administration would oppose anything that would give legitimacy to the ICC.”52 In September 2003, the administration had sanctioned thirty-two countries and withheld close to $90 million in bilateral military assistance.53 The US Congress supported Bush and passed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (P.L. 107-206, title II), blocking aid to countries that did not sign onto what were referred to as the Article 98 agreements. Within the act, the Nethercutt Amendment called for ending “economic support funds” for governments that had not signed the bilateral immunity agreements. Within this context, the administration went as far as terminating financial assistance to twelve Latin American states, including Mexico and Brazil. According to one report,

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The administration’s policy has been to insist that every nation receiving US military aid sign an exemption agreement or face an aid cutoff, regardless of the political consequences. Destroying the court has been a pet cause for conservative ideologues in the Bush State Department, such as UN Ambassador John Bolton, who in the first term insisted that his crusade take priority even over military relations with allies that dispatched troops to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.54

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More than half of the countries in Latin America were blocked from aid and training programs as a result of their not signing bilateral ICC agreements with the United States. These measures went into effect despite testimony from the top military commanders, including General Bantz Craddock, commander of the US Southern Command, who argued that the policy held “unintended consequences” and that “loss of engagement prevents the development of long-term relationships with future [Latin American] military and civilian leaders.”55 The effects of this uncompromising approach to the ICC were visible in several sectors. Many US allies viewed them as an overreaction, and the administration was accused of “blackmail” and even “bullying.”56 Countries within Latin America were particularly resentful, pushing leaders in that region to look to other powers such as China, Russia, and Venezuela for funding and training.57 In terms of US credibility, the ideological campaign against the ICC damaged the capacity of the United States to work with other countries both inside and outside the United Nations. There are reports that the administration was split on the issue, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice advocating an attempt at mending fences and Ambassador Bolton insisting on an aggressive campaign against the ICC. The unyielding tone began to shift slightly in 2005, as the mass atrocities in Darfur came onto the administration’s agenda. The first indication of some level of tolerance for the institution appeared when the United States did not veto a resolution referring the Darfur case to the ICC. Yet, the administration was adamant that the lack of a veto should not be equated with support for the ICC. The US representative insisted that despite the US abstention, it “had not dropped, and indeed continued to maintain, its long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the Court. . . . The Rome Statute was flawed and did not have sufficient protection from the possibility of politicized prosecutions.”58 By 2008, officials in the State Department signaled that the ICC could complement the Security Council’s agenda, as well as the US agenda, particularly on Darfur. The Wall Street Journal labeled the change “a rhetorical turnabout for an administration that came to power determined to hobble the movement for a permanent war crimes tribunal.”59 The early Bush years were marked by a persistently dismissive tone regarding the UN as an institution, as well as its employees, processes, and many of its members. The administration tried to undo portions of the United Na-

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tions Charter, international law concerning the use of force, and several decades of work toward treaty establishment and adoption. In the context of the continuum of multilateralism introduced in Chapter 2, the United States, at this point, sat on the extremes, in terms of the quantity of actors it wished to engage with and the qualities of engagement with those partners. Stealth Multilateralism As the conflict in Iraq progressed, the administration found it was almost impossible to continue its go-it-alone approach, particularly with the crisis developing in Iraq. As the administration sought a way out of what was proving to be rather disastrous policy, it softened its tone and rejoined UNESCO. Bolton wrote that the move was a symbolic white flag meant to court international support: Make no mistake, the Bush Administration’s decision to rejoin UNESCO in 2004 was largely motivated by international politics. The theory was that the signal of bending the American knee to multilateralism would win Bush and the country plaudits from its former critics, and ease concerns about the cowboy unilateralists running administration foreign policy.60

Despite the fig leaf, however, there was little international support for US operations in Iraq. The international community took a “you broke it, you fix it” approach and limited its assistance. According to Ambassador Dennis Ross, who served under three presidents, “In the end, the Iraq case stands as a model for how not to do statecraft.”61 In another remarkable about-face, the rising threat of North Korea demonstrated once again that unilateralism was not a viable approach for the United States. In July 2006, the North Koreans launched a ballistic missile test, and in October 2006, the country tested its first nuclear device. In a rejection of unilateralism, the Bush administration repeatedly called for diplomatic approaches. US efforts supported the council’s passage of UNSC Resolution 1718 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the resolution created strict sanctions on North Korea, it did not contain language concerning international military action. The Bush administration could not afford another military confrontation. In addition, many of its traditional allies and supporters were marginalized, and the United States began to find that a unilateral approach—both in rhetoric and in reality—was extremely costly in terms of military resources and human life. By 2006, public support for the administration had eroded. According to a Gallup poll, the average public approval ratings for the first term had been 62 percent; however, the second-term average plummeted to 37 percent, with only 31 percent approving of Bush’s job as president in May 2006.62

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Despite its rhetoric and its legal avoidance of the Security Council, the Bush administration continued its financial support of the United Nations and, as Figures 6.1 and 6.2 (p. 146) illustrate, even incrementally enhanced its financial contributions to the organization. Stephen Schlesinger argued that the Bush years were marked by a “stealth UN policy initiative,” as the administration made significant gains at the UN in terms of breadth of engagement and on issues of terrorism, US occupation of Iraq, sanctions on North Korea and Iran, and expansion of peacekeeping operations, even as the administration rebuked the UN in public.63 Domestic politics and the growing violence in Iraq triggered a noticeable yet discreet change in the Bush administration’s approach to the UN. In a move that signaled the need for a more conciliatory tone and a focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2007, the administration appointed Zalmay Khalilzad to serve as US ambassador to the United Nations. Dr. Khalilzad was born in Afghanistan, served as the US ambassador to Iraq from 2005 to 2007, and as US ambassador and special presidential envoy to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. When he became US ambassador to the United Nations, he was the topranking Muslim in the Bush administration. Khalilzad’s tone was markedly different from that of John Bolton. In an interview with the New York Times, Khalilzad remarked, “I have tried to develop personal relationships with my colleagues here, I have tried to create a sense of trust, I level with them, I don’t demean them.”64 Later, in testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 12, 2007, there was a reversal of Bolton’s rhetoric as Dr. Khalilzad sent a clear message of multilateral necessity and a confluence of interests between the United States and the UN: [A]n effective United Nations is in America’s interest. . . . As one of the principal architects of the United Nations, the United States placed at the foundation of the UN certain fundamental purposes and values—preserving peace, promoting progress, and advocacy of human rights. It is therefore vital for the United States to enable this institution to make the greatest possible contribution to advance those founding objectives.65

Khalilzad’s tone was complemented by a remarkable difference in leadership approach. One observer claimed, “Ambassador Khalilzad has a totally different style than Ambassador Bolton. . . . Khalilzad is informal, inclusive, not at all hierarchical and secretive the way Bolton was.”66 The changing priorities were a key turning point according to a member of the US State Department. As a member of the Obama administration’s team explained, “Zalmay was very passionate about putting the rhetoric of Bolton behind us. His time allowed for a seamless pivot to the current administration. There is a very distinct evolution with the Bush administration. We were lucky to come in in 2009, not 2005.”67

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In terms of Iraq, originally the UN played a marginal role and was sidelined as a “humanitarian NGO.”68 The administration’s initial plan was unilateral and rested primarily on a three-year initiative by Paul Bremer (the presidential envoy to Iraq) to construct a democracy. However, when violence erupted in the Sunni triangle and there were extensive demands for elections within the context of radicalized sectarian factions, the administration found that it lacked the expertise and leverage to create a viable transitional political process. In addition, domestic politics, climbing death tolls in Iraq, and a looming 2004 presidential election forced the Bush administration to turn to the UN. As one news source described the situation, “The United Nations has proved to Mr. Bush to be an essential partner in his central national security focus—the battle against terrorism.”69 Bush needed help, but domestic politics prevented him from any expression of gratitude or even of UN functionality. Thus, the evolution of the Bush administration presents a quiet return to multilateralism. In time, the Bush administration found that the UN was a key element in successful dealings with its highest national security priority—terrorism. The organization provided a venue to address the financing of terrorist organizations, the proliferation of nuclear capacities, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006 was an important step toward the change of tone and perspective. In addition, the administration realized the futility of creating international legal instruments to address terrorism and the proliferation of weapons from a unilateral position. Congress: Politics, Payments, and Reform During the Bush administration, Congress continued to play a central role in the US-UN relationship. Its influence was clearly visible as the head of UNESCO actively lobbied Congress to advocate for the United States to rejoin the organization. Director-General Kōichirō Matsuura started his campaign in 1999 by specifically targeting Jesse Helms of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.70 In the drive for support, the institutional competence of UNESCO was cited time and again, with Matsuura claiming that UNESCO had been reformed. Bush echoed this sentiment in his September 2002 speech to the General Assembly. The congressional animosity of the 1990s was transformed on September 11, 2001. Shortly after the attacks, Congress expressed renewed support of the UN and approved a payment of UN dues and authorized a payment of $582 million, and temporarily lifted the 25 percent cap on peacekeeping contributions. Tom Lantos (D-CA) explained, “We cannot ask the United Nations to bring freedom to difficulties-possessed people, battle terrorism, resolve international conflicts and conduct extensive peacekeeping operation, and yet fail to pay our dues.”71

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However, the warming trend that was left in the wake of the devastation of the terrorist attacks quickly cooled. For many members of Congress, the debate over UN weapons inspections and sanctions and finally the Iraq War in 2003 provoked significant contempt for the UN. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, Senate Democrats proposed a resolution that explicitly required the support of the United Nations in any military operations in Iraq. However, in the end, leading Senate Democrats (including Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, Dianne Feinstein, John Kerry, Richard Gephardt, and Joseph Lieberman) voted for the resolution authorizing war against Iraq. The joint resolution that passed in January 2003 did contain language about UN authorization, as it encouraged the administration to “obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”72 After the United States withdrew its resolution from the Security Council (with only four of the nine votes needed), and the administration declared that “diplomacy has failed.” The reaction in Congress was bitter; in fact, one month later, in April 2003, Representative Ron Paul of Texas attempted to push through Congress H.R. 1146, the American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, proposing that the United States end it membership in the United Nations. Oil-for-Food Programme The high point in contentious relations between the US Congress and the UN came over the Oil-for-Food Programme, created in 1996 to allow the Iraqi government to purchase food and medicine and prevent the Security Council sanctions from creating a humanitarian crisis. Saddam Hussein’s government was permitted to sell oil to raise funds for civilian needs. However, it is estimated that billions in revenue that was intended for the people of Iraq went to Saddam Hussein’s regime, to a Texas oil company, and to senior UN officials. Even the Secretary-General, the Russians, the French, the Chinese, and the US State Department were implicated in the investigations. By April 2004, the investigation into allegations of mishandled funds had become highly politicized. There were claims that the head of the program, Benon Sevan, had mismanaged funds. The accusations then spilled over to Kofi Annan and even to his son Kojo Annan (who worked for Cotecna, a UN subcontractor inspecting shipments of humanitarian aid into Iraq). Nile Gardiner, at the Heritage Foundation, charged that “the oil-for-food scandal represents a spectacular failure of leadership on the part of Kofi Annan.”73 Annan rebutted, “There is nothing in the accusations about my son. He joined the company even before I became Secretary-General, as a 22-year-old, as a trainee in Geneva, and then he was assigned to work for them in West Africa, mainly in Nigeria and Ghana.”74 Some claimed that the investigation was a cynical smokescreen launched by Senator Norm Coleman Jr. (R-MN) to divert attention from problems in Iraq and as retribution against Kofi Annan’s criticism of the war.75

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Congress launched multiple investigations, the Government Accountability Office issued several reports, and Annan conducted his own inquiry. Former Federal Reserve chair Paul Volcker was recruited to head the UN investigation. As the investigations progressed, members of Congress called for Annan’s resignation. Joy Gordon described a “feeding frenzy on the part of conservative journalists.”76 Tensions between the United States and the UN Secretary-General flared again as Kofi Annan was considered responsible for the sexual abuses committed by UN peacekeepers and the lack of action against the US-labeled genocide in Darfur. At this point, however, the Bush administration had found some value in working with the UN and was compelled to defend the organization against congressional attacks. The administration’s spokesperson, Scott McClellan, provided tepid support for the Secretary-General and proclaimed: “This is a very serious matter. . . . We continue to support the United Nations, we continue to support SecretaryGeneral Annan in his work at the United Nations.”77 In the end, Annan was cleared of any wrongdoing. Although the report by Volcker did lay blame on Kofi Annan for general mismanagement, it stated that there was no evidence of corruption or misconduct by the SecretaryGeneral. In addition, there were several indications that US agencies had been aware of—and, in many cases, approved—the transactions that were later blamed on the UN. Regardless, the episode was extremely damaging to the UN. In June 2005, at the UN’s sixtieth anniversary, the celebrations were marred by questions about its corruption, capacities, and relevance. At the time, the press labeled the UN an “underachiever,” better described as “divided states” rather than “United Nations”; “compromised”; “beleaguered”; and “under a cloud.” As one reporter described it: “There’s a real feeling of nervousness about whether this organization can make it through the years ahead.”78 The entire ordeal led to a circle-the-wagons mentality at the UN. Members of Congress also complained that “the UN” was criticizing members of Congress and had adopted a tone of moral superiority.79 The name-calling and animosity reached its apex. The oil-for-food controversy spilled into US relations with its allies. Members of Congress accused the French of involvement in the corruption, though some countered that the accusations against the French were in response to their lack of support for the Iraq War.80 The French ambassador to the United States claimed that “unfounded accusations . . . have been spread by a handful of influential, conservative TV and newspaper journalists in the US.”81 Congressional Funding Stealth multilateralism shows up in Congress during the Bush administration as well. Drilling a bit deeper, there is a contradiction between the aggressive rhetoric from many members of Congress and the UN funding levels. US

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funding for the UN serves as an indicator of multilateralism on two levels— first, as a measure of commitment to participating in the UN, and second, on a more general level, as support for the effectiveness of the UN. The two are distinct in that an administration may not seek to engage in the drama of multilateral diplomacy but still support the overall institutional activities. In the first few months of the George W. Bush administration, the Congress delayed UN payments and seemed to go back on the agreement brokered in 1999 for the full payment of US arrears. This was damaging to the UN’s operational capacity and to the credibility of the United States with other member-states.82 In August 2001, the House of Representatives, under Republican leadership, failed to approve payments under the Helms-Biden agreement and tried to make UN funding conditional on excluding US military personnel from ICC jurisdiction.83 Several observers believed that the United States had squandered an opportunity to finally address the arrears issue.84 And yet, in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, congressional funding of the UN (i.e., assessed, peacekeeping, and voluntary) consistently grew under the Bush administration. From 2003 to 2008, there was almost a doubling of US payments to the United Nations, although these numbers are slightly exaggerated in that they include the UN Capital Master fund to renovate the UN Headquarters in New York. Another indicator of the commitment to multilateralism involves US discretionary spending at the United Nations. Figure 6.1, which traces these voluntary contributions, reveals a steady increase in congressional funding after 2003. This trend is also echoed in US contributions to the peacekeeping budget, illustrated in Figure 6.2. Despite the dip in 2004, when the congressional cap on peacekeeping was reinstated, funding for peacekeeping rebounded. In fact, from 2001 to 2007, US funding of UN peacekeeping doubled from $846.0 million to $1.7 billion. There were bumps in the road, however. For example, in 2005, the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would have held 50 percent of US funding if the UN failed to meet the House’s reform goals. However, the effort did not receive support in the Senate. Although the US Congress got what it wanted and the UN did receive its annual dues, many, particularly in the G-77 caucus group, were resentful of the move by the US legislative branch. The head of the G-77 explained, “[W]e find unpalatable the fact that there is this ax hanging over our heads in terms of the spending limitations.”85 Figure 6.2 demonstrates the steady congressional funding of the Contributions to International Organizations and US support of peacekeeping. Although these numbers are a response to administration initiatives, Congress approved the requests. The dynamics of the separation of powers played a role in US-UN relations as well. Immediately after the events of September 2001, congressional opposition was temporarily “neutralized, . . . leaving a very strong alignment

146 Figure 6.1 US Discretionary UN Spending, 2000–2010

Source: Browne and Nakamura, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues. Note: The total spending data are skewed by the US return to UNESCO in 2004 and, in 2009, by the commitment to the UN Capital Master Plan (CMP). The gray line removes both UNESCO and Capital Master Plan and still indicates an average budget growth rate of 4.72 percent during the eight years that George W. Bush made budgetary requests.

Figure 6.2 US Contributions for International Organizations and International Peacekeeping Activities, 1999–2010

Source: Data compiled from congressional appropriations acts and federal funding bills, fiscal years 1999 to 2010.

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between the executive and legislative branches.”86 But the Iraq War controversy of 2003 dissipated this temporary support. Yet, despite the oil-for-food scandal and abrasive rhetoric, congress continued funding the UN—revealing another inconsistency between rhetoric and policy. At the same time, the funding pattern may be the result of a congressional desire to support the president and his budget request more than its desire to support the United Nations. Presidents must play the two-level game and appease allies who see the United Nations as a legitimate forum and work with the UN when it provides a useful supplement to US foreign policy. Yet considering the conservative movement away from internationalism in periods of Republican control over the White House and Republican control over one or both houses of Congress, one might expect severe restrictions in UN funding. But this was not the case during the Bush administration. The continuation of congressional funding for the UN illustrates two things: first, it is easier for a Republican president to advocate for UN funding, and second, the UN remained relevant. Although there were efforts to make UN dues conditional based on reforms, unlike in the 1990s, these provisions never passed Congress.87 Each year the president submits a budget request to Congress, including the State Department’s request for the assessed contribution to the UN’s regular budget (as well as to forty-three additional organizations in the UN system and other regional and non-UN organizations). This is labeled the Contributions for International Organizations (CIO) account. In a different request, the president will ask for US funding of the UN’s peacekeeping operations, or Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. As Table 6.1 demonstrates, Congress authorized more than 95 percent of the budget for the UN as requested by the Bush administration. The high point of tensions over the Oilfor-Food Programme was in 2005, which was the only year in which congressional funding of both CIO and CIPA was less than 90 percent of that requested.

Table 6.1 Requested and Authorized Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) and Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), 2001–2009 Fiscal Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Requested (Assessed CIO) 946.06 mil. 878.76 mil. 891.37 mil. 1.010 bil. 1.194 bil. 1.296 bil. 1.268 bil. 1.354 bil. 1.529 bil.

Authorized CIO

870.83 mil. 850 mil. 866 mil. 1.01 bil. 1.18 bil. 1.29 bil. 1.26 bil. 1.4 bil. 1.5 bil.

Percentage Authorized 91% 96 97 100 98 100 99 104 98

Requested CIPA

738.66 mil. 844.13 mil. 725.98 mil. 350.2 mil. 650 mil. 1.035 bil. 1.135 bil. 1.107 bil. 1.497 bil.

Authorized CIPA

846 mil. 844.13 mil. 673.71 mil. 550.2 mil. 490 mil. 1.035 bil. 1.1 bil. 1.7 bil. 1.5 bil.

Source: Browne and Nakamura, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues.

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Political party dynamics appear to have an impact on UN funding. When Republicans control the White House, paying UN dues does not become part of the tug-of-war characteristic of divided government. When Democrats control one or more houses of Congress and Republicans control the executive, funding for the UN is likely to be secure. In this case, when Democrats are in control, they are unlikely to block UN funding. In addition, the Republican political identity often perpetuates an image that Republicans are strong on foreign policy, and engagement at the UN is received as strategic. Paradoxically, although support for the UN is lowest among conservatives, the UN may fare better in terms of funding when a Republican is in the White House, although Democratic-controlled Congress has also cut UN funding. Reforms: From Commission to Council The issue of UN reform is fascinating and highlights how domestic politics can run counter to the necessities of the politics at the international level. During the early 2000s, members of Congress, the White House, and the UN SecretaryGeneral were all calling for a major overhaul of the UN. The top of the list of reforms demanded by Congress included restructuring the Human Rights Commission and the enduring issue of management problems.88 In 2005, Tom DeLay, majority leader in the House of Representatives, declared, “As long as tyrants and terrorists get as much say in policymaking as democratically elected leaders, the UN will continue to betray its charter and betray the billions of people on this planet that look to it for hope.”89 At one point in 2006, Congress called for withholding UN dues, but in classic “good cop, bad cop” fashion, Bolton appealed to Congress and argued that not paying UN dues would compromise US foreign policy.90 Clearly, the Bush White House did not want Congress dictating US foreign policy. A pattern appeared during the Bush era that was similar to what had occurred during the Reagan era. First, there are allegations of corruption, waste, and outrage. Then there are calls for reform and threats to withhold funding. What often follows is a softening of hard-liner positions and, finally, declarations that reforms have been made. The case of the Human Rights Commission was one of several examples in which the US Congress proclaimed the organization to be full of corruption and then heralded the administration’s efforts as successful, thus allowing for a reengagement. The Human Rights Commission was also viewed as corrupt and hostile toward Israel, particularly as it examined allegations against Israel thirteen times. Nancy Soderberg, who had been US deputy representative to the UN under the Clinton administration, explained the particular appeal of human rights issues during the Bush administration’s tenure as many neoconservatives were pushing for more action in the Darfur region of Sudan and in North Korea: “Getting the human rights council would be a success for the Bush administration, because it would be something it could offer to its conservative base while portraying it as a more general success.”91

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In fact, there was significant domestic and international consensus about the problems facing the Human Rights Commission. Kofi Annan had made the commission’s reform part of his own agenda to restore confidence in the UN overall.92 Repeating the pattern of accusations, “reform” and return, Bolton managed to head off congressional attempts to cut funding by arguing that US efforts to implement reforms at the UN were progressing. In what was heralded as a bold move, Annan called for the creation of a Human Rights Council to replace the battered commission. Yet, when the new forum was created, controversies surfaced regarding membership, voting rights, and authority. The US efforts under Bolton served to further politicize the process, according to Lauren: He [Bolton] conveyed unconcealed hostility to the entire United Nations enterprise, skipped nearly all of the negotiating sessions but then fiercely complained in holier-than-thou tones about the “manifest deficiencies” of any reform proposals other than his own, persistently introduced new amendments and tried to reopen the text of the operative resolution in ways that were widely regarded by other delegations as crude delaying tactics.93

Bolton and others protested about the composition of the proposed Human Rights Council, and much to the dismay of the other 175 countries involved, the US proposal wanted a guaranteed seat for all permanent Security Council members while also hoping to limit membership to only democracies. The US push for “hard criteria” for membership was particularly problematic, given allegations against the United States for abuses in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. In March 2006, when the vote to create the Human Rights Council came to the floor of the General Assembly, the vote was 170–4, with the United States voting against it. At the end of the day, US efforts were viewed as self-interested and obstructionist. Civil Society: “US Out of the UN” and “UN Out of the US” Movements Civil society also played a contributing role in both the dismissal of the UN and the clandestine return. Examination of the rhetoric from the 1980s through the Iraq War of 2003 shows that the damaging language about the UN had an impact on public views of the UN. The cues from Moynihan and Kirkpatrick took seed within several sectors of American society and hindered the palatability of the UN. As Muldoon wrote, “The viciousness of the criticism and sustained effort to discredit the United Nations by the neoconservative faction of the Bush administration in the run-up to the war on Iraq were both extraordinary and effective.”94 Although this dynamic goes back several decades, during the controversy over the Iraq war, the attacks became more vicious, targeted, and toxic.

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The administration’s rancor was mirrored in portions of civil society, and scathing animosity appeared in both Congress and sectors of the general public. The Iraq War prompted accusations that the UN supports terrorist organizations and—like the accusation of communist sympathies of the Reagan era—that it provides a breeding ground for anti-Americanism.95 In 2005, the Citizens United Foundation funded the creation of Broken Promises, a sixtyminute film on the failures of the United Nations. Several websites such as Get Us Out of the UN (www.getoutoftheun.org) and Move America Forward (www.moveamericaforward.org) called for the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations. Another wave of condemnation was found in state legislatures, where several bills were introduced advocating US withdrawal from the United Nations. In one instance, several New Hampshire representatives posed a 2005 resolution: Many of the members of the United Nations are not friendly to the United States and support many things that are detrimental to the country and against its interests, yet expect the United States to provide the finances and manpower to solve all of the world’s problems, even putting the lives of the nation’s military forces in danger. . . . Take measures to dissolve the membership of the United States in the United Nations.96

Several vocal groups within civil society held that the United Nations was an organization that threatened US sovereignty and provided a forum for creating opposition to US policy. However, most of the extreme animosity was at the fringes of society. A review of the polling data suggests that support for UN membership continued and that US citizens wanted their foreign policy leaders to both cooperate with and strengthen the United Nations. In 2007, 60 percent of Americans interviewed agreed with the statement, “When dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the US will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.”97 Yet, over the eight years of the Bush administration, there was consistent decline of UN job approval rankings, with the last five years of his term particularly depleted. As indicated in Figure 6.3, from 1990 to February 2009, general approval ratings of the UN dropped 30 percent, with the most significant loss occurring from 2002 to 2003, when “poor job” rankings went from 36 percent to 60 percent of those interviewed. The bipartisan nature of the decline in approval ratings provides an additional indicator of the toll of negative rhetoric. In data taken from a Gallup report, party affiliation proved to be important in one’s evaluations of the UN. In 2000, among Republicans, support for the UN was at 41 percent; by 2006, support dipped to a low of 23 percent.98 In 2003, 59 percent of Democrats viewed the UN as doing a “good job,” but only 36 percent found this accurate in 2006. Thus, within the first six years of the Bush administration, there was

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Figure 6.3 US Public Opinion and the United Nations, 1990–2016

Sources: Andrew Dugan and Nathan Wendt, “Solid Majority of Americans Say UN Doing a Poor Job,” Gallup Poll, February 25, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/167576/solid-majority -americans-say-doing-poor-job.aspx; Jeff Jones and Lydia Saad, “World Affairs,” Gallup Poll Social Series, February 6–9, 2014; Jim Norman, “UN Job Rating Among Americans Higher, but Still Low,” Gallup Poll, March 1, 2016.

a 43 percent decrease in UN approval ratings by Republicans and a 39 percent decrease by Democrats. By 2008, only 18 percent of Republicans polled expressed approval of the UN. Ian Destler found that partisan polarization magnified the challenges of UN funding and negatively affected US payments to the United Nations.99 As politics within the United States became more toxic, politics between the US and the UN became more toxic. It is helpful to examine why public opinion regarding the UN is so malleable. There are consistent indicators that the US public advocates continued membership and wants the United States to work through the UN. However, US citizens’ literacy about the United Nations is rather low. The UN presents an intricate collection of organizations with distinct mandates and capacities. Most Americans are not familiar with the organizational structure and the prominent role of member-states—particularly in the Security Council. Furthermore, most Americans do not give much attention to the UN’s activities and performance.100 Within the United States, UN job approval is vulnerable to context, and the literature points out that lack of personal experience, the legal complexity, and the low visibility of the United Nations all make individual opinions on the institution malleable to cues from the political elite.101 In 1961, James Rosenau wrote that most observers of foreign policy

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are “so far removed from the scene of actions” that they “hardly grasp the plot.”102 In related research, Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis found that the US public held acute misinformation about the facts of the Iraq War, which may have contributed to the low UN ratings. The authors found that six months after the initiation of the war, 49 percent of Americans believed the United States had found clear evidence that Saddam Hussein was working with al-Qaeda, 77 percent believed world public opinion supported the Iraq War, and 73 percent of those who supported the war believed the United States had found weapons of mass destruction.103 A Confluence of Catastrophes Several international and domestic factors came together to make the first decade of the new millennium a difficult time in US-UN relations, as well as in US relations with many of its closest allies. The following section applies the conditional multilateralism framework presented in Chapter 2. The discussion highlights the dysfunctional dynamics at the international level, within the UN, and within the United States that came together to undermine multilateralism. Although the United States firmly remained in a hegemonic position at the beginning of the century, this did not imply that it had carte blanche capacity to sustain that position after eroding the foundation of its own power. Several other significant powers, including Russia, China, France, Germany, and even Canada, rejected US unilateralism and insisted on some compliance with the norms of international institutionalism. The United States set an agenda of preemptive strikes, identified an axis of evil, and began to wage an uncompromising war on terrorism, asserting “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Both the Iraq War and the broader War on Terrorism skirted international law as drone warfare, detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and events at Abu Ghraib hampered US legitimacy and credibility. The Cold War approach was based on containment and alliances, the War on Terrorism approach shunned the role of alliances and rejected containment. At the international level, the events of September 11, 2001, changed the landscape in favor of cooperation. France presents one case in which support of the United States was significant. President Jacques Chirac proclaimed that he was “completely determined to fight by your side this new type of evil”104 and supported these efforts with the invocation of NATO’s Article 5, the collective defense clause, and intelligence sharing, financial support, and troop commitments. However, the initial outpouring of international sympathy and support immediately after the terrorist attacks were soon replaced by concerted efforts to restrain the insistent moves of the United States toward an invasion of Iraq. In the US implementation of both the War on Terrorism and the Iraq War, the French were not consulted, and by March 2003, France and Germany allied together to pre-

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vent US advances into Iraq. From Bush’s first speech to the General Assembly in September 2002, the Bush administration had connected the future of the UN to the use of force in Iraq, and many, including the French and Canadians, were extremely concerned about the fate of the UN system and authorization of force if the United States went to war without the UN. After $2 trillion spent and an estimated 175,000 lives lost in Iraq, Jean Chrétien’s words of April 2003 may have proved prophetic: “The long-term interests of the United States will be better served by acting through the United Nations than by acting alone.”105 Circling the Wagons at the UN At the institutional level within the UN, several components converged. First, the institutional mandate of the UN is to prevent war, and with little in the way of casus belli in Iraq, the UN mandate ran directly counter to US goals. Given the UN’s role as a forum for state-to-state coordination, the use of force in Iraq was rejected by three veto-wielding powers, as France, Russia, and China were not compelled by the Bush administration’s case for war. Therefore, not only did the venue for policy coordination run against the US agenda, but also the venue provided a forum for member-states to rally opposition to the American path into Iraq. The problems at the UN were not generated just by the United States, however. There were also valid issues of mismanagement; structural issues of voting dominance by countries not always friendly to US interests; and growing pains that produced corruption, lack of funding, and lack of clarity in mandate. The Human Rights Commission was a particularly egregious example in which those countries with significant records of human rights violations actively sought seats on the commission in order to protect their interest. In 2003, for example, the representative from Libya was elected to serve as president of the commission—the result of the numerical dominance of the African group. The inconsistency between the organizational mandate and its actual effectiveness was vast. The United States, regardless of its rhetoric of exceptionalism, was part of the dysfunctional process at the UN, as it refused to call out allies and other great powers for their human rights transgressions and rejected allegations of its own violations of human rights in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.106 Another layer of animosity was fed by the presence of an activist SecretaryGeneral. Kofi Annan came into office with a reform agenda. (See Table 6.2 for a list of some of his many reform initiatives.) Annan advocated for a “dramatic operational expansion” and called for “radical overhaul” of a long list of UN organizations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council, and the Human Rights Commission. Despite agreement among the Secretary-General, Congress, and the White House over the need for reforms, the process was highly politicized.

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Table 6.2 UN Reform Proposals from Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 1997–2006 Date

Title

Reforms Proposed

November 2005

Report of the SecretaryGeneral on Management Reform

Secretariat reform and creation of a UN ethics office

March 2006

September 2005

April 2005 September 2002 April 2000 July 1997

Investing in the United Nations for a Stronger Organization Worldwide

In Larger Freedom

Management reform and restructuring of the UN Secretariat

General Assembly revitalization, enhanced Security Council representation, enhanced Economic and Social Council role in development policy, creation of Human Rights Council, and UN Secretariat reform

Explanatory Note of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding Commission

Creation of a Peacebuilding Commission

We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century

Expanding access of civil society and the private sector to the UN, streamlining the organization with a results-based approach

Strengthening the UN: An Agenda for Further Change

Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform

Prioritizing agendas, serving member-states more effectively, and focusing on human rights

Emphasis on increasing “transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and flexibility”

The unilateral reform efforts initiated by the United States were a bitter pill for the UN to swallow. Annan rejected both the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act, adopted by the House of Representatives, and the bipartisan Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force on UN Reform recommendations. Annan argued that the path to changing the UN was through negotiations with other member-states, not through “draconian” budgetary threats from the United States.107 The Secretary-General faced an impossible dilemma. On the one hand, if he kowtowed to the demands of the US Congress, he compromised the integrity of the UN itself, as the UN would be perceived as a handmaiden of the United States. On the other hand, by rejecting the US demands for UN reform, he jeopardized the organization’s fiscal viability. Trygve Lie’s words that the job of the Secretary-General was “the most impossible job in the world” certainly rang true for Kofi Annan and his relations with the United States.

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Kofi Annan took the lead in UN reforms and was able to streamline much of the bureaucracy by cutting nearly a thousand positions and changing the management team. His credibility was extremely high, yet his diplomatic approach—which sought to accommodate US demands, serve the other 192 member-states, and advocate for the UN—was unattainable. In response to the calls for reform and threats of withholding payments, UN Deputy SecretaryGeneral Mark Malloch-Brown lashed out at the United States in June 2006. He highlighted the importance of civil society, the hijacking of the US discourse by a conservative faction, and the Bush administration’s covert engagement at the UN: The US is constructively engaged with the UN. But that is not well known or understood, in part because much of the public discourse that reaches the US heartland has been largely abandoned to its loudest detractors such as Rush Limbaugh and Fox News. That is what I mean by “stealth” diplomacy: the UN’s role is in effect a secret in Middle America.108

Domestic Dysfunction and Drawback As Brown pointed out, regardless of international pressures, the tides did not bode well for the UN when it came to politics within the United States. Before the events of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration’s ideological orientation was not inclined to take a multilateral path, even outside the UN system. In addition, the administration brought to the national dialogue the triumph of the views of Barry Goldwater, with his great suspicion of international organizations in general and the UN in particular. From the neoconservative tradition, the UN is viewed as a threat to individual liberty and US sovereignty. Again, the narratives, particularly among neoconservatives, held that the UN is a cumbersome, wasteful organization that allows America’s enemies (“terrorists,” “socialists,” “communists,” and “abortionists”) a seat at the table. For traditional laissez-faire conservatives, the UN runs counter to ideas that promote minimalism in government and that reject a social welfare network.109 In this regard, the UN represents the further expansion of government power. The Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations Development Programme, and other agencies represent social welfare policy at the global level. At the same time, however, for issues such as Darfur, some Christian conservatives found the UN helpful.110 In addition to a White House largely hostile to the UN, the House of Representatives was controlled by the Republicans from 2001 to 2007, and the Senate was under Republican control from 2003 to 2007. The recess appointment of John Bolton to represent the United States at the UN further fanned the hostilities, as his approach to relations with the United Nations was perceived as combative. Although many in the State Department and the White House did not find the approach helpful, it was embraced by conservative

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factions. The remarks of Florida congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to Bolton during a congressional visit highlight support for Bolton and his confrontational agenda: “I just want you to know that you’re a rock star around here.”111 Domestically, it was politically rewarding for the Bush administration to frame the UN as ineffective. It played well to a section of the conservative base, and any diplomatic failing on the administration’s part could be deflected as the result of a corrupt international organization. When the Iraq War did not yield the triumph that administration officials predicted, the UN again became a relevant player. With the terrorism agenda and the Iraq War, the administration needed the UN’s expertise and hoped it would assist with burden sharing. Yet President Bush could not publicize the value of the UN, however limited. Behind the scenes, the administration’s approach evolved to what may be described as “limited multilateralism.”112 As the Bush administration’s quiet campaign suggests, engagement at the United Nations was in the strategic interests of the United States—from burden sharing to collective legitimation, the UN enhanced US capacities. Historically, there is a return to multilateralism after international crises— when tragedy and disorder appear, calls rise for international governance and the strengthening of international organizations.113 After the attacks in September 2001, calls for unity and diplomacy came from both Congress and the executive branch; however, they were short lived and were destroyed in the lead-up to the Iraq War. The United States had an opportunity to strengthen multilateralism and harvest international goodwill toward the nation, and yet it turned away from collaborative approaches to governance. The conditional multilateralism framework highlights how domestic factors, the international context, and UN institutional challenges all came together to create a volatile and adverse dynamic. Although the move away from multilateralism enhanced the administration’s discretion to act, it decreased its capacities to influence outcomes. Bush rejected not only the UN but also multilateralism itself. Unlike in the Clinton administration, traditional US allies were marginalized, and alternative venues such as NATO were not workable. 1. “US Ousted from UN Human Rights Commission” CNN.com (May 3, 2001), http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/05/03/us.human/. 2. Bill Nichols, “Tension Returns to US Relationship with UN,” USA Today, September 10, 2001. 3. Romesh Ratnesar and Mike Allen, “The End of Cowboy Diplomacy,” Time 168, no. 3 (2006). 4. “US Ousted from UN Human Rights Commission.” 5. The Canadians quickly rejected these accusations and tried to make up the budget shortfall for the organization.

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6. Colonel Daniel Smith, “Dropping Out—American Style,” CDI Weekly Defense Monitor 6, no. 14 (2002). 7. Mary Robinson, “Plenary Session on the Relevance of the United Nations,” National Forum on the United Nations, June 26–28, 2003. 8. William Clinton, “Status of the United States Efforts Regarding Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions,” White House Document (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 17, 2000). 9. “Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002). 10. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at Naval Station Mayport,” February 13, 2003. 11. Julia Preston, “Bush’s Step Toward UN Is Met by Warm Welcome; Council Seems Ready to Act,” New York Times, September 13, 2002. 12. Matthew Rothschild, “Bush Trashes the United Nations,” The Progressive 67 no. 4 (April 31, 2003). 13. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in an Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” UN General Assembly, New York, September 12, 2002. 14. Ibid. 15. UN Security Council, “Security Council Holds Iraq in ‘Material Breach’ of Disarmament Obligations,” Meeting 4644, SC/7564 (November 8, 2002). 16. B. Gregory Marfleet and Colleen Miller, “Failure After 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council,” Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 3 (2005): 333. 17. UN Security Council, Meeting 4644, November 8, 2002, 3. 18. Ibid. 19. UN Security Council, “Briefing Security Council, US Secretary of State Powell,” Meeting 4701, February 6, 2003. 20. Ibid. 21. In the Iraq case, many of the member-states in opposition to the Iraq War plans were also responding to their domestic publics. German chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised to block the war efforts during the 2002 election campaign, and Canadian prime minister Chrétien’s efforts to find a way around the use of force were strongly supported by his domestic population. 22. “Outrage at ‘Old Europe’ Remarks,” BBC News, January 23, 2003. 23. Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005). 24. Other countries in noncompliance with Security Council resolutions included Israel (thirty-two), Turkey (twenty-four), Morocco (sixteen), and Croatia. India, Pakistan, and Indonesia all made the list in 2002. See Stephen Zunes, “UN Resolutions Being Violated by Countries Other Than Iraq,” http://www.ifamericansknew.org/stats /violations.html. 25. UN Security Council, “Security Council Hears Over 60 Speakers in Two-Day Debate on Iraq’s Disarmament,” February 19, 2003. 26. Richard Falk, “What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?” American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003). 27. Stewart Patrick, “Beyond Coalitions of the Willing,” Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003), 38. 28. “‘Million’ March Against Iraq War,” BBC News, February 16, 2003. 29. Alex Callinicos, “Anti-War Protests Do Make a Difference,” Socialist Worker (March 19, 2005). 30. Irwin Wall, “The French-American War over Iraq,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, no. 2 (2004): 133.

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31. “Chirac: Iraq War Undermined UN,” CNN.com, September 23, 2003. 32. Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Rebukes the UN and NATO on Iraq Approach,” New York Times, February 9, 2003, 2. 33. Richard Perle, “Thank God for the Death of the UN,” The Guardian, March 20, 2003. 34. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Accused of Irrelevance and Deeply Divided over Iraq, the United Nations Has Never Mattered More,” Washington Post, March 2, 2003, B1. 35. Rothschild, “Bush Trashes the United Nations.” 36. David Moore, “Support for Invasion of Iraq Remains Contingent on UN Approval,” Gallup.com, November 12, 2002, http://www.gallup.com/poll/7195/support -invasion-iraq-remains-contingent-un-approval.aspx. 37. Lydia Saad, “Top Ten Findings About Public Opinion and Iraq,” Gallup.com, October 8, 2002, http://www.gallup.com/poll/6964/top-ten-findings-about-public -opinion-iraq.aspx. 38. Adam Nagourney and Janet Elder, “More Americans Now Faulting UN on Iraq, Poll Finds,” New York Times, March 11, 2003. 39. Poorvi Chitalkar and David M. Malone, “The UN Security Council and Iraq,” United Nations University Working Paper Series, no. 1, 2013 , 6. 40. Patrick E. Tyler and Felicity Barringer, “Annan Says US Will Violate Charter If It Acts Without Approval,” New York Times, March 11, 2003. 41. Rothschild, “Bush Trashes the United Nations.” 42. Roger Coate, “The Iraq Invasion and US-UN Relations,” in Australia, Canada and Iraq: Perspectives on an Invasion, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Jack Cunningham (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015). 43. Steven R. Weisman, “Against France and Russia, Washington Tries to Curb UN Role in a Postwar Iraq,” New York Times, March 27, 2003. 44. Felicity Barringer, “Unanimous Veto by the UN’s Council Adopts Iraq Plan,” New York Times, October 17, 2003. 45. Anne Applebaum, “This Call for Help Is About Re-Election, Not Iraq,” The Sunday Telegraph, September 7, 2003. 46. Steven R. Weisman and Felicity Barringer, “US May Drop Attempt at Vote on Iraq in UN,” New York Times, October 8, 2003. 47. David Greising, “The High Price of Unilateralism,” Chicago Tribune, October 19, 2003. 48. Warren Hoge, “Bolton and UN Are Still Standing After His First Test,” New York Times, September 18, 2005. 49. John Bolton, “Global Structures Convocation,” World Federalist Association, New York, February 3, 1994, 4. 50. “Is a UN International Criminal Court in the US National Interest?” hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John Bolton, Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs). 51. Human Rights Watch, “US Fiddles Over ICC While Darfur Burns,” January 31, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/31/us-fiddles-over-icc-while-darfur -burns. 52. Senior official, Amnesty International, interview with author, June 6, 2013. 53. Fiona McKay, “US Unilateralism and International Crimes: The International Court and Terrorism,” Cornell International Law Journal 36 (2004). 54. Jackson Diehl, “A Losing Latin Policy,” Washington Post, March 10, 2006. 55. Senators John McCain, John Warner, Carl Levin, Hillary Clinton, and James Inhofe all expressed their agreement with the general. US Senate, Armed Services

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Committee, “Hearing of Combatant Commander’s Military Strategy and Operational Requirements in Review of the FY2007 Defense Budget,” March 14, 2006. 56. Nicholas Kristof, “Schoolyard Bully Diplomacy,” New York Times, October 16, 2005. 57. Clare M. Ribando, Article 98 Agreements and Sanctions on US Foreign Aid to Latin America, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, April 10, 2006), 6. 58. UN Security Council, “Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court” (2005). 59. Jess Bravin, “US Accepts International Criminal Court,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2008, 2. 60. Richard Hoggart, An Idea and Its Servants (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 8. 61. Dennis B. Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 131. 62. “Presidential Approval Ratings—George W. Bush,” Gallup.com. 63. Stephen Schlesinger, “Bush’s Stealth United Nations Policy,” World Policy Journal 25, no. 2 (2008). David Kaye coined the term “stealth multilateralism,” see “Stealth Multilateralism,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (2013): 113–124. 64. Warren Hoge, “Praise at UN for a New US Envoy’s Inclusive Tactics and Convivial Style,” New York Times, June 6, 2007. 65. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 12, 2007, Senate Hearing 11-777, https://www.congress.gov/110/chrg/shrg48267/CHRG-110shrg48267.htm. 66. Hoge, “Praise at UN for a New US Envoy’s Inclusive Tactics and Convivial Style.” 67. Senior official, Bureau of International Organizations, US Department of State, personal interview with the author, January 2013. 68. Senior official, UN Peacebuilding Commission, personal interview with the author, March 2013. 69. Howard LaFranchi, “Bush and the UN: A Reluctant Embrace,” Christian Science Monitor, September 22, 2008. 70. Joseph Fitchett, “How Head of UNESCO Got Washington to Rejoin,” International Herald Tribune, September 16, 2002. 71. Nichols, “Tension Returns to US Relationship with UN,” 710. 72. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2003). 73. Steven Edwards, “Congress Meets UN Resistance: Legislators Probe Oil-forFood Corruption Claims,” National Post, April 6, 2004, A11. 74. Steven Edwards, “Annan Diverts Blame in Iraq Oil Scandal,” National Post, April 29, 2004, A13. 75. Scott Ritter, “The Oil-for-Food ‘Scandal’ Is a Cynical Smokescreen,” The Independent on Sunday, December 12, 2004; John G. Ruggie, “What About the Log in Your Eye, Congress? Annan Under Attack II,” International Herald Tribune, December 8, 2004. 76. Joy Gordon, “When Unilateralism Is Invisible: A Different Perspective on the Oil-for-Food Scandal,” Global Governance 13 (2007): 61. 77. Ewen MacAskill, “Annan Cleared in Oil-for-Food Inquiry,” The Guardian, March 30, 2005, 13. 78. Warren Hoge, “For the Beleaguered UN, a Dance of Reinvention,” International Herald Tribune, February 25, 2005, 2. 79. Ruth Wedgwood, “100 Days to a Better United Nations,” Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2006.

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80. Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “Oil-for-Food Probes Expose Cultural Gulfs,” Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 2005. 81. William Safire, “Scandal with No Friends,” New York Times, April 19, 2004, A23. 82. Elizabeth Neuffer, “US-UN Relations Seen Worsening,” Boston Globe, May 10, 2001. 83. Alison Bond, “US Founding of the United Nations,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 395 (2003) 84. Nichols, “Tension Returns to US Relationship with UN.” 85. Warren Hoge, “UN Adopts a 2-Year Budget, Averting a Financial Crisis,” New York Times, December 24, 2005. 86. David Caron, “Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multilateralism 2001–2003: A Mid-Term Assessment,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 21, no. 395 (2003). 87. Paul Richter and Maggie Farley, “Bolton Backs Voluntary Donations to Run UN; Envoy Says Such Funding Would Force Efficiency. But He Is Against the US Withholding Its Dues,” Los Angeles Times, September 29, 2005. 88. Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell, “Report Card from America UN Reform,” International Herald Tribune, November 26, 2005. 89. “Procedings and Debates of the 109th Congress,” Congressional Record, June 17, 2005, H4679, https://www.congress.gov/crec/2005/06/17/CREC-2005-06-17-pt1 -PgH4679-2.pdf. 90. Howard LaFranchi, “Enough UN Reform to Satisfy Congress?” Christian Science Monitor, September 30, 2005. 91. Howard LaFranchi, “How the US Wants the United Nations to Reform,” Christian Science Monitor, September 13, 2005, 2. 92. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Feedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). 93. Paul Gordon Lauren, “‘To Preserve and Build on Its Achievements and Redress Its Shortcomings’: The Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2007): 333. 94. Ibid. 95. “TV Campaign Urging: Kick UN Out of US,” WorldNetDaily, Novermber 21, 2004. 96. See http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1321889/posts. Utah also saw a similar legislative initiative. 97. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, World Public Opinion 2007, WorldPublic Opinion.org, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jun07/CCGA+_Full Report_rpt.pdf. 98. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans’ Ratings of United Nations Among Worst Ever: Sixty-Four Percent Say It Is Doing a Poor Job,” Gallup.com, March 6, 2006. 99. I. M. Destler, “The Reasonable Public and the Polarized Policy Process,” in The Real and the Ideal, eds. Anthony Lake and David Ochmanek (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 100. Donald J. Puchala, “American Interests and the United Nations,” Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 4 (1982–83). 101. Philip Everts, “NATO, the European Community and the United Nations,” in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Miedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 423. 102. James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961), 34.

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103. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsey, and Even Lewis, “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraqi War,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 4 (2003–04). 104. Remarks by President Chirac and President Bush at the White House, September 18, 2001. 105. Jean Chrétien, “The Road to Baghdad Leads Through the UN,” Policy Options (2003). 106. Lauren, “‘To Preserve and Build on Its Achievements and Redress Its Shortcomings.’” 107. Ibid. 108. Mark Malloch-Brown, “UN Needs US, US Needs UN to Face Challenges” (New York: UN Department of Public Informaiton, June 7, 2006). 109. Breighton Gunther, “Laissez-Faire Conservatism and the United Nations Reform Act of 2005” (master’s thesis, Texas Woman’s University, 2007). 110. Abraham McLaughlin, “Urgent Calls for More Troops to Darfur,” Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 2006. 111. LaFranchi, “Enough UN Reform to Satisfy Congress?” 2. 112. Ian Johnstone, “US-UN Relations After Iraq,” European Journal of International Law 15, no. 4 (2004). 113. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

7 Barack Obama and the Rhetorical Return to the UN

The election of Barack Obama in November 2008 seemed to mark the beginning of a new era in US-UN relations. The signals that came from Washington were reminiscent of 1945, as Obama embraced a view of the United States as a leader of global multilateralism. In his initial days, Obama declared a restored confidence in the United Nations. The 2010 National Security Strategy announced, “We are enhancing our coordination with the UN and its agencies. We need a UN capable of fulfilling its founding purpose— maintaining international peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and advancing human rights. To this end, we are paying our bills.”1 Indeed, the Obama administration’s return to multilateralism was marked with the payment of millions in debt to the UN that had accumulated between 2005 and 2008. The president’s new ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, also provided a ringing endorsement and proclaimed, “We are rather dramatically changing our approach to the United Nations.”2 This focus was echoed in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s words: “I believe that at its best, the United Nations is not only a critical, central institution, but one in which the United States has a lot of equities.”3 Yet, the renewed commitment was not without concerns, as Rice explained, The UN is imperfect; but it is also indispensable. There can be no substitute for the legitimacy the UN can impart or its potential to mobilize the widest possible coalitions. . . . In short, the UN is essential to our efforts to galvanize concerted actions that make Americans safer and more secure.4

Initially, the level of reengagement was positive, and the Obama administration’s actions seemed to match the rhetoric. The administration once again elevated the UN ambassadorial position to the cabinet level and sought out talks through the UN that the Bush administration had boycotted, including discussions on human rights, nuclear disarmament regarding Iran and North Korea, and climate change. Obama introduced the Global Poverty Act, prioritizing global poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals, and 163

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moved to adopt the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also created several initiatives within the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), including building a coalition of states to address the issue of freedom of expression and to assist with referendums in Sudan and Libya. There were also important symbolic gestures as Obama chaired UN Security Council meetings on two separate occasions. According to one observer, Obama “didn’t just chair the Security Council but gave an expansive speech to the General Assembly about common interests and convened a special meeting with other leaders on UN peacekeeping.”5 There is value in this positive rhetoric and Obama’s points of success. However, in many areas, the Obama team did not live up to its promise of renewed engagement,6 and an “era of collective engagement” did not fully materialize.7 On several major issues, including Syria, the Ukraine-Crimea crisis, and Iraq, the administration effectively ignored the UN. In addition, according to David P. Forsythe, the Obama administration’s actions in Pakistan, including the killing of Osama bin Laden, were clearly unilateral, with little or no regard for the authorization of force by the UN.8 In other cases, such as the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, the language was conciliatory, but the policy approach remained unilateral or minilateral at best. The Obama administration continued an exclusive approach, picking a few key players for multiple bilateral negotiations.9 In one example, at the 2012 Climate Change Conference, the United States bypassed the UN and negotiated with a small cohort of states (including China, India, Brazil, and South Africa), deliberately avoiding wider venues. In fact, at the 2012 Doha meeting, several reports claimed that “the US was generally seen as obstructionist.”10 In moves that blocked a UN agency, the Obama administration defunded UNESCO, obstructed efforts to address the Palestinian situation through the UN, decreased the funding levels of several UN agencies, and maintained the US tradition of vetoing council resolutions directed at Israel. The Obama administration’s unilateralist streak was driven not necessarily by the administration’s agenda or policy preference. The story is more nuanced; lack of engagement with the UN was the result of several factors, some of which were outside the administration’s control. The conditional multilateralism model sheds light on these seemingly contradictory policy orientations. Just as plant growth is the product of multiple factors (with external elements such as exposure to the sun and aspects under the surface including hydration levels and soil quality), this story is multidimensional. As this chapter illustrates, over time, the administration was able to find some traction to engage in a more inclusive multilateral approach on issues such as Iran and climate change, but only by sidelining domestic actors. The Obama team inherited some of the challenges to multilateral cooperation created by the Bush administration. In some cases, the domestic environ-

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ment was not supportive. For example, in attempts to procure ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty in 2012, Congress undermined Obama’s efforts. In other situations (e.g., the crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2014), the UN’s institutional dynamics made it very difficult for the administration to work through the UN system. This chapter examines several cases of what may be labeled US multilateralism and explores the depth of those collaborations, as well as the factors that either fostered or impeded the Obama administration’s engagement at the UN. The Libya case, the Iranian nuclear agreement, and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change are just three examples of areas in which the United States adopted a more inclusive multilateral approach, though, in each case, Obama avoided the domestic fray. Libya and Muted Multilateralism Although the outcome of the 2011 Libyan intervention is problematic, with many within the United States viewing this engagement as a failure, the intervention in Libya provides an example of a successful multilateral engagement at the United Nations. In early 2011, events in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt signaled a dramatic change in relations between repressive regimes and restive peoples. In response to the dramatic overthrow of Tunisian president Zine alAbidine Ben Ali on January 15, 2011, Muammar Qaddafi issued a statement condemning the uprising. In February 2011, antigovernment protests erupted in Benghazi, Libya, and spread to Zintan. Sporadic violence continued, and by late February, anti-Qaddafi forces controlled the city of Zawiya. During the first week of March, the government retaliated, and Libya launched air strikes on antigovernment forces. In response to growing demands, members of the international community began exerting pressure, as President Obama called on Qaddafi to relinquish power and the UN Secretary-General demanded an end to the carnage.11 Human Rights Watch reported that Libya’s government forces had opened fire on protesters in several major cities, including Benghazi, Bayda, Ajdabiya, Zawiya, and Derna.12 In a speech to the country, Qaddafi vowed to show “no mercy” to the 800,000 residents of Benghazi, and Libyan delegates at the UN claimed that Qaddafi threatened that “either I rule you or I kill you.”13 Within days, the president of France was lobbying for a no-fly zone to stop Qaddafi’s progression of violence on civilians. Amidst pleas for help from Libya’s own UN ambassador, consensus developed within the Security Council around a potential intervention. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that if “left unchecked, Qaddafi will commit unspeakable atrocities.”14 The Arab League also bolstered discussions within the Security Council when it passed a unanimous resolution calling on the UN to intervene. Then, at a point when scholars had predicted the end of humanitarian engagement, we find a success story of inclusive US multilateralism at the UN.15 With the French leading the movement, the Obama administration,

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along with the British, managed to pass Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing “all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” Ten countries voted for the resolution, calling for an immediate cease-fire and a no-fly zone to shield civilians from attacks by Qaddafi’s planes. On March 19, 2011, a multilateral coalition launched a military operation with the proclaimed intent of protecting the people of Benghazi. The United States took a self-proclaimed “backseat,” as France and the United Kingdom took the lead. This was clearly a multilateral initiative, as one analyst in the US Permanent Mission to the UN explained: “We both pushed it and were pulled by it. It wasn’t our idea.”16 NATO agreed to take control of the no-fly zone, while command of targeted ground units remained with individual coalition states. The fighting ended in late October 2011, when Qaddafi was killed by rebel forces, and the Security Council terminated the NATO mandate. Although violence and instability continued, the intervention in Libya was a case of US multilateralism in agenda setting, policy formation, and, in a rare case, policy implementation. For many observers and some scholars, the Libyan intervention was hailed a success. James Traub described it as “a new model of multilateralism suitable to a post-hegemonic era. . . . The Libya resolution was a major achievement for Rice and a vindication of the Obama administration’s commitment to multilateral institutions, above all the United Nations.”17 As one member of the State Department team explained, “Clinically Libya is a very healthy result of collaborative multilateralism.”18 Although the agenda setting began with other countries, the United States did come on board as a supporter and an architect of the Security Council resolution. The policymaking process highlighted real-time negotiations among Washington, DC, New York, and many European capitals.19 In terms of implementation of the policy, the military operations that began on March 19, 2011, included the British Royal Navy imposing a naval quarantine and launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. The French flew sorties over Libya and were joined by Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, all of which contributed military and logistical assistance. On the ground, Qatar provided weapons to the anti-Qaddafi forces, and the British sent in military experts to train, plan, and coordinate rebel operations. Although the US military found this a model operation in terms of implementation and coordination, the Obama administration did not publically hail the intervention as a success. In US policy circles and even on the 2012 presidential campaign trail, there was little or no mention of the fact that the intervention saved a potential 800,000 lives in Benghazi. Part of the reason for not labeling the Libyan intervention a success lies in domestic politics. Within the United States, there was little political space to praise the UN specifically or even multilateralism in general. The predominant rhetoric from the 1970s for-

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ward had depicted the UN as incompetent and even anti-American. Because the 2012 presidential election was around the corner and the UN was not a primary issue, the Obama administration may have anticipated that discussing Libya would lose more votes than it would gain. In fact, during the vice presidential debate, Paul Ryan picked up the Republican theme popular during the 1990s and criticized the Obama administration for “outsourcing our foreign policy to the United Nations.”20 Association with the UN became a liability for the Obama campaign, in that multilateralism demonstrated weakness. In addition, after the September 12, 2012, attacks on the US Consulate in Benghazi, resulting in the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three others, Libya was no longer a success story in the eyes of the US public. The Human Rights Council Another mixed case of multilateral engagement is found in the 2009 election of the United States to the UNHRC with 167 votes. The effort demonstrated a return of the United States to the organization after the venomous years under the Bush administration.21 Under Bush, John Bolton had declared that the United States would have more influence on the issue of human rights if it did not join the council. He criticized the organization as holding an anti-Israel bias and as being part of a facade of legitimacy, in that several members of the council held particularly atrocious records on human rights.22 Within the Congress, the move to reengage at the UNHRC provoked a bitter response. The chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), described the council as a “rogues’ gallery” and declared that funding the UNHRC was “a waste of taxpayer dollars. . . . I’d like to make sure that we once and for all kill all US funding for that beast.”23 There were also vocal anti-UN criticisms in the media from journalist Claudia Rosett (who had exposed the oil-for-food scandal during the Bush administration). In addition, the Wall Street Journal, Brett Schaefer (Heritage Foundation), and Hillel Neuer (UN Watch) also criticized the UNHRC and Obama’s efforts to rejoin the organization.24 Thus, within the United States, efforts were made to defund, discredit, and even eliminate the UNHRC. In a demonstration of the complexity of the domestic sphere and civil society, there were also criticisms from the left, with some liberal groups condemning the UNHRC for lack of action on human rights in Iran and Syria and the repeated use of the venue by Arab states to condemn Israel. The reentry into UNHRC epitomizes the contending pressures of domestic politics on US engagement. Despite President Obama’s orientation and pragmatic commitment to the organization, he faced significant hurdles. As one member of the State Department described, “There were extensive multilateral efforts, not just in the Security Council but also in the Human Rights Council. Two years after we joined, lots of elbow grease [was] applied in

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Geneva.”25 A press statement from the White House highlighted the restoration of multilateral engagement in the UNHRC: The US sought and secured election to the UN Human Rights Council. Though the Council is deeply flawed, the United States is now working to reform it from within so that it can speak up for those suffering under the world’s cruelest regimes, fight the Council’s excessive focus on Israel, and focus on major human rights abuses worldwide.26

Once again we find the narrative of successful reform (used during both the Reagan and Bush administrations) that provides the opportunity for reengagement. Again, the narrative often used within the United States is that the UN was broken, we have helped fix it, we can now reengage with it. Despite contending pressure about US participation within UNHRC, there were points of success. The agency made considerable progress in institutionalizing a process in which transitional countries, such as Tunisia, could try to move past a history of human rights abuses and promote a future of accountability to their populations. In this case, the United States was key in supporting technical assistance to create accountability mechanisms in Kyrgyzstan, Guinea, Tunisia, Yemen, and South Sudan. The United States also achieved some success as it built a coalition of countries that supported a resolution condemning Iran’s human rights record; the resolution passed in March 2011. In June 2011, the United States joined a group of countries that passed a groundbreaking resolution advocating equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons. Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for International Organizations, Suzanne Nossel, also claimed several accomplishments in the Obama administration’s engagement in UNHRC, including collaboration on Libya, Syria, and the Côte d’Ivoire. From her perspective, the success stories included progress on women’s rights, political rights, and religious freedom. According to Nossel, “The story of how the United States and others turned around the Human Rights Council since joining the body in 2009 offers a case study on effective tactics for achieving US policy goals through multilateral diplomacy and advancing human rights norms at the United Nations.”27 Within UNHRC, the Obama administration sought balance regarding the treatment of Israel. However, this particular issue turned out to be explosive in the first few years of Obama’s term, when controversy erupted over the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the Goldstone Report) on allegations of Israeli human rights abuse during the 2009 January conflict in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian issue and the Goldstone Report dominated the UNHRC for several years, and the organization was described as “a place where dozens of countries could join forces to express their collective frustration over the long suffering of the Palestinians and over Israel’s abuses and perceived political intransigence.”28 The United States remained

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firmly aligned with Israel; and on this issue, it continues to hold a minority voice in the UNHRC. The next section explores the tragic development of a humanitarian crisis in Syria, where neither the UNHRC nor the United States can claim success.

Syria, the UN, and Chemical Weapons In March 2011, amid a wave of popular uprisings throughout the Middle East, Syrian people held a Day of Dignity in Damascus, with demonstrations calling for the release of political prisoners. The government quickly tried to quiet the protest with tanks in Homs, Daraa, and Damascus. In mid-April 2011, the government attacks intensified and, under the direction of President Bashar alAssad, killed an estimated 110 protestors at a funeral. In its response, the United States found the UN an appropriate venue to condemn the violence and launch an investigation. But the UN’s institutional pathologies, relying on great power consensus to promote peace and security, became visible once again as Russia and China issued a double veto on a Security Council resolution condemning Syria’s attacks on its civilians. After the resolution failed, Secretary of State Clinton blasted the organization rather than the vetoing powers: “Faced with a neutered Security Council, we have to redouble our efforts outside of the United Nations with those allies and partners who support the Syrian people’s right to have a better future.”29 Given the institutional impasse, the administration began exploring more unilateral options or an option based on a “coalition of the willing” that might resemble the 1999 US operation in Kosovo. For the growing crisis in Syria, Russia and China created several logistical barriers to intervention and paralyzed the Security Council. In addition, the experiences of US involvement in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq colored both the national dialogues and the international reactions. The palatability of a US intervention in Syria was undermined by the memory of the Bush administration’s promising a swift victory in Iraq. At the institutional level and within the Security Council, Iraq also created a historical milieu. In 2013, the British Parliament was reluctant to support any involvement, regardless of the merits of military action against Syria. China and Russia looked at the 2011 Libyan case and the UN authorization of force as overstepping the original mandate, as Resolution 1973 did not call for regime change. Thus, the institutional structures within the Security Council were closed, blocking a multilateral response to the violence within Syria. After the double veto, efforts to curb the violence in Syria failed in the Security Council. But US efforts in UNHRC were more successful and produced a call for the Syrian government to cooperate with commission investigators, allow access for humanitarian groups and the media, and end “gross human rights violations.”30 In a venue-shopping initiative within the UN, a UNHRC

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resolution provided the framework for passing a UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in Syria (GA 11266). These moves created a widespread coalition of countries that denounced the Syrian actions and continued to keep Syria in the international media. And yet, the Syrian crisis grew over the summer of 2013, after an alleged chemical weapons attack killed more than 1,400 people. In August 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry made a case for military action against Syria, and the use of the “coalition of the willing” approach seemed imminent. Although the British had no taste for military moves against Syria, France and the United States seemed set on a path of military strikes against the alAssad government without UN authorization. President Obama, in a highly dramatic moment, appeared on prime-time television and made a case for air strikes against Syria. In the declaration, he stated, “I’m comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold Assad accountable.”31 In a stunning move, however, Obama indicated he would “take this debate to Congress.” The domestic politics component was inverted in this case, as the Obama administration took a rather unilateralist path and then punted to Congress. While elevating the US Congress, Obama’s words diminished the relevance of the United Nations, and his rhetoric matched the reality of his administration’s engagement. Up to this point, Obama had been adamant about his support for the UN and multilateralism, but at this moment, he followed both Bill Clinton (in Kosovo) and George W. Bush (in Iraq) and declared the UN inoperable. Yet, Obama’s statement about the UN was overly general. Referring to “the UN” in its generality buried the complexities of the politics within the Security Council, particularly with Russia and its long-standing support of the Syrian government. However, it was far easier for the administration to criticize “the UN” than to call out the Russians and the Chinese. Congressional support for a military intervention in Syria did not materialize, as memories of Iraq and Afghanistan were too fresh. The stories of human rights violations and weapons of mass destruction were reminiscent of the Bush administration’s 2002 claims about Iraq. Congress also found significant logistical challenges with military operations in Syria. Yet, in a twist, an offhand remark by Secretary of State Kerry stating Syria could avoid attack if it gave up its chemical weapons spurred a flurry of international negotiations, particularly between Russia and Syria. In a face-saving measure that averted a congressional rejection of Obama’s proposal, the Russians managed to convince the Syrian government to give up its chemical weapons and join the UN Chemical Weapons Convention.32 Although the United States and Russia did not initially agree on an approach to remove the chemical weapons, France was able to find a compromise plan. Their approach was based on Chapter VII authority, which allows UN member-states to use military and nonmilitary ac-

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tion to confront threats to peace and security. The diplomatic path prevailed, and traditional diplomacy, sanctioned by the United Nations, averted military action in Syria. In late September 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a binding resolution. As Kerry proclaimed, “Diplomacy can be so powerful that it can peacefully defuse the worst weapons of war.”33 An official in the State Department described the compromise as “a breakthrough arrived at through hard-fought diplomacy. . . . This is historic and unprecedented because it puts oversight of the Assad regime’s compliance under international control and it’s the first UNSCR to declare that the use of chemical weapons is a threat to peace and security.”34 After Syria provided a list of weapons, the UN-affiliated Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) sent a team to the country to begin removing the chemical agents. The result was a multinational effort. Russia provided the armor, the United States contributed containers and technology, the Italians contributed a port, and the Chinese assisted as well. Norway and Denmark donated ships to transport the chemicals to sea for hydrodialysis. The Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Lebanon also participated and lent support to the joint operation.35 Returning to the policy process model as a guide of qualities of engagement, the chemical weapons situation in Syria provides a limited case study of successful multilateralism. Again, as with Libya, the overall outcome may have not yet yielded successful results, but as a case of countries working together, it does point to the effective use of diplomacy and multilateral methods for the United States. In addition, both the United States and Russia led the agenda-setting process. The policy formulation process was clearly multilateral, with Russia, France, and the United States all part of the discussions and operating through the Security Council. This, in itself, demonstrates significant cooperation between the United States and Russia during a time of strain over the Ukraine situation. Although there were concerns about whether Syria was in complete compliance and about the potential for ISIS to access remaining chemical weapons, the UN reports that 98 percent of chemical weapons within Syria were destroyed.36 And yet, with more than 40,000 deaths and close to four million refugees, multilateralism clearly failed the people of Syria. The P5+1, Iran, and the US Senate International efforts to address the Iranian nuclear weapons program represent another example of successful multilateralism for the United States, as it coordinated efforts with the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China, plus Germany). The circumstances also highlight the continued relevance and complications of the US domestic realm. Obama’s approach to the Iranian nuclear issue began in June 2010, when the Security Council passed

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Resolution 1929 establishing three punitive approaches to entice Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program—it increased economic sanctions against Iran, banned all ballistic missiles tests, and imposed a weapons embargo. In a September 2010 speech to the General Assembly, Obama proclaimed, “Now is the time to build the trust” and extended an offer to the Iranians to begin negotiations.37 However, the UN also provided a platform for the antics of then president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as he repeatedly taunted Obama with invitations to “debates” at the United Nations and accused the US government of orchestrating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.38 Despite Iran’s posturing, the Obama administration, as part of the P5+1, held several meetings with the Iranians to begin negotiations. In November 2013, the group created the First Step Agreement, and Iran began converting nuclear materials into nonweapon form and allowed inspectors access to nuclear sites. Efforts to achieve an agreement were aided in June 2013 with the election of President Hassan Rouhani, a more moderate voice within Iran. Obama began moving away from rhetoric that framed Iran as a rogue power, instead making a more legal argument that Iran was in noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In January 2014, the negotiations successfully established a six-month joint plan of action, cutting Iran’s production of nuclear materials and allowing greater oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Intense multilateral negotiations in 2014 and 2015 produced an agreement in July 2015 that was unanimously supported by the Security Council. The Council then set provisions for terminating all UN sanctions following a verification process by the IAEA. Here, the three-level game becomes relevant again. At the same time that the P5+1 countries were holding expert-level talks, Congress sought to reverse course and impose further economic sanctions on Iran. In a clear case of intermestic politics, several senators (led by John McCain and Lindsey Graham) called for additional sanctions against Iran.39 A few pro-Israel groups within the United States also lobbied against a diplomatic approach.40 In March 2015, in an open letter to Iran, forty-seven senators again tried to influence the process and block the multilateral negotiations, declaring that anything the Obama administration agreed to could be voided by the next president. Despite delays and congressional posturing, however, the negotiations continued, and Iran agreed to IAEA inspections. The IAEA—a partner organization within the UN system—proved to be particularly valuable in working on the Iranian nuclear issue. In September 2015, a congressional resolution of disapproval did not garner the sixty-vote threshold needed to derail the agreement. In January 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had complied with its agreement as the country had taken most of its centrifuges offline, shut down a nuclear reactor, and removed most of its enriched uranium. Despite this momentum, Congress continued efforts to

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block the lifting of sanctions; in January 2016, the House of Representatives passed the Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made efforts to impose a new round of sanctions on Iran. In a clear example of divided government and dysfunctional dynamics, the Obama administration vowed to veto any legislation inserting new sanctions. Defunding UNESCO One illustrative case of the domestic tensions that spilled over into Obama’s relations with the UN is found in its relationship with UNESCO. In a throwback to the 1980s, the organization became embroiled in US politics.41 The administration was supportive of UNESCO and Secretary of State Clinton visited its Paris headquarters in May 2011 and proclaimed, “I am proud to be the first secretary of state from the United States ever to come to UNESCO, and I come because I believe strongly in your mission.”42 Then, in fall 2011, Palestine applied for full membership in the organization, and 107 memberstates voted in favor of accepting the petition. The vote to admit Palestine to UNESCO triggered provisions in US legislation from 1990 and 1994, mandating the withdrawal of funds from any organization that accepted Palestine as a full member. UNESCO itself had done little to support the vote, yet was harmed significantly when the US pulled its funding.43 The United States once again lost its voting rights in the organization. Within months, the administration quietly attempted to restore some of the $70 million in contributions to UNESCO that were cut, including a request in the 2013 budget that Congress denied. The UNESCO case highlights how, despite an administration’s support of a UN agency, domestic politics severed the relationship. Some blamed Obama for sending mixed signals to the Palestinians when he encouraged Palestinian membership in the UN and yet argued, “Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the UN.”44 As the events took place in the beginning of a presidential election cycle, critics accused Obama of pandering to both the right and the left. Regardless, the administration continued to support UNESCO and acknowledged the fault was not with the organization, but the member-states. In 2015 the administration lobbied Congress to finance UNESCO and requested a waiver of the US law that banned funding. In addition, the 2016 budget request held that it “continues to seek legislation that would provide authority to waive legislative restrictions that prohibit paying US contributions to United Nations (UN) specialized agencies that grant the Palestinians the same standing as member states or full membership as a state.”45 Congress denied the waiver and the funding request. Conservative Representative Ros-Lehtinen asserted “a UN body that acts so irresponsibly—a UN body that

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admits states that do not exist—renders itself unworthy of US taxpayer dollars.”46 Overall the defunding of UNESCO provides an example of the Obama administration’s commitment to multilateralism that was interrupted by domestic politics. There was no dispute with UNESCO, yet the administration could not shield the organization from acts by its member-states, in particular the United States. US Multilateralism and the Paris Agreement In 2015, we find two points of inclusive multilateralism for the Obama administration; however, both instances (the climate change agreement and the Iran nuclear agreement) deliberately avoided the domestic realm. The Paris Agreement on climate change, adopted in December 2015, presents a case in which domestic politics influenced but did not interrupt inclusive multilateralism. Indeed, the collaboration at the international level was done with a focused eye on avoiding domestic blockades imposed by congressional interference. The three-level game was clearly evident, even before the delegates arrived in Paris, as the Obama administration had to navigate Congress, work with other key states, and find a compromise agreement that would satisfy almost 200 other countries. In a June 2015 statement to African delegates in Germany, the French foreign minister explained, “We know the politics in the US. Whether we like it or not, if it comes to the Congress, they will refuse. . . . We must find a formula which is valuable for everybody and valuable for the US without going to the Congress.”47 In his 2012 acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Obama declared that addressing climate change would be a priority during his second administration. In 2009, at the Copenhagen conference aimed at securing country commitments to the reduction of greenhouse gases, negotiations fell apart. Member-states—in particular, the United States and China— adopted stiff negotiation positions and engaged in a very exclusive approach to negotiations. Overall, the meeting was described as poorly organized, with little groundwork established prior. In Paris, however, things were different. The preparatory work was considerable. In contrast with previous attempts, the groundwork for the Paris meeting took a more flexible, “bottom up” approach in which countries made voluntary pledges to cut emissions. The Obama administration began negotiations months ahead of the meeting, holding several bilateral meetings and striking agreements between key states, including China, India, and Brazil. In September 2015, the United States and China (the two largest carbon emitters) announced that they would be synchronizing their commitments to reduce carbon emissions in some areas, while China also planned to create a cap-and-trade system. The United States agreed to cut over 26 percent of its emissions by 2025, and the EU pledged a 40 percent reduction by 2030.

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Beyond financial support, the United States aided countries in assessing their carbon emissions and establishing reduction goals. The Obama administration levied support through the White House Global Climate Change Initiative and provided assistance to more than fifty countries. One participant explained that the administration “took considerable political risk” and assisted many states (Colombia, Peru, Vietnam, Norway, Indonesia, Brazil, Guatemala, and Mexico, to name a few) in developing the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), allowing them to come to the Paris meeting informed and prepared.48 At the conference, the Obama team worked closely with the French delegation, and both leaders worked phone lines, nudging world leaders toward consensus. In this case, the United States demonstrated significant engagement in agenda setting and policy formation. In securing a deal, however, the Paris conference faced multiple challenges, including finding consensus about goals; creating a binding agreement; smoothing tensions between wealthy countries and poorer states; and providing support, adaption, and mitigation plans for the destruction caused by climate change (namely, droughts, floods, rising sea levels, and the salination of arable lands). Almost 200 nations represented by 40,000 delegates produced an agreement that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon hailed as “historic”; others found it “a rare victory for global multilateral deal making”; and one observer claimed, “The UN should take a victory lap.”49 The meeting created the specific goal of preventing global warming from going above 2°C, through voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and the creation of a $100 billion climate fund. At the international level, the political opportunity structures were ripe. By December 2015, the destruction caused by climate change was becoming more evident, and the scientific community, industry, and many key states were all pushing for some action.50 Scientists with the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that there was “unequivocal” evidence that climate change was occurring and released a report in 2015 concluding that it “is now 95 percent certain that humans are the main cause of current global warming. . . . The more human activities disrupt the climate, the greater the risks of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems, and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system.”51 Declining prices for renewable sources of energy at the time also created more economically viable energy alternatives. The lead-up to Paris was also facilitated by public-private partnerships, as several corporate sponsors, including Bill Gates, billionaire founder of Microsoft, led efforts to create and promote a green energy fund. The agreements made in Paris would also face hurdles in terms of building compliance from domestic legislatures, finance ministers, and regulatory agencies. The adoption stage at the domestic level in the United States presents a different operational environment. One official claimed, “Obama had ‘pushed

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the envelope’ on domestic climate change policy because he believed it was essential to ensuring the US’ credibility as a leader in international negotiations.”52 In crafting the agreement, the Obama administration had tailored a very specific, “bullet-proof agreement” to prevent the agreement from being shot down by Congress. He made sure that the guidelines avoided mandatory compliance in favor of voluntary accordance. The agreement from Paris was deliberately crafted to avoid taking the form of a treaty that would then go to the Senate for almost assured rejection; instead, it was crafted to build on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which had been ratified by the Senate in 1992. Despite these efforts, Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) claimed that “the president is making promises he can’t keep, writing checks he can’t cash, and stepping over the middle class to take credit for an ‘agreement’ that is subject to being shredded in 13 months.”53 In an interesting observation, one scholar observed that given the domestic political and regulatory environment within the United States, “the Chinese are more likely to follow through with the agreement than the US.”54 The next sections examine the broader international and domestic forces at play that contribute to the contractions and lethargy of the United States when it comes to working with the UN. International Dynamics and the Declining Hegemony The Obama administration operated within a kaleidoscopic international context. The axis of global power was no longer clearly centered over the Western hemisphere, with the United States acting as the fulcrum. The concentration of political power at the international level had been diluted, and some described it as a polyarchy with diverse actors and diffuse centers of influence.55 With the Cold War’s end, increases in technology and communications, the rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and the rise in the number of NGOs, international power was more scattered. The opportunity structures at the global level were open to many types of actors, and no one country, or even a small group of states, dominated. China pursued a more active role in the UN, and both India and Brazil lobbied for a permanent membership in the Security Council.56 Moreover, with a resurgent Russia, international dynamics continued to seep into the institutional dynamics at the UN; as such, the Security Council once again faced a Cold War–like paralysis on issues such as Syria and the Ukraine. Within this context, the United States found it more difficult to work in an environment in which even its close friends and allies were disgruntled. In several situations, the Obama administration frustrated, alienated, or offended traditional allies. For example, when the administration called for opening the circle and prioritized the G-20 over the G-8, many saw this as a rejection of multilateralism. Although this move seemed more democratic, it inadvertently

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isolated several allies, as the decision was viewed as a unilateral one that did not involve the Europeans.57 Other challenging dynamics included allegations that the United States was spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the public release of a recording of US assistant secretary of state for Europe, Victoria Nuland, using profane language to disparage the EU. These events, along with other blunders, made it difficult for the United States to maintain a network of trusting allies.58 Despite Obama’s multiple efforts, winning back US allies at the UN proved challenging. Domestic Barricades: Framing the UN in Opposition The US domestic context surrounding the UN can be characterized by fearinducing rhetoric and partisan attacks. Despite the administration’s early embraces of the UN, public voices seldom gave any indication that the UN was either important or useful. Within civil society, many factions within the United States continued to frame the United Nations as ineffective, illegitimate, and even threatening. In one example, the John Birch Society launched its Anti– Agenda 21 Campaign. The group actively lobbied against what is commonly called Agenda 21—a twenty-year-old, nonbinding statement of principles adopted during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio. This agenda declared its purpose as enhancing global cooperation to improve environmental sustainability and reduce economic disparities among countries. With the aid of increased technological communications, the John Birch Society elevated its message and its footprint. In its anti–Agenda 21 drive, it found evidence of a tangible expression of “UN activism” and used the statement of principles as a focal point to pull the United States away from the UN. Glenn Beck, a conservative radio host, joined the chorus of rejectionists and published a book in 2012 entitled Agenda 21. The book’s plot tells of a futuristic America in which the UN implements a program that dismantles the US government, creates an authoritarian state, takes away land rights, and forces rural inhabitants into urban areas.59 The anti–Agenda 21 narrative was found in both national and state legislator’s programs. Ted Cruz (R-TX), a particularly vocal opponent of the UN, declared Agenda 21 a “globalist plan that tries to subvert the US Constitution and the liberties we all cherish as Americans.”60 Responding to this sovereigntist argument, many US state legislatures—some with prompting from the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)—considered bills directly prohibiting the implementation of Agenda 21.61 More than twentysix state legislatures considered such measures, and Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South Carolina all passed such resolutions (though New Hampshire’s was later overturned). Other states (e.g., Montana) considered bills sponsoring US withdrawal from the UN.

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This rhetoric, which typically would be isolated to the political margins, also seeped into mainstream US politics. At the national level, the Republican National Committee (RNC) released a statement in January 2012 calling the Agenda 21 program “a comprehensive plan of extreme environmentalism, social engineering and global political control,” as well as “socialist/communist redistribution of wealth.”62 The measure equated the UN-sponsored idea of sustainability as a covert plot to “destroy the American way of life.”63 Critics of the anti–Agenda 21 movement described it as a right-wing conspiracy theory used to spark fear about the UN and climate change policy.64 For a particular segment of society, this movement reflected the fears that the UN presents a significant threat to US sovereignty, an agrarian lifestyle, local political establishments, and civil liberties. The UN continues to face management issues, excessive bureaucratization, and several other organizational pathologies. At the same time, portions of US society distort much of what is done at the United Nations, all for political gain. The legislative initiatives, party platforms, publications, and fear campaigns demonstrate the widespread nature of misinformation about the United Nations that tends to dominate public discussions. The 2012 Republican Party National Platform illustrated the impact of both the rhetoric and the loss of confidence in the United Nations when it proclaimed: The United Nations remains in dire need of reform, starting with full transparency in the financial operations of its overpaid bureaucrats. As long as its scandal-ridden management continues, as long as some of the world’s worst tyrants hold seats on its Human Rights Council, and as long as Israel is treated as a pariah state, the UN cannot expect the full support of the American people.65

One section heading of the platform, titled “Sovereign American Leadership in International Organizations,” also committed all Republicans who were elected to office to cut all funding for the United Nations Population Fund. Some of the voices within conservative factions are reminiscent of those present over a century ago, in William Jennings Bryan’s ideas of absolute sovereignty and US superiority. The result of these campaigns, legislative initiatives, and policy platforms was the significant decline in support for the UN within one of the main political parties in the United States and a normative orientation that closed the political opportunity structures for US collaboration through the UN system. In this light, if the United States does choose multilateralism through the UN, it exposes itself to “loss of sovereignty” and a host of other nefarious threats. Congress and the Politics of Fear: Treaty Ratification The narrative of fear—though appearing innocuous on the surface—has an impact, especially in US treaty ratification. As the Senate rejects treaty after

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treaty, the persistent US defections result in lost US credibility and a diminished influence in treaty-drafting processes.66 As mentioned in the opening paragraph of Chapter 1, in December 2012, the Senate rejected the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities. That rejection, which was led by several who claimed the treaty would threaten US sovereignty, once again demonstrated the leveraging of scare tactics and misinformation campaigns that some members of Congress found convincing. In 2013, another example of the impact of perception of threats to sovereignty came from attempts to ratify the international Arms Trade Treaty. Within the United States, a concerted campaign labeled the agreement a direct threat to Second Amendment rights in the United States.67 The treaty blocks illicit international trade in small arms to those countries committing human rights violations. Opponents viewed the international treaty as evidence of the UN’s intrusive mandates and its activist policy trying to violate the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. The Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) presents another example of congressional reticence in the face of what many claim to be strategic interests. Despite support from the Bush administration and the Obama administration’s advocacy of the treaty, as well as endorsements for ratification from the US Navy and the Chamber of Commerce, Senate Republicans successfully garnered the thirty-four votes needed to prevent its ratification in July 2012. Invoking the sovereigntist view, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) proclaimed, “This is Victory Day for US sovereignty in the Senate.”68 On the other side, newspaper columnist Bob Keeler declared that the failure of ratification was “unfathomable” and that the rejection indicated that the United States declined “to be part of the family of nations” and was “well on the way to becoming an outlaw nation.”69 Because the United States is the only littoral state that has not ratified UNCLOS, it cannot invoke Article 76, which allows states to make extended continental shelf claims and establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arctic region. The Russians, in contrast, ratified the treaty and have since made large claims on the Arctic continental shelf, extending as far as the North Pole. When it comes to treaty ratification, politics in Washington, DC, have damaged efforts at international collaboration and US strategic interests. The Palestine-Israel Issue and the United States at the United Nations The withdrawal from UNESCO reflects a broader, long-term trend in which domestic politics spills over into the US-UN dynamic. With this particular issue, US politics surrounding support for Israel creates a situation in which there are pressures on an administration from both sides of the political spectrum. From the 1975 General Assembly resolution declaring Zionism a form of racism, “the UN” as a conglomerate is often viewed as opposing Israel and, by default, as being in opposition to the United States. The Palestine-Israel

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conflict plays a central role in US engagement at the UN within several key agencies—in particular, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and UNESCO. Since the UN’s creation, the United States has cast seventy-eight vetoes in the Security Council, and almost half of those vetoes were on resolutions dealing with the Palestine-Israel situation. If one narrows the time frame to those vetoes since 1980, 60 percent of the vetoes (or thirty-six of the fiftyeight) cast by the United States involved the Palestine-Israel issue. At the time of this writing, the most recent US veto was in response to a December 2014 resolution calling for Israel to withdraw from the “occupation of territory conquered in June 1967.” The resolution received eight yes votes (from Argentina, Chad, Chile, China, France, Jordan, Luxembourg, and Russia), with five countries abstaining and the United States vetoing the measure. As one observer explained, “United States policy toward Israel is an especially sensitive political issue, according to analysts from both parties, in part because of politicians’ fears of offending Jewish voters and contributors and in part because the issues seem so intractable.”70 The topic also showed up in the US defunding of UNESCO and earlier rejections of the Human Rights Council. This divisive issue is a domestic issue. According to conservative thinker Kenneth Anderson: “Israel has served as a kind of antenna for energy and anti-American sentiment.”71 Another observer claimed, “Israel trumps everything.”72 When assessing the role of civil society on US-UN relations, portions of the Jewish population within the United States lost considerable confidence in the UN, largely due to a progression of resolutions and UN reports that were critical of Israel. This falling-out between the Jewish community and the UN resurfaced during the 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa. Many viewed the proceedings as an anti-Israel propaganda circus. In addition, the Goldstone Report, issued by the Human Rights Council on the 2009 Gaza War, accused the Israeli government of deliberately attacking civilians. As one analyst explained, “Israel’s foreign ministry was blown away, they could not imagine that Israel was being accused of targeting civilians.”73 These cases are only part of what many in the US Jewish community saw as a series of one-sided resolutions against Israel. In fact, in 2011, the author of the Goldstone Report issued what appeared to be a retraction of the criticism against Israel.74 Although member-states proposed the resolution and voted for it, the UN took the blame. Together, these events damaged both the credibility and legitimacy of the UN. At the United Nations, former SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan was very sensitive to this issue. In one statement, he noted that the Zionism-equals-racism resolution was a “low point” in UN-Israel relations.75 However, for many US-based Jewish organizations, there is an inherent tension as they reject UN condemnations of Israel but support the UN’s existence. Some Jewish organizations within the US do support the UN and view it as providing significant access and influence for one of Israel’s closest al-

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lies—the United States. Organizations such as the American Jewish Committee consistently advocate for full payment of US dues to the UN.76 Relations between portions of the Jewish community and the UN are improving, particularly with the invitation to Israel to become a member of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), which allows Israel to participate in many UN activities, including the Human Rights Council. In response to the invitation, Secretary of State Kerry issued a statement declaring, This is a particularly welcome development as we work to end anti-Israel bias in the UN system. We will continue to speak out for our close ally, Israel, and we will continue to support efforts to normalize Israel’s treatment across the UN system as a full and equal member of the community of nations.77

It is important to clarify that the role of this segment of civil society is not as tidy as Mearsheimer and Walt described in their research on the “Israel lobby.”78 This lobby, particularly when it comes to the United Nations, is not one unified group with a single agenda; in fact, there is competition among and within US Jewish groups. They hold divergent agendas when it comes to the UN and often engage in turf battles for influence.79 Some organizations, such as the Zionist Organization of America, provide vocal critiques of the UN.80 Some groups actively lobby in Washington, whereas others operate within New York and try to work directly with the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. There are organizations that support the US payment of dues to ensure its full leverage as a permanent member of the Security Council, as this, in turn, secures the ability of the United States to support Israel at the UN. Yet others mirror the neoconservative narratives about US overpayment of contributions to an organization that works against US and Israeli interests. In September 2014, a pro-Israel group calling itself the World Values Network placed a full-page advertisement in both the New York Times and the Washington Post with images of ISIS, Hamas, and Ban Ki-moon, accusing the Secretary-General of creating a “moral equivalency” between Israel and Hamas. The advertisement invited readers to “Join our fight against the UN making suckers of Americans. Join our fight against the Israel-haters at www.shmuley.org.”81 With the Palestine-Israel issue, multilateral engagement at the UN faces domestic opposition on both the left and the right; it also highlights connections between the domestic and the international contexts. US Engagement at the United Nations: The Numbers To return to the broader question about whether the Obama administration reengaged the UN, we can empirically assess the level of commitment by comparing the Obama and Bush administrations in terms of voting record in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Table 7.1 demonstrates consistent support for Security Council resolutions and only a handful of ve-

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toes. Under the Bush administration, there were a total of eleven vetoes. For the Obama administration, there was only one veto between 2009 and 2016. In the General Assembly under the Bush administration, of the 782 votes, the United States voted “yes” 19.6 percent of the time—a rejection rate of almost 80 percent. The Bush administration voted “no,” on average, 68 percent of the time, with some years higher (e.g., 72 percent in 2007). For the Obama administration, voting coincidence—that is, voting with the majority—rose consid-

Table 7.1 US Voting Record in the United Nations, 1988–2014 Security Council Resolutions

Total Year Votes 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

26 25 40 42 74 95 78 67 59 57 73 67 52 54 70 69 62 71 89 57 66 49 59 68 55 48 59

Yes Votes 17 15 37 42 74 95 77 66 56 55 73 66 49 51 67 66 59 70 87 57 65 48 58 67 55 47 58

General Assembly Resolutions

No Total Votes Abstained Votes 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

3 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

166 143 103 88

a

78 92 97 93 87 82 97 83 88 106 98 90 102 108 93 97 84 87 95 89 90 98

Yes Votes 15 14 14 15

a

19 32 37 34 31 25 28 25 19 26 17 17 22 17 10 17 23 26 38 29 37 35

No Votes 112 95 70 55 a

41 45 46 44 41 39 49 40 52 64 68 62 68 77 72 71 48 45 47 49 46 52

Abstained 36 32 17 15

a

17 15 14 15 15 16 18 17 17 16 13 11 12 14 11 9 11 15 10 11 7 11

Coincidence (%) 15.4 16.9 21.3 27.8

a

36.8 48.6 50.6 49.4 46.7 44.2 41.8 43.0 31.7 31.2 25.5 23.3 25.0 23.6 18.3 25.6 39.0 41.6 51.5 42.5 48.4 44.6

Sources: Most records are from the US State Department, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls /rpt/index.htm. Some voting records are from the United Nations, http://www.un.org /Depts/dhl/resguide/scvote.htm. Notes: The Department of State establishes voting coincidence percentages by “dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes. Non-consensus votes are calculated using only votes on which both the United States and the other country in question voted Yes or No; not included are those instances when either state abstained or was absent.” For format and methodology source, see http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/162413.pdf. a. Data not available.

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erably; it was consistently over 40 percent, and in 2011, it was greater than 50 percent. If one considers the votes taken by consensus, US coincidence increased significantly under the Obama administration. For instance, in 2014, the inclusion of consensus votes brought the coincidence level to 87 percent. The veto rate also declined from ten issued during the Bush administration to two during Obama’s tenure, both of which concerned the Israel-Palestine situation. “Show Me Your Budget, and I’ll Tell You What You Value” Another measure of the qualities of the US-UN relationship comes from funding patterns. The 2014 US State Department budget justification began with a quote from Joseph Biden, who quipped, “Don’t tell me what you value—show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.”82 Table 7.2 traces US contributions to the UN’s regular budget for almost fifteen years. The numbers show a significant dip in 2003—easily attributed to the tensions over the Iraq war. From 2003 to 2006, however, there is almost a doubling of payments and a marked increase in payments from 2009 to 2010. This trend is echoed in US contributions to the peacekeeping budget, though in a reversal of the pattern, the 2011 Contributions to International Organizations were cut. This cut is attributable to the post-2010 midterm elections within the United States, when fiscal conservatives, looking to cut federal spending, again found the UN a visible target. Table 7.2 also provides another empirical indicator of the role played by the legislative branch and demonstrates a significant decline in funding for the assessed contributions to the United Nations. These numbers are dictated by congressional authorization and domestic politics, not the administration’s priorities. In 2014, in a statement of goals, the State Department identified seven pillars of US foreign policy, which included the “active reengagement with global institutions, and working to modernize those institutions to meet evolving challenges,” as well as “upholding and defending the universal values that are enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”83 Although the 2014 State Department budget request did claim authority to sidestep legislative restrictions that prevent the United States from funding UN agencies that recognize Palestine as a full member, it did not request funding for UNESCO. The document made the claim that “the ability to make such contributions is essential to advancing US interests worldwide and strengthening US global leadership, influence, and credibility.”84 Interestingly enough, John Kerry’s budget justification statement for 2015 did not mention the United Nations, though it did discuss the priorities of UNICEF and the creation of a peacekeeping response mechanism that would serve as a rapid reaction force. However, aside from stating that the budget is in line with obligations to the UN, the UN was not listed as a priority. In 2016, the budget request included $5.4 billion for peacekeeping. The 2017

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Table 7.2 Authorized Contributions to International Organizations and International Peacekeeping, FYs 1999–2016 Fiscal Year

FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 estimate FY 2016 request

Contributions for International Organizations (CIO) $922 million 885 million 871 million 850 million 866 million 1.00 billion 1.20 billion 1.20 billion 1.26 billion 1.40 billion 1.50 billion 2.00 billion 1.60 billion 1.55 billion 1.37 billion 1.34 billion 1.47 billion 1.54 billion

CIO Percentage Change from Previous Year –6.00 –1.58 –2.41 +1.88 +15.47 +20.00 0 +5.00 +11.11 +7.14 +33.00 –20.00 –3.13 –11.61 +2.2 +8.84 +4.54

Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) $231 million 500 million 846 million 844 million 674 million 550 million 490 million 1.00 billion 1.10 billion 1.70 billion 1.50 billion 2.40 billion 1.90 billion 1.92 billion 1.91 billion 1.76 billion 2.11 billion 2.93 billion

Source: Office of Management and Budget, Appendix: Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 1999 to 2016, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf and http:// www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/index.htm.

budget request asked for $4.7 billion for “international organizations and peacekeeping” but only mentioned the UN in context of climate change and terrorism. In October 2015, the United States owed $813 million in unpaid dues to the UN; in late December 2015, Congress passed a spending bill that fully funded US assessed dues and provided $2.62 billion in support for peacekeeping. At the same time, however, the bill cut funds for renovations of the UN headquarters in New York, and in a full display of domestic dynamics, Congress cut all funding for the Human Rights Council, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the Arms Trade Treaty. In the 2012 Democratic National Platform, the party declared, “We have restored America’s leadership at the UN by cooperating with our partners there when we can and respectfully disagreeing with them when we must, reversing the previous administration’s disdain for the UN.” In some cases, this statement is accurate. Overall, the numbers indicate that in areas where the administration had significant autonomy (i.e., voting in the General Assembly and the Security Council), the Obama administration seemed to be more engaged and more multilateralist than the Bush administration. Yet in areas where Con-

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gress plays a role (i.e., funding the UN), the numbers indicate mixed levels of support. In fact, although there was a perceptible reengagement of some institutions, such as the Human Rights Council, the rhetoric of the first year is matched by spotty improvement in engagement within the UN framework. A more “thickly” constructed, or inclusive, multilateralism has evolved, but only in cases that excluded the domestic realms.85 According to David Lake, “President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. . . . But . . . the problem of credibility is structural and not one that a new administration can solve simply by a new style or approach to foreign policy.”86 In this regard, President Obama demonstrated a learning curve about strategically structuring engagements within the UN to avoid Congress. There continue to be issue areas in which there are deep differences with member-states at the UN and even efforts to block international policy coordination. Although the Obama administration gave new prominence to multilateral policy coordination, for the most part, multilateral cooperative efforts were not the defining modus operandi. 1. White House, “National Security Strategy” (May 2010), 46, https: //www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 2. Susan E. Rice, “A New Course in the World, a New Approach at the UN,” New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and Center on International Cooperation, 2009. 3. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Speech in Advance of the United Nations General Assembly,” US Department of State, September 18, 2009. http://www.state.gov /secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/09/129366.htm. 4. Helene Cooper, “Russia Signals Support of Obama at UN,” International Herald Tribune, September 25, 2009, 8. 5. Hayes Brown, “Obama Will Personally Chair UN Security Council Meeting,” ThinkProgress.org, August 18, 2014, http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/08/18 /3471674/exclusive-obama-will-chair-un-security-council-meeting-in-september/. 6. Kyle McNally, “Drone Strikes and US Unilateralism: From Bush to Obama,” Global Policy (July 13, 2012). 7. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 23, 2009. 8. David P. Forsythe, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” in International Organization and Global Governance, eds., Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (New York: Routlege, 2014). 9. Moises Naim, “Minilateralism,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2009). 10. Lise Morjé Howard, “Sources of Change in United States–United Nations Relations,” Global Governance 16, no. 4 (2010). 11. James Meikle, “Libya Must Stop Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians, Says UN Chief,” The Guardian, March 7, 2011. 12. Ibid. 13. “Fundamental Issues of Peace, Security at Stake, Secretary-General Warns,” United Nations Security Council, 6490th Meeting, Department of Public Information, February 25, 2011.

Notes

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14. Wil Longbottom and Rob Cooper, “The West Attacks,” Daily Mail (March 19, 2011). http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1367957/U-S-launches-missile-strikes -Gaddafis-air-defences-British-French-fighters-enforce-fly-zone.html. 15. Thomas G. Weiss, “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004). 16. Senior official, Sanctions Unit, US Permanent Mission to the United Nations, personal interview with author, March 2011. 17. James Traub, “The Point Guard,” Foreign Policy, no. 195 (September/October 2012), 56. 18. Mark Schlachter, public affairs director, Bureau of International Organizations, Department of State, personal interview with author, January 2013. 19. Senior official, Sanctions Unit. 20. Paul Ryan, “Transcript: Vice Presidential Debate 2012,” CNN.com, October 12, 2012, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/12/transcript-vice-presidential -debate/. 21. Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas G. Weiss, The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). 22. Colum Lynch, “U.S. to Join Human Rights Council, Reversing Bush Policy,” Washington Post, March 31, 2009. 23. “The World from The Hill: U.N. Funding an Early Target for House Republicans,” The Hill (January 23, 2011). http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/foreign-policy /139563-the-world-from-the-hill-un-funding-an-early-target-for-house-republicans. 24. David Bosco, “Can Conservatism Reconcile with the United Nations?” Foreign Policy (July 9, 2013); “UN Rights Council Raps Israel, Allows Worst Regimes to Misuse UPR Review,” UN Watch, January 30, 2013, http://www.unwatch.org/site /c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1289203/apps/s/content.asp?ct=12938473. 25. Schlachter, personal interview with author. 26. Barack Obama, “Advancing U.S. Interests at the United Nations,” Office of the Press Secretary, White House, September 20, 2010, https://www.whitehouse.gov /the-press-office/2010/09/20/advancing-us-interests-united-nations. 27. Suzanne Nossel, “Advancing Human Rights in the UN System,” Council on Foreign Relations Report (June 2012). 28. Ibid., 6. 29. “Obama Falls into a UN Trap,” Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2012, A12. 30. UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” (November 23, 2011), http://www .refworld.org/docid/4edde9d02.html. 31. Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” Office of the Press Secretary, White House, August 31, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office /2013/08/31/statement-president-syria. 32. Kathleen Hennessey and Paul Richter, “US Weighs Russia’s Offer on Syria Arms,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2013. 33. Edith M. Lederer and Matthew Lee, “UN Ends Stalemate, Votes to Rid Syria of Chemical Weapons,” Boston Globe, September 28, 2013. 34. Andrea Mitchell and Erin McClam, “World Powers Reach Deal on Removal of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” NBC News, September 26, 2013, http://www.nbc news.com/news/other/world-powers-reach-deal-removal-syrian-chemical-weapons -f8C11266825. 35. Charbel Raji, “100% of Declared Chemical Weapons Materials Destroyed or Removed from Syria,” OPCW-UN Joint Mission in the Syrian Republic, June 23, 2014, http://opcw.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=pbq2OEoBdL8%3d& tabid=54.

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36. Anthony Deutsch, “U.N.’s Kane Calls for Greater Syrian Disclosure on Chemical Weapons,” Reuters, December 2, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us -mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons-idUSKCN0JG19N20141202/. 37. Steven Edwards, “Olive Branch Offered to Iran; ‘Now Is the Time to Build Trust,’ Obama Tells UN,” The Gazette, September 24, 2010. 38. Howard LaFranchi, “Iran’s Ahmadinejad: US Used 9/11 to Prolong World Domination,” Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 2010, http://www.csmonitor .com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0923/Iran-s-Ahmadinejad-US-used-9-11-to-prolongworld-domination. 39. Sophia Harman and David Williams, eds., Governing the World? (New York: Routledge, 2013). 40. Dana Milbank, “AIPAC Sounds Its War Cry,” Washington Post, March 6, 2012, A2. 41. Roger Coate, Unilateralism, Ideology, and US Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988). 42. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Clinton’s Remarks at UNESCO Global Partnership for Girls’ and Women’s Education,” May 26, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/education /clintons-remarks-unesco-global-partnership-girls-womens-education-may-2011 /p25148. 43. Justin Morris, “Libya and Syria,” International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2013). 44. Helene Cooper, “Obama Says Palestinians Are Using Wrong Forum,” New York Times, September 21, 2011. 45. “Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2016,” Foreign Operations Department of State and Related Programs (2015), http://www.state.gov/documents /organization/236395.pdf. 46. Brett D. Schaefer, “No ‘Partial Funding’ for UNESCO,” National Review Online, January 9, 2014, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/367924/no-partial -funding-unesco-brett-d-schaefer. 47. “Climate Deal Must Avoid US Congress Approval, French Minister Says,” The Guardian, June 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/un -climate-talks-deal-us-congress. 48. Richard Donovan, senior vice president of forestry, Rainforest Alliance, personal interview with author, January 2016. 49. Bruce Jones and Adele Morris, “Beyond the Paris Agreement,” Brookings Report: Understanding COP21 and Beyond, 21 (December 14, 2015), http://www .brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2015/12/14-cop21-beyond-the-paris -agreement-jones-morris. 50. Coral Davenport, “The Marshall Islands Are Disappearing,” New York Times, December 1, 2015. 51. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report (2015), http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf. 52. Ashley Alman and Daniel Marans, “Barack Obama Praises Paris Climate Change Agreement,” The Huffington Post, December 12, 2015, http://www.huffington post.com/entry/obama-paris-climate-agreement_us_566c8cf1e4b0fccee16ed503. 53. Suzanne Goldenberg, “How US Negotiators Ensured Landmark Paris Climate Deal Was Republican-Proof,” The Guardian, December 13, 2015. 54. Stacy VanDeveer, chair, dual major in sustainability, University of New Hampshire, personal communication with author, December 2015. 55. William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, vol. 48 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008).

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56. Luke J. L. Eastin, “Legitimacy Deficit: Chinese Leadership at the United Nations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 18, no. 4 (2013). 57. Richard Gowan, The Obama Administration and Multilateralism: Europe Relegated (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2010), http://ecfr.eu/page /-/documents/the-obama-administration-and-multilateralism.pdf. 58. David Wise, “U.S. Spying on Germany: Making Enemies out of Allies, and for What?” Reuters, July 11, 2014; Ed Pilkington, “US Official Apologises to EU Counterparts for Undiplomatic Language,” The Guardian (February 6, 2014). 59. Glen Beck and Harriet Parke, Agenda 21 (New York: Pocket Books, 2013). 60. Pema Levy, “Eight Things You Don’t Know About Ted Cruz.” Newsweek (October 2013), http://www.newsweek.com/2013/10/11/eight-things-you-dont-know -about-ted-cruz-238090.html. 61. According to its website, the American Legislative Exchange Council “works to advance limited government, free markets, and federalism at the state level” (http://www.alec.org/about-alec/). 62. “Agenda 21? Senate Hopeful Ted Cruz Sees Global Plan to Subvert US Sovereignty,” Chron (Houston Chronicle blog), http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/03 /agenda-21-senate-hopeful-ted-cruz-sees-global-plan-to-subvert-u-s-sovereignty/. 63. “Republican National Committee Endorses Major Conspiracy Theory of Radical Right,” Southern Poverty Law Center 146 (Summer 2012). 64. Intelligence Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, Agenda 21: The UN, Sustainability and Right-Wing Conspiracy Theory (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, April 2014); Charles P. Pierce, “In UN Conspiracy Theorists, the Right Has a Long Con,” Esquire (February 16, 2012). 65. Republican National Convention, “We Believe in America,” Committee on Arrangements for the 2012 RNC, 2012, http://www.gopconvention2012.com. 66. Guri Bang, Jon Hovi, and Detlef F. Sprinz, “US Presidents and the Failure to Ratify Multilateral Environmental Agreements,” Climate Policy 12, no. 5 (2012). 67. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. to Sign International Arms Trade Treaty, over Protests of the NRA,” Washington Post, September 24, 2013; Ryan Villarreal, “Hands Off Our Guns! NRA Blasts UN’s Arms Trade Treaty,” International Business Times, March 22, 2013. 68. Jim Lobe, “U.S.: Republicans Sink Law of the Sea Ratification for Now,” IPS (July 18, 2012), http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/07/u-s-republicans-sink-law-of-the-sea -ratification-for-now/s. 69. Edwin Feulner, “U.S. Must Reject Law of the Sea Treaty,” Real Clear Politics (December 11, 2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/12/11/no_time _to_get_lost_116390.html. 70. David E. Rosenbaum, “Most Presidential Hopefuls Critical of Reagan Policy on Mideast,” New York Times, December 31, 1987. 71. Bosco, “Can Conservatism Reconcile with the United Nations?” 72. Member of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)–affiliated Jewish organization, personal interview with author, June 4, 2014. 73. Ibid. 74. Conal Urquhart, “Judge Goldstone Expresses Regrets About His Report into Gaza War,” The Guardian, April 3, 2011. 75. Benjamin A. Gilman, ed., Treatment of Israel by the United Nations: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing Company, 1999). 76. American Jewish Committee, “AJC Capital Alert” (2012), http://www .ajc.org/atf/cf/%7Bf56f4495-cf69-45cb-a2d7-f8eca17198ee%7D/2012_CAPITAL _ALERT.PDF.

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77. John Kerry, “Israel Invited to Join the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in Geneva,” Department of State Press Statement, December 2, 2013. 78. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 3 (2006). 79. Senior official of ECOSOC-affiliated Jewish organization. 80. See http://zoa.org/2014/07/10252240-the-united-nations-is-a-joke-against -humanity/. 81. Washington Post, September 2, 2014. 82. Ibid., v. 83. US Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification Document for Fiscal Year 2015,” 139. 84. Ibid., 43. 85. Stewart Patrick, “Beyond Coalitions of the Willing,” Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003). 86. David Lake, “Making America Safe for the World,” Global Governance 16 (2010): 478.

8 Exceptional Americanism and the Essentials of Cooperation

Few stories are as complex, as misunderstood, or as urgent as that of the United Nations. —Edward Luck

Even superpowers are not immune to global pandemics, climate change, unstable financial markets, and threats from nuclear proliferation; some problems require collaboration. Senator William Fulbright’s observation in 1943 that sovereignty is an illusion in an era of airplanes and atomic weapons remains relevant.1 The discussion now returns to the questions posed in Chapter 1 to explore the essential components of US engagement at the UN. This chapter traces the unique conditions that bring the United States to the UN. The findings indicate rather strongly that US multilateralism at the UN is conditional and that the margins for cooperation are thin. The tale told in the previous chapters point to dramatic changes within the UN itself, the rise of Congress as a transnational actor, and growing support for an ideological perspective within the United States that rejects both international organizations and the complexities of interdependent global relations in the twentyfirst century. In this regard, this chapter also addresses the sources of contention between the United States and the UN. In returning to the project’s initial questions about what drives the United States to act in a multilateral way, several observations can be made. First, US engagement at the UN is constant—the United States has never left the UN. However, there have been marked episodes of increased engagement, as multilateralism is a variable that changes across both time and issue area. Second, power politics at the global level open and close political opportunity structures at the UN, particularly within the Security Council. Third, a president’s party affiliation does matter, with liberal administrations being more committed to procedural multilateralism. Fourth, the domestic realm has an expanding effect on US-UN relations. Congress, in particular, has become a transnational actor; through budgeting and treaty ratification, it increasingly shapes the USUN relationship. Finally, there are ideological challenges to international en191

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gagement, as well as rising concerns within US civil society that the UN is potentially intrusive and even threatening to US sovereignty. Within different problem areas (e.g., climate change versus terrorism) there are varying levels of domestic support and impacts. On some issues (e.g., peacekeeping), there is significant backing for US engagement with the UN. Yet, on other issue areas—in particular, national security—the United States consistently embraces a more unilateral or bilateral approach. Together, these dynamics produce an inconsistent and even paradoxical relationship: the UN is a source of US influence globally, while at the same time, the United States compromises the UN through bifurcated and inconsistent interactions. This dysfunctional dynamic is pervasive in US-UN relations. As Luck pointed out, the relationship between the United States and the United Nations is the most “persistently problematic” of all UN memberstates.2 The sections that follow explore each of the above assessments. There are clear patterns in US multilateralism, with variable levels of commitment at different times.3 The US inclusive engagement at the UN is limited to a few historical episodes—1945–1970, 1990–1993, and then covertly in 2007–2009 and 2015. Yet outside these periods, the United States continually engages with the organization, even when its presence at the UN is intended to block UN initiatives. For instance, in its dealings with Iran to halt its development of a nuclear weapons program, the United States worked bilaterally with the Iranians, then multilaterally with the P5+1, and then bilaterally back and forth with Iran and Israel. As Morse and Keohane explain, “Multilateralism is not essentially cooperative and characterized by integrated rules. Nor is the alternative to established multilateralism, simply unilateralism or bilateralism.”4 Instead, it is more accurate to describe the United States as weaving in and out of institutional multilateralism at the UN. The next observation is that the fate of institutionalized multilateralism is often closely tied to a state’s strategic interests and the distribution of power at the international level. US support for multilateralism in general and for the UN in particular is influenced by specific threat environments—that is, if the homeland appears threatened, unilateralism is preferred. When the United States is in a position of relative dominance, it has a better chance of working within the UN; however, these instances are rare. Often great power rivalries overshadow the Security Council process. Furthermore, engagement is more likely if the veto-wielding powers are in agreement about coordinated paths to address threats to peace and security. The 2011 Libyan case presents one example of inclusive US engagement; however, this window of opportunity was in large part the result of Russia and China opting to abstain from voting in the authorization of use of force—a courtesy they did not extended in the case of Syria (2011–).

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The level of US involvement at the UN is also dependent on an administration’s overall commitment to working with international partners. US presidents face unique institutional constraints in the domestic environment that often pull the country away from the UN. Although the political orientation of a presidential administration is important, most presidents find strategic interests in the UN, even if they are late in coming to this conclusion. But regardless of strategic interests, there are times when an administration cannot effectively maneuver. For the most part, working through the UN in an overt manner is a liberal phenomenon that is commonly opposed by conservatives. Fiscal conservatives tend to find the organization bloated and wasteful, whereas ideological-based conservatives view it as another layer of intrusive government. At the same time, however, conservative administrations can and do engage the UN, though given their constituencies, those endeavors are not widely advertised. Congress presents another element that has a significant impact on USUN relations. Over time, Congress has increasingly accepted the invitation to struggle over foreign policy. UN funding is a particularly thorny issue as Congress holds the power of the purse. As the turmoil with UNESCO and UNHRC illustrate, congressional funding has significant influence on UN agencies. This dynamic is compounded by increasing levels of partisanship, divided government, and thin public support for the UN. Thus, there is a narrow window in which the United States can work with the UN. Engagement, particularly on peace and security issues, is a three-level game: administrations must be committed, Congress must be either willing or marginalized, and other veto-wielding powers in the council must find some common ground. Although the United States consistently finds the UN valuable when dealing with peacekeeping, terrorism, and climate change, the dysfunctional dynamics become particularly relevant around the issues of family planning, UN financing, and Israel. With the growth in alternative venues, US foreign policy makers have opportunities to work around contentious domestic politics and the impassable political dynamics of UN member-states. Yet, in some cases, the “crisis of multilateralism” is more rhetorical than real, as the language and tone about the UN rarely reflect the political realities of the relationship. There is perceptible and growing drift in relations between the United States and the UN. To return to Luck’s question, “What has led to such a dramatic reversal, as America turned from being the greatest champion to the loudest detractor of the UN?” The fluctuations of engagement are driven largely by domestic factors, with the rise of Congress as an assertive actor and sovereigntist ideological views within the United States. However, this drift is also reflective of the dysfunctional dynamics within the UN. The next section examines the international factors, the UN’s institutional features,

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and US domestic elements that push and pull the trends in institutional multilateralism at the UN. US Pillars of Power in International Relations International politics are increasingly complex. Gone are the days of a bipolar system with dominant superpowers controlling agendas and holding a monopoly on power sources. Several dynamics at the global level challenge the UN while also increasing its relevance; these include changing global threat environments, with the rise of intrastate conflicts and transnational terrorism; great power transitions; relative declining leverage of the United States; and, finally, the diversity of actors on the global stage. Today, we find multiple nonstate actors engaged in the international policy process, nefarious groups flaunting borders, and waning illusions of state sovereignty. The United Nations is an arena in which many of these actors and their agendas collide. Great powers no longer control the global agenda or dictate outcomes, and this provokes instincts for unilateralism. Several staffers and officials around the UN have pointed out that the United States is used to getting its own way and tends to back out if it doesn’t. As Craig Murphy writes, “Hyperpowers are fickle (if not feckless) friends of global governance.”5 Power dynamics within the international system, which materialize at the United Nations, may force the United States into more bargaining and compromise positions at a time when it sees itself (rightly or not) in a hegemonic light. When Russia vows to block any intervention against its allies, for example, “minilateralism” may be viewed as the only option available to the United States and “coalitions of the willing,” which are not possible within the UN’s cast of players, are often a logical and effective choice. At the same time, operations such as Korea (1950), Iraq (1991), and Somalia (1993) reveal that working through the UN does not imply that the United States relinquishes control; there may be compromises in the drafting of UN policy, but the US seldom compromises in the implementation of policy. The three pillars of US power—military capacity, legitimacy, and norm diffusion—are intimately tied to international organizations. As Ikenberry points out, US hegemony was established and then maintained through the creation of international institutions, particularly the UN.6 Puchala echoes this view in describing the UN as “the servant of a long-standing US hegemony.”7 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, NATO, and the United Nations are all part of the bricks and mortar of US strength. Multilateralism provides the image of self-restraint, transparency, predictability, and legitimacy; thus, the UN helps sustain US power.8 Despite isolationist impulses and the appeal of unilateral or minilateral methods, the UN is a venue for promoting institutional restraint for growing

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powers; so in this regard, it matters strategically.9 What James Traub labels as a “post-hegemonic world” increases the incentives for US engagement at the UN, specifically because it reflects a Western-based institutional order in times of transition and uncertainty.10 The very same institutional restraints that dampen US multilateralism may also limit the assertive tendencies of other rising powers.11 Beyond relative power considerations, when the United States rejects multilateralism at the UN, it is rejecting not only the organization but also its own allies. Most member-states view Security Council resolutions as the general will of the “international community” and the product of international law. As Thakur writes, “The United Nations remains the focus of international expectations and the locus of collective action.”12 Most European countries are firmly committed to the UN, and most states around the globe view the institution as the legitimate venue for crafting international policy. After the Bush administration’s rejection of the UN in 2003 and the war in Iraq, the United States was perceived by many as a rogue state, not only by long-term adversaries but also by close allies. As illustrated by Victoria Nuland and her EU comment (discussed in Chapter 7), not only does the United States not play well with its own allies, but in some cases, it embarrasses, marginalizes, and even undermines them. Kofi Annan’s final speech as Secretary-General echoes this observation: “When it [the United States] appears to abandon its own ideals and objectives, its friends abroad are naturally troubled and confused.”13 According to another analyst, “Washington doesn’t understand you have to work hard to be liked.”14 Although the Obama administration did tamp down some of the resentment toward the United States, there still remains a general sense of mistrust and a view that US engagement is myopic and selfserving. Changing dynamics in world politics have altered the way we think about multilateralism. The international political system is composed of norms, regimes, and other international organizations that are intertwined with and interdependent with the UN. The IMF and World Bank are both essential US economic venues. Many agencies within the UN system, such as the OPCW, IAEA, and UNHCR, are also part of the US national security tapestry in that they assist with mitigating threats from chemical and nuclear weapons and refugee crises. With growing interdependence and transnational issues, the UN is a pillar of global governance.15 The next section explores the UN’s institutional dynamics that contribute to the widening estrangement with the United States. The Institutional Context The dysfunctional institutional dynamics within the United Nations contribute to its tumultuous relationship with the United States. The grand bargain struck

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between Roosevelt and Stalin in the days leading up to the San Francisco Conference continues to impede the creation of an institution capable of promoting a “permanent peace.” The institutional setup is problematic in that great powers are not held accountable, which fosters inconsistency and threatens international rule of law. The UN, like most bureaucracies, is also prone to inefficiency, bloat, and corruption. In addition, the United States comes to the UN as a minority, and working through venues such as the General Assembly places it in a compromised position. As UN membership has grown, it has become less and less a Western/US-dominated institution. Even in the best cases, when there is general agreement about goals, the process of international cooperation can be challenging and time consuming and requires compromise. The sheer number of member-states, regardless of their agenda or orientation, makes cooperation and coordination difficult, particularly for a state that is used to dominating the agenda. Given these parameters, there are different incentives for the United States at different stages in the creation of foreign policy. The UN’s value to the United States may be present in creating procedural legitimacy and legality for a policy already crafted; yet, as demonstrated in case after case, the UN’s utility is diminished in the operational implementation of a policy, particularly those involving use of force. Korea (1950), Iraq (1991), and Libya (2011) were the exceptions, not the rule. In addition, these interventions were thin or partially multilateral.16 In the case of the use of force, US strategic interests and multilateral coordination challenges are compounded by the complex, highly bureaucratic, underfunded organization that is the UN. One area of considerable consensus is that the United Nations is in need of reform and updating. UN leaders, US politicians, and scholars all find the organization failing to meet its goals. With the problems in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Syria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the capacities of the UN to protect humanity from the “scourge of war” are questionable. The UN is also inundated with very high expectations; according to Tharoor, the UN is “expected to succeed all the time.”17 The UN is often tasked with some of the most difficult cases of human conflict and human suffering and is given very little operational support to demobilize violence, build stable societies, and mitigate immense human suffering. Yet, there are notable successes, but, as Deans explains, “Much of the good the United Nations does, meanwhile—especially in areas like refugee aid, development and disease prevention that are important to billions of poor people around the world—gets lost amid the badnews headlines.”18 In addition, changes within the United Nations in terms of shifting goals (i.e., the Sustainable Development Goals and the focus on peacekeeping) seem removed from the post-9/11 security focus dominant in US foreign policy narratives. There are places for significant UN reform and improvement; however, much of the dysfunctionality within the UN comes from its member-states.

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Dag Hammarskjöld, second Secretary-General of the United Nations, anticipated this problem. In a 1953 speech to the American Association for the United Nations, he warned against “those who see special delight in blaming the storms on the ship instead of the weather.”19 US policies toward the UN are in part to blame for the problems faced by the organization. This is particularly true in terms of funding and treaty ratification, but also in those cases in which the United States skirts the UN’s legal parameters regarding use of force (1999 in Kosovo, 2003 in Iraq, and 2014 in Iraq and Syria). The fact that the United States maintains a permanent seat in the Security Council also dictates UN capacities. According to one observer, “The US is more concerned with protecting its permanent membership than in protecting global peace. . . . The US needs to think about itself as a member and not an owner of the United Nations.”20 In fact, many of those interviewed for this project claimed that the United States does not engage in diplomacy. The result is that often the US delegation is perceived as arrogant and brash, projecting an attitude that other countries should “fall in line” just because the United States showed up. Despite the domestic myths of the UN as a venue for countries to mobilize against the United States, the evidence suggests that this is not the case. In examining voting data in the General Assembly, several have found that, with the exception of Russia, the other BRICS states have moderated their positions and moved closer to the United States. In fact, data on General Assembly voting records indicates that the BRICS are moving closer in terms of policy coordination “but [are] not strengthening opposition to the United States.”21 Overall, the data implies that, in fact, the United Nations is a less dangerous place than it was in the 1970s. It is not surprising that the UN is inefficient. It is an organization with close-to-universal state membership and an extensive agenda that encompasses almost every issue in the world. With the plethora of international instruments now available, as well as the ability to venue shop, the United States continues to experiment with different configurations of states and international organizations that fit its agenda.22 Yet when it comes to a near universal member institution with access for civil society and connections to the private sectors, there are few alternatives. Overall, the constellation of factors that produce robust multilateralism through the UN is quite demanding. The institutional dynamics must be conducive to collaboration, particularly in the General Assembly and Security Council. If great powers (particularly Russia and China) hold contrasting interests, then the venue of the Security Council is closed. In addition, with more visible and salient issues, the domestic arena can have more impact, particularly in cases of divided government. If the three gears highlighted in Figure 2.2 are moving in the same direction, effective and efficient multilateralism is possible. But even when the international and institutional factors

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may all be ripe for cooperation and collaboration, domestic actors (i.e., Congress) can interfere. The creation of the UN provided the quintessential case study of the stars aligning for US multilateralism. Within the United States, there was bipartisan consensus, Great Power agreement, and, after decades of warfare, open political opportunity structures. However, the fortuitous dynamics of 1945 were not arbitrary; they were carefully cultivated and nurtured over the course of several years, as was the essential confluence of great power agendas. Then, the Cold War effectively shut down the Security Council, and the rise of the developing world and its agenda closed the General Assembly. This dynamic and the rise of the G-77 prompted declarations of the UN as a “dangerous place”—a narrative soon spiraled into congressional slashing of budgets, which, in turn, damaged UN institutional capacities. Global factors and UN institutional growth seeped into domestic politics and began to erode support from political elites and the public. As the Cold War ended, the cycle reversed, and domestic actors were initially very favorable toward the UN. But then, the UN’s inabilities in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Bosnia (1995) fueled partisan rhetoric about the organization’s relevance and capacities. This dynamic was repeated in the months after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Failure has a long shadow. Presidents and Parties Although presidents are the symbol of US engagement abroad, this research indicates that an administration and its priorities are significant but not independently instrumental. Presidents can be drawn to the UN for two reasons— a normative commitment or a strategic need. Both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush (presidents who seemed to reject the UN on ideological grounds) quietly returned to the UN after considering strategic interests and necessity. These findings support Howard’s observation that presidential priorities often change during their administration—regardless of initial views toward the UN, those views are often moderated while in office.23 Voting patterns in the Security Council and the General Assembly demonstrate that an administration’s support for the United Nations does influence the priority given to the UN and the level of cooperation with other memberstates. The US delegation under Republican presidents are less likely to vote with other states in the General Assembly. In 1985, Congress passed a resolution that requires the Department of State to report on the level of vote coordination between the United States and all other member-states on nonconsensus votes in the General Assembly. This indicator (that is, how votes overlap) is labeled “voting coincidence.” Figure 8.1 demonstrates that there is a noticeable difference in US voting agreement in the General Assembly depending on a president’s party affiliation. The graph illustrates that the average voting co-

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Figure 8.1 US Voting Coincidence in the UN General Assembly by Presidential Party Affiliation, 1985–2014 60

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incidence for Republican presidents from 1985 to 2014 was 23.3 percent, whereas for Democrats, it was more than 20 points higher, at 44.9 percent. For most of the 1980s, voting coincidence under Reagan and the first Bush administration did not exceed 30 percent. For the next eight years under the Clinton administration, the rate of vote concurrence was solidly in the 40 percent range and came close to 50 percent in several years. Under the first two years of the George W. Bush administration, the level of accord is around 30 percent but then dropped to the mid-20 percent mark for the rest of his time in office. Under the Obama administration, the level of symmetry with member-states in the General Assembly rose 15 percentage points and peaked at over 50 percent in 2011. The data indicate higher levels of cooperation with other countries in the assembly by liberal administrations and declining levels under conservative presidents. Underscoring the importance of Israel in this relationship, the voting coincidence numbers increase significantly (regardless of party affiliation)

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when votes regarding Israel are taken out. Yet, as Milner and Tingley pointed out, “Most governments . . . are not governed by a unitary rational executive” and the legislative branch and interest groups also add constraints.24 In areas such as budgeting and treaty ratification, the Congress (particularly the Senate), as a transnational actor, can undermine presidential initiatives and even UN programs. Congress Nowhere are the domestic impediments to cooperation between the United States and the United Nations more apparent than with Congress. In fact, in some cases, the dysfunctional dynamics at the domestic level have led presidents to seek out the UN in an effort to bypass this fray (i.e., in Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1991). Presidents must play the three-level game and appease allies who see the UN as a legitimate forum, even as Congress works to obstruct these relations, interrupting not only US-UN relations but also credibility with key allies. This was clearly demonstrated in the P5+1 negotiations with Iran. Even as six great powers were in negotiations about incentives that would convince Iran to give up its nuclear program, members of Congress were pushing for increased sanctions—illustrating the countervailing pressures imposed from within the United States. Even when conditions are favorable for US multilateral collaboration within the UN (as in the 2011 Libyan case), the domestic context (in particular, Congress and public opinion) does not always provide the political space for an administration’s overt advocacy of the UN’s utility to assist in managing international threats. As the contradictions in rhetoric indicate, “What makes sense at home or abroad is often hard to sell in the other arena.”25 Presidential foreign policy initiatives increasingly interact with the legislative branch. Liberal presidents are particularly susceptible to engaging in a tug of war with Congress over the UN. Under both Clinton and Obama, UN funding became highly politicized and was tied to congressionally imposed reforms. Yet, ideology is not the only driving factor. Unexpectedly, UN funding tends to be less contentious under conservative presidents. Tracing the history of US financing for the UN indicates that when Republicans control the White House and one or more houses of Congress, the legislative branch is unlikely to block UN funding requests. This may have two sources. First, funding does not become politicized when the government is not divided. Second, conservatives tend to claim more political credibility on foreign affairs, and their narrative that they are tough on national security may serve to protect an administration from critiques of “subcontracting” US foreign policy to the UN. Bipartisanship support of the UN was an essential ingredient in the American acceptance of membership in the United Nations. The 1945 commitment to notions of international rule of law, great power coordination, and institu-

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tional approaches to conflict resolution (as cultivated by Roosevelt and Vandenberg) has waned, particularly with conservatives. The foundation for this rejection began with the Irreconcilables in the early 1900s and then emerged again, years later, when Barry Goldwater appeared as a vocal critic against the UN. As ideology has become more influential in US political parties, the UN is even less valued.26 From Goldwater to Kirkpatrick and from Helms to Bolton, factions within the United States have viewed the UN as dangerous. Brett Schaefer of the Heritage Foundation explains that most conservatives are “convinced that the UN also has profound flaws managerially, budgetarily, and diplomatically. . . . So there’s a tendency by a number of conservatives, having seen past reform efforts fail, to give up and condemn the UN as being beyond saving.”27 Truman’s insights about making international engagement and the US participation at the UN a bipartisan project that included both the legislative and executive branches has been lost in the highly contentious environment in Washington, DC. Election cycles also play a role. Every four years, presidential campaigns and their rhetoric can damage US-UN relations. When “on the stump,” specific references to the United Nations usually hold negative connotations and are associated with corruption and a sitting president’s mismanagement of foreign policy. Political candidates, presidents, and legislators all find that the UN is an easy target and a convenient place to deflect culpability. Bipartisan bashing was evident in both the Clinton administration and the second Bush administration. In fact, according to one author, the US is “killing its progeny,” and “lawmakers and White House aides find it easier to placate a fanatic minority than to make the effort to energize an inactive majority.”28 In a 2015 Republican presidential debate, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) proclaimed that Obama “wants to use the United Nations to bind the United States and take away our sovereignty.”29 The same candidate launched a television campaign ad proclaiming “it was an attack on US sovereignty when the United Nations’ world court” ordered a “stay of execution for an illegal who committed murder.” According to the ad, “Cruz fought the United Nations and won, defending the US constitution and states’ rights.”30 Although the UN has many supporters within the US, there are almost no competing narratives to counter accusations such as those from Cruz. Presidents, members of Congress, and the media do not issue praise for the UN. In part, this is based on ideological orientations within the US, but it is also enhanced by the UN’s organizational complexity and the “spaghetti junction” of specialized agencies, funds, programs, and commissions Weiss writes about.31 Another area in which Congress influences multilateralism directly is through treaty ratification. It takes only one-third of the US Senate to reject a treaty, and the recent track record of approval is dismal, with Stewart Patrick describing the Senate as the “graveyard of treaties.”32 Treaty ratification is also a function of the amount of work and political capital an administration is

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willing to employ to secure support—something that is increasingly lacking. The rejection of both the International Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities reveals the structural challenges of the US political system and growing ideological concerns.33 The dynamic leads presidents to create workarounds and to draft agreements that build on existing legislation, thus avoiding the need for congressional funding or approval. The Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015, for example, was deliberately crafted to avoid Congress. The increasing use of executive agreements is another result of this impasse. However, working around Congress presents constitutional issues and is hardly a functional approach to either domestic or global governance. The Senate’s rejection of treaty after treaty also affects US relations with its allies.34 Most countries are aware that treaty ratification is highly unlikely for the United States; therefore, US credibility is compromised, and its voice in treaty negotiations is muted. To have effective and efficient multilateralism, the primary three gears (see Figure 2.2) need to be turning in the direction of coordination. Although the international and institutional factors may all be ripe for cooperation and collaboration, the domestic political environment often impedes US engagement at the UN. From 1919 forward, a key piece of the puzzle is Congress. Robust multilateralism must be a bipartisan endeavor. Congress can influence treaty ratification, affect the UN budget, and frame the image of the UN. The dysfunctional dynamics involving the legislative branch are considerable. From divided government to an increase in the strength of ideology, there are both strategic and normative incentives to inhibit US-UN relations. The Congress wields the power of the purse, the power of the vote, and the power of voice. Contentious relations between the White House and Congress add to the damaging drama and, with limited interruptions, continue to steer the United States away from institutional multilateralism. The Public, Polling, and the Pundits Multilateralism is a method of interacting with other states, but it is also a value in itself. Americans are not isolationists; they clearly support diplomacy and consistently advocate involvement in the United Nations. The basic support for the United Nations as a diffuse idea continues to hold widespread support, and the US public supports membership in the United Nations. In Gallup polling from the 1960s through 2005, general support for US membership in the UN never dipped below 75 percent. Yet, almost one-third of the public does not support US “cooperation” with the United Nations. When the Chicago Council on Global Affairs asked Americans if “the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice,” the results indicated a strong level

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of support. A 2004 poll reported that 66 percent agreed with the statement; over the next six years, those numbers dipped to a low of 50 percent in 2010 but rebounded to close to 60 percent by 2014. Moving from general support to specific areas, the US public’s support grows depending on issue area, with UN peacekeeping and the strengthening of international laws against terrorism gaining strong public backing—at over 60 percent.35 Figure 8.2 reveals the responses to a poll that asked whether the United States should cooperate “fully” with the United Nations; the graph reveals the decline in desire to engage, even as the numbers remained at the majority level. In 1964, 74 percent polled agreed, with only 17 percent in disagreement. These numbers tumbled in 1974, with the emergence of vocal opposition to the UN from members of Congress and calls from Goldwater to withdraw from the organization. The success of US engagement in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 elevated those numbers to a high mark of 77 percent. But then the ratings declined through the 1990s, reflecting the poor publicity associated with Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In 2001, support rebounded a bit, as most govFigure 8.2 Popular Support for US Cooperation with the United Nations, 1964–2014

Sources: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “October 2005 News Interest Index” (November 2005): 105; Edward Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Gregory G. Holyk, “United States Leaders and Public Support for Multilateralism,” University of Illinois at Chicago, 2008; Gregory G. Holyk, “US Public Support for the United Nations,” Public Opinion Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2010): 168–189; Pew Research Center, “Public Sees US Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips” (December 3, 2013).

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ernment agencies received a boost in support after the events of September 11, 2001.36 The controversies of the 2003 Iraq War are reflected in another low point at 43 percent. There was some recovery with the Obama administration, though the numbers of those who disagreed grew and remained at or above 30 percent for the past decade. Most scholars reject isolationism as causing these declines; in fact, when US international engagement occurs in a multilateral context, public support for the operation rises.37 The overwhelming public support for the United Nations during the 1950s and 1960s has faded. Together, the public opinion data indicate that working through the United Nations is not supported by about 30 percent of the population, with level of support closely related to political party identification. Figure 8.3, which is based on several years of Gallup polling, emphasizes the growing disparity between self-identified Republicans and Democrats regarding their view of the United Nations. In 2016, only 17 percent of Republicans polled described the UN as doing a “good job”—a 35-point difference from Democratic approval ratings of 52 percent. Since the 2003 Iraq War, Republican support has fallen from an average of 30–40 percent to 20 percent, with some years dipping even lower.38

Figure 8.3 Partisan Identification and UN “Good Job” Rating, 2000–2016 70

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This decline in support is driven by diffuse concerns with government organizations and is also responding to assessments of the UN and specific issue areas. Lack of conservative support for the UN may be part of a broader mistrust of government agencies in general. As Luck pointed out, with recent waves of anti-governmentalism in portions of the US electorate, “there is little reason to expect that international organizations will be treated with any more fondness than the homegrown variety.”39 In addition, declining numbers from conservatives from 2014 to 2016 may have been in reaction to the nuclear agreement with Iran and the climate change accord in Paris 2015. Outside of conservative groups, assessment of the UN may be a function of expectations. If the public has high expectation of the UN’s ability to address a particular issue (e.g., a humanitarian crisis in Syria) but, at the same time, little knowledge about the organization’s institutional capacities, this may create a letdown or relative disappointment. As Walter Russell Mead explained, “If the UN disappeared today, we’d have to try to reinvent it tomorrow. But the day after that, we’d be disappointed in it again.”40 The combination of expectation and disappointment pushes up the disapproval ratings. Within the United States, the anxieties of the age (i.e., globalization and increased migration) fuel concerns about the UN. Some claim that anti-UN sentiment builds on a lack of understanding about global politics and low literacy about UN capacities and limitations and that it thrives in an environment of American exceptionalism.41 Overall, lack of personal experience with the UN, as well as its legal complexity and low visibility, leads to malleable individual opinions on the institution.42 Some claim that national literacy about international affairs would improve support for the UN and multilateralism in civil society. In fact, Kathleen Courtney, vice chair of the League of Nations Union, argued in 1944, “Only with an informed public opinion can we get any democracy behind any form of international organization.”43 It appears that support for the UN is something that requires cultivation. Yet, the UN does not effectively promote itself and its accomplishments to the US audience. For the US public, support for the UN is not obvious. US presidents often make the case for UN relevance in the chambers of the General Assembly, but they almost never do so on American airways. In balance, civil society contains both those who advocate for the UN and those who advocate against it; yet the voices of groups such as the UN Foundation and the Better World Campaign do not have quite the same impact as the Republican National Party platform or legislation guidelines from the American Legislative Exchange Council that provide templates for draft bills to block UN initiatives in multiple state legislators. Yet, many private citizens, relief agencies, and NGOs within the US are pushing for the adoption of international conventions and protocols. As Luck pointed out, there are “persistent strains of idealism and cynicism, multilateralism and unilateralism, internationalism and isolationism” within American debate and discourse.44 However, very few groups

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blog in favor of the UN, craft legislation for members of Congress and state legislatures, or advocate increased participation at the UN. When George W. Bush or even Kofi Annan criticizes the UN, people take note. As presidents and other politicians find scapegoating the UN a convenient tactic to deflect criticism of their foreign policies, public opinion tends to echo these elite messages.45 Within the United States, the popular cultural markers for the UN are often the oil-for-food scandal, sexual misconduct of UN peacekeepers, and continued corruption. Negative rhetoric can undermine working through the UN, especially when the organization is framed as inefficient, corrupt, and anti-American. This, in turn, raises concerns that some multilateral initiatives may “hold logic in the public’s favor” but still fail to gain public support.46 The following section explores the broader and more enduring normative environment that pushes and pulls US engagement outside its borders. Cowboy Idealism and Exceptional Americanism Americans want to make the world a better place. The desire to change the world in its image—specifically the promotion of democracy, institutional conflict resolution, and rule of law—means that the United States is committed to institutional multilateralism. The UN is a key player in the global dissemination of “American values” and part of what Franklin Roosevelt once called “an arsenal of democracy.” However, American exceptionalism creates normative and strategic tensions. The Janus-faced aspect of this narrative pushes and pulls members of Congress, presidents, and publics toward and away from collaboration. The UN faces allegations that it impinges on US sovereignty. This accusation is far from new. In similar fashion, in the early 1900s, nationalists within the United States feared that international organizations would impose upon and compete with US power. The concerns of Henry Cabot Lodge from a century ago lingered with the anxieties over Europeans imposing control in the early part of the twentieth century, the postcolonial states in the 1970s, and controlling majorities from the African and Arab states in the twenty-first century. The sovereigntist view fears a looming external Leviathan. The UN gives shape and even a street address to the abstract fear of intrusions on sovereignty. In most cases, these views overestimate the capacities of the UN and demonstrate a lack of understanding of UN mandates and legal parameters. Despite growing norms of mutual reciprocity and expectations of US leadership, American exceptionalism justifies US exclusion from both UN parameters (i.e., use of force in Iraq 2003) and multilateral treaties. Perhaps the term exceptional Americanism is more adequate, as it demonstrates recent interpretations of this perspective that emphasize confidence in US capacities. Harold Koh explains that the United States “exempts itself from

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certain international law rules and agreements, even ones that it may have played a critical role in framing.”47 This view is reminiscent of William Jennings Bryan’s ideas of absolute US superiority, which assumes continued capacities and invulnerability to global issues. The mythos of being “selfmade” by “pulling oneself up by one’s own bootstraps” creates fiercely independent thinking in the American social fabric and includes an element of rogue idealism or, as Lago describes, “cowboy idealism with idealized capacities of tireless strength and skills to destroy evil, conquer enemies, and seek truth and justice.” He continues: “The cowboy doesn’t wait for the arm of law and government, he goes out on his own and gets the job done.”48 The impatience of the United States also contributes to this view; Americans want to get the job done and believe they have the capacity to do so. From this view, according to Weiss, “Multilateral diplomacy is slow, public, and inefficient. Compromise is the means, and half-loaves are the result.”49 Thus, working around the UN is both justified and necessary. Exceptional Americanism means that the sovereigntist throngs miss the global security threats (i.e., climate change, global pandemics, and transnational terrorism) that require coordination of multiple countries. The consequences of exceptional Americanism isolate the United States from allies and compromise its political credibility. According to Margaret MacMillan, “Faith in their own exceptionalism has sometimes led to a certain obtuseness on the part of Americans, a tendency to preach at other nations rather than listen to them, a tendency as well to assume that American motives are pure where those of others are not.”50 Another scholar notes that this posture creates a global image of the United States as “pushy, preachy, insensitive, self-righteous.”51 US election cycles, partisan politics, fear of loss of sovereignty, and a healthy dose of exceptional Americanism fuse together to undermine US participation at the UN, which, in itself, is a rather American innovation. Sectors of the US public are enchanted by an exceptional image of the United States that denies the challenges of a thickly interdependent world and the need for non-militarized tools of foreign policy, and the case for burden sharing does not effectively counter the running narratives of exceptional Americanism. US policy elites and the public have been consistent in their inconsistent commitment to the UN. The trajectory of US-UN relations is one of peaks and valleys; however, the overall trend is one of an incrementally increasing crevasse. US leadership often exaggerates both the levels of engagement and the levels of estrangement at the United Nations. As the “stealth multilateralism” of the George W. Bush administration and the mostly rhetorical return to the UN of the Obama administration indicate, the peaks and valleys are not as dramatic as portrayed in the media.52 And yet, this disconnect and posturing reflect the significance of the domestic political context as the primary recipient of such messaging. Mark Malloch-Brown criticized the dysfunctional dynam-

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ics of reality versus rhetoric and blasted the leadership in Washington, DC, for allowing “too much unchecked UN bashing,” despite many levels of cooperation.53 The lack of connection between the rhetoric—of what the United States stands for and what it does—contributes to the growing crisis for both the nation and the UN. Implications for US Foreign Policy Although studies of war show a decline in interstate wars (wars between two or more states), intrastate conflicts (internal) have risen, with insurgencies and organized violence linked to transnational criminal networks and violent terrorist groups. Increasingly, civilians are under attack, and refugee and humanitarian crises are on the rise. As such, the demands for collaboration have increased. The United States will continue to support peacekeeping and efforts to mitigate terrorism within the UN. The UN plays a vital role in addressing growing instability in peripheral areas such as Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. However, because the UN cannot act against the desires of the major powers, and, with Russia and China both more active in global politics, UN efforts will continue to be hobbled by great powers, including the United States. The result is that the United States will continue to seek out alternative venues. Returning to the questions posed in Chapter 1, is there a crisis in US multilateralism, or is the disengagement from international cooperative venues merely rhetorical? Crisis, as defined by Webster, is “an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending; especially: one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome.” The crisis comes in the countervailing pressures, as global threats to international stability and human security are met with reluctance from within the United States to engage in multilateral efforts. The crisis then combines with the UN’s lack of institutional capacity to address those demands. One observer explained that “the pattern is clear: since the early 1990s, the need for effective multicountry collaboration has soared, but at the same time multilateral tasks have inevitably failed.”54 US power is not what it used to be. The inability of the US military to determine events on the ground in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria demonstrates that the hard power approaches are costly and often not effective. The costs of shunning the United Nations—verbally, politically, financially, and logistically—are significant. In this regard, the UN remains an “indispensable tool.”55 As one observer notes, “We have gone about as far as we can with a global system that is at best partly governed and regulated.”56 These dynamics of growing demands and declining capacities are leading to a crucial or decisive point. Although UN mandates are growing more robust, they are controversial and are made feeble by inconsistent budgets and fickle collective will. In 2011,

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the Council authorized the use of “all necessary means” to protect civilians in Libya; in 2013, it created a UN Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a stabilization mission in Mali with a mandate to pursue terrorist organizations. In March 2016, the success of more than 100,000 peacekeepers operating in sixteen countries was compromised as UN personnel are increasingly targeted by insurgents, not to mention a budget shortfall of $1.6 billion. As a primary architect and financier, the United States is a key player in UN viability. For the United Nations, US relations with the organization directly affect the payment of dues, the support of peacekeeping initiatives, and the control of nuclear proliferation. The United States can make efforts to fortify the UN. However, the foundations with the United States for supporting the UN are weak. One UN staffer claimed, “Multilateral diplomacy does not exist for the US. The Chinese want as many people as possible funneling through the UN to gain the experience. While the Americans in the State Department actually don’t like the New York assignment.”57 As two scholars observed twenty years ago, “We can ill-afford to diminish this instrument to advance our foreign policy interests through wild inconsistency, thoughtlessness, or neglect.”58 However, strong-arming the UN is not good for either the United States or the UN. The United States is more effective in working with the UN system when it is not seen as driving the UN agenda. The strength and credibility of the UN was and remains intertwined with that of the United States. When the UN looks good, the US looks good. When the United Nations is weak and under international pressure, the United States is usually in a weakened position as well. Without the United Nations, the United States cannot secure both domestic security and international stability. In addition, the reluctance to work with the Security Council—specifically in situations of use of force—carries considerable costs to America’s legitimacy and international standing on the global stage. As Ikenberry asserts, “The most enduringly powerful states are those that work with and through institutions.”59 Institutions are more than just collective action solvers; they are also order sustainers. Others point out that the key to power is restraint; as such, US self-interest requires institutional restraint and multilateralism.60 As one conservative columnist explains, “To secure America—the homeland and the political and economic values that make the United States so attractive— America must continue to undergird the rules-based international order that has served it so well in the seven decades since World War II.”61 In interviews with staff at the Department of State, analysts mentioned that for some sectors in the US government, the UN actually holds increasing relevance in the face of the rise of China and other non-Western powers. The policymakers disclosed that the US government want the Chinese working through the UN. In this regard, the UN becomes an important venue to the United States, and multilateralism becomes a path to keeping other competing powers engaged in a

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system of institutional restraint. Although the alternate path of not working with the UN is unlikely, the United States will continue to cherry-pick which UN policies and procedures it will follow. For scholarship on US-UN relations, the question is no longer whether domestic politics influences these dynamics, but instead how. As Milner writes, “Politics thus occurs all along the water’s edge.”62 A complete picture of US multilateralism must account for the synergy among domestic social forces, the policy elite, and the international strategic and normative context. In the case of US multilateralism at the United Nations, ideas and identity collide with strategic imperatives and domestic impediments. Future Prospects The United States is the most difficult and yet most essential player for the UN. The US-UN relationship gets caught in the general contradictions of US relations with the world. On one hand, the United States is extremely powerful; on the other hand, it is not able to effectively accomplish many of its foreign policy goals. The United States promotes democracy, yet appears to ally with authoritarian regimes. It calls for compliance with international law, yet declines to accept its parameters. Despite its shortcomings, the United Nations provides several key elements for the global community that clearly serve US interests. As Jeane Kirkpatrick pointed out decades ago, “Relations inside the United Nations constitute a significant dimension of our relations with other countries and deserve to be considered with seriousness.”63 The UN also provides access for the private sector (through the Global Compact) and the NGO community.64 There is no other place where this diverse group of actors may come together. UN specialized agencies work throughout the globe, mitigating the effects of natural disasters and health crises and providing technical assistance. The UN is a global forum for norm creation; in cases where there are no conflicting great power interests, the UN can bring peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement actions.65 Moreover, the UN is an effective canary in the coal mine, as it brings attention to dark corners of the globe and provides a forum to air even the great powers’ dirty laundry. In terms of US foreign policy, the UN can still be an effective venue, but the United States must be willing to do the challenging work of diplomacy. Presidents must be committed not only to the outcome but also to the process. Multilateralism takes work; leadership entails not telling other countries what to do, but carefully bringing relevant partners to the table and constructing a process that heeds the concerns of other states. With waning US economic power, soft power, and even military functionality, the UN continues to be a source of influence for the United States. According to one senior adviser, “The United Nations presents a unique opportunity for the United States to lead.”66 Truman also held that the policy of the United States should be to

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“support the United Nations with all the resources that we possess . . . not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent partnership.”67 In an era of declining public support and obstructionist factions within the United States, domestic politics within the United States holds growing relevance for both the UN and the international order. 1. Randall Bennett Woods, “Fulbright Internationalism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 491 (May 1987). 2. Edward Luck, Mixed Messages (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). 3. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 4. Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism,” The Review of International Organizations 9, no. 4 (2014), 386. 5. Craig N. Murphy, “The United States and the UN,” in Obama and the World, eds., Indirjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidg (New York: Routledge, 2014), 269. 6. Ikenberry, After Victory; John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 7. Donald J. Puchala, “World Hegemony and the United Nations,” International Studies Review 7, no. 4 (2005): 572. 8. Alexandra Homolar, “Multilateralism in Crisis?” Global Society 26, no. 1 (2012); Ikenberry, After Victory. 9. Ikenberry, After Victory. 10. James Traub, “The Point Guard,” Foreign Policy, no. 195 (September/October 2012 ). 11. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds., International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Routledge, 2014). 12. Ramesh Thakur, “UN, US Should Not Work at Cross-Purposes,” Update.UNU.edu, no. 42 (June–August 2006). 13. Kofi Annan, “Annan Chides US in Final Speech,” BBC News, December 12, 2006. 14. Director of NGO focused on United Nations oversight, personal interview with author, March 2014. 15. Alessandra Ricci, “Multilateralism 2.0: Finding Some Evidence” (CRIS Working Paper no. W-2014/6, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 2014). 16. Atsushi Tago, “Determinants of Multilateralism in US Use of Force: State of Economy, Election Cycle, and Divided Government,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 585–604. 17. Shashi Tharoor, “Saving Humanity from Hell,” in Multilateralism Under Challenge: Power, International Order, and Structural Change, eds. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Triman (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), 29. 18. Bob Deans, “The United Nations: Underachiever Due for Overhaul,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 11, 2005, F1. 19. Dag Hammarskjöld, “Address in Cooperation with the New York University Institute for Review of United Nations Affairs” (American Association for the United Nations, New York, September 14, 1953).

Notes

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20. Senior official in UN-related NGO, personal interview with author, April 15, 2014. 21. UN Security Council, Security Council Report: Women, Peace and Security (New York, April 16, 2014); Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data” (2013). 22. David Rothkopf, “We Are Losing the War on Terror,” Foreign Policy (June 10, 2014). 23. Lise Morjé Howard, “Sources of Change in United States-United Nations Relations,” Global Governance 16, no. 4 (2010). 24. Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 74. 25. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” International Organizations 48, no. 1 (1994), 44. 26. Hans Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 27. David Bosco, “Can Conservatism Reconcile with the United Nations?” Foriegn Policy (July 9, 2013). 28. Barbara Crossette, “Killing One’s Progeny: America and the United Nations,” World Policy Journal 19, no. 3 (2002): 54. 29. Karoun Demirjian, “The Iran Deal Could Be Multilateralism’s Moment. But Congress Isn’t Ready,” Washington Post, September 25, 2015. 30. Available at http://therightscoop.com/new-ted-cruz-ad-i-fought-the-united -nations-and-won/#ixzz3zK8iHvyw 31. Thomas G. Weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 14. 32. Stewart M. Patrick, “More Treaty Gridlock: Another Impact of GOP Senate Takeover,” blog, Council on Foreign Relations, November 10, 2014, http://blogs .cfr.org/patrick/2014/11/10/more-treaty-gridlock-another-impact-of-gop-senate -takeover/. 33. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, Herding Cats (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Luke Glanville, “Syria Teaches Us Little About Questions of Military Intervention,” in Into the Eleventh Hour, eds., Robert W. Murray and Alasdair Mackay (Bristol, UK: E-international Relations, 2014). 34. Guri Bang, Jon Hovi, and Detlef F. Sprinz, “US Presidents and the Failure to Ratify Multilateral Environmental Agreements,” Climate Policy 12, no. 6 (2012). 35. Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura, “Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment,” in 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, ed. Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2014). 36. Virginia A. Chanley, “Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and Consequences,” Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (2002). 37. Steven Kull, “The US Public Isn’t Averse to Peacekeeping,” Christian Science Monitor 87, no. 144 (1995). 38. Lydia Saad, “Americans’ Opinion of UN at Record Low,” Gallup Poll, March 6, 2008; Jeffrey M. Jones and Nathan Wendt, “Americans Say UN Is Needed, but Doubt Its Effectiveness,” Gallup Poll Briefing (March 28, 2013). 39. Edward Luck, Mixed Messages (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), xii 40. Deans, “The United Nations.” 41. I. M. Destler, “The Reasonable Public and the Polarized Policy Process,” in The Real and the Ideal, eds., Anthony Lake and David Ochmanek (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 77; Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.

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42. Philip Everts, “NATO, the European Community and the United Nations,” in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, eds., Oskar Miedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 43. “Informed Public Opinion Held as Vital to Peace Maintenance,” Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 1944. 44. Luck, Mixed Messages, 3. 45. This research relies on volumes of polling data, including reports by Gallup, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, to serve as indicators of US-UN relations over time. 46. Edwin L. James, “Have Cooperationists Overshot Their Mark?” New York Times, January 17, 1943, E3. 47. Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1778 (2003). 48. Don Lago, Mything in Action: American Identity Lost and Searched for in the 2004 Election (New York: iUniverse, 2006). 49. Thomas G. Weiss, “The UN: Slow and Inefficient, but It Works,” Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 1990. 50. Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London: John Murray Publishers, 2001). 51. Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” 1481. 52. Howard, “Sources of Change in United States–United Nations Relations.” 53. Warren Hoge, “UN and US Again Display Testiness of Their Relations,” New York Times, June 8, 2006. 54. Moises Naim, “Minilateralism,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2009). 55. Madeleine Albright, “Who Broke the UN?” Foreign Policy 195 (September/October 2012). 56. A. Michael Spence, “The Global Security Deficit,” Project Synidcate (July 25, 2014). 57. Senior official in UN Peacebuilding Commission, personal interview with author, April 15, 2014. 58. Charles William Maynes and Richard S. Williamson, eds., US Foreign Policy and the United Nations System (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 16. 59. Ikenberry, After Victory, 20. 60. Lisa Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992). 61. Rothkopf, “We are Losing the War on Terror.” 62. Milner and Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge, 2. 63. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Moral Dimensions (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988), 284. 64. Roger Coate, “The John W. Holmes Lecture,” Global Governance 15, no. 2 (2009); David Davenport, “The New Diplomacy,” Policy Review 116 (2002/2003). 65. Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 66. Gillian Sorensen, senior adviser at the United Nations Foundation, personal interview with author, May 2013. 67. Harry S. Truman, “Message to the Congress Transmitting First Annual Report on US Participation in the United Nations,” February 5, 1947.

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Index

Abu Ghraib, 152–153 Acheson, Dean, 67 Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, 46 Afghanistan, 68, 87–88, 139, 141, 169, 170; limitation of hard power, 208; and Soviet withdrawal, 96 Agenda 21, 3, 177–178. See also United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio Agenda setting, 19, 20fig, 25, 166, 175, see also policy process model Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 172 Aideed, Mohamed, 102 Al Qaeda, 133, 152 Al-Assad, Bashar, 169–170 Albania, 107 Albright, Madeleine, 2–3, 102, 105–106, 108, 112 Allison, Graham, 24–25 American Bar Association, 52t American Council on Education, 52tab American exceptionalism, 7–8, 25, 29, 40, 42–46, 53–56, 59, 113, 121, 205–206, American Farm Bureau Federation, 52tab American First movement, 46 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 117; see also interest groups American Jewish Committee, 181 American Legion, 51, 52t American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), 178, 205 American Service-Members’ Protection Act (P.L. 107-206, title II), 138; see

also Article 98 agreements; International Criminal Court American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 1999, 114; of 2003, 143; see also sovereignty American Unitarian Youth, 52tab Amnesty International, 104; see also human rights; nongovernmental organizations Anfal campaign, 99; see also, Kurds Angola, 11, 68 Annan, Kofi, 109, 111, 129, 133, 137, 149, 180, 195–196, 206; oil-for-food scandal 143–144; reform agenda 153–155, 154tab Annan, Kojo, 143; see also Cotecna Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 130 Arab League, 165–166 Arab–Israeli Conflict, 10, 66, 116, 179– 181, 183; 1973 War, 75; Six Day War, 73, 77–78; Argentina, 180 Armed Services Committee, 73 Article 98 agreements, see International Criminal Court, Ashcroft, John, 111 Assertive Multilateralism, 102, 118 Atlantic Charter, 47 Austin, Warren, 49 Axis of evil, 152; see also Terrorism, war on

B2H2 group, 50 Baker, James, 96, 98 Balkans, 108 Ball, Joseph, see B2H2 group Beck, Glenn, 177

241

242

Index

Begin, Menachem, 85 Belgium, 74, 104, 166 Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine, 165 Better World Fund, 116; see also Turner, Ted Biden, Joseph R., 112, 183; see also Helms-Biden Agreement Bill of Rights, see US constitution Bin Laden, Osama, 164 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 130 Blix, Hans, 134 Bolton, John, 103, 110, 117, 138–141, 155, 167 Bosnia, 29, 95, 99, 101, 103, 109, 111– 112, 115–116, 196, 198, 203; intervention, 106–108; see also UN Protection Force; Yugoslavia Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 103; tensions with US, 108, 115, 120–121 Brazil, 11, 22, 138, 164, 174–176 Bremer, Paul, 142 BRICS, 22, 176, 197 British Royal Navy, 166 Broomfield, William, 109 Brown, Mark M., 155, 207–208 Bryan, William J., 42–43, 178, 207 Buchanan, Patrick, 115, Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, 45 Bulgaria, 166 Bureau of International Organizations, 25 Burton, Harold, see B2H2 group Burundi, 103–104 Bush, George H. W., 1, 75, 95–96, 109 Bush, George W., 4–5, 30, 75, 129–156, 170, 198–199, 206–207; see also stealth multilateralism

Cambodia, 102 Canada, 152, 166 Cap-and-trade system, 174–175; see also Paris Agreement Carter, Jimmy, 79–80, 88, 97 Castro, Fidel, 70–71 Catholic, Jewish and Protestant Declaration on World Peace, 52tab Chad, 180 Chamberlain, Neville, 45 Chapter VII operations, see UN charter; see also United Nations Security Council

Chechnya, 119 Chemical weapons, 17; in Syria 169–171 Chile, 180 China, 11, 22, 24, 47, 50–51, 57–58, 66, 98, 108, 136, 139, 152–153, 164, 171, 174, 176, 180, 192,196–197, 208–209; Cold War disputes 68, 70, 72–73, 75–76, Chirac, Jacques, 135, 152 Christopher, Warren, 102 Churchill, Winston, 50, 54, 57 Citizens United Foundation, 150 Climate change, 3, 5, 12, 163, 164, 174– 176, 178, 184, 191, 192, 193, 207 Clinton, Hillary R., 143, 163, 165, 169, 173 Clinton, William J., 4, 8, 29, 33, 111– 112, 114–122, 131, 134, 148, 156, 170, 199–201; assertive multilateralism, 102–103; Bosnia, 106–108; compromise, 112; Rwanda, 103–105; and tensions with UN, 108–109 Cold War, 4, 8, 10, 22, 26, 30, 66; approach to, 154; effects in United Nations, 67–68, 74, 83–87, 198; see also Post–Cold War era Coleman, Norm, 143 Colin Powell, 133, 135–137 Collective security, 41–43, 68–70, 102; see also League of Nations Colombia, 98, 175 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), 47 Communism, 75, 77, 83–84, 111, 115– 116, 150, 155, 178; threat of, 66–72 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 2, 114 Concert of Europe model, 45–46 Conditional multilateralism, 22, 32fig , 59, 66, 68–70, 105–106; framework of 31–33, 88, 95, 108, 156, 164–165 see also multilateralism Congo, 66, 68, 74; crisis, 70 Congo, Democratic Republic of, 196, 208–209; see also UN Force Intervention Brigade Congress of Industrial Organizations, 52tab Connally Resolution, 50; see also UN Charter Constructivism, 8, 20–21

Index

Contract with America, 110, 122 Contributions for International Organizations (CIO), 146fig, 147tab, 184tab Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), 27, 147tab, 148, 184tab Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 86 Cooperation, 5–8, 15–19, 40, 47, 49, 59, 74, 82, 88, 152, 163–164, 171, 177, 203fig, 207–208; casual factors, 20– 22, 25, 30; domestic impediments, 200–202; essentials of, 191, 196– 199; multi-causal models of, 31–33, 32fig; see also Liberalism Cotecna, see Oil-for-Food Programme Council of Foreign Relations, 47 Council on Foreign Relations, 3, 52tab Cowboy Diplomacy, 130–131; see also Bush, George W. Cowboy Idealism, 206–208 Craddock, Bantz, 139 Cruz, Ted, 177, 201 Cuba, 68, 70, 87, 96, 111 Cyprus, 85, 171

Darfur, 139, 144, 148, 155 Davis, Forrest, 48 Day of Dignity in Damascus, 169 Dayton Peace Accords, 106 Dean, Howard, 116 Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, 135 DeLay, Tom, 148, Democratic National Convention, 175 Democratic Party, 43–44, 76 Denmark, 166, 171 Dewey, Thomas E., 48, 52 Disabled Veterans of the World War, 52tab Distribution of power, 16–17, 192; polyarchy, 176; see also realism Doha meeting (2012), 164; see also climate change; UNFCCC Dole, Robert, 1, 82, 108, 112, 115 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 57; agreements 51

East Timor, 119, 121 Edwards, John, 143

243

Egypt, 5, 69, 70–71, 73, 97, 109, 134, 165 El Salvador, 102 Engagement, 3, 5–11, 19, 39, 42–46, 56, 66, 84, 95, 97, 102, 105, 107, 118, 121, 129, 131, 139–141, 148, 155– 156, 164–168, 170, 180–181, 191– 195, 198, 201–204, 206–208; drivers of, 16–22, 24–25, 28–29, 31–32; qualities of, 20fig, 171, 175 see also cooperation; voting coincidence estrangement, 20, 195, 207–208; politics of, 65 Ethiopia, 68 Exceptional Americanism, 29, 191, 206– 208; see also American exceptionalism Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 179

Farmers Union, 52tab Federal Council of Churches of Christ of America, 47 Feinstein, Dianne, 143 Finland, 58 First Step Agreement, 172 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 86 Four policemen approach, 51, 57; see also Dumbarton Oaks Conference Fourteen Points, 42; see also Wilson, Woodrow Fox News, 155 France, 47, 70, 74, 98, 100, 104, 107, 118, 132–137, 152–153, 166, 170– 172, 180 Fulbright, William, 49–50, 53, 56, 191

Gardiner, Nile, see Heritage Foundation Gates, Bill, 175 Gaza Strip Conflict, 168–169, 180 see also Goldstone Report General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT), 74–75 General Assembly (UN), 6, 8, 23, 25, 27, 31, 65–67, 69, 70, 73, 75, 85–86, 132, 142, 153, 164, 172–173, 196, 205 high level group, 83; Human Rights Council, 149; policy coordination indicator, 9; reform proposals, 154tab; Syria, 170; voting bloc patterns, 74, 81, 87, 96, 197–198; vot-

244

Index

ing coincidence 82, 199fig; see also Uniting for Peace Resolution (UNGA/377); US arrears, 110–112, 119; US engagement, 184tab; and Zionism, 76, 116–118, 179, 180–181 Geneva, 130, 143, 167–168; see also United Nations Human Rights Commission; United Nations Human Rights Council Geneva Conventions, 85, 118 Genocide Convention (1948), 105 Gephardt, Richard, 143 Germany, 11, 19, 47, 98, 107, 118, 133– 137, 152, 171–172, 174; Nazi Germany, 53–54, 57, 59 Ghana, 143 Gingrich–Mitchell Task Force on UN Reform, 154 Global Compact, 210 Global Poverty Act, 163–164 Goa, 66, 70 Goldberg, Arthur, 73–74 Goldstone Report, 168–169, 180–181 Goldwater, Barry, 71–72, 76, 80–81, 155, 201, 203 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 85, 87, 96 Graham, Lindsey, 172 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Greece, 135, 166 Greenhouse gasses (GHG), 174–175 see also climate change; and Paris Agreement Grenada, 84 Gromyko, Andrei, 81 Group of Eight (G-8), 176–177 Group of 20 (G-20), 176–177 Group of 77 (G-77), 74–75, 81, 145, 198; see also new international economic order; non-aligned movement Guantanamo Bay, 149, 152–153 Guatemala, 175 Guinea, 168

Haass, Richard, 3 Habib, Philip C., 85 Hague Tribunal, 41 Haiti, 111, 121 Hamas, 181 Hammarskjold, Dag, 197 Harkin, Tom, 112 Hatch, Carl, see B2H2 group

Helms, Jesse, 26–27, 111, 113, 142 Helms-Biden agreement, 111, 145; see also United States arrears Heritage Foundation, 81, 114, 143, 167, 201 Hill, Lister, see B2H2 group Historical milieu, 29–31, 59, 88, 105, 119, 169; see also conditional multilateralism; normative context Holbrooke, Richard, 108, 113, 129 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 167 see also United States Congress Hull, Cordell, 45, 58 Human rights, 2, 4, 39, 40, 73, 84, 87, 99, 130, 138, 141, 148–149 153, 154tab, 163, 167–170, 179 violations in Rwanda, 104; see also UNHCR Human Rights Watch, 104, 130 Hunter, Robert, 97 Huntington, Samuel, 24–25 Hussein, Saddam, 99, 133–134, 143, 152 Hyde, Henry J., see United Nations Reform Act

India, 22, 70, 164, 174, 176 Indivisibility, 16 Indonesia, 175 Inhofe, James, 179 Institutional-based approach, 15–18; see also multilateralism Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 175 Interest groups, 8, 24, 27–28, 200; and Israel 116–118 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 175 Intermestic Politics, 7–8, 26–27, 172; see also three-level game; two-level game International Arms Trade Treaty, 2, 179, 184, 202 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 172, 195 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 80, 84 International Criminal Court (ICC), 2, 130–131, 145; campaign against the court, 138–139; see also Rome Statute International Monetary Fund (IMF), 21, 194–195

Index

International Red Cross, 104 Iran, 5, 19, 87, 99, 100, 110, 129, 141, 163–165, 167, 168, 171–174, 192, 200, 205; Iran–Iraq War, 85, 88, 96; Joint Plan of Action, 172; Terror Finance Transparency Act, 173; UNSC Resolution 1929 ,172; see also First Step Agreement Iraq, 4, 5, 11, 17, 84–85, 97–98, 111, 139, 164, 169, 170, 194, 196; 197, 200 fall of Baghdad 136–137; Gulf War; oil for food program; operation provide comfort, 99–101; UNSC Resolution 678, 96; US invasion of 3, 9–10, 19, 129–136, 140–144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 183, 195, 198, 204, 206, 208; see also Persian Gulf War; weapons of mass destruction Irreconcilables, 40–44, 113, 201 Islamic State (ISIS), 5, 17, 181 Isolationism, 39, 44, 46–48, 50, 53–57, 204–205 Israel, 2, 10, 19, 27, 28, 66, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 84–85, 87–88, 108, 148, 164, 167–169, 173, 178–181, 183, 192– 193; interest groups 116–118, 172; US relationship, 6, 80–88, 199–200; see also AIPAC; Arab-Israeli Conflict; Gaza Strip Conflict Italy, 59, 107, 166

Japan, 57–58, 98, 118, John Birch Society, 72, 78, 177 Jordan, 166, 180 Judd, Walter, 49

Kant, Immanuel, 15 Kashmir, 85 Kassebaum and Solomon amendment, 82 Kassebaum, Nancy L., 82, 101 Kennedy, John F., 65, 70–71 Kenya, 104 Keohane, Robert, 16, 18, 22, 192 Kerry, John, 143, 170–171, 181, 183 Keyes, Alan L., 85 Kai-Shek, Chiang, 68–69, 54 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 141 Kiesling, John B., 135, Ki-moon, Ban, 12, 175, Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 80–82, 84–85, 87– 88, 113, 117, 149, 201, 210

245

Kissinger, Henry, 56, 75–76 Kiwanis International, 52t Koch, Ed, 81 Korea, North, 5, 31, 87, 129, 148, 163; Korean War 68–70; rising threat of 140–141; UNSC Resolution 1718 Kosovo, 9, 24, 95, 101, 129, 134, 137, 169–170, 197, 203; intervention 106–108; Kosovo Force (KFOR), 107; see also United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); Yugoslavia Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 108 Kurds: UNSC Resolution 688, 99–101 Kuwait, 96, 99 Kyoto Protocol, 2, 22, 130 see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyrgyzstan, 168

Lantos, Tom, 142 Leach, Jim, 82 League of Nations, 39–44, 53, 55, 58– 59, 113, 135, 205; see also collective security; fourteen points; irreconcilables; Wilson, Woodrow League of Peace (LEP), 41–42 Lebanon, 84–86, 171 Levin, Carl M., 112 Liberal institutionalism, 20 Libya, 9, 11,19, 29, 84, 110, 153, 164, 196, 200, 209; case study, 165–169, 171, 192; UNSC Resolution 1973, 5, 166, 169 Lie, Trygve, 69, 154–155 Lieberman, Joseph, 112, 143 Limbaugh, Rush, 155 Lindbergh, Charles, 46 Lions International, 52tab Lodge, Henry Cabot, 41, 43–44, 113, 206 Luxemburg, 180

Macedonia, 107; see also Yugoslavia Mackinac Republican Leadership Conference, 49 Major, John, 100 Mali, 208–209 Marshall Plan, 68 Matsuura, Koichiro, 142; see also United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

246

Index

McCain, John, 172 McCarthy, Joseph, 68–69 McCarthyism, 66, 70 McClellan, Scott, 144 McConnell, Mitch, 176 McHenry, Donald F., 80 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 100 Merkel, Angela, 177 Mexico, 11, 138, 175 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 155, 163–164 Milosevic, Slobodan, 106–108 Minilateralism, 17, 194 Moynihan, Daniel P., 76–78, 87, 113, 149 Multilateralism, 4, 10, 21–22, 25–29, 31, 32fig, 33, 41–42, 44, 55, 59, 66, 68, 74–75, 84–88, 95–97, 101, 105–108, 114, 163–164, 177–178, 185, 191– 192, 194–195, 197–198, 201–202, 206, 209–210; a la carte approach 16–17; as collective mobilization, 30; assertive, 102–103; case studies, 171, 174; concept of, 27; crisis of, 2, 193, 208; defined, 16–18; driving factors, 23–24; limited, 156; muted, 165–167; origins of, 15; puzzle of, 3, 5–7; research approach, 8–9; spectrum of, 20fig, 98–99, 118–119; stealth, 129, 140–152, 207; qualities and quantities of 18–19; see also conditional multilateralism Multinationalism, 18; see also cooperation

Namibia, 102 Nasser, Gamal, 70–71, 73 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 52tab National Association of Manufacturers, 52tab National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 52tab National Education Association, 52tab National Farmers Union, 52tab National League of Women Voters, 52tab National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), 104 National Security Revitalization Act, 100 National Security Strategy (US), 163

Neoconservatism, 82, 85, 117, 121, 148, 155; rise of, 87–88 Nethercutt Amendment, 138; see also International Criminal Court (ICC) Neuer, Hillel, 167 New international economic order, 74 New World Information and Communication Order, 84; see also United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization New world order, 97, 99, 116, 135; see also Post–Cold War era New York Formula, 18 Nicaragua, 68, 80, 84 Nigeria, 143 Nixon, Richard, 8, 78–79, 87, 96, views on UN, 74–75 Non-aligned movement, see also NorthSouth issues Nongovernmental Organization (NGO), 9, 104, 130, 138, 142, 176, 205, 210; iron triangle, 81 Normative context, 25, 29–32, 95, 210 see also American exceptionalism; conditional multilateralism; protectionism; sovereignty Norms, 4, 17, 20–21, 29, 39, 195, 206; humanitarian intervention, 136; human rights, 168; international institutionalism, 152; R2P, 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 24, 68, 107, 116, 156, 194; Article 5, 152; in Libya, 166–167; intervention in Kosovo, 106–108; see also collective security North Korea, see Korea, North North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), 68 Norway, 166, 171, 175 Nossel, Suzanne, 168 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 172; see also International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuland, Victoria, 177, 195 Nuremberg Trials, 131 Obama, Barack H., 5, 7–8, 10, 30, 33, 141, 177, 179, 195, 199–201, 204, 207; defunding UNESCO, 173–174; engagement at UN, 181–183, 185; human rights council, 167–169; Iran nuclear issue, 171–173; muted multilateralism, 165–167; Paris agree-

Index

ment, 174–176; rhetorical return to UN, 163–165; Syria 169–171 Obsessive nationalism, 56; see also isolationism Office of Public Information, 51 Oil-for-Food program, 129, 137, 143– 144; UNSC Resolution 1382, 132 Operation Provide Comfort, 100 Operation Restore Hope, 101–102; see also Somalia Operation Safe Haven, 100 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 171, 195 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 104

Pakistan, 136–137, 164 Palestine, 173, UNESCO, 179–181, 183; UNSC Resolution 672, 118 Palestine-Israel conflict, see Arab-Israeli War Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 85 Palestinian National Authority, 23 Paris Agreement (2015), 165, 174–176, 202, 205; see also climate change Pasvolsky, Leo, 58 Paul, Ron, 114, 143 Peacekeeping Response Mechanism, 183 Pearl Harbor, 47–48, 53, 57 Pearson, Lester, 69 Peking Formula, 18 Pell, Claiborne, 109 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 85–86, 96, 98, 100 Perle, Richard, 135 Permeant 5 (P-5), see also United Nations Security Council Perpetual Peace, see Kant, Immanuel Persian Gulf War (1991), 4, 9, 95–99, 109, 115, 118, 203 Peru, 175 Pickering, Thomas R., 119 Policy process model, 18–19, 20fig, 171 Political action committees (PACs), 117; see also AIPAC Political opportunity structures, 40, 59, 66, 87, 96, 101, 105, 107, 108, 118, 175, 178, 191, 198; conceptualization of, 30–33 Politics of Fear, 178–179 Portugal, 74 Post–Cold War era, 40, effects on inter-

247

national politics 95–99, 118–119, 132, 176 Presidential Decision Direction-25 (PDD-25), 105, 113; see also United Nations Peacekeeping operations Protectionism, 47, 59; of sovereignty, 54 Putnam, Robert, see two-level game

Qaddafi, Muammar, 165–166 Qatar, 166 Quarantine Speech, see Roosevelt, Franklin D.

Radio Libre des Mille Collines, 104; see also Rwanda Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 52tab Reagan, Ronald, 8, 77, 80–88, 111, 148, 150, 168, 173, 198–199; see also splendid isolationism Realism, 15, 20–21, 24, 75 Republican Coordinating Committee (1966), 72 Republican National Committee (RNC), 178 Republican Party, 44, 48–49, 53, 57, 80, 84, 121; internal divisions, 71–72; 2012 party platform, 178 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 100 Rice, Condoleezza, 139 Rice, Susan, 163, 166 Roberts, Owen, 48 Rockefeller, Nelson, 72 Romania, 166 Rome Statute, 130–131, 139 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 8, 39, 44–45, 47, 56, 206 Roosevelt, Theodore, 41; see also League of Peace Rosett, Claudia, 167 Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana, 156, 167, 174 Ross, Dennis, 140 Rotary International, 52tab Rouhani, Hassan, 172 Ruggie, John G., 16, 18 Rumsfeld, Donald, 133, 135 Rwanda, 9, 29–30, 95, 101–106, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 116, 119, 121, 129, 196, 198, 203 Rwandan Patriotic Front, 104 Ryan, Paul, 167 San Francisco Conference (1945), 33,

248

Index

44, 50–51, 54–59, 65, 67, 196; fiftieth anniversary, 121; see also United Nations, UN charter Saudi Arabia, 97, 98, 134 Schaefer, Brett, 167, 201 Scowcroft, Brent, 96, 98 Secretariat (UN), 23, 153, 154tab, Secretary-General (UN),75, 77, 83, 103, 108, 136, 143, 148, 153, 181; see also Annan, Kofi; Boutros-Ghali, Boutros; Hammarskjold, Dag; Lie, Trygve; Moon, Ban-Ki; Perez de Cuellar, Javier, Thant, U; Waldheim, Kurt Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 48, 49, 54, 109, 111, 113, 141, 142, 173 Senate Subcommittee on International Operations, 138 Sevan, Benon, 143 Sikes, Robert, 76 Silent majority, 78 Simon, Paul, 101 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, see transgovernmentalism Smith, Christopher H., 112 Smuts, Jan, 46 Social movement theory, see political opportunity structures Soderberg, Nancy, 148 Soft power, 4, 11, 210; see also Constructivism Somalia, 119; Resolution 794, 101 South Africa, 22, 46, 74, 77, 110, 164, 176, 180 South Sudan, 168 Sovereigntist movement, see also America First Movement Sovereignty, 1, 3, 7–8, 11, 23, 29, 53, 54, 56–57, 59, 72,114, 119, 122, 131, 191, 194, 206–207; in Iraq, 99–100; perceived threats to, 111, 150, 155, 178–179, 192, 201; surrender of, 39, 42–45, 48–50; see also responsibility to protect Soviet Union, 40, 47, 59, 67, 70, 76, 86– 87, 96, 98, 100, 130; collapse of 118; reforms, 85 Spain, 166 Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (SRSG), 137 Splendid Isolation, 80–81 Sri Lanka, 119

Stalin, Joseph, 50, 54, 57–58, 196 State based approach, 15–18; see also multilateralism Stealth diplomacy, 155 Stealth multilateralism, 129, 140–142 Stevens, J. Christopher, 167 Stevenson, Adlai, 70–72 Suez crisis, 66, 68–70, 74–75 Sweden, 166 Syria, 5, 9–11, 17, 29, 164, 176, 192, 196, 197, 205, 208 case study; 167– 171; GA/11266, 170; see also Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Taft, Robert, 53, 72 Taft, William H., 41–42 Taiwan, 75, 136 Tanzania, 104 Terrorism, 3, 141, 142, 156, 184, 192– 194, 203, 207, 208; War on, 129, 134, 152; see also United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy; Thant, U, 73 Third UN, 23, 24; see also nongovernmental organizations Three-level game, 97, 113, 174, 193, 200; approach, 134, 172 Thurmond, Strom, 70 Torricelli, Robert, 106 Transgovernmentalism, 27 Transnational Issues, see climate change; terrorism Treaty of Versailles, 27, 39, 44, 130 Truman Doctrine, 68 Truman, Harry, 39, 50, 54–57, 59, 69, 74, 201, 210–211 Tunisia, 165, 168 Turkey, 98–100, 134, 166 Turner, Ted, 116 Tutsi, see Rwanda Two-China policy, 75 Two-level game, 24, 33, 40, 57–59, 147,

Uganda, 104 Ukraine-Crimea crisis, 164–165, 171, 176 Unilateralism, 2, 18, 22, 25, 73, 98, 134, 135, 152, 192, 194, 205; go it alone approach, 4, 130, 140 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), see Soviet Union

Index

United Arab Emirates (UAE), 166 United Kingdom, 45, 47, 50–51, 55, 57, 58, 69, 72, 100, 134, 135, 137, 166, 169, 170 United Nations (UN), bashing, 10, 77– 79, 84, 86, 95, 114, 208; black helicopter myths, 114–115; credibility gap, 72–76; Cold War paralysis, 67– 68; Global Compact, 210; force multiplier, 118–119; founding, 59; institutional framework, 3, 67; North-South issues, 23, 68, 87; peacekeeping operations, 27, 85, 105, 110–111, 119, 120fig, 121, 129, 141, 147; reform agenda, 153, 154tab; spaghetti junction, 23, 201; US arrears, 109–113, 119, 145, 146fig; US relations, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9–11, 24–26, 29–31, 66–67, 76, 80, 85–88, 95, 99, 101, 108–112, 114–118, 129, 137, 138, 142, 145, 152, 163, 179– 180, 183, 191–192, 200–202, 207, 210 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), 104–105 United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), 137 United Nations Association of the U.S.A., 28, 116 United Nations biennial budget committee, 111 United Nations Capital Master fund, 145 United Nations Charter, 40, 54–55, 67, 114, 135; article 19 loss of voting privileges, 70; Chapter I, Article II (4), 73; Chapter VI article 27, 67; Chapter VII, 73, 99, 140, 170; ECOSOC, 153, 154tab; International Court of Justice (ICJ), 80, 84; ratification of, 11, 50–51, 65; Secretariat, 23, 153, 154tab, United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention, 170 United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 85–86, 183 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (2009), 10, 164 United Nations Command, 69, 101 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 177 United Nations Convention on the Law

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of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS), 2, 4, 75, 80, 165, 179 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 1, 4, 179, 202 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 164 United Nations Day, 65 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 82, 155 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 153, 154tab United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 5, 10, 12, 23, 132, 140, 142, 164, 179,180, 183, 193; defunding of, 173–174; den of hostility, 83–84; relations with US, 71, 80, 83, 87–88 United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 69, 73, 75 United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, see Goldstone Report United Nations Force Intervention Brigade, 209 United Nations Foundation, 116, 205 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 130, 176; see also Kyoto Protocol United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 142 United Nations Human Rights Commission, 130, 148–149, 153–154tab United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 164, 167–170, 193 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 108 United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), 85 United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), 104 United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II), 102 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 130, 178, 184 United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 106; see also Bosnia United Nations Reform Act, 154 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2, 4–6, 8–9, 11, 19, 21, 23– 24, 30–31, 33, 54, 58, 76, 80, 96–98, 100–101, 113, 134–137, 139, 141,

250

Index

143, 149, 151, 153, 154tab, 164– 167, 169–172, 176, 180–182, 182tab, 184, 191–192, 195, 197– 198, 209 Bosnia, 106–109; Korean War, 68–69; paralysis to activism, 119–121; resolutions, 69, 99, 118, 132, 133, 166; Rwanda 103–105; veto power 56, 59, 66–67, 70, 84– 85, 116–117; see also permeant 5 United Nations Security Council Observer Mission (UNSCOM), 132 United States: arrears, 109–113, 119, 145, 160; assessed contributions, 110, 184tab; declining hegemony, 176–177; Department of Defense, 7; Public opinion, 7, 9, 25, 27–29, 33, 40, 46–48, 53–55, 57, 65–66, 72, 78fig, 83, 88, 103, 114–116, 122, 151fig, 203fig, 204fig; International Criminal Court, 2, 130–131, 138– 139, 145; Internationalism, 8, 10, 42, 46, 48–51, 56, 73, 80, 147, 205; threats to sovereignty, 111, 150, 155, 178–179, 192, 201; UN relations, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9–11, 24–26, 29–31, 66–67, 76, 80, 85–88, 95, 99, 101, 108–112, 114–118, 129, 137, 138, 142, 145, 152, 163, 179–180, 183, 191–192, 200–202, 207, 210, voluntary contributions; Voting Coincidence 182tab, 198–200; by party affiliation, 199fig United States Chamber of Commerce, 52tab, 179 United States Congress, 2, 7–12, 25–28, 32, 65–66, 72, 73, 85–86, 88, 95, 97, 103, 105–106, 108, 116, 122, 131, 138, 150, 153–154, 156, 167, 170, 172, 184–185, 198–199, 200–203; arrears, 109–114; as transnational actor, 191, 193; condemnation of UN, 76–77; defunding UNESCO, 173–174; funding, 144–148, 147tab; House Foreign Affairs Committee, 167; interest groups, 117–118; opposition to UN membership, 39–44, 46–50; out of control, 81–83 partisan politics, 51–59, 68–71; politics of fear, 178–179; reforms, 148–149; United States contributions to UN peacekeeping (S. 248), 120 United States Constitution, 50, 112, 177, 179, 201, 202; second amendment, 27

United States Navy, 179 United States Permanent Mission to the UN, 76, 166 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 67, 69 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 183 Urquhart, Brian, 85, 120

Vandenberg, Arthur H., 48, 49, 57, 201 Venezuela, 139 Venue shopping, 24, 68, 169–170 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, 52tab Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 137 Vietnam, 28, 66, 68, 71–74, 77, 175 Volcker, Paul, 144 Voting coincidence, 182tab, 198–200; by party affiliation, 199fig

Waldheim, Kurt, 75, 83–85 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 132, 133, 142, 152, 170 Weschler, Joanna, see Human Rights Watch Western European and Others Group (WEOG), 181 White House Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI), 175 Willkie, Wendell L., 48, 53, 55–57 Wilson, Woodrow, 39, 41–44, 46–48, 51, 54–56, 136 Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 51 World Bank, 21, 194, 195 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), 180 World Court, 44, 201 World Health Organization (WHO), 80, 86 World Values Network, 181 World War I, 40, 42, 44, 130 World War II, 28, 40, 45–46, 48, 57–59, 73, 116, 209

Yemen, 168 Yugoslavia, 106–107

Zionism, 66; as racism, 76–78, 116, 179–180 Zionist Organization of America, 181

About the Book

It is no secret that the US variously pulls away from the United Nations and embraces it as a significant venue for policy initiatives. But what explains this dramatic inconsistency? What is the logic of US multilateralism? Alynna Lyon explores the puzzling waxing and waning of US support for the UN, tracing events, actions, and decisions from the end of World War I to the present. Lyon weaves together a consideration of international context, UN institutional dynamics, and US domestic politics to conceptualize and explain the trials and tribulations of the US-UN relationship. In the process, she tells the story of the progression of the US from a country committed to internationalism to one full of dysfunctional partisanship, ideological underpinnings, and domestic power struggles that undermine its capacities to cooperate on a global scale. Alynna J. Lyon is associate professor of political science at the University of

New Hampshire. She is coauthor (with Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns) of The United Nations in the 21st Century, 5th edition.

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