About Face?: The United States and the United Nations 9781685856502

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ABOUT FACE?

ABOUT FACE? The United States and the United Nations Robert W. Gregg

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of A m e r i c a in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, C o l o r a d o 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, C o v e n t Garden, L o n d o n W C 2 E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gregg, Robert W . About face?: the United States and the United Nations / Robert W. Gregg. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1 - 5 5 5 8 7 - 2 9 5 - 6 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 1-55587-406-1 (soft: alk. paper) 1. United N a t i o n s — U n i t e d States. 2. Intervention (International law) 3. Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 . I. Title. JX1977.2. U 5 G 6 5 1993 341.23'73—dc20 93-15352 CIP

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of A m e r i c a T h e paper used in this publication m e e t s the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of , Paper for Printed Library Materials Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 .

For Barbara

Contents

i Introduction

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II US Expectations Regarding the United Nations

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III The Roots of Disenchantment

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IV The Financial Crisis: The United States Versus the United Nations

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V The Gulf Crisis: The United States Leads the United Nations

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VI Back to the Future?

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Index About the Book and the Author

173 181

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Chapter I

Introduction

A funny thing happened on the way to the war in the Gulf in the winter of 1991: the United States rediscovered the United Nations. After many years during which it had either neglected or disparaged the United Nations and largely limited its participation to damage control, the United States could be found assiduously courting the global institution and working around the clock to build and sustain Security Council support for an international response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The final balance sheet on the Gulf War has yet to be written, but it is no exaggeration to say that Operation Desert Storm, which visited such a disastrous military defeat upon Saddam Hussein, would have been a much more perilous undertaking had the UN Security Council not invoked Chapter 7 of the UN Charter in unmistakably strong language. Nor is it an exaggeration to say that the Security Council would not have embraced collective security so firmly had the United States not been prepared to assume the leadership role at the United Nations that it had all but abandoned in the 1980s. This reassertion of US interest in and leadership of the United Nations was indeed a remarkable volte face, coming as it did so shortly after the United States had demonstrated its lack of confidence in the organization by systematically withholding large portions of its assessed contribution— a policy that had driven the UN to the brink of bankruptcy. Moreover, although foreign policy largely vanished as an issue during the 1992 US presidential campaign, the decision by the lame duck president, George Bush, to dispatch US troops to Somalia in support of UN humanitarian relief efforts seemed to demonstrate that the US-UN rapprochement may be more than a one-time phenomenon. The revitalization of the United Nations in the Gulf crisis, a development that owes so much to US policy, has inspired talk that the UN may at long last be coming home to the spirit of the San Francisco conference. The Charter, it has been argued, may finally, after nearly half a century of

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abuse and highly selective i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , b e c o m e the acceptable blueprint for world order that its f r a m e r s intended. And the necessary, although arguably not the s u f f i c i e n t , condition f o r this r e s u r g e n c e of the United Nations is the c o m m i t m e n t of the United States to a world order in which the UN plays a pivotal role. But just as one swallow does not make a summer, neither does the UN response to one or two dramatic crises constitute a trend. There are, to be sure, grounds for cautious o p t i m i s m . But it is possible that the p e n d u l u m of expectations may swing too far, overcorrecting for the generally negative v i e w of the United Nations, which has been nurtured by d e c a d e s of frustration and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , and prematurely positing the durability of the US-UN rapprochement. T h e relationship b e t w e e n the United States and the United N a t i o n s , now seemingly a m i c a b l e and positive after r e a c h i n g its nadir d u r i n g the Reagan administration, has long been a stormy one. 1 A n d not all of the irritants that have strained that relationship over the years have b e e n exorcised by the end of the Cold W a r and the success of Operation Desert Storm. Those irritants have their roots in the fact that the United States has interests and values that in the aggregate have constituted something very much like a prism through which the United States v i e w s the United Nations, the role the UN ought to play in world affairs, and how it ought to play that role. That conception of the UN has led, throughout much of the global b o d y ' s existence, to expectations that have been both e x c e s s i v e and excessively e t h n o c e n t r i c . T h e US view of the U N — s o m e t h i n g less than an ideological position but more than a pragmatic, situationally specific o n e — h a s been the product of several assumptions. Although f e w of these a s s u m p t i o n s or e l e m e n t s c o m p r i s i n g the U S conception of an acceptable United Nations have been truly i m m u t a b l e , most have c h a n g e d remarkably little since the f o u n d i n g of the UN. Their persistence has accounted for much of US disenchantment with the global organization and for the caution voiced here regarding the second h o n e y m o o n b e t w e e n the United Nations and its most influential m e m b e r . T h e e l e m e n t s that c o m p r i s e this more or less coherent v i e w of the United Nations are of several kinds. S o m e reflect what might be t e r m e d s e l f - i m a g e — t h e vision the United States has had of itself and its mission in world affairs. Others are specifically concerned with the UN itself, and with the permissible p a r a m e t e r s of Charter interpretation. S o m e can best be characterized as a s s u m p t i o n s about the way the world works or, more accurately, the way it s h o u l d work. T h e s e e l e m e n t s o v e r l a p and interact with each other, producing a view of the UN that has been more consistent and less flexible than would be the case if they c a m e into play separately. In the beginning, w h e n the United Nations w a s still young and largely untested, US expectations regarding the UN were relatively high a n d UN

Introduction

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performance was either consistent with those e x p e c t a t i o n s or not yet so far out o f line with them as to f o s t e r d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t . B u t e v i d e n c e that the United Nations would not function as the United States b e l i e v e d it should surfaced almost from the m o m e n t the global organization b e c a m e operational. Although the U S - U N r e l a t i o n s h i p e x p e r i e n c e d its ups and downs in the years that f o l l o w e d , the trend line w a s n e g a t i v e . U S a s s u m p t i o n s about the United N a t i o n s — t h e way it should f u n c t i o n and the results it should a c h i e v e — w e r e contradicted with increasing frequency by events in New Y o r k and G e n e v a until, by the 1 9 8 0 s , even the pretense that the UN any longer mattered to the United S t a t e s was hard to sustain. T h i s book is about the U S c o n c e p t i o n o f the United Nations, the deterioration o f U S support for the UN as c o n c e p t i o n and reality diverged, and the tentative restoration o f U S interest in and support for the UN in the early 1 9 9 0 s . T h e f o c u s o f the b o o k i n v o l v e s two c a s e studies. T h e first deals with the culmination o f g r o w i n g U S frustration with the United Nations in what can only be called an orgy o f U N - b a s h i n g during the 1 9 8 0 s , the s e c o n d with the crisis in the G u l f and the attendant restoration o f the UN to a position o f p r o m i n e n c e in U S foreign p o l i c y . T h e s e two episodes or phases in the U S - U N relationship, c o m i n g as they have one right after the other, raise the question o f whether the turnabout in U S policy can be attributed to fundamental c h a n g e s in U S assumptions and e x p e c t a t i o n s regarding the UN or to the belated e m e r g e n c e o f a UN that is more c o m p a t ible with U S assumptions and e x p e c t a t i o n s . In either c a s e , there is a further question: What are the prospects for the continuation and replication o f the cooperation between the United S t a t e s and the United Nations that was one o f the distinctive features o f the G u l f c r i s i s ?

Note 1. A sophisticated theoretical framework for the analysis of the changing relationships between the United States and international organizations more generally is provided in Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds., The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Chapter II

US Expectations Regarding the United Nations

Like all institutions, the United Nations has been in important respects a reflection of the time when it was created. It was the product of demands made and bargains struck by those who dominated the international scene in 1945. And the one state that more than any other dominated the international scene in the closing days of World War II was, of course, the United States. No matter what the yardstick of measurement or indicator o f power and influence, the United States was preeminent, and by a wide margin. Although other states played important roles in the creation of the United Nations, the Charter was very much the handiwork o f the United States. T h o s e who represented the United States in the drafting o f the Charter, those who argued the c a s e for US ratification, and those who supported the new organization in those formative first months brought with them certain e x p e c t a t i o n s — s o m e explicit and vigorously voiced, others unstated and perhaps even unacknowledged—that constituted a rough consensus as to what the UN should be and what it should do. T h e s e people realized that the Charter was not, from the U S point o f view, a perfect document. But it was perceived as a reasonably accurate reflection o f U S interests and values, and the UN was widely viewed within the United States as an important institutional tool for the exercise o f the leadership that was expected of the world's preeminent power—leadership that it was preparing to assume in a major departure from the isolationism o f the prewar years. 1 T h e expectations that shaped the U S view o f the United Nations were not only products o f U S predominance in a world in which all o f the other would-be powers had been ravaged if not fatally weakened by the war. Nor were they merely the result o f the struggle with the Axis powers, just then coming to a successful conclusion, or of troublesome differences with the Soviet Union, already looming on the horizon. S o m e had much deeper roots in U S historical experience, although they were given a new sense o f

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importance and urgency by the war and by an awareness of f u n d a m e n t a l c o n f l i c t s of interests and v a l u e s with its c o m m u n i s t ally. A brief survey f o l l o w s , which outlines s o m e of the m o r e important e x p e c t a t i o n s the United States had for the United Nations, together with several relevant aspects of the US national character, which w o u l d color the n a t i o n ' s view of the p e r f o r m a n c e of the global organization.

US Hegemony Ernst Haas has d e f i n e d h e g e m o n y as "the national capability to a d v a n c e long-range views of world o r d e r . . . by w o r k i n g with the preponderant resources available to the h e g e m o n f o r the success of institutions c h a r g e d with that t a s k . " 2 T h e United States did have long-range views of world order at the end of World W a r II, and it also had what must have s e e m e d to be a preponderance of resources with which to guarantee the success of U N - s y s t e m institutions created to a d v a n c e those views. W h e t h e r the United States was in fact the hegemon, as o p p o s e d to a merely dominant power, is a matter social scientists have vigorously debated. 3 Most of the literature on hegemony and the theory of hegemonic stability is concerned with the d y n a m i c s of the world e c o n o m y and especially with the hegem o n ' s role in creating and supporting a f r e e trade regime. But h e g e m o n y is more generally about g o v e r n a n c e in the international system, about power, and about leadership; if the United States was the hegemon in the period f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r II, its h e g e m o n y w o u l d presumably not be exercised selectively, but w o u l d extend to the United Nations. T h e creation of a stable world order required US leadership, and the United States w a s prepared to play that role and to assume disproportionately large costs to achieve the desired world order, at the UN as elsewhere. T h e United States, of course, had very little experience with w o r l d leadership. T h e responsibilities of the h e g e m o n were unfamiliar, and the burdens w e r e unprecedented if the war e f f o r t is discounted. Although the distinction between benevolent and coercive h e g e m o n y had not been developed when the UN was launched (theorizing about hegemony was still over the horizon), 4 the United States did, h o w e v e r , see its leadership as b e n e v o l e n t . It w a s u n d e r s t o o d that the h e g e m o n ' s task would not be an easy one, and that the United Nations could not be counted on to rubberstamp U S policies automatically. But it was assumed that US power would be f u n g i b l e there as elsewhere, and that d e f e r e n c e would be paid to a benign p o w e r and respect granted to the principal architect of the hard-won military victory and the new postwar international order. In effect, hegemony was construed to mean that the UN w o u l d be a relatively pliant instrument of U S policy. It w a s a simple syllogism: T h e United States w a s

US Expectations

Regarding the UN

7

the hegemonic power with primary responsibility for a stable world order; the United Nations w a s a m a j o r US-approved vehicle for achieving such a stable world order; ergo, the UN w o u l d respond to US leadership in the creation and m a i n t e n a n c e of such a stable world order. N e e d l e s s to say, such logic is badly flawed. US expectations were to be shattered early and often in the years after 1945. T h e decline of the United States as h e g e m o n i c p o w e r has been the subject of much c o m m e n t a r y . That decline has certainly had consequences for the United Nations and for other multilateral institutions, as well as for the international political e c o n o m y . But what is equally important for assessment of the US v i e w of the UN and US d i s a f f e c t i o n with the global body is the fact that, even before the beginning of that decline, the United States had realized that h e g e m o n y ' s costs—that is, the obligation to supply collective goods for the system disproportionately—may exceed, or be perceived to exceed, its benefits.

Congruence During those hectic years of institution-building just prior to and immediately after the end of World W a r II, the United States, as principal architect, quite predictably sought institutions that would reflect US preferences and respect the realities of power in the international system. T h u c y d i d e s observed more than t w o thousand years ago that the strong do what they can, w h e r e a s the w e a k do what they must. A c c o r d i n g to this logic, the United States, whether h e g e m o n or merely the single most powerful state, could have demanded and held out for a United Nations that actually enhanced US power or, to use r e g i m e terminology, w a s dynamically stable. It did not do so, however, settling for what regime theorist Stephen Krasner has called congruence. 5 A c c o r d i n g to Krasner, c o n g r u e n c e means that " t h e characteristics of the regime reflect the p r e f e r e n c e s of individual states ( w e i g h t e d by their national power capabilities) and do not a f f e c t capabilities." 6 Desirous of legitimizing its position of d o m i n a n c e and confident of its capacity to control o u t c o m e s in any event, the United States constructed a UN in which power within the institution w a s much more equitably distributed than it w a s in the real world. But b e c a u s e its authority w a s so severely c i r c u m scribed, the UN could not actually diminish US power capabilities or enhance those of other states at the expense of the United States. There are, however, two problems with congruence, or rather with the US perception of congruence. T h e first is that the United States expected too much of it. T h e U N w a s initially represented to the United States as "a natural organic outgrowth of A m e r i c a ' s own cherished institutions and

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f u n d a m e n t a l instruments of g o v e r n m e n t . " 7 T h e United Nations, which had been tailored to US s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , w o u l d evolve, under US guidance, in directions largely c o m p a t i b l e with US interests and v a l u e s . C o n g r u e n c e s e e m e d to mean that the UN w o u l d be " o u r kind of p l a c e . " In effect, the United States took c o n g r u e n c e f o r granted as the normal and proper condition of US-UN relations. Things did not turn out quite that w a y . Reflecting on his experience as US ambassador to the United Nations in the 1970s, Daniel Patrick Moynihan referred to it not as "our kind of place," but as " A D a n g e r o u s Place"; 8 many others concurred. T h e second problem, of course, was that a UN that w a s c o n g r u e n t rather than d y n a m i c a l l y stable was a UN that could relatively easily b e c o m e incongruent if and when states began to use its egalitarian/majoritarian voting p r o c e d u r e s to assert p r e f e r e n c e s other than those of the dominant (or hegemonic) power. T h e US assumption regarding c o n g r u e n c e s u b s u m e d a number of relatively specific expectations about the United Nations and its responsiveness to US leadership. T h e y included support for the status quo, f o r the view that state consent rather than majority rule is the governing principle in UN decision-making, and for functionally specific UN system agencies, i m m u n e to politicization. It was also expected that the UN would display a preference for market as opposed to authoritative allocation and f o r pluralistic and democratic societies, that it would eschew radical solutions to the p r o b l e m s brought b e f o r e it, and that it w o u l d support US e f f o r t s to contain the threat posed by international c o m m u n i s m . Finally, the UN w o u l d be run in an e f f i c i e n t and f r u g a l m a n n e r . A n d these e x p e c t a t i o n s w e r e intensified by certain a t t i t u d e s — e l e m e n t s , p e r h a p s , of the US national character.

The Status Quo International organizations may be classified as custodians of an existing order or agents for the creation of a new order. T h e North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), designed to protect Western Europe against possible assault f r o m the Soviet Union, falls into the f o r m e r c a t e g o r y . 9 T h e European C o m m u n i t y , with its c o m m i t m e n t to the transformation of the economic and ultimately the political landscape of Western Europe, is the preeminent example of the second. Classifying the United Nations has posed a marginally greater challenge, but for the United States the call has not been all that difficult. In the US view, the Charter makes it quite clear that the UN was to be instrumental in preserving the new postwar status quo. At the end of World W a r II, w h e n the UN system w a s being created and c h a n g e w a s in the air, the United States w a s not a status quo power,

US Expectations Regarding the UN

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much less a champion of the status q u o ante. But it was busily engaged in creating a w o r l d order visualized as the new (and better) status quo, and the UN w a s to be both an e m b o d i m e n t of that new order and one of its principal institutional defenders. T h e Charter was not, of course, so drafted as to proscribe c h a n g e . That w o u l d have been both undesirable and impossible. But the UN was to operate within well-defined parameters. T h e contours and content of the new o r d e r were largely predetermined by the h e g e m o n i c p o w e r and its principal allies, and they w a n t e d no part of a Charter that constituted an o p e n - e n d e d c o m m i t m e n t to further change. That Charter, for example, posed no challenge to the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Change, moreover, was channeled by Charter language which appeared to provide a m p l e protection for the principal architects and beneficiaries of the status quo, the United States foremost a m o n g them. A n d even though the goals of the United N a t i o n s were essentially c o n s e r v a t i v e and reformist, they w e r e still more a m b i t i o u s than the authority p o s s e s s e d by the UN for a c h i e v i n g them. T h e United Nations, in e f f e c t , w a s v i e w e d by the United States as a f o r u m for debating c h a n g e s within the system, rather than c h a n g e s of the s y s t e m . In the language of regime theory, rules and procedures might be negotiable, but fundamental principles and norms are not. T h e United States wanted a UN that would oil the wheels of the newly emergent world order, not o n e that w o u l d tear it down and build new orders. Needless to say, this view that the UN was an instrument f o r maintaining the status quo w a s not one shared by all of its members.

The Unit Veto If the United Nations w a s to be a status quo organization, congruent with the preferences of the hegemon or dominant power, it followed that the decisions reached by its several o r g a n s could not be binding on the United States without its consent. Nor, f o r that matter, could any state be bound without its consent in this horizontally o r g a n i z e d system of s o v e r e i g n states. L a w r e n c e Finkelstein has t e r m e d this a unit veto system, m e a n i n g that UN m e m b e r s may opt out of compliance with UN decisions, the only exceptions being those specified in the Charter, exceptions to which states have given their consent by b e c o m i n g m e m b e r s . 1 0 T h i s w a s a critically important c o m p o n e n t of the US view of the United Nations. Article 2 7 of the Charter specifically conferred upon the United States, along with other permanent m e m b e r s , a veto in the Security Council on substantive matters. But in the other organs, and especially in the General A s s e m b l y , d e f e r e n c e to the principles of egalitarianism and majoritarianism put U S interests and values at risk unless a broader, more

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generalized veto could be asserted. So although the United States was prepared to support a Charter in which decisions were reached by voting, with each state possessing one vote and the majority prevailing, it insisted that those decisions, with a few exceptions, were to be treated merely as expressions of international sentiment unless states explicitly gave their consent to be bound by them. As Finkelstein argued, "the norm of the international system is that the authoritative allocation of what states value . . . requires the consent of the states affected by the allocative decision." 11 The United Nations, with its exceptionally broad mandate, is concerned with the allocation of many things that states value, ranging from money to status to legitimacy, and it has from the beginning been the scene of an ongoing effort to vest more authority for the allocation of such values in the decisions of majorities. Although the United States has at times wavered in its support for the traditional norm requiring state consent (always when it has been at the vanguard of a majority on an issue about which it feels very strongly), its commitment has ultimately been to the unit veto, which constitutes both an escape hatch for the protection of interests and values it cannot persuade the majority to honor and a defense of the prerogatives of state sovereignty.

Functional Specificity The UN system consists of the United Nations and an array of specialized agencies, another attribute of the postwar order that reflects the strong preference of the United States. A belief in functional specificity tends to be characteristic of Western societies generally. One of Talcott Parsons's pattern variables for measuring the transition from traditional to modern society is concerned with whether the society (or the polity) is functionally diffuse or functionally specific, 1 2 and the United States was presumably the very model of a modern society when it set about the task of organizing the postwar system. For the United States, the assumption that specialized agencies should be created was very nearly axiomatic. But the US insistence that there should be a division of labor in the organization of postwar multilateral diplomacy, with various UN-system agencies each possessing responsibility for a particular policy area, can also be attributed to a much more pragmatic consideration. The United States took the view that the shape of the postwar economic and social order had already been decided; indeed, the United States itself had made most of the critical decisions, defining the principles and norms that would govern that order. Therefore there was no need for political institutions to debate these matters. What was required were specialized, technical agencies that would permit representatives with specialized competence to

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address essentially technical issues. S u c h an a r r a n g e m e n t would help to ensure that the system worked efficiently and it would guarantee that the large questions of principle that had been answered at Bretton W o o d s and elsewhere would not be reopened. T h e result was a c r u d e variation on the doctrine of f u n c t i o n a l i s m . Functionalists such as David Mitrany had argued that, unlike politicians and diplomats, technicians and experts were practical and task-oriented, and should be given the opportunity to pursue the w o r k of solving c o m mon problems, regardless of nationality and f r e e from the pressure of extraneous considerations. 1 3 The United States was not, of course, embracing functionalism a la Mitrany; such a doctrine, carried to its logical conclusion, is s u b v e r s i v e of sovereignty, and the US g o v e r n m e n t was not prepared to go so far. But it did signal early on that it was opposed to what it regarded as the "politicization" of the technical work of the UN system. The United Nations itself was (and is) a multipurpose institution, the exception to the principle of functional specificity within the UN system; the generality of its mandate " w a s to be a standing invitation to challenge the functionalist division of labor that the United States so obviously pref e r r e d . " 1 4 As a result, the United States has not only had to worry about politicization of the agencies, it has also had to concern itself with the impulse of the UN to engage in a form of institutional imperialism.

The Market A m o n g U S a s s u m p t i o n s regarding the United Nations, o n e of the most basic was surely that it would be supportive of the principle that economic allocations are to be m a d e by market m e c h a n i s m s . A s Harold Jacobson claimed, "the debate about what international governmental organizations should do in the economic field is a debate about how much g o v e r n m e n tal intervention there should be in global economic affairs." 1 5 The position of the United States in this debate has, from the beginning, been clear and unequivocal: Laissez-faire is the optimal state of affairs, with laws of supply and demand determining what is produced, w h o produces it, and how it is distributed. T h e e c o n o m i c disaster of the 1930s and the Keynesian revolution made a compelling case for some governmental intervention at both national and international levels, but on the w h o l e the liberal economic order that the United States was instrumental in establishing in the 1940s was committed to minimizing such intervention and giving market forces f r e e rein. T h e United Nations itself was not, of course, the focal point of US efforts to realize the objectives of the liberal international e c o n o m i c order. T h e agencies with primary responsibility for g e n e r a t i n g g r o w t h through

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the p r o m o t i o n o f f r e e trade w e r e the International M o n e t a r y F u n d ( I M F ) , the International B a n k f o r R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and D e v e l o p m e n t ( I B R D ) , and the G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t on T a r i f f s and T r a d e ( G A T T ) . 1 6 T h e trade r e g i m e e s t a b l i s h e d in the 1 9 4 0 s e m b r a c e d s e v e r a l n o r m s that r e f l e c t e d the U S p r e f e r e n c e for a m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d s y s t e m , a m o n g them n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , and r e c i p r o c i t y . T h e principal rationale for the m o n e tary r e g i m e and the I M F , w h i c h w a s its institutional c e n t e r p i e c e , w a s to fac i l i t a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade by p r o m o t i n g the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n o f e x c h a n g e a m o n g c u r r e n c i e s . T r a d e w a s also to b e stimulated by W o r l d B a n k p o l i c i e s d e s i g n e d to e n c o u r a g e international i n v e s t m e n t . T h e i m p o r t a n c e to the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f m a r k e t a l l o c a t i o n in the liberal e c o n o m i c order is i n d i c a t e d by the fact that primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r nurturing and sustaining it w a s given to institutions in w h i c h the U S position was o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d o m i n a n t relative to the U n i t e d Nations. B u t the prov i s i o n s o f the UN C h a r t e r , although m o r e g e n e r a l , c a n a l s o b e r e a d as an e n d o r s e m e n t o f the U S p r e f e r e n c e for m a r k e t a l l o c a t i o n and o f the proposition that security is in part a f u n c t i o n o f the e c o n o m i c w e l l - b e i n g a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a g l o b a l f r e e - m a r k e t e c o n o m y . At l e a s t that is the w a y the U n i t e d S t a t e s c h o s e to r e a d the C h a r t e r . In this c a s e , as in o t h e r s , the United S t a t e s was to b e disappointed by and frustrated with the U N , which later b e c a m e the v e h i c l e o f c h o i c e f o r s t a t e s w a n t i n g to c h a l l e n g e the tenets o f the liberal e c o n o m i c order.

Pluralism C l o s e l y related to, but c o n s i d e r a b l y broader than, the U S b e l i e f in the market w a s the U S c o n v i c t i o n that p o w e r should b e dispersed rather than c o n centrated. T h e U S v i e w o f the U n i t e d Nations w a s thus s h a p e d in part by the b e l i e f that p l u r a l i s m is i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e and that the U N s h o u l d and p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d r e f l e c t that b e l i e f in its w o r k . T h a t m a n y U N m e m ber states w e r e authoritarian, l a c k i n g a private s e c t o r , c o m p e t i t i v e political parties, and o t h e r attributes o f a pluralistic s y s t e m , w a s r e c o g n i z e d by the United S t a t e s , but that situation might b e c h a n g e d ; the UN w o u l d c e r t a i n l y not treat it as a d e s i r a b l e n o r m . R o b e r t P a c k e n h a m , in an insightful b o o k written in the 1 9 7 0 s but still relevant today, argued that the U n i t e d S t a t e s has e m b r a c e d s e v e r a l propositions that have their r o o t s in a reading o f its o w n historical e x p e r i e n c e . 1 7 O n e o f t h e s e is that distributing p o w e r is m o r e important than a c c u m u l a t ing it. T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n s t r e s s e s the i m p o r t a n c e o f l i m i t e d g o v e r n m e n t a l authority, separation o f p o w e r s , strong local g o v e r n m e n t , c o m p e t i t i v e political p a r t i e s , n u m e r o u s m e d i a t i n g s t r u c t u r e s , s e p a r a t i o n o f c h u r c h and state, v o l u n t a r i s m — a l l

o f the t i m e - t e s t e d f e a t u r e s o f the U S

system,

w h i c h , by e x t e n s i o n , c o n s t i t u t e a model to w h i c h others should a s p i r e .

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Regarding the UN

13

T h e UN Charter does not explicitly endorse pluralism any m o r e than it does capitalism. And the presence of the Soviet Union a m o n g the principal f o u n d i n g members tends to undermine the argument that the United Nation was, a m o n g other things, intended to be a significant reaction against totalitarian concentration of power. But the United States nonetheless projected onto the UN its conviction that "the possibilities for a peaceful and f r e e international order depended on the internal constitutions of the states m a k i n g up the w o r l d c o m m u n i t y " ; 1 8 and the internal constitutions that provided the best d e f e n s e against resort to policies of hostility and aggrandizement abroad were those that were patterned after that of the United States. This tendency to expect c o n g r u e n c e between US practices and those accepted by the UN helped to set the stage for disaffection when the UN failed to a c k n o w l e d g e the superiority of US-style d e m o c r a c y to mobilization regimes in the Communist bloc and the Third World.

Reform, Not Revolution Although the United States expected the United Nations to play an important role in the preservation of the new postwar status quo, it also anticipated and even welcomed a role for the UN as an agent of change in certain areas. T h e principle of self-determination of peoples is explicitly endorsed by the Charter, and the United States initially provided both the philosophical foundation and the political pressure for UN-based efforts on behalf of decolonization and self-determination. 1 9 Moreover, US support for democratization was inevitably an invitation to change in many places. But this support for c h a n g e was qualified by a deeply rooted conviction that radicalism and revolution are bad. 2 0 As Michael Hunt has argued, "revolution c o n t i n u e d , as it had ever since the 1790s, to s u m m o n up visions of a reign of terror, of brutal assassinations, and of an international conspiracy against order and reason." 2 1 The American Revolution could be invoked to j u s t i f y support for the self-determination of others, but it had not been a t h o r o u g h g o i n g social revolution of the kind e x p e r i e n c e d by France at the end of the eighteenth century or by Russia early in the twentieth century. On the contrary, the US e x p e r i e n c e had produced an aversion to radical politics and the violent challenges to established order that w e r e to b e c o m e so c o m m o n in the p o s t - W o r l d W a r II era. A c c o r d i n g to the liberal tradition, such extreme measures were not necessary for political and e c o n o m i c progress; indeed, the chaos and disorder that a c c o m p a nied them made democracy less rather than more likely and posed a serious threat to US interests. Thus, one of the elements in the US perception of the United Nations has been that the global body would be an agent for reform, not revolution. C h a n g e w o u l d be m o d e r a t e and constructive; the UN w o u l d reject the

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argument that the goal of self-determination justified the use of any means to achieve that goal. As Packenham observed, the US liberal tradition disposed the United States to perceive e v e n m o d e s t alternatives as massive c h a n g e s , 2 2 a view that w o u l d put the U n i t e d States on a collision course with the UN majority on more than one occasion.

Preemptive Imperialism T h e United States does not think of itself as an imperialist power. Indeed, it sees itself as principal defender of a status q u o that serves U S interests and provides conditions conducive to the e c o n o m i c and political progress of other less f o r t u n a t e states. In the p o s t w a r era it w a s the Soviet Union that had imperial a m b i t i o n s . T h e United States o p p o s e d t h o s e ambitions and expected to enlist the United Nations in this mission. T h e result, paradoxically, was a US policy perceptively termed "preemptive imperialism" by Tony Smith. 2 3 Smith has argued that the preferred U S policy is what he terms "liberal a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m , " in e f f e c t a policy that would protect w e a k states f r o m the e f f o r t s of o t h e r p o w e r s to e x t e n d their spheres of i n f l u e n c e as well as promote nondiscriminatory multilateral economic relations. From this perspective, the M o n r o e Doctrine and the Open Door Policy in China were classic expressions of liberal US anti-imperialism. W h e t h e r one accepts this rationale for US foreign policy or not, it is hard to disagree with S m i t h ' s thesis that in the postwar era the United States r e s o r t e d to preemptive imperialism w h e n more modest e f f o r t s to help economically weak and politically unstable Third World countries failed to arrest the spread of Soviet power and influence. 2 4 O n e of the cardinal assumptions the United States brought to its relationship with the United Nations was that the global body w o u l d share its c o n c e r n f o r protecting the weak and v u l n e r a b l e against p r e d a t o r states such as the Soviet Union. Michael Hunt put it this way: "It w a s now the task of Americans, w h o had b e c o m e great yet had renounced self-aggrandizement, ' t o save the w o r l d f r o m t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . ' " 2 5 A n d the U N , committed under the Charter to the establishment of a stable a n d d e m o c r a t i c w o r l d order, w o u l d be e x p e c t e d to c o o p e r a t e in a c c o m p l i s h i n g that vital objective. For many UN members, however, imperialism w a s imperialism, regardless of the rationale o f f e r e d in its d e f e n s e , and it w a s o f t e n US intervention to halt the spread of c o m m u n i s m that produced the greatest resentment. US e f f o r t s to j u s t i f y such intervention and to treat it as a logical and legitimate application of Charter principles were to e n c o u n t e r strong and persistent o p p o s i t i o n and to c o n t r i b u t e to US d i s e n c h a n t m e n t with the UN.

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Regarding the UN

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Optimism Regarding Progress US expectations regarding the United Nations and the role it w o u l d (or should) play in the postwar international order were colored by certain characteristics of the country, its people, and its leaders. A m o n g those that c o m e to mind are US optimism, a certain naivete with respect to the larger world (especially outside of Europe), impatience for results, and something akin to a premillennial view of at least s o m e aspects of interstate relations. T o argue that o n e of the f a c t o r s s h a p i n g the US view of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s is US o p t i m i s m about progress d o e s not quite do justice to the p h e n o m e n o n in question. P a c k e n h a m came close to capturing this elusive trait of national character w h e n , in d i s c u s s i n g U S attitudes toward Third World development, he argued that the United States believes that c h a n g e and d e v e l o p m e n t are easy a n d that all good things go together. 2 6 T h e s e elements of the US liberal tradition, which have applicability well b e y o n d the field of development, have their roots in the doctrine of American exc e p t i o n a l i s m . 2 7 A l t h o u g h the United States may fall victim to selective amnesia—forgetting or ignoring elements of its own past that do not support the conventional w i s d o m — t h e propositions that change and development are easy and all good things go together have in some considerable measure been borne out by the US historical experience. T h e applicability of these propositions to countries with very different natural e n d o w m e n t s and political and social conditions f r o m those of the United States is, of course, another matter. N o n e t h e l e s s , the e v i d e n c e is that the United States a s s u m e d that " A m e r i c a n institutions would provide the models and American experience would serve as the inspiration," with the result that other nations could "accomplish in years what it had taken the advanced countries d e c a d e s to achieve." 2 8 T h e United States has typically taken the position that the principal limits to growth and p r o g r e s s are s e l f - i m p o s e d . It has argued for the removal of these barriers, these d e f o r m e d political systems and social institutions, these perverse e c o n o m i c n o s t r u m s . Follow the US e x a m p l e , and not only will e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t occur, but with it social reform and political democracy, and hence stability. T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s h a v e colored US attitudes t o w a r d the United Nations, particularly but not exclusively in the context of discussion and d e b a t e over ways to achieve d e v e l o p m e n t , which in the 1960s and 1970s b e c a m e the dominant issue on the UN agenda. With the conviction that its e x p e r i e n c e is relevant and its a s s u m p t i o n s tested and valid, the United S t a t e s b e c a m e impatient with UN discussion a n d debate that ignored the U S message and even attacked the messenger. Ali Mazrui argued that it is the United States that is the poor listener, m u c h more interested in telling other states what to do and how to do it than in learning about the

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About Face? The United States and the United Nations

p r o b l e m s that c a s t doubt on the v a l i d i t y o f U S a s s u m p t i o n s . 2 9 W h e t h e r Mazrui is right or w r o n g , U S - U N r e l a t i o n s have b e e n o n e o f the c a s u a l ties o f this d i a l o g u e o f the d e a f .

Naiveté T h e b e l i e f that c h a n g e and d e v e l o p m e n t are e a s y and that all g o o d things g o t o g e t h e r is thus both an a s s u m p t i o n and, as a r e f l e c t i o n o f U S optim i s m , a c o m m e n t a r y on the n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . A n o t h e r c l o s e l y r e l a t e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the United S t a t e s that has shaped its p e r c e p t i o n o f the UN would s e e m to b e a certain naiveté about the w o r l d — a b o u t other c o u n t r i e s , peoples, and c u l t u r e s , and about the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f g l o b a l p r o b l e m s . It is by now a c l i c h é to o b s e r v e that the U n i t e d S t a t e s , by virtue o f the protection a f f o r d e d it by the A t l a n t i c and P a c i f i c o c e a n s and the great national c h a l l e n g e o f w e s t w a r d e x p a n s i o n during the first c e n t u r y o f its e x i s t e n c e , c o u l d and did indulge the l u x u r y o f r e l a t i v e i n d i f f e r e n c e to the world b e y o n d its s h o r e s . T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m is that U S foreign p o l icy w a s h i s t o r i c a l l y isolationist, and that the U n i t e d S t a t e s p e r c e i v e d i t s e l f as the c i t y on the hill, its r o l e that o f l e a d e r by e x a m p l e rather than by forceful intervention in the affairs o f o t h e r s . Although the isolationist label has a l w a y s b e e n e x a g g e r a t e d 3 0 and t h e role o f c i t y on the hill has b e e n traded in o f late for that o f g l o b a l p o l i c e m a n , attitudes d e v e l o p e d in an e a r lier and s i m p l e r age have died hard. T h e United S t a t e s has r e m a i n e d , if not e x a c t l y ignorant o f the world b e y o n d its s h o r e s , at least s l o w to understand and e m p a t h i z e with m u c h o f that w o r l d . In part, this c a n b e a t t r i b u t e d to U S e t h n o c e n t r i s m , w h i c h

Howard

W i a r d a argued has produced " a n i n a b i l i t y to understand the T h i r d W o r l d on its o w n t e r m s , an i n s i s t e n c e on v i e w i n g it through the l e n s e s o f our o w n W e s t e r n e x p e r i e n c e , and the c o n d e s c e n d i n g and p a t r o n i z i n g attitudes that such e t h n o c e n t r i s m i m p l i e s . " 3 1 C e r t a i n l y e t h n o c e n t r i s m is at the r o o t o f s o m e o f the a s s u m p t i o n s with w h i c h the United S t a t e s has a p p r o a c h e d the United N a t i o n s . B u t naiveté, or a s i m p l e inability on the part o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s to c o m p r e h e n d the c i r c u m s t a n c e s and v i e w s o f o t h e r s , w h e t h e r e x p l a i n e d by U S e t h n o c e n t r i s m or not, is a l s o a p r o b l e m . T h i s n a i v e t é e x tends b e y o n d a failure to understand o t h e r p e o p l e s and c u l t u r e s , as Henry K i s s i n g e r a c k n o w l e d g e d in his o b s e r v a t i o n that the U n i t e d S t a t e s t y p i c a l l y s e e k s " t o s o l v e p r o b l e m s on their m e r i t s , without a s e n s e o f t i m e or c o n text or the s e a m l e s s w e b o f r e a l i t y , " w h e r e a s s u c c e s s r e q u i r e s a " s e n s e o f history, an understanding o f m a n i f o l d f o r c e s not within our c o n t r o l , and a broad v i e w o f the f a b r i c o f e v e n t s . " 3 2 W h e t h e r c a l l e d n a i v e t é or s o m e t h i n g e l s e , this a s p e c t o f the U S n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r has o f t e n f r u s t r a t e d U S e f forts to w o r k with and through the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .

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Impatience Impatience is another element of the US national character that has contributed in significant measure to the US r e s p o n s e to the way the United Nations does its work. It has been frequently argued that the US public is not greatly interested in foreign policy, or rather that it has a short attention span where foreign policy is concerned. As Philip Geyelin has argued, the natural and historic condition of the United States is " d e t a c h e d and wary of e n t a n g l e m e n t , content to nourish cultural ties and ancestral connections, pleased to profit from international c o m m e r c e , but preoccupied with p e r f e c t i n g the A m e r i c a n way of life, liberty, and the pursuit of its own e c o n o m i c well-being. D e t a c h m e n t — o r , at the most, rare m o m e n t s of e n g a g e m e n t — i s A m e r i c a ' s natural s t a t e . " 3 3 T h i s is not to say that the United States has reverted to isolationism, only that permanent exertion in foreign policy runs against the grain and requires a major challenge to US interest and values, a vigorous effort by political leaders to persuade the public of the need for such exertion, and tangible evidence that the policy is successful. T h e implications of this aversion to the primacy of foreign policy for the United Nations are clear. The UN had been oversold as part of an effort to prepare the country for a more active leadership role in world affairs. If the UN could demonstrate its worth with significant accomplishments supportive of major US policy goals, especially in the context of a Cold W a r that increasingly justified permanent exertion in foreign policy, it w o u l d be a d j u d g e d s u c c e s s f u l . O t h e r w i s e , the c o u n t r y ' s characteristic impatience would c o m e into play and the UN would presumably lose favor in the United States, even w h e n it did not adopt positions that were explicitly contrary to U S preferences. In the w a k e of the prodigious and indisputably successful effort to overwhelm the Axis powers on the far-flung b a t t l e f i e l d s of the w o r l d , a UN characterized by inconclusive diplomatic dithering, tedious bargaining over ambiguous language, and the absence of clear-cut " r e s u l t s " c o u l d only be e x p e c t e d to f r u s t r a t e a nation with the proclivities of the United States. And it is but a short step f r o m frustration to d i s e n g a g e m e n t .

Premillennialism T h e r e is a fine line b e t w e e n a foreign policy that supports certain values and one that treats those w h o disdain and reject those values as the forces of darkness and evil. US foreign policy has crossed this line often enough to s u g g e s t that " e l e m e n t s of premillennialist thinking . . . exist in vague and d i f f u s e f o r m " in the United States and help to shape the US perspective

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About Face? The United States and the United

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on international relations. 3 4 According to this view, international relations are a conflict between the forces of good and evil permitting of " n o intermediate redoubts, no c o m p r o m i s e positions; it is all or nothing and always the slippery slope." 3 5 President Ronald R e a g a n ' s characterization of the Soviet Union as the evil e m p i r e and President George B u s h ' s c o m p a r i s o n of Saddam Hussein to Hitler are t w o of the most recent and more explicit m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of this premillennial impulse, but it is not a new p h e n o m e n o n . T h e United States has tended to approach w a r s in this s p i r i t — n e v e r m o r e so than in the struggle against Imperial Japan a n d Nazi G e r m a n y , c u l m i n a t i n g with the d e m a n d for unconditional surrender. If o n e ' s e n e m y is evil, and o n e ' s own c a u s e just in some transcendent sense of the term, then there can be little room for c o m p r o m i s e or c o n c e s s i o n . T h i s view of world politics shaped US foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union and later China r e p l a c i n g the A x i s p o w e r s as the forces of evil. Support for these states and nonsupport for U S causes were often perceived as tantamount to making a pact with the devil. This starkly bipolar view of the world was to be tested early and often in the United Nations, for the UN was a forum in which the issues that divided West f r o m East were debated and states were expected to stand and be counted. When states equivocated or retreated into neutrality or, worse yet, c a m e d o w n on the side of the f o r c e s of evil, the UN s u f f e r e d in US eyes. Premillennialism may be a minority position theologically in the United States, but in its secular f o r m it has simplified the task of comprehending the complexities of the troubled postwar world, given us a series of politically p o w e r f u l if analytically weak m e t a p h o r s , and provided a yardstick for measuring the p e r f o r m a n c e of the United Nations and hence the relevance of that organization for the United States.

Efficiency and Frugality There is o n e final expectation the United States has had for the United Nations, although it was not initially as important as it has b e c o m e in more recent years. At the time the UN w a s being l a u n c h e d , not much thought w a s given to the m a n a g e m e n t of the global o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e size of its b u r e a u c r a c y and of its b u d g e t w e r e not principal foci of debate. T h e United States had had little experience with the operation of permanent international organizations with multinational secretariats, and the extent of f u t u r e growth of membership and hence of agenda and d e m a n d s for more staff and more f u n d s could not be fully appreciated in 1945. In the beginning, as might have been expected, the UN Secretariat was staffed primarily with nationals of Western states, the United States foremost a m o n g them, and the US assessment made it by far the largest contributor,

US Expectations

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19

albeit to a relatively modest budget. 3 6 Questions as to whether the UN Secretariat w a s s t a f f e d and run in such a way as to g u a r a n t e e efficiency and whether the size and nature of UN e x p e n d i t u r e s met US expectations regarding prudential fiscal management did not arise at the outset. But these were latent US concerns, and in time US assumptions regarding efficiency and frugality b e c a m e more explicit in response to trends within the organization. A clue to these latent concerns can be f o u n d in the fact that the United States opted for what might be termed "the m a n a g e m e n t portfolio" when the m a j o r p o w e r s first laid claim to UN Secretariat d e p a r t m e n t s . 3 7 US assumptions as to what constitutes efficient and frugal management of the United N a t i o n s have, of course, a l w a y s been closely tied to UN perf o r m a n c e on substantive issues. When other US expectations are met, UN e f f i c i e n c y and frugality are less salient f o r US p o l i c y m a k e r s ; when the UN fails the United States in other areas, however, they are quite likely to be invoked. T h e s e several e x p e c t a t i o n s and aspects of the US national character have c o m e into play in various c o m b i n a t i o n s w h e n the U n i t e d States has assessed the p e r f o r m a n c e of the United Nations and d e c i d e d whether and to w h a t extent to g i v e its s u p p o r t to the g l o b a l b o d y . S o m e have b e e n generically critical, a f f e c t i n g the US view of the UN a c r o s s the board on virtually all issues and at virtually all times. O t h e r s a s s u m e importance on certain issues and f a d e into relative i n s i g n i f i c a n c e on others. Collectively they s u g g e s t a set of q u e s t i o n s , the a n s w e r s to w h i c h p r o v i d e a b a r o m e t e r of the willingness of the United States to take the United Nations s e r i o u s l y a n d g i v e it a place of i m p o r t a n c e in the c o n d u c t of U S f o r e i g n policy. •

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•

•

Is the fact of US hegemony in evidence at the United Nations; that is, does the membership generally respect and defer to US leadership on matters that the United States d e e m s important, and are the costs incurred by the United States in the exercise of its leadership role at the UN commensurate with the benefits it obtains there? A r e UN d e c i s i o n s c o n g r u e n t with U S p r e f e r e n c e s , a n d d o they effectively leave US power capabilities unchanged? Does the United Nations support and facilitate the proper functioning of the international order created in the wake of World War II; that is, does it help to maintain the US-sanctioned status quo? Is the principle that sovereign states may not be bound against their will by the decisions of UN majorities accepted and honored, and not chronically contested, by the membership? Is the division of labor among UN-system agencies accepted, and d o e s the U n i t e d N a t i o n s e s c h e w a t t e m p t s to p o l i t i c i z e what the United States considers technical issues?

20

About Face? The United States and the United

• • • •

• •

•

•

Nations

Does the United Nations support the market system as the optimum method of allocating resources? Does the United Nations support pluralism and Western-style democracy as opposed to authoritarian and mobilization regimes? Does the United Nations reject revolution as the path to change, and prefer instead orderly processes of reform? Does the United Nations recognize the threat posed by states bent on imperialistic expansion, and does it therefore support US efforts to preempt such expansion? Is there at the United Nations a healthy belief in progress and a willingness to accept US prescriptions for achieving it? Are US naiveté about other peoples and cultures and US impatience with the time-consuming and often inconclusive aspects of multinational and multicultural diplomacy not tested too severely at the United Nations? Is there an understanding at the United Nations that international politics may at times take on the character of a contest between good and evil, and will the members take the right (the US) side in this struggle? Is the United Nations an efficient and frugal organization, and does it go about the task of realizing US policy objectives without conspicuous waste and at modest cost?

The answer to all of these questions has been " n o " often enough to create in the United States a sense of disenchantment with the United Nations. That has not been true at all times, or with respect to all issues, or for all US foreign policymakers, much less for the whole of the US public. But these have been the litmus tests for broad and sustained US support for the United Nations—support of a kind that does not require that the UN be at the center of all US foreign policy, but does include a willingness to exercise leadership there and to seek to invest the UN with greater moral authority and capacity for effective action in an increasingly complex world. For the most part, that support has been lacking for much of the U N ' s existence, and the explanation for that lack of support can be found in the fact that US policymakers have not been able to answer more of these questions positively more of the time. In the early 1990s the United States has once again exercised leadership at the UN, and a case can be made that beginning with the Gulf crisis it has tried to invest the UN with the moral authority and capacity for action it has largely lacked for some time. This change, this about-face, may mean either that those questions are now eliciting different answers or that the United States has relaxed its expectations regarding the United Nations. Before turning to an analysis of this about-face in the US approach

US Expectations

Regarding the UN

21

to the U N , it will be useful to e x a m i n e the deterioration o f U S - U N relations, culminating in the crisis of the 1 9 8 0 s .

Notes 1. A relatively recent and very readable account of the original US view of the United Nations is Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Franck titles his initial chapter "Great Expectations." 2. Ernst Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," International Organization 37, 2 (Spring 1983), p. 229. 3. The literature on this subject is extensive. See, for an introduction to debate, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984; Bruce Russen, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization 39, 2 (Spring 1985); Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39, 4 (Autumn 1985); lsabelle Grunberg, "Exploring the ' M y t h ' of Hegemonic Stability," International Organization 44, 4 (Autumn 1990). 4. See Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," for the distinction between benevolent and coercive hegemony. Most writers have taken the postion that hegemons are benevolent. 5. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 75-78. 6. Ibid., p. 75. 7. Franck, Nation Against Nation, p. 14. 8. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978. 9. At least it did throughout much of its history. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it is not so clear what N A T O ' s role will be in the future. 10. See Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ed., Politics in the United Nations System, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988. The argument is developed in Chapter 1. 11. Ibid., p. 3. 12. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System, New York: The Free Press, 1951. 13. See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1946. The best short summary of the functionalist thesis is in Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares, 3rd ed., New York: Random House, 1964. 14. Robert W. Gregg, "The Politics of International Economic Cooperation and Development," in Finkelstein, Politics in the United Nations System, p. 121. 15. Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, 2nd ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, p. 211. 16. The GATT occupies the institutional niche in the liberal international economic order created when agreement could not be reached on the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO). 17. Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. 18. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 152.

22

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

19. This familiar thesis is succinctly argued in Donald F. McHenry, "Confronting a Revolutionary Legacy," in Sanford J. Ungar, ed., Estrangement: America and the World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 75-99. 20. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, p. 170. 21. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 170. 22. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, p. 149. 23. See Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 3. 24. Ibid., Chap. 4. 25. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 157. 26. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, pp. 112-129. 27. For an explication of this doctrine, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, Now York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955. Packenham is very much indebted to Hartz. 28. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 160. 29. Ali Mazrui, "Uncle S a m ' s Hearing Aid," in Ungar, Estrangement, pp. 179-192. 30. Frances FitzGerald argued this point in "The American Millennium," in Ungar, Estrangement, pp. 253-276. 31. Howard J. Wiarda, Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1985, p. 1. 32. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 130. 33. Philip L. Geyelin, "The Adams Doctrine and the Dream of Disengagement," in Ungar, Estrangement, p. 197. 34. Frances FitzGerald, "The American Millennium," in Ungar, Estrangement, p. 270. 35. Ibid., p. 271. 36. Initially the United States paid 38.89 percent of a budget of less than $20 million. As large as this percentage was, it was considerably smaller than the US assessment would have been had the principle of capacity to pay been strictly applied (49.89 percent). 37. Georges Langrod, The International Civil Service, Leyden, Holland: A. W. Sythoff, 1963, p. 176.

Chapter III The Roots of Disenchantment

No state could realistically expect the United Nations always to reflect its views. Issues will be inscribed on the agenda that some states would prefer not to discuss or on which they would prefer not to take a position. Other issues to which some states attach a high priority will not be given the serious attention they believe those issues deserve. S o m e states will from time to time be discomforted by the tone o f the debate, and they will, even in the best of circumstances, occasionally find themselves on the losing side o f a vote. S o m e states will not always be satisfied with the way their assessed contributions to the organization are used. They may chafe under the frustrating requirements of multilateral diplomacy. But if all states can expect to have bad moments at the United Nations, the United States might have been expected—and apparently did itself e x p e c t — t o have fewer problems than most because of its great power and influence, the fact that the organization had been tailored in considerable measure to US expectations, and the luxury, denied to many lesser powers, o f being able to achieve many o f its objectives unilaterally without the need to mobilize support in the UN. Unfortunately, but not unpredictably, the United States has not, however, had fewer problems with the United Nations than most other states. It is difficult, o f course, to gauge comparative discontent. Many states have had good and sufficient reason to view the UN as an inhospitable place: the Soviet Union when isolated in the early years, China as a result o f its long ostracism, several European countries during the years when they were the target o f the UN majority's unrelenting assault on colonialism, large numbers o f Third World states for what they have regarded as the U N ' s inadequate response to their development problems, and Israel and South A f r i c a for their treatment as pariah states. Our purpose is not to determine which states have fared least well at the United Nations, but to explore the frustrations o f the United States,

23

24

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

w h i c h h a v e a r g u a b l y had m o r e o f an i m p a c t on the e v o l u t i o n o f the U N than those o f any other state and w h i c h have s e e m e d s o disproportionate to the reality o f U S power and i n f l u e n c e in the w o r l d , w h i c h the U N has not in a n y w a y s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i m i n i s h e d . A t t h e r o o t o f U S d i s e n c h a n t m e n t with the UN have been U S e x p e c t a t i o n s , o u t l i n e d in the previous c h a p t e r , w h i c h would appear to have a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y b e e n e x c e s s i v e in v i e w o f the nature o f the United N a t i o n s and o f the c h a n g i n g s y s t e m i c c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h the UN has had to f u n c t i o n . T h e United Nations p o s s e s s e s a n u m b e r o f f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that, by t h e m s e l v e s , did not m a k e the frustration o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s with the g l o b a l organization i n e v i t a b l e ; h o w e v e r , they d i d — o r at least s o m e o f them d i d — m a k e

it l i k e l y . S i m i l a r l y ,

the i n t e r n a t i o n a l

system

in

the

d e c a d e s after W o r l d W a r II e v o l v e d in w a y s that did not g u a r a n t e e U S ant a g o n i s m toward the U N . T h e y did, h o w e v e r , m a k e it m o r e p r o b a b l e . It w a s the intersection o f these b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the UN and the e m e r gent and persistent f e a t u r e s o f the p o s t w a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m that frustrated U S e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Had the UN b e e n s o c o n structed as to render it largely i m m u n e to s y s t e m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s that the U n i t e d S t a t e s opposed or, better yet f r o m the U S p e r s p e c t i v e , to e n a b l e it to c h a n n e l those d e v e l o p m e n t s in d i r e c t i o n s c o m p a t i b l e with U S purposes, U S - U N r e l a t i o n s w o u l d h a v e b e e n far m o r e a m i c a b l e . C o n v e r s e l y , had s y s t e m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s b e e n m o r e b e n i g n ( f r o m the U S p e r s p e c t i v e ) , it w o u l d have mattered less to the U n i t e d S t a t e s h o w the UN w a s structured and what procedures w e r e e m p l o y e d there. B u t s y s t e m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e not, f r o m the U S point o f v i e w , alw a y s b e n i g n , and the U n i t e d N a t i o n s p o s s e s s e d a n u m b e r o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that did not, as the U n i t e d S t a t e s had h o p e d , f a c i l i t a t e the r e a l i z a t i o n o f U S o b j e c t i v e s . Instead, they all t o o o f t e n s e e m e d to a m p l i f y t h o s e disc o n c e r t i n g trends within the U n i t e d N a t i o n s s y s t e m . In r e t r o s p e c t , all o f this w a s p r o b a b l y i n e v i t a b l e . B u t it m a y b e u s e f u l to e x a m i n e b r i e f l y both the m a j o r s y s t e m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s o f the p o s t w a r era and t h o s e f u n d a m e n tal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the U N that r e f l e c t e d , nurtured, and s o m e t i m e s d i s torted t h e m , p r o d u c i n g a l o n g the w a y i n c r e a s i n g U S frustration and, ultim a t e l y , s o m e t h i n g v e r y c l o s e to U S a b a n d o n m e n t o f the b e l i e f that the U n i t e d N a t i o n s had any m e a n i n g f u l role to p l a y in the c o n d u c t o f U S foreign policy.

Fundamental Characteristics of the United Nations T h e United Nations p o s s e s s e s — a n d has p o s s e s s e d s i n c e its f o u n d i n g — f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f overriding i m p o r t a n c e : universality o f m e m b e r s h i p , e g a l itarianism/majoritarianism, limited authority, great power responsibility

The Roots of

Disenchantment

25

and privilege, and a b r o a d m a n d a t e . S o m e o f these h a v e

contributed

s i g n i f i c a n t l y to t h e d e f e a t o f U S e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r t h e U N , b u t e v e n t h o s e that a p p e a r b e s t s u i t e d t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f U S i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e s h a v e o f t e n in p r a c t i c e b e e n at b e s t a m i x e d b l e s s i n g f o r U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y .

Universality of Membership In t h e s t a n d a r d t y p o l o g y f o r c l a s s i f y i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t w o dimensions are e m p l o y e d : m a n i f e s t purposes o f the organization ( s p e c i f i c or g e n e r a l ) a n d m e m b e r s h i p ( l i m i t e d o r u n i v e r s a l ) . 1 L i m i t e d m e m b e r s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e t y p i c a l l y r e g i o n a l in s c o p e ( e . g . , t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n

of

A m e r i c a n States), or they may have relatively few m e m b e r s b e c a u s e only a r e l a t i v e l y f e w s t a t e s a r e e n g a g e d in t h e a c t i v i t y that led to t h e c r e a t i o n o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n ( e . g . , the International W h a l i n g C o m m i s s i o n ) . T h e

UN

w a s n e v e r i n t e n d e d to b e a l i m i t e d m e m b e r s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n in e i t h e r o f t h e s e t w o s e n s e s , a n d it w a s t h e r e f o r e a l w a y s p r o s p e c t i v e l y u n i v e r s a l . A r t i c l e 4 o f the C h a r t e r d o e s , h o w e v e r , s t i p u l a t e t w o c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m i g h t h a v e l i m i t e d m e m b e r s h i p h a d t h e y b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d d i f f e r e n t l y . O n e is that a s t a t e s e e k i n g m e m b e r s h i p b e p e a c e - l o v i n g , t h e o t h e r that it b e a b l e a n d w i l l i n g to c a r r y out t h e o b l i g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d in t h e C h a r t e r . T h e rationale for inclusion o f the qualifying phrase

"peace-loving

s t a t e s " w a s the e x c l u s i o n o f t h e d e f e a t e d A x i s s t a t e s ( a s w e l l a s S p a i n ) , its e l f an i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n to t h e c o n c e p t o f u n i v e r s a l i t y . I f o n e c o n s i d e r s the m a n y i n s t a n c e s s i n c e t h e f o u n d i n g o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s in w h i c h s t a t e s h a v e r e s o r t e d to w a r to s e t t l e d i s p u t e s o r a c h i e v e n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s , it b e c o m e s c l e a r that a m o r e literal r e a d i n g o f t h e " p e a c e - l o v i n g " c o n d i t i o n might have been used to further limit UN m e m b e r s h i p . N e e d l e s s to say, such a reading o f Article 4 was never seriously contemplated, although the S o v i e t U n i o n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d e n g a g e in w h a t h a s b e e n t e r m e d " c o m p e t i t i v e e x c l u s i o n " o f e a c h o t h e r ' s c a n d i d a t e s f o r m e m b e r s h i p in t h e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s o n not d i s s i m i l a r g r o u n d s . 2 T h e n o t i o n that s t a t e s s h o u l d b e w i l l i n g a n d a b l e to f u l f i l l

Charter

o b l i g a t i o n s c o u l d h a v e b e e n u s e d to s c r e e n o u t a p p l i c a n t s w i t h t i n y l a n d a r e a s , m i n u s c u l e p o p u l a t i o n s , a n d , the usual c o r o l l a r y o f t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s , minimal financial resources—the so-called microstates. T h e option o f quali f i e d o r a s s o c i a t e m e m b e r s h i p w a s in f a c t c o n s i d e r e d at t h e U N , but in v i e w o f the l a r g e n u m b e r o f f a i r l y s m a l l s t a t e s a m o n g the o r i g i n a l m e m b e r s a n d the p o t e n c y o f the " s o v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y o f s t a t e s " a r g u m e n t , not t o m e n t i o n the p o l i t i c a l c a l c u l u s , s i z e n e v e r b e c a m e an i m p e d i m e n t to u n i v e r s a l i t y . T h e result is t h e o n e w i t h w h i c h w e a r e all f a m i l i a r , a U N that c o u n t s a m o n g its m e m b e r s v i r t u a l l y e v e r y s t a t e in t h e w o r l d , a r i c h ( o r , d e p e n d i n g on o n e ' s p o i n t o f v i e w , a r a n c i d ) s t e w o f e n t i t i e s a s d i v e r s e a s S w e d e n a n d Iraq, the S e y c h e l l e s and China.

26

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

Egalitarianism/Majoritarianism Not only has any entity meeting the m i n i m u m legal standards of state sovereignty been eligible for UN membership; in addition, according to Article 18 (1), each member state, regardless of size or other attributes of power, casts one vote in the General A s s e m b l y . T h e corollary of egalitarianism, also enshrined in the Charter in Article 18 (2 and 3), is majoritarianism, that is, decisions may be arrived at by voting, in which process the vote of the smallest state counts for as much as the vote of the largest and the majority carries the day. T h e s e provisions of the Charter created a situation, often commented on by the U N ' s critics, in which issues can be decided by large and even overwhelming majorities consisting primarily of relatively small states. There were, of course, alternatives to one-state, one-vote, as the decisionmaking rules of the International Monetary Fund and World B a n k , or, for that matter, the UN Security Council, demonstrate. But the drafters of the UN Charter, committed to the principle of sovereign equality of states and mindful of the fact that the U N ' s authority was to be limited in any event, took as their model the v o t i n g arrangements in parliamentary democracies. As Inis Claude once observed, this is an analogy of dubious merit. International majorities, he wrote, are likely to be " u n d e m o cratic in the sense that they do not represent a majority of the w o r l d ' s population, unrealistic in the sense that they do not reflect the greater portion of the w o r l d ' s real power, morally unimpressive in the sense that they cannot be identified as expressions of the dominant will of a genuine c o m m u nity." 3 Whether one agrees with C l a u d e ' s conclusion that for all these reasons majority decisions in an egalitarian UN are both ineffectual and dangerous, it is clear that these attributes of the Charter have constituted both an invitation to the proliferation of sovereign states and a means whereby the rapidly growing multitude of sovereign states could control the UN agenda, challenge established norms, and seek to enlarge the Charter's limited grant of authority. It should also be noted that UN e g a l i t a r i a n i s m has also meant that each m e m b e r state, o n c e again regardless of size or other attributes of p o w e r , is eligible to o c c u p y a seat on the U N ' s limited m e m b e r s h i p organs, including, most significantly, the Security Council. T h e point is illustrated by the composition of the Council that adopted the several resolutions c o n d e m n i n g I r a q ' s invasion and annexation of K u w a i t and authorizing sanctions and "all necessary m e a n s " to secure Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. 4 T h e ten nonpermanent m e m b e r s of the Council participating in those decisions included Y e m e n , Malaysia, Cuba, C o l o m b i a , Ethiopia, Zaire, Cote d ' l v o i r e , Romania, Finland, and Canada. This roster provides persuasive evidence of the durability of the egalitarian principle.

The Roots of

Limited

Disenchantment

27

Authority

Both universality and egalitarianism plus majoritarianism were supported by the United States, but it is not difficult to see how they could have become problems for the hegemonic power. The U N ' s limited authority is a somewhat different matter. It is a characteristic of the United Nations that supports Lawrence Finkelstein's dictum regarding the unit veto—that states may not be bound by UN majorities without their c o n s e n t — a n d therefore it is consistent with one of the US assumptions regarding a desirable (and an acceptable) UN. In fact, had the Charter granted the organs of the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, substantially greater authority, the United States almost certainly would have insisted on some form of weighted voting. As Stephen Zamora has summarized the correlation between these two organizational features: " w h e r e states are most likely to surrender some autonomy to the international organization, one finds the highest incidence of voting safeguards to protect their interests." 5 In the main, Charter language makes clear that its organs have recommendatory power only. There are, however, important exceptions. There is, of course, the case of the Security Council, especially under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Here the United States enjoys the protection of the veto. But the General Assembly, in which the United States has a vote equal to that of Cuba (or Grenada or Guinea-Bissau), may under the Charter establish new institutions (Articles 22 and 68), approve the budget and apportion expenses (Article 17), and establish regulations according to which staff will be appointed (Article 101). These are not inconsiderable grants of authority. But even if we set these exceptions aside, the limited authority of the United Nations has not been an unmixed blessing for the United States. It has meant not only that the United States could more easily not do what it did not want to do; it has also meant that the United States has often been unable to do what it has wanted to do, or, in order to achieve its objectives, has had to support expansive interpretations of the Charter with which it has later been uncomfortable. 6 Great Power Responsibility

and

Privilege

The characteristic of the Charter regarding the privileged status of great powers has its expression in the permanent seats and veto rights on the Security Council for the so-called "Big Five." Thus in the area of what was to be the U N ' s primary function, the maintenance of peace and security, the second and third of the organization's fundamental attributes—egalitarianism and limited authority—are significantly qualified. In the Security

28

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

Council some states are unquestionably more equal than others, and when they are in agreement the Council may indeed authoritatively allocate values. T h e cases of Iraq and Somalia are only the most recent and in some ways the most dramatic demonstrations of this proposition. T h e privileged position of the great powers (or at least those w h o were accorded that status in 1945) reflects the view that decisive action to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression should not be undertaken unless those p o w e r s are prepared to support it. As Claude has observed, the founding f a t h e r s ' "acceptance of the veto was a testament to their awareness that the great powers would not consent, on paper and still less in fact, to put their p o w e r resources at the disposal of a sheer m a j o r i t y f o r the implementation of decisions with w h i c h they might not be in accord." 7 The United States, no less than the Soviet Union, subscribed to this position. It wanted the United Nations to possess teeth in this, its most important area of responsibility, but it w a s not prepared to abdicate US national control over the most important of all sovereign prerogatives, the decision to keep peace or make war. T h e price the United States paid for its privileged position—and ultimately paid willingly after some haggling over the question of whether a permanent m e m b e r of the Council had to abstain f r o m voting in disputes to which it was a p a r t y — w a s that other " p o w e r s " would be similarly able to block UN action in crisis situations. T h u s a Charter provision that was quite consistent with US preferences often proved in practice to be a barrier to the realization of US purposes, especially in the hands of the Soviet Union. The Broad

Mandate

As noted above, the c o m m o n typology f o r c l a s s i f y i n g international organizations breaks them down as to their m a n i f e s t purposes. D o they have limited purposes or are they general purpose institutions? T h e United Nations, alone a m o n g the universal intergovernmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s , falls into the latter category, a point that is m a d e abundantly clear in Article 1 and then amplified in the balance of the Charter. T o be sure, the maintenance of peace and security was the U N ' s principal raison d ' ê t r e . But unlike the other agencies in the UN s y s t e m , the United Nations m a k e s no pretense of functional specificity. T h e Charter was (and is) an all-purpose hunting license, and authorizes the UN to b e c o m e deeply involved in issues far r e m o v e d f r o m traditional notions of peace and security and in ways much less identified with the m a i n t e n a n c e of the status quo, which was such an important consideration for the United States. T h e breadth of the UN mandate, like the other f u n d a m e n t a l characteristics of the organization, was not only acceptable to the United States but

The Roots of

29

Disenchantment

a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t e d b y it. B u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s e x p e c t e d that t h e U N ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in a r e a s o t h e r t h a n p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y ( e s p e c i a l l y in t h e fields o f e c o n o m i c and social c o o p e r a t i o n ) would b e " a n c i l l a r y and instrum e n t a l w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f t h e C h a r t e r , " 8 n e i t h e r a s i m p o r t a n t a s t h e p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y f u n c t i o n n o r a c h a l l e n g e to t h e p r i m a r y r o l e o f m o r e specialized a g e n c i e s within the U N s y s t e m . Y e t the United S t a t e s a c c e p t e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l C o u n c i l ( E C O S O C ) a s a p r i n c i pal o r g a n o f the U N , did n o t insist upon a g u a r a n t e e o f a s e a t f o r i t s e l f o n that C o u n c i l , e n d o r s e d o n e - s t a t e / o n e - v o t e a n d m a j o r i t y rule f o r t h e o r g a n s that w o u l d d e a l w i t h e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l i s s u e s ( E C O S O C a n d t h e G e n eral A s s e m b l y ) , a n d c o u n t e n a n c e d " a n o p e n - e n d e d a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r t h e U N to c r e a t e n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s , h o l d c o n f e r e n c e s , d r a f t c o n v e n t i o n s , a n d o t h e r w i s e m o d i f y the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l a n d s c a p e f o r m u l t i l a t e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n in the e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l f i e l d . " 9 It is s m a l l w o n d e r that t h i s last o f t h e f i v e f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the United N a t i o n s , the b r o a d

mandate,

w o u l d b e a s o u r c e o f m u c h f r u s t r a t i o n to the U n i t e d S t a t e s o v e r t h e y e a r s .

Systemic Developments Affecting the United Nations S y s t e m i c c h a n g e s that t o o k p l a c e o v e r t h e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g the f o u n d i n g o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w e r e i n e v i t a b l y r e f l e c t e d t h e r e . I n d e e d , t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f the U N — a n d e s p e c i a l l y

its u n i v e r s a l i t y , its

d e c i s i o n r u l e s , a n d its b r o a d m a n d a t e — v i r t u a l l y

egalitarian/majoritarian g u a r a n t e e d that

these

c h a n g e s w o u l d b e d r a m a t i z e d in U N c h a m b e r s . A l t h o u g h t h e r o s t e r o f s y s t e m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s o f c o n s e q u e n c e is, o f c o u r s e , m u c h l a r g e r , f o u r — t h e C o l d W a r , the N o r t h - S o u t h c o n f l i c t , the t e c h n o l o g y r e v o l u t i o n , and the f a c t that t h e s t a t e is i n c r e a s i n g l y u n d e r s i e g e — m e r i t s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n .

The Cold War T h e d e v e l o p m e n t s o f t h e p o s t w a r p e r i o d that m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a n d h e n c e t h e U S v i e w o f t h e U N , w e r e , to u s e t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l shorthand, the E a s t - W e s t and N o r t h - S o u t h c o n f l i c t s .

Both

w e r e c h a l l e n g e s to t h e d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m o f t h e s t a t e s o f the N o r t h A t l a n t i c c o m m u n i t y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r e m o s t a m o n g t h e m , a n d e a c h in its o w n w a y t r a n s f o r m e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . N e i t h e r challenge was entirely

new, but both gathered m o m e n t u m

during

the

d e c a d e s f o l l o w i n g the d e f e a t o f the A x i s p o w e r s and the c r e a t i o n o f the United Nations. T h e E a s t - W e s t c o n f l i c t , or the C o l d W a r , c a m e with the c o l l a p s e o f the a l w a y s strained and tenuous wartime c o o p e r a t i o n a m o n g the allies and the e m e r g e n c e o f a d e t e r m i n e d b i d b y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n to a c h i e v e , i f not

30

About Face? The United Statesand

the United

Nations

dominion, as the Soviets may have hoped and the United States may have feared, at least parity. T h e challenge f r o m M o s c o w w a s the first d e m o n stration of a fact that later came to seem o b v i o u s but was initially difficult f o r the United States to a c k n o w l e d g e : T h a t its great p r e p o n d e r a n c e of power and claim to uncontested hegemony w a s the product of the special circumstances obtaining at the end of the w a r — a historical aberration, not the norm. For more than forty years, the struggle b e t w e e n the two superpowers and b e t w e e n the coalitions they built and a r m e d in this era of bipolarity was the single most important feature of the international system. It constituted the principal threat to world peace; it f o s t e r e d an a r m s race, the prospectively devastating c o n s e q u e n c e s of which are b e y o n d imagining; it inflamed local conflicts in areas far removed f r o m the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. A n d it permeated the United Nations, turning the new institution with responsibility for m a i n t a i n i n g the peace into an often virulent if verbal battleground. T h e United Nations w a s not, of c o u r s e , the most important place, much less the only place, where the Soviet challenge to the United States was played out. But it was impossible to keep the Cold War out of the UN, and the superpowers, rather than trying to insulate the global forum f r o m the struggle in which they were engaged, turned the UN into a major arena for that struggle. T h e United States s o u g h t to enlist the United Nations against the challenge from the C o m m u n i s t bloc; the Soviet Union f o u g h t back, e m p l o y i n g every available Charter w e a p o n . T h e t w o p o w e r s both courted and threatened the so-called nonaligned states, turning one issue after another into a referendum on the Cold War. T h e roll call of UN crises resulting from the Cold War conflict is familiar to all students of this troubled era: T h e stalemate over the admission of new m e m b e r s , the bitter end of the stewardship first of T r y g v e Lie and then of D a g H a m m a r s k j o l d as Secretary-General, the response to the war in Korea and later to the breakd o w n of government authority in the C o n g o , the Article 19 crisis of the 1960s. These are only a few of the entries on a long list, which continued to grow almost until the eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, o v e r s h a d o w i n g much of what the UN did or tried to do and c o n t r i b u t i n g to the disillusionment of the United States with the United Nations.

The North-South

Conflict

T h i s s e c o n d axis of global c o n t e n t i o n — t h e N o r t h - S o u t h c o n f l i c t — c a m e into sharp focus somewhat later than the struggle between East and West, and never constituted as much of a threat to world peace. But over time it actually displaced the East-West c o n f l i c t as the principal f o c u s of the

The Roots of

Disenchantment

31

U N ' s agenda, generating angry debate, dramatic and controversial proposals, many new institutions, and accelerated budget growth. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that this conflict between the established, industrialized, market economy states and the less-developed states of the so-called Third World would have been considerably more muted had the latter group of states not had the United Nations as a venue for expressing their grievances and promoting various changes in the international order that had been put in place after World War II. T h e North-South conflict antedated the founding o f the United Nations, but it was the inability of the colonial powers, weakened by the war, to retain their overseas possessions that propelled it into prominence as a global meta-issue. O n c e having obtained their independence, the many new states that emerged during the 1 9 5 0 s , 1 9 6 0 s , and 1 9 7 0 s discovered that true independence was a chimera, and they turned with increasing frustration and anger against the North (or more precisely the W e s t ) for redress of their growing list of grievances. These states j o i n e d the UN, transforming it both quantitatively and qualitatively, and availed themselves of its egalitarian and majoritarian decision rules to press their case. And whereas the North-South conflict is normally associated with the economic development issue, the South was (and is) also interested in a number o f other emotional and volatile issues that bring it into conflict with the North, including the fate of Palestinians and black South Africans, neocolonialism and cultural imperialism. T h e s e issues came to be linked repeatedly in rhetoric and resolution. T h e South seemed increasingly to take the view that the old order itself—the global order that the United States had done so much to establish—constituted " a threat to peace and security because it perpetuates hegemony and dependence, justifies intervention, sanctions racism, frustrates development, and fosters the conditions that breed disorder and v i o l e n c e . " 1 0 T h e United States was the principal target of this challenge, just as it was in the Cold W a r confrontation. T h e United States was, after all, the state that best symbolized the established order and, more than any other, seemed to thwart the aspirations o f the South. It could, if it would, make the concessions necessary to usher in a new order. T h e United Nations not only amplified this challenge by providing a highly visible platform and a venue for concerted action among the tactically like-minded, it also c o n ferred a kind o f legitimacy upon the claims o f the aspirant states. They had, after all, taken their case to a U S - s a n c t i o n e d forum, availed themselves of Charter procedures that the United States had sponsored or endorsed, developed a broad agenda reflecting what were indisputably most o f the great issues o f the day, and built impressive winning coalitions in support of their positions on those issues.

32

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

The Technology Revolution A c a s e c a n b e m a d e that c o n t e m p o r a r y h i s t o r y b e g a n w i t h t h e s e c o n d ind u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , w h i c h t o o k p l a c e in t h e l a t t e r part o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . G e o f f r e y B a r r a c l o u g h m a d e p r e c i s e l y t h a t c a s e w h e n he a r g u e d that " t h e p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g f a c t o r , m a r k i n g o f f t h e n e w a g e f r o m t h e old, w a s the i m p a c t o f s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e on s o c i e t y , b o t h n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l . " 1 1 It w a s B a r r a c l o u g h ' s t h e s i s that t h e s e c o n d i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n — t h e s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n — w a s " f a r q u i c k e r in its i m p a c t , f a r m o r e p r o d i g i o u s in its r e s u l t s , f a r m o r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y in its e f f e c t s o n p e o p l e ' s l i v e s a n d o u t l o o k " 1 2 than t h e f i r s t a n d m o r e c e l e b r a t e d i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s r e v o l u t i o n u s h e r e d in t h e f a m i l i a r t w e n t i e t h century a g e o f steel and e l e c t r i c i t y , o f oil and c h e m i c a l s , o f b a c t e r i o l o g y and refrigeration. B a r r a c l o u g h ' s s l i m but p r o v o c a t i v e little v o l u m e w a s p u b l i s h e d in t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s , l e s s than t w o d e c a d e s a f t e r W o r l d W a r II c a m e to a d r a m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w i n g t h e e x p l o s i o n o f the a t o m i c b o m b s o v e r H i r o s h i m a a n d N a g a s a k i . A n d a l r e a d y it h a s b e e n o v e r t a k e n b y e v e n t s ; w e are in t h e m i d d l e o f a n o t h e r r e v o l u t i o n o f f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s , a r e v o l u t i o n that many have characterized as postindustrial. T h i s revolution has been driven b y an e x p l o s i o n in s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n in the fields o f information p r o c e s s i n g , t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and m o l e c u l a r a n d c e l l u l a r b i o l o g y . Its s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s i n c l u d e m i c r o c h i p s a n d s e m i c o n d u c t o r s , fiber optics, b i o s y n t h e t i c s and artificial i n t e l l i g e n c e — a w h o l e host o f d e v e l o p m e n t s that h a v e b e e n t r a n s f o r m i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s in almost every sphere.13 T h i s r e v o l u t i o n in s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y d r a m a t i c a l l y s p e d up t h e processes by which the world w a s shrinking. A s D e n n i s Pirages o b s e r v e d , " n a t i o n s o n c e b u f f e r e d f r o m e a c h o t h e r b y o c e a n s , m o u n t a i n s , and o t h e r natural o b s t a c l e s are b e c o m i n g part o f an i n t e g r a t e d ' g l o b a l v i l l a g e ' c r e a t e d b y instantaneous c o m m u n i c a t i o n , nearly i m m e d i a t e transportation, and integrated global m a r k e t s . " 1 4 Although these c h a n g e s have undeniably brought with t h e m m a n y b e n e f i t s , they h a v e not b e e n an u n m i x e d b l e s s i n g . T h i s r e v o l u t i o n has m a d e e v e n s o - c a l l e d c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s m o r e c o m p l e x , m o r e a c c u r a t e , and m o r e d e a d l y , turning the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r m s b a z a a r into a particularly c h i l l i n g d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . It has m a d e state b o u n d a r i e s i n c r e a s i n g l y p o r o u s , p l a c e d the e n v i r o n m e n t at risk in w a y s p r e v i o u s l y u n i m a g i n e d , and o t h e r w i s e b r o u g h t into f o c u s a s e t o f interrelated p r o b l e m s that h a v e c o l l e c t i v e l y b e e n t e r m e d the " g l o b a l p r o b l e m a t i q u e . " 1 5 A l t h o u g h t h i s r e v o l u t i o n h a s not c o n v u l s e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s in t h e w a y that t h e C o l d W a r a n d the N o r t h - S o u t h c o n f r o n t a t i o n h a v e , it h a s b e e n an i m p o r t a n t c o n t e x t u a l f a c t o r , e x a c e r b a t i n g o l d p r o b l e m s a n d g e n e r a t i n g n e w o n e s . It m a d e t h e C o l d W a r m o r e d a n g e r o u s , w i d e n e d the g a p b e t w e e n

The Roots of

Disenchantment

33

developed and developing states, and raised difficult and divisive questions about the continuing validity of the industrial paradigm. All of these developments have been very much on display at the UN. The State Under Siege The great paradox of the late twentieth century is that at a time when there exists an unprecedentedly large number of sovereign states, the sovereign state is facing unprecedentedly serious challenges. It was fashionable a few years ago, with the rise to prominence of the transnational corporation, to speak of "sovereignty at bay" and to speculate about the coming end of the Westphalian system. But even though it is certainly too soon to write the obituary of the sovereign state, it is true that the state—and not only the small, weak state—is experiencing increasing difficulty maintaining and exercising the authority that has been the hallmark of sovereignty. The sovereign state is everywhere penetrated—by satellite surveillance, electronic banking, transboundary pollution, waves o f refugees and peoples fleeing economic hardship, terrorists and drug traffickers, increasingly assertive and successful transnational corporations, and weapons delivery systems that easily span great distances. The list of agents that are no respecters of boundaries is growing and seems destined to continue to grow, in spite of the best efforts of governments to protect their states from these externally generated military, economic, political, and cultural shocks. T h i s assault on the integrity of the sovereign state came at a time when many newly independent states were demonstrably artificial, their boundaries a legacy of colonial rivalries embracing disparate peoples who felt no sense of common nationhood. The result in many places was struggle to create viable nation-states at the very time when the rationale of the Westphalian system was increasingly coming into question. T h e survival of the nation-state was not, of course, ever an agenda item at the United Nations, where states for the most part were busy insisting on their sovereign prerogatives. But the problem of the not-quitesovereign state was a factor in many UN debates on many UN agenda items, and the forces that were challenging state sovereignty gained increasing prominence on that agenda over the course of the UN's history. Moreover, the Charter's most explicit acknowledgment of the fact of sovereignty, Article 2 (7), came under attack even from states that would countenance no abridgement of their own sovereignty. This occurred in at least two categories of cases. One involved members' frustration with pariah states such as South Africa, which led them to make exceptions to the fundamental principle of Article 2 ( 7 ) . 1 6 Another consisted of efforts by the Third World majority to use General Assembly resolutions to compel Western states to transfer resources. This attempt to create more

34

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

authoritative international r e g i m e s i n c l u d e d , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , m e a s u r e s that w o u l d insulate d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t i n t e r f e r e n c e by e c o n o m i c a l l y m o r e powerful states, thereby s t r e n g t h e n i n g the s o v e r e i g n authority o f the w e a k while limiting or c o n d i t i o n i n g that o f the s t r o n g . 1 7 It is p r o b a b l y h u m a n rights i s s u e s that c o n s t i t u t e the area in w h i c h s y s t e m i c trends have f o s t e r e d the g r e a t e s t c h a l l e n g e at the U n i t e d Nations to the c o n c e p t o f state s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e U N has m o v e d g r a d u a l l y " f r o m p r o m o t i o n to p r o t e c t i o n — t h a t is, f r o m n e g o t i a t i n g n o r m s to s u p e r v i s i n g their i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . " 1 8 Initially this t o o k the f o r m o f strong c o n d e m n a tion o f the p r a c t i c e s o f certain p o l i t i c a l l y v u l n e r a b l e states, such as S o u t h A f r i c a , Israel, and C h i l e , but m o r e r e c e n t l y the rather c o n s i d e r a b l e UN m a c h i n e r y in the human rights f i e l d has b e e n used on a m u c h b r o a d e r front, and c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s a g r o w i n g i f still c a u t i o u s l y e x e r c i s e d w i l l i n g n e s s to c h a l l e n g e traditional n o t i o n s o f state s o v e r e i g n t y . 1 9 T h e m o s t r e c e n t e v i d e n c e o f this e r o s i o n o f the p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d o f s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y c a n b e found in U N - s a n c t i o n e d interventions in Iraq in the aftermath o f O p e r a t i o n D e s e r t S t o r m and in S o m a l i a .

Impact on US Expectations A s s u g g e s t e d a b o v e , t h e s e s e v e r a l s y s t e m i c trends or d e v e l o p m e n t s have interacted with the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the United Nations to produce UN p r a c t i c e s and patterns that have, on b a l a n c e , frustrated the United S t a t e s and c a u s e d it to look m u c h less f a v o r a b l y on the global organization than it did in the b e g i n n i n g . It will b e u s e f u l to return to the set o f a s s u m p t i o n s and e x p e c t a t i o n s the U n i t e d S t a t e s brought to its a s s e s s m e n t o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , and to e x a m i n e the w a y s in w h i c h they w e r e a f f e c t e d o v e r the years by s y s t e m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s and the m a n n e r in w h i c h t h o s e trends w e r e handled by the U N .

Hegemony R o b e r t G i l p i n has argued that t w o o f the p r i n c i p a l c o m p o n e n t s o f g o v e r n a n c e in the international s y s t e m are the distribution o f p o w e r and the hie r a r c h y o f p r e s t i g e . 2 0 W h e n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w a s l a u n c h e d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s i n d i s p u t a b l y the p r e e m i n e n t p o w e r with r e s p e c t both to e c o n o m i c and military c a p a b i l i t i e s . M o r e o v e r , its p o w e r w a s o s t e n s i b l y reinf o r c e d by its prestige, that is, by the c r e d i b i l i t y o f that p o w e r and the res u l t i n g w i l l i n g n e s s o f l e s s e r s t a t e s to i d e n t i f y their v a l u e s and

their

interests with t h o s e o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Its d e m o n s t r a t e d w i l l i n g n e s s to supply p u b l i c g o o d s in the f o r m o f s e c u r i t y and e c o n o m i c

well-being

w o u l d further have e n h a n c e d its prestige. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s , in e f f e c t , the h e g e m o n i c p o w e r in the e m e r g e n t p o s t w a r international order.

The Roots of

Disenchantment

35

But U S hegemony proved to be ephemeral. It also proved to be largely irrelevant where the UN was concerned. T h e Marshall Plan, widely regarded as one of the most dramatic demonstrations o f hegemonic power (and the willingness to spend prodigious amounts to realize the hegemon's goals), was negotiated and implemented without any reference to the UN. Even in the UN's early years, when the United States had not yet been significantly challenged militarily by the S o v i e t Union or e c o n o m i c a l l y by Japan or Western Europe, and when it typically commanded a huge majority in the UN's General Assembly, U S power proved to be less fungible in the United Nations than it did when employed elsewhere, free o f the U N ' s constraints. Gilpin suggested that " l e s s e r states in an international system follow the leadership of more powerful states, in part because they accept the legitimacy and utility of the existing order." 2 1 But U S prestige was not sufficiently compelling to overcome reservations among many UN members regarding the legitimacy and the utility o f the US-supported world order. The United States could hardly be said to have played Gulliver to the rest of the world's Lilliputians at the UN, but it discovered early on that, however dominant the U S position in world affairs, it would not always be easy to mobilize the United Nations in the pursuit of US goals. T h e rapid deterioration of East-West relations into a bitter Cold War and the chaos and disorder that accompanied the breakup o f the colonial empires quickly demonstrated that UN structures and processes would not always be responsive to US leadership. Early successes, such as the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Iran's Azerbaijan region and the creation of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization ( U N T S O ) to preserve the armistice in the first Arab-Israeli war, provided initial grounds for optimism. But as T h o m a s Franck argued, " w h i l e during its inceptive years the UN may occasionally have succeeded in applying its principles and procedures, the successes tended to be serendipitous, the failures fundamental." 2 2 T h e limits of hegemonic power—both within the UN and beyond its w a l l s — w e r e dramatically demonstrated by the S o v i e t - b a c k e d coup in Czechoslovakia in 1 9 4 8 , only three years after the San Francisco Conference. Although there would be more victories for the United States at the United Nations in the years ahead, they would be fewer than U S interests demanded, they would be progressively harder to achieve, and they would often be the result of fortuitous circumstances unlikely to recur. T h e classic case of such fortuitous circumstances was, o f course, the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council when North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1 9 5 0 , enabling a US-sponsored resolution invoking collective security under Chapter 7 o f the Charter to be adopted by a vote of 9 to 0 with one abstention. 2 3 T h e United States did bear disproportionate costs at the United Nations in the early years, as befits a hegemon, although such costs were

36

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

obviously inconsequential when compared with those incurred in reviving the world economy. But the returns on even that modest investment looked less and less impressive as challenges f r o m the Communist bloc and the Third World were mounted, the former employing the Soviet veto in the Security Council and the latter taking advantage of the egalitarian/majoritarian decision rules in the General Assembly either to block US initiatives or to adopt resolutions opposed by the United States. Disillusionment set in early and, as Franck contended, "the United States began to abandon its commitment to the system some years before we ceased to control it." 2 4 Hegemonic stability theorists typically stress what they refer to as the h e g e m o n ' s dilemma—that the h e g e m o n ' s efforts to sustain the system (and the costs incurred in doing so) lead inevitably to its own decline. US hegemony, never as strong or convincing as talk of a Pax Americana would have it and always a misnomer where the UN was concerned, did atrophy over time as the United States became overextended and other power centers emerged. The UN itself had nothing to do with this relative decline in US power, but in spite of its reputation as a mirror that distorts the realities of the international system, the UN fairly accurately reflected this decline and US frustrations resulting from it. Congruence All states would like the United Nations to support programs, endorse resolutions, and achieve results that are responsive to their own needs and reflect their own interests and values. All states, in other words, want a UN that is congruent with their needs, interests and values, and quite obviously that is an impossibility. US expectations in this regard appeared to have a stronger foundation than those of most other states, but those expectations were not always realized, and the situation only worsened over time. US power did not produce the desired deference. As noted in Chapter II of the Charter, congruence implies two things: that the United Nations would reflect the preferences of the United States and that it would not affect US power. Given the protections afforded by its veto in the Security Council and the absence of centralized decision authority in the General Assembly, the United States had little or no cause to worry about the second of the two conditions for congruence. It would be difficult to make a case that the UN diminished US power, although it has quite obviously demonstrated on occasion the limitations of that power. But the UN has certainly not always reflected US preferences, and until relatively recently it seemed to reflect those preferences less and less on more and more issues. In that sense, the US expectation regarding congruence was not realized. The United States was—and is—always able to block Security Council action that is contrary to its interests and to opt out of compliance with what are essentially hortatory General Assembly

The Roots of

Disenchantment

37

resolutions. But it was not able to prevent the U N ' s majority f r o m adopting resolution after resolution that were a n a t h e m a to W a s h i n g t o n — r e s o lutions c o n d e m n i n g Israel and s u p p o r t i n g the Palestine Liberation Organization, calling for strong measures to force South A f r i c a ' s hand on the issue of apartheid, ascribing blame for the failure of development and laying out an agenda for a new international e c o n o m i c order, and so on in a lengthy list, which makes the unmistakable point that the UN had from the US perspective b e c o m e incongruent. Even the d r a m a t i c instances of c o n g r u e n c e proved to be transitory. T h e Security Council supported the United States in the Korean War, and when the Soviet Union resumed its seat there, the General Assembly endorsed the U S - s p o n s o r e d Uniting for Peace resolution, thereby c i r c u m venting the Soviet veto by s h i f t i n g responsibility for managing collective security to the plenary body. 2 5 But many m e m b e r s quickly began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of having the UN take sides in the most dangerous of Cold W a r conflicts, and the US-led Korean exercise turned out to be a o n e - o f - a - k i n d use of UN authority. T h e UN r e s p o n s e to the Suez crisis of 1956 w a s also c o n g r u e n t with US p r e f e r e n c e s , thanks in good measure to the convergence of US and Soviet interests, and as a result the United Nations e m b a r k e d on its precedent-setting experiment with peacekeeping forces. But c o n g r u e n c e between US interests and UN positions in international crises b e c a m e increasingly rare in s u c c e e d i n g d e c a d e s , and replicating the success of the United Nations E m e r g e n c y Force ( U N E F ) model in s u b s e q u e n t crises p r o v e d increasingly d i f f i c u l t to do. 2 6 T h e source of the US problem was not, of course, the United Nations. US preferences on important issues were simply not those of a great many other states. But the United Nations, by its very nature, m a d e it easy f o r those states to demonstrate their disagreement with the United States and to leave a record of that disagreement. T h e US government inevitably had to deal with the reality of i n c o n g r u e n c e — w i t h the C o m m u n i s t bloc, with Marxist regimes in the Third World, with s o m e of its trading partners, even with its allies. It c a m e to resent the need also to deal with what it perceived as the inflation of that incongruence at the UN, where many states, e n c o u r a g e d by the protection of n u m b e r s , s e e m e d e m b o l d e n e d to challenge the United States more f o r c e f u l l y than they could through bilateral channels. At the nadir of U S - U N relations, the United States o f t e n f o u n d itself in near c o m p l e t e isolation in a body of m o r e than 150 m e m b e r s . 2 7 Expectations regarding a congruent UN had clearly been misplaced.

The Status

Quo

T h e erosion of US d o m i n a n c e and the increasing i n c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n US preferences and UN positions translated into a c h a l l e n g e — o r rather a

38

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

series of challenges—to the postwar status quo. While many of the d i f f e r ences between the United States and the UN m a j o r i t y posed no threat to the international order that the United States had done so m u c h to establish, some did. T h e conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, initially the U N ' s most significant division, concerned fundamental principles and norms, but Moscow was rarely in a position to play more than a negative, obstructionist role at the UN except when it aligned itself with the large and growing bloc of developing or Third World states. This g r o u p of states was both opposed to many of the basic features of the status q u o and capable of enlisting the UN in e f f o r t s to bring about significant c h a n g e . Of the fifty-one original m e m b e r s of the United Nations, thirty-one were developing countries. But twenty of the thirty-one were old, well-established Latin American states, not then regarded as hostile to the status quo. Asia and A f r i c a were poorly represented at the United Nations. By the end of the 16th General A s s e m b l y session in 1960, the U N ' s m e m b e r s h i p had g r o w n to an even hundred, of which sixty-six or almost two-thirds w e r e d e v e l o p i n g countries. M o r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y , f o r t y - s i x of the sixty-six w e r e Asian or African, the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority of them former c o l o n i e s of European states, now newly independent. T h e ascendancy at the UN of recently independent Third World states c o n t i n u e d until by 1980 more than half of the total m e m b e r s h i p had not even existed as sovereign states at the time of the San F r a n c i s c o c o n f e r ence in 1945. They had not been present at the creation of the United Nations; the status quo was not one they had had any part either in designing or e n d o r s i n g w h e n the postwar order was b e i n g established. D i s s a t i s f i e d with their lot within that order, they m o u n t e d challenges to s o m e of its most basic features. T h e most s w e e p i n g of these c h a l l e n g e s w a s contained in the 1974 Charter of E c o n o m i c R i g h t s and Duties of States, 21 * which asserted new rights (for developing countries that had not participated in the creation of the liberal order) and new duties (for d e v e l o p e d countries which had created the liberal order with their own interests and needs in mind). The New International Economic Order ( N I E O ) was the plan for putting those rights and duties into practice. 2 9 T h e s e were not the only attacks on the status quo, although they w e r e the most sweeping in scope. Such attacks did not alter the real world status quo, although they may have dented it in places. But they did, in U S eyes at least, have the e f f e c t of creating a presumption that the status q u o was not legitimate—a presumption the United States would not c o n c e d e . And they certainly altered the status quo at the United Nations, where such b o d i e s as the United N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on T r a d e and D e v e l o p m e n t ( U N C T A D ) and the C o m m i t t e e of 24, 3 0 c r e a t e d at the u r g i n g of large

The Roots of

39

Disenchantment

T h i r d W o r l d majorities, shouldered aside older and m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e UN b o d i e s , d e v e l o p e d r e l a t i v e l y c o h e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s in s u p p o r t o f their r e v i s i o n i s t d e m a n d s , a n d put the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d o t h e r d e f e n d e r s o f the s t a t u s q u o on the d e f e n s i v e . T h e r e g i m e s that the U n i t e d S t a t e s p l a y e d s u c h a l a r g e r o l e in e s t a b l i s h i n g a f t e r the w a r h a v e , o f c o u r s e , u n d e r g o n e d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s , but f o r the m o s t part t h o s e c h a n g e s a r e not a t t r i b u t a b l e to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i t s e l f has b e e n an i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e a g e n t : P r e s i d e n t N i x o n ' s a c t i o n in s u s p e n d i n g the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o f d o l l a r s i n t o g o l d in 1 9 7 1 d e a l t a far g r e a t e r b l o w to the s t a t u s q u o than t h e G r o u p o f 7 7 ' s c a l l f o r an N I E O , for e x a m p l e . Y e t the U N ' s persistent and ofte n strident r e j e c t i o n o f imp o r t a n t e l e m e n t s o f the U S - s u p p o r t e d s t a t u s q u o h a s b e e n a m a j o r f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g to U S d i s e n c h a n t m e n t w i t h t h e g l o b a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .

The Unit Veto In his a s s e s s m e n t o f the p o l i t i c s o f v a l u e a l l o c a t i o n in t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , L a w r e n c e F i n k e l s t e i n s p o k e o f an " i n t e r m e d i a t e z o n e o f s t r u g g l e " b e t w e e n d e c i s i o n s that d e p e n d f o r t h e i r a u t h o r i t y on the c o n s e n t o f m e m b e r s t a t e s and d e c i s i o n s that d o n o t . 3 1 B o t h F i n k e l s t e i n ' s a r g u m e n t a n d the r e a l i t y o f U N p o l i t i c s tell us that the b o u n d a r i e s a r e not d e t e r m i n a t e . B u t t h i s is p r e c i s e l y t h e p r o b l e m f r o m the U S point o f v i e w . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s s u m e d that it w o u l d not b e b o u n d b y the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y o f U N d e c i s i o n s u n l e s s it c h o s e to a c c e p t t h o s e d e c i s i o n s a s b i n d i n g . It w a s a s t r i c t c o n structionist

where

the C h a r t e r w a s

concerned,

and Charter

language

s e e m e d q u i t e u n a m b i g u o u s : T h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y w a s a u t h o r i z e d to " d i s c u s s , " " c o n s i d e r , " and " r e c o m m e n d . " T h e United S t a t e s w a s free to opt out o f c o m p l i a n c e w i t h d e c i s i o n s b y t h e U N m a j o r i t y at w i l l . T h e r e w e r e , to b e s u r e , e x c e p t i o n s , b u t t h e y , t o o , w e r e w e l l d e f i n e d . T h e A s s e m b l y could create subsidiary b o d i e s , approve the budget, apportion e x p e n s e s , e s t a b l i s h r e g u l a t i o n s f o r a p p o i n t m e n t o f s t a f f , a n d , o f c o u r s e , set t h e a g e n d a a n d a d o p t its o w n r u l e s o f p r o c e d u r e . In t h e s e s p e c i f i c i n stances, centralized d e c i s i o n s by m a j o r i t i e s ( o r qualified m a j o r i t i e s ) were provided for by the C h a r t e r . B u t the U n i t e d S t a t e s initially a p p e a r e d to v i e w d e c i s i o n s in t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s a s h o u s e k e e p i n g d e c i s i o n s a n d n o threat to its i n t e r e s t s . It c e r t a i n l y did not b e l i e v e that t h e list o f c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n s c o u l d g r o w at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e m u c h l a r g e r list in w h i c h t h e unit veto was available. H o w e v e r , t h o s e s t a t e s that w e r e d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e s t a t u s q u o — a n d t h e y t u r n e d out to b e a r a t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y o f t h e m e m b e r s — s o u g h t to u s e the U N a s a v e h i c l e f o r c h a n g e b e c a u s e its e g a l i t a r i a n / m a j o r i t a r i a n d e c i s i o n r u l e s g a v e t h e m l e v e r a g e , f i r s t to s e t t h e a g e n d a f o r

change

a n d t h e n to r e g i s t e r o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p p o r t f o r s p e c i f i c c h a n g e s . B u t , n o t

40

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

s u r p r i s i n g l y , the U N m a j o r i t y w a s not s a t i s f i e d w i t h o n l y m o r a l v i c t o r i e s . It w a n t e d the o v e r w h e l m i n g v o t e s f o r c h a n g e to b e t r e a t e d as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . A s a f o r m e r A l g e r i a n A m b a s s a d o r to t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a r g u e d , the T h i r d W o r l d p o s s e s s e d a " r i g h t to t h e c r e a t i o n o f l a w t h a n k s to the s t r e n g t h o f its n u m b e r s . " 3 2 A c c o r d i n g to this l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g , U N r e s o l u t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r c h a n g e s in t h e s t a t u s q u o a r e m o r e t h a n m e r e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ;

they

should be binding if adopted by c o m p e l l i n g m a j o r i t i e s . T h i r d W o r l d d i p l o m a t s and their g o v e r n m e n t s did not really believe that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s in t h e m i n o r i t y on s u c h i s s u e s w o u l d m e e k l y c o m p l y , a l t h o u g h they f r e q u e n t l y a r g u e d , to the o b v i o u s a n n o y a n c e o f W a s h i n g t o n , that all t h a t w a s l a c k i n g w a s p o l i t i c a l w i l l . B u t the m a j o r i t y n o n e t h e l e s s p u r s u e d w h a t S t e p h e n K r a s n e r h a s t e r m e d a m e t a p o w e r s t r a t e g y , 3 3 that is, s e e k i n g t o c h a n g e t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g

inter-

n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s b y e m p l o y i n g w h a t in t h e g a m e o f b a s k e t b a l l m i g h t b e t e r m e d a f u l l - c o u r t p r e s s . T h i s c o n s i s t e d o f d r e s s i n g up its d e m a n d s in l a n g u a g e t h a t s o u n d s a u t h o r i t a t i v e , s u c h a s t h e Charter

of

Economic

R i g h t s a n d D u t i e s o f S t a t e s ; r e i t e r a t i n g t h o s e d e m a n d s in r e s o l u t i o n a f t e r r e s o l u t i o n , e a c h o f w h i c h is c r a f t e d in s u c h a w a y as to c r e a t e a p r e s u m p tion that t h e U N h a d a l r e a d y d e c i d e d t h o s e m a t t e r s ; c r o s s - r e f e r e n c i n g d e m a n d s in o t h e r f o r u m s ; a n d u s i n g s u c h a u t h o r i t y as the m a j o r i t y d o e s p o s s e s s — t o s e t the a g e n d a , a d o p t the b u d g e t , e s t a b l i s h s u p p o r t i v e c o m m i t t e e s , i n s t r u c t t h e s e c r e t a r i a t , a n d c o n v e n e ad h o c c o n f e r e n c e s — t o r a t c h e t up the pressure on the custodians o f the old order. T h e r e s u l t has not b e e n t h e d e m i s e o f t h e unit v e t o , but c o n s t a n t s t r u g g l e o v e r t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n d e c i s i o n s s u b j e c t to the unit veto and d e c i s i o n s w h o s e authority derives f r o m m a j o r i t y v o t e s — a strugg l e that h a s t a k e n its toll o n U S p a t i e n c e . M o r e o v e r , e v e n w h e r e the m a j o r i t y c a n n o t c o m p e l d i s s e n t i n g s t a t e s to a c t in p a r t i c u l a r w a y s , it c a n c h i p a w a y at t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n s o r , c o n v e r s e l y , b u i l d up a p r e s u m p t i o n o f l e g i t i m a c y f o r the m a j o r i t y ' s p o s i t i o n s . T h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s u n d e r s t a n d s this is i l l u s t r a t e d b y the t e n a c i t y w i t h w h i c h it r e g u l a r l y c h a l l e n g e d s u c h t h i n g s a s t h e " Z i o n i s m is r a c i s m " r e s o l u t i o n s ; 3 4 the r e p e a t e d r e f e r e n c e s to t h e N e w I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c O r d e r , a l w a y s in c a p s as i f t h e c o n t e n t o f s u c h an o r d e r h a d a l r e a d y b e e n d e c i d e d ; a n d t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e C o m m i t t e e o f 2 4 to t r e a t t h e s t a t u s o f P u e r t o R i c o a s an e g r e g i o u s e x ample o f colonialism.35

Functional

Specificity

T h e division o f labor a m o n g UN system agencies was never watertight. T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s w a s a l w a y s a m u l t i p u r p o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n , and t h e m a n d a t e o f the U N E d u c a t i o n a l , S c i e n t i f i c , and Cultural

Organization

( U N E S C O ) , a l t h o u g h n a r r o w e r than that o f t h e U N , h a s a l w a y s b e e n r e l a -

The Roots of

41

Disenchantment

t i v e l y b r o a d and b y its n a t u r e e a s i l y s t r e t c h e d . A s i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s w i t h very low per capita i n c o m e , n e g l i g i b l e industrial c a p a b i l i t i e s , and depend e n c e o n u n s t a b l e e a r n i n g s f r o m s u c h c o m m o d i t i e s as c o p p e r , tin, c o f f e e , c o c o a , sugar, rubber, and j u t e b e c a m e more numerous, pressure mounted a c r o s s t h e s p e c t r u m o f U N - s y s t e m a g e n c i e s to m a k e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p ment a high priority. T h e result was the overlapping and interlocking o f a g e n d a s , a s w e l l as i n c r e a s i n g c o m p e t i t i o n in t h e f i e l d f r o m U N a g e n c i e s , e a c h a n x i o u s to a s s u m e the r o l e o f f a v o r e d p r o v i d e r o f t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . B y

the t i m e the c a m p a i g n

f o r an N I E O

l a u n c h e d , it w o u l d n o t b e an e x a g g e r a t i o n to s a y t h a t m o s t U N

was

system

a g e n c i e s w e r e in i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s d e v e l o p m e n t a g e n c i e s . T h e i r m e m b e r s h i p ( c l i e n t e l e ) m a d e it i n e v i t a b l e . In t h o s e c a s e s in w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s w e r e d i s i n c l i n e d to r e g a r d t h e m s e l v e s as d e v e l o p m e n t a g e n c i e s , e f f o r t s w e r e m a d e to c o n v e r t t h e m to that c a u s e . T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d ( I M F ) is a c o n s p i c u o u s c a s e in point. W h e r e a s t h e W o r l d B a n k had f a i r l y e a s i l y m a d e the trans i t i o n f r o m a b a n k f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n to a b a n k f o r d e v e l o p m e n t ( a l t h o u g h with d o c t r i n e and c o n d i t i o n s that h a v e s o m e t i m e s frustrated d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s ) , t h e I M F h a s a l w a y s i n s i s t e d that it is not in t h e b u s i n e s s o f l e n d i n g f o r d e v e l o p m e n t . B u t d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s h a v e t r i e d to push a n d prod the I M F in that d i r e c t i o n , o f t e n a v a i l i n g t h e m s e l v e s o f t h e f a v o r a b l e political c l i m a t e and d e c i s i o n rules o f the UN G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y

and

U N C T A D f o r t h e p u r p o s e a n d u s i n g t h o s e f o r u m s to p r o n o u n c e upon m a t ters t r a d i t i o n a l l y within the p u r v i e w o f t h e I M F . D u r i n g t h e y e a r s w h e n the N I E O w a s an a c t i v e i s s u e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e U N m a j o r i t y a r g u e d t h a t t h e I M F s h o u l d c r e a t e a s o - c a l l e d S D R - a i d l i n k , t h a t is, u s e s p e c i a l d r a w i n g rights ( S D R ) f o r d e v e l o p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e a s w e l l a s f o r c o p i n g w i t h b a l a n c e o f - p a y m e n t s p r o b l e m s . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s d i d not sit w e l l w i t h

the

United S t a t e s , w h i c h not only s t r o n g l y d i s a p p r o v e d o f the idea but a l s o r e s e n t e d t h e i n t r u s i o n i n t o t h e I M F ' s d o m a i n b y an o r g a n i z a t i o n

whose

personnel, both delegates and staff, w e r e seen as g e n e r a l i s t s , l a c k i n g the s p e c i a l i z e d e x p e r t i s e a n d o u t l o o k o f t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s at t h e I M F . F u n c t i o n a l s p e c i f i c i t y a m o n g U N a g e n c i e s b r o k e d o w n a l o n g t w o fault l i n e s . O n the o n e hand, a s i l l u s t r a t e d b y the U N ' s f o r a y s into t h e I M F ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n , the g e n e r a l p u r p o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a l l e n g e d the r e g i m e s e s t a b l i s h e d at t h e e n d o f W o r l d W a r II b y t a k i n g e x c e p t i o n to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l c u s t o d i a n s o f t h o s e r e g i m e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , the r e v i s i o n i s t m a j o r i t y , intent o n g i v i n g its m e s s a g e the w i d e s t p o s s i b l e h e a r i n g , e i t h e r d i s m i s s e d t h e v i e w that the s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s s h o u l d c o n s i d e r matters falling o n l y within their areas o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n o r r a t i o n a l i z e d that the i s s u e s they r a i s e d w e r e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t i m p o r t a n c e a n d w e r e t h e r e f o r e g e r m a n e in a n y f o r u m . T h u s t h e i s s u e o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s w a s not c o n f i n e d to t h e U N , w h e r e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o u n d it d i f f i c u l t e n o u g h t o d e a l w i t h , but w a s b r o a c h e d

42

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

in virtually all UN system agencies. T h e United States called this politicization, by which it meant that the agencies were straying f r o m their assigned functional niches and dabbling in matters that should be addressed, if at all, in other, more appropriate f o r u m s . A m a j o r reason given for US disillusionment with U N E S C O , for example, w a s the allegation that it w a s p o a c h i n g upon the turf of other organizations, f o r example, the UN itself in the matter of arms control and d i s a r m a m e n t (although the record will show that the United States was not enthusiastic about much of what the UN itself said and tried to do in this field). A m o n g the f a c t o r s u n d e r m i n i n g the US p r e f e r e n c e for f u n c t i o n a l l y specific institutions were also the o n g o i n g revolution in science and technology and an awareness of the increasing vulnerability of the sovereign state on a shrinking planet. T h e f o r m e r repeatedly demonstrated the interconnectedness a m o n g problems, making it increasingly apparent that they could not be effectively addressed in isolation f r o m each other. T h e latter p r o d u c e d a healthy respect for the p h e n o m e n o n of negative side e f f e c t s and a growing sense, at least in some quarters, that the industrial paradigm just might no longer serve the human interest in a world of finite resources and environmental fragility. T h e reports of the C l u b of R o m e and other organizations with a holistic vision that began s u r f a c i n g in the 1970s were not addressed to the agenda of any one institution; they directed attention instead to the need for a broader perspective, o n e that inevitably m a d e the sectoral boundaries within the UN system seem more artificial. But whether the erosion of b o u n d a r i e s a m o n g UN a g e n c i e s was the product of political calculation by frustrated majorities of m e m b e r states or inexorable long-term trends in the global p r o b l é m a t i q u e , the United States w a s frequently d i s c o m f o r t e d by the process. It felt the need to mount damage-control e f f o r t s on more issues in more places than it had e x p e c t e d to when the UN s y s t e m was b e i n g created. As with other attempts to change the status quo, this development produced more rhetorical heat than tangible results, but the United States felt compelled to o f f e r resistance out of a c o n c e r n that silence w o u l d be construed as acquiescence in unwanted regime c h a n g e .

The Market T h e recent collapse of any pretense that C o m m u n i s m is a viable e c o n o m i c alternative to capitalism, much less the wave of the future, has apparently m a d e the issue s u r r o u n d i n g this particular US assumption m o o t , at least for the time being. But for a good portion of the U N ' s existence, the c o n flict b e t w e e n US insistence on primacy of the market and vigorous c h a l lenges to that view by a great m a n y UN m e m b e r s produced o n e of the principal causes of US d i s a f f e c t i o n with the global organization. D e e p l y

The Roots of

Disenchantment

43

rooted suspicion of capitalism at the United Nations for much of its history can be attributed to (1) the reaction of the many newly independent m e m bers against colonial exploitation; (2) the appeal of the Soviet model, with its promise of more rapid e c o n o m i c progress and more equitable distribution of its benefits than capitalism could provide; and (3) the widespread concern a m o n g Third World leaders that a market e c o n o m y would mean rival centers of power and influence, which might threaten the regime during the difficult period of postindependence nation-building. As a result, the UN became not only a place where states with a strong c o m m i t m e n t to a market e c o n o m y were o u t n u m b e r e d , but a place w h e r e the alleged defects and evils of capitalism were regularly denounced and the virtues of socialism in its various f o r m s (e.g., A f r i c a n socialism) were regularly proclaimed. This was not a situation d e s i g n e d to m a k e the UN popular with the US government at any time, and even less so during the years w h e n its principal rival w a s a militantly c o m m u n i s t state aggressively proclaiming the superiority of its system. But the more important problem f r o m the U S point of view was not the nature of the domestic e c o n o m y of UN members, but the plans the UN majority had for restructuring the international e c o n o m y . U N C T A D w a s created to generate and legitimate different " k n o w l e d g e " regarding trade and development issues than that emanating f r o m the General Agreement on T a r i f f s and Trade ( G A T T ) and the I M F (both d o m i n a t e d by W e s t e r n market-economy states), the Organization for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and D e v e l o p m e n t ( O E C D , an exclusively Western club), and even E C O S O C (which had been a disappointment to the growing majority of Third World states at the UN). That different knowledge was ultimately codified in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Declaration and Program of Action for Creation of a New International E c o n o m i c Order, and it w a s conspicuously favorable to authoritative as o p p o s e d to market allocation of economic goods and services. This particular m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the assault on the status q u o can be seen in such proposals as the Lima Declaration of 1972, with its stipulation that the developing countries' share of the w o r l d ' s m a n u f a c t u r i n g output be increased to 25 percent by the year 2 0 0 0 , 3 6 a target that could not possibly be met without massive government intervention in the w o r k i n g of the f r e e market. Even more threatening w e r e provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty, negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, which obligates private corporations to m a k e seabed mining technology available to an international enterprise (and to groups of d e v e l o p i n g countries) and provides f o r limits on the production of seabed n o d u l e s so that e a r n i n g s of land-based producers will not be adversely a f f e c t e d . 3 7 W h e r e a s yet another of the "new o r d e r " proposals, the C o m m o n Fund for C o m m o d i t i e s , posed no real challenge to the market in its final f o r m , the original version,

44

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

v i g o r o u s l y p r o m o t e d b y the U N C T A D S e c r e t a r i a t a n d t h e G r o u p o f 7 7 , w o u l d h a v e a u t h o r i z e d a n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e in t h e m a r k e t to s u p p o r t p r i c e s o f a n u m b e r o f c o m m o d i t i e s o f s p e c i a l

impor-

t a n c e to d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . 3 8 S u c h m e a s u r e s w e r e d e s i g n e d to o v e r c o m e t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c w e a k n e s s e s o f d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s — w e a k n e s s e s , t h e y a r g u e d , that m a d e it v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r them to c o m p e t e e f f e c t i v e l y in a m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d s y s t e m . B u t a l t h o u g h g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e m a r k e t p l a c e is f a r f r o m u n k n o w n in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e U S g o v e r n m e n t w a s u n p r e p a r e d to s c r a p the p r i n c i p l e o f m a r k e t a l l o c a t i o n in s u c h p r e c e d e n t - s e t t i n g w a y s . It w a s c o n v i n c e d that these p r e s c r i p t i o n s for s p e e d i n g the p r o c e s s o f T h i r d W o r l d d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d not p r o d u c e the d e s i r e d r e s u l t s , that t h e y w o u l d d a m a g e the i n t e r e s t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d U S - b a s e d c o r p o r a t i o n s , a n d that a n y e x c e p t i o n s to m a r k e t p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d b e ad h o c a n d s i t u a t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c a n d n o t t a k e t h e f o r m o f s w e e p i n g r e g i m e c h a n g e s , c o d i f i e d in t r e a t i e s a n d b r o a d l y a p p l i c a b l e to all s t a t e s r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r particular e c o n o m i c situations. T h i s issue, perhaps m o r e than any other, d e m o n s t r a t e d to the United S t a t e s the p r o b l e m a t i c n a t u r e o f a C h a r t e r that a l l o w s m a j o r i t i e s to d e f i n e p r i o r i t i e s , c r e a t e n e w o r g a n s to p u r s u e t h o s e p r i o r i t i e s , a n d a l l o c a t e b u d g e t r e s o u r c e s to p r o m o t e t h e m . U N C T A D h a s b e e n a p r i m e e x a m p l e o f t h e p r o b l e m , in W a s h i n g t o n ' s v i e w . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s not e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t its c r e a t i o n in the first p l a c e , but c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e to r e s e n t U N C T A D ' s role as a think tank for d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s and a principal incub a t o r o f p r o p o s a l s that c h a m p i o n e d a u t h o r i t a t i v e o v e r m a r k e t a l l o c a t i o n . Whereas, other Western states were variously willing to m a k e c o n c e s s i o n s to t h e G r o u p o f 7 7 in U N C T A D a n d t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s rarely d e i g n e d to treat T h i r d W o r l d d e m a n d s ( o r t h e U N ' s c o n t r i b u tion to the f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h o s e d e m a n d s ) s e r i o u s l y . Its h o s t i l i t y to the U N o v e r this i s s u e o w e d l e s s to a c o n c e r n that t h e l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c o r d e r w a s a c t u a l l y t h r e a t e n e d than it did to c o n t e m p t f o r t h e i d e a s l a u n c h e d and e m b r a c e d t h e r e , a s w e l l a s r e s e n t m e n t that it h a d to t a k e t i m e to r e f u t e t h o s e i d e a s a n d s e e its b u d g e t a s s e s s m e n t s c h a n n e l e d i n t o s u c h an e n d e a v o r .

Pluralism T h e c h a l l e n g e t o c a p i t a l i s m w a s , o f c o u r s e , a c h a l l e n g e to t h e k i n d o f p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y the United S t a t e s f e r v e n t l y e s p o u s e d . B u t f r o m the

US

p o i n t o f v i e w t h e p r o b l e m w a s not o n l y that t h e U N m a j o r i t y w a s not s u f ficiently supportive o f the free market. T h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f the U N ' s history t h e m a j o r i t y o f its m e m b e r s w e r e n o t d e m o c r a c i e s a s t h e U S u n d e r s t a n d s t h e t e r m , a n d this u n d e m o c r a t i c m a j o r i t y g r e w a p p r e c i a b l y w i t h t h e influx o f new postcolonial states. T h e result o f this trend w a s a U N , m a n y

The Roots of

45

Disenchantment

o f w h o s e m e m b e r s h a d little t o l e r a n c e f o r p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , f r e e t r a d e unions, e l e c t i o n s b a s e d on c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g several political

parties,

media independent o f government control, and other features o f a pluralistic s o c i e t y . T h e r e have always been a fair number o f traditional

dictatorships

a m o n g the U N m e m b e r s t a t e s , w h o s e l e a d e r s w e r e m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in s e l f a g g r a n d i z e m e n t than t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e i r s o c i e t i e s . N o o n e h a s e v e r c o n f u s e d s u c h s t a t e s w i t h W e s t e r n - s t y l e d e m o c r a c i e s , but t h e r e h a s t y p i c a l l y b e e n at least a m o d i c u m o f p l u r a l i s m in n o n p o l i t i c a l s p h e r e s in s u c h s t a t e s , a s l o n g as n o c h a l l e n g e w a s m o u n t e d to the d i c t a t o r . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has t y p i c a l l y t o l e r a t e d s u c h r e g i m e s , w h i c h h a v e not b e e n in t h e v a n g u a r d o f t h o s e a d v o c a t i n g d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s q u o a n d which have often been U S clients. M u c h l e s s a c c e p t a b l e to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a v e b e e n t h e m o d e r n d i c t a t o r s h i p s , m o b i l i z a t i o n r e g i m e s that a r e t y p i c a l l y c o m m i t t e d to t h e r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e i r c o u n t r i e s , w h i c h h a v e at t h e i r d i s p o s a l

modern

m e t h o d s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and c o n t r o l , a n d w h i c h h a v e o f t e n d i s p l a y e d a virulent strain o f a n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m . 3 9 S u c h states have typically

been

m o r e v i g o r o u s in t h e i r c h a l l e n g e to U S i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e s , a n d t h e y h a v e not t r o u b l e d to d i s g u i s e t h e i r c o n t e m p t f o r p l u r a l i s m . M o r e o v e r , t h e y h a v e f r e q u e n t l y a s s u m e d l e a d e r s h i p r o l e s at t h e U N , t h e i r s t a t u s e n h a n c e d b y c r e d e n t i a l s e a r n e d in t h e s t r u g g l e f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d t h e f o r c e f u l n e s s o f t h e i r c h a l l e n g e to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r that t h e y h a d n o part in c r e a t i n g . C u b a , a n d to a l e s s e r e x t e n t A l g e r i a , h a v e b e e n c a s e s in p o i n t , a g g r e s s i v e l e a d e r s o f the N o n - A l i g n e d M o v e m e n t d u r i n g t h e h e i g h t o f t h e a s s a u l t o n U S v a l u e s at the U N d u r i n g the 1 9 7 0 s . O n e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the s t a t i s t m e n t a l i t y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s f o u n d s o t r o u b l i n g has b e e n t h e U N m a j o r i t y ' s a p p r o a c h to t h e h u m a n

rights

i s s u e . T h e C h a r t e r , in A r t i c l e s 5 5 a n d 5 6 , s e e k s to p r o m o t e h u m a n r i g h t s , and the U n i t e d S t a t e s has had no p r o b l e m w i t h that o b j e c t i v e , that a U N - b a s e d r e g i m e d i d n o t s u b j e c t

US

practices to

provided

international

s c r u t i n y ; i n d e e d , it p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t r o l e in the d r a f t i n g o f t h e U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f H u m a n R i g h t s , a d o p t e d in 1 9 4 8 . 4 0 H u m a n r i g h t s in many

different

categories

have

since

been

codified

in

UN-approved

t r e a t i e s . 4 1 B u t the U N ' s r e c o r d in m o n i t o r i n g c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e m a n y r i g h t s h a s b e e n at b e s t h i g h l y u n e v e n . S o m e part o f that r e c o r d m a y b e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , g i v e n t h e t e n a c i t y w i t h w h i c h s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s r e s i s t i n t e r f e r e n c e in w h a t t h e y r e g a r d a s t h e i r d o m e s t i c a f f a i r s , but the U n i t e d S t a t e s has b e e n d e e p l y d i s a p p o i n t e d w i t h t h e U N ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . P a r t o f t h e p r o b l e m , a s p e r c e i v e d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , is t h a t , r e g a r d l e s s o f r h e t o r i c a l s u p p o r t f o r s u c h p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s a s freedom o f s p e e c h , a s s e m b l y , and religion, the presumption o f i n n o c e n c e , a fair trial, and s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t through free e l e c t i o n s , a m a j o r i t y o f U N

46

About Face? The United Statesand

the United

Nations

m e m b e r s have not really accepted such limitations upon the authority of the g o v e r n m e n t . For such states, g o v e r n m e n t is the source of rights, not the agent whose potential for misrule and abuse is the justification for individual rights. The U N ' s mandate in the human rights field has not, therefore, been the vehicle for achieving pluralism that the United States might have hoped it would be. T h e rights that over the years have really aroused the emotions of the U N ' s majority have more o f t e n than not been g r o u p r i g h t s — s u c h as the right of self-determination (at least f o r p e o p l e living under colonial rule) and the right not to be subjected to a r e g i m e of apartheid—and e c o n o m i c and social rights—such as the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. T h e U N ' s promotion of g r o u p rights, which in W a s h ington's view are not controversial per se, has often been resented because it has in e f f e c t been a d e m a n d that the W e s t e r n p o w e r s take a c t i o n s the United States regards as imprudent or counterproductive. E c o n o m i c and social rights, on the other hand, are treated by the United States more as goals than as rights. T h e UN majority has o f t e n taken the position that the great majority of states cannot now meet those goals because they labor under the c r i p p l i n g d i s a d v a n t a g e s i m p o s e d by the liberal international e c o n o m i c order. T h e proposed solution has been the acceptance by the West of the Charter of E c o n o m i c Rights and Duties of States, a solution the United States has never accepted. In the area of greatest concern to the United States, civil and political rights, UN performance has improved substantially in recent years. But f o r much of the U N ' s history, the various UN b o d i e s involved in the field were highly selective in investigating and c e n s u r i n g human rights violations. The issue that rankled the United States more than any other was the repeated condemnation of Israel, the Middle E a s t ' s only pluralistic d e m o cratic country. Israel's policies, especially in the occupied territories, certainly merited attention on occasion, but w h a t angered the United States w a s the double standard w h e r e b y other m o r e e g r e g i o u s o f f e n d e r s w e r e not similarly criticized. For the United States, this combination of statism and hypocrisy contributed significantly to its d i s e n c h a n t m e n t with the United Nations.

Reform, Not

Revolution

T h e U S aversion to violent revolution and radicalism, s h a p e d by the lessons learned from its own historical experience and hardened by the Soviet challenge, w a s tested f r e q u e n t l y t h r o u g h o u t the years at the United Nations. Although the United States desired the end of colonial empires, it w a s u n c o m f o r t a b l e with the violent p r o c e s s by which s o m e c o l o n i e s

The Roots of

Disenchantment

47

achieved their i n d e p e n d e n c e and with the radical rhetoric that a c c o m p a nied that violence. T o o o f t e n , f r o m the US perspective, liberation m o v e ments w e r e run by s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d c o m m u n i s t s or were s u p p l i e d with arms and other f o r m s of assistance by the Soviet bloc. T h e alarm felt by the United States was not due just to the violence, but to the credentials and the postindependence goals of the insurgents as well. A case in point was N a m i b i a . T h e United States supported its i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m South Africa, but serious reservations about the South West African P e o p l e ' s Organization ( S W A P O ) conditioned that support and for years put the United States at odds with the U N ' s majority on tactics. T h e same was true in other struggles where colonialism per se w a s not the issue, such as those involving the quest for a Palestinian state and the end of apartheid in South A f r i c a . T h e s e t w o cases have been a m o n g the most durable, frustrating, and impervious to solution of any on the U N ' s a g e n d a . In both, the United States has w a n t e d to pursue s o l u t i o n s via d i p l o m a c y and negotiation, w h e r e a s the great m a j o r i t y of UN m e m b e r s have been willing (some, W a s h i n g t o n believed, even e a g e r ) to press the issue through all available means. The tactics of both the Palestine Liberation Organization ( P L O ) and the African National Congress ( A N C ) have been (and in the case of the P L O still are) anathema to the United States, but have been e m b r a c e d by the UN in n u m e r o u s resolutions, almost always over strenuous US objections. Indeed, the UN has granted observer status to these two m o v e m e n t s , declared its solidarity with them, created special b o d i e s to help them in their respective struggles, and e n d o r s e d armed struggle for the realization of their goals. From the US perspective, what the United Nations has done, under relentless pressure f r o m a T h i r d World m a j o r i t y hostile to both Israel and South Africa, has been to legitimize radical a p p r o a c h e s to difficult, c o m plex p r o b l e m s and, in the process, cause serious harm to the very principles on which the UN is based. T h e treatment of Israel, perhaps more than any other single factor, has long alienated the United States and convinced it that the majority is all too willing to substitute radical rhetoric for rational debate. Nor does the US government believe that such rhetoric, while o f f e n s i v e , is essentially harmless; as T h o m a s Franck argued, there has been a sustained attempt " t o liquidate the s y m b o l s by which the world ack n o w l e d g e s ( I s r a e l ' s ) s t a t e h o o d . " 4 2 As recently as 1983, Israel w a s charged with genocide in the General Assembly and an unsuccessful motion to reject its credentials obtained a total of f o r t y - t h r e e votes, which with twenty-nine abstentions meant that nearly 50 percent of those states voting were willing to countenance Israel's exclusion f r o m the U N . 4 3 C o n f r o n t e d with radical rhetoric, advocating radical means to achieve radical ends, the United States was rapidly losing patience with the United Nations even before the Reagan-Kirkpatrick " r e v o l u t i o n " of the 1980s.

48 Preemptive

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

Imperialism

The long twilight zone between peace and war, which we know as the Cold War, was not a foregone conclusion when the United Nations was created, but it was a distinct possibility and it quickly became a reality. Chapter 7 of the Charter was clearly an insufficient barrier against unambiguous Soviet aggression, a fact that was established beyond doubt in 1956 when the UN stood helplessly by while Soviet tanks rolled across Hungary. The United States was no more eager than any other state to march into war with the Soviet Union under the UN flag, and has been willing to settle for what Alan James called "creed protection" 4 4 —UN resolutions that condemn those actions that violate Charter norms, especially when stronger measures are neither possible nor prudent. Unfortunately, the US view of the U N ' s proper role often encountered two problems. The first is that the UN majority was not always sufficiently vigorous and explicit in denouncing behavior of the Soviet Union and its clients, which the United States regarded as a violation of Charter norms (as well as a threat to US interests and values). The second is that that same majority was not always willing to endorse unilateral action by the United States aimed at arresting or reversing such behavior, but instead frequently criticized US action on the ground that it violated Charter norms. What the United States wanted f r o m the United Nations was the international c o m m u n i t y ' s support for its resistance to the spread of international communism, which it regarded as by far the most serious threat to the status quo throughout the Cold War years. In effect, it wanted the UN to accept its view that the Soviet Union was an imperialist state, committed to an adventurous foreign policy that fished in the troubled waters so common in many parts of the Third World, promoted Marxism-Leninism, stirred up anti-US sentiment, and created client states, dependent on and supportive of the Soviet Union, wherever it could. Washington took the view that the UN should be prepared to oppose Soviet imperialism and support US policies with that objective. The UN did, to be sure, censure Soviet aggression in a number of instances, from Hungary in 1956 to Afghanistan in 1979, and thereafter. 4 5 Creed protection in the latter case was most welcome f r o m the US perspective, because it had become convinced that the UN majority had settled into a double standard in this area much as it had in the area of human rights, treating the Soviet Union with kid gloves while showing little or no compunction about criticizing the United States. But in order to obtain broad backing for General Assembly resolutions critical of the Soviet Union (the veto effectively blocked Security Council action), the United States typically had to settle for language that was less sharp and less direct than it would have liked. Thus the resolutions dealing with the presence of

The Roots of

49

Disenchantment

S o v i e t f o r c e s in A f g h a n i s t a n n e v e r m e n t i o n e d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n b y n a m e , calling instead for the withdrawal o f foreign f o r c e s . B u t e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s t h e i s s u e o f s u p p o r t f o r its o w n u n i l a t e r a l e f f o r t s to c h e c k t h e s p r e a d o f c o m m u n i s t ( r e a d S o v i e t ) i n f l u e n c e . S u c h s u p p o r t w a s f o r t h c o m i n g in t h e e a r l y c a s e o f t h e North K o r e a n invasion o f S o u t h K o r e a , w h e n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l

and

l a t e r t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y a d o p t e d r e s o l u t i o n s that p u r p o r t e d t o i n v o k e the C h a r t e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y m e a s u r e s , but c a n m o r e a c c u r a t e l y b e d e s c r i b e d a s p r o t e c t i v e c o v e r f o r U S i n t e r v e n t i o n in s u p p o r t o f S o u t h K o r e a . In l a t e r y e a r s , U S i n t e r v e n t i o n to a r r e s t w h a t it p e r c e i v e d a s t h e s p r e a d o f S o v i e t / c o m m u n i s t i n f l u e n c e f a i l e d to r e c e i v e the b l e s s i n g o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h it w a s t h e d o g g e d r e s i s t a n c e o f w h a t U S P r e s i d e n t L y n don J o h n s o n c a l l e d that " r a g g e d y - a s s little f o u r t h - r a t e c o u n t r y " a n d t h e rising tide o f d o m e s t i c o p p o s i t i o n that d o o m e d U S i n t e r v e n t i o n in V i e t n a m , the U N in t h e p e r s o n o f S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l U T h a n t a n g e r e d W a s h i n g t o n with his o u t s p o k e n a d v o c a c y o f a p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n in the V i e t n a m W a r . 4 6 W h e r e a s t h e c o n f l i c t w i t h T h a n t m a r k e d a l o w p o i n t in U S

govern-

m e n t r e l a t i o n s w i t h the o f f i c e o f the U N S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , t h e h o s t i l i t y o f l a r g e m a j o r i t i e s in the U N ' s i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n s to U S

anticommu-

nist i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e T h i r d W o r l d , a n d e s p e c i a l l y in t h e W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e , w a s e v e n m o r e f r u s t r a t i n g . G r e n a d a a n d N i c a r a g u a a r e c a s e s in point. In b o t h i n s t a n c e s , t h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o o k the p o s i t i o n that it w a s a c t i n g t o c h e c k the s p r e a d o f S o v i e t ( a n d C u b a n ) i n f l u e n c e ; in b o t h ins t a n c e s , t h e U N m a j o r i t y r e j e c t e d that r a t i o n a l e f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n , c o n t e n d ing that t h e U S a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a v i o l a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d t h e n o r m s o f t h e C h a r t e r . T h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y did not n a m e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , but o t h e r w i s e m i n c e d n o w o r d s in a f f i r m i n g " t h e s o v e r e i g n a n d ina l i e n a b l e right o f G r e n a d a f r e e l y to d e t e r m i n e its o w n p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l s y s t e m , a n d to d e v e l o p its i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u t o u t s i d e i n t e r v e n t i o n , i n t e r f e r e n c e , s u b v e r s i o n , c o e r c i o n o r t h r e a t in a n y f o r m w h a t s o e v e r . " 4 7 T h e r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r the i m m e d i a t e w i t h d r a w a l o f f o r e i g n t r o o p s w a s a d o p t e d b y t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g m a r g i n o f 1 0 8 in f a v o r , 9 against, and 2 7 abstentions. T h e U S i n v a s i o n o f G r e n a d a c a m e to a q u i c k a n d s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u sion a n d w a s e n o r m o u s l y p o p u l a r in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , c i r c u m s t a n c e s that made the General A s s e m b l y ' s criticism doubly irritating. Nicaragua was a different story, the p r e s i d e n t ' s policy h a v i n g e n c o u n t e r e d s t r o n g o p p o s i tion in t h e C o n g r e s s a n d a d e c i d e d l y m i x e d r e a c t i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i c . 4 8 B u t h e r e , t o o , t h e U N w a s u n s y m p a t h e t i c . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s c o m p e l l e d to use its v e t o t o b l o c k S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l d e c i s i o n s c a l l i n g f o r a halt to m i l i tary a t t a c k s o n N i c a r a g u a a n d f o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e W o r l d C o u r t r u l i n g that s u p p o r t e d N i c a r a g u a ' s c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 4 9

50

About Face? The United Statesand the United Nations

T h e record is clear that the United Nations has been relatively e v e n handed in its c r i t i c i s m o f S o v i e t and U S v i o l a t i o n s o f A r t i c l e 2 ( 4 ) o f the Charter. B u t U S administrations have typically r e j e c t e d what amounted to a doctrine o f moral e q u i v a l e n c e . T h e y believed that S o v i e t intentions w e r e malevolent, their own b e n i g n . T h e very stability o f the international s y s tem was threatened by international C o m m u n i s m , directed and/or nurtured by M o s c o w , and the international community ought to r e c o g n i z e that fact and support U S efforts to c o m b a t the spreading c a n c e r . S o v i e t imperialism was bad, U S preemptive i m p e r i a l i s m a n e c e s s a r y antidote. T h e failure o f the UN to acknowledge the merits o f this thesis and to act on it was an important factor in the souring o f U S - U N relations.

Efficiency,

Frugality

Considering the broad s c o p e o f its mandate, the seriousness o f many o f the issues before it, and the near universal m e m b e r s h i p it must try to serve, the U N ' s budget has never been all that large. In 1 9 9 2 , the regular budget (the portion for which m e m b e r s are a s s e s s e d ) totaled a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1 . 1 b i l lion, a s e e m i n g l y i m p r e s s i v e f i g u r e that shrinks d r a m a t i c a l l y in s i g n i f i c a n c e when c o m p a r e d with the c o s t o f such things as a B - l b o m b e r or a Trident submarine. T h e U S assessment has always been by far the largest o f that for any state, reflecting the fact that the United States has the greatest capacity to pay (the principal criterion e m p l o y e d by the organization in determining the scale o f assessments). Originally close to 4 0 percent o f the regular budget, the U S a s s e s s m e n t has b e e n s c a l e d down in steps to its present level o f 2 5 percent. It should be noted that this p e r c e n t a g e is actually less

than

would be the case if the principle o f capacity to pay had been rigorously applied, the United S t a t e s having m a n a g e d to negotiate a lower a s s e s s m e n t for itself. It is also worth noting that the UN regular budget constitutes only about . 0 0 0 0 5 percent o f the U S gross national product, with each U S citizen paying a mere $ 0 . 8 8 as his or her share o f the U S a s s e s s m e n t . 5 0 B u t these figures notwithstanding, the United States has long been dissatisfied with the level o f the UN budget. Although the United States did not withhold a percentage o f its assessment until the 1 9 7 0 s and did not resort to truly substantial w i t h h o l d i n g until the 1 9 8 0 s , the U S g o v e r n m e n t had b e e n c o m p l a i n i n g about w a s t e , i n e f f i c i e n c y , and m i s m a n a g e m e n t at the UN for many years b e f o r e that. T h e s e c h a r g e s mirrored g r o w i n g dissatisfaction with UN p r o g r a m s , and h e n c e with the agenda o f a m a j o r i t y increasingly at odds with the United States over UN purposes and priorities. B u t w h i l e the U S c r i t i q u e o f UN m a n a g e m e n t was in c o n s i d e r a b l e measure a critique o f UN politics and policies, the United States was g e n uinely c o n v i n c e d that the global organization was badly run.

The Roots of Disenchantment

51

In this U S v i e w , programmatic decisions w e r e increasingly made by the political organs without reference to feasibility or cost. T h e responsibility for carrying out those decisions was entrusted to a secretariat that w a s becoming, in U S eyes, less professionally and administratively sound as a result of the requirements of g e o g r a p h i c distribution and short-term contracts, not to mention poor management practices. T h e Secretary-General and his principal subordinates w e r e too often seen as captives of a political process they could not control and irresponsible governments to which they could not say no. In e f f e c t , the United States w a s disappointed in the realities of international administration. In addition to the inherent difficulty of integrating the functioning of personnel from many different cultures and administrative systems, there w e r e a host of other problems the United States found frustrating. A m o n g them were a bloated and top-heavy secretariat; secretariat members w h o w e r e little more than agents of their home countries or whose appointments w e r e clearly based on considerations other than merit; the absence of a clear, coherent relationship between program planning and budget; the proliferation of committees, c o m m i s s i o n s , and other bodies of marginal utility, often with overlapping and even redundant responsibilities; and e x c e s s i v e meetings and documentation. T h e United States pursued its criticism of what it regarded as waste and inefficiency in the General A s s e m b l y ' s Fifth Committee, the A d v i s o r y Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ( A C A B Q ) , and the Committee on Program and Coordination ( C P C ) , as well as through consultations with other major contributors to the U N ' s budget. But it regularly encountered resistance f r o m a U N majority that suspected the U S concern with waste and i n e f f i c i e n c y w a s simply rationalization and that the real U S objective w a s to subvert the will of the majority. Each of the U N ' s s e v e r a l restructuring e f f o r t s underscored this c o n f l i c t , the T h i r d World majority wanting to use restructuring to speed the process of development, the United States v i e w i n g it as an occasion f o r administrative reform. Not surprisingly, there has been little restructuring of the United Nations in spite of numerous reports and debates on the subject. 5 1

Elements of the National Character Those elements of national character alluded to in Chapter I I — o p t i m i s m , naiveté, impatience, and a tendency to p r e m i l l e n n i a l i s m — h a v e all c o m e into play as the United States has struggled with its disappointment with the U N ' s performance. U S optimism—the belief that progress is easy and that all good things g o together—has been s e v e r e l y tested by events since World War II. B e cause those events have frequently been dramatized, and on occasion e x aggerated, on the UN stage, the U N has acquired a negative image—things

52

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

that should be relatively simple are unnecessarily complicated. That progress toward the solution of global problems is not easy is certainly understood by most US leaders, but that does not mean that they or the U S public must like it. And the U N ' s reputation has been tarnished by the fact that it has been a constant reminder that some problems are indeed intractable. T h e U N ' s agenda has been clogged with issues that go b a c k many years and produce predictable—and for the United States b o r i n g — debate year after year; there is no sunset law at the United Nations. In a world as complex as the one in which we live, there are bound to be failures of understanding between states with different histories, cultures, e c o n o m i c conditions, political systems, rivalries, values, interests, and problems. In effect, all states are probably more ethnocentric and less well-informed than is desirable for optimally clearheaded and productive diplomacy. This is inevitably a recipe for frustration and occasionally for surprise, and the United States is not immune. In fact, as suggested in Chapter II, the United States may labor under a special handicap as a result o f its own relatively insular history and, until recently, limited interaction with many non-Western peoples. As with US optimism, the problem o f a certain naivete about the world is not, o f course, confined to the United Nations, but has affected US policy in a variety of bilateral contexts as well. But the UN tends to magnify the problem. The UN is not a cozy club o f the like-minded or the similarly situated. It has, for example, a very large population of states that are predominantly Muslim; the United States has only recently begun to understand these states, and then only imperfectly. African states constitute nearly one-third of the U N ' s membership, and unlike the British and French, the United States has little familiarity with the African continent and its diversity, which is arguably even greater than that o f the world o f Islam. Y e t these two large and overlapping groups o f states have been at the center o f most of the U N ' s most emotional and contentious d e b a t e s — those concerned with the volatile Middle East, A f r i c a ' s troubled southern quadrant, e c o n o m i c development, self-determination, and terrorism. T h e United States has, of course, taken positions on this broad and contentious agenda—positions very often at odds with those preferred by the U N ' s majority—but it has had a much harder time understanding the forces that shape that agenda. Ali Mazrui argued that this " l a c k o f understanding is one part o f the U S insensibility to outsiders, part o f the phenomenon o f its deaf e a r . " 5 2 Mazrui, among others, has charged that U S foreign policy is characterized by racism and intolerance of cultural pluralism, a more serious charge than naivete and one with which many in the Third World would agree. Among the most commonly cited illustrations o f that thesis has been nearly reflexive U S support for Israel, a Western outpost in a region o f darker-skinned

The Roots of

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53

peoples w h o s e faith is Islam, a p r e d o m i n a n t l y A f r o - A s i a n religion, and whose culture is strange to virtually the entire US public. T h e conviction that this pro-Israel, anti-Arab policy is often contrary to real US interests has only helped to m a k e M a z r u i ' s point f o r Third W o r l d critics. And the resulting dialogue of the deaf has only served to further alienate the United States from the United Nations. It has been argued that impatience is another aspect of the US national character. " T h e difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer"—the World War II motto of the S e a b e e s — c a p t u r e s the traditional can-do attitude the United States has typically b r o u g h t to the c o n f e r e n c e table. Unfortunately, the United Nations rarely does anything immediately, and s o m e things do not get done at all. T h i s is not, of course, solely or even primarily the fault of the UN per se, a l t h o u g h its structures and processes and institutionalized w o r k habits have all contributed to the p r o b l e m . But the UN, perhaps inevitably, c a m e to s y m b o l i z e the more complex reality of 150-odd states 5 3 with very different interests struggling to find c o m m o n ground and an agreed strategy for reaching it, and on occasion even s e e k i n g to d r a m a t i z e d i f f e r e n c e s rather than c o m p r o m i s i n g them. Not surprisingly, the United States frequently preferred to pursue its policy o b j e c t i v e s in settings w h e r e it did not h a v e to mobilize support from a m o n g so many states of such diverse persuasions. US impatience has also been on display, of c o u r s e , when the United States is on the defensive, trying to prevent the adoption of resolutions it o p p o s e s , or, at a m i n i m u m , to maintain a losing coalition of respectable size and c o m p o s i t i o n . This w a s the more c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e over the years, and the United States b e c a m e increasingly impatient with the effort required, especially in view of the marginal results. T h e impatience w a s the greater when the effort had to be expended in rebutting "lies." Daniel Patrick M o y n i h a n , in perhaps his most e l o q u e n t m o m e n t as US a m b a s sador to the UN, expressed it best in his 1975 speech after the adoption of the "Zionism is racism" resolution: "The terrible lie that has been told here today will have terrible c o n s e q u e n c e s . Not only will people begin to say, indeed they have already begun to say, that the United Nations is a place where lies are told. . . ," 5 4 Moynihan had, of course, argued that the United States should neither acquiesce in such distortion of language nor abandon the field, but instead stay and fight (or go into opposition, as he urged in the essay that earned him his post as ambassador). And the United States did stay and fight. But its impatience with what w a s h a p p e n i n g t h e r e — w i t h respect to language and many other things, s o m e of them quite t a n g i b l e — w o u l d lead eventually to the crisis of the 1980s. And then there is the matter of that hint of premillennialism in the US approach to world affairs. As w e have noted, the United States wanted the

54

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

U n i t e d N a t i o n s to j o i n w i t h it in s u p p o r t i n g t h e status q u o , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y in c o n t a i n i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d r e j e c t i n g r a d i c a l s o l u t i o n s to the num e r o u s c r i s e s b e s e t t i n g s t a t e s in t h e T h i r d W o r l d . W h e n t h e U N i n s t e a d g a v e s u p p o r t to the i d e a o f m o r a l e q u i v a l e n c e w h e n it w a s not a c t u a l l y e n dorsing S o v i e t - s u p p o r t e d c a u s e s and c l i e n t s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s tended to react as if the g l o b a l b o d y w e r e l e g i t i m i z i n g evil rather than s i m p l y ref l e c t i n g the i n t e r e s t s o f its m e m b e r s . U S P r e s i d e n t D w i g h t E i s e n h o w e r ' s s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , J o h n F o s t e r D u l l e s , a r g u e d p r e c i s e l y t h i s p o i n t in a t t a c k i n g n o n a l i g n m e n t , a m o v e m e n t that b e g a n o u t s i d e o f the U N but s o o n f o u n d in t h e U N t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e p l a t f o r m f o r p r e s e n t i n g its c a s e a n d d e m o n s t r a t i n g b r o a d s u p p o r t f o r its p o s i t i o n s o n t h e c r u c i a l i s s u e s o f t h e day. A f t e r all, if U S c a u s e s w e r e g o o d and those o f the c o m m u n i s t p o w e r s w e r e e v i l , n e u t r a l i t y w a s not a m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e p o s i t i o n . T h i s attitude a l s o i n t e n s i f i e d U S i m p a t i e n c e with U N t o l e r a n c e o f c e r tain S o v i e t p r a c t i c e s . It w a s n o s e c r e t that t h e S o v i e t U n i o n m a d e n o d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h o s e o f its c i t i z e n s w o r k i n g in its m i s s i o n to t h e U N a n d t h o s e s e r v i n g in the U N S e c r e t a r i a t , r e q u i r i n g the l a t t e r to l i v e in the S o v i e t c o m p o u n d a l o n g w i t h the f o r m e r a n d o t h e r w i s e m a k i n g a m o c k e r y o f t h e c o n c e p t o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l s e r v i c e . T h e S o v i e t U n i o n r e f u s e d to let its n a t i o n a l s a c c e p t p e r m a n e n t c o n t r a c t s in the S e c r e t a r i a t , a n d i n s i s t e d o n w h a t a m o u n t e d to a c l a i m in p e r p e t u i t y to c e r t a i n S e c r e t a r i a t p o s t s . A s f a r a s W a s h i n g t o n w a s c o n c e r n e d , S o v i e t s s e r v i n g in t h e U N S e c r e t a r i a t w e r e in e f f e c t S o v i e t s p i e s . T h e f a c t that U S h a n d s w e r e not e n t i r e l y c l e a n w h e r e t h e c o n c e p t o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l s e r v i c e is c o n c e r n e d , o r t h a t other countries have a l s o manipulated the s e r v i c e for their o w n advantage, is b e s i d e t h e p o i n t . It w a s S o v i e t b e h a v i o r a n d U N a c q u i e s c e n c e in it that p a r t i c u l a r l y r a n k l e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d t h e e x p l a n a t i o n l i e s in that p r e millenniarian perspective which distinguishes evil intent from

garden-

v a r i e t y a b u s e s o f the s y s t e m . T h e l a t t e r m a y b e o f f e n s i v e ( w h e n o t h e r s d o it), but t h e f o r m e r is i n t o l e r a b l e . *

*

*

In all o f t h e s e m a n y w a y s , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s w a s f o r m a n y y e a r s a c h r o n i c s o u r c e o f f r u s t r a t i o n to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . W e r e w e t o g r a p h that frustration over time, w e would find peaks and v a l l e y s — p e r i o d s o f time w h e n U S - U N r e l a t i o n s w e r e r e a s o n a b l y a m i c a b l e , o r at l e a s t l e s s s t r a i n e d , a l t e r n a t i n g w i t h p e r i o d s w h e n t h e g l o b a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d its m o s t i m p o r tant m e m b e r w e r e on a c o l l i s i o n c o u r s e . B u t t h e trend l i n e w a s l a r g e l y n e g a t i v e . U S e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r the U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a d b e e n r e p e a t e d l y , i f not i n v a r i a b l y , d i s a p p o i n t e d , a n d a l t h o u g h t h e n e e d to s t a y a n d d e f e n d vital i n t e r e s t s a l w a y s o u t w e i g h e d the u r g e t o w a l k

away from what

seemed

increasingly to b e a failed organization, the United States grew steadily

The Roots of

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55

more impatient with the U N and the U N b e c a m e l e s s and less important in U S f o r e i g n policy c a l c u l a t i o n s . Finally, in the 1 9 8 0 s , U S i m p a t i e n c e reached a breaking point.

Notes 1. Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, 2nd ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, pp. 11-13. 2. For a discussion of the membership stalemate, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares, 3rd ed., New York: Random House, 1964, pp. 8 3 - 8 6 . 3. Ibid., p. 119. 4. See Chapter V in this book for a discussion of these resolutions. 5. Stephen Zamora, "Voting in International Economic Organizations," American Journal of International Law 74 (1980), p. 608. 6. See, for example, the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution, GA Res. 377 (V), November 3, 1950. 7. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 139. 8. Robert W. Gregg, "The Politics of International Economic Cooperation and Development," in Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ed., Politics in the United Nations System, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988, p. 116. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., p. 115. 11. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, New York: Penguin Books, 1964, p. 45. 12. Ibid., p. 44. 13. For a recent survey of scientific and technological trends that are transforming international relations, see Kenneth Keller, "Science and Technology," Foreign Affairs 69, 4 (Fall 1990). 14. Dennis Pirages, Global Technopolitics, Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1989, p. 2. 15. The term is John Gerard Ruggie's. See "On the Problem of the 'Global Problématique': What Role for International Organizations?" Alternatives 5 (May 1980), pp. 517-550. 16. In addition to adopting a long series of resolutions condemning South Africa for the practice of apartheid, the General Assembly began in 1974 to refuse to accept the credentials of delegates from the Pretoria government. 17. This theme is explored in Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 18. David P. Forsythe, "The Politics of Efficacy," in Finkelstein, Politics in the United Nations System, p. 247. 19. See the running account of the expansion of UN efforts in the human rights field in the annual publication of the United Nations Association of the United States entitled Issues Before the (46th) General Assembly of the United Nations, now published by the University Press of America, Lanham, Md. 20. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 21. Ibid., p. 30. 22. Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 45.

56

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23. S C R e s . 1501, J u n e 25, 1 9 5 0 . 24. F r a n c k , Nation Against Nation, p. 5 9 . 25. G A R e s . 3 7 7 ( V ) , N o v e m b e r 3, 1 9 5 0 . 2 6 . T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s in r e p l i c a t i n g the s u c c e s s of U N E F I w e r e q u i c k l y a p p a r ent in the C o n g o crisis, w h e n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s o n c e a g a i n placed a p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e in the field with r e s u l t s that c a m e c l o s e to d e s t r o y i n g the g l o b a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . 2 7 . S e e M i g u e l M a r i n - B o s c h , " H o w N a t i o n s V o t e in t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , " International Organization 41, 4 (Autumn 1987). MarinB o s c h ' s a n a l y s i s of G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y v o t i n g b e h a v i o r s h o w e d that in the 1 9 8 0 s ( p r i o r to his e s s a y ) the U n i t e d S t a t e s cast the l o n e n e g a t i v e v o t e 9 8 t i m e s , or t w i c e as m a n y t i m e s as all o t h e r U N m e m b e r s c o m b i n e d . 28. G A R e s . 3 2 8 1 ( X X I X ) , D e c e m b e r 6, 1 9 7 4 . 29. G A R e s . 3 2 0 1 and 3 2 0 2 ( S - V l ) , M a y 1, 1 9 7 4 . 3 0 . See G A R e s . 1654 ( X V I ) , N o v e m b e r 27, 1 9 6 1 . T h i s C o m m i t t e e ( o r i g i n a l l y of 17) w a s to a s s u m e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e a l i z i n g the g o a l s of the D e c l a r a t i o n o n the G r a n t i n g of I n d e p e n d e n c e to C o l o n i a l C o u n t r i e s a n d P e o p l e s , G A R e s . 1514 ( X V ) , D e c e m b e r 14, 1960. 31. L a w r e n c e S. F i n k e l s t e i n , " T h e P o l i t i c s of V a l u e A l l o c a t i o n in the UN S y s t e m , " in F i n k e l s t e i n , Politics in the United Nations System, pp. 1 - 4 0 . 3 2 . M o h a m m e d B e d j a o u i , Towards a New International Economic Order, N e w Y o r k : H o l m e s a n d M e i e r , 1979, p. 142. 3 3 . K r a s n e r , Structural Conflict, p p . 1 3 - 1 8 . 3 4 . G A R e s . 3 3 7 9 ( X X X ) , N o v e m b e r 10, 1 9 7 5 . 3 5 . F r a n c k r e c o u n t e d this s t r u g g l e in Nation Against Nation, pp. 1 9 5 - 1 9 9 . 36. T h e L i m a D e c l a r a t i o n and Plan of A c t i o n on I n d u s t r i a l D e v e l o p m e n t and C o o p e r a t i o n w a s e n d o r s e d at the S e c o n d G e n e r a l C o n f e r e n c e of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s I n d u s t r i a l D e v e l o p m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n ( U N I D O ) in 1 9 7 5 and q u i c k l y b e c a m e an int e g r a l part of the N I E O a g e n d a . 3 7 . S e e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n v e n t i o n o n t h e L a w of t h e S e a , Part XI, e s p e c i a l l y S e c t i o n 3 and A n n e x III. 3 8 . For a n a l y s i s of t h e C o m m o n F u n d n e g o t i a t i o n s , s e e R o b e r t L. R o t h s t e i n , Global Bargaining, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979, as w e l l as his s u b s e q u e n t a r t i c l e s , " R e g i m e C r e a t i o n by a C o a l i t i o n of t h e W e a k , " International Studies Quarterly 2 8 ( A u t u m n 1 9 8 4 ) , a n d " C o n s e n s u a l K n o w l e d g e a n d Int e r n a t i o n a l C o l l a b o r a t i o n : S o m e L e s s o n s f r o m t h e C o m m o d i t y N e g o t i a t i o n s , " International Organization 38, 4 ( A u t u m n 1 9 8 4 ) . 3 9 . S e e B a r r y R u b i n , Modern Dictators, N e w Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1987. 4 0 . G A R e s . 2 1 7 A (III), D e c e m b e r 10, 1 9 4 8 . 4 1 . S e e e s p e c i a l l y the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o v e n a n t o n E c o n o m i c , S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l R i g h t s and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o v e n a n t o n C i v i l a n d P o l i t i c a l R i g h t s , b o t h a d o p t e d in G A R e s . 2 2 0 0 A ( X X I ) , D e c e m b e r 16, 1 9 6 6 . O t h e r h u m a n r i g h t s t r e a t i e s h a v e b e e n a d o p t e d in t h e f i e l d s of t o r t u r e , r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and g e n d e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , as well as on the s u b j e c t of a p a r t h e i d . 4 2 . F r a n c k , Nation Against Nation, p. 2 1 6 . 4 3 . Ibid., p. 2 1 7 . 4 4 . A l a n M . J a m e s , " U n i t V e t o D o m i n a n c e in U n i t e d N a t i o n s P e a c e - K e e p i n g , " in F i n k e l s t e i n , Politics in the United Nations System, p p . 8 2 - 8 3 . 4 5 . O n H u n g a r y , s e e G A R e s . 1 0 0 4 ( E S - 1 1 ) , N o v e m b e r 4, 1 9 5 6 . O n A f g h a n i s t a n , the A s s e m b l y first a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e in G A R e s . ( E S - V I ) , J a n u a r y 4, 1 9 8 0 .

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46. This episode in US-UN relations is well described by Franck, Nation Against Nation, pp. 153-158, and by Max Harrelson, Fires All Around the Horizon, New York: Praeger, 1989, pp. 157-166. 47. GA Res. 38/7, November 2, 1983. 48. A good account of this story is to be found in Cynthia J. Arnson, CrossRoads, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989. 49. The General Assembly did adopt a resolution demanding compliance with the 1CJ ruling. See GA Res. 41/31, June 27, 1986. 50. David P. Forsythe, The Politics of International Law, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990, p. 118. 51. Restructuring did not become a serious issue at the UN until the mid1970s, in the context of debate about a New International Economic Order. The most ambitious reforms did not occur, however, until the financial crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, and these were largely limited to the secretariat rather than to the multiplicity of intergovernmental bodies that have grown up within the UN system and the UN itself over the years. 52. Ali Mazrui, "Uncle S a m ' s Hearing Aid," in Sanford J. Ungar, ed., Estrangement: America and the World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 188. 53. UN membership stood for some time at 159; the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, together with the end of the Cold War, has in the 1990s pushed that number above 180. 54. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978, p. 198.

The Financial Crisis: The United States Versus the United Nations

T h e landslide victory scored by Ronald Reagan over J i m m y Carter in the 1980 presidential election was, in important respects, a w a t e r s h e d event for the United States. T h e e m p h a s i s on s u p p l y - s i d e e c o n o m i c s , g o v e r n ment deregulation, dramatically increased d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g , and the Armageddon-like struggle with the "evil e m p i r e " of the Soviet Union has been much c o m m e n t e d on by both s u p p o r t e r s and critics of the Reagan revolution. T h e rapidly escalating budget deficit that resulted f r o m these policies has generated an e n o r m o u s a m o u n t of publicity, if very little in the way of effective corrective measures. And taxes, always unpopular but the acknowledged means of paying for civilized society, had acquired such a bad odor as a result of R e a g a n - e r a rhetoric that f e w politicians in the land any longer have had the political courage to speak of raising them to address either the deficit or s o c i e t y ' s needs. 1 T h e s e landmark c h a n g e s in US political and e c o n o m i c life so d o m i nated public discourse in the 1980s that relatively little attention was paid to another important shift in US policy. It was at this time that the United States turned up the heat, as it were, on the United Nations, resorting to tactics far stronger than rhetorical c o n d e m n a t i o n . T h e United States, in effect, undertook to bend UN practice to US political will by playing the most potent card in the US h a n d — t h e leverage resulting f r o m the fact that the United States pays 25 percent of the U N ' s regular budget. A case can be made, of course, that the c h a n g e in US policy toward the UN during the Reagan administration was more one of degree than one of kind. A f t e r all, neither the failures of the United Nations to measure up to US expectations nor expressions of US disenchantment with the global body were new. The change in policy may have seemed more dramatic bec a u s e the Carter administration had c o n s c i o u s l y s o u g h t to send a signal that the UN w o u l d have a more p r o m i n e n t place in the conduct of US foreign policy. T e n s i o n s in U S - U N relations had b e e n eased by the

59

60

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

a p p o i n t m e n t o f A n d r e w Y o u n g as the U S a m b a s s a d o r to the U n i t e d Nations. Y o u n g had " t a l k e d o f r e d e e m i n g the United S t a t e s at the UN and the UN in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o f putting the U n i t e d S t a t e s on ' t h e right side o f the moral issues o f the w o r l d . ' " 2 D u r i n g his s t e w a r d s h i p there, he made it c l e a r that the United S t a t e s w a n t e d to m a k e greater use o f the U N , and he adopted a d i p l o m a t i c s t y l e that u n d e r s c o r e d that intent. B u t the C a r t e r - Y o u n g interlude s h o u l d not be c o n s t r u e d as a m a j o r turning point in U S - U N r e l a t i o n s ; rather, it should be s e e n as an attempt, against the g r a i n , to redirect U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y and to use the UN as o n e v e h i c l e for d o i n g s o . H o w e p h e m e r a l that attempt w a s b e c a m e apparent s h o r t l y after the e l e c t i o n o f 1 9 8 0 . H a v i n g s a i d that, h o w e v e r , it r e m a i n s true that what h a p p e n e d to the U S approach to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s during the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n did c o n s t i t u t e a rather s i g n i f i c a n t

departure

from e a r l i e r p r a c t i c e . T h e

majority-

United States

had long r e s i s t e d

sponsored resolutions, endorsing ideas and c a l l i n g for a c t i o n s it found una c c e p t a b l e , and had f o u n d i t s e l f on the l o s i n g end o f the v o t e c o u n t on such r e s o l u t i o n s with i n c r e a s i n g f r e q u e n c y . It had long c o m p l a i n e d about a v a r i e t y o f UN p r a c t i c e s and a r g u e d for r e f o r m s , o n l y to d i s c o v e r that what it regarded as meaningful r e f o r m was almost i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e in the prevailing political c l i m a t e at the U N . T h e U S r e s p o n s e in the past had been to take a p r i n c i p l e d stand, s e e k i n g to persuade and, f a i l i n g that, registering its o b j e c t i o n s , the m e a n w h i l e d i s t a n c i n g itself f r o m the o r g a n i z a tion and d i s c o u n t i n g its i m p o r t a n c e in the c o n d u c t o f U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d to do s o m e t h i n g very much like this during the R e a g a n era. B u t it did s o m e t h i n g e l s e as w e l l . It undertook to c o m p e l the UN to c h a n g e its w a y s by w i t h h o l d i n g a s i z a b l e portion o f its s i z a b l e f i n a n c i a l a s s e s s m e n t . T h i s was not the first t i m e that the U n i t e d S t a t e s had resorted to this tactic, but it was the first time that it had d o n e s o on a s c a l e that m a d e c l e a r that it was not o n l y registering its displeasure but a l s o trying to f o r c e the UN to perform as the United S t a t e s wanted it to p e r f o r m . T h e United S t a t e s decided to play hardball. T h e story o f U S p o l i c y toward the United Nations during the R e a g a n years is, o f c o u r s e , m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d than is s u g g e s t e d by the use o f the f a m i l i a r sports m e t a p h o r . It is a s t o r y that e n c o m p a s s e s the s o m e t i m e s strained r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e b r a n c h e s o f the U S g o v e r n m e n t , as well as the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s , esp e c i a l l y w h e r e b u d g e t i s s u e s are c o n c e r n e d . A n d it is a story that n e c e s sarily f o c u s e s on the interplay b e t w e e n the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s u b s y s t e m in W a s h i n g t o n and the participant s u b s y s t e m in N e w Y o r k . 3 In o t h e r words, the c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n the United S t a t e s and the United N a t i o n s during the 1 9 8 0 s c a n b e v i e w e d as an a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n p r o c e s s or f e e d b a c k l o o p . D e c i s i o n s reached at the UN stimulated f a c t i o n s within the U S g o v e r n m e n t to greater (and m o r e n e g a t i v e ) activity, resulting eventually in rejection o f the o b l i g a t i o n to pay the full U S a s s e s s m e n t . T h i s p o l i c y , in turn, s t i m u l a t e d

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The Financial Crisis

r e a c t i o n at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , l e a d i n g to a q u a l i f i e d a d j u s t m e n t o f the rules g o v e r n i n g t h e p r o c e s s o f U N b u d g e t m a k i n g . A n d t h o s e c h a n g e s in N e w Y o r k in their turn led to a n e w r o u n d o f d e b a t e w i t h i n the U S r e p r e s e n t a t i v e subsystem and a further modification o f the U S position. T h i s action-reaction p r o c e s s w a s o n d i s p l a y t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f the R e a g a n p r e s i d e n c y ; its r e s u l t s are still w i t h us, a n d they b o t h s u p p o r t c a u t i o u s o p t i m i s m r e g a r d i n g the future o f U S - U N r e l a t i o n s a n d p r e s e n t p r o b l e m s f o r the U N a s it tries to a s s u m e a m o r e p o s i t i v e r o l e in t h e p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a .

Financial Obligations Under the UN Charter D e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s fall i n t o t w o c a t e g o r i e s : T h o s e o f e x t e r n a l a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t h o s e o f internal a p p l i c a t i o n . D e c i s i o n s in t h e f o r m e r , with rare e x c e p t i o n s , do not bind m e m b e r states without their c o n s e n t . 4 T h e y are s y m b o l i c in c h a r a c t e r , m e r e t e s t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n . T h e r e a r e , o f c o u r s e , t h o s e w h o w i l l a r g u e that s u c h d e c i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n r e i t e r ated many times by o v e r w h e l m i n g majorities or by c o n s e n s u s ,

should

e n j o y t h e s t a t u s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . 5 B u t t h e l a n g u a g e a n d t h e l o g i c o f the C h a r t e r a r g u e o t h e r w i s e , a n d s t a t e s c a n a n d d o i g n o r e s u c h d e c i s i o n s , not o n l y w i t h i m p u n i t y but w i t h a m p l e l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . D e c i s i o n s o f internal application are another matter. M o s t such decis i o n s are e i t h e r s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z e d by t h e C h a r t e r , in w h i c h c a s e they e n j o y t h e l e g a l s t a n d i n g o f t h e C h a r t e r i t s e l f , an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t y , o r they are l o g i c a l l y inferred f r o m s p e c i f i c C h a r t e r p r o v i s i o n s . T h e s e decis i o n s h a v e s t a n d i n g in i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w that d e c i s i o n s o f e x t e r n a l a p p l i c a tion do n o t . T h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s e x a m p l e o f d e c i s i o n s o f i n t e r n a l a p p l i cation are G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y r e s o l u t i o n s that adopt the

organization's

budget and set m e m b e r s ' a s s e s s m e n t s . A r t i c l e 1 7 o f t h e U N C h a r t e r is e x p l i c i t a b o u t t h i s . It s t i p u l a t e s that " t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y shall c o n s i d e r and a p p r o v e the budget o f the Org a n i z a t i o n " and that " t h e e x p e n s e s o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n shall b e b o r n e by t h e M e m b e r s as a p p o r t i o n e d b y the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . " O n e d o e s not n e e d to r e a d b e t w e e n t h e l i n e s o r a r g u e in t h i s c a s e t h a t a g e n e r a l g r a n t o f aut h o r i t y , to b e e f f e c t i v e , r e q u i r e s a s p e c i f i c ( a n d p o s s i b l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l ) int e r p r e t a t i o n . N o r is t h i s a c a s e in w h i c h t h e C h a r t e r a p p e a r s to s e n d a m i x e d m e s s a g e , a s it d o e s , f o r e x a m p l e , in A r t i c l e 2 ( 4 ) w i t h its r e q u i r e m e n t that " a l l m e m b e r s s h a l l r e f r a i n in t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s f r o m t h e threat o r u s e o f f o r c e " a n d in A r t i c l e 5 1 w i t h its p r o v i s i o n that " n o t h i n g in t h e p r e s e n t C h a r t e r s h a l l i m p a i r t h e i n h e r e n t r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l o r collective self-defense." T h e i n t e n t o f A r t i c l e 1 7 is c l e a r . T h e f a c t that A r t i c l e 1 8 ( 2 ) c l a s s i f i e s b u d g e t a r y q u e s t i o n s a s i m p o r t a n t o n e s , to b e m a d e b y a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r ity o f t h e m e m b e r s p r e s e n t a n d v o t i n g , t e n d s to r e i n f o r c e t h e v i e w that the

62

About Face? The United States and the United

Nations

drafters of the Charter understood full well what they were doing in Article 17. A n d if there w e r e any doubt, it would seem to be d i s p e l l e d by Article 19, with its provision that states falling two years in arrears in the payment of their financial contributions shall lose their vote in the General A s s e m b l y . Only in Articles 5 and 6 is so explicit and severe a penalty specified for failure to comply with one of the provisions of this t r e a t y . 6 States that ratified the Charter and became m e m b e r s of the United Nations undertook to be bound by its provisions, including Article 17. This is the situation in law. In practice, as we know, things have been quite different. Over the years, many states have paid less than their full assessment as approved by the General Assembly under Article 17. Their reasons for doing so have varied, but in the main have been the result either of an alleged inability to pay or of a d e m o n s t r a t e d u n w i l l i n g n e s s to pay, based on strong disagreement with the purposes for which the money was to be spent or the processes by which those e x p e n d i t u r e s w e r e approved. T h e former explanation for nonpayment may be acceptable under the Charter; the latter is not. But the fact that majority decisions are authoritative on matters pertaining to the budget has not meant that some states have not exercised a unit veto. There have been two major assaults on the General A s s e m b l y ' s authority in this area, o n e occurring principally in the 1960s a n d the o t h e r — t h e f o c u s of this case study—in the 1980s. T h e y m a k e the point, and m a k e it c o n v i n c i n g l y , that the struggle over the capacity of the UN General Assembly authoritatively to allocate v a l u e s is a t w o - w a y street. T h e majoritarian c a m p may have been tenacious in its d e m a n d s f o r more centralization of authority, but defenders of the unit veto have not only resisted those d e m a n d s but have actually challenged the authority of the majority in the area w h e r e it would appear to be strongest under the C h a r ter—control over the budget. In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the General Assembly m a j o r i t y ' s control over the UN budget was challenged, in the first instance by the Soviet Union and other C o m m u n i s t bloc states and by France, and in the s e c ond by the United States. In both cases, actions in violation of obligations incurred by b e c o m i n g m e m b e r s of the United Nations proved to be p o w erful means of coercing changes in the rules governing budget m a k i n g . In the ongoing struggle over capacity of the United Nations authoritatively to allocate values, those w h o wished to reduce that authority w e r e in a stronger position than those w h o wished to e x p a n d it. Capabilities are decidedly asymmetrical at the United Nations. T h e first of the U N ' s two major financial crises, the one which rocked the organization in the 1960s, was the result of the refusal of s e v e r a l states, the Soviet Union and France foremost a m o n g them, to pay assessments for one or more peacekeeping forces. 7 This case is distinguishable

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63

f r o m the crisis of the 1980s in that nonpayment was justified in part on the ground that the peacekeeping operations were themselves illegal. T h e Soviet Union and France took the position that under the Charter only the Security Council could authorize peacekeeping forces, whereas it w a s the General Assembly, acting under the Uniting for Peace resolution, that had d o n e so in the Suez and C o n g o crises. T h e United States m a d e no such claim of illegality when it w i t h h e l d portions of its a s s e s s m e n t s in the 1980s. M o r e o v e r , the costs of both the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo ( O N U C ) were financed out of separate accounts, thereby differentiating them f r o m the regular budget. H o w e v e r , these costs were treated as UN e x p e n d i t u r e s within the s c o p e and intent of Article 17 of the Charter, both by the Secretary-General and the General A s s e m b l y ; an advisory opinion of the W o r l d Court declared them to be legally binding 8 and an o v e r w h e l m i n g majority of the m e m b e r ship s u p p o r t e d a resolution accepting the C o u r t ' s opinion 9 —all of which suggests that those w h o refused to pay were in effect acting to reduce the scope of centralized authority and setting a precedent of sorts for US withholding in the 1980s. T h e penalty prescribed in Article 19 w a s never invoked against the Soviet Union, even though its refusal to pay a s s e s s m e n t s f o r the peacekeeping f o r c e s placed it more than two years in arrears. T h e UN went to great lengths to avoid a s h o w d o w n over this important constitutional issue, transacting business during the 1964 General A s s e m b l y session by substituting "laboriously negotiated c o n s e n s u s " for voting. 1 0 Whereas the United States had initially been a d a m a n t about the i m p o r t a n c e of u p h o l d i n g the Charter, in the end it c o n c l u d e d that the costs of f o r c i n g an issue that it could not be sure of winning in any event were simply too high. O n e factor in the US a b a n d o n m e n t of its support f o r the letter of the Charter and for the International Court of Justice advisory opinion w a s almost certainly a growing awareness that an authoritative General A s s e m bly might not always be in the best interests of the United States. A m b a s sador Arthur Goldberg made a point of noting the precedential quality of the A s s e m b l y ' s failure to apply the Article 19 penalty to the defaulters in 1964, declaring that "if any m e m b e r can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain activities of the Organization, the United States reserves the same option to m a k e exceptions if, in our view, strong and c o m p e l l i n g reasons exist f o r doing so." 1 1 In 1964, the US position was not that Articles 17 and 19 had been " r e p e a l e d " or that the General A s s e m b l y ' s authority had been trimmed in this critical area. But a shadow of doubt had been cast on the obligation to pay assessments voted by the requisite majority of the General A s s e m b l y . Whether the Charter had been amended de facto remained a debatable question well into the 1980s, and indeed is still an open question.

64

About Face? The United States and the United Nations

W h a t is c l e a r is that the U n i t e d S t a t e s did not i n v o k e the G o l d b e r g d o c trine f o r m a n y y e a r s , e v e n w h e n it f o u n d i t s e l f in d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h the UN m a j o r i t y on b u d g e t i s s u e s , w h i c h w a s o f t e n . I n s t e a d , the g o v e r n m e n t t y p i c a l l y m a d e its c a s e in the F i f t h C o m m i t t e e o f the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y (and in other subsidiary c o m m i t t e e s with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s p e c t s o f the b u d g e t p r o c e s s ) and then a b s t a i n e d and g r u m b l e d a b o u t the r e s u l t . T h e presumption that there was a legal o b l i g a t i o n to pay w a s a s t r o n g o n e , and no direct c h a l l e n g e w a s m o u n t e d a g a i n s t c e n t r a l i z e d a u t h o r i t y on b u d g e t matters f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e period o f t i m e after the A r t i c l e 1 9 c r i s i s . A s w e shall s e e , e v e n in the 1 9 8 0 s , w h e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s b e c a m e m u c h m o r e a g g r e s s i v e l y c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l with r e s p e c t to the U n i t e d Nations, the president ( o r at least the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h ) t o o k p a i n s to stress that the United S t a t e s had a legal o b l i g a t i o n to pay a s s e s s m e n t s v o t e d by the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . It n e v e r a r g u e d that the o b l i g a t i o n to pay had b e c o m e a c a s u a l t y o f c u s t o m , that b e c a u s e states had not b e e n p e n a l i z e d for failure to meet their f i n a n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s , A r t i c l e 1 7 no l o n g e r meant quite what it s a i d and s t a t e s are no l o n g e r r e q u i r e d under the C h a r t e r to pay what the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y a s s e s s e s them to f i n a n c e the b u d g e t it has approved. Indeed, it w o u l d have b e e n d i f f i c u l t to m a k e an e m p i r i c a l c a s e for such an a r g u m e n t , g i v e n the f a c t that U N m e m b e r s that w e r e m o r e than t w o y e a r s in a r r e a r s had in f a c t b e e n d e p r i v e d o f t h e i r v o t e s in the G e n eral A s s e m b l y by the s i m p l e e x p e d i e n t o f turning o f f the e l e c t r o n i c v o t i n g m e c h a n i s m at their s e a t s . B u t the o b l i g a t i o n to pay, w h i l e n e v e r d e n i e d by the U S g o v e r n m e n t , w a s e r o d e d by t w o d e v e l o p m e n t s in the 1 9 8 0 s : O n e w a s the e v o l u t i o n o f the p r a c t i c e o f s e l e c t i v e w i t h h o l d i n g by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the o t h e r w a s the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the p r a c t i c e o f d r a m a t i c , a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d w i t h h o l d i n g as a result o f a c t i o n by the C o n g r e s s . T h e s e are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d p h e n o m e n a that at o n e and the s a m e t i m e tell us m u c h a b o u t the c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n the e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e b r a n c h e s o f the U S g o v e r n m e n t in the c o n d u c t o f U S foreign p o l i c y and j u s t as m u c h or m o r e a b o u t the s y m b i o t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the t w o b r a n c h e s at a t i m e w h e n U S - U N relations had r e a c h e d their nadir.

The Reagan Administration and the United Nations A s w e have noted, U S - U N r e l a t i o n s had b e e n d e t e r i o r a t i n g o v e r the y e a r s , and in spite o f e f f o r t s by C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p e o p l e , n o t a b l y A m b a s s a d o r s A n d r e w Y o u n g and D o n a l d M c H e n r y a n d A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f State for International

Organization

Affairs C. William

Maynes,

the

U n i t e d S t a t e s e n t e r e d the 1 9 9 0 s with a substantial c a t a l o g u e o f g r i e v a n c e s against the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h e U N ' s agenda had c o m e m o r e and m o r e to

The Financial

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65

reflect the preoccupations of the Third World majority, and both the ends and the means advocated by that majority, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, were difficult f o r US p o l i c y m a k e r s to accept. T h e UN b u d g e t inevitably r e f l e c t e d these d e v e l o p m e n t s ; the rate of growth of the budget, spurred by the e v e r - g r o w i n g Third World constituency, w a s perceived in Washington as out of control. Many of the purposes for which US assessments were b e i n g spent severely strained the t o l e r a n c e of key f i g u r e s in both branches of the g o v e r n m e n t . Nor w a s the problem limited to the United Nations itself. Disenchantment with other agencies within the UN system was also on the rise, especially for the Congress. Testimony to this mood may be found in such d o c u m e n t s as the so-called Ribicoff Report of 1977, 1 2 which catalogued a whole series of grievances against the way the system was working. Events of the 1970s f o r e s h a d o w e d the a b a n d o n m e n t by the United States in the 1980s of a willingness to accept responsibility for its financial obligations. It w a s during that d e c a d e that the C o n g r e s s , in its handling of a p p r o p r i a t i o n s for both the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and U N E S C O , established a precedent for its attack on the UN assessment. In 1970, seven years before the United States withdrew f r o m the ILO, the C o n g r e s s r e d u c e d by half the p r e s i d e n t ' s request for f u n d s for that organization. In 1971 it appropriated no f u n d s w h a t s o e v e r . In 1974, ten years b e f o r e pulling out of U N E S C O , the Congress stipulated that no f u n d s were to be obligated or spent to support that organization until the president certified that it had ceased certain anti-Israel actions. 1 3 In both cases, f u n d s were released well before the United States fell two years behind in its p a y m e n t s , s u g g e s t i n g that both b r a n c h e s of the g o v e r n m e n t were mindful of the c o u n t r y ' s legal obligation. But the United States had taken the first steps d o w n the slippery slope. M o r e o v e r , the C o n g r e s s in 1972 had adopted legislation stipulating that the US contribution to the UN budget, then set at 3 1 . 5 2 percent of the w h o l e , be reduced to 25 percent by the end of 1973. 1 4 T h e House of Representatives had earlier in that same year a p p r o v e d a bill that w o u l d have a c h i e v e d the s a m e result immediately, placing the United States in violation of the Charter, and there is strong likelihood that the US w o u l d have unilaterally r e d u c e d its assessment the f o l l o w i n g year had not the 27th General Assembly voted to bow to US pressure and accept the 25 percent ceiling. 1 5 T h u s there w a s no violation of the Charter and no formal refusal to accept a decision of the General Assembly regarding the budget as binding. But it was a close call. Already in 1972, as John S t o e s s i n g e r has o b s e r v e d , "a large n u m b e r of American legislators had c o m e to perceive the United Nations as, at least, a wasteful and inefficient body and, at worst, an organization that in the w a k e of the A m e r i c a n d e f e a t over the C h i n e s e representation issue, had b e c o m e inimical to the national interest." 1 6

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And this w a s b e f o r e the " Z i o n i s m is a f o r m of r a c i s m " resolution. It was before the campaign for a New International Economic Order and before the resolution on a Charter of E c o n o m i c Rights and Duties of States was adopted, b l a m i n g the Western market e c o n o m y states for failure of Third World development, demanding sweeping changes in the structure of the world economy, and insisting on the equivalent of an affirmative action program for developing countries. It was before US labor's dissatisfaction with the policies of the ILO led to the temporary withdrawal f r o m that agency, and b e f o r e charges of politicization and frustration over a New World Information Order undermined support for U N E S C O and helped create the climate of negative opinion that in the 1980s supported the decision to withdraw from that organization as well. 1 7 It was before US Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, calling the UN a d a n g e r o u s place, urged the United States to go into opposition at the UN. 1 8 In effect, the years immediately prior to the advent of the Reagan era were a period of growing disillusionment the UN system, a disillusionment the Carter administration was unable to dispel and to which it may even have inadvertently c o n t r i b u t e d . 1 9 It w a s a disillusionment tinged with anger—anger at perceived politicization; at double standards; at p r o g r a m s that s e e m e d to violate the principle that the activities of these o r g a n i z a tions would be beneficial to all m e m b e r s ; at an increasing e m p h a s i s on statism; at secretariats that were regarded as biased, incompetent, and disloyal to the ethic of a truly international civil service; at m i s m a n a g e m e n t or worse by executive heads; and at persistent and seemingly perverse hostility to US views and values. W h e n the United States acted in the 1980s to withhold monies f r o m the UN, it acted in the context of years of c u m u lative disappointments and frustrations with the global organization. In retrospect, one of the most important previews of the events of the 1980s was provided by the contretemps over the so-called Helms amendment in 1978. This congressional assault on the principle that full payment of assessments is a legal obligation took the form of e f f o r t s to cut appropriations by an amount equivalent to the portion of UN agency budgets devoted to technical assistance. T h e argument in this case w a s that technical assistance should be f u n d e d through voluntary contributions to p r o g r a m s such as the United Nations Development Program. In that way the United States could control the level of its c o m m i t m e n t and frustrate Third World e f f o r t s to achieve automaticity of r e s o u r c e t r a n s f e r s through the regular budgets of the UN and the specialized agencies. This issue, which threatened to become a hardy perennial, came to a head in 1978 with the adoption of an amendment by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) to the FY 1979 appropriations bill for the Departments of C o m m e r c e , Justice, and State, which deleted nearly $ 2 8 million and added a p r o v i s o that the US c o n t r i b u t i o n to the regular budget could not be used for technical assistance p u r p o s e s . 2 0 T h e

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"treaty o b l i g a t i o n " a r g u m e n t initially prevailed in the House, but ultimately, during consideration of the c o n f e r e n c e report, the House voted to accept the Senate (i.e., the Helms) version. President Carter opposed this action, both on the ground that it w a s illegal and b e c a u s e he, like all presidents, disliked micromanagement of foreign policy by the Congress. But he signed the appropriations bill nonetheless, indicating that he would ask the 96th Congress to repeal the restriction. UN officials indicated that they could not accept earmarked funds, and the president was unable to certify that none of the U S contribution would be used for technical assistance programs; as a result, the law had the effect of f r e e z i n g the entire U S contribution to the a f f e c t e d agencies. T h e f u n d s were eventually restored, but it was a closely contested struggle between those w h o argued that the United States had an obligation to pay its assessment and increasingly assertive conservatives w h o denied any such obligation and were openly seeking more control over UN system expenditures by the United States (and by the Congress). T h e tenor of the arguments being advanced by the U N ' s congressional critics was reflected in the c h a r g e of C o n g r e s s m a n John Rousselot (RCalif.) that a s s e s s m e n t s a m o u n t to mandatory taxes collected by the UN tax man and in Senator H e l m s ' s assertion that these assessments are an international tax that US taxpayers do not o w e . 2 1 T h i s line of argument w o u l d be heard again in the 1980s when U S hostility to both the United Nations and taxes generally p e a k e d during the R e a g a n presidency. Although the Congress did subsequently modify its position on this issue and never formally sought to m a k e the case that the UN had exceeded its authority, it had effectively implemented the G o l d b e r g doctrine and set the stage for a m o r e serious c h a l l e n g e to the United N a t i o n s , which w a s to come during the Reagan presidency. Responsibility for the stepped-up assault on the United Nations in the 1980s has been the subject of c o n s i d e r a b l e debate. In the final analysis, however, the executive and legislative branches of the g o v e r n m e n t must share responsibility. T h e m a s s i v e U S w i t h h o l d i n g of f u n d s f r o m the United N a t i o n s is typically attributed to the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d m e n t , socalled because the sponsor of the measure that most dramatically restricted the US contribution w a s Senator Nancy K a s s e b a u m ( R - K a n . ) . 2 2 This would seem to suggest that it was the Congress, not the White House, that was primarily responsible for the confrontation that brought the UN to the edge of bankruptcy. But although it is true that anti-UN sentiment ran high on Capitol Hill and that for a time Congress took the initiative away f r o m the administration on the matter of the US a s s e s s m e n t , as it had in the 1970s, President Reagan and his appointees were key players in that confrontation. T h e y set the tone f o r U S - U N relations in the 1980s; Congress was quick to pick up the cue.

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By 1980 the national m o o d had c h a n g e d , and the president himself p e r s o n i f i e d a n d r e f l e c t e d that n e w m o o d . W h a t e v e r the w o r d s u s e d to d e s c r i b e that m o o d a n d the p r e s i d e n t ' s a r t i c u l a t i o n of i t — a s s e r t i v e , t o u g h , a nation once again standing tall—they suggest a declining tolerance for b u s i n e s s as usual at the U N , w h e r e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s e e m e d to h a v e t a k e n u p r e s i d e n c e as a p e r m a n e n t , d e f e n s i v e , a n d o f t e n lonely m i n o r i t y . A n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that w a s " t h e m o s t u n i l a t e r a l i s t , n a t i o n a l i s t i c , a n d i d e o l o g i c a l of any p r e s i d e n t i a l t e a m s i n c e at least 1 9 4 5 " 2 3 had little n e e d f o r s u c h an o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n , o n c e an o r g a n i z a t i o n o n the o u t e r f r i n g e of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , g a i n e d c r e d i b i l i t y a n d i n f l u e n c e a s a t h i n k t a n k that h a d t h e e a r of t h e n e w a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; its U n i t e d N a t i o n s S t u d i e s p r o j e c t , w i t h its b a r r a g e of a n t i - U N m o n o g r a p h s a n d b a c k g r o u n d e r s , c a p t u r e d t h e g r o w i n g r e s e n t m e n t with t h e g l o b a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d c h a n n e l e d it into policy recommendations.24 T h e m u c h h e i g h t e n e d hostility to t h e U N h a d its p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n in t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of P r o f e s s o r J e a n e K i r k p a t r i c k as the U S a m b a s s a d o r t h e r e . K i r k p a t r i c k , w h o s h a r e d m u c h of the H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n ' s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the U N , w a s an ideal s p o k e s p e r s o n f o r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h e s e r v e d . B o t h t h e m e s s a g e s h e c a r r i e d t o t h e U N a n d t h e s t y l e in w h i c h s h e d e l i v e r e d it w e r e w e l l a t t u n e d to t h e n e w n a t i o n a l m o o d . 2 5 S h e m a d e f u l l u s e of her post to c a s t i g a t e the U N f o r w h a t s h e s a w as t h e d e f e c t s of b o t h its p r o c e s s e s a n d its p o l i c i e s , and b e c a u s e s h e w a s p e r c e i v e d to b e c l o s e to t h e p r e s i d e n t her i n d i c t m e n t c a r r i e d m u c h w e i g h t . M o r e o v e r , A m b a s s a d o r K i r k p a t r i c k b r o u g h t into t h e g o v e r n m e n t , b o t h at the m i s s i o n in N e w Y o r k a n d in the B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n A f f a i r s in the D e p a r t m e n t of State, a g r o u p of l i k e - m i n d e d p e o p l e , s o m e of t h e m f r o m the H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n , w h o c o l l e c t i v e l y p r o d u c e d a d e c i d e d l y a n t i - U N tilt w i t h i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t . T h e s e w e r e the p e o p l e w h o w e r e c a l l e d u p o n to c r a f t U S p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s and to t e s t i f y o n C a p i t o l Hill on U N - r e l a t e d m a t t e r s , b u d g e t i n c l u d e d , and i n e v i t a b l y their n e g a t i v e m e s s a g e h a d an i m p a c t . W h e r e a s o t h e r m e m b e r s of h e r t e a m , i n c l u d i n g a s t r i n g of h a r d - l i n e r s w h o s e r v e d as a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s o f s t a t e , h a d m o r e to d o w i t h s h a p i n g that m e s s a g e in W a s h i n g t o n , it w a s h e r c o l l e a g u e , A m b a s s a d o r C h a r l e s L i c h e n s t e i n , K i r k p a t r i c k ' s alter e g o at t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n cil, w h o m a d e t h e b i g g e s t h e a d l i n e . In r e m a r k s later c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " o f f t h e c u f f ' a n d not a p p r o v e d by t h e W h i t e H o u s e , he had this to s a y : If in the judicious determination of the members of the UN, they feel they are not w e l c o m e and they are not b e i n g t r e a t e d w i t h the h o s t l y consideration that is their due, then the US strongly encourages such m e m b e r states seriously to consider r e m o v i n g t h e m s e l v e s and their organization from the United States. We will put no impediment in your way, and we will be at dockside bidding you a fond farewell as you set off into the sunset. 26

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Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, President Reagan chose to dignify this irresponsible speech just two days later, saying that Lichenstein "had the hearty approval of most p e o p l e in A m e r i c a in his suggestion that we w e r e n ' t asking anyone to leave, but if they chose to leave, g o o d b y e . " 2 7 Nor w a s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n hostility r e s e r v e d f o r the U n i t e d N a t i o n s alone. International o r g a n i z a t i o n s generally c a m e in f o r rough treatment f r o m an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that w a s e v e n more s e n s i t i v e than its p r e d e c e s sors had b e e n to a perceived lack of respect f o r U S interests and values. It w a s d u r i n g the Reagan era that the United States reversed policy at the UN Law of the Sea C o n f e r e n c e , a b a n d o n i n g support f o r a treaty that previous U S administrations had played such an important role in d r a f t i n g ; w i t h d r e w f r o m U N E S C O just as that UN s y s t e m a g e n c y w a s b e g i n n i n g to m a k e s i g n i f i c a n t progress in a d d r e s s i n g U S c o m p l a i n t s ; cast the only vote a g a i n s t a W o r l d Health O r g a n i z a t i o n r e s o l u t i o n that s o u g h t to restrict the m a r k e t i n g of infant f o r m u l a in d e v e l o p i n g countries; and even turned s o u r on the World Bank and the I M F f o r l e n d i n g and regulatory practices that were d e e m e d i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s u p p o r t i v e of free market principles. It w a s not a propitious time for US relations either with the UN or with the U N system. T h e fact that the representative subsystem for US participation in the UN was so much more openly hostile to the UN during the Reagan presidency created a situation in which it became increasingly difficult for the view to prevail that the United States had a treaty obligation to pay its assessed share of the UN b u d g e t . Initially, w i t h h o l d i n g w a s selective, as it had been in the case of the H e l m s a m e n d m e n t w h e n Carter w a s in the White House. An early and enduring example of such selective withholding has b e e n the refusal to pay that portion of the U S assessment that would have been used to f i n a n c e programs beneficial to the P L O (e.g., the Division on Palestinian Rights in the UN Secretariat and the General Assembly C o m m i t t e e on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People). Another e x a m p l e has been the withholding of f u n d s equal to the U S share of the annual cost of the Preparatory C o m m i t t e e responsible f o r d r a f t i n g rules for i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the Law of the Sea T r e a t y . T h e s e instances of w i t h h o l d i n g have different origins. T h e first is attributable to a congressional initiative, the s e c o n d to a decision taken in the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . But the result is the s a m e : n o n p a y m e n t of a small but symbolically important part of the US assessment. At least these instances of w i t h h o l d i n g are consistent with the norm developed in the financial crisis of the 1960s and enunciated in the Goldberg doctrine. They constitute refusal to pay for specific activities that the United States opposes (or believes to be in violation of the Charter). A m bassador Kirkpatrick argued the legitimacy of such withholdings in testimony b e f o r e the Congress:

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1 t h i n k that it is a p p r o p r i a t e f o r u s to w i t h h o l d c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m t h e United Nations w h e n the p u r p o s e s for w h i c h they are b e i n g s p e n t are not consistent with the g o a l s of the C h a r t e r . T h o s e a s s e s s e d f u n d s are, after all, assessed in relationship to s o m e s p e c i f i c goals, and those g o a l s are stated in the Charter, and if p r o g r a m s are proposed that are t h e m s e l v e s inconsistent w i t h the C h a r t e r and A m e r i c a n v a l u e s , I t h i n k it is a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e United States under those c i r c u m s t a n c e s to w i t h h o l d . 2 8

Whether such withholding constitutes a responsible exercise of U S p o w e r is, of course, another matter. But refusal to pay for programs that support the P L O or the Law of the Sea Preparatory C o m m i t t e e is a far cry f r o m blanket withholding. This was yet to c o m e , and it was not long in c o m i n g . T h e attack on the UN budget, as opposed to specific line items in that budget, escalated rapidly in the 1980s. Near the end of President R e a g a n ' s first year in office, the United States, for the first time in the U N ' s history, cast a vote against the UN budget in its entirety. 2 9 That this was a perfectly legal exercise of US power, an attempt to influence the UN majority and the Secretary-General to rein in budget g r o w t h , is not in dispute. M o r e over, the United States had the support of other m a j o r contributors in opposing the UN budget. But it is clear that US patience was fast approaching a breaking point. Given the prevailing attitude within the g o v e r n m e n t and the Congress, together with the steady erosion of traditional restraints, it s e e m e d probable that the United States w o u l d soon r e f u s e to c o m p l y with budget decisions of the UN majority unless significant a n d timely concessions were made in New York. Another straw in the wind was the Reagan administration's decision to begin delaying the date of p a y m e n t of its annual contribution to the U N . Reagan had c o m e into o f f i c e c o m m i t t e d to c u t t i n g g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i tures, and although the UN was not a special target (the a s s e s s m e n t w a s too small to make much of a dent in the US budget), steps taken to reduce federal s p e n d i n g and induce restraint at the UN did contribute to an und e r m i n i n g of respect and support f o r US treaty obligations. U n d e r UN rules, payment of the annual assessment in full is due within thirty d a y s of receiving the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s letter requesting it. That letter is typically sent in January. Under the c h a n g e instituted by the Reagan administration, the United States now defers payment until the fourth quarter of the calendar year. Even though this shift had only a b o o k k e e p i n g rationale in Washington, it had the effect of creating cash f l o w problems at the U N . In the early 1980s, Congress also signalled a readiness to e x p a n d the scope of the G o l d b e r g doctrine and begin g e n e r a l i z e d w i t h h o l d i n g . It passed a law that stipulated the United States s h o u l d cease participation in and withhold financial support f r o m the UN or any UN-system agency that denies participation to Israel. 3 0 T h e D e p a r t m e n t of State quickly fell into line with this congressional m a n d a t e and invoked the policy in the case of the International A t o m i c Energy Agency in 1982. 3 1

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T h i s action by C o n g r e s s reflected a g r o w i n g u n w i l l i n g n e s s to be bound by decisions of the UN majority and contributed to a sense that the United Nations and the United States were on a collision course. It also indicated that the C o n g r e s s w a s quite prepared to c o n f r o n t the UN on its own, independently of the position of the executive branch. And although the e x e c u t i v e branch inevitably had p r o b l e m s with congressional assertions of independence, its own rhetoric and actions had more than a little to do with the performance by the Congress. After all, Reagan was the first president to withhold UN assessments without congressional mandate.

The Kassebaum Amendment All of this skirmishing c a m e to a head in 1985 in the f o r m of an a m e n d ment to the Foreign Relations Authorization bill, introduced by the junior senator f r o m Kansas, Nancy Kassebaum. 3 2 It is ironic that this most serious of US challenges to its obligations under the UN Charter should be associated with Senator K a s s e b a u m . She is not, and w a s not at the time, a m e m b e r of the reflexively anti-UN c a m p in the C o n g r e s s . Most Hill watchers claim that her initiative, successful in c o n s i d e r a b l e measure because of the respect accorded her as a n o n i d e o l o g i c a l pragmatist, o w e d much to the diligent and persuasive work of a m u c h m o r e ideological m e m b e r of her staff. In any event, it was her a m e n d m e n t that c a m e to be identified with the nadir in US-UN relations. S e n a t o r K a s s e b a u m ' s a m e n d m e n t was not a i m e d at any one instance of UN m a l f e a s a n c e or any one UN position that the US f o u n d objectionable. It w a s concerned instead with an overall pattern of excess and waste, and with the fact that the United States, in spite of its role as the largest contributor by far to the UN budget, was unable to exercise proportionate influence over the global organization's spending priorities and practices. What s h e sought was r e f o r m in the process by which the United Nations approved its budget. T h e means she proposed for achieving the goal of UN reform involved an across-the-board reduction in the US contribution. T h e e a r m a r k e d withholdings, which until then had been the vehicle for expression of U S dissatisfaction, could and presumably would continue, but they clearly did not constitute sufficient leverage for genuine reform. T h e Kass e b a u m a m e n d m e n t provided that leverage. It called for a 20 percent reduction in the US contribution (from 25 percent to 20 percent of the U N ' s budget) and it stipulated that the reduction should remain in effect until the UN (and its specialized agencies) introduced w e i g h t e d voting on budgetary matters. In other words, the United States would have the equivalent of 25 p e r c e n t of the votes w h e n decisions r e g a r d i n g the b u d g e t were b e i n g m a d e . If it did not, it w o u l d unilaterally reduce its assessment to 20 percent of the UN budget.

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T h e d e m a n d that w e i g h t e d voting replace one-state/one-vote in decis i o n m a k i n g regarding the b u d g e t w a s t a n t a m o u n t to an insistence on a change in the regime for financing the UN system. In fact, regime theorists would argue that the United States was insisting on a change of the regime itself, because it w o u l d o v e r r i d e o n e of the f u n d a m e n t a l principles on which the regime was based, the principle of equality of states. Weighted voting may, of course, coexist with a r e q u i r e m e n t that d e c i s i o n s be reached by a majority (simple or extraordinary) of votes cast. That is the situation in the I M F and the W o r l d B a n k . But those m a j o r i t i e s w o u l d be very different f r o m those that have heretofore approved UN budgets. As a practical matter, weighted voting would give a de facto veto to the principal donor states if their votes were weighted more or less proportionately to the size of their contribution to the b u d g e t . 3 3 A quick glance at the list of states voting against the United Nations budgets in the years preceding the adoption of the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t makes it quite clear that those budgets would have been rejected (or tailored to satisfy the objections of the major donors) under a system of weighted voting. 3 4 So the US action was nothing less than a direct challenge to one of the U N ' s basic premises and a bold attempt to shrink substantially the scope of such centralized authority as the UN possesses under the Charter. T h e r e was, of course, no prospect w h a t s o e v e r that weighted v o t i n g could be adopted by the United Nations, given the conditions for a m e n d ing the Charter. 3 5 Elliott Richardson, chairman of the United Nations Association of the United States, said as m u c h when he o b s e r v e d that demanding what is unachievable only complicates the task of improving UN performance. 3 6 And inasmuch as Senator Kassebaum and a majority of the members of the Congress were more interested in reforming the UN than killing it, there was a willingness to reconsider the Kassebaum l a n g u a g e when the UN General Assembly responded to US pressure by agreeing to reforms in the U N ' s budget process.

The UN Response to US Pressure T h e Kassebaum amendment, coming as it did on the heels of a growing list of US withholdings for specific purposes, f o c u s e d the attention of the UN m e m b e r s h i p as few other d e v e l o p m e n t s in recent UN history had. By the time the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t took effect, the UN already faced a deficit and cash f l o w p r o b l e m as a result of various other w i t h h o l d i n g s a n d unpaid assessments by a n u m b e r of countries in respect to both the r e g u l a r budget and peacekeeping forces. 3 7 T h e Secretary-General had been reporting annually to the General Assembly on the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s deteriorating financial situation, and he had taken steps to reduce spending, including a f r e e z e on hiring, w a g e increases, and p r o m o t i o n s , and the imposition of

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new limits on travel, paperwork, overtime, and consultants. 3 8 By fall 1986, a serious question had arisen as to whether the United N a t i o n s w o u l d be able to pay its bills and meet its payroll. During its 41st Session, the General Assembly received the report of the e i g h t e e n - m e m b e r G r o u p of High-Level I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l E x p e r t s , which it had e s t a b l i s h e d during the 40th Session in fall 1985 to i d e n t i f y measures for improving the efficiency of the U N ' s administrative and financial f u n c t i o n i n g . 3 9 T h e posture adopted by the U n i t e d States had imparted a special sense of urgency to this task, and the G r o u p of 18 responded with a n u m b e r of significant r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the size of the UN Secretariat and the desirable mix of permanent and fixedterm positions in the Secretariat. However, the G r o u p of 18 was unable to reach agreement on the most important matter of i m m e d i a t e concern: T h e rules governing d e c i s i o n m a k i n g regarding the budget. In light of the not-so-subtle threat contained in the Kassebaum a m e n d ment, the General Assembly had to c o m e to closure on this issue. It did so late in its 41st Session in Resolution 41/213. 4 0 This resolution is arguably one of the most important adopted by the General A s s e m b l y in m a n y years. A l t h o u g h it d o e s not address all of the c o n c e r n s e x p r e s s e d by U S critics, it does attempt to rationalize the UN budget process. While not reco m m e n d i n g the adoption of w e i g h t e d voting on b u d g e t d e c i s i o n s , as required by the Kassebaum amendment, it called for the institutionalization of consensus at an important stage of that process. T h e UN had long been poorly o r g a n i z e d to integrate p r o g r a m m a t i c and b u d g e t a r y decisions; by strengthening the C o m m i t t e e on Program and Coordination and g i v i n g it the responsibility for making recommendations to the Fifth C o m m i t t e e of the General Assembly regarding the budget ceiling and budget priorities, Resolution 4 1 / 2 1 3 r e p r e s e n t e d an important step t o w a r d m a k i n g the UN budget a serious policy tool, independently of whether it would satisfy the US Congress. 4 1 But by calling for the adoption of these critical b u d g e t decisions by consensus, Resolution 41/213 did give the United States s o m e thing very much like a de facto veto over the UN b u d g e t and h e n c e appeared to achieve the a v o w e d objective of the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t by means other than weighted voting. A r m e d with the leverage of withholding, the United States had tried to use the bargaining process in the G r o u p of 18 and in the General A s s e m bly to gain a considerably greater measure of control over the UN budget and thus over the UN itself. As one US official put it quite candidly to the author, the United States wanted to build a machine it could drive. Stated quite simply, the United States wanted to put an end to budget m a k i n g by UN majorities. It was not clear, however, whether a consensus requirement w o u l d p r o v i d e the United States with a s u f f i c i e n t l y p o w e r f u l d e v i c e f o r blocking b u d g e t s and hence programmatic activities it d e e m e d unacceptable. Resolution 4 1 / 2 1 3 had introduced consensus only in the C P C , not in

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the Fifth C o m m i t t e e or the General A s s e m b l y meeting in plenary. S o m e skeptics argued at the time that nothing m u c h had changed, inasmuch as the C P C had customarily reached d e c i s i o n s by c o n s e n s u s a n y w a y , e v e n before the adoption of Resolution 41/213. This argument was disingenuous in 1986, and subsequent experience has done nothing to lend it more credence. C o n s e n s u s , previously an informal understanding, was c o d i f i e d by Resolution 41/213. Moreover, the procedure now obtains in a f o r m demonstrably more powerful than it w a s b e f o r e . But those w h o harbored doubts about the e f f i c a c y of c o n s e n s u s thought they had some reason to be worried. Pressures to enlarge the C P C d e v e l o p e d immediately, and the 42nd General A s s e m b l y acted, over US opposition, to achieve that objective, voting to increase the C P C ' s m e m bership f r o m twenty-one to thirty-four. 4 2 T o UN critics in W a s h i n g t o n , this development, hard on the heels of the adoption of reform legislation, looked suspiciously like an attempt to subvert that reform by packing the C P C with members w h o would insist on ambitious and controversial programs that the United States and other m a j o r contributors would then be expected to fund. Even prior to the adoption of Resolution 4 1 / 2 1 3 there had been s o m e modest erosion of majoritarian control over an area of decisionmaking that had traditionally been an exception to the prevailing unit veto system. T h e Group of 18, which played such an important role in setting the agenda for the debate in the General A s s e m b l y on budget r e f o r m , was itself not the kind of body to which the UN majority likes to entrust such important matters, given its small size and a composition that favored relatively large and " i m p o r t a n t " states. 4 3 And the C P C , with its limited m e m b e r s h i p and proportionately greater voice for states with large assessments, is a standing challenge to the majoritarian ethos. T h e decision to enlarge the C P C was unquestionably an expression of concern about the erosion of the maj o r i t y ' s authority, but it did not mean that the majority would not take reform seriously. T h e majority in the General Assembly retained the capacity to reject C P C recommendations and adopt a budget unacceptable to the United States and/or other m a j o r contributors, but the result of such a move would almost certainly have been continued or renewed withholding and a worsening of the budget crisis. US leverage remained intact, with the U N ' s commitment to consensus the best deterrent, if not a certain g u a r a n tee, against a further tightening of the budgetary screws in W a s h i n g t o n .

The US Response to UN Reform It w a s a widely held view at the United Nations that the General A s s e m b l y had gone a long way to meet U S conditions, in spite of strong resentment

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of US tactics and against deeply ingrained r e l u c t a n c e on the part of the majority to yield its numerical advantage. H a v i n g d o n e so, the m e m b e r s expected the United States to reciprocate—to k e e p its part of the bargain and pay its assessments. T h e US response to the adoption and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of Resolution 41/213 is instructive in that it demonstrated several things: (1) that budget reform w o u l d not satisfy m a n y of those w h o s e o b j e c t i o n s to the United Nations are political in nature; (2) that divisions within the g o v e r n m e n t , within the Congress, and between the two branches over US participation in the UN are deep-seated and hard to o v e r c o m e ; (3) that skepticism regarding the U N ' s commitment to reform would not be easily exorcised; (4) that policies, once set in motion, acquire a life of their own, making them hard to reverse even when the conditions that produced those policies no longer exist; and (5) that new or newly potent i n d e p e n d e n t variables (in this case the US budget deficit and the strictures of the G r a m m - R u d m a n Hollings Budget Deficit Reduction Act) intrude and affect US reaction to UN reform. Eventually the United States announced that not only would it resume full payment of its assessment, but it would pay the arrearages that had accumulated while the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t was in e f f e c t (not, however, those resulting from withholdings for specific purposes such as the Law of the Sea Preparatory Committee and assistance to the PLO). But the road to that announcement was a rocky one, which warrants c o m m e n t inasmuch as it tells us much about the U S - U N relationship and the complex process by which the United States arrives at its UN policy or policies. T h e Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t had stipulated that the United States would withhold 20 percent of its assessment until the UN adopted weighted voting. Not only had the UN not adopted weighted voting, it had approved a reform measure that did not absolutely guarantee the result the Congress so obviously had in mind. Inevitably, there were many on Capitol Hill w h o remained unconvinced that reform w a s more than cosmetic, and w h o were therefore prepared to believe that the UN could be expected to continue to do business as usual, in w a y s quite unsatisfactory to the United States. In the end, after a protracted debate on the adequacy of Resolution 41/213, which exposed the diverse motives of the supporters of the original Kassebaum amendment, the Congress adopted the position that the reform process at the UN merited recognition, but that it also required continued congressional oversight. T h e administration, which had initially been critical of the action of the Congress, took the initiative in seeking m o d i f i c a tion of the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t . T h e C o n g r e s s , r e s p o n d i n g in part to the urging of Senator K a s s e b a u m herself and in spite of m i x e d signals f r o m the administration, ultimately rewrote the authorizing legislation.

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Consensus, assuming that the C P C continued to employ it and that the General Assembly honored C P C recommendations, was to be treated as an acceptable substitute for w e i g h t e d voting. But the Congress w a s not prepared to trust either the U N ' s or the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s interpretation of the adequacy of r e f o r m . It r e j e c t e d an administration r e c o m m e n d a t i o n that w o u l d merely have required presidential certification for restoration of the US assessed contribution at a level above 20 percent, and substituted in the end a proposal by Senator Kassebaum that called for a three-stage payment of the US assessment. This formula stipulated that the president could release 4 0 percent of the appropriated f u n d s on October 1, the beginning of the US fiscal year, but that an additional 40 percent could not be released to the UN until the president had c e r t i f i e d that the UN w a s making progress in realizing reform goals (late in December, after General Assembly action on the UN budget). T h e release of the final 20 percent could not occur until the Congress had had 30 days in which to express its independent j u d g m e n t as to the adequacy of the r e f o r m s . 4 4 The 40-40-20 formula was acknowledged to be a device for retaining congressional leverage. By itself, h o w e v e r , it w a s not enough for m a n y m e m b e r s , especially those w h o saw the issue as m u c h more than the reform of the UN budget process. As a result, m o d i f i c a t i o n of the Kassebaum amendment quickly b e c a m e an exercise in laying out even more detailed conditions; it attracted a m e n d m e n t s that were to make the Foreign Relations Authorization Act f o r Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 as much of a straitjacket for the administration as the original Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t had been. T h e thrust of several of these a m e n d m e n t s is contained in the law, which made release of US assessments conditional upon presidential certification that three things had taken place. T h e president had to determine—and so report to the Congress—that: •

•

•

T h e c o n s e n s u s b a s e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by General Assembly Resolution 41/213 is being implemented and its results respected by the General Assembly. Progress is being made toward the 50 percent limitation on seconded e m p l o y e e s of the Secretariat as called for by the G r o u p of High Level Intergovernmental Experts to R e v i e w the Efficiency of the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e and Financial F u n c t i o n i n g of the United N a t i o n s (Group of 18). The 15 percent reduction in the staff of the Secretariat (recommendations 56 and 57 of the Group of 18) is being implemented and that such a reduction is being equitably applied among the nationals on such staff. 4 5

T h e first of these c o n d i t i o n s is essentially the revised version of the original Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t . T h e other two reflect perennial c o n c e r n s

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of several members w h o had repeatedly sought to use the leverage of withholding to c h a n g e UN personnel policies, especially those that w e r e deemed favorable to the Soviet Union. It was clear that the congressional concern for UN reform would not be easily satisfied by a UN decision to employ c o n s e n s u s in budget m a k i n g in a body called the C o m m i t t e e on Program and Coordination.

Confusion Compounded At the time of the adoption of the first version of the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d ment in 1985, the United States had d e v e l o p e d a modest arrearage in its UN assessment, the result of c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y m a n d a t e d w i t h h o l d i n g s for UN programs beneficial to the P L O and S W A P O , an administration withholding for the Preparatory C o m m i s s i o n on the Law of the Sea T r e a t y , and a s u m that r e f l e c t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i s a g r e e m e n t with the UN o v e r the relatively arcane matter of tax equalization. T h e K a s s e b a u m language stipulated that w i t h h o l d i n g w a s to c o m m e n c e at the b e g i n n i n g of FY 1987, O c t o b e r 1, 1986, at w h i c h time the United States w o u l d normally be paying its UN assessment f o r the c a l e n d a r year 1986. So the e f f e c t of the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t was not felt until late in 1986, by which time the General A s s e m b l y w a s s t r u g g l i n g to agree on a f o r m u l a f o r r e f o r m that w o u l d both satisfy the United States and preserve the prerogatives of the UN m a j o r i t y — t h e f o r m u l a c o n t a i n e d in Resolution 4 1 / 2 1 3 . U n f o r t u nately for the UN, K a s s e b a u m - m a n d a t e d w i t h h o l d i n g s took e f f e c t in the same year that US budget deficit reduction e f f o r t s first produced f u r t h e r reductions in the a p p r o p r i a t i o n , with the result that the United S t a t e s was able to c o n t r i b u t e only $ 1 0 0 million of an a s s e s s m e n t in e x c e s s of $200 million. This drastic shortfall in itself was problem enough for the UN; but it also meant that the base against which subsequent authorization requests and appropriations would be made was so low that, barring herculean efforts by the administration and extraordinary restraint by the Congress, the problem would only become worse. And it did become worse before it became better. T h e adoption of r e f o r m Resolution 4 1 / 2 1 3 by the General A s s e m b l y came on December 19, 1986, too late to be factored into the Department of S t a t e ' s request for f u n d s for UN c a l e n d a r year 1987. Rather than request full funding, which could subsequently have been withheld had reform not materialized, the administration reduced the request by the a m o u n t specified by K a s s e b a u m . It w a s not until July of 1987 that a s u p p l e m e n t a l request went forward to Capitol Hill, and at no time did the administration request f u n d s to meet the shortfall for calendar year 1986. Inevitably, this led to c o n f u s i o n and disorder in congressional efforts to adopt authorizing legislation. 4 6

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A s noted a b o v e , a g r e e m e n t w a s f i n a l l y r e a c h e d at the end o f 1 9 8 7 on r e v i s i o n o f the s t r i c t u r e s o f the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d m e n t . T h i s m e a n t that funds e x c l u d e d in the F Y 1 9 8 7 appropriation c o u l d be added f o r F Y 1 9 8 8 , but it a l s o meant that they c o u l d not b e r e l e a s e d to the UN until the n e w c o n d i t i o n s had b e e n met. Although $ 1 4 4 million w a s e v e n t u a l l y appropriated, neither an authorization nor an appropriation bill had b e e n passed by the b e g i n n i n g o f F Y 1 9 8 8 . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s a b l e to s q u e e z e out a $ 1 0 m i l l i o n p a y m e n t to the UN in N o v e m b e r f r o m funds m a d e a v a i l a b l e under a c o n t i n u i n g resolution; in D e c e m b e r an additional $ 9 0 m i l l i o n w a s contributed, although the payment r e q u i r e d special approval by the O f f i c e o f M a n a g e m e n t and B u d g e t and e l i c i t e d a c h o r u s o f disapproval f r o m U N c r i t i c s on C a p i t o l H i l l . 4 7 T h u s by the e n d o f UN c a l e n d a r y e a r 1 9 8 7 the U n i t e d S t a t e s had a c c u m u l a t e d a r r e a r a g e s in its UN a s s e s s m e n t o f $ 2 5 3 m i l l i o n , m o r e than $ 2 0 0 million o f t h o s e arrearages in the t w o years s i n c e the adoption o f the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d m e n t . 4 8 A l t h o u g h the F Y 1 9 8 8 / 1 9 8 9 a u t h o r i z a t i o n act, w h e n f i n a l l y a d o p t e d , provided f o r c l o s e to full f u n d i n g f o r the U N , t h e r e b y p e r m i t t i n g the adm i n i s t r a t i o n to s e e k a d d i t i o n a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n s , the U S b u d g e t s u m m i t in late 1 9 8 7 produced an a g r e e m e n t that l i m i t e d i n c r e a s e s for F u n c t i o n 1 5 0 , w h i c h includes the U N a s s e s s m e n t , to 2 p e r c e n t . T h i s a g r e e m e n t , r e a c h e d in the w a k e o f the s t o c k market c r a s h o f that fall, meant that there w o u l d b e an F Y 1 9 8 9 appropriation for the U N a s s e s s m e n t o f $ 1 4 4 m i l l i o n , the e x a c t f i g u r e a p p r o p r i a t e d f o r F Y 1 9 8 8 and a far c r y f r o m full f u n d i n g . W h i l e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e f e n d e d its r e q u e s t f o r $ 1 4 4 m i l l i o n , $ 7 0 m i l lion short o f the a s s e s s m e n t for c a l e n d a r y e a r 1 9 8 8 , it a r g u e d that it w a s m e r e l y h o n o r i n g the budget s u m m i t a g r e e m e n t , not indicating lack o f support f o r the United Nations. Just as 1 9 8 7 had b e e n taken up with a c h i e v i n g a g r e e m e n t on l a n g u a g e m o d i f y i n g the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d m e n t , s o w a s 1 9 8 8 o c c u p i e d with w a i t i n g f o r and trying to i n f l u e n c e the p r e s i d e n t ' s determination regarding UN ref o r m . In J u l y , a s e n s e o f the C o n g r e s s resolution w a s adopted c a l l i n g upon the U n i t e d S t a t e s to pay its full U N a s s e s s m e n t f o r c a l e n d a r y e a r 1 9 8 8 , 4 9 yet in A u g u s t the S e n a t e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e v o t e d to r e f u s e to w a i v e presidential c e r t i f i c a t i o n in o r d e r to permit the i m m e d i a t e r e l e a s e o f $ 4 4 million already appropriated to m e e t c a l e n d a r year 1 9 8 7 o b l i g a t i o n s . 5 0 C o n g r e s s i o n a l c r i t i c s o f the p a c e and a d e q u a c y o f U N r e f o r m w e r e num e r o u s and v o c a l , in spite o f the call f o r full funding. F i n a l l y , on S e p t e m b e r 1 3 , 1 9 8 8 , P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n issued the l o n g a w a i t e d c e r t i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h had the e f f e c t o f r e l e a s i n g the p r e v i o u s l y appropriated $ 4 4 m i l l i o n . 5 1 He a l s o i n d i c a t e d that he w a s r e q u e s t i n g full funding for F Y 1 9 9 0 and that he w a s g o i n g to c r e a t e an independent study g r o u p to s e e k w a y s to pay a c c u m u l a t e d U S a r r e a r a g e s . T h i s w a s g o o d n e w s f o r the U N , both b e c a u s e it b r o u g h t an i m m e d i a t e infusion o f d o l l a r s

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and because it seemed to augur well for the f u t u r e after two years of budget b r i n k m a n s h i p . A s e c o n d presidential certification, still necessary f o r payment of the balance due for calendar year 1988, was m a d e in late December after the General Assembly, for the first time since 1946, approved a budget resolution by consensus. 5 2 This brief account of the tortured struggle over UN f i n a n c i n g m a k e s clear that what had begun as a strategy for compelling the United Nations to pay more attention to US interests soon degenerated into a parody of responsible decisionmaking. Nor did the trouble end with presidential certification that revised congressional conditions had been met. US arrearages continued to mount even as the Congress lost interest in the confrontation with the UN; at the very time when President Bush was assiduously seeking UN support for measures that would remove Saddam H u s s e i n ' s armies f r o m Kuwait, those arrearages had climbed to more than $ 4 5 0 million.

The Tenacity of Anti-UN Sentiment How is o n e to account f o r this disorderly p r o c e s s — a process d e v o i d of leadership, a process that repeatedly sent mixed messages and too few dollars to the United Nations? One explanation is that it is extremely difficult, at least in the short run, to reverse a tide of negative criticism. T h e UN was not exactly a popular institution in the United States when the R e a gan administration took o f f i c e . But A m b a s s a d o r Kirkpatrick and her protégés in the government did much to further diminish the reputation of the global organization. O n e e x a m p l e a m o n g m a n y of the i n f l u e n c e of her s t e w a r d s h i p is the annual Report to C o n g r e s s on the Voting Practices in the United Nations, prepared by the Department of State pursuant to legislation Kirkpatrick had promoted. 5 3 This document was not intended to be a useful r e f e r e n c e f o r US d i p l o m a t s engaged in c o a l i t i o n - b u i l d i n g at the UN. T h e y would be p r e s u m e d to be thoroughly f a m i l i a r with the v o t i n g practices of UN m e m b e r s . It was, rather, a yardstick with which to measure support for US positions on critical issues and a c l u b with which to punish those states d e e m e d insufficiently supportive, presumably through reductions in foreign aid. T h e r e is little evidence that the results have been an important, much less a decisive, factor in determining the recipients of US foreign assistance; but the report helped to m a k e the point that the United Nations was a place where a great many states regularly have an o p portunity to demonstrate their lack of respect for US interests and values. T h i s annual report w a s f a r f r o m b e i n g the most important legacy of the Kirkpatrick tenure, but it symbolizes the mood of the time. The barrage of negative speeches and testimony by the ambassador and her colleagues sent a message that had resonance a m o n g m e m b e r s of a Congress already

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less than enamored with the United Nations. It was a message the administration found it hard to countermand when it decided that it wanted full funding and a better relationship with the global body. Both the president and the secretary o f state expressed their strong support for the reforms adopted at the United Nations, and Vernon Walters, who succeeded Kirkpatrick, worked indefatigably to persuade the Congress to respond positively to those reforms. In the end, Walters's efforts began to pay dividends, but it was not easy to convince the Congress, especially in light of the fact that several members of the Kirkpatrick team remained on board after her departure, their conversion to support for full funding o f the UN not entirely c o n v i n c i n g . T h e best evidence that this conversion had been largely c o s m e t i c was provided by Alan Keyes, who as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs had dutifully carried the administration's message to Capitol Hill. After resigning from the government in fall 1987, Keyes wrote a bitter op ed piece in the Washington Post, which in effect charged the government with abandoning its opposition to UN abuses and anti-US bias, thereby sending "a clear signal to the officials and delegates in New Y o r k : they can safely continue with business as usual." And, he added, "they w i l l . " 5 4 K e y e s ' s statement, together with several of Kirkpatrick's syndicated columns and a denunciation o f the UN by Charles Krauthammer in a widely discussed essay in The New Republic,55 illustrate one of the lessons from the battle over the US assessment: the administrative and budgetary reforms in New Y o r k , even if they were to prove substantial and enduring, would not satisfy many of the U N ' s critics, including a sizable number on Capitol Hill. For such people, issues related to the budget, including waste, inefficiency, inflated salary scales, and the overall size of the UN budget, were not the real cause of discontent. Their grievances seemed sure to survive long after the specific concerns o f the senator from Kansas were met. This point was made by Krauthammer when he argued: the UN problem is not an accounting problem, although it is an A m e r i c a n propensity to see l i f e ' s failures that way. . . . T h e issue is not improving U N e f f i c i e n c y . D o w e r e a l l y w a n t an o r g a n i z a t i o n m o r e e f f i c i e n t in u n d e r m i n i n g W e s t e r n v a l u e s , d e v a l u i n g the l a n g u a g e o f W e s t e r n l i b e r a l i s m , a t t a c k i n g W e s t e r n a l l i e s , c o n d e m n i n g W e s t e r n e c o n o m i c and social practices, and e x a c e r b a t i n g the f e w c o n f l i c t s to which it d o e s turn its attention?56

Krauthammer had much more to say, and his is an indictment with which many agreed, although few expressed it in such caustic and colorful lang u a g e — t h e UN " a s a playpen created by the adult powers for the children"; a forum providing "therapeutic recreation for the have-not countries"; a place whose language o f discourse " i s the twisted Orwellian

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dialect of U N e s e " ; an institution, in brief, w h e r e the US p r e s e n c e " l e n d s the outrages [of the UN majority] a legitimacy and credibility they would otherwise lack." 5 7 T h i s is the U n i t e d N a t i o n s that its detractors w e r e c o n v i n c e d w o u l d not be reformed by Resolution 41/213. One high-ranking UN official said as much to the author w h e n he a r g u e d that b e c a u s e nearly 8 0 percent of the U N ' s budget is used to pay salaries, the result of reform would be only to trim the UN Secretariat, not m o d i f y the b e h a v i o r of the m e m b e r s . Indeed, this official claimed that the reason the Third World majority eventually went along with Resolution 4 1 / 2 1 3 w a s that they realized that its impact would be on the bureaucracy, not on the ability of the majority to invoke world opinion and set the agenda. It is widely a c c e p t e d a m o n g people w h o deal with UN a f f a i r s in Washington that k n o w l e d g e of the UN a m o n g m e m b e r s of the Congress is very limited, with s u p e r f i c i a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s s u b s t i t u t i n g for t h o u g h t f u l analysis in a great m a n y cases. Although this is hardly surprising, and is almost certainly true with respect to many a c o m p l e x issue on the c o n gressional agenda, it has had a bearing on the way in which the Congress deals with UN f i n a n c i n g . T h e b e n e f i t s of US participation in the United N a t i o n s are f r e q u e n t l y hard to measure; d e f e n d e r s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t e n f i n d that their a r g u m e n t s , which stress intangibles and collective goods, do not impress m e m b e r s w h o are looking for something much more concrete to justify the annual outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars (the budget for the UN system as a whole is, of course, substantially larger than that for the UN itself, and the differences a m o n g the UN-system agencies are not always well understood by many members). There is no substantial pro-UN constituency, so that attacking the UN or t r i m m i n g its assessment is largely cost-free in a political sense. Indeed, s o m e m e m b e r s have found the opposite to be true—that there is political mileage in b e i n g a UN opponent and saving money in the process. A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d , a decision such as the one the United Nations took to build a new c o n f e r e n c e center for its E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c a in A d d i s A b a b a , Ethiopia, a s s u m e d the p r o p o r t i o n s of a last straw. Not in itself a significant i s s u e — a n d a relatively i n e x p e n s i v e one at $73.5 million—the center symbolized much that the Congress believed w a s w r o n g with the UN: It appeared to be a misplaced priority, especially at a time when the UN was under pressure to rein in budget growth; it was more evidence that the UN catered uncritically to Third W o r l d interests; and it w a s to be built in a country that at the time w a s an u n p o p u l a r Soviet client and had been m a n i p u l a t i n g f a m i n e for political ends. Senator Kassebaum made use of the Ethiopian c o n f e r e n c e center to galvanize support for congressional action to achieve reform of the UN budget process, but her initiative and the alacrity with which the Congress r e s p o n d e d must

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be viewed in the context of cumulative frustration with the UN and the nature of the Congress and the condition of relations between that body and the executive branch where money matters are concerned.

Congress Versus the Executive Branch The participation of the Congress in the process of approving the US contributions to the United Nations is, of course, constitutionally mandated. The Congress must appropriate the money with which the United States pays its assessment. If the Congress viewed payment of the assessment as a legal obligation—that is, as an uncontrollable such as payment of interest on the national debt or certain entitlements—there would be no issue. But the Congress as a whole has not seen it that way. Even so, it has not followed automatically that the Congress should see its role in the budget process as a license to challenge either the assessment or the administration's request for funding. The fact that it has come to do so is related in part to the adversarial relationship between the legislative and executive branches and to the great importance the Congress as a body attaches to the power of the purse. The Congress, like the president, is acutely aware that the budget is a most powerful policy tool and that programs are no stronger than the money available to finance them. Given its disenchantment with the United Nations and the absence of leadership with either the institutional tools or the will to insist that the assessment shall be paid in full, it is not surprising that it should try to use the power of the purse as leverage to effect changes at the United Nations and, if necessary, to force the administration's hand on the issue. The challenge to the president, or at least to the executive branch, is part of a much discussed pattern, latent in a system that divides power and invites competition, but very much in evidence since the Vietnam War. Popular as Ronald Reagan was, we were all witness to the fact that the Congress repeatedly denied the president funds he wanted in order to support the Contras in Nicaragua. And while the issue was much less visible and the stakes were perceived to be smaller, UN financing also produced a congressional challenge to presidential prerogative. No longer willing to defer quietly to the executive branch on foreign policy issues and very much concerned to maintain its own oversight of activities of which it was skeptical, the Congress found the authorization-appropriation process a convenient vehicle for managing US-UN relations. That the administration had itself engaged in UN-bashing and sent mixed signals to Capitol Hill only served to make it easier for the Congress to do what many of its members were inclined to do in any event. The tension between executive and legislative branches over UN funding cannot be explained by reference to the fact that a Republican sat in

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the White House whereas Democrats controlled the Congress. It was congressional Republicans who took the lead in stipulating the conditions that had to be met before full f u n d i n g would be restored; the Democrats, if anything, might have been expected to stake out a position more supportive of the UN than the one adopted by Reagan's team. Nor were executivelegislative tensions simply one more e x a m p l e of Vietnam-conditioned reflexes. The State Department, which has the task of d e f e n d i n g the administration's requests for UN assessments before relevant congressional committees, has frequently had a problem on Capitol Hill that transcends party lines. In part, this is simply a matter of roles and styles. Edward Derwinski, a former congressman who later served in the State Department, said it succinctly: C o n g r e s s m e n tend to approach issues that fall into black and white categories. T h e approach o f the State Department is to look at all sides, study all options, try for c o m p r o m i s e . Well, w h e n you're in the political world, you approach things in a more precise and hard-nosed fashion. Y o u either c o m e d o w n for or against aid to Turkey or Greece, for or against a base agreement with the P h i l i p p i n e s . 5 8

Derwinski might as well have been talking about the United Nations, about which many in the Congress believe the State Department (and its Bureau of International Organization A f f a i r s ) is equivocal, too ready to understand and explain the organization rather than move decisively to change it, and insufficiently diligent in pursuing matters of concern to Capitol Hill. T w o of the U N ' s severest critics in the Congress, Senator Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) and Representative Donald Sundquist (R-Tenn.), illustrated this last point in the 1980s with their scathing criticism of the State Department for its failure to take steps expeditiously to deal with the problem of alleged kickbacks to their governments by communist bloc nationals working for the UN Secretariat. 5 9 The congressional problem with the State Department did not disappear with the arrival on the scene of A m b a s s a d o r Kirkpatrick's people. The d e p a r t m e n t ' s reputation was too well established for that to happen, and it had the difficult task of simultaneously denouncing the United Nations, insisting that the administration should and could manage the troubled relationship with the global organization, and interpreting the progress of reform there. Congressman Dan Mica (D-Fla.) reflected congressional frustration when, defending the Congress against a New York Times charge that it was responsible for inadequate UN f u n d i n g , he blamed inadequate requests and mixed signals from the administration. 6 0 The institutional problem has been exacerbated on occasion by personality conflicts. One of these broke out during the period in question between the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee (Congressman

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Mica) and the assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs (Alan Keyes). Persons w h o were involved in the authorization process at the time claim that the conflict b e t w e e n the t w o men was so acute that it m a d e cooperation in that process, and hence between the two branches of government, exceedingly difficult (one participant described it as "virtually impossible"). Throughout this period of intense US confrontation with the United Nations, relatively few in the Congress were willing to rise to the d e f e n s e of the proposition that the United States had a treaty obligation to pay its full assessment. There were, to be sure, some m e m b e r s who, although not unmindful of the U N ' s flaws, remained strongly committed to the organization and to the Charter requirement that dues be paid as assessed. But they were outnumbered by their colleagues in three other discernible categories: Those w h o shared the Krauthammer view and were convinced that " r e f o r m " would only be cosmetic; those who advocated "tough love" and believed that the United States had to do something to shake up the UN, but who, having done so, were willing to give reform a chance; and those, predominantly Democrats, w h o were internationalists and supporters of the UN but w h o saw no need to take the lead in a fight for full f u n d i n g when the president's own party was disinclined to do so. This last group might be called the "tar baby" school for its aversion to becoming too closely identified with an issue with such limited appeal, especially in a time of budget stringency. T h e Congress may have been divided in its assessment of the value of the United Nations to the United States and how to strengthen the global organization, but the record is clear that it w a s c o m m i t t e d to m i c r o m a n a g e ment in this area of foreign policy, as in other fields. All of the statutory restrictions mandated by the Congress are a form of micromanagement. The Congress came to see itself as the pivotal player in the campaign for UN ref o r m . T h e president and the Department of State might have w a n t e d reform, but they were not going to make it happen; the Congress would. Senator Kassebaum m a d e the point in proposing her a m e n d m e n t , arguing that "the history of the UN has shown conclusively that it requires Congress rather than executive branch action to bring the UN and its agencies under control." 6 1 And Congressman Mica, while serving with the US delegation to the 40th General Assembly, left no doubt as to the primacy of the Congress in the process. " W e in Congress," he announced, "have every intention of reducing our financial contribution to this body unless genuine budgetary reforms are instituted." 6 2 Even in the process of a b a n d o n i n g the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d m e n t , the Congress was not prepared to turn the business of j u d g i n g the adequacy of reform completely over to the executive branch. K a s s e b a u m ' s about-face, W a l t e r s ' s intensive lobbying, K e y e s ' s departure, and a c o m b i n a t i o n of movements toward reform in New York and a residual sense of obligation

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in Washington produced in the end a partial restoration o f funding for the United Nations. But it was a restoration on the installment plan. Advocates of tough love and those who wanted to avoid the tar-baby effect were willing to put U S - U N relations back on track. But the tensions inherent in executive-legislative relations, the complexities o f the budget process, and the constraints imposed by the B a l a n c e d Budget and E m e r g e n c y Deficit Reduction Act, commonly referred to as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, conspired to prevent the U S government from moving quickly to restore full funding.

The Congressional Budget Gauntlet When Congressman Mica spoke of " w e in Congress" being determined to achieve UN budgetary reform, or Senator Kassebaum referred to the role of the Congress in bringing the UN under control, the implication seemed to be that the Congress is a monolith, speaking with one voice. This is, of course, patently untrue, as critics of the Congress's role in foreign policy are fond o f telling us with their references to 5 3 5 secretaries o f state. W h i l e the situation is considerably less chaotic than that number would suggest, the participation of the Congress in foreign policymaking is highly fragmented, and that has been an important factor in the handling o f the UN assessment, as it has been in almost every other policy area. Walter Oleszek described the situation: T h i s congressional decision-making process is constantly evolving, but it has certain enduring features that affect consideration of all legislation. T h e first is the decentralized power structure o f C o n g r e s s , characterized by n u m e r o u s s p e c i a l i z e d c o m m i t t e e s and a c e n t r a l party l e a d e r s h i p that struggles to promote party and policy coherence. A second feature is the existence o f multiple decision points for every piece o f legislation. 6 3

A s Oleszek reminds us, decentralization means that policymaking is subject to various disintegrative processes. In the case of the UN assessment, its fate is determined by six committees—two authorizing committees (the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), two appropriations committees (one in each house), and two budget c o m m i t t e e s (one in each house), together with their specialized subc o m m i t t e e s . Although these committees each have their own roles to perform in the legislative process, all o f them are involved in making spending decisions and they are in point of fact rivals in that process. T h e authorizing committees are the substantive legislative panels; appropriations c o m m i t t e e s are not supposed to make policy. But in practice they often do make policy, and in recent years, under conditions o f fiscal

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austerity, the authorizing committees have lost influence to their appropriating counterparts. In the conventional w i s d o m , the Foreign A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e and the Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e would be program advocates, their m e m b e r s typically more liberal and internationalist in outlook than the m e m b e r s h i p of the two houses as a whole. The appropriations committees would be advocates of s p e n d i n g restraint, setting up a struggle b e t w e e n the two sets of committees. However, conditions of fiscal austerity have m o d i f i e d the role of the a u t h o r i z i n g c o m m i t t e e s , m a k i n g them more negative, c o n d i tioning them to accept reduced levels of resources for p r o g r a m s within their jurisdictions. Congressional disenchantment with the United Nations has made the task easier, especially a m o n g their Republican m e m b e r s . Moreover, the budget committees have contributed to the erosion of the role of the authorizing committees, especially in the context of large budget deficits and the strictures of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. T h e congressional budget resolution, which is the product of the budget c o m m i t t e e s ' efforts, creates a framework within which other committees must work. Cuts must be made, whether by negotiated agreement or sequestration. Under the deficit neutrality of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, if more is to be spent on one program, less must be spent on another, a situation not designed to benefit departments and functions without strong constituencies. T h e problem has been compounded by the fact that appropriations for the Department of State, including international organizations and c o n f e r ences, are part of an appropriations bill, one of thirteen, which e m b r a c e s the Departments of C o m m e r c e and Justice and the federal judiciary, as well as the Department of State. In this c o m p a n y , the Department of State (including the UN) is vulnerable. During the hectic struggle to produce legislation for FY 1988, described above, the competition for appropriations between foreign relations and domestic programs c a m e to the s u r f a c e w h e n the President threatened to veto the House-passed measure because it m a d e drastic cuts in the Department of State appropriations (21 percent less than the administration had requested, which translated into a cut of $ 8 8 million in the assessed contributions f o r intergovernmental organizations). 6 4 D e f e n d i n g this action, the floor m a n a g e r of the measure, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Neal Smith (D-Ia.), noted that the administration had omitted f r o m his request a number of p r o g r a m s that were important to m e m b e r s of the C o n gress, including the Economic Development Administration, the Legal Services Corporation, and the Juvenile Justice Program. These, he explained, had to be funded, and given the budget realities, that could not be a c c o m plished unless some other programs were trimmed. Assessments for international organizations, which lacked popularity and constituency support, were among the obvious candidates. 6 5 This episode not only illustrates the perennial conflict between the two branches, it also underscores the fact

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that the budget process is a gauntlet, containing numerous points at which the UN assessment can be manhandled. Moreover, the process is one that the several committees, w h o s e e f f o r t s are already poorly coordinated, do not wholly control. Fragmentation of congressional attention to an issue such as the UN assessment is further exacerbated by the declining deference members pay to committee decisions. Rank-and-file members have increasingly resorted to legislating by a m e n d m e n t f r o m the floor. Many of the a m e n d m e n t s that have been aimed at US participation in the UN have c o m e f r o m the floor, especially at the appropriations stage, as m e m b e r s w h o do not serve on the key panels and do not claim any special expertise in the matter take advantage of the openness of the process to leave their imprint on fiscal policy or score points against the unpopular UN or both. S o m e of these a m e n d m e n t s are representative of an o n g o i n g but unsuccessful attempt to find a f o r m u l a more f a v o r a b l e to the United States than capacity to pay, and most would produce results considerably more inimical to US interests than the situation they w o u l d change. S o m e proposals seem to have been aimed at nothing less than e m a s c u l a t i o n of the UN. Although many of these obviously " h o s t i l e " a m e n d m e n t s have been rejected, others have been adopted, often by voice vote, without serious effort by the leadership to block their passage. Frequently such a m e n d m e n t s are dropped in conference, but some have b e c o m e law and even those that have not seem to have had a distorting impact on congressional consideration of US financial obligations. Many of the hostile a m e n d m e n t s , such as S u n d q u i s t ' s on kickbacks or H e l m s ' s on technical assistance or K a s t e n ' s on s e c o n d m e n t , are attributable in considerable part to another congressional d e v e l o p m e n t , the dramatic increase in staff. T h e catalyst f o r m e m b e r activism is typically a zealous staff assistant w h o latches onto a particular issue, as was the case with Senator K a s s e b a u m ' s initiative on reform of the UN b u d g e t - m a k i n g process. A case can be m a d e that the decline in d e f e r e n c e to c o m m i t t e e s and leadership is inversely proportional to the growth in size (and hence in knowledge and expertise) of staff, although the causes of fragmentation in the congressional decision process are obviously more c o m p l e x . This fragmented budget process also has had as a result the p h e n o m e non of missed deadlines. T h e Congress finds it extremely difficult to meet its o w n schedule, which calls for a budget resolution, then authorization, and finally appropriation. T h e result is that g o v e r n m e n t must often be f u n d e d by continuing resolution, which a d d s yet o n e m o r e obstacle to p r o m p t and full payment of the UN assessment. T h e deficit and G r a m m R u d m a n - H o l l i n g s have the e f f e c t of making an already c o m p l e x process even more difficult. T h e challenge to the United Nations mounted by the United States in the 1980s was both a c o n t i n u a t i o n , albeit in h e i g h t e n e d f o r m , of an old,

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f a m i l i a r quarrel with the g l o b a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f a m o r e i d e o l o g i c a l s t y l e in U S p o l i t i c s and o f f r u s t r a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g f r o m c o n straints i m p o s e d by a m o u n t i n g budget d e f i c i t . It w a s a c h a l l e n g e in w h i c h both the W h i t e H o u s e and the C o n g r e s s c o n s p i r e d . T h e form the c h a l l e n g e t o o k — a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d w i t h h o l d i n g o f a substantial portion o f the U S a s s e s s m e n t — w a s the doing o f the C o n g r e s s , and d e m o n s t r a t e d the e x t e n t to w h i c h U S relations with the U N are h o s t a g e to the p h e n o m e n a o f divided g o v e r n m e n t , the w e a k e n e d s t a t e o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , and a c o m p l e x and d i s o r d e r l y b u d g e t p r o c e s s . B u t e v e n t h o u g h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y not h a v e r e s o r t e d to the t a c t i c o f w i t h h o l d i n g a la K a s s e b a u m , and it c e r t a i n l y r e s e n t e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l m i c r o m a n a g e m e n t o f the issue, it did set the t o n e for the c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e a r s m u c h o f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d r a m a t i c increase in the U S b u d g e t d e f i c i t , a d e v e l o p m e n t that m a d e it e a s i e r to j u s t i f y cuts in p r o g r a m s with limited c o n s t i t u e n c y support. W h e n G e o r g e B u s h a s s u m e d o f f i c e , the g o v e r n m e n t had already a n n o u n c e d its intention to r e s u m e full funding and to pay the arrearages that had accumulated during the 1 9 8 0 s . T h e congressional frenzy over the United Nations had also abated, in part b e c a u s e r e f o r m s had b e e n instituted in N e w Y o r k , but also b e c a u s e c h a n g e s in g o v e r n m e n t personnel had a c a l m i n g e f f e c t and UN b a s h i n g s e e m e d to have y i e l d e d up about as m u c h p o l i t i c a l m i l e a g e as most m e m b e r s o f the C o n g r e s s c o u l d e x p e c t to gain from it. B u t the p r o b l e m s that had plagued the U S relationship with the United Nations f o r s o m a n y years had not d i s a p p e a r e d o v e r n i g h t . T h e l e g a c y o f disappointed expectations remained, now c o m p o u n d e d by a new l e g a c y : A large bill due the United Nations, a bill that w o u l d not b e paid quickly and c o u l d b e e x p e c t e d to cloud U S - U N relations well into the 1 9 9 0 s . S o m e o f the f a c t o r s that had g e n e r a t e d and s u s t a i n e d U S d i s i l l u s i o n ment with the U N in the first f o u r d e c a d e s o f that o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s e x i s t e n c e b e g a n to undergo c h a n g e at the very t i m e that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c h o s e to adopt a m o r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l s t a n c e . T h o s e c h a n g e s w e r e not due s o l e l y o r e v e n primarily to U S p o l i c y . B u t they did open up p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e t w e e n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and its m o s t important m e m b e r s t a t e — p o s s i b i l i t i e s that w e r e p r o m i n e n t l y on display during the G u l f c r i s i s of 1990-1991.

Notes 1. President Bill Clinton did propose substantial tax increases in his initial State of the Economy address to the Congress, and then faced the difficult task o f building support for this aspect of his deficit reduction plan among citizens conditioned by years of antitax rhetoric. President Bush paid heavily in political capital for his abandonment of a "no taxes" pledge; it may have been a decisive factor in

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his loss of the presidency in 1992. Walter Mondale's 1984 promise to raise taxes almost certainly doomed whatever remote chance he might have had of upsetting Ronald Reagan. 2. Seymour Maxwell Finger, Your Man at the U.N., New York: New York University Press, 1980, p. 261. 3. This distinction is discussed in Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, 2nd ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, pp. 110-114. 4. Enforcement measures under Chapter 7 constitute the most conspicuous exception. 5. See, for example, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979. 6. Article 5 countenances suspension of the rights and privileges of membership of states against which enforcement action has been taken, and Article 6 speaks of expulsion of a state that has persistently violated Charter principles. 7. The story of the U N ' s first financial crisis has been told in many places. A good succinct summary is provided in John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, 4th ed., New York: Random House, 1977, pp. 121-145. 8. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962, I. C. J. Reports, 1962. 9. GA Res. 1854 (XVII), December 19, 1962. 10. See Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, pp. 121-145, and Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 8 2 - 8 7 . 11. New York Times, August 17, 1965, A6. 12. U. S. Participation in International Organizations, United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977. 13. The action with respect to the ILO is contained in PL 91-472, and in the case of UNESCO in PL 93-559. 14. PL 92-554, October 25, 1972. 15. See Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, pp. 142-144. 16. Ibid., p. 143. 17. The fullest account of US withdrawal from the ILO is to be found in Walter Galenson, The International Labor Organization, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. US-UNESCO relations have been dissected by many; see, for example, Roger Coate, Unilateralism, Ideology, and United States Foreign Policy: The U. S. In and Out of UNESCO, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988. 18. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978. 19. Although Ambassador Andrew Young earned respect at the UN, especially among African and other Third World delegates, his penchant for what Seymour Maxwell Finger has called "open mouth diplomacy" not only hurt Carter but created problems for the public perception of the UN (for example, his comment that Cubans were a stabilizing factor in Angola and, most damaging, his remark to a reporter that "there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of political prisoners in the United States"). See Finger, Your Man at the U.N., pp. 267, 283-286. 20. This episode and the implications for US-UN relations are the subject of a brief case study in Charles W. Whalen, Jr., The House and Foreign Policy: The Irony of Congressional Reform, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, pp. 92-95. 21. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, pp. 134, 136.

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22. To be precise, the measure should be called the Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment, inasmuch as Congressman Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.), was the author of the original House version. That version was dropped in conference, so that it was essentially the language proposed by the Senator from Kansas that became law. 23. David P. Forsythe, The Politics of International Law, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990, p. 122. 24. The Heritage Foundation's studies of the UN (and UN-system agencies) included such monographs as Arieh Eilan, The General Assembly: Can It Be Salvaged? and Burton Yale Pines, ed., The U. S. and the U.N.: A Balance Sheet; such backgrounders as Juliana Pilon, Moscow's UN Outpost, and Roger Brooks, The U.N. Department of Public Information; and such executive memoranda as Juliana Pilon, Breaking the Law: The State Department Helps the PLO, and Thomas Dewey, The U.N. Makes a Deal with the Soviets. 25. See Seymour Maxwell Finger, "The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the United Nations," Foreign Affairs 62, 3 (Winter 1983/1984), pp. 436-457. 26. These remarks are reprinted in "The U. S. Role in the United Nations," Hearings, House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: GPO, 1984, Appendix 2. 27. Ibid., Appendix 4. 28. "U. S. Financial and Political Involvement in the United Nations," Hearings, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Washington: GPO, 1985, p. 25. 29. See Issues Before the 37th General Assembly of the United Nations, UNAUSA, 1982, p. 145. 30. H. Cong. Res. 322, S. Cong. Res. 68, 97th Cong., 2nd Session: Congressional Record (House), 128: HI943, May 10, 1982. 31. See speech by Gregory Newell, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, US Department of State, at the 24th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, April 8, 1983. 32. This amendment would ultimately become Section 143 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 (PL 99-93), August 16, 1986. 33. At the time the Kassebaum amendment was adopted, the United States and the Soviet Union could together cast more than a blocking one-third of the votes if votes were the equivalent of assessments. The same would have been true of the United States and Japan, or the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, or any of a number of combinations of Western countries. 34. A good illustration is GA Res. 41/211, by which the General Assembly adopted a revised budget for the 1986-87 biennium entailing an increase of more than $48 million over the originally approved budget. This practice of adding to the UN's budget has been a particular concern of the US government, and it treated this vote as one of the ten key votes in the 41st General Assembly. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 122 to 13, with 10 abstentions. The combined assessment of the 13 states opposing the resolution was 47.16 percent of the total, and the combined assessment of the 10 states abstaining was 35.09 percent. The 122 states that supported this resolution had a combined assessment totaling only 17.18 percent of the whole. 35. According to Article 108, a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly is required for adoption, followed by ratification by two-thirds of the U N ' s membership, including all permanent members of the Security Council.

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36. Quoted in the Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XI-37, November 1, 1985. 37. As of December 31, 1986, the U N ' s short-term deficit was estimated at $392.8 million, including both the regular budget and the budget for peacekeeping operations. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Financial Emergency, UN Doc. A/C. 5/41/24, October 27, 1986. 38. For a brief summary of measures taken by the Secretary-General to stave off bankruptcy in the mid-1980s, see Financing the United Nations, a UNA-USA Fact Sheet, n.d. 39. The Group of 18 was established by GA Res. 40/237, December 18, 1985. The Report of the Group of 18 is to be found in GAOR (XLI), Supplement No. 49 (A/41/49), August 15, 1986. 40. GA Res. 41/213, December 19, 1986. 41. There was widespread agreement among officials interviewed by the author, both in the UN Secretariat and in the US government, that the revised mandate of the CPC and the attendant changes in the structure of the Secretariat could contribute significantly to making the UN budget process more rational. The Secretary-General created, within the Department of Administration and Management, an Office for Programme Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring, and Evaluation, which consolidated planning/coordination and budgeting functions previously handled in different units of the Secretariat. See UN Doc. A/42/234, April 23, 1987. 42. GA Res. 42/450, December 17, 1987. The United States cast the only vote in opposition. From this time forward, geographical distribution in the CPC was to be fixed as follows: nine seats for African states, seven for Asian, seven for Latin American and Caribbean, seven for Western European and other, four for Eastern European. 43. The Group of 18, with less than 12 percent of the U N ' s membership, represented 62.68 percent of the assessment for the regular budget; five of the top six states in the scale of assessment were represented and with few exceptions the representatives from the various regions were the states with the largest assessments, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Nigeria. Similarly, even the enlarged C P C is not a microcosm of the General Assembly, but a body that gives more weight to states with relatively large assessments. At the time of the enlargement of the CPC, its thirty-four members constituted approximately 22 percent of the U N ' s total membership, but had a combined assessment of almost 77 percent of the total. 44. See Section 602 of PL 100-204, December 14, 1987. 45. Ibid. 46. This struggle is well captured in successive issues of the Washington Weekly Report of the UNA-USA. 47. Critics included, significantly, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), not normally among those in the vanguard of the attack on administration policy in this area. 48. This is the U N ' s figure. The United States regularly places its obligations at a slightly lower level. The distinction is made each year in the annual report by the Department of State entitled United States Contributions to International Organizations. For example, in the Report to the Congress for the Fiscal Year 1987, the administration identified the net requirement at a 25 percent assessment rate, then subtracted administrative and statutory withholdings and arrived at what it called "the total U. S. estimated requirement." Where the contribution is less because of a shortfall in appropriated funds, as there was for that year, the shortfall

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is acknowledged. It would seem that, at a minimum, the administration regards its own obligation as assessment less its own withholdings. 49. See Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XIV-26, July 29, 1987. 50. The vote, during markup of the FY 1988 supplemental appropriation on a request from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was eight to seven. 51. The formal determination bears the number 88-23, and is reported in the Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XIV-28, August 12, 1988. It calls attention to UN successes in the peacekeeping field as well as in the areas mandated in Section 702 of P L 100-204. 52. See Press Release from the UN Information Center, "UN General Assembly Adopts Key Budget Decisions by Consensus," January 3, 1989. 53. PL 98-164, Section 117, November 22, 1983. For commentary on the utility of this report, see Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 267-269. 54. Washington Post, January 21, 1988, p. A23. 55. Charles Krauthammer, "Let It Sink," The New Republic, August 24, 1987, pp. 18-23. 56. Ibid., pp. 19, 22. 57. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 58. Quoted in I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 282. 59. The kickback issue is addressed in Section 151 of PL 99-93, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY 1986-1987. It resurfaced in Section 703 of PL 100-204, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1988/1989, seeking in the latter case a "rental reduction" from the pay of any international civil servant who receives a housing allowance from any member state. 60. Reported in Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XIV-7, February 26, 1988. 61. See Congressional Record, June 7, 1985, S 7793. Jeane Kirkpatrick, shortly after leaving her UN post, reinforced this view in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (April 19, 1986), arguing that it is appropriate for the legislative branch to withhold contributions to UN budgets. 62. These comments were made before the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on October 18, 1985. Quoted in Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XI-37, November 1, 1985. 63. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures, and the Policy Process, 3rd ed., Washington: CQ Press, 1989, p. 15. 64. See Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XIII-24, July 10, 1987. 65. Ibid.

Chapter V

The Gulf Crisis: The United States Leads the United Nations

Most analysts of the e v e n t s that f o l l o w e d I r a q ' s miscalculated invasion and annexation of Kuwait have concluded that it was the United States that called the tune. In this view, the role of the United Nations was secondary; the United States, in a masterful demonstration of diplomatic skill, secured UN legitimation for US o b j e c t i v e s and f o r the m e a n s by which those objectives were achieved. In other w o r d s , the United States w a n t e d — s o m e would say n e e d e d — U N support and, playing the Security Council like a violin, obtained that support in a series of resolutions that were both forceful in their treatment of Iraq and permissive in the latitude they gave to US policymakers. An alternative view g i v e s m o r e credit to the United Nations. It sees the Gulf crisis as the U N ' s finest hour in a long time, and the near unanimity of the Security Council in d e f e n d i n g Charter principles and authorizing enforcement action as evidence that the global body is alive and well and ready to assume the role m a p p e d out it by its f r a m e r s nearly half a century ago. In this view, the United States w a s in the end an agent of the United Nations; its military might and l e a d e r s h i p of the coalition provided the means whereby the will of the international c o m m u n i t y w a s carried out. Just as in the p r e d o m i n a n t view the United States n e e d e d the UN, so in this view did the UN need the United States. Although the two perspectives differ, both underscore the importance of the US-UN relationship, and both a c k n o w l e d g e that in this very important test of that relationship the t w o w o r k e d well together. Because the Gulf crisis focused attention on the United Nations and US policy toward the UN as no other event had in m a n y years, there is an u n d e r s t a n d a b l e tendency to see it as a d r a m a t i c w a t e r s h e d , one of those events that wrenches the parties to a dispute out of old and unproductive patterns of mutual recrimination and c o n f r o n t s them with unanticipated opportunities

93

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for c o o p e r a t i o n . Indeed, b e f o r e K u w a i t , this w a s a relationship in the doldrums, o n e that had actually been deteriorating; after K u w a i t , a relationship o f great p r o m i s e , o n e that c o u l d b e the c o r n e r s t o n e o f a new world order. I r a q ' s invasion o f K u w a i t and the e f f o r t s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the U n i t e d N a t i o n s to f o r c e Iraq out o f K u w a i t w e r e , in important r e s p e c t s , a turning point in the U S - U N relationship. B u t it is n e c e s s a r y to note that the ground had b e e n prepared f o r the c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the United Nations and the U n i t e d S t a t e s to w h i c h w e w e r e all w i t n e s s in the m o n t h s during w h i c h the d i p l o m a t i c s c r e w s w e r e t i g h t e n e d and military f o r c e ultimately b r o u g h t to bear against Iraq. M u c h o f the U S p u b l i c m a y have b e e n surprised to s e e the United Nations p r o m i n e n t l y , c o n t i n u a l l y , and f a v o r a b l y in the news again after years o f relative n e g l e c t ; h o w e v e r , t h o s e w h o f o l l o w U N a f f a i r s m o r e c l o s e l y w e r e a w a r e that the g l o b a l b o d y w a s s h o w i n g s i g n s o f l i f e and that there w a s r e a s o n to b e l i e v e that the U n i t e d S t a t e s might well find the UN a m o r e c o n g e n i a l p l a c e to pursue its f o r e i g n policy o b j e c t i v e s than it had in quite s o m e t i m e .

Transition at the United Nations S e v e r a l f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d to this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the U N into a m o r e c o n g e n i a l place for U S interests and v a l u e s . T h e most important by far, o f c o u r s e , w a s the winding down o f the C o l d W a r and its c o r o l l a r y , the S o viet U n i o n ' s greater r e a d i n e s s to a p p r o a c h the U n i t e d Nations as an arena o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n rather than c o n f r o n t a t i o n . B u t the U N w a s a l r e a d y s h o w i n g s i g n s o f m o v e m e n t in d i r e c t i o n s f a v o r e d by the United S t a t e s — o r at least less u n f a v o r a b l e to the U n i t e d S t a t e s — e v e n b e f o r e it had b e c o m e c l e a r that the S o v i e t U n i o n c o u l d no l o n g e r sustain the C o l d W a r . T h e c h a n g e s t a k i n g p l a c e at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s — o r in the w a y s that m e m b e r s t a t e s c h o s e to use the U n i t e d N a t i o n s — w e r e t y p i c a l l y t e n t a t i v e and inc r e m e n t a l . S o m e w e r e m o r e a t m o s p h e r i c than t a n g i b l e . A n d b e c a u s e they w e r e m o d e s t and s e e m i n g l y r e v e r s i b l e , and b e c a u s e the U n i t e d S t a t e s had d i s t a n c e d i t s e l f f r o m the U N e x c e p t f o r the purposes o f d a m a g e limitation, there w a s typically a lag b e t w e e n d e v e l o p m e n t s in N e w Y o r k and G e n e v a and an a c k n o w l e d g m e n t in W a s h i n g t o n that the s i t u a t i o n had i n d e e d i m p r o v e d s u f f i c i e n t l y to j u s t i f y a r e t h i n k i n g o f the U S - U N r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e s e c h a n g e s at the U N , or in the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e within w h i c h the U N f u n c t i o n s , are several in n u m b e r , although they tend to b e interrelated. It m a y b e useful to identify s o m e o f the f a c t o r s that, with the outbreak o f the G u l f c r i s i s , helped to m a k e the U N a m o r e p r o m i s i n g v e n u e f o r the U S - l e d e f f o r t to e x p e l S a d d a m Hussein f r o m K u w a i t . M i k h a i l G o r b a c h e v ' s rise to p o w e r in the S o v i e t U n i o n led q u i c k l y and d r a m a t i c a l l y to m a j o r c h a n g e s in that c o u n t r y ' s d o m e s t i c and foreign

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policies. A m o n g the less heralded of these changes w a s a striking reversal of the Soviet approach to the United Nations. For much of the U N ' s history, as US policymakers were only too well aware, the Soviet Union had " v i e w e d the w o r l d body as little m o r e than a c o n v e n i e n t platform f r o m which to take rhetorical shots at A m e r i c a n and Western policy, thereby forging a convenient solidarity with the Third World." 1 It had been a cynical performance, c o m p o u n d e d by blatant disrespect for the concept of an international civil service, failure to pay assessments, and a lengthy litany of platitudinous proposals that M o s c o w never expected to be adopted and would have disavowed had they been adopted. Indeed, a m a j o r reason for the poor state of US-UN relations was Soviet behavior. Gorbachev moved promptly to change all that. Even b e f o r e politicians and pundits were declaring that the Cold War was over, the Soviet Union began to show a very different face at the United Nations. It abandoned the harsh rhetoric that had been a staple of its diplomatic style. It began to pay bills it had owed f o r years. It a l l o w e d nationals w h o w o r k e d f o r the UN Secretariat to seek living a c c o m m o d a t i o n s outside of the c o m p l e x maintained for its UN mission. It a n n o u n c e d that it w o u l d permit s o m e of its nationals w o r k i n g for the Secretariat to accept long-term contracts. It introduced a n u m b e r of c o n c r e t e p r o p o s a l s designed to improve the f u n c tioning of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , especially in the area of p e a c e k e e p i n g , and those proposals were clearly meant to be taken seriously. It worked cooperatively with the other p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council to launch five significant p e a c e k e e p i n g missions. In brief, the Soviet Union demonstrated by word and deed that it intended to give the United Nations a much more important place in its f o r e i g n policy and that it w o u l d approach the UN in a much more constructive and collegial spirit than it had in the past. 2 T h i s reversal was, if anything, even more startling than that of the United States, and although w e l c o m e , it w a s initially greeted with s o m e skepticism in W a s h i n g t o n . But it gradually b e c a m e apparent that the Soviet Union did indeed wish to end the Cold War, and that a different posture at the United Nations w o u l d very probably serve its interests better than the costly and largely failed policies of adventurism and military assistance in the Third World. Not only did the Soviet Union give evidence of this policy change by w i t h d r a w i n g its troops from A f g h a n i s t a n , it s u p ported the creation of the United Nations G o o d O f f i c e s Mission for A f g h a n i s t a n and Pakistan ( U N G O M A P ) , a p e a c e k e e p i n g operation with the express purpose of monitoring that withdrawal. 3 This flurry of Soviet initiatives, begun at the same time that the e f f e c t s of the Kassebaum a m e n d m e n t were first being felt at the UN, facilitated a thaw in US-UN relations and helped set the stage f o r the cooperation between the s u p e r p o w e r s , w h i c h w a s essential f o r the Security C o u n c i l ' s

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response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although that cooperation m a d e enf o r c e m e n t action against S a d d a m Hussein possible in 1 9 9 0 and 1991, it had first b o r n e fruit in 1988 and 1989 with the creation of several new peacekeeping missions, another of the important factors m a k i n g the UN a more attractive place f r o m the US point of view. In 1988, UN p e a c e k e e p e r s were a w a r d e d the N o b e l P e a c e Prize. S o m e w h a t ironically, the prize anticipated rather than f o l l o w e d the most creative use of UN peacekeepers since the Suez crisis of 1956. But if s o m e of the operations honored retrospectively by the prize had b e e n at best qualified successes ( O N U C , U N F I C Y P , and U N I F I L 4 c o m e to mind), they may have " p r e s e r v e d through a d a n g e r o u s generation of bipolarity the 1945 dream of the United Nations as the central arbiter of global security." 5 In any event, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize c a m e at a time when the United Nations was not only about to embark upon an unprecedented number of p e a c e k e e p i n g missions, but at a time w h e n the very concept of peacekeeping w a s undergoing a remarkable transformation. Peacekeeping forces were still being used to separate o p p o s i n g forces and observer missions were still being called upon to monitor cease-fires. But late in the 1980s the UN Security Council began to b r o a d e n the range of duties of observers and peacekeepers. They were charged with overseeing the withdrawal of Soviet troops f r o m A f g h a n i s t a n a n d C u b a n t r o o p s from Angola, 6 with supervising free and fair elections and the transition to independence of Namibia, 7 with the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance forces in Honduras, 8 and with monitoring of the electoral process in both N i c a r a g u a 9 and Haiti. 1 0 D u r i n g this same period, p l a n s f o r the United Nations to assume major new roles in long-running and seemingly intractable c o n f l i c t s in C a m b o d i a , the W e s t e r n Sahara, and El S a l v a d o r were also gaining m o m e n t u m . 1 1 It would be a mistake, of course, to give the United Nations all of the credit for this w e l c o m e burst of creative activity in the area of its primary responsibility under the Charter. In some situations, the parties to the conflict had simply reached the point of exhaustion and, u n a b l e to a c h i e v e their goals, were ready to c o u n t e n a n c e a UN role. In virtually all situations, events within the Soviet Union, together with their overseas ramifications, served to d e f u s e c o n f l i c t s s u f f i c i e n t l y to c r e a t e r o o m f o r a UN presence. M o r e o v e r , Soviet d i p l o m a c y w a s instrumental in p e r s u a d i n g client states to participate in negotiations leading to the c r e a t i o n of UN m i s s i o n s . 1 2 But the important point is that the United N a t i o n s w a s once again a viable vehicle for conflict m a n a g e m e n t in a n u m b e r of the w o r l d ' s hot spots, and the g o v e r n m e n t of the United States had reason to be pleased with that new reality. T h i s appeared to be the case even in Central A m e r i c a , w h e r e the United States had resisted UN e n c r o a c h m e n t for decades. With the Soviet

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Union no longer willing, and perhaps no longer able, to support c o m m u nist r e g i m e s in the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e and now p l a y i n g a m o r e benign role at the UN, the United States could more c o m f o r t a b l y contemplate the presence of UN peacekeepers in its own backyard. In s u m , the creation of these several new and varied p e a c e k e e p i n g ventures by a Security Council newly f r e e d f r o m the suspicions and paralysis of the Cold W a r m a d e the switch in US policy from confrontation to courtship of the UN considerably easier than it otherwise would have been. S o m e of the factors that facilitated resumption of a c o o p e r a t i v e relationship had little to d o with the shift in Soviet attitude t o w a r d the UN. Some, such as the muting of the North-South conflict, antedated the Gorbachev era. T h e T h i r d W o r l d ' s litany of d e m a n d s for redistribution of the w o r l d ' s wealth had by the 1980s b e c o m e a chronic source of irritation for the United States, which rejected not only the substance of most of those d e m a n d s but their underlying assumptions as well. But the c a m p a i g n for a new international e c o n o m i c order had peaked in the 1970s and was already fast losing steam when Ronald Reagan was inaugurated f o r the first time in 1981. T h e last major push came at the 11th Special Session of the General Assembly in 1980, but the global negotiations which the UN majority hoped would follow never came about. A l t h o u g h the p r o b l e m s that stimulated d e v e l o p i n g country c l a i m s against the W e s t e r n world remained, and in many cases actually b e c a m e worse, the futility of an aggressive assault on the liberal e c o n o m i c order w a s a c k n o w l e d g e d and the dialogue b e c a m e less heated and more desultory. T h e debt crisis, with its high stakes for d e v e l o p e d and d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s alike, p r e e m p t e d increasingly sterile d e b a t e about c o m m o d i t y price stabilization and technology transfer and other features of the NIEO, which looked very m u c h like zero-sum p r o p o s a l s in W a s h i n g t o n . Moreover, the debt crisis shifted attention away f r o m UN f o r u m s and the Group of 77 to international financial institutions and bilateral negotiations with the large debtor countries such as Mexico and Brazil. On the eve of the Gulf crisis, the United States w a s very much preoccupied with its o w n unprecedentedly large budget deficit and w a s less disposed than ever to treat the United Nations as a s i g n i f i c a n t d e v e l o p m e n t f o r u m . T h e fact that d e m a n d s for resource transfers and a global a f f i r m a tive action p r o g r a m w e r e heard less f r e q u e n t l y and less stridently at the UN helped to set the stage for improvement in the U S - U N relationship. A n o t h e r factor m a k i n g it somewhat easier for the United States to res u m e a c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United N a t i o n s w a s the e m e r gence at the UN of a s o m e w h a t more even-handed approach to the discussion of human rights violations as well as greater attention to the matter of e n f o r c e m e n t . A pattern had been established throughout the years whereby e g r e g i o u s violators of rights the United States r e g a r d e d as b a s i c w e r e

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e f f e c t i v e l y spared criticism for their b e h a v i o r in UN f o r u m s , w h e r e a s a handful of unpopular regimes, several of which e n j o y e d US support, were regularly excoriated—the double standard to which the United States had so o f t e n and so strenuously o b j e c t e d . But in the 1980s s o m e m o d e s t progress could be o b s e r v e d — p r o g r e s s that w a s insufficient to b r i d g e the vast gulf between the US view of human rights and that of most UN m e m bers, but progress nonetheless. As David Forsythe has observed, the U N regime had s h o w n increased balance compared with the 1 9 6 0 s and early 1970s. Independent rapporteurs and w o r k i n g groups were used to bypass the 'tyranny of the majority'; both C o m m u n i s t and Third World v i o l a t i o n s were addressed to at least s o m e extent; and n e w n o r m s and agencies were established, as on torture. 1 3

In spite of this heightened c o n c e r n f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t of e n f o r c e ment procedures and a new willingness to m a k e use of such r u d i m e n t a r y procedures in cases involving previously " i m m u n e " governments, the UN core regime on human rights remained weak and problematical. But with the amelioration of some of the worst features of the U N ' s p e r f o r m a n c e in this field and a modest if still fragile and reversible trend toward more democratic g o v e r n m e n t s in several regions of the world, the United States had reason to view the UN as a slightly less dangerous place, even b e f o r e Saddam H u s s e i n ' s aggression sent the Bush administration h a s t e n i n g off to New York in search of UN support. T h e e n d i n g of the East-West conflict and the s h i f t i n g of the NorthSouth conflict to a back burner meant that d e b a t e at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w a s less shrill and in s o m e instances m o r e civil. O n e other f a c t o r contributing to a less heated dialogue was progress toward the dismantling of apartheid in South A f r i c a . O n e of the most intransigent p r o b l e m s on the U N ' s agenda has long been Pretoria's apartheid regime. It has shared with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and opposition to creation of a Palestinian state a place at the top of any list of the most emotional issues c o n f r o n t i n g and dividing the global o r g a n i z a t i o n . No p r o g r e s s w a s achieved on the latter problem during the 1980s, but the lifting of the ban on the A f r i c a n National Congress and the release f r o m prison of A N C leader Nelson Mandela raised hopes for an early end of apartheid. T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s did not satisfy the great m a j o r i t y of U N m e m bers, w h o have annually adopted resolutions c o n d e m n i n g apartheid in lang u a g e clearly r e f l e c t i n g their hostility to the South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t and their f r u s t r a t i o n o v e r their inability to e f f e c t more d r a m a t i c c h a n g e more quickly. But they did ease the pressure on the United States s o m e what, partially d e f u s i n g an issue that had f r e q u e n t l y f o u n d U S policies under attack f r o m the U N ' s Third World majority, and never m o r e so than during the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e x p e r i m e n t with the policy of constructive e n g a g e m e n t .

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In this area as in others, it is of less note that p r o b l e m s were resolved than that the atmosphere in which debate took place b e c a m e less acrimonious. Developments that took place outside of the United Nations and had relatively little to do with anything the UN itself had said or done provided grounds for cautious optimism and reduced incentives f o r recriminations. T h e United States, of c o u r s e , believed that its a p p r o a c h had been vindicated. Whether that view is warranted or not, breathing space w a s created at the UN, to the benefit of the US-UN relationship. T h e stewardship of Perez de Cuellar as Secretary-General also facilitated rapprochement between the United States and the United Nations. The Reagan era was also the era of most of Perez de C u e l l a r ' s tenure. Although the fifth Secretary-General, like all of his predecessors, had his share of critics, he w a s widely regarded as a dedicated international civil servant and very probably the most effective executive head the UN had had since Dag H a m m a r s k j o l d in the years before the C o n g o crisis. Perez de Cuellar was, of course, the beneficiary of the lessening of East-West and NorthSouth tensions, but he also demonstrated considerable diplomatic skills in turning the thaw in the Cold War into opportunities for the UN. Not only was he a tireless and frequently effective diplomat, using his good o f f i c e s and personal representatives to facilitate the m o v e m e n t of w a r r i n g forces f r o m stubborn intransigence to wary negotiation, he also handled the prickly relationship with the United States during the financial crisis with considerable poise and patience, defending the institution and at the same time taking steps to r e d u c e the size of the Secretariat and o t h e r w i s e addressing complaints regarding organizational bloat and inefficiency. In many respects, Perez de Cuellar was the kind of Secretary-General with w h o m the United States could feel comfortable, and US criticisms of the UN were not directed at him, even if there w e r e those w h o wished he would read the riot act to the Soviet Union and be a tougher manager of a multinational Secretariat with whose habits and culture many in W a s h i n g ton had little patience. Later, in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm and amid talk of a new w o r l d order, the United States w o u l d indicate its p r e f e r e n c e for a younger and more vigorous S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l . A senior US official, commenting on US disappointment in the election of BoutrosGhali in 1991, provided a succinct and telling picture of W a s h i n g t o n ' s view of the outgoing Secretary-General, noting that his successor " c o m e s f r o m the same generation of old-fashioned, traditionalist diplomacy that Perez de Cuellar exemplified. Our fear is that he will prove to be warmed-over Perez de Cuellar." 1 4 But that w a s 1991. At the turn of the decade, when the frenzy of UN bashing subsided at the US mission and in the Congress, the SecretaryGeneral was ready to assist the transition to a m o r e amicable relationship and the United States w a s prepared to support him. Finally, there w a s the matter of budget r e f o r m . A l t h o u g h e f f i c i e n c y and m o n e y w e r e not necessarily at the heart of the U S quarrel with the

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UN, as argued by Charles Krauthammer, the inability o f the U n i t e d States to control the size or shape o f the UN budget had b e c o m e the surrogate for a w h o l e host o f U S c o m p l a i n t s about the organization. T h e r e f o r e , it w a s important at both ends o f P e n n s y l v a n i a A v e n u e that the l e v e r a g e o f the Kassebaum amendment work and that the United States gain e f f e c t i v e c o n trol over UN spending. B y the end o f the second R e a g a n term it was clear that the United Nations was c o m m i t t e d to reform, and the president so certified. T h e c o n s e n sus procedure in the C o m m i t t e e on Program and Coordination was holding, and the General A s s e m b l y had not tried to undo the C P C ' s w o r k . In addition, U S c o n c e r n s regarding the U N ' s overall budget c e i l i n g and cost add-ons after budget approval were b e i n g m e t , as was U S i n s i s t e n c e on something very c l o s e to zero growth in that budget. S i m i l a r l y , on the personnel side, Secretariat posts were b e i n g trimmed. None o f these e l e m e n t s o f the r e f o r m p a c k a g e had progressed to a point where results c o u l d b e considered c o n c l u s i v e . And there were plenty o f critics who w e r e ready to dismiss reform as w o e f u l l y inadequate or superficial or even irrelevant; they would have preferred to keep pressure on the UN through continued withholding and were doubtlessly pleased that the United S t a t e s was unable to pay arrearages quickly. B u t , on b a l a n c e , the reforms begun as a result o f U S p r e s s u r e — w h e t h e r that pressure was illegal or n o t — a l s o helped to c r e a t e a situation in which the UN w a s o n c e again a m o r e a t t r a c t i v e venue for U S foreign policy.

Residual Problems for US-UN Relations W h e n Iraqi f o r c e s poured into Kuwait on August 2, 1 9 9 0 , the relationship between the United States and the United Nations could best b e described as awkward. On the one hand it was not as strained as it had b e e n throughout much o f the previous decade, when in both word and deed the administration and the C o n g r e s s had made it c l e a r that the United S t a t e s much preferred unilateral to multilateral diplomacy and was disinclined to m a k e much use o f the UN as a vehicle for such multilateral diplomacy as it did conduct unless the global body c h a n g e d its ways. As a result o f the end o f the Cold W a r , several s u c c e s s e s on the p e a c e k e e p i n g front, the e a s i n g o f tensions over several hardy perennials on the UN agenda, and s o m e modest r e f o r m s in budget and personnel p r a c t i c e s , the UN b e c a m e m o r e a c ceptable to all but its severest critics in Washington. T h e United S t a t e s had c h a l l e n g e d the UN in about as dramatic a way as it could, short o f withdrawing, and the UN had responded in w a y s that e n h a n c e d U S l e v e r a g e . T h e S o v i e t Union had e m b r a c e d the UN and m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m , r e v e r s i n g four decades o f policy and removing a principal source o f U S frustration.

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And the election o f George B u s h , the only U S president ever to have served as ambassador to the United Nations, seemed to augur well for a further strengthening o f the US commitment to the UN. But the relationship with the UN, no longer as cold as it had been in the middle 1 9 8 0 s , was nevertheless no more than lukewarm on the eve o f the Gulf crisis. S o m e old problems, resistant to the winds of change blowing through UN chambers and corridors, continued to plague U S - U N relations. And new problems continued to surface, providing ammunition for the UN's critics in the United States and reminding all parties that the path to normalization o f U S - U N relations would be uneven and occasionally rocky. One o f the more dramatic of these reminders that the United States and the UN majority still marched to different drummers was the flap in 1 9 8 8 over Y a s s e r A r a f a t ' s plans to address the 43rd General A s s e m b l y . The government o f the United States decided not to grant Arafat a visa, a position the U N ' s legal counsel and the UN membership as a whole regarded as a violation o f host country obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. The U S position was straightforward and unequivocal: H a v i n g found that M r . A r a f a t , as C h a i r m a n o f the P L O , k n o w s o f , condones, and lends support to terrorism against Americans, the United S t a t e s f o u n d that M r . A r a f a t is an a c c e s s o r y to s u c h t e r r o r i s m and accordingly denied the visa. T h i s is an action fully consistent with the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations and this includes our right to protect our national security, established precedent thereunder, and the widely recognized, inherent right o f any host State to protect its national security. 1 5

T h e General A s s e m b l y vote on a resolution deploring the U S action was just one more in a series that demonstrated how isolated the United States could be within the global body. Only Israel j o i n e d the United States in opposing the resolution (the United Kingdom abstained), and 151 states supported it. 1 6 T h e General Assembly then repaired to Geneva for three days o f meetings so that Arafat could speak. Progress toward U S - U N rapprochement was also slowed by U S actions in Central America and the response to those actions by the General Assembly. U S policy in Nicaragua was a target o f the UN majority right up until the time o f the implementation of the Esquipulas II Agreement 1 7 and the announcement by the Nicaraguan government that it was calling general and free elections. Prior to that breakthrough in 1 9 8 9 and the subsequent creation o f O N U V E N and O N U C A , the United Nations was still roundly condemning the United States for its trade embargo and its support o f paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, demanding that it comply with the World Court's ruling o f June 2 7 , 1 9 8 6 , and calling upon it to pay reparations to Nicaragua. 1 8

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If the s u c c e s s of the peace process in Nicaragua ultimately d e f u s e d US-UN tensions on that front, the Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s invasion of Panama in D e c e m b e r 1989 served to rekindle tensions just over a month after the creation of O N U C A had seemed to usher in a new era of U S - U N cooperation in the Western H e m i s p h e r e . W h a t e v e r the m e r i t s of the US case for its invasion of P a n a m a , 1 9 the m a j o r i t y in the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y saw it as a violation of the UN Charter and strongly deplored it by a vote of s e v e n t y - f i v e to twenty, with forty abstentions. 2 " In this instance, as in the mining of N i c a r a g u a ' s harbors, the b o m b i n g of Libya, and other cases, the US conception of its rights and obligations regarding the use of force under international law clearly differed f r o m that of the UN majority. Indeed, the first p o s t - C o l d War session of the General Assembly produced a n u m b e r of resolutions that highlighted the still large g a p between s o m e of the goals and tactics being p r o m o t e d by the U N ' s m a j o r i t y and those the United States found acceptable. 2 1 T h e s e included resolutions calling for observance of international law and c o n d e m n i n g the acquisition of territory by f o r c e . 2 2 U S opposition to such resolutions, typically with very minimal support, could be explained by the fact that they were thinly disguised or even very explicit attacks on US and Israeli policies. As such, they were a reminder—if any were needed—that the Middle East remained a m a j o r s t u m b l i n g block to the more rapid i m p r o v e m e n t of US-UN relations. One year later, Saddam Hussein would single-handedly change that, at least for the m o m e n t . T h e other explanation for the tepid nature of the U S - U N relationship on the eve of the Gulf crisis was that the United States, in spite of government promises to restore full f u n d i n g and pay arrearages, had not yet made good on those p r o m i s e s . T h e administration had c o m m i t t e d itself to repayment of the arrearages over a five-year period, so at the time S a d d a m Hussein invaded Kuwait, the United States still owed the United Nations. T h e excuse, of course, w a s that the US budget deficit m a d e it impossible to retire the arrearage immediately. However, many at the UN (both in the Secretariat and in the diplomatic corps) were angry that the United States, having illegally withheld assessments and coerced the UN into unpopular c h a n g e s in b u d g e t - m a k i n g procedures, w a s n o w not f u l f i l l i n g its part of the bargain and bringing the UN back f r o m the brink of financial ruin. It was hard for many in the UN community to believe that the United States, with its great wealth and superpower status, could not find a way to meet its relatively modest financial obligations if it really wanted to. A m b a s s a d o r Vernon Walters addressed this problem with s o m e plain talk when he appeared before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International O r g a n i z a t i o n s and on International O p e r a t i o n s of the House Foreign A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e in February 1988. Speaking s o m e months bef o r e President R e a g a n certified that the c o n d i t i o n s of the K a s s e b a u m a m e n d m e n t had been met, Walters initiated what w o u l d be an o n g o i n g

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series of appeals to the Congress by the Reagan and Bush administrations for full f u n d i n g of the UN. He stated that if the United States intends to use the United Nations as a serious arm of our foreign p o l i c y in Iran/Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other areas, w e must treat it as a serious institution. W e cannot continue to neglect our f i n a n c i a l c o m m i t m e n t s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and then e x p e c t that our opinions, policies, and positions will carry their former weight in the world b o d y . T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s is not a p e r f e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l l y or administratively, from the U.S. perspective, nor will it ever be. After all, the w o r l d is hardly a perfect p l a c e , s o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s c o u l d hardly be otherwise, it is the organization of 1 5 9 independent countries w h o gather to discuss problems of c o m m o n concern. W e must work to improve the way it s e r v e s our needs, but with realistic e x p e c t a t i o n s for the results that will be a c h i e v e d . 2 3

This appeal to the Congress, so different in tone f r o m that of Walters's predecessor, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, reflected both the encouraging fact that reform e f f o r t s were under way at the UN and a p r a g m a t i c a c k n o w l edgment that the UN would be a congenial place for the pursuit of US interests only if the United States paid its dues. W a l t e r s ' s successors and others h a v e b e e n m a k i n g this s a m e point ever since, but appropriations have regularly fallen well short of obligations. 2 4 By the time the Bush administration had settled in Washington, it was possible to m a k e the f o l l o w i n g observations regarding US-UN relations: • •

•

•

•

•

•

UN-bashing by the United States, at least in the often virulent form it had assumed in the mid-1980s, had ended. T h e Heritage Foundation crowd had departed and more pragmatic and diplomatic people had replaced them, both at the mission in New York and in the State Department. Budgetary reform had taken hold at the UN, and although the results were not entirely satisfactory to the United States, the new procedures seemed to be working satisfactorily. T h e Soviet Union, in both word and deed, had begun to take the U n i t e d Nations seriously, signaling that it w o u l d no longer be a forum for waging cold war. Peacekeeping had earned a new lease on life, demonstrating not only that the UN w a s capable of making a contribution to stability in several of the world's hot spots, but that its capacity for task expansion was far from exhausted. T h e T h i r d W o r l d ' s assault on the liberal e c o n o m i c order and on Western values generally had abated somewhat, a victim of its lack of success and declining cohesion within the ranks of the U N ' s majority. D e e p divisions within the UN persisted nonetheless, some of them h a r d y p e r e n n i a l s largely u n a f f e c t e d by t h e e a s i n g of Cold W a r

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tensions and others reflecting the frustration of the majority with its inability to turn its votes into concrete results and of the minority with the hypervigilance required to defend its interests and values. T h e balance sheet s e e m e d to f a v o r both i m p r o v e d U S - U N relations and a more relevant and effective UN, although it also demonstrated that the United Nations w a s e m e r g i n g f r o m the d o l d r u m s of the p r e v i o u s d e c a d e in a financially w e a k e n e d condition and with a great many latent p r o b l e m s that could easily reverse an o t h e r w i s e positive trend. T h e f r u s tration and anger that had characterized US policy toward the UN throughout much of the 1980s had largely dissipated by the beginning of the c e n t u r y ' s last decade. But frustration and anger had not yet been replaced by an e a g e r n e s s to see the United Nations as a p r e f e r r e d v e n u e f o r the c o n duct of US foreign policy. The government said the appropriate things, and anyone inferring US policy from speeches delivered before the a s s e m b l e d nations at the UN by President Bush might have believed that the United States had espoused multilateralism with great enthusiasm. His address before the General Assembly on October 1, 1990, although obviously influenced by the Security C o u n c i l ' s r e s p o n s e to I r a q ' s aggression, is a d r a matic case in point. He began by stating that he had " n e v e r been prouder to have once served within your ranks and never been prouder that the United States is the host country for the United Nations." 2 5 A n d he c o n cluded with these words: T h e world must k n o w and u n d e r s t a n d : F r o m this hour, f r o m this day, f r o m t h i s hall, w e s t e p f o r t h w i t h a n e w s e n s e of p u r p o s e , a n e w s e n s e of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . W e s t a n d t o g e t h e r , p r e p a r e d to s w i m u p s t r e a m , to m a r c h uphill, to tackle the tough c h a l l e n g e s as they c o m e — n o t only as the United N a t i o n s , but as the n a t i o n s of the world u n i t e d . . . . T h e United N a t i o n s is n o w fulfilling its p r o m i s e as the w o r l d ' s p a r l i a m e n t of peace. I c o n g r a t u l a t e y o u . I support you. A n d I wish you G o d s p e e d in the c h a l l e n g e s a h e a d . 2 6

In fact, by invading Kuwait in August of 1990, Saddam Hussein had provided a dramatic and unexpected impetus to the further improvement of relations b e t w e e n the United States and the United Nations and to the r e e m e r g e n c e of the UN as a factor to be r e c k o n e d with in the conduct of world affairs.

Iraq: Catalyst for US-UN Rapprochement W h e n Saddam Hussein decided on a military solution to his dispute with Kuwait, it seems certain that he did not anticipate that his actions w o u l d lead to the mobilization of an e n o r m o u s multinational military f o r c e in

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Saudi Arabia and to the war that drove him f r o m what w a s to be the newest Iraqi province. Nor did he anticipate that the United Nations Security Council w o u l d adopt, one after another, s o m e of the strongest resolutions in its forty-five-year history, culminating on N o v e m b e r 29, 1990, in Resolution 678, authorizing the use of "all necessary m e a n s " (i.e., force) if he did not promptly comply with those other resolutions. 2 7 Iraq would, of course, have considered the possibility that its invasion and a n n e x a t i o n of Kuwait w o u l d lead to s o m e kind of international res p o n s e . It must have anticipated a negative reaction in many quarters; a move for c o n d e m n a t i o n by the United Nations w a s probable, considering Charter support f o r the principles of sovereignty and nonaggression. But Iraq s e e m e d to believe that its o w n claims against Kuwait and j u s t i f i c a tions for its action w o u l d override any sentimental concern f o r a nouveau riche oil sheikdom, and it certainly did not believe that opposition to its invasion and annexation w o u l d be much more than pro forma. It would, in other words, c o n f r o n t the world with a fait accompli and ride out any resulting diplomatic unpleasantness without great difficulty. S a d d a m Hussein could be forgiven for miscalculating the severity of the r e s p o n s e to his invasion and annexation of K u w a i t . T h e United Nations had m o u n t e d only one military e n f o r c e m e n t action under Article 4 2 of the Charter in its entire history, and that, of course, had occurred during the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union f r o m the Security Council at the b e g i n n i n g of the Korean War. For all practical purposes, collective security had b e c o m e a dead letter. T h e r e had, to be sure, been another instance in which the UN had imposed sanctions, 2 8 but it involved a pariah regime in Southern Rhodesia, a case that was easily distinguishable f r o m one involving a m e m b e r in good standing of the N o n - A l i g n e d M o v e m e n t and the G r o u p of 77, not to mention a respected regional p o w e r that had only recently e n j o y e d relatively b r o a d international s u p p o r t in its w a r with Iran. T h e d o c t r i n e of collective security had had no deterrent v a l u e in the years since the d r a f t i n g of the UN Charter; it had none in the s u m mer of 1992. Moreover, as William Kincade has observed, "there were many signs that might have been read as favoring the conclusion that no nation strong enough to protect Kuwait was deeply committed to its security." 2 9 Kincade has taken Richard N e d L e b o w ' s thesis that b r i n k m a n s h i p c r i s e s 3 0 are a function of both need and opportunity and applied it to I r a q ' s behavior in the Gulf crisis. S a d d a m ' s frustration with " t h e d e s p e r a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s Iraq faced and the absence of thanks and compensation for its years of sacr i f i c e " 3 1 may h a v e b e e n s u f f i c i e n t to cause him to seize Kuwait, even in the f a c e of evidence of a persuasive commitment to that c o u n t r y ' s defense. But his calculus w a s s i m p l i f i e d by the fact that his need w a s matched by what he must have perceived as an attractive opportunity.

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The politico-military e n v i r o n m e n t for s e i z i n g Kuwait must have s e e m e d very auspicious to those driven by perceived necessity and a predisposition to v i o l e n t m e t h o d s . M u c h of S y r i a ' s army w a s tied d o w n in L e b a n o n ; Jordan w a s not a factor; Saudi Arabia w a s too weak to d e f e n d Kuwait and might prefer to seek safety in its 1 9 8 9 nonaggression pact with Iraq s o as to avoid l o s i n g its vulnerable northeastern territory; Iran w a s highly unlikely and probably unable to protect Kuwait; and Egypt and Turkey were poorly positioned to assist it, e v e n a s s u m i n g that they were w i l l i n g . The U . S . and Israel were c a p a b l e of e x a c t i n g military penalties for a g g r e s s i o n , but also i l l - p o s i t i o n e d to d o s o q u i c k l y and e f f e c t i v e l y and suffered other liabilities, as well. Israel w o u l d e x p o s e itself to action from Iraq and other Arab states and had no interest in aiding Kuwait. T h e U . S . w a s hampered by a dearth of security arrangements with the Gulf states and by long lines of supply and c o m m u n i c a t i o n . There w a s no precedent at all for an international coalition as broad and e f f e c t i v e as the o n e Iraq c a m e to face, s o Saddam might plausibly think his army could withstand, wear down, or break up a smaller, less c o h e s i v e f o r c e . 3 2

Of perhaps even greater significance in S a d d a m ' s calculations were the signals emanating from Washington. While the United States was undoubtedly displeased with Iraq's human rights performance, it continued right up until the m o m e n t of I r a q ' s invasion of Kuwait to provide reassurances of US support for essentially normal relations. T h u s as late as July 1990 the administration was resisting congressional efforts to end commodity credit guarantees, close out a line of credit f r o m the US Export-Import Bank, and require the government to o p p o s e f u t u r e loans to Iraq f r o m multilateral banks. The reassuring m e s s a g e s c o n v e y e d by a g r o u p of US senators in April of that year and by Ambassador April Glaspie a week before the invasion have been extensively reported and c o m m e n t e d upon. It is clear that neither the senators nor the ambassador meant to give S a d d a m a green light for his invasion of Kuwait, but it is equally clear that what they said and what they did not say had the effect of reinforcing B a g h d a d ' s conviction that the risk of war with the United States w a s indeed very small. 3 3 Although it may be interesting to speculate as to the probable evolution of the Gulf crisis and US-UN relations had the United States taken a d i f ferent approach to Iraq in the spring and summer 1990 and demonstrated an unequivocal commitment to K u w a i t ' s integrity, that was the road not taken. Driven by a combination of perceived need and perceived opportunity, Saddam did invade Kuwait on August 2 and was almost immediately c o n fronted by an unexpected demonstration of US and UN resolve.

Diplomacy in the Security Council The UN Security Council, meeting in emergency session on the very first day of the Iraqi invasion of K u w a i t , adopted the first of what w o u l d

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b e c o m e a series of strong resolutions on the Gulf crisis. Resolution 6 6 0 c o n d e m n e d the invasion and d e m a n d e d the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops f r o m Kuwait. 3 4 While this resolution echoed the position taken that same day by the Bush administration, it was a spontaneous and broadly based response to an e g r e g i o u s violation of the UN Charter and in no way reflected pressure f r o m Washington. T h e vote w a s fourteen to zero, with Y e m e n not participating. Although it was not clear at the outset of the crisis how far the Security Council would go in invoking the e n f o r c e m e n t measures in Chapter 7, it w a s immediately apparent that the paralyzing hand of the Cold W a r had been lifted. Perhaps the most important event of this opening round of the crisis was the joint statement issued on August 3 by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State J a m e s B a k e r calling f o r the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops and urging all states to cease arms deliveries to Iraq. This statement was nothing less than an announcement that the Cold War was over and that the UN might now be able to play a significant role in crises heretofore b e y o n d the e f f e c t i v e reach of the global body. Without that message, the United States would almost certainly have been stymied in its subsequent e f f o r t s to obtain UN e n d o r s e m e n t for e n f o r c e m e n t measures against Iraq. With it, the r e s p o n s e to Iraqi aggression could m o v e f o r w a r d on parallel t r a c k s — t h e coalition rapidly being a s s e m b l e d by the United States and the broader international community represented in the UN Security Council. Most of the analyses of the crisis in the Gulf have f o c u s e d on decisionmaking within the U S government, on the buildup in Saudi Arabia of coalition forces in Operation Desert Shield, and on the decision reached in Washington to abandon sanctions in favor of war in the form of Operation Desert S t o r m . 3 5 T h e United N a t i o n s is a m i n o r player in most of these analyses, and the implication is clear: T h e real story unfolded in Washington, not in New York, and involved President Bush, Secretary of D e f e n s e Richard Cheney, Chairman of the Joint C h i e f s of Staff Colin Powell, National Security A d v i s o r Brent S c o w c r o f t , General Norman S c h w a r z k o p f , and assorted other US o f f i c i a l s , most of them m e m b e r s of the military. Even Secretary of State Baker plays a secondary role in much of the postcrisis literature, u n d e r s c o r i n g the c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m that the decision for war was made early (and unilaterally) and that diplomatic activity w a s largely an irrelevant sideshow. T h e corollary, of course, is that the United Nations w a s part of that s i d e s h o w — t h a t what happened in the Security Council was of secondary importance. This view of the crisis is understandable, given President B u s h ' s early assertion that I r a q ' s occupation of Kuwait "will not stand," his subsequent comparison of Saddam with Hitler, the shift f r o m a defensive to an o f f e n sive force posture in early November, and the transparent unwillingness of the United States to negotiate with Iraq as the January 15 deadline for

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withdrawal f r o m Kuwait approached. Students of the crisis seem to be in a g r e e m e n t : President Bush decided at s o m e point in early a u t u m n 1 9 9 0 that I r a q ' s withdrawal f r o m Kuwait w a s not enough, that S a d d a m also had to be humiliated. Inasmuch as humiliation was the o u t c o m e Saddam most wanted to avoid, war b e c a m e inevitable. 3 6 But this view of the crisis should not be allowed to obscure the diplomatic activity that was taking place concurrently. President Bush may have decided for war, or at least for a crisis strategy and tactics that made war a virtual certainty, but he w a n t e d — s o m e would say he n e e d e d — U N support. And while that support was unequivocal in Resolution 6 6 0 and relatively easy to muster in most of the other resolutions adopted by the Council d u r i n g the first three m o n t h s of the crisis, the United States paid the UN the c o m p l i m e n t of serious attention d u r i n g those m o n t h s . It assiduously w o r k e d the diplomatic channels both in New York and in capitals, seeking to maximize Security Council support for resolutions designed to tighten the screws on Iraq and compel compliance with Resolution 660. Later, a f t e r " A m e r i c a n o b j e c t i v e s a p p e a r e d to escalate f r o m getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait to eliminating S a d d a m Hussein as a threat to stability in the Gulf region," 3 7 the task c o n f r o n t i n g US diplomats f r o m A m b a s s a d o r T h o m a s Pickering to the president himself b e c a m e considerably more c h a l l e n g i n g . T h e UN had a g r e e d in A u g u s t that Iraq must get out of Kuwait and had adopted sanctions with the objective of making its c o n t i n u i n g o c c u p a t i o n of that country so p a i n f u l that it w o u l d feel c o m pelled to c o m p l y . A coalition of t w e n t y - n i n e states had c o n t r i b u t e d to a military b u i l d u p in Saudi Arabia that was intended to be a deterrent to further adventurism by Saddam and would demonstrate the seriousness of the international c o m m u n i t y ' s c o m m i t m e n t to Kuwait and to the principle of nonaggression. But the ground rules shifted for both coalitions—the military o n e in the Gulf and the d i p l o m a t i c o n e at the United Nations. As a trenchant study of leadership and f o l l o w e r s h i p in the Gulf conflict put it, "what had begun as a relatively minor and painless contribution to a multilateral e f f o r t to i m p o s e sanctions to c o e r c e Iraq into w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m Kuwait and to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia w a s t r a n s f o r m e d at least f i v e times by w a r ' s end, always at American instigation or by unilateral decision." 3 8 Although the authors of this essay are doubtless correct in their conclusion that "the f r e e d o m of maneuver for coalition members fell dramatically the moment they signed on in August 1990," 3 9 it is also clear that coalition m e m b e r s b e c a m e less and less enthusiastic about following W a s h i n g t o n ' s lead as the United States b e c a m e increasingly committed to a military solution to the problem posed by Saddam Hussein. That loss of enthusiasm was also evident in the Security Council, where m e m b e r s were confronted with a difficult choice: Continuation of the embargo, which had achieved a remarkably high level of compliance, or authorization of the use

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of force, which would effectively shift control of the Gulf crisis to the United States. During this critical phase of the crisis, the Bush administration at one and the same time resisted the e f f o r t s of other states to broker a political settlement with Iraq and pursued with rare diplomatic vigor support for a Council resolution that would legitimize the use of force by the coalition. The United States had what a m o u n t e d to a fall-back position: It could invoke Article 51 of the Charter to justify military action against Iraq. Article 51 provides that states may assist o n e another in resisting aggression and requires no authorization by the Security Council for its implementation. The Kuwaiti government was presumably willing to agree to the use of force by the United States to expel the occupying Iraqis. But Article 51 was, as B u s h ' s people well knew, a very poor alternative—useful perhaps for purposes of leverage to achieve their real objective but not an effective vehicle for sustaining broad coalition support and almost certainly a poor basis f o r mobilizing d o m e s t i c support, especially in the C o n g r e s s . W h a t the government needed, both for international and domestic purposes, was strong Security Council e n d o r s e m e n t of U S - l e d military action. In other words, the United States needed the United Nations. For a period of roughly a month prior to adoption of Resolution 678, President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, and A m b a s s a d o r Pickering were engaged in truly hyperactive diplomacy. Baker was especially busy, traveling the globe in an effort to generate support for the necessary Security Council authorization. As one detailed review of this diplomatic offensive assesses the task f a c i n g US o f f i c i a l s , " T h e y had to secure support f o r a resolution worded so as to convince Iraq that force would be used unless it c o m p l i e d with existing UN resolutions r e q u i r i n g its unconditional withdrawal f r o m Kuwait. But the w o r d i n g had to be such as, at a m i n i m u m , to avoid a veto by any of the five permanent m e m b e r s of the Security Council." 4 " This was no easy task. Of the C o u n c i l ' s other permanent members, only the United K i n g d o m p o s e d no p r o b l e m for W a s h i n g t o n . A n d the United States needed the support of most, if not all, of the n o n p e r m a n e n t members; a mere nine votes (the minimum required for passage of a Council resolution) would hardly constitute an impressive demonstration of international unity. T h e final vote for Resolution 6 7 8 w a s twelve in f a v o r , t w o o p p o s e d (Cuba and Yemen), and one abstention (China). But that result c a m e at the end of several weeks of intensive negotiations, important c o m p r o m i s e s on language, and at least one important side p a y m e n t . T h e Cold War may have ended, but the Soviet Union c o u l d not be counted as an automatic " y e s " vote. G o r b a c h e v had to contend with c o n servatives at home w h o were not prepared for a de facto alliance with the c o u n t r y ' s long-standing principal e n e m y , and he and his colleagues were

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sensitive about the Soviet U n i o n ' s reduced role in world affairs. Yevgeny P r i m a k o v , a Soviet envoy actively s e e k i n g a f a c e - s a v i n g way out of the crisis for S a d d a m Hussein, said, " w e should gather up all the things that have been said in the United Nations and the A r a b League about negotiating I r a q ' s dispute with Kuwait and settling the Palestinian p r o b l e m and give them to him in one big f a c e - s a v i n g package." 4 1 T h e Bush administration, not surprisingly, rejected this idea, insisting that Saddam could not be rewarded f o r his aggression. T h e United States f o u n d it necessary, h o w ever, to accommodate Soviet reluctance to support a resolution specifically mentioning force (hence the alternative phrase, "all necessary means," proposed by Baker and accepted by S h e v a r d n a d z e ) . A n d even more importantly, it had to accept G o r b a c h e v ' s insistence that the resolution provide an opportunity for further n e g o t i a t i o n — w h a t the Soviet president (and Resolution 678) termed a "pause of g o o d w i l l . " If there w a s to be a pause, there would need to be a deadline, and here, too, the United States had to c o m p r o m i s e . T h e date set was January 15, 1992. China proved to be less of a p r o b l e m for the United States than the Soviet Union was. It indicated early in the discussions regarding a Council resolution authorizing use of force that it did not expect to cast a veto. But in spite of its need to use the crisis to regain f a v o r in Washington and other Western capitals, Beijing remained something of an enigma throughout the negotiations. It obviously w a n t e d a quid pro quo for support of a U S - s p o n s o r e d resolution, and s o u g h t o n e by p r e s s i n g f o r B a k e r to visit China, "a high diplomatic price [for the United States to pay,] given the prohibition on official exchanges imposed by the US after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989." 4 2 Although that invitation was not accepted, the United States did invite the Chinese foreign minister to visit Washington after the vote in the Council, a m o v e generally regarded as diplomatic payment for C h i n a ' s abstention on the key resolution. 4 3 French support for the resolution can best be described as pragmatic acceptance, rather than enthusiastic support. Indeed, as Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal claim in their essay on leadership and f o l l o w e r s h i p in the Gulf crisis, " W i t h the o n e exception of Britain, no other state that joined the anti-Iraq coalition showed much zest for the increasingly military nature of the enterprise as it was being w o r k e d out by Washington over the crisis." 4 4 Although France had made clear its support "in principle" for the resolution sought by the United States, and would later participate in Operation Desert Storm, it w o u l d not a n n o u n c e its support f o r the resolution in adv a n c e of Council debate; s u b s e q u e n t l y , the Mitterrand g o v e r n m e n t put some distance between itself and the United States as the January 15 deadline approached, resurrecting the idea of linkage to the Palestinian question and otherwise seeking to revive the possibility of a diplomatic solution even after it w a s clear that the decision had been m a d e for war.

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The task of obtaining the support of the nonpermanent m e m b e r s of the Council, none of w h o m could be described as enthusiastic about the military option, was s i m p l i f i e d by the C o u n c i l ' s c o m p o s i t i o n . T h e United States held little hope of p e r s u a d i n g either C u b a or Y e m e n to support a resolution endorsing use of force, although Baker went the extra mile, paying a rare visit by a senior US official to the Y e m e n i capital and meeting with the C u b a n foreign minister. T h e s e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s did not pay off, 4 5 but they are testimony to the effort mounted by the US government as it sought international legitimacy for its Gulf p o l i c y . But e x c e p t for these two states, no other nonpermanent m e m b e r of the Council was either a friend of Iraq's or reflexively anti-American. A case can be made that the United States was lucky, especially in the fact that the African states on the Council were, as one US official put it to the author, "good Africans, not ringleaders of knee-jerk, Third World anti-US posturing." Neither Zaire nor Cote d'lvoire posed a problem for US diplomacy, and even Ethiopia, with its memory of the League of Nations' failure to save it from Mussolini's aggression in the 1930s, was "hawkish on the Gulf issue from the start." 4 *' Nor did any of the other elected members appear to pose a special dilemma for US diplomacy; in the case of each of the regions represented on the Council, it is possible to imagine those seats occupied by more difficult, intransigent states (from the point of view of Washington). Colombia and Malaysia, both nonaligned but moderate, at one point joined Cuba and Yemen in appealing for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but in the end succumbed to Baker's and Pickering's entreaties and to the bandwagon effect. On November 29, 1990, the Security Council met, debated, voted on, and adopted Resolution 678, ending weeks of intensive diplomacy and behind-thescenes negotiations. Throughout much of that time the United States had not even formally acknowledged that it was seeking a UN resolution, preferring instead to "engineer a 'rolling consensus'—a continual, cumulative and intentionally visible process intended to give those not yet persuaded the impression of inexorable momentum." 4 7 The US government succeeded in this endeavor, and the margin by which it succeeded and the absence of any demurrer when Baker declared that the words "all necessary means" constituted an authorization for the use of force make it difficult to argue that Operation Desert Storm lacked the support of the United Nations. The Bush administration had sought and obtained a critically important UN vote of confidence in its leadership of the international community's effort to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait.

The Road to War T h e story of B a k e r ' s (and B u s h ' s ) personal diplomacy during autumn 1990 tends, of course, to make the point that the United States w a s simply using

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the UN as an instrument of its own foreign policy, and that it managed to o v e r w h e l m the m e m b e r s of the Security Council with a c o m b i n a t i o n of high-pressure salesmanship and something akin to bribes. Resolution 6 7 8 would not have been adopted had the United States not w o r k e d hard for its approval; nevertheless, there is an element of c o n d e s c e n s i o n in the argument that the m e m b e r s of the Security Council allowed t h e m s e l v e s to be manipulated by the United States. Eleven resolutions specifically concerning the situation in the Gulf had been adopted before Resolution 6 7 8 w a s approved. Only three votes were cast against all of those resolutions, two in the case of Resolution 666 on September 13, 1990, and one in the case of Resolution 6 7 0 on S e p t e m b e r 26. Cuba and Y e m e n o p p o s e d Council guidelines for delivery of foodstuffs and medical supplies in the first case, and Cuba opposed expanding the e m b a r g o to include air traffic in the second. 4 8 No other state either opposed or abstained on any of these resolutions, and the cumulative record suggests that Council m e m b e r s were genuinely outraged at Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and did not need the United States to tell them how to respond to it. A b u m p e r sticker seen on US highways asserted that there would have been no hue and cry, much less an Operation Desert Storm, had K u w a i t ' s principal export been b r o c c o l i — o b v i o u s l y a product of anti-Bush sentiment. There is almost certainly some truth in its message, as evidenced by subsequent reluctance to confront Serbia over its assault on Bosnia, a state w h o s e only d e f e n s e against aggression is its s o v e r e i g n t y (rather than its sovereignty plus its strategic importance or its value as a source of scarce and critical resources). But the alacrity with w h i c h the Security Council challenged S a d d a m Hussein and ratcheted up its c h a l l e n g e to his annexation of Kuwait still suggests a strong c o m m i t m e n t to f u n d a m e n t a l Charter principles, and a willingness to go well beyond rhetorical creed protection. T h e r e s e r v a t i o n s of s o m e Council m e m b e r s r e g a r d i n g the resort to military force are understandable, in view of the fact that e c o n o m i c sanctions had been in e f f e c t for only a f e w short m o n t h s and that, in the abs e n c e of the m e a n s spelled out in C h a p t e r 7 of the C h a r t e r , the Council would necessarily have to "sign away to interested powers the operational responsibility for applying military f o r c e . " 4 9 But the m e m b e r s were able to o v e r c o m e those reservations, aided by S a d d a m ' s behavior during the cris i s — a n "in your f a c e " p e r f o r m a n c e that could hardly h a v e e n c o u r a g e d those w h o hoped for a peaceful settlement. They did have their "pause of goodwill," however, which gave S a d d a m an opportunity to m a k e a conciliatory m o v e b e f o r e the January 15 deadline. As for the manifest discrepancy between the Charter prescription for e n f o r c e m e n t m e a s u r e s and the ersatz version b e f o r e the C o u n c i l on November 29, the m e m b e r s knew that they were abdicating control. Y e m e n ' s foreign minister was quite correct when he called it "a classic example of

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authority without responsibility." 5 0 As Bruce Russett and J a m e s Sutterlin have pointed out, " T h e major danger [of such an abdication of control by the Council] is that the entire undertaking will be identified with the country or c o u n t r i e s actually involved in military action rather than with the United Nations." 5 1 A n d this is exactly what has h a p p e n e d , in the view of many critics of the Gulf crisis and war. But the tools f o r e n f o r c e m e n t envisioned by the C h a r t e r ' s framers were simply not available to the Security Council during the Gulf crisis, having been a m o n g the many casualties of the Cold War; nor w a s there any prospect that these tools could be forged in the heat of the crisis or brought to bear, untested, against a country allegedly possessing the w o r l d ' s fourth largest army and a singularly truculent leader. If in Kuwait "the UN w a s less the w o r l d ' s policeman than its sheriff deputizing a posse," 5 2 it nonetheless w a s prepared to demonstrate a c o m m i t m e n t to the spirit of collective security. If the C o u n c i l could not itself conduct a military operation if one b e c a m e n e c e s s a r y , it w a s prepared to entrust that mission to a broadly based coalition, led by the only state in a position to assume that role. In effect, the m e m b e r s of the Council seemed to be responding, however reluctantly, to the questions, "If not here, where? If not now, w h e n ? " On the day f o l l o w i n g the adoption of Resolution 678, the Bush administration proposed direct negotiations between Secretary of State Baker and I r a q ' s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. T h u s o p e n e d what w a s f o r most observers the most frustrating phase of the crisis, the pause f o r negotiations that the Soviet Union had insisted upon and most Council m e m b e r s hoped would produce progress toward settlement—a pause during which Iraq and the United States argued over the date of a Baker-Aziz meeting, the Congress debated and authorized the president to use US armed forces against Iraq, and absolutely no negotiations took place b e t w e e n W a s h i n g t o n and Baghdad. Indeed, the Bush administration never intended to negotiate, as that word is c u s t o m a r i l y understood. It m a d e clear that it w o u l d make no concessions, that Iraq would have to comply fully with all Security Council resolutions and would have to do so by January 15. A s Linda Brady observed, " T h e o f f e r to negotiate was merely the political price the administration had to pay to ensure the passage of the United Nations resolution." 5 3 It also enhanced B u s h ' s credibility by suggesting that he preferred a peaceful solution to the crisis, helped hold the coalition together, and strengthened his hand with domestic critics, especially in the Congress. Reasonable people may disagree as to whether Operation Desert Storm was necessary, or whether it was necessary when it w a s launched on January 16. A very s i z a b l e minority in both houses of C o n g r e s s believed that the resort to force w a s premature, and it seems clear that many members of the international c o m m u n i t y , including much of the Security C o u n c i l ' s m e m b e r s h i p , b e c a m e resigned to the use of f o r c e rather than enthusiastic

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about it. Soviet reticence is well documented. France, on the very day of the January deadline, made a last ditch effort to head off war and proposed that the Council agree on an international c o n f e r e n c e to deal with the Palestinian question if Iraq would agree to withdraw from Kuwait. Germany and Japan, both indisputably major powers with an interest in Middle Eastern oil, but neither a member of the Council and hence precluded from participating in the drafting of Resolution 678, were conspicuously not eager for a military solution of the crisis. M a n y G e r m a n s , f o r e x a m p l e , h a v i n g h a d j u s t - w a r r h e t o r i c r e b o u n d on t h e m in the past, proved highly skeptical of the kind of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for the use of f o r c e against Iraq that s u r f a c e d d u r i n g the crisis. Likewise, in J a p a n , t h e r e is a d e e p c o m m i t m e n t to n o n - m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , and the Gulf crisis with its o b v i o u s military d e m a n d s on all allies c a u s e d not only a kind of policy paralysis in T o k y o , but a g o v e r n m e n t a l crisis. In short, A m e r i c a n s may be c o n v i n c e d that the failure of G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n to c o n t r i b u t e to t h e G u l f W a r w a s f r e e r i d e r s h i p ; it c a n b e p e r s u a s i v e l y a r g u e d that t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e w a s d u e to a f a i l u r e of U . S . leadership, a failure to s e c u r e f o l l o w e r s h i p f r o m these states. Put bluntly, the United States failed to provide a s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t that the b i g idea w a s also a g o o d i d e a . 5 4

This author is inclined to the view that the military operation that began on January 16 was overly determined, and that William Kincade is correct in his assessment that "no combination of rational interests or strategic imperatives compelled Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait or George Bush to drive him out."55 (Emphasis added.) T h e reluctance of so many to abandon diplomacy and sanctions in favor of military action does not alter the fact that the United Nations did nothing to undermine or qualify its approval of the use of force. However much the members may have preferred a peaceful settlement, no resolution was introduced to rescind or extend the deadline. The Council seemed cognizant of the risks in appearing to equivocate on its commitment to full compliance with the twelve resolutions. T h e handling by the United States of the negotiations over whether and when to negotiate certainly tended to c o n f i r m the judgment that the Bush administration viewed "the possibility of a negotiated settlement and a peaceful withdrawal (the 'nightmare s c e n a r i o ' ) with fear, not relief." 5 6 The United States refused to treat S a d d a m ' s announcement that he would release all hostages as a positive signal, in spite of the fact that this had been one of President B u s h ' s conditions. Even more significantly, the United States rejected S a d d a m ' s invitation to Baker to come to Baghdad on January 12 for talks, even though that date fell within the time frame Bush had announced on N o v e m b e r 30. As J a m e s Bennet observed, Iraq had to regard this effort on B u s h ' s part to dictate the date on which the

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Iraqi president should receive B a k e r as a h u m i l i a t i n g and unacceptable bait-and-switch. 5 7 At the UN it was well understood that the pause of goodwill had degenerated into a charade in which "the process, rather than the underlying objectives, b e c a m e the issue" 5 * w h i l e Iraq and the coalition moved inexorably toward a military s h o w d o w n . But the Council adopted no f u r t h e r resolutions until President Bush had called a halt to the carnage in the desert. T h e paradox of general a c q u i e s c e n c e in a war that most states would have preferred to avoid has been perceptively analyzed in a recent study of the relationship during the crisis b e t w e e n the United States and the international community. It is not that the government in W a s h i n g t o n did not c o n t i n u e to act within a multilateral framework throughout the conflict. On the contrary, the Bush administration has clearly b e e n o n e o f the m o s t m u l t i l a t e r a l l y - m i n d e d administrations in the postwar period. B o t h the president and his secretary of state worked assiduously at channelling the conflict through the United Nations; at keeping in touch, o f t e n personally, with other leaders; and at w i d e n i n g the support for the anti-Iraq line. T h e real p r o b l e m w a s that leadership turned into headship, where d e c i s i o n s for the group are arrived at unilaterally by a leader w h o s e o v e r w e e n i n g p o w e r e n s u r e s that subordinates w i l l have f e w other o p t i o n s than to c o m p l y . . . . T h e leader's preferences quickly b e c o m e the g r o u p ' s by default, not by consensus. For no m e m b e r of the coalition w a s in any position to resist the o v e r w h e l m i n g inertial force of W a s h i n g t o n ' s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g o n c e it started to r o l l . 5 9

This analysis is f o c u s e d m o r e on the military coalition than on the diplomatic coalition, and it arguably overstates the case in its claim that the Bush administration has been o n e of the most multilaterally minded; however, it nonetheless makes an important point about the US-UN relationship in the Gulf crisis. A f t e r m a n y years during which the United Nations had played a marginal role in US foreign policy—years during which US leadership there had been e x e r c i s e d largely f o r p u r p o s e s of d a m a g e limitation—the United States w a s c o n f r o n t e d with a situation in which the UN was vitally important and in which US leadership of the global organization was required. It is possible to conclude that the reassertion of US leadership at the UN had three negative characteristics: 1. It was excessive, constituting little less than coercion of the Security Council into endorsing Washington's policies. 2. It was cynical, displaying a highly selective concern for the principles of nonviolence and the rule of law. 3. It was even abusive, manipulating the Council into an unconscionable abandonment of its obligation to seek the peaceful settlement of disputes.

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It is not p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , to i g n o r e the f a c t that the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s o n c e again taking the U n i t e d N a t i o n s s e r i o u s l y and a c t i n g as i f the g l o b a l body had a m a j o r role to play in the c o n d u c t o f U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In that s e n s e , there had b e e n a dramatic a b o u t - f a c e in the U S - U N r e l a t i o n s h i p . P r e s i d e n t B u s h w a s a b l e to draw upon that n e w l y e n h a n c e d r e l a t i o n s h i p in d e a l i n g with the C o n g r e s s . D u r i n g the 1 9 8 0 s the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had, in the w o r d s o f o n e c a r e e r o f f i c i a l i n v o l v e d in U N a f f a i r s , i n c i t e d a riot that q u i c k l y spread to C a p i t o l Hill and to an o r g y o f U N - b a s h i n g by the C o n g r e s s . W h e n R e a g a n , and later B u s h , s o u g h t to return U S - U N rel a t i o n s to n o r m a l ( r e a d proper, not e n t h u s i a s t i c ) , the C o n g r e s s w a s s l o w to r e s p o n d . A f t e r all, the p e r c e p t i o n in W a s h i n g t o n w a s not that the U N was suddenly doing s o m e t h i n g p o s i t i v e , w h i c h m a d e it o n c e again an a p p r o p r i a t e v e n u e f o r U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s , but r a t h e r that it had m e r e l y c e a s e d to b e as much o f a p r o b l e m f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s . B u t w h e n Iraq i n v a d e d K u w a i t , the C o n g r e s s as w e l l as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

was

treated to the sight o f the international c o m m u n i t y e x p r e s s i n g its o u t r a g e through the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . I n s t e a d o f the p o s t u r i n g and i n d e c i s i v e n e s s and d e f e r e n c e to C o m m u n i s t s t a t e s and T h i r d W o r l d r a d i c a l s that the U n i t e d S t a t e s had found s o o b j e c t i o n a b l e in the past, the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l had m o v e d q u i c k l y and e m p h a t i c a l l y to align i t s e l f with U S p o l i c y . A s a r e s u l t , w h e n the C o n g r e s s f i n a l l y g o t a r o u n d to d e b a t i n g the issue, both the administration and c o n g r e s s i o n a l supporters o f a j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g the use o f U S m i l i t a r y f o r c e in the G u l f c r i s i s w e r e a b l e to i n v o k e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 6 7 8 as a principal r a t i o n a l e f o r their position. W e c a n n o t know with certainty what the o u t c o m e o f this deb a t e w o u l d h a v e b e e n had there b e e n no UN r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g " a l l n e c e s s a r y m e a n s " to obtain I r a q ' s u n c o n d i t i o n a l withdrawal from K u w a i t . B u t it is r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that an A r t i c l e 5 1 d e f e n s e o f the use o f U S military f o r c e w o u l d have b e e n m u c h m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c ; indeed, there is a g o o d l i k e l i h o o d that the president w o u l d not h a v e g o n e to war ( a n d that the C o n g r e s s w o u l d never have had its d e b a t e or a d o p t e d its " u s e o f f o r c e " r e s o l u t i o n ) in the a b s e n c e o f R e s o l u t i o n 6 7 8 or s o m e t h i n g very much l i k e it. A s it w a s , the margin for the president w a s s l i m in the S e n a t e ( f i f t y - t w o to f o r t y - s e v e n ) . 6 0 O t h e r f a c t o r s p l a y e d an important part in the d e b a t e and the v o t e , inc l u d i n g the s e n s i t i v i t y o f the C o n g r e s s r e g a r d i n g its r o l e in m a k i n g w a r ( t h e V i e t n a m e x p e r i e n c e had not b e e n f o r g o t t e n ) , p a r t i s a n s h i p ( c o n g r e s sional R e p u b l i c a n s w e r e solidly b e h i n d their president, w h e r e a s a m a j o r i t y o f D e m o c r a t s favored continuation o f international e c o n o m i c pressure), and, o f c o u r s e , p e r s o n a l a s s e s s m e n t s o f the w i s d o m o f the p r e s i d e n t ' s switch to an o f f e n s i v e strategy in N o v e m b e r and o f the p r o b a b l e s u c c e s s o f a sanctions-first policy.

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But those w h o favored authorizing the use of US military force were able to w r a p themselves in the UN f l a g . Typical are the remarks of Rep. Bill Green (R-N.Y.): U N R e s o l u t i o n 6 7 8 , with its predecessors, is the first effort of the United N a t i o n s to function on behalf of c o l l e c t i v e security s i n c e the end of the C o l d W a r . If C o n g r e s s n o w u n d e r c u t s 6 7 8 , it w i l l l i k e l y d e s t r o y this i n i t i a t i v e to r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a s it w a s o r i g i n a l l y c o n c e i v e d — t h e v e h i c l e by w h i c h the nations o f the world work together for c o l l e c t i v e security. 6 1

A similar sentiment w a s voiced by R e p . Paul Henry ( R - M i c h . ) , w h o argued that the U S Congress ought not to put itself at o d d s against the United Nations or q u e s t i o n the c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n and actions of the Security C o u n c i l . Turning against the United N a t i o n s in this instance w o u l d strike a b l o w against the struggle to refine and strengthen international p e a c e k e e p i n g institutions that will be s o important in the p o s t - c o l d war e r a . 6 2

Senator Slade Gorton ( R - W a s h . ) sounded an even more apocalyptic note, c l a i m i n g that failure to authorize the use of f o r c e upon the expiration of the C o u n c i l ' s deadline could result in "the United N a t i o n s s u f f e r i n g the fate of the League of Nations." 6 3 T h e Joint Congressional Resolution adopted on J a n u a r y 12, 1991, makes no f e w e r than five references to the United Nations, and twice links the resolution to Security Council Resolution 678. T h o s e w h o favored the sanctions and opposed an open-ended authorization of the use of force actually included more of the U N ' s strongest supporters on Capitol Hill than could b e f o u n d on the other side. But they w e r e r e d u c e d to a r g u i n g that Resolution 6 7 8 did not reflect the true interests of the international c o m munity. Senator Joseph Biden ( D - D e l . ) put it this w a y : " W h a t model, of any f u t u r e utility, w o u l d be established by a process w h e r e b y the United Nations imposes sanctions briefly after which the United States undertakes massive and unilateral action with a veil of UN a p p r o v a l ? " 6 4 Biden may have been correct, but his w a s the more difficult case to make.

War's Aftermath Operation Desert Storm began on January 16, 1991, with the first of what w e r e to b e c o m e almost c o n t i n u o u s air strikes against military targets in Iraq. It ended forty-three days later, after more than 100,000 air sorties had

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b e e n f l o w n a n d f o u r d a y s o f g r o u n d w a r had d e c i m a t e d I r a q i f o r c e s . T h e a n n o u n c e m e n t that t h e " l i b e r a t i o n o f K u w a i t " h a d b e g u n w a s m a d e b y W h i t e H o u s e s p o k e s m a n M a r l i n F i t z w a t e r , not b y the o f f i c e o f t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , r e f l e c t i n g t h e f a c t that t h e

United

S t a t e s , not t h e U N , w a s g i v i n g t h e o r d e r s . W h e n P r e s i d e n t B u s h w e n t o n t e l e v i s i o n t w o h o u r s l a t e r , h o w e v e r , h e m a n a g e d b o t h to p l a c e t h e m i l i t a r y a s s a u l t f i r m l y w i t h i n the U N m a n d a t e a n d t o m a k e o f t h e w a r a p a t r i o t i c US mission.65 S i x w e e k s l a t e r , o n F e b r u a r y 2 7 , t h e p r e s i d e n t w a s a b l e to a n n o u n c e that " K u w a i t is l i b e r a t e d " a n d that h e w a s c a l l i n g f o r a s u s p e n s i o n o f o f f e n s i v e c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s b e c a u s e " o u r m i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e s are m e t . " 6 6 T h e war had b e e n d e c i d e d l y ( a n d for m a n y s u r p r i s i n g l y ) o n e - s i d e d . On t e l e v i s i o n s e t s in l i v i n g r o o m s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e w a r s o m e t i m e s r e s e m b l e d a v i d e o g a m e r a t h e r t h a n a v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t in w h i c h t h o u s a n d s

of

I r a q i s w e r e b e i n g k i l l e d . It g e n e r a t e d a t r e m e n d o u s s u r g e o f n a t i o n a l p r i d e in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e p r e s i d e n t w a s a b l e to s a y , o n l y a f e w d a y s a f t e r the w a r h a d e n d e d , " B y G o d , w e ' v e k i c k e d t h e V i e t n a m s y n d r o m e o n c e and f o r a l l . " 6 7 T h e s e n s e that t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f K u w a i t had b e e n a p r o d u c t o f U S - U N c o o p e r a t i o n — t h a t is, that t h e r o l e o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l in m o b i l i z i n g international c o n d e m n a t i o n o f Iraq and l e g i t i m i z i n g the m i l i tary a c t i o n that d r o v e it f r o m K u w a i t w a s c r i t i c a l to the w h o l e e n t e r p r i s e — had l a r g e l y b e e n lost s i g h t o f in t h e s m o k e o f b a t t l e and in the v i c t o r y p a r a d e s a f t e r t h e w a r . In h i s a d d r e s s a n n o u n c i n g t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f K u w a i t , P r e s i d e n t B u s h did s a y that " t h i s is a v i c t o r y f o r the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , f o r a l l m a n k i n d , f o r t h e r u l e o f l a w , a n d f o r w h a t is r i g h t . " 6 8 H e c o u l d h a r d l y have said less. But o n c e the shooting started, the United Nations faded f r o m the p i c t u r e , not to r e a p p e a r until the a d o p t i o n b y the S e c u r i t y C o u n cil o f the f i r s t i m p o r t a n t p o s t w a r r e s o l u t i o n s , 6 8 6 o n M a r c h 2 a n d 6 8 7 o n April 3, 1 9 9 1 . 6 9 E a r l y in F e b r u a r y , a f t e r m o r e than t h r e e w e e k s o f i n t e n s i v e b o m b i n g o f Iraqi t a r g e t s , S o v i e t P r e s i d e n t G o r b a c h e v e x p r e s s e d his c o n c e r n that t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s t h r e a t e n e d t o e x c e e d the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s m a n d a t e ; on the e v e o f t h e land w a r , a n d a f t e r t a l k s b e t w e e n the S o v i e t a n d Iraqi f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s , G o r b a c h e v put f o r w a r d a p e a c e p r o p o s a l that w o u l d h a v e had t h e e f f e c t o f r e p e a l i n g t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s r e s o l u t i o n s in return f o r I r a q ' s prompt and u n c o n d i t i o n a l withdrawal f r o m K u w a i t . 7 0 B u t this m a n e u v e r w a s v i e w e d in W a s h i n g t o n a s an a t t e m p t o n M o s c o w ' s p a r t t o g u a r a n t e e S a d d a m ' s s u r v i v a l a n d p r e s e r v e its o w n i n f l u e n c e in t h e r e g i o n . T h e Bush administration, now confident o f a decisive military victory and o p e n l y p r o m o t i n g t h e o v e r t h r o w o f S a d d a m , w a s n o t a b o u t to c e d e c o n t r o l o f e v e n t s in t h e G u l f to a n y o n e e l s e . N o t h i n g c a m e o f the G o r b a c h e v i n i t i a t i v e , a n d G e n e r a l S c h w a r z k o p f ' s t a n k s r o l l e d a c c o r d i n g to p l a n on F e b ruary 2 4 .

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The Gulf W a r suggests that Russett and Sutterlin were quite right to be concerned that, in the absence of Security Council control, military action taken in the n a m e of the United Nations will be associated with the states providing the planes and the troops rather than with the UN. 7 1 That w a s certainly the case with most of the US public and the media, and even the g o v e r n m e n t scarcely paid lip service to the U N ' s role once the war began or its role in the decision to end it. Moreover, the Bush administration had obviously c o m e to the conclusion that the d e m a n d s m a d e upon Iraq in Security Council resolutions 660 through 6 7 8 were insufficient. Although it repeatedly invoked those resolutions and insisted that S a d d a m comply promptly and unconditionally with all of them, it also began the process of ratcheting up its o w n expectations as to the postwar situation in Iraq. At no time did President Bush unilaterally m a k e new d e m a n d s upon Iraq, but he made no secret of the fact that he wanted Saddam to be deposed and the threat posed by I r a q ' s w e a p o n s of m a s s destruction, especially those of an " u n c o n v e n t i o n a l " character, eliminated. The potential for a rift between the United States and the United Nations w a s very much present during the war. T h e w i s d o m of the decision to end the war b e f o r e the c o m p l e t e destruction of the Iraqi military and without a s w e e p to B a g h d a d has been much debated. T h e tenacity with which Saddam retained power, the roadblocks he placed in the way of efforts to achieve the objectives of Security Council Resolution 687, and the brutal way in which he suppressed dissident p o p u l a t i o n s in the country inevitably led to s e c o n d - g u e s s i n g of the president's decision to end the war when he did. But that decision was entirely consistent with the Council resolutions under which the war w a s fought, and a failure to halt the slaughter when it was clear that the objective of liberating Kuwait had been achieved would almost certainly have provoked a split between the United States and the United Nations. 7 2 With the war won, however, the Bush administration had no desire to establish a US imperium in the Gulf region. It had no wish to see the disintegration of Iraq, an event it believed would be destabilizing for the entire region. And it certainly did not want to create a situation in which " U S forces would become b o g g e d down in Iraqi politics," the liberators turning into "an unwanted army of occupation." 7 3 T h e White House continued to entertain the hope that S a d d a m would be overthrown, but its primary concern a f t e r the war w a s that Iraq w o u l d not again be able to threaten its neighbors. T h u s , although the United States may have pressed reluctant Security Council m e m b e r s into a c c e p t a n c e of a military solution of the problem posed by Iraq, conducted the war on its own terms without further consultation with Council members, and treated Operation Desert Storm as a glorious triumph for US arms, it did not sever or seriously j e o p a r d i z e the UN c o n n e c t i o n . W h e n it c a m e time for the Council to establish a f o r m a l

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Nations

cease-fire and d e f i n e I r a q ' s postwar obligations, the United States f o u n d that the broad consensus that had existed within the United Nations during the previous s u m m e r and fall had survived the war. T h e United States sought and r e c e i v e d strong Security Council e n dorsement for a resolution that made unprecedented d e m a n d s on Iraq. Far f r o m taking the position that with Kuwait liberated the international c o m munity could forgive and forget, Resolution 687, which has been referred to as "the mother of all r e s o l u t i o n s , " presented the most a m b i t i o u s , f a r reaching challenge to the prerogatives of a sovereign state ever adopted by the Council. T h i s resolution may, of c o u r s e , be v i e w e d s i m p l y as the C o u n c i l ' s attempt to close the b o o k on the collective security e x e r c i s e begun almost eight m o n t h s to the day earlier with Resolution 660. B u t Resolution 687 does much more than merely tidy up the loose ends of this first p o s t - C o l d War application of Chapter 7. By April 1991 there was no longer an act of aggression or a breach of the peace to contend with. Saddam Hussein's forces had been expelled from Kuwait. What remained, in the j u d g m e n t of twelve of the C o u n c i l ' s m e m b e r s (Cuba o p p o s e d 687 as it had 678, and Yemen and Ecuador abstained), was the threat to the peace posed by Iraq's residual military capability, especially in view of the continued presence in Baghdad of a regime that could not be trusted to respect the rights of neighboring states. T h e Council was, in e f f e c t , s a y i n g that once Chapter 7 has been invoked, it constitutes a hunting license, which does not expire once an act of aggression has been undone. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the UN may act intrusively with respect to a s t a t e ' s sovereignty not only to c o m pel that state to give up its ill-gotten gains and r e n o u n c e the policies the international c o m m u n i t y has f o u n d o f f e n s i v e , but also to m a k e sure that that state does not maintain or acquire the capability to pose such a threat again. Whether this is viewed as punishment for past o f f e n s e s or as a f o r m of prior restraint, it certainly presents a vigorous challenge to the prerogatives of the sovereign state, as Iraq was quick to point out. Iraq may not, as Baghdad has argued, have been reduced by Resolution 687 to some kind of international trusteeship, but it was placed under Council orders to do some things (and not to do others) that lie well within areas in which sovereign states have traditionally brooked no outside interference. Specifically, Iraq w a s required: • •

T o agree to the destruction or removal of all of its chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles of a certain range To allow a UN commission to inventory its chemical and biological w e a p o n s and ballistic missile sites and oversee destruction of its missile systems and launchers and take charge of all chemical and biological weapons and sites

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• To submit to the Secretary-General a list of its nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material and related facilities, and to place all of its nuclear weapons-usable material under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency for custody and removal • To open itself to on-site inspection of its nuclear weapons capabilities so that the Secretary-General may develop a plan for their destruction • To declare that it will not acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles in the future, and submit to ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance Resolution 687 also enlarged upon the original Council objective of making Kuwait whole by initiating an embargo on conventional armaments, weapons of mass destruction, missiles, licensing and technology transfer, and personnel or materials for training, technical support, and maintenance. In effect, the Security Council was determining the nature of Iraq's military capabilities, at least in the negative sense of stipulating that certain weapons would not be part of its arsenal. Finally, Resolution 687 asserted Council control over decisions affecting the economic life of the state by decreeing that a percentage of Iraq's oil revenues were to go into a fund to compensate for losses and damages for which it was deemed liable. Both the ends and the means outlined in Resolution 687 were unprecedentedly intrusive, and went well beyond the agenda of enforcement spelled out in resolutions 660 through 678. To be sure, Resolution 678 did authorize the use of "all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (emphasis added). It is possible to argue that just as these words contemplated the use of force, so did they contemplate the dismantling of Iraq's offensive military capability if that was the only way to ensure a restoration of peace and security in the area. But although the measures stipulated in 687, taken together, may have been a logical (and most would say a necessary) next step, considering Iraq's defiance of Charter principles and Council resolutions and its reckless performance during the crisis, they still constitute a remarkable challenge to the prerogatives of a sovereign state. That this path-breaking resolution was adopted with a minimum of acrimony seems to suggest that the Council members were seized with the historic importance of the situation—that they were determined that the United Nations should regain control of the crisis and demonstrate both its willingness and its capacity to play a pivotal role in the maintenance of what President Bush had referred to as a new world order. The alternative, after all, was that that new world order would turn out to be nothing more than Pax Americana.

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Resolution 687 thus reflected a convergence of US and UN interests. Neither wanted a return to the status quo ante. The United States w a n t e d a militarily declawed Iraq, but w a s not prepared to undertake the task itself. T h e United Nations, or at least the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y of the members of the Security Council, were desirous of resassuming the initiative, which had passed to the United States during the winter months. T h e so-called Big Five, in spite of their d i f f e r e n c e s , had w o r k e d reasonably well together during the crisis and had discovered the s a t i s f a c t i o n s of shared power and influence during that crisis; the postwar situation in Iraq provided an opportunity for a continuation of that role. A n d although all UN m e m b e r s , and especially those in the Third World, were understandably uneasy about c o m p r o m i s i n g the principle of nonintervention c o n tained in Article 2 (7), it was not difficult to make the case that the measures contained in Resolution 6 8 7 were part of a c o n t i n u u m , begun with Resolution 6 6 0 and necessitated by the challenge Iraq had posed to the equally basic Charter principle found in Article 2 (4). If the Gulf crisis is broken down into three p h a s e s — I r a q ' s invasion of Kuwait until the launching of Operation Desert Storm, the war itself, and postwar efforts to bring the crisis to satisfactory closure—it is the third phase that has been the most frustrating for both the United States and the United Nations. T h e problem has not been that there has been a serious falling out between the United States and the other members of the Security Council, although there have inevitably been some tense diplomatic moments; the principal difficulty has been that Iraq has proved to be a most recalcitrant adversary, even in defeat. Saddam Hussein has both challenged the patience of the international community and appealed to its humanitarian instincts, confident that neither the United States nor the Security Council has any stomach for resuming military action. He has seemed convinced that anxiety about UN e n c r o a c h m e n t upon matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the state, together with latent frustration with W a s h i n g t o n ' s double standard in the region, would in time lead to a reassessment of the crisis and a less judgmental view of Iraq's policies. T h e postwar period has been characterized by repeated e f f o r t s by Iraq to frustrate UN officials in the discharge of their duties under Resolution 687. T h e U N ' s Special C o m m i s s i o n tasked with overseeing elimination of Iraq's w e a p o n s of mass destruction had first to identify and locate those w e a p o n s and the facilities for p r o d u c i n g them, and the Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t did what it could to m a k e that mission as difficult as possible. It was this phase of the Special C o m m i s s i o n ' s work that produced the early and much publicized detention of UN inspectors in possession of secret nuclear documents in a Baghdad parking lot and the subsequent refusal to permit their access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Since that time, S a d d a m has repeatedly tested the will of the Security Council. He has challenged its agents

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in their work of destroying or r e m o v i n g the w e a p o n s and the facilities f o r building and using them, and he has fought its e f f o r t s to establish the controls necessary to ensure v e r i f i c a t i o n of his c o m p l i a n c e with Resolution 687. T h e United States invariably took the lead in insisting that sanctions be kept in place until the o b j e c t i v e s of Resolution 6 8 7 w e r e fully satisf i e d . W h e n a s k e d how the Special C o m m i s s i o n w o u l d k n o w w h e n that goal has been r e a c h e d , its head, Rolf E k e u s , t e s t i f i e d to the nature of the p r o b l e m : W h e n those w e a p o n s are eliminated or r e m o v e d from Iraq and there is a s o l i d control s y s t e m in p l a c e to e n s u r e that Iraq w i l l not a c q u i r e n e w w e a p o n s , then the time is right for c o n s i d e r i n g lifting the sanctions. . . . Our task is to d o a lot o f d e d u c t i v e work and see if w e can put the j i g s a w p u z z l e together or whether there are p i e c e s missing. W e might calculate by e d u c a t e d g u e s s i n g , s o m e o u t s i d e h e l p , and our o w n o v e r v i e w s o f the precise number and kind of m i s s i n g pieces, and then w e have to g o after that. If w e don't find it, w e have to notify the C o u n c i l . 7 4

But it is the United States that has the final say. With its veto, it is in a position to block any attempt to modify the conditions laid d o w n in Resolution 6 8 7 — a n d hence any attempt to r e m o v e sanctions b e f o r e the US government is satisfied that Iraq has been stripped of its capacity to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical w e a p o n s . T h e situation that p r o d u c e d the most serious problem for the United States in the w a r ' s immediate aftermath, however, was the failed rebellion of the Kurds in the north of Iraq. The Bush administration wanted Saddam o v e r t h r o w n , but it did not want the disintegration of the state. 7 5 Unfortunately for US policy, the forces that rose up against S a d d a m in the chaos that a c c o m p a n i e d the end of the war were separatist f o r c e s — t h e Shiites in the southern part of the country and the Kurds in the north. T h e revolts of the Shiites and the Kurds reflected deep-seated resentment of the Baath establishment and were a reminder that Iraq was not a nation. Moreover, the rhetoric e m a n a t i n g f r o m W a s h i n g t o n had almost certainly e n c o u r a g e d those revolts; what else w e r e these p e o p l e s , with their history of grievances against S a d d a m and his r e g i m e , to m a k e of B u s h ' s o b v i o u s desire that the Iraqis rid themselves of the scourge of B a g h d a d ? S a d d a m ' s military had been badly mauled in the war, but it w a s still quite capable of crushing rebellion, especially if those in revolt were denied the air cover that the United States, with or without its coalition partners, c o u l d p r o v i d e — a s they were initially. But the United States was not interested in redrawing the m a p of the Middle East; indeed, its approach to the opportunities presented by this remarkable demonstration of collective security in action w a s in the main a very c a u t i o u s one, s u g g e s t i n g how limited w a s B u s h ' s concept of a new world order.

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T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the brutal suppression of the popular uprisings, and especially that of the Kurdish minority in the north, w a s soon on display in the United States on television screens and in the press, and it quickly became apparent that President Bush had a public relations problem on his hands. There may not have been strong sentiment for establishment of a state of Kurdistan (indeed, few in the United States knew anything about the great complexities of that issue), but it was o b v i o u s that a terrible humanitarian crisis was u n f o l d i n g in the north of Iraq along the Turkish border and that the United States had helped to create the conditions for that crisis and was able, with all of the m a n p o w e r and hardware available in the region, to do s o m e t h i n g about it. Finally, and with a reluctance borne of anxiety that it might be setting off down a very slippery slope, the US government undertook to airlift supplies to the several hundred thousand K u r d s w h o had f l e d into the m o u n t a i n s b e t w e e n Iraq and Turkey. 7 6 This w a s the beginning of Operation Provide C o m f o r t . It was also impossible for the Security Council to ignore the situation resulting from the failed revolt of the Shiites and the Kurds. T h e humanitarian efforts of two UN agencies—the UN Coordinator for Disaster Relief ( U N D R O ) and the UN High Commissioner for R e f u g e e s ( U N H C R ) — w e r e seriously complicated by postwar civil strife and by the Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t ' s repression of the two dissident populations. On the same day that President Bush announced the US relief effort, the UN Council addressed the subject of the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in a resolution even more controversial than resolutions 678 or 687. 7 7 Resolution 6 8 8 reflected the concern of UN members with the humanitarian crisis and the Iraqi government's responsibility for some of its worst features and with the implications of UN action for the cherished principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. This resolution produced the fewest number of affirmative votes of any of the Council's many resolutions dealing with the Gulf crisis, as four d e v e l o p i n g countries and China, deeply troubled at the prospect of UN interference with efforts by a sovereign state to control dissident populations in a multinational or multi-sectarian society, either cast negative votes or abstained (Cuba, Y e m e n , and Z i m b a b w e opposed the resolution, w h e r e a s India and China abstained). Nor were these states alone in their concern for this dangerous precedent; Iraq may have been in the international doghouse, but it was still distinguishable from a state such as South Africa in the minds of much of the UN m e m b e r s h i p . 7 8 It w a s clear that the Council had gone about as far as it could go; there was general agreement that stronger measures risked vetoes f r o m either China or the Soviet Union or both. T h e language of Resolution 6 8 8 constitutes a f a s c i n a t i n g balancing act, at one and the s a m e time a f f i r m i n g the U N ' s obligation to provide humanitarian relief, castigating the policies of the Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t , and

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reminding the world that Article 2 (7) of the Charter, with its prohibition of UN interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states, was still operative. The resolution condemned the repression of its civilian population by the Iraqi government (especially in Kurdish populated areas), demanded that it end that repression, and insisted that it allow access by international humanitarian organizations. No reference was made to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait or to any of the Council's antecedent resolutions, but Resolution 688 did invoke the magic words "threat to international peace and security," thereby providing justification for a resolution that otherwise would presumably have violated the Charter. The Bush administration and the members of the Security Council were, at this point, treading very carefully. Both felt compelled to do something about "the magnitude of the human suffering" 7 9 in Iraq, but both felt that they were at or near the limit of what they could do. Secretary of State Baker's remarks upon his arrival in Turkey on April 7, 1991, illustrate the dilemma. Once again, the world f i n d s it necessary to respond to Saddam H u s s e i n ' s s a v a g e and i n d e c e n t u s e o f f o r c e . O n l y this t i m e , the v i c t i m is not a neighboring country. T h i s time, Iraq's forces are killing, threatening, and committing crimes against the Iraqi people. . . . W e are not prepared to g o d o w n the slippery slope of b e i n g sucked into a civil war. W e cannot p o l i c e what g o e s on inside Iraq, and w e cannot be the arbiters of w h o shall govern Iraq. A s the President has m a d e repeatedly c l e a r — o u r o b j e c t i v e w a s the liberation of Kuwait. It n e v e r e x t e n d e d to remaking Iraq. W e repeatedly said that could only be d o n e by the Iraqi people. . . . H o w e v e r , w e cannot be indifferent to atrocities and human s u f f e r i n g in Iraq . . . w e w i l l not tolerate any interference with this humanitarian relief e f f o r t . 8 0

Within less than two weeks of the April 5 decision to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurdish refugees, President Bush found it necessary to send military helicopters and US troops into northern Iraq to construct refugee camps and provide security so that the Kurds, fearful of reprisals by Saddam's forces, might safely return to Iraq and eventually to their homes. 81 As the heading of a New York Times news analysis piece phrased it, this was perceived as "A Risky Undertaking," one that took "Bush to the Edge of the Tangle He Has Tried to Avoid." 8 2 Not only did it demonstrate the political and military dimensions of what had been described as a humanitarian operation; it also generated tensions between the United States and the United Nations, arguably the most serious since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The United States, with British and French cooperation, proposed to construct camps, set up supply lines, establish aircraft landing strips, and begin the process of moving in food, medicine, tents, blankets, and other

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needed supplies. It had hoped to turn the entire e n d e a v o r over to the United Nations as quickly as possible. Both the US action and the p r o posed substitution of UN police for US and other Western troops as guarantors of the Kurds' security provoked immediate controversy. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, w h o was already deeply involved in the problems of postwar Iraq as a result of mandates contained in Security Council resolutions 687 and 688, was quick to question W a s h i n g t o n ' s authority to implement its plan without I r a q ' s agreement and the consent of the Security Council. 8 3 One UN official was q u o t e d as saying that the United States and the United Nations were on a collision course. But the United States and its allies were not willing to give Saddam a veto o v e r the establishment of a relief zone in northern Iraq, and they were quite certain that either China or the Soviet Union, if not both, would block Council authorization of the plan. T h e s a f e - h a v e n z o n e quickly b e c a m e a fait accompli, and the debate shifted to a quest for a formula that would enable the United Nations to take over for the US and allied forces. At this point, US and UN purposes once again converged. The Secretary G e n e r a l ' s special refugee envoy, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, had negotiated an agreement with the government in Baghdad that authorized the UN to take over refugee assistance operations in Iraq. 8 4 But the problem of the security of the r e f u g e e c a m p s r e m a i n e d ; without some c o n v i n c i n g guarantee that they would not be attacked by government troops, most of the Kurds could not be p e r s u a d e d to c o m e d o w n f r o m their m o u n t a i n refuge. T o resolve this dilemma, Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom p r o p o s e d — a n d the United States quickly endorsed the i d e a — that a UN police force be established to take over f r o m the United States and its allies the j o b of securing the camps. T h e rationale was that UN police, unlike UN peacekeepers, would be civilians, not soldiers; would carry only sidearms, not automatic weapons; and would in other respects not appear as the challenge to Iraqi sovereignty that a full-fledged peacekeeping force would. In effect, they would provide only symbolic security for the camps, but in light of the a g r e e m e n t reached by Prince Sadruddin, that would presumably be enough. T h e proposal had the advantage, it was argued, that no additional Council resolution w a s required, a police f o r c e being a logical extension of that agreement. S a d d a m Hussein initially rejected this plan, thereby frustrating US e f forts to disengage from Iraq and creating a situation in which US policymakers began to make use of "the Q w o r d " (quagmire). 8 5 But UN officials persisted in their efforts to achieve a c o m p r o m i s e that would obviate the necessity of seeking Security Council approval; these e f f o r t s led first to the UN a s s u m i n g administrative control of a key r e f u g e e c a m p , a step Prince Sadruddin called "a c o n f i d e n c e - b u i l d i n g exercise that I hope will ultimately bring people h o m e . " 8 6 In d u e c o u r s e , and under admittedly

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heavy US pressure, the United N a t i o n s and Iraq signed an a g r e e m e n t to allow some 5 0 0 UN security g u a r d s to m o v e into northern Iraq. 8 7 This arrangement was not wholly satisfactory, inasmuch as the security it provided the Kurds was more symbolic than real. But the decision to leave an allied contingency f o r c e in southern T u r k e y to intervene as required to protect the Kurds, together with the appearance of progress in negotiations between the Iraqi government and Kurdish rebel leaders, m a d e it possible for US and other Western troops to withdraw f r o m northern Iraq in July. 8 8 In the months f o l l o w i n g the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, there was always the danger that U S - U N cooperation in the Gulf would break down. Once the Council had legitimized the use of force, the United States had not needed the UN to wage war. But to create a stable peace, the overarching US objective after w a r ' s end, the United States did need an effective UN presence in Iraq. However, the behavior of S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s government not only made it extremely difficult for the UN to carry out its postwar mandates, it also pushed the United States, however reluctantly, to take steps (and consider others) that threatened the always fragile consensus within the Security Council. This was particularly evident in the case of S a d d a m ' s campaign against the Kurds and against the Shiites in the marshes of Southern Iraq. Even when the humanitarian rationale for intervention was compelling and came in the wake of a popular enforcement action against an unpopular regime, the principle of state sovereignty still c o m m a n d e d powerful support in a world in which ethnonationalism poses either an active or a latent challenge to many UN m e m b e r states. T h e United States, in the n a m e of the coalition and always in cooperation with its principal a l l i e s — t h e United K i n g d o m and F r a n c e — e s t a b lished no-fly zones north of the 36th parallel (to protect the Kurds) and south of the 32nd parallel (to protect the Shiites). 8 9 Neither zone w a s the product of a Security Council resolution, although W a s h i n g t o n held to the view that the prohibition against Iraqi military flights over substantial portions of that c o u n t r y ' s o w n territory w a s consistent with the logic and spirit of Council Resolution 688, which had c o n d e m n e d I r a q ' s repression of its own citizens as a "threat to the international peace and security." 9 0 S a d d a m never accepted the legality of the no-fly zones as he had, albeit reluctantly, UN w e a p o n s inspection activities under R e s o l u t i o n 6 8 7 . Although he displayed great caution in testing the c o a l i t i o n ' s determination to e n f o r c e the no-fly z o n e s , he w a s certainly c o g n i z a n t that they constituted a potential wedge between the United States and the United Nations. It w a s not until late fall and winter 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 , h o w e v e r — n e a r l y t w o years after the launching of Operation Desert Storm and during the U S presidential transition—that S a d d a m sharply escalated his challenge to the no-fly zones. T h e United States responded militarily, shooting d o w n Iraqi w a r planes and attacking g r o u n d - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s and radar sites in the

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southern air-exclusion zone. T h i s pattern of challenges by Iraq and measured military responses by the United States not only cast a shadow over the political transition in Washington; it also demonstrated, if demonstration were still needed, that the crisis that b e g a n with I r a q ' s invasion of Kuwait had not ended, and that it was too soon to m a k e a final assessment of the impact of that crisis on the U S - U N relationship. But in our analysis of U S - U N r a p p r o c h e m e n t during the Gulf crisis, the most important point is not that Washington experienced difficulty preserving UN support, which it occasionally did, but that it wanted that support, w o r k e d diligently to cultivate it, w a s willing to c o m p r o m i s e to preserve it, and studiously avoided f o r c i n g issues w h e n the result w o u l d presumably have been to lose it. Many have criticized the Bush administration for " u s i n g " the United Nations, but the fact remains that during the Gulf crisis the UN was once again useful to the United States. T h e g o v ernment rediscovered the importance of multilateral diplomacy (although much of what took place was bilateral diplomacy in a multilateral f r a m e work) for purposes other than d a m a g e limitation. Not everyone was pleased with the U N ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . Hard-core US critics w e r e u n i m p r e s s e d . A f t e r m a k i n g the c o n d e s c e n d i n g observation that "the Gulf war s h o w e d what the United Nations can do if skillfully handled," Brian Crozier, for example, went on to dismiss the global body. " T h e aftermath of the battle showed what the UN c a n ' t do, and the time is ripe for a f u n d a m e n t a l change. Such as putting something in its place. . . . T h e old UN would be consigned to where it has long belonged: that mythical place that Khrushchev and other C o m m u n i s t s used to call the garbage heap of history." 9 1 But the US Congress, as a body, displayed none of the animus toward the United N a t i o n s that had characterized its p e r f o r m a n c e throughout much of the 1980s. Many eloquent voices w e r e raised in opposition to President B u s h ' s decision to g o to w a r , 9 2 but almost uniformly they declined to include the United Nations in their indictment. Perhaps the most c o m m o n l y voiced complaint about US policy, and particularly about the US-UN relationship, was that the administration was guilty of a hypocritical double s t a n d a r d — e a g e r to rally the UN against I r a q ' s occupation of Kuwait but not against Israel's occupation of the West Bank, quick to seek UN condemnation of Saddam H u s s e i n ' s invasion of a small neighbor but dismissive of UN condemnation of its o w n invasion of Panama. But although opinion may have been divided regarding US policy during the Gulf crisis, there can be no d e n y i n g that the UN figured m o r e prominently and more positively in that policy than it had in many years. T h e r e had clearly been an a b o u t - f a c e f r o m the UN bashing that had been the hallmark of US policy toward the global organization in the 1980s.

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Financial Crisis Versus Gulf Crisis The context in which the Gulf crisis unfolded was, of course, very different f r o m that in which the financial crisis took place. As noted earlier in this chapter, the end of the Cold W a r (if not yet of the Soviet Union) and the c h a n g e in the dramatis personae both in Washington and on the world stage had created conditions in which it was m u c h easier f o r the United States to work cooperatively with the UN in meeting the challenge posed by Saddam Hussein. But any comparison of the way in which the US government approached the UN in the two crises must also take note of several distinguishing features of the crises themselves. T h e first is that at the time of the financial crisis, the problem, f r o m the US point of view, was d i f f u s e , whereas the problem in the case of the Gulf crisis w a s concrete and f o c u s e d . In the 1980s, the R e a g a n administration and many in the C o n g r e s s w e r e generally d i s e n c h a n t e d with the UN, not because of any one failure or shortcoming but as a result of a variety of grievances that had been festering for quite s o m e time. At the time of the financial crisis, virtually all of the US e x p e c t a t i o n s for the United Nations outlined in Chapter II had met with disappointment, including, of course, the expectation that the UN would conduct itself in an efficient and frugal manner. T h e US response to its grievances was to withhold f u n d s , f o c u s i n g attention on the UN budget and m a n a g e m e n t . But the crisis was about m u c h more than m o n e y . W i t h h o l d i n g w a s s i m p l y the w e a p o n of choice of those w h o wished to express their displeasure with the UN and provide incentive for reform. In the Gulf crisis, the problem w a s very s p e c i f i c a n d easily c o m p r e hended by all: Iraq had invaded and occupied its neighbor, Kuwait. All of the conditions customarily associated with the definition of a crisis were met w h e n Iraqi troops crossed the border on A u g u s t 2, 1990: Decisionmakers were taken by surprise, they were c o n f r o n t e d with what they perceived to be a m a j o r threat, they believed that they had a finite period of time in which to respond, and military hostilities had suddenly b e c o m e a distinct possibility. 9 3 T h e grievances that had been festering in W a s h i n g ton and had precipitated the first crisis were largely beside the point in the wake of Iraq's aggression. President B u s h ' s felt need to mobilize international support for action against Iraq transcended any residual frustration with the UN. A n d fortunately that frustration w a s by the s u m m e r of 1990 more residual than rampant. A second distinguishing feature is that the financial crisis was a crisis only f o r the United Nations, w h e r e a s the Gulf crisis w a s a crisis for both the UN and the United States. Iraq created the latter, precipitating crisis decision b e h a v i o r in both W a s h i n g t o n and New Y o r k . But the United

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States created the earlier of the t w o crises; as a result, in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s the U N soon f o u n d itself in crisis m o d e ( e x c e p t , of c o u r s e , that there w a s n o d a n g e r of w a r ) , w h e r e a s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e m a i n e d largely r o u t i n e (if s o m e w h a t c h a o t i c ) . T h e t w o crises are a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e by the w a y in w h i c h they e n g a g e d the U S political p r o c e s s . T h e G u l f c r i s i s i n v o l v e d r e l a t i v e l y f e w h i g h - l e v e l d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , all of t h e m in the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h ( t h e f a c t that h e a r i n g s w e r e held by the S e n a t e A r m e d S e r v i c e s C o m m i t t e e a n d that the t w o h o u s e s of the C o n g r e s s u l t i m a t e l y d e b a t e d a n d a d o p t e d a J o i n t R e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g the use of military f o r c e d o e s not alter the f a c t that this c r i s i s w a s largely h a n d l e d , as c r i s e s t y p i c a l l y a r e , in camera b y the president and a f e w close a d v i s o r s ) . U S i n v o l v e m e n t in the financial crisis, on the other hand, e n t a i l e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n at all s t a g e s of the p r o c e s s by far m o r e p e o p l e , in both the e x e c u t i v e and legislative b r a n c h e s — a c h a r a c t e r istic of noncrisis d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Finally, there is the matter of m o n e y . A l t h o u g h the financial crisis w a s not exclusively and p e r h a p s not even primarily a result of U S c o n c e r n with U N c o s t s , the d e b a t e w i t h i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s very m u c h a b o u t w h a t the U S s h o u l d pay to the UN a n d w h e n , a n d this inevitably m a d e the C o n gress a p o w e r f u l p l a y e r in the crisis. C o n v e r s e l y , a l t h o u g h the cost of the Gulf crisis and w a r w a s i n c o m p a r a b l y g r e a t e r than the US c o n t r i b u t i o n to the UN f o r a c o m p a r a b l e p e r i o d of t i m e , the b u r d e n on the U S t r e a s u r y w a s virtually nil. T h u s m o n e y n e v e r b e c a m e a m a j o r issue in the d o m e s t i c debate, a n d the C o n g r e s s w a s d e n i e d a m a j o r s o u r c e of leverage in the dec i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s . It w o u l d b e i n t e r e s t i n g to s p e c u l a t e as to w h e t h e r a n d h o w U S d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in the c r i s i s w o u l d h a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t had the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e e n u n a b l e to p e r s u a d e J a p a n , G e r m a n y , a n d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s to pay f o r D e s e r t Shield a n d D e s e r t S t o r m . In these and other respects, the t w o crises present s o m e t h i n g of an apples and oranges p r o b l e m for those w h o w o u l d use t h e m to explore c h a n g e s in the relationship b e t w e e n the United States and the United Nations. But if o n e m a k e s a l l o w a n c e s f o r these d i f f e r e n c e s , the t w o crises still e m e r g e as significant milestones in that relationship. T h e first appears as the low point, even in a generally negative trend line, w h e r e a s the latter appears as a sudden and quite dramatic up-turn in the U S - U N relationship. W h e t h e r the rediscovery of the importance of the U N by the United States is a temporary, situationally s p e c i f i c p h e n o m e n o n , o r the h a r b i n g e r of a new era in w h i c h the UN plays a significant role in U S foreign policy, r e m a i n s to be seen.

Notes 1. Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Moscow's U.N. Policy," Foreign Policy 79, Summer 1990, pp. 94-95.

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2. See ibid, for a review of these initiatives and the role of Gorbachev and especially Soviet former Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky in drafting and demonstrating that the Soviet Union meant business. Petrovsky has since become the UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs. 3. SC Res. 622, October 31, 1988. 4. ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo); UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus); UNIFIL (United Nations Force in Lebanon). 5. John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1991, p. 210. 6. United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). SC Res. 626, December 20, 1988. 7. United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). SC Res. 435, September 29, 1978, and SC Res. 626, February 16, 1989. 8. United Nations Operation in Central America (ONUCA). SC Res. 644, November 7, 1989. 9. United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). The Secretary-General created ONUVEN pursuant to GA Res. 43/24, November 15, 1988. 10. United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Haiti (ONUVEH). GA Res. 45/2, October 10, 1990. 11. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), S C Res. 745, February 28, 1992; United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (M1NURSO), SC Res. 690, April 29, 1991; United Nations Operation in El Salvador (ONUSAL), SC Res. 693, May 20, 1991, and SC Res. 729, January 14, 1992. 12. Weiss and Kessler, "Moscow's U.N. Policy," p. 99. 13. David P. Forsythe, "The United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights," in Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds., The United States and Multilateral Institutions, Boston: Unwin, Hyman, 1990, pp. 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 . 14. New York Times, November 21, 1991, p. A31. 15. John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, eds., Issues Before the 44th General Assembly of the United Nations, Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1990, pp. 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 . 16. GA Res. 43/48, November 30, 1988. 17. The Esquipulas II Agreement was negotiated by the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and was designed, inter alia, to bring about the cessation of aid to insurrectionist forces and the use of territory of one state for attacks on others. 18. See GA Res. 41/31, June 27, 1986. The vote was ninety-four to three, with forty-seven abstentions. 19. See, for example, Charles Maechling, Jr., "Washington's Illegal Invasion," Foreign Policy 79 (Summer 1990), pp. 1 1 3 - 1 3 1 . 20. GA Res. 44/240, December 29, 1989. 21. See Noam Chomsky, "The Use (and Abuse) of the United Nations," in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 3 0 7 - 3 1 0 . 22. See GA Res. 44/42, December 6, 1989, and GA Res. 44/43, December 7, 1989. 23. Department of State Bulletin, May 1988, p. 69. 24. Washington Weekly Report, published by UNA-USA, is invaluable for tracking the vicissitudes of this process. 25. US Department of State Dispatch, October 8, 1990, p. 151.

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26. Ibid., p. 153. 27. Security Council (SC) Res. 678, November 28, 1990. 28. Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra correctly call the Southern Rhodesia case "the clearest instance of the United Nations using force to uphold its decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter." They explain this now largely forgotten action in United Nations Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text, Academic Council on the United Nations System, Reports and Papers, 1992-1, pp. 2 4 - 2 6 . 29. William H. Kincade, "On the Brink in the Gulf: Part 1, Onset of the 'Classic' 1990 Crisis," Security Studies 2, 2 (Winter 1992), p. 181. 30. For a definition and analysis of brinkmanship crises, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War, Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 5 7 - 9 7 . 31. Kincade, "On the Brink in the Gulf: Part 1," p. 173. 32. Ibid., p. 181. 33. By summer 1992, two years after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, congressional concerns over the Bush administration's alleged "coddling" of Iraq prior to the crisis and subsequent cover-up of that relationship had produced multipronged investigations by the Congress. See New York Times, August 9, 1992, p. A18, for a review of the allegations. 34. SC Res. 660, August 2, 1990. 35. See, for example, Bob Woodward, The Commanders, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. 36. William H. Kincade, "On the Brink in the Gulf: Part 2, The Route to War," Security Studies 2, 4 (Fall 1993). 37. Linda P. Brady, "Negotiation and War: The Role of Diplomacy in the Gulf Crisis," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., March 31-April 4, 1992, p. 11. 38. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," Political Science Quarterly 106, 3 (Fall 1991), pp. 401-402. 39. Ibid., p. 402. 40. Martin Staniland, Getting to No: The Diplomacy of the Gulf Conflict, August 2, 1990-January 15, 1991: Part 3: The Making of Resolution 678 (Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, No. 449), Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1992, p. 3. 41. Ibid., p. 11. 42. Ibid., p. 7. 43. New York Times, November 28, 1990. 44. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow?" p. 403. 45. The meeting with the Cuban foreign minister was apparently intended, in part, to persuade Cuba not to persist in seeking to place a motion on sending a peacekeeping force ahead of the US-sponsored resolution (678). See Staniland, Getting to No, p. 15. 46. Staniland, Getting to No, p. 6. 47. Ibid. 48. SC Res. 666, September 13, 1990; SC Res. 670, September 26, 1990. 49. Jeffrey Laurenti, The Common Defense: Peace and Security in a Changing World, New York: UNA-USA, 1992, p. 11. 50. Frederick K. Lister, "Thoughts on the Use of Military Force in the Gulf Crisis" (Occasional Papers No. VII), New York: The Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City University of New York, 1991, p. 2.

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51. Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70, 2 (Spring 1991), p. 76. 52. Laurenti, The Common Defense, p. 6. 53. Brady, "Negotiation and War," p. 18. 54. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow?" pp. 404-405. 55. Kincade, "On the Brink in the Gulf: Part 2." 56. James Bennet, "Sand Trap. U.S. Diplomacy Did Work: It Got Us Into War," Washington Monthly, April 1991, p. 27. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid., p. 28. 59. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow?" p. 407. 60. In the House of Representative, the Joint Resolution was adopted by a more comfortable margin of 250 to 183. 61. Quoted in Washington Weekly Report, UNA-USA, XVII-2, January 18, 1991. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. President Bush's speech of January 16, 1991, is reprinted in Sifry and Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, pp. 311-314. 66. This address is contained in Sifry and Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, pp. 449-451. 67. Katherine Boo, " W h a m Bam, T h a n k s Saddam," Washington Quarterly, April 1991, p. 19. 68. Sifry and Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, p. 449. 69. SC Res. 686, March 2, 1991, and SC Res. 687, April 3, 1991. 70. The essential elements of the Soviet peace proposal are reprinted in Sifry and Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, p. 345. 71. Russett and Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order." 72. Was the coalition acting within the spirit of Resolution 678 and even more importantly of Chapter 7 of the Charter when, from the beginning, it made Iraq the target of bombing rather than prosecuting the war on Kuwaiti soil? Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra argued that "it should have been enormously controversial for military forces to cross the border into Iraq, just as it had been for UN forces to cross the 38th parallel in Korea." See Weiss and Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping, p. 29. 73. Martin Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs 71, 1 (America and the World 1991/2), p. 73. 74. The Interdependent 18, 1 (January-February 1992), p. 6. 75. Richard Haass, President B u s h ' s special advisor on Middle Eastern matters, in New York Times, May 10, 1991, p. A10. 76. President B u s h ' s statement of April 5, 1991, is contained in US Department of Slate Dispatch, April 8, 1991, p. 233. 77. SC Res. 688, April 5, 1991. 78. The great majority of the U N ' s members had long since ceased to accept the Article 2 (7) defense of apartheid put forth by the government of South Africa, treating that country's ethnic and racial policies as an exception to the rule of noninterference. 79. See the preambular paragraph of SC Res. 688, which notes that the Council is "deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved." 80. US Department of State Dispatch, April 15, 1991, p. 271.

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81. New York Times, April 18, 1991, pp. A l , 16. 82. Ibid., p. A l . 83. Ibid., p. A16. 84. New York Times, April 30, 1991, p. A l . 85. New York Times, May 10, 1991, p. A l . 86. New York Times, May 14, 1991, p. AIO. 87. New York Times, May 24, 1991, p. A8. 88. See New York Times, June 22, p. 12, and New York Times, July 13, p. 13. 89. The no-fly zone in the north was established in April 1991, concurrent with Security Council Resolution 688. The no-fly zone in the south was not established until August 1992, after it had become apparent that S a d d a m ' s campaign against the Shiites was a major problem, as was his treatment of the Kurds in the north. 90. Resolution 688 contained no reference to enforcement, nor was it authorized under the provisions of the Charter explicitly authorizing military action. 91. Brian Crozier, "Closing Time for the U.N.?" National Review, May 13, 1991, pp. 4 4 - 4 5 . 92. Among the more eloquent of these were Lewis Lapham, "Onward Christian Soldiers," and Robert Scheer, "What a Wonderful War," both in Sifry and Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, pp. 4 5 2 - 4 6 0 and 492-497, respectively. See also essays under the general heading of "What We Lost in the Desert," Washington Monthly, April 1991. 93. For definitions of crisis, see Charles Hermann, International Crises, New York: The Free Press, 1972; and Lebow, Between Peace and War.

Chapter VI Back to the Future?

The Gulf crisis o c c u r r e d at roughly the h a l f w a y point b e t w e e n G e o r g e B u s h ' s o v e r w h e l m i n g victory in the 1'988 presidential c a m p a i g n and the 1992 presidential election. W h e n he called a halt to Operation Desert Storm on February 27, 1991, President B u s h ' s popularity with the US p u b lic w a s so great that most D e m o c r a t i c leaders of stature d e c i d e d that it would be futile to mount a challenge for the presidency the f o l l o w i n g year. Although his decision to abandon sanctions and w a g e war had had its critics, the p r e s i d e n t ' s p e r f o r m a n c e in mobilizing an impressive coalition in support of US policy both at the United Nations and on the battlefield w a s widely regarded as masterful. The quick and decisive triumph of US a r m s only served to heighten the esteem in which he was held by the US public. If B u s h w a s the w i n n e r , so apparently w a s the United Nations. T h e p r e s i d e n t ' s invocation of a New World Order had reflected the view that the United Nations w o u l d a s s u m e a more important role, not only in US foreign policy, but in global m a n a g e m e n t g e n e r a l l y . T h e Gulf crisis strengthened that presumption, as John N e w h o u s e noted: A m o n g the great expectations aroused by the rout of Communism was a role for the United Nations that would match its lofty purpose. With the Cold War over, threats to peace and stability could at last be managed as they ought to be managed. The performance of the U N ' s Security Council during the past two years—especially its resolutions authorizing sanctions and more against Iraq—seemed to confirm the arrival of what was called grandly, if unwisely, the new world order. 1

President B u s h returned to this t h e m e in his " v i c t o r y " address to a j o i n t session of the Congress at the end of the Gulf War. Until now, the world w e ' v e known has been a world divided, a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. And now we can see

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a n e w w o r l d c o m i n g into v i e w . A w o r l d in w h i c h there is a very real prospect of a n e w world order. . . . A w o r l d w h e r e the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. 2

This address was very probably the high water mark of the Bush presidency. Within a matter of months, the president was on the defensive at home, his credentials in the field of foreign policy of little help in stemming the erosion of his popularity. T h e national euphoria that had greeted military success in the Gulf had dissipated at an alarming rate, partly as a result of Saddam H u s s e i n ' s retention of power and the messy aftermath of the war, but even more as a c o n s e q u e n c e of e c o n o m i c recession and political paralysis at home. T h e stunning victory of D e m o c r a t Harris W o f f o r d over prominent Bush cabinet m e m b e r Dick T h o r n b u r g h in the race f o r a P e n n s y l v a n i a Senate seat e f f e c t i v e l y e n d e d any pretense that the 1992 presidential election would be about creating a new world order. On N o v e m b e r 3, 1992, the US public elected Bill Clinton as president of the United States. G e o r g e Bush, w h o had e n j o y e d a remarkable 90 percent approval rating at the conclusion of the Gulf War, was sent packing with less than 40 percent of the popular vote. In a strange three-cornered race, he had been bested by the governor of a small state w h o had virtually no national name recognition as recently as a year b e f o r e the election, no foreign policy experience, and a single-minded approach to the c a m p a i g n , s u m m e d up succinctly by the poster on the wall of his headquarters: " T h e e c o n o m y , stupid!" With the Cold W a r over, it w a s as if the w o r l d b e y o n d the n a t i o n ' s shores no longer mattered. Foreign policy had disappeared, almost without a trace, throughout both the primaries and the general election and s e e m e d destined for benign neglect after election day. Although neither the public nor the politicians (Pat B u c h a n a n w a s an e x c e p t i o n ) were actively promoting either US nativism or isolationism as it had been practiced between World W a r s I and II, there w a s clearly a turning inward to address the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c problems. Most critics w e l c o m e d this rearrangement of priorities, both b e c a u s e of the sheer m a g n i t u d e of the n a t i o n ' s b u d g e t deficit and in order that the United States could play the dominant role in a p o s t - C o l d W a r world in which e c o n o m i c strength and competitiveness seemed likely to be more important indices of power than military might. But in spite of a c o n s e n s u s that d o m e s t i c issues should be the first order of national business, it is n o n e t h e l e s s striking that, in a matter of only a little less than two years after the rout of S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s armies by the U S - l e d coalition, the e x c i t e m e n t g e n e r a t e d by Operation Desert Storm had vanished and with it the vocation for leadership on behalf of a new world order. T h e "increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic" 3

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mood in the United States not only ended talk of a new world order, it also effectively shifted the f u r t h e r cultivation of U S - U N relations to the back burner. The relationship between the United States and the United Nations did not again become adversarial as the US national mood turned sour and the 1992 presidential election began to heat up. But interest in the UN and its place in US foreign policy inevitably b e c a m e a casualty of the decline of interest in foreign policy (except f o r such issues as J a p a n ' s e c o n o m i c challenge and the North American Free Trade A g r e e m e n t , issues which do not involve the UN). But in D e c e m b e r 1992, barely a month a f t e r the election, G e o r g e Bush, now a lame duck president, put foreign policy and the US-UN relationship back on the front page and high on the president-elect's agenda by announcing that he would put some 2 8 , 0 0 0 US troops into Somalia to provide security for relief e f f o r t s in that fractured and rudderless country. It was a d r a m a t i c and u n e x p e c t e d step, and not only b e c a u s e of its timing. With the Cold War over, the United States had no strategic interest in that region, and there w a s no p r e c e d e n t f o r US military intervention so f a r from home for humanitarian purposes. B u s h ' s o f f e r of troops f o r S o m a l i a , promptly and unanimously accepted by the UN Security Council, has important implications for the balance between foreign and d o m e s t i c policy issues in the Clinton administration; it has equally important implications for the role of the UN in U S foreign policy. Nor is it only Somalia that has r e f o c u s e d attention on the US-UN relationship. Events in what used to be Yugoslavia and in a militarily d e f e a t e d but u n c h a s t e n e d Iraq, together with the response to those events by George Bush in his last weeks in office and by Bill Clinton during the first months of his presidency, have served as further reminders that US policy is critical f o r the United Nations and that the U S - U N relationship, however much improved since the 1980s, is not without its problems. T h e question of whether the rapprochement between the United States and the United Nations during the Gulf crisis is likely to be sustained can p e r h a p s best be addressed by r e e x a m i n i n g the set of US a s s u m p t i o n s or expectations regarding the UN identified in Chapter II of this volume. W e noted that the United States had been d i s a p p o i n t e d throughout the years in most of those expectations. At the end of the century, with the Cold W a r over and the UN responding to US leadership in the w a k e of Saddam Huss e i n ' s ill-considered assault on Kuwait, are these expectations now b e i n g met? Have s o m e of them been a b a n d o n e d as unrealistic or anachronistic, or simply as no longer important impediments to the realization of a strong and durable US commitment to the United Nations? A n d finally, have new problems arisen that have not been part of the historic e q u a t i o n — p r o b l e m s that threaten (or have the capacity to threaten) the recently improved relationship between the UN and the only remaining superpower?

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The United Nations in a Changing International System Before revisiting the set of US expectations regarding the United Nations to see whether and how they may have been t r a n s f o r m e d in the last few years, it will be u s e f u l to review briefly those characteristics of the UN and those features of the international system that, by their interaction, contributed so significantly to US frustration with the global body. T h e five most salient characteristics of the United Nations described in Chapter III have r e m a i n e d essentially unchanged. T h e C h a r t e r has inevitably u n d e r g o n e s o m e m o d e s t reinterpretation at the m a r g i n , but it is still very much the d o c u m e n t that emerged from the San F r a n c i s c o C o n ference in 1945. T h e Charter has to date been formally a m e n d e d only for the purpose of enlarging the Security Council and the E c o n o m i c and Social Council, and those changes occurred long ago. All other changes, including some of such importance that they amount to de facto a m e n d m e n t s of the Charter, have been the result of precedential decisions, which have been accepted over time and b e c o m e established practice. But the f u n d a mental characteristics of the organization are still intact, m e a n i n g that the United Nations is still formally essentially the same institution it was nearly half a century ago. T h e broad m a n d a t e remains in place, although the end of the Cold W a r has had as o n e of its c o n s e q u e n c e s a refocusing of attention on the U N ' s primary m i s s i o n , peace and security. This d e v e l o p m e n t seems, at least temporarily, to have pushed other elements of the b r o a d mandate somewhat further into the background. Decisions in the General Assembly and in all subsidiary organs except the Security Council are still formally made according to a f o r m u l a in which each state has one vote, with a majority (simple or two-thirds) of states present and v o t i n g d e c i d i n g the issue. In practice, consensus is frequently substituted for voting (this is an important qualification of majority rule on budget matters, as noted in Chapter IV), but there is no binding obligation to seek consensus, and the e g a l i t a r i a n / m a j o r i t a r i a n decision rules remain one of the U N ' s most important features. T h e corollary of this principle has been the U N ' s limited authority. That characteristic of the organization has also survived, in the absence of a f o r m a l Charter amendment, although it has been challenged with increasing vigor, especially in the human rights field. T h e fence erected by Article 2 (7) has been battered and even breached in a place or two, but the UN r e m a i n s a body with largely r e c o m m e n d a t o r y , not binding, authority. T h e Security Council is now, as it w a s in the beginning, a m a j o r exception to the egalitarian/majoritarian and limited authority principles. It is in that forum that the great powers still possess greater privileges as well as greater responsibilities. But it is here also that e v e n t s h a v e most

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c o n s p i c u o u s l y overtaken Charter prescription. T h e f i v e states that were made permanent members of the Council and granted a veto were supposedly the f i v e principal powers at the end of World W a r II (although the privileged position given to China hardly accorded with the facts). By the 1990s no one w a s prepared to argue that France and the United Kingdom were more p o w e r f u l than Germany and Japan, and the UN had to resolve a potentially sticky constitutional problem by treating Russia as the successor state to the now-defunct Soviet Union. Nonetheless, great power responsibility and privilege remained one of the U N ' s f u n d a m e n t a l characteristics, even as problems arose as to which states should be entitled to great-power status. T h e fifth of the fundamental characteristics of the UN, universal membership, had not c h a n g e d by the 1990s, and it had c o m e even closer to being a description without need of qualification. 4 T h e dissolution of the Soviet Union a n d Yugoslavia contributed most s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the late surge in UN m e m b e r s h i p , but other states, such as the t w o K o r e a s — l o n g on the outside due either to their own choice or the vicissitudes of global politics—joined the organization, and even Switzerland was reported to be considering d o i n g so. T h e United N a t i o n s was a m u c h d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n in the 1990s than it had been in 1945, but its constitutional f r a m e w o r k w a s essentially the same as the o n e drafted in the closing months of W o r l d W a r II. What made the UN so different was the systemic context in which it functioned. Just as the s y s t e m i c context that prevailed throughout most of the long years of U S d i s e n c h a n t m e n t with the UN w a s not the o n e e n v i s i o n e d by the framers, so is the systemic context of the early 1990s not the one that shaped UN p u r p o s e s and policies throughout most of the previous several decades. T h e most important systemic c h a n g e by far is the end of the Cold War. T h e easing of Cold War tensions more than anything else created the conditions in which Security Council agreement on the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait w a s possible. But although the Berlin Wall had been torn d o w n and c o m m u n i s t regimes had crumbled throughout Eastern Europe before the Gulf crisis erupted, the Soviet Union w a s still in existence and many in Washington were worried that forces of reaction would overthrow G o r b a c h e v and reinstitute a hard line. Not until a f t e r the aborted c o u p by the military and the K G B in August 1991 and the subsequent collapse of both the Communist party and the Soviet Union itself w a s it possible to say with certainty that the decades-long bipolar confrontation between East and West w a s truly at an end. With the d e m i s e of the Soviet Union and the o v e r w h e l m i n g evidence that Russia not only has no interest in challenging the United States, but desperately needs help from the only remaining superpower, the prospect

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is that the United Nations will be much less likely to resemble an ideological war zone. Russia is far less likely to exercise the veto to frustrate US and other Western initiatives in the Security Council; it is far less likely either to lead or to follow the U N ' s majority of what have been called Third World states into confrontation with the United States and the West in the General Assembly; and it is far less likely to treat the Secretariat as cynically as it did throughout so much of the U N ' s history. In brief, Russia seems likely to look at the United Nations more or less as other states, particularly large and important states, d o — a s a place to pursue its interests rather than as a place to mount a relentless ideological campaign. T h e result will be that issues that c o m e b e f o r e the global body will no longer automatically acquire a Cold War d i m e n s i o n . T h i s is no g u a r a n t e e that Russia will regularly side with the United States or that debate in the various UN organs will be f r e e of rancor and end amicably with the adoption of broadly backed resolutions. But the systemic feature of the postwar era, which more than any other paralyzed the UN and made it an unattractive venue for the conduct of US foreign policy, has been removed, opening up possibilities heretofore foreclosed for the UN and improving the prospects for enhanced US-UN cooperation. T h e other principal axis of interstate conflict that has m a d e itself felt at the United Nations—the one that, in fact, c a m e into being and was sustained in considerable part because the UN facilitated it—is the o n e between North and South. Like the East-West conflict, the North-South conflict had abated s o m e w h a t by the time of the Gulf crisis; it was neither dead nor dying, but only in remission. T h e present prognosis is uncertain. On the one hand, the so-called Third W o r l d — t h e South in the North-South c o n f l i c t — n o longer exists in the original sense of the term. It was a f u n c tion of the East-West conflict, and consisted of states that, at least in the beginning, wished to distance t h e m s e l v e s f r o m both M o s c o w and W a s h ington. Even before the collapse of the c o m m u n i s t bloc and the end of the Cold War, however, the N o n - A l i g n e d M o v e m e n t had b e c o m e badly f r a y e d , its radical and m o d e r a t e w i n g s chronically at o d d s r e g a r d i n g the strategy and even the meaning of nonalignment. With colonialism largely a thing of the past, the glue that held Third World states together at the UN w a s largely a shared belief in their c o m m o n status as developing countries and a conviction that most of them could not " h o p e to cope with their international vulnerability except by challenging principles, norms, and rules preferred by industrialized countries." 5 But even this conviction w a s shallow. T h e unity of the G r o u p of 77, the Third W o r l d ' s e c o n o m i c coalition at the UN, could be sustained only by sticking to generalities and preserving the myth that the S o u t h ' s agenda constituted a coherent package. In spite of the diversity of the Third World, however, and the ultimate futility of its efforts to achieve a new economic order based on authoritative

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rather than market allocation, the U N ' s d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y m a j o r i t y has managed to keep the North-South conflict alive in UN f o r u m s . Unlike the East-West conflict, which ended w h e n the East c o l l a p s e d and in a sense sued for peace, the North-South conflict survives because the problems at its core remain unaddressed and the states that mounted the attack on the liberal international e c o n o m i c o r d e r remain u n a p p e a s e d . A l t h o u g h this conflict has been carried on in less strident terms in recent years than it was during the 1970s and early 1980s, it remains an important feature of the systemic context in which the UN functions. This fact w a s illustrated dramatically by the United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on E n v i r o n m e n t and D e velopment ( U N C E D ) at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Ironically, the end of the Cold W a r s e e m s temporarily to have m a d e attention to the problems of d e v e l o p i n g countries of the South by the industrialized countries of the North less, rather than more, likely. But that lack of responsiveness c a n — s o m e would say that it already h a s — b e c o m e part of the problem, increasing frustration and potentially g e n e r a t i n g another cycle of confrontation at the United Nations. T h e revolution in technology, which has been another of the important characteristics of the international system i m p i n g i n g on the U N , c o n t i n ues unabated, largely u n a f f e c t e d by shifts in the distribution of power in the state system. The Gulf War provided impressive evidence of advances in w e a p o n s technology. One expert, William J. Perry, assessed the situation this w a y : In Operation Desert Storm the United States e m p l o y e d for the first time a n e w c l a s s o f military s y s t e m s that g a v e A m e r i c a n forces a revolutionary advance in military capability. Key to this capability is a n e w generation o f military support s y s t e m s — i n t e l l i g e n c e sensors, d e f e n s e suppression s y s t e m s and p r e c i s i o n g u i d a n c e s u b - s y s t e m s — t h a t s e r v e a s " f o r c e multipliers" by increasing the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f U S w e a p o n s s y s t e m s . A n army with such t e c h n o l o g y has an o v e r w h e l m i n g advantage o v e r an army w i t h o u t it, m u c h as an army e q u i p p e d with tanks w o u l d o v e r w h e l m an army with horse cavalry. 6

While the technological advantage now lies with the United States, Perry a c k n o w l e d g e s that other countries will seek to emulate the technical systems that produced US success in the Gulf and that, "even if Washington tried, it could not control this technology." 7 Nor is this the only area in which the revolution in t e c h n o l o g y is affecting the climate in which the UN functions. S o m e of the issues on the agenda at U N C E D were the product of scientific and technological progress and its corollary, threats to the global ecosystem. T h e issue that stimulated the most heated controversy at the Law of the Sea C o n f e r e n c e and ultimately persuaded the United States not to sign the treaty is traceable to

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the d e v e l o p m e n t of technology f o r m i n i n g on the ocean floor. K W a l t e r Wriston has recently spoken to the issue of rapid and consequential technological change, o f f e r i n g a catalogue of d e v e l o p m e n t s that led him to the conclusion that policymakers "are driven by technologies which they may only dimly understand." 9 He noted, for example, that photographs taken by a privately o w n e d French satellite c o m p e l l e d M o s c o w to admit the seriousness of the Chernobyl disaster, and he r e m i n d s us that in the realm of finance, "the entire globe is linked electronically" with consequences that are " m o r e draconian than the gold e x c h a n g e standard and a great deal faster in coming." 1 0 T h e revolution in t e c h n o l o g y directly a f f e c t s the fourth of the syst e m i c factors noted above, the p h e n o m e n o n of the sovereign state under siege. It gives every evidence of continuing to weaken some states by giving adversaries more means with which to challenge them and to weaken all states by facilitating penetration of the polity, the e c o n o m y , and the culture. But the most dramatic evidence of the weakened condition of the state is the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union and Y u g o s l a v i a , w h e r e even the tradition of centralized authoritarian rule w a s unable to prevent the triumph of long-suppressed but still potent ethnonationalism. L a w r e n c e Freedman has characterized this d e v e l o p m e n t as "the culmination of the decolonization process" 1 1 as well as a manifestation of the end of the Cold War. Like earlier phases of decolonization, it has resulted in the creation of new sovereign states. But it is clear that the concept of self-determination of peoples has taken a new turn, and that the centrifugal f o r c e s at work in Europe (and e l s e w h e r e ) pose a d i f f e r e n t kind of threat to regional and perhaps even global stability than did the b r e a k u p of the colonial empires in the decades after W o r l d W a r II. Many of the new states that emerged in A f r i c a and Asia d u r i n g that period w e r e multinational, frequently as the result of the artificiality of borders, w h i c h w a s c o l o n i a l i s m ' s legacy. But few of the conflicts that followed posed threats to other states, and most of the g r o u p s that sought autonomy or independence were denied international support. 1 2 Self-determination w a s widely construed as a right of peoples living under colonial rule, but not as a right of disaffected minorities within sovereign states. In the p o s t - C o l d W a r era, that distinction has been vigorously and s u c c e s s f u l l y contested. Sovereign states have been b r e a k i n g up, and the circumstances in which their disintegration is taking place m a k e this one of the most important f e a t u r e s of the s y s t e m i c context in which the UN f u n c t i o n s today. For years, the acquisition of nuclear w e a p o n s by nonnuclear states was a major concern, and its prevention was the rationale for the Non-Proliferation T r e a t y . N o w the international c o m m u n i t y is conf r o n t e d with a situation in w h i c h the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n ' s nuclear w e a p o n s stockpile is shared by three of the successor states. Many of the new states that were until recently part of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

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contain large ethnic minorities, which guarantee turbulence, generate pressures for further fragmentation, and invite outside intervention. T h e result is a highly volatile situation in Europe, which until recently had been one of the w o r l d ' s most stable regions f o r many years. S o v e r e i g n states in other regions are also in trouble, but it is E u r o p e , the core area of the Westphalian system, where the problem appears to be most acute and most dangerous. A case can be made that the overriding attribute of the international system in which the UN must function at the close of the twentieth century is the crisis of statehood. This crisis, so conspicuously on display in places as diverse as Somalia and Bosnia, already occupies a prominent place on the U N ' s agenda. In the absence of the stabilizing influence that the Cold War is alleged to have brought to international politics for much of the period since World War II, 13 the corrosive social and political forces that are weakening so many states confront the United Nations with a challenge that seems certain to test its capacity to manage the "new world order."

US Expectations About the UN Revisited As we have argued in Chapter II, the US-UN relationship was shaped f r o m the beginning by a set of US assumptions about the United Nations—about what kind of organization it should be and about what it should do. T h e s e assumptions created expectations, and, as we have seen, those expectations were frequently disappointed in the decades after the San Francisco c o n ference. Indeed, the U N ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was, f r o m the perspective of Washington, so disappointing and even so irritating that by the time the global organization celebrated its fortieth birthday the United States w a s either treating it with contempt or coercing it to change through resort to tactics of dubious legality. T h e two case studies presented here—the financial crisis and the Gulf crisis—constitute the nadir and the zenith of U S - U N relations. This relatively sudden reversal in the U S perception of the UN and of its utility f o r US foreign policy invite a reexamination of those expectations the United States brought to its relationship with the global body. W e shall find that some have changed very little and that some have b e c o m e moot. W e shall find that the UN comes much closer to satisfying US expectations in s o m e instances but seems still to pose a p r o b l e m , real or latent, f o r the United States in others.

Hegemony A m a j o r reason for the d r a m a t i c i m p r o v e m e n t in the US view of the United Nations during and a f t e r the Gulf crisis w a s that the UN accepted

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U S l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e e f f o r t to e x p e l I r a q f r o m K u w a i t . F o r t h e f i r s t t i m e in a l o n g t i m e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s s u m e d t h e m a n t l e o f h e g e m o n

(or

s o m e t h i n g v e r y m u c h l i k e it) at the U N a n d f o u n d the m e m b e r s h i p d e f e r e n t i a l . T h e n e e d to b a d g e r J a p a n a n d G e r m a n y i n t o c o v e r i n g t h e c o s t s o f t h e w a r t o o k s o m e o f t h e luster o f f t h i s e x e r c i s e o f h e g e m o n i c p o w e r , but t h e U S p e r f o r m a n c e p r o v i d e d a r e a s o n a b l e f a c s i m i l e o f h e g e m o n y and led to t a l k a b o u t a N e w W o r l d O r d e r in w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s c l e a r l y c a s t in the r o l e o f h e g e m o n . N o t h i n g l i k e it h a d h a p p e n e d s i n c e the U N ' s f o r m a t i v e y e a r s , a n d e v e n then the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w a s at t h e p e r i p h e r y o f U S interests and efforts. C h a r l e s K r a u t h a m m e r , s u r v e y i n g t h e s t a t e o f t h e w o r l d at t h e e n d o f t h e C o l d W a r a n d o n t h e e v e o f O p e r a t i o n D e s e r t S t o r m , r e f e r r e d to it a s " t h e u n i p o l a r m o m e n t . " 1 4 A c c o r d i n g to c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m , t h e r e h a d b e e n but t w o s u p e r p o w e r s , s t a t e s " c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y p o s s e s s i o n o f a n u c l e a r a r s e n a l , b y w h i c h e a c h . . . r e n d e r e d t h e o t h e r v u l n e r a b l e , a n d b y the c l a i m e a c h m a d e to r e p r e s e n t a m o d e l o f t h e f u t u r e o f m a n k i n d . " 1 5 N o w t h e r e w a s but o n e s t a t e that m e t t h i s t e s t : T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d w o n the C o l d W a r and was unquestionably preeminent. T h e N e w W o r l d Order would b e m a d e in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . B u t t h i s v i e w o f t h e p o s t - C o l d W a r a n d p o s t - G u l f W a r w o r l d is, a s t h e m a n y c r i t i c s o f t h e K r a u t h a m m e r t h e s i s a r e q u i c k t o tell us, b a d l y f l a w e d . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m a y b e m i l i t a r i l y d o m i n a n t , a l t h o u g h its m i l i t a r y p o w e r is not e v e r y w h e r e f u n g i b l e , b u t to c o n f e r u p o n it t h e l a b e l " h e g e m o n " a n d e x p e c t its p e r f o r m a n c e to m e a s u r e up t o H a a s ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f h e g e m o n y 1 6 s m a c k s o f either naivete or misplaced arrogance. p o w e r rests on e c o n o m i c as well as m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s .

State

Krauthammer

s e e k s t o r e f u t e t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , c l a i m i n g t h a t " t h e n o t i o n that e c o n o m i c p o w e r i n e v i t a b l y t r a n s l a t e s into g e o p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e is a m a t e r i a l i s t illus i o n . " 1 7 B u t N y e is m u c h c l o s e r to t h e truth w i t h his l a y e r - c a k e a n a l o g y : No single hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structures. The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable to the United States. The economic layer is tripolar and has been for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power. . . . But military prowess is a poor predictor of outcomes in the economic and transnational layers o f current world politics. The United States is better placed with a more diversified portfolio o f power resources than any other country, but the new world order will not be a era o f American hegemony. 1 8

C o m p a r i s o n s o f J a p a n ' s a n d G e r m a n y ' s e c o n o m i c p o w e r w i t h that o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c e r t a i n l y t e n d to w e a k e n t h e l a t t e r ' s p r e t e n s i o n s to h e g e m o n y , a l t h o u g h t h e r e s u l t s a r e l e s s o b v i o u s at t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s than in

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other contexts. But even if one dismisses the Japanese and German challenges as irrelevant to an assessment of the US claim to hegemony, the economic problems that plague the United States cannot be dismissed. Hegemons are presumed to be willing and able to bear disproportionate costs to sustain their vision of a desirable world order. Quite aside f r o m the fact that the United States has no clear vision of its preferred post-Cold War world order, the would-be hegemon is not willing and arguably not even able to bear such costs. The response to Iraq is widely regarded as a one-time event, and even it had to be financed by Japan and Germany and the oil-rich Gulf states. The United States is still in arrears in its payment of UN assessments, and is talking about reducing its share of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations to a level considerably below its capacity to pay. John Bolton, former assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, recently told a House committee that the US share "does seem excessive," and that " w e will fight to ensure that the US share of UN peacekeeping is kept at an absolute minimum." 1 9 This position may well be prudent politically, but it is not exactly hegemonic. Only time will tell whether the deference paid the United States by the Security Council during the Gulf crisis will survive and transfer to other issues (and other UN forums). But the United States must first decide whether it wishes to remain actively and constructively engaged at the United Nations. George Bush repeatedly said that the United States does not intend to become the world's policeman, and there is no evidence that President Clinton disagrees; but it is not yet clear, short of that, whether the United States aspires to a leadership role on the important issues now before the international community. Congruence For the United Nations to meet US expectations regarding congruence, the decisions it reaches and the manner in which it reaches them would need to be consonant with US values and generally in accord with US preferences. Moreover, those decisions would not adversely affect US power or enhance the power of other states at the expense of the United States. Although the UN cannot be said ever to have diminished US power (although it often helped to demonstrate the limitations of that power), it produced a pattern of decisions on a variety of issues that was conspicuously incompatible with US preferences and in some cases at variance with US values. In other words, the UN became incongruent from Washington's perspective. During the Gulf crisis, congruence was reestablished. T h e Security Council shared the US view that Iraq's invasion was intolerable and "would not stand," and it proceeded through a series of resolutions both before and after the war to adopt positions that reflected and endorsed US

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preferences. It was this compatibility between US policies and UN positions during the gulf crisis that gave birth to the belief that the UN would occupy a prominent place in the new world order that President Bush was touting. Inevitably there will be occasions w h e n the relationship b e t w e e n the United States and the majority of UN m e m b e r s turns incongruent again. It happened at U N C E D , and no amount of last-minute c o m p r o m i s e s on language could mask the d i f f e r e n c e s . But the test is not whether US p r e f e r ences are regularly and u n i f o r m l y e n d o r s e d by the United N a t i o n s , but whether c o n g r u e n c e is the norm. On the whole, early indications are e n couraging. The UN budget continues to be approved by means of consensus, reflecting deference to the US position. T h e worst of the excesses of the Cold War years have been exorcised, including the notorious resolution equating Zionism with racism. It is worth noting that this bitterly debated subject, which had done so much to alienate the United States, w a s quietly laid to rest in a simple one-line resolution in which the General Assembly simply decided "to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3 3 7 0 of 10 N o v e m b e r 1975." 2 0 T h e vote w a s not close (111 to 25, with 13 abstentions), which a u g u r s well f o r the further i m p r o v e m e n t of US-UN relations. But there are any n u m b e r of latent threats to c o n g r u e n c e . O n e is the n e w f o u n d p r e e m i n e n c e of the Security C o u n c i l , reflecting the fact that peace and security issues, long hostage to the Cold War, are n o w o n c e again the U N ' s most important responsibility. T h e corollary of this trend has been the relative decline of the General A s s e m b l y , a fact that diminishes the influence of that vast coalition of developing, Third World states that dominated UN politics for so many years. It would be surprising if efforts are not m a d e to reverse this trend and reinvest nonsecurity issues with a new sense of urgency. If that happens, c o n g r u e n c e may again bec o m e a casualty. The Status

Quo

T h e United States had wanted the UN to be a m o n g those institutions that would embody and defend the new p o s t - W o r l d W a r II status quo of which it w a s the principal architect. T h e UN might be an instrument of c h a n g e in some instances, but they would be changes within an agreed f r a m e w o r k and in a c c o r d a n c e with principles and n o r m s to which the United States had given its assent during the so-called second try at world order. H o w ever, several characteristics of the organization actually facilitated a challenge to the status quo w h e n a combination of C o m m u n i s t bloc states and newly independent developing countries, which had not been present at the creation, banded together and sought to use the UN to legitimize new principles and norms for international governance. T h e resulting assault on the

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14 7

status quo had the United States on the defensive at the UN f o r many years and contributed significantly to US disenchantment with the organization. Recent developments have deflated much of that campaign to alter the status quo. T h e collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its empire, the resurgence of democratic forces w h e r e authoritarian and even totalitarian governments had ruled for decades, the failure of C o m m u n i s m and the w o r l d w i d e rush to e m b r a c e capitalism, the a b a n d o n m e n t as lost causes of issues that had long energized the global majority—all of these developments have seemed to vindicate the principles on which the postwar order was built. And so they have, up to a point. But the global order confronting the United States at the end of the century is demonstrably not the one it created at mid-century. If the UN is to be an agent for preserving the status quo, it will be a very different status q u o f r o m the one the Communist bloc and the U N ' s Third World majority spent so many years attacking. Even its most e n d u r i n g features have been t r a n s f o r m e d until they scarcely r e s e m b l e their prototypes. States are still the principal actors in the system; the UN has been a m o n g the f a c t o r s e n c o u r a g i n g their proliferation. But today 180 of them belong to the United Nations, most only nominally sovereign and all penetrated by a variety of f o r c e s only dimly imagined in 1945. T h e very number of these states, their e n o r m o u s diversity, a n d the fragility (and in s o m e cases n o n v i a b i l i t y ) of m a n y of them distinguish the present order f r o m the o n e originally e n v i s i o n e d by the United States. C a p i t a l i s m may have t r i u m p h e d over socialism, but in a form so different f r o m that envisioned by the United States at the time of the Bretton W o o d s and San Francisco c o n f e r e n c e s as to m a k e it virtually a new p h e n o m e n o n . Production has been globalized; financial markets have been internationalized. T h e r e will clearly be no g o i n g back to the future. T h e United States will p r e s u m a b l y w a n t to relish its victory in the Cold W a r and enlist the United Nations in its e f f o r t s to s o l i d i f y and expand the t r i u m p h of capitalism and d e m o c r a c y , that is, to p r e s e r v e what George Bush called the new world order. A l t h o u g h that concept r e m a i n s somewhat f u z z y , it s e e m s reasonable to a s s u m e that its principal tenets are "liberalism a n d f r e e m a r k e t s , the rule of international law a n d an era of peace and prosperity." 2 1 Unfortunately, these are turbulent times. As John Lewis G a d d i s has argued, the end of the Cold W a r " b r i n g s not an end to threats, but rather a d i f f u s i o n of t h e m . " 2 2 G e n e r a l principles of the kind that m a k e up B u s h ' s new world order concept are an inadequate guide for dealing with these threats. T h e United States has yet to determine its agenda f o r a p o s t - C o l d War world. T h e old one will not do. The three principles that have guided its [US] foreign policy—American exceptionalism, anticommunism and world e c o n o m i c liberalism—are of

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little help, because others are less receptive, or because "victory" has made anticommunism irrelevant, or because the market itself is the problem (as in U.S.-Japanese relations) or provides no answers (as in ecological matters). 23 This assessment by Stanley H o f f m a n n of the US dilemma points to a problem for US-UN relations. Until the United States develops more specific goals for the postwar era and strategies for achieving them, US leadership at the UN is likely to remain ad hoc, as it w a s in the Gulf crisis and subsequent international crises, or largely rhetorical and ineffective. The US assumption that the United Nations would be an agent for preservation of the status quo has lost much of its m e a n i n g in the absence of a coherent p o s t - C o l d War foreign policy agenda. T h e 1992 presidential election campaign and early signals f r o m the Clinton administration suggest that formulation of that foreign policy agenda still lies s o m e w h e r e in the future.

The Unit

Veto

T h e United States protected itself and its interests in the Security Council with the veto provision in Article 2 (7). Of equal importance w a s the right to opt out of c o m p l i a n c e with decisions of other UN organs when it disagreed with them. T h e unit veto is available to other states as well, but the fact that the United States cannot be b o u n d by majority decisions without its consent has been far more important to it than the U N ' s inability to compel other states to act as the United States w i s h e s they w o u l d . T h i s principle is so basic in a world of sovereign states and decentralized authority that it is usually taken f o r granted; it is the e x c e p t i o n s that c o m mand attention. But the unit veto was vitally important to the United States during the many sessions of the General A s s e m b l y when it w a s part of a small minority on what it considered important issues. With the end of the Cold W a r and the truce in the more virulent f o r m s of the North-South confrontation, the principle that states cannot be bound without their consent w o u l d a p p e a r o n c e again to be taken f o r granted rather than contested by large, revisionist majorities. If anything, the US position is even stronger with the de facto requirement that the UN budget, previously determined by a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, is now subject to a unit veto. Struggle b e t w e e n the principles of c o n s e n t and majority rule can, of course, resurface at any time. T h e modest erosion of the protection of the principle of state sovereignty in the fields of human rights and humanitarian intervention, stated in Article 2 (7), is instructive in this regard. T h e boundaries of permissible UN intervention are still being explored; the res p o n s e to US e n f o r c e m e n t of the no-fly z o n e s in Iraq makes it clear that the subject is highly controversial. What seems certain is that the principle

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or easily, even to a reconstituted and more many states have a stake in preserving that course, will be quite able to exercise the more important question for the future of how often it will need to do so.

Specificity

A s we have noted, one of the assumptions that shaped US expectations regarding the United Nations was that the UN system would be characterized by a division of labor and that technical agencies and their agendas would not be politicized. A corollary of this assumption was that, however broad its mandate, the UN would not presume to instruct the specialized agencies in their areas of competence. Events demonstrated that neither assumption was warranted. Many of the specialized agencies became infected by the political virus, and the UN General Assembly (and subsidiary organs such as U N C T A D ) espoused policies that directly challenged those being pursued by the more conservative international financial institutions. Politicization is obviously in the eye of the beholder, and the beholder of politicization is typically in the minority when the votes are cast. During those years when it frequently found itself in a minority on matters it deemed to be important, the United States was quick to raise the charge of politicization. The tactics and the resolutions that have given rise to this charge have been associated with the Communist bloc and with the NonAligned M o v e m e n t and, to a lesser degree, with the G r o u p of 77. The demise of C o m m u n i s m and the Soviet Union, the marginalization of the Non-Aligned Movement in a post-Cold War world, and the more realistic assessment of its agenda and its prospects by the Group of 77 have made the politicization issue largely moot. This is one US expectation for the United Nations that seems to be fulfilled, at least in the near future. However, it should be remembered that the original US preference for functionally specific agencies was rooted in the belief that f u n d a m e n t a l principles had already been determined and that the task of the agencies would be largely technical. But at the end of the twentieth century, the principles on which the liberal international economic order was based are not so firmly in place as the United States once believed or as the collapse of challenges f r o m the East and the South might suggest. The emerging conflict among the major economic powers promises to be about principles as well as market shares. Indeed, as Miles Kahler argued, the goal of a liberal world economy is now being openly questioned; protectionism and industrial policy are on the rise, and "the infallible wisdom of markets . . . is less likely to be taken for granted in the f u t u r e . " 2 4 Functional specificity

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a m o n g international institutions will be m u c h harder to maintain in a world of intensive economic warfare. The Market Shintaro I s h i h a r a ' s prediction that the twenty-first century will be a century of e c o n o m i c warfare constitutes a sobering if perhaps overly alarmist antidote to the widespread belief that the death of C o m m u n i s m in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seals the triumph of capitalism. 2 5 One of the more important US assumptions about the postwar world was that market f o r c e s should have free rein and that international institutions would exist, not to regulate the international e c o n o m y but to help to create conditions that would result in minimizing government intervention and maximizing f r e e trade. This assumption was c h a l l e n g e d throughout much of the U N ' s history by the Soviet bloc, which rejected capitalism on principle and as part of its broad gauged challenge to the West, and by the U N ' s dev e l o p i n g country majority, which pursued a m e t a p o w e r strategy and advocated authoritative allocation of resources as a w a y to c o m p e n s a t e f o r economic and political weakness. 2 6 It is d i f f i c u l t to quarrel with the c o n c l u s i o n that C o m m u n i s m has failed. Whether capitalism has triumphed is not so obvious, although it is unquestionably in much better health at the end of the century than its long-time rival. Russia is trying to recreate itself as a market e c o n o m y state, as are other states in Eastern Europe and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. Elsewhere, states that had looked to the Soviet Union as a patron and model are struggling to c o m e to terms with a w o r l d in which there is no Soviet Union and in which heavily interventionist government policies are no longer e c o n o m i c a l l y or politically correct. T h e situation in A f r i c a is typical. "For those countries that had put state-directed economies at the center of their political p r o g r a m — t h e s e l f - d e s c r i b e d ' A f r i c a n socialists' like G h a n a , Kenya, Mali, and T a n z a n i a , and the ' M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s ' like Angola, Benin, Congo, Mozambique, and S o m a l i a — t h e loss of legitimacy was p r o f o u n d . " 2 7 Centrally planned and controlled e c o n o m i e s are out, privatization and competition are in, f r o m Moscow to Accra. L a w r e n c e Freedman has a r g u e d that the unipolar model of the p o s t - C o l d W a r world is dubious because "it mistakes the implosion of the Soviet Union for the rise of the United S t a t e s . A corollary of this argument might be that we risk mistaking the collapse of C o m m u n i s m for the triumph of capitalism. There are at least three reasons why this is so and why it may be premature to a s s u m e that US-UN relations will continue to be smoother because the anticapitalist bias has been exorcised. T h e first is that Russia and any n u m b e r of other f o r m e r C o m m u n i s t states f a c e e n o r m o u s difficulties e f f e c t i n g the transition to capitalism. By

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any yardstick, R u s s i a ' s agenda is, as Michael Mandelbaum claimed, one of staggering proportions, without any close historical parallel. 2 9 At best it will take a long time, and "along the way the temptation will be considerable to stop, to retreat, to adopt populist remedies for e c o n o m i c hardship, and above all to cast aside g o v e r n m e n t s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the h a r d s h i p . " 3 0 Failure of this great experiment will have negative c o n s e q u e n c e s not only for Russia but for capitalism, for the Western capitalist states that were unable to provide sufficient and timely assistance, and conceivably for international security. T h e second prospective problem with declaring capitalism triumphant is that a great many states in the former Third World are mired in endemic poverty and saddled with d e m o g r a p h i c , resource, and political p r o b l e m s that m a k e them u n p r o m i s i n g c a n d i d a t e s even f o r the most c r e a t i v e infusions of f r e e market principles. Moreover, whereas Russia is assured of at least some Western help with its transition, much of the South, and Africa in particular, seems destined for years of benign neglect. In the w o r d s of a French diplomat, " E c o n o m i c a l l y speaking, if the entire black A f r i c a , with the exception of South Africa, were to disappear in a flood, the global c a t a c l y s m will be a p p r o x i m a t e l y n o n e x i s t e n t . " 3 1 It is i n c o n c e i v a b l e that these problems will not reappear on the UN agenda and that the discourse will not again b e c o m e heated. U N C E D is an early w a r n i n g signal that the North-South conflict has not been removed f r o m the UN agenda, and that not everyone is convinced that market allocation is the answer to the problems of the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority of the UN m e m b e r s h i p . Finally, there is the troublesome fact that the victor in the Cold W a r and the state that has been the principal model and advocate of f r e e market principles is itself beset with serious e c o n o m i c problems. At the very time that Operation Desert Storm w a s demonstrating US military prowess, the United States was struggling to cope with an unpleasant fact with important international political and e c o n o m i c consequences: It had b e c o m e the w o r l d ' s largest debtor nation. Not only does the m a g n i t u d e of the US debt and its domestic economic malaise deprive Washington of leverage in world affairs. It also tarnishes the victory of capitalism by d e m o n s t r a t i n g the w e a k n e s s of its principal model. By the 1990s, deprecation of market allocation in UN f o r u m s had largely been silenced, and for that the United States could be g r a t e f u l . But it w a s by no means certain that the old debate w o u l d not resurface. Pluralism The United States has assumed that pluralism and democracy are intrinsically desirable. It expected the United Nations to reflect that conviction, inasmuch as its primary mission w a s the preservation of peace, and d e m o c r a t i c

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societies were the least likely to be instigators of v i o l e n c e against their neighbors. But for much of its history, the UN m e m b e r s h i p w a s top-heavy with states that were conspicuously u n d e m o c r a t i c . S i n g l e party rule w a s c o m m o n . T h e private sector was stunted where it was not nonexistent. Mediating structures b e t w e e n the government and the p e o p l e w e r e typically few and subject to harassment and worse by the g o v e r n m e n t . Not surprisingly, except for support f o r the principle of self-determination of p e o p l e s living under colonial rule, military occupation, and apartheid, these states displayed little interest in democratic principles when c o n f r o n t e d with issues that gave them an opportunity to declare themselves. T h e situation at the United Nations in the 1990s is, both o b j e c t i v e l y and f r o m the US point of view, dramatically better. D e m o c r a c y , like capitalism, is gaining ground. R u s s i a ' s experiment with d e m o c r a c y a f t e r centuries of totalitarian and authoritarian rule has attracted the most attention, but e f f o r t s to open up previously closed political systems are under way in many countries on several continents. In addition to the transition f r o m C o m m u n i s t rule in Eastern Europe, the situation has i m p r o v e d in Latin America, where " f o r the first time in history, elected civilian g o v e r n m e n t s rule every country in Latin America, save one: C u b a , " 3 2 and in A f r i c a , where "nearly three-fourths of 47 countries south of the Sahara are in various stages of political liberalization." 3 3 T h e trend is impressive, but the soil in which d e m o c r a c y is trying to take root is shallow. As Rosenberg observed, "Latins can now vote in democratic elections every f e w years, but most still deal with u n d e m o c r a t i c courts, police, bureaucracies, and militaries every d a y . " 3 4 In A f r i c a , in addition to the p r o b l e m posed by weak and untested political parties, the growth of democratic regimes is handicapped by "the a b s e n c e of a political culture supportive of e f f e c t i v e d e m o c r a c y . " 3 5 T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n about Africa applies also to Russia and other states of the f o r m e r Soviet Union, which lack the "fertile soil for the cultivation of d e m o c r a c y : tolerance, the willingness to c o m p r o m i s e , respect for differing opinions." 3 6 A n d the failure of democracy to succeed in Russia can have incomparably greater consequences for the United States and the United Nations. Nonetheless, the fact that more countries are now b e c o m i n g more pluralistic and democratic, together with the U N ' s greater " w i l l i n g n e s s to put more teeth into s o m e of the human rights norms and standards it has promulgated over the y e a r s , " 3 7 has substantially improved the p r o s p e c t s f o r improved U S - U N relations. The importance of China and C u b a on the UN scene lies in the fact that they seem to represent a rear-guard action against d e m o c r a c y (and capitalism), rather than the wave of the f u t u r e . T h e success of the d e m o c r a c y m o v e m e n t is not assured, but the trend is an encouraging one.

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Revolution

Another of the U S assumptions that affected its view of the United Nations was that the UN would "say n o " to radicalism. T h e United S t a t e s was not opposed to c h a n g e per se, and w a s supportive f r o m the b e g i n n i n g of the UN era to such c h a n g e - o r i e n t e d principles as s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , but it sought orderly change. T h e UN would be an agent for reform, both at the state and at the systemic levels, not an advocate of revolution. Here, too, the United S t a t e s was f r e q u e n t l y d i s a p p o i n t e d in the United Nations, where radical rhetoric, a d v o c a t i n g what W a s h i n g t o n perceived as radical means to a c h i e v e radical ends, w a s c o m m o n p l a c e . T h i s had long been a problem f r o m the US perspective, but it b e c a m e especially acute in the 1970s and early 1980s; it w a s not coincidence that the United States lost patience with the global body in the years that f o l l o w e d . T h e r e is m u c h less e v i d e n c e of the radical i m p u l s e at the UN in the 1990s. A s o f t e n i n g of rhetoric and the greater willingness to pursue negotiated settlement of difficult and frustrating issues is attributable to many factors: T h e e n d of the Cold W a r ; R u s s i a ' s s w i t c h f r o m a policy of c o n frontation to o n e of a c c o m m o d a t i o n ; m o v e m e n t , h o w e v e r glacial, toward dialogue on the Palestinian and South A f r i c a n issues; marginalization of the more radical "Third W o r l d " states in the p o s t - C o l d W a r climate; and a generally more pragmatic approach by more states to more problems after years of heated rhetoric and failed policies. T h e United States has itself contributed to the c h a n g e . For e x a m p l e , President Bush insisted that Israel not intervene in the Gulf W a r when attacked by Iraqi missiles, o r c h e s t r a t e d direct n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n Israel and its A r a b neighbors, criticized Israel's f r e q u e n t resort to force in dealing with Palestinian unrest, a n d — p e r h a p s most s i g n i f i c a n t l y — d e m o n strated his opposition to I s r a e l ' s policy of building settlements in the o c cupied territories by withholding f o r a time $ 1 0 billion in loan guarantees. T h e s e positions s e e m e d to d e m o n s t r a t e a m o r e e v e n - h a n d e d approach to the problems of the Middle East ( s o m e have argued that they constituted an anti-Israel policy), and they helped to d e f u s e an issue that had produced some of the angriest debate and, f r o m W a s h i n g t o n ' s point of view, s o m e of the U N ' s most extreme and unacceptable resolutions. President B u s h had also set a different tone at the UN early in his administration with his selection of T h o m a s Pickering to serve as the U S a m b a s s a d o r there. V e r n o n W a l t e r s had been a w e l c o m e c h a n g e f r o m J e a n e Kirkpatrick, w h o s e tenure had been c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n f r o n t a t i o n and w h o s e m a n n e r m a n y had f o u n d abrasive. P i c k e r i n g w a s an even g r e a t e t success, a man " v i e w e d by many diplomats and international civil servants as probably the most successful of the 19 people w h o have represented the

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United States at the United Nations since 1946." 3X His relatively quiet, highly professional style had much to do both with the realization of US objectives and the moderation of some of the extreme positions the United States had found so offensive. He has summarized that style, saying that "Our approach has been to ask others, ' D o you want to make a futile gesture, or do you want to look for a compromise that will avoid a veto?' . . . Invariably w e ' v e been able to persuade others to work out a resolution we can live with." 3 9 As with capitalism and democracy, recent trends could easily be reversed. But the 1990s have begun with the UN more interested in reform than in revolution and the United States more interested in the UN as a result. Preemptive

Imperialism

The United States, from the onset of the Cold War, sought to enlist the United Nations in support of its resistance to Soviet expansionism and the spread of international communism. It was modestly successful in the organization's first years, in spite of the Soviet veto, inasmuch as the Soviet Union at the time commanded only a small handful of votes and the concept of nonalignment had not yet been introduced into the political calculus of the General Assembly. But increasingly the m e m b e r s h i p d e m o n strated an unwillingness to accept the US assessment of the Soviet threat. To make matters worse, when the United States unilaterally pursued foreign policies designed to counter that threat, the UN was more likely to condemn Washington than Moscow. Preemptive imperialism had no significant constituency at the United Nations. The end of the Cold War has removed these points of friction. UN observers and peacekeeping forces have been dispatched to virtually every continent to monitor ceasefires, verify troop withdrawal, disarm insurgents, observe elections, and otherwise preserve order and assist the transition to a p o s t - C o l d War world. A decade ago, such missions would in most cases have been impossible. There is a temptation to claim that with Soviet imperialism (or what the United States labeled Soviet imperialism) dead, US preemptive imperialism, lacking a raison d ' ê t r e , is also dead. The possibility remains, however, that some US administration will feel compelled—as the Bush administration did in the case of P a n a m a — t o intervene militarily and without the approval of the United Nations in Central America or the Caribbean for reasons unrelated to the communist threat. But for the time being, this is another of the sources of tension that has been rendered moot by systemic developments.

Efficiency,

Frugality

There are probably quite a few members of the Congress and even a few officials in the Bureau of International Organization A f f a i r s in the State

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Department who would be tempted to agree with the speech given by one of the characters in David Hare's play A Map of the World. Words! Meaningless words! Reports! So many reports that they boast from N e w York alone there f l o w annually United Nations d o c u m e n t s , which, laid end to end at the Equator, would stretch four times around the world! Yes! Half a billion pages! And this . . . this week one of the y e a r ' s seven thousand m a j o r UN meetings. With w o r k i n g papers, proposals, counterproposals, records, summaries. A bureaucracy drowning in its own words and s u f f o c a t i n g in its o w n d o c u m e n t s . T h e w a s t e p a p e r b a s k e t the only instrument of sanity in an otherwise insane organization. 4 0

Hare has resorted to hyperbole, but the mood in W a s h i n g t o n , and especially on Capitol Hill, has often reflected some of the same frustration. The confrontation with the UN in the 1980s may have had mixed motives, but if there was one lesson most members learned from it, it was that the UN was a poorly managed place. That view persists, even as Washington acknowledges reform, congratulates the UN on its role in the Gulf crisis, and pays arrearages. The U N ' s budget is now adopted by consensus, the result of the US pressure that produced General Assembly Resolution 41/213; this means that the United States has a de facto veto over that important document. It exercised that veto in General Assembly consideration of the UN budget for the 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 biennium. When a budget with 0.9 percent positive real growth was proposed, former Ambassador Pickering insisted that that was not good enough. He argued that such a budget "does not reflect the need to move the organization in new directions. T o o much of it appears to be business as usual, maintaining too many of the outdated programs and ineffective secretariat structures of the past." 4 1 The United States prevailed; the budget ultimately adopted by the General Assembly met the US demand for no growth. But the US interest in improved m a n a g e m e n t at the UN runs deeper than a cap on budget growth, as Pickering's statement makes clear. As a report in the Washington Post on Secretary-General B o u t r o s - G h a l i ' s efforts to streamline the UN secretariat reminds us, "For more than a decade, US administrations have demanded a wholesale cleanup of what they call the United N a t i o n s ' profligate m i s m a n a g e m e n t and pork-barrel dispensing of j o b s and b e n e f i t s to the Third World countries that dominate the membership." 4 2 In the 1980s, a major concern in Washington, especially among conservative members of the Congress, had been Soviet abuse of the international secretariat. By the early 1990s, with a new SecretaryGeneral at the helm, that concern extended to the bureaucracy as a whole and to the need for reform of the personnel system if the UN were to become the lean and efficient organization the United States was determined it should be.

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T o m a k e sure that the s t r e a m l i n i n g of the U N Secretariat w o u l d not be d e r a i l e d , P r e s i d e n t B u s h s e l e c t e d his f o r m e r a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l a n d e x g o v e r n o r of P e n n s y l v a n i a , D i c k T h o r n b u r g h , to s e r v e as the h i g h e s t - r a n k ing U S national in the UN Secretariat in the post of u n d e r s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l for a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d m a n a g e m e n t . T h o r n b u r g h ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , a c o n t r o versial o n e , 4 3 m e a n t that the U n i t e d States w a s insistent on o c c u p y i n g the t o p m a n a g e m e n t post at the U N , w h e n it c o u l d h a v e held s o m e o t h e r , m o r e political, p o r t f o l i o . Shortly a f t e r a s s u m i n g his n e w post, T h o r n b u r g h provided a s u c c i n c t s u m m a r y of the U S p o s i t i o n : "It d o e s n ' t m e a n m o r e i n f u sions of h u g e a m o u n t s of f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t , " he said, " b u t d o i n g m o r e w i t h less, s t r e t c h i n g r e s o u r c e s a n d e n h a n c i n g the credibility of the U N so p e o ple are m o r e w i l l i n g to pay a r r e a r s . " 4 4 Insofar as the UN is m o r e frugal and e f f i c i e n t , the c h a n g e for the better is largely attributable to sustained U S pressure rather than to s y s t e m i c factors. But UN reform is an old issue that has historically produced m o r e ideas and reports than it has significant action, and W a s h i n g t o n is far f r o m satisfied. On the other hand, e f f o r t s to i m p r o v e m a n a g e m e n t threaten to r e d u c e opportunities for many of the UN m e m b e r s h i p to a s s u m e positions of influence and prestige in the Secretariat, and the possibility of a revolt by T h i r d World states over the " m a n a g e m e n t issue" c a n n o t be discounted. E f f i c i e n c y has its costs, as the United States m a y be r e m i n d e d in the years a h e a d . Elements

of National

Character

It w a s s u g g e s t e d in C h a p t e r II that c e r t a i n e l e m e n t s of the U S n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r — a t e n d e n c y to p r e m i l l e n n i a l i s m , o p t i m i s m r e g a r d i n g p r o g r e s s , n a i v e t é , a n d i m p a t i e n c e — h a v e i n f l u e n c e d the w a y in w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has v i e w e d the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . If the U S p u b l i c s e e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations as a contest b e t w e e n the f o r c e s of g o o d and evil, the UN will s u f f e r if it a p p e a r s to e m b r a c e the d o c t r i n e of moral e q u i v a l e n c e . If they are basically o p t i m i s t i c about p r o g r e s s , the UN will be a s o u r c e of f r u s t r a t i o n if it a c q u i r e s a r e p u t a t i o n as an institution that s e r v e s as a d u m p i n g g r o u n d for p r o b l e m s that d o not get s o l v e d . If the U S p u b l i c is insular a n d s o m e w h a t naive in this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the w o r l d , the UN will be b o t h a p u z zle and an irritant b e c a u s e it is an a s s e m b l a g e of u n f a m i l i a r p e o p l e s , driven by w i d e l y d i v e r g e n t e x p e r i e n c e s a n d n e e d s . If the U S p u b l i c is i m p a t i e n t , the U N will o f t e n a p p e a r to be a p l a c e w h e r e talk s u b s t i t u t e s f o r action and w h e r e t i m e a n d e n e r g y m u s t t o o o f t e n be invested in w h a t a p pears to b e the u n p r o d u c t i v e w o r k of multilateral d i p l o m a c y . T h e U S v i e w of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s has b e e n c o l o r e d by all of these attributes of national c h a r a c t e r . A s with s o m e of the e x p e c t a t i o n s the U n i t e d S t a t e s b r o u g h t to its r e l a t i o n s h i p with the U N , h o w e v e r , t i m e a n d e v e n t s have effected some changes.

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With the d e m i s e of the Soviet Union and the lifting of the threat of C o m m u n i s m , the p r e m i l l e n n i a l s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n g o o d a n d evil, w h i c h came to be called the Cold W a r , w a s over, the forces of evil h a v i n g b e e n defeated. It is possible that other evils will e m e r g e and r e k i n d l e the premillennial impulse, but it is not likely. S a d d a m Hussein p l a y e d that role b r i e f l y , but he hardly q u a l i f i e s as a s u r r o g a t e f o r the S o v i e t U n i o n . Neither d o e s J a p a n ; it may be the principal a d v e r s a r y of the U n i t e d States in the years i m m e d i a t e l y a h e a d , but its c h a l l e n g e , a l t h o u g h serious, is not ideological and certainly not in a league with that of international C o m m u n i s m . If the United States displays a certain naivete about the world b e y o n d its shores, the c o n s e q u e n c e s will p r e s u m a b l y be less serious if, with the end of the Cold War, the world is a less dangerous place. T h e 1992 presidential election c a m p a i g n s u g g e s t s that the U S public and their political parties were making exactly that a s s u m p t i o n , turning away f r o m f o r e i g n affairs and focusing their attention on the condition of their o w n country. That the p o s t - C o l d War era will be more benign may, of course, be a mistaken assumption, in which case " t h e p h e n o m e n o n of its deaf e a r " 4 5 may again become a problem for the United States. It was certainly a problem in the period prior to the Gulf crisis, w h e n the US g o v e r n m e n t , first in the case of Iran and then in the case of Iraq, displayed its failure to understand the forces at w o r k in the turbulent Gulf region. In the unsettled c i r c u m stances of this transitional era, issues are bound to arise and crises to erupt involving states and peoples with which the United States has little f a m i l iarity. These issues and crises will f i n d their way to the UN agenda, where U S p o l i c y m a k e r s will be e x p e c t e d to take positions, even as the United States turns inward to address its o w n problems. US impatience, so o f t e n in e v i d e n c e with respect to the United Nations, is still an important e l e m e n t of the national c h a r a c t e r , as G e o r g e Bush could attest. His approval rating was unprecedentedly high f o l l o w i n g Operation Desert Storm, but it p l u m m e t e d sharply in a matter of months, d e m o n s t r a t i n g the durability of the " w h a t have you done f o r me lately?" p h e n o m e n o n . If US impatience with its own president could materialize so quickly after the impressive demonstration of his diplomatic skills and the d r a m a t i c triumph of US arms, it s e e m s unlikely that the surge in U S support for the UN is secure. In 1990, a Gallup poll f o u n d that 54 percent of the US public believed that the United Nations w a s d o i n g a good j o b , an impressive 16 percent increase o v e r the previous y e a r . 4 6 But 1991 a n d 1 9 9 2 were less good years f o r the UN than w a s 1990. T h e crisis in what had been Yugoslavia s h o w e d the UN once again as indecisive, its w o r d s m o r e cautious than they had been in the Gulf crisis, its actions tentative and far short of what was needed to bring a halt to S e r b i a ' s mauling of Bosnia. Although there are important d i f f e r e n c e s between Kuwait and Bosnia, and

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t h e r e m a y be g o o d r e a s o n f o r U N c a u t i o n , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , like G e o r g e B u s h , l o s e s s o m e o f its l u s t e r f o r t h o s e w h o a r e i m p a t i e n t f o r results. O p t i m i s m r e g a r d i n g p r o g r e s s — t h e n o t i o n that c h a n g e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t a r e e a s y a n d that all g o o d t h i n g s g o t o g e t h e r — m i g h t s e e m to b e v i n d i c a t e d by t h e w o r l d w i d e t r e n d t o w a r d m a r k e t a l l o c a t i o n , p l u r a l i s m , a n d d e m o c r a c y , not to m e n t i o n the U N r o l e in t h e G u l f c r i s i s . B u t there is c o n s i d e r a b l e e v i d e n c e that n a t i v e o p t i m i s m is b e c o m i n g a c a s u a l t y o f p o o r e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e a n d c h r o n i c p o l i t i c a l p a r a l y s i s at h o m e . T h e 1 9 9 2 presidential election c a m p a i g n gave e v i d e n c e of widespread disillusionment with " t h e s y s t e m " and with politics, and barring s o m e dramatic dev e l o p m e n t not n o w f o r e s e e a b l e , that m o r e p e s s i m i s t i c m o o d c o u l d persist for s o m e time. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , i f t h e U N r e l a t i o n s h i p s u f f e r e d in t h e e y e s of the U S p u b l i c w h e n the c o u n t r y w a s o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t p r o g r e s s a n d U N a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s w e r e f e w and far b e t w e e n , it is e v e n m o r e l i k e l y to suffer as t h e national m o o d turns s o u r . O p t i m i s m c r e a t e s e x p e c t a t i o n , w h i c h the U N has t y p i c a l l y not b e e n a b l e t o m a t c h ; p e s s i m i s m is l i k e l y to b e c o n f i r m e d b y w h a t h a p p e n s ( o r d o e s not h a p p e n ) at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a n d in any e v e n t t e n d s to p r o m o t e i n d i f f e r e n c e r a t h e r t h a n e n g a g e m e n t .

The US-UN Relationship: Four Large Problems U S d i s e n c h a n t m e n t w i t h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a d b e e n e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y by the t i m e P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n m o v e d i n t o t h e W h i t e H o u s e . M a i y o f t h e sources o f U S frustration had either disappeared or g o n e into remission. B u t f o u r large p r o b l e m s r e m a i n e d . T w o o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s — t h e

frustrated

m a j o r i t y and m a n a g e m e n t — a r e , in e f f e c t , c u r r e n t v e r s i o n s o f o l d e x p e c t a t i o n s , a l l u d e d to p r e v i o u s l y but in n e e d o f f u r t h e r c o m m e n t . T h e hird, t h e issue o f i n t e r v e n t i o n , is n e w , o r at least n e w l y s a l i e n t , a n d it m a y v e i l p o s e the l a r g e s t c h a l l e n g e to t h e f u t u r e o f t h e U S - U N r e l a t i o n s h i p . A n d t h e f o u r t h , m o n e y , is a l e g a c y o f t h e e r a o f U N - b a s h i n g by the United S t a t e s in the 1 9 8 0 s , c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e U S b u d g e t d e f i c t a n d e f f o r t s to b r i n g it u n d e r c o n t r o l .

The Issue of the Frustrated

Majority

Historically, o n e o f the principal c o m p l a i n t s the United States

levied

a g a i n s t the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w a s that it l a b o r e d u n d e r the t y r a n n y o' t h e m a j o r i t y . A n d after the U N ' s first f e w y e a r s , the United S t a t e s wts all t o o o f t e n not a m e m b e r , m u c h l e s s t h e a r c h i t e c t , o f that m a j o r i t y . T h e U N w a s not c o n g r u e n t w i t h U S i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e s . R e c e n t e v e n t s w o u l d s e e m t o h a v e c h a n g e d all that. R e n e w e d e m p h a sis on p e a c e k e e p i n g a n d e n f o r c e m e n t in t h e a f t e r m a t h o f the C o l d W a r h a s

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meant the ascendancy of the Security Council, a development much to Washington's liking. The United Nations is once again concentrating on what the United States regards as its primary mission, the maintenance of peace and security. The Security Council is a relatively congenial forum in which the United States can more effectively lead and shape outcomes. And the General Assembly, where incongruence has been most pronounced, has been marginalized. But the view from Washington is not the view from many of the world's other capitals. The events that have propelled the Security Council to center stage and moved the General Assembly to the wings have had the effect of reducing the great majority of the UN membership to the role of spectators in an organization that is arguably more important to them than it is to the United States. Most of the 180 members of the UN are necessarily excluded from participation in the Council's deliberations; moreover, those deliberations have been dominated by five states, each with a permanent seat and a veto—a state of affairs that strikes many UN members as an anachronism. The UN's Third World majority seeks increased representation on the Council and revision of the Charter's veto provision, although it is inconceivable that the United States (or the other powers) will countenance significant reform along these lines. But the real problem, from the point of view of the South, is the marginalization of the General Assembly. For these states, the General Assembly is the U N ' s most important forum, the place where all states participate with equal voice and vote and where issues of primary importance to them, especially those having to do with development, are addressed. The Non-Aligned Movement, meeting in Jakarta in September 1992, issued a call for a more authoritative General Assembly. 47 Although prospects for major reform of the General Assembly may be even less promising than they are for the Security Council, the United States can expect to be confronted there by a testy majority unwilling to quietly accept a diminished role in a UN run like a club by the powers. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, as noted earlier, is illustrative of the problems that persist for the US-UN relationship when the focus shifts to the Third World's agenda and the forum is plenary. Whether the scientific case had been made for the various environmental initiatives on the agenda at UNCED, whether the linkage between measures to protect the environment and at the same time to promote development was in every case persuasive, whether the demands upon the United States (and other developed countries) were balanced and reasonable—the fact remains that the United States found itself the villain of the conference. From the perspective of a great majority of those participating in negotiation of the major UNCED documents, 4 8 the United States did not display the requisite political will to advance the cause of environmental protection and sustainable development.

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F o r the d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , U N C E D must have i n v o k e d a s e n s e o f d e j a vu. T h e y w o u l d have b e e n r e m i n d e d o f the d i s m i s s i v e w a y in which the United S t a t e s treated e f f o r t s to launch a New International

Economic

Order, r e f u s i n g to b e drawn into w h a t c h a m p i o n s o f t h e N I E O liked to refer to as " g l o b a l b a r g a i n i n g " and e f f e c t i v e l y gutting s u c h m a j o r proposals o f the G r o u p o f 7 7 as the C o m m o n F u n d f o r C o m m o d i t i e s . 4 9 Or they would h a v e seen a parallel in P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s r e j e c t i o n o f the L a w o f the S e a T r e a t y , c i t i n g its p r o v i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g s e a b e d m i n i n g , a d e c i s i o n particularly g a l l i n g to T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s b e c a u s e o f the c o n s t r u c t i v e role U S d i p l o m a t s had p l a y e d in n e g o t i a t i n g t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s . T h e m e s s a g e s e e m e d to b e c l e a r : the U n i t e d S t a t e s might b e the o n l y c o u n t r y c a pable o f driving S a d d a m Hussein out o f K u w a i t , but it w a s not prepared to a s s u m e a l e a d e r s h i p role on e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s and it r e m a i n e d unres p o n s i v e to the agenda o f d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . U N C E D r e m i n d s us that the U n i t e d N a t i o n s is a b o u t m a n y

issues

other than p e a c e and security ( a s traditionally d e f i n e d ) , and that what the global m a j o r i t y wants may not in m a n y c a s e s b e what the U n i t e d S t a t e s is prepared to a c c e p t . I r o n i c a l l y , its n e w - f o u n d position o f d o m i n a n c e at the UN may portend trouble f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s . E f f o r t s by a frustrated maj o r i t y o f the U N ' s 1 8 0 m e m b e r s to regain control o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n and its agenda have the potential to u n d e r m i n e U S w i l l i n g n e s s to w o r k c o o p eratively with the g l o b a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . U N C E D may yet b e a m o r e important h a r b i n g e r o f things to c o m e than w a s O p e r a t i o n D e s e r t S t o r m .

The Issue of Management W a s h i n g t o n ' s e x p e c t a t i o n that the U N b e run e f f i c i e n t l y and frugally w a s never m o r e than o n e o f m a n y e x p e c t a t i o n s , and not t h e m o s t important o n e , at that. T h e U S c o n c e r n with what it regarded as f i s c a l irresponsibility by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s had a l w a y s b e e n as m u c h o f a c o m m e n t a r y on UN p o l i t i c s and p o l i c i e s as it had on U N administration. B u t the e x e r c i s e o f m a j o r w i t h h o l d i n g in the 1 9 8 0 s s e e m s to have produced a m u c h intens i f i e d p r e o c c u p a t i o n with the issue o f U N m a n a g e m e n t . A c o n v i c t i o n has g r o w n that the U n i t e d N a t i o n s is out o f c o n t r o l , that it has b e c o m e , in Brian Urquhart's words, " a n enormous ramshackle structure."50 A s a result, the U S g o v e r n m e n t (with the C o n g r e s s s c r u t i n i z i n g the results v e r y c l o s e l y ) has z e r o e d in on the UN b u r e a u c r a c y , c r i t i c i z i n g its s i z e , its c o m p o s i t i o n , its w o r k h a b i t s , a n d its a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . C h a r g e s o f m i s m a n a g e m e n t h a v e f o c u s e d a t t e n t i o n on the o f f i c e o f the S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l , w h e r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e f f e c t i n g the r e f o r m s d e m a n d e d by the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e s i d e s . B o t h B o u t r o s - G h a l i and his p r e d e c e s s o r , P e r e z de C u e l l a r , have b e e n under u n r e l e n t i n g p r e s s u r e by W a s h i n g t o n to b e what UN S e c r e t a r i e s - G e n e r a l have never b e e n — t o u g h administrators, w i l l i n g to say " n o " to the many v e s t e d interests in a multinational s e c r e t a r i a t .

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Although some progress has been made, the prevailing view is that much more needs to be done. In September of 1992, the Washington Post, a generally liberal paper not known for animus toward the United Nations, published a series of four feature articles that mounted a scathing critique of mismanagement and even corruption at the UN. 5 1 It is no secret that the United States, and the Congress in particular, will not be satisfied with a few fewer undersecretaries-general and assistant secretaries-general, a hiring freeze, or the termination of a handful of programs (and their staffs), which have long since outlived their usefulness. Reform of the magnitude sought by the United States is inevitably extremely unpopular, and will be resisted by an entrenched staff and by governments that view the U S position on reform as an attempt to reduce Third World access and influence. Moreover, US expectations in this area and the difficulties certain to be encountered in satisfying them are very likely to place a strain on the relationship between the United States and the Secretary-General. 5 2 It is no exaggeration to say that the prospects for an amicable US-UN relationship would seem to depend heavily on the outcome of the struggle over management of the global body. The Issue of Intervention Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided the occasion for a dramatic demonstration of what the United Nations could do with US leadership and what the United States could do with UN support. Subsequent events, including those within Iraq since the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the human tragedy in Somalia, and most particularly the violent collapse of Yugoslavia, tell a rather different story. For those who believed that the Gulf crisis and its handling by the UN and the US-led coalition heralded the dawn of a new post-Cold War international order, the difficulties encountered in these subsequent crises have led to sober second thoughts. For all of their differences, these crises have had two common threads. In the first place, in none of them has the United States been convinced that its vital interests are at stake, at least not to the degree that they were (or were alleged to be) when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The result is that US leadership has been less assured. In the second, all of these crises have unfolded, in whole or in part, within rather than between states. This has meant more than a little ambivalence at the United Nations, given the domestic jurisdiction barrier of Article 2 (7) and the general reluctance to set precedents for military intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. The fact that in all three cases the UN Security Council has authorized intervention, albeit cautiously and in deliberately limited ways, and that the United States has ultimately and without enthusiasm assumed leadership responsibilities, does not alter the fact that both the United Nations and the United States have set out with some anxiety across unfamiliar terrain. Not

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Nations

surprisingly, in each of these cases there has been at least the hint of trouble in the US-UN relationship. As noted in Chapter V, US intervention in northern Iraq to provide security for the Kurds was undertaken reluctantly, and UN support for that intervention was equally reluctant and tentative. The members of the Security Council were well aware that there was a significant qualitative difference between authorizing enforcement against an aggressor state and restricting the s t a t e ' s freedom of action against s e g m e n t s of its own population. The ambivalence surrounding intervention in Iraq, as well as the latent tensions between the United Nations and the United States over that issue, surfaced again in the waning days of the Bush administration when the United States launched air attacks on Iraq in enforcement of no-fly zones designed to protect Kurds and Shiites against the B a g h d a d r e g i m e . Although the United States claimed that its position was consistent with and in defense of Security Council resolutions, the no-fly zones had never been authorized by the Council and several of its members had serious reservations about the US actions. Although US-UN cooperation did not break down over this issue, it was clear that the Council was having second thoughts about allowing the United States to interpret its resolutions as it saw fit, especially in so sensitive an area as humanitarian intervention. Somalia provided another test case of the U S - U N relationship, and once again the issue was humanitarian intervention. That tortured country had turned into something of a public relations disaster for the UN, and the Secretary-General w a s arguing vigorously for intervention on a scale that w o u l d ensure the delivery of f o o d to a starving population. Eventually the United States, presumably driven by p h o t o g r a p h i c evidence of the human tragedy in Somalia and President B u s h ' s desire to leave o f f i c e on a positive note, did intervene militarily. T h e result was one the UN wanted (the Security Council promptly endorsed the US action), 5 3 but the f o r m it took m a d e many members uncomfortable. Once again, as with Operation Desert Storm, the UN had turned control of a UN-authorized military mission over to the United States. T h e US government was no more willing in Somalia than it had been in Iraq to place its troops under a UN c o m m a n d . A l m o s t immediately after the launching of Operation Restore Hope, the U S g o v e r n m e n t and the Secretary-General b e c a m e embroiled in controversy over responsibility for disarming Somalia gangs and the conditions that w o u l d justify a US decision to withdraw troops and turn the task of p r o v i d i n g security over to UN peacekeepers. Although the UN decision f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n intervention in Somalia w a s s i m p l i f i e d s o m e w h a t by the fact that there w a s no e f f e c t i v e central g o v e r n m e n t in M o g a d i s h u , it w a s still a d i f f i c u l t and precedent-setting one. T h e C o u n c i l ' s resolution marked the first time the UN had intervened

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in the internal affairs o f a sovereign state with a mandate to use force other than in self-defense. Whereas this constituted a welcome expansion of UN authority for some, it looked very much like a slippery slope to others. Either way, it constituted a major test o f the capacity of the United Nations and the United States to work cooperatively together. Bosnia has proved to be an even more difficult case than either Iraq or Somalia. When fighting originally broke out in Yugoslavia, UN members, the United States included, saw no reason to intervene. It was, after all, civil strife, and too many states had their own problems with ethnic groups desirous o f autonomy or independence. Moreover, it was widely understood that the deep-seated animosities among the ethnic groups and the inhospitable terrain would make intervention a costly and precarious proposition. T h e situation was transformed when the United Nations recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As o f that date, the UN was confronted not only with civil war but with aggression by Serbia in support o f ethnic Serbs in sovereign states now members o f the United Nations. But intervention still looked like a hazardous undertaking to the Security Council, in considerable measure because that is the way it looked to both the United States and the European Community. T h e measures that were adopted by the UN failed either to end the fighting or to arrest the spread of Serbian nationalism at the expanse o f Croatians and Muslims. T h e arms embargo imposed by the Council in September 1 9 9 1 actually benefited the S e r b s ; 5 4 the peacekeeping mission to Croatia, approved in February 1 9 9 2 , had the effect o f acknowledging S e r b gains in the w a r ; 5 5 and the UN relief effort in B o s n i a , buffeted by the battle raging around Sarajevo, was unable to relieve the misery of that city's Muslim defenders. B y the winter of 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 it was apparent that the UN was failing even in its limited mission. B o s n i a n Muslims were still being raped, slaughtered, and forcibly driven from their homes and villages by S e r b s . T h e policy of " e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g " had largely succeeded; the state o f Bosnia-Herzegovina bore little resemblance to the Yugoslav republic that had so recently declared its independence. T h e UN presence in the region not only had almost no bearing on the progress of the war; it had b e c o m e a major argument against enforcement o f the Council-mandated no-fly zones, the British and French fearing that their troops would b e c o m e targets o f Serbian retaliation. In spite of differences with its allies and other key members o f the S e curity Council throughout the crisis, the United States was at no point more eager to b e c o m e embroiled militarily in the region than they were. Unlike Somalia, Bosnia did not appear to be " d o a b l e . " Late in his administration, President Bush did launch a brief diplomatic offensive aimed at obtaining broad international support for the use o f air power in support o f relief efforts; but nothing c a m e o f it, and within a matter o f weeks the

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Clinton administration was reluctantly pursuing a diplomatic settlement not vastly different f r o m the o n e put f o r w a r d by C y r u s V a n c e ( f o r the U N ) and D a v i d O w e n ( f o r the E C ) , 5 6 a s e t t l e m e n t that e s s e n t i a l l y a c c e p t e d the triumph o f S e r b i a n a r m s as a r e g r e t t a b l e fait a c c o m p l i . T h e c r i s i s in Y u g o s l a v i a , a l r e a d y a s o b e r i n g r e m i n d e r o f the c o n straints under w h i c h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s will w o r k in the p o s t - C o l d W a r w o r l d , has the c a p a c i t y to b e c o m e c o n s i d e r a b l y w o r s e , e s p e c i a l l y i f the c o n f l i c t spreads to K o s o v o or M a c e d o n i a . T h e p r o s p e c t o f a wider B a l k a n war, c o n c e i v a b l y i n v o l v i n g B u l g a r i a , T u r k e y , and G r e e c e , is a m a j o r c o n cern in both W a s h i n g t o n and N e w Y o r k , and is p r o b a b l y the o n e e v e n t that c o u l d g e n e r a t e support f o r m a j o r m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n on the g r o u n d . In the m e a n w h i l e , President C l i n t o n f o r the first t i m e w a s s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r i n g U S air strikes against S e r b p o s i t i o n s . W h a t e v e r the final o u t c o m e , the U N i n v o l v e m e n t in the B a l k a n c r i s i s , t o g e t h e r with its role in the c r i s e s in S o m a l i a and Iraq, has already d e m o n strated the p r o b l e m s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s that lie a h e a d f o r the U S - U N relat i o n s h i p in the d i s o r d e r l y p o s t - C o l d W a r w o r l d . T h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f the U N ' s n e w f o u n d but still v e r y t e n t a t i v e v o c a t i o n f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n intervention within s o v e r e i g n states, and indeed the c r e d i b i l i t y o f the UN itself, has b e c o m e hostage to e v e n t s in Iraq, S o m a l i a , and B o s n i a . T h e s u c c e s s o f those interventions has, in turn, b e c o m e h e a v i l y dependent on U S p o l i c y . A n d there is e v e r y reason to b e l i e v e that these c r i s e s are but the f o r e r u n ners o f o t h e r s that will further c h a l l e n g e both the c a p a c i t y and the will o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and the U n i t e d S t a t e s to deal with them in a f o r c e f u l and t i m e l y m a n n e r . It t a k e s no g r e a t s t r e t c h o f the i m a g i n a t i o n to r e c o g nize that therein lies a potential m i n e f i e l d f o r the U S - U N relationship.

The Issue of Money E a c h o f these issues—the frustrated UN majority, United Nations mana g e m e n t , and humanitarian i n t e r v e n t i o n — h a s f i n a n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . E a c h raises questions that carry a p r i c e tag, and they all c o m e at a time w h e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s still has unpaid a r r e a r a g e s at the U N and is still r u n n i n g a h u g e d e f i c i t at h o m e . E v e n i f the U S g o v e r n m e n t did not have to w o r r y about r e n e w e d pressures f r o m a r e s t l e s s U N m a j o r i t y , limited and halting steps to r e f o r m UN m a n a g e m e n t p r a c t i c e s , and the d i l e m m a posed for the U N by the h u m a n c o s t s o f e t h n i c and tribal c o n f l i c t in an e v e r - g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f states, budgetary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w o u l d c r e a t e p r o b l e m s for U S p o l i c y at the U N . T h o s e issues s i m p l y e x a c e r b a t e the situation. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s will b e n o m o r e e a g e r in the 1 9 9 0 s to fund U N p r o g r a m s it o p p o s e s than it w a s w h e n it w a s s o h e a v i l y e n g a g e d in U N b a s h i n g in the 1 9 8 0 s . A n d it is by no m e a n s c e r t a i n that the U N ' s d i s a f f e c t e d m a j o r i t y will e x e r c i s e restraint in p u s h i n g f o r such p r o g r a m s . If the

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Secretary-General does not address the m a n a g e m e n t issue in a manner acceptable to the United States, it is not i n c o n c e i v a b l e the UN critics in Washington will again d e m a n d the withholding of assessments. As for the interventions in conflict-ridden countries around the world, which the UN has recently undertaken and will probably be under pressure to undertake in the future, the issue of cost is an increasingly urgent one. T h e UN missions in Yugoslavia and S o m a l i a , like the ones begun earlier in Cambodia and Lebanon, are relatively large, appear destined to last longer than anticipated, and cannot be assured of success. Such missions, which are already controversial, inevitably generate financial problems while they fail to solve political ones. I n a s m u c h as the United States p a y s by far the largest share of peacekeeping costs (30.29 percent under a special scale of assessments), the potential for trouble in the U S - U N relationship grows in direct proportion to the US perception that the UN is overextended and its peacekeeping missions ineffectual. Independently of the p r o b l e m s posed by these clouds over U S - U N cooperation, the US budget deficit and the c o u n t r y ' s preoccupation with domestic problems constitute an obstacle to the resumption of vigorous US leadership at the United Nations. T h e United States has resumed payment of its full share of the UN budget, 5 7 and has been systematically reducing its arrearages in both the regular and p e a c e k e e p i n g a c c o u n t s . But W a s h ington is not exactly a p p r o a c h i n g the UN with an open wallet. T h e C o n gress has insisted on a full a c c o u n t i n g f r o m the State D e p a r t m e n t of the proposed use of US c o n t r i b u t i o n s , a position that reflects the perennial struggle between the two branches of government and creates the possibility of d e l a y s in p a y m e n t s . 5 8 M o r e o v e r , the United States still r e f u s e s to pay its a s s e s s m e n t s at the b e g i n n i n g of the c a l e n d a r year, thereby c o n tributing significantly to chronic liquidity problems at the UN. T h e United States rejects the Secretary-General's proposal to charge interest on unpaid assessments after sixty days, and otherwise expresses little sympathy with the argument that financial solvency is a major problem for the UN. T h e constraints imposed by efforts to reduce the budget deficit and address public dissatisfaction with neglected issues on the h o m e front have made it difficult for the government to match its words of praise for the UN with significant infusions of money. The Bush administration did seek $ 7 0 0 million as the US contribution to a contingency f u n d for peacekeeping, to be paid in two tranches in 1992 and 1993. 5 9 T h e s e monies would certainly help to m a k e the U N ' s expanding role in this field more credible, and former Secretary of State B a k e r testified that it w a s "a g o o d b u y , " arguing that the United States " s h o u l d be willing to invest in ' k e e p i n g the p e a c e ' after having spent considerably greater sums to win the Cold W a r . " 6 0 But congressional approval has been conspicuously reluctant, except when vital US interests are at stake, and there has been m o u n t i n g p r e s s u r e in the

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C o n g r e s s to cut the U S contribution f o r UN p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s b a c k to 25 percent.61 It s e e m s likely that the United S t a t e s will c o n t i n u e to pursue a policy o f low, s l o w , or even no growth for the UN budget. S u c h an approach may look prudent in Washington, but it will not win friends at the UN. For the great majority o f the UN m e m b e r s h i p , the United Nations is underfunded relative to the scale and scope o f their needs, and much o f the problem is the l a c k o f political will on the part o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s largest power. T h e r e is every likelihood that the U N ' s financial difficulties and the issue o f U S r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for them and leadership in r e s o l v i n g them will continue to c o m p l i c a t e the U S - U N relationship for the f o r e s e e a b l e future.

Conclusion A f t e r forty years o f frustrated e x p e c t a t i o n s regarding the United Nations, the United States mounted a vigorous attack on the global organization in the 1 9 8 0 s . M e m b e r s o f the administration and o f the C o n g r e s s minced no words in c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the UN as a b a d l y , if not f a t a l l y , f l a w e d institution, w h i c h was not s e r v i n g U S interests or r e f l e c t i n g U S values. T h e l e v e r a g e o f f i n a n c i a l withholding a v a i l a b l e to the c o u n t r y paying the largest p e r c e n t a g e o f the UN budget was used to c o e r c e the UN to " r e f o r m , " but there was no g u a r a n t e e that reform m e a s u r e s adopted by the UN would satisfy the United States or that the w o r l d ' s most powerful state would then be willing to resume a proactive leadership role at the UN. Only a few years later, in the w a k e o f S a d d a m H u s s e i n ' s invasion and occupation o f Kuwait, the United States was busily e n g a g e d in mobilizing support in the UN Security Council for a strong international response to this act o f a g g r e s s i o n . T h e result was a rare d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f U N - s a n c tioned e n f o r c e m e n t action against a state found to b e in v i o l a t i o n o f the Charter. It was also a remarkable reversal o f the U S relationship with the UN. T h e United S t a t e s , so recently e n g a g e d in h e c t o r i n g the UN when it was not d i s m i s s i n g it as irrelevant to the c o n d u c t o f U S f o r e i g n p o l i c y , was now eagerly e m b r a c i n g it and proclaiming its importance to an emerging new world order in which the crisis in the G u l f was the first test. W a s this a b o u t - f a c e by the U n i t e d S t a t e s an a b e r r a t i o n or w a s it the b e g i n n i n g o f a new era in U S - U N r e l a t i o n s ? Innate s k e p t i c i s m tends, o f c o u r s e , to discount the s e c o n d and m o r e o p t i m i s t i c o f t h e s e v i e w s . B u t many o f the expectations the United States had f o r the UN and the UN so often disappointed are now either b e i n g realized or are no longer important b e c a u s e o f fundamental s y s t e m i c c h a n g e s . In e f f e c t , the UN does much better on the litmus test o f U S e x p e c t a t i o n s today than it has in many long years, and this has to provide grounds for cautious o p t i m i s m regarding the future o f U S - U N relations.

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As w e have seen, democracy and capitalism c o m m a n d new adherents and new respect, a n d that fact is b e g i n n i n g to have its e f f e c t at the U N . The United States need no longer worry about UN tolerance for Soviet adventurism or the spread of C o m m u n i s m , or about UN criticism of US efforts to contain them. T h e c o l l a p s e of the Soviet Union and of C o m m u nism, together with progress e l s e w h e r e in dealing with h e r e t o f o r e intractable p r o b l e m s , has led to a lessening at the UN of radical rhetoric and revolutionary proposals for solving those p r o b l e m s . T h e right of the United States to opt out of c o m p l i a n c e with UN r e s o l u t i o n s of which it disapproves remains intact and actually has been strengthened. Politicization in the UN system is less of a problem for the United States than it has been in many years. All of this means that c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n US preferences and UN prescriptions is today the norm in many issue areas. T h e United States is now acknowledged as the w o r l d ' s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y dominant military power, and in that sense at least the United States can claim the role of h e g e m o n . A n d although the international system is still in a state of flux after the end of the Cold War, the outlines of a crude new status quo can be ascertained, and it is one the United States f i n d s congenial. In all of these respects, US assumptions as to what the UN should be and what it should do are now being borne out—if not in their entirety, at least to m u c h greater extent than w a s the case d u r i n g m u c h of the U N ' s history and particularly during the period of m a x i m u m confrontation in the early and mid-1980s. Balanced against this catalog of promising developments are a f e w negatives and s o m e cautionary o b s e r v a t i o n s both about the United Nations and about the United States. US h e g e m o n y is at best partial and at worst nonexistent. T h e world is not truly unipolar, and Japan and G e r m a n y (or Europe) are now p o w e r f u l enough, especially in the absence of a Soviet threat to k e e p them in harness with the United States, to play increasingly independent roles on the world stage. T h e implications of this f o r the U S - U N r e l a t i o n s h i p are not clear and may not soon be apparent; what is clear, h o w e v e r , is that the United States is a p p r o a c h i n g the a s s u m p t i o n of the h e g e m o n ' s burden at the UN in a most tentative fashion. Moreover, several of the positive signs in the U S - U N relationship are based on trends that are both brief and thin. Hopes f o r the success of experiments with f r e e markets and private o w n e r s h i p could easily be dashed in any of several places, including R u s s i a . Most of the newly pluralistic and democratic states are fragile and vulnerable to the f o r c e s of reaction. Unfortunately, c h a n g e and development are not easy, and all good things do not necessarily go together. And so it goes, through a litany of caveats regarding the prospects for a prolonged U S - U N h o n e y m o o n . T h e f o u r most serious threats to the U S c o m m i t m e n t to give the United Nations a p r o m i n e n t place in the c o n d u c t of its f o r e i g n policy, however, are those outlined earlier in this chapter:

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•

The prospect that the great majority of the UN membership will feel "disenfranchised" by the marginalization of the General Assembly and the domination of the Security Council by a condominium of the powers, and that the majority will pursue policies designed to correct that condition

•

The prospect that reform of the Secretariat and of UN management practices will be superficial, resulting in the perpetuation of irrelevant or redundant programs and activities that reflect vested interests in the bureaucracy and wastefully consume budget resources The prospect that the UN response to escalating crises and conflicts in troubled countries around the world will put the United States and the United Nations at cross purposes as to the wisdom of intervention; responsibility for such interventions as are authorized; and the nature, scale, timing, and financial underwriting of those interventions T h e prospect that the US preoccupation with domestic problems, coupled with the size of its own budget deficit, will mean that UN claims upon the US treasury will encounter stiff resistance, especially from Congress.

•

•

T h e r e are many w h o see the p o s t - C o l d War, p o s t - G u l f War period as a w i n d o w of opportunity. International officials, governments, nongovernmental organizations, academics, and others have been generating papers and p r o p o s a l s designed to take a d v a n t a g e of that opportunity. T h e S u m mit Meeting of the Security Council, held in January 1992, was in itself an acknowledgment that this is a singularly important m o m e n t in modern history. In a report requested of him by that s u m m i t meeting, UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali said: In these past m o n t h s a c o n v i c t i o n has g r o w n , a m o n g nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to a c h i e v e the great o b j e c t i v e s o f the Charter—a U n i t e d N a t i o n s c a p a b l e o f m a i n t a i n i n g international p e a c e and security, of securing justice and human rights and o f promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." This opportunity must not be squandered. T h e organization must never again be crippled as it w a s in the era that has n o w p a s s e d . 6 2

Whether the opportunity is squandered and the organization crippled will depend on many factors, s o m e of them b e y o n d the capacity of an organization of limited authority in a turbulent world of sovereign states to manage. This author does not particularly care f o r the concept of "political will," a phrase that has been bandied about f o r m a n y years to express the frustration of the UN majority with the f a i l u r e of s o m e state or states (often the United States) to do what the majority w a n t s it to do. W h a t has been castigated as a lack of political will is usually s o m e t h i n g e l s e — a

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fundamental policy disagreement with the m a j o r i t y ' s agenda. But at this particular juncture in the U N ' s history, the exercise o f a little political will by the United States is very much in order. A window of opportunity does exist. T h e permanent members o f the Security Council have established an unusual degree o f rapport and are, in the words of Lexington in The Economist, "Justly proud o f what they, with the Secretary-General's people, have done to help sort out the messes in Afghanistan, South A f r i c a - N a m i b i a - A n g o l a - C u b a , Iraq-Iran and now Kuwait-Iraq." 6 3 Japan and Germany, stung by criticism o f their performance in the Gulf crisis, are looking for ways to make constructive contributions to a stronger UN without shedding constraints on the use of their militaries abroad. T h e great majority o f UN members from the South have lowered their voices and are, on the whole, approaching issues pragmatically, not ideologically. T h e Secretary-General has made not inconsiderable headway in the difficult task o f streamlining the UN bureaucracy. Various issues that could blossom into crises or raise the temperature o f debate are still over the horizon, although the disaster in the Balkans provides a troubling glimpse into the future. T h e time is propitious for the United States to assume leadership, not case by case, as in the Gulf crisis and S o m a l i a , but on a sustaining basis. It could begin by acting on legislation introduced by Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.), which would transfer the U S cost o f UN peacekeeping from the international affairs segment of the federal budget to the national defense segment, that is, from the State Department's budget to the P e n t a g o n ' s . 6 4 This would be an acknowledgment that UN endeavors in this field may now be an important contribution to the n a t i o n ' s defense and, given the relative size of the two budgets, it just might make it easier for the Congress to treat these UN expenses as a modest investment in national security rather than as an exorbitant claim on the treasury. It is important that the United States rediscover the habit o f leadership at the UN. It demonstrated in the G u l f crisis what can be done if it is prepared to make the effort. If its leaders are not prepared to give serious thought to the content o f a new world order and to the place o f the United Nations in that order, the U S - U N relationship will almost certainly slide back into a rut. That relationship is unlikely to be as strained as it was in the 1 9 8 0 s , the rut not as deep. But it will be an opportunity missed. Moreover, the failure o f U S leadership could easily contribute to the realienation of the UN membership, especially if the United States is perceived as interested only in trimming the UN budget and bureaucracy without advancing a positive vision o f the organization's role in world affairs. It will not be easy to convert the recent experience o f U S - U N cooperation into something more ambitious and more enduring. T h e government still has major policy disagreements with the majority o f UN member

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states and there are those, such as f o r m e r UN a m b a s s a d o r Jeane Kirkpatrick, w h o resent B o u t r o s - G h a l i ' s activist interpretation of the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s role and are o n c e again g i r d i n g f o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the global b o d y . 6 5 T h e r e is a concern that s o m e p r o b l e m s on the U N ' s agenda, such as the crisis in Bosnia, are a kind of q u i c k s a n d , to be a p p r o a c h e d with e x t r e m e caution. T h e C o n g r e s s c o n t i n u e s to be s e n s i t i v e about its p r e r o g a t i v e s , e s p e cially w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n s are c o n c e r n e d , a n d until the U S b u d g e t deficit has been brought under control, the s e c o n d b r a n c h of g o v e r n m e n t is likely to be h y p e r v i g i l a n t w h e r e s p e n d i n g on the U N is c o n c e r n e d . A n d the national preoccupation with d o m e s t i c malaise w o r k s against the d e v e l o p m e n t of a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g approach to the United Nations. T h e c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d the U n i t e d N a t i o n s in the G u l f crisis, so w i d e l y h e r a l d e d s o r e c e n t l y , p r o v i d e s a f o u n d a t i o n o n w h i c h to build. It m a y not h a v e b e e n a t e x t b o o k e x a m p l e of collective sec u r i t y , b u t it w a s a g o o d e x a m p l e of c r e a t i v e p r o b l e m s o l v i n g u n d e r the p r e s s u r e of e v e n t s by both the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n cil. It w o u l d be u n f o r t u n a t e if it w e r e a l l o w e d to b e c o m e an isolated e x a m p l e of c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the global o r g a n i z a t i o n and its most i m p o r tant m e m b e r .

Notes 1. John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round (Change at the United Nations)," New Yorker, Dec. 16, 1991, p. 90. 2. New York Times, Mar. 7, 1991, p. A8. 3. David Gergen, "America's Missed Opportunities," Foreign Affairs 71, 1 (America and the World 1991/92), p. 1. 4. By the end of 1992, UN membership had reached 180. 5. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 1. 6. William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," Foreign Affairs 70, 4 (Fall 1991), p. 66. 7. Ibid., p. 81. 8. See provisions on deep seabed mining in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part XI. 9. Walter Wriston, "Technology and Sovereignty," Foreign Affairs 67, 5, (Winter 1988/89), p. 865. 10. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 11. Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs 71, 1 (America and the World 1991/92), p. 25. 12. An exception occurred in East Pakistan, which broke away and became Bangladesh with India's military assistance and the rest of the world's acquiescence. Collective fear of the consequences of reopening colonial boundary issues was particularly strong among African states. 13. See, for example, John Mearsheimer, "Why We Shall Soon Miss the Cold War," Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, pp. 51-61.

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14. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Movement," Foreign Affairs 70, 1 (America and the World 1990/91). 15. William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power," Foreign Affairs 70, 1 (America and the World 1990/91), p. 34. 16. See Chapter II, note 2. 17. Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Movement," p. 24. 18. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs 71, 2 (Spring 1992), p. 88. 19. Quoted in Washington Weekly Report, XVII-10, March 27, 1992. 20. The December 16, 1991, decision and the US reaction to it are summarized in Washington Weekly Report, XVII-40, December 17, 1991. 21. Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," p. 21. 22. John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs 70, 2 (Spring 1991), p. 113. 23. Stanley Hoffmann, "A New World and Its Troubles," Foreign Affairs 69, 4 (Fall 1990), p. 118. 24. Miles Kahler, "The International Political Economy," Foreign Affairs 69, 4 (Fall 1990), p. 149. 25. See Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70, 5 (Winter 1991/92). 26. Krasner, Structural Conflict. 27. Carol Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," Foreign Policy 85 (Winter 1991/ 92), p. 152. 28. Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," p. 26. 29. Michael Mandelbaum, "The End of the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs 71, 1 (America and the World 1991/92), pp. 178-179. 30. Ibid., p. 178. 31. Quoted in Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa," Foreign Affairs 71, 1 (America and the World 1991/92), p. 148. 32. Tina Rosenberg, "Beyond Elections," Foreign Policy 84 (Fall 1991), p. 72. Since that article was written, Haiti's elected government was overthrown. 33. Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," p. 148. 34. Rosenberg, "Beyond Elections," p. 72. 35. Lancaster, "Democracy in Africa," pp. 156-157. 36. Mandelbaum, "The End of the Soviet Union," p. 177. 37. John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, eds.,y4 Global Agenda: Issues Before the 46th General Assembly of the United Nations, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991, p. 171. 38. New York Times, November 19, 1991, p. A19. 39. Ibid. 40. David Hare, A Map of the World, London: Faber and Faber, 1982, p. 67. 41. Quoted in Washington Weekly Report, XVII-35, November 1, 1991. 42. Washington Post, February 12, 1992, p. A27. 43. See the comments of former UN Undersecretary General Ronald Spiers, New York Times, February 28, 1992, p. A15. 44. New York Times, March 30, 1992, p. A15. 45. Ali Mazrui, "Uncle S a m ' s Hearing Aid," in Sanford J. Ungar, ed., Estrangement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 179-192. 46. Jeffrey Laurenti, American Public Opinion and the United Nations, UNAUSA Occasional Papers, New York: UNA-USA, 1992, pp. 19-20. 47. William Branigan, "The U.N. Empire: How to Fix It? (North and South Stand Worlds Apart on Reform)," Washington Post, September 23, 1992, pp. A l , 32.

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48. The documents that were the focus of UNCED were the framework convention on climate change; a convention on biological diversity; the so-called Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Agenda 21 (a voluntary action plan for the twenty-first century); and a non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of forest. The United States signed the convention on climate change (in which no timetables or targets were set), but did not sign the biological diversity convention. 49. For an analysis of the Common Fund concept and negotiations, see Robert Rothstein, Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for the New International Economic Order, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. 50. Quoted in William Branigan, "The U.N. Empire: Polished Image, Tarnished Reality (As U.N. Expands, So Do Its Problems)," Washington Post, September 20, 1992, p. A26. 51. William Branigan, "The U.N. Empire," Washington Post, September 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1992. 52. For perhaps the best account of the problems a Secretary-General (or any executive head) has in effecting change within the bureaucracy, see Robert W. Cox, "The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization," in International Organization 23 (Spring 1969). 53. SC Res. 794, December 3, 1992. 54. SC Res. 713, September 25, 1991. 55. SC Res. 743, February 21, 1992. 56. The Vance-Owen proposal called for ten autonomous provinces in Bosnia under a weak central government. Serbs would retain control of more than 40 percent of the land and three of the ten provinces; heavy weapons would be stored under UN supervision and 25,000 UN peacekeepers would be deployed; and ethnic cleansing would cease and human rights would be respected. 57. The United States still withholds monies from specific items in the U N ' s budget, such as the US share of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission (executive decision) and activities supportive of the PLO (legislative mandate). 58. See Washington Weekly Report (UNA-USA) for a running account of this struggle. 59. Ibid., XVIII-11, April 3, 1992. The first tranche of $270 million was included in the continuing appropriations resolution for foreign aid, which ended the standoff between the president and the Congress over the issue of providing Israel with $10 billion in housing loan guarantees with which to absorb new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 60. Ibid., XVIII-7, March 6, 1992. 61. Ibid., XVIII-10, March 27, 1992. Congressmen Tom Lantos (D-Cal.) and Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) have led this move to cut the US contribution for peacekeeping forces. 62. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Report of the SecretaryGeneral pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, United Nations, 1992 (DPI/1247). 63. Lexington, The Economist, March 2, 1991, p. 32. 64. Washington Weekly Report, XVII1-18, June 11, 1992. 65. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Boutros-Ghali's Power Grab," Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1993, p. A19.

Index

ACABQ. See Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), 51 Afghanistan, 48-49, 56(n45), 95-96, 103, 169 Africa, 38, 52, 89(nl9), 91(n42), 111, 142, 150-152, 170(nl2). See also various countries. African National Congress (ANC), 47, 98 Aga Khan, Sadruddin, 126 Algeria, 40, 45 American Revolution, 13 ANC. See African National Congress Angola, 89(nl9), 96, 150, 169 Anti-Americanism, 45 Apartheid, 37, 46-47, 98, 133(n78) Arab-Israel War of 1948, 35 Arab League, 110 Arab states, 53, 106, 153. See also various countries Arafat, Yasser, 101 Argentina, 91(n43) Arnson, Cynthia 57(n48) Article 19 crisis, 30, 62-63, 89(n7) Asia, 38, 91(n42), 142. See also various countries Assessments: of United Nations members, 50, 70, 72, 74, 90(n33, 34), 91(n43); of United States, 19, 50, 59, 65, 80; arrearages, 77-79, 88, 102, 145, 155-156, 164-165; Carter administration, 67; Charter obligation to pay, 27, 39, 61-64, 67, 69, 84; Congress, 64-67, 69-72, 75-78, 82, 84-87; French withholding, 62-63; Goldberg doctrine, 63-64, 67, 69-70; Helms amendment, 66-67, 69, 87; International Labor Organization, 65; Jeane Kirkpatrick, 69-70, 92(n61); Kassebaum amendment, 67, 71-73,

75-78, 90(n22), 95; Reagan administration, 67, 70-71, 78, 83, 88; Soviet Union withholding, 62-63; UNESCO, 65; United States withholding, 1, 50, 60, 64, 66, 69-71, 73, 75, 88, 91(n48), 102, 165-166, 172(n57). See also Budget. Axis, 17, 18, 25, 29 Aziz, Tariq, 113 Baker, James, 107, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114-115, 125 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Act. See Gramm-RudmanHollings Budget Deficit Reduction Act Balkans, 164 Bangladesh, 170(nl2) Barraclough, Geoffrey, 32, 55(nl 1, 12) Bedjaoui, Mohammed, 56(n32) Benin, 150 Bennet, James, 133(n56, 57, 58) Berlin wall, 139 Biden, Joseph, 117 Big Five, 27, 122, 139, 159 Blodgett, John, 131 (n5) Bolton, John, 145 Boo, Katherine, 133(n67) Bosnia, 112, 143, 157, 163, 170, 172(n56) Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 99,155,160, 168, 170, 172(n62) Brady, Linda, 113, 132(n37), 133(n53) Branigan, William 172(n47,50, 51) Brazil, 91(n43), 97 Bretton Woods, 11, 147 Buchanan, Pat, 136 Budget deficit: of United States, 59, 75, 77, 85-88,97, 102, 164-165,168 Budget: of United Nations, 18-19, 27, 39-40, 50-51,61-65, 79-81,90(n34), 91(n37),

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174

Index

146, 148, 155; of United States, 59, 75, 82, 85-88, 165, 169; reform of UN budget process, 73-74, 77, 81, 91(n41), 99-100; US contribution to UN budget, 22(n36), 50, 59, 66-67, 70-72, 77-78, 88, 91(n48), 165-166, 172(n59, 61); US reaction to UN budget reform, 75-79, 102-103. See also Assessments; General Assembly Resolution 41/213; Withholding Bulgaria, 164 Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 83, 154-155 Bush, George: American politics, 101, 135-136, 157-158; Bosnia, 163; Gulf crisis, 79, 98, 107-111, 113-116, 118-119, 128; Saddam Hussein, 18, 107-108, 110, 119, 123; Iraq, 107, 119, 123-125, 132(n33), 162; Israel, 153; New World Order, 121, 135, 146-147; Panama, 102, 154; Somalia, I, 137; United Nations, 79, 88, 98, 103-104, 116, 118, 128-129, 137, 145, 153, 156, 165 Cambodia, 96, 165 Canada, 26 Capitalism, 42-44, 147, 150-151, 167 Carter, Jimmy, 59-60, 66, 67, 89(nl9) Central America, 96, 101, 154. See also various countries Charter. See United Nations Charter Chege, Michael, 171(n31) Cheney, Richard, 107 Chernobyl, 142 Chile, 34 China, 14,18, 23,25, 65,109-110, 124,126, 139, 152 Chomsky, Noam, 131 (n21) Chopra, Jarat, 132(n28), 133(n72) Claude, Inis, 21(nl3), 26, 28, 55(n2, 3, 7) Clinton, Bill, 88-89(nl), 136-137, 145, 148, 158, 164 Club of Rome, 42 Coate, Roger, 89(nl7) Cold War: end of, 2, 21 (n9), 94-95, 142, 144, 147, 150, 154,157, 161, 167-168; end of, impact on UN, 57(n53), 61, 94-95, 97-100,102-103, 107,109,120, 129, 135, 140-141,146,148-149, 153,158-159, 164; end of, impact on US policy, 136-137, 144-145,147-148,151, 154, 164, 167; impact on UN, 17, 29-32,35, 37, 48, 113, 143, 154; impact on US policy, 18, 31, 48,141, 154 Collective security, 1, 35, 37, 48-49, 105, 112-113, 117, 123 Colombia, 26, 111

Colonialism, 23, 31, 35, 40, 43, 46-47, 56(n30), 140, 142, 152 Committee of 24, 38, 40, 56(n30) Committee on Program and Coordination (CPC), 51, 73-74, 76-77, 91(n41, 42), 100 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 69 Common Fund for Commodities, 43-44, 46, 160 Communism, 8, 14, 42, 47-51, 97, 135, 139, 147, 149-150, 152, 154, 157, 167 Communist bloc, 13, 30, 36-37, 47, 62, 83, 116, 140, 146, 149 Congo (Brazzaville), 150 Congo (now Zaire), 30, 56(n26), 63, 99 Congress. See United States Congress Congruence: in US-UN relations, 7-8, 36-37, 145-146 Constructive engagement, 98 Contras, 82 Cooper, Andrew, 110, 132(n38, 39, 44), 133(n54, 59) Costa Rica, 131 (nl7) Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 56(n41) Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 56(n41) Cox, Robert, 172(n52) CPC. See Committee on Program and Coordination Croatia, 163 Crozier, Brian, 128, 134(n91) Cuba, 26, 27, 45, 89(nl9), 96, 109, 111-112, 120, 124, 132(n45), 152, 169 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 56(n30) Decolonization, 13, 31, 35, 38, 46-47, 56(n30), 142 Democracy, 13, 15, 20, 44-46, 147, 151-152 Derwinski, Edward, 83 Destler, I. M., 92(n58) Dewey, Thomas, 90(n24) Division on Palestinian Rights, 69 Dole, Robert, 91(n47) Dulles, John Foster, 54 East-West conflict. See Cold War Eastern Europe, 91(n42), 139, 150, 152. See also various countries Economic development, 15, 31, 37, 41, 43-44, 51-52,66,159-160 Ecuador, 120 Egalitarianism: in United Nations, 9-10, 24, 26-27, 29, 31, 36,39, 72, 138 Egypt, 106

Index

Eila, Aiieh, 90(n58) Ekeus, Rolf, 123 El Salvador, 96 Environment, 32, 42,141-142, 159-160 EsquipulasII Agreement, 101, 131(nl7) Ethiopia, 26, 81, 111 Europe, 23, 142-143. See also Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and various countries European Community, 8, 163-164 Finger, Seymour Max, 89(n2, 19) Finkelstein, Lawrence, 9, 10, 21(nl0, 11), 39, 56(n31) Finland, 26 Fitzgerald, Frances, 22(n30, 34, 35) Fitzwater, Marlin, 118 Foreign policy, US. See Bush, George; Carter, Jimmy; Clinton, Bill; Nixon, Richard; Reagan, Ronald; United States: foreign policy; United States Congress Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, 71-72, 77, 90(n32), 92(n59) Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 75-76, 78, 92(n59) Forsythe, David, 55(nl8), 57(n50), 90(n23), 98, 131(nl3) France, 13, 52, 62-63, 110, 114, 127, 139, 142, 163 Franck, Thomas, 21(nl, 7), 35, 36, 47, 55(n22), 56(n24, 36, 42), 57(n46) Freedman, Lawrence, 142, 150, 170(nll), 171(n21, 28) Functionalism, 11 Functional specificity: among UN organizations, 10-11,40-42, 149-150 Gaddis, John Lewis, 171(n22) Galenson, Walter, 89(nl7) GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gelb, Leslie, 92(n58) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 12, 21(nl6), 43 General Assembly. See United Nations General Assembly Gergen, David, 170(n3) Germany, 114, 130, 139, 144-145, 167, 169; Federal Republic of, 90(n33); Nazi, 18 Geyelin, Philip, 17, 22(n33) Ghana, 150 Gilpin, Robert, 34, 35, 55(n20, 21) Glaspie, April, 106 Goldberg, Arthur, 63 Goldberg doctrine, 63-64, 67, 69-70 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 94-95, 109-110,118, 139

175

Gorton, Slade, 117 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Deficit Reduction Act, 75, 85-87 Green, Bill, 117 Gregg, Robert, 21(nl4), 55(n8, 9, 10) Grenada, 27, 49 Group of 18. See Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts Group of 77, 39, 44, 97, 105, 140, 149, 160 Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts, 73-74, 76, 91(n39, 42) Grunberg, isabelle, 21 (n3) Guatemala, 131 (nl 7) Guinea-Bissau, 27 Gulf crisis, 1, 3, 20, 88, 93-94, 101-102, 115-116, 128-129, 135, 137, 139-140, 145-146, 148, 158, 161, 166, 169-170; Congress, 116-117, 128, 130; Iraq's policy during crisis, 104-106, 114; Iraq's policy after the war, 122-124, 126-127; UN response to crisis, 106-114; UN policy after war, 120-127, 133(n79), 162; US response to crisis, 97, 107-115, 130, 157, 166, 169; US policy after war, 119-120, 122-128, 162. See also Bush, George; Iraq; Hussein, Saddam; Kuwait; United Nations Security Council; United States: foreign policy; United States Congress Gulf war, 1, 113-114, 119, 128, 130, 135, 141, 144, 153, 168 Haas, Ernst, 6, 21(n2), 144 Haass, Richard, 133(n75) Haiti, 96, 171(n32) Hammarskjöld, Dag, 30 Hare, David, 156, 171(n40) Harrelson, Max, 57(n46) Hartz, Louis, 22(n27) Headquarters Agreement (US-UN), 101 Hegemonic stability theory, 6, 21(n3, 4), 36 Hegemony: US, 6-7, 19, 34-36, 143-145, 167 Helms amendment, 66-67, 69, 87 Helms, Jesse, 66 Henry, Paul, 117 Heritage Foundation, 68, 90(n24), 103 Hermann, Charles, 134(n93) Higgott, Richard, 110,132(n38, 39, 44), 133(n54,59) Hiroshima, 32 Hitler, Adolf, 18 Hoffman, Stanley, 148, 171(n23) Honduras, 96, 131(nl7) Human rights, 34, 45^t6, 56(n41), 89(nl9), 97-98; economic and social rights, 46; group rights, 46; political and civil rights, 45-46

176

Index

Hunt, Michael, 13,14,2!(nl8), 22(n21, 26, 28) Hussein, Saddam, 1, 94, 96, 119, 123, 136, 157, 166; invasion of Kuwait, 104-106, 114, 161; and George Bush, 18, 107-108, 110, 114, 118-119, 123, 125-129; and UN, 108, 112, 122, 126-127 Hyde, Henry, 172(n61) IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank Imperialism, 14, 20, 31, 48-50, 154; preemptive, by US, 14, 20, 50, 154; by UN, 11 India, 91(n43), 124, 170(nl2) Indyk, Martin, 133(n73) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 70, 121 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, World Bank), 12, 26,41,72 International Court of Justice (World Court), 49, 57(n49), 63,101 International Labor Organization (ILO), 65-66, 89(nl3, 17) International Monetary Fund (IMF), 12, 26, 41, 43, 72 International Trade Organization (ITO), 21(nl6) International Whaling Commission, 25 Intervention, humanitarian, 161-164, 168; in Iraq, 124-127, 134(n89,90), 148, 162, 164; in Somalia, 1, 137, 162-164; in Bosnia, 163-164 Iran, 106, 157, 169; Azerbaijan province, 35 Iran-Iraq War, 103, 169 Iraq, 25; invasion of Kuwait, 1, 26, 30, 93-94, 100, 104-106, 116, 128-129, 139, 161; relations with Kurds and Shiites, 123-127, 162; and United Nations, 26, 28, 94, 105-118, 120-127, 129, 139, 164, 169; and United States, 94, 106-109, 113-120, 122-127, 129,132(n33), 137, 144-145, 148, 157, 162; weapons of mass destruction, 120-123, 126 Ishihara, Shintaro, 150 Islam, 52-53 Israel, 23, 34,37,46-47, 52-53,65, 98, 101-102, 106, 128, 153, 172(n59) Ivory Coast, 26, 111 Jacobson, Harold, 11, 21(nl5), 55(nl) James, Alan, 48

Japan, 18, 35, 90(n33), 114,130, 137, 139, 144-145, 148, 157, 167, 169 Johnson, Lyndon, 49 Joint Congressional Resolution of January 12, 1991, 117, 130, 133(n60) Jordan, 106 Kahler, Miles, 149 Karns, Margaret, 3(nl) Kassebaum amendment, 67, 71-73, 75-78, 84, 88, 90(n22, 33), 95 Kassebaum, Nancy, 67, 71, 75, 81 Kasten, Robert, 83, 87 Keller, Kenneth, 55(nl3) Kenya, 150 Keohane, Robert, 21(n3) Kessler, Meryl, 130(nl), 131(nl2) Keyes, Alan, 80, 84 Keynesian revolution, 11 Kincade, William, 105, 114, 132(n29, 31, 36), 133(n55) Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 47, 80, 170, 172(n65); as ambassador to the UN, 68, 79, 83, 153; on withholding, 69-70, 92(n61) Kissinger, Henry, 16, 22(n32) Korean War, 30, 35, 37, 49, 105 Kosovo, 164 Krasner, Stephen, 7, 21(n5, 6), 40, 55(nl7), 96(n33), 170(n5), 171(n26) Krauthammer, Charles, 80-81, 84, 92(n55, 56, 57), 100, 144 Kurdistan, 124 Kurds, 123-127, 134(n89), 162 Kuwait, 157; Iraq's invasion of, 1, 26, 30, 93-94, 96, 100, 102, 105-106, 116, 122, 125, 128-129, 132(n33), 137, 139, 161, 166; liberation, 118-120; as post-invasion object of US and UN diplomacy, 79, 94, 107-114, 116, 118, 121, 133(n72), 144, 169 Lake, Anthony, 92(n58) Lancaster, Carol, 171(n27, 33, 35) Langrod, Georges, 22(n37) Lantos, Tom, 172(n61) Lapham, Lewis, 134(n92) Latin America, 38, 91(n42), 152. See also various countries Laurenti, Jeffrey, 132(n49), 133(n52) Law of the Sea Conference, 69, 141 Law of the Sea Treaty, 43, 56(n37), 160, 170(n8); Preparatory Commission, 69-70, 75, 77, 172(n57); seabed mining provisions, 43, 142, 160 Law, international, 49, 102 Lebanon, 106, 165 Lebow, Richard Ned, 132(n30), 134(n93)

Index

Libya, 102 Lichenstein, Charles, 6 8 - 6 9 Lie, Trygve, 30 Lima Declaration of 1992, 43, 56(n36) Lister, Frederick, 132(n50) Macedonia, 164 Major, John, 126 Majoritarianism: in United Nations, 9-10, 24, 26-27, 29, 31, 36, 39, 40, 74, 138 McHenry, Donald, 22(nl9), 64 Malaysia, 26, 111 Mali, 150 Management: of United Nations, 18-19, 50-51,65-66, 71-73, 154-156, 160-161, 165, 168 Mandate: broad UN, 11, 25, 28-29, 40-41, 138, 149 Mandela, Nelson, 98 Mandelbaum, Michael, 151 Map of the World (Hare), 155 Marin-Bosch, Miguel, 56(n27) Market system: in transition, 149-151; and Third World, 42-44, 140-141,150-151; and United Nations, 43-44, 150-151; US support for, 11-12, 20, 42, 44 Marshall Plan, 35 Marxism-Leninism, 48 Maynes, C. William, 64 Mazrui, Ali, 52 Mearsheimer, John, 170(nl3) Mexico, 91(n43), 97 Mica, Dan, 83-84, 85 Middle East, 46, 52, 102-103, 123, 153. See also various countries Mingst, Karen, 3(nl) MINURSO. See United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Mitrany, David, 11, 21(nl3) Mitterrand, François, 110 Mobilization regimes, 13, 20, 45 Monroe Doctrine, 14 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 8, 21 (n8), 53, 57(n54), 66, 89(nl8) Mozambique, 164 Namibia, 47, 96, 169 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization New International Economic Order, 38-41, 43, 56(n36), 66, 97, 160 New World Information and Communication Order, 66 New world order: Bush, 135, 144, 147, 169 Newell, Gregory, 90(n31) Newhouse, John, 135 Nicaragua, 49, 82, 96, 101-102, 131(nl7)

177

NIEO. See New International Economic Order Nigeria, 91(n43) Nixon, Richard, 39 No-fly zones: in Bosnia, 163; in Iraq, 127, 134(n89), 148, 162 Nobel Peace Prize, 96 Non-Aligned Movement, 45, 54,105,140, 149, 159 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 142 North American Free Trade Agreement, 137 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 8, 21 (n9) North Korea, 35, 49, 139 North-South conflict, 29-32, 97-99,140-141, 148, 151 Nossal, Kim Richard, 132(n38, 39, 44), 133(n54, 59) Nye, Joseph, 144, 171(nl8) OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Office of Management and Budget, 78 Oleszek, Walter, 85, 92(n63) ONUC. See United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUCA. See United Nations Operation in Central America ONUSAL. See United Nations Operation in El Salvador ONUVEH. See United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Haiti ONUVEN. See United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua Open Door Policy, 14 Operation Desert Shield, 107, 130 Operation Desert Storm, 1-2, 34, 99, 107, 110-113, 117-119, 122, 127, 130, 135-136, 141, 144, 151, 157, 160-162 Operation Provide Comfort, 124 Operation Restore Hope, 162 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 43 Owen, David, 164, 172(n56) Packenham, Robert, 12,14,15, 21(nl7), 22(n20, 22, 26) Pakistan, 170(nl2) Palestine Liberation Organization, 37, 47, 69-70, 75, 77, 172(n57) Palestinians, 31, 41, 47, 98, 110, 114, 153 Panama, 102,128, 154 Parsons, Talcott, 10, 21(nl2) Pax Americana, 36,121

178

Index

Peacekeeping: United Nations, 37, 56(n26), 62-63, 92(n51), 95-97, 99-103,145, 154, 158, 163, 165-166, 169, 172(n61) Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 99, 126, 160 Perry, William J., 141, 170(n6, 7) Personnel policies: United Nations, 18-19, 51, 72-73, 76-77, 83, 87, 92(n59), 155, 160-161 Petrovsky, Vladimir, 131(n2) Pfaff, William, 171(nl5) Philippines, 83 Pickering, Thomas, 108, 109, 153-154, 155 Pilon, Juliana, 90(n24) Pines, Burton Yale, 90(n24) Pirages, Dennis, 32, 55(nl4) PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization Pluralism, 8, 12-13, 20, 44-46, 151-152 Politicization, of United Nations: US view, 8, 11, 19,42, 149 Powell, Colin, 107 Premillenialism: in US foreign policy, 15, 17-18, 20, 51, 53-54, 156-157 Preparatory Commission. See Law of the Sea Treaty Primakov, Yevgeny, 110 Puerto Rico, 40 Radicalism: US view of UN support for, 13, 45-47, 54, 153 Reagan, Ronald, 2, 59, 66, 82, 88-89(nl), 97-98, 160; and Soviet Union, 18, 49; and United Nations, 47, 59, 67-70, 83, 100, 103, 116; and US assessment, 60-61 Reagan, Ronald, 18, 47, 49, 59, 88-89(nl), 97; foreign policy of, 60-61, 98; and United Nations, 2, 67, 69, 70, 72, 78, 79, 82,83, 100, 116, 160 Reform, of United Nations: Third World views, 159, 161; UN measures, 57(n51), 72-74, 91(n41), 103, 155-156, 168; US pressure for, 51, 60, 71-72, 75-77, 80-81, 84, 99-100, 155-156, 160-161, 164, 168. See also Kassebaum Amendment; UN General Assembly Resolution 41/213 Report to Congress on the Voting Practices of the United Nations, 79 Revolution: in technology, 32-33, 141-142; US view of UN support for, 13,46-47,153 Ribicoff Report, 65 Richardson, Elliott, 72 Romania, 26 Rosenberg, Tina, 152, 171(n32,34) Rothstein, Robert, 56(n39) Rousselot, John, 67 Rubin, Barry, 56(n39) Ruggie, John Gerard, 55(nl6) Russett, Bruce, 21(n3), 113,119, 132(n51), 133(n71)

Russia, 13, 139-140.150-153,167 San Francisco Conference, 1, 35, 38,138, 143, 147 Saudi Arabia, 105-108 Scheer, Robert, 134(n92) Schwarzkopf, Norman, 107, 118 Scowcroft, Brent, 107 SDR. See Special drawing rights Self-determination, 13-14, 46, 52,142, 153 Serbia, 112, 157, 163 Seychelles, 25 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 107, 110 Shiites, 123, 127, 134(n89), 162 Simon, Paul, 169 Slovenia, 163 Smith, Neal, 86 Smith, Tony, 14, 22(n23, 24) Snidal, Duncan, 21(n3, 4) Solomon, Gerald, 90(n22) Somalia, 28, 34, 143, 150, 161; UN involvement, 162-165; US intervention in, 1, 137, 162-163, 169 South Africa, 23, 31, 34, 37, 47, 55(nl6), 98, 124, 133(n78), 151, 153,169 South Korea, 35, 49, 139 South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), 47, 77 Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 105, 132(n28) Sovereignty: challenges to, 33-34, 142-143; Charter principle, 9-10,19, 148;and humanitarian intervention, 124, 126-127, 161, 163-164; and Iraq, 120, 124, 126-127; and UN membership, 25-26, 38 Soviet Union: end of, 139, 142, 147, 149-150, 157, 167; and end of Cold War, 21, 57(n53), 94-97, 100, 103, 129, 139, 154; and Gulf crisis, 107, 109-110, 113-114, 124-126, 131(n2); UN and Cold War, 13, 23, 25, 28, 30, 35-38, 48-50, 54, 62-63, 65, 105; US and Cold War, 5, 8, 14, 18, 29-30, 35-38, 46, 48-49, 54, 59, 65, 154-155. See also Russia Spain, 25 Special drawing rights (SDR), 41 Spiers, Ronald, 171(n43) Staniland, Martin, 132(n40, 41, 42, 46, 47) Stoessinger, John, 65,89(n7,10, 15) Suez crisis of 1956,37,63, 96 Sundquist, Donald, 83, 87 Sutterlin, James, 113, 119, 132(n51), SWAPO. See South West African People's Organization Sweden, 25 Switzerland, 139 Syria, 106

Index

Tanzania, ISO Third World, 13-14,140,151, 153; and NIEO, 23, 31, 33-34, 40, 4 3 ^ 4 , 66, 97, 103; in United Nations, 36-39, 47,49, 51, 65, SI, 89(nl9), 95, 98, 116, 122, 140, 146-147, 156, 159-161; US understanding of, 15-16, 52-54 Thornburgh, Richard, 136,156 Transnational corporations, 33, 43 Turkey, 83, 106, 124-125,127, 164 U Thant, 49 UNAVEM. See United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNCED. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCTAD. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDRO. See United Nations Coordinator for Disaster Relief UNEF. See United Nations Emergency Force I UNESCO. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFICYP. See United Nations Force in Cyprus UNGOMAP. See United Nations Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIDO. See United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNIFIL. See United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Kingdom, 52, 101, 109-110, 126-127, 139, 163 United Nations Angola Verification Mission, 131 (n6) United Nations Association of the United States, 72 United Nations Charter, 1-2, 9, 13-14, 25-28, 39, 44-45, 50, 61, 72, 89(n6), 96, 138-139, 168; budget and assessment, 27, 61-63, 65, 69-72; Chapter 7 enforcement, 1,35,48, 93,105, 107, 109, 112-113, 120-122, 133(n72), 134(n90), 166; sovereignty and intervention, 9, 33, 105, 120, 122, 125, 133(n78), 148, 161; and Soviet Union, 30, 63; and Third World, 31,49, 159; and United States, 5, 8-10, 12, 27, 29, 39, 44-45, 63-65, 69-72, 148 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 141,146, 151, 159-160, 172(n48) United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 69, 141

179

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 38, 41, 43-44, 149 United Nations Coordinator for Disaster Relief (UNDRO), 124 United Nations Development Program, 66 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 40-42, 65-66, 69, 89(nl3, 17) United Nations Emergency Force 1 (UNEF), 37, 56(n26), 63 United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 96, 131(n4) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/213,73-77,81, 155 United Nations General Assembly: authority of, 27, 36, 39, 61-63; budget and assessment issues, 61-65, 72-74, 76-77, 79, 155; egalitarianism/ majoritarianism, 9, 26, 29, 36, 138; Fifth Committee, 51, 64, 73-74, 92(n62); and Israel, 47, 146; and reform, 72-74, 77, 79, 91(n43), 100, 155; and South Africa, 55; and Third World majority, 33, 36, 38, 41, 44, 49, 56(n27), 90(n34), 97, 101-102; and United States, 35, 48-49, 56(n27), 76, 84, 90(n34), 101-102, 104; Uniting for Peace Resolution, 37, 49, 63 United Nations Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 95 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 124 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 56(n36) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 96, 131 (n4) United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 63, 96, 131 (n4) United Nations Secretariat, 18-19, 54, 57(n51), 69, 73, 76, 81, 91(n41), 95, 99-100, 102, 140, 155-156, 160, 168-169 United Nations Secretary-General, 51, 63, 70, 72,91(n38, 41), 118, 121, 126,131(n9), 155, 160-162, 165, 169; Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 99, 155, 160, 168, 170, 172(n62); Hammarskjold, Dag, 30; Lie, Trygve, 30; Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 99,126, 160; Thant, U, 49 United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, 107-108, 119-122 United Nations Security Council Resolution 666, 112 United Nations Security Council Resolution 670, 112 United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, 109-114, 116-117, 119-120, 124, 133(n72)

180

Index

United Nations Security Council Resolution 686, 118, 133(n69) United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, 119-124, 126-127, 133(n69) United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, 124-127, 133(n79), 134(n89) United Nations Security Council, 26-27, 63, 68,138; and Bosnia, 161, 163; and great powers, 27-28, 139, 159, 169; and Gulf crisis, 1, 93, 105-116, 118-119, 127, 139, 145, 166; and Iraq after Gulf War, 118-127, 161-162; and Korean War, 35, 37, 49, 105; and Nicaragua, 49; and peacekeeping, 95-97; and post-Cold War preeminence, 146, 158-159, 168; and Somalia, 137, 161-163; Summit Meeting of, 168; veto, 9, 27-28, 36-37, 48-49, 109-110, 124, 126, 139-140, 148, 154, 159 United Nations Special Commission, 120, 122-123 United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 131(n7) United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 131(nll) United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), 35 United States Congress: budget process, 75-79, 82, 85-88; executive-legislative relations, 75-80, 82-84, 88; House of Representatives, 65; and Gulf crisis, 113, 116-117, 130, 133(n60); House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee (and subcommittees), 83, 85-86, 102; Senate Appropriations Committee, 78; Senate Armed Services Committee, 130; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 85-86, 92(n50, 61); and United Nations, 65-67, 71, 75-77, 79-82, 84, 87-88, 130, 166; and withholding of US assessment, 70-78, 102-103 United States Department of State, 68, 70, 79, 83, 86, 91(n48), 103,154, 165, 169 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 37, 55(n6), 63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 45

UNTSO. See United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Vance, Cyrus, 164, 172(n56) Vance-Owen Plan, 164, 172(n56) Veto:unit veto, 9-10, 19, 27, 36, 39-40, 148-149; in UN Security Council, 9, 27-28, 36-37, 48-49, 109-110, 124, 126, 139-140, 148, 154, 159; Vietnam War, 49, 82-83, 116 Vietnam, 49, 118 Walters, Vernon, 80, 102-103, 153 Weapons, 141-142; Iraq's, 120-123, 127 Weiss, Thomas, 130(nl), 131(nl2), 132(n28), 133(n72) West Bank, 128 Western Europe, 8, 15, 35, 91(n42). See also various countries Western hemisphere, 49, 97, 102 Western Sahara, 96 Westphalian system, 9, 32, 143 Whalen, Charles, 89(n20) Wiarda, Howard, 16, 22(n31) Wofford, Harris, 136 Woodward, Bob, 132(n35) World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 12, 26, 41,72 World Court (International Court of Justice), 49, 57(n49), 63, 101 World War I, 136 World War II, 5-8, 13, 32, 51, 53, 136, 139, 142-143, 146 Wriston, Walter, 142, 170(n9, 10) Yemen, 26, 107, 109, 111-112, 120, 124 Young, Andrew, 60, 64, 89(nl9) Yugoslavia, 57(n53), 137, 139, 142, 157, 161, 163-165 Zaire, 26, 111 Zamora, Stephen, 27, 55(n5) Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), 124 "Zionism is racism" resolution, 40, 53, 66, 146

About the Book and the Author

In the wake of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the United States assiduously courted the support of the international community for a policy of sanctions and later of military action against Iraq. The primary venue for that successful diplomatic effort was the UN Security Council; in effect, the United States made the United Nations a critically important pillar of its foreign policy, and in the process helped to give the UN the most favorable press it had had in years. This is a situation rich in irony, for it was but a few short years ago that the United States treated the UN with ill-disguised contempt. During the Reagan administration, US-UN relations reached a 40-year nadir, yet under George Bush, these relations were very nearly euphoric. There was a dramatic about-face in US policy. Telling the story of this policy reversal, About Face? looks in depth at the period of UN bashing in the 1980s and the courtship of the UN in 1990 and analyzes the forces that produced first one and then the other of these latest phases in the tumultuous US-UN relationship. The book concludes with a critique of the thesis that, with the Cold War over and collective security rediscovered, the UN will at last assume the role envisioned for it by the founders and the United States will find in the UN a congenial vehicle for the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Robert W. Gregg is professor of international relations in The American University's School of International Studies.

181