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English Pages 312 [306] Year 2007
TURF WARS
BETTINA NG'WENO
Turf Wars Territory and Citizenship in the Contemporary State
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
2007
Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data N g'weno, Bettina. Turf wars : territory and citizenship in the contemporary state I Bettina Ng'weno. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-o-8047-5596-2 (cloth: alk. paper) I. Blacks--Colombia--Government relations. 2. Blacks--Colombia--Claims. 3· Blacks--Colombia--Land tenure. I. Title.
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Contents
List of Figures
vii
Acknowledp;ments
ix
Introduction
I
Turf Wars I.
Autonomy
29
2.
Self-Governance
49
3·
The Contemporary State
71
Territory
4·
Suspect Nationals
5· 6.
Ancestral Lands Tense Territories
99 135 171
Citizenship
7· 8.
Equal Citizens Participation
195 229
Conclusion
265
Notes Bibliography
275 281
Index
291
Figures
Colombia in 1999
5
Cerro Teta from Buenos Aires
7
Alsacia
32
La Salvajina reservoir
34
The school in Alsacia
42
Cerro Teta
so
Cerro Teta as seen from Mira Soles
57
Stone at the top of Cerro Teta
6s
Northern Cauca Dancers in Buenos Aires
137 138
Mining zone in Santa Barbara
144
Mining areas
145
Coffee and plantain farmers in Alsacia
153
Agricultural areas
154
Family land in Santa Catalina
164
Local land tenure
165
Acknowledgments
There are many people who were instrumental to completing this book and without whom I could never have started, continued, and finished my research and writing. I am especially grateful for the help and support of friends and family. There are more people than I could adequately thank here, although I will mention a few specifically. I am grateful to the generous funding from the Wenner Gren Foundation, Adele Simmons, the Department of Anthropology at Johns Hopkins University, Dorothea and Andrew Brass, Amolo Ng'weno, and the University of California, Davis. I want to thank Esther Hernandez-Medina, Rodolfo Guzman, Beatriz de la Mora, and Silvia Le6n for help with Spanish translations. But most of all I would like to thank Espelencia Baptiste and Laura Bellows for the best possible intellectual group. I owe a tremendous amount to Sara Berry, without whose help and clarity of mind I could not have written this book. I am also grateful to MichelRolph Trouillot, Joanne Rappaport, Luis Guarnizo, Ben Orlove, Charles Hale, Amolo N g'weno, Hilary N g'weno, and Melissa Gormley. A special thanks to Fleur Ng'weno, who made this book readable. There are so many people whom I would like to thank in Colombia. In Cali I want to thank first and foremost Camilo Restrepo and Caroline Peters as well as Marcia Dittman, Camilo Espinal, Carlos Ossa, Francia Salgar, Luz Elena Arias, JoEllen Simpson, Frank Rutter, Xavier Chiribi, Fernando Prieto, Pablo Lozano, Jose Tomas Buitrago, and Carlos Mendoza. En Cauca le agradezco a toda la gente que brind6 su tiempo para conversar conmigo acerca de la tierra, acerca de la identidad y de sus vidas y
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
suefios. Aprendi mucho mas de lo que jamas pude haber imaginado. Mi agradecimiento especial a Don R6mulo Carabali y toda la gente del Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras del Cerro Teta por hacerme sentirme bienvenida y por su apoyo e involucramiento constantes en mi trabajo. Quiero agradecer en particular a Don Juan Antonio Sandoval, Sofia Sanchez y Romil Choc6 y familia, Hernando Sarria, Luis Fernando Vasquez, Felix Angel Nazarith, Jose Omar Balanta, Omar Mina, Marcos Pop6, Francisco Pefia, Pedro Caicedo, Nimia Aponza, Grigelio Aponza, Agustin Agrono, Ortilio Antero, Esteban Carabali, Reinel Carabali, Quenedis Carabali, Ana Carabali y Evaristo Carabali quienes trabajaron conmigo y me ayudaron a experimentar lo que significaba vivir en Buenos Aires. Tambien quiero agradecer afectuosamente a las familias en Mira Soles quienes hicieron mas de lo posible para hacerme sentir en casa, incluyendo a Don Guillermo Solarte, Dofia Ana Viveros, Memo Solarte y familia. El conocimiento y la guia ofrecidos por Adelmo Carabali y Plutarco Sandoval fueron particularmente importantes para este proyecto. A Marysol Loboa gracias por tu ayuda y tu amistad y por compartir tantos dias de locura. Un agradecimiento especial a la gente en Alsacia y especialmente a Ibes Trujillo, Cenen Aponza, Luz Deifa Carabali y Caramelo Carabali, Don Leonsio Pop6 y Dofia Paula, Don Emerito Carabali y Dofia Epifania Moreno, Dofia Angela Carabali y Herman Ocor6 quien me recibieron con mucho carifio y hospitalidad. Y sobre todas las cosas, gracias del coraz6n a la familia de Don Nelson Sandoval y Dofia Elena Olaya, a Bonnie, Maria Elena, Rosario, Wisman, Yein, Jimmy, Jeison, y Juan Carlos y toda su familia! La suerte me envi6 a su casa y estare siempre agradecida por ha her vivido con ustedes.
TURF WARS
Introduction
In the southern part of Colombia, on the steep slopes of the Western Cordillera range of the Andes, two Afro-Colombian communities are making claims to the land on which they live and work, as ethnic groups. The two areas of land being claimed as Collective Territories for Black Communities face each other across the valley of the Cauca River as it cuts through the mountain on its way to the sea. The communities, trying to secure mining and farming access and resources in an ongoing struggle over land, seek autonomy and self-governance over their territories as well as community self-definition. Similar to ethnic territorial claims elsewhere in the world, such claims raise questions about the nature of state territory, legitimacy, and authority. How did these types of claims become possible and important? Do they put the state in question, or are they a result of such a questioning? What can such claims tell us about the Colombian state and about states in general?
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INTRODUCTION
What springs to mind when most people think of Colombia is drugs, violence, and a degree of chaos. It seems reasonable to assume that a place so consumed by these crises cannot function and must lack the rule of law and that the state must be out of control, with devastating consequences for the economy and society in general. Less noticed are Colombia's achievements compared to other Latin American countries-high economic performance and significant territorial concessions made to Black and Indigenous populations-which would usually imply a well-functioning state. The claims to territory as Black communities are set against this backdrop of often contradictory extremes. The initial reaction to Colombia as out of control is grounded in convictions about the nature of states in the context of globalization, where drugs, violence, and chaos question the relevance and efficacy of the state. These convictions are held not just with regard to Colombia-across the world diverse scholars are questioning the role of states in shaping our lives today (Munch 2001; Sutter 2003; Jalata 2004; Saikal 2003). The questions arise from the analyses of state formation and of globalization and from the point of view of migration or social movements. They point to changes, causing, as Rose (1999) describes, a problem of analytical method where many of the conventional ways of analyzing politics and power seem obsolete. These changes question the natural frame of boundaries of the nation-state as a political system and the inevitability of geopolitics to be conducted in terms of alliances and conflicts among states. Along with this notion that nation-states are no longer in the political driver's seat, some scholars see this change as produced by a wearing down of the nation-state by external forces of globalization and internal forces of pluralization (Menyhart 2003; Saporita 2003). This comes in two forms. First, the nation-state as social organizer is being eroded by globalization and the shift of the locus of power from the national to the supra- and transnationallevels, and, second, the nation-state's legitimacy, authority, and sovereignty are being weakened from within by the increasing pluralization of modern societies (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 653). Moreover, the idea of the liberal state is challenged by claims for special group rights by collective actors who emphasize their cultural differences from the rest of society. As Munro (1996) points out, in some areas of scholarship the wearing down of the state has pushed scholars to consider the state as one
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3
domain among many and no longer an overarching framework. Rather, scholars stress the fragmentation of politics, processes of economic disengagement from state control, and expanding areas of social life that fall outside the ambit of state authority. At the same time, scholars have begun to realize the contradictory pattern developing within and between states. Part of globalization also includes nationalist, sectarian, and ethnic movements, which, as political subjects, demand specific rights and territorial and political autonomy. Restrepo (1997) makes the paradox of these actions clear: Across the world, nationalist movements and ethnic minorities are acquiring a political importance that leads to both the fragmentation of the nationstates in which they emerge as well as the consolidation of rights that recognize ethnic and cultural alterity (p. 298).' This paradox of fragmentation and consolidation is also made visible with regard to military power and the legitimate monopoly of violence (Mbembe wor; Rose 1999), the increased ability of the executive and the decreased ability of the administrative parts of governments (McLean 2003; Rudra 2002), and the production of wealth and the disparity of its distribution among and between states (Chua 2003; Griffin Cohen and McBride 2003). ]ones (woo) argues that a central paradox informs contemporary concerns: that, on the one hand, the state seems to be under threat from economic, technical, and cultural developments while, on the other hand, the military capabilities of states have never been greater and the concentration of state military strength-in the hands of the United States of America-has never been exceeded. (p. 3) In sum, as Trouillot (zoor) argues, "This century opens on two sets of contradictory images: The power of the national state sometimes seems more visible and encroaching, and sometimes less effective and less relevant" (p. I26). We can conclude that as we begin the twenty-first century, the state is indeed in question. The urgency of this questioning today stems from the perceived changes in state relevance and significance resulting from the restructuring of world interrelatedness through technology, economic processes, mass communication, and social and political movements taking place in the latter half of the twentieth century. If indeed there is a new
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INTRODUCTION
world order, generally referred to as globalization, how has the nature and functioning of states, as well as the state's significance for everyday life, changed in conjunction with these processes? In this book I focus on territorial claims by Mro-Colombians to explore the relevance, meaning, practices, functions, and locations of state power. I indicate shifts and changes in ideas of property and authority that necessitate a reassessment of the relationship between property and states. It is my argument that both property and authority are being reconstituted within states, and in the process the state is changing form and function, as is the concept of what a state is and does. Property, in particular, territory, as a key feature of states, allows us to see and make tangible the transformation of the nature of the state and state functioning. I approach Colombia as a window to understanding the nature of the state, because the highly fraught situation of governing in contemporary Colombia-the violence, divisions, and economic structure-constitutes a historical conjunction that could lead in a variety of directions. Colombia serves as a good case study that anticipates the direction of state transformation in terms of (1) territorialities and (2) categorization as subjects of the state. Because Colombia offers a vista into phenomena that are often hidden in other political and social circumstances, it is a rich illustration of the dynamics of the processes by which states are transformed. Thus Colombia is an extreme rather than exceptional site from which to study the state. Colombia can be used as an extreme example of many other states whose organization of people and power mirrors that of Colombia, precisely because it allows us to ask questions about state functioning that would otherwise not be visible, or at least would not appear obvious.
Colombia Situated at the northwestern corner of South America, Colombia's varied geography includes the Pacific and Caribbean coasts, high central plateaus, and tropical lowlands. In Colombia the Andes chain of mountains divides into three ranges, or cordilleras, running from south to north, with vast river valleys between them. The cordilleras are separated by the Cauca and Magdalena rivers, which flow into the Caribbean in the north. These varied
INTRODUCTION
5
landscapes give life to an astonishing biological, agricultural, and livelihood diversity. Rich in natural resources such as water, forests, minerals, and excellent soils, Colombia has an export economy that depends largely on agriculture (coffee and flowers) and mineral products (petroleum and coal). Claims to land are not a new phenomenon in Colombia; rather, Colombia can be characterized by intensive agrarian conflicts over public lands,
ATLANTIC OCEAN
VENEZUELA
PACIFIC OCEAN
COLOMBIA
BRAZIL
ECUADOR
PERU
Colombia in 1999
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INTRODUCTION
the status of private property, and the distribution of land in general; these conflicts have reduced the legitimacy of the state in the minds of many rural people (LeGrand 1986). The conflicts have been regional in character and have intensified in certain periods, such as in the latter half of the twentieth century during the interpolitical party war known as La Violencia (19481968), during the agrarian reforms instigated by the U.S. policy Alliance for Progress (197os), during the bonanza in illegal drug production and trade, and during the governing crisis of the 198os. Although these disputes have occurred among different sections of the populace, the state has been the important context in which these fights have taken place. In the 198os much of the violence consisted of attacks on state representatives, including the murder of 300 members of the judiciary and 4 presidential candidates. The extreme violence perpetrated by drug traffickers, the paramilitary (right-wing private militias), the leftist guerrillas, and the armed forces in a fight for power spurred the government and the people of Colombia to seek solutions through peace settlements. The 1991 constitution was created through the National Constituent Assembly and came into being as part of negotiations that demobilized guerrilla groups. The new 1991 constitution aimed to reduce conflict by advocating the reorganization of the national territory. At the same time, the government attempted to eo-opt marginalized groups to its side by agreeing to demands for ethnic territories, creating for the first time "collective territories for ethnic groups" in the new constitution. Law 70 of 1993 makes this provision real for Afro-Colombians, recognizing them as ethnic groups and setting the provisions for Afro-Colombian territorial, cultural, and citizenship rights. Since 1995, Afro-Colombians have been claiming collective territories as ethnic groups under this rubric.
AFRO-COLOMBIAN CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN BUENOS AIRES
The first day that I visited the municipality of Buenos Aires in I 996 in search of a place to do fieldwork-a place that was far from the heat and the sugarcane of the Cauca valley and a place where farmers actually owned the land they worked on-I was introduced to Don Nelson Sandoval,> the head of the Miners' Cooperative of Buenos Aires. Don Nelson suggested that if I was
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7
interested in land claims by Mro-Colombians, I should go to a meeting of the Community Council of Black Communities of Cerro Teta (Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de la Teta) that was being held in town. This meeting established my main contacts with the claimants over the hill Cerro Teta, and I was to return two years later in 1998 to work principally on this claim and area of the municipality. I ended up renting a room in Don Nelson's house, in the municipal center, Buenos Aires, whose hinterland is included in the claim. From a chance introduction in 1999, I learned about a second claim in Alsacia and its community company Brisas de Mary L6pez, on the other side of the Cauca River. Despite transport and security difficulties, I managed to visit Alsacia three times, for a few days each time, and I frequently ran into members of the community company in other parts of the municipality. I was struck not only by the similarities and differences between these two claims to territory but also mainly by their complicated connections and overlapping members, support, politics, strategies, and effects. Although I have laid out the two claims separately for ease of understanding the
Cerro Teta from Buenos Aires
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INTRODUCTION
dynamic of each claim, as I will show, the claims are closely connected and intertwined and address similar concerns of rural people. Of course, these two claims did not arise out of thin air and must be understood through their historical development because local, national, and international processes affected their possibility. The history of the claims places them as part of ongoing struggles over land and access to productive resources and over securing life and livelihood as rural Colombians who have not been the center of concern of the government. This makes the claims similar to land struggles (historical and present) all over Colombia and in many parts of Latin America. Although these struggles are between sectors of society-small and large landholders, for instance-these land conflicts are also struggles that always have the state in mind. How the state is perceived to respond to the struggles affects the direction and latitude of action of the claimants. As I will show in further chapters, state response is both nationally and internationally determined, but the consequences of the response are not always predictable. At the same time, these claims represent a more general and unified attempt at self-definition as communities (ethnically, ideologically, and territorially) on the one hand and at political opening (as citizens and constituencies) on the other. This again mirrors a phenomenon in other parts of the world, including Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, where culturally defined groups are clamoring for self-governance and autonomy through territory as a basis of political participation. In the form it takes at the moment (ethnic claims to territory), I consider this push for self-governance and autonomy a relatively new phenomenon of the late twentieth century, specific to nation-states in postcolonial societies. The very process of claiming is the setting through which these varied goals are achieved. Negotiation as a community, for political transformation as well as for land and livelihood security, takes shape in claiming. The specific histories of each claim determine the outcomes of these four goals (land and resources, securing life and livelihood, self-definition of community, and finally political opening) in the daily lives of people in Buenos Aires. At the same time they shed light on what such processes mean on a national and international level. As a result, in this book I have tried to trace in detail the histories of the two claims and the motivations that caused them to take the shape they
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did and the consequences that resulted. Through this process I hope to show that as the categorization of society members changed with political changes, struggles over land and livelihood between sectors of society were transformed into struggles over community self-definition and political opening. This shift also marks the transformation of relations between citizens and their states and the transformation within states themselves. The details aim to return to the questions posed earlier: Why these claims? And why this solution? On what grounds and by what means is governance produced in these claims and their consequences?
Categories of Belonging Most of Colombia's approximately 40 million inhabitants live within the Andes and their interlocking valleys, leaving more than half of the country sparsely inhabited. Seventy percent of the population is urban, living in cities spread across Colombia, the largest of which is Santa Fe de Bogota, the capital, with approximately 8 million residents. The population includes people of Indigenous American, African, European, and Asian descent. The Colombian national identity is framed in media, popular expression, scholarly writings, and government policies and procedures through an ideology of mestizaje (race and cultural mixture) such that the quintessential Colombian is identified as a person of Indigenous, African, and European heritage. This modern idea of mestizaje has existed, with varying popularity and importance, alongside the notion of Indigenous peoples who hold ancestral lands and have a separate culture from the rest of the Colombian nation. These two ideas of race and culture, of mixture and difference, have structured Colombian ideas of self and national belonging. For the last 400 years people of Mrican descent have lived in South America. Most entered as slaves through Brazil or the Colombian port of Cartagena in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. In Colombia slaves worked on haciendas, in gold mines, and on cattle ranches situated throughout the western and northern parts of the country. In colonial times the most important categorical distinction for peoples of African descent was that of slave or freeman (libre). Yet the categorization of free people, first into people of color and then into castas (registers of different
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INTRODUCTION
racial mixtures), was also a system of hierarchical distinction among the free. With the end of slavery in 1851 and the rise of racialized scientific theories, the categorization of peoples of African descent took on new significance, produced through ideas of modernity, national culture, and attempts to "whiten" the country and specific regions within it. Today, with the national and regional Black community movements and movements within the African Diaspora in the Americas in general, categorization again takes on new significance. Through these movements Afro-Colombians have succeeded in getting concessions from the government in the form of recognition as ethnic groups or as groups of citizens who have been discriminated against in the past. They have demanded and received collective rights to property, including the tiding of more than 4· 5 million hectares of ancestral land (which in aggregate is almost the size of the Dominican Republic) in the Pacific basin (Sanchez Gutierrez and Garcia zoo6). Although the categorization of peoples of African descent in Colombia has changed through time, I have decided to use the term Afro-Colombian to refer in general to the people with whom I did my study. I do, however, maintain the usage of legal, social, and political terms in their specificity as they refer to processes, actions, and peoples. I do this to retain the implications of categories and to illuminate distinctions in the deployment of race and ethnicity in the categorization of Mro-Colombians. There are a few reasons for the use of Afro-Colombian. I wanted to use a term that allows some critical distance between my categorization and the many terms used by Colombians so as to be able to talk about the arbitrary and capricious yet extremely powerful nature of categorization itself. My informants used a number of categories, such as negro, negritude, communidades negras, niche, or moreno, but they rarely used Afro-Colombian. However, I find the term less regionally bound and less regionally different in meaning. Afro-Colombian, then, does not contain the historically associated and regionally specific hierarchies of class, progress, race, and region that the other categories contain. In addition, I did not want to confuse Mro-Colombians with the legal term Black communities (comunidades negras) used in the 1991 constitution and subsequent legislation, so that I could explore the implications of legalizing certain categories that might or might not correspond to groups of people. Since the 1991 constitution was written, government documents have used
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diverse references to citizens of African descent, including Black communities, Afro-Colombians, Afro-Caribbean peoples, and Blacks, although there seems to be a trend toward using Afro-Colombian. I try to capture these transformations under a wide enough umbrella to talk about differing implications. Until leaving Kenya, my home, where racial categorization did not use calor terms, Black to me was a calor, not a people. Of course, terms such as African (as used in Kenya) or Afro are color references as well, but they also contain powerful notions of continental belonging, history, legitimacy, and political inclusion or exclusion. Along with this, studying in the United States at a time of changing terminology from Black to Afro-American to African American-and amid intense arguments about who counted within and the political implications of this terminology-instilled in me the totally constructed nature of categories. My interest is then how these categories get produced and what it is like to live within them. Nevertheless, the term Afro-Colombian has a long historical academic usage, with corresponding conceptualizations of hierarchy, modernity, class, race, and region. Questioning how we can understand Afro-Colombians as ethnic groups, Restrepo (1997) carefully detailed the change in usage of Afro-Colombian and Black (negro) over the last fifty years that corresponded to anthropological searches for a way of conceptualizing peoples of Mrican descent in the Americas as an object of study. These searches included understanding the basis of culture in Mricanisms, strategies of adaptation, modes of production, creation in new contexts such as slavery, blackness, and racism, and more recently a plethora of differing approaches talking of land, symbolic systems, politics, and modernity. In particular, Restrepo argues that regardless of the categorization, there has remained a phantom of Indigenous categorization against which the conceptualization of people of Mrican descent is produced. The Indian has been the mirror through which Afro-Colombians are seen. In this book I explicitly compare the dynamics for Indigenous and AfroColombian populations of legally being ethnic groups. I do this, first, precisely because of the mirror of Indigenous ethnic categorization that serves to inform conceptualizations of ethnic Afro-Colombians. This mirror reflects both the possibilities and the limits of ethnic identity for AfroColombians. Second, I make the comparison because of the history of the Indigenous experience of mobilizing ethnicity as a political instrument for
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INTRODUCTION
negotiating with the state. Third, my interest in property started in Kenya, where our notions of customary law and indigenousness informed my questions and expectations of ethnic territories and by which I judged the status and nature of such territories. When I found that Mro-Colombian territories were profoundly differently imagined from conceptualizations from Africa and that Indigenous territories were more similar, I sought to investigate why. And finally, I compare the Indigenous and Afro-Colombian experiences because the land of one of the Mro-Colombian claims that I detail in this book is being counterclaimed by Indigenous communities. The comparison, then, is to illuminate the consequences of the way that categorization is historically produced. Afro- Colombian was not the self-description of choice of most people with whom I worked. One of my Afro-Colombian informants told me that some people are insulted by the term Afro-Colombian because of the reference to Mrica and the connotation of not belonging that it appears to encompass, although he himselfliked it. On the first point-the reference to Africa-my stand as an Mrican of course can only be one of extreme surprise, and I do not see the reference to Africa as a reason not to use the term. In fact, I use the term as a political move precisely for its connection to Africa and therefore history (rather than color) and as a repudiation of the negative connotations that this connection conjures up. To not use the term would be to agree to this positioning of Africa. The second point, the connotation of not belonging, I take seriously, and I hope that it is obvious through my work that my usage means only to select a portion of Colombians, rather than to say some are more and some are less Colombian. Mro-Colombian claims to territory as ethnic groups pose some questions about the subject of postcolonial states and national belonging. The Mestizo category of national belonging is bound up in ideas of mixture as a sign of modernity on the one hand and a sign of Indigenous roots (and therefore legitimate claims to territory) on the other. It is in the name of this group of citizens that the nation and state exist. Even though Latin American countries are some of the first nation-states and have many years of independence, Indigenous people continue to pose a problem for this particular construction of Latin American belonging and state formation. Although many postcolonial theorists do not have Latin America in mind and thus talk of postcolonial as post-195os, this dynamic of what Mamdani
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(1996) called the native question is a quintessential postcolonial problem relevant to Latin America. It is a problem of the establishment oflegitimacy of rule in a place where some members of the population had prior authority (and often continue to have authority) over territory and people. Scholars of Latin America are now reassessing the role of the colonial state in the independence and republican eras, paying particular attention to this question (Trouillot 1991; Thurner and Guerrero 2003; Thurner 1997; Sanders 2004b; Andrews 2004; Appelbaum 2003; Warren zoor). Mro-Colombian claims to territory based on cultural distinction as a result question both the national makeup as Mestizo and the uniqueness of the Indigenous claim to difference. The claims are part of a process of transition in state recognition of Mro-Colombians as they obtain the possibility of moving from being legally silenced invisible racial groups to legally vocal visible ethnic groups. Categorization by race or ethnicity is deployed with different consequences in the attempt to control the social organization of sameness and difference. What is interesting to me are the things that are enabled or curtailed with deployment of either race or ethnicity. The claims then radically reinterpret the basis for national belonging and cultural distinction. Thus in this book I have three main goals: 1.
To understand the grounds for and means by which the process of governance is produced in claims to ethnic territories
2.
To understand the crucial role of categorization as a state effect used to restructure territoriality and as an essential part of state functioning
3·
To illuminate the central position of territory in the negotiation and production of state transformations
Why These Claims Now? In the late twentieth century, in many postcolonial countries groups of citizens have been making collective claims to territory on the basis of cultural distinction. These property claims are extremely varied in their local manifestation but have some broad similarities across continents. The claims have tended to be first and foremost jurisdictional claims based on cultural (usually ethnic) difference from a general, nationally imagined population.
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INTRODUCTION
As such, they have tended to assert local decentralized power with calls for
self-governance and autonomy that affirm or enhance ethnic or religious structures of authority. Based on cultural distinction, these claims highlight not only the importance of the social and state organization of difference and territory but also the concept that categories come with territorial maps. These collective properties are often inalienable, nonmortgageable, immutable, and unrentable and thus are significandy restricted from entry into property markets. Why would such claims-based on cultural distinction, collective and restricted from markets-occur across such diverse regions and communities? What has changed in states such that these new spaces are opened and certain populations matter in ways different from before? In Colombia, how did it become possible for Afro-Colombians to make claims to territory as ethnic groups as a means to equality as citizens? I do not believe the answers lie in direct cause and effect but rather in a genealogy of moments and strategies, of transforming discourses and traditions, of unequal power struggles that have nevertheless shifted the imagination of the possible. There is no originary instant against which change took place, no cause and effect generated by actions of either the state or local communities. Rather, dynamic interwoven processes, procedures, and actions have made possible certain discourses, dispositions, and practices, which cumulatively have produced effects. I use the past not to detail cause and effect but rather to detail anumber of moments, events, and procedures whose combined effects enable us to trace shifts that allowed for the actors to think, see, and act differendy. I originally became interested in the issue of why certain forms of property are crucial for power in modern states not in Colombia but in Kenya. Driving down the dusty coral roads in any part of coastal Kenya, you can see the new walls and fences built in the last fifteen years contrasting with the unfenced coconut plantations, vegetable gardens, and cashew groves. These walls and fences, indicating new development, recent land purchases, upcountry and foreign owners, and new ways of life, divide the coastal topography symbolically, economically, and politically as well as spatially. The unquestioned acceptance of this change as inevitable, good, and beneficial to modern states in government policies and development plans, by academics and by those who hold this property, conflicts with the land fights and ethnic organizing around territory in surrounding areas. Observing such
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conditions led me to study the relationship between how we hold property and the ways we govern and can be governed. How did these specific forms of property come to have morality that predicted inevitability? What do these conflicts say about the nature of states as part of a global system and as internally dynamic entities? I often have to explain why I, born in Nairobi, Kenya, decided to study in Colombia. The notion of an African anthropologist doing research in Latin America seems so odd, unusual, and, as many people have told me, including established academics, "exotic." The assumptions on which this question rests were the reasons I decided to study Colombia and, more precisely, the specific issues of ethnic claims to territories. In I 988 I was studying agricultural science and management at the University of California, Davis, and I read in Time magazine that Colombia had found an innovative way to protect its environment. As my recollection permits, the short article stated that protection was to come through the return of a large percentage of forestland to Indigenous ownership and of another large percentage to the management of Indigenous and Black communities who live in the tropical rainforests. It seemed an unprecedented move to turn over such an expanse of national territory to community ownership and/or administration-and an exciting new direction in thinking about the environment, states, and local communities. At the same time, most striking to me was that there were Black people in Colombia and I had never heard of them. I was so disturbed by this that I was forced to confront the systems of knowledge, education, and power that structured my understanding of the world, where Africa and Latin America are not just spatially distinct but conceptually absolutely separate and where Afro-Colombian existence was silenced. Not only were Afro-Colombians absent from Colombia's projection of self to the rest of the world, but we in Kenya were so used to looking at where the British had trod that we could not see Latin America to even start to ask questions. When working on policy issues connected to global warming at the African Center for Technology Studies in Nairobi, I was struck by another epiphany: that power was knowledge (to play off Foucault's words), or at least people would like it to be. What brought this to mind was that the arguments around global warming at the time agreed that pollution from cars in the United States and Europe was the primary culprit and therefore stopping the cutting of the rainforest in Ivory Coast was the obvious solution. The type of era-
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INTRODUCTION
sures and inequities that such reasoning implied drove me to search for tools to investigate the relationship between two issues that greatly troubled me and for which I found no satisfactory answer. I sought to understand the dynamics and mechanisms of power that relate systems of resource distribution (institutionalizing huge injustices and relegating the majority of the world to poverty) to knowledge production about the way the world works (which for the most part produced justifications and rationale for the status quo). I came to anthropology looking for tools that would help me answer questions about how power worked to relate the most global level of international actions with the daily lives of people in any location. With the opportunity to do my Ph.D. in anthropology, I combined my fascination with property and my discomfort with the structuring of knowledge in general and between Africa and Latin America in particular in my study of Colombia. Many African colleagues have subsequently asked me, What can we (Mricans) learn from your study? All works of anthropology are innately comparative, and this one is comparative both with other anthropological theory and literature and with Kenya because my questions and concerns were structured with the concerns and stakes of Kenya in mind. Although the comparison is not explicit, I cannot overemphasize that as anthropologists our stakes in specific problematics (in my case property, race, ethnicity, and the state in Kenya and their effect on my life) guide our investigation and interpretation of ethnographic material. Although I have presented the issues that were important to people where I did my research, I hope that they and the Colombian context allow us to reexamine how we think about property, about race and ethnicity, and about states (in particular, postcolonial states) as parts of dynamic localized and globalized interrelations. That is, I hope this study illuminates things about nation-states at present and their relation to territory and categorization in a global context that can be used to look at the Kenyan state or other states in Africa.
Property and State Transformation Globalization is often talked about in terms of territory, such that economic activity shows no territorial boundaries, businesses, investment, and finance move regardless of borders, culture is homogeneous and worldwide, and
INTRODUCTION
17
nations are no longer cultural containers. Scholars stress that economics, financial existence, markets, and peoples and ideas no longer pertain to specific territories. However, territory is the taken-for-granted "unit" of discussion, and little attempt is made to investigate the changing nature and significance of territories along with other changing processes of globalization. The Afro-Colombian communities in this book, similar to other ethnic groups in Latin America, are claiming autonomy and self-governance over territories. They are specifically making a distinction between land (in economic, class, or even tangible terms) and territory (in social, cultural, and political terms). Territory, then, includes the space in which life is lived, the intricate pattern of social relations and cultural constructions, economic practices, and political belonging, dispositions, and structuring (Grueso et al. 1998). If one speaks of territory rather than land, new questions arise about membership, governance, and administration. Whose territory is it? What kind of entity are they? Who can be a member? How is it administered? All of these questions about territory have in mind a collective entity that must be imagined, governed, and populated. In this manner the discourse of territories is also one of governance and belonging. Recently "the spatialities of sovereignty have become a key issue in inquiries into the nature of modern power" (Ong 2006, 18). In particular, scholars have looked at ways in which citizenship, belonging, and identification cross borders, are deterritorialized, and are produced in many locations (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Ong zoo6). Some have argued for imagining sovereignty without territoriality to address the crisis of locality, translocality, separate rights, and forms of citizenship that human movement and a liberalized market produce (Appadurai 2003). Others have investigated ways of studying "the positioning practices that articulate subjects and space" within state territories (Moore zoos, s), the ways in which citizenship has been delinked and relinked to territory in new ways by the dispersion and realignment of market strategies, resources, and actors (Ong zoo6), and the way that territory is seen as a terrain of relationships between human and nonhuman actors (Tsing zoos). It would seem that if everything else about the state is under transformation because of the processes of globalization, then the nature of the unit of state might be changing as well. To put it another way, if we no longer take territory for granted as a unit that gives shape to states and nations, then we
18
INTRODUCTION
might be able to see changes in the conceptualization of territories and their importance to states. To do this, I would like to return to property, in particular, real property, as a key feature of modern states. Marx (1964, 1967) argued that property is a fundamental human relationship of power-power relations between people mediated through things. Theories concerned with the relationship between states and property have located the development of notions of property within the legal structures of modernizing states. As concepts of property changed with the development of capitalism, so did conceptualizations of sovereignty, authority, and territory defining states (Burch 1998). In the process of changing to modern states, states also sought to create certain kinds of productive citizens through a war on property. These citizens are not just economically produced but also racially produced (Asad 1975). This process works through the creation of persons and the fixing of their relations to things and their subjectivity vis-a-vis the state, produced through legal and political processes, social relations, and culturally constructed understandings. The transformation of the political world through new concepts of property rights allows us to understand a foundational claim of modern states as "absolute legitimate jurisdiction over all peoples inhabiting its established territory" Oones zooo, 4). Thus for the modern state, property is a function of political process and one of the key elements through which government has been organized. Nevertheless, as Saporita (2003) argues, property disputes have become globalized and control in some areas (such as intellectual property) has shifted from the national to the transnational arena, privileging global market forces over sovereign authority, further questioning the state.
THE VISIBILITY OF TRANSFORMATION
Although the consequences and significance of globalization are hotly debated, most scholars agree that globalization has some effect, some consequences, which have caused scholars and citizens alike to question the state. These questions have turned on an axis of the quantity and quality of change brought by globalization. Within recent writings that grapple with globalization and the relevance of the state, two opposing views are discern-
INTRODUCTION
19
ible. On the one hand are works that address the homogenization of social, cultural, economic, and political life produced through interconnectedness; on the other hand are works that address the polarization of the same homogenization of life produced through the uneven, unequal distribution of effects and benefits. Rose (1999, 2) argues that this dual process of globalization and localization disrupts notions of nation-states, their territorial unity, and governability. ]ones (zooo), attempting to explain the present moment, argues that modem states claim unchallenged jurisdiction over all peoples who inhabit their territory but that such claims to sovereignty have been challenged by their many practical qualifications and, more important, that "the inhabitants of smaller or more fragile, states and societies have long confronted the substantial limitations to practical sovereignty that existed even within the most settled periods in the history of the system of state" (Jones zooo, 4). Legitimacy was seen to rest in the nation as a "natural community," a claim that many postcolonial states find difficult to maintain because of the obvious distinctions of populations and cultures associated with the state that were set up during colonialism. For most postcolonial states the nation never was the cultural container, the passing of which is presently lamented, and the state was never in control of economic policies or markets. Further, the nation-state was often at great pains to legitimize its rule in the face of alternatives and the association of the state with colonialism. Multiculturalism is not a feature new to postcolonial states, almost all of which have in some manner special rights, recognitions, and/or protections accorded to specific parts of their populations. Thus for most of the states in the world there is no new pluralization of populations, no overturning of conditions of economic control, no previously unchallenged domestic sovereignty, and no absolute legitimate jurisdiction. Rather, there is a new significance and space given to certain kinds of claims to territory, identity, and national belonging as well as a specific manner of questioning the authority and legitimacy of the state. That is, it is not the fact of plurality itself that matters but the fact that its significance for state power has changed on national and international levels. These new significances, spaces, and manner of questioning do indicate transformation within states in general. What is striking is how global the phenomenon is. Postcolonial states better illuminate these transformations as a change
20
INTRODUCTION
in significance rather than substance precisely because of their particular histories of state formation. In addition, a country such as Colombia, whose internal dynamics and violent conflicts illustrate this questioning and these spaces in dramatic ways, provides a powerful example of processes that occur at less intense levels elsewhere. The visibility of the transformation might be stronger in one state, such as Colombia or Kenya, than in another, such as the United States or France, because the fissures and cracks in the ideology of what constitutes the state are more obvious.
STUDYING THE STATE
How can we study the state by concentrating on the details of daily life? Where is the state located if it is thought of as a privileged site of both power and struggle (Gramsci 1957), an ideological project and exercise in legitimacy (Durkheim 1984), a construction (Abrams 1988), an illusion of boundaries inseparable from society (Mitchell 1991), or a property-based ideology built on the fiction of absolute sovereignty (Burch 1998)? How can an investigation of so seemingly macrosystemic an object of inquiry be carried out by the methods common to anthropology without falling into being just a study of either micropolitics or formal legal and bureaucratic systems? How do we show the points at which society and state become distinct? Micropolitics holds the possibility of reifying communities without acknowledging their connections to more extensive forms of power. Formal legal systems, on the other hand, hold the possibility of assuming the transformative power of law. Yet both provide entry into studying the state. Anthropologists have detailed the regionally and culturally differentiated construction of state power, arguing that the nature and functions of the state are produced in multiple locations Goseph and Nugent 1994). Rubin (1997) sees this as an illustration ofFoucault's notion that "the state apparatus is the 'institutional crystallization' of something that happens elsewhere, in multiple local sites of contestation, such as workplaces, families, associational groups, and institutions" (p. 14). Trouillot (2001) extends this logic, arguing that we should study the effects of the state without prejudice to the site in which they originate. That is, we should not assume that government is the only location of the state. What I find interesting for my work are
INTRODUCTION
21
the interactions among multiple sites, such that state practices and procedures can be found in areas other than the government but are intimately connected to the government. I thus take up Trouillot's suggestion that we "focus on the multiple sites in which state processes and practices are recognizable through their effects" (Trouillot 2001, 126). Trouillot identifies four kinds of effects produced by the processes and practices of the state: (1) "isolation effect" (atomized individuals in a homogenized population), (2) "identification effect" (members of categorized imagined communities), (3) "legibility effect" (a language and knowledge of governance), and finally (4) "spatialization effect" Gurisdictions and boundaries of experience and perception). In this book I illustrate different incidences of these four effects, showing how they are multiply located and interactive. However, I have chosen to frame my investigation of the state through property relations because property is central to and constitutive of the practices and processes that produce these effects. In this book I argue that the relationship between third world states and citizens is being structured around territory through efforts to (re)incorporate people and territory within national boundaries, in the face of demographics, sub- and supragovernmental structures, armed groups, and economic structuring that question the relevancy and extent of the state. One form of that (re)incorporation is the incorporation of marginalized cultural groups into a multicultural framework through the provision of ethnic territories as a means to equal citizenship. This incorporation depends on a process of categorization of people as ethnics, others to the modern national citizen, which justifies giving legal recognition to their claims for autonomy and self-governance in separate jurisdictions. The process of categorization comes up against historical conceptualization of groups and property as well as historical territorial relations that may or may not fit well with ethnic categorization. Because territory is the central element to this change within states, it is through the control of territory that the state is negotiated, fragmented, and extended, that politically salient constituencies are created, that communities participate as citizens, and that armed groups challenge both the state and what citizenship can be. Essential to this process is what I term the grounding of power in territory-through the occupation, control, and deployment of territory in negotiations with the state and the rest of society. As such, Afro-Colombians must invest in
22
INTRODUCTION
processes and practices of state legitimation and ideological and territorial expansion by appealing to the government for recognition and collective land titles while also investing in processes and practices that question state authority and legitimacy through the occupation, possession, and control of territory to reform the basis of participation in the political field on their own terms.
COLOMBIA IN THE CONTEXT OF
1999
I spent fourteen months doing most of my fieldwork between I998 and woo after spending three previous months in Colombia in I996. The field research for this book was predominantly carried out in I999, which was a notable year for Colombia. In Colombia a few things marked my research time and place as exceptional, or at least produced a heightened experience of commonplace phenomena. Economically, I999 was a bad year. Between I994 and I999 Colombia's foreign debt increased by so percent and unemployment almost doubled to I8 percent (Colombian Embassy 2002). U.S. decertification for two consecutive years, mainly because of accusations that the president at the time, Ernesto Samper, was elected with funds from the Cali drug cartel, aggravated the decline of an economy already hit by falling prices for coffee and oil, the country's two largest exports. In I 998-I 999 the economy entered a recession and experienced negative growth for the first time in almost seventy years. Of course, except for the United States, I999 was not a good year for many countries around the world. Most experienced increased unemployment and economic downturn following the r 997 East Asian financial crisis. In I998 the Conservative Party candidate, Andn!s Pastrana won the elections and as president initiated increased reforms to rejuvenate the economy. These reforms included harsh economic restructuring along neoliberal economic lines, which included reducing government bureaucracy and improving tax collection, new regulations in the energy sector, restructuring and recapitalization of failing banks, liberalization of the economy, and of course privatization projects. To pay for these structural adjustments, Colombia took the unprecedented step of negotiating a loan agreement and economic reform package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the
INTRODUCTION
23
negotiations were finalized in December 1999 (Colombian Embassy 2002). The loan conditions included the reform of the social security and pension systems and the strengthening of the financial sector, both of which were met by 2001. Through these measures the government was able to reduce its deficit from 6-4 percent in 1999 to 2.6 percent in 2001. Foreign investors took advantage of the new economic opportunities, and foreign investment increased by 97.2 percent in 2000 (US$2.6 billion). However, unemployment only went down to r 5. 3 percent and foreign debt was at 46.9 percent ofGDP in 2001 (Colombian Embassy 2002). These new economic policies were met with widespread civil protest, making I 999 a year of constant, intense demonstrations over the new budget and the restructuring of society, from pensions to peace agreements. Teachers, university students, the transport industry, and unions went on strike nationally numerous times, protesting the budget, the rising cost of gasoline, and changes in pension plans. Prisoners organized a national prison strike, and later in the year prison visitors, mainly wives and children, refused to leave until prison conditions were addressed. Twelve thousand representatives of Indigenous communities blockaded the Pan American Highway in Cauca for eleven days in June, protesting unmet government promises for crucial services. All over the country neighborhoods and individual house owners barricaded themselves against eviction from a failed system of constant valuation of savings and loans commonly known as UPAC.J In addition, in Cauca 3o,ooo campesinos (peasants) blockaded the Pan American Highway for twenty-four days in November to protest noncompliance by the departmental government with previous agreements. These demonstrations took place in the midst of violent conflicts between the state and armed groups and in the midst of peace negotiations with these same groups. This violence was predominantly rural and caused the displacement of more than I million people in I999• a number that rose to almost 2 million in 2002. In 1998, after meeting with the leader of the main guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (or FARC),4 and pledging peace talks and negotiations with the guerrillas if elected, Pastrana was elected president of Colombia by a margin of ro million votes (Guillermoprieto 2001). Many considered his election a vote for peace. On May 26, 2002, Alvaro Uribe Velez was elected to replace Pastrana as president, and this was also considered a vote for peace. The tactics
24
INTRODUCTION
through which peace would be gained, however, were distinctly different. Rather than negotiation, Uribe pledged to double the size of the army and to raise a civilian armed force of a million people with the intention of direct confrontation with and decisive defeat of the guerrillas. The two options for the same goals demonstrate the fragility of the position of the government. The question of state legitimacy and authority is particularly important for poor Afro-Colombians because it is through the state that their resources (mainly entitlements) are secured. At the same time, their current leverage with the government stems in part from the state being in question in terms of authority, legitimacy, and control of territory. To analyze this relationship between citizenship and territory in contemporary states, I have divided this book into three parts: "Turf Wars," "Territory," and "Citizenship." Today, turf wars between groups and states and among different groups within national society revolve around the dual concepts of community autonomy and self-governance on the one hand and state territorial authority and national sovereignty on the other. The "Turf Wars" section addresses the critical concepts of autonomy and self-governance through a detailed comparative look at two claims for collective territories by Black communities in the municipality of Buenos Aires in southwest Colombia. I look at how these concepts are made manifest in the negotiation for territories. It is also my argument that governments and citizens are trying to recapture and reconstitute both property and authority and in the process are changing the form and function of the state and thus the relationships of governance. The next two sections, "Territory" and "Citizenship," are an exploration of the two sides of this coin. The chapters in the "Territory" section address the central concept of categorization as a subject of the state and the inscription of categories on the ground, such that belonging is tangibly written into the geography of the nation and the administration of the state. I look at how "Afro-Colombians" produce a problem for categorization while struggling to determine their own inscription. The chapters in the "Citizenship" section address the key concepts of equality, participation, and authority. I look at the foundations for, bottlenecks in, aspirations of, and frustrations over the production of equal citizens played out in the claims for recognition, territory, and subjectivity. My study indicates shifts and changes in ideas of property and authority that necessitate a reassessment of the relationship between property
INTRODUCTION
25
and states. The shift from struggles over resources and land to claims to autonomous, self-governing entities also marks a shift in how the ways we hold property matter to the way we govern and can be governed. Territorial claims are the setting through which the goals of citizenship in terms of resources, livelihood, self-definition, and political opening are produced within the contemporary state.
ONE
Autonomy
In a country study for the Federal Research Division of the U.S. Library of Congress, Hanratty and Meditz (1990) describe Colombia as having a population "descended from three racial groups-Indians, blacks, and whites." The study goes on to assert that: In the 198os, wholly black communities were disappearing, not only because their residents were moving to the cities but also because the surrounding mestizo and white populations had begun moving into black communities. Eventual absorption into the mixed milieu appeared inevitable in the 198os .... Rather than forming organizations to promote their advancement as a group, blacks concentrated on achieving mobility through individual merit and adaptation to the prevailing system. (p. 81) These descriptions are portrayals of how many people who were not AfroColombians (especially those with some say over the matter) thought about the current makeup of the nation in the 198os and what the future would hold. 29
30
TURF
WARS
However, today these words make no sense at all. Afro-Colombians have not only demanded recognition as distinct cultural groups but also successfully mobilized as communities and won entitlement to collective territories covering more than 4-5 million hectares of land in the Pacific basin. Rather than seeking individual adaptation to the prevailing system, MroColombians have sought to transform the system, demanding group recognition, enfranchisement, and advancement as the basis for individual equality and thus mobility. Demands for equality through the recognition of cultural distinction have been grounded in claims to ancestral lands in the form of collective territories of ethnic groups, which along with similar claims by Indigenous people has meant the restructuring of national territory. In contrast to Hanratty and Meditz's (1990) country study, in 2001 the Colombian embassy in the United States described Colombia as one of the most "ethnically diverse countries in the Western Hemisphere" (a description it retained in 2005) and celebrated the "legal protection and authority" granted to AfroColombian communities by Colombia's constitution (Colombian Embassy 2001 b, 2005). Because diversity is now considered strength, eventual absorption into the mixed milieu not only does not appear inevitable but also is not a sought-after goal, either for Afro-Colombians or the state. Has so much changed in just a few years? The world indeed has changed tremendously in the latter part of the twentieth century, and the new national descriptions of Colombia, the ability to demand ethnic territories, and the willingness to celebrate new categories of belonging are all signs and symptoms of these changes. Colombia is not alone in having specific groups of the population demanding recognition of cultural distinction, including land, autonomy, and self-governance. Afro-Colombians are not alone in gaining ground in some sort of realization of these demands. Indications of such changes across the world include new legislation on multiculturalism, renewed attention to customary law and indigenous management of natural resources, the re-enthronement of royalty belonging to subnational groups, Indigenous peoples' movements, and struggles for regional autonomy and ethnic or religious territories. Nikolas Rose (1999), using examples from "the English-speaking world," argues that these phenomena are part of a general trend toward the emergence of community (as a moral body) as a way of governing, or what he terms government through community. Rose argues that such ways of governing
AUTONOMY
31
change the political problem of citizenship. It is no longer a question of one national character that fits onto a nation-state. Rather, the new question is one of how "multiple identities receive equal recognition in a single constitutional form" (Rose 1999, 178). In Latin America the political reforms that have recognized multicultural, pluri-ethnic nations-such as the 1987 Constitution of Nicaragua, the 1991 Constitution of Colombia, the 1992 National Constituent Assembly of Paraguay, the 1994 reformed Constitution of Bolivia, or the 1998 Constitution of Ecuador-have invariably recognized special territorial and property rights for specific groups defined by cultural distinction.' Reforms in other countries, such as the 1988 Constitution of Brazil and the 1996 peace agreements of Guatemala, have also recognized property rights of ethnic groups. Other parts of the postcolonial world echo these trends in recognition of rights in property and resources based on specific cultural distinction, including Aboriginal territorial rights in Australia or Canada and Maori resource rights in New Zealand. In areas where such rights have not been recognized, culturally distinct groups have made extensive claims to land and resources as a basis for autonomy and self-governance, including use of customary law to justify primary ownership of land in South Africa and claims to clan land in Kenya (Ng'weno wor), Ache separatist claims in Indonesia, and territorial demands of the Palestinians. What unifies such claims is their demand for specific forms of territorial ownership or property relations as a basis for a new political engagement constructed on group or regional autonomy and self-governance.
Claiming Autonomy Nestled beneath the cloud forests of the high Andes, touching the continental divide, is the small community of Alsacia. It is a community of principally Afro-Colombian coffee farmers who have organized their own school, roads, electricity, and community timber company. The community consists of seventy-three families on I ,oo8 hectares of land, with each family having a plot of 8 hectares. The land is partially covered with natural forest, planted forests, and small-scale coffee farms. This group of Afro-Colombian campesinos, displaced from their traditional livelihood of gold panning by the
32
TURF WARS
hydroelectric dam La Salvajina, organized to make collective claims to land in Alsacia. Today the community of Alsacia would like the government to recognize their collective property rights in the land as Black communities, that is, as an ethnic group. In the northern part of the department of Cauca, dividing the municipality of Buenos Aires in two, is the Cauca River. Huge and powerful, the river carves the land in half, depositing on its banks the treasures it has accumulated from farther up the mountain and taking with it the things that stand in its path. As it travels, the river maintains the only flat land in the municipality, offering up fertile soils for dry season planting. Although mountains rise up from both sides of the river, to form the many vertebrae in the backbone of the Cordillera Occidental, or western range of the Andes, only one side of the river is referred to as !as montaiias, or the mountains. Most of the population lives on the other side, in the southern half of the municipality, where the land is only slightly less steep. For generations the people of this area, who are principally coffee farmers, have used the river to pan for gold.
Alsacia
AUTONOMY
33
Although living principally on the southern side of the river, the campesinos have cultivated coffee in las montaiias on the northern side for at least fifty years, migrating to their farms during the week and returning home on weekends, depending on the season and the demands of agricultural work. In the I 97os and I 98os people migrated to the northern side of the river to settle permanently. The people who make up the parceleros (plot holders or members) of Alsacia are originally from the southern part of the municipality, and most retain some small, inherited, steep-sloping land under coffee or cassava cultivation in the south. South of the Cauca River, some men were almost full-time gold miners who operated small-scale tunnel mines or worked as share miners in other people's mines, and women and other men would supplement their incomes in the dry season by panning for gold on the banks of the river. Individuals could largely determine the extent that gold played in their income and livelihood. The Salvajina dam changed the possibility of this alternative source of income.
A CHANGING LANDSCAPE: THE SALVAJINA DAM AND COMMUNITY FORMATION
People in Alsacia see the Salvajina hydroelectric dam, built where the Cauca River enters the municipality of Buenos Aires, as the reason for their present existence as a group. They explained that they decided to organize to obtain other property as a result of the dislocation caused by the dam. Cenen Aponza, a founding member of the community of Alsacia, describes the process of coming first to Agua Blanca and then to Alsacia: I am from Palo Blanco [in the south], but for twelve years we have been here in this area. More than anything, I moved because of the hydroelectric dam of La Salvajina, which expropriated the lands and the traditional forms of work in mining of the great majority of the people of the other end of the municipality. We moved because of this, looking for a new form of life to develop. We came here to get land. We tried to get land to settle. Well, yes, we achieved this through INCORA, that is, the institute in Colombia that is authorized to hand over land to organized campesinos. Thus we achieved something like an accord with INCO RA and the previous proprietor of this
34
TURF WARS
farm. They negotiated, and INCO RA bought the land and at the same time handed it over to us, so that we could try to work it. In this process it has been six years that we have been located here in these parts. We are trying to create a new model of living with the family, no? Caught at the final point before the floodplain, the Salvajina dam holds back the waters of the Cauca River between two huge folds in the Cordillera Occidental of the Andes, forming a 75-kilometer-long reservoir. Completed in 1989, the dam was built by the Cauca Valley Autonomous Regional Corporation (Corporaci6n Regional Aut6noma del Valle del Cauca; CVC). The eve did a study of the effects on the area to be flooded by the dam but not on the surrounding areas. As Escue ( 1 996) argues, "The local indigenous, peasant and black people only realized the project's implications when their land was flooded and they were unable to take their produce to market along the customary route" (p. 193). To protest the effects of the dam, the local communities formed the Association of Salvajina Dam Victims (ASOPRODOSA). With the support of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca; CRIC), ASOPRODOSA staged demonstrations in Popayan, the
La Salvajina reservoir
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Index
Ache, 3I ACIA (Asociaci6n Campesina Integral del Media Atrato), S4, S6, ISz, 2 I4 Acosta, sz, 53, I5S Adoracidn de Niiio Dids, I3S, I4I affirmative action, 252-54 Africa, S, I 2, I6; colonial state in, 74; 99; East Africa, 26 I; meaning of, I oo, ro I, I07, roS, IIO, II9-I25, I29-I33, I3S, I39, 239 Mrican descent, 9, IO, I I, 76, I99, 269. See also categorization, social agriculture, 5· 53· 5s, 6S, So, I36, I40, I59, I6I, ISz, zro, 2I9, 246, 27I; coffee:5, 22, 3I, 33,35-37,52,57-59, I22, I36, I40, I53-I56, I62, I63, I69, 177, 223, 265, 272; farmers, 6, 31, 33, 37,44, 5I, 52,53, 5S, 59,6I, 77,92, 93,99, I30, I36, I3S, I39, I53-I5S, I62, I63, I69, zoo, 204, zoS-zio, ziS, 22I, 222, 224; La Broca, 35· See also land (agrarian) reform Agriculture, Ministry of, 3S, 7S, 92, I6I, 224 Agua Blanca (in las montaiias), 33, 37, 3S, I63,202,2I9 Agua Blanca (neighborhood of Cali), I 3S Agustin Codazzi Geographic Institute (Instituto Geogr:ifico Agustin Codazzi, IGAC), I6S, 2I2, 243 Alliance for Progress, 6, 7S, I6o Alsacia: claims to, p, 33, 35, 37, 39-42, 44-4S,5I,67,69,73,S3,S9-93·95· I44, I47, I 55, IS3, IS6, I95-I97, 20I, zoz,zo4-206, 209,2I3, 2I5, zi6,ziS22I, 223,224,247, z6I, 265;location, 7, 31, ro6, I63, I67, I69, I76, I7S;
Amazon, I29 Amazonas, department of, ro3 Amu: as a family name, I20, 27Snr Ich4 Andes, I,4,9· 3I,32, 34·49·70,75,S7, II3-II5, I29, I32, I36, I37, I42, I5I, ISS, 2I3, 263 Angola: as a family name, I 20, 27Sniich4 anthropologist, I5, I6, 20, S6, 93· IIO, II2, II3, I2I, I33, 205,240, 24I Antioquia, department of, 46, roz, I04, I40,2II, 276n4ch3, 277n3ch4 ANUC (Asociaci6n Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos; National Association of Peasant Producers), 7S, 79, S3, I6o, I6I Aponza: as a family name, 165, 27Snrich4 Aponz:i,Cenen, 33,36-39,42,45, I96I9S, zoo,zoz, 204, 279n2ch7 Aponza, Nimia, 4I, 42, I I I, I95, z ro Appelbaum, Nancy, I04 Arar:it: as a family name, I 20, 27Sniich4 armed groups, zi, 23, 65, 79, So, Sz, S6, S9, 96, I36, I5I, I 53, I?3-I7S, IS7, ISS-I90, I92, I96, I9S, 20I, 2I3, 2I5, 2I6,227, 229,232,237,239,263. See also drugs; guerrilla; paramilitary; violence Arocha, J aime, S6, SS Arroyabe,Jorge, 67, 6S ASOPRODOSA (Association of Salvajina Dam Victims), 34, 2 I9, 220 Association of Plot Holders of Alsacia (Asociaci6n de Parceleros de Alsacia), 37· 3s
292
INDEX
assassination: Indigenous and AfroColombian leaders, 214, 229; politicians, 77, 182, 183 Atlantic, 45, 211 Atlantico, department of, 279n8ch5 AUC (United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia; Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia). See paramilitary Australia, 31, 24 7 authority, 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 24, 73, 197, 213,215,234· 237,247· 248,251,252, 254-257, 262, 266, 269; absence of, 26o, 263; construction of, 239; of community, 173; of community council, 203, 208, 217, 248, 250; culture and customs, 247; of elite groups, 69; of ethnic entities, 24 7; of guerrilla, 214, 237,238, 239; oflndigenous, 75, 219; judicial, 52; over knowledge, 240, 241, 263; land, 43, 221; of municipality, 211; of OT, 238, 263; of state, 2,4, r8, 19, 22, 24, 54,66, 173· 232, 239· 247· 248, 256, 262-264, 272; over territory, 13, 84, 96, 174, 189,205,211,215,221, 231,232,238,248,26I,263, 264,267 Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uraba. See paramilitary
baldios. See land tenure Balanta, Omar, 53, 54, 63, 64, 125-127, 217 Bello Horizonte (vereda), 1 r6 Berta, 185 blockade, 23,65, rr6, 162,175,255-257, 263 Bogota, Santa Fe de, 9, sz, 63, 77, 106, 110, Ill, 113,189,203,211,224,259 Bojaya, 214 Bolivar, department of, 102 Bolivar, Sim6n, 75, 76, 103, 105, 277n2c~
Bolivia, 198, 266 Brazil, 9, 95, 233, 266, 269, 271 Bucarameja, 259 Buenaventura, 65, 189
cabildo (resguardo governing council), 41, 50,62-66,69,92,93· 116,185,187, 201,207,214, 219,221,249· 254,256, 262 Cadena, Marisol de la, 130
Caicedo, Clemente, 52 Caicedo, Octavio, 55, 56 Caicedo, Pedronel, 53, 54-55, 125, 126I27,2I0,222,249,250 Caja Agraria (Agrarian, Mining, and Industry Bank), r68, 176, 178, 179 Calabar, 120 Caldas, department of, 36, 46, 104, 140 Cali, 43, 65, 66, 82, ro2, 111, 113, 120, 137-140, 143, 162, 163, 179, r8r, 189, 200,207, 230,235,237· 240,250, 258-260 Caloto, 113, 130, r6r, 214 campesino, 23, 32, 33, 38-40, 73, 78, 79, 82,83,92, 105, 12~ 136, 153· 157162,169,176, r88,2o9,219,26r Canada, 31, 247 Caqueci, department of, 36, 82 Carabalf: as a family name, 20, 165, r66, 278n11ch4; as a synonym for black, 119 Carabalf, Adelmo, 44, 45, 66, 88, 108, 195, 2oo,2o4,205, 2o6,2o8, 211 Carabalf, Amador, 210 Carabalf, Diego, 36, 38, 42, 200, 202 Carabalf, Gesus) Emerito, 36, 2oo, 202, 203 Carabalf, R6mulo, 99, 200, 201, 209, 217 Caracas: as a family name, 278n1 rch4 Caribbean coast, 4, 88, ro2, 152, 276n4ch3 Cartagena,9,46,75, ro6 Carter, Donald Martin, 242 Cascarilla (vereda), 52 Castafio, Carlos. See paramilitary categorization, legal: black communities, I, 10, 11, 15, 24, 29, JZ, 43-48, 51, 62-69,72,84-89,91,93· 105,114118, 125-128, 131, 135· 136, 148, 174· 182, 189, 190, 198, 200, 203, 204, 207, 209-212,24o, 241,244,245,248-255, 262, 263, 269, 270; castas, 9, 74, 101; ethnic groups, 1, 6, 10-14, 17, 30, 31, 43·44,67,83-90,92,95·96, 112,117, rr8, 120, 12~ 129, 131, 147, 157, r6~ 185, 192, 196, 199· 201, 212, 223, 225, 227,247,252-254,261,262,265-269, 271, 272; indigenous communities, 12, 23,46,64-67,71,75·83,86,92,93· 105, 112, 115, 116,118, 124-130, 159· r6r, 183, 185, 187,212-214,222,232, 241, 250-254, 261, 269; insular natives,
INDEX
Ss, S6, z 77n5ch3; libns (freemen), 9, SS, roo, 103, IO), '47 categorization, social: Black, I I, S6, I04, I06-12S, 130, f32, 141, ISI, rs6, I69, 209; Creoles, 74, 75, 7S, z66; Catholic, Ss, r4I, 142,236, 27Sn3chs;gentede color (people of color), 76; Mestiw, 12, I3, 29, 6I, 104, 109, II2, us, uS, 12 3, I26, I27, rSs, 2I9; moreno, ro, IoS, 277n7ch4; mulato, roS, 277n7ch4; neg;ritud, ro, I09, rr2, 1SS; negro, ro, II, 76, IOS, I09, rrS, II9, 120, 123, I2S, I26, 277n7~; niche, ro, 1oS, II9; physicality, 109, no; Protestants, Ss, 236; trigueiio, IOS, z 77117ch4; "\Vhite, 10, 29, 76,104, I06, I09-III, II4, IIS, I23, 127, 130, 14I, ISI, 196, 242, 277n3ch4 Cauca, department of, 23, p, 46, 62, 63, 72, S4, 96, 99, ro2, 104, Io6, r 19-12I, r3r, I32, 137-139, rsS, r6o; r64, r66, 277n7ch4, z7Sn7chs Cauca River, 4, 6, p, 33, 36, 4S, 49, I02, 103, 114, I36, I37, I44, 147, IS4, 163, r66, 174, rSo, rSs, r9r, 196, 2or, 204, 2IO, 221, 265, 272 Cauca Valley, r69, 177, ISS, IS9, 196, 2II, 214,219,226, 256,25S,276n4Ch3 Cerro Catalina, 56 Cerro Teta: claims to, sr, 55, 56, 6o-6r, 62-70, 73,s3,S9-93.99· 103, rrs, r2S, 143, 144, 147, r6r, r69, rS5, IS6, 195-198, 200-204, 20?-209, 211-214, 2r6-21S, 220, 221, 224,91-93,99, 103, I I); description of, 7, 49, 52, 143, 265; exploitation of, sz, 6o, 6r, 143-153, 167, 17~ 241-243, 2)0 Chambimbe (vereda), 53, 126 Charrupf: as a family name, 27Snrrch4 Chiquinquir:i (vereda), 52, r65, rS7 Choc6, department of, 76, SS, 102, 103, 104, 105, II2, II3, 1S9, 2II, 214, 276n4ch3 Chua, Amy, 94,95 civil society, 232-33 COCEI (Coalition of Workers, Peasants, and Students of the Isthmus) Zapotec movement, 226 Colombian Institute of Anthropology (ICAN), 24I Colombian United Pentecostal Church, 37
293
colonialism, 19, 74, roo, 124, z6S colonos, 73,159, 276mch3. See also land tenure Communist Partv, S6 Community Co~pany, Brisas de Mary L6pez,7,40-42,44-47, 209, 2r6, 2rS, 223 Community Council of Black Communities of Cerro Teta (Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras de la Teta), 7, so, sr, 53, 63, 66-69, 99, II), I2I, 126, 14S, 150, IS5, 197, 201,203, 2o6,2o7,2I0,2r6, 22o,22I, 222, 242, 243, 245, 249; creation of the Constitutive Assembly, 66; financial crisis, 223, 224; Junta Directiva (board of directors), 53, 63, zoS, 211,217, 2IS, 22I Community Mothers, q1-I73, rSr comunero. See land tenure CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), 95 CONFORESCA, 6S Congo: as a family name, 120 Conservative Party, 22, n. I 59 constitution (political), 70, S3, 93, ror, 159, 263, 266; Constitution of Brazil (I9SS), p; Constitution of Colombia (1991), 6, ro, 43-45, 47, 55, 6r, 64, 69,71-73· 78,S4-86, 87,89-93·96, IOI, Ill, II2, 114, II8, 129, IJZ, I35• 143, 152, 177, 181, 184, r87-r88, 191, 196, 19S,207, 230,232,246, 24S-254· 261, z6S, 269; Constitution of Ecuador (I 99S), 3 r; Constitution of Nicaragua (19S7), 3 r; reformed Constitution of Bolivia ( 1 994), 3 r. See also decrees; laws; Provisional Article 55 constitutional court ruling T-422/96, 252-54, 2Son4chS Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 27I Corcino: as a family name, 278niic~ Cordoba, Diego Luis, 77, II3 Cordoba, Piedad, 277n3c~ Cordobismo (movement), r I 3 CRC (Regional Corporation of Cauca), 236,279n9chs CRIC (Consejo Regional lndfgena del Cauca; Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca), 34, 93, n6, 219, 220,255,257
294
INDEX
Cuellar,Julio, r85 Cuba, 279n7chs Cuban Revolution, 7S cultural distinction, q, I4, 30, 31· I05, I13, 125, I27, I29, 132, 26I, 270 Cundinamarca, department of, 36, IS5 CVC (Corporaci6n Regional Aut6noma del Valle del Cauca; Cauca Valley Autonomous Regional Corporation), 34, 35· 207, 2!2, 1I9 decentralization, 73, 79, 85, 94-96, I I I, I72, I77• ISo-IS3, I96-I99, 1IS,124, 226, 2 33; devolution of territory, I91, 164; reforms I9Sos, I So, IS2; tax collection, I8z decrees: Decree I37I, 2II, 2I2, 176n4ch3; Decree I627, 276n4ch3; Decree I745· 44, 45, 67, 85, zi7, 243, 244; Decree 2148, 276n4ch3; Decree 2249, 276n4ch3; Decree 23I3, 276n4ch3; Decree1314• 276n4ch3; Decree 2344, 177n4ch3; Decree 2374, 276n4ch3, zSon3ch8. See also constitution; laws demilitarized zone: Sz, S3 Dfaz: as a family name, I65 displacement: inAlsacia, 33, 34, 36, 37, 47,4S, r6r, I95, 202,119, z6I, z6S, 272; ofBlackcommunities, I74• 2I4, 2I5; in Cerro Teta, I6I, 26S, 272; drugs, So, S2; internal, 23, I74• I79, 2I4, 229; peace communities, S3; La Violencia, 73, 7S, S2. See also armed groups; guerrilla; paramilitary; violence drugs, 2,6, 22, 73, 79,So-S3,S6,96, I44• I6I, I63, I74• I75• I7S, 179, IS7, IS9, 1I4, 216, 246, 270; Cali cartel, 22, I39; coca/cocaine, So, 81, I4o, I74• 237, 23S; marijuana, 79· See also armed groups, guerrilla; paramilitary; violence Ecuado~95, I03, I6z, 146,269 El Guaico (mineral area), 52, 54, 56, sS, 6o, 6z, 6S, I44, I4S, I6I, IS5, IS6, 103, 220 elections: Buenos Aires's mavor, I So, I96-I9S; in general, I6S, .I73, 226; governor, I9S; municipal, I I I, IS2, IS3, I99, 214; presidential, 22, IS2, 229
ELN (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional; National Liberation Army;). See guerrilla ELP (Popular Liberation Army). See guerrilla Environment, Ministry of, 236 EPSA (Empresa de Energfa del Pacifica), 35. I76 Escue, Alcibiades, 34 ethnicity, Io, I I,IJ, I6, 43-45, 63-65, S4, S6, SS, 93, 100, IOI, II3, II4, II7, uS, I2I, I13-I1j, I28-I30, I31, I69, I70, I90, 15I, 254· 16I, z6S, 269, 272, 177n6ch4. See also categorization; race ethnic territories, 6, I2, I 3, 2 I, 30, 44, 45.47·4S, )I,64, 73.s4,S6,SS,S9, 9I, 92, 95, 96, 136, Ij2, 170, 1 73• 175, IS2, IS3, IS7, ISS, I91, I92, I97-20I, 2I1,2I4, 229,230,232, 234· 240,245. 247,250,252, 25),263,264, 265,26S, 270-272 European Union, 66, 232, 233 family names of African origin, I2o FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de ColombiaRevolutionary; Armed Forces of Colombia). See guerrilla FEDECAFE (Federation of Coffee Producers), 6S, 7S, I j6, I 59 Federation of Cattle Ranchers, 6S Federation of Landowners, 79 Field, Les W, I88 France, zo fuga, Izo, I3S, 142, 143 Fundaci6n Cultural Afro-Colombiana Maasai, IF Fundaci6nMingas, 207,143 Ghana, no Gaitan,Jorge Eliecer, 77 Garffuna, 266 Gilinsky, brothers, p, 52, 54, 55, 6o-62 globalization, 2, 3, 4, I6-r8, 96 globo jamilia1·. See land tenure Gohi: as a family name, llO, 278ni Ich4 Government, Ministry of: Division of Black Community Affairs, 276, 2771l4Ch3 Grupo de lntegraci6n Rural (GIR), 204 Guambiano, I 24, I 3 I
INDEX
Guatemala, z66; peace agreements (I996), 3 I Guaza: as a family name, 120, 278nuc~ guerrilla, 6, 23, 39, 68, 73, 79,81-85, Io6, I62, I73-I8o, I83, I87, I89, 2I3, 2I4, 219, 237-239· 257-26I,263, 270; ELN (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional; National Liberation Army), 8r-83, I75, 237-240, 259; ELP (Popular Liberation Army), 84; FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), 23, 79, 8I, 83, I75, 214, 229, 275n4Intr; "hot" areas, I75, r78, 179, 258; M-I9 (Movement of April 19th), 84; PRT (Revolutionary Workers' Party), 84; Quintin Lame movement, 79, 84; red zones (zonas rajas), I87, r88. See also armed groups; drugs; paramilitary; violence Haiti, 75, 277n2ch4 Hale, Charles R., 95 Hanratty, Dennis, 29, 30 High Level Consultation on Black Communities, 67, 92, I89, 2II, 276n4ch3 Honduras (country), 266 Honduras (corregimiento), 233,236,249 Honduras (vereda), 52, 240 Hormilson, 141 "hot" areas. See guerrilla INCORA (Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute; Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria ), 33, 34, 38-40, 44-46, 6~69,92, I2~ I63, I84,207, 209, 213, 2I7, 219, 221 lncorado. See land tenure independence, I2, I3, 74-76, 78, ro3, I24, 147, 152; ofHaiti, 75 Indonesia, 31 inheritance. See land tenure lnter-American Development Bank, 232 Interior, Ministry of the, so, 63, 148, 2II, 212 International Coffee Agreement (r9S9), 35· I56 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions 107 and 169,83, 233, 250 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 22, r8r,232
295
im·asi6n. See land tenure Ivory Coast, I 5 JAC (Junta de Acci6n Comunal; Communal Action Group;), s6, 78, 176, 235· 236,242 Jackson,Jean, 12S, rSS Jamundf, 6r, 259 ]ones, R.]. Barry, 3, I9 Juchit:in, 226 Kaniki: as a family name, 278nr r ch4 Kenya, II, r4-r6, 20, JI, 71, ro6, Io7, IIO, I2I-I23, I77, I78, 247 La Balsa, 66, I03, zoo, 204, 2I7, 240 land (agrarian) reform, 6, 37-40, 43, 44, 4~6~ 7S,84,92,95, r6o, r63, I66, I88,2oo, 202,209,212, 213,2I6,zrg, 220 land tenure, 7I, So, 99, IZg, I36, r6o, I6z, r68, 231, 244; baldios, 46, 47, 67, 72,87-Sg, 105, 157· 160,163, !87, 213, 244, 276n3ch3; comunero, 165, I68;globofamiliar, r65, r68, r84; lncorado, I63; inheritance, 37, r 52, r63-r67; invasion, 208; latifundios, 157; minifundios, 157;parceleros, 37, 40, 42, 44-47· 89, 147· I63, IS3, 197,202, 205, 2o6, 209, 213, 219, uo; recuperaci6n, 279115ch7; tenants, 5S, 59, 72, 77· 2 59 land title/titling: to Alsacia, 45, 46; in the Andes, 24, 88, I I4, 2 I 3; to Cerro Teta, j0-j3, 66-68; collective titles, IO, 22, 30, 95, I04, IZ9, 207, 208,212, 224, 244, 254, 269; through colonization, I 59, I63; insecurity of, 56-58, 66-6S, I59, I6o, I67, 185, I87, 2IJ, 2I4, 216, 24S: in the Pacific basin, 10, 30, 46, 88, S9, 105, II4, 212; taxation, r6S Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), 27I Landless Workers Movement (MST), 95· 2 7I La Paila (resguardo), 41, 93 La Salvajina (hydroelectric dam), 32, 34, 35,93, I47• I76,zig, 279n9chs Las Delicias (resguardo), 63, 66, 6g, 92, II5, II6, rS4, 185, 222,248, 258, 276n4ch2 Las Pailas (mineral area), 6o, 144, 149
296
INDEX
Latin America, 8, 12, I3, IS-I7, 31, 74-78,So,90,94-Io9, I3I, 144,226, 266, 269 La Violencia, 6, 73, 77, S2, 159, r6o latifundios. See land tenure laws: Law 2 of 1959· S7, 105, 277n4c~; Law 70 of 1993, 6, 43-44, 45, 64, 67, s5, s7, ss, IIr, 112, r 35 , r6 9 , 2o 7, 2II,241,252-254•269,276n3Ch3, 2Son3ch8; Law 89 of 1890, 63, 64, 12S, 129, 207; Law IIO of 1913, 276n3ch3; Law 135 of 1961, 39, 105, 129; Law 388, 230, 235· See also constitution, decree, Provisional Article 55 LeGrand, Catherine, 69, I 59 legitimacy, I, 19, 24, 74, 79, 189 Lehman, Carlos, 56 Lehman, Roberto, 56 Liberal Party, 77, 7S, 159, 196 Llanos (eastern Colombia), 140 Lleras Restrepo, Carlos, 77 Loboa, Marisol, I 25 Loma Alta (mineral area), 6o, 145 Los Ciguerrillos (mineral area), 6o, 144 Los F arallones de Cali (national park), 46,83,206 Lucumf: as a family name, 120, 278niich4 M-19 (Movement of April 19th). See guerrilla Maasai, 124, 125,266 Madroiio (mineral area), 145, 150 Magdalena, department of, 102 Magdalena River, 4, 102, 279n8chs Mamdani, Mahmood, r 2, 13, r 24 Mandinga: as a family name, 120, 278niich4 Maori, 3I marginalization, II, 21, II5, 130, 143, 172,252-254 Marx, Karl, r8 Maya, 266 Mazamorrero River, 56, 144 Mbembe, Achille, 239 Medellfn, I I 3, r 89 Medina Gallego, Car! os, r 57 Meditz, Sandra W., 29, 30 mestizaje, 9, 76, IIO, I I I , 115. See a/so categorization, social; race Mestizo. See categorization, social
Merico,95, 226,269 Mezf: as a family name, 278nr I ch4 Mina: as a family name, 120, 278nrrc~ Mina, Marcos, 209 Miners' Cooperative (Cooperativa Multiminera de Buenos Aires y Suarez), 6, 51-54· 6r, 66, 93· 115, 145· 148, 149· I 51, 185,201,203,217,220 Mines and Energy, Ministry of, 5 I, 52, s6,62,63,6s,66,69,92, 148, rsz, 186, 2II, 212 minifundios. See land tenure mining: I, 33· 35· 51-54· sS, 6r, 62, 68, 92, IOJ, II7, II9, 122, 123, IJ6, 139, 143· 144· 147· 148, 151-1)3, 155· 169, 172,175, r82, r85, 201, 209, 2ro, 220, 22 r, 246, 268; gold, 9, p, 33, 35, 37, 49-54, 59, 6r, 62, 91, 102, 103, II3, 122,136, 143-153· 19), 220, 237· 265, 272; as a male occupation, 146, 147; miners, 31, 33, 37,49-56,59, 6o-64, 66,67,91-93,99, rrS, r2o, 139, 143-153, 157, r69, 185, r86, 2oo, 201, 203, 2o8-2ro, 212, 218, 219, 220-21. See also Community Council of Black Communities of Cerro Teta; Miners' Cooperative; SENA Mira Soles (verecia), p, 56, 58-62, ro7, I15-II8, 145, 148, 154, 176, 184-r86, 2 55 Morales, Evo, 198, 266 Movimiento Nacional Cimarron, S6 Mozorongo: as a family name, 278nuch MSCN (Movimiento Social de Comunidades Negras; Social Movement of Black Communities), 105 Munchique (national park), 46, 206 Munchique (vereda), 52, 53, 59, 6r, 62, 15S, r66, 171, 176 Munro, WilliamA., 2, 3 multicultural, 21, JI, 86, 266, 270 multiculturalism, 19, 30, 94 Narifio, department of, 1S9, 2 rr, 276n4ch3 Nasa, u6, r85, rSS, 226,255 nation, 12, 17, 19, 24, 29, 70, 71, 73, 76, 90, II2, 128, 130-IJZ, 1)6, 177, 1Sr, 223, 230, 25r, 255; Colombian, 9, 61, r 14, 199; Indian, 74-76; multicultural, 3I, S6, 270; Nasa, n6, 255;
INDEX
pluri-ethnic, 31, 86; Spanish, 74-76, lOO, I24 National Constituent Assembly (of Colombia), 85. See also constitution National Front, 77, 78 National Rehabilitation Plan (Red de Solidaridad), 55, 276nzch2 nationalism, 75, I 24 Naya region, I6I, I89; as El Naya, I74• 175. 178, 237-240, 258 Naya River, 144 Nazarith,Jesus, rsr neo-liberalism, 22-24, 79, 94, 95, I6z,
r8z,zos,233,246,z66,z7o New Life-Solidarity Health Company (ESS) (government-funded NGO), 2 43· 2 45 New Zealand, p, 247, 269 Nicaragua, 266 Nigeria, 119, I22 OAS (Organization of American States), 2 32-2 34 Oaxaca, 226 Ocor6: as a family name, 2 78nr rch4 Olaya, Elena, s6, 57· s8, 107-108, I I I, 112 Olaya Herrera, Enrique, I 59 ONIC (National Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Colombia), 86 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), 79 Ordoiiez, Lauriano, 56--Qo, I6I OT (Planes de Ordenarniento Territorial), z 30-243 Ovejas (vereda), 52 Ovejas River, 53, 144, 150 Pacific basin, 30,45-47, 88, 89, II2-II4, 119, 129, r64, I82, 2Iz, 2I4, 264 Pacific Ocean, 45 Pacific region, 4, 45, 46, 47, 65, I I4, I89,
207 Pakistan, 24 7 Palestinians, 3I Palo Blanco (vereda), 52, 145, I66, I76, I96,2IO Panama, I02 PanArnericanHighway, 23, r6z, 219,255 Paraguay, National Constituent Assembly of(1991), 31
297
paramilitary, 6, 47, 73, 8o-83, r6r, I6z, I73-175, I79• I8o, 183, I89, 2I4-1I5, 229, 237, 158-26I, 27o; Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uraba, 2 I4; AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia; United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia), 8I, 8z, I6r; and Car! os Castaiio, 8r; and la lista, 258,259. See also armed groups; drugs; guerrilla; violence parceleros. See land tenure Pastrana, Andres, 22, 8r, 8z Pecaut, Daniel, I74 Peru, I 30, r 31 Peters, Pauline, IF Peti6n, Alexandre, z 77nzch4 Plan Colombia, 246 political opening, 8, 9· 25, 94· 95. I77, I97· I99· 200, 2!6, 225; and collective territories, 206, 2 I 5; and community councils, 206; and I99I constitution, 268. See also elections Popayan, 34, 35, 55,6o, Ioz, II3, I38, 147· I6z, 219, zs6 Pop6: as a family name, 120, 278nr Ich4 Pop6, Jose Manuel, rg6-I98, 279nzch7 Pop6, Leoncio, 36-38, 210 Pop6, Marcos, I87-I88 Proceso de Comunidades Negras, 86 Providencia (island), 86, 207, 2 I I, z76n4ch3,277n5ch3 Provisional Article 55 (Articulo Transitorio 55), 43-45,64, 85, 87, 253, 254, 275n2chi PRT (Revolutionary Workers' Party). See guerrilla Puerto Tejada, II9 1 131, I32 Puturnayo, department of, 36 Quinamay6, I38, 141, I43 Quintfn Lame movement. See guerrilla race, 9, IO, II, I3, I6, 74, 76, Ioo, roi, I03, 104, I06-I09, Ill, II3, II5, II7-II9 1 I2I 1 122, 124, 125, IJZ, 143, 15I,240,242, 253, z6r,268, 269, 275nzlntr; spatial separation of, II4· See also categorization; ethnicity racism, II, 57, 58, 76, 86, IOI, IIO, II9, I33i in Buenos Aires, nr-12; and Law 70, I I 2
298
INDEX
Ramfrez, Antonio, 52 Rappaport,Joanne, 226 recuperacirfn. See land tenure red zones (zonas rojas). See guerrilla resg;uardo, 4I, so, SI, 64, 92, 93· I04, 127, I29, I3o, I6r, r84, r85, zo6-zo8, 213, z 17, 248, 249, 256, 257. See also La Paila; Las Delicias Restrepo, Eduardo, 3, r I Rio de Janeiro, 233 Risaralda, deparunent of, 140 Robles, I4I Rodrfguez Villa, Fabio, 230 Rojas, Tulio, 13 I Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 77 Roldan Ortega, Roque, 25 r Rose, Nikolas, z, I9, 30, I9o, 198, 2I5, 227,2JI,242 Rubin,Jeffrey W., 20, 226 SAC (Society of Colombian Agriculturalists), 78, I 59, 2 76nzch3 Samper, Ernesto, 22, 65, I82 San Andres (island), 46, 86, 2 I r, 276n4ch3, 277115ch3 San Basilio de Palenque, 277112ch4 Sanchez, Gonzalo, So Sanchez, Humberto, 62 Sandoval, Nelson, 6, 7, 54-56, 6o-64, 66, I48, I86, 195, zoo, zoz, 203, 2I6, 220 Sandoval, Plutarco, 5I, 66-68, I85, 198, zoo, 204-206, 208, 2I7, 222 San lgnacio (cmregimiento), r r6, r 17, r84, 248, 249· 256 SanJoaqufn (vereda), sz, II3, I66, I78 Santa Barbara (vereda), sz, II6, I78, r86 Santa Catalina (island), 2 r I, 276n4ch 3 Santa Catalina (mineral area), 145 Santa Catalina (vereda), 52, II6, r64-I66, I76, r86 Santamarfa, Guillermo, 207, 208, 279114Ch7 Santa Marta, 2 52 Santander, department of, 46 Santander de Quilichao, I38, 179,219 Santa Rita (vereda), r 30 Santa Rosa (vereda), 52, I 76 Saporita, Christopher, r8 SENA (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizage), 150-151
Shell,279n8ch5 Silvia, r6r slavery, 9, II, 54, 74-76, Ioo, ro2, 103, I05,II3, II9, 1)2, r66, 277112Ch4, 278n6ch5, 278nr4c~; in Cauca, wz; city of Popay:in, 147; end of, I o, 76, roo, 103-105; fort El Mina, uo; La Balsa revolt, 103; manumission, wo, 103 Smurfit Carton de Colombia, 38, 39, 68 social justice, 71, 95, 215, 225, 262 Solarte, Car! os, II 5 Solarte, Francisco, II6 Solarte, Guillermo, s6-6o, 107-108, 115, 195,200, 20I, 203 Solarte, [Guillermo] Memo, s6-6o, 107-108, II)-II7, I)I-1p, 184, I86, 195· 200, 203, 208 Solarte, Mary Luz, I r6 Solidarity Network (Red de Solidariedad). See National Rehabilitation Plan Solfs: as a family name, 165 SoIfs, Sim6n, I 66 South Africa, 3r, I 22, 271 Special Commission on Black Communities, 86 Suarez, 36 Suarez,Pedro, r85, r86 Sub-Commission on Equality and Ethnic Rights, 86 Supreme Court, 252 Syndicate of Rural Owners and Entrepreneurs. See SAC tenants. See land tenure Teta River, I44, 146 Texas Oil Company (Texaco), 279n8ch5 Timba, I96 Timba River, I)4, 2IO title/titling. See land tide/tiding T6ez (resguardo), 130 Toribfo, I6r Torres, Albeiro, II2 Toscano, Alfonso Cabrera, 2 30 Totor6, r6I Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, 3, 20, 21, 272 1rujillo, lbes, r 95 Tukanoans, I88 Tumaco, I 89 Tunubala, Floro, 198
INDEX
UMATA (Municipal Unity for Agricultural 'Technical Assistance), z 30 Union Fenosa. See EPSA United Fruit Company, 279n8chs United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 233 United Nations Environment Program,
232 United States, 11, rs, 20, 22, 78,205, z78nschs UniValle (University ofValle), sz, S5, 66, 207, 243 UPAC (Unidad de poder adquisitivo constante), 23, 27sn3Intr. Uraba, 46 Uribe Velez, Alvaro 23, 129 USAID (United States Agency for International Development), 232 Valdez,Juan, rs6 Valle del Cauca (department) 36, 62, 6s, ro6, 137,138, 277n7ch4;southern, I63,203,zs8,276n4Ch3,277n7ch4 Valle-Interandino areas, 47, 88, I02, II4, 138 Veltmeyer, Henry, 95
299
Venezuela, 79, ro3, I40 Viafara: as a family name, IZO Villa Rica, I 31 violence, 2-4, 6, 23, so, So, 83, 173, I79, r87-I9o, I95, I96, 2o6,zi6, 226,270, 271; in Buenos Aires, I73-I8o, zs8, 2 59, z68; against collective territories' leaders, 2I4, 215, 229; drug economy, Sr; frontier colonization, I6o; guerrilla, 79, 214; in the Pacific basin, 2I4, 215; paramilitary, I89, 258-26I; against politicians, 77, r82, I83; ruralurban migration, r 39· See also armed groups; drugs; guerrilla; paramilitary Viveros, Ana, 56 Wade, Peter, 87, roo, 104, !28, I 30 whitening, ro, 76, 104 \Villiams, Brackette F., 262 World Bank, 43, 46, 88, u4, r81, 212, 232 Zamosc, Leon, I6o Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), 95 Zuiiiga: as a family name, r65