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UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL AID IN BURMA A Short Survey

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The ASEAN Economic Research Unit is an integral part of the Institute, coming under the overall supervision of the Director who is also the Chairman of its Management Committee. The Unit was formed in 1979 in response to the need to deepen understanding of economic change and political developments in ASEAN. The day-to-day operations of the Unit are the responsibility of the Co-ordinator. A Regional Advisory Board, consisting of a senior economist from each of the ASEAN countries, guides the work of the Unit.

UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL AID IN BURMA A Short Survey

Soe Saing

Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 69 ASEAN Economic Research Unit INSTITUTE OF SOUTIIEAST ASIAN STUDIES 1990

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

c 1990 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 17ze responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters. Cataloguing in Publication Data

Soe Saing. United Nations technical aid in Burma : a short survey. (Research notes and discussions paper / Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ; no. 69) 1. United Nations--Burma--Technical assistance. 2. Technical assistance-Burma. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore). n. Title. ill. Series. DS501 I596 no. 69 1990 sls90-1462 ISBN 981-3035-52-8 ISSN 0129-8828 Printed in Singapore by Loi Printing Pte Ltd.

CONTENTS

I

Nexus Between Technical Assistance and Development Aid Some Views "Capital" and "Investment" in Developing Countries Need for Aid

II

The Modalities of U.N. Technical Aid The United Nations United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Genesis Principles Founding Policies, 1950 Practicalities Towards the United Nations Special Fund, 1957 United Nations Development Programme, 1966 The Capacity Study of 1968 The Consensus of 1970 The IPF System, 1972 New Dimensions, 1975 Progress -- Set-back -- Recovery Restructuring, 1977 Lessons, 1986

III

Burma and the United Nations System The United Nations System in Burma: Summary The UNDP UNICEF FAO

1 1 3 5 9 9 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 14 15 15 15 16 16

17 17 18 18 19

vi

Contents

WHO Others Country Background: An Overview National Development Practices Technical Co-operation Priorities Technical Assistance Leading to Capital Aid Development Planning in Burma IV

Country Programmes First Country Programme (CP I) Innovative Features Second Country Programme (CP II) Summary of Status of Implementation Third Country Programme (CP III) Review of the Third Country Programme Fourth Country Programme (CP IV) Pluses Fifth Country Programme (CP V) Food and Agricultural Organization Burma and the F AO United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF in Burma World Health Organization and Burma

v

Government Focal Point for Technical Co-operation The Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD) and Its Function The Interrelationship between FERD, UNDP and Various Aid Agencies

VI

Aid Co-operation and Co-ordination The Role and Impact of U.N. Technical Aid: Some Reflections Effectiveness Constraints Inputs to Outputs

19 19 20 20 21 21 22 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 28

29 30 30 31 34 35 37 41

41 44

46

46 48 48 49

Contents

vii

The Role of the U.N. System: Reflections Prescriptions Aid Co-ordination: An Overview

49 51 51

VII Burma's Status as a Least Developed Country

54

Some Features Characteristics Background A Third-World Initiative The Substantial New Programme of Action (SNPA): ~~~

54 55 55 55 ~

Burma as a Least Developed Country (LLDC)

56

Postscript

60

Appendices

62

Appendix A: Appendix B: Appendix C: Appendix D:

Organizations Forming the United Nations System List of Least Developed Countries Technical Assistance Provided to Burma by the UNDP and Its Predecessors Sectoral Allocation of UNDP Assistance to Burma, CP IV 1982-86

62

64 66 67

Notes

68

References

69

I

NEXUS BE1WEEN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AID

Some Views

Forty years ago in 1949, President Truman proposed in his Presidential Inaugural Address, inter alia that the United States "should make available to peace-loving people the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life". This proposal led to the various forms of. assistance to poor countries in the form of capital, food as well as materials, expertise and training. (This proposal later came to be known as the Point Four Programme for the reason that it was the fourth point of the presidential inaugural address). Historically, technical assistance in one form or another had always been an integral part of the relations between the colonies and their respective ruling metropoles. It was conducted essentially by the colonial powers who provided the administrators, the teachers and the technicians to the colonies to administer, build and maintain an infrastructure base for the purposes of governance, defence and trade. The private investors and traders who followed the flag brought their own expertise, and themselves also trained local labour for their own purposes. Early in the 1940s, the United States already had pioneered training programmes in agriculture, health and education in Latin American countries and China. These were the first technical assistance programmes extended by one country to another independent foreign country, albeit within its orbit of influence. However, it was this Point Four doctrine of 1949 expounded by President Truman that first began formally a quantum step beyond the metropole-colony connexion precedents. This doctrine explicitly accepted moral responsibility to help development in all poor countries, and not limiting to those with ties to the United States. It identified the transfer of technology as the primary means for rendering the assistance.

2

United Nations Teclrnical Aid in BumJa

This early doctrine was based upon the idea that the introduction of production methods of the developed societies would, somehow, lead directly to substantial increases in the production of goods in less developed countries. This transfer of "know-how" was to be accomplished through (a) specialists in particular fields and (b) trainees to be sent abroad for vocational or professional courses. The host government would contribute local currency costs, to demonstrate the mutuality of interests, to emphasize the desire for "self-help", and to show independence. The foregoing propositions of the U.S. technical assistance programmes subsequently influenced the United Nations and its specialized agencies. They went on to initiate and expand manifold their own technical assistance programmes which were, however, restricted to economic and social spheres, totally excluding any military or paramilitary aid. As the simplistic assumptions of the original doctrine came face to face with the realities in the less developed countries some modifications had to be made, out of necessity. Perhaps the most fundamental was the recognition of how extensive and varied were the factors encompassed by the term "developing countries", and that there was no homogeneity nor uniformity among these developing countries, even among the geographically similar ones. In the poor countries, furthermore, it was found necessary to provide not only technical know-how, but also equipment and supplies for the projects to function. And quite often Western technology proved to be unsufficient, or ill-suited. Almost everywhere, new fangled methods encountered difficulties rooted in diverse local cultures and traditions. Transferring advanced Western skills to local counterparts did not prove, as formerly envisaged, to be the panacea for the economic ills besetting the poor countries. Transfers of skills and know-how were just not enough by themselves to stimulate and foster development. The pendulum thereupon swung the other way towards massive capital inflows. Many of the theories about technical assistance in the 1950s and 1960s, and thereafter, did not lose sight of, but only dissipated, the focus on the role of capital. Pre-investment and feasibility studies, then, came to be recognized as essential features of technical assistance programmes that were hoped to attract foreign capital. When Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) capital became available, it was evident that technical assistance would have to be packaged as an integral part of such aid. The quality of available human resources were in turn recognized as equally important as the quantity of material capital inflows. The quality of life also came to be taken into account as an equitable part of public policy

Nexus Between Technical Assistance and Development Aid

3

with the expanding gross national product (GNP), even in poorer societies. The discovery, or rather the rediscovery, of such tenets did divert some attention away from the emphasis placed on the magnitude of the capital inflow, towards the efficacy with which all investments need to be managed. Of greater significance was a growing emphasis on building the social and economic environment within which better and more opportunities for the advancement of the broader segment of the population could be provided. Within this awareness, one approach directed attention to the public policies and social institutions that affect human behaviour. Many believed that political and social reform, and the presence (or absence) of various infrastructures to be the more important motivators of economic progress than the contributions of technical know-how and capital, that had preoccupied earlier theorists. Some even considered such reforms to be a precondition, without which neither capital nor technology could be effectively utilized. Another approach looked for answers in the institutfonal build-up for managing development-- planning llgencies, research institutes, budget bureaus and the like. By -building suclt, organizations, it was thought that some viable mechanism would have been established for better utilization of the services of both expatriate advisors and local technocrats. With decades of trial and failure experience, the various technical assistance doctrines have become more refined, more cognizant of the realities, more aware of the limitations, and paradoxically, yet more hopeful of the opportunities. Experience, as such, has not made the task any simpler; it, however, has made the possibilities more promising, and, therefore, within reach of attainment. Technical assistance in all forms have now become accepted in toto, in its own right, and not as a mere adjunct to some capital aid. "Capital" and "Investment" in Developing Countries Most orthodox development theories emphasize capital formation as the major factor in the development of countries. Such as in Harrod-Domar and similar models, growth in production is the result of a propensity to save and a stable aggregate capital-output ratio. "Capital" is a term defined in national accounting as the value of the stock of physical capital goods. Economists did, however, make suitable reservations as to the importance also of other factors, such as institution building, improvement in the allocation of resources and so on in the process of development to safeguard their flanks. The central thrust of the conventional approach, nevertheless, remains the

4

United Nations Technical Aid ill Burma

preoccupation with investment in physical capital as the main vehicle in economic development. The position of investment in material capital is the backbone of the operations of the international financial institutions (IFis), such as the World Bank group, the Asian Development Bank, and others. This is what they still concentrate on (albeit with more sophistication and fine-tuning). This preoccupation with physical capital goods is embedded in their policy and practice. It follows from this that, in the attempts to set up objective measurements of the economic performance of the developing countries, the savings and investment rates have to be the focal points, around which the ancillary factors must revolve. There are admittedly acceptable reasons why the definition of investment as expenditure on material capital goods has been commonly adopted. Within a given structure of an economy, this definition is adequate. It is simple, yet fits in neatly in the preparation of national accounts. In the standard U.N. System of National Accounts, investment consists of fixed capital formation and increase in stocks, and is measured by "expenditure on tangible assets other than land, mineral rights and the like". On the other hand, such economists as Solow, Abramovitz, Denison and others have found empirically, that the growth of the capital stock and labour force could not account for more than a fraction of the total growth of GNP, and that the "unexplained residual factor" -- improved resource allocation, technological change, improvement in the quality of human resources -accounts for as much as half of the total growth rates. At best, it seems therefore that the provision of material capital goods may account for no more than half of the economic growth in a developing country within a certain range of investment and growth rates. And, how therefore are the activities covered by non-capital aid, the foremost of which is technical assistance, to be classified in development theory? Technical assistance is conventionally never classified in a national budget as "investment" except for expenditure on incidental long-lasting equipment such as computers, vehicles, and the like. Any expenditure by the recipient government on technical assistance is a non-capital outlay -- it is current government expenditure -- that is to say, it is the kind of expenditure that, by accepted budgetary norms, should be held down to free funds so that "savings" can be increased to enable corresponding investment in material capital. Furthermore, the donor countries treat technical assistance as part of

Nexus Between Technical Assistance and Development Aid

5

the Official Development Assistance and as such, it is capital expenditure. In the balance of payments account of the recipient country it will be shown as a debit item (for receipt of services) in the cunent account; and as a credit item (of unrequited transfer) as a contra entry in the capital account. Then in the national accounts of the recipient country, technical assistance shows up not as investment but as consumption. The treatment of technical assistance in budgetary and balance of payments accounts is, therefore, somewhat contradictory and awkward theoretically. One inescapable conclusion derived from all this is that investment in material capital can only be one of the many factors involved in economic development, and that "current" expenditures on health, education, agricultural extension, research, management training, and so forth, may be equally or, in some instances, even more important than investment in capital alone. The development of an economy comes about by an admixture of investment factors with the relevant non-investment factors relating to human resources and institutions. Increased investment alone, without the latter will, in all likelihood, result only in swollen budgets without concomittant growth. In mature economies, these non-investment factors grow spontaneously and in chain-reaction, directly and indirectly responding to capital investment. In contrast, such growth has to be specifically nursed into existence, and persistently and consistently "nurtured" in developing countries. There is nothing automatic about the process of growth nor is it self-sustaining in such countries. For all the above, the nexus between development aid and technical assistance in all its various forms is all the more a crucial factor for development. Its essentiality is now no more controversial, nor deniable. Need for Aid

Low-income countries not excluding Burma are primarily dependent on external resources (which includes technical aid) for financing all purposes of economic development. More than half of the investment expenditure of the countries designated by the United Nations as Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) (of which Burma is one), is financed by official external resources. And for Burma, official foreign aid will, now and in the foreseeable future, have to be a principal source of capital formation and foreign exchange. Issues relating to the obtainment and utilization of these resources are, therefore, of utmost concern and relevance. A poor country, like Burma, is one where the levels of individual income

6

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

and savings are minimal, and the production profile is such that efforts to increase productive growth run inevitably into snags and bottlenecks at one stage or another, sooner or later -- more likely sooner. Low level domestic savings, insufficient foreign exchange earnings to pay even for basic import requirements, lack of technical skills, institutional inadequacy, wide-spread capacity limitations (or non-utilization) are prominent manifestations. The overriding reason in seeking foreign assistance is, therefore, to remove these impediments, if possible all at the same time. For Burma, of the bottle-necks that foreign aid is meant to relieve, the seemingly irremovable constraint is the foreign exchange component, while the low level of domestic savings is possibly less understood. Very few now believe in the simplistic notion of foreign aid being an adequate addition to domestic savings which, given the capital-output ratio, would consequently raise the growth rate proportionally. Despite two and a half decades of the so-called "socialist" stance, and the inward-looking self-sufficiency stand, Burma has yet to discover a more viable alternative to foreign economic assistance for its development. But aid is not always a package of unalloyed joy. Foreign assistance for a particular project can have unintended adverse little-understood ramifications for the long-term development of the recipient country. It is therefore vital for a country like Burma which is dependent to an appreciable extent on external assistance, to consider the procurement and use of such resources in the context of an overall realistic, consistent and pragmatic "plan" for national economic development. Burma has attempted some "socialistic" planning but the results are only too evident. A "plan" does not have to be sophisticated. The data base in Burma is too weak anyway to warrant the building of advanced econometric models. Thanks to years of manipulating figures to conform to the "plans" and "targets" laid down, Burma has no better than broad aggregated economic and statistical magnitudes, with not very adequate sectoral details (of doubtful authenticity), and also of dubious macro-economic consistency. The national"plans" were a series of conglomerations of projections added up from the lower to the higher strata of administration. As elsewhere, uncertainties surround estimates of some of the variables: projections of exports and foreign exchange earnings, and its manufacturing production figures were notoriously "optimistic" and out of line at all times. The total amount of external resources received and receivable never seemed to be able to meet the estimated needs. Matching the various objectives with the available foreign exchange requires rapid adjustments. Burma does not possess the dynamic means to do that.

Nexus Between Technical Assistance and Development Aid

7

Planning should mean more than estimating resource requirements and setting aggregate targets. It should also involve, among other things, setting key policy decisions to attain given objectives, and implementation of these through administrative actions sequentially. It should involve ensuring consistency throughout the various decisions and actions. This is a most difficult administrative operation, which is easier stated than done, and rarely done right. Burma has yet to show proof that it can perform this task competently. If only foreign assistance were "fungible" or "switchable", and if countries could choose the donors to get the assistance from, the planners' job would be that much less difficult, assuming that they do possess the relevant information, and that there is the national capacity to plan and set clear-cut goals. This is an ideal set-up, however, with many suppositions seldom, if at all, to be found in a less developed country. In practice, foreign aid is available only in donor-dictated forms with very limited possibility of substitution between them. The donors themselves often specify where the required physical resources are to be procured (which is tied aid); and the donors have their own preferences for certain schemes or projects, for reasons of their own. Foreign assistance comes in so many forms. There is a confusing and non-exclusive list of definitions of the different types of assistance. "Project", "non-project", "programme", "commodity", "sector", "structural" and "budgetary support" are some. A considerable proportion of the external assistance to the poorer countries, however, is by way of non-project aid. The need in general for raw materials, components, semi-finished goods, spare parts, for fuller capacity utilization of the local industrial plants, and for key agricultural inputs, are as essential as, often even more so than, the need for additional capacity-creation itself. With the ever-present foreign exchange shortages, the requirements for this form of assistance, including general balance-of-payments support, have increased. This is especially true for Burma in its economic travail. Under-utilization of the capacity of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) seems to be one of the really obstructive impediments on the path of Burma's development. Burma has received non-project assistance mostly from Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. Such availability bas considerably alleviated its balance-of-payments difficulties, and ameliorated the snags in its capacity-utilization somewhat, but nowhere near the extent needed. Non-project assistance or commodity assistance for the supply of raw materials is useful only in a limited way, because the commodities imported

8

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

are almost always specifically for the projects of the original donors. In the LLDCs, there is an all-round shortage of administrators, planners, managers, engineers and skilled craftsmen, though the degree of scarcity varies. Burma is no exception. This is the main factor limiting the "absorptive capacity" of the LLDCs. Technical assistance can, therefore, be a most cost-effective and efficacious way of removing this stumbling block. For the LLDCs, the multiplicity of types of foreign aid embody the relationship between the donors and the recipients. The donors' preferences and interests are mixed with degrees of altruism, self-interest, as well as non-too-subtle persuasion, and ill-disguised leverage, and sensitive pressures. No aid provided by one country to another will ever be without this complex interplay of such considerations.

II

THE MODALITIES OF U.N. TECHNICAL AID

The United Nations Strange as it may seem, there is no universal agreement as to what comprises the United Nations system. This fact alone indicates the complexity of the system. In this study the term is used to describe all that conglomeration of Organizations, Institutions, Funds and Programmes (all in capital letters), operating under the aegis of the United Nations, and all of which deal with economic and social questions. Within the U.N. system there were, in 1986, nineteen inter-governmental agencies (if the World Bank trio are counted as one) which are usually referred to as "Specialized Agencies", although only seventeen of them are full Specialized Agencies de jure under the terms of the U.N. Charter. The agencies are all autonomous, and report to the United Nations General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Each deals with a defined functional sector, such as health, agriculture, education or labour. In addition, there are fifteen Organs and Programmes related to the Economic and Social Council, some of which use the services of the specialized agencies as "executing agencies" for the implementation of their projects and programmes. These Organs and Programmes also undertake activities in the economic and social fields on their own. Finally, there are a number of "Special Bodies" of the U.N. most of which are of only marginal relevance in the economic and social fields (see Appendix A). The idea underlying the U.N. Specialized Agencies is older than the United Nations itself, by some eight decades. The three specialized agencies in the fields of telecommunications, meteorology and postal services are the direct descendents of the organizations created in 1865, 1873 and 1875 respectively. Those original organizations grew out of sheer technical necessity

10

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

in the eras of growing communications world-wide. They had two common features: to act as clearing houses of information, and to promote internationally standardized regulations. Only after 1945 was a third function added: that of providing technical assistance in their special fields. Immediately after World War I in 1919 the International Labour Organization (ILO) was formed with overt political, economic and social objectives. This was the most "political" Specialized Agency until the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was created in 1946. Three international financial institutions, created between 1944 and 1948, and now giants among the U.N. Specialized Agencies, but totally different from the rest of them, play immensely important roles in world economic affairs. The first is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), designed to remove the international monetary instability and exchange restrictions which had bedevilled international trade and payments in the years between World War I and World War ll. The second is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ffiRD), commonly called the World Bank, designed originally to finance reconstruction (mainly in Europe) after the ravages of the war. But ultimately, it transformed itself into a development bank for the developing countries as well. The Bank has two affiliates, the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The third is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT. GATT is technically not a Specialized Agency but is treated de facto as such, and designed to regulate international trade and to foster trade agreements and the removal of international trade barriers. Different needs in the wake of post-war reconstruction and technical considerations led to the formation of the other Specialized Agencies. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) was created to alleviate the post-war general food shortages. The World Health Organization (WHO) was designed to remove threats to world health arising from war conditions which crossed and recrossed political frontiers. The United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also a reconstruction role, namely, restructuring the minds of men after the ravages of militarism. Because of their reconstruction roles, the above mentioned three organizations have social as well as purely functional purposes, just as ILO had. Together they are the "Big Feur" among the Specialized Agencies. Other organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International

The Modalities of U.N. Technical Aid

11

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), were mainly creatures of technical changes. Among all the U.N. organizations one stands out unique. Although not itself a specialized agency but a Programme, it is an important source of funds for almost all of the specialized agencies -- the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It is supported by voluntary, not assessed, contributions from member governments, mostly the industrialized countries. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Genesis It began with what was called Technical Assistance. Lack of expert resources and technical competence in undeveloped geographical areas prompted the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 to organize international teams of experts to advise governments on economic development; to assist in training experts and technicians to procure equipment and supplies; and to organize their development efforts. Such technical assistance ideas were then "modish" and "current". The Charter of the United Nations itself had set the objective: "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character", and to promote "higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development". Despite these lofty objectives, it seemed that the United Nations was then seeking development "on the cheap". The amounts envisioned for this technical assistance effort towards the uplift of two billion of mankind were approximately 1/500th of the United States Marshall Plan for European economic recovery. The Marshall Plan was resoundingly successful in rebuilding the capital base of war-torn Europe, which already possessed the trained human resources among its survivors. By contrast, what the underdeveloped countries needed then was to develop precisely the human resources -- before capital inputs could be effectively used. The Marshall Plan was a misleading model; the development efforts in the Third World at that time nevertheless tilted towards capital assistance, neglecting the fundamental infrastructural emphasis, as should have been. As a result, "indigestion" arose from the ingestion of lumpy capital without the commensurate capacity of the recipient countries to absorb them fruitfully.

12

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

Principles The United Nations, however, in its collective wisdom understood early the key operative principles on technical assistance. ''Technical Assistance for Economic Development", a report in 1949 in response to a General Assembly resolution, laid down four basic guiding principles: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Self-determination; Self-reliance; Neutrality and respect for sovereignty; Long-term commitment.

These (now) obvious and (time-tested) principles remain the key differentiating characteristics of U.N. assistance. As a result of the above mentioned report in 1949, the Economic and Social Council established: 1.

2.

3.

the "Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries", or EPTA, to function on its own; an inter-agency body, the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) composed of the executive heads of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies to supervise the EPTA; and an intergovernmental policy group, the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), a standing body of the Economic and Social Council, to oversee the policy aspects.

Founding Policies, 1950 ECOSOC in creating the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) laid down its basic policies which stated that United Nations assistance to developing countries would 1.

2.

be rendered only in agreement with the government and only on request; not be a means of foreign economic interference nor be of a political nature, and would avoid distinctions on the political structure of a country or the race OJ creed; and

The Modalities of U.N. Technical Aid

3.

13

be designed to meet the specific needs as decided by the government.

Practicalities An important early step in EPTA was the establishment of a network of field offices, located in the developing countries, as focal points for contact with the governments. Because they were voluntary and not assessed, the year-to-year budgetary contributions by the donor countries fluctuated from good times and bad; besides, some were in non-convertible currencies. These features led later to financial, and managerial difficulties. For all the undisputed substantial contributions in laying basic foundations for development in so many countries, the quest for a co-ordinated, integrated and multisectoral approach eluded realization. EPTA's efforts to draw together the segments of the U.N. system into a manageable whole dashed against conflicting built-in sectoral perspectives and interests of the various Specialized Agencies, which were and still are powerful, and jealous of their autonomy. In 1953, the overseeing Intergovernmental Technical Assistance Committee, therefore, reviewed the system of allocations and financial procedures. As a result, beginning in 1955, TAB was to formulate target figures each year as a guide to planning country and regional programmes. This country-by-country programming modality marked a watershed in the evolution of the development process. The governments themselves were now made responsible for setting priorities, thus encouraging self-reliance, which after all was the be-ali and end-all of technical co-operation itself. Towards the United Nations Special Fund, 1957 Demand for assistance was soon greatly out-pacing available funding, and in December 1957, the General Assembly established a new fund, the United Nations Special Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) which served as a complement to EPTA. The Special Fund, with double the volume of funds available to EPTA, undertook larger-scale, longer-term projects including equipment, whereas EPTA concentrated on expert services, particularly training fellowships. Both EPTA and the U.N. Special Fund functioned side by side based on

14

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

ad hoc practical experience and necessity. Ideas and innovations were thought up as the programmes evolved. Necessity, as such, was the mother of implementation. Then, on the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council, EPTA and SUNFED were merged into one organization.

United Nations Development Programme, 1966 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was thus the resulting offspring in January 1966 of the wedlock of EPTA and SUNFED. Operational work went on, uninterrupted, meshing well from the complementary strengths of its forbears. The two parent funds dovetailed nicely and moved into operations pragmatically. The Capacity Study of 1968 Just two years later, in 1968, the UNDP Governing Council itself commissioned a "Capacity Study" of the UNDP. The resulting "Jackson report" was a land-mark in the history of Technical Assistance. This capacity study, in principle, was positive of the United Nations assistance, but critical of each partner in the system -- the UNDP, the Specialized Agencies, and the governments -- for their avoidable shortcomings. The UNDP had, therefore, to demonstrate its resiliency by having to fashion a "second generation" mechanism to perform in a more effective, timely and systematic way, involving a larger quantum of assistance. The Consensus of 1970 The UNDP Governing Council in 1970 produced a "Consensus" on its own future. This Consensus has since served as a basic mandate, based on which vague operational generalities were replaced by more systematic restructuring: 1.

2. 3.

The UNDP would match its magnitude of contributions to its activities on five-year cycles. Country programmes were to coincide with the recipient country's own development plans. Regional, inter-regional and global programmes would be introduced.

The Modalities of U.N. Technical Aid

15

The IPF System, 1972 Of the Consensus results, the most important innovation was the programme allocations under the five-year cycle scenario. The first such cycle was set in 1972. Out of the innumerable permutations involving economic and political interests regarding fund allocation contentions, a basic and equitable method was formulated. Each country was assigned an :'Indicative Planning Figure" (IPF), ensuring the largest amounts for the poorest and most populous countries. U.N. designated "Least Developed Countries" would receive extra IPF allocations. Measurable need replaced the former chancy "first come, first served" method as a framework for programme assistance. The IPF system has now served well continuously for four successive cycles. And the least developed countries have received progressively relatively larger shares of the resources. New Dimensions, 1975 For all the efforts, the prospects of self-sustained growth seemed still remote for most poor countries. In 1975 the UNDP itself, therefore, undertook a major analysis of the lessons of experience, and broadened its own mandate to include "new dimensions" of assistance, and to sharpen the focus on key objectives. The new dimensions were designed to get away from the traditional project "package" of foreign experts, plus fellowships plus imported equipment. The new dimensions sought to turn the UNDP on its head -- to switch from preoccupation with project inputs, to project outputs, and build up indigenous capacities. A key aim was to contribute to self-reliance, perceived to be the only road to self-sustained development. Progress -- Set-back -- Recovery

However, in 1975 the UNDP's operations suffered a severe set-back. Rapid inflati9n with unanticipated cumulative shortfalls in voluntary contributions combined to cause a severe cash flow problem, resulting in sudden and drastic cutbacks in planned expenditures. For an organization geared to integrated, forward planning, and one which exhorted governments to set their priorities, the disruptions were both crippling and embarrassing. It took strenuous effort, and a few years to get back to "normalcy".

16

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

Restructuring. 1977 Then the proliferation of funding agencies and the unremitting fragmentation of development activities moved the General Assembly in 1977 to restructure all the social and economic sectors of the United Nations system. It produced, inter alia, one most important direct outcome affecting the UNDP: to have "overall responsibility for, and co-ordination of, operational activities for development carried out at the country level ...". Lessons. 1986 In 1986, total resources available to the UNDP under all means of financing amounted to US$850 million, some US$650 million of which were for the UNDP's core budget. Combined with parallel financing and Trust Funds, the UNDP was generating more than one billion dollars a year, then and since. By 1985, on the 35th anniversary, the UNDP and its predecessor organizations had received US$9 billion from 175 countries. It had fielded some 185,000 experts, awarded 136,000 fellowships, and expended more than one billion dollars on specialized equipment. One hundred and sixty developing countries and territories had benefited from these inputs -- an awesome record unsurpassed and unsurpassable by any country or organization in technical co-operation efforts. The UNDP could in its history rightly lay claim to some important contributions to the discipline of development. It was the UNDP and its predecessors which: 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

embodied a multi-dimensional, integrated and cross-sectoral approach to development; first devised the concept of integrated country programming; built the world's most extensive development service network; established the IPF system for an objective allocation of resources; and made self-reliance and collective self-reliance the supreme objective of the development process itself.

All of these are now common practice.

III

BURMA AND THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

The United Nations System in Burma: Summary Burma and the United Nations have had a long and fruitful relationship for forty years. When Burma joined the United Nations in 1948 there were 58 members. That number has grown to 159. In the early 1950s, at the invitation of the Government of Bur1na, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the WQfld Health Qrganization (WHO) and the U.N. Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB) set up offices in Rangoon. The merger of UNTAB and SUNFED resulted in the UNDP in January 1966, and the resident representative of UNDP came into residence. Co-operation between the U.N. agencies and Burma increased dramatically. From an annual average of US$37,000 in the early years it climbed to the commitment of about US$28 million -- a manifold increase, with the likelihood of more to come, now that Burma is designated a least developed country. The UNDP's technical assistance followed the development priorities of the country's national development plans. Agriculture was befittingly given the top priority, followed by pre-investment studies aimed at generating direct investments in transport and communications, industry, science and technology, natural resaurces, tourism and trade. The UNDP is the most important U.N. agency in Burma, and the resident representative has the role of primus inter pares among his peers, and by virtue of the U.N. General Assembly mandate of 1977, he co-ordinates the programmes of the other resident U.N. missions. He also serves as the representative of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in the execution of their activities in Burma. The United Nations is the largest source of technical assistance, and

18

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

pre-investment studies to Burma. Assistance comes in the mixed form of advisory services and consultants, feasibility studies, equipment and fellowships. In 1986 alone, about three hundred government officials received fellowships to attend U.N.-sponsored training courses, study tours, seminars, workshops and meetings abroad. In the same year there were about one hundred and twenty international personnel and consultants based in the country, while another hundred came on missions. Nearly ninety Burmese nationals were serving as U.N. Volunteers (UNV), a sort of reverse technical assistance, in some thirty countries, mainly in the fields of medicine, engineering and education. The UNDP

The UNDP's role is unique, being pivotal because of the nature of its partnership with the government. Unlike other aid agencies, the UNDP has no sectoral bias and it can direct its resources towards any area of national priority, at the government's request. Since 1974 the UNDP has played a vital role as a catalyst for investment when, together with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as executing agencies, it financed wide-ranging technical assistance programmes aimed at mobilizing financial resources to meet Burma's development needs. Known as the Burma "Umbrella Project" it went into a second phase (Umbrella II) in 1979 and a third phase (Umbrella ill) to run from 1982 to 1987. To date, such UNDP-financed studies have generated hundreds of millions of dollars in follow-up investments in a number of economic sectors and sub-sectors. For the period 1951-66 Burma received a total of US$15 million of assistance from the U.N. Technical Assistance Board (TAB), and US$7 million ·. from the U.N. Special Fund. From the time UNDP became the sole integrated agency in 1966 Burma has received technical assistance amounting to US$102 million (up to 1986) (See Appendix B). UNICEF

Following the UNDP are the Big Three of the U.N. agencies operating in Burma. The first is the U.N. Children's Fund, still known by its former initials of UNICEF. UNICEF assistance to Burma since it began in 1949

Burma a11d the United Nations Syst£m

19

has changed. Initially, it concentrated solely on child health. In the 1950s its mandate was extended to child education and social welfare. In the 1980s the stress was on integrated basic health services. The UNICEF's new programme for Burma saw an orientation towards activities which reached the communities directly, as exemplified in the support for education and social welfare, and the emphasis placed on intermediate technology, especially in water supply and sanitation. FAO

All aspects of agriculture came under the realm of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. The FAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations pledged to raise nutritional and living standards through more efficient production and distribution of food. Improvement in the living conditions of the rural population is also part of the FAO's work. The FAO is involved in a range of activities from paddy storage through improving grain, fisheries, and livestock to forestry. It provides direct funding under its Technical Co-operation Programme, and administers trust funds from bilateral donors. WHO

Established in 1948 as a U.N. Specialized Agency to protect and promote the health of people around the globe, the World Health Organization (WHO) in Burma encompasses programmes in the joint spheres of health and medicine. Its assistance ranges from disease control to training of medical personnel and promotion of rural health care. WHO works with the government to achieve primary health care throughout the country as part of the scheme, Health for All by the Year 2000. Others Among the other U.N. agencies and offices involved in Burma for project execution are the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Meteorological Organization (WTO), and several others.

20

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

Country Background: An Overview Burma attained independence on 4 January 1948, and joined the United Nations on 19 April 1948. To enable it to enjoy the rights and privileges of being a member of the United Nations, especially to obtain technical assistance for the rehabilitation of its twice run-over war-ravaged economy, Burma signed several agreements from the beginning with the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. A very brief outline is given below on the national development practices as a background, and the mechanism of planning, as was done in Burma, given the fact that Burma was a professed socialist country then pursuing its economic objec~ives mainly through short-term and long-term planning. National Development Practices In the early 1970s Burma embarked upon a long-term twenty-year perspective plan, divided into five Four-Year Plans. Projections indicated that foreign exchange of more than US$500 million annually would be needed for the Plan. In its national development strategies, Burma bas attached a distinct importance to the concepts of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The cultural dimension of economic development was also considered a quintessential element in the overall development of the country, and the continued maintenance of the Burmese way of life was a topmost priority. In Burma's avowed socialistic economy, the state and co-operative sectors were required to play major roles. The state sector was primarily organized through the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), of which there were more than fifty major ones. Any effective development strategy must therefore be predicated on the enhanced dynamism of these enterprises, as they in turn acted as conduits in the channelling of capital and related technical assistance into the economy. Should these SEEs fail "to deliver the goods", the socialistic economic structure, which so heavily leaned upon them for success, would fo.u nder and come tumbling down. Unfortunately for the country, failed they did. The private sector had its own contribution to make through medium and small-scale enterprises, especially in agriculture, transport and industry, and services sectors. The private sector was for a time the saving factor, the safety valve of the economy. In terms of Plan objectives, the agricultural sector was to have been dealt with in the context of rural development, which is broader than the direct

Bum1a and the United Nations System

21

productive efficiency of agricultural enterprises. It also involves access to facilities such as health, water supply and education. Burma did attempt, through mechanisms such as the People's Health Plan, primary health care, water supply programmes and literacy campaigns, to emphasize these aspects. Efficiency and equity have always been declared to be equal attributes of Burma's intended development strategy. But it turned out to be otherwise. Technical Co-operation Priorities In a bid to salvage the shortcomings and deficiencies of the previous plans, the fifth and last Four-Year Plan (1986-91) identified a number of projects for technical assistance -- nearly eighty - to which the government attached priority. Given its development objectives, the government expressed a preference for technical assistance in four areas: 1.

2. 3. 4.

development of an indigenous research capacity in the key economic sectors. A corollary was the need to adapt research and technology to available local resources and conditions. technical assistance for the preparation of feasibility studies for investment projects. interest in selected fields of advanced technology, such as computers and electronic equipment. training, the primary aim of which was to acquire the required skills, irrespective of paper qualifications.

Technical Assistance Leading to Capital Aid Burma was the first country to initiate the so-called "Umbrella" projects under which a diversity of feasibility studies was executed by two multilateral financing institutions, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank. The complementarity of technical to capital assistance was borne out by investment projects consequent to the Umbrella projects' activities. The same positive relationship was also established with bilateral donors, and several linkages were forged to match technical assistance with capital aid. But all these measures were too late in corning and could not overcome the other deleterious effects of utilizing the foreign resources inefficiently and ineffectively.

22

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

Development Planning in Burma

The System and the Cycle In 1972 Burma embarked upon the implementation of a long-term perspective plan spanning twenty years. This long-term plan was divided into five four-year plans, and the fifth and last four-year plan began in 1986. The four-year plans were formulated within the framework of the guidelines laid down by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), after a series of co-ordination meetings between the central and regional organizations and the basic economic units. Annual plans were based on sectoral plan proposals of the ministries, as well as the regional plan proposals made by the State/Divisional People's Councils (the administrative units). Macro-level planning was the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and Finance. The operational functions were the responsibility of the Planning Department at the centre, with planning offices at the lower administrative levels, in geographical sub-centres.

The Beginning and End of the Twenty-Year Plan In 1972 the two-house legislature created by the 1947 Constitution was replaced by a unicameral body, the Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Assembly), whose members comprised elected representatives. It adopted the twenty-year plan (TYP) called the "Long-Term and Short-Term Economic Policies of the Burma Socialist Programme Party". The first two years of the first FYP, 1972-73,_ were a non-starter, and the First Four-Year plan was discarded. Institutional inadequacies, imprecisely formulated policies, and administrative inexperience were responsible. Policies had not been synchronized sufficiently to cope with the new responsibilities. The serious process of economic planning commenced only with the Second FYP (1974-77) and its successors, the Third and Fourth FYPs (1978-85). However, there was an almost uninterrupted series of shortfalls to meet targets laid down. Burma entered the fifth Four-Year Plan period in April 1986, for the period 1986-91. Efforts for better performance to recover the serious shortfalls were renewed, but without effect. Accordingly, the following objectives were then recast:

Bumza and the United Nations System

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

23

To further strengthen mass participation in developmental efforts; To upgrade the quality of agricultural products and to promote food self-sufficiency; To implement export promotion including export of services; To strive for consistency and coordination among existing economic activities; To achieve effective mobilization of domestic resources; To promote productive efficiency and cost-effectiveness in all fields of economic activity.

The outcome of these recast "more of the same" objectives were not observable as events overtook the implementation. They were nullified by the military take-over in September 1988. The ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was abolished and "socialism" as the state pOlitical programme was abandoned. The twenty-year socialist plan thus met with its demise, unlamented.

N

COUNTRYPROG~S

First Country Programme (CP I) The First Country Programme for Burma was originally planned for the period 1973-77. It was later revised to coincide with the changed national Second Four-Year Plan. In preparing the revised First Country Programme, the entire range of United Nations Development Programme assistance to Burma was reviewed to assess the relevancy and adequacy to the development objectives and priorities contained in the Second Four-Year Plan. In brief, the revised First Country Programme was framed to assist the government in undertaking research in crop production, animal health, forestry, industry, and mineralogy; in strengthening regional agricultural experimental stations, educational planning, health services, geological survey, trade development, and meteorology; in establishing pilot plants in industry; in teaching at advanced levels marine science, and new mineral technologies; and in providing training in vocations, post and telecommunications, and computer operations. In the agricultural and related sectors, projects were to increase the availability of high-yield seeds; to promote grain production; to rehabilitate and develop rubber estates; to expand livestock production; and to experiment in quick-growing tree species. In the mineral sector, the projects were for the exploration of tin/tungsten. The educational projects at the tertiary level were to be made more production-oriented. In addition, the revised programme was to rectify skilled manpower shortage, and to accelerate the transfer, and development of appropriate technology.

Country Programmes

25

Innovative Features Compared with previous ad hoc UNDP assistance to Burma, the First Country Programme introduced several features: 1. 2.

3.

an emphasis on large-scale projects, the IBRD/IDA's interest in investment follow-up for a port project, the first IDA-UNDP pre-investment activity in Burma. a laboratory project which was the first large-scale UNDP pilot plant.

Second Country Programme (CP II) The Second Country Programme was prepared by the Rangoon UNDP office, i!l1 cansultation with the Foreign Economic Relations Department, and the U.N. Agencies in the country. The Second Programme, from 1974 to 1978, covered approximately the same years as the Second Four-Year Plan. The salient features of the Second Country Programme were: 1.

2.

sectoral expenditures in line with the priorities in the country's Second Four-Year Plan. marked variations in expenditure patterns due to the unprecedented UNDP liquidity crisis in 1975-76.

The pre-investment studies for feasible projects had already led to loans (bilateral and multilateral) totalling more than US$126 million (US$44 million from IDA and ADB, and US$82 million from the Federal Republic of Germany) for large-scale investments. The experience gained in the Second Programme in the preparation of pre-investment studies for feasible projects was later incorporated into the Third Country Programme. The level of competence among Burmese professionals and technicians, particularly in the health fields, was such as to lead to the practice of entrusting Burmese directors with the implementation of entire projects. The IPF resources available for the programme period 1974-78 were estimated at US$26 million, but because the implementation rate of the

26

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

UNDP programmes, globally as well as in Burma, had been unsatisfactorily low, an over-programming to the ceiling figure of US$35 million was envisaged at the start. During the programme period, expenditure was unceremoniously (an understatement) cut in 1975-76 because of the UNDP liquidity crisis, resulting in wide fluctuations in the rates of delivery. These up-down changes had an unsettling effect on all concerned, especially the "customer" ministries. Expenditure rates later picked up, to US$23 million, but this was far less than the optimistic over-programmed US$35 million aimed for. During the above mentioned liquidity crisis, many planned and ongoing projects had perforce to be deferred. Some projects were caught on the hop. On the other hand, some were already in full swing: it was a matter of fortuitous timing that affected the projects, one way or another. In the meeting of the Burma Aid Consultative Group in 1978 organized by the World Bank, a number of UNDP pre-investment projects which supported major investments in different ways were highlighted. These were broadly grouped as: 1.

2. 3.

4.

Pre-investment projects: the Umbrella project executed by ffiRD which led to investment in four different sectors. Pilot projects. Training projects: two training projects, in telecommunications, and petroleum refinery, supported large-scale investments in these two sectors. Research type projects: the Agricultural Research Institute generated research leading to follow-up agricultural productivity projects for World Bank assistance.

Summary of Status of Implementation Of the thirty-five ongoing projects in the programme, eighteen were completed and eight were scheduled to be completed towards the end of 1978. Third Country Programme (CP III) The Third Country Programme (CP ill) covered four years (1979-82) and coincided with the Third Four-Year Plan which had already been approved by the Pyithu Hluttaw (the People's Assembly) earlier in 1978. The Plan set out the development objectives, sectoral priorities and resource allocations. At the

Coulllry Programmes

27

same time a number of sectoral studies had been undertaken by the World Bank and others, in agriculture, power development and road transport. A jeint United Nations/UNDP mission had also reviewed the UNDP inputs into the mineral sector in late 1977. All these studies became the primary source materials for the preparation of the Third Country Programme. Review of the Third Country Programme The CP III originally included twenty-nine ongoing projects carried over from the Second Programme (CP II) together with thirty-four new projects. As a result of the two reviews held in 1979 and 1980, twenty-six new projects were added, totalling eighty-nine projects. The CP III addressed itself equally to the following functions: research and exploration; training and education; planning, management and general services; and pre-investment. The projects which were started in 198llagged in implementation. Late arrivals of international project staff led to lower implementation in all other components. Thus, the lead time for ordering equipment had to be stretched to the detriment of all. Project design flaws, and international assistance brought in prematurely before the readiness of the government inputs were common occurrences. All this could have been avoided with some elementary PERT or network analysis. However, not all projects were thus adversely affected. On the contrary, there were some successful projects: Marine Science Teaching and Research at Moulmein College. The UNDP, with UNESCO as executing agency, assisted in the successful development of a university-level marine science training programme in aquaculture, marine biochemistry, seaweeds, mangroves and biological oceanography. Population Census. Burma conducted a country-wide population census in 1983. The UNDP and the UNFPA provided an in-house computer facility for data processing. National personnel were trained in all aspects of computer operation and maintenance. Some less positive pictures, included: Shortfalls in Project Delivery. End-of-year expenditure accounted for only half of the target. A rise in the value of the U.S. dollar, accounting delays, and difficulties in delivering inputs (expert services, and equipment) were the causes. A more serious cause for under-expenditure was the lengthy government red-tape, tying

28

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

up sums of money which could otherwise have been utilized for alternative projects. Fellowship Delays. All UNDP-funded projects have training components. Cumbersome selection procedures (by both the government and the United Nations) were at fault. In several cases, fellowships had been carried forward year after year unutilized. Fourth Country Programme (CP IV)

The Fourth Country Programme (CP IV) covered 1982-85 (but was later extended by one year to 1986). A joint government-UNDP review of the Third Country Programme (CP ill) was conducted to explore the possible expansion of the project pipeline. The government document, "Five Year Development Programme, 1980-81 to 1984-85", prepared for the World Bank-organized Burma Aid Group, highlighting development priorities as well as listing technical assistance requirements, was used in the programme exercise. The UNDP resources for the period were pitched at US$78 million, made up of US$11 million for ongoing commitments, newly programmed funds of US$65 million, and a small programme reserve of US$2 million. The CP IV contained eighty-nine projects, of which thirty were ongoing. Of the new fifty-nine projects, twenty-five originated from reviews. Ten of the remaining thirty-four new projects were large-scale, with allocations of US$2 million each. The CP IV reflected the government's interest in matters recently considered in various international forums. For example, the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) has stimulated the formulation of national plans. A national food strategy as recommended by the World Food Council was also prepared. Resource planning in such sectors as forestry, fisheries and wildlife conservation, all with UNDP assistance, was in line with the international concern for the environment. Continuous programming necessitated the compilation of a reserve list of projects for annual review. Slow starting and under-achieving projects were replaced. One criterion in allocating CP IV resources to various ministries was their absorptive capacity and implementation capability. In some cases, the CP IV was joined with multilateral and bilateral aid programmes. For example, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Country Programmes

29

was involved with the Australian Government in the development of drinking water supply in the IDWSSD master plan. In education, there was also complementarity: the UNDP was active in ~econdary and post-secondary education and the UNICEF in primary education. The regular programme of the World Health Organization was linked with UNDP funding in the WHO Health for All by the Year 2000 {HFA 2000) project on primary health care. The FAO's Technical Co-operation Programme (TCP) had several projects which resulted in UNDP-financed follow-ups. In fact, this programme has been the mechanism for UNDP/FAO project identification in recent years. Connexions with bilateral programmes also grew. Some UNDP projects were of the "multi-bi" type, with funds-in-trust provided by bilateral donors. One such major bilateral project was for a study for a fertilizer plant. Pluses

During the last decade, the UNDP contribution to the Agriculture and Forest Research Institutes at Yezin amounted to US$20 million. The introduction of high-yielding varieties led to increased paddy production, and the agricultural research development and extension network was a major contributing factor. The same project also provided a stimulus to the development of crops other than rice, such as cotton, wheat, groundnut, sunflower, sugar, and maize. This was one of the prominent cumulative successes of the Fourth and Third Country Programmes. Apart from aiding in the development of varietal methodology and techniques, this project also established mechanisms of collaboration with the various international agricultural research centres, such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in Rome, and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines. These proved valuable sources for elite cultivars and germ-plasm which have now been introduced into Burma. Under the CP IV was its largest project, Civil Aviation Development, which enabled the Department of Civil Aviation to obtain the expertise, equipment and training to meet international air traffic safety standards. The CP IV also enabled development in the expansion of the electronic communications sector. Concern with modern technology was equally reflected in the UNDP-funded project for the establishment of the National Computing Centre.

30

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

Fifth Country Programme (CP V) As the first four country programmes (1972-86) were implemented with varying

degrees of success, the Fifth Country Programme may be worth considering as a sequel. This cannot, of course, be an assessment, as it is still in progress. But the focus and features expected of it can be encapsulated below. The CP V (1987-91) focuses on the following four major areas: 1.

2. 3.

4.

The Modernization of the Agriculture Sector -- its expansion, diversification, enhancement of capacity for research and improvement of services, primarily to the small farmer. The Development of Agro-Industry -- intensification of the backward and forward linkages between agriculture and industry. The Development of Physical Infrastructure -- fonhe movement of goods and services, and proper utilization of available national energy resources. The Development of Social Infrastructure -- improvement in personnel training within the social services.

Food and Agricultural Organization To advance international co-operation in food and agriculture, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) was formed on 16 October 1945 (which date has now become World Food Day). Its motto is, "Fiat Panis -- Let There Be Bread" (which reflected the predominance of the occidental mind: rice, the staple food of the majority of the world's population remained unmentioned). The FAO's objectives are: 1.

2. 3.

to raise the levels of nutrition and standards of all the peoples; to improve the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products; and to improve the condition of the rural people.

As a development agency, the FAO offers technical advice and assistance projects for the agricultural community. As an information centre, the FAO collects, analyses and disseminates information, and serves as a clearing house. The FAO proffers on request independent advice on agricultural policy and

Country Programmes

31

planning; and on administrative and legal structures for agricultural development. The FAO is not an aid agency or an agricultural bank; it relies on three main sources for its support: contribution by member countries, trust funds by some more affluent member countries, and the United Nations Development Programme. Burma and the FAO

Burma joined the FAO in September 1947 (even before joining the United Nations). The FAO's presence in Burma started with a study entitled "Integration of Forests and Industries" by a solitary F AO expert. Burma, since time immemorial has been a country with an agricultural base and has therefore a natural affinity with the FAO. FAO projects in Burma cover a wide range of activities, from bee-keeping through forest and fishery resources development, to raising healthier livestock and better and more crops. Examples of some of the F AO projects include the following.

Agriculture: Paddy Burma has all along been a rice exporting country since the time the Suez Canal was opened. In 1972, a government projection of paddy yield based on the production of the preceding five years unexpectedly indicated that at the then prevailing rates of production and consumption, the country would become a net importer in a decade, an unbelievable prospect. Foreign strains of high-yielding varieties (HYV) developed by the International Rice Research Institute were therefore hurriedly introduced, and just as hurriedly rejected by the consumers. The government then put in a sustained and multi-faceted effort focusing on breeding and introducing new high yielding varieties with induced mutations of local paddy varieties, by means of atomic radiation. The peasants' organizations were mobilized, and provided with more inputs of fertilizers and pesticides as incentives. Positive results ensued. One project by the FAO strengthened the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI), and another by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) involved genetic improvement through the use of induced mutations. An integrated programme of applied research, seed multiplication, pilot

32

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

scale extension and training activities also achieved higher productivity for beans, legumes and coarse grains. The production of more food is not enough, however. A high percentage of foodstocks are lost due to pests and spoilage. The FAO, through two projects, helped on methodology to reduce loss of rice in harvesting as well as in post-harvest threshing, drying, processing and storage.

Diversification The UNDP-FAO Country Programme has three major projects in the agricultural diversification scheme: food crops development, plantation crops development, and industrial crops development. The latest UNDP /FAO industrial crops project helped to develop different varieties of cotton, jute and sugar-cane, for the agro-based industries. The Cotton Development Project has introduced new seeds of elite cotton germ-plasm, and organized field demonstrations and pilot blocks. Highyielding cotton varieties have been developed and introduced extensively. An integrated cotton pest control programme was also a part of this project. Similar plans are under way for jute and sugar-cane. Plantation crops which received attention were rubber, cashew and cocoa. The UNDP-FAO has been involved in the rubber sector alongside IDA capital aid. The Rubber Rehabilitation Project (Phase I) was launched with IDA assistance to increase production of natural rubber. By the end of Phase ll in 1988, new areas were expected to produce 50 per cent more than the previous annual production.

Livestock Despite the FAO programme of farm mechanization reliance must continue on "living tractors" -- the oxen-buffaloes -- for "power" and as meat. Oxenbuffaloes were endangered with infestation of FMD (foot and mouth disease) and other animal diseases. More than one per cent of the cattle population are infected annually, causing economic hardship to the indigent cattle owners, who can ill afford to lose their sole means of livelihood. The UNDP and FAO began providing assistance on animal health from the early 1970s through virology and foot and mouth disease surveillance, virus typing, and introduction of techniques for the production of cell cultures and various vaccines.

Country Programmes

33

This was followed by a project to control and, ultimately, eliminate major infectious cattle diseases.

Fisheries Fish and shrimps are just as important a part of the Burmese diet as meat. At the present per capita consumption rate the current fish and meat production can supply only 75 per cent of the needs of the country. Burma has a long coastal area, and the potential yield of fish alone in the continental shelf has been estimated to be more than two million tons annually, which would provide a large surplus for the demand-dominated export market. The Institute of Fisheries Technology (1FT), established by the FAO with the assistance of the UNDP and the Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA), train fishing vessel operators in basic seamanship, fishing technology and engineering. The UNDP-FAO also opened several centres for training in fishing-gear technology, mid-water trawling, double rig shrimping, and other allied subjects. This has enabled the country to develop self-sufficiency in the training of personnel for the operation and maintenance of commercial fishing vessels and various on-shore facilities, as well as for the upgrading of artisanal skills.

Forestry Burma, half covered with forests, a renewable resource, has long been synonymous with teak. The FAO has provided technical support in the UNDP-funded Nature Conservation and National Park Project, and implemented a programme of environmental conservation. The UNDP-funded and FAO-executed project on National Forest Survey and Inventory formulated a national forest policy for utilization and development of existing forest resources. Additional forest resources have been developed to meet the needs at the village level for fuelwood, fodder and small agriculture timber, and future needs for industrial raw materials. Fostering soil and water conservation in critical catchment areas have also been implemented. The project also assisted in the preparation of fo rest type maps, and the implementation of forest inventories, as well as the compilation of forest management plans, and the design of a forest monitoring system for regional forest units.

34

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

The project has produced sets of panchromatic aerial photographs of parts of the country. Landsat imagery of the whole country at 1:250,000 scale was made available, and a mosaic map of the whole country has been derived from this. The F AO's Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) also assisted a UNDP-funded project for technical and vocational forestry and forest industries training. United Nations Children's Fund The UNICEF mandate is to help protect the lives of children and promote their development. The greater their vulnerability the higher the priority. At its very first session in December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly created UNICEF -- then called the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The resources in the early years were devoted mainly to meeting the emergency needs of children in post-war Europe and China. In December 1950, the General Assembly reformed the UNICEF to respond also to the needs of children in developing countries. In 1953, the UNICEF became a permanent body of the United Nations system. UNICEF co-operation has now become a part of national development efforts, in the spirit of the General Assembly's 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which recognized the intrinsic value of childhood as such and its potential to contribute to national progress. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to UNICEF in 1965 was in recognition of the pioneer performance of the United Nations in the belief that the well-being of today's children will form the basis of the peace of tomorrow's world. Thereafter, the new UNICEF mandate shifted beyond sectoral projects to the wider spheres of social and human development, and it came up with country programming (as in the UNDP), and then with the community-based services approach. The General Assembly proclaimed 1979 as the International Year of the Child (IYC) and made UNICEF the lead agency with the primary responsibility for IYC follow-up. UNICEF is unique among the organizations of the United Nations in that its mandate is concerned with a particular age group -- that of infants and children -- rather than with sectoral involvement such as in labour, or education alone. UNICEF is autonomous, with its own governing body, the Executive Board, and a secretariat. UNICEF field offices act as the operational units for advisory services, programming and logistics. Regional offices provide and

Country Programmes

35

co-ordinate specialized support for the country programmes. UNICEF joins forces with the office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRC), WFP, UNDP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as with the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies in disaster areas. All UNICEF income comes from voluntary contributions -- from governments, inter-governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and individuals. While most of the funding are contributed by governments, UNICEF is not a "membership" organization with an "assessed" budget. The significance of UNICEF's achievements goes beyond the tally of yearly accomplishments. Its enduring methods and health techniques make life-and-death savings as well as quality-of-life differences for three to five million children annually world-wide. UNICEF in Burma UNICEF works in a variety of sectors in Burma: health, water and sanitation, primary education, nutrition, urban services, and services for women. Problems in communities, after all, do not confine themselves to man-created divisions. UNICEF has adopted the basic services approach -- a broad-based integrated approach which emphasizes community participation. It has been assisting programmes in Burma since 1949. Over the years, the light blue UNICEF logo has become a familiar sign throughout the country, and in Burma UNICEF's name is synonymous with child care. The government and UNICEF had developed a US$27 million programme for 1982-86, with an additional $18 million to be raised as "noted" funds, that is, supplementary funds which UNICEF would raise by finding sponsors for specific projects. In keeping with its Basic Services approach, UNICEF supported the extension of the People's Health Plan to two hundred additional towns by 1986. It funded the training of half of the 16,000 community health workers as well as the training of half of the 5,600 auxiliary midwives. In a two-pronged attack on the problem of diarrhoea -- the other prong being the provision of clean water and sanitation -- UNICEF supported the Burma Pharmaceutical Industry (BPI) to manufacture and to distribute countrywide, packets of Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS) at nominal cost. This almost "free" sugar-salt packets saved thousand of lives, many of whom were infants and children.

36

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

To protect children against communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, diptheria, whooping cough and tetanus, UNICEFs Expanded Programme of Immunization has targetted BCG and DT shots for several million children each. TT vaccinations of some 2.3 million pregnant women were also carried out. Trachoma, which affects one fifth of all children living in the central dry zone, continues to be treated (with success) with tetracycline eye ointment produced by the Burma Pharmaceutical Industry with UNICEF support.

Nutrition UNICEF supported national project activities to establish community nutrition centres and hospital nutrition units for the rehabilitation of malnourished children, with priority given to poor urban areas. In addition, UNICEF supports the national school feeding programme through training and the provision of equipment, as well as in the production of appropriate low-cost supplementary foods. UNICEF has also supported an iodinated, oil injection mass campaign covering over four million people to control and eradicate endemic goitre and cretinism.

Water Supply and Sanitation Most common child diseases are sanitation or water-related, namely, diarrhoea, trachoma, scabies, leprosy, worm-infestations, typhoid, and so forth. UNICEF committed one-third of its funds to provide clean drinking water and good sanitation. Since 1978 with assistance from the Australiaq International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), UNICEF has been involved in boring deep tube wells throughout the dry zone, a 40,000 sq. mile area that receives less than twenty inches of rain per year. In the hilly regions, UNICEF has assisted in the development of spring catchment and gravity flow systems. In the wetter lower delta area, UNICEF has assisted in the rehabilitation of existing wells, the construction of new wells, and the drilling of shallow tubewells by community members. Burma has pledged to provide 50 per cent of its population with clean drinking water by the end of the decade, that is, 1990. Apart from the obvious health impact, an assured water supply close to a village free women and children from the unceasing daily toil of having to fetch water from a pond or

Country Programmes

37

well many miles away. In the dry zone area, the saying is that water is more precious than liquid gold. Education and Social Welfare Out of a hundred children who enter kindergarten in Burma, no more than a quarter will reach Grade 4. The unacceptably high student to teacher ratio, overcrowded classrooms, lack of adequate elementary teaching aids, poverty, and the need to look after siblings at home are some of the reasons for this high drop-out rate. The government and UNICEF have implemented, among other measures, a Primary School Improvement Programme (PSIP) to provide amenities to make schools better places to go to. At the non-formal end of the education spectrum, UNICEF has supported the ongoing Voluntary Primary Night School Programme by paying for the cost of textbooks and stationery, as well as giving training grants. World Health Organization and Burma

The World Health Organization (WHO) is a United Nations Specialized Agency established to protect and promote the health of all the people of the world. Its chief tenet is "The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social conditions". This tenet is still in force today. WHO was formed in April 1948. One ambitious goal set in May 1981 is Health for All by the Year 2000 (HFA 2000). This means that by the end of this century, people everywhere on this earth (barring lost tribes), should have some access to health services to enable them to lead socially and economically productive lives. The World Health Assembly, which meets in Geneva, is guided by the Executive Board, which gives effect to its policies. WHO is divided into six geographical regions of the world in keeping with its decentralized mode of functioning. Regional activities are supervised by the respective Regional Committees, with emphasis on regional priorities and needs. In line with this lofty aim of health for all by the year 2000, Burma attempts to achieve primary health care coverage through a country-wide network of Rural Health Centres, and village-based voluntary health workers.

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United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

WHO has participated in Burma's First and Second People's Plans using the Country Health Programming (CHP) mechanism. A Third Plan is being formulated with WHO support of technical expertise and basic equipment. WHO's emphasis on the managerial process for national health development has been reflected in annual training courses for medical officers and other technical personnel. Support through providing equipment and computers by WHO to the Health Information System (IllS) has been vital for planning and monitoring health services delivery. The project management of health in Burma has now become so well developed and nationalized that there are only two international WHO experts who reside in the country: the WHO Programme Co-ordinator and Representative, and one other. The twenty-four WHO projects are all managed by National Project Managers supported by a number of Activity Managers. WHO only provides short-term consultants. This system of WHO is not only cost-effective but also fosters national self-reliance. WHO works with the government to expand the Primary Health Care network; provides expertise, technical support and funds for health hazards research and, more importantly, assists the development of the country's national health staff. The WHO Family Health Programme includes maternal and child health and nutrition activities. The training of traditional birth attendants (native mid-wives) is important in the identification and early despatch to hospitals of serious cases (which may not be recognized as such by the families concerned), thereby reducing avoidable maternal and new-born mortality. Good health cannot be dispensed; it can only be obtained from a good mix of environmental, behavioural, socio-economic, and management factors. The Health Education Programme through appropriate mass and individual communication helps give publicity to a notable extent. · WHO also collaborates, with UNDP funding, in the development of technology units based in medical institutions for training lecturers/teachers, undergraduates, and para-medical personnel. WHO assists in fighting communicable diseases -- a major cause of mortality in the country. Through the Vector-Borne Disease Control Programme, WHO supports measures to control malaria, now unfortunately resurgent world-wide, including Burma. WHO also supports disease control programmes against cancer, cardiovascular and rheumatic fever diseases through the provision of expertise, and material support. In these programmes the emphasis is on prevention and

Country Programmes

39

early diagnosis through the primary health care approach. Burma has recently conducted a successful Trachoma Control Programme for reducing blindness. Trachoma was prevalent in dry zone areas where water is scarce. Medicines and eyedrops -- both locally manufactured and inexpensive -- have brought about dramatic successful results and this scourge is now under control. Of the prevalent eye diseases glaucoma stands out; its symptoms are insidious and therefore likely to be ignored and neglected, until too late. Early detection and treatment can prevent blindness for a great many sufferers. The Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat (BENT) Hospital in Rangoon is being upgraded to serve as a Regional Centre for the Prevention of Blindness due to glaucoma. The primary eye care programme also has mobile ophthalmic units to reach the outlying areas, and thus help otherwise inaccessible patients in time, a most important factor in glaucoma treatment. To rehabilitate the disabled, WHO funded a community-oriented disability prevention and rehabilitation pilot programme which trained voluntary health workers to use appropriate technology. Likewise, WHO collaborated in a deafness prevention project for the early diagnosis and treatment of school children. WHO also supported with equipment and expertise the persistent and concerted national efforts at detoxification of drug addicts. It also provided medical supplies, and helped in the training of health personnel. The Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) immunized children under the age of five against common childhood diseases such as diptheria, whooping cough, tetanus and poliomyelitis. As the focal agency for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) launched in 1980 WHO funded feasibility studies for the combined water and sanitation programmes (which were costeffective), and provided other advisory services. WHO also supported the School of Traditional Medicine for training traditional medical practitioners, and the standardization of traditional local herbs and medicines. WHO is undoubtedly a worthy standard bearer of the United Nations. It has helped in eradicating or minimizing killer and disabling diseases, thus ameliorating the adverse effects, financially, socially and emotionally, directly on the sufferers and their families, and indirectly on the community at large. The spin-off effects of WHO's work on diseases are enormous -- almost incalculable in terms of statistical figures alone. The impact can of course be quantified -- in the number of lives saved and the many eyes that have been operated on. The more valuable aspect,

40

United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

however, is qualitative -- hope, a most precious gift, is given to the sufferers and their immediate families. Death is always the final destiny of all, but because of WHO, tens of thousands of sick people in Burma did not, do not, will not have to meet their final destiny prematurely. There lies the tribute to WHO.

V

GOVERNMENT FOCAL POINT FOR TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD) and its Function

Background The Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD) was formed in February 1972 in the wake of general administrative changes involving the whole system of civil administration. The then existing civil service system was based upon the British-Indian system which more or less prevailed from the time of the annexation of Burma by the British in 1885. The civil administration was composed of ministries (then called Departments), with a political minister heading each. The Secretariat was headed by a Permanent Secretary with an hierarchy of Additional Secretary, Deputy Secretary, down to Assistant Secretary and with general support and clerical staff. It was the top civil servants who formulated and shaped policies (approved formally by the Minister). The policies were then sent down to the subordinate departments, which were separate entities themselves, but which were "line", and which looked upon the Secretariat as "General Staff or Headquarters", and the fount of all worldly wisdom. Thus, the Secretariat as a whole and the entire Ministry f0rmed the centre of the civil administration fiefdom. This was abolished in one fell swoop in 1972. In place of this British-Indian system was substituted an East European style of civil administration. As before, the political head of a ministry was still the Minister. What was instituted was the post of Deputy Minister, who was in effect in charge of the administration of both the ministry and the subordinate bodies. The Deputy Minister replaced the former Permanant Secretary as head of the civil service staff; the difference was that the Deputy Minister had always to be a politically elected member of the unicameral Pyithu Hluttaw, that is, the People's Assembly. He therefore was a politician

42

United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

as well as a technocrat, possessing the advantages and disadvantages of both, and falling between two competing stools. This was almost all that remained. The Minister was directly assisted by a small ministerial office, headed by a middle level "Head of Ministers Office" (several ranks below that of a Director-General in charge of a "line" department), whose main functions were to liaise, and call for case files and information to be sent up by the "line" departments through him to the respective Deputy Ministers and to the Minister. As the hub of the wheel and being the nearest to the Minister and the Deputy Ministers, this office performed the pivotal and indispensable role of "Office of Chief of Staff' -though it was never the original intention that it should be so. As a matter of fact, the opposite was intended: it was to be no more than an efficient post office. However, it turned out to be otherwise. More significant politically was the super-imposition of a new state organ, the Council of State, which was placed above the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) headed by the Prime Minister. This superior organ held all the powers of legislature of the Pyithu Hluttaw, the People's Assembly, during the interregnum when the latter body was not in session. The Council of State comprised twenty-eight elected members, two from each state and division, there being altogether fourteen states and divisions in the country. The twenty-ninth member was the Prime Minister in an ex-officio capacity. This Council of State was headed by the President of the country, as the ex-officio Chairman. The four organs of state authority, namely, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet and Executive), the Council of People's Justices (Judicial), the Council of People's Attorneys (Legal) and the Council of People's Inspectors (Audit) were equally subordinate to the Council of State. Contrary to Western (non-socialist) political practices the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) was not above the other three organs of power. It did not even enjoy primus inter pares status. The four organs of power were all equal in rank (at least in theory) and status and enjoyed the same emoluments. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was supreme. It was the Party Central Executive Committee which chose candidates for election to the Pyithu Hluttaw from which, in turn, all the ministers and members of the three organs of state were chosen. But it was, in effect, the Party Central Executive Committee which actually did the choosing, which the Pyithu Hluttaw always unanimously approved. With regard to this paper, it is the changes at the lower levels of

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43

administration, those of the ministries and departments that are of concern. Below the ministries were departments headed by Directors General who reported to the Deputy Ministers in their respective ministries. On its formation in 1972, the FERD took over part of the functions of the then Ministry of National Planning (which was merged with the Ministry of Finance and Revenue to become the Ministry of Planning and Finance), on matters pertaining to foreign aid obtained from bilateral and international sources, the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, and others. It also took on the functions formerly performed by the Budget Department of the then Ministry of Finance and Revenue, on subjects of foreign aid -- the World Bank and its affiliates (but not the IMF, which remained in the domain of the Central Bank in the same ministry), and also of the Asian Development Bank-- together with all aspects of debt servicing, loan negotiations, economic briefs and so on. The FERD thus became the main (but not the sole) body responsible for the co-ordination of all non-trade foreign economic assistance. External trade and commercial negotiations, and transactions remained the domain of the Ministry of Trade. There were slight variations and exceptions to this central role of the FERD in that matters concerning the World Health Organization were handled by the Ministry of Health; those concerning the Food and Agricultural Organization were dealt with by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests; those of the International Labour Organization, by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare; those of UNESCO by the Ministry of Education; and those concerning "general" economic subjects, such as on budgetary matters of the United Nations itself, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was the formal link between the FERD and the external world, geographically speaking, through the embassies abroad. Transmission of formal messages was made through the MOFA, which, within its departments, happened to have a Director-General in charge of two divisions: (1) international organizations and (2) economic. This did at times overlap somewhat with the work performed by the FERD, but because of the tradition of close co-operation and mutual respect between the Ministry of Planning and Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serious problems seldom arose between the two. Powerful as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was, the fact that the Ministry of Planning and Finance was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister did delineate the usual bureaucratic hierachical pecking order, which also filtered down the line.

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United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

Other functions of the Ministry of National Planning were hived off to the Planning Department and the Project Appraisal and Progress Reporting Department. The advent of the Twenty-Year Perspective Plan of the government, together with the First Four-Year Plan and the annual rolling plans were put into effect in 1972. In the same year also, the novel Indicative Planning Figure (IPF), and the country programming exercises of the UNDP began. It seemed that good things did not come singly but in batches. Coincidentally or otherwise, the resurgence of relations with the World Bank also began in 1972, and Burma joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1973. These were the auspicious beginnings for the newly formed FERD in its role of a mini-Hercules department, shouldering the burden and weight of dealings with foreign aid. The number and value of projects, both bilateral and multilateral, increased. Contacts and recontacts were made with foreign aid organizations, both bilateral and multilateral. The FERD perforce had to be reorganized and expanded by the extant events, and the new set-up was implemented in 1981. The problem that the FERD constantly faced was with regard to personnel. The recruitment of good quality middle-level management staff, who need to be well-rounded, bilingually articulate, and numerate was always difficult. It was rare to get all three qualities in one individual. The better crop of teaching staff in the disciplines of economics, statistics, and law, from the universities and institutions bad to be called upon by transfer. This was, however, only partially successful but, civil service regulations and bureaucracy being what they were, this was only to be expected -- and some deadwood naturally remained within the FERD, unmoved and unmovable. By dint of seniority, time-servers and paper-pushers still managed to survive, if not exactly to flourish. Only time itself and natural attrition could deal with them. The Interrelationship between FERD, UNDP and Various Aid Agencies The interrelationship between the FERD, the UNDP and the various aid agencies has already been touched upon previously. The FERD bas institutionalized a series of regular, periodic, and formal meetings with the UNDP. With other U.N. agencies, however, there are less formal and less frequent meetings. The usual day-to-day and ad hoc contacts with the U.N. agencies would, of course, be there, just as in the case of the UNDP.

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45

Of the bilateral donor agencies, Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbrau (KFW), the German aid organization, was represented by its Embassy, supported by staff from elsewhere, such as Bangkok where the KFW has a stronger presence. Of the Japanese aid organizations, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) was represented in the Embassy, with diplomatic status, whereas the Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA) was represented by one office outside the Embassy with no diplomatic status. Nordic, Dutch, and Canadian aid agencies did not have representations in Rangoon at all. Ad hoc missions would come from the respective headquarters, or Bangkok, or Dhaka where the representative offices were located. The Australian International Development Aid Bureau (AIDAB) has always been represented in the Australian Embassy itself. The Un.ited States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a separate representative in the Embassy with diplomatic status. The British Council had a separate office for fellowships, and so forth, and there was much contact with it. The British Council's representative was. accredited ll:S the cultural attache of the British Embassy. Such diplomatic accredition made it easier for them to contact and gain access to relevant ministries, departments, and thus facilitated matters to the benefit of both parties, the donors and the government.

VI

AID CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION

The Role and Impact of U.N. Technical Aid: Some Reflections

The United Nations system of technical co-operation and other forms of assistance has benefited Burma to a fair extent (lately to the order of US$30 million or thereabouts per annum). Its contribution could, however, be more significant if it had a multiplier, catalytic effect on the country's development efforts. Various inter-governmental forums have stressed the enhancement of self-reliance in the developing countries as the key to development. They have also reasserted the need to make the U.N. system of technical co-operation more effective, and to have rigorous scrutiny of results to find out if the efforts did accomplish the aims. The UNDP's own ex-post facto evaluations of functional projects have provided some insight in identifying patterns and problems, but not the fundamental causes within each country. An evaluation of U.N. technical aid activities in individual countries can provide a clearer overall picture. After all, it is at the country level that the U.N. system's contributions combine with national resources and other international contributions to make things work. And technical co-operation practices have of late moved to new directions.* The discussion that follows include: (a) (b)

an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.N. technical aid process as seen from a recipient country; and possibilities for improvement.

A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the U.N. technical assistance in Burma is patently not yet possible. But based upon the assessments of the UNDP Country Programmes as well as those of the

Aid Co-operation and Co-ordination

47

UNICEF, the F AO and the WHO over the past fifteen years, a brief overview will not be out of place. In doing so, it must be borne in mind that there are impediments yet to be overcome. These include the comparatively small proportion of U.N. technical co-operation; the perennial difficulty of determining technically what the so-called "impact" of development assistance comprises; and what "catalytic" effect there might be; and the paucity of fundamental socio-economic sources. There is also a technical difficulty in this analysis. It exists inherently in the structural diversity of the projects. Projects have been varied in form, scope, complexity, purpose and duration. There have been no replicate projects in Burma, nor has there been an average or standard sized project to be used as a tentative base for measurement, and comparison. Different U.N. organizations have dissimilar technical concepts, documentation, procedures and policies which have not helped matters either. Faced with all these, the overview is directed towards the recurrent topic of self-reliance; the current role of the 'U.N. system; ·possibilities for co-ordination; and constraints and preso.r.iptions. Self-reliance is of topical interest. Despite years of effort and external assistance, Burma, like other LLDCs, has yet to attain an acceptable level of economic self-reliance. Constraints on the path of self-reliance have been many: governmental emphasis on centralized economic control and social welfare, which discouraged public initiative and drive; self-generating and ever expanding, almost mindless, government red tape; an education system that over-emphasized the "Arts" subjects over technical and managerial "science" training, all these at the national level. Paper solutions there were, but they were not easy to implement. Another problem is that of the external assistance itself. The aid process has encouraged nationals to turn to "foreign experts" rather than to tackle the problems themselves. But then, in Burma there is hardly any incentive to do the tackling oneself. The risks are many and the rewards few. It is safer to be prudent and rely on "foreign experts". This kind of attitude cannot possibly enhance self-reliance in any way. The number of fellowships sponsored by the UNDP projects have been fairly high, but scattered thin over all sectors. The fellowships have not been found to be successful in helping to build self-reliance. Instances of fellowships being awarded to administrators instead of the technicians, the uneven extensions of academic fellowships, as well as the lack of monitoring and follow-up of fellowship programmes have not been uncommon.

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United Nations Technical Aid in Bunna

Overcoming all that, and after all the hard work abroad, to have to return to the same milieu and work environment, the same old rules, could be both galling and discouraging to the returnees and therefore hardly conducive to fostering initiative for self-reliance. Effectiveness The contributions of the United Nations system to Burma's development efforts have been undoubtedly positive, despite some isolated and inevitable disappointing results. Had technical aid from the United Nations system not been available, Burma's development would have been less and slower. The positive results, however, could possibly have been greater, on hindsight. Having said this, however, it must be pointed out that the effectiveness of the work of the U.N. organizations in Burma suffered in general from a lack of cost consciousness. Priority was often given for technical and administrative objectives, and less importance on how to ensure that the objectives were attained in the least costly way. The statements made here are not new, as there have been repeated discussions on this. It is no consolation to know that not only Burma but most other developing countries seem to suffer from similar symptoms and malaise. But because the issues are so crucial, and because corrective actions have been less than effectual, the need for reiteration exists. Constraints For a country which had supposedly decentralized its administrative system, development projects had to be well co-ordinated from the start if resources were to be put to the best use. The FERD in the Ministry of Planning and Finance was not yet in a position to do the full co-ordination through no fault of its own. Particularly in view of the large increase in external assistance expected as a result of being designated a LLDC, ways of strengthening its co-ordinative processes became all the more pressing. Experts tended to outstay their welcome and usefulness, and there were too many "generalist" advisers. Possibilities for short-term consultancies, and synchronization of expert services with other inputs needed re-thinking. In order to utilize expert services to better effect, novel ways as well as shorter durations for expatriate specialist services could possibly be explored, such as:

Aid Co-operation and Co-ordination

1.

2.

3. 4.

49

substituting equipment for project, and using local staffing instead of foreign experts (not easy for a country like Burma with its present increasingly high rate of professional-level brain drain); using experts (less expensive) from fellow developing countries under schemes for technical co-operation among developing countries (TCDC). having trouble-shooters-- experts who come in to solve only specific problems or to cross-check; and having a multidisciplinary, subcontracted team to take on an entire job, all the while transferring skills;

Inputs to Outputs

Financial resources transferred, experts provided, equipment delivered and expenditures spent are all useful indicators of technical co-operation activity. The concentration on "inputs" and "programme delivery" should, therefore, not override the focus on results as the only true measure of technical co-operation effectiveness. Not all expenditures (either in cash or kind) bear fruit, however. It would always be more pertinent to ask what kind of fruits, what kind of results ensued. The Role of the U.N. System: Reflections

The role of U.N. technical aid reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the system itself. The plus factors are the ability of the system to proffer relatively unbiased advice on development problems (compared to the specific policy interests of bilateral donors) and the means at its disposal to provide comprehensive technical services to all economic and social sectors almost without exception. The minus factors of the U.N. technical aid were their relatively small size and complex process. U.N. system inputs represented less than 10 per cent of total foreign development assistance available to Burma, and this fact gave them less clout and leverage than the big bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. It made them a second-class power at best vis-a-vis the bilateral donors. The role of the U.N. system differs in both degree and kind from that of other donors. Major projects were usually linked with the specific interests of

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United Nations Technical Aid in Burma

the bilateral donors, while the remammg small, difficult, specialized, or sensitive (and usually less desirable) areas were left, more by default than by deference, to the U.N. system. Though the United Nations was not a residual donor, it had come to be regarded as a filler of gaps, and a handler of difficult and diffused jobs-- a role which was challenging for the U.N. system, and also one useful to Burma. It is hard to pin-point the economic impact specifically attributable to the U.N. system (except perhaps in the UNICEF, WHO and FAO where specific subjects were dealt with and thus were amenable to quantification). But it can be generalized that the U.N. system did play a useful, albeit fairly low profile role, in the economic and social development of the country. But for the United Nations' assistance it is doubtful if Burma could have achieved whatever small progress it bas had. Differently put, Burma might have bad to seek LLDC status earlier than it did, but for the UNDP, the UNICEF, the FAO, the WHO, and other assistance. Of the U.N. organizations, UNICEF is the most well known, followed by the FAO and the WHO. The quality of these agencies' field staffs, their work with government ministries, their advisory assistance to institutions, their "grassroots" and community approaches and their tasks in the difficult and diverse sub-sectors have made their mark, and have been well received even in small towns and villages. These positive general assessments, however, must be tempered with reservations on the U.N. system's total operating effectiveness. Its standard mix of expert-equipment-training package with the need to find suitable project staff and equipment, gave rise to inevitable delays at all points. Being on schedule was always an exception. A more down to earth approach, and action-oriented pragmatic projects are what are required. Too much paper work, too many unnecessary project vehicles, and (not the least important) prerequisites for expatriate staff, such as travels (frequent junkets within the country and to neighbouring countries), expensive accommodation, and duty free goods, are the drawbacks which cannot readily be done away with but only reduced. Then again, the U.N. agencies had often been less than firm in managing their activities, often acquiescing to local counterpart requests for big and small obligations. A hard eye and the gumption to insist that the projects be carried out according to schedule even if inconvenient for the counterparts to do so were not evident. These acquiesces and obligations were inevitable for the man on the spot (and he is always on the spot), that is, the resident representative. It is he

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51

who has to face the authorities at all times; and there are quid pro quo too on the part of the U.N. agencies themselves. The point is whether the quid and the quo are "fairly" equivalent or if one is unduly weightier than the other, or whether it is only one way. Prescriptions Having said all the above, and keeping in mind that to prescribe in such matters is the easiest part, the following actions seem to be called for from both the government and the U.N. organizations, to improve the costeffectiveness and the quality of project implementation. (The list is not meant to be exhaustive, nor is it in order of priority). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Firmer application of existing guidelines on project planning and design processes. Objectives and target dates for all projects to be laid down realistically in measurable terms. Measurable progress indicators during implementation, and also after. Monitoring, review, and evaluation in every project. Specific inputs, and definite results expected (changes to be produced), with explicit would-be beneficiaries and target dates. Realistic project scheduling and pre-planning to ensure timeliness of all inputs (PERT/CPM use essential). Flexible implementation methodology to meet local situations. Expert assignments to be minimized. Greater cost control and tighter budget preparation. Institutionalized monitoring and follow-up of fellowship programmes.

Aid Co-ordination: An Overview In the prevailing sceptical aid environment and the large unmet needs of the LLDCs, there is clearly a case for more effective use of aid. In this setting, aid co-ordination has emerged as a critical issue. Efficacious and effective use of existing aid, and more flexible means of dispensing by donor countries are worthwhile objectives to strive for, to improve the lot of the recipient countries. Aid co-ordination concerns donors and recipients alike. The actions of

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United Nations Technical Aid in Bumta

one determines the reaction of the other. On the donor side, policies such as tied aid, mixed credits, and different modalities of aid dispensing, reduce the possibilities for aid co-ordination. A major responsibility for aid co-ordination, therefore, rests (more by default) with the recipient country. Governments must manage plans, policy and institutional reforms as being the prerequisites for better aid co-ordination. So-called development plans had existed in Burma since the 1950s. Planning, however, was made around individual projects rather than within a coherent macro-economic framework. Lip service, of course, was paid to "balanced growth" and such socialist jargon. Within the government there were only a few channels of mechanism to co-ordinate aid flows, and even less opportunities. This was because the imperative need was to get donors to finance specific development projects, and being aware of the donors' penchant to provide aid in accordance with methodology of their own, there was no desire to push them unnecessarily towards co-ordination. The authorities did perceive (though dimly) that co-ordination of donor activities could be of benefit, both as a means of mobilizing additional aid and as a way of increasing the efficacy of ongoing aid. They were concerned, nevertheless, that such co-ordination efforts might be used by donors to encroach or impinge upon the country's sovereignty. Burma has a somewhat chauvinistic phobia about this point, possibly more than most other LLDCs. On the donors' side also, there were doubts regarding aid co-ordination. Individually, donors had accumulated some economic advantage during the years of aid giving, and were wary that these hard-won advantages might be whittled away if co-ordination was left to the recipient country. Negotiating the content and volume of aid and other terms through bilateral channels afforded donors a powerful leverage to pursue their interests, which advantage they were naturally loth to relinquish. The government on its part, rightly or wrongly, felt that aid co-ordination was a matter not to be delegated, if possible, to outsiders unless more or less forced to by the exigencies of requirements. And in many cases in its opinion, the government was better placed than any donor to promote it, or not to, if it did not wish to. In brief, the need to make better use of development opportunities requires a streamlining of relations between the recipient country and the donors, and more co-ordination among the donors themselves. The following are some features that might be looked into to improve aid co-ordination.

Aid Co-operation and Co-ordination

1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

53

Donors (whether countries or multilateral aid agencies) should be willing to work within the government's programmes. Donors can harmonize decisions regarding debt relief. Donors can give medium-term indications of aid (longer than two or more years). The Foreign Economic Relations Department should have more authority to monitor the progress of project implementation (at all stages), and to implement agreements between the government and the donors. The multilateral agencies could assume a leading role to orchestrate donor assistance.

The bottom line, however, lies in the "fungibility" of aid. It could be the saving grace, the safety valve to enable the recipient country to direct and switch (within set limits) to other priority uses the resources released by the foreign aid. To a poor country all are priorities: the need for all kinds of agri-input, equipment of all sorts, factories, roads, trucks, infrastructure, almost anything one can think of. Whatever the future holds, the imperative lies in the present. The infrastructure of a poor country is such that any new road, new housing, new telephone system will always be welcome. The saturation points are still too far off. As a general rule, to be able to digest and absorb aid requires skill and technology know-how -- which can come only with technical ass istance -and which must the refore precede any large scale capital aid so that it can be fruitfully utilized. For lack of a horseshoe, in this case, technical competency, the horse, that is, the capital aid could well be lost, or useless. Horror stories abound, in Burma as elsewhere. The common thread running through all the aid problems is the lack of technical, educational, and vocational competency.

VII BURMA'S STATUS AS A LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY

Some Features The term "Third World", or the "developing world", refers to something that is multifaceted and constantly evolving. Vast differences and disparities exist within this wide context. In the decades of effort to alleviate poverty among developing countries the principle of equitable treatment, namely, that equal situations should attract similar deals, and obversely, that different ones should receive differentiated treatment emerged. It was necessary, therefore, to envisage special corrective measures for the least developed among the developing countries. As long ago as 1964, at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) in Geneva, special efforts in favour of such countries were called for. Such terms as "least developed countries" and "most disadvantaged countries" had already been in use then. In 1971, specific measures became feasible following the adoption by the General Assembly of a list prepared by the Economic and Social Council's Committee for Development Planning (COP) naming twenty-four countries as being least developed. Between 1971 and 1981, the General Assembly added seven more countries to the original list. The United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (Paris, 1981) considered the situation of these thirty-one LLDCs and the urgent measures required to alleviate their plight. It adopted a Substantial New Programme of Action (SNPA), which was to be implemented in the 1980s. When Burma (1987) was added, the number of LLDCs reached fortyone countries (see Appendix B).

Bumra's Status as a Least Developed Country

55

Characteristics The Committee for Development Planning (CDP) applied three economic and social criteria to classify a country as least developed: 1.

2. 3.

Low income-- per capita gross domestic product of US$100 (1968 value) or about US$400 (1986 value) or less; Low literacy rate-- 20 per cent or less of the population old enough to read; Share of manufacturing in total gross domestic product of 10 per cent or less.

These three criteria are the simplest and most convenient means of delineation so far devised. Background The first resolution to draw up a list of LLDCs so that specific measures can be taken to help them, was adopted in 1972 at UNCTAD III at Santiago. It was followed by another adopted at UNCTAD IV at Nairobi in 1976. The two resolutions, however, proved inadequate, suffering from two defects: first, they lumped all the LLDCs as a homogeneous category; secondly, the proposed measures were too general, without the adequate machinery for implementation. A Third-World Initiative The imperative process resurged, therefore, in 1979, at the Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting held at Arusha (Tanzania). The programme adopted at that meeting became a basis for action at UNCTAD V (Manila, 1979), which in turn moved the U.N. General Assembly itself to convene a special United Nations Conference at Paris in 1981. There were to be two phases. The first would be the "life-saving" phase and that would be followed by a second phase, a "Substantial New Programme of Action" (SNPA) to deal with the underlying structural causes. The Substantial New Programme of Action (SNPA): Features The SNPA was a ten-year plan (1981-90) both for the LLDCs and for the

56

Chapter VII

donor countries. It has three chapters: (1) general situation and national measures; (2) international support measures; and (3) arrangements for implementation, follow-up and monitoring. The SNPA re-underlined the concept of the reciprocity of development rights and duties. The duty of the donor countries is to help the LLDCs, from which the corollary follows that the LLDCs have a right to expect aid. The LLDCs on their part have the obligation to manage the resources/aid for the general good of their society. That obligation is in turn connected with the donor's right of monitoring and supervision. Thus, the SNPA is a contract of solidarity and mutual interests. Certain industrialized countries had earlier decided at the 1978 session of the Trade and Development Board to revise retroactively the terms of the debts of the LLDCs. This was tantamount to remission of debts. (This particular point was to become a sticky issue between Burma and Japan later.) Apart from the volume of aid, three other important proposals were, inter alia, to reduce the debts of the LLDCs, by converting them into grants; to finance local recurrent costs by grants; and the assistance be untied.

Burma as a Least Developed Country (LLDC) Burma was designated as a Least Developed Country in December 1987. The Problem Areas Leading to Least Developed Country Status Compared to the 1970s, Burma's economic growth in the early 1980s had somewhat moved upward at an average annual rate of 5 per cent during 198285 and the official inflation rate had been held down to a single digit percentage increase per annum. The growth was partly due to some success in stimulating agricultural output through crash programmes and crop diversification. In turn, these gains contributed to an increase in agro-based manufacturing. However, they turned out to be favourable only temporarily. At the same time, in stark contrast to the favourable factors, the budgetary and balance of payments position had been depressingly negative. In 1985-86 the export target was US$555 million, but the actual figure achieved was US$230 million. The position was worse in 1986-87, when the target was US$535 million but the achievement was only US$149 million. Shortfalls, year after year, can only lead to national bankruptcy, unless some drastic measures are taken to prevent this. The problem was not all due to the fall in the international price of rice, after a climb in the early 1980s. The

Burma's Status as a uast D~loped Cmvltty

57

terms of trade were predictably unfavourable, no more than 75 per cent. There were also factors such as stagnation of internal revenues both in absolute and relative terms. Domestic bank credit to the public sector had increased by two-thirds since 1981-82 to finance the budgetary needs (especially of the State Economic Enterprises [SEEs]). The debt-servicing ratio had climbed to 60 per cent or more, clearly far beyond the danger point. Expansion of credit to the SEEs, at the same time that their capacity utilization further decreased, was clearly not conducive to price stability. On the contrary, this credit expansion contributed directly to inflation. The SEEs had already caused a strong cumulative expansion of domestic credit and thereby put heavy inflationary pressure on the economy. They have had to rely solely on bank credit despite the policy reforms of the early 1980s, which were neither precise nor strong, but meant to increase their productivity and hopefully, surpluses. One of the reasons for the inefficiency of the SEEs was capacity under-utilization owing to lack of raw materials, spare parts, and maintenance. Vicious rounds of shortages resulted in prices spiralling upwards. The resulting burden was thrown upon the entire community, and was especially severe on the wage-earners and fixed income groups. The wellmeaning but economically unfeasible policy to protect the public from price increases by disallowing the SEEs to adjust upwards their costing and pricing paradoxically fuelled further inflation. This was a prime example of the socalled socialist principle of non-inflation, and "stable" prices, combined with misguided (however "altruistic") economic naivete, causing an economy to go awry, thus wreaking distortive income distributions all round. In the meantime the populace stoically carried on nevertheless. For that alone they deserve a better economic fate. The authorities attempted to redress, belatedly, some of these problems by cutting down its capital outlays, and imports, and by prohibiting new external debt. There was also an extreme measure, the third of such (the first was in May 1964, the second in November 1985), to demonetize some denominations of the currency in circulation. It was estimated to have wiped off at least half of the Ml value of the notes. Public confidence naturally plummeted. The velocity of circulation accelerated very rapidly, as nobody wished to keep any surplus cash in hand. After the initial shock, the prices rebounded back. The resulting effect seemed to have somewhat negated the original aim of a surgical strike against "black money" in the hands of the "black marketeers", and also to hit at the economic and political insurgents indulging in border area smuggling. Again, the poor people became poorer, and the rich did not seem to be affected too adversely. These efforts

58

01apter VII

prevented the situation from deteriorating more rapidly. But medium-term growth was impeded, a negative side-effect of the measures prescribed, much too high a price to pay. Both external and internal factors thus combined to back Burma to a tight corner from where it had no alternative but to apply to the ECOSOC to be designated a least developed country. The causes were many, and the circumstances were mixed. Some consequences could have been forseen but some not; some were avoidable, but some were only self-inflicted.

Relief Measures The application for LLDC status was accepted by the General Assembly and Burma became the forty-first member of this club of the poorest of the poor countries in the world. Out of all this, there are three "immediate" redeeming relief measures that accrue to Burma. The first is a grant/ aid of 3.6 billion yen (about US$29 million) which was received as debt relief from Japan in July 1988. It was also possible that the balance of 3.5 billion yen (about US$28 million) which remained out of the 7.1 billion yen (about US$57 million) originally repayable by Burma to Japan in 1988 would also be granted as a second instalment of debt relief for the year 1988. All th is came about after hard negotiations between Burma and Japan. The Japanese stance originally was that only debts incurred before 1978 (the year in which the Trade and Development Board passed Resolution 165 [SIX] regarding remissions) would be considered. Japan's interpretation, allegedly, was that this Trade and Development Board resolution was only exhortatory and not mandatory, nor did it cover the debts after 1978. One more sticky point between Burma and Japan hinged upon the modus operandi of the grant/aid relief. The Japanese Government, even at this stage, expected all future repayments of debts to be on schedule as per the original agreements, and only after the receipt of such repayments would they return the paid amount in part or in full as grant aid. Japan's excuse was said to be that its budgetary regulations and practices did not permit instant conversion of past debts into grants, that is, wiping them off the slate. Be that as it may, and if the above were true, it seemed to have been a narrow and legalistic interpretation not in the spirit of largesse which was expected of the world's leading creditor. In contrast to the alleged strict modality of the Japanese, it was believed that the Federal Republic of Germany (the second biggest donor to Burma), and the Nordic and Dutch Governments would negotiate on the correctness

Bunna's Status as a Least Developed Country

59

of the debt figures outstanding, and their respective authorities would then take the necessary administrative steps to cancel the agreed sums which would be converted from loan to grant, that is, these loans need not be repaid anymore. All these measures, of course, would have to be subject to the rules governing debt-rescheduling practices of the Paris Club. In any case these measures reflect the more "generous" and realistically flexible attitudes of the donors, in the circumstances when a country though willing is unable to fulfil its international obligations. The third relief is from the UNDP. Once the status of LLDC became official, an additional sum from its Least Developed Country Pool of Resources became available to be added to the Indication Planning Figure (IPF) which would allow Burma to receive additional technical assistance in the next few years. This makes Burma the sixth largest recipient of IPF from the UNDP in its current cycle. An additional sum would also be made available from the U.N. Capital Fund, if required. All in all, this sad tale of opportunities foregone, chances missed, and its economic future unduly blighted means that it is now "back to the drawing board" for Burma. In any case the events that took place, or were about to, as described above, have become "frozen". After the military take-over in September 1988, all aid, whether multilateral or bilateral, have effectively ceased. When and how foreign aid will be restored remains an enigmatic question for the moment. The answer revolves around the fundamental political issue of the future of the country.

POSTSCRIPT

The name of the country of Burma has been changed since June 1989 from ''The Union of Burma" to ''The Union of Myanmar". As the events described in this paper pre-dates the name change, the original name "Burma" is retained throughout, in order to avoid confusion, and to preserve chronological sequence. While this paper was being prepared, unprecedented successive traumatic political events and drastic changes erupted in Burma. It all started with a tea-shop brawl between university students and townfolk near the campus of the Rangoon Institute of Technology -- the kind of trivial storm in a teacup not uncommon near campuses. However, it did not stop there, but instead generated the largest ever country-wide student demonstrations and strikes by civil servants and the populace. There is a Burmese saying that "a tiny spark from a refuse heap can burn down a palace". In this instance, no palace was burnt down physically. But three presidents of the country and a prime minister were deposed from office within six months -- quite an uneviable record anywhere. In the unfolding scenario, the military stepped in to quell the civil uprising and to restore law and order, thus repeating the previous coup d'etat in 1962 a quarter of a century ago. Subsequent to this military take-over, all bilateral aid in progress as well as those pending negotiations for remission of external debt were halted unilaterally at the behest of the donors themselves. Multilateral aid from the World Bank, the ADB and the U.N. Agencies had to be suspended for lack of effective means of implementation in the wake of the turmoil. All external aid has therefore ceased. When and under what circumstances they will be resumed is uncertain and unpredictable.

*

*

Postscript

61

From newspaper accounts, and unofficial reports, however, it transpired that several visits have been made by the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations agencies to the country during 1989. The IMF mission was for consultations regarding Article IV, which is an annual and regular event. The World Bank sent several missions, including one on a general economic survey, and several for sectoral ones, on transport, energy and others. The disbursements on some of the ongoing projects in these sectors, as required, were made. In the aftermath of the military take-over, the most active seems to be the United Nations system. Missions of the UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO and several others have visited the country and work on some sectoral projects has resumed. However, no new aid negotiations seem to be in the offing, nor are there re-negotiations for past ones. They are still in a state of suspension.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Organizations Forming the United Nations System

Intergovernmental Agencies (19) FAO GATT lTC IAEA ICAO IFAD ILO IMO IMF ITU UNESCO UNIDO UPOV UPU WHO WIPO WMO WTO

Food and Agricultural Organization General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade International Trade Centre International Atomic Energy Agency International Civil Aviation Organization International Fund for Agricultural Development International Labour Organization International Maritime Organization International Monetary Fund International Telecommunication Union United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Industrial Development Organization International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Universal Postal Union World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization World Meteorological Organization World Tourism Organization

Appendix A

63

World Bank Group (1) IBRD IDA IFC

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Development Association International Finance Corporation

Organs and Programmes Related to ECOSOC (14) UNHCR UNICEF UNCfAD UNDP WFP WFC UNCDF UNEP UNFPA UNFDAC UNSFLDC INCB ACC UNRISD

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme World Food Programme World Food Council United Nations Capital Development Fund United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control United Nations Special Fund for Land-Locked Developing Countries International Narcotics Control Board Administrative Committee on Co-ordination United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

Special Bodies of the United Nations (7) UNSTRAW UNITAR UNRWA UNU UNY UNDRO UNIDR

United Nations International Research and Training for the Advancement of Women United Nations Institute for Training and Research United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United Nations University United Nations Volunteers Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

APPENDIX B List of Least Developed Countries

Country 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Afghanistan Benin Bhutan Botswana Burundi Chad Ethiopia Guinea Haiti Lao People's Democratic Republic Lesotho Malawi Maldives Mali Nepal Niger Rwanda Samoa Somalia Sudan Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Upper Volta Yemen Bangladesh Central African Republic Democratic Yemen Gambia Cape Verde Comoros

Date of Inclusion on the List 1971

1975

1977

Appendix B

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Guinea Bissau Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Sao Tome and Principle Sierre Leone Togo Vanuatu Tuvalu Kiribati Kauritania Burma

1981 1982

1985 1986

1987

65

APPE NDIX C Technical Assistance Provided to Burma by the UNDP and its Predecessors (up to 1986)

Age ncy

1. 2. 3.

Technical Assistance Board UN Special Fund UN DP

Amount of Assistance Received in U S$

14,9 10,000 6,800,000 102,200,000

123,910,000

APPENDIX D Sectoral Allocation of UNDP Assistance to Burma, CP IV 1982-86 (In million US$)

General development issues, policy and planning Natural resources Agricultural, forestry and fisheries Industry Transport and communications International trade and development finance Human settlements Health Education Employment Social conditions and equity Culture Science and technology

10

Total*

76

* Figures do not tally because of rounding.

7 17 7 10 1 1 7 7 1 2 2

NOTES

* It is at the country level, and in the total sum of the country programmes undertaken by all the United Nations agencies, that an up-to-date in-depth evaluation, whether in the style of the UNDP, the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank, is likely to produce the information at both macro and micro levels, that will be most useful for future action to be taken to redress the implementation problems, especially of projects and programmes. These country-oriented evaluations are likely to be "expensive" in terms of professional expertise, and counterpa rt officers, and possibly cost as much as a major project. After all, it will have to be a major operation, if there is serious intent. If properly thought out and carried through, this evaluation will likely repay many times its cost in terms of cash. Because the results can be applied in farreaching enduring ways, the outcome of such an evaluation can be most rewarding. Moreover, s uch an evaluation will not impinge upon a country's sovereignty (about which Burma is most sensitive), and it is consistent with the U .N. mandate to make overall evaluations of the multilateral aid provided by its various agencies. The World Bank undertakes such studies regularly in selected countries. Such a country-wide approach on the evaluation would have the advantage of ensuing a better understanding of the inter-agency relationships among U .N. proj ects and programmes, a clearer overview of the relationship with the country concerned, and also with other donors. Time seems now opportune for Burma to undergo such an evaluation, as a prelude to capital aid flow. Burma is on the threshold of a new economic era having abandoned its socialistic doctrinaire approach, having been a failure in the past quarter century.

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United Nations and Specialized Agencies

United Nations Handbook 1987. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 1987 Annual Reports of the UNDP office, Rangoon, various issues Reports of the FAO office, Rangoon, various issues Reports of tlze UNICEF office, Rangoon, various issues Reports of the WHO office, Rangoon, various issues Burma Country Programmes of the UNDP I (1972-73) UNDP II (1974-78) UNDP III (1978-82) UNDP IV (1982-86) Burma Country Programmes of the UNICEF (1983-86) UNICEF (1986-91) Burma Country Programmes of the FAO

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Bello, Kinley and Elinson. Development Debacle. London: Third World Publications, 1982. Broad, Robin. Unequal Partners. University of California Press, 1988. Chenery, Hollis, et al. Redistribution with Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. Girling, Robert H. Multilateral Institutions and the Third World. New York: Praeger, 1986. Hassan M. Selim. Development Assistance Policies & the Performance of Aid Agencies. London: McMillan Press, 1983. Kjellstrom and D'dmeida. Institutional Development and Technical Assistance in Macroeconomic Framework. World Bank Discussion Paper 13. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1987. Lamb, Geoffrey. Managing Economic Policy Change. World Bank Discussion Paper 14. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1987. Lethem, F.J., and Lauren Cooper. Managing Project-Related Technical Assistance. World Bank Staff Working Paper 586. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1983. Muns, D., ed. Adjustment, Conditionality and International Financing. Washington D.C.: IMF, 1984. Please, Stanley. The Hobbled Giant. Boulder-Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. Silverman, Jerry M. Technical Assistance & Aid Agency Staff. World

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THE AUTHOR

The author has served in the Government of the Union of Burma, in the Ministry of Finance and Revenue, and later in the Ministry of Planning and Finance. He was seconded to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and served in the Programme Co-ordination and Monitoring Office of the Executive Secretary. As a member, and vice-chairman of the Appointments and Promotion Committee, and of the Joint Advisory Council, for several years, he has represented the ESCAP in the United Nations Headquarters in staff matters, and also in the meetings of the Federation of International Civil Servants Association (FICSA). He was a Research Fellow, and is a Visiting Fellow in the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.