Unravelling Liberal Interventionism: Local Critiques of Statebuilding in Kosovo 9781138579910, 9780429507649

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“A superb collection on Kosovo’s statebuilding process written by a distinguished group of local scholars. This book is a staunch contribution to understanding the challenges that underpin contemporary efforts for building peace and creating states after violent conflict. A must-­read for scholars and practitioners of international relations alike.” Atifete Jahjaga, President of the Republic of Kosovo (2011–2016) “A rare and valuable study by a group of Kosovar scholars that argues that local actors are not passive targets but critical agents of legitimation and success of international peacebuilding efforts. A timely contribution to the literature on peacebuilding that also strengthens the emerging field of Non-­Western and Global IR.” Prof. Amitav Acharya, Amer­ican University, Washington, DC “Taking its prompt from postcolonial challenges critiques of Eurocentrism in International Relations theory, this book insightfully reassesses the local dimensions and meanings of intervention. It does so, however, by addressing Europe’s intimate other – Kosovo. The editors have curated a wide-­ranging and edifying set of contributions that turn the postcolonial critique towards Europe’s own borderlands. As such, this book marks a crucial contribution to – and innovation in – debates surrounding intervention and statebuilding.” Prof. Robbie Shilliam, Johns Hopkins University

Unravelling Liberal Interventionism

Despite calls for the decolonisation of knowledge, scholars who come from conflict-­affected societies remained marginalised, excluded from the examination of the politics and impacts of liberal interventionism. This edited volume gives local scholars a platform from which they critically examine different aspects of liberal interventionism and statebuilding in Kosovo. Drawing on situational epistemologies and grounded approaches, the chapters in this book interrogate a wide range of themes, including: the politics of local resistance; the uneven relationship between international statebuilders and local subjects; faking of local ownership of security sector reform and the rule of law; heuristic and practical limits of interventionism, as well as the subjugated voices in statebuilding process, such as minorities and women. The book finds that the local is not antidote to the liberal, and that local perspectives are not monolithic. Yet, local critiques of statebuilding do not seek to generate replicable knowledge; rather they prefer generating situational and context-­specific knowledge be that to resolve problems or uncover the unresolved problems. The book seeks to contribute to critical peace and conflict studies by (re)turning the local turn to local scholars who come from conflict-­affected societies and who have themselves experienced the transition from war to peace. This book is essential reading for students and scholars of peace- and statebuilding, conflict studies and international relations. Gëzim Visoka is Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, Ireland. Vjosa Musliu is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Free University of Brussels (VUB), Belgium.

Worlding Beyond the West Series Editors: Arlene B. Tickner

Universidad del Rosario, Colombia

David Blaney

Macalester College, USA

and Inanna Hamati-­Ataya

Cambridge University, UK Historically, the International Relations (IR) discipline has established its boundaries, issues, and theories based upon Western experience and traditions of thought. This series explores the role of geocultural factors, institutions and academic practices in creating the concepts, epistemologies, and methodologies through which IR knowledge is produced. This entails identifying alternatives for thinking about the “international” that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West. But it also implies provincialising Western IR and empirically studying the practice of producing IR knowledge at multiple sites within the so-­called ‘West’. 15 Widening the World of International Relations Homegrown Theorizing Edited by Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin 16 Western Dominance in International Relations? The Internationalisation of IR in Brazil and India Audrey Alejandro 17 Islam in International Relations Politics and Paradigms Edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, and Deina Abdelkader 18 China and International Theory The Balance of Relationships Chih-­yu Shih et al. 19 Unravelling Liberal Interventionism Local Critiques of Statebuilding in Kosovo Edited by Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu

Unravelling Liberal Interventionism

Local Critiques of Statebuilding in Kosovo

Edited by Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-57991-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-50764-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To Eira and Nora

Contents



List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgements

  1 Introduction: local critiques of intervention and statebuilding

xi xii xiii xvi

1

V j osa M u sli u and G ë z im V iso k a

  2 International statebuilding and local resistance in Kosovo

21

G ë z im V iso k a

  3 From Kosovo with hospitality: rethinking hospitality beyond Westphalia

39

V j o sa M usliu

  4 The hyperreality of EU enlargement: a Baudrillardian critique of the European Union in Kosovo

54

Kr e nar  G as h i

  5 Local inclusion or exclusion? Security sector development in Kosovo

69

F lorian Q e h a j a

  6 Making the law, ruling the law: international statebuilding and the rule of law in Kosovo D afina  B u ç a j

84

x   Contents   7 Local voices and agency in statebuilding: perspectives from life stories

101

A rlinda R r u st e mi

  8 Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly of Kosovo

117

J e l e na L on č ar

  9 Inside-­out and outside-­in on dealing with the past in Kosovo: actors, voices and practices

132

N ita L u ci and L inda  G u sia

10 The subaltern of the local: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women and statebuilding in Kosovo

148

S akibe J ashari

11 The politics of citizenship, social policy, and statebuilding in Kosovo

162

A rtan M u stafa

12 Conclusion: after local critiques

178

G ë z im V iso k a and V j osa M u sli u



Index

183

Figures

5.1 What is your opinion on the future of the Kosovo Security Force? (n = 1101) 9.1 Partial view of Heroinat monument

79 140

Tables

11.1 Main social indicators under self-­management, UNMIK and independence 11.2 Main transfers as a percentage of average wages, 2002–2015 11.3 Income from work and disposable income: from society’s poorest to the richest 10% 11.4 Income redistribution (inequality reduction) according to ethnicity 11.5 Views on politics and the economy according to income level, %

166 169 169 171 173

Contributors

Dafina Buçaj is a Doctor of Juridical Sciences (SJD) candidate at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, and her research focuses on “Due Diligence in Cyberspace: Obligation of States to prevent transboundary harm originating from their territory”. She has worked as an assistant lecturer on the Department of International Law at the University of Prishtina – Faculty of Law (Kosovo), since 2013. In the past she has worked with the Academy of Nuremberg Principles in Nuremberg as a Research Fellow in projects related to transitional justice, contributing chapters to two books (published in 2016 and 2017). She holds a master degree in Law from the University of Cambridge, bachelor degree in Law and another one in journalism from the University of Prishtina. Krenar Gashi is a Basileus Doctoral Fellow at Ghent University (Belgium). His doctoral research focuses on exploring the foreign policy and international relations of the European Union (EU) through the use of the works of Jean Baudrillard. He specialises in the relations between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans, with a special focus on enlargement, peace-­making and peace-­keeping policies. Gashi was a prominent civil society leader and non-­profit executive in Kosovo. He was the director of Kosovo’s first think tank, KIPRED, and established the Institute for Development Policy (INDEP), an influential think tank that focuses on democratisation, Europeanisation and sustainable development. He holds an MA in Media and Communication (KIJAC) and another MA in European Politics (University of Sussex). He has authored tens of influential policy-­papers that have shaped key public policies in Kosovo. Linda Gusia is a lecturer at the Department of Sociology at the University of Prishtina and chairs the Program for Gender Studies and Research at the University of Prishtina. Her research interests are gender, sexuality, nationalism, collective memory in the context of conflict and war, social movements, social justice, public spaces, cities. As part of her PhD theses she interrogated ambiguities of nationalism and gender by looking both; at the women movement in Kosovo and the sexual violence as a strategy of war looking closely at the politics of gender representation visually and textually. She graduated from New York University and has a PhD from the University of Prishtina.

xiv   Contributors She is author of a number of book chapters and articles including a book “Our men will not have amnesia”: Civic Engagement, Emancipation, and Gendered Public in Kosovo (co-­authored with Nita Luci). Sakibe Jashari holds an MA degree in Anthropology with the University of Sussex, with a focus on Anthropology of Reconciliation. She also holds a bachelor’s degree from LSE in Politics and International Relations. Jashari has over 15 years of experience working with international organisations in community affairs, transitional justice and human rights. Jelena Lončar is a teaching assistant at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Science. She holds a PhD in Politics from the University of York. Her research interests include political representation, ethnic politics, quotas and civil society. In recent years, her research has focused on the performance of minority representation and the performativity of the representative claims about and for minority groups. Her current research project problematises the construction of Serbo-­Albanian Dr Lončar’s research has been published in a number of journals, including Communist and Post-­Communist Studies and Nationalities Papers. Nita Luci is a lecturer at the University of Prishtina, Department of Anthropology, and Conceptual Art Program, Faculty of Arts. She holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor. Her research has focused on topics of gender and manhood, state, social movements, military intervention, post-­socialism, nationalism, public art, memory, and violence. She co-­founded and ran for the first two years (2013–2015) the University Program for Gender Studies and Research at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Prishtina. Dr Luci is author of numerous books, articles and chapters, including “Our men will not have amnesia”: Civic Engagement, Emancipation, and Gendered Public in Kosovo (co-­authored with Linda Gusia); and Un/welcomed Guests: NATO Intervention in Kosova; Events and Sites of Difference: Mark-­ing Self and Other in Kosovo (co-­authored with Predrag Marković). Vjosa Musliu is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Free University of Brussels (VUB), Belgium. Her current project at Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) analyses the performative turn in EU external relations with the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Peru. Dr Musliu’s work has been published in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Global Society and European Foreign Affairs Review. She finished her PhD at Ghent University, holds a master diploma from the Catholic University of Leuven, and a bachelor degree from State University of New York. She has published in a series of international journals and has presented her research in over 20 academic conferences. In addition to her academic work, Dr Musliu is a regular columnist in Belgian and Kosovar media. Artan Mustafa is a lecturer at the University for Business and Technology in Prishtina, Kosovo. Dr Mustafa has lectured at the Department of Political

Contributors   xv Science, University of Vienna, and has had a research stay at the University of Tokyo. He is specialised in welfare state, democracy, social stratification and social solidarity, and quality of life, etc. He holds a PhD degree from the University of Vienna and an MA degree in political science and sustainable development from Uppsala University and a bachelor degree from the University of Prishtina. Dr Mustafa worked for more than a decade as a media reporter and editor in Kosovo, and is an active blogger and lecturer on social policy. Florian Qehaja is the Director of Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and an affiliated scholar at Columbia University. He recently published his book International or Local Ownership? Security Sector Development in Post-­ Independent Kosovo. He holds a PhD in security studies from the University of Ljubljana; a master degree from the University of Sussex (UK) in Contemporary European Studies (MA) as an OSI/Chevening scholar, and a bachelor’s degree in Law from the University of Prishtina. Arlinda Rrustemi is a strategic analyst at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). She holds a PhD in Political Science from Leiden University in the Netherlands. In 2016, Arlinda defended her doctoral thesis, entitled “State-­ Building through Life Stories: Incorporating Local Perspectives”, which was supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). She holds a BA from the University College Roosevelt and an LLM degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. She teaches on humanitarian intervention, peacebuilding, power instruments and multilateral organisations, and is involved in several research projects uncovering peace infrastructures and countering radicalisation. Gëzim Visoka is Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University (DCU, Ireland). He holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from DCU. His research focuses on post-­conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding, transitional justice, global governance, foreign policy, and diplomatic recognition. Dr Visoka has written and edited numerous books and journal articles on peacebuilding, statebuilding and state recognition. His most recent book includes: Acting Like a State: Kosovo and the Everyday Making of Statehood (Routledge, 2018). Dr Visoka is associate editor of Peacebuilding journal and editor-­in-chief of The Palgrave Encyclopaedia of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Acknowledgements

This book grew out of an unplanned meeting we had in Brussels during the summer of 2016, after giving panel presentations at a conference. As both of us are originally from Kosovo, and we study international interventions in Western universities, we have ourselves experienced academic subalternity and the disadvantages of having non-­Western voices. We instantaneously agreed, therefore, on the need to give a voice to other local scholars who are excluded, silenced and discriminated against by the existing Western-­centric epistemic dominium. Editing the book has been both challenging and rewarding. Owing to a lack of institutional incentives, proper training and academic exposure, many local scholars hesitated to partake in this project. Yet, despite that, we have managed to bring together a solid group of established and emerging scholars. We are grateful to the contributors to this volume who have patiently worked with us throughout the project. Our work as editors has not only given us a much better understanding of the positionality of local scholars on statebuilding, it has also brought us closer to understanding some of the challenges they face in undertaking academic research. We hope that the very process of writing chapters for this book has given the contributors an opportunity to gain confidence in generating new knowledge and participating more actively in global scholarly debates. Our host universities, the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University (DCU) and the Department of Political Science at the Free University of Brussels (VUB), deserve special recognition for their continuous support and collegiality. In particular, we are grateful to Bruno Coppieters for his unequivocal support for this book. Veronica Kelly also deserves special gratitude for her tremendous contribution through reading and very thoroughly copy-­editing the entire manuscript (any remaining flaws are our own). Last but not least, love and gratitude to our partners, Grace and Evrim, with whom we welcomed our respective daughters, Eira and Nora, who were born into this world shortly after this project was initiated.

1 Introduction Local critiques of intervention and statebuilding Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka

Can the local speak? Global efforts to rebuild societies ruined by violent conflict are influenced first and foremost by the type of knowledge produced for and about these societies. Since the inception of statebuilding studies as a scholarly field, knowledge production for conflict-­affected societies has been based predominantly on Western epistemologies – which are shaped by particular cultures of thought, self-­ perpetuated epistemological superiority, and codified academic practices (see Tickner and Blaney 2012). The same can be said for International Relations (IR) work done on conflict-­affected societies in other disciplines, which has systematically failed to consider non-­Western discussions on the matter (Shilliam 2010). Western IR has acquired a hegemonic status. It dominates not because it is equipped with the analytical tools for finding the truth – rather, it is because it has been carried by the dominance of Western power over recent centuries that Western IR operates unconsciously in the minds of others in a way similar to colonised knowledge (Acharya and Buzan 2010). Academics specialising in IR and its subdisciplines have been cognisant for some time of the presence of Western-­centrism and the limits of IR and its subfields (conflict and peace studies, development studies, European studies) (see Hobson 2012). The politics of knowledge are inextricably linked to power, intervention, and domination in world politics. When it comes to local perspectives in the knowledge production of conflict-­affected societies, IR debates have only sporadically engaged with the dynamics of the local, the subaltern and other critical forms of agency (see Richmond 2018). Most of the international scholarship on these societies tends to come from an unrepresentative body of knowledge, which tries to mediate, deviate, reinterpret and, consequently, construct a different social reality, which is interpreted through different measurements, reference points and analytical concepts (Visoka 2017b). Compared with this self-­proclaimed universal knowledge, local knowledge has been called particularistic, and susceptible to biases (Musliu 2014). The work of local scholars is very limited, overshadowed by that of foreign scholars who have better analytical and writing skills, better institutional support and better access to research resources and publishers (see Visoka 2017b). This does not mean that the local scholar is

2   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka unknowledgeable. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2010: 18) argue that “non­Western IR theories do exist, but … they are hidden from the Western discourse by language barriers or other entry difficulties and therefore do not circulate in the global debates”. Indeed, local scholars often have a wealth of knowledge, but it is not primarily used for instrumental purposes or for transferral to and sharing with outside audiences. Local knowledge is very much used to meet narrow, practical, everyday interests and needs, and as such is embedded in a logic of generating sufficient knowledge to respond to societal situations. The often-­cited reasons for the lack of local scholars in statebuilding debates are weak educational and institutional foundations, and the socio-­economic and material constraints imposed by the legacy of the conflict and by governmental mismanagement of the knowledge economy in post-­conflict societies. Local scholars are also affected by the high thresholds for language quality set by publishing outlets (in terms of quality of writing and language), driven undoubtedly by fierce competition to publish impactful research by Western scholars. Short of resources and proper guidance, and in some cases even short of academic tradition, local scholars are misled and forced to publish in dubious journals and non-­credible commercial publications. Lack of institutional incentives and an inability to travel abroad for research, or to participate in academic conferences and join research networks, have also lessened the capacity of local scholars in post-­conflict societies. In the “local turn”, what is missing from existing research is a thorough examination of what local scholars think about statebuilding processes. Focusing on different aspects of statebuilding in Kosovo, this edited book seeks to explore the “local” as a subject cultivating knowledge on international interventions. It does not seek to create a new IR theory, but to give a voice and broader circulation to local perspectives from Kosovo, a country widely influential in shaping IR debates. After the conflict ended in 1999, Kosovo received a “whole package” of international missions and structures. Since then, democracy building has been the focal point for all the international structures deployed in Kosovo, including, inter alia, NATO’s deployed troops known as KFOR, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). To this end, international intervention in Kosovo includes statebuilding, peacebuilding and post-­conflict reconciliation agendas, to name but a few. Alongside the work on international intervention and missions in Kosovo, there has been a plethora of literature that analyses the deployment, performance and problems of intervention and statebuilding there. Much like the “mission”, the “missionised” – the local in Kosovo – has been extensively studied, examined and problematised. A small portion of this literature has also engaged in a fundamental critique (including post-­colonial and post-­structuralist accounts) of the international missions’ entitlement, legitimacy and ethics. Not being rooted in the lived experience of war, disintegration and missions, however, the critique that emanates from accounts seeking to empower the local tend to re-­inscribe and rehearse imperatives of political ­domination and cultural erasure. Much like the subaltern, which refers to the

Introduction   3 populations that are socially, politically and geographically outside the structures of hegemonic powers, the local is disenfranchised from the mechanisms that conceptualise, implement and legitimise the project – but also, and most importantly, disenfranchised from the knowledge created on international peacebuilding and statebuilding missions. Unlike the subaltern in a “subaltern research project”, the local is not a reified concept, in that there is no assumption of an existing cultural or epistemic solidarity among Kosovar scholars. This book explores a fundamental question: can the local speak, and if so, what does it say about international statebuilding? The added value of promoting local voices is that it pluralises our knowledge about statebuilding and brings in geo-­epistemological positionalities, which are aspects overlooked in peace and conflict studies. The book is driven by a conviction that a genuine, critical, local epistemology should engage in trying to decolonise knowledge from Western and Eurocentric frameworks, interrogate the decolonised knowledge and agencies, and explore the mutual constitution of international and local processes (see Smith 2012; Memmi 2006). The book moves the local Kosovar from being an object of research and a passive recipient of international and European practices to being a subject who cultivates and produces knowledge and, ultimately, who challenges and responds to these practices and knowledges. It is long past time for Western scholars to cease studying the local – in this case, Kosovars – and instead consider studying with the local. The aim of this edited book is to let the local speak about a wide range of themes that concern local society and are also closely interlinked with broader debates in statebuilding studies. Taking local scholars seriously does not mean allowing them to speak in separate platforms. It means engaging with them and with their critical agendas and their concepts. Accordingly, the book seeks to contribute to critical peace and conflict studies by expanding the scope of local epistemologies and to interrogate, from the bottom up, dominant perspectives on peacebuilding, statebuilding, democracy building, minority representation, security sector reform and economic recovery. Before exploring the contribution made by this book, a nuanced overview of existing literature on the local turn in statebuilding studies is offered, to situate the themes and purposes of this book in wider scholarly debates.

Unpacking the local turn in statebuilding studies In the past three decades, the rise of intra-­ethnic conflicts and the limits of preventive diplomacy have given birth to new interventionary practices, including statebuilding and peacebuilding missions, which seek both to intervene in conflict-­affected and turbulent societies, reconstructing state institutions there, and to engineer new social norms, values and relations between identity groups in conflict. This development has stemmed from an overwhelming international consensus that building state institutions is an appropriate method for reaching a peaceful resolution of conflict, by channelling political interests through institutionalised processes, promoting political moderation, and encouraging compromise under democratic rules. Statebuilding has come to be defined as “an

4   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka externalized process focused on the role of external actors, organisations, donors, IFIs, agencies, and INGOs and their key role in building liberal institutions for security, democracy, markets, and creating basic infrastructure and public services” (Richmond 2014: 178). Despite extensive investment, international statebuilding has not managed to achieve its intended goals. In conflict-­affected societies that have been subject to external statebuilding, peace continues to be fragile, and there are growing authoritarian tendencies among the local actors, rendering newly established institutions dysfunctional to the detriment of socio-­ economic development and ethnic reconciliation. The inability of international interventions to achieve their desired goals raises questions as to their viability, and has mobilised various epistemic communities to rethink the statebuilding strategy. Scholarly debates initially attempted to tackle the fallacies of statebuilding by trying both to identify operational and normative flaws, such as fluctuating effectiveness strategies and resources, and to offer solutions for overcoming global and context-­specific challenges. This wave of statebuilding literature mainly blamed local warlords and political actors for capturing the state and failing to comply with liberal norms and rules. Later on, as the crisis of statebuilding interventions worsened and problem-­fixing efforts failed, the debate moved on to seeking new sources of legitimacy. The limits of Eurocentric approaches to statebuilding were gradually identified as one of the conceptual problems undermining effective solutions for building successful states after violent conflict. In this context, the local turn in statebuilding studies has emerged as one of the most significant advancements in peace and conflict studies. It has been invoked widely to signify local actors, community engagement, community ownership of peace processes, and the spaces of conflict-­affected societies, as well as the alternative and post-­colonial subjects, agencies and subjectivities of bottom-­up resistance to international intervention. Roger Mac Ginty (2015: 840) considers that “the term ‘local’ has become a central feature in prescriptions on how to make and build peace”. Similarly, Thania Paffenholz (2015: 868) claims that the local turn in statebuilding studies “advocates a major shift in focus from international peace builders to local people as the most important drivers of peace”. Among problem-­solving and policy-­oriented scholars, the local turn has become instrumental for enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of interventions. The mainstreaming of the local turn in statebuilding can be traced back to the growing realisation of policy makers and peace scholars of the limits of institution-­centric forms of peacebuilding and the promise of bottom-­up, people-­ centred approaches to conflict resolution. The growing role of international NGOs in post-­conflict societies, and the mainstreaming of human security, have also been important in actualising the crucial part played by local actors and recipient communities in peace processes and socio-­economic development. Paffenholz (2014: 19) finds that “there is now a general acceptance among international actors of the key role of local actors in peacebuilding”. Since then, the local turn has attracted extensive attention in peace and conflict studies. Among scholars, early attempts to promote the local is evident in

Introduction   5 the work of John Paul Lederach, who advocated the inclusion in peacebuilding processes of not only elites, but also communities affected by the conflict. As the problematic of statebuilding for critical scholars has been the ineffectiveness of hegemonic, top-­town interventionism, as an alternative they have suggested a contextualised, hybridised peace that would be more “locally sustainable, resilient, and legitimate” than existing praxis (Richmond 2009: 572). The local represents an alternative epistemological site for seeking justice and emancipation, and recognition of local agency, needs, culture and rights. Oliver P. Richmond (2011: 3–10) argues that as a result of focusing on peace at the international, regional and state levels, liberal peacebuilding has failed to engage with the local context, or to explore everyday forms of peace, care, empathy or emancipation. For Mac  Ginty and Richmond (2013: 764), unpacking the local conditions shaping post-­conflict societies helps us understand critical and resistant agencies, unexplored views of peace and cohesion, the contradictions and tensions of social norms, and structural blockages and the drivers of violence. Critical scholars argue that emancipatory peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts should have a detailed understanding of local cultures, traditions and needs. Richmond (2011: 112) suggests that “local decision making processes should determine the basic political, economic, and social processes and norms to be institutionalized in context”. The local turn has been a by-­product of debates on hybrid forms of peace and political orders, which have proved a useful analytical device for revealing the weaknesses of externally imposed, top-­down interventions in the area of statebuilding, reconciliation, peacemaking and development, and which highlight the power of local resistance and indigenous forms of governance, justice and welfare. Richmond (2011) coined the concept of “local-­ liberal hybridity” to describe the interaction between “the local” and “the international”, where the two co-­exist rather than assimilating or dominating, and where the locals resist, modify or adapt to the liberal peace. For Richmond (2011: 151), hybridity represents “a transmutation of both the liberal and the local discourses of peace, even in view of their relatively unequal material relations and of course, their differences and similarities”. Through the lens of hybridity, they seek to weaken the hierarchical order of Western political agencies, cultures and modes of knowledge and they seek to show how in practice they and local, transitional and non-­Western knowledge and practices are mutually constitutive and interact with one another. Since its inception, however, the local has become an essentially contested concept. Different waves of statebuilding critique have concluded that the local has become a metaphor for a recipient of foreign intervention and development assistance, and is also associated with static, indigenous, non-­Western and illiberal perspectives on identity. The discourse on local statebuilding has been co-­ opted by the predatory practices of international statebuilders. Roger Mac Ginty (2015: 840) argues that “local legitimacy, partnership and ownership of international peace interventions are seen as a fast track to success, sustainability and exit”. While the discourse of local ownership is evident in the UN’s landmark reports, it has been appropriated by state-­centric paradigms and is now invoked

6   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka under the principle of “national ownership”, which seeks to blend the eroded norm of state sovereignty with the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect. For instance, UN Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016) on the new agenda for sustaining peace “reaffirms the importance of national ownership and leadership in peacebuilding, whereby the responsibility for sustaining peace is broadly shared by the Government and all other national stakeholders …”. The UN’s new agenda for sustaining peace stipulates that: “the United Nations system’s efforts must continue to be oriented around three key principles reinforcing national ownership; developing country-­contextual responses; and ensuring the effective delivery of development results on the ground” (UN Secretary-­ General 2018: 10). For many critics, however, the discourse of local or national ownership is seen to disguise the asymmetric power of international organisations and maintain local legitimacy. Under the disguise of local ownership, the international missions have consulted only certain political institutions and actors at the expense of the wider population, which is bypassed. Local legitimacy is seen as a legitimation of statebuilding by representatives of the people, and the distance between the external interveners and local subjects is thus maintained. These epistemological anomalies have prompted growing calls from scholars to decolonise knowledge, to move from Eurocentric and Western dominance to more pluralist and particularistic modes of knowledge (Musliu 2014; Rutazibwa 2013; Smith 2012). The realisation is gradually growing that anthropological and sociological perspectives, and especially the interactions between insider and outsider agents, need to be incorporated into the study of post-­conflict societies (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale 2014). Critical scholars argue that in order to engage with local agents, their context and the everyday manifestation of statebuilding, there needs to be a methodological shift whereby local field research becomes the primary source of inferences and ethnographic and anthropological methods are adopted. Richmond argues that “[c]alls to engage with the local or local-­local, in the context of a hybrid outcome of the mediated encounter between the international and the local, imply a decolonisation of knowledge and a disaggregation of power” (Chandler and Richmond 2015: 10). Visoka (2017b) goes further, arguing that the sources outsider scholars use for producing knowledge about peace need to be redefined. He calls for peace scholars to draw on embedded knowledge, everyday sense-­making, and to read local academic work. Moreover, Roger Mac  Ginty (2015: 841) suggests departing from the view of the local as “static, rural, traditional, incapable and waiting to be civilised, developed, monetised and shown how it can be ‘properly’ governed”, and seeing it instead as “de-­territorialised, networked and constituted by people and activity rather than place”. Mac Ginty (2015: 848–859) defines this post-­territorial view of critical scholars as “critical localism”, and suggests looking at “the social, political and economic worlds in terms of networks, relationships and activities”. Similarly, Stefanie Kappler (2015: 875) argues that “the positionality of local identity is contingent on the ever-­changing social context and political economy of peacebuilding”. Thania Paffenholz (2015: 861) points out that current views

Introduction   7 of the local tend to see it in opposition to the notion of liberal peacebuilding and to associate it with resistant agencies – overlooking the fact that the local can be either liberal or illiberal, as such ideological divides are prevalent in all human societies regardless of their geographical location. Paffenholz (2015: 868) maintains that “a future research agenda should, therefore, move away from the binary understanding of the research subject and generate sound empirical evidence”, where “closer cooperation between critical peacebuilding scholars and area studies researchers working on similar subjects could enrich the debate, as could more exchange with other strands of peace research”. In the search for new epistemological avenues, Mac Ginty’s (2015) conception of the local as networked and relational, and Paffenholz’s (2015) call to unpack the local further, correspond well to what Ulrike Freitag and Achim von Oppen (2010) refer to as “translocality”, which describes the translocal practices, identities, spaces and positionalities of different agents, and also allows space for critically examining and overcoming the static binaries of local/international, liberal/indigenous, north/south and colonial/postcolonial. Freitag and von Oppen (2010: 20) argue that translocality provides “a useful conceptual perspective for multi-­range analysis which [makes it possible] to bridge the gap between approaches in both anthropology and history that focus on either the ‘local’ or the ‘global’ or on an assumed polarity between the two”. In the context of statebuilding studies, translocality makes it possible to use place-­based epistemologies as a starting point, but also to see locality as socially and culturally produced, by mobility and transgression – which in turn opens up space for seeing ideological, political and epistemological change being effected by both insider and outsider forces simultaneously. Translocality reveals the pragmatic nature of belonging, as well as the precarity of epistemic identities and belonging, in the transactional tapestry of knowledge production. It is a by-­product not only of mobility, connectivity and relationality, but also of frictions between insider and outsider agents and their statebuilding agendas, expressed in the form of compliance, adaptation, co-­optation, resistance, and rejection. As Annika Björkdahl et al. (2016: 4) maintain, the global and the local are mutually constituted through frictional encounters that cannot be predicted in advance. Statebuilding actors tend to “delocalise or (re-)localise their identities and are therefore in constant movement” (Kappler 2015: 876). This fluid identity of local actors and scholars, which simultaneously complements and is frictional to outsider perspectives and to shifts from de-­localisation to re-­localisation, is at the very heart of translocality. While we subscribe to the critique of the local turn in statebuilding studies, we contend that the conception of agency based on place – especially the location of knowledge producers and their institutional and socio-­economic status – still continues to play a crucial role in shaping the positionality, identity and knowability of agents (Visoka 2018). A strand of emerging critical scholars tends to problematise and theorise the local to the point of erasing any normative commitment to statebuilding and peacebuilding on the ground. They conduct field research and engage with local knowledge not for the purpose of improving

8   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka the condition of subjects affected by violent conflict, or understanding their socio-­cultural needs and positionality, but to legitimate their epistemic selves and de-­legitimate the work of other scholars (see Randazzo 2017; BarguésPedreny 2018). As with the mantra that labels local actors as incapable of governing their own political and social affairs, in academia we have seen the trend of perceiving local scholars as incapable of generating knowledge. This in turn has justified Western scholars, with their “eloquence” and their linguistic and intellectual ability, in taking the liberty of speaking on behalf of the local. Critical approaches to statebuilding claim to promote more ethical methodologies and express sensitivities towards local culture, needs and context during field research. There is also a switch to anthropological and ethnographical methods which tend to present more genuine pathways for transmitting local knowledge to scholarly debates. The main proponents of the local turn in statebuilding studies, however, are still scholars from the global North, while a handful of global South scholars are marginally included in mainstream debates. In post-­ conflict contexts there is far less local than foreign scholarship, and it is of lower quality. Despite ethical empathy with and methodological consideration of the local, critical approaches still remain embedded in representational hermeneutics. In other words, critical scholars approach the local through preconceived conceptual lenses, as well as comparative transferable, distilled knowledge, which influence how they see and reproduce it. Existing perspectives that have excluded local scholars and their voices have committed an epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice has come to signify “how epistemic practices and institutions may be deployed and structured in ways that are simultaneously infelicitous toward certain epistemic values (such as truth, aptness, and understanding) and unjust with regard to particular knowers” (Pohlhaus 2017: 13). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) refers to the epistemic violence of those formulating knowledge who tend to preclude subaltern voices. Admittedly, an exception to this trend is the commitment of Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond to give a stronger voice to local scholars (see Mac  Ginty and Peterson 2015; Richmond and Pogodda 2016; Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović 2016). Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015: 183) admit that: Perhaps the single greatest failing, and one that the secondary critique does not dwell on, is that much of the debate on the liberal peace has been restricted to academics, policymakers and students within the global North. While many scholars and practitioners from the global South share the perspective of the critique, their voices have only rarely made it into the mainstream academic debate. This discussion indicates that, in order to address these limitations, the local turn in statebuilding studies needs to (re)turn to local scholars who come from conflict-­affected societies and have themselves experienced the transition from war to peace. It is crucial to give local scholars space to voice their critiques of

Introduction   9 international interventions on their own terms, and to see what they say about it. The remainder of this chapter and the rest of the book are dedicated solely to giving a voice to local scholars and researchers and to letting them offer their own narratives on international statebuilding in Kosovo.

Local critiques of statebuilding in Kosovo Kosovo has been one of the landmark case studies of ethnic conflict, international intervention and post-­conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding. The character of Kosovo’s conflict, the presence of multiple experimental international missions and the country’s convenient geo-­political location have been some of the major factors attracting Western researchers. Kosovo has been a fertile breeding ground both for policy-­oriented theories and for generating critical perspectives on intervention and statebuilding. However, local scholars are systematically under-­represented in international debates about Kosovo and the region, never mind being given a say in broader empirical and theoretical debates. There are some exceptions, but they are still disproportionately few compared with international researchers (see among others: Knežević et al. 2013; Çeku 2015; Mehmeti and Radeljić 2016; Pula 2018; Elbasani 2018). In most edited volumes or handbooks, the case studies of post-­conflict societies are written by scholars who are Western, be they associated with the liberal peacebuilding debates or described as critical scholars. This is particularly true for Kosovo (see Knudsen and Laustsen 2006; Hehir 2010; Chandler and Sisk 2013). This book brings together a number of Kosovar scholars to offer local perspectives on a broad range of topics concerning international interventions and their impact on local societies, including: the politics of hospitality; democracy promotion and power sharing; the politics and limits of local resistance; local narratives of international intervention; the role of regional actors; the politics of memory; knowledge and gender; local ownership and security sector reform; as well as minority protection and subalternity in the context of post-­conflict societies.1 The discussion in this book is intended not only to make a contribution to area studies but also to open up possibilities for broadening non-­Western IR perspectives with views from post-­conflict societies. The chapters seek to represent local scholarly perspectives, and they also document some of the local actions and reactions to international interventions, thus making both a conceptual and an empirical contribution as well as highlighting the intermingling duality between discourse and practice, and knowledge and performance. Local critiques in this book focus both on macro dynamics, evident in glimpses of an epistemological critique of statebuilding processes, and micro dynamics, evident in a nuanced examination of particular sectors, policies and actors. At its core, the book seeks to problematise international statebuilding in Kosovo, and also to offer a local critique of the knowledge production that informs academic and policy literature alike. Liberal interventionism, as a policy practice as well as a scholarly paradigm, has triggered extensive problem-­solving and critical research. Critical perspectives

10   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka on statebuilding, in particular, tend to perceive local responses to international intervention through rather uncritical lenses. Local resistance and agency are seen as an ideological and praxiological antidote to interventionism – necessary to reveal the weaknesses and flaws of liberal interventionism in theory and practice – without much scrutiny. In Chapter 2, Gëzim Visoka problematises this nexus in the case of local resistance to international interventions in Kosovo. He argues that protracted international interventions in post-­conflict societies have encountered strong local resistance, which has often derailed both local and international efforts to build a sustainable peace. Examining the dynamics of local resistance, the fluid repertoire of contentious politics and their impact on peacebuilding in Kosovo, Visoka argues that although local resistance has the potential to counter-­balance and challenge the power of liberal interventionism and to reduce the popularity of ethno-­nationalist structures, it can also trigger peace-­breaking and counter-­emancipatory dynamics, thereby unintentionally prolonging the ungovernability of peace. Drawing on original documentary analysis, this chapter demonstrates that local perspectives are not only critical of external actors but are also capable of unravelling the local politics and dynamics that shape the prospects for sustainable peace. The local level of criticality, as demonstrated in this chapter, tends to account for many peculiarities that are often omitted by Western-­centric critiques of statebuilding. In particular, the local critique of resistance to statebuilding adds another layer of empirical authenticity and specific attention to socio-­political dynamics that resist capture even by Western self-­proclaimed area studies experts. The European Union (EU) has played a significant role in the liberal interventionist project in Kosovo, which is the largest recipient of EU funds per capita in the world (Koeth 2010). EU–Kosovo relations extend to European integration, post-­war reconciliation and statebuilding support. In Kosovo, the EU has deployed its biggest Common Security and Defence Policy mission to date, and it plays a leading role in the negotiations on normalising relations between ­Belgrade and Pristina. For a number of scholars, such an intense, multi-­layered relationship makes Kosovo seem like a protectorate of the EU (Judah 2008), and/or a place where the EU is building a future member state (Keil and Arkan 2014). Drawing on EU–Kosovo relations, Vjosa Musliu in Chapter 3 problematises the limits of the concept of hospitality and shows how a different form of hospitality, articulated from a performative perspective, is possible. While the EU’s hospitality is highly conditional and, ultimately, with its policy on visas, moves towards overt hostility (towards Kosovars), Kosovo’s hospitality towards the EU is close or identical to Derrida’s concept of unconditional hospitality. The chapter makes two central arguments: first, what makes hospitality possible is not the existence of a home, or the lack thereof: rather, it is the performance of home and hospitality through the relationships between guests and hosts. Second, EU–Kosovo relations are characterised by the intermittent cohabitation of all forms of Derrida’s hospitality (conditional hospitality, unconditional hospitality and hostility), while at the same time they transcend these forms. Musliu engages in imagining a new form of IR in hospitality and intervention – one that

Introduction   11 is essentially detached from Westphalian sovereignty. To do this she takes the case of Kosovo and the EU as two structures that float between sovereign and post-­sovereignty. On the one hand, the idea of the EU as a supranational structure has been turned into a reality by sovereign states giving up their sovereign powers to Brussels. On the other hand, Kosovo functions as a liminal category between a contested sovereign state and a sovereign state. Whereas the fluidity of the EU as a home is the result of agreement, Kosovo’s fluidity, by contrast, is the result of compulsion. The European Union has been one of the key international actors supporting statebuilding efforts in Kosovo. Owing to Kosovo’s geographical proximity, and their socio-­political attachment to the region, the EU and its member states have regarded the strengthening of state institutions there as key to their own stability and prosperity. The EU’s intervention and presence in Kosovo cannot be understood without its enlargement policy. As this is the EU’s ultimate aim, its financial aid, its rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and its mediation of the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina cannot be decoupled from its strategy of “stabilising the Western Balkans” through enlargement. Scholars have gone to great lengths to explain EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, describing its transformative power (Börzel 2011), normative power (Noutcheva 2009), democracy building (Elbasani 2008) and statebuilding (Greiçevci 2011). Even in critical works, neither the fundamental power aspects of EU enlargement, nor the relations built thereon between the EU and Kosovo, are questioned. Nor do these accounts offer a critique situated in local knowledge. In Chapter 4, Krenar Gashi walks us through the power embedded in the EU enlargement process. He draws on the work of Jacques Baudrillard to argue the hyperreality of EU enlargement where EU conditionality for Kosovo loses its reference to any concrete enlargement benefit and as such can be declared “dead”. What this actually means is that, in the absence of any real prospect of EU membership for Kosovo, the EU’s discourse is filled with repeated assertions of “a European future for Kosovo”. In this way the EU has constructed a hyperreality for Kosovo, in which ambiguities transcend all discourses and meanings. Gashi argues that Baudrillard’s thought holds the promise of a challenge to the rationalist-­constructivist debate in EU studies. In essence, Gashi’s chapter reveals the liquid, hallowed forms of EU interventionism in Kosovo, the interplay between the political and the technical in complex issues such as sovereignty, security and democracy, and the overlooked impact of unintended consequences that can undermine the original objectives. Using Baudrillard’s hyperreality concept, Gashi demonstrates that local critiques of statebuilding are not entirely unfamiliar to Western thinkers. While thinkers such as Baudrillard are considered radical in the West, among local scholars such conceptual maps are seen as suitable modes of thinking for explaining the abnormal policy of interventionism. In this regard, what differentiates local critiques is the capacity to situate abstract concepts in real-­world problems and, through them, to reveal the hidden, non-­linear, fragmented techniques of Western interventionism. The EU in Kosovo has covered up its fractured power

12   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka and inefficiencies by merging together once-­separate policy issues, such as the enlargement process with stabilisation, peacemaking and statebuilding agendas. This notwithstanding, Gashi’s chapter highlights that the EU’s and other Western actors’ will to power at any cost transcends the tangible world, diluting the real with the imaginary, which is mediated through ambiguous policy discourses and diplomatic performances. After violent conflict, reforming the security sector is considered one of the main tasks of international statebuilders (Muggah 2009). Security Sector Reform (SSR), presumably at the top of the global security agenda, is intended to advance the expansion of liberal values and support the Western status quo through support interventions shaped by liberalism rather than universal norms (Mac Ginty 2008: 143; Richmond 2009: 325). In addition to being criticised for spreading liberal values, externally driven, misinformed SSR has been characterised as a classic white man’s burden mission (Bryden and Hänggi 2004: 131), colonial liberalism (Richmond 2009: 340), symbolic violence (Lemay-­Hébert 2011), and paternalistic at its core (Qehaja 2017: 44). While in most cases security sector reform is initiated by international actors and supported by material and expert services, ensuring local leadership is considered crucial to designing an effective, sustainable reform process. Having been deeply involved in SSR processes in Kosovo, Florian Qehaja in Chapter 5 bridges his policy and academic expertise to show, first, how local constituents were not included in the reform there, and second, how the overall reform seemed to be geared not towards reforming the sector but rather towards ensuring security and minimising conflict between ethnic groups. Qehaja explains that local actors were used merely symbolically in the security sector reform process, with no recognition of their crucial agency, and that this in turn has often led to different forms of political and institutional resistance. Much like in other cases, the international structures were interested in replicating a “best practice” that had worked elsewhere, while lacking the sensitivity to the local context, culture and socio-­political dynamics that is crucial for understanding the current state of the security architecture in Kosovo. Qehaja’s chapter offers critical policy provocations on the political economy and geopolitics behind the security sector reform in Kosovo. The analysis in this chapter robustly critiques the concept of local ownership by empirically unmasking the international policy fallacies behind the desire to prioritise stability over genuine local security needs. Moreover, Qehaja’s analysis, drawing from his first-­hand experiences as a participant observing the security sector reform, highlights the hegemonic effect of the concept of local ownership which seeks – through the very allegedly consultative process – to silence and subordinate local agency in shaping the country’s security architecture. Qehaja also illustrates that, when detached from their original context, politics of expertise and comparatively generated best practices tend to be pointless and have limited impact in other contexts. The toolkits and best practices brought to Kosovo deliberately disregarded local security preferences, including clear public opinion polls and locally generated knowledge. As a result of these anomalies, Kosovo continues,

Introduction   13 even today, to struggle to achieve security sovereignty and to reduce its dependence on external actors. It seems that the very logic of statebuilding and security sector reform is designed not to improve the country’s self-­reliance and independence, but to impose new forms of vulnerability and dependence. Establishing the rule of law after a conflict is a complex and difficult process, and is often a top priority for international missions. In the discourse of liberal interventionism, restoring the rule of law through the establishment and enforcement of state-­based structures such as judicial, penal and police bodies is considered essential in order to consolidate social trust and stability, promote security and justice, and establish democratic governance (see UN Security Council 2004). Building the rules of law in a post-­conflict society involves a series of institutional components such as courts, the legislature, a good educational system, a free press and strong civil society. There is also a growing realisation that statebuilding requires not only the capacity and willingness of the international bodies, but also a measure of understanding and sensitivity towards the local population and their culture. In particular, a lack of understanding of the cultural context results in the creation of institutions that are detached from the realities of the local people (Coelho 2015). In Chapter 6, Dafina Buçaj explores the efforts made in the rule of law sector in Kosovo. Buçaj, who was part of the legal drafting process herself, shows that the international involvement in drafting law in Kosovo frequently caused long delays thanks to differences of opinion between EU and US advisers, often caught squabbling over the merits of their respective systems. The chapter shows that the use of the neo-­trusteeship model has led to the creation of a justice system cobbled together from ill-­fitting puzzle pieces borrowed from the different legal systems of countries pushing their donor agendas, resulting in a disjointed pattern. Buçaj holds that Kosovo had to agree to many constitutional arrangements in return for its independence and sovereign statehood. Ironically, she argues further, it is these concessions, made in the name of statehood, that have in time proven to be the greatest obstacles to enacting Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty. In her analysis, Buçaj shows that, through law-­making interventionism in Kosovo, the international community has managed to control the entire statebuilding process without giving sufficient consideration to the much-­needed democratic legitimacy and broad popular acceptance of the norms, laws and institutions – which were installed not to respond to local needs, to but to further international interests. Buçaj shows that many norms in Kosovo’s legal system do not reflect the democratic will of its citizens, resulting in the latter’s resistance to accepting or identifying with the new legal and political order. Power sharing has brought Kosovo relative ethnic peace, but that has come at the cost of institutional paralysis and the normalisation of political disorder. The contestation of its legal and institutional order represents a major blowback to any new state, and may result in chronic forms of instability and crisis. Buçaj shows how the international community recycles legal and constitutional provisions from one separate process to another, creating legal orders that are incompatible with social and political realities. In addition, Buçaj assertively reveals how the legal

14   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka drafting process and the establishment of the institutions exposed competition between different donors to impose their own legal models, thereby creating a system of ill-­fitting puzzles that lacks uniformity, and consequently impeding the efficiency of the entire justice system in Kosovo. The legacy of this uneven external statebuilding process is a heavy cost borne by Kosovo’s citizens, who find themselves governed by a dysfunctional legal and political order, partly as a result of external intervention and partly as a result of state capture by local elites. The lack of situated knowledge in international statebuilding in Kosovo features in all the chapters of this book. Very often these missions have been criticised by critical theorists for being hegemonic (Musliu 2017; Rutazibwa 2013), for undermining the social contract, treating local actors as colonial subjects (Richmond 2009), and prioritising elites and institutions over ordinary communities (Visoka 2017b; Richmond 2009). In Chapter 7 Arlinda Rrustemi turns her gaze to life stories and popular narratives in order to understand the international intervention in Kosovo. She reflects on stories from the lives of a broad spectrum of ethnic minorities, and uncovers how local perceptions in Kosovo shifted over time from very positive – essentially welcoming the humanitarian intervention as a liberation – to negative, as a result of direct experience of the international structures during the post-­conflict reconstruction stage. The chapter makes a compelling case for engaging with everyday life, local culture and identity and with the emotional and psychological issues arising in post-­conflict situations. Ethnic relations have featured prominently in the international literature on Kosovo (see Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Judah 2008; Di Lellio 2009). One dominant argument in the Western literature is that creating institutions with core liberal values is sufficient to secure peace and stability (Paris and Sisk 2009). Pointing to the rational and self-­maximising character of individuals, advocates of liberal interventionism maintain that the liberal peace architecture is universally applicable. By the same token, the internationally designed constitutional framework, with its emphasis on ethnic power-­sharing and multi-­ ethnic democracy, is expected to produce stability and cooperation among ethnic groups in post-­conflict societies. Listening to the voices of the Serb parliamentarians in the Assembly of Kosovo, Jelena Lončar in Chapter 8 examines how this mantra is essentially sabotaged in the case of Kosovo. In her analysis, Lončar explores how Serb parliamentarians respond to incentives and constraints, and whether they manage to raise their authentic voices or merely give in to various pressures and expectations, be they from the international structures in Kosovo or from the Albanian majority. She finds that the presence of Serb parliamentarians in the Assembly was merely a symbolic illusion to sustain the perception that liberal interventionism had produced a multi-­ethnic polity in Kosovo. Exploring the perceptions and experiences of Serb MPs in Kosovo, Lončar argues that their political agency was undermined not only by the majority Albanian community but also by Serbia, their kin state, which wanted to constrain their political behaviour to fit in with its own domestic and geopolitical

Introduction   15 calculations. Lončar’s conversations with Serb parliamentarians illustrate the everyday narratives and dynamics of ethnic power-­sharing and the demise of liberal statebuilding in Kosovo. They reveal the prevalence of inter-­ethnic discrimination as well as in-­group self-­entitlement and silencing. The absence of formal peace – or inter-­societal reconciliation – between Kosovo and Serbia has profoundly undermined efforts to build multi-­ethnic power-­sharing institutions, which has in turn entrenched and reproduced ethnic antagonism. This notwithstanding, Lončar manages to capture hidden forms of agency and various modes of institutional resistance among the minority communities, debunking the myth of the compliant local and shedding light on the intra-­ethnic dynamics often overshadowed by inter-­ethnic relations in the Balkans. Knowledge production is not only what passes for and gets codified as knowledge. Rather, it is quintessentially linked with memory, with the selection and historicisation of certain events and developments. For instance, the narrative of the past in post-­Yugoslav countries in general has been built around alleged historical and cultural legacies, using explanatory frameworks that perceive violent ethnic conflict as an endemic feature of the region (Kaplan 1993). On the other hand, feminist theorists such as Sandra Harding (1987), Patricia Hill Collins (2000) and Dorothy Smith (2005) argue that certain socio-­political positions, occupied by women and by other groups who lack equal social and economic privileges, can become sites of epistemic production. From this standpoint, in Chapter 9 Nita Luci and Linda Gusia argue that post-­war imaginings and recognitions in Kosovo have systematically produced meta-­narratives and a specific, glorified segment of the past in order to give certain social groups the power to govern at the expense of other, excluded groups. They offer a ­feminist critique of the stratified hierarchies of memory-­making, and show how this re-­engineering of the suffering and sacrifice experienced during the violent conflict in Kosovo has been translated into legal and institutional practices that privilege war veterans and discriminate against the survivors of wartime sexual violence. In addition, they problematise the struggle for local sovereignty and self-­determination, which has brought in elements of memory-­making and nation-­building in an effort to legitimise an alternative social and political order in Kosovo. This chapter provides a good illustration of local feminist research in the context of statebuilding, and of the socio-­ethical and methodological approach taken to reveal the gendered practices of nation-­building institutionalised within the emerging political and legal order in Kosovo. In particular, the conceptual framework adopted by Luci and Gusia to explore the politics of memory-­making in Kosovo draws on both Western and non-­Western feminist standpoint epistemologies, giving them a unique opportunity to interpret local complexities in Kosovo. Literature on Kosovo tends to portray ethnic antagonism only between Albanians and Serbs, ignoring other non-­dominant ethnic and religious groups (Musliu 2017). Contributions from local Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian scholars is even more limited (Galjus 1999). If these groups are less visible, or downright absent, we must at least ask why. Sakibe Jashari in Chapter 10 maps out

16   Vjosa Musliu and Gëzim Visoka “­ insignificant others” in Kosovo and their positionality in the statebuilding process. Jashari’s chapter unpacks further multiple layers of the local, putting emphasis on the most subordinated and non-­dominant minority groups who are often overlooked in statebuilding research. The chapter highlights the subordinate status of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women within their own community, in Kosovar society, and in wider international forums. In her analysis, Jashari argues that Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) women have become the subaltern of all subaltern groups in Kosovo, as their agency is subordinated by the international missions, by local actors from the majority and, ultimately, by the RAE’s patriarchal community itself. Jashari shows that essentialising the conflict in Kosovo as a dispute between two dominant ethnic groups (Albanians and Serbs) has resulted in smaller ethnic groups in Kosovo being sidelined and systematically discriminated against. The politics of demographic status has been replicated in the politics of care, where attention is paid to the dominant groups while the “insignificant other” is ignored. These power dynamics notwithstanding, the chapter demonstrates that bottom-­up women’s networks have been a promising alternative for non-­dominant communities keen to fulfil some of their rights and needs. Donor-­driven approaches and the dominance of self-­ interest among these women’s groups has undermined their ability to respond to the acute needs of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in Kosovo. Accordingly, Jashari’s chapter offers extensive evidence to show that the local is not homogeneous; rather, it is deeply enmeshed in multiple layers of dominance, disempowerment and silencing. While the local is a passive subject in knowledge production in the field dominated by Western epistemologies, it remains passive – and is often even absent – in the practical implementation of international missions as they follow one-­ size-fits-­all blueprints. This has often led to autistic policies that simply did not resonate with the socio-­political conditions in Kosovo (e.g. employing economic and social models that were not supported by the economic parameters). Research shows that the quality of social rights is measured by the influence they have on reducing poverty and inequality in a society (Korpi 1983; Esping-­ Andersen 1990; Stephens 2010). Looking more closely at post-­war social policy in Kosovo, in Chapter 11 Artan Mustafa argues that the residual social policy launched there by the international missions has failed to contribute meaningfully to building a citizenship of both shared rights and shared obligations to the state and to society. On the contrary, the social and economic model imposed on Kosovo follows neoliberal economic blueprints, and has not met local welfare needs that have become pressing since the violent conflict. Rather, this neoliberal statebuilding model has deepened social injustice and inequality in Kosovo, depicting the local as responsible for self-­management while failing to create the structural conditions needed for social empowerment and emancipation. Drawing on critical descriptive statistics and extensive field research, Mustafa’s chapter offers compelling evidence of the introduction of inappropriate social welfare provisions which undermine not only the viability of the new state, but its entire social fabric.

Introduction   17

Note 1 Putting together an edited volume giving local perspectives on liberal interventionism and statebuilding was no easy task. The overarching challenge was the selection of authors. Our original intention was to include local scholars who are based in Kosovo, ensuring equal gender and ethnic representation. We have intentionally not included scholars who do not come from Kosovo originally, as extensive research by international scholars is already available. While we have managed to ensure a gender balance, however, we had great difficulty in bringing in locally based scholars, especially from all ethnic communities. A good number of local scholars objected to being part of this project for ethno-­political reasons, through research passivity, or from a lack of institutional incentives to publish book chapters. Several other local scholars pulled out at a later stage for personal reasons, further limiting our choices. Despite these challenges, we have managed to secure a diverse range of authors who represent different local perspectives on statebuilding in Kosovo. Apart from the editors and two of the authors, all the contributors to this volume are based in higher education institutions in Kosovo. All the writers have conducted original research on Kosovo and have been involved in one way or another with international and local organisations that have worked on statebuilding there. Two of our authors, from minority communities in Kosovo, examine the political representation of Serbs in the Assembly and the subaltern condition of Roma, Egyptian and Ashkali women in Kosovo. This book does not claim to represent the only local narrative, or the only critique of statebuilding in Kosovo, but it does represent a small leap forward on the daunting journey facing locals as they strive to make their voices heard and to penetrate the predominantly Eurocentric knowledge on statebuilding.

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2 International statebuilding and local resistance in Kosovo Gëzim Visoka

Introduction Resistance to international statebuilding has recently emerged as one of the key themes in critical peace and conflict studies. The focus on local resistance not only tends to reveal the limits and inadequacies of international interventions, it also highlights various local and bottom-­up forms of agency. In post-­conflict societies, local forms of resistance have predominantly justified their actions in relation to the incompatible political agendas of local and international actors; unfair political and aid conditionality; and the undemocratic and unaccountable practices of the international presence in these societies. Christine Bell (2013: 258) argues that “[t]he more international actors attempt to ‘enforce’ peace and to implement a standard set of political and legal institutions, the more they can rub up against local resistance  …” In statebuilding literature, there are mixed accounts of the role and impact of local resistance and contentious politics on post-­conflict processes. For many, “resistance can lead to hope – that is, to an openness to the indefinite possibility that things could be different, even if one does not know exactly how” (Hoy 2004: 10). In general, scholars situated on the liberal–interventionist wing are more critical of local resistance, whereas those affiliated with critical-­emancipatory forms of peacebuilding have a more positive view of resistant agencies. Proponents of liberal peace associate local resistance with peace spoilers, warlords and local strongmen who seek to exploit transitions from war to peace in order to consolidate their own power (see Paris and Sisk 2009). Critical scholars, on the other hand, argue that local resistance can lead to an alteration of liberal peace by ignoring, subverting and preserving alternative approaches to post-­conflict transitions (see Mac Ginty 2011: 9). Yet resistance has largely been studied as part of a critical interrogation of international interventions, designed to reveal the dynamics and limits that foreign actors face in conflict-­affected societies. As SungYong Lee (2015: 1439) points out, “conventional discussions have made insufficient effort to identify the actual characteristics of the various types of local resistance”. The latter’s negative impact is often overlooked, as the critical approaches have used examples of resistance primarily to criticise liberal interventionism. How local resistance shapes statebuilding thus remains under-­researched in peace and

22   Gëzim Visoka c­ onflict studies. Evidence from the field indicates that, while in certain circumstances building peace and state institutions through resistance can lead to emancipation, in other situations it can generate uncertain forms of politics and adverse impacts (Visoka 2011, 2017). As recognised by Oliver Richmond (2010: 686), resistance in a statebuilding context could end up neither revitalising “the liberal social contract and [giving] these externally constructed states substance”, nor enabling “a more proactive encounter between the liberal peace and its others, in which the hegemonic weight of the liberal peace project is finally countermanded”. This chapter critically examines the role and impact of local resistance in Kosovo. It explores the dynamics of local resistance there, the fluid repertoire of contentious politics, and their impact on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Since the end of the conflict, in 1999, Kosovo has faced tremendous challenges in trying to build a stable peace and consolidate functioning state institutions. Protracted international missions have encountered strong local resistance, which has often derailed both international and local efforts to build a sustainable peace. To examine the impact of local resistance in Kosovo, this chapter explores the discourses, politics and practices of Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) (Movement for Self-­determination!), which has emerged as the most organised and durable critical social movement in post-­conflict Kosovo. Condemning liberal interventionism, LVV has portrayed the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a neo-­colonial entity whose role was not to emancipate Kosovar society but to suppress the democratic desire for statehood and to preserve Serbia’s continuity in Kosovo. Similarly, they criticised NATO peacekeepers for tolerating post-­conflict violence and maintaining ethnic divisions in Kosovo. LVV regarded the international missions as colonial regimes; power-­sharing as an attempt to establish a dysfunctional state; elections as a means of appointing local political pawns; decentralisation as an attempt at ethnic partition; reconciliation as abandoning past sufferings without retributive justice; the return of refugees and displaced persons as tactical re-­colonisation; dialogue and peacemaking as harmful to Kosovo’s fragmented sovereignty; civil society as local agents serving foreign interests; and economic reforms and privatisation as sources of corruption and neo-­liberal exploitation (see Visoka 2017). In a nutshell, they have regarded all international policies in post-­conflict Kosovo as tools for undermining democracy, self-­determination and social emancipation. After independence, LVV expanded its political activity by entering institutional politics while still maintaining some features of a critical populist social movement. Within institutions, they continued their resistance by promoting parliamentary politics to limit the role and impact of supervisory and diplomatic interventionism and to unchain public institutions from criminalised political structures part of ethno-­nationalist elites that have dominated Kosovar politics since the end of the war. The analysis in this chapter shows that although local resistance does have the potential to counter-­balance and challenge the power of liberal interventionism, and reduce the popularity of ethno-­nationalist structures, it can also trigger

Local resistance in Kosovo   23 harmful, peace-­breaking dynamics. When LVV’s discourse and performative contention are explored in detail, it becomes clear that it promoted a complex militancy in order to accumulate political and social power in the name of emancipation, resistance and self-­determination. Despite the promise of non-­violent resistance, local campaigners in Kosovo have missed many opportunities to use it for genuine, inclusive emancipation. This chapter explores how local groups have opposed and defied international missions and their statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts, and highlights the narratives and repertoire of local resistance in Kosovo. It also offers a critique of local resistance by exposing its contradictions and peace-­breaking dynamics. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to contribute to the pluralisation of critical peace and conflict studies by demonstrating the importance of speaking truth to resistance as much as speaking truth to power.

Local resistance against liberal interventionism Over the past two decades, Kosovo has been subject to extensive international intervention aimed at building a stable peace and creating a new multi-­ethnic state. Key peacebuilding activities have included engineering multi-­ethnicity as Kosovo’s collective identity, supporting local civil society, facilitating the return and reintegration of refugees, and fostering multi-­level inter-­ethnic dialogue. As regards statebuilding, the international community tried to build state institutions in Kosovo and installed a neo-­liberal economy with a political system based on power-­sharing, gradually transferring governing powers to locally elected representatives, which combined both moderate and ex-­combatant factions of Kosovo Albanians (see Visoka 2016). A crucial deficiency in international statebuilding efforts has been the lack of bottom-­up involvement in shaping the post-­conflict social contract. International statebuilding – oriented towards security, rights and institutions – has fallen short of consulting local subjects or accounting for local needs, and has ultimately failed to provide social justice or welfare, which are crucial conditions for building a sustainable peace (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Richmond 2014). Likewise, ethnocentric political elites, together with donor-­driven civil society organisations, contributed to decision-­makers’ ignorance of local needs and interests – an ignorance that ultimately resulted in a failure to build a legitimate, sustainable political order. This paved the way for the emergence of critical social movements in Kosovo, who would like to defy both international missions and new local power-­holders. One of the most challenging opponents of international peacebuilding and the statebuilding agenda in Kosovo was Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV). Albin Kurti and a handful of other followers founded this movement around the idea of determining Kosovo’s political future through collective self-­determination and in defiance of the peace imposed by the international community. Between 2004 and 2010 LVV acted as a critical social movement, organising protests against the international missions and opposing their statebuilding model. In late 2010 it expanded its activity and entered formal politics, gradually consolidating its

24   Gëzim Visoka power and becoming one of the largest political parties in Kosovo. LVV claimed to represent the majority who were silenced by multiple ruling authorities and the politics of compliance propagated by the international missions. It argued that freedom, development and progress could be achieved in Kosovo only when the country exercised its right to self-­determination. It saw notions such as peace, stability and moderation as institutionalised injustice and alienation that suppressed freedom, development and justice. LVV regarded Kosovo’s right to self-­ determination as the most important factor for peace, stability, progress and emancipation both there and in the wider region. It believed that an independent Kosovo would also emancipate Serbia from its chauvinist projects of hegemonic dominance and its land-­grabbing practices. Whereas local political elites moved away from grassroots activity and focused on institutional interactions, LVV captured the everyday, local and rural space of activism (Lemay-­Hébert 2013: 95). Rather than adopting hidden forms of resistance, LVV has used open methods to achieve their political goals. They argue that “in Kosovo power is too unjust … to resist covertly. This political system must be openly opposed” (LVV 2005d: 4). To generate local support, LVV promotes a discourse of majoritarian victimisation, exaggerating the potential danger of Serbia’s reoccupation of Kosovo and demonising UNMIK for facilitating that process. It has constantly claimed that its “actions are non-­ violent” (2005c: 1), but in practice its protests have deliberately provoked violent reactions from local and international police. Before independence, LVV opposed party politics and elections. It dismissed parliamentary democracy and called instead for participatory and direct democracy. In its view, elections were intended to replace referenda, while true change could only come through direct democracy. However, whenever it failed to change political processes through street protests, LVV turned to parliamentary politics and became a fierce advocate of strong parliamentary democracy in Kosovo. Once inside the institutions, LVV prolonged parliamentary debates, took a proactive stance in the national media, organised petitions and performative events with civil society, and occasionally reverted to its radical and violent forms of resistance. Local resistance to the international governance of post-­conflict societies shares many similarities with local resistance in colonial and post-­colonial contexts (Visoka 2011). Those who were once welcomed and regarded as liberators are soon seen as new occupiers. LVV’s resistance methods have included: popular demonstrations; citizen mobilisation and education; public performances, slogans and media communication; campaigns for “naming and shaming” political leaders; and institutional techniques and more hidden forms of resistance through everyday acts of disobedience (see Visoka 2017). From the outset, LVV has promoted a discourse of contention, enmity and delegitimation on international missions. LVV regarded the international administration of Kosovo as a colonial intervention preventing local self-­determination and exploiting both the conflict and the new ethno-­political elite for its own geostrategic and economic interests (LVV 2005c: 1). LVV’s main strategy towards UNMIK aimed to delegitimate the mission in the eyes of the local population, portraying its

Local resistance in Kosovo   25 mandate as undemocratic, paternalistic, imperfect and colonial. During one of many violent riots, LVV (2007a: 1) accused UNMIK of being not only “an undemocratic and neo-­colonial regime, but also a terrorist regime”, claiming that the “intentional killing of civilians and cultivation of widespread fear and panic are two key characteristics of terrorism”. Accordingly, LVV constantly tried to delegitimate the international missions by revealing their superior attitude towards local culture, exposing unequal income and unjust benefits, and showing how governance in Kosovo was neo-­ colonial and undemocratic (Lemay-­Hébert 2013; Roberts 2015). Kurti argued that international workers in Kosovo are not accountable to the local population, they have lucrative salaries, low costs, guaranteed jobs, and rapid promotion in their careers. The privilege, usurpation and lack of legitimacy is rationalised by overrating UNMIK’s merits and by highlighting the inabilities of the locals. (LVV 2005b: 1) LVV traces the origins of corruption in post-­conflict Kosovo back to international missions who established such practices by governing undemocratically themselves in first place (which meant they must be corrupt, LVV maintains) and then passing these self-­mirroring practices on to the local elite. By doing this, LVV wanted to ruin UNMIK’s “story of a successful international mission” (Kelmendi 2013: 380). Similarly, the movement strongly opposed the presence of NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo, arguing that “KFOR is not here to protect us … [they] are only implementing international policy on the ground” (LVV 2006e: 4). LVV regarded NATO peacekeepers as no longer rescuers of Kosovo citizens, but as a mercenary force guaranteeing the unassailability of UNMIK’s corrupted governance of the territory (2006a: 1). One of the major tasks of international missions in post-­conflict societies is to assist in economic reconstruction (see del Castillo 2008). While international assistance is welcomed when seeking to overcome a humanitarian emergency, its role may later be perceived as more harmful than is often assumed. LVV considered international missions economically harmful for Kosovo. It highlighted the material suffering of Kosovo Albanians expelled from the north as a result of the inaction of the UN mission and NATO peacekeepers, and how UNMIK harmed Kosovo’s local economy by enabling Serbian products to dominate the market. It also highlighted how the mismanagement of privatisation and governance negatively affected the economy and undermined economic reconstruction (LVV 2008e: 2). For LVV, the international missions used Kosovo as a zone of unconstrained profitability. LVV’s leader Albin Kurti argued that “UNMIK’s fiscal policies have destroyed local producers and have privileged foreign markets. Kosovo imports 20 times more goods than it exports” (LVV 2008f: 3). LVV also opposed international humanitarian aid. In general, the vision of critical social movements is not neo-­liberal statebuilding: rather, what they want is international assistance that would support the local economy, encouraging

26   Gëzim Visoka p­ roduction and self-­sufficiency, rather than external assistance that would deepen dependence on foreign markets. LVV felt that the presence of multiple governing authorities made Kosovo a weak state, which in turn discouraged foreign direct investment. It argued that Kosovo’s economy would recover only when the neo-­colonial and neo-­liberal interests of foreign governments were taken out of the equation (LVV 2008g: 2). Objecting to the marketisation and privatisation of public assets, LVV argued that “the state should intervene in the economy. Kosovo should manage its resources and not privatise them.… Fiscal policies should support and encourage local producers and not imports. The state should steer the direction of economic development” (2008h: 3). During the first decade of international governance in Kosovo, the UN and its associate organisations vested in themselves expensive executive, legislative and judicial authority. Their decisions could not be challenged by the local population, their actions were not always transparent, and they could not be removed from power by the community in whose interests they ostensibly exercised authority (Skendaj 2014; Visoka 2017). In this context, LVV condemned international missions in Kosovo for denying local subjects the right to self-­ determination. It considered elections to be not a mechanism of political deliberation but a constraint on the will of the people. It argued that UNMIK wanted electoral campaigns in order to control the process and shape the outcomes. For LVV, local institutions were the representatives of international missions, whose role was to manage local expectations and who regarded statebuilding not as a pathway to independent statehood, but as an expansion of indirect, fluid international rule over Kosovo. The formation and consolidation of local institutions, according to LVV, served the purpose of convincing the local population that they were not yet ready or good enough to govern their own country independently. LVV viewed the emergence of ethno-­nationalist elites in Kosovo as a product of the international missions’ tolerance of a marginal group of local power-­grabbers who behaved like post-­colonial rulers. It claimed (2005a: 1) that local ownership in Kosovo encouraged corruption, which was exploited by foreign missions as a political weapon with which to sabotage local elites. Here it argued that “international administration and the diplomatic services dominate us not because they that are strong, great, and all-­knowing. They rule because local politicians are subordinate to them and behave with servility” (LVV 2005a: 3). LVV also accused the international missions of using the Kosovo police to crush local resistance, creating the impression that it was not they but local institutions that opposed resistance. LVV considered that local law enforcement agencies were perpetrating violence on behalf of the international missions in an attempt to preserve the latter’s liberal image in Kosovo and abroad. The question of statehood was the elephant in the room while Kosovo was under international administration (Weller 2009). The UN itself admitted that, compared to all other post-­conflict societies, “Kosovo has the added burden of its unresolved political status” (UN Security Council 2003: 5). For several years, this issue was avoided because of the objections of Serbia, Russia, China and

Local resistance in Kosovo   27 other like-­minded members of the Security Council. Kosovo’s uncertain sovereignty had direct repercussions on effective international statebuilding there. LVV believed that a just political settlement could never be achieved through international mediation: only a popular referendum would provide a lasting resolution of the issue of Kosovo’s statehood. When the UN initiated negotiations for defining Kosovo’s future political status, LVV fiercely opposed them. Fearing that the process would enable Serbia to interfere in Kosovo’s internal affairs, it argued that the two should not negotiate because Kosovo was not yet a sovereign state and would thus not be equal at the negotiating table. Instead, it demanded that Kosovo should negotiate only with the local Serbs within Kosovo. In this regard, it asked if the international community was concerned with the protection of the Serb community within Kosovo, and if so, why they were negotiating not with local Serbs, but rather with Belgrade. Moreover, LVV argued that Kosovo was controlled by UNMIK in an antidemocratic regime, and was thus under internal constraints that rendered it unable to negotiate freely with Serbia. Here, it objected to UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) as a basis for future negotiations, because it recognised Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Finally, LVV objected to the negotiations because the local institutions that represented Kosovo there were run by sabotaged politicians who would accept any solution in order to protect their own power and profit. As the negotiations drew to a close and the prospects for supervised independence became clearer, LVV argued that Kosovo was not gaining substantial independence. They proposed that, rather than declaring independence in coordination with foreign partners, Kosovo should declare its independence in coordination with the people of Kosovo through a referendum (LVV 2008b: 1). LVV regarded Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 as a declaration of dependence, because “this declaration will not create a Kosovo with complete independence, sovereignty and democracy. It is only an affirmation of our continuous dependence: lack of sovereignty, territorial integrity and democracy” (LVV 2008c: 1). LVV was also against considering this a sui generis case, claiming that Kosovo’s right to external self-­determination was based on the universal right to liberation, decolonisation and self-­determination. It argued that if Kosovo were treated as a unique case, experimental forms of intervention would be permissible. It declared (2013: 1): in order to accomplish the independent statehood of Kosova, it is necessary for various international and supranational organisations to end their rule of Kosova and for Kosova to become part of these organisations on an equal basis with other states. Kurti argued that “we need a seat in the UN, not UNMIK in Kosovo. We need a referendum to join the EU, not the deployment of EULEX without a referendum” (LVV 2008f: 3). LVV opposed the EU’s presence after independence claiming that it was deployed without the consent of the people of Kosovo, was undemocratic and unaccountable to Kosovo institutions, and represented a

28   Gëzim Visoka c­ ontinuation of UNSC Resolution 1244. LVV argued that EULEX was following in UNMIK’s tradition of remaining unaccountable to Kosovo society. LVV also objected to the continuation of NATO’s peacekeeping mandate under the auspices of UNSC Resolution 1244: instead, they wanted NATO to sign a Status of Forces Agreement and to recognise Kosovo as a sovereign state (LVV 2008a: 3). Similarly, LVV strongly opposed the reconfiguration of UNMIK after independence, regarding it as a strategic readjustment designed primarily to boost Serbia’s intention to divide Kosovo along ethnic lines. Despite extensive international investment in Kosovo, clashes between statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts on the one hand, and local state formation and contestation dynamics on the other, produced a wretched peace which became incapable of surviving without continuous external intervention. In 2011 the EU initiated a complex process of technical and political dialogue in an attempt to resolve sensitive outstanding political issues regarding the status of the Serb minority in the north of Kosovo, end Serbia’s interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs, and unblock the region’s prospects for EU integration (see Visoka 2017). Opposition parties and wider critical movements in Kosovo mobilised and have often openly resisted the implementation of technical and political agreements. LVV has been very active both within and outside Kosovo’s parliament in opposing the EU-­facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. It initially opposed this peace process through peaceful means, arguing that “through these negotiations Kosova is being turned formally into an abnormal broken-­up state, on the verge of becoming a failed state …” (LVV 2015: 11). It proposed making peace with Serbia only after the latter had recognised Kosovo’s independence, apologised for all the crimes committed during the conflict, accorded justice to war victims, made reparation for economic destruction, and withdrawn its parallel structures from Kosovo (LVV 2015: 10). Within Kosovo’s institutions, LVV has constantly tried to obstruct the dialogue with Serbia by seeking a parliamentary review of the agreements made. It considered the dialogue and the subsequent agreements a severe setback to Kosovo’s independence, fearing that they would lead to the legalisation of parallel Serb structures in Kosovo and the sanctioning of Serbia’s direct interference in Kosovo’s politics. The transition from street politics to institutions reveals how LVV exploited Kosovo’s domestic political and economic instability, the presence of international missions and the persistence of hostile ethnic relations in the region – all with the aim of consolidating its political power and eventually taking control of the government. The more LVV utilised the methods of mainstream parties in Kosovo to generate legitimacy, the more distant its emancipatory potential became. The more it normalised and institutionalised its techniques of resistance, the more its uncompromising principles began to be compromised. Behind the desire for emancipation, there was hunger for power. Under these circumstances, local resistance lost its impetus to counter fluid interventionism, strengthen ethical governance and promote a bottom-­up peace agenda. Instead, only a thin line now separated their politics of emancipation from exclusionary discourse and peace-­harming practices.

Local resistance in Kosovo   29

Local opposition to international statebuilding Because of conflicting political agendas and profound disagreements about Kosovo’s sovereignty between international and local actors, international statebuilding has failed to establish a stable, sustainable political and democratic order in Kosovo (Visoka 2017). International missions and the local institutions controlled by ethno-­nationalist groups have been unable to secure local legitimacy or to deliver on their promises. This has not only led to the creation of fragile state institutions, prone to political interference and unable to respond to local needs for equality, justice and socio-­economic development, but has also triggered different forms of local resistance which have challenged the entire statebuilding process in the country. In this context, LVV’s opposition to the statebuilding and peacebuilding process in Kosovo highlights the scope of local resistance to liberal interventionism. First, the movement regarded statebuilding and peacebuilding as tools for disciplining local actors and imposing external standards without recognising the democratic rights of the local population or their desire for freedom and self-­determination. Albin Kurti argued that the discourse of “post-­conflict” societies wipes out the local experience of managing political affairs autonomously, allowing international rule through statebuilding and peacebuilding (LVV 2007b: 4). LVV criticised the discourse of democratisation, arguing that international missions themselves impede democracy in Kosovo by denying the right to collective self-­determination. One LVV activist argued that “Kosovo doesn’t need to be taught how to be democratic. The country needs to be democratic. This entails no more international supervision. It entails freedom, sovereignty …” (LVV 2007c: 3). LVV viewed international statebuilding in Kosovo as an effort to establish a local political order that was compliant with international conditionality and did not have sufficient agency to undertake independent action in the interests of local subjects (2005a: 1). LVV also opposed security sector reform, regarding it as a strategic effort by external forces to make Kosovo dependent on the international military presence. It viewed the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the acceptance of UNMIK’s authority as a premature defeat for Kosovo. LVV also opposed and questioned the role of local civil society, and saw donor support for civil society as a form of control and a mechanism for preventing radical politics. For LVV, civil society was harmful to the project of self-­determination, whose role was to legitimate foreign rule over Kosovo. LVV also opposed transitional justice for war crimes, regarding it as an attempt to equate the crimes of the Serbian regime to the defensive resistance of Albanians in Kosovo. For LVV, the main problem with the statebuilding process was its being instrumentalised to appease the Serb community at the expense of self-­determination for the overwhelming Albanian majority. It saw talk of a power-­sharing democracy as a narrative designed to enable a minority to rule over the majority. It opposed the social engineering of multi-­ethnicity in Kosovo, the decentralisation of powers and the formation of new Serb-­dominated municipalities, as well as the collective return of displaced Serbs. In Kosovo, decentralisation emerged as a policy after

30   Gëzim Visoka UNMIK had failed to persuade local Serbs or Belgrade to participate in Kosovo’s power-­sharing institutions. LVV regarded decentralisation as a step that might lead to partition, which would in turn lead to the recurrence of war (Visoka 2011; 2017). According to LVV, decentralisation was about expanding Serbia’s territorial autonomy and allowing it to control important geostrategic locations (LVV 2006e: 3). Decentralisation, it believed, was not a process for bringing the government closer to its citizens, but a deliberate plan to entrench ethnic boundaries and create a divided society. LVV also opposed externally imposed policies on multi-­ ethnicity, minority integration and minority rights in Kosovo, again considering that such normative frameworks represented covert attempts to divide the country (2006b: 2). Between 2001 and 2005, the UN insisted, as a precondition to opening the talks on Kosovo’s future status, that the territory should become a functioning, multi-­ethnic state as a precondition to opening talks on the territory’s future status. The official rationale for promoting multi-­ethnic institutions was to achieve peaceful coexistence between all ethnic groups in Kosovo. UNMIK tried to engineer a multi-­ethnic character for all institutions by creating a regulatory framework that would grant minorities reserved posts in public institutions. The UN later admitted, however, that “to a large extent, it was bluff … that UNMIK, Penelope-­like, had an interest in endlessly spinning out the standards process” (Guehenno 2015: 241). In LVV’s view, standards for Kosovo were racist criteria which were being imposed on an oppressed people and not on Serbia, which had a greater need to change its criminal policy towards Kosovo. LVV argued that the discourse of inter-­ethnic tolerance suppressed true problems, such as the persistence of inequality and the absence of freedom. It constantly opposed the classification of human rights with minority rights, promoting instead the universality of rights. In addition, it argued that, by viewing political affairs from the perspective of ethnicity, international missions had depoliticised the citizenry in Kosovo and, thereby, had paved the way for collective obedience. LVV argued that by offering local Serbs the choice of aligning politically and economically with Belgrade, UNMIK has impeded their integration into Kosovo (LVV 2008d: 1). Moreover, critical social movements in Kosovo have feared that the discourse of tolerance, moderation and obedience could lead to forgiveness for war crimes, an acceptance of internal ethnic partition, and the silencing of local critical agency. LVV, for its part, has argued that the integration of minorities will not succeed if ethnicity is seen as the basis for social interaction. It maintains that integration should have been promoted by emphasising common ground, such as the need for socio-­economic development. Ethnic integration, it says, takes place only when there is socio-­economic development, which explains why, by ignoring the politics of well-­being in Kosovo, fluid interventionism failed to integrate communities there. The very act of imposing ethnicity as a social category created division and revived the inherent ethnic conflict. Kurti argued that international statebuilders in Kosovo did not care about minority rights: what they cared about was the problem of sovereignty, which was why they ignored the integration of communities and insisted on negotiating with Serbia.

Local resistance in Kosovo   31 One of the major legacies of the Kosovo conflict was the displacement of minorities who feared revenge once the fighting had ended (see Visoka 2016). The community most affected were the Serbs, some 200,000 of whom had fled their homes for other mono-­ethnic enclaves or for neighbouring Serbia. After the war, Serbia consistently advocated the return of refugees, seeing this as a way to reinstate its demographic and political influence over Kosovo, and actively discouraged Kosovo Serbs from participating in Kosovo’s institutions, as this might legitimise a future independent Kosovo. Fears of a return to Serbian rule consequently triggered a new wave of nationalism and overall impatience among Kosovo Albanian leaders. Most vocal was LVV, who opposed the collective return of Kosovo Serbs – a policy it saw as part of Serbia’s plan to “divide” and “swallow” Kosovo (2006d: 1). It argued that, instead of identifying the people who had disappeared during the conflict and returning them from Serbia, UNMIK had brought Serb war criminals back to the scene of their crimes and attempted to reintegrate them into Kosovo, without bringing justice to the victims (LVV 2006b: 3). LVV felt this as provocation and a move that undermined social healing in Kosovo. It described the “sustainable return” policy as “re-­colonialism” (2006d: 1) aimed at a demographic manipulation that would enable Serbia to implement its plan to partition Kosovo internally (LVV 2006d: 1). In addition, LVV has regarded the treatment of Orthodox monuments (as belonging not only to Serbs but to all Kosovo citizens) as evidence of historical peaceful co-­existence and common usage of religious sites throughout Kosovo’s history. Linking cultural and religious heritage with a single ethnic group is cited as an attempt to re-­colonise Kosovo and an expression of Serbia’s demand for territorial control. In this regard, it has argued that Kosovo Serbs should not be encouraged to integrate into Kosovo until Serbia ends its interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs (LVV 2008i: 4). Using a nationalist discourse, LVV has tried to defy the international community’s quest for a collective forgetting of the past in Kosovo labelling it a typical instrument of peacebuilding. The price for opposing international peacebuilding in Kosovo, however, was that LVV was excluded from important political decision-­making processes, which weakened its popular support and political sustainability. Under these conditions, the movement was obliged to expand its methods of resistance and consider entering formal politics.

Speaking truth to local resistance In statebuilding literature, local resistance is predominantly seen as a welcome development, challenging the unaccountable and undemocratic nature of international peace interventions (Lee 2015). Existing scholarship has, however, overlooked the limits and impact of local resistance and critical agency in shaping peace after violent conflict. As David Couzens Hoy (2004: 6) puts it: “critique without resistance is empty and resistance without critique is blind.” The work of critical social movements, such as LVV, requires proper scrutiny to

32   Gëzim Visoka examine how they impact on the prospects for building a sustainable peace and advancing the emancipatory politics on which they have justified their resistance in first place. While LVV propagated equality, justice and development in the abstract, it rejected progressivist processes such as dialogue, compromise and diversity. Resistance can hardly mean emancipation if it does not recognise the rights of the powerless or the obligation for protecting powerless minorities. In the case of Kosovo, LVV’s rhetorical historicism and exclusionary practices have hindered it from making any meaningful contribution to the emancipation of political culture or helping improve the welfare of Kosovo’s citizens. Instead, it has promoted a policy of excluding minorities from public life. LVV has never empathised with other non-­dominant minorities. LVV has profoundly undermined the prospects for ethnic reconciliation and, in one instance has obstructed the statebuilding process in Kosovo. At the heart of its ideology is the notion of emancipation through self-­determination. Although LVV’s emancipatory priorities reflected the situation on the ground, which required immediate change, a closer examination of their actual programme reveals a set of exclusionary practices which can have unintended, unanticipated and undesirable consequences (Visoka 2011). Some of LVV’s practices that were clearly exclusionary towards minorities include ridiculing land set aside for Serbian monasteries; promoting a boycott of Serbian products; condemning Serbian municipal autonomy; using emotive anti-­Serb messaging and war images; and advocating the abolition of reserved parliamentary seats for minorities (Visoka 2011, 2017). By invoking a discourse of abolishing ethnic identity and creating a new, common, civic identity, LVV implicitly tried to deny the rights of minorities. It argued (LVV 2010: 4) that “the interests of the citizens are not protected by encouraging community divisions, but by resolving them through the concept of civic democracy”. At the same time, they sought to make Kosovo a state of Albanians and “other” citizens. This is evident in the party manifesto, which states that LVV is “committed to the constitutional definition of Kosova as a state of Albanians and all citizens of Kosova” (LVV 2010). LVV has thus not helped overcome inter-­ethnic hostility: rather, it has reinforced ethnic divisions and sparked fear among minorities. It was against transitional justice, against international governance of the rule of law, and against making peace with Serbia – thereby promoting antagonist politics that do not lead to emancipatory social transformation. At the heart of LVV’s resistance is a praxiological negativity towards authority, power and external intervention which has undermined local subjects’ sovereign choices. In this context, LVV attacked all efforts at peacebuilding or ethnic reconciliation. In resisting ethnic decentralisation, it organised meetings with the regions that would be affected and used maps to show what the consequences were. In defying and defaming international missions, it organised performative actions at their head offices, painted messages onto their vehicles, and damaged or demolished their property and assets. They also attacked local politicians through defamation, throwing eggs and paint at them and obstructing their public events. In promoting economic nationalism, LVV propagated a boycott of Serb

Local resistance in Kosovo   33 products through posters and media advertisements, blocked border points to prevent Serbian exports from entering Kosovo, and hijacked and destroyed trucks bringing goods in from Serbia. In opposing multi-­ethnicity, they attacked NATO peacekeepers, obstructed the celebration of Serbian national and religious holidays and organised counter-­campaigns to promote Albanian nationalism. Using these resistance methods, LVV managed to undermine profoundly the popularity of fluid interventionism and to jeopardise peacebuilding in Kosovo. One of the most puzzling aspects of local resistance has been the covert legitimation of violence (see Kalyvas, et al. 2008). LVV has avoided taking responsibility for the consequences of its actions. The movement has pursued a guiltless resistance, which is normatively unattainable with the terms of emancipation, justice and progress. Outwardly, LVV has always maintained that the “best way to face the current political order and the undemocratic rule in Kosovo is with a non-­violent movement” (2006d: 3). They have argued that “we do not threaten violence or anarchy … but this does not mean that we should remain humble and subservient to the government as it violates and desecrates us, and forces us to accept an imposed and unacceptable fate” (LVV 2006c: 2). On another occasion, LVV argued that “if today we do not organise as a people and, through powerful nationwide demonstrations, prevent the division of Kosovo, then a bloody peace will turn into a bloody war” (2007b: 3). It has claimed that “if Serbia is experienced in starting violent wars, Kosovo is known for organising democratic protests” (LVV 2006d: 3). LVV’s reactionary, exclusionary resistance, however, has produced both physical and structural violence. Hence, on the one hand, LVV has admitted that it has never subscribed to “passive resistance”, because every action the movement has undertaken has inflicted some form of damage in order to send a message to UNMIK and the Kosovo government. On the other hand, LVV has emphasised its nonviolent character by stating that it has “never threatened the lives of people or attempted to injure or kill people … this is the only nonviolent means we have of preventing these institutions from leading Kosova towards certain war” (see Human Rights Advisory Panel 2015). Overall, the fluid practices of resistance in Kosovo have shifted between peaceful nonviolence and its opposite, violence (see Tilly 2003). The critique of local resistance demonstrates that the politics of crowds can be harmful to peacebuilding processes. They are often rooted in violent rituals, coordinated destruction, camouflaged opportunism, and scattered attacks (see Tilly 2003). They can allow the political infiltration of violent social groups. The loss of rational attributes permits engagement in unlawful acts, violence and harm towards others. As Laclau (2005: 32) argues, in populist protests, “the boldest and least scrupulous who march ahead … set the example in destruction”. Hence, this type of “mobilization of the masses adds to the ungovernability and political impasse of democratizing states” (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 171). While civil disobedience is widely regarded as entailing a commitment to non-­violence, there are voices that justify its triggering violent responses from authorities as a necessary condition for generating public sympathy, mobilising more supporters and potentially bringing about social change (see Sharp 1973).

34   Gëzim Visoka Symbolic and affirmative violence was embedded deep in the discourse and practices of LVV. According to the movement’s new rationale, violent resistance was justified as a protest against what it called the “ruling autocratic government that is supported by some international diplomats” because “any calm demonstrations would just turn into a carnival that the government would make fun of ” (von Laffert 2016). For LVV “[s]imply gathering people together is consequently not enough, you have to become more active than that” (von Laffert 2016). Regardless of LVV’s justifications, it is certain that its discourse and affirmative actions have further entrenched ethnic division, and that by normalising radical politics it has created the conditions for renewed intra-­ethnic and inter-­ethnic conflict in Kosovo. Whether this conflict will remain at the political and rhetorical level, or will escalate into violent confrontation, remains to be seen. Many of the actions undertaken by LVV did not constitute responsive resistance to power and government. In fact, it deliberately caused trouble in order to create antagonistic political relations with the government. As a power-­driven resistance movement, LVV has expected to receive comparable power responses from the law enforcement agencies. Whenever the Kosovo police have not resisted their resistance, LVV has lost its discursive power and its manpower. Its actions have often seemed more like acts of intervention and domination than acts of resistance and dissent. It is therefore important not to romanticise the activity of critical social movements as wholly legitimate resistance, always motivated by a desire for emancipation and liberation: LVV, for one, has – on the contrary – not provided a political alternative for emancipation and development in Kosovo. Rather, it has pursued a strategy of violent resistance against the government, on several occasions seeking to overthrow it violently. In Kosovo, LVV’s antagonistic politics have, inter alia, blocked the work of the institutions, intensified nationalist politics, and further polarised the political scene at the expense of more pressing issues such as youth employment, public services, security and ethnic reconciliation. Beyond its impact on the peace process, LVV is seen as having suffocated the public space in Kosovo by trying to dominate and monopolise social activism in the country. When other party leaders held public gatherings, LVV activists often infiltrated and interrupted these events by enacting derogatory and disruptive performances. This intolerance of other social movements is explained by the fact that LVV regarded other civil society groups as “a hegemonic attachment” to society, brought in from outside (LVV 2009: 3). Its attempt to monopolise the right to protest has discouraged many people from going out and articulating their genuine dissatisfaction with bad governance in Kosovo. Accordingly, citizens not affiliated with LVV’s ideology and political structure often boycott public spaces and try to find alternative ways of expressing their concerns. Sceptics in Kosovo have therefore seen LVV as a dangerous organisation that pursues populist politics both in order to overturn the existing government and to change the entire political and constitutional system there. A public commentator once remarked that LVV’s “everyday battles are deployed to monopolise the past, usurp the present, and forge the future” (KohaNet 2015).

Local resistance in Kosovo   35 Finally, the internal functioning of LVV has been widely criticised for being undemocratic, a criticism often levelled at all political parties in Kosovo. Despite being an alternative party on the political scene (Baliqi and Beha 2015), LVV has been criticised for rigid internal policies, for sanctioning (curtailing) freedom of expression, and for constantly expelling members on the pretext of breaking its bylaws and serving the interests of its opponents. While LVV has preached bottom-­up approaches to self-­determination, peace and development in Kosovo, within its structures it has pursued top-­down approaches to decision-­making and the appointment of party leadership (Kohavision TV 2016). It has accused other parties of capturing the state of Kosovo: internally, however, it was itself captured by a small group of leaders. Criticising LVV’s undemocratic internal governance, a former member claimed that “inside LVV there is no democracy”, and that those who think differently are excluded (Gazeta Blic 2015). In response, many founding and prominent members of LVV silently resigned, distancing themselves from violent methods of resistance, from alignment with controversial religious groups, and from LVV’s attempt to discipline pluralist thinking.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the promise and pitfalls of local resistance and it role in shaping the politics of statebuilding and peacebuilding in Kosovo. In general, local resistance is viewed as a welcome revitalisation of post-­conflict politics and as bringing about bottom-­up changes (Visoka 2011). As Roger Mac Ginty (2011: 212) rightly points out: “resistance can be sectarian and motivated by selfish interests. But, in some cases, resistance leads to a better form of peace … that is more comfortable and sustainable for the communities that must live that peace.” In particular, local resistance highlights the dysfunctionalities of liberal interventionism, and thus – by delegitimating and destabilising the problematic social order – favours alternative forms of politics as a means to reclaim subjectivity and agency. Critical social movements from the margins of society in Kosovo thus aimed to address issues effectively where mainstream political forces had failed. In this context, LVV emerged as a small critical movement of dissatisfied individuals that managed to impose itself on Kosovar society, partly thanks to its performative and persuasive power but also as a situational response to the failure of the international community – and of Kosovo’s own institutions – to adopt a more bottom-­up agenda in pursuing peace. Like no other local group in Kosovo, LVV challenged the compliance politics imposed by the international missions and the monopolisation of local politics by ethno-­nationalist elites. Critical local agency in Kosovo, using liberal and illiberal practices, have shaped peace through resistance, defiance and exclusion while at the same time trying to represent excluded social groups, tackling sensitive ethnic issues, reshaping the peace agenda, and changing the flow of events, discourses and practices. Despite this, they failed to change the international agenda for Kosovo. The most they managed to do was to delay the implementation of external impositions and gradually weaken the popularity of the mainstream parties.

36   Gëzim Visoka Although LVV might have been seen as a promising political platform for overcoming fragile governance and poverty in Kosovo, the movement’s exclusionary practices did not contribute to peacebuilding or reconciliation. It has used instrumental violence, on the pretext of resisting externally imposed and internally enabled conditions, as a way of accumulating and consolidating its political power. LVV’s conception of peace was not practiced on the grounds of on empathy, tolerance, compromise, but on majoritarian power, identity domination, and a statist/realist conception of freedom, rights, justice and peace. Local resistance that aims for mono-­ethnic emancipation, while also ignoring the distinct identity and rights of minority communities, risks segregating society further and effectively delaying any form of ethnic reconciliation and the establishment of inclusive social cohesion. The exclusionary method of local resistance, together with the use of violence and harmful practices, has undermined LVV’s ability to become a true agent of positive, transformative and inclusive peace in Kosovo. Hence, the very foundation on which its political rise was built – the cause of self-­determination – has weakened its political mission for advancing political emancipation of Kosovo society. It is important for peacebuilding studies to develop more focused accounts of cases and contexts where resistance has contributed to peacebuilding or peace-­breaking. Consequently, emancipation via resistance should not be seen as the ultimate solution to post-­ conflict problems: instead, the ethos and nexus of emancipation should remain the “immanent critique” of dominance and power relations within and between social groups. In conclusion, promoting local perspectives on statebuilding helps to debunk the romanticisation of resistance and to highlight various discursive and praxiological fallacies which are not productive for post-­conflict societies but which, on the contrary, help to prolong ethnic division and violence.

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Local resistance in Kosovo   37 Jarstad, A. K. and Sisk, T. D. (eds) (2008) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kalyvas, S. N., Shapiro, I., and Masoud, T. (eds) (2008) Order, Conflict, and Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelmendi, A. (2013) Kapërcimi i Rubikonit drejt Pavarësisë. Prishtinë: Koha. KohaNet (2015) Rrenat e neveritshme të Arbër Zaimit [In English: All the disgusting lies of Arbër Zajmi], Pristina, 9 October. Available at: http://koha.net/?id=31&o=904 (accessed 6 April 2016). Kohavision TV (2016) Rubikon – Fraksion Plus, 12 April 2016. Available at: www. youtube.com/watch?v=RfvxwHfT6ig (accessed 12 April 2016). Laclau, E. (2005) On Populist Reason, London: Verso Books. Lee, S. Y. (2015) ‘Motivations for Local Resistance in International Peacebuilding’, Third World Quarterly 36(8): 1437–1452. Lemay-Hébert, N. (2013) ‘Everyday Legitimacy and International Administration: Global Governance and Local Legitimacy in Kosovo’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7(1): 87–104. LVV (2013) The Manifesto Principles and Priorities of Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE!: 100 Points Joined Together by the Changes Necessary for Kosova. Available at: www. vetevendosje.org/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2019/01/programi_i_shkurte1494292671compressed.pdf (accessed 15 February 2019). LVV (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!) (2005a) Gazetë Mujore Vetëvendosje! No. 3, August. LVV (2005b) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 6, 20 September. LVV (2005c) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 8, 11 October. LVV (2005d) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 10, 25 October. LVV (2006a) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 24, 28 February. LVV (2006b) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 37. 30 May. LVV (2006c) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 38, 6 June. LVV (2006d) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 47, 8 August. LVV (2006e) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 54, 26 September. LVV (2007a) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 86, 14 May. LVV (2007b) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 93, 2 July. LVV (2007c) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 105, 24 September. LVV (2008a) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 121, 14 January. LVV (2008b) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 123, 28 January. LVV (2008c) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 126, 18 February. LVV (2008d) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 127, 25 February. LVV (2008e) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 136, 28 April. LVV (2008f ) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 138, 12 May. LVV (2008g) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 142, 9 June. LVV (2008h) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 148, 21 July. LVV (2008i) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 165, 17 November. LVV (2009) Gazetë Javore Vetëvendosje! No. 219, 16 November. LVV (2010a) Short Political Programme. Available at: http://vetevendosje.org/repository/ docs/Programi_i_shkurte_anglisht.pdf (accessed 22 July 2016). LVV (2015) Report on Republic of Kosovo: The Resistance Against a Semi-­Authoritarian Regime, 21 October. Available at: www.vetevendosje.org/wp-­content/uploads/2015/10/ Report-­on-Kosova_Movement-­for-SELF-­DETERMINATION.pdf (accessed 22 July 2016). Mac Ginty, R. (2011) International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

38   Gëzim Visoka Mansfield, E. D and Snyder J (2007) ‘Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War’, in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, pp. 161–176. Paris, R. and Sisk, T. (eds) (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-­War Peace Operations, London: Routledge. Richmond, O. P. (2010) ‘Resistance and the Post-­Liberal Peace’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 3(3): 665–692. Richmond, O. P. (2014) Failed Statebuilding: Intervention, the State and the Dynamics of Peace Formation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Roberts, D. (ed.) (2015) Liberal Peacebuilding and the Locus of Legitimacy, London: Routledge. Sharp, G. (1973) The Politics of Nonviolent Struggle: Power and Struggle, New York: Porter Sargent Publishers. Skendaj, E. (2014) Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions, New York: Columbia University Press. Tilly, C. (2003) The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. UN Security Council (2003) Provisional Verbatim of the 4782th Meeting. UN Doc. S/ PV. 4782. 3 July. Visoka, G. (2011) ‘International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: The Thin Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 22(1): 99–125. Visoka, G. (2016) Peace Figuration After International Intervention: Intentions, Events and Consequences of Liberal Peacebuilding, London: Routledge. Visoka, G. (2017) Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. von Laffert, B. (2016) ‘In Kosovo, if Debating Doesn’t Work Throw Tear Gas’, Politico, 3 May. Available at: www.politico.eu/article/albin-­kurti-kosovo-­if-debating-­doesntwork-­throw-tear-­gas/ (accessed 16 February 2019). Weller, M. (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle to Independence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3 From Kosovo with hospitality Rethinking hospitality beyond Westphalia Vjosa Musliu

Introduction When hospitality is examined in international relations (IR), such as in a comparison with Kant, the emphasis is placed on granting hospitality to individuals, in particular refugees. In analysing relations between states, most studies take the Westphalian state as the central space and agent of hospitality (Rosello 2001; Benhabib 2004; Baker 2011; Brown 2010), so that hospitality is quintessentially linked with the existence of a home as a fully fledged sovereign state. Critical works on Derrida’s hospitality have elaborated on the notion of power in hospitality. In Unconditional Hospitality: (Trans-)Jordan as Postcolonial State, Bulley (2017: 93–94) explains how hospitality in the refugee camps inside Jordan transcends both the borders and the sovereignty of the Jordanian state. Notwithstanding the valuable criticism, such critiques problematise hospitality in spaces within other sovereign states (e.g. Guantanamo Bay, refugee camps) – all reproducing the same binaries of inside/outside. In fact, works that displayed the limits of poststructuralist literature on hospitality emerged in the early 1990s. A number of authors have argued that hospitality remains overdetermined in nation-­statist imaginaries and fantasies, even though exclusion is a necessary hallmark of the Westphalian state (Shapiro 1997; Doty 2003). Vaughan-­ Williams adds that this imaginary, “underpinned by the concept of the border of the state, has had, and indeed continues to have, significant political and ethical influence on the practice and theory of global politics” (2012: 2). Along the same lines Jackson (2003), Lapid (2001) and Alberti (2014) argue that borders of states are taken for granted in IR, as they are a point of departure but not a subject of inquiry. Other than pointing out the limits of hospitality in IR, very few works have gone a step further and illustrated what a new imaginary of hospitality in IR would look like. To fill the gap, this chapter shows how EU–Kosovo relations provide a tool for reconceptualising hospitality and home in IR. On the one hand, the idea of the EU as a supranational structure has been turned into a reality by sovereign states giving up their sovereign powers to Brussels. On the other hand, Kosovo functions as a liminal category between a contested sovereign state and a sovereign state. Irrespective of their differences, both Kosovo and the EU function

40   Vjosa Musliu outside the contours of the Westphalian system of states. Whereas the fluidity of the EU as a home is the result of agreement, Kosovo’s fluidity, by contrast, is the result of compulsion. Equally though – for both the EU as a supranational structure and for Kosovo as a contested state – the concept of “home” is permanently susceptible to change. The specificity of Kosovo’s problematique does not lend itself to a more generalisable theorisation of a different form of hospitality. Nonetheless, it is precisely its contested status, its openness and ontological instability that make it so interesting for a re-­articulation of hospitality. Problematising on the relations between the two entities, Kosovo and the EU, this chapter makes two central arguments. The first runs that EU–Kosovo relations are characterised by the intermittent cohabitation and contestation of all forms of Derrida’s hospitality (conditional hospitality, unconditional hospitality and hostility), while at the same time transcending these forms. Consequently, the second argument is that hospitality is not dictated by the existence of a home, or the lack thereof: rather, it comes into being in the performance of home and hospitality through the relationships between guests and hosts. Both arguments offer new insights into hospitality in IR that go beyond the Westphalian imaginary. This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part it elaborates on the conceptual and theoretical foundations. It will begin by explaining how both the EU and Kosovo function outside the Westphalian system. Next, it will elaborate the main premises of Derrida’s philosophy of hospitality. The chapter then uses Derrida’s take on hospitality to explain EU–Kosovo relations. Initially, it will elaborate on Kosovo as a guest in the EU through the enlargement process; it will go on to discuss the EU as a guest in Kosovo with its rule-­of-law mission. The chapter will make use of over 100 press releases and other text produced by the EU, EULEX and the European Union Office in Pristina, as well as with 34 semi-­ structured interviews conducted throughout Kosovo in 2012/2013 with local Albanians, Serbs, and EU employees in Kosovo.

EU and Kosovo: two structures outside of the Westphalian system Since its declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo has struggled to attain international recognition and thereby to become the legitimate host of its own home (state) in the Westphalian system (Visoka 2018). Remaining outside of this system, Kosovo floats between meanings, definitions and narratives on what it is, and who its agents are (Musliu and Orbie 2016). Meanwhile, somewhat paradoxically, Kosovo is at one and the same time a combination of a contested state and a sovereign state. First, in 2008 Kosovo declared its independence, backed by the US and its allies but opposed by Serbia, Russia and China and their allies. The contested nature of Kosovo’s independence led to multiple international organisations acting with overlapping and status-­neutral mandates – neither recognising nor opposing that independence, and thus challenging its consolidation (Visoka and Bolton 2011). Kosovo is therefore a liminal category, oscillating between a sovereign home (recognised by more than 100 states

From Kosovo with hospitality   41 around the world) and a contested home (not a member of the United Nations). Second, since the end of the war in 1999 between Serbia and the Albanian majority in Kosovo, Kosovo has been subjected to a set of Western structures of liberal interventionism, with the UN mission and NATO troops operating there since 1999 and an EU rule-­of-law mission deployed since 2009. Third, the EU did not recognise Kosovo’s independence “en bloc”, as five of its member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) still oppose it, mainly owing to their own internal problems with minority accommodation and secessionist claims. Instead, the EU has opted for a “status-­neutral” position: that is, neither supporting nor opposing Kosovo’s independence (Newman and Visoka 2018). Notwithstanding its contested political status, along with other Western Balkans countries Kosovo received the EU’s unconditional promise of integration. The slogan “Kosovo’s future belongs in the EU” has been repeated all the way from Javier Solana in the late 1990s to the current EU High Representative (EUHR) Frederica Mogherini. Much as for Kosovo, the concept of home is problematic for the EU. As a supranational entity, the EU floats between and among definitions of a polity. Talking about Europe, Zygmunt Bauman (2004: 2) argues that “Europe is a mission – something to be made, created, built”. In an interview in the 1990s, Derrida commented that the task of realising an ethics of hospitality is difficult “everywhere, but especially in a Europe with the tendency to close up on the outside to the extent that it claims to be open on the inside” (Derrida 2005: 131). First, the borders of the EU as a home are, continuously, susceptible to change with each addition or dismembering of new member states. Second, thanks to the so-­called refugee crises, in the past five years EU borders have not only become more blurred, they have also been exported (Vaughan-­Williams 2017), off-­shored (Vaughan-­Williams 2012) and projected far beyond the thresholds of “Europe” (Bialasiewicz 2012). In turn, the shape of the EU as a home has become blurred.

Derrida’s hospitality Derrida explains “hospitality” as welcoming the other. It means to invite and welcome the stranger (l’étranger), both on a personal level – how do I welcome the other into my home? – and on the level of the state. The latter raises socio-­ political questions about refugees, immigrants, foreign languages, minority ethnic groups, etc. (Derrida 1997: 110). Central to the concept of hospitality is the concept of “home”, which not only makes the act of hospitality possible but at the same time distinguishes between the “host” of a home and the “guest”, as subjects of hospitality. On the one hand, hospitality invites a demarcation of borders: it requires a definition of what is domestic and what is foreign; what is home and abroad; who is a host (the subject offering hospitality) and who is a guest (the subject being welcomed). On the other hand, it disturbs this clear distinction between two concepts, precisely because when we talk about hospitality, we do not necessarily have to have clear-­cut delimitations of guest and host. In

42   Vjosa Musliu tying together home, hospitality and the guest/host, Derrida explains that hospitality is not simply a matter of allowing them (the other) to occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking no questions, but it literally means that the other (the guest) takes our place. If they take our place, then we are no longer in the simple position of host; rather, the guest becomes a host, while the original host is turned into a guest. For Derrida, there does not need to be a clear-­cut division between guest and host (2000a). One precondition for the host to be called such is that he/she needs to maintain his/her own mastery: “he controls the threshold, he controls the borders” (Derrida 2000a: 113). The question of hospitality is no longer just about us giving hospitality to the other – it is about hospitality being granted to ourselves in our own home, which is always the home of the other. “Our home is no longer where we can relax, feel free to be ourselves, but where we are persecuted” (Derrida 2000b: 38). The other (the guest) can arrive at any time, without invitation, and take what he likes in our place. The “at-­home” becomes where we are held hostage. Derrida distinguishes between two kinds of hospitality. “Conditional hospitality” means welcoming the other under certain conditions: the showing of documents, asking for a visa, and similar procedures. Hospitality is due to the foreigner, certainly, but remains, “like the law, conditional, and thus conditional in its dependence on the unconditionality that is the basis of the law” (Derrida 2000a: 73). For Derrida, “unconditional hospitality”, on the other hand, obliges one to accept the visitor, regardless of whether he or she is a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest or an unexpected visitor, whether the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, an animal, a divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female. The absolute, “unconditional law of hospitality”, as Derrida (2000a) himself acknowledges, is impossible to implement or organise in practice, as it cannot have any legal or political status. No state can write it into law, so it can only be poetic. For Derrida, distinguishing between visitation and invitation is the other way to explain unconditional and conditional hospitality. “Hospitality of visitation (pure hospitality) consists of letting the visitor, the unexpected arrival, come without asking for any account, without demanding his passport” (Derrida 2000b: 77). He adds that, in contrast to an invitation, with a visitation the guests are not selected, nor does the host expect or prepare for the other’s visit. “If I am unconditionally hospitable I should welcome the visitation – not the invited guest, but the visitor. I must be prepared, or prepared to be unprepared, for the unexpected arrival of any other” (Derrida 2005: 34). For Derrida, invitation “remains a scrutinised hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protective of its sovereignty” (Derrida in Borradori 2003: 86). Far from being mutually exclusive, Derrida argued that there could be occasions where hospitality and hostility would cohabit perfectly. He called this “hostipitality” (Derrida 2005: 124). Derrida is not the first to have been preoccupied with hospitality. His concern was inspired by Kant’s universal hospitality, which Derrida characterises as conditional, because it is “dependent on and controlled by the law and the state police” (Derrida 2000b: 15). Even though it is not a concept of obvious

From Kosovo with hospitality   43 i­mportance in IR (Bulley 2009: 65), in the past 20 years hospitality has gained popularity in international relations and ethical foreign policy literature (Campbell 1998; Bulley 2006; Shapiro 1997; Doty 2003; Rodríguez 2014). Making the case for hospitality in IR, Bulley argues that as a “liminal concept that works on the border of the way that traditional international relations (IR) have been thought about, hospitality still allows the enactment of ethics as it welcomes the outside into the inside” (Bulley 2009: 70). Studies on EU enlargement to the Western Balkans in general and Kosovo in particular have been at the forefront of literature on EU external relations, EU enlargement and Europeanisation. A number of works argue that enlargement is the policy area where the EU has been most influential and most powerful (Del Sarto 2016; Dimitrova 2010; Sjursen 2006). Other scholars have tried to engage more critically with how the EU exercises its power in the process of enlargement, whether looking through the lens of critical theory (Keil and Arkan 2014; Noutcheva 2016; Chandler 2010) or poststructuralism (Bulley 2009; Aydin-­ Düzgit 2014; Carta and Morin 2014; Diez 2014; Cebeci 2012). Notwithstanding a series of useful insights from the poststructuralist works focusing mainly on Turkey and on Central and Eastern European countries, only Bulley (2009) has dealt – ever so slightly – with the special nature of the case of Kosovo. In his book Ethics as Foreign Policy: Britain, the EU and the Other, he puts forward the concept of “conditional hospitality” to explain the shifting meanings of “Europe” as reflected in the EU’s enlargement package for the Western Balkans and in what he calls the far more “circumscribed hospitality” of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Bulley 2009: 62). His account nonetheless comes up short in explaining how claims of home and hospitality are articulated in a wider array of local and international narratives from within the Western Balkans and ENP countries in general, and Kosovo in particular.

Kosovo in the EU: from scrutinised conditional hospitality to overt hostility Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia between 1974 and 1999. The war between Serbia and Kosovo’s Albanian majority prompted an intervention by NATO as a response to the “violence and repression in Kosovo” perpetrated by the government in Belgrade. The NATO bombing in 1999 resulted in the surrendering of Slobodan Milošević (then Serbian president) and, that same year, the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement between NATO and Serbia’s government – two acts that, together, put an end to the conflict and paved the way for the deployment of a UN mission in Kosovo which remained operational until 2008. Until 2008, de jure Kosovo was still part of Serbia, while de facto the state of Serbia no longer had any presence there. After several rounds of UN-­mediated negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, the inability to resolve Kosovo’s political status was due to the parties’ diametrically opposed views (Musliu 2015). Serbia was calling for Kosovo’s reinstatement as a part of Serbia; Kosovo, on the other hand, was demanding independence. Acknowledging the

44   Vjosa Musliu deadlock in the ­negotiations, in 2007 the UN envoy for the negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, Martti Ahtisaari, put together his plan to resolve Kosovo’s status, drawing up the blueprint for its independence. For the EU, “the Balkans have for over a decade been a top priority for our foreign policy efforts. Nowhere is the EU expected to deliver more.… They lie on our doorstep” (Solana 2000). Notions of the Balkans as the EU’s doorstep, backyard, etc. are rampant in EU discourse. From this perspective, the Balkans can potentially be considered a recipient of the EU’s hospitality because it is physically (geographically) somewhere nearby (at the back, in the front, next door, etc.). The prospect of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans has been envisaged as resulting in fundamental societal, political and system changes that would ultimately bring the region closer to the “European family”. The 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission states that “enlargement policy needs to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region where states are weak and societies divided” (Commission of the European Communities 2005). At times, bringing the region into the “European home” seems to take on religious overtones, with the implication that getting onto the European path, and adhering to European values, represents a form of salvation: the salvation of breaking free from weak and divided societies, and embracing European values. For Carrington, the Prodi Commission regularly portrayed the EU as possessing an ethical dimension in its foreign policy, and one of the main ways this ethical foreign policy was supposedly enacted was through hospitality towards the “other” (2012). In addition to the abovementioned criteria, EU membership for Kosovo has also been presented by the EU as a restorative project following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). In his speech “Towards a new international morality: the humanitarian interventions”, Solana (2000) described the events in the Balkans where “entire societies could fall prey to warlords, rallying the tribe against the enemy, the stranger, or simply the ‘other’, right in the heart of Europe, a one-­hour flight from Rome, Vienna or Athens”. The structural or transformative power of the EU, Solana claims, would bring the region closer to centres that are not the sites of such horrors. For the former head of the European Union Office in Kosovo, Samuel Žbogar, “we [the EU and Kosovo] have to build together a culture of non-­tolerance of corruption. This is the European way” (European Union Office in Kosovo 2013). The rhetoric of embracing European values is very much present in the EU’s discourse on Kosovo. At times, the notions of European standards, best practices, highest international standards and European values are used interchangeably in this discourse. Although nowhere is it stated explicitly what exactly these European standards are, reference is vaguely and tacitly made to issues relating to multi-­ethnicity, the internal market and the rule of law, among others (Musliu 2017). While the rules on EU enlargement were more or less standard procedure for the six initial members, membership for states subsequently joining the European Union was made conditional on their complying with lists of additional obligations. Linas Linkevičius and Štefan Füle illustrate how the democratic

From Kosovo with hospitality   45 c­ riteria imposed on the CEE countries, for instance, were less restrictive than the conditions laid down for the Western Balkans, which made the enlargement process more difficult for the latter countries (Linkevičius and Füle 2013). Two aspects illustrate this. First, in addition to the conditions deriving from the acquis communautaire, the EU supplemented the enlargement process for the Western Balkans by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which is primarily concerned with commitments to introduce reforms in the spheres of politics, economics, trade and human rights. Even then, the very opening of SAA talks was conditional on several criteria. “Before opening SAA negotiations, the EU examines whether a sufficient degree of stabilisation is in place” (Commission of the European Communities 2005). The second extra difficulty in the enlargement process for the Western Balkans concerns the agenda. Unlike in previous rounds of enlargement, in the Western Balkans the EU started the SAA negotiations with Chapters 23 and 24 (Pozantov and Milevska 2014). As these chapters deal with the rule of law and the democratic order, they are considered to be the most important ones, and having to tackle them first thus represented an increased difficulty in the process of gaining membership. For Renner and Trauner, the slowing down of membership with the additional conditions exemplifies a “creeping of membership of South East European countries” (2009: 454). For other scholars of EU enlargement, the extra conditions are the result of the internal political peculiarities of the relevant countries (cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), regional cooperation, the issue of Kosovo), rather than extra requirements actually specified by the EU (Lavenex 2004). Third, for Kosovo and Serbia in particular, the conditional hospitality is being further burdened with yet another requirement – for the “normalisation of relations” by means of the EU – mediated technical dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina (Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017). This being so, the EU’s enlargement in the Western Balkans is not merely what Derrida calls conditional hospitality, it is more: it is a scrutinised conditional hospitality, through which countries in the region are systematically burdened with additional requirements, further delaying their prospects of membership. In addition to the accumulated conditions for the Western Balkans, Kosovo was singled out for two extra ones. The first had to do with the requirements for visa liberalisation, which the EU used to impose another benchmark on the Western Balkan countries for an SAA: negotiations on this. After acknowledging the progress made, in December 2009 the EU granted visa waivers to the citizens of Serbia (excluding Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia, but not Bosnia or Herzegovina. Since ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats living in these states could hold passports from their “mother states” (Serbia and Croatia, respectively), only the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were unable to travel visa-­free. The exclusion of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina – two predominantly Muslim countries – from the visa regime was met with fierce criticism in both countries. By December 2010 the EU had granted visa waivers to citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, now leaving out only Kosovo. On the one hand, the

46   Vjosa Musliu exclusion of Kosovo was seen as an indication that the EU was implicitly recognising Kosovo as a separate state. On the other, in closing its doors to Kosovars, the EU was reverting to hostility. In different studies, in closing its borders to its “others” the EU has been called “fortress Europe” (Kramsch, Mamadouh and Der Velde 2004: 533) and a “gated community” (Houtum and Pijpers 2007: 298), or has been described as denying access to the new “barbarians” (Benhabib 2006: 48). From 2012 onwards, moreover, for Kosovo citizens there was a stepping up of the procedures involved in applying for and acquiring a Schengen visa (Muja 2013). The European Commission maintained that the visa regime would stay in place until it had been guaranteed that Kosovo could “ensure that relevant reforms are implemented and rules and procedures are respected so as to minimise the associated security risks for EU member states” (Commission of the European Communities 2009). For the head of a local NGO in Kosovo, the EU’s visa regime for Kosovars has little to do with fulfilling the requirements stipulated by the EU’s roadmap for visa liberalisation: rather, it is much more a result of the discourse it has constructed which portrays Kosovars as asylum seekers threatening the EU’s security.1 Such heavily scrutinised, deeply conditional hospitality from the EU is, more than anything else, confusing, which brings us to the first central argument. On the one hand, the EU pledges its support for bringing Kosovo into “the European family”. On the other, with every step it takes the EU seems more and more hesitant about fulfilling its commitment, continuously stipulating more requirements that delay the process. In this set-­up, it is imperative to ask whether this is still hospitality. Or is it, rather, a subtle form of hostility? Or is it both? Derrida refers to the cohabitation of this seemingly virtual hospitality on the one hand and borderline hostility on the other as “hostipitality”. Bulley (2006: 79) argues that, whatever the conditions (or lack thereof ), enlargement will inevitably fall into the category of the ethical undecidability of hospitality, as the necessary filtering and choosing (of who and what is included) also necessitates a violent exclusion. The resistance to offering hospitality is not merely a result of the EU’s closing its doors to Kosovars as “non-­EU” and/or “others”. Albeit with nuances, the EU maintains the same policy towards the vast majority of the so-­called developing countries. What makes Kosovo unique is that on the one hand, this is happening to a country in which the EU has its highest financial investment per capita in the world (European Court of Auditors 2012); has launched its most ambitious rule-­of-law mission to date (Koeth 2010); and has virtually offered the prospect of membership (Bulley 2009). With its visa policy, the EU treats us [Kosovo] the same way as it treats the Congo. The only difference between us [Kosovo] and the Congo is that we are part of an EU plan to grant us membership in the distant future.2 At the same time, the EU is not offering Kosovo the possibility of having and developing ties with the European Union as its future, and, by closing its doors,

From Kosovo with hospitality   47 it is sending out the message that Kosovars remain “others” – not European enough. In her speech to Kosovo’s national parliament in May 2016, the High Representative of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, said: “Kosovo is Europe. You don’t need to become Europe. You already are” (Mogherini 2016). It is not clear what change Mogherini was referring to, that some might have thought Kosovo would have to make in order to become European. Nonetheless, neither the visa regime nor other steps to further the enlargement process have actually materialised. For, as long as the borders of an imagined “Europe” do not extend to include Kosovo, the latter is permanently left out, reinforcing the paradigm of Kosovo being not Europe – being, instead, its “other”. What is welcomed in Europe is “Kosovo” as a European project and as a potential member of the EU, but Kosovars as such are to remain outside of Europe until a Kosovo to come, a future Kosovo (a Kosovo that is an EU member) is possible.

The EU in Kosovo: unconditional hospitality Even though Derrida argued that unconditional hospitality can only be poetic, the case of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) exemplifies unconditional hospitality in a very practical form. Having launched the most expensive Common Security and Defence Policy mission to date (EULEX), the EU sees itself as propagating the “highest European values and standards” of rule of law, democracy and human rights in Kosovo (Musliu and Orbie 2016). The invitation to EULEX issued in “Ahtisaari’s Plan” – which was later enshrined in Kosovo’s constitution – provides that “Kosovo shall issue an invitation to the international community to assist in successfully fulfilling its obligations” (United Nations Security Council 2007). The aim of the mission was “to help build up and strengthen the rule of law, support a functioning democracy, as well as aid Kosovo along its European processes” (European Union office in Kosovo 2013). I have argued elsewhere (Musliu and Orbie 2014) that what was clearly a self-­invitation for EULEX’s deployment came to be known in the public discourse (both within and outside Kosovo) as an invitation from Kosovo’s authorities. By self-­invitation, I refer to the act when one Western structure (UNMIK) transferred its mandate to EULEX. EULEX shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-­ ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and best European practices. (EULEX 2016) Such an act is a simulation of the invitation and, ultimately, a simulation of the act of hospitality. It blurs the distinction between the host (the subject who issues an invitation) and the guest (the invited subject). In fact, the act of intervention

48   Vjosa Musliu itself (NATO intervention in Serbia in 1999) and the subsequent international missions (UNMIK and EULEX) upset the distinction between guest and host and indeed the clarity of the meaning of home. In governing or supervising the locals, the international bodies take on the characteristics of a host, while the local Kosovars turn into guests. It is important to clarify that such a situation is relevant not only to contested states. Unlike Kosovo, East Timor and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, are recognised as fully fledged sovereign states (homes). Yet, much like Kosovo, they have had international organisations and missions present for a long time in their countries and have been exposed to an equally problematic interplay of guest/host relations and an equally problematic performance of hospitality. Inversions of these roles can be traced in colonial literature, where similar interplays are a recurring theme in the shifting of roles between colonisers and colonised. In his account of Indian hospitality to English visitors, Hu argues that colonialism “commences with the inversion of the host/guest because those who originally occupy the position of the host and offer hospitality to the outsiders are now turned into the colonised by their colonisers” (Hu 2013: 26). In a similar vein, in his novel A Passage to India, Forster argued in 1924 that, in colonial hospitality, the locals were subordinate to the foreign masters who had usurped their homeland. The colonisers discover that, in order to feel at home, they need to replicate their original home (Forster 1924: 86). Forster reminds us that although, theoretically speaking, the English who came to India were visitors/ guests, the political reality in which they colonised India made them self-­ proclaimed hosts. Meanwhile, the Indians – now the reluctant guests of their English colonisers – attempted to reverse their roles and reclaim their position as hosts. Taking a similar post-­colonial perspective, Nathan Bell (2014) argues that Jordan’s hospitality in welcoming over two million Palestinian refugees, and many thousands of Iraqi refugees, during the two Gulf Wars, is also characterised by a blurred distinction between guest and host. For him, this interplay approaches Derrida’s concept of unconditional hospitality (Bell 2014). A situation similar to that of the English colonisers in India, albeit outside the colonial setting, is apparent in EULEX’s status as guest/host in Kosovo. By making the rules in the home in which it is staying as a guest, EULEX changes the dynamics of behaviour, governs the local people (albeit through supervision and monitoring), and ultimately becomes a host. Local Kosovars, in turn, become guests in their own home. Nevertheless, the colonial example, however convincing, does not fully correspond to the politics of hospitality in EU–Kosovo relations. First, unlike in a colonial set-­up, the reversal of guest and host relations did not happen after the arrival of the “Western man”: instead, it was the starting point of relations between Kosovo and the EU. Second, unlike in traditional colonial relations, for the EU, Kosovo is not (entirely) foreign or “other”. At the same time, nor is it part of the European family: rather, it is part of an imagined European home that will eventually extend its borders to encompass the Balkans. In 2011, three years after the deployment of EULEX, a group of civil society organisations in Kosovo recommended a time frame for its exit strategy. That

From Kosovo with hospitality   49 same year, Kosovo’s government increased its calls to end EULEX’s mandate through joint coordination between it and EULEX.3 Such calls from Kosovo’s political elite have continued ever since.4 EU officials in Kosovo maintain that “EULEX will leave when Kosovo’s rule of law and democratic principles are sound and sustainable”.5 For one of its chief operators, if EULEX were to leave, “Kosovo wouldn’t be able to stand on its own feet. The international support is very much needed”.6

Conclusion Having explained the politics of EU–Kosovo relations, what are we to make of the re-­articulated notion of hospitality? Not being a fully fledged sovereign state, is Kosovo actually a home, capable of mastering and offering hospitality? Can we talk about a reversal of the roles of guest and host in non-­finalised states/ homes? Or is such a reversal more a feature of power imbalances such as that evidenced in colonial literature? In the era of liberal interventionism and evolving forms of post-­national states, shall we give up home? By implication, shall we also give up distinctions between hosts and guests? On the one hand, when in the position of host, with Kosovo as its guest, we have seen the EU with its Janus face: offering a scrutinised, conditional hospitality with its enlargement process, while at the same time displaying hostility in its visa regime policy. As a host, the EU tries to minimise the opportunities for welcoming Kosovo into its family, and the ways of doing so, while at the same time making a firm promise about Kosovo’s “European future”. As a result, the conditional hospitality of enlargement – with its selection of the similar and exclusion of the other – cannot help but be simultaneously both hospitable and hostile. Through the enlargement process, the EU creates, maintains and redefines its “others” by keeping them inside the abundantly clear boundaries of the “other”. The conditions on which the EU is willing to extend hospitality are closely linked to its hostility, just as its position as guest is inherently subordinate to its status as host. As a result, it turns hospitality into hostility. At the same time, the position of EULEX as a guest accepted unconditionally and without question comes very close to what Derrida describes as “absolute hospitality”. As part of its monitoring role, EULEX has sovereign powers over its own mission. It decides on its own job description and priorities; it renews its own mandate every two years; and its staff has immunity from the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s courts. In addition, EULEX enjoys executive authority in performing its tasks, especially in prosecuting cases of war crimes and corruption. So far, its performance has been subjected to one audit by the European Court of Auditors, a process conducted in 2012. Kosovo’s hospitality towards the EU is both “unconditional hospitality” and a fundamental simulation of it. Projecting itself as a member of the “European family”, the local political elite in Kosovo welcomes the EU’s presence in exchange not only for future membership of the EU, but also for future recognition of its contested status – in other words, independence. As a result, Kosovo accepts (it also does not have any choice) the EU’s

50   Vjosa Musliu hostility towards it in the visa policy in exchange for full acceptance into the “EU club”.

Notes 1 Interview by author with a civil society actor, November 2012. 2 Interview by author with a civil society actor, October 2012. 3 Interview by author with a journalist, October 2013. 4 Interview by author with a civil society actor, October 2013. Interview by author with a university professor, October 2013. 5 Interview by author with a civil society actor, October 2013. Interview by author with a civil society actor, October 2013. 6 Interview by author with a journalist, October 2013.

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4 The hyperreality of EU enlargement A Baudrillardian critique of the European Union in Kosovo Krenar Gashi Introduction When, at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, European leaders signed a statement that “the future of the countries of the Western Balkans is in the European Union” (European Council 2003), there was little dispute that the “the hour of Europe” had come. With enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) just around the corner, the EU was shaping itself into a new kind of power in world politics. Since the Thessaloniki Summit, however, the picture of EU enlargement has gone bleak. Following enlargement to the CEE countries, the EU hit what scholars called “enlargement fatigue”, with enthusiasm for the policy waning across its member states (Schimmelfennig 2008). Of the countries of the Western Balkans, only Croatia received full membership, in 2013, whereas Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are considered “candidate countries”, and Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina “potential candidates”. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis of 2009, enlargement is considered to have been re-­nationalised by the member states (Hillion, 2010), and not only fatigued but actually on “life support” (O’Brennan 2014). With Britain’s decision to exit the EU, and the refugee crisis, worries arose that the countries of the Balkans would remain “in a waiting room for Europe” (Belloni and Brunazzo 2017). This begs the question: what is EU enlargement today, and, more importantly, what does it mean for the aspirant members? In this chapter, I look at the EU’s actions in the context of enlargement in my country – Kosovo – which is a potential candidate for EU membership. Back in 2003, at the Thessaloniki Summit, Kosovo was not yet a state, but the phrase “a European future for Kosovo” became part of its political discourse long before the country declared its independence in 2008. Its declaration of independence from Serbia, however, divided the EU internally. While most member states rushed to support the unilateral move by the authorities in Pristina, five – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – to this day refuse to recognise Kosovo’s independence. European Parliament reports have repeatedly stated that the division between member states has hindered efforts by the supranational institutions to implement the EU’s policy in Kosovo effectively (European Parliament 2009, 2013,

The hyperreality of EU enlargement   55 2015). Researchers working on EU–Kosovo relations have echoed this (Greiçevci 2011; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). Despite this context, the EU has managed to find creative solutions in building its relations with Kosovo: since 2008, it runs a rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) which is the Union’s largest mission outside its borders (Council of EU 2008); since 2011, the EU has facilitated a dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia; and in 2016 Kosovo reached a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, marking its first formal step in the process of enlargement (European Commission 2016b). The EU’s Office in Kosovo and its Special Representative give substantial policy input into the Kosovo institutions and, together with representations of the member states, are the most influential foreign actors in the country (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12, 2017),1 although the Union remains neutral on Kosovo’s statehood. Kosovo, on the other hand, has made European integration its prime policy goal and framework, while all the political parties competing in the 2010, 2014 and 2017 elections also campaigned on the promise to integrate the country into the EU. Aiming to explore critically what the EU and its enlargement policy in Kosovo mean for the people of Kosovo, this chapter is organised in two parts, each consisting of two sections. In the first part, I review the literature on EU enlargement and explain my academic journey in my attempts to make sense of the EU in Kosovo. In the second part, I introduce Jean Baudrillard’s concept of “hyperreal” and then employ it to explore the EU’s actions in Kosovo. In this exploration I draw on a discourse analysis of texts – reports, statements, speeches and press releases – and 12 semi-­structured interviews. I suggest that Kosovo’s accession to the EU is what Baudrillard calls “hyperreality” – a social reality in which discourses are ambiguous to the point where it becomes impossible to locate meanings. Facing internal divisions and complicated external relations, the EU, I argue, is unable to project real power in the case of Kosovo, and can thus merely simulate it, by designing creative actions that are not necessarily intrinsic to enlargement as we know it. I observe how, in facilitating a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the EU has scaled down most of its enlargement activities, while Kosovo, for its part, has scaled down its membership aspirations to obtaining visa-­free travel to the EU for its citizens.

Enlargement as we “know” it Most of what we know about what the EU is and what it does with its enlargement has come from observing and analysing the events of the 2004 enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The discipline of EU studies has established that the EU is a different kind of power in world politics: a “civilian power” (Duchene 1972; Orbie 2006) that dislikes coercive action, a “normative power” (Manners 2002) that spreads its norms and values in the world. In the EU’s narratives, enlargement is a process through which countries that aspire to full membership fulfil the Union’s political, economic and legal criteria. The initial criteria for membership, often referred to as the Copenhagen

56   Krenar Gashi criteria, were outlined by the European Council in that city in 1993. Scholars have established that, by requiring the aspirant countries to fulfil these criteria, the EU transforms them into member states (Grabbe 2006). Conditionality is considered the EU’s most powerful tool in world politics, and scholars have observed that it is most efficient when full membership of the Union is used as viable leverage (Vachudova 2005). In scholarly accounts, conditionality in international intervention receives both praise and criticism, being seen by some as a “necessary evil” and by others as a blatant assertion of power from abroad (Anastasakis 2008). Since 1993, however, the Copenhagen criteria have been expanded and amended. For the countries of the Western Balkans, the criteria now also include cooperation with international judicial authorities regarding war crimes, good neighbourly relations, and country-­specific conditions which the European Commission specifies annually in its country reports (previously known as progress reports). While the prospect of full EU membership was extended to the countries of the Western Balkans in the hope of replicating the success of the enlargement to the CEE countries (Noutcheva 2012), the nature of enlargement has significantly changed. With its non-­ uniform assessment of compliance – in some cases rigorous, in others pragmatic – the EU has been criticised for undermining the consistency of the enlargement process (Anastasakis 2008). The EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans is rightly seen as more complex than it was in the CEE countries. Thanks to the tumultuous past of wars and conflicts that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, enlargement in this region involves at least two other processes: peacebuilding and statebuilding. Regarding the latter, Florian Bieber (2011) problematises the limited capacity of the EU to deal with statebuilding in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Frictions between statebuilding as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and member-­statebuilding as part of enlargement policy, he argues, can obscure the clarity of purpose and legitimacy of the EU in the region, while highlighting a void between the “highly technical EU accession process on the one hand, and the security-­driven EU state-­building on the other” (Bieber 2011). Noting how its policy in the Western Balkans is a hybrid of enlargement and standard foreign policy, Gergana Noutcheva (2009) argues that the EU lacks a strong normative justification in the region. The aspirant countries’ compliance with EU conditionality, which she labels as fake, is more a result of the EU’s strategic leverage than of voluntary submission to its normative power (Noutcheva 2009). According to Börzel (2011), the limited statehood of the countries of the Western Balkan has seriously curbed “transformative powers” of the EU, despite their membership prospects. She argues that while the “EU has offered the Western Balkans a membership perspective to stabilize the region and overcome problems caused by weak and contested statehood”, it is precisely this limited statehood that “undermines their compliance with EU norms and rules” (Börzel 2011: 5). In Bosnia, for example, Ana Juncos (2012) identified several internal contradictions that undermine the EU’s actions: between its technocratic approach and the politics of statebuilding, between the

The hyperreality of EU enlargement   57 state-­strengthening and state-­weakening dynamics of its intervention, between the external promotion of the EU’s demands and local ownership, and between member-­statebuilding and peacebuilding (Juncos 2012). Research on the EU, and consequently on EU enlargement, continues to be dominated by the rationalist/constructivist debate over the very nature of the EU integration project (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). While rationalists see enlargement as being driven by a choice based on the costs and benefits to states, and they therefore study the aspirant countries’ compliance with EU conditions, constructivists consider that enlargement is driven by identity, norms, values and beliefs, whose transformation they study (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). A number of authors do continue to provide more critical accounts of the EU’s external actions by unpacking and unsettling dominant concepts, frameworks and meanings (Diez 2004, 2005; Chandler 2008; Hehir 2011; Cebeci 2012; Bulley 2014; Musliu and Orbie 2014; Borg and Diez 2016; Musliu 2017), but these accounts are still scarce compared to the literature produced through rationalist/constructivist debate. In the Western Balkans, rationalists have argued that the aspirant countries’ response to external incentives goes hand in hand with resistance to the adaptation costs (Elbasani 2009), and maintain that the underlying motivation driving enlargement has not changed (Vachudova 2014). In this regard, the EU’s tight control of the accession process has created a powerful motivation that can outweigh very high costs and can “lead to developments in the aspirant country that are solely in the interest of the EU” (Dedja 2012). Constructivists, on the other hand, have used divergence in identities and norms to explain the stalled Europeanisation process (Subotić 2011), or the formal adaptation of EU norms by aspirant countries in a weird “pre-­accession” change (Economides and Ker-­Lindsay 2015). While the rationalist/constructivist debate has generated a substantial critique of how we understand Europe, it has also created a disciplinary problem: what Patrick T. Jackson calls the problem of putting ontology first (Jackson 2011), or, to use Roy Bhaskar’s words, the assumption that “it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive possibilities for us” (Bhaskar 1979: 31). In this way, what is regarded as knowledge and what methods and rationalities are to be used for generating this knowledge depends fundamentally on the wagers researchers place on the nature of the European project, while at the same time excluding other, alternative approaches. The differences between rationalists and constructivists give the impression their debate is a pluralistic, whereas in fact it represents a reduction of pluralism, as it encourages an assumption that these two particular “rationalities and methodologies are scientifically superior to the others” (Manners and Whitman 2016: 12). Another major problem in EU studies as a whole is explored by Rebecca Adler-­Nissen, who asserts that even critical researchers are more interested in showing how supranational institutions and the EU member states demonstrate normative behaviour, while downplaying the accidental or unintentional effects of the European project in general (Adler-­Nissen 2016: 89). When it comes to the EU’s actions outside its borders, Olga Burlyuk (2017) rightly argues that

58   Krenar Gashi studies are usually framed to look for success or failure in terms of the EU’s achieving the effects it intended, relying on the assumption that the EU’s intervention is simply a good thing for the third countries. The unintended consequences – the unanticipated or unforeseen consequences or effects, side effects, or externalisation effects – are usually left out of the process of generating knowledge about the EU (Burlyuk 2017). This is especially problematic because what in the eyes of the EU can be dismissed as “undesired” or “unintended” effects or consequences can have great deal of impact on the formation of social realities in the countries subject to EU intervention. In short, I have identified three problems as weakening the affinity between the knowledge generated about the EU and me as a researcher from Kosovo. First, the study is overwhelmingly focused on the EU, and not on the countries in which the EU acts. Second, the assumption that the nature of the EU project predetermines our ability to study it leaves little room for the projection of local voices in the knowledge generated through the mainstream rationalist/constructivist frameworks, especially in the context of enlargement. Third, leaving what are labelled “undesired effects” and “unintended consequences” out of the analysis meant leaving out a very large portion of “local realities”. In order to avoid such problems, as I elaborate in the following section, I turn to poststructuralist philosophy, and in particular to the writings of twentieth-­century French thinker Jean Baudrillard.

Jean Baudrillard as a critique Jean Baudrillard work’s, like that of other poststructuralist authors such as Lyotard, Derrida and Foucault, offers a fundamental critique of Western metaphysics. Like many poststructuralists, Baudrillard saw our social reality as a “fake” reality – something that is faster and better than the “real” – or, as he calls it, “hyperreal”. In my reading of Baudrillard, the first necessary step is to follow his critique of the linear logic of thinking and understanding (Baudrillard 1984, 1993, 1994, 2007). It is precisely the logic of linear understanding, of thinking of everything as a sequence of events that are thought to follow each other through a cause and effect, that Baudrillard problematised. He observed how “events no longer have consequences” because they can no longer provide “any testimony to the meaning” (Baudrillard 1984). To turn his words around, it is not the events that produce meanings, but rather the pre-­set meanings that “produce” the events. Second, still similar to contemporary French philosophers, Baudrillard problematises the relationship between symbols and objects. This relationship, writes Baudrillard, is lost, and “images” and “signs” are no longer connected to their referents, the supposed “real”, but instead refer only to their own recurrences as signs (Baudrillard 1987). Symbols no longer represent “real” objects – instead they are locked into a rotation of the symbolic that is “its own definitive end” (Baudrillard 1993: 205). This is especially problematic when it comes to social science, where research is often caught up in vicious circles, not really studying the objects themselves but merely the “symbols” or “signs” of the objects.

The hyperreality of EU enlargement   59 Third, Baudrillard’s social reality is not that of the “real” but that of “simulations” which, in spite of being a replica of the “real” and “fake” in their nature, still manage to produce “real” effects” (Baudrillard 1994). Power, for instance, can only be simulated, although it still produces real power effects. Simulations, in this way, should be understood as different from reality in terms not of appearance but rather of their construction. It is precisely the impossibility of distinguishing between what is “real” and what is “simulated” that leads to the construction of what Baudrillard calls “hyperreality” (Baudrillard 1994). In hyperreality, Baudrillard (1994) argues that “present-­day simulators attempt to make the real, all of the real, coincide with their models of simulation”. As he sees it, “hyperreality” is characterised by the impossibility of determining it, by discourse “that is no longer simply ambiguous, as political discourses can be, but that conveys the impossibility of a determined position of power, the impossibility of a determined discursive position” (Baudrillard 1994). Baudrillard has portrayed the EU as a virtual manifestation of “the real” idea of Europe that it promotes, where the EU institutions represent the “hyperreal” of Europe while the “real” idea that is promoted “does not exist” (Baudrillard in Sassatelli 2002). Following this logic, it can be argued that the “hyperreality” of the European integration project is best observed in the context of EU enlargement, where grand narratives of the EU as a force for good in world politics predominate. What follows is an exploration into the “hyperreality” of the EU in Kosovo.

The European “hyperreality” of Kosovo Kosovo’s prospects of becoming a full member of the EU are ambiguous. This ambiguity stems primarily from the fact that not all EU member states recognise Kosovo as an independent, sovereign country. Between 2008 and 2017, however, the EU’s supranational institutions treated Kosovo like other candidate and potential candidate countries.2 The European Commission publishes country reports (previously known as progress reports) in which it assesses Kosovo’s progress towards full membership; the country receives EU assistance through the Instruments of Pre-­Accession and has a European Union Special Representative. Internally, full membership of the EU is Kosovo’s prime policy. This “success” of the EU with Kosovo, which resulted in the ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, is generally attributed to the “creativity” of the supranational institutions, which work on the general assumption that the five non-­recognising member states will eventually give in and recognise Kosovo’s independence.3 The European Parliament has repeatedly called on these five member states to do so (European Parliament 2009, 2013, 2015). Commission officials have revealed how their “creativity” was based on the legal argument that no treaty provisions explicitly stipulated that for a country to become a member of the EU it would have to be recognised as sovereign by all member states.4 But, Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon states that, on membership, the Council must decide unanimously, after consulting the Commission and receiving support from an absolute majority of the European Parliament.

60   Krenar Gashi The ambiguity in the very nature of the EU’s relations with Kosovo is manifested throughout the EU’s discourse. As I have argued elsewhere, never in such assertions does the EU acknowledge its internal divisions when it comes to Kosovo; on the contrary, the discursive strategies project a “fake” unity of the EU (Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017). The ambiguities through which Kosovo’s relations with the EU are constructed have allowed the supranational institutions to engage with Kosovo’s institutions beyond their “real” possibilities, or, to put it in Baudrillard’s terms, to “simulate” a process of Kosovo’s accession to the EU. The EU’s internal assumptions when it comes to Kosovo were challenged by the 2018 enlargement strategy; owing to last-­minute objections and interventions by Spain, any references to clear membership prospects were omitted from the text on Kosovo, unlike that on the other countries in the Western Balkans (Rettman 2018). The Spanish objection was firm in contesting the very meaning of the phrase “the future of Kosovo is in the EU”. The phrase was, however, stated and restated in virtually all communications issued by EU officials in their subsequent visits to Kosovo. This “absence” of a “real prospect” of membership demonstrated in the day-­to-day politics of the Union was followed in turn by repetitive assertions and reassertions of the opposite in the EU’s discourse. The difference here is not merely in the gap between words and deeds, for which the EU has been persistently criticised by mainstream scholars, as both actions and discourses become quite ambiguous. With no political landscape for a “real” enlargement that would include Kosovo, the EU has constructed a “hyperreal” process for the country, in which ambiguities transcend all discourses and meanings. As Baudrillard (1994) writes, the only weapon of simulated power “is to reinject the real and the referential everywhere” in order to persuade us of the reality of the simulation. The “hyperreality” of Kosovo’s accession to the EU is constructed precisely by reasserting the integration discourse and the mantra “the future of Kosovo is in the EU”. It is worth noting here that in the texts and speeches on Kosovo produced by the EU, phrases like “Kosovo has a European future” and “the future of Kosovo is in the EU” are used interchangeably, although officials are reluctant to refer explicitly to clear membership prospects. Consequently, the discourse on European integration in Kosovo is characterised by assertions and re-­assertions of the idea that in the distant future the country will be in the EU. The prospect of membership for Kosovo is thus best described by Baudrillard’s “hyperreal”, as it is generated and regenerated through discursive ambiguities serving in this way as an end to justify any and all actions taken by the EU. While Baudrillard’s concept goes no further than traditional approaches in terms of understanding how “real” Kosovo’s European future is, the concept brings added value to our understanding of how “things work” in this “hyperreality” by problematising certain aspects of the EU’s interventions in Kosovo. I will elaborate how Baudrillard’s “hyperreality” enables us to understand the downgrading of the EU’s actions in Kosovo from core enlargement issues to what I call “side-­programmes” of enlargement policy. The first side-­programme is the dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Faced with its own internal divisions over ­Kosovo’s

The hyperreality of EU enlargement   61 statehood, the EU has initiated a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina which has gradually become intrinsic to the enlargement policy. Representatives of the two countries have been meeting since 2011, initially on technical and later on political developments. In April 2013 the prime ministers reached the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations, usually referred to as the Brussels Agreement, which has been labelled by the EU as “ground-­breaking” and “historic” (Barroso 2013; Van Rompuy 2013). Early commentators, on the other hand, highlighted quite a few problems associated with the process of the dialogue and its outcomes. Criticism was focused on the lack of transparency (Hopkins 2014) and, especially, on the ambiguities that characterise the agreements (Bieber 2015; Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017). As with the EU’s overall discourse in Kosovo, the ambiguities in the dialogue have led the parties to interpret the agreements in their own, different – not to say opposing ways, which eventually led to the stagnation of the process and the partial implementation of what was agreed (Hopkins 2015). In Kosovo, the dialogue with Serbia is currently seen as a never-­ending process, which is neither related nor completely unrelated to the country’s membership prospects.5 Elsewhere I explain that the EU is recontextualising the issues between the two countries by substituting certain elements of the process with legitimation for the process itself (Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017). In turn, the dialogue – as an EU action within the context of enlargement – is producing ambiguous agreements. Ambiguities are not confined to the substance of the dialogue, but also affect meanings, to the point where one cannot really tell what the dialogue means for the EU, for the countries, or for their relations with the EU – and in particular, one cannot tell what “normalisation of relations” means or for whom these relations should be normal (Gashi, Musliu and Orbie 2017). As a consequence, Kosovo and Serbia often need the EU’s assistance in order to agree about what they have already agreed.6 Being in a position where it has to maintain neutrality towards Kosovo’s statehood, which is the core problem for Kosovo and Serbia to resolve through dialogue, all the EU can do is to simulate power by shifting the focus to non-­ core problems. Such a shift becomes problematic when the question is asked whether the dialogue is serving its purpose (which is to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia) or whether it is merely helping the EU to maintain and legitimise its power position vis-­à-vis the two countries. Politicians in Kosovo and Serbia, who point out that neither of the countries has any alternative to EU membership, rightly perceive that the dialogue is entering a stalemate (Interviews 1, 4, 5 and 6 2016).7 It is serving as a kind of “waiting room” for the accession of Kosovo and Serbia (Interviews 2 and 3 2017).8 In this way, the dialogue is becoming the virtual, the “hyperreal” dimension of Kosovo’s relations with the EU, as the ambiguities it produces transcend its framework, making the EU’s entire policy of enlargement towards Kosovo and Serbia more ambiguous. Aside from the dialogue with Serbia, the most salient issue in Kosovo’s EU agenda is the country’s determination to obtain for its citizens visa-­free travel to

62   Krenar Gashi the Schengen countries of the EU. Since 2008, Kosovo’s internal European integration agenda has consisted of mainly of efforts to achieve this: the majority of both policy activities and public resources have been focused on fulfilling EU conditions for visa liberalisation (Interviews 4, 5 and 6 2016).9 The EU started its visa liberalisation programme for the Western Balkans in early 2008, and provided the countries with roadmaps for the process (checklists setting out political and technical requirements and conditions) – a programme from which Kosovo was excluded (Council of the EU 2009). By the end of 2010, when all the other countries of the Western Balkans were able to travel freely to the EU’s Schengen Area, Kosovo was adopting its own roadmap, unilaterally, based on the EU’s criteria for neighbouring countries (Kosovo Government 2010). With EU membership seeming distant, visa liberalisation became one of the most salient policy topics in Kosovo – politicians seeing it as the country’s first tangible result in the context of EU enlargement (Thaçi 2010). Since 2012, when the EU finally provided Kosovo with a roadmap, visa-­free travel has been the only concrete objective that the Kosovo authorities have put forward in their relations with the EU (Interview 6, 9, 10 and 11 2017).10 The prospect of membership, in a way, has been reduced to the prospect of achieving visa-­free travel. By 2016 the European Commission had recommended to the Council that it should allow Kosovo citizens to travel without visas (European Commission 2016a). The recommendation, however, included two more conditions: Kosovo needed to deliver concrete results in the fight against corruption and organised crime, and to ratify the border demarcation agreement it had reached with Montenegro. The latter was particularly stressed by EU officials on multiple occasions (European Commission 2017). The pressure continued even when it became certain that the issue was creating a political deadlock, rendering the parliament dysfunctional for months (Gashi 2016). Kosovo politicians noted that such conditions had been imposed on no other country in exchange for visa-­free travel (Ahmeti 2017). Most problematically of all, however, the EU Special Representative in Kosovo stated that, even if the country were to ratify the agreement with Montenegro, there would be no guarantee that Kosovo citizens would be given visa-­free deal with the EU (Kosovo 2.0 2017). On 10 May 2017, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Isa Mustafa went to the Parliament hoping a two-­thirds majority would vote to ratify the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro, but all he witnessed was the fall of his government. In a no-­confidence motion sponsored by the opposition parties, 78 out of 120 MPs voted in favour, including most of the legislators from the governing Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic Party of Kosovo – PDK), Mustafa’s coalition partner (Bytyçi 2017). The move, party officials stated, was a response to Mustafa’s continued failure to whip MPs from his own Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo – LDK) to fulfil the EU condition of ratifying the border agreement. A lengthy political crisis that culminated in the collapse of the government and fresh elections, and all the attendant consequences, would normally be seen as an unintended consequence of the EU’s conditionality in the context of EU enlargement. It took Kosovo

The hyperreality of EU enlargement   63 nearly three years to fulfil this condition: a newly elected parliament ratified the border agreement with Montenegro on 22 March 2018. At the time of publication of this edited volume, however, Kosovo citizens wishing to travel to the EU still require visas. The EU’s conditionality in Kosovo has been used, mainly if not exclusively, in the two side-­programmes of the enlargement policy. The overall impression from interviews conducted in the country is that, rather than bringing Kosovo closer to membership, fulfilling the EU’s conditions is simply paving the way for further conditions (Interviews 4, 5, 6 and 9 2016).11 And these additional conditions, it is felt, have more to do with ad hoc political issues than with making Kosovo more European or progressing in any way towards full membership of the EU (Interviews 6, 9, 10 and 11 2016).12 For Kosovo, EU conditionality has become locked into the symbolic order – or, to use Baudrillard’s words, has become a symbol that represents merely its own recurrence as a symbol.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have dealt with the problematics of understanding what EU enlargement means for Kosovo as a potential candidate for membership. I began by reviewing the literature on the EU and its enlargement policy, identifying some obstacles to the projection of local meanings and the generation of local knowledge through mainstream approaches. I then turned to the poststructuralist writings of Jean Baudrillard, using his concept of “hyperreality” to explore discourses and events relating to the EU’s actions in Kosovo. Through Baudrillard’s lenses, I have portrayed EU–Kosovo relations as a “hyperreality” in which the EU simulates the power it does not really have, to enable the accession of a country it does not really want in. Although supranational institutions carry out the enlargement policy on behalf of the EU, it is the member states that hold the ultimate power to admit a new country to membership. In this way, the EU’s enlargement policy in Kosovo is manifested in de-­politicisation and technicalisation by the supranational institutions, and, in turn, re-­politicisation by the member states. While such processes can also be observed through mainstream approaches, a Baudrillardian approach sheds light on how de-­politicisation and re-­politicisation are not opposite processes that cancel each other out, but are rather of the same simulated nature that constructs “hyperreality”. In such “hyperreality”, the ultimate of all meanings – that the future of Kosovo lies in the EU – is asserted and re-­asserted everywhere, to the point where it serves as testimony to any and all events. Even events like the Spanish intervention in the drafting of the enlargement strategy (which now states that there are “objective obstacles” to Kosovo’s membership of the EU) are balanced through a discursive reassertion of the final meaning. The concept of “hyperreality” reveals how EU enlargement in Kosovo has been scaled down, so that the main focus now is on the EU’s efforts to facilitate a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and on Kosovo’s efforts to obtain visa-­ free travel to the EU for its citizens. EU conditionality has been used almost

64   Krenar Gashi exclusively in these two areas, with conditions very often being imposed ad hoc rather than being intrinsic to the enlargement policy. Fulfilling the EU’s conditions only led to more conditions for Kosovo, to the point where EU conditionality is no longer perceived as a symbol representing progress towards full membership, but rather as a symbol that merely represents its own recurrence. Despite being locked into this symbolic order, conditionality produces real power effects and maintains real power relations between the EU as an intervener and Kosovo as a subject of intervention. Baudrillard’s writings are considered eclectic and radical in the realm of Western philosophy, so this chapter’s conclusions may well appear radical and subjective in the realm of EU studies. The elaborations herein, however, have drawn a different picture of the EU’s actions in Kosovo and their effects, a picture that is generally left out by researchers battling between the rationalist and constructivist views of the nature of the European project. As Baudrillard explains, in the “hyperreality” of simulations, even his writings were nothing but another simulation. The strategy of employing Baudrillard is, in his own words, to push analysis beyond all limits, to the point where it loses all objective validity, in order to gain in coherence – that is to say, in “real affinity” with the systems that surround us (Baudrillard 1984). As I have argued here, only by losing objectivity and disregarding the nature of the European project, and the EU’s intentions, can we hope to understand what the EU and its enlargement policy mean for Kosovo. Needless to say, the main aim of this chapter was not to dispute the “realness” of the statement that “the future of Kosovo is in the EU”, but rather to problematise such “realness” by exploring discourses and developments from a local perspective.

Notes   1 Interview by author with a Senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, 27 May 2016; Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016; Interview by author with a Kosovo journalist and editor, Pristina, May 2017; Interview by author with a Kosovo Albanian civil society activist, Pristina, May 2017; Interview by author with a Kosovo Serb civil society activist, Mitrovica, April 2016.   2 Interview by author with a senior diplomat from a large EU member state, Vienna, 21 May 2016; Interview by author with a diplomat from a small EU member state, Berlin, 21 May 2016; Interview by author with an official of the European Commission, Brussels, 16 February 2017; Interview by author with an official of the EU Office in Kosovo, Pristina, 3 May 2017.   3 Interview by author with a diplomat from a small EU member state, Berlin, 21 May 2016; Interview by author with an official of the European Commission, Brussels, 16 February 2017.   4 Interview by author with an official of the European Commission, Brussels, 16 February 2017; Interview by author with an official of the EU Office in Kosovo, Pristina, 3 May 2017.   5 Interview by author with a senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 25 May 2016; Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016; Interview by author with a Kosovo journalist and editor,

The hyperreality of EU enlargement   65 ­ ristina, May 2017; Interview by author with a Kosovo Albanian civil society P activist, Pristina, May 2017; Interview by author with a Kosovo Albanian civil society activist, Pristina, May 2017.   6 Interview by author with a senior official of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 16 May 2016; Interview by author with a senior diplomat from a large EU member state, Vienna, 21 May 2016; Interview by author with a diplomat from a small EU member state, Berlin, 21 May 2016; Interview with author a Senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, 27 May 2016.   7 Interview by author with a senior official of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 16 May 2016; Interview by author with a Senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, 27 May 2016; Interview by author with a senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 25 May 2016; Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016.   8 Interview by author with a senior diplomat from a large EU member state, Vienna, 21 May 2016; Interview by author with a diplomat from a small EU member state, Berlin, 21 May 2016.   9 Interview by author with a Senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, 27 May 2016; Interview by author with a senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 25 May 2016; Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016. 10 Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016; Interview by author with a Kosovo journalist and editor, Pristina, May 2017; Interview by author with a Kosovo Albanian civil society activist, Pristina, May 2017. 11 Interview by author with a Senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, 27 May 2016; Interview by author with a senior official of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, 25 May 2016; Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016; Interview by author with a Kosovo journalist and editor, Pristina, May 2017. 12 Interview by author with a Member of Parliament of Kosovo, Pristina, 24 May 2016; Interview by author with a Kosovo journalist and editor, Pristina, May 2017; Interview by author with a Kosovo Albanian civil society activist, Pristina, May 2017.

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5 Local inclusion or exclusion? Security sector development in Kosovo Florian Qehaja

Introduction1 Local ownership is one of the most frequent policy buzzwords used in post-­ conflict settings. To summarise the existing definition, local ownership signifies the involvement of local actors in leading reform processes in close coordination with international actors (Donais 2012; Richmond 2012). Local actors are meant to be the representatives of post-­conflict or post-­independence countries and the beneficiaries of support from the international community in a statebuilding process. While the significance of local ownership is easily perceived at first glance, it remains a contested concept because of its different interpretations in practice, “often linked to the conflicting operational and normative imperatives that face the international community” (Von Billerbeck 2017: 6). The contestation, however, is not found solely across the concept as such, but also in its origin since – as is the case with most concepts – local ownership is designed in Western circles. In that regard, the domination of Western concepts marginalises local scholarship and academia (Acharya and Buzan 2010: 222) despite the Western ambition to advocate for the rights of locals. This chapter aims at challenging the existing orthodoxy surrounding the production of knowledge about local ownership, which is dominated solely by the perspective of Western scholars. There is a widely shared assumption that explains the use of nascent Kosovo society as a case study in experimental learning for the benefit of Western-­based scholars, mainly serving individual research agendas and not the interests of the indigenous communities.2 In order to reach the desired level of understanding of the local context, research on local ownership should be deeply grounded in understanding the perceptions of the affected communities (Autesserre 2010). As in other post-­conflict countries, Kosovo’s society was not only “unable to further [its] own interests” (Krogstad 2014: 120), but it had limited capacities and space to assume ownership in examining local ownership in the crucial dimensions of statebuilding. The findings provided throughout this chapter rely on personal experience in both policy and academic research in the last ten years. It was possible to achieve this thanks to an academic experience both in-­house and overseas, including a strong affiliation with the international academic community. The idea was not

70   Florian Qehaja to challenge existing knowledge on local ownership per se: this chapter safely tests rather than invents a new concept of local ownership in security sector reform (SSR), from the perspective of a local. Looking at the question of local ownership from the position of a local scholar and practitioner gives a better understanding of the context and socio-­political dynamics. A focus on the security sector is of crucial relevance for identifying local perspectives owing to the contestation of international intervention in some processes in the security sector which – despite the new mandate and operating procedures – continues to represent the traditional state apparatus. The overarching findings explain how political ambiguity and the prioritisation of stability over institutionalisation led to the side-­lining of locals from the strategic development of the security sector. In particular, the arguments against the transformation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF ) into the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF ) represent one of the most relevant cases of external intervention in defiance of local demands. Consequently, the ownership of the design, management and control of the security sector was ambiguous and uneven. The empirical findings are based on the concepts of local ownership and SSR, within the broader theoretical framework of statebuilding and liberal peacebuilding theories. The first part of this chapter will concisely set out the state of knowledge in relations between the international community and local actors in different settings. This will be followed by empirical examples elucidating the complex relationships between the international community and local actors in developing the security sector in Kosovo.

Security for whom and by whom? During the Cold War, security was understood as “an instrument of ideologically driven realpolitik” (Sedra 2010:16), with the emphasis on state security. Now, the focus in contemporary International Relations (IR) is largely on state behaviour, which is analysed using different lenses – theories – in respect to different phenomena (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Williams 2013). Security in IR is understood as “the alleviation of threats to cherished values” (Williams 2013: 1). Unlike the traditional interpretation of security in the pre-­Cold War period, security nowadays is widely deemed indispensable to development, human rights, the rule of law and sustainable peace. In the absence of security, societies are left vulnerable to renewed conflict, radicalisation and corruption. The transition from traditional “security for the state” into “security for the people” is framed as Security Sector Reform (SSR) – a process aimed at developing and transforming a state’s security mechanisms to deal with security threats and better provide its citizens with consistent security measures, human rights and democratic norms (Nathan 2007: 15; Panarelli 2010: 1). Such practices are mainly put to use in post-­conflict environments in which conflict prevention is one of the tools (Edmunds 2002). This change was sparked by increasing experience and an improved understanding of the interconnection between development and security, which have

Local inclusion or exclusion?   71 suggested that there is a security-­development nexus (Fitz-­Gerald 2012; CMC 2017: 6), often explained as security sector development (Qehaja 2017: 89). Recognising the contemporary links between development and security in the global world, SSR has become a modern tool in reconstruction and societal reforms in post-­conflict and post-­authoritarian settings (Gordon 2014a: 2, 2014b: 127), where the domestic public security institutions can no longer keep order and protect their citizens (Bryden and Hänggi 2004: 121). Furthermore, the concept expands to two parallel levels of physical security and the control of the institutions providing security and rights (ibid.: 126). The aim of SSR is believed to be directed to the governing security institutions, particularly with respect to “soft issues”, such as democratic civilian oversight and the monitoring of human rights (Brzoska 2006). SSR is aimed at democratising security institutions in a wider sense, not merely the armed forces. Hence, the notion of a “holistic” security sector is widely referred to when examining SSR – one in which all actors are subject to reform, including the executive, monitoring and law-­making bodies. A holistic approach to the security sector connotes the inclusion, in addition to the police, military, intelligence and civil emergency services, of oversight institutions such as the parliament, independent oversight bodies and civil society. Alternatively, the broader approach to SSR incorporates non-­uniformed service and the entire justice system (Jackson 2011). While SSR was nominally well grounded, it was either miscommunicated or misused. It has been presumed that on top of the global security agenda, these practices are intended to advance the expansion of liberal values and support the Western status quo through support interventions shaped by liberalism rather than universal norms (Mac Ginty 2008: 143; Richmond 2009: 325), often framed as “liberalisation before institutionalisation” (Paris 2004: 179). Besides criticism of spreading liberal values, the externally driven, misinformed SSR has been characterised as a “classical white man’s burden” mission (Bryden and Hänggi 2004: 131), colonial liberalism (Richmond 2009: 340), “symbolic violence” (Lemay-Hébert 2011) and paternalistic to its core (Qehaja 2017: 44). While the primary actor in SSR is considered to be the local population, in practice the whole concept of “local ownership” was created, and is driven, by international actors. This asserts that the concept was created by external constituents to overcome the “unequal relationship” that remains as one of the main arguments against the application of local ownership. Notably, the international community has gained expertise in working in post-­conflict environments, democracy enforcement, arbitration and mediation (Ebnöther and Fluri 2005: 199). In addition to know-­how on stable security systems and their development, Western actors are often donors in SSR, questionably creating distinctively asymmetrical relationships by virtue of the money flow (Hellmüller 2012: 249), where the internationals structures are seen as the authority and the locals as the beneficiaries. Working in a foreign and often insecure environment with a restricted budget and idealistic plans, donors frequently start to manage SSR without clearly defined goals and with little understanding of the situational context (Panarelli 2010: 2). This can resonate at the different levels of society as a lack

72   Florian Qehaja of trust in the new institutions and their procedures (Gordon 2014a: 2). This practice is often advocated by the more practical considerations of local corruption, legitimacy, a lack of local capacity, urgency and donor priorities (Nathan 2007: 8). Hence, reforms are too often undertaken without the necessary background knowledge of the situation, leading to superficial and impractical outcomes (Nathan 2007: 18). The expertise and monopoly of knowledge among the international community in peacebuilding and reform strategies are being challenged globally. The same applies in the case of Kosovo. The inclusion of local actors has been regarded as a prerequisite for SSR programmes where an understanding of the unique context of the reforming state is a necessity (Nathan 2007: 18; Von Billerbeck 2017: 1). The importance of local actors is rooted in their deep knowledge of and cultural affinity with the country in which they are intervening. Although many countries undertaking SSR have been negatively affected by conflicts in their recent past, all cases are unique and, as such, no general approach, no quick fix, no guideline for solving the problems exists (Nathan 2007: 18; Autesserre 2010; Gordon 2014a: 4). Moreover, no nation or state can be approached as a tabula rasa, without political or social legacies (Bryden and Hänggi 2004: 131). Practice, however, shows very few differences between the approaches adopted for implementing SSR in Kosovo and those adopted in, for example, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The practice in both countries from the same region (Kosovo and Bosnia) represents a “package” containing a generic interpretation of good governance and liberalism. The problem is that this “package” is not always adapted to the local context, causing severe problems for the building of institutions. Undeniably, the externally driven models reflect a set of ideologies, rules, definitions and paradigms as well as “standard operating procedures” (Autesserre 2010). This set of international rules is not sufficiently attuned to the local context, and as a result problems of institutional sustainability can arise when international support is decreased. The typical “package”, or what Autesserre called a “toolkit”, is cynically demonstrated by the application of an identical “toolkit” in East Timor and Congo, just that the “template hit by find and replacing East Timor with Congo simply missed a few occurrences” (Autesserre 2010: 84). Some define this state of affairs as the “one-­ size fits all” paradox in SSR (Jackson 2011; Oosterveld and Galand 2012). Mac Ginty drew a parallel between this standardisation and IKEA enterprise – “a flat pack peace made from standardized components” (Mac Ginty 2008: 145). In order to overcome the superficiality and lack of context in SSR programmes, wide inclusion of local actors seeks to increase the legitimacy of the process and its eventual outcomes among the local population (Gordon 2014b: 129). Local ownership is also highlighted in the contemporary philosophy behind SSR, whereby the external actors assist in amending security forces and practices in order to safeguard citizens, with the locals ultimately taking responsibility for maintaining the reformed practices after the internationals have withdrawn (Panarelli 2010: 1; Gordon 2014b: 130). The concept of “local ownership” in SSR denotes the degree to which local actors control the design,

Local inclusion or exclusion?   73 its implementation and the performance of the international community in relation to the process (Qehaja 2017: 4). This means that the locals need to internalise the process and, if in doubt, the process is likely to fail (Brzoska 2006: 11; Donais 2009: 3). Likewise, it has been argued that local ownership as a concept is too vague and gives an illusory image of the situation, and that its use in rhetoric leads to disappointing application in practice (Ebnöther and Fluri 2005: 202; Donais 2008: 3; Autesserre 2010; Panarelli 2010: 1; Gordon 2014a: 3; Von Billerbeck 2017: 6). Furthermore, it is believed that local inclusion is vital to all learning processes, with ownership inspiring the subject as resolutions made by outsiders are not regarded as legitimate and presumably remain superficial (Lederach et al. 2007: 68; Richmond 2009: 327). Intrinsically, authenticity is increased in the process through the proximity and active engagement of the relevant society, including the most vulnerable – when the population concerned feels involved and respected (Lederach 2005: 61). To a large extent, SSR is a highly political measure that uncovers states’ vulnerabilities (Nathan 2007: 13). As such, mutual inclusion and sometimes even trust are questioned throughout the process between the locals and internationals (Gordon 2014a: 1; Qehaja and Prezelj 2017: 3). The approach to local inclusion varies between regions, where, principally in Africa, there has been a lack of local input and willingness to engage in ownership (Nathan 2007: 3; Billerbeck 2017: 132). Moreover, local actors are repeatedly portrayed as “a homogenous and disorderly Other, whose needs and aspirations do not conform to liberal standards” (Richmond 2009: 325). This assumption further precipitates the often-­addressed assumption that the locals’ policy-­drafting skills are undeveloped (Scheye and Peake 2005: 12; SDD and SDN 2006: 24). With such varying perceptions and difficulty in the application of localisation measures, it is considered that the concept of local ownership in SSR is used as a rhetorical tool rather than being purposely applied in practice (Nathan 2007: 3; Richmond 2009: 325). Regardless of the reasons to disregard local ownership, its absence is disadvantageous in the long run for democratic development and the sustainability of the state; “democracy cannot take root other than by democratic means” (Nathan 2007: 7). Besides, inclusion in the process teaches the locals and empowers them to produce long-­term results, whereas concentrating on the product and quick fixes undermines the sustainability and true localisation of the reform (Gordon 2014a: 6). Oftentimes, an SSR is meant to address the exact problems that locals are often blamed for, but the process of reform is too rarely taken into account as a useful tool for preparing to become a democratic state (Nathan 2007: 8). Instead, a hybrid approach needs to be created situationally, moving beyond the foreign vs local divide. Such a model could combine local structures and principles with liberal ones, integrating best practice (Richmond 2009: 336; Visoka 2011: 105) and further expanding participation in SSR by participants with civil society (Donais 2009: 14; Gordon 2014a: 8). All too often, locals have been used merely as a means for consultation in SSR, remaining as subjects and objects rather than agents (Richmond 2009:

74   Florian Qehaja 324). This has led to the unintended consequence of research resistance, mainly by local think tanks and NGOs that challenge the generic research provided by the international organisations. This research usually implied annual reports and surveys still limited by the bureaucracy and political positioning of these organisations. Furthermore, it is common for the international community to network widely with the top levels of societies – with those who possess Western educational credentials – which results in cooperation from only a small sector of the society. This has also been the case with the security sector in post-­independent Kosovo, in a period marked by excessive interference from international powers (see below), leading to legal and institutional ambiguity in the Kosovar security sector and overshadowing bottom-­up domestic demands (Qehaja 2017: xx–xxi). As a result, security policy was detached from the local reality, making Kosovo a prime example of lack of involvement by local constituencies in SSR ending up by endangering sustainable development (Qehaja and Prezelj 2017: 14).

The challenges of “internalising” local ownership in the Kosovar security sector The history of local ownership in the Kosovar security sector is unique, with varying levels of inclusion and exclusion of locals in the post-­conflict context (1999–2008). After the war in 1999, the delayed transfer of power to local people was justified using the contested and unresolved political status of Kosovo and the genuine lack of institutions capable of managing the security sector (Visoka 2011: 107; Qehaja and Prezelj 2017: 5), where there was no direct link between the former socialist security institutions and the post-­conflict efforts at institution building (KCSS 2011). This was largely managed on all levels of security sector development by the international administration and missions, whose political positioning challenged and outweighed domestic demands. In particular, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) lacked an exit strategy from Kosovo, which was read as a sign of its desire to retain its position and the status quo of the mission. With the benefits enjoyed by the international missions in Kosovo, the gap between internationals and locals caused social domination in the country (Caplan 2012: 4; Lemay-Hébert 2011). In 2004, the UNMIK mandate was reconfigured with more calls for local control in the security sector, which was due to follow after an Internal Security Sector Review that further confirmed the need for this (ISSR 2006). During this period, the international community took steps to develop the security sector by applying “best Western practices”. This, however, was not always locally endorsed. The best practice in some EU countries could serve as prime reference case studies, but these models could not simply be transplanted straight into the Kosovar security sector. Frequent references to “best Western practices” or Europeanisation artificially justified the interference of the international community in the security sector. Despite the goodwill of the international community to enable Kosovo embracing “best Western practices”, the

Local inclusion or exclusion?   75 environment usually represents the opposite pole of these values, making it practically impossible to put it on the right track (Musliu and Orbie 2014: 427). For example, the value of disarming police officers because this represents Western practice is one of the most ludicrous examples of failed international practice. To recall, during the international administration of Kosovo, senior international officers proposed a model of policing in which the Kosovo police should not possess a short weapon while on patrol, based on the assumption that possession of weapons in a post-­conflict environment triggers violence. The suggestion was based on the Danish model in which police officers do not possess weapons while patrolling (Qehaja 2017: 60). The same applied to another security institution – the Kosovo Protection Corps – whose leadership allowed a guerrilla movement (KLA) to be dismantled, thanks to a peace process, while providing no self-­protection mandate, let alone serving as security provider. A minor shift which diminished the almost absolute influence of international community in the security sector commenced with the process of Kosovar independence, in a few provisions embedded in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in 2008. Since the declaration of independence, the main responsibility for the security sector was transferred to the new Kosovar state, although the International Civilian Office (ICO) remained as the international body responsible for intervening in cases of dispute in the security sector. In 2008 the EU deployed its rule of law mission (EULEX), which, along with the NATO mission, KFOR, remained essential for ensuring a safe and secure environment and supporting Kosovo’s security sector. In particular, the role of EULEX, which aimed at developing the Kosovar institutions towards the EU changed over time, with only minimal executive powers remaining in 2012, while KFOR’s presence decreased considerably. The independence of Kosovo relied on provisional supervision by the ICO, EULEX and KFOR, but their actions often ran counter to the statebuilding interests of the local authorities. This situation was further complicated by the lack of an exit strategy for EULEX and KFOR, the inapplicable parallels and generalisations drawn between different post-­conflict SSR and the incongruence between local needs and “best Western practice” in SSR (Qehaja 2017: 69–71). The locals consequently became reliant on and tied to the actions of the international community, which created dependence. As shown in the case of the security forces below, dependence creates an unequal relationship that can at worst be misused, leading to distrust between the actors, sowing doubt and causing grievances. As a result of this dependence, the local leadership became obedient and servile to the international community, further suspending rooted and legitimate local governance, as domestic institutes were subordinate to international ones (Kurti 2011: 90). Moreover, in Kosovo, as in other post-­conflict settings, an exaggerated emphasis on stability is seen as the norm in reports by the international community, where the country’s institutional development and the results of reforms are simply overshadowed. The over-­satisfaction with the stability – exercised through “stabilocrats” (BiEPAG 2017) – eventually led to the militarisation of

76   Florian Qehaja security, with the number of international police and military becoming the measure of stability (Kurti 2011: 91). Tackling external security threats requires physical reform on the ground, where changes are easier and more quickly seen, although it is only a remedy to a problem. The case of exaggerated stability in Kosovo is a prime example of the neglect of locals in SSR. On top of all, it challenged the generic process of risk and threat assessment, because political assessment overrides professional assessment, and it led to no “alleviation of threats to cherished values”, as Williams (2013) pointed out. The most flagrant example is found in the process of drafting the National Security Strategy (NSS), in which the international community clearly and openly imposed a strategy which later failed to be implemented owing to a lack of reference to the local context, the side-­lining of the process and the prioritisation of politics over real security threats (see Qehaja and Prezelj 2017).

Statebuilding without armed forces The establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF ) as the local armed force was an externally driven political decision, not based on local needs or threat assessments. The process started in 2007 when the UN Special Envoy for the Final Status Settlement of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, in his final report came up with the conclusion that the emerging state of Kosovo should have an institution – the KSF – with a personnel capacity of 2,500 active and 800 reserves, lightly armed and with a clear mandate in tasks concerning disaster relief and civil protection (UN 2007). The momentum for proposing a new institution also came from the demands of the international community to disband the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) – a civilian protection organisation which operated from 1999 until 2008 as part of the process of demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The idea behind the “disbandment with dignity” of the KPC (UN 2007) was to cut the association between the Kosovar state institutions and the war, as further links would be detrimental to a multi-­ethnic society in which all communities (meaning ethnic minorities) were equally represented in the upcoming force. The decision to disband the KPC triggered reactions from members who could not generally agree with the reasoning, or with challenges to their future careers. Concerns about the latest force were clear: not more than 50% of KPC members would have the opportunity to join the new force, while the remaining members, regardless of age or skill, would need to enter a re-­integration programme. This would result in early retirement or in taking up a position in civilian employment. Furthermore, the decision was political, and initiated solely by the international community without previously consulting Kosovo’s governmental representatives or KPC members. The government representatives, however, had to accept this model in light of the general concessions required in order to achieve their goal – international support for Kosovo’s statehood. While creating an artificial distance between the KLA and KSF was the primary political intention of the international community, it was not entirely clear what made it propose a security institution which would not differ that

Local inclusion or exclusion?   77 much from the mandate of the disbanded KPC. This because both KPC and KSF had a primary mandate in disaster relief, with the minor difference that KSF would be lightly armed compared to the non-­armed KPC. Local actors believe that due to the small differences between the mandates of the KPC and KSF, the argument for creating a new security force would not have been convincing enough for the locals, if their opinion had been asked. Years after the establishment of the KSF, the discourse of local political actors and civil society in Kosovo reveals dissatisfaction and demands for its mandate to be altered. Newly emerging arguments on the deficiencies of the KSF – which is now solely in the hands of the locals – emphasise the differences between locals and the international community in their understanding of security needs and threats. While the local authorities believe there needs to be a defence cell that would take over the mandate from KFOR after ten years, the international actors would agree eventually to these terms but would prioritise macro-­stability over rationale – meaning that as long as there is still a lack of normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, the army could turn into a security problem. Here, the international community claims that since the independence of Kosovo is contested by some UN member states, the capabilities of the KSF would imply a balanced structure that would reflect not a traditional armed force but something in between – something less than military and more than police (Interviewee A 2014).3 In fact, the same arguments have been applied to the build-­up of the Kosovo police in the immediate post-­conflict period.4 The additional argument put forward by the international community was of a military nature: it stated that introducing a traditional army would be a direct threat to Serbia. The creation of Kosovar defence capabilities, it claimed, would pose a military threat to Serbia, as Kosovo would have the means to attack military assets in southern Serbia (Interviewee A 2014).5 The third argument covers the previous two arguments under the blanket of the open market and neo-­liberalism, suggesting that Kosovo does not need military capabilities in any capacity because there is no military threat to Kosovo, and maintenance would be costly. The first and second arguments fall under the obsessive exaggerated stability dilemma and cannot be considered viable: first, the decision to support the statebuilding process in Kosovo should have been followed in supporting the build-­up of the entire state apparatus, including the defence sector. The recognition by pro-­independence countries – which represents their stance on statehood – did not imply any dilemma over the right of Kosovars to assume full sovereignty. In this context, additional arguments concerning the presence of international military missions such as KFOR, and therefore the fulfilment of defence-­related tasks by this mission, are short-­sighted and against the core of local ownership. The international missions, including KFOR, are provisional because, as Donais has rightly stated, “the international missions cannot forever replace the local institutions” (Donais 2012). An analogy could have been drawn with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had no obstacle to the introduction of armed forces despite having an international military presence. ­Initially, there was also a NATO military presence, which was later replaced

78   Florian Qehaja by an EU military presence, in parallel with the presence of Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces (NATO 2004). Alternatively, the military argument is further weakened as, presumably, the KSF would ideally reflect the same strength in manpower (2,500 active members) but with a defence-­related mandate. From a traditional military point of view, how could this institution pose a threat to a country which has a well-­ established armed force 12 times the size of the KSF? The arguments the international community seemed to prioritise appeared to be based on its firm opposition to the creation of state-­related mechanisms. For example, Serbia’s National Security Strategy of 2009 refers to the regional threat arising from the creation of the Kosovar state. The strategy states explicitly that “the introduction of the so-­called KSF represents a serious threat to the existing regime of arms control and it is detrimental to the balance of powers in the region” (Government of Serbia 2009: 8). The strategy, however, failed to explain how the KSF (with a civilian protection mandate) could, militarily, be a threat to the region – let alone considering political arguments. Moreover, these political assessments could never be proved because, on the contrary, none of the intentions of the KSF Command or its members represented a threat to the national security of Serbia or other neighbours. The argument of a number of international stakeholders that there was “no need for a defence force” was also contradictory to the international community’s standard approach to the stability dilemma. On the one hand, the international community was promoting the preservation of stability, while on the other it rejected the traditional requirement of having armed forces. The problem with this can be answered with a simple response: Kosovo does not make an exception vis-­ à-vis other countries of the region which retained military capabilities, despite limited and reformed in the context of NATO integration. Contemporary armed forces are expected to safeguard peace and sovereignty, assist other state authorities if required and contribute to international peacekeeping missions. The prospects of the contemporary armed forces, in the context of Kosovo, are fully in line with the governmental and societal aim of joining NATO. The discourse of political actors and civil society in Kosovo reveals constant demands to modify the mandate of the KSF. In fact, the periods of ten years after independence and nearly ten years of international administration served as a “transition phase” to creating a defence structure. It was NATO that initially verified the semi-­operational capabilities of the KSF and the KSF ’s full operational capability (NATO 2013). The commitment to reach these capabilities has been indicated through statements by the senior level of the KSF. The establishment of a traditional armed force appeared to receive a wide range of support from the entire political and societal spectrum. People’s perceptions are used by local think tanks and NGOs but they are rarely used as a research tool by the international organisations. People’s perceptions taken into account by local thinks tanks and NGOs, but are rarely used as a research tool by international organisations, especially when it comes to security. For that purpose, it is extremely relevant to measure people’s support for decisions on

Local inclusion or exclusion?   79 security when studying the legitimacy and inclusiveness of such a decision. The survey in this study measured the public’s perception of the decision by the Kosovo government to introduce the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF ). The citizens were asked whether they: a) agreed with the existing mandate of the KSF or b) endorsed the decision to establish the KAF. Eighty-­seven per cent of K ­ osovars unreservedly endorsed the decision to transform the KSF into the KAF, while only 6 per cent said that they endorsed the KSF ’s existing mandate – which was solely to protect civilians. In fact, from a numerical point of view, it is certain that 87 per cent of the citizens supported a locally driven institutional design while only 6 per cent would be happy with the externally driven design. Only 7 per cent of the respondents did not give an opinion on the matter. This shows that the topic of defence reform is high on the agenda of ordinary Kosovar citizens. Despite the fact that the stability and security of the country were exaggerated, KFOR discourages the local forces from developing beyond their existing mandate. Moreover, the local and international communities have different sets of beliefs and cultural perceptions, which cannot be overcome with coercion. The symbolism of armed force echoes a commonly shared sociological understanding in the Western Balkans, uniting people over shared symbols (Celik 2012). Thus by removing the locals, not allowing or consulting on the use of commonly shared symbolism, the further transformation and development of the security sector rests on a fragile base. Subsequently, the international resistance to Kosovo’s right to having its own defence structure was absolute and powerful. This powerful approach under the banner of liberal intervention outweighed

Figure 5.1  What is your opinion on the future of the Kosovo Security Force? (n = 1,101).

80   Florian Qehaja local consent which can be interpreted as the weak positioning of the local actors. Despite strong political, security, institutional and societal arguments, Kosovars were not in a strong position to resist externally imposed institutional frameworks in light of robust negotiations and political dilemmas on the path towards statehood. Overall, the dilemma over the KSF (civil protection) – the KAF (defence) dichotomy represents a set of consequences that the international community will regard as lessons learned for subsequent actions in similar settings. First, the assessment of stability, risks, and threats needs to evolve in line with changes to circumstances on the ground. A politicised security assessment contains contradictions which impact on genuine institutional design. Second, this case showed that lack of consideration for a “bottom-­up” approach is unsustainable, as it can either turn into a lack of public support for the international community or can strengthen the increase discourse in favour of another model. Third, and from the institutional perspective, artificially created transitions follow a pattern of “disband-­create-disband-­create” (KLA-­KPC-KPC-­KSF ), leading to major financial and institutional implications and weaknesses for institutional memory.

Conclusion Local ownership is an essential policy instrument in favour of more local inclusion. Yet it remains an inconclusive concept in the absence of local knowledge production. Its primary aim of respecting the rights of the local people was artificially constructed in the policy circles of international development. Local ownership did manage to fulfil the technical requirements of introducing international policies, but it failed to apply the concept to the key processes of security sector development. The findings show that local ownership remained on the margins of donors’ “logframe”. The findings confirm that the international community disregarded the core principles of local ownership in the process of security sector development in Kosovo. This chapter showed that the development of the security sector in Kosovo appears to have been jeopardised as a result of externally driven models and advice, with these ideas prevailing over political and regional matters, disregarding the local demands. The actions of the international community can be justified on the basis of promoting democracy and European values – ideals which Kosovo aspires to, but which conflict with the local culture when transplanted entirely under the banner of “best international and/or European practice” (Musliu and Orbie 2014). The Kosovo case is fully in line with the existing academic debate which suggests that “in post-­conflict societies SSR appears as social engineering in which internationals teach domestic counterparts how to construct and manage a security sector” (Donais 2008: 7). Indeed, in the case of a denial of the right to create armed forces, the actions are beyond “mentoring”. Here, two problems are highlighted: on the one hand, the monopoly of an international authority in an emerging state, and on the other, the powerlessness of local actors to refuse the actions of the international authority. The public perception measurement

Local inclusion or exclusion?   81 c­ omplements the statements of relevant stakeholders and existing academic debate in which externally driven models in the security sector represent a societal problem in the long term. In the future, the international community should carefully consider its role in any particular context alongside the demands of local government representatives. It should avoid a standardised and externally based model of security and policing because these solutions, when tried in the context of Kosovo, proved to be unsuccessful and quite unsustainable. The over-­ emphasis on stability and the prevalence of “high politics” are detrimental to progress in the security sector. Overall, support for this sector should be based solely on the principle of internalising good context-­based practices in which the security sector gains sustainability. In the end, we are all seeking sustainable security solutions.

Notes 1 I am grateful for the assistance given by Ms Charlotta Lahnalahti during the research for the purposes of this chapter. 2 These arguments derive from the personal interviews conducted in the period 2014–2015 with local governmental and non-­governmental stakeholders for the purpose of my PhD. For more, please see: Qehaja. F. (2017) International or Local Ownership? Security Sector Development in Post-­Independent Kosovo. Washington, DC: Westphalia Press. 3 Interview by author with A, Former Senior Advisor to Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, Prishtina, 30 September 2014. 4 The intention of the international community was to increase the capabilities of the Kosovo police solely in the field of public order. This was because the primary intention of the international community was to build a police force for immediate post-­conflict challenges, and fulfil a basic security requirement. This categorised the building up of the force for a provincial rather than a state level. Hence the investment was made to ensure that the police would not resemble the kind of police service found in normal states. 5 Interview by author with A, Former Senior Advisor to Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, Prishtina, 30 September 2014.

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6 Making the law, ruling the law International statebuilding and the rule of law in Kosovo Dafina Buçaj

Introduction When a people declare independence, the opportunity presents itself to create a legal personality from the ground up and, as part of its self-­determination, that people is entitled to choose how it wants to be governed, what institutions it wants to have and what legal system and school of thought it deems most appropriate for itself. In practice, however, it is very rarely nowadays that a country is built from scratch and, as history has shown, even though the creation of a new state is a matter of fact, the role of the international community in allowing and supporting this is crucial. These processes are very often met with different ideas as to what the goals of statebuilding should be. Consequently, there is no single definition of statebuilding. The Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) defines it as “an endogenous process to enhance the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-­society relations” (OECD 2008: 11), so it is considered “primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is necessarily limited” (OECD 2011: 20). Statebuilding thus aims to strengthen the capacity to fulfil key state functions (OECD 2011: 60), which include a range of activities such as rebuilding infrastructure, providing state services, creating and building the capacity of the institutions (executive, legislative and judicial) and upholding democratic governance, civil and political rights, gender equality and human rights in general (Grävingholt et al. 2012: 7). It is generally accepted that the three building blocks needed for a state to function are a political settlement, essential capabilities and expected capabilities (Whaites 2008; Fritz and Menocal 2007; DFID 2009). While other building blocks are dealt with throughout this book, the main focus of the chapter in hand is on the second block, in particular the “establishment and maintenance of the rule of law” requirement (Ingram 2010: 5). This chapter aims to provide a general analysis of the drafting of legislation and the building of a system for the rule of law in Kosovo, examining how the international community has impacted on this process, and to what extent it has failed to create an effective, sustainable legal system. It has been contended that introducing the rule of law entails several segments, such as: establishing governance and judicial structures that

Making the law, ruling the law   85 function on the basis of effectiveness, inclusiveness, transparency and independence; reforming the existing legal framework and drafting new legislation; and, lastly, the societal aspect of building public commitment to human rights and trust in the rule of law and governmental institutions (Wippman 2010: 366). While the status nascendi of a state presents a rare opportunity for scholars and practitioners to come with their brilliant minds and create a system from scratch, as David Wippman (2010: 366) notes, building the rule of law in a post-­conflict society is a daunting task, as it not only involves many institutional components such as courts, legislatures, a good educational system, a free press and strong civil society, but it also requires a cultural commitment by the society to the new values associated with the rule of law, as well as the support of the society in general. That being so, one could argue that statebuilding requires not only the capacity and willingness of the international bodies, but also a dose of understanding and sensitivity towards the local population and their culture – the lack of which results in the creation of institutions that are detached from the realities of the local people (Coelho 2015). In practice, statebuilding is often met with overexcitement, different schools of thought and conflicting agendas, resulting in complex, dysfunctional national systems. Kosovo is one of the examples where the statebuilding process has been highly influenced – not to say dictated – by the international community. Drafting legislation and establishing the rule of law, as key components of statehood, are the areas that have been most influenced by the international community in different ways, whether through direct control of the drafting processes or dictating certain decisions, through the investment agendas of donors or, most recently, through the EU integration agenda. With more than $14 billion in foreign aid, Kosovo is considered to have received more assistance than any other similar territory in the world (Howard 2013: 28), and has been regarded as the most expensive effort at democratisation and statebuilding (Bardos 2004: 21), yet there is much criticism of the success of these efforts owing to Kosovo’s weak economic development (Yannis 2004; Chesterman 2004). There is no denying that the institutions have been established and the legal tools necessary to enable the country to function have been approved, but the actual efficiency of the system as a whole, leaves much to be desired. The argument in this chapter is elaborated into two major sections. The first section of the chapter will give the general background to the international community’s involvement in setting up the rule of law sector in Kosovo and in the legal drafting process – thereby aiming to paint a bigger picture of statebuilding efforts from the early stages by providing information about the initial years of international involvement, prior to the declaration of independence (Assembly of Kosovo 2008a). The second section elaborates on the impact of the international community on the drafting of the core legal document on statehood – the Constitution of Kosovo. In particular, the section focuses on the difficulty of implementing certain provisions of the Constitution, which resulted in obstacles to the building and strengthening of Kosovo’s statehood. Section three focuses mainly on the rule of law sector as a core component of statehood, and in particular on

86   Dafina Buçaj the role of the international community in the process of drafting some of the key legislation. While its contribution has been significant, as will be shown in this section the donor-­driven agenda and the lack of consensus among the international community has often resulted in a power struggle between institutions and the creation of redundant bodies and institutions, which has then translated into a lack of efficiency. The controversial impact of international aid will further be elaborated in section four, which will discuss the role of the international community in strengthening the institutions: namely, the impact that the presence of the international missions has had on the (in)ability of the local institutions, especially the judiciary, to fulfil their obligations. And lastly, the fifth section examines a rather controversial topic: the establishment of the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in order to prosecute war crimes. This topic finds itself in this chapter not because of its lack of popularity among the population and the politicians, but rather on account of its controversial legal structure and the manner in which these bodies were established.

International constitution making and the challenges to Kosovo’s statehood The factors surrounding statebuilding in Kosovo are very complex, as it occurred in two different stages characterised by different efforts. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, which means that, since its de facto separation from Serbia in 1999, after the NATO intervention, more than nine years are unaccounted for. Although the main focus of this chapter is to look at the statebuilding efforts around the time of and after the declaration of independence, it is of interest to understand the developments that took place during the intermediate period, 1999–2008, when Kosovo was under UN administration, as it is during this time that the basis was laid for independence and for Kosovo’s functioning as a state. Following a 72-day bombing campaign by NATO, with no UN backing, on 10 June 1999 the UN Security Council passed a resolution outlining the post-­war settlement for Kosovo (Rogel 2003: 12). The resolution, known as Resolution 1244, authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo, established KFOR, and envisaged the deployment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (UNSC Res 1244 1999). UNMIK was given a very broad mandate: among other things, Regulation No. 1999/1 assigned to it all legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including for the administration of the judiciary (UNMIK 1999) – thus vesting in UNMIK exclusively all powers to do with building institutions in both the executive and the judiciary. The international community, under the UNMIK umbrella, played a major role in setting up some of the core legal institutions and drafting the initial legal framework. UNMIK began its statebuilding work, as Cady (2012: 27) describes, “from a tabula rasa situation” in which there were no judges, no applicable law and no detention centres, since, during the ten years of Milošević’s attempt to

Making the law, ruling the law   87 “cleanse” Kosovo of its Albanian population, all the judges of Albanian ethnicity, as well as other relevant officials, had been dismissed. UNMIK governed through 435 regulations between 1999 and 2008. However, the responsibilities of UNMIK were rendered obsolete when Kosovo declared independence, although legally Resolution 1244 has never been abrogated and there continues to be a UNMIK office in Prishtina to this day. On the other hand, almost simultaneously with Kosovo’s proclamation of independence, in February 2008, the Council of the European Union in one Joint Action appointed both the EU Special Representative and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo: EULEX Kosovo (Council of the European Union 2008). Constitution making can play a central role in statebuilding, as it not only provides the operating system for establishing a country’s institutions but also establishes the relationship, the political bond, between the people and their government (Wallis 2014). It is therefore suggested that people should have the final say as to their desired form of government and should be given the opportunity to participate in drafting their state’s constitution (Michelman 2003). In that regard Joanne Wallis argues that public participation in constitution making can play a particularly important role in statebuilding because it can provide fragmented and divided societies with the opportunity to resolve their grievances, agree on common values and norms, and work out how they are going to be best accommodated and adjust to the transition to statehood. (Wallis 2014: 2) While that is in principle the case, the drafting of a constitution and its subsequent implementation can become a source of division and an obstacle to achieving statehood. As will be argued below, this was the case in Kosovo. To understand how the Constitution of Kosovo came about, namely the drafting process in 2008, one must go back almost 19 years to understand how Kosovo’s independence originally came into being, as the compromises in the final text of the Constitution reflect a long period of negotiations. The Rambouillet peace talks in 1999 aimed at reaching an agreement to end the violence in Kosovo. They were governed by certain principles, which related primarily to ending criminality, to safeguarding the territorial integrity of Serbia, to finding a peaceful solution for Kosovo’s population through an interim mechanism that would lead to a final status settlement, and to general issues relating to governance in Kosovo, human rights and the implementation of the agreement (Weller 1999: 225–226; Rogel 2003: 12). While the main contentious issue in the talks and in the draft agreement itself was the status of Kosovo, which was deemed to be the reason why the talks failed, the draft agreements drawn up by the International Group provide a good basis for understanding where some of the core principles relating to governance in Kosovo originated. Although the Rambouillet talks failed, some principles of the draft agreement guided the process of drafting the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo

88   Dafina Buçaj Status Settlement, which was mandated on the basis of the UN Security Council’s conclusion that the situation in Kosovo was no longer sustainable (UN Security Council 2007). The Ahtisaari Plan contains certain basic provisions which, after independence, were incorporated into Kosovo’s Constitution. They include provisions on the composition of the Kosovo Assembly and the seats reserved for the non-­majority communities (Art. 3.2); on symbols and an anthem to reflect the country’s multi-­ethnic character (Art.  1); on legislation of vital interest that requires the approval of the majority of the non-­majority communities in addition to that of the Assembly (Art.  3.7); on the need for the consent of the majority of communities to the election of two Constitutional Court judges (Art. 6.2), as well as reserved positions throughout the entire judicial system in Kosovo. As described by Ahtisaari himself, in an article where he sets out the basis for the provisions and the reasons for approaching them in this manner, many of those relating to the institutions – in particular those relating to the position of the Serbian community in Kosovo – were proposed as a compromise with Belgrade (Ahtisaari 2008: 185), rather than deriving from Kosovar society. This may partly explain why some of these provisions have never enjoyed the support of society as a whole, and later proved to be problematic. The blocking of the creation of the Kosovo Armed Forces by the Serbian political representatives in the Assembly, for more than four years now – ever since 2015, when the initiative was put forward by the government (Bytyçi 2017) – is one of the most relevant examples of the constitutional provisions whose implementation has run into difficulty and which are often used counter-­ effectively. All this thanks to the “veto power” of the Serbian community – one of the compromises Kosovo made in the long process of claiming liberty and statehood, and a compromise that has now come back to haunt its statehood during votes in the Assembly. As envisaged in the Constitution itself, amending it requires the approval of two-­thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly including two thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly holding reserved or guaranteed seats for representatives of communities that are not in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo. (Constitution Art 144) In accordance with Article 64 of the Constitution, ten seats are reserved for the Serbian community and ten for other non-­majority communities. As a result, not only does the decision on the creation of the Kosovo Armed Force require constitutional amendments, but any decision that requires constitutional changes is dependent on the approval of two-­thirds of the non-­majority communities. In practical terms this means that any decision can be blocked, or indirectly vetoed, by the Serbian non-­majority community when it presents a united front and is backed by the Serbian government in Belgrade (TANJUG 2017). The constitutional provisions presented above, along with many others, are included in the package introduced by the international community as part of

Making the law, ruling the law   89 their statebuilding efforts, to which Kosovo had to agree in return for its independence and statehood. Accepted by Kosovo as a compromise, in return for independence and statehood, they have become the greatest obstacles to that statehood. These provisions, however, were drafted without consultation of the public – a norm which, as indicated above, guarantees the bond between citizens and their Constitution. Consequently, many norms in Kosovo’s Constitution do not reflect the history or desires of the majority of the population, resulting in the latter’s resistance to accepting or identifying with those provisions.

Fragmented legal drafting when designing an even more fragmented rule of law sector Kosovo has often been referred to as “the spotlight of international agencies” (Dursun-­Ozkanca 2009: 5). Howard argues that where statebuilding has taken place in the form of neotrusteeship, which is “a complex mix of international and domestic governance structures that … involve a remarkable degree of control over domestic political authority and basic functions by foreign countries” (Howard 2014: 132), it can be effective, but that dividing the leadership can lead to circumstances where no one is in control. In Kosovo, international governance was divided between the UN, NATO, the US and the EU, which very often resulted in divided decision making and turned Kosovo into a battlefield for the power of states and different interests (Dean 1999). One may therefore argue that Kosovo remains an unsettled order with international actors actively entertaining different visions of what it should be and how it should get there (Bátora et al. 2018). An International Crisis Group report describes the rule of law as a sector that has suffered from “a cacophony of advice from well-­ meaning foreign advisers and donors pushing incompatible agendas” (Crisis Group 2010: 1), saying it has been merely an empty formula designed to please donors hoping for peace and stability (Wählisch 2010: 10). It is undeniable that legal drafting in Kosovo has been donor driven, and while donor support has meant both financial and technical assistance, at times it has caused delays, or clashes between international stakeholders pushing different agendas and attempting to introduce practices from their different home countries which, excellent though they may be, often do not fit well with one another. The remainder of this chapter aims to look at two segments in terms of building the rule of law in Kosovo: horizontal and vertical legal drafting and, from the macro perspective, how the rule of law functions as a whole. From a horizontal perspective there is an understanding among the stakeholders in Kosovo that the legal drafting process has been led by the international community and has rarely faced resistance from local stakeholders, and that different sets of provisions were borrowed from the international legal order and transposed into the domestic legal system (Buçaj 2016). However, international involvement has very often caused long delays in passing very important laws, owing to the disputes between EU and US advisers who were often caught squabbling over the merits of their respective legal systems (Crisis

90   Dafina Buçaj Group 2010). Furthermore, the use of different approaches has led the same laws to be amended over and over again throughout the years, using different models depending on which donor supports the changes at a given time. To date, approximately 438 laws have been drafted and approved in Kosovo (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo 2018). While this is a great achievement, as it shows all the work and effort that have been put into building the legal framework, what is worrisome is the fact that some 158 of these laws have been abrogated by new ones, and there have been approximately 125 amendments: very often, a law that abrogated a previous one was itself amended subsequently (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo 2018). Some, such as the law on procurement, have been newly introduced or amended up to seven times in the eight years since Kosovo’s independence. The Constitution itself has been amended four times since its initial approval in 2008 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo 2018). Such frequent changes have jeopardised legal certainty, not only for society in general, which finds it hard to know what the applicable law is, but even for lawyers. Later on, when observing the legal drafting process and the establishment of the institutions, it can be seen that the different donors pushed for their own models, thereby creating a system of ill-­fitting puzzles that lacks uniformity, and consequently impeding the efficiency of the justice system. A good example is the drafting of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, which were strongly influenced by the US government and their support, resulting in the introduction of certain US-­based instruments (Buçaj 2016; Marmullakaj 2017). Moreover, the US heavily influenced the drafting of the Crime Victim Compensation Law, as well as laws in the commercial field and on property rights (USAID Programs). On the other hand, in recent years the rule of law has been guided by Kosovo’s prospects of European Union membership, and influenced by the EU itself through different forms of conditionality, such as those set out in periodical progress reports on Kosovo, regional strategies and other specific policy guidance, including the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law, the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap and, most recently, the European Reform Agenda. Through these instruments EU has pushed for different reforms in Kosovo. The Visa Liberalisation Roadmap alone stipulated around 40 requirements for Kosovo to meet before it could join the Schengen Area (European Commission 2012). Furthermore, donor assistance has also led to the establishment of different institutions. According to a recent report by the Ministry of Public Administration there are 79 independent bodies in Kosovo – 33 established by the Kosovo Assembly and 47 by the government – all established at different times with the support of different donors and with no clear guidelines or powers (Ministry of Public Administration 2016). So, despite their attempts to perform their duties well, in practice there are often power struggles between them. For example, several institutions deal with corruption, ranging from the State Prosecutor’s Office, the Specialist Prosecutor and the Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) to the Anti-­Corruption Agency and Anti-­Corruption Council of the President of the

Making the law, ruling the law   91 Republic of Kosovo, and including the most recent invention – the task force. “There has been a tendency to establish anti-­corruption initiatives and institutions instead of strengthening the existing ones” (Freedom House 2013: 8), which has led to power struggles and a lack of efficiency and accountability, while these bodies only become a burden on the budget of Kosovo. One might hope that the above are only problems with legal drafting, and that these laws and institutions are efficient and functional. This, however, is not always the case. When looking at the process of legal drafting from a vertical perspective, the procedure for proposing and enacting laws in Kosovo is – formally – fairly simple. The first step is to draft a concept document justifying the law, which, once approved, enters the government’s legislative plan. The sponsoring ministry conducts the entire drafting process, including consultations with other stakeholders, and produces the final draft which is then submitted to the government for approval (Regulation on the Work of Government). Next, the draft law undergoes two – or if necessary three – readings at the Assembly while, in between, the relevant committees may propose amendments and hold public hearings (Rules of Procedure of the Assembly). Following approval, the law is sent to the president for promulgation. Timewise, the process can optimally be concluded between six and 12 months. In practice, however, it is much more complicated and time-­consuming than the process legally prescribed, and may very often diverge from it. An elaborate example of the actual process, which can truly be described as “dramatic”, thanks to the clashes and different positions of stakeholders, could be observed during the amendment of the four core laws of the judiciary, namely the Law on Courts, on the Prosecutor’s Office, on the Judicial Council and on the Prosecutorial Council. To begin with, the initial requirement to amend these laws arose not from a concept document drafted by the government but rather from criteria set out in the EU’s visa liberalisation roadmap. Consequently, the amendment of the four core laws of the judiciary was automatically included in the government’s legislative plan, because it was an EU requirement (see Assembly of Kosovo 2015a). The initial drafting by the Ministry of Justice had begun in 2013, but the laws were not completed until 2015: they had been put on hold for a considerable time following a request from the European Action External Service (EEAS) – communicated orally by the EU Office in Pristina – not to start amending them until a justice agreement had been reached in the political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (facilitated by EU), as the amendment process might affect the outcome of the talks. This is an example of the conflicting requirements issued by the EU in terms of legal drafting. More difficult, however, is the process of managing and coordinating the views and opinions of the different stakeholders: on the one hand local, on the other the international ones. While some of the international stakeholders have similar views, that is not always the case with the EU, as very often the opinions expressed by the EULEX judges and prosecutors may differ from those of the EU projects under the Instrument for Pre-­Accession Assistance, namely, the twining projects. Despite

92   Dafina Buçaj the fact that, in general, the EU’s approach to the rule of law in Kosovo is hailed as a good example of internal EU collaboration, in practice the EC’s twinning projects greatly resemble EULEX’s Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising activities – and, owing to the EU Office’s working methods, streamlining its activities with those of EULEX entails some practical challenges (Derks and Price 2010). In some cases, “both at Brussels and field level, the Commission and the Council’s CSDP missions clash over who has competency to do what, which hampers the ability to ensure such a coherent approach” (Derks and Price 2010: 17. The EU has created the Legislative Review Mechanism in an attempt to unify its positions (EU in Kosovo 2016; JRCB Conclusions 2017), but in practice it does not always succeed. A concrete example of these conflicting views is the request from the EU – in the meeting of the Committee on Legislation, Mandates, Immunities, Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and the Oversight of the Anti-­ Corruption Agency, held on 26 May 2015, at the Assembly – to remove one of the proposed articles concerning the review by the Supreme Court of Prosecutorial Council decisions (Assembly of Kosovo 2015a). The said provision was incorporated into the law upon a proposal from one of the EU–CoE joint projects, recommending a review procedure (PECK 2013). This example shows that the rule of law in Kosovo is characterised by a multiplicity of voices (both local and international) and their competing visions (Bátora et al. 2018). From the above we can observe that, despite the efforts to coordinate among the stakeholders, the reality is that there are many times when there are clashes, including between different donors such as the EU and US, owing to their different ideas and objectives. “Because the Kosovar government often still looks for guidance from the United States – which they regard as their most important and influential ally – this hampers a coherent overall donor approach to the rule of law in Kosovo” (Derks and Price 2010: 23) There are claims that US bodies in Kosovo draft new legislation about whose compatibility with the acquis communautaire the Kosovo government consults with the EC only at a later stage (Crisis Group 2010). On the other hand, USAID has complained that the US and EU philosophies and approaches diverge at times, and that this delays USAID in achieving its objectives (Venner 2016). And not only that: the clashes very often result in the establishment of a fragmented rule of law system, to the detriment of efficiency and service delivery.

The [lack of] power of the judiciary Ten years after independence and 19 years since the end of the war, with millions of funds having been allocated to building the rule of law in Kosovo, justice continues to be one of the most criticised sectors not only in international reports but also by Kosovo’s own citizens. According to a recent survey, “36% of citizens were satisfied with the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions combined, which is considered an increase from previous years” (UNDP Kosovo 2017: 2). The EU’s country report for Kosovo is one of the most highly influential resources used for identifying the progress Kosovo has made and the

Making the law, ruling the law   93 improvement needed. The 2018 report is not very different from the previous ones, and lists rule of law as one of the most concerning sectors, where progress is slow. Among its main findings, the report states that more efforts are needed in the fight against corruption and organised crime, while the need to increase the independence and efficiency of the judiciary is one of the most concerning issues (European Commission 2018). The report’s findings indicate what the current situation is, and what progress has been made, and it also serves as a tool for further reforms – it does not, however, analyse why progress is so slow, what causes this. One of the main takeaways from the report is that, ten years after independence, some progress has been made but the “judiciary is in its initial stages”. In a young country aspiring to EU membership, at a time when its neighbours are being given candidacy status, for the people of Kosovo it is slightly disappointing to receive a report that notes a slowing-­down of progress (KohaNet 2018). However, when the report is analysed with due consideration for the manner in which the justice system in Kosovo has been run to date, the statement that “the judiciary is its initial stages” – particularly in the areas of corruption, financial crimes and organised crime – may be the most appropriate finding. This is because the international missions in Kosovo have been exclusively in charge of prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the above-­mentioned crimes, and only recently have such executive powers been transferred to Kosovo’s own institutions. Until 2008, UNMIK had exclusive power to administer justice in Kosovo. It has been contended, however, that “UNMIK did too little to build up Kosovo’s own capacity during the decade [in which] it ran the territory” (Crisis Group 2010: 14). With Kosovo’s independence, although there was no formal handover, it looked as if (and this is how some describe it) EULEX took over from UNMIK (Novotna 2010: 589). Similarly, for its initial mandate EULEX had exclusive powers in the judiciary. By virtue of the Law on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors (Assembly of Kosovo 2016), the latter were empowered to take any case “whenever it was considered necessary for the proper administration of justice” (Article 3 of the Law on EULEX). In addition, EULEX had exclusive competence to deal with the crimes investigated by the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, which dealt mainly with high-­profile corruption cases, organised crime and war crimes (Assembly of Kosovo 2008b). Only with the changes made to its mandate in 2014, and later, in 2016, did EULEX cease to have exclusive competence to take over any case it “desired”. The statement that Kosovo’s judiciary is in its initial stages, therefore, may well be accurate. The success of the rule of law in Kosovo should also be measured with reference to the success of the international missions there. As stated above, between 1999 and 2014 UNMIK, and originally also EULEX, had full authority to transfer any case to the “internationalised” docket, and the number of cases that both UNMIK and EULEX took on, but did not close, ran into thousands (Bátora et al. 2018: 19). The question therefore remains whether the international missions fulfilled their mission. Where the executive branch is concerned, the EU

94   Dafina Buçaj contributed to setting very high expectations when the EULEX mission was launched in 2008, and the perception among the locals is that those expectations have not been met (Bátora et al. 2018: 26). Further on, one of the goals – and expectations – of the international missions was hat that international officials would act as mentors to their local counterparts, and that capacity building and executive functions would go hand in hand (Bátora et al. 2018: 20). In Kosovo’s case, while there has been a significant mentoring process in the police and customs, the same cannot be said of the judiciary, in relation to either UNMIK or, later, EULEX judges. Various reasons have been put forward to explain why the mentoring and capacity-­building processes did not take place, attributing this failure to technical difficulties – e.g. judges not being located together and working in the same offices (Skendaj 2014: 93) – or more substantial obstacles such as the “independence of the judges”, as the executive branch was separated from the mentoring one and the executive, according to one report, was even told not to perform any mentoring tasks (Bátora et al. 2018: 20). It can thus be argued that the international missions have failed in one of their core functions: building the capacity of local stakeholders and investing in human resources in Kosovo. Moreover, one of the main criticisms of the judiciary in Kosovo is that “judicial independence and [the] rule of law remain weak, and continuing inefficiencies in the system prevent the judicial branch from effectively playing its role as a counterbalance to the powerful executive branch” (USAID Kosovo 2018: i). One of the priorities for the local institutions is the creation of an independent judiciary, free from political interference, so the perceived political interference with EULEX judges and prosecutors is far from helpful: although there is a categorical denial of direct instructions from Brussels on what decisions they should be reaching, many judges and prosecutors admit to indirect interference. This interference is exercised through subtle pressure, such as instructions when a certain person is needed for a political goal, when interim measures are not to be implemented by the police, or when a request concerning a case should not be granted (Bátora et al. 2018: 26).

Specialist chambers – the champion of innovation and interference by the international community Despite its well-­intended goals, international executive assistance has very often undermined the ability of Kosovo’s judiciary to act. One of most serious instances of this, where not only Kosovo’s judges and prosecutors were undermined, but also the EULEX mission itself, was the establishment of the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office – or, as it is known in Kosovo, the Special Court (“Specialist Chambers”). The Specialist Chambers are a unique, complex structure that requires detailed analysis. For the purposes of this chapter, however, there are two main aspects that affect Kosovo’s statebuilding efforts: the establishment process and the structure itself, and how the existence of the chambers affects the judiciary.

Making the law, ruling the law   95 The Specialist Chambers were de facto established by the Kosovo Assembly through the Law on the Specialist Chambers following the constitutional changes that paved the way for their establishment (Assembly of Kosovo 2015c). The “requirement” to establish them, however, came from the international community, mainly the EU. The idea arose from an initial special task force investigating the allegations made in a report by the Council of Europe (2011, Dick Marty Report), and although they were set up under the jurisdiction of Kosovo, they were actually located in The Hague. The Kosovo Assembly and other institutions agreed to the establishment of the Specialist Chambers under Kosovo’s jurisdiction with certain modalities under the threat that “if Kosovo will not do it, then the UN will” (KohaNet 2014). At the time they were approved, the establishment by the UN of an International Tribunal for Kosovo was considered a worse scenario by Kosovo’s government and MPs because, in their view, a UN tribunal would open the door to the involvement of Russia and China and would undermine Kosovo’s international statehood (Assembly of Kosovo 2014). Nevertheless, as indicated above, both the jurisdiction and the structure of the chambers undermine Kosovo’s judiciary, as the chambers are attached to each level of the court system, including a chamber of the Constitutional Court, but they conduct their work separately from the rest of Kosovo’s system (Assembly of Kosovo 2015b). Moreover, the law provides for a separate Specialist Prosecutor’s Office and a full supporting administration, including victim support, as well as an Ombudsperson. The structure is thus a mirror of Kosovo’s overall justice system, but it is run by the EU and completely excludes local institutions. In addition, one of the main justifications for having the chambers run entirely by internationals and relocating them to the Netherlands was based on allegations that Kosovo was not a safe environment for witnesses. Such justifications undermine not only the role of the judiciary in Kosovo but also the work of EULEX itself, as it is the mission that was in charge of prosecuting war crimes, including those for which the chambers were established, and it also ran the witness protection system (Law on EULEX). Moreover, taking into consideration the lack of support among Kosovo’s institutions and citizens, the chambers “risk becoming mere shells or being captured by private or patrimonial interests, since they are not rooted in society” (OECD 2008 para 10). Although at the time of writing the chambers have yet to issue indictments, there are already doubts among members of the legal community, civil society and political commentators that the Specialist Chambers could bring justice to their families, regardless of whether they come from the Albanian or the Serbian community (Visoka 2017). Furthermore, there is already widespread distrust of the international tribunals, and the new setup is no different since a great many Kosovars already considers that the court has no legitimacy as it consists solely of internationals and operates outside Kosovo (Visoka 2017). Having regard to the fact that judges in a country derive their authority from the population, i.e. from the sovereign, and bearing in mind that the Specialist Chambers are composed exclusively of international professionals, it remains to be seen how the population will react when indictments or judgments are rendered.

96   Dafina Buçaj

Conclusion It has been contended that “exhausting external support by international organizations risking to substitute statehood” (Wählisch 2010: 10), and it could very easily be argued that this was the case for Kosovo. International assistance, and in particular international missions, are effective when they are present in a country for a short time and manage to achieve their core mission, which is to build local capacity. International donors must make sure that, in parallel to exercising their executive competencies, they pass on the accumulated knowledge to the local authorities and activate local expertise (Grävingholt et al. 2012: 43). As elaborated above, by retaining their executive powers international missions like UNMIK and EULEX have not only failed to pass on knowledge to local actors but have kept the latter from exercising such executive powers. Nineteen years after the war, Kosovo still has a large presence of international missions, including some with executive judicial competence. Their continued presence, for such a lengthy period, raises some questions as to what the true purpose behind the mission is – whether it is statebuilding or the personal interests of the staff employed in the missions. Nevertheless, in general there is no question but that, when compared to 19 years ago, Kosovo has come a long way and a great deal has been achieved in building the legal framework and upholding the rule of law. Local people, however, complain that there could have been more progress. As this chapter shows, the aid could potentially have been better utilised in achieving the goals of statehood, and probably with less resources. The chapter identifies several segments where, despite having good intentions, international assistance has had undesirable effects on Kosovo’s statehood. The international community has had a significant influence on the process of drafting all the key legislation in Kosovo such as the Constitution, the core laws on the judiciary and their respective sublegal acts, and has also proposed new and innovative legislation to improve the existing framework. Nevertheless, these proposals and suggestions, although well intended and selected as the best pieces from the jigsaw puzzles of other national legal systems, when put together in Kosovo they very often seem not to fit the pattern there. Down the years this has led to considerable difficulty in applying these legal provisions, which are very often in conflict with others, drafted at a different time at the incentive of a different donor or international organisation. A similar criticism can be levelled at the functioning of the rule of law system. As elaborated throughout the chapter, the rule of law sector is one of those most severely criticised in Kosovo, owing to its lack of efficiency and accountability. The lack of power at a certain level can be, and is, attributed to the failure of the international community to strengthen local capacity, attempting instead to replace it with international executive assistance. In addition, the failure to build trust among citizens and extend sovereignty to the whole territory of Kosovo may be the greatest challenge the judiciary has faced, so, although legally the justice system has been integrated, it remains to be seen in practice how effective the rule of law will be in the north. On the other hand, the establishment of a specialist judicial institution

Making the law, ruling the law   97 almost 15 years after the war and eight years after independence – an institution run entirely by internationals and relocated to a third country – undermines the effort to create a strong, unified rule of law system. As a result, Kosovo has moved from parallel judicial structures run by Belgrade to parallel judicial structures run by EU, thus continuing the chain of distrust in the rule of law in Kosovo.

References Ahtisaari, M. (2008) ‘Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 19(1): 183–187. Assembly of Kosovo (2008a) ‘Kosovo Declaration of Independence’. Pristina: Assembly of Kosovo’. Available at: www.assembly-­kosova.org/common/docs/Dek_Pav_e.pdf (accessed 11 September 2018). Assembly of Kosovo (2008b) ‘Law on the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo’, (03 June) No. 03/L-­052, Pristina: Assembly of Kosovo. Assembly of Kosovo (2014) ‘Transcript of the Plenary Session of Kosovo’s Assembly. 23 April 2014’. Available at: www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/ trans_s_2014_04_23_10_5606_al.pdf (accessed 10 September 2018). Assembly of Kosovo (2015a) ‘Committee on Legislation, Mandates, Immunities, Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and the Oversight of the Anti-­Corruption Agency’. Meeting no. 23, Minutes of the Meeting. Assembly of Kosovo (2015b) ‘Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office’, (31 August) No. 05/L-­053, Pristina: Assembly of Kosovo. Assembly of Kosovo (2015c) ‘Transcript of the Extraordinary Session of Kosovo’s Assembly, held in August 3, 2015’. Available at: www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/ docs/proc/trans__2015_08_03_21_6095_al.pdf (accessed 10 September 2018). Assembly of Kosovo (2016) ‘Law on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo’, (3 June) No. 03/L-­053, Pristina: Assembly of Kosovo. Bardos, G. (2004) ‘Containing Kosovo’, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes 3(4): 21–34. Bátora, J. Navrátil, M., Osland, K. and Peter, M. (2018) ‘The EU and International Actors in Kosovo: Competing Institutional Logics, Constructive Ambiguity and Competing Priorities’, Working Paper. EUNPACK. Buçaj, D. (2016) ‘Acceptance of International Criminal Justice through Fragmented Domestication: The Case of Kosovo’, in S. Buckley-­Zistel, F. Mieth, and M. Papa (eds) After Nuremberg. Exploring Multiple Dimensions of the Acceptance of International Criminal Justice, Nuremberg: International Nuremberg Principles Academy, pp. 1–17. Bytyçi, F. (2017) ‘NATO U.S. slap Kosovo’s Move to Create National Army’, Reuters. World Newsmarch. Cady, J. (2012) ‘Establishing the Rule of Law: The U.N. Challenge in Kosovo’, Focus stratégique, No. 34 bis. Chesterman, S. (2004) You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and Statebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coelho, J. (2015) ‘Building State Failure in Kosovo?’, Contemporary Southeastern Europe, pp. 7–15.

98   Dafina Buçaj Council of Europe (2011) ‘Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo’, Doc. 12462, 7 January. Council of the European Union (2008). ‘Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO’, Official Journal of the European Union, L 42/92. Dean, J. (1999) ‘OSCE and NATO: Complementary or Competitive Security Providers for Europe? IFSH (ed.) OSCE Yearbook, Hamburg: IFSH, pp. 429–434. DFID (2009) ‘Building the State and Securing the Peace’, Emerging Policy Paper, UK Department for International Development (DFID), London. Derks, M. and Price, M. (2010) The EU and Rule of Law Reform in Kosovo, The Hague: Clingendael Institute. Dursun-­Ozkanca, O. (2009) ‘Rebuilding Kosovo: Cooperation or Competition between the EU and NATO?’ EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference, Marriott Marina Del Rey. Los Angeles, CA. EU in Kosovo (2016) Kosovo and the EU: An Overview of Relations between the EU and Kosovo. Available at: (accessed 16 February 2019). European Commission (2018) ‘Roadmap-­visa Liberalisation with Kosovo’, June 2012, Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-­homepage_en/7209/ Roadmap-%20Visa%20Liberalisation%20with%20Kosovo (accessed 5 September 2018). Freedom House (2013) Nations in Transit, Authoritarian Aggression and the Pressures of Austerity. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-­transit/nations-­ transit-2013 (accessed 10 September 2018). Fritz, V. and Menocal, A. (2007) Understanding State-­building from a Political Economy Perspective, London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Grävingholt, J., Leininger, J., Haldenwang, Ch. and German Development Institute (2012) Effective Statebuilding? A Review of Evaluations of International Statebuilding Support in Fragile Contexts. Evaluation Study. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Howard, L. (2013) ‘Statebuilding through Neotrusteeship: Kosovo and East Timor in Comparative Perspective’, Working Paper. UNU/WIDER. Helsinki. Howard, L. (2014) ‘Kosovo and Timor-­Leste: Neotrusteeship, Neighbors, and the United Nations. The Annals of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science’, Aid and Institution-­building in Fragile States: Findings from Comparative Cases, Vol. 656, pp. 116–135. Ingram, S. (2010) ‘State-­building – Key Concepts and Operational Implications in two Fragile States’. Joint Initiative by the World Bank’s OPCFC and UNDP’s BCPR. Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board (JRCB) – Joint Conclusions, (2017) European Union. Pristina. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-­ homepage/34675/joint-­rule-law-­coordination-board-­meeting-joint-­conclusions_en (accessed 10 September 2018). KOHAnet (2014) Në Kosovë kundërshtohet ideja për Tribunal Ndërkombëtar për krime lufte [video]. Pristina. Available at: http://archive.koha.net/?id=27&l=965 (accessed 10 September 2018). KohaNet (2018) Raporti i Progresit: Reformat në Kosovë janë ngadalësuar. Pristina. Available at: www.koha.net/arberi/87374/raporti-­i-progresit-­reformat-ne-­kosove-jane-­ ngadalesuar/ (accessed 10 September 2018).

Making the law, ruling the law   99 Kosovo and the EU (2016) An Overview of Relations between the EU and Kosovo. European Union Office in Kosovo. Available at: http://eueuropaeeas.fpfis.slb.ec. europa.eu:8084/delegations/kosovo/1387/kosovo-­and-eu_en (accessed 10 September 2018). Marmullakaj, V. (2017) ‘Legal Transplants and Their Impact on Kosovo’s Legal System’, Sociology and Anthropology 5(4): 373–377. Michelman, F. (2003) ‘Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?’, Review of Constitutional Studies 8: 101–128. Ministry of Public Administration (2016) ‘Review of Institutions and Agencies of the Assembly and Central Bodies of the Government’, Available at: https://map.rks-­gov. net/getattachment/1d5a601b-3d46-4028-a5ad-b7ba07d9b109/Review-­of-institutions-­ and-agencies-­of-the-­assembl.aspx (accessed 29 October 2018). Novotna, K. (2010) ‘Laboratory of the International Community? Role of International Organizations in the Re-­establishment of the Rule of Law in Kosovo’, Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting. 104, pp. 588–591. Project against Economic Crime in Kosovo (PECK) (2013) ‘Final Narrative Report’, Available at: https://rm.coe.int/project-­against-economic-­crime-in-­kosovo-peck-­finalnarrative-­report/16806d0f30 (accessed 10 September 2018). Rogel, C. (2003) ‘Kosovo: Where It All Began’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 17(1): 167–182. Skendaj, E. (2014) Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. TANJUG (2017) ‘Government Wants Serbs to Back Serb List in Kosovo Election’, Available at: www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=05&dd=22&nav_ id=101331 (accessed 10 September 2018). The Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) (2008) Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility, Initial Findings. Paris: OECD Publishing. The Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) (2011) International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t We Do Better? Paris: OECD Publishing. Crisis Group (2010) ‘The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo’, Europe Report N°204. UNDP Kosovo (2017) ‘Public Pulse Report No.  8’, Available at: www.ks.undp.org/ content/kosovo/en/home/library/democratic_governance/public-­pulse-xiii/ (accessed 16 February 2019). UN Security Council (1999) ‘Resolution 1244 on the Situation Relating Kosovo’ Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999. UN Security Council (2007) ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ UN Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1, 26 March. United Nations Development Programme Kosovo (UNDP) and USAID. (2012) ‘Public Pulse Report No.  4’, Available at: www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library/ democratic_governance/public-­pulse-4.html (accessed 10 September 2018). UNMIK (1999) Regulation on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo. UNMIK/REG/1999/1. USAID Kosovo (2018) Country Development Cooperation Strategy (2014–2018), Washington, DC: USAID. Venner, M. (2016) Donors, Technical Assistance and Public Administration in Kosovo (Humanitarianism Key Debates and New Approaches MUP), Manchester: Manchester University Press. Visoka, G. (2017) Assessing the Potential Impact of the Kosovo Specialist Court, The Hague: Impunity Watch/Pax.

100   Dafina Buçaj Wallis, J. (2014) Constitution Making During Statebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wählisch, M. (2010) ‘The Rule of Law in Kosovo, in Matthias Koetter/Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Understandings of the Rule of Law in Various Legal Orders of the World’, Rule of Law Working Paper Series No. 15. Weller, M. (1999) ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo. International Affairs’, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 75: 211–251. Whaites, A. (2008) States in Development: Understanding State-­building, London. DFID Working Paper, London: DFID. Wippman, D. (2010) ‘Building the Rule of Law in Kosovo’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (Amer­ican Society of International Law), Vol.  104. Washington, DC. International Law in a Time of Change, pp. 366–369. Yannis, A. (2004) ‘The UN as Government in Kosovo’, Global Governance 10(1): 67–81.

7 Local voices and agency in statebuilding Perspectives from life stories Arlinda Rrustemi

Introduction International interventions (both military and civil) have been commonplace in post-­conflict countries, sometimes following prior involvement by the international community in ending the conflict. The interventions promote liberal democracy and aim to achieve stability. At the same time, they have been decried by critical theorists for being hegemonic, undermining the social contract, treating local actors as colonial subjects, prioritising elites and institutions over ordinary communities and evading social justice (Richmond 2009: 586). They also “fail to develop an engagement with everyday life, local culture, identity, and the emotional and psychological issues arising in post-­conflict situations” (Richmond 2009: 569). In short, as the interventions conducted by “knowledgeable” international actors continue to yield negative results, the necessity arises to learn from mistakes by listening to the local people and their perceptions of international efforts. This chapter investigates how local actors view the international community in Kosovo and, in particular, how international actors are seen to silence local actors. To this end, the chapter uncovers local opinions of the international interventions that took place in Kosovo after the war. It explores the dynamics between local and international officials and points out the latter’s main misconceptions about the local community. It also uncovers many of the local community’s negative perceptions of the involvement in Kosovo by the international community which is viewed, variously, as abusing power, being self-­interested, arrogant, and disrespectful towards the local culture and customs, maintaining double standards, and disrupting reconciliation processes. The stories told here reveal how local perceptions in Kosovo shifted over time from very positive, essentially welcoming the humanitarian intervention as a liberation, to negative, as a result of direct experiences with the international governance structures during the post-­conflict reconstruction stage. Negative perceptions were formed when the local community felt silenced on important issues of state- and peacebuilding by the behaviour of international actors. Against this background, the chapter resonates with arguments presented by critical theorists, while also pointing out how negative perceptions affect reconciliation and governance. It

102   Arlinda Rrustemi thus reaffirms the need to listen to the other, to promote good relations between international and local statebuilders, to remain engaged in a dialogue with the locals even when critical points are raised, and to work in equal partnerships with them (Autesserre 2014). Moreover, negative perceptions held by local groups are likewise an obstacle to an equal dialogue and honest engagement with the international community. In particular, they decrease the willingness to approach and communicate with the international community, thus further deepening mistrust and negatively affecting the prospects for actually empowering the local community in the long term. While critical theorists have emphasised that, thanks to the international hegemony (Richmond 2009), locals have less room to speak, this chapter argues that the ability to speak is partially impaired also from within the local sphere. Without a deeper understanding and a de-­mystification of the other, therefore, dialogues between the two groups will remain superficial and unequal. Dialogue in this context means engaging in sincere communication with each other: listening, and also transmitting one’s own messages to the other, with respect. For international actors, it entails showing consideration to local experiences, culture and identity and other issues that arise in post-­conflict situations. In arriving at these conclusions, two sociological methods were used to uncover the local voices: life stories (first-­person narratives) based on interviews, using the snowball sampling method. This resulted in original, interdisciplinary research in the form of 34 life stories, all collected in Kosovo, from individuals of different local groups and with diverse backgrounds in terms of class, gender, education, age and ethnicity. A subset of five stories was chosen for its theoretical relevance, exemplifying the challenges of speaking up while the international community holds power in post-­conflict processes. Furthermore, the selection of stories presented here shows the perspective of individuals living in Kosovo’s divided society, whose interaction and involvement with the international community has been personal and complex. As such, this method aims to “enact worlds and make particular orderings more visible than others” (Aradau and Huysmans 2014: 17). The “thick” descriptions given in the life stories offer a way to re-­conceptualise the local voice and its impact in post-­conflict reconstruction from a theoretical angle. As Wilkinson (2015) argues, this can be done by achieving reflexivity, engaging with the local, the situated, the contextual, and experiential knowledge. Finally, life stories have not so far been used in investigating Kosovo’s peacebuilding processes, and they therefore promise to spark novel and relevant insights. Using such an innovative method, this chapter is also consonant with a recent body of literature that has argued for a narrative turn in the field (Lemay-­Hébert et al. 2013; Visoka and Richmond 2017). The following section offers a brief theoretical introduction to local state- and peacebuilding initiatives and the general discontent of local communities in contexts of international post-­conflict intervention. Five stories are set out subsequently, all of which are rich in detail and offer local perspectives that are relevant to the theme of this chapter. Dardan’s and Artan’s life story exemplifies the challenges that arise from attempting to speak up and dissent from the perspectives

Local voices and agency in statebuilding   103 held by the international community. Eldar’s story highlights the problematic role of international policies on minority rights, which often reinforce divisions between minorities as some are seen to receive more favourable treatment than others. Dhurata raises questions about the role of the international community in northern Kosovo in a life story that hints at their contribution to the currently problematic status quo. Shkodran’s story similarly questions the ability of the international community to listen to local voices, especially when their strategies diverge slightly. The last section presents a conclusion on the prospects for bridging the differences between the international and local communities.

The critique of liberal peacebuilding An appreciation of state- and peacebuilding theory is essential in order to contextualise the life stories and their import. In general terms, one can distinguish between two types of approaches. Orthodox liberal peace theorists focus primarily on the development of democracy, the rule of law and a free market economy. In their view, essential elements for improving local conditions include strengthening the state and extending its scope, building appropriate institutions, enhancing coordination, ensuring a sufficiency of resources, preparing an exit strategy, and correctly sequencing different goals and priorities while learning lessons from the past (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 232–233; Rrustemi 2016). While liberal peace theorists acknowledge that their approach has limitations, most notably because difficult and unpredictable models can have destabilising side effects, postliberal peace theorists criticise other, more structural shortcomings. Among other ideas, they call for agency to be returned to the suppressed, to aim at reconciling local demands for democracy, development and human rights with aspirations to self-­determination, to shift from top-­ down to bottom-­up state- and peacebuilding and to return to putting politics before ideology (Belloni 2012; Goetze and Guzina 2008; Mac  Ginty and Firchow 2016; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Richmond 2014). This chapter substantiates postliberal critiques with empirical evidence, reaffirming their argument that on the ground and in the region there exist asymmetric power relations which, most notably, discipline local society (Visoka and Richmond 2017). More specifically, local communities find it hard often to speak and, if they do, they will often not be heard unless they turn to violent means. As a result, the participation and also the emancipation of the local community are impaired in post-­conflict reconstruction processes, and this probably undermines peacebuilding in the long term. Instead, postliberal forms of peace would be needed in order to consider local claims (those from different ethnic groups often being incompatible, or even conflicting) and to encourage dialogue and the creation of spaces for co-­existence. By implication, this requires a shift from external, top-­down impositions that merely antagonise the local population and legitimise ethno-­nationalist elites (Visoka and Richmond 2017). Not only in Kosovo, but in many other post-­conflict countries too, ethnic power-­sharing has entrenched nationalist groups and allowed an authoritarian culture to be formed.

104   Arlinda Rrustemi This, in turn, undermines reconciliation and contributes to a re-­territorialisation of power. The resulting negative “hybrid” peace, and the contested state, are then incapable of meeting either citizens’ demands or the requirements for European Union integration. To overcome the contradictions of the hybrid social contract in Kosovo, Visoka and Richmond (2017) suggest reconciling a divisive conception of the state and peace and promoting a pluralist, locally generated civic identity. The latter term has not been defined, and it remains to be seen whether or not it will materialise in the future. A locally grounded emancipatory peace would, however, also mean changing the character of the existing state in Kosovo (Visoka and Richmond 2017). Doty (1996) points out that mentioning local discourses also serves to acknowledge their presence. While the international community recognises the presence of the local community, it limits its participation in the state as soon as differences emerge in their preferred strategies for achieving peace. As a consequence, Western representations have reproduced practices of domination and the silencing of alternatives (Doty 1996: 13). Besides employing individuals’ stories to expose the reality of the peacebuilding process, this chapter therefore seeks to develop an understanding of how locals view the international community, and of the process whereby local perspectives in Kosovo, representing alternative narratives, are silenced. It thus helps to bridge the gap between the two groups, with a view to enabling a dialogue in future. Now, we turn to the local stories.

Uncovering the “subaltern” local perceptions though life stories This section examines local communities’ perceptions of the international community, which can shape the reality on the ground. Since the humanitarian intervention in 1999, the international community has been deeply involved in the post-­conflict reconstruction stage. The United Nations administered the territory with its undefined status, focusing in particular on aspects of the rule of law and security. At the time of writing, Kosovo still hosts two other international missions, KFOR (Kosovo Force) and EULEX (the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo), which remained even after the declaration of independence in 2008. In the post-­war period, Kosovo also experienced a surge of humanitarian organisations and think tanks. The dominance of the international community prompted a backlash against its presence from the local community, resulting in a further reduction of opportunities for locals to speak up and impact policy. The local stories selected here illustrate aspects of these developments. Some local storytellers view the international community as abusing its power and as being disrespectful towards local culture and norms, echoing studies that have used methodologies other than life stories. More concretely, negative perceptions were formed when the local community felt marginalised by certain experiences, e.g. when the international community stopped funding, rejected local ethnic identities, furthered ethnic divisions or discriminated against

Local voices and agency in statebuilding   105 p­ articular minorities. Consequently, attitudes towards the international presence have generally deteriorated over time. The stories below also show how these negative perceptions affect reconciliation and governance. Relational dimensions of local inclusion Dardan’s story is crucial for understanding whether and when the local community speaks up and how an international presence impacts it. It also offers new perspectives on security sector reform (SSR), in particular. On the one hand, it indicates that the international community failed to incorporate local voices sufficiently, owing to the prevalence of “one size fits all” practices, frequent turnovers of international staff (thanks to short-­term contracts and policies), and local perceptions of subordination. On the other hand, his story shows that investing in good relations between the parties may result in local voices being heard by the international community. Dardan is a Kosovo Albanian who completed his education in the former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s he returned to Kosovo and resumed living in his village, and continued living in his village when he started a family. During the war, he migrated to another country in the region and lived as a refugee until the war ended. He then worked in the security sector in governmental institutions, later moving on to an international organisation for a higher salary and a perceived higher level of professionalism. Working closely with many international officials, in both of his positions, gave Dardan multiple perspectives on the interactions between local and international actors. His story highlights many of the reasons why the local community accepts all the proposals made by the international community, despite doubts regarding their shortcomings. In his experience, the main reasons why locals do not speak up are personal interests and/or ignorance, a view he illustrates with examples from security sector reform, in which he played a crucial role. While Dardan acknowledges the international community’s importance in developing the capacities of different services, he also views it as the origin of “many bad things”. For instance, he witnessed international officials trying to “import everything from their countries” in the police sector.1 Like Dardan, many local academics have criticised policies that are implemented in post-­conflict countries and that come in the form of “one size fits all” solutions, transplanting practices from one context to a different one. The reported failure of these practices has prompted a call to “return to basics” (Ernstorfer and Stockmayer 2009: 15). Moreover, they may have ignored the local context, with its own cultural, political, social and historical elements. Dardan also experienced “a continuous unsteadiness” during his work, as police commissioners from different countries were frequently changed: each incoming international police chief introduced new reforms, which meant repeatedly starting “everything” from scratch. According to Dardan, the lack of continuity created by short-­term contracts and the new policy and management ideas of international officials precludes the development of good relations with local counterparts – and also, consequently, success on the ground.

106   Arlinda Rrustemi Furthermore, a focus on SSR dominated the immediate post-­war period, requiring not only a transformation of ex-­combatants and a reform of “front-­ line” organisations (police, army, etc.), but also far-­reaching adjustments to the management of institutions such as the ministries of defence, justice and the interior, as well as oversight bodies in the executive and in parliament. The goal of SSR is to make the state accountable (McFate 2010: 4). Like other countries, Kosovo faced many challenges during the reform of its security sector, including the lack of a coherent reform framework, how to determine which groups represented civilian interests, and how to involve the stakeholders on the ground, which meant that weapons first needed to be removed from the warlords. In addition, SSR is difficult to operationalise programmes have few good metrics for success (“what gets measured gets managed”), making it difficult to determine what works. Finally, bilateral military assistance programmes are quick to resort to “train and equip” programmes, but rarely commit to reorganising institutions. This combination of factors poses a significant challenge to the successful implementation of SSR, which therefore requires a fundamentally holistic approach (McFate 2010). What is missing from the literature is an understanding of the role played by local actors in this process. Dardan attributes the weakness of the security sector to the fact that “they [the local community] accepted everything the internationals brought, so today we lack many things in the security system thanks to the way in which the internationals designed built it and interfered with it”.2 In other words, the fact that the local community accepts an international programme does not necessarily mean that it is a good programme, or that it leads to successful SSR. Once he had developed good relations with his international bosses, Dardan began to suggest changes based on his experience, which had previously resulted in building the capacity of the police. Even then, he often refrained from sharing his suggestions, as he felt that they would not be considered. This process reflects how local expertise remains in a position of subordination. To be sure, research based on fieldwork with international officials has proposed valuing local expertise on a par with thematic knowledge (Autesserre 2014). Still, Dardan’s story shows that locals should be actively encouraged by their international counterparts to share their expertise, in order to overcome the perceived subordination and increase the chances of success. Furthermore, according to Dardan, some local individuals accept international projects that are perceived as meaningless because they prioritise their personal interests over a professional concern for the quality of the police. In particular, some local counterparts only supported projects in return for payment. Likewise, some may not resist the international proposals out of “ignorance, or maybe from a practical standpoint – each of them cared for their own position”.3 He claims that, as the local community was “never ready to say no to them”, the police sector now faces many management and financing challenges. The international community may offer many initiatives, but very often the way how projects are designed also limits their impact. Dardan seems to feel that the main responsibility for speaking up rests with local individuals, who ought to stand up for their own rights and interests. Yet he

Local voices and agency in statebuilding   107 himself spoke up only when he sensed that his opinion would be considered, and when his relations with the international military staff were good. Most importantly, his story indicates that the international community has not acted to incorporate local voices based on a duty of care, which would mean proactively involving the local community and inviting them to express their needs. The international community may therefore consider it worthwhile to invest in staff relations, as they appear to be a prerequisite for the incorporation of local rights and interests, as this story has shown. Focusing on the interveners’ everyday practices, Severine Autesserre (2014) argues that international staff should develop personal and social relationships with local individuals if they wish to improve their own performance and success. Dardan’s story confirms this argument from a local perspective, while illustrating concretely how such practices could immediately make a positive contribution, namely, by breaking the vicious circle in which local and international actors jointly produce sub-­optimal outcomes in reforming the security sector. Moreover, it hints at a duty of the internationals to encourage their local counterparts to share their local expertise, in order to increase the chances of success in the long term. The international exclusion of dissenting local voices Kosovo’s internationally facilitated institution-­building has often taken the form of top-­down statebuilding – a highly criticised process. More concretely, the hegemony of the international community has frequently resulted in the exclusion of local communities from decision making in the most important processes of statebuilding (Chandler 2010; Lemay-­Hébert 2011; Richmond 2014; Visoka and Doyle 2014). Artan’s story confirms this argument from another viewpoint – a local story – providing a concrete example of the exclusion of dissenting local voices. It shows that when local individuals speak up for their rights and interests, and where these conflicts slightly from international strategies, their voices will effectively be disempowered by being labelled “not constructive”. The method of communication with the local community and the duty of the international community to engage with the local community even if it represents criticism are therefore crucial for the incorporation of local voices in policymaking, assessment and institution building. Equal partnerships between the local and international communities are necessary. Artan is an Albanian from Kosovo who describes himself as educated and “patriotic”. He comes from a poor family who took education and political activism very seriously. Patriotism was highly valued in the extended families of both his parents, who were politically persecuted and, in some instances, even killed. Artan completed his education in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and was imprisoned before the war. He took part in the peaceful uprising of Albanians against the Serbian regime, led by the late President Ibrahim Rugova. Later, however, he joined the KLA and supported their cause: to end discrimination against the Albanian community in Kosovo by means of war. After the war he became a member of parliament and was active in negotiating legal and judicial

108   Arlinda Rrustemi matters, the mandates of the international missions, European integration, foreign relations and the drafting of the constitution, among other issues. During his time in parliament he faced several challenges that can be linked to power differentials between the local and international groups. The subordination of the local and the dominance of the international became palpable in many personal and public conversations with local and international actors. He stresses that Kosovo is “full of absurdities” created by unequal power relations, which also result in harmful processes on the ground. He therefore stresses that partnership should be the key to successful post-­conflict reconstruction. Some of his experiences in his everyday work illustrate the importance of these aspects. For example, double standards in promoting human rights were visible to Artan in his personal conversations with an international community official. Crucial, in his view, is the fact that certain human rights standards are promoted in Kosovo but not in European Union countries: Why do we need this? Do you have it in your own country? Find a model and we will follow it, but if they tell me that we have to do it here, that Serbs must have rights that an Albanian doesn’t, I will ask them: Do you do this in your own country, sir? No. So why are you giving this to me as a European standard when you don’t have it in the heart of Europe?4 Artan explains that if members of parliament (MPs) reject proposals put forward by the international community, resistance follows. More worryingly, they are labelled “bad” MPs, while those who “sign everything” proposed by the international community are regarded as “good”, and as partners, even if the international proposals may not meet local needs. Artan calls these MPs a “servile group”.5 His friends view the international community as “allies” who need to be “honoured”, and to whom the local community should be “grateful” for the humanitarian intervention in 1999. While Artan does support the international community, and honour its presence, he rejects laws that conflict with Kosovo’s interests and encourages a critical attitude towards the international community. His friends, by contrast, acknowledge the limitations of international policy but do not change their behaviour, preferring to remain in power. This resonates with arguments that present the ruling elites in Kosovo as having scant regard for concepts such as sovereignty, the national interest or national security, thanks to their focus on personal and clan security. Reflecting on his experience of more than a decade in parliament, Artan claims that most of the laws in Kosovo are drafted “partly by foreigners” and ratified by a “servile political elite”. Moreover, the above-­mentioned personal interests undermine the willingness of political elites to assess legislation critically, resulting in the passing of laws that may be harmful to society and to post-­ conflict reconstruction in the long term. According to his account, he resisted these proposals through discussions and various written amendments, though in vain. His amendments were thrown out, one example being a proposal for equal protection of cultural zones regardless of ethnicity. He mentioned other examples

Local voices and agency in statebuilding   109 too, regarding monuments and the use of language. As a result, he continues to raise his voice, but he has little impact on policymaking as he is considered a bad MP, whereas, in order to remain in power, other MPs agree to such proposals even though they infringe on the sovereignty of the state. Artan views the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue as a crucial issue for the local community to speak up about. In his view, Kosovo’s elite is making too many political compromises in the belief that they “will be praised”. This strategy serves to secure the KLA-­affiliated political parties’ grip on power. Artan calls instead for negotiations on equal terms. In this context, he explicitly states the need for “the best model for the treatment of minorities”. Empathising, however, with the  minority group, the Kosovo Serbs, he condemns their being treated by the Serbian state, which represents them in the dialogue, as second-­class citizens. He fears that they are being used as an “instrument of Serbia” to undermine Kosovo’s independence. And while one may question whether this view is shared by all Serbs in Kosovo, it underlines a desire for negotiations to be conducted between equal parties. In the event of failure, he fears a “Bosniasation” in Kosovo, meaning that war victims will not have achieved their aim, as progress will be blocked by more powerful minorities. He stresses that the international community’s focus should be on securing long-­term solutions rather than implementing these potentially harmful policies. Several postliberal theorists have argued that top-­down statebuilding facilitated by the international community often results in limited influence for the local community, and even its exclusion (Chandler 2010; Lemay-­Hébert 2011; Richmond 2014). Post-­conflict societies are pathologised, with domestic populations being characterised as dysfunctional and international rescue interventions as functional. Meanwhile, Western states’ own political malaise is deferred. Artan’s story provides a concrete example of how such exclusionary practices function on the ground, namely by narrowing the space for political debate, presenting dissenting local voices as unconstructive and useless for policymaking, assessment or institution building. Like the previous story, it hints at a duty on the part of the international community not only tolerate to but to engage critical voices from its local counterparts in policymaking, in order to increase the chances of long-­term success in statebuilding. To build an effective democracy, the international community should aim to promote public participation and contestation. Both Dardan’s and Artan’s local stories highlight that the powerful, the international, are frequently criticised not in public but instead, primarily, in private discussions. James Scott points out that “each subordinate group represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” (Scott 1990: xii). Criticism and resistance become part of a secret story that can be observed in rumours, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes and theatre, sheltering behind anonymity. Methodologically, life stories add another plane where, when narrated in a safe environment, in the set-­up of an anonymous interview, hidden processes are uncovered.

110   Arlinda Rrustemi The persistence of identity and the paradox of multi-­ethnic politics Humanitarian intervention paved the way for an end to the violence perpetrated against the Albanians living in Kosovo, but it also resulted in a complex post-­ conflict situation for the various ethnic groups living there. While the NATO intervention could have led Serbs to reject the UN presence, instead they viewed “UN peacebuilding as an opportunity to secure their collective existence and prevent recurrent ethnic revenge, hoping to re-­incorporate Kosovo eventually into Serbia” (Visoka 2016: 107). To organise and protect themselves, the Serb authorities established parallel structures in Kosovo. Belgrade was able to exploit these groups to promote national interests and use them as a bargaining tool on EU integration (Visoka 2016: 107–108). This complex situation also affected the identities of Albanians, Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo. Dhurata’s story provides an opportunity to uncover the intricacies that lurk behind this well-­known status quo, and that are posed by the politics of identity, the engineering of multi-­ethnicity and statebuilding without nation-­building. An ethnic Albanian woman and successful in her profession, Dhurata lived in northern Mitrovica. After the war, KFOR maintained the barricades and prevented Albanians from going there, the result being a legally and socially divided city. Dhurata was then forced to move to southern Mitrovica, where she subsequently rented an apartment and worked in the NGO sector, assisting displaced persons and fostering good inter-­ethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians. Interestingly, Dhurata does not regard the heavy international presence in Mitrovica as creating favourable conditions for this – on the contrary. As she sees it, the fact that KFOR erected barriers in the north created an isolated area that is now separated from the rest of Kosovo. Although preventing violence in the short term, this move has hindered broader national reconciliation. A conversation between Dhurata and a SHAPE/NATO general illustrates how the presence of internationals entrenched physical and mental barriers in a way that precludes local penetration. Asked why KFOR did not remove the watchers on the bridge blocking access, the general became nervous and evasive: “You know, you are from Kosovo, it was not easy, we had to work with people diplomatically. It was not possible.”6 Dhurata – a person who, thanks to her experience of displacement and her profession, seeks to inhabit spaces of interaction – is being denied this access by internationals. Scholarship has sought to accommodate identities in different ways. Liberal peace approaches, for instance, conceive of identity as an issue to be managed within a framework of multiculturalism and pluralism (Richmond and Franks 2006: 66). By contrast, Van Evera (2001: 20) argues that “while ethnic identities can seldom be transformed into new identities, [they] can often be made more benign and efforts in this direction can bolster peace.” Dhurata’s story does not necessarily contradict these insights, but it goes beyond them. Even in the face of a willingness by local individuals to engage in reconciliation, the international community entrenches ethnic divisions in an effort to maintain security. International rhetoric is not matched by practice. In Dhurata’s case, the local became

Local voices and agency in statebuilding   111 an agent for a multi-­ethnic state while the international remained captive to preconceived notions of ethnic division and hatred. According to Dhurata, this paradox is the result of internationals pursuing their own national interests and maintaining security at the expense of actual post-­conflict reconciliation.7 Tellingly, almost two decades after the war, integrating the northern area remains the most important challenge being negotiated in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. The insecurity created by the unsettled question of the north continues to undermine any progress in Kosovo (Triantafyllou 2014). Another life story further illustrates the limitations of the multiculturalist framework promoted by liberal peace, which may reinforce existing divisions between minority groups that perceive others as being favoured. A highly educated and successful Bosnian storyteller, Eldar claims that the position of Bosnians in Kosovo remains weak owing to the international community’s exclusive focus on the Serbian minority there. Eldar was educated in the former Yugoslavia, Europe and Asia, and now has a family and a job in Kosovo’s public sector. Since the war he has continued in the public sector but has also worked regularly in the private sector. Dedicated to helping empower minority groups through cultural and educational activities, he sees institution-­building as the main indicator of success. Yet Eldar himself faces difficulties, such as travelling to Bosnia, his home country. One of his children cannot travel there. As Bosnia and Kosovo are weak states, and since the Bosnian minority’s lobbying has failed to achieve recognition for a Kosovar passport, the position of Bosnians remains weak even compared to other minority groups in Kosovo. Eldar firmly believes that the internationally sponsored institution-­building often discriminates against Bosnians. He suggests that they are “paying the price” for maintaining “peace”, which has resulted in the more favourable treatment of Serbians.8 In his view, this status quo is “convenient” for the international community. For a person belonging to a minority group, like Eldar, the international community has suffered a loss of legitimacy. To be sure, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm seeks to promote multiculturalism as a tool for finding a political resolution to existing ethnic conflicts. The commitment of the international community in Kosovo to respect the rights and interests of minority communities led concretely to the promotion of ethnic decentralisation policies. Yet, from the perspective of a person like Eldar, international efforts paradoxically introduced another arena for inter-­ethnic competition. Non-­dominant minority groups, such as Bosnians, Turks, Gorani, Egyptian and Roma, perceive that the international community has favoured only the Serbian minority. Research shows that statebuilding is a technical term that enabled the international community in Kosovo to maintain reserved powers in the fields of human rights and minority protection, as it effectively governed the country fully until 2008 (Dulic 2007). During that time, the international community was placed at the forefront of minority protection. This resonates with the criticism of the manner in which that policy has been implemented, which has been described as “ultimately counterproductive”. The practice resulted in a society with homogenised groups divided by municipalities, which in turn erased

112   Arlinda Rrustemi p­ ossible hybrid or ambiguous identities, instead institutionalising ethnic divides (Randazzo and Bargués 2012). Eldar’s story corroborates these observations that the international community may have unintentionally discriminated against certain minority groups. The last life story points to another shortcoming of liberal peace, promoted within the framework of multiculturalism, where individuals who support national identities are actively excluded from policy making. Shkodran is an ethnic Albanian who has been a devoted human rights advocate both before and since the war in Kosovo. He studied in Kosovo before the war and began working for human rights organisations after finalising his studies. Politically, he defended the human rights of all people, regardless of ethnicity, even during the war. Afterwards, he was in frequent communication with the international community who acted as donors, with him at the receiving end as an NGO official. Yet Shkodran stresses that the international community is dominant and lacks respect for the local culture and customs, which are interlinked with the national identity. To exemplify, he describes a discussion he had with the former ambassador of a Western country about Kosovar identity. When Shkodran explained that he felt Albanian and not Kosovar (an identity he essentially regards as a post-­war international invention), the ambassador insisted that “now, Kosovo Albanians should be called not Albanians but Kosovars”.9 As Shkodran insisted that his identity could not be altered, he was called “nationalist and imposer”. Shkodran stresses that he is not nationalistic. In short, the pressure from the international community to promote a purely Kosovar identity, to the detriment of an Albanian one, has met with a backlash. Shkodran represents an example of those who resist this idea, as he thinks that his Albanian identity is the most important element in his life. Furthermore, the international community seems to have devised strategies to exclude the Albanian identity from political discourse. Shkodran claims specifically that his NGO receives less funding because of his stance on the identity issue: … if they disagree with you about something or they identify you as an organisation that is against them, for example, since they communicate among themselves and share a common attitude. They never say that they are blocking it [funding] for this reason or that, and they always give a reason, such as “No, there are no funds” or “Our policies have changed”.10 Shkodran explains the role of the international community in Kosovo using a car metaphor to highlight the superiority of international actors: For example, if you are in the car with me and I am driving it, I am the one who directs the car, not you. You can advise me to go this way or that way, but I am still the one who decides which way to go. And here they have the brakes in their hands.… While for us it is a state issue, they come and say take it or leave it.11

Local voices and agency in statebuilding   113 It is important to remember that Shkodran’s criticism of the international community is specific, not general, as he challenges its attempts to impose an “artificial” and therefore ultimately unsustainable Kosovar identity. Crucially, however, this story illustrates the dominant role exerted by the international community in Kosovo and its alleged righteousness. Local ideas are dismissed and, as seen with the funding issue, significant pressure is applied to uphold their marginalised status in the public sphere. Shkodran continues his resistance, as he feels the local voice is important, especially as he aims to protect cultural identity, which is strongly interconnected with ethnic identity. Despite all the international rhetoric in favour of multiculturalism, Shkodran’s story confirms yet again that the practice does not match it. Before the war, most Albanians viewed themselves as sharing one ethnic identity with Albanians in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. “Kosovo” referred to a geographical area and “Kosovar” to a dialect of the Albanian language. It is therefore unsurprising that, after the war, when it was proposed to introduce a Kosovar identity and to remove the Albanian one from the discourse, the result was resistance from those with a strong belief that they were Albanians. Following Van Evera (2001), it is once again seen that identities could perhaps be redirected but can hardly be wholly transformed. Erasing identities is not a solution; working with them, however, might well be. In any case, the establishment of “phantom states”, whose governing institutions may have extensive external resources but which lack social or political legitimacy, is something to be avoided (Chandler 2006).

Conclusion The goal of this chapter has been to uncover, through stories of personal experiences, when and how the international community silences local narratives in Kosovo. The starting point for any enquiry has to be the local community’s negative perceptions of the international actors, who are often viewed as arrogant, as dismissive of local identity and culture, and as hindering reconciliation. This divisive narrative of “the other”, while the result of lived experience, is not conducive to dialogue. Using life stories is an insightful method of how such perceptions come about, how they are sustained, and even how they could be overcome. A number of concluding observations can be made here. First, theoretical arguments critiquing a hegemony of the West find concrete and painful expression in the experiences of locals who are often portrayed as inefficient and destructive once they dissent from and speak out against international agendas. These life stories illustrate some of the particular tools that are used in this context, including the ceasing of funding, the stigmatisation of local ethnic identities, the creation of new arenas for inter-­ethnic competition and the denial of access to potential spaces of reconciliation. While not all of these practices are necessarily intentional, they are nonetheless perceived as real. International dominance undermines not only local participation in everyday politics, but also peacebuilding in the long term. Put plainly, there is no inherent value in local voices speaking up as long as they may be rendered meaningless.

114   Arlinda Rrustemi Relatedly, patterns of domination also have a subtler impact on local behaviour. In a context of fear and mistrust, locals feel less inclined to speak up. The story of Dardan is a case in point, showing that local expertise is being lost on important questions such as SSR. In other cases, locals may benefit personally from aligning themselves with international actors whose ideas they reject in theory. It is beyond doubt that such a situation is an impediment to the peaceand statebuilding processes currently taking place in Kosovo. The conclusion to be drawn is that it is essential for the international community to change these perceptions, not only by refraining from exclusionary practices but also by encouraging local voices to speak up, even when what they say makes for uncomfortable hearing. The establishment of good staff relations and emphatic engagement with local identities represent two concrete examples in this context. That, in turn, may increase the chances for an emancipatory peace and for sustainable, successful post-­conflict reconstruction. Finally, this chapter highlights the complexities of local agency. Theoretically, even liberal peace theory discusses local needs, although mainly in the instrumental terms of incorporating local culture (Caplan 2012). Postliberal ­theorists, by contrast, run a risk of romanticising the local in a way that takes away their agency (Richmond 2009). Life stories are suitable for unpacking the ambiguous character of local agency, often strongly shaped by its interactions with internationals and based on perceptions – and perhaps even misconceptions – about the best directions for state- and peacebuilding. The methodology thus suggests itself as one element that could contribute to scholarship by bringing the complexity of the local to the fore in peacebuilding.

Notes   1 Interview by author with Dardan, Kosovo, 2014.   2 Ibid.   3 Ibid.   4 Interview by author with Artan, Kosovo, 2013.   5 Ibid.   6 Interview by author with Dhurata, Kosovo, 2014.   7 Ibid.   8 Interview by author with Eldar, Kosovo, 2013.   9 Interview by author with Shkodran, Kosovo, 2013. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

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8 Voices of the Serb minority in the assembly of Kosovo Jelena Lončar

Introduction The performance of minority politics hinges upon various demands and expectations. While claiming to represent, members of parliament (MPs) do not work in a vacuum. Rather, they work against particular institutional and cultural backgrounds, which, at least in part, set up the structure of opportunities open to them. In post-­conflict societies such as Kosovo, international actors, kin states and their often-­conflicting peacebuilding strategies can place strong constraints on the behaviour of minority representatives. This chapter explores how Serb MPs in Kosovo’s parliament respond to the incentives and constraints they face, and whether they manage to raise their authentic voice or merely give in to the various pressures and the expectations of others. Much of the existing literature suggests that institutions determine the behaviour of individuals (Hall and Taylor 1996). Consequently, previous literature on minority representation tends to focus on political parties and electoral systems as the most important factors for explaining the behaviour of representatives (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Jensenius 2013). Similarly, liberal peacebuilding literature suggests that imposing liberal institutional and constitutional design is crucial for securing peace in post-­conflict societies such as Kosovo’s (Paris 2010). Indeed, institutions set the rules of the game: who is allowed to sit and speak in parliament, and under what conditions, depends largely on the electoral system and parliamentary rules. This chapter, however, differs from the existing literature in that it acknowledges the role of local people in interpreting the meaning of institutional norms and building peace from the bottom up. Focusing on the behaviour of Serb minority parliamentarians in Kosovo, I demonstrate how local actors exploit institutional backgrounds as resources that enable them to pursue their goals. I follow Saward in arguing that “every making of a representative claim involves challenging, reinforcing, or modifying a certain code, including electoral ones” (Saward 2010: 76). Hence, I am interested in how representatives engage with institutional incentives by complying with them, and pushing boundaries, and how they use various incentives to their advantage. In doing so, this chapter offers a local perspective on the Serb–­ Albanian conflict in Kosovo and a critique of the international interventionism

118   Jelena Lončar that tends to silence those most affected by peacebuilding strategies. My findings are based on a discourse analysis of 238 plenary speeches and eight interviews with 13 Serb minority MPs who served in Kosovo’s fourth Assembly (2010–2014). Examining both speeches made in the plenary sessions and interviews allowed me to observe how MPs’ discourse changes depending on the audience they are addressing. While their public claims seem more constrained by external pressures, MPs’ resistance to international peacebuilding is more explicit during interviews. Similarly, while in public Kosovo Serb representatives seemingly follow directives from the Serbian government, interviews offer examples of non-­compliance and intra-­group conflict. The chapter starts by examining the existing literature and arguing for the importance of local perspectives when building sustainable peace. It continues with an exploration of Serb MPs’ perceptions and interpretations of the various incentives and constraints they feel in their work, concluding with an analysis of the MPs’ performance in parliament. Minority parliamentarians and ethnic power-­sharing A dominant claim in peacebuilding literature is that creating institutions with core liberal values is sufficient to secure peace and stability (Paris and Sisk 2009). Pointing to the rational and self-­maximising character of individual institutions, advocates of liberal interventionism maintain that the liberal peace architecture is universally applicable. Hence, an internationally designed constitutional and institutional framework, with its emphasis on the market economy and multi-­ethnic democracy, is expected to produce stability and cooperation among ethnic groups in post-­conflict societies. Yet this argument overlooks the importance of local perspectives, identities and interests: if international peacebuilding strategies fail to gain legitimacy among the local population, they can hardly produce sustainable, long-­lasting peace. With this in mind, peacebuilding literature has recently made a turn towards a more critical understanding of peace, which shifts our attention to local actors and their responses to international pressures (Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2011: 327). Kosovo is a good example of a failure of international interventionism. Kosovo’s constitutional and institutional design was shaped during UN-­facilitated international negotiations (2006–2008). The negotiations resulted in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (hereinafter, the Ahtisaari Plan). Although the Ahtisaari Plan never came into force, as Russia strongly opposed it in the UN Security Council, the Kosovo authorities included it in the new constitution and legislative framework adopted after 2008. It was agreed that in the event of conflict the Ahtisaari Plan would prevail over Kosovo’s Constitution (Beha 2014). Kosovo was designed as a multi-­ethnic democracy with power-­ sharing guarantees for the Serb community, such as reserved seats in parliament and government and veto powers on minority-­related issues. By guaranteeing the inclusion of the Serb minority, these measures were expected to lend legitimacy to the new institutions of Kosovo. In addition, the international actors have

Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   119 c­ ontinued to monitor the implementation of their peace- and statebuilding strategy. Although supervised independence ended in 2012, the influence of international actors did not change. Currently, the representatives of the EU, the OSCE and influential embassies are still present in Kosovo, and monitor all political processes. They aim, by their presence, to secure peace and reconciliation among the divided ethnic groups. In addition, they directly monitor all the plenary sessions and committee meetings of Kosovo’s parliament in order to secure the implementation of international agreements and cooperation among the representatives of the different ethnic groups. Despite power-­sharing guarantees and the strong international presence, Kosovo is still a society deeply divided along ethnic lines. Instead of producing peace, power-­sharing institutions have further entrenched ethnic divisions and confrontation over the territory and state ownership (Visoka 2017). Kosovo Serbs do not recognise Kosovo’s independence, and live in separate enclaves without much contact with the Albanian majority. Their resistance to liberal peace strategies, however, has attracted barely any attention. International peacebuilders tend to treat Kosovo Serbs as a homogeneous group under Belgrade’s control. That is why they were not effectively included in the talks about the status of Kosovo. Instead, they were considered to be represented by the Serbian government (Weller 2008: 666). While neither scholars, international actors nor Serbia perceive Kosovo Serbs as independent agents with their own interests, this chapter argues that providing space for their perspectives is important for the future of peace in Kosovo. The following sections analyse their perceptions of the imposed institutions, and their efforts to resist external pressure and raise their own voice.

MPs’ perceptions of their incentives Critical approaches to peacebuilding suggest that a bureaucratic, formal framework for liberal peace cannot successfully be transferred intact, as both conflict and peace depend on local particularities and interpretations (Richmond 2011). This section accordingly explores how minority parliamentarians interpret and engage with the imposed norms and international presence. I argue that, although international actors and kin state do play an important role in how Serb MPs shape their behaviour in the Kosovo parliament, local representatives should not be treated as mere objects but rather as agents with their own identities and interests. They do not simply give in to international pressures: they also try to challenge them and to modify the beliefs and perspectives of their constituents. Serb MPs see themselves as “children of the international community”1 and argue that nothing can be done without a seal of approval from international actors. The international community is portrayed by them as not only supportive of them but also as dictating their actions. However, while international actors do have the power to direct parliamentary decisions, their presence has not been successful in changing the hearts or minds of the local population. Despite strong international mediation and the constitutionally

120   Jelena Lončar guaranteed inclusion of the Serb community in public institutions, Serb MPs feel excluded from Kosovo’s parliament, perceiving the parliamentary scene as fundamentally hostile to minorities and their interests. As representatives of their community, their claims hinge around this sense of outsiderness, which they dramatize, at the same time as they downplay any powers they might hold at the negotiation table: “When a Serb MP speaks, it sometimes happens that Albanian MPs do not pay attention. They talk to each other, and I see this as a sign of discrimination”.2 This, Serb MPs claim, feeds the atmosphere of rampant distrust that affects the normal functioning of institutions. Despite this atmosphere, they assume and seek to reproduce the belief that social conflict can co-­exist with reciprocity among free and equal members of a political association. However, this becomes an impossibility when some members of the parliament are portrayed as being outcasts: outside of the society and its legal order (i.e., as criminals): When MPs start talking about how bad we are, that affects you … the rhetoric about Serb criminals: Serb criminals in the north, Serb criminals here, Serb criminals there, they did it, they are chetniks, they are like this, they work for the Serbian state security service. All of this ends up affecting public opinion later.3 These claims confirm that it is not sufficient to arrange institutions in a liberal way and expect individuals to play according to the rules. While Serb MPs have guaranteed seats in both parliament and government, and veto powers in the areas that affect the vital interests of minorities, they are perceived as not belonging – even their bodies are seen as “unfit” for the space. For instance, a majority MP4 speaks of minorities as self-­excluding and as being a “foreign” or alien “body” within the entity representing the body politic: It is very strange to see them. They don’t get along with Albanians. They would rather stay isolated somewhere as if they feel uncomfortable in their skin. You have no idea how foreign a body they look in that assembly room when they are there.5 The image is strikingly violent in its portrayal of the visible discomfort of exclusion. Minority representatives are depicted here as self-­consciously out of place. The perception of parliamentary space is inseparable from an expectation of who its natural occupant is, who belongs and who does not. In Kosovo, Serb MPs are perceived as “space invaders” (Puwar 2004: 8), not only by others but also by themselves. The behaviour of Serb MPs is further constrained by how Serbia portrays them. The Serbian government presents itself as the only voice of the Kosovo Serbs, aiming thereby to silence any independent claims. It tends to treat Kosovo Serbs as mere objects rather than as subjects capable of articulating and acting in their own interests. Such portrayals serve to delegitimise any of their attempts to

Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   121 act independently, and to present their antagonistic claims as actions against Serbia and “true” Serb interests. According to one Serb MP: [Serbia] does not allow us to develop an authentic idea.… They humiliate us, I would say – they like to present us only through humanitarian activities as poor, miserable beggars who need to be dressed up, whose kids need to be taken out of the enclaves for a bit. They do not want to present us as intellectuals, as educated people, people who can think, who maybe know more than they do.6 Neither Belgrade nor Prishtina recognises Kosovo Serbs as “professional and competent people” (Kostić 2012). When they first entered Kosovo’s institutions, in 2001, they were portrayed as traitors by Serbia and referred to as “Thaçi’s Serbs”,7 a description that signifies their betrayal of Serbian interests and co-­ option by the Kosovo Albanian institutions. On the other hand, despite being elected (and hence in), in the early years Serb MPs did not actively participate in parliamentary work – they were at the same time both in and out (Visoka 2017: 79). For years, they have selectively attended parliamentary sessions under either Belgrade’s instructions or international pressure. Portraying Kosovo Serbs as incompetent victims is used as a means to direct their behaviour and deprive them of the right to an independent voice. While purporting to speak for and instead of them, Serbia still does not recognise them as equal to its other citizens, deepening their sense of humiliation even further: The institutions [of the Republic of Serbia], which are the worst, do not recognise us as Serbs. I have always said, we have been defined as equal citizens according to the Serbian Constitution, but when we cross Merdari [the border, to enter Serbia], because of our territorial background we are in a thousand ways deprived of the same rights as Serbs in the rest of Serbia when it comes to many administrative issues: documents, passports, visas, bank loans, etc.8 Rather than merely telling how Serbia portrays Kosovo Serbs, this claim also implies resistance. It suggests that Kosovo Serbs are capable of exercising agency: they are not merely co-­opted by the internationals and their own kin state, but fight for their own voice. These findings suggest that we need to be aware of all the complexities, which include not only the institutional and constitutional framework but also the ways in which local actors interact with each other and with international actors. The above claims show how international incentives and constraints affect local identities, values and interests, producing hybrid forms of peace and inter-­ethnic relations. The following section explores in more detail how local minority representatives exercise agency by trying to raise their own voice in parliament.

122   Jelena Lončar MPs’ performance: between conflict and cooperation Evidence shows that MPs try to juggle between these different and often contrasting incentives. While on most occasions their behaviour reflects and often reinforces institutional and cultural expectations, they also try to resist them and develop their own independent perspective. As might be expected, MPs often withdraw, i.e. lack of cooperation, silence and boycott, but they also make claims about the need for Kosovo Serbs to genuinely engage in making politics, based on integration and cooperation with the ethnic majority. Inter-­group conflict Pointing to the rational and self-­maximising character of individuals, advocates of liberal interventionism maintain that the liberal peace architecture is universally applicable. Hence, an internationally designed constitutional and institutional framework is expected to produce stability and cooperation among ethnic groups in post-­conflict societies. Much of the research on Kosovo has therefore adopted this top-­down approach by focusing on institutional guarantees for minority groups and for relations between the Serbian and Kosovar governments, while the actual perspectives of the local population have been insufficiently considered. Yet the claims of Serb MPs in Kosovo’s parliament point to the importance for peacebuilding of deep historically and culturally constructed identities and values. The Kosovo Serbs’ identity has been constructed around their difference from ethnic Others, i.e. in opposition to Kosovo Albanians. Despite constitutional guarantees of minority rights, this leads them to believe that reconciliation is impossible, and that Serbs and Albanians cannot live together. On a policy level, these beliefs serve to justify the separation of ethnic groups. Rather than being geographical categories, proximity and distance become categories through which communities and individuals experience their affinities or lack thereof. An image of Serbs and Albanians in physical proximity, yet worlds apart, is portrayed quite strongly in the following statement: We still live in separate societies. Gračanica [Serb municipality] is 3–4 km away, but still they live their life there and these people in Prishtina theirs and Albanians have become experts at in treating Gračanica as invisible. … I close my eyes when I leave Gračanica and open them again when I enter North Mitrovica.9 Serb and Albanian identities are performed in this statement through mutual negation. The sentence suggests that the existence of Serbs is only possible by denying – literally closing one’s eyes to – the “Others”. Similarly, another representative aims to build group unity by evoking a fear of Albanisation, of which language – and the stealing of identity it might perform – is the marker: I would like to ask you to provide me with an identification card which will

Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   123 identify me not as “Zonja” [“Mrs” in Albanian], but as Rada Trajković. Therefore, discrimination and the Albanisation of my Serb name and title should not be happening. (Trajković 2011) This MP suggests that Albanians do not recognise Serbs or their culture and have continued to persecute Serbs even after the war, but by different means – in this particular case by renaming them in official documents. By refusing to be addressed in the Albanian language, she also suggests that a “true” Serb is one who denies it legitimacy as a dominant language and, hence, rejects Kosovo as an Albanian state. The state of Kosovo is delegitimised not only through verbal utterances, namely hegemonic re-­naming, but also non-­verbally: I always say Kosovo and Metohija and that annoys them, but I want to make them accept freedom of speech in parliament. I am not ready to give up on that. For example, when electronic voting is off, I raise three fingers. That would not cross my mind, it would not be so important, if we were not in the situation we are in, if my people were not isolated, like in Klina – they returned, but they are shot at – so I want to encourage them. Even in the middle of Prishtina, I show that I am a Serb.10 This statement indicates how naming and body language may be used as powerful tools for producing ethnic boundaries. The “Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija” was the official name of the territory before the war. Serbs use “Kosovo” as the name for the eastern part of the province and “Metohija” for the western part (Kostovicova 2005). When the Albanians declared independence in 2008, they dropped the term “Metohija”, naming the country only “Kosovo”, or “Kosova/ë” in Albanian. For both Serbs and Albanians, the phrase “Kosovo and Metohija” has a Serbian connotation that signifies Serbia’s ownership of the territory. The gesture of raising three fingers symbolises the same claim to ownership. It is a Serb salute that denotes Serbian Orthodoxy and allegiance to the Serbian nation. The use of these symbols in Kosovo’s parliament suggests that Albanian efforts to create an ethnic Albanian state face Serbian resistance. The gesture undermines these efforts: it implies that Albanians have failed, and that Kosovo still belongs to Serbs. Such claims to state ownership are characteristic not only of Kosovo; elsewhere too, they generally tend to feature in nationalist discourses during and after ethnic conflict (Brubaker 2015). Non-­verbal language is particularly important as it enables representatives to reach a wider audience. When minority representatives address parliament in minority languages, their speeches remain imperceptible to the wider, Albanian, society. By contrast, culturally recognised gestures such as the three-­ finger salute make a strong cross-­community impact, as they are easily read and interpreted by all in the way intended – i.e., as defiance. They also arouse much stronger emotions than reason-­based claims. The same MP who raised three fingers made more antagonistic claims:

124   Jelena Lončar I do not see anyone more competent than the Prime Minister, Mr Thaçi, or Slobodan Milošević’s former spokesman, Mr Dačić, to tell us directly and clearly about the fate of missing and kidnapped people. Mr Thaqi, you were on the ground, as the leader of the so-­called Kosovo Liberation Army. And you know, from the ground, where murdered and kidnapped Serbs are.… When it comes to border crossings, I want to share my personal experience because I often travel and cross the border at Merdare, because I was born there. I really strive for normalisation. I want Serbs who enter and leave Kosovo and Metohija to be able to move freely. (Trajković 2012) In this statement, the MP considers the Serbian and Albanian leaderships equally responsible for war crimes, suggesting thereby that she does not recognise Albanians as victims and liberators or Serbs as aggressors. Moreover, while other minority MPs avoid even mentioning war or responsibility for war crimes, she directly blames Kosovo’s prime minister as the head of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Such claims reinforce inter-­ethnic conflict and hamper international efforts to build lasting peace. By making them, Serb MPs do not merely tap into the cultural expectations of Kosovo Serbs; they also encourage the belief that reconciliation is impossible. While, by participating in Kosovo’s institutions, they appear to be bowing to international pressure, their speeches often tend to entrench ethnic divisions further rather than overcome them. These findings point to the importance of considering local knowledge, values and beliefs and including local people in designing peacebuilding strategies. Silence and boycott While the above claims perform conflict in an open way, most Serb MPs choose silence and boycott, rather than direct confrontation, to convey their sense of hostility and non-­cooperation. Rather than making antagonistic claims, they perform their disagreement by not participating in the plenary sessions. For instance, Serb MPs boycotted the ceremonial session to mark the termination of the supervised independence phase. The boycott was intended to demonstrate that they did not recognise Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. Although a few days before they had yielded to international pressure and supported independence by their vote in parliament, they wanted to distance themselves symbolically from the decision.11 Similarly, in spring 2014 they boycotted plenary sessions for a month because the parliamentary majority adopted a draft law on general elections whereby minority parties would no longer be granted a lower threshold, but only guaranteed seats (B92 2014). When present in parliament, minority MPs tend to respond with silence in particular when majority MPs accuse minority groups of war crimes or when minority legislation sponsored by the international community is on the agenda: “Goran Marinković is the only one who actually dares to speak. Others let it go in one ear and out the other. I swear this is the case. You will see how much

Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   125 each of them spoke”. Another MP agrees: “It has happened that they spoke against Serbs, against Serbia and the Serb nationality, but for some reason we remained silent”.13 Silence is a particularly useful tool for Serb MPs as it allows them to convey different meanings for their international audience and their ­constituents, who do not share the same cultural context. For example, MPs may intend the international actors present at plenary sessions to read their silence as a sign of cooperation. The presence of international actors during the plenary sessions serves to prevent the escalation of conflicts and ensure the making of secret agreements. In interviews, minority MPs claimed that they relied heavily on the support of the international community in achieving their goals. To gain this support, MPs need to demonstrate cooperation and a favourable attitude towards peace and inter-­ethnic reconciliation. Hence, by being silent and not confronting the ethnic majority MPs, to the international audience minority MPs convey cooperation and obedience. Their silence, however, carries a different layer of meaning for minority constituents. One of the Serb MPs explained this as follows: 12

The moment I became part of the institutions … I sobered up and realised what the situation was. And I believe that since 2011 many things have changed and some issues have been publicly imposed. In the same way as I sobered up in 2011, the majority of Serbs sobered up through the process of the Brussels agreement and realised where they are living and what institutions they depend on.14 This claim taps into the atmosphere in society, and the Serbs’ acceptance that they no longer live in Serbia and are an ethnic minority in an Albanian state. Sharing the same situation, the Serbs as a minority constituent are able to read the silence as it was intended: as an acceptance of defeat. Even if they do not want to admit it, let alone recognise it publicly, they are aware that any rebellion would be impossible. The associated costs are simply too high, and there are few associated benefits. As one Serb MP put it, the only outcome to be expected would be that “those Albanians would break our heads outside”.15 Hence, they “personally try not to provoke anyone’s feelings by any word or to give anyone an opportunity to abuse one’s feelings” (Miletić 2014b). MPs’ silence does more than merely express the atmosphere in society: it also reinforces feelings of defeat and exclusion. It would, however, be culturally unacceptable to admit explicitly to such feelings in public. Fear of provoking the majority explains why Serb MPs were, for example, silent on the issues of war crimes and missing persons. Despite these being among the most frequently addressed issues in parliament, and despite the fact that representatives of other groups spoke about their victims and called for the resolution of missing persons cases, the Serb MPs kept remarkably silent. With Serbs portrayed as aggressors, any claim about Serb victims would prompt only anger and an avalanche of accusations, rather than empathy and understanding. As Langton (1993: 315) argues:

126   Jelena Lončar At the first and most basic level, members of a powerless group may be silent because they are intimidated, or because they believe that no one will listen. They do not protest at all, because they think that protest is futile. They do not vote at all, because they fear the guns. In such cases, no words are uttered at all. Yet their silence is more ambiguous. As Gray (2015) reminds us, silence may signify a whole spectrum of meanings, from acceptance to passive disaffection with the democratic system, to principled resistance, to specific decisions. In the case of Kosovo, silence conveys a sense not only of acceptance but also of disaffection and resistance. While Serb MPs claim that they have accepted the new reality, they still choose silence instead of exercising their voices and participating actively in the institutions. This leaves space for the audience to interpret their silence also as a way of resisting Kosovo’s institutions: while we do have to put up with your victory, that does not mean we embrace and recognise it. For Serb MPs, this seems an important message to send to their audience, as their very appearance in the institutions, prior to any speech act, could be read as a sign that they recognise Kosovo. By being elected according to Kosovo’s rather than Serbian legislation, and by helping to pass legislation, they may be perceived as contributing to building the institutions of the new state and, hence, recognising its existence. Since such meanings can be read into their presence, by their silence they aim to persuade the audience of the opposite: that while they are physically present in parliament, by choosing to be silent and boycott rather than speak they deny legitimacy to the institution and, thereby, to the state itself. This meaning is directed towards Serbia, which does not recognise Kosovo’s sovereignty and did not publicly support Serb participation in Kosovo institutions until 2013, but also to their Serb constituents in Kosovo, who, despite accepting that they are governed by the laws of Kosovo rather than Serbia, still do not recognise Kosovo because the recognition of defeat is culturally unacceptable.

Cooperation and integration: the “authentic voice” of Kosovo Serbs Power-­sharing literature suggests that institutional inclusion and guaranteed veto powers for different ethnic groups bring the benefits of increased legitimacy for state institutions, a stable system and the prevention of conflict over vital interests (Lijphart 1977: 41). In Kosovo, however, power-­sharing guarantees did not produce these effects. This can be seen both in direct resistance, through the confrontational speeches Serb MPs make in parliament, and in more indirect resistance, through silence or boycott. At the same time, the integration of minorities into Kosovo’s institutions has opened up a channel for Kosovo Serbs through which they can try to raise their own voice, independently of Serbia. This is a particularly important finding as it is rarely noticed in the existing literature. The efforts to resist the constraints imposed by Serbia

Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   127 and their own constituents are visible in MPs’ claims about authenticity and cooperation, as I will show below. I argued earlier that Serb MPs in the Kosovo parliament are often portrayed in Serbia as traitors, because of their cooperation with Kosovo’s institutions. The epithet “Thaçi’s Serbs” alludes to their betrayal of Serbian interests by their participation in what are regarded as illegitimate institutions, thereby legitimising them. This external pressure imposes a huge constraint on the performance of representation: to make their claims culturally resonant, MPs were expected to demonstrate their loyalty to Serbia by being uncooperative and resisting ethnic Albanian statebuilding efforts. In interviews, however, MPs claimed that instead of giving in to such pressure, their strategy has been to provide a new understanding of betrayal and loyalty. First, they claim that substantive representation or the advancement of the interests of their community can be delivered only through participation and compromise; it is not a betrayal of interests if one is doing what is necessary to pursue these effectively: It hurts me that they call us Thaçi’s Serbs because I am not, I am a Serb, and I protect Serb interests.… We recognise that the only way to survive and to stay in this region is to enter the institutions of Kosovo and fight for Serb interests, for our rights. This is the only way – by boycotting you do not get anything.16 Second, they argue that the “good representatives” of Kosovo Serbs are not those loyal to Serbia but those loyal to the Kosovo Serbs. The stress is therefore on local identification and loyalty understood the pursuit of local symbolic and material interests. Hence, Serbia’s position is not to be followed blindly. Pointing to the intertwined destinies of Albanians and Serbs, there was a consensus among Serb MPs that “integration in Kosovo’s institutions is our only hope for survival and existence”17 and that “if we want these institutions to change (and we have a different approach from the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in Kosovo), Serbs have to participate actively, regardless of how hard, embarrassing that is”.18 In their view, the representatives of Kosovo Serbs must think independently about ways of strengthening local identity and pursuing what is locally valued: There are these good representatives of their communities who are real Serbs, who are from Kosovo, who think independently and who understand this process in its complexity.… They understand that integration into Kosovo’s institutions and Kosovan society is their only salvation, the only solution for survival and existence. It is easy from a comfortable chair to dictate the tempo to those living 350 km away; that is very nice and comfortable, but the situation here and our living conditions are different.… One cannot protect the national interest by beating one’s chest and saying I am a Serb, Mother Serbia, Belgrade, etc. No, if you want to protect the interests of your

128   Jelena Lončar community, be present in a parliamentary committee, defend the interests of your community there, propose amendments, suggest, fight to persuade other members of the committee to support your proposal. Fight, rather than thinking that you will defend Serb interests by making nationalistic arguments once every three years, while you have zero minutes of parliamentary speaking time or only a single speech.19 According to this claim, a good representative is more loyal to Kosovo Serbs than to Serbia. Since the territory of Kosovo is currently under Albanian rule, if Serbs want to stay in Kosovo they have to integrate into Kosovar society. On the other hand, those who follow directions from Belgrade are portrayed as giving up on Kosovo and, thereby, on the Kosovo Serbs. Interestingly, while authenticity is usually defined as the politics of intransigence, for Serb representatives’ authentic politics is a politics of compromise and cooperation: Our biggest problem is our lack of unity in Kosovo, our divisions and our promotion of someone else’s politics. We do not have a politics that is the politics of Kosovo Serbs, an authentic politics of Kosovo Serbs. This is necessary for us.20 Because of the lack of adequate support from Belgrade, Serb MPs claim that they “feel like orphans in a military school, who are left alone at a graduation ceremony when everyone else’s parents came to support them”.21 The image used in this claim portrays the representatives beautifully, as inexperienced children who need the care and support of their parents – in this case the kin state – but have none by their side. MPs portray themselves as being left to their own devices in parliament. But the long arm of Serbia makes itself felt in other ways: the play of loyalty to Serbia creates disunity; it divides them against one another. This is strengthened by the portrayal of the Kosovo parliament as a military school. Being in a war zone requires them to join forces and act as one in the face of the enemy. But what one witnesses is, rather, internal division, which undermines the development of a true politics of Kosovo Serbs – the only kind that can serve their interests. Being abandoned by Serbia should, however, encourage them to do the contrary: that is, to develop their own, independent, Kosovo Serb politics. Among other things, this politics would include integrating into Kosovo’s institutions and cooperating with the majority. In making such claims, MPs challenge the culturally accepted norms that no cooperation is possible with the enemy. This strategy further allows them to portray themselves in their desired manner before the internationals and to delegitimise commonly held beliefs that Serb representatives are merely traitors who are motivated by personal benefit.

Conclusion This chapter showed that Serb MPs face quite strong incentives and tight constraints in their parliamentary work. First, power-­sharing guarantees aim to

Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   129 encourage the inclusion of minorities and increase the legitimacy of public institutions. Second, international actors play an important role in the performance of minority representation, since all decisions depend on their approval and they mediate the relations and political negotiations between ethnic groups. Under such circumstances, liberal peace literature expects minority parliamentarians to demonstrate cooperation and integration into Kosovo’s institutions. At the same time, however, imposed power-­sharing arrangements encourage ethnic bargaining and the construction of representative positions and roles around ethnic difference. In addition, Serbia encourages conflictual behaviour by Serb MPs in order to pursue its ethnic goals and distort Kosovo’s prospects for independence. Kosovo Serb MPs feel constant pressure from Serbia, which, as they argue, treats Kosovo Serbs as mere objects rather than as independent agents. Similarly, international peacebuilders overlook the importance of the local Kosovo Serb population in building peace and interpreting internationally imposed norms. They tend to assume that Serbia’s acceptance of international interventionism is sufficient to secure the compliance of the Kosovo Serbs. While previous literature leads us to expect that institutional factors and external pressures will determine the behaviour of MPs, my findings indicate that the relationship between MPs’ behaviour and the incentives they perceive is more complex and dynamic. None of the above-­mentioned factors on its own explains the behaviour of the Kosovo Serb MPs, as they tend to shift from inter-­ ethnic conflict to cooperation, thereby juggling between the diverse pressures they face. Despite institutional inclusion, these MPs feel excluded in and from parliament, and discriminated against. In addition, while they often do tend to comply with the expectations of Serbia and international actors, they also exploit them strategically to achieve their own goals, while at the same time trying to modify the culturally constructed opinions and expectations of their constituents. They do this by framing their behaviour as a struggle for authenticity and an attempt to find the independent voice of local Kosovo Serbs. Despite strong incentives to construct firm ethnic boundaries, Kosovo Serbs argue that, for reconciliation and sustainable peace, it is necessary to depart from ethnic peace agendas. They suggest that long-­term peace can only be achieved through local dialogue and cooperation. Bearing in mind that political representatives do not merely express pre-­established views and interests but also create public opinions and perceptions, it is essential to open up space for constructive dialogue in parliament without external tutelage. This is an important message for peacebuilders: that reconciliation is possible only if local actors are given space to raise their voices and create a more context-­specific, bottom-­up peace. These findings have implications for the future of international interventionism. Kosovo Serbs’ resistance to international intervention and Serbia’s tutelage reveals the shortcomings of the liberal peace framework and corroborates the emerging critical peacebuilding literature, which focuses on the participation of local citizens in the process of peace- and statebuilding and their engagement with externally imposed institutions. Instead of seeing political agents as simply acted upon or reactive, this chapter indicates that a more dynamic analysis is

130   Jelena Lončar necessary, in which due attention is paid to the ways in which political actors mobilise institutions, and background culture, as resources in the pursuit of the new courses of action they favour.

Notes   1 Interview by author with J. Bontić, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014.   2 Ibid.   3 Interview by author with G. Marinković, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014.   4 Berat Buzhala was an MP from the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), a leading party in the government coalition which also contains minority parties (2010–2014).   5 Interview by author with B. Buzhala, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, March 2014.   6 Interview by author with R. Trajković, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014.   7 Hashim Thaçi was the prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo from 2007 to 2014. In 2016 he was elected president of Kosovo.   8 E.g. citizens of Serbia do not need a visa for the Schengen countries, but that exemption does not apply to Serb citizens of Kosovo; Interview by author with R. Trajković, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014.   9 Interview by author with P. Miletić, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 10 Ibid. 11 Interview by author with B. Kostić, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 12 Interview by author with G. Marinković, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 13 Interview by author with J. Bontić, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 14 Interview by author with M. Stojanović, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 15 Interview by author with G. Marinković, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 16 Ibid. 17 Interview by author with B. Kostić, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 18 Interview by author with P. Miletić, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 19 Ibid. 20 Interview by author with G. Marinković, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014. 21 Interview by author with S. Milosavljević, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2014.

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Voices of the Serb minority in the Assembly   131 Dunning, T. and Nilekani, J. (2013) ‘Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils’, Amer­ican Political Science Review 107(1): 35–56. Gray, S. W. D. (2015) ‘Mapping Silent Citizenship: How Democratic Theory Hears Citizens’ Silence and Why it Matters’, Citizenship Studies 19(5): 474–491. Hall, P. A. and Taylor, C. R. (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies 44(5): 936–957. Jensenius, F. R. (2013) Power, Performance and Bias: Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Cases in India, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kostić, B. (2012) Parliamentary transcript. Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. 15 May. Kostovicova, D. (2005) Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space. London: Routledge. Langton, R. (1993) ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22(4) 293–330. Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mac Ginty, R. (2011) International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Miletić, P. (2014b) Parliamentary transcript. Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. 23 April. Paris, R. (2010) ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies 36(2) 337–365. Paris, R. and T. D. Sisk (eds) (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, London, Routledge. Puwar, N. (2004) Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Space. Oxford, New York: Berg. Richmond, O. (2011) A Post-­liberal Peace. New York, London: Routledge. Richmond, O. P. and A. Mitchell (2011) ‘Peacebuilding and Critical Forms of Agency: From Resistance to Subsistence’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 36(4) 326–344. Saward, M. (2010) The Representative Claim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Trajković, R. (2011) Parliamentary transcript. Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. 22 February 2011. Trajković, R. (2012) Parliamentary transcript. Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. 16 November 2012. Visoka, G. (2017) Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Weller, M. (2008) The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status for Kosovo. International Affairs 84(4): 659–681.

9 Inside-­out and outside-­in on dealing with the past in Kosovo Actors, voices and practices Nita Luci and Linda Gusia

Introduction Memory, in post-­war and post independent Kosovo, both as knowledge and practice, has operated as the sine qua non of state and nation building. On one hand, there is the production of memory from the inside that serves the national audience whereby collectivised remembrance is imagined as a resource for dealing with the past in recognising violence, trauma and resistance. Most of these imaginings and recognitions have, however, produced meta-­narratives and a glorified past, and have relied on the erasure of diverse social histories and subjects. On the other hand, from the Outside In, specific narratives about Kosovo’s past and culture are frequently offered as explanatory tools for local political positionalities. In such instances culture is reduced to a determining function without accounting for the many layers and positions of power that crosscut experiences, institutions and responses. We argue that all of these practices have produced complex effects, rendering the past into a means of producing mechanisms of governmentality that have aimed to democratise state and society but have largely failed to deliver social justice. We do not account for the institutions that have been charged with statebuilding in Kosovo, rather we focus on the “local” actions and reactions to the practices of these institutions. We show that statebuilding is a multi-­layered process, in which memory production is not neatly laid out but often causes stumbling over the conflicting ideological landscape. In this chapter, we frame our analysis with the use of specific notions of inside-­out and outside-­in to account for the many layers and positions of power that go into cultural and political memory work. We begin by offering a means to engage with positions of insider and outsider, because they structure the category of the local around which this volume centres, as well as the social and political relations we set to unpack. At the same time, we adopt a feminist stand-­ point theory, which we elaborate below, to reflect on our position as academics, researchers and participants in Kosovo’s context. This positioning and participation is one of knowledge production as well as feminist–activist. Not only because we treat the socially and politically charged topics of a violent past, but also because it enables a space for research and knowledge that is ethically

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   133 engaged. Our particular contribution is an engagement with memory work, actors and practices that seeks to simultaneously unpack regimes of truth, of the  unequal power relations upon which they are predicated, and ground our ­analysis on assertions and contestations of agency. In the first section of the chapter we draw from our own work, engagement and experiences – sociological, anthropological and feminist – and preserve an uneasy and tense positionality that claims resonance through the very misrecognitions and erasures it undergoes. We deliberate on the dichotomy of insider– outsider because it allows a reminder of the systems of power under which we operate. Throughout, we foreground the agency of diverse interlocutors – including activists, survivors of war violence, artists, academics and politicians – whose positions are socially and politically varied and thus transcend the totalising effects of dichotomous positions of insider and outsider. Based on a social and political responsibility they articulate, and deeply informed by personal experiences, we show how memory and social activisms seeks to both recognise memories of violence and transform social responses. We then follow with a closer look at two particular manifestations, a law and a protest, that exemplify the tensions brought in by practices of memory. In the first we take a look at the competing notions of justice in dealing with the past within state institutions. This section discusses the amendment to the Law No. 04/L-­054 on the Status and Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of KLA, Sexual Violence Victims of War, Civilian Victims of War and Their Families. The amendment to include survivors of wartime sexual violence (referred to as victims in the law) was a locally driven process of both institutions and civil society but which initially did not receive the support of international actors in Kosovo. It was later heralded as Atifete Jahjaga’s legacy to be, Kosovo’s former President. Here we rely on participant–observation and interviews with institutional representatives, activists and survivors. Our second case is based on a re-­construction of a 2007 protest in Prishtina (Kosovo’s capital) that questioned the lack of voice in political processes and claims made on the right to self-­determination. The growing frustration with lack of statehood and disappointment with international institutions governing Kosovo (specifically UNMIK), on the part of protesters, and the dismissal of social and political concerns the protest movement claimed made visible that “internationals” perceived the protest as lack of compliance and disobedience to “international democratic standards”. For those protesting this dismissal signified a larger misrecognition of the history of the 1990s and the 1999 war in Kosovo, and the ways protesting became an essential practice in claims to agency and statehood. The examples that weave the article, although seemingly unrelated are snapshots of social texts and practices of memory and remembrance. It is an assemblage of stories that exemplify the making of institutions and the negotiation of political rights. However, this assemblage is made of a series of silences and erasures that legitimate not only particular stories and experiences but also particular institutional responses to them. Memory and violent experiences become

134   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia unrecognised as a legitimate means of claiming rights, specifically because of the way that Kosovo’s statebuilding has been conditioned upon the erasure of national-­based narratives and historical experience. Conceived as a human rights intervention, this dominant reading from the outside-­in is deeply detached from the “local” conception, which holds claims to statehood as a fight for national-­ sovereignty and social justice.

Standpoints on witnessing and enacting: local academics in transnational space The narrative of the past in post Yugoslav countries in general has been built around alleged historical and cultural legacies, offering explanatory frameworks that perceive violent ethnic conflicts as an endemic feature of the region, locked in ancient feuds and “primordial basest instinct” (Kaplan 1993). In addition, viewing transformations from authoritarian regimes and centralised economies to democracy and liberalisation through the lens and frame of transition obstructs the recognition that post-­socialist and post-­war transformations have been part of larger global rearrangements of power (Chatterjee 2011). When expected results and alignments with “western democracy”, in the neo-­ liberal framework, are not met they are largely attributed to failings of “local national culture” (Verdery 1996). Kosovo, in particular, appears in transnational imaginaries as a nation in need of defence from genocide and international protection. As Gusia and Kennedy (2016: 4) argue, this imagery helped to justify a liberal internationalism with a military edge, but only after relative ignorance of the non-­violent struggle preceding the … war against Serb occupation. Ignorance of the latter, with focus on the former, defined a new aggressive militarism in support of democracy’s extension. These discursive frameworks are often accepted as value neutral, objective and detached accounts of outsider readings of the situation (Woodward 1997; Pula 2013; Luci and Gusia 2014; Visoka 2016). Challenging and suspending these dominant assumptions about the region and replacing them with alternative frameworks, especially those that would be deemed academically and politically credible would foreground the inherent tensions of respective institutions and their structuring of power. Mindful in avoiding the traps of dichotomies of victim–victimiser, insider– outsider, our inquiry begins by reflecting on our own multiple positions as academic researchers, participants and witnesses in Kosovo’s context. Reflexivity, an almost defining feature of anthropology and increasingly relevant to sociology, continues to be “alien in the worlds of international studies” (Kennedy 2015: 30). In anthropology, reflexivity was part of a larger linguistic turn, engagement with constructivist analysis, and the discipline’s scrutiny of its embeddedness within colonialism (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Comaroff and

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   135 Comaroff 1991; Cooper and Stoler 1997). In sociology, Pierre Bourdieu insisted that sociology should especially be reflexive of its epistemic claims, particularly in its preoccupation with the relationship between structure and agency (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). As feminists, we strive to understand the world from the standpoint of women and other marginalised groups in society. We take inspiration from standpoint theorists such as Sandra Harding (1987), Patricia Hill Collins (2000) and Dorothy Smith (2005), who claim that certain socio-­political positions occupied by women (and by other groups who lack social and economic privilege) can become sites of epistemic production. Margins can be a starting point for inquiry into questions about not only those who are socially and politically marginalised, but also in revealing the systems of power and privilege. Here we rely on Donna Haraway (1988: 583) who has defined feminism’s stake in the objectivity–subjectivity frame (read insider–outsider) as ethical and political whereby “only partial perspective promises objective vision.… [Whereby] feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge … It allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see”. For us learning to see has been conditioned by our disciplines, but also opened up through feminist agency and understandings. Such has been shaped by our academic education and social positioning and has also meant recognition of privilege. Whereas standpoint theory seeks to include experiences from the margin, intersectionality foregrounds structures that arise thought the different juxtapositions of gender, class, race, sexuality, ability, and ways they structure and create particular mediations of marginality and privilege, particularly marking white male privilege (Crenshaw 1989). Intersectionality thus can be a method rendering evident the power structures and the construction of social categories, fostering more nuanced understandings of ways juxtapositions of social categories produce particular experiences. It is the insistence on historical understanding, ethnographic grounding of relations of power, and the systematic production of difference that invites recognition of analytical epistemologies of postcoloniality, and by extension relations between a global North and South. Writing histories of social and political movements, and shifts, remains a much-­needed project, particularly since linear narratives of statebuilding and national histories continue to dominate (Hayden 1994; Bowman 1994; Schmitt 2014; Gashi 2014). Kosovo not only offers an example of its place in the disintegration of a modern–socialist state, but also demonstrates, primarily, nation-­ building processes, which targeted territorial annexation, set-­up structures of segregation, and essentialised identities of all kinds (Luci 2014: 14; Verdery and Chari 2009). Alongside these intersections, of post/socialism and nationalism, Gani Bobi a Kosovar prolific writer in cultural studies, social theory, and a professor of sociology at the University of Prishtina, in his The Context of Self-­ Culture (Konteksti i Vetkulturës 1994), engaged in close dialogue with Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. Writing just one year before his death, at a time when the Serbian regime had appeared to have normalised structures of segregation and violence in Kosovo, Bobi relied on Fanon’s calls for liberation

136   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia as a demand for nationhood, a liberation that might come only through armed resistance and recognition of one’s colonisation. Moving between calls for solidarity and complex theoretical elaboration, he argued that what is required are “more reflexive and differentiated relations towards tradition and cultural heritage” (Bobi 1994: 32). He noted that tradition cannot be reduced to a simplistic protection of the past, but is a necessary condition for the creation of new cultural values in Kosovo. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, movements for the independence of Kosovo have been intrinsically connected to re-­conceptions of relations between “traditional” and “modern” cultural formations and its place in the shifting paradigms of nationhood. As Chatterjee (1993) claims, post-­colonial societies are cast in constant consumption of modernity, which is held hostage by western imaginings of nation. The women’s movement in Kosovo during the 1990s, for example, made use of a strategy based on “political motherhood” as means of reimagining connections between modernity and tradition and political agency in the nationalist public/private divide. This activism, would not entirely erase enactments of tradition and patriarchy, but would appropriate them to a newly formed discourse of citizenship and human rights (Gusia 2016). However, women in the 1990s did not speak as a homogenous group, nor do women activists and academics who today hold diverse socio-­economic and political positions. We have also been often placed in the category of “Albanian woman”, at times too “authentic”, other times not enough. On a particular occasion, presenting at the Gender and Identity conference organised by Kosovo’s Agency for Gender Equality (2009), a panel shared with a with a local scholar and one from a neighbouring country caused much controversy (Luci 2014). The presentation opened up the topic of the Kosovo Liberation Army and masculinity. Those in attendance included women parliamentarians, some of whom were former KLA fighters. One of them stood up and said, “You do not have the right to talk about the KLA. I can talk about the KLA; I was in the KLA”. This was not an anticipated reaction and was followed by a request to engage in a conversation and a recounting of their personal and political experiences in that role. At that point a conversation on authority, legitimacy and voice began and the course of the talk was altered. The floor was turned and the participants began a discussion on the role of women in the war. The following year Susana Milevska gave a presentation on the “Feminist Theory & Activism in Global Perspective”, at another international conference organised by Feminist Review. The journal was celebrating its 30th anniversary. There, Milevska (2011: 52) discussed “the potentialities of regional feminisms” for transnational theory, and noted the exchange that had occurred at the prior year’s conference in Prishtina. Milevska observed that the audience objected because the local scholar’s presentation was in English, and [b]ecause the paper was written in a very hermetic language, [it] was almost incomprehensible to some audience members, especially those coming from

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   137 the older generation of local feminist activists and the women members of parliament in Kosovo. It created a notable sense of frustration at the conference. (2011: 52) Although perhaps a technical detail, the presentation was actually delivered in Albanian, and most of the comments on language were directed to other local presenters. Milevska did note that a simultaneous translation was provided, and language choice should not have been an issue. However, at the time when this “critique” was launched the debate went beyond the technical and technological and a moment of untranslatability ensued. The women parliamentarians, former KLA fighters, did not wish anyone but them to have the legitimacy of telling the history of the KLA, for this is also where they drew their political power. Milevska (2011: 56), however, does make some relevant points and they are cited here at length: It is absolutely necessary to begin a discussion about regional feminism and solidarity in both academic and activist contexts because, not only will it inform and enrich the transnationally oriented feminist theory with more transversal links and “reciprocal influxes” … but it could also contribute to a more successful strategy of bridging oppositional positions and towards encouraging women’s empowerment at the local level. However, there is another concern. “Transnational theorists” cannot assume that women at the “local level” do not understand their language, or that scholars from “remote corners of the world” will never have the opportunity to read what a theorist says about them. Nor can theorists assume that theory occurs in a transnational space and practice in local ones. To paraphrase Navaro-­Yashin (2003), the mobility and flexibility promoted by processes and theories of transnationalism fail to grasp how they also “engender the opposite: immobility, entrapment, confinement, incarceration” (2003: 108). These terms themselves are not helpful, and, some time ago, at least in anthropology, we burned the straw man and came to understand how problematic it is to construct “subjects” out of composites. After all admonitions, Milevska had presented a deeply theoretical paper without objections. The opposition to the local scholar’s paper occurred because the audience understood what was being said and engaged in transaction. For Spivak (1988), for example, subaltern narratives, could only give a semblance of dislocating normative histories, for their narratives remain defined through particular Western notions of the subject. But, as Susan Gal (1991: 177) argues, “such cultural power rarely goes uncontested”. The meanings that speakers convey are always situated in particular institutional settings; the control of discourse or representation occurs in social interactions (socio-­cultural contexts that also point to the material inequalities of actors), and may be “the occasion of coercion, conflict, or complicity” (1991:177). In this constellation, the roles

138   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia and positions of international/normative and local/native researchers are sites of contradiction and contestation because of the assumed difference between the two (Narayan 1993; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Weston 1997; Breidenbach and Nyíri 2009). Below we operationalise these contradictions through the notions of inside-­out and outside-­in by exemplifying the dynamic processes and the juxtapositions these categories produce. We aim to account for how “insider” and “outsider” positions have been defined, mobilised and contested in Kosovo’s memory and institution building.

The law and the protest The two examples we now examine – a legal mechanism for the recognition and reparation of survivors of war-­time time sexual violence, and a protest that enacted disobedience to lack of decision-­making power – are elaborated based on research from different methodological frames and aim at discovering the diverse voices, actors and practices that have produced memory and political positioning in Kosovo. The Law No. 04/L-­172, on Amending and Supplementing the Law No. 04/L-­054 on the Status and the Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of Kosovo Liberation Army, Sexual Violence Victims of the War, Civilian Victims and their Families, is analysed for the discursive frames it employed and the emergent distributive grammar it structures within the spaces of law and memory. The protest is reconstructed through participation-­ observation that centres on a dialectics between discursive practices and public performance. Both allow us to bring together the circulation of meta narratives, competing social texts and practices, and uncover the historical genealogies of their making.

The law The wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda initiated the international legal codification of sexual violence as a war crime. However, it was not until 2008 that the UN adopted resolution 1820, which declared that: “rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” (UNSC resolution 1820). In international law, wartime rapes were initially framed as crimes against dignity and honour, as opposed to crimes of violence. However, as many scholars of gender have noted, the emphasis on honour distorted the recognition that rape is primarily violence against women – “violence against women’s body, autonomy, integrity, selfhood, security, and self-­esteem as well as her standing in community” (Copelon 1995: 201). In Kosovo, recognition of survivors of wartime sexual violence emerged as a subject of public debate when the Kosovo Women’s Network raised the issue at their annual 8 March protest in 2012. The following year the Kosovar Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture also began a public awareness campaign they titled “Hear My Voice”. In 2014 the debate entered the formal political

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   139 sphere when members of parliament coming from the Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-­Determination) proposed an amendment to Law No. 04/L-­ 054 to include survivors of wartime sexual violence. It took another year for the law to be promulgated, mainly with the support of then President Jahjaga, who established the National Council for Survivors of Wartime Sexual Violence. Another two years were necessary to establish the Government Committee for the Recognition and Verification of the Status of Persons Raped During the War in Kosovo (April 2017). The slow and painful process of recognition and the public debates that it fostered, however, helped break the silence on the issue. While recognition of wartime sexual violence has taken shape though law, public commemoration and remembrance of wartime violence have also emerged and become the subject of many contestations. The first resistance came when it challenged the entanglement of nationalism and masculinity in public discourse and collective memorialisation. In general, as DiLellio and Schwandner-­Sievers (2006) have shown, the master-­narrative of national identity has been based on the memory of war, predominantly shaped and created by a particular narration based on the cult of heroic masculinity and that of freedom fighters). This narrative has persistently marginalised not only women’s experiences, but also civilian accounts of the past. An attempt to foreground women’s experiences of war was Heroinat, a monument initiated by Alma Lama in 2014 (former MP) and supported by Kosovo’s Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. A needed intervention to the lack of women in public and state practices of remembrance, the monument situated in the centre of Prishtina is relevant because it invites engagement with the very difference it signifies but also the dominant nationalist narrative. Namely, the construction of a single female face made of 20,000 miniature carved faces (all identical) on medal-­pins. While it was initially heralded as an attempt to overturn the existing regime of representation, the official, political and public rhetoric recognised women only for their sexual and cultural reproductive roles in marking the boundaries of the nation (Yuval-­Davis and Anthias 1989). The memorial thereby came to homogenise all women’s experiences and placed them on a pedestal through the very experience that had marginalised and stigmatised them. Survivors of war-­time sexual violence, in particular, became turned into sacrificial commodities in nationalised commemoration that has maintained their difference, not as a location for claiming rights, but as marginalised outsiders to the nation’s collective remembrance. In the specific context of post-­war Kosovo one also needs to consider the long-­term impact of the international military and humanitarian intervention and on-­going statebuilding project. These interventions have not afforded critical and differentiated thinking of the past and thusly promoting a sense of social justice. The general framework influenced by the international community, and accepted by local politicians in Kosovo, therefore by those claiming insider and outsider positions alike, has been one of moving forward and looking towards the future. Security and peace have been regarded as paramount to justice, an approach

140   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia

Figure 9.1  Partial view of Heroinat monument. Photo by Korab Krasniqi © Reproduced by permission.

c­ reating a sense of historical limbo that many civilians feel erases their social and individual experience of war. For example, Vlora Çitaku, former Minister of European Integration, shared that in her public support for legal recognition of survivors of sexual violence she was “criticized by the international community and was urged not to open up issues of war”. International forums lately – namely the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict held in 2014, supported by UK’s Foreign Secretary William Hague and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees – have become a means of offering recognition to survivors of war time sexual violence outside of the framework of the nation-­state. However, the initial recognition of rape as a crime against dignity and honour continues to linger in general understandings of wartime sexual violence. Also, focus on war time sexual violence exclusively within a legalistic frame, assuming that that legal recognition of crimes delivers justice to victims and survivors, speaks of a neo-­liberal position which discounts needed social transformations and reparations. In Kosovo, the public marginalisation of experiences and narratives of sexual violence has most often been explained by a theory of cultural stigmatisation. During a UN fact-­finding project an international consultant produced a report that entirely omitted the work of Kosovar scholars. During an interview with one she reminded her to “hushhhhh … keep [your] voice down, because

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   141 this is a very sensitive topic”. The general failure to implement necessary measures, international or national, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (adopted in 2000) on Women, Peace and Security, that could help economic and political participation of women, has not prevented political attention toward the topics of gender inequality (specifically sexual exploitation, trafficking in human beings and domestic violence). Within these spheres of concern, however, women have been placed within their conventional and traditional contexts of visible vulnerabilities: in chains (in awareness-­raising posters), or with bruises on their faces (in public service announcements). As Cynthia Enloe (2000: 108–109) has noted, “making rape visible as a matter of political and legal concern can be dangerously easy”. In an effort to recognise the mass rape of women as a systematic strategy and weapon of war recognitions of such violent experiences reveal the existing structural rigidities, miss-­frames, and misrepresentations of survivors’ positions (Gusia 2016). Such misrecognitions have been shared by both nationalist and human rights activists, which often are superficially regarded as insider/outsider or subjective/objective positions. While these are relevant concerns related to the representation of survivors and victims, they fail to consider the interdependency of recognition and representation with redistribution in a globalised frame of justice. We would argue along the lines of Nancy Fraser’s (2013) three-­dimensional theory of justice. A debate on redistribution should open the question of who is included in redistributive justice and how. While reparations are almost entirely not discussed (Serbia still failing to recognise its role in the wars in former Yugoslavia), social assistance provided by the national government becomes the only form of redistribution. For survivors of wartime sexual violence, a governmental verification process has still not begun, whereas other claimants that fall within the purview of the law have been receiving compensation. The verified list of veterans and martyrs has also been disputed, but mainly pointing to practices of clientelism and questionable claims (over 50,000 claiming government assistance). When introduction of survivors of wartime sexual violence into the law was debated in the Kosovo Assembly, MPs first raised doubts over the credibility of claimants and the difficulty of verifying the crime. Overall, mnemonic hegemony and unwillingness of judicial international bodies have fostered political and social changes that elevate different kinds of patriarchalities and further economic and power asymmetries.

On sovereignty and self-­determination On 10 February 2007, the Vetëvendosje! movement organised a protest opposing the ongoing negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia that led to the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Led by Albin Kurti, former student organiser and leader of the 1997 protests in Kosovo, and former prisoner of Serbia’s Milosevic regime, Vetëvendosje! is a populist movement, now political party, whose main criticism has been levelled against the UN administration in Kosovo, with claims to the principles of self-­determination. The status talks

142   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia finally lead to Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 18 February 2008 and transformation of Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions into the Government of Kosovo. What Vetvendosje!, with big public support, protested was the very path decided by international and national counterparts leading to partial sovereignty. In this constellation Vetvendosje! is marked as the “local nationalist” whereas the provisional institutions overseen by UNMIK as partners to the international protectorate. Vetvendosje! would claim the position of an authentic insider voice, unbending to the perceived colonial supervision, whereas the provisional institutions played a double game. While on the one hand they capitalised on the imagery and memory of freedom fighters for the national audience, they consistently succumbed to international pressure to peacebuilding processes that did not allow the creation of mechanisms for transitional justice. The general perception these positions created, that the insider is nationalist and outsider is colonialist, would become challenged by the investigation undertaken by the Ombudsperson and a public art intervention that called for new spaces of dialogue. The protest, with some 2,500 participants, was tragically concluded when two of the protesters lost their lives due to what largely has been seen as disproportionate use of force on the part of the security forces (the Kosovo police services, and particularly the United Nations Mission in Kosovo police force, at the time responsible for establishing and overseeing Kosovo’s security force.) An independent investigation was immediately announced, and the chief of the Kosovo Police Services resigned. This was hailed as a sign of democracy, especially since officials have consistently failed to show accountability. The Ombudsperson did not have a mandate to investigate the actions of UNMIK police, but produced a detailed report on the accounts of the day. The UNMIK international police were, for the most part, involved in maintaining order. They lost control of the situation when, in an attempt to disperse the crowd, they discharged tear gas and rubber bullets. Their Kosovo Police colleagues were not wearing masks. The results of the investigations were later made public, but no legal or other measures were taken to identify those responsible for the death of the protesters. Albin Kurti, the Vetëvendosje! leader, was jailed for instigating violence, and the UN mission sought to identify him as the guilty party. The Ombudsperson reported that rubber bullets used by the Romanian unit of the international police force had passed their expiration date by 13 years. The German Federal Office of Criminal Police Investigation suggested that the rubber bullets “were more dangerous than one had originally assumed” (Ombudsperson in Kosovo 2008: 17). Members of the Romanian unit were recalled, disregarding the UN Headquarter request that they remain and continue to cooperate in the investigation. To the protest participant and the viewing public, even those not sympathetic to Vetëvendosje!, the important fact was the clear disregard for regulations, namely, the prohibition against directly targeting the upper body of protesters when discharging rubber bullets. The Ombudsperson’s report concluded that “nineteen persons were arrested, while eighty-­two others requested medical assistance … thirty of them were

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   143 injured by rubber bullets, fifty-­six others had bodily injuries in different parts of their bodies, mostly caused by the use of excessive physical force” (Ombudsperson in Kosovo 2008: 13). The report also stated that an investigation conducted by the Kosovo Police Inspectorate showed insufficient communication between police officers on the ground and those in the main offices. By April 2007, an international prosecutor of the UN administration announced that the evidence led to the conclusion that, “the deaths of Mon Balaj and Arben Xheladini had been unnecessary and avoidable” (Ombudsperson in Kosovo 2008: 16). But, the state of evidence gathered did not meet the threshold of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity committed by any particular person.… There appeared to be a divergence between Romanian domestic law and generally accepted international law and guiding UN principles on the use of deadly force and very possibly on the use of rubber bullets. (Ombudsperson in Kosovo 2008: 16) On the day of the 10 February protest, Rron Qena and Fatmir Mustafa (aka Karlo), both part of the contemporary art scene, appeared with a folding table and tea. They served to all those present the more “traditional” Turkish tea. The performance could be seen as an invitation to partake in a local paradigm and to observe the world through a local practice of commensurability. It also utilised the practice as a metaphor for communication, to sit down and drink together as an act of amicability. The next day, during a vigil for the two deceased protesters, the two artists blindfolded the eyes on a statue of Mother Theresa and the child she holds by her side. Here, Mother Theresa is reinvented, not only as a symbol of sacrifice and peace, but also as an international and national symbol whose intentional blindness comments on international incapacity for introspection. Mother Theresa and the children she holds are both blind and blinded. The artists’ interventions, as well as the act of protesting, can be seen as actions to protect a particular cultural practice that un/conventionally include memories of the recent war, mediated cultural proximity and distance, as well as a reminder of how engagement in the public square in Kosovo has been a historical practice for claiming agency. On one hand, the reactions of the international police, by assuming the meanings of international law and human rights, and by mediating the publics’ belonging in public space, flattened a rather complex terrain. A positive response to Rron and Kalro’s invitation could have aided in creatively rethinking a worldview, that, more than often, limits the desire or possibility to discuss diverging experiences, such as suffering and authenticity, and various claims to their ownership. Nonetheless, as Bordis Buden has observed “the current moment is characterised by a criticism blind to crisis, and a crisis blind to criticism” (2009: 41). The miscommunication, lack of clear and applicable laws, distribution of responsibilities, excessive force and a general “state of exceptions” further strengthened Vetëvendosje!’s claim that Kosovo has no need for international supervision and should claim its rights to full sovereignty. In a context where

144   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia justice is served disproportionately, anti-­colonial, leftist and nationalist threads underline Vetëvendosje!’s discourse and activism. In this case the position of insider and outsider became cemented into two separate standpoints, which continue to fail to deliver the transitional justice mechanisms in the dealing with the past. A point of further inquiry remains the very negotiation of transitional justice, but one that would have to account for the structural inequalities and power hierarchies by means of neoliberalism’s production of patriarchy and gendered (feminine and masculine) subjectivities (Cornwall, Karioris and Lindisfarne 2016).

Conclusions Interrogating conflict in terms of the legacies it creates, as well as the emerging claims about social justice, depends on a negotiation of the past. As Levy has noted, in the relations between past and future in the contemporary globalisation of memory cultures, “memory and its association with a particular past are not an impediment for the future but a prerequisite to enunciate a narrative (bridge) over the present” (2010: 16). The historical and memory meta-­narratives of post-­ war Kosovo have been contingent upon either nationalist or neoliberal imaginings, but which in current practices have been sanitised and respectively rendered as the local and international. The domains of policy, law, activism, knowledge production, and protest, have been formed and transformed through these narratives. Oftentimes they are treated as spaces apart, but we have shown that juxtapositions of insider and outsider can create spaces in-­between where relevant social and political action takes places. Kosovo has figured in the spaces and knowledge of international relations through the debate on humanitarian intervention, or that of statebuilding, but those very spaces are the products of entanglements and exchange among a sundry of actors. By using the juxtaposition of insider and outsider positions we have rendered visible the persistence of the binary but also its friability. In our reading, we pointed to embodied knowing, to borrow from Dorothy Smith (2005: 7), where knowledge is not assumed as a given or a finalised form, but is recognised “as a ground in experience from which discoveries are to be made … as well [ground for] acting and organizing to change how those experiences have been created” (2005: 8). Highlighting a feminist positionality, we have attempted to offer an encounter with different forms and processes that produce relations of power embedded in patriarchies, which at times collude and at other times collide. Nationalism’s corner stone is a gendered differentiation and division of roles and imagery, but it is also of the contemporary mechanisms of international post-­war oversight. At times these divisions can be more visible, as the case of the Heroinat memorial shows. At other times, they are the background of hierarchies of power, whereby the issue of sovereignty appears genderless but relies on power asymmetries of imagined insiders and outsiders. By situating the different actors and positions in the multiplicity of responses and actions, it becomes possible to open a more politically uneasy and open-­ended

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   145 perspective. Both of our examples identify ways in which competing frames of justice were predicated upon a selective presentation of what were deemed appropriate displays of agency. These displays utilised memory as a vehicle to claim and disclaim access and rights to recognition, redistribution and representation.

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146   Nita Luci and Linda Gusia Anthropology in the Postmodern Era, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 175–203 Gashi, Sh. (2014) ‘Kosova 1912–2000 in the History Textbooks of Kosova and Serbia’, in S. P. Ramet, A. Simkus and O. Listhaug (eds) Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosova: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 239–274. Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (eds) (1997) Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gusia, L. (2016) Gjinia, reprezentimi dhe sfera publike. PhD thesis. Prishtinë: Universiteti i Prishtinës. Gusia, L. and Kennedy, M. (2016) ‘Kosova’s Place in the Transnational Imaginary: A Comparative and Historical Account of Becoming Policy Significant’, paper presented to the conference Can Comparative Historical Sociology Save the World? Seattle, 19 August. Haraway, D. (1988) ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies 14(3): 575–599. Harding, S. (1987) Feminism & Methodology: Social Science Issues, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Hayden, R. (1994) ‘Recounting the Dead: The Rediscovery and Redefinition of Wartime Massacres in Late- and Post-­Communist Yugoslavia’, in R. Watson (ed.), Memory, History and Opposition Under State Socialism, Sante Fe, NM: School of Amer­ican Research Press, pp. 167–184. Kaplan, R. D. (1993) Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, New York: St Martin’s Press. Kennedy, M. D. (2015) Globalizing Knowledge: Intellectuals, Universities, and Publics in Transformation, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Levy, D. (2010) ‘Changing Temporalities and the Internationalization of Memory Cultures’, in Y. Gutman, A. D. Brown and A. Sodaro (eds), Memory and the Future: Transnational Politics, Ethics, and Society, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 15–30. Luci, N. (2014) Seeking Independence: Making Memory, Nation, and Manhood in Kosovo. PhD thesis: Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Luci, N. and Gusia, L. (2014) ‘ “Our Men Will Not Have Amnesia”: Civic Engagement, Emancipation and the Gendered Public in Kosovo’, S.  P. Ramet, A. Simkus and O. Listhaug (ed.), Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 201–222. Milevska, S. (2011) ‘Solidarity and Intersectionality: What Can Transnational Feminist Theory Learn from Regional Feminist Activism’, Feminist Review, Feminist Theory & Activism in Global Perspective/FR Conference Proceedings, pp. 52–61. Narayan, K. (1993) ‘How Native Is a ‘Native’ Anthropologist?’, Amer­ican Anthropologist, 95(3): 671–686. Navaro-­Yashin, Y. (2003) ‘ “Life Is Dead Here:” Sensing the Political in “no man’s land” ’, Anthropological Theory, 3(1): 107–125. Ombudsperson in Kosovo (2008) Ex Officio No. 008/2007. Regarding the Incidents that Occurred during the “Vetëvendosje” Protest on 10 February 2007. Pristina, Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo. Pula, B. (2013) ‘Iterations of Sovereignty: Kosovo and the New Mode of Peripheralization’, in V. Knežević, K. Lukić, I. Marjanović and G. Nikolić (eds), Free and Sovereign: Art, Theory and Politics. A Collection of Essays and Interviews on Kosovo and Serbia, Novi Sad: NAPON.

Dealing with the past in Kosovo   147 Schmitt, O. (2014) ‘Historiography in Post-­Independence Kosovo’, in S.  P. Ramet, A. Simkus and O. Listhaug (eds), Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 53–74. Smith, D. (2005) Institutional Ethnography: Sociology for People, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Spivak, G. Ch. (1988) ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Cultures, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. UNDP Kosovo (2014) ‘Gender Equality Strategy 2014–2017’, Available at: www.ks. undp.org/content/dam/kosovo/docs/womenPub/Kosovo%20GES%202014-2017.pdf Verdery, K. (1996) What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Verdery, K and Chari, Sh. (2009) ‘Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Post­ socialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 51 (1): 6–34. Visoka, G. (2016) ‘Arrested Truth: Transitional Justice and the Politics of Remembrance in Kosovo’, Journal of Human Rights Practice 8(1): 62–80. Weston, Kath. (1997) ‘The Virtual Anthropologist’, in A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds) Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Woodward, S. (1997) ‘Violence-­prone Area or international Transition? Adding the Role of Outsiders in Balkan Violence’, in A. Kleinman, V. Das, M. Ramphelle and P. Reynolds (eds) Violence and Subjectivity, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 19–45. Yuval-­Davis, N. and Anthias, F. (1989) Women-­Nation-State, New York: St Martin’s Press.

10 The subaltern of the local The Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women and statebuilding in Kosovo Sakibe Jashari

Introduction This chapter problematises the role of Roma,1 Ashkali2 and Egyptian3 women in Kosovo and looks at relationships of subordination within Kosovar society, as a public realm, and within the community, as a private realm. Though the universalist approach is not common in the discipline of anthropology, the public/ private binary is used in feminist anthropology to explain universal female subordination (Ortner 1974; Rosaldo et al. 1974) as a cross-­cultural phenomenon. In feminist anthropology, the universalist approach focuses on gender asymmetry based on the premise of subordination which, it is argued, is universal with regard to women. In this light, my discussion will focus on the Network of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Women’s Organisations of Kosovo (NRAEWOK), international human rights discourse and the subaltern concept, which refers to the marginalised position of a group of people who are outside the formal political structure. The subaltern theory was initially put forward by Gramsci (Ives 2004) and was extensively used in post-­colonial studies during the 1980s. Subaltern theory is not, as in Spivak’s formulation, limited to “somebody who is not getting a piece of pie” (Guha and Spivak 1988: 47) – it applies to any group of people who are among the voiceless. This chapter will discuss the subaltern concept in relation to Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women and their position within voiceless communities and in society in general. The situation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women did not go unnoticed by the wider society in Kosovo, or by international structures, but it was undoubtedly passed over in silence. Clearly, the subject did not attract enough interest to be considered an important issue that deserved to be tackled. I suggest that this lack of interest is three-­fold. For one thing, Kosovo’s statebuilding trajectory has been capitalised as a Serb–Albanian conflict, resulting in asymmetrical power relations between the larger and the smaller ethnic communities. The second is that women’s issues and rights have been addressed rather superficially, and not considered genuinely relevant in the peacebuilding or statebuilding processes.4 In a more specific sense, I suggest that Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women’s rights did not attract attention because of the international and national ignorance about the three communities. As a result, there was a failure to both understand

The subaltern of the local   149 their culture or plight and to involve them in the emancipatory peace or a pluriversal peace: including all parties involved using bottom-­up solutions (Visoka and Richmond 2016: 5). In this regard, the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Gorani and other smaller ethnic and religious communities hardly triggered even a marginal debate (Musliu 2017: 10). The third suggestion is that Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women are not spared the traditional patriarchal domination of society ­ubiquitous in the Balkans. That said, they are repeatedly in a subaltern position in both the public and private spheres, where their agency is undoubtedly denied. Even though the international organisations began to introduce democratisation and liberal peace more than a decade ago, the situation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women has not improved to match that of women from the majority community. A triggering question is, why not? This will be discussed later, in the first part of the chapter where I will put forward some ideas in answer to this question. In the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo conflict (1998–1999), the linking of women’s rights with domestic violence was introduced by the international intervention agencies as part of the liberal peacebuilding package.5 Before, this concept had not been popular because the country’s attention was generally focused on the bigger struggle – self-­determination, liberation and independence – in which women played an active part. The Kosovo Women’s Network6 (KWN) had existed since 1996, however – first as an informal group, now as a formal entity that promotes and protects women’s rights in Kosovo. Similarly, the Network of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Women’s Organisations of Kosovo7 was established in 2000 as an informal group of women activists, at that time supported by the OSCE and the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), and later on by the UN agencies and local organisations. As stated earlier, the transnational human rights and gender discourses were on the international agenda for Kosovo, which was to be reinforced by the rule of law. The same agenda was planned for the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. As in many other parts of Europe, however, the socio-­economic situation of these three communities was put on the back burner, and as time went by was eventually neglected (Sigona and Trehan 2009). While still only informally established, NRAEWOK wrestled with organisational matters, and also lacked capacity and financial support – all essential for successful work and for becoming an agent of future change. In addition, there were struggles between the leaders of the network and also between the activists. Although dozens of projects have been implemented since the network was set up to empower Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in Kosovo, their situation remains almost the same as before 1999. Given that transnational human rights are universal, how are the same women’s/human rights translated, and understood, in the community, specifically among Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women, given the subaltern position they are in? Literature on the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities is quite limited (Visoka 2008), particularly when it comes to the situation of women. Several women’s agencies, networks and organisations8 monitor women’s rights through their work and research, in

150   Sakibe Jashari an effort to generate social change and achieve gender equality in Kosovo, but in their research any mention of Roma, Ashkali or Egyptian women is either encapsulated in a single paragraph or is omitted completely. They describe the national legal framework9 on women’s rights as quite comprehensive, even though effectively implementing it remains a major challenge.10 In this chapter, I will try to fill the void in the scholarly literature and engage with local knowledge from the perspective of the native Roma from Kosovo. Knowledge and experience of the community, and the legacy of more than a decade working with international organisations in the aftermath of the conflict, will be used for observation, following the interpretive ethnographic approach. The observation methodology will be used also with regard to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in general. Six interviews were conducted with members of these communities (four females and two males). The female interviewees were women’s rights activists from Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian civil society, while the male interviewees were representatives of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian political parties. It is claimed that scholars who study the community they belong to are in a better position than those who are not when it comes to understanding and interpreting the culture of that community (Kondo 1986; Zin 1979; Lughod 1998). Critics may question how native is the native (Narayan 1993: 672), but it is essential for the researcher to engage reflexively in fieldwork (Crapanzano et al. 2010) and to maintain this approach continuously throughout. Adopting the reflexivity method, which helps prevent the research from producing overgeneralised knowledge is key to maintaining balanced subjectivity (Rose 1997). Another important matter for the researcher is the quality of his or her relationship with the group of people represented in the research (Narayan 1993: 671). As a native, my research will be based on these academic principles and methods. My experience in studying abroad showed me that there is little information about the situation in Kosovo, and in particular about the communities there. In addition, when analysing the Kosovo conflict and international intervention, academic production hardly ever escapes the Serbo–Albanian dichotomy. I believe this chapter will help close that gap. I would like to stress that, although in writing I have kept the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities separate, paying particular attention to women, I personally regard them as one unitary group in a community sense: a group of people who have faced similar difficulties and struggles in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and who share similar cultural, traditional and religious understandings and values. For the purpose of this research, I will focus on the aftermath of the conflict (1999 onwards), and will not look in depth at the previous period. Although the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities have different ethnonyms, intermarriages between them are very common and families are quite heterogeneous in this regard. Within these three communities the notion of ethnicity is ambiguous as well as fluid. As noted by Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 4), ethnicity as a concept can mean “the essence of an ethnic group”, or “the quality of belonging to an ethnic group or community”, or it can

The subaltern of the local   151 define “a number of people who share some cultural or biological characteristics and who live and act in consent”. The latter definition reflects more accurately the current situation of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. As noted, intermarriages are common among them, and it is a woman who is the actual carrier of intermarriages, in some cases arranged and in some not, but surely through her. There are thousands of cases where an Ashkali woman has married into a Roma or Egyptian family, or vice versa. Their traditional customs are similar, so there is no need to harmonise the customary wedding rituals, or even to have different ones, and – more importantly – ethnicity is not seen as an issue on that day. Eventually, a woman who has married into one of the other two ethnic groups will either be loyal to her original ethnicity or, as time passes, she will be more inclined to adopt the orientation of the ethnic group she has married into. This example confirms the ethnic fluidity among the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities from a woman’s perspective. As indicated, literature written by locals on Kosovo’s Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities is limited, especially that written by members of these communities (Galjus 1999). Also, the double discrimination they face – as women and as a minority – has been totally ignored. In Kosovo’s liberal democracy, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women suffer from being the subalterns of the subaltern communities. The situation of Roma women everywhere else in Europe is quite similar to that of Roma (including Ashkali and Egyptian) women everywhere else in the Balkans. The rights of Roma women in Europe did not feature were not visible in the Eurocentric human rights discourse until 1994, when a congress against racism and intolerance, organised by the EU Commission, published a manifesto presenting their situation (Kóczé 2011). In academic literature, Roma women in Europe are presented from the traditional and customary viewpoint adopted in England (Okley 1983), or from that of managing sexual desire, as in Spain (Gay and Blasco 1994). Similarly, there is no academic research on their role in political organisations or in representation in Europe (Barany 2001; Guy 2001; Tong 2015).

Artificial empowerment and silencing Kosovo is inhabited by around 1.8 million people, of which 8,824 or 0.5 per cent are Roma, 15,436 or 0.9 per cent Ashkali and 11,524 or 0.7 per cent Egyptian.11 Although statistically and constitutionally12 they are recognised as three different ethnic groups, the majority of the population refer to them as “Gypsies” (Lichnofsky 2013: 29) – a term the Roma consider pejorative, even though they use it among themselves, regarding it as “an internal matter” and their prerogative. Roma have been present in Europe, especially in the Balkans, since the thirteenth century. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire they faced pressure to become assimilated and, with that, pressure to align with the dominant ethnic group (Mertus 1999). Groups of Ashkali and Egyptian ethnicity emerged gradually: some scholars interpret this as a response to the constant political pressure on the Roma (Galjus 1999; Sigona and Trehan 2009). As this pressure continued, the Roma were unable to

152   Sakibe Jashari remain neutral and were forced to choose a side in the conflict (Cahn and Peric 1999). During the Yugoslav period, and later during the 1990s in Kosovo, the ethnic awareness of smaller groups such as Muslims, Egyptians and Ashkali was encouraged purely to downplay the larger ethnic groups (Vickers and Fraser 1998) – in the case of Kosovo, the Albanian ethnic group. This unwritten rule led the smaller groups, such as the Egyptians and Ashkali, to claim that their ethnic identity was different from that of the Roma. In 1991, during the era of Slobodan Milošević, Egyptians were included in the census as a separate category for the first time – something that is seen as a result of the nationalist dichotomy between Albanians and Serbs (Lichnofsky 2013). In the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict, a similar division continued, but this time in a different form and with a different purpose. The presence of international missions and the introduction of a “cosmopolitan law” – a notion coined by Douzinas (2007) – and the concept of liberal peace, which promoted the discourse of universal human rights, have been ways of maintaining the divisions between Ashkali and Egyptians. For international missions, multi-­ethnicity was a primary activity when defining the collective identity of Kosovo (King and Mason 2006). They strongly emphasised ethnically based differences through using the language of rights (Sigona 2012), which in turn encouraged a more marked ethnic-­based division. In a way, the “political correctness” the international missions aimed for has forced the majority to respect the self-­described communities in Kosovo. This in turn has instilled an artificial respect for the minority communities. In addition, for Kosovo’s institutions, this issue was seen as “an international thing” rather than as indicating inclusive citizenry. Research has shown that these communities, though described as ethnically different, have at times claimed that “there is too much mention of minorities. We don’t want to raise a lot of noise around us, as we want to prevent future conflicts” (Sigona 2012: 1223). There was a feeling of trepidation among Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians: they feared that if the international community highlighted their rights too much, their future would eventually be in jeopardy from the majority community. On the other hand, despite international efforts to flag the acceptance of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo, the international community has failed to include them in Kosovo’s political and social dialogue as it did with the Serb. The analogy of this is “divide and rule”, which I believe was unconsciously applied to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, as the main focus was on a trajectory of statebuilding and the resolution of the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. All this political influence, pressure and ethnicisation, discussed earlier, has certainly put Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in a far worse position than women from the dominant community, in all spheres. Being in a subaltern position among the already subaltern Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, these women were ignored in the struggle to be part of the society. The illiteracy rate among Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in Kosovo is around 38.3 per cent – the highest of all communities.13 It has hampered the personal development of these women has isolated them from the broader community. To date, illiteracy has

The subaltern of the local   153 not changed much: it stems in part from the three communities’ culture of devaluing education, and in part from the failure of government authorities to propose structural change to combat it. As a result, education has not improved to a satisfactory level, so there has been no breakthrough in terms of isolation. Ultimately, the position of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women remains the same as in early 2000s. I have touched briefly upon the Network of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Women’s Organisations of Kosovo (NRAEWOK), which was initially an informal group of relatively educated Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in the early 2000s, supported and guided by the OSCE and KFOS. It was active for a few years, but then abruptly ceased to exist owing to internal leadership problems and the lack of funding from donors. Later, in 2006, UNIFEM offered to revive the network by making it a formal entity and helping to build capacity for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women activists and leaders. The caveat here, however, was that NRAEWOK would be working under the supervision and guidance of the Kosovo Center for Gender Studies (KCGS), an Albanian-­led women’s organisation, and would have to bring all three communities under one umbrella. This move was regarded as an imposition by UNIFEM.14 As noted by Kóczé (2011: 31), for international donors, defining the nature of the assistance they give is one way of claiming power based on their intervention. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian civil society, and the international donors, saw NRAEWOK as a partner for the Strategy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in the Republic of Kosovo 2009–2015, a blueprint that was expected to improve the situation of these communities.15 Of the strategy’s 11 aims, one was devoted to gender issues. The strategy set out women’s situation, with the problems of double discrimination, lack of freedom of movement owing to post-­conflict insecurity, low level of education, high illiteracy rates, unfavourable position in the labour market and various other social obstacles. Although this document was intended to improve the situation of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in Kosovo, and to empower them, it failed to be implemented thoroughly because of the government’s and the international community’s lack of interest in supporting its implementation either politically or financially. As noted by Sigona, in the decade following the conflict in Kosovo (up to 2012) there was only a limited improvement in the socio-­economic and human rights situations of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, and nothing demonstrates this better than the failure of the integration strategy. Meanwhile, NRAEWOK was working strictly under the KCGS in building capacity for the network of activists who would eventually work in the field with other women. As regards level of expertise, the capacity building was not satisfactory, as NRAEWOK was not fully involved in the programme or projects. There was too much micromanaging by the KCGS on a daily basis.16 In 2012, NRAEWOK started working on their own as an independent entity, yet their old struggles continued. The skills of the network’s staff, leadership and activists remained underdeveloped, hampering their ability to manage comprehensive community research and projects independently. Some staff members and

154   Sakibe Jashari a­ ctivists who had been involved in capacity building with NRAEWOK for years left Kosovo during the mass migration in 2014.17 As a result of all these hindrances, NRAEWOK continuously struggled to raise funds for the projects they planned for the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women.18 In this whole situation the voices of these women were silenced both inside and outside the community. Neither of the sides involved in the issue had an opportunity for improvement or change. More generally, NRAEWOK as the designated individuals could not seize the opportunity to comprehend fully, and transcend, the human rights paradigm. In addition, as a small “elite” group of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women, the activists became detached from their communities and the transfer of knowledge to ordinary women in the community was limited. This was because, for one thing, they were not equipped with sufficient knowledge, skills or capacity to deal competently and responsibly with the tasks required of them.

Some important but neglected issues Having reviewed the position of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women from the perspective of the international human rights discourse in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, and the shortcomings of the approach towards them, I will now look at a few important but neglected issues in that international discourse: namely, acculturation, the infamous Roma camps, and war-­time rape. These three important elements explain the ignorance and neglect of the international missions in relation to the women of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. The international discourse paid markedly less attention to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities than to Kosovar society as a whole, which created a form of alienation between the two. This, in turn, led to Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian resistance to acculturation by wider society. The ethnicisation of Kosovo and the prioritisation of ethnic groups by the international community had overlooked the smaller ethnic communities, creating an “insignificant other”. In his outstanding book Orientalism (1978), Said explained how East and West have been constructed as two different antagonistic worlds. In a similar analogy, Kosovo would be depicted as having a majority of the dominant community more westernised in attitude and lifestyle, while the smaller minorities, namely the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, would be portrayed as being more oriental – and also more backward in attitude and lifestyle. This approach has created a deep division between the two sides, neither of which is willing to mingle with the other. Acculturation There are few interpretations of the concept of acculturation. I would use Winthrop’s (1991: 82–83) description of it, as a “process of systematic cultural change of a particular society carried out by an alien, dominant society”. Cultural change can occur when contact is established between different groups in a society (Winthrop 1991: 3). In other words, acculturation can take place when

The subaltern of the local   155 people mingle with others from a different culture. Kroeber (1948: 425), on the other hand, notes that in the acculturation process change should be reciprocal, although at times not equal but rather asymmetrical, and that acculturation should not be effected abruptly. As mentioned earlier, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian people have been present in Kosovo since the thirteenth century, so, in this case the process of acculturation began long before 1999–2000. In Tito’s communist era, for instance, there was more diversity and less emphasis on respect for diversity. Culturally, everyone was considered equal, including the Roma and other small communities. Acculturation was more vivid and experienced more widely during that time. After 1999 the opposite occurred, mainly because of the change in the political system, and especially because of the conflict. Hatred, fear, insecurity, urge for vengeance, pain and memory all helped to destroy trust between people. There was a need to repair relationships and re-­ establish contacts but, as Kroeber noted, gradually, not abruptly. In the case of Kosovo, however, good inter-­ethnic relations were expected to be restored abruptly by the international structures, and at times by imposition and conditioning. In that spirit, tradition, customs and culture were not regarded as part of the process of establishing good ethnic relations. “Tradition, in its guise as a canon of autochthonous praxis, presents itself as all but essential in structuring community-­level processes” (Iliff 2012: 253). In the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian cases, tradition and culture were not part of the international discourse. The same obviously applied to the women of these cultures, as a subaltern category which was ignored in this context by a plethora of international and national institutions and agencies. On the other hand, owing to post-­conflict fear, insecurity and persecution, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians were not in a position to draw closer to the majority community. Another important element relating to these minorities was their discomfiture at the majority community’s prejudices against their traditions, culture and lifestyle. In general, and throughout this period, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians were loyal to their traditions and culture, and not much inclined to change – the women among them resisting acculturation and modernity even more strongly. Lack of education is another reason why they tend to be closer to what they have been raised with and what is familiar to them, and have no desire to explore more and be exposed to change. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women are far less modernised than the women in the majority community,19 and this gap will not close without genuine efforts to increase education among Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian people in general, and women in particular, by both the community and the state. As an opportunity to launch proper activism among these women was missed, there is a need to rebuild a critical mass of young, educated women who will call for more education for girls and women in the community and will advocate properly for their human rights. As shown in the earlier discussion, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women’s activism based on the premise of subordination, and constructed by the non-­Roma, was tried. In cases such as this, the creation of knowledge is not simply innocent – it is strongly connected with the operation of power (Foucault 1980).

156   Sakibe Jashari Roma camps Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians were seen by the Albanian side as Serb collaborators (Musliu and Orbie 2016). Similarly, stories are told and allegations made about the involvement of smaller communities such as these with the Serbian regime before and during the 1999 conflict. Before 1999, a considerable number of Roma were Orthodox – thus sharing the religion of the majority of Serbs, with whom they consequently felt they had more in common, and to whom they felt closer. Another issue that needs to be emphasised is that in the 1990s most Roma had low-­level jobs with socially owned enterprises, e.g. cleaning companies, which at that time were managed by Serbs. During the conflict, Roma working with these companies were ordered to do cleaning work linked to military and regime activities. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians were therefore depicted by the Albanian side as Serb collaborators, and the resulting frustration was expressed by driving them out of their homes and looting and burning their property.20 The same anger spurred people from the majority to drive the Roma community out of the Roma Mahalla neighbourhood in Mitrovica. Following this act of violence, the international community’s solution to the problem was to set up camps in the northern part of Mitrovica to accommodate the persecuted Roma. Infamously, the camps of Cesmin Lug, Zitkovac, Kablare and Osterode in northern Kosovo were built in 1999 by UNHCR. In response to the forcible removal of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities from their homes in Roma Mahalla, UNHCR took on the responsibility of evacuating them and giving them shelter. International NGOs and human rights organisations brought to the attention of UNHCR management the fact that placing these persecuted communities in an area where the land appeared to be toxic – contaminated by the nearby Trepça mine – would not be a good idea. The response was that they would only be in that area for the short term. This short-­term settlement in the lead-­ contaminated camps lasted, however, for over a decade (1999 to 2010). By the time the camps were closed and the communities were housed elsewhere, some 8,000 people from those camps had a high level of lead in their blood. According to the doctor hired by the World Health Organization in mid-­ 2000 to monitor the health of around 300 children in the camp aged between 0 and 14 years, the levels of lead found were shocking. As a result, a number of children became seriously ill and their physical and mental growth was stunted.21 A number of pregnant women either miscarried or the development of their foetus’s brain was affected, causing disabilities in infants.22 The Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women who suffered received no attention from women’s rights-­based organisations, whether international or national: their rights and plight they were not considered worthy of advocacy in the public discourse, or of demands for treatment and for their situation to be changed. The treatment of not only women and children, but all 8,000 people, became bound up in a complex triangle involving the Serbian authorities in the north of Kosovo (Mitrovica), where the camps were, and in the south of Kosovo (Mitrovica and Prishtina) and the international agencies such as WHO, UNMIK, OSCE and to some extent Kosovo’s

The subaltern of the local   157 own authorities. People who suffered from this hazardous contamination and did not choose to be placed in that area were overlooked for chelation treatment.23 In all this international liberal peace mission scandal, in May 2017 UN Secretary-­ General Antonio Guterres expressed “profound regret” for the poisoning of hundreds of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian people in the camps run by the UN. This “regret” followed a report by the Human Rights Advisory Panel,24 which was part of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Nonetheless, “regret” remained the only thing the UN had to offer for all those children who lost their lives and all those mothers who lost their babies during pregnancy and had their overall health damaged. In his statement of “regret”, the UN Secretary-­General avoided two important things: making a public apology, and raising the possibility of individual reparations. Instead, his statement talked about setting up a trust fund to help Kosovo’s Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. This trust fund he mentioned, however, has no funds, notably from the UN itself – and furthermore, it is not clear who will eventually contribute to or manage it. There was no reaction to this from the government of Kosovo in defence of its citizens. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: this has yet again raised false hopes among the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities that their victimhood will be recognised. Wartime rape In any conflict, rape is used as a tool of psychological warfare, to humiliate the enemy, and as a weapon of war. And so it was in Kosovo, where an estimated 20,000 Albanian women were raped by Serb military and paramilitary forces. Unfortunately, no one knows exactly how many women and men were raped, as this number was never confirmed by the Kosovo authorities – for many reasons, but ultimately because of the culture of silence which, for more than a decade, has dominated both society as a whole and the survivors of the conflict-­based sexual violence, and because of the prevailing stigmatisation. “Kosovo society as a whole remained silent on the issue of sexual violence against women – whether because this specific crime revived memories of national victimisation, or because it pointed to stains on the honour of whole families” (Di Lellio 2016: 623). Not until a few years ago was the issue of conflict-­based sexual violence against women and men in 1999 brought into the public domain for discussion, thereby enabling the parliament to pass legislation recognising the victim status of the women who had been raped. The legislation covered the period from 27 February 1998, when the conflict is assumed to have started, until 20 June 2000, after it had ended, and NATO troops and international missions were established on the ground. Nevertheless, there are still unresolved issues in relation to this: for instance, besides recognition they need reparations, just like other recognised victims, such as the families of missing persons and other similar categories. Owing to stigmatisation and social exclusion, many women survivors of sexual violence live with a number of health, financial and psychological problems and untreated depression. Former Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga was very vocal on the issue of conflict-­based sexual violence and women survivors. When the debate on this

158   Sakibe Jashari began, President Jahjaga joined the Global Initiative for the Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict (PSVI), by the UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague. In March 2013 she initiated the formation of the National Council for Survivors of Sexual Violence, to open up an institutional debate and coordination among national and international stakeholders. The new Council increased the momentum to give voice to the women sexually abused during the conflict. But it was also another missed opportunity for the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian and other non-­ Albanian women, as the National Council for Survivors of Sexual Violence has never had a single representative from their communities, nor did it ever discuss the rape of any of those women during the conflict. Yet Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women were victims of sexual violence during the conflict. What makes their situation different is that they were raped by both sides, Serb and Albanian. There are about 11 cases25 of raped women in the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities that no one talks about, including the Council and the international community, who have preferred to keep the discourse on the subject mono-­ethnic rather than inclusive. The law that recognised the status of the survivors/victims of rape is discriminatory in its timeframe of 27 February 1998 to 30 June 2000:26 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women – and also other women – were raped, in connection with the conflict, after June 2000. Their suffering and victimisation have thus been denied, and their voices silenced. Although the international community promoted multi-­ethnicity as a major objective for more than a decade, it apparently did not regard this issue as belonging in the human rights discourse. Again, an insignificant other was created, based on marginalising others (Musliu and Orbie 2016: 11).

Conclusion This chapter has problematised the issue of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women and the international human rights discourse during the process of statebuilding in Kosovo. Universally and historically, women’s role in statebuilding has not been equal to that of men, and the Kosovo case was no exception: the agency of women from these minorities was denied in that process, and they were silenced in the international human rights discourse. For them, the interaction between the public, the private and domestic, and the international spheres was presented in constant liminality and subordination. Furthermore, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women found themselves caught in the tension between “tradition” and “modernity”, at times with two competing and conflicting identities – the former a customary part that was preserved and practised mostly because of a lack of acculturation, the latter not fully understood, because of the lack of active engagement in the human rights discourse. While ethnicity was a catalyst in spurring conflict in the region, the international human rights discourse in general, and in the context of women’s rights in particular, failed to disentangle “ethnicity” when capitalising the knowledge on women’s rights. Conversely, the focus was put on the Serb–Albanian dichotomy, leaving smaller groups outside the narrative and off the platform for

The subaltern of the local   159 having their voices heard and their agency recognised. For Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women, an opportunity for progress and the creation of knowledge in the women’s rights discourse was missed, resulting in a reinforcement of their subordination to the dominant community and a reconfirmation of women’s subaltern position to men in their own communities. By the same token, NRAEWOK was ignored in the international human rights discourse, which put it in a subordinate position in relation to the dominant community. On the one hand, the inaction of the international peacebuilding missions – which failed to include the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women affected by sexual violence in the social debate – left a gap in the Kosovo narrative, and on the other it erased part of the collective memory of a particular group of people. Will there be another opportunity to include the narrative of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in the Kosovo metanarrative? This remains to be seen. For now, however, these minority women have missed an opportunity to be presented on equal terms with the rest of their society.

Notes   1 Based on linguistics, historiography, cultural anthropology and, recently, population genetics, the Roma’s Indian origin is considered a fact. www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/ roma/Source/FS2/1.0_india-­europe_english.pdf.   2 Ashkali regard themselves as an ethnic group whose ancestry can be traced back to ancient Persia. www.ecmikosovo.org/uploads/Ashkalicommunity1.pdf.   3 The Egyptians consider themselves an ethnic group whose ancestry can be traced back to ancient Egypt. www.ecmikosovo.org/uploads/Egyptiancommunity1.pdf.   4 Kosova Women’s Network (KWN), 1325, Facts and Fables (Pristina: KWN, 2011).   5 UN Regulation No. 2003/12 on Protection against Domestic Violence – 7 May 2003.   6 www.womensnetwork.org.   7 www.rrograek.org/en/.   8 Agency on Gender Equality, Kosovo Center for Gender Studies, Kosovo Women’s Network.   9 Law on Gender Equality, Law Against Discrimination and Law Against Domestic Violence. 10 Kosovo Country Gender Profile, Agency for Gender Equality, 2014. 11 Kosovo Statistical Office, December 2014. 12 Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members in the Republic of Kosovo – 2008/03-L-­047. 13 Position of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women in Kosovo – Kosovo Center for Gender Studies (KCGS), 2008, Pristina, Kosovo. 14 Interview with Respondent 2, 27 April 2017 – Pristina, Kosovo. 15 Strategy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in the Republic of Kosovo, 2009–2015, Prishtine. 16 Interview with Respondent 1, 10 April 2017 – Pristina, Kosovo. 17 Interview with Respondent 2, 27 April 2017 – Pristina, Kosovo. 18 Interview with Respondent 2, 27 April 2017 – Pristina, Kosovo. 19 Interview with Respondent 3, 28 April 2017 – Pristina, Kosovo. 20 OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova. ‘As Seen, As Told – 1999’, Pristina: OSCE. 21 Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Poisoned by Lead, 2009. 22 Ibid. 23 Medical treatment that removes excess lead from the blood.

160   Sakibe Jashari 24 The Human Rights Advisory Panel Case No. 28/08, OPINION, 26 February 2016. 25 Interview with Respondent 4, 28 April 2017 – Pristina, Kosovo. 26 Assembly of Kosovo, (2011) Law on the Status and Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of Kosova Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War and their Families – Law No. 04/L-­054.

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11 The politics of citizenship, social policy, and statebuilding in Kosovo Artan Mustafa

Introduction Kosovo’s post-­war (1999) social policy, introduced by international organisations, did not work meaningfully on building a citizenship based on shared living standards and social solidarity. Being radically residual, and later subject to particularism, the policy did not aim at such citizenship, and failed to significantly support democratisation. Citizenship, or full membership of a society, was defined by sociologist T. H. Marshall (1950) as consisting of civil, political and social rights. The social rights (institutions) include employment policy, taxes, and social transfers and services, which make up an entity’s social policy. Quality social rights, Marshall suggested, can help strengthen the ability to exercise equal civil and political rights by promoting shared living standards. The quality of institutions (social rights) is measured by analysing their generosity or the level of benefits they provide and, crucially, by the influence they have on reducing poverty and inequality in a society (Korpi 1983; Esping-­Andersen 1990; Stephens 2010). Democratisation can encourage demands on competing political parties for social rights, and quality social rights in turn support democratisation by creating social capital through political trust, participation and legitimacy (Kangas and Palme 2009). Democratisation, as C. Tilly (2005: 130) conceptualised it, means “movement towards greater breadth, equality, consultation and protection of mutual rights and obligations between citizens and governmental agents”. Kosovo’s after war social policy resembles R. Titmuss’s (1974: 30–31) ideal model where public institutions intervene to provide social welfare for the needs of individuals only when the capabilities of families and private market “break down”. Since independence, it was continually layered through a policy of particularism where rights or public benefits are provided to narrow social groups rather than universally (Mungiu-­Pippidi 2006). In this chapter, I argue that despite the radical post-­war institutional transformation from what had been Kosovo’s social policy of self-­management under Yugoslavia (1952–1989), there is continuity in the decades-­long deep inequality and social exclusion. The existing policy and dominant anti-­egalitarian power structures are likely to maintain these social realities which inspire non-­solidarity,

The politics of citizenship and social policy   163 p­ olitical distrust and the active economic emigration of Kosovars to Western countries in the European Union (EU). In substantiating my argument, I analyse the design of institutions (social rights) relative to the theoretical ideal typologies, the role of major actors (agencies) in formulating and articulating these rights over time, and their results. The chapter, therefore, can also inform broader debates on democratisation.

UN administration: the context, the new policy, and results After the 1980s, the reconfiguration of social rights in post-­communist South-­ eastern Europe (SEE) followed a generally pro-­market agenda, promoted by the international organisations. More comprehensive social rights, however, were established in the SEE countries where economic performance was better, Brussels was geographically closer, and local left-­wing parties and workers’ unions were stronger (Deacon 2000; Deacon and Stubbs 2007; Orenstein 2008). Owing to the leading, direct role of the international organisations, post-­socialist Kosovo is considered an “international state-­building” case (Knudsen 2013: 288) or regarded as operating within a “protectorate engineered” legal framework (Deacon, Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 240). Although the majority of the legislation that introduced Kosovo’s post-­war social policy was enforced after its first free parliamentary elections (2001), in the early years of the Kosovo Parliament, the laws were generally designed by the World Bank, backed by International Monetary Fund (IMF ) and European Union (EU), and promulgated by the United Nations Special Representative. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was the ultimate authority, and the international organisations enjoyed public approval since, following NATO’s intervention, which had put an end to the (1998–1999) ethnic war, they were viewed by the population as the voice of the West (see also Cocozzelli 2009). The legal powers of UNMIK aside, the political context was favourable to the sponsored pro-­market legislation. Right after the war, both major local political forces – the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – had “parallel” governments of their own in place. The former was, in reality, stronger on the ground. This is the reason why the first law on social policy, introduced in 2000, covered invalids and the next-­of-kin of the war dead\of war casualties. UNMIK wanted to demilitarise the KLA, and the law was one of its concessions. Local actors did not have full power to determine the substance of laws on social policy, but as this episode (regulating the benefit payments to war invalids and other victims) shows, local voices could not be completely ignored by UNMIK when they were relevant. In other words, their strength mattered. The biggest political party to come out of the demilitarised KLA – the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) – originated in the leftist Popular League of Kosovo (LPK), formed by Yugoslavia’s Albanian former political prisoners who were known to be Marxist-­Leninists. PDK’s founding programme had several typical left-­wing aims, and it developed links with the Socialist Party of Albania and Western left-­wing parties such as the UK’s Labour Party

164   Artan Mustafa (­ Malazogu and Gautam 2014: 28). But PDK soon lost the first parliamentary elections, owing to the lack of popularity of the KLA’s post-­war parallel government, in particular when it came to its handling of public resources and its often violent behaviour towards political opponents. The international organisations, too, were actively involved in creating “leadership resources” in support of the more moderate LDK (Duclos 2016: 52). Thus, although the local knowledge of social policy at the time cannot be overestimated, those elected with the most votes to the first parliament were positioned ideologically on the right, and since the LDK had relied heavily on diplomats’ endorsement for its electoral results, the prospects of the agenda of the international organisations were further improved. With the LDK as the leading local party, it was easier for UNMIK to endorse the World Bank’s projects without major resistance. By contrast, the PDK had been the only party to refuse to endorse an internationally drafted Constitutional Framework in 2001, arguing that it was not comprehensive enough compared to the Albanian ambitions for an independent Kosovo. Furthermore, the performance of self-­ management socialism1 in Kosovo, in comparison to other entities of Yugoslavia, had been very poor, and left an unfavourable legacy. This legacy and the power context, in addition to the disenfranchisement of the labour movement during the Serbian hegemony of the 1990s, explains to some degree the unusually limited resistance of the former workers to the new policy. Workers and the urban population were more supportive of the LDK, which continually won the most votes throughout the UN administration. Elsewhere in SEE, former workers and the urban population had been the most vocal opponents of the pro-­market reforms and institutional transformation (Kapstein and Milanovic 2003). As workers passively awaited the return of some of their former rights, the new legislation installed the radical residual policy. In socialism, Kosovo had a dominantly Bismarckian or conservative policy, mostly consisting of insurance programmes for the employed and their families; whereas a citizenship of residual rights, like the new one, relies heavily on the market and intervenes, temporarily, only when the market and the family fail to provide protection for people in need (Titmuss 1974; Esping-­Andersen 1990). The new policy introduced highly flexible “hiring and firing” labour regulations. Workers could be fired with one single month’s notice from the employer. The policy established no minimal wage, no obligatory health insurance and no unemployment protection, and maternity leave lasted only 12 weeks. Under self-­management socialism, work rights were firmly entrenched, and generally protected even in times of crisis (including by an unemployment protection programme); workers had health insurance for themselves and their families, maternity leave lasted up to two years, and workers even received consumption subsidies. While most other Yugoslav entities maintained some level of labour rigidity, thanks to inherited institutional structures, Kosovo’s flexibility became reminiscent of that of former Soviet-­style communist states in SEE (see Arandarenko 2004). In addition, since it abandoned an initial post-­war strategy to commercialise former social enterprises in favour of direct privatisation, UNMIK signed contracts of sale for 465

The politics of citizenship and social policy   165 enterprises and former workers could not return to their jobs – further impacting their circumstances. By the end of the UN’s de-­industrialising administration, the biggest employer in Kosovo became the public sector with 39 per cent (2007) working in the non-­economy sector (state administration), compared with 25 per cent (1986) in the later years of the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo (EKS 1987; Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust 2015). When it came to social transfers, the international organisations’ agenda was centred on pensions. The law on pensions was introduced in 2001. The most important change it introduced was the establishment of the Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust (KPST), or Pillar II of the World Bank’s three-­tier package. A nearly similar model was introduced in Pinochet’s Chile in the 1980s under the influence of the so-­called “Chicago school” of neoliberal economy (see Huber and Stephens 2012). Pillar II installed obligatory individual savings on the market, charging 5 per cent of the gross salary for employees and employers each. The funds are managed by the KPST, usually through investment in foreign market shares. Although its board is appointed by the parliament, it is a completely autonomous body. Its administrative services cost more than any of the other public social services provided by the government. Under self-­ management, Kosovo applied the Pay-­as-You-­Go pension model, whereby the current generation of workers paid for the current pensioners, according to the latter’s previous work contributions and with income guarantees from the government. The new model meant the abolition of any solidarity among workers or among generations of workers, and of government guarantees of pension income: pension savings are now individual, dependent on global market moods, and have no government income guarantees attached. Further market space for voluntary savings was created through Pillar III. In time, market-­based pensions should become the most relevant transfers, likely to recreate present market disparities in retirement – a typical social dualism consequence of residual, liberal policy (Esping-­Andersen 1990). In exchange for this radical marketisation and individualisation, the policy created the basic (Beveridge) pension for all elderly people over the age 65 and for permanently disabled people, paid for from government revenue. A means-­ tested conditional social assistance scheme was also introduced for families living in poverty. But these schemes were programmed by the World Bank to require minimal cost by tying them to poverty lines based on minimum expenditure on consumption, following the example set by the Beveridge pensions. Because the basic pension is tied to the cost of the food basket … the cost of the basic pension system is likely to increase at a rate lower than the overall growth rate of the economy, thus maintaining fiscal sustainability in the long run. (World Bank 2005: 69) The basic pension, in 2007, amounted to €40 and was worth 49 per cent of the average consumption per capita; the maximum social assistance benefit, for a

166   Artan Mustafa poor family with seven members, was €75: the equivalent of 39 per cent of the average family consumption in the country (source base, KAS 2015b). Thanks to these transfers, the elderly population and poor families became much strongly compensated than under the system of self-­management. However, although market realities were changing, the benefits were rarely adjusted, and the weak social protection was not made any stronger. In 1981, workers’ children – 37 per cent of all children under 14 – were receiving cash allowances; by the end of UNMIK’s administration of Kosovo allowances had begun to be issued for only around 3,500 orphaned or adopted children and those with a permanent disability. Together with around 9,500 beneficiaries of the scheme for war invalids and the next-­of-kin of the dead, this was all the social protection there was. It aimed to provide for government revenue-­financed poverty protection, through minimum rights and a minimum budget, according to the residual model, as shown by the interview referred to below. Under self-­management socialism, almost all social rights were connected to work, with the exception of the small programme on poverty protection which covered no more than 3.3 per cent of the poor (see Table 11.1). During UNMIK we had people from everywhere … but I would say … more or less we tried to install the English system … when it comes to nearly everything concerning the protection of the family: standards, the protection of the citizens’ rights, laws.… So, the family is the pillar, the basis, which should have the responsibility. If the family fails, then we come to the scene. We still have this politics and this concept in Kosovo (…). We expect that the party steps in here. In our mentality, when the party comes itself, you know they have the “rope around their neck”.2 Under socialism, income taxes were the biggest single source of revenue for the provincial governments; under UNMIK, personal income tax and corporate tax were worth less than 1 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). After the war, Table 11.1  Main social indicators under self-management, UNMIK and independence

1978 2007 2015

Work rate (%)

Social Population Infant spending as coverage of mortality % of GDP cash rate transfers (%)

18.8 19.7 28.8*

7.3 (1981) 3.55 5.7

Income Income poverty (%) Gini-I (%)

19.2 (1981) 62.9 (1981) 38.8 18.9 10.9 20.0 20.2   7.5 23.3

38.1 37.1 43.7

Note * Rate for 2016. Poverty = those under 60% of median income. Gini-I = Gini-Inequality. In 2015, the number of social assistance beneficiaries declined by more than 50,000 family members compared to 2007. Own calculations, source base ESK/KAS 1980, 1987, 2015a, b.

The politics of citizenship and social policy   167 government revenue was chiefly made of value added tax (VAT) and border taxes. Because of the low revenue collected from personal income (the highest tax bracket was 20 per cent), property and corporate tax, and the dominance of consumption taxes, public revenues was financed mainly by the entire society, rather than proportionally according to the economic status. But while government revenue was funded by society as a whole, and social transfers were minimal, according to the World Bank’s prescription: the expectation that the market would create an economic blossoming was proving unfounded. By the end of UNMIK’s administration of Kosovo, in late 2007, the employment rate (19.7 per cent) was lower than the maximum Kosovo had had during socialism (23 per cent) (source base, EKS 1987, Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust 2015). The inequality in disposable income (Gini 37.1 per cent) was only 1 percentage point lower than the last year under socialism (1978) for which such a comparison can be made (Gini 38.1 per cent). Kosovo had the highest inequality then, and it retained its record in comparison to other Yugoslav entities. Under Bismarckian self-­management, inequality was due to the fact that the employment rate was low and most social transfers were connected to work or bureaucratic status, leaving many people excluded. For example, the majority of the elderly people did not receive pensions as they had not worked before, and around 40 per cent of people had no health insurance. Under UNMIK, inequality was caused by low employment, low public expenditure on social transfers (3.55 per cent of GDP in 2007), and the consumption-­based tax structure which was not programmed to work towards social equality.

Post-­independence: particularism, bureaucrats, inequality Kosovo’s authorities gained more power around and after the declaration of independence (2008), although the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund continued to play an important role in policy design and supervision. Government revenues grew as well. The biggest party in cabinet throughout the post­independence period was the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which in the meantime had converted ideologically to the centre right. In 2017, all parties emerging from the former KLA were in a coalition government, and all three main state positions were held by former KLA leaders. During the first decade of statehood, from a citizenship perspective, Kosovo’s social policy worsened owing to the governance of the PDK. PDK’s policy was strongly particularistic viewed through Mungiu-­Pippidi’s (2006: 87) definition of particularism as the “regular distribution of public goods on a non-­universalistic basis”. Public goods often targeted PDK’s base of supporters. Soon after it gained power (2008), the government introduced a differentiation in law between KLA-­related categories and civilians. During the UNMIK period, the law on war wounded and the next-­of-kin of the dead, although expected to benefit mostly former KLA members, still had a somewhat universal outlook. After these changes, former KLA invalids and the family members of dead KLA soldiers were allocated several times more benefits than

168   Artan Mustafa civilian invalids or the families of civilians who had died during the war. The PDK revisited most often the schemes on “war categories”. As a result, the schemes for families of KLA martyrs and KLA invalids, and the pensions for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and Kosovo Security Force (FSK), issue the largest payments of all social transfers (Table 11.2) and, together with the scheme for KLA veterans, benefit around 60,000 people. Similarly, the PDK-­led government introduced (2010) a scheme to compensate former political prisoners, designed primarily for political activists jailed since the time of self-­ management in Yugoslavia. It is not an ongoing benefit, but rather a one-­off compensation, which commenced in 2015. In the first year, 418 people were compensated to the value of €10,503,754; and in total around 12,000 people are expected to benefit from it. Both schemes, in addition to cash benefits, provide legally privileged tax breaks and education access for beneficiaries and their relatives. They have become the second most expensive social schemes after pensions. This form of particularism was electorally motivated and the decisions to introduce legislation, for example in the case of veterans and former political prisoners, were usually taken near elections. The exchange of benefits for electoral votes involved here is significant, because potential votes from the beneficiaries could amount to some 35 per cent of the average number of votes (214,000) the PDK has received to win in elections since 2007. The PDK rewarded its supporters and punished other groups – civilian victims, other factions that participated in the war and were closer to the LDK, and, intrinsically, women and ethnic communities, as most KLA members and former political prisoners were male and ethnic Albanian.3 These punishments had consequences, as they furthered an exclusivist citizenship. As the number of beneficiaries who were KLA-­related and/or former prisoners increased, those in social assistance declined (Table 11.1 above). This decline, at a time when the poverty rate was rising, indicates poor-­quality governance in poverty protection. During its spell in power, the PDK created no new programmes in the sphere of social protection. True to a residual policy, under the direct impact of the international organisations, it decentralised most of the responsibility for poverty protection and the provision of care. It mostly transferred the limited care provision to civil society organisations. Also, non-­war-related transfers remained low (Table 11.2) compared to wages. The PDK’s reign further correlates with the accelerating privatisation of former social enterprises. By 2016 there were twice as many contracts of sale signed as under UNMIK, but they were worth in total about €50 million less. Since its electoral basis was not former workers, and as many contracts ended up with former KLA superiors, the enterprise sales are another form of punishment of others by the PDK. The PDK governance was asymmetrically creating a new well-­to-do class connected to the bureaucracy and to public revenue, too. By 2016, the average income in the public sector had grown by 184 per cent in comparison to 2007, while the maximum figure for the private sector was 37 per cent. As VAT

The politics of citizenship and social policy   169 Table 11.2  Main transfers as a percentage of average wages, 2002–2015 Year

Average wages

Social assistance (%)

Basic pensions (%)

Contributory War state pensions categories (%) (%)

2002 2005 2009 2011 2013 2015

€138.18 €178.30 €228.46 €277.15 €281.52 €319.10

– 19.6 17.5 14.4 14.2 15.6

20.2 22.4 19.6 16.2 21.3 23.5

– – 32.8 27.0 35.8 43.8

– 31.4 57.3 66.7 67.8 42.6

Note Calculation of average wages based on average reported pension savings from KPST; social assistance benefit calculated for the first household earner. In the war categories, the addition of veterans reduces the average amounts paid overall.

thresholds were raised several times, in 2008 the PDK initiated and changed the law on personal income, reducing the highest bracket (meaning progressivity) from 20 per cent to 10 per cent. In 2014, a law designed by the World Bank was adopted, for the first time introducing quasi-­Bismarckian health insurance (implementation pending). All these policy changes mean that the state takes in revenue from the entire society through consumption taxes, while it provides good salaries, good pension savings, up to nine months of paid maternity leave and potentially good health insurance for civil servants. At the same time, it takes less from them through taxes. Meanwhile, the PDK had also increased public investment (roads, school buildings and agricultural subsidies) in the municipalities where it has most electoral supported. Though the employment rate rose to 28.3 per cent (2016), with most of the rise in the private sector, the fact that only the richest 10 per cent of society was getting richer (see Table 11.3) indicates that there is more connection than independence between bureaucracy and the market. A large proportion of business is dependent on public money, and public money is subject to particularism. Particularism inspires more particularism, so it becomes a socially “accepted norm” (Mungiu-­Pippidi 2006: 88). Seeking to balance its actions, the PDK Table 11.3 Income from work and disposable income: from society’s poorest to the richest 10% 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2007 Income from work 0.0 Disposable income 1.9

0.0 3.8

0.0 5.1

1.9 6.2

7.0 7.3

8.8 8.7

10.8 14.4 19.8 37.0 10.6 12.9 16.4 26.6

2015 Income from work 0.0 Disposable income 1.3

0.0 3.3

0.0 4.6

0.09 5.9 5.5 6.7

8.9 7.9

11.5 14.7 20.2 37.6   9.4 11.6 15.5 33.7

Note Author’s calculations. Source base: Household Budget Surey (KAS 2015a).

8

9

10

170   Artan Mustafa s­ upported a government pension scheme for former pension contributors (self-­ management workers). The LDK had begun negotiating it in the last years of UNMIK, prior to independence. Initially, each former contributor received 35 euro in addition to the Beveridge pensions. When the LDK got the office of prime minister and minister of labour and social work in 2016 it further improved the pensions of former workers (its constituency), based on a calculation that considers their years of education and contributions. At the same time, however, in an official concept paper it proposed abolishing the Beveridge pensions, which would have terminated one of the few existing universal programme. The basic pension would be changed into a social pension or state pension, which would be issued to all citizens above 65 years of age who do not receive other income from public or private payment schemes within or outside the country (…). The entitlement to the benefit will be connected to (…) minimum defined years of permanent residence in Kosovo (…) and pensioners’ other incomes. (Other incomes should be) smaller than the social pension (…) if there is some smaller income, then the pension will cover the difference (to bring the full income up to the level of the social pension). (Government of Kosovo 2016: 18–19) The LDK was soon removed from government, however. A coalition of parties coming out of KLA gained full control of the main state offices in 2017. More particularistic schemes targeting former fighters were created, and the wage raise for civil servants was back on the government agenda again. The prime minister’s salary rose to six times the average family income; his family’s disposable income (2018) is now 114 times higher than the social assistance payment for an average poor family of five members. The democratic elections thus affected how government revenue is used. Social spending (nearly 6 per cent of GDP, Table 11.1) and the society’s coverage through social transfers in cash (around 20 per cent) became almost similar to the best period under self-­management socialism (the late 1970s). But Kosovo’s social stratification problems worsened. Since 2015, income inequality has reached Gini 43.7 per cent (Table 11.1) – the highest figure in Europe. Increased inequality is caused by particularism and low social transfers in comparison to market realities. In line with Stubbs and Zrinščak (2015: 398), all these features are manifestations of a clientelist citizenship – characterised by a “broad set of hegemonic political practices and strategies marked by particularistic modes of governance, exclusivist definitions of citizenship, and asymmetrical distribution and redistribution of resources”.

The dual social rights of the Serbian community There is, furthermore, a duality of social rights covering the Kosovo Serb ethnicity, granted by both Kosovo and Serbia and contributing to non-­shared, divisive

The politics of citizenship and social policy   171 living standards. The residual policy did not aim to grant quality social rights that would promote social equality and solidarity. Since it took several years for UNMIK to launch most social rights, and since the Serbian government’s programmes were often of better quality, the latter were more attractive to the Serbian community for economic purposes, quite apart from that community’s political position against Kosovo’s independence. Nor did residualism contribute intrinsically to inter-­ethnic solidarity. For example, as pension savings were individualised, and the presence of Serbs in formal private-­sector jobs was small, there was no increased economic motivation for inter-­ethnic solidarity, cooperation etc. UNMIK did not block Serbia’s social transfers or wages, nor did it make the Serbian population of North Kosovo pay taxes. Unlike Kosovo, Serbia inherited most of its socialist institutions from Yugoslavia, despite partial marketisation reforms and the privatisation of social enterprises. Crucially, it retained the essential features of the pay-­as-you-­go (PAYG) pension system and health insurance (Aranadarenko and Perišić 2013; Arandarenko and Uvalic 2014). The Serbian minority in Kosovo therefore receives contributory PAYG pensions and unemployment protection benefits from Serbia, as well as social protection payments through Serbia’s 11 Centres for Social Work (SCW), in addition to benefiting from Kosovo’s social rights, which extend to the whole population. Overall, Serbia’s total payments on social transfers and salaries in Kosovo cover around 40,000 Serbs and non-­Albanians (Lazarevic et al. 2016: 15–17), and could amount to €450 million annually (Andric 2011). They are more relevant to the Serbian ethnicity, as Table 11.4 indicates, compared to rights provided by Kosovo. Essentially the same residual approach was maintained by Kosovo’s government after independence. Moreover, its particularist social transfers, being more exclusively Albanian in nature (e.g. those to war categories and former political prisoners), did not target the Serbian community. Over the years, the income share of the Serbian community from public transfers declined. All of these features mean that the policy was not working to bring the communities and their living standards closer. A European Union-­mediated dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, underway since 2011, has negotiated solutions for various specific Table 11.4  Income redistribution (inequality reduction) according to ethnicity Albanian

2007 2011

Serbian

Other

Kosovo policy

+Non-Kosovo Kosovo transfers policy

+Non-Kosovo Kosovo transfers policy

+Non-Kosovo transfers

9.8 6.2

8.0 6.5

13.7 26.6

24.6 10.9

9.4 3.9

22.6   9.4

Note + Non-Kosovo transfers do not include remittances or donations. Author’s calculations. Source base: Household Budget Survey (KAS 2015a).

172   Artan Mustafa problems with the ultimate aim of fully “normalising” relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Dual social rights have not yet been part of the dialogue, however, despite the worsening social situation within the Serbian ethnicity: inequality among the Kosovo Serb population rose from 44.2 per cent (2007) to 57.1 per cent (2015), based on the Household Budget Surey (own calculations: KAS 2015a). The growing inequality within the Serbian ethnicity may result, among other things, from the fact that many officials receive payments from both governments. As Serbs are a smaller community, the overall income disparity eventually becomes much more noticeable, especially with limited tax collection. And for the Serbians, unlike the Albanians and other minorities, diaspora remittances, although rising, remain smaller – so they cannot effectively redress the marked inequalities. In 2015, the parties in the EU-­mediated dialogue agreed to establish a Serbian Community of all Serbian-­majority municipalities in Kosovo. This has still to be voted on by Kosovo’s parliament – but even if it is eventually approved, it remains unclear whether and how social policy will be streamlined throughout the territory (see quote below). Absence of streamlined (similar) institutions and the presence of dual social rights help neither Kosovar citizenship nor the consolidation of social equality. In my view, it is too costly for Prishtina (Kosovo) to pay for all existing provisions, so it practically lets Serbia do it. Prishtina says “we have wages for only 470 people in Leposavic”; I have that many personnel in education alone (…) I have been in politics for 40 years and I cannot assure anybody what the future should or will be, although I believe any law is better than no law. The governments should agree on one law and, why not, maybe even agree to pay together (for welfare state benefits) (…). The current situation is not anything like socialism or liberalism. It is as if (in the northern municipalities) we have arrived at communism: there are wages and welfare payments, but no work, no taxes and no rule of law (…).4

Social policy and democratisation: what future trajectory? Kosovo has better infrastructure now, with more than 2,000 km of newly asphalted roads and thousands of square metres of schools built, greater freedom of expression, and party plurality in comparison to its best decade under Yugoslavia (1970s). Yet many citizens continue to be dependent on remittances from the diaspora, their need to pursue a higher standard of living by economic emigration towards the West remains high (especially in the rural areas), and the feeling that there is something deeply unjust behind the rising social inequalities is becoming increasingly aggressive. As Korpi (1983: 206) says, the central question in social policy is “how inequality among citizens arises and how it can be counteracted”. In Kosovo, democracy – in the shape of free elections and wider consultation than under self-­management – did impact on social policy. But this impact has often led to particularism. Partiality and ineffective social

The politics of citizenship and social policy   173 policy both reinnforce social inequality (see above sections, and Rothstein 2005; Mungiu-­Pippidi 2006; Rothstein et al. 2012). By generating widespread social inequality, the policy also encourages distrust and creates weak social capital for democratisation: this is demonstrated in Kosovo both by its earlier history (escalating to violent conflict) and by recent decades (low levels of trust and legitimacy). As Table 11.5 below shows, the attitude of Kosovars, of all classes, on politics is very negative. The dissatisfaction with economy and the feeling that the government is not doing enough to reduce poverty signify an unfavourable perception of existing social rights. In such a context, the addition of particularised social rights only increases dissent. The actual massive exit through economic emigration, the emigrants (mostly the excluded, the ill and the poor – as demonstrated during the massive illegal emigration in late 2014 and early 2015), and the increasingly particularistic redistribution supports the explanation that social material inequality is the crucial factor behind the low levels of satisfaction, legitimacy and political trust (see Uslaner 2008; Ariely and Uslaner 2016). Since the delcaration of independence, more than 10 per cent of the population (compared to the 2011 population projection for 2018) emigrated to the West or renounced Kosovar citizenship. Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe, with 67 per cent of the population of working age, but it is aging too; its population under 14 has declined by 42 per cent since 1971. It needs to keep its citizens in Kosovo (to control emigration), to have future taxpayers and innovators, but also to have chances of further democratisation. A social policy that works towards more equality and solidarity could help, but for this, as the literature shows, higher social spending, more progressive taxation, universal programmes, stronger unions and left-­wing parties are required (Korpi and Palme 1998; Kangas and Palme 2009; Huber and Stephens 2012). The existing structure of institutions and political reality guarantee the persistence and the hegemony of inequality. After all, there is no universal programme of children’s allowances, there are only 40 pre-­schools financed by government revenue, the work rate remains low, and in absence of stronger wage Table 11.5  Views on politics and the economy according to income level, %

Government does not protect everyone from    poverty Dissatisfaction with the economy Distrust of politicians Distrust of political parties Distrust of parliament

Poor

Middle class

Upper class

77.4

78.3

68.4

75.8 74.0 74.0 69.4

74.6 82.4 81.0 72.1

64.9 82.4 85.9 68.4

Note Author’s calculation. Source base: European Social Survey 2012. The poor class or 33.9% of the population = under €220 a month; the middle class or 52.4% of the population = €221 to €700; and the upper class or 4.4% of the population = with an income of over €700.

174   Artan Mustafa regulation, powerful individuals often have several jobs. The workers’ unions became more involved in social dialogue after independence, but they were less relevant than associations representing KLA categories. Thanks to the growing individualisation, private-­sector workers also had little interest in cooperating with unions. And by 2017, a left-­wing party had never been in government at the central level. Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Self-­Determination for Self-­Determination) entered the parliament after the 2010 elections, and it voted consistently against residual legislation. But it failed to gain leading power, probably in part because it was consistently opposed by diplomatic stakeholders (even more openly than KLA had been long before) owing to its nationalistic discourse. Its chances further deteriorated after a major conflict within the leadership of the party in late 2017.

Conclusion This chapter analysed the institutional change in post-­war Kosovo compared to its self-­management past. It outlined the role of international organisations in launching social rights, their modification after independence, and their coexistence with Serbian-­run parallel institutions. It also analysed the level of rights and their results. It was shown that, with the joint endorsement of major international organisations, the new social policy planned to offer limited social rights, utilise radically pro-­market solutions and avoid meaningful social solidarity. Post-­independence, there was additional complexity and particularism, but the residual policy’s orientation did not differ drastically from that of the previous one. Compared to the self-­management period, the state gained more direct responsibility for poverty management and social service provision. Yet the role of the market, civil society and municipalities, when it comes to social rights and the provision of services, will grow in time. And Kosovo’s social policy is not the only source of social rights in the territory. The chapter showed that high levels of inequality were produced by the stagnating or declining effectiveness of the residual social policy. Several key factors lie behind this poor performance by social policy: social transfers are designed to produce small payments, they are financed from general taxation, progressivity in all and – taxation on income in particular – is low and has been diminishing, there is a weak employment policy which does not promote the distribution of jobs or social solidarity, and the government’s ability to deliver means-­tested payments and services is limited. Similarly, it was shown that there were considerable differences within and between ethnicities. All these dimensions, combined with the parallel Serbian government policy and widespread corruption among political and bureaucratic elites, do not help social policy to work towards a citizenship of quality social rights working towards shared living standards. Inequality – produced by poor-­quality social rights – inhibits democratisation by discouraging social trust, solidarity and cooperation, and by pushing the more excluded citizens towards emigration.

The politics of citizenship and social policy   175

Notes 1 During the period 1952–1989, after the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) owing to the strained relations between its leaders and Joseph Stalin, Yugoslavia engaged in its unique experiment of self-­management socialism. Although, like elsewhere in communism, the Federation was governed by the dictatorship of a single legal party, unlike Soviet-­style communism it allowed the market to play a greater role and unemployment was officially recognised. The responsibility of the enterprises (workers’ organisations) and workers, rather than of the state, was central in organising and financing social policy. 2 Interview by author with Muhamet Gjocaj, Director of the Department for Social and Family Policy at the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Government of Kosovo, Pristina, February 2016. 3 Interview by author with Nenad Rašić, member of the National Parliament in Kosovo (2014–2017) and former Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in the Government of Kosovo (2008–2015), Pristina, February 2016. 4 Interview by author with Dragan Jablanović, President of municipality of Leposavić (Government of Kosovo) and Director of the Centre for Social Work (Government of Serbia), Leposavić, December 2016.

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176   Artan Mustafa Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2012) Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Government of Kosovo (2016) ‘Concept Paper on Pension Reform’, February 2016. Available at: http://kryeministri-­ks.net/wp-­content/uploads/docs/Koncept-­dokumenti_ per_rregullimin_e_fushes_se_pensioneve_MPMS.pdf (accessed 8 August 2017). Kangas, O. and Palme, J. (2009) ‘Making Policy Work for Economic Development: The Nordic Experience’, International Journal of Social Welfare 18(1): 62–72. Kapstein, E. B. and Milanovic, B. (2003) Income and Influence: Social Policy in Emerging Market Economies, Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Knudsen, R. A. (2013) ‘Privatization in Kosovo: “Liberal Peace” in Practice’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7(3): 287–307. Korpi, W. (1983) The Democratic Class Struggle, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) ‘The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries’, Amer­ican Sociological Review 63(5): 661–687. Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2015a) ‘Household Budget Survey, Microdata, for 2007–2009’, Pristina, KAS. Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2015b) ‘Annual Reports on Social Welfare 2003–2015’. Pristina: KAS. Available at: http://ask.rks-­gov.net/sq/agjencia-­e-statistikave-­te-kosoves/ sociale/shendetesia-­dhe-mireqenia-­sociale (accessed 21–27 February 2016). Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust (2015) ‘Annual reports 2009–2015’. Pristina, KPST. Available at: http://trusti.org/sq/per-­ne/reports-­alb/raportet-­vjetore/ (accessed 13 March 2016). Lazarevic, T., Luci, N., Milovanovic, I. A., Ivkovic, A. M. and Isufi, A. (2016) Gender that Matters: Poverty and Social Inclusion – Social Protection Status in Rural Kosovo and Serbia, Belgrade: The Center for Communities Development: Center for Ethics, Law and Applied Philosophy. Malazogu, L. and Gautam, B. (2014) ‘Busolla ideologjike e Kosovës’, November. Available at: http://d4d-ks.org/assets/Busolla-­ideologjike-e-­Kosov%C3%ABs1.pdf (accessed 29 May 2014). Marshall, T. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mungiu-­Pippidi, A. (2006) ‘Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment’, Journal of Democracy 17(3): 86–99. Orenstein, M. (2008) ‘Postcommunist Welfare States: Poverty, Inequality and Democracy’, Journal of Democracy (19)4, 81–94. Rothstein, B. (2005) Social Traps and the Problem of Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rothstein, B., Samanni, M. and Teorell, J. (2012) ‘Explaining the Welfare State: Power Resources vs. the Quality of Government’, European Political Science Review 4(1): 1–28. Stephens, J. D. (2010) ‘The Social Rights of Citizenship’, in F. C. Castles, S. Liebfried S, J. L. Obinger, and C. Pierson (eds) Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 671–686. Stubbs, P. and Zrinščak, S. (2015) ‘Citizenship and Social Welfare in Croatia: Clientelism and the Limits of “Europeanisation” ’, European Politics and Society 16 (3): 395–410. Tilly, C. (2005) Trust and Rule, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Titmuss, R. (1974) Social Policy. London: George Allen & Unwin.

The politics of citizenship and social policy   177 Uslaner, M. (2008) Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life, New York: Cambridge University Press. World Bank (2005) ‘Kosovo Poverty Assessment: Promoting Opportunity, Security, and Participation for All’, June. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/8650 (accessed 2 August 2016).

12 Conclusion After local critiques Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu

This book has examined local perspectives on international statebuilding in Kosovo, in a bid to unravel the politics and impacts of liberal interventionism. While Kosovo has ignited numerous debates in areas such as political science, international relations and international law, local scholars have been largely absent when knowledge on and about where they live has been crafted and articulated. Despite a growing interest in local, bottom-­up perspectives on and experiences of statebuilding, local scholars and activists have been insufficiently engaged in speaking about liberal interventionism, while the self-­perpetuated superiority of Western perspectives tends to remain detached and disembodied from the peculiarities of conflict-­affected societies. Furthermore, these perspectives present themselves as objective, neutral and unbiased knowledge, unlike the embodied, situated knowledge produced by local scholars. In this book we have tried to reverse the order of knowledge production: we have focused solely on exploring how local scholars perceive statebuilding, and what those actually in the field have to say about liberal interventionism. The chapters here explore a wide range of themes, including: the politics of local resistance; the uneven relationship between international statebuilders and the local people; the faking of local ownership of security sector reform and the rule of law; heuristic and practical limits of interventionism, as well as subjugated voices in the statebuilding process, such as voices of minorities and women. Rather than recapping the local critiques of statebuilding put forward here, this concluding chapter reflects on a number of cross-­cutting findings and charts potential avenues for future research. To the surprise of many, this book shows that the local is not an antidote to the liberal. Across different chapters it can be noted that the ontological, epistemological and methodological positionality of local scholars is, rather, founded on Western thinking. This is evident in the intertextuality and intersectionality of dominant knowledge and its local interpretation in Kosovo. The chapters here, examining a wide range of topics, have inevitably engaged with Western and liberal perspectives on statebuilding. In part, this may be attributed to the overwhelming dominance of Western scholarship on post-­conflict societies, which is then transmitted to local scholars, who often end up adding empirical nuances without challenging the ontological or epistemological assumptions

Conclusion   179 such knowledge carries. The dominant position of Western epistemologies springs from the pioneering work undertaken by the scholarly community in Europe and North America, enabled by socio-­linguistic advantages, institutional support, and advanced print capitalism. In the current “epistenomy” (knowledge management), local scholars are on a constant quest for recognition and legitimacy, which prompts them to abide by Western rules of knowledge production, including those on the usage of specific research theories, methods and approaches. This notwithstanding, the “local liberalism” evident in some of these chapters is also informed by a profound commitment to political and social order, justice, equality and democratic development, which need to be reclaimed as values that are as much local as imported. Accordingly, the ideological orientation and individual consciousness of the authors in this edited volume is a hybrid of local culture and Western liberal values. While many of the critical observations made here debunk the undemocratic and illiberal nature of international interventions, local perspectives reveal both the observable and the imaginary contours of local liberalism as it should have worked in Kosovo, in particular in efforts to build a functioning state after violent conflict and independent statehood. The dichotomy between the international and the local has imposed the essentialisation and categorisation of a broad range of diverse actors. The scholarly knowledge produced by local contributors to this volume is not monolithic. Each chapter uses a different set of theories, concepts and methods, although there is a general tendency towards postpositivist and critical perspectives. Local critiques of statebuilding tend to have a more pluralistic, non-­deterministic conception of disciplinary and paradigmatic positionality, which allows them to adopt more pluralistic and situational modes of critique. Nevertheless, they are still embedded in methodological nationalism, which often prompts them to take ethno-­ centric positionalities in relation to other ethnic groups and the international community. In this regard, future local perspectives on statebuilding should seek to avoid reproducing methodological nationalism, which carries the risk of entrenching ethno-­nationalist positionalities and becoming complicit in new local modes of epistemic violence, and might be translated into harmful policy discourses and practices. The chapters in this book clearly show that local critiques of statebuilding are embedded in both deconstructive and reconstructive modes of criticality. Local critiques demonstrate a balanced critique, which disentangles the flaws and shortcomings of policy discourses and practices as well as offering nuanced, normative observations on how statebuilding should work in practice. At the same time, however, local scholarly perspectives tend to prefer deconstructive modes of critique, while also remaining willing to offer critical policy alternatives designated to transform the current policy order. Local critiques of statebuilding do not seek to generate replicable knowledge, which is often seen as essential for identifying lessons and best practices. On the contrary, they prefer to generate situational, context-­specific knowledge, be that to resolve current problems or to uncover unresolved ones. Local critiques of statebuilding not

180   Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu only promote alternative perspectives on the broad range of themes covered in this volume, they also enrich empirically, and rejuvenate intellectually, the eroded critical concepts and theories which in Western scholarship are often used for epistemic adventurism rather than to change or improve the real world. Dominant Western perspectives on statebuilding tend to follow certain research themes, leading policy makers, in a wide range of policy contexts, to seek solutions that will improve or prolong Western dominance. Knowledge production in this case is part of the technology of dominance. To counterbalance this, the broad array of topics and themes ignored by Western scholars tends to become the epistemic locus for local critical perspectives. The perspectives propagated in this volume cover in far greater depth the overlooked and double effects of statebuilding, the uneven and discriminatory policy practices, and the hidden and non-­linear forms of interventionism penetrating all arteries of life. Often, aspects of statebuilding are embedded in an abstract labyrinth of knowledge without much perceptive or social attachment to the real world of statebuilding. By contrast, the authors here have used situated knowledge, often informed by their own extensive field research, wider observation and subjective observation of the statebuilding process. Yet local critiques of statebuilding in Kosovo are predominantly embedded in Western modes of criticality – partly because most local scholars in Kosovo are educated in Western universities and are thus exposed to particular readings and modes of thinking, and partly because they tend to regard Western scholarship as intellectually more credible and acceptable than locally generated or non-­Western knowledge. As a result, local scholars often end up legitimising and reproducing the dominance of Western-­centric scholarship in world politics. Local critiques of statebuilding provide a rare opportunity to generate more critical and emancipatory knowledge which retains a critical impetus but also offers practical alternatives and original solutions for resolving, from within, issues that affect the people living in conflict-­affected societies. While this book has experienced severe difficulty in bringing together scholarly voices from all ethnic groups in Kosovo, it has managed to strike a fine gender balance. A whole generation of female academics are now making their careers in related disciplines. This is indeed an important emancipation of Western academia, which has recently tackled many topics previously suppressed in male-­dominated scholarly disciplines. Often, however, we have seen a tendency by Western women academics to write in the name of women in conflict. Gender aspects and local women have been co-­opted, represented and portrayed through theoretical lenses developed and perpetrated by Western scholars (both male and female). Despite claims of its emancipatory and inclusive peace, we see that (the best practices of ) Western liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding are primarily masculine and patriarchal – even when advocating gender-­ equality practices; exclusionary – even when advocating inclusion and representation for all ethnic minorities; and partisan and undemocratic – even when advocating democracy as the higher law. In particular, certain theories and methodologies used in accounting for local women do not properly represent the

Conclusion   181 sociological or political reality of women in conflict. Consequently, women in post-­conflict societies have been objectified twice by academics: once by male Western scholars, and again, now, by female Western scholars. A true feminist emancipation would be creating space for local women to speak for themselves. In this book, six chapters written by local female scholars engage with matters pertaining to gender, inter-­ethnic relations, the politics of hospitality, and local stories of intervention. Arguably, we cannot talk about “feminism” as a homogeneous, disembodied intellectual enquiry. It is therefore imperative to navigate using local and “particular” epistemologies of feminism. Promoting reflexivity, positionality, ethnography and, overall, a methodological pluralism, would allow a more profoundly situated understanding of the interplay between identity, space and power, and understanding of social hierarchies, emergent ethics and experiences of war and peace. In conclusion, this book has highlighted the local cry for a different relationship between Kosovar society and the international community: one that promotes emancipation and not never-­ending intervention; one that encourages development and not chronic dependence. The socio-­political emancipation of local people cannot take place without epistemic liberation from Western and Eurocentric concepts, discourses, narratives, methods, and other forms of knowing and doing. A challenge remaining for the future is thus to develop original theoretical and methodological knowledge that fits in with the empowerment of local citizens and offers a new radical platform for expanding knowledge about and for them, and that could be extended to other, like-­minded societies without the existing epistemic hegemonies. In its next endeavours, therefore, local knowledge should not be preoccupied with the questions “Can the local speak?” or “How does it speak?”, but should ask rather “What is the particular local form of knowledge cultivation? How can we help to guide this knowledge and give it space in the matrix of knowledges?” In particular, future research into local perspectives on statebuilding would benefit enormously from documenting, translating and transmitting – assertively and accessibly making available – the lived and observed histories, narratives and experiences of statebuilding within and beyond state institutions. By way of conclusion, we offer five practical steps that could contribute to localising and decolonising knowledge about and for conflict-­affected societies: 1

2

When undertaking field research on a conflict-­affected society, choose a local scholar to work with, not as a translator or logistical assistant but as co-­researcher, co-­writer and co-­author of your research outputs. It is essential for research institutions funding research on and about conflict-­affected societies to issue explicit guidelines for the empowerment of local scholars. Research training and coaching are pivotal for empowering local scholars to undertake original research and promote it internationally. As with the present movement among international studies journals to encourage the citation of female scholars, it is crucial to encourage authors and editors to cite local scholars, either from the country taken as a case

182   Gëzim Visoka and Vjosa Musliu

3

4

5

study or who work in a similar research area. In particular, it is essential to empower local female scholars, who are subjugated by both the local and the international academic communities. Partly responsible for the insufficient exposure of local scholars in international epistemic debates is the lack of institutional and financial support from national higher education authorities. It is vital for universities and higher education authorities in conflict-­affected societies to put in place merit-­based research funding schemes. A major barrier to reaching out to local scholarship or internationalising their work is language. The international epistemic community should encourage the translation of important local scholarly works into English and other major international languages. Similarly, international scholars should try to make their research available in the languages of being studied. Finally, the proportion of local scholars participating in major international conferences and events is very low, owing to financial and travelling constraints. It is crucial for major international scholarly associations to commit resources to supporting local scholars and to use conflict-­affected places as venues for international conferences.

Index

Acharya, A. 1–2, 17, 69–70, 81 Baudrillard, A. 11, 54–55, 58–60, 63–64 best practice 12, 44, 73–74, 179–180 Björkdahl, A. 7, 17 Bosnia and Herzegovina 45, 48, 54–56, 72, 77, 138 Chandler, D. 6, 9, 43, 57, 107, 109, 113 citizen mobilisation 24 citizenship 16, 20, 131, 136, 162–165, 167–174 civic identity 32, 104 civil society 13, 22–24, 29, 34, 48, 77–78, 85, 95, 150, 153, 168, 174 civilian power 55, 68 colonisation 6, 22, 27, 136 conditionality 11, 21, 29, 42, 50, 56, 62–66, 68, 90 conflict-affected societies 1, 4, 8, 21, 178, 180–182 contentious politics 10, 21–22, 87 contestation 28, 40, 70, 109, 133, 138–139 corruption 22, 25–26, 44, 49, 51, 62, 70, 90–93, 97, 175–177 critical local agency 35 critical social movements 23, 30–31, 34–35 critique 1, 2, 5, 7, 8–12, 15, 17, 20, 23, 31, 33, 36, 39, 54, 57–58, 103, 117, 137, 178–179-180 cultures 1, 5, 144–147, 155 decentralisation 22, 29, 30, 32, 111 democracy 2, 3–4, 9, 11, 14, 19, 22, 24, 27, 29, 32, 35, 37, 47, 52, 66–68, 72, 73, 80–81, 101, 103, 109, 118, 131, 134, 142, 145, 161, 172, 176, 180 Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 62, 163–164, 168, 170

Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 62, 130, 163–164, 167–169 democratic will 13 democratisation 85, 149, 162–163, 172–173 Derrida, J. 10, 39–42, 46–49, 58 diplomatic interventionism 22 divided society 30, 102 donor-driven approaches 16 elections 22, 24, 26, 36, 55, 62, 67, 124, 160, 163–164, 168, 170, 172, 174 emancipatory peacebuilding 5 empathy 5, 8, 36, 125 enlargement 11–12, 40, 43–47, 49, 54–68 ethical foreign policy 43–44 ethnic conflict 3, 9, 15, 30, 34, 111, 113, 123–124, 129, 134 ethnic divisions 32l 104, 110, 119, 124 ethnic peace 13, 129 ethnic power-sharing 14–15, 103, 118 ethnicity 23, 29, 30, 33, 44, 102, 108, 110, 112, 131, 150–152, 158, 160, 171–172 ethno-nationalist elites 22, 35, 103 EULEX 2, 11, 18, 27–28, 40, 47–49, 51, 55, 75, 87, 90–96, 104 Eurocentric approaches 4 European Parliament 54, 59, 67 European Union 2, 10–11, 40, 44, 46–47, 51–52, 54, 59, 87, 90, 98–99, 104, 108, 163, 171 Europeanisation 43, 57, 74, 176 everyday 2, 5–6, 14–15, 24, 34, 101, 107–108, 113 external actors 4, 10, 13, 72 external relations 43, 55 fluid interventionism 28

184   Index gender 9, 15, 17, 84, 102, 131, 135–138, 141, 144–150, 153, 159, 160, 176, 180–181 global North 8, 135 global South 8 governance 13, 17 hegemony 102, 107, 113, 141, 164, 173 hidden forms of agency 15 hospitality 9–10, 39–49 human rights 20, 30, 33, 36, 45, 47, 70, 84–85, 87, 103, 108, 111–112, 134, 136, 141, 143, 145, 147–149, 151–160 hybridity 5, 18–20, 83 hyperreality 11, 54–55, 57–61, 63–64 identity 3, 5–7, 18, 20, 23, 32, 36, 50–51, 67, 68, 102, 104, 110, 112, 113, 122, 127, 131–136, 139, 152, 160, 181 impact 2, 9–12, 21–22, 31–32, 34, 52, 58, 80, 84–86, 99, 102, 104–106, 109, 114, 123, 39, 165, 168, 172, 175, 178 independence 13, 17–18, 22, 24, 27–28, 40–41, 43–44, 54, 59, 69, 75, 77–78, 84–90, 92–94, 104, 109, 119, 123–124, 129, 136, 142, 149, 166–167, 170–171, 173–174 instability 13, 28, 40 institutional politics 22 institutionalisation 70–71 international actors 11–12, 21, 69, 77, 84, 89, 101–102, 105, 107–108, 112–114, 117–119, 121, 125, 129, 133 International Civilian Office (ICO) 75 international community 13, 23, 27, 31, 35, 47, 69–78, 80–81, 84–86, 88, 94, 96, 99, 101–114, 119, 124–125, 139–140, 152, 154, 156, 158, 181 international interventions 2, 4, 9–10, 21, 101, 175, 179 international missions 2, 6, 13, 16, 19, 22–26, 29–30, 32, 48, 74, 77, 86, 93–94, 96, 108, 152, 154, 157 International Relations 1, 17–18, 20, 39, 43, 50, 67, 70, 81, 114, 144, 161, 178 international statebuilding 3, 9, 14, 21, 23, 27, 29, 51, 84, 98, 115, 178 interventionism 5, 9–11, 13–14, 17, 21–23, 28–30, 33, 35, 41, 49, 117–118, 122, 129, 178, 180 justice 5, 8, 13–14, 16, 19–20, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 36, 50, 71, 83, 90–93,

95–97, 101–106, 132–134, 139–142, 144–145, 147, 160, 179 KFOR 2, 25, 75, 77, 79, 86, 104, 110–115 knowledge production 7, 9, 15–16, 80, 132, 144, 178–180 Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) 70, 79–80 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 29–76, 124, 136, 138, 163 Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) 76–77, 80, 168 legitimacy 4–6, 13, 25, 28, 56, 72, 79, 84, 95, 111, 113, 118, 123, 126, 129, 136–137, 162, 173 Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) 22–32 liberal interventionism 9–10, 14, 17, 21, 23, 29, 41, 49, 118, 122, 178 liberal peace 5, 7–0, 14, 19–222, 38, 70, 83, 103, 110–112, 114–119, 122, 129, 131, 149, 152, 157, 161, 176, 180 liberal peacebuilding 5, 7, 19, 38, 83, 103, 111, 115, 117, 131, 149, 180 liberal values 12, 14, 71, 118, 179 liberation 14, 26–27, 29, 34, 76, 101, 124, 135–136, 138, 149, 160, 163, 181 local elites 14, 26 local feminist research 15 local institutions 26–29, 77, 94–95 local knowledge 1–2, 7–8, 11, 80, 124, 150, 164, 181 local ownership 5–6, 9, 12, 19, 26, 57, 69–74, 77, 80–83, 178 local perspectives 1–2, 10, 17, 36, 70, 102, 104, 118, 178–179, 181 local population 13, 24–26, 29, 71–72, 85, 103, 122 local resistance 5, 9, 10, 21–29, 31, 33, 35–38, 83, 131, 178 local scholars 1–2, 8–9, 11, 17, 69, 178–182 local turn 2–5, 7–8, 18–19 Mac Ginty, R. 4–8, 12, 19–21, 35–37, 71–72, 83, 103, 115, 118, 131 media 24, 33, 81, 146–147 micro dynamics 9 minority protection 9, 111 minority rights 30, 103, 122, 130 multi-ethnicity 23, 29–30, 33, 44, 110, 158 Musliu, V. 1–2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14–16, 18–20, 39, 40, 42–48, 50–52, 57, 60–61, 75, 80, 149, 156, 158, 178, 180, 182

Index   185 narratives 9, 14–15, 23, 40, 43, 55, 59, 102, 104, 113, 132, 134–135, 137–138, 140, 144, 181 NATO 2, 15, 22, 25, 28, 33, 41, 43, 48, 75, 77–78, 86, 89, 110, 132, 134, 157–158, 163, 180 neo-liberal economy 23 networks 2, 6, 16, 149 NGOs 4, 74, 78, 156 non-dominant minorities 15–16, 32, 111 non-western knowledge 5, 180 non-western IR 9 normalisation 13, 45, 55, 60–61, 68, 77, 124 partition 22, 30–31 peace and conflict studies 3–4, 21, 23 peace processes 4 peace spoilers 21 peace-breaking dynamics 23 peacebuilding 2–7, 9–10, 17–23, 28–29, 31–33, 35–38, 56–57, 67, 72, 81–83, 102–104, 110–111, 113–119, 124, 129, 131, 142, 148–149 peace-making 19, 83 performance 2, 9–10, 12, 14, 34, 40, 48–49, 73, 107, 117, 122, 127, 129, 138, 143, 163–164, 174 political economy 6, 12, 98 positionality 6–7 post-conflict reconstruction 14, 19, 81, 101–104, 108, 114 post-conflict societies 2, 4–6, 9–10, 14, 21, 25–26, 36, 80, 109, 117–118, 122, 178, 181 privatisation 25–26, 164, 168, 171 public opinion 12, 120, 129 real-world problems 11 recognition 5, 12, 15, 40, 49, 52, 77, 111, 126, 132–136, 138–141, 145, 157, 179 reconciliation 4–5, 10, 15, 22, 32–34, 36, 101, 104–105, 110–111, 113, 119, 122, 124–125, 129 relationality 7, 20 resistance 4–5, 7, 9–10, 12, 15, 21–29, 31–38, 46, 57 Richmond, O. 1, 4–6, 8, 12, 14, 17, 22, 69, 71, 73, 101–104, 107, 109–110, 114, 118–119, 149 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian (RAE) 16, 148–149, 153–154, 159, 161 Security Sector Reform (SSR) 12, 24, 70–76, 80, 82, 105–106, 114–115, 145, 160

self-determination 15, 22–24, 27, 29, 32, 35–37, 84, 103, 133, 139, 141, 149, 174 Serb community 27, 29, 118, 120 Serbia 14–15, 18–19, 22–33, 40–41, 43, 45, 48, 51, 54–56, 60–61, 63, 65–68, 77–78, 82, 86–88, 91, 95, 107, 109 sexual violence 133, 138–141, 157–160 silencing 15–16, 30, 104, 151 simulation 47, 49, 59–60, 64 situated knowledge 14, 135, 178, 180 social justice 23, 101, 132, 134, 139, 144 social policy 16, 162–165, 167, 169, 171–177 socio-economic development 4, 29–30 sovereignty 6, 11, 13, 15, 22, 27, 29–30, 39, 42, 77–78, 96, 108–109, 126, 134, 141, 143–144 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 44–45, 47, 76, 81, 88, 97, 118 stability 11–14, 24, 28, 40, 70, 75–81, 89, 101, 118, 122 standpoint epistemologies 15 sustaining peace 6, 20 terrorism 25 Thessaloniki Summit 54 tolerance 26, 30, 34, 36, 44, 51, 151 Treaty of Lisbon 59 UN Secretary-General 20, 157 UN Security Council 6, 26, 86, 88, 118, 141 unintended consequences 11, 32, 58, 62, 66, 74 UNMIK 2, 22, 24–31, 33, 36, 47–48, 74, 86–87, 93–94, 96, 99, 133, 142, 156–157, 163–164, 166–168, 170–171 victimisation 24, 157 visa liberalisation 45–46, 52, 62, 66, 90 Visoka, G. 1–2, 4, 6–9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21–24, 26, 28–32, 34–36, 40–41, 73–74, 95, 102–104, 107, 110, 119, 121, 134, 149, 178, 180, 182 war crimes 29–30, 49, 56, 86, 93, 95, 124–125, 138 Weller, M. 26, 87, 119 western Balkans 11, 41, 43–45, 54, 56–57, 60, 62, 79, 115 western IR 1–2, 9 Yugoslavia 44–45, 56, 86, 105, 107, 136, 163–164, 168, 171, 175