The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping 9781685854652

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T H E WAVE OF THE FUTURE

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

President of the Academy Olara A. Otunnu Editorial Board Marianne Heiberg, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs F. T. Liu, International Peace Academy Augustus Richard Norton, US Military Academy Henry Wiseman, University of Guelph

T H E WAVE OF THE FUTURE T H E UNITED NATIONS AND NAVAL PEACEKEEPING

ROBERT STEPHENS STALEY II

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS • BOULDER & L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU Published for the International Peace Academy 777 United Nations Plaza New York, New York 10017 © 1992 by the International Peace Academy, Inc. All rights reserved Statements of fact or opinion are solely those of the author; their publication does not imply endorsement by the International Peace Academy or any other persons or organizations. The International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series is made possible by the support of the Ford Foundation and the Samuel Freeman Charitable Trust.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Staley, Robert Stephens II. The wave of the future : the United Nations and naval peacekeeping / by Robert Stephens Staley II. p. cm. — (International Peace Academy occasional paper series) Includes bibliographical references ISBN 1-55587-379-0 (pb) 1. United Nations—Armed Forces. 2. International police. 3. Navies. 4. Sea-power. I. Title. II. Series JX1981.P7S73 1992 341.5 '8—dc20 92-21076 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

CONTENTS

Foreword, Eric Grove List of Acronyms

7 9

1

Introduction The United Nations at Sea: A Thin Record

11

2

Objectives of UN Maritime Activities A United Nations Role in Maritime Peacekeeping Operations?

17

3

Regional Maritime Challenges

25

4

Organizational and Experiential Models Pell's International Sea Patrol A United Nations Standing Naval Force: The NATO Experience The Maritime Defense Zone Model The US Coast Guard Caribbean Model The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Model The Gulf Conflict (1990-1991) Model

29

5

A UN Maritime Agency Recommendations for Future UNMA Effectiveness Conclusion

43

Appendix: Naval Peacekeeping Operations Notes About this Occasional Paper The International Peace Academy

51 55 61 62

5

FOREWORD

The 1990s and the twenty-first century challenge us to engage in innovative thinking on the subject of international security. The Cold War, which matched the disturbing threat of universal destruction with the comforting certainties of an international system set in predictable stasis, is over. What seemed impossible only a few years ago is now practical— indeed, sometimes an urgent requirement. Such is the need for new thinking on the subject of maritime security. Not so long ago attempts to discuss the subject of international peacekeeping at sea were dismissed as impossible and unnecessary. They may have been so in the context of the confrontation of two rmyor naval blocs, but now, in the aftermath of one of the most impressive examples of international naval action of all time, and in a world of many simmering conflicts with a maritime dimension, we must think anew about the possibilities and practicalities. Robert Staley's timely study provides an excellent starting point for a debate that must gather strength in the near future. H e is not naive about the problems of maritime peacekeeping and enforcement, and his recommendations for a UN Maritime Agency deserve serious consideration. Even if not necessarily a blueprint for the future, they provide one possible model to help clarify our analysis of future requirements. T h e fact that the United Nations has not had much of a naval role so far should not be allowed to rule out a considerable role in the area in the future. As Staley mentions, naval forces were considered of great importance in enforcement operations when the Military Staff Committee engaged in its all too short period of serious negotiations in 1947-1948. The UN-assigned forces eventually discussed, after the initial bids mentioned in the paper, looked as if they would come out at about the force levels in the major categories not all that different from those deployed for Desert Storm. W e are now at last in the position to put into effect the intentions of

7

8

ERIC

GROVE

the UN's founding fathers. The world has moved back to the multipolar, fluid, and unstable state that was envisaged in 1945. We should not therefore let the inhibitions of the aberrant four decades of the Cold War mask the potential of the UN as the primary agency of the world order, at sea as well as on land. One good result of that Cold War was the working out of the modalities of a remarkable degree of international naval cooperation. NATO, after much effort, evolved powerful and effective means of operating international naval forces. These techniques provide us with a firm foundation for the construction of future squadrons in whatever international framework seems appropriate. Robert Staley's important proposals are not only desirable; they are also eminently practical and deserve the most serious study. —Eric Grove Research Fellow, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton

ACRONYMS

ATO Cs 3 C IC CG DSCS EEZ IPA LAMPS LASH LEDET LST MDZ MFO MILSATCOM MNF MIT NATO NAVOCFORMED RN ROE SACLANT SNFL SOP STANAVFORCHAN STANAVFORLANT UN UNDOF

Air Tasking Order Command, Control, and Communication Coalition Coordination Communications and Integration Center Coast Guard Defense Satellite Communication System Exclusive Economic Zone International Peace Academy Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System Lighter Aboard Ship Law Enforcement Detachment Landing Ship Tank Maritime Defense Zone Multinational Force and Observers (Sinai) Military Satellite Communication Multinational Force (Beirut) Mobile Technical Training North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean Royal Navy (British) Rules of Engagement Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Standing Naval Force Atlantic Standard Operating Procedure Standing Naval Force Channel Standing Naval Force Atlantic United Nations United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan) 9

ACRONYMS

UNIFIL UNITAR UNMA UNSOP UNTSO US USCG USN USSR

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Institute for Training and Research United Nations Maritime Agency (proposed) United Nations Standard Operating Procedure United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine) United States United States Coast Guard United States Navy Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1

INTRODUCTION

There are many possible tasks for peacekeeping on the oceans. Indar Jit Rikhye1

Since its inception at the close of World War II, the United Nations has undertaken numerous peacekeeping operations, from Cyprus to IranIraq, from Suez to Cambodia. It has also been involved, in varying degrees, in collective security enforcement actions against North Korea and Iraq. Further, it has played a variety of roles in support of diverse regional and global cooperative efforts, ranging from famine relief to scientific research. But through all these activities since its establishment, the United Nations has not developed a consistent means of operating on the world's oceans in either a peacekeeping or an enforcement role. Within the next decade, however, the United Nations may well face any of the following maritime situations: 1. In the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, political and military conflicts occur with increasing frequency among its former member states. Although the former Soviet armed forces have been divided among these states, tentative agreements break down between Russia and Ukraine concerning control of Black Sea ports and naval units. Ships and crews assigned to one state declare their intention of joining the navy of the other state, and tensions flare on land and sea. Turkey requests emergency United Nations action in the Black Sea to head off a maritime conflict that threatens potentially disastrous and widespread results. 2. Having rebuilt its military strength following the Gulf War, Iraq has become increasingly bold in demanding concessions from neighboring states. Following another lightning invasion of Kuwait, Iraq this time 11

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continues into the oil fields of Saudi Arabia virtually unchallenged. As the world voices its outrage and threatens retaliation, Iraq counters: It will set fire to Kuwaiti and Saudi wells and release vast quantities of oil into the Gulf if it is opposed. The United Nations meets to discuss its capabilities not only to counter and contain Iraq's aggression, but to prevent massive environmental damage in the Gulf. 3. A group of island nations in the southwest Pacific present evidence to the United Nations that their fisheries are being depleted by the depredations of highly efficient factory fishing fleets operating in contravention of international agreements. They ask that the United Nations provide a maritime patrol to ensure that such violations cease. 4. An international scientific team contends that CO2 levels in the world's oceans haverisento dangerously high levels. A United Nations panel recommends monitoring these and other vital oceanographic measurements, and enforcing increasingly urgent international agreements on ocean pollution. 5. As the economies of various smaller nations continue to stagnate and the living conditions of their citizens worsen, increasing numbers of refugees search for better conditions across the waters. Inevitably, many die in their craft after incredible suffering; and sadly, some states refuse to accept those who make it to safe harbor, instead turning them back to the open sea. The United Nations considers taking action at sea to stop the ongoing tragedy. 6. In the face of increasing instances of arms smuggling involving nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the United Nations debates the creation of a UN Maritime Intercept Force. Remembering the 1992 example of the US Navy's inability or unwillingness to follow a North Korean vessel suspected of carrying advanced Scud missiles to Iran, members note that UN vessels would be free of the stigma of national embarrassment or the appearance of self-serving motives. In each case, we can conceive of two extreme possibilities. At worst, the United Nations would find that it could bring together neither the political will nor the material resources to act decisively and positively on the world's oceans to prevent calamity. But at best, cooperative maritime capabilities will already have been coordinated and exercised so effectively that the United Nations, when faced with an international emergency at sea, will quickly launch the appropriate maritime force. Perhaps this latter premise is only a dream. Perhaps there are real historical reasons why the member states have not previously attempted cooperative efforts at sea as they have on land. But perhaps these inhibitions are no longer as strong as they once were. If that is true, then perhaps the time has come to rethink the possibilities of United Nations action on the world's oceans.

T H E W A V E OF T H E

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FUTURE

T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S AT SEA: A T H I N R E C O R D

As it has pursued its peacekeeping goals, the United Nations has tended to stay on solid ground for a number of reasons. These vary from the lack of specific maritime objectives, to the unwillingness or inability of the superpowers to support such action, to the desires of many Third World nations to avoid falling further into the orbit of either superpower through cooperative maritime action. But because of the dramatic changes we have observed in these areas in just the past several years, the concept of multinational cooperation at sea merits a new look. Early proposals for United Nations police and peacekeeping forces rarely mentioned maritime forces. Rather, they emphasized the more visible and common techniques of land warfare and built their proposed organizations around land forces.2 But while most early UN proposals focused on land situations, the idea of multinational maritime forces is not itself new. As early as 1911, a US suggestion for a multinational naval force designed to discourage the naval arms race was widely discussed, and the idea remained alive up to the eve of World War II. In addition, naval forces were an important component of the UN forces envisioned by the Military Staff Committee in its original deliberations in 1946 and 1947. In their view, naval blockades and bombardments were plausible strategies for enforcement operations and preferable to ground operations. In the 1947-1948 discussions on the size of forces to be assigned to the Military Staff Committee, the five delegates made the following suggestions:

Naval Forces Battleships Carriers Cruisers Destroyers/Frigates Submarines

France 3 6 9 48-54 12

UK/China 2 4 6 72 12

US 3 6 15 84 90

USSR 0 0 5-6 48 12

Eventually the effort to create a UN naval force fell apart under the political stresses of the incipient Cold War.3 In 1948, however, US and French naval vessels, working closely with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)—the first

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peacekeeping operation in UN history—did sail under the United Nations flag in support of Count Bernadotte's mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Palestine.4 During the Korean War the US Navy and ships from other nations operated together under the United Nations banner. In addition, the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) operated a Landing Ship Tank (LST) while the United Nations Security Force in West Irian operated five coastal vessels to supply UN troops and the local population. In 1968, during its cease-fire operation in the Suez Canal Zone, UNTSO proposed using patrol boats and helicopters to enhance its observation capacity, but Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan rejected the idea because "boats would not see enough and helicopters would see too much."5 For many years the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) has operated small craft as part of its peacekeeping procedures in the Straits of Tiran. And of course large-scale multinational operations were carried out twice recently in the Gulf. On a larger and more highly institutionalized level, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) evolved multinational naval forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s that operate to this day, but at a far lower level than originally envisioned by their proponents. And US Senator Claiborne Pell envisioned an International Sea Patrol in the 1960s. (These developments are discussed later in detail.) For a number of reasons, however, these proposals and organizations were not adopted by the United Nations. One of the factors that kept these visions from becoming reality has now gone by the wayside: The ideologically and nationally driven competition of the United States and the Soviet Union has become a thing of the past. Originally envisioned as an effective operational agency that could not only debate and legislate but also implement and enforce its mandates, the United Nations Security Council has until recently been hamstrung by the bipolar opposition between the superpowers. Until its recent resolutions authorizing action against Iraq, the United Nations had rarely acted with the full support of both superpowers in any controversial matter. Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, for example, only the ill-timed walkout of the Soviet delegation from the Security Council allowed authorization of the United Nations forces in Korea. And in the early 1960s, the Security Council agreed on the use of force in the Congo twice to enable the UN operation to implement its mandate. For the most part, however, the United Nations concept of peacekeeping has been based on the non-use of force except in self-defense. Under Article 47 of the Charter, the United Nations Military Staff

T H E W A V E OF THE FUTURE

15

C o m m i t t e e exists to advise and assist the Security Council regarding possible military action required to maintain international peace and security. The political realities of the Cold War had rendered this committee powerless. W e must h o p e that recent changes in the international situation will result in the rediscovery of this committee's potential. 6 In 1987, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf was the scene of intense maritime maneuvering that sometimes flared into hostilities. In attacking each other's economic interests, b o t h Iran a n d Iraq t h r e a t e n e d the shipping of such neutral traders as Kuwait. As a result of this threat to local shipping, to the world's oil supplies, a n d to the larger principles of f r e e d o m of the seas and free trade, the United States reflagged various tankers a n d instituted naval escort action. During this period the Soviet Union introduced an action in the United Nations to consider and, if possible, to create a United Nations Naval Peacekeeping Force. Rather than allow o n e nation (or a coalition outside United Nations control) to operate in a m a n n e r that might n o t serve the interests of the larger community of nations, the proposal was aimed at allowing U N control of such an operation at b o t h the policymaking and implementation levels. While events have passed the Soviet proposal by, it still seems a relatively simple a n d useful concept. If the United Nations can m o u n t successful land-based peacekeeping operations, why n o t o p e r a t e j u s t as successfully at sea? A careful examination reveals a host of difficulties, n o t the least of which involves cost. T h e e q u i p m e n t and infrastructure—materiel, lodging, supply, administration, and C s (command, control, a n d communication)—that support a land-based United Nations peacekeeping force cost a great deal. Each participating nation provides (and is compensated for) t h e required military personnel along with their c o r r e s p o n d i n g personal equipment, and the United Nations supplies transportation to the peacekeeping area. Transportation to the scene for b o t h people a n d materiel has largely b e e n d o n a t e d by the US Air Force, and actual on-scene personnel generally have b e e n drawn f r o m such nations as Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Chile, and Uruguay. 7 Although land-based peacekeeping, then, is a complicated and expensive proposition, the situation at sea is far m o r e complex b o t h f o r contributing nations a n d for the actual maritime peacekeeping team itself: First, navies are expensive, and nations rarely have all the ships and personnel they feel they n e e d for their own effective defense and e n f o r c e m e n t . Any ship lent to the United Nations is o n e less ship available to the d o n o r nation.

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Second, the safety and success of a ship at sea depends upon extensive training and reliable teamwork. One doesn't assemble a scratch team at the last minute to operate a frigate or a submarine. Third, such vessels typically operate within the larger structure of a task force, and the C s demands of such a force require that individual ships have trained together under clearly defined standard operating procedures and rules of engagement. Fourth, these ships and task forces require extended and esoteric high tech support in the form of real-time weather information, satellite intelligence, communication support, refueling capability, and air cover. All of these requirements lead to the conclusion that a maritime peacekeeping and enforcement organization will be expensive and extensive—it will cost a great deal and require a well-developed support structure. This study suggests that given recent and ongoing changes in the global environment—physical as well as political and economic—the member states of the United Nations may again wish to consider creating a United Nations Maritime Agency. But we must first ask: Why should such an organization exist? What might it accomplish? And how ought it to be organized so as to be maximally effective, given the limiting realities of cost and political priorities?

OBJECTIVES OF U N MARITIME ACTIVITIES

The evolution of a United Nations maritime capability—to include the specific possibility of United Nations Naval Peacekeeping Forces—should proceed from a clearly enunciated set of needs. Once these needs or objectives are established and the political will has been generated, then the United Nations can search for a means—a structure and a m e t h o d designed to accomplish its objectives. Carl von Clausewitz, the influential nineteenth-century Prussian theorist, makes the fundamental observation that war is "a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means." 8 That is, wars occur for (and are guided throughout by) political purposes, not for military ends in themselves. If we may extend this thought, then any preparations for maritime organizations and actions (which could either keep the peace or ultimately resolve conflicts through enforcement activities) must be directed toward the accomplishment of specific political objectives. If the nature and mandate of a United Nations Maritime Agency is to be dictated by strictly military or policing considerations, however, then the United Nations will be devising a situation wherein the cart is pulling the horse. If and when the United Nations begins the process of constructing a maritime agency, it must begin with a clear statement of the political objectives it wants its maritime agency to accomplish. This statement of objectives should reveal the eventual nature and composition of that force. If the political purpose of the force is to deter or defeat any seaborne aggression one nation might visit upon another, then the maritime force will be strongly naval: military technology and the techniques to use it effectively will be mandatory. If, however, its political purpose is to discourage aggression or provide a stabilizing influence in times of crisis—leaving the combative actions to the parties in conflict—then maritime craft and training will be less capable of

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violence and tend more toward observation and communication. Bluntly put, if the United Nations should decide to dictate nonviolence to its member states, then paradoxically it must be prepared to partake in violence—certainly reluctandy, and in what we must hope will be only the most rare and extreme situations. At present the United Nations does not demonstrate this expression of political will. But with the breakup of the Soviet Union and with numerous disruptive changes in inter- and intra-state relations around the world, the need for peacemaking and collective security forces with military capabilities may increase within the United Nations. In any case, the objectives agreed upon for any multinational maritime agency will fall under the general headings of peacekeeping, enforcement, and observation. Peacekeeping: Under this rubric, the maritime agency will seek to prevent conflicts, contain conflicts, and end conflicts. In the second instance, conflict would be contained in terms of both geographical area and level of violence. These are, of course, already established United Nations goals, but at present the United Nations has no force or agency capable of achieving these goals at sea or in largely maritime contexts. Enforcement: Here the United Nations will seek to implement international laws and agreements governing collective security, naval disarmament, maritime trade, travel, fisheries, oil production and transportation, and pollution. As its member states increasingly realize the complexity and interdependence of the global ecosystem, such distinctions as territorial and international waters may be emphasized less. If and as the nations move toward universal ratification of a Law of the Sea agreement, it would seem inevitable that a United Nations Maritime Agency, with ships and personnel at its disposal, will most effectively and fairly work toward enforcement of that agreement. Additionally, the United Nations may want to strengthen its ability to call for international blockade as a means of putting economic pressure on transgressor nations. Observation: Here the United Nations will depend u p o n both local physical presence and distant satellite imaging technology to aid enforcement, to provide statistical data in order to detect and measure changes, and to promote the health and productivity of the world's oceans. The variety of tasks, then, for which a United Nations Maritime Agency would be responsible runs the gamut from traditional peacekeeping operations to the enforcement of specific United Nations mandates. O n e example of when a maritime peacekeeping operation comparable to earlier land-oriented operations would be necessary is if two nations were involved in a conflict that significantly manifested itself at

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sea. The actual instance of maritime conflict could occur as open naval battle, the shelling of cities from coastal waters, the use of naval forces to insert and supply troops in enemy territory, or the obstruction of maritime commerce by one party's navy through actual interception or the mining of enemy sea lanes or harbors. In the Adriatic Sea, for example, the Yugoslav navy's shelling of such coastal cities as Dubrovnic might have been deterred by a United Nations maritime force in place off the coast, operating under United Nations resolutions and negotiated agreements to prevent such hostile naval activity. While this maritime peacekeeping action should complement comparable land activity, it would nonetheless make an essential contribution to holding down the level of violence and ensuring that both parties abide by previous agreements or United Nations resolutions. Other areas of maritime enforcement and observation are increasingly important, and a United Nations Maritime Agency would be ideally suited to treat such problems in a timely and consistent manner. These areas range from operations against piracy, terrorism, and drug smuggling to ecological operations involving maritime oil production and shipping; pollution from both fresh water sources and ocean dumping; fisheries agreements; and the monitoring of ocean temperature, salinity, acidity, and carbon dioxide content. During peacekeeping or enforcement activities, for example, multinational maritime forces must be aware of possible environmental terrorism or even inadvertent environmental damage, and must be prepared to prevent, counter, or contain such damage. Events late in the Gulf War illustrate this necessity. When Iraq released massive quantities of oil into the Gulf and burned over 500 Kuwaiti oil wells, several customary and conventional principles of international law came into play. Article 147 of the Geneva Convention on protection of civilians declares as a grave breach the "extensive destruction . . . of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." And Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 contains, in Articles 35 and 55, "a prohibition of the use of means or methods of warfare . . . intended or . . . expected to cause" widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment. In addition, Rule 23g of Hague IV forbids a belligerent "[to] destroy... the enemy's property, unless... imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."9 Whether or not Iraq violated specific prohibitions regarding environmental damage, the fact remains not only that such damage occurred, but that the multinational force in place was not well prepared to combat either the Gulf oil slick or the burning wells. In the future, precautions

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ought to be taken that either prevent such actions by local disputing parties, or minimize the resulting damage through the availability of appropriate technology and techniques. A properly directed and equipped United Nations maritime force would anticipate and counter such potentially destructive environmental actions. More generally, many nations recognize the importance of common maritime security embracing environmental, social, and economic factors—as well as the more traditional naval elements. Derek Boothby suggests that "poverty, environmental threats and, above all, the population explosion will increase the struggle for ocean resources. Out of this emerges the possibility for a positive role for established maritime nations to maintain order on the seas and use their experience and naval capabilities to promote sustainable ocean management."10 This role may of course be played out by individual nations or a consortium of maritime nations, but a United Nations Maritime Agency would provide a useful mechanism for focusing these efforts productively.

A UNITED

NATIONS

MARITIME PEACEKEEPING

ROLE

IN

OPERATIONS?

Although a study of this limited scope cannot hope to tackle the subject of how best to organize any and all peacekeeping operations, the general question of organization does affect future United Nations operations at sea. In Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, Robert Houghton and Frank Trinka have suggested four essential prerequisites for the establishment of a successful peacekeeping operation, and I have attempted to adapt these principles to potential multinational maritime operations:11 Cooperation of Local Parties The peacekeeping force works to discourage aggressive action and encourage compliance with the peacekeeping force's mandate. When the parties to a conflict support the mandate and the resulting peacekeeping force, and when they physically cooperate with that force, then the force tends to be effective—as in the cases of UNDOF and the MFO. When the conflicting parties do not cooperate with the peacekeeping team, success in implementing the mandate is difficult, if not impossible—as in UNIFIL and MNFII. In the case of the 1991-1992 war in Yugoslavia, for example, one reason the European Community was not able to act effectively as a

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peacekeeper was that, in every instance, at least one party to the conflict would not support sustained peacekeeping action. If European maritime nations were to have assembled a naval peacekeeping force to discourage the shelling of Dubrovnic from the close-in waters of the Adriatic or the blockading of Croatian ports by Yugoslav naval vessels, those peacekeeping vessels could have found themselves under attack from both sea and shore batteries. Unless both sides agreed to the presence of peacekeeping naval forces, the forces would be ineffective and in danger. Political Support Over the past forty years, the support of a multinational peacekeeping operation by the two superpowers has been one of the best guarantors of success. If both the United States and the Soviet Union actively lent their political support, as in the case of UNDOF, other support would follow—not the least of which would come from the local parties. Even if the Soviet Union would not enthusiastically support a peacekeeping operation, strong support by the United States and a lack of Soviet opposition would still promote a healthy possibility of success. If the United States were not to support a multinational response to a crisis, then the operation's chances of success would not be high. Within the past several years, however, the international political situation has changed dramatically. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, it may be that other nations or regional groupings will play a more pivotal role in the success or failure of future peacekeeping or enforcement activities. Although admittedly not a peacekeeping operation, the multinational action against Iraq is instructive on this point. There the Soviet Union's unwillingness to back its former client state, and its support of the international condemnation of Iraq's aggression, lent stability and a near unanimity to the multinational enforcement of the UN mandates. The support of Arab and Islamic nations was vitally important, as was the diplomatic, material, and economic support of the European Community. In addition, China's willingness not to veto Security Council resolutions enabled the multinational force to operate against Iraq under the mandate of the United Nations. At present, the United States has the world's largest navy. Any movement toward a United Nations maritime peacekeeping action, whether embodied in a standing force or taken as an ad hoc reaction to a specific crisis, may need the support of the United States. However, the support of a broad base of maritime nations, including such other naval powers as Russia, Great Britain, and France, will also prove important to

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the success of such a large-scale endeavor. In the past, the Security Council's permanent members were generally kept from involvement in peacekeeping forces for political reasons. However, John Mackinlay points out in The Peacekeepers that in previous operations, the employment of smaller nation forces "at the lowest level of day-to-day operations . . . exacerbates the problems of language and communication of orders." He continues: Some of the contingents will lack the requisite level of military sophistication These day-to-day running problems of the peacekeepers at the coal-face seldom excite the interest of the politicians who cause their deployment or the peacekeeping cognoscenti who study the problem at the international level. [The larger nations also offer] advantages in terms of staff experience and military sophistication which are now more important than before (in view of the quantity and availability of role-enhancing electronic surveillance and communications equipment) to the smooth running of a peacekeeping force. But more significant is the long-range international influence of the superpowers which are likely to be dominating the event at the highest level. The positive effects of their involvement can be felt in a number of ways. In some cases major powers and permanent members of the Security Council exert more hostage or deterrent effect in a single-nation capacity than the combined effect of an international force consisting of small nations which have no significance to local parties. In the negotiating phase of a peace agreement in some instances they may be more effective than United Nations negotiators in securing a workable truce or treaty, because they can usually back up their negotiating positions with offers which, for positive or negative reasons, cannot be refused by the opponent forces.12

These factors, while important in land-based peacekeeping efforts, can be even more significant in the highly technological and politically sensitive maritime arena. Unambiguous, Restricted Mandate

As Houghton and Trinka have observed, "A mandate which is carefully crafted, unambiguous, restricted in scope and application and not open to varying interpretations promises to be successful. A mandate cast in broad, general, and ambiguous terms usually gives rise to difficulties later regarding application or interpretation."18 Such idealized phrases as "ensuring the peace and security of the region" are difficult to implement without specific directives, rules of engagement, limitations, and administrative procedures. Thus a mandate ought to reassure both the local

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parties and the peacekeeping forces that actions taken will conform to explicit prescriptions, and that there is a reasonable connection between these prescriptions and the desired results. If, for example, the function of the multinational force is purely peacekeeping and not enforcement, then the equipment and rules of engagement with which the force operates should reflect this limitation. The craft involved will be light and either fast or stable (depending on its mission), suited for monitoring, communication, and symbolic presence—and a quick removal if violence sets in. The group should also operate under clear instructions to avoid any provocative response to challenges or acts of noncompliance by either of the local parties, and the local parties should be made to understand this limitation implicitly. If, on the other hand, the function of the multinational force is clearly mandated to be that of enforcement, then heavier vessels (destroyers, frigates, cruisers, and in the larger threats to peace, aircraft carriers) will prove useful, especially when enforcing a mandate against a party whose tendency would be to use violence. Here the rules of engagement must be clear and consistent across the multinational force. And if these operating instructions are to have any deterrent value, they must also be clear to the local parties; however, the knowledge should not be so explicit that it could be used against the multinational force. In times of international crisis or conflict, United Nations mandates have tended to be general and nonspecific, in order to meet with the approval of all parties, especially those with vital interests at stake: the warring parties or those directly affected by the final outcome. These mandates serve to initiate, to authorize, to legitimize national or United Nations agency actions. But commanders need more precise directions and rules of engagement, drawn up by people on the scene or by those who are intimately familiar with the physical and emotional realities of the situation. Local commanders must also have the authority to act decisively in ambiguous situations. Mackinlay lists four conditions satisfied by ideal enabling instructions: 1. All forces in the likely area of operations—both those in the peacekeeping and enforcement contingent and those being restrained—must publicly agree on the conditions laid down by the United Nations or the multinational body. 2. Provision must be made for the peacekeeping force to take sanctions against forces or individuals violating the agreement at either the international or local level. 3. Care must be taken to protect the impartial status of the force where that issue is of concern.

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4. Whether the multinational force is constituted under United Nations aegis or otherwise, finances and logistics must be securely provided for.14 Freedom of Movement In order to demonstrate both its effectiveness and its impartiality, a multinational force must be able to move wherever and whenever necessary within the area of its peacekeeping responsibility. At one level this requirement is physical and geographical, and the realities of maritime operations allow for inherently greater mobility than available in most land operations. But at another level the requirement is political, and restrictions placed on the force, whether maritime or land based, by one or several local parties can be the source of eventual claims of bias or incompetence charged against the multinational force. In order to exploit fully the inherent mobility of maritime operations, numbers will count—especially if the area to be patrolled is vast. But various "force multipliers" (advantages derived from technique or technology) can compensate for reduced numbers. Satellite or advanced airborne electronic monitoring is one such advantage, as is computerized analysis of incoming data. An effective multinational peacekeeping force must avail itself of such methods. But while these advantages can help reduce the number of necessary ships and personnel, they are nonetheless costly, and once again the issue of funding rears its head.

REGIONAL MARITIME CHALLENGES

No one can predict with certainty where a United Nations maritime force might be called into action in the decades to come. But if previous trouble spots are any guide, then one could consider a variety of specific regions where the international community would benefit from United Nations Maritime Agency assistance. From the Middle East to the Antarctic, various maritime regions each contain unique intrinsic potential conflicts. Although these problems have historically been regional, they are becoming increasingly global in terms of both cause and effect. The Middle East. Both the Iran-Iraq war and the more recent Gulf War demonstrate the nature and extent of threats to maritime peace in the region. Because of the importance of the area's oil reserves and because of ethnic and national rivalries, maritime stability is crucial not only as a desired result, but as a necessary precondition for peace in the region. Much more will be said later of efforts in this direction in the Gulf and the Red Sea. The Mediterranean. The growing unrest in southeastern Europe has shown results in the maritime arena that may well prove harbingers of things to come. Over the past two years economic and political dislocation in Albania has resulted in attempts at mass emigrations across the Adriatic to Italy. Other such movements in the future would be mitigated by the availability of a multinational maritime patrol in the region. The United Nations has already served a valuable peacekeeping role on Cyprus, but the very nature of the conflict there underscores the potential for future ethnic and international violence. Greece and Turkey have avoided open conflict for some time, but underlying animosities may require maritime peacekeeping operations at some future date. In addition, the war in Yugoslavia and Croatia was accompanied by a blockade of Croatian ports and the shelling of port cities (most notably Dubrovnik) from the sea. In both cases, multinational maritime forces 25

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might have found an early constructive role. As it was, a Western European Union decision on 18 November 1991 prompted naval action in the Adriatic.15 Italy, France, and Great Britain placed vessels on the scene, including hospital ships and frigates, with warnings to the Yugoslav navy that harm done to these vessels will be interpreted as an act of war. And one Western European Community report has suggested a naval answer to the problem of city bombardment: "The warship that fires on a defenseless city from a safe distance out to sea must be put in a situation whereby it knows that it can do so at the cost of being promptly sent to the bottom." 16 The Indian Ocean. Tensions between India and Pakistan lead to perhaps the largest maritime concern in the region, but additional anxiety grows out of the continuing violence in Sri Lanka between the government and the rebel Tamil Tigers.17 For some time now this conflict has caused disturbances between naval and fishing vessels of India and Sri Lanka, and recently the Indian navy has introduced a "peacekeeping force" of Indian warships and commandos aboard fast patrol boats whose objective is to stop rebel runs from the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka. At present the method of stopping these runs is to shoot at and sink any craft suspected of carrying Tamil rebels off the coast of Sri Lanka.18 While India's intentions are surely for the best in its navy's response to Sri Lanka's requests for assistance, General Indar Jit Rikhye sees that "in such situations, external forces are often persuaded to support one side, further complicating the conflict. For example, India's attempt to stop the tide of refugees from East Pakistan and provide assistance to the dissident forces in East Pakistan led to a war between India and Pakistan in 1971."19 In such cases multinational maritime assistance may be preferable. The Baltic. For some time the Scandinavian navies have complained of mysterious submarine intrusions into their territorial waters. If the problem were to continue into a period of intense unrest among former Soviet states in the region, the potential for a casus belli incident is far from negligible. The North Atlantic. The depletion of the once rich fishing banks of this region, including the Grand Banks off the coast of Newfoundland, could give rise to increased competition for decreasing resources. In addition, the time may soon come when international pressures will attempt to limit or stop the deep-sea dumping of sludge and other pollutants in the deep Adantic. And closer to shore is the issue of river-borne pollution entering and fouling the waters off the east coast of the United States. A much longer range problem, and one of global concern, grows out of the potential for decreasing salinity in the extreme North Atlantic due

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27

to increased melting of freshwater ice. Normally the cool water in the North Atlantic sinks (due to its greater density) and heads south, driving a seawater convection belt which over time moves at deep levels through the South Atlantic, then turns east across the Indian Ocean and into the Pacific. When this water eventually rises, it picks up heat and returns west across the Indian Ocean and into the Atlantic, heading north in its final phase as the Gulf Stream. If general warming increases the melting of ice in the extreme North Atlantic, the water becomes less saline and thus less dense. If less dense, it may slow and possibly stop the convection stream, resulting in potentially catastrophic global climatic changes. The monitoring of this complicated phenomenon would be a natural responsibility of the United Nations Maritime Agency. The Caribbean. Although the region enjoys a high degree of cooperation among its national navies and coast guards, several problems threaten to introduce long-term maritime conflict The confluence of poverty and opportunity causes drug smuggling through the waters of the Caribbean, and therefore the necessity of international cooperation in enforcing national and international laws against such activity will probably remain strong. In addition, piracy remains a lethal threat in some areas. Perhaps most significant of all is the tragic movement of boat people from areas of poverty and repression. Given the economic realities of the region, there is little reason to hope that this problem will disappear. Yet if an effective and humane multinational answer to the problem is not devised, countless people will risk death on the open seas. As in areas of the Pacific, the issue of the boat people will continue to demand international attention for many years to come.20 The North Pacific. Massive overfishing and the resulting depletion of salmon, halibut, and other species have led to international agreements limiting such destruction. But many of these agreements are currently unenforceable due to problems of observation and jurisdiction. The South Pacific. In this area of increasing interdependence there also exists the possibility of increasing friction, especially in the maritime environment. One recent report notes that with such a small proportion of land available for agriculture and the enormous Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) now claimed under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, it is hardly surprising that the ocean has become the prime source of income for many of the South Pacific islands and the main focus of their plans for economic development. As all South Pacific nations have taken maximum advantage of the principles for claiming maritime space and have extended their maritime jurisdiction out to the 200 nautical mile limit established in 1982, the offshore claims of the Pacific islands now blanket most of the ocean. In most cases the extent of the maritime space claimed dwarfs the land

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territory. For example, the small island state of Kiribati claims an area that is the size of all Europe—2000 times its land area.21

While most of these claims are settled amicably, three boundary segments still are disputed: (1) the boundary between Fiji and Tonga, where it is possible that Tonga's claim to North and South Minerva Reefs may pose difficulties; (2) unresolved sovereignty claims by France and Vanuatu to Matthew and Hunter Islands; and (3) the way in which US sovereignty over the minute Swains Island affects the boundary between Western Samoa and American Samoa, heavily disadvantaging the former.22 A further area of future conflict involves the driftnet fishing practices of Japanese and Taiwanese fishermen in the region. The 20 th South Pacific Forum in July 1989 expressed concern that this practice threatens the area's fishery sustainability. As a result, the Forum agreed to draft an agreement banning driftnets in the region. Although both offending nations later agreed to limit the practice within their fleets, the threat remains troubling. Additional (and deeper) issues remain as potential causes of instability and grounds for a divergence of maritime interests, and even maritime conflict in the South Pacific: 1.The ongoing involvement of external powers in South Pacific affairs. 2. The growing economic and social difficulties of many of the South Pacific island states, potentially leading not only to violent conflict but to increases in piracy, smuggling, and even large-scale seaborne migrations (boat people). 3. The possibility of deterioration of the maritime environment. This maritime environmental threat grows out of possible future toxic and nuclear waste dumping, overfishing, and even the greenhouse effect. "Any thermal expansion of the seas," writes Bateman, "plus some accelerated glacial melting, as a result of the increase in certain gases in the atmosphere would have a disastrous effect on the low-lying atoll states such as Kiribati and Tubalu."24 Thus the observation of changes in sea levels is one more crucial maritime issue in the South Pacific. The Antarctic. Environmental issues are particularly challenging in this fertile and fragile environment. Because the Antarctic Treaty calls for a nonmilitary regimen south of the sixty degree latitude, a United Nations Maritime Agency could be a valuable monitoring and enforcement factor in the region.

4 ORGANIZATIONAL AND EXPERIENTIAL MODELS

Before solving the question o f who participates, we must consider the basic question of organization. Which governments or agencies will be responsible for organizing and implementing this maritime activity? Will it be a peacekeeping or an enforcement operation? How will command and control be carried out? Will such an activity be directly under United Nations control? Will it be a United Nations standing force, a contingency force, or an agency? If such a maritime endeavor were to be given life by the United Nations, there would exist a variety of possible structures—including at the furthest extreme a large, permanently manned and equipped naval force. At a less permanent level, the United Nations may develop a system of assembling contingency forces under a permanent office of maritime operations. Or at the least permanent end of the scale, the United Nations may simply react in a specific situation by deputizing a capable national force or by creating an ad hoc maritime team designed to solve a given problem. When the problem ceases to threaten, the team ceases to be.

P E L L ' S INTERNATIONAL SEA PATROL In 1966, US Senator Claiborne Pell envisioned the creation o f an International Sea Patrol "responsible for international safety regulations at sea, for operation of a world-wide rescue service, for enforcement of international law concerning navigation at sea, for ensuring uniformity and adequacy o f world-wide aids to navigation, for regulating international fisheries, for providing aid and assistance to stranded seamen outside their own countries, and for carrying out the decisions of the World Health Organization at sea."25 The International Sea Patrol would 29

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not serve as a military force per se, but for purposes of discipline, command, and control should be modeled on military or police organizations, most specifically on the US Coast Guard. In addition, the Sea Patrol would be a highly professional standing organization, "competent in all aspects of ocean operations and in the pertinent aspects of law enforcement." 26 Pell's vision is profound, and stands as an early model of what is now all the more desirable and necessary.

A UNITED

NATIONS

STANDING NAVAL

THE NATO

FORCE:

EXPERIENCE

More recently, Gwyn Prins, director of Cambridge University's Global Security Program, has advocated the creation of a United Nations Standing Naval Force. 27 Prins recognizes the need for the development of concomitant United Nations command and control systems and procedures, and specifically calls for the development of United Nations Standard Operating Procedures (UNSOPs). In addition, the Standing Naval Force he envisions would be augmented by nations and alliances during periods of international emergency. Prins's standing force would seem to take as its model naval developments in NATO. A review of the evolution of NATO's multinational naval operating forces may provide lessons for those who would develop a future United Nations Maritime Agency. Following World War II, the nations of the North Atlantic began to see the necessity of naval cooperation in the face of perceived threats from the Soviet Union. Out of meetings in 1947 and 1948 grew the early organizational structure of NATO. These meetings were aimed specifically at developing "closer standardization in the field of planning, operations, and logistics."28 When NATO was finally created in 1949, efforts at multinational maritime cooperation developed a more formal and effective structure. The first meeting in October, 1949, of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Out of this and other meetings was created NATO's unified naval command structure, vested in the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, or SACLANT. (Of course the impetus behind this coalescing of naval forces was the common perception of a specific threat. The evolution of a comparable United Nations unified naval command must be driven by other very real threats to global maritime peace and prosperity.) As with today's small navies, the smaller NATO nations did not then have large or numerous craft. However, their potential contributions

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were seen as significant in "coastal escort and coastal a n d inshore minesweeping"; indeed, it was in these important areas that their initial contributions were made. 2 9 Behind this adjustment of means a n d roles lies a n important lesson, often learned and relearned in N A T O ' s prolonged naval adaptations; that lesson is that unity of effort requires equality of influence at the policy level. In practical terms, nations with larger navies a n d m o r e advanced e q u i p m e n t must share the decisionmaking process with all participants, o r cooperation will inevitably break down. During N A T O ' s early years, vessels operated within their own national groupings. In 1965, however, at British suggestion, Exercise Matchmaker b r o u g h t together a British frigate, a Canadian destroyer escort, a US escort vessel, and a Dutch destroyer that deployed as a single force for five months. At the e n d of 1967 the N A T O Council decided to convert the planned Matchmaker IV into a Standing Naval Force Atlantic (originally STANAVFORLANT, now m o r e commonly SNFL). Drawn f r o m various N A T O nations, these vessels would train a n d cruise together serving not only as a quick reaction force, b u t as a visible symbol of multinational cooperation a n d commitment. T h e original SNFL consisted of destroyers o r frigates f r o m the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada, West Germany, and Norway. Since that time, this pattern of six o r seven mixed escort vessels has b e e n generally followed, and other units have exercised with and supported the force as required. 30 But even as the standing naval force operated jointly, its effectiveness was constrained by political realities: "Its flexibility was limited by the n e e d to first obtain higher approval f r o m allied political authorities w h o themselves would have to reach some kind of consensus b e f o r e issuing certain o r d e r s in a crisis. Moreover the ships were still subject to recall at any time by the contributing nations." 3 1 SNFL was designed to serve four main functions: 1. It provided training experience for j o i n t operations, which enabled allied navies to improve "naval operations proficiency a n d N A T O tactical development a n d evaluation." 2. It provided evidence of allied solidarity. 3. It provided NATO with a multinational ocean surveillance capability. 4. It provided SACLANT with an immediately available c o m b i n e d force to b e deployed "to the scene of any possible contingency to reaffirm the solidarity of the N A T O alliance and provide a visible deterrent." T h e force would move "quietly to a threatened area, o r j u s t out of sight over the horizon," a n d then b e ready to respond to higher political a n d military direction while at the same time exercising the right of f r e e d o m of the seas. In addition, the force would b e the nucleus a r o u n d which "a m o r e powerful and versatile N A T O force could b e f o r m e d " if tensions

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escalated. Thus it was envisioned as a stabilizing force operating at a low level, but capable of effective action and escalation when necessary.32 NATO has tried two other such structures. In 1969 it formed a multinational on-call force in the Mediterranean. Rather than a standing force, this group was composed of three to five destroyers called together periodically. Then in 1973 another standing naval force was constituted in the English Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), made up of mine countermeasure vessels from Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with occasional contributions from the United States and Norway.83 Thus in the search for a model of multinational naval cooperation, the NATO standing force bears examination. However, its political limitations must be admitted and transcended in any effective United Nations Standing Naval Force. T H E MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE MODEL

In searching for models after which to organize and administer future UN activities, the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) system may prove useful. The MDZ organization combines US Navy and Coast Guard administrative structures, personnel, and equipment.34 At present there are two MDZs, one on each coast of the United States, and each is commanded by a Coast Guard flag officer. An MDZ is designed to provide for the defense of the continental United States against maritime threats. Its defense zone currently reaches out to 200 nautical miles, and may be extended in time of war. The MDZ's official mission is to plan for and, when directed, conduct, coordinate and control operations in the area designated as the Maritime Defense Zone as required, in order to: 1. Ensure the integrated defense of the area, 2. Protect the sea lines of communications, and 3. Establish and maintain necessary control of the vital sea areas, including ports, harbors, navigable waters and offshore assets, exercising both statutory authority and naval command capability. Specific maritime missions in support of these ends include: 1. Harbor and coastal defense from external threat (coastal surface, submarines, mines, sabotage). 2. Port security (protection of facilities from internal threats such as terrorism, theft, and accidents). 3. Marine safety (inspections, investigations, merchant personnel licensing, and pollution response). 4. Harbor and coastal operations (vessel traffic, anchorages, aids to navigation, and search and rescue). 35

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33

Each Maritime Defense Zone is divided into geographic sectors, and these sectors are further subdivided into areas each of which coincides with the area of responsibility of the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port. The MDZ commander exercises operational control over the areas seaward of the sectors out to the limits of the MDZ. What results is a three-layered approach composed of an outer defense under the control of the MDZ commander, an inner defense under control of the sector commander, and coastal and port area defense under control of the Captain of the Port. While under the overall control of the MDZ commander, both the navy and the Coast Guard take on specific responsibilities within the MDZ: 1. Inshore undersea warfare—USN 2. Port safety and security—CG 3. Mine countermeasures—USN/CG 4. Search and rescue—USN/CG 5. Salvage—USN 6. Reconnaissance and surveillance—USN/CG 7. Interdiction-USN/CG 8. Antiterrorism and countersabotage—CG 9. Disaster response—CG/USN 10. Explosive ordnance disposal—USN 11. Vessel movement control—CG 12. Antisubmarine warfare—USN/CG 13. Escort shipping-USN/CG 14. Air defense—USN 15. Antisurface warfare—USN/CG 16. Naval control of shipping—USN/CG 17. Command, control, communication, and intelligence (CSI)—USN and CG 18. Aids to navigation (electronic and visual)—CG36 These responsibilities mirror those reasonably expected of a multinational maritime force engaged in a peacekeeping mission in a region where war, civil unrest, or a general breakdown of maritime institutions threatens the productivity of the maritime region. In addition, the MDZ model is deliberately linked to land-based operations (with their corresponding command and control functions) in ways that would almost inevitably obtain in most conceivable multinational maritime peacekeeping situations. In addition to their MDZ procedures, US forces have available advisory information entided Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.,s7 Because the segment "Naval Peacekeeping Operations" is sugges-

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tive and potentially useful to future UNMA planners, I have included it in the appendix. T H E US COAST GUARD CARIBBEAN MODEL

As mentioned earlier, the need within the Caribbean Basin for maritime peacekeeping and enforcement is based on a range of potential threats to international peace and productivity. Natural disasters threaten each summer and fall during the hurricane season. Drug smuggling by sea and air continues to be a problem, and "narcoterrorism" is on the rise as a reaction to increased law enforcement activity. And economic and political instability promise poverty, dislocation, and violence for many nearby countries' citizens.88 The US Coast Guard has for some time played a role in countering or reducing these threats, or in managing their consequences. For example, in each instance of crisis in Haiti, Coast Guard assets have been called upon to evacuate or safeguard people affected. After the conflict in Grenada, medium and small Coast Guard vessels were called in by the multinational Caribbean Defense Force to support peacekeeping efforts by preventing arms smuggling and the entry of subversives who might threaten the fragile stability on the island. And for one year a Coast Guard training team helped the Grenadans design and build their own effective coast guard. In these and other operations in the Caribbean and throughout Latin America, the US Coast Guard, in cooperation with numerous national navies, has relied upon a range of resources, including: 1. 378-foot High Endurance Cutters with limited antisubmarine warfare, electronic warfare, and command and control capabilities. Because these vessels must be effectively armed for possible limited use in Third World conflicts, they are being fitted with US Navy harpoon and phalanx systems, and they support helicopter activity. Crews are trained for both peacetime Coast Guard and wartime naval missions, and their vessels are interoperable with NATO craft in terms of both logistics and communications. 2. 270- and 210-foot Medium Endurance Cutters with limited antisubmarine capabilities. These ships deploy with either a Light Airborne Multipurpose System I (LAMPS I) or a more limited helicopter, and crews are trained for both Coast Guard and naval missions. The larger craft is especially useful for command and control in mine countermeasure operations because of automated navigation, data display, and weapons control systems. These ships are also interoperable with NATO craft. 3. Patrol boats ranging from 110 feet to 82 feet in length. These

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35

vessels operate in five-boat squadrons and are armed with small caliber deck machine guns for law enforcement or naval warfare uses. They are extensively trained in various MDZ missions. 4. Mobile Aerostat Units, which are balloon-deployed surface search radar towed by vessels with partial civilian crews. These are typically used in drug interdiction to reduce the number of patrol craft needed, because their effective radar range is much greater than that of surface-based radar units. 5. Smaller patrol craft for use in harbors and shallow coastal operations. 6. Such special units as Port Security Teams, Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs), and Visit and Search Teams. These teams can be used either directly or as training and advisory resources. The Port Security Teams can be transported by air to protect facilities, on-site survey teams, and other local operations. Maritime LEDETs are routinely used aboard US Navy ships and can be deployed for other uses as well (see the subhead "Postwar Embargo"). They are especially valuable as peacekeeping forces because of their expertise with civil police authorities, foreign crews, civilian vessel search techniques, training on small vessels in law enforcement scenarios, and small boat handling skills. 7. Air assets include E-2C aircraft for air interdiction, long- and medium-range fixed-wing craft (such as the C-130), and medium- and short-range helicopters (such as the HH-53, HH-65, and HH60). 8. Bilingual personnel aboard craft in Caribbean operations. In addition to these resources, the Coast Guard has a permanent Mobile Technical Training (MTT) team in Antigua that is funded through the Department of State to support drug interdiction. The MTT team trains eastern Caribbean forces in drug interdiction methods, organization, operational techniques, and support functions (including Search and Rescue). Of note is the fact that most smaller coastal nations have maritime missions and assets more compatible with typical Coast Guard operations than with larger naval operations. Thus annually the US Coast Guard typically trains over 180 international students from over twenty countries within the United States and provides training teams on location in thirty nations. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND O B S E R V E R S (MFO) M O D E L

The history of the MFO, as a non-UN operation, is instructive in numerous ways.89 Of particular interest to those considering future multinational maritime cooperation is the fact that in addition to its land operations, the MFO also carries out regular maritime patrols. These are

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accomplished by the MFO's Coastal Patrol Unit, composed of three Italian minesweepers supported by a crew of about 100, whose duties are to watch over the Straits of Tiran. Although the straits are continuously observed from land, one of the Coastal Patrol Unit's vessels is at sea for 12 hours out of every 24, half of which time is at night. And during the time that it is not at sea, a vessel is always ready to be launched upon request. The area observed is a 60-nautical-square-mile passage between Ras Mohammad and Dahab described as "deceptively hazardous, with strong winds and currents endangering ships which steer too close to the coral reefs. . . . The traffic through the straits comprises a variety of small freighters and pleasure cruisers of every description."40 Most of the maritime problems in this area arise from small craft that unintentionally violate national waters, and thus are not threatening to international security. However, the passage is part of the sea lane leading to the Israeli port of Eilat. Because Egyptian closure of the lanes helped trigger previous Arab-Israeli conflicts, MFO observation is an important confidencebuilding measure.

THE GULF CONFLICT (1990-1991) MODEL

The Gulf multinational maritime operation, while not a peacekeeping mission in the traditional sense, offers information of value to those who would seek to bring together future multinational maritime efforts. While not precisely a UN-mandated action, the operation was indeed carried out under a series of UN resolutions. The Multinational Force operated both in the Gulf and in the Red Sea in three stages: the Desert Shield embargo, Desert Storm, and the postwar embargo. Desert Shield Embargo Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, several nations quickly sent ships to the region for two broad reasons. The first reason was to defend against possible further hostile action by Iraq in the Gulf, such as the placing of mines, aerial attacks on ships (suggested by the devastating Iraqi Mirage attack on the USS Stark in 1987), or an attack on Saudi Arabia. The second reason was to prepare to take any actions necessary to redress the situation as prescribed by United Nations mandates. These actions included the implementation of the maritime portion of a total embargo (excepting medical supplies) on the shipment of goods into and out of Iraq. One might also suggest individual national

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37

political purposes in sending ships to the region, such as signaling national resolve or supporting an ally. When nations send their naval forces to a particular spot in response to a crisis such as this, vacancies are created in their normal patrol areas. To help cover these vacancies, other nations or multinational agencies not actually (or as fully) involved in the Gulf filled in or went on a higher level of alert. For example, throughout much of this dme NATO's Naval On-Call Force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) remained on alert in the Mediterranean and extended its patrol activities, even though officially NATO could not be involved in this out-of-area conflict. This force of eight warships included destroyers and frigates from Britain, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United States.41 The United States and the United Kingdom were not new participants in naval action within the Gulf region. Both had maintained large patrols during the Iran-Iraq war, wherein Kuwaiti and other tankers were reflagged and escorted through dangerous waters in the Gulf. Some of these US and UK ships were still in the Gulf in August and formed the nucleus of the recent multinational naval force. The United States had in place eight ships from its Joint Task Force Middle East, including five frigates, a cruiser, and a destroyer. Great Britain had four ships in place, including two frigates, a cruiser, and a supply ship. In addition, France had a frigate and the Soviets a destroyer, while the Kuwaitis were fortunate in retaining two missile boats and their tender. Further out, the United States had three carrier battle groups available (one in the Indian Ocean, one in the eastern Mediterranean, and one en route to the Mediterranean), along with a battleship and an amphibious ready group. The carriers would prove valuable in providing both air cover for the ships in the multinational naval force and aerial observation (both visual and electronic) of Gulf shipping during the Desert Shield embargo phase.42 Such observation played an important role in the success of the embargo, for the Maritime Interception Force was thinly spread across a wide area. As merchant ships headed north into or through the Gulf, intercepting vessels had to identify, intercept, and search them early enough to avoid the reach of Iraqi aircraft, missiles, or gunboats. And because the embargo also prohibited trade from Iraq outward, sea and air surveillance was required to pick up ships in the north Gulf heading south. In order to search all maritime traffic with the limited number of multinational force ships available, the force devised a computerized system to classify and keep track of the many surveillance reports from various sources—surface, air, and electronic. Interceptions under the UN-sanctioned embargo actually began on 17 August when the Iraqi tanker AlFao was searched in the Red Sea, and

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the Al Byaa and Al Abid were inspected in the Gulf. The initial searches were conducted by US teams led by four-man US Coast Guard LEDETs (of which more will be discussed in the "Postwar Embargo" section). But within days other navies joined the inspections, and soon non-US forces were conducting some 30 percent of all interceptions.43 By mid-November approximately 150 warships were available in and around the Gulf, and the multinational Maritime Interception Force had intercepted 3,630 merchant ships, of which 417 had been boarded and 16 diverted.44 The embargo continued throughout the next phase of the multinational action against Iraq, and by the time of the cease-fire in late February approximately 7,000 ships had been investigated at a rate of 30 to 40 daily. O f these, about 1,000 were boarded and searched at a rate of 5 to 10 daily. In conducting these searches, the multinational interception force faced several tests of its desire to avoid open conflict. Possibly because Saddam Hussein publicly threatened to execute any of his captains who stopped to be searched, some simply would not stop unless forced. In each case the ship would be hailed by radio and ordered to submit to search. If the captain refused, shots would be fired across the ship's bow—a clear and universally recognized signal that the vessel is to stop or turn around. If the ship held its course and speed, ultimately an armed team would board the vessel by helicopter and take control of the ship, halting it until a search had been completed. Because of the danger to the search party under these conditions, the team most likely would be well armed and trained in special operations procedures. If no contraband were found, the ship would be sent on its way. If, however, illegal goods were found aboard, the ship would be diverted to another port. Desert Storm During the course of the largely aerial and ground action of Desert Storm, multinational naval forces continued enforcing the UN-mandated embargo. In addition, of course, these forces played both defensive and offensive roles against Iraq. Naval air complemented land-based air in performing command, control, and communication functions; achieving air superiority; flying interdiction missions against land- and sea-based targets; and providing close air support for ground troops. In addition, naval air provided the multinational naval force with crucial protection against the possibility of surface, aircraft, and missile attack. The largest portion of these actions was accomplished by the US Navy. However, British successes was also significant. Three Royal Navy Lynx helicopters used Sea Skua air-to-surface missiles to sink thirteen Iraqi naval vessels.45 And the Kuwaiti craft mentioned earlier played a

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39

significant role in clearing Iraqi anti-air defenders from off-shore oil platforms and in recapturing Kuwaiti territory. The Iraqi use of mines in the northern Gulf was a serious threat to any vessel in the region. Naval analyst Norman Friedman reports that "the planned Iraqi mining density along the Kuwaiti coast was 60 mines per nautical mile for depths between 10 and 40 feet, 800 to 1,600 mines per nautical mile between the 10-foot line and the beach, and 3,200 to 6,400 mines (of much simpler type) per nautical mile on the beach itself. Further mines were laid offshore."46 One Iraqi vessel, the salvage tug Aka, reportedly laid several mine fields during the war, successfully hiding up the Shatt-al-Arab between forays. The ship was regularly detected by satellite sensors, but planners in Riyadh were unable to target the vessel effectively. Given the complexity of the targeting system, by the time an aircraft was actually sent against the minelayer, the ship was well out of the area. Mine countermeasure responsibilities were largely shared by the United States and Great Britain, with the Royal Navy shouldering much of the task of surface mine countermeasures. Australian and Saudi mine disposal divers also played an important role once the mines were located. Generally, US minesweeping helicopters would move through an area sweeping for magnetic or acoustic mines. For safety's sake, they were often preceded by British Sea King helicopters whose task was to protect the minesweepers from Iraqi attack. Following the minesweeping helicopters, the more effective minesweeper ships would do a thorough search before declaring a clear channel. These ships were quite naturally vulnerable to Iraqi air and missile attack; thus the air cover provided by the multinational force from further south in the Gulf was vital. And as the swept area gradually extended further north, these covering ships were likewise able to extend their range north.47 While the damage resulting from Iraqi mining was neither widespread nor extensive, the mining did have its negative effects. Certainly ships of the multinational force were kept further south than they would have wished, and the time and cost expended on minesweeping was significant. In addition, two US vessels were damaged by mine explosions. Both vessels were involved in the sweeping operations: one as a platform for helicopter sweeping, and the other as a missile cover against the possibility of Iraqi air attack on sweeping vessels.48 In addition to its maritime interception and mine countermeasure accomplishments, the multinational naval force kept Iraqi forces in Kuwait uncertain of what to expect. This uncertainty was centered on the very real threat of a seaborne amphibious invasion of the Kuwaiti coast; the Iraqis expended a great deal of defensive energy preparing for

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this threat, which, as it turned out, would have been more profitably directed to the west. Thus even though the amphibious assault was never mounted, its value lay in the very possibility it posed to Iraqi planners. Postwar Embargo Because Iraq had not fully complied with the United Nations resolutions and was still under embargo, the multinational force continued its work well past the end of open hostilities.49 These activities included mine countermeasure operations and Maritime Interception Force operations.50 Mine countermeasures. By the end of open hostilities, the Iraqis had laid over 1,200 mines in ten separate offshore areas. By mid-March of 1991, 270 of these mines had been located and destroyed. Though the threat continually subsided, drifting mines were still a concern; five were destroyed in July and one in August. One of the most effective hunter systems employed was the Demon Camera Minehunting Video System. Drawn underwater by helicopter, the device monitors light differences as it views upward. The resulting color imaging is then processed through a computer to reveal probable mine locations. Also useful was the Floating Mine Disposal System Mark 1. This remote-controlled vehicle was adapted from the Scarab, a vehicle developed for use during the earlier Iran-Iraq conflict. In addition, ships operating in the region employed the Plessey Mine Avoidance Sonar, which detects mines by focusing a sonar beam into the surface layer ahead of the vessel. This system can function effectively at speeds as high as 30 knots. And the Quils 21 sidescan system, a hand-held sonar used by British fleet diving units, also proved useful in the task of clearing mines and underwater obstructions. 51 Even as mine hunting and clearing operations continue under Western European Union coordination, a mix of legal, diplomatic, and procedural concerns affect those operations. Should mines be hunted in Iraqi territorial waters? If not, the danger clearly exists that floating mines will move southward into previously cleared areas, presenting a danger to merchant and multinational force vessels. In what manner and with what precautions should searches be carried out in waters involved in territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq? What is the most effective and fair distribution of mine countermeasure activity for each participating national force? What is the degree of confidence merchant vessels can have that previously swept waters continue to be safe? These specific questions represent the type that will challenge any such force in the future. At present, the multinational force escorts merchant vessels through the swept channels to Kuwaiti ports. In addi-

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tion, it operates a Maritime Advisory Service that provides crucial information to merchant vessels operating in the northern and central Gulf. All information issued through this service requires careful legal review, including questions of "requiring" versus "advising" merchant vessels to use one channel over another, as well as details on the salvage of sunken Iraqi naval vessels, derelict craft, and drifting hazards to navigation. Maritime Interception Force. As during the first two stages of the operation, Maritime Interception Force activities were continued in the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea after the open hostilities ceased. Because of war damage, the cessation of dredging operations, and the presence of numerous mines, Iraqi ports have been closed to shipping. At the time of publication, no one in the multinational force knows when Basra and other Shatt al-Arab ports will be usable. However, because several other Iraqi ports to the southwest and on the Khwar abd-Allah may be reopened soon, the Maritime Interception Force has continued to enforce the embargo against Iraq. Thus all maritime traffic through the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf has been monitored, and any traffic suspected of heading for an Iraqi port has been intercepted. In addition, members of two US Coast Guard LEDETs in the Gulf have continued to train personnel in law enforcement techniques throughout the multinational force and most of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Interception operations have also continued in the Red Sea. Because the Jordanian port of Aqaba has historically served as one point of shipment into Iraq, all vessels bound for or departing the Gulf of Aqaba have been intercepted, boarded, and inspected. The work has been carried on by five or six multinational force warships supporting three LEDET teams, with various support vessels filling out the fleet. When a merchant vessel is stopped, the LEDET inspectors require that all cargo be accessible for inspection and that all paperwork, such as bills of lading and manifests, be in order with all consignees identified. If these requirements are not met, the ship is diverted to a port other than Aqaba. As ofSeptember 1991, the Maritime Interception Force had intercepted over 11,000 vessels and diverted 110. Most of these diversions occurred either because some part of the cargo was not accessible for inspection, or irregularities in manifests prevented adequate identification of the source or end user. Those who have taken part in the inspections report that "it is hot, dirty, dangerous and hard work." It may take eight hours to inspect a moderate-sized container ship, and some work days run past midnight. But these same inspectors testify that "the operation was effective in enforcing the United Nations embargo."52

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There is another side, however, to the account of ship inspections: the side of the merchants themselves. Because these inspections required costly preparations, time, and sometimes diversions of the merchant vessels, substantial pressures resulted against the interception procedures. The merchants try to maximize profit by loading their ships as efficiently as possible, with cargo stacked tightly and deeply. Often such loading meant that some portions of the cargo could not be inspected. And some types of vessels experienced such problems more regularly than others. For example, LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) vessels carry a large number of fully loaded lighters, or barges, stacked one atop the other, side by side, throughout the length and width of the ship. One shipping corporation exerted influence that resulted in a change of the procedures for inspecting its LASH vessels. Another consortium of shippers took out advertisements in port city newspapers telling of surcharges due to the lost time and money resulting from failed inspections or inefficient loading. As a result, once again pressure was put on the multinational force to relax their inspection regimen or at least treat one ship differently from another. And in fact the US Embassy in Jordan strongly supported weakening embargo enforcement efforts. In the face of these pressures, the Maritime Interception Force has done its utmost to demonstrate fair, impartial, and consistent enforcement. It would be most unfortunate if merchant organizations knew or suspected that certain inspection vessels would use less demanding procedures than others. To ensure the necessary consistency, the multinational force has sought uniformity of procedures and diversion criteria through formal maritime commanders' conferences (convened by calling together the commanding officers of each nation's ships), frequent exchanges of senior officers between national interception vessels, and standardized LEDET training. As the leaders of the multinational force work to convert these individual member-nation ships into a cohesive and dependable team, training and exercising together has grown to be an important contributing factor. LEDET training has been particularly well-received by Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the time will come when naval units of these nations will play a significant role in Maritime Interception Force operations in the region.

5 A U N MARITIME AGENCY

In reviewing the models examined above, it would seem that the most efficient and productive move would be in the direction of a powerful United Nations agency responsible for overseeing all United Nations maritime concerns. This agency would be responsible for developing a framework and a series of agreements around which United Nations maritime forces could be constituted and that would be based on a variety of needs—from grave and explosive international conflicts to longerrunning environmental concerns. Under this agency—which I have provisionally named the United Nations Maritime Agency (UNMA)—nations will agree ahead of time to supply the necessary personnel and equipment for various categories of United Nations requirements. But such forces would only be constituted and employed if and when UNMA is directed by specific Security Council resolutions. One could argue quite convincingly that UNMA should not—indeed, could not—be involved in both peacekeeping and collective security enforcement. Why not? Because a multinational collective security force (such as that ranged against Iraq) chooses sides in a conflict, while peacekeeping forces by definition do not. The decision as to how the United Nations institutionalizes and directs its maritime capabilities in the future must take this important issue into account. But however it is directed, an effective UNMA would necessarily require professional maritime leadership. The top leadership position could be filled on a rotating basis by a senior naval or Coast Guard officer nominated by his country's leaders, selected by the Secretary-General, and approved by the Security Council. Better yet, the position could be removed from any national service and instead filled by someone whose first and only responsibility is to the United Nations. Thus this leader would be deeply experienced in maritime matters and would permanently (or for the duration of a specific mission) leave the service of his

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or her country for United Nations service. For the sake of continuity and coherence, the leader's staff could likewise be composed of permanent UNMA personnel, drawn from and trained in some of the member states' great naval, coast guard, merchant marine, and oceanographic traditions. Rather than owning its own large fleet, UNMA would rely on standing agreements to draw from member nations its ships and trained crews, which would report to UNMA task force or fleet command whenever necessary. The commander of an active UNMA task force would be drawn from either the experienced UNMA staff or one of the donor nations. But in any case all participants must be relied upon to follow United Nations rules of engagement and standard operating procedures. In addition, the UNMA staff must take precautions, well ahead of any specific operation, that equipment and technique be compatible among donor craft and crews. Upon the cessation of an emergency, the expiration of a mandate, or the completion of a task, each ship would return to the control of its national command authority. Perhaps the only ships actually owned by the United Nations and operated by permanent UNMA crews would be a high-technology flagship and various observation and communication craft. Ideally, most of these craft would be either extremely mobile or durable, and a few larger craft would be more specifically suited for oceanographic observation. Such an operation would be expensive, but not as expensive as a standing force. Finances would be drawn from regular member contributions to the United Nations, and during peacekeeping or enforcement periods of increased expenditure, cost would have to be shared equitably among those who do and do not contribute forces. Of course the creation of a United Nations maritime command structure must accompany the institution of a parallel land command structure, and both must come under the control of an overall Peacekeeping Operations office. Indar Jit Rikhye, founder and first president of the International Peace Academy, has argued for a stronger, more stable and institutionalized military command structure operating under the Secretary-General and specifically the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Special Political Affairs (now for Peacekeeping Operations). Reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General, the Military Advisor could build and head a Military Advisory Staff, which in turn could provide consistent and effective decisions and programs. The Military Advisory Staff could also be the root stock upon which to graft parallel operational and command offices for land and maritime peacekeeping staffs—staffs composed of professionally trained, experienced, and committed United Nations personnel.58 Must maritime peacekeeping forces be composed exclusively, or even largely, of naval personnel? Images of large-scale naval activity, of gunboats engaged or threatening engagement during periods of intense

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naval violence would suggest that only experienced naval personnel could be productively used for such purposes. But these images may be misleading. A great many of the functions envisioned for maritime peacekeeping forces would consist largely of observation, monitoring, and establishing a presence in order to discourage war activities or the breaking of agreements. Some of these functions will be highly technological, including the use of electronic monitoring apparatus and communication equipment. While naval personnel with training in these areas are admittedly qualified to fulfill these missions, there exists a ready pool of civilian personnel with comparable training in the scientific and engineering communities, including those with previous maritime experience and even prior naval training. In the event that political sensitivities lead away from any possibility of heightening military tensions through the use of overtly naval forces, civilian personnel should serve admirably.54 In addition, the traditions of the Coast Guard as protector and enforcer, rather than warmaker, would lend its personnel a high degree of credibility in most UNMA operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FUTURE

UNMA

FOR

EFFECTIVENESS

Education and Training UNMA operational and staff personnel will require two kinds of preparation. One is professional education concerning peacekeeping and enforcement procedures, maritime and naval theory and practice, and political and institutional knowledge. These courses will transfer not only facts and techniques, but attitudes as well. Such training will be best accomplished by an appropriate agency of the United Nations Secretariat, or possibly through the International Peace Academy. The classes would optimally be composed of a mixture of national and United Nations personnel. The curriculum and culture of the overall course of UNMA education could be evolved out of pre-existing UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and IPA programs, but they could also profit by being modeled to some extent on the successful system in use at the Naval Command College, an international school for advanced naval officers which is located at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. The second kind of preparation will involve operational training. Here UNMA personnel and equipment, along with multinational forces committed for various contingencies, will exercise at sea together, much as the NATO standing and on-call forces do.

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Makeup of Crews and Task Forces Other than those aboard U N M A craft, crews should be national. However, these national crews should serve in international task forces, which in turn have exercised together as regularly as possible. A n d the national vessels and crews must subordinate themselves to U N command, much in the same way national contingents are placed under United Nations command during land peacekeeping operations. Another possible arrangement is exemplified in the non-UN Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, a US-initiated movement where the United States relinquished control to a non-US force commander and multinational staff; this was a realistic accommodation meant to convince Egypt that the operation was truly international. 55

Flexible Agreement Rather than rely on a standing force, U N M A should be able to draw upon forces from a variety of nations when the situation commands. This capability implies permanent responsibility for implementing and administering pre-arrangements when directed by the Security Council, or by the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. It also implies that a temporary contingent be dissolved and reabsorbed into its respective national forces when its mission is complete. Financial Support In order to avoid a discouraging drain on volunteer nations, it will be necessary to find an efficient United Nations funding mechanism. Susan Mills, long active in peacekeeping financial planning, argues that while United Nations peacekeeping operations are growing in number and importance, "member states have yet to agree . . . on how to meet the costs of these activities without provoking repeated financial crises. Until and unless agreement is reached and all parties unreservedly abide by such an agreement, United Nations peacekeeping will continue to be placed in jeopardy." 5 6

Rules of Engagement (ROE) Responsibility Typically an armed force employs rules of engagement in anticipation of and during forceful action. The purpose of these ROEs is threefold: during peacetime activity, as a guideline to help keep the peace; during a transition to war, as a guard against misstep or accidental escalation and as a safety measure for the force's personnel and vessels; and during

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wartime, to control combat operations. In all three stages, a force's ROEs serve a political purpose, ensuring that the force follows national policy; a military purpose, ensuring its own safety, minimizing escalation, and striving for effectiveness; and a legal purpose, ensuring that international law is followed. Such ROEs will be necessary in both peacekeeping and enforcement (or collective security) operations, but planners should realize the rules will differ markedly in the two cases. If intelligently developed, ROEs ensure command authority over individual ships; provide a reliable and universally understood system of authorizing and restricting the use of military force; provide standing guidance for all conceivable situations; ensure the defense of national security interests; avoid precipitating a larger conflict; ensure the survival of deployed forces from preemptive attack; and preserve a spectrum of responses to the national command authority. Specific rules change depending upon the level of combat involvement. For example, during peacetime a ship may not be allowed to fire on an approaching plane under any circumstances. But during war the ship may be required to fire on any plane that fits a certain profile. Between the extremes of peace and war there may be a series of ROE levels that gradually tighten security and make more effective (and lethal) a commander's options. All ships are advised immediately when the national command authority raises or lowers that level. During the multinational operation in the Gulf, one document notes, US rules of engagement "became effective for, or were consistent with, all Coalition combatant forces. This compatibility was assured by coordination meetings between US and allied commanders. Additionally, US liaison teams linked US commanders with other forces to assure that US and many different Coalition forces acted in harmony and operated effectively together." 57 The more general ROEs or guidance for the conduct of the Maritime Interception Force operations (for example, which ships were to be approached, when, and in what manner) were derived from the principles embodied in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the work of the UN Sanctions Committee. In addition, US Coast Guard procedures, practiced and taught by their LEDETs, were generally adopted. And finally, regular meetings between the national naval commanders and liaison teams led to a level of consistency and reliability that helped ensure that the ROEs inj>ractice were as similar as possible between the various national forces.

Equipment and Support Preplanned UNMA arrangements will dictate what types of craft (naval, air, and electronic) it requests. Smaller is better for some projected

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needs, while other missions will require craft more durable in high seas. For example, minesweepers can ensure freedom of navigation and fast patrol craft can guard against small guerrilla attacks (like those of the Tamil Tigers) or observe compliance with laws and agreements. However, planners must also pay careful attention to such needs as firepower, defensibility, detection, and sustainability. UNMA will also require that shore facilities and logistic support are prearranged. In addition, UNMA staff must assure technological and procedural compatibility of components from different nations. Command, Control, and Communication As with most other elements of the multinational effort against Iraq, the command, control, and communication (C3) system used to support the coalition was derived from the systems of incoming services and developed coherence as the cooperative effort progressed. Reports from the field suggest that integrating C s into a centralized arrangement was not easy. Equipment differences among national services, and indeed among US services, intensified the expected differences of procedure and language. However, in the end an innovative and cooperative system successfully supported massive and complex deployment, sustainment, and operational needs.59 While equipment and technology was fundamental to the success of the C s effort, even more important was an understanding of the system architecture developed to direct the forces at sea and in the field. Central to this effort was the establishment of the Coalition Coordination Communications and Integration Center (C 3 IC) and its associated combined planning teams. For political, military, and cultural reasons, separate but parallel lines of command authority existed throughout the effort. Islamic forces were organized into a Joint Forces Theater of Operations command structure under Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz. Non-Islamic members of the coalition were led by the commander in chief of the US Central Command, General Norman H. Schwarzkopf. But because no commander exercised total authority, the CSIC became the means of coordinating information and planning. Multinational command, control, and communication was made as effective as possible through the use of Secure Telephone Units (STUs), personal computers, fax machines, shared national and commercial satellite resources, and the exchange of liaison teams to overcome language and technological problems. Because of technological differences in the communication equipment used by various national forces, some technical upgrades and innovations were required. In addition, some items normally restricted for use by only one national service were

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shared for the sake of coalition effectiveness. Military and commercial satellite communications systems played key roles in assuring rapid and accurate transfer of information, although overloaded UHF satellite communication channels proved troublesome. Specifically, two commercial satellites (INTELSAT and INMARSAT) complemented the US Military Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM) systems. Much of the information derived from these systems was moved through the US Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS), described as "the principal multichannel transmission system for intraand inter-theater communications during the early deployment."60 Early on, 75 percent of all intertheater information connections were supplied by DSCS, as were a large portion of the local requirements. In addition, crucial weather data was derived largely from military and civilian weather satellites. The satellite-generated Global Positioning System, called NAVSTAR, was important on land and sea. It was especially useful in giving ships a navigational accuracy of plus or minus 100 meters, which is particularly important in navigating and bypassing charted minefields.61 Because of the complexity of land- and sea-based aircraft operations throughout the region, a centralized and computerized Air Tasking Order (ATO) was developed that listed all sorties planned each day, including such important information as in-flight refueling call signs, frequencies, times, locations, altitudes, targets, and munitions. The ATO was produced through the aid of the Air Force Computer Aided Force Management System, which unfortunately was not fully interoperable with navy equipment. As a result, each night the ATO was physically carried on floppy disks to the command aircraft carriers in the Gulf and in the Red Sea, and then distributed by helicopter to other ships.62 This communication problem, although important in its own right, also represents many other similar problems between national forces, services, and even batde groups within a service. For example, NATO procedures and cryptographic systems, including the BRAHMS secure speech system for commercial satellite links, were successfully used among NATO and Australian vessels. But communicating with Soviet, Pakistani, Argentine, and Arab vessels could be accomplished only by International Mobile Maritime VHF voice links and visual signaling.63 Political Concerns Planners must be sensitive to the fact that technologically advanced nations will want to keep certain capabilities out of the possession of other nations. Advanced communications systems, computer equipment, and tactical procedures may be seen as so secret that one nation will be unwilling to share them even under UNMA operational control.

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Further, some nations may fear losing control of national deployments to outside forces, thus weakening air readiness and flexibility. This political problem must be solved before UNMA procedures will be workable.

CONCLUSION

The world faces a period of great change in the coming decades. These changes may well be disruptive and violent in some respects. But they will also present the nations of the world with the chance to break out of old patterns of behavior and to discover new ways of working together for the common good. Our decisions must work to ensure peace and prosperity on the world's oceans for the benefit of all humankind.

APPENDIX: NAVAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

a. Naval involvement in peacekeeping operations may take the form of sealift, surface forces, marine amphibious forces, or individuals. b. The open sea beyond a coastline provides a near equivalent of a prohibited border zone on land, and comparatively simple controls within territorial waters can simplify the problem of identification. The degree of physical protection necessary depends on the ease with which operatives can make landings. A rugged coastline with inaccessible cliffs and treacherous offshore currents obviously needs less observation than an easily-approached one with wide beaches offering good exits to the interior. Observation and surveillance of an indented coastline is difficult, and peacekeeping forces must make use of surveillance devices and reconnaissance. c. The naval component will establish liaison with other commanders for collecting and sharing reconnaissance information. Reconnaissance information must be disseminated immediately to all affected commands. d. Surveillance. Naval surveillance is the systematic close and continuous observation of selected air, surface and/or subsurface areas, specifically to detect and identify aircraft, vessels or forces. The purpose of surveillance is to provide early warning of potentially hostile activities. (1) One of the most difficult problems of surveillance is distinguishing contacts of agreement violators from the total number of contacts present. Sufficient assets may not be available to conduct all desired surveillance operations. The naval component commander must prioritize surveillance requirements and make shortfalls known to the overall peacekeeping force commander.

From Charles M. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1989), pp. 43-45.

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Surveillance requirements can be simplified by controlling movement of friendly traffic, operating an identification system, or exploiting resources outside the naval component. In some cases, merchant and fishing vessels may be organized into an effective supplemental reporting system. (2) Surveillance operations planners must consider the nature of the mission, the capabilities of available surveillance assets, the geography of the area being watched, and the environment in the target areas. It may not be possible to survey the entire area where the parties to the dispute maybe operating. The total area must then be divided into smaller surveillance areas and these smaller areas prioritized for surveillance operations. e. Interdiction. (1) Interdiction is an action taken to intercept, divert, disrupt, or delay one of the parties in the dispute from violating the agreement. Immediately upon discovery of an unidentified target, cognizant authority will direct action to identify and, if so indicated, interdict that target. In all cases, appropriate rules of engagement apply. (2) The naval component commander is responsible to interdict hostile or potentially hostile surface targets in the assigned area of responsibility. Surface interdiction within a naval coastal area may be accomplished by surface or air assets assigned to the naval component. f. Coastal Sea Control. Coastal sea control is the employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore area. Coastal sea control is accomplished by conducting surveillance and interdiction operations. g. Protection of Offshore Assets. Offshore assets are primarily petroleum production platforms and deepwater offshore port facilities. These assets are vital not only because of their gas and petroleum production but also for their potential use as remote heliports, surveillance platforms, and logistics support bases. h. Harbor Defense/Port Security. Harbor defense/port security is the protection of harbor approaches, harbors, anchorages, ports, vessels, waterfront facilities and cargoes. Harbor defense measures include surveillance, interdiction, port security and vessel movement control. Port security is protection from accidents, negligence, civil disturbance, sabotage, and disasters. Port security includes port safety. Both are closely related, mutually supportive, and often conducted concurrently. i. Countermines. Mines are a concern for all naval peacekeeping efforts. Mine countermeasures is a specialized area designed to ensure

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access to or transit of oceans and waterways. Mine countermeasures includes all means used to prevent or reduce the danger to surface ships and submarines from mines. (1) Mine hunting locates individual mines so that actions may be taken to avoid, remove, or destroy them. (2) Minesweeping is covering a region of water by traversing it with either mechanical sweep gear to sever the moorings of moored mines or by producing influence fields which satisfy the firing mechanisms of influence mines. j. Search and Rescue. The purpose of search and rescue is to recover distressed personnel in a threatened environment. It is conducted to preserve, and return to duty, manpower resources of the United States and other parties.

NOTES

1. IndarJit Rikhye, The Future ofPeacekeeping, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper No. 2 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1989), p. 25. 2. See, for example, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (Cambridge, MA: 1958) Annex II, p. 300ff. Cited in Olav Stokke, "United Nations Security Forces: A Discussion of the Problems Involved," in Peacekeeping: Experience and Evaluation, ed. Bjorn Egge et al. (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), p. 54, which details a projected landbased peace force under a reorganized UN; and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, International Military Forces: The Question ofPeacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), which proposes in extreme detail a UN standby police force that is exclusively land based. 3. Much thanks to the distinguished naval historian Eric J . Grove for bringing these deliberations to my attention. F. T. Liu provided the table "MSC Estimates" from UN Security Council Office Records, 2nd year, Supplement No. 13. 4. For a complete (and firsthand) account of this early United Nations maritime peacekeeping mission, see Frank Uhlig, Jr., "The First United Nations Force," US Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1951, p. 201. Mr. Uhlig, presendy editor of the Naval War College Review, was a member of the crew of the USS Patau, an escort aircraft carrier flying the United Nations flag in 1948. Uhlig reports that the United States made two stipulations in lending its ships to the United Nations: "One was that the ships were to be used only to transport persons or materials in connection with the truce, and for observation and reporting duty. The second was that they were not to use force to board or stop any other vessel. All four warships flew the United Nations' emblem on the same halyard as the national ensign and immediately below i t " 5.1 am indebted to F. T. Liu, a longtime member of the UN Secretariat and a tireless peacekeeper, for this observation. 6. International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 15 (Section 4, paragraph 27), states: "It was the intention that the Military Staff Committee should be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. However, due to a lack of unanimity among its members from the beginning the influence and effective capacity of the Committee has diminished to a point where it is no longer consulted by the Council when peacekeeping operations are being planned.

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Although it meets regularly at bi-weekly intervals it is never called upon to function as it was required to do under the Charter. (Article 47) Whether it ever will again will depend upon adjustments being made in United Nations current structure, machinery and policy for mounting peacekeeping operations." 7. The Soviets also provided airlift for UNEFII: see Henry Wiseman, "The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis," in The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (New York: UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 305. 8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605. 9. Adapted from Section 12, "The role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution of military operations by United States forces and the other Coalition forces and the effects on operations of Iraqi compliance or noncompliance with the law of armed conflict," in Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 1991), pp. 12-6 through 12-7. 10. Derek Boothby, "The United Nations and Naval Arms Control and Disarmament," in Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security: A Conference Report, ed. Dan W. Middlemass et al. (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1991), p. 47. 11. These four essential elements of a successful multinational peacekeeping force are adapted from Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, 1984), pp. 83-88. 12. From J o h n Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations At The Arab-Israel Interface (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989), pp. 223-225. 13. Houghton and Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping, pp. 85-86. 14. Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, p. 215. 15. "WEU States Want To Help SFRY Victims," and "UK, Italy, France To Send Ships to Adriatic," FBIS-WEU-91-223,19 November 1991, p. 1; "King Warns Against Firing on SFRY Aid Ships," FBIS-WEU-91-224,20 November 1991, p. 12. Thanks to Milan Vego, who brought these and other articles on the Adriatic situation to my attention. 16. "Observers Blame Serb-Led Army for Escalating War in Croatia," New York Times, 3 December 1991, p. A8. 17. For an extensive, if somewhat dated, coverage of this region, see The Indian Ocean as a Zone ofPeace, International Peace Academy Report No. 24 (New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985). 18. "Indian Navy Blockades 'Tigers,'" Navint: The International Naval Netosletter, 3:16 (16 August 1991), p. 7. 19. Rikhye, The Future, p. 19. 20. For more on potential problems in the Caribbean, see Lloyd Searwar, Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean Basin: Perspectives to the Year 2000, International Peace Academy Report No. 27 (Ottawa, Ontario: The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987). 21. W. S. G. Bateman, "The South Pacific" (paper presented to the Conference on Maritime Interests, Conflict, and the Law of the Sea, at Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, 20-23June 1991), p. 6. 22. Bateman, "The South Pacific," p. 7.

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23. Claire Slatter, "The Domestic Political Dimension: The South-West Pacific," in Security in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific: Challenges of the 1990s, International Peace Academy Report No. 29 (New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), pp. 147-148, calls for increased regional peacekeeping capabilities based on civilian teams, and warns that barring such activity, "the Pacific region may not be particularly 'pacific' in the future." 24. Bateman, "The South Pacific," p. 19. 25. Claiborne Pell, Challenge of the Seven Seas (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1966), pp. 238-241. 26. Pell, p. 240. 27. As so termed and prescribed by Gwyn Prins in his important inquiry, "The United Nations and Peace-Keeping in the Post-Cold-War World: The Case of Naval Power," Bulletin ofPeace Proposals, 22:2 (June 1991), pp. 135-155. Prins considers the risks and opportunities arising from the Gulf crisis from a midcrisis point of view, and suggests new possibilities for effective confidence-building measures and naval disarmament agreements. 28. Joel J. Sokolsky, The Fraternity of the Blue Uniform: Admiral Richard G. Colbert, US Navy, and Allied Naval Cooperation (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), p. 2. Sokolsky's examination of Colbert's efforts to promote multinational naval cooperation is a rich mine of information for those who would follow in Colbert's footsteps. 29. Sokolsky, Fraternity, p. 4. 30. EricJ. Grove, Battlefor the Fjords (London: Ian Allan, 1991), pp. 11,23-24, 46; and Sokolsky, Fraternity, p. 35. 31. Sokolsky, Fraternity, p. 38. 32. Sokolsky, Fraternity, p. 36. 33. Sokolsky, Fraternity, p. 38. 34.1 am indebted to Commander Robert G. Olsen, Jr., US Coast Guard, for much of what is included here on the Coast Guard's role in MDZ implementation. 35. Adopted from John N. Leonard, "The Coast Guard, Readiness, and the NBT (Next Big Thing)," The Bulletin (August/September 1988), p. 19. 36. From Robert Sitton, "Maritime Defense Zones: Essential To A Successful Maritime Strategy and To A Strong National Defense," unpublished research paper, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1988, p. 7. 37. Charles M. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1989). The concept of peacekeeping in this manual moves further toward enforcement and mutual security operations than the traditional sense of the word would allow. 38. Much of what follows is adapted from Robert Olsen's excellent paper, "Proposed U.S. Coast Guard Role in United Nations' Sponsored International Peacekeeping Operations," Naval War College, Newport, RI, 22 June 1990. 39. For useful analyses of MFO organization and operations, see Alan James, "Symbol in Sinai: The Multinational Force and Observers," in Peacekeeping and Confidence-Building Measures in the Third World (Report No. 20), ed. Hugh Hanning (New York: International Peace Academy, 1985), pp. 17-31; and John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, pp. 160-198. 40. Mackinlay, p. 187. 41. "NATO Naval Force Remains on Alert," Naoint: The International Naval Newsletter, 2:24 (7 December 1990), p. 1.

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42. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), pp. 69-71. 43. For more information on the naval aspects of the conflict, see Norman Friedman, "The Seaward Flank," US Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1991, pp. 81-83; Peter Gilchrist, Sea Power: The Coalition and Iraqi Navies (London: Osprey, 1991); Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," Survival May/June 1991, pp. 246-259; J . M. Martin, "We Still Haven't Learned," US Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1991, pp. 64-68 (on sea mines); and Anthony Preston, "Naval Aspects of die Gulf Conflict," Military Technology, April 1991, pp. 44-45. 44. "Huge Number of Ships Intercepted But Doubts Over Sanctions," Navint: The International Naval Newsletter, 2:24 (7 December 1990), p. 1. 45. "Sea Skua Successes," Navint: The International Naval Newsletter, 3:4 (1 March 1991), p. 2. 46. Friedman, Desert Victory, p. 211. 47. Friedman, Desert Victory, p. 212. 48. "US Cruiser Almost Lost," Navint: The International Naval Newsletter, 3:5 (15 March 1991), p. 1. 49. See, for example, Paul Lewis, "Iraq Defying UN on Arms Industry and Oil Sale Terms," New York Times, 5 February 1992, p. A1 and A15. 50. I owe much to Commander Robert F. Duncan, US Coast Guard, who served both as attorney for the multinational Maritime Interception Force and as assistant officer-in-charge, US Coast Guard Forces Middle East, in 1991 following the cessation of open hostilities. His acute observations and clarifying descriptions helped immensely in understanding current multinational operations in the Gulf and Red Sea regions. 51. "Gulf: Mines a Major Problem But New Systems Work Well," Navint: The International Naval Newsletter, 3:6 (29 March 1991), p. 1. 52. Again, I must thank Commander Duncan (who spent a good deal of time in the Red Sea boarding merchant ships and overseeing the Maritime Interception Force operation) for these observations. 53. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst, 1984), pp. 218-220. 54. For further discussions of the capabilities of civilian peacekeeping personnel, see Alan James, "The Politics of Peacekeeping in the 1980s," in Peacekeeping and Technology: Concepts for the Future, ed. Hugh Hanning (New York: International Peace Academy, 1983), pp. 25-41. Of special interest is his discussion of the assignment of a civilian mission to the Sinai in 1975 (p. 28). 55. Mackinlay, pp. 174-175. 56. Susan R. Mills, The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis, Internationa] Peace Academy Occasional Paper No. 3 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1989). 57. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 1991), p. 16-1. 58. For more on ROEs in the Persian Gulf, see W. H. Parks, "Rules of Engagement: No More Vietnams," US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1991, pp. 27-28. 59.1 have adapted here some useful information on C I lessons learned from Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, pp. 15-1 through 15-5. 60. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, p. 15-2. 61. "Gulf: Mines a Major Problem," p. 1.

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62. "'Manual' Systems Used in Gulf War," Navint: The International Naval Newsletter, 3:13 (5 July 1991), p. 1. 63. "Gulf: Mines a Major Problem," p. 2.

A B O U T THIS OCCASIONAL PAPER

Though the United Nations will face numerous challenges on the world's oceans in the next decades, it has not yet developed the capability to operate effectively in the areas of maritime peacekeeping or enforcement. This study examines the various regional maritime challenges confronting the United Nations and describes several organizational and experiential models—ranging from Claiborne Pell's early suggestions for an International Sea Patrol, through various NATO standing forces and U.S. Coast Guard models, to recent experience gained through multinational maritime cooperation in the Gulf—from which planners might extract important lessons. The author concludes with specific recommendations for the establishment of a UN Maritime Agency, seeing that step as crucial in the effort to ensure peace and prosperity on the world's oceans for the benefit of humankind. ROBERT STEPHENS STALEY II is a research fellow with the International Peace Academy. From 1988 through 1992 he was a professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he published the monograph Land-Based, Air in a Maritime Strategy: The Need for a Joint Strategic Doctrine; for thirteen years he was on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy. Currently at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, he is continuing his research on international maritime peacekeeping and enforcement.

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T H E INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

The International Peace Academy is an independent, nonpartisan, international institution devoted to the promotion of peaceful and multilateral approaches to the resolution of international as well as internal conflicts. IPA plays a facilitating role in efforts to settle conflicts, providing a middle ground where the options for settling particular conflicts are explored and promoted in an informal setting. Other activities of the organization include public forums; training seminars on conflict resolution and peacekeeping; and research and workshops on collective security, regional and internal conflicts, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and nonmilitary aspects of security. In fulfilling its mission, IPA works closely with the United Nations, regional and other international organizations, governments, and parties to conflicts. The work of IPA is further enhanced by its ability to draw on a worldwide network of eminent persons comrpising government leaders, statesmen, business leaders, diplomats, military officers, and scholars. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is a general awakening to the enormous potential of peaceful and multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts. This has given renewed impetus to the role of IPA. IPA is governed by an international board of directors. Financial support for the work of the organization is provided primarily by philanthropic foundations, as well as individual donors.

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INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

Available from the International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017 (212-949-8480): The Future of Peacekeeping, Indar Jit Rikhye Paths to Peace in Afghanistan: The Geneva Accords and After, Selig S. Harrison The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis, Susan R. Mills United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations, F. T. Liu Negotiations Before Peacekeeping, Cameron R. Hume Available from Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 (303-444-6684): The United Nations in a Turbulent World, James N. Rousenau United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, F. T. Liu The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping Robert Stephens Staley II Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan, William Maley and Fazel Haq Saikal

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