Under the Sun: Life and Reality in the Book of Kohelet (Das Alte Testament im Dialog / An Outline of an Old Testament Dialogue) [New ed.] 9783034331227, 9783034331234, 9783034331241, 9783034331258, 3034331223

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Shamai Gelander

Under the Sun Life and Reality in the Book of Kohelet

DAS ALTE TESTAMENT IM DIALOG an

outline

of

an

old testament Vol. 12

Peter Lang

dialogue

This book presents the Book of Ecclesiastes as a single coherent work, whose ideas are consistent and collectively form a comprehensive worldview. Moreover, in contrast to the prevailing view in the research literature – it presents the Book of Ecclesiastes as a work with an essentially positive outlook: Kohelet’s fault-finding is aimed not at the world itself, or how it functions, but at the people who persist in missing out on the present, on what it has to offer, and of the ability to enjoy all that exists and is available. Contrasting with these are Koheleth’s positive perscriptions to make the most of the present. To my mind, his remonstrations are meant to «clear the way» for his positive recommendations – to clear the path, as it were, of the obstacles to accepting reality. These two aspects, the negative and the positive, come together in this investigation into Koheleth’s belief, which is founded on an acceptance of all that God has created.

Shamai Gelander (*1931) is a graduate of the Hebrew University and the University of Tel Aviv and holds a PhD in biblical studies. He served as a senior lecturer of biblical studies at the Haifa University and of jewish studies at the University of Tel Aviv. He was a visiting professor in Oxford and served as chairman of the department of biblical studies and as academic director (rector) of the college «Oranim».

Under the Sun Life and Reality in the Book of Kohelet

DA S A LT E T E S TA M E N T I M D I A L O G an outline of an old testament dialogue

Band / Vol. 12 Herausgegeben von / edited by Michael Fieger & Sigrid Hodel-Hoenes

PETER LANG

Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • New York • Oxford • Wien

Shamai Gelander

Under the Sun Life and Reality in the Book of Kohelet

PETER LANG

Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • New York • Oxford • Wien

Bibliographic information published by die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at ‹http://dnb.d-nb.de›. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data: A catalogue record for this book is available from The British Library, Great Britain Library of Congress Control Number: 2017958904

Translation by J. Orr-Stav. Umschlaggestaltung: Thomas Jaberg, Peter Lang AG Umschlagabbildung: © Lichtbildwerk, Olaf Gloeckler, Atelier Platen, Friedberg ISSN 1662-1689 ISBN 978-3-0343-3122-7 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-0343-3123-4 (ePDF) E-ISBN 978-3-0343-3124-1 (ePub) E-ISBN 978-3-0343-3125-8 (Mobi) This publication has been peer reviewed. © Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, Bern 2018 Wabernstrasse 40, CH-3007 Bern, Switzerland [email protected], www.peterlang.com All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems.

Table of contents

Introduction................................................................................................ 7 Chapter 1: Escaping from reality............................................................. 29 Escape to the future.............................................................................. 30 On the attempts at insuring against future mishaps..................... 33 On the acquisition of skills, traits, and excellence....................... 41 Against distinction and in praise of the average.................................. 47 The relative nature of values................................................................ 52 Absolute justice versus existing world order....................................... 59 Other aspects of coming to terms with realities and limitations.............................................................................. 64 Escaping to the past............................................................................. 66 Interim summary.................................................................................. 67 Chapter 2: The positive aspect................................................................. 71 Eat and drink: Between despair and faith............................................ 71 Cast Thy Bread..................................................................................... 79 Between determinism and free will..................................................... 81 Concluding observations...................................................................... 90 Chapter 3:Koheleth and his beliefs.......................................................... 97 On justice and injustice........................................................................ 98 Koheleth and his God......................................................................... 104 Interim summary ............................................................................... 111 Chapter 4: The opening verses and coda................................................ 115 Opening verses (Eccles. 1)................................................................. 115 Coda (12:1–8) ................................................................................... 121

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Conclusion............................................................................................. 133 Epilogue: The structure of the Book of Ecclesiastes........................ 137 Bibliography........................................................................................... 143 Abbreviations: Translations, magazines, series and files.................. 148

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Introduction

The main purpose of this study is to present the Book of Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) as a work whose diverse elements merge to form a coherent worldview regarding a person’s lifestyle, reality and beliefs. Fundamentally, we shall see that Koheleth’s approach is governed by a set of ideas that might be thought of as a general notion of what constitutes a “righteous life”—in the name of which he castigates anything that he perceives to be an obstacle—namely, whatever he perceives to be a hallmark of a “misguided life.” His criticisms and condemnation are primarily intended to serve the “right way,” and to pave the way toward it. Thus, these two aspects—the negative and the positive—join to form a comprehensive picture, rather than a mere compilation of aphorisms that reflect a bleak outlook on life, or a compendium of occasionally contradictory statements. Observing his critical arguments in conjunction with his positive recommendations also allows us to understand Koheleth’s faith and his attitude to his God as a unified ideology. Moreover, the addition of the negative and positive clarifies the ideological meanings of the first and final chapters of the Book of Ecclesiastes, as they are revealed to provide a poetic framework for the ideological messages in the book as a whole. Koheleth’s declaration that “a living dog is better than a dead lion” (9:4) is, I believe an extreme statement that might be viewed as the essence, or starting point, of his outlook. It means that any form of life, however humble, is preferable to any death—however honorable or noble. In other words, life is a supreme goal above all others and not a means to achieving other aims. This outlook runs counter to any faith that demands a person to be willing to dedicate—or indeed, sacrifice—themselves for its sake. It runs counter to the biblical belief—at least as exemplified in the stories of Abraham onwards—that one should not only abandon one’s past and go wherever God instructs one to go, but to follow the ways of the Lord throughout one’s life (Gen. 17:1), and even be willing to sacrifice one’s nearest and dearest to Him. Koheleth’s radical view on this topic has various ramifications, some consequential, and some leading up to and supporting it.

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The traditional criticism of Koheleth probably springs from reservations about his rejectionist attitude. However, modern-day criticism of him is based primarily on the apparent absence of method in his writings, ideologically as well as structurally. One dominant approach in the research literature sees the Book of Ecclesiastes as primarily a compilation of maxims, rather like the Book of Proverbs. Koheleth appears to inherit the traditional wisdom that preceded him, but then sets out to refute it based on his personal experience.1 This suggests that the Book of Ecclesiastes is not a systematic doctrine, and its various maxims do not add up to a consistent and coherent philosophy.2 It would also appear that it does not spring from a comprehensive worldview, but rather from a variety of critical approaches that he acquired over the years, in contrast to prevailing views. Moreover, since it is a compilation, it also includes various contradictory adages:3 it is customary to see the passages where Koheleth hails the positive aspects of life and the wonders of nature as problematic and exceptional, since the predominant mood in the Book of Ecclesiastes is pessimistic and gloomy,4 or he presents certain maxims in an ironic light.5 Some commentators go as far as to attribute these apparent contradictions and deviations to the authors of later addenda, most of whom appear to have sought to temper some of Koheleth’s more extreme views.6 1 2

3

4

5 6

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See the representation of this approach in A. Rofé, Mavo Lesifrut HaMikra [Introduction to Biblical Literature], Jerusalem 2007, pp 408–411. Thus, Rofé, for example, who presents verses 7:1–6 as a series of well-known proverbs, that Koheleth quotes. See the survey by R.B.Y. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes (Anchor Bible), Garden City, New York 1965 pp. 194–201. According to Rofé, based on verses 4:9–12, which are at odds with Koheleth’s views. See also Y. Klein, who lists a series of internal contradictions: “Mavo lesefer Kohelet,” [Introduction to the Book of Ecclesiastes] in Megilot, Olam Hatanakh [Scrolls: The World of the Hebrew Bible], Tel-Aviv 1996, pp. 162–166 (in Hebrew). See, in particular, R.N. Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 7:87 (1982) pp.  87–98; Idem, “Ecclesiastes 1/5–7 and the Wonders of Nature,” JSOT 13:105 (1988) pp. 105–112; G.S Ogden, “Qoheleth XI 7 – XII 8: Qoheleth’s Summons to Enjoyment and Reflection,” VT 34.1 (1984) PP. 27–38. Thus, for example, I. J. J. Spangenberg, “Irony in the Book of Qohelet,” JSOT 21:57 (1996) pp. 57–69. See Seow’s survey of approaches in: C.L. Seow, Ecclesiastes (Anchor Bible), New York 1997, pp. 36–47. Of particular note is the approach to Bickel’s extreme notion that the text as we know it today came about because its editors or compilers found it in the form of a collection of loose pages which they were unable to restore

Conversely, some scholars have sought to find in the Book of Ecclesiastes a measure of coherence.7 Some have proposed that it has a single unified structure, while others have suggested that to a literary or artistic structure in certain passengers or parts of the book. Wright’s commentary, I believe, is a clear example of the former category:8 while others believe that Ecclesiastes, like the Book of Proverbs, is nothing but a disparate collection of sayings,9 and others detect an underlying consonance and even evolutionary threads within the book,10 Wright focuses exclusively on its structure, irrespective of any ideological unity. In his comprehensive review of structural analyses by others, he finds that the overwhelming majority tend to sum up or label a sequence of ideas with a succinct heading, and as such risk adopting a subjective view. For this reason, he says, he prefers a structural analysis that focuses on the morphological features rather than the ideological content, to ensure “Objective methodology.”11 To that end, he presents the entire book as being based on a symmetrical and concentric structure. For example, he finds a key pattern in chapters 9 and 10, which he labels Man Does Not Know, and a similar pattern surrounding the phrases “who can” or “shall not find” in chapters 7 and eight. to their original order, and thus its current ordering is arbitrary. See: G. Bickel, Der Prädiger über das Wert des Daseins, Insbruck 1884. 7 Seow (ibid.) does not see the author’s contradictory views a sign of a lack of unity. In his opinion, “wisdom” may accommodate conflicting notions, and similarly Koheleth should not be regarded as either a pessimist or an optimist, because the world itself is full of contrasts. 8 See: E. D. Wright, “The Riddle of the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth,” CBQ 30 (1968) pp. 313–334. 9 Delitzsch is a clear example of this approach, whereby any attempt to discern a coherent order in the Book of Ecclesiastes must inevitably involving a coercion of the subject matter. See: F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes, (trans. M. G. Eaton) Edinburgh 1891. 10 See Wright’s reference to: Hitzig; Ginsberg; Bea; Genung; Zögler; Ginsburg; Vauvari; Buzy; Podechard; Lamparter; Pantrel; Weber; Miller, in Delitzsch, Commentary on the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes. 11 See, in particular, two studies in the New Stylists tradition: O. Loretz, Qohelet und der alte Orient, Freiburg 1964, which does not see any method in the book’s structure, and G. Castellino, “Qohelet and His Wisdom,” CBQ 30 (1968) pp. 15–28, who discerns two parts in the book, based mainly on the distinction between the passages written in first person, and those in imperative form. The first (1:1–4:16) is primarily a negative appraisal of life, and the second (4:17–12:12) adopts a more positive attitude.

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However, closer examination raises casts doubts on this interpretation: the pattern Man Does Not Know appears in chapters 9 and 10 only three times in contexts that match Wright’s description (9:10, 12; 10:15), but also appears in other contexts (e.g. 11:2, 5, 6). Similarly, the phrases who can and shall not find also appear in chapters 7 and 8 only three times (7:13, 14; 7:28–29). Although these expressions might be seen as an ideological essence of their wider context—in that they center on man’s limited ability to foresee the expected in a bid to control his future—these chapters contain not only rejectionist statements but also positive and prescriptive statements such as 7:1–5, 13. Hence, classifying patterns simply by ideological themes also suffers from the same problem that Wright found in his predecessors’ interpretations: while there is no disputing that eight passages in the book end with the words “Vanity and vexation of spirit,” it is doubtful that each one of these passages is also a discrete literary unit in its own right. Generally, defining any given unit by its opening or concluding verse is too simplistic: it might equally suit another unit, or involve a certain constraint. Thus, for example, Wright labels the first part of the book, after the opening, under the heading Koheleth’s Examination of Life: this is too generic, as it might equally apply to other parts of the book, since pronouncements about the meaning of life may be found throughout, as I shall demonstrate in the course of this inquiry. His heading for the second half of this first part (6:10–11:6)—Koheleth’s Conclusions on Various Issues—is also questionable, since throughout the book, many of the declarations that appear in the form of declarative statements are in fact conclusions that he has drawn from his own experience. The same is true, for example, for the labeling of one of the secondary sections under the heading I Should Leave it Unto the Man that Shall Be After Me (2:18–26). In my view, Koheleth’s negative attitude to the suggestion that a person must dedicate their life to the future is evident in the book in his rejectionist declarations as much as in his declarative statements and in his prescriptive advice (e.g., 11:1–6). Therefore, although Wright does much to contribute to our understanding of the links between the central ideas in Ecclesiastes, his attempts to find the key to Koheleth’s ideology by detecting a schematic structure do not work well. Wright’s approach to the issue of structure is even more extreme when he reverts to numerology. For example, he notes that the Hebrew word ‫הבל‬ hevel (“vanity”), has a value of 37 in gematria, and appears 37 times in the book, while the word ‫ דברי‬divrei (“words of ”) has a gematrial value of 10 

216—like the number of the verses in the book, etc. As Seow rightly points out, numerology is a poor basis for deciding structure, since the counting is inconsistent (Wright concatenates certain verses and combinations with different ideological meanings, resulting in an arbitrary count)—and besides, in ancient times the verses were not numbered.12 However, Seow also does not believe that Ecclesiastes is merely a random collection of sayings. Like Beckhaus, he proposes a fairly symmetrical structure of two halves of roughly equivalent size (the dividing point being 6:16): the first half, from 1:2–6:9—with two subsections that he labels Everything is Fleeting and Meaningless and Morality Means Dealing with Everything that is in Doubt)—and the second (headed Everything is Elusive) from 6:10–12:8. The former is made up of two subsections—one headed Everything is Fleeting and Meaningless, which in turn subdivides into Introduction (1:2–11); Nothing Lasts for Long (1:12–26); Everything is in God’s hands (3:1–22); and Relative “Good” is Not Really Good (4:1–16)— and the other Morality Means Dealing with Everything that is in Doubt, which consists of The author’s Attitude to God (5:1–7), and Pleasure, Not Greed (5:8–6:9). The second half—Everything is Elusive—is subdivided into No One Knows What is Good (6:10–7:14); The Elusiveness of Justice and Wisdom (7:15–29); The world as an Arbitrary Entity (8:7). The section Morality Means Dealing with Everything that is in Doubt contains the sections Carpe Diem (9:1–10); The World is Full of Risks (9:11–10:15); Living with Risks (10:16–11:16); and Summary (11:7–12:8). In my view, this division, too, is somewhat willful, since quite a few passages in the book could fall under the same headings, and the definitions themselves are a matter of debate. Thus, for example, the notion of making the most of the present and of the world around oneself, appears several times in various guises throughout the book. The schematic division into a pessimistic half and an optimistic one also does not hold up to scrutiny, as we shall see later. Sheppard adopts a more measured approach.13 In his view, the continuity in the Book of Ecclesiastes is compelling than in the Book of Proverbs, and its coda (especially 12:13–14) offers a religious ideology that is identical to that of Ben Sira. 12 Seow (ibid., pp. 43–47). 13 See: G.T. Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” CBQ 39 (1997) pp. 182–189. See also his review of researchers who attribute the Book of Ecclesiastes to two, three, or even eight different authors.

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Other scholars avoid trying to find a coherent structure in the book or, indeed, demonstrating a consistent ideological philosophy. Instead they are content to present certain passages as having a poetic structure—by which they mean not only those that are clearly of a poetic nature (such as 3:1–8),14 but also many passages of a seemingly more prosaic character, such as 4:13–16; 5:9–6:9, etc. While a morphological analysis undoubtedly helps to clarify the understanding of the passages in their own right, the distinction between the various literary forms reinforces the impression that the book is essentially a collection of texts that differ from each other in terms of their ideas, as well, and as such it is difficult to see the Book of Ecclesiastes as representing a unified and consistent worldview.15 However, even those who claim that the book has a uniform structure, and therefore that Koheleth’s ideology is fundamentally consistent, agree that a number of statements are “anomalous” inasmuch as they are at odds 14 See: J. Blenkinsop, “Ecclesiastes 3.1–15: Another Interpretation,” JSOT 66 (1995) pp. 55–64. D. Rudman, “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4: 13–16,” JBL 116/1 (1997) pp. 57–73. D.C. Fredericks “Chiasm and Parallel Structure in Qoheleth 5:9– 6:9,” JBL 108.1 (1989) pp. 17–35. G.S. Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 1–16,” VT 32.2 (1982) pp. 158–169. Idem: “Qoheleth IX 17 – X 20: Variations on the Theme of Wisdom’s Strenght and Vulnerability,” VT 30.1 (1980) pp.  27–37. Idem: Qoheleth XI 1–6,” VT 33.2 (1983) pp. 222–230. J.F.A. Sanger, “The Ruined HouseEcclesiastes 12: A Reconstruction of the Original Parable,” JBL 94/1 (1975) pp. 519–531. G.S. Ogden, “Qoheleth XI 7 – XII 8: Qoheleth’s Summons to Enjoyment and Reflection,” VT 34.1 (1984) pp. 27–38. A. Fisher, “Beobachtungen zur Komposition von Kohelet 1,3–3, 15” ZAW 103, 1 (1991) pp. 72–86. C.L. Seow, “Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem,” JBL 118/2 (1999) pp. 209–234. 15 Conversely, see: See however: T. Porti, “Leshe’elat hasidur veha’arikhah beQohelet: Hapitgam keḥuliyah meqashert,” [On the question of the ordering and editing of Ecclesiastes: The proverb as a link], Beit Mikra 52b, 2012, pp 52–71. However, that focuses on the question of the unity of the two literary units (9:13–3l; 10:8–15) while I present various sayings and proverbs that are stated as conclusions from the assertions that the author makes, or from his own experience, which together provide a uniformity of ideas. See also an attempt to introduce the principle of the sequence in the first verses as the first observational sequence: N. Cohen, “‘Venatati et libi’: Mivneh vemashma’ut beretzef hahitbonenut harishon besefer Qohelet (1:12–2:26),” [“And I gave my heart”: Structure and meaning in the first observational sequence in the Book of Ecclesiastes], Beit Mikra 58b, 2013, pp 47–82.In my view, not only are many statements in the book are underscored as conclusions drawn from his own experience (as I make clear in the course of this book), but that the key to the principle of the sequence is left in many cases to the discretion and understanding of the reader.

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with Koheleth’s precepts and tone of speech. The prevailing view is to see these verses as the author’s attempts to “moderate” or to offer a more balanced view that might otherwise tend to be somewhat extreme. Among the most prominent of these are: Two are better than one; because they have a good reward for their labor (4:9) Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God, and be more ready to hear, than to give the sacrifice of fools: for they consider not that they do evil. Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter any thing before God: for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth: therefore let thy words be few. For a dream cometh through the multitude of business; and a fool’s voice is known by multitude of words. When thou vowest a vow unto God, defer not to pay it; for he hath no pleasure in fools: pay that which thou hast vowed. Better is it that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay (5:1–5)

and: A good name is better than precious ointment; and the day of death than the day of one’ birth (7:1)

and: Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days (11:1)

When read at face value, one dictum (4:9) talks in praise of friendship, while another recommends strict religious observation and honoring commitments (4:17–5:4), another (7:1) praises personal virtues and integrity over material accomplishments, and yet a fourth—as we shall see later—recommends relinquishing one’s daily routine (bread) to the hands of the flow of time (water). To my mind, whilst the wisdom literature and the prophetic literature (such as Isaiah 1: 11[12], and Amos) do feature poetic prose and passages of true poetry side by side—a change of form does not necessarily entail a change in ideological message. In the Hebrew Bible there are many literary works that treat their subjects differently from what is customary in contemporary philosophical literature. Rather than subjecting a particular subject to exhaustive scrutiny then moving on to another topic, the literary unit in biblical literature often examines several topics in sequence, occasionally in different forms or styles, and entrusts the reader to elicit what they have in common. Different aspects are presented of the same topics or in different guises in other literary units within the same book— 13

or the reader may find a similar composition of the same topics in another literary unit—and through the common denominator of the topics in one unit, the full import of the ideological message may be appreciated. This method of presentation becomes apparent as one engages in a detailed examination of the topics in the Book of Ecclesiastes. Although it is difficult to define precisely what constitutes a “literary unit,” in most cases it is a chapter, in others a chapter may encompass more than one unit, and in still others a given topic may spill over from one chapter to the next. The link between the topics is often associative, and the boundaries of a literary unit may exist only subjectively in the reader’s own mind. Thus, the reader may find each unit to be a mosaic of topics, that collectively present a particular idea, and spring from the same approach. This, in effect, is the nature of a poetic structure. As in lyrical poetry, here, too, the ideological continuum is not formed by a logical construction or through narrative development, but rather by means of the common denominator of a set of images or declarations. No particular topic is fully explored in any given message or context—but rather, it appears continually in different ways within the ideological mosaic, in a different context on each occasion. For example, Koheleth’s negative attitude to notion of a “life’s work” or dedicating one’s life to building the future, is evident in his negative declaration such as 2:18–19— Yea, I hated all my labor which I had taken under the sun: because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me. And who knoweth whether he shall be a wise man or a fool? yet shall he have rule over all my labor wherein I have labored, and wherein I have shewed myself wise under the sun. This is also vanity.

and in a declarative statement such as 11:2–3: Give a portion to seven, and also to eight; for thou knowest not what evil shall be upon the earth. If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth: and if the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be.

Obviously, these two pronouncements are not identical, and they appear in different contexts: the former in relation to the issue of “memory,” (i.e., the futility of trying to elude oblivion and extinction), and the latter 14 

concerning one’s inability to shield oneself from unexpected hardships. However, the general message may lie in what they have in common— namely, that these are different aspects of “missing out on the present and on life”: by investing efforts in something that is beyond one’s control, one loses what life and the present have to offer. It follows that one may also be able to see, as Wright has observed, that in Koheleth’s words there is no distinction between the descriptions of his own personal experience and his theoretical logical arguments, because they are intertwined. On the contrary, as we shall see in the course of our inquiry, in the most important issues, such as justice and injustice, Koheleth repeatedly reiterates, in various ways, how his personal experience has figured in his conclusions. When viewed in this way, I believe that one might overcome one of the two main difficulties in presenting Koheleth’s worldview—namely, that if indeed the book is representative of a general outlook on a range of well-defined topics, why is it not presented methodically according to those topics, instead of as a collection of statements that appear to jump haphazardly from one issue to another. The second difficulty is greater and more serious—i.e., the trap implicit in the desire to present a range of subjects as a consistent theory. The risk is that certain verses or passages might be interpreted by forcing them to fit the commentator’s particular interpretation, even when they are not necessarily understood as such in a straightforward reading. These are the expressions, maxims and passages whose meaning is not unequivocal, and whose relationship to their context is problematic. If we find that certain maxims are indeed at odds with the consistent worldview that I am trying to present, then I shall have to admit that the general picture has certain gaps, and that the ensemble is not always consistent. However, if that turns out to be the case, we will at least know that we have benefited from a renewed examination of the Book of Ecclesiastes. I believe that the Book of Ecclesiastes should be viewed as a composition whose various parts and components combine to form a comprehensive worldview—in the sense of a theory of the essence of what the author believes is a “righteous life.” Admittedly, in most of the book Koheleth rails against misguided views, in statements cast in denunciatory terms—such as declaring certain lifestyles as a “sore travail,” a “sore evil,” or as “vanity” (a term whose meaning we shall explore at greater length later on). However, this rejection is not, in my view, merely a random collection. The phenomena that Koheleth is rejecting concern a 15

range of issues, or a mosaic, that collectively provide a certain portrayal of a “misguided life,” and this criticism is clearly governed by what the author believes to be the “correct” lifestyle.16 This is even more apparent in the passages where Koheleth has words of praise. Both the denunciation and the approbation spring, therefore, from a uniform and consistent starting point: Koheleth, who is confident in his knowledge of how to make the most of life, decries the various ways in which people allow the good life to slip out of their hands, by squandering the present and pursuing paths that diminishes their ability to appreciate all that is good in the world and its present constitution. His criticisms throughout the book are aimed at different forms of “escapism” or “missing out,” as I shall attempt to demonstrate further below. One should also note that, since Koheleth deplores the various ways in which people tend to “avoid” the present in pursuit of misguided lifestyles, his pronouncements such as “Therefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me” (2:17) are not aimed at life in general but at a particular action or series of actions that he speaks of in that context—namely, at one of the misguided lifestyles. The same is true of the statement later on in the same verse: “—for all is vanity and vexation of spirit.” In the course of our inquiry we will find that the word “all” here refers only to the issues detailed in that particular context. It seems to me that one of the reasons why Koheleth is thought to have a fundamentally pessimistic and negative outlook is because it is thought that these declarations are about life in general, rather than about specific issues that he addresses in that particular context.17 Like other “wisdom literature”works in the Hebrew Bible, Koheleth presents his ideas in a style founded on a figurative speech18—with a clear 16 See, on the other hand, S. Barton, “Kohelet,” JBQ 26,3 (1998) pp.  168–176, who believes that the optimistic parts of Ecclesiastes, like certain Psalms (e.g.  5, 85), reflect the transition from despair to hope, which is part of the dynamics in the mind of someone whose faith is stronger after venting his disappointments, such Pss. 5, 85. See also Gelander, The Religious Experience in the Book of Psalms (2013), especially pp 33–65. 17 See, for example, H. Shapiro, Qohelet: Hafilosof hamiqrai [Kohelet: The Biblical Philosopher], Or-Yehuda 2011 p.  33, 39, where he compares the attitude of Ecclesiastes that of Schopenhauer. See also p. 39. 18 In this book, I tend to use the term “figurative language” to denote the use of words not in their lexical sense, but in generally associative ways that may be explained by context, or by the parallelism.

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preference for metaphor over terminology—unlike other types of biblical literature (especially the literature of law and cultic terminology).19 Nonetheless, in the Book of Ecclesiastes, too, there are also a considerable number of expressions where the author uses a kind of terminology—as I shall detail below: some of these appear within a parallelism, some are accompanied by an explanation, and some appear on their own. What they all have in common in terms of their appearance is that in each case the author uses them to clarify his attitude toward a particular characteristic phenomenon in human behavior, efforts, or events. This suggests that they constitute a type of terminology, which contributes to outlining the overall worldview in the book. Accordingly, I shall attempt to examine the meaning of these expressions before moving on to detail the various topics that Koheleth deals with. The following is therefore a preliminary investigation, which I shall revisit in accordance with each of the relevant topics: 1. Vanity versus profit:20 I believe these two expressions should be viewed as opposing notions that frame Koheleth’s worldview.21 Viewing them in this way may bring us closer to an accurate understanding of their meaning. Generally, whatever Koheleth regards as negative or misguided, and therefore fleeting, with no sustained existence or firm grip on life, he dubs “vanity” or “vanity of vanities” (including the expression “the days of his vain life”—e.g., in 6:12). Conversely, what he regards as true, faithful and enduring or capable of withstanding the ravages of time, is referred to by words of the Hebrew root y-t-r in its various forms—e.g., yitron (“profit”), motar (“preeminence”), and yoter (“hath more”). Fundamentally, the starting point of Koheleth’s ideology is rejection. Although ultimately his aim is to project a positive attitude toward the world or toward the righteous life, he primarily censures whatever appears to him to be 19 See, for example, J. Milgrom, Studies in Levitical Terminology, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1970. 20 See detailed review of the commentaries by: D. Ingram. Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes, New York – London 2006 and especially there at 129–191. His conclusion is that the term yitron is ambiguous: he translates it as being related to “excess” or “surplus,” but in most cases he interprets it as “advantage.” See also the review of the interpretations of verse 8:1: Pinker, “The Advantage of a Country in Ecclesiastes 5: 8,” JBQ 35/4 (2009), pp. 211–222, where he recommends interpreting yitron to mean “advantage.” 21 So, too, thinks D. B. Miller (see note 24 below).

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distorted and mistaken. In other words, although his criticism is meant to deliver a positive message about the righteous life, he focuses his efforts on highlighting the obstacles and distortions that stand in the way, and therefore his criticism outweighs his positive prescriptions. Thus, in most of the passages where the expression vanity appears, the term profit also appears, but in a negative form22—e.g. “the profit of the earth is for all” (5:9).23 Similarly, the word vanity in its various guises24 appears twice as much, if not more, than the word profit.25 Most commentators, including the translators, have tended to address the word vanity without reference to its opposite—even when they discuss their juxtaposition.26 At this juncture, I will make do with the 22 The Hebrew word used here—yitron—appears only in Ecclesiastes. Kadri interprets it as “benefit” or “advantage.” See Z. Kardi, Milon Ha’ivrit Hamikrait [Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew], Ramat-Gan 2006, p. 483. But see also my discussion of the term below, and note 25 below. 23 Cf. Shin C. L. Seow, “Linguistic Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” JBL 115/4 (1996) pp.  643–666, who tends to interpret the expression in accordance with its Greek meaning of “advantage” or “surplus” (Òφελος). 24 1:2 (x 5), 14 (with parallelism: “and vexation of spirit”); 2:1, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21 (with parallelism: and a great evil), 23, 26; 3:19; 4:4, 7, 8 (with parallelism: “a sore travail”), 16; 5:9; 6:9, 12; 7:6; 8:10, 14 (x 2); 9:9 (in the expression: “all the days of thy vanity” x 2); 11:10; 12:8 (“vanity of vanities,” as in 1:2). 25 2:11, 13 (x 2); 3:9, 19 (motar); 5:8, 15; 6:8 (yoter), 12; 10:11. 26 See, in particular: V. Fox, “The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet,” JBL 105/3 (1986) pp. 409–427, with a discussion of the different interpretations. Fox himself prefers to interpret the word hebel as “absurd”—but in a subsequent commentary he believes Kohelet used it in various senses, including “vain, empty, useless” (as in Proverbs 21:6). For my part—as will become apparent from our examination—that the word does have a consistent sense throughout, and the notion that it means “useless” is a due to the subjective view that anything that does not endure is useless and worthless. See Klein, “Mavo lesefer Kohelet,” p 170. (Accordingly, Fox also interprets yitron as “benefit, priority,” while I interpret it as “enduring”). Conversely, see a review of various approaches in: D. B. Miller, “Qohelet’s use of h’bl” JBL 117/3 (1998) pp. 437– 454. Miller himself argues that despite differences in contexts, such as “fleeting,” “ephemeral,” “vapor” (which in its metaphorical sense encompasses “foulness,” “transience,” etc.), the expression must have a consistent meaning: he prefers the notion of “insubstantiability,” but he also thinks that Kohelet uses the expression in its metaphorical sense, which includes the experiences of human experience. For more on the metaphorical meaning of the expression, see: D. Fredericks & K. A. Farmser, “Who Knows what is Good?,” Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, Grand Rapids 1991, and once again, S. Bakon, “Kohelet,” JBQ 26,3 (1998) pp.  168–176—who interprets hevel as “vanity” and yitron as “advantage.”

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explanations I offered above, and attempt to bolster and focus my claims in the course of my more detailed examination of Koheleth’s objects of criticism. 2. Happen (Hebrew root: q-r-h). Although the conventional understanding of this word is “occur”—in the sense of an unexpected or unplanned event—its context in many places in the Hebrew Bible suggest that it has an opposite meaning of an intentional circumstance that comes about at God’s instigation. Thus, for example, the words of Abrahams slave “O Lord God of my master Abraham, I pray thee, send me good speed this day” (in Hebrew, haqreh-na lefanai— Gen.  24:12), or Jacob’s words to his father “Because the Lord thy God brought it to me” (Gen.  27:20—in Hebrew, ki hiqrah adonai eloheikha lefanai); and of course “and her hap was to light on a part of the field belonging unto Boaz” (Ruth 2:3—in Hebrew, vayiqer miqreh), etc. In my view, this is meaning of the root q-r-h in the Book of Ecclesiastes as well—which is in line with Koheleth’s arguments about how events are preordained by God.27 The appearance of this word in association with expressions such as “happeneth to them all” (“but time and chance happeneth to them all”—9:11)28 is, I believe, further evidence of this.29 27 For this reason, I do not agree with commentaries that understand the word as synonymous with death. See: A. Kislev, “Qohelet vehitmodeduto im hamavet le’or hatfisot bamiqra uvesifrut hamizraḥ haqadum,” [Kohelet and his grappling with death in light of biblical worldviews and the literature of the ancient East], Beit Mikra 52b, 2012, pp 28–51. This issue will be discussed below, especially in chapter 4, which deals with the framework of the Book of Ecclesiastes. 28 See J. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1–15: Another Interpretation,” JSOT 66 (1995) pp.  55–64. He tends to interpret “A time to…” as “The right timing”—i.e., as the interface between human actions and chance occurrences brought on by a combination of reasons that we call “fate.” We will revisit this issue in our discussion of 1:1–15. 29 Cf. G.S. Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 1–16,” VT 32.2 (1982) pp. 158–169. Although Ogden points out that ‫“( תע‬A time”) and ‫“( הרקמ‬happenstance”) are used as equivalent terms (as in 3:17–18), in 9:11 he believes it is actually used to denote the suddenness of death, which may befall a person irrespective of how swift or strong they are (as in 9:11–12)—in other words, physical prowess are no guarantee of success. However, in my opinion, Koheleth is not concerned with physical strength, but with intellectual aptitude, since elsewhere he points out that wisdom also bestows no particular advantage. In one instance, he rejects the pursuit of excellence in one particular field. This issue will be discussed in detail below. Seow (in “Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem”.—see note 14 above), also attributes this to a series of phrases that reflect its Greek sense of “chance” (Τύχη).

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3. King (Hebrew: m-l-k). This word, in its various guises, appears eleven times throughout the book.30 In most instances its meaning appears to be no different from its common and conventional meaning of a monarch or supreme ruler. But on one or perhaps two occasions, it is used in an apparently metaphorical sense. Since in both these two places the context is somewhat obscure, an alternative interpretation might possibly resolve the difficulty if we apply the metaphorical meaning to the other instances in the book as well. One is at 5:8—“the profit of the earth is for all: the king himself is served by the field”31— and the other is 8:2 (“I counsel thee to keep the king’s commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God”). In the former instance— regardless of whether we interpret the word profit as I proposed above, or as “exceptional virtue” or “prerogative”—the second half of the verse (“the king himself is served by the field”) compels us to understand it in a non-literal manner—for it is hard to see control over a cultivated field is what grants the king his absolute prerogative. In this regard, I prefer to interpret the word field in the wider sense of “estate”—i.e. the totality of person’s assets—be it material property or his vocation or field of expertise. If so, the statement means that a person’s “profit,” or advantage—namely, one’s only enduring, constant and immutable property—is that which one has absolute control over—i.e., making the most of one’s possessions. (As opposed to investing one’s resources, including one’s initiative, in vague prospects or in something beyond one’s control—which is something that Koheleth repeatedly repudiates.)32 The word king therefore denotes the absolute, the perfect, the ultimate. This is borne out by the words in 2:12 also support this understanding: “for what can the man do that 30 1:12; 2:12; 4:13,14 (“to reign,” “in his kingdom”); 5:5, 8:2, 4; 10:16, 17 (“when thy king”), 20. With regard to 4:13–16, see Rudman, who suggests that “to reign” in this case might mean “to advise,” and—like Ogden—believes that it may hint at Joseph. See D. Rudman, “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4: 13–16,” JBL 116/1 (1997) pp. 57–73, and the review of approaches there. 31 See Pinker’s detailed review of the interpretation of this verse in Pinker, “The Advantage of a Country in Ecclesiastes”—and our examination of this verse below, especially in chapter 2. 32 See Pinker’s interpretation, which narrows the meaning to the virtues (advantages) of good governance, and his review of other commentaries, in Pinker, “The Advantage of a Country in Ecclesiastes,” 211–222. See also Fisher, “Beobachtungen zur Komposition von Kohelet 1,3–3,15.”

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cometh after the king? even that which hath been already done”— i.e. anyone lesser than the king cannot but repeat what has already been done. In other places, too, this word may assume this broader meaning if we understand it as a metaphor: if indeed the word king denotes someone perfect or someone of supreme accomplishment, that may be the intention in chapter 1, too, where Koheleth introduces himself. He who says of himself “I have grown and added wisdom over all that was before me over Jerusalem” (1:16) and goes on to list all his material accomplishments (2:5–10), makes clear through such a detailed description that this is the meaning of king in the rhetorical question “for what can the man do that cometh after the king?” The introduction of himself as King of Israel in Jerusalem (1:12) does not necessarily mean that he is literally the king, but rather that he surpasses everyone else in his accomplishments.33 While his selfproclamation as Koheleth son of King David in Jerusalem (1:1) is problematic, as many have suggested, it is possible that “son of David” means that he is one of the distant descendants of the House of David.34 However, in the metaphorical sense his grim warning “Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child” versus “Blessed art thou, O land, when thy king is the son of nobles” (10:16–17). A literal reading of the passage does not, it seems, warrant such a belligerent pronouncement by the author—since anyone with a modicum of sense understands the dire consequences of the land being led by ruler lacking any accomplishment or experience, and conversely the advantage of the 33 In the research literature there have been various efforts to detect clues of the author’s condition or life story. See Kislev, “Qohelet vehitmodeduto” (note 27), who infers from Koheleth’s proclamations about the impossibility of bequeathing anything to the next generation (e.g. 2:18, 4:8) and from his avoidance of the expression “My son,” that the author lived alone and had no son. However, see also my reading of these statements. 34 See Klausner’s detailed story, which identifies Koheleth with Horkanus Ben Tuvia, in Klausner, Historiah shel Habayit Hasheni, vol. II, Jerusalem 1964 4 pp 124–156. Conversely, see Ogden, who detects hints of Koheleth’s personal-historical situation in the descriptions in 4:13–16, and who ultimately assumes that the allusion is not necessarily to any single person, but rather to certain figures in the Israelite tradition (Abraham, David, Joseph), as a rhetorical device to underscore Koheleth’s understanding of the meaning of “good”—namely, that young members of past generations do not get the appreciation they deserve. G.  S.  Ogden, “Allusion in Qoheleth IV 13–16?,” VT 30/3 (1980), pp. 309–315.

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country whose ruler is very competent.35 For this reason, I prefer to understand the word land in this case in the same sense as earth in 5:9 (“the profit of the earth is for all”)—i.e. as total command and control of a particular domain. The “Woe to thee, O land” verse is therefore a general reference to anything that is under-utilized, or a domain over which one does not have full control. Koheleth’s discussion of this issue ties in with his general disapproval of missing out on the present and against a misguided views of life and of world order. This issue will be expanded upon and substantiated in the following chapters. For now, it is worth noting that the obscure verse “I to keep the king’s commandment” (8:2—in Hebrew, ani pi melekh shmor) might be understood in a similar fashion. (The main difficulty lies in the attribution of “I” to the latter part of the verse: some believe that it is meant to be followed by a colon—as if to say, I say to thee. Some believe that the final word should be eshmor (“I shall keep”).36 While the meaning of the verse becomes more apparent in verse 4: “and who may say unto him, What doest thou?”—namely that not only must one obey the king and do all as he commands, but that this advice is self-evident. In other words, the emphasis appears to be to keep the king’s commandment in the sense of meek obedience. Hence, in 5:2: “Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter any thing before God: for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth: therefore let thy words be few.” In my view, these two verses share the same ideological message—namely, that when faced with absolute perfection, one must avoid taking any stance, but rather allow the various manifestations of perfection to be taken in and influence oneself.37 In one verse, this perfection is embodied in the term king, while in the other it is manifested in the word God. Judging by the contexts, the difference between them appears to be that king represents earthly perfection (“the king himself is served by the field”), while God represents the supreme perfection of the entire universe (“for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth”)—and that in the face of this perfection, man is better off recognizing his 35 See an identical use of the word in Isaiah 3:4: “And I will give children to be their princes, and babes shall rule over them.” 36 In the Septuagint and KJV: “I say” or “I counsel,” or “I:” Cf. NAS. 37 This may also be the meaning of the expression “be more ready to hear” (5:1)—i.e., it is better to receive and accept anything that happens, than to take an active position.

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limitations.38 As we shall see, in Koheleth’s view, taking a position or identifying with only one particular aspect, or devoting oneself entirely to a single aspect of life, prevents one from being connected with all of life, and leads one to miss out on the present and to gain a misguided view of the world. That said, he is not necessarily recommending one to be total passive, since he says “therefore let thy words be few,” and “keep the king’s commandment.”39 4. Under the sun—the same is true of this expression. Ostensibly, it means “on earth”—i.e., everywhere. But that sense is conveyed by the author in expressions such as under the sky (2:3) and on earth (8:14– 16, and cf 12:7).40 It is possible, however, that its metaphorical sense will underscore my interpretation of the two previous expressions, thereby clarifying Koheleth’s intentions even further. I believe that Koheleth uses the words the sun in the theoretical sense as well as in the literal sense of a celestial object. I am not suggesting that his references to its philosophical sense of the sun as the very foundation on which all other truth rests, as Plato surmised—that would place Koheleth’s religious outlook in an entirely different light, which has no justification or basis in other parts of the book. However, I do believe that, as the source of all light and energy, the sun for Koheleth 38 Cf Miller’s view, who while discussing the concept of God in Ecclesiastes, also examines the meaning of generic terms such as “wisdom” and “folly.” H. P. Müller, “Wie sprach Qohälät von Gott?” VT 18/4 (1968) pp 507–521; and de Jong, who examines the question of identification of God in Ecclesiastes with God of the forefathers in the Hebrew Bible in general, in S. de Jong, “God in the Book of Qohelet: A Reappraisal of Qohelet’s Place in Old Testament Theology,” VT 47.2 (1997) pp.  154–167. We will examine this issue separately in the course of our inquiry. 39 In my opinion, these ideas are very similar to the notion that following an encounter with a revelatory experience, a person often tries to make the new vision his own personal possession and to control it. This is manifested in his adoption of the opinion that he defines what he has discovered. However, in the absence of appropriate language at his disposal, his language allows him only to compare the new to something old and familiar—hence expressions such as “For it is like…” In so doing, he is applying the old and familiar to the new—in a manner akin to chewing the cud. For more on this topic: see P. Haezrahi, Hape’ilut hamitbonenet: Iyyunim Be’estetiqah [The Observational Activity: Studies in Esthetics], Jerusalem, 1965— especially pp 33–71 (in Hebrew). 40 Conversely, see Bakon, “Kohelet,” who interprets “under the sun” as “certainties”— i.e., things that can be observed and verified by experience.

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represents the ultimate and perfect source in Creation. If so, the expression under the sun denotes anything that falls short of it, or anything of lesser validity. This, then, presents us with two opposing sets of expressions: expressions that represent all that is whole and absolute (the sky, the sun), to whom man directs his efforts, versus expressions that represent all that is limited and relative (“the earth,” “under the sun,” “under the sky”), which define the limits of man’s ability.41 5. The same is true of the word labor. It appears many times in the Book of Ecclesiastes (twenty times, to be exact—twelve of them as a verb).42 From their respective contexts it is clear that the author is not using the word in its general conventional sense of work or hard labor, but rather in the sense of efforts made to secure an advantage (yitron), or memory (zikaron), as explained above. Koheleth’s arguments that in a person’s efforts to overcome the limitations of their ability or the constraints of time, space, the laws of nature, or fate—they lose one’s sight of the present, with all that it has to offer. In this regard, then, the word labor may be interpreted to mean both labor and its fruits— similar to its use in Psalms 128:2—“For thou shalt eat the labor of thine hands.”43 6. Be merry is another expression that is not used in its general and conventional sense.44 From its contexts, its meaning appears to refer to full use of one’s resources and a sense of full experience of all that the present has to offer (see, for example, 4:16).45 We shall return to and expand upon the various meanings of this expression in chapter 2.

41 See: 1:3, 9, 13, 14; 2:11, 17, 18, 19, 22; 3:1, 16; 4:3, 7, 15; 5:12, 17; 10:2, 12; 8:9, 15, 17; 9:3, 6, 9, 11, 13; 10:5. 42 See: 1:3, 19, 20, 21; 2:10, 18, 22, 24; 3:9, 13; 4:4, 8, 9, 16; 5:14, 15, 17; 6:7, 8:17 (on occasion, twice in the same verse). 43 Cf. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3.1–15: Another Interpretation,” 61 (see above note 14), who believes that labor is not limited to earning a living or accumulating wealth, but also pertains to the search for the meaning of human activity—as in the list in 3:1–9. 44 See 2:10, 26; 3:12, 22; 5:16, 18, 19; 7:4; 8:15; 9:7; 10:19; 11:8, 9. 45 This interpretation may be strengthened by the fact that “be merry” does not feature in the list of things which there is “A time for”—namely, being merry is not bound by any hard and fast rules, or advance planning. However, cf. Z. Jura, “Ulesimhah mah zo osah” [“And of mirth, What doeth it?”], Beit Mikra (2001) pp. 353–370.

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Besides these terms and expressions, there are others—such as “a time” and “do evil,” which we shall decipher below by examining their respective contexts. From all the above, it appears that in the Book of Ecclesiastes we must distinguish between the dominant tone and the purpose and aim of what is said. In the prophetic literature, for example, while we find that the predominant tone is one of chastisement, the prophet is primarily a man of vision. His ultimate objective is the “End of Days,” but the path to achieving it is riddled with difficulties and mishaps, and his denunciations are aimed mainly at these obstacles that prevent the vision from being realized. The reprimand is therefore a means and not an end in itself. The same is true of Koheleth.46 Although the phenomena that he castigates outweigh his acclamations of positive aspects both in number and in their intensity of expression, the objects of his rebukes, in their various guises, are merely the opposite of the desired goal. His primary purpose might be defined as a true and righteous connection to life and to everything that the present has to offer (see in particular: “For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope”—9:4). In most instances, the correct ways to make such a connection are signaled by the Hebrew root y-t-r (advantage), in its various forms. Unlike his repeated positive presecriptions, Koheleth’s negative pronouncements appear in a wide range of forms, but always alluding to the same theme—i.e. these are the various ways in which man shies away from the world and all that exists, is available and present. These include the natural traits and skills that one has been blessed with, which all too often one does not appreciate, leading one to waste one’s life and to miss out on all that is good and beautiful in it, as created by God. These various forms of abdication, as we have noted, are marked by the repeated use of the word vanity. Each of the chapters Part I of our inquiry is devoted to one aspect of these forms of escapism. In Part II, I examine Koheleth’s “positive” counsels. Needless to say, between his remonstrations against the various misguided approaches that people have to life, and his advocacy of the positive aspects that they overlook, Koheleth’s outlook appears to be an unorthodox one. To my mind, this mainly pertains to three issues that 46 Cf. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 196–197. However, he is of the opinion that Koheleth’s counsel to enjoy life is a kind of “default” option—even though Scott rules out that any Greek influences are at play here—including the hedonistic views of an agnostic.

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might be seen as cornerstones of the biblical worldview. One is the issue of correlation between man and nature. In various parts of the biblical literature, the prevailing view is that justice is a law of nature—that is, nature is where justice takes place. According to this view, nature was created to suit the needs of all creatures, and it rewards man for his behavior. Historically, nature serves those who have been liberated from slavery to liberty, and at the cosmological level, too, the Creator’s world is said to be one where there is no room for evil.47 Koheleth, however, takes a different approach, which is based on the dividing lines between the laws of nature and the bounds of human understanding. The second issue, which is largely interlinked with the first, concerns the prevailing perception of reward in the Hebrew Bible. In statements such as “there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness” (7:15), Koheleth reiterates that absolute values are the preserve of God, and lie beyond man’s reach. The third issue in which Koheleth’s position is at odds with that of the Hebrew Bible—particularly in Genesis 1:11—is in his very fundamental view of the value of life. There are other instances in the Hebrew Bible, especially in Genesis 1:11, where life is perceived as a preeminent and sacred value, a supreme aim above all others—as exemplified, for example, by the freedom of choice. However, for the most part—especially from Genesis 12 onwards—life is perceived as only a means, rather than as an end in itself. As the tenets of the monotheistic faith took shape, the notion emerged that the righteous man is he who is willing to sacrifice his life for a particular goal, and that goal is the supreme value. This concept is taken to its most extreme expression in the Binding of Isaac, but is apparent in Abraham’s story from the outset, when he is required to uproot himself from his home and his past and go wherever God tells him to. In contrast, as we noted at the beginning of this introduction, for Koheleth “a living dog is better than dead lion” (9:4)—that is to say, any form of life, however humble, is preferable to death, however honorable and noble. In this, Koheleth rejects the notion of sacrifice, and underlines the value of life as a supreme value and aim in its own right, rather than as a means. I

47 For a detailed examination of the issues of the correlation between nature and justice, see S. Gelander: “Hatzedek vesidrei habri’ah,” [Justice and World Order], Beit Mikra 97 (1984), pp 158–179. See also Gelander, Religious Experience in Psalms, chapter 3.

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shall return and discuss this threefold deviation when we examine each of Koheleth’s statements in turn. It should be noted that my inquiry is not based on a line-by-line reading of the chapters in their order as in the Book of Ecclesiastes, but mainly on their key ideas, and in reverse order—that is, the assertions in Chapter 1 assume their full meaning only in the light of the statements in the following chapters, while the description in Chapter 12 represents a kind of closing of the circle of intent. Accordingly, I discuss the opening and conclusion of the Book of Ecclesiastes only in chapter 4 of this book. Conversely, since Koheleth’s philosophy focuses mainly on decrying people’s misguided lifestyles, I devote chapter 1 of this book to what appears to Koheleth as the various ways in which people “abdicate” from life, or miss out on it. In chapter 2, I review Koheleth’s various prescriptions for a well-lived life—i.e., his advice on how to engage with reality and what the present has to offer. Since both his remonstrations and his prescriptions are presented as a poetic mosaic, we will often have to resort to paraphrasing to present the conjectured meaning or significance of certain passages. However, this is to be expected, if it facilitates the quest for the common ideological denominator, given that Koheleth himself often repeats certain key ideas in more than one way (as is often the case in poetry). In addition, since Koheleth’s poetic structure and style does not lend itself to a neat schematic division into topics, certain statements or declarations suit more than one category, and therefore certain verses will fall under more than one heading. Moreover, in these instances the two aspects will be complementary in terms of their world outlook and ideological message. Chapter 3 of this book is about Koheleth’s beliefs—namely, his views about God and man. A clear presentation of this will be possible in the light of our inquiry in the two previous chapters: if we bear in mind that Koheleth had a certain vision in mind in both his criticisms and his prescriptions, the faith underpinning his ideology may become more apparent. Chapter 4, as noted earlier, examines the opening and conclusion of the Book of Ecclesiastes words as a kind of prologue and coda, respectively, which highlight the issues of contending with oblivion by aiming to attain a “righteous life.” The full meaning of the opening passages of Ecclesiastes and its conclusion will become apparent on completion of our inquiry. In keeping with its title, this book seeks to explore the ideological dimension of the Book of Ecclesiastes, rather than offer a comprehensive study of it. Specific issues such as where and when it was written, the 27

identity of the author and his distinctive language, are not discussed here. While those questions undoubtedly have a bearing upon the central ideas in the Book of Ecclesiastes, I shall be discussing them solely in the context of their appearance and in terms of what they have in common, leaving their thorough examination to references the research of other scholars, while noting the highlights of their arguments in passing.

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1.

Escaping from reality

Koheleth’s harsh criticism encompasses a wide range of assertions—but in reality, they share a single ideological common denominator, in that they repeatedly highlight the various ways in which people flee from what is readily accessible and from the present. His critique is therefore a highly focused one. It is not a litany of accusations against the world as a whole and the way its functions or against man’s insignificance and failings, but rather a focused critique of the mistaken ways in which man conducts his life. Koheleth believes that all a person’s efforts, methods of operation, aspirations, desires, and understandings, are used in a manner that makes him overlook all that is readily accessible and present, causing him to miss out on the extraordinary quality and virtues of the world. Man’s limitations and discontent are therefore not predetermined, but rather stem from how he conducts his life—much of which dissipated in efforts in the wrong direction. Instead of using the resources that he has and his natural abilities, and instead of harnessing the existing and appreciating what is close at hand, he wastes his life in various ways that might be summed up as forms of escapism. In this part of the inquiry, I intend to discuss the various ways in which this escapism is manifested. First and foremost of these is the escape to the future, in its various guises—such as devoting oneself to one’s “life’s work,” with the intention of bequeathing it to one’s successors, and amassing assets to insure oneself against possible mishaps. However, escapism also includes efforts to develop traits that one is not naturally endowed with, and pursuing goals well beyond one’s skills and ability. It is also evident in the pursuit of perfection and of absolute values. Such quests also involve sacrifices, and Koheleth categorically rejects the notion that one should sacrifice one’s life for certain values or lofty goals.1 In the book’s poetic opening,2 Koheleth poses the rhetorical question “What profit hath a man of all his labor, which he taketh under the sun?” 1 2

See discussion below about the phrase “is better than...”—especially 9:4: “for a living dog is better than a dead lion.” The content and views presented at the start and end of the book are discussed in detail in chapter  4, “The opening verses and coda,” which deals with the book’s framework.

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(1:3)—from which we understand that all his labor is intended to achieve a certain “profit.” As we discussed above, in the Introduction chapter, the word profit (in Hebrew, yitron) should be understood as “an enduring advantage.” A man‘s labor is therefore aimed at avoiding oblivion—yet oblivion cannot be avoided, of all his labor,3 and everything is fleeting. Hence, Koheleth’s declaration “and I hated life,” or “and I hated all my labor” (2:17, 18) is not a reference to life and labor in general, as Scott has suggested,4 but rather a lifestyle in which man does not savor all that is present, available, and serendipitous, and invests all his efforts in various forms of escape. In chapter 4, we shall examine the substance and outlook of the book’s opening and conclusion in our discussion about the book’s general structure; meanwhile, this chapter is devoted to examining the various forms of escapism.

Escape to the future Yea, I hated all my labor which I had taken under the sun: because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me [2:18–19]

Whether it is the labor itself, or the fruits of one’s labor, this passage is about a man who instead of enjoying his actual labor or its fruits, devotes all his efforts to that which comes after—that is, to his successors and heirs. It is a reference, therefore, to the common phenomenon of wanting to overcome oblivion and disappearance by establishing continuity between generations through inheritance.5 Koheleth rejects this notion, on the grounds that there is no knowing whether the intended heir has the requisite qualities and skills, and therefore one cannot know how he will 3 4

5

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The word of in this case is in the sense of “despite.” Scott (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 204) argues that Koheleth sees life as a whole as pointless, and that his negative warnings and attitude toward values stem from his fundamentally pessimistic outlook on life. See Kislev’s review (Kislev, “Qohelet vehitmodeduto,” and notes 42, 54 there) on various writings that express the notion of a person’s descendants carrying on their life’s work, as a means of dealing with the notion of death, and about commentators that link Ecclesiastes 4:8 with 2:18–19, and cf. my interpretations of these verses above.

manage the legacy that he has inherited. Such escapism to the future must therefore be rejected:6 since there is no knowing what will happen to the fruits of one’s labor after the death, it follows that one’s work is for naught. In essence, all a man’s life’s work is fleeting, and therefore he has wasted his life.7 This sentiment is repeated in other statements in the same vein: There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and it is common among men A man to whom God hath given riches, wealth, and honor, so that he wanteth nothing for his soul of all that he desireth, yet God giveth him not power to eat thereof, but a stranger eateth it: this is vanity, and it is an evil disease.8

As in the previous passage, the issue is a person who does not benefit from all that he is fortunate to have received. However, here the discussion is not only about his labor or about the fruits of his labor (riches and assets), but about his status (honor), as well—nor is it about his efforts, as in Chapter 2:11 (“Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labor that I had labored to do: and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun”)—but rather that which God has given him. These two statements are very similar in style and wording, which supports my proposed interpretation of the phrase “under the sun.” The meaning of the Hebrew root sh-l-t (yashlitenu) in these contexts also refers to full utilization of all that is readily accessible and provided—but here, too the giving and the taking are in the hands of 6

7

8

Many commentators understand this as though Koheleth were stating a fact, that after a person’s death his estate is handed over to someone who did not work for it. See in particular: H. Gese, “The Crisis of Wisdom in Kohelet,” J. L. Crenshaw (ed.), Theodicy in the Old Testament, Philadelphia 1963 pp. 142–143. It is worth bearing in mind the common biblical notion that heritage is itself a foundation of faith: the stories of the Patriarchs indicate that the handing down of faith in God was a condition for maintaining the divine promise. Accordingly, Jacob’s great advantage over Esau was that Jacob appreciated the significance of the birthright. Thus, Koheleth’s declaration against the labor involved in bequeathing one’s life’s work is a challenge to the prevailing view. See also S. Gelander, “Hahavtaḥot la’avot” [The promises to the Forefathers] and “Hama’avaq al habkhorah” [The struggle over the birthright,], Sefer Bereshit [The Book of Genesis], vol. II, Tel-Aviv, 2009 pp 43–54; 231–236 (in Hebrew). Malul notes that stranger in this case means anyone who is not a member of the family. See M. Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, Tel Aviv-Jaffa 2002, p. 457 note 123—and his references there to various biblical sources.

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God.9 The message, then, as in the previous statement, is that man cannot ensure his future, so he must make the most of the present and of what comes his way, since—as Koheleth repeatedly emphasizes—“This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God.” (2:24).10 He then elaborates: “If a man beget an hundred children, and live many years, so that the days of his years be many, and his soul be not filled with good, and also that he have no burial; I say, that an untimely birth is better than he (6:3). This verse highlights birth and death as the significant brackets of a person’s life, but in amplified form: “an hundred” stands for innumerable descendants, while the lack of burial denotes a degradation of the deceased.11 The meaning of the statement is therefore that the man who fails to be satisfied with his lot is doomed to have his blessings become a curse. Once again, then, the conclusion is that one must not labor for the future, but enjoy the present. This message is repeated and reasoned later in the chapter: “For who knoweth what is good for man in this life, all the days of his vain life which he spendeth as a shadow? for who can tell a man what shall be after him under the sun?” (6:12). Fleeing to the future means that one’s life is turned into a mere passing shadow, inasmuch as he is no longer in control of it. It is notable that here, as in other contexts like it, Koheleth refers to life as “the days of my vanity”—a phrase that underscores of the temporary and fleeting nature of the present. A similar theme appears earlier, in another context—“for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?” (3:22). In other words, since there is no possibility of predicting the future, “there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his own works; for that is his portion” (ibid.)—in other words, the best course is to be happy while doing things.12 9

This issue—of the relationship between man and God, and between a person’s situation and their fate—is discussed at greater length below, in Chapter 3. 10 The meaning of “to eat and to drink” is explored further below, especially in chapter 2. 11 See: N. Shupak, “Funeral and burial customs in the story of Joseph,” Beit Mikra, 55:1 (9), pp. 84–93. See also: C.B. Hays, “Re-excavating Shebna’s tomb: a new reading of Isa. 22, 15–19 in its ancient Near Eastern context,” ZAW 122,4 (2010): 558–575; and J. L. Wright, “King and eunuch: Isaiah 56: 1–8 in light of honorific royal burial practices: JBL 131,1 (2012): 99–119. 12 It should be noted that Koheleth generally refrains from espousing absolute values. His arguments predominantly involve presenting only relative values, such as “… is better than….” This makes this verse all the more significant, inasmuch as“there

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On the attempts at insuring against future mishaps Koheleth’s criticism of the phenomenon of fleeing from the present has ramifications for other, closely related issues. To my mind, his reiteration that man cannot insure himself against future harm does not spring necessarily from the fact that he is totally subject to the vagaries of fate, as many commentators have suggested,13 but is also related to Koheleth’s warnings about fleeing from the present. All efforts to insure oneself against possible harm in future are misconceived—not because one’s fate is necessarily preordained, but because while doing so, one allows the present to slip away. His remonstrations against such “insurance” efforts are therefore related to, and complement, his exhortations not to flee to the future: There is a sore evil14 which I have seen under the sun—namely, riches kept for the owners thereof to their hurt. But those riches perish by evil travail:15 and he begetteth a son, and there is nothing in his hand. (5:13–14)16

This pronouncement is very closely related to those previously cited (2:18– 19; 6:1–3)—however, this time the emphasis is different. The previous statements were about the futility of striving to accomplish a true “life’s work,” and the impossibility of bequeathing it—in essence, about the person who strives to experience the future instead of the present. Here, on the other hand, the statement is more specific. Although here, too, the issue is about

13

14

15

16

is nothing better .…” is an absolute value. This topic is discussed at greater length below, and in chapter 2. See Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes: 198, 204–205 et passim; H.P. Müller, “Wie sprach Qohälät von Gott?,” VT 18, 4 (1968): 507–521—especially his interpretation of “that which is past” (in Hebrew, nirdaf). See also G. S. Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 1–16,” VT 32.2 (1982), pp. 158–169. See the explanation in D. B. Miller, “Qohelet’s Symbolic Use of hebel, JBL 117/3 (1998): 437–454, which distinguishes between vanity and evil, and argues that their juxtaposition refers to the labor that brings no satisfaction, such as 6:7–12. In my view, the expression “by evil travail” is a generic one, denoting any sort of mishap. In other words, any assets that one puts aside for a time of need are in danger of being lost, and therefore cannot provide any security. See N. Lohfink, “Kohelet und die Banken: zur Übersetzung von Kohelet V 12–16,” VT 39.4 (1989): 488–495, where he compares it with 2:18–22, and argues that what they have in common is the worthlessness of wealth in the face of death. To my mind, because Koheleth’s emphasis is on the failure to make the most of the present, “loss” or missed opportunities must be distinguished from death.

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inheritance and the next generation, the reference is to “But those riches perish by evil travail,” we find that the focus has now shifted—namely, that taking steps to “insure” against possible afflictions is pointless. The similarity of these themes underscores how we should avoid overly-schematic divisions of the book. There is no doubt that all sorts of statements might be included under the same heading—but precisely for that reason I see it necessary to highlight the different forms in which missing out on the present may take, and which Koheleth seeks to denounce, and accordingly I have divided these forms of escapism into separate categories. Besides his general disapproval of sacrificing one’s present for the future, Koheleth suggests that this may assume various guises, one of which is attempts to protect oneself from oblivion and other occasional mishaps. “Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labor that I had labored to do: and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun” (2:11). From the context, it is clear that this is not a generic or arbitrary assertion, but rather a conclusion drawn from his rich experience. In the previous verses, Koheleth details at length a list of ways in which means and actions may be accrued, whose purpose was “till I might see what was that good for the sons of men, which they should do under the heaven all the days of their life” (2:3). In light of my earlier interpretation of the expression “under the sun,”17 the reference here is to a single, particular course that a person might take or devote their lives to, and the word good in this instance refers to the absolute good.18 In other words, since he had been blessed with all possibilities and means at his disposal, he tried to see if there was a single, ultimate course that he might take that might ensure that he is remembered in posterity. He then proceeds to list the various things that he has done to this end (2:1, which marks the beginning of the attempt with mirth),19 representing all possible courses of action (including others that are not mentioned). From these various and diverse attempts, he reached 17 See the Introduction chapter above, and note 40 there. 18 See N. Lohfink, Qohelet (Die neue echter Bibel 1) Wǖrzburg, 1950 p.  51; I.J.J. Spangenberg, “Irony in the Book of Qohelet,” JSOT 21: 57 (1996): 57–69; D. Rudman “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4: 13–16,” JBL 116/1 (1997): 57–73; N. Lohfink, Qohelet: A Continental Commentary, Minneapolis 2003. 19 Judging by the context, and in line with most interpretations and translations, I prefer to interpret the Hebrew original for “I will try thee,” anaskhah, as anaskha, from the root n-s-h——although it is also possible that it derives from the root n-s-kh, meaning “pampering” or “luxury,” as suggested in the JPS.

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the conclusion that no single path confers an “advantage”—i.e. guarantee against oblivion: “and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun” (2:11). This is followed later by a rhetorical question that also explains why he resorted to “behold wisdom, and madness, and folly”—and reached the conclusion: “for what can the man do that cometh after the king? even that which hath been already done” (2:12). The “king,” as we noted earlier, is a metonymic allusion to a paragon or champion, whom no one, in his time or later, can hope to equal in terms of perfection and uniqueness, and therefore there is no reason for him to be remembered, or for anything to remain of his actions. The paths and qualities that he tried to hold onto (“wisdom, and madness, and folly”) were not enough to save him from oblivion and secure him immortality, because he could never reach the level of perfection represented by the proverbial “king.” Thus, sticking to any one path only squanders all the options provided by the present, and limiting oneself to a single field of endeavor is only a form of escapism from the present and available. This conclusion also leads us to the irony, in a wording that is somewhat deceptive: “Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness” (2:13).20 Ostensibly, this statement is at odds with Koheleth’s arguments elsewhere, since even in this chapter we read “I sought in mine heart to give myself unto wine, yet acquainting mine heart with wisdom; and to lay hold on folly” (2:3), and his conclusion that, like other paths and virtues, none of these provide any advantage. Many commentators have suggested that Koheleth here acknowledges the advantage of wisdom over folly,21 but to my mind, if the advantage of wisdom over folly is like the advantage of light over darkness, then wisdom has no advantage at all, since the superiority of light over darkness is merely a convention—especially if we understand the word advantage (yitron) not as “preference,” but as “persistence,” or permanence—as I explained earlier. After all, light and dark succeed each other, and neither one vanquishes the other. The cyclical nature in the changes of light and dark are in line with Koheleth’s words in the opening verses, which point to the regular nature in the natural cycle as a permanent fixture—unlike man, who leaves no trace after his death (1:11). 20 See Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, 117, on the conventional use of wisdom as a parallel to light—but in pointing to this convention, Malul appears to be missing the irony in this verse. 21 See Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 216; H. Fish, Poetry with a Purpose: Biblical Poetics and Interpretation, Indianapolis 1988 pp. 158–178.

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And indeed, the irony of these words is apparent later: “The wise man’s eyes are in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness: and I myself perceived also22 that one event happeneth to them all” (2:14). The Hebrew word in this case (miqreh) does not refer to death, since the fact that “as the one dieth, so dieth the other”(3:19) is no advantage, and self-evident—too selfevident to rank as a conclusion from Koheleth’s rich and diverse experience, as he detailed in the previous verses. It is better to interpret it as I proposed in the Introduction—i.e., as something that God had planned in advance.23 Wisdom and folly are presented here a merism,24 or spectrum of qualities, and Koheleth’s assertion is that no single trait or skill can safeguard a person from oblivion and extinction. This is underscored later when he repeats and expands his rhetorical question: “Then said I in my heart, as it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then more wise?” (2:15) in other words, acquiring wisdom does not in fact afford any advantage. The reason: “For there is no remembrance of the wise more than25 of the fool for ever; seeing that which now is in the days to come shall all be forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? As the fool.” (2:16).26 22 There are instances in the Hebrew Bible where the Hebrew word gam (usually, “also”) does not indicate the addition of a secondary thing, but a word of emphasis— in the sense of “Yea,” or “indeed,” or “in fact.” This is usually reflected in traditional translations. See, for example, “and he loved also Rachel more than Leah” (Gen. 29:30) or “Yea, I know that thou didst this” (Gen. 20:6) and—in my opinion— Job 10:10 “What? shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?” 23 We explore Koheleth’s attitude toward God and His dominion over the world in greater detail in chapter 3. 24 In rhetoric, a merism is the combination of two contrasting words, in reference to an entirety—e.g., man and boy; hither and thither. 25 In Hebrew, the word than is im, which normally means “with,” but in this case is in the sense of “like” (cf. Gen.  18:23; Psalms 106:6 and 143:7, and elsewhere). The word how here is used as a lament-like exclamation (cf. II Sam. 1:19). 26 In this spirit, we might also interpret verse 10:2: “A wise man’s understanding is at his right hand; but a fool’s understanding at his left.” But the distinction between right and left is not necessarily a distinction between strength and weakness (as Fox suggests, in M. Fox, in Encyclopedia Olam HaTanakh: Megilot, Tel-Aviv 1996, p.  202 [in Hebrew]). It may also be a gentle jibe against the prevailing view in ancient times about the vaunted advantages of intelligence and its comparison to light versus dark, when in truth the test of any human attribute—be it a wise man or a fool—is the degree to which it suits the circumstances. See also Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, 320, note 25, who cites M. Douglas and V. W. Turner, who argue that the parallelism of right versus left was common in many countries, including

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The same is true about his conclusion in the matter of “riches kept for the owners thereof to their hurt” (5:12). Since this wealth is lost “by evil travail,” he extends his conclusion: “that in all points as he came, so shall he go: and what profit hath he that hath labored for the wind? / All his days also he eateth in darkness, and he hath much sorrow and wrath with his sickness” (5:16–17). Here, then, he explicitly states that by attempting to accrue wealth, assets, or other means in a bid to insure oneself from future mishaps, one is prevented from enjoying the present. By devoting oneself to something transient and ephemeral, one deprives oneself of enjoyment of the present. The presentation of the wise man and the fool as opposite ends of the same spectrum is reiterated in other expressions, such as “All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean” (9:2). The rest of the verse confirms that these are not only acquired traits, but also contrasting behavior and lifestyles: [...] to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath [...] that there is one event unto all” (9:2–3). In other words, there is no prescribed method of controlling the future and shielding oneself from mishap. This same notion, albeit without any reasoning or justification, also features elsewhere, in brief statements, and in a wide range of contexts— e.g., “For he knoweth not that which shall be” (8:7), and— Give a portion to seven, and also to eight; for thou knowest not what evil shall be upon the earth / If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth: and if the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be” (11:2–3)

All these statements rule out the possibility of foreseeing the future and guarding against misfortune. However, there are occasions where Koheleth’s prescription points to a broader outlook, and the essence of his belief. For example, “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him” (7:14). This appears after a series of maxims in the format “is better than...,” that present various situations as comparative virtues—such as, “A good name is better than precious ointment,” or “Sorrow is better than laughter”). These statements in ceremonial classes. This also suggests the possibility that Koheleth is making an ironic allusion to a conventional view and traditional expression.

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are founded on the notion that there is no such thing as a perfect and absolute virtue—only relative preferences. However, the full verse may indicate that the advice to enjoy from what is readily accessible and to accept it as it is should not necessarily be understood as merely a kind of default option, or as a compromise due to human limitations.27 In his declaration, “God also hath set the one over against the other” (7:14), we learn that the absolute and infinite, which encompasses the extreme boundaries, is in the hands of God. We shall discuss this idea at greater length in chapter 3, when we examine Koheleth’s belief. However, here, too it is worth noting that Koheleth repeatedly states, in various ways, that “This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God” (2:24, and similarly, 3:13). In other words, God is perceived not as a ruler who arbitrarily determines man’s fate,28 but as someone who gives man options to choose from. In this respect, Koheleth’s words appear to be closer in spirit to Job’s argument“What? Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?” (Job, 2:10). (In the following verse—“to the end that man should find nothing after him” [Eccles. 7:14], I proposed that the words should find be understood as “to understand,” or even “to succeed,” as in 9:10; and the expression after him—as in after the king [2:12]—in the sense of “here” = “after God”.)29 In other words, man with his limited faculties cannot perceive the full extent of God’s actions in their absolute entirety. The common denominator in “God also hath set the one over against the other” is in what is ready to hand, or present. The present, therefore, is in the hands of man—but he fritters it away in his various attempts to flee to the future or even to the past (see 7:10). Koheleth’s exhortation to make the most of life is founded on a certain positive approach. We find a similar recommendation elsewhere: “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might—for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou 27 Conversely, see Fuchs, Olam HaTanakh: Megilot, 192–193, who sees this passage as “the golden mean.” 28 See Müller, “Wie sprach Qohälät von Gott?”—but conversely S. de Jong in “God in the Book of Qohelet,” who argues that there is a logical discrepancy between Koheleth’s pronouncements about divine determinism and his rejections of the conventional view of the theory of reward. However, Seow also tends to detect a deterministic outlook in many of Koheleth’s expressions, and of the divine preordainment—see Seow, Ecclesiastes, 47–60. 29 And not “in the future,” or “after death,” as many commentators have suggested— unlike 6:12 (cf. Fuchs, Olam HaTanakh: Megilot—see note 21 above).

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goest (9:10). However, here the recommendation is substantiated. The first half states that man may, or is even duty-bound, to do all that he can under any given circumstances (an idea echoed in other verses, such as “also he hath set the world in their heart” [3:11]—i.e., the world is man’s oyster, and entirely in his hands).30 But the second half puts forward a reasoning that renounces the notion that there is anything after death. The expression “for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom” is a figurative allusion to initiative and planning. This is apparent from the words “no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom.” Notably, work in this case also assumes another meaning from the first half of the verse (“Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might”)—namely, that one must not to take upon oneself to do something that is beyond one’s capabilities, or the results of which one cannot foresee nor control. Therefore, the word grave in the second half of the verse is presented not only in its general sense, as a void,31 but also in the sense of everything that is totally beyond one’s control. Hence, the oblivion that lies after death does not spring from a pessimistic suggestion to abandon all hope, but rather a caution not to indulge in illusions: “He that observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap” (11:4), and “By much slothfulness the building decayeth; and through idleness of the hands the house droppeth through” (10:18). Action, and making the most of the resources to hand, is the correct way to avoid the flight from, and loss of, reality. Similarly, in “Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?” (3:21), where oblivion is not even presented as a certainty, but as a doubt. The same is true of the declaration “For the living know that they shall die: but the dead know not any thing” (9:5). These various pronouncements 30 Although many commentators interpret this verse in the negative sense—i.e., that God has prevented man from understanding the meaning of his actions, I prefer Yehiel Hillel Altschuler’s view, based on his interpretation of 3:1–11, that this is a reference to man’s free will—i.e., that God placed the world in people’s heart (=minds) so that they may understand it. This, despite the fact that free choice the source of man’s sin. See also below, and the discussion in chapter 2 on the issue of determinism. 31 This is the view in the Book of Job—although there, too, the grave (in Hebrew, sheol, i.e. the underworld) is perceived, like death, to be a state of non-existence. See Job 3:13–19, 7:9, 26:6, etc. Cf. Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, 261, note 17, who believes that sheol is perceived here, as in the ancient Eastern myths, as the land of the dead, which is ruled by the darkness. In 3:21, as well, Malul believes (ibid., 241, note 247) that sheol does not mean a state of total non-existence.

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assume meaning later, in verse 10, linked together by the positive advice “Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God now accepteth thy works” (9:7). This recommendation will be examined later in chapter 2. Koheleth’s essentially positive appeal for maximum action belies the common belief that his philosophy is founded on a submission to fate.32 A person who suggests that control of one’s life and success are contingent upon initiative and action is clearly not someone who bemoans the absolute control of Fate over one’s life. Thus, his many and varied statements about how everything is preordained are in fact indicative of the positive aspects of Creation and world order (“He hath made every thing beautiful in his time”—3:11), and that man’s failings stem from his continual efforts to grapple with what is beyond his reach, i.e. from his flight from the present and what is available.33 Koheleth’s essentially positive approach to quotidian life is discussed at greater length below, in chapter 2. For now, let us focus on Koheleth’s negative attitude toward man’s attempts to insure himself against possible mishaps. This phenomenon, as previously noted, has various manifestations. One is the attempt to achieve an advantage over others, either by causing others to fail, or by sabotaging their property. This, I believe, is the meaning behind verse 10:8—“He that diggeth a pit shall fall into it; and whoso breaketh an hedge, a serpent shall bite him”—should

32 See Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 193, 198; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 58. 33 This, contrary to the repeated claims of commentators who believe that Koheleth contends that man’s failings and limitations are due to Fate’s arbitrary control of his life. See G. S. Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 17 – X 20: Variations on the Theme of Wisdom’s Strength and Vulnerability,” VT 30.1 (1980): 27–37; Scott, ibid., 205, 212; Seow ibid. pp. 56–58.

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be understood, rather than as an affirmation of the reward doctrine.34, 35 The notion of measure for measure—according to which the evil man is punished for his evil ways in the same manner in which he has acted—runs counter to Koheleth’s outlook. Indeed, he repeatedly asserts the opposite on various occasions—for example, “All things have I seen in the days of my vanity: there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness” (7:15, 10:7, and elsewhere). Therefore, in light of the context of verse 10:8, what Koheleth appears to be saying is that danger exists everywhere—as explicitly stated in verse 10:9 “Whoso removeth stones shall be hurt therewith; and he that cleaveth wood shall be endangered thereby”—and in fact, anyone who sets about undermining others or trying to safeguard themselves from danger will in fact experience that very danger. In modern parlance, if you fling mud at others, you will get muddy. On the acquisition of skills, traits, and excellence On this issue Koheleth’s criticism appears to ramp up a notch, and is aimed at a deeper level—that of a person’s inner being. Previously, we saw how Koheleth decries fleeing from the present, with particular focus on the lengths that people go to ensure their future by passing on their “life’s work,” or by amassing wealth. However, the main efforts of someone seeking to avoid loss or oblivion on not necessarily at the material level, but at the spiritual one. Fleeing from oblivion means avoiding 34 The Hebrew word for pit in this case is gumatz—apparently of Aramaic provenance. This verse appears, therefore, to differ from Proverbs 26:27—else Koheleth would be contradicting himself. See: M. Zer Kavod, “Hastirot beSefer Kohelet” [The Contradictions in the Book of Ecclesiastes], Sefer Braslavi, Jerusalem, 1970, pp 173–189; M.W. Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, Sheffield (1989); and J. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3. 1–15, Another Interpretation,” JSOT 66 (1995): 55–64, who argues that this passage is not characteristic of Koheleth. He interprets 3:2–8 as though it said that everything, as it were, is up to us: the choice of the right time (a time to die in this case meaning a time to retire), and the proper circumstances for doing things. But this would contradict other statements of his, especially 3:10–11 and 16–18. Therefore, Blenkinsopp suggests that 3:2–8 and 3:9–22 be regarded as two separate passages in the book, with conflicting messages. 35 The expression shall fall (in Hebrew, yippol) is likely used here in the sense of “shall go down”—as in Gen. 24:64, or Gen. 14:10.

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anonymity, and it is commonly thought that one way to achieve this is through distinction and excellence. In keeping with his notion that values are relative, Koheleth declares that “A good name is better than precious ointment” (7:1). A straightforward reading of this verse is that a person’s good name is preferable to luxuries and pampering. But this would be at odds with Koheleth’s outlook, for two reasons: (a) he repeatedly urges us, in various ways, to enjoy everything that we have, including preferring any material or tangible achievement over aspirations (e.g., 4:6, 6:9); (b) he repeatedly rules out the notion of a person devoting themselves to achieving a particular virtue, or acquiring a “good name.” For this reason, I believe that it is better to see the two parts of verse 7:1 in their metaphorical sense: the word name representing the ends of the journey, the achievement of a goal, where one’s character and distinction are well known— while precious ointment represents anointing, i.e. the dedication of a person to a given role, when they are just setting out. At the start of the journey, a person is driven by their hopes and dreams, while at the end of it, they are conscious of their abilities and limitations, and of reality itself.36 We shall return to this verse later, in another context, when we discuss the link between its beginning and its end. For now, we should note that, if this is the case, this statement is closer to those where Koheleth deplores efforts to overcome loss and oblivion by devoting oneself to false hopes and dreams, or to achieving distinction and excellence. On this matter, we find that Koheleth offers unequivocal statements, such as “Be not righteous over much; neither make thyself over wise: why shouldest thou destroy thyself?37 / Be not over much wicked, neither be thou foolish: why shouldest thou die before thy time? (7:16–17). The words “thou die” here do not appear to be a reference to death as punishment—since Koheleth does not believe in the theory of divine reward and punishment, nor does he believe that evil people suffer the consequences of their actions. After all, elsewhere he argues that “there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness” (7:15). But since he also argues that “But it shall not 36 The full meaning of this verse is discussed below, and in Chapter 2. 37 In this context, the Hebrew for be thou foolish (teshomem) means “bring destruction upon oneself ” (see M. Z. Kadri, Milon HaIvrit HaMiqra’it [Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew], Bar-Ilan 2006, p.  1114. In modern Hebrew, its meaning is more “be frustrated.”

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be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days” (8:13), he clearly believes that while positive traits do not inure oneself from harm, negative traits do have the effect of shortening a person’s life. The words [shouldest] thou die correspond, therefore, to be thou foolish—and if so, the true meaning of the statement is that zealous adherence to a positive path (righteousness, wisdom) is like zealous adherence to a negative one (wicked, fool), inasmuch as neither offers any significant advantage when one follows to the exclusion of all others. On the contrary: absolute adherence to any single path to the exclusion of its antithesis only confines a person’s life (hence, in my view, the expression “shouldest thou die before thy time”). The word et (“time”) in this context appears to be the same as in the poetic passage of 3:1–9, which begins with the statement, “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.”38 Moreover, suitability is not only a function of time, but of the framework as a whole—i.e. to space and every aspect of being and action:39 for every option there is also the opposite option. This idea is expressed in various ways, such as “God also hath set the one over against the other” (7:14), or “It is good that thou shouldest take hold of this; yea, also from this withdraw not thine hand” (7:18). It follows that the perfection in God’s Creation is beyond the comprehension or the reach of man: “Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun” (8:17).40 The expressions “under the heaven” or “under the sun” refer to the earthbound domains that man’s life is restricted, and since he is incapable to taking in the whole of a given 38 Cf. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3. 1–15,” 55–64, who believes that verses 3:2–8 and 9–22 contradict each other, and their ideas, and language, are uncharacteristic of Koheleth, as they suggest that it is up to man to decide when is the appropriate time to do things that lie within his capability—an idea that runs counter to the ideas in 3:10–11, 16–18. Ultimately, he accepts that 3:2–8 may be in fact be a passage that Koheleth is quoting from elsewhere, such as the philosophy of a Jewish scholar of the Stoic school, while his contribution is merely the heading (3:1) and his interpretation in vss. 9–22. For more on the possible influence of early Stoicism on Koheleth’s thought, see E. Bickermam, Four Strange Books in the Bible, New York 1967, pp. 141–149; A. Braun, Kohelet und die frühelenistische Popularphilosophie, (BZAW) 130, Berlin 1973; J.G. Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-stoicism in Qoheleth,” Hebrew Annual Review 9 (1985): 169–187. 39 Malul (Knowledge, Control and Sex, 430, 432), like Jenni, suggests that the word time (et) means an appropriate time for a given activity. See the discussion about these verses below, and Chapter 2. 40 See also my interpretation of 3:11, above.

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action, he cannot recognize that choosing one narrow path distances him from grasping the whole of reality. In light of all the above, the full meaning of Koheleth’s warning may be understood: “Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter any thing before God: for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth: therefore let thy words be few” (5:2) This is not, in my view, a general exhortation to fear God and submit to Him entirely—if only because that would be wholly uncharacteristic of Koheleth. His call to guard against what one utters is, in fact, a suggestion to avoid taking a position. His reasoning for doing so (“for God is in heaven”) is consistent with the meaning of God and heaven in other contexts—i.e., they represent the ultimate, the idea in its purest form. The words before God (similarly to 5:1: “Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God”) are a reference to the experience of revelation in modern parlance might be termed an “observational experience.” The observer knows that every new object of observation metaphorically resists any attempt to define it or to perceive its essence with words or conventional means of expression. He also feels that the moment he imposes himself on the observed object, or attempts to assimilate it and appropriate it for himself, the object would lose its distinctiveness and identity.41 This is because the processing of a new sight is carried out by defining it with old tools, i.e. by comparing it with something familiar. However, in doing so, one is negating its novelty, and imposing something of oneself upon it—a kind of mental chewing of the cud, as it were—thus compromising one’s ability to appreciate the novelty in its pure form. This, I believe, in general terms, is Koheleth’s position. He is warning us to avoid “taking a position” when encountering divine novelty, because with our limited faculties (“thou upon earth”—5:2) we lack the means of truly engaging with reality, and prefer instead to flee from anything new in favor of the familiar past. Although he refers to taking a position in terms of words (“to utter any thing”; “thy words”), this does not necessarily mean only verbal utterances: “All things are full of labor; man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing” (1:8).42 Full recognition of reality is contingent, therefore, on passive reception. 41 See, for example, the explanation put forward by Pepita Haezrahi, Hape’ilut Hamitbonenet [The Observational Activity], Jerusalem 1965, pp. 33–53 (in Hebrew). 42 I am inclined to interpret the word things in this instance (in Hebrew, dvarim) as “words, speech.” But the Septuagint suggest it means λόγοι, which might be understood in two ways. See also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 300, who translates dvarim as

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Moreover, man’s efforts to acquire abilities, skills and traits in order to achieve maximum realization of virtues and accomplishments that give him an “advantage” actually distance him from appreciating the present and his surroundings. In particular, Koheleth decries efforts that are purportedly allow one to gain power and control: There is no man that hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he power in the day of death: and there is no discharge in that war; neither shall wickedness deliver those that are given to it” (8:8).43

Acquired traits or excellence in any given field is not enough to render oneself capable of control or achievement at the critical moment: [...] the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all” (9:11).

Once again, a detailed listing is intended to represent a range of traits,44 which are pitted against the words time and happen, as before. The emerging conclusion reiterates the notion that perfect order in reality as a whole, which Koheleth also praises once again, while denouncing the efforts of man in the wrong direction, which distances him from reality. His recommendation is founded on praise for the existing order while questioning man’s vain efforts to fix the world and its order: “If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice “all words.” The JPS, however, has it as All such things are wearying, meaning the things that Koheleth listed earlier. Malul, in Knowledge, Control and Sex, 131, points to the biblical notion that knowledge can be acquired by eating, tasting, smelling, etc. For more on the relationship between the various physical senses and motion verbs in assimilating ideas and emotions, see also below. We shall also return to this verse in Chapter 4 below. 43 The Hebrew for the expression man that hath power is shalit, whose broader meaning we discussed earlier, which includes the meaning of “command” in the sense of complete understanding. 44 Koheleth makes frequent use of such “cataloging,” including representational cataloging, i.e. when three or more items stand in for “everything,” or the range of available possibilities. See 1:16–17 (wisdom and knowledge, madness and folly, and all the verbs in 2:4–9; “wisdom [...] knowledge [...] equity” (2:21—cf.  2:26); multitude of dreams and many words there are also divers vanities (5:7); “riches, wealth, and honor” (6:2); “wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know the wickedness of folly” (7:25); “work [...] device [...] knowledge [...] wisdom” (9:10).

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in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they.” (5:8).45 The same is true of the other claim: All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath (9:2).46

This view, whereby the sought-after trait or virtue fails to ensure the sought-after accomplishment, appears to underlie his statement “I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the earth” (10:7).47 Devoting oneself to a single path, to developing a single skill or acquiring a single trait, not only fails to ensure that one will be remembered and saved from destruction and oblivion—it isolates one within a narrow field, so that one’s efforts become an actual competition: “Again, I considered all travail, and every right work, that for this a man is envied of his neighbor” (4:4). Excellence does not bring a person closer to the world in its perfection, as Koheleth recommends (“For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope”—9:4)—on the contrary, it isolates him. To my mind, the statement “For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” (1:18) may be interpreted not only in the Socratic sense—namely, that the more a person knows, the more they are aware of their limitations and failings—but also in the sense that the more knowledge a person has, the smaller the circle that he can share his knowledge with. Loneliness distances him from other people’s memory, with a commensurate diminution of the “advantage.”48 45 For this reason, this statement must not be seen as sardonic [...]against “bureaucracy,” as various commentators have argued. See W. Zimmerli, Das Buch der Prädiger Salomo (ATD) Göttingen 1967, p. 191. For more on this verse, this Chapter 3. 46 Closer inspection of these contexts reveals that interpretation of one event as “death” limits the significance of the claim, and presents it as a kind of lament over blind Fate’s absolute control (see Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, especially p. 198). 47 Verse 10:4 (“If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place; for yielding pacifieth great offences”) may perhaps also be understood in this vein— namely, a passive acceptance of realities and of one’s position in life can rectify many human blunders. 48 Conversely, see S. Bakon (“Kohelet”), who believes that this is Koheleth’s pessimistic conclusion in view of man’s labor in his fruitless attempts to understand God’s acts.

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Koheleth’s counsel that “Two are better than one” (4:9) is not only a statement in praise of camaraderie and spending time together. As a selfconfessed introvert (“For who can eat, or who else can hasten hereunto, more than I?”—2:25),49 he is hardly one to commend active socializing. Rather, in my view, this is yet another variation of his caution against aspiring for individualistic distinction and achievement, in favor of ordinariness and being content with the gifts that one is naturally endowed with.50 This is clearer when considered in light of the previous verse (4:8).

Against distinction and in praise of the average “There is one alone, and there is not a second; yea, he hath neither child nor brother: yet is there no end of all his labor; neither is his eye satisfied with riches” (4:8). A person whose talents and achievements have brought him to a degree of unrivaled distinction, who is irreplaceable (“neither child”) or has no equal (“nor brother”) is forever doomed to labor—for he must continue to strive for ever higher achievement, and because of his endless ambition will never be satisfied with what he already has, nor enjoy his accomplishments (“neither is his eye satisfied with riches”).51 This argument is an extension and accentuation of the phrase “For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth 49 Malul (Knowledge, Control and Sex, 137, note 43) notes (based on Kedar Kopstein) that this expression is a case of synesthesia (a conflation of senses or attribution of the stimulation of one sense to another sense), and presents at greater length, in various contexts, the biblical use of sensory words or terms of movement in the sense of perception, understanding, and learning. 50 Rofé (Mavo Lesifrut HaMiqra, 409) sees these verses (4:9–12) as the continuation of the tradition of collections, i.e. As in the other instances, such as 7:1–6, 9…7–9. Here, too, Koheleth is including in his collection a well-known maxim from the literature of the ancient East (Rofé refers to Sheffer, who points to the various versions of the Legend of Gilgamesh—see ibid., note 15). 51 Kislev (“Qohelet vehitmodeduto,” 42, and note 53) suggests that the problematic transition to first person in the latter half of this verse (“For whom do I labor, and bereave my soul of good?“) should be understood, as some commentators have suggested, as Koheleth’s personal identification with the topic, after presenting it as objective truth—i.e., a rare outburst of feeling that provides a glimpse of his real personality.

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sorrow” (1:18). He who excels, who is one of a kind, is not only lonely and unable to share his knowledge with anyone else,52 but is also incapable of fully appreciating what he possesses (“neither is his eye satisfied”), and therefore he misses out on the existing and what the present has to offer him. It is in light of these words that one must interpret the following verse: “Two are better than one; because they have a good reward for their labor” (4:9). This is not an endorsement of camaraderie and socializing, as this would not only be contrary to Koheleth’s generally introverted nature, and at odds with the previous verse.53 Rather, it is an assertion that two ordinary individuals are better than one, however remarkable or peerless. Indeed, as is evident from the continuation of that passage, which talks about the “threefold cord,” the more, the merrier. Verses 4:8–12 are, in effect, one statement, which begins with “There is one alone,” which is not a statement against solitariness—just as “neither is his eye satisfied with riches” is not a statement against greed. Rather, they form part of a general rejection of ambition, for it obliges one to engage in a pursuit without end (“yet is there no end of all his labor”)—and as such without any clear goal. It is a futile quest, which leads a person to lose appreciation of the present and of what he has (“For whom do I labor,54 and bereave my soul of good”—4:8). In contrast to the disadvantages of distinction, Koheleth hails the virtues of the “average”—and the value of others: “For if they fall, the one will lift up his fellow: but woe to him that is alone when he falleth; for he hath not another to help him up / again, if two lie together, then they have heat: but how can one be warm alone ? / and if one prevail against him, two shall withstand him”(4:10–12). The claim that this is simply about physical protection is implausible: the advantages described here are self-evident, and there was no need to detail them. But as in the other passages that we have discussed, here too the detailed list is meant to 52 Conversely, see D. Rudman, “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4 13–16,” JBL 116/1 (1997): 57–73, who believes that this is indeed a reference to the essential loneliness of any person, while “yet is there no end of all his labor” is a reflection of society’s demands, which is governed by jealousy. 53 Some commentators believe that the next verse (10) is a sardonic addendum by the author, which sees the benefits of socialization as limited to physical protection. See: R. Gordis, Kohelet. The Man and his World, a Study of Ecclesiastes, New York 1971, p. 242. 54 In my view, For whom in this case should be understood as “To what end?” (In some instances in the Hebrew Bible, the Hebrew word mi (who) is used in the sense of “How”—see Ruth 3:16, and entry mi in the BDB, p. 566.)

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denote a range of options, and as such is metaphorical. Thus, “woe to him that is alone when he falleth” does not refer to a physical fall, but any kind of fall. If someone is peerless and falls from their high status, there is no one to help him back up. Conversely, if there is “another” who can support and raise him, it follows that “him that is alone” is not unique and singular in his status and achievements, after all. The groundwork for the ideological meaning of this metaphorical image is laid down before, in a wide-ranging description, or detailed “catalogue,” where we gain a glimpse of Koheleth’s personal experience (2:3–10). Close inspection of the wording reveals that Koheleth had not merely tried his hand in every possible field, but had sought the ultimate achievement and the most extreme option in each, in a bid to “see what was that good for the sons of men” (2:3).55 Here, contrary to elsewhere in the book which state that there is no absolute “good”—only relative (“better is… than”)—the good is an explicit entity that one must be dedicated to and hold onto in reality (“under the heaven”) for all of one’s life (“the days of their life”). He also notes that what he had acquired was greater in quantity and quality “above all that were in Jerusalem before me” (2:7), and “I was great, and increased more than all that were before me in Jerusalem” (2:9). And yet, despite all this (and similar accomplishments stated in Chapter 2), the many means that he had at his disposal only shackled him and subjected him to an endless process, and accordingly, all his achievements were fleeting (2:11). This view is repeated throughout the book. “He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver” (5:9), for example, addresses the same issue. Here, the word “loveth” is likely in its most extreme sense of total and uncompromising devotion, since no one hates money for no reason.56 But money itself is not an end in itself, but a means, and devotion to it is akin to walking on a path with no end—an act that prevents a person from savoring 55 I propose interpreting the reasoning behind “for what can the man do that cometh after the king?” (2:12) as I did earlier: “the king” is a metonymic expression of the ultimate, absolute, and perfect. Some commentators argue that instead of “after the king,” it should be understood as “after me”—i.e., as a continuation of Koheleth’s personal confession. See Seow, Ecclesiastes (1997), 118. However, this is belied by the latter part of the verse—“even that which hath been already done“), which in the Hebrew is et asher asuhu, is in third person. 56 Seow (ibid. 21–36) explains at length about the use of “silver” in the time of Koheleth as a payment currency. See also other linguistic devices used at this period in “Linguistic Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” JBL 115.4 (1996): 21–36.

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the present and obliges him to let it slip between his hands. (The second half of the verse is obscure: “he that loveth abundance with increase”57— although one might surmise that it is meant to complement the first half, i.e. he who devotes himself to pursuing a great deal does not get to enjoy the fruits of his labor.58 Similarly, “All the labor of man is for his mouth, and yet the appetite is not filled” [6:7], is obscure, but it may be understood as either Koheleth denouncing boundless greed, or commending one to work only to suit his needs, since appetite, i.e. greed, can never be satisfied.59) The futility of striving to achieving the ultimate goal of some sort is echoed in other maxims. Thus, for example— For there is a man whose labor is in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in equity; yet to a man that hath not labored therein shall he leave it for his portion. This also is vanity and a great evil. [2:21]

—from which we understand that, for Koheleth, the word labor means dogged dedication. Once again, the “catalogue-like” detail of traits such as wisdom, knowledge and skill, are an allusion to skills or talents generically. Here we learn that he who does not labor in one of these also receives “his portion”60—an idea reiterated in 2:26:

57 Most commentators believe that the Hebrew letter bet in behamon (“with increase”) is a dittographic error, and it should have read simply hamon (“a great deal”). But Seow (Ecclesiastes, 204–205) points to other instances in support of the Masoretic version, such as haamen be– (“believe in”), or b’taḥ be- (“trust in”)…, and thus its meaning here is “whoso believes in prosperity.” 58 Frederics believes that 5:9–6:9 is an independent, literary unit with a chiastic structure. However, during our inquiry I shall attempt to explain that in the book’s final edited form it offers a mosaic of themes that regularly repeat as permanent or similar elements in literary units that can no longer be defined in schematic boundaries. See D.C. Frederics, “Chiasm and Parallel Structure in Qoheleth 5:9–6:9,” JBL 108.1 (1989): 17–35. 59 Cf. Fox, Qohelet and his Contradictions, 190. The Hebrew word corresponding to appetite is nefesh, whose original meaning was “throat, esophagus” (see Numbers 11:6; Jeremiah 31:14; Psalms 69:2, etc.) or “body” and, metaphorically, “appetite.” However, elsewhere in the Book of Ecclesiastes—e.g., 6:9—it does appear in the sense of “soul.” 60 “Portion” in its usual sense of “remuneration, reward” (see also 3:22, 5:17)—witness the significant parallelism in 5:18: “[...] to enjoy the good of all his labor that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life, which God giveth him: for it is his portion.”

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For God giveth to a man that is good in his sight wisdom, and knowledge, and joy: but to the sinner he giveth travail, to gather and to heap up, that he may give to him that is good before God.

Many commentators have had difficulties with this verse,61 but its structure may shed some light: at its beginning we find the expression “that is good in his sight,” and at its end—“before God.” Although this closes a circle, it is not a chiastic structure. If it were, the words “to the sinner” would have had to appear in the penultimate stage, as a parallel to “to him that is good before God,” that appears at the beginning. Moreover, a chiastic structure, as is well known, is a visual illustration of the notion of reward, or measure for measure62—but Koheleth rejects the reward doctrine (see, in particular, 8:14), and this verse is not about the reward for one person versus the punishment of another, but about the contrast between two complementary paths in the creation of perfection “before God.” The “sinner” here is not necessarily a criminal, but merely one who

61 See the extensive and detailed review of commentaries of this verse in A. Pinker, “How should we understand Ecclesiastes 2:26?,” JBQ 37,4 (2010): 219–229, where he notes three main possible interpretations: (1) That this is about “ideal” or “poetic” justice (as understood by Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Rashbam, Sforno, Metzudot, as well as Ginsburg, Delitzsch, Whybray, Hartum, Zer Kavod and others. Such an understanding requires one to focus on the identity of the “sinner.” On this point, Pinker, like others, is mistaken in his understanding of the description of the “sinner.” To my mind, what Koheleth is proposing is a suggestion to come to terms with realities, and the sinner is he who is misguided and does not recognize current realities, and continues to labor and pursue, and there is no end to his efforts. In this regard, the passivity of doing “good” in the sight of God is the right and desirable action. To understand “sin” as “error” (and not necessarily as a deliberate transgression), see M. Z. Kadri, Milon HaIvrit HaMiqra’it, 228 (conversely, see Talmudic commentaries, such as Brakhot 1:102—the story of Rabbi Meir and his wife Bruria—which interprets “sins” (ḥata‫׳‬im) as the plural form of ḥet.) Another possible interpretation is the arbitrariness of God’s actions (which many modern commentators subscribe to, such as Hertzfeld, Gelling, Gordis, Ginsburg, Fox, Seow, Rudman). In this regard, the main problem is the question of the nature of the “sin”—i.e. the criterion for determining it: is this a moral sin toward man, or toward God. The third possibility is that Koheleth is merely quoting a wisdom adage, or this is an addendum of a pious editor (which is Pinker’s ultimate conclusion). 62 See, in particular, Fokkelman’s analysis of the structure of the story of the Tower of Babel (Gen. 11:1–9) in J.P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis, Assen/Amsterdam 1975 pp. 11–45.

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is leading a misguided lifestyle,63 and that a person who is fortunate to have joy, wisdom and knowledge—i.e., he who is happy with his lot—is good in the sight of God. Conversely, he who is forever seeking to gather and accrue—namely, on a constant quest of acquisition in a bid to reach a level of perfection (“that he may give to him that is good before God”), is misguided. It is a rejection of the relentless desire and pursuit of ever more and more, and praise for he who is content with what he has. Without such an interpretation, it is difficult to understand the latter half of the verse, at least.

The relative nature of values Koheleth’s rejection of the striving for perfection ties in directly with his statements about the relative nature of values: since striving for the absolute and perfect is like chasing the wind (because perfection is unattainable), Koheleth offers a series of preferences, whose common denominator is awareness of one’s limitations, and being content with what one has. In the absence of an absolute “good,” there is only relative “good.” In various contexts, Koheleth repeatedly remarks upon the relative nature of the good, and from these it is apparent that in this he is referring to values, situations, skills, and behavioral patterns. In all of these, one option is preferable to another, but from their variety, it is clear that here, too, Koheleth is talking about the range of possibilities. In other words, in all instances, and not just in certain topics, the choice that one has is between one relative good and another. To fully understand the worldview behind these statements, it is useful to list the relevant verses and discuss their meaning in turn: Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full with travail and vexation of spirit (4:6) Two are better than one (4:9) Better is a poor and a wise child than an old and foolish king (4:13) Better is it that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay (5:4) Better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of the desire (6:9)

63 The meaning of sin in the sense of “error” is fairly common in the Hebrew Bible. See BDB, 306—and the discussion above on the meaning of 2:26.

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A good name is better than precious ointment; and the day of death than the day of one’s birth (7:1) It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting... (7:2) Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better (7:3) It is better to hear the rebuke of the wise, than for a man to hear the song of fools (7:5) Wisdom is good with an inheritance... (7:14) Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof (7:8a) ...the patient in spirit is better than the proud in spirit (7:8b) ...for a living dog is better than a dead lion (9:4) Wisdom is better than strength (9:16) Wisdom is better than weapons of war (9:18) Wisdom strengtheneth the wise more than ten mighty men which are in the city (7:19)

We have before us ten pronouncements of this sort. In two of them—7:14 & 19—the explicit pattern of “is better than...” is missing, but the word better in them is both relative and conditional. The statement “wisdom is good with an inheritance” means that wisdom without an inheritance is not a “good” wisdom: inheritance in this case is not in the narrow sense of a plot of land, but in the broader sense of a source of livelihood, remuneration, or fruits of labor. The same applies to 7:19, where wisdom may not an absolute guarantee, but is still better than ten mighty men.64 These two expressions of praise for the virtues of wisdom may be complementary: in one (7:14) we learn that wisdom with no existential purpose or basis, is not good; in the other (7:19) we learn that control without wisdom is not good. Here, too, as previously noted, the Hebrew word for “mighty men”—shalitim—from the root sh-l-t, meaning “rule”—is in the broader, metaphorical sense, rather than in the narrow sense of an actual ruler. But it is worth dwelling a little on the other statements, as well. At least two of them (9:16, 9:18) repeatedly confirm the relative advantage of wisdom (although, as we saw earlier, Koheleth argues ironically that wisdom is no guarantee against destruction and oblivion—that is to say, it is of no “advantage”—cf. 2:13). The element of wisdom also appears in vss. 4:13 64 Similar to this pronouncement, in principle, is 7:7: “Surely oppression maketh a wise man mad; and a gift destroyeth the heart.” I agree with Rofé’s interpretation that if a wise man meets an oppressor, the oppressor will drive him mad—i.e., even wisdom cannot necessarily withstand other’s greed. See Rofé, Mavo Lesifrut HaMiqra, 408. But see also Bronzwick’s interpretation, that oppression in this instance means “boastfulness,” or “arrogance.” Bronzwick’s: “Surely oppression maketh a wise man mad; and a gift destroyeth the heart” (Eccl. 7:7), Beit Mikra, 52:2 (2006), pp. 91–94.

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(“Better is a poor and a wise child”) and 7:5 (“It is better to hear the rebuke of the wise, than for a man to hear the song of fools”). Taken together, they state that wisdom is deemed superior to all other virtues. In the course of our examination we will see increasing emphasis that real wisdom lies in accepting existing realities and frameworks, and in knowing one’s limitations. Accordingly, although the verses that exhibit such preferences appear to relate to different issues, what they all have in common is a preference for the existing, the average, and the readily available. For Koheleth, it clear that immediate and tangible satisfaction (“Better is an handful with quietness”—4:6) is preferable to constant and pointless striving (“vexation of spirit”) toward some ultimate goal (“both the hands full”). Similarly, that which is tangible and existing (“the sight of the eyes”—6:9) is preferable to vague intentions and goals (“the wandering of the desire”).65 His preference for the “ordinary” over the exceptional is an issue we have already discussed, in relation to the phrase “Two are better than one” (4:9). Nowhere is the contentment with the tangible and the achievable more starkly expressed than in Koheleth’s preference for life of any kind—even the wretched—over heroic death, or self-sacrifice for lofty ideals: “for a living dog is better than a dead lion” (9:4). This statement, more than any other, illustrates Koheleth’s attitude to values. In contrast to a lifestyle that demands one to be ready to sacrifice oneself for one’s belief, and contrary to any ideology, Koheleth declares that there is no worthier cause than life itself. In other words, life itself is the goal, rather than the means to achieving any other objective. Moreover, in this verse in particular, and in this ideological context, we find one of the few passages, if not the only one, where good is not relative, but absolute: “For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope: for a living dog is better than a dead lion.” (9:4). Making the most out of life is the only “better” that Koheleth recognizes. 65 It is possible that behind the parallel of “the sight of the eyes” with “the wandering of the desire” lies another interpretive layer—namely, judging by appearances is a human trait (“[...] for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the lord looketh on the heart”—I Samuel 16:7), while God judges by a person’s heart or ardent desire. We find a higher level of discernment in Isaiah’s description of the ideal ruler: “And shall make him of quick understanding in the fear of the Lord: and he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears” (Isaiah 11:3). Koheleth is therefore challenging this view, by suggesting that ordinary judgment is preferable to the ideal judgment ability.

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In light of this radical declaration, all the other pronouncements about the preferred “good” are merely ramifications or consequences, because it encapsulates the ideological foundation of Koheleth’s worldview— all other statements merely apply it to other areas. Since, according to Koheleth, one must prefer what is readily accessible to any aspiration to achieve the perfect and the excellent, it is little surprise that he advises avoiding any long-term commitments, for which there is no assurance that one may fulfill them in any event: “Better is it that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay” (5:4)—because, as the previous verse warns: “When thou vowest a vow unto God, defer not to pay it.” As in the case of other pronouncements that we have discussed, this, too, should not be seen as a casual moral directive or religious injunction about the sanctity of a vow. In the Hebrew Bible, a vow is not only a serious pledge, but a solemn undertaking of the most significant sort of sacrifice.66 Just as he argues devoting oneself to a “life’s work,” and against efforts to insure oneself against future unexpected mishaps or acquiring skills and abilities to achieve certain accomplishments and excellence in a bid to insure against oblivion and extinction, Koheleth here cautions against making any long-term commitment that one does not know if and when one can fulfill. All these, in his view, are obstacles to making the most of

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There are five descriptions of vows in the Hebrew Bible: Jacob’s vow (Genesis 28:20– 22); the vow of the Children of Israel in the desert (Numbers 21:2); Jephthah’s vow (Judges 11:30–31); Hannah’s vow (I Samuel 1:11); and Absalom’s vow (II Samuel 15:8). From a literary viewpoint, they appear to have followed a fixed template, since they have certain elements in common: 1) Opening pattern (“And X vowed [...] God/the Lord”); 2) Prefixing the condition with the word If; 3) verb emphasis by root repetition (in Hebrew) or the addition of surely, indeed, or whatsoever (in English): “and will [...] and will“; “aser aasrenu” [surely give the tenth of]; “naton titen” [wilt indeed deliver]; “hayotzé asher yatza” [whatsoever cometh forth]; “raoh tir’eh” [wilt indeed look]; yashov yashiveni [shall bring me again indeed]. This pattern has ancient roots, as it also appears in ancient Ugaritic literature (CTA 14 (Krt) IV 199–206). See also Y. Avishur, Encyclopedia Olam Hatanakh: Sefer Bereshit [The World of the Hebrew Bible: The Book of Genesis], Tel Aviv, 1993 pp 174–175. Thus, vows had an ancient and sacred tradition. See S. Gelander, “Vow,” The Book of Genesis, vol II, Tel Aviv (Open University, 2009) pp 246–247. It, however, be should be noted that Koheleth’s warning in verse Eccl. 5:4 is not necessarily a repetition of the commandment in Deut. 23:23 (“That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform”): here the intention is to avoid taking on commitments, as explained above.

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the present, and represent various types of flight from it toward a vague future. Most of the other pronouncements about the relative “good”— especially those in Chapter 7—have an even clearer common ground. In various ways, they all illustrate the statement “Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof” (7:8)—i.e., the end of a journey is preferable to its beginning. This, apparently, is also the true meaning behind “A good name is better than precious ointment” (7:1). As we saw earlier, a person’s name is an encapsulation of their essential nature and traits—the product of their journey in life.67 In contrast, the oil represents an embarkation on a journey, and a designation to a particular role, or mission. Ostensibly, this statement says that a person’s good name is preferable to material comforts—but Koheleth is not interested in praising virtues and good qualities and denouncing material comforts. Indeed, such a declaration would contradict his recommendations to enjoy all that is readily available—especially his prescription “Let thy garments be always white; and let thy head lack no ointment” (9:8). Moreover, such an interpretation would be at odds with the second half of the same verse (“and the day of death than the day of one’s birth”), and would not present a plausible parallelism.68 Accordingly, the word “name” should be seen as parallel to “the day of death,” and “precious ointment” as corresponding to “the day of one’s birth.” Awareness of the end of a journey causes a person to cling to the present while recognizing their own limitations, and divesting oneself of any illusions. This apparently is also the idea behind verse 7:2, since “a house of mourning” is where one meets with the end of a journey, while “and the living will lay it to his heart” is the point when one becomes 67 See Prov. 22:1; Zephaniah 3:19. Cf.: Song of Songs 1:3. The alliterative wordplay in the Hebrew (“tov shem mishemen tov”) both accentuates the words’ affinity and underlines the distinction between them. In the ancient East, a name was perceived as a concise encapsulation of a person or thing—therefore the act of naming is an expression of the caller’s control, or experience, of that which is named. Thus, God’s dominion over the world is also evident in the new names that he bestows everything he creates (light = day; darkness = night; firmament = sky; gathering together of the waters = sea). Similarly, a victorious king renames the defeated foe, and the names that mothers give their sons reflect their emotional experiences just before birth. See S. Gelander, ibid. (2009), 261. 68 Some commentators interpret this verse to mean that a person’s good name outlasts them. See L. Crenshaw, ibid. pp.  133–134, and Kislev’s reservations about such interpretations (“Qohelet vehitmodeduto,” 40).

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conscious of the fact that after death there is nothing, and therefore only the present offers anything of substance. Similarly, in a “house of mirth” a person is inclined to fall prey to illusions. Since making the most of the present and adhering to it is dependent on coming to terms with reality and its order and on one’s awareness of humanity’s limitations, it is clear why it is preferable to hear the rebuke of the wise than the song of fools (7:5): the wise has experience, and his criticism is based on knowledge of the present, while the fool is the opposite. The notion that “Sorrow is better than laughter” (7:3) on the grounds that “for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better” may be based on the same idea. The actual word used in the original Hebrew is kaas (anger), and various Jewish commentaries have suggested that anger may deter a person from doing bad things, while laughter prevents one from returning to the straight and narrow.69 Accordingly, anger makes one take greater care with one’s actions. However, from the various interpretations put forward in Talmudic commentaries it appears that the meaning of this verse is uncertain—especially since elsewhere Koheleth explicitly advises to avoid anger, and even denounces it outright (11:10, 7:9). One of these statements in particularly obscure, and given to many interpretations: “Better is a poor and a wise child than an old and foolish king” (4:13). The main difficulty lies in the ensuing verses, starting with “For out of prison he cometh to reign” etc. (4:14).70 Verse 16 is particularly difficult—“There is no end of all the people, even of all that have been before them: they also that come after shall not rejoice in him. Surely this also is vanity and vexation of spirit”—because it is unclear who the words them or him refer to.71 One can only surmise that in this passage Koheleth 69 See Kohelet Rabbah 7:3, and its discussion of the story of David and Adonijah, or of Amnon, and of the generation of the Flood, or Sodom and Gomorrah. 70 In the King James translation used here, and in the JPS (can emerge), the verb is in the present tense, but most commentators agree that the Hebrew verb should be read in the past tense—yatza (came out). 71 The most likely possibility, in my view, is that the Hebrew word oto should not be understood as him, but as it, referring to the child’s future, which also does not fare well: although innumerable people prefer him, ultimately they will be disappointed in him, as well. This is how Seow (Ecclesiastes, 173) understands it, but Ogden understands it differently—see: G.  S.  Ogden, “Allusion in Qoheleth IV 13–16 ?,” VT 30/3 (1980): 309–315. In his view, the statement in this passage is that wisdom is generally not recognized, and therefore not worthwhile. He also believes that the

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is seeking to qualify his pronouncements—namely, that while the start of a journey (“a poor and a wise child”) is preferable to its end (“an old and foolish king”), and despite the great success that that person may enjoy, ultimately he, too, will be a disappointment. This sequence of verses about the relativity of good is therefore not a chance collection, and certainly do not contradict Koheleth’s basic premises.72 Rather, they are examples of the various ramifications of a consistent and comprehensive worldview.73 They all appear to be primarily an urging to make the most of the present while being conscious of the limits of reality and the world order, and of one’s own limitations. Recognition of limitations involves coming to terms with existing realities, both in the universe as a whole, and in society. The declaration “That which hath been is named already,74 and it is known that it is man: neither may he contend with him that is mightier than he” (6:10) is not necessarily a pessimistic declaration, because its purpose is the opposite: recognizing existing realities and being aware of limitations clears the way to making the most

description hints at a particular reversal of fortune in Israelite history—possible related to Abraham, Joseph, David, or Jeconiah or Daniel. But Ogden himself believes that there may be no connection between the old king and the child. In my view, any attempt to attribute this statement to a particular historical chapter would be both speculative and contrived. Rudman raises the possibility that this passage be in the tradition of court stories attesting to unstable societies, such as those of Joseph, Esther, and Daniel—see D. Rudman, “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4:13–16,” JBL 116/1 (1997): 57–73. Weismann thinks he detects a hint of political satire in 4:13–16 and 9:13–16—see Z. Weissman, Satirah Politit Bamiqra [Political Satire in the Hebrew Bible], Jerusalem 1966, pp.  219–234. However, to my mind, Koheleth’s words go beyond mere critique of a particular historical incident. See also below the discussion about the attitude toward a ruler. 72 Conversely, see Seow (Ecclesiastes, 47–60), who believes that this sequence— especially 4:10–16, is somewhat surprising, since Koheleth had previously argued that one must enjoy from everything available. I shall return to this point in the discussion about Koheleth’s views on the nature of wisdom. (Similarly, Rofé [Mavo Lesifrut Hamiqra, 408–409] believes that this is a series of existing sayings that Koheleth is quoting, and his intention is to challenge mainly the invariable praising of the wise and denunciation of the fool, while his actual opinion is in vss. 7:6b–7. See also Kislev’s reservation in Kislev, “Qohelet vehitmodeduto,” 40. 73 With the exception of 7:3 with regard to preferring anger (“sorrow” in JPS and KJ), whose meaning is unclear. 74 In other words, it has already been established and defined. See my explanations about the nature of a name above, and note 59.

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of the present, and thereby to happiness. Thus, we are in a better position to understand the statement— Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because though a man labor to seek it out, yet he shall not find it ; yea further; though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it (8:17)

This interpretation is consistent with “Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions” (7:29), in which Koheleth praises the divine act of Creation in creating man as honest, while denouncing the pointless pursuits that people engage in. The same is true of the declaration “He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end” (3:11).75

Absolute justice versus existing world order Koheleth’s recommendation to come to terms with existing realities underpins his advice “If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they” (5:8). This brings us back to the relativity of good: “And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there” (3:16). This is not, in my view, just a pessimistic protestation against world realities,76 since he later says “I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work” (3:17). Part of his reasoning for this is “For there is not a just man upon 75 The use of the words find out in this context (in Hebrew, matza) may lend further support to my proposed interpretation above—namely, that in addition to the notion of what is available, it also refers to success. This expression in itself may indicate that Koheleth links success with making the most of what is at hand. See also above on Baal Metzudat Zion’s interpretation of this verse, in which he emphasizes man’s free will (note 28). 76 Bakon (“Kohelet”), sees these verses as evidence of Koheleth’s skepticism about the reward doctrine.

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earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not” (7:20). In other words, Koheleth recommends that we leave judgment in the hands of God, because only He is in possession of the absolute values, while man is capable of only partially understanding them, and indeed sometimes understands them in completely opposite fashion. This may help explain the verses that present what he has learned from his own experience: There is a vanity which is done upon the earth; that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous: I said that this also is vanity (8:14)

If we accept the notion that the word vanity means something ephemeral and short-lived, and the phrase “upon the earth” (or “under the sun”) as something limited and relative, then the meaning of this verse is that a misguided reward is but a fleeting benefit. And indeed, in the same context, in the previous verses, Koheleth has already argued that “But it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow; because he feareth not before God” (8:13).77 While it is unclear if this verse is really praising God’s judgment and world order, it does end with the recommendation to enjoy and rejoice by coming to terms with this reality, and in a manner that allows one to make the most of the present. This, in his view, is the essence of wisdom: Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry: for that shall abide with him of his labor the days of his life, which God giveth him under the sun.78 / when I applied mine heart to know wisdom, and to see the business that is done upon the earth (8:15–16)

This message is echoed in verses 7:15: [...] there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness.” But there the counsel is also cast within a significant framework, that begins “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of 77

Verse 12 is somewhat obscure, but when read in conjunction with vs. 13 it may become clearer. Specifically, the word order in vs.  13 should be rearranged—namely,“[...] because he feareth not before God, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow.” Thus, the passage presents the fear of God as security and belief in present world order, and he who does not fear God will not gain sight of the good. 78 Eat and drink is a metonymic expression meaning daily routine or function—see especially Jer. 22:15, and below, chapter 2.

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adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other [...],” and ends with “Be not righteous over much; neither make thyself over wise: why shouldest thou destroy thyself?” (7:14–17). It follows, therefore, that the recommendation to come to terms with existing realities involves avoiding adherence to a single path and from pursuing the ultimate. (Does this mean that any choice involves a concession of some sort? Although Koheleth does not say this explicitly, the aggregate of his statements on this topic appears to suggest so. This may explain the purpose of the statement “but one sinner destroyeth much good” [9:18]—especially if we interpret sinner to mean someone misguided, as we proposed earlier [with regard to 2:26], that is to say, someone who prefers to stick to one path and make the most of it [“to gather and to heap up”] instead of enjoying all opportunities that come one’s way.) Recognizing and accepting existing realities is behind several of Koheleth’s recommendations, including those about the correct attitude to one’s superiors (i.e., rulers and kings) and those of a lower station in life (“thy servant”—7:21, as we shall see below). The balance between these two is what brings a person to understand their position, status and limitations, thereby avoiding escaping to what lies beyond one’s reach, and allowing one to make full use of what exists at present. This, it seems, is also the meaning of his statement “Whoso keepeth the commandment shall feel no evil thing: and a wise man’s heart discerneth both time and judgment” (8:5), which appears to refer to the commandments of one’s king or ruler. Awareness of the existing hierarchy is supposed to deter a person from getting involved in matters that lie beyond his control. Awareness of one’s limitations involves understanding that one can never attain perfectionm, as epitomized by the “king”: “for what can the man do that cometh after the king? even that which hath been already done” (2:12). The “king,” as the pinnacle of the social hierarchy, is a metonymic reference to a champion (as we saw with regard to 5:9, “the king himself is served by the field”). These ideas are the basis for Koheleth’s advice and recommendations about the appropriate attitude toward a ruler, which is first and foremost to act with submission and care (8:2–4): I counsel thee to keep the king’s commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God. / Be not hasty to go out of his sight: stand not in an evil thing; for he doeth whatsoever

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pleaseth him. / where the word of a king is, there is power: and who may say unto him, what doest thou? (8:2–4)79

This verse is partly obscure,80 but its general sense is clear. The words “Be not hasty” appear to mean “Do not rush [to say anything].”81 The same applies to another advice: “Curse not the king, no not in thy thought; and curse not the rich in thy bedchamber: for a bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that which hath wings shall tell the matter” (10:20). The parallelism suggests that the reference at the end of the first part is indeed thy bedchamber (in Hebrew, matza’akha) and not thy knowledge (mada’akha) as appears in the Masoretic version.82 Although, at a simplistic and narrow level, this is a warning not to inform on someone (“for a bird of the air shall carry the voice”),83 in the metaphorical sense it appears to be an appeal to internalize one’s acceptance of social hierarchy, even in secret and in intimate situations. The duty of obedience and discreet conduct 79 Waldman believes that these verses aim to warn against the king’s terrible power— based on Safira’s contracts and Assarhadon’s Contract, in which the vassal is sworn not to heed any unfavorable statements about the king’s actions or those of his heir (Ashurbanipal). However, Waldman also admits that the similarity to those writings is not compelling, because with Koheleth the emphasis is on actual acts of rebellion or conspiracy (cf. Ezek.  17:13). He also points to an Amarna letter, in which conspiracies against the king are described as “a bad thing,” while the expression stand not he interprets as “do not ally with.” See M. Waldman, “The Dābār Ra of Ecclesiastes 8:3,” JBL 98/3 (1979): 407, 408—and the references in the Bibliography there. 80 The words counsel thee are absent in the Hebrew, but Seow (Ecclesiastes, 276) agrees with the translations that insert them, as a form of “Say I.” 81 Particularly per the JPS. See above our explanation for the verse 5:2, “Be not rash with thy mouth.” 82 Malul (Knowledge, Control and Sex, 233–234, note 5) interprets thy knowledge from in the sense of sexual congress—as in Micah 7:5 (“keep the doors of thy mouth from her that lieth in thy bosom“)—in which case, either reading is correct. See also Seow (Ecclesiastes, 328), who translates it “Even in your intimacy.” 83 Seow, ibid. 35, explains this advice in light of the social and economic situation in Koheleth’s time, when tax collection was entrusted to private “contractors,” which brought about a proliferation of informers—hence the warning to mind one’s tongue. However, even if that is the case, I prefer to interpret it in a broader, more symbolic sense of advising one to know one’s place and act accordingly. In any event, the meaning of this expression here is far from its original meaning, as in the commentary of the Book of Psalms, which attributes special wisdom to birds (especially crows). On this matter, see A. A.  Shemesh, “Ki Off Hashamaim Yolikh et Hakol, Kohelet 10:20,” Beit Mikra 49b (2004): 156–177.

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also explains 10:4: “If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place; for yielding pacifieth great offences”—the general meaning of which is that one must avoid taking action and remain passive in the face of a ruler’s wrath, because as his anger subsides, he also forgives and forgets.84 Since the “king” or “ruler” epitomizes social law and order, clearly happiness is contingent upon the existence of good order, with the king in his rightful place—and conversely, when rulers do not maintain good order, catastrophe ensues.85 This is the meaning of the words “Blessed art thou, O land, when thy king is the son of nobles, and thy princes eat in due season, for strength, and not for drunkenness” (10:17), and its corollary— “Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child, and thy princes eat in the morning!” (10:6). Generally, these verses are about proper versus improper conduct: the word na’ar in the Hebrew Bible serves both in the sense of an adolescent boy lacking in status and authority (cf. Jeremiah 1:6)—in contrast to zaqen, who enjoys authority and respect—or a slave, whose opposite here is ben-ḥorim. Proper conduct in this context is not in the sense of restrained and modest behavior as opposed to the pursuit of pleasures and diversions,86 but in the wider sense, since Koheleth is not preaching arbitrary morality. (Cf. Isaiah 3:4, where the plural of na’ar (— in KJ, “children”) implies both a punishment and curse: “And I will give children to be their princes, and babes shall rule over them”—Isaiah 3:4).87 Here, too, the use of the words eat or drink is metonymic, symbolizing any 84 This reading of the verse aligns with the JPS: “If the wrath of a lord flares up against you, don’t give up your post; for when wrath abates, grave offenses are pardoned.” 85 See E. Levine, “The Humor in Qohelet,” ZAW 109,1 (1997): 71–83. He groups all of Koheleth’s critiques of rulers under the heading Institutional Absurdity, arguing that just as the prophets refuse to recognize anything conventional and satisfactory with the good, so Koheleth is reluctant to identify anything customary and proper as sane. In Levine’s view, Koheleth is describing various negative manifestations of human behavior in a humorous tone—i.e., by accentuating their comic or absurd aspects, for essentially didactic purposes. As we shall see in the course of our inquiry, it seems that, just as the prophets’ denunciation of people’s sins was governed by a vision, Koheleth’s critiques are shaped by his notion of “correct” lifestyle. However, it is difficult to determine the tone in which the words were said, or whether they said tongue in cheek, or humorously, as Levine suggests. That said, I agree with him that Koheleth’s tone does not strike one as gloomy, angry or irritable. 86 Cf. Fuchs, Olam HaTanakh:Fox, Megilot, 204. 87 See also Hosea 3:4, 10:8, and elsewhere.

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routine conduct or function.88 Thus, Koheleth here is praising a country whose rulers are worthy and conduct themselves properly, and denounces the opposite.89 Other aspects of coming to terms with realities and limitations Coming to terms with existing realities is not only about recognizing one’s status in relation to one’s superiors in the hierarchy, or about constant obedience to authority, but also about the proper treatment of those of lower rank. This explains what Koheleth says about slaves: “Also take no heed unto all words that90 are spoken; lest thou hear thy servant curse thee:” (7:21). Recognition of proper boundaries is the key to making the most of the present and the available. Just as one must negate one’s wishes before someone superior, one must also ignore the sardonic attitude of one’s subordinates.91 This understanding appears to demonstrate that Koheleth’s philosophy is a coherent doctrine of ideas, rather than an ad hoc collection of proverbs and maxims of diverse, and at times contradictory, messages. Koheleth’s recommendation to be satisfied with the limitations of one’s achievements and not to aspire to perfection may also explain other statements, such as “Two are better than one,” which we explained earlier as a commendation of ordinariness, of connecting with one’s peers, and not seeking to be “without equal.” In similar fashion, I believe, we should 88 The Hebrew word bashti is in the sense of “drinking”—thus the expression eat and drink is divided into the two parts of the clause. 89 Although Fischer does find a link between what he defines as “the royal fiction” in 1:12 onwards, and among the ideas distributed throughout the book about the symbolic significance of the word king, and the importance of proper governance: those two notions, together, form part and parcel of the wisdom that Koheleth has acquired in his personal experience. However, Fischer sees 1:3–3:15 as a separate and uniform literary unit. See A. Fischer, “Beobachtungen zur Komposition von Kohelet 1,3–3,15,” ZAW 103,1 (1991): 72–86—and see also note 14 in the Introduction above. 90 Here the word that (in Hebrew, asher) is in the sense of “for the sake of,” or “in order that”—as in Gen. 11:7: “that they may not understand one another’s speech.” 91 The biblical use of the word curse (in Hebrew, qalel) is in many cases in the opposite sense of “honor”—i.e. “belittle.” The operative verb in Gen. 16:4 “[...] “her mistress was despised [in Hebrew, vateqal] in her eyes” is derived from the same root. In the case of Exod. 21:17 or Prov. 2:20—”he that curseth his father, or his mother” [meqalel aviv ve’imo]—the reference is not only to speech, but attitude.

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understand his stance regarding women. One such problematic verse is 7:26: “And I find more bitter than death the woman, whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands: whoso pleaseth God shall escape from her; but the sinner shall be taken by her.” The words whose heart should be regarded as the start of a subordinate clause, which explains what kind of woman is more bitter than death—namely, the “predatory” kind of woman, who lays a trap for a man and seeks to capture him in her net and subjugate him.92 In other words, Koheleth is not asserting that all women have hearts that are snares and nets—only the type that he describes here. His warning about such temptresses who seek to entrap the man is echoed at greater length in the Book of Proverbs, in dramatic terms (Prov. 2:16– 19; 5:3–6; 6:24–29).93 The great significance that these verses attribute to the appropriate form of socializing, which is the key to success and enjoyment of life, is in keeping with Koheleth’s rejection of ambition and the pursuit of excellence and achievement, and advocation of ordinariness and connecting with one’s equals, on the principle that “Two are better.”94 Therefore, the other statement regarding women is consistent with this approach, and complements it: Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life of thy vanity, which he hath given thee under the sun, all the days of thy vanity: for that is thy portion in this life, and in thy labor which thou takest under the sun” (9:9).95

(The repeated emphasis of the phrase “all the days of thy vanity,” and “under the sun” helps to clarify the intent: given the brevity of life and a

92 As the translation indicates, the Hebrew word asher here is in the sense of “whose”— i.e. not as a reason, but as a description, in this case of the woman that he finds “more bitter than death.” 93 Cf. Y. Shemesh, “‘Umotzé ani mar mimavet et ha’ishah’ (Kohelet 7:9): Ha’omnam metzuiah sin’at nashim bamiqra?” [Is there really hatred of women in the Hebrew Bible?], Shnaton 10 (2009): 77–101. 94 Many commentators understand this to mean a total rejection of all women—as though the heart of any woman “is snares and nets, and her hands as bands [...]” Scott (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 200) believes that, like the Sages, Koheleth has certain misgivings about women. He also cites examples from the Book of Proverbs, but does not appear to notice that there, too, the warning is about a particular type of woman, rather than women in general. Scott also raises the possibility that Koheleth is speaking here out of personal experience. 95 This positive depiction also appears in the Book of Proverbs (5:18–20).

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person’s limited abilities,96 the answer is “the wife whom thou lovest”.) And since, in the matter of the woman, we find that Koheleth’s recommendation is close in spirit to that of “Two are better than one,” we may also interpret accordingly the particularly difficult statement on this topic: “… one man among a thousand have I found; but a woman among all those have I not found” (7:28). If a good pairing is the most supreme of ambitions, it is only right that one must be extra careful in one’s search, and invest a great deal of effort in it. We find a similar expression in the Book of Proverbs, at the start of the song of praise to a woman: “Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies” (31:10).

Escaping to the past The human proclivity of continually escaping to the future, with all that that entails, is one obstacle preventing one from making the most of the present; another is the constant dwelling on the past: “Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days were better than these? for thou dost not enquire wisely concerning this” (7:10).97 In view of Koheleth’s repeated castigation of the numerous ways that people flee from the present to the future, the fact that he faults nostalgia only once appears somewhat lopsided. However, his attitude in this matter is not limited to this verse only: everything he says about his past and his experience (especially 1:12–14, 16–17; and 2:1–10, 12, 20) leads him to a series of conclusions (such as 1:15, 18; and 2:11, 13–19), of which this verse is the perhaps the most important one. His recognition of the importance of experience is consistent with his declaration that “Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof” (7:8)—since the future is shrouded in mystery, and lies beyond a person’s control, while experience of the past is based on reality, which he is duty-bound to be conscious of. That said, he must not dwell on the past or yearn for it, “for thou dost not enquire wisely concerning 96 See above our explanation for the expression “under the sun”—especially in the Introduction chapter. 97 The expression “the former days” here is undoubtedly a reference to the past in general, rather than to a specific period. Cf. his use of former in 1:11, as well—versus all that have been before them (in Hebrew, ha’aḥaronim) in 4:16.

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this.” And since wisdom means accepting existing realities and coming to terms with them, fleeing from the present toward the past and how things used to be is also unwise. With this pronouncement, therefore, Koheleth completes his critique of the efforts that people make in their pursuits, quests, and aspirations, which lead them to miss out on their lives—i.e., the present, and all that it has to offer.

Interim summary In this chapter I presented Koheleth’s assertions about the misguided lifestyle that people lead as they squander their lives in various efforts and aspirations to save themselves from oblivion, thereby failing to make the most of the present and finding themselves constantly seeking to flee from what is known and at hand, in pursuit of the unknown and unattainable. His criticism leads him to one fundamental conclusion about making the most of the present, with many ramifications: (a) In their desire to elude extinction and oblivion, people put all their efforts into securing their future, by passing on their life’s work to their heirs—but since there is no knowing if the heirs are worthy or capable of continuing this legacy, their labor is in vain; (b) Attempts to protect oneself from future mishaps are also ultimately in vain: instead of enjoying what is readily accessible and what the present has to offer, one is faced with a reality that is hazy, unexpected and uncontrollable; (c) Constant striving to perfection, excellence, and pursuit of attainments is but another attempt to escape extinction and oblivion (or anonymity)—and is equally misguided, since man cannot attain perfection. Moreover, the pursuit of excellence only causes one to be isolated, and the quest for ever more accomplishments only heightens one’s awareness of one’s shortcomings. The more effort one invests in achieving these goals, the more one is cut off from the present reality, and loses the ability to experience one’s life to the full;98 (d) The same is true of long-term commitments: when one vows to do something, one is assuming a task that one does not know if one can complete, and as long as that commitment is outstanding, one is shackled 98 As previously noted, Levine (“The Humor in Qohelet”) thinks Koheleth is saying this with his tongue firmly in his cheek.

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and preventing from appreciating and experiencing one’s surroundings; (e) Virtues, vaunted skills and excellence are all the product of certain values— but these are merely relative values, since absolute values lie beyond the reach of mortals; (f) The conclusion from all the above is that there is no point in devoting one’s life to supreme aims or sacrificing oneself for them. Life itself, even at its most wretched form, is an end in itself, rather than the means to achieving a goal that is ultimately unattainable. Some of Koheleth’s critical arguments are presented as the product of his personal experience. Some, however—such as his claim that there is nothing “in the grave, whither thou goest” (9:10)—are clearly not, but rather reasoned conclusions in their own right. Some assertions are linked together by association, or by virtue of a shared topic, and in some occasions, variations of the same assertion may appear in different passages, to underline various aspects of the same approach. Moreover, the negative critiques and positive prescriptions are not neatly divided into different texts, but interwoven with each other, with a positive counsel occasionally arising directly from a negative critique. Thus, his maxim“Two are better than one” is a direct extension of the description of the loneliness of the peerless individual. Similarly, his recommendation to accept and come to terms with existing realities springs from his rejection of the quest for perfect justice and absolute values. This acceptance, he maintains, is the very essence and practical outcome of wisdom. However, for methodological and didactic reasons, I prefer to separate Koheleth’s negative statements from his positive ones, since the latter, in my view, contain the substance of his teachings. Ideologically speaking, if one were to choose the statements that sum up the essence of Koheleth’s approach on the matters discussed above, I would list the following: “It is good that thou shouldest take hold of this; yea, also from this withdraw not thine hand” (7:18).99 This verse indicates that real wisdom lies in accepting existing realities and coming to terms with them, since it continues: “for he that feareth God shall come forth of them all”—in other words, this wisdom is also the true fear of God, which is something we shall expand upon in Chapter 3. 99 Malul, ibid., 136, points to the biblical use of the expression take hold (in Hebrew, eḥoz) in the sense of “learn,” when the reference is to experience, alongside other contact verbs such as tamakh.

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“For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope: for a living dog is better than a dead lion” (9:4). “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” (9:10). “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other” (7:14). Although these verses, in my opinion, faithfully represent the main tenets of Koheleth’s views on the issues discussed in this chapter, each of these topics is expressed in other verses, as well—albeit in different variations, or from slightly different perspectives. This is a natural outcome of the fact that poetic language based on metaphors never says precisely the same thing in other words. The more generic the heading of a given topic, the more it is able to encompass a wide range of statements. Accordingly, Koheleth’s outlook is not so much an orderly doctrine with a clear schematic structure, but a philosophical mosaic, whose elements are founded on the same consistent outlook—namely, the desire to present what Koheleth regards as a “correct” life, which is one based on maximum appreciation of the present and acceptance of existing realities. Consequently, he rejects the many ways in which people escape from the present and from what it has to offer. This twofold message has many guises, but the logical principle underlying them all is the same. Thus, the reader will find that the fundamental conclusion from certain statements is the same as from a group of other statements (with the exception of the poetic passages that are discrete creative pieces in their own right, such as 1:1–10; 3:1–9; 12:1–8—which we shall discuss later).

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2.

The positive aspect

The basic premise of this enquiry is that Koheleth’s positive directives are his primary concern, and his negative critiques are intended mainly to remove the obstacles from the desired path. In chapter  1, I alluded occasionally to those positive directives, noting that they spring directly from the critiques, inasmuch as one can induce from what he denounces what it is that he commends (e.g., 2:18–10)—and similarly with regard to his arguments about man’s limitations and his inability to achieve all that is whole and the absolute good.1 In these passages and others like them, one gets the impression that Koheleth’s positive prescriptions are only the default option2—i.e., appreciating the present and of all that it has to offer is merely a sort of compromise. In this chapter, we shall examine how, in fact, Koheleth perceives the “correct life” as an explicit objective and a purpose. This view may receive some support in chapter 3, which deals with Koheleth’s beliefs.

Eat and drink: Between despair and faith To explore this issue, we must first examine the meaning of the expression “eat and drink” (or, in some cases, only “eat”) in its various guises. In 1

2

Levin believes that Koheleth’s critiques had a didactic purpose—namely, to direct the reader’s attention to his positive prescriptions. Accordingly, he believes that the notion that Koheleth’s teachings are bleak and uttered in a fit of pique is a misconception. On the contrary—he thinks the overall tone is wry and humorous, with a view to revealing the comic and absurd aspects of man’s misguided behavior. See E. Levine, “The Humor in Qohelet,” and notes 85, 98 in chapter 1. In my view, it is very difficult to establish the tone being used, and it is largely left to the reader to decide, but I agree with his assertion that the Koheleth’s teachings had an essentially didactic purpose, and that his critiques were not conceived in despair and gloom. See also below. Per Seow, Ecclesiastes, 24—especially with regard to the section “Living with Risks,” pp. 328–346.

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various places in the Hebrew Bible this expression is a metonymical one meaning the daily routine or functioning.3 This includes variations such as “eat bread”—as in the case of Ahab, King of Israel who, on hearing that Naboth the Jezreelite refused to give up his vineyard, “[...] laid him down upon his bed, and turned away his face, and would eat no bread” (I Kings 21:4)—i.e., ceased to function (as evident also from his wife Isabel’s response). Similarly, the prophet Jeremiah admonishes King Jehoiachim severely by telling him “Shalt thou reign, because thou closest thyself in cedar? Did not thy father eat and drink, and do judgment and justice, and then it was well with him?” (Jer. 22:15). In other words, doing justice and charity was part of his father’s daily routine.4 If so, it follows that this representational meaning of the expression “eat and drink” is occasionally inserted into the immediate context. For our purposes, it is also worth noting other instances in the Hebrew Bible where, when someone links mundane existence (symbolized by the expression “eat and drink”) to destruction and death, it implies that he or she is living a life without faith or hope. Thus, for example, the widow at Zarephath, who in her reply to Elijah’s request, says: As the Lord thy God liveth, I have not a cake, but an handful of meal in a barrel, and a little oil in a cruse: and, behold, I am gathering two sticks, that I may go in and dress it for me and my son, that we may eat it, and die” (I Kings 17:12).

Elijah performs the miracle with the barrel of meal and the cruse of oil, but it is only after he revives her son that the widow proclaims, “Now by this I know that thou art a man of God, and that the word of the Lord in thy mouth is truth.” To my mind, this is a story about a test of faith: while the man of God was testing the widow, he himself was also being tested, since the miracle with the barrel of meal and the oil failed to persuade her that he was indeed a man of God and speaking the truth—only his ability

3

4

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See Gen. 39:6; I Sam. 2:36; II Sam. 11:11; I Kings 4:20, 13:19 (where the divine proscription undoubtedly appears in a symbolic sense); Jer.  16:8; Ezek.  24:17; Psalms 41:10; and elsewhere. McCarthy discusses this issue at length. In his view, the scene in Exodus 24:11—“also they saw God, and did eat and drink”—is not a description of a renewed covenant with God, but a return to life’s routine. See D.  J.  McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant, Rome 1978 passim.

to revive the dead did so.5 In contrast to “that we may eat it, and die,” faith and hope are linked to continuation of life. An even clearer example of the association between eating and drinking and life appears in the words of Isaiah, in his harsh prophecy of divine punishment: And in that day did the Lord GOD of hosts call to weeping, and to mourning, and to baldness, and to girding with sackcloth / And behold joy and gladness, slaying oxen, and killing sheep, eating flesh, and drinking wine: let us eat and drink; for to morrow we shall die (Isaiah 22:12–13)

In other words, far from expressing remorse and atonement as God has asked,6 the people of Jerusalem are carrying on their daily routine with no belief or hope for the future. The same message is conveyed in the story of Esau’s sale of his birthright to Jacob. On his return from the hunt, exhausted, Esau says to Jacob: “Behold, I am at the point to die: and what profit shall this birthright do to me?” (Gen. 25:32), and subsequently, “Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentiles; and he did eat and drink, and rose up, and went his way: thus Esau despised his birthright” (Gen. 25:34). The juxtaposition of birthright with eating and drinking is meant to highlight the contrast between a value that is bequeathed to future generations, and immediate gratification of material needs:7 thus, Esau—like all those who associate the expression “eat and drink” with death—is presented as being shortsighted and lacking in faith. In the story of Elijah at Horeb (I Kings 19) the same idea is presented, but in reverse: desperately weary from his travels to the mountain on foot, Elijah “requested for himself that he might die; and said, It is enough; now, O Lord, take away my life” (I Kings 19:4), and even after the angel 5

6

7

This, in contrast to prevailing interpretations. Y. Amit, for example, believes that the story is designed to demonstrate the prophet’s powers of persuasion and influence. See Y. Amit, in Encyclopedia Olam Hatanakh: Melakhim Aleph [The World of the Hebrew Bible: I Kings], Tel-Aviv 1998, p 169. Cf. Jonah 3:5–8. See also Shadal’s (Samuel David Luzzatto) commentary: “Thus behaves the multitude, when a great calamity befalls them and they see no way out…” (revised printing by P. Schlesinger, Jerusalem, 1970, p 175 [in Hebrew]). For a detailed analysis of the structure of this story, which presents the birthright as a spiritual value in contrast to the satisfaction of material needs, see: S. Gelander, “The struggle over the birthright,” Sefer Bereshit [The Book of Genesis], vol II, Raanana: Open University, 2009, pp 231–236.

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awakens him and forces him to eat, he once again succumbs to the comfort of sleep (“And he did eat and drink, and laid him down again”—19:6). Even during the divine revelation at Horeb, he alludes to his imminent death—twice—with the same words with which he sought his own death earlier (“and they seek my life, to take it away”—19:10, 14). The implication is that he had failed his test here, which is why he is also ordered to anoint Elisha as prophet in his stead.8 In light of all the above, the full meaning of Ecclesiastes’ positive prescriptions may be apparent. The expression “eat and drink” appears on five different occasions in various forms (on one occasion in the form of “to eat”), but with an identical sense and a nearly identical expressive context: 2:24: There is nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labor. This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God. 3:13: And also that every man should eat and drink, and enjoy the good of all his labor, it is the gift of God. 5:18: Behold that which I have seen: it is good and comely for one to eat and to drink, and to enjoy the good of all his labor that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life, which God giveth him: for it is his portion. 8:15: Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry: for that shall abide with him of his labor the days of his life, which God giveth him under the sun.9 9:7: Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God now accepteth thy works. Similarly, 5:18: Behold that which I have seen: it is good and comely for one to eat and to drink, and to enjoy the good of all his labor that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life, which God giveth him: for it is his portion. 8

9

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See S. Gelander, “Elijah at Horeb,” From Two Kingdoms into One Nation, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2011, pp. 27–33, and the reference there to A. Simon’s view that in this story it is God who is strengthening Elijah’s resolve. In view of these positive counsels in the contexts detailed below, it is clear that verses 8:1–17 should not be summed up under a negative heading such as “The World is Arbitrary” (see Seow, Ecclesiastes, pp 276–295). This is further support for my view that the Book of Ecclesiastes should not be divided into generalizing headings in an attempt to find a symmetry of some sort in the story’s structure.

Each of these maxims is presented as a conclusion of a list of arguments by Koheleth against the misguided paths that people take. The first instance (2:24) appears shortly after his deprecation of the notion of bequeathing one’s “life’s work” to one’s children to ensure an unbroken legacy. The second (3:13) follows a rejection of man’s attempts to understand world order and God’s ways. The third (5:18) appears after decrying the futility of man’s attempts to insure himself against future mishaps. The fourth (8:17) is stated in the context of Koheleth’s examination of divine reward, judgment, and the distinction between a righteous man and an evil one. The fifth (9:7) concludes a detailed critique of the notion of sacrificing one’s life for a supreme objective of one sort or another.10 The restating of this idea in 5:18 (albeit in abbreviated form of just “eat”) continues the theme of the preceding verse and reiterates it by advocating making the most of the present over concern for the future. In chapter  1 of our inquiry, we noted other objects of Koheleth’s criticism, but the presentation of these “eat and drink”verses as conclusions of these critiques in particular may be due to two reasons, which are not necessarily contradictory. One is that the author or editor thought the arguments presented before the concluding verse to be particularly compelling, each a natural extension of its predecessor, rendering the conclusion about the appropriate path as something indisputable, being the antithesis of the misguided paths preceding it. The other is that the author or editor wanted to avoid an overly schematic structure or rigid pattern. Either way, these concluding statements represent a kind of repeating refrain aimed at presenting the proper path as an enduring, unequivocal and equally weighty counter to the repudiatory assertions that list everything that hinders the desired path. In addition, all these verses feature certain elements that repeat with slight and insignificant variations. This regularity of such a variety of expressions represents an unequivocal truth which withstands a diverse sample of scrutiny:

10 A. Rofé (Mavo Lesifrut HaMikra) see these verses (9:7–9) as the continuation of the “Collections tradition.” As in other instances such as 4:9–12; 7:1–6, here, too, Koheleth uses a proverb from the literature of ancient East. (Rofé refers to Sheffer, who points to the various versions of the Epic of Gilgamesh. See note 15 there.

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• • • • • • •

In the Hebrew, the word tov (“good”) repeats in the first five verses: twice in the first (2:24), and in the feminine form (tovah) in the third verse (5:18) Four of the verses feature the word adam (“man”) Three of the verses feature verbs of the Hebrew root r-a-h in the sense of to see or to show Five of the verses use the expression “eat and drink” Three of verses speak of “his labor” Four of the verses contain verbs of the Hebrew root s-m-ḥ (in English, “be merry” or “enjoy”) In all of them, the word God is the reason behind the prescriptive counsel.

These elements help in deciphering the ideological message of the pattern: in chapter  1, we found that the word tov (“good” and its derivatives) usually appears in relativistic contexts—as with other values, “good” is not absolute. But the above verses are different: although they do not refer to an absolute good, they do allude to the “best” option available to a person. In other words, unlike the verses discussed in chapter 1, they do not present a choice between two options, but rather a single prescription that rules out all other options. Moreover, the word see or its derivatives (the Hebrew root r-a-h) appears here in the sense of understanding and learning from experience. As elsewhere in the Book of Ecclesiastes, the word amal (“labor”), has a broader sense than that of hard work, and denotes anything involving trouble and suffering. In the Hebrew Bible in general, the root s-m-ḥ (“be merry” or “enjoy”) appears in a wide range of meanings beyond its modern sense of being happy. As we noted in the Introduction, for Koheleth it means making the most and deriving the maximum experience of everything that the present has to offer.11 Koheleth’s recommendation to enjoy or be merry (as in “enjoy the good of all his labor that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life”) appears on one occasion without reference to “eat and drink” 11 Jura takes a similar stance, but attempts—particularly based on this expression in its various forms—to find a pattern in the structure of the Book of Ecclesiastes, as I noted earlier. In my view, dividing the book under headings designed to describe the content of various passages often leads to gross generalization, encompassing a wide range of meanings and associative contexts. See Z. Jura, “Ulesimḥah mah zo osah— Kohelet 2:2” [And of mirth, What doeth it?—Eccl. 2:2], Beit Mikra, 167 (2001), pp 353–370.

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(3:22), but in the same sense. Although the Hebrew word also appears in a negative context (in English:“and of mirth, What doeth it?”—2:2), in that instance mirth appears is one of the many things that Koheleth attests that he had experimented with in his attempt to see “what was that good for the sons of men” (2:3)—including “wisdom, and madness, and folly” (2:12): “I said in mine heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, therefore enjoy pleasure” (2:1). It is this attempt that made him realize that only “to him that is joined to all the living there is hope” (9:4), and that adhering to any single path in a bid to achieving perfection, success, and understanding the purpose of life, is a fruitless and interminable quest. In the aforementioned verses, enjoyment is associated with making the most of life—that is to say, with “eat and drink” (hence, it is not an end in itself, but a means).12 Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, anyone associating eating and drinking with death is someone lacking in faith and hope—but for Koheleth, eating and drinking is a mark of enjoyment, and enjoyment of one’s life and daily routine is a gift of God. Thus, he commends enjoyment not because he advocates hedonism,13 but because it an expression of faith: appreciation of what one has is a kind of recognition of the desired path in the eyes of God.14 12

Cf. Whybray, who argues that “mirth” is a central theme in Koheleth’s outlook, and that his negative pronouncements, such as “Therefore I hated life” (2:17), are a throwback to his outlook before he had matured in life, or the hypothetical musings (e.g., 6:2–5) of someone who has it all but is still unsatisfied, and therefore not enjoying life. He also contends that Koheleth’s assertions such as “Better [...] the day of death than the day of one’ birth” (7:1) are part of a series of paradoxical statements aimed at reminding the reader that the end is nigh, and are said in irony. See R. N. Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 7:87 (1982) pp. 87–98. 13 Unlike the outlook expressed in other ancient Near Eastern writings. In the Epic of Gilgamesh, the barmaid advises Gilgamesh “Go eat your bread with enjoyment” and “Let your clothes be white at all times”—in the same order as in Koheleth’s advice—but there the intention is hedonistic. See S. Shiffrah, Y. Klein, Bayamim Hareḥokim Hahem [In Those Far-Off Days], Tel-Aviv 1996 (in Hebrew), and The Epic of Gilgamesh, Tablet X, pp 261–266, esp. 73/5–73/30. 14 For more on this topic, see chapter  3 below, which is about Koheleth’s beliefs. However, it is also worth noting here that those who see Koheleth’s philosophy as a dark view of the world which underlines man’s helplessness in the face of allcontrolling Fate, sees these recommendations as making the best of a bad situation. In other words, since everything is fleeting, man may as well enjoy what he has—but these pleasures are also God-given, not everyone gets to enjoy them. To my mind, however, there is no sign of the latter qualification appear anywhere in the text, and to

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The very appearance of these statements as a kind of repeated refrain makes them a kind of unifying element: each set of statements or assertions that are summed up in an “eat and drink” type of verse is implied as sharing a central common moral with another cluster of statements that is summed up in a similar statement.15 Although these verses are neither distributed throughout the Book of Ecclesiastes, nor appear at regular intervals, their insertion—by the author himself, or by a subsequent editor—suggests that all the preceding critiques have a certain ideological common denominator, and they all share a common positive, and repeating, counterclaim.16 This, in and of itself, is a strong indication that Koheleth’s pronouncements are not an arbitrary collection of (mostly pessimistic) statements that occasionally contradict each other, but a coherent range of arguments pointing to the same emphatic conclusion. This is that one must not commit the fundamental error of engaging in endless pursuit of what lies beyond one’s reach—as most people do—but rather accept the world as it is and enjoy the mundane present, for it is “the gift of God.” If this is so, there is reason to doubt the notion put forward by some commentators that death is a key theme in Koheleth’s philosophy simply think so is a product of the belief that Koheleth is fundamentally a pessimist. See, in particular, Seow, Ecclesiastes, 47–60 (“Message”). 15 Cf. T. Porti, “On the question of the Order and Editing in Ecclesiastes: The proverb as a linking element,” Beit Mikra 57/2 (2012) pp 52–71. However, she sees various proverbs as binding elements—e.g., 10:1 (linking 9:13–18 to 10:2–3), rather than as repeated sayings such as those noted above, including a few proverbs. Both types appear as a conclusion of the assertions preceding them, including learning from experience. 16 Ogden reaches a similar conclusion, but believes that the “eat and drink” verses are a kind of rejoiner to the repeated “What profit [...]” question—in particular, in the wake of the negative response given in the previous verse (2:11). This is because he understands the word yitron (profit/advantage) differently. However, his main concern in this regard is on the question of whether chapters 9 and 12 belong to this framework. In his view, Chapter 9 is a discrete literary work in its own right. Philosophically, he also reaches the conclusion that although man cannot conceive or understand God’s actions, wisdom lies in coming to terms with existing world order and making the most of the present. (He also discerns a division by topics, and that verses 9:1–6 mark a turning point in Koheleth’s discourse: while in previous chapters, he had discussed all types of man and God’s actions, henceforth he focuses solely on the wise man and his actions. However, as evident from our inquiry, this division is inaccurate in several instances.) See G.S. Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 1–16,” VT 32.2 (1982) pp. 158–169.

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because it casts a pall over many of a person’s achievements in their lifetime.17 Koheleth’s repeated recommendations to celebrate life are linked, in various guises, to his idea that making most of the present is God’s will and gift. In all of these, death is perceived as a total and empty void. His most explicit expression of this is “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” (9:10). In contrast to the constant preoccupation in ancient Eastern beliefs with sheol and the abode of the dead,18 Koheleth appears to reject out of hand the notion that death is a discrete realm in its own right. This topic is worthy of a separate and extensive study that lies beyond the scope of the present discussion, but suffice it to say that Koheleth’s dismissive attitude to death is echoed in many expressions in the wisdom literature.19 His references to death are therefore intended only to underscore the importance of opting for life and savoring what it has to offer.

Cast Thy Bread In the light of all the above, the meaning of another of Koheleth’s positive prescriptions may be clearer: “Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days” (11:1). This verse is commonly understood as a call to be generous. Proponents of such an interpretation understand the expression “thou shall find it” in the sense as “you will be rewarded.” While the notion that the righteous person or generous benefactor will be rewarded is not unusual, it is at odds with Koheleth’s beliefs. Admittedly, 17 Cf. A. Kislev, “Qohelet vehitmodeduto,” note 27 in the Introduction), who notes the considerable preoccupation with death in the religious beliefs of the ancient Near East. 18 See, for example, M. Ganan, Redet Inanna El Shahat [Inanna’s Descent into Hell], Jerusalem, 1995 (in Hebrew).; S. Shifrah, Y. Klein, “Yeridat Ishtar Lasheol,” in Bayamim Hareḥokim Hahem, 368–375, 350–367; Y. Renan, Elot veGiborim [Goddesses and Heroes], Tel-Aviv 2001 (in Hebrew). On Egyptian mythology, see, A. Francfort, “The Power in the Earth: Resurrection,” Kingship and Gods, Chicago 1948 pp.  181–214; on the worship of Osiris, see A. Frankfort, “The Power in the Earth: Resurrection,” Kingship and Gods, Chicago 1948 pp. 181–214. 19 See Psalms 6:6; 30:10; 88:11–12; 94:17; 115:17; 116:9, etc.

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various commentators have proposed another view, that is closer in spirit to his practical prescriptions, such as “the simple interpretation of this verse is to sow where there is water, for the seed to benefit from. Because when it is harvest time, you will find it.”20 But this interpretation is also problematic, since Koheleth repeatedly argues that one must not invest efforts in securing one’s future. Moreover, it assumes that this verse is not a simple, straightforward practical advice on how and when one must sow, but a general, metaphorical guidance. However, as we have seen, the word bread is symbolic of daily routine (especially in accordance with 9:4),21 and water represents the flow of life. Accordingly, the verse may be understood as a suggestion to let life (or the flow of life) to deliver one’s life routine (or substance) to oneself. In other words, place your life’s fate in the hands of time: don’t engage in elaborate initiatives to secure your future, or your life’s endeavor, but rather let the flow of life do so: in the fullness of time (“after many days”), the right choice of life will emerge of its own accord. This interpretation is consistent with Koheleth’s laidback approach, his recommendation not to channel one’s efforts, talents or energies into any single area, and his assertion that it is not possible to change the fixed and immutable laws or nature or how the world operates.22 Accordingly, he proposes, to “Give a portion to seven, and also to eight” (11:2), and “In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thine hand” (11:6)—namely, do not confine your activity to a single defined area or time period. Conversely, “For there is a man whose labor is in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in equity; yet to a man that hath not labored therein shall he leave it for his portion” (2:21)—in other words, a man’s lot is not necessarily the product of his work, wisdom, or talents. Similarly— 20 From Perush Lekah-Tov, by Tuvia Ben-Eliezer (in Hebrew). But subsequently he, too, argues: “meaning, charitable persons.” Zimmerli, on the other hand, asserts that this verse is an exhortation to gamble, or take risks, rather than invest in sure ventures— based on a reading of the word Shlaḥ (cast) as Shalaḥ—i.e., “letting [someone/ something] free”—instead of as tossing something at a particular target. See W. Zimmerli, Das Buch des Prediger Salomo, Göttingen 1967, p. 191. 21 See Job 3:24—“For my sighing cometh before I eat”—i.e., sighing had become an integral part of his daily life (especially if we understand the word before [lifnei] as “akin to”—see I Sam. 1:16.) 22 Cf. Ogden. However, he underlines the contrast between man’s ability and the doubts about his control over nature, based on a structural analysis of the contexts. See G.S. Ogden, “Qoheleth XI 1–6),” VT 33.2 (1983) pp. 222–230.

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For God giveth to a man that is good in his sight wisdom, and knowledge, and joy: but to the sinner he giveth travail, to gather and to heap up, that he may give to him that is good before God (2:26)23

In other words, no particular path is more advantageous than others.24 For “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him” (7:14). Within the unfathomable workings of the universe, the true path to living life to the full means that one must accept and fully assimilate one’s purpose in life and resources, come to terms with how society is ordered, and appreciate everything that one encounters at the appropriate time and place. This, it seems, is also the message underpinning the verses of “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose” (3:1–8).

Between determinism and free will To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven25 A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted; A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up; A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance; A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing; A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away; A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak; A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.

23 See our discussion of these verses above in chapter  1. See also A. Pinker, “How should we understand Ecclesiastes 2:26?” 24 To put it another way (which we also discussed above, in Part I), he who is righteous in the eyes of God takes all paths (wisdom, knowledge, and joy)—in contrast to the sinner, who limits himself and his concerns to “gathering and amssing.” The end of the verse then contrasts these two approaches. 25 See also our discussion of this topic in chapter  1, and the reference to Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, who argues (pp. 430, 432), like Jenni before him, that the Hebrew word et (‫ )תע‬specifically means “an appropriate occasion” for a given activity.

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This set of verses is a unique literary formation in the Book of Ecclesiastes—indeed, in the entire Hebrew Bible. The author does employ similar “listings” elsewhere in the book (as previously noted, any sequence of three or more listed items should be regarded as a representative listing meaning of anything similar—be it actions, attributes, emotions, or possessions.26) However, this one is different in that it is structured in the form of items and their respective counterparts:27 each positive action (e.g., “a time to plant”) is followed by a negative complement (“a time to pluck that which is planted”)—and occasionally in reverse order, lest (I believe) one be left with the impression that one is preferable to the other. In terms of the existing and obligatory framework, the positive and negative are of equal import.28 Collectively, these actions, or emotions, symbolize all of man’s actions, and are subject to the opening generalization— “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven”— which hints at the latter’s meaning, As we have previously, the expression 26 See Eccl.  2:4–6 (“I made me [...] I builded [...] I planted [...] I made [...]”), and subsequently vss 7–9 (“I got me [...] I gathered me [...] I gat me [...] I was great, and increased”); 2:21: (“in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in equity”); 2:26 (“wisdom, and knowledge, and joy”); 5:6 (“the multitude of dreams and many words there are also divers vanities”); 6:2 (“riches, wealth, and honor”); 7:25 (“wisdom, and the reason of things and [...] the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness”); 9:10 (“work [...] device[...] knowledge [...] wisdom”). 27 Whybray believes Solomon’s prayer (I Kings 8:31–51) is also a listing of this sort— and indeed, there, too, the listed items are representative of all topics and possibilities, including those that are unmentioned. However, there the topics are spelled out in detail, rather than merely cited by name or alluded to in brief, and the repeated phrase, “Then hear thou in heaven” enables a concise summary of the Temple roles. See R. N. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, Grand Rapids 1989, p. 66. 28 Some commentators believe this passage to be structurally problematic, because its positive and negative messages are intermixed, and on the face of it it is unclear what parts are intended as a warning aimed at advising when something should be done and when it should be avoided. See especially: J. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15: Another Interpretation,” JSOT 66 (1995) pp. 55–64. However, Blenkinsopp also believes that neither the text not the language are characteristic of Koheleth, and that they contain ideas that are subsequently in veiled language (especially 3:10–11, 16–18). In his view, vss 5:5–8 also deny that human beings are capable of adopting the axiom in these verses in their everyday lives. Basically, Blenkinsopp believes these verses are actually those of a Judean Stoic philosopher, rather than of Koheleth himself—or, at the very least, inspired by Stoics of his time. Previous commentators have also speculated about the possible Stoic influences behind on the Book of Ecclesiastes, and see my reference below.

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“under the heaven” has a delimiting purpose, symbolizing man’s limited range of action and control compared with the infinite expanses of heaven. Hence, the assertion that “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven” applies not only to man but to everything above him—i.e., the universal order and laws. On the face of it, the expression is a chiastic parallelism: To every thing parallels every purpose, and season parallels time. But it is not a synonymous parallelism. As Kugel points out, in any poetic line with a parallelism-like structure, the latter half is not a precise repetition of the idea in the first half, but reiterates it and makes it more distinctive.29 So, too, in this instance: season is a general term denoting the inexorable passage of a period of time, while time refers to a regular occasion in the year for a given event.30 The same is true for the relationship between every thing and every purpose: the Hebrew for purpose (ḥefetz) appears seven times in the Book of Ecclesiastes—occasionally in the sense of desire or design, and other times in the sense of contentment, enjoyment, or satisfaction.31 To my mind, it may be interpreted as meaning “a matter” in its various senses (i.e., an topic or issue of debate), but also in the sense of “desire”32—which is certainly the case in this verse. However, 29 See J. L. Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry, Parallelism and Its History, New-Haven/ London 1981, pp 1–73. See also his reference to Robert Laut (note 26, p. 12) as the first to examine the nature of the biblical parallelism. 30 Similarly, the Septuagint’s translation of season (zman) as Χρόνος, and time (et) as χαιρός, are widely accepted. See A. Kahana, Mikra Mefurash: Kohelet [Hebrew Bible with Commentary: Ecclesiastes], reproduction of 1930 edition, Jerusalem 1969, p. 167. See also: Jer. 60:2; Ps. 1:3, etc. Conversely, A. Sheffi believes that the meaning of the Hebrew word et varies: in some instances it means a random or arbitrary occurrence or unplanned phenomenon, and in some instances a prearranged time (e.g., 9:11 versus 5:6, and especially 7:17). See A. Sheffi, “Hahityahasut lamusag ‘et’ beSefer Kohelet” [The use of the term ‘et’ in the Book of Ecclesiastes], Beit Mikra 125 (1991), pp. 144–151. See also S. Gelander, “Letfisat hazman bamikra—heibet aḥer” [On the perception of time in the Hebrew Bible—another aspect], Beit Mikra 185 (2002), pp 121–127. 31 This according to M.  Z.  Kadri, “ḥefetz,” Milon Ha’ivrit hamikrait [Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew], Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan 2006. However, B. D. B. interprets verse 3:1 as “satisfying”—as in 12:1—and 5:8 as “matter” (i.e. “marvel not at the matter”)—in line with most translations. See “‫ ”ץפח‬in F. Braun, S. R. Driver, C. A. Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, Oxford, repr. 1968. 32 Per Metzudat-Zion (Yehiel Hillel Altschuler), who interprets verse 3:11 accordingly— although fundamentally he sees free will as man’s original sin. See also below about how the issue of determinism is handled.

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it is very likely significant that the word season (zman) does not appear again in the entire list in the following verses—only the word time (et). Presumably, then, the listing in 3:1–8 is not alluding to the regularity of the universal scheme of things, but to the various types of purpose, each of which has its own regular and appropriate occasion (time). The initial impression—as indeed echoed in most commentators’ interpretations—is that “everything in the world happens by divine decree, and man will not comprehend God’s actions, nor can he change anything, so he may as well enjoy his life.”33 This wording suggests that man’s appreciation of his life is merely a default (i.e., hedonistic, and therefore suspect) condition— an interpretation that may spring from the that Koheleth’s world view is inspired by that of the Greek Stoics.34 However, that view is now called into question.35 Any philosophical treatise about the place of man in the world is likely to contain certain elements or even expressions that are similar to those of related compositions elsewhere—especially those authored around the same time period or in a culture with whom there was periodic contact. However, to conclude thereby that these verses were lifted from such foreign works and placed in the Book of Ecclesiastes without any real bearing on the author’s own world view is unwarranted. As we have seen, Koheleth recommends that one enjoy life and make the most of the present not because this is the default option or in a spirit of hedonism, but a gift of God. The verses following the opening verse give the impression that everything is indeed divinely preordained, because they begin with acts that are beyond human control—namely, birth and death. However, this may be deceptive, since (in the Hebrew) it does not say “a time to be

33 A. Kahana, Mikra Mefurash: Kohelet, pp. 167. 34 Kahana, ibid., notes that an idea similar to that of verse 1 is found in the writings of Pittacus, and in those of Dimitrius Phalirus, Ptolemy Philadelphus’s librarian, on the subject of the appropriate times for things. There is also a certain similarity to Theogenes’ advice not to do anything rashly, because in every matter, the right time is the best time. Koheleth’s list here is also reminiscent of Marcus Aurelius’ counsels— although they also contradict each other on various points. For more on the influence of the early Stoics on Koheleth, see A. Braun, Kohelet und die Frühelenistische Popularphilosophie, BZAW 130, Berlin 1973. 35 See, in particular, J.G. Gammie, “Stoicism and Anti-Stoicism in Qoheleth,” Hebrew Annual Review 9 (1985) pp. 169–187.

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born” (et lehivaled),36 but rather “a time to give birth” (et laledet). By the same token, the time to die may also be subject to one’s discretion, since Koheleth advises to avoid extreme courses of action, with the rhetorical question:“why shouldest thou die before thy time?” (7:17). As we have previously noted, “death” in this context means withdrawal from life in the metaphorical sense, so the message here is that even with regard to the most fundamental matters such as birth and life, one does has a certain measure of free will. However, even if we do not subscribe to this interpretation (which is admittedly somewhat far-reaching), the overall message of these verses is that while the laws of life are fixed and preordained, one always has some measure of choice in the prescribed spectrum of action between each item and its counterpart. Thus, although there is a season for every thing, missteps may bring about one’s death “before thy time,” and so, through judicious choices, one can at least avoid the mishaps that are not preordained.37 (Similarly:“Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin [...] wherefore should God be angry at thy voice, and destroy the work of thine hands?”—5:5). Was Koheleth ahead of his time, then, in understanding that determinism does not necessarily mean no free will? We cannot say.38 36 As in many translations. See also Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15: Another Interpretation.” 37 That said, this freedom is constrained by a delicate balance: while people can avoid doing bad things, they cannot ensure their future through good and worthy actions (8:8). 38 See in particular, D. Rudman, “Determinism and Anti-Determinism in the Book of Koheleth,” JBQ 30, 2 (2002) pp.  97–106, where he examines three different approaches in ancient commentaries to the issue of determinism. One is the deterministic approach (exemplified in the Aramaic and Ebenezra’s translations), and in the Babylonian Jewish and modern commentaries with regard to the role of “luck” in people’s lives. The influence of the astrological approach is very evident in the Ecclesiastes Rabbah commentary, with its attempts to apply Eccl. 3:11 to particular historical events. But Ecclesiastes Rabbah also features the other approach, that seeks to find a compromise between determinism and divine judgment—as evident in the Rashi and Rashbam commentaries, who understood season and time as referring to the expected consequences of a person’s actions. The third—anti-deterministic— approach is reflected in the commentary of Baal Metzudat David (Altschuler). He underscores man’s free will, and interprets vss. 3:1–8 accordingly—i.e., the words “to everything there is a season and a time to every purpose” are not about predetermined fate, but about the variable desires of man, who does not adhere to any one wish or goal. However, he also believes that free will is the source of man’s sins. Rudman, for his part, agrees that there is a degree of determinism in Koheleth’s words. (In

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However, as the list in this case is meant to be representative of all human actions, and each action is defined and delimited by its opposite, the wide range does imply a free will between the two extremes. Awareness of the immutable laws of nature and doing everything at its appropriate time enable a person to live life to the fullest and most balanced degree.39 Moreover, this list may be seen as a kind of general introduction to a discussion that is expanded upon, explained and answered later in the text (in part, in Chapter 7). The general statement“It is good that thou shouldest take hold of this; yea, also from this withdraw not thine hand” (7:18) is thrown into sharper relief in light of the list of items and their counterparts in verses 3:1–8.40 The words “of this” and “from this” are most likely a reference to those items—although they may also refer to Koheleth’s advice in the same context a few verses earlier: “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other” (7:14). In both verses (14 and 18), his advice ends with a reference to God (in the case of 7:18: “for he that feareth God shall come forth of them all”)—in line with the “eat and drink” statements we discussed earlier, which also repeatedly reiterate that this is a gift of God. The “Better is… than...” verses presented at the end of Chapter 1 as a series of maxims statements to the effect that good is relative assume an additional significance, since they do not present one option as being acceptable and the other as wrong, but rather that one is preferable to the other. If we were to compare those verses side by side with the statements of 3:1–8, it would be apparent that Koheleth is arguing that we distinguish the modern era, there have been so-called compatibilistic thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, John Stuart Mill—who argued that determinism does not necessarily contradict free will. Thus, for example, hunger and satiety are governed by natural processes that are beyond human control, but the choice of what to eat, when and how much are at a person’s discretion. Many philosophers believe that free will is our most fundamental freedom. For a more recent examination of this topic, see M. Cohen, “Ḥofesh be’olam deterministi” [Freedom in a deterministic world], Galileo 171 (2012), pp 68–69.) 39 However, S. de Jong believes that there is a certain logical tension between Koheleth’s deterministic pronouncements and his views on the comeuppance of evildoers or the rewards for righteous person. See S. de Jong, “God in the Book of Qohelet: A Reappraisal of Qohelet’s Place in the Old Testament Theology,” VT 47/2 (1997) pp. 154–167. I shall discuss the issue of reward or retribution in chapter 3. 40 See Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, p. 136, who explains that in the Hebrew Bible, the Hebrew word aḥaz also appears in the sense of “learned” (or “experienced”).

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between absolute and relative. He objects to the perennial human pursuit of the absolute and the perfect, because these are the preserve of God alone (“for God is in heaven”), and what is given to man by God is the relative free will (“and thou upon earth”—5:1). All his statements in praise of the infallibility of God’s actions and against man’s misguided quests for perfection points to this intention (for example, “He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end”—3:11; cf. 7:29). In my view, the words “from the beginning to the end” refer to the all-encompassing and absolute perfection of God’s actions, which encompass all contrasts and extremes, while man is incapable of seeing things in their entirety—only in contrasting partiality: “And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there” (3:16). Koheleth’s emphasis of “under the sun” is, in my view, important in this verse in the same sense that we explained earlier—namely, it underscores man’s limited domain. The maxim “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose” is repeated again later: “to every purpose there is time and judgment, therefore the misery of man is great upon him” (8:6).41 The second half of this verse is obscure: from a straight reading, one might understand it to mean that the laws of the universe and world order were established because man is inherently evil, and therefore needs boundaries to prevent him from doing evil. Another possible interpretation is that man’s evil is great, because he does not understand that “to every purpose there is time and judgment” etc.—i.e. he is not aware of the established order. However it is also possible (as in KJV and other translations) that the latter half of the original Masoretic version (“ki daat haadam rabbah alav”)—contains a typographical error and should in fact read raat (“evil of ” or “misery of ”)42—namely, that man should recognize the fact that to every purpose there is time and judgment. This may also clarify the meaning of other statements. For example, “for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” (9:10) is now cast in a positive light: rather than seeking to present oblivion as something dark, Koheleth underscores 41 See also 3:18: “I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them [...]” 42 As in the Septuagint: νω̃σις.

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the positive awareness of all that one has in this world. If “in the grave, whither thou goest” there is no there is no work, device, knowledge, or wisdom, it is because these are all available to you now. Accordingly, this maxim opens with the positive recommendation: “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might,” which previously had been reasoned on the grounds of: “For the living know that they shall die: but the dead know not any thing” (9:5). Clearly, the word know in this verse is equivalent to wisdom in verse 10—namely, total assimilation and engagement with one’s resources and surroundings.43 The conclusion: there is no substitute for life—what it lacks is not to be found in any other dimension. Recognizing the obligation to opt for life involves accepting the existing world order: “I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it: and God doeth it, that men should fear before him” (3:14). The ending of this verse seems out of place. The prevailing view among commentators is that it is a later insertion by an editor (here and at the end of the book as a whole—12:13–14), in a bid to underline the call for faith and observation of commandments.44 However, this may not be the case: if we remember that Koheleth advocates for life by making the most of the present, and sees total acceptance of the God-given world order as the expression of true wisdom and faith, the words “and God doeth it that men should fear before him” may be similar to his conclusion to 3:11—“also he hath set the world in their heart.” In other words, fearing God also means accepting all His actions, and recognizing man’s limitations, and that the perfect and absolute are the exclusive preserve of God’s eternal existence: “for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth” (5:1). This applies to other declarations, as well: “Every man also to whom God hath given riches and wealth, and hath given him power45 to eat thereof, and to take his portion, and to rejoice in his labor; this is the gift 43 See Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, p.  131, who notes that knowledge is achievable through eating, tasting, smelling, etc., much as it is perceived through action verbs (ibid., 136, 142, etc.). Thus, all means of connection and perception apply. 44 See A. Rofé, Mavo Lesifrut HaMikra, 409–411. 45 See Seow, Ecclesiastes, 14, 21, who argues that the word shlaḥ also has the sense of “bequeath”—which would be in keeping with Koheleth’s critique where he casts doubt on the possibility of bequeathing a “life’s work“: “because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me/ And who knoweth whether he shall be a wise man or a fool? yet shall he have rule over all my labor wherein I have labored”—2:18–19.

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of God” (5:19)—is coupled with “For he shall not much remember the days of his life; because God answereth him in the joy of his heart” (5:20). As with the ending of 3:14, here, too, the ending may be thought of as problematic and the product of editorial intervention. However, it is also possible that the words answereth him are in the sense of “matter”—like “to be exercised therewith” (1:13), i.e., to engage in it, or dwell upon.46 If so, then here, too, just as God “doeth it that men should fear before him,” and “hath set the world in their heart,” He is also concerned with “the joy of [man’s] heart.”47 Individual verses with wisdom-like pronouncements may also echo the same message. As previously noted, the verse “Moreover the profit of the earth is for all: the king himself is served by the field” (5:9) refers to Koheleth’s understanding of the word profit48—namely, that the only immutable thing in a person’s life is to make the most of what one has. The words “king” and “served by the field” may also appear here, in the metaphorical sense, with the king symbolizing He whose control is absolute, and the “field” representative of any human endeavor.49 The same principle applies to a simpler and more comprehensible statement: “The sleep of a laboring man is sweet,50 whether he eat little or much: but the abundance of the rich will not suffer him to sleep” (5:12). 46 See Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, 190. 47 See our interpretation of s-m-ḥ, and cf. Whybray, Ecclesiastes. This is also in keeping with most translations—e.g., “Because God keeps him occupied with joy in his heart” (RSV)—while others interpret both joy and enjoyment as hedonism, e.g.: “Because God keeps him busy enjoying himself” (JPS). 48 See Introduction chapter for explanation of key terms in the Book of Ecclesiastes. 49 Conversely, see A. Pinker, “The Advantage of a Country in Ecclesiastes 5:8,” JBQ 35/4 (2009) pp.  211–222, which provides a comprehensive review of the many interpretations of this verse, most of which argue that the text is corrupted and propose changes, and points out their flaws. In his view, this verse is about the virtues of a well-ordered and established government, but was misunderstood by the author or editor, and hence the misleading changes in its structure. To my mind, this is close to Koheleth’s meaning, who sees wisdom as being primarily about acceptance with the existing order. Eaton’s translation is closest to this interpretation, although it does perceive the words king or field in their metaphorical sense, as I do further below. Instead, he understands it to mean: “But an advantage to a land for everyone is: a king over cultivated land.” See A. Eaton, Ecclesiastes, Illinois 1983 p. 101. 50 As in “Truly the light is sweet” (11:7), here, too, the assessment of good and bad— i.e., the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom—is manifested in the realm of the physical senses. Malul notes that sweet is the counterpart of bitter, as in “more bitter than death” (7:26)—see Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, 265.

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Presumably, this is not an exhortation to be content with little, since “The sleep of a laboring man” is sweet even if he eats a great deal. Rather, the contrast here is between the laboring man and the rich man: the latter acquires wealth, but since that acquisition is intended to secure his future, it is an example one of the many deplorable ways that people attempt to “flee” from the present, as we noted in chapter 1. The laboring man, on the other hand, devotes himself to his work—i.e., his life revolves around the present.

Concluding observations In light of all the above, Chapter 11 of the Book of Ecclesiastes should be understood as consisting entirely of positive prescriptions, each of which is a kind of summary of the issue at hand. These prescriptions are graphic antitheses to the coda of 12:1–8 (although that, too, begins with a positive directive: “Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth”). If, as I believe, Koheleth is indeed mostly concerned with positive prescriptions, and his negative statements are merely pointers to the path of a “correct life,” then Chapter 11 of the book is a positive summary of all his ideas, and Chapter 12 is a kind of coda, whose main purpose is to underscore the message of the preceding chapter.51 The expression “the evil days” are an

51 See Seow, Ecclesiastes, 46–47, who refers to Beckhaus’s view that vss. 19:16–11:6 comprise a discrete passage that might be titled “Living with Risks”—while 11:7– 12:8 represent a kind of summary. (Conversely, cf. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 253–255, who divides the latter into two contrasting passages: 11:7–10 versus 12:1–8.) This reinforces my argument against generalized headings, as I noted in the Introducion. The heading “Living with Risks,” for example, represents the notion that man is controlled by fate, and therefore he might as well enjoy as much as he can. However, Seow notes that some commentators (Hertzberg, Michel, Zimmerli), see 11:7–8 as a summary of the previous passage, and believes that the text from 11:7 onwards should be divided into two: 11:7–10 (a recommendation to enjoy as long as it is possible), and 12:1–8 (the consequences of leaving enjoyment “too late“). In my view, these divisions present enjoyment as a “default” condition. See the discussion below.

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allusion not to death, but to old age.52 We shall explore this issue further in chapter 4, where the references to “the evil days” will be found to be allusions not to total oblivion, but to man’s decline—in relation to himself, to his surroundings and to nature and its order. In all these respects, this description is different from those of sheol in the literatures of the ancient East.53 Conversely, whoever sees savoring the present as a kind of default or “fall-back” option is effectively also stating that whatever lies beyond the future is better, but beyond man’s reach—and thus, to confine oneself to the present is an admission of one’s failings. However, in my view, this is at odds with Koheleth’s belief.54 His exhortations to enjoy the present are frequent and varied—many of them coupled with the reminder that this is God’s will and gift. Moreover, the idea that the ultimate, the perfect, and eternal all lie beyond the present and beyond life is at odds with Koheleth’s fundamental premise: when he declares that “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” (9:10), he is effectively saying that beyond life there is nothing. 1. Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days. 2. Give a portion to seven, and also to eight; for thou knowest not what evil shall be upon the earth. 3. If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth: and if the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be.

52 That is to say, I disagree with the notion that Koheleth is preoccupied with death— particularly if this is founded on the description in Chapter 12. Cf. A. Kislev, “Qohelet vehitmodeduto,” 28–51, and conversely, A. Barton, “Kohelet,” JBQ 26,3 (1998) pp. 168–176, who argues that the expression “the evil days” is indeed an allusion to old age, and its purpose is to underscore the enjoyment of the present. He explains that this reflects a reversal in Koheleth’s demeanor—that is, after giving vent to his despair, he assumes a more optimistic view, rather like the dramatic transition from despair to hope in certain Psalms. 53 See, in particular, Seow, Ecclesiastes, 369, who compares 12:1–8 to the literature of the ancient Near East—especially the Epic of Gilgamesh (with its description of light as the antithesis of the world of the dead), or the description of Ishtar’s descent into sheol, as a place of no return. On this point, it is worth comparing the various accounts of the description of descent into sheol—see specific reference in note 18 above. 54 See my reservations with this view in note 14 above.

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4. He that observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap. 5. As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child: even so thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all. 6. In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thine hand: for thou knowest not whether shall prosper, either this or that, or whether they both shall be alike good. [11:1–6]

These verses are variations of the same theme—namely, that one should make the most of the possibilities that arise in the course of life. However, they are also linked to one another, inasmuch as each verse explains its predecessor, or underscores its main message. The opening verse—(“Cast thy bread” etc.) we explained earlier. From the context it is apparent that bread and water here are in a metonymic sense: beyond its meaning as basic subsistence, bread represents the routine of life, and water symbolizes the flow of time. However, the following verse suggests that verse 1 was not just a recommendation to place existence in the hands of time or fate, since the imperative nature of “Give a portion” indicate that it is a call to action, rather than a recommendation of passivity. Moreover, the words “to seven, and also to eight” imbues this advice with a meaning of a multiplicity of options. The daily routine is rich and varied, and the growth from seven to eight may be a hint of the advantage in numbers— in other words, the more occupations a man has, the better. Accordingly, the rest of the verse—“for thou knowest not what evil shall be upon the earth”—is consistent with Koheleth’s assertions that there is no one path that insures man against future mishaps. Indeed, adhering to a single path is “a sore evil,” while the words “To seven, and also to eight” represent connecting to “all the living” (as in 8:9)—meaning making the most of all available possibilities, which is the key to a correct life. In this respect, the message of these summary verses is closer in meaning to what was said in previous contexts: “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other” (7:14), and “It is good that thou shouldest take hold of this; yea, also from this withdraw not thine hand” (7:18). The detailed description in verses 11:3–4 underlines this intention: If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth: and if the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it

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shall be. / He that observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap.

The thesis put forward here is, then, straightforward: God’s actions—i.e. the conduct of nature—cannot be foreseen by man. Verses 3–4 presents this in an inverted structure: in verse 3 the blessing (rain) appears before the evil (wind), while in verse 4, man’s reaction is the reverse: the wind (“observeth the wind”) precedes the rain (“regardeth the clouds”). This chiastic or concentric structure conveys the notion of action and reward, or the principle of measure for measure.55 In other words, man’s attempts to contend with unexpected natural phenomena are fruitless. However, in subsequent verses we find that this was not a mere pessimistic comment about man’s failings:56 the mysteries of the future are not left unanswered, because the answer lies in how man deals with them. Like the bread and the water, sowing and harvesting also appear here in a metonymic sense—a merism,57 pitting the investment at the start of the action against the enjoyment of its outcome.58 In contrast with the futility of the (passive) efforts to foresee the blessings of nature or its harm, Koheleth recommends proaction: one should devote oneself to anything possible: “In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thine hand: for thou knowest not whether shall prosper, either this or that, or whether they both shall be alike good.” In light of the context as a whole, this is likely meant not in a literal fashion, nor is it about working “around the clock,” but in the general sense of “for good and for bad”—much like the description of the quality of light, later: “Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun” (11:7). From the message overall, what Koheleth is talking about is that which is known and controlled versus the unknown and uncontrolled. This may explain the verse 11:5, which in the King James translation may seem obscure:“As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of 55 See, for example, Gen. 2:24b; 9:6; 11:1–9. See also J. P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis, Assen/Amsterdam 1975 pp. 11–45. 56 On this point, cf. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 205, 212, who notes the efforts of people to overcome their shortcomings, to no avail. 57 A merism is a juxtaposition of two extremes that encompasses the spectrum between them—e.g. “old and young,” “summer and winter,” etc. 58 The archetypal metaphor in this instance is in the verse “They that sow in tears shall reap in joy” (Ps. 126:5). See also S. Gelander, “Praise and thanksgiving,” The Religious Experience in the Book of Psalms, Peter Lang, Bern, 2016, pp. 84–89.

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her that is with child…” (11:5). In the Hebrew, the word spirit is the same as the word wind in verse 4 (ruah), and if we read verse 5 as being about “the way of the wind” as in verse 4, it is more understandable.59 (Unlike 3:21, for example, where Koheleth asks “Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth”: there the context is about death, and the notion that nothing lies beyond life—while in Chapter 11 the mystery of nature is contrasted with the practical purpose of man’s actions.) The latter part of the first half of 11:5—“how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child”—is more difficult to decipher. It may be understood in light of the Aramaic translation—namely, “just as you do not know how the breath of life enters the body of a child while in the bowels of his pregnant mother.”60 In other words: “when you do not know what the day will bring.” (The latter half of the verse “even so thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all” also appears in other contexts—especially 3:11; 8:17.) The first six verses of Chapter 11 may therefore be thought of as a concise summary of Koheleth’s philosophy: its clear distinction between the unforeseeable future and the wealth of opportunities offered by the present is similar to that between the conduct of nature—which is the dominion of God—and human activity. The realm of God’s control is absolute and perfect, while in areas where man is control he must not limit himself to any single course of action—either in the spatial dimension (“Give a portion to seven, and also to eight”), or in the temporal one (“In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening withhold not thine hand”). This distinction between the respective domains is largely consistent with the opening words of the entire book, and represents a kind of closing of the circle. However, the continuation of the text (vss 7–9a) is a kind of hymn of praise of the joys of life: [7] Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun: [8] But if a man live many years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember the days of darkness; for they shall be many. All that cometh is vanity.61

59 See Fuchs, Encyclopedia Olam Hatanakh: Megilot/Qohelet, 206. 60 "‫היכמא דליתך ידע איכדין יהליך רוח נשמתא דחיי בגוף עולימא שלילא דשרי במעיינא דאימיה מעוברא‬..." See also Kahana’s opposing view that the translator read the Hebrew ba’atzamim as in various manuscripts: A. Kahana, Mikra Mefurash: Kohelet, p. 212. 61 Here, too, the word hevel appears to be in the sense noted in the Introduction chapter—i.e., as something fleeting and impermanent.

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[9] Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth; and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes.

This somewhat buoyant advice is balanced in two respects: one is that the counterpart of enjoying one’s youth is to relish in the bounties of nature, and in sunlight;62 the other is the sober recognition that such enjoyment is offset by many days of darkness. The end of verse 9 (“but know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment”) echo this clearheaded approach and cautious optimism. Most commentators find this message problematic,63 with some interpreting it as a warning to anyone who does not enjoy the happier aspects of life, which are a gift of God.64 This positive poetic passage in praise of the joys of life is followed by a bleak description of old age (12:1–8)—and since it concludes the final chapter, it leaves its stamp on the entire Book of Ecclesiastes. However, in my view, this serves only to underline the joy of life, as it keeps it check and prevents it from becoming debauchery. Boundless joy is recklessness. Awareness of what follows the joy gives it a measure of reflection and responsibility—a mark, in effect, of true happiness. This awareness is also in keeping with Koheleth’s view that true wisdom lies in recognizing and accepting the world order and laws of existence. Furthermore, this description of old age is also a kind of ironic response to man’s myriad attempts to flee from the present to the future—which, as we have seen, Koheleth faults on many counts.

62 It is worth noting the parallelism here between light and wisdom—as in Eccl. 8:1 (and 2:14). On this point, see Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex, 117. In this respect, enjoyment of light is also an expression of acceptance of world order, which is the essence of wisdom, as explained above. 63 Rashi, Ibn Ezra and Rashbam tried to resolve this on the grounds that it is said ironically. However, Kahana (Mikra Mefurash: Kohelet, 113–114) disagrees, arguing that Koheleth is drawing a distinction here between following one’s inclinations—i.e. avoiding doom and gloom—and engaging in forbidden pursuits. 64 Per Seow, Ecclesiastes, 58, 197—although he is referring in particular to the phrase “God answereth him in the joy of his heart.” See our discussion of this phrase (answereth in the sense of “finding interest in,” or “engaging in”—per Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex 190).

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3.

Koheleth and his beliefs

An examination of Koheleth’s negative critique of man’s ways, coupled with his positive prescriptions for a correct life (as presented in the previous two chapters), allows us to gain the fullest and most comprehensive view possible of his beliefs. His descriptions and declarations reflect a sharp and contrasting distinction between God and God’s control of His world, and man and his ways. God is eternal, and therefore the epitome of all that is perfect and absolute; man is transient, or the embodiment of all that is relative and limited. This contrast is the foundation for everything Koheleth says about God, and about man. The statement “for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth: therefore let thy words be few” (5:2) is, to my mind, the essence of this outlook, as will presently become clear.1 God is mentioned in the Book of Ecclesiastes approximately forty times.2 Of these, in thirteen times it is in connection with the Hebrew root n-t-n (“give”) in its various guises.3 This alone should be proof enough that God and his ways not only play a key part in Koheleth’s teachings, and that Koheleth likely does not see God as capricious or whimsical, whose judgments are absolute and unpredictable, as many commentators believe—unless all of these mentions contradict Koheleth’s general outlook.4 1

2 3

4

This reasoning is identical to the statement in Psalms “The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord: but the earth hath he given to the children of men” (Ps 115:16)— however, there it is used to justify confidence in life and to banish the threat of death, since worshipping God is possible only in life (“The dead praise not the Lord [...]” etc.). On this issue, see S. Gelander, “The Promised Life Experience,” The Religious Experience in the Book of Psalms, Jerusalem 2013, pp 145–159. See Eccles. 1:13; 2:24, 26; 3:10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17; 4:17; 5:1(2x), 5, 6, 17–19; 6:2 (2x); 7:13, 14, 18, 26, 29; 8:2, 12, 13, 15, 17; 9:1, 17; 11:5, 9; 12:7, 13, 14. 1:13; 2:26 (2x); 3:10, 11, 13; 5:18 (2x), 17, 21; 8:15; 12:7. On three further occasions, giving is mentioned indirectly in the Hebrew (2:24: “that it was from the hand of God”; 5:18 “and hath given him power [in Hebrew: vehishlito] to eat thereof”; 6:2 “God giveth him not power [lo yashlitenu].” See, in particular: H.  P.  Müller, “Wie sprach Qohälät von Gott?,” VT 18/4 (1968), pp. 507–521. In his view, Koheleth is skeptical of the actions of God, who has made everything immutable yet has denied man the ability to understand and grasp the

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The words “for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth” are cited as proof of Koheleth’s recommendation to avoid taking a position in the face of divine perfection, and to accept God’s ways with passive resignation. If we do not understand this as such, the statement has no significance relevance to Koheleth’s ideas. The prevailing view among commentators is that this verse is a recommendation to act politely and with good manners, and to say little in front of someone so lofty and sublime.5 Such an interpretation would indeed be consistent with Koheleth’s repeated counsel to submit to the supreme authority and accept the existing order. However there is a difference between obedience out of submission to a capricious authority, and acceptance out of deference to his judgment. In my view, Koheleth does not see God as an capricious being, but as a “giving” God—and that this giving is part and parcel of the perfection of his actions: “He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart…” (3:11).

On justice and injustice The prevailing view—in light of Koheleth’s many statements concerning justice and his approach to the theory of retribution—is that he sees God as an capricious power.6 Consequently, the Hebrew word miqreh (“befall”) is

5 6

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totality and full meaning of His actions. (Accordingly, Müller also distinguishes between the use of the word give in the general sense of giving life—which in itself is limited—and the “sore travail” that God gives man “to be exercised therewith.” See also: M. W. Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, Sheffield 1989 passim, which examines Koheleth’s views on divine justice. See also in this regard: S. de Jong, “God in the Book of Qohelet: A Reappraisal of Qohelet’s Place in the Old Testament Theology,” VT 47/2 (1997), pp. 154–167, who discerns two contradictory approaches to the issue of justice: according to 3:17 there is divine justice, but according to the two following verses (3:18,19) God apparently cites human injustices to denounce man’s failings. This issue—and particularly Koheleth’s views on the subject of retribution—is discussed further below. So, too, according to the Septuagint, and see Kahana, Mikra Meforash: Kohelet, pp. 181–182. See Scott, ibid., 205, 212, and similarly, Seow, ibid., 47–50, and esp. Müller, “Wie sprach Qohälät von Gott?”

also interpreted as a manifestation of arbitrary fate.7 However, as we noted in our Introduction, the word befall, its various appearances throughout the Hebrew Bible, refers to a premeditated and calculated occurrence— and this appears to be the case with Koheleth, as well. There is a certain equivalence between Koheleth’s attitude toward befalling and his attitude to the theory of retribution: he rejects the notion of retribution because he rejects the notion that one can insure oneself against the future. Man’s various attempts to protect himself from future mishaps are but various forms of eluding the present and all it has to offer—and thus a squandering of his life—and the same is true with regard to divine retribution, which is based primarily on the notion that man receives his due reward or punishment for his actions. However, in Koheleth’s view, man is “upon the earth,” and so his perspective is limited and his values are relative, while God is “in heaven,” and therefore what is “good” in the eyes of man is not necessarily good in the eyes of God, and by attempting to be “righteous over much” or overly wise (7:16), man is exceeding his boundaries and divorcing himself from reality. His consequent conclusions are also based on Koheleth’s personal experience (“And moreover I saw under the sun”— 3:16; “All things have I seen in the days of my vanity“—7:15; etc.) and on the consistency of his critical thought. On this point, it is worth revisiting Koheleth’s approach to the issue of justice: “All things have I seen in the days of my vanity: there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness” (7:15). We discussed these issues in chapter 1—but here they take on another aspect. To understand this, we must assume that someone like Koheleth—who is seeking to present his views, the sum of his experience, his criticism and his positive recommendations in a manner that is both poetic and concise—is probably choosing his words with great care, in the full knowledge that there is no way to say precisely the same thing with different words. So, too, in the case of the verse before us. The general idea is that “the righteous suffer, while the wicked prosper.” But that is not, in fact, what Koheleth is saying here. While he does begin by saying “All things have I seen,” in what follows we learn that his experience is in fact limited, since he qualifies that with the words “in the days of my vanity.” This is not the same as“in the days of my life,” but an expression of the fleeting and ephemeral nature 7

According to most commentators—and see recently Kislev, ibid., who interprets miqreh as an allusion to death.

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of life. In other words, he is saying that, while his personal experience is all-encompassing, his experience is narrow in scope, since it is limited in time. Hence, “all things” refers only to what he could achieve in the short scope and fleeting duration of his life. This qualification is also evident in the conclusion of the statement: “and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness.” This is not to say, therefore, that the wicked man’s success is everlasting—but, on the contrary, that his wickedness is fleeting, and only appears to be enduring to one whose view is limited by “the days of his vanity.” The beginning and conclusion of this verse are therefore about the dimension of time which, in the case of Koheleth’s experience and the wickedness of the wicked man, is limited. Conversely, the righteous man, is said to be lost in his righteousness. The word in, in this case, is undoubtedly in the sense of “despite”—i.e., “the just man that perisheth despite his righteousness”—namely, he loses his way despite his righteousness.8 This is a somewhat surprising statement, as it runs counter to the message in the Book of Psalms, where the speaker’s innocence is often coupled with a request for guidance from God—such as “he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness” (Psalms 23:3)9—i.e., that the just man’s path is successful because God has guided him. Koheleth thinks differently: the just man’s righteousness does not ensure his safe arrival to his destination. His rejection of the notion of reward makes a distinction between the just man and wicked one: while the limitations the speaker (“all the days of my vanity”) and the wicked man (“prolongeth his life”) are both circumscribed by time, the just man’s failure is in the spatial dimension (perisheth in the sense of “loses his way”). In other words, this verse rejects the doctrine of divine retribution or reward, on the grounds that man’s life is limited both in time and in space. Koheleth’s primary message, therefore, is not about divine justice, nor is he rejecting the notion of retribution per se, but that man, because of his short life span and limited faculties, is best not to try 8 9

Thus, per Kahana, Mikra Meforash, 193. For more on the juxtaposition of the protestation of innocence and the appeal for guidance, see Ps. 5:9; 25:4–5; No 4; 31:4. See also 39:4; 43:3; 51:8; 73:3; 81:11; and others. See also on this topic, Ajami 24 Fu 11 and more. See on this subject Gelander, “The Experience of Closeness to God,” The Religious Experience in the Book of Psalms, Jerusalem, 2013 pp 92–89. Use of the Hebrew word ma’agal in the sense of “way” was common in biblical wisdom literature—see Proverbs 4:11, 26; 5:6, 21; and elsewhere.

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and comprehend the full scope of God’s actions, but be content with what he can perceive with his limited senses. This interpretation may be further supported by his statement elsewhere, with similar sentiments: “I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the earth” (10:7). Here, too, Koheleth is recounting what he has learned from experience (“I have seen”)—except that here it is not about whether divine retribution is a valid concept, since there is no reason to assume that the prevailing state of affairs (whereby princes ride on horses, and servants walk upon the earth) is any more indicative of divine justice. In other words, in this statement Koheleth is not casting doubt on the notion of divine retribution, but rather pointing out that the classic hallmarks of status (such as riding on a horse) are not reliable testaments of people’s actual condition: he who rides a horse is not necessarily a prince. To put it another way, judging a person based purely on their external attributes is misguided, because it is entirely a function of one’s own experience. A similar idea is expressed in the previous verse: “Folly10 is set in great dignity, and the rich sit in low place” (10:6).11 The same is true of the general conclusion about the relationship between righteousness and retribution: “There is a vanity which is done upon the earth; that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous” (8:14). But for the opening words, “There is a vanity which is done upon the earth,” this statement would be an unequivocal rejection of faith in retribution. But as noted in the Introduction, if we understand the word vanity here as “fleeting” and the words upon the earth as an allusion to mankind’s limited capacities (in contrast to the unbounded abilities in heaven), the apparent contradiction between action and retribution would be revealed as a mere illusion, due to man’s limited faculties. So, too, with regard to the argument “And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there” (3:16). The conventional view is that these words are a reference to the corruption that 10 Most commentators agree that the Hebrew word should be spelled ‫השכל‬. 11 Ogden sees the entire context (9:17–10:20) as being vaguely about the future, as something subject to the vagaries of blind fate—and that retribution, too, has nothing to do with man’s actions or conduct. See G.S. Ogden, “Qoheleth IX 17 – X 20: Variations on the Theme of Wisdom’s Strength and Vulnerability,” VT 30/1 (1980) pp. 27–37.

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was rampant in the days of Koheleth, rather than an indictment of world order in general.12 And indeed, every significant literary work might be said to conceived in light of its contemporary reality, and Koheleth’s work is no exception. However, exposing corruption is not Koheleth’s ultimate goal. The real ideological message of these statements (7:15, 8:40, and 10:6–7) is that man’s perception of wrongdoing where he expects to see justice is due to his subjective view (“I saw…,” “in the days of my vanity,” “upon the earth”). However, Koheleth does not deny the existence of divine justice, for his says: “I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work” (3:17). In other words, justice must be left in the hands of God, for “He hath made every thing beautiful in his time” (3:11), and therefore Koheleth’s counsel is “If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they.” (5:8).13 He also advises: “Be not righteous over much; neither make thyself over wise” (7:16).14 The relativistic nature of values that we discussed in chapter  1 now takes on an additional meaning— namely, that values such as righteousness and justice only appear to be relative from man’s perspective, because he is incapable of conceiving all of God’s actions (“so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end”—3:11b)—even though God, for His part, “hath set the world in their heart” (ibid.). In other words, it is not God who is preventing man from understanding the world order and how it is run, but rather man who is fallible: “For there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not” (7:20). The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that Koheleth does not attribute the wrongdoing to God, nor accuses him of crookedness15—unless of course, we choose to see the Book of 12

See Kahana, Mikra Meforash, 172: “This passage describes the dire state of legal justice in Koheleth’s time [...]” (adding that this is not the case in King Solomon’s time). 13 The Hebrew terms be’ito and ḥefetz should be understood as we proposed earlier: the former means “in his time”—i.e. the most appropriate situation to do something, and ḥefetz means “matter.” 14 In chapter 1, we understood this counsel as referring to the rejection of aspiration to uniqueness and excellence. 15 Conversely, see Seow, ibid. 56, who argues that Koheleth attributes the crookedness to God, based on his interpretation of 7:13 (“for who can make that straight, which he hath made crooked?”), and that, unlike Job, Koheleth does not demand that this be corrected. My contention is that the crookedness is entirely in the eye of

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Ecclesiastes as merely a random collection of adages and maxims, some of which are mutually contradictory. Koheleth’s criticisms are aimed against man, rather than God—and it is in that spirit that we should also understand the following: So I returned, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter (4:1).

The actions which are carried out “under the sun” are those of man, and the expected consolation is also that of man. This, it seems, is also the meaning behind the words: For all this I considered in my heart even to declare all this, that the righteous, and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of God: no man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them” (9:1)

The first part of this verse says that human beings are all in the hands of God, who has also preordained their feelings (including love and hate…— “all that is before them”).16 However, the second half clarifies the intention: since the very fact that all human beings are in the hands of God is not new, and therefore does not require any special examination on Koheleth’s part as emphasized in the beginning of the verse. In my view, what it says here is that although God, who controls human beings, has put before them and their most extreme emotions as well (love and hate), man cannot see this, and therefore does not know them. Such an interpretation is also in keeping with Koheleth’s overall criticism, which denounces man’s tendency to “flee” toward anything that lies beyond his reach, thereby missing out on what he has. The following verse must also be understood in this spirit, unless we understand it, too, as a protest against the arbitrary nature of divine fate: the human beholder—and so, too, with regard to the verse “That which is crooked cannot be made straight: and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” (1:15). The more man recognizes his limitations, the better he will be at being “joined to all the living”—while accepting the existing state of affairs, which in his view is the essence of wisdom. 16 Thus, according to most commentators: the expression before them means “beyond them”—i.e., beyond their control, and entirely dependent on external circumstances that are contingent upon God. See Samuel David Luzzatto’s commentary, and Kahana, Mikra Meforash, 201.

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All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath (9:2)

Many commentators believe the word befall is an allusion at death,17 however the statement that all human beings are also mortals is also a self-evident one that does not require the benefit of Koheleth’s rich life experience, and as we seen, in the Hebrew Bible the word event typically refers to a deliberate and preplanned event. The true meaning of the verse is therefore that a person’s fate or future is not determined by their choice of a particular path. This is very much in keeping with Koheleth’s varied refutations of the misguided notion of adhering to a single lifestyle or occupation.18 Correct judgment is the preserve of God, who gives every person their fair due (“his portion”): “For there is a man whose labor is in wisdom, and in knowledge, and in equity; yet to a man that hath not labored therein shall he leave it for his portion” (2:21). The implications of this distinction between what is “in heaven” and what is “upon the earth”—i.e., what is the preserve of God, and what is in man’s power—are clarified in Koheleth’s descriptions of God, and collectively these give us a fuller picture of his faith.

Koheleth and his God

He hath made every thing beautiful in his time (7:11) That which is crooked cannot be made straight: and that which is wanting cannot be numbered (1:15)

The key to understanding Koheleth’s attitude toward God lies largely in the resolution of the tension between these two statements: since if everything is done “beautiful in his time,” why are some things crooked? Such references to crookedness appear repeatedly, heightening the tension

17 See, recently, Kislev (ibid.). 18 See, for example, 7:16, 4:8, and elsewhere.

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still further—e.g.: “Consider the work of God: for who can make that straight, which he hath made crooked?” (7:13). The conventional view is that the message in these words is the same as that that appears throughout—such as: “I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it” (3:14).19 Whoever understands this in this fashion, is also inclined to draw a sharp distinction between God’s total control of the world and man’s limited capacity20—which attributes all that is crooked to God rather than to man, which raises a difficulty that must be resolved. However, we must also consider that in the two statements (1:15, 7:13), the human actions are presented indirectly as attempts to amend the crookedness, rather than to make crooked that which has been made straight. It follows that Koheleth does not, perhaps, attribute negative intentions to man. On the contrary—he believes that man’s vain efforts are done in good faith— however, they are pointless and therefore unnecessary. This is similar to the message in 3:14—namely, that God’s actions are perfect (“beautiful in his time”), and therefore require no modifications whatsoever. This suggests that God cannot be perceived as arbitrary, or capricious: for if He has done everything “beautiful in his time” and created a perfect existence, and man is aspiring to correct and improve, the discrepancy between the perfection of God’s actions and man’s inadequacy must have a different explanation—unless of course, we contend that Koheleth’s teachings contains many contradictory statements.21 Assuming the term time in 1:15 means the same as in 3:1–8, the expression “beautiful in his time” may be easier to explain. Although ostensibly it is a positive statement that everything that happens occurs in the most appropriate conditions and circumstances, the structure of 3:1–8 suggests that this is true only when every action is viewed against its polar opposite. As in the case of the texts that we discussed earlier, here, too, the listing-like structure indicates that each item is representative of an entire 19 See Fox, ibid. 1996, 173. 20 See, in particular, Scott, ibid. 205. In his view, the injustice and all that is crooked is exclusively God’s preserve, and that on this issue Koheleth’s ideological message is akin to that of Islam, inasmuch as he recommends one to submit entirely to God’s mysterious ways: the world carries on completely oblivious to man, and all his efforts to change his fate with his wisdom and creative skills are destined to fail. Seow (ibid. pp. 56–58) takes a similar view, highlighting the inability of human beings to control their own destiny. 21 See, in particular, notes 4, 11, above.

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category of details that are not mentioned. The perfection implicit in this poetic passage is that which arises from the juxtaposition of opposites. Just as the existence of each listed concept and value is made possible and understood in light of its opposite, actions should be understood as the realization of the perfect notions of “under heaven” (or “upon the earth”)—i.e., within the remit of man. These verses may point to a key tenet of Koheleth’s faith22—namely, that the perfection of God’s actions lies in the equilibrium between the two contrasting items. It is difficult to know if this perfection is also contingent upon the appropriate conditions for changing this equilibrium, whereby one side overcomes the other. Koheleth is not explicit on this point, but this may be the view underpinning the poetic description at the beginning. It is also, perhaps, the meaning of the words “All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again” (1:7), and also “The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose” (1:5).23 In other words, the conduct of nature is founded on maintaining a continuous equilibrium between contrasts, in a cyclical process that leads nowhere. It is a self-contained existence—a kind of circle symbolic of perfection,24 that cannot be violated by changing the equilibrium or its orientation, and therefore “That which is crooked cannot be made straight: and that which is wanting cannot be numbered.” The point is that without the sunset there can be no sunrise—and vice 22 Conversely, see J. Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1–15: Another Interpretation,” VT 66 (1995) pp.  55–64, who argues that there is to see in these verses (and in 3:9– 22) as the primary place in the book in which the entire text is subject to unique interpretations. However, he also sees difficulties in the composition of the passage, since in some instances it starts with a positive act, and in others with a negative one, with no apparent rhyme or reason—meaning that it is unclear when one should do something and when one should refrain from doing so. He believes the common message underpinning all these statements is similar to that of Proverbs 9:23— although elsewhere (8:6–8) Koheleth denies a person’s ability to maintain this axiom in everyday life. Ultimately, he concludes is not as if these verses are not written by Koheleth himself but taken from the writings of a Jewish Stoic scholar, because the language and ideas are not characteristic of Koheleth. 23 Further implications of the meaning of 1:1–8 as reflections of Koheleth’s belief are discussed below, in chapter 4—particularly with regard to the ideological import of the opening passage for the composition as a whole. 24 R.N. Whybray makes a similar point in “Ecclesiastes 1.5–7 and the wonders of nature,” JSOT 13:105 (1998) 105–112. For a more extensive discussion of the poetry in Eccles. 1 and 12, see chapter 4 of this book.

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versa; without darkness, there is no light. This is the essence of the natural law of existence itself, and man must recognize this, “for who can make that straight, which he hath made crooked?” (7:13). Moreover, human values follow much the same pattern: each exists only by virtue of the existence of its counterpart, The mutual dependence between light and darkness is echoed in that between righteousness and evil: “And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there” (3:16). Accordingly, Koheleth also advises that “If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter” (5:7). Thus, these remonstrations are not necessarily a denunciation of corruption. Koheleth is not a “social reformer,” nor does he counsel humanity not for want of choice, since he ends on a positive note: “for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they.” There is a hierarchical order, and Koheleth’s advice is not to try and subject one’s view of these divine arrangements to the limited confines of human understanding and perception. Moreover, the supreme status of the “higher than the highest” is not necessarily that of an capricious God, because, as we shall see below, He is referred to repeatedly as a “giving” God. Accordingly, Koheleth’s view of the relationship between God and man is not a bitter and dark protest about the insignificance of man in relation to the might of God, but rather a dispassionate understanding that just as nothing exists without its counterpart, so too there can be no life without death, no eternity without oblivion, and no vanity without profit. The earth “abideth forever,”25 but life comes and goes for all living creatures, including man. Verse 3:19 should also be understood in the same vein: “For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preeminence above a beast.” The verse begins, as it ends, with the conclusion that man, despite all his intelligence and abilities, “hath no preeminence”—i.e. is no more enduring than animals. Here, as in other verses (such as 9:5), the message is that man’s efforts to elude oblivion are merely an attempt to disrupt the perfect balance26 of 25 In this instance, “the earth” should be understood as the universe—in contrast to the phrase “upon the earth,” which is used to denote man’s earthbound limitations. 26 The prevailing interpretation by commentators that the word preeminence means “precedence” has naturally created many difficulties. Early commentators (e.g.

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opposites—and that is the true meaning of “beautiful in his time” that Koheleth declares in 3:11. The various statements on this issue collectively form a single ideological outlook, namely that God’s eternal and perfect nature and actions are made up of absolute opposites, which man, in his limited world and lifespan, can neither experience, nor comprehend (“… so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end“— 3:11).27 Instead of perceiving the entire spectrum of contrasts, “from the beginning to the end”—i.e. from one end to the other, man tends to focus on only one side—the positive or the negative—and accordingly, has a “crooked” (distorted) perspective. The apparent arbitrariness is not due to God’s arbitrariness, since He is a “giving” God, and“also he hath set the world in their heart” (ibid.) The error that causes man to miss out on life is rooted in his relentless and varied attempts to escape from the present, from what it has to offer and is available to him. Koheleth’s belief means recognizing the essence of the whole, which, inter alia, encompasses the contrasts between God and His world on the one hand, and man on earth on the other. Coming to terms with the existing world order is the essence of wisdom, and of the fear of God. This recognition must be accepted gladly, while reveling in the routine of daily life, with all it has to offer: “Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God now accepteth thy works” (9:7). Accordingly, Koheleth recommends that we accept the good with the bad, as reciprocal elements in God’s actions: “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him” (7:14). Because “It is good that thou shouldest take hold of this; yea, also from this withdraw not thine hand” (7:18). We discussed these verses earlier in our inquiry, with regard to the relative nature of values. Now we find that the relative nature of values is so only from man’s limited perspective—as the continuation of the verse makes clear, seeing Targum Jonathan) sought to resolve this by suggesting that the reference here is to evildoers, only. See Kahana, Mikra Meforash, 174. 27 Cf. 7:29, and especially 8:17: Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because though a man labor to seek it out, yet he shall not find it ; yea further; though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it.

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the opposites is in keeping with God’s will: “for he that feareth God shall come forth of them all.” If perfection is apparent only when the opposite extremes are considered, Koheleth’s negative attitude to the theory of retribution is more understandable. The conventional view—that the righteous is rewarded with good, and all that is bad is the just deserts of evil—leads to the misguided notion that what is good and bad in man’s eyes can tilt the balance and correct all that is “crooked.” However, Koheleth does not believe that divine perfection is capricious: “But it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow; because he feareth not before God” (8:13)—and this after he has already argued that “yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, which fear before him” (8:12). Moreover, when he warns against “taking a stand” (“Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter any thing before God“—5:1) or surrendering to extreme obligation (“When thou vowest a vow unto God, defer not to pay it; for he hath no pleasure in fools: pay that which thou hast vowed“—i.e., do not commit to things that are beyond your reach), he adds the warning: “wherefore should God be angry at thy voice, and destroy the work of thine hands” (5:1–5). In other words, man can stave off God’s wrath and avoid being harmed by him. This view is also implicit in other contexts—e.g., in speaking to the woman “whose heart is snares and nets,” he adds: “whoso pleaseth God shall escape from her; but the sinner shall be taken by her” (7:26). While one might argue that this is merely a figure of speech, the various contexts of these verses suggest that they reflect Koheleth’s general outlook, that since fear of God means accepting existing world order, and therefore whoever recognizes the dominance of the perfect balance, “shall come forth of them all” (i.e., come out ahead). While he cannot secure his future, he may at least avoid the evil that might otherwise have befallen him—and that, too, is one of the ways of understanding the eternal balance. To complete the picture, we should note that although Koheleth repeatedly emphasizes the diametrically opposite nature of divine perfection and man’s narrow earthbound perspective, he does not suggest that man is insignificant or worthless. Although he is critical of human failings, Koheleth stops short of dismissing man as inferior. On the contrary—his various warnings against foolishness suggest that he

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believes that man is capable of wisdom.28 However, there are two sides to Koheleth’s portrayal of God as “giving”: on the one hand, his exhortation to eat and be merry and to enjoy the mundane routine of life—all of which he repeatedly refers to as a gift of God29—he also declares: “And I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom30 concerning all things that are done under heaven: this sore travail hath God given to the sons of man to be exercised therewith” (1:13).31 It is not easy to resolve these two statements.32 If God is responsible for making man engage in all that is “vain and vanity of spirit” (1:14)— which is not a good pursuit—how can man be happy and see the fruits of his labor? One likely explanation is that what is bad about man’s pursuits is his insistence on attempting to examine and understand everything under the heavens with his limited mental faculties and senses. The implicit message is therefore similar to the words of Ben-Sira—“Do not enquire into things that are beyond your comprehension” (or, as Hamlet’s points out to Horatio, “There are more things in heaven and earth [...] than are dreamt of in your philosophy”)33 But such an explanation does not appear to be consistent with the statement that this “sore travail” was inflicted upon human beings by God.34 28 See Seow, ibid. pp. 54–60, who repeatedly notes the centrality of man in Koheleth’s philosophy. In his view, the Book of Ecclesiastes is not a philosophical treatise, since it deals with the Creator and Creation, and man’s place in relation to God and the universe. Since he regards Koheleth’s approach to humanity’s suffering as essentially theological, he prefers to define the Book of Ecclesiastes as a work of “anthropological theology.” 29 See: 2:11, 5:17, 18; 8:15; 9:7. 30 See Kahana, Mikra Meforash, 156: “by wisdom” means with the help of, or by means of wisdom—as in 7:23. 31 Although 5:20 (“because God answereth him in the joy of his heart”) might be interpreted as being similar to 1:13—i.e. in the sense of “found interest” (as we noted earlier with regard to Malul’s interpretation, ibid., 190), the difficulty remains here due to the meaning of “sore travail.” 32 Scott (ibid., 205, 212) points out that despite humanity’s best efforts to overcome its shortcomings, nothing is in its control. Seow (ibid., 47–60) similarly repeatedly emphasizes that both wisdom and justice are elusive, and everything is in God’s hands. 33 See Tractate Hagigah 13, p. 1—and Ben Sira 3:21–22, as well. 34 Fox (ibid., 173) interprets this to mean that investigating actions in the world through wisdom is painful activity that God has given human beings to engage in. But this would suggest that God has a capricious attitude toward human beings.

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There, I prefer to see this question, too, as another example of Koheleth’s view of perfection as encompassing opposites: just as good and evil, like light and darkness, exist by virtue of their mutual dependence— so, too, is God’s conduct with regard to humanity: on the one hand he gives man the ability to celebrate His actions (3:22) and enjoy the routine of daily life (2:24),35 while on the other hand man also has the possibility of investigating and demanding, through wisdom, all that is transpires under the heavens (1:13). In light of all his recommendations, it appears that Koheleth clearly favors the former course of action. As previously noted, this is also implicit in 2:26: whoever is good in God’s eyes will act wisely and be merry, while he who God has allowed to collect and gather is the sinner, i.e., the one who errs in his ways (“For God giveth to a man that is good in his sight wisdom, and knowledge, and joy: but to the sinner he giveth travail, to gather and to heap up, that he may give to him that is good before God”). If we adopt this interpretation, we reach the conclusion not only that God is not capricious, but that He leaves man the freedom of choice between the two extreme options.

Interim summary Koheleth’s critical remarks, which constitute the lion’s share of the book, are directed against man rather than against God. God, as we have noted, represents the eternal and perfect. Man symbolizes all that is perishable, fleeting and incomplete. The “good” person in God’s eyes is the one who recognizes this, and being aware of these contradictions and limitations, is able to experience the present and all that is available, as a gift of God. 35 We discussed the metonymic meaning of “eat and drink” at length in previous chapters, but it is worth noting that the conclusion of this verse with the words “This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God” (my emphasis—GS) has a special significance, since in various instances throughout the Hebrew Bible the Hebrew word gam does not necessarily mean “in addition” but rather is a form of reinforcement and emphasis—a kind of “indeed” or “particularly.” See Gen. 29:30 (“and he loved also Rachel more than Leah”), and perhaps that is also its meaning in Job 2:10 (“What? shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?”), II Kings 2:3, and elsewhere. See: B.D.B., “gam,” and Kadri, Milon Ha’Ivrit HaMikra’it (Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew).

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Conversely, the sinner is he who seeks to overstep his boundaries. The right-minded perspective is to recognize that perfection is founded on the existence of opposites, and is key to full enjoyment of God’s beneficence. It follows that Koheleth’s intention is not hedonism, nor is it submission or humility or a sense of helplessness—but rather, a faith that requires man to be aware of God’s virtues out of a sense of joy and full contentment with one’s possessions and capabilities. Koheleth’s praises of all that is “ordinary” take on a sharper and fuller meaning in light of this understanding. Whether it is his advice to avoid aspiring to uniqueness (“There is one alone, and there is not a second [...] yet is there no end of all his labor [...] Two are better than one”—4:7, 9), or whether he is decrying aspiration to achieve a perfect fulfillment of values ​​(“Be not righteous over much; neither make thyself over wise”— 7:16), his belief is that perfection is exclusively God’s preserve, and man must recognize this and make the most of what God has given him in the present. Accordingly, while there is no absolute “good” “upon the earth” (i.e., within a person’s reach) there is such a thing as “best” in a relative world—namely,“there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his own works” (3:22, and 2:24). Even so, “He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver” (5:10). This also appears to be the message behind his statements regarding talent: “what good is there to the owners thereof, saving the beholding of them with their eyes” (5:11)36—i.e., man’s achievement is not beyond his tangible understanding. Indeed, ability, in his view, may be the root of evil: “Again, I considered all travail, and every right work, that for this a man is envied of his neighbour” (4:4). Thus, being mindful of the right measure in everything is the key to the right way of life, and leads to the correct faith.37 Besides his unequivocal prescriptions for the right life, Koheleth is repeatedly explicit in his statements about death: “for there is no work, 36 Some commentators interpret the Hebrew word kisharon to mean “benefit” or “success.” See Kahana, Mikra Meforash, 144. 37 Various commentators consider these prescriptions (and thus the conclusion “God also hath set the one over against the other”—7:14) as taking “the golden mean” of being resigned with fate for lack of choice, and his recommendations to enjoy the routine of life as a form of hedonism. However, in my view it is more about a sharp and comprehensive distinction that man is required to make in order to see that the present world order, with all its contradictions, as the realization of perfection. Cf. Fox, Zer Kavod, ibid.,173–189; 1989, and 1996, pp 192–193. Similarly, see S. de Jong, ibid.

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nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” (9:10). On the face of it, this is a curious statement, since he always points out that his conclusions are based on his personal experience: how does he know that there is nothing in the grave, or that the dead know nothing? The answer, it seems, is this: anything that is unknown has nothing to offer. Anything that is unattainable or knowable does not exist. This is supported by his choice of words: the word know repeats in both clauses of one verse, while in the other verse, all the verbs are from the realm of conscious action. Death, therefore, is the total end: “for that is the end of all men; and the living will lay it to his heart” (7:2). Thus, Koheleth’s attitude toward death also tells us about the essence of his faith: it is all centered on reality, on what is present and exists—and therefore, he who devotes his efforts to whatever lies beyond is both misguided, and sinful.38

38 Hence it is doubtful that Koheleth’s teachings might be classed as theology—unless it is in the sense of what Seow refers to as an “anthropological theology.” See also note 28 above.

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4.

The opening verses and coda

Opening verses (Eccles. 1) [2] Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity. [3] What profit hath a man of all his labor which he taketh under the sun? [4] One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for ever. [5] The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. [6] The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits. [7] All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again. [8] All things are full of labor; man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing.

The opening verses of the Book of Ecclesiastes (1:2–11) are a kind of exposition: its assertions offer an extreme version of an ideological outlook whose full meaning becomes apparent as one peruses the book as whole, but which at first is surprising and invites different understandings. It is, in other words, a deliberately provocative opening. On reading these verses, the reader is meant to ask “What does the author mean?”—and the answer is then given, in various guises, through statements scattered throughout the book.1 The organization of the material as a whole is discussed in the Appendix; in this chapter, we will examine the ideological messages of these opening verses, in light of our inquiry in previous chapters of this

1

Cf. M. Fox (Kohelet, 170), who regards this passage as a Prologue.

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book.2 In so doing, we will find that, as we noted in the Introduction,3 the word vanity does not have several meanings, but only one, notwithstanding its varying meanings elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible4 —namely, “fleeting,” or “short-lived.” The refrain of “Vanity of vanities” is a poetical one, a type of hyperbole (like “slave of slaves,”5 and certainly does not mean “worthless”—for two reasons: From the context, it is clear that the opening expression (“Vanity of vanities”) does not stand on its own, but is related to the question that immediately ensues—namely “What profit hath a man of all his labor which he taketh under the sun?” (1:3).6 The word profit in this context is the opposite of vanity—namely something that endures, is not fleeting. The question “What profit…?” is not a rhetorical one: the answer to it is negative, and since this appears immediately after the expression “Vanity of vanities…” it follows that all a person’s labor, or effort, is aimed at achieving a certain profit—i.e. to avoid oblivion. However, since everything is fleeting and short-lived, nothing will be left of one’s life

2

3

4

5 6

Unlike my contention that this 1:2–11 is a literary unit in its own right, some see a different structure at play. See, in particular, A. Fischer, “Beobachtungen zur Komposition von Kohelet 1,3—3,15,” ZAW 103,1 (1992) pp. 72–86, who bases his interpretation mainly on his view of vss 1:3–3:15 as comprising groups of three verses of similar structural content, each featuring the word vanity, and which together form a concentric structure. He bases this hypothesis also on a subdivision by philosophical topics that he contends appear in a repeating pattern. As I have noted earlier (especially in the Introduction) regarding approaches of this sort, there is risk to appending a particular label to a passage that encompasses various themes: that label might be applicable to other things that are absent in that passage, and conversely, verses or expressions that omitted may also elsewhere. See the discussion above, in the Introduction chapter, about Koheleth’s fundamental concepts—including that of vanity—particularly in light of its counterpart profit in its various forms (in Hebrew, yitron/motar/yoter)—and the bibliographical references there. See M. Zer Kavod, Koheleth (1973), who similarly notes that the meaning of “Vanity of vanities” is “fleeting and short-lived” in the borrowed sense—except of the case of human beings, for whom it is true literally. Gen. 9:25, and elsewhere. See according to Ibn Ezra, and also Zer Kavod, ibid., in note 4. “What” in the sense of “There is no” (as in “What portion have we in David?”—I Kings 12:16, and similarly “We have no part in David“—II Sam.  20:1). See also Kahana, Mikra Meforash: Kohelet, 152—except that he interprets profit in the monetary sense of profit or compensation, and not as I have suggested.

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whatsoever.7 To put it another way, however hard one tries, one cannot can leave behind any trace of oneself, because everything is ephemeral and fleeting. No other interpretation of these verses can account for the link between the opening declaration and the rhetorical question that follows, or demonstrate that they form a logical sequence. As discussed earlier in this book, Koheleth has a dim view of the actions that people take, whom he castigates for a misguided outlook on life and attitude to reality. However, he does not believe that human actions are all pointless—on the contrary, the errant ways that he decries are the sort that might seal a person’s fate (e.g., “Be not righteous over much; neither make thyself over wise: why shouldest thou destroy thyself? Be not over much wicked, neither be thou foolish: why shouldest thou die before thy time?”—7:16–17). Serious blunders, with highly adverse and fateful consequences, cannot be considered inconsequential, and as we saw in chapter  1 of our enquiry, Koheleth devotes considerable thought and creative effort to highlight such errors and to justify his position toward them—and in any event certainly does not dismiss them out of hand. While the opening verses (2–3) contrasts man’s efforts (“labor”) and his ability to achieve his aims (“What profit…”), the following verses (vss 4–11) highlight the differences between man and the world. However, they also contains a set of internal tensions. The conventional interpretation of verse 4 is that “One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh” refers to human beings, while the expression “but the earth abideth for ever” refers to the world8—but various commentators have thought otherwise. According to Kohelet Rabbah, the first part of the verse is about how little changes from one generation to the next, and that each generation exists onto itself, while the earth is forever available for man’s use.9 Rashi thought this verse refers to the impact of a sinful generation 7

The same rhetorical question also appears immediately after the listing headed “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven” (3:1– 8)—which lends further support to my argument that Koheleth’s main criticism is directed against human efforts to achieve an advantage. See also the following note. 8 “Generation” in the sense of all the people that live in a given period—see “Dor” (generation), Kadri, ibid. 181. Cf: “Omedet” (abideth), BDB, 190.2, in the sense of “exists” (as in Ps. 119:4; 145:6), or a circle of people with a common interest. 9 See Midrash Rabbah: Kohelet, parashah 1, 2: R. Levi and R. Yaacov Gvula, in the name of R. Hanina: As a generation goes, so it comes. A lame one goes, and another one comes; a blind one goes, another comes—lest they say: “He put some to death, and revived others”

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on subsequent generations—in line with the words of Job 20:10.10 In the Kabbalah, on the other hand, this verse is thought to suggest the notion of the incarnation of souls11—an idea which is expressly at odds with Koheleth’s doctrine, since he repeatedly and invariably rules out any possibility of continuation or existence after death (especially in 9:10). On the face of it, the meaning of verse 4 appears to be self-evident. Nevertheless, as often the case with poetic philosophy, the entire passage raises other questions: while the Hebrew word omedet (lit. “standing”) is correctly translated as abideth in the sense of “enduring”—rather than in its literal sense of the earth standing still12—it does contrast with the circular motion of celestial bodies: [5] The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. [6] The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits. [7] All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again.

In other words, nature’s absolute perfection is evident in its eternal and self-contained circular nature. In contrast, the fleeting lives of humans are epitomized in the word generation, which also has an implicit cyclical connotation.13 Thus—at a non-superficial level, at least—the contrast between man and nature is not absolute. A more substantive internal tension exists between the statement “that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun” (9) and the preceding verse: “All things are full of labor; man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing” (8). As reflected in the English translation, the expression “full of labor” (in Hebrew, yege’im) here does not mean “tired” but rather

10 11 12 13

(per Deut. 32:39). Alternatively: “‘And the earth abideth forever’ means that it is there for mankind’s use.” “His children shall seek to please the poor, and his hands shall restore their goods.” See referrals to the Sefer Habahir, and Sefer HaZohar (Reiah Meheimanah), in S.A. Moss, “Ecclesiastes 1:4 A Proof Text for Reincarnation,” JBQ 21,1 (1993) pp. 28–30. Also per Kahana, Mikra Meforash: Kohelet, 153. See in particular, R. N. Whybray, “Ecclesiastes 1.5–7 and the Wonders of Nature,” JSOT 13:105 (1988) pp. 105–112.

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“full of work, constant in their action”—i.e., continually self-renewing.14 The word “things” refers to what is in nature, while “utter,” “seeing” and “hearing” are man’s responses and emotions. The message, therefore, is that man will never be satisfied with receiving “All things,” since nature has an inexhaustible supply of novelties. This, then, begs the question of the meaning of the expression, in the following verse, “and there is no new thing under the sun.” The answer is that the whole of verse 9 is an allusion to human actions, rather than to natural phenomena, because (as we have seen in previous chapters), the expression “under the sun”—like that of “upon the earth”—is a reference to mankind’s circumscribed domain (as distinct from“under the heaven”). It follows, therefore, that Koheleth believes man to be incapable of significant innovations. Verse 10 (“Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which was before us”) may be a reiteration of this point—that is, anything that appears to be new in the eyes of man is so only due to his inability to encompass and understand the underlying logic of nature in its entirety. Nonetheless, the internal tensions between the eternal circular motion of heavenly bodies and the existence defined as abideth—much like the tension between the infinite bounty of nature and its repeating regularity—make it difficult to make an unequivocal distinction between objective existence and man’s subjective perception. Generally speaking, statements with equivocal messages are of an ironic nature:15 they allow the reader to decide whether to accept them at face value, or as a hint of the precise opposite. Irony of this sort is needed to make the fine distinction between conventions or prejudices and an enduring truth—and for this reason, Koheleth, being primarily concerned with refuting conventions, likely opted to use it. This, at any rate, is how we should understand the statement “Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness” (2:13). Here, the word excelleth (in Hebrew, yitron) does not mean “is superior to,” but “outlasts.” In other words, light is no more enduring than darkness, since they constantly alternate—and the same is true for wisdom and folly. It 14 Per Kahana (Mikra Meforash: Kohelet, 154) and see also Whybray, ibid., ibid. (see previous note). 15 See above, I. J .J. Spangenberg, “Irony in the Book of Qohelet”, JSOT 21:57 (1996) pp. 57–69, and Levine, “The Humor in Qohelet.” But as previous noted, their allusions to irony pertain to other matters (Levine sees it as a form of humor, as one of the ways in which Koheleth treats folly).

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is only by convention that we ascribe inherent superiority to wisdom and light. The same is true for the innovations of nature:16 the discrepancy between the unlimited bounty of nature (“man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing”) and “there is no new thing under the sun” leaves the discretion with man. So, too, in the matter of the circular pattern of the forces of nature. This repeating pattern pits man against the tension between the regularity and the plethora of possibilities within the circularity. It is worth bearing all this in mind when one reexamines vss 3:1–8. Here, too, there are internal tensions: every matter and every action has not only its appropriate time and circumstances, but is also bounded by its counterpart. At the same time, this detailed listing, with its myriad of possibilities and choice between one option and its antithesis, leaves room for human discretion (Koheleth himself hints at this when he reasons his directive “Be not over much wicked, neither be thou foolish” on the grounds that “why shouldest thou die before thy time?”—7:17, as noted above). The opening passage in the book ends with the words “There is no remembrance of former things; neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after” (1:11). This represents a closing of the circle: what had previously been presented as a rhetorical question (“What profit…?”) now appears in the form of an experience, or summarizing declaration. While it is difficult at first to see how this conclusion follows on from the previous verses, the question is coupled with its own answer: the use of the word remembrance (in the sense of “legacy”) instead of profit may be an indication that this, in fact, is the kind of “profit” that man truly seeks. Vss 9–10 suggest that man’s efforts to immortalize himself in a bid to escape oblivion and leave a vestige of memory are evident in his relentless quest for the new and efforts to innovate. However, Koheleth declares that “under the sun”—i.e., in the realm of man’s existence—there is nothing new:

16 The fact that the word new make no further appearances in the Book of Ecclesiastes after verse 1:10 may also be further evidence that in his poetic declarations in the opening verses, Koheleth was deliberately poses provocative questions, the answers to which become apparent only later. Accordingly, he uses an expression in the opening that does not recur, because its meaning is very general and puzzling, and only later does his intention become apparent.

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that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. / Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time, which was before us. (vss. 9b–10).

This is because perennial and eternal renewal is generally present in the cyclical patterns of nature (vss.  5–7). Recognizing that man will never be able to tap into most of the rich tapestry that is the world (8) is the reason for Koheleth’s repeated exhortations, throughout his doctrine, to abandon the pursuit of novelty, the efforts to immortalize oneself or to insure oneself against future mishaps, and instead seize the moment and all it has to offer.

Coda (12:1–8)17 [1] Remember now thy Creator18 in the days of thy youth, while the evil days come not, nor the years draw nigh, when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them; [2] While the sun, or the light, or the moon, or the stars, be not darkened, nor the clouds return after the rain: [3] In the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble, and the strong men shall bow themselves, and the grinders cease because they are few, and those that look out of the windows be darkened,

17

I regard vss 1–8 as the true conclusion of the Book of Ecclesiastes due to their content and literary form, and vss 9–14 as the “coda” (as does Fox, in Kohelet, 208—and see my discussion of Seow’s view, below). Accordingly, I shall refrain from commenting on the coda verses, inasmuch as they, like the issue of the book’s editing as a whole, is beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, for further discussion on this point, see: G. T. Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” CBQ 39 (1977) pp. 182–189, where he points out different approaches to the subject editing (various commentators attribute the editing of two, three and eight editors). In his investigation of the relationship between the “coda” verses and the content of the book as a whole, he also examined how closely the Book of Ecclesiastes is related to the Book of Proverbs, and concludes that in fact it is closer to Ben-Sira than to Proverbs. Ultimately, however, he concludes that Ecclesiastes is a complementary compilation of analogies and wisdom aphorisms—contrary to my contention. 18 Although in Hebrew the word is boreikha, which is plural (i.e., “your Creators”), the intention is undoubtedly to a single God—much Elohim and kdoshim (e.g. Hosea 12:1; Prov.  9:10, 30:3)—and in various versions the singular form is used. See Kahana, Mikra Meforash: Kohelet, p. 214.

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[4] And the doors shall be shut in the streets, when the sound of the grinding is low, and he shall rise up at the voice of the bird, and all the daughters of musick shall be brought low; [5] Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears [obstacles] shall be in the way, and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden [hatch], and desire shall fail: because man goeth to his long home, and the mourners go about the streets: [6] Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl be broken, or the pitcher be broken at the fountain, or the wheel broken at the cistern. [7] Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it. [8] Vanity of vanities, saith the preacher; all is vanity.

These verses represent a closing of the circle in relation to the opening verses of Chapter 1, particularly on an ideological level. (Although some commentators do discern a similarity in terms of form and terminology— especially between 1:5 and 12:2, and of course the virtual identity between 1:2 and 12:8.)19 The contrasting tension between the two passages appears to help clarify both: what is said in the Coda gives further meaning to the opening declarations (as to other statements in the composition). The beginning of his exhortation to “Remember now thy Creator” lends further support to our contention about Koheleth’s faith: just as his urging to enjoy all that the present has to offer is repeatedly accompanied by his emphasis that it is a gift of God,20 his call to enjoy what is possible is coupled with the obligation to remember God. Once again, we find that accepting things as God provides them and coming to terms with the established world order are the key to wisdom and the foundation of faith. For our purposes, however, the continuation of this verse is particularly important: the “evil days” are defined as “the years [...] when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them.” In the Hebrew, the operative word is ḥefetz—the same as the word translated as purpose in 3:1—and there can be no doubt that the meaning is the same in the two cases. The “evil days” are therefore the reality which man finds no pleasure in. Hence, before the “evil days” arrive—although all possibilities are preordained in an established pattern of a thing and its antithesis—man still has the choice between the two extremes. Moreover, all the subsequent detailed descriptions illustrate the 19 See, in particular, C. L. Seow, “Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem,” J.B.L. 118. 2 (1999) pp.  209–234—in contrast to my understanding of this issue in the course of this inquiry. 20 See: 2:24; 3:13; 5:17; 8:15; 9:7. See also 5:18; 6:2, and elsewhere.

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nature of the “evil days,” and therefore the common denominator of all these descriptions lies in the full picture, and the ideological message emerges only from the combination as a whole. As is well known, everything in these verses has been subject to innumerable interpretations, which vary from one commentator to the next—not only with regard to the various expressions or literary style devices, but to the description as a whole, and its messages. Indeed, there is no consensus on the question of what the author is talking about. Most traditional commentators believe that this poem is an allegory for old age.21 Others—especially the early Christian and medieval commentators—thought it to be an eschatalogical text, i.e., about the End of Days. Yet others have attributed symbolic meanings to the various expressions about the hallmarks and experiences of old age.22 Since the eschatalogical interpretation has reappeared repeatedly in recent years (albeit tentatively, and with many reservations),23 it is worth reexamining. The biblical prophecies of doom (be it over the Children of Israel for their sins, or about other nations) portray the expected punishment as catastrophic changes in the natural order—virtually all involving light turning darkness.24 However, I am not sure that it would be true to describe these as prophecies of the End of Days, i.e. as the end of the world. As a rule, the Hebrew prophets’ descriptions of calamity served not as an end to themselves, but as a means to an end: the prophet, as a man of vision, sought a better future, which he predicted would come about by the formation of a new natural order—a kind of renewed, improved Creation. The quintessential examples of these prophecies are the visions 21

See: Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat 151 col. 2; 152 col. 1; and Rashi, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra. See also Seow’s survey in “Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem” (see note 20 above). 22 Seow, ibid. 23 Fox believes that eschatological images underpin vs. 2 (see M.V. Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, Sheffield 1989 pp.  290–294), while Seow (ibid.) extends the eschatalogical aspect to other descriptions, particularly based on comparisons to eschatalogical expressions in prophetic literature (see my discussion of this, below). See also T. Krüger, “Dekonstruktion und Rekonstruktion prophetischen Eschatologie in Qohelet—Buch und ‘jedes Ding hat seine Zeit’,” Festschrift D. Michel, BZAW 241 1996 pp. 114–124. 24 See Isaiah 5:30, 13:10; Ezekiel 32:7–8 (about the king of Egypt); Amos 5:8 (although there this set of metaphors appears in one of the doxologies—i.e., songs of praise to the Creator God, who rules the universe), and 8:9; Micah 3:6; Joel 2:10, 3:4, 4:15. See also the descriptions in Job 3:9, 18:6.

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of Isaiah (11:6–8; 30:26; 60:10–22; and 65:17).25 The first of these depicts a kind of closing of the circle that begins with the explusion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden—the origin of the animosity between the woman and her seed, and that of the snake (Gen. 3:15)—while the ideal future is described as one where “the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice’s den” (Isaiah 11:8). In the other prophecies, the circle is closed through the creation of a new heaven and earth, and of a new light that exists independently of the sun and the moon. Overall, therefore, the End of Days are seen as only a phase designed to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of a better world and a perfect natural order.26 This, I believe, is the essential difference between eschatology and the apocalyptic writings in ancient literature—i.e., between the Hebrew Bible and deuterocanonical books: while the former sees the calamity and destruction as paving the way for the creation of a perfect world, the latter makes the creation of the perfect future world contingent upon the total destruction and loss of the existing one.27 2. However, Koheleth’s vision has nothing to do with forecasting the future—either as a prophecy of doom, and certainly not for the purpose of constructing a new reality and perfect world. In stark contrast to the Hebrew prophets, Koheleth rejects the very notion of yearning for the future, for being, in his view, a type of escape from the present, which prevents man from enjoying life, which is the gift 25 In fact, the same is true about the conclusion of the Book of Amos (9:13–15)— although it is conventional view is that it is an editorial addendum, and not part of Amos’ prophecies. See also Jer.  31, in which the cluster of prophecies about the End of Days (“Behold, the days come”) join a kind of “program” that ultimately links the eternal nature of the world order with the total internalization of faith (esp. vss. 34–37). See also Ezekiel 36—especially vss 22–38, and Joel 3. 26 On the various components and stages in the visions of the End of Days, see S. Gelander, “Visions of the End of Days,” S. Gelander (ed.), Drakhim BeHoraat HaNevu’ah [Methods of Teaching Prophetical Literature], Tel-Aviv, Makhon Mofet 2004, pp. 85–89. 27 However, many commentators do not agree with this distinction: some see the Apocalypse (the revelation of the end of the world) as part of eschatology (the theology related to the end of mankind)—or at least as one of its components. See: Y. Find, “Eschatology,” in D. Knaani (ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. 1, Tel-Aviv, 1962, pp 330–331 (Hebrew). See also Y. Dan, Apocalipsah Az VeAkhshav (Apocalypse Then and Now), Tel-Aviv, 2000 (Hebrew)—esp. pp 19–48, 49–68.

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of God. Needless to say, therefore, his descriptions cannot be ascribed any eschatological meaning, in any sense. While, in his account, the “evil days” are characterized, in part, by the disappearance of the light (verse 2), this should not be understood literally, but as a metaphor of what the details of the “evil days” have in common—much as “They that sow in tears shall reap in joy” (Ps. 126:5) is not literally about agriculture, and the righteous man is not literally a tree planted “by the rivers of water” (Ps. 1:3). Here, the message is that just as appearance of light is the start of all existence, its disappearance represents the ultimate end. This becomes clearer when we remember Koheleth’s words about light, namely “Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun” (11:7)—especially since it is followed by “But if a man live many years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember the days of darkness” (11:8). The enjoyment of the light encapsulates all possible enjoyment of the present, and the only possibility for renewal—namely through constant wonderment, as reflected in the opening words “All things are full of labor;28 man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing” (1:8). Accordingly, the “evil days” here are in a sense that is complementary to 7:14: “In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him” In other words, life is about good days and bad days following each other in alternate succession, and it is up to man to accept this and to come to terms with the bad. In the final verses, the “evil days” in which man takes no pleasure—that is to say, they contain nothing of any interest to him. 3. The descriptions that following the words “the years draw nigh, when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them” (12:1) are therefore descriptions of how such lack of pleasure is manifest, and what it means, and must search for what they have in common. Although some of them are obscure, their meaning may be deduced from the overall picture—which is that old age is marked by the loss of function in matters that concern man—be it one’s body, one’s position, social or economic activities, or the obvious trappings of wealth and social status. In this regard, it makes no difference whether “the keepers 28 See above my explanation for the expression yege’im and note 14.

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of the house” and “the strong men” and “the grinders” are indeed references to a person’s arms, legs, and teeth, as commonly thought,29 or merely archetypal examples of things that no longer function properly or meet one’s expectations in old age. In the anatomical interpretation,“those that look out of the windows” (12:3), and “the doors shall be shut in the streets” (12:4) are references to a person’s “apertures”30, and the description is an allegory of a body whose various limbs no longer function properly in old age. However, this is inconsistent with the descriptions that follow (“and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden”—12:5— although some commentators think that these, too, are descriptions of the defects and weakness of an old person’s body).31 The alternative interpretation—that the description are not allegorical, but metonymic descriptions of activity and phenomena that collective portray the loss of one’s grip on life— “the keepers of the house” and “the strong men” simply represent those who are charged with protecting one’s security. When these, too, cease to function properly, and are presented in their weakness, it is apparent that the “evil days” are marked by the loss of physical security. Similarly, “grinders” and “the sound of the grinding” may be understood as metonymic references to the providers of food, just as the word bread is not merely symbolic of a basic foodstuff, but an illustration of the routine of life, as we discussed earlier. Accordingly, the words “and the grinders cease because they are few” are emblematic of the dwindling of economic activity.32 Likewise, “the doors shall be shut in the streets” may be 29 See Tractate Shabbat 152, col.  1; and Rashi. See also Kahana’s survey (Mikra Meforash: Kohelet, 214–215), and Fox (Kohelet, Tel-Aviv, 1996, p 170 [Hebrew]). 30 On “when the sound of the grinding is low” (beshefel qol hatahanah) see Tractate Shabbat, ibid. and Rashi: “whose intestines are not grinding up what he eats…” 31 As though the reference is to an old person’s hair, which is white like the blossoms of an almond tree (Tractate Shabbat, ibid.)—and the grasshopper, which was a common delicacy at the time, is difficult for them to digest (ibid.). 32 Seow (in Ecclesiastes (Anchor Bible), p.  223) identifies the background to this description as the days of the prophet Nehemiah’s struggle with the commercial competition and widespread activity, in which the Sabbath was not kept. Thus, the dwindling of activity may be a reference to the suspension of activity on the Sabbath. In his subsequent writings (“Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem,” p. 216), he qualifies that interpretation, and explains that the description may be related to the disappearance or dwindling of the number of women grinding wheat, due to some unspecified sudden calamity. (Similarly, he interprets “those that look out of the windows” as

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a reference not only to economic activity, but to social activity, as well: open doors symbolise a person to be reckoned with, of good connections and status, while closed doors symbolise the opposite. Thus, the “evil days” are also marked by increasing loneliness. I can offer no certain interpretation of various expressions here—such as “the clouds return after the rain,” or “those that look out of the windows be darkened.” In Hebrew, the operative noun here is arubot, which has various meanings in the Hebrew Bible, only one of which we know for certain (“and as the smoke out of the chimney”—Hosea 13:3). In one instance, the arubot are the apertures where pigeons congregate (“and as the doves to their windows”—Isaiah 60:8)—which is why commentators who think this passage is a metaphor for the human anatomy, interpret “those that look out of the windows” to mean the eyes in their sockets.33 However, in most instances in the Hebrew Bible, the expression arbubot hashamaim means “the windows of heaven” (as in Gen. 7:11),34 and therefore I prefer to think that “the clouds return after the rain” and “those that look out of the windows be darkened” are two expressions of the notion of a loss of function. We see a similar association between the two expressions elsewhere in the Book of Ecclesiastes: “he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap” (11:4) There, as we have already noted, the message is that he who places his trust in the forces of nature (over which he has no control) will not see the fruits of his labor: “If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth”—i.e., one cannot predict the actions of the forces of nature. Assuming a measure of consistency in the various descriptions, it follows that 12:2 means that when man expects the sky to clear (after rainfall), it becomes overcast again,35 and instead of seeing the blessing in the heavens opening up, man only sees the darkness. In other words, the two expressions are depictions of another aspect of the “evil days,” which is the dashing of the hopes placed on the blessings of nature. The contrast between man and the natural order that was presented in the opening verses is also conveyed in another way in the concluding verses— the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden” the women who watch from the windows, i.e. as a metonymic reference to bustling activity—ibid. 356–360.) 33 Tractate Shabbat, 152, col. 1. 34 As in the story of the Flood, in the Book of Kings and in the prophetic literature. See: Gen. 7:11, 8:2; II Kings 7:2, 19; Isaiah 24:18; Malachi 3:10. 35 Similarly, Fox (ibid., 1999, 208).

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Although the expressions are somewhat obscure, they appear to allude to the initial stages of renewal in flora and fauna (the early blossoming of an almond tree, and what may be the hatching of the grasshopper— in Hebrew, veyistabel—in stark contrast to the “evil days” of man, when his“desire shall fail”—i.e. he loses his sexual drive, or the primal drive of life renewal. Thus, the final clause of vs. 5 heightens the contrast between the ever-renewing nature and the decline of man in his twilight years. Some commentators discern a contrast between the start of Chapter 1 and the end of Chapter 12, with the former depicting nature’s constant renewal as a cyclical pattern, and the latter showing it as linear and onedirectional36—however, this is inaccurate: in vs. 1:5, at least, nature, too, is in a state of constant renewal. The natural environment also heightens the depiction of alienation: while the “bird” and “the daughters of musick” are synonymous,“he shall rise up” is the opposite of “shall be brought low”—revealing this part of the verse (4b) as an antithetic parallelism. In other words, man awakens to the bird’s song, but is sad to hear it, rather than happy. It follows that the first part of vs. 5 should be understood in this way, too: he fears both what is above him and what lies at his feet.37 With the obstacles in the way, he feels that he is approaching “his long home,” and in his mind’s eye he sees the mourners, currently going about their business in the marketplace. This description in the latter half of vs.  5 depicts the inner meaning of a man’s growing isolation from his surroundings. There is a significant parallel between “And the doors shall be shut in the streets” and “and the mourners go about the streets,” in that they complement each other to depict the meaning of the “evil days” in terms of social and environmental isolation. Verses 6–7 take us further, to another aspect of the present slipping away from man—namely that of the inanimate. After the previous verses’ portrayal of the dysfunction of the human environment, isolation from one’s immediate surroundings, and the mocking endless vitality of nature, now we see problems with objects, as well. Once again, while the

36 Seow, “Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem,” p. 226. 37 In many places in the Hebrew Bible, happiness and success are described in terms of a smooth path, free of obstacles. Thus, “Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low: and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain” (Isaiah 40:4). See also Ps. 1:1, and elsewhere.

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precise sense of “the silver cord” or “the golden bowl”38 is obscure, their meaning may be deduced from the overall context. The basic and clearest illustration of the connection between man and his world is offered by the inanimate objects that he uses to maintain his daily existence. Thus, extravagant and rare objects symbolise a person’s lofty status. Regardless of whether or not they meant to be components of a valuable lamp, “the silver cord” and “the golden bowl” are clearly luxury item of the sort that a person of means uses to display his status. If indeed it is a lamp, its loss symbolizes the loss of one’s source of light—but in any event, just as Koheleth describes the evidence of his wealth in vss. 2:4–8 in the form of expensive and rare objects (including shidah and shidot—which the KJV interprets as “musical instruments, and that of all sorts”—2:8), the “evil days” at the end of his life are illustrated by their loss or destruction. Irrespective of whether the author is deliberately using obscure names of objects that we are unfamiliar with, the basic message is that trappings of wealth and status ultimately prove to be useless in the end. The old man’s growing withdrawal from his world is manifested, in part, in his loss of interest in the objects themselves. The symbolism of the breaking of the vessels intended for drawing water from the well is self-explanatory: since water is the source of life, when man no longer has the means of drawing it, the vital link between him and his life is severed, and his life comes to an end. In light of all this, it is clear that this passage is not about the aging of the body, nor is it about an escatological end. First and foremost, it is a poem about loneliness, when the dreaded “evil days” are manifested in a growing withdrawal from all aspects of life, and ultimately end with man’s total isolation from his surroundings.39 This isolation, then, is the 38 Seow (“Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem”) thinks that the reference is to a lamp (so, too, according to Zachariah 4:2–3, and see Radak)—one of the objects that were customarily buried with a person in ancient times—which suggests that this depiction is using archetypal representations of death. However, in my view, here too the reference is to the final stages of life—the days when a person finds “no pleasure in them”—rather than death or its aftermath. He also argues that, here too, the reference to the various parts of a human body, while Fox (Kohelet, 209) argues that both the silver cord and the golden bowl are part of the tools used to draw water from a well, and as such, are metaphors for the decline of a person’s life. 39 In this regard, there is little point in comparing this poetry with that of other works of ancient Eastern literature—particularly that of Egypt, such as Instruction of Ptahhotep (Prisse Papyrus 4.2–5.2), or The Tale of Sinuhe (Berlin Papyrus 3022, lines 167–170),

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oblivion that leaves behind no trace of oneself. It is the meaning of “There is no remembrance” and of “what profit.” It is here that everything ends, when“shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.” Those final words are worthy of a few comments: 1. The closing of the circle by returning to dust echoes Koheleth’s words in a previous context: “all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again” (3:20). If so, this refutes the claim of some commentators that the description here is linear rather than cyclical40—for here too, the circle is clearly being closed, just as it had begun—the creation of man began with dust and ends with dust. 2. Since the absolute end is marked by the return to dust, the focus of Koheleth’s doctrine is clearly on man and his life, rather than on the universe and its eternal laws—since the creation of the world did not begin with dust, but with a void, and it is only to man that was said “for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return” (Gen. 3:19). 3. The final words, “and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it” do not contradict the statement “Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?” From the context it is apparent that here (3:21) what is discussed is what happens after death, and in this respect the future is hidden from all living things—man and beast. And while it is apparent from this verse that the spirit of life was given by God, and it returns to Him in the end, it follows this gift is in fact a “loan.” Anyone who believes that the spirit of life belongs to God, as Koheleth argues, must be infused with a profound faith in God. 4. The final “note” of this poem underscores the fact that God is the one who gave man his spirit. Once again, as before, God is presented as giving.41 These words belie the hedonistic interpretation of or the Instruction in the Insinger Papyrus (XVII, lines 11–14). See English translation in M. Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Berkeley (University of California) Vol. 3 1980 p. 199. See also Seow’s reference to it (“Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem”). In all those poems, old age is depicted in terms of the aging of the body and its limbs, with virtually no figurative language or imagery. Besides the topic itself, I do not believe that the comparison is relevant, other than to highlight the originality of the Book of Ecclesiastes. 40 Seow, ibid.—and see note 37 above. 41 See what my discussion above, in chapter 3—particularly with regard to the positive prescriptions such as “eat and drink,” etc.

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Koheleth’s repeated exhortations to “seize the day,” and the seemingly bleak quality of the book in general: the description of the trials and adversities of old age is simply as a warning of what is to come. Since, by implication, everything that is missing in old age had existed in earlier stages of life, this is an fundamentally a positive message. In summary, we can say that the opening verses of the Book of Ecclesiastes and its coda in Chapter 12 provide a framework that encapsulates the ideological essence of the composition a whole—a kind of prologue and coda, as it were. As a literary phenomenon, they might be regarded as “a story within a story” (or a poem within a story)42—much as the very brief story of the Taberah is a kind of prelude to the story of the Kibrothhattaavah,43 or to Aaron’s appeal, or to Moses’ prayer for Miriam.44 The same is true for the incorporation of Lamech’s poem within the genealogical list of the descendants of Cain.45 The term “ideological essence” is perhaps an inaccurate definition—but as a short text incorporated into a wider context of a different literary genre, it is valid inasmuch just as it hints at the fundamental sense of the wider context and its main import, just as an analogy does not precisely correspond to the original on a detail-to-detail basis.

42 Andre Gide dubbed this literary phenomenon a mise en abyme, as E. L. Greenstein points out, who sees the role of the flood story in the Epic of Gilgamesh as fulfilling a similar role (of the play-within-a-play in Shakespeare’s Hamlet). He also notes similar phenomena in biblical literature, such as the references to Rachel and Leah in Ruth 4:11 (as noted by M.  G.  Bal); Levi’s action in the story of the concubine at Gibeah (Judges 30–29—per Susan Niditch), or the symbolic significance of the rending of the hem of Samuel’s mantle (I Sam. 15:27–28—per R.A. Brauner). In his view, analogies that appear in narrative contexts also serve the same purpose. See: E. L. Greenstein, “The Retelling of the Flood Story in the Gilgamesh Epic,” Hesed veEmet (1998) pp. 197–204. 43 Num. 11:1–3 with regard to the detailed story in 11:4–35. 44 Num. 12:12–13. 45 Gen. 4:23–24. This paean hints at another and serious stage in the decline of mankind, whereby, after the first murder, killing, in Lamech’s word, became a kind of “norm.” Thus, this poem highlights the general trend of the early days of mankind (Gen. 1:11).

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Conclusion

One of the key premises of this inquiry has been that Koheleth’s disparagements and negative pronouncements are not the true purpose of his composition, but serve only to define the “misguided life” in a bid to clarify what, in his view, is the “correct life.” This correct lifestyle is not necessarily one of pleasure-seeking per se, but one of having the right faith. As evidence for these premises gradually emerges, one realizes that Koheleth’s ideas reflect a comprehensive and consistent worldview, and therefore his work should not be seen as a mere collection of maxims, some of which are mutually contradictory. The overwhelming majority of Koheleth’s assertions are presented as lessons gleaned from his own personal experience. This suggests that only what man experiences personally can serve as the basis for his views, and by extension that the correct path is one where one fully focuses on what reality has to offer: after all, man has nothing but what he experiences himself (“For who can eat, or who else can hasten hereunto, more than I?”—2:25). Accordingly, anything that lies beyond his grasp or his scope of experience is unknown (“For the living know that they shall die: but the dead know not any thing”—9:5)—and therefore does not exist and is illusory (“for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest” 9:10). This clarifies his statements about death: in reality, they are about living life to the full. The book’s coda (12:1–8) is about old age rather than about death, because Koheleth himself can attest to its manifestations from his own personal experience. Koheleth contends that man spends his life attempting to cling to whatever lies beyond it; instead of making the most of the present, he aspires to what lies beyond his reach. Koheleth’s criticism is aimed against such misguided aspirations, and accordingly his positive prescriptions of the desirable and correct path are about making the most of life. The disparagements and positive prescriptions are presented side by side, and occasionally juxtaposed, so that from any given statement one might also learn about its counterpart. Thus, in his derision of people’s zealous protection of their wealth for times of need, it is apparent that he recommends that wealth be exploited and enjoyed in the present. 133

Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity and for greater ease of presentation, I have distinguished between Koheleth’s castigations of what I have labeled as forms of escapism, and his positive recommendations. In Koheleth’s view, virtually all of man’s misguided approaches to life involve efforts to elude oblivion, termination and obscurity, in an effort to gain a “profit” or to be commemorated. These take on many forms, and Koheleth rejects them all. One approach is to leave behind a “legacy” of some sort that one bequeaths to one’s heirs in the hope of ensuring a kind of continuity of life (2:18). Another is the attempt to insure oneself against future mishaps (such as 5:12–14; 9:11). Cultivating a notable attribute or talent in the hope of attaining perfection is also perceived by Koheleth as a form of escapism, since singling out any one option and preferring it above all others avenues, at the expense of all others (such as 1:3; 7:16– 17). The same is true for the pursuit of any type of personal distinction or excellence (4:8), because doing so isolates a person, and engenders competitiveness, which, in turn, gives rise to jealousy (4:4). These errors all involve self-gratification or preoccupation with material matters. However, Koheleth also rejects what he perceives as introversion: man’s pursuit of absolute values—in particular, justice versus misdeeds, or justice in the face of evil. Many commentators believe that this means that Koheleth implicitly rejects the doctrine of reward and punishment, and believes that the world conducts itself in an arbitrary fashion, because man’s destiny is not a function of his actions (especially according to 3:16; 8:14, etc.). However, in my view, Koheleth’s statements in this regard reflect a more fundamental notion—namely, that the state of perfect equilibrium between every thing and its counterpart is a reflection of the absolute and eternal nature of the Divine, and that this fact lies beyond man’s understanding. It is for this reason that he proposes avoiding taking a position or identifying with any particular aspect of the world or single path (5:1; 9:2), or dedicating or sacrificing one’s life for any single purpose: even the lowliest and most despicable any form of life is preferable to the most illustrious death (9:4). Complementing Koheleth’s critical disapproval of man’s efforts to avoid oblivion and to gain a “profit” or “memory” are his positive exhortations, that might be grouped under the heading “To eat and drink”—i.e., to enjoy the mundane present, with all that it has to offer. In contrast to escapism to the future or to the past, the correct life, as Koheleth sees it, is to live in the present. His various statements in praise of eating and drinking 134 

and enjoying the fruits of one’s labor are distributed across the Book of Ecclesiastes in various contexts (2:24; 3:13; 5:17; 8:15; 9:7, and see also 3:12; 5:18, 22; 11:8–10). These might be seen as a kind of recurring theme or repeating refrain, in that they are presented as inevitable conclusions amidst many rejected options. The fullest form of exploitation of the present involves not only passive enjoyment, since in his recommendation to “eat and drink” Koheleth takes care to add the words “enjoy the good of all his labor”—namely, the action itself. But the “present” in this context refers not only to the dimension of time, but also to everything that is present and within one’s reach, given one’s means. Accordingly, he argues that one should avoid taking on momentous undertakings that one does not know how or if one is able to complete, and instead limit oneself to tasks whose conclusion one can anticipate, and know how to complete (“defer not to pay it…”—5:3–4). Likewise, he counsels against pursuing perfection of a given virtue or talent, such as wisdom or righteousness in the face of foolishness or evil (7:16–8). By extension, he reasons that one should reject aspiring to distinction and excellence—for he who has no equal in the world is lonely and never satisfied (4:8). Making the most of the present therefore means being content with being unexpectional, and seeking out what people have in common, rather than the attributes that set them apart and make them unique (4:9; and the full meaning of 7:18). This outlook springs from the notion that there are no absolute values within the sphere of human life: the best that one can hope for is a relative good—something better or preferable to its alternatives (7:1–3, 5, 19)— and thus the best course is “to eat and to drink”—namely, to conduct an ordinary life and to enjoy the fruits of one’s labors (3:24). This relativism is also why one should prefer any form of life over death (“for a living dog is better than a dead lion”—9:4), and thus, only he who partakes of all of life, instead of just one part of it, is “good” (9:4). I reiterate this point because, as I see it, this verse encapsulates Koheleth’s worldview in the most distilled form. It is also noteworthy in that it runs counter to any belief that measures fulfillment by a person’s willingness to sacrifice themselves for it. The juxtaposition of Koheleth’s disparagements and positive recommendations make it possible to form a coherent picture of his faith. It is a faith founded on the understanding that God made everything beautiful in its time (3:11), and that man must recognize this (ibid.), and therefore accept the world as it is (3:14). This, then, is the meaning of making the 135

most of the present. It is also the basis of wisdom, the achievement of which is contingent upon accepting existing world order and the laws of nature; recognizing that absolute perfection exists only “in the heavens,” and not in the human realm (5:1); and that all perfection consists of sets of opposites held in a state of equilibrium (e.g., 3:16). Furthermore, wisdom is also contingent upon accepting social hierarchy (5:7), obeying and submitting to one’s superiors (6:10; 8:2, 4; 10: 20), and asserting authority over those of lesser standing (7:21). Such acceptance inevitably also affects how one’s life progresses. If one is to be content with one’s lot, in terms of possessions and talents, it follows that one must let the “flow of life” determine one’s routine and the basis of one’s existence. This, then, is how the verse “Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days”(11:1) should be understood. That said, although the world order is fixed and cannot be changed, and although “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven” (3:1), and every action is defined and circumscribed by its counterpart, man still has freedom of choice: not only can he choose a path and adhere to it, but the degree to which he does so and the scale of his achievement is at his discretion: “Be not righteous over much—neither make thyself over wise: why shouldest thou destroy thyself?” (7:16–17). This choice may also affect his fate: “Be not over much wicked, neither be thou foolish: why shouldest thou die before thy time?” (ibid.). Determinism, then, does not necessarily preclude freedom of choice, and God must not be perceived as as an arbitrary entity—as Koheleth repeatedly reminds us, God is benevolent, and the pleasures of the present and the joys of living are His gift. The concluding verses (12:1–7) depict the end of life as a time when one loses touch with all that binds one to the activities and functions of life—be it one’s own limbs, or one’s protectors and attendants. One also disconnects from one’s social surroundings, with all its economic hustle and bustle, and from one’s natural environment and trappings of identity or status. This portrait of gradual detachment implies that the nature of life before this period is a time when everything functions normally—i.e., when it still holds one’s interest (“purpose”).

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Epilogue: The structure of the Book of Ecclesiastes As discussed in the previous chapters of this book, Koheleth’s ideas collectively form a coherent and consistent doctrine. However, its themes are dispersed throughout the text, and the Book of Ecclesiastes has no clearly defined form, such as a chiasmos or symmetrical structure of some sort (with the possible exception of the opening and the concluding verses, which might be seen as a preamble and coda, respectively). In the Introduction of this book I argued that various attempts to present the Book of Ecclesiastes as a carefully crafted structure are overly simplistic. Some commentators put together under a single heading topics and ideas that may also be found elsewhere in the book, and attempts to detect a symmetrical structure have similarly foundered, because they attribute various passages to headings that might apply to other passages that are not included in the proposed structure. The same is true of attempts to define certain passages as independent and coherent literary works in their own right.1 Nonetheless, and, since I do not believe that Koheleth’s composition is a random collection of maxims, I shall attempt to make sense of how it is organized. To this end, I shall examine some of the central themes that he discusses, and how they appear within their respective contexts. 1



Fischer’s approach is a good example of this: he sees Ecclesiastes 1:3–3:15 as a discrete literary unit. As such, he presents its structure based on two criteria: one based on the story of Koheleth’s personal experience, the other about the central ideological question, which trying to establish the link between them—namely, the connection between what he calls “the royal fiction,” which is Koheleth’s personal story, and the topics of wisdom that is learned from experience. Based on these criteria, he presents the material in two columns, each with a concentric structure. One is divided into groups of three verses each, each comprising a personal attribute, a conclusion, and a suitable aphorism, and ending with the word vanity). The other is a series of thoughts with the guiding question “What profit…?” appearing at the beginning (1:3) and in the middle (3:9). While this presentation is fairly persuasive, the word profit and the concluding declarations of vanity also appear in other parts of the work, and in my view, it is enough to examine the first and second triplet (1:13–15; 1:16–18) to realize that the distinction between conclusion and the concluding maxim is not always clear-cut, and that the headings that Fisher provides to various verses are highly generic and might equally apply to other groups of verses, and therefore are not very accurate. See A. Fischer, “Beobachtungen zur Komposition von Kohelet 1,3 –3,15,” ZAW 103,1 (1991) pp. 72–86.

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One of these is about justice and its manifestations. We find this in Koheleth’s pronouncements on five different occasions in the text: “And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked” (3:16–17) “So I returned, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter” (4:1) “If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they.” (5:7) “All things have I seen in the days of my vanity: there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness” (7:15) “[...] there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous” (8:14)

The basic idea in these verses is that man’s actions bears no relation to his fate. This runs counter to the doctrine of reward and punishment. The manifestations of justice and injustice lie beyond the ken of man, and he must not dwell on it. However, the contexts of Koheleth’s pronouncements imbue them with further significance. The first instance (3:16–17) is preceded by the oft-repeated mantra “to eat and to drink”—i.e. to enjoy day-to-day existence as much as possible (3:12–13), and the exhortation to see Creation as perfect (3:14), followed by the declaration that after death a man can leave nothing behind—so there is no escaping oblivion, the future lies beyond his control, and therefore he has no choice but to revel “in his own works.” The second instance (4:1) is accompanied by a declaration that the dead are preferable to the living—a statement aimed, perhaps, at those seeking the manifestations of justice in light of the suffering of the oppressed. However, this is followed by remonstrations against excellence and distinction. In the third instance (5:7), Koheleth argues that man must not be concerned with manifestations of injustice and justice, but accept the world as it is. This follows his warnings against taking solemn oaths (vows), which one may not know how to fulfill or their consequences— 138 

followed by repeated recommendations to be content with little, and with what one can achieve. Similarly, the fourth instance (7:15) is preceded by a recommendation to view God’s actions as perfect and complete, and to accept everything one has, for good and for bad, followed by a series of counsels to avoid aspiring to acquire distinction, and to be content with the ordinary. In the fifth instances (8:14), Koheleth once again rejects the conventional notions of action and reward, after declaring that he knows that God-fearing conduct is ultimately worthwhile,2 extolling the enjoyment of life and its routine, and urging us to recognize the perfection of Creation and man’s limited capacity to encompass and understand it. In light of all these instances, we may conclude the following: 1. From the distribution of these passages throughout the composition and their varying scopes, it is clear that they are not arranged in any symmetrical or other easily discernible pattern throughout the text. If this is the case with such a central theme, there is clearly no pattern to the more minor topics. 2. In his pronouncements about justice and injustice, Koheleth repeatedly and variously points out that his assertions are the product of his personal experience it (“And moreover I saw,” “So I returned, and considered,” “I saw,” “All things have I seen in the days of my vanity,” “yet surely I know”). This is consistent with his general approach of rejecting anything that is not observed in reality, and recommending one not to breach reality’s frameworks, in material aspirations or in pursuit of the absolute and perfect. 3. Accordingly, we find that Koheleth’s dwelling on the subject of justice and injustice springs from his general demands that one should accept the existing world order and make the most of one’s opportunities. However, since this theme appears repeatedly in each of the above instances in another ideological context, it assumes a further significance, which is the true key to the organization of the book as a 2

In the course of my inquiry (esp. in chapter 3), I explained that the “God-fearing” for Koheleth means accepting the existing world order—including recognition that perfection must consist of the eternal counterpart of every value and virtue—whether it is about Creation, the existence of values and virtues, or social hierarchy. The expression oseh ra me’at (8:12) is difficult: commentators have suggested that the latter word is meant to be méah [shanim] (“a hundred years”—Targum Jonathan), or méah [péamim] (“a hundred times,” per Vulgate), while the Septuagint believes it is supposed to me’az (“since then” —απο τóτε).

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whole. Since each of these topics appears in a different context, each element in Koheleth’s world view is multifaceted, which prevents it from falling under any single heading, and makes it dependent on other topics and aspects. This is true of other key themes, as well—such as Koheleth’s assertions that no single attribute or virtue can insure man from future mishaps: “I communed with mine own heart, saying, Lo, I am come to great estate, and have gotten more wisdom than all they that have been before me in Jerusalem: yea, my heart had great experience of wisdom and knowledge. “And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. “For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.” (1:16–18) I said in mine heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, therefore enjoy pleasure: and, behold, this also is vanity [...] I sought in mine heart to give myself unto wine, yet acquainting mine heart with wisdom; and to lay hold on folly, till I might see what was that good for the sons of men [...] And whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them [...] And I turned myself to behold wisdom, and madness, and folly (2:1–3; 10–12—although in fact the other verses in the same context express this idea). “There is no man that hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he power in the day of death: and there is no discharge in that war; neither shall wickedness deliver those that are given to it” (8:8) “[...] there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.” (9:2) “I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all” (9:11)

Even though all these passages deal with the same issue, it is still very difficult to group them under a single heading: Koheleth rejects the notion of devoting oneself to any single attribute or lifestyle. However, there is a more general implicit criticism here of the belief that one may avoid future mishaps or the perils of oblivion. Hence, we can also add other statements here, such as “For

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there is no remembrance of the wise more than of the fool for ever” (2:16),3 as well as his disapproval of aspirations for excellence and distinction, such as 4:8 (“There is one alone, and there is not a second; yea, he hath neither child nor brother: yet is there no end of all his labor”), and 7:16–17. The same is true of all other topics, as well, which are dispersed across the entire book, each embedded within a different context. These include Koheleth’s assertions about governance and the king (even if only in the metaphorical sense of one who outperforms everyone), in 2:12; 5:8; 4:13–16; 8:2–4; 10:4,16–17, 20; his praise of God’s actions (including his recommendation to accept the existing state of affairs in His world—and joyfully so, not in a spirit of resignation), in 1:15; 3:11, 14; (5:7); 6:29; 7:13–14; 8:17; and his advice to “eat and drink and be merry” (2:24; 3:13, 22; 5:17–18; 8:17; 9:7; 11:8–9). Admittedly, among these repeating themes there might be one or two elements that appear only once—such as when he urges one to avoid nostalgic longing for the past (7:10), or when he describes the folly of misguided efforts, in great detail (e.g., 2:12–17). By and large, however, it involves fairly well-defined themes that appear repeatedly in various places throughout the composition. The end result, therefore, is that the main themes of the book form a kind of mosaic whose elements crop up repeatedly—albeit not at regular intervals, or indeed in any kind of predictable pattern, and in various extents, guises and contexts, as repeating motifs, whose meaning gradually come into focus over time. The reader, moving from one topic to the next, may wonder at first what these themes have in common ideologically— but as they crop up repeatedly, the range of ideas projected by the mosaic diminishes. Koheleth’s disparagements and positive prescriptions are both founded on a consistent outlook (even if its ramifications are diverse), that God’s perfect world must be accepted as it is, by making the most of the present, with all that that entails. To this end, he repeatedly presents various aspects of the “correct life,” in contrast to the “misguided life,” as discussed throughout this book. Although it is delivered to the reader in small doses, as it were, Koheleth’s doctrine is the product of a coherent worldview, and not a haphazard collection of aphorisms.

3

The preposition im in the Hebrew text, which normally means “with,” in the sense of “than.”

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Abbreviations: Translations, magazines, series and files ATD Das Alte Testament Deutsch Basor Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research B.D.B. F. Brown, S.R. Driver, C.H. Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament Beit Mikra: Beit Mikra: Journal for the Study of the Bible and Its World. BN Biblische Notizen PWCJS: BZ Biblische Zeitschrift BZAW Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaften CBQ Catholic Biblical Quarterly Har Hebrew Annual Review HUCA Hebrew Union College Annual JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society JBL Journal of Biblical Literature J.B.Q. Jewish Biblical Quarterly JPS Tanakh, The Jewish Publication Society JQR Jewish Quarterly Review JSOT Journal of the Studies of the Old Testament 148 

JSS KJ NAS OTL PWCJS: RB RSV Shnaton: VT ZAW

Journal of Semitic Studies Holy Bible, King James Version New American Standard Bible Old Testament Library Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies Review Biblique The Bible, Revised Standard Version An Annual for Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies Vetus Testamentum Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche

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DA S A LT E T E S TA M E N T I M D I A L O G an outline of an old testament dialogue

Herausgegeben von / edited by Michael Fieger & Sigrid Hodel-Hoenes Diese Reihe will den wissenschaftlichen Dialog zwischen dem Alten Testament und benachbarten Fächern fördern. Im Mittelpunkt des Interesses stehen der weit verzweigte Dialog zum Neuen Testament sowie die wechselseitige Beziehung mit den Humanwissenschaften, die durch die Vielschichtigkeit des Alten Testaments hervorgerufen wird. Dazu gehören neben der Theologie, Anthropologie und Ethik auch Gebiete wie Psychologie, Pädagogik, Soziologie, Ökonomie, Geschichtsschreibung, Musikwissenschaften und Sprachforschung. Aber auch zu naturwissenschaftlichen Fragen wie beispielsweise in der Medizin gibt es einige wichtige Bezugspunkte. In diese international ausgerichtete Reihe werden sowohl Monographien und Tagungsbände als auch Dissertationen und Habilitationen in deutscher, englischer, italienischer und rumänischer Sprache aufgenommen. Ein wichtiges Anliegen ist es, dass sich die Bände nicht ausschliesslich an Fachleute richten, sondern eine breitere wissenschaftlich interessierte Leserschaft ansprechen. This series intends to promote and stimulate the scientific dialogue between the Old Testament and its interrelated subjects. The interest is focused on the New Testament and its relationship with the human sciences. In addition to theology, anthropology and ethics and aside from areas relating to psychology, pedagogy, sociology, economics, historiography, music and linguistics, there are some important points of reference to scientific questions, including medicine. This international series will publish not only monographs and conference volumes but also theses and dissertations in German, English, Italian and Romanian. Of vital importance is the desire that these volumes address themselves not exclusively to specialists, but to the general interested reader.

Band/Vol. 1

Michael Fieger & Sigrid Hodel-Hoenes Der Einzug in Ägypten. Ein Beitrag zur alttestamentlichen Josefsgeschichte. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-437-5.

Vol. 2

Michael Ufok Udoekpo Re-thinking the Day of YHWH and Restoration of Fortunes in the Prophet Zephaniah. An Exegetical and Theological Study of 1:14-18; 3:14-20. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0510-5.

Vol. 3

Jin-Myung Kim Holiness & Perfection: A Canonical Unfolding of Leviticus 19. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0580-8.

Vol. 4

Michael Fieger & Jörg Lanckau (Hrsg.) Erschaffung und Zerstörung der Schöpfung. Ein Beitrag zum Thema Mythos. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0479-5.

Vol. 5

Nicoletta Gatti & George Ossom-Batsa Journeying with the Old Testament. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-1006-2.

Vol. 6

Michael Fieger & Marcel Weder Krankheit und Sterben. Ein interprofessioneller Dialog. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1105-2.

Vol. 7

Janusz Kucicki Eschatology of the Thessalonian Correspondence. A comparative study of 1 Thess 4, 13-5, 11 and 2 Thess 2, 1-12 to the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1474-9.

Vol. 8

Andreas Beriger, Stefan M. Bolli, Widu-Wolfgang Ehlers, Michael Fieger & Wilhelm Tauwinkl (Hrsg.) Vulgata-Studies Vol. I. Beiträge zum I. Vulgata-Kongress des Vulgata Vereins Chur in Bukarest (2013). 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1478-7.

Vol. 9

Jonathan Grossman Ruth: Bridges and Boundaries. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1674-3.

Vol. 10

Shamai Gelander The Religious Experience in the Book of Psalms. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2091-7.

Vol. 11

Jonathan Grossman Abram to Abraham. A Literary Analysis of the Abraham Narrative. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2077-1.

Vol. 12

Shamai Gelander Under the Sun. Life and Reality in the Book of Kohelet. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3122-7.