Territory, State and Nation - The geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellen

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Territory, State and Nation

MAKING SENSE OF HISTORY

Studies in Historical Cultures

General Editor: Stefan Berger

Founding Editor: Jörn Rüsen

Bridging the gap between historical theory and the study of historical memory, this series crosses the boundaries between both academic disciplines and cultural, social, political and historical contexts. In an age of rapid globalization, which tends to manifest itself on an economic and political level, locating the cultural practices involved in generating its underlying historical sense is an increasingly urgent task.

Recent volumes:

Volume 41

Territory, State and Nation: The Geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén

Edited by Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén

Volume 40

Analysing Historical Narratives: On Academic, Popular and Educational Framings of the Past

Edited by Stefan Berger, Nicola Brauch and Chris Lorenz

Volume 39

Postwar Soldiers: Historical Controversies and West German Democratization, 1945–1955

Jörg Echternkamp

Volume 38

Constructing Industrial Pasts: Heritage, Historical Culture and Identity in Regions Undergoing Structural Economic Transformation

Edited by Stefan Berger

Volume 37

The Engaged Historian: Perspectives on the Intersections of Politics, Activism and the Historical Profession

Edited by Stefan Berger

Volume 36

Contemplating Historical Consciousness: Notes from the Field

Edited by Anna Clark and Carla L. Peck

Volume 35

Empathy and History: Historical Understanding in Re-enactment, Hermeneutics and Education

Tyson Retz

Volume 34

The Ethos of History: Time and Responsibility

Edited by Stefan Helgesson and Jayne Svenungsson

Volume 33

History and Belonging: Representations of the Past in Contemporary European Politics

Edited by Stefan Berger and Caner Tekin

Volume 32

Making Nordic Historiography: Connections, Tensions and Methodology, 1850– 1970

Edited by Pertti Haapala, Marja Jalava and Simon Larsson

For a full volume listing, please see the series page on our website: http://www.berghahnbooks.com/series/making-sense-of-history

TERRITORY, STATE AND NATION

The Geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén

Edited by Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén

First published in 2021 by

Berghahn Books

www.berghahnbooks.com

© 2021 Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Names: Björk, Ragnar, editor. | Lundén, Thomas, editor.

Title: Territory, state and nation : the geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén / edited by Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén.

Other titles: Rudolf Kjellén. English | Geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén

Description: New York : Berghahn Books, 2021. | Series: Making sense of history ; volume 41 | “The present volume is a much-revised translation of a collection of essays on Rudolf Kjellén that was originally published in Stockholm in 2014.”-- Foreword. | “Some of the original contributions were updated, while other new ones were added.”-- Introduction. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021005949 (print) | LCCN 2021005950 (ebook) | ISBN 9781800730724 (Hardback) | ISBN 9781800730731 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Kjellén, Rudolf, 1864-1922--Influence. | Geopolitics--History. | Political scientists--Sweden.

Classification: LCC JC269 .R8513 2021 (print) | LCC JC269 (ebook) | DDC 320.1/2--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021005949

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021005950

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-80073-072-4 hardback

ISBN 978-1-80073-073-1 ebook

Contents

List of Illustrations

Foreword. Why Rudolf Kjellén?

Mark Bassin

Introduction

Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén

Chapter 1. Rudolf Kjellén: Academic, Publicist, Politician

Ragnar Björk, Bert Edström and Thomas Lundén

Chapter 2. Rudolf Kjellén: The Swedish Intellectual and Political Context

Ragnar Björk

Chapter 3. Sweden’s Borders: Kjellén’s Contribution to Social Science by Defining and Applying Geopolitics

Claes G. Alvstam and Thomas Lundén

Chapter 4. Rudolf Kjellén’s Great Power Studies: The Editions

Ragnar Björk

Chapter 5. Rudolf Kjellén’s Great Power Studies: Examining Germany, USA, Russia, Japan

Ragnar Björk

Chapter 6. Geopolitics, Political Geography and the Political Science Irredenta: Kjellén’s The State as a Form of Life

Thomas Lundén

Chapter 7. Kjellén and the First World War

Gunnar Falkemark

Chapter 8. The Small Game in the Shadow of the Great Game: Kjellénian

Biopolitics between Constructivism and Realism

Carl Marklund

Chapter 9. Discourse, Identity and Territoriality: Kjellén’s Thinking about a European Federation of States

Ola Tunander

Chapter 10. Rudolf Kjellén’s Intellectual Impact in Latin America

Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

Chapter 11. Kjellén’s Legacy: A Story of Divergent Interpretations

Thomas Lundén

Conclusion. Kjellén’s Life and Work: Tensions between Opposites

Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén

Index

Illustrations

Map 3.1 Strömstad, Swedish map of 1891.

Map 3.2 Map of Haparanda town and the border to Finland under Russia, 1874.

Map 4.1 Sea of Japan, 1891.

Map 6.1 Southern Germany in the borders of 1871, showing Alsace Lorraine in Germany.

Map 7.1 Balkans, 1891.

Map 11.1 Haushofer’s map, ‘Der deutsche Volks- und Kulturboden in Mittel- und Osteuropa’ [The German ethnic and cultural area in Central and Eastern Europe].

Foreword

Why Rudolf Kjellén?

MARK BASSIN

This volume is a much-revised translation of a collection of essays on Rudolf Kjellén that was originally published in Stockholm in 2014. For the Swedish reader, the relevance of the collection needs no explanation. Kjellén is widely recognized as an important – if unconventional – figure in the intellectual and political life of early twentieth-century Sweden. He was the holder of the country’s most prestigious university chair in political science, the Skytteanska Professorship at Uppsala University – he served as an active and outspoken Member of Parliament, and he also worked as a highly influential journalist. Yet despite all this, Kjellén has remained surprisingly little-studied and even less understood, even in his own country.

This lack of attention comes largely from the shadow of notoriety that coloured his legacy, a shadow cast by the resolutely conservative positions that he advocated and that have increasingly been at odds with the increasing liberal orientation of Swedish politics and society since his death in the 1920s. In his academic work, Kjellén developed an organismic concept of Great Power politics centred around the notion of Geopolitik – a neologism he coined in 1899 to highlight the significance of geography for political affairs, in domestic as well as international arenas. Kjellén was a lifelong Germanophile and supporter of the Wilhelmian Reich. His academic work was widely translated in Germany and was received there with perhaps greater interest than in his own country. Geopolitik in particular proved inspirational as the Germans developed their own science of geopolitics after 1918, and its leading proponent Karl Haushofer borrowed many of Kjellén’s ideas and drew on his reputation for his own purposes. To the extent that Geopolitik became associated with the Nazi state in the 1930s, Kjellén appeared to be implicated as well.

As a politician, moreover, Kjellén supported a variety of conservative positions, not least among them a trenchant opposition – for most of his life – to extending the franchise to women in Sweden. His most notable contribution to Swedish

political discourse was the notion of the Folkhemmet, a vision inspired by the Bismarckian example of a corporatist state in which social classes would collaborate rather than struggle against each other, and the state would act as guarantor of basic provisions such as health care, pensions, and other forms of social security. Paradoxically, in the 1930s, Kjellén’s Folkhemmet concept was taken over by the Social Democrats on the left, who ‘democratized’ it into their own notion of a welfare state. In this form, it became the basis for the fundamental consensus in Swedish politics that endures to the present day.

There is thus no question about the inherent interest of the figure of Kjellén for a Swedish audience. But what is his significance for the international reader? Why does the original collection merit an English-language presentation? In the broadest sense, all of the authors in this volume seek to address this question, although it is articulated in very different ways in their contributions. In anticipation of these arguments, therefore, it would be useful to provide some general orientation by briefly summarizing the reasons why Kjellén’s work today takes on an international significance, and why the material of this volume represents a useful point of reference for all readers with an interest in international affairs. Three aspects in particular can be identified, all of which relate to leading academic and public discourses that have developed since the end of the Cold War.

The most obvious of these is the new growth of interest in geopolitics. The popular wartime assumption of a close connection between Haushofer’s Geopolitik and National Socialism was in fact exaggerated and inaccurate, but it served nonetheless to stigmatize the entire field internationally. As a result, geopolitics remained taboo for many decades after 1945. Since the 1990s, however, there has been a veritable renaissance of interest in this field. The earlier stigma has been overcome, and there is today a large scholarly and current-affairs literature devoted to it. Part of this interest relates to the history of the field, and in this connection to Kjellén’s role has been rediscovered and is referred to as a matter of course. Unlike better-known practitioners such as Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Isaiah Bowman, however, there is practically no depth of understanding as to what Kjellén’s contribution to geopolitical thinking actually amounted to,

beyond the simple fact that he coined the term. The chapters in this collection begin to fill in this blank space.

The picture that emerges of Kjellén’s contribution to geopolitics is complex and in certain respects contradictory. On the one hand, Geopolitik figured as part of Kjellén’s attempt to develop a comprehensive analytical model for the political state as a biological organism. Although this was a popular and widely accepted perspective in his day, its roots in fin de siècle Social Darwinism are unmistakable, and it is of little more than historical interest today. At the same time, however, Kjellén was concerned with the material sources of national power and how variations in this power affect interactions between states – two issues that have re-emerged with great immediacy after the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War. Among other things, Kjellén’s geopolitics was intended to provide inventories and evaluations of the material bases of state power. These included territorial assets, natural resources, demographic profile, industrial development and transportation infrastructures, which he saw as objective factors conditioning the dynamism of individual states and their potential for development. All of this corresponds to some of the most vital concerns of geopolitics today.

Secondly, Kjellén was one of the first to develop the concept of ‘Great Powers’. He did so, of course, in the context of his own day, and thus his attention was focused on the major imperial states that were struggling for advantage on what by the late nineteenth century had become a global arena of interaction and conflict. Kjellén identified a variety of factors that were significant in this matrix of Great Power interaction, and notably included the principle of autarky or economic self-sufficiency, which would permit a state to survive exclusively on the basis of its own resources and thus minimize the need for interaction with other states. Along with this went what might be called the Grossraum or ‘bigspace’ imperative for states to extend their influence and control across evergreater geographical expanses. Kjellén was genuinely visionary in this respect, elaborating concepts such as buffer states, spheres of influence and power blocs, all of which were to become common currency in the international politics of the twentieth century. He believed that the number of Great Powers would diminish (he predicted that only four world powers would remain in 2020), but that their

respective geographical reach would grow ever larger. Once again, the relevance of all this for the concerns of the present day is obvious, be it in the reemergence of the Great Power concept, the development of regional blocs, or post-Cold War visions of a global system based on ‘multipolarity’, for which the principles of autarky and Grossraum are once again crucial.

The final element making Kjellén’s work significant for the present day is its importance for the study of biopolitics. Biopolitics is commonly associated with the work of the French historian Michel Foucault, who began using the term in the 1970s to describe the ways in which the state manages and controls the biological life processes of the populations under its jurisdiction. In fact, this term as well was another one of Kjellén’s neologisms. Like geopolitics, Kjellén’s conceptualization of biopolitics was complex and brought together a number of highly differing elements. Perhaps most immediately, he deployed the term in connection with his view of the state as a biological organism – a perspective he presented most completely in his 1916 work Staten som Lifsform, or ‘the state as a form of life’. Like his geopolitik, this all-encompassing biologization of political organization and social behaviour reflected the Social Darwinistic temper of his times, and does not offer much practical insight for the concerns of the present day. But in the framework he set out for studying the material structure of the state, Kjellén included a category of ‘demo-politics’ which focused precisely the sorts of questions raised by Foucault and others concerning state intervention and control over the biological aspects of demographic development. In Sweden, these issues would gain great practical significance with the rise of the social-democratic welfare state – Kjellén’s Folkhemmet – in the 1930s, which included an emphasis on social engineering and eugenics. The celebrated statesman Gunnar Myrdal, who together with his wife Alva published an influential study Crisis in the Population Question, was an admirer of Kjellén, and in 1934 Sweden initiated a state-sponsored programme of sterilization that lasted for over a decade. All this serves to connect Kjellén to biopolitical concerns that figured centrally in the history of the twentieth century, and indeed continue to do so to this day.

The excellent chapters that make up this volume explore all these aspects of the work of Kjellén. The picture that emerges is of a complex and conflicted scholar,

whose contributions had, and still have, genuine multidimensional significance, not only for Sweden but also for the international arena.

Mark Bassin is Baltic Sea Professor of the History of Ideas, at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University in Stockholm, and a research fellow at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs. His research focuses on problems of space, ideology and geopolitics in Russia and Germany. His most recent monograph is The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia (Cornell UP, 2016). He has also co-edited the collections The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia’s Foreign Policy (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017); Eurasia.2: Russian Geopolitics in the Age of New Media (Lexington Books, 2016); Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015); Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities (Cambridge UP, 2012); and Space, Place and Power in Modern Russia: Essays in the New Spatial History (University of Northern Illinois Press, 2010).

Introduction

RAGNAR BJÖRK AND THOMAS LUNDÉN

This is an anthology about the man who coined the concept of ‘geopolitics’, the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922). It deals with his ideas about state power and its relations to domestic resources in nature, infrastructure, culture and population. The volume also deals with his relevance for modern-day international affairs as well as the problematic aftermath of his sometimes controversial and enigmatic thoughts. With the renaissance of geopolitics as an object of study in geography, political science, international relations and other disciplines – as well as the fundamental role it plays in the realms of strategy and diplomacy – Kjellén has to some extent already been analysed by scholars, but the existing literature on him remains remarkably limited.

While occasionally referred to in Sweden and abroad (especially in South America), Kjellén was for a long time either forgotten, neglected or misinterpreted. A fair judgement of his political thinking and values was given by political scientist Nils Elvander in a paper (1956) on Kjellén’s inclination towards radical conservatism, and in Elvander’s dissertation (1961) on the conservative ideological debate in Sweden in Kjellén’s time. Both of these are in Swedish. However, neither of them aimed to cover his ‘life and letters’ or his scholarly thinking. An abbreviated copy of Kjellén’s first article mentioning geopolitics in 1899¹ was published in the geographic periodical Ymer (1976/77). A biography based on a collection of Kjellén’s letters has been edited and commented upon by his daughter (Kjellén-Björkquist 1970), also in Swedish.

Although Kjellén was included by Elvander in the 1968 edition of IESS (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences), the first elaborate account of his scholarly ideas was Sven Holdar’s article ‘The Ideal State and the Power of Geography’ (1992), which has been the foundation for further references in political geography and political science in the English-language literature.

The idea to produce a comprehensive anthology sprang up a few years later. In 1996, Japan scholar Bert Edström took the initiative to arrange a symposium about Kjellén at Stockholm University.² Historian Ragnar Björk was involved in producing an anthology based on the symposium, but for several reasons the idea could not be implemented at the time. Several years later it was taken up again, with geographer Thomas Lundén also involved, and the book Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen was published in Swedish (Edström, Björk and Lundén 2014). It was launched at a symposium at Skytteanum, the Political Science department of Uppsala University, where Kjellén had held the very prestigious Skyttean Professorship in Rhetoric and Political Science from 1916 to his death in 1922. Some of the original contributions were updated, while other new ones were added.

The book in Swedish had a slightly different scope to the present one. While Kjellén is mostly known abroad for books and articles translated into German (and from German into other languages), his extensive publishing as a public intellectual – comprising pamphlets, newspaper articles, lectures and reviews in Swedish – cover another and often more biased side of Kjellén’s production. One chapter in Edström, Björk and Lundén (2014), by geographer Claes Göran Alvstam (Alvstam 2014), describes his activities as a (physical) geographer, a role that was forced upon him, but that was, as it turned out, much in line with his interest in nature and cycling as an avid ‘outdoorsman’.³ This role also brought him into contact with canonic German geographers of the time such as Carl Ritter and, above all, Friedrich Ratzel. One of Kjellén’s favourite great powers was the ascendant Japan; and his distinction between Lesefrüchte (learning by reading) and the facts on the ground (studied by visiting an actual location) has been analysed by Bert Edström (Edström 2014). By contrast, the British Empire was initially seen by Kjellén as a doomed power that would be overcome by the United States, Japan and Germany. But this was a question about which he had already changed his mind before the Great War. Kjellén’s very strong disavowal of the British in the war against the Boers in South Africa (which he made with little reference to African peoples) is described by Gundel Söderholm and Jan Gunnar Rosenblad (Rosenblad and Söderholm 2014; Söderholm and Rosenblad 2014) in two chapters in the Swedish anthology Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen. All the other contributions

are, in revised form, included in the present anthology, together with some new essays.

Kjellén as an Activist

In the present anthology, the focus is on Kjellén’s scholarly achievements, on geopolitics, and on his analysis of the great powers. It concentrates on his scholarly production; thus, his role as a ‘radical activist’ in parliament and in Swedish domestic debates, is only mentioned in relation to his geopolitical scholarship. He always wavered between an exclusive Swedish nationalism unconcerned with irredenta (primarily Swedish speakers in Finland) and a globalist perspective. This volume, however, only briefly mentions his combination of activism and conservatism; his sceptical attitude, at the time, towards a democratic and parliamentary polity; gender equality; his alleged xenophobia and antisemitism; and his evolution on some of these questions.

A part of Kjellén’s activism in the years leading up to the First World War was his juxtaposition of ‘the ideas of 1789’ and ‘the ideas of 1914’. In his account, the former had exhausted their emancipatory power and relevance, and now a more sombre attitude towards the present, emphasizing duty and national unity, was due. This also reflected his philosophy of history, in which the pendulum swings between expansion and concentration, and between liberalism and a conservatism whose most urgent concern was protecting gains and buckling up for hard times.

Kjellén’s Interpretation of Geopolitics

Kjellén’s interpretation of geopolitics will be analysed in many of the contributions in this volume. Among its key aspects are the following:

• For Kjellén, geopolitics is both a (sub-)discipline of political science and, on occasion, a strategy used by political actors. While he typically focused on the object, he at times argued for a specific foreign policy.

• While geopolitics can be studied semantically and pursued at all levels of territorial regulation and domination, Kjellén concentrates on the nation-state and, to some extent, on groups of states, while downplaying subordinate categories such as provinces and municipalities. But in an important sense he differed from conventional geopolitical studies of later years in not treating these nation-states as unchanging units. He rather included internal aspects such as resources, demographics and so on in evaluating the great powers and their abilities to act in the international arena.

• States are seen as driven by their natural and cultural endowments and their geopolitical situation. Individual statesmen and their impact on politics are given little attention by Kjellén.

• Kjellén frequently refers to the state as an organism with stages of birth, growth and death. To the extent this is more than a metaphor, it regards the nation-state’s involvement in struggle against other nation-states, and the need to exert willpower in this struggle. While Kjellén concentrates on the ‘expansivist’ and even antagonistic pursuit of geopolitics, the concept of geopolitics is not in itself tied to expansion and conflict.

Geopolitics is only one of Kjellén’s categories of the exertion of power, and it is part of an array of different factors that influence each other in an ever-changing mix of influences. These include natural resources, technology, demography, economics and governance. Regarding the last, great powers may have very different polities and still be competent and powerful. Democracy (exemplified by ‘England’, like many of his contemporaries, he refers to Great Britain as

‘England’ and the Netherlands as ‘Holland’) is only one among several types of authority. Others are the centralized state (as seen in France), federalism (as in the United States) and ‘caesarianism’ (as witnessed by Czarist Russia). His concentration on geopolitics is motivated by what he sees as a lack of spatial consciousness among political scientists and insufficient awareness of political science among geographers of his era (with the remarkable exception of his primary inspiration, Friedrich Ratzel).

A Biased and Skewed Reputation

As mentioned, despite the renaissance of geopolitics as an object of study and as an approach to diplomacy and strategy in international affairs, Kjellén has been peculiarly absent from most studies of the topic. German scholarship was for a long time obsessed with the disastrous use of the concepts of Lebensraum and Geopolitik by the Haushofer school (until 1935 admiringly referring to Kjellén), only recently modified by the insight that other, and even darker, interests guided the Nazi regime. In Anglo-Saxon and French scholarship – based on the few accounts available in English, and with some remarkable exceptions – Kjellén has been either neglected or misunderstood. This is also true of Ratzel. Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan are very often named as the forerunners of a territorial strategic analysis. But these geographers with a military background mainly looked at territorial and naval space as a means to dominance,⁴ while Ratzel analysed the content of territorial resources and related it to the state and its power. Kjellén organized Ratzel’s rather eclectic findings into a more systematic inventory.

Outline of the Book

This anthology is arranged in sequence from ‘life’ to ‘letters’ to ‘concepts’, and finally to ‘reception’. The ‘letters’ chapters are loosely related to the development of Kjellén’s scholarly production, from his first article on

geopolitics to his last edition of The Great Powers and its legacy. The first chapter, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: Academic, Publicist, Politician’ by Björk, Edström and Lundén, sketches his life line from a rather insignificant position at a small urban university college in Gothenburg to a prestigious position at Sweden’s oldest university in Uppsala. He was the inventor of the concept of geopolitics, which is the theme of the present volume, but in his hopes for Sweden’s future he also used the word folkhem, ‘the people’s home’, which was later used and partly implemented by his adversaries, the Social Democrats. His neologism ‘nationell socialism’ went on to have a very different legacy. Kjellén actually meant the goal of and an expression of the political striving for a folkhem, but the term would go on to be used by others with discriminatory and totalitarian connotations. The chapter also examines the character of Kjellén’s scientific approach and his personality as a scholar.

Kjellén would be remembered by posterity as an exceptional figure, both in his political opinions and in his academic writing. As demonstrated by Ragnar Björk in Chapter 2, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: The Swedish Intellectual and Political Context’, in Kjellén’s time the three spheres of scholarship, politics, and public debate were all dominated by a rather learned and cautious mindset, so although he had much in common with his colleagues in his ‘professorial conservatism’, his much more radical, maverick approach in all areas gradually alienated him from his peers. Also, with his vision of a ‘people’s home’ with a collective structure and a nationalist footing, he was increasingly out of touch with the rising interest in social engineering techniques, which would be realized by others in the interwar years. On the whole, he was more of a ‘continental’ type of scholar – had he lived in Germany, he might have been a Kathedersozialist.

Kjellén’s first publication after studies at Uppsala University was his 1899 article on Sweden’s international boundaries, in which he defined the concept of ‘geopolitics’. In Chapter 3, ‘Sweden’s Borders: Kjellén’s Contribution to Social Science by Defining and Applying Geopolitics’, Alvstam and Lundén review his cross-disciplinary scrutiny of borders, starting from a traditional historical analysis of their legal underpinnings, but ending in a geopolitical evaluation of the strength of the line separating Sweden from its neighbours, with a number of comparisons to other borders across the world.

Kjellén’s breakthrough as a scholar came with the first edition of Stormakterna [The Great Powers] in 1905. Ragnar Björk’s contribution, Chapter 4 on ‘Kjellén’s Great Power Studies: The Editions’, follows Kjellén through three editions of the book, allowing the reader to understand how his analysis and methodologies changed over time, comparing documents simultaneously in an almost ‘online’ fashion. In the following chapter, ‘Kjellén’s Great Power Studies: Examining Germany, USA, Russia, Japan’ (Chapter 5), Björk shows how Kjellén in a Landeskunde manner digs into the essence of ‘great powers’, meaning both the concept itself and its instantiation in the actual powers, which after the turn of the century numbered eight. Kjellén’s analyses of four great powers are analysed here in detail. Across editions, Kjellén unsentimentally allows the rise of the United States and Japan to affect and correct his provisional analysis of the relevant features of a great power – as, later, global war would as well.

Kjellén’s second ‘hit’, at least in the German-speaking world, was Staten som lifsform [The state as a form of life], published in Swedish in 1916 and in German the year after. This was an attempt to claim geopolitics for an activated and redefined political science. In the preface he declares his goal as a scholar: to produce a unified theory of the state as a political system. But in spite of this, his way of thinking was still very much inspired by Ratzel, as underlined in Thomas Lundén’s review in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, Lundén shows that, contrary to Ratzel, Kjellén puts his examples within a theoretical framework and widens the scope of his analysis by including new features of an active state and its relation to the nation (as an ‘imagined community’) and its members. His view of the state as an organism, one with willpower, is a metaphor for its evershifting power and extension, its life and death under changing governance.

The Great War was seen by Kjellén as a possible, perhaps probable, outcome of the contradicting interests of the great powers. In Chapter 7, ‘Kjellén and the First World War’ by Gunnar Falkemark, three questions are in focus: What caused the outbreak of the war? Which values were at stake in the trial of different states’ strength? How can the outcome be explained? According to

Kjellén, the different sides of the war represented different values. Countries like ‘England’ and France were inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution: freedom, equality and fraternity. But these values had exhausted their progressive potential. Germany represented order, justice and duty, ideas that better served the harsher needs of the present. Thus, Germany’s time had come. Kjellén’s sympathies were totally with Germany, and its defeat was a shock to him. He sees the American intervention in the war as decisive. He does not credit the outcome to the resource strength of the United States, but rather to American idealism and their belief in democracy.

One example of extreme vulnerability in the balance of power in the first decades of the twentieth century is given by Carl Marklund in Chapter 8, ‘The Small Game in the Shadow of the Great Game: Kjellénian Biopolitics between Constructivism and Realism’, in which he analyses Kjellén’s thoughts on the peripheral ‘in-between’ state (i.e. Sweden) in terms of its relations with the great powers, and its chances for gaining a foothold in regional commerce and culture. Kjellén’s conclusion in 1912 was that nearby Russia, especially its Baltic provinces, were the most susceptible to, as it were, a ‘soft’ Swedish influence.

In Chapter 9, ‘Discourse, Identity and Territoriality’, Ola Tunander analyses Kjellén’s thinking about a European federation of states. Kjellén’s version of geopolitics, with its understanding of the state in organic terms, was an attempt to treat the state as an independent object of study with its own dynamics and internal logic, political power and will, and a unity of land and people. This stood in sharp contrast to the Anglo-Saxon conception of geopolitics, which had a technological and geostrategic focus. Kjellén turned to the German cosmopolitan tradition with its multicultural unity and its drive towards a European league of states, meaning a union that would respect the freedom and independence of states while placing leadership in the hands of a central power. His description of this union is practically identical to what would later become NATO – but for Kjellén it was Germany, not the United States, that was expected to accept this leadership role.

The subject of Chapter 10, ‘Rudolf Kjellén’s Intellectual Impact in Latin America’ by Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, was mediated by domestic geographers and political scientists, often of German origin, and especially in Brazil. In Latin America, Kjellén is usually referred to in connection with Ratzel; but there have been more recent comparisons to Gramsci, who read descriptions of Kjellén’s thought in Italian geographical journals.

Kjellén died in 1922. In Chapter 11, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy: A Story of Divergent Interpretations’, Thomas Lundén explores this legacy, with a focus on the European and American use and misuse of his ideas. Kjellén’s last German edition of The Great Powers, was reprinted and ‘revised’ by Karl Haushofer, who continued appropriating his work until around 1934, after which Kjellén (and to an extent Haushofer as well) disappeared from the Nazi German discourse. With a few exceptions and for entirely different reasons, Kjellén also disappeared from Swedish social science. After the Second World War, occasional articles have dealt seriously with Kjellén’s scholarship, whereas most references in the English language refer to him at best as the inventor of the concept of geopolitics, ignoring his global vision and his criticism of capitalism and laissez-faire liberal democracy, which partly resembles the critique in recent work on ‘critical geopolitics’ of ‘neo-liberalism’.

Kjellén – an Actor in Multiple Domains

Kjellén was active within several different spheres: as a scholar, as a public figure and commentator on contemporary issues, and as a practising politician with a mandate in parliament. This anthology focuses on his academic writing related to geopolitics and great power relations, but his other activities have to be considered in order to understand his worldview. He was a political scientist, but his scholarly activities and his teaching assignments spanned a number of different disciplines. Besides widening his own discipline towards a much broader definition of political science in a way that had not been done before, advocating it to be the social science, he worked on problems within history, geography (even including physical geography; see Alvstam 2014), social

anthropology, international relations and comparative historical sociology. The diverse contributors to this book mirror this interdisciplinarity.

In the Swedish context, Kjellén is not recognized as a pioneer, but he stands out internationally as one of the forerunners of geopolitical studies. After his death, books on geopolitics almost ceased to be published in Sweden, but on the European continent the topic remained of interest, and his reputation as a trailblazing scholar of international politics and as the father of geopolitics was not questioned – even if it was often misunderstood. Geopolitics has lately witnessed a revival both as a concept and as an activity; it is often associated with cynical and aggressive power plays, a diplomacy of threats and bullying, and periodic pressure to redraw national borders. This book is an attempt to elucidate the scholarly contributions of its progenitor, contributions that qualify him as a pioneer in his fields of study and a figure of ongoing international interest.

Acknowledgements

The editors gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies, Stockholm, in the preparation of this collection.

Ragnar Björk is a retired associate professor of history from Uppsala University and is now affiliated with Södertörn University. His research is mainly concerned with ‘research on research’, with the history of historiography and the social sciences, the history of science, including the Nobel Prize, and also modern political history. He graduated at Uppsala in 1983 with a dissertation on explanatory techniques – including narration and colligation – among historians, and was awarded the Geijer Prize for best historical dissertation. Since then, he has conducted a number of research projects on those same themes. Some of his latest publications are:

‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1) (2016); ‘Voluntarismens väg: Och något om Rudolf Kjellén som producent av helhetskunskap om samhället’, in Erik Nydahl and Jonas Harvard (eds), Den nya staten: Ideologi och samhällsförändring kring sekelskiftet 1900 (Nordic Academic Press, 2016); Thorsten Halling, Ragnar Björk, Heiner Fangerau and Nils Hansson, ‘Leopoldina: Ein Netzwerk für künftige Nobelpreisträger für Physiologie oder Medizin?’, Sudhoffs Archiv 102 (2018), X.

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University. His latest book is Pommern: ett gränsfall i tid och rum [Pomerania: A border case in time and space] (Lund University, 2016), and his earlier scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, for example: ‘Geopolitics and Religion: A Mutual and Conflictual Relationship. Spatial Regulation of Creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology / Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25(2) (July 2015); ‘Border Twin Cities in the Baltic Area: Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’, in John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova (eds), Twin Cities: Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time (Routledge, 2019); and ‘Turning towards the Inland Sea? Swedish “Soft Diplomacy” towards the Baltic Soviet Republics before Independence’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/03468755.2021.1896576.

Notes

1. For a review of this article, see Alvstam and Lundén, ‘Sweden’s Borders’, this volume.

2. Kjellén had published the book Den stora Orienten [The big Orient] in 1911

after a trip to Japan that took him around the world.

3. About his field research within geography, see Alvstam 2014.

4. The Mahan expert John H. Maurer has, in a recent article, pointed at other (often neglected) faces of Mahan’s scholarship, very much in line with Kjellén’s realist views on international relations. See Maurer 2017.

References

Alvstam, Claes-Göran. 2014. ‘Kjellén som geograf’ [Kjellén as a geographer], in Edström, Björk and Lundén (eds), Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen. [Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitics and Conservatism]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 55–81.

Edström, Bert. 2014. ‘Resan till drömlandet – Japan’ [Journey to the dreamland – Japan], in B. Edström, R. Björk and T. Lundén (eds), Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen. [Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitics and Conservatism]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 122–45.

Edström, Bert, Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén (eds). 2014. Rudolf Kjellén Geopolitiken och konservatismen. [Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitics and Conservatism]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg.

Elvander, Nils. 1956. ‘Rudolf Kjellén och nationalsocialismen’ [Rudolf Kjellén and National Socialism], Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 59: 15–41.

———. 1961. ‘Harald Hjärne och konservatismen: Konservativ idédebatt i Sverige 1865–1922’[Harald Hjärne and Conservatism: Conservative debate of ideas in Sweden 1865–1922]. Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala 42. Uppsala.

Holdar, Sven. 1992. ‘The Ideal State and the Power of Geography’, Political Geography Quarterly 11(3): 307–23.

Kjellén, Rudolf. (1976/77) 1899. ‘Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser’[Studies on the political borders of Sweden], Ymer 19: 283–331, in abridged form in Ymer Årsbok 1976/77, 69–80, with a comment by Thomas Lundén.

———. 1911. Den stora Orienten: resestudier i österväg [The Great Orient: Travel studies heading Eastwards]. Gothenburg: Åhlen & Åkerlund.

Kjellén-Björkquist, Ruth. 1970. Rudolf Kjellén: En människa i tiden kring sekelskiftet I–II [Rudolf Kjellén: An individual in the time of the turn of the century. I–II]. Stockholm: Verbum.

Maurer, John H. 2017. ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitics and Grand Strategy’, in Kurt Almqvist, Alexander Linklater and Andrew Mackenzie (eds), The Return of Geopolitics. Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, 111– 22.

Rosenblad, Jan Gunnar, and Gundel Söderholm. 2014. ‘Nationalisten och

boerbeundraren’ [The nationalist and Boer admirer], in B. Edström, R. Björk and T. Lundén (eds), Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen. [Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitics and Conservatism]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 244–77.

Söderholm, Gundel, and Jan Gunnar Rosenblad. 2014. ‘Han tvivlade på det brittiska imperiet’ [He mistrusted the British Empire], in B. Edström, R. Björk and T. Lundén (eds), Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen [Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitics and Conservatism]. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 100–121.

CHAPTER 1

Rudolf Kjellén

Academic, Publicist, Politician

RAGNAR BJÖRK, BERT EDSTRÖM AND THOMAS LUNDÉN

Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) had a remarkable career. With his concept of geopolitics, and his approach to understanding the workings of the great powers, he had an academic impact that was greater outside his native Sweden than on his native soil. This chapter attempts a characterization of his work, partly by following the different steps he took over the course of his life.

Kjellén was a vicar’s son from Torsö, an island in Lake Vänern in south central Sweden, and he soon showed signs of intellectual promise. After his senior high school examination (Abitur) at the early age of 16, he pursued academic studies at Uppsala University. After a Bachelor of Arts in 1883 he studied political science under Oscar Alin (1846–1900), with whom Kjellén would later collaborate. In 1890 he presented his doctoral thesis ‘Studier rörande ministeransvarigheten’ [Studies concerning ministerial responsibility], a comparative study encompassing several European states, and he was appointed ‘docent’ (earning lecture right) in the same year. In 1891 he was employed as a teacher of political science at the newly founded Gothenburg University College,¹ and the following year his assignment also included geography. This enlargement of his responsibilities was to have fundamental importance for his scholarly activity. In 1901 he was appointed professor of political science at the college (Alvstam 2014; see also Alvstam and Lundén, ‘Sweden’s Borders’, this volume).

In addition to his increased teaching, Kjellén’s research combined speculative theory and empirical knowledge, which likewise forced him to broaden his perspective. At his desk in front of increasingly overloaded bookshelves he pondered over the forces that govern world politics. He carefully followed the specialist literature published on the continent, particularly in Germany. His findings and conclusions were reported in the 1905 book Stormakterna [The Great Powers] (see Björk’s two chapters on ‘Kjellén’s Great Power Studies’, this

volume), which gave him a reputation as an analyst of international politics. His international visibility was assured the next year when the editors of the sixth edition of Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon (Meyer 1905), a twentyvolume encyclopedia that sold 240,000 sets, took notice of this professor at a local Swedish university. They did so in spite of his relative youth and the fact that he did not have the same gravitas as the learned men who held venerable seats at Uppsala and Lund. Kjellén was described in the Lexikon as a legal scholar, geographer and author of a number of publications on the history of law and of geography; his numerous contributions to the conservative press were also reported. At least eight works by him had by then been published in German. Kjellén had thus, a few years into the twentieth century, won a place and a voice as somewhat of a European intellectual.

In Sweden, Kjellén became associated with a group of prominent professors who were active as politicians, promoting a so-called ‘professorial conservatism’ (Björk 2014: 278–312 and Björk, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: The Swedish Intellectual and Political Context’, this volume). He was, on the one hand, the academic who dispassionately analysed the foundations of world politics, and on the other, the fiery orator and eloquent writer who decried the decay of the present with a sharpened pencil. As a scholar he studied older Swedish legal history, ministerial responsibility, the impeachment institute, and the constitution of 1809, but he also approached the great questions of the day such as the break-up of the Swedish–Norwegian Union as well as the then-acute problem of emigration. He was a controversial debater with radically conservative opinions who also made bold statements of progressive activism. In Gothenburg he was member of an informal group of scholars and activists, the Young Right, which was more politically engaged than the establishment conservatives of the Uppsala– Stockholm circles. Considering Kjellén’s restless activity, it is not surprising that he decided to engage in practical politics. He was a member of the Second Chamber of the Riksdag (parliament) in 1905–8 and of the First Chamber in 1911–17, but his contribution to the work of the Riksdag was more as a source of inspiration and as a speaker than as a direct implementer of policies. In her biography based on a collection of his letters, his daughter testified to his disappointment that his ‘scientifically based’ ideas were not taken seriously in the Riksdag (Kjellén-Björkquist 1970 I: 55). In 1916 he was called upon to take up the prestigious position of Skyttean Professor of Rhetoric and Government at Uppsala University. Established in 1622, it is probably the oldest chair of

political science in the world. His elevation was fully in line with the views of his many admirers. Not only was he the most internationally renowned Swedish political scientist, but as a gifted orator he was one of the very few who could properly occupy a chair that was defined in terms of both political science and rhetoric.

Kjellén was a type of political scientist rarely seen after his death in 1922. His successor as the Skyttean professor, Axel Brusewitz (1881–1950) specialized in problems of constitutional history, especially contemporary problems, and constitutional legal analyses of political institutions. He embraced a methodology with a rather narrow time range, reading the sources scrupulously. He did not hesitate to abolish geopolitics as part of the political science curriculum as pursued at Uppsala University (Lewin 1985: 188). Breaking the ‘Kjellénian experiment’ was imperative for him, as he regarded Kjellén’s theory of the state as ‘nothing less than a threat to political science as a science’ (Brusewitz 1945: 23).

Kjellén as a Scholar

Kjellén was a versatile researcher. His many-sided interests made him, as his disciple Georg Andrén described it, ‘an observer of the new tendencies within governmental life’ (Andrén 1932). Kjellén’s conclusion was that the fevered developments in the areas of foreign, colonial, economic and social politics demanded ‘a new political science’, one that was to be the social science. The state was the centre of his interests, but it had to be seen in the context of all the expressions of a living society. As described by Kjellén in the book that he considered his best, Staten som lifsform [The State as a form of life] (for a survey of it, see Lundén, ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography’, this volume), the conventional understanding within academia was essentially that ‘the state [is], primarily and principally, a legal entity; what constitutes its status is the constitution and nothing more; knowledge regarding the state will consequently be a pure and exclusive knowledge of the constitution’ (Kjellén 1916). He cites the German legal scholar Conrad Bornhak, who stated in his Allgemeine

Staatslehre that the state ‘shall not be construed by reason but grasped empirically’ (Bornhak 1896). His mission, then, was to change the direction of political science, to broaden it to include the realities of political life. Based on his observations, Kjellén formulated a historical theory that described a movement from autocracy via constitutionalism to democracy and back to autocracy (Kjellén 1916: 155ff).²

One aspect, among others, of Kjellén’s empirical principle, is to observe states operating on the international scene. Kjellén then adds another idea: politics ‘is not only an aggregate of legal letters and historical facts and statistical measure, but above all a life’ (Kjellén 1905: vii). States, ‘as we follow them in history and in reality have to move within them, are sensual-reasonable creatures’ (Kjellén 1916: 27). Kjellén saw them as ‘supra-individual lives, as real as private individuals, only incommensurably greater and more powerful’ (Kjellén 1916: 30). They have personalities and can be regarded as ‘great lives, supra-individual personalities, full of life’s instincts for better and for worse, proud, honourloving and selfish, but no one like the other’ (Kjellén 1915b: 7).

Based on observations from international politics, Kjellén interprets and notes: ‘These states speak and act, sit together at congresses or fight on the battlefields, lure and flee each other, help and upset each other, like other living creatures in communality’ (Kjellén 1915b: 30f). Kjellén obviously interprets these activities as outcomes of the states’ property of being ‘individuals’.

Looking at the political game played by states, Kjellén, in a sense, looked also at its performative and journalistic dimensions, not only formal diplomacy. He writes in Staten som lifsform that the game played between countries offers ‘opportunities for collating with reality’. One might add that it is apparently not so much ‘reality’ reflected here, because his focus is really on ‘expressions in the press’, in newspapers and periodicals. So, what he is actually studying is not the nature of the states but, as he himself says, ‘the general contemporary perception of the nature of the performing parties’ (Kjellén 1916: 17–19, 27).

Ideas of competition between states, or of powers as living organisms fighting for their survival, are implicitly tied to warfare. In Kjellén’s eyes, competition between territorial states is a tool for natural selection. Although not a militarist or a military man, in the sense of being familiar with weaponry and the battlefield, he could idealize the hardship that warfare would entail, as a means of toughening and teaching populations and individuals (Kjellén 1915a: 32, 42, 49, 51). The barbarism of the First World War, however, led Kjellén to still his penchant for activist foreign policy towards the end of his life, and he began to emphasize the suffering and destruction that followed in the aftermath of war (Elvander 1961: 266).

Three Key Concepts

Rudolf Kjellén was an unusual academic. Searching at random in his publications, whether journalistic, essayistic or scientific, one can easily spot what his contemporaries, including his opponents, characterized as shimmering metaphors and suggestive associations.³ He was a linguistic innovator with a talent for identifying important contemporary phenomena. Conceptual neologisms were part of Kjellén’s ingenuity. Three of them became common and are still used today: geopolitics, folkhem (people’s home) and ‘national socialism’. However, the legacies of these concepts would turn out to be extremely different from one another.

Geopolitik – Geopolitics

Kjellén introduced geopolitics as a concept and as an area of research in the essay ‘Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser’ [Studies on Sweden’s political borders] in the geographical journal Ymer (Kjellén 1899: 283; see Alvstam and Lundén, ‘Sweden’s Borders’, this volume).⁴ This approach came out of his scholarly activity as a political scientist cum geographer. The idea of geopolitics

was close at hand. At the time, the frequency of geographic explorations since the mid-nineteenth century – attempts to reach the poles or venture into the ‘heart of darkness’ – was approaching its zenith. Ship and railway builders, politicians, military personnel, and imperialists alike were looking at maps and thinking in terms of territory. Kjellén’s use of the concept, as a method for getting at key conditions and resources on the ground, gave the concept of geopolitics a lasting and often acute relevance in diplomacy and international politics. It is today an established approach within the study of foreign policy, strategy, and international relations. In many ways this speaks to Kjellén’s international reputation – even though in some circles, including academic ones and particularly within ‘critical geopolitics’, the term is mainly understood as an ideology of territorial expansion.

Geopolitics as defined by Kjellén is an amalgamation of geography and politics. It is ‘the theory of the state as a geographical organism and phenomenon in space’ (Kjellén 1916: 39). This concept is one of the five categories he uses for his analysis of the state: riket (geopolitik) [politics of the realm], rikshushållet (ekopolitik) [political economy], folket (demopolitik) [demographic politics], folk-samhället (sociopolitik) [social policy] and statsregementet (kratopolitik) [legal and constitutional politics]. Correspondingly, he used five domains in analysing countries: geographical, ethnic, economic, social and legal. A country was assessed in each of these domains with a combination of material and abstract indicators. The significant impact of geopolitics in this assessment led Kjellén’s followers to treat it as the most important category, but he opposed this approach. According to him, geopolitics does not have an exceptional position; his entire analytical apparatus has to be used in analysing a state (Kjellén 1918a). Kjellén makes demographic and political-economic politics a part of geopolitics in a wider sense. But the concept of geopolitics specifically proved to be powerful enough to live on apart from other concepts he proposed.

Kjellén is also guided by a philosophy of history: actors on the international scene have to take into account that history is determined by an oscillation between expansion and contraction, between liberalism and regulation. But within these overarching cycles, the foreign policies of states are to a large extent determined by their geography and topography, including space (the

character of a territory), location (where on the globe it can be found), and borders and other boundaries. To these factors are added natural resources, demographic distribution, and so on.

For Kjellén, certain states are forced by geopolitical realities to pursue expansion (Kjellén 1916: 122f). A great power is defined as having an expansive orientation and actively pursuing political power; its essence comprises the ambition to grow and change the status quo (Kjellén 1914: 157–58). Kjellén presents illuminating examples in Staten som lifsform:

Vigorous states that are spatially confined have a categorical political imperative to broaden their space through colonization, political union or conquests of different kinds. This has been the case with England and in more recent times with Japan and Germany: as can be seen, there is no gratuitous conquest, but natural and necessary growth for the sake of the self-preservation instinct. (Kjellén 1916: 67)

Later in his discussion Kjellén invokes Mitteleuropa, whether in the smaller form of Germany–Austria–Hungary or, even better, a larger one including the Levant. ‘Here we see a complex of states, or a block of states, satisfying spatial demands’ (Kjellén 1916: 67). His geopolitical approach seemed to legitimize great-power expansionism, and earned him several adherents, not least in countries like Germany and Japan, whose expansion could be taken as an implementation of the idea of Lebensraum (the United States, though, had no such organic need for imperialist expansion). Lebensraum, or ‘life space’, was a concept that Kjellén can be said to have anticipated in his discussion of autarky but it was never fully developed. Ratzel, often seen as the originator of the concept, used it only in the biological sense of a habitat in his Politische Geographie (Ratzel 1897), which influenced Kjellén’s approach to academic geography.⁵ For Kjellén, ‘autarky’ is a state’s economic self-sufficiency, and is one of the most important concepts in his theory of geopolitics. Achieving autarky, preferably within existing borders, is the ultimate goal of a great power, making itself independent of all other states.

Folkhemmet – the People’s Home

Perhaps the most interesting political-ideological concept associated with Kjellén is folkhem, or ‘the people’s home’, which he used in a 1912 exchange with the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Hjalmar Branting (1860–1925), and the same year in an article that would later be published in one of his essay collections. Kjellén writes: ‘One thing is sure: only on its own ground can Sweden be founded as the happy people’s home that it is destined to become’ (Kjellén 1915a: 56).⁷ Folkhemmet was not a concept invented by him, but he adopted it in order to capture the idea of a national community (see Björck 2000).

Kjellén died in 1922. Six years later, the leader of the Social Democratic Party and later prime minister of Sweden, Per Albin Hansson (1885–1946) used ‘folkhemmet’ in a famous speech in the Riksdag. Here, the word hem, ‘home’, can be interpreted as implying both a dwelling and a family, in a way that helped to give Sweden a lasting association with safety and community. The concept was further popularized and promoted by Hansson without his mentioning its origins in nineteenth-century Germany. Today it is often still ascribed to Kjellén, even by Social Democrats.

Ultimately it is not possible to determine exactly how this concept was transferred from one person to another. It would be hard for Social Democratic leaders to admit that Hansson was influenced by a Conservative such as Kjellén in matters of domestic politics. The word had been used before, both in Sweden and Germany. The copy of Kjellén’s book found in the Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek [Swedish labour movement’s archive and library] bears a dedication from the author to Erik Hedén (1875–1925), who was a Social Democrat, editor of the party newspaper, and strongly anti-German during the Great War. It is thus clear that this concept spread among the Social Democrats, not only Hjalmar Branting. However, the folkhem ideology pursued by Hansson was built on an idea of national concord resembling Kjellén’s vision.⁸

Nationell Socialism – National Socialism

Contrary to the Social Democrats, Kjellén wanted the Young Right movement to pursue democracy on a national basis. Also unlike the Social Democrats, he did not call for a parliamentary system (Nilsson 2002: 86). However, the ‘national democracy’ he proposed did not take hold. In that sense it differs from another one of his concepts, national socialism. Combining socialism with nationalism, although not unheard of, was still provocative, especially as Kjellén was an arch-nationalist and therefore an explicit opponent of the kind of socialism that had an internationalist foundation. He stated: ‘This is the social idea as such; socialist praxis has corrupted it because of its focus on class. Is it so difficult to understand that one can sympathize with the first [the social idea] without choosing the latter [class interests], and believe in the future of the first at the expense of the latter?’ (Kjellén 1914: 22).

Kjellén seized upon what he saw as the real ‘ideas of socialism’, not their particular use by what he called ‘a class egoistic party’. When ‘national socialism’ later acquired a totally different and alarming meaning, which it retains to this day, it did not do Kjellén’s reputation much good.

The relation between Kjellén and Nazism has been most thoroughly discussed by the political scientist Nils Elvander (1928–2006). His judgement is that Kjellén’s view on race is not at all consonant with the Nazi one (Elvander 1956). One of the fundamental dogmas of Nazism is the significance of race and the supremacy of the ‘Aryan race’, but Kjellén categorically dismissed the idea of pure races. He approvingly cites Ernest Renan: ‘The truth is that there is no pure race – building politics on an ethnographic analysis is a chimera’ (Kjellén 1916: 86ff). Kjellén was not perceived or categorized as an antisemite. ‘It should be noted’, he wrote in 1917, ‘that the domestic Jews, as in the whole in the West, do not make a national distinction; their assimilation into the body of people proceeds calmly and lightly, and there are hardly any signs of antisemitic movements’ (Kjellén 1917: 92; see also Kjellén 1916: 114).¹

It was devastating to Kjellén’s legacy that he coined ‘national socialism’, as the disgust with the Nazis attached itself to his work.¹¹ He did not embrace National Socialist anti-intellectualism or their celebration of acts of violence. He advocated that a stern, patriarchal (‘manly’) ethic and a hardening of the mind be cultivated in the people of a nation, implicitly in order to attain the dedication and willpower necessary to survive in a competitive and demanding world. The ‘ideas of 1914’ – roughly order, duty, and national cohesion – were designed to be an alternative to ‘the ideas of 1789’, a contrast that he eloquently developed in a book in German in 1915 (Kjellén 1915c). Together with anti-liberalism, anti-capitalism and corporativism, they belong to the cluster of ideas that became associated with the radical right in Kjellén’s times, as well as to some extent the emergent fascist movement. Traces of these ideas are also partly shared by modern leftist critics of ‘neo-liberalism’. Several of the ideas have also been adopted by today’s populist parties.

Kjellén’s Methodological Convictions and His Aims as a Scholar

The Objectivist

Kjellén never tried to obfuscate his intentions as a scholar. In one of his letters, he says that he tries ‘to order and clean everything in the chaos that is prevalent in my science; and during this ordering of the small and on the periphery, the great ordering also eventually grows; in other words, the system will elevate political science to independence. This is what Linnaeus accomplished in botany and Berzelius in chemistry’ (Kjellén-Björkquist 1970 II: 242).¹² When he wrote a book at the end of his life endeavouring to give a description of the land and people of Sweden, he stated that he aspired to conduct his analysis using a rigorous system that covered all directions of inquiry (Kjellén 1917: Förord [Preface]). He wrote about the weight he assigned to ‘objective facts’, and that he saw himself as a ‘seeker of truth in its objective form’ (Kjellén-Björkquist

1970 II: 66).¹³

Kjellén emphasized the importance of situating facts in their context in order to understand them. ‘To scour the environment, survey the scene in which daily events play out, trace their roots in the past; this will … be the scientist’s method’ (Kjellén 1905: 3). Kjellén often preferred to talk about ‘the scientist’, invoking a natural scientist’s methodological rigour, rather than ‘the scholar’, in the sense of a learned individual working in the human sciences.

Kjellén’s demand for objectivity was, of course, also relevant for the study of international politics. He asserted that he depicted the world ‘as it is’,¹⁴ examining the merciless struggle between nations (Elvander 1961: 273). In his self-conception, ‘truth-loving sober realism’ guided his conception of the state, an ideal derived from Leopold von Ranke’s essay Die großen Mächte (1833). He had adopted ‘something of the biologist’s respect for life as it is, independent of the humanitarian ideals of the individual. It does not judge; it is content with observing and trying to understand’ (Kjellén 1915b: 7). However, Kjellén’s ‘objective facts’ are often combined with subjective evaluations. Elvander maintains that Kjellén’s scholarly analyses and political propaganda are ‘indissolubly interlaced in his publications’ (Elvander 1956: 16).

Kjellén was conscious of the importance of a scholar not allowing his own values to guide the analysis. At the same time, he was aware of the difficulty of living up to this ideal. Here, some similarities with the Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) can be discerned. It was Myrdal who, early on and perhaps as deeply as anyone, grappled with the problem of objectivity. In the 1920s Myrdal was a very convinced ‘objectivist’, but after his visit to the United States on a Laura Spelman Memorial scholarship in 1929–30, he turned around, and began to emphasize instead the ‘rule of bias’. His ‘solution’ to this was that scholars should, before discussing their subject, declare their politicalideological identity or convictions (Myrdal 1969; 1982). This, however, was an approach that Kjellén did not embrace. Whereas Myrdal wanted to handle bias by guiding the reader, Kjellén merely acknowledged it as a dilemma.

In spite of Kjellén’s understanding of the importance of not allowing values to influence the analysis, he himself demonstrated an inclination to embrace divergent values – one by him as an individual, another as a scholar.¹⁵ In 1915, after the Great War had started, he declared: ‘Amica Germania, sed magis amica veritas! [Germany is my friend, but truth is a better friend!] (Kjellén 1915b: 10).¹ Even in the final stage of the war he sided with Germany and wrote that as a Swede he had to side with the power that fought against Russia (Kjellén 1918b). In the aftermath of the war he admitted that his ‘belief in the German resilience in the World War’ was a mistake (Kjellén 1920: 5).

The Globalist

Kjellén’s theoretical works are characterized by a strong element of systematization. Irrespective of the inherent value of these systems, he is seen today as a precursor of what he termed the ‘planetarian’ approach. He had come to the conclusion that the world had to be studied as a ‘terrestrial unit’ with natural and cultural diversity; in this he was inspired by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, ‘the founder of political geography as a scholarly discipline’ (Kjellén 1900: 9).

One trend observed by Kjellén was that of globalization. According to Kjellén, although the history of the world had previously been studied as a case of ‘Europe being the site of world history, now the site has grown to become the world’ (Kjellén 1914: 153). In this contemporary interlaced system, according to Kjellén, the economy plays a dictatorial role: ‘It is economic interest, it is commerce that embraces the world, and its demands have lately, under the name of culture and the warranty of canons, become dictatorial. … The planetary situation is … created in the spirit of subordination, not equality. The development towards the unity of mankind has been organically linked to the development of great powers, at the expense of the small ones’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 14–16).

The Prognosticator

Kjellén asserted that general models can be used for making prognoses (Lewin 1972: 24). With the view that the scientist’s task is to investigate the laws of statehood, and of the relations between the great powers, he argued that one could ‘lift … the veil of the future’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 23). By analysing the preconditions for state action, a scholar can discover and sketch out possible developments. But he did not rely on the actions by particular statesmen. Regarding Germany he noticed one must identify the opportunities existing for the growth of Germany as a world power in the constitutional arena, and the particular preconditions that are required (Kjellén 1915b: 173). Almost to the end of his life, Kjellén maintained that Germany would become a new world power. Although he was correct in evaluating the great power potential for Germany, its defeat in the war was also his defeat. Kjellén’s Germanophilia led to recriminations and was disastrous for the reputation of his method (Lewin 1972: 12). In his daughter’s opinion, his failed prediction resulted in a personal crisis that lasted for the rest of his life (Kjellén-Björkquist 1970 II: 294).

One of Kjellén’s recent successors as Skyttean professor, Leif Lewin, argues that the very idea of prediction advocated by Kjellén appears to be a modern idea; the problem, however, is that his technique was flawed (Lewin 1972: 24). According to political scientist Gunnar Falkemark, the negative critique of Kjellén as a prognosticist is misguided. Now, almost a century after his death, we know the facts. Kjellén made approximately thirty predictions dealing with great-power politics and was grossly wrong in fewer than five, including his forecast of a collapse of the British–French entente. However, he correctly predicted the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire, the decline of France and the dissolution of the British Empire (Falkemark 1992: 106).

One of his peculiar predictions is found in the second edition of Stormakterna (1911a). There, Kjellén writes that Islam may become a factor in great-power politics: ‘It is not to be ruled out that the spark of Muhammed will once more

flare in a “holy war” under the banner of the Calif against the infidel. It is certain that in the Muhammedan world there is a ferment that may in the future emerge as a factor in great politics – a “black danger” for Europe’ (Kjellén 1911a: 36; see also Falkemark 1992a: 42; 1992b: 106).¹⁷ That is to say, religion (the ‘black danger’) may play a role in great-power politics, something he otherwise was not ready to embrace. Even before his travels to other countries and cultures, Kjellén foresaw that the ‘West’ – even if he rarely used that expression – would face the disdain, hatred and vengefulness of the ‘rest’, with Japan as one example representing, as it were, all other non-Western peoples. He also took note of the fate of oppressed minorities, not only in Russia, but even of the black population in the United States, who were being deprived of formal legal rights (Kjellén 1905 II: 86–90).¹⁸

Ragnar Björk is a retired associate professor of history from Uppsala University and is now affiliated with Södertörn University. His research is mainly concerned with ‘research on research’, with the history of historiography and the social sciences, the history of science, including the Nobel Prize, and also modern political history. He graduated at Uppsala in 1983 with a dissertation on explanatory techniques – including narration and colligation – among historians, and was awarded the Geijer Prize for best historical dissertation. Since then, he has conducted a number of research projects on those same themes. Some of his latest publications are: ‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1) (2016); ‘Voluntarismens väg: Och något om Rudolf Kjellén som producent av helhetskunskap om samhället’, in Erik Nydahl and Jonas Harvard (eds), Den nya staten: Ideologi och samhällsförändring krig sekelskiftet 1900 (Nordic Academic Press, 2016); Thorsten Halling, Ragnar Björk, Heiner Fangerau and Nils Hansson, ‘Leopoldina: Ein Netzwerk für künftige Nobelpreisträger für Physiologie oder Medizin?’, Sudhoffs Archiv 102 (2018), X.

Bert Edström is a non-resident senior research fellow at the Institute of Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm. His main research area is Japanese foreign policy, but he has also published articles and edited

books on the Swedish and European relationships with Japan. His latest book is Sverige–Japan: 150 år av vänskap och samarbete [Sweden–Japan: 150 years of friendship and collaboration] (Sweden–Japan foundation, 2018). Other titles include: ‘Japan as a Distant Friend: Scandinavian Countries Adjusting to Japan’s Emergence as a Great Power’, in Tosh Minohara, Tze-ki Hon and Evan Dawley (eds), The Decade of the Great War: Japan and the Wider World (Brill, 2014); ‘The Postwar Image of Japanese Prime Ministers – from a European Viewpoint’, in Masuda Hiroshi (ed.), The Foreign Policy Ideas of Postwar Japanese Prime Ministers (Minerva shōbō, 2016; in Japanese); and ‘Japan and Western Europe: From Postwar Acrimonious Conflict to Comprehensive Collaboration’, in Lam Peng Er and Purnendra Jain (eds), Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change (Lexington Books, 2020).

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University. His latest book is Pommern: ett gränsfall i tid och rum [Pomerania: A border case in time and space] (Lund University, 2016), and his earlier scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, for example: ‘Geopolitics and Religion: A Mutual and Conflictual Relationship. Spatial Regulation of Creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology / Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25(2) (July 2015); ‘Border Twin Cities in the Baltic Area: Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’, in John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova (eds), Twin Cities: Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time (Routledge, 2019); and ‘Turning towards the Inland Sea? Swedish “Soft Diplomacy” towards the Baltic Soviet Republics before Independence’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/03468755.2021.1896576.

Notes

1. For an overview of Kjellén’s years and work in Gothenburg, see Lindberg and

Nilsson 1996.

2. Presentations of Kjellén’s taxonomy are found in Lagergren 1999: 99–102, and Ebeling 1994: 49.

3. Kjellén wrote mostly in Swedish. He used non-reformed spelling even after the reform in 1906. The term Lifsform in his 1916 book would be Livsform in modern Swedish. A few contributions were published in German. Most of his works published in German were translated by others. Like all his contemporaries, Kjellén was well versed in modern and classical languages. Kjellén’s literary style is expressionistic, stilted, partly archaic, and difficult to render into English. Some of his words are difficult to translate without changing style or connotation. The word rike, German Reich, denotes a country or realm without the negative connotation of, for example, the Third Reich. A nation is a people wanting or forming a state, and stat is an independent territory with a government or leader. When using the word geography, Kjellén is sometimes referring to the discipline explaining terrestrial space, and sometimes to its object, often its natural contents, but sometimes including the cultural landscape and its infrastructure. Like many of his contemporaries, he refers to Great Britain as England and the Netherlands as Holland.

4. In this famous article he wrote: ‘själfva ämnet … faller inom ett teoretiskt gräns-område. För Sveriges gränser intressera sig jämte geografen även historikern och folkrättsforskaren, statistikern och politikern; och en närmare analys af gränserna kan icke undvara metoder och synpunkter från något af dess forskningsriken. Den framställning som här lämnas, skall mot historisk och folkrättslig bakgrund söka gifva en öfversiktlig beskrifning af våra tre hufvudgränser, för att därefter kunna värdera dem ur “antropogeografisk” eller – som jag i detta fall skulle föredraga att säga – geopolitisk synpunkt’ [the subject itself … falls within a theoretical boundary area. The boundaries of Sweden are of interest to the geographer but also to the historian, the researcher of international law, the statistician and the politician, and a closer analysis of the boundaries cannot dispense without any of these realms of research. The

description here given shall, against a background in history and international law, give a comprehensive description of our three main boundaries, in order thereafter to evaluate them from an “anthropogeographical” – or, as I in this case would prefer to call it – a geopolitical point of view] (Kjellén 1899: 283).

5. Even in Ratzel 1901, the focus is on plants and animals, with a short discussion of human behaviour, but Kjellén does not refer to this publication. See Klinke and Bassin 2018.

6. For Kjellén’s implementation of geopolitics in the study of the various great powers, see Björk’s chapters on Kjellén’s ‘Great Power Studies’, this volume.

7. ‘Ett är säkert, endast på egen grund kan Sverige byggas ut till det lyckliga folkhem, som det är emnadt att blifva’ (Kjellén 1915a: 56).

8. The relation between Kjellén’s and the Social Democrats’ concept of folkhem is discussed in Gunneflo 2015. See also Björk, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: The Swedish Intellectual and Political Context,’ this volume, on the inspiration and implementation of folkhemmet as a welfare society, beyond Kjellén’s times.

9. The Young Right (Unghögern) was an informal group of conservative intellectuals, led by Kjellén and a professor of philosophy, Vitalis Norström (1856–1916). Cf. Björk, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: The Swedish Intellectual and Political Context’, this volume.

10. Kjellén chose the Jewish publishers Geber and Bonnier to issue his major publications, including Stormakterna and Staten som lifsform, and the German Jewish Dr Walter Berendsohn as translator of his Die Großmächte und die

Weltkrise (see Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume).

11. For a study of Kjellén’s legacy, see Lundén ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume.

12. Note by Kjellén, 24 December 1915.

13. Note by Kjellén, 1908.

14. ‘Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist’ approximately translates as ‘how it essentially was’.

15. Parker 1998: 19, on Ratzel and Kjellén: ‘However, they both retained a partially hidden political agenda which sat ill with those principles of objectivity that they deemed to be essential’.

16. For a study on Kjellén’s assessment of the war, see Falkemark, ‘Kjellén and the First World War’, this volume.

17. ‘Det är icke uteslutet att Mohammeds gnista ännu en gång kunde uppflamma i ett “heligt krig” under kalifens fana mot de otrogna. Säkert är, att i den muhammedanska världen för närvarande råder en jäsning, som en gång kan framstå som en storpolitisk faktor – en “svart fara” för Europa’ (Kjellén 1911a: 36).

18. The only Swedish scholar using Kjellén’s structural approach was Fredrik Johannesson (1896–1949), who in his thesis (in Swedish) ‘The Pan-American problem 1826–1920: A Study in Modern Politics’ (1922) has adopted Kjellén’s analytical division into different spheres of politics (see Rivarola, ‘Rudolf Kjellén’s Intellectual Impact in Latin America’, this volume). In 1923 Johannesson was appointed secretary of the Interparliamentarian Group of the Riksdag, a group of former and active members of the Riksdag aiming to ‘promote international arbitrage and peaceful relations between the peoples [nations]’ (Sveriges statskalender 1925, item 1155).

References

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CHAPTER 2

Rudolf Kjellén

The Swedish Intellectual and Political Context

RAGNAR BJÖRK

Introduction

During the life of Rudolf Kjellén, so roughly from the 1860s to the 1920s, an ideological, emancipatory nationalism co-existed globally with a pragmatic internationalism that served to coordinate travel and trade, and develop international standards. Politically, the overarching tendency to extend participatory forms of governance was expressed in the rise in strong popular movements, with demands for parliamentarism and the right to vote.

For Swedish scholars like Kjellén, new roles became available, whether serving as a public intellectual or participating as a parliamentarian in decision-making. Simultaneously, there was a widespread scholarly ambition to make disciplines more ‘scientific’. Kjellén shared with some of his social science colleagues a desire to look to the exact sciences as methodological models. An ongoing specialization and a more rigorous methodology narrowed their field of expertise.

An aspect common to political life and the world of scholarship at the time was a voluntarist conviction. During the second half of the nineteenth century, people in the West had come to believe they could successfully participate in governing societies and reforming them. Science and technology had demonstrated how the world could be mastered and make material life easier, while also opening up horizons. One might call this quest for discovery, and for trust in the benevolent and modernizing potential of technology, the ‘Jules Verne effect’.

One question that naturally follows is whether social life, with the help of scholarship in the human and social sciences and a voluntarist belief, could be engineered to create ‘the good society’. That is, social sciences are treated as a policy tool, whether operating in the academy or in civil administration. This latter is an aspect couched in Kjellén’s idea of the folkhem.

The intention of this chapter is to sketch the world in which Kjellén lived, mainly as it appeared to him and his generation in the Swedish context. It examines how he chose what to do, in various roles, and which roads to take as a scholar and as an activist. The historical context here is not approached singularly from a Kjellénian perspective, but is a more open portrait; however, how Kjellén figured in relation to what transpired, whether more visibly or inconspicuously, is of course noted.

Swedish History and Society in Kjellén’s Era

Nineteenth-century Swedish history has at times been characterized as ‘empty’ or eventless. Nation-building, a frequent concern in many other European countries during the nineteenth century, had been effectuated in Sweden centuries before. The loss of Finland in 1809 did not affect Swedish national identity significantly. Although a sizeable irredenta of Swedes was left within the borders of Finland, which was now a Russian grand duchy, not much revanchism could be found in what was now Sweden proper. The new constitutional arrangement of 1809–10 was based on a balance-of-power principle. It did not change the four-estate parliament (riksdag), but introduced a new institution, the ‘ombudsman’. New legislation drafted in 1766, and modified in the 1770s, radically expanded the freedom of the press and allowed for a moderately liberal public sphere to develop. It was not until 1866 that a twochamber parliament was established, and gradually both parliamentarism and democracy, including extended voting rights, were carried through. Not until 1921, later than in other Nordic countries, did women get the right to vote. At that point, the polity became wholly based on the individual as the operational unit.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Sweden – simultaneously with Germany – entered the second stage of the industrial revolution, which included electricity, a chemical industry, mass production, export and transportation. The riches of the North were surveyed, and with the help of some British capital they began to be exploited. Then water power, mining and forestry began to contribute to the national economy. Together with the successful transformation of some technical inventions into commercial products – the creation of the socalled ‘enterprises of geniuses’ – a balance in the economy was achieved, with export income from both raw materials as well as industrially manufactured products.

This amounted to an economic take-off that laid the financial ground in the twentieth century for successful ‘society-building’ and, later, for a comprehensive welfare society. German exceptionalism, in the form of an authoritarian Sonderweg in which market economics were combined with ‘illiberal’ politics – did not have a correlate in the case of Sweden. The strong civil servant community instead, and rather smoothly, got along with political and social reforms, a Swedish ‘middle way’.

When Sweden ceded Norway in 1905, all aspirations to play a role in international affairs were abandoned. The three Scandinavian countries declared neutrality in the Great War; no great-power interests forced them into it. In the case of Sweden, a legacy of peace stretching back to 1814 could now be extended; today, that legacy spans more than two centuries. In the 1930s, though, the idea of a Swedish ‘middle way’ was promoted. However, this idea and concept came from the outside; it was conceived by the American journalist Marquis Childs. The internally practised ‘Swedish model’ concerned the labour market, and since 1938 a mechanism to keep industrial relations outside of political and ideological conflicts has been in place. This was accompanied by a gradually evolving and externally focused pursuit of ‘soft power’, which was eventually combined with renewed aims to play a role internationally.

Spheres of Activity – and History vs Political Science

One year into the Great War, Rudolf Kjellén formulated ‘the ideas of 1914’, deliberately formulated as an alternative to ‘the ideas of 1789’. Instead of ‘freedom, equality and fraternity’, and instead of a utopian civil society without class or borders, he now emphasized the more sombre virtues of duty and effort. Tougher times demanded ‘concentration’ more than emancipation and liberal ‘expansion’.

In the above programme we see Kjellén as a public intellectual who encompasses both his political activism role and his conservative ideological stance. In Sweden before 1850, the three spheres of scholarship, politics, and public debate were either entangled or in their infancy. One learned individual could easily inhabit all three and be seen as an authority. This is exemplified by two institutions, one ad hoc and one long standing. A so-called ‘committee of geniuses’ in the 1820s comprised some half-dozen figures of perceived wisdom and authority, including historian and poet Erik Gustaf Geijer (1783–1847) and chemist and natural scientist Jöns Jacob Berzelius (1779–1848). The committee was tasked with deciding whether to move Uppsala University to Stockholm. (In the end the answer was negative.) Meanwhile, the Swedish Academy, established in 1786, was home to various learned and witty men of letters from several walks of life, including politicians, writers, civil servants and scholars. Gradually the writers gained the upper hand, though, particularly after 1901 when the academy began awarding a Nobel prize in literature.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, these spheres had begun to crystallize and to disentangle, each of them becoming, as it were, ‘professionalized’. This meant that one had to earn one’s authority separately in each sphere. However, during the 1890s a group of younger university men – historians as well as political scientists, some of them in Uppsala, others at the newly established university colleges in cities like Stockholm and Gothenburg – had begun to appear as a force in public debate. They wanted to straddle the edges of these spheres by being both active and competent in all of them. They had gained

momentum by the time the pendulum swung from the radicalism of the 1880s to the conservatism of the 1890s. All were proper scholars of the humanities, and many of them were also practising politicians, having acquired a mandate in the national parliament (riksdag), and they enjoyed reputations as public intellectuals.

This group differed somewhat from the Kathedersozialisten of continental Europe, not only because they held seats in parliament, but also because they seldom applied their scholarly expertise to the ‘social questions’, Fragen, of the time. As historians their expertise was grounded in earlier eras, and as political scientists they usually focused on historical constitutionalism. To the extent they aspired to change society, though, they drew on their roles as lawmakers and participated in public debate, moving from the university lecture hall and its pulpit to the one in parliament, without much changing the content, adjusting to a new audience. This was especially easy for the Uppsala scholars after the Uppsala–Stockholm railway opened in the 1860s. Otherwise, they sent their reflections on contemporary problems to newspapers and other periodicals, ironically often to themselves, sitting as editors of the very same journal.

This was, incidentally, in rather noticeable contrast to the character of their Nordic neighbours’ approach to scholarship (Björk 2016: 49–54).¹ There was in Sweden a kind of ‘professional exceptionalism’, whereby historians did not deal with developments after 1809, the year that Sweden lost Finland. Everything after that point, which in other quarters would have been treated as ‘modern’ or ‘contemporary’ history, was considered the proper domain of political scientists. Nonetheless, several subjects – politics, constitutionalism, parliamentary affairs, diplomatic relations, state institutions including the crown, public administration, and the evolution of the nobility – were common in both disciplines. Thus, ‘history’, in the basic sense of bygone eras, was a feature of historical scholarship as well as political science

The social sciences in the Swedish academic world had no faculty organization of their own, and thus did not develop any peculiar type of inquiry until the

1940s. In the late nineteenth century, almost all of the scholars who were to hold posts in political science were trained as historians. These included those who held the prestigious Skyttean professorship prior to Kjellén – Wilhelm Erik Svedelius (1816–1889), Oscar Alin (1846–1900) and Simon Johannes Boëthius (1850–1924), as well as Kjellén’s colleague in Lund, Pontus Fahlbeck (1850– 1923), to whom he dedicated one of his books. Kjellén, who was born in 1864, was half a generation younger than most of his peers. Yet he died with them in the early 1920s and represented the so-called ‘professorial conservatism’.

Kjellén was trained in a scholarly culture that was historical to its core. He was offered a lectureship in both history and political science. When, in the 1890s, he applied for his first post, in Gothenburg, it was a position in history. He did not get it, but was luckier a little later when he garnered the one in political science.

A number of scholars who emerged in the 1890s, while falling short of an actual movement, represented the so-called ‘professorial conservatism’. They included the historian Harald Hjärne (1848–1922) and political scientists Oscar Alin – Kjellén’s teacher – and Pontus Fahlbeck. The period from roughly 1890 to the 1910s was ‘the golden age’ for these establishment conservatives. They were academics but simultaneously also state-employed civil servants, and they embraced the ethos of impartiality from that sphere, remaining observant of the interests of the state and its administration, without directly serving them.

Swedish academic life had few radicals, either to the left or to the right. Kjellén, however, was an exception, and he was on the right. In history and political science, his early disciplinary homes, there was not, for example, a Marxist school like those that existed elsewhere in Scandinavia and in other European countries. One such prominent school was in neighbouring Norway, represented by Halvdan Koht and Edvard Bull Sr., both of whom would later become social democratic ministers of foreign affairs.

As mentioned, several of the Swedish professors in these disciplines sat in

parliament. Both in politics and in scholarship they were mildly conservative or mildly liberal. To be liberal, then, was almost to be ‘radical’; nobody crossed the line to actual socialism until the 1950s. Harald Hjärne, a historical colleague, and much an establishment historian, somewhat older than and revered by Kjellén – a reverence that was not reciprocated – was a ‘leftist’ before 1900 and conservative, mildly so, after, and he had several gifted and successful disciples. Most of them, however, ventured into spheres other than history. Hjärne’s student, the historian Nils Edén – who, incidentally, would be offered a lectureship also in political science – was a liberal, and would become prime minister in 1917. He invited the social democratic leader Hjalmar Branting to join his government; the two are now mostly remembered for ushering in women’s suffrage, but they were also instrumental in staving off revolutionary sentiments in a period of hardship.

One of Kjellén’s successors as Skyttean Professor in Uppsala, Axel Brusewitz (1881–1950), was also a liberal. In his scholarship, although he dealt with modern history, he methodologically resembled earlier and later political scientists as well as his history colleagues. That is, he concerned himself with diplomatic microhistory, entailing a short time span and an intimate engagement with historical sources, which in turn, it was hoped, would ensure objectivity. Exploring grandiose themes or occupying oneself with contemporary problems increased the risk of ‘speculation’; projects such as Kjellén’s ‘great power studies’ were thus not looked upon kindly. Cultural as well as economic approaches to history and society were ignored by the disciplines, as was, of course, the philosophy of history in the manner of Buckle and Lamprecht.²

The dominant Hjärne school of historians in Uppsala was challenged and gradually overcome by the Weibull school in Lund, which was intellectually radical but in political terms only vaguely liberal. The Weibull school’s international outlook, however, was restricted to the Nordic countries. The Hjärne school took a broader view, both in terms of its topics and its participation in international conferences. The political scientists, along with adjacent scholars such as the economist and sociologist Gustaf Steffen (1864– 1929), a Kathedersozialist type, were also somewhat more internationally minded. Nonetheless, Kjellén’s magnum opus, Stormakterna, was quite unique

in its scope of inquiry.

Nation-Building and National Narratives – or Not?

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, European nation-states had consolidated. An aristocracy that previously had operated also outside of national borders, along with the royalty, increasingly began to feel more at home within those borders, while the earlier parochialism of other estates and classes began to give way to a concern with what transpired on the national stage. The Prince, or the ruler, began to identify less with the state – with their state and its immediate political power – and more with the nation and surrounding society. For the new type of rulers, inhabitants of the nation were seen less as potentially hostile subjects to be controlled and more as citizens to be relied upon – as human resources with the potential to benefit society as a whole, including its competition with other nation-states. Increasingly, scholarship was seen as a similar kind of resource, such that encouraging free thought and the unhampered ‘search for truth’ would, in a Humboldtian, competitive manner, benefit the nation-state’s interests.

To instil this sense of belonging and connectedness, historians began writing, and rewriting, national narratives, quite often in an emancipatory framework whereby the people came together and took a stand against an outside power or other force that was holding the nation and its people back.³ This was exemplified by the case of Norway and Sweden. The two nations had, since 1814, been in a union. Whether it constituted a personal one, with the king as the bond, or an arrangement between states was an unresolved question.

From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, a vital debate over national identity took place in Norway, invigorating scholarship on the subject.⁴ Despite a long-standing and explicit sense of identity among Norwegians, intellectuals avidly pursued mental and organizational nation-building during this time.

Building a nation in Sweden, though, had been a sixteenth-century business. By the twentieth century, writing a national master narrative was not an urgent matter for Swedish scholars, nor was sorting among competing narratives. Geijer had in the 1830s written a comprehensive national history, but it took more than a century before someone tried it again, when the internationally renowned economic historian Eli Heckscher (1879–1952), a Hjärne pupil, wrote just such a history. Over the decades, most historians had instead focused on the histories of specific periods, such as the ‘great power era’, the eighteenth-century ‘age of liberty’, or the reign of King Gustav III. Without being too heavy-handed, one could say that the great power era was for conservatives – the staunch and the milder ones alike – what the age of liberty was for liberals. During the latter, royal power was weak, while the parliament managed, for instance, to radically expand the freedom of the press in a constitutional act of 1766. When women historians eventually gained a foothold in academia, they largely demonstrated a preference for the Gustavian era, considered the more cultured one.

Political scientists in Kjellén’s era extensively discussed the origins of the new constitutions in 1809–10. Did they develop internally as a legacy of early popular representation in the late Middle Ages, or did they derive from an Enlightenment model of separation of powers, in the manner of Montesquieu? Conservatives emphasized a long historical tradition, while liberals looked for more recent influences, but both historians and politicians debated the topic.

Overall, Swedish scholarship was characterized by a relative lack of conflict over the nation’s recent past. More pronounced disputes were over methodology, such as source criticism. There was also a general absence of various theoretical constructs, such as Marxism, positivism and evolutionism, which were more prevalent in other Scandinavian countries. Kjellén’s analysis of great power trajectories and his categorizing models for analysing the state did not fit this restricted theoretical approach.

In Sweden, a peculiar historiographical logic had it that since the national history

was not ‘conquered’ from the aristocracy by a liberal, emancipating bourgeoisie, as a consequence, in the first half of the twentieth century, the working class never really felt an overwhelming need to ‘conquer’ that history from the bourgeoisie and reinterpret it from a class-based Marxist perspective. Nonetheless, the workers’ movement in Sweden had a broad, educated and dedicated base that was well versed in history. When, in the interwar years, a formal programme was launched to write the history of the working class in Sweden, several conservative – mildly so, of course – and establishment historians were involved. Such historians had, over time, left behind the history of high politics, instead focusing on the lives of ordinary people. The workers’ movement had no problem with allowing conservative scholars to write most of the historical volumes, although the single professionally trained Swedish Marxist, Per Nyström (1903–1993), would contribute one volume.

Norway vs Sweden – and Lessons for Kjellén

During the 1880s and 1890s, cultural radicalism gave way to greater conservatism and romantic idealism. Nationalism in Sweden was feeble and politically rather defensive in reaction to the progressive nationalism and even secessionism of the Norwegians, among whom a majority opinion gradually emerged to leave the union with Sweden.

Whereas in the 1810s great power politics after the Napoleonic wars had compensated Sweden with Norway after the loss of Finland, the Norwegians tried, following a short war with Sweden, to salvage as much sovereignty as possible through reference to legality, to the paragraphs of the 1814 Kiel peace agreement. This effort was seen as necessary for those who feared the threat of amalgamation, a union that would have completely merged the two nations and the two peoples together, marginalizing the national identity of the smaller Norwegian population. This threat was personified by Crown Prince Carl Johan, one of Napoleon’s generals, from the French Bernadotte family, who had been invited to form a royal house in Sweden. However, no amalgamation occurred, and legalism trumped power politics.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the political scientist Oscar Alin, a teacher of Kjellén’s, put forward a related legal argument. Alin’s interpretation of the peace accords of 1814 was that Norway could not unilaterally leave the union. However, this time the Norwegians’ emancipatory politics and aspirations for sovereignty, as elsewhere in Europe, ruled the day. Also, Norwegian politics had evolved in a progressive direction, in tune with the times, and parliamentarism had become an established practice; the Norwegian government was dependent on support in the Storting parliament. Thus, in this case, politics trumped technical legal arguments. The Norwegians again had their preferred outcome! (Björk 2011: chapter 1).

Kjellén had contributed to Alin’s efforts and their failure. He learned a couple of things from this. First, an older generation of students and scholars, who had experienced the national and social awakenings of the 1840s, also embraced the Scandinavianist idealist movement. But young Kjellén felt bitterness towards the Norwegians over the break-up of the union. He had difficulty mustering enthusiasm for Scandinavianism. He also showed himself to be quite indifferent to the plight and the national interest of the Danes in relation to Germany. Kjellén also demonstrated little of the deep concern for or sense of solidarity with Finland, which so many Swedes – scholars, politicians and public intellectuals alike – had evinced, particularly when russification intensified in the 1890s. That sentiment was especially widespread in establishment circles – at least those on the east coast of Sweden.

It is not often productive to focus on differences between regions of Sweden in terms of opinions about, affinities for, or politics towards neighbouring nations. Still, although it is not always appreciated, Sweden’s Baltic or eastern side had a certain affinity with Finland, while its western side demonstrated a more Scandinavian orientation. Kjellén, meanwhile, looked south, to Germany.

Secondly, Kjellén shared Oscar Alin’s elaborate legal views opposing the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden. However, intellectually

the most important lesson that Kjellén took away from his experience with these arguments was that a scholar cannot just deal with legal matters – the technical content of agreements, constitutions and so on. One had to take into consideration the things that really mattered in politics. The discipline of political science – in Swedish statsvetenskap, literally the ‘science of the state’ – had to abandon what Kjellén called its ‘juristic’ focus: ‘traditional political science has to be widened, like a ring that has become too tight for the finger it is expected to circle’ (Kjellén 1916: 7–8).

In a series of lectures in 1908, Kjellén declared his ‘defection from political science’, as it was presently conducted. He thus alluded to a famous declaration, in 1838, by historian Erik Gustaf Geijer, who ‘defected’ from conservatism to embrace liberalism. Kjellén then set out to make political science the very science of society. Out of this came, most prominently, the idea of geopolitics, the programmatic state analysis in Staten som lifsform, and his work on the great powers.

Defecting from His Peers

Kjellén thus set himself apart from ‘the received view’, both in terms of the scholarly disciplines that were his heritage, and of traditional, establishment politics, which to him were either too conservative or (typically) too liberal. In his career he had now moved from the academic ‘tower’ in provincial Uppsala, close to governing circles in Stockholm, to the newly founded Gothenburg University College, a virtual ‘marketplace’ in a commercial city whose port was open to the high seas and to new ideas. The college was intended to cater to the needs of business in Gothenburg, including mercantile education. It was envisioned as something like the Midland institutions in Britain – in the city, of the city and for the city (Bender 1988). The University College in Gothenburg was not a state institution, and it cultivated the ideal of the so-called ‘free academy’. These factors probably made the academic atmosphere more open to people like Kjellén. In the 1940s, a figure like the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer could be hired there for some years before continuing on to Yale

University (Björk 2016: 56–57).

While at Gothenburg, Kjellén’s teaching duties included geography, and later also statistics, which no doubt helped to shape his thinking. When he first applied for a post in Gothenburg it was in history, which he lost to a proper historian, Ludvig Stavenow (1864–1950), who would later become vice chancellor at Uppsala University. Kjellén’s position was officially in political science instead – so he had three, maybe four, disciplines at his disposal. Lecture by lecture, Kjellén refined his study of the great powers, producing the first edition of Stormakterna in 1905. Overall, he dealt with more varied fields and bigger problems than his contemporaries and colleagues. In this sense, he was more ‘continental’ than they were.

Likewise, in politics and in his role as a public intellectual, Kjellén had strayed from the conventional political stances and inclinations of those peers who were serving in similar roles. However, peers were also ‘lettered’, enough so to be given seats in the Swedish Academy. Historian Harald Hjärne was, in the 1910s, a very influential member of its Nobel committee for literature, advocating a kind of ‘neutrality policy’ that discounted writers from the belligerent nations of the First World War.

Kjellén was never part of this Parnassus. He was not only a radical, in both scholarship and politics, but was an activist, and as such he had more in common with political activists on the left. Kjellén was indeed generally associated with so-called ‘professorial conservatism’, which was applied to many of his establishment colleagues who came to prominence in the 1890s. However, the Young Right movement, of which he was also – not least by himself – considered a member, was a rather small but very visible group. Most of its radical members came from Gothenburg, including philosopher Vitalis Norström (1856–1916), writer Adrian Molin (1880–1942) and journalist Oscar Norén (1844–1923).

National Identity – External vs Internal

Underlying many of the late nineteenth century public debates among learned elite, scholars, writers – including August Strindberg – and occasionally politicians, was a concern for Swedish national identity, although it was not often couched in those terms; contemporary nation-building was not generally considered an urgent task.

The dilemma for the identity debate was that Sweden had once been a great power in Europe, which had to be confronted. Should one cling to that, or focus on other matters, closer to the lives of ordinary Swedes? This represented a sizeable part of Kjellén’s concerns, particularly as an activist – to look backwards or forwards? Ultimately, as it were, he looked both ways. His forward-looking inclination was a response to what he deemed to be a mood of defeatism and indifference that mourned more than celebrated past greatness.

The other Nordic countries did not have to deal with such a lingering legacy. Their historical self-perceptions varied widely: Denmark had long ago had to transcend its more glorious past, which had been reinforced by war with Germany in 1864; Norway focused on its emancipatory ambitions; while Finland, as a Russian grand duchy, just fought for national survival.

In Sweden there had been very little in the way of revanchist sentiments, and even less in the way of actual action, concerning the loss of Finland. However, the collapse of Sweden’s empire, with a first instalment in 1721 and a final one in 1809, was the topic of scholarly discussion during the nineteenth century. Gradually, a school of thinking emerged that was critical of Charles XII. It followed two lines. The most influential strand was more liberal and somewhat anti-militarist, condemning Charles for the reckless, never-ending campaigns he conducted deep into Russia. (The liberal crown prince and future king, Oscar, was among the active adherents of this school.) The other strand was likewise

critical, arguing that after the initial success at Narva in 1700, military failure characterized Charles’s reputation. Here, the conclusion was that Charles had, unnecessarily, squandered the great power standing of Sweden. Leopold von Ranke had discussed these developments in his influential 1833 essay, ‘Die grossen Mächte’ [The great powers] (von Laue 1950).

However, in the 1890s, propagated by some conservative scholars, such as Hjärne, there was something of a rehabilitation called a ‘renaissance’, of Charles XII in Sweden. These conservatives argued that Charles, by demonstrating military prowess, had managed to stave off Russian designs on Sweden for centuries. Sweden had been attacked jointly by Russia, Denmark and Poland at the end of the seventeenth century, and in response to charges of ‘militarism’, these scholars pointed out that Charles had carried out a defensive battle.

The bland nationalism of the 1890s, following the radical 1880s and undergirded by ‘professorial conservatism’, never transformed into a call to arms for an active and demonstrative foreign policy, such as taking a tough stance against the Norwegians. Progressive political developments in Norway towards parliamentarism and democracy, if not embraced by moderate conservatives in Sweden, at least had to be acknowledged by them. But when it came to the Norwegians’ secessionist ambitions it was another matter. Somewhat provocatively, they asked why the union should not be understood as a good, modern model for governance, uniting two peoples? Look at Italy and Germany, after all! In the end, though, they grudgingly accepted the end of the union.

In this context, it is interesting to note the tension in Kjellén’s response, in contrast to his conservative and liberal scholarly colleagues. When Kjellén began to publish his work on the great powers – beginning in 1905, the same year as the break-up of the union – he included a chapter on the erstwhile powers of the Ottoman Empire, Portugal/Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden. He was wholly unsentimental about the prospects for a Swedish return to great power status. Such a programme could never have sustained itself: Sweden was just a military state,⁵ with insufficient resources (such as population, economy,

appropriate size and location) to support territorial expansion into East Central Europe or Western Russia.

There is a wider context here. Kjellén lived during a rather long in-between period for the self-perception of Sweden in an external sense; its imagined role in the world. This period lasted from the first half of the nineteenth century, with the beginning of the decline of Swedish great power status, to the aftermath of the Second World War, when Sweden presented itself to the rest of the world as a ‘model’ welfare state and also a ‘soft power’ image. Incidentally, both the older and newer of these externally oriented identities derived from the state and its performance, not from such things as civil society, culture or the entrepreneurial successes from the beginning of the century (Björk 1996: 326).

During the nineteenth century, Sweden had aspired to be a power responsible for calm and orderly development in Northern Europe. However, Sweden was not invited to the peace negotiations after the Crimean War, even though the Baltic Sea had been an important theatre in that conflict. Consequently, during the nineteenth century there was a gradual shift away from taking on responsibilities beyond Sweden’s borders. One might say, that as much as Norway could pursue its campaign for sovereignty in relation to an essentially benign Sweden, then Sweden, reciprocally, could practise the art of accepting the loss of international influence by finally acknowledging the break-up of the union. After all, the split with Finland had been much more traumatic at the time, almost like a limb torn lose, whereas Sweden and Norway were more like the two exhausted and wornout parties in a divorce.

Kjellén wanted a more important role for Sweden in European high politics. His fondness for Germany arose not only from the two countries’ common cultural and scholarly aspects – many scholars were trained at German universities – but also from German political power. Implicitly, for Kjellén, Sweden should take the opportunity to ride on the coat-tails of the great power emerging to the south. In contrast, the inclination among Hjärne’s students was to say, ‘it should be like in England!’

With no prospects for a small, peripheral nation like Sweden, one might argue that Kjellén – with a political activist’s vision of achieving success at least somewhere, in some sense – redirected his hopes for external recognition to the nearest and most potent nation that was likely to become a great power, Germany, as a proxy for Swedish greatness. The idea of having a mission instead internally in Sweden, as a substitute for externally oriented power, had not yet really gathered momentum, but would later be embodied by both Sweden’s ‘middle way’ and the welfare society. Still, during part of the nineteenth century, a rallying call was at times heard to ‘regain Finland within the borders of Sweden’ by appropriating resources in the north – mining, forestry, and the harnessing of water power from many mighty rivers. Actually, Kjellén was a strong supporter of this, and of strong state intervention. His ideas for a more prominent and successful Sweden was to become relevant in the years following his early death in 1922.

A Future Folkhem – Political Science as a Proper Policy Science?

If in Europe the nineteenth century had been an era of nation-building – not the best performance event for Sweden – then the twentieth century would be characterized by ‘society-building’ – and here Sweden excelled, as it turned out. Judging from his work, including the folkhem concept, Kjellén would eagerly have participated in such an effort, but he envisioned different goals and a different route to success from the one that would eventually be realized.

The social democrats, at least beginning in the interwar years, had abandoned the route of class struggle, and instead opted to engage other parts of Swedish society in building up the folkhem, eventually achieving a welfare society encompassing the whole of the nation. Kjellén, though, would have started at the other end: first a ‘national cohesion’, one of his ‘ideas of 1914’, would need to be cultivated, and then ‘national socialism’ would come about.

To what extent a compromise-based market economy, a welfare society – as we are familiar with from the postwar era – was on his mind or part of his conceptualization of a future society, is hard to say. On the one hand, he saw capitalism, not least as it was practised by the imperialist great powers, as the cause of enormous resentment among non-European peoples, and as both ‘immoral’ and ultimately self-harming. Capitalism, and particularly its early ‘Manchester’ type, was also characterized by commercialism and materialism, which was anathema to Kjellén. On the other hand, the growing practice towards the end of the nineteenth century of having the state support enterprises and infrastructure projects, conduct social policy and so on was one he enthusiastically supported. This corresponded to a stage in the evolution of capitalism that the Bielefeld school later termed ‘organized capitalism’.

Both in his vision for political science and his unorthodox combination of several other disciplines, Kjellén ventured into intellectual territory that was uncharted in Sweden. To synthesize multiple fields of learning was not uncommon. But Kjellén’s specific combination of fields and his ambition to elevate political science as a social science brought him closer to another aspect of knowledge production. This was the extensive Swedish system of commissions, which explored issues and proposed measures for solving problems that would be promptly followed by legislation – a virtual ‘engine of reform’. Such an approach was indispensable for a future welfare society. On the one hand, it was planning without ideological guidelines (thus diverging from Bernalist planning); on the other hand, it was large-scale knowledge production separate from academically departmentalized or theoretically organized discourse.

This reformist, outcomes-oriented approach, which in many other societies was the domain of universities (e.g. the Kathedersozialisten, of which Kjellén would probably have been one had he lived in Germany), was in Sweden performed inside the administration, an unpolitical machinery at the disposal of political parties. Often the staff was trained in law, which aided in transforming policy research into legislation.

Interestingly, although Kjellén was an activist with ideas for social reforms, his scholarly and political science, by him newly consecrated as the social science, did not extend to or include guidelines for policy. He was very concerned with being ‘scientific’, which is clearly evidenced by the constraints he imposed on the study of the great powers – to not venture into the mindsets, strategies, policies or actions of individual politicians, the ‘statesmen’, which would have infused an element of subjectivity into scholarship.

Thus, although Kjellén was generally considered to be ‘ideological’, both in his teaching and in his scholarship, he did not do enough in the academic sphere to combine unsentimental, realistic analyses with an approach to policy grounded in scholarship. Rather, he reserved most of his political arguments for the spheres of public debate and parliamentary politics. But these were spheres where he did not have sufficient credibility or an established network of sympathetic colleagues. In the end, this left him largely irrelevant as a social reformer.

In a 1908 booklet (Kjellén 1908), Kjellén collected some of his parliamentary work, and from this he extracted a sixty-page introductory ‘Program’, as he called it. It is somewhat of an irony that many of his ideas and practical proposals for making society more efficient actually coincided with what was later to be undertaken. One may note here that he considered Bismarckianreformed German society as a ‘model’. An added irony is that the ‘slow, inefficient bureaucracy’ that he lashed out against in this Program, in some sense constituted the means by which, in the interwar years and then together with scholarly experts in the above-mentioned commissions, reforms could be laid that would be the legislative and organizational foundation for a welfare society.

There is a related sense in which Kjellén stood at a crossroads and ultimately aligned himself, together with many other scholars, with the past rather than the future. This also regards his working method, which turned out to be unsuited to developing actionable policy knowledge.

The era of ‘big science’ arguably took off, with the United States in the lead, after the First World War. Increasingly, scientific research was to be performed in teams, in laboratories well equipped with instruments and with supporting staff. In this way, large quantities of knowledge, including of the kind that resulted from experimental testing, could be summarized and synthesized.

Kjellén and many of his contemporaries in the human and social science fields also aimed to collect knowledge from multiple discourses – Kjellén from the store of several disciplines – in order to discern connections, patterns and perhaps even ‘laws’. The library was the laboratory. The result might be called ‘big inductivism’, in the sense that an awareness of patterns and broad trends was to form gradually in the mind of the scholar, as he pored through a huge mass of unsorted evidence, much like an archaeologist allowing a religious rite or a social hierarchy to be ‘deduced’ from a mass of unsorted material. This was the working mode of most of the social philosophers of these decades, including those who observed major trends such as increased equality (Tocqueville), the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Tönnies), and so on, as well as the students of culture and civilization such as Buckle, Lamprecht, Spengler and Toynbee. Such thinkers worked alone, and they devoted decades to erecting large, cognitive edifices – but these were more or less useless as practical knowledge if one wanted to change society in an orderly and predictable way.

The human and political sciences might implicitly function as policy sciences, serving politicians, the administrations, and the polity in general, with knowledge usable for law-making. But the practices of university scholars in these fields, including in the United States, was still done in the ‘big inductivist’ manner following the First World War. Consider the following quote from 1922, in a policy memo by Rockefeller Foundation officer Beardsley Ruml, in which the term ‘deductive’ (below) refers to very generalized end results following the inductive processing of vast empirical material as outlined above:

production from the universities is largely deductive and speculative, on the

basis of second-hand observations, documentary evidence and anecdotal material. It is small wonder that the social engineer finds this social science abstract and remote, [and] of little help to him in the solution of his problem.

The Rockefeller Foundation had begun a large survey of what kinds of policy research would be useful and merit support; first in the natural and biological sciences, but gradually also in the social sciences. In Sweden some scholars soon recognized this opportunity. Together, in 1925, the conservative economist Gösta Bagge (1882–1951) and socialist economist Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) wrote to the foundation and argued for Sweden to be a kind of ‘laboratory’ for social research, the results of which could be applied to bigger countries. (Myrdal would go on to spend the academic year 1929/30 at a Rockefeller organization.) They complained of the status of research: ‘But as yet very little real inductive scientific work has been done in the social field in Sweden’.⁷ Swedish ‘bureaus’, or administrative commissions, had collected ‘huge masses of material’, but it had not been used in a scientific way. Echoing Ruml, they added that social science in Sweden ‘has almost wholly been of an exclusively abstract and deductive character’.⁸ However, ten years later, Myrdal wrote to Rockefeller officer Tracy B. Kittredge:

much of our research here concerning wages, the cost of living, national income and migrations, [and] has actually been used prior to publication on the practical work and planning by these [administrative] commissions. Our situation in Sweden is extraordinarily favourable to setting up and carrying through research on problems of immediate practical importance.

In the meantime, at the end of the 1920s in the United States, Herbert Hoover had launched a broad ‘Recent Social Trends’ study that would be published at the end of his presidency, in which a number of academically renowned scholars participated, each one a specialist in one subject or ‘sector’.

The ‘big science’ approach had now reached the human and social sciences.

Teams of academically based scholars worked with civil servants in the administration to produce expert knowledge that could be used for reform measures, such as could later be seen in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. As may be seen from Myrdal’s second quote, people who had been trained in various non-legal disciplines at universities were now involved in the Swedish system of commissions.

Kjellén, the activist-cum-scholar, had been working wholly on his own, and had assembled ‘huge masses of material’. But without much contact with the administration or the commissions in Sweden, he had only halfway achieved his ambition to reform and modernize political science. He had embarked on a path of radical-right politics, which would over time stray evermore from the path of participatory democracy.

A useful social science, which to Kjellén would have been the discipline of political science, might have contributed to the exploration and formation of his folkhem idea, but his position as an outsider and his radical right-wing ideology meant that contributions from him became difficult and unwelcome. Others both knew how to organize knowledge production, which would be relevant for society-building, and how to pursue a middle-of-the-road participatory democracy.

Conclusion

When one follows the evolution of the spheres of scholarship, politics and public debate in Sweden from the middle of the nineteenth century to the interwar years, and observes Kjellén acting within them with his hopes and ambitions, one finds that he regularly chose paths that turned out to be blind alleys, at least in the short run, and thus found himself in an intellectual vacuum of sorts.

It so happened that in this particular era his scholarly colleagues were also active in these three spheres, which would not be the case when his generation disappeared from the scene in the 1920s; from then on professionalized expertise in a single sphere would increasingly rule the day. But even before that, Kjellén’s colleagues and peers were all much more prudent and cautious in the three spheres. Kjellén was a radical and an activist, and by definition wanted change – a stance that risks things not going one’s way.

Kjellén wanted to reform political science to better mirror the reality of politics. It should be the social science of politics – thus ‘geopolitics’, not geography; ‘ecopolitics’ not economics; ‘demopolitics’, not demography. The field in which he came to do his most ambitious work was international politics. This was rather unique among his peers, especially for a scholar from a small country with no recent experience of imperial or great power ambitions – and thus, presumably, with no vested interests. His Stormakterna is a grand overview of high politics. With its three editions in the eventful period between the years 1905 and 1920, it serves as a kind of real-time record of the powers’ shifting standings (see Björk’s chapters on the great powers, this volume).

However, his Swedish colleagues in history and political science were very cautious, methodologically putting the highest value on staying close to sources; at times this created a mimetic effect whereby they adopted, more or less, the style and phrasing of their sources. Their aim was to achieve objectivity by not letting their own individual idiosyncrasies interfere. No theoretical or social philosophical approaches, such as Marxism, evolutionism or positivism, were ever on the agenda. And, of course, there were no grand schemes. This is not to say that much of the methodological, scholarly criticism of Kjellén’s work was unjustified, but his aims were very different from those of his colleagues. Kjellén’s teacher Oscar Alin had several disciples, as did Kjellén’s peer Harald Hjärne, though many of them entered into domains beyond the scholarly ones. Kjellén, on the other hand, inspired no such scholarly followers, despite being very much appreciated as an open-minded and unpretentious teacher.

In politics, Kjellén’s scholarly colleagues were moderately conservative (considering some reforms acceptable) or liberal (considering more reforms desirable). These colleagues became part of the establishment, both in politics – some of Hjärne’s students became government ministers – and in letters. Kjellén’s radical-right politics made him less welcome in those circles.

In a related but maybe less noticed field, it turned out that Kjellén had no position for producing relevant knowledge to supply the machinery of commissions of the civil administration. Although he wanted political science to be dealing with political reality, and though he had a vision of a society for ‘everybody’, a folkhem, he did not come into close contact with the first-order, sector-wise organized knowledge that was produced by administrative commissions in Sweden. The gradual, piecemeal approach was alien to Kjellén, and whereas most of his colleagues, who were active in parliamentary politics, participated sitting as experts on committees and suchlike, he did not contribute to these either.

It was in ideological and political debate, and in the public sphere in general, that Kjellén was perhaps most heard and recognized. Although he saw organized socialists as opponents, he himself acknowledged what he had in common with them in terms of social ideas – anti-capitalism, a collectivist inclination, and anti-liberalism. With his ‘illiberal’ inclination, it is not inappropriate to label Kjellén a ‘populist’ of sorts – even though he had no throngs of followers.

In 1908 Kjellén positioned himself between the two poles of ‘rightbureaucraticism’ and ‘socialism’, and claimed for himself a position that he himself recognized could be designated either as ‘young left’ or as ‘young right’. What mattered was changing society. Kjellén’s Germanophile stance was shared by several social democrats, though the outcome of the war left this perspective without a plausible future in the near term.

Still, in the 1950s, Gunnar Myrdal accompanied his wife Alva to New Delhi,

where she was appointed ambassador to India. The scholarly result of this stay became the three-volume Asian Drama (Myrdal 1968). Myrdal was sure to bring along his former teacher’s work on the great powers. And as Kjellén’s work gradually attracted attention abroad, after his death in 1922 he did gain new adherents – but at a distance, both in time and in space.

Ragnar Björk is a retired associate professor of history from Uppsala University and is now affiliated with Södertörn University. His research is mainly concerned with ‘research on research’, with the history of historiography and the social sciences, the history of science, including the Nobel Prize, and also modern political history. He graduated at Uppsala in 1983 with a dissertation on explanatory techniques – including narration and colligation – among historians, and was awarded the Geijer Prize for best historical dissertation. Since then, he has conducted a number of research projects on those same themes. Some of his latest publications are: ‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1) (2016); ‘Voluntarismens väg: Och något om Rudolf Kjellén som producent av helhetskunskap om samhället’, in Erik Nydahl and Jonas Harvard (eds), Den nya staten: Ideologi och samhällsförändring kring sekelskiftet 1900 (Nordic Academic Press, 2016); Thorsten Halling, Ragnar Björk, Heiner Fangerau and Nils Hansson, ‘Leopoldina: Ein Netzwerk für künftige Nobelpreisträger für Physiologie oder Medizin?’, Sudhoffs Archiv 102 (2018), X.

Notes

1. See also Haapala, Jalava and Larsson 2017.

2. Both Buckle and, a little later, Lamprecht, aspired to make the writing of history more scientific. Both were positivists, emphasizing empiricism, with the

search for ‘laws’ in history. Lamprecht also emphasized mental aspects; every era was characterized by a certain ‘collective psyche’. Two of the very few theoretical or methodological essays in Historisk tidskrift [Swedish historical review] in these decades, in 1896 and in 1900, were on Lamprecht and his ‘method’. They were both written by Nils Edén, and the one in 1900 is thoroughly researched and comparative in scope.

3. See also Berger 2015 (chapters 1–4); Berger and Lorenz 2008b (especially chapter 1); and Aronsson et al. 2008 (chapter 10).

4. See Hubbard et al. 1993, especially ‘Introduction’, and the chapters by Lunden, Sejersted and Nordby.

5. This is the presently established conception – and terminology – of today’s historical scholarship on the Swedish great power.

6. Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Pocantico Hills, New York; Record Group 3, Series 910, Box 2, Folder 10, ‘Social Sciences – Program and Policy’, p. 3.

7. RAC, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Collection, Series III, Subseries 6, Box 77, Folder 804.

8. Ibid.

9. RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Collection, Record Group 1.1, Series 800 S, Box 10, Folder 101.

References

Aronsson, Peter, et al. 2008. ‘Nordic National Histories’, in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds), The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories, Writing the Nation Series, vol III. European Science Foundation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 256–82.

Bender, Thomas (ed). 1988. The University and the City: From Medieval Origins to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press.

Berger, Stefan. 2015. The Past as History. National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation Series, vol. VIII. European Science Foundation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Berger, Stefan, and Chris Lorenz (eds). 2008a. The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories. Writing the Nation Series, vol. III. European Science Foundation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2008b. ‘Introduction: National History Writing in Europe in a Global Age’, in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds), The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories. Writing the Nation Series, vol. III. European Science Foundation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–24.

Björk, Ragnar. 1996. ‘Un centre à la périphérie: Les aspects mêlés de l’héritage national suédois’, Historiens & Géographes, Off-print: No. 366, ‘Le sentiment national d’identité en Europe’.

———. 2011. ‘The Overlapping Histories of Sweden and Norway: The Union from 1814 to 1905’, in Tibor Frank and Frank Hadler (eds), Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts: Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation Series, vol. VI. European Science Foundation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 17–34.

———. 2016. ‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1): 49–54 and 56–57.

Frank, Tibor, and Frank Hadler (eds). 2011. Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts: Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation Series, vol. VI. European Science Foundation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Haapala, Pertti, Marja Jalava and Simon Larsson (eds). 2017. Making Nordic Historiography: Connections, Tensions and Methodology, 1850–1970. New York: Berghahn Books.

Hubbard, William H., et al. (eds). 1993. Making a Historical Culture: Historiography in Norway. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Kjellén, Rudolf. 1908. Ett program: Nationella samlingslinjer [A program: National lines of rallying]. Stockholm: Geber.

———. 1915. Die Ideen von 1914: Eine weltgeschichtliche Perspektive.

Leipzig: S. Hirzel.

———. 1916. Staten som lifsform: Politiska handböcker III [The State as a Form of Life: Political Handbooks III]. Stockholm: Geber.

von Laue, Theodore H. 1950. Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lunden, Kåre. 1993. ‘History and Society’, in William H. Hubbard et al. (eds), Making a Historical Culture: Historiography in Norway. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 15–51.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Pantheon.

Nordby, Trond. 1993. ‘State- and Nation-Building’, in William H. Hubbard et al. (eds), Making a Historical Culture: Historiography in Norway. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 181–209.

von Ranke, Leopold. 1950. ‘The Great Powers’, in Theodore H. von Laue, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [1833. ‘Die großen Mächte’, Historische Zeitschrift, Band 2: 1–51].

Sejersted, Francis. 1993. ‘Approaches to Modern Norwegian History’, in William H. Hubbard et al. (eds), Making a Historical Culture: Historiography in Norway. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 156–80.

CHAPTER 3

Sweden’s Borders

Kjellén’s Contribution to Social Science by Defining and Applying Geopolitics

CLAES G. ALVSTAM AND THOMAS LUNDÉN

The objective of this chapter is to give a short description of Rudolf Kjellén’s early empirical studies of Sweden’s borders, with emphasis on the principal aspects of his work, including his comparisons with similar historical and contemporaneous cases, and his application of geopolitics. As mentioned, Kjellén defined the concept of ‘geopolitics’ in an article in the popular scientific journal Ymer in 1899 (Kjellén 1899). Ymer was a quarterly journal, launched in 1881 and issued by the Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography (SSAG). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the society had a scope reflected in Ymer by broad definitions of the disciplines with a rather narrow focus on polar research and explorations in Africa (Ljungström 2004: 38–40). Membership was based on recommendations, and the society included many civil servants and academics, among them prominent women. When he wrote this piece, Kjellén had been a member of the SSAG since 1897 and was, following his doctoral dissertation in political science at Uppsala, working as a docent in political science and geography at the newly inaugurated Gothenburg University College. Although his teaching obligation in geography had been forced upon him by the college, he quickly broadened his scholarship by reading some classics by figures such as Carl Ritter, Alexander von Humboldt, Ferdinand von Richthofen, Eduard Suess, Albrecht Penck, and especially Friedrich Ratzel (Kjellén 1900: 1–17). He set about this task with increasing enthusiasm, and continued to publish geographically inspired articles well after his formal duties changed with his appointment to the Röhss’ Chair in political science with statistics at Gothenburg in 1902 (Alvstam 2014: 57ff).

Kjellén’s article, numbering almost fifty pages, at one point focuses on a none too exotic area – Sweden’s political boundaries. It is a very careful analysis of the historical documents forming the basis for the delimitation of the land boundary between Sweden and Norway, and the river boundary between Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Finland under the Russian Empire, followed by an analysis mainly based on cartographic material. The article is thus based on systematic archival studies on documents and secondary sources. Kjellén is very

much aware that his choice of study cannot be readily placed within a specific discipline, and he explains the earlier lack of studies on Sweden’s political boundaries by writing that

the subject itself … falls within a theoretical boundary area. The boundaries of Sweden are of interest to the geographer but also to the historian, the researcher of international law, the statistician and the politician, and a closer analysis of the boundaries cannot dispense with any of these disciplines.¹ (Kjellén 1899: 283)

His method is to describe the sources available, and then

to give a comprehensive description of our three main boundaries, in order thereafter to evaluate them from an ‘anthropogeographical’ – or, as I in this case would prefer to call it, geopolitical – point of view.² (Ibid., emphasis in the original)

His aim, based on an empirical study of Swedish conditions, is ‘to apply the impulses given by Friedrich Ratzel in his Antropogeographie I (1882) and Politische Geographie (1897)’ (Kjellén 1899: 283; Alvstam 2014: 72–73).

After the publication of the Ymer article, Kjellén continued his explorations within the field of geopolitics by initiating a grand research project to write a comprehensive popular geography of Sweden, adopting what he labels a ‘modern-genetic’ approach. The main idea behind the project was to trace the continuous development of Sweden’s territorial border from a long-term historical perspective, examining the negotiations between the Kingdom of Sweden and its neighbours through the lens of constitutional law, and encompassing not only large-scale territorial gains and losses, but also the more detailed local interpretations of Sweden’s borders. In this latter respect, Kjellén introduced the concept of ‘natural boundaries’, and formulated the research

question of whether a described political unit is also a natural geographical unit – whether, in other words, it represented ‘geographic individuality’ (Kjellén 1900: 26). This question leads him to ‘geopolitical routes’ where he, referring to Penck, turns to physical geography and incorporates general geomorphology with the endogenic as well as exogenic dynamic forces behind the formation of the physical landscape of border areas. The ‘natural’ boundary is thereafter juxtaposed with the ethnographic concept of a ‘cultural’ boundary, including differences in language, national character, and so on across national borders (ibid.: 28). His main emphasis, though, is to investigate states ‘striving for natural boundaries’ in order to attain external security (ibid.: 33f).

His grandiose ambition to complete a large-scale project along these lines was never realized, though there are many examples in his later works, both in political science and geography, in which he uses his transdisciplinary approach to combine history, constitutional law, politics, geography and ethnography into a synthesized ‘geopolitics’.

Neither the Ymer article nor the geography textbook of 1900 were translated from the Swedish original, and Kjellén himself saw these studies more as ‘propaedeutic’ efforts that would precede ‘deeper explorations into Sweden’s geography by adapting a modern approach’ (Kjellén 1900: 178). Nevertheless, they give a good picture of how Kjellén applied his views to detailed empirical material from Sweden, coupled with numerous international comparisons, and offer in this respect a solid example of early scholarship in the field of geopolitics.

Borders in History

Kjellén’s formal education, except for his main field of political science, was in history, and there is almost always a longue durée aspect to his studies. Sweden was historically in a tripartite relation to the outer world: to Denmark in the

south, Norway in the west, and Russia in the east. But since the Roskilde Peace of 1658 when the sea boundary with Denmark was established, only the eastern (Russian) and western (Norwegian, under Denmark) land borders remained, Finland having been ceded to Russia in 1809. With the Kiel Peace of 1814 and the establishment of the Swedish–Norwegian Union, only one international land border remained, with Russia. But both in a historical perspective, as well as in terms of the existing political balance, the three borders are analysed by Kjellén.

The southern border, with Denmark, is only mentioned by referring to historical documents, for reasons given later in the paper. With Norway, on the other hand, there is a wealth of documents going back to the thirteenth century, with the Boundary Treaty of 1751 (with Denmark) as the main source. The eastern boundary with Russia (when Finland was an integral part of Sweden) was signed as a treaty in 1323, while the Treaty of 1810 defined the new boundary towards the Duchy of Finland under Russia. Kjellén gives examples of territorial gains and losses up to the formal consolidation of Swedish territory in 1810, but does not mention the possessions in the east Baltic area, Germany or overseas, obviously because his point of departure was the 1899 territory, with only one aberration mentioned below.

A short paragraph is devoted to the physical marking of borders, with examples that include ancient Egypt, the Great Wall of China and the Dannewirke of Denmark, as well as the Russian–Swedish boundary in Finland. Stones, cairns and clearings are mentioned, the latter ‘method used even in the recent boundary markings, as in the Transylvanian mountains between Hungary and Romania in 1888 (8 metres) and in the Vosges between Germany and France (4 metres)’ (Kjellén 1899: 298, note 1). The 1810 border with Russia (Finland) is mainly riverine, and border markings on each side then indicate a distance to the actual limit in the river.

Topographical Description

Kjellén writes that political boundaries arise in accordance with the laws that in general determine political development:

These are of two origins, depending on whether the peoples seek their roots in nature or in history. We thus define a natural boundary as one determined by conditions in nature, and a cultural boundary as one created by historical developments. The first is linked to certain natural forms – a shore, mountain, watershed – while the latter rests on tradition and practice alone. But there is a presumption that the two versions will coincide, for as the power of nature has a strong impact on people’s minds, it is probable that historical developments have been tied to some prominent natural form. But they can also be independent of each other, in accordance with the degree of free will that lives in the population. When this will solely and deliberately designates a boundary, thereby neglecting both the influence of history and nature, then we have a third type of boundary, contrary to the previous ones, which might be called a constructed boundary. (Kjellén 1899: 303, emphasis in the original)

He then tries to define the different parts of the boundary according to the three principles. Only the particularly interesting notes or comments will be mentioned here. He begins with two exceptional cases affecting the southern end of the Norwegian–Swedish boundary. Starting in the Skagerrak waters, the delimitation is affected by a group of small underwater skerries, Grisbådarne, which already in 1897 caused a conflict between the two members of the union.³

The other case concerns the only part of the boundary where Norwegian territory makes a sharp inward bend into Sweden, leaving Swedish Bohuslän (attached to Sweden in 1658 and regulated in 1661) on its western side. This seemingly anomalous delimitation has its roots in internal divisions within the former Danish–Norwegian kingdom. The watershed of the Enningdal River leading to the Norwegian mouth of the Idde Fjord covers a large but narrow area of many lakes and rivulets. The actual boundary runs west–east in the middle of the area, leaving at least half of it in Sweden. Kjellén sees this as startling evidence that no consideration has been made of the river or watershed, or any other type of

natural form. In a note he adds that the Parish of Enningdal even before the separation of Bohuslän paid taxes to the province of Akershus, which remained in Norway. This is only one of several ‘bays’ of Norway protruding into Swedish territory, but it is the only one of any geopolitical interest.

Map 3.1 Strömstad, Swedish map of 1891. The Swedish topographical map shows the ‘protruding area’ of Norway, part of the Enning Valley (Enningdalen) water catchment area from Sweden in the south running into Norway, and the Idde Fjord separating the two countries. Source: Swedish Topographical Map 61, 1891.

Much of the long boundary area further northwards is sparsely populated, which makes the difference between a natural and a cultural boundary less interesting. In most cases where Kjellén sees a break in the natural conditions for delimitation he admits that there is no cultural overlapping. In the central areas of the Scandinavian Peninsula the boundary is a mixture of artificial, natural and cultural indices. Further north the mountain ridge called Kölen (‘the keel’) (cf. Lundén 2016: 383), which with some aberrations more or less defines the watershed, defines the border in the Boundary Treaty of 1751. Kjellén briefly mentions the codicil regulating the rights of migratory Sámi in Swedish Lapland to grazing lands on the Norwegian side (Kjellén 1899: 293; Kjellén 1900: 44ff; Lundén 2014: 188–89).

The Swedish–Norwegian boundary ends at the triple point with Finland (then under Russia). Kjellén briefly mentions the Finnish–Norwegian boundary which he sees historically and in international law as a direct continuation of the Lapland boundary (cf. Lundén 2016: 413f). He interprets the delimitation in the Boundary Treaty with Russia of 1826 as an attempt to keep Russia away from Varanger Bay. But he sees the two protrusions of Russian Finland as ‘political bays’ separating Sweden from Norway.

The north-eastern boundary of Sweden is defined by the river basin ending in the Torne River. He is careful to point out that town of Torneå (in Finnish ‘Tornio’) in Finland is located on a peninsula on the western riverbank. ‘Nature is thus still working on drawing Torneå more intimately to the Swedish side, to which the town belonged naturally’ (Kjellén 1899: 315; Kjellén 1900: 152f).

Geopolitical Analysis

Kjellén first points out that the concept of

natural boundaries conceal ambiguities both in form and content. The expression is on the one hand ambiguous, as in current usage it has two interpretations, one more distinctively signifying ‘based in nature’, another connoting something that is ‘clearly appropriate’. If the former definition is used, then all cultural and artificial boundaries would be illegitimate, while in the latter sense of the term certain cultural boundaries (e.g. linguistic ones) would very well be found natural, while we on the contrary will find several boundaries based in nature to be highly unnatural as political boundaries. (Kjellén 1899: 317, emphasis in the original)

But Kjellén then admits that there is often only a slight difference between different types of boundary: ‘Judging the political value of boundaries, we only differentiate between (relatively) good and bad boundaries’. He then sketches a history of border drawing, starting with early attempts to fence in and protect oneself from enemy tribes, often surrounded by wide zones of uninhabited land. These tendencies may, in special circumstances, live on into the present, which Kjellén exemplifies by the treaty-defined waste boundary between China and Korea. In a note he also mentions a number of cases from European history as well as from contemporary Africa. As modern examples he refers to ‘buffer states’ and to the use of Cossacks in Russia and the Militärgrenze in Austria before 1881.

As populations increase, the ‘commons’ that separate different places are settled, and territories come into direct contact. Isolation is broken, communication takes over, and buffer zones disappear. But as long as peoples live side by side

deliberately and with an instinct for self-preservation, the impulse to communicate and exchange must not be followed to a point where national identity is endangered.

Our era has overcome the old international principle of enclosure, but it has not set full ‘intertwinement’ … but a sound mixture of both, still with the centre of gravity towards the former. It is from this point of departure that the boundary should be evaluated … We thus demand from a good boundary that it should be, relatively seen, a good separator between the peoples, so they do not intertwine in their qualities and ideas. And hand in hand with this internal psychological aspect goes the external principle that the boundary should serve as a protection, being easy to defend and to surveil. (Kjellén 1899: 318–19, emphasis in original)

From these notions of the cultural side of boundary relations, Kjellén moves on to consider more trivial aspects of the demography and geometry of borders.

The final part of this chapter is an attempt to evaluate the territorial configuration of Sweden. The border is in general satisfying from a geometrical point of view, especially compared to the Norwegian–Russian (Finnish) boundary, which he compares to the northern boundary of Italy, ‘sticking its bays and prickles in between the Swiss and Austrian Alps’. Looking in closer detail, Kjellén finds Norway having an advantage with the several ‘bays’ protruding into Sweden. He does not mention here that in the Enningdalen case (see above) the watershed principle would have given Norway even more territory, while in the other cases he admits the cultural principle as a reason for Norway’s territorial dominance. In a case in the north (Vapstälven River flowing into Norway), where the watershed principle is disregarded in favour of a straight line, Kjellén excuses the break with the fact that the straight line runs through almost uninhabited territory (Kjellén 1900: 142).

Looking at a historical-cultural boundary, it is often contrary to a ‘statal viewpoint’ – that is, a perspective focused on internal and external military

security. But it has beyond its geographical rationale a psychological one: the suggestive power of habitual concepts to human minds. Even a purely historical boundary can gain a certain degree of solidity through age itself, making its existence an undeniable fact. Kjellén’s verdict regarding the cultural boundary is similar to that regarding the constructed boundary: if it coincides with an appropriate natural feature, it offers a positive advantage, but if it contravenes an otherwise natural tendency, its advantages will be undermined, as nature will in the long run prevail.

Sweden’s southern border with Norway is historically defined, running through a homogeneous landscape that is primarily forest. While not especially good from a geographical perspective, this is positively bad in ignoring the real and important fact of the watershed. Kjellén notes a growing trend towards keeping river systems together within political units. The formation of the Congo state is one example, as is the resolution of the Fashoda crisis between ‘England’ and France.⁴ He further mentions that a

nation willingly sends its spurs up or down a river valley, thereby encouraging territorial demands. We see a good example of this in the Southern Alps, where the water divide between Italy and its northern neighbours is twice broken by the political boundary, as the upper valley of Ticino belongs to Switzerland, and that of the Adige to Austria, but in both cases the rivers have extended the Italian nationality and thus encouraged Italian demands on political association with [against] the canton of Ticino and the crown land of Tyrol. (Kjellén 1899: 325)

Kjellén asserts that Sweden’s boundary with Norway diverges from the riverine distribution, going first west of the divide, then east of it. That Norway has certain rights to log driving and salmon fishing down the Swedish part of the Trysil/Klarälven River is seen by Kjellén as evidence of the possibilities for conflict and political inconvenience. In the Enningdal case, which shows the opposite distribution of territorial supremacy, he says that nature has resulted in Norwegian Fredrikshald (Halden) enfolding much of the Swedish Dalsland province within its commercial influence. But the fact that the natural factors

have not had a greater effect shows the importance of cultural, historical and constitutional factors (Kjellén 1899: 325, note 2). The divergence of watershed boundary and political border in the southern and middle parts is mitigated by historical tradition and by the sparse population in areas where culture is not an important factor, but Kjellén sees these segments of the line as a bad boundary.

Kjellén acknowledges, however, that much of the area is lowland with indistinct divisions between watersheds. Mountain ranges are recognized as better boundaries, both because they naturally divide populations on each side and because they serve a defensive role, with their significant obstacles and narrow passes, without totally eliminating communication. Kjellén gives the examples of Bohemia, Hungary, France after 1871, and Central Asia. But the last case shows that the details of demarcation may still be unclear, as exemplified by the Pamir controversy. In cases where the mountain crest and the watershed division do not coincide, as between Chile and Argentina, the watershed provides a more organic boundary, and thus is preferable for international law. Sweden’s northern border closely maps on to watershed-dividing mountains in the Kölen range, which Kjellén sees as part of a model boundary.

The river boundary has historically played a more important role than any other type, particularly as borderland zones become populated and a clear delimitation is needed. Even rivulets can serve, such as the Rubicon, Leitha, Eider and, in Sweden’s case, the Brömsebäck with Denmark, Systerbäck [Sestroretsk] with Russia, and Göta Älv (River) with Norwegian Bohuslen. The suitability of riverine borders can also be seen in France’s Rhine border with Germany, and in the Central Asian Oxus boundary between Russia and the British Empire (‘England’). ‘Looking at the contemporary map, one can find, even in culturally distinctive countries, river boundaries along the Danube, Upper Rhine, in East Asia, Equatorial and South Africa and among the La Plata countries’ (Kjellén 1899: 326–27).

It is easy to see the good qualities of a river boundary. But rivers are not as reliable as they may seem:

International law defines the deepest point [djupfåra] as the boundary, but rivers constantly change, forming serpentines and sandbanks. … Mountains do not have an economic function, but rivers are cultural mediators. We have already pointed out organically combining the flow of a river from its sources to its estuary, but if it is unnatural to cut the flow of a river, it is even more unnatural to sever one side from the other. By its character as a communication artery, the river works to densify the population instead of dispersing it, and it thus directly violates the preconditions for a good boundary. It is thus clear that the growth of communication has a tendency to decrease the use of rivers as state boundaries. Just as Sweden transgresses the Göta River, we see today Russia crossing its Amur towards Manchuria, threatening Korea at the Yalu; and Germany’s advance in the 1870 War meant a better mountain boundary instead of the Rhine. (Kjellén 1899: 327f emphasis in the original)

Kjellén, however, admits that in exceptional cases where the river valley is deep and wide, the shores steep and the flow turbulent enough, it will hinder contact across the two sides. Tara’s unsurmountable clefts make a good boundary between Montenegro and Turkey, and even the wild flowing water of the uninhabited upper part of the Swedish–Finnish boundary and the wide and deep Idde Fjord are acceptable to Kjellén.

Map 3.2 Map of Haparanda town and the border to Finland under Russia, 1874. Kjellén is careful to point out that the town of Torneå (Tornio) in Russian Finland is located on a peninsula on the western riverbank. The river basin argument here speaks in favour of a single political management of the area, but he admits that the population on both sides of the river are Finnish-speaking. Source: Swedish map of jurisdictional districts (Härad), 1874.

But much worse are the conditions for the main part of Sweden’s boundary with Russia, the Torne Valley (Kjellén 1899: 327–28). Kjellén paints a picture of this northern river valley, with a density of population matched only by urban areas, and with an intensity of contact across the river in terms of commerce, fishing, shipping and agriculture, and even in illicit trading if the river is a customs boundary.

Nature cannot offer a better type of communication. A startling example is given by the language boundary between Swedes and Finns: it has developed totally independent of the river lines.

When the boundary between Sweden and Russia in its most important section was located in such a river valley of homogeneous culture, and when Russia at the most important point was even allowed to jump over and take a foothold on the Swedish shore, it reveals a lack of geopolitical insight among the statesmen of the time – or of a conscious determination on the one side to create only a preliminary boundary. … Russian politics has distant aspects and a good memory. (Kjellén 1899: 329, emphases in the original)

Kjellén’s Summary

Kjellén concludes that the Swedish border is geographically most apt where political friction is weakest, in the sparsely populated areas of Lapland, while lacking any natural basis in the south-west with Norway as well as in the northeast with Russia, where it is only based on tradition [hävd] or on an even more unstable riverine foundation. Looking at the southern border with Norway, Kjellén summarizes that

there is no ‘natural boundary’. Nature has left the boundary open. And the same goes for the Scandinavian land border with continental Europe [i.e. the border with Finland] … Scandinavia thus totally lacks the natural dividing wall that the Pyrenees gave Spain, the Alps gave Italy and the Himalaya gave India … Together with Finland, Scandinavia is a ‘connecting peninsula’ and the Torne and Tana rivers cannot save its independence any more than the Jalu and Tumen rivers can geographically detach Korea from China. (Kjellén 1899: 330)

Sweden is thus geographically open towards its neighbours in the south-west and the north-east.

That this condition nonetheless has been durable and also created a sense of security can be attributed to the two other main factors that … determine the strength of a political border: political balance, the proportion of strength between a population and its neighbours, and historical pressure, the degree of interest that one side holds for the other side. Just about half a century after the demarcation of the Swedish–Norwegian boundary, the union acted as protective garb concealing its deficiencies, and less than half a century after the demarcation of the north-eastern border, Russia shifted its political centre of gravity to the south and the east. Thus, the union and Russia’s reorientation served to hide the weaknesses of the border. But should the judicial cover of Sweden’s left side [i.e. the union with Norway] dissolve, and should Russia once again turn towards Scandinavia in pursuing its interests, then it would be clear that our country has vulnerable parts that lack what we may call natural boundaries. (Kjellén 1899: 331, emphases in original)

Conclusion

This, Kjellén’s first article on geopolitics, has become a standard reference in contemporary studies on the topic. His definition is short, and while he first mentions ‘anthropogeography’, he evidently wants to clarify the concept as something partly distinct from human geography, even if he refers to Ratzel. Later scholars, such as Thermaenius (1938), have argued that geopolitics and political geography are closely related, even if not the same. In both cases, the state plays a more important role than in the human geography of Ratzel.⁵

The semantics of ‘nature’ are discussed rather late in the article. Kjellén rightly points out the ambiguous meaning of the word, and seems committed to a blended meaning, whereby a boundary based in nature seems to be more ‘natural’ than other boundaries.

The description of Swedish borders is not controversial but is appallingly onesided. Even when the neighbouring states of Norway and Russia (Finland) are mentioned, Kjellén’s evaluations proceed only from an internal Swedish perspective. His assessments are also one-sided in that the physical configuration is privileged over other aspects. Incursions into Sweden are automatically seen as part of a bad boundary.

Rivers are given much attention. A river cut by a boundary between its headwaters and its mouth can be the basis for conflict, while a river coextensive with a state boundary is usually (with some exceptions) even worse. Kjellén points out the changing course of rivers, which can make ambiguous the exact location of the border. In addition to this, river basins are usually a zone of cooperation among the populations living in the area.

Kjellén points to two areas of weakness along the Swedish border. The southwestern border with Norway is characterized by many ‘bays’ and river crossings. Overall, the landscape is rather low and forested, leaving little basis for a strong, strategic delimitation. Kjellén discusses watersheds where the headwaters are in Sweden (particularly Enningdalen) and the mouth in Norway, and vice versa (the Trysil-Klara river), but he does not seem to consider either country to have an advantage. In the Enningdalen case, he deplores Norwegian Halden’s (then Frederikshald) impact as a commercial ‘catchment area’, but the historical basis of a domestic parish on the Norwegian side is accepted. In general, when the natural basis seems unclear, Kjellén refers to history and usage (hävd), often in favour of the Norwegian side. But on the whole, Norway is rarely mentioned.

The other area of weakness is in the north-east, the river boundary with Russian Finland. The river basin argument here favours a single nation administering the area. His argument is strengthened by the fact that the populations on both sides of the river are Finnish-speaking. Kjellén here makes an exception in very clearly and negatively mentioning Russia as a menace.

Kjellén has been accused of being an irredentist (cf. Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume), but he is unusual in never demanding any territorial reforms to Sweden’s advantage. Rather, his evaluations are one-sided in that only the Swedish side of the boundary is analysed, and often found to be deficient, but the other side might often end up with the same evaluation.

So, what about Kjellén’s evaluations? From the distance of 120 years, we can see that the border remains intact, even its ‘weak’ parts. In terms of the southern part of the Norwegian–Swedish border, which he judged to be weak, the split of the union in 1905 did not inspire irredentist claims. But the border became significant during the Nazi German occupation of Norway from 1940 to 1945. The weak boundary zone then proved to be a relatively safe way for Norwegians to flee their occupied country into neutral Sweden (Hansson 2019). In the northeast, the Russian menace forced Sweden to strengthen its military installations

(Rodell 2009). With respect to Tsarist Russia in the First World War, the Finnish Civil War and Finland’s complicated situation during the Second World War, the weak Swedish border partly served to aid escaping Finns. In this sense, Kjellén’s weak boundaries proved to be an asset for maintaining an open society.

Claes G. Alvstam is emeritus professor of international economic geography at the School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, and former director of its Centre for International Business Studies. His research comprises international trade and investments issues, international trade and transport policy, and the internationalization process of the business firm. He has published frequently in leading journals, such as Economic Geography, Journal of Economic Geography, World Development, Multinational Business Review and Asian Business and Management. He has also (together with Gunnar Falkemark) edited a student textbook anthology on cases in geopolitics: Geopolitik. Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, Padrigu Press, 1992.

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University. His latest book is Pommern: ett gränsfall i tid och rum [Pomerania: A border case in time and space] (Lund University, 2016), and his earlier scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, for example: ‘Geopolitics and Religion: A Mutual and Conflictual Relationship. Spatial Regulation of Creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology / Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25(2) (July 2015); ‘Border Twin Cities in the Baltic Area: Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’, in John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova (eds), Twin Cities: Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time (Routledge, 2019); and ‘Turning towards the Inland Sea? Swedish “Soft Diplomacy” towards the Baltic Soviet Republics before Independence’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/03468755.2021.1896576.

Notes

1. ‘… att själfva ämnet … faller inom ett teoretiskt gränsområde. För Sveriges gränser intressera sig jämte geografen äfven historikern och folkrättsforskaren, statistikern och politikern; och en närmare analys af gränserna kan icke undvara metoder och synpunkter från något af dessa forskningsriken.’

2. ‘… gifva en öfversiktlig beskrifning af våra tre hufvudgränser, för att därefter kunna värdera dem ur “antropogeografisk” – eller, som jag i detta fall skulle föredraga att säga, geopolitisk – synpunkt.’

3. The boundary conflict, which was actually about lobster catchment rights, was solved in 1909 by international arbitration, mainly in Sweden’s favour, but a legally binding agreement was not reached until a convention about territorial waters was reached on 5 April 1967 (Lundén 2014: 197–98).

4. The Fashoda crisis of 1897 was a clash between French advances eastwards from French Congo towards the Sudan, while British interests kept the Upper Nile connection southwards. Kjellén saw the solution as a vindication of the ‘river basin’ principle.

5. See Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume, for further elaborations on Kjellén’s relation between political science and geography.

References

Alvstam, Claes-Göran. 2014. ‘Kjellén som geograf’, in Bert Edström, Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén (eds), Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och

konservatismen. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 55–81.

Hansson, Lars. 2019. Vid gränsen: Mottagningen av flyktingar från Norge 1940– 1945 [At the Frontier. Sweden’s reception of refugees from Norway 1940–1945]. Gothenburg: Gothenburg University.

Kjellén, Rudolf. 1899. ‘Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser’, Ymer 19(3): 283–331.

———. 1900. Inledning till Sveriges geografi: Populärt vetenskapliga föreläsningar vid Göteborgs Högskola, No. XIII. Gothenburg: Wettergren & Kerber.

Ljungström, Olof. (2002) 2004. Oscariansk antropologi: Etnografi, förhistoria och rasforskning under sent 1800-tal [The science of man in nineteenth century Sweden: exotism, archeology and racial studies as scientific views of humanity in the ‘Oscarian’ period]. Stockholm: Gidlunds.

Lundén, Thomas. 2014. ‘Nordic Boundary Conflicts in the 20th Century’, in Anna Moraczewska and Wojciech Janicki (eds), Border Conflicts in the Contemporary World. Lublin: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 193– 213.

———. 2016. ‘Kölen’; ‘Lapland’, in Mats-Olof Olsson (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Barents Region. Oslo: Pax forlag, p. 383, 413f.

Ratzel, Friedrich. 1882. Antropogeographie. Stuttgart: Verlag von J. Engelhorn.

———. 1897. Politische Geographie. Munich: Oldenbourg.

Rodell, Magnus. 2009. ‘Fortifications in the Wilderness: The Making of Swedish–Russian Borderlands around 1900’, Journal of Northern Studies 1: 69– 89.

Thermaenius, Edvard. 1938. ‘Geopolitics and Political Geography’, Baltic and Scandinavian Countries IV: 165–77.

CHAPTER 4

Rudolf Kjellén’s Great Power Studies

The Editions

RAGNAR BJÖRK

Introduction

Background and Purpose

Rudolf Kjellén’s analytical approach, embodied in the concept of geopolitics, was codified and demonstrated empirically across the several editions, from 1905 to 1920, of his magnum opus, Stormakterna [the great powers]. Kjellén’s concern with the great powers started out with lectures at Gothenburg University College, beginning around 1900. He wanted his students to become informed about international affairs. When he collected the material from these lectures for publication it was intended both for an academic audience, including students and colleagues, and for the general public. He called the resulting works ‘handbooks’.

Since becoming professor of political science, with teaching obligations in geography, at Gothenburg in 1895 he had become increasingly frustrated with the political science discipline in Sweden. Its focus had been solely on constitutional history. The increasingly irrelevant, and in effect futile, legal argumentation regarding the Swedish–Norwegian union, mainly by his teacher Oscar Alin, was a particular source of frustration, as it understood politics only in legal terms.¹ The Norwegians had argued for emancipation, for sovereignty, on the basis also of an increasingly democratic polity. They won the day.

Political science had to become more relevant, Kjellén argued, and this required two kinds of reorienting approaches – getting closer to the ‘reality’ of politics

and staying more in touch with ‘contemporary affairs’. The ‘reality’ meant paying attention not just to the letter of the law in a particular nation-state, but to what might be called ‘the deep context’: the very material basis for governance, including economics, trade, social affairs, and so on. In effect, political science needed to become the social science² (see Björk, ‘Swedish Intellectual and Political Context’, this volume).

Stormakterna was intended both as an illustration of his geopolitical ideas, and an example of political science undertaken as the social science of the ‘real world’ of contemporary politics. The purpose of this chapter is to examine Stormakterna’s argument as it evolved across the various editions, the scholarly principles Kjellén professed, and the methodology he employed. Quotes from Kjellén himself are used to express his reasoning. This is both to clarify and validate the argument as such, and to convey a sense of Kjellén’s often vivid language, metaphors and associations. This also serves to illuminate Kjellén’s conceptual world, the thinking and reasoning of a scholar in the decades before and after the turn of the twentieth century.

The Editions

Some initial bibliographical information is necessary. The successive editions – together with yearly summaries by Kjellén published in periodicals, which are not addressed at length here – functioned as a continuous commentary, one whose revisions and updates can all be seen alongside one another at the same time, on the status of the various great powers as well as on international affairs in general; if you will, the early twentieth century version of an online update.

Kjellén published three main editions of Stormakterna. The full title of the first edition in 1905 was Stormakterna: Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik [The great powers: Contours of contemporary high politics]. It comprised two books, but later they would usually be published in one volume. The first book is subtitled Rent europeiska stormakter [Purely European great powers] with a

preface dated March 1905; the second book, subtitled England, Förenta Staterna, Ryssland, Japan [England, the United States, Russia, Japan], had new pagination and a preface dated September 1905.

The second edition, published from 1911 to 1913, carries the same title, and it is in several senses an extended version of the 1905 edition. This edition contains four books, which were typically published in two volumes. The first book, with a preface from November 1911, covers the former great powers Austria-Hungary and Italy. The second book, with a preface from October 1912, deals with France and Germany. The third book, with a preface from May 1913, is wholly devoted to England. This edition includes also some documentary source material, such as the Monroe doctrine of 1823, the 1878 Berlin agreement, and various alliance and entente agreements, as well as the 1812 ‘will of Peter the Great’. The fourth book, with a preface from November 1913, covers the United States, Russia and Japan, with an additional section titled ‘Slutsatser’ [Conclusions].³

The 1920 edition remains mainly a torso since it is not as elaborated as the previous editions and what Kjellén had in mind to accomplish. It has a preface from May 1920, and is entitled Stormakterna och världskrisen [The great powers and the world crisis]. The book is divided into two parts, ‘The old great power system’, which revisits all eight great powers, and ‘The world crisis and the new system’.⁴ In the 1920 edition, Kjellén utilizes a system of categories for analysing the state, which he put forward in the 1916 book, Staten som lifsform [The state as a form of life]. Each nation-state chapter in the 1920 edition includes sections titled ‘Genesis’ [Sw. Uppkomst], ‘Realm’ [Sw. Rike], ‘People’ [Sw. Folk], and then, alternatively, ‘Constitutional problems’, ‘Society and regiment’, ‘Household and society’, or some combination of these. The final section for each power is labelled ‘Foreign policy’ [Sw. Utrikespolitik]. The 1920 edition was translated into German, and in 1921 was published as Die Grossmächte und die Weltkrise. Its 23rd edition appeared in 1930 as Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkrise in a version updated and revised by Karl Haushofer (cf. Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s legacy’, this volume). No fewer than fourteen works by Kjellén were available in German.

In 1914, another edition was published in response to public demand for the book, but also because of the death of Kjellén’s publisher, Hugo Geber. The content is more or less wholly congruent with the official second edition.

In the meantime, Kjellén had also, in journals and daily newspapers, written more or less yearly updates of events in international affairs. Several of these were collected and published in at least two volumes related to his work on the great powers. They are Politiska essayer: Studier till dagskrönikan (1907–1913) [Political essays: Studies for the daily chronicle (1907–1913)] (1914); and Världskrigets politiska problem [The political problems of the World War] (1915). In the latter, geopolitical aspects are given more focused attention.

A note on terminology: during the nineteenth century, sovereign countries were established in the form of nation-states. This is how things stood when Kjellén’s analyses appeared at around the end of that century. These nation-states are the ones that appear in the international arena as legal subjects, as parties to international agreements, and so on. The great powers are all nation-states, in the above sense, but some of them are also empires. The terms state, country, realm, power, land and nation are used at different times to refer to these sovereign nation-states. The term nation-state is the generic term. Kjellén very rarely used the term. Rather, he alternated between nation, state and power. Where Kjellén uses the term ‘nation’ to mean ‘people’, this is either explicitly indicated or is made clear from the context.

To the extent that the literature on discourses on such topics as international relations, cultures and civilizations, and on great powers, have been brought into the picture, it is to help to situate Kjellén’s approach in the overall field. The following is primarily intended to be a presentation and an analysis of his work, rather than an assessment. However, in a concluding section of this chapter, Kjellén’s perception of the great powers is considered alongside more recent analyses of diplomacy and strategy, of international relations, and of great-power discourse.

Some Essential Characteristics of Kjellén’s Stormakterna

Kjellén’s work on the great powers has some peculiar characteristics, which in several senses sets it apart from contemporaneous studies, and from great-power studies in general.

(1) Kjellén is convinced that a relevant analysis must be up-to-date, contemporaneous or modern.⁵ This is seen in two ways: in disciplinary scholarship and in methodology. The first two editions in particular contain yearly chronologies. They document what has transpired on the international scene, summarizing tensions, incidents, conflicts, summits, treatises, new political actors, and the like. These events are evaluated and used to adjust or fine tune – and in some cases even to reverse – his previous analyses. Through this approach, by working on a continuously evolving ‘theory’ of the great powers, he rather stands alone among other theoreticians of the topic, both contemporary and more recent. In some senses he comes closer to observers dealing with international relations or diplomacy (Tilly 1990; Watson 1992; Mann 1993; Kissinger 1994; Wilkinson 2007; Siracusa 2010).⁷ A third discourse, partly overlapping with the recently mentioned ones, is the one on cultures and civilizations (Toynbee 1946; Spengler 1962 [German original Untergang des Abendlandes, 1917]; Quigley 1979; Huntington 1996; Ferguson 2011).⁸

(2) As Kjellén published three editions a few years apart, he returned to his own findings over and over again, adjusting his analysis, and thus making it a kind of record in real time. The most rewarding aspect of this is the fact that he returns to the great-power scene after the First World War. Primary attention will here be given to the 1905 and 1920 editions.

(3) Kjellén’s ambition was to make his approach global, to encompass the whole – as he puts it – ‘planetary situation’, in order to go beyond the European perspective. The ‘planetary’ approach is also appropriate given that these decades around the turn of the twentieth century were ‘internationalist’, not least

regarding the community of scholars (Lyons 1963). One must emphasize here that this global perspective does not mean seeing the world from a ‘world history’ perspective (McNeill 1998), or using a ‘world system’ approach (Wallerstein 1974).

(4) Kjellén incorporates specific knowledge of each nation-state, each great power. This is done somewhat in the vein of Landeskunde, where substantial statistical information, together with other basic information on resources, are compiled country by country. Kjellén’s whole approach depends on such a detailed and deep understanding of each power, though with emphasis on categories – including location, space, demography, production, constitution, and the like – that he systematically employs in his ‘excavation’ of each nation-state. He uses these to measure the strengths or weaknesses, advantages or disadvantages, of each great power in its jockeying for position. As he puts it, each power is ‘autopsied’. It should be added here that this combination of teaching and research was not alien to some of the professors of political science who had preceded Kjellén at Uppsala such as Wilhelm Erik Svedelius (1816– 1889), though it was usually done in a rather crude manner. This state-by-state approach organizes the whole work. To explicate this approach, and to show how Kjellén tries to identify ‘types’ of great powers that demonstrate ‘regularities’ and assess their prospects, four of these powers – Germany, the United States, Russia and Japan – will be presented in the next chapter.

(5) Kjellén’s intended journey is from theory or concept formation to ‘empirical tests’, or ‘applications’. This is done continuously in his editions of Stormakterna. As he puts it:

My examinations of the great powers are practical applications, illustrations, or experiments, if you will, to test a theoretical model of the modern state that deliberately differs from the one that, to us, seems to have received an official academic seal of approval. …

The legitimacy of my work’s [Stormakterna] scientific value will be clear from an empirical study of the concept of the state, where ‘Stormakterna’ relates like illustrations to a text. (Kjellén 1913b: 140)

The Idea of the Great Power

Kjellén writes that ‘when you search for a viewpoint on contemporary international relations you only have to study the great powers. Into their mutual relations all the important questions are drawn. The great powers, they are the world. Great-power politics is world history at work’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 20).

Kjellén’s concern is with political power, in the form of designated nation-states of a certain magnitude, such as the eight great powers he recognizes: England, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Japan and the United States. His interest is not in units such as civilizations or cultures, in the senses used by Spengler and Toynbee in his own time, or in more general configurations like ‘the West’ or ‘the Orient’ as used in recent years by Huntington and Ferguson.

One implication here is that it is not the scholar who creates the units to be studied; these are not theoretically deduced categories based on factors like religion, which is typical for studies of cultures and civilizations such as Huntington’s. Nor are they units devised by scholars, such as those based on material progress (e.g. systems of production) or anthropological-psychological characteristics (e.g. inward- and outward-looking dispositions). Rather, Kjellén, along with certain other students of international relations (e.g. Kennedy, Watson, Kissinger), recognizes the units as they recognize themselves.

There are a couple of methodological advantages to this. First, to the extent the scholar would like to examine their potential to ‘go up’ or ‘go down’ as a great power, he deals with legal subjects, identified by international law. They, thus,

have both the formal and the practical ability to operate with a ‘foreign policy’ – something you could hardly ascribe to a ‘civilization’ or a ‘culture’, whose voluntarist potential might be limited to (as in the work by Toynbee) a ‘challenge-and-response’ dynamic. Here, voluntarism refers to the idea that society is malleable. You may, and lastingly so, change it according to a certain design; the work of the ‘social engineer’. An early version of the idea is found in the thinking of Giambattista Vico, from the early eighteenth century. In the twentieth century totalitarian societies made the most of it, including manipulating also the individual.

Secondly, when Kjellén embarks upon his empirical examinations of these nation-states, it is relatively easy for him to find data – statistical, historical and otherwise – regarding demography, economy, military resources, political systems, and so on. These data, then, are eminently fit for comparisons between units. Kjellén may thus discern ‘types’ of great powers and identify patterns and trajectories among them. How did these powers come to figure in the present political configuration? Where are they all individually heading? Which are ‘going down’ and which are ‘going up’, poised to dominate the world scene?

Kjellén’s approach also differs from diplomatic and international relations studies by not taking into consideration the actions of ‘statesmen’, as he calls the politicians operating internationally from 1815 to the Great War. Their subjective predispositions, and at times erratic behaviour, are not taken into consideration, he argues, because this would make a ‘scientific’ study of the great powers impossible. The ‘types’, the patterns, the ‘laws’ must be both recognized and seen as operating without any statesman interfering.

Another noticeable difference between Kjellén’s approach to the great powers, and the fields of ‘international relations’ and ‘diplomacy’, is that the latter tend to treat the states as a kind of ‘solid units’, a unified, concerted leadership, untroubled by internal divisions, thus as strong players in international affairs (Ranke 1833; Kissinger 1974) with less emphasis on the state’s resources, including its internal politics. Kissinger speaks, though only occasionally, of

conflicts between Tories and Whigs (Kissinger 1974: 72–74), and Siracusa mentions Labour’s opposition to the Versailles peace agreement, as well as John Maynard Keynes contributions to this outcome (Siracusa 2010: 50–52).

The existence, or ‘life’, of nation-states is approached from a biological point of view, which to Kjellén is a ‘modern’ one. The metaphor, though, is not Spengler’s life cycle approach, referring either to their growth, flowering and death, or the yearly cycle of seasons from spring to winter. Rather, Kjellén equips the powers with a will, and with different degrees of the willpower necessary both to survive the struggle for existence, and – particularly for a great power – to compete with other great powers. Kjellén does not use the concepts of social Darwinism or make references to them, and nor does he elaborate the parallel to individual actors with recourse to the language of human psychology. By contrast, when Kissinger demonstrates the difference between the realist Th. Roosevelt and the idealist Woodrow Wilson, he characterizes the former’s reasoning as Social Darwinist (Kissinger 1974: 40).

One may here also discern the two kinds of competition, for ‘winning’ (dominance) and for ‘survival’, typical to many fields of human endeavour. When Kjellén examined the outcomes for the great powers in the First World War, it was clear to him that some had just barely survived as sovereign nationstates, while others had ‘won’ by remaining as flourishing great powers.¹

The Kjellénian approach to great-power rivalry can be compared to nations’ attempts to outdo one another at international exhibitions, from the Crystal Palace of 1851 onwards, where a strong showing could implicitly intimidate or even threaten other states. This is not exactly ‘soft power’, but perhaps something closer to Theodore Roosevelt’s metaphor of the ‘big stick’ – albeit one held behind your back.

In terms of Swedish domestic politics, Kjellén was both a member of parliament and very active as a public intellectual – a true ‘activist’ – with a clear and

prescriptive vision for Sweden’s political future. But in the case of the study of great-power politics, he draws a clear red line. Although he, as a citizen and scholar in a small, neutral country, could not expect to influence great-power politics in any way, he is adamant in emphasizing the importance of the scientist remaining objective, neither examining the role of ‘statesmen’ nor indulging in ‘that’ kind of politics. The Kathedersozialist option is not on the table.

Evolution of Great Powers

The concept of a ‘great power’¹¹ arose out of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Watson 1992). It was, at the time, less the result of scholarly analysis and categorization than the self-conception and co-optation of a group of nations in a position to shape the future of international relations – ‘We are the great powers!’ Thus, the European state system took on an institutional and pseudolegal character; a formalized system, with anticipated meetings to evaluate how the system had performed – and several such meetings, or summits, actually took place in later decades.

Some scholars, such as Watson, even traced the relations between states backwards in time and identified a ‘system’ very early, as in the case of ‘ancient systems’ that evolved into an ‘international society’. The Congress of Vienna had consecrated five powers to be reckoned with – Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Like a latter day ‘security council’, these five powers were a kind of aristocracy in international affairs, with rights but also with duties, such as controlling smaller powers in their vicinity, a ‘turf responsibility’, if you will. The early nineteenth-century historian A.H.L. Heeren called these powers ‘a senate’.¹² As some observers noted, these powers were best understood as existing side by side – not one following the other, occasionally as the reigning ‘hegemon’. This was arguably an older form of international control and domination.¹³ Other scholars, meanwhile, emphasized the balance-of-power situation in earlier eras, in which the balance was conditional and unstable.

The Vienna Congress was supposed to end the several centuries of ‘European civil wars’, and it succeeded rather well, lending further credibility to the fivepower consecration for most of the rest of the nineteenth century. The system initially functioned well, at least until 1848, but the revolutionary events still allowed the congress system to remain intact. After that a period of ‘troubles’ ensued, before the congress in Berlin 1878 settled things again. The primary purpose of that congress was to impose order on the imperial and colonial ‘scrambles’ that transferred great-power conflicts into new places. Again, stability was achieved. However, from the mid-1890s, new dramas began, now mainly based outside Europe. This state of affairs, in which the number of great powers reached eight, drove Kjellén to define a ‘great power’ and account for their emergence.

Two New Great Powers – USA and Japan

This expanded group now included the newly unified Italy, and two nonEuropean powers, the United States and Japan. At the time it was not selfevident that they should be included. The established great powers had mandated their place in the ‘senate’ or ‘system’, mainly by continuously fighting each other. They thus claimed interests, legitimate or not, beyond their proper borders; they had a ‘foreign policy’, rather than just a ‘security policy’, which was the main concern of smaller powers. The two new powers were not part of the recognized ‘system’. Their locations, across the ocean from a European point of view, made them stand apart from historically characteristic European interactions. Other of their characteristics also diverged from those of the original powers. Kjellén was to describe these two new ones as ‘apparent anomalies’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 254).

The United States, on a faraway continent, while having acquired territory from the crumbling Spanish Empire, and developing an impressively productive society, had, until the end of the nineteenth century, faced difficulties qualifying as a great power in terms of foreign policy. Also, it had not sought colonies in the manner of European states. Its posture to the outside world was often

isolationist. All these aspects changed swiftly and comprehensively in the 1890s.

Japan, likewise far from the European continent, was an isolated and isolationist country par excellence. It had withdrawn, taking a time-out, as it were, for a decade after Commander Perry had energetically knocked on its doors in 1853– 54, and then started a headlong rush to modernization in all spheres, including that European specialty, imperialism.

One should here take notice of the fact that Japan, as well as the USA (now seen as a ‘Western’ power), rather soon began to develop great-power characteristics in two other areas, not always recognized in studies of great powers, cultures and civilizations – namely, basic research and international sports. Here, the case of Japan is instructive.

Basic research in Japan was in full flight at the turn of the century, and continuously stayed at a high level, including participation in the international community of scholars, not least during the era of ‘internationalism’ before the First World War.¹⁴ This is clearly demonstrated by Nobel Prize nominations for Japanese citizens in the sciences and in medicine.¹⁵ Japan’s performance in international sports peaked during the interwar years.¹ These were fields that other, existing great powers were much slower to recognize in their bids for international influence, recognition and respect.

These two characteristics – scholarship that demonstrated inventiveness and potentially state-of-the-art technology, and international sports that demonstrated the competitive fitness and health of the population – suggested to rivals a nation’s capacity for wielding raw power. As resources for a great power, these two areas belong to the categories of ‘innovation and technology’, and to ‘recognition’, respectively. Using different terminology, these might be called ‘semi-soft’ power or competences. Writers on the great powers had tended to ignore these categories up until the mid-twentieth century¹⁷ (on ‘soft power’, cf. Marklund, this volume).

However, the small or midsize powers’ constructive ambitions, more prevalent during the twentieth century, to contribute to the good of domestic society by being recognized as a model for a healthy and liveable society, could arguably be ascribed also to a great power, as in Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great society’ programme in the 1960s. The basic ‘soft power’ aim here was to present oneself to the world as an attainable ideal, one to be emulated in some way. One can make an argument for the United States being on its way, during the nineteenth century, to become a ‘great society’ without being a ‘great power’. For the moment, disregarding the treatment of its native population, the United States, as a power standing alone and unchallenged on its continent, could display greatpower characteristics (location, space, population, economy, produce, innovation, polity, etc.) on a par with the European great powers, but without the corresponding military capacity.¹⁸ This is an ‘exceptionalism’ that differs from the kind ordinarily ascribed to the USA, arguably the result of its being ‘the first new nation’. The problem of how a nation-state can simultaneously be ‘strong’ and ‘kind’, however, has yet to be discussed.

Japan’s capacity to equip itself with a ‘foreign policy’ more or less allowed it to skip the interest-based, diplomatic and congress-attending stage. With military might, it reached across the sea to mainland Asia, descending upon Korea, and interfering with Russian and Chinese interests. In both the 1905 and 1911–13 editions, Kjellén pays much attention to a future great power threesome in the Far East, with clashing interests. After entering into – or, arguably, introducing or even inventing – great power politics in its part of the world, Japan, in a very short period of time, rose to great-power eminence. With the epochal and heavily symbolic Battle of Tsushima, in which Japan defeated the Russian navy, it achieved for itself the Eurocentric honour of being designated a ‘European power’, which simultaneously cast doubt on Russian identity and the designation of ‘European’.

Map 4.1 Sea of Japan, 1891. Kjellén put a special interest in Korea, which he saw as an indication of the balance of power between Russia, Japan and China, and the Yalu (‘Jalu’) River as an important border. He often compared the Korean peninsula with that of Scandinavia, situated between the great powers of Russia, Germany and Great Britain. Source: The Century Atlas and Gazetteer of the World, John Bartholomew, London: John Walker, 1892, p. 56.

The long-standing European fascination with Japanese culture, mainly of the aesthetic kind, had, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, extended to a European interest in Japan’s modernizing endeavours (Stead 1904; Watanabe 2012). Now, this interest began to take on a more concerned character, with the general threat from Asia at times being dubbed ‘the yellow peril’. Kjellén used this expression, but he also identified an ‘American’ as well as a ‘Russian’ peril.

In Kjellén’s great-power analyses, the then very recent appearances of the USA and Japan as great powers had a profound effect on his discussion – what really characterized a great power, and what are the ‘laws’ characterizing its behaviour and prospects? As will be seen, Kjellén’s preoccupation with the USA and Japan complicates these questions.

Outline of the Editions – 1905

In this presentation of the 1905 edition, the basic tenets of Kjellén’s great-power analysis will be spelled out. They will be relevant also for the subsequent editions. Here, first, a section will deal with Kjellén’s ‘planetary’ overview, covering his conceptual tools, hypotheses and methodology, as well as a historical sketch of the recently ‘dismissed’ great powers. The result of these two will actually affect his subsequent overall 1905 analysis.

The Planetary Situation

In this first chapter in Kjellén’s Stormakterna, he both gives a panoramic background to the new global situation and discusses methodology.

Kjellén used the term ‘planetary’, which he employed for his introductory chapter in the first edition of Stormakterna, to refer to a radically new situation, one that had developed in international politics during the previous decade. The label ‘planetary’ could be said to be identical to ‘global’. In Kjellén’s account, in 1894 Japan had crossed the sea to Korea, while in 1897 the United States had abandoned its ‘stay-at-home’ politics and taken Hawaii. And in 1900 the expedition to Peking to quell the Boxer Rebellion was actually joined by all the world’s great powers (Kjellén 1905 I: 18). This was the high-politics aspect of a growing internationalization that, as Kjellén noted, also saw a number of international agreements, such as the humanitarian Geneva Conventions of 1864, the International Court of Arbitration in the Hague in 1899, the Universal Postal Union in 1874 and 1878, the literary copyright conventions negotiated in Berne from 1886 to 1896, and, in the world of science, the international measurement of longitude and latitude in 1886 (ibid.: 15).¹

Regarding Kjellén’s own internationalist credentials, in the 1905 preface he excuses himself, admits gaps in his scholarly toolkit, and expresses regret for not having visited and acquainted himself with the powers he writes about (ibid.: VI). As he had been to the United States in 1904, on a trip that included the world exhibition in St Louis and a visit to New York, he could claim five of the great powers. When the trans-Siberian railway was completed, he eagerly took it in 1909 as part of a round-the-world tour through Russia, China, Korea and Japan, and then across the Pacific to the USA. He later published a book about his Far Eastern travels (Kjellén 1911). In later editions of Stormakterna, he could proudly declare that he had familiarized himself with all eight of the great powers.

Methodology – Determinism vs Voluntarism

A paramount methodological issue for Kjellén was how to handle determinism and voluntarism – or, relatedly, structure vs action, collective vs individual will, and objectivity vs subjectivity. Now and then the problem pops up. His basic inclination was to limit room for action. Demonstrated voluntarism is hard to square with his overall idea of finding regularities, ‘laws’, that conditioned the behaviour and paths of powers. He confronted a tradition of political history studies in which leading politicians or ‘statesmen’ took action. Kjellén wanted to modernize the study of power, moving the focus from the subjectivity of these politicians to the basic conditions in which power was deployed. Thus, ‘the free will of the states on the chessboard is really not as free as it initially would seem to be’; and he continues, ‘both their rationality and their foolishness are limited by their objective circumstances, beyond which they cannot go’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 20).

In a somewhat peculiar way, Kjellén’s ambition not to interfere, either by furnishing subjective analysis or pursuing his own political activism, creates a forbidden zone in the whole area of study itself, including political actors’ selfunderstanding. Thus,

the political scientist here must – more or less – leave out of sight the subjective factors: the peoples’ conceptions of themselves and environments, the character and depth of emotional moods, the ability of individual actors to evaluate situations and take advantage of konjunkturer [basically, historical opportunities]. These belong to the area of the statesman; here is the limit between theoretical and practical politics. (Ibid.: 21)

And he adds, assuring the reader:

But how great an importance you may still expect these subjective forces to have – they cannot radiate too far away from their objective conditions, which undeniably are within the jurisdiction of scientific judgement. (Ibid.: 21)

Kjellén in his recurring, political summaries between editions of his book, very seldom mentions political leaders by name, although he is keenly aware that these high-ranking politicians represent and lead their respective states, sometimes confronting each other and sometimes venturing into alliances.

When he – in Chapter II – is about to address the historically ‘dismissed’ great powers, he excludes a certain category: ‘We do not here pay any attention to those kingdoms whose decline requires no other explanation than that the contingent force [the ruler], which held them together, has disappeared’ (ibid.: 27). Not only does Kjellén exclude statesmen’s actions from examination, but he also dismisses their actual roles in the past. Implicitly, Kjellén belittles the role of the individual leader, whether internally ‘rousing the masses’ or pursuing external goals. Thus, Kjellén does not try to develop any ‘leadership idea’ in the examination of the great powers’ respective capacities.

Also, and unlike modern studies of societies, Kjellén does not employ a specific theory of society. Subsequently, he does not discuss (formal) institutions or (informal) networks as such. Among what is excluded are governmental authorities, some with delegated public power, universities, industrial enterprises, political parties, labour unions, emancipatory and philanthropic organizations, and so on. Several of these organizations transcend national borders. Even though Kjellén is primarily focused on nation-states as powers relating to other external powers, the configuration and impact of institutions and networks do differ between different powers. Admittedly, at times Kjellén does recognize conspicuous instances of institutions affecting state capacity.

Kjellén continues by enumerating the character of the respective powers’ ‘objective facts’, which are, as will be seen in the following chapter, also those dimensions along which his country-by-country examination proceeds:

The states are thus primarily statistical facts, with their definite populations, outer and inner measures, social-historical layers, and political institutions. They are geographical facts, with fixed space on the earth’s surface, fixed locations, definite border conditions, and productive capability. They are also, to a certain degree, historical facts, determined by their previous development and their traditions, in the same way as every singular entity is by its antecedents. (Ibid.: 20–21, emphasis in the original)

Kjellén operationalizes this into variables to be checked for each great power. These assumed factors include ‘location’ and ‘space’, or ‘room’ (these two factors were essential for the basic geopolitical understanding of great powers); population, including numbers of inhabitants and ethnic factors (nationalities or ‘races’); military resources (the navy and the army); and the economy (agricultural and industrial production, including trade capability, such as possessing a commercial fleet and an advanced infrastructure). Regarding infrastructure, railway construction came to acquire an almost iconic role in signalling the most progressive, innovative and powerful societies, though it is not a separately considered factor in Kjellén’s analysis. A ‘minimum size’ requirement is introduced after some time into Kjellén’s work. Also, a ‘climate factor’ is introduced, as all great powers are to be found in the temperate zone. To these more or less ‘material’ factors, Kjellén added the most significant of political-cultural aspects, the constitutional framework, which was also his field of expertise within political science. This governance factor involved aspects of parliamentarism, democratic indicators and political parties. However, ideologies as such were not included.

As indicated above, a state’s constitutional and administrative system, entailing Kjellénian concepts such as the centralized state, the federal state, Caesarism, and latent ‘democracy’ is rather the only relevant institutional resource. The

internal politics of a nation, inspired by ideologies and political parties, tends to be discussed mainly as an extension of the category ‘population’. Other possible categories for the internal properties of a nation-state, such as religion, public sphere, culture, health and welfare, and research, which are often examined in modern, comparative studies, are not discussed – although religion figures as a factor in party politics, particularly in Germany – and nor are mentalities, heritage and traditions, or identities (e.g. in relation to one’s neighbours) discussed as such, though they are to some extent related to the differences between peoples, ‘races’, ethnicities, and the like.

In Kjellén’s era, one of the most conspicuous institutions, one that functioned as a network that transcended national borders, was that of the European royal houses, which are nowhere to be found in Kjellén’s writings. One might say that this is consonant with his marginalization of ‘statesmen’ in general. Even when the German emperor Wilhelm II is examined more than just in passing, his family connection to the English monarchy is not noted.

Kjellén calls his solution of materially identifiable conditions and the behaviour of a population as ‘biopolitics’, and it is here that the ‘laws’ produced by science are to be found. Previously enumerated facts, comprising a topographical and geographical framework with some similarities to Braudel, limits the behaviour of the nation-state. Kjellén continues:

Already, one has tried to find a certain law-regulated character in history, seen from socioeconomic (LAMPRECHT) or geographical (RATZEL) preconditions – and then we have not even mentioned those who in history hardly see anything else than the work of pure laws of nature (BUCKLE) … [W]ould it not be probable, that even the psychological side of history could reveal a certain, for science available, regularity? (Kjellén 1905 I: 22)

Kjellén is anxious to incorporate psychology as a scientific category, one ‘material’ in the same sense as the basic geographic and demographic factors. He

is thus confronting not only the subjectivity of political history, but also crude versions, such as Buckle’s – in the quote above – of a natural science approach. Psychology, here, thus, is not subjectivity inferred from the behaviour of an erratic statesman. Rather – and here one of a more controversial aspect of Kjellén’s thought comes to the fore – it may be categorized as a biological factor. One might ask to what extent the following is intended as a literal argument or rather as a metaphor:

From a certain point-of-view, you cannot avoid noticing that within the great powers themselves biological facts may be recognized. By their own force of life and benevolent circumstances, in continuous competition with each other – that is, in the struggle for survival and by natural selection – they have evolved on the earth’s surface. We see them born and growing there, and we have also seen them wither and die, like other organisms. They are, thus, forms of life; of all life forms on this world the most impressive. As such, they must be able to become subjects of a, so to say, biopolitical study, which tries to explore the laws governing their development. (Ibid.: 22f, emphasis in the original)

Kjellén puts ‘willpower’, ‘the psychological side of history’, in the context of competition – for survival, or ultimately for winning – to derive a biopolitical law covering instances of struggle. By this procedure, the seemingly wilful behaviour of ‘choosing’ among possible actions assumes a ‘hard’, deterministic character, similar to other, more decidedly material factors – location, economy, military – which are more readily expected to condition the actions of states.

Starting at the other end, that is with deterministic structures and conditions, one finds Kjellén on his home ground of geopolitics. The map – the horizontal, twodimensional understanding of the world – is at the core of Kjellén’s geopolitics. This is already clear when the first factors discussed in his power analysis are location and space. Sometimes he also discusses a country’s ‘territorial configuration’: for example, a country might have ‘lobster claws’ of land stretching out and surrounding a neighbour’s territory. Rivers, in particular, are important. Not only are they, together with mountain ranges, watersheds and

oceans, ‘natural borders’ – in the senses both of being part of ‘nature’ and of being recognized as well-functioning means for separating states ‘coming naturally’ – but they represent possibilities for power by way of economy, in the form of transportation routes, harbours and the like.² Here one can see Kjellén as the keen surveyor of maps, extremely familiar with all parts of the world, effortlessly jumping between the continents to find topographical and other parallels.

When Kjellén turns to causality, to factors that constrain or expand opportunities for action, he employs the idea of, what one might call, horizontal conditioning. Portugal faced the oceans whereas Spain did not. As an island, England could minimize costs for certain types of military defence. In Kjellén’s time, the United States, alone between two oceans, did not have a proper foreign policy – although they had taken their share of Spanish America. ‘The foreign policy of the United States was not to have a foreign policy’ (Kissinger 1974: 36). Russia’s Drang to the ‘warm seas’ could be seen as something similar.

Kjellén’s ‘horizontal conditioning’ – his concern with geography, nature, topography, and similar factors – may be compared to Fernand Braudel’s efforts to understand the sixteenth-century Mediterranean, but his approach may be called ‘vertical conditioning’ (Braudel 1972, 1973). In ordering his material he starts, literally, from the bottom, with the topography of the sea floor creating currents and other features that help to determine possible port locations, for example. In the process, Braudel moves from the slow-changing structure (les structures) of geography, to the confluence (les conjonctures) of developments in the economy and the society in general, and then to (political) events (les évenéments), which suddenly appear or subside, like flotsam on the waves.

Braudel’s model might also be called a ‘hierarchy of levels’, with limiting conditions that continuously move upwards, level by level. Kjellén, though, is primarily interested not in politics as such, in the sense of individual actions, but by the potential for a nation-state to carry out great-power politics. This potential he locates in resources and forces that, as categories, are similar to Braudel’s –

topography, geography, economy and demography. But whereas Braudel wanted to sketch and write, and in some sense, explain the history of the Mediterranean region during a particular epoch (that of Spanish king Philip II), Kjellén wants to identify a type, that of the great powers, by examining a number of instances of the hypothetical ‘type’. Using Braudel’s metaphors of the high seas, one could say that Kjellén starts at the ‘top’, where the captain steers the ship of state; but his interest lies with the ships and the ocean, not with the people on the bridge. He classifies the ships.

Kjellén’s great powers are really not supposed to engage in serious diplomatic brinkmanship or to stir conflicts in which failure might lead to outright warfare. In fact, the First World War distorted his model analysis. Kjellén might have invoked ‘natural selection’ and organisms’ struggle for survival as images, but though his attitude is militant, and his language sometimes has a martial character, the realities of warfare and its conduct are not within his grasp, either in the form of actual experience or as scenarios. He never displays any understanding of, or even interest in, military affairs such as strategy, tactics, weaponry, logistics or morale. The great powers were, in his vision, never expected to collide in actual warfare, at least not on their own soil. If the great powers moved without intention, like tectonic plates, these plates would remain stuck rather than generate military earthquakes. The actual ‘Clausewitz ending’, the outbreak of the Great War, was a catastrophe.

After criticism following both the 1905 edition and the first books of the 1911– 13 edition, Kjellén developed his methodological argument more explicitly and radically. As this is important for the overall understanding, it is mentioned briefly here. The fuller version is examined below, where it appears chronologically, in the outline of the 1911–13 edition. In the preface to the second edition, because Kjellén felt forced to respond to criticism, he is more transparent. He contrasts the ‘logic of space’, the geography, with ‘the logic of time’ – with history, as it were. He criticizes the emphasis by others on ‘the power of the personal’, not only for its ‘individualistic philosophy of the world’, but as ‘liberalism in science’ (Kjellén 1911–13 IV, preface: V–IX). On the last point, he comes out as ‘political’ in the most conspicuous manner through his disdain for a ‘liberalism’ in which individualism distorts both scholarship and

politics.

The ‘Dismissed’ Great Powers

By 1920, Kjellén could revisit ‘the very clash of great powers’ witnessed during the Great War. How, he asked himself, had his analyses fared? Some of the great powers had lost the war, but in the larger historical context it might also be seen as just a ‘battle’ in the eternal struggle among great powers. In his summary in the 1920 edition, no great power was categorically dismissed. Some nation-states may have been bruised, but they still hung around. And in view of the next battle two decades later, beginning in 1939, one may say, that a characterization of ‘still standing’, seems justifiable. To Kjellén, none of the 1920 powers deserved being abandoned as such, and consequently remained subjects of study. No one was actually ‘dismissed’.

However, in the second chapter in the first edition (1905), as well as in the second (1911–13), Kjellén categorized four dismissed great powers – although, to be sure, in his era they remained nation-states. They were the Ottoman Empire – or Turkey, as Kjellén calls it –, Portugal, the Netherlands – or Holland, as Kjellén calls it – and Sweden.

In view of the concepts and analytical approach that Kjellén had introduced in the first chapter, ‘The planetary situation’, the second chapter results in a couple of re-evaluations, not really foreseen in the first chapter. One such reconsideration is the presumed necessity of a balance between the evolution of state and of society – a rather sophisticated observation in Kjellén’s otherwise rather shallow analysis of how a society is organized and functions. And such a discussion of balancing state and society does not appear again in his work.²¹ All four of the dismissed powers failed in this respect, as will be seen below.

Another observation in this chapter is that some powers have ‘successor states’, here not those created in the wake of the Great War. One example would be a power taking over a ‘task’ or ‘mission’ that a previous state or power had historically performed. But such a mission would have to be a strictly geopolitical one.

Teleological reasoning is atypical of Kjellén. For him there is neither a mission in history nor a ‘manifest destiny’ bestowed upon a single nation or people.²² However, humankind may have one. Some overall tendencies, those of a more historical-sociological kind, can be identified, such as disassociation–association and disentanglement–entanglement. However, Kjellén’s most common view of history and change is one of a pendulum moving from, for example, liberalism and individualism to conservatism and collectivism, or from ‘expansion’ to ‘concentration’. But history as such is open-ended.

Kjellén has only four powers to operate with in his analysis of the ‘dismissed’ powers, but he still finds it possible to characterize them into two ‘types’. On the one hand, there are Portugal and the Netherlands, both ‘built on materially based wealth, in its external form appearing as a motherland with large colonial appendices’ and ‘on the other hand, Turkey and Sweden, who were built on a military-political foundation, with a sustained territorial connection between the mainland and its dependencies’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 58). He then likens these two kinds of great powers with the ancient tension between Carthage and Rome, and, in his era, the globally significant tension between England and Russia.

Spain gained riches from its colonies, but never consolidated the fortunes from the Americas into a strong state. As Kjellén irreverently puts it, ‘and back home in Castilia the peasants starved while the adventurers beyond the ocean created for themselves riches, which were soon lost’ (ibid.: 37). The United States gave the final kiss of death: ‘It was a victory for “progressism”, of work against the status quo of the spirit of chivalry’ (ibid.: 38).

Holland ‘was the state system’s first political great power on a purely economic base’ (ibid.: 43). Kjellén refers to Ratzel’s law of the kingdoms of the Carthage variety, though ‘quick growth, quick fall’. With no proper hinterland, Holland had ‘all the advantages of location, but lacked the very space’ (ibid.: 44). Another drawback was its constitution and political structures. It was too decentralized, too particularistic, which he describes by quoting the expression ‘an oligarchy of 2,000 sovereigns’. This decentralization was ‘fortunate for the spirit of liberty and for tolerance, but conspicuously fateful for the inner strength of the state’ (ibid.: 45). England was stronger in these aspects and became Holland’s successor as a great-power type in terms of commerce, oceanic seafaring and overseas colonies. Kjellén noted that, as of the beginning of the twentieth century, ‘the people of Holland are the most contented and happiest in the Western world’ (ibid.: 50). Being part of this was something to appreciate, but it was not a good sign for future competitiveness.

When it comes to Sweden, finally, Kjellén finds no real ‘material’ reasons – such as commerce, natural resources, or location – for its great-power status. Sweden was no successor to any of the other mentioned great powers. Its status was, rather, based on a conviction of a spiritual or cultural responsibility. ‘Our [Sweden’s] great-power politics was a politics of ideas’ (ibid.: 52). Sweden rose as a great power because of ideas: the defence of the faith, Lutheranism and of the ‘majesty of the father country’,²³ with Gustavus Adolphus. Yet Sweden fell because Charles XII, in his war with Russia, advanced principles of law and righteousness.²⁴ Although the Swedish constitution and representative government – through its Monarchia Mixta – balanced the groups and interests in society, the country did not have the resources or stamina to sustain a greatpower position. Kjellén refers to the inability to make the Baltic a dominum maris Baltici. The parallel is to the Italian vision of the Mediterranean as a mare nostrum. In Sweden’s case, according to Kjellén, this was partly because of the rivalry with the Dutch in the Baltic, but also because of ‘a lack of interest’ (ibid.: 54). Kjellén here adds another, related factor: a Swedish mentality or national character of being ‘slow’. In his later analyses of the great powers, he puts much stress on the factor of ‘willpower’. If you lack it at the crucial moments in history – as it turned out that Germany did in the First World War – you will go down. He offers no ‘nationalist’ excuses for his own country’s inability to fill a great power’s shoes.

In the end, Sweden’s presence on the stage of the great powers was just a ‘guest appearance’ (ibid.: 55). Russia and Prussia were the executors of Sweden’s bankruptcy as a great power. To the extent that Sweden would eventually have a successor state, albeit one that would take time to emerge, it would be Prussia/Germany (ibid.: 194).

In his own time, Kjellén notes somewhat sarcastically, Swedes ‘like the people of Spain, stand somewhat to the side of the general Western type – even if you cannot objectively conclude whether it is the Swedes with their tables of hard liquor or the Spaniards with their bullfights that reveal the greatest peculiarity’ (ibid.: 57).

Kjellén’s 1905 Analysis of the Great Powers’ Identifying Characteristics

The configuration of great powers remains the same in all three editions, though their relative standings in Kjellén’s hierarchy changes. They are AustriaHungary, Italy, France and Germany – all of them, as Kjellén calls them, ‘continental’, here meaning European, and dealt with in the first book of the 1905 study. As ‘non-continental’ great powers he lists England, Russia, the United States and Japan.

In his 1905 treatment of the characteristics of great powers – location, space, demography, economy, military capacity, etc. – which Kjellén had determined, following the first two chapters, because of his more profound investigation of each of the powers (see Chapter 5), he immediately added the criterion of an unspecified ‘minimum size’ for a great power – you must be ‘big’ to be ‘great’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 241). This is an obvious change from early modern history when Portugal, Holland and Sweden had all qualified. Down the line in his arguments in the various editions he often brings up one and the same tendency or, as it were, ‘law’ – ‘the big will become fewer but bigger’.

From the examination of the eight great powers, as of 1905, he quickly – and rather unsentimentally – dismissed the relevance of three characteristics, and possible variables, in determining whether or not a country could be a great power: race, religion and governance. The method he applied in this part of the study is falsification proper (see the section on the 1911–13 edition below). One counter-instance would be enough, and that was to be Japan – primarily regarding the first two variables.

Kjellén has not presented us with any proper theory of society, covering which factors should be privileged, only ‘educated guesses’, and nor has he invested any analytical or argumentative capital in any factor. The reason these three factors are mentioned at all, despite immediately being dismissed, is that they figure rather prominently in the discourses of his time. The reason that many other factors, which in more recent analyses have been considered relevant, were not considered is that in Kjellén’s world, and in his times, they figured hardly at all – for example, high quality of research, of living standards, of individual consumption, and a budding welfare (the ‘good life’) society; or maybe even athletic prowess, a widespread ideology, a lively press and suchlike.

Ethnicity, nationality or ‘race’ is often discussed when addressing the cultural standing, the degree of development, of a nation. In Europe, Kjellén distinguishes between Romanic, Germanic and Slavic peoples. His tables and rankings show that people of the Germanic ‘kind’ have been successful when it comes to establishing great powers in the modern era.

Such ethnicity classifications are, of course, often used by peoples from various nations or parts of the world for self-identification, not least in front of strangers or outsiders, such as Europeans in colonial and imperial ventures. To use these as readings of ‘performance’ was a rather established practice, but from time to time they resulted in surprises for the contemporary observer, like Kjellén. But when the Japanese ‘surprised’ on the ‘race’ index, Kjellén was not actually that surprised. There was, apparently, no need to discuss race further; just notice it,

and then dismiss it – including the European vs Asian dimension – as a criterion for great-power capacity.

On other occasions Kjellén ruled out ‘colour of skin’ and ‘blood’ as inherent determining factors for competence and performance. This is said both in general and when discussing the ‘Negro question’ in the United States, which he does, at some length (Kjellén 1905 II, [USA]: 86–90; 1911–13 [USA]: 27–31; also, see the section on the USA in Chapter 5). Here, Europeans, of various ‘races’, meet with Africans, having cohabitated in the same, though more or less segregated, society.

Also, he uses the ‘English’ – that is, inhabitants of the British Isles – to argue that when people of various ethnic backgrounds come together and breed, the result, seen from historical experience, is an improvement of the ‘race’, at least in the long run. This goes also for Japan, if one goes back a long time in history (see the section on Japan in Chapter 5). Why this effect of cross-breeding should come about is not discussed. As always, Kjellén just notes the outcome, here regarding the apparent success of societies.

At least as interesting is the fact that religion does not play much of a role either. In the discourse of culture and civilizational studies, religion is very important, both for classifying and for characterizing. This is so for very early epochs, like the Axial Age,²⁵ but also for very recent studies, such as Huntington’s. As with other factors or indices to be read, it is not surprising that Kjellén minimizes it, when it cannot be shown to make a crucial difference in great-power categorizing. But religion as a faith, a belief, and a pervasive mentality, and as a strong and widely recognized institutional factor, has otherwise been much discussed in societal research.

Also, on a personal level – and here I will try not to slip into ad hominem argumentation – Kjellén was truly familiar with religion, with the church and with belief, and its role in the lives of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century

Europeans. This was not necessarily because Kjellén was the son of a clergyman, but because he himself was involved in the so-called Young Church movement. One might expect him to ponder the impact of religion in the lives of peoples all over the world, including of those he examines. In paying attention to the possible role of belief he might have asked himself whether the ‘performance enhancing’ component of Protestantism discussed by Weber might be something similar to what one might find in a society, like Japan, with Buddhism and Shintoism, but overall with a Confucian cultural influence coming from China over the centuries.² Interestingly, religion plays the biggest role when Kjellén discusses Germany, not only for the division between Catholics and Lutherans, but also because religion, in particular Catholicism, plays a role in politics – the ‘black’ dimension – as expressed in party formation (see Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume).

In the wholesale dismissal of religion as a factor at a time in history when religion played an important role in any society, and when emigrating Europeans brought their religion to the rest of the world, implicitly with clashes between beliefs, institutions and traditions, you might say that Kjellén ignored mentalities in general as a factor.

Race could sneak its way into politics via demography. Most great powers examined by Kjellén were not homogeneous nation-states but were composed of several different peoples or nationalities, ‘tribes’ or ‘races’, ethnicities, and sometimes irredenta, and these had a variety of interests. These interests were at times expressed as movements, which were channelled into parties. To the extent religion played a role, it was also as the expression of interests in the form of political parties; but political parties were generally not that important in determining great-power status or capacity. They could have a negative impact, though, by being divisive, weakening the resolve of the government of the great power.

If Kjellén in some sense could be said to ignore the mental, and indeed the cultural, aspects of a great power, whether in the form inspired by ideologies and

religion, or by mentalities in the shape of heritage, tradition, or a perceived ‘responsibility’, there was still one such aspect he resorted to, and it turned out to be a decisive one. This was what a great power’s performance ultimately hinged upon when more quantitative, statistical factors really could not satisfactorily account for the potential or the performance. This factor was willpower.

Initially, Kjellén talked about the ‘will’, (1905 II: 242), later ‘willpower’, and then – and more substantially – the Nietzschean-sounding ‘will to power’, and finally, the ‘will to more power’ (see e.g. the 1911–13 edition, book IV, page 244). This was, in the end, sadly missing in Germany, Kjellén complained at the end of the war. The idea of willpower may fit in with the biological parallel, of a state struggling for survival in its life; but for willpower to serve a great power, one might expect it to be equipped with a more cognitive dimension. Kjellén does not really operationalize it, however.

Kjellén’s specialty as a political science scholar was in comparative constitutional studies. The legal aspects of the discipline ‘political science’, or the ‘science of the state’ (statsvetenskap) were dealt with by most of his Swedish and other Nordic colleagues. Again, it is somewhat peculiar, or indeed telling, the way in which he quickly dismisses the form of governance – the constitutional, legal system – as a factor: ‘the great powers today demonstrate all kinds of governance, from the Caesarism of Russia, to the parliamentarism of England, from the centralized polity of France, to the American federal system. The type of constitution is negligible, as is ancestry and faith’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 242).

As will be seen, Kjellén is restlessly on his way to one of his most important statements and conclusions: ‘indirectly we have now reached the first and basic conclusion. The great power is not a mathematic but a dynamic, not an ethnic or cultural but a physiological concept. The great mass and the high culture cannot be left out, but they do not constitute a great power until a strong soul is infused within it. The great power is in principle a unitary and strong, with the rich means of power equipped, will’ (ibid.).

When Kjellén, in the first, 1905, edition, is about to sum up, he seems not to have found any clear indication about the fates of the great powers. He vaguely projects some very general observations in one paragraph, remote in time – that is, some one hundred years into the future. One may discern a couple of tendencies in Kjellén’s projections:

(1) The rise of the United States and Japan, and, in the near future, also China. This development signals a downturn for Europe, which may only be saved by these nations cooperating, led by Germany. This occurs, Kjellén guesses, sometime after the year 2000, and before that the number of great powers will have gradually diminished into four ‘world powers’ – the USA, Russia, China and Europe (Kjellén 1905 II: 250).

(2) The big powers are getting bigger and stronger; thus we may witness a future with a unified humankind – ‘the one and only world-state’ (ibid.: 253). This outcome is not a goal, but is based on an analysis of how power evolves.

Kjellén slightly polemicizes against a ‘popular perception’ of a unilateral road to the goal of Kant’s: ‘eternal peace under one and only general culture. But modern science presents another developmental law. That law is the one of a circular movement, a loop, a sea with constantly rising and falling waves’ (ibid.: 253).

But before this, and because of ‘human differentiation’ – a concept now and then employed by Kjellén – emergent small states will, at times, dissolve greater powers, even empires; this by buzzing and swarming, like bees.²⁷

Kjellén’s 1905 Analysis of the Great Powers – Classifying into Types

It is now incumbent on Kjellén to typecast the great powers. In the chapter on ‘dismissed’ powers, Kjellén recognizes some ‘types’ of powers, in particular ‘economic’ and ‘military’ based ones. Now, in the analyses of the actual existing great powers, he discusses both their means and their status as types. The means are either economic (trade and industry) or military (land-based army), with England and the United States representing the first kind of capacity, and Russia and Japan the latter. There are also ‘territorial configurations’ that may be marine or continental. Among the ‘dismissed’ powers it was rather easy to sort them into types; Portugal, Spain and Holland were marine types, while Turkey and Sweden were continental. But now Kjellén is forced to also make use of a mixed category, which he calls ‘amphibian’, to which France and Germany belong. England and Italy exemplify the marine type, with commercial benefits from the sea, while Russia and Austria are clearly continental, relying on a land army. However, the United States and Japan are ‘apparent anomalies’. The explanation is that the ‘continental’ United States is isolated on its continent, and the ‘marine’ Japan achieved its great-power status while embarking upon an ‘aggressive’, colonial mission (Kjellén 1905 II: 244). These newcomers complicate Kjellén’s typology. Here, an additional characteristic is added to both the marine and the continental type – the marine type, with its colonies, is composed of ‘dispersed’ parts, whereas the continental type has a ‘closed’ or ‘limited’ extension.

Classification is a delicate matter, and rather heavily theoretical. One may at times have to bend categories or simplify cases. The very reason for categorizing is more often, as here, to generalize about the examples in the categories, about the ‘types’ one finds. In Kjellén’s case, he wants to use ‘tendencies’ in assessing the whether the powers are going up the rankings or going down. And these rankings are based on static, measurable categories such as population, economic production in industry and agriculture, and military capacity; but they are also based on qualitative properties such as ‘good governance’, which is effective for handling a great-power rivalry. This latter is often understood as unified, concerted leadership, with as little ‘friction’ in and from internal politics as possible.

These measures of performance are, of course, bound by even more rigid conditions – the geographical ones, such as location, room or space (territory), and borders. A common approach in several societal analyses, very well illustrated by Fernand Braudel, is a three-layered image of a society, comprising geography, economy and politics. Such levels, or spheres, may also be found in interpretations of society or social philosophies, like historical materialism. If you relate these three levels to deliberate societal changes, to voluntarism, you may regard ‘geography’, including topography, as a structural given. Efforts to steer society in a certain direction, to ‘perform history’, will then be focused on the ‘economy’, meaning society in general, or on resources, to be utilized at the level of ‘politics’, by politicians. But as Kjellén does not want to engage the political level, the actions of the ‘statesmen’, he limits himself largely to the middle level. This is a sphere where a great power may assert itself. The way to do this is to outperform other powers with increased population, economic productivity, military build-up and so on, and thereby such a power will rise in the rankings, and thus be more influential on the international scene. That is, unless you bring also the lower level, of geography and topography, into play – and thus the sphere of geopolitics opens up!

Spelt out in these Braudellian terms, a hierarchy with three levels, Braudel himself includes the two very basic levels in order to fully present the conditions and contexts for the political level, the events (les événements) or political action; that is, to anchor his purpose, which is to understand and to write history. Kjellén, however, focuses on the two basic levels in order to account for greatpower potentials. He does not harbour any intention to understand political action; ultimately, he has no desire to write history.

Clearly, one of the national performance indicators is population. Kjellén often both lamented and criticized France’s two-children policy, limiting its population growth. But population growth may create a need for more resources to sustain this larger population, and a ‘pressure’ builds up. A means to alleviate this would be to add to the nation’s territory, and this could be done – depending on the location, and room, of the nation-state – by relying on the colonies. Thus, to Kjellén, colonies, in the sense of territory on another continent, are never restricted to bringing home riches, but are places for settlement, and, notably, in

Kjellén’s analysis, subsequently for markets. Kjellén has no qualms about discussing imperialist acquisitions of territory in a ‘Leninist’ manner, getting rid of overproduction from effective capitalist industries in the homeland by creating markets on foreign shores. This is one kind of Kjellén’s geopolitical understanding, where ‘space’ and ‘location’ come into play, and where ‘horizontal conditioning’ explains. The middle level, ‘economy’ or ‘society’, here with the population factor, cooperate with ‘space’ and ‘location’; thus, this is geopolitics.

Kjellén wanted to find out which of his types of great powers had a good future in store. Thus, just classifying was not enough, but he tried to spot ‘developmental tendencies’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 245–47). The most noticeable of these tendencies is a crossing of types of great powers, and a movement from ‘location’ to ‘space’ as the most significant geographic variable. Thus, where in the world you are placed becomes less important than the size and specific features of the territory you command. Had France commanded more ‘room’, or space, of its own, in its own ‘location’, in order to grow the important resource ‘population’, it would not be in need of colonial ‘space’. This will later be shown to be an important aspect concerning, as it were, the ‘imperial’ needs that a great power will have – Kjellén calls them ‘organic’. As a preview, the USA had no legitimate ‘imperial’ needs (e.g. in South America, or on other continents), because it had plenty of resources ‘at home’, whereas Japan, being short on vital resources on home ground, could claim such organic needs.

The most important tendency, in terms of the great power set-up, is something else: ‘a requirement has begun to rise higher than all the others, the demand for economic self-sufficiency, “autarky”’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 245, emphasis in the original). And in this, the land-based continental powers have an advantage. The days of the seaborne empires – a concept not used by Kjellén – are of the past:²⁸ ‘[I]n the future higher demands will be put on the natural, supportive potential of the motherland. Over time, the solid geographical base will triumph’ (ibid.: 246). One important aspect of this is that the geographical-topographical centre of gravity (Schwerpunkt), as just indicated, will move from ‘location’ to ‘space’. International infrastructural networks and travel, connecting every part of the world, play a role here, diminishing the value of a privileged ‘location’ (ibid.).

This is ‘the conquering of distance’, from Jules Verne to US president Ulysses Grant, crying it out to the world, and picturing – as Jean Bodin did in the sixteenth century – a mankind unified by republicanism, trade and exchange.

Finally, in order to formally rank² the great powers, Kjellén presents tables (ibid.: 247) in which the powers are ranked in every category by their quantitative, statistical ‘performance’. The indices are area (territory), population, land-based army, warships (tonnage), commercial fleet, trade (total and export), and harvest. Adding up the values on the indices, the powers are ranked as follows: England, the United States, Germany, Russia (given the summation of indices these first four are very close in the upper echelon), followed by France, Austria-Hungary, Japan and Italy (ibid.: 248).

This is where Kjellén stands in his 1905 analysis of the order of the great powers.

Outline of the Editions – 1911–1913

After the publication of the two books of the 1905 edition of Stormakterna, Kjellén regularly published updates in articles in periodicals. In 1911 he began publication of a new, extended and revised edition of the work.

Elucidating Methodology and Making Analytical Modifications

At the end of 1913, Kjellén was in a defensive mood. Reactions to his first edition and to the available books of the second edition of Stormakterna, in Sweden and among fellow political scientists, had not been wholly favourable.³ But he picks up the glove!

Because Kjellén had to deal with criticism, he was forced to state both his theoretical and his value-laden convictions more forcefully. He does not shy away from acknowledging other points of view. To begin, he complains that his critics cannot abandon the ‘small peoples’ perspective’. He then tries to justify his inclination to ‘prophesize’, here mainly by pointing to the fact that the great powers are subordinated to the ‘principle of development’. That Kjellén advanced this principle is, apparently, both because he is observing these powers in real time – they are on their way to somewhere, ‘going up’ or ‘going down’ – and also because they are to be understood in view of their ‘life power’. Concerning this last concept, he, notably, refers to other humanist studies, such as the neologisms in language, new styles in art, class movements in society; ‘everywhere statements about life power are considered wholly legitimate and justified’ (Kjellén 1913 IV, preface: VII). This he also labels ‘the genetic approach’ to scholarship.

To express a value judgement as a form of evaluation, he argues, is wholly legitimate. He does this at greater length in a contribution to a Festschrift for his publisher, Hugo Geber, in 1913.³¹ In the November 1913 preface to the fourth book of his 1911–13 edition of Stormakterna, he is rather explicit on two points of view.

First, as Kjellén has argued elsewhere in passing, he now speaks more directly about what he considers to be an over-appreciation of the role and power of ‘the personal’ in history, as opposed to ‘the necessary’. ‘My work programmatically turns against this liberalism in science, with its one-sided individualistic explanation of the world’ (ibid.: VII). This is a clear statement belittling voluntarism, and thus the possibility that politicians, ‘statesmen’, could determine the outcome of events. He not only, as before, shies away from involving the statesmen’s thinking and actions in a scholarly analysis. He severely minimizes the individual’s role in society in general, which partly seems to be because of an ideological colouring of ‘liberalism’, here assumed to focus on the importance of the individual.

This declaration of principle he extends to his second theoretical point. He appeals to what he calls ‘the logic of geography’, which he sets against ‘the logic of events’. This latter expression is reminiscent of what Karl Popper and others termed ‘the logic of the situation’. Regarding those who use the latter kind of argument, he asks if they ‘think that room [or space] ties up the freedom of action of states less than time does?’ (ibid.: VIII). ‘The state is a prisoner in its space, land, location, and so on, and is not able, at any given moment, to free itself from it, nor wholly from its people’s mentality, its measures [roughly, statistical characteristics], its institutions’ (ibid.).

Regarding those who polemicize against Kjellén for dealing with ‘prophecies’, he argues, ‘regularly these [‘prophecies’] in reality are applications of the logic of geography to the situations at hand: corollaries [Kjellén uses the Swedish korollarier] embedded in objective facts seen against a genetic background’ (ibid.).

In Kjellén’s chapter Slutsatser (Conclusions), in the last of the four books of the 1913 edition, he points out that although a number of political events have occurred – chronologically listed in his introductory chapter in the 1911–13 edition (‘The planetary situation’) – these do not matter enough to change his conclusions regarding these powers, at least not within his categories regarding the great powers.³² However, the changes in alliances, and wars in the Balkans, increase his worries about a possible ‘general world war’.

When he, again, discusses the ‘urges’, or ‘inclinations’, of great powers – the ultimate force making them act as such powers – he adds to the Nietzschean ‘a will to power’ the expression ‘a will to more power’. Without mentioning him, Kjellén opposes Bismarck’s comment that Germany is a ‘satisfied’ (‘saturiert’) power, and says that a great power is never satisfied. And now he has begun to use the concept ‘spheres of interest’ (Kjellén 1913 IV: 244). The successful great power can never let up on its drive to live, to expand. Spain, Turkey and China, however, ended up in ‘fatalistic resignation’. In these characterizations one may

notice a similarity with the ‘wintertime’, later ‘petrification’, of these powers, as with the concepts used in Spengler’s listing of ‘cultures’.

Also, Kjellén observes – as in 1905, but generally referring to Ratzel, and others such as Schneider – that all great powers are located in the ‘temperate zone’; and, he adds, ‘only there the human will is kept strong and healthy. Because of this, India, Brazil, and all the tropics are doomed; because of this, but not directly because of blood or skin colour, the general incompetence of the black race’ (ibid.).

Kjellén thus resorts to a recurrent theme in the history of ideas – the ‘climate school’ extending from Ibn Khaldun to Montesquieu. Still, arguments in these matters are really not that important to Kjellén. His main interest lies with understanding the characteristics and differences among those world’s states already designated as great powers.

Kjellén operates with a number of mechanisms, sometimes expressed as the relations of opposites, sometimes qualifying as ‘laws’. A dynamic metaphor is often used, as an oscillation between amplitudes; or, when the relation is more static, balance or harmony is emphasized. Over time states are engaged in ‘mutual contact’, which has increased with increased global communication. The result will be ‘friction’, which may, again, lead either to hostility or to more friendly exchanges. Related to these is mankind’s urge to both ‘associate’ and to ‘differentiate’; or, using other concepts, to ‘entangle’ and to ‘disentangle’. In a sense this corresponds to the varying moves, tendencies or ‘needs’ of a society – again using Kjellén’s concepts –to ‘emancipate’. Although he does not refer to them in Stormakterna, these movements coincide with Kjellén’s ‘ideas of 1789’ (roughly speaking, liberalism and emancipation), and ‘the ideas of 1914’ (roughly speaking, conservatism and concentration).

Towards the end of the 1905 chapter ‘Conclusions’, Kjellén had emphasized a brighter future, achieving ‘autarky’ – that is, self-sufficiency – , for those great

powers that are ‘continental’ states with a significant land mass, like Russia, the USA and maybe Germany. Their essential resources are available domestically rather than being spread out in overseas colonies. In such a land mass you supposedly would find all the resources – raw materials, agricultural and industrial produce, population – necessary to support your power position, including in times of conflict and possible isolation.

However, in 1913, Kjellén focuses less on the ‘continental’ as the ideal type for a great power, and says: ‘rather, our observations point in the direction that the ideal sits in harmony between land and sea interests’. That is why England and Japan ‘seek continental complements to their insular core’, and why Russia and the United States ‘look for more shore to their massive, unshapely bodies’ (Kjellén 1913 IV: 247, emphasis in the original).

When Kjellén discusses the 1911–13 standings of the great powers, the ‘ranking anew’, some are descending according to some parameters, while ascending according to others. He says about China that, although it is not yet included among the great powers, ‘if we imagine a visitor from another planet, with our scientific possibilities, and [who] got a map of world politics in its hand, he would immediately point to China as one of the major great powers’ (ibid.: 252). Of course, to Kjellén, it would be the ‘hard’ geographical and topological characteristics, and less the politics of the times, which would be decisive for great-power status.

As in 1905, Kjellén worries about Germany. Its ‘space’ is already too small and crowded. The Balkan crisis of 1912–13 has diminished the value of its stock. ‘Its speculation in Turkish papers appeared to be a mistake. Its “Levantine” programme has received a serious blow’ (ibid.: 254). Germany’s ‘Central European programme’ stands, though.

Kjellén’s use of the concept of ‘programme’ is more frequent than in the 1905 edition, and in the 1920 edition it is rather conspicuous. This signifies an

increasingly voluntarist focus, in that although he still refrains from discussing the plans and actions of statesmen, one can ascribe possible ‘strategies’ to the various great powers. To what extent these strategies spring from inherent necessities in a given situation, such as from location in combination with political possibilities, or from pressures upon the ‘life’ of the great power, is difficult to say.

Kjellén again invokes the tendency or ‘law’ that the great powers are getting bigger and fewer at the expense of, primarily, smaller and weaker powers. But the slight ambivalence one could see in 1905 regarding the future of small powers is now more apparent. On the one hand, some small states are being shattered by the violence of the big ones – for example, Cuba in 1901 and Panama in 1903 by the USA. On the other hand, new powers, sovereign nationstates, are appearing – Norway in 1905, Bulgaria in 1908, and Albania in 1913. Also, at times the giant empires are shaken to their foundations, as they were in the USA in the 1860s, Russia in 1905, and China in 1912–13 (Kjellén 1913 IV: 256–57). He also turns to the ‘dynamic’ concepts of opposites affecting each other, the ‘law of transformation’ or oscillation, and cites Ranke from his noted 1833 essay regarding exchange, or reciprocity, and succession, as inherent in world history.

Kjellén’s final judgement here, in his 1911–13 edition, regarding what dominates world history, is – on the face of it – somewhat surprising:

Power is not at all history’s last word, but culture; spiritual as well as material, moral no less than physical. The powers … are tools used by history in its cultural work. But this work benefits perhaps most from cooperation between big and small powers; as the agriculture of a nation is best served by mansions and small farms alike, mutually supporting each other. (Ibid.: 259)

In this, Kjellén touches upon the idea that will be later expressed as ‘soft power’ (see Marklund, this volume). This, however, is mainly used to emphasize the

possible means to exert ‘model power’, or applying negotiating skills, as part of a great-power conflict on the international scene, including as a service provided by small states for great powers (see Björk 1994: 8, on Guten Dienste of mediators). Kjellén has a more general, and, indeed, a more historical perspective – what will happen in the long run, and why? The answer, using some of today’s cherished ideas and concepts, is that through cooperation and trust, culture will prevail and create harmony.

Political Science – The State of the Discipline and Its Object

Regarding the state of political science, and his recurring concern that it is not ‘scientific’ enough, Kjellén reiterates:

Our official political science has in some places stiffened into a narrow meaning: the state as an abstract, ‘inward’ concept, the public interest as opposed to the private one within the same community. According to this terminology the Swedish state is a species in the genus ‘the constitutional form of state’. In my school of teaching, the state is looked upon as a concrete ‘outward’ concept, in opposition to other states: the Swedish state here belongs to the genus ‘the European system of states’. The state in this meaning is not only a legal arrangement … but a power (‘power’, ‘puissance’) [English and French words used here, in parenthesis, by Kjellén], a living force – in short, a life. (Kjellén 1913b: 140, emphasis in the original)

Here, though, Kjellén argues for a more comprehensive view of the state as, in effect, a society; it is, however, primarily related to nation-states. To him, rather quickly, but comprehensibly, the nation-state becomes a ‘power’, and quite suddenly, but less obviously, it can also be viewed as a ‘life’. Here, it is not clear whether this should be understood in a metaphorical or a literal sense.

Kjellén then continues by discussing the sectors or expressions, the ‘sides’, as he calls them, of the state. To the established ‘constitutional’ order he adds ‘society’, ‘people’ and ‘realm’, with their respective ‘social’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘geographical’ organization (ibid.: 141). In the later book, Staten som lifsform (Kjellén 1916), he also includes ‘household’, or ‘economic’ organization (see Lundén, ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography’, this volume).

These four ‘sides’ will all be used in any subsequent examination of ‘a historically appearing state … with continuous regard to the connection between the details and the whole, the repercussions on the life force itself. Maybe, I could express it, that my perspective is anthropological, not anatomical’ (Kjellén 1913b: 141).

Kjellén here, with a biological metaphor, in line with his infusion of aspects of life, of organismic thinking, into the understanding of society, expresses a systemic view of his objects. But in this he also reacts to the legal approach to society and state, which was part of ‘the received view’ in his training as a political scientist. This is witnessed by his subsequent presentation of the ordinary handbooks in the discipline, and where the different phenomena of the state are presented, often in detail, but not seen as a functioning whole or ‘an organic context’. ‘The state here [in the handbooks] is itself … disintegrated into its constituent parts, and the presentation has the impression of an inventory of a house rather than a characterization of its owner, who lives there’ (ibid.: 142). Kjellén also, a little later, uses the neologism ‘medico-legal’ [Sw. medikolegal] for an understanding that is limited to view society from an ‘anatomical’ perspective by enumerating its parts – and where it is legal paragraphs that are supposed to determine the relationships between these body parts.

The ambition to find regularities, ‘laws’, presupposes that one has instances to generalize about. Kjellén counted eight great powers, and, in turn, they are classified in types, so as to belong to subcategories. If one considers those instances as part of, and functioning within, a ‘system’ on a higher or ‘global’ level, this would make ‘law making’ – identifying regularities between these

societies or powers – quite difficult. If you operate with ‘the global system’ (of powers), there is only one instance of its kind. It is einmalig, uniquely existing in history, though it may change its appearance, maybe even its ‘essence’, as it proceeds through history. In such a system, the constituent parts are dependent on each other, as well as on systemic characteristics. To employ a Kjellénian metaphor – the constituent, physiological-anatomical parts of a living body, a ‘system’, as it were, cannot be analysed as instances existing on their own that are generalizable. Kjellén at times appears to be caught between, on the one hand, generalizing about a number of instances within a global system and, on the other hand, trying to say something ‘scientific’, something generalized, about the global system itself. This ‘global system’, towards the end of Kjellén’s study, tends to be referred to in terms of its ‘inhabitants,’ of ‘humankind’.

The quotes above, where Kjellén comments upon and legitimizes his work, quite clearly demonstrate how he wants to embrace what he sees as an up-to-date, modern and, as it were, progressive position regarding the evolution of the scientific approach generally. This also underscores how important it is to understand Stormakterna both as an investigation into the features of great powers and as a test of his geopolitical theory.

A systemic and determinist approach, in Kjellén’s version, could be seen as emphasizing the collectivist before the individualistic understanding of the world. But here, politics, or ideological concerns, seem to creep into Kjellén’s argumentation. This is witnessed by the quote from above, ‘My work programmatically turns against this liberalism in science, with its one-sided individualistic explanation of the world’ (Kjellén 1913 IV, preface: VII). Individualism is ‘old-fashioned’, because individualism is tied to liberalism. And liberalism has characterized the past era, ever since the French Revolution. What Kjellén calls ‘the ideas of 1789’ are now to be replaced by ‘the ideas of 1914’, where duty, high morals, and joint efforts are heralded (see Kjellén 1913b).

Collectivism, biology, system, common effort – all go together, both in the new, progressive, scholarly approach and in political practice, as perceived by

Kjellén. Regarding the scholarly enterprise, in the sense of its direction and of the increase in scientific rigour, Kjellén was undoubtedly on the right side of history – and that is where he urgently wanted to be. Moving in the direction of finding patterns, as in the natural sciences, was also characteristic of the social sciences of his times. One could say that the rise of hermeneutics towards the end of the nineteenth century – including Rickert, Dilthey and Windelband – manifests this tendency, since hermeneutics, and various forms of Einfühlung, were supposed to set the human sciences apart from the social sciences – to make the study of the individual humans an exclusively humanist enterprise. And Kjellén wanted his kind of analysis of society to be, rather, the social science par excellence.

Seen from the vantage point of training and early scholarly commitment, the traditional political science scholar would be seen as leaning towards the ideal of either historical or legal, exclusively constitutional approaches. Kjellén, though, argued instead for political science to evolve and become the social science – one that should be modern and progressive, much like the natural sciences.

Outline of the Editions – 1920

Introduction

In the very short introductory chapter to the third, 1920, edition of Stormakterna, comprising a single volume, and indeed remaining a torso, now with the title Stormakterna och världskrisen [The great powers and the world crisis]. Kjellén proclaimed once again the ambition underlying this kind of work as a whole. But he also introduces modifications in the analysis, which fifteen years of deliberations on the subject had inspired – along with, of course, fifteen years of eventful international politics.

Kjellén found it urgent to reiterate his mission as a scholar. From a ‘received view’ of a legislatively understood polity, Kjellén eagerly opened the door to a more complex, chequered and multidimensional reality, but he stopped short of opening the next door – leading to a world of political actions by ‘statesmen’, the world of ‘subjectivity’, of voluntarism. In 1905 he so clearly put in much energy and a sense of mission to challenge the received view – the safe discourse, the one where a scholar could find a firm basis in a rule-guided and rule-documented world, backed up with sources; a world where only the bodies, authorities and institutions of the state and their interrelationships were dealt with, albeit elaborately. He rather argues again that the great powers have arisen ‘from an inner necessity, by purely historical processes, independent of rules for the formal constitution of law’ (Kjellén 1920: 1, emphasis added)

However, and as a modification of his more dogmatic approach in earlier editions, he points out that ‘subjective factors cannot be overlooked’ (ibid.: 4). And he repeats the threefold reservation he had put forward in the 1905 edition. The purpose is obviously to point out how far a scholar, a scientist, may acknowledge such factors without trespassing into politics. The reservation regards ‘the peoples’ perception of themselves and the world around them, the degree and depth of emotional moods, the ability of acting persons to assess situations and to make good on opportunities opening up’ (ibid.). However, Kjellén does not really operationalize these subjective factors, and they are not systematically taken into account in his further discussion of nation-states and great powers, and in their participation in international affairs.

In this introductory chapter to the 1920 edition, Kjellén wants to emphasize some developments that have occurred since he first wrote on the subject. To summarize:

(1) The continuous concentration of power, not only into even bigger great powers, but into very big industries, enterprises, shipping companies, financial capital, labour market trusts etc. (ibid.: 2).

(2) A ‘planetary situation’ with an ‘economic and political world-system with growing solidarity and a community of interest instead of the isolated local systems of older eras’ (ibid.: 2–3).

(3) ‘This [point (2) above] is a sign of imperialism; and the soil into which it has been planted is an over-emphasized nationalism’ (ibid.: 3).

(4) ‘On the other hand, during these times there was a general movement that reacted against this whole development towards difference between big and small. It was the democraticism, with its trinity of individualism, cosmopolitanism and pacifism’ (ibid.: 3). One may note that Kjellén does not speak of ‘democracy’, together with ‘parliamentarism’, as an ideal system or method for guaranteeing popular representation and power in the polity. Rather, it is an -ism, an ideology, on a par with, say, socialism and liberalism, but with postwar components, which Kjellén discerned were on the rise.

Kjellén then quotes Martin Spahn, in saying that ‘this tension gave the face of politics an enigmatic trait’ (ibid.: 3).³³ Note that Spahn had read and appreciated Kjellén’s recent book in German, Studien zur Weltkrise (Kjellén 1917b). Kjellén’s 1920 book, Stormakterna och världskrisen, which is discussed here, was published in German in 1921, in the first of several editions, as Die Grossmächte und die Weltkrise (see Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume).

Statesmen Going to War – The Destruction of a Geopolitical Model

The mounting rivalry between the great powers towards the end of the nineteenth century led to a ‘Clausewitz ending’; the clash of interests in high politics continued into warfare. This was, of course, not meant to be, and obviously not in the mind of the European statesmen who framed the conditions for future great-power relations in Vienna in 1815.

Such a historical evolution of international affairs was not part of the scholarly theorizing of the times, either. For one thing, a specific discourse on great-power rivalry did not really appear until the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century. Then, new nation-states aspired to join the system of powers, claiming an interest beyond their proper borders. Colonialism became imperialism, international relations becoming ‘planetary’, as Kjellén put it, and there was a general growth in power in Germany, the United States and Japan.³⁴ All these things created tension in the established ‘system’. Along with politicians and diplomats, scholars might fear a development where the more peaceful competition of the nineteenth century, in various fields, particularly in industry, was replaced by a more brutal clash of interests. And although scholars and politicians alike could speak of a darkened horizon and an upcoming war, scholars appear not to have much of a preparedness, even less a scholarly apparatus, for such a turn of events. Scholars, such as Kjellén, resisted the ‘unscientific’ aspect, the ‘subjectivist’ approach. Real action – including possible mistakes – by statesmen was not considered their responsibility.

Rudolf Kjellén was one of few scholars who published on the great powers both before and after the war. As was the case with many scholars and observers, he had no conceptual tools or insights for analysing a military confrontation. He would occasionally speculate about the possible positive aspects of preparing for war and of warfare itself. Preparation for war, and even combat itself, could have a ‘hardening’ effect, building up resolve in individuals as well as in a people. As mentioned, this was sometimes expressed in his ‘the ideas of 1914’ – as opposed to ‘the ideas of 1789’. Kjellén was obviously not prepared to understand troop movements, weaponry, combat or logistics, not to speak of the horror of the trenches of 1917. There are no battlefield scenarios in his pre-war writings.

To be sure, the 1920 edition, despite a chapter dedicated to this war, does not primarily deal with the battlefield campaigns (but see Falkemark, this volume). By not speculating about policy-making and implementation by governments, military leaders and statesmen, and even less so about actual warfare and campaigns, Kjellén could avoid being let down by these actors and events. By

taking such ‘structure-harming’ initiatives as to start warfare, these politicians exhausted or destroyed the structural conditions, which had been used by Kjellén to build up his model of great-power potential, and which he had earlier so carefully mapped.

A decisive reason why Kjellén could not allow such ‘tipping over the chessboard’ in his own analysis, was, of course, that he was determined to analyse these structures and to discern regularities or ‘laws’ that conditioned the behaviour of the great powers – that is, to be a true and modern scholar. And these laws, if not ‘disturbed’, could indicate what would happen in the near future regarding the competition between these powers; making ‘prophecies’, as his critics expressed it.

In evaluating the outcome of the World War, which, from Kjellén’s point of view, was an unnecessary intervention by ‘statesmen’, he was forced to reckon with an actual confrontation, in which the ‘competition for survival’ would truly be the name of the game, but catastrophically ending with a ‘competition for winning’. The very harsh peace accords, intended to crush the losers, were indeed a new component in how warfare between great powers in Europe ended.³⁵ This time, the winners did not care if the losers survived or not. And winners were indeed identified; they were primarily the British and the Americans. Today some scholars speak of the ‘West’ versus ‘the rest’.³ To Kjellén it was, as he put it, Anglosaxia contra mundum (1920: 199). Nonetheless, ‘West vs the rest’ is a useful demarcation when it comes to Kjellén’s summing up of the standing of the powers after the First World War.

The Great Powers after the War

The final chapter of the 1920 edition is titled ‘The Great Powers after the War’. The pattern for organizing the material is similar to the previous editions.

An initial section on the ‘fallen’ great powers is now substituted for the chapter in previous editions on the historically ‘dismissed’ powers. The ‘fallen’, or ‘the losers’, are Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. The demise of AustriaHungary is the most definitive one, not least because the outcome is consonant with the ‘laws of a sound, modern state construct. The geopolitical unity of rivers in the long run could not keep the realm together in the face of the centrifugal forces of the nation-state’ (Kjellén 1920: 183).³⁷

Losers – Austria-Hungary

Kjellén’s argument regarding the fate of Austria-Hungary is a geopolitical tour de force, combining several elements.

‘Middle Europe’ was the expression of a desire for Europe to attain greater mass in the middle position between the British and the Russian flanks (Kjellén 1920: 184). This was the basic construction plan for a planetary equilibrium, with Europe as a part with a relevant weight. The materially, river-based (Rhine– Danube–Weichsel) aspect of Central Europe had now been undermined when its eastern flank, Russia, succumbed towards the end of the war, and a vacuum appeared. This was a fact that the world (peace) congress had to deal with. Middle Europe, then, was declared a vacuum as well. Western Europe thus disentangled itself from its continental mooring. The Danube monarchy’s raison d’être had not only been the rivers’ geopolitical weight, and its dynastic tradition, but as a border post against the East.

The disappearance of Austria-Hungary has eminently grown into world historical dimensions. It was the relic kept until our time, of the medieval European universal state, based on Christendom’s community. … [But now,] since all counterweights have disappeared, a new universal empire rises on the Western horizon, and this time clearly on a planetary base. … World history, beginning with the Levantine, continuing to a Mediterranean, and from there to a European stage, now appears to move a small measure to an Atlantic one. In this

sense it may be said, that Austria in its fall has pulled Europe with it. (Ibid.: 185, emphasis in the original)

Kjellén had generally treated the great-powers’ deployment of political power as emanating from the familiar factors of location, population and economy, and as gradually constituting and building up ‘needs’ and ‘pressures’, which may end up as conflicts and clashes between those powers. Such instances of clashes of interests constituted ‘the logic of geography’. But now, here, he infused an element of ‘history’, the ‘logic of the situation’, a dialectic in which one major event leads to another. He had now, thus, written a piece of recent history. And, importantly, the fall of the Austrian empire is not understood in military or political terms, but given a specific and new kind of geopolitical interpretation. Here history and geography worked together – not geography and societal factors, as in the case of the demography of France.

Losers – Germany

To deal with Germany’s fall from grace, such a destiny, at least momentarily, was presumably the toughest part for Kjellén personally. But he, again, brings up the ‘weaknesses’ of Germany as a power, which he had noticed in his pre-war examinations (see the following chapter on the four powers). He is, though, rather vague when he speaks of ‘two nations’ within the country. He, as before, refers to a ‘particularism in the mind of the people’ (Kjellén 1920: 187). But he makes it clear, that it is not the division between the social democrats and bourgeois society that is a problem. The former ‘served at the front for the fatherland with the same loyalty as those men of other parties. As a consequence, they thus acquired the moral right to take command, when the old system of government disintegrated’ (ibid.: 188). Also, the household, the legal system, and the governance held their own, and ‘technology [showed] its ability to attain autarky, where nature alone does not suffice’ (ibid., 187). Quite probably, Kjellén here had in mind the fertilizing technology, which was one of Fritz Haber’s more humanitarian examples of his several diversified contributions to a German society mobilized for war.

But in the end, ‘the decisive weakness resides in the people’s soul and the national willpower, which could not withstand the enemy’s spiritual blockade and boycott’. He then noticed that whereas the war united the French and the Italian, and strengthened their sense of community, it divided the people in Germany (ibid.: 187).

Kjellén had acknowledged already in his 1905 analysis that will and willpower were important properties for a great power in ordinary times, in its efforts to expand its power and status – to ‘compete for winning’ – when other qualities could not be assigned such an ultimate character. But now the willpower was lacking, including in the most trying of times, in warfare, the ‘competition for survival’ in its purest form.

Having appeared before him on the international stage in recent months, Kjellén also reflects on the revolutionary events during the winter of 1918/19. In the outcome, with respect to the German constitution of 11 August 1919, he discerns a fusion of American, French, Swiss and Russian ideas, with workers being represented in ‘councils’ at the enterprises – ‘the constitutional factory’, he calls it. He wonders how this ‘representation of interests’ really could go along with the commission of victors’ demands for war reparations (Kjellén 1920: 190). Kjellén quotes some voices preferring a retreat from all power politics, because of the ‘German people’s incurable incompetence for politics’, and preferring a return to a Hellenistic ideal of ‘a “Weltvolk des Geistes”, along with the new Rome, England’ (ibid.: 191).

If the Austrian Empire’s fall was couched in a European-wide context, the fate of the German power, a great power on the rise, is discussed in terms of internal weaknesses, in a peculiar sense making good on doubts that Kjellén had aired even before the war. In a way, he had undermined, or delegitimized, his own hope for a German great-power rise, by recognizing built-in weaknesses, which placed the hopes and aspirations in an unrealistic light (Cf. Falkemark, ‘Kjellén and the First World War’, this volume).

In one of Kjellén’s unsentimental, or unprejudiced, outsider’s observations he speculates about ‘a continental combination of those expulsed [Germans and Russians] against the marine world powers in the League of Nations’ (Kjellén 1920: 191).

Losers – Russia

Germany and Russia, Germans and Russians, Germanic and Slavic peoples – however labelled, according to Kjellén, these are two of the most dominating nations, ‘races’ or ‘cultures’ in Europe. They not only lost in a military sense in the World War, but were seemingly being demoted from having a say in future European affairs generally, in a cultural and civilizational way.

Whereas Kjellén earlier, in terms of races and culture, had seen Germanic features both in Germans and in English peoples, he now tends to separate them, in the sense of singling out Anglo-Saxons: the British and Americans. The Romanic ‘races’ are categorized roughly as he did before. They had shown signs of enduring vitality, and they were not excluded from influence, as Kjellén put it, implying that they were not really expected to return to their once more glamorous roles.

Regarding Russia, Kjellén, as with Germany, first notices and discusses the internal turmoil, including the revolutionary re-orderings – not mitigated, as was the case with Germany during 1919 – with the Bolshevists as the most radical political organization ever seen. It is ‘the 1871 Paris Commune extended to a world realm’ (Kjellén 1920: 191–92). But the revolutionary spirit has a very strong power of cohesion. After ‘the will of the Czar Peter’, there is now a new mission to conquer the whole world. ‘But whereas the new Russian powerholders look for a dominion of an ideal kind the world over, and on a social

foundation, their own realm has disintegrated in the name of nationalism, to an extent now and then reminiscent of the fate of Austria’ (ibid.: 192–93).

Kjellén refers to the new nations on Russia’s western rim, several of them recognized as members of the new ‘system’, thus becoming nation-states: Poland, Finland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (ibid.: 193). ‘The disentanglement of the states on the rim of the central realm would strengthen [Russia’s] character of a real nation-state’ (ibid.: 194).

To this purely external loss one must add the geopolitical change in location, returning to the landlocked realm of Czar Peter, with only random openings to the Black and the Baltic seas, and furthermore deprived of its agrarian and industrial point of gravity (in the Ukraine), which thus had moved to Siberia as the fountain of nourishment. (Ibid.: 193–94)

Because of the war, Germany had lost a half [century], but Russia two whole centuries, in … development. (Ibid.: 194)

Empires, Great Powers, Nation-States and ‘Races’ – ‘The Nationality Principle’

Kjellén, of course, duly took notice of the fact that the outcome of the World War meant the spread, and an increased number, of nation-states, of people winning sovereignty. This was both because the war doomed several old empires, resulting in ‘successor states’, and because the allied victors pressed on for recognizing the nineteenth-century principle of ‘one nation – one state’, now with the help of the League of Nations. Of course, not all new successor states – sovereign countries, like Yugoslavia – were proper nation-states, in the sense that one nation, or people, more or less wholly populated the new country.

Kjellén did not wholly embrace this development. He had seen the great power as having a proper place in the system of (nation-) states. And such a power could accommodate several peoples: more dominant, ‘leading’ ones as well as more marginal peoples, who were not a priori entitled to constitute themselves with a state of their own. Such great powers could well be empires, with territories, possessions, peoples and ethnicities, either close to the mainland or outlying, perhaps overseas, pieces of land, ‘colonies’; and all being part of the same polity, existing within the same governmental embrace.

Thus, one of the things that appears to have confused Kjellén, following the outcome of the war and the peace negotiations, was the renewed focus on nationalities and their rights, primarily for them to become nation-states and acquire sovereignty.

The ‘great powers’ was an established concept in international politics, and which for a century had been both rather clear-cut in definition – beginning with participation in Vienna in 1815, and with others subsequently added – as well as simple to enumerate. ‘Great power’ was not coterminus with ‘empire’, but most of them were empires, of some kind. The USA was recognized as a great power at more or less the same time, the 1890s, as it acquired an empire in the sense of territorially both continuing and going beyond the Monroe doctrine, regarding the hegemony in the Western hemisphere. Also, Japan moved parallel to these two categories. And Italy might be found in the same field of status. But the Ottoman Empire, with, as it were, ‘European credentials’, was never part of the nineteenth-century concert. Prussia was perhaps the only recognized power without an empire.³⁸ The overall leading role of the state and a unified governance, with a coherent policy and attitude towards the outside world, characterized both the great power and the empire.

The ‘nation’, as a people, for Kjellén could be said to function as an ‘interest group’ within a higher category, but, of course, to also constitute the inhabitants of a homogeneous and sovereign nation-state. When Kjellén speaks of ‘races’, or ‘tribes’, this could refer either to several peoples, each with a language and a

history of their own, or to a vaguely ethnic category, an affinity among several peoples characterized by a cultural or civilizational community. They were either joined in effort or they shared a common destiny. These ‘races’ could be ‘ranked’, or at least classified, according to their level of cultural (aestheticethic) refinement and/or civilizational development. Races in a more ‘biologicalanthropological’ meaning, are commonly numbered to be three. Kjellén would refer to them as African, Negro or black; as Mongolian or yellow; and as European (seldom, though) or white, but most often not specified. The official US census today operates with at least five races in this meaning, not in an ethnic meaning.

Kjellén’s paramount examples of races – in his terminology – in Europe are labelled Romanic, Germanic and Slavic. But with an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ victory in the World War, the latter, as ‘race’, is seen as separate from the Germanic one. It seems as if great powers crystallizing along such ‘racial’ lines – cultural, civilizational, ethnic affinities, and levels of advanced society – would to Kjellén be a natural evolvement. The various, often ‘smaller’ nations, or peoples – Kjellén never uses the term ‘minority’ in a conceptual manner – ought readily to be able to find their place within these ‘racial affinities’ (socially), and to go with their common belonging, common governance, within the great power (politically).

Historical and cultural scholars such as Spengler, discussing such large-scale affinities as ‘cultures’ or ‘civilizations’, could of course accommodate the categories involving performance, cognitive traits and refinement levels mentioned above, but the very political and state-forming categories, which Kjellén and other students of the great powers had focused on, are missing in the former kind of studies.

Winners – Japan

Moving from the ‘fallen’ great powers – but with only Austria-Hungary as a

definitive case – to the remaining ‘victors’ and their varying statuses after the war, Kjellén first turns to Japan, which he labels ‘the Oriental great power’ in giving a rubric for this section. In the 1905 edition, and also in the 1911–13 one, Kjellén was much engaged in and impressed by the rise of Japan, and saw with excitement the emerging clash of interests in the north-east of Asia between Russia, Japan and China.

Now, in 1920, his text on Japan is more dispassionate in tone. That Japan was now an established great power took the edge off Kjellén’s once novel observation. Also, Russia turned out to be a loser, both in Europe and in the Far East, and China had not been able to assert itself.³ Furthermore, Japan had gained much from the outcome of the war, without having put in much of an effort (Kjellén 1920: 195). To Kjellén, this last was a moral drawback.

As also for other powers, Kjellén prefers to speak of various national ‘programmes’ for Japan. In Japan’s case, a ‘continental programme’, focusing on the mainland Asia and on China, competes with a ‘Pacific programme’, vaguely being insular and marine but also ‘liberal’. A third programme, of expansionism, focuses on building railways in Manchuria. But there is, in general, ‘a geographical and psychological position in between’ (ibid.: 150); and the outcome of the competition between these possible alternative programmes seems unclear.

The clear-cut victories for the Allies in Europe, though, rocked the overall balance of power, and the influence Japan had reckoned with. What Kjellén now saw for the future was the following: ‘the big planetary game immediately after the war is in the hands of these three, Japan, the USA and England; and it is at least not out of the question that the stage after the final game on the little orient [roughly, the European side of the Eurasian continent] will now move to the big one – if in the form of “der nächste Weltkrieg” [the next World War] or not, the future will show’ (ibid.: 198).

Winners – the Romanic Great Powers

France and Italy, the Romanic peoples, were formally winners following the end of the World War, and, unlike the Germanic and Slavic ones, they were not excluded from a say in world politics in the future.

In earlier editions Kjellén had painted a rather bleak future for France because of, for example, its decline in population – the ‘two-children policy’. He also sees Italy after the war catching up in this variable. But otherwise, he discerns a kind of rehabilitation for France; the degenerative tendencies are no longer there. ‘Hidden forces in the psyche of the French people’ are now being revealed (Kjellén 1920: 211). The constitution and governance are intact after the war, and political stability bodes well. France has, as Kjellén notes, played down its old Romanic belonging, and instead has oriented itself along the war alliance path, towards the Anglo-Saxon powers (ibid.: 212).⁴

Italy, on the other hand, evidences less-promising aspects. In this 1920 edition, ‘foreign affairs’ had become an established concept and a heading for not only geopolitical basic conditions and ‘inclinations’ (Drang and the like), but rather various ‘programmes’, and the conscious setting up of plans, sometimes ranked in order. In this approach, more of an emphasis on ‘voluntarism’ shows up in Kjellén’s analysis of the characteristics of the great powers; they are not only in the hands of their material conditions. In the case of Italy, and as a consequence of the Berlin conference in 1878, there were no less than four programmes (ibid.: 27–29). The first is an ‘irredenta’ programme, to complete the work of unifying Italy, and ‘creating Italians’. The second is a ‘Mediterranean’ programme, where a specific geopolitical tendency comes into play, looking across the sea to the shore nearest on the other side – here, as an extension of Sicily to Tunis. The third is a pure ‘colonial’ programme, without, as Kjellén argues, ‘either national or geographical “right” or legitimacy’. And although Libya came under the control of the Italians, the campaign to Abyssinia was a failure (ibid.: 28). And the fourth is a ‘specific marenostro programme within the framework of the general Mediterranean programme and in geographical connection with

irredenta’ (ibid.: 29). The marenostro programme is the one most in play after the war, and among its features Kjellén notices ‘d’ANNUNZIOS’s Garibaldi campaign’ to Fiume [now Rijeka] in September 1919 (ibid.: 210).

The nationality question makes itself felt for France, an established colonial power, as with the British: ‘to a large extent [France] has had to rely on coloured troops for its victory; a method that cannot avoid getting back [to the French] in terms of increased demands from the respective colonial population’ (ibid.: 210).

In a rare reflection – here, justified by the Romanic theme – Kjellén brings up the question of the role of South America; otherwise included in the chapters on the United States, and the issue of pan-Americanism (ibid.: 115–16). The initial efforts to create a ‘Latin union’, a great power in Latin America, a so-called ‘AB-C formation’ of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, have not been furthered much (ibid.: 212). A couple of problems are ‘the lack of the stimulus, that originates from a rich coastal development’ (ibid.: 213). This is an archetypical geopolitical point-of view. Kjellén continues to mention the fact that the area is ‘too much isolated from all the main centres of culture’ (ibid.; see Rivarola Puntigliano, ‘Rudolf Kjellén’s Intellectual Impact’, this volume).

Winners – The Anglo-Saxon Great Powers

When Kjellén examines the great powers after the war he does notice the importance of the ‘nationality principle’, both in the normative aspect of efforts by the victors – not least US president Wilson – to award and ‘reward’ oppressed and dependent peoples with a sovereign state of their own, and also the recognition and acknowledgement of the break-up of empires.

But it went two ways. By losing a number of nations, or peoples, on the rim, the Russian Empire – as indicated above – not only gave birth to new nation-states,

but the Russians themselves became more homogeneous, not only as Slavs, but as Russians. A Russian nation became coterminus with the nation-state of Russia, albeit soon to be the Soviet Union.

When it came to Britain and the USA it also worked in more than one way. For one thing, a true American nation seemed to have evolved from among the many different nationalities, who, in waves, at different times over a long period, had come to the United States and created the American melting pot, or the ‘cast of war’, as Kjellén termed it here. Not the many millions of Irish and Germans altered this process, that is tilting the balance too much in a certain direction (Kjellén 1920: 202).

The British had mobilized many soldiers – Irish, Indian and Egyptian are specifically mentioned by Kjellén – from around its empire. ‘The Hindus, in masses commanded to the soil of Europe to defend the interests of their lords, could no longer be rejected with the phrase “the white man’s burden”, when they reflected upon their own lack of freedom’ (ibid.: 204). And India got a place of its own at the postwar peace deliberations.

When Kjellén is about to characterize the new order, he reaches rhetorical heights, with suppressed admiration as well as scepticism shining through.

On the dark horizon you spot the contours of a new, world-dominating realm of the same species as the one of Rome after the Punic Wars and of the same circum-marine type, but this time on the basis of the Atlantic itself, a political Atlantis. … The ambitions for centuries to reach a planetary equilibrium following the European one, and based on the political equal standing of the Germanic race, turned out in Versailles to be an illusion. … the supremacy, or pure monopoly [of the Anglo-Saxon tribe] in all decisive factors: sea power, production, capital, and the general opinion [sic]. (Ibid.: 199)

To include a ‘general opinion’ as a decisive factor in these matters is not what Kjellén has paid much attention to before. This was an aspect that Kjellén had first brought into focus when, early on, he discussed who would qualify as a great power. Going back in history to the middle of the nineteenth century, he aligned this kind of judgement with the other, more formal and material ones, which made it possible to recognize a power as a great power (see the introductory section of this chapter). Thus, the concept of ‘general opinion’ [Sw. allmänna meningen] is, as an idea, perhaps more similar to Rousseau’s ‘opinion générale’, or maybe even to the scholarly ‘received view’ (i.e. two kinds of not publicly discernible opinions) than to the more modern era concept of a recognizable public opinion, demonstrated in public media. In any case, the ‘general opinion’ here stands for an elite consensus.

The contribution to humanity by the Germanic people is now reduced to the last, now overcome, obstacle for the total control by the Anglo-Saxon tribe. It is the defeat of intellectualism and fantasy at the hands of the will and the practical reason … and it is also [the victory] of the state establishment supremacy against the people-state … No counterweight is to be seen: France has in the system been reduced to a guardian of the weakness of Europe, and Japan is – as we have already seen – an isolated outsider. (Kjellén 1920: 199)

Kjellén had never really looked upon ‘England’ (Great Britain) as a European power. With the Romanic powers, globally weakened, the outcome of the war is, to him, clearly a European defeat.

On all fronts you could see the victory and supremacy of England – but Kjellén spots cracks in the armour. Looking at the British Empire from a geopolitical point of view, Kjellén recognizes the most obvious success. The war rewarded England, ‘as long as we calculate territory and population. In short, it may be expressed that the Indian Ocean programme in one stroke has become a reality’ (ibid.: 205, emphasis in the original). Kjellén enumerates those territories – mandates, protectorates or otherwise – controlled by the British: Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Hijazz [the Western part of the Arab peninsula

(Kjellén’s term was ‘Hedjas’)], German East Africa, and, in part, Persia (ibid.: 205–6).

But ‘the nationality question’, as has been discussed above, had begun to undermine the empire according to Kjellén, and on the home front English traditions had begun to be abandoned; for example, he says that a draft army had been necessary to organize for the war, and the ‘war cabinet’ is a deviation from the very idea of parliamentarism [sic] (ibid.: 205). To Kjellén, noticeably, an emergency, wartime-style government departs from pure parliamentarism, both in the sense that it is a kind of coalition government, and also that experts, such as high-ranking civil servants, are included. Kjellén was sceptical towards the now gradually evolving and implemented features of democracy, and the fact that here, in a very general sense, the government is not wholly dependent on parliament. If the principles of a democratic polity are not strictly held on to, then Kjellén appears to be anxious to point to its flaws. In the 1905 analysis (Kjellén 1905 I: 84), Kjellén also had pointed to this example of a peculiarity of internal politics, namely the alternation in power of the two main political parties as being a system with ‘two governments’, each standing ready to take over the rule.

Although the fact that the United States and Britain followed similar paths – ‘the organization’, as Kjellén occasionally calls it – manifests an ‘ethnic unity’, it also constitutes a ‘political dualism’ (Kjellén 1920: 200). With this Kjellén has in mind the federalism of the USA versus the unitarian governance of Britain. As Britain is losing influence in relation to its closest ally, the USA, there is, Kjellén opines, ‘only two ways out: the old coalition policy once again, now turned towards the United States – or the voluntary resignation. Several circumstances speak for the latter … the deepest driving force in the American declaration of war was the feeling of community with the English cultural and societal ideal’ (ibid.: 207). The Americans went on a crusade, ‘when they crossed the ocean against “the Kaiser” and “militarism”. We witness an Anglo-Saxon consciousness, which may prove to be stronger than differing political traditions’ (ibid.: 207). But regarding militarism, Kjellén had noted that the United States, within a very short period of time and mainly improvising in the process, had managed to put a competent military force on its feet. ‘No doubt this has left [the

USA] with certain militaristic inclinations, which the world would do good to reckon with in the future’ (ibid.: 201).

What is to be expected, is that ‘the English consciousness, already by the younger daughter colonies softened into pan-Britishness, may in the fullness of time transcend into a pananglism together with the oldest, long since lost, colony – like a smaller flame merging into a higher light’ (ibid.: 207).

The General Essence of the Great Power – Kjellén’s Methodology

Kjellén from early on, and then steadfastly, emphasized his methodological approach to the problem of the great power – what would ultimately be the ‘essence’ of a great power? His examination should be truly ‘scientific’, implicitly not just ‘scholarly’, or learned. Kjellén adopted two procedures, which should serve his scientific cause.

First, he did not enter the area of intention and action, the doings of politicians and ‘statesmen’, to steer and change the direction of political life, the outcomes of events. In effect, this is deliberately abstaining from making a contribution to the discourse of ‘international relations’ – the ‘play’ between great powers. Secondly, the task is to find out what are the basic ‘material’ features common to all powers, which may lay claim also to them being great powers.

At any given moment, say, ‘1905’, ‘1911–13’ or ‘1920’, Kjellén is left with a combination of valid and relevant factors that are supposed to operate in various ways in every great power. These are subsequently classified into types, often dualistically juxtaposed; for example, powers that are ‘continental’ vs ‘marinebased’, or ‘economic’ vs ‘military’ – however, there are combinations, termed ‘amphibian’: ‘territorially dispersed’ (often seaborne empires, such as England or France) vs ‘territorially unified’, or ‘closed’ (such as Russia or Germany). The

‘laws’ Kjellén hopes for are not really made explicit, except for the somewhat trivial ‘the big are getting fewer and bigger’. Otherwise, he discerns developmental tendencies for more or less successful combinations, as witnessed by powers ‘going up’ or ‘going down’ (see e.g. Kjellén 1905 II: 244–46).

One could say that Kjellén starts with two lists and checks them against each other. The first list consists of the designated great powers at the time, so about 1900. These are not prospective ones, but an established set-up of those powers that have been around since 1815, and which, on a few occasions after, have coopted a few new ones. The second list is constituted by a number of those features, or factors, that characterize a power; either a certain quantity of the factor, or the noticing of the factor’s very presence. The first list, of ‘powers’, is more difficult to change or amend, at least in a short time perspective. Over time, in history, great powers may be ‘dismissed’ or reduced to ‘powers’ only, while other powers may qualify as great powers. The second list, of ‘factors’, is the one primarily subject to variation.

The technique, when juxtaposing lists, is either to tick off whether a great power is in possession of the factor at all, or whether a satisfying quantity of the factor is at hand. If not, falsification is both possible and necessary. The factor is then taken off the list. This is enough for Kjellén to deny a factor any relevance regarding the set-up of resources for a great power, or to discuss the factor at all. This is done in a rather schematic, but also unsentimental and unprejudiced, manner. The procedure, as ideally construed, is illustrated below, with a Q & A paragraph, regarding both the procedures and the results given. Some comments are added.

(1) Is a Christian religion a necessary feature of a great power?

Answer: No. Falsifying instance: Japan.

(2) Are the ethnic and racial features of a great power necessarily ‘European’, or white?

Answer: No. Falsifying instance: Japan.

(3) Is a location with access to the sea, whether directly or via agreement, necessary?

Answer: Apparently.

With this answer, the strong, centuries-long Russian (and less than a centurylong German) inclination, or Drang, is recognized. Subsequent efforts to get access to the seas, the oceans – the warmer the better – obviously play a big role in this tentative answer by Kjellén. Quite aware of the preliminary character of this answer, Kjellén established the connection only ‘for the moment’, or conditionally. This means that the verdict on whether it is ‘necessary’ is also contingent.

(4) Is a location in a temperate climate zone necessary for a great power?

Answer: Probably.

Kjellén’s adopted version of this venerable ‘climate theory’ was not initially on his ‘list’, and so not part of his initial reflections on which features would be relevant. But guided by some examples and contentions from the literature on great powers (e.g. Schneider) he finds that this could very well be the case.

When he ventures to find out ‘why’, to find the causal connection, he seemingly speculates:

All [great powers] are to be found in the temperate zone; only there the wills [willpowers] of nations are kept strong. Also, without exception, they all belong to the northern hemisphere; because only there the earth’s rich dispersion guarantees a toughening friction between the wills of the people and a strong natural selection. The verdict over the potential great power of South America … thus takes on a programmatic importance. The requirement of a beneficial location for transportation and travelling follows from the great power’s … strong will, as well as the requirements of a healthy climate and ample space. (Kjellén 1905 II: 214)

(5) Is a polity with, say, a strong centralized state, necessary for a great power? (France would be the obvious positive example – a power that was occasionally, in modern European history, a ‘hegemon’.)

Answer: No. Falsifying instances(s): the United States – federalism; Russia – Caesarism or despotism; England – democracy.

Interestingly, Kjellén has a new, or at least a modified, answer regarding this feature in the 1920 edition (see further below).

(6) Is a strong, nationally spread, pervasive mentality or conviction – a willpower, as it were – a necessary feature for a great power?

Answer: Yes.

Kjellén finds it necessary, or at least advisable or judicious, to actually recognize this last factor. It is something ‘subjective’, but it is not a question of an individual’s intention. It is, rather, a ‘mental force’ of the collective, a shared appreciation of ‘the situation we are in’. One reason why this kind of factor could be admissible is that, with a slight modification, it could go together rather well with Kjellén’s kind of ‘scientific’ approach. This factor of mentality, or ‘psychology’, does so by taking on the character of being ‘biological’.

The collectively spread mental factor he recognizes (i.e. a will, or a willpower) is figuring as something of a ‘rest’, a leftover category, to be taken into account when other factors do not seem to suffice. Its workings are dynamic. The willpower, as a factor, is a feature to resort to when it is lacking, as witnessed by a failed effort, or a resignation in front of obstacles. This is tellingly used when the German defeat is explained: ‘But the decisive weakness lays in the soul of the people and the nation’s will’ (Kjellén 1920: 187). Also, China’s willpower is, for the moment, not sufficient.

A great power is a society. Kjellén does not operate with a proper theory of society, one that would explain how the various parts of society are really connected as a ‘system’, as it were, or which could be expressed in ways similar to his already identified factors, such as space, inhabitants, industry, economy, political institutions and the like. Kjellén is mainly concerned with whether factors are present or not – thus, the possibility of ‘lists’. If, for example, a Christian religion is not necessary, what role does religion, whatever it is, play in those societies that do possess one? Is a Weberian perspective on Protestantism interesting at all?

Thus, in his examination of the lists, Kjellén finds out only what some philosophers of science call the ‘constant conjunctions’ between factors and great powers.⁴¹ Such conjunctions are sometimes expressed as ‘empirical generalizations’, or as provisionally valid regularities. Although Kjellén could at times speculate about the mechanism, the possible causal connection, or bridge,

between a characterizing factor and the fact that a great power may show it, he does not try to infer such causal connections. Why is it that all the great powers are characterized by, say, a considerable land mass, a centralized state, and a strong military? This would have been looking for a ‘necessary relation’, which correspondingly could be derived from a proper ‘law’ (Bunge 1967: 354–64). The effort of finding ‘constant conjunctions’ is ordinarily a first heuristic step, often expressed as a hypothesis, on the way to establishing the ‘mechanism’, which constitutes the ‘necessary relation’ in the form of a law.

By avoiding, as Kjellén did, exploring the possible mechanism, and thus in the end not searching for a proper law, you yourself avoid taking a position on the question how the world is ultimately construed. This may also be interpreted as a means to avoid being prejudiced. This is so, because to work with a hypothesis, a preliminary informed guess – a ‘prejudice’, as it were – regarding connections and mechanisms, means taking the risk of being wrong. But you need to ‘take a chance’ with a still unconfirmed hypothesis, in order to be able, eventually, to find a substantiated law.

Kjellén, given his scientific ambition to find categorical truths, had, judiciously maybe, avoided the dimension where such a mechanism, an eventual ‘causal’ connection, would be even more difficult to establish – that is, the ‘subjective’ dimension, the relation between an intention, or purpose, and an attained goal, usually prompting a hermeneutical approach.

This is where Kjellén stands, in terms of his evaluation of features and factors to be found – or missing – in the group of powers recognized as great powers. And this is the position from where he starts his final reasoning as to the qualities of a great power, its very essence.

To his modifications already in the first (1905) and the second (1911–13) editions, thus going beyond his first tentative list – mainly to be found in Chapter 1, ‘The Planetary Situation’, of the 1905 edition – he had, on the way,

added ‘size’; a certain territorial size was a minimum requirement. However, after the World War, the original list of great powers emanating from 1815 was no longer that authoritative or reliable, and now many other countries and powers on all continents had also to be contemplated. Kjellén takes a look at China, India and Brazil, and finds that size (land mass) and population (numbers) could not be given that much weight in their case.

The most interesting addition and modification at this stage regards the polity, the constitutional framework: ‘Up until now the constitutional form has seemed to be insignificant’ (Kjellén 1920: 213), and then he reiterates his earlier observations on how, for example, federalism, Caesarism and parliamentarism all allow for great power status. But, ‘the testimony of the World War now gives reason to the modification, that a great-power development at the present time is hardly possible in a purely anti-democratic form’ (ibid, emphasis in the original). He leaves the observation at that. The procedure and conclusion are of the same character as the early ones from 1905 and onwards, that he just ticked off the feature on his list, as he did for example with religion and race, and found that they were not deciding variables: no ‘constant conjunction’; no need to further explore the relations between the characteristics; end of argument – end of discussion.

The observation that the status of great power, as of 1920, seems to require at least not being anti-democratic, similarly does not motivate Kjellén to ask himself why this is so, or to reflect on the mechanisms of a society by which it can, for example, carry out large-scale warfare. A possible factor in that context, such that a participatory polity, a democracy, may, actually, be favourable if one wants to mobilize and drum up support for one’s own society, its institutions and its values, is thus not discussed.⁴²

Then it is rather notable that Kjellén proceeds with once again emphasizing his former ‘discovery’, which is now a cherished conviction: ‘On implicit ways we are led to a first and basic conclusion. The great power concept is not mathematical but dynamic, not ethnic or cultural but physiological’ (Kjellén

1920: 214). He continues with the minimum material requirements, and then he again emphasizes that the great power must be ‘equipped with a will, which is reflected in demands and influence outside one’s own door. We add: the will to more power. No great power is in the end saturiert [Eng. ‘satisfied’]. The great powers are “expansion states” (LAMPRECHT)’ (ibid.).

Here, in 1920, more than before the war, he emphasizes the ‘colonial’ aspect. All the great powers have spheres of interest [Kjellén uses italics in the text] (ibid.: 214). And this happens also to coincide with how the great powers of 1815 and onwards are characterized or equipped. Their ‘spheres of interest’ refers to states and peoples in their vicinity, to secondary powers. Thus, now, in 1920, democracy and ‘empire’, of some kind, may go together.

By denying ‘culture’, in a broad sense, Kjellén places ‘will’ or ‘willpower’, and other psychological and socio-psychological concepts such as ‘resignation’, in the biological category. It is unclear whether he means that a power really could mobilize a will within its population – to put in an effort to, for example, intentionally ‘create’ an opinion, which is the opposite of ‘resignation’. To instil confidence, and belief in the future, would later be seen as a commendable task for all politicians, and part of ordinary political work. A long-standing effect of such confidence would be ‘trust’ (cf. President Mitterrand in the late 1980s speaking of ‘la force tranquille’). And, one may ask, if one directs such a question to peacetime circumstances – could the leaders of a nation mobilize or encourage efforts to build a welfare society, foster an enterprising and innovative spirit, stimulate ambitions for, say, sports deeds? True, Kjellén is reflecting on mentalities useful for great-power achievements, but the question of the extent to which a political leadership can create an all-embracing support for a chosen issue is still open.

The previously rather elaborated discussions on geopolitical aspects, such as how a river runs, a power’s access to the seas, and its very territorial configuration, are now less visible in Kjellén’s argument. They come to life primarily in the ‘climate theory’ application.

Only at this moment in Kjellén’s summing-up analysis are some of the geopolitical concepts entered into the discourse. And, again, the negative characteristics, which follow from a biological interpretation, are used when it comes to understanding why the ‘losers’ of the conflict of war did lose: ‘The resignation, the voluntary exit from the contest of the highest ends’ (Kjellén 1920: 214). China is put forward as a country, a power, with all the material things going for her, but the lack of will has given her a small state status. Russia and Germany may be examples of the same general law; but Kjellén is cautious here, indicating that their downgrading may only be temporary (ibid.).

Kjellén’s general attitude towards the war is that it was a rupture of a revolutionary kind. What he saw when the war started was that a divided type, on a ‘maritime basis’, with the economy as the strong feature of its great-power status, was exemplified by England. This would give way to the ‘closed’, continental-type, with a large land mass, and able to achieve ‘autarky’. Here Germany was the best example. It was the type of great power with the best prospects for the future, not least because the railways were seen as a means to upset the transportation and travelling advantages enjoyed by the maritime-based sea powers, such as England.

By the end of the war, Kjellén admits that this development seems to have been reversed, because England, the strong maritime-based economy, had won. But Kjellén turns the argument around. It was the land masses of the entire British Empire that had helped the English to win. And Russia and Germany, the great powers that were mainly ‘military’-based, did not lose the war to the ‘economy’based great powers. Instead, the latter (England and the USA) had become ‘militarized’. Ultimately, the ideal for a great power is a harmoniously mixed or balanced form (Kjellén 1920: 215–16).

In retrospect, for Kjellén in the beginning of 1920 (preface from May 1920, in this 3rd edition), he sees the truth in the tendency ‘the bigger are getting even bigger’; but at the same time, the opposite appears to be true, both in the sense of

what he is observing, and what he finds to be a kind of historical necessity, of how history functions.

Humankind’s inclination for differentiation [here, meaning between small states and big states] is no less deep than the one for association. … Above the small state stands the great power; but above the great power stands humankind, which for its purpose needs them both. (Ibid.: 218)

He repeats a dictum from the 1911–13 edition:

Power is not at all the last word of history, but culture: spiritual as well as material, moral no less than physical … (Ibid.: 218)

Humankind has now, by itself, taken a first step towards political organization; a step, if it could be steered in the right direction, would make the very concept of great power irrelevant in its present, imperialistic shape. This is the programme The League of Nations. (Ibid.)

The League of Nations and the Future

When Kjellén discusses the newly founded League he sees its potential, but he is sceptical regarding its structure, and particularly the discrimination between powers, between peoples. When modern culture has developed into a world culture, a voluntary kind of association rather than external compulsion by a universal state has strengthened (Kjellén 1920: 218–19). Kjellén harks back to the internationalization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: ‘a whole series of international associations in the fields of law, humanity, science, and travel and transportation; not to forget the big “workers’ international”’

(ibid.: 219). But, ‘[a]s against this quiet evolution [late nineteenth-century internationalization] towards the goal, the World War stands out as a revolutionary rupture’ (ibid.: 219).

Kjellén sees the basis for the coming League in the peace conferences in the Hague in 1899 and 1907 – a part of the previously mentioned internationalization process. ‘The representation [of peoples and nation-states] is here already rather full, and above all true: the face of humankind is not in any particular way twisted’ (ibid.: 219). Then Kjellén takes a closer look at the very organization of the League, and of its participants. ‘From the horizon of the Versailles peace conference humanity may be divided into three degrees, with varying positions in the League: the founders, the invited, and those standing outside’ (ibid.: 220).

Two old great powers, of the first order, are excluded from the preparations of the League. They are also the main representatives of two world cultures: the Germanic and the Slavic. Also, the Muslim culture here lacks any sovereign representative; but the Anglo-Saxon and the – as Kjellén puts it here – Mongolian races have from the beginning been awarded with a complete, and the Romanic with a very strong, representation (ibid.: 220–21). Kjellén now alternates between ‘culture’ and ‘race’ as the concepts for non-organized communities above and beyond the nation-state or great power.

Kjellén then refers to paragraphs in the League’s constitution, which mentions procedures for arbitration, peacekeeping, limits on armaments, and sanctions, and finally observes: ‘But in the constitution itself the League is not equipped with any sovereign power over its members; even regarding questions of armament and intervention these members nominally preserve their free will; their dependence is moral and factual, not legal’ (ibid.: 221).

Kjellén considers the two organs, the Assembly and the Council, as having peculiarly competing tasks. Kjellén lists the various countries, big and small, and

their possibilities to have a say in the League: ‘the democratic equality between big and small is, upon a closer look, much of an illusion’ (ibid.: 222). England, he says, may count on additional votes from its colonies and from two ‘vassals’, Portugal and Hijazz.

A political analysis displays a Janus image, with two faces: to the left, a peace community, the first big step in the history of mankind for our species to take shape and form in the sign of the idea of law or right … and to the right, a power organization on the old imperialistic basis, securing the fruits of victory, and as a mask in front of the Anglo-Saxon world domination. (Ibid.: 222–23)

In passing, one may note what arrangements Kjellén designates as being politically ‘left’ or ‘right’. These are concepts for political designations he has not used before in such contexts.

As the child of two rather odd parents – the ideology of WILSON and the realpolitik of CLEMENCEAU – the leading thought of its time was born, and now, with this evil heritage, will have to be tested towards the uncertainty of existence. (Ibid.: 223)

Kjellén is rather confounded by the decision of the US Congress not to ratify the agreement establishing the League: ‘The League of Nations without the United States is a completely new problem. The Anglo-Saxon dictatorship within the League is thus broken …’ (ibid.: 223). To refer to ‘internal’ politics, one may add, as a factor truly affecting international, great-power politics, and on a crucial level, is something new and difficult to assess.

Are these things just ordinary difficulties in getting an organization going, or are they signs of weakness of an inherent kind, Kjellén asks. His book, the 1920 edition of Stormakterna, ends with the following sentence:

Only one thing seems clear: if this first effort to give political form and shape to mankind will go aground under the evil star of its moment of birth, the very thought, once awakened, will no longer die. (Kjellén 1920: 224)

‘The Great Powers’ – Context and Comparative Discourses

Nation-Building and Society-Building

On his home soil, in Sweden, Rudolf Kjellén was considered by others, and indeed by himself, to be an ardent nationalist. But when it came to the greatpower analysis, he vacillated. He was sceptical about embracing the scholarly equivalent, ‘the nationality principle’. For one thing, and to begin closer to home, Kjellén wanted the union between Norway and Sweden to be preserved. The Norwegians had far-reaching self-rule. For many decades it was more or less only a personal union, with the king, Oscar II, as the common head of state (Björk 2011); a little like the monarch being head of state for the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth at the same time. Eventually sovereignty for Norway began to be broadly accepted in Sweden – but Kjellén opposed it.

The explanation of the apparent divergence in Kjellén’s position regarding the nationality question – and apart from just espousing his own immediate interest regarding the union – may be found in some major tendencies dominating the era, which were the concerns of both people and polity: nation-building before the turn of the century, and society-building after 1900.

The overall tendency at the turn of the century was for nationalism to gradually change from being an emancipatory force for change in ‘nation-building’,

characteristic for much of the nineteenth century, to becoming either a defence for the nation’s value or identity, or to surge as a force or movement for change, in the sense of rallying the whole of the ‘people’, but now for the huge task of ‘society-building’, often as social reform, and carried out within the confines of the nation.

Society-building was an important enterprise for most of the nation-states at the time, for smaller states and for great powers alike, and this effort was to dominate much of the twentieth century and its politics. Gradually, this was later to be referred to as creating a welfare society (see Björk, ‘Swedish Intellectual and Political Context’, this volume). In Kjellén’s perspective, this mission of building the society was to be entrusted to an imagined community or movement, embracing most of society, and it should be guided by the idea of what he called ‘national socialism’ (cf. Björk, Edström and Lundén, ‘Academic, Publicist, Politician’, this volume). He had coined the concept ‘national cohesion’ [Sw. nationell samling], a process of getting together on a national level. Implicitly, for successful society-building in the first half of the twentieth century, a sense of national belonging in many quarters was considered useful, even necessary, to create a folkhem, a people’s home. Kjellén, reflecting on this enterprise, had long included the workers in this project, and towards the end of his life also the otherwise internationalist workers’ movement, which Kjellén hoped and expected could be counted on to be involved in this common task. As it was, German social-democrats had proved during the war to be patriots, both at the home front and on the battlefield.

Although emigration tapped the nation, which in these decades involved a large part of the population, and though immigration in terms of numbers was much less conspicuous, Kjellén still argued in an exclusionary manner regarding the people suitable for the new national enterprise. Concerning the examined great powers, he had worried about both their numbers and their ‘kind’ – the quality level of the people. Overall, total numbers were important; Kjellén had all along decried the French two-children-only policy. Maximizing the people at hand, as a resource to mobilize for society-building, meant disavowing class differences, while maximum efficiency of the population in ‘kind’ was interpreted as ethnic belonging, but even more as an ideological requirement to join in the common

effort. In the academic world, Kjellén much welcomed different points of view, but in the societal, national political mission those who ‘begged to differ’ were not appreciated. This concerned both emancipating women and pacifists, groups within which Kjellén spotted both weakness and an unwillingness to commit to the common cause. There was also a definite populist trait in his scepticism towards both a growing bureaucracy and big, capitalist enterprises.

The idea of ‘national cohesion’ may be seen as a parallel on the national level to his vision of humankind on the global level, coming together, beyond greatpower strife, more or less in the fullness of time – a vision that might reflect his upbringing in the home of a clergyman, and perhaps a reminiscence of his own Christian beliefs when younger.

Some of the great powers at the turn of the century were empires. In 1905 Kjellén was cautiously doubtful about their future. England and France, as well as Russia and Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg Empire, could count on large populations overall as a great-power resource, but the many different nationalities within them were, in these emancipatory times, considered a huge and an unnerving uncertainty. This was so both for the European peoples close to the centres of Russia and Austria-Hungary, as empires, but even more so regarding the colonial peoples of England and France, who were living far away from the core of the great power. They were supposedly very different in kind – in ‘race’ and as witnessed by ‘civilizational level’ – and they were now also beginning to grow in numbers. These were all factors to challenge the solidity of the English and French empires.

Both because of his studies and his travels across all empires, Kjellén was very much aware of these glaring, and in the end, as he suspected, harmful and disruptive differences. His depiction of the differences between the people of the home country and peoples of the colonies reverberates with his anger and frustration; he worries over the exploitation as such, and the commercialism and materialism of the imperialists. The imperialist exploitation took shape both economically – Kjellén applied, for example, the ‘Leninist’ argument of the

colonies as markets for capitalism’s overproduction – and ethnicallydemographically, in the sense of subordination and, as exemplified during the war, with soldiers forced to fight for their respective empire’s interests, even those regarding old national feuds in Europe.

Kjellén vividly depicts the visible and growing resentment around the world towards not only European empires but European peoples – that is, ‘whites’. Japan is supposed to act on behalf of its Asian nations’ compatriots. The ‘nationality question’ as it played out on other continents would come back to haunt the Europeans. The possibilities of vengeance that Kjellén hints at represent a word of warning for Europe’s future security in, say, a hundred years – the grand perspective on the future he on occasion allowed himself. Otherwise, he seldom speculated on the more immediate decades.

Thus, to the extent that nineteenth-century nation-building meant emancipation, expansion and separation – Kjellén’s interpretation of the consequences of ‘the ideas of 1789’ – the ‘nationality principle’ was not necessarily the one and only guiding principle for a vigorous, multi-ethnic great power ‘going up’. However, in the common task of society-building, ‘the ideas of 1914’, with concentration, with duty and national cohesion, and with the whole nation joining in if fit to make a contribution, the ‘nationality principle’, for Kjellén and others, gained renewed relevance and value.

If the nation-building enterprise had been pursued by progressive elites, together with support from ‘the masses’, in powers and empires, the upcoming societybuilding effort was broader in the sense of involving these masses more in the form of people’s movements and/or organized as nationwide political parties. Thus, society-building became both more relevant and easier when democracy meant that ‘the masses’ became really involved, as participants, as acting subjects on their own, in shaping society.

For Kjellén and others, society-building meant an exciting challenge, where the

state in the nation-state should take on much more responsibility for strengthening society. This concerned not only infrastructure efforts, but included the support of commercial companies. This was later to be called the era of ‘organized capitalism’. In Sweden’s case, a relevant example is the development and exploitation of Norrland, the north, with all its riches, for an evolving industrial society.

When Kjellén began to examine the properties necessary for a great power, this included features of a society-building character. Of course, economic and, primarily, military might figured prominently in great power and international relations studies of the twentieth century, though much less so in studies of cultures and civilizations (see below, on discourses).

Although only implicitly in Kjellén’s examination, the two newcomer great powers, the USA and Japan, had both, towards the end of the nineteenth century, devoted themselves to society-building – though Japan over a much shorter and more intense period. This they mostly did before becoming great powers externally. But whereas Japan was an old and ethnically homogeneous nation, the USA was simultaneously preoccupied with nation-building – and of a multiethnic character. Here, in observing the USA, Kjellén tried to evaluate the melting pot efforts, and thus, also, how to look upon ‘the nationality question’. Mixing ‘races’, or ethnic communities, seemed to work, Kjellén acknowledged – including, over time, even the blacks.

A feature and a concern straddling the nation- and society-building eras and enterprises was the character of the polity. The ideal, and not only for Kjellén, for both nation- and society-building, was – as indicated – a unanimous people striving in the same direction. As far as great-power status was concerned, at the turn of the century, a centralized polity (France), a federal system (USA), an authoritarian society (Russia), and a democratic polity (England), all seemed to work. But in 1920, following the war, but perhaps not necessarily because of it, Kjellén recognized that democracy seemed to be the inevitable, really functioning polity.

The System Idea and Critical Geopolitics

The ‘system’ approach has, of course, long been used in analyses of social and economic relations, globally and proto-globally, with entry discourses of, for example, centre and periphery, colonialism and imperialism, dependency theory and the like.

When it comes to the ‘system’ involving political power in particular, powers are most often treated as ‘solid units’ with which to conduct the subsequent analysis. It is what takes place ‘between’ these units that is important. In diplomacy and international relations studies this may take the form of system or game theory. More seldom, and hardly systematically, are internal affairs – ideological and political party cleavages – brought into the picture. Typically, this is only recognized when internal politics demonstratively affect foreign policy actions. The US Congress disavowing President Wilson’s commitment to the League of Nations is a case in point, and one that Kjellén also had to take into account.

The tension between a solid and a non-solid perspective is seen also from how the gravity gradually changed regarding the qualifying achievements for the Nobel peace prize. Alfred Nobel was more detailed in his will about what was to be recognized as a peace-promoting achievement, than he was regarding achievements in the other prizes. He mentioned three such areas – holding peace congresses, pursuing disarmament, and promoting brotherhood among peoples. In the first decades of the existence of the peace prize, the Nobel committee of the Norwegian parliament, Storting, tried to stick to the concept of relations specifically ‘between’ powers, between states. But that internal affairs were also important for the peace to be kept overall was seen in the gradual change of emphasis in the peace prizes awarded, from around the middle of the twentieth century, when ‘internal’ human rights concerns were much more often taken into consideration.

Geopolitics from the 1920s and onwards became, on the one hand, a topographical-geographical interpretation of the history of international relations, and, on the other hand, a policy – a ‘programme’, as Kjellén would have called it – to extend one’s own sphere of influence. This could be expressed in France’s ‘we need more space for our growing population’, or in Russia’s and Italy’s sea- or land-searching compensations, looked for in various directions, to the south, east and west.

When, in the 1980s, ‘critical geopolitics’⁴³ was launched, the policy aspect was more emphasized, but was turned scholarly inwards in the sense that the theories of international relations, such as realism, idealism and interdependence, were critically examined, with the purpose to, as it were, deconstruct them. Critical geopolitics could be said to be somewhat broader in scope than Kjellén’s concept of geopolitics or the interwar years’ policy (‘programme’) implications. In critical geopolitics, thus, the three discourses of international relations, cultures and civilizations, and great-power studies overall (see below), were thought to be included. The purpose was to examine this kind of studies critically, and to interpret them less as scholarly disciplines, and more like policy programmes, even ‘ideologies’. When critically deconstructed, these disciplines or discourses were said to operate with an ‘us versus them’ perspective on the world. You could also find this in other critical approaches of the time, sometimes referred to – but seldom by their adherents – as postmodernism.

One might compare ‘critical geopolitics’ with the field of ‘social studies of science’, which has been practiced for longer, relating achievements to some social contexts. But whereas the latter focuses on finding ‘interests’ or motives involved in the exercise of purportedly ‘objective’ sciences – for example, when awarding prizes is more related to scholarly network connections than to actual achievements – critical geopolitics may be said to go a step further. The scholarly proponents of various theories or discourses such as ‘realism’, who were being criticized in critical geopolitics, could also be identified as practising politicians. This meant that the issue went beyond the world of scholarship, in the sense of scholars simply being ‘subjective’. Rather, since acting, interestdriven politicians were involved, the purportedly politicized scholarship would then have consequences not only for people’s trust in the academic world, but

the fates of whole, existing peoples and nations, which were the targets of these applications by practitioners, would be at stake. The prime example of this, according to critical geopolitics, would be Henry Kissinger. One may add that using scholarship to find out and propose policies, perhaps even to carry them out in politics, would be a perfectly normal, legitimate, and maybe commendable, task and exercise, as seen from the perspective of the Kathedersozialist a century earlier. This was mostly applicable to internal affairs, though.

Kjellén did not pursue studies in the traditional discourses on international relations or diplomacy, in his times so common among his Swedish colleagues in both political science and history. Among historians these diplomacy studies mainly concerned older times, such as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Kjellén, rather, all along aspired to move away from near-sighted, treatisefocused studies. Also, such instances of more modern diplomatic studies were, for Kjellén, too close to politics, to ‘the statesmen’, as he called the leading politicians.

In Sweden, the circles of high politics and diplomacy lured several of his fellow academic practitioners, his colleagues. But Kjellén himself was never part of the establishment ‘circles’, the cabinets of power in Sweden. So although in his analysis Kjellén aspired to be more of the ‘realist’ in his approach, in practice he gradually alienated himself from the establishment circles, where this kind of ‘realist’ approach could, as it were, be realized.

Three Discourses – and Kjellén’s

From a latter-day perspective, Kjellén’s Stormakterna shows affinities with three discourses: (a) international relations, either as dealing with an emerging international society or as a policy-guided practice, or diplomacy; (b) cultural and civilizational studies; and (c) studies strictly of the great powers. When Kjellén began his work, however, none of these discourses was very well

developed. In modern great-power studies, the lists of previous works, from earlier periods, are short.

(a) A common experience in Europe after 1648 was that several of the most important states had been involved in both warfare and subsequent peace negotiations. You could say that Europe thus characterized itself as the very continent of war and peace – and thus also of compromise. These were processes and procedures that had been practised over and over again in the following centuries. Over time, European peoples got to acquire substantial and valuable insights into the habits and thinking of their neighbours, their sometimes opponents, even enemies. This ‘war and peace’-determined mutuality became, as it were, a kind of European identity. Peoples and states getting entangled in warfare, but subsequently disentangling themselves, and reaching a modus vivendi compromise in peace settlements, was the seasoned process and practice.

Students of international relations or – conceived in more personal terms – diplomacy, when looking back, often understand the European scene both as a basic condition, and as a ‘system’. A basic starting point for diplomacy can be found in the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648. Possible, identified ‘systems’ – with states mutually involved, constantly and over a long period – could then, for some scholars, be traced backwards for earlier epochs, such as to exist among city-states. However, the ‘1648’ crucial date is noticed also because the idea of a universal state or community, intended and consecrated by God, had become a less likely realization since the Christian church had split. This so more definitely since the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, when the duel between Catholics and Lutherans ended in a draw, where neither the heavens nor earthly powers could appoint a winning side, an authoritative power, to uphold the idea of a universal community; and nor could the Holy Roman Empire, as a kind of semisecular version of this ideal of unity, fulfil the hopes. After 1648, the key words became instead ‘balance of power’ or equilibrium, and the ‘realism’-thinking, of primarily promoting your own, timely interest, was coined as raison d’état or Staatsräson. This was the world of Richelieu, Oxenstierna and others.

To Kjellén, interdependencies among the great powers, holding on to an equilibrium, was not part of his perception of how the great powers related to each other. His powers operated more on their own, in a continuous struggle, both trying to ‘survive’ and, if possible, to get an upper hand on the others, to ‘win’. As the statesmen were excluded from his analytical approach, diplomacy and negotiations were not part of these faceless great powers; or, the other way around, if no diplomacy was anticipated, then no politicians could figure. History as political events, with politicians acting (i.e. political history), was the predominant kind of history writing in Kjellén’s times. Kjellén in his study of the great-powers never aspired to, and never did, write history.

(b) The scholars studying cultures and civilizations focus on the ‘deep’ context, an essence or identity of each specific culture. As these scholars, almost without exception, aspire to cover all possible cultural efforts of humankind, they go as far back in history as they can. Then, they often find religious or civilizational elements, such as language, art and the like – i.e. traces that simultaneously serve as their sources and as means to characterize – to find out the essences of these civilizations. Although these civilizations may overlap chronologically, they mostly evolve on their own, and their respective histories are written one by one. These histories regularly begin with the rise and expansion of these cultures and civilizations, and follow through to them falling apart. Thus, the stories may follow a trajectory of change, as the more or less only comparative possibilities available appear to be to follow their rise and demise. Commonly, these fates of historical civilizations are taken to be ‘laws’ of evolvement, and are ascribed to all civilizations, now and in the future.

The numbers of these cultures available for comparison, and possible generalizations, range from a little bit more than a handful (Spengler, Quigley, Huntington) to between twenty and thirty (Toynbee). Spengler uses metaphors of both organisms (they come to life, flourish and die) and the seasons of the year (going through phases from spring to winter). Quigley operates with seven stages – mixture, gestation, expansion, conflict, universal empire, decay and invasion – which they all pass through. Quigley and Toynbee perceive interrelations between civilizations. The decay and demise, one must emphasize, is secular in the scholars’ very analyses (no apocalypse), though the identified

causes for both their rise and their fall may be spiritual and cultural.

These approaches normally do without diffusion of characteristics – such as learning phases, by force or by voluntary adaption – between these various cultures. Rarely are they to be seen as able to form a ‘system’, with continuous interdependencies between them. Presumably, as these scholars start with ancient examples of cultures and civilizations, the then possible, discernible traits, perhaps arbitrary features, that could be useful for comparative purposes, must be the ones – and no others – identified also in more modern and more complicated societies. These scholars – Huntington excepted – seldom differentiate between the modern societies under consideration, not seeing them as harbouring different cultures or civilizations. For that and other reasons, such studies most often do not operate with polities, either as legal frameworks, political institutions, or conscious policies. Thus, and most conspicuously, they also lack politicians.

The measure of voluntarism in these cultures and civilizations is rather insignificant, as treated by their scholarly proponents. They cannot form, design or propel themselves. Still, one must argue, the history of the last couple of centuries demonstrates an increasing voluntarism in modern societies. They have shown an ability to engineer themselves, both in design and in propulsion, in planning and in drive. One may discern this all the way up until the first crude, and consciously planned, totalitarian societies of the interwar years, where the malleability was presumed to be without limits, including its supposedly eugenically designed citizens.

Interestingly, these internally wholly controlled and managed societies, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, coexisted with an international opposite – chaos on the global arena in the interwar years. The once, from 1815, carefully engineered international society was nowhere to be found, and the League of Nations was witness to the failure.

(c) On the whole, the cultural-civilizational approach is more or less the opposite of the international relations studies, and, in particular, of the diplomacy approach. It is also distinct from regular great-power studies. Kjellén, again, is somewhere in between. His great powers operate and function rather on their own, like the ‘cultures’. As his interest is in the exertion of power, the polity sphere is an important one. The statesmen are absent, like in the ‘cultures’, but every great power has a political will, a willpower, that moves the power, but this willpower is not part of any strategies or negotiations. Kjellén’s powers may be ‘on the rise’ or ‘going down’, but they do not necessarily ‘die’. Rather, in line with his view of history – maybe, one may say, his philosophy of history, though seldom called that by himself – the great power, like any society, may follow a pendulum movement of expansion (emancipation, an aspect of ‘liberalism’) and concentration (consolidation, an aspect of ‘socialism’ of a sort). This is the overall movement of history. But humans may make an impact, because most geopolitical characteristics are variables. Space, population, produce, infrastructure and so on may change, but the forces necessary for humans to steer society, their nation-state, in a certain direction requires a unified, concerted effort for it to come about – the ocean liner analogy; but in Kjellén’s judgement, Japan had managed it twice (see chapter 5, for Japan’s achievement). In that process the great power’s overall potentialities and needs, together with such efforts by a ‘unified people’, make them ‘clash’ with other such powers.

The discourse examining the great powers is not forced to pick up the traces, from way back in time, of possible cultures or civilizations. And they are not ‘being limited’ to focus on interactions, bi- or multilateral, or as part of a system, like in international relations. These powers are whole nation-states, defined by themselves, and to study them you do not have to look at what is ‘between’ them.

A major and influential work on the great powers, like that of Paul Kennedy, notices powerful state formations in ancient or early modern times, such as Ming China, the Islamic world, and, later, Tokugawa Japan. But sixteenth-century Europe is where the emergence of powers truly occurs. Much like Kjellén, Kennedy (1988) discusses ‘dismissed’ powers like Spain and the Netherlands.

Regarding resources, Kennedy focuses much on economic resources. Military power – read ‘political’ power – definitively goes together with economic might. ‘Powerful’ is more or less taken for granted to mean also ‘power-exerting’. The ability to create a strong, a ‘great’, society, translates readily into outwardly strength and its exertion. The ‘powerful and kind’ alternative – as sketched above in this chapter – seems not to be given any real consideration. This is somewhat interesting, as in diplomatic study, the ‘powerful and not-so-kind’ version of Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy is pitched against the ‘powerful and kind’ one of Woodrow Wilson. Noticeably, both of these two were interventionist. The ‘rich (also ‘powerful’) and kind-on-your-own’ – that is, the isolated welfare society alternative – also sketched earlier in this chapter, is again beneath the discourse horizon.

Kennedy’s economic focus is in line with large socioeconomic studies like those of Tilly, Mann and others – and why not Marx – where political power and its exertion is less the prime knowledge interest of these authors. Kennedy has some geopolitical observations, such as the emergence of ‘flank powers’ being ‘sheltered’, like England and Russia, which are much in line with Kjellén’s reasoning. What is more specific to Kjellén, though, is his focus on autarky, for a country to be self-sufficient with resources, and to be found within its own borders, in its specific ‘location’. This favours the big, continuous land masses of Russia and the USA, which then have no ‘organic’, legitimate reason to be imperialistic – unlike, for example, Japan.

One of Kennedy’s most important themes, as with Ferguson, is the focus on competition – as it were, a ‘weak’ kind of interaction – for explaining the ‘rise of Europe’, collectively represented in the form of its several powers, those that were the first to become ‘great’. Technology and arms race are at the bottom of this (cf. the observation above on Europe as the continent specializing in conflict and compromise, in ‘war and peace’).

Kjellén shares with the cultural and civilizational studies the ambition to find

‘laws’ for his object, the great powers – for him, though, less their specific trajectories in time, in history, and more the prospects of the ‘types’ he finds among the powers. This is not a prime concern among modern students of international relations and of great powers.

The ‘Scientific’ Political Scientist

Kjellén had the ambition of modernizing political science, and making it ‘more scientific’. First, this meant overcoming the discipline’s focus on formal, legal aspects, such as constitutional studies. Secondly, inspired, at least implicitly, by ideas from the philosophy of science, the ‘scientific’ ambition went in two directions. One was to find laws of evolution for his objects of study – here, those societies that were great powers. The other was to eliminate the subjectivity by eliminating the acting individuals, and in the world of the great powers they were the leading politicians, the erratic and unpredictable ‘statesmen’. One dimension of putting the study of politics on a firm realist foundation, was to consider the most basic ‘material’ conditioning factors, such as the geographic one – thus, geopolitics.

In his time, and according to contemporary ideals, in the very direction of modernizing and being more scientific, Kjellén was rather successful. He was, however, rather alone with this kind of effort in the community of scholars, where he initially could have expected a response. Although he rather valiantly, following the First World War and a democratizing and emancipatory society, tried to accommodate his thinking and great-power theorizing to changed circumstances and ideals, his sweeping generalizations, and, at times, insensitivity in categorizing groups and peoples, made him less modern, and less scientific, in the decades to come.

Final Words

Of Kjellén’s three editions of his work on the great powers, the first one, from 1905, carries the greatest energy. His text has a sense of mission – to tell his students, indeed, to tell the world. He is driven by a sense of discovery and great enthusiasm.

The 1911–13 edition contains rather more of effort. It is a more laboured work, with significantly more empirical material, both updating and complementing the 1905 work, while sticking to its basic analytical approach and findings.

The 1920 edition is, as mentioned, a not really completed work, remaining, as it were, a torso. It also lacks the zeal and zest of the previous editions. In the first part of the book the old order of the great-power system, before the war, is repeated or summed up, as before in a nation-by-nation manner, and in the second part of the book the First World War and the fates of these great powers are presented and discussed. Although the very military outcome of the war resulted in another picture, with some powers on the rise and others going down, Kjellén, though cautious, saw this as no final ranking of the great powers, as to the resources that would determine their standing over time. And although he was sceptical about the League of Nations as a construct, he could not deny that it contained an idea that was going some way towards the unity of mankind – a utopian perspective he had held all along.

Already in the 1905 edition, Kjellén had a particular perspective on ‘the end of history’, in which all powers, now merged into very few and thus including all of humanity, would share the good life. This is in line with his perspective on how each national society, each country, would develop and become one of unity and prosperity.

But, one might say, these very hopes for the best of worlds are shared by more or less everyone. The problem is how to get there – to come up with a viable analysis for this. And here more difficult questions arise: for example, those concerning priorities among the political roads to be taken; the inclusion and

exclusion of those who would be part of it; and the need for negotiated compromises to be reached before the desired consensus could be achieved. These are words, concepts and thinking that seldom found their way into Kjellén’s perception of society and of the world, both how to study them and how to live in them.

Ragnar Björk is a retired associate professor of history from Uppsala University and is now affiliated with Södertörn University. His research is mainly concerned with ‘research on research’, with the history of historiography and the social sciences, the history of science, including the Nobel Prize, and also modern political history. He graduated at Uppsala in 1983 with a dissertation on explanatory techniques – including narration and colligation – among historians, and was awarded the Geijer Prize for best historical dissertation. Since then, he has conducted a number of research projects on those same themes. Some of his latest publications are: ‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1) (2016); ‘Voluntarismens väg: Och något om Rudolf Kjellén som producent av helhetskunskap om samhället’, in Erik Nydahl and Jonas Harvard (eds), Den nya staten: Ideologi och samhällsförändring kring sekelskiftet 1900 (Nordic Academic Press, 2016); Thorsten Halling, Ragnar Björk, Heiner Fangerau and Nils Hansson, ‘Leopoldina: Ein Netzwerk für künftige Nobelpreisträger für Physiologie oder Medizin?’, Sudhoffs Archiv 102 (2018), X.

Notes

1. This ambition by Kjellén has been recognized by a modern scholar, of the ‘critical geopolitics’ conviction; see Dodds 2014: 55.

2. ‘Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning’ [Introduction on the self-

consideration of political science] (Kjellén 1916: 1–8). See Lundén, ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography’, this volume.

3. The chapter on England has more than doubled (from 64 to 147 pages), thus grown into a small book of its own, but also the other great powers are allowed more space (Germany up from 58 to 95 pages, the United States from 68 to 106, Russia from 53 to 85, and Japan from 32 to 48).

4. Generally, in references further on the three editions will be referred to as ‘1905’, ‘1911–13’ and ‘1920’, with Roman numerals – I, II, III and IV – for the respective books of the edition in question. The work itself will be referred to with the Swedish title, Stormakterna. Unless otherwise indicated, italics in quotes are by Kjellén. The translations of the quotes into English are made by the author.

5. Both the term ‘modern’, and various expressions of ‘modern’ in the sense of ‘modernizing’ in order to become modern, often appear in Kjellén’s writings, at least from 1899, which was when the term ‘geopolitics’ was first advanced. It has a very positive connotation. ‘Modernity’, as an expression of a historical epoch and its more or less fixed characteristics, was not a concept used by him.

6. From the nineteenth century you may mention, and so does also Kjellén, A.H.L. Heeren (1760–1842) and Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). Heeren’s book, Handbuch der Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Kolonien [Handbook on the history of the European state system and its colonies], first edition from 1809, and then subsequent editions to include the end of the Napoleonic wars, was translated into Swedish, the first edition from 1819. In 1865 a new translation appeared, based on the 4th original edition. In Swedish its title is Handbok i det europeiska statssystemets och dess koloniers historia. This edition is probably the one used by Kjellén.

Ranke’s work is his well-known essay ‘Die großen Mächte’ [The great powers] (1833). When it is referred to later in this chapter, it is its inclusion in Theodore H. von Laue’s book, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (1950) that is used.

Kjellén also mentions and made use of some contemporary works, such as Lenz 1900; Schneider 1904 [not being retrieved by the author] was first used by Kjellén as a PhD dissertation, later, and for the 1920 edition, Kjellén refers to the work as, apparently, a published book, Die grossen Mächte der Vergangenheit und der Gegenwart; Spahn 1918, who, in turn, had been referred to by Kjellén, is mainly appreciative of Kjellén’s book, Studien zur Weltkrise (1917b). Cf. also Lie 1912; Lie, a Norwegian, emphasizes ‘neutrality’, as do other small state’s writers.

A modern classic, Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1988), does not include any history of the discourse of great powers, but mentions Ranke’s essay as a model (‘Introduction’, p. xxvii). Cf. also Bridge and Bullen 2005.

7. Watson (1992) ‘rediscovered’ Heeren – using an English edition of Heeren’s book from 1834 – as seen in pp. 7–8 and in ch. 18, ‘The Age of Reason and Balance’, of his book.

8. It should be noted that Ferguson, in his book, does not start with organizational units such as nation-states and cultures, but with fields of human endeavour, such as competition, science, property, medicine, consumption and work.

9. The two concepts for competition are elaborated, e.g. in Björk 2001, particularly pp. 395–96.

10. Cf. Falkemark, this volume.

11. An ‘invention’, supposedly by British foreign affairs minister Lord Castlereigh.

12. Heeren produced one of the earliest, extensive and systematic analyses of the world’s great powers, constituting ‘systems’. He also, nota bene, included the colonial additions to the great powers, something Kjellén also was rather careful to do as part of discerning certain ‘types’ of great power, and in particular in then calculating resources, such as population, raw materials, markets and produce.

13. For this observation, Kjellén sometimes referred to contemporary German scholar G. Schneider and his 1904 book.

14. Bartholomew 1989; Alfred Stead 1904. The latter is an anthology with selfpresentations by Japanese scholars, civil servants, and politicians. In the same year it was translated into Swedish: Japan skildradt av japaner (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1904).

15. Nobel Prize nomination material retrieved from the Nobel Archives of the Karolinska Institute, 1901–40, and from the Royal Academy of Sciences, 1901– 40. Source material with the author.

16. Although participating before the First World War, Japan garnered its first medals in the 1920 summer Olympics in Antwerp, and the breakthrough came in Los Angeles in 1932, placing 5th in the medal table, behind the USA, Italy,

France and Sweden (see e.g. Wallechinsky 1988).

17. However, more recently, and regarding research, Niall Ferguson has organized knowledge around civilizational performance (Ferguson 2011). And as an example of the now recognized value of recognition, one may consult Ringmar 1996.

18. Cf. e.g. Kennedy 1988, table 19, p. 261.

19. This rhymes rather well also with more recent studies, one of the earlier being Lyons 1963.

20. This is seen also in Kjellén’s examination of borders, where the examples of various ‘territorial figures’ – roughly, what they look like spread out on the map – include, for comparative purposes, e.g. Prussia, Chile, ‘Equatorial Africa’, ‘Cappadocia’, Pamir and the United States. See his first attempt with this approach, ‘Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser’ [Studies on the political borders of Sweden], in Ymer 1899; pp. 317–29, with notes 2 and 3 (p. 318). Cf. Alvstam and Lundén, this volume. In this approach Kjellén is inspired by Friedrich Ratzel, e.g. in his 1897 book, Politische Geographie (see also, Lundén, ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography’, this volume). Ratzel seldom, though, refers to specific nations or geographical instances.

21. This observation is what stands out also in Kjellén’s own judgement; see 1905 I: 59.

22. For this concept, applied on the United States, see Stephanson 1995 for theme, discourse and bibliography.

23. This chauvinistic-idealistic concept and thought has understandably long been out of date with Swedish historiography. However, a more modern and less chauvinistic version of it may be said to figure in the PhD thesis of Erik Ringmar (1996). Here, the idea and motive, recognition, is emphasized, and precisely as a means to justify the ambition to be ranked among the great powers of seventeenth-century Europe. Cf. the argument in the ‘Introduction’, not least when it comes to Japan.

For a critical view of Swedish historiography in this field, see Björk 2007. Here, the author argues, too much emphasis has been put on the discourse of GPE (Sweden’s ‘Great Power Era’), whereas the study of SBE (the Swedish Baltic Empire) has been neglected. The latter considers the impact on the nations and peoples of the Baltic Rim, as well as the control of trade and routes of the Baltic. Little attention has been paid to these imperial aspects beyond the realm proper. The provincial character of the GPE approach is evident, regardless of whether the focus or explanatory mode of GPE studies is on military strategy, the benefits of war on the continent, or the class interest of the high nobility.

24. Kjellén here implicitly refers to the Swedish institutions and constitutional character as a model for Russia, partly adopted by Peter the Great.

25. Some scholars here are Shmuel Eisenstadt, Johann P. Arnason and Björn Wittrock. For an overview, see Wittrock 2013.

26. See e.g. Watanabe 2012, chapters 1 and 5.

27. Among the Nordic countries this is emphasized, including an emphasis on neutrality. Cf. Lie 1912.

28. Extracted from history are also the ‘lone trade emporium’, such as Carthage and Venice, and also those based on river estuaries, like in Portugal and Holland, and those controlling the rim of an inland sea, like the Roman Empire and Sweden.

29. Kjellén’s procedure, of ranking powers, resembles the procedure for ranking candidates for a post as professor at a Swedish university.

30. Kjellén’s Stormakterna was reviewed, with four installments, in Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift [Political Science Review]: in 1905 twice (books I and II), in 1913 (books I, II and III), and in 1914 (book IV). The 1905 reviews – by ‘Ht’ – are scholarly cautious, considering his work to be ‘too journalistic’, but with ‘carefulness in facts’, ‘witty in presentation’, and ‘with an oratorical tone’. In 1913 and 1914 the reviews are more extensive – at least the 1913 one by Lage Staël von Holstein, the 1914 anonymous, possibly by Staël von Holstein again – and they are both more ‘activist’ in approach and appreciation. Kjellén’s work was not reviewed in Historisk tidskrift [Swedish Historical Review].

31. Kjellén, ‘Till kritiken af “Stormakterna”. En replik’ [To the criticism of ‘Stormakterna’. A rejoinder], in Till Hugo Geber. Den 30 augusti 1913 [To Hugo Geber. The 30th August 1913] (no other editorial information than this is given, but Hugo Geber’s son Nils has written a preface, addressed to his father), p. 140. This rejoinder is thus published in a slightly obscure place – a kind of internal Festschrift to his publisher, Hugo Geber, on his 60th birthday, with both a rather limited spread and being somewhat awkward in regard to the general content of the Festschrift, with small, most often celebrating, contributions by the publisher’s Parnassus of renowned writers and intellectuals, honouring Geber.

32. In the introduction (1911–13 edition) to his very extended examination of England – a whole ‘book’ of 147 pages – he says that his judgement concerning

the future of this great power has not changed. However, whereas in the 1905 chapter on England it was a question of an economic downturn for England, now, in 1911, it is an economic boom. But, still, structures prevail over conjuncture.

33. Martin Spahn’s book referred to by Kjellén, is – in all probability – Die Grossmächte. Richtlinien ihrer Geschichte. Mass-stäbe ihres Wesens (1918). However, Spahn feels that more of scholarship urgently needs to look beyond national borders, and he is disappointed with German historians in this sense, whereas Friedrich Ratzel has performed promising studies (Spahn 1918: 12–13).

34. See e.g. Spahn 1918: 152–66.

35. For a comprehensive overview of Europe’s war in modern times see Johansson 2006, also on Kjellén.

36. See Ferguson 2011.

37. Cf. also Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume, for Hassinger’s treatment of this evaluation by Kjellén.

38. One may notice that the German Sonderweg started to diverge more or less at the same time, when the Western, industrialized world moved parallel on the two roads of market economy and political democracy. Of these two liberal principles, Germany stood on one leg only, the market economy.

39. China’s apparent lack of attention to its own interest – its lack of willpower, as it were – is commented upon by Kjellén (1905 II: 198). Kjellén had in 1908– 09 travelled around the world and reported on this journey in his book Den stora Orienten: Resestudier i österväg [The Big Orient: Travelling studies in the East], 1911.

40. ‘…a symbol of this orientation is the now seriously considered tunnel beneath the English Channel…’ (Kjellén 1920: 212).

41. See e.g. Bunge 1967, ch. 6, ‘Law’, 354–64, especially 358.

42. The later rather prevalent ‘law’, or generalization, that democracies do not go to war with each other cannot perhaps be employed when studying what happened in proto-democratic times, such as before 1914; but that wars involving whole societies and polities seem to leave democracies still standing when warfare has ended may be consonant with Kjellén’s simple observation.

43. See Ó Tuathail 2006: 5.

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CHAPTER 5

Rudolf Kjellén’s Great Power Studies

Examining Germany, USA, Russia, Japan

RAGNAR BJÖRK

Introduction

Kjellén’s overall ambition was to make his discipline, political science, both ‘modern’ and ‘scientific’. In the 1890s he acquired a position at Gothenburg University College, and he was assigned to also teach geography. He developed the concept of ‘geopolitics’, which was intended to emphasize the importance of basic geographic factors conditioning a country’s, or a nation-state’s, potential in high politics. Primarily, he focused on two such factors. One was ‘location’: Where on the continents of the planet is the power situated? Does it have a coast? What is its climate? The other factor was ‘space’, or room: What extension does the country have? What is its ‘territorial figure’? Could it accommodate a growing population?

The global perspective, or the ‘planetary’ one, as he called it, was on Kjellén’s mind from the beginning. One might say that he started with a list of eight established great powers – England, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, the USA and Japan. He then put together another list, with a number of preconceived, possibly relevant factors, such as location, demography, agricultural and industrial produce, military resources, and the like. The lists were juxtaposed. If any great power did not possess a certain factor, this factor was taken off the list, since it apparently was not necessary for a great power designation. A second step was to classify the great powers into types, such as ‘continental’ vs ‘marine-based’, ‘economic’ vs ‘military’. Kjellén then aspired to find out ‘laws’, or, rather, ‘development tendencies’ for these various types of powers; or, simply, which were ‘going up’ and which were ‘going down’. The detailed investigations of the powers, country by country, were carried out with statistics, partly in a Landeskunde manner, combined with an impressive familiarity with relevant literature. Gradually, Kjellén was also able to travel in all the great powers, and the work Stormakterna is organized by presenting the

countries with one chapter for each country.

When Kjellén set out to examine all the eight great powers, one by one, he first dealt with the four from continental Europe: Austria-Hungary, Italy, France and Germany. The four others – England, Russia, the United States and Japan – were considered to either have a weaker connection with Europe, or none at all. To Kjellén, this is not only the map speaking, but also culture and affinities among peoples, as well as – lurking in the background – future prospects.

In this chapter, four of the eight contemporary great powers will be looked into more closely. Of the three editions of Stormakterna (1905, 1911–13 and 1920), the 1905 edition will be used. Kjellén’s approaches and theses will be rendered and commented upon. When relevant reconsiderations are made by Kjellén in other editions, such as regarding the characterizing factors and the set-up and standing of the great powers, it is given due notice here.

Kjellén had a kind of ‘special relation’ with Germany. In a sense, Kjellén’s examination of Germany was a test to find out if his subjective affinity for the nation was matched by what a stricter, more scholarly examination would indicate. The USA and Japan are the two newcomers as great powers, with characteristics that forced Kjellén to reconsider some of his ideas of what would signify a successful great power. Russia touched both European and Far Eastern politics. The Far East, with Japan as the most significant new power, was considered by Kjellén to be an upcoming ‘hotspot’ – that is, before the First World War once again focused world politics on Europe.

Germany

Kjellén’s depiction of Germany as a great power is coloured by his enthusiasm for the country.¹ On many fronts, Germany had demonstrated a forceful

development during the last decades of the nineteenth century. To most observers, it appeared as the nation-state most clearly on the rise.

Kjellén’s fascination was in line with the affinity that many in the Swedish establishment felt with German culture and scholarship in general. Something that stood him apart, though, was his limited display of solidarity with, or even interest in, the other Nordic countries. When he discusses Germany’s several border-changing wars during these decades, the one with Denmark in the beginning of the 1860s is presented very matter-of-factly (Kjellén 1905 I: 200).² To most Swedes, Germany was close as a neighbour – as big, but not dominating or threatening. Among the other ‘Germanic’ nations and peoples, that is, England and the Netherlands – Kjellén cites Karl Lamprecht as considering the history of the Netherlands as being part of German history (ibid.: 48, asterisk footnote) – their relations with Germany were not and had not been problemfree. Unlike most other nations and peoples in Germany’s vicinity, Sweden did not have any recent grievances with Germany, nor any pressing concerns regarding its own identity or sovereignty. For the other Nordic countries, it was somewhat different. Norwegians were looking westward, clearly more AngloSaxon in affinities and contacts than the Swedes. Finland was still a Russian grand duchy, and the Finns were nationally under pressure from Russification, which had become very harsh from the 1890s. Denmark had recently fought a war with Prussia. Sweden could embrace German culture and civilization, and by now also political power, without any reservations or second thoughts.

In a peculiar sense Swedes had this non-traumatic attitude towards German culture, in common with the learned elite on the east coast of the United States, which up until the interwar years looked to Germany for frontline research, to inspire and to measure up against. So, Germany had things going for her during the turn of the century decades, when Kjellén observed the country.

However, when Kjellén applied his geopolitical parameters (location, demography, economy, constitutional character, etc.) to Germany, things looked differently. On many counts Germany did not do well. Kjellén noted

deficiencies, difficulties and divisions, which made him conclude that Germany, as a nation-state, and consequently as great power, was, as he put it, ‘unfinished’. The Swedish term used by Kjellén, ofärdig, could mean both not (yet) ready (to be or do something), and not (yet) complete – in a sense, also handicapped or incapable. All these connotations imply that something could or ought to be done to change the situation, so that something more unified or harmonious would result. However, regarding its most glaring deficiency, in Kjellén’s eyes, namely the many small sovereignties from German history and a lack of state unity, things had become much better, and so improvements in other fields seemed possible.

There were some remaining deficiencies. By means of its ‘location’, Germany was predestined to ‘a place in the sun’, Kjellén observed. It is the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of Europe (Kjellén 1905 I: 197). This echoes a reflection made also by nineteenth-century historian A.H.L. Heeren, albeit with a final reflection, which later would appear as rather innocent: ‘How would this system [the European ‘system of balance’] be able to develop without such a central state [referring to the German Reich], which is important for everybody, but dangerous to nobody?’ (Heeren [1819] 1865: 3). However, and related to this location, most of its big rivers end or, in their vital parts, run through other countries – this is true for the Rhine, Danube and Weichsel – and this affects the border situation (cf. Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume).

When it came to borders, Kjellén noticed, regarding Denmark, that ‘Jutland geographically belongs together with Northern Germany and may, when owned by someone else, give the impression that it, in an unnatural way, separates Germany’s two seas’. Kjellén, then, rather typically, with associations springing from a strong familiarity with the map, makes the parallel of how the Korean peninsula separated the maritime unity of Russia’s vital sea interests, and this conditioned ‘the recent war in East Asia’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 200). However, to the relief also of Denmark, the Kaiser Wilhelm canal, which opened in 1895, made things more pleasant, ‘solving the problem of the unity of German water’ (ibid.).

Kjellén’s discussion of the modern great powers often brings infrastructural projects to the forefront, primarily railway-building, and not least those in the colonies. These projects – Berlin–Baghdad, Cairo–Cape, Cairo–Calcutta – create and sustain entire geopolitical ‘programmes’ (Kjellén’s term) for a nation, like England or Germany. The idea of a number of national programmes is elaborated much more in the 1920 edition of Stormakterna.

Regarding demography, there exists Germanic irredenta (ibid.). There are several instances of this, with boundaries along which there are no clear demarcations between Germans and Danes, Poles, and French. Kjellén is, of course, aware that the ‘principle of nationality’ may clash with the geographical concerns of ‘natural’ borders.

Regarding Danes and Germans, he notices the disappointment in Denmark that the agreement in 1878 did not rectify the fact than 160,000 Danes in ‘South Jutland’ – Slesvig (Schleswig) – had ended up beyond the border, in Germany. He duly takes note of the fact that this contradicts ‘the principle of nationality’, and that the Danes complained of the nationalization policies of the German rulers in Slesvig. Regarding the province Alsace-Lorraine, Kjellén considers the situation after 1871 to be ‘stable’, even though he recognizes that ‘even the German nationality in Elsass [Alsace] has been imbued by a French spirit’ (ibid.: 204).

Kjellén is most worried about the border situation in the east. And here the deeper conflict between ‘races’, Germanic and Slavic, makes itself felt. The Poles do not have a sovereign nation-state, and here Kjellén discusses mainly the Poles living within the German state. He begins using the metaphor of the Poles as a ‘sea of people’ – and then holds on to the metaphor, to find them ‘overflowing’ in Upper Silesia, Posen and Western Prussia. But this ‘sea’ is covered by German language isles, so that, ‘the map looks like an archipelago’. And in the north-east there is also a ‘Lithuanian archipelago, diluting the German unity’. The towns are mainly German. ‘This is the type of an unfinished [Sw. ofärdig] border between peoples’ (ibid.: 205).

When Kjellén is faced with facts and figures like these, with a history of wars, states and nation-building, and in the process of changing in many parts of Europe, he sticks consistently to the great power aspect or interest. The once existing Polish–Lithuanian empire, which he does not call by this name,³ but rather the ‘Greater Polish (“Jagellonian”) idea’ (ibid.: 206), he considers wholly unrealistic (‘fantastic’). The question of emancipation into statehood is, of course, a process that is well known from history, and to him, but his perspective is consistently from the great power point of view. Regarding the Poles, this approach is apparently still complicated. Not only do they count more than 3 million in Germany, but they are ‘a highly cultivated and socially developed nation, with rich literature, an educated or trained press, and proud traditions from a sovereign past’ (ibid.: 205).

From German divisions and deficiencies – implying unfinished business – Kjellén continued to social aspects, and, in the first place, he noticed ‘the general opposition within the contemporary Western type of society, the opposition between agricultural and industrial interests’ (ibid.: 209). In focusing on the export industry, he expresses this opposition also in the following way: ‘“Volkswirtschaft” or “Weltwirtschaft” – nationalism or imperialism’ (ibid.). Here a tension is implied, not only between types of production, between tradition and modernity, and between lifestyles, but also between serving the nation and serving the world. The agricultural interests were nationally situated, whereas the industrial interests were oriented to the outside world.

The colonies should not only be a supplier of raw material and a release for possible overpopulation at home – a process of emigration that was very visible, encompassing, and also troubling in the turn-of-the-century world – but also a wide market for industrial, as it were, overproduction. This was later considered more of a Leninist analysis of the intensifying of the capitalist mode of production, of imperialism, its last stage.

To acquire ‘colonies’, territories beyond its borders, by warfare or strongman

diplomacy, was expected to be part of Germany’s external politics, as it had been for imperialist newcomers the United States and Japan. This was so if it desired to ‘complete’ itself as a great power, or, nearer to home, to ‘round off’ its territorial figure – a task no longer to be ‘unfinished’.

Bund der Landwirthe – both small farmers and the ‘Junker aristocracy’ – was established in 1893, and Bund der Industriellen – the ‘industrial nobility’ or ‘iron kings’ – in 1895 (ibid.: 210–11). Presenting these interest organizations led Kjellén on to political parties, in a more clear-cut sense. Kjellén, a radical conservative at home in Sweden, recognized that social democracy originated in Germany. Already in this 1905 edition, his interpretation is that Germany’s social democrats, after some revisionism of the doctrines, all stand on national ground (ibid.: 211–14).

A further area characterized by division in Germany was the confessional one: Protestants 62.5 per cent and Catholics some 36 per cent, are the figures Kjellén presents. However, the divisive opposition, as reflected also in the ‘culture struggle’ (Kulturkampf) between 1872 and 1887, had now subsided. Kjellén lists the parties in the German parliament – some twenty of them, based on ideology, regionalism, ethnicity, and interest grouping (ibid.: 216). He expressed his scepticism with this party system:

The preconditions [for a healthy governance] are the lack of shallow parliamentarism; the method to replace the state’s ministers according to the gusts of wind in the sea of party politics, is as alien to the German constitution as it is to the German social structure and the character of its people. (Ibid.)

Kjellén’s final verdict on the polity, is that it is ‘of the same character as its border: unfinished only, but not falling apart’ (ibid.: 221).

Although Kjellén discusses in detail Germany’s internal politics, and the life of political parties, based on economic, ideological and religious interests or affiliations, he does not do so with most of the other countries. And, one may add, addressing the internal power politics of an individual country does not appear that often in studies on international relations or, even, in works on great powers overall.

The last German characteristic he discusses is uncharacteristic of his general approach, and it appears only in the study of the German case. Thus, ‘that the personality [here, in the sense of a person, an individual] is the highest [thing] in history, is perhaps not such a generally valid truth as is usually supposed; but in the history of Prussia this thesis is valid without anything taken away from it’ (ibid.: 222–23). Kjellén here has Emperor William II (Wilhelm II) in mind. Kjellén sees flaws in the emperor’s character, such as Byzantine ruling manners, and difficulty in keeping inside the letters of the constitution. But, still, he argues, in a true personality, flaws are often only the backside of laudable character traits. But when it is time for the final eulogy, Kjellén becomes rather vague. William is brave, he displays sensitivity of a humanitarian kind, he acts according to a calling and on behalf of his country; he is, thus, like the princes of Wales – ich dien [I serve] (ibid.: 223–24). The emperor is ‘ahead of his people’, looking into the future, envisioning Germany as also a world power (ibid.: 225). Germany is not to be understood – as Bismarck put it – as just saturiert (satisfied). In his ambition to be ‘scientific’, Kjellén systematically tries to exclude political leaders, ‘statesmen’, because they would have added a subjective, an unpredictable factor. But regarding Germany he made a single exception.

In the final pages on Germany, Kjellén moves even further into the middle of contemporary big politics. Bismarck had pursued a policy of ‘concentration’. This latter concept is a line of reasoning, which Kjellén carries on in two senses. On the one hand, as a policy aspect, there is the urgency to unify a nation, to get rid of particularism, such as regionalism and ‘partyism’. A large number of political parties will segment, thus weaken, the legislative branch of power. On the other hand, ‘concentration’ is seen by Kjellén as an empirical regularity whereby nation-states, great powers, are becoming bigger and stronger but at the

same time fewer. This is several times referred to by Kjellén as ‘Lord Salisbury’s “law”’.

Kjellén then starts a discussion regarding the three great powers, to which an ascending power, such as Germany, had to pay primary attention – Russia, England and the United States; the continental European powers were now of lesser interest. Germany in 1897 had acquired a foothold in the Shantung peninsula in China. A railway began to be built, to transport coal from mines in the interior to the harbour of Tsintau – ‘a possible Cardiff in Asia’ (Kjellén 1905 I: 229). In 1899, Germany got a concession for its later famed Baghdad railway line. The Balkans and Turkey were to be drawn into European civilization, opening them up as markets, and acquiring access to cereals from the area. Much of this was to counter Russian influence and expansion into this area.

Perhaps because Kjellén monitored the development of international affairs year by year, month by month, and allowed the most recent developments and episodes to influence his interpretations, as it were, in an online manner, he vacillates regarding the future of Germany as a great power, and even more so as a world power. ‘The desire to conquer the world has not yet awakened in a people who have been doomed to live through centuries of … division’ (ibid.: 240). He spots this lack of interest also among the dominant ideologies:

All the three, dominant mass-based views on the world in the political life of present-day Germany – the agrarian, the clerical, and the social democratic – show rather little understanding of a policy of expansion on such a scale. (Ibid.)

One of the interesting aspects of Kjellén’s analysis of the case of Germany is that although he harbours a definite sympathy for Germany, which he explicitly admitted in an essay,⁴ though not that often expressed in his great-power analysis, Germany fares much worse than the other great powers regarding future prospects. One should notice that this sceptical analysis is presented in the 1905 historical situation, where Germany was generally considered to be ‘on the

rise’. On the final page of the chapter, after noticing that the field of competing great powers has become rather ‘crowded’, he recognizes that Germany shows so many flaws or cracks, and dividing elements, regarding both state and society, that its future is still in obscurity (Kjellén 1905 II: 241).

One is here reminded of a much later discourse, the one on the specific German exceptionalism – the Sonderweg, the deviating path – which in the 1970s was also the topic for discussing Germany’s political heritage of ‘illiberalism’. Still, whereas the twentieth-century discourse sees Germany’s deviation as not managing to let the liberal, market-driven economy be accompanied by liberal, democratic politics, Kjellén, rather, directs his attention to Germany’s lack of, what one may call, ‘imperialistic activism’ – the necessity to find resources as well as to establish markets outside one’s own Raum, outside the proper borders of the country’s thus far designated ‘space’.

In the case of the United States, the problem was, rather, the opposite. With plenty of resources within its own territory, there was no need for imperialistic expansion. Since it was thus not ‘organic’, as Kjellén termed it, it was not justified.

The United States

With the United States a counter-factual question arises: can a nation, a power, be powerful on its own, but not outwardly power-exerting, and simultaneously be a nation, a society, that is well developed in an internal sense, with plentiful agricultural and industrial produce, and with an extended involvement of its population in politics and in civil society affairs? In short, does it have the possibility to acquire the status of – to use a modern term – a welfare society, or a ‘great society’, using Lyndon B Johnson’s 1960s programme concept, but without being involved in great power politics.

The United States during a large part of the nineteenth century, to several observers, moved ever further into a position of societal success for this ‘first new nation’. Kjellén also notices this. His reflection during a 1904 US journey: ‘The stranger is astonished, when on the railyards … he sees whole herds of hundreds, maybe thousands of red-backed railway cars, like resting cattle covering enormous widths’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 80–81). He sums up the agricultural and industrial production: ‘There is only one conclusion; the United States is the richest country in the world’ (ibid.: 68). And he refers to Tocqueville when he notes that this land has been held in reserve for a higher humankind (ibid.: 69).

Kjellén devotes some of the initial argument to the continental isolation of the United States. It is not challenged, and it can neither compete nor interact with the established category of great powers. ‘Hardly any nation-state, seen from a European point of view, is better situated on the surface on the top of the earth, than the great republic of America. It is the isolation of England and Japan, but on a more elevated scale. All equal enemies are far away’ (ibid.: 74). When Kjellén travelled in the United States in 1904 he also noticed the lack of fortifications (ibid.: 76).

As always, Kjellén is observant regarding the ethnic set-up. Numbers and characteristics in this category follow on from the paragraphs on location and space. His interests concern both the sense of a ranking, a hierarchy, of ‘races’, and of latent conflicts between them, with also irredenta and possible political secessions. He ponders the case of the southern states from the 1860s civil war onwards, but sees no lingering secessionist inclinations among them. Although one may spot other nationalities being dominant in certain parts of the land – Scandinavians, Germans, and others, west of the Great Lakes – he eventually dismisses the prospect of secessions also here.

A special case is ‘the Negro question’. The Negroes constitute a substantial minority, he notes; 11.6 per cent live mainly in the south, and are of a ‘lower race’. Looking ahead, Kjellén conjectures that ‘in the name of federalism and republicanism it [the ‘race’] could by itself direct its destiny at home (states such

as Mississippi and South Carolina), where they are in a majority and constitute a strongly heterogeneous part at the union congress. This would be a secession in reality … a “black Ireland” on the American continent’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 87).

Further, ‘politically speaking, the Negro is the full equal of the white man. But he has had to pay dearly for this upgrading, in the social sense. The old, more or less patriarchal relation between master and slave has in the southern states been followed by a caste system, where Negroes are treated like a kind of pariah. It is a complete social boycott’ (ibid.: 87–88). After giving examples of daily life segregation, he continues: ‘it is not much better with equality before civil law; all education – not to speak of legal marriage relations – are separate for the two races’ (ibid.: 88). ‘Yes, also the political influence has in reality after 1877 been taken back from the Negro race; with violence and cunning, with [both] unlawfulness and lawfulness, and speculation in the lack of intelligence of the Negroes, as when you in South Carolina have introduced some tricks by the execution of the right to vote, and in the state of Mississippi introduced a kind of examination in the constitution as a condition for the validity of the voting’ (ibid.).

So far, Kjellén says, the Negroes have accepted this, but could it continue like this, he asks. He notices how Booker T. Washington was invited to [dine with] President Roosevelt, ‘to the scare and horror of the general opinion in the country… [other Negroes] are highly gifted and educated, and have dedicated themselves to raising the level of their race (“the afro-american league” [Kjellén uses this term and spelling in English])’ (ibid.: 88). For the future, Kjellén sees only two options, ‘either the melting together of the two races into a new one, or the suppression of the lower race’ (ibid.: 89).

This reasoning illustrates Kjellén’s concern with the constitution of the population in a society as one of the most important of the very material factors. How do various ethnic groups go together, for the possibility of the nation-state to use its resources to the fullest? Indeed, will the nation-state hold up in the longer run? This is the theme of his discussion of secessionist tendencies, and

these were tendencies that he had observed for several European states, and, not least, for some empires. It is quite clear, that Kjellén sees the United States as still much in the making, also in its very territorial configuration and population set-up. And this at the time when the country was about to enter the global arena, as a great power, with further volatility anticipated.

Kjellén continues his discussion of the melting pot in general, and reflects on the continuous influx of European migrants with different nationalities. He sees this as an ongoing process, and compares it with the Austrian monarchy, where the nationalities have strong self-perceptions and fight each other. But, ‘it is more or less quiet and calm between the white peoples in the American Union. They have lost their national pathos, under the spell of a secretive, psychological process, which forces them into a new form of national existence and community’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 97). And he continues, ‘if this is the case, then neither the Negro question nor the latent white people’s confusion through immigration constitute any worries for the future of America’ (ibid.).

As the ethnic aspect is so important for Kjellén in his evaluation of the prospect of great powers, this parameter has been given some attention here. In the case of the USA, he himself emphasized this, ’I wish to put particular attention on this aspect’ (ibid.: 95). ‘…as to the goal of the process, we already and clearly have in sight a new people’s element, a new kind of human’ (ibid.: 95, emphasis in the original). ‘What we see there [in the United States] in our days is the impressive spectacle of the birth of a nation coming into the world’ (ibid.: 96, emphasis in the original). Theoretically, Kjellén argues, two processes may be at work: ‘acclimatization’, to a new nature, to new conditions; and ‘assimilation’, here meaning crossbreeding among several peoples, entering the country one after the other. The new breed of humans appearing in the United States is called ‘Yankees’ [jänkimän, as Kjellén calls them in Swedish] (ibid.: 96).

Kjellén now turns to what might be called ‘mentality’. The Yankee is characterized by youthfulness – not to say childishness (a love of noise) – and a ‘progressistic’ [Kjellén’s term in Swedish is progressistisk] mentality (ibid.: 98).

Another characteristic is the high value attached to work. Already, through migration, a natural selection of the most enterprising has occurred, and now these continue their struggle, for success, in America. There is ‘a strong breath of Nietzsche’s sermon, and nature’s own law: progress [Kjellén writes ‘progress’ also in Swedish] for the species without consideration for the individual (ibid.: 100). As he puts it, the lack of humanity gives the United States an advantage over Europe. ‘Where the strong is appreciated, more workers perish, but work wins’ (ibid., emphasis in the original).

Kjellén paints a bright picture of the nineteenth-century growth and flowering of the United States, blessed by three factors: (a) a location away from enemies; (b) a space, or room, with an abundance of natural resources; and (c) a people, a population, though coming from a variety of backgrounds, growing into a unified character, and possibly into a self-perceived community.

In that respect, the USA might have been – with my initial terminology – a ‘welfare society’ in becoming a society where you do ‘fare well’. As a type, of a great-power to be, the USA is the latest incarnation of the previous ones – and going backwards into history, of England, Holland, Portugal, Venice and Carthage (ibid.: 107). Kjellén then poses the question: ‘Will the richest power on earth, the great power of work, in itself inoculate – or does it already own it – also the instinct to rule and the aspiration for external expansion, so that it will become Carthage and Rome in one person, but on the planetary format?’ (ibid.).

Kjellén continues – and this is rather important from the point of view of his overall great power analysis: ‘One thing is sure: such a development [in short, imperialism] is not within the sphere of political necessities. We cannot call it organic, as it is not dictated by some real life need’ (ibid.: 107, emphasis in the original). The previously established great powers have had a weak geographical centre; thus, they conducted a policy of acquiring colonies. ‘What England seeks in other parts of the world, the United States has in its own geographical body. Its natural colonial empire lies within its own borders … Under such circumstances, a political hunger for territory, or soil, appears as inorganic and

therefore also without historical legitimation’ (ibid.: 108). This constitutes a new kind of geopolitical problem, where the prognosis is uncertain.

Gradually, now, Kjellén changes the tone and mood from being impressed to becoming sceptical, even disgusted – or, to put it another way, too much ‘civilization’, too little ‘culture’. This is a theme often ascribed to German philosophizing, e.g. Spengler (see Huntington 1996: 41).

Although Kjellén still sees the USA as limited when it comes to being a commercial threat to European powers, he examines the Monroe doctrine in practice on the American continent (Kjellén 1905 II: 121).⁵ He discerns a panAmericanism: ‘America to the Americans’, but which in fact is turning into ‘America to the United States’ (ibid.). Kjellén uses a concept in English, ‘manifest destiny’, here to mean a determinism in the US absorbing the whole continent (ibid.: 121). Although the Alaska purchase, in 1867, violated the principle of unity of territory, ‘You might say that American imperialism starts with the involvement in the Venezuela question in December 1895’ (ibid.: 122).

Kjellén then moves on, in quick succession from 1897 and onwards, with US action in Hawaii, Cuba, Guam and the Philippines. The second big foreign affairs programme, after the ‘America programme’ alluded to above, is now the ‘Pacific programme’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 123). The latter requires the opening of the Panama isthmus. Now, in November 1904, the work on the canal will soon start. With his typical, growing scepticism, Kjellén continues: ‘The Suez Canal was a gift to humanity, the Panama Canal will overwhelmingly serve the United States’ (ibid.: 124).

Kjellén quotes Alfred Mahan, who argues that the Monroe doctrine does not stand in the way of US expansion in the Pacific. The doctrine mainly concerns the inviolability of ‘European’ interests, extended to Africa, the Levant and India. Japan, China and the Pacific are not included, according to Kjellén’s reading of Mahan (Kjellén 1905 II: 127). ‘Our conclusion is clear: the great

Union admits in reality no natural border for its influence’ (ibid.: 128). Also, a particular military spirit is evolving, ‘psychologically in accordance with its national youth and specific recruitment of peoples’ (ibid.). Still, Kjellén sees this as a passing movement, whose exaggerations will come back to haunt it. Sooner or later the US control of the Philippines will lead to a conflict, and probably with Japan, who holds the better geographical right to areas in the Far East (ibid.: 130).

Kjellén, in the end, depicts the United States as the extreme of a certain ‘cultural form’, the ideal of ruthless ‘progressism’, with a focus on work and with its focal point in intellectual life’ (ibid.: 132). ‘His [the American] motto is “go ahead”, his life content is “struggle”’ [in the Swedish text, Kjellén uses the English terms, given within citation marks – an ironic adoption of American favourite concepts, style and flair] (ibid.: 132).

But nowhere can you hear the sighs of so much distress in the individual as in this large realm. No houses cast as long and deep shadows as the American skyscrapers. If we, in our time, should speak of a treadmill, it certainly is erected in the new world. (Ibid.: 132)

Having portrayed the United States at the turn of the twentieth century as the most intense, forward-looking, competitive, and – by implication – ‘liberal’ society in the world, but a society which in the end is being disclosed as ruthless, Kjellén’s rhetoric turns to the other extreme, on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, in Asia, ‘the contemplation in contented repose’ (ibid.: 132, emphasis in the original). ‘This is the opposite ideal; in its essence more passive, stationary, because it is founded on moral life’ (ibid.). It is Japan that is here on his mind as the very contrast to the USA. But before that, the broad bridge between East and West must be examined – Russia.

Russia

Kjellén’s ever-recurring comparison between great powers often takes on the character of reasoning in dualisms. Two powers represent elaborated extremes, on parameters and as types. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Japan and the USA are opposites in one sense, but USA and Russia are illustrative as opposites in another sense. Both of them have huge land masses, but whereas the USA is both isolated and protected by oceans, Russia has no specific natural land borders to the powers immediately to the West (Europe) or to the East (Japan). Russia is a country with a long statehood, and it is also an old great power. Japan is an old nation-state, but as a great power it is just in the making. The USA is, still, both a nation-state and a great power in the making, though the ‘making period’ is just a question of a couple of decades.

With the succession of chapters in this 1905 analysis – from USA, to Russia, and on to Japan – Kjellén also follows the shift of gravity of world politics into what he sees as the next focal point, the Far East. Simultaneously, the dualisms are emphasized – USA vs Japan and USA vs Russia. In the Far East, the rather recent Russian interests in Siberia, and the possibility of an access to the open sea, collide to the East with the interests of China and of Japan. To Kjellén, Europe and its powers take second place, at least for a while.

Whereas the United States was an extreme example of an economically powerful but militarily less strong power, with the balance between ‘state’ and ‘society’ heavily tilted towards the latter, Russia had over the centuries ‘ruthlessly dedicated itself to the fulfilment of external state tasks’, but without managing economic flourishing (Kjellén 1905 II: 142). Kjellén sketches the well-known image of Russian ‘European’ history as characterized by ‘not taking part’ in the epochs of chivalry, scholasticism, urban flowering, the Renaissance, exploring other continents, the Enlightenment, and so on.

Typically, for Kjellén, and for other analysts of the great powers up until then, one should add, he does not mention the era of ‘the scientific revolution’, in which Russia also did not take part, or at least was much of a latecomer. Science

and scholarship – knowledge and technology as possibly affecting great power growth – are not on his list of parameters.

Kjellén speaks also of a ‘Russian peril’ making itself felt in Western Europe during the nineteenth century, but it is now fading, this because the absolutist kind of governance has been abandoned in Europe. Again, with a US comparison, there is a similarity, because a hegemon-like nationality (AngloSaxon and Russian/Slavic, respectively) is surrounded by or intermingled with a number of smaller nationalities. However, whereas in the United States these latter immigrating ones – Germans, Russians, Italians, Irish, Scandinavians, and maybe Africans – are in the process of melting into the ‘American nationality’, in Russia the Poles, the ‘little Russians’ (Ukrainian or Ruthenian), Finns, Baltic peoples, Germans, Caucasians (e.g. Georgians) and others, are long since alienated with the czarist rule and empire. They are more bent on emancipation into statehood than on integration into Russian society. This has prompted, and now, towards the end of the nineteenth century, deepened a policy of Russification. The old idea of a unifying pan-Slavism turns into a harsh, punishing pan-Russianism (Kjellén 1905 II: 152).

In Russia, dissimilar from Europe, there has not developed any ‘third estate’. Rather than the ‘people’ versus the aristocracy, as in revolutionary France, there is in Russia the ‘intelligentsia’ versus the bureaucracy. The oppositional intelligentsia is composed of students, the working class, and local nobility (ibid.: 159). Kjellén quotes a Russian commentator during Alexander I: ‘Our form of governance is monarchy, limited by tyrannicide’, and Kjellén contributes with the ironical travesty: ‘Our actual form of governance is bureaucracy, limited by corruption’ (ibid.: 157).

As with the United States, Kjellén discusses governance in relation to size – a factor he did not include early on, but one that he soon noticed must be reckoned with, in terms of a minimum size. Here, Kjellén’s reservations regarding parliamentarism is put into context.

A people’s representation [parliament] is not in itself a strength for a state; it may also be a field, where inner contradictions are offered their proper opportunity to fight and to divide. Everything depends upon if there is, in society and land, enough unity … The bigger the space the state has to embrace, … the bigger the danger of disintegration according to natural differences. (Kjellén 1905 II: 161)

Experience so far indicates that ‘there are only two natural forms for the political organization of huge land masses: ‘Caesarism, the principle of old Rome; and the federation, the principle of the new world’ (ibid.: 161, emphases in the original). The USA uses the federal form and it functions well. Similarly, because of the many specified, long-existing and profiled nationalities in Russia, the federation would theoretically be best, but because of the inherent separatist ambitions among the many nationalities, the result could instead mean the dissolution of the empire. A unified, parliamentary governance could equally well mean ‘an organized revolution’ (ibid.: 162) – in either case, a vicious circle, according to Kjellén.

Although Kjellén does not explicitly discuss it, he has here connected the functional potential of a type of governance with the direction of history, with the historical experience of the peoples involved. In Russia, peoples or nations have experienced subordination within the Russian Empire and have steadily yearned for emancipation. Kjellén does not see federalism as an option with this historical backlog. In the USA there appears to be a pull factor, working equally on all incoming peoples, all bent on integrating themselves in the ‘new world’, be it a nation-state or an empire in the making – as it were, an evolving multiethnic society. Although the separate states in the USA are not organized according to ethnicity – rather along the chronological steps of US expansion and inclusion – federalism, to Kjellén, seems to be an apt form of governance for the USA.

Kjellén finds a vicious circle also in Russia’s economy, it being heavily reliant on agriculture. But, ‘no country on earth has a worse tended soil than Russia’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 164). The peasants are extremely badly off. He compares it

with other nations: ‘the Russian peasant is starving. In the midst of the riches of the granary, the people have no bread’ (ibid.: 165, emphasis in the original) … ‘The lifting of serfdom has in fact been no more of a blessing to Russian peasants than the abolition of slavery has been to the Negroes in America. But what has made their [the Russian peasants] situation outright unbearable is the financial system of government during the last couple of years’ (ibid.: 165).

Kjellén goes on to discuss what he, and others, call ‘the system of Witte’. Sergei Witte was Russian minister of finance between 1892 and 1903. The country was rapidly industrialized during his term, and for this he won acclaim in Western Europe. But Kjellén, among others, saw flaws in the ‘system’. National wealth, Kjellén argued, was being concentrated in the one and only hand of the government, with tariffs and monopolies stifling private initiative. In order to pay for industrialization and the build-up of infrastructure, loans from abroad have to be taken. And the security for the loans is the export of cereal (ibid.: 166–68). Thus, ‘the country starves while single industrialists acquire fortunes in the millions, and the coffers of state bulge, and the reputation of Witte as a statesman travels the world’ (ibid.: 168). ‘This is the organic connection between Russia’s external policy and its present fate. Not by its absolutist system in itself, not by despising the right of the nationality and the Western ideas in general, but by its negligence to fulfil the state’s elementary duty towards the life necessities of the broad layers, has this bureaucracy brought the country to the side of the abyss where it now stands’ (ibid.: 169).

To finance the repayment of loans, Russia looked beyond its borders – and particularly to the East. Kjellén discerns no less than four or five ‘programmes’, long-term policies for the expansion of Russia. These are geopolitical considerations, involving ‘location’ and ‘room’: they are the Atlantic, Byzantine, Indian, Indian Ocean and Pacific programmes (ibid.: 170–85). Kjellén identifies a future ‘hotspot’ (further, see below, on the Far East). The Indian Ocean programme is a ‘sovereign geopolitical outline, the fourth string in the big political bow of Russia’ (ibid.: 181); and, ‘we do not exaggerate when we say that the Persian Gulf is becoming one of the main theatres of world history’ (ibid.: 182).

The main focus for Russia is now the Pacific programme directly towards the East, with the trans-Siberian railway (ibid.: 182). ‘… its goal seemed to have been reached in 1898 when the Russian flag was planted on the ramparts of Port Arthur. For the first time the Andreas cross swayed in a harbour of its own, and in open sea breeze; centuries of desires to the sea appeared to be satisfied; the giant trapped between the ice-covered White Sea and the blind alley of the Black Sea had at last managed to free one arm, in the Yellow Sea’ (ibid.: 183). The Gulliver association regarding Russia and its history is obvious.

Then, the catastrophe of 1904–05 occurs. The Russian fleet is destroyed by the Japanese at Tsushima – the Pacific programme is in ruins. This event, occurring only months before Kjellén’s publication of this, his 1905 edition of Stormakterna, really shook Western observers. This shock radiates out of the pages here. Whatever lingering, excusing argument of cultural supremacy, of Russians as Europeans, of legitimizing the Russian imperial moves in the East, is now evaporating. Kjellén says of Russia:

When this veil has been torn away, you saw a naked desire to conquer, with no trace of national necessity. A power which by no means may feed the homeland with its own industry, does not require any new markets, and a population that already has more than enough space does not need any new homes! (Kjellén 1905 II: 184)

Kjellén indicates what for a great power would be valid reasons for expansion, for, as it were, imperialism – to find new markets and room for settlers. When these very material reasons are not at hand, then the expansion is not ‘organic’, as he has termed it elsewhere; for example, when it came to the USA expanding, unnecessarily, in the American hemisphere, and now even beyond or across the Pacific Ocean.

Regarding Russia, ‘we basically do not see anything else than a bureaucracy satisfying its own selfish interests at the expenses of the nation’; Kjellén quotes historian Harald Hjärne, an expert on Russia, and who speaks of a ‘machinery of conquest’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 184).

The year 1905 saw a first revolution in Russia. Being in the midst of events during the year – the preface is dated September 1905 – Kjellén is rather cautious in his prognosis. One basic reason for his belief in Russia’s continuance as a great power is simply the geographical, geopolitical one – the country has a natural unity across a vast expanse (ibid.: 185). And, ‘out of the waves of the revolution he [Russia] will appear stronger than ever’ (ibid.: 186).

In a footnote earlier in the chapter on Russia, speaking of the form of governance, Kjellén writes: ‘the idea of a federation is said to be listed in the programme of the “revolutionary committee” in May 1905’ (ibid.: 162, asterisk footnote). ‘Russia’s great power shall not die with its present political system’ (ibid.: 185, emphasis in the original).

He now airs a thought of a historical-philosophical kind, which he had put forward earlier in his work on the great powers. A continuous expansion through conquests is not the normal pattern for the development of (nation-)states. They, as well as great powers, rather, ‘move forward in a rhythmical exchange between expansion and concentration of outer and inner growth’ (ibid.: 187). Concentration is now on the agenda for Russia. This is the pendulum theory of history, which Kjellén embraces. Thus, with typical Kjellén rhetoric: ‘Between a newborn Asia and a unified Europe you find Russia’s natural place – no longer a world-conquering Rome, but the great buffer, which shall transmit and mitigate the touch between the white and the yellow’ (ibid., emphasis in the original).

Kjellén devotes the next chapter to ‘The problems of the Big Orient’, dealing with Russia, China and Japan. This is the place on earth, he suggests, that will now be the hotspot of great-power politics. Russia was to be understood as a

‘small’ opposite to the USA. Japan will now, bridged by Russia, be understood as the ‘big’ opposite to the USA, who, in turn, is fully understood only when the ultimate contrast, Japan, is depicted.

The Problems of the Big Orient

Kjellén’s greatest concerns and worries, and where his emotions and feelings of affinity shine through, are with Germany, its status and prospects. The strongest feelings of intellectual curiosity, of novelty and adventure, though, seem to be connected with Japan. The rise of Japan as a great power, to Kjellén as well as to many Westerners/Europeans, was ‘orientalism’ of the Far Eastern kind.

Crossroads, leading into a crucible, with latent crossfires, was the area around the Korean peninsula, where Russia, Japan and China, all with rising ambitions during the 1890s, were about to decide on how to handle foreseeable clashes; much like similar, discernible great-power flashpoints in Europe. However, since the potential conflict soon subsided – Russia defeated, China subdued, and European nations hovering on the brink of war – the intellectual and scholarly fascination, to which Kjellén’s writings on the subject bear witness, particularly in the 1905 edition, stands out as somewhat isolated.

China, Kjellén argues, is the other big source – together with Europe – for humans and culture, and to the envy of Europe here you find both political and social harmony. Although China is not a great power, its power is the ‘broadbased type: a giant country with a temperate climate, with nature’s best riches overflowing and found within one and the same border’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 188, emphasis in the original). Still, China is ‘a quantité negligible among the acting persons in big politics’ (ibid.). Ultimately, China has not had the crucial will to power’ (ibid., emphasis in the original).

… Safe and secure in its complete autarky, it has allowed its urge to develop to be distinguished in a vegetative satisfaction with what is at hand at the present; its doors have been closed, it has accepted the world to pass by with no wish to teach it or to learn from it. If any part of humanity deserves to be called ‘the old world’ it is the Chinese one. [China] has come to get the humiliating role, which it occupies in contemporary history: the carrion to where the eagles gather. (Kjellén 1905 II: 189 [cf. Watanabe and Recht 2020: 4])

To Kjellén, the latter observation concerns not only a common desire of external powers to tap China’s riches and markets, but it refers to the recent, extraordinary occasion when all of the contemporary world’s great powers participated in a punishing expedition in 1900 to crush the Boxer Rebellion (ibid.: 202–4). The usual conflicts among the great powers to get to a prey, somewhere in the world, were not at hand this time. They all shared.

Kjellén presents the build-up to a latent clash of interest between Russia and Japan – the founding of Vladivostok in 1860, the clash over Sachalin, and Japan’s repeated interests in Korea: ‘… in 1876, Japan took the step to forcibly get a trade agreement with Korea; thereby applying the same method of mild violence that [Japan] itself had experienced at the hands of the great powers a couple of decades earlier’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 192). Japan thus applied one of the lessons it had learnt by being a great power.

Kjellén interprets the military confrontation between Japan and China over Korea in the mid-1890s as an intervention to ward off ‘Russia’s secret plans’. In characteristic manner, he uses a parallel with recent European international politics to illustrate the thinking: ‘From this point of view [intervening in Russia’s plans], Korea to the statesmen of Japan has been the same as SlesvigHolstein in the 1860s was to Bismarck; in the same way as he behind Denmark has Austria in sight, and behind Austria imagined the bigger adversary France, the Japanese had foreseen a conflict with Russia behind its Austria, China’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 193–94). In the Shimonoseki peace agreement of 1895, Japan secured from China and for itself the Liaotung peninsula with Port Arthur.

The continuous power play is summed up by Kjellén, anxious to emphasize its importance by using an abundance of italics:

To Japan, Port Arthur is thus the key to Korea, where it envisions all its future, or at least the road to the future. To Russia, Port Arthur is the pinnacle of its railway politics, from which it expects economic renaissance. Not for its own sake Port Arthur has become a world historical centre, but because the contrary interests of two great powers by historical and geographical necessity have come to cross each other exactly there. This is how historical conflicts arise. (Kjellén 1905 II: 199, emphases in the original)

Kjellén very rarely expressed himself, with meta-comments, as first below:

To speak of right here is to lay history on its side. History is unfortunately not a story with a beautiful moral for children. (Ibid.: 200)

Japan has as little right to Korea as Russia has to Manchuria. None of them has any trace of right over China’s Port Arthur. It is not about rights. It is about interests. (Ibid.)

Russia, which in this part of the world has not even historical claims, hunts for naked greatness; Japan seeks life conditions. In this sense, Japan’s claims are given better marks in the face of history. (Ibid.)

The ‘slumbering Leviathan’ [China] now was revealed in all its helpless weakness, like a vast depot of humans without the strength of organization or the

feeling of community. This discovery suited Europe very well because of its need for industrial expansion. Odysseus was gone; now the suitors began to assemble in his house. (Ibid.: 201)

After the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, Japan could focus on the battle with Russia on its own.

Japan

In a rare meta-comment, Kjellén expresses satisfaction with the fact that, in his lectures as early as 1896 and 1897, he had designated Japan as a future great power, ‘before not that many really believed its “rising sun”’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 208; see Edström 2014).

Kjellén was both invigorated and challenged by taking on Japan. The ultimate purpose was, of course, to examine its admittedly rather recent but – definitely from 1905 – more or less unchallenged status as a great power. To do that, an understanding of Japan as a culture, and maybe as a civilization, appeared as a requirement. And in turn, this necessitated an overall background of ‘Asian culture’, which, in effect, would mean the high culture and centuries-old civilization of China. This, to the general European observer at the time, likewise enamoured by a rising Japan, would have been the expected approach.

Kjellén, however, although he gives due attention to Confucianism and other ‘Chinese culture’ features in tow, devotes most space to those cultural traits that could be most readily compared to various and specific European powers, and not to an overall Asia-Chinese culture correspondingly compared to an imagined, general ‘European culture’. This is done in Kjellén’s typical manner of crystallizing dual opposites. True, this goes some way to put the various European powers in relief – in the vein of a Kiplingesque ‘you do not know

Europe if you do not know Asia’.

But the gist of the comparative approach here is to see Japan as another nationstate great power, which as a type is best related to other such great powers – and most of them are European. When it comes to the strictly great power analysis, no presumed ‘Asian’ vs ‘European’ essences of culture are brought into the picture. As a power, Japan is a ‘great power’, not an ‘Asian great power’.

However, Kjellén insists, when it comes to a larger perspective, involving, one might say, the future for cultures or civilizations and their differences, the resentment felt by the victims of European imperialism will be channelled into the power most likely, at the earliest stage in history, to confront this world order, and that is Japan. Japan, whether embracing this role or not, will serve to represent the Asian and other non-European peoples versus the established imperialist powers (see below).

Concerning Japan, Kjellén is rather short on information regarding the regular statistical parameters (people, trade, military, etc.), but he notices that Japan’s economic balance is of a European type, with an import surplus, including food (Kjellén 1905 II: 209–11). ‘When you reflect on Japan’s preconditions for a great power position, your thoughts immediately go to its insularity and location. It is England in another version: everything so far in leeward of culture, as England, in a sense, before the discovery of America’ (ibid.: 212). When it comes to location, Japan’s insularity is, of course, the most striking aspect. Kjellén lets his imagining, dreamlike fantasy soar: ‘the wonderful land in the blue water of the Pacific Ocean, where it is situated with its three-island girdle, like a festive decoration suspended on the coast of Asia’ (ibid.: 208). England, or Britain, would be the immediate, comparative impulse. However, rather than being a maritime power based on a commercial economy, ‘it surprises us that in Japan we find a profiled, purely military, land-power type, [the like of] Turkey and Sweden in the past, [and] Russia in contemporary times’ (ibid.: 212). ‘With its weak economy and strong militarism, it protrudes as a pure contrast to the United States, but as a pendant to Russia, whose preconditions [in nature,

location and size] are the opposite’ (ibid.: 213). Japan’s topography and raw materials are compared to equally mountainous and natural resource-poor Italy. Kjellén concludes: ‘The Japanese great power appears in particular as a creation of the human beings’ (ibid.: 214 emphasis in the original).

Japan being so much a creation of humans, Kjellén’s ordinary big interest in the people and their composition is now conspicuous. Being very homogeneous now, in Kjellén’s times, ‘Japan is a nation-state in the most intimate meaning’ (ibid.: 214). As of old, though, it is a mixture of many of the peoples in the region. And, again, a European similarity is to be found: ‘Also Pacific Britain’s history starts with this crossbreeding between races, into which the psychologist of peoples sees an indication of a [future] great and rich development’ (ibid.: 215)

What most strikes Kjellén is the very flexibility of the people of Japan: ‘Historical sources know of no analogy to this history, when a people twice break with their national form of culture and have the strength to set for themselves a new, higher ideal’ (ibid.: 215–16). He brings one of his theoretical observations, a law-like regularity, into the picture: ‘The rhythmic alteration between concentration and expansion, as I had myself pictured, to set up as a basic law for the future development of peoples and culture … is, in the history of Japan, conspicuous’ (ibid.: 216). A little later in the text, Kjellén takes this to new heights: ‘the recent development of Japan appears to us as a miracle – I would almost like to say the greatest miracle in world history next to the victorious rise of Christianity above the ruins of European Antiquity’ (ibid.: 216).

Kjellén notices the development of several, latent great-power qualities, generally characterized by what one might call ‘imitation with limitation’ (see below). Now, a conspicuous, future-looking theme, a warning of a kind, is highlighted – Japan as a pioneer and spokesperson for the non-European peoples, globally, and for retribution, in all senses: ‘We should be aware that prayers for the success of Japan in these days rise from the shores of the Menam

and the Ganges, from the bazaars of Buchara and Teheran, from all parts of the world where white men are oppressors… [pausing points added by Kjellén] Japan itself cannot be unaware of this. It pictures itself fighting not only for itself but for a bigger cause: for the claims of the suppressed races to equal rights and standings with the white one, or at least freedom from his control’ (ibid.: 220– 21).

This is an example of ‘cognitive empathy’ – to really grasp, to understand, someone else’s situation. Here, to Kjellén, it borders on ‘emotional empathy’ – primarily to sympathize or to feel with, in a state of awe, someone else; generally, to picture for oneself, and experience for oneself, the perspective on the world as seen from ‘the other’. This, in 1905, is the result of reading the literature. After his travels to Asia, including Japan, in 1909, this imagined perspective of ‘the other’ is, for Kjellén, confirmed and internalized.

In the end, Kjellén finds it necessary for Japan to team up with China – ‘the soul of Japan in the body of China’ (ibid.: 236) – to be able to assert itself as a great power. This is not so much because of the lack of basic material resources, but rather because of cultural or civilizational traits. Some touchdowns on the way to this conclusion merit mention. A strategy of ‘imitation with limitation’ is expressed in various ways. ‘The Europeanization has been necessary for the success of its [Japan’s] desire to emancipate and to gain greatness, but it has never been anything other than a means’ (ibid.: 221). This goes for its history of borrowing from Chinese culture (e.g. Confucianism) over the centuries. But the cult of Japanese ancestors has always been held on to.⁷

After emphasizing traits of mass suggestion, collectivism, trust in authorities as such, including the emperor, but a ‘history without proper names’, an impersonal trait, Kjellén sums it up in characteristic dualistic manner:

I have tried to summarize the opposite between the Orient and the Occident in a theory of the two poles of mankind. The strong and rich development of the

personality makes the Occident’s race the spokesman for the idea of individualism, with its subsequent sense of freedom and demands on rights in politics, and of egoism in the moral domain. The weaker accent regarding the personality allows the Mongolian race to stand out as the special carrier of the principle of solidarity, which takes the form of belief in authority and a sense of duty in politics, and of altruism in the moral domain. This is, if you will, the male and the female principle in the world historical development. The two most conspicuous representatives of these two ideals are the youngest great powers, the United States and Japan; while Russia appears as a transition and an intermediation between the two. (Kjellén 1905 II: 225–26)

Sometimes one may wonder, whether Kjellén had been better off in not adding number upon number of exemplifying parallels, and, as here, ending up with male and female principles. It is as if he cannot let go of the possibility to ‘take it all the way’. Another implicit parallel, though, is that the two basic ideas, mentalities, or even life principles, are to be found also in ‘the ideas of 1789’ (female) and ‘the ideas of 1914’ (male). This reflects his view of history as a pendulum, alternating between ‘expansion’ or emancipation (1789) and ‘concentration’ or community cohesion (1914).

Kjellén proceeds to wonder how the Japanese themselves look upon the problem.⁸ He now returns to the theme of resentment: ‘in reality there is a deep antipathy towards the essence of Europe, and a contempt as well’ (ibid.: 227, emphases in the original).

Kjellén had previously sketched the history of ‘the yellow peril’, as perceived in the West, from the 1860s and onwards. In its first phase it concerned ‘soldiers’ (a Russian policy to utilize forces of China in Europe); then, in the 1870s and 1880s, as ‘workers’ (Chinese immigration to the USA and Australia); next, with exports of ‘industrial goods’, in the 1890s, with Japan defeating China – and then the ‘peril’ regarded Japan and not China. In the fourth stage, around 1900, the ‘peril’ was seen as diminished, interpreted as a Russian trick, to secure sympathies in Europe in its conflict with Japan. But then, with Japan beating

Russia militarily, the ‘soldier’ theme was back (Kjellén 1905 II: 228–29). Kjellén now reveals to the reader what the yellow peril is really all about:

The rest of mankind has thus [e.g. because of the Opium Wars] come to look upon Europe, and not without reason, as the representative of naked selfishness and pure desire for profit. In this sense we are able to say that Europe’s real yellow peril is the gold: the cult of Mammon, materialism. This system has thus developed, in the oppressed part of mankind, not just hatred but contempt. (Ibid.: 239, emphases in the original)

More in passing, Kjellén reflects upon the resources of Japan to acquire a great power position, and its possibilities to hold on to it. Cheap labour has been an advantage, but ‘racial characteristics may to some extent vary according to the circumstances’ (ibid.: 230). Kjellén now surmises that Japan’s industry should probably face the same problems as Western powers have had to meet – an increase in wages and a worker’s question of its own (ibid.: 230–31). This argument is inserted as a more ordinary socioeconomic approach to a modernizing, industrial nation.

After 1905, Kjellén noticed an increased Japanese emigration taking place, primarily going to the United States, and also a new nationalism in Japan, appearing as what he calls ‘state socialism’. Probably, this is a tendency he had also observed for the development nearer to home, and what today might be referred to as ‘organized capitalism’.

Japan cannot at all, on home soil, muster the resources necessary for a great power. ‘The prognosis we must put forward for Italy and England, because of the weakness of the mother countries in world competition, must be done also for Japan …’ (ibid.: 235). The policy of conquest in its surroundings of East Asia – ascribing to the term ‘the Sea of Japan’ a literal relevance – gives Kjellén reason to say that Japan ‘is a third example of a circum-marine type of great power, after Rome and the Mediterranean realm, and Sweden and the Baltic

realm …’ (ibid., emphasis in the original).

For Japan, there is only one possibility: ‘connection with China’ (ibid.: 236). ‘China is the true great power of the east in the physical and quantitative sense. Only here are there the natural preconditions for autarky on a world-historical scale. Here is the broad geographical base, which Japan misses. Here is also the other condition missing in Japan: the true shopkeeper [Sw. krämare] blood, with its inherent appreciation of money.’ Japan is dominated, and too much, Kjellén thinks, by its moral code, the bushido ideal, ‘the way of the warrior’ (ibid.: 232).¹

Interestingly, Kjellén plays down another factor: ‘China’s hate towards Japan, if you can speak of such a thing, is very pale compared to its hate towards Europe’ (ibid.: 237). This is not only a question of European imperialism and humiliation of the Chinese – for example, the crushing of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Kjellén has no illusions regarding the peoples of, primarily, Eastern Asia, and them, in the end, sticking to racial solidarity, with a ‘pan-Mongolian great state’ on the horizon (ibid.: 236).

It should be added that in the 1920 edition Kjellén recognizes that he was mistaken on this last point, regarding racial solidarity; in fact, ‘interest’ ruled the day, he finds. When Kjellén in his 1920 edition discusses his previous analysis, he clearly disassociates himself from the idea of Japan and China joining up, although in the 1905 edition he had put forward some solid, material argument, regarding autarky. But ‘it soon appeared that blood was not thicker than water. The policy of Japan towards China in no way turned out to be an emotional play on the strings of race, but a definite policy of interest …’ (Kjellén 1920: 148).

The Japanese military victory over Russia had broken the spell. The prestige of the white race, lingering on as a mental obstacle, was no longer there. Japan will ‘realize the emancipation of Asia, just as the United States has regarding America’ (Kjellén 1905 II: 240). What we might expect, is a Monroe doctrine for

East Asia, with Japan as the guarantor … Asia to the Asians (ibid. emphasis in the original).

In Kjellén’s world, it is not yet a question of ‘the West’, but of Europe; and the United States is a kind of parallel to Japan, both as a new great power and as a power threatening, or at least challenging, Europe. And again, taking the view of ‘the other’, he pictures that on the portal in Irkutsk, where one may now read ‘The door to the Great Ocean’, on the other side of the portal, in the near future, one may read ‘The door to Europe’ (ibid.).

Ragnar Björk is a retired associate professor of history from Uppsala University and is now affiliated with Södertörn University. His research is mainly concerned with ‘research on research’, with the history of historiography and the social sciences, the history of science, including the Nobel Prize, and also modern political history. He graduated at Uppsala in 1983 with a dissertation on explanatory techniques – including narration and colligation – among historians, and was awarded the Geijer Prize for best historical dissertation. Since then, he has conducted a number of research projects on those same themes. Some of his latest publications are: ‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1) (2016); ‘Voluntarismens väg: Och något om Rudolf Kjellén som producent av helhetskunskap om samhället’, in Erik Nydahl and Jonas Harvard (eds), Den nya staten: Ideologi och samhällsförändring kring sekelskiftet 1900 (Nordic Academic Press, 2016); Thorsten Halling, Ragnar Björk, Heiner Fangerau and Nils Hansson, ‘Leopoldina: Ein Netzwerk für künftige Nobelpreisträger für Physiologie oder Medizin?’, Sudhoffs Archiv 102 (2018), X.

Notes

1. In reviews after the 1905 edition, Kjellén was criticized for being too fond of Germany.

2. Kjellén’s 1905 edition contains two books – I and II – and they were regularly published in one volume, as the 1905 edition. For more bibliographical information on the three editions of Stormakterna, see chapter 4, note 4.

3. Cf. Bömelburg 2007, on Oskar Halecki as ‘an international civil servant’ with the League of Nations.

4. ‘The War and Political Science’, from 29 October 1915, in a collection of essays, Världskrigets politiska problem [The political problems of the World War], published by Kjellén in December 1915.

5. Kjellén quotes Mahan, from 1902, regarding the doctrine (Kjellén 1905 II: 121).

6. Quite soon after it was finished, Kjellén rode the trans-Siberian railway and completed a round-the-world trip in 1909. In 1911 he published a book on his travels, Den stora Orienten [The big Orient].

7. For the general impact of Confucianism, see Watanabe 2012, e.g. chapters 1 and 5.

8. In 1904, the anthology Japan by the Japanese: A Survey by its Highest Authorities (edited by Alfred Stead) was published. In the same year, it was

translated into Swedish, Japan skildradt af japaner [Japan as depicted by Japanese] (Albert Bonniers förlag, Stockholm). Kjellén often refers to this publication. However, as he notes, this is a Japanese self-presentation rather than a comment upon a possible role as an ‘Asian representative’.

9. In the 1920 edition, Kjellén retracts this argument.

10. Apart from obtaining knowledge from his historian colleague, Harald Hjärne, who wrote a small book on Japanese history and life, and who acquired a huge amount of literature on Japan, which was later handed over to the Uppsala University library by his son, historian Erland Hjärne, Kjellén had acquired information on these matters from the volume of Japan by the Japanese (Stead 1904). In particular, Kjellén had read the contribution on the bushido ideal by Prof. Inazo Nitobe (Nitobe 1904: ch. XIV) [in Swedish: ‘Bushido – Japans moraliska grundsatser’].

References

Bömelburg, Hans-Jürgen. 2007. ‘Zwischen imperialer Geschichte und Ostmitteleuropa als Geschichtsregion: Oskar Halecki und die polnische “jagiellonische Idee”’, in Frank Hadler and Mathias Mesenhöller (eds), Vergangene Grösse und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa: Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918/Lost Greatness and Past Oppression in East Central Europe: Representations of the Imperial Experiences in Historiography since 1918. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 99–133.

Edström, Bert. 2014. ‘Resan till drömlandet – Japan’, in Edström, Björk and Lundén (eds), Rudolf Kjellén: Geopolitiken och konservatismen. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 122–45.

Heeren, Arnold H.L. (1819) 1865. Handbuch der Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Kolonien. Göttingen: Röwer. [Kjellén may have used the Swedish translation, Handbok i det europeiska statssystemets och dess koloniers historia (translation from the 4th original edition). Stockholm: Axel Hellstens förlag.]

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Japan skildradt af Japaner [Japan depicted by Japanese]. 1904. Stockholm: Bonniers.

Kjellén, Rudolf. 1905. Stormakterna: Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik [The Great Powers: Contours of contemporary high politics]. Books I–II. Stockholm: Geber.

———. 1911. Den stora Orienten: Resestudier i österväg [The Great Orient: Travel studies heading eastwards]. Gothenburg: Åhlén & Åkerlund.

———. 1911–13. Stormakterna [The Great Powers]. Books I–IV. Stockholm: Geber.

———. 1915. Världskrigets politiska problem [The political problems of the World War]. Stockholm: Bonniers.

———. 1920. Stormakterna och världskrisen [The Great Powers and the World Crisis]. Stockholm: Geber.

Nitobe, Inazo. 1904. ‘Bushido – the Moral Ideas of Japan’, in Alfred Stead (ed.), Japan by the Japanese: A Survey by its Highest Authorities. London: Heinemann, 262–80.

Stead, Alfred (ed.). 1904. Japan by the Japanese: A Survey by its Highest Authorities. London: Heinemann.

Watanabe, Hiroshi. 2012. A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901. Tokyo: I-House Press.

Watanabe, Hiroshi, and Recht, Linus. 2020. ‘Alexis de Tocqueville and Three Revolutions: France (1789–), Japan (1867–), China (1911–)’, International Journal of Asian Studies., 163–181 [accessed online July 2020].

CHAPTER 6

Geopolitics, Political Geography and the Political Science Irredenta

Kjellén’s The State as a Form of Life

THOMAS LUNDÉN

In Kjellén’s most important declaration of geopolitical theory, Staten som Lifsform (1916), he defines the content and delimitation of a comprehensive political science. This chapter is intended as a summary of and comment on his book.

The State as a Power – the ‘Irredenta’ of Political Science

In the preface, Kjellén declares his goal as a scientist: to gain a unified theory of the state, a political system. His ‘Introduction about the self-deliberation (själfbesinning) of political science’ is a critique of the contemporary status of the discipline, described as a historical study of constitutions. Traditional political science thus has to be widened. A Sweden preparing for universal suffrage cannot dispense with an up-to-date political education.¹ His first chapter, ‘The general character of the state’, is a discussion about the role of the state in the life of the individual. The first aspect is one of a legal ‘container’, defining rights and wrongs. But the state is not only a passive regulator. It actively encroaches upon the citizens’ lives by demanding taxes, giving advice, granting subsidies, and regulating household and company economy. Political science has to include the character of the state as a social and economic power beside its purely legal functions. But there is also another aspect of the state: its function in relation to other states. The state has a Janus function: facing both inwards and outwards. Kjellén exemplifies with the Balkan crisis of 1908, where a number of states act in relation to each other. He points out that the actors were characterized as ‘powers’ (makter, German: Mächte). The remainder of the chapter is a discussion about the relation between geography and his definition of political science, where the German geographer Ratzel is described as the great inventor, but in the end Kjellén claims hegemony for a political science comprising temporal and spatial aspects of authoritative power.

Political Science and Geography

The delimitation towards geography is particularly clarified in his second chapter, ‘The state as a realm. Geopolitics’ (Staten som rike. Geopolitik), which starts with the following definition:

Geopolitics is the discipline of the state as a geographical organism or entity in space: that is the state as land, territory, domain [gebit], or most pregnantly, realm. Being a political science, it has a steady focus on the state [statlig] unit and wants to contribute to the understanding of the nature or essence [väsen] of the state, while political geography studies the earth as a domicile for human societies, in relation to the other qualities of the earth. (Kjellén 1916: 39)

Kjellén’s strong dependence on Friedrich Ratzel is clear already from two articles from the newspaper Göteborgs Morgonpost in 1901, which Kjellén decided to include as an attachment to Staten som Lifsform. He writes: ‘As an acting personality, the human being is to some extent under the influence of preconditions beyond herself: the influence of predispositions [anlag] of the environment, with one word, the circumstances. …to the knowledge about an artefact belongs the knowledge about its environment’. Kjellén gives the example of the method used by an art historian to focus on an art environment and ‘life situations of various kinds’. After a usual Kjellénian moderation he continues: ‘This method has been introduced also into the science of politics, and the reformer is Friedrich Ratzel. The fact that he calls his products “anthropogeography” and “political geography” adds nothing to the matter; it is the knowledge about the state that he deepens by investigating the different relations between the state and its land’ (Kjellén 1916: 186, emphasis in the original).

In Staten som Lifsform, pages 20ff., Kjellén touches upon the question of which discipline his state concept number two, the state as a power, should belong to. The concept ‘obviously has a geographical side’. The [Swedish] words land and rike (realm) are used as synonyms for state, and the territorial aspect is mentioned: ‘What appears in our fantasy with the thought of a foreign power is without doubt, a cartographic picture’. It will thus not surprise that modern geography demands this object of study as its heritage and ownership – its banner-holding spokesman here is Friedrich Ratzel, the creator of anthropogeography and the reformer of political geography at the last centennial. ‘To him, the states are thus at all stages of development to be seen as nature organisms, albeit as such imperfect and at higher stages ever more tending to the spiritual-moral … The state is one part humane and one part organized earth, thus sounds the final diagnosis’ (Kjellén refers to Ratzel’s second edition, 1903: 4).²

Kjellén remarks that Ratzel recognizes the primacy of political science to ‘this material’, but as ‘the political scientists are content with their objects “standing in the air” he contends that according to his opinion geography should fill the vacancy’. Ratzel’s formulation deserves to be cited as it was relevant long after Kjellén’s irredenta attempt: ‘To many political scientists and sociologists, the state is standing in the air as well as for many historians, and the land of the state is to them just a larger type of real estate’ (Ratzel 1903: Preface).³ But, Kjellén continues, ‘A continued analysis will clearly reveal to us the incompetence of geography and ethnography to fathom this object. One does not have to observe for long to find that the nature of the powers is not exhausted by the definition of land and people. … Without doubt we also think of societal and juridical traces’. A bit later, a typical Kjellénian phrase: ‘The enigma of the state roots into spiritual depths, to where the spatial perspective of the geographer does not reach’. To support this conclusion, he uses an article by the renowned geographer Albert Penck (Kjellén 1916: 22; Penck 1916: 238).

Having denounced geography, ethnology and statistics, he asks himself why political science has not chosen to include ‘the powers’ as an object of study: ‘the territory has, in spite of occasional attempts, only appeared as a frame around the image of the state, or simply as a presenter tray on which the right

political science has been served in its juridical bowls’ (Kjellén 1916: 24).

The state that his disciplinary colleagues in respective countries have described in terms of formal structure ‘from the inside’ also has an outer side, a power in fight with other powers. When the fight for existence aggravates, then we see the states like with the nature side outwards, so that the legal side in its order sometimes seems to have vanished (25). It is this ‘side’ that Kjellén asserts, having been ignored by political science. It is also so that the juridical side is part of the greater concept of the state as a power (28). Here we can understand a fight for the disciplinary territory: Political science has drawn a tight disciplinary boundary around the legal concept of the state, ‘while statistics and geography has reached their hands for the wider, factual concept…. We have had to have a political science that synthetically ascends above the thesis of old political science and of the antithesis of geography’ (29f, emphasis in the original.). Here he also takes the help of Penck (1916) with a formulation of a future: ‘political science that scrutinizes the state not only as a legal institution but as a living organism with very different functions, … encompassing the entire life of the state’.⁴

The word ‘life’ is central in the text. Staten som lifsform expresses Kjellén’s concept of the state as a body with functional organs, even if he clearly denounces too far-fetched parallels with the individual human body as organs of reproduction (32)! In this connection he also enters into the importance of comparative studies that brought geography and linguistics into modern sciences. ‘Only as political science in a pregnant meaning – a science of the “state ships” rather than the state constitutions, of the states and not only of the state powers, “Staatenkunde” instead of “Staatswissenschaft”, there is for political science an independent space among modern areas of research’ (33, emphasis in the original).

After a delimitation against the discipline of history, Kjellén arrives at a characterization of political science as a science, detached from other areas of knowledge: ‘Its left wing is not geography but geopolitics, its object is not the

country, but ever and only the country as immersed by political organization, that is the state (riket)’ (36). The other parts are in order to ‘the right’, economic politics, ethnopolitics, sociopolitics and regimental politics. ‘In the five directions given, the nature of each state exhausts itself during an eternal circulation, so that each one is working by itself, and in the others’ (37).

Kjellén then chooses to concentrate on two partial disciplines; geopolitics and ethnopolitics, in which the biological character of the state is mostly immanent and necessary. They are characterized as the ‘nature’ side of the state. It appears as ‘a frame around the freedom of the will of the state that emerges out of objective and relatively constant factors, particularly in country and people’ (38, emphasis in the original).

The State as a Realm: Geopolitics According to Kjellén

The main chapter of Staten som lifsform treats the state as a realm (see the definition above). The word rike (realm; in German, Reich) has, perhaps after Germany’s Third Reich, fallen into an undeserved disrepute, but with its conceptual meaning of power or might, it has an important meaning in Kjellén’s vocabulary. ‘Land’ in Swedish may mean a province (e.g. Uppland) or simply the same as English ‘land’, or country, but rike is confined to independent states. Irrespective of vocabulary, the land is an indispensable quality of a state. The Hanseatic League, shipping companies, trade unions, religious orders and other organizations can extend over the earth, but without territorial supremacy there will be no state. ‘Only the municipality shares the necessary territorial character with the state, but on the other hand it lacks its full right to determination’ (41). This territorial aspect of the state is, according to Kjellén, a late ‘viewpoint’ – for a long time the states were made up or symbolized by towns, centres of power (Athens, Sparta, Rome, Carthage).

The modern state presupposes a territory of both cities and countryside. Like

farmers, all states are landowners, but the state cannot sell its land, ‘it is under “serfdom” from the territory’ (44). Kjellén draws the parallel with rooted plant societies, inhabited by mobile animal societies – corresponding to the citizens, who can move outside the territories like the ant outside the anthill. The integrity of the state domain is now more important than non-territorial losses; the [Swedish] break-up with Norway and the exodus loss to North America was easier for the population to accept than the possible loss of Grisbådarne, some minuscule skerries between Swedish Bohuslän and Norwegian Østfold.⁵

‘The realm is the body of the state … It is Ratzel’s theory (åskådning) that we here confess.’ As a corollary, all people resident in the country are subject to the supremacy of the state, and every state has in principle a total supremacy over its territory. Kjellén gives some examples of exceptions, such as occupations, or prohibitions in international law to fortify parts of the territory, but in most cases the situation will return to a state control of the territory. The territory can, of course, like the body, be subject to mutilation, and as different parts of the country have different values, the losses can be more or less serious. Expansive realms have a tendency to shrink back to a more original territory (46–48).

In Kjellén’s opinion, the state has the same obligation to develop its infrastructure (hjälpkällor) and natural resources as an individual has a duty to care for its well-being. He criticizes the old liberal standpoint that the state should leave the land to the unlimited command (våld) of the individual, exemplifying with the negative examples of the liberal neglect of the Swedish Norrland question and the US trust system (49–50).

Territorial losses are like medical operations, they have to be remedied by internal development to restore health. Kjellén mentions Holland’s reclaiming of sea and lakes after the loss of Belgium in 1830, Denmark’s heath colonization after Germany’s expansion in Schleswig in 1864, and a famous Swedish poet’s word after 1809 ‘to reclaim Finland within the Swedish borders’. But different parts of a country have different values; Sweden in the seventeenth century had to pay an enormous sum of money to retain its only outlet to the Atlantic Ocean,

and Bolivia in 1884 was paralysed by the truce that gave Chile control of its vital part, the coast (51).

The organic nature of the realm is never clearer than in war: ‘War is like an experimental field for geopolitics’, as ‘geopolitics can serve the art of war by indicating the vulnerable parts’ (51–52).

The organic relations of the state domain develop over generations, increasing the inhabitants’ feeling of solidarity with the country – it is their playground, field of work and cemetery, as well as their nutrient field and protected home. Added to the people’s spontaneous work to develop and organize the country is, increasingly, the state power’s work with local administrations, transit systems and ‘general works’. The people do not grow away from their country; they still grow into it (53).

States develop into ‘geographical individuals’ (an expression created by the geographer Carl Ritter in 1817) through ‘natural boundaries’ outwards, and through an inward harmonic ‘nature/natural domain’. The relativity of this is indicated by the example of England’s Indian Ocean realm: its future is doomed because of the rapid development of land transport compared to sea lines of communication (58). The different delineation of the state boundary in relation to its interior is discussed in a relatively trivial way. Kjellén’s own reservations are more interesting: ‘The good boundary is a hindrance to traffic; it must not be absolute or exclusive … but the right middle line between seclusion and mediation’ (56–57). The nature/natural domain should not be uniform but harmonic, it must be able to ‘saturate the need for nourishment (näringsbehof) in different directions’. The state can contribute to its autarky and make its realm ‘more natural than it fundamentally is’ (61, emphasis in the original). Weak boundaries can be strengthened from inside through a fitting (avpassad) communication (i.e. transport infrastructural) policy (62).

One problem in geopolitics is the right of the individuals to parts of the state

territory. The moral foundation for the right of ownership is ‘the work of the living with the earth/soil, above all the chain work of generations to increase its value. Thus, says Ratzel, ‘the landowner shares the ground with the state and is thereby tighter enchained to the state than the merchant’ (64). Is he thereby a part having equal rights (likaberättigad)? Here Kjellén makes a sharp attack on the liberalism of Karl Staaff, who in the (Swedish) parliament had likened the relation between the state and the then private Kiruna (mining) company to that of two neighbours, something that aroused sharp ripostes from both socialists and conservatives. To Kjellén, the ownership is delegated from the state ‘under a silent reservation that it does not lead to the ruin of the state. If science [according to Kjellén!] in this respect justifies socialism, there is no scientific answer to when the state should intervene with its “supreme ownership”’ (65).

Kjellén then asserts ‘that the organismic comprehension of the realm, and that one only, can give a satisfying solution to all related problems. That one only is thus compatible with the modern thinking that seeks connection in the manifold of shifting phenomena … New contributions to this political necessity will meet us in the particular geopolitics, with its observations of particular sides of the realm – here above all space, configuration (gestalt), and location’ (66). The organic comprehension is demonstrated – with typically Kjellénian examples of ‘aberrations’ – with that history puts ever-greater spatial demands, exemplified with the succession of ‘banner-carrying merchant powers’ – the city-state of Venice, the delta country of ‘Holland’, the island realm of ‘England’, and the USA – a continent. Viable states in a contained space are under a categorical imperative to enlarge its space, through colonization, unification or conquest (67). In Central Europe, Kjellén sees (in 1916) a historical balance in eighteenthcentury Prussia over Bismarck’s Germany towards a larger unit, GermanyAustria-Hungary, perhaps extended towards the Levant (i.e. Balkan-TurkeyBaghdad) – a complex of states, perhaps also emerging in pan-America. But then follows the reservation: with centrifugal tendencies follow increased vulnerability outwards and moral deficiencies inwards, ‘as the expansion exceeds the measure of real needs of life’ (67–68).

The territorial configuration (gestalt) is commented upon in a way that is trivial to the modern reader. The location – the placing of the states along each other

and the cultural situation in relation to the world commerce – is the geographical influence that seems to influence the state’s action the strongest. Germany’s selection of partners and political paths is delimited/contained by the multilateral neighbourhood, different from the free-lying ‘England’. Norway and Portugal both have mightier neighbours in their back, which influences their choice of political associations. Small states like ‘Holland’ and Romania benefit by having two rival great neighbours in their backs, while both are negatively influenced politically by having supremacy over the mouths of the river systems of two great powers. Location (and here Kjellén evidently means relative location) can ‘move, relocate, while the states lie still’. Sweden is an example: from having been surrounded by three amicable small states it has now become proximal to the expanding states of Russia and Germany and – through the dissolution of the union with Norway – now has a pro-English neighbour. The role of the ‘buffer state is not agreeable’, but ‘the buffer policy contains a life insurance for small states in the era of the great powers’ (72, emphasis in the original).

Kjellén’s spatial reasoning has a strong processual direction. The ‘historical side’ of the states (Ratzel) wanders, with different zones of expansion and intensification changing over time. For Sweden, the Baltic idea was guilty until Finland was lost, and after that the Gothenburg region expanded in a spirit of Scandinavianism. The United States is looking evermore to the south, against a pan-America, but also westwards, against the greatest future market, China: ‘the time may come when gains and risks (Japan) in this area changes the Pacific into its ‘historical side’ (73). At the end of the chapter, tribute is paid to Ratzel, the ‘great ploughman and pioneer (föregångsman)’ (75).

The State as People: Ethnopolitics

Kjellén himself questions why geopolitics and to a certain extent ethnopolitics is given more space than the three other categories, and opines that it is about a concentration upon those parts of political science that have been mostly overlooked. The other parts of the book are coloured by the author’s biological view of the state, and on space. The state is bound to its people, who often define

the state, but individuals can emigrate and immigrate: ‘Here we can see a turnover between the states that geopolitics cannot know’ (78). Defining a people as ‘the elevated community of a long sequence of deceased, now living and afterwards coming generations’, he criticizes the simple idea of democracy as a people’s will based on the present citizens’ instant opinions. Against this, he defends institutions’ role to defend minorities and future generations (80). Irrespective of type of governance, democracy or monarchy, the state has an obligation to create loyalty.

But loyalty is challenged by ethnic rivalries. Kjellén mentions Germany, where Danes, Poles and Frenchmen (evidently the population of Alsace-Lorraine, annexed in 1871!) ‘react against the state and are attacked by the state’. He also mentions Belgium, Russia and its Duchy of Finland, where the conflict between Finns and Swedes has decreased the common insight of Russification. Austria provides a picture of an almost anarchic fight between different nationalities, while Hungary ‘only through a Magyarization à la russe has been able to uphold a sign of ethnic unity’ (82).

Concerning nationality, Kjellén asserts the commonness of land, but he concentrates on the two others – blood kinship (blodsförvantskapen) and the commonness of language – and to both he is appallingly recalcitrant. He cites Rénan: ‘there is no pure race; building politics on an ethnographic analysis – it’s a chimera’ (86). Then follows several examples of the multi-ethnic origins of European ‘peoples’. As a scientific and commonly recognized result we can state that genealogical viewpoints do not suffice to solve the riddle of the nation (88). He then continues to kill the illusion of a direct relation between people and language: ‘nations can shift language, not as easily as changing clothes, but still fully and fundamentally’ (89). This leads to the conclusion that ‘the nation is thus an ethnic individual, as the realm is a geographical one’ (92, emphasis in the original).

As an alternative to nation-building through assimilation (where again he shows that almost all nations have a multi-ethnic origin), he asserts an influence that

relates to the natural determinism of the time, the ‘process of acclimatization’: accommodation to the environment. The geographer Kirchoff has ‘been able to depict the nature domain really as forms of moulding, where different human elements are moulded into homogeneous masses, of course strongly dependent on the forms of nature (98–99). Well both Kirchoff and Kjellén mediates and moderates the influence of nature, but the latter denounces a far too cultural deterministic view on the nation-building, with the exception of the cases where the nation-building happens without change of land. The examples of the Netherlands and Portugal show how the closure from the great state has led to the development of independent cultures and languages. But in these cases, nature has after all, in the particular coastal localization – the riparian domain, played a certain role in the secretion (utsöndring) of new nations (100).

Map 6.1 Southern Germany in the borders of 1871, showing Alsace Lorraine in Germany. Kjellén recognized a pro-French sentiment in these areas of German speech. Source: The Century Atlas and Gazetteer of the World, John Bartholomew, London: John Walker, 1892, p. 20.

The nationality principle plays an important role within ethnopolitics, but it has to be weighed against geopolitical considerations. Here we can see a hint at federalism: ‘On the other hand, the nationality principle does not hinder a political association into higher rings, like that of the Magyars in the Habsburgian monarchy or the Germans in a Mitteleuropa, if only the unity of the nations and their autonomous freedom within the ring is kept’ (109). Nations are not split and steady but elastic; the West European Jews are fully naturalized, ‘immersed into the surrounding nationality’, while those in Eastern Europe are Orientals (114). In a footnote, Kjellén even asserts that history favours a certain mix of races rather than racial purity. Nationality is a creation of our time, influenced by communication and the press – and by the state. Race (e.g. Germans, Slavs, Finns, Turks) plays a minor role in a nation’s formation. PanSlavism as a ‘uniting racial thought’ has reached bankruptcy, and in the area where the racial thought has reached its peak, within pan-Germanism, several of the Germanic nation-states have shown no sympathies for a unity based on racial communality. ‘Here geography has a full supremacy over ethnography’ (113– 15). But as usual, some examples to the contrary are given: ‘our time is within the sign of the nation-state’ (118).

The national feeling is dynamic. If it is being brought out of equilibrium, it is important for the state to bring it back into balance. Serbia is exemplified as a state where extreme nationalism should be subdued, while in Sweden there is a certain lack of national consciousness, and Poland is given as an example of nationalism sinking below a critical level (but in footnote 170 he also blames its hangmen). Concerning the demographic aspects of population, he has some understanding for the need of those states with a growing population for territorial advances (in the form of colonies), whereas France, for example, with its population stagnating, has no such need. Sweden has the fortunate position of

a realm (rike) greater than its people, and thus no need for territorial expansion (123).

The State as a Household, Society and Regiment

In the chapter on the state as a household, society and regiment, Kjellén discusses the need of the realm for autarky. The autarkic household is nationally and geographically separated (from other realms). The state strives to develop a balance between different industries (näringar) and activities, a relatively contained area of production and consumption being able to exist in emergency cases within locked doors (129). But autarky must not become a fetish, the invocation of which closes the eyes to the importance of, and need for, economic intercourse between the peoples. East Asia (China, Korea, Japan) is a warning example by historically – until recently – closing its doors and thereby stagnating. ‘The economic self-sufficiency must not be bought at the expense of the growth of the soul of the people, which is conditional on normal intercourse with other states and peoples’ (133). A small state has to be careful not to bind itself into a strong dependence on a great power; Sweden’s hesitancy towards a trade agreement with Germany is given as an example. The principle of autarky also warns against a strong dependency on monoculture – the Greek dependence on Corinth raisins, and its ‘ensuing crisis leading to half state bankruptcy is a warning example’. Even in the future system of states there is a need for an exchange of products, and the difference in development will have to be part of the ‘international division of work’. But as the households [i.e. the states] reach their autarkic independence, the strong variances in ‘superior culture and colonial culture’ have to be levelled out, giving advancement to a system where raw materials are exchanged for raw materials and industrial products for industrial products. While ‘England’ can preach free trade, it is in reality a ‘commercial union’ with its self-governing colonies, while Germany should expand through a free union of states on the Berlin–Baghdad route via Mitteleuropa. For Russia, Kjellén suggests a territorial concentration and industrialization to reach a balance between primary and secondary production (131–32).

Spatiality is less prevalent in the section on sociopolitics, but Kjellén paints a development of longue durée. From a clan society, where a community of blood is important, develops a village society, where neighbourliness is important: ‘The territorial principle prevails over genealogy’ (140). With further development another type of society is formed, based on differentiation of professional roles and different levels of privileges, including a substratum of unfree people, and supported by states. With the French Revolution, Kjellén sees the emergence of a society of citizens where only individuals count in relation to the state (141). He evidently does not like this development, but he sees a new society of associations emerging in which ‘all natural groups of interest have an organization and a due place in the cultural work’. In Kjellén’s vision, the state should be balancing different social classes, with voluntary associations seen as natural groupings in contrast to the detested individualism. ‘Where no nationstate can be realized, as in Austria-Hungary and Russia, there “nationalities” appear as classes and load division (söndring) with a new element, and the same goes under certain circumstances for different religions within a state, as in Germany, Russia and in the realms of the Levant’ (145). Religion is appallingly rarely mentioned in Kjellén’s reasoning. In the class question, the state must wage a double fight against workers and capital. If the state lacks sociality and harmony between the groups in society, there is a risk that the state diverts the attention through foreign actions, even war. Bismarck’s wars in the 1860s can be seen as a diversion from an internal parliamentary conflict, as Russia’s 1904 war with Japan was when they were on the threshold of revolution (146). Here, as an exception, we can find an idea about an active individual political will: the state using foreign policy – war – for domestic purposes.

The regimental politics is the active effort of the state; government in its direct capacity, supremacy, legal organization – the responsibility of the cultivator for land and estate. ‘The nation has sentiments, society (and the household) has interests, governance (regementet) means duties’. The land colours the temperament of the nation, the size and configuration of the state puts different demands on its governance, for example through federations in large or mountainous countries, or through the rigidity of governance: ‘Imperialism assumes an imperator’ (149). Here Kjellén enters the relation between constitution and praxis. Different states have, by necessity or through historical processes, different constitutions, but also different relations between constitution and praxis. Instead of a direct statistical democracy, Kjellén favours

governance based on harmony between different interests, and sketches a kind of historical development of forms of governance, with some similarity to the theories of Hegel and Marx, but with the important difference that his model is circular and not teleological. He sees a pendulum movement of excesses leading from absolutism via constitutionalism to parliamentary democracy, eventually taken over by absolutism (156–57). While Kjellén may seem to put some pretentions in this, it is based on weak assumptions and can both be confirmed and rejected by the ensuing reality of geopolitics. His conclusion at the end of the chapter holds better: ‘The whole political organization is in the end only a form: what it adds up to is the living content’ (158). ‘The state is greater than its constitution’ (160).

The State under the Law of Life – and the Purpose of the State

In the penultimate chapter, ‘The state under the law of life’, Kjellén treats the birth and possible death of the state organism. In order to be recognized, the state has to be organized, with a government and a land area. The birth of a state is in itself a violation of international law (Kjellén, writing in 1916, is referring to breakaway territories, and he mentions that the exceptional example of Albania in 1913 was made through great power godfathers). Strengthening the case for recognition as a state is, beside a political command of its territory, an independent culture; Kjellén here mentions Norway’s high status, but also its will and determination. Norway with 2.5 million people is recognized, while Ukraine with 35 million is not. In the case of Poland, he seems to stagger between the condemnation of the cutting up of the country and of the sickness of the country: ‘nationality had disappeared with pain’. But ‘external slavery can for a nation become the baptism of suffering into amelioration’ – in 1916 there was hope for a new Polish state (172).

International law (folkrätt) is weak. If a state decides to break a treaty, there is no way to punish it unless it causes a war (176–78). In the final chapter, ‘Conclusion on the purpose of the state’ (Afslutning om statens ändamål), he defines the purpose of the state as the prosperity not of the individuals but of the

nation. States act in their self-interest: ‘The state is detached from the free action of the individual where people see the state primarily as a creation of conscious human reason’ (181). His view of the state is materialistic, deprived of idealism, but he finishes with a wish for an idealistic responsibility for the state ship to be on a course to the betterment of the nation.

Kjellén and Ratzel – Inspiration and Disavowal

Friedrich Ratzel published his book Politische Geographie in 1897. An opus comprising 716 pages, it served as a standard reader within the German cultural sphere, but also through immigrant scholars in Latin America⁷ and even Japan. Like his follower Kjellén, his literary style gives an impression of professorial lectures. References to other scholars are relatively rare, and there is little critical theoretical analysis of the material presented. Compared to Staten som lifsform, Politische Geographie is more analytical in the sense that what Kjellén deals with under the heading Geopolitik, in a rather vast but unstructured chapter, is divided by Ratzel into six sections and twenty-seven chapters, each of which is in turn divided into a great number of sub-chapters. As pointed out by several later scholars (e.g. Thermaenius 1938;and Kristof 1960), Ratzel collected and presented a vast number of facts and findings, but he never managed to present a theoretical synthesis of the subject of political geography. He refers to the great predecessor, Carl Ritter, but asserts that political geography has lagged behind other sciences, and also that political science is lacking in influences from geography. This is cited by Kjellén, who, while willingly admitting his intellectual debt to Ratzel, claims the scientific domain of geopolitics for a modernized political science.

A comparison of Politische Geographie and Staten som lifsform shows how important Ratzel’s examples are for Kjellén’s geopolitical reasoning. But unlike Ratzel, Kjellén puts these examples within a theoretical framework, and widens the scope by adding other aspects of the active state and its relation to the nation(s) and to its inhabitants (Abrahamsson 2013). Staten som lifsform seems to have been conceived as the theoretical superstructure to Stormakterna (1920),

serving as inventories of the spatial, demographic, infrastructural and natural resources of the great powers.

Ratzel and Kjellén concentrate on the state as a formal organization, even if both mention federations. Kjellén mentions the municipality as a political territory (41), but he directly dismisses it as having no decision-making power (see above). By defining the state as an organism (even if it is with reservations, or even if seen as a metaphor), all other political-territorial entities have to be neglected. If the state is a body, it cannot consist of a number of organs with exactly the same functions. Kjellén is of course aware of this; for example, he comments on spatial differences in domestic politics in Germany (Kjellén 1921: 61),⁸ and on the tendencies to form federations. But at the same time as Kjellén criticizes his colleagues in political science for their lack of broad-mindedness concerning the scope of their academic discipline, he by his definition dismisses the political life that takes place at different hierarchical levels below and above the territorial state. By the same organismic definition, the state is given something of a destiny (though even here Kjellén gives examples of rebirths), and in spite of his role as a politician and of his developmental model of governance, in Staten som lifsform he is not discussing the processes that lead to authoritative decisions. His ‘level of explication’ in the process between power and land in Staten som lifsform is rather closer to the stance of the geographer than of the politologue. The work Stormakterna [The great powers] emphasizes power more than land, and the taxonomy on the whole is significantly a-spatial, in the sense that each country’s resources are described as a whole, even if internal differences are noted.

Kjellén’s contribution to scholarship lies in the amalgamation of spatial and temporal views of an active state, a transdisciplinary overlap of political science, geography and history. His aftermath became blurred by his reluctance to democracy, but his early fame among revanchist German geopoliticians seems to have had an abrupt end when his disavowal of race as a factor defining the actual nation(-ality) states of Europe became uncomfortable to the racist Nazi German ideologists.

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University. His latest book is Pommern: ett gränsfall i tid och rum [Pomerania: A border case in time and space] (Lund University, 2016), and his earlier scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, for example: ‘Geopolitics and Religion: A Mutual and Conflictual Relationship. Spatial Regulation of Creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology / Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25(2) (July 2015); ‘Border Twin Cities in the Baltic Area: Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’, in John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova (eds), Twin Cities: Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time (Routledge, 2019); and ‘Turning towards the Inland Sea? Swedish “Soft Diplomacy” towards the Baltic Soviet Republics before Independence’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/03468755.2021.1896576.

Notes

1. Kjellén, an adversary of universal suffrage, here seems to act as a neutral observer of the political process in Sweden.

2. In the original: relationerna mellan staten och dess “mark”, landet. Swedish ‘mark’ is related to the earth’s soil and surface; and traditionally referred to open borderlands. In German, the translation would be Boden, but there is no English word with the same connotation.

3. ‘Für manche Staatswissenschaftlern und Soziologen steht der Staat gerade so in der Luft wie für viele Historiker, und der Boden des Staates ist ihnen nur eine größere Art von Grundbesitz.’

4. ‘Staatenkunde – welche den Staat nicht bloß als rechtliche Institution, sondern als lebenden Organismus mit sehr verschiedenen Funktionen betrachtet…’, a ‘Erfassung des gesamten staatlichen Lebens’.

5. A short description of the case, with further references, in Lundén 2014: 197.

6. In his 1899 article on Sweden’s boundaries (see Alvstam and Lundén, ‘Sweden’s Borders’, this volume), he remarks on the ambiguous semantic of the words ‘nature’ and ‘natural’, either ‘based in nature’ or ‘suitable, ingenuous’. In his 1916 discourse, he is using both meanings. A natural boundary is related to strategic considerations that are partly dependent on morphology, but also to ethnic and cultural cleavages, while the harmonic domain is characterized by ethnic and cultural homogeneity but a diversified landscape of resources.

7. Cf. Rivarola Puntigliano, ‘Rudolf Kjellén’s Intellectual Impact’, this volume.

8. See Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume.

References

Abrahamsson, Christian. 2013. ‘On the Genealogy of Lebensraum’, Geographica Helvetica 1: 1–8.

Kjellén, Rudolf. 1899. ‘Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser’ [Studies on the political borders of Sweden], in Ymer H 3, 283–331 (in abbreviatura form in Ymer Årsbok 1976/77, 69–80, with a comment by Thomas Lundén).

———. 1901. ‘Politiken som vetenskap’ [Politics as science]. Göteborgs Aftonblad, 22 and 26 March 1901 (and as attachment in Kjellén 1916: 184–88).

———. 1916. Staten som lifsform: Politiska handböcker III. [The State as a Form of Life: Political handbooks III]. Stockholm: Geber.

———. 1920. Stormakterna och världskrisen: Ny omarbetad upplaga av ‘Samtidens stormakter’. Politiska handböcker I [The great powers and the world crisis: Political Handbooks I]. Stockholm: Geber.

———. 1921. Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise. Second edition. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.

Kristof, Ladis K.D. 1960. ‘The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution IV: 1, 15–51.

Lundén, Thomas. 2014. ‘Nordic Boundary Conflicts in the 20th Century’, in Anna Moraczewska and Wojciech Janicki (eds), Border Conflicts in the Contemporary World. Lublin Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 193– 213.

Penck, Albert. 1916. ‘Der Krieg und das Studium der Geographie’, Zeitschr. der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin, IV.

Ratzel, Friedrich. (1897) 1903. Politische Geographie. Munich: Oldenbourg.

Thermaenius, Edvard. 1938. ‘Geopolitics and Political Geography’, Baltic and Scandinavian Countries IV: 165–77.

CHAPTER 7

Kjellén and the First World War

GUNNAR FALKEMARK

Introduction

Rudolf Kjellén felt an emotional solidarity with imperial Germany, which at the beginning of the twentieth century aspired to become a world power, thereby finding ‘a place in the sun’. The outbreak of the First World War filled Kjellén with warm hopes that the values cherished by him would be strengthened through a German victory in the great power struggle. The outcome of the war was consequently a bitter disappointment to him.

We are used to taking it for granted that Germany’s defeat in the war was beneficial. But there are people with insights who really assert that a German victory had been of benefit to mankind; amongst others, the philosopher Bertrand Russell grappled with this thought. In one of his many publications, he maintains that a German victory would have spared mankind from both Bolshevism and Nazism.¹ In a book of memories from the mid-1950s, he gives a flashback to the time of the First World War and the war propaganda against Germany that he strongly rejected:

I had lived in the Kaiser’s Germany and I knew that progressive forces in that country were very strong and had every prospect of ultimate success. There was more freedom in the Kaiser’s Germany than there is now in any country outside Britain or Scandinavia. (Russell 1956: 12)

I will refrain from discussing Russell’s standpoints. It will suffice to say that the strongly positive emotions towards the German Empire that we find in Kjellén

are not exclusively restricted to decidedly conservative people with an admiration for military and discipline.

In this chapter I will discuss Rudolf Kjellén’s geopolitical theory and his normative philosophy, with the First World War as a starting point. Kjellén saw the war as a fight in world history between different political philosophies – the ‘Ideas of 1789’ with the ‘Ideas of 1914’. In this battle he was far from neutral in values. But in his mind, the war could also be observed with scientific lenses. In this connection he could, in his own opinion, clarify the state of affairs with due objectivity. We are facing one of the eternal problems of social science methodology: that of the possibility of combining a passionate engagement for certain values with the demands for the objectivity of research. I will, in order, discuss how Kjellén saw the following main questions:

(1) What caused the war?

(2) What was the war about?

(3) How can the outcome of the war be explained?

(4) Are Kjellén’s explanations to questions 1–3 consistent?

In order to answer these questions, I will analyse Kjellén’s theory on international politics and his normative political philosophy, starting with his views on the motive power within the international system.

The International System

Kjellén is most famous for having launched the term ‘geopolitics’ and having developed a theory in the geographical aspects of international politics.² In order to deepen the understanding of his view on the functioning of the international system I will compare his apprehension with a modern version of the classical theory on international politics labelled ‘the traditional theory’, ‘realism’, ‘the anarchy model’, and more. The version of the theory that I will call ‘realist’ consists of a number of key theses often presented in literature.³ This theory has a long and glorious pedigree. Without making a long exposé of the history of ideas, I will only mention Thucydides, Kautilya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Churchill. Its main theses are as follows:

(1) The international system consists of states.

(2) The main actors in the international system are the great powers.

(3) States act as uniform actors.

(4) The states’ actions are guided by self-interest.

(5) Military power is the most important form of power.

(6) The international system is anarchic, as it lacks a centre of power.

(7) In international politics, morals and ideology play a subordinate role.

(8) The power resources of states develop at different paces.

(9) Politics of power balance is an unavoidable part of the international system.

Kjellén does not summarize his main assumptions on international politics in the way it is made above. But it is not difficult to prove with citation and reasoning that he supports all elements in the realist theory. Suffice it to show in a couple of important cases how Kjellén is reasoning, and how his geopolitical theory is related to realist theory.

Kjellén’s reasoning in at least one case means a meaningful specification of realism, and that is in the sharp and important distinction between ‘state’ and ‘nation’. To him, a state is a piece of territory controlled by a centre of power, and which is recognized in international law. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Sweden was a state, as was Austria-Hungary, while Norway became a state in 1905 after the dissolution of the union with Sweden. Poland, on the other hand, was not a state; it ceased to exist after the last partition at the end of the eighteenth century. But Poland was still a nation.

The concept of nation is given slightly different definitions by Kjellén. He sometimes makes a distinction between ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’. Nation is then ‘the apprehended phenomenon’, while nationality is ‘the essence itself, the personality, what is apprehended’ (Kjellén 1914: 6). Nationality is sometimes defined as ‘a determined feeling of collectivity’ (ibid.: 25). Without making too much violence on Kjellén’s intentions, I think one can define a nation rather vaguely as a group of people sharing a feeling of belonging. Factors that contribute to the development of this feeling include a common language, religion and history. Even if the concept is vague, it is easy to exemplify some of

the nationalities in Kjellén’s definition as the Swedes, Germans, Serbs, Poles, Greeks and Italians.

Kjellén formulates, based on the concept of nation, a conformity of law of world history importance, called the ‘nationality principle’. According to this principle, every nation craves for a ‘statal form of coming into being’ – simply, every nation wants to form its own state. This conformity of law gets its central importance from the fact that most states are not nation-states, as they are not dominated by one single nation. The power of this craving of nations to form states can result in ‘a centrifugal power where several nations under the same state have longed for freedom, but a centripetal force where different states of the same nation have longed for unity’ (Kjellén 1916: 106).⁴

It is thus, in Kjellén’s reasoning, the same principle that explains the Balkan people’s liberation from Turkey in the decades before the First World War, and the unification of Italy in 1869 and the appearance of the Bismarckian Reich in 1871.

As I will be analysing the way Kjellén looks at the causes of the First World War, it may be appropriate to analyse how he in general describes the role of war in the international system. Similar to the most modern form of realism that we find in Kenneth Waltz’s famous work Theory of International Politics (1979), Kjellén embraces a structural theory on war and its causes. ‘It is the necessity of the state system that develops it, not of individuals’ (Kjellén 1915a: 5). Like Waltz, Kjellén asserts that the ultimate cause of war is related to a deranged power balance. ‘War is introduced’, he says, ‘as the instrument by which a new equilibrium is created between the powers, and this new situation will get its expression in a new political map’ (ibid.: 3–5).

Map 7.1 Balkans, 1891. This was the situation when Kjellén wrote his first version of The Great Powers. The geopolitical situation was totally different in 1920 when his last version appeared. Source: The Century Atlas and Gazetteer of the World, John Bartholomew, London: John Walker, 1892, p. 23.

The result of a bellicose trial of strength can never be eternally conserved. Depending on the differential development paces of states, new reasons for friction will appear. There is here a similarity with V.I. Lenin’s theory on imperialism that contains certain traits that realists use to value. Lenin launched what he called ‘the law on uneven development’ (Lenin [1916] 1939: 119). Because capitalist states develop power resources at different speeds – Lenin’s theory only concerns war under (‘ripe’) permanent capitalism – a peace between capitalist states can never be subsistent. To Kjellén, a law on the differential development of power is not confined to a certain economic system. It is simply a generally valid biological law of development.

There is another interesting similarity between Lenin and Kjellén: their view on status quo. To them, status quo is always an arrangement favouring some but not others. Such an arrangement is dictated – for example, after a war – by the victors over the defeated. In other words, the strong dictate the rules to the weak. But those who were previously strong tend eventually to weaken, whereas some of the weak may grow in strength. The challenges against status quo grow. If those who benefit from the prevailing system do not voluntarily give up their privileges, war can hardly be avoidable. It is thus not by legal or moral arguments that success is reached in the international arena, and it is only with vociferous language that a country will make itself heard.

Realism, as defined in the nine theses listed earlier, is thus the almost evident point of departure in Kjellén’s analyses of international politics. Beyond this theoretical departure he has developed an important geopolitical theory. If his theory on international politics can be likened with a tree with a mighty crown,

we can describe realism as the trunk, and the geopolitical theory as its branches and leaves.

Geopolitics is, generally speaking, about the political impact of geographical factors.⁵ In geopolitics, analyses focus on [terrestrial] space. In the early twentieth century, Kjellén develops a theory of the state in which geopolitics is a central ingredient. I will neither try to summarize this theory nor describe its main components; suffice to enhance some theoretical assumptions that Kjellén is consistently using when analysing the background and causes of the First World War.

The natural starting point in geopolitics is the observation that a state presupposes a territory. The importance of a state’s territory cannot be determined without analysing its relations to other states. From the location and boundaries in relation to other states, Kjellén discerns a number of geopolitical imperatives. It is a kind of action demand that is forced upon each state’s leadership, irrespective of its general targets and ideologies. These imperatives are to be seen as categorical. Kjellén emphasizes three of them: (1) a proper [territorial] space; (2) freedom of movement; and (3) possibilities for a strong concord. The exact signification of these imperative action postulates will be clear from Kjellén’s analysis of the interlacement of different causes leading to the ‘World Fire’ in the late summer of 1914. Before dealing with this analysis, I will describe Kjellén’s personal standpoint to the advantage of one of the warring parties.

Normative Standpoint

In the introduction to this chapter I pointed out that World War to Kjellén was about political values of great importance to him. In his analysis of the war, he begins with an evaluative self-assessment. His political sympathies are on the side of Germany – ‘amica Germania, sed magis amica veritas!’ (Kjellén 1915a:

10). He does not strive for the type of impartiality won by ‘limping between opposite standpoints and searching for a mean proportional’ (ibid.). But Kjellén’s normative declaration of position does not mean that truth is of no interest to him. As evident from the Latin citation, the sake of Germany is dear to him, but truth is dearer. Kjellén promises an ‘honest striving’ to search for the truth without ‘unconcerned considerations’. In this connection he cherishes a hope that this striving for truth is facilitated by his biological outlook. It seems to him that with this outlook, where he seeks deep-lying mechanisms behind the outbreak of the war and is not trying to ‘do justice or pronounce [Sw: utleda] guilt’, the striving for truth is facilitated. We will later ask the question of how successful Kjellén is in his endeavour in this regard.

The question then is whether or not a researcher can be objective and simultaneously solidarize himself with one of the main combatants of the war. The answer is of course dependent on how the ambiguous concept of objectivity is evaluated. As I see it, a central sense of objectivity – within the social sciences – is when a researcher gives a truthful description and analysis of societal conditions, based on the evidence available. Such a representation may very well benefit one side in a societal conflict of some kind. But it must not do this by breaking scientific rules on methodology, as for example source criticism or the drawing of conclusions from statistics.⁷

There are in the scholarly community different opinions as to whether a researcher should declare his or her personal preferences or not. Within Swedish political science after the Second World War, value relativism has been dominant. Researchers in their academic activities should keep evaluatively neutral. Social scientist Gunnar Myrdal, however, had a different view: social science research can never avoid that normative elements seep into scientific reasoning and results. The only way to attain some element of objectivity is for social science researchers to openly declare their evaluative standpoints. But not only that, researchers should also clarify how their evaluations determine the theoretical research (Myrdal 1969: 55–56).

Concerning Kjellén’s analyses of the First World War, it is obvious that he, at least to some extent, acts in accordance with Myrdal’s recommendations. He openly declares his value preferences. But one can hardly say that he makes any attempts to tell the readers in what way these preferences determine his studies of the war.

First World War: Background and Causes

When analysing Kjellén’s views on the complicated ‘intertwined motives’ of the war, one might differentiate between his publications before the outbreak of the war and those produced after the war was a fact. Of his publications from before the war, I will particularly put attention to Stormakterna [The great powers] (4 vols, 1911–13, 2nd edition) and Politiska essayer [Political essays] (1914, first collection). Among his publications after the outbreak, I find that Världskrigets politiska problem [Political problems of the World War] (1915a), Världspolitiken 1911–1919 [World politics 1911–1919] (1920b), and Stormakterna och världskrisen [The great powers and the world crisis] (1920a) to be of particular interest in the view of the causes of the war.⁸

There is a remarkable concordance between what he wrote before the fateful actions in August 1914 and what he wrote later on. Before 1914, Kjellén is of the opinion that the conflicts and friction points that exist between the great powers are so important that he does not see how a great war can be avoided. When the war becomes fact, it is these frictions that he explains were the most important causes.

According to Kjellén, the reason for the ‘World Fire’ can be sought in deep-lying conditions of what we would today call ‘structural’ character. The war did not depend on statesmen not being skilful enough or prescient, or on them making decisive but avoidable mistakes, or something similar. As the causes of the war are not to be found among singular actors, traditional diplomatic history has a

peripheral place in the Kjellénian explanations.

An enlightening example will show his way of reasoning. The student Gavrilo Princip’s shots in Sarajevo in the end of June 1914, depriving the life of the Austro-Hungarian throne pretender couple, does not lead to any lengthy comments. An act of this kind was what could be expected. He gives the following short conclusion:

The shot in Sarajevo, like a shot in the high mountains, brought about the avalanche, because the tension had already increased towards the very brink of the endurable. Strong powers, far above the heads of individuals, have brought about the tension. It is tempting to use the saying, that all and none bear the guilt. (Kjellén 1920b: 121)

Kjellén’s explanation of the war is far from simple. No single cause can be pinpointed. We stand instead before a rather entangled causal chain. In order to briefly summarize the causal background of the war, I will single out the reasons under two headings: geopolitical and ethnopolitical.

It might be appropriate to start a geopolitical analysis of the outbreak of the war with the imperatives formulated above. These are to a high degree determining the motives and actions. Let us start with Russia. Concerning the first imperative, the Russian Empire is spatially well endowed, so there is no need for complaints. The same goes for the third imperative, the possibilities for a strong concord, meaning a continuous territory. The critical point for Russia is the second imperative: the large country lacks freedom of movement. Kjellén finds that ‘Russia’s enclosure from the ocean’ is a prime geopolitical factor (Kjellén 1915a:15). The country has a coastline at Vladivostok, but its harbour is located 10,000 kilometres from its heart, and Japan controls that area. At Archangelsk the ice is a problem for almost half the year. Denmark and Sweden control the exit of the Baltic, and Turkey holds the key to the Black Sea exit towards the Mediterranean. In Kjellén’s view, ‘longing for the sea, closely defined, to the

Mediterranean via the Dardanelles’ was one of the main motifs that developed into the war (Kjellén 1915a: 21).

England has not been grappling with the same problems as Russia. Being the leading naval military power, the country has been endowed with an almost maximal freedom of movement. Neither is the problem its spatial extension. The main problem for the British world power is the spread of its dependencies around the world. The concord or unity is endangered. A main motif for British foreign policy will be to organically link the different parts of the realm. In this connection, the land bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf are of central importance. England will, without control, be facing preposterous defence challenges. How would they, Kjellén asks, be able to defend India – the jewel in the British imperial crown – ‘around the Cape!’ (Kjellén 1915a: 27). Egypt will, in this geostrategic context, be the most valuable as well as vulnerable part – its Achillean heel. England’s desire to control the land bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf might be seen as ‘pure and uncontaminated expansion’. The British drive to strengthen control over this area, Egypt in particular, is seen by Kjellén as a pure instinct of selfpreservation. And he makes an interesting observation of what we would today signify as ‘the logic of the situation’: ‘We see here an interlacing of attack and defence that might be said to be typical of imperialistic development: one step makes the second necessary, if one does not have to take one or more steps back’ (ibid.: 29).

It can be inserted here that Kjellén is of the opinion that even if a country is a great power it cannot just lie back and rest on its old laurels. Discussing AustriaHungary’s policy in the Balkans, he says that a great power needs a ‘programme for expansion’ (Kjellén 1914: 192). One is reminded of the remark a Russian diplomat in the eighteenth century allowed him to say: ‘One who does not grow starts to rot’.

Now to the great power that not without right can be said to be the real storm centre – Germany. This is the country, once thought by Voltaire to be destined to

eternal poverty, that in the Kjellénian analyses makes the great obstacle to England’s and Russia’s plans for expansion. Compared to these countries, Germany has a much more problematic relation to the three geopolitical imperatives: appropriate territorial space, freedom of movement, and organic concord. Concerning space, one has, according to Kjellén, to take into consideration that a ‘planetary situation’ has occurred. Competition between the great powers is no longer restricted to the European scene; it extends over the whole planet. In this perspective the spatial dimensions of Germany – colonies included – are modest. The freedom of movement is precariously small: Germany is ‘the small realm squeezed in between the great ones’ (Kjellén 1915a: 32). As a colonial power it is at the mercy of England if it wants to communicate with its dependencies in Africa and other areas. England can, by its location, control the English Channel to prevent German ships from reaching the world’s seas.

Not only are the geopolitical imperatives about space and movements problematic in the case of Germany, but nor is the need for internal concord attained. The relation between motherland and colonies is problematic, and the colonies have no mutual relations. Kjellén tends to be upset on behalf of Germany: ‘These are unbearable conditions for a great power’ (Kjellén 1915a: 34). There is only one possibility for expansion for Germany. With expressions such as the ‘intrinsic logic of geography’ and the ‘law of least resistance’, Kjellén wants to explain why Germany tries to escape being encircled by the other powers through a ‘Drang nach Süden’ (Drive to the South). As a result of this being the only possible direction of thrust, Turkey becomes an interesting ally for Germany. There is also an interest among the Turks for German–Turkish cooperation. In comparison to England and Russia, Germany is genuinely interested in the physical integrity of the Ottoman realm. While Russia’s interest in the Turkish Straits strongly threatens the unity of the realm, England tries to control the land bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

The German–Turkish community of interest is symbolized by the enormous railroad building, the Baghdad Railway, that once finished would link Berlin with the Persian Gulf. ‘The Baghdad line as a German enterprise opens the horizon towards a Greater Germany of a peculiar as well as grandiose kind. We

stand here at one of most meaningful ground-plans for the future great power maps of our times’ (Kjellén 1912: 154–55). By strengthening not only Germany but also Turkey, the Levantine programme gets into conflict with the most ardent interests of Russia and England. Considering the strong Russian need to secure its grain exports to the world market, this is a deadly danger for the Russian economy. The German expansion towards the Persian Gulf is at the same time a great threat to English control of the access route to India. The Baghdad Railway was not without reason called ‘the dry road to India’.¹

An important consequence of the Berlin–Baghdad programme is a marked increase in Germany’s interest in its allied brother, Austria-Hungary. Because the German expansion programme has such a southern direction, the unity of this fragile realm carries the utmost weight for Germany. It means that threats against the Habsburgian dependencies and areas of interest in the Balkans will be transformed into threats towards Germany also.

The geopolitical analysis will thus render the following results: England, Russia and Germany have, before the war, one by one developed expansionist programmes in foreign policy, mainly of a defensive character. They almost by necessity follow the ‘intrinsic logic of geography’. And, of key importance, the programmes are not only incompatible but they represent unsolvable conflicts. What has been said now is ‘the verdict of geopolitics concerning the outbreak of the World War’ (Kjellén 1915a: 59).

I would like to parenthetically mention two important facts of a geopolitical nature that are usually put forward as a background to the war, and that Kjellén downplays in his 1915 analysis. One is the inflamed conflict between Germany and France about the French provinces of Alsatia and Lothringia, which Germany had conquered in the 1870–71 war.¹¹ The other is the rapid German naval armament in the decade before the outbreak of the war. That Kjellén omits this in his geopolitical analysis is somewhat strange, as in other connections he so often emphasized to what an extremely great extent the whole British power is based on their naval supremacy.

If geopolitical circumstances constitute the first type of factors causing the war, then ethnopolitical circumstances are the other type. In his analysis of ethnopolitical conditions, the nationality principle is at the centre of interest. There is a decisive geographical component here also. The geographic location and distribution of nations is of particular note. Kjellén enumerates a number of violations against the nationality principle. There are cases in Western Europe, as for example Italy’s remaining ‘irredenta’, that are ‘an “unredeemed” part of the nation that have been left over at the unification, or split away from it’ (Kjellén 1915a: 71). These West European cases are, according to Kjellén, not unsolvable, whereas in Eastern Europe there are cases that are impossible to master in a peaceful way, and the most important of these concerns Serbia. In the first case, the Serbian nation before the war was represented by two independent states, Serbia and Montenegro. Here we find a population of around five million. Beyond the Serb states there are, however, almost six million Serbs living in the territories of foreign powers near their ‘free’ countrymen. In these areas there is also a coast – which is what the Serb states are lacking and what the laws of geopolitics state as a necessity.¹²

What escalated the antagonism between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was the annexation by the latter of Bosnia in 1908, thereby preventing the great Serbian dreams of a ‘Jugoslavia’. Kjellén sees this as an implacable conflict. An implementation of ‘Jugoslavia’, that would among other things cut AustriaHungary from the sea, is fundamentally against the most vital interests of this great power. In the light of this perspective, Vienna’s ultimatum to Belgrade after Gavrilo Princip’s shots – and the ensuing war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia – is an unavoidable chain of events.

I have mentioned here the causes that Kjellén seems to find the most important. What has been said so far is not a complete enumeration of all factors leading to the war. One factor not yet mentioned is the so-called race problems as motives of social imperialism. They will be briefly mentioned here. Kjellén’s use of the concept of ‘race’ is not related to biological conditions, but is above all a category of civilizations. As a background to the war, he discerns a fight

between, primarily, Germans and Slavs. Russia, through pan-Slavism, plays the role of an advocate for all Slavic nations, and wants to ‘collect them under its wings’. As a programme for Russia, according to Kjellén, pan-Slavism rather becomes ‘pan-Russianism’. He finds that the idea of pure races is a chimera, and he does not seem to believe in the ‘race motif’ as a reason for war.

Another causal category given some, if not decisive importance, is ‘social imperialism’. This term, not used by Kjellén, denotes those conflicts between states that serve as diversions from internal conflicts. Particularly in multinational states, Kjellén says, statesmen have come to see the war as a way of creating a healthy pressure inwards, thus keeping the state together. Two cases are particularly enhanced: to Russia and Austria-Hungary, considerations of the inner crises of society have ‘been a real motif in waging the great adventure’ (Kjellén 1915a: 135).

It could be added that a modern German historian, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, has applied the idea of social imperialism as an important factor behind the German foreign policy before 1914. Wehler has defined social imperialism as ‘the diversions outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo’ (Wehler 1969: 115). In his impressive study Bismarck und der Imperialismus, Wehler has explained in great detail how social imperialism formed Germany’s colonial expansion, which started in 1884.

‘The Ideas of 1789’ vs ‘The Ideas of 1914’

The different causes of war analysed above are mentioned in Kjellén’s publications before the war as interfaces of conflict or serious contrasts in the international system. They return in rather unchanged form in his analyses after the outbreak of the war. There is, however, one element that appears after the war has begun – that of ideology and worldview. Kjellén will regard the ongoing

war as a ‘battle of faith’, or ‘outlook’.

Kjellén (1915b) develops his thoughts on the war as ‘a battle of ideas’ in a publication in German that was never translated into Swedish, Die ldeen von 1914, published in Germany in the war autumn of 1915.¹³

From the German sociologist and economist Werner Sombart, he picks up the idea that all great wars are wars on faith (Sombart 1913). The ongoing war is also a battle between world ideologies, those of 1789 and 1914. Facing each other, according to Kjellén, are those decrepit ideals associated with the French Revolution and the ideals incarnated by the German so-called revolution of 1914. The first ideal is embodied by England and France, while their ally, Russia is, not surprisingly, absent. The ideas of 1914 – order, justice and duty –are represented by the other party, Germany, while Austria-Hungary is not mentioned. It is important to underline that while Kjellén asserts that the war ‘is about’ radically different concepts of faith, he does not maintain that these have caused the war; I will return to this later. The ideas of 1789 are the famous liberté, egalité and fraternité, which are critically analysed by Kjellén. What is, he asks initially, freedom? Logically and semantically, it is nothing else than the lack of fetters – ‘das Fehlen von Fesseln’ – he answers. And he points out that freedom in this ‘negative’ meaning, known from Isaiah Berlin’s conceptual definition, has no intrinsic value (Berlin 1969). The value of freedom exists in the character of these fetters. Kjellén refers to Bishop Thomas’s song on freedom (1439), which says, approximately: Freedom is the best of things, for those who know to use it right (Kjellén 1915b: 30–31). Important to him is the reservation added. Kjellén admits that the freedom idea of the French Revolution was justified in its historical context, but that the insurrection against the preposterous limitations under ‘l’ancien régime’ has now gone too far. Freedom has gone astray, leading to pure licentiousness. State, society, church, family, law, customs, conscience – everything is finally the victim of unlimited freedom.

It is interesting to note that Kjellén’s criticism of the consequences of freedom echoes Plato’s condemnation of the alleged unlimited freedom under democratic

rule. According to the Greek philosopher, freedom means that life lacks order and restraint. People find this way of living ‘pleasant, free and happy’ (Plato 1974: 381).

The egalitarian idea is also heavily criticized. Like freedom, there is, in Kjellén’s opinion, a historically sound reaction against absolutism; however, this reaction has evolved into pure preposterousness. The egalitarian ideal is a Procrustean bed where all, tall or short, are being mutilated or extended in order to reach a unity measure. The supremacy of mediocracy will, first and foremost, deprive the important individuals of their happiness.

Kjellén wants to pose another value against the ‘mechanic atomism’ characterizing the egalitarian enthusiasm, namely justice (Gerechtigkeit). Justice is not related to equality. Justice has its place in the organic apprehension of the state embraced by Kjellén. A societal organization of justice is characterized by units with different values in relation to their importance for the entirety (Kjellén 1915b: 37–38). Kjellén imagines that the unprecedented trial of war is particularly suited to develop justice as a concept of value. It is unnecessary to underline that justice in his definition is one of the ‘ideas of 1914’.

Finally, concerning brotherhood; this is for Kjellén a cosmopolitan ideal, threatening national concord. In its stead, Kjellén wants to see a community in the national ‘paternal house’ (Kjellén 1915b: 38).

To Kjellén, the ideas of 1789 are not exhausted by the three well-known catchwords of the French revolutionaries. These ideas are founded on the notion of human rights. He reacts against the ‘frog perspective’. In this perspective it is always the individual appearing as plaintiff against a society that has violated his justified interests. As the leading representative of this one-sided bias on the individual’s right, Kjellén discerns the author of Du contrat social, 1762, JeanJacques Rousseau. But when the French revolutionaries cry out their great words about human rights there is a stern voice answering from the most distant part of

Germany, the old Prussian capital of Königsberg – the voice of Immanuel Kant. It preaches duty. Through the mouth of Kant, we hear about another reality and another ideal, the ‘practical reason’, the ‘autonomous will’ and the ‘categorical imperative’, proclaims Kjellén (Kjellén 1915b: 38). We here meet a Germany pronouncing another life ideal than the one preached from France. The irresponsible talk about unlimited rights is juxtaposed by the importance of duty fulfilment and sacrifice (Kjellén 1915a: 175).

Kjellén does not see everything related to the ideas of 1789 as false values, but they represent ‘half-truths’. And the ideas of 1914 shall not be seen as pure negations of 1789. The ideas of 1914 are, using a Hegelian terminology, not a new antithesis but something more excellent – a new synthesis (Kjellén 1915b: 43).

That the ideas of 1789 are promoted by two sides of the Entente Cordiale – England and France – is obvious. But this alliance had another member, Russia. Kjellén faces serious problems trying to get this deviant part of his ideological analysis into explaining the war. Kjellén again uses Hegelian terminology. Germany obviously stands for the synthesis, representing order. It is in the opposition to this value that England, France and Russia find each other. ‘To the licentiousness of pure individualism and the oppression of pure absolutism, order is equally detestable; they feel that it means death to both of them’ (Kjellén 1915a: 176, emphasis in the original). Kjellén’s brave attempt to explain the triple entente formation based on ideology reminds one of Bertrand Russell’s final comment on Hegel’s philosophy in his History of Western Philosophy, where he finds an important truth: ‘the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise’ (Russell [1945] 1975: 715).

I have, until now, analysed the political ideologies thought by Kjellén to be what the war is fundamentally about. But in the propaganda of the warring countries, the war is partly to defend values other than those put forward by Kjellén. I will here discuss how the governments try to legitimize the war ideologically. Kjellén appears as an unmasker of ideological mendaciousness; but it is in this

connection reason to observe that his taking side fools him. With truth as a lodestar, he should, without favouring, critically scrutinize the attempts of all parties to legitimize. But this does not happen. While skilfully unveiling the emptiness of the Western power’s ideological warfare against Germany, the German war propaganda is left in peace. There is no convincing evidence that this propaganda was any less mendacious than that of the adversaries.

How does he criticize the propaganda of the Western powers, in which the Germans are stamped as barbarians? Would the people of Goethe, Kant, Nietzsche¹⁴ and Richard Wagner be barbarians he asks, and confidently leaves the answer to the readers (Kjellén 1915a: 161). The war is presented as a fight for democracy, and Germany depicted as a militaristic state without a gentleman’s culture. It is not difficult for Kjellén to reveal the emptiness in these accusations, using the Western alliance partner in the East. ‘We now make the final observation,’ he says, ‘that all imputations made by the Western powers in the name of culture, is applicable to a much higher degree to the Eastern power behind, their own great confederate’ (Kjellén 1915a: 173). A modern reader can just agree.

The German Defeat

Kjellén is almost paralysed by the sudden German defeat. All he believed in and hoped for seems to have suffered defeat. Looking back, on New Year’s Eve 1918, on the recent events and rendering an account of them, he does not spare the words. He bursts out, almost as in swoon: ‘This is the … definitive triumph of the “irrational powers”. It is the history of a disaster as unexpected as unprecedented. … It is the history of how four years of tremendous victories and fifty years of peaceful development get lost in a couple of months’ (Kjellén 1920b: 226).

At first Kjellén does not seem to think clearly. The revolutionary events came

too suddenly and unexpectedly ‘in order for anyone to understand and digest its implication’. A world has gone under – ‘how shall we suddenly understand a Prussia without the Hohenzollern or a Europe without Habsburg’ (ibid.: 236).

His analytical capacity gradually returns. One of his first conclusions is about the new constellation in great-power politics. Here he finds reason for a pessimistic conclusion – given today’s knowledge – with considerable realism. Europe’s leading role in the global development is a bygone stage. We are now facing an Anglo-Saxon ‘universal power’ (ibid.: 239).

Why, then, did the war end with Germany’s defeat? One main explanation, according to Kjellén, is found in the strength that Germany’s adversaries were able to summon. He notes that none of the victorious powers would have had any chance against Germany in a ‘single combat’. The final victory against Germany was in no way inevitable. There is here a game of chance. A total victory was within reach for Germany in the spring of 1918.

There is, however, a factor of subjectivity that Kjellén returns to. He has discovered a ‘fundamental miscalculation’ by the Germans, shared by him, which is their underestimation of the American determination and their resources. Kjellén asserted during the war that the side with the best organization would win. Indeed it appeared evident, to the bitter end, that the Germans would benefit from their superior organization. Now he is forced to admit that the USA, by an astoundingly rapid summoning of an army of one million men, had shown an impressive organizational capacity.

There is one more factor explaining the outcome of the war. Kjellén once again points at the intervention of the USA as the condition making the balance tip over in favour of the Western powers. In the disregard of the USA that he notes is also an ‘undervaluation of the enormous self-esteem and gambling mind that does not enter a game in order to do anything but win’. But even more dangerous was the underrating of American idealism. It was earlier not thought of this

people, says Kjellén, that ‘they could devote their whole soul on anything else than material gains’ (Kjellén 1920b: 241). In spite of having explained, at the beginning of the war, that, like all other great wars, it was a war about faith, he seems totally surprised that the Americans had also looked at it in this way. Full of astonishment, he sighs: ‘However absurd it may seem to us, it is still a fact that the Americans have felt something of a crusader feeling when crossing the ocean [to fight] against the Germans. Because this enemy was infidel: he did not confess to the true democratic faith! (or theory)!’ (Kjellén 1920b: 241). Reading these words, one might ask why Kjellén is really so surprised. What did he mean by ‘battle of faith’ when uttering in 1915 that the World War was such a war? Did he imagine that a war of faith could be fought without the fighters being animated by something like ‘crusader feelings’ – or was the thought behind it just a way of adorning one of the warring parties, for which he felt strong sympathy, with morally and politically elevating motifs.

When Kjellén is pondering the defeated and victors, he is forced to make a conclusion that must have cost him much self-mastery: it is the more democratic camp that won: ‘The victorious faith is that of the popular state, the defeated faith is that of the guardian state (the Germans’ “Obrigkeitsstaat”)’ (Kjellén 1920b: 241). This, he is quick to add, is not a question of right or wrong, or good or evil. Had it been so, then the Germans, with their system of social care (Fürsorge) with its beneficial effects in particular to the wide mass of people, would have been the winner. But Germany suffered from a serious fault. It showed a weakness in the national desire.

Kjellén is not totally blind to the fact that factors of a geopolitical nature have influenced the outcome. It is Germany’s unfortunate in-between location that contributed to the disaster. The country has, in comparison to its foes, had a handicap by being forced to fight on several fronts simultaneously. The only remarkable thing with this explanation is that Kjellén does not give much weight to it.

Summarizing Kjellén’s reasoning about Germany’s defeat, the emphasis is on

the deployment of the American soldiers. Their ideologically motivated fighting spirits became decisive in breaking the equilibrium existing in 1917 between the original warring states.

Summarizing Analysis

I have now answered the three questions formulated in the beginning. What remains is to critically reflect on Kjellén’s answers to the questions raised, to discuss their compatibility, and to discuss what Germany’s defeat means to the sustainability of his scientific theory.

I will start with revoking the distinction made before: the difference between explaining what caused the war, and what the war was about from an ideological perspective. When, before the war, Kjellén analyses different more or less complicated conflicts in great-power politics, ideological difference plays a minuscule role. Reading his analyses from this period, there is no reason to believe that a war between the great powers would break out because of ideological juxtapositions. After the outbreak he does not change his mind, even if there are some hints that different state ideals might have increased the antipathy between the foes-to-be. But on the whole, he does not include ideological conflict as an important reason for war. It would have been strange for Kjellén to assert something like that. He would then have contradicted himself in a flagrant way, as he points out the almost ridiculous in declaring – the way the Western powers did – that divergent opinions about democracy would motivate the war. Accusations against Germany would have fallen back with much more weight against Russia, their ally.

What has now been said does not hinder the theory that war can be about different ideas, in the sense that the warring parties do cherish different ideals. But this does not contradict that they are not part of the causality of the war. I do not think that Kjellén is contradicting himself when, both before and after the

outbreak of the war, he asserts that the war was primarily caused by geo- and ethnopolitical circumstances, while simultaneously saying that different societal ideals are at stake.

One might assert here that, in one important respect, ideas are of great importance. Even if these have not caused the war it can be ideologically decisive who wins the war. The ideals of statehood cherished by the victor can leave their stamp on the development of events after the cessation of war. For this reason, it can be meaningful to study the ideals embraced by different parties, as Kjellén did. This conclusion is valid even if the state ideals are ‘only’ to be seen as an ideological legitimation of the prevailing power conditions in each country.

We have seen how Kjellén makes a heroic effort to find an understandable ideological link between the essentially different adversaries of Germany. He is led astray, I think, by his sympathy for Germany. There happens to be an extremely simple explanation of the London–Paris–St Petersburg alliance, an important element in the realist tradition of ideas that Kjellén belongs to. The explanation consists of a principle formulated by the Indian social theorist Kautilya, who lived around 300 BC, saying ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’. It is in fact rather amazing that Kjellén did not want to see the obvious fact that the triple entente was founded only on a common fear of the German growth in power. It is difficult for Kjellén to admit that Germany – especially after Bismarck disappeared from the scene – pursued an aggressive foreign policy, which became particularly threatening to its neighbours because of its formidably rapid economic development. It is surprising that he does not use geopolitical explanations more than he actually does, especially as there is a good geopolitical explanation for the outcome of the war. This explanation focuses on Germany’s location, and on the developing strength of the coalition against it; and this is intrinsic in the Kjellénian theory. There is in fact a researcher doing what Kjellén, with his intellect, might have done. I am thinking of the British historian Paul Kennedy’s great work on the reasons for the rise and fall of great powers (Kennedy 1988). His explanations throughout are geopolitical, and the whole analysis is so similar to Kjellén’s studies of the great powers, and their policies, that one might ask if it is just a coincidence.

There are reasons to notice that Kjellén’s theory on great-power politics was not influenced by the German defeat in the First World War. Some political scientists have assumed that Kjellén’s weakness in making prognoses have cast doubts on his entire scientific theory. His successor at Uppsala, Axel Brusewitz, asserted ‘that reality contradicted the reality analyst’, thereby demolishing the foundation for his political system (Brusewitz 1945: 23). I have discussed Kjellén’s ability as a prognosis maker, but, in reality, he was not bad at all – on the contrary (Falkemark 1992: 106). It cannot be denied that Kjellén’s prognosis, and hope, for a German victory went wrong. But this does not cast any shadow over geopolitics as a scientific method. It has, contrary to what many have imagined, nothing in particular to do with Germany at the beginning of last century. Geopolitics, Kjellén’s most important contribution to social research, is developed as a theory about relations between states, and it is as applicable to the Greek state system in the time of Pericles as to the international system in the 2010s.

There is another aspect that should be put forward. A theory is obviously created by a single individual, but once formulated it has a life of its own. Perhaps created by a scholar to explain a certain type of phenomenon, it may be seen as a failure, but others may later find that the theory may explain phenomena not even known by the inventor. If, thus, Kjellén may have doubted his theory when Germany lost the war, and could not see any geopolitical explanations for this, it is irrelevant for the long-term status of the theory. It does not exclude that other researchers may be more successful with the same theory. This is why I find it important to mention Kennedy’s geopolitical explanation of the German defeat.¹⁵

Finally, what about Kjellén’s objectivity? Undeniably, as we have seen, several shortcomings in his analysis are related to his evaluative stance. Some of these are not very serious, but a few are. One among these is his surprising inability to understand the rationale behind the alliance between England, France and Russia. However, one should say to Kjellén’s credit that he is very open with his value judgements and sympathies. This fact makes it relatively easy to detect the flaws in his analyses. And I would like to add a final remark. Social science

research would certainly be duller and worse without researchers having deep and strong emotions.

Gunnar Falkemark is professor emeritus in political science at the University of Gothenburg. He has conducted research in, among other things, philosophy of social science, international politics, history of political science and policy analysis, with special focus on the traffic area. His first major scientific work was the thesis Power, Theory and Value (Lund: LiberGleerup, 1982). Other books include Politik, mobilitet och miljö [Politics, mobility and environment] (Möklinta: Gidlund, 2006). An article in this field is ‘Establishing Intermodal Terminals’ in R. Bergqvist et al., World Review of Intermodal Transportation Research 3(3) (2010). His latest book is Avundsjuka i politik och samhällsliv [Envy in politics and social life] (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 2018).

Notes

1. It should be mentioned that Russell presupposed that Great Britain would have stayed neutral at the outbreak and that the German victory would have come soon. See Russell 1956: 12.

2. See e.g. Ó Tuathail 1996: 43–45.

3. This description is a personal synthesis of the most important theoretical assumptions found in modern classics in the literature on international politics, as e.g. Carr 1964; Morgenthau 1978; Waltz 1979; Kennedy 1988. It should be added that what I describe as ‘realism’ is often in modern literature on international politics called ‘classical realism’. See e.g. Baylis, Smith and Owens 2008: 95–98. For a useful analysis of different forms of realism, see Korab-

Karpowicz 2017.

4. Cf. Tunander, ‘Discourse, Identity and Territoriality’, this volume.

5. When using the word ‘geography’, Kjellén is sometimes referring to the discipline that explains terrestrial space, and sometimes to its object, often its natural contents, including the cultural landscape and its infrastructure.

6. Kjellén’s geopolitical theory is discussed by e.g. Falkemark 1992; Holdar, 1992; and Thermaenius 1938.

7. I borrowed this thought, about whether objectivity and the favouring of parties might under certain circumstances be compatible, from the Lund University philosopher Göran Hermerén. See Hermerén 1972.

8. My presentation here is built on books written by Kjellén. There are also a vast number of his articles and diary notes. In the large selection of letters put together by his daughter Ruth (Kjellén-Björkquist 1970) [Rudolf Kjellén: A human being in the time of the turn of the century], there is a detailed account of this material. Nevertheless, I am confident – based on Kjellén-Björkquist’s account – that a scrutiny of this much larger material, unpublished in book form, would not change any of the conclusions drawn in the following pages.

9. Kjellén, like many of his contemporaries, uses the word England for Great Britain or the United Kingdom.

10. For a modern analysis of the importance of the Baghdad Railway to the great powers before the First World War, see Falkemark 1994, which also includes a survey of the international literature on the subject.

11. Kjellén (1920a: 154f.) mentions this conflict, however, as being one of the three main conflicts that ‘burdened’ the great power systems before the war.

12. Montenegro obviously had a coast but it was badly suited to maritime commerce, and until 1913 the country was separated from Serbia by Turkish territory.

13. For an analysis of Kjellén’s general political philosophy, see Falkemark 2014: 163–67.

14. Kjellén spells it Nietsche in his original.

15. To any reader familiar with the work of Karl Popper it is obvious that I have allowed myself a theoretical loan from his metaphysical theory on ‘the three worlds’. In this, the first world is the material reality, and the second is the human condition of consciousness. The third world consists of those theories that man has created. Den tredje världen består av de teorier som människor skapar. See Popper 1979, passim. Kjellén’s hopes and belief in a German victory belongs in the second world, while the geopolitical theory is included in the third world.

References

Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds). 2008. The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brusewitz, Axel. 1945. ‘Från Svedelius till Kjellén: Några drag ur den skytteanska lärostolens senare historia’ [From Svedelius to Kjellén: Some traits from the later history of the Skyttean Chair], Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 48: 3– 25.

Carr, Edward Hallet. (1946) 1964. The Twenty Year’s Crisis. New York: Harper & Row.

Falkemark, Gunnar. 1992. ‘Rudolf Kjellén: Vetenskapsman eller humbug?’[Rudolf Kjellén: Scientist or Humbug], in Gunnar Falkemark (ed.), Statsvetarporträtt: Svenska statsvetare under 350 år [Portraits of political scientists: Swedish political scientists during 350 years]. Stockholm: SNS förlag, 89–109.

———. 1994. ‘Tysklands expansionspolitik 1871–1914: Fallet Bagdadjärnvägen’ [Germany’s expansionist politics 1871–1914: the case of the Baghdad railway], Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 97(3): 241–277.

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CHAPTER 8

The Small Game in the Shadow of the Great Game

Kjellénian Biopolitics between Constructivism and Realism

CARL MARKLUND

Introduction

It is often claimed today that geopolitics has recently returned after its assumed retreat since the end of the Cold War (Larrabee 2010; Guzzini 2012; Almqvist, Linklater and Mackenzie 2017). After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, influential observers concluded that classical geopolitics of territorial control, military force, population size and natural resources were in the process of being supplanted by the increased importance of information technology, knowledge economy and asymmetric conflicts. Academics, entrepreneurs, journalists and politicians began to speak about a ‘new’ international politics following in the wake of globalization, famously captured in Edward N. Luttwak’s concept of ‘geo-economics’, Joseph S. Nye’s notion of ‘soft power’ and the normative framework associated with Björn Hettne’s and others’ school of ‘new regionalism’ (Luttwak 1990; Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 2001; Nye 2004; see also discussion in Marklund 2020; Lundén 2021).

In this view, economic resources and spatial location certainly continued to play an important role. But intellectual property, know-how and social capital appeared increasingly more salient for market performance and hence for the relationship between states and other international actors in an era shaped by flows of finance and technology. Only international actors with the ability to compete in attracting capital, knowledge and labour appeared able to retain their capacity for innovation and their rank in the global market economy (Florida 2005). As the risk of direct military conflict and the likelihood of Cold War proxy wars seemed to decrease, material assets, military means and natural resources did not seem to carry the same decisive weight as before. The very image of a certain country or region as ‘attractive’ or ‘successful’ evolved into an important resource in itself, as signalled by the growing attention to various

rankings of countries’ performance along particular parameters, such as innovation, transparency, tolerance, and even happiness. Great powers as well as small states have long since invested in information efforts such as ‘nation branding’ and ‘strategic communication’ to make their positions known and attract positive interest. But in the wake of the Cold War, these practices and discourses became even more important for boosting confidence in the evermore dynamic, globalized and sensitive investment market (Anholt 2007; Dinnie 2008; Zaharna 2010).

This development in turn mirrored a new recognition of the importance of culture in the relations between countries. This resulted, on the one hand, from theoretical achievements within the constructivist research tradition. On the other hand, it followed from the sudden thaw of a series of historically and culturally founded conflicts, frozen during the Cold War, heralding the ‘return of history’ (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Bátora and Mokre 2011). Within the field of international relations, this so-called ‘cultural turn’ also reflected a broader shift from the dominance of Cold War realism to the post-Cold War idealism of the Clinton Era and the Washington Consensus. Neither power nor influence could any longer be accurately interpreted primarily in terms of numerical or mechanical relations of material resources, if the complexity of the diverse sources of power in the globalized knowledge and network society should be accounted for (Thrift 1997; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Castells 2009).

At the same time, however, it has become increasingly common since the end of the 1990s to rhetorically project geopolitical or ‘geostrategic’ notions onto regional problems as well as global challenges. This geopolitical return – at least in the rhetoric of the punditry – usually reflects obscurity and uncertainty as to the general trends of specific international problems, such as in the case of China and Russia, or when regions with key natural resources, especially energy reserves, are involved (Sörlin 2013; Högselius 2019). Geopolitics is today a highly normatively charged concept (Ó Tuathail 1996; Dodds 2014; for a seminal discussion of Kjellénian geopolitics, see Holdar 1992). To some extent, its recent revival mirrors this generally negative assessment of the concept to imply competition over scarce resources and zero-sum contest, rather than international collaboration around common problems, as the determining factor

of international relations. This also contains an element of alarm or caution, indicating a rhetorical need to elevate the attention given to certain international problems within academia and the media.

Yet, there is also a modest return to a more genuinely geopolitical analysis, in recognition of the hybridity of material and immaterial factors in the evolution of contemporary globalization (Moisio 2018a; Moisio 2018b). Recent research has also shown that geopolitical discourse and rhetoric can serve as means to reduce cognitive dissonance in some of the dynamic and complex situations in the world today. Geopolitical thinking is again increasingly cited as a valid cognitive category for interpreting foreign policy, security policy and resource management. As such, we may speak of a postmodern form of geopolitics through the political and social consequences of this way of speaking and seeing things, irrespective of whether this perspective reflects and interprets contemporary international relations accurately or not (Guzzini and Neumann 2012).

Against the backdrop of this recent return of geopolitics, this chapter investigates the nature–culture divide as evidenced in the writings of the so-called ‘father of geopolitics’, Rudolf Kjellén. Judging from his scientific production, Kjellén’s ‘geopolitical outlook’ has correctly been interpreted as a ‘highly deterministic view of the conditions of states in the fight for existence’ (Elvander 1961: 271). But this assessment can to some extent be modified if viewed against his popular and political production: in parallel with his academic work, Kjellén sought to interpret the economic and political consequences of his general theory of geopolitics for what can be called ‘small state geopolitics’ (Larsen 2011a; Larsen 2011b). While Kjellén’s scientific achievements have long since been of interest to geographers, historians and political scientists, this chapter goes beyond Kjellén’s important scientific works to also investigate his now perhaps less well-known, but prolific and at the time much debated popular science output, as well as his conservative political authorship. By studying how this material reflects Kjellén’s views of Swedish foreign policy and Sweden’s status in the world, the chapter seeks to show how this in turn may elucidate not only the contradictions in Kjellénian geopolitics, but also how his ideas on biopolitics presented a hybrid between constructivism and realism; this contrasts with the

determinist and materialist ‘vulgar geopolitics’ that Kjellén’s thinking has often been reduced to.

Natural Borders and National Space

In 1899, Kjellén introduced the concept of geopolitics in an oft-quoted article in the journal Ymer as the doctrine of the state as a ‘geographical organism’ (Kjellén 1899: 283–331; see Alvstam’s and Lundén’s chapter, ‘Sweden’s Borders’, this volume). Inspired by modern anthropogeography, which dealt with the relation between humanity and the inhabited planet, Kjellén underlined the importance of the interplay between geographical factors and various power resources for the interrelations between states (Kjellén 1901: 401). To this end, he investigated the conception of ‘natural borders’, traditionally understood as one of the most important foundations of the classical, realist-inclined geopolitics (van Houtum 2005: 672–79). Kjellén, by contrast, claimed that there are no absolute ‘natural’ borders, except for possibly the ocean floor or the ice cap; rather, there are just relatively good borders and relatively bad ones, in relation to a specific human need. In this initial framing of his geopolitical theory, Kjellén rejected the notion of borders being determined by nature alone, instead viewing them as shaped by human agency and intentions. In 1900, he further developed this argument, asserting that ‘the destinies of the peoples are not determined by geographical compulsion only, but also by an element of free will’, claiming that human action can modify and even to a certain degree ‘neutralize nature’ (Kjellén 1900: 177). The ‘laws’ of geopolitics are thus determined at the intersection between nature and culture. This in turn underlines Kjellén’s emphasis on the underdetermined, processual and power-political elements in geopolitics. In both cases, concepts like ‘organic’ and ‘natural’ primarily seem to mean successful, purposive and efficient in an almost Machiavellian view of the relation between nature and culture, as well as immaterial and material resources of power. He thus presented a more hybrid and nuanced relationship between nature and culture than Kjellénian geopolitics is usually credited with (Kjellén 1899: 317; see Marklund 2014; Roitto, Karonen and Ojala 2018: 121; see also chapters by Alvstam and Lundén, this volume).

Sweden, for example – at the time in a politically troubled personal union with Norway – did not enjoy the protection of natural borders, in Kjellén’s estimate (Kjellén 1899: 329–30). Kjellén’s worry over the lack of natural borders around Scandinavia was mainly founded on his ‘organic’ conception that ‘the peoples’ develop in interplay between contraction and expansion, oscillations that result from the struggles of various groups in finding ‘their natural place on earth’ (Kjellén 1900: 32, 34). It may appear contradictory that Kjellén was critical of the concept of natural borders but regarded the struggle for natural place as essential; however, it seems as if this reflects his view of geopolitics as underdetermined and continuously subject to change on the one hand, and as determined and eternally bound by the laws of geopolitical expansion applicable to the waxing and waning of great powers on the other hand.

As such, Sweden’s ‘open’ borders presented an inherent risk to the state, even if no better or more natural borders would be possible either. Here, the recent experiences of Korea served as a warning to Kjellén. Geopolitically, the Scandinavian Peninsula resembled the Korean Peninsula – the latter squeezed between Russia and Japan, the former between Russia and Great Britain – and Kjellén envisioned a similar struggle over Scandinavia as had recently taken place between Russia and Japan over Korea (Kjellén 1900: 176). Against this background, Kjellén ominously concluded that international law and Sweden’s personal union with Norway provided Sweden with only marginal protection. If Russian expansionism were to shift away from its current focus on the Far East and again turn towards the Far North, Sweden would once again find itself vulnerable in the face of great power competition, largely for its strategic location and for its lack of natural borders (Kjellén 1899: 330).

Sublimated Expansionism

If Sweden by the late 1890s had not achieved natural borders, it could hardly be said to have found its natural place on the planet. In attempting to provide an answer to this question, Kjellén in 1900 set out to trace a Swedish ‘territorial history’, analysing its geographical elements. The results of this analysis would

remain a central part of Kjellén’s ideas about Sweden’s future domestic and foreign policies for the coming twenty years. Kjellén first noted that early Swedish expansionism in the immediate aftermath of the Viking Age not only lacked natural borders but, more importantly, it also suffered from the absence of a sufficiently strong centre – culturally, economically and politically (Kjellén 1900: 39). In addition to the internal weaknesses of its neighbours and their numerous conflicts elsewhere, it was precisely the emergence of an efficient and centralized state power apparatus that eventually allowed the Swedish Empire to form in the 1600s. Despite its relative longevity if compared with the former expansive phase, there were also similarities between these periods, Kjellén found. Both times, ‘greatness’ had been achieved by expansion to the east. However, in both cases, Swedish expansion had been lacking in geopolitical logic, as the material power base was too small, too diverse, and the ultimate extent of the expansion too vacuous (Kjellén 1900: 54).

Nevertheless, in Kjellén’s assessment, the Swedish Empire had at least attempted to formulate a geostrategy under the principle of ‘dominium maris baltici’. In his view, a succession of generations of Swedish administrators, aristocrats and royals had identified a specific geopolitical logic in extending Swedish fiscal and territorial control across as many islands, littorals and above all rivers as possible in order to dominate commerce throughout the wider Baltic Sea Region and to secure a broader tax base. According to Kjellén, these early Swedish geostrategists had little interest in expanding further inland; but the subsequent wars, negotiations and alliances of the Swedish Empire contradicts this view, as Swedish imperial activities eventually ranged far from just the watershed of the Baltic Sea itself.

Despite its allegiance to this valid geopolitical principle, the Swedish Empire retracted when stronger competitors such as Russia emerged, partly due to the Swedish Empire’s ‘circum-marine’ character. After the loss of Finland in 1809, Kjellén claimed that ‘the Swedish people’ had been confronted with a ‘choice’ between East and West, choosing the latter due to the rising obstacles in the East (Kjellén 1900: 58). Kjellén thus depicted Swedish territorial history as a pendulum movement in oscillation between Baltic and Scandinavian (or Atlantic) ambitions.

This narrative would serve as a kind of ‘ideological power resource’ in most of Kjellén’s later popular or political articles on Sweden’s position in the world (Kjellén 1900: 57; 1911: 3–5; 1917: 8–12). In his political tracts a few years later, he explicitly used this narrative to discursively sublimate Swedish territorial expansion of the past into an imaginary Swedish geostrategy for the future, adapted to Sweden’s contemporary small-state status as well as the geopolitical dominance of the great powers. This geostrategy, in its turn, did not entail military aggression towards either neighbours or peoples far away, but encompassed state-led and export-oriented commercial and intellectual mobilization at home, based on active social and population policies as well as ambitious economic and research programmes (Kjellén 1906; 1908).

National Unity

This perspective on the prospects of a small or weak state such as Sweden conducting its own form of geostrategy contrasts directly with Kjellén’s hardboiled analysis of great powers’ dominance over small states, as eloquently expressed in both Stormakterna (1905) and Staten som lifsform (1916; cf. chapters by Björk, ‘The Great Powers Studies’, and Lundén, ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography and the Political Science Irredenta’, respectively, this volume). While Kjellén in these two works appears to condone and even at times celebrate the notion of geopolitics as a deterministic competition between great powers – what he elsewhere called an irreversible ‘planetary’ struggle to subsume Earth under ‘Western culture’, forcing small states to group as ‘vassals’ under the ‘feudal’ control of the great powers (Kjellén 1906: 175f, 185) – his writings on Sweden expose a different story.

Here, Kjellén explicitly contrasted the (failed) opposition to this planetary drive by the Boers in South Africa (Rosenblad and Söderholm 2014) and the Qing dynasty in China on the one hand, and the (successful) adaptation in Japan during the Meiji Restoration on the other, recommending Sweden to follow the

latter course by fighting modernity with more modernism, drawing direct inspiration for his modernization programme for Sweden from Japanese experiences (Kjellén 1906: 175). To Kjellén, Swedish society appeared as an organic unity, just as Japanese society, whose parts suffer from the joint social problems at the same time as it grows from joint social progress. Only through deep national solidarity could this organism be protected against the geopolitical competition of great powers and geo-economic interests of big business (Kjellén 1906: 3).

Most Swedish conservatives considered that Sweden had been placed in a more vulnerable situation following three events in 1905 – the break-up of the Swedish–Norwegian Union, the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Russian Revolution (Elvander 1961: 247–49). For Sweden to avoid the ‘gloomy horoscope’ that Kjellén saw for the small states in a future dominated by the geopolitical contests of the great powers, Sweden needed what he called ‘nationell samling’ (national unity, national rally) in the face of internal divisions. Kjellén argued that there were objective reasons for expecting Sweden to fare better than other comparable ‘small’ states – its territorial size and natural resources in fact implied its status as a ‘mellanstat’ (middle state) akin to Spain or Turkey, rather than a genuine small state, and it thus had latent potential for autarky, power, security and wealth (Kjellén 1906: 17, 191–92).

However, Sweden’s greatest obstacle for realizing its latent power rested with its ‘underpopulation’, Kjellén argued. This, in turn, was exacerbated by emigration and declining nativity, as well as the vastness of Sweden’s territory itself – the same area as Japan, but with only one-tenth of the population. As a member of the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, and as a representative for the conservative General Electoral League (Allmänna valmansförbundet) in the second chamber in 1905–08 and in the first chamber 1911–17, Kjellén often spoke about the need to ‘regain Sweden within Sweden’s borders’, implicitly referring to a poem of 1811, ‘Svea’, written by Esaias Tegnér after the loss of Finland in 1809. Acknowledging the worsening social inequality caused by rapid industrialization, modernization and urbanization, he expressed both fear and understanding towards the demands for democracy and socialism following in its wake. However, he also regarded the Old Right unable to devise appropriate

countermeasures to the socialist challenge, due to its anti-modernist traditionalism. To Kjellén and the Young Right, by contrast, Sweden required an active and ambitious modernization programme in all fields of life, not only to defend Swedish territory against external aggression by great powers locked in geopolitical competition, but, perhaps even more importantly, to secure Swedish society from inner dissolution (Larsson 1994: 63ff, 69).

Kjellénian Biopolitics between Constructivism and Realism

At about the same time as Kjellén took a seat in the Riksdag, he began formulating a politological research programme for a ‘biopolitical’ study of the state, in an attempt at exploring the scientific laws of [great power] development (Kjellén 1905: 23f). This programme would examine the geographical location, boundary situations and morphology of different countries (geopolitics), their economic resources (ecopolitics), their population development and ‘racial’ composition (demopolitics), their social conditions (sociopolitics) and finally their constitutional structure (kratopolitics). In Kjellén’s initial biopolitical programme – eventually revised a decade later in Staten som lifsform (Kjellén 1916: 83; see also discussion in Abrahamsson 2013: 41) – geopolitics emerged as just one of several different biopolitical methods available to states in their attempts at securing and/or strengthening their position and status in an increasingly competitive world. Several parts of the research programme can be found in the political work programme proposed by Kjellén in the name of the Young Right in 1908 (Kjellén 1908, especially 30–62).

While this initiative has correctly been understood as primarily a research programme (Elvander 1961: 270f; Hornvall 1984: 313–22; Soikkanen 1991; see also discussion in Esposito 2008: 16f; Lemke 2011; Gunneflo, 2015), its formulation coincided with Kjellén’s activity as a Member of Parliament. His bills and parliamentary debates appear as a series of attempts at a practical implementation of this theoretically oriented academic programme. Kjellén’s numerous motions put before the parliament amount to a kind of plan for ‘internal colonization’, combining his biopolitical and geopolitical precepts for

Swedish domestic and foreign policy, as adapted to the latent power resources available to Sweden.

Domestically, Kjellén argued in general terms for social reforms, but few of his proposals addressed practical health and social policy. His social programme appears less concerned with redistribution than growth, and growth presupposed investments in the economy. Primarily, Kjellén detailed demands for state intervention and government support for home ownership and land reclamation, railways and roads, canals and ports, transoceanic shipping lines and business schools, as well as nationalization of major natural resources – especially of hydropower, iron and timber for the industrialization of Norrland. These investments would, Kjellén assumed, generate new jobs and opportunities for social mobility within Sweden itself, discouraging further Swedish emigration abroad and promoting Swedish nativity. Yet, Sweden remained ‘underpopulated’ in relation to its resources and its territory, Kjellén surmised, suggesting the country could support another 10 million inhabitants in addition to the 5.5 million people already living there. To this end, he involved himself with organizations seeking to encourage remigration of American Scandinavians to Sweden. Just as the USA, he noted, Sweden required migrant labour to realize its latent potential, but Kjellén did not specify from where these migrants would come. Elsewhere, he spoke favourably of Chinese and Japanese seasonal migration to the USA – especially to California and Hawaii – in his statement before the Emigration Study. Simultaneously, however, he argued in favour of anti-immigrations laws, primarily directed against Polish seasonal workers from Galicia, using racist rhetoric (Kjellén 1908: 215ff); for a similar argument, almost verbatim, see Emigrationsutredningen, 1910: 15–20).

Internationally, Kjellén’s programme called for renegotiating the terms of trade and tariffs in agreements with Sweden’s main trading partners, Germany and Great Britain. More specifically, Kjellén envisioned a future role for Sweden in Russia in general and in the Baltic Sea Region in particular, proposing that Sweden should serve as a transit route for Russian exports and imports, as well as a provider of modern science, technology and know-how in exploiting vast Russian natural resources. This was fully in line with then current Swedish selfperceptions of being a nation of engineers (Fridlund 1998: 77–103). Certainly no

admirer of Russian autocracy, Kjellén predicted that Russia would eventually liberalize, economically as well as socially. This would open new opportunities for Swedish outreach to the east (Kjellén 1911: 18, 28). This ‘Baltic programme’ would not entail any aggression, infiltration or subterfuge on the part of Sweden, Kjellén assured. Instead, it based itself upon the proposition that Swedish immaterial resources in terms of commerce, culture, science and technology would prove attractive to Russian administrators and entrepreneurs in their search for neutral power resources in their efforts at circumventing the dominance of other great powers in these fields (Kjellén 1911: 27). Due to its recent defeat in the Far East, moreover, Russia’s international trade would benefit from being channelled through the Baltic Sea and via Sweden to the global markets, Kjellén, prophesied. For this reason, Kjellén also saw the need for state support in opening markets for Swedish business interests in officially independent and sovereign nations and semi-colonies across the world, without however advocating ‘small state imperialism’. Interestingly, Kjellén does not seem to have taken a great deal of interest in Arctic or Antarctic endeavours, which stood at the centre of Danish and Norwegian activities and that later resulted in contested ‘small state imperialism’ (cf. Nilsson 1978). When concessions were not expected from the colonial powers, the efforts and expertise of Swedish diaspora, entrepreneurs, explorers and scholars active in other parts of the world were to be engaged (Avango, Högselius and Nilsson 2018: 324–47). His programme presaged small state geopolitics or ‘resource colonialism’ (for the concept, see Vikström, Högselius and Avango 2017) – a kind of colonialism without colonies (Lüthi, Falk and Purtschert 2016: 1–9). In this sense, it also resembled Wilhelminan Wirtschaftsnationalismus, with its strategic aspirations for commercial control through credits, investments and technology transfers, especially in the field of infrastructure (cf. Falkemark, ‘Kjellen and the First World War I’, this volume).

Conclusion

In his argumentation for the viability of this joint biopolitical and geopolitical programme, Kjellén explicitly drew upon his perceptions of Swedish superiority in intellectual and moral terms, arguing that material and immaterial factors presumed each other, not the least in the era of modernity when science and

technology brought practical and theoretical knowledge closer together. The dream of a ‘new Sweden’ based upon investment into its own natural resources and social capital, exploitation of Baltic and Russian markets, as well as commercial outreach to the semi-colonies and intermediary states of the world, suggest visions of Kjellén as a ‘hyperborean’, comparable to other Swedish conservatives and proto-fascists enchanted by the prospect of rekindling the Swedish Empire anew, if less through military aggression but sublimated through joint cultural and commercial mobilization, directed inwards as well as outwards (Elvander 1956 and 1961: 270f; Linderborg 2001: 268ff; Hall 2000; Schough 2008; Marklund 2015; see Lundén, ‘Kjellén’s Legacy’, this volume).

In a series of mainly popular books, lectures and newspaper articles, primarily between 1900 and 1917, he maintained that Sweden, despite its smallness, had considerable cultural and material resources that might prevent such a development, presupposing that a conscious programme for national concord would be applied in domestic as well as foreign policy. Kjellén here nuanced and partly abandoned his own theory by upgrading the importance of cultural resources in relation to demographic and economic resources, at least concerning smaller states. Political programmes, even if illusory or even partially mythological in character, could in his view function as levers in relation to geographical facts. Small states could evidently develop a type of geopolitical ‘soft power’ – or the ‘geopolitics of the weak’, as proposed by Ola Tunander (2008: 165, 171). To Kjellén, this in turn meant a relatively optimistic future vision of not only the prospects for Sweden, but also for other ‘middle states’ globally, provided they made use of biopolitics to offset geopolitics, enacting a biopolitical ‘small game’ in the shadow of the geopolitical ‘Great Game’, played by the great powers.

Here, Kjellén’s thinking seems in important ways to have reflected the complex tension between small-state realism and idealism dominating Swedish foreign policy during the 1900s, the interpretation of which is still the most central question in the history of Swedish foreign policy. Kjellén’s point was that Sweden enjoyed a certain latitude in pursuing a certain type of geopolitics. This contrasts with ‘vulgar geopolitics’, which is generally seen as deterministic and materialistic in focus. In this conception, however, small states and middle states

appear paradoxically at greater liberty to pursue their ideals and interests than the great powers – bound, as they are, to follow the blind laws of geopolitics – provided they in turn follow the laws of biopolitics by enhancing their immaterial as well as material power resources, and operationalize them accordingly (Sundelius, 1995).

This shows that, to Kjellén, geopolitical laws existed in a complex interaction between culture, history and geography, where at different times one or the other can get the upper hand. These fluctuations in turn give rise to a fundamentally dynamic and processual view of geopolitics. By different means – material as well as immaterial – different actors, great powers as well as small ones, can influence their geopolitical situation and thus their power. Small states must take scientific biopolitics into account and transform these insights into practical action to strengthen the state and the nation against external threats and internal disintegration. A biopolitical action programme might thus modify, if not cancel, geopolitics. The voluntarism of biopolitics could thus work as a counterweight against the determinism of geopolitics. As a result of this inquiry, Kjellén’s early combination of biopolitics with geopolitics betrays a more sophisticated conceptualization of the hybridity of cultural and natural factors, of determinism and indeterminism, in a continuous, if sometimes contradictory, oscillation of realism and constructivism, which in many ways appear more apt to interpret today’s ambiguous globalized and networked world society than the international system of great powers and imperial ambitions it is usually associated with.

Carl Marklund is a docent of Nordic Studies at the University of Helsinki, and a researcher in political science at the Institute of Contemporary History at Södertörn University. His research interests include comparative welfare state history, international relations, public diplomacy, nation branding and geopolitics. Recent publications include ‘Soft Power’ in International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (2020); ‘Double Loyalties? Small-State Solidarity and the Debates on New International Economic Order (NIEO) in Sweden during the Long 1970s’, Scandinavian Journal of History 45(3) (2020) and ‘The Nordic Model on the Global Market of Ideas: The Welfare State as Scandinavia’s Best Brand’,

Geopolitics 22(3) (2016).

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CHAPTER 9

Discourse, Identity and Territoriality

Kjellén’s Thinking about a European Federation of States

OLA TUNANDER

Introduction

Rudolf Kjellén’s Stormakterna and his main oeuvre, Staten som lifsform were important sources of inspiration for the geopolitical scholar and general Karl Haushofer (Diner 1984; Lewin 1985; Sprengel 1984).¹ By the time of his visit to Sweden in 1935, Haushofer was just preparing the 25th German edition of Die Großmächte (Thermaenius 1937: 212). Haushofer was attracted by Kjellén’s argument that states are not strict legal entities but dynamic organisms in competition on the international scene. He would fuse this thought with Ratzel’s idea of the Lebensraum – ‘living space’ – that later made its way to Adolf Hitler, although the latter gave it a different meaning.²

Kjellén, however, was no Nazi, and his political thinking leaned less towards the national-romantic Blut und Boden and more towards the German cosmopolitan tradition with its multicultural unity and drive towards a multinational league of states; a union that would respect the freedom and independence of states under the leadership of a central power. His description of this union of states is almost identical to what later became NATO. We can recognize his geopolitical thinking not only in the organic nation-state of the first half of the last century but also in the multinational and cosmopolitan military union in the latter half of the same century. The early twentieth-century nationalism as well as the post-Second World War NATO seems to have originated from different aspects of Kjellén’s thoughts. The history of geopolitics cannot be discussed without reference to his works, as he was the political scientist who as early as 1899 coined the concept of ‘geopolitics’ (Kjellén 1899: 283; Thermaenius 1937, 1938; Sprengel 1984; Taylor 1994)

Kjellén was a parliamentarian and professor of political science. He travelled the world with his male choir brothers, and he visited the USA, where he was fascinated by the ‘Sunday Negro in his wordless elegance’ (Lewin 1985: 168). Being a conservative parliamentarian, he fought for constitutional monarchy against excessive parliamentarism. He sought for the ‘royal artery’ (kungsådran) of Swedish politics in the ‘deep channel’ of a river following its dwindling path between dangerous riverbanks on the right- and left-hand sides (Kjellén 1914a: 215). He was a socially concerned nationalist, who fought against the liberals and their minimal state as well as against the socialists and their maximal view of the state. Despite his hostility towards contemporary socialism, his social ideals and concept of a ‘people’s home’ had similarities with latter-day social democracy. He influenced the Social Democratic economist and politician Gunnar Myrdal (Falkemark 1992: 89–109), and he preferred a ‘national socialism’ different to the ‘class socialism’ that he regarded disastrous to the nation (Kjellén 1914a: 22). But in contrast to later German National Socialism, Kjellén was no anti-intellectual or racist. He recommended respect for other races and cultures, and he thought universal suffrage would create a tool to avoid political extremism. But he also regarded war as an instrument to strengthen the nation, and he rejected the pacifism, materialism and laxity of liberalism (Elvander 1961). He emphasized monarchical power and the role of the strong leader in a country that ‘was richer in war heroes than in statesmen’, and adds: ‘even after the former species has died out in the lack of demand, the number of the latter does not seem to have increased’ (Kjellén 1916: 2). Kjellén was in the centre of politics during the formative years of Swedish democracy. He was a member of the Second Chamber of Parliament 1905–08 and of the First Chamber 1910–18 as representative of the ‘Young Right’, the Young Conservatives (Lagergren 1999).

As a scholar, Kjellén was an ardent fighter for an independent discipline of political science, and a critic of the liberal ‘legalistic view of the state’. Political science was not to be reduced to a sub-discipline of jurisprudence, geography, ethnology, economics or history. According to Kjellén it had to have its own identity, explaining the state in general. It must not be reduced to any of its many different functions. To him, the state was not a mixture of what he called ‘geopolitics, ethno-politics, economy-politics, socio-politics and regimental politics [the politics of government: ‘regimentspolitik’ or ‘kratopolitik’]’, but a unity, a ‘living organism’, a power and will that incorporated all these ‘areas of politics’.

Due to the Nazi defeat in the Second World War, and because of the alleged role of geopolitics in Nazism, geopolitics, and primarily the Swedish–German geopolitics, was tarnished. Numerous now-forgotten political scientists expressed repulsion towards Kjellén. They held his ‘organism theory’, his acceptance of the ‘great power-morale’ and geopolitics in contempt (Falkemark 1992). The later chief editor of the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, Herbert Tingsten, who in the 1950s and 1960s argued for Swedish NATO membership, only had ironies for his old professor. Tingsten cannot, however, be accused of having understood very much of Kjellén’s writing, his emphasis on ethnicity and territoriality, his use of the spoken language in order to understand the concept of the state, and his view of the birth of states and the formation of political unions, which now again occupy centre stage in the political science discourse. By reading Kjellén more closely, we also find that his thoughts were central during whole of the twentieth century. Kjellén was a conservative scholar. He was not a real democrat: ‘[P]opular emotions are not governed by reason’, and ‘majority concerns may not recognize the minority’. At the same time, he was in many ways the political philosopher of the ‘golden middle-way’. In hindsight we can say that his thought achieved influence far beyond his own political followers. However, despite his importance on the Continent, his political thinking had virtually no impact in Britain.

Kjellén’s practical political experiences were to shape his political thinking with texts such as Stormakterna 1–4 [The great powers] (1911–13), Samtidens stormakter [Contemporary great powers] (1914b), Politiska essayer 1–3 [Political essays] (1914–1915), Världskrigets politiska problem [The political problems of the World War] (1915) and Staten som lifsform [The state as a form of life] (1916). In the preface to the latter, Kjellén describes it as his ‘principal work, lending unity to my divergent contributions in different fields of theoretical and practical politics. … These diverse studies flow together like brooks and tributaries into a main furrow, gaining unity in a common, strictly defined view of the state. It implies an essential step forward towards the goal that I as a scientist aimed at: a system of politics’ (Kjellén 1916: v).

Kjellén’s Organic Concept of the State – the State in General

Kjellén today makes a fascinating read; the reader finds himself at the heart of the current debate on ethnicity and territoriality, on power and identity, and on metaphors and discourse analysis, despite the fact that he is confined to a time in which political science was in its infancy. His organic state concept was an attempt to view the state as an independent object of study with its own dynamic and logic, power and will; an organic unity of land and people, an organism with body and soul, a personality on the international scene. He explains this thought by using metaphors from poetry and prose. Like a human being, the state can lose a limb without perishing, but there are ‘others without which the state could not survive. Even the state-bodies have their Achilles heels and hearts. Such vital parts are first and foremost the capitals and the great arteries of communications’ (Kjellén 1916: 50).

Kjellén approaches the state as an object of study, not by creating a model but by starting from the everyday experience, an empirical investigation of how we, or rather politicians, journalists and authors, speak about the state, of how we spontaneously describe this general concept. He cites some newspapers: ‘Austria now appears as the champion of armed despotism’, ‘Turkey has been ambushed’, Germany has ‘vengefully isolated England’ (Kjellén 1916: 18), and Kjellén concludes that the state is evidently something more than a legal entity. He tries to analyse the state as it appears to us, as a judge and a coercive power, as an entrepreneur and parent, as a diplomat and warrior, because ‘the state must itself, by its actions, bear witness to its essence’ (ibid.: 9).

According to Kjellén’s study of historical linguistics, the state’s unity of ‘stat’ and ‘land’ has followed the word from its origins in the Swedish language in the middle of the seventeenth century. And he particularly criticizes the minimalistic state of liberal individualism that has been reduced to ‘a sullen and impolite gentleman behind a wicket’ (Kjellén 1916: 6). Kjellén’s scientific ideal is centred on critical distance, empirical scrutiny of current discourses and a striving to find the essence of things, but he also maintains a humorous and partly ironic

distance from his own metaphors. Conceptual dryness, models, and narrow descriptions of the state’s random forms of appearance is not Kjellén’s style. The concept of state is developed through a myriad of metaphors. By reading Staten som lifsform we enter Kjellén’s political-philosophical laboratory. Here he says that political science always risked being transformed into

an apology for the randomly realized ideal of statehood … It is an imposing drama to see the idea of the state wander through the ages. It is widening to cover the individual spheres of interest, and then retreating from it, in a mighty rhythm, whose rolling waves coincide with the general world history. We can see it swelling during the European antiquity in the idea of the strong state, while later thinning out in the corporate organizations of the Middle Ages; to culminate again during the age of absolute monarchy and again being depressed during the liberal individualism that influenced the nineteenth century. The secret of our official conception of political science is that we still maintain the theoretical adaptation to the latter manifestation of the idea of the state. (Kjellén 1916: 5–6; emphasis in the original)

But, says Kjellén in his critique of liberalism, the state is inseparable from its land and people. We speak in Swedish about the specific people and their land or ‘mark’ like ‘Tyskland’ [Germany], ‘England’, ‘Ryssland’ [Russia] and ‘Danmark’, about the people and their state or ‘rike’ like ‘Frankrike’ [France] and ‘Sverige’ [Sweden], about states as a unity of land and people, as geographic and ethnographic categories. Citing Friedrich Ratzel’s Politische Geographie: ‘Every state is a piece of humanity and a piece of soil’ (Ratzel 1897: 4). We also talk about ‘Moder Svea’ [Mother Sweden] and ‘Uncle Sam’. The state appears as an ‘organic individual’ with its feet on the ground. Criticizing the prevailing liberal school, he says that as long as political science is content with its object being ‘in the air’ then geography has to fill the vacancy (Kjellén 1916: 22).

The ‘state-body’ – as an organic unity of land and people and as an organic individual with vital parts as ‘hearts’ and ‘arteries’ – must be regarded as a metaphor, illuminating a process or inner logic, not as a dogmatically fixed

concept. This state-body metaphor is used by Kjellén to say that the loss of parts of a territory cannot be equated with the loss of property, but ‘with an operation; a consequence of which is not only a loss of removed tissue, but also of certain strength. … Where there is still health, one finds an instinctive need to regain what has been lost by intensive domestic development’. And he refers to the words by author Esaias Tegnér in the poem Svea from 1811, where he argues for such a development in order to ‘regain Finland within the Swedish bounds’ (Kjellén 1916: 50). Sweden would, after the war with Russia and the loss of Finland in 1809, try to reconquer or regain what had been lost, not by war but through an inner development, by an exploitation of the forests and rivers of northern Sweden:

Oh Finland, you [have] just been torn like a shield of bloody flesh from the heart of the state! … Farewell, you shield of Svea; farewell, you land of heroes! Look, the waves of Bothnia bring our tears to your shore; Well, the Lord our destiny decides; Cry, Svea, for what you lost, but protect what you possess; … Let, Svea, your mountains doubly bring their wealth; the harvest in your nocturnal forest sprout; Lead the waves of the river like loyal subjects, and within the Swedish bounds Finland regain. (Esaias Tegnér, ‘Svea’, 1811)³

Never does the organic nature of the states appear clearer than in the war, writes Kjellén. War is like an ‘experimental field for geopolitics, as for all politics, and the general staff should be academies of science not least in this field of political science. It is their duty to make plans for military campaigns’ (Kjellén 1916: 51). To direct the strike against the ‘heart’ of the state has been central to all modern warfare, but this ‘heart’ is not always something given. To Kjellén there is here no dogmatic formula. The metaphor, instead, presents an inner logic, which has its own genesis. Napoleon thought he would strike the heart of Russia, but this was a false generalization of the fundamental thought of his warfare, because Russia did not yet have a heart as the Western states have’ (ibid.: 53). What has been called the ‘nomadic character of Russia’ (Neumann 1997) made it possible for Russia to withdraw from its central cities without being annihilated as a state.

Today, we might add that one state after the other chooses to truncate parts of its territory. Underdeveloped, conflictual or nationalist parts of the country are seen as ‘proud flesh’ that several states have tried to amputate. This was the case with the Czech enthusiasm for letting Slovakia become an independent state, Russia’s conscious removal of the Central Asian republics and Slovenia’s (and Croatia’s) amputation of the more ‘backward’ Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. In Czechoslovakia, Slovak leaders mobilized popular nationalism against Prague as a card in the Czech–Slovak power game. The Czechs then chose to take the Slovak ‘quest for independence’ seriously in order to liberate themselves from the Slovak burden – its ‘inefficiency and traditionalism’; or to cite a Prague newspaper shortly before the independence of Slovakia: ‘Alone to Europe or together to the Balkans’ (cited in Rupnik 1995). Prague was willing to let Slovakia go – or rather, important power elites in the Czech Republic happily cut off its ‘proud flesh’, amputating its nationalistic East – in order to strengthen the Czech economy, make negotiations easier with the Western institutions, and move its centre of gravity westwards towards the EU and NATO. The fact that the more cosmopolitan West was aiming for centrality – and access to the EU and NATO – indicated a new European geopolitics less inclined to stress the state’s own territory and more inclined to stress its ranking in the international hierarchy. In late 1991, Moscow cut off the Central Asian republics. Already in summer 1991, Russia knew it could not keep the Baltic republics, and perhaps not Ukraine and Georgia, and to let the backward and undemocratic Central Asia remain in the new Russian state would make it more difficult for Russia to join the European institutions – that was what Gennady Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev argued in a letter to Boris Yeltsin, and that is what happened. Two weeks before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the president of the Kazakh SSR, Nursultan Nazarbayev, said: ‘I am doing my best to preserve the USSR as an integral state, but you, representatives of the Moscow intelligentsia, should know that Yeltsin’s team has a quite different strategy’ (citated in Tsipko 1994: 444f). Despite the weak national movements in the Central Asian republics, Moscow granted independence to them in December 1991. Moscow retained its military responsibility for Central Asia and Transcaucasia – defined in the Tashkent Treaty – and became involved in the wars in Georgia, Tadzhikistan and Chechnya. Generally, however, Moscow managed to cut loose from the Turkic people’s backwardness, and distance itself from the high birth rate, which for years had been a source of worry for the Russians. In 1993, the chairman of the International Affairs committee of the Russian Parliament, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, stated that Russia was not interested in an alliance predominantly with the Central Asian states, because that would pull Russia

away from Europe (Lough 1993: 60). Boris Yeltsin called the secretary general of NATO, Manfred Wörner, and asked when Russia could become a member of NATO. Wörner was not able to answer Yeltsin, because Russia was never going to be accepted by NATO. Many in Russia today may feel that they gave up the Soviet state for nothing. However, it is a fact that, in the 1990s, Western and more developed parts of various other states strived for centrality and access to the EU and NATO, and this pointed at a new geopolitics, with less emphasis on territory and more on the state’s position in the international hierarchy (Tunander 1997).⁴ This thought employs Kjellén’s metaphors to explain the radical change that had taken place.

This way of approaching the state as an object of study – to listen to the spoken word, to use metaphors describing a process or a state of affairs, and which can be transformed into concepts – differs radically from a legalistic or economic approach. Speaking about the warring actors as economic or legal subjects was meaningless to Kjellén – particularly when this was written during the tumultuous times of the First World War. War and diplomacy was not something that should be handed over to the historians. He saw war and diplomacy as an integral part of the activities of the state, and if one omits these activities from political science one will not understand the state in general. And he cites Hegel: ‘[F]or the birth, life and death of the state there is no other forum than world history, which is the world verdict. And its norms are certainly not that of the jurists’ (Kjellén 1916: 16).

The declaration of independence of a state is worth nothing if it does not gain recognition in international law, and this is in reality recognition of the great powers. The legally recognized state system has

no room for a newcomer. All seats are already taken, [and the newcomer] is by his very birth guilty of breaches to international law. The established system with its neat portioning and minutely balanced judicial relations must after all be rearranged to make room for the newcomer. … In the eyes of international law and morale, the birth of every new state is obviously a scandal and the infant will

be regarded as a bastard in the inquisitional books of international law. (Kjellén 1916: 163–64)

To Kjellén the problem of political science was its interdisciplinary and subdivided nature (belonging to disciplines like legal science, economy, history and geography), and its lack of an independent identity. In contrast to these approaches, he searched for the general concept of the state to avoid the manyheaded hydra devoid of identity. To the political science of today, this is a strange problem, as there is neither lack of identity nor lack of students. Political science is instead trying to confine its territory and redefine its identity in order to avoid immigrating elements from other disciplines that would give it a multidisciplinary character, which might devaluate the ‘value’/competence of the professor and decrease his power. Even the comprehensive identity of political science, as described by Kjellén, is met with resistance at many universities, as he advocates an essayistic form and a plethora of metaphors in order to approach his concept. Meanwhile, Kjellén’s early analyses have not only had a direct influence on the Continental political science during the first half of this century, they also find resonance in the politics of the Cold War era, and not least in the political discussions of today’s international politics.

Geopolitics and Ethnopolitics

To Kjellén, the concept of ‘geo-politics’, the geographical determination of the behaviour of states, had to be supplemented by ‘ethno-politics’, which focuses on the ‘ethnic organism’, the population as people. While ‘geo-politics’ looks to the ‘state’, the ‘realm’ (in German Reich, in Swedish rike), ‘ethno-politics’ looks to the ‘nation’. ‘We cannot think of a state without land. The concept of state will then evaporate’ (Kjellén 1916: 40); and ‘a people that leaves its country, kills its state’ (ibid.: 78). ‘Geo-politics’ and ‘ethno-politics’ are, says Kjellén, only two aspects of the state. Together, they form the ‘nature side’ of the state, while ‘eco[nomy]-politics’, ‘socio-politics’ and ‘regimental politics’ (the politics of governance) form its ‘cultural side’, ‘where its intent appears more creative and free’ (ibid.: 38). Nations are partly to be seen as nature, ‘as organisms in a

biological sense. The only aspects that are fixed are their interests, prejudices and urges: the urge for self-preservation and growth, the will to life and the will to power. We shall not deny altruistic tendencies, and they may sometimes even get into power [sic], but they will develop only when not directly conflicting with the egoistic tendencies’ (ibid.: 96).

If we look at the amount of text that Kjellén devotes to the nature and culture side of the state, it is obvious that he gives the former a decisive importance. The former limits and shapes the latter, while it is through the rationality of the latter that the former can be disciplined.

The nation has emotions, the society (and the household) has interests, the regiment implies duties. The regiment [the governmental apparatus] pits its rational ambitions against the nation’s essence of desire; the regiment pits its permanent institutions and its legally defended freedoms against the class struggle and coercion of society. The regiment is accordingly the essence of the culture side of the state. It tries to transcend the supreme power of nature/desire in free and purposeful acting. (Kjellén 1916: 149)

To Kjellén, freedom is defended by the governance of the state against the coercion of society.

When we speak today of the Swedish–German geopolitics with its organic fusion of the ethnic, the geographic, the economic and the political, as expressed in Kjellén’s thinking, it is an expansion and redefinition of his geopolitical concept. This is, however, something we have to live with. As ‘geopolitics’ in the contemporary conceptual world has come to be associated with a particular discipline of political science, and not, as with Kjellén, an aspect of the state – viewed as a land ‘or, most pregnant, a realm’, the concept of ‘geopolitics’ has come to include also what he calls etno-politik, ekonomi-politik, socio-politik and regiment-politik, because the former cannot be discussed without the latter.

Kjellén regarded the nation-state as a natural expression of the unity between land and people – a land with more or less ‘natural boundaries’ and a certain autarky or self-sufficiency. Geo-politics, ethno-politics and eco[nomy]-politics seem to him to have found their natural form in the nation-state. The people seek freedom in the state, while the state seeks its ‘spiritual content’ in the people (Kjellén 1916: 112). The previous dynamic seems to work in a dual way, according to Kjellén, who refers to the development in the Balkans, on one hand, and in Italy and Germany on the other: ‘[as] a centrifugal force where several nations under the same state have longed for freedom, and as a centripetal force where different states of the same nation have longed for unity’ (ibid.: 106).⁵

The state offers to the nation the higher spiritual content, which it in itself lacks. The blind instincts of the nation are mitigated and controlled by the legal rational ideas of the state. Its force of nature has entered a higher level of consciousness giving it a rational form. Under the light of freedom, it has tied itself to historical responsibility. (Kjellén 1916: 103, emphasis in the original)

In the preceding paragraphs, the people, and the land with its ‘natural boundaries’, are imagined as something given. We picture island-states like Britain, or peninsular-states like Spain, Italy and the Scandinavian ones, with their marked borders and relatively homogeneous populations. But to Kjellén, this is simply a tendency. The various peoples are shaped through the centuries, and he cites Ernest Renan: ‘The truth is that there is no such a thing as a pure race – building politics on an ethnographic analysis is to build on a chimera’ (Kjellén 1916: 86). After describing how the Spanish people developed as a mixture of highly different peoples, he continues:

In England we have very much the same picture, on the basis of Celtic, Roman and German races: there are Picts and Scots, Brits and Gauls of different kinds, Romans and French nomads [sic], Danes have arrived directly from southern Scandinavia and Angles and Saxons from north-western Germany; and still nobody will deny that the English nation now appears to us in the most fixed and

distinctive form. … The purest blood in Europe is probably to be found in Scandinavia; but Danes and Juts have over time become strongly Germanized; in Norwegian anthropology, they have remarked a strange darker and brachycephalous element (with its core in Jären); [and] the Icelanders have received Celtic influences. (Kjellén 1916: 87–88, emphasis in the original)

Let us disregard racial science from the turn of the century and look at his understanding of how the nation is shaped. One has to differentiate between the nation-state as an ideal form and practical politics, and it was also evident to Kjellén that the nation-state was becoming too small in order to correspond to the twentieth century’s ‘political and economic necessities’.

The classic example is close: If Frederick the Great’s Prussia was enough for the eighteenth century balance, then Bismarck’s Germany was needed for the nineteenth century, and now when the standard has expanded to the giant realms of England, Russia and the USA, the balance seems to require a Mitteleuropa, either in the lesser format of Germany and Austria-Hungary (NAUMANN) or rather in the larger one, with the Levant included (JÄCKH). We here meet the picture of a complex of states, or a bloc of states, to meet geographical changes. (Kjellén 1916: 67, emphases in the original)

We find here, in other words, perceptions pointing forward towards NATO and the EU. But Kjellén emphasizes that such a ‘bloc of states’ lacks an ethnic unity and must respect the particular nations’ identities, so as not to be transformed into a regime that suffocates all autonomous life with the power of its culture (Kjellén 1915: 167). ‘Neither Mitteleuropa nor pan-America have any relations at all with ethnic units: the former seeks to unite such diverse races as German[ics], Slavs, Finns and Turks; the latter strives to bridge over the most decisive racial conflict and unite Germanic (including all other ingredients in the Yankee blood) with Roman races. Here, geography evidently has a total supremacy over ethnography’ (Kjellén 1916: 115).

If we speak about geopolitics, not in the Kjellénian sense as an aspect of state (in contrast to ethnopolitics), but as a scholarly discipline putting a certain weight on the geographical element, then the Swedish–German geopolitics constitutes a fusion of geographic, ethnic and economic elements that shape state politics, and through regimental politics mould its ‘nature side’ by the reason of government. This train of thought radically differs from the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, as we know it from the Cold War imagery. Swedish–German geopolitics, despite its shady past, is today revealed in a more relevant light.

Germanic and Anglo-Saxon Geopolitics

Throughout the Cold War, geopolitics played a central role, not so much in the academic as in the political-military sphere. The formulation of the ‘containment’ policy and the NATO alliance, its development during later decades, and the weapons deployment in the 1970s and 1980s were all motivated by geopolitical arguments. But these arguments were first and foremost supported by Anglo-Saxon geopolitics with Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Colin Gray. Mackinder, like Kjellén, warned of a Russian expansion as a result of the advantage of the new railways over maritime shipping. But unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Kjellén and the German geopolitics not only or even primarily emphasized the relation between technological development and geography, but also their connection with ethnicity, political idea, and economic space. To Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, state and identity was something given, while in the Germanic geopolitics this was something that was constituted in a continuous process. The Anglo-Saxon ‘universalism’ stood in opposition to the Germanic ‘culturalism’.

In contemporary Europe, with its unclear and changeable identities, focusing primarily on the reach of weapons and communications systems seems passé. One can no longer think of politics without considering ethnicity, cultural identity, and political ideas. When Samuel Huntington discusses ‘the clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1989, 1993, 1996a, 1996b), it is an indication that politics has become something much more similar to the thoughts presented by

Kjellén. The boundary line between East and West drawn by Huntington is almost identical to the one Kjellén had drawn eighty years earlier and termed ‘the great cultural border line between Russia and Europe’ (Kjellén 1915: 122). Huntington cites my comments about the tensions between Eastern and Western Ukraine and about a former Soviet general predicting that Eastern Ukraine will come back to Russia in the years to come (Huntington 1996a: 167). Kjellén argued against Aleksander Pushkin and his thought that ‘all small Slavic streams will flow into the Russian sea’ (Kjellén 1915: 122). ‘What is west of the historic dividing line – the White Sea, Lake Peipus, the Rokino Marshes, River Don – … belongs in general to Europe, with culture preceding the race. The great divide is not Germanics versus Slavs. It is Germanics + West and South Slavs + Finnish cultural tribes versus Eastern Slavs. Racial viewpoints are consequently eliminated’ (Kjellén 1915: 124).

Kjellén points out that this cultural divide between the Germanic and West Slavic Central Europe and the East Slavic Russia might be the object of a higher political organization, either in the form of a centralistic dominion or in the form of a Central European federation of states under German leadership. And he continues:

A union of states with Germany-Austria would be the only possibility for the West Slavic peoples to avoid Russian dominance. This, however, would presuppose that Germany chooses its cosmopolitan Austrian (Habsburgian) face before its Prussian one. The Prussian racial intolerance against the Poles has to be replaced with a respect for the individual nation and with the Austrian state concept with its multinational ‘system of freedom vis-à-vis Czechs, Poles and others’. (Kjellén 1915: 171)

We now know that no Central European union of states or league of states was established. After the First World War, the victorious powers instead created a buffer zone of independent states, but these were to perish during the Second World War. Only thereafter did the Allies feel compelled to create a politicalmilitary union, a league of states under the leadership of a central power. This

leader role, however, was reserved for the United States, not for Germany.

The similarity between the Kjellénian idea and NATO is striking. The thought of a multinational state federation under the leadership of a central power guaranteeing freedom and security is consequently not entirely new. Kjellén assumed that Germany would be accepted by its Slavic neighbours if it were to induce itself to choose its multinational, Austrian-Habsburgian, face. Such a multinational union under German military and political leadership would be recognized as legitimate, and he assumed that the Central European peoples would turn to Germany, in the same way as the West European and later also the Central European peoples turned to the United States as the leading military, economic and political power.

This interpretation provokes us to, once again, look at the nature of NATO. During the Cold War, NATO appeared to most of us as an alliance fortifying the West against an external threat – the Soviet Union. But then this alliance should have collapsed after the Soviet disintegration. This did not happen, despite the predictions about upcoming internal conflicts made by neorealism.⁷ NATO seems to have possessed an organizational and ideological identity as well as a clear leadership that made the organization survive the Warsaw Pact. NATO claims to respect certain values – democracy, rule of law, market economy, individuality, national pluralism – that demand a political-military organization, or, perhaps, a union. This political-military organization that has dominated the West bears a greater resemblance to what Kjellén describes as a solution to the Central European problem than anything that has traditionally been associated with the term ‘alliance’. Different from the public rhetoric, however, discipline and consequently political-military subordination within NATO has been stronger than what Kjellén had imagined for his Central European bloc of states, but this only supports the idea that NATO is something much more than an alliance. The fact, however, that NATO is simultaneously legitimized as an ‘alliance’ gives the single state more leeway than what would otherwise have been the case.

A contemporary of Kjellén, the father of British geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, presented his solution for Central Europe: the establishment of a buffer zone, ‘a Middle Tier of really independent states between Germany and Russia’, in order to prevent these great powers from growing too strong and thereby dominating Europe. Mackinder looked at the different states as autonomous units that could, from a traditional British view of balance of power, secure territorial integrity: ‘The Middle Tier supported by outer nations of the World League [such as Great Britain] will accomplish the end of breaking up Eastern Europe into more than two state systems’ (Mackinder 1919: 120). This proved to be a major mistake. The Second World War erased the independence of these states. Small states now turned to the major powers for protection, and they thereby became subordinated to these powers’ political agenda, as Kjellén had anticipated. The proposal for an Atlantic alliance had already been presented in the middle of the war by Mackinder’s disciple, the American geopolitical scholar Nicholas Spykman (1942, 1944). He was of the opinion that an American alliance with the states of Western Europe was necessary to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union. But, unlike Kjellén, he spoke in terms of an ‘alliance’, not about a political-military union under the leadership of a central power. NATO came to be perceived as an alliance of independent states – a practical realization of Spykman’s thoughts.

It is only after the Cold War ended that we can say with impunity that these ideas were wrong. Now, we see NATO as something more than an alliance. The fact that NATO was not dissolved after the fall of the Soviet Union shows that NATO has been much more coherent with a common political idea, with common values, and under a clearly defined leadership. This construct has in reality been almost identical to what Kjellén termed a ‘state bloc’ or a ‘federation of states’, or what the German geopolitical philosopher Carl Schmitt termed a ‘Großraum’ (a greater space) (Schmitt 1941). This concept already existed with Kjellén, albeit in an undeveloped form, but to Schmitt it represented a European or Central European Monroe doctrine. However, both these writers assumed a German, not a US leadership. And they both spoke primarily of Central Europe, not Western Europe. But it was Germanic geopolitics, in its cosmopolitan form, that proved itself to be more accurate in describing the future of Europe. With the more unified NATO, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ geopolitics was replaced by ‘Germanic’ geopolitics, even if, as yet, this remained unrecognized.

It would consequently be possible to divide Germanic geopolitics with its Ratzelian and Kjellénian roots into two major currents: on the one hand, a more urban, cosmopolitan and multinational tradition, which Kjellén describes as the Austrian face, and which rests on the Habsburgian Empire’s recognition of the individual people’s own identity and relative freedom; and on the other hand, the more rural, national-romantic Blut und Boden tradition, the Prussian face, that sees borders between states as potential war zones, and sees the small nations’ possibilities to form a state of their own as an expression of the random weakness of the great powers. This later thought will be found with geopolitical scholars like Karl Haushofer. His critique of the Jews was directed against the ‘metaphorical Jew’, the urban and cosmopolitan Jew, not against the Zionist Jew, who sought his own home and land (Diner 1984: 1–28). His geopolitical thoughts were transmitted to Adolf Hitler by their common acquaintance Rudolf Hess (see above), but Haushofer’s criticism of the Nazi anti-Jewish ideas made him refrain from joining the Nazi party (ibid.), and after his son’s participation in the coup attempt against Hitler in 1944, Karl Haushofer was arrested and brought to the Dachau concentration camp.

To Karl Haushofer the outcome of the First World War – with the creation of independent Central European states as well as the Balkan states – was a result of the weakness of Russia and Germany. When both of them had regained strength, he supposed that the small independent states in between them would be forced into submission (cf. the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact). To Haushofer, Russia was a natural ally. He preferred ‘the robbers of the steppe’ to those of ‘the sea’. The German attack against Russia was to him, both militarily and politically, a disaster (Diner 1984: 10–16). The essential element to Haushofer was the cultural basis of the state, which put him in opposition to the AngloSaxon (and Bolshevik) universalism – its individualism, liberalism and democracy – mistaking their own culture to be universal. The same critique can be found in the writings of Kjellén and Schmitt, but their ideals and political scope are different. We find the same debate today in Samuel Huntington’s criticism of Francis Fukuyama (Huntington 1989; Fukuyama 1989); or, with Huntington’s words: ‘The West is unique, not universal’ (Huntington 1996b). Kjellén refers to an article by Albert Gottlieb (1914) speaking of two universal realms:

‘[D]ie zentralistische Herrschaft und die patriarchalische Vorherrschaft’ [The centralistic hegemon and the patriarchal sovereign]. The former is ancient Rome, which smothers all independent life by the power of its culture; the same ideal as Russia, the modern Byzantine, now wishes to realize under the might of its unculture. The latter is contemporary England that nurses her children overseas, binds them with loose bonds, but lacks every understanding and respect for their alien character. … In the name of ‘Volksfreiheit’, Gottlieb now presents a third type: ‘Führung ohne Herrschaft’ [Leadership without hegemony or dominion]. Dominion rests on force or cunning, leadership is more demanding; it demands not only superiority, but also the ability to understand the alien spirit, to respect and preserve its identity. But this is Germany’s heritage. This cosmopolitan interest rests in German blood – this receptivity to foreign cultural influences that for a long time, when unity was a necessity, was Germany’s weakness – [and] now after unification, [it] is its exclusive strength. … This thought explains the peculiar relation to Austria-Hungary, which is the cornerstone of the Greater Germany building. (Kjellén 1915: 167–68).

Apart from blood metaphors and certain historical exaggerations, we find here a topical critique of universalism. It was, according to Kjellén, universalism and its individualistic idea in the form of Napoleon Bonaparte that created nationalism.

This abuse, this overstretching of individualism, was necessary to make the nations in general wake up. It was on them, and only on them – on Spain’s, Germany’s and Russia’s down-trodden and resurrected national consciousness – that the mighty stumbled. And by then a political discovery, the likes of which had not been seen since Christianity’s discovery of the individual: there is another character (personlighet) in history, and this character is the nation. (Kjellén 1916: 104)

Contrary to Haushofer’s Greater Germany construction, Kjellén’s ‘Greater Germany’ constituted a cosmopolitan federation of states, a Central European

union with respect for the individual nation’s identity, under German leadership that would guarantee their security and form an economic sphere of interest in the same way as the colonies had come to represent a similar sphere to England (Kjellén 1916: 130–31). To once again cite Kjellén’s perception of a future bloc of states: ‘Now when the standard has expanded to the giant realms of England, Russia and the USA, the balance seems to require a Mitteleuropa [Central European] complex of states or bloc of states to meet geographical changes’ (Kjellén 1916: 67).

This idea was further developed by Carl Schmitt, who instead of Haushofer’s Lebensraum spoke of a Central European Großraum with Germany as the leading power, or Reich (Schmitt 1941). Schmitt’s Großraum was probably more densely connected than Kjellén’s bloc of states. Schmitt based his idea on the Monroe Doctrine, which denied European and other powers the right to interfere in American affairs. This doctrine gave the single American states some independence, but they were largely influenced by the political idea of the USA. The doctrine was directed against the intervention by the European colonial powers in Latin America, and formed a unit of relatively independent states, whose security was guaranteed by the United States, but where the US in praxis intervened if single states sought a more independent path, something that also happened in Europe under US leadership. The US actually intervened with the use of force or cunning in several states like Italy, Greece and Turkey, which made the US look increasingly like a centralistic hegemon, a ‘zentralistische Herrschaft’ than a ‘leadership without hegemony’ that Kjellén had anticipated.⁸ Carl Schmitt thus tried to apply the same thought on Central Europe with Germany as a military guarantor – a federation of relatively independent states under German leadership, influenced by the German political idea and organized into the German economic sphere of interest. This thought arose as a result of President Woodrow Wilson’s proposal for a universal federation of states – an extension of the Monroe Doctrine into a world doctrine. A non-interventionistic Großraum principle was, according to Schmitt, provoked by Wilson’s ‘imperialistic world doctrine’, which under humanistic pretexts would legitimize interventions anywhere appropriate (Schmitt 1941: 23). In the same way as Kjellén describes how Napoleon’s universalism provoked nationalistic reaction and a ‘national consciousness’, Schmitt describes how the Wilsonian and the Bolshevik universalism – on a higher level – creates the Großraum concept as its counterpart; a thought that already existed, if only in the bud, in Kjellén’s works.

Historically speaking, there is no doubt that, at the end of the 1940s, the advance of the Red Army together with the general impotence of the United Nations led to the creation of a Euro-Atlantic ‘bloc of states’ – a Großraum we call NATO – that was orchestrated around the political ideas of the Western world, and guaranteed and controlled by its central military power, the USA. But it was only after the end of the Cold War that we realized that this bloc of states is not an alliance, such as the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical thinkers imagined, but a Großraum under the leadership of a Reich, in accordance with the concept of Swedish–German geopolitics.

Ola Tunander is research professor emeritus at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Norway. In 1989, he received a PhD and was appointed senior researcher at PRIO, where he headed its Foreign and Security Policy programme. In 2000, he was appointed research professor, and was a civilian expert to a Swedish government inquiry. He has contributed to journals like Review of International Studies, Intelligence and National Security, Geopolitics, Security Dialogue, Journal of Peace Research, Cooperation & Conflict and has been peer reviewer for International Security (Harvard), RUSI Journal (Royal United Services Institute, London), Political Geography and Millennium (London School of Economics). He is the author or editor of thirteen books, including Cold Water Politics: The US Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front (London: Sage, 1989), The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe (London: Sage, 1994), Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity (London: Sage, 1997), and The Secret War against Sweden (London/New York: Frank Cass, 2004).

Notes

Large parts of this chapter were published as ‘Geopolitikens fader: Rudolf Kjelléns Staten som lifsform’, Internasjonal Politikk 56(3) (1998): 475–89. A similar English article, ‘Swedish–German Geopolitics for a New Century: Rudolf Kjellén’s “The State as a Living Organism”’, was published in Review of

International Studies 27(3) (2001): 451–63.

1. On Ratzel and Kjellén, see Thomas Lundén ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography’, this volume.

2. Holger Herwig presents a direct link between Haushofer through his assistant Rudolf Hess to Hitler, who used Hess as his secretary. The concept of Lebensraum had been mediated almost directly from Haushofer to Hitler, although this academic approach actually had a marginal impact on Nazism (Herwig 1999). Herwig claims a direct link between German geopolitics and Nazism, which not only exaggerates Haushofer’s role but also ignores the conflict between the materialism of geopolitics on the one hand and Nazi voluntarism and racial ideology on the other. Nazism actually rejected geopolitics as something suspect (Bassin 2016), and Haushofer’s Jewish wife was certainly not a Nazi choice. After Hess had fled to Scotland in 1941, Haushofer lost his protector, and he was interrogated by the Gestapo. After his son Albrecht’s involvement in the attempt on Hitler’s life in 1944, Karl Haushofer was placed in the Dachau concentration camp, while Albrecht was executed. Herwig does not mention that Albrecht (a diplomat and a geopolitical scholar himself) had already been in the resistance since before the war. He visited his Norwegian friend Arvid Brodersen, the secret liaison between the Norwegian resistance and the German military opposition, in 1938 in Oslo, and told him about Hitler’s plans to concur more land further east [from conversations with Professor Brodersen, who used to come to my seminars in Oslo in the 1990s]. Brodersen entered the University of Berlin in 1927. He was forced to leave for Sweden after the attempt on Hitler’s life in 1944. He lived for many years as a professor in the USA.

3. The original poem included attacks on Russia but was moderated into this anti-irredentist version. Kjellén gives the example of ‘Holland’ recompensing the loss of Belgium by reclaiming land from the sea, and Denmark colonizing the sandy heaths after the loss of Schleswig.

4. Conversations with Brigadier General Klaus Wittmann, who was working closely with Secretary General Manfred Wörner and who took the phone when Yeltsin called and asked for Russian NATO membership. Wittmann was responsible for the development of NATO’s new strategic concept.

5. Cf. Falkemark, ‘Kjellén and the First World War’, this volume.

6. For representative publications, see e.g. Mackinder 1919; Spykman 1944; Gray 1977; and Brzezinski 1986.

7. See e.g. Mearsheimer 1990.

8. One sentence has been added in the English translation; see Tunander 2009.

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CHAPTER 10

Rudolf Kjellén’s Intellectual Impact in Latin America

ANDRÉS RIVAROLA PUNTIGLIANO

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to explore and analyse the influence of Rudolf Kjellén in Latin American geopolitical thinking and action. When using the word ‘thinking’, I refer to a broad variety of pundits from different professions and disciplines – scholars, politicians, military and intellectuals, or what in Spanish are called pensadores (thinkers).

America was a place of global encounter as well as the starting point of the first global geopolitical project (Schmitt [1950] 2003: 88–89). Throughout the Iberian empire’s American (referring to the whole American continent, also known as ‘the Americas’) civilization, the elites were able to construct national visions and policies, linked to a global outlook, or what Kjellén called ‘planetary thinking’. Along this line, the Iberian empires and the later independent states, heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, developed sophisticated techniques of territorial and social control that included ‘both Machiavellian statecraft and Gramscian hegemony’ (Agnew 2010: 42). There are here long lines of continuity of all this into the modernization of states in the twentieth century, making Latin America a fertile soil for the reception of Kjellén’s new insights.

Hence, to understand the impact of Kjellén’s work in Latin America, this chapter starts with a brief historical background of what I would call the ‘geographic consciousness’ among Latin American policy-making and intellectual elites. That is, of course, not homogeneous across such a vast region, and the lines of continuity into our days are diverse or, in some cases, hard to find. My point here is to outline that the ideas of Kjellén and other ‘classical geopoliticians’ did not reach an intellectual ‘nowhere land’. Both the Portuguese and the Spanish state

machineries were resources, and left behind a profound and broad geographic knowledge, linked to explorations, cartographic techniques and territorial control. In the following section I turn to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, where we find the first geopolitical steps and linkages to what at this moment was a new modern and rational approach to geography and policymaking. The third section deals with the mid-twentieth century and the emergence of schools of geopolitical thinking where one can see the influence of Kjellén. Finally, I turn to more contemporary studies on geopolitics, analysing lines of continuity, innovations, and the pervasiveness of Kjellén in current Latin American geopolitics.

Latin American Geographic Consciousness

As pioneers in global explorations, the Iberian states created advanced organizations and tools of analysis for geographic exploration and territorial control. The task of colonization and control of the extensive American continent was indeed a gigantic challenge. There was much rivalry here, but there were also periods and dimensions of collaboration that marked the growing geopolitical scope of the Latin American countries. Besides the abovementioned influence of the Church, and perhaps even due to it, both empires where formally united into one single state between 1580 and 1640. It broadened the geographic minds, showing the continental scope of the Iberian empire across the American continent (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz 2017). There were here, for example, far-reaching territorial consequences for Brazil since the Tordesillas division line became an obsolete limit. The Portuguese could then expand their Drang nach Westen throughout the Amazonian region, with the blessing of the emperor (Pandía Calógeras 1998: 155, 159).

It could be said that two geographic mindsets with continental scope have their roots during this period, with relevance still today: the ‘American’, embracing the totality of this continent, and the ‘South American’. In the case of the Portuguese, the second one became a strategic objective in order to reach the Pacific region of South America, with direct contact with the silver areas of Peru

and Alto Peru (current Bolivia). It also meant to link the Atlantic possessions with the Pacific Ocean, as an outlet to the Asian markets for goods from central parts of South America.

Eurocentric views of Latin American relations with the world have created a bias in regarding Europe as the only dominating market for the American continent. As research increasingly shows, for Iberian America, the role of Asia and the Pacific Ocean was highly relevant (Gordon and Morales 2017). The Portuguese were surely aware of this, as they also had Asian possessions that they could link directly to their American ones, and from there to Europe, as the Spanish did. This kind of geopolitical considerations were connected to systematic geographical surveys of the region that we today call Latin America, placed at the centre of Iberian global visions. By the 1570s, it was already clear to the official geographer and cosmographer of the Council of Indies, López de Velazco, that there were three different sub-regions within the Spanish territories: the Northern Indies, Western Indies (the Caribbean) and the Southern Indies (Barton 2003: 40). This kind of knowledge was at the base of the territorial framework of organization of the Iberian empires.

The accumulated knowledge from this geopolitical ‘inception period’ was later used by the Libertadores, the leaders of an independence movement during the early nineteenth century. One of the first and most influential was the Venezuelan, Francisco de Miranda (1750–1816). He was concerned with independence and creating the conditions to maintain a sovereign state, where the geographic dimension was crucial, particularly in what refers to as a continuity in the geopolitical goal of maintaining a ‘continental unity’ of the Hispanic-American territories. Adopting the devise of ‘concordia res parvae crescunt: discordia maximae dilabuntur’ [with concord small things increase, with discord the greatest things go to ruin], Miranda was the first to propose the formation of a Continental Hispanic American Congress (Bohórquez Morán 2006), surely inspired by the United States of America and its First Continental Congress of 1774.

Miranda’s ideas continued in the later proposals of Simón Bolivar (1783–1830), the legendary leader of the Hispanic-American independence movement. Bolivar shared Miranda’s concern for maintenance of unity after independence, being well aware of Spanish, French, British and US ambitions to control the resources of the immense Hispanic-American territory. The ‘continentalism’ of Bolivar and his followers sought initially to consolidate sovereignty through a union of the whole hemisphere (Londoño 1950: 74). Yet, this soon clashed with the alternative continentalist approach of the United States, initiated by the famous ‘Monroe Doctrine’, from 1823. For reasons well outlined by Kjellén’s disciple Fredrik Johannesson (1922: 15–18) the positions of the US and its neighbours were incompatible.

While the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration of policy expressing the power position to which the US aspired (Spykman 1942: 73), the Bolivar Doctrine (outlined in 1826 at the Anfictionic Congress of Panama) rested on equality among peoples. Well aware of the international threats as well as the geographic obstacles to creating a new Hispanic-American state, Bolivar endorsed the idea of a confederation of sovereign states that were going to be united by the juridical platform presented at Panama (de la Reza 2006: 17). Bolivar was concerned with the ethnopolitical arguments for a common nationality of this new state, its place in the international system, and its territorial structure. Concerning the last element, Bolivar’s government had earlier on established the utis possidetis juridical principle as the base for the organization of the new states.

The Bolivarian ‘continental’ state was not achieved, but the vision did not disappear. It continued, becoming the geopolitical inspiration and aspiration for later efforts to create common links between American states. Nevertheless, what predominated in the formation of the current states were official ideologies promoting separated national, geographic visions. Yet, Bolivarian or not, geography was relevant, shaping national and regional thinking through national geography institutions, where the Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística (SMGE) was among the first, created in 1833 (Dunbar 1996: 187). Between 1833 and 1935, approximately fifty societies were founded, two of the most important of which were the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, in 1838,

and the Argentinean Instituto Histórico-Geográfico del Río de la Plata, in 1854 (Smith Madan 2017: 87).

The case of Brazil is interesting because, unlike the other colonial territories in America, Brazil had a continuity of imperial structures after independence. In fact, with Napoleon Bonaparte’s occupation of the Iberian Peninsula (1807–14), the Portuguese royal family moved to Brazil in 1808, bringing the empire’s state apparatus. The city of Rio de Janeiro thereby became the hub of a worldwide empire, as well as the base of one of Europe’s oldest diplomatic corps. However, due to Brazil’s relevance for the empire, there had been first-rate thinkers and strategists coming from this part long before 1808. One of the most famous names was the diplomat Alexandre de Gusmão (1695–1753), personal secretary to King Dom João V (1689–1750) and a key person in the territorial agreements with the Spanish Empire during the mid-eighteenth century (Escola Superior de Guerra 2007: 61), which not only aimed for a settlement with the Spanish, but for a peaceful coexistence and union in South America (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz 2017: 11–13).

After independence in 1822, Brazil remained a monarchy until the transition to a republic in 1891. Two people appear to be important in terms of the perception of state and territory. One was the geologist José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva (1763–1838), the country’s first minister of foreign affairs, and a visionary with regard to the creation of an American system. The other was a later minister of foreign affairs (1845–1912), José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior (known as the Barão do Rio Branco). Under his command, Brazil peacefully expanded its territory by 900,000 square kilometers – a huge success for the geographic insights of Brazilian diplomacy. This was most probably influenced by a variety of geographic writings, such as Fredrich Ratzel, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Halford Mackinder and Rudolf Kjellén (Mota Ardenberg 2002: 363).

The First Geopolitical Steps

One of the first studies on the region with a modern political geographical focus was authored by the Spaniard Carlos Badía Malagrida, in 1919 (Badía Malagrida 1946). Although he did not use the concept ‘geopolitics’ or mention Kjellén, he was a pioneer in relation to the later emergence of geopolitics. Political geography was a central analytical venue for Malagrida’s analysis of state formation in the region that he calls ‘Sudamerica’, which is used as synonymous with what we now call Latin America (including the Antilles). Although his study had no mention of the Luso-American contribution, it did not exclude Brazil from his (Bolivarian) idea of a Hispanic American Confederation. On the contrary, for Badía Malagrida, the maintenance of Brazilian territorial integrity was of key importance for what he called a ‘super national Hispanic American unity’ (ibid.: 42).

Even though scholars and pundits such as Mahan, Mackinder and Vidal de la Blache gained attention in Latin American geographic and strategy-oriented studies, Ratzel had a particularly strong influence (Kelly 1997: 11–12). He was, for example, the main source of inspiration for Malagrida, paving the way for Kjellén and geopolitics. One of the reasons for a widespread German influence was the spread and popularity of German military instructors among Latin American military forces, from the late nineteenth century (Nunn 2001: 16) and even earlier, through the work on Latin America by Alexander von Humboldt.

As said above, the influence of the new insights of the late nineteenth century swept across the whole region, but they were particularly strong in Brazil. Some hold that the roots of modern geopolitical thinking in this country goes back to the work of Elyseo de Carvalho, in the early 1920s (Martin 2007: 33–34), but unfortunately I have not been able to access Carvalho’s study. Thus, as far as I know, the earliest mention of Rudolf Kjellén is in Everardo Backheuser’s brief article from the mid-1920s (Backheuser [1925] 1952). This might be the earliest mention of Kjellén in Latin America.

Backheuser was a scholar as well as vice president of the Sociedade de Geografia do Rio de Janeiro (created in 1883), which would later be converted

into the Sociedade Brasileira de Geografia (Brazilian Geographic Society). Recognizing Ratzel’s role as forbearer of geopolitics, Backheuser upheld Kjellén as the father of geopolitics. In his early text on this, Backheuser explained that Kjellén’s geopolitics goes beyond Ratzel’s political geography, as it incorporates ‘politics’ into geographical studies. In his view, a problem of geographical science, since its beginning in Humboldt and continuation in Ratzel, was that it was ‘shy’ and ‘hesitant’, and more oriented by ‘naturalists’ than ‘sociologists’. A Kjellénian perspective was seen as a positive contribution, as it included a deeper analysis of the state and some of its key dimensions, such as ethnopolitical (the people), the economic, and the relation with other states (Backheuser 1952: 534, 537). This perspective was deepened and extended in his later writing on geopolitics during the late 1940s, where he not only deepened the analysis of Kjellén’s ideas but also incorporated in his work Portuguese translations of Kjellén’s texts (Backheuser 1948). Backheuser’s publication from 1948 is probably the first textbook on geopolitics in Latin America.

Between the publication of Backheuser’s first mention of Kjellén, in 1925, and his textbook in the late 1940s, there was an extensive analytical geopolitical production in Latin America. In the case of Brazil, one of the first and advanced studies using modern geopolitical perspectives was published by Mario Travassos in the 1930s, about Brazil’s continental projection (Travassos [1935] 1947). There are not many references in this book to other scholars, but the influence of Ratzel and Kjellén is evident. For example, in the method analysing frontiers, the importance of geographical formations, the relation to settlement and the strategic long-term value of national policies related to territory (Pedone and Antoniazzi Ronconi 2017: 662). This was, perhaps, the clearest example of a return of a ‘continentalist’ perspective, in this case with modern geopolitical scope and with a Brazilian vantage point.

In the case of Argentina and the Spanish-speaking countries, one of the forebearers of national geopolitical thinking was Admiral Segundo Rosa Storni (1876–1954), who also acted as the country’s minister of foreign affairs in 1943– 44. Inspired by the work of Mahan, he mainly had a ‘thalassocratic’ perspective, regarding Argentina as ‘peninsular’ country that should have a focus towards the

ocean (Storni 2009). In his hypothesis of conflict, the main rival was Brazil. Concerning pundits in geopolitics after Storni, I would like to point out the early work of Jorge A. Vivó Escoto (1943: 18, 54). Originally Cuban, but living in Mexico, Vivó was probably one of the earliest Spanish-speaking Latin Americans to write about geopolitics. In his early text, from 1943, he mentions Kjellén, Ratzel and the roots of geographic studies leading to geopolitics. Rejecting the view of Ratzel as ‘imperialist’, Vivó’s study set forward a geopolitical analysis of the Caribbean (in which he includes Mexico), advocating a Hispanic American geopolitics as the base to form a Latin American confederation. Vivó’s text was one of the sources of inspiration for the more elaborate work of the Argentinean Jorge Atencio (1965), who wrote what is still one of the standard textbooks in Spanish on geopolitics, entitled ¿Que es la Geopolítica? [What is geopolitics?]. This study highlighted the scientific value of geopolitics as well as its importance concerning strategy and for commanding the state. Atencio himself recognized the importance of earlier Mexican pioneers in geopolitics, such as Vivó Escoto.¹

Kjellén, as the one who had coined the concept ‘geopolitics’, was amply mentioned in a new geopolitical wave of the mid-twentieth century, which was the heyday of so-called national-popular governments across the region. However, as the case of Atencio (and earlier Backheuser) shows, Kjellén was not only mentioned as the one who had coined an attractive concept, but because of the new dimensions that his approach gave to the analysis of geography and Latin American societies. The Kjellénian perspective was used to centre the attention on the state, its relation to the people, the national issue, political economy and international relations. It is not surprising that these arguments were a strong attraction to Latin Americans of the time, as was the case for Lazaro Cárdenas in Mexico (1934–40), Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina (1946–55), Getulio Vargas in Brazil (1930–45 and 1951–54), Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in Chile (1927–31 and 1952–58), and Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala (1951–54). These represented a deep shift in the commanding heights of Latin American states, representing new forces with projects aiming to overcome a subordinated and peripheral position in the international system. There was here a mixture of ‘developmentalist’ economic policies, a new conceptualization of ‘autonomy’, and a search for broader popular inclusion to support long-term strategies containing (national) goals related to regional integration, industrialization and social inclusion.

The inspiration of the political economy of the German Friedrich List, and of the later development-oriented economic theories of the Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, also played an important role in the ideas promoted by the nationalpopular forces – for example, in the promotion of industrialization, in the role of the state, and (in the case of Myrdal) advocating the benefits of regional integration and nationalism for developing states (Myrdal 1956: 87). Kjellén’s and (fundamentally) Ratzel’s geopolitical perspectives were here merged with developmentalist outlooks, presenting a new model on how to steer a peripheral state through the international system, towards development and autonomy. This is what I will here refer to as the ‘geopolitics of development’.

While geopolitics was rejected in Europe and the United States, it was advancing in Latin America. A long acquis of Latin American geographic knowledge was here intertwined with modern international insights, which became the bases of new models and schools of thought. The linkage of pundits, intellectuals and a new political establishment was a driving force behind such process. Yet, up to the 1950s, there were still strong national and sub-regional separations within Latin America. Backheuser was, for example, slightly mentioned in Atencio’s book and does not appear in the reference list, while Travassos does not appear at all. However, there was another distinction that in time would grow stronger. Within the geopolitics of development, one could identify two main vectors: the ‘authoritarian’ and the ‘popular’. A common feature for both was a blend of Ratzel’s continentalist approach and Kjellén’s focus on the state, international relations, political economy and ethno-politics (about the people and the state). The most important difference was related to the last point, the role of the people in the ‘development’ project. While some saw ‘the people’ (el pueblo) or the ‘popular’ movements as a fundamental support for the autonomic developmental project, others trusted the ‘enlightened’ force of certain elites.

A Geopolitical School Grows

By the 1960s, Latin America had what could be regarded as its own geopolitical schools. This was, clearly, the case in Brazil. From the initial steps described above, geopolitical studies became incorporated in universities and places such as the Instituto Brasileiro de Geopolítica and, particularly, the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), created in 1949 (Miyamoto 1981: 80). New ideas gained prominence, and most of the scholars had a good knowledge of the geopolitical classics, where Kjellén was regarded as a pivotal name. With the military coup of 1964, military pundits became increasingly dominant within geopolitical thinking, and their geopolitical models were, to large extent, the basis of the new military government’s development-oriented plans and international strategies.

In the Brazilian case, developmentalism continued to foster industrialization and searched – with varying degrees – for autonomy, but with an authoritarian orientation. As Wanderley Messias da Costa (2013: 199) explains, these continued to be greatly influenced by classical geopolitics, ‘particularly Ratzel and Kjellén, whose concepts of space, position circulation, heartland etc. would be amply used for analysis of the Brazilian territory and its external projections’. Nationalism and autonomy continued to play a relevant role for the authoritarian developmentalists, but differently from in the past. While the projection of Brazil as a regional and global power was maintained and, in some ways, extended, it was placed as subordinate to the United States, within the frame of the Cold War and the West’s (US-led) struggle against communism. However, there was also a limit to subordination in relation to Brazilian ‘continental’ projection towards South America as a whole, and to other parts of the world. That was the case with Brazil’s policy towards Africa, for example, where Brazil had geopolitical goals that were contrary to US interests (Penha 2011).

During the 1960s, the Brazilian geopolitical school produced new relevant names, some of them having served with the Brazilian troops who fought with the Allies during the Second World War. About this, Genaro Arriagada Herrera (1986: 158) argues that Brazil is an interesting example of the victorious army harbouring a major attraction for the basic doctrines of the defeated side (Germany); yet, this had started long before the war. One of these new names was Golbery do Couto e Silva, who marked a renewal and updating of geopolitical thinking in Brazil and became highly influential in the ruling elites

of that time. One can clearly see the Kjellénian influence in do Couto e Silva, especially in the book Geopolítica do Brasil (Silva 1967). This study further developed the view of geopolitics as a basis for a national doctrine and strategic vision, where the connection with Kjellén is found in the study of the state’s and the nation’s consolidation.

In Golbery do Couto e Silva’s perspective, this meant a commitment to a US-led vision along the so-called ‘national security doctrine’, whose focus was to combat international communism. But he was also concerned with defending Brazilian interest in the South Atlantic region and South America, where he says that Brazil had a responsibility for development as well as for the defence of Christian and Western civilization (Silva 1967: 84–87, 135). Another relevant name, along this line, was General Carlos de Meira Mattos. He also mentioned Kjellén and classical geopolitics, directing his analysis towards the global projection of Brazilian geopolitics, with an emphasis on South American ‘continentalization’ (Mattos 1964: 111). Even if he also was supportive of the national security doctrine, he too sought a more autonomous geopolitics of development, being, for example, positive towards regional integration, as a tool to sustain the process of industrialization (Escola Superior de Guerra 2007: 53). It could be said that, in spite of differences, there was a general consensus among geopoliticians around the latter point. In the case of Brazil, related to a South American ‘continentalism’, these visions and national projections were not only from military pundits; one example was the work of the Ratzelianinfluenced work of Delgado de Carvalho and Therezinha de Castro (IBGE 2009).

Still, the authoritarian model promoted by the military-led geopolitical school thwarted a ‘national platform’ in what concerns popular support and broader national consensus on strategic matters. That was also the case of a more ambitious regional integration policy. There were indeed interesting and important proposals in this direction during the military period (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño-Ruiz 2017: 93–97), but the areas of cooperation and further integration were limited by the harsh repression under the umbrella of the US-led ‘national security doctrine’. There was also much suspicion among geopolitically inspired scholars from the Spanish-speaking countries about

Brazilian imperialism, or ‘sub-imperialism’ of the United States (Trías 1967). In Brazil, harsh repression, and later on also a deep economic crisis, increasingly alienated the military and ruling elites from the society they sought to ‘develop’.

In Argentina, geopolitics continued to expand during the 1960s and 1970s, after the contribution of pundits such as Atencio. If one looks at the most influential names, the general orientation was diverging from Storni’s thalassocratic view, and towards a more ‘continentalist’ approach, more aligned to Kjellén and Ratzel. In more strictly geopolitical terms, one of the most relevant names was General Juan E. Guglialmelli. He marked distance from Storni’s advocacy of Argentinean ‘peninsular insularity’, arguing that changed contexts and development demands required the strengthening of the national economy, with increasing autonomy and potential for defence. According to him, this was not possible without ‘continental vertebration’, for which he sought a closer relation to Brazil as well as a union with Chile (Guglialmelli 1979: 70). Guglialmelli collaborated in the developmentalist policies applied by Arturo Frondizi’s democratic government (1958–1962), but this line of action weakened after a military coup against Frondizi, with shifting geopolitical priorities among the military forces. Nevertheless, Argentinean continentalism remained strong among geopolitical pundits, and continued to be inexorably linked to regional integration as well as to ‘supernational’ nationalist ideas – that is, ideas and visions of a Latin American nationalism, with roots back in Miranda and Bolivar; what in Spanish-speaking America is known as the Patria Grande (big fatherland).

In fact, Guglialmelli, as other relevant names of Argentina’s geopolitical intelligentsia, was in general critical towards the repressive policies of the military regimes, particularly those of the 1970s. With the military regime that took over in 1976, the goals of ‘national’ policies and popular inclusion were set aside by a massive repression without precedent in the modern history of the country, leaving aside the priorities of industrialization and regional integration. A similar position to Guglialmelli was held by another important Argentinean geopolitician who also worked along the ‘continentalist’ line, namely Colonel José Felipe Marini. He made ample mentions of Kjellén and Ratzel, as well as other relevant names of classical geopolitics. About Kjellén, in particular, Marini

highlighted his contribution in setting the focus on the state and its relation to territory. As others, Marini gave credit to Kjellén’s contribution to the study of international relations, by deepening the understanding of the action of the state in relation to other states (Marini 1980: 325). In this sense, Marini was an enthusiastic promoter of a line of autonomy, which in his view implied a search for the Patria Grande. He was perhaps the first to speak of a Latin American ‘geopolitics of integration’ (Marini 1987).

The geopoliticians supporting this line of thinking could be associated with an ‘anti-imperialist’ stand, confronting what they saw as the lack of autonomy in following the US-positions (or those of other foreign powers, such as the Soviet Union) in terms of friends and foes, nationally and internationally. They also strongly rejected market liberal policies, aimed towards dismantling the state’s support and active role behind industrialization, including the arms industry. In general, the most relevant geopoliticians of the Spanish-speaking countries were more aligned to the ‘popular’ stand of the geopolitics of development, including many military pundits. It is, though, important to note that the military regimes during the 1960s and 1970s had different positions. The one of Peru, for example, pursued a very different line, closer to the Brazilian authoritarian geopolitics of development. It should not surprise then that one of the most influential people here was also an outstanding geopolitical pundit, General Luis Edgardo Mercado Torres Jarrín, who was minister of foreign affairs 1968–71, and prime minister 1973–75.

There were also, of course, civilian geopoliticians in the Spanish-speaking countries, where one of the most relevant names was the Uruguayan Bernardo Quagliotti de Bellis. They were influenced by the work of Backheuser and Atencio, and who, as Quagliotti,² in turn influenced military pundits such as Marini. A deeper analysis of these studies and mention of more geopoliticians falls outside the scope of this study, as many do not mention Kjellén. Some of the most relevant names of this group from the early 1980s can be found in a publication of Luis Dallanegra Pedraza (1983), including the participation of the Brazilian Therezinha de Castro, which shows the interaction of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking geopoliticians. Yet, even if some did not make explicit mentions of Kjellén, the influence of continentalist geopolitics (particularly

Ratzel) is considerable, and these Latin American authors can therefore be regarded as part of the Latin American geopolitics of development.

As said before, the geopolitics of development was a product of mixing different analytical dimensions with classical geopolitical ones. One of these was political economy, where German ideas also had a strong impact. A relevant name in this field was the Argentinean economist Alejandro Bunge (1880–1943). With influences from scholars such as Friedrich List, Bunge promoted, in the early twentieth century, industrialization and the creation of a South American Zollverein. Intertwined with Ratzelian/Kjellénian continentalist geopolitics, a package of ideas mixing Latin American developmental political economy (Margulis 2017) and nationalist Patria Grande geopolitical projections, found its way to national-popular leaders. Perón played a pivotal role here in the formulation of a new model, pushing forwards proposals such as a ‘continental’ South American state, with national and regional integration.

Another interesting name behind this perspective was Chilean president Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, and particularly his minister of finance in 1953, the economist Felipe Herrera (1922–1996).³ Herrera made a fundamental contribution in the shaping of the ‘popular’ geopolitics of development. One of his arguments was that in the age of continental states, the fragmented Latin American nation must unite in order to become sovereign (Herrera 1967: 36). According to Herrera (similarly to Myrdal), integration was ‘a political economic phenomenon, both in its objectives and in its procedures’ (ibid.: 23). Integration, industrialization, state-centred perspectives, autonomy, continentalism and – as Herrera argued – the (nationalist vision of) ‘continental people’, were all elements highlighted by Herrera. Even if he did not use the concept geopolitics, the influence of Ratzel’s and Kjellén’s continentalism appears unmistaken.

Contemporary Geopolitics

The polarization and conflict experienced in Latin America during the period of military regimes, between the 1960s and 1980s, together with the unprecedented levels of violation of human rights, distanced universities and intellectuals from the military. They also carried a widespread negative perception of military involvement in political affairs, something that included intellectual influence on ‘national’ strategies and policy-making. Geopolitics as a discipline and analytical concept was also increasingly regarded in a negative way, particularly in the case of countries where influential (generally) military geopoliticians were associated with the commanding heights of the regimes, such as the case of Brazil. This went hand in hand with a weakening political (and intellectual) support of developmentalist, national-popular ideas, something that maybe played a particularly important role in further eroding the influence of geopolitical thinking in policy-making and higher education centres.

The political scene, by the early 1990s, had become increasingly dominated by a so-called ‘neo-liberal’ wave that was, in general, negative towards geopolitics, particularly towards the ‘geopolitics of development’ associated to populism, and in some cases to nationalism and the military regime, as well as to statecentred policies. Political forces opposing neo-liberalism were also negative, for different reasons, but fundamentally because of the association of geopolitics with US imperialism, subservience to military regimes and, in some cases, in rejection of the ‘state’ and ‘development’. Nevertheless, in spite of scepticism, ‘geopolitics survived democratization transition in the 1980s, leading in the 1990s to supporting integration at the regional and sub-regional levels’ (Kacowicz 2000: 82).

In fact, it could be said that during the 2000s geopolitics had a strong revival in Latin America. Among the most outstanding names was the Uruguayan geopolitician and philosopher, Alberto Methol Ferré (1971). He had been writing with a geopolitical perspective since the 1960s, but it was in the 1990s that his geopolitical approach became more elaborated and diffused across the region. He brought back many of Perón’s ideas within a Ratzelian framework, through which Methol Ferré advocated regional integration as a path towards a ‘continental state’. In his view, the framework of a new world order will be structured around ‘continental states’. If Latin America is going to become an

autonomous actor in this system, it would have to construct a ‘continental state’, in a Latin or South American dimension (Methol Ferré 2013).

This perspective had an important impact on the foreign policy of the Uruguayan president José Mujica (2010–15), as well as those of other Latin American presidents during the 2010s, which turned back towards many postulates of the popular geopolitics of development, in some cases referring to geopolitics. Continental integration, development and new forms of regionalism influenced, again, a new wave of political leaders across the region. It was in many ways reminiscent of the geopolitics of development, but without the authoritarian part. Methol Ferré’s perspective, as Badía Malagrida’s, was explicitly Ratzelian, but it was made with full awareness and incorporation of Brazilian geopolitical insights, as well as with inputs from people such as Felipe Herrera. It was also, in many ways, complementary to the work of people such as Quagliotti, Marini, Dallanegra Pedraza (2010), and, more recently, Miguel Barrios, who published a Latin American geopolitical dictionary with mentions of Kjellén and Ratzel (Barrios 2009).

In the case of Brazil, even if the influence of the ESG waned during the 1990s, geopolitics remained strong at different academic centres. In relation to ‘classical geopolitics’, a good example is the study of Antonio Carlos Robert Moraes on Ratzel’s theories and ideas, with texts of Ratzel translated to Portuguese. This author has also a very interesting analysis of Brazilian history, from a geographic point of view, in connection with issues such as development, modernity and Brazil’s peripheral position in the world system (Moraes 2009). Other important studies can be found in the works of the previously mentioned Wanderley Messias da Costa (2013) and André Roberto Martin (2007) at the Geography Department of the University of São Paulo. In both cases, we find mentions of Kjellén and use of classical politics, particularly in the case of Messias da Costa. Kjellén, Ratzel and Karl Haushofer are also relevant in Siguenoli Miyamoto’s (2014) research, with an interesting contribution on the relation between geopolitics and international relations. An even more recent example of Brazilian research involving Kjellén is the work of Érika Laurinda Amusquivar, analysing the connection between Kjellén and Antonio Gramsci’s geopolitical thinking (Amusquivar 2018).

There is no doubt that classical geopolitics and Kjellén are still part of current geopolitical work in Brazil, although what seems to have been weakened here is the connection of geopolitical pundits with policy-making or political groups. It could be discussed, of course, if Kjellén is now a matter of the past, or just an obligatory mention when scholars refer to ‘classical geopolitics’, but there is no space here to cover this or the large and increasing amount of geopolitically oriented studies from or about Latin America using perspectives such as ‘critical geopolitics’, ‘feminist geopolitics’, geopolitics related to environment, foreign imperialism, or literature.⁴ There are also those who mention Kjellén and Ratzel, but have a bias towards other geopolitical perspectives such as ‘critical geopolitics’, which mentions them without a clear analytical perspective,⁵ or that do so but are highly critical of their geopolitical position, as is the case of the Mexican geopolitician Leopoldo González Aguayo (2011). In general, it could be said that issues related to geography and the spatial dimension have maintained a strong tradition of analysis within universities and among pundits, with qualified research on this matter.⁷ Within this context, geopolitics in Latin America has not become a subordinate annex to realism or international relations, but has survived with its own profile. As this chapter suggests, the geopolitics of development, mixed with Latin American lines of thinking, and the connection with development-related concerns, is part of that regional profile.

Conclusion

During the nineteenth century, new ideas on political geography and, later, geopolitics were rapidly diffused, influencing intellectuals and policy-makers. A possible reason for this reception could be found in the existing knowledge on issues related to geography, territorial control, strategic thinking and international policy; a product of centuries of intellectual traditions with roots in the Iberian dominance. One of the most advanced countries in Latin American in this dimension was Brazil, but there were also several Spanish-speaking countries with strong intellectual and organizational platforms, such as strong universities.

It should be no surprise that it was in Brazil where Kjellén’s geopolitics appears to have found its first outspoken support. While other classical geographicoriented ideas (Mahan, Ratzel, Mackinder, Vidal de la Blache, etc.) had already found their way to the Latin American intelligentsia by the early twentieth century, it was in Brazil where influential pundits pointed out Kjellén as a main source of inspiration. Some of the most important issues inspiring Latin Americans were: (1) the central role given to the analysis of the state (in relation to territory/geography); (2) the relation of state and people (nationalism and territory); (3) the relation of the state with other states in the international system (international relations and regional integration); and (4) the political economic dimension of the state (development).

By the mid-twentieth century, when geopolitics was being demonized in Europe and the United States, the situation in Latin American was the reverse. A wave of developmentalist governments – led by national-popular ideals in search of industrialization and autonomy – embraced geopolitical ideas for the creation of long-term national strategies and new theoretical tools. Kjellén and ‘classical geopolitics’ books, particularly by Ratzel, now became standard reading as geopolitical textbooks at universities and defence schools. Mixed with regional ideas on history, society and political economy, the Latin American approach to geopolitics became a ‘geopolitics of development’.

In Brazil, this geopolitical perspective became increasingly dominated by military intellectuals, who also took command of the state for almost twenty years (1964–1983). In this case, what predominated was the authoritarian vector of the geopolitics of development. It sought many of the traditional goals of the geopolitics of development but presented important contradictions. For example, at the same time as it pursued ‘autonomy’, it was strongly aligned with the US Cold War doctrines, something that went against the geopolitical goals of both national and regional integration. However, the geopolitics of development survived among groups opposing the regimes, particularly in the Spanishspeaking countries where the ‘popular’ geopolitics of development continued to develop.

By the early 2000s, continentalist perspectives, pursuing a return of geopolitics of development and regional macro-nationalist visions, ‘Latin’ and ‘South’ American, had again become predominant. Even if there are currently few specific mentions of Kjellén (although still more on Ratzel), it could be said that some elements of the ‘continentalist’ classical geopolitics have found their response in Latin American geopolitical visions. There is much of Kjellén and Ratzel in the pursuit of regional nationalism, integration, autonomy and developmentalist political economy. This view needs, again, to be revised in front of new geopolitical insights that are coming out of the closet, such as feminist and critical geopolitics. In turn, the new geopolitical vantage points do also need to come to terms with what they mean when using the concept ‘geopolitics’. A deeper look at the ‘classical’ toolkit could be of help in that endeavour.

Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano is associate professor in Economic History and director of the Nordic Institute of Latin American Studies at Stockholm University. His latest books are Regionalism in Latin America: Agents, Systems and Resilience (London: Routledge, 2020; co-edited with José Briceño-Ruiz); Brazil and Latin America: Between the Separation and Integration Paths (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017; with José Briceño-Ruiz); Resilience of Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Development and Autonomy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; co-edited with José Briceño-Ruiz). He has also published several articles and chapters in books, among the most recent are: ‘The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church in Latin America’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 2019; ‘Thinking Big from the Periphery: Raúl Prebisch and the World System’, in Matias E. Margulis, The Global Political Economy of Raúl Prebisch (London: Routledge, 2017); ‘21st-Century Geopolitics: Integration and Development in the Age of “Continental States”’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 2016; and ‘“Geopolitics of Integration” and the Imagination of South America’, Geopolitics, 2011.

Notes

1. See Atencio 1965: 14; and Cuéllar Laureano 2012: 73.

2. For an overview of Kjellén, see Quagliotti 2002: 7–8.

3. Later on, Herrera became the first president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 1960–70.

4. See Ceseña 2008; Bruckmann 2011; Cabezas 2014.

5. For example Pinochet (1977), whose book only reviews different theories without any significant contribution on geopolitical elaboration.

6. For another interesting Mexican geopolitician, see Peón Alvarez 1990.

7. See Suzman et al. 2011, or Moraes 2009.

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CHAPTER 11

Kjellén’s Legacy

A Story of Divergent Interpretations

THOMAS LUNDÉN

The aim of this chapter is to present an interpretation of Kjellén’s concept of geopolitics by his German followers, and the Nordic and Baltic evaluations of his work after his death and in post-Second World War and post-Cold War scholarship. More generally, I evaluate the reception of his works over time and in different cultural milieus.

Kjellén’s Last Book in German

In Germany, where several of Kjellén’s books had been translated, his last publication was Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise. Zweite Auflage [The great powers and the world crisis. Second edition] 1921, based on his Stormakterna och världskrisen, 1920.¹ This book is of particular interest because it was used by Karl Haushofer as a basis for new editions, bearing the names of Kjellén and Haushofer (see below).

In the introduction, Kjellén offered special thanks for the main translation work to Privatdozent Dr Walter Berendsohn from Hamburg.² Covering the world powers one by one, Kjellén analyses each state using sub-chapters: Aufstieg (approx. history), Reich (realm, state), Volk (population), Haushalt (economy), Gesellschaft (society), Regierungsform (governance) and Auswärtige Fragen (foreign affairs), evaluating each state by its natural, demographic, societal and governmental conditions, including its power relations to other great powers. In addition to the revised versions of the pre-Versailles treatment, Kjellén shortly before his death added a new chapter on the World War and the new system. In modern terms it might be called a realist interpretation, based on a wide assessment of natural, demographic and infrastructural resources. His stance is generally pro-German, but the text is an attempt at being scientific. As an

example, two citations concerning Germany and its containment may suffice. Under the heading Die Weltkrise und das neue System. IX: Der Weltkrieg [The world crisis and the new system. IX: World War], Kjellén writes:

175: Germany, as a matter of fact, saw no other possibility … the path through Belgium offered the only possibility, as the way down was barred by the French chain of fortifications. It so happened that Germany took this path, against the will of Belgium, under disrespect of its own warrant for its neutrality (‘a scrap of paper’). The English statesmen could not resist this opportunity to intervene for international law and the freedom of small states, inasmuch as it really was a vital question for England. In war politics, Belgium plays the role of a mainland deployment area for England.³

181–82: Germany itself was closed off from the world market (by the English North Sea blockade of 5 November 1914). That this blockade included the neutral states in Scandinavia worried the master of the seas just as little as earlier Germany had been worried by the warranted neutrality of Belgium. The political realities force the United States towards undeniable neutrality – even if not on Germany’s side – as long as England rules the oceans of the world and the alliance with Japan is maintained … Moreover, the anti-democratic government of Germany was a thorn in the flesh, they wanted to ‘make the world safe for democracy’. Capitalism and democracy thus work together on Anglo-Saxon ground to the conclusion that became determining for the war. (Emphasis in the original)⁴

Haushofer ‘Appropriating’ Kjellén

In 1930, a book appeared with the two names Kjellén–Haushofer on the cover: Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege [The Great Power before and after the World War].⁵ The book is divided into the following sections: Das alte Großmachtsystem, der Weltkrieg, Das neue Großmachtsystem, Das Wesen der

Großmacht, Der Völkerbund, Rückblick und Ausblick [The old great power system, World War, The new great power system, The nature of the great power, The League of Nations, Retrospect and prospect]. The sections on the World War, the League of Nations plus the new sections on Germany and Japan are written by Haushofer; the other states are covered by Hugo Hassinger, Erich Obst and Otto Maull.

The book starts with a foreword by the German publisher, Karl Haushofer, signed Munich October 1930, followed by ‘A Last Introduction from the Hand of Rudolf Kjellén’, p.14. Like Kjellén’s last German edition, the book is ordered state-by-state, following his divisions into history, realm, population, economy, society, governance and foreign affairs.

In the following, a comparison is made between Kjellén’s last original edition of 1921 (marked 1) and Kjellén–Haushofer of 1930 (marked 2):

Kjellén–Haushofer: The Introductory Part

Preface by the German editors (2. p.1*): With reference to Kjellén’s Großmächte (19 editions in Germany 1914–18) and Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise (2 editions), the latter

has been renewed in the present form by a German group of researchers dealing with the 1922 deceased great Swedish scholar. As far as anything of Kjellén’s work could be retained, it has been kept unchanged. But the spirit was more important to his successors than the letter. So much also had to be formulated differently, so that Kjellén’s worldview could be depicted according to his spirit and what is further developed could be shown to rest on his foundations. It was essential to let the accuracy of many of Kjellén’s prognoses be recognized.

… This wish was sacrificed, as what was in form and details was no longer tenable, in order to give a faithful group of admirers of the great politologue (Staatsforscher) his work rejuvenated, as the editors believed that he would have renewed it today. How far we have met his mind, is up to the comparing reader to decide!

Munich, October 1930. Karl Haushofer.⁷

(2) 1–4. The last preface by the hand of Rudolf Kjellén. This is an exact version of Kjellén’s Einleitung (1), p.1–5.

Kjellén–Haushofer: The Description of the Great Powers

As to the contents of the book: the beginning of (2) partly follows Kjellén’s (1) division into Das alte Großmachtsystem, but the order has been changed with Germany taking the first place (2) instead of Austria-Hungary (1). In (2), every country is given an author’s name in brackets: Germany (Haushofer), AustriaHungary (Hassinger), etc. In Kjellén (1), a second part is Die Weltkrise und das neue System, whereas (2) consists of three more sections: B. Der Weltkrieg (Haushofer); C. Das neue Großmachtsystem (Haushofer) with separate chapters for each state plus Ostasien and Lateinamerika, each with the same authors as in the old system; and finally D. Das Wesen der Großmacht. Der Völkerbund. Rückblick und Ausblick (Haushofer).

A Comparison of Part One, Das Alte Grossmachtsystem: Germany

Haushofer’s version of Germany (2: 5–25) follows Kjellén (1: 51–73) word by word, with the following exceptions: in the beginning of the chapter, some changes are made due to the change in the order of chapters. Under the subchapter Gesellschaft (1: 61, 2: 15) Haushofer comments (16):

But not only the red but also the black wing seemed in Kjellén’s view from the outside to be strongly developed in German society. He thought here to find a division that he had not encountered in his observation of other countries: the confessional one between Protestants and Catholics. Catholicism in Germany seemed to the Protestant Swede not to be an ordinary church, but a party.

… geographically viewed, it appeared to him as an external phenomenon in the western, southern and eastern edges of the realm; he thus accentuated the Polish question, as the Catholic Church was the principal seat of the propaganda work in Poland.⁸

Haushofer here evidently does not share Kjellén’s evaluation of the Catholic Church as a political power. The text then returns to Kjellén’s original.

Map 11.1 Haushofer’s map, ‘Der deutsche Volks- und Kulturboden in Mittel- und Osteuropa’ [The German ethnic and cultural area in Central and Eastern Europe]. The extremely black area denotes ‘German ethnic area’, whereas the striae mark the German culture area, covering Bohemia, Slovenia, large areas of Hungary, Romania and Poland. The crossed area is explained as areas of Low German speech in Holland and Belgium, and the slashed area is explained as an area of ‘lost German speech’. The pre-1919 as well as the 1930 borders of Germany, German Austria and adjacent states are indicated. Source: Kjellén–Haushofer 1930, fig. 3, p. 22.

With these two minor aberrations, Haushofer is just copying Kjellén’s original. But there is an important addition to the text, which is four maps without direct reference to Kjellén’s book:

Fig. 1, Deutsch-österreichischer Dualismus [German-Austrian dualism] shows a simple division between the two empires, where Germany with its rivers running north and west is shown with two arrows pointing in this direction, whereas the Austrian part shows the Danube as a thick artery with its arrow pointing southeast.

Fig. 2 shows Der deutsche Volks- und Kulturboden in Mittel- und Osteuropa [The German ethnic and cultural land in Central and Eastern Europe], with a black area indicating German Volksboden, including Alsatia and half of Switzerland, and beyond this area German Kulturboden, encompassing the rest of Bohemia, large parts of Poland and areas around the ‘islands’ of German ethnicity in the south-east. The Dutch language is depicted as areas of the Niederdeutsch [Low German] language in ‘Holland’ and Belgium.¹

Fig. 3 shows Die deutsche Westgrenze [The German western boundary] (from Hennig and Körholz 1935), with ‘Germanisch’ [Germanic] encompassing areas

of Flemish speech, Luxembourg, most of Alsatia and part of Lothringia.

Fig. 4 (p.24) shows Einkreisung Deutschlands vor dem Weltkrieg [Germany’s containment before the World War]. Even if there are hints in Kjellén’s text that might be a basis for the maps, Haushofer’s cartography tends to exaggerate a ‘German hegemony’ in Central Europe.

Austria-Hungary

Hassinger’s chapter (pp.26–45) has a footnote (p.26):

For an understanding of the political upheavals in the area of the earlier Danube Monarchy it was also already necessary in the present chapter devoted to the pre-War Austria-Hungary to undertake essential additions and changes in the text. But in this the reviser always endeavoured to adjust them to the spirit and style of the book. The disposition of the chapter was kept unchanged, and whenever possible, the text was kept. Only in one place could the reviser not wholly follow Kjellén, as he could not sacrifice his conviction. Although history has decided against the Danube Monarchy, he believed he had to evaluate the geopolitical and idealistic foundations of this state somewhat higher than Kjellén. H. Hassinger.¹¹

At the end of the first section, Aufstieg, the text first follows Kjellén, but then adds a more ethnopolitical emphasis (28):

To be Europe’s guard in the East and being a buffer against lower cultures, to offer the cover of protection of a multinational state towards the small peoples of south-eastern Mitteleuropa who had been elevated by German culture to avert

the national rivalries of those peoples who would estrange them from European politics, and to prevent them from being offered by Russia to act as vanguards against Europe.¹²

In the third sub-section, Volk, the ethno-geographer Hassinger extends Kjellén’s writing with more details, such as increasing the number of ethnic groups. But the main difference between Kjellén’s and Hassinger’s versions is Kjellén’s concentration on the centrifugal tendencies in the monarchy, while Hassinger points at Austria-Hungary as

really an ideal economic community comprising a communication area with its natural centre in Vienna. The peoples of its core area were moulded together in a centuries-long community of destiny, embodied in the great tradition of the Ruling House and the army. In this, among the higher officials, in the nobility and in part of the bourgeoisie, particularly in the German one, existed an Austrian feeling of state and an Austrian awareness of culture.¹³

In the sub-section Verfassungsprobleme [Constitutional problems], Hassinger also enlarges Kjellén’s text with more details, but, as far as I understand, without any major differences in the interpretation, other than the same tendency to emphasize the centripetal forces rather than Kjellén’s emphasis on the dissecting ones.

The last sub-section, Auswärtige Politik [Foreign policy] is almost identical, but at the end Hassinger omits Kjellén’s conclusion that what Austria-Hungary was lacking was ‘a national personality’. Two maps are included in Hassinger’s chapter: one on the monarchy’s territorial advances and losses before the World War, and the other on the advantages and disadvantages of the bordering (Umgrenzung) of the Danube Monarchy. This map is natural-deterministic, based on the catchment areas of the Danube.

Kjellén–Haushofer: The World War and Conclusions

Haushofer’s rendering of Der Weltkrieg (2: 162–90) strictly follows Kjellén’s text with the only aberration being that, at the end, where Kjellén writes ‘Es ist unter diesen Umständen noch zu früh’ [Under these circumstances it is still too early …], Haushofer writes ‘Es war under diesen Umständen für Kjellén noch zu früh’ [… too early for Kjellén …], with some corollaries. After Kjellén’s final ‘ohne Gewähr für die Zukunft’ [without guarantee for the future], Haushofer adds, ‘Hier musste die Erneuerung einsetzen’ [Here the renewal had to be put in].

Haushofer1930 and Kjellén 1921 – A Development or an Apprehension?

What is lacking from all renderings of Kjellén’s texts are the literature references at the end of each section. Haushofer like Kjellén includes references within the texts – for example, ‘(Rohrback 1912)’ – however, the book also has a section called Literatur (330–339), divided into the main subjects of the book, but the works are ordered by year of publication, not alphabetically.

There is no indication of any consent by Kjellén to Haushofer to edit, rewrite or extend ‘Die Großmächte’. They had been in contact by correspondence at least in 1917 (Stoakes 1986: 141; Spang 2013: 151, note 314). In an interview with the conservative, but anti-Nazi, Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet published 4 November 1935, Karl Haushofer refers to Kjellén as his ‘venerated teacher’, but also informs that he is preparing the 25th edition of ‘his’ [i.e. Kjellén’s] Stormakterna (Edström, Björk and Lundén 2014: 52; see also Björk, ‘Rudolf Kjellén’s Great Power Studies: The Editions’, this volume). It is not clear from Haushofer’s interview what the ‘editing’ of Kjellén’s book would imply. But as indicated above, already in the 22nd edition Haushofer had made changes to Kjellén’s original manuscript and added new chapters. In the 23rd edition, written before the Nazi takeover in 1933, it is already clear that it is not just a reprint but an apprehension, or even a kidnapping, of Kjellén’s name and

theories.

The Indian professor of geopolitics, M.M. Puri, commented on Haushofer’s relation to Kjellén’s Stormakterna: ‘One of his classical works, The Great Powers, which originally appeared probably in 1916 if not earlier, was reissued by Nazi Germany in the 1930s, in German, and with amendments and distortions that could not have emanated from or been allowed by Kjellén had he been alive then’ (Puri 1990: 44; cited in Häggman 1998: 100).

German Views on Haushofer’s Scholarship Compared to Ratzel and Kjellén

In 1935, the Swedish scientific journal Geografiska Annaler published a review in German by J. Sölch of Raumüberwindende Mächte edited by Karl Haushofer. It is a lengthy and critical review with the characterization: a great number of different authors, disconnected, uneven. Concerning Haushofer, the reviewer remarks (139): ‘Then K. Haushofer begins to speak for a “Final reflection” (including a heading: National Socialism as a world-encompassing or spatially enclosed phenomenon). … Besides, the Geopolitik has here forcefully distanced itself from the original meaning of the word in the mind of Kjellén. K. Haushofer’s latest, just published book is called World Politics’.¹⁴

In the introduction, ‘Einführung in das Problem’ [Introduction to the problem] (p.3), Haushofer asks himself how Kjellén would have acted to the developments after the World War after writing Die Politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges (1916). Concerning ‘Fragen der Raumanschauung’ [Problems of spatial aspect] he would have concentrated on the ‘Raum’ [(terrestrial) space]. This is the only mention of Rudolf Kjellén in the whole book. Haushofer’s tendency to emphasize Raum at the expense of Blut [blood] is clear in his interview in Svenska Dagbladet mentioned earlier.

During the Second World War, two German scholars published books related to Haushofer and mentioning Kjellén. Andreas Dorpalen, an exiled historian residing in the USA, wrote and edited a book on Karl Haushofer, including excerpts from his writings. In the introduction, Herman Beukema, professor at the US Military Academy, writes about defeated Germany after 1918: ‘German savants borrowed heavily – and discriminately – from such foreigners as Kjellén, Mahan and Mackinder in preparing their own thesis. For this new – and very old – field of research, Kjellén had earlier coined the name “Geopolitics”’ (Beukema 1942: xii).

Dorpalen in the introduction on Haushofer paints a picture of a ‘fabulous septuagenarian who has been called everything from Hitler’s idea man to the man who in the end will take the Führer’s place’ (Dorpalen 1942: xxi). In his selection of Haushofer’s writings there are some references to Kjellén – for example, from an anthology from 1936, referring briefly to Kjellén’s definition of geopolitics (Dorpalen 1942: 23f; Kjellén 1916b, 1918); a book on Japan from 1921, where Haushofer accuses Germany of not understanding space, of forgetting Ratzel and Richthofen, ‘and when we finally did listen to their echo among foreigners – the Swede Kjellén, the Englishmen Johnston and Mackinder, Americans, and Russians – the world tribunal of history rejected our plea as too late’ (Dorpalen 1942: 38). In another Haushofer article (1926–27), on how Germany can regain its living space, he refers to Kjellén as being a Swede to point at the problem of internal German divisions, culturally defined by the three main rivers (Dorpalen 1942: 40; Kjellén 1917a; see also Das Problem der drei Flüsse mentioned by Janáč 2012, and below).

Dorpalen devoted two pages (52–54) to Kjellén, depicting him as a political science developer of Ratzel’s theses not accepted by geographers. ‘But Kjellén went beyond Ratzel’ by adding four other aspects of the life of the state, which have to be harmoniously correlated. He refers to the German 1924 edition of Der Staat als Lebensform, saying about the other forms ‘as a household …, as a people in its national and racial characteristics, as a social community’ (Dorpalen 1942: 41), while Kjellén had said ‘som hushåll, som folk, som samhälle’ [as a household, as a people, as a society], and ‘Power is in fact more important to the continued existence of the state than law’ (Kjellén 1916a: 36, emphasis in the

original). Dorpalen concludes:

The objections raised against Ratzel’s organic theory apply here too. Ratzel found it useful in order to explain Germany’s demands for territorial expansion. Kjellén used it in addition in order to endorse his anti-liberal views with doctrine that regarded the state not as a creation to further the welfare of its citizens, but as a purpose in itself. Kjellén’s concept of the state thus reveals itself as a direct forerunner of the Nazi state theory, and there can be no doubt that it did exercise a strong influence on German political thought. At the same time, it provided an important source for the ‘theory’ of Geopolitik. (Dorpalen 1942: 54)

Under the heading ‘The “Geopolitik” of Karl Haushofer’, Dorpalen writes:

Although Kjellén exercised his strongest influence on German geopoliticians as practical political analyst and advocate of German Lebensraum [with an endnote reference to Kjellén 1918 and 1916b], his contributions to the ‘theory’ of Geopolitik should not be underestimated. By broadening Ratzel’s organic theory of the state, he confirmed to Haushofer what the latter had already learned in Japan, that in order to analyse a political situation accurately, economic, social, cultural and national factors must likewise be taken into account. Thus, although Haushofer adopted for his ‘discipline’, the term ‘Geopolitik’, which Kjellén wanted to cover merely the territorial aspect of the state [reference to Kjellén 1917b: 45], he nevertheless agreed with the Swedish scholar that Ratzel’s concept of the state was too narrow. In Haushofer’s statement that Geopolitik is concerned with everything that affects, ‘directly or indirectly, the culture, power and economics of a state, and the struggle for power over the spaces of the earth’, the impact of Kjellén’s thesis is unmistakable. And as champions of world power for the Reich, the German geopoliticians naturally concurred with Kjellén in regarding power as the most important attribute of the state. The definition of Geopolitik as the doctrine of power on earth is in complete accord with Kjellén’s concept of politics. (Dorpalen 1942: 55)

Dorpalen rightly sketches Kjellén’s enlargement of Ratzel’s ideas into a more comprehensive ‘theory’ (quotation-marked by Dorpalen) of the active state, and Haushofer’s adoption of this wider aspect into ‘Geopolitik’. But in using his anti-liberal views to deny any interest in the welfare of its citizens, Dorpalen totally misinterprets Kjellén (see Björk, Edström and Lundén, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: Academic, Publicist, Politician’, this volume). And in not mentioning Kjellén’s total denunciation of ‘blood’ and adding ‘racial characteristics’, referring to a 1924 edition of Der Staat als Lebensform, he misses the reason why Kjellén was never used by the Nazi rulers (and also why Dorpalen, in 1942, totally overestimated Haushofer’s role in Germany).¹⁵ In the Foreword to Dorpalen’s posthumous book German History in Marxist Perspective, Georg G. Iggers writes:

With the World of General Haushofer, Geopolitics in Action, also published in 1942, Dorpalen entered the field of German studies. … the work combines an analysis of the doctrines of geopolitics with a reproduction of important selections not only from Haushofer but also from earlier theorists – Germans such as the geographer Friedrich Ratzel and non-Germans as the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder and the Swedish Germanophile historian Rudolf Kjellen, who combined an advocacy of imperialist expansion with geographical theory. (Iggers 1985: 12)

In a book originally published (but destroyed) in 1944, and finally posthumously published in 1951, Albrecht Haushofer compares Ratzel and Kjellén, pointing out deficiencies in Kjellén’s definition of geopolitik, and that his organismic view of the state has created bewilderment. He also, and importantly, points at the fact that Kjellén only sees one political actor, the state, ‘without considering, that the state is only one of several political organizations’.¹ Haushofer Jr further asserts that the ideas of Kjellén have been rejected by political scientists but taken up by geographers, who have led them into historical philosophy, which they should refrain from. ‘Spurred by Ratzel and Kjellén, and decisively instigated by the experience of the World War and the peace treaties of 1919, the newest political geography and geopolitics in Germany has developed’ (Haushofer [1944] 1951: 17f.). Haushofer Jr further asserts that Kjellén has not had any following in Sweden, where only Sten De Geer is of geopolitical

interest.

Kjellén’s Legacy in Small States – before and during the Second World War

Two Contributions in Swedish

The first account of political geography in Swedish after Kjellén’s death was written by the Finnish¹⁷ geographer, sociologist and diplomat, Ragnar Numelin: Politisk geografi, 1927. It is a small book covering a survey of the whole field, including German, French and Anglo-American contributions. Ratzel’s work is characterized by its heavy terminology, material wealth and loose method, but also by its richness in ingenious and fruitful ideas. About Kjellén, Numelin asserts that he mistakes organism for organization, but he holds that Kjellén’s research in political science with a geographical accent is one of the most idearich and juicy fruits of Ratzelian thoughts. Concerning Haushofer’s Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, Numelin summarizes a strong impact of the journal’s political preponderance at the expense of the scientific account.

Numelin’s book was followed ten years later, in 1937, by a study by the Swedish political scientist Edvard Thermaenius, ‘Geopolitik och politisk geografi’ [Geopolitics and political geography]. In the introduction, the author mentions Haushofer’s visit to Sweden in 1935 (see above), giving reverence to his ‘teacher’ Kjellén but supposing that he and Sweden are like the prophet and his fatherland. Thermaenius then asserts that Kjellén is today in disrepute but was held in high esteem in the early and mid-1910s, even among people who did not share his views. His geopolitik was political geography with emphasis on the political side. After his death, very little has been published on the theme in Swedish, except for Numelin’s Politisk geografi (mentioned above). Concerning the semantic history of the subject of geopolitics, Thermaenius refers to Kjellén’s Inledning till Sveriges geografi [Introduction to the geography of Sweden, 1900], where Kjellén began to see the states not as legal entities but as

powers. Modern political geography starts with Ratzel, who never managed to create logic. This is where Kjellén creates an order that indisputably makes him the creator of geopolitics. Thermaenius, however, sees the difference between political geography and geopolitics as minimal and unimportant. Concerning Kjellén’s and Ratzel’s organismic view of the state, Thermaenius cites Supan¹⁸ and Numelin in their view that it is a false metaphor, and asserts that in most cases the word ‘organization’ would be better to describe the character of their main object, the active state.

Concerning contemporary German geopolitics, Thermaenius states that it is vehemently political, and can rather be regarded as propaganda for the renovation of the German great power than an academic science. Geopolitical literature is now splitting into two fractions, one faithful, geopolitical, the other scientific. Haushofer leads the first. It is a type of Lebenanschauung (life outlook), aiming at becoming a faith and the geographical conscience of the state. In an English-language article, Thermaenius points out that while Kjellén saw geopolitics as one among five aspects of governance, the Haushofer school compressed all aspects into geopolitics: ‘Kjellén himself acknowledged this “German” use of the term – by complaining of its being misused’ (Thermaenius 1938: 166; and Kristof 1960, footnotes 23, 25).¹ Thermaenius also refers to Haushofer’s propagandistic use of maps. Finally, he discusses the reasons why the geopolitics discourse in Sweden more or less died with Kjellén: it is obviously of a geopolitical nature, but Sweden has no geopolitical aspirations, so the subject is not important at home. This was even confirmed by Kjellén, who had denied any irredentist claims by Sweden (Kjellén 1915: 196–97).²

Two Comments on the Brink of the Second World War

Shortly before the German occupation of his country, the Danish geographer Gudmund Hatt wrote a collection of lectures with dates of publication given. The text was originally published in Danish in the Berlingske Aftenavis, 1 March 1940, 9–11, and reprinted in the book Kampen om magten: Geopolitiske strejflys, 1940, and translated into Swedish as Kampen om makten: Geopolitiska

strövtåg [The fight for power: Geopolitical rambles], 1941. According to Hatt, the word ‘geopolitics’ was first used by the Swedish political scientist and geographer Rudolf Kjellén. Ratzel is the sine qua non for Kjellén. In Germany, too much has been written by Ratzel’s followers about the state as a spatial organism. One should in particular warn against the conception that small states should always represent primitive stages of development, and larger states more advanced stages, as it would consequently be the natural fate of small states to be swallowed up by the large states. Ratzel’s works are free from the political ballast that characterizes what the geopoliticians write. In Ratzel’s works the air is high, chilly, impersonal. But the dissertations by the geopoliticians are too often interventions in the political fight, and they do not wish to be anything else. And the German geopoliticians’ propaganda is so obvious and unmasked that it can hardly fool (vilseleda) any alert (vaken) reader. Hatt continued his comments on geopolitics on the radio and in journals during the German occupation of Denmark, but was forced to resign from his position as professor in 1948 based on an allegation of being a fellow traveller (Larsen 2011, 2013).

Shortly before Estonia’s occupation by, and annexation to, the Soviet Union, Rudolf Kjellén’s book Staten som lifsform was published in Estonian as Riik kui eluvorm, with a foreword by Edgar Kant (1940), geographer and then vicechancellor of Tartu University. An interpretative comment by Dr Mart Kuldkepp (2015), University College London:

To Kant, the book is Kjellén’s most important contribution, summarizing everything he had up to then written on theoretical and practical politics, finalizing into one unit – ‘a statal worldview’. In this book Kjellén finally abandoned ‘a legalistic view of the state’ and the philosophy of the Manchester school, and created political science as an autonomous discipline not dependent on history, jurisprudence or any other school of thought. Kant further dwells on Kjellén’s concept of the state as an active ‘person’, fighting for its existence and running into conflict with others.

Kant further emphasizes Kjellén’s distinction between nations [=peoples], which

have emotions, society and economics (which have interests), and state and government (which have duties). Against the emotional aspirations of the nation, the state sets its rationalism – against class struggle its institutions, and against societal lack of freedom its legal order.

According to Kant, Kjellén has said that his book, to Swedish readers, is an introduction to political reality. Smaller nations around the Baltic Sea have often appreciated a kind of ‘idealism’ that is illusory, and Kjellén warns against it. Kant says it is time to wake up and look reality in the eyes and see it as it is, especially during the hard times that have struck all of us.

A Comment from Neutral Switzerland

It seems as if Nazified Europe generally ignored Kjellén (and, to some extent also, Haushofer father and son). But in a Swiss geographical journal Der Schweizer Geograph, Oberstdivisionär (general) Hans Frey, a member of the geographical society of Berne, under the rather challenging title ‘Geographie, Krieg, Geopolitik’ [Geography, war, geopolitics], discusses the value of the discipline of geography for understanding the territorial dispositions relating to warfare (Frey 1943). Referring to Hitler’s and Hess’s reading of Ratzel in the Landsberg prison in 1924, Frey writes that the scientific endeavour turned into politics: ‘What was striven for in a scientific way turned into political events during the war … Geopolitik has taken its name and many theories from the book Staten som lifsform. It was translated from Swedish into German in 1917’²¹ (Frey 1943: 5). By ‘Geopolitik’, Frey evidently refers to the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.

While the Haushofer school’s connection to National Socialism is clearly underlined by Frey, the value of geopolitical reasoning is emphasized, but so also are its failures in prediction. Referring to a geopolitical report in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik in 1933 by Albrecht Haushofer, the prospects for an Axis Berlin– Rome is questioned on the basis of a common interest in Südtirol, and a Lehre

(teaching) from Kjellén’s Der Staat als Lebensform is cited: ‘The nations cannot measure each other with the same yardsticks as they measure themselves. Each time, when it concerns themselves, interest is at play, and that makes a difference’ (Kjellén 1917b: 117). To this, Frey further adds another citation by Kjellén; during the 1914–18 war he himself found that ‘often every hope had disappeared of finding a sense of truth and justice among the nations’ (Kjellén 1916a: 96).²² Frey then comments: ‘So by a co-creator of the Geopolitik. What he says will be subsumed as an excuse under the concept of reason of State’ (Frey 1943: 6).²³

References to Kjellén and Haushofer after the Second World War in Sweden and Finland

Sven Björnsson, a Lund University geographer, wrote the word ‘Geopolitik’ for Svensk Uppslagsbok [Swedish encyclopedia], 2nd edition, 1947–1955.²⁴ Björnsson, who died in 1950, devotes a large space to the academic scholarship of Rudolf Kjellén. He also mentions Kjellén’s good repute in Germany, calling him the father of German geopolitics, but he refers to the Lebensraum concept as influenced by Mackinder’s Heartland theory (Cf. Bassin 2005: 219; Klinke and Bassin 2018). Like Thermaenius, he divides German geopolitics into two schools: one more scientific, represented by Haußleiter, Hennig and Grabowski, which under Nazism succumbed under the other one, led by Haushofer, and characterized by Björnsson as quasi-scientific, using falsifying cartographic methods. With the exception of Björnsson, Kjellén is only occasionally mentioned in Sweden by Uppsala political scientists, in histories of the Skyttean Department, or in evaluations of his alleged extremist values (mentioned in Björk, Edström and Lundén, ‘Rudolf Kjellén: Academic, Publicist, Politician’, this volume).

The Myth of a Swedish Irredenta

In Kjellén’s time there was a vivid academic interaction between Sweden and Finland, one country until 1809. Finnish historian Matti Klinge, in his book Från lojalism till rysshat [From loyalism to Russophobia] 1988 (translated from Finnish), refers to Kjellén’s influence in Finland. Under the heading ‘Politik som naturvetenskap – energiprincip och organismanalogi’ [Politics as natural science – the principle of energy and the organismic analogy], Klinge refers to Ostwald’s theory on energy.²⁵ The ‘new concession to the natural science way of thinking: politics. The Swede Rudolf Kjellén’s book Stormakterna had taken the step from descriptive politology into a research method looking for cause and effect’. Citations from contemporary press in Finland show that educated youth in Finland adopted with interest the geopolitical view that Kjellén had lain down. According to Klinge:

Kjellén further developed his system of science [lärosystem] in the 1910s, and he was also an active writer during the First World War. At this time, his works were also published in Finnish. Evidently his production was followed in Finland, particularly as he rather often dealt with problems concerning Russia and Sweden. In his collection Politiska essayer I [Political essays I], which appeared in 1914, he deals with the position of small states in Europe, immediately reaching the astonishing conclusion that the consolidation of the small states was still going on. When, in addition to that, he concluded that the road to sovereignty almost always went through autonomy, this article certainly gave impulses to the generation of young Finns, who after the outbreak of the World War pondered over questions of national/ism and world politics. (Klinge 1988: 205–9)

Under the heading ‘De svenskspråkigas 1910-tal: germanism och conservatism’ (220) [The 1910s of the Swedish-speakers: Germanism and conservatism], Klinge writes:

In his book Politiska essayer III [Political Essays III] from 1915, the … influential right-wing politician Rudolf Kjellén treated Finland as a Swedish irredenta, but in the end he took exception from irredentist thinking. It did not

exist in Sweden, but most probably in the Russians’ fantasies. But already in January 1916, Kjellén, addressing a German public, clearly defined the Swedishspeaking areas of Finland: Schweden hat hier eine ‘Irredenta’ [Sweden has an ‘Irredenta’ here]. (Klinge 1988: 226)

Klinge does not clarify his source for this last conclusion.² Klinge’s reading of Kjellén here is strange. Kjellén’s whole article is a clear denial of any irredentist aspirations from Sweden. On pages 196–98 he writes: ‘The Swedes in Finland live in bad territorial connection with each other and with no connection at all with Swedes across the state border. From the Finnish side we have never heard of a sign of longing for “redemption” in this direction, even less of any programmatic striving for it. But now comes the astonishing thing: our clear conscience in the matter does not help us to escape from the suspicion! … A “Suecia irredenta” in Finland has very weak preconditions on the map, and even less in the people’s soul. Nonetheless it does exist in the Russian imagination’ (emphases in the original).²⁷

A doctoral dissertation by a Swedish historian of ideas gave a new impetus to the Finnish ideas of a Kjellénian irredentist idea towards Finland. Christer Nordlund, in ‘Det upphöjda landet’, refers to Kjellén under a heading ‘Alternative voices concerning changes in [water] levels’ as

the statistician, geographer and young-right-man Rudolf Kjellén” … Influenced by the anthropogeographer Friedrich Ratzel (and probably also by De Geer²⁸), land rise was a leading component in the so called science (lära) of geopolitics [reference to Kjellén 1900: 17]. The foundation of geopolitics, as designed by Kjellén, was that each nation [Nordlund uses this word in Swedish] functioned as an organism, the nature which determined – or at least ought to determine – the political development. For the needs of the Swedish nation, its present territory was too small, and the most natural was that Scandinavia including Finland should form a common Fennoscandia. The Baltic Sea was not a throat, it was a bridge (brygga), and if not, the land rise should take care of that. (Reference to Kjellén 1900: 174–75, cited in Nordlund 2001: 131)

A check with Kjellén 1900 shows that on pages 16–17 there is nothing about land rise; rather the pages are about the relationship between space and time, man and the earth, nature and culture, and their mutual dependencies. On pages 174–78 he discusses the concept of Fennoscandia with reference to the Finnish geologist Ramsay, and ‘that Scandinavia and Finland … were modelled from the same enormous plate of ancient rock, shared geological destinies, shared the burden of the same glaciation and since then in the same way strived again to escalate to the level of balance’. He then refutes that this could be used as to ‘benefit’ (gagna) as precedence in a geopolitical respect. Instead, ‘the experiences of history can gain a deeper meaning (innebörd)’, and ‘Another geopolitical sentence: to a great power the Baltic Sea itself is less a border than a bridge (brygga)’ (emphases in the original).

The great power is definitely not Sweden, it is Russia. Kjellén makes a comparison with Korea, referring to Russia’s pressure and the power balance between the great powers. Nordlund further uses the word the Swedish ‘nation’ as a territorial concept, which is contrary to Kjellén’s notion of nation as a people. Nordlund’s careless reading of Kjellén is adopted by Jukka Nyyssönen in his article ‘Väinö Tanner and the Idea of Fennoscandia’: ‘Tanner’s Fennoscandian project also lacked the aspect of Swedish expansionism à la geopolitician Rudolf Kjellén, who envisaged for Sweden a sufficiently large and natural territory in Fennoscandia, which would include Finland’ (Nyyssönen 2017: 323). By using Nordlund as source, Nyyssönen mediates a factoid about Kjellén’s irredentism (see above, and Klinge 1988; Nordlund 2001).

Kimmo Katajala, in ‘Finland – the last outpost of Western Civilization?’ (2014), refers to Kjellén in the following way:

Ratzel’s ideas greatly influenced the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), who in turn had a remarkable influence on Political Science and Geography at the turn of the century. The title of Kjellén’s most significant book, The State as a Living Form (1916), illuminates the core of his thoughts

effectively. He was able to place the old metaphor of the state as an organism in a biological and Darwinist context. Thus, according to Matti Klinge, these ideas – together with racial and nationalist corollaries – had a strong influence on the arts, social sciences, literature and philosophy in general. These ideas were adopted in Swedish-speaking circles around the turn of the century. Meanwhile, Kjellén published and presented his views on what he called ‘Geo-politics’ very actively during the first two decades of the 20th century so that they also became known among Swedish-speaking Finnish intellectuals. Although the associated racial ideologies were not widely supported in nineteenth-century Finland, they did gain wider currency as the ideas of Kjellén and others regarding the organic nature of states and nations became better known and more generally supported in Finland. … the influence of German thought on political science was strong in Sweden, as the example of Kjellén demonstrates. The Germans also deliberately spread Russophobic and pro-Germanic ideas into Sweden in the hope that the country might become an ally against Russia. (Katajala 2014: 302–3)

While Kjellén was obviously influenced by German thoughts on political science, and certainly had a wider scope on its subject than a purely legalistic one, these thoughts were not shared by many of his peers. Kjellén strongly condemned any essentialist racism, but his views on Russian politics (before and after the revolutions) were clearly very negative. In Staten som lifsform he deplores that the internal conflicts between Swedish- and Finnish-speakers in Finland had decreased their common fear for Russification, affecting all peoples in the imperial borderlands (Kjellén 1916a: 82). He had no irredentist aspirations for Sweden towards Finland, not even towards the Åland Islands. Asked by activist Carl Sundbeck shortly before his death, Kjellén referred to the Åland Islands as belonging to the bishopric of Åbo [Turku] before 1809, an indication of its connection to Finland (Sundbeck 1924: 21–22).

That Kjellén’s geopolitical theories, especially the role of nation-building and of small states, played an important role in national discourses in Finland around the turn of the twentieth century, directly and through translations and interpretations, but also quickly dismissed and forgotten, is elaborated in an article by Soikkanen (1991) and further discussed and evaluated by Roitto, Karonen and Ojala (2018) in an article on geopolitics and identity. In contrast to

the ‘Swedish irredentist myths’ discussed above, it is Kjellén’s analysis of the great powers, particularly the Russian threat, Baltic relations to Germany and their impact on Sweden – and, as a corollary, to Finland – that is given importance. Many of the references are to scholars represented in this volume.

Kristof and Grabowsky – Interpreters of Kjellén

In his 1960 article, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics’, Ladis Kristof devotes several columns under the heading Misunderstood Geopoliticians and Misused Geopolitics to defend Kjellén’s metaphorical interpretation of the state as an organism:

Kjellén, always considered the chief villain of the organic theory, seems to make clear from the beginning that he treats the state as a living body. His state has a life, growth, old age and a time of death. It has also both a body and a soul and is object to the laws of life. But ultimately, and despite Kjellén’s use of an organictheory vocabulary, one cannot but conclude that he speaks in a metaphor. The individual and the nation are to him more important than the state. The nation can survive the disappearance of the state, but the state ‘loses all hope’ of revival if the nation becomes extinct. Hence ‘the state appears to be an accidental being while the nation is the true being’. But not even the nation – a multitude united into one living being – is the most important factor in the life of the state. Kjellén reaches a conclusion that is ‘both from the practical and theoretical point of view of immeasurable importance: the life of the state is, ultimately, in the hands of the individuals’. (Kristof 1960: 21–28, with refererences to Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, 1917: 218–20)

Kristof further states that Kjellén’s state is not even remotely given the sovereign status of Hegel’s Weltgeist or Marx’s ‘material forces’ (Kristof 1960: 22). His lengthy and learned discussion of Kjellén and Ratzel does not, unfortunately, seem to have evoked further interest in the Anglo-Saxon world, with the

exception of a few articles mentioned below. Kristof gives a clue: ‘The philosophical distance between America and continental Europe (especially Germany and Russia), together with a peculiar American distrust of metaphysical thinking, led to much misunderstanding of some of the European political and geopolitical writings’ (ibid.).

An example of Kristof’s explanation about the difference in German and American intellectual culture is given by Adolf Grabowsky (1960), returning from his exile in Switzerland and publishing a book Raum, Staat und Geschichte [Space, state and history] with the subtitle Grundlegung der Geopolitik [Foundation of geopolitics]. Kjellén is given much credit, and in the preface Grabowsky says: ‘I have welcomed that almost fifty years ago the excellent Swedish researcher Rudolf Kjellén created the concept of geopolitics, but since then I have greatly deplored that this word came into disrepute through the unscholarliness of those in Germany who misused it for a policy of conquest’ (ibid.: 7).²

Grabowsky’s style is in a way similar to Kjellén’s (and Ratzel’s), in being full of references to facts, ideas and examples. His main appreciation for Kjellén is his emphasis as a political scientist on the state as an active agent in space and time, while he sees the influence of geography on Kjellén’s geopolitics as being void of the historical aspect. In spite of this, he refers to the geographer Hettner’s (1927) appreciative words about Kjellén and his condemnation of a spaceless politology (Grabowsky 1960: 13), while in the first chapter Ratzel is dismissed as being from geography, not politics. In dealing with Kjellén (ibid.: 23–24), Grabowsky sees in Kjellén’s reasoning – based on Die Großmächte der Gegenwart – a semantic difference between the state (der Staat) and the realm (das Reich), with the Reich as the highest form of territorial existence, not measured in area, but ‘a building of great architecture, immersed by modern, rational powers, to which nonetheless certain irrational remains are attached’.³ In Grabowsky’s reading, the great powers seems to conquer nature, hence his downplaying of ‘geography’.

In his strong condemnation of Haushofer’s work (which he admits, had not much influence on Nazi German territorial advances), Grabowsky underlines that geopolitics is a method, not a Normenwissenschaft (Grabowsky 1960: 142–43). Kjellén does not explicitly call geopolitics a method, but by putting it within a framework of different aspects of a state’s activities, he definitely puts it within the set of methods of political science (ibid.: 148). But in the domination of the territory (Raumüberwindung), the different historical forces interact into a type of nature. Grabowsky, in interpreting, underlines that Kjellén was not a great systematician nor a philosopher of history, but this interaction of forces has to be methodically investigated. With the example of explaining Guatemalas’s situation, Grabowsky suggests using the Kjellénian concepts of physiopolitik, morphopolitik, and topopolitik, but adds the country’s numerical and ‘energetical’ size (ibid.: 150).

Grabowsky’s appreciation of Kjellén is mixed with a depreciation of the role of geography (interpreted as the discipline or its object) in geopolitics, a view that was already apparent in his 1933 book, Raum als Schicksal. Even if there is in Kjellén an increasing tendency to claim geopolitics for political science, Grabowsky’s standpoint seems much influenced by the dark story of Nazi-era German geopolitics, mainly carried out by geographers.³¹ It is perhaps no wonder that his book is not mentioned in a German standard work on political geography, K.-A. Boesler, Politische Geographie (1983).

In their influential reader Contending Theories of International Relations, published in 1971, James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff write:

Rudolf Kjellen (1864–1922), a Swedish geographer, first used the term ‘geopolitics’ when describing the geopolitical bases of national power. Adhering to an organic theory of the state, he held that states, like animals in Darwinian Theory, engage in a relentless struggle for survival. States have boundaries, a capital, and lines of communication, as well as a consciousness and a culture. Though Kjellen writes metaphysically and imputes to the state the quality of a living organism, he nevertheless concludes that ‘the life of the state is,

ultimately, in the hands of the individuals’. He considered the emergence of a few great powers a result of efforts [by] strong states to expand. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971: 55)

The main reference is to Rudolf Kjellen, Der Staat als Lebensform (1917b, 218– 20), but much is evidently from Kristof 1960, cited above.

In a Swiss dissertation from 1977, ‘Friedrich Ratzels politische Geographie und der Staat’ [The political geography of Friedrich Ratzel and the state], Hans Brummer compares Ratzel to Kjellén, emphasizing that with a Social Darwinian approach the concept of state under international law (Völkerrecht) – the state as a power – comes to the fore in relation to that of constitutional law – the state as a legal entity. Brummer further states that ‘Kjellén supremely exceeds Ratzel in his theoretical penetration of the subject, and so there can be no question of any master–student relationship’ (Brummer 1977, 89–90).³²

Post-Cold War Treatment of Kjellén’s Geopolitics Based on German Sources

In his Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion (1986), Geoffrey Stoakes writes:

During the First World War, Haushofer maintained his interest in geopolitics by reading the works of the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, with whom he also corresponded. At one stage he contemplated undertaking research with Kjellén after the war was over’ (ibid.: 141).³³ … Although Haushofer was greatly impressed by the works of the Americans A.T. Mahan and Brooks Adams, and by the British geographer Halford J. Mackinder, his ideas on geopolitics were derived mainly from the German scholar Friedrich Ratzel, whose somewhat diffuse observations appear only to have been classified by Rudolf Kjellén,

Haushofer’s Swedish correspondent and mentor. (Ibid.: 147)

Stoakes builds his verdict on a 1929 paper by Otto Maull.³⁴

Klaus Kost, in his 1988 dissertation, defines his study of the influence of geopolitics on the research and theory of political geography (in Germany) until 1945 as focused on four themes: the Lebensraum ideology; political Great Space (Großraum) intentions linked to the concept of Mitteleuropa; geographical determinism; and ‘worldviews and world outlooks as a product of the postWorld War feeling of a cultural crisis’ (Kost 1988: 11).

Kjellén is referred to in about fifty instances, including almost twenty pages directly about his work. Because of Kost’s focus, only those aspects of Kjellén’s scholarship that had an impact on German geography and geopolitics until 1945 are discussed, especially works that could be used for enhancing Germany’s right to world power. As a consequence, Staten som lifsform, which is perhaps Kjellén’s scientifically most recognized book (used by Kost in the posthumous 4th German edition of 1924) is downplayed as an intermediate in relation to his more Germanophile and emotional publications. Kost also lessens Kjellén’s dependence on Ratzel, pointing out that his view of geopolitics was only one of several aspects of the active state. He further asserts that while Kjellén strongly maintained political science’s right to the object (the state as an active territory) against geography, it was from the social sciences (sociology, law and politology) that Kjellén’s theories were heavily criticized (especially by Haußleiter, 1925), while geographers like Walter Vogel, in a response in 1926, defended them. In the following years, and into the Nazi regime, Kjellén was used as a ‘neutral’ scientific witness by German geographers.

As almost hagiographically depicted by pre-1946 (and mainly pre-1934) German geography, Kjellén in Kost’s interpretation turns out to be an emotional, unscientific, undemocratic and uncritical Germanophile. But other, and more scientifically valuable, aspects of his scholarship are neglected by the

conservative and Nazi geographers, and consequently by Kost (see also Stogiannos, discussed near the end of this chapter).

Frank Ebeling, in Geopolitik: Karl Haushofer und seine Raumwirtschaft (1994), discusses Ratzel’s influence on Kjellén and their differences, but clearly points out that it was Kjellén who developed Ratzel’s ideas, using a much more differentiated view on ‘the state’, where geopolitics was only one of several factors, all influencing each other. It was not a monocausal, deterministic theory of the state. Ebeling sees Kjellén’s ‘Staatslehre’ as an attempt to wield empirical findings and political-philosophical theory into a concept of the state as an agent. Each of the factors should in cooperation lead to a harmonious relation between the state and its contents, nature, culture and inhabitants. As to the evaluation of the war as part of the geopolitik, Ebeling asserts that Ratzel’s view of the war as a ubiquitous (allgegenwärtig) element was modified by Kjellén to be seen not as a natural condition but as a break in the temporal development of the state (Ebeling 1994: 49–51).

Rainer Sprengel, in Kritik der Geopolitik: Ein deutscher Diskurs 1914–1944 (1996), defines his intention to analyse German geopolitics as discourse of Raum (space) and Zeit (time), and, as a corollary, the dichotomous ‘nature’ (often simplified as ‘geography’) and ‘culture’ (‘history’ and ‘political science’) (Sprengel 1996: 12). Sprengel describes the German reaction to Kjellén’s concept of geopolitics, the first critical review by geographers and the more positive evaluations by historians and political scientists. During the (First) World War, Kjellén became better known and more highly esteemed in Germany with the translations of his works, but Sprengel sees his evaluation more in the light of his accentuation of political science as an independent discipline and of his Germanophile leaning than of his discussion of geopolitics. However, Kjellén’s prophecy of a planetary era, and the concept of world power, was adopted by Adolf Grabowsky as early as 1914.³⁵ But in spite of a number of reviews of Kjellén’s work, there was no active geopolitical discourse until around 1924. Sprengel mentions the ‘Kjellén–Haushofer’ edition of 1930 as an attempt by the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik group to represent the ‘criticalauthentic’ continuation of Kjellén’s work (ibid.: 26–32).

In his chapter Der Staat und die politische Gemeinschaft als Organismus [The state and the political community as an Organism], Sprengel devotes several pages to Kjellén’s concept of organism, based on his discussion in Der Staat als Lebensform, and to the rather different interpretations in German geopolitical discourse, especially by Hennig and Maull. In other chapters, Sprengel compares Kjellén’s ideas on nature, the relation between individual and nation, and so on, to scholars like Sombart, Kant and, of course, Ratzel (Sprengel 1996: 133–37). In the sub-chapter titled ‘Allerlei Verwirrung’ statt Raumdeterminismus [‘Diverse confusion’ instead of spatial determinism], Sprengel returns to Kjellén’s Staat als Lebensform and points out the contradiction between Kjellén’s deterministic comprehension of the ‘nature side’ of the state, and the ‘culture side’, which includes politics. But in the end Kjellén endorses the political side, while his later followers take different stands (ibid.: 171). Much of Sprengel’s discourse related to Kjellén is about the relation between ‘geography’, interpreted as natural determinism, space and nature, and ‘political science’, interpreted as time and freedom of action. Another dichotomy in the geopolitical discourse is between ‘Volk’ and ‘Rasse’, where Sprengel put both Ratzel and Kjellén together with Mackinder, Maull and Hennig in their definition of Volk as a ‘(Kultur-) Nation’, with little or no influence from racial concepts (ibid.: 192f).

Christian Spang, in his enormous volume on Haushofer and Japan (2013), devotes a few pages on Kjellén, mainly based on the German version of Der Staat als Lebensform, interpreting his ideas as a combination of social Darwinism with Ratzel’s interpretation of Lebensraum, in challenging the new idea of international law. He further denotes Kjellén’s ideas of the expansionistic state that was willingly taken up by Haushofer (Spang 2013: 227f). While mentioning Kjellén among proponents of the state as an organism, and dependent on geographical factors, he does not include Kjellén in those scholars seeing international politics as a fight for Lebensraum (ibid.: 232).

Kjellén in Modern Anglo-Saxon Interpretations

In the English-speaking world just before the ‘return of geopolitics’, the only really influential article on Kjellén based on his own life and production was written by geographer Sven Holdar in 1992 and published in Political Geography Quarterly. It is a well-balanced presentation with a few debatable assertions: for example, his alleged acceptance of the German invasion of Belgium (see Kjellén’s own wording above) and the misinterpretation of his ambiguous but in essence general acceptance of the Norwegian–Swedish border. Holdar’s paper has at best been the source for presentations in English-language books on geopolitics, such as Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (1996), who cites Kjellén’s Swedish and German titles translated into English. Ó Tuathail devotes about two pages to Kjellén under the heading ‘Rudolf Kjellen and the Linneanization of Global Space’. His description seems to be entirely based on Holdar’s paper, and is thus mainly correct, except regarding Holdar’s evaluation of Kjellén’s views on Belgium, but he refers to Thermaenius (Ó Tuathail 1996: 64) in Kjellén’s disavowal of Haushofer’s use of the concept of geopolitics. All Ó Tuathail’s references to Kjellén’s Swedish and German publications are in English translations.

David Murphy’s book The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany 1918–1933 gives hints at the impact of Kjellén’s scholarship in the teachings of Obst, Grabowsky (who ‘credited Kjellén rather than Ratzel with being the father of geopolitics’ [Murphy 1997: 6]), Vogel and others – but strangely not Haushofer. Kjellén is mentioned as the Swedish Germanophile political scientist and journalist (ibid.: ix), and when mentioning Erich Obst, Murphy writes that his teachings were based on Kjellén’s Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege, ‘a seminal geopolitical tract revised with the help of Obst for a new edition that appeared in 1932’ (ibid.: 153). In the footnote to this (ibid.: 109, 285), Murphy writes that ‘the reissuing of the work, a geopolitical standard, was undertaken by Erich Obst, Otto Maull and Hugo Hassinger, edited by Karl Haushofer. See Rudolf Kjellén, Die Grossmächte…, 2nd edition, ed. Karl Haushofer, Leipzig 1932’. The role of Haushofer in appropriating Kjellén is evidently downplayed.

Geoffrey Parker, in these four extracts from his Geopolitics Past, Present and Future (1998), writes:

The origin of geopolitics can be traced back to the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén and the German natural scientist and geographer Friedrich Ratzel. Both were active during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and, although there is no evidence that they ever met, the symbiosis of their ideas produced a new dimension of thought within the social sciences. In 1897 Ratzel’s book Politische Geographie was published. This is generally considered to be the seminal work in modern political geography, and it proved to have considerable influence on the development of the subject both in Germany and elsewhere. Most importantly, its influence on the work of Kjellén was to have far-reaching consequences in the application of geography and geographical methods to politics. (Parker 1998: 10–11)

Kjellén rapidly realized that Ratzelian thinking was an entirely new way of viewing the state, and it was this which led him to a new method of thinking and theorizing about the state and its behavior which he called Geopolitik …. Kjellén thus conceived of geopolitics as being a science which gave clarity to phenomena which had in the past been subject to conjecture and speculation. In this he echoed Ratzel’s call for complete objectivity in the study. … Without necessarily rejecting these traditionally accepted indicators of legitimacy, Kjellén’s geopolitics was founded on the proposition that there was another, and higher, form of legitimation of the state, and that this lay in its geographical space. It was the effectiveness of the state as a geographical entity which was seen as being both the most important factor in its success and the most powerful justification for its existence. … However, they both retained a partially hidden political agenda which sat ill with those principles of objectivity which they deemed to be essential. (Parker 1998: 17–19)

Ratzel was coming from the natural sciences… Kjellén, on the other hand, was coming from the social sciences, and he put the ‘geo’ in the position of being an indicative prefix. Later his thinking processes appear to have become highly

geographical, but geopolitics retained its position as part of the wider analytical system which he had devised. While this difference of terminology reflected the different emphases of two individuals, it was to have momentous consequences for the subsequent development of geopolitical study. …The origins of the gulf which opened up between the two [Politische Geographie and Geopolitik] lie in the divisions within the German geographical establishment in the years which followed World War I. The future role of the subject was much debated, and out of this debate the term geopolitik came into use to describe a particular school of thought which advocated the active participation of geographers in the affairs of the state. This distinguished them from the academic mainstream, who sought to distance political geography from politics. This divide became a chasm, and for over half a century it was to render virtually impossible the development of the study of the earth and the state along those lines which both Ratzel and Kjellén had wished it to go. (Parker 1998: 23–24)

The Geopolitik which arose in Germany after World War I had its roots in the ideas both of Ratzel and Kjellén … [Haushofer] was well aware of Kjellén’s works, and these and his correspondence with Kjellén himself influenced the formulation of his ideas’ (Parker 1998: 30–31):³ ‘Kjellén’s definition of geopolitics as “the science of the state as a realm in space” … implies not so much the study of the “relationship” between two independent phenomena as the integrated study of a single phenomenon: the state as a spatial entity. … This was something far more basic to Kjellén than the question of whether the state was organic or not’ (ibid.: 56). Twenty years after Kjellén’s death, Edvard Thermaenius expressed the opinion that Kjellén ‘had created something completely new and original, and that this was “the true science of the state as a spatial unit”’. (Parker 1998: 169)³⁷

In a recent book on Classical Geopolitics, Phil Kelly depicts the work of Ratzel and Kjellén in terms similar to those of Parker and Kristof, and provides references to these scholars (Kelly 2016: 116). Kristof’s and Parker’s treatment of Ratzel and Kjellén seem to be the most accurate ‘Anglo-Saxon’ descriptions of the relationship between the two scholars. It is strange that neither Kristof nor Parker is often mentioned in contemporary English literature on geopolitics, Kelly’s recent contribution being an important exception.

Some Recent Treatments of Kjellén’s Geopolitics

Swedish and Nordic Contributions

With the ‘return of geopolitics’, Kjellén has been cited and reviewed in Sweden and abroad. Obviously the Swedish and Nordic treatment is based on a much more varied reading of Kjellén’s books, articles and pamphlets. In her doctoral thesis, Fredrika Lagergren (1999) deals with two aspects of Rudolf Kjellén’s scholarship and political ideology: his evaluations of democracy and of biopolitics. His reserved and sceptical acceptance of democracy is less based on a statistical principle of majority rule than an idea of the ‘will of the nation’. As for his biopolitics, which has been misunderstood and ridiculed, it should be seen as a metaphor for the state to be seen as an active, ever-changing political body, dependent on power relations and resources (Lagergren 1999: 90–107).

In Katarina Schough’s Hyperboré: Föreställningen om Sveriges plats i världen [Hyperborea: The conception of Sweden’s place in the world] (2008), the author defines her basic idea in the Introduction, the hyperborean figure of thought. Several of Schough’s references to Kjellén come from his 1912 pamphlet, Sverige och utlandet [Sweden and abroad], and to his Baltic programme where he argues for a Swedish higher culture that should advance eastwards.³⁸ In the chapter Imperiedrömmar [Dreams of an empire], Kjellén’s thoughts are analysed, based on his book Sveriges geografi (1900), Stormakterna (1911–13) and several pamphlets, but not on Staten som lifsform. Schough reiterates Kjellén’s ideas about a Swedish cultural and economic advance eastwards, with a sharp frontier towards Russia and its oriental culture and races.

In a controversial book from 2012, The Explorer’s Roadmap to National Socialism: Sven Hedin, Geography and the Path to Genocide, Sarah Danielsson,

writes about Hedin’s alleged inspiration by Ratzel and continues: ‘Lebensraum and the nation was evolved further by the Swedish geographer Rudolf Kjellén in the 1920s … He argued that the nation was an organic entity and [that] the geographical conditions needed to be utilized for the betterment of the race’ (Danielsson 2012: 22).

It is difficult to find anything in these sentences that is correct. Kjellén was not a geographer, he did not use concept of Lebensraum, he died in 1922, he was not a racist in any modern sense of the word, it was the state and not the nation that he saw as an organic entity, and it was the natural resources that should be utilized for the betterment of the relation between nation [the people] and state.

A measure of the rather belittled role given to Kjellén by Nordic geographers is demonstrated by Kristian Stokke and Elin Saether, who in a 2011 article devote just one sentence to Kjellén: ‘The ideological tradition in geopolitics had a strong presence in the work of Rudolph [sic] Kjellén in Sweden and Gudmund Hatt in Denmark’ (Stokke and Saether 2011: 242; with references to Holdar 1992 and Larsen 2011).

In an article in the Nordic Journal of Law, Retfærd, Markus Gunneflo highlights two aspects of Kjellén’s scholarship: biopolitics, as a forerunner to Foucault’s discourse, and his folkhem concept and its partial relation to the Swedish social democracy (Gunneflo 2015).

The book Geopolitik 13 Försök [Geopolitics. 13 essays], edited by Mattias Hessérus and Peter Luthersson (2017), is an anthology of various articles related to the topic by young Swedish scholars. In Axel Östling’s ‘Geopolitikens begynnelse: En svensk pionjär’ [The beginning of geopolitics: A Swedish pioneer] Kjellén is described as ‘en nedrigt underskattad vetenskapsman’ [an infamously underrated scientist] in a well-balanced survey of Kjellén’s thoughts, with their combination of farsightedness and narrowness of outlook, but it contains nothing new if compared to Holdar’s survey of 1992. The author

mentions ‘the only book about Kjellén not written by a relative’ (evidently Edström, Björk and Lundén 2014), without referring to its title or reviewing it.

An interesting view of Kjellén is provided by Ingrid Wållgren’s chapter ‘Kampen för tillvaron: Rudolf Kjellén och geopolitikens rötter’ [The fight for existence: Rudolf Kjellén and the roots of geopolitics], in the same anthology, in which his life trajectory is put in relation to the influence of Darwinism and Darwin’s rejection of what would develop into social Darwinism (by the way an interesting parallel to Haushofer’s negative and vulgar appropriation of geopolitics!). Wållgren emphasizes a deep pessimistic side of Kjellén, which led to his worldview changing from idealism to realism. She also shortly discusses Ratzel’s influence on Kjellén. She has found a very interesting citation from a letter written in 1903: ‘även hos staterna skall göra sig gällande en “fitness for survival” [sic]’ [even the states are under the influence of a ‘fitness for survival’], an excellent summary of Kjellén’s view of the state as Darwinist, not social Darwinist. She also provides a good review of Staten som lifsform, comparing with [the geographer] Piotr Kropotkin, who like (and before) Kjellén put the natural conditions into the evaluation of the state, but unlike Kjellén put moral (and of course, political) aspects into his evaluation.

Worldwide Contributions

Outside of the Scandinavian-language area, the treatment of Kjellén seems very dependent on secondary sources. German-language contributions, as mentioned above, rely heavily on Kjellén’s translations and Haushofer’s treatment of his ‘teacher’, while recent English-language reviews and references often seem dependent on a small number of secondary sources. In the rest of the world, the coverage spans between misinterpretations, references to reliable sources and, in a few cases, interesting applications of Kjellén’s ideal, for example by Indian Puri and the Latin American reception analysed by Rivarola Puntigliano. However, in Hungarian and Portuguese articles, Parker is often used as the source of information on Kjellén.³

Polish geographer Piotr Eberhardt in two articles (Eberhardt 2012, 2015) analyses Kjellén’s scientific ideas in comparison with his partial master Friedrich Ratzel, based on a careful analysis of their respective works. In an anthology called Deutschland, aber wo liegt es? (Ester, Hecker and Poettgens 1993), devoted to the concept of Mitteleuropa, an article by geographer [sic] Rudolf Kjellén, ‘Das Problem der drei Flüsse: Geopolitische Konturen’, from his Studien zur Weltkrise (1917a) is copied, and referred to by Jiří Janáč (2012) in a discussion about the waterways and canal projects in the inland area of Central Europe. Kjellén is presented as the Swedish social scientist and author of probably ‘the most circulated geopolitical work throughout history’ (Janáč 2012: 35).

In Russia after 1991, the most famous interpreter of geopolitics has been Aleksander Dugin. In his Osnovy geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics], he devotes two pages (Dugin 2000: 39–41) to the ‘definer of geopolitics’, Rudolf Kjellén, who is characterized as a historian and political scientist, and who, without being a professional geographer, has developed Ratzel’s work, claiming it for politology. Dugin further refers to Kjellén’s four neologisms of geopolitics, ‘but this whole discipline … never attained a broad reception, although as a term ‘geopolitics’ has been confirmed in various circles’ (cf. Lacoste’s similar verdict below).

Dugin then in a sub-heading ‘The state as a form of life and the German interest’, refers to Kjellén’s main principles, arguing that Kjellén took Ratzel’s principles on ‘continental statehood’ to their logical conclusion, and further demonstrated that in the European context Germany represented the expansivistic pivot within the other states, counteracting the peripheral states in Europe and beyond (the Entente), a geopolitical dynamic showing decay for England and France, but growth for Germany in spite of their defeat in the First World War. The German state is ‘young’ and the Germans are a ‘young people’. Dugin here inserts a reference to Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who included the Russians among the young. Dugin refers the whole text to Die [sic] Staat als Lebensform (Dugin 2003: 571), but his account is evidently also based on other Kjellén publications, or on secondary sources.

Nikolai A. Nartov, in his reader Geopolitika (2003: 54–58) describes Kjellén as the author of the term ‘geopolitics’, a Swede by nationality but Germanophile in heart, describing himself as a pupil of Ratzel, but developing geopolitics as part of politology, separating it from sociology’. Nartov bases his account entirely on Dorpalen (1942), emphasizing ‘the state as a living, biological formation, following the law of growth, where powerful, vital states, which have limited space, are subject to the categorial imperative of expanding their space, on the road to colonization, amalgamation or conquest’ (Nartov 2003: 54, with ref. to Dorpalen 1942: 52). Nartov then enumerates Kjellén’s types of statehood, as a land and a people, … ‘all incorporating five elements each, and these powers all are fingers on one hand, which work in peacetime and guard in wartime’ (Nartov 2003: 55, with ref to Dorpalen 1942: 53). Nartov further writes:

His opinions were influenced by the transition in the capitalist mode of production from free competition to state-monopolistic capitalism, and even including World War I, in the movement that partitioned the world. Kjellén was one among a number of scientists who theoretically anticipated not only the result of division of the world, but the establishment of fascist dictatorships. Kjellén wrote, among others, that ‘political democracy will thus not be the last word in history’. The scientist appeared as an adherent of the elimination of parliamentarism, the installation of imperial rule, or Caesarian in its concentrate. Power with him ‘did not ought to be in vain a sword-bearer’.

Smirnov et al. in Geopolitika: Teoriya i praktika. Uchebnoe posobie [Geopolitics: Theory and practice. A textbook] write that Kjellén introduced the scientific term ‘geopolitics’ with his main work, but also mentions ‘The Great States (1914)’. He selected three spatial factors which are crucial in the fulfilment of geopolitical processes: (1) Expansion, the rush for larger territory; (2) Territorial autarky; and (3) Free transport, or exit into global communications (Smirnov et al. 2016: 40).

Anatolii Gorodilov, in Geopolitika: Slovar’ personalii: uchebnoe posobie

[Geopolitics: A dictionary of persons. Textbook] focuses on people related to geopolitics, including philosophers, politicians and scholars. Kjellén is described as a jurist, proposing a science called geopolitics. ‘He studied jurisprudence in Uppsala, with a dissertation in 1890 … Part of his work was published in coauthorization with K. Haushofer’ (Gorodilov 2014: 335).

Bagalin, Gorodilov and Manukyan, in Geopolitika, describe Kjellén as a follower of Friedrich Ratzel. Kjellén added a ‘cyclical theory’ of the development of peoples and states dependent on their geopolitical ‘ripeness’ or ‘non-ripeness’, including much from the theories of ‘life extension’ typical of ‘conservative’ geographers. A nation’s political growth developed in four stages: first attaining independence, and last stagnation. Russia is mentioned as an East– West intermediate. Like Smirnov et al., Bagalin, Gorodilov and Manukyan mention Kjellén’s three factors, mentioning that Russia has two but not the third – freedom of movement with access to warm seas (Bagalin, Gorodilov and Manukyan 2017: 63).

The selected Russian books on geopolitics give a varied picture of Kjellén, mainly referring to Staten som lifsform, mostly in its German translation. What is common is the emphasis on his ‘organismic’ view of the state, and his division into different aspects of state governance. Some of the books contain factoids about Kjellén, such as his background in law, and his alleged cooperation with Haushofer. Nartov’s description of him as a portender of fascism is linked to a Hegelian–Marxist interpretation (his cyclical view on governance). Several of the writers refer to his classification of young and old, strong and weak nations/states, putting Germany (and, in Dugin, Russia) into the dynamic group. Two books mention his views of Russia as being intermediate between East and West, its territorial greatness, its autarchy, but its lack of access to warm seas.

In France, the historical scepticism against German geopolitics seems to have spilled over on Kjellén, who in Lacoste’s article ‘La géographie, la géopolitique et le raisonnement géographique’ (2012: 18) is dismissed with the words: ‘In 1905, a Swede, Rudolf Kjellen [sic], professor of law, launched the word

geopolitik (mainly as an abbreviation of Ratzel’s Politische Geographie [1897] as one of the several headings that he recommended: demo-politik, socio-politik, eco(nomie)-politik, geopolitik, an enumeration that did not have a great echo’.⁴

In the same edition of Hérodote, Frédérick Douzet and David Kaplan in an article entitled ‘Geopolitics: la géopolitique dans le monde anglo-américain’ write: ‘The concept of “critical geopolitics” has emerged in the 1970s in response to the “classical geopolitics” which, inspired by the writings of Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen, put the geographical determinism in the forefront in order to justify the exertion of political power on a territory and the recourse of military action’ (Douzet and Kaplan 2012: 237).⁴¹

The two French contributions, in the same issue, give a generally misleading summary of the works by Ratzel and Kjellén. While Lacoste generally downplays Kjellén (with totally false background information, resembling Dugin’s conclusion), Douzet and Kaplan at best seem to have adopted a Karl Haushofer version of Ratzel and Kjellén.

Alexandros Stogiannos The Genesis of Geopolitics and Friedrich Ratzel Dismissing the Myth of the Ratzelian Geodeterminism, published in Greek in 2017 and in English in 2019, is a thorough scrutiny of Ratzel’s work, and very much an Ehrenrettung. Stogiannos refers to a lecture by Klaus Kost stressing that no scientific or epistemological continuity between Ratzel and Kjellen has been verified. According to Kost:

Ratzel and Kjellen were not so much connected by the common vision of modernizing political geography – irrespective of whether it was then termed geopolitics or not – as they were by their truly conservative opinion of the state and politics, which was not the subject matter of scientific research, but more of a trigger for active political action. Kjellen aims to create a policy system, not a system of Geopolitics … therefore, for Kjellen, geopolitics is a subdivision of political systems, while there are other categories, whose objectives are served

by specialized disciplines. (Kost 1988: 46; Stogiannos 2019: 10)

The definition of geopolitics by Kjellen, who defined it (1916) as the science of the state, understood as a geographical organism, operating in space, proves that Kjellén’s geopolitik is a subsystem of a more general analytical set, dealing exclusively and naturalistically with the territorial expression of a state formation. The comparison between political geography (Ratzel) and geopolitics (Kjellén) logically leads to the discontinuity pointed out by Kost, simply because disparate things are compared: a consistent (even if methodologically weak) analytical system in terms of key assumptions (political, cultural, economic) is compared to merely a subsystem separated out and isolated from Kjellén’s complete analytical system: namely Kjellén’s ‘geopolitical’ (i.e. territorial) dimension, and only that. According to the above observation, Kjellén’s perception of geopolitics finds no reference to any version of modern geopolitics, as it refers to a single characteristic of geopolitical influence, namely the territorial dimension. Finally, a comparative study of the works of Ratzel– Kjellen should be conducted at the level of comprehensive systems, leaving aside any terminological difficulties and the following paradox: the fact that while keeping geopolitics in the background, two analytical frameworks (Ratzel’s political geography and Kjellen’s political system) are mentioned, which were never independently named geopolitics! (Stogiannos 2019: 18, referring to Kjellén 1920b)

Stogiannos further states that Kjellén had an erroneous conclusion (Kjellén 1917a: 21), namely that Ratzel supported a naturalistic/organismic perception of the state (Stogiannos 2019: 122).

In a recent PhD dissertation, Érika Laurinda Amusquivar, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Brazil, analyses ‘Antonio Gramsci and the Geopolitics: Theory and History’ (2018), referring to Gramsci’s short reference to Kjellén in one of his Cadernos do Cárcere, evidently informed about Kjellén through a 1927 article in Nuova Antologia, ‘Gli Indirizzi Attuali della Geografia e Il Decimo Congresso Nazionale’ by Roberto Almagià, which is attached to the thesis.

Amusquivar devotes much of the thesis to Kjellén (mainly correct, but with minor misunderstandings), mainly based on Holdar and other Swedish sources, (perhaps over-) emphasizing the deterministic nature of the Kjellénian state’s existence, in contrast to Gramsci’s ideas ‘that spatial categories depend on a historical process that involves an uneven and combined development between space and politics’ (Amusquivar 2018, Abstracts; see also Rivarola Puntigliano, this volume).

Conclusion

Kjellén was obviously heavily influenced by Ratzel’s Politische Geographie, in the first and probably also second edition, in his view of the territory and its contents as an important factor in the spatial history of the active state. But in difference to Ratzel, he added aspects of the life of the state, dividing it into five functions which influenced each other. He criticizes contemporary political science for its lack of temporal and spatial considerations. Temporal, in the sense that politology of the early twentieth century was primarily a study of constitutions, and at best the history of constitutional change, but not a view of the state as an ‘agent’. The lack of spatial thinking has its roots in the same formalistic discipline, and Kjellén (1916a: 21–22) refers to Ratzel’s conclusion: ‘For some political scientists and sociologists, the state is hanging in the air just as much as it is for many historians, and for them the land of the state is just a larger type of property (Ratzel 1897, Preface: IV)’.⁴²

In Kjellén’s Staten som lifsform the emphasis is on a theoretical discussion of the role of the state in its different functions. Stormakterna is a more empirical inventory of the spatial qualities of the different great powers. In a way, the first is a study in geopolitics, the second a descriptive political geography, using Kjellén’s own distinction in Staten som lifsform (see the introduction).

What is lacking in Kjellén’s analysis is the domestic political life of the

territorial state, partly as a result of his Ratzelian concept of the state as an organism. In an organism, there is no need for a hierarchy of functions, or the type of ‘linkage politics’, the relations between different hierarchical layers of governance studied, such as by Rosenau and pointed out by Albrecht Haushofer in 1944. Being an active politician himself, Kjellén is of course not unaware of domestic conflicts or of internal political contradictions. In his different editions of The Great Powers he mentions, for example, the geopolitical cleavages within imperial Germany. But his main criticism against contemporary political science is the lack of understanding of what he calls the ‘outer side of politics’ – the relation between states as territorial actors. His description of imperial Germany as a victim of containment, surrounded by three great powers, and the break with the Wilsonian principles towards the losers, and the French revenge in the Versailles treaty, was taken up by German geopoliticians and developed in a much more propagandistic version after Kjellén’s death in 1922. There is no indication that the German versions of The Great Powers of 1920, after the translation of 1922, had received any permit from Kjellén for his name to be used in the Haushofer changes and additions. After 1935, the use of Kjellén’s name seems to have lost importance in Nazi-German geopolitics. His proGerman but still modified and anti-racist evaluations were not of use anymore to a regime more and more using geopolitics as a pretext for racist accusations and for military preparations. As pointed out by, for example, historian Karl Schlögel (2016: 34), the foremost ideological concept of the Nazis was not space (Raum) but people (Volk), race and blood.

The legacy of Kjellén’s geopolitical theories has been a combination of oblivion, repudiation and misunderstandings, and a partial revival after the end of the Cold War. The Swedish lack of appreciation was interpreted by Thermaenius as a natural lack of relevance from a ‘nation-state’ without any irredentist aspirations, but he was appreciated by politicians in Finland at the time of its independence from Russia, and by geographers from the small states of Estonia (Kant) and Denmark (Hatt) shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. After the war the negative references to Kjellén seem to stem from a ‘guilt by association’ stemming from his non-scientific production as a reactionary activist, and his Germanophile leanings. While the German ‘Berührungsangst’ (approx. ‘anxiety of mentioning’) stems from a more general tendency to equate geopolitics with Nazi expansionism, Kjellén’s ideas were presented as early as 1960 by Grabowsky and Kristof, both ‘outsiders’ to events in Nazi Germany; and then

much later, after the geopolitical events of 1989 and 1991, critically but positively analysed by Sprengel and Ebeling. In the English-language literature, Kjellén is usually either neglected or referred to through secondary or tertiary references, mostly in textbooks on political geography, with the remarkable exceptions of Kristof and Parker, who still made little impact on the schools of ‘critical geopolitics’. After the end of the Cold War, references to Kjellén reappear, especially in Germany, but in the Anglo-Saxon hegemonic culture they were mostly based on secondary sources. In the French cultural context, Kjellén’s impact is minimal, whereas he is positively and critically reviewed in Latin America and India.

The fact that Kjellénian geopolitics was ‘kidnapped’ by revanchist German scholars, and for a while used for Nazi irredentist and expansionist arguments, should not disqualify the use of the Kjellénian concept of geopolitics for analysing the benevolent or malevolent territorial actions of political powers. The invention of the concept of ‘critical geopolitics’ in the late twentieth century was evidently a way of ‘doing away’ with the image of an evil discipline, at best (or worst) described by Ó Tuathail in 1999 as ‘the same ilk [sic] as political realism, distinguishing itself by its proclivity to find “geography” as a singularly important element in foreign policy conceptualization and practice. Critical geopolitics is, by contrast, a problematizing enterprise that places existing structures of power and knowledge in question’ (Ó Tuathail 1999: 107). My rather surprising conclusion is that much of Kjellén’s treatment of geopolitics is more in line with Ó Tuathail’s definition of ‘critical geopolitics’ than his uncritical definition of the original concept. As a corollary, the concept of ‘critical geopolitics’ is superfluous. While the political act of territorial advances is almost always confrontative, the study of geopolitics should, as with all other science, be critical, irrespective of the ideological stance of the scholar.

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University. His latest book is Pommern: ett gränsfall i tid och rum [Pomerania: A border case in time and space] (Lund University, 2016), and his earlier scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, for example: ‘Geopolitics and Religion: A Mutual and Conflictual Relationship.

Spatial Regulation of Creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology / Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25(2) (July 2015); ‘Border Twin Cities in the Baltic Area: Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’, in John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova (eds), Twin Cities: Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time (Routledge, 2019); and ‘Turning towards the Inland Sea? Swedish “Soft Diplomacy” towards the Baltic Soviet Republics before Independence’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/03468755.2021.1896576.

Notes

1. Cf. Björk, ‘Rudolf Kjellén’s Great Power Studies: The Editions’, this volume.

2. Berendsohn, dr. in literature, moved to Denmark in 1933 because of Hitler’s oppression of people of Jewish origin, and escaped to Sweden in 1943, joining Stockholm University College’s Germanic Department.

3. Deutschland sah nämlich keine andere Möglichkeit…, hierzu bot der Weg durch Belgien die einzige Möglichkeit, da die Wege weiter unten durch die französische Festungskette gesperrt waren. So kam es, daß Deutschland gegen Belgiens Willen diesen Weg nahm, unter Mißachtung seiner eigenen Bürgschaft für dessen Neutralität (ein ‘Papierfetzen’). Die englischen Staatsmänner konnten dieser Gelegenheit nicht wiederstehen, für das Völkerrecht und die Freiheit der Kleinstaaten einzutreten, um so weniger, als es für England eine wirkliche Lebensfrage bedeutete: Belgien spielt kriegspolitisch die Rolle eines festländischen Aufmarschgebietes für England.

4. Deutschland selbst vom Weltmarkt abgeschlossen (durch die Englische Nordseesperre vom 5. November 1914). Dass diese Blockade sich auch auf die

neutralen Staaten in Skandinavien erstreckte, bekümmerten die Herren des Meeres ebensowenig wie die verbürgte Neutralität Belgiens vorher Deutschland. ……die politischen Wirklichkeiten weisen die Vereinigten Staaten unverkennbar zur Neutralität – wenn nicht geradezu an Deutschlands Seite – solange England Herr des Weltmeeres ist und das Bundnis mit Japan aufrechthält, … Ausserdem war Deutschlands antidemokratische Regierung ein Dorn im Auge, man wollte ‘make the world safe for democracy’. So wirken Kapitalismus und Demokratie auf angelsächsischen Boden zusammen zu dem Entschluss, der für den Krieg entscheidend wurde.

5. In the Bibliography of Frank Ebeling’s Geopolitik. Karl Haushofer und seine Raumwissenschaft 1919–1945 the book is referred to as “Ders.:[Haushofer, Karl] Deutschland. In: Die Großmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege. Hrsg.v. Karl Haushofer u. Rudolf Kjellén. Lepzig-Berlin 1930, and to Ders. u. Rudolf Kjellén: Die Großmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege. Lepzig-Berlin 1930. Kjellén, who died in 1922 still seems to be active!

6. Hugo Hassinger, 1877–1952, Austrian-German geographer, active for German irredenta and racist ideology.

7. ‘sind von einem deutschen Forscherkreis für den 1922 verstorbenen großen schwedischen Gelehrten in der vorliegenden Fassung erneuert worden. Soviel irgend von Kjelléns werk erhalten bleiben konnte, ist unverändert übernommen. Aber höher, als der Buchstabe stand seinen Nachfolgern sein Geist. So mußte vieles anders gefaßt werden, damit Kjelléns Weltbild seinem Geiste nach dargestellt und das Weiterentwickelte auf seinen Grundmauern gezeigt werden konnte. Das Wesentliche aber war, dabei die Richtigkeit so vieler Prognosen von Kjellén deutlich erkennen zu lassen.

… Diesem Wunsch wurde geopfert, was an der Form und Einzelheiten nicht mehr zu halten war, um einem treuen Verehrerkreise des großen Staatsforschers sein Werk verjüngst etwa so geben, wie die Herausgeber glaubten, daß er es

heute würde erneuert haben. Wie weit sie seinen Sinn trafen, dass entscheide der vergleichende Leser!’

8. ‘Aber nicht nur der rote sondern auch der schwarze Flügel schien Kjelléns Beobachtung von außen her in der deutschen Gesellschaft starkt entwickelt. Er glaubte hier einen Zweispalt zu finden, der ihm bei der Betrachtung anderer Länder nicht begegnet war: den konfessionellen zwischen Protestanten und Katholiken. Der Katholizismus in Deutschland schien dem protestantischen Schweden nicht eine allgemeine Kirche, sondern eine Partei zu sein. … Geographisch betrachtet erschien er ihm als eine Außenerscheinung an den westlichen, südlichen und östlichen Rändern des Reiches; er verschärfte also die polnische Frage, die Katholische Kirche war der Hauptherd der Werbearbeit in Polen.’

9. There is no reference to Kjellén’s paper ‘Das Problem der drei Flüsse: Geopolitische Konturen’ (from Studien zur Weltkrise, 1917), copied in Deutschland, aber wo liegt es? (Ester, Hecker and Poettgens 1993), which addresses the problem of river and canal connectivity in Central Europe.

10. The map is referred to as a simplification after A. Penck, with no further reference. The original is most probably in Penck’s 1915 booklet, p. 26.

11. ‘Zur Verständnis der großen politischen Umwälzungen im Raume der früheren Donaumonarchie war es auch bereits im vorliegenden, dem ÖsterreichUngarn der Vorkriegszeit gewidmeten Kapitel nötig, wesentliche Ergänzungen und Änderungen des Textes vorzunehmen. Doch war der Bearbeiter dabei stets bestrebt, diese dem Geist und Stil des Buches anzupassen. Die Disposition des Kapitels blieb unverändert, und wenn irgend tunlich, wurde der Text übernommen. Nur in einem Punkte vermochte der Bearbeiter nicht völlig Kjellén zu folgen, wollte er nicht seine Überzeugung Opfer bringen. Obgleich die Geschichte gegen die Donaumonarchie entschieden hat, glaubte er doch die geopolitischen und ideellen Grundlagen dieses Staates etwas höher einschätzen

zu müßen als Kjellén. H. Hassinger.’

12. ‘Europas wacht im Osten und Puffer gegen niedere Kulturen zu sein, den durch deutsche Kultur gehobenen Kleinvölkern des südöstlichen Mitteleuropa ein Schutzdach in einem übernationalen Staat zu bieten, die nationalen Reibungen jener Völker aus der europäischen Politik auszuschalten, zu verhindern, daß diese von Rußland als Vortruppen gegen den Westen aufgeboten wurden.’

13. ‘geradezu eine ideale Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und umfaßte ein Verkehrsfeld mit dem natürlichen Mittelpunkt Wien. Die Völker seiner Kerngebiete waren zusammengeschmiedet in jahrhundertelanger Schicksalsgemeinschaft, verkörpert durch die große Tradition des Herrscherhauses und der Armee. In dieser, in der höheren Beamtenschaft, im Adel und einem Teil des Bürgertums, insbesondere im deutschen, gab es ein österreichisches Staatsgefühl und österreichisches Kulturbewußtsein.’ (2: 33–34).

14. ‘Dann ergreift er nochmals das Wort zu einer zu einer “Schlussbetrachtung” (u.a. Nationalsozialismus als weltüberspannende oder raumgebundene Erscheinung). …Im übrigen [sic] hat sich die Geopolitik hier von der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes im Sinne Kjellén kräftig entfernt. K. Haushofers letztes, soeben erst erscheinenens Buch, nennt sich bereits “Weltpolitik”’. Thermaenius, 1937, p. 309, comments: ‘Att denna geopolitikens utveckling i politisk och praktiskt politisk riktning – >> bort från geografien>> – kritiserats från geografiskt håll är ej ägnat att förvåna. Här skall blott påpekas J. Sölchs visserligen ganska välvilliga recensioner av Jenseits der Grossmächte och Raumüberwindende Mächte’ [That this development of geopolitics in a direction towards politics and applied politics – ‘away from geography’ – has been criticized from geographical corners is not to be surprised at. Here will only be mentioned the certainly rather benevolent reviews by J. Sölch of Jenseits der Grossmächte and Raumüberwindende Mächte.

15. Cf. Nartov’s Russian description of Kjellén, referring to Dorpalen 1942 (Nartov 2003).

16. Even if Kjellén’s metaphor of the state as an organism made him disregard most internal politics of the state, he very often referred to ‘higher rings’ of state cooperation. See Tunander, ‘Discourse, Identity and Territoriality’, this volume.

17. The word Finnish may refer to all inhabitants of Finland, while the state recognizes two official languages, Finnish and Swedish.

18. Alexander Supan 1847–1920, German geographer. Thermaenius probably refers to Supan, 1922. Supan’s review of Kjellén is mentioned in Hwang 2011, but Hwang refers to pages in Supan’s earlier edition of 1920.

19. In a very critical review of Hennig and Körholz’s Einführung in die Geopolitik (1935 edition) in Haushofer’s Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (1936), the reviewers demand a subordination of geopolitics under the dogmas of National Socialism, in this case a greater scope for ‘racial knowledge’ and the subordination of geopolitics under ‘racial theory’. This last occurrence of geopolitical opposition to Nazi ideology is treated in more detail by Ebeling. Hennig challenged the Nazi ideologist by questioning the racial ideology in a paper in Haushofer’s Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, 1936, pp. 58–63. His article was reviewed by a Heidelberg Working Group for Geopolitics as being irreconcilable with the ideology of National Socialism (Ebeling 1994: 193–94).

20. See also note 26.

21. ‘Was so auf wissenschaftlichem Wege erstrebt wurde, griff während jenes

Krieges ins politische Geschehen über. … Den Namen und manche Lehrmeinung hat die Geopolitik dem Buch “Der Staat als Lebensform” entnommen. Es erschien aus dem Schwedischen ins Deutsche übersetzt 1917.’

22. Kjellén 1916a: 96: ‘Nationerna äro så skapade, att de icke kunna mäta andra med samma mått som sig själfva. Hvarför icke? Därför att när det gäller dem själfva, kommer intresset med i spelet; och därmed blir saken en annan för dem!’ [The nations are so created that they cannot measure others with the same measures as themselves. Why not? Because when it is about themselves, interest enters the game, and thereby the case will be different to them]. In a footnote on the same page he adds: ‘Hvad vi under kriget fått erfara i samma riktning, öfvergår all föreställning och frestar understundom att uppgifva allt hopp om nationernas sannings- och rättskänsla’ [What we have experienced during the war in the same direction exceeds all imagination, and at times tempts to give up all hope of finding the nations’ sense of truth and justice].

23. ‘Die Nationen können einander nicht mit demselben Masse messen, wie sich selbst. Jedesmal, wenn es sich um sie selbst handelt, kommt das Interesse ins Spiel, und dann ist es für sie eine ganz andere Sache’ [The nations cannot measure each other with the same mass as themselves. Every time it’s about themselves, the interest comes into play, and then it’s a very different thing for them]. To this Frey adds another citation by Kjellén, that during the World War of 1914–18 he himself found ‘manchmal jede Hoffnung geschwunden, bei den Nationen Wahrheits- und Rechtsgefühl zu treffen’ [sometimes all hope vanished to strike at the nation’s sense of truth and justice] (Kjellén 1916a: 96). ‘So ein Miterschaffer der Geopolitik. Man wird, was er sagt, entschuldigend beim Begriff der Staatsraison einreihen’ (Frey 1943: 6).

24. Björnsson wrote descriptive geopolitical surveys in Svensk Geografisk Årsbok [Swedish Geographical Yearbook] 1938 –40 with a certain understanding af German territorial claims, but he never mentioned theoretical geopolitics in these articles (Lundén 2017, Unpublished paper).

25. Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), a Baltic German chemist and political activist. See Kuldkepp 2015, where Ostwald’s unsuccessful visit to Sweden to argue for a Swedish North Germanic Federation under German supremacy is dismissed by Kjellén, who still favours the idea. Kuldkepp also indicates (ibid.: 268) that these ideas were used by the Russian press to enhance Sweden’s dependence on German influences.

26. Presumably Klinge is referring to Kjellén’s Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, published in 1916 with a Foreword written in Gothenburg, Christmas 1915. On page 57 he writes ‘Finland is a Suecia irredenta’, adding that this ‘is as good as totally dead in the memory of both parts’.

27. 196: Svenskarna i Finland bo … i dåligt territoriellt sammanhang med hvarandra och intet sammanhang alls med Sveriges rike öfver riksgränsen. Från finska sidan ha vi aldrig försport ett tecken till längtan efter “förlossning” i den riktningen, än mindre någon programmatisk sträfvan därtill. 197: Men nu kommer det märkliga: vårt rena samvete i frågan hjälper oss icke undan misstanken!

28. Nordlund is probably referring to Gerard De Geer, geologist (1858–1943), and not to his son Sten De Geer, geographer (1886–1933), who like his father studied landforms but later turned into social geography.

29. ‘Ich habe es begrüßt, daß der ausgezeignete schwedische Forscher Rudolf Kjellén vor bald fünfzig Jahren dafür den knappen Begriff Geopolitik geschaffen hat und habe es dann sehr bedauert, daß dies Wort durch die Unwissenschaftlichkeit derer, die es in Deutschland für eine Eroberungspolitik mißbrauchten, in Verruf kam.’

30. ‘ein von modernen rationalen Kräften durchströmter Bau großer Architektonik, dem freilich auch noch gewisse irratinale Rest anhängen’.

31. See e.g. Kost 1988.

32. ‘Mit diesem Ansatz [sozialdarwinistische Tradition] tritt logischerweise der völkerrechtliche Staatsbegriff (der Staat als Macht) gegenüber dem staatsrechtlichen (der Staat als Rechtssubjekt) in den Vordergrund’. ‘…erhebt sich KJELLEN in der theoretischen Durchdringung seines Gegenstandes souverän über RATZEL; von einem Meister-Schüler-Verhältnis…kann keine Rede sein’.

33. Stoakes p. 141 note 6: Copy of letter from Haushofer to Kjellén, 10 October 1917. Haushofer Nachlass 955(d).

34. Stoakes p. 147 note 31: This is the view of Kjellén put forward by leading geopolitician, Otto Maull in ZfG, vol. 6 (1929), 617.

35. In 1933, before his exile to Switzerland, Grabowsky defended Kjellén’s conclusion of geopolitics as a method in political science (Sprengel 1996: 27–33, 174; Murphy 1997: 103). But with his rather strange apprehension of geography as a static natural science analysis of the natural and cultural landscape without a time perspective, he criticizes Kjellén for his dependence on Ratzel (Grabowsky 1933: 17). But in 1960, returning from his long exile in Switzerland, Grabowsky reiterated the value of Kjellén’s geopolitics.

36. Reference to Stoakes 1986: 141, note 6.

37. Reference to Haggman [Häggman] 1988:12.

38. This programme is analysed by Marklund, ‘The Small Game in the Shadow of the Great Game’, this volume.

39. Mező 2007; Churro 2013.

40. ‘En 1905, un suédois, Rudolf Kjellen, professeur de droit, lancait le mot geopolitik (d’abord comme abbreviation de la Politische Geographie de Ratzel [1897] comme une des multiples rubriques qu’il préconisait, demo-politik, socio-politik, eco(nomie)-politik, geopolitik, énumeration qui n’eut pas grand écho.’

41. ‘Le concept de “géopolitique critique” a émergé dans les années 1970, en réponse à la “géopolitique classique” qui, inspire des écrits de Friedrich Ratzel et Rudolf Kjellen, mettait en avant le déterminisme géographique pour justifier l’exercise du pouvoir politique sur un territoire et le recours à l’action militaire.’

42. ‘Für manche Staatswissenschaftlern und Soziologen steht der Staat gerade so in der Luft wie für viele Historiker, und der Boden des Staates ist ihnen nur eine größere Art von Grundbesitz.’

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CONCLUSION

Kjellén’s Life and Work

Tensions between Opposites

RAGNAR BJÖRK AND THOMAS LUNDÉN

In his time, Kjellén was highly visible in public debates, and constantly provoking commentary. However, as a scholar (Kjellén had very few disciples), and also as a politician, he was not especially influential nor even admitted into establishment circles. After his death, his work and ideas were mostly neglected in Sweden, but his analyses of the great powers have been the object of enduring interest abroad. There is thus a tension inherent in the very image of him.

In Kjellén’s own work, career and mindset one may also spot a number of tensions, apparent in all aspects of his activities. But they are tensions, not conspicuous contrasts or contradictions.

Kjellén had an analytical propensity to grasp issues as a tension between opposites. It is not a question of displaying radical changes of mind over time or of operating with contradictions. Nor is it a proper dialectic with a final synthesis. Kjellén framed his thinking in dualisms, in two ways. One was letting his findings boil down to opposites or crystallize around the poles of a continuum. In the other, Kjellén imagined the motion of a pendulum, with tendencies developing into extremes, reaching amplitudes, and then swinging back. This actually expressed his overall view of history. An illustrative example is his positing of two sets of ideas. The ‘ideas of 1789’ were freedom, equality and brotherhood, which Kjellén countered with ‘the ideas of 1914’, which were order or duty, righteousness, and national cohesion. This kind of dynamic could also be described in terms of an ‘expansion’ being halted, with an eventual tendency towards ‘concentration’. To symbolically flesh out the tension between these thoughts he even analysed the opposing categories – ‘ideas of 1789’ and ‘ideas of 1914’ – as representing, respectively, a female and a male principle. Each opposing set of ideas would run its course, and was a necessary part of history. In any case, at the beginning of the twentieth century, closing in on 1914, Kjellén saw ‘concentration’ as urgently needed.

A similar tension concerns methodology. Popper’s two concepts – of a ‘context of discovery’ and a ‘context of justification’ for the scientific process – require very different mindsets. Kjellén was very inventive in developing hypotheses and making ‘discoveries’, whereas the more painstaking, incremental argument of the ‘justification’ stage received less attention. As is common in the first stage of a scholarly study, Kjellén collected voluminous and detailed source material when he prepared his work on the great powers. There, each power was presented in a kind of handbook style, with extensive, empirical information. But when he employed this material for generalizations, it could be more sweeping than empirical.

It should also be mentioned that a tension can be seen between the way Kjellén treated traditional ‘political science’ and his ambition to widen the scope and enhancing the rigor of the discipline into a virtual ‘science of society’, methodologically on par with the natural sciences, and focusing not least on what he called the ‘system of politics’.

Another tension in Kjellén exists between the national and the international. It takes two forms: the cognitive interest and the evaluations. His interest in the global – the ‘planetarian’ – approach is visible both in his doctoral thesis on ministerial responsibility in a number of countries and their different types of governance, and in his great power studies. This can be juxtaposed with his studies of the nation – one of his books is called Sverige [Sweden]– which encompassed people as well as geography. Kjellén could always truly see different peoples and cultures displaying an Einfühlung (an imaginative and emotional ability), and this helped him to more fully understand other societies and cultures. This can also be seen, for example, in his travelogue Den stora Orienten [The great Orient]. At the same time, he harboured an increasing scepticism regarding ‘cosmopolitism’, and saw a growing need for safeguarding the interests and values of the Swedish nation.

In politics, being part of the Young Right (Unghögern) movement, Kjellén could

be very enthusiastic about the intensity, magnitude and youthfulness of a political power, as it was displayed by the workers’ movement on a May Day demonstration. He embraced the movement’s strong collective orientation, but was alienated by its emancipatory and reformist agenda. Rather than a ‘classegoistic’ social democracy, he envisioned a wider and more collective formation, a nationally cohesive society, the result of the people coming together as one nation – what he called nationell samling. But again, while thus identifying with the established society and its pillars – including the monarchy, the military, the church, and the aspects of government responsible for order – when it came to ‘capitalism’ Kjellén was sceptical of the pervasive, transformative power of the market, with commercialism and materialism in tow. In this he was more of a populist than a self-conceived ‘guardian’ of society.

Inherent in this is also a tension between a Christian-based moralizing (including at times a legalistic dimension), and an amoral view of the will and of the will to power, it being incumbent on a state or an organism to prove itself in the struggle of life. This is seen also in his documentation and analysis of trends among world powers.

A tension appears also in Kjellén’s varying concerns regarding Sweden’s Nordic neighbours. Kjellén helped to spread the work of his teacher, Oscar Alin, which included elaborate legal arguments opposing the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden. Kjellén was also morally troubled by what he, and many of his contemporaries, saw as deceitful behaviour on the part of the Norwegians. When it came to another Scandinavian neighbour, though, he was much less interested. He had difficulties mustering enthusiasm for the idealistic ‘Scandinavianism’ movement, and he also showed himself to be quite indifferent to the plight and the national interests of the Danes in relation to Germany. Concerning Finland, he had no irredentist concerns, but deplored the internal animosities between Finnish and Swedish speakers, keeping them weaker relative to Russia.

Kjellén was well informed about the different cultures, and the beliefs, of

peoples around the world, having travelled to all the great powers he analysed. In those studies, he repeatedly returns to the animosity, resentment and outright contempt that the imperialism of the European powers had created around the world, primarily in Asia. He recognized the situation for ‘minorities’, such as the national minorities in the Russian Empire that were later to form nation states, and he discussed the treatment of the black population in the United States. At the same time, he still ranked peoples and ‘races’ around the world, if not as inherently being of a lower or higher order, then at least as having different capacities for society-building.

Although Kjellén envisioned a unified humankind in the future, he shunned cosmopolitanism and pacifism in the near term. To what extent one should read between the lines here is not clear, but, generally, he had little sympathy for such movements.

Kjellén’s personality was also one of variations, in mood and temper. Sometimes he was passionately enthusiastic and open, while at other times he was sternly critical, projecting distaste and even contempt. Both people and nature could move him. He expressed an exhausted satisfaction with a record-breaking bicycle ride over the plains in his home province, and when he, finally, stood in front of the mythic and majestic Mount Fuji, he wrote that his ‘eyes were dimmed’.

In his academic career Kjellén experienced the tension between ‘the tower’ and ‘the marketplace’. He had grown up in the countryside, and when he began his studies at Uppsala University, he arrived at an institution that, though prestigious, was provincial as well as pastoral. Academically, it was the quintessential ‘tower’. In the mid-1890s, when he got a post at the newly established Gothenburg University College, he instead, and quite literally, entered the ‘marketplace’, a learned institution in the midst of a bustling, mercantile, shipping and commercial city, with its port a gateway to the world’s seas. After some twenty years, in 1916, Kjellén returned to a learned and more contemplative life back in Uppsala. The pendulum had swung again, the tension

still there.

In his later years, back in Uppsala, some of those who would become his rather well-known students, such as Herbert Tingsten and Gunnar Myrdal, recognized Kjellén’s good-humoured willingness to accept objections and critical views at his seminars. His was a rare personality – one of uncontested but differently valued reputation, with a legacy that swung between oblivion and a rather fragile glory.

Uppsala and Stockholm, 6 March 2021 Ragnar Björk and Thomas Lundén

Ragnar Björk is a retired associate professor of history from Uppsala University and is now affiliated with Södertörn University. His research is mainly concerned with ‘research on research’, with the history of historiography and the social sciences, the history of science, including the Nobel Prize, and also modern political history. He graduated at Uppsala in 1983 with a dissertation on explanatory techniques – including narration and colligation – among historians, and was awarded the Geijer Prize for best historical dissertation. Since then, he has conducted a number of research projects on those same themes. Some of his latest publications are: ‘Re-embedding the Historian: German-Language Refugee Scholars in Scandinavia, 1933–1945’, Storia della Storiografia / History of Historiography 69(1) (2016); ‘Voluntarismens väg: Och något om Rudolf Kjellén som producent av helhetskunskap om samhället’, in Erik Nydahl and Jonas Harvard (eds), Den nya staten: Ideologi och samhällsförändring kring sekelskiftet 1900 (Nordic Academic Press, 2016); Thorsten Halling, Ragnar Björk, Heiner Fangerau and Nils Hansson, ‘Leopoldina: Ein Netzwerk für künftige Nobelpreisträger für Physiologie oder Medizin?’, Sudhoffs Archiv 102 (2018), X.

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University. His latest book is Pommern: ett gränsfall i tid och rum [Pomerania: A border case in time and space] (Lund University, 2016), and his earlier scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, for example: ‘Geopolitics and Religion: A Mutual and Conflictual Relationship. Spatial Regulation of Creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology / Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25(2) (July 2015); ‘Border Twin Cities in the Baltic Area: Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’, in John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova (eds), Twin Cities: Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time (Routledge, 2019); and ‘Turning towards the Inland Sea? Swedish “Soft Diplomacy” towards the Baltic Soviet Republics before Independence’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/03468755.2021.1896576.

Index

activism

Germany with imperialistic, 141

Kjellén and, 3, 12, 28–29, 36–37, 39, 41, 43–44, 70, 75, 280

policy and, 41–42

Sundbeck and, 265

Aguayo González, Leopoldo, 244

Alin, Oscar, 11, 31, 35, 44, 63, 292

Alto Perú (Bolivia), 164, 232

Amusquivar, Érika Laurinda, 278

de Andrada e Silva, Bonifácio, 234–35

Anfictionic Congress of Panama, 233–34

Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, 103, 105–8, 251

Cold War and, 221–24, 227

as England, 101

Germany and, 190, 222–27

Kjellén and, 270–73, 280

NATO replacing, 224

universalism of, 224

as US, 101, 116

Antilles, 235

Árbenz, Jacobo, 237

Argentina, 56, 91, 105, 236, 240–41

Arriagada Herrera, Genaro, 239

Atencio, Jorge, 237–38, 240–41

Austria-Hungary, 170

great powers and, 64, 68, 70, 83, 89, 99–102, 104, 118, 134–35, 178, 184–85, 221

Hassinger on Kjellén and, 254–55, 282n6

map including, 253

Mitteleuropa with, 16, 166, 223, 226

Serbia conflict with, 186

autarky

China and, 151, 156–57

as economic self-sufficiency, x, 89, 92, 100, 203

England and, 114

for great power status, 89

Kjellén and concept of, x, 16, 92, 114, 126, 151

realm for, 169–70

Backheuser, Everardo, 235–36, 238, 241

Badía Malagrida, Carlos, 235, 243

Balkans

Europe and, 140, 166, 184

general world war and, 91–92, 161, 178–79, 185

independence and, 217, 220, 225

map of, 179

Barão do Rio Branco. See Paranhos, José Maria da Silva Júnior

Barrios, Miguel, 243

Berendsohn, Walter, 23n10, 250, 281n2

Beukema, Herman, 257

biopolitics

by Kjellén, xi, 199, 204–6, 273–74

as population behaviour, 77–78

of small states, 207

Björnsson, Sven, 262, 284n24

Bolivar, Simón, 233–35, 240

Bolivar Doctrine, 233–34

Bolivia, 164, 232

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 34, 128n6, 217, 226–27, 234

borders

in geopolitics, 53–54

Kjellén on, 51, 200

Kjellén on Swedish, 48–51, 54–55, 58–60, 174n6, 200–202

open society and, 60

as rivers, 49, 51, 53, 55–60, 61n4

Sweden and Russia, 56–60, 201, 205, 284n25

of Turkey, 58, 183

types of, 56–58, 129n20, 165

Braudel, Fernand, 77, 79, 87–88

Brazil, 278

geopolitics in, 232, 235, 238–45

Germans and, 7

Kjellén and, 112, 245

as not temperate zone, 91

Portuguese royal family and, 234

Brazilian Geographic Society, 236

Brummer, Hans, 268

Brusewitz, Axel, 13, 32, 193

Buckle, 32, 42, 46n2, 77–78

buffer states, x, 54, 150, 166, 223–24

Bunge, Alejandro, 242

Caesarism, 77, 85, 110, 112, 147

del Campo, Carlos Ibáñez, 237, 242

capitalism

Europe and, 156

imperialism and, 88, 138

Kjellén on, 40, 45, 117, 119

Cárdenas, Lazaro, 249

Caribbean, 233, 237

de Carvalho, Delgado, 239

de Castro, Therezinha, 239, 241

Catholic Church, 84, 122, 139, 231, 253

Central Asian republics, 217–18

Central European union, 223, 226

Charles XII, 38, 82

Chile, 56, 91, 105, 164–65, 237, 240, 242

China, 113

autarky and, 151, 156–57

Boxer Rebellion and, 74, 151, 157

on Japan and Europe, 157

Kjellén on, 86, 92, 151

willpower of, 111, 131n39, 151

class

Folkhemmet and, ix

Kjellén on, 17–18, 90, 117, 147, 170–71, 213, 219–20, 261, 291–92

for states, 170–71

Sweden and, 34, 40

Clausewitz ending, 80, 97

Cold War

Anglo-Saxon geopolitics and, 221–24, 227

developments since, ix–x, 197, 250

Kjellén and, 219, 268–70, 280

nation branding after, 198

power after, 197–98

US and, 239, 245

conservatives

Hjärne as, 31–33, 36, 38–39, 44, 149–50, 158n10

Ideas of 1914 and, 92, 95, 155, 177, 290–91

on Swedish Charles XII, 38, 82

constructivism, 7, 197, 199, 204, 207

Continental Congress (US), 233

Continental Hispanic American Congress, 233

da Costa, Wanderley Messias, 238, 244

do Couto e Silva, Golbery, 239

critical geopolitics, 8, 15, 120–21, 244–46, 277, 280–81

cultural approach, 122, 124–26

after Cold War, 198

Germany and, 224

cultural discourses, 122–26

Dallanegra Pedraza, Luis, 241, 243

Danielsson, Sarah, 273–74

De Geer, Sten, 259, 264, 284n28

democracy. See also governance form

Kjellén on, 4, 17, 119, 131n42, 167, 189, 191–92

Social Democrats for parliamentary, 17

US and, 6

Denmark, 51, 56, 281n2

Germany and, 136–37, 151, 164, 228n3, 261

Hatt of, 260–61, 274, 280

Kjellén on, 35, 228n3, 292

Sweden and, 37–38, 50, 183

Dorpalen, Andreas, 257–58, 276, 283n15

Dougherty, James, 267–68

Dugin, Aleksander, 275–77

Ebeling, Frank, 23n2, 269, 280, 281n5, 283n19

Eberhardt, Piotr, 275

economic self-sufficiency

autarky as, x, 89, 92, 100, 203

Holland and, 81

Elvander, Nils, 1, 18–19

Elyseo de Carvalho, Everardo, 235

England

Anglo-Saxon ‘universal power’ as, 101

autarky and, 114

First World War and Egypt for, 183

Germany threat to, 184–85

as great power, 86–87, 106–8, 128n3

Ideas of 1789 as, 187–89

India and, 106, 165, 183, 185

Kjellén on, 4, 23n3, 130n32, 131n40, 194n9

nationality question of, 107

sea access for, 114

Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 234, 238–39, 243

Estonia, 102, 210, 261, 270, 280

ethnicity, 83, 109

EU and, 217–18, 221

Japan and, 84

Kjellén on, 83, 167

nationality principle and, 102–4, 106, 116, 118–19, 169, 178, 185

US with, 142–43

ethnopolitics, 254

First World War and, 185–86

geopolitics and, 163, 167, 183, 192, 219–21

state as people and, 167–69, 234

EU. See European Union

Europe

Balkans and, 140, 166, 184

capitalism and, 156

China on, 157

EU future for, 217–18, 221

imperialism of, 71, 153, 292

Kjellén on, 7, 86

nation-building in, 32–34, 39, 102–4

NATO and, 217, 221

resentment toward, 40, 118, 153, 155, 292

European Union (EU), 217–18, 221

federalism

Europe and, 7

Kjellén on, 4, 77, 112, 148, 169

states and, 212–13

US and, 85–86, 108, 110, 119, 142, 147

Ferguson, Niall, 68, 126, 129n8, 129n17

Finland

Kjellén and, 35, 203, 216, 262–65, 280, 292

Klinge of, 262–65, 284n26

language of, 283n17

maps of, 57

Numelin of, 259–60

Sweden losing, 28, 34, 37, 202–3, 216

Swedish border with, 53, 57, 58–60

First World War

Balkans and, 91–92, 161, 178–79, 185

Egypt and England in, 183

ethnopolitics and, 185–86

geopolitical causes of, 183, 192

Germany and, 184–85, 192–94

great powers and, 69, 80, 99–108

Kjellén and, 6, 14, 98–99, 176–77, 182, 269

‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ for, 192–93

Princip shooting for, 182, 186

realism on, 251

reasons for, 182–83

Russia and sea access in, 183

folkhem (people’s home)

folkhemmet and, ix, xi, 16–17, 23n8

Kjellén on, 15–16

Social Democrats and, 16–17

social engineering for, 27–28, 40

France

as centralized state, 4

‘coloured’ race and, 105

as great power, 104–6

Ideas of 1789 as, 187–89

Kjellén and, 4, 104–5, 117, 277

population limits by, 88

freedom

Ideas of 1789 as, 92, 155, 290–91

Kjellén on, 187–88

Frey, Hans, 261–64, 283n23

Frondizi, Arturo, 240

future

Europe and EU, 217–18, 221

Kjellén on, 20–21, 90–91, 118

League of Nations and, 114–16

Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 29, 33, 35

geography. See also political science

Finland map in, 57

into geopolitics, 49–50

Grabowsky on, 266–67, 270–71, 280, 284n35

Kjellén and, 2, 12, 36, 48–49, 90, 194n5

Korea peninsula and, 137, 150, 201, 264

Latin America and, 232–35

political science and, 4, 161–63

of states, 165

of Sweden, 51–53

geopolitics, ix, 195n15. See also international influences

Badía Malagrida and, 235, 243

borders in, 53–54

Brazil in, 232, 235, 238–45

definition of, 15, 128n5, 134, 161, 180

ethnopolitics and, 163, 167, 183, 192, 219–21

First World War and, 183, 192

geography into, 49–50

Germany and Nazism on, 214

of Germany and Sweden, 221–27

Haushofer, K., and, 244, 271, 274

imperialism and, 120, 144

as Kjellén neologism, viii, 15, 275

Kjellén on, x, 1, 3–5, 48–49, 59–60, 163–67, 177, 180–81, 193–94, 200

Latin America and, 235–46

Mackinder on, 222, 224, 257–58, 262, 268

as maps, 78

NATO and, 222–27

neo-liberalism on, 243

within political science, 3, 6

as resource competition, 198–99

of small states, 93, 166, 199, 206–7

of Sweden, 23n4, 38, 204–6

system approach and, 120–22

Turkey and, 140, 153, 178, 184, 203, 215, 226–27

warfare and, 165, 192

Geopolitik

definition of, viii

Dorpalen on, 257–58

Frey on, 261–62, 283n23

Germans on, viii–ix, 4

Grabowsky on, 266

Haushofer, K., on, viii–ix, 4, 212, 256, 269, 276

Kjellén on, viii–xi, 15–16, 277–78

Parker on, 271–72

Ratzel on, 172

Thermaenius on, 259, 283n14

Germany, 114, 131n38, 195n11

Anglo-Saxon geopolitics and, 190, 222–27

Brazil and, 7

culturalism of, 224

Denmark and, 136–37, 151, 164, 228n3, 261

England and, 184–85

First World War reasons for, 184–85, 192–93

on geopolitics, 214

geopolitics of Sweden and, 221–27

on Geopolitik, viii–ix, 4

Gottlieb on, 225–26

Grabowsky on, 266–67, 270–71, 280, 284n35

great power and, 20–21, 97, 99–101, 128n3, 136–37, 140–41

Großraum and, x, 224, 226–27, 268

on Haushofer, K., 256–59

Ideas of 1914 as, 188

with imperialistic activism, 141

on individual’s rights, 188

Kjellén support for, viii, 19–20, 39, 45, 92, 135–40, 158n1, 176, 181, 190, 251

Kjellén used by, 279–80

maps and, 168, 253–55

as Mitteleuropa, 16, 169–70, 275

NATO and, 7

Poland and, 137–38

realm of, 184–85, 221

religion of, 139

rivers of, 137

Russell on, 176, 189, 194n1

Russia and, 184–85

Schmitt on, 224–27

Social Democrats of, 117, 139

Sweden and, 135–36

Thermaenius on, 59, 194n6, 259–60, 262, 271–72, 280, 283n14

globalization, 197–99, 207

Kjellén on, 20, 97, 291

Latin America in, 231

as planetary, 134

Gorodilov, Anatolii, 276–77

Gottlieb, Albert, 225–26

governance form, 77, 85–86, 110, 112, 115, 147. See also federalism

democracy as, 4, 6, 17, 119, 131n42, 167, 189, 191–92

history directed by, 148

Grabowsky, Adolf, 266–67, 270–71, 280, 284n35

great power(s), Chapters 4 and 5

Austria-Hungary and, 64, 68, 70, 83, 89, 99–102, 104, 118, 134–35, 178, 184–

85, 221

autarky for, 89

characteristics for ranking, 87, 89, 109, 112, 134

characteristics of current, 76–77, 86–89, 109, 134–35

colonial aspect of, 13, 71, 81, 87, 97, 113, 118

conservative historians on, 33

definition of, 16, 129n11

as dismissed, 87

England as, 86–87, 106–8, 128n3

evolution of, 70–71

as fewer and bigger, 86, 92–93, 97, 109, 114, 140, 221

First World War and, 69, 80, 99–108

France as, 104–6

geopolitics and, 202–3

Germany and, 20–21, 97, 99–101, 128n3, 136–37, 140–41

Holland and, 80–82

imperialism and, 149

‘in-between’ states and, 7

from inner processes, 96

Islam as, 21, 115

Italy as, 71, 87, 89, 103–5, 134–35, 154, 156, 220

Japan as, 2, 71–74, 87, 97, 103–4, 128n3, 150–54, 156

Kjellén on, x, 6, 12, 68–70, 98, 108–14

list of, 82–83

location and space for, 88–89

Myrdal on, 45

politics and, 79, 85

population and, 88

Portugal and, 80–81

Russia and, 99, 101–2, 106, 128n3

sea access for, 72, 87, 92, 105–6, 109–10

on small state, 114, 170

soft power and, 29, 38, 70, 72, 93, 197, 207

Stormakterna on, 20, 36, 65

Sweden and, 37–38, 46n5, 80, 82, 203–4

temperate climate zone for, 77, 91, 110, 151

Turkey and, 80–81, 87, 91

US as, 71–72, 74, 86–87, 97, 103, 106–8, 128n3

warfare and, 79–80

willpower for, 4, 6, 18, 69, 78, 82, 85–86, 100, 110–13 124, 131n39

Great Space. See Großraum

Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise. Zweite Auflage [The great powers and the world crisis. Second edition] (Kjellén), 23, 65, 131n33, 212, 250, 267, 271

Stormakterna as, 97

Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise. Zweite Auflage [The great powers and the world crisis. Second edition] (Kjellén–Haushofer), 271

Haushofer, K., appropriating, 251–56, 270, 282n5

Großraum (Great Space), x, 224, 226–27, 268

Guatemala, 237, 267

Guglialmelli, Juan E., 240

Gunneflo, Markus, 23n8, 274

de Gusmão, Alexandre, 234

Hassinger, Hugo

on Austria-Hungary and Kjellén, 254–55, 282n6

Germany maps by, 255

Die Großmächte and, 251–52, 271

Hatt, Gudmund, 260–61, 274, 280

Haushofer, Albrecht, 228n2, 258–59, 261–64, 279

Haushofer, Karl

Björnsson on maps and, 262, 284n24

on Catholic Church and Kjellén, 253

Dorpalen on, 257–58, 276, 283n15

Ebeling on, 23n2, 269, 280, 281n5, 283n19

geopolitics and, 244, 271, 274

on Geopolitik, viii–ix, 4, 212, 256, 269, 276

German scholar views of, 256–59

Germany maps by, 253–54

Grabowsky on, 266–67, 270–71, 280, 284n35

on Die Großmächte, 251–56, 270, 282n5

on Jews, 225, 228n2

Kjellén and, 65, 212, 226, 250–62, 268, 270, 272, 275, 277

Lebensraum and, 4, 226, 228n2, 258

Nazis and, 7, 225, 228n2

Numelin on, 259–60

Spang on, 270

on Stormakterna, 256

Thermaenius on, 59, 194n6, 259–60, 262, 271–72, 280, 283n14

Heeren, A.H.L., 70, 128n6, 129n7, 129n12, 136–37

Hennig, Richard, 262, 270, 283n19

Herrera, Felipe, 242–43, 246n3

Hispanic American geopolitics, 233–35, 237

history

competition and psychological, 78

government directing, 148

great powers and conservative, 33

Kjellén education in, 50

liberalism and, 33

as pendulum, 3, 81, 124–25, 150, 155, 171, 202

political science and Swedish, 30–31

of Sweden, 28–31, 33

Hjärne, Harald, 31–33, 36, 38–39, 44, 149–50, 158n10

Holdar, Sven, 1–2, 194n6, 270–71, 278

Holland, 130n28

as dismissed great power, 80–82

Kjellén on, 4, 23n3, 80, 167–68, 228n3

von Humboldt, Alexander, 33, 48, 235–36

Huntington, Samuel, 68, 84, 123–24, 222, 225

Iberian Peninsula, 231–34, 245

Ideas of 1789

Ideas of 1914 vs., 3, 18, 29, 98, 187–89, 291

as liberty and freedom, 92, 155, 290–91

as political philosophy, 95, 98, 118, 177

Ideas of 1914

as conservatism, 92, 95, 155, 177, 290–91

Ideas of 1789 vs., 3, 18, 29, 98, 187–89, 291

as national cohesion, 40, 118–19

imperialism, 171, 179–80

capitalism and, 88, 138

of Europe, 71, 153, 292

geopolitics and, 120, 144

Germany with activist, 141

great power colonialism in, 13, 71, 81, 87, 97, 113, 118

great powers and, 149

Japan and, 71

Kjellén on, 118

Latin America and, 240, 244

Lenin on, 191–92

nationalism and, 138

race and, 186

resentment toward, 40, 118, 153, 155–56, 292

by small states, 205–6

of US, 145, 243

Wehler on, 186–87

India, 58, 91, 112, 145, 280

England and, 106, 165, 183, 185

Indies, 233

individual’s rights, 188, 226

Instituto Brasileiro de Geopolítica, 238

Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 234

Instituto Histórico-Geográfico del Río de la Plata, 234

interdisciplinarity, 8, 40, 50, 218

international influences. See also geopolitics

cultural discourses vs., 122–26

on independence declarations, 218

Kjellén and, ix, 12, 15, 44, 123, 158n6

League of Nations in, 114–16

in 1900, 74–75

power and, 177–78

Stormakterna on, 12, 32, 44, 74–75

of Sweden, 38–39

warfare and, 179–80

internationalism, 27, 71

Islam, 21, 115

Italy, 178–79

as great power, 71, 87, 89, 103–5, 134–35, 154, 156, 220

Kjellén on, 54–55, 58, 64, 82–83, 120, 185

Janáč, Jiří, 275

Japan, 129n16

China on, 157

ethnicity and, 84

as great power, 2, 71–74, 87, 97, 103–4, 128n3, 150–54, 156

imperialism and, 71

Kjellén on, 2, 9n2, 86, 119, 146, 150–57, 158n8, 158n10

on Korea, 72–75, 151–52

as marine power, 156

science research and, 71–72

Sea of Japan map, 73

Spang on, 270

US compared with, 150, 155

Jarrin, Luis Edgardo Mercado Torres, 241

Jews

Berendsohn and, 23n10, 250, 281n2

Haushofer, K., on, 225, 228n2

Kjellén on, 18, 23n10, 169

João José V, Dom (King, Portugal), 234

Johannesson, Fredrik, 24n17, 233

Johnson, Lyndon B., 72, 141

justice, 6, 181, 187–88, 262, 283n22, 283n23

Kant, Edgar, 261, 270, 280

Katajala, Kimmo, 264–65

Kelly, Phil, 272–73

Kennedy, Paul, 125–26, 129n6, 193

Kissinger, Henry, 69, 121

Kjellén, Rudolf, 23n3, 214. See also specific subjects

dualisms by, 290

goal of, 160

as neglected, 4, 280–81

as outsider, 43–44, 121–22, 126, 280, 290

Klinge, Matti, 262–65, 284n26

Korea

Japan on, 72–75, 151–52

map of, 73

rivers and, 54, 56, 58

Korean peninsula, 137, 150, 201, 264

Kost, Klaus, 268–69, 277–78

Kristof, Ladis, 266, 268, 272–73, 280

Lagergren, Fredrika, 23, 273

Lamprecht, Karl, 32, 42, 46n2, 77, 113, 136

Latin America

on geography, 232–35

geopolitics and, 235–46

Iberian Peninsula and, 231–34, 245

imperialism and, 240, 244

Kjellén and, 237–38, 240–42, 245–46

Latin union in, 91

Ratzel and, 235, 238, 240–43, 245–46

League of Nations, 114–16

Lebensraum (Life Space), 268

Haushofer, K., and, 4, 226, 228n2, 258

Kjellén and, 16

Mackinder and, 262

Ratzel and, 212, 270, 273

Lenin, Vladimir, 191–92

Levant, 16, 145, 166, 168, 170–71, 221

liberalism

of historians, 33

Kjellén on, 80, 95, 214–16

neo-liberalism and, 7, 18, 223, 243

as ‘the personal’, 90, 95

Life Space. See Lebensraum

List, Friedrich, 237, 242

Mackinder, Halford, ix, 4, 270

on buffer zone, 224

on geopolitics, 222, 224, 257–58, 262, 268

Lebensraum and, 262

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, ix, 4, 9n4, 145, 158n5, 236, 268

maps, 52, 57, 73, 168, 179, 253

Austria-Hungary on, 253

Balkans and, 179

Björnsson on, 262, 284n24

Finland and, 57

geopolitics as, 78

Germany and, 168, 253–55

Korea and, 73

of Norway, 52

Poland on, 253–54

Sea of Japan and, 73

of Sweden, 52, 57

Marini, José Felipe, 240–41, 243

Martin, André Roberto, 244

Mattos, Carlos de Meira, 239

Maull, Otto, 251, 268, 270–71, 284n34

medico-legal, 94

methodology, 75–80, 89–93, 108–14

Methol Ferré, Alberto, 243

Mexico, 236–37, 244

de Miranda, Francisco, 233, 240

Mitteleuropa, 268

with Austria-Hungary, 16, 166, 223, 226

for balance, 221, 226, 254

Germany as, 16, 169–70, 275

Miyamoto, Siguenoli, 244

Monroe doctrine, 65, 103, 145, 157, 224, 226–27, 233

Montenegro, 58, 186, 195n12, 217

Moraes, Antonio Carlos Robert, 243–44

Murphy, David, 271

‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, 192–93

Myrdal, Alva, xi

Myrdal, Gunnar, xi, 213, 237, 242, 293

on great powers, 45

objectivity and, 19, 181

on social science research, 42–43, 181–82

Nartov, Nikolai A., 276–77, 283n15

nation. See specific subjects

national identity, 37–39, 107

ethnicity and, 102–4, 106, 116, 118–19, 169, 178, 185

Kjellén and, 116–17, 291

statesmen and, 32–33

Stormakterna with statistics and, 67–69

nationalism

Bonaparte and, 226–27

England and, 107

Ideas of 1914 as, 40, 118–19

imperialism and, 138

Poland and, 169, 172, 178

nationality principle, 102–4, 106, 116, 118–19, 169, 178, 185

national security, 239–40

national socialism

Kjellén and, ix, 5, 15, 17–18, 40, 117, 213

Nazism and, 18, 262, 283n19

nation-building

Europe and, 32–34, 39, 102–4

national identity in, 37–39, 107, 116–17

in Sweden, 33

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nazism

Elvander on Kjellén and, 1, 18–19

on geopolitics, 214

Haushofer, K., and, 7, 225, 228n2

Kjellén and, viii–ix, 18, 212

national socialism and, 18, 262, 283n19

neo-liberalism, 7, 18, 223, 243

neologisms of Kjellén, 90

biopolitics as, xi, 199, 204–6, 273–74

geopolitics as, viii, 15, 275

medico-legal as, 94

national socialism as, ix, 5, 15, 17–18, 40, 117, 213

Netherlands. See Holland

Nobel, Alfred, 120

Nobel Prize, 30, 36, 71, 120

Nordlund, Christer, 264, 284n28

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

as alliance, 223–24

Anglo-Saxon geopolitics and, 224

Europe and, 217, 221

geopolitics and, 222–27

Germany leadership for, 7

Großraum and, x, 224, 226–27, 268

Kjellén and, 7, 212–14, 223–24

Russia and, 218, 223, 228n4

Norway

emancipation for, 33, 63, 93, 178

Kjellén on, 35, 116, 172, 201, 292

map of, 52

Sweden and, 29, 33–39, 116, 164, 292

Sweden borders and, 49, 51–53, 55–56, 59–60, 61n3, 200

Numelin, Ragnar, 259–60

Nyyssönen, Jukka, 264

objectivity

Brusewitz and, 32

declarations and, 181

Kjellén and, 19, 24n15, 41, 70, 75–76, 177, 182, 193–94, 272

Myrdal and, 19, 181

political scientists for, 44

Ratzel and, 24n15, 272

as scientific, 27

Obst, Erich, 251, 271

oppressed minorities

Kjellén on, 21, 106, 156

resentment by, 40, 118, 153, 155, 292

Östling, Axel, 274

Ostwald, Wilhelm, 263, 284n25

Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, 131n43, 271, 280–81

Paranhos, José Maria da Silva Júnior (Barão), 235

Parker, Geoffrey, 24n15, 271–73, 275, 280

Penck, Albrecht, 48–50, 162–63, 282n10

pensadores (thinkers), 231

people’s home. See folkhem

Perón, Juan Domingo, 237, 242–43

Peru, 232, 241

Pfaltzgraff, Robert, 267–68

Pinochet, Ugarte, 246n5

planetary situation. See globalization; international influences

Poland, 38, 102

Germany and, 137–38

map including, 253–54

nationalism and, 169, 172, 178

political science

geographers and, 4, 161–63

geopolitics within, 3, 6

Kjellén modernizing, 1, 8, 18–19, 35–36, 44, 63–64, 93–96, 126, 128n1, 134, 213, 217–18, 291

Kjellén with chair on, viii, 11, 13

for objectivity, 44

science and, 93

on state, 162–63

statesmen and, 3, 41, 69–70, 75–77, 96, 98, 108, 126

Swedish history and, 28–31, 33

politics

borders and, 51

egalitarian idea in, 188

great powers and, 79, 85

Ideas of 1789 as, 95, 98, 118, 177

Kjellén and Swedish, 12–13, 44–45, 213, 291–92

Kjellén with Young Right and, 12, 17, 23n9, 37, 204, 213, 291–92

power and, 177–78

Swedish professors in, 30–32

Popper, Karl, 90, 195n15, 291

population

biopolitics and behaviour of, 77–78

France limits on, 88

great power status and, 88

race and, 84–85, 103, 105, 142–43, 186, 213, 220–21, 265

of Sweden, 203–5

Portugal, 167–68

as dismissed great power, 80–81

João José V and, 234

Portuguese Council of Indies, 233

Princip, Gavrilo, 182, 186

programmes, 120

as expansion policies, 149

in 1920 edition, 137

Puri, M.M., 256, 275

Quagliotti de Bellis, Bernardo, 241, 243

race

as black, yellow, or white, 103

as demography, 85

France and ‘coloured’, 105

imperialism and, 186

Kjellén on, 186, 220–21, 265

tribes and, 103

US and ‘Negro question’ on, 84, 142–43, 213

Ranke, Leopold von, 19, 93, 128n6

Ratzel, Friedrich

Brummer on, 268

Dorpalen on, 257–58, 276, 283n15

Ebeling on, 23n2, 269, 280, 281n5, 283n19

on Geopolitik, 172

Grabowsky and, 266–67, 270–71, 280, 284n35

Hatt on, 260–61, 274, 280

Kelly on, 272–73

Kjellén and, 4, 23n5, 49, 161–62, 167, 172–73, 279

Kost on, 268–69, 277–78

Latin America and, 235, 238, 240–43, 245–46

Lebensraum and, 212, 270, 273

as neglected, 4

Numelin on, 259–60

objectivity and, 24n15, 272

Parker on, 24n15, 271–73, 275, 280

on state as realm, 164

Stogiannos on, 277–78

Wållgren on, 274

realism, 194n3

on First World War, 251

neo-realism and, 7, 18, 223, 243

by small states, 207

realm, 130n23, 158

for autarky, 169–70

of Germany, 184–85, 221

Grabowsky on, 267

Kjellén on, 23n3, 65–66, 94, 99, 161, 163–67, 169, 219–20, 225–26, 267, 272

Ratzel on state and, 164

of Russia, 102

states as, 15, 23n3, 161, 163–67, 169

religion

Catholic Church and, 84, 122, 139, 231, 253

as faith, 82, 84, 86

of Germany, 139

Islam and, 21, 115

Kjellén on, 68, 77, 83–85, 109, 111–12, 170–71

Rio de Janeiro, 236

Ritter, Carl, 2, 48, 165, 172

rivers, 282n9

borders as, 49, 51, 53, 55–60, 61n4

of Germany, 137

Korea and, 54, 56, 58

Russell, Bertrand, 176, 189, 194n1

Russia, 130n24

Bonaparte on, 217

bureaucratic selfishness of, 148–50

on Central Asian republics, 217–18

expansion by, 224

as fallen power, 99, 101–2, 106, 128n3

Finland for, 28, 34, 37, 202–3, 216

First World War and sea access for, 183

Germany threat to, 184–85

on Kjellén, 275–77

Kjellén on, 4, 86, 146–50, 222–23, 228n3, 265

Kristof on, 266, 268, 272–73, 280

as military power, 87

NATO and, 218, 223, 228n4

Pacific plans by, 149, 151, 183

realm of, 102

Sweden border with, 56–60, 201, 205, 284n25

US compared with, 146–48

Witte of, 148

Yeltsin of, 217–18, 228n4

Schmitt, Carl, 224–27

Schneider, Georg, 91, 129n6, 129n13

Schough, Katarina, 273

science. See also objectivity

deductive vs. inductive, 42–43

Japan and research in, 71–72

Kjellén on, 41–42, 94–96

Myrdal on social, 42–43, 181–82

political science and, 93

U.S. on ‘big’, 41, 43

sea access, 72, 87, 92, 105–6, 109–10

for England, 114

Japan and power in, 156

for Russia, 183

Sweden and, 156

Second World War

German scholars on Haushofer, K., and, 257

Kjellén’s image after, 7, 262–65

Kjellén’s image before and during, 259–62

Serbia, 169, 186, 195n12, 217

small state(s)

biopolitics of, 207

China as, 113

geopolitics, 93, 166, 199, 206–7

great powers on, 114, 170

groups, 202–3

imperialism, 205–6

realism, 207

SMGE. See Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística

Social Democrats, ix, 5, 23n8, 40, 45

folkhem and, 16–17

of Germany, 117, 139

Kjellén and, 213

for parliamentary democracy, 17

Sociedade de Geografia do Rio de Janeiro, 236

Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística (SMGE), 234

society

borders for open, 60

building of, 39–40, 116–19

Johnson and US great, 72, 141

Kjellén and theory of, 76, 83, 111

soft power, 29, 38, 70, 72, 93, 197, 207

Sölch, Johann, 256, 283n14

Sombart, Werner, 187, 270

South America

imperialism and, 240, 244

Kjellén and, 7, 105–6

Spahn, Martin, 97, 129n6, 131n33

Spang, Christian, 270

Spengler, Oswald, 42, 68–69, 91, 103, 123, 144

Sprengel, Rainer, 269–70, 280

Spykman, Nicholas, 222, 224

state as lifeform

Brusewitz on, 13, 32, 193

Dugin on, 275–77

Kjellén and, 6, 13–14, 65, 69, 163, 213–14, 270, 279, 283n16

Staten som Lifsform (Kjellén), 6, 160, 174n2, 279

state(s). See also specific subjects

international hierarchy of, 217–18

Kjellén categories on, 15–16, 94

Kjellén on, x, 1, 161–62

nation desiring, 178

as organic, 215–16, 219–20

purpose of, 171–72

states interacting with, 160–61

terminology on, 66

statesmen

Kjellén on, 3, 41, 69–70, 75–77, 96, 98, 108, 126

national identification for, 32–33

rivalry and, 97–99

Stoakes, Geoffrey, 268

Stogiannos, Alexandros, 277–78

Den stora Orienten [The great Orient] (Kjellén), 9n2, 131n39, 158n6, 291

Stormakterna (Kjellén), 23n10, 130nn30–31

as breakthrough, 6

editions of, 64–66, 158n2

on geopolitics, 63–64

as global, 67

as Die Großmächte, 97

Haushofer, K., on, 256

on international politics, 12, 32, 44, 74–75

on Islam, 21

national statistics in, 67–69

1905 edition of, 74–89, 127

1911-1913 edition of, 89–96, 127

1920 edition of, 96–116, 127

on power, 173

updates on, 2, 64–65, 89

Storni, Segundo Rosa, 236, 240

Sudamerica, 235

Sundbeck, Carl, 265

Supan, Alexander, 260, 283n18

Sverige (Kjellén), 216, 291

Sweden, 130n28, 130nn23–24

as circum-marine power, 156

Denmark and, 37–38, 50, 183

Finland border with, 53, 57, 58–60

Finland lost by, 28, 34, 37, 202–3, 216

on Folkhemmet, ix

geography of, 51–53

geopolitics of Germany and, 221–27

Germany and, 135–36

great powers and, 37–38, 46n5, 80, 82, 203–4

history and, 28–31, 33

international standing of, 38–39

Kjellén and politics of, 12–13, 44–45, 213, 291–92

Kjellén and scholarship of, 34

Kjellén on borders and, 48–51, 54–55, 58–60, 174n6, 200–202

Kjellén on geopolitics of, 23n4, 38, 204–6

maps of, 52, 57

as middle state, 203

‘middle way’ of, 29, 39

nation-building in, 33

Norway and, 29, 33–39, 116, 164, 292

Norway borders and, 49, 51–53, 55–56, 59–60, 61n3, 200

political science on, 30–31, 33

population of, 203–5

professionalization in, 30–31

professors and politics of, 30–32

Russia border with, 56–60, 201, 205, 284n25

welfare state in, 34, 40

Young Right political party of, 12, 17, 23n9, 37, 204, 213, 291

Switzerland, 55, 254, 261–64, 266, 284n35

Tegnér, Esaias, 203, 216

temperate climate zone, 77, 91, 110, 151

territorial strategic analysis, ix, 4, 9n4, 236

territory. See specific subjects

Thermaenius, Edvard, 59, 194n6, 259–60, 262, 271–72, 280, 283n14

thinkers. See pensadores

Tordesillas division line, 232

Toynbee, Arnold, 42, 68, 123

Travassos, Mario, 236, 238

Turkey

border of, 58, 183

geopolitics and, 140, 153, 178, 184, 203, 215, 226–27

great power and, 80–81, 87, 91

as Levant, 168, 185

United States (US)

Anglo-Saxon ‘universal power’ as, 101, 116

on ‘big’ science, 41, 43

Cold War and, 239, 245

democracy and, 6

ethnicity and, 142–43

federalism of, 85–86, 108, 110, 119, 142, 147

Grabowsky on, 266–67, 270–71, 280, 284n35

as great power, 71–72, 74, 86–87, 97, 103, 106–8, 128n3

imperialism of, 145, 243

Japan compared with, 150, 155

Kjellén on, 4, 86, 116, 119, 141–46, 190–91

Kristof on, 266, 268, 272–73, 280

Mahan of, ix, 4, 9n4, 145, 158n5, 236, 268

Monroe doctrine of, 65, 103, 145, 157, 224, 226–27, 233

national security doctrine of, 239–40

with new breed, 143

race question in, 84, 142–43, 213

Russia compared with, 146–48

University of São Paulo, 244

Uruguay, 241, 243

US. See United States

utis possidetis juridical principle, 234

Vargas, Getulio, 237

de Velazco, López, 233

Venezuela, 145, 233

Vidal de la Blache, Paul, 235, 245

Vivó, Jorge A., 236–37

Wållgren, Ingrid, 274

warfare

as deranged power, 179

development toward, 97–98, 112

faith and, 187, 191

geopolitics and, 165, 192

great powers and, 79–80

as internal diversion, 186–87

international system and, 179–80

Kjellén on, 14, 79–80, 98, 187–89, 213, 216

Watson, Adam, 70, 129n7

Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 186–87

willpower

of China, 111, 131n39, 151

for great power status, 4, 6, 18, 69, 78, 82, 85–86, 100, 110–13 124, 131n39

‘will to more power’ and, 91

Wilson, Woodrow, 69, 106, 116, 120, 125, 227, 279

Witte, Sergei, 148

women

Kjellén on voting and, ix, 117, 174n1

Sweden vote for, 28, 32

World War I. See First World War

World War II. See Second World War

Yeltsin, Boris, 217–18, 228n4

Young Right movement, 12, 17, 23n9, 37, 204, 213, 291–92

Zollverein, 242