United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force 9781685856281

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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

O C C A S I O N A L PAPER SERIES

President of the Academy Olara A. O t u n n u Editorial Board Marianne Heiberg, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs F. T. Liu, International Peace Academy Augustus Richard Norton, US Military Academy Henry Wiseman, University of Guelph

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE

F. T. Liu

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS • BOULDER & LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU Published for the International Peace Academy 777 United Nations Plaza New York, New York 10017 ©1992 by the International Peace Academy, Inc. All rights reserved Statements of fact or opinion are solely those of the author; their publication does not imply endorsement by the International Peace Academy. T h e International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series is made possible by the support of the Ford Foundation and the Samuel Freeman Charitable Trust.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Liu, F. T. United Nations peacekeeping and the non-use of force / by F. T. Liu. p. cm. — (International Peace Academy occasional paper series) Includes bibliographical references ISBN 1-55587-337-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United Nations—Armed Forces. I. Title. II. Series. JX1981.P7L585 1992 341.584—dc20 92-6760 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

CONTENTS

Foreword Brian Urquhart List of Acronyms

7 9

1

Introduction

11

2

U n i t e d Nations Military Observer Missions

13

3

U n i t e d Nations P e a c e k e e p i n g Forces First United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Operation in the Congo United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Second United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

17

4

Conclusion Weaknesses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Resurgence of the Security Council Strengthening of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Recommendations

36

Notes About this Occasional Paper The International Peace A cademy

44 45 46

5

FOREWORD

T h e nonviolent nature of United Nations peacekeeping operations is at the same time their most important and their least understood characteristic. It is the characteristic that makes peacekeeping forces acceptable both to the governments and parties engaged in conflict, and to the governments that contribute the troops. T h e principle of nonviolence sets peacekeeping forces above the conflict they are dealing with: Violation of the principle almost invariably leads to the peacekeepers becoming part o f the conflict and therefore part of the problem. W h e n force may be used is perhaps the most difficult decision peacekeepers on the spot can be faced with. Although use of force requires most c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the urgency o f the situation demands immediate decisions. In the mandates o f peacekeeping operations, any departure from the basic principle o f non-use of force except in self-defense requires the most serious t h o u g h t — b u t that is not to say that peacekeeping forces should not be strengthened. T h e r e is a very important difference between the use o f force and a show of strength. Clearer and bolder mandates for peacekeeping operations would greatly strengthen them. Clear warnings that opposing, attacking, or overrunning a peacekeeping force would evoke further, more forceful measures from the Security Council would certainly b e a powerful deterrent. Upgrading the skills, the equipment, and the armament of p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s , clearly displaying m i l i t a r y capacity, would strengthen the authority of peacekeeping operations. T h e inclusion o f personnel or contingents from the permanent members o f the Security Council might give added weight to a particular operation. It is important to maintain the distinction between peacekeeping operations and other, more traditional uses o f military contingents: T h e non-use o f force and the acceptance of, and implicit cooperation 7

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of all parties with, a peacekeeping force are the two major distinctions that are essential to the durability and success of peacekeeping operations. These basic principles do not, however—as this study shows—give peacekeeping operations immunity from situations in which violence and military force are involved. In such situations the leadership and discipline of peacekeeping personnel and the measure of support they are given by the Security Council and the Secretary-General are p a r a m o u n t in overcoming difficult crises without violent and fatal involvement. This p a p e r gives a valuable account of the practical problems encountered over a period of more than forty years observing the principle of non-use of force. With the recent proliferation of peacekeeping operations, and the new diversity of situations with which they are required to deal, it provides a useful basis for considering ways to strengthen the authority and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. —Brian

Urquhart

ACRONYMS

ANC

Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Army)

DFF

De Facto Forces (Israeli-controlled Lebanese militia)

IDF

Israel Defence Force

LNM

Lebanese National Movement

MNF

Multinational Force

ONUC

Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo)

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organization

SLA

South Lebanon Army (new name of the Israeli-controlled de facto forces after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon)

UN

United Nations

UNDOF UNEF I UNEFII UNFICYP UNIFIL UNIKOM UNMOGIP

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force First United Nations Emergency Force Second United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNTAG

United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

9

1 INTRODUCTION

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense is central to the concept of United Nations peacekeeping. It is based on practical as well as idealistic considerations. T h e concept of peacekeeping was developed by the United Nations at the b e g i n n i n g of the Cold War because the increasing mistrust between the two superpowers had made the collective security system enshrined in the UN Charter unworkable. Peacekeeping operations were devised as a practical mechanism to be used by the United Nations to contain armed conflicts and to facilitate their political settlement by peaceful means despite the constraints o f the Cold War. Unlike the enforcement action envisaged in the Charter, these operations are directed on a day-to-day basis by the Secretary-General (not by the Security Council), and they are based on consent and not on coercion. They must be completely impartial and their military personnel are not authorized to use force except in self-defense and as a last resort. T h e principle o f non-use of force except in self-defense is closely linked with consent. T h e UN peacekeeping operations can be set up in areas of conflict only with the consent o f the parties directly concerned. A fundamental assumption is that these parties, in accepting a UN peacekeeping operation, commit themselves to cooperating with it and will h o n o r this c o m m i t m e n t . T h e r e f o r e any p r o b l e m between UN peacekeepers and o n e o f these parties can be resolved peacefully by negotiation and suasion, and the use o f force becomes unnecessary and counterproductive. A related consideration is that the parties to a conflict are more likely to accept a UN peacekeeping operation if the latter has no offensive intent and capability and will in no conceivable circumstances become a threat to them. T h e principle o f consent applies also to the troop-contributing governments that provide the required military personnel to the United 11

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Nations. These governments would be extremely reluctant to volunteer personnel if their soldiers were to be sent to an area of conflict for combat duty a n d m i g h t f i n d themselves in a situation where they would have to kill or be killed. T h e r e is also a c o r r e l a t i o n betwe