Titoism in Action [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520350458

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titoism in action

berkeley and los angeles

titoism the reforms in yugoslavia

action

after 1948

by fred warner neal

U N I V E R S I T Y OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

1958

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Cambridge

University Press, London,

1 9 5 8 BY THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

Angeles England

CALIFORNIA

Library of Congress Catalog Card 'Number: 58-102.91 Printed in the United States of America Designed by Marion Jackson Skinner

this book is dedicated to Irena

preface EVER

SINCE

the Communist party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the Yugoslavs have been experimenting with new theories of communism and have evolved a new political structure and economic system, different from those usually associated with communism of the Soviet type. The Yugoslav experiments constitute the most interesting and most significant development in Marxism since the Russian Revolution, and they have had an enormous impact on the whole Communist world, including the USSR itself. The Yugoslav reforms apparently reflect an effort to create a society that is socialist and yet has within it some elements of political democracy. One of the most important questions of our times is whether it is possible to have such a society. To the extent that the Yugoslav experience throws light on that question, it is hoped that this study will serve a purpose beyond the rather narrow limits imposed by scholarship. This book undertakes to trace the development of the new reforms, and the theories behind them, explain them and evaluate their significance. Emphasis is on the development up

PREFACE

through 1954, by which time the basic pattern had emerged. But the new Yugoslav system is still incomplete and still undergoing constant changes. The book attempts to describe the Yugoslav system as it was operating in 1957. Originally, it was planned to treat only the internal developments, but before the writing was concluded there occurred something of a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union; there were also the sensational developments in Poland and Hungary in 1956, themselves a reflection of the impact of Titoism. As far as one can see, these developments have not vitally affected the internal situation in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, there has been added a postscript on Yugoslav foreign policy which may help to put Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union, as well as with other countries, in perspective. In making an assessment of the Yugoslav situation, I have drawn on my personal experiences in Yugoslavia, both before and after the Cominform Resolution of 1948, and especially on detailed researches undertaken there during 1954. I was able to observe firsthand the operations of political and economic institutions in each of the six republics of the country and attend meetings of worker-management bodies, local government organs, citizens' meetings of worker-management bodies, local government organs, citizens' groups, courts, and Communist party committees. I talked with leading Yugoslav officials, from Tito on down, and with countless ordinary citizens. In addition, this work is based on texts of Yugoslav laws, government documents, statements, and other official publications, on Yugoslav books, journals, and newspapers. I have also utilized my experiences in the USSR and official Soviet sources as well as pertinent books, articles, and reports published here and abroad. With the exception of certain items taken from the Joint Translation Service's daily summary of viii

PREFACE

the Yugoslav Press, made available by the United States Embassy in Belgrade and by the External Research Staff of the State Department, the material quoted from Yugoslav language publications has been translated by me or under my direction. Citations from Borba are always from the Belgrade edition unless otherwise indicated. Material is cited from various issues of the Serbo-Croat language publications Arhiv za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke and Medjunarodna Politika, as well as from issues of their respective English language editions, New Yugoslav Law and Review of International Affairs, depending on which was available. Transliteration of titles and names from the Serbian Cyrillic is given in the Croatian Latin equivalent. Transliteration from Russian follows the style prescribed by the Library of Congress. A detailed analysis of all the new Yugoslav reforms, including Yugoslav foreign policy, has not been attempted heretofore, although certain works have dealt with some phases and with the general situation in post-Cominform Yugoslavia. A number of the works dealing with Yugoslavia—especially those in English—have been written by persons with ethnic relationships in Eastern Europe. The contribution of some of them has been limited by emotional overtones that the authors, no doubt understandably, were not able to circumvent. I have no emotional commitment to my subject, ethnic or otherwise, and the book has striven to avoid value judgments on the theory that the readers can make their own. It is always presumptuous for a foreigner to discuss the institutions of other countries. This may be especially true of Yugoslavia, because the system is altogether new and still evolving. It is not impossible that, despite considerable effort to prevent it, errors have crept into this book, errors of both fact and interpretation. If so, I can only say they were made

ix

PREFACE

honestly in an attempt to serve the interests of scholarship and the interests of peace and understanding, which—I am glad to say—are also the interests of my own country. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the American Universities Field Staff, whose representative I was in Yugoslavia during my 1954 researches, and the American Philosophical Society, which conferred a grant furthering those researches. I am appreciative of permission to quote extensively from American Universities Field Staff Reports. In Yugoslavia, I had the wholehearted cooperation of the United States Embassy and of my friend Ambassador James W . Riddleberger. Among the large number of Yugoslavs who went out of their way to help I am especially indebted to Milos Martic; Blagoje Lazic, now chief American correspondent for Borba; Jovan Djordjevic, chief of the Federal Executive Council secretariat for legislation and of the Legal Council; Kiro Gligorov, now chief of the Federal Executive Council secretariat for economic affairs; Branko Novakovic, deputy director of the Yugoslav Information Center in New York; Ivan Bozecevic, secretary-general of the Yugoslav trade-union Sindikat; Milovan Djilas; Edvard Kardelj, vice-president of Yugoslavia; Ales Bebler, former deputy foreign secretary; and Josef Vilfan, chief of President Tito's secretariat. These gentlemen talked freely with me, attempted to answer my questions in detail, and frequently supplied me with invaluable documentation. Needless to say, however, the interpretations and conclusions are mine alone. I am also indebted to J. K. Pollock, A. A. LobanovRostovsky, James H. Meisel, and Henry L. Bretton of the University of Michigan, for a critical reading of a part of the manuscript. I also benefited from discussions about Yugoslav developments with Louis Kostanick, of the University of California, Los Angeles; Jozo Tomasevich, of San Francisco State College; and many others.

X

PREFACE

Unless otherwise indicated in the legends, all photographs are reproduced through the courtesy of the Yugoslav Information Center, New York. I wish further to thank Miss Adele Baker, of Los Angeles, for her yeoman service—far beyond the call of duty—in typing the final manuscript. And, of course, I could not have written this book at all had not my wife shown superhuman forbearance in putting up with me during the throes of composition. F. W. N. The Claremont Graduate School Claremont, California

xi

contents

I INTRODUCTION, 1

II THE NEW DOCTRINE, 15

III THE COMMUNIST PARTY, 34

IV THE LEADER, 82

V THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM, 89

VI MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY, 118

VII THE REFORMS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 160

VIII THE REFORMS IN AGRICULTURE, 185

IX RELAXATION OF TOTALITARIANISM, 213

X REFLECTIONS ON TITOISM, 232

XI A POSTSCRIPT ON YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY, 250

NOTES, 277

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 311

INDEX, 321

illustrations (following page 46)

Tito on his 65th birthday Marshal Tito during World War II Edvard Kardelj, vice-president of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Rankovic, vice-president of the Federal Executive Council A meeting of the Workers' Council Steel works at Zenica The Belgrade International Fair, 1957 A peasant woman at work in her home Farm machinery in Vojvoidina Market in Rijeka Boulevard Marshal Tito, Belgrade Grave of World War II hero in Bosnia Pioneers parade in Belgrade, 1955 Gate of Dubrovnik Cathedral of Zagreb Market in Mostar, Herzegovina The Yugoslav army on maneuvers

introduction THE

C O M M U N I S T

leadership which came to power in Yugoslavia in 1945 organized the country along the lines prescribed by the Soviet Union for an Eastern European "people's democracy." 1 All industry as well as large estates was nationalized and a policy of collectivization was begun. A program of industrialization was swiftly launched. A federal planning commission worked out a detailed plan, of the Soviet type, and various federal economic ministries and administrations directly operated the factories. The 1946 constitution set up people's republics in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, but the great preponderance of power was held by the federal government. A federal control commission supervised the execution of federal laws throughout the land. The federal ministry of the interior, with its political police,

INTRODUCTION

known as OZNA,2 stamped out all opposition to the Tito regime. All political and social life in the country was controlled directly or indirectly by the Communist party. Most of the prewar parties were outlawed. Those that remained were compelled to operate through a single People's Front, which had a single program. That program was dictated by the Communist party. The party was a member organization of the People's Front, but it alone kept its independent political organization and program. Tito, as leader of both the government and the party, wielded supreme authority. 3 Although in the years immediately following the war Yugoslavia seemed to be a model Soviet satellite, there were already at work several factors which ultimately belied the appearance. The biggest difference between Yugoslavia and the other Eastern European satellites was that in Yugoslavia— and only in Yugoslavia—had the Communists established themselves in power without important assistance from the Soviet Union. Even before Soviet troops reached Belgrade in late 1944, Tito's Partisan army—with the backing of Great Britain and the United States—had cleared large areas of the country of the Axis invaders. 4 Since the wartime Partisans comprised large numbers of all the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia and from all sections,5 Tito was, at least as compared with Communist leaders elsewhere in Eastern Europe, a national leader in his own right. Furthermore, unlike his comrades elsewhere, he had a tested army that was primarily loyal to him. Thus when differences with the Soviet Union began to appear, Tito was in a unique position to assert his point of view. The differences were not slow in appearing. 6 They involved Yugoslavia's ambitious industrialization plans, Soviet attempts at economic exploitation, reluctance of the Yugoslavs to follow the advice of Soviet advisers, and their opposition to Soviet recruitment of Yugoslavs for the MVD. There were

2

INTRODUCTION

also operational-doctrinal differences, which had to do with the peculiar Yugoslav approach to collectivization of agriculture, the role of the Yugoslav Communist party, and foreign policy differences involving Yugoslav relations with Albania and Bulgaria. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had organized the Communist Information Bureau 7 to cope with just such "nationalist deviation" as was being manifested by the Yugoslavs. There then began the series of notes between Soviet and Yugoslav leaders. When Tito refused to admit completely the error of his ways and confess deviation—as Communist mores demand— the Soviet Union read the Yugoslavs out of the Cominform and proceeded to denounce them as enemies of communism.8 It was this resolution of the Cominform expelling the Yugoslav Communist party which set the stage for the development of the new Communist theories and practices that are dealt with in the ensuing chapters. The Resolution itself was followed by more tangible opposition, chief of which was an economic blockade imposed on Yugoslavia by the entire Soviet bloc. Far from "escaping" from Soviet domination, the Yugoslav Communists were stunned by the impact of the Cominform Resolution. Imbued, like Communists elsewhere, with both love and obedience for Stalin and the USSR, the Yugoslavs were heretics only because Moscow saw heresy in anything less than complete subjection in all things. Their expulsion from the Cominform produced a psychological and political crisis among Yugoslav Communists. That they had erred might be possible; but that they had sinned irrevocably and an anathema should be pronounced on them by the very objects of their adoration was inconceivable. Although Tito and his inner core of advisers had realized for some months before the Resolution that they were in for an unhappy time, even they found the actual act of excommunication both terrible and

3

INTRODUCTION

unexpected. Psychosomatic illnesses were common among them. Tito, for example, suffered his first gall-bladder attack at the time.9 The late Boris Kidric, a member of the Politburo, told the author that in the days following the Cominform Resolution he "spent agonizing, sleepless nights," and "struggled with my conscience and my skin broke out." Blazo Jovanovic, head of the party in Montenegro, and a member of the federal Central Committee, confessed that the Resolution was "the most terrible thing that ever happened to me." If the leaders of the Communist party of Yugoslavia found Moscow's denouncement of them difficult to accept, the same was even more true of the rank and file. They were experiencing the same feeling as American Roman Catholics might if they were to wake up one morning to discover that the entire American hierarchy had been excommunicated. Their psychological difficulty to comprehend what had happened, plus, doubtless, uncertainty about the reaction of the rank and file of the party, accounted for the ambivalent attitude of the Yugoslav Communist leaders in the days following their excommunication. They literally begged to be taken back into the Cominform fold. In a speech to the Fifth Party Congress in July, 1948, Tito pledged his faithfulness to the USSR and promised "to work with all our might to mend relations between our party and the Soviet Union." Yugoslavia's foreign policy, Tito said, was in full accord with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, for the Soviet policy "corresponded and corresponds to the interests of our country." When he concluded his speech to the congress the hall rang with cries of "Hail Stalin, Hail Tito." 1 0 Similarly, Yugoslav actions at the Danubian Conference in Belgrade in the summer of 1948 are inexplicable except by the theory that the Yugoslavs either hoped Moscow would forgive or that they were still unable psychologically to accept the fact of their new position. A top Yugoslav foreign office

4

INTRODUCTION

representative acted as unofficial floor leader for the Soviet leaders, and the Yugoslav delegation constantly voted with the USSR, usually against their own interests.11 Yet at that same time, Tito and his lieutenants did stand by their guns. Tito told the Fifth Party Congress: "Can we renounce everything and say it is true we are nationalists simply because it says so in the Resolution of the Information Bureau? Of course we cannot . . . admit this. . . . The signers [of the Resolution] did not take objective truth into account at all." 1 2 This defiance of the Soviet Union, compromised though it was, was undoubtedly popular among the mass of non-Communist Yugoslavs. Although there was little outward reaction among the traditionally apolitical peasants, among the more politically aware opposition to communism was identified with opposition to the Soviet Union. Although at first incredulous, they now had to recognize the hated Yugoslav Communists as the chief defenders of the country from the hated Soviet Union.13 Put in this difficult position, many became perforce more or less supporters of the regime, especially when the secret police, now busy tracking down Cominformists, stopped bothering them.14 The Yugoslav Communists had already made noteworthy strides toward eliminating the nationalist-religious strife that had plagued the Yugoslavs long before they were organized into a state. If this problem had not been altogether solved, it had at least been so muted that it was no longer a major political problem. The strongly nationalist role assumed after 1948 by the Yugoslav Communist party—the first really nationwide party the country ever had—put still further into the background the old struggles between Serbs and Croats, between Roman and Orthodox Catholics. Although some might feel that a common opposition to the Communists was also a factor in this, on balance there was little reason to dispute

5

INTRODUCTION

Milovan Djilas' 1951 evaluation that "our government is in a much stronger position among the people as a result of our firm defense of national independence against the USSR." 1 5 On the eve of the Cominform Resolution, Yugoslav relations with the West were probably the worst of any satellite country. Unfailing supporters of the USSR in the cold war, the Yugoslavs had alienated Western public opinion by their undemocratic methods and by the execution of General Mihailovic and the imprisonment of Archbishop Stepinac. In addition, they had shot down two U.S. Air Force planes flying near Yugoslav territory, resulting in the death of two American soldiers. Still further disputes involved detention of the Yugoslav Danube fleet, gold deposited in New York by the Royalist government, and American claims for expropriation of property and lend-lease balances.16 Western diplomats, unable to dismiss the possibility that the whole Cominform incident might be a complex Soviet tactic, were further puzzled by the Yugoslavs' protestations that they were loyal Soviet Communists and also by their continued hostility to the West for the first year after the break. It was not until November, 1950, that the American government definitely put itself on record as supporting Tito and believing that the split with the USSR was genuine. This policy was expressed in a letter by President Truman to Congress, stating that $16,000,000 of Mutual Defense Assistance funds had been used for drought relief in Yugoslavia. This assistance was given in response to a formal Yugoslav request for aid in a note dated October 20, 1950. Further relief was then provided after the President had advised Congress as follows: Since the break between the Kremlin and Yugoslavia, it has been the policy of this government to assist Yugoslavia to maintain its independence. The continued independence of Yugoslavia is of great importance to the security of the

6

INTRODUCTION

United States and its partners in NATO and to all nations associated with them in their common defense against the threat of Soviet aggression. We can help preserve the independence of a nation which is defying the savage threats of the Soviet imperialists, and keeping Soviet power out of one of Europe's most strategic areas. This is clearly in our national interest.17 The immediate result of American aid was the beginning of a pro-Western Yugoslav foreign policy. At the same time, the Yugoslavs had begun to edge away from the Soviet Union as far as internal policies were concerned. In the beginning, this manifestation was almost altogether in the realm of theory, and even here they backed into changes from what was at first an entirely negative position. Actually, they had little choice. The continued and mounting hostility of the Soviet Union had driven Tito and his comrades into a reconsideration of their entire position. There was a need to find an ideological basis for their position as a Communist nation outside the Soviet community, and the discovery that the Soviet brand of communism was not for them in at least one respect soon brought them to an examination of other aspects of it as well. 18 The Yugoslavs took the position that since they remained Communists, and the Soviet Communists opposed them, this meant that the Soviets were not good Communists. "Good communism" was equated with Marxism-Leninism. The Yugoslavs contended that the Soviet Union had deviated from "true Marxism-Leninism" as a result of an independent Communist bureaucracy created by Stalin which transformed the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship over the proletariat. Proof was the Soviet Union's "imperialist denial of equality between socialist states," as manifested by the Cominform Resolution.19 This theme, that Stalin had been guilty of "revisionism" of basic Marxism-Leninism, began to

7

INTRODUCTION

be echoed and reechoed in the statements and writings of the Yugoslav Communists in the fall of 1949 and afterward.20 From here, the Yugoslavs worked out new theories of their own—theories based on Marxism but with interpretations different from those of Soviet doctrine. These added up to a new theoretical approach to communism, involving a new theory of state, of surplus value, of agriculture, and of the party. During this new theorizing and ideological groping, the Yugoslavs insisted that they remained Marxist-Leninists, socialism and communism were their goals as before, and only Stalinism was repudiated.21 Perhaps the essence of the new Yugoslav doctrine was that the state must start at once to "wither away." Having erected the outlines of their new ideology, the Yugoslavs, in 1950, began to implement it by a series of reforms that transformed the political and economic character of the state. The new reforms were to safeguard against "Stalinist bureaucratic state capitalism" and launch the "withering away" of the state.22 Also the reforms were to bring about a different and more democratic type of socialism, although not political democracy of the Western type.23 The key to this development was decentralization—decentralization of the government, decentralization of the economy, and, later, decentralization of the Communist party. Decentralization, said Mose Pijade, one of the leading theoreticians among the Yugoslav Communists, was the "first and most vital step toward democracy and the road to socialism." 24 Although in one sense the reforms are all of a piece, they fall logically into several categories. Generally speaking, they were not put into effect by individual laws but rather as a series of measures created by decrees and then finally pulled together in formal enactments. First were those dealing with industry and the economy generally: worker-management of factories, revamping of the

8

INTRODUCTION

planning mechanism, and decentralization of the state economic administration. Although the establishment of workers' councils in the factories preceded the decentralization, Yugoslav theory holds that it was decentralization that made worker-management possible. Without the abandonment of the attempt to plan directly all production, bureaucratic control on top would have stifled worker initiative.25 The second group of reforms was in the realm of political organization, and was embraced, as were most of the administrative changes, in the constitution of 1953. Here was the extension of greater political autonomy to the republic governments, broadening of authority of municipal governments, and direct worker representation in legislative bodies at various levels. Also in the constitution are the new theory of separation of powers between political and administrative functions and a new form of executive. Third was a whole series of agricultural measures which reflected the failure of collectivization and ultimately spelled the end of the kolkhoz system. The agricultural reforms, however, were in a separate category from the others, because of both theoretical and operational factors. They were begun as temporary measures, and the Yugoslavs only reluctantly came to consider them as an integral part of the whole new system. Finally, there were the reforms relaxing the nature of totalitarianism in Yugoslavia. Included in this group were not only the new criminal code and the new election statute, but also the new and decentralized role of the Communist party and the broadened responsibility and authority for the People's Front. With one major exception, these reforms appeared to set a pattern that the Yugoslav leaders hope will continue for some time to come. The exception was the commune. Exactly what the commune is to be is a matter of much discussion in Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslav leaders have emphasized repeatedly

9

INTRODUCTION

that they consider it a vital part of the ultimate structure they are creating. 26 As set forth by Kardelj and others, the commune is to be the end product of socialist decentralization—a combined political and economic unit embracing both the countryside and agriculture on the one hand, and the city and industry on the other. It would be a more or less self-contained and self-supporting local administrative unit that would integrate industrial and agricultural production with consumer needs. 27 Certain communes were formed in 1955, but disagreement about their role and exact organizational form remained. As originally conceived, the reforms were seen as a "return to real Leninism," from which Soviet direction had taken the Communist movement. 28 As they developed, however, the new practices in government, economy, and party went beyond even Leninism, although they remained well within the confines of Marxist philosophy. The implications of this comprised one of the main facets of a dispute within the Communist party and contribute to an essential political contradiction in the new system. Yugoslav theoreticians, in discussing the new developments, constantly stressed their difference from Soviet practice. 29 There is no doubt that they do differ. The decentralization, for example, went so far in certain instances as to draw criticism from American officials in the FOA Mission in Belgrade, 30 and some observers have concluded that a main Yugoslav motivation was "to do things as differently as possible from the way they are done in Russia and still maintain a claim to Marxism." 31 At the same time, the new economic and political structure in Yugoslavia has drawn to some extent on Western institutions. This is freely admitted by the Yugoslavs,32 although they emphatically deny that "Western pressure" forced them into the new developments or that Western aid was a factor. 33 In addition to doing things differently from the USSR and 10

INTRODUCTION

borrowing from the West, the Yugoslavs also sought to go back to revolutionary experiences of the past to find models for their new system. The French Revolution, the Committee of Public Safety, the Paris Commune, and the early Soviets in Russia are not infrequently referred to in discussions of the new reforms.34 But it is claimed that the system as a whole is new and original and some of its forms are unique in the annals of political and economic organization. 35 In all governments, there is often a big gap between statutory provisions and hortatory statements concerning them on the one hand, and political fact on the other. This is especially true of Communist Eastern Europe, not only because of the extralegal authority wielded by the Communist parties and the class nature of the governments, but also because, traditionally, law means less there than in the Anglo-Saxon West. As with the Soviet system, law tends to be regarded more as a norm, a statement of what should obtain, rather than a fixed principle that invariably applies in all cases.36 Significantly, a Russian proverb observes: "Law is like a wagon tongue. Wherever you turn it, there it goes." Yugoslavia is no exception. Indeed, legal reality in Yugoslavia is sometimes all the more vague because of contradictions seemingly inherent in the new reforms. For example, these reforms create a decentralized economy, in which initiative has full play within the confines of economic laws, and at the same time maintain a socialist and a planned economy. That this effort is officially described as a "decentralization which is in its essence not antagonistic to an essential centralization of the socialist plans" 3 7 does not in fact make it not antagonistic. On the political side, the reforms have had the effect of making for more personal freedom and encouraging discussion of new ideas while the Communist party continues to exercise exclusive control. Further, these developments are taking place in a country comprised of a people with a low

11

INTRODUCTION

cultural level, widespread illiteracy, and no real experience in self-government—a people who are inevitably confused by the ideological zigzagging of the past decade. In addition, the official Yugoslav approach is one of experimentation and eschews preconceptions about the right forms or even the exact nature of the goals.38 Especially in a revolutionary situation, this means frequent changes. The laws spelling out the new reforms in Yugoslavia have already been changed often, and frequent additional changes are anticipated.39 How the laws should work and how they should be altered is a topic of frequent public debate at all levels in Yugoslavia. The peculiar psychology of the Yugoslav Communists is a factor here. In one sense, their undogmatic approach to socialist forms is more in the spirit of American pragmatism than Soviet Marxism. But at the same time they still sometimes manifest a rigid and doctrinaire attitude typical of ideologists in general.40 The first characteristic prompts them to change; the second makes them reluctant to admit error. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the new Yugoslav system does not always work as it is supposed to on paper and sometimes appears to be breaking down entirely.41 Nor is it surprising that at various times—no matter what the law says—government and party officials step in to direct the course of affairs the way they want them.42 Certain observers of the Yugoslav scene have concluded that the new reforms are altogether a façade, designed only to fool the public, foreign and domestic.43 It is true that many Yugoslavs hostile to the Tito regime agree. The investigations reported herein, however, fail to validate this judgment. It may be that in the future, if the new laws do not operate successfully, their forms may be maintained, but not their substance. Certainly it is correct to state that the Yugoslav leaders hope, and expect, that the reforms will bring socialism

12

INTRODUCTION

and communism to their country.44 The dominant role of the Communist party often sharply limits the democratic nature of many of the reforms, and there has been no indication that the party intends to abdicate its primacy. Nevertheless, life in Yugoslavia has changed as a result of the new system. Few indeed would say that the Tito regime in 1956 was not less absolutistic than it was before 1950. Further, despite the economic difficulties Yugoslavia was encountering, the cold figures show real physical improvement. The standard of living has risen since 1951, and so has key industrial production. 45 This is not to say that the new system is working properly, or even well, or that it necessarily can succeed without major changes. Tito has declared that the real implementation of the new system depends "on the pace of cultural developments," adding that for "poor peasants who have for centuries been vegetating at the lowest possible cultural level and standard of living . . . this will not be an easy or a rapid process." 48 Possibly even more important than the new reforms is the new psychology of the Yugoslav Communists which produced them. Despite their talk about democracy, the Yugoslav Communists are not democratic in the Western sense of the word. But the impact of the Cominform Resolution shocked them out of that impervious, suspicious, and hostile attitude so typical of the Muscovites. The realization—forced on them by cold political reality—that they had been wrong made them now less dogmatic. They were able and willing—often eager— to discuss ideas different from their own. They were less certain that all non-Communists were either stupid or wicked or that Marxism was capable of only one—their—interpretation. The new ideology they were forging itself came out of more free discussion than Belgrade had seen in a long while. The expression "We are searching for our way" began to be heard in Yugoslav Communist circles, with an implication that many

13

INTRODUCTION

possibilities hitherto discarded or refused had now at least to be considered. 47 Inevitably the area of freedom of opinion widened. This in itself—as limited as it was—perhaps represented the greatest and most real deviation from Stalinism and Soviet practice generally.

14

the new doctrine THE

INITIAL

YUGOSLAV

reaction to Soviet charges of ideological deviation in 1948 was to deny them all.1 Although the Yugoslavs may have been guilty of many of the practices denounced by the USSR, 2 they were correct in denying formal theoretical deviation. In the seven years following the Cominform break, there did in fact evolve a significant new ideological structure; however, the concrete formulation of theoretical departures from Soviet doctrine did not appear until after the Yugoslav expulsion, and many of them resulted from it. Tito admitted that until the Cominform Resolution the Yugoslav Communists "had too many illusions" and were too uncritical in taking and replanting in Yugoslavia everything that was being done in the Soviet Union—even those things that were not in harmony with their specific conditions or "in the spirit of the science of MarxismLeninism." "But," he said, "today we ourselves are building

THE NEW DOCTRINE

socialism in our country. W e are not using any kind of stereotype." 3 Boris Kidric and other Communist leaders spoke of having been "duped by Soviet ideas." Only after the Cominform Resolution had freed them from the necessity of conforming to Soviet thought and practice did they begin to have original ideas. 4

NATIONAL COMMUNISM The beginnings of the new Yugoslav Communist doctrine concerned Yugoslavia's unique position as a Communist state outside the Soviet community. In toto, this amounted to a theory of national communism which justified Yugoslavia's complete independence from the Soviet Union. Especially at first, the Yugoslav theorists attempted to base their new position firmly on Marx and Lenin. Going back to Lenin's theory of the uneven development of capitalism, they claimed for themselves more or less what Stalin had claimed for the Soviet Union in his theory of "socialism in one country." But Lenin had proclaimed the equality of socialist states, and it was the Soviet Union's "imperialist denial" of this equality that for the Yugoslavs branded the USSR as a deviate from Marxism-Leninism. 5 Equality, they hold, means that each nation is free to develop socialism as it sees fit, with the form usually different in each instance because it reflects the culture and needs of differing societies.6 Thus, essentially one form of socialism is as valid as another. The Yugoslavs, therefore, rejected the Third International Communist opposition to Second International Socialism and viewed with approval even the mildly socialistic Scandinavian countries.7 Yugoslav Communist nationalism, however, is not bourgeois nationalism. The Yugoslavs have eschewed the idea of international communism as an organized force and specifically rejected the theory of world revolution. 8 However, world com-

16

THE NEW DOCTRINE

munism remains not only a desirable goal but, as Marxist theory teaches, the inevitable goal. The Yugoslavs see all countries gravitating constantly and inexorably toward socialism and communism, even if they are unaware of it.9 Even capitalist countries are moving gradually toward socialism, in spite of their efforts not to, and every capitalist country has within it elements of socialism.10 When all nations have ultimately achieved communism voluntarily and in their own way, a world Communist community will then exist ipso facto.11 For the time being, "conditions are such that pure capitalism can no longer exist alone on this earth, because socialism is being born alongside."12 Thus there is no fundamental conflict between capitalist nations and socialist nations, and the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the inevitability of capitalist hostility are not valid.13 Although not expressly rejecting Lenin's idea that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism and capitalism is therefore the cause of war, Yugoslav theory insists that capitalist nations are not necessarily warlike. "Aggressive policies, not ideology, cause war," Tito said.14 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was accused of aggressive policies against Yugoslavia growing out of contradictions in its system of "state capitalism."15 Any aggression and any interference by one nation in the affairs of another are condemned by the Yugoslavs. Thus they reject Lenin's theory of just and unjust wars, previously interpreted as a justification for wars of "liberation of oppressed peoples." Tito declared that "every war is absurd but an ideological war is even more absurd," and added that "under the guise of an ideological struggle conducted by means of propaganda . . . imperialistic ambitions, etc., are found." 16 The only just wars, declared Edvard Kardelj, are wars "of an oppressed people against their oppressors or the defensive war of a people for their independence against the aggression of 17

THE NEW DOCTRINE

a conqueror or interventionist." He specifically excluded from the category of just wars attempts of "the Soviet Union and every other country to bring happiness to other peoples by forcing its political system and hegemony on them." 17 Even before this theoretical position was enunciated, the Yugoslavs more or less acted on it by condemning the North Korean aggression.18 In certain particulars, these new doctrines approach the position of Eduard Bernstein and other German revisionists who were so excoriated by Lenin and the early Social Democratic leaders. The Yugoslavs have made it clear, however, that they reject Bernstein's view that the aim of a proletarian movement is only political democracy rather than communism.19 Further, they still hold that, inevitable though communism may be, Communists must fight for it and a dictatorship of the proletariat is justified—although not always necessary— to effect the transformation from capitalism to socialism, nationalize means of production, and "neutralize" hostile classes.20 The Yugoslav Communist leaders do not like the term "national communism" because it connotes to them nationalism of the type deplored by basic Communist ideology, that is, capitalist nationalism. Since even their communism remains, in theory, a world goal, it is true that in one sense "national communism" is something of a contradiction in terms.21 Nevertheless, that is what their system is. Technically speaking, "national socialism" might be a more precise term, but that cannot be used because of its association with Nazi Germany.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE The second major area of new departures in Yugoslav theory concerns the role of the state. Taking Marx and Lenin as their guides, the Yugoslav theories insist that the state must "wither

18

THE NEW DOCTRINE

away." The dictatorship of the proletariat, even if necessary in the beginning, must not be a continuing thing. The dictatorship of the proletariat, according to the Yugoslavs, means the ownership and management of the means of production by the state in the form of a large state apparatus and the undemocratic use of what Lenin once called the "organs of oppression." Nationalization of industry and management by the state, however, is held to be only "the first, and the lowest, form of socialism." 22 This form is dangerous because it creates the opportunity for a "bureaucratic cast" to seize and exploit power for its own ends, "as happened in the USSR." In this instance, socialism becomes "nothing but state capitalism." 23 Kardelj explained it in terms of the class struggle: "The transitional period from capitalism to socialism, that is, from a class to a classless society, similarily constitutes a class struggle, the latter being chiefly characterized by its development of a strong tendency for its political center of gravity to be shifted to the state system proper and to the workers' party itself." This tendency, according to Kardelj, is even more dangerous than "counterrevolutionary attempts by expropriated classes." Therefore, once the "exploiting elements of society have been isolated" and no longer represent a clear and present danger to socialist institutions, it is necessary to safeguard against "bureaucratic state capitalism" by beginning at once the process of "the withering away of the state." 24 A state is not "really socialist," Kardelj said, "until it begins to wither away." The Yugoslav state is only defensible because it is a state in the process of "withering away." 25 Stalin's various excuses as to why the Soviet state must become stronger rather than "wither away" have been ridiculed by the Yugoslavs.26 The real reason, they have charged, is that the masses in the USSR under Stalin were exploited and the state bureaucracy had to become stronger and more dictatorial in order to maintain its position. A Marxist state must advance toward

19

THE N E W DOCTRINE

communism and this necessarily means "withering away." Djilas concluded in 1952 that since the Soviet Union "could not advance toward communism," it had "as much connection with Marxism as have gods with hatters." 27

SURPLUS VALUE AND OWNERSHIP In addition to starting to "wither away," a state to be "really socialist," according to Yugoslav theory, must be based firmly in the interest of the working class.28 These concepts involve the Marxist theory of surplus value and the questions of ownership and control of the means of production. According to Marx, the essential contradiction in capitalism is that the capitalist owners exploit workers by taking from them the "surplus value" of products they create.29 According to Stalin, the concept of surplus value may be properly applied only in a capitalist economy, and where the means of production are owned by the state, as in the Soviet Union, surplus value, if it exists at all, is not applicable in the same sense.30 The Yugoslavs insist that surplus value always exists and assert that Stalin's attempt to deny its validity in the USSR was an attempt to conceal the real nature of the Soviet system. The question is, Who gets the surplus value? In a capitalist society, they say, surplus value accrues to the capitalists. In a state ownership system, it accrues to the state. In neither system does it accrue to the workers who create it. In both, therefore, the workers are exploited.31 The question, as the Yugoslavs see it, is not only one of ownership but also one of control.32 National ownership in the USSR means control by the state. Such control not only has deprived the workers of the rewards of their labor but it has also prevented the "withering away" of the state.33 For workers to share in surplus value, they themselves must control, or at least share control of, the means of production. At

20

THE NEW DOCTRINE

the same time, there cannot be a return to private ownership. To solve this problem, the Yugoslavs devised the concept of "social property." Social property involved national but not state ownership and "social but not state control." 34 The mechanism for "social property" was found in workermanagement. Workers in each factory, through their elected representatives, were to have more or less complete authority to organize production and dispose of the proceeds of their work as they saw fit. This would permit state control of the means of production to cease, and the way was therefore opened for the state "to wither away." The Yugoslav system, accordingly, would be transformed "from state socialism to economic democracy." 35 "From now on," Tito declared in 1950, "the state ownership of the means of production—factories, mines, railways—is passing on to a higher form of socialist ownership. . . . Therein lies our road to socialism and that is the only right road as regards the withering away of state functions in the economy." 36 DECENTRALIZATION AND PLANNING Up until this time, the Yugoslav economy had operated under the provisions of a rigid, Soviet-type plan. Centralized planning scheduled the production of every nut and bolt, according to the Soviet theory that the more centralized the planning controls, the more efficient the economy.37 The management of industry was centralized in the multitudinous federal ministries and boards in Belgrade. For Yugoslavia, this had constituted "a relative leap from the past into the future," but "such a situation in itself contains outstanding contradictions." "The contradictory nature of the dialectical elements in it," said Boris Kidric, "inevitably becomes more obvious and more acute, and either the process of transformation of state ownership into common ownership of the nation under the

21

THE NEW DOCTRINE

management of the direct producers must commence and gain way, or else an all-powerful and all-embracing state industrial monopoly ceases to become the foundation for socialism and becomes increasingly the economic basis for the classcaste rule of a bureaucracy." 38 Thus, in order for "social property" and worker-management to be meaningful, there had to be a new theory of planning. 39 NEW THEORY OF PLANNING The new theory of planning was based on "socialist decentralization"—decentralization of the economy and of the government. Planning was now to be mainly a function of individual producing enterprises, which were to compete among themselves. The federal economic ministries were to be abolished. State economic functions were "to lose their former character of a government of men, to acquire the socialist character of a government of things." The state was to become merely the "socialist regulator" of the nation's industry by indirect controls contained in "social plans drawn up by the representative bodies of the country." Such controls as would be maintained were to represent "nothing else but a defense of the socialist community against the danger of the elemental, automatic section of these economic laws which, at the present, still low level of material forces of production, lead to capitalist anarchy and a new growth of captitalism." 40 The Yugoslav economy, evolved on this theory, was officially described in the following manner: The Yugoslav economy is a planned economy. As distinguished from the usual conceptions of a planned economy, the plan, or better said, the plans . . . are not central and rigid plans. The plans of the Yugoslav economy are different from the plans of the USSR and the countries under its domination. They do not prescribe compulsory tasks for the enterprises in regard to production, prices, quality, etc. All

22

THE NEW DOCTRINE these elements are left to the action of the free market, to the action of supply and demand. Plans in the Yugoslav economy are in their essence only aimed at channeling and coordinating the trends of general development. 41

An economy so planned and so organized would maintain the essence of socialism and prevent bureaucratic control at the same time that it promoted production by "freeing the initiative of the producers to develop according to basic economic laws." 42

SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

To the Yugoslav theorists, "withering away" of the state by decentralization involved democracy. Aleksandar Rankovic, proclaiming that political democracy is necessary to socialism, declared that society "reaching the socialist path of withering away of the state" inevitably must be concerned with freedom and human rights. 43 And Mose Pijade held that "decentralization is the first and most vital step to democracy." 44 This did not, however, mean Western-type democracy. According to Yugoslav theory, "there is no such thing as a universal form of democracy . . . a democracy without qualifications, which would have the same meaning for everybody and could remain unchanged." For example, "bourgeois democracy always remains a democracy of a minority, of a ruling class" because the "majority has not the necessary economic, social, intellectual, and cultural resources to allow it to manifest itself fully and make decisions freely." 45 This does not mean that a political system "grown on capitalist soil cannot be called democratic." But, even though in the early stages of socialism the socialist state may have to limit liberty, socialism can and must develop its own democracy. This is called "socialist democracy," and it is held to be a "more real form of democracy" than that obtaining under capitalism. 46

23

THE NEW DOCTRINE

Djordjevic has called socialist democracy "a system of organizational devices and methods for the liberation, development and establishment of new social relationships to replace those which have resulted from the system of private ownership or state capitalist ownership of the means of production and from the social and political supremacy of a privileged minority over the majority." Although it has elements of political democracy, it "is not and cannot be either a transplantation of political democracy into a socialist society or even merely a modification of political democracy. It is a new social phenomenon"; Djordjevic defines this as follows: . . . a political system in which, first, the working people play the decisive role in the determination of policy; second, this decisive role of the working people is assured by a system of political, socioeconomic and individual rights such as not only allow but also organize self-government by the people and the rights of individuals at all levels; third, political and other decisions adopted correspond to the interests and aspirations of the socialist community. In addition, there should be added a fourth condition: those who work (the working people) not only determine policy but to the greatest possible extent themselves obligatorily put it into execution.47

Socialist democracy involves concretely not only decentralization and worker-management but also autonomy in local government and guarantees of political rights, said Kardelj, because "decentralization in our old administrative system might have turned into despotism by local leaders, directors, trustees, and secretaries." It also involves, he added, self-government of nongovernmental institutions such as schools, hospitals, and the like. He described this as "decentralization in two directions: vertically and horizontally. . . ." 4 8 The theory of socialist democracy accepts Abraham Lincoln's definition of government of, by, and for the people as "a postulate for any real democracy" but applies it to a so24

THE N E W DOCTRINE

cialist rather than to a capitalist society.49 Certain methods for achieving democracy which evolved under capitalism are also acceptable. 50 But here the new theory becomes cautious. Generally speaking, Western democratic forms are held to be dangerous because they have within them the seeds of capitalism.51 Particularly is this held to be so of the multiparty system, which is emphatically rejected. "The bourgeois form of democracy presupposed the existence of a multiparty system," warned Kardelj. "We do not claim that such a system in itself and in principle is not possible as a form in certain phases of the transitional period . . . but it is perfectly clear that in a comparatively backward country like Yugoslavia . . . such a system would inevitably destroy not only the socialist foundations of such a country, but even its independence. . . . If anyone were to engage in planning a multiparty system in our country, it would either prove him to be not only an opponent of socialism but above all an enemy of the independence and freedom of our peoples, or else that he understood nothing of what is happening in the world today." 52 At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the theory holds there is no need in Yugoslavia for more than one party. Political parties are "either a reflection of clashing economic interests or they are meaningless as far as real issues are concerned," Kardelj has explained. "In Yugoslavia, there is no clash of economic interests, in the Marxist sense, and to have meaningless parties in a country with our level of cultural and ideological development would only mean confusion." 53 Rather than a multiparty system, Kardelj stated, the Yugoslavs chose to base their political democracy on "the basic organs of popular self-government which are closest to the masses and through whom the individual will of the citizens finds the most direct and intensive expression. . . . Elected by working men and standing at the head of basic organizational cells of the whole social life, these organs may act

25

THE NEW DOCTRINE

as far more sensitive transmitters of the democratic will of the working men than any kind of multiparty system." 54 This kind of "political democratism of a socialist country naturally presupposes the possibility of a struggle of opinions, that is, the possibility of social criticism." In Yugoslav theory, however, this does not mean toleration of antisocialist criticism. "There can be no doubt," Kardelj declared, "that a socialist state has not only the right but the duty of resisting antisocialist criticism by administrative means, especially when it takes corresponding organizational forms, if it threatens to break up the foundations of the new social relationships, foundations upon which alone socialist democracy can exist and develop. . . . We, therefore, never deny one fact, namely that with us no democratic form is feasible which would open the door to activities of that type." 5 5 THEORY OF THE PARTY Having declared the necessity for political democracy and the struggle of opinions on the one hand, and the necessity for a one-party system on the other, Yugoslav theory inescapably had to deal with the role of the Communist party in a "socialist democracy." The Communist party of the Soviet Union was recognized as the source of much of the evil in that country because there was no difference between the party and the state, between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Communist party. In a socialist democracy, it is held, they must be distinguished. 58 Tito charged that Stalin reduced "the role of the party to administration of a state apparatus that still bears the stamp of a class society. . . . The party in the Soviet Union is becoming more and more bureaucratic and is growing to be part and parcel of the bureaucratic state apparatus, becoming 26

THE NEW DOCTRINE

identified with it and simply a part of it. . . . This stereotyped concept was beginning to take hold here, too. . . ." 57 It is the working class as a whole and not the party which must have the leading role, Kardelj declared. "For Soviet Stalinist theory and practice," he said, "the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' means the complete subordination of the working class and the masses to the monopolistic authority of the 'wisest' and absolutely identifying the merging of the instruments of the 'elite'—that is, of the party—with the state executive and administrative apparatus, the maximum centralization within that system—that is, the concentration of all authority in the hands of a central few—and the subjection of the whole field of science and ideas to the interests of the system's survival."58 All this, the new Yugoslav theory holds, is wrong, contrary to Marx and Lenin, and antisocialist. The party, true, is "the expression of the most progressive social consciousness," but, rather than having the working class speak through the party, as in the Soviet Union, the party must speak through the working class. Above all, "the party must in no case be led into the danger of merging with the apparatus of state executive authority, of becoming its instrument, or vice versa." 59 In short, as Rankovic declared, the role of the Communist party and its organization had to be changed "to harmonize" with changes—theoretical and operational—in the state and the economy.60 The party was no longer to play "the leading role" in the development of socialism but only "a conscious role." It was to maintain its "monolithic purity" but at the same time to decentralize. Democratic centralism was to be maintained, but party democracy was to be emphasized. The party was no longer to intervene directly in government and economic affairs but was to confine its role to "political and ideological leadership" and education, effected by individual mem27

THE NEW DOCTRINE

bers. 61 In short, Tito said, the party in Yugoslavia should be less a party, as Lenin made it, and more a "league," as Marx envisaged it 6 2 —a league of the "best workers from the ranks of the working class, working peasantry and progressive professionals," characterized by the qualities of "sincerity, selfsacrifice, modesty, exemplary personal life, comradely communist relations and all those features that should set an example for the other workers." 63 Not only was the party's role different in Yugoslav theory but the party itself was to "wither away" along with the state. Lenin once said that "the dictatorship will be unnecessary when classes disappear," 64 and a 1920 resolution of the Comintern held that "the necessity for a political party of the proletariat" would cease "with the complete abolition of classes," at which time the Communist party would "become dissolved completely in the working class. . . ." 65 However, as the concept of the "withering away" of the state grew vaguer in the USSR, the idea of any end to the party seemed to have been forgotten. Now the Yugoslavs revived it, tying it up with the "withering away" of the state. "The alternative between the Marxist premise on the withering away of the state—and with it every party system—and the Stalinist theory on the strengthening of the state today constitutes the touchstone of true socialism," declared Kardelj. 66 "If the state really withers away," said Tito, "the party necessarily withers away with it." 67 However, despite the fact that, according to Yugoslav theory, the state is now really "withering away," the situation regarding the party is different. There can be no "withering away" of the party, Tito explained, "until the last class enemy has been immobilized, until the broadest body of our citizens are socialist in outlook." In the interim, the party "must exist, and not merely exist, but also be ideologically stronger, it must be conscious of the tremendous part it plays." 68

28

THE NEW DOCTRINE

AWAY FROM LENINISM

In its beginnings, the new Yugoslav theory was seen by its initiators as a return to "real Leninism," as rescuing Leninism from Stalinist deviation. 69 The sum total of the new theory, however, amounts to an abandonment of Leninism, if that term is considered to mean a cohesive body of theoretical and operational principles. Kardelj has admitted as much. Yugoslav theory, he said, now sees Leninism as "simply a series of ideas and methods that grew out of the Russian experience. Our experience is different." 70 Particularly, Yugoslav theory, as it has emerged since the Cominform Resolution, encourages a pragmatic approach to both tactics and strategy not usually considered compatible with Leninism. Instead of the Communist party discovering "objective truth" in "Marxist science" and expressing it in a precise political line leading to specific goals, the Yugoslav theorists are now inclined to say: "We are searching for our way, we are not sure." An example is offered by the attempt to adjust the theory to agricultural policy. Until the abandonment of their collectivization effort, the Yugoslavs accepted Lenin's theory that socialism in the villages was necessary for socialism in the country and that the way to achieve it was through class warfare among the peasants. To the Yugoslavs, as to the Russians, this meant collectivization as a goal. Now, however, Yugoslav theory holds, in effect, that, rather than socialism in the villages being necessary for socialism in the country, it is the other way around. Kardelj declared that the economic system in any country determines the outlook of all its people. As the farmers in America have a capitalist outlook because America is capitalist, he said, so Yugoslav peasants will come to have a socialist outlook "as socialism in our 29

THE NEW DOCTRINE

country develops gradually"—led by industrial workers. The goal still remains "cooperatives of some sort," but what sort "we don't know." 71 None of this means that the Yugoslav Communists therefore reject all or even most of Lenin's principles and addenda to Marxist theory. But it does mean that they have "de-deified" him and that his precepts may now either be accepted or rejected as the situation warrants. Lenin remains a patron saint of the Yugoslav Communists, perhaps even their leading patron saint—Marx remaining in the category of a Communist deity—but he is not their only patron saint. Yugoslav theory sometimes appears negative in orientation. "The end our struggle for socialist democracy should serve," observed Kardelj, "is to refuse to permit the development and consolidation not only of old capitalist relationships but those today most dangerous remnants of our own past, state capitalism and bureaucratism." 72 Yet if the theory is negative, its formulators claim that thereby they are "realists," by which they mean that they realize doctrine is conditioned by material forces. 73 Above all, Kardelj said, the "one thing our experience with the Soviet Union taught us is to beware of being dogmatic. We are searching for our way. We are trying to do so by dialectical reasoning. We are keeping our eyes always on socialist goals, and we think we have the basic organization to achieve socialism." 74 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Forced by the Cominform Resolution to reevaluate their ideological position, the Yugoslav Communists since 1948 have evolved a new body of Marxist theory, different from Soviet theory in several important respects. To justify their position 30

THE NEW DOCTRINE

outside the Soviet community, the Yugoslavs sought to establish a theory of national communism, under which all socialist states are equal and entitled to develop socialism as they see fit, depending on their differing conditions. International communism as a system and world revolution were rejected, and the Yugoslavs cast aside the theories of the inevitability of capitalist hostility and just and unjust wars. Although they saw socialism and communism coming inevitably to all countries, they still held that the dictatorship of the proletariat might be necessary to effect the transformation from capitalism, especially as far as nationalizing the means of production is concerned. For Yugoslav theory, however, a really socialist state must begin to "wither away" as soon as there is no longer an immediate danger from exploiting elements. It must, therefore, go beyond mere nationalization of the means of production and decentralize by turning over control of industry to the workers themselves. Otherwise, workers are deprived of the surplus value they create no less by the state than by capitalist owners, and socialism degenerates into state capitalism, as happened in the Soviet Union. According to Yugoslav theory, such a process means the introduction of democracy to socialism but not Western-type democracy. Although there must be a struggle for ideas, there can be no room for antisocialist criticism, and thus no multiparty system. The theory does, however, hold that the dictatorship of the proletariat must not be exercised by the Communist party alone but by the entire working class. The party is supposed to "wither away" along with the state and itself decentralize and become more democratic. But, although the "withering away" of the state is held to have begun, there can be no "withering away" of the party until "the broadest body" of the people are "socialist in outlook." Although the party

31

THE NEW DOCTRINE

as such must not assume bureaucratic control of the state, in the interim it must not only exist but become "ideologically stronger." Sometimes appearing to have a negative orientation—based, as it is, on opposition to Soviet ideas—the new Yugoslav doctrine is essentially pragmatic. Begun as a return to "real Leninism," it has in fact abandoned Leninism as a cohesive body of theoretical and operational principles. The most potentially significant parts of the new Yugoslav doctrine, perhaps, are those concerning a separate type of socialism based on national conditions and the role of the state vis-à-vis the means of production. Whether it is called "national communism" or not, the first concept provides not only a theoretical base for national Marxist socialism unrelated to any organized world movement, but also throws needed Marxist criticism on Soviet theories of international politics that have been too often unquestioned. The Yugoslav interpretation of surplus value and the theory of worker-management have given an aura of meaningfulness to the most beclouded of all Marxist concepts, the "withering away" of the state. Despite its insistence on the necessity of democracy in socialism, Yugoslav theory embraces the Leninist doctrine of the one-party state. In reviving the concept of the "withering away" of the Communist party, the theory falls prey to an essential contradiction. If, as Tito says, when "the state really withers away, the party necessarily withers away with it," then, since the Yugoslavs hold their decentralization as in fact a stage of the "withering away," the party logically also should be "withering away." That this is not happening seems to be an illustration of altering both theory and logic to fit the practical power needs of the Yugoslav Communist leaders. The new theory of the party, however, is still a significant departure from previous Communist doctrine. In enunciating his theory of socialism in one country, Stalin 32

THE NEW DOCTRINE

was at pains to point out that the Soviet Union was sufficiently large and self-contained to be able to achieve socialism alone. In the theories that underline the Yugoslav experiment, this important point is ignored. Especially since the Yugoslavs assert that doctrine must be conditioned by material forces, the persistence of their new theories may depend in large part on their ability to obtain economic assistance unaccompanied by doctrinal or operational demands. If it does nothing else, however, the new Yugoslav doctrine constitutes a devastating Marxist criticism of Soviet theory and practice, and opens new theoretical and operational horizons for Marxism.

33

the communist party THE

POSITION

OF

THE

COM-

munist party in Yugoslavia illustrated both the well-known dominant role of Communist parties in states where they have come to power and the peculiar nature of Yugoslav communism.1 Organized on the Soviet pattern and headed by men steeped in the Soviet tradition, the Yugoslav Communists even in 1945 occupied a position similar to that of their comrades in the USSR, where, as Stalin said, "not a single important political or organizational question" was decided without directions from the party.2 Even after the Cominform dispute had produced a new ideological pattern, a more liberal approach to communism, political and economic decentralization, and profuse professions of democracy, few could doubt that, as Stalin said about the situation in the USSR, "the party governs the country." 3

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Yet at the same time, both the ideological and operational position of the party also underwent significant changes after 1948. If the changes did not portend a fundamental weakening of the party's dictatorship, still they created serious difficulties for the maintenance of that dictatorship and raised important questions as to its future course. THE PARTY IN 1948

Although its history of prewar quarrels with Moscow 4 may not have been important in the 1945-1948 period, the Yugoslav Communist party was in a much more independent position than the other satellite parties because it had come to power through its own efforts rather than having been installed in power by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, its membership was predominantly peasant, 5 an incongruous fact for a party that represents the dictatorship of the proletariat. Perhaps even more significant, at least from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, was its relationship to the People's Front. 6 The Communist party, instead of being outside and above the People's Front—a mass organization growing out of Tito's wartime Partisans—operated inside it and behind it. Although no one doubted that the People's Front was dominated completely by the Communist party, government and even ideological activities publicly were carried on in the name of the Front and not the party. Thus the Communist party of Yugoslavia was, in a sense, merged to some extent with non-Marxist elements that supported its program. 7 These differences, however, had little if any impact on the organization or the operation of the party. Despite a high degree of collective leadership at the top, Tito, as secretarygeneral of the Central Committee, was the unquestioned leader and final voice in all things. That unanimity in the Politburo was demanded was clear from the disciplining of Andrija

35

THE COMMUNIST PARTY 8

Hebrang in January, 1948. Politburo members occupied top government posts, fulfilling Lenin's condition of merging the upper stratum of the party with the upper stratum of the state. 9 The Central Committee secretariat was organized on the Soviet pattern, with sections devoted to agitation and propaganda, development of cadres, military affairs, and general inspection. Rigid democratic centralism made the cells and local party units entirely subservient to the top leadership. Local party secretaries dominated local government; operating the secret political police was practically a full-time job for Aleksandar Rankovic, one of the two secretaries of the Central Committee. Speaking "disrespectfully" of the party exposed citizens to arrest. 10 Party membership might not be public, but nevertheless party people were entitled to special privileges and perquisites in the form of housing, rations, discounts, travel, automobiles, and gasoline, especially on the upper levels. In addition to official party youth organizations, a wide variety of organizations in the People's Front served as "transmission belts" for Communist propaganda and control. The membership of the Communist party in 1945 was 140,000. Of the 12,000 who were members in 1941, only 3,000 had survived the war. 11 By June, 1948, membership had increased to 448,175. On the eve of the Cominform Resolution, therefore, the party was almost entirely composed of Yugoslavs who had been Partisans. 12 If this meant they still had wartime ties of loyalty to Tito and his top lieutenants, it also meant that they entered the party during the flush of enthusiasm for the Soviet Union and saw communism principally in terms of the Soviet example. Although the Soviet accusations were made over a period of three months in the spring of 1948, no hint of the dispute had reached the rank and file of the CPY before publication of the Cominform Resolution on June 28.13 That the Resolution

36

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

and the Soviet charges, subsequently published in Belgrade, did not split the Yugoslav Communist party asunder may have been owing almost as much to the fact that the Yugoslav Communists were stunned as to their loyalty to Tito and the efficiency of Rankovic's secret police. Although the party leadership acted swiftly against such Cominformists as Hebrang and Zujovic,14 their attitude at the Fifth Party Congress, called right after the Resolution, was decidedly cautious as far as the USSR was concerned. Tito, in his peroration to the congress, declared: "At the end, comrades, I should like to emphasize that we shall work with all our might to mend relations between our party and the CPSU (b)." And the congress responded by rising to its feet and shouting "Stalin—Tito!" 15 The congress then adopted a resolution expressing the hope and desire to do everything possible to settle the SovietYugoslav dispute. 16 Addressing the Sixth Party Congress four years later, Tito explained this action in part on grounds that the party had for many years been "developing the loyalty and devotion of its members and peoples toward the Soviet Union . . . [and] found it difficult to believe that the USSR harbored such dishonest designs toward us, as practice later revealed that it did. Illusions about the USSR were gradually shattered." 17 Rankovic, at the same congress, declared that since 1948, 11,128 persons had been "penalized by summary administrative procedure" and 2,572 persons had been sentenced by regular military and civilian courts for pro-Cominform activity.18 Yet in 1952 Tito could assert that Cominform pressure "did not succeed in shaking the ranks of our party," and he was probably entitled to his claim that not a single other party would have resisted such pressure. 19 His contention that the Yugoslav party emerged from this struggle "with the Soviet revisionists even stronger and more monolithic, with the

37

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

ideological and political level developed and . . . more acute," 20 is, however, open to question. Certainly the party grew in numbers. Almost as if to underline solidarity with Tito in the struggle against the USSR, party membership in the six months following the Cominform Resolution increased by 81,637 members to a total of 530,812. By December, 1950, it had grown to 607,443; by December, 1951, to 704,617; and by June, 1952, to 779,382.21 IMPACT OF THE RESOLUTION There can be little doubt, however, that the impact of the Cominform Resolution on the Yugoslav Communists was enormous. Reference has already been made to the psychological disorientation suffered by many Yugoslav Communists in the months following the Resolution.22 The early formulation of the new line—by Pijade, Kardelj, and others—was in the beginning largely negative, emphasizing criticism of Soviet theories and methods. To the extent that dogmatism was lessened in the Yugoslav Communist attitude, it was replaced by uncertainty. When positive ideas began to appear, they centered around the idea of decentralization as a means toward a more democratic type of socialism. "Decentralization," said Pijade in 1950, "is the first and most vital step toward democracy." 23 That is to say, if the concept of the infallibility of Marxism-Leninism did not at first suffer, doubts were at least created as to what Marxism-Leninism was. The basic Soviet-type doctrine, in which members of the Communist party were supposed to have unswerving faith and in whose name they devoted their disciplined efforts to help the party control all phases of Yugoslav life, was eliminated. What was put in its place was less a theory than a method of action calling for almost a reverse emphasis on the part of the Com-

38

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

munists. It is not unnatural that there resulted, in Tito's words, "a certain spiritual demoralization." 24 One thing was certain: the party needed support for its new position, not only to strengthen its hand in the quarrel with the Soviet Union but also because decentralization meant inevitably reliance on a broader sector of the population than formerly. In the nature of things, this meant greater reliance on the People's Front, which in 1948 already numbered about 7,000,000.25 Even in the People's Front, the privileged position of party members was an irritant, and the tendency of many Communists was, Balkan-style, to flaunt their privileges in the face of the populace. 26 Furthermore, as a part of their new campaign against "bureaucracy," the Yugoslav ideologues included in their criticisms of the Soviet system the role of the Communist party as well as the government. In addition to this, the program of decentralization was being bucked by various Communists, either because they misunderstood the new line or because they were reluctant to share authority. 27 The upshot was a decision by the Central Committee in the fall of 1950 eliminating certain material privileges, particularly as regards special rations and housing rights, for party members. 28 Party members were reminded that their legal position in the Yugoslav state was exactly the same as nonparty members and that they were not entitled to special treatment simply because of their membership in the party. The correspondent of the New York Times, often critical of the Tito regime, was moved to comment: "For the first time, a Communist state has abolished the line of demarcation separating the rulers from the people and has adopted as a fundamental principle a modicum of equalitarianism." 29 The adoption of "a modicum of equalitarianism" as a principle was not specifically connected with the reforms in gov-

39

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

ernment and the economy or the emphasis on democracy that was appearing more and more in Yugoslav ideological tracts. There was, in fact, a noticeable official silence pertaining to the role of the party in Yugoslavia's new Communist system. Yet as decentralization of government and economy, local autonomy, and a liberalized policy toward collectivization of agriculture proceeded, the contrast presented by the monopolistic power position of a highly centralized Communist party became sharper. In the spring of 1952 the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee dealt with the problem. The Central Committee's directives of June, 1952, not only began to apply the principle of decentralization to party organization but also took steps to limit the party's direct role in local government.30

THE JUNE, 1952, DIRECTIVES

According to the June directives, secretaries of local party organizations were to give up their positions as heads of local government organizations, for example, people's committees. It was held that for the same persons to hold both jobs was incompatible with the new autonomy extended to local governments, for it interfered with the development of the party's ideological work and acted to prevent criticism of local government activity. Since almost all local government heads were also heads of local party committees, the people's committees were little more than extensions of the party organization. Since this situation in the Soviet Union typified the "bureaucratic caste system," which the new Yugoslavia was now opposed to, it had to be changed. From the same point of view, the June directives instructed local party officials to limit their interference in economic operations. Although workers' councils had been freed from much govern-

40

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

ment bureaucracy, party interference was sometimes having the same deleterious effects and had to stop. The June directives also extended considerable autonomy to local party units, with an aim of expanding intraparty democracy "in forms of ideological and educational work" and eliminating bureaucracy in the party. "Up to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," admitted Tito, "the entire ideological-educational work was run predominantly from the center. The subject matter and even the forms of work were determined and initiated by the agitation-propaganda department of the Central Committee." 3 1 Under the new directives, although propaganda activities were, of course, to follow the general program of the party, in the absence of special directives local party units were to decide themselves what to do and how to do it. The responsibility and the privileges of lower party organizations were emphasized. These were significant changes. Their effect was mixed, and, as far as the rank and file of the party was concerned, the result was considerable confusion. As Tito said at the Sixth Party Congress a few months later: "Many of the party organizations have been left to themselves, without being extended any help in the transitions and preparations for their new responsibilities, and as a result of this the work on raising the ideological and educational level of the membership has been neglected or is lagging. . . . Various conceptions . . . alien to the party began to penetrate in the ranks of the party membership . . . various elements . . . began, it appears, to conceive our expansion of democracy wrongly and to raise their heads. Various theories began appearing on the freedom of this or that." 32 And Rankovic added that some Communists went too far

41

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

in interpreting party democracy while others did not go far enough. In certain instances, party members even thought it was not necessary to attend party meetings or pay dues. A contributing factor to the difficulties, Rankovic thought, was the "low ideological level of a considerable part of the party membership." 33 At the same time, both Tito and Rankovic insisted that, in the words of the latter, the new measures "increased the political activities of the party organization among the masses . . . [and] introduced a new spirit and style of working into the party organization." 34 A NEW THEORY OF THE PARTY

In many ways, 1952 was the high point of enthusiasm for democracy among the Yugoslav Communist leaders. Their relations with the West were flourishing, and opposition to the Soviet Union was at a peak. American economic assistance had brought a halt to the deterioration in living standards. The reforms in the economy and government had produced an unquestioned favorable response from the populace, and plans for a new constitution were launched. Despite the negative results of the June, 1952, liberalizations in the party, it was almost as if a momentum were propelling the leaders along paths they feared to travel. The Sixth Party Congress in Zagreb, November 3-7, crystallized the trend in the form of a new theory of the party and new roles for its constituent parts and their members. The main purpose of the Sixth Congress, according to Rankovic, was "to harmonize the party's work" with changes that had occurred in connection with the new reforms and to "suppress dangers of bureaucracy in the party." 3 5 It sought to achieve this not only by extending much further decentralization in party organization but by proclaiming that hence42

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

forth the party would confine its activities mainly to political and ideological education and no longer seek to impose its will on government and other activities by direct order. Members of the party were to exert influence not by the weight of their party position but by functioning as individuals in the society.36 All this meant that still more reliance had to be placed on the People's Front, which would now have to "take on a firmer organization form and ideological substance." 37 Even the name of the party was changed because "in view of the fact that the role of the party at this state of our social development changed to a certain extent . . . the word party is no longer adequate." 38 The party henceforth was to be known as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The change in name was not to affect the organizational structure of the party or its democratic centralism, nor would the new league "reduce its role and responsibility for the successful development of socialism"; but, still the name would be "more correct and would correspond to the present stage and perspective of future development" if the party were to be known as a league.39 Under the new statute adopted by the Sixth Congress, the party was no longer to play the "leading role" in development of socialism but only a "conscious role," since the party now has to win a leading role "on the basis of good work and extensive knowledge of the laws of society and not by a decree determining for itself that it is the leading political force." 40 Further, the party no longer saw itself as the "initiator, organizer and leader of the struggle of the Yugoslav people" but, more modestly, "it mobilizes and moves the broadest masses of the people to action by political and organizational means, so that its struggle and achievements make it a leader." 41 The resolution of the Sixth Congress, proclaiming that the

43

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

reforms in the economy and government "make political and ideological work on the education of the masses the fundamental duty of the Communists," declared: The League of Communists cannot be and is not the direct operational leader and director of economic, government or social life. It is rather, by its political and ideological activities, primarily by discussion, to work in all organizations, agencies and institutions for the adoption of its line and standpoint, of the standpoint of individual members. 42

T H E N E W PARTY STATUTE

The party statute adopted by the Fifth Party Congress in 1948, despite the Cominform Resolution which preceded it, was, by and large, "a copy of the Statute of the Soviet Communist Party . . . weighed down by Soviet practices and requirements." 4 3 To "find release from such bureaucratic obstructions," the Sixth Congress adopted a new statute which "lays down clearly the fundamental principles for the building of the party at the present state of social development and socialist democracy." 4 4 The changes in the new statute, embracing the directives of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, included the following points: 4 5 1. All the party's activities should be public. "This is no propaganda slogan," said Rankovic, "but a principle that must govern the party organizations in their everyday work." 2. Nonparty members should be urged to attend meetings of the basic (lowest) party units, whose "activities should develop as much as possible under the control and the participation of the masses." 3. Special party units would no longer exist inside government administrative branches and "social organizations," such as trade-unions and youth groups. In these organizations, individual party members should work for the party

44

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

program, but actual party organizations must be based only on production and territorial divisions. That is to say, Communists would now belong only to factory units or organizations based on residence—block, ward, village, and so on—except where special groups might be formed to deal with specific problems. 4. Republic party congresses, which, under the 1948 statute had only the right to determine the tactical line, now were to have the right to determine the political line of the party in their areas "based on the general political line of the CPY." 5. Higher party organs would no longer have authority to assign specific operational tasks to basic party units but only to lay down broad lines of policy and make general suggestions for implementation. 6. The Central Committee no longer would be empowered to appoint party organizers with authority in special areas. The article of the 1948 statute granting this authority to the Central Committee, "which was literally copied from the Soviet Communist Party's statute, was again simply an undemocratic measure to justify the existence of commissars wherever they were thought necessary." 7. Central Committee candidates—"with no right except an advisory vote"—were eliminated, and vacancies on the Central Committee—if the membership is reduced by a third— were to be filled by a special congress convened for that purpose. 8. The permanent bureaus of party officials in lower party committees were abolished. Party tasks were now to be assigned to various party members individually, although each town, district, ward, and commune committee retained a secretariat of no more than five members, headed by a secretary, "to take care of current affairs." 9. Basic party units could now expel any of their members without reference to higher party authority. Under the 1948

45

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

statute, decisions to expel a member not only had to be approved by district committees, but basic units were forbidden to expel committee members. The change gave greater independence to basic units, and, since all party members belong to a basic unit, provides the basic units with a check on the leadership, at least theoretically. 10. Basic party units could make their own decisions regarding new members, without reference to higher party authority. The requirement of an eighteen-month period of candidature prior to full membership was abolished. In addition, the name of the Politburo was changed to Executive Committee. Doubtless because no change was foreseen in the unquestioned leading role of this body, this matter was not discussed at the congress. Five new members were added to this top ruling group of the party, however, then bringing its membership to thirteen. The membership of the Executive Committee at the time of the Sixth Party Congress consisted of Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Rankovic, Milovan Djilas, Franjo Leskosek, Mose Pijade, Boris Kidric, Ivan Gosnjak, Blagoje Neskovic, Sevetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Djuro Salaj, Djuro Stari-Pucar, Lazar Kolasevski, and Vladimir Bakaric. Kidric died in 1953, Pijade, in 1957, and Djilas was dropped in 1954. ONE-PARTY SYSTEM RETAINED None of this implied that the party was going to lose its identity or cohesiveness. Rankovic especially criticized party workers who frequently talked about the need to make the party a "mass organization" with emphasis on large numbers. 46 "This viewpoint," he declared, "is an erroneous one, and it certainly must have an injurious effect. . . . The strength and mass character of the party cannot be measured simply by the number of members but also, apart from other things,

46

Edvard Kardelj, vice-president of Yugoslavia and Titoism's leading theorist. He may succeed Tito as head of the state.

Aleksandar Rankovic, head of UDBA, is a vice-president of the Federal Executive Council and shares the number two position in Yugoslavia with Kardelj.

A meeting of the Workers' Council of the railway at Zagreb.

workshop

Steel works at Zenica.

The Belgrade International Fair of 1957, at which there were technical exhibits by 850 firms from 28 countries.

MM m

Machinery owned by a collective farm is here being used on a privately owned plot in Vojvoidina.

Market in Rijeka.

Boulevard Marshal Tito in downtown Belgrade. At the end is the Abanija Building, Belgrade's "skyscraper."

Pioneers, the Communist organization for children, parade in front of the Skupstina Building in Belgrade during the First of May celebration, 1955.

Grave of a World War II hero in Bosnia, bearing both Christian cross and Partisan red star. (Photograph by Irena Neal.) LEFT:

Gate of the walled city of Dubrovnik on the Adriatic.

Cathedral of Zagreb, with its brightly colored roof. Letters on top of building in foreground say "Long Live Tito."

Market in Mostar, Herzegovina. (Photograph by Irena Neal.)

Military aid from the United States has furthered mechanization of the Yugoslav army, shown here on maneuvers.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

by internal unity, political activity and purity. The mass character of the party does not lie in the numbers of members but in the extent to which these members, by their activity and political work, succeed in bringing the broad masses of the people under the influence of the party." In order to have this success, Rankovic warned, the Communists must be "responsible for their work and their behavior not only to their party organizations and leadership but to the people, to the whole of society in the first place." The new role of the party was said to mean the end of its monopoly in political affairs. No longer, proclaimed Edvard Kardelj, did the party "consider the determination of the political line of struggle for construction of socialist relationships as its monopoly alone." 47 If it was not clear what this meant in fact, Tito made clear what it did not mean. It did not mean any change in the oneparty system. A multiparty system would only "permit the organized destruction of revolutionary achievements for which blood has already been shed," Tito emphasized. 48 Yet at the same time, he said, there were now new "conditions in which the revolution is in the main consummated and the transformation of society is already nearing a higher level." Under such conditions "new forms of organized mass political forces" must be set up having "an indispensable uniform program." The "organized mass political forces" were already at hand, in the People's Front, but their organizational forms and purpose were now outdated and inadequate. Many party members, Tito complained, conceived of the People's Front only in terms of "voluntary work drives," forgetting that "our party has, precisely through the People's Front, been offered the broad opportunity of reeducating people in a new socialist spirit." Accordingly, Tito called on the People's Front to be reorganized into a "Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia," which would include "the broad sections of

47

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

the population, all our social organizations, groups and individuals, and Communists too. . . THE SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

Responding to Tito's call, the People's Front at its Fourth Congress in Belgrade in February, 1953, reorganized itself. The change of the People's Front into the Socialist Alliance, declared Kardelj, in his capacity as secretary general of the new organization, was, along with the change of the party to the League of Communists, "an inseparable, component part of all the social changes that have been carried out in our country during the last few years." 49 Kardelj denied that the change was only one of name but insisted there were "substantial changes in the character and role of the People's Front in new social conditions." The Socialist Alliance, he said, "is not a political organization of socialists but a political alliance of the working class and the whole of the working people . . . who, through this Alliance, will politically implement their government and determine the socialist policy of that government as well as all other social organs. . . . It should be sufficiently broad in its political platform so as to enable the participation in it of every citizen who comports himself honorably toward the social community and accepts the general aims of socialism—regardless of ideological and other differences in opinion." Kardelj saw the role of the League of Communists to be one of "general ideological leadership . . . political and educational work among the masses," whereas the Socialist Alliance was to deal with "concrete political and other social questions." In short, the Communists, sitting as a league, were to make broad, general policy and then, as individuals, lead the Socialist Alliance in applying it to specific situations. However, Kardelj exhorted the Socialist Alliance to inde-

48

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

pendence, and warned the Communists "to put an end to the so-called duplication of work, that is, an end to the practice whereby the party organizations at their meetings decided all political and other questions and then simply forwarded these decisions to the People's Front organizations for approval." Both Tito and Kardelj in their addresses to the Fourth Congress of the People's Front stressed the role they hoped the Socialist Alliance would play in international cooperation with labor and progressive movements. 50 What they seemed to have in mind was that cooperation with European Socialist parties was desirable but difficult for the Communists because of traditional Communist hostility to the Second International Socialists, so it should be done by the Socialist Alliance.

THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE PARTY These changes announced for the party, although they might significantly alter the method of operations, implied no essential change in the party's dominant position in the society. There now came, however, a concept of a more startling character: "the withering away of the party." Communist theory has always embraced as a goal—however distant—"the withering away of the state," but since the early days of the Soviet Union what would happen to the Communist party had not been discussed.51 Now in Yugoslavia, the Communists contended that the "withering away of the state" was in actual process. This being the case, Tito admitted, "the Communist party cannot continue to function in the same old way. . . . If the state does not wither away, then the party becomes, in a certain sense, an instrument of the state, a force outside of society. If the state really withers away, the party necessarily withers away with it. Many of our own people do not realize this fact yet. We have to explain

49

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

to them gradually of what this withering away consists, and we have begun to do so." 5 2 Tito first publicly mentioned the concept of the "withering away of the party" even before the Sixth Party Congress, but it was only with the publication of his biography by Vladimir Dedijer immediately after the congress that the idea entered discussion among the rank and file.53 Tito again referred to the concept after the congress in replying to questions of some young Communists regarding the future role of the party. 54 Even at the time of the Sixth Party Congress, confusion was apparent throughout the ranks of the Yugoslav Communists. The Politburo did not have a formal program to propose to the party, Milovan Djilas explained, because "it was decided that our own socialist development . . . was not sufficiently clear in outline." 55 It was obvious from remarks of the leadership at the congress, cited above, that already the liberalizing directives of the Fourth Plenum had produced uncertainty among the rank and file. The actions of the congress, plus the new concept of the "withering away of the party," compounded the confusion and produced a crisis in the party that led some months later to the Djilas Affair.

PARTY DECENTRALIZATION Meanwhile the main organizational changes in the Communist party following the Sixth Party Congress concerned decentralization of functions and a reduction of the party apparatus at various levels. This had, in fact, begun even before the congress. Rankovic, in his address to that body, testified that "860 comrades who held posts of leadership in the party and state apparatus" had now gone to other work. Some of these functionaries left the employ of the party, while others were assigned to local units. In November, 1952, there were 901 paid party workers assigned to district and city

50

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

committees, or one for every 865 party members; but Rankovic declared, . . more must be done on the gradual reduction of the number of professional party workers."56 The reduction proceeded on all levels, in large part by curtailing party functions. For example, all formal agitationpropaganda work and supervision of such organizations as women's and youth groups, was turned over to the Socialist Alliance. Work on party cadres and so-called ideologicaleducational work among party members was turned over to local party units. From the secretariat of the Central Committee in Belgrade were eliminated the agitation-propaganda, cultural, and military departments. The secretariat's apparatus as reorganized consisted of a personnel or cadre department, an organization department, a financial department, and a record department concerned with, among other things, the history of the party. To the secretariat was also attached a control commission, with the task of enforcing decisions of the Executive Committee and Central Committee, checking on lower party units and ferreting out serious ideological aberrations.57 Also attached to the secretariat were the High Party School in Belgrade (where budding Communists leaders received training in Marxism, Yugoslav brand) and so-called lower party schools where lesser functionaries received ideological training and indoctrination. The secretariat also had instructors conducting various courses and seminars at the local level. Between 1948 and 1952, 560 persons attended the High Party School, 17,196 attended the lower party schools, and 3,282 members, mostly local leaders, participated in other formal party instruction.58 The secretariats of the republic central committees were practically decimated by this decentralization. For example, the secretariat of the Central Committee of Montenegro, the smallest in Yugoslavia, had only two full-time employees in

5i

THE COMMUNIST PARTY 59

the fall of 1954. However, since almost all high party officials are also government officials, much party work is in fact carried on from government offices. For instance, Mito Hadzi Vassilev, a member of the Central Committee of Macedonia and also a member of the Macedonian Republic Executive Committee, told the author in 1954 that he spent most of his time on work for the party and the Macedonian Socialist Alliance, of which he was secretary. Except for expenses, he was paid entirely by the Macedonian Republic. Many party functionaries, loath to lose good jobs, fought the decentralization. Borba reported that a party member in Kosmet who fought assignment to the villages "said he deserved to become 'some kind of employee' and not to be forced to work. . . Another Communist sought to retain his job in a village bureau, declaring: "If a bureaucratic apparatus must exist, I see no reason why we should not exploit it instead of doing physical work." Still another party official refused an assignment to an agricultural estate, because "the enterprise is situated next to the road where people pass and they will see him and laugh at him because he is working." Borba commented: "Thus they played into the hands of reaction. . . 60 The formal decentralization of party activities was real enough, but the meaning of the extension of autonomy to lower party bodies was less clear. Operationally, to be sure, local party committees were more on their own, and the right to recruit and expel members was, theoretically at least, an important one. However, the Yugoslavs claimed that the right of republic party congresses to determine their own "political line" had "profound meaning" and showed "more sharply" than anything else the contrast between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties. 61 The limited nature of this right can be seen in the following "hypothetical example of this change in practice," cited to illustrate "the tremendous significance of the new principle in the future development of the Yugoslav

52

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Communist party and to the entire program of building a socialist democracy as well": Under the former system of party organization, if the national congress fixed a specific goal for the numerical growth of agricultural cooperatives in, let us say, Croatia, the task of the Croatian party was limited to working out the ways and means of reaching that figure. Under the new provision, it would be up to the Croatian Party to determine under the specific conditions understood by those living and studying the situation on the spot how strong a cooperative drive should be launched at any specific period, what short-term balance between private and socialist holdings should be encouraged, what type of cooperative organization would be most effective and practical within given conditions, and so forth.82 THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP The high point in party membership was reached just before the Sixth Party Congress when 779,382 persons belonged. The tightening up of discipline the following year resulted in a sharp increase in the number of expulsions, reducing the membership to 700,030 at the beginning of 1954. The downward trend continued through the middle of 1956, when party membership was 635,984. Party officials felt that a membership somewhere between the 1954 figure and the 1956 figure represented something of a "mean." Table 1 shows the trend of party membership. In 1952, the party accounted for 8.43 per cent of the adult population of Yugoslavia, or 4.72 per cent of the total population. In 1948, peasants comprised approximately 50 per cent of the party membership and workers less than 30 per cent. By 1952, the number of workers had increased by only 2.5 per cent; the number of peasants decreased by 7 per cent. The party leadership then ordered a drive to increase the number of workers in the party. 63 By the beginning of 1954,

53

THE

COMMUNIST

PARTY

this had succeeded to the extent that for the first time there were slightly more workers than peasants in the party. This trend continued during 1954. In December of that year the percentage of workers was 32.9, although by 1956 it had dropped slightly to 31.36. 64 TABLE 1 Period

Number of members

June, 1945 140,000 June, 1948 448,175 December, 1949 530,000 December, 1950 607,443 December, 1951 704,617 June, 1952 779,382 January, 1954 700,030 June, 1956 635,984 SOURCE: Figures for 1945-1952 are taken from reports of Tito and Rankovic, Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1953). Figure for 1954 was given the author by officials of the secretariat of the Central Committee in Belgrade. The 1956figureis from Komunist, nos. 11-12, 1956, p. 14. Table 2, presented by Rankovic to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in 1954, shows the social pattern of party membership as well as its geographic distribution at the beginning of that year. Women made up 20 per cent of the membership in 1948 but only 13 per cent of the membership in 1952. 65 By 1954, according to figures provided by the secretariat of the Central Committee, the number of women in the party had increased to 121,159, or approximately 18 per cent. Party officials constantly exhorted their comrades "to eliminate sectarian, conservative and undemocratic attitudes toward women." 6 8 Not only the low ideological level of the Communists but their low literacy as well was a source of concern to the leadership.

54

THE

COMMUNIST

PARTY

TABLE 2 White-collar Peasants employees

Area

Workers

Other

Total

Serbia Croatia BosniaHerzegovina Slovenia Macedonia Montenegro Army Total

70,120 47,816

98,504 30,122

71,398 42,573

30,624 17,737

270,646 138,248

25,615 18,846 9,564 4,697 14,997 191,655

17,828 4,053 17,377 10,105 11,403 189,392

28,009 21,096 13,314 5,556 7,285 189,231

7,717 8,368 4,911 1,812 58,583 129,752

79,169 52,363 45,166 22,170 92,268 700,030

• Includes 25,096 persons who joined the party during 1953. See table 3. SOURCE: Komunist, no. 4 (April), 1954, p. 267. Blazo Jovanovic, a member of the national Executive Committee (Politburo) and head of the Montenegro League of Communists, complained to a party congress in Titograd: There is a considerable number of those [Communists] who are not up to the events and are unable to settle the problems by which they are confronted in the course of socialist development. In the countryside, there is a considerable number of Communists who are either semiliterate or illiterate, who can hardly read the newspapers, not to mention anything else. And if they read the papers, they can hardly understand what they write about. As for those Communists, it is their prime task and obligation to learn how to read. . . . e7 In Bosnia-Herzegovina less than 22 per cent of the party members had gone beyond elementary school in 1948, whereas in 1954 63.2 per cent had gone beyond elementary school. Of these, 46.8 per cent had only partial secondary school training, 10.3 per cent had finished secondary school, and 6.1 per cent had complete or incomplete university training. Although some of these increased percentages reflected addition of newer members between 1948 and 1954, much of it resulted

55

THE COMMUNIST PARTY 68

from adult education. The level of education of party members was higher in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. PARTY DOMINANCE All members of the party belonged to the Socialist Alliance of Working People, which had in 1954 a total membership of about 8,000,000.69 Under the statute adopted by the Fourth Congress of the People's Front, the Socialist Alliance was composed of both organizations and individuals. Although organizations as such could belong, their members, in order also to be members of the Socialist Alliance, themselves had to "enroll personally" in one of the basic organizations of the Alliance. Like the party, the Alliance was organized at the federal, republic, local, and "bloc" levels. The Socialist Alliance was completely dominated by the League of Communists. Officially, its highest body was a federal board, which in turn elected a presidium. Out of the twenty-seven-man presidium named at the Fourth Congress, twenty-one were members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists. The presidium embraced all but two members of the party's Executive Committee. Tito, secretarygeneral of the party, was president of the Socialist Alliance, and Kardelj was its secretary-general. The secretaries of each republic organization of the Alliance were members of the republic party central committees. The Alliance served the party not only as a front organization but also as a coordinator of most organized group activities aside from the party itself. Whereas before 1952, the chief activity of the People's Front was to rally large groups for "voluntary work" on construction projects, 70 the Socialist Alliance now went in for more political work. While the number of paid functionaries of the party had declined, those of the Alliance increased as it took over activities from the party.

56

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Chief of these new functions was political propaganda, practically all of which was now handled by the Socialist Alliance. This included not only election propaganda and hortatory material—such as wall signs saying "Long Live the Balkan Pact!"—but also organization of mass meetings, speeches by government dignitaries, and so on. Socialist Alliance committees paid especial attention to elections, instructing their members on procedure to be followed at voters' meetings and the like. Borba, which had been the official organ of the party, was now the organ of the Socialist Alliance. As a part of its work in "educating the masses" for the party, the Socialist Alliance relied on its large member organizations as "transmission belts." Chief among these were the People's Youth Organization, the Association of AntiFascist Women, the Federation of Veterans, and the Federation of Disabled War Veterans, associations of journalists, writers, artists, and teachers, and various children's organizations. Since, in addition to meetings and other activities, most of these had special publications, their coordination by the Socialist Alliance had enormous propaganda possibilities. It was likely that the party financed some activities of the Socialist Alliance, although there was no evidence on this point. The Socialist Alliance netted about 40,000,000 dinars a month (about $134,000) from dues. In 1954, the Central Committee decreed a reduction in dues that was estimated to cut party revenues from this source nearly 45 per cent. 71 Even with these reductions, however, dues brought the party some 75,000,000 dinars a month. 72 Although monthly dues in the Socialist Alliance were 5 dinars per member, in the party, dues were graduated according to the income of the member, except for peasants who paid a flat rate of 30 dinars a month; students not on a scholarship and Communists without monthly income, who paid 20 dinars; and army conscripts, who paid 2 dinars a month. All Com-

57

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

munists receiving monthly cash wages paid according to the following scale: up to 10,000 dinars, % per cent of income; 10,000 to 20,000, 1 per cent; 20,000 to 35,000, 2 per cent; above 35,000, 3 per cent. Three per cent of monthly earning was also paid by artists, authors, lawyers, craftsmen, and other Communists not formally employed. 73 TRADE-UNIONS AND THE ARMY Two other transmission belts whose activities were generally outside the Socialist Alliance were of especial importance. These were the trade-union Sindikat and the army. The role of the unions as an instrumentality of the party in the economy and in education is described elsewhere.74 "It is obvious," said Tito, "that in our country the Communist party and the tradeunions are closely bound in one single purpose—the building of socialism." 75 Although the Sindikat was affiliated with the Socialist Alliance, its top leadership held important party posts. The Sindikat president, Djuro Salaj, was a member of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists, and he and other Sindikat officials had direct relationships with the secretariat of the Central Committee as well as with the party organization on lower levels. Approximately 40 per cent of trade-union committee members belonged to the party. In fact, with the extensive decentralization of government and economy that occurred, without the trade-union acting as the voice of the party in the factory, there would have been little means of enforcing the party's will in many individual units. 76 The army was in a special category. As in any highly authoritarian government, it was an important source of strength for those in power; but at the same time it always represented a potential threat. In Yugoslavia this was particularly true. The existence of a large and tested army was a factor in Tito's independent position vis-a-vis the USSR. Tito referred to the

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY

army as "the chief pillar of support of our peoples for preserving independence." 77 At the same time, the army was a focus of Soviet efforts at subversion.78 There was, therefore, intensive party work in the army to build up loyalty to the Tito regime. Between 1948 and 1952, 90,948 new members were admitted into the party from the army, bringing army membership at the time of the Sixth Party Congress to 140,193.79 In the haste to recruit new members from the army, however, there was "inadequate attention . . . paid to necessary qualities for becoming a party member." 80 The result was a reduction in army membership in 1953. However, as can be seen from table 2, party membership in the army was still more than membership anywhere except Serbia and Croatia, and almost the entire officer corps belonged to the party.81 Indicative of the attention the party paid to the army was the fact that about 650 party courses were organized annually for military personnel, in addition to about a million political lectures and 700,000 political discussion groups.82 THE NEW PARTY SYSTEM IN OPERATION Under the new concept of the party in Yugoslavia, party decisions were supposed to be carried out not by the party organizations collectively but by individual members working in various nonparty organizations, particularly the Socialist Alliance. The basic party organizations were supposed to provide the necessary ideological and political education, orientation, and stimulation for their members to function. The plan for "ideological work" for a block organization in Sarajevo was stated like this: Learning is individual. However, consultation is done jointly. In the first place, party literature is studied and after that, in the following order, the daily press, elaboration of various economic and other social problems. In order to be able to

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY cope more easily with some themes, such as for example the question of socialist democracy, forms of self-management in enterprises and institutions, etc., six groups were organized. All members of the basic organization have been grouped according to the streets in which they live. Each group establishes its program of work independently, taking into account that every member must study well the material of the themes which are going to be put up for discussion. Besides this, it is the duty to include in their work as many members as possible of the Socialist Alliance who are not Communists. Such methods of work offer possibilities to prepare people for the League of Communists.83

Although the Socialist Alliance was supposed to coordinate the various "social" organizations of the country, the party units also attempted to do this through the activities of their members in their organizations. They were not always successful. For example, Olga Marasovic, secretary of the Second Ward Committee of the Sarajevo party organization, complained that there were too many organizations to keep track of and that the basic party units "are not in a position to have a review of what all the members are doing."84 In Montenegro, the head of the party called on both the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance to have "closer contact" with youth and women's organizations. In Croatia, the party organization tried to get at this problem by organizing groups of Communist "activists," consisting of party members in various organizations, to coordinate party work in the Socialist Alliance.85 Although the League of Communists was supposed to free itself of administrative matters, and party units exist in the factories to assess concrete economic problems, local party organizations still spent considerable time dealing with administration of economic enterprises. The district committee at Zenica, for example, devoted most of a meeting in 1954 to such matters as prices, investment, and production, especially at

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the large Zenica iron works. The workers' council was sharply criticized for boosting prices, for furnishing transportation of workers to sports events, and for building a garage for 80,000,000 dinars which was too small to house big trucks. "When the district committee of the League of Communists analyzed how investment and other funds were used," Borba reported, "then it was discovered that neither the committees of the League of Communists nor the Communists who are working on the economy devoted full attention to these questions." 86 Again, a two-day conference of the League of Communists at Travnik analyzed the productive capacity of the enterprise "Sebesic" and found it was being utilized at a capacity of only 60 per cent. Attention was paid to a brickyard in Turbet, which made an arrangement with a private contractor under which the latter netted a 205,000-dinar profit. Borba, reporting the meeting, asked: "What were the Communists doing in the brickyard when they permitted that private contractors be given the means of the community to enrich themselves while on the other hand permanent workers of this brickyard cannot even earn their wages?" 87 In the carrying out of "ideological-political work," the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance often overlapped to the point of joint activity. A series of public seminars in Smederevo, although formally proclaimed as a Socialist Alliance activity, were said to be "a part of an extensive plan which has been set to be elaborated in the League of Communists and Socialist Alliance organizations." 88 In the Lopar district of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the district committee of the party "passed a decision under which two-day seminars have to be organized in ward centers with all members of the Socialist Alliance." 89 The difficulty of distinguishing between the work of the party and the Socialist Alliance was seen by the following report from Kasindol, in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 6i

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Many problems were put before the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance, as for example: to organize a course of domestic science for women; to erect a monument to killed Partisans . . . ; to open an eight-year school; to complete the 'Partizan' building; to open a health center, etc. But all these problems could not be successfully solved because there was no serious action in the Socialist Alliance of this village. The reason for this state of affairs in the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance of Kasindol lies in the poor work of Communists engaged in mass political organizations. Some members of the Socialist Alliance basic organization, including here the president, indulged in drinking, neglected their work, and as such they would not fight against harmful influences.90 The Socialist Alliance could, perhaps, be seen most clearly as an individual organization in its operations regarding local government. In Kragujevac, for example, it was reported that during 1954 the people's committee did "not deal with a single important question without its having been discussed in the Socialist Alliance." Once action was taken by the people's committee, the Socialist Alliance then "paid particular attention to the carrying out of these decisions and at its meetings criticized people who broke these rules." 91 Although the Socialist Alliance operated on the basis of democratic centralism as far as its organizations are concerned, more leeway was supposed to be allowed individual members in expression of their private beliefs. For example, the party took a dim view of religious activities on the part of its members, but according to Kardelj: "For the Socialist Alliance and its members, religious feelings are the private concern of the individual. Within the ranks of the Socialist Alliance can be both atheists and people who believe in and belong to various religions." 92 In fact, however, it was a question how far this leeway extended. There were numerous reports of expulsions from the 62

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Socialist Alliance of members unduly critical of the party or regime. For example, the Kasindol Socialist Alliance organization, referred to above, expelled four members in August, 1954. One, Lazar Bojovic, "openly began to appear with very harmful and hostile slogans, criticizing our leadership and some measures, expecially concentrating his attacks against Communists . . . making use of their personal mistakes." Another, Despot Stefanovic, showed "disrespect for the best sons of this province . . . to whom the people are erecting a monument, began to curse and scold people's deputies, cry for old Yugoslavia and even began to assault honest people." A third, Cvija Stefanovic, "became a victim of a bad priest" and "later on she began to gather with mainly pro-Cetnik elements. The result was that their influence affected Cvija, who began to attack those women who refused to observe church holidays, cursed and called them names. Their collaborator in all this was Milos Remic. Conscious members of the Socialist Alliance perceived this and prevented such a harmful work in due time. That is why they unanimously decided to expel them from this organization." 93 Action of Socialist Alliance units, like that in Kasindol, were invariably unanimous. Another example was the expulsion from the Socialist Alliance of Milovan Djilas, prior to his trial in December, 1954. 94 The whole relationship of the League of Communists to the Socialist Alliance strongly indicated that the Socialist Alliance did not function significantly except through its Communist members. Blazo Jovanovic put it this way: The activity of political work in the Socialist Alliance of Working People mostly depends upon the activity of the Communists themselves, and this is the best criterion of work and political influence of the League of Communists. In those quarters where the Communists are active, the Socialist Alliance of Working People is also active. In those quarters

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where the Communists are inactive, and where they do not attend the meetings of the Socialist Alliance, the other working men do not assign any importance to the work. Similarly, it is necessary for the Communists to be active also in all other mass social organizations. The influence and attitude of the League of Communists should predominate there also.95 CONFUSION AND REACTION It would be too much to conclude from the above illustrations that the party in Yugoslavia did not in fact have a new role or that it had not changed significantly since 1950. However, it seemed clear that the new role was not always what one might expect from the pronouncements of party leaders and, also, that many Communists had no clear understanding of what the new role was supposed to be. "It is known," wrote Stalin, "that theory, if it is really theory, gives practical people strength and orientation, a clarity of perspective, confidence at work, faith. . . ." 98 If some Yugoslav Communists seemed to wonder, as far as the party was concerned, if there really was a theory, what perplexed others was that there seemed to be several theories that, if not mutually contradictory, were at best vague. 97 The Communists had been told to work as individuals rather than rely on their party status. They had been told to work with, but not dominate, the Socialist Alliance. They had been told not to order the government about but to criticize its activities. They had been told they must emphasize democracy and tolerate different opinions. They had been told that the party no longer had a monopoly on setting the political line. They had been told that the party, to which they were expected to devote their lives, was to "wither away." But at the same time, and often almost in the same breath, the Communists had been told that (1) the party must maintain and even augment its leading position throughout the society; (2) they must fight

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bourgeois tendencies and antistate activity; (3) they must not believe in freedom to express antisocialist ideas; and ( 4 ) they must struggle to safeguard the purity and monolithic position of the party. Given the admitted low ideological level of the party, it was hardly surprising that the resulting confusion reached a point where, in June, 1953, the leadership decided something had to be done about it. From Brioni, his summer residence in the Adriatic, Tito summoned a plenum of the Central Committee to deal with the matter. The Brioni Plenum, as it was called, promptly decreed a general tightening of party discipline and a reemphasis on democratic centralism.98 The plenum found that relaxed discipline had allowed "ideological and political confusion to grow" to the point where broad areas of the party were "ceasing to be revolutionary." "All kinds of uncertainty and anti-Marxist theories are starting to appear," the Central Committee declared. "The struggle for ideological and political unity is very weak. It is not a rare occurrence that members of the Communist League believe they have the right to protest against decrees and other measures that have been adopted in our Socialist State in a democratic manner." The "negative tendencies," which had to be corrected, involved two fundamental errors among the Communists: 1. Some considered that the "process of democracy meant they could contribute nothing to the party but lectures." They had become passive, ignored party discipline, adopted "pettybourgeois-anarchist ideas of freedom and democracy" and failed to combat "foreign and anti-Socialist manifestations." 2. Other Communists still believed "the party line had not changed at all" and thought the new emphasis on democracy was only an "agitation-propaganda tactic." The plenum concentrated its fire on the former group, which clearly was considered the more harmful. So that there would

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PARTY

be no misunderstanding about the concept of the "withering away of the party," the Central Committee said that this concerned only the distant future, when communism was achieved and the problem of ideological leadership no longer present. For the foreseeable future, it was explained, leadership by the Communist party as a disciplined and monolithic force— modified as it might be—was an indispensable factor to the development of socialism and communism in Yugoslavia. The Brioni Plenum was "the signal for a general tightening up of discipline within the party and of control by the party over anyone who acted contrary to official policy." 99 It would be too much to say that a purge resulted, but a total of 72,067 members were expelled from the party during 1953, most of them in the latter half of the year. Table 3, giving figures presented by Rankovic to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in 1954, shows the distribution of members expelled as well as new members recruited during 1953. TABLE 3 Area

Expelled

New members

25,259 10,603 Serbia 13,949 Croatia 6,113 19,737 Bosnia-Herzegovina 4,577 4,368 Slovenia 915 5,142 Macedonia 1,120 1,075 261 Montenegro Army 2,537 1,507 Total 72,067 25,096 SOURCE: Komunist, no. 4 (April), 1954, pp. 267-268.

Decrease 15,056 7,836 15,160 3,453 4,022 814 1,030 47,371

Although none of the formal decisions of either the Fourth Plenum or the Sixth Party Congress were abrogated, the leadership made it clear that Communists were not authorized to differ with government policies where these reflected the will

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of the party. 100 Since almost all government policies reflect the will of the party, criticism of government was seriously delimited. The elections, which had been scheduled for the spring of 1953, were postponed until fall. 101 The interim period was utilized by intense party work to convince the Communists to "be active in the preparations for and the conduct of meetings of voters" and to be sure they did "not allow reactionary elements . . . to be nominated." 1 0 2 THE DJILAS AFFAIR The Brioni Plenum indicated that if the party leadership did not want to reverse the trend toward decentralization and democracy in connection with the party, they at least wanted to put brakes on it. Yet even among the high command the confusion had not been cleared up. One member of the hierarchy in particular, Milovan Djilas, felt the decisions of the Brioni Plenum were "one-sided, that they had forgotten the struggle against bureaucratism." 1 0 3 Not only did Djilas not agree but he "felt that the Brioni Plenum had somehow to be corrected." 104 This he set about to do by writing a series of articles in the fall of 1953 in Borba and in the theoretical magazine Nova Misao (New Thought). Before starting, Djilas talked with Tito. When he proposed to continue his articles on bureaucratism and democracy in the party, Tito replied: "111 tell you what. There are some things I do not agree with, but in the main there are good things in them, and I don't think the others are any reason for you not to write. Go on with it." Tito said he made this answer "since in his [Djilas'] articles among other things he had been expressing what many of us had already said or written about the matter." 1 0 5 Djilas' articles, as they turned out, contained ideas that went beyond those expressed by anybody else in the Yugoslav

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party. In fact, Djilas called for a virtual end to the party as an organized political force in society. He argued that there was no longer a need for the class struggle in Yugoslavia because all effective enemies of socialism had been liquidated. "The new enemy," he wrote, "bureaucracy, is even more dangerous than the previous one, capitalism." 106 Pointing to the confusion among the Communists, Djilas added: The basic organizations of the Communist League . . . have reached an impasse. From above they are requested to do something, and they do not know what to do. Indeed they have nothing to do in the old manner. The themes for socalled education-ideological work . . . are obsolete and tedious. 107

Not having anything to do and representing a positive danger to democratic socialist development, the League of Communists, Djilas held, should "wither away" by merging with the Socialist Alliance, and individual Communists should merge "with the ordinary citizen." 108 Djilas questioned not only the need for the party but for its auxiliaries like youth and trade-union organizations. "In my opinion," he wrote, "professional party, youth and other workers are superfluous." 109 "The Leninist type of both party and state dictatorship by means of the party has become obsolete." 110 In any event, Djilas argued, "the goal is not communism or a Communist society because in the end this will come anyhow." The goal of complete communism is too distant to be meaningful and only "distracts attention from bureaucratic reality." The goal must be "concrete measures, realizable from stage to stage, from one concrete target to another. . . . The goal today is quick progress of socialism and democracy through concrete and feasible forms—not communism." 111 Not only was Djilas carrying the concept of the party in

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Yugoslavia to what he saw as its logical conclusion, but also he was going to the heart of the theoretical principle involved. Underlying his reasoning, as he later explained it, was the belief that the Yugoslav Communists had abandoned the Leninist concept of the party. As Djilas saw Leninism, "objective truth" was arrived via the Marxian dialectic. Under this concept, he agreed, there had to be a strict democratic centralism; there had to be, in fact, a dictatorship of the party leadership because that leadership was responsible for carrying out the exact line determined by the dialectic. But now, as Djilas saw it, Yugoslav communism had gone beyond this stage and had abandoned the Leninist concept for a more or less pragmatic approach. It had no definite line, and it did not need one, because there was no longer any danger from antisocialist forces. But there was a danger from party bureaucracy. Truth, no longer seen via the dialectic, now had to be arrived at by free discussion. This meant abandonment of democratic centralism to permit formation of "ad hoc blocs" of party members which could differ among themselves on various questions. This being the case, the party, as a party, was no longer needed. The alternative meant decision simply on the basis of the personal ideas of the party leaders, and since they were fallible, this inevitably created the danger of erroneous decisions.112 Djilas capped the climax to his efforts with a bitter, satirical attack on the very top "inner circle of party bureaucrats," who, he charged, maintained their existence in a "closed world . . . from the nature of power and the manner in which it was attained." 113 The extremely vague, philosophical manner in which the Djilas articles were written were here spiced by indirect but obvious references to Colonel General Peko Dapcevic, chief of staff of the Yugoslav army, and his 21-yearold actress bride. 114 These heretical views, published by one of the top members

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of the party in official party publications, added greatly to the ideological confusion already present in Yugoslav communism. Discussion among Communists and the press was widespread. Generally speaking, the articles were popular among the rank and file, and even some members of the Central Committee hailed them. 115 Some published comments were enthusiastic. One "Communist with 29 years of party membership" agreed with Djilas that party meetings were "obsolete and tedious" and saw the party properly "headed for a museum." 116 Another letter writer declared a majority of people were "fully in agreement with Djilas' ideas," 117 whereas another praised the articles as "powerful sunbeams shining upon our life and people." 118

DJILAS DISCIPLINED It is an indication of the extent of the ideological confusion in Yugoslavia that it was not immediately obvious to all that Djilas was in a position of irrevocable opposition to the top party leadership. As it was, Djilas' articles appeared regularly for nearly two months before Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic realized what was happening. 119 But when, after Tito had sent word of his disapproval and Kardelj and Rankovic had expressed strong disagreement, Djilas continued to publish his views, a showdown was clearly at hand. Even before this, Djilas had practically ensured it by telling Kardelj, as Kardelj reported it to the Central Committee, "that Comrade Tito was defending Bureaucracy and that he, Djilas, would sooner or later have to fight it out with him." 120 The showdown was not long in coming. On January 10,1954, Borba announced that Djilas' articles were "contrary to the opinions of all other members of the Executive Committee" and the matter would be taken up at the forthcoming Third Plenum of the Central Committee. 70

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The Third Plenum, which convened January 16, in effect put Djilas on trial. 121 In keeping with the Sixth Congress admonition that party proceedings were to be public, the plenum was not only open but its proceedings broadcast. The party leadership arose one by one to denounce their friend and colleague for deviationism. Tito seemed to do it more in sorrow than in anger. "In Comrade Djilas," he said, "I see a comrade." Kardelj accused Djilas of following Eduard Bernstein, who was expelled by the German Social Democrats in 1899 because of his denial of communism as an ultimate goal and his insistence that democracy was the principal consideration. Mose Pijade, heaping bitter invective on Djilas, referred to his writing as "political pornography." Only Vladimir Dedijer recalled that "a week ago Milovan Djilas' postulates in Borba were more or less adopted by the majority of us who are sitting here . . . All at once the very same people who approved these articles are attacking Milovan Djilas fiercely. . . ." And Dedijer asked: "How can we think one thing today and all of a sudden change our opinion overnight?" The answer to Dedijer's question appeared to be that "all of a sudden" the top hierarchy of the party realized their dictatorship of the proletariat was being challenged. That they did not intend to preside over its dissolution, despite all talk about democracy, responsibility to the masses and "withering away," was made clear by Tito himself. He told the Central Committee: One good thing has come to the surface in all this business, and that is to be seen in the fact that it has done a lot to open our eyes and thoroughly wake us up, and many of our people too, to something we certainly never imagined. For we never imagined that there were any (least of all Comrade Djilas) who thought that in Yugoslavia the class enemy was already liquidated. In Djilas' theories, there are no classes, there is no class enemy, all are now equal. But it is precisely his case which shows how dangerous the class enemy is in Yugoslavia. 71

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The class enemy exists, and it is very clear after Djilas' articles that he exists in the League of Communists. He is manifest in various forms. As for the "withering away of the party": I was the first to speak of the withering away of the party, of the withering away of the league, but I never said this was to take place in six months or a year or two, rather that it was a lengthy process. There can be no withering away or winding up of the League of Communists until the last class enemy has been immobilized, until the broadest body of our citizens are socialist in outlook, for the League of Communists is responsible for the realization of the achievements of the revolution. . . . It must exist, and not merely exist, but also be ideologically stronger, it must be conscious of the tremendous role it plays. . . . I agree that we too spoke of it, but . . . we never said it would be tomorrow, the day after tomorrow or in a year or two but that it was a lengthy process which would only develop through trials and difficulties. Then Tito went on to say that Djilas' ideas would lead "to anarchy, to a terrible uncertainty" and added: "If we permitted this, in a year's time our socialist reality would not exist. It would not exist, I tell you, without a bloody battle." In two statements notable for their rambling ambiguity, Djilas was contrite, but he did not recant. He said he realized now he had been in error, but he added: "It would not be honest if I said that now, suddenly, all the ideas I have held were wrong. This I cannot do." Unanimously—including even the heretic and Dedijer—the Central Committee voted to discipline Djilas. But his punishment—fantastically light considering traditional Communist treatment of heretics—showed the Yugoslav party bosses might have tempered but had not abandoned the new approach to communism. Djilas was expelled from the Central Committee and other party posts, but his comrades decided "to give him a final warning" and not expel him from the party. No action

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was attempted against Djilas' person. Ignored to the point of ostracism, he moved to a modest apartment in Belgrade. 122 He had resigned his post as president of the Federal Assembly, and his constituency in Montenegro, which had elected him with an announced 98.8 per cent of the ballots, voted his recall. Three months later he resigned from the party. The whole affair was in striking contrast to Soviet practice. A few years earlier Djilas might well have been summarily dispatched by a firing squad. Djilas himself declared that he survived "as a monument to the Cominform Resolution." 123 And Tito referred to "the step we should have had to take in the days of the sharp revolutionary struggle." 124 IMPACT OF THE DJILAS AFFAIR It is not easy to assess the impact of the Djilas affair. Djilas was undoubtedly correct when he said later "there are no Djilasites, in any formal, active sense," but he was also right when he added "there is lots of Djilasism, though." 125 True, its manifestations were largely negative. For one thing, as a Communist leader admitted almost a year later, throughout Yugoslavia "intellectuals are avoiding writing about the theory of Marx-Lenin. . . ." 126 A Croatian Communist declared: "We will not go against the party leadership, but we have stored up new ideas which the future will permit us to utilize." A Slovenian party functionary made the surprising admission that "ideology is unimportant." 127 Party officials themselves testified to the existence of Djilasism" but at the same time denied it. A member of the Montenegro Central Committee, declaring "there does not exist an intensive life in the League of Communists," admitted: "We have allowed this state of affairs to come about to some extent . . . because of the influence of Djilas' writings. . . ." 128 Another Montenegrin party official warned of "anarchistic

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY manifestations which Djilas fanned here by his personal influence and his conceptions and writings." Lest any think that this was true only in Djilas' native Montenegro, he added that the situation of which he complained "is acute . . . not only in Montenegro but in general." 129 Yet the control of the party hierarchy was never seen to better advantage than in the manner in which the matter was hushed up immediately. 130 Once the Third Plenum had ended, there was almost no further public discussion or even mention of it. Steps were taken quietly to supervise publishing activities more closely. 131 The Party Control Commission undertook the examination of a few party members, and local secretaries talked privately with individuals thought to be enthusiastic backers of Djilas, but the issue was not formally brought up in any of the party organizations or committees. 132

DJILAS' SECOND HERESY The last had not been heard of the Djilas affair, however. Among those examined by the Party Control Commission were General Dapcevic, who had figured so prominently in Djilas' last article and whose brother had been arrested while trying to escape eastward after the Cominform Resolution; Mitra Mitrovic, Djilas' former wife, who had indicated some sympathy—although not support—for Djilas at the plenum; and Vladimir Dedijer, who alone had spoken in favor of his friend. All three were members of the Central Committee. The commission apparently decided there was no question about General Dapcevic, and Miss Mitrovic also satisfactorily passed her proverka.133 Dedijer not only did not pass—he reiterated his support of Djilas' ideas—but he challenged the right of the commission to examine him. Dedijer went even further. In mid-December, 1954, he walked out on a meeting of the Party Control Commission,

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leaked the episode to Western newspapermen in Belgrade and then gave an interview to the Belgrade correspondent of the London Times.134 During this contretemps, Djilas had remained in his "splendid isolation." Now, however, the correspondent of the New York Times went to him and asked his opinion. Djilas responded with views even more startling and heretical than those expressed in his articles a year previously. If there was to be no really free discussion inside the party, he said, then Yugoslavia should have a two-party system. He thought a "new democratic Socialist party" should be formed to compete with the League of Communists. He denounced the Control Commission's examinations as "an attempt to frighten the democratic elements in the Party." 135 Tito was in India at the time, but Kardelj, as acting president, did not hesitate. He assailed Djilas and Dedijer for "blackmail" and demanded their prosecution on charges of hostile propaganda. The Federal Assembly voted to strip Dedijer of his parliamentary immunity. The Central Committee, acting on a recommendation from the Control Commission, suspended him.136 Three days after his statement appeared in the New York Times, Djilas was expelled from the Socialist Alliance, and the basic organization of the Alliance to which he had belonged "demanded that criminal proceedings should be taken against" him.137 He was also even expelled from such an organization as the sport-fishing society Dunav, "because of his harmful and treacherous work against our peoples. . . ." 138 The trial began on January 24, 1955, and, apparently contrary to the statute, was secret.139 Great emphasis was placed on the fact that Djilas and Dedijer found a platform for their views in the foreign press. Tanjug, the official news service, termed the pair "foreign interventionist tools,"140 and a veritable orgy of criticism against the Western press ensued.141

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Djilas and Dedijer were convicted, one receiving a sentence of eighteen months, the other a sentence of six months. But the sentences in both cases were suspended—that is, the pair was placed on probation, Djilas for three years, Dedijer for two—and they were freed.142 In many ways, considering the gravity with which their offenses were viewed, the sentences were tantamount to acquittal. Once again, the new and anomalous character of Yugoslav communism had been manifested. Although the results of the trial might frighten some wayward party members into conformity, it did little to solve the fundamental question still facing the Yugoslav Communists: Conformity to what? They were not aided in answering this question by the fact that Djilas, from his isolation in Belgrade, continued to embarrass the regime. With the foolhardy courage of the old Montenegrin warriors from whom he descended, he virtually dared his erstwhile comrades to act against him. On May 31, 1956, Djilas complained in a letter to the New York Times that Yugoslav publishers refused his manuscripts for political reasons. While Tito was in Moscow in June, 1956, he wrote a series of articles for the Hearst and other foreign newspapers attacking the new Soviet leadership with which Tito was then making further rapprochement.1*3 For these likely violations of his probation, Djilas received only abusive criticism in the Yugoslav press. But when, at the time of the Hungarian uprising, he wrote an article for the New Leader, socialist but strongly anti-Communist, attacking the ambiguity of Tito's stand, this was too much.144 He was made to start serving a three-year sentence.145 If Djilas had been daring his erstwhile comrades to move against him, the dare was now taken. This time there was no probation. And when a manuscript he had written violently attacking the very bases of communism appeared in book form in the United States in 1957,146 seven years were peremptorily added to his sentence.147

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Vladimir Dedijer, meanwhile, was also going further beyond the pale. For a series of lectures abroad in the spring of 1957, in which he criticized the Soviet Union but not Yugoslavia, he was assailed by Tito. Party pressure brought to bear on the faculty at the University of Belgrade was not enough to keep him from passing a doctoral examination, but he failed to obtain a reappointment to the history professorship from which he had been dismissed in 1955. In the fall of 1957, he was refused a passport and thus kept from going to England to accept a fellowship at Manchester University.148 At the same time, his younger brother, Stevan Dedijer, an atomic physicist and a Princeton graduate, was in trouble. Already expelled from the League of Communists because of his outspoken views, the younger Dedijer wrote an article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists urging greater freedom of expression in Communist countries.149 Although he had previously been director of the atomic research laboratory at Vinca, near Belgrade, he was then associated with the Rudijer Boskovic Institute at Zagreb, where he was working on a doctoral dissertation. About two weeks after publication of his Bulletin article, his fellowship at the Institute was terminated. Slobodan Nakicenovic, secretary of the Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy, said the action was taken because Dedijer showed no sign of completing his dissertation and "had nothing to do with publication" of the article. Many, however, were unconvinced.150 The Yugoslav party might not be sure of the nature of the conformity it sought, but it seemed increasingly sure about how to treat those who were openly nonconformists. DELAY OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESS Ideological questions haunted the Yugoslav Communists not only in regard to internal matters but also in regard to their international position. Complications arose not only out of the "normalization" of relations with the Soviet Union in 1955, but

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also by the crises in Eastern Europe that developed in 1956.151 The repeated delays of the Seventh Party Congress were surely an indication of the enormous difficulty the Yugoslavs had in seeing their ideological future clearly. The Seventh Congress was certain to be an important conclave. Events had gone beyond the situation envisaged at the Sixth Congress, both in the domestic and international spheres. There was a need for a pulling together of the various doctrines of Yugoslav communism into one cohesive text. Moreover, one of the chief formulators of some of these theories had been Milovan Djilas, who now, as an avowed anti-Communist, was discredited and languishing in prison. It would seem necessary that doctrines associated with Djilas' name had either to receive new and different authority or be altered. Above all, there was a need to restate, if not reformulate, those theories that were essentially anti-Stalinist in nature in keeping with the changes Tito saw, or hoped for, in the Kremlin after Stalin's death. The Seventh Congress normally would have been held in the fall of 1956. At that very time came the Hungarian uprising and the bloody Soviet repression of it. The whole nature of Moscow's future relations with Eastern European communism, including Yugoslav communism, was in doubt. 152 It was not surprising, therefore, that the congress was postponed until the following spring. But the spring saw further tensions between Yugoslavia and the USSR and the congress was then postponed until fall. Meanwhile, an integrated party program was worked out. Again relations with the Kremlin interfered. Following the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow, the heads of the various Communist parties in power signed a declaration of "unity and fraternal cooperation," denouncing the West and particularly "aggressive imperialist circles in the United States." The Yugoslav representatives boycotted the meeting and refused to sign.153

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Whether this was a factor or not, the Seventh Congress was once more postponed, and at the last minute, this time until the spring of 1958. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Communist party of Yugoslavia was organized and operated on the pattern of the Soviet party. To harmonize the position of the party with the new reforms and new attitude toward communism, the party leadership relaxed democratic centralism and curtailed the privileged position of party members. At the Sixth Party Congress in November, 1952, a new theory of the party was set forth. According to this theory, the party was no longer to interfere directly in government affairs, and party decisions were to be carried out by members working as individuals in their jobs and in various organizations. The name of the party was changed to the League of Communists. The People's Front was soon thereafter reorganized into the Socialist Alliance of Working People. The Communists were to have leading positions in the Socialist Alliance, which was to include all persons not hostile to the regime, regardless of their specific views, and to coordinate all group activity in Yugoslavia into a "struggle for socialism and democracy." The party apparatus was drastically reduced, and many of its functions were turned over to the Socialist Alliance. In addition to decentralization of party organization and stress on democracy, there was put forward a new concept, that of the "withering away of the party." At the same time, however, the Communists were berated for lax discipline, holding petty-bourgeois, anarchistic views, and not safeguarding the monolithic purity of the party. The result was widespread confusion in the ranks of the party, which was characterized, in any event, by a low ideo-

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY

logical and educational level. The confusion was manifest on the one hand by passiveness and failure to observe democratic centralism, and on the other by a refusal of some Communists to change their old "bureaucratic methods of operation." There was no clear line distinguishing activities of the party and the Socialist Alliance, so that "ideological-political work" lagged. It was clear that the Socialist Alliance functioned significantly only through its Communist members. In the summer of 1953, the party high command began to back away from the liberalizing trend and demanded a tightening of party discipline and strict observance of democratic centralism. Widespread expulsions from the party followed. Milovan Djilas, however, was unable to accept the attitude of the leadership and began a campaign in the press against bureaucratic tendencies. Believing there was no longer a need for the party in the old sense, he advocated its virtual elimination and ended by bitterly attacking top figures in the party. For this heresy, Djilas was expelled from his party posts although not from the party. That nothing happened to him other than this is an indication that the party leadership was not going to foresake completely the new liberalized concept of communism, although they were going to maintain their dictatorship. The Djilas episode was hushed up, but its impact on the rank and file of the party worried the leaders. The affair broke into the open again nearly a year later when Vladimir Dedijer, who had supported Djilas previously, defied the Party Control Commission and gave an interview to Western correspondents. Thereupon Djilas also gave an interview, this time advocating a two-party system for Yugoslavia. For this "hostile propaganda," Djilas and Dedijer were tried in secret and sentenced to jail, but their sentences were suspended and they went free. The over-all picture presented by the Yugoslav Communist party was one of confusion and uncertainty, produced by the

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY

effort to maintain a Communist dictatorship at the same time that democracy was emphasized and the government and the economy were decentralized. Tito and other party leaders apparently wanted to develop their own brand of socialism by popular support and participation rather than by party control, but they feared there was not enough popular support to accomplish this. Whether the party could continue in this ambiguous position, without returning to the traditional position of a Communist party or without losing its hold on Yugoslav society, was unclear. The elimination of Soviet hostility, which originally prompted the new directions, posed further questions for the Yugoslav theorists. The repeated postponement of the Seventh Party Congress indicated ideological uncertainty involving both domestic and international matters. But there was still no evidence that the party was going to abandon the bases of its new position or shift back to Stalinist concepts.

81

the leader T H E ROLE O F T I T O ,

ne Josip Broz, personally, was obviously of great significance in Yugoslavia.1 Something less than a dictator and considerably more than a constitutional president, he occupied a unique position. His real and unquestioned power came from the fact that he dominated the Communist party, serving not merely as chairman of the Central Committee and of the Executive Committee—his official party posts—but also as The Leader. Yet at the same time, even during postwar Yugoslavia's most totalitarian period, Tito never exercised the sole authority in his country that Stalin, for example, did in his. In fact, almost from the first there was a sort of collective leadership. In this, to be sure, Tito was the dominant figure, "much more equal," to paraphrase Orwell, than his peers but still not on an altogether different plane. This was true notwithstanding the

THE LEADER

early efforts to build Tito up in the same kind of father image for Yugoslavia as Stalin came to be for the USSR. This situation resulted, of course, from Tito's history in the Yugoslav party. When the Stalin purges of the 'thirties were over, he was practically the only surviving member of the hierarchy with any status both in Yugoslavia and in the international Communist movement. In a very real sense, therefore, he himself built the modern Yugoslav Communist party. His role was even more emphasized after many Yugoslav party members were killed in World War II; at the same time the Communists gained many new converts who often associated Tito and the party as one in their minds. Tito's strength, however, stemmed not only from his Communist following. As the leader of a successful military organization, which comprised many thousands of non-Communists, he came as close as anybody in Yugoslavia ever had come to being a national leader. Also, his Croat origin helped mitigate the opposition of many Croats, even anti-Communists, who were traditionally opposed to the Belgrade government. In addition, Tito commanded the personal loyalty of that part of the Partisan movement that later became the nucleus of the Yugoslav army. This wartime situation colored his relations with other top Yugoslav Communists. They were all comrades-at-arms, and a real friendship and trust, forged in battle for a common cause, existed among them. YUGOSLAV CHARISMA That Tito was thus both a national leader and a Communist leader in his own right set him apart from the other Eastern European Communist bosses, who, minus any substantial following of their own, were by and large installed and kept in office by Soviet might. This difference was evident in the

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THE LEADER

early years after the war from the public position occupied by Tito as compared with that of the satellite leaders. In those days, when Yugoslav school children were reciting poetry comparing Tito to beautiful flowers, charisma in Yugoslavia seemed to be following the Soviet pattern. By 1949, however, when the Yugoslavs were ridiculing the adulation of Stalin in Soviet-dominated lands, it stopped abruptly. It is anomalous that this coincided almost exactly with the rise of the so-called cult of the individual in the satellites. The attempt to identify communism with the various nationalisms saw portrayals of Bierut in Poland, Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, Rakosi in Hungary, and Chervenkov in Bulgaria as beloved little fathers of their people in the Stalin manner. With the deemphasis of the cult of the individual after Stalin's death, and particularly after Khrushchev's attack at the Twentieth Party Congress, still another anomaly prevailed. In "de-Stalinized" Yugoslavia, Tito occupied a far more prominent position publicly than did his erstwhile comrades in their far more totalitarian countries. In no other country was a Communist regime as much personified by one man.

A MAN OF ACTION There can be no doubt that Tito possessed a first-rate mind as well as outstanding qualities of leadership. He inspired in his followers a fierce loyalty, to which he responded with loyalty in kind. No man could have had Tito's career as soldier, revolutionary, and Communist leader without being characterized by the adjective "ruthless." Yet, at the same time, he constantly showed certain homey, human qualities not usually identified with Eastern European dictators. Imprisoned by the Royal Yugoslav government before the war, for example, he was frequently visited by an old woman who lived nearby

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THE LEADER

and who brought him and other prisoners food, tobacco, and reading material. When the Yugoslav Communists took over and the old woman continued her visitations, she was arrested. But Tito intervened. "Let her alone," Dedijer quotes him as saying. "She is a churchgoer. She used to help us, and now she is helping the reactionaries. She sees no difference at all and believes she is doing a good thing." 2 Largely self-educated, Tito had also acquired an acceptable degree of sophistication and culture. So much so, in fact, that certain anti-Communist Yugoslav émigrés have contended that the original Tito was purged by the Russians at the end of the war and another, better-educated person substituted for him. Such fantasy, of course, was entirely without foundation. But whereas his forte was, naturally, politics, he was less at home in the intricacies of ideology, Marxist and otherwise, than some of his lieutenants, particularly Kardelj. This was in part because he was always primarily a man of action. He was also, to the extent possible for a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist, a pragmatist. The combination of these factors accounts in no small degree for the independent course pursued by Yugoslavia following 1948 as well as being a factor in the ideological confusion that developed in the country since that time. A story that perennially made the rounds of Belgrade is illustrative. Tito, according to the tale, was riding in the country. As his car came to a crossroads, a herd of sheep approached from the other direction. Tito's chauffeur gave the signal for a left-hand turn but just then Tito instructed him to turn right. The sheepherder, despite having seen the signal, calmly drove his sheep directly into what would have been the path of the car if it had turned left. Tito, curious, stopped his car and questioned the herdsman.

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THE LEADER

"Why did you turn that way when you saw my driver signal for a left turn?" he demanded. "We might have run your sheep down." "Oh, I wasn't worried," answered the peasant. "It is well known that our president signals left but goes right." Tito was said to enjoy this story, as he did his ceremonial role as top man in Yugoslavia. At one time, his penchant for gaudy uniforms, plus a slight resemblance in stature and face, brought from unsympathetic observers a comparison with the late Hermann Goring. After that the uniforms were toned down, but they were still colorful, well-tailored, and plentiful. Up close, Tito cut a handsomer figure than photographs indicate: less tubby and better preserved. Except for the most official functions, he tended to wear civilian dress, and for entertaining he usually affected a dinner jacket, white in summer. His third wife, whom he married in 1952, Jovanka Budisavljevic, had been a Partisan during the war and afterward a major in the Yugoslav army. A dark, attractive, and Junoesque Serbian, she took a quick course in Paris in the social amenities of diplomacy before she publicly appeared as Madame Broz. She was a distinct asset to the White Palace, Brioni, or wherever Tito happened to be holding forth.

AFTER TITO WHAT? An obvious question was: "After Tito what?" Clearly no one could say for sure. In many respects, Yugoslavia was up against the same problem of succession as any nondemocratic revolutionary regime where power gravitates around one individual. Except for the Soviet Union, the problem of an independent Communist regime arranging for succession in power had not arisen. Certainly there were vast differences between the Soviet situation, both after Lenin and after Stalin, and the

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THE LEADER

Yugoslav situation. For one thing, the Yugoslavs were comparatively free of the prerevolutionary party strife that characterized Russian communism. The Yugoslav leaders were all more or less agreed on a course. Furthermore, the wartime camaraderie that permitted Tito to preside so loosely over his seconds-in-command tended also to make for less jockeying among them for position. Of course the opposition of Djilas showed that at least as far as he was concerned sharp differences did exist. But the other party leaders interpreted Djilas' attack as an attack on all of them—which, of course, it was— and its effect was to produce more, rather than less, unity. Before 1950, it was not unlikely that had Tito suddenly disappeared from the scene an internecine struggle involving Yugoslavia's alienation from the USSR might have occurred and split the party asunder. Time disposed of this issue as such. One could not say, however, that there was unanimity among the party leaders about the nature of relations with the USSR following the rapprochement, although how sharp or deep the differences were was impossible to say. But no other vital issue save power—the struggle for which is the more naked the less institutionalized a regime is—was apparent. Kardelj appeared the most likely successor to Tito. As former foreign minister and then as working head of the Federal Executive Council, Kardelj surely had a better knowledge of the functioning of the Yugoslav government at home and abroad than any other possible contender. As a Partisan general, he had much the same claim on support from the army as other leading Communists. A Slovene, his selection would be less likely to ignite the old particularist feud between the Serbs and Croats than that of, say, the Serb Rankovic. It was true that the latter still headed the UDBA, or secret political police. But not only have many of the UDBA's powers been

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THE LEADER

curbed, but, also, it never operated as independently as the MVD, nor was it ever directly the instrumentality of Rankovic in the same sense that the MVD was of Beria. If it did come to a contest between Kardelj and Rankovic, it was possible that Yugoslavia's relations with the USSR would be a factor. Both men were deeply sincere Communists, but there was reason to believe that Kardelj, as the more original thinker and the more moderate of the two, would be the more likely to continue independent policies, both internally and externally. Still less likely contenders were other members of the party's Executive Committee. Of these, perhaps Svetozar VukmanovicTempo was best known, although in 1957 it was being said that Mijalko Todorovic might displace him as economic czar. Djuro Salaj could probably count on trade-union backing, 3 and General Ivan Gosnjak's role as leader of the army could not be discounted. An increasingly important figure as the problem of what to do with agriculture became ever more important was the party's agricultural spokesman, Vladimir Bakaric. That he was also leader of the party in Croatia gave him political strength at the same time that it handicapped whatever aspirations he had to be a national leader. 4 The fact was, however, that none of the possible contenders—neither Kardelj nor anybody else—was anything remotely resembling a Tito in the public eye. The next Yugoslav leader might inherit Tito's official posts but not his political stature. In 1957, many Yugoslav Communists were predicting that a split in functions would occur after Tito, with one man heading the government, another the party. In any event, it seemed clear that after Tito, Titoism would have to get by on its institutional merits.

88

V

the new governmental system THE

FEDERAL

People's Republic of Yugoslavia, as organized by the constitution of January 31, 1946, was patterned closely after the government of the Soviet Union in theory, form, and operation. The new theories of communism which developed in Yugoslavia subsequent to the break with the Cominform in 1948 produced broad political and economic changes in the country. Many of these were embodied in the new constitution which was adopted on January 13, 1953. This basic law established some novel governmental institutions in its effort to create a "socialist democracy"—a state that is socialist and at the same time democratic. The new constitution was officially called a Fundamental Law because it "fundamentally modified . . . but did not re-

THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

voke" as a whole the 1946 constitution, "permitting further gradual harmonizing of the new constitutional order with the principles which are now being established."1 Actually, however, the change was so complete and basic that, regardless of what it was called officially, the document was really a new constitution, and was in fact usually referred to in that way by Yugoslav officials and scholars.2 The theoretical basis of the change followed the lines of the new Yugoslav Marxist thinking generally. The 1946 constitution, resting "more or less on a centralized system of administration," was not regarded as altogether wrong for that time, because then it was necessary to "develop workingclass consciousness and root out enemies of socialism." But the old constitution "at the same time represented a permanent danger of becoming bureaucratized, a danger of suppression and restriction of socialist initiative of the working masses, a danger of bureaucratic centralism . . . in a word, it contained the danger of preserving and enlarging state capitalist elements in our social economic system." 3 By 1953, Yugoslavia had won its struggle "against the aggressive pressure of the Soviet hegemonists" and had "achieved the victory of socialist democracy over bureaucracy, over elements of state capitalistic despotism."4 The old constitution was then seen as a barrier to the successful operation of decentralized government and worker-management of the economy and was held to be in conflict with the principles of socialist democracy.5 For "all these reasons," Kardelj told the Federal Assembly, "a change in the constitutional system through a new Fundamental Law" must come about.6 The governmental structure, as based on the 1953 constitution, contained the following principles, according to Kardelj: . . socialism, the leading role of the working class, social self-government, equal personal rights, decentralization of 90

THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

executive functions, unified social and political system, equality of rights of peoples, democratism, revolutionary sincerity and alertness."7 In addition, the constitution itself made it apparent that important principles were worker-management of industry and direct worker participation in government.8 The application of these principles to government, it was claimed, made the new Yugoslav state a different and more democratic kind of socialism.9 The major differences in the Yugoslav government under the 1953 constitution involve the nature of the federal system, a new theory of executive powers and function, and the organization of the Federal Assembly, including direct worker representation and a new method of republic representation. FEDERALISM Yugoslavia was a federal state, but under the new constitution its federalism was of a special variety. Whereas the 1946 constitution saw Yugoslavia as "a community of equal and sovereign" republics, an official commentary explained, "the new constitutional laws, without changing the nationalist basis and state-juridical structure, display a considerably higher degree of unity of the Yugoslav peoples and a new basis of unified federal state, as 'the federal state of sovereign and equal peoples.'" 10 The theory, in brief, was that since the principles of the new political and economic system guarantees the democratic rights of all Yugoslav peoples, there was less necessity for stressing special rights for each of the national republics. "Viewed from this angle," Kardelj asserted, Yugoslavia was "no longer a federation of the old type . . . no longer only a union of nationalities and of their states, but has above all become a bearer of the social functions of a unified socialist community of Yugoslav working people." 11 At the same time, Yugoslav federalism of some sort was 91

THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

"an historical necessity," growing out of the complexities, past and present, of the national question. Although the concept of sovereign republics had been abandoned, Kardelj said, the constitution rejected "the confused theories pertaining to fusion of the Yugoslav peoples into one Yugoslav nation in the old sense of the word," since these theories of "integral Yugoslavism" were "reactionary" and "incapable of realization." But whereas a federation of republics "equal in rights is indispensable," this was so "not only because of the national composition of our country" but stemmed also "from our social system as such, from our concept of the people's sovereignty and social self-government." Thus Yugoslavia would be a "federation in that new sense, that is, as a system founded on social self-government, even if it were not multinational." 12 A part of the claim to federalism in the new Yugoslav sense was based on the fact that the new constitution was one of delegated and enumerated powers. Article 3 declared that "only those rights which are designated in the federal constitution belong" to the federal government. Similarly, republic governments had only powers enumerated in the republic constitutions. All other powers accrued to the local people's committees, which "are the basic organs of state authority of the working people." The theory was that the people directly gave the federal and republic governments their powers and they, through their elected representatives at the local level and by "direct participation" in local government, had all other authority. 13 These residual rights were expressed not only through government bodies, however, but also through worker-management organs. Article 2 of the constitution declared that "all power in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia belongs to the working people," expressed through both popularly elected organs and workers' councils, and Article 4 decreed that "social ownership of the

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THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

means of production, self-government by the producers of the economy, and self-government by the working people in the municipality, town, and district constitute the basis of social and political organization in the country." Although Yugoslav leaders tended to regard the governmental side of federalism as only formal, 14 numerous constitutional and other provisions stressed the importance of the republics. In an important sense, they had more autonomy than formerly. The legal authority of federal officials to intervene at will in republic affairs was limited by the new constitution, ending the hierarchical form of government under the 1946 constitution, 15 and republic participation in the planning process provided certain economic autonomy. Parliamentary representation for the republics was still provided for—the Council of Nationalities—although in a more restricted manner, and the areas of federal and republic legislative authority were defined carefully and in detail. 16 But the fiction of a constitutional right of separation from the federation—Soviet-fashion—had been abandoned, and there was in Kardelj's words, "a unified, social and political system," in which the supremacy of federal law was unquestioned. 17

THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY The composition of the Federal Assembly and the constitutional provisions regarding it illustrated some of the basic changes in the new Yugoslav system. Here were reflected not only the new concept of federalism but also the role of workermanagement in the society and the emphasis on local people's committees. The 1946 constitution created an assembly of two chambers: the Federal Council, representing all citizens, and the Council of Nationalities, representing the republics. The 1953 con-

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THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

stitution likewise provided for a bicameral assembly, but now the two houses were the Federal Council and an entirely new chamber, the Council of Producers. Yet the Council of Nationalities was retained, although in a different way. Every citizen of Yugoslavia voted for members of the Federal Council. Election—and recall, also—were by secret ballot for individual candidates—rather than the old system of lists —with one deputy elected for each 60,000 inhabitants. But in addition, the Federal Council included a set of deputies representing the republics and autonomous divisions and constituting the new Council of Nationalities. These deputies were elected by the executive bodies of the republics and divisions —ten from each of the six republics, six from the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and four from the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija, known as Kosmet. These deputies, representing in a sense vestigial institutional federalism, formed a separate Council of Nationalities within the Federal Council. Ordinarily they voted simply as individual members of the Federal Council, but on legislation involving constitutional changes, the federal economic plan, and other matters, they also sat separately as the Council of Nationalities. The implications for federalism in the Council of Nationalities and its powers were evident in the constitutional distinctions among the terms exclusive, basic, and general legislation. Exclusive legislation dealt with matters of federal jurisdiction, where, according to Article 16, the republics could not legislate unless specifically authorized to do so by federal law. Basic legislation involved areas where the republics could enact their own complementary laws, or legislate in the absence of federal law. General legislation "lays down principles for the related legislation of the people's republics and may be directly applied only if there exists no law of the people's republic." However, "the people's republic shall intro-

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THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL

SYSTEM

duce its own laws in conformity with the principles of the general law." Exclusive legislation, according to Article 15, included laws pertaining to "personal liberties and other basic rights of man and the citizen," social security, civil and penal codes, patents and copyrights, currency and credit, national defense, and foreign relations. Basic legislation was that concerning management of the economy, communications, public property and roads, budgets and taxes, family and marriages, "and measures of general interest to the entire country for the reduction of contagious diseases and for the protection of public health and life of the citizen." General legislation was that "in the field of the organization of authority, education and culture, public health and social policy, as well as in other fields which are of general interest for all the people's republics." Originally, under the constitution, the Council of Nationalities had to decide whether there was a need for any general legislation before it could be placed on the Federal Assembly's agenda and then, if it disagreed with the Federal Council's version, the matter in dispute was automatically killed for a year. In March, 1954, this provision was abolished.18 The Council of Nationalities still, however, retained a separate vote on constitutional questions and the federal economic plan, and, if it disagreed with the whole Federal Council, the latter was dissolved. Further the Council of Nationalities was authorized to "render decisions" on pending legislation affecting federal-republic relationships if such action was requested by a republic council, one of the houses of a republic assembly. As distinguished from the Council of Nationalities, the Council of Producers, directly representing workers, was a fullfledged, although not quite coequal, chamber. It consisted of deputies elected by workers in factories, craftsmen, and handi-

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THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

craft workers acting through their guilds and members of agricultural cooperatives. The number of deputies elected from each group was in proportion to their participation in the total "social product" of the country as specified by the annual economic plan, on the basis of one deputy to every 70,000 of "producers population." Councils of producers existed at federal, republic, and local levels. The original system, according to which members of all councils of producers were directly elected by workers, was changed. Under the method prevailing during and after 1954, election to the federal and republic producers' councils was indirect. Candidates were nominated by meetings of competent electors or by petition, but the elections were carried out by electoral boards consisting of the local producers' councils—district and town—in each electoral district. Members of local producers' councils continued to be elected directly. For electoral purposes in all instances there were only two groups, one including workers in industry, commerce, and crafts, and the other comprising members of agricultural cooperatives. Deputies of each group were elected separately, with members of electoral boards—in federal and republic elections—each having votes in proportion to the workers in his own electoral district. Although there was no provision respecting the number of candidates in federal and republic elections, in local elections the number of candidates had to be at least twice as large as the number of seats to be filled.19 The Council of Producers was held to be a "new institution," unknown in previous constitutional practices," 20 although the Yugoslavs referred to a "modified" form of economic representation provided for in the Weimar Constitution. 21 The theory of the producers' councils in Yugoslavia was that, as workers' councils gave workers control of factories so did producers' councils give them direct say in government. The councils were referred to as "an indispensable

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THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

factor in the political system of socialist democracy," which "represents the element and condition of the democratic character of the new political structure in Yugoslavia." 22 On all economic matters, including those dealing with the plan, budget, investment, wages, and taxation, it was a coequal body with the Federal Council. It further shared authority with the Federal Council on constitutional matters and election of federal officials, and it had exclusive authority "within limits fixed by law" to "render decisions" having the force of law regarding the work of economic enterprises, state organs, and self-governing institutions on matters of economy, labor, and social insurance. 23 However, the area of authority of the Council of Producers was limited. It was excluded by omission, for example, from legislating on all general legislation, much exclusive and basic legislation dealing with noneconomic matters, for example, civil rights, penal code, marriage and divorce, public health—and all international matters except "ratification of international treaties pertaining to economy, labor and social security." Save in areas specifically enumerated, the Federal Council wielded sole legislative authority (sometimes in connection with the Council of Nationalities). The Council of Producers could propose amendments to all legislation, including that respecting which the Federal Council had exclusive authority, although final action on such amendments was up to the Federal Council alone. In matters where both chambers participated on an equal footing, the constitution provided that an unresolved disagreement should result in automatic dissolution of the whole assembly and new election of members of both houses.24 The nature of the difference between the two houses was indicated by the fact that members of the Federal Council received a monthly salary—on the theory that membership in this chamber was a full-time occupation—whereas members of the Council of Producers, according to the constitution,

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THE N E W GOVERNMENTAL

SYSTEM

"perform their duties gratuitously," being entitled only to expenses and compensation for loss of earnings while acting as legislators. The Federal Council had nine permanent committees: foreign affairs, organization of authority and administration, national economy, social welfare and public health, education, budget, legislation, mandates-immunity, and applications and appeals. The Council of Producers had seven committees: national economy, economic organizations, labor and social insurance, budget, legislation, mandates-immunity, and petitions and appeals. Most work was done in committee, according to Mose Pijade, the late president of the Federal Assembly, and frequently the same committees of the two chambers worked jointly. Pijade proposed consolidation of the budget committees and the legislative committees—the latter of which work out actual texts of laws.25 In addition to the standing committees, the Assembly, under the constitution, named from members of both houses a joint, nine-man "Commission for Interpretation of Laws." At the request of a deputy, the Federal Supreme Court, or the executive council of a republic, the commission was authorized to make a "binding interpretation" which must subsequently, however, be confirmed by the Assembly. The Commission for Interpretation of Laws sat with its functions intact after dissolution of an assembly, until after a new election. The constitutional provisions respecting the Assembly made an interesting provision concerning the relationship of deputies to republic and local governments.26 Members of the Assembly were specifically granted the right to sit and deliberate —although not to vote—in the people's committees in the areas from which they were elected. They were specifically charged by the constitution to "inform the voters" regarding the work of the Assembly either directly or through the respective people's committee, and those deputies who formed

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the Council of Nationalities "are obliged" to report on their work and the work of the Assembly to the republic bodies. Further, people's committees were given the right to request information pertaining to legislative matters from their deputies in the Assembly as well as to transmit to the Assembly their opinions. THE EXECUTIVE The 1946 constitution provided for a parliamentary presidium "as a sort of intermediary organ between the Assembly and the government."27 It provided also for a council of ministers, as in the Soviet Union, and for ministries headed by members of the council. The ministries directed operations of both government and economy. In abolishing these institutions, the new constitution sought to "combine the best aspects of both separation and unity of executive powers and also separate executive powers from administrative power." 28 The framers considered that it thus achieved "the democratic principle of unity of state authority . . . under conditions when the socialist forces . . . are still waging a hard struggle against the enemies of socialism" and at the same time "safeguards against bureaucratism and undemocratic tendencies." 29 The executive organs were the president of the republic and the Federal Executive Council. Although separate, they were still considered "a collective form of the executive organ of the People's Assembly,"30 and the president was chairman of the council. The presidency was a powerful position. The president, representing the entire nation, had independent powers in addition to those involving his headship of the Federal Executive Council and such normal executive function as proclaiming laws, signing treaties, and receiving ambassadors. He had

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THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL

SYSTEM

authority to suspend temporarily acts of the Federal Executive Council, referring the matter to the Assembly. He was supreme commander of the armed forces and president of the National Defense Council, a ministerial body charged with military policy, members of which he nominated. The president was elected by the Assembly from among its members, although he had no vote in that body. He was "responsible for his work" to the Assembly and his term corresponded to that of the Assembly—four years. However, if the Assembly was dissolved, he remained in office until the election of a new president.31 The real governing body of Yugoslavia was the Federal Executive Council.32 Under the constitution, it had the right to decree its own organization and functions, which it did,33 with ensuing approval by the Assembly.34 It consisted of thirty-four members elected by the Assembly, plus the presidents of the executive councils of the republics as ex officio members. The council was charged with the enforcement of the Assembly's laws and of the constitution. It was authorized to issue decrees, regulations, decisions, and rules. These had the force of law as soon as signed by the president, but there must have been subsequent approval by the Assembly in most instances. The Executive Council might invalidate actions of the executive organs of the republics when they were counter to federal law, although the republic bodies might appeal to the Federal Assembly. The Executive Council also had "primary responsibility" for the budget and economic plan. It created economic enterprises, determined federal investment, supervised the judiciary, proclaimed a state of emergency, during which it might govern for a limited time without the Assembly, proclaimed general mobilization and state of war in the event of attack, and ratified international treaties and agreements "whose ratification is not effected by the Assembly."

lOO

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The organization of the Federal Executive Council was complex. Although it was a "collegiate body" and acted as a unit, it was divided into six permanent committees and two permanent commissions, which might be authorized to act on their own. The committees were coordination, interior, economic, educational social welfare and public health, and budget. The commissions were the administrative and the amnesty commissions. Of these bodies, the coordinating committee was most important. It consisted of the vice-president and secretary of the Executive Council, chairmen of other committees, the state secretaries (ministers) for national defense and foreign affairs, and the chairman of the national bank. The last three could be members ex officio, although the state secretaries were in fact members of the Executive Council in 1954. The coordinating committee in effect decided what business should come before the Executive Council and drafted formal acts adopted by it. The committees and commissions, consisting of from three to seven members, not including ex officio members, did practically all the formal work of the Executive Council, save final votes, which were decided by a majority of those present. There were also ad hoc "expert-administrative commissions," including both members of the Executive Council and outside experts, for study of various technical questions such as foreign-exchange rules. Only the four vice-presidents of the Executive Council were full-time employees, the others spending most of their time on various legislative or administrative activities. Some of them served as rapporteurs of a sort to follow the Executive Council's proposals through the legislative process in the Assembly, although the Executive Council often designated nonmember technical commissioners to represent it before Assembly committees. The four vice-presidents each had a cabinet, although the president utilized his own administrative establishment for Executive Council work.

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Although general policies were set by the Federal Executive Council's formal members, its real work, as far as government was concerned, was carried on by its twelve secretariats. These were the secretariats for legislation, economic affairs, industry, agriculture and forestry, transport and communications, social relations and labor, culture and education, public health, social insurance, justice, information, and general administration. Their work is discussed below. Perhaps the most important adjunct of the Federal Executive Council, however, was its Council for Legal Affairs. 35 This body in effect supervised the work of the secretariats as it concerned legislation, served the Assembly as a sort of adviser in drafting legislation, and also had the function of watching over operation of the courts and other bodies making legal decisions throughout all Yugoslavia. Consisting of top civil servants and justices of the Supreme Court, its head in 1957 was Jovan Djordjevic, the Belgrade professor of law who also served as chief of the secretariat for legislation and deputy to Kardelj.

THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION The 1953 constitution made a distinction between the executive organs of government—the president and Federal Executive Council—and the "federal organs of administration," as the state secretariats were called. In place of the numerous ministries that had existed previously, there were created only five state secretariats: foreign affairs, national defense, internal affairs, national economy, and budget and state administration. The latter two were later changed to secretariats for finance and for commodity trade. At the time the constitution was enacted, much was made of the distinction between executive organs and the administration. The former, it was contended, would discharge only "the

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political side" of government functions, whereas the administration's "jurisdiction is confined to the direct . . . implementation" of laws of the Assembly and of Federal Executive Council regulations "within the competence of the federal government." The state secretariats, it was stressed, have no "original political powers." 36 The concept was never clear. Article 94 of the constitution provided that the state secretariats "independently exercise the authority granted to them," but the secretaries were appointed and removed by the Federal Executive Council, worked under its supervision, and "may be obliged to submit their actions to the Council for preliminary approval." 37 Yugoslav spokesmen insisted, however, that the difference between the structure of the executive in 1946 and in 1953 "consists particularly" of this separation.38 This theory of the separation between the political and administrative side of executive functions emphasized a basic Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet system, namely, that "an independent bureaucracy" was able to create in the USSR "a state capitalist despotism and imperialist hegemony." 39 As Kardelj explained it at the time: By entrusting the Federal Executive Council with the political executive function and the federal administrative organs with the administration, the Fundamental Law endeavored to prevent the executive organs from becoming bureaucratic. Such negative changes occur when the political and administrative elements of the executive functions and administrative functions are united in a single body in the government or in its ministries. On the other hand, with the Federal Executive Council separated from everyday and practical work of administration, it will be easier and more efficient to carry out that creative work, study and preparation of general decisions, peaceful analysis and principal solutions, which a modern and particularly a socialist state requires from its highest executive organs. Under such conditions, the state administration will also strengthen its system of work and will devote

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Although the theory remained, the administrative reorganization of 1956 destroyed much of its basis. Under the earlier arrangement, the Federal Executive Council secretariats worked only within the Executive Council and had no legal status of their own. The 1956 reorganization laws gave them a legal status and formally included them within the "state administration." 41 Their function was now, in effect, to supervise the whole administrative system in Yugoslavia at all levels by seeing to it that the policies of the Federal Executive Council were understood and carried out. As Kardelj put it: Their task is to keep an eye on matters, to intervene within the framework of their powers and to submit to the Federal Executive Council proposals for prescriptions and measures when such a need arises. In addition, an exceptional importance is also attached to their functions along the line of affording expert help to the lower organs of administration.42

At the same time, it was stressed that the Federal Executive Council secretariats did not "possess that degree of independence which the constitution provides for the state secretariats but operate strictly within the framework of powers granted them by . . . the Federal Executive Council." The state secretariats, in other words, were full-fledged ministries, whereas the relatively small Federal Executive Council secretariats were concerned with areas "where federal administrative jurisdiction is a relatively small order." 43 To bolster further the concept of separation of policymaking from administration, the constitution specifically authorized an administrative disputes law under which suits could be filed by citizens against the state secretariats and their employees for damages resulting from unlawful activity. No suits could be filed against formal acts of the Federal 104

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Executive Council, but legal action against its secretariats and their members was authorized in the 1956 laws. In this way, it was held, Federal Executive Council activity was more restricted under the new organization than formerly. 44 The 1956 reorganization also made other changes. The Institute for Economic Planning and the Statistical Institute were placed directly under the Federal Executive Council. There was also provision made for "independent" federal committees, consisting of government officials and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, such as economic organizations. These were to have the same general status as state secretariats. Only one was in existence in 1957, a committee for foreign trade. It had broad powers for issuance of directives to government organs concerned with control of foreign trade. The reorganization further spelled out the organization of the state secretariats, also, providing for a series of "inspectorates" and administration, many of which already had existed. For example, the state secretariat for finance now had a financial inspectorate, a foreign-exchange inspectorate, and a federal revenue administration. The creation of these as formal administrative organs greatly broadened the authority of the federal government and its ability to enforce it. In addition, the 1956 laws drove a wedge into the separation of executive and legislative functions by now permitting members of the Assembly to serve as state secretaries and state undersecretaries. There was no indication, however, that this heralded the emergence of a parliamentary-type governmental structure. THE REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS The federal constitution also briefly outlined the form of government in the republics, but assumed that each republic would

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have its own constitution, filling in the details.45 Except that the republics had no independent president,46 structure of their governments closely followed the federal pattern. People's assemblies, consisting of republic councils and councils of producers, were declared to be the "highest organs of state authority in the people's republics." An executive council, consisting of from fifteen to thirty republic deputies, was elected by the republic assembly as the executive organ. It was headed by a president, who had power to withhold acts of the Executive Council and submit them to the Assembly for decision. Administrative functions were carried out by "republic state secretariats" responsible to the republic executive councils. These administrative organs were charged not only with execution of republic laws and acts of the republic councils but also with execution of federal laws and acts of the Federal Executive Council "when their execution is placed by federal law or regulation" in their hands. The constitution further. charged people's committees to "execute directly federal and republic laws and other acts" except where execution of such was legally placed within the sphere of competence of federal and republic administrative bodies. In addition to the six republics, the constitution made provision for the government of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija, both of which were attached to the republic of Serbia.47 Both areas were "ensured the rights of autonomy," but the "rights of autonomy are laid down by the constitution of the People's Republic of Serbia." The Serbian constitution also provided for organization of government in the autonomous areas and delimited their area of authority. Both areas were authorized to "enact independently their statutes . . . in conformity with the constitution of the people's republic of Serbia,"48 which they did.49 Following the 1956 reorganization, the re-

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public governments again accommodated themselves to the federal structure. THE CONSTITUTION IN OPERATION

The new constitution made no pretense at setting up a political democracy of the Western type. It had no bill of rights, in the American sense of creating areas that cannot be invaded by any political power, and the constitution itself could be altered by the Assembly, limited only by the rights of the republics expressed through the Council of Nationalities. Furthermore, the Assembly, when it decided there was an emergency, could postpone elections indefinitely. The personal guarantees contained in the constitution, only three in number, were general and unspecific: "Free association of the working people for the purpose of realizing democratic, political, economic, social, scientific, artistic, professional, athletic and other common interest. "Personal freedom and other basic rights of man. "The right to work." 50 Absent were such specific guarantees as are found, for example, in the Soviet constitution, of freedom of speech and religion. In short, the Yugoslav constitution did not, and did not pretend, to protect minority rights. This was apparently what Kardelj meant when he said one of the major characteristics of the constitution was "revolutionary sincerity and alertness." Explaining that concept, apparently with an eye to the meaninglessness of guarantees of political liberties in the Soviet constitution, Kardelj said: This is an open, honest and sincere way of treating our reality without tendencies of embellishment or romantic dashing forward, but with a live revolutionary alertness toward the dangers of hostile acts against our revolutionary and socialist achievements. To the extent to which the [Fundamental]

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Law aspires toward the broadest democratic forms . . . it is equally clear with respect to the means . . . for suppressing the persistence of antisocialist forces to destroy by force that which our working people have won with their blood and great heroic efforts. Such counterrevolutionary actions will not be permitted. . . . Naturally the Law has had to provide also for the possibility of intervention by the highest state and social organs . . . where the interest of the socialist progress suffers because of low social consciousness or because of political or socioeconomic backwardness. In brief, the fundamental law reflects in every respect our concrete social and political reality; it hides nothing and embellishes nothing. . . ,B1 Although in fact the government operated formally quite closely within the pattern created by the constitution, despite Kardelj's view the predominant role of the Communist party and the Yugoslav view of law and society in general often made formal operation and reality two different things. There was no question, for example, that Tito had power and authority in fact way beyond that provided for the president of the republic. For the most part, however, this resulted not from violation or even disregard of the constitution but from Tito's role as head of the Communist party and the unquestioned leader of a successful revolutionary movement. This is to say, Tito did not override the Federal Executive Council or coerce members of the Assembly; they simply agreed with him. A pertinent factor, of course, was the manner in which elections and the whole concept of popular participation in governmental processes were carried out. This is discussed below. 52 Suffice it here only to say that the constitution did not tell the whole story. Similarly, it was true that the Federal Executive Council was the real source of governmental action rather than the Assembly. In fact, all laws adopted by the Assembly during its first year of operation under the new constitution were

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drafted in the Federal Executive Council and adopted without formal dissent.53 The general legislative pattern was for the Executive Council to prepare a predlog, or proposition, and submit it to the Assembly for an uredba, or decision. Pijade complained that these propositions were in the form of complete laws already drafted, "on the theory that this would speed up work in the adoption of laws." He denied, however, that it had this result and declared that "this practice must be stopped." 54 This did not seem likely, however, to affect the influence of the Federal Executive Council, which arose not only from its position in the government but possibly even more from the fact that all but two of its members were members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists and, if Tito was included, six of its members sat on the Politburo, or Executive Committee. Neither the authority exercised by President Tito nor the leading role of the Federal Executive Council vis-à-vis the Assembly could really be said to violate Kardelj's percept of "revolutionary sincerity." Although one might question whether the same could be said for the relationship of the Federal Executive Council to the administrative departments, the 1956 reorganization brought the formal structure—if not the theory—into line with the reality. This reorganization all but negated the separation of executive and administrative functions if, in fact, it had ever really existed. To a considerable extent, decisions clearly administrative in character often emanated from the Executive Council even before 1956.55 Furthermore, there was an unofficially recognized division of responsibility among certain members of the Federal Executive Council for some of the very areas that theoretically were in the jurisdiction of the state secretariats. It was understood by all, for example, that Kardelj played a considerable part in the administration of foreign affairs and that Rankovic supervised certain functions of the state secretariat of internal

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affairs. 58 Vukmanovic-Tempo had taken an active hand in the trade and finance secretariats. On the other hand, Ivan Gosnjak, the state secretary for national defense, was also a member of the Federal Executive Council, and direct interference in that secretariat is said not to have occurred. From the start, of course, Yugoslav officials themselves indicated that the separation of policy-making and administration was more theoretical than practical. Professor Djordjevic, for example, compared the relationship of the Federal Executive Council and the state secretariats to that between the President of the United States and the executive departments. 57 And Kardelj, at the same time he asserted that "the direct responsibility of the . . . federal administration to the Federal Executive Council . . . in no way minimizes the political significance of the federal administrative organs," declared that the separation was only "the symbol of the victory of the working masses of Yugoslavia over state-capitalist tendencies and bureaucratic forms." 58 To an even greater extent than the executive, the Federal Assembly in operation was, as Pijade admitted, "not all as yet as envisaged" by the constitution. It would take "four years, if not more," he said in 1954, for it to work as it should. 59 It was clear from the shortcomings listed by Pijade that the Assembly did not operate as legislative bodies in the West generally do. During the first year of operation of the new Assembly, no member raised questions pertaining to affairs in his constituency. Time provided for general questions—as in the British Parliament—was almost unused, and there was little discussion of matters aside from technical provisions of laws under consideration. There was evidence of disinterest in proceedings among many deputies. Rather than studying legal projects, committees reports, and minutes of the Assembly, Pijade said, "unfortunately, a fair number of deputies leave the material on the benches where they sit." One ques-

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tion that was frequently asked, according to the late president of the Assembly, was, "How long will some session last?" On the other hand, a collective interview with a number of deputies arranged by Borba revealed that, in the manner of legislators everywhere, the deputies in Yugoslavia were under pressure from their constituents for favors. Sometimes, for instance, "they intervene in the Executive Council or the Institute for Planning . . . not for the preservation and protection of legality but solving some personal questions which were sometimes even against the law." This problem was made more acute by the fact that members of the Federal Assembly were often also members of the republic assembly and of local people's committees. Such a deputy, Borba commented, "easily becomes a localist and . . . subordinates the deputy's function to his own function." 60 It was possible that the bicameral and federal character of the Assembly would be altered. Most actual legislating was carried on by the Federal Council. The Council of Producers did on occasion sit separately and always voted by itself, but joint meetings were more the rule than the exception. Pijade's proposal for combining the budget and legislative committees of the two chambers has already been mentioned. There was also, apparently, a problem regarding attendance of Council of Producers deputies, since they were unpaid and ordinarily engaged on full-time jobs. Pijade spoke of "the too great engagement of their members in the economy" and of difficulties that "arise if they have to spend much of their time in the Assembly." This problem, he said, was "still being studied and . . . should be settled in a way that the character and the jurisdiction of this important house be in no way infringed upon." 61 The Council of Nationalities was regarded as expedient, but a bothersome expedient. Pijade referred to it as "formal, purely principled . . . only of historical importance," but with "enor-

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mous moral political value and strength as a principle which is always lively and creative, present everywhere." 62 Especially troublesome to Pijade was the constitutional provision calling for dissolution of the Federal Council when there was disagreement with the Council of Nationalities over questions relating to the constitution or the federal plan. Such dissolution, he declared, "is in no way justified." Similarly, Pijade opposed the provision calling for dissolution of the Assembly where the Council of Producers disagrees with the Federal Council. The solution should not be dissolution but submission of disputed questions to the electorate for a referendum. A dispute involving the Council of Nationalities was, as a matter of fact, "an impossibility," Pijade said frankly, but he contended that, although here had been no disagreement between the Federal Council and the Council of Producers this is no sign there might not be. 83 The Federal Council of Producers represented one of the striking anomalies of the Yugoslav system, not so much in its operations as in the method of its election. Although the constitution did not literally conceal the real nature of the Council of Producers, the implication of its provisions, unless studied with utmost care and thought, could be seriously misleading. According to the constitution, the Council of Producers consisted of deputies "elected by the producers engaged in production, transport and commerce in proportion to the participation of the respective economic sectors in the total social product of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." More than 60 per cent of the total population of Yugoslavia was engaged in the practice of agriculture in one form or another. 64 Agriculture, despite the drive for industrialization, remained the single most important economic activity in Yugoslavia. When agriculture prospers, so does the country; when it does not, neither does the country. Yet the "producers" represented in the Federal Council of Producers were

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to a considerable extent not the real agricultural producers, the private peasants. This was so for two reasons: First, representation in the respective segments of the economy in the producers' council, according to the constitution, depended on their contribution to the "total social product" of the country, as determined by the federal government. In part because of droughts, agricultural output was comparatively low. In addition, however, government computations, based on official price lists, resulted in depressing agriculture's share of "total social product." In 1954, for example, it was put at around 33 per cent. 65 Second, the members of the Council of Producers, according to Article 28 of the constitution, were elected "by the workers and employees of economic enterprises and by members of agricultural cooperatives. . . ." The "decollectivization" of agriculture and the abandonment of the Soviet-type kolkhoz as a goal for Yugoslav agriculture meant that a considerable number of peasants were outside cooperatives of any sort, although a majority of them probably belonged to the so-called general cooperatives. Those "unaffiliated" peasants, of course, could not participate in elections for the Council of Producers, and even those in general cooperatives were represented more often by administrators and technicians than by real peasants. 66 This discrimination against peasants was reflected in the fact that in 1954 out of the 202 members of the Federal Council of Producers, 135 represented industry and 67 represented agriculture. Out of 504 members of republic councils of producers, 335 represented industry as against 169 for agriculture. 67 This is roughly the inverse of the ratio of the two groups in population. Although neither complete abandonment of collectivization nor the end of discrimination against private peasants had been fully decided on at the time of adoption of the constitu-

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SYSTEM

tion, the framers apparently recognized that the question of peasant representation would arise. "Objections of another kind have also been made," Kardelj admitted to the Assembly in discussing the Council of Producers. "Some say that the concept of producer has been established in too narrow a manner and that one part of the population has been proclaimed unjustly as nonproducer." 68 But both Kardelj and other Yugoslav officials had still to address themselves to the problem posed by these objections. The fact that the activity of the underrepresented majority of the producers of the country—agriculture—continued to be the most critical sector of the Yugoslav economy cast doubts on the validity of Kardelj s further statement that "this question has no practical importance whatsoever." 69 In 1957, it was still too early to say to what extent practice would ultimately diverge from constitutional theory or provision. Generally speaking, however, it was clear that government under the new constitution was different from that under the old. The sweeping reduction in federal agencies and personnel—federal administrative employees were cut by more than a third—was in itself important.70 The decentralization provisions were in effect and were significant especially in regard to local government.71 But to a considerable extent the decentralization clauses of the constitution, as well as those relating to worker-management, more nearly described what had already been done than charted new paths. And the accompanying relaxation of totalitarianism perhaps basically stemmed more from the new psychological approach to communism than from laws and institutions.72 Still, however, the constitutional changes were a new departure away from authoritarianism. If in the future they did in fact govern Yugoslav officialdom in practice and theory, they might show, as Kardelj has claimed, that "with our deeds 114

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we are proving step by step . . . that democracy is not a monopoly of capitalism. . . . " 7 3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The new structure of government in Yugoslavia, outlined in the constitution of 1953, departed in several significant respects from the previous Soviet-type organization and generally followed out the new Yugoslav theories on democratic socialism. Although formally a federal state and maintaining the federal structure, Yugoslav institutional federalism was now regarded as chiefly formal and a historic and political necessity growing out of the complex national question. To some extent, however, the republics had more real autonomy than formerly and now participated in the economic planning process. The theory of the constitution was that both federal and republic governments have delegated powers only, and the area of legislative authority accruing to each was carefully defined. But the idea of sovereign republics had been abandoned, and the emphasis was on national unity based on socialist principles. The nature of Yugoslav federalism could have been seen in the new organization of the Federal Assembly, where the body representing the republics—the Council of Nationalities—sat only as a part of the Federal Council, although retaining some individuality and authority. The second chamber of the Assembly was now the Council of Producers, representing workers. In actual operation, the Council of Producers tended to represent more industrial workers than peasants, who still constituted the majority of the population. This resulted both from arbitrary decisions regarding the contribution of agriculture to economic production and to the fact that, since

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the abandonment of collectivization, there was an increase of the number of peasants outside of cooperatives. The refusal of the Yugoslav leadership to face up to the serious problem involved in this discrimination was indicative of the difficulty the doctrinaire Communist mind has in adjusting itself to the important role of the private peasant. The president of the republic and the Federal Executive Council—both chosen by the Assembly—constituted the executive and were the real governing authorities of the country, exercising power in fact beyond their constitutional role because of the leading position of Tito and other incumbents in the Communist party. The Executive Council more or less dominated the Assembly, which had yet to assert itself as an independent legislative force. An important constitutional principle was the separation of the executive function—performed by the president and the Federal Executive Council—from the administrative functions—performed by the state secretariats. The Yugoslavs held that the merger of these functions was responsible for "Soviet bureaucratic state capitalism." It may well be that the Yugoslavs actually thought in 1953 that they could make such a separation, but by 1956 they had more or less abandoned the idea. Although some remnants of the concept remained, in fact executive organs intervened at will in administrative functions. The concept of separation of executive and administrative functions, and the difference with the Soviet Union on this point, therefore, appeared to be more theoretical than real, although one could not claim that the theoretical factor was totally without significance. Generally speaking, the Yugoslav constitution made no pretentions toward establishing a political democracy of the Western type and did not attempt to guarantee minority rights, as the Soviet constitution did. Yugoslav theorists said this was an example of their "revolutionary sincerity."

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It was still too early to say how the constitution would develop. Many of its provisions had a real impact on government, especially those providing for a decentralization of functions. Although the constitution did create a pattern for a government that might be socialist and still not totalitarian, the real development in this direction probably reflected the new, liberalized psychology of the Yugoslav Communists more than formal laws and institutions.

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VI

management and

control of the economy ACCORDING TO MARXIST THEORY,

ownerships of the means of production is the determining factor in any society. The Yugoslav revisionists had declared that it is not only formal ownership that counts but control as well.1 They insisted that the major difference between their new system and the Soviet system lay in this point.2 The decentralized economy and system of worker-management of industry that developed in Yugoslavia since 1950 were perhaps the most unique and interesting—and important— characteristics of Tito's brand of communism. Even before the end of hostilities, the Tito government had seized major industries within its writ, and by the end of 1945 the major means of production in Yugoslavia were under government control in fact if not in legal theory.8 The com-

MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY

pletion of the expropriation of industry and the legalization of national ownership were voted by the Assembly in December, 1946.4 Certain smaller factories remained in private hands technically until the second nationalization law of April, 1948.5 Even at the time of the 1946 law, however, the economy was completely planned and directed by the federal government in Belgrade. Generally speaking, the operation of the planned Yugloslav economy followed in some detail the practices of the Soviet Union. The top governmental planning body, the Central Planning Commission, charted all production and distribution. Specific factories were organized into industrial associations —mining, light industry, machine tools, and so on—and these were under the direct control of federal ministries. The ministries appointed all industrial officials, including plant directors, and dictated their activities. The plan set forth detailed figures for production in the various industrial categories and, through the industrial associations, assigned subplans to individual factories. The budget and a financial plan provided needed funds, using the dinar, as the ruble is used in the USSR, as a sort of bookkeeping control mechanism. Rigid controls fixed not only production but prices, wages, and investments, and profits, over and above those planned, were returned to the federal treasury. All plans, either adopted by the Assembly or enacted by decree, had the force of law. Under this system, workers, although told that they owned the factories through the proletarian state, had no voice in their operations. Nor did the managers themselves have any real initiative in most matters, so complete were state controls.6 Post-Cominform Yugoslav theory held that this is a form of socialism, because industry is nationalized, but "only the first and lowest form." 7 No progress toward communism could be made unless there was development away from state ownership, and where there was no progress, this "first and lowest 119

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form" of socialism degenerated into "bureaucratic state capitalism," exploiting workers by retaining the surplus value of their production in the same way as under capitalism. In this instance, the state would not "wither away," as it must under socialism, but, as in the Soviet Union, would become bigger and bigger. This, according to the Yugoslavs, is not true Marxism at all but a deviation therefrom. 8 With this theoretical reasoning, the Yugoslavs began their decentralization reforms in 1950. The kingbolt of the process was the new system of worker-management of industry. Worker-management was then followed by a sweeping decentralization of state economic controls and planning. WORKERS' COUNCILS

The first law on worker-management, entitled the "General Law on Management of Government Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Workers' Collectives," was enacted on July 2, 1950.9 The essence of the law was the creation in each factory of a workers' council, elected by the workers, with authority to manage the plant. Tito hailed the law as, next to the original socialization of industry, "the most significant historical act of the National Assembly" and as "one of the most democratic acts that we have passed so far." The law, he declared, "reflects socialist reality." 10 Kardelj has described the institution of workers' councils as the turning point in socialism. It is, he said: . . . 'that finally discovered political form' under which the economic liberation of work was possible to be achieved, which Karl Marx said for the commune at one time. . . . The working class with workers' councils does not only liberate itself from capitalists, but in its economic and socially conscious impulsive action becomes independent also from the state administrative apparatus, that is to say, it turned

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this apparatus into its own weapon. In it lies in the first place the great historical importance of the working class.11 In the workers' council, added Kardelj, "we have the instrument for the withering away of the state and the achievement of communism."12 The first law on worker-management was something of a bridge between the old and new systems. It was amended and revised during its first four years of operation, although the basic provisions regarding workers' councils remained unchanged. Particularly as the decentralization of the economy proceeded, the area of competence of the councils widened. According to the law, "factories, mines, transport, commercial, agricultural, communal and other state enterprises, as the common property of the whole nations, are in the name of the social community administered by their working staffs within the framework of the state economic plan and on the basis of rights and duties established by law or other legal prescription." 13 The workers' council was given responsibility for operations in general, but it was to elect a management board from amongst its members. The management board, together with the manager, was actually to administer the enterprise. A workers' council consisted of from 15 to 120 members, depending on the size of the enterprise, and in factories employing less than thirty persons the council embraced the entire working force. The councils were given three major types of functions: 1. To elect and watch over the management board, which acts as its executive committee in running the factory. It may dismiss the entire management board, or any of its members, and it must ratify "important decisions" taken by the board. 2. To draw up over-all basic plans for operation and to supervise the final balance sheet of the enterprise.

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3. To distribute that portion of a factory's income left over after "fixed charges" have been taken care of. Any worker might run for election to the workers' council, according to the law. To be nominated, he had to secure signatures of at least 5 per cent of the workers in his factory. Groups of workers of this size or larger might propose lists of candidates. The most important method of nomination, however, was nomination by the Sindikat, the national tradeunion organization. Although the law gave no special privileges to the Sindikat, the function of the trade-union organization as a nominating agency was mentioned specifically in the law, and in fact nominations were made by the union almost entirely. Election, according to Article 20, was by "general, equal and direct suffrage, and by secret vote," and the term of office was for a year. The management board's membership ranged from three to seventeen, depending on the size of the workers' council. At least three-quarters of the membership had to be actual workers "directly engaged in production, or otherwise in the basic productive activity of the enterprise." The manager, however, was an ex officio member of the board and sat with it in all meetings, although he did not have a vote. The management board was charged with working out proposals for the enterprise's basic plan, issuing monthly plans, setting wages, hours, conditions of work, and generally presiding over the operations of the plant. These basic features of the new system enacted by the basic law remained unchanged through 1957. Other parts of this first measure were altered considerably. The law of 1950 provided for organization of various factories in a given industry to be organized in a "higher economic association." Under its provisions, all workers in a higher economic as-

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sociation also elected a workers' council, which in turn elected a management board for the entire industry. In this earlier system, the chain of command and progressive responsibilities were unclear in several important particulars. For example, the management board of a higher economic association was charged with the selection of directors for individual factories within the industry. Individual workers' councils and management boards could "propose" removal of directors to the higher association management board. But the director was "responsible" to (a) the management board of his factory, (b) the management board of the higher economic association which appointed him, and (c) the government-appointed manager of the entire industry unit. At the same time, "workers and employees of an enterprise" were "responsible for their work in the enterprise to the director," who might appeal decisions of the workers' council or management board to the management board of the higher economic association. At the industry-wide level, the detailed functions of management boards were not specified, except for the appointment of factory directors and hearing appeals from the factory workers' councils and management boards. Similarly, the functions of the state-appointed industry managers were not spelled out. In the event of conflict between these managers and the industry-wide management boards, appeal could be had to federal agencies. 14 The 1950 law on workermanagement was preceded by a decree abolishing federal ministries dealing with industry and setting up in their place a series of councils, boards, and committees consisting of federal and republic ministers and the various industry-wide managers. The precise powers of these new bodies were not specified. 15 It may be that, with a view to later changes, these legal provisions creating a hierarchy in the worker-

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management system were intentionally vague. Certainly it is true that in one sense they permitted something of a gradual transition to more complete decentralization. However that may be, the higher, economic associations and the complex system of councils and boards soon proved to be so ambiguous and cumbersome as to be unworkable. 16 Under a series of enactments in 1952 and 1953,17 the higher economic associations and governing councils and boards were completely eliminated. Each factory was constituted a selfgoverning unit unto itself, except so far as it was subject to the jurisdiction of people's committees, that is, local governments. As before, employees elected a workers' council, and the workers' council elected a management board. Terms of office for members of each body were now fixed at one year, with the proviso that only one-third of the members of a management board could be reëlected. Except for hiring and firing of the plant director, the workers' management bodies in each enterprise were virtually autonomous. Within the limits of laws of general application, they were empowered to determine their production and investment, sales practices, working arrangements, prices, and wages. Even in connection with hiring and firing of directors— especially in connection with the latter—the workers' councils had broad powers. Plant directors were appointed—often after a competitive examination—by special commissions consisting of representatives of the workers' council, the producers' council with jurisdiction, and the industry-wide chamber representing all workers' councils for the entire industry involved. Members of the workers' council had to constitute at least a third of the commission's membership. The commissions were nominated by the local people's committee, except in the largest and most important enterprises, where they were formed on the initiative of the Federal Executive Council or republic execu124

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tive councils. Appointment was confirmed by the appropriate people's committee. The procedure for dismissing a plant director was as follows: the workers' council first petitioned the local people's committee. The question was then put up to a commission. If the commission decided against firing the director but the workers' council continued to insist on it, then the people's committee might order election of a new workers' council. If the new workers' council again demanded the director's dismissal, it then had to be ordered by the people's committee. 18 The new system retained some of the ambiguity of the old as far as the director's position was concerned. The director was the "highest employee in the enterprise," and "in conformity with decisions" of the workers' council and the management board, he "independently settles current problems. He was entrusted with the task of seeing to it that the enterprise adheres to law in its work and fulfills the legal regulations." He was authorized to "take any measures necessary for execution of the proper work of the enterprise" when in his opinion the management board failed to act where it should. Economic enterprises, according to Yugoslav law, were "social property." They were "nationally owned" but not statemanaged. 19 Each enterprise was affiliated with a people's committee, which was responsible for its general conduct and to which it must pay taxes.20 Enterprises could be created in three ways: (1) by the federal government, where the enterprise was a major one and a part of the over-all federal investment plan; (2) by the republic governments, in instances where republic-wide operations were envisaged; and (3) by local people's committees. In each instance the procedure was the same. 21 There was first established an "investors' group," which was financed by government funds and charged with creating the plant and necessary organization. Ordinarily investors' groups were 125

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headed by contracting firms, which made creation of new enterprises a business and included various production specialists who would later take over operations. When the physical plant and basic organization were completed, the government body in question reconstituted the investors' group as a "collective." The first task of the collective was then to elect the worker-management organs and appoint a director. The enterprise then had its legal liason with the local government (people's committee) in the area it was located in, regardless of which government body created it. In larger enterprises, which might have branches in different localities, the enterprise as a whole continued its responsibility for over-all operations, but each part still had a direct liason with its respective local government. This meant it must pay taxes to the local people's committee, work with it in connection with appointment and dismissal of managers, and is subject to it for application of various federal and republic laws. The federal and republic governments, of course, retained a larger degree of supervision over the few really large producing units.22 CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE Although each enterprise was in fact a self-governing unit, there was after 1954 a gradual reintroduction of the idea of industry-wide organizations, albeit on a more or less informal and extralegal basis. These were the so-called chambers of commerce and associations of enterprises, consisting of representatives of workers' councils in a given economic sector. These "vertically linked, self-governing associations" were created, according to Kardelj, to "fill a certain vacuum in our economic system." 23 They existed for various branches of industry, transport, agriculture, construction, foreign trade, and selling and catering, and by 1957 had covered virtually all economic activity in Yugoslavia.24 Affiliation with the chambers was not compulsory for any

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enterprise—except those engaged in foreign trade—but only a few enterprises failed to belong to one or another of them. Their function was to take a national view of economic problems and make recommendations to individual enterprises. Their decisions were not legally binding on the individual worker-management bodies, although in fact they exercised a growing influence; there were ever fewer instances where views of the chambers were deliberately flouted. Whereas membership in the chambers was often restraining, it was also often highly advantageous for individual enterprises, especially the smaller one, since it provided a means of exchanging experiences and ideas and an opportunity of benefiting from industry-wide promotional activities that were beyond the means of any one producing unit. DECENTRALIZED PLANNING It could be seen from the broad powers given the workers' councils that the Yugoslav economy had many of the characteristics of a free-market economy. Yet it was at the same time a planned, socialist economy. The new planning system did not involve a rigid, central plan, as in the USSR, which prescribes in detail compulsory amounts of all commodities to be produced as well as fixing prices and wages. The Federal Planning Institute (formerly the Central Planning Commission) did work out statistically a set of desired production goals of key items in the economy. It arrived at these figures after conferences with planning officials of republics, people's committees, and workers' councils. These were hoped-for and desired production goals, but the production figures, unlike under the Soviet method, did not have the force of law and were not legally binding on an enterprise. The actual production plan itself contained merely the over-all figures for the whole country.25 Where individual enterprises failed to meet the production 127

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provided for in their own plans, however, the law gave the supervising governmental unit—usually the people's committees—authority to regulate them in various ways. This authority extended all the way from specifying types and quantities of production, price-fixing, and financial regulation to appointing a temporary administrator to manage the enterprise and, in extreme cases, even to liquidation. Although the authority was infrequently invoked, it was clear that to enjoy their autonomy enterprises had to be run on a businesslike basis. The plans were limited to one year, as far as actual application was concerned. In 1955, there was some demand for longer-range planning also, and federal planning experts devised the idea of a "general prospective plan," based on future anticipations. In 1957 this appeared in the form of a "five-year plan," but it had little relation to the former, Soviet-type fiveyear plan, which the head of the Federal Planning Institute held to be impossible under the decentralized economic system. 26 The heart of the annual social plan was the part called "basic proportions." These were a set of governmental controls, for the most part indirect, designed to affect the economy in such a way that the desired production would be achieved. The basic proportions included the following: 1. Direct investment. This was investment in new industry directly handled by the federal government so that necessary new factories would be constructed. 2. Control of interest rates. This involved a set rate of interest which all enterprises had to pay on fixed assets, and regulations for borrowing new capital, according to types of industries. 3. A sliding scale turnover tax (levied on production) for equating supply and demand and helping channel investment. 4. Taxes designed to keep wages from getting too high and certain guarantees of "average minimum" wages.

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5. Provisions for ceiling prices in "monopoly" industries. 6. Regulation of foreign trade. These basic proportions, worked out by the Federal Planning Institute at the direction of the Federal Executive Council, were enacted into law by the Assembly as the major features of the annual social plan. They were administered by the state secretariat for finance and the national bank. Since all government investment and much of that of individual firms was in the form of bank credit, the national bank played a leading role in the decentralized planning system. It had the right to audit books of any enterprise. It performed the function of collecting compulsory federal and other governmental payments, and all economic organizations were bound by law to make periodic reports to the bank on income and its distribution. 27 The inspectorates of the state secretariats also made reports on various industrial operations, but there was nothing like the elaborate "organs of verification" of the Soviet system. Federal measures for control of investment were regarded as the most important feature of the plan. The plan itself contained figures for total investment in the country, including that made directly by the federal government, from the republic and local governments, and also from individual factories. Only the figures for federal investment were legally binding, however, as far as the plan was concerned. The other figures technically were estimates only, based on reports of planned investment from the other units. These consisted in the first instance of investment planned by individual workers' councils. This was correlated by people's committees, then by republic planning commissions and finally by the Federal Planning Institute. Where nonfederal investment estimates were considered unduly low or high, the federal experts had to rely on persuasion. A staff of federal economists of the Planning Institute was kept constantly at work conferring with republic, local, and factory officials.

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After the decentralized system went into operation in 1950, more than half the total investment came directly from the federal government, and the remainder came from republic and local governments and individual plants.28 The 1954 plan, however, provided for an increase in the proportion of nonfederal investment.29 It was based on a total investment fund of 340 billion dinars, from the following sources: 1. Directed investment, from the federal treasury, for new industrial projects—110 billion dinars. 2. Investment by republic and city government—chiefly for schools, hospitals, roads, and so on—60 billion dinars. 3. Amortization investment paid by individual enterprises into their own investment funds—130 billion dinars. 4. New investment by individual enterprises—40 billion dinars. New capital was provided out of a general investment fund in the national bank, which was financed by charges on fixed assets paid by all enterprises. The bank, at the direction of the secretariat for the economy—based on desired production goals and plans of various workers' councils—made available fixed amounts of credit for certain categories of industry. Individual enterprises then bid for these funds, the rate of interest being determined by supply and demand but repayment terms varying from industry to industry, according to what products the government wishes to promote.30 For example, in 1954, 4 billion dinars were made available out of the general investment fund for housing construction. Ten firms, each seeking 50 million dinars, offered a rate of 5 per cent. Five firms, each seeking 250 million, offered 4 per cent. Fifteen firms, each seeking 150 million, offered 3 per cent. Twenty firms, each seeking 5 million, offered 2 per cent. Ten firms, each asking 2 million, offered 1 per cent. Since only 4 billion dinars were available, and since the highest bidders were entitled to it, the firms offering less than 3 per cent re-

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firms

Total dinars asked

Per cent offered

500,000,000 1,250,000,000 2,250,000,000 120,000,000

5 4 3 1-2

The bank named special ad hoc commissions of experts for each bidding to examine the technical competency of the applicants, and the bank itself must approve the firms' solvency. Short-term credit was granted under the same system of bidding, except that where applications for loans offering to pay the going rate of interest were underwritten by local people's committees—as they invariably were—the bank had no alternative to a grant of credit. Many people's committees in fact guaranteed loans in excess of their own total funds. T o stop this practice and help to curb excessive credit, the Federal Executive Council decreed in 1955 that such guarantors must deposit with the bank a percentage of each loan granted.32 Each enterprise must "stay out of the red." The law provided that factories "repeatedly failing to meet obligations" might have a compulsory management board appointed for them and "are liable to liquidation." The obligations included operating expenses, interest payments on fixed assets, payments into a depreciation fund, repayment of loans, taxes, and wages. From its total receipts, a plant was first to cover operating expenses. It then committed itself—vis-à-vis the local government—to cover depreciation on both maintenance and fixed

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assets. Next it paid the annual federal charge on its fixed assets. In 1954, this was 6 per cent. After that, it had to pay the federal turnover tax. The remainder was termed the "income of the enterprise." From its income, a factory had first to cover "minimum" wages according to its wage-rate schedule, plus a social security tax on its total wage fund. In 1954 this was fixed at 45 per cent. The amount now left was called "profit." On this, an enterprise had to pay a federal profits tax, which under the 1955 plan was 50 per cent. The local people's committee then decided, by taxes, what part of the remainder may be kept by the plant, and this was disposed of as the workers' council saw fit.33 The wage system in Yugoslavia was complicated, in part because it was still evolving. Up to 1954, the Federal Planning Institute worked out with representatives of industry an "average maximum" wage beyond which wages could not go without the total wage fund being subject to sliding-scale taxes that could be as high as 90 per cent. These taxes were levied by people's committees. Under a new series of wage decrees in connection with the 1955 plan, however, these penalty taxes were eliminated. Local government taxes became the sole restriction on the size of wage funds. 34 In addition, over-all pay scales for various categories of work were proposed on an industry-wide basis by the chambers of commerce, and something like norms for individual workers, mapped out by the workers' council in each plant, according to figures adopted by the industry-wide body, determined the extent to which each worker might participate in any increase above the "maximums" in a given enterprise. 35 The problem also was under continuing study by a federal wages commission. The social plan set "average minimum" wages for various types of industry. This minimum constituted the wages of the lowest-paid worker who met all the requirements, such as time in job, experience, actual production, and so on. Since some work132

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ers in each plant usually did not meet all the requirements, some received a wage less than the minimum. The minimum was paid before "profits" were calculated, and depending on total receipts and taxes—especially local taxes—actual total payments to workers might be considerably above the minimum. But if no "profit" accrued, then only the minimum was paid. Where a plant failed to realize sufficient income to pay minimum wages, the national bank was authorized to loan the enterprise up to 80 per cent of the total amount needed to pay the "minimum"—which was a flat figure specified for an entire industry. Wages were then paid to workers according to a scale, so that workers who in fact would have received less than the industry-wide minimum would in fact receive even less than 80 per cent of the minimum. An actual example may help clarify the minimum-wage policy. In 1953, the "average minimum" wage for the mining industry was set at 9,000 dinars a month. One particular mine, employing a thousand workers, had certain employees receiving wages as low as 7,000 dinars a month. Owing to cave-ins and other difficulties, this mine had virtually no income for April, 1953. It was accordingly advanced 7,200,000 dinars (80 per cent of 9,000 for 1,000 employees) by the bank. Actual payment scales worked out so that the 7,000-dinar-a-month employees received only 4,300 dinars for April.36 State trading had been abolished in Yugoslavia, and foreign trade was carried on by individual enterprises, subject to a set of complicated government regulations. Any factory might export and import, although actually the bulk of foreign operations were carried on by about twenty big export-import organizations. The secretariat for the economy was empowered to prohibit certain exports and maintain a monthly "contingent list," which set export quotas of certain commodities.37 The big problem in foreign trade was foreign exchange, of which Yugoslavia was chronically short. Under the law, pro-

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ceeds from exports were handled this way: half of the proceeds were turned in immediately at the conclusion of the sale to the national bank, where the foreign currency was changed for dinars at the official rate of 300 to a dollar. The other half could be exchanged at a "free rate." The free rate, fixed by the bank at approximately the true relation of the dinar to the dollar, fluctuated around 900 dinars to the dollar after the 1951 devaluation. Before the exchange of the second half was made, the exporting firm might for a two-month period use it for purchases abroad and might, for even a long period, with the bank's permission, keep it in an account in a foreign bank. In addition to imports by firms paying with the proceeds from exports, imports were financed either by purchasing foreign exchange at the bank at the "quota rate" or by direct barter with foreign firms. Imports were, of course, greatly limited by tariffs usually so high as to be prohibitive. In practice, most raw material transactions were handled by the bank, which furnished foreign exchange at special low rates for purchase of needed items.38 An interesting sidelight to the foreign trade policy was the manner of distribution of goods purchased—by a special commission—with financial aid from the United States and other countries. Such goods were auctioned off—in dinars—to the highest bidder among Yugoslav firms.39 PARTY-UNION CONTROL Some of the difficulties in Yugoslavia's decentralized economy resulting from the autonomy given to individual producing units are described below. That these were not more serious was due to a considerable extent to extralegal controls exercised by the Communist party and the Sindikat, the tradeunion organization. The party had units in almost every factory. Before the crea134

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tion of workers' councils, these factory committees played a prominent part in the management and often overruled directors' decisions.40 With the advent of workers' councils, and especially after the new role of the party was proclaimed in 1952, direct party influence in the economy lessened. Intervention in management still occurred, and Communists were held responsible by the party for successful operations.41 Vukmanovic-Tempo declared that the role of the Communists in the factory was to "make the whole workers' collective interested in rational business" and added that "it depends a great deal on the role of the Communists what economic policy an enterprise will conduct. . . ." 42 Generally speaking, however, party control in the factories was now indirect, via the workers' councils and the Sindikat. The percentage of actual party membership on workers' councils varied greatly. On the average, it was probably between 60 and 70 per cent.43 Understandably, about the same percentage of members of producers' councils appeared to belong to the party. Control by the party via the trade-union Sindikat was especially significant. The role of unions in any Communist country is different in theory and practice from the role of unions in a capitalist country. Since in theory the state owns industry and the proletariat runs the state, there is no need for an organization to protect the workers against "capitalist exploiters." In application, this theory reduces the unions to zero or to instrumentalities of state control over workers, as in the USSR.44 In Yugoslavia, with all factories run by workers' councils, elected by the workers themselves, the theory that unions are not needed to protect the workers against management acquired certain substance. Tito said in 1950 that since all the workers now unite in choosing their own bosses, "the tradeunion's task of protecting the workers weakens to a considerable extent." 45 The unions in Yugoslavia—welded into one general organ-

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ization, the Sindikat, and geared to operate on all levels—did, however, have a new and vital role to play in the Yugoslav system, a role that was more important the more the economy was decentralized. The Sindikat operated, as did the party, on the principles of democratic centralism, and as in the party, this tended to be more central than democratic. Thus union officials in any factory were responsible not only to their members but also to the executive bodies of the union organization. Since the Sindikat was organized both vertically and horizontally, its officials had a wide area of influence. It was on the Sindikat that both government and party depended primarily to curb excess of workers' councils, to guard against uneconomic practices, to fight for increased production, and to help raise the level of efficiency. Where the union organization was not effective, it was taken to task. Sindikat units at Novi Sad, for example, were scolded because "they usually wait for directives from the party committee and the local trade-union council, instead of discussing problems which interest the individual groups themselves." 46 The general union organization had, at the end of 1954, a membership of 1,700,000 out of some 2,000,000 workers in Yugoslavia. Although only about 300,000 of them were also members of the Communist party, these included all Sindikat officials and the more active union men. All party members employed in factories belonged to the Sindikat.47 There was no attempt to conceal the party's domination of the Sindikat. As Tito declared: . . . it is logical for the parties of the working class and the trade-unions, fighting for the same ultimate goals, to be closely connected in that struggle. Therefore, it is obvious that in our country the Communist party and the trade-unions should be closely bound by one single purpose—the building of socialism.48

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The law on workers' councils gave the Sindikat a special position in drawing up lists of nominees for election to workers' councils although independent nominations could be submitted and sometimes were. It was no accident, therefore, that 100 per cent of the members of workers' councils were also members of the Sindikat. In the works of Ivan Bozecevic, secretary-general of the Sindikat: "We draw up the nomination lists. If any nonunion men get in, it's a mistake." No mistake had been reported. In the 1954 election of 5,050 workers' councils, three hundred nonunion lists of nominees were placed before workers, but none were successful.49 The Sindikat also played an important role in the election and operation of councils of producers at all levels of government. According to Bozecevic, 100 per cent of the members of producers' councils belonged to the Sindikat, and Bozecevic himself was president of the Council of Producers in the Federal Assembly. All this made for conformity. Union officials saw their task as representing the broad, national interest as well as individual groups of workers. As a result, the Sindikat was frequently on the side of the manager and against the employees, often against higher wages and for longer hours. Each local union organization had a production council, whose job it was to be constantly in touch with workers' councils in its area and give advice on even day-to-day problems. An incident at the Radoje Dakic metal works plant in Titograd in the summer of 1954 was typical of the relationship between the Sindikat and the worker-management bodies. The management board had referred to the workers' council for discussion a proposal that for a two-month trial period the midmorning rest period should be cut from fifteen to five minutes. One of the members of the management board, Mihaile Curobic, was also a member of the union production council

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of Montenegro. At his suggestion Tripto Sindik, secretary of the Montenegro Sindikat, called a meeting of the union members of the workers' council of the factory. Union officials strongly recommended that the proposal be adopted. Curobié reported that the plant committee of the party, to which he belonged, had also decided for adoption. At an ensuing meeting of the workers' council, the proposal to cut rest time was argued by Curobic and carried unanimously. 50 In addition to seminars on technical, industrial, and administrative problems organized by production councils, the Sindikat operated workers' universities, gymnasia or high schools, elementary schools, and even literacy classes. In view of the low educational level prevailing in Yugoslavia, this function was an important one. Some 45,000 workers in Yugoslavia were constantly attending formal Sindikat schools of one sort or another. 51 Union membership remained fairly constant, and its percentage of new workers was especially high. One reason was that the Sindikat was the chief recruitment agency for new workers. In a predominately agricultural country like Yugoslavia, this meant enticing peasants from farm to factory, providing job training and general orientation to urban life. In this process, as in worker education, no little indoctrination ensued. DEMOCRACY FOR THE WORKERS The number of workers' councils continued to grow from the 155,166 reported at the end of 1950. In 1954, there were 201,296 such bodies in existence, and in 1956, 214,937.52 Of these, according to the Federal Statistical Bureau, there were 6,093 in enterprises employing more than thirty persons. 53 It was clear that the workers' councils encompassed virtually

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all economic activity in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the average number of members of the councils themselves decreased. In 1956, there were only seven with more than ninety members and only twenty-one with more than seventy-five members. The average in enterprises of more than thirty workers was twenty.54 Yet in the first six years of the existence of workers' councils, more than 1,200,000 persons out of a total employment of 1,500,000 had been elected to serve on them for various terms.55 This period constituted, as Tito said, "a gigantic school."56 What did it all mean in terms of democracy for workers in Yugoslavia? "The workers' councils," according to Djuro Salaj, president of the federal trade-union organization, "have carried out the deepest democratization . . . in our enterprises," and through them "the working class has become master of its destiny."57 Another Yugoslav spokesman contended that the workermanagement system had had a deep effect on the psychology of Yugoslav workers and contained "not only economic, political, and social but also a moral and psychological value." 58 It was not difficult to find Yugoslavs who thought this claim was exaggerated. Actually, the meaningfulness of workermanagement varied from enterprise to enterprise. Some workers' councils visited by the author were obviously in control of their operation and doing an efficient job. Others were either not actually determining important management questions, or were doing it inadequately.59 It was clear, in any event, that generally a number of factors often muted the voice of the ordinary workers in running their factories. These included not only indirect party and trade-union control but also the continued leading role of directors in many enterprises, the tendency for some worker-management organs to be dominated by foremen, technicians, and white-collar employees, and an autocratic attitude on the part of many of these bodies.

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In general, of course, the low cultural level of a great many workers still stood in the way of their active participation in management affairs. Worker-manager relations.—Conflict between the workers' councils and the managers was a frequent source of worry to authorities. The vagueness of the law often aided factory directors in riding roughshod over the worker-management organs, and in 1957 Tito felt it necessary to urge that "more energy" be expended to eliminate instances where "managing executives curtail . . . rights of the workers' councils and the workers . . . yield only too easily to such improper treatment. . . ." 60 However, despite the fact that both party and Sindikat often took the manager's part, there was an increased turnover in plant directors. Since 1950, for example, the Ivo Lola Ribar Zeleznik, the largest machine factory in Yugoslavia, had six managers, although this was an exceptional case.61 Role of nonworkers.—Officially reported figures put the percentage of members of workers' councils "directly engaged in production" at 76 per cent in 1952, 78 per cent in 1954, and 74.2 per cent in 1956. Salaj has pointed out, however, that these figures are misleading because of the lack of a precise definition of the phrase "directly engaged in production." Especially in management boards, he complained, "there is too great a number of foremen and office employees."62 Salaj also cited—this time with approval—the fact that in 1956 51.3 per cent of the members of workers' councils were skilled workers, including 19.2 per cent highly skilled; semiskilled workers represented 14 per cent and unskilled workers accounted for 11 per cent. As might be expected, the proportion of skilled to unskilled workers on management boards was slightly higher. In larger enterprises, 75 per cent of all the presidents of workers' councils and 68.9 per cent of all presidents of management boards were actual workers. In smaller enterprises, the figure for both was 79 per cent.63

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There was little doubt that the workers' councils were dominated by skilled workers and better-educated technicians employed in the offices. Highly skilled workers and office employees with university degrees accounted for 70 per cent of the total membership of workers' councils, according to Salaj, although these categories accounted for only about 25 per cent of the membership of managing boards. There was no reason, however, why these figures could not indicate, as Salaj asserted, that the workers realized their interest was better served by having the most able among them on their management bodies. Attitude of members of worker-management organs.—In a country like Yugoslavia, as in many other countries, it is not surprising that workers, given management authority, sometimes utilized it in a highhanded way. Salaj charged that although the worker-management bodies were "created as the most powerful barrier to bureaucracy [they] themselves are not fully immune from this grave danger to socialist relationships." Especially he criticized the workers' councils and management boards for "aloofness from their voters and a lack of interest in their demands," as well as for devoting "insufficient care to human needs." Some of them, he complained, have created special privileges for themselves, grabbed higherpaid posts, paid themselves special fees, and held meetings too often and during working hours. In 1956, he reported, 14 per cent of workers' council meetings and 25 per cent of management board meetings were held during working hours. These meetings incurred expenses amounting to 245 million dinars, of which 104 million dinars was for compensation for time lost from work. In addition, management boards awarded themselves special fees for attending meetings amounting to 7 million dinars. Often meetings were closed to nonmembers. 64 Furthermore, workers' councils usually were lax in informing the workers of their activities. They "seldom submit reports

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MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY to their voters," according to Salaj, and the number of submissions of questions to workers by referendum—161 in 1956 —was held to be insufficient. In addition, in "quite a number of enterprises" the councils did not hold regular meetings of all the workers, "and in some of them such meetings are not held at all." Where meetings of all workers were held, there was a tendency for nonmembers of the councils not to participate. There was discussion of forming a new workermanagement body in the form of an assembly of all the workers to cope with some of these problems. One hoped-for result of such a body would be Communist pressure on workers' councils.65 On the other hand, evidence of workers freely utilizing their rights was seen in the high percentage of participation in elections for workers' councils and in the number of recalls. In 1952 and 1954, 87 per cent of the workers voted, and in 1956 the percentage was 88. During 1956, 1,480 members of workers' councils and 483 members of management boards were ousted at recall elections.66 It was altogether likely that active worker participation in management affairs would rise with the educational level of the workers. In addition to union-sponsored courses, mentioned above, the workers' councils themselves were busy at education and even were granting scholarships—amounting in 1956 to 140 million dinars—to universities and various other schools.67 There was strong evidence, however, of the extent to which the workers were already in fact managing their own enterprises in the economic difficulties that such management helped bring about.

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AND

CONTROL

OF

THE

ECONOMY

PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION Considering the intensity of the shift to decentralization, the new Yugoslav economic system achieved surprising positive results. Although plan fulfillment fell short of 100 per cent in some categories in each of the first three years after decentralization, and over-all industrial production, the major goal, dipped in 1951 and again in 1952, by 1953 it began a steady increase. This can be seen in table 5, reported to the First Congress of Workers' Councils in 1957 by Djuro Salaj, president of the Sindikat. TABLE 5 Over-all industry Production equipment Raw materials Consumer goods

1939 100

1950 172

100 100 100

510 160 165

1951 1952 166* 164

1953 183

1954 208

1955 242

1956 266

534 153 162

757 169 160

785 193 184

917 228 207

971 255 230

582 156 142

* The 1951 figure for over-all industrial production corresponds to that reported for 1947; The Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1955), p. 47. SOURCE: Yugoslav Facts i? Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 15.

Contending that such increases resulted from the new incentives given workers, Kardelj in 1954 had declared that the workers' councils have "in fact justified themselves economically." 68 And in 1957, Tito, looking at Yugoslavia's industrial inadequacy in the past, asserted: "We can boldly state that the role of our working class in workers' self-government has contributed most to enable us to emerge from this most difficult position." 69 At the same time, it was obvious to any observer that the decentralized Yugoslav economy was not operating properly and in some areas had encountered serious difficulties. Furthermore, public statements of Yugoslav officials, in keeping with

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the Communist practice of self-criticism, frequently pointed to weak spots in the economy. Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, as sort of top overseer of the economy, went as far in 1954 as to assert that "the entire system has entered a blind alley." 70 He was referring to certain practices of workers' councils that contributed to inflation and interfered with production, despite all efforts of the Sindikat and the party. This statement doubtless reflected a moment of pessimism, but in 1957, the First Congress of Workers' Councils in Belgrade was still concerned over much the same problem. Four areas in particular worried Yugoslav authorities: (1) inflationary pressure of price and wage increases that are unrelated to productivity; (2) development of uneconomic investment; (3) growth of "economic particularism," which was what the Yugoslavs called the expression of local and sectional interest; and (4) the whole area of foreign trade and foreign exchange. Inflationary pressure.—As might be expected, much workers' council action was related one way or another to wages and prices. Both rose sharply after 1950. The exact extent of wage increases was difficult to determine, as no meaningful wage statistics were published in Yugoslavia.71 During the period 1952-1954, it was estimated unofficially, wages had risen about 8 per cent,72 and a further increase of from 8 to 10 per cent was expected in 1955.73 Both retail and wholesale prices mounted steadily during this period. Although the cost of living remained fairly level and even declined slightly during 1953, reflecting an improved harvest,74 1954 saw great inflationary pressures. Prices increased on the average more than 1 per cent a month. During the first half of the year, there was an 8 per cent increase in wholesale prices and a 9 per cent increase in retail prices, and the latter especially continued to mount during the second half of the year. Neither the 1953 nor the 1954 plans foresaw these increases, and serious im-

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balances between purchasing power and goods available resulted. 75 One difficulty was that wage and price increases corresponded neither to production increases generally nor to increases in production of needed items. Borba cited one enterprise that carried out only 38 per cent of its planned production but made a profit of 138 per cent. Another concern fulfilled its planned production, but instead of realizing the planned profit of 101,000,000 dinars on this production it made a profit of 365,000,000 dinars. Still another firm, Borba said, fulfilled its production to the extent of 113 per cent but made a profit of only 5 per cent. 76 In Split, the author was told of a distillery that paid wages in June, 1954, amounting to 64 per cent above the industry minimum, whereas a nearby canning factory during the same month was forced to pay some of its workers under the industry minimum. Before decentralization, the factory director in these instances could have been held responsible. Now the directors, although far from powerless, were officially responsible to the worker-management organs. People's committees were given the power, through taxes, to check excessive wages and to some extent discourage price rises. Two factors, however, worked against effective use of this power. First, because of duplicate membership in the workers' councils and the producers' councils of people's committees, there often existed a similarity of interest in behalf of higher wages. Second, because of the interest of people's committees in obtaining tax revenue from factories within their jurisdictions there was a predisposition to encourage large profits, regardless of type of production. Borba complained of the "narrow-minded policy of people's committees, which very often simply drove their enterprises to increase prices in order to realize greater profits for themselves." The experi-

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ence of 1954 showed, Borba declared, that people's committees were not "truly interested" in curbing inflation but were "very often guided by some quite noneconomic criteria." 77 Under Yugoslav neoclassical economic theory, high prices should be correctable by the law of supply and demand rather than by direct government intervention. "The market prices," Borba observed, "are primarily an economic question. That is why it is impossible to find a legal solution. . . ." 78 Necessary competition was lacking, not only because of the limited number of Yugoslav producers but also because of a high-tariff policy maintained to help build domestic industries. Further, Yugoslavia's acute shortage of foreign exchange interfered with importation of goods even where it might be otherwise desirable. Since it was necessary to use all available foreign exchange for high-priority military and industrial goods, plus foodstuffs, almost none remained for buying manufactured consumers goods that could compete with excessively priced domestic products. 79 This situation in effect gave many producers a monopolistic position, which some of them have utilized to "blackmail" other firms into buying at unreasonably high prices, accepting products of inferior quality, and placing orders in excess of real need. 80 Other enterprises, according to Borba, developed a "business spirit" and engaged in "speculation" by decreasing production or holding goods off the market in order to create artificial shortages and thereby boost prices. 81 Such "monopolists" were constant targets of government and party attack and were frequently threatened—and indeed sometimes confronted—with direct government intervention, despite theoretical objection to this course of action. In particular, the Federal Executive Council utilized its authority—although sparingly and often ineffectively—to fix ceiling prices on the theory that such "monopolistic" prices were not "a purely economic matter but become a question of politics and ethics." 82

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In certain instances, the federal government broke away from the policy of nonadministrative interference in the economy, as for example, when the Assembly by law directed the republics to sequester 50 per cent of their overplan revenues.83 Direct price-fixing was to be coordinated and possibly extended through a price-control bureau established in the spring of 1955. Generally speaking, however, reliance continued to be had on indirect controls.84 The most important of these appeared to be the new wage system, with the introduction of a modified system of norms, first worked out during 1955. This was designed to cope with what Kardelj called "anarchistic tendencies to level,wages, regardless of productivity of work . . . contrary to the principle 'to each according to work done.'" 85 As Sergei Krajger, director of the Federal Planning Institute explained it, the new wage system was to permit increases only when production was increased and not as "a result of special market conditions, monopolistic position of individual enterprises, special conditions influencing formation of prices, etc." 86 By 1957, however, Tito still felt it necessary to warn the workers' councils that as far as adequate wage policies were concerned "the solution has been dragging on it for a long time, yet it is on this that the productivity of labor depends to a large extent." 87 One reason for low productivity, of course, was the general lack of consumer goods throughout Yugoslavia. Recognizing this, the 1955 and 1956 social plans called for more production of consumer goods, and the index for output in this field during the latter year was up to 230, compared with 142 in 1952.88 The resolution on the 1957 social plan called for still further increases in the production of consumer goods and "a wage system that will encourage more productive labor. . . ." 89 Uneconomic investment.—The Yugoslav government's difficulty in regard to investment was not in creating it but in

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controlling it. Both republic and local governments were free to create new enterprises at will, and individual factories could invest their surpluses as they wished. As a result, new investment was so large as to throw the plan out of balance. During the first ten months of 1954, for example, nonfederal investment funds were more than twice as much as anticipated in the social plan. 90 Such extra investment increased production, but often not in the right direction. Republic and local governments got funds for their new investment by taxing existing industries. In 1954, republic and local tax revenue was 85 per cent in excess of 1953.91 These taxes were sometimes so excessive as to cut into the reinvestment ability of going concerns, and in addition had an adverse effect on prices by adding to demand for materials. Experts of the United States economic mission in Belgrade listed excessive local taxation as one of the most serious production problems in the Yugoslav economy.92 Furthermore, the new enterprises that were created, especially those formed by smaller government units, tended to be along the lines of manufactured consumer goods. This was so both because of the limited funds at the disposal of each unit and because of popular pressure to increase living standards. But the needs of the economy as a whole, as decided by the nation's rulers, called for more industrial goods. Also, in their eagerness to create new industries, local governments often set up factories that, in the opinion of federal authorities, were basically unprofitable. In the beginning, because of the shortage of goods, they might operate successfully, but over the long run they would be sure to be in the red and face liquidation. This was, of course, altogether uneconomic, and the federal government urged the people's committees to be interested in small, essentially local industries, requiring little investment, rather than larger, more grandiose ones.93 In an effort to get at the investment problem and still adhere to their theories of indirect controls, the Yugoslavs considered

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a thorough overhaul of the banking system and in this connection were studying, among other things, the American Federal Reserve System. This apparently heralded some decentralization in banking, on the theory that locally established banks, if strictly accountable to a central bank, would be less likely to be "taken in" by individual enterprises and people's committees. Whether further decentralization of this type would be an answer to problems caused by decentralization was a question. There was also a problem in unnecessary duplication of distribution facilities. In Macedonia, for example, in 1950, there were two textile wholesaling enterprises, in 1953, three, and in 1954, four. The largest of these, the Skopski Magazin, suffered a reduction in profits because of this, with a failure to achieve a promised wage increase. The president of the workers' council of this enterprise thought the creation of "the fourth and probably also the third" of these wholesaling firms made his job harder and prices higher unnecessarily. He complained that he lost one of his buying experts to the last-created enterprise and it was difficult to find people who knew the textile business.94 Tito, in 1957, taking note of this practice, declared: "Unfair competition and establishment of several enterprises of the same kind only for the sake of competition with the already existing enterprises are very harmful, because superfluous investments are made which could be used much more advantageously for other purposes." 95 In addition, there was uneconomic investment by the enterprises themselves. Two canning factories in southern Croatia, for example, installed equipment for the making of a popular type of candy called "Turkish Delight." A leather-products factory in Slovenia, cutting its production of shoes, the prices of which were limited by government action, increased output of luggage and briefcases.98 Since often, as in the abovementioned examples, such production is immediately more

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MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY

profitable, wages were increased and new workers attracted, with an added inflationary pressure and strain on the already short labor force. The sequestration of republic revenues, referred to above, and compulsory "loans" from enterprises sometimes amounting up to 50 per cent of overplan surpluses,97 ameliorated but did not eliminate difficulties resulting from uneconomic investment. One of the major factors contributing to this problem appeared to be the credit policy, under which increasing interest rates saw, rather than a restriction, a constant expansion of credit. 98 By the end of 1954, the government had been forced to reexamine the entire system with the aim of providing tighter controls.99 This tightening up, through better credit controls, penalty taxes, and closer supervision by people's committees, resulted by 1956 in a decrease in capital funds, such as used for building, and an increase in operating capital funds. Salaj contended that this showed a tendency away from the "one-sided solving of all economic questions exclusively or dominately through investment." 100 That the problem had not been licked, however, was indicated by Tito's statement in 1957 that "in some cases new investments have again started to expand at exaggerated rates. . . 101 Economic particularism.—Where abuses in operation of the economy resulted—as they often did—from sectional or local interest, they were considered to be "economic particularism," the evils of which were a favorite theme of official pronouncements on the economy. Tito in 1957 listed economic particularism first in a list of the "most pronounced" bad practices "which, if not removed, could have very unfavorable consequences for the development of our monolithic socialist community." 102 In addition to investment and pricing practices, one serious example of this was occasional reduction in working forces by workers' councils seeking to increase profits

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among the remaining employees. In the spring of 1952 this practice contributed in part to large-scale unemployment in Yugoslavia.103 In 1953, Politika reported further unemployment caused by "profiteering workers' management organs."104 In both of these cases, shortages of materials were contributing factors, but the same could not be said for other cases. In 1957 Salaj reported unemployment still a source of worry. 105 Other examples of economic particularism resulted from more or less connivance between workers' councils of particular firms and people's committees for favoritism in price and supply. The term was applied also to failure of people's committees to enforce wage and other controls adequately.106 Economic particularism created economic strains generally, but as far as was known it had not manifested itself in overt opposition to the federal government policy of utilizing resources of the more advanced sections of Yugoslavia to build up the underdeveloped areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosmet. There have been, however, examples of lack of cooperation between governmental units. For example, during 1954, there was a surplus of electric power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has comparatively little industry and population. Serbia, with a big population and much industry, comparatively, had a power shortage. To build interrepublic power lines, the federal government allotted 2 billion dinars to Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the understanding that Serbia and Bosnia would put up an additional billion and a half dinars each. These amounts were provided, but construction of the power lines lagged. Meanwhile, there developed a controversy between the Bosnian and Serbian authorities over how much power was to be transmitted.107 In this instance, the federal government ultimately solved the difficulty by creating a federal power authority, with jurisdiction over such questions.108 Foreign trade.—The decentralized foreign trading system, 151

MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY

under which individual enterprises negotiate their own exports and imports, was another cause of trouble. One problem here was the unreliability of statistics on which the monthly contingent lists—limiting exports of certain items—were based. Thus at times exports were permitted of needed goods in short supply at home. This had an adverse eSect on the price level and on occasion forced plants to shut down for lack of raw materials, resulting in short-run unemployment. 109 Nor did the complicated set of foreign-exchange controls work adequately. Each Yugoslav enterprise was interested in its dinar position, while the economy as a whole badly needed hard currency, especially dollars. Therefore, although exports and imports were, on the whole, regulated adequately as far as type and amount were concerned, they not infrequently posed problems as far as Yugoslavia's foreign-exchange position was concerned. Two examples illustrate the difficulty. An American buyer sought in 1954 to obtain Yugoslav copper sulfate. Available quantities were held by two Yugoslav export-import firms, Hempo and Kemikal, both of Zagreb. The American buyer offered the prevailing international market price of $200 a ton. But at the same time a Brazilian firm offered the equivalent of $320 a ton, provided an arrangement was made for simultaneous purchases of Brazilian coffee. Hempo and Kemikal worked out a deal with a Yugoslav coffee importing firm, Centroprom, whereby they could use part of the income from the sale of copper sulfate for coffee purchases and did their business with Brazilian rather than American importers.110 In another case, an American importer sought zinc filings of a certain quality, which a Yugoslav firm had. The Yugoslav firm, however, had a higher price offered in dinars for Egyptian cotton. 111 It therefore sold the zinc filings to Egypt in return for cotton. In both instances, the Yugoslav

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firms showed higher dinar balance by selling to non-American buyers, but the Yugoslav economy lost opportunities to add to its badly needed dollar exchange. Although other factors—primarily the nature of the industrialization process and the crisis in agriculture—were more important, still these foreign-exchange difficulties contributed to Yugoslavia's serious balance of payments situation, one of the most critical of all economic difficulties that faced the Tito regime. 112 The establishment of the Foreign Trade Bank and the Committee for Foreign Trade and the legal authority of the Foreign Trade Chamber, of course, resulted in a decided tightening of foreign-exchange controls. But Yugoslavia was still finding free foreign trade—even of a limited nature—an expensive luxury that had yet to pay off. Speaking of economic difficulties resulting from decentralization, Kardelj declared that they "constitute the price we must pay anyhow for the beginners' school." 113 Thus far, a not unimportant part of the price for beginners' school had been paid not only by Yugoslavia but also by the United States in the form of economic aid. During the period 19501954 alone, U.S. assistance in all its forms totaled about a billion dollars, half of which was for military purposes, 114 and further aid continued. However, Yugoslav officials have maintained that before long, with the basic phase of industrialization completed, the decentralized socialist economy could stand on its own feet. 115 After seven years.—Reviewing "four years of experience" with the decentralized economic system in 1954, Kardelj admitted serious "weak points and shortcomings." But he blamed the "damages and mistakes" primarily onto the fact that the system was "new, still evolving, and as yet incomplete." Kardelj pledged that the economic difficulties would be overcome and

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that in the meantime the new system would be maintained and would "become of ever greater value for international socialism."118 At the First Congress of Workers' Councils in 1957, the tenor of remarks was very much the same as in 1954. There was evidence, however, that if the same problems were still present, some of them, at least, were not so serious. It was true, as Salaj declared, that "no economic system can be built up completely within seven years, the more so when the economic system was not preceded by almost any verified experience. . . 1 1 7 It was another question, however, as to whether he was correct when he put aside as "altogether unjustified and groundless . . . all the fears in respect to primitivism, narrow-mindedness, egoism [and] presumptive particularism of the direct producers, because all these phenomena . . . are local and sporadic and none of them represents the general weakness of the workers' council management bodies." 118 If Salaj was correct in saying, further, that "the apparent incompatibilities between a planned economy and the independence of enterprises, between the conscious guidance and the market machinery are gradually disappearing,"119 it was in large part because of increasing emphasis on "conscious guidance." This seemed to be the direction in which the Yugoslav economy was to move. The concrete forms of the "conscious guidance," of course, were the chambers of commerce and other over-all economic associations. These, indeed, seemed to be designed primarily as a correction for too much decentralization. Yugoslav leaders made it quite clear that more and more reliance was being placed on these bodies to combat economic particularism and other problems resulting from decentralization.120 In a sense, this development represented an extension of the principle of "social management" to economic enterprises.

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This concept, discussed in the next chapter, involves representatives of the general public participating in management with those actually involved in operations. Indicative of the trend was the increasing discussion in Yugoslavia of so-called consumers' councils, which would participate in management of enterprises and, according to some views, even supervise workers' councils. 121 When all such bodies were taken in conjunction with the active role of the trade-unions in industry and the General Cooperative Union in agriculture, they amounted in an economic sense to what Stalin called "transmission belts" in the Soviet Union. That is, such public organizations tended to be dominated by leaders, usually Communists, strongly oriented toward government points of view. There was no doubt that they were important weapons in the arsenal of indirect controls. As Salaj put it: "We shall, without endangering independence and self-government, adjust the system of workers' councils to the ever-developing stages of social and economic development." 122 To the charge that all of this was but centralization by other means, the Yugoslav answer was that it was not centralization because (a) action by citizens was not governmental action; (h) workers' councils retained independence; and ( c ) the whole approach was an example of the "spirit of socialist self-government." 123 To the answer that it smacked of the fascist corporate state, the Yugoslavs retorted that such a system was impossible without capitalism and that in fact only the working class was here involved, in administering its own affairs. Furthermore, it was pointed out, formal governmental functions were not involved, but only the economy, which was already in the hands of the workers. Actually, however, the Yugoslavs were aware of two possible dangers in the development of "vertically linked, self-

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governing institutions." One was that they might develop "bureaucratic tendencies," which would threaten the independence of workers' councils. The other was that, created to combat localism and monopolistic practices, they might show manifestations of economic particularism and monopoly on a national level. Mindful of these, an official commentator declared: "An economy which is managed by the working collectives is anxious to take advantage of the benefits inherent in the mutual interconnections of enterprises, yet it must also guard against all those dangers linked with economic combinations, because any kind of monopoly is completely alien, repulsive and contrary to the idea and principle of workers' self-government." And he added: "The decisions of the economic chambers and associations of enterprises must not restrain the independence of the organs of management." 124

SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSIONS

Following out post-Cominform Yugoslav Marxist theory, the Yugoslav economy in 1950 began to decentralize. The economic system that evolved after 1950 centered around the institution of workers' councils, elected by workers in each enterprise. Together with management boards, which the workers' councils elect from their membership, the workers' councils determined how much to produce and what, prices, wages, and investment. Except for the selection of a factory director, the worker-management organs were virtually legally autonomous. Most direct federal economic controls had been abandoned. Although the means of production were "nationally owned," they were "social property" and not state-managed. The bevy of federal ministries, boards, and councils, which before 1950 directed Yugoslav industry, had been abandoned, as had the

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concept of detailed and binding federal planning. There was still a federal plan, but it now drew up only desired and anticipated production goals, relying on a series of indirect controls involving investment, interest rates, flexible taxes, foreign-trade regulations, and authority to fix prices in certain instances. The people's committees had become the major source of administrative control of autonomous enterprises, for example, controlling through local taxes the amount of income available for wage increases. A high degree of control was maintained outside the law, however, by the Communist party and the trade-union organization, which dominated all workers' councils and took a hand constantly in their operation. Democracy in the workermanagement system was sometimes limited by continued domination of directors, domination by plant officials and technicians, and a high-handed manner of operation by the worker-management bodies themselves. But to a very considerable extent it could not be disputed that the workers and their representatives did in fact play a leading role in the management of enterprises. Although the decentralized economy was given credit by Yugoslav leaders for production increases since 1950, it still did not work properly in many important respects. The independence allowed workers' councils and local governments resulted in inflationary increases in prices and wages, uneconomic investment, excessive local taxation, and other reflections of sectional interest and unnecessary shortages of needed foreign exchange. The planners were unable to foresee these difficulties, and serious imbalances in the economy resulted. In an effort to cope with them, the Yugoslav government was frequently forced to resort to direct intervention, despite its theoretical objections to such action. All this illustrates what appears to be an essential conflict between socialism, with its emphasis on planned industrializa-

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tion, and the comparatively free-market economy which results from the autonomy of individual producing units. This contradiction is especially marked in a country as underdeveloped as Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav doctrinaire attachment to decentralization was reminiscent of the fierce anticommunism often displayed by ex-Communists, although in regard to Yugoslavia it was based on the assumption of furthering communism. Because of their theories, the Yugoslavs were both unable to direct the economy as well as it might have been directed and unable to give up the goals that make direction necessary. Because they wished to stimulate industrialization, they maintained a high-tariff policy. But a high-tariff policy interfered with operation of the law of supply and demand on which the decentralized system relied. Because of their insistence on the "withering away" of the state to achieve the goal of communism, they gave freedom to workers in each factory to plan and manage their production. But because of the natural inclination of individual workers' groups to better their own positions, economic policies were followed which made progress toward communism more difficult. Furthermore, the inevitably experimental nature of the new Yugoslav system made the job harder. Taking as their guide chiefly opposition to Soviet practice, the Yugoslavs often seemed more certain as to what not to do than what to do. To cope with the problems produced by the extreme decentralization, the Yugoslavs were forced to establish institutions for direct economic control in several instances. Increasingly, however, they were coming to rely on "vertically linked," nongovernmental but governmentally influenced industrial associations to combat economic particularism and other evils of decentralization. In one sense, these bodies delimited the sphere of free economic activity. But if they had dangers in themselves, at the same time they involved basic Yugoslav principles of "socialist self-government." Also, it is likely that

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the Yugoslavs faced the choice between such indirect methods of combating local excesses and incompetencies and reinstitution of outright direct government controls. Certainly the trend to further decentralization had been slowed down, if not halted, and it was not yet clear how much reliance on "conscious guidance" would, in fact, compromise the freedom extended to workers' councils. Despite these question marks, however, the Yugoslav system generally continued to maintain its decentralization and to hew to the line of indirect controls. Considering the low cultural level of the population and the economic backwardness of the country, the experiment with decentralization and worker-management had worked surprisingly well in many ways, probably better than Tito anticipated in 1950 when he warned that implementation of the reforms would be neither easy nor rapid. As the Yugoslavs rightly pointed out, over-all droughts and intensive industrial construction, which necessitated large amounts of foreign assistance, made inconclusive this test of the viability of the Yugoslav economic system thus far. It was the Yugoslav contention that as soon as basic industrialization had been achieved, the economy would be self-supporting. Whether it could in the future stand on its own feet, without either a relaxation of socialist goals or drastic curtailment of the decentralized economic system—in fact if not in theory—still remained to be seen.

159

VII

the reforms in local government THE

INCREASED

EM-

phasis on local government in Yugoslavia reflected the general decentralization of both political and economic authority and the attempt to make the state "wither away." In many ways, the developments in local government—changes accomplished as well as planned—were among the most important of the Yugoslav reforms.1 This was so for the following reasons: 1. Along with worker-management, the new system of local government was the basis of the unique Yugoslav approach to communism. 2. In Yugoslav constitutional theory, the organs of local government were the holders of all authority not specifically granted to federal and republic governments.

THE REFORMS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 3. They were key factors in administration of the decentralized economy. 4. Development of popular participation in local government was a leading Yugoslav claim to an increase in political democracy. 5. Local government reforms were the starting point for development of the "commune," which the Titoist leaders saw as the ultimate in the whole complex of their new reforms.

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES In one sense, Titoism began at the local level. As the Partisans liberated territory during the war, they established "people's liberation committees" in charge of each local area. When these were coordinated in the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslav People's Liberation—Tito's wartime political organization—they became the basis of the new government of Yugoslavia.2 It is from this wartime beginning that the term people's committee—which in Yugoslav terminology meant local government—came.3 Since the end of the war, there had been three major laws dealing with people's committees. The first statute, enacted in 1946, right after adoption of the first Tito constitution, did little more than confirm the wartime position of people's committees as organs of local government.4 Although these people's committees were theoretically autonomous, they were in fact nothing more than administrative organs of the central government. They had no economic functions of their own other than carrying out federal decrees, on which they were dependent for funds. Not only the totalitarian nature of the Yugoslav state but also the organization of the people's committees made them simply adjuncts of Belgrade. Each was dominated by an executive committee, which in turn consisted of local officials of the Communist party.5 This was the

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exemplification at the local level of "Stalinist bureaucracy," opposition to which later became the dominant motif of Yugoslav theory and organization. The second law was enacted in 1949 at a time when the Yugoslavs were just beginning to break away from Soviet forms and methods toward a more democratic type of socialism. This law broadened the scope of the people's committee's authority. 6 The people's committees were given certain limited powers over economic enterprises within their jurisdiction and the right to propose their own budgets and economic plans. 7 But their activities and even their internal administration were still subject to direct federal control. An important innovation of the 1949 law, however, was the requirement for each people's committee to report on its activities at least once every two months to general public meetings of voters. Under the 1946 law, the people's committees were the lowest rung in a whole hierarchy of government, generally based on the principle of democratic centralism. The 1949 law relaxed this somewhat by distinguishing between "local and general jurisdiction" and guaranteeing a certain degree of autonomy in areas defined as "local." 8 Under both laws, however, the people's committees exercised only jurisdiction given to them by the constitution and federal statutes. With the creation of workers' councils and the decentralized economy in 1950 came new ideas about democratic government. More and more, the Yugoslav theorists began to take the position that the central government should restrict itself and formal local autonomy should become actual. 9 The Communist party itself paved the way for the practice of these ideas by directing the abolition of the dominant executive committees.10 The next logical step was a change in the local government system. As Djordjevic explained:

162

THE REFORMS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT All these changes . . . called for a far-reaching reorganization of local self-government as a part of the political system of Yugoslavia as a whole. Therefore, the contradiction between the trends toward socialist democracy on the one hand and of bureaucratic state capitalism on the other hand had to be resolved for the benefit of socialism by broadening and strengthening the people's right to self government. 11

THE 1952 REORGANIZATION

Reorganization of local government was accomplished by the General Law on People's Committees of April 2, 1952. 12 This law was held to mark "the beginning of a new phase in the development of the socialist state system which will transform the Yugoslav People's Republic into a political organization of socialist democracy." Further, it was seen as "the basis of a complete constitutional reform of the state" which came a year later and as a part of the "withering away" of the state that "is essential in a period of transition from capitalism to socialism."13 The 1952 law changed the basic nature of local government in Yugoslavia. It created the people's committees as the chief administrative units in the country, both in the political and economic spheres, and enormously broadened their popular base. When implemented by the constitution of 1953, it brought, to a certain extent, real autonomy to Yugoslav local government for the first time. In addition, there were created certain elements of "direct democracy" in local government and the basis of a new concept, "social management."14 Under the new system, the federal and republic governments had only those powers delegated to them by the constitution, with all other "functions of authority" belonging to the people's committees.15 In addition, both federal and republic governments now relied on people's committees to

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carry out federal and republic laws within their areas. "Hence," it was concluded, "the whole system of government rests on the people's committees and derives therefrom." 16 In general, people's committees existed at three levels: (1) the opStina, sometimes called a commune, which was usually a collection of rural villages; (2) the srez, a district embracing from six to twenty opstine and often smaller municipalities; and (3) the grad, or city.17 Under the 1952 law, there was a consolidation of the smaller units, and at the end of 1954 there were 3,823 village people's committees, 327 district people's committees and 25 people's committees of cities. In addition, there existed 239 people's committees of municipalities not technically classified as cities but with special rights vis-à-vis district committees.18 The city and district people's committees, which were operatively the most important, were bicameral. One house was elected by all voters in the area, and the other, the council of producers, was named by workers and those peasants in collectives. Generally speaking, the two houses had overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction, except that the producers' councils, as in the federal and republic assemblies, had special authority regarding social plans and certain other economic matters. Members of both chambers were elected for a fouryear term. The village people's committees, consisting entirely of rural areas, did not have producers' councils, and members of its single chamber were elected for a three-year period. At the head of each people's committee was a president, elected from among its members. Although the president was more than the presiding officer, he had no special administrative authority beyond that given him by the people's committee. A full-time secretary, who was not a member but was elected by the people's committee, headed the administrative staff. The people's committees were ordinarily divided into

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five working commissions, with three members of each chamber on each commission. These were: economy, internal affairs (police, water, etc.) health, education, and administration.19 ECONOMIC ROLE OF PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES The most important functions of people's committees—as far as the over-all Yugoslav system was concerned—were economic. Under the decentralized economic system, the people's committees were the key administrative organs of control and regulation, and their rights vis-à-vis economic enterprises gave them considerable financial autonomy. In addition to the law on people's committees and the constitution, the relationship of local governments to the economy was spelled out in three major statutes: the law on planned management of the economy, the law on budgets, and the law on social contribution and taxes.20 In the first place, the people's committee was the basic unit consulted in regard to construction of the annual federal social plan. Although the plan was drawn up by the Federal Planning Institute, this was accomplished in large part as a result of conferences with various people's committees. Each people's committee had a plan of its own, which embraced the plans of each enterprise within its jurisdiction. 21 The people's committee was then charged with enforcement of the federal plan as far as its basic proportions concern individual enterprises. That is to say, it was the people's committee which collected federal taxes, supervised proper payment of the investment tax, enforced depreciation fund payments, and in general had the responsibility of seeing to it that the various factories fulfilled their plans. The people's committees had the primary responsibility for policing activities, for undertaking corrective action in the event of consistent

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losses and lack of plan fulfillment, and for collecting and reporting statistics. Once required federal contributions were paid by factories, the people's committee had broad authority to determine how the rest of the income should be expended. There were virtually no limits to local taxing power after federal and republic obligations have been met. As explained in the preceding chapter, the people's committees' authority over wages was indirect. The 1955 draft social plan proposed in effect to have people's committees more or less determine the whole wage structure. Under the new system, the local government organs were first to approve minimum wage scales adopted by individual workers' councils, and the total minimum wage fund was to constitute the base on which local taxes were to be applied. An enterprise could then utilize for its own purposes—such as wages above the minimum—only that part of the profits which the local people's committee did not take in taxes. This local taxing authority was held to be "one of the most important proportions of the plan, next to the basic distribution of national income," because it "determines the general level of pay" and also played a large role in investments.22 Table 6 shows the percentage distribution of "profits" of individual enterprises after federal and republic taxes in seven Yugoslav cities during 1954. Reference has already been had to the deleterious effect of local taxes on investment and production. There were also official complaints of continuing pressure, both political and economic, by people's committees on workers' councils. The local government bodies, it was charged, "have often interfered even with those affairs which must be the exclusive right of the workers' councils." Speaking of these misuses of local authority in 1957, Djuro Salaj, president of the tradeunion federation, blamed them primarily on to the dependence of people's committees on local enterprise for funds.

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He predicted that in the future local governments would be able to raise more revenue from individual income taxation and expressed the hope that then interference with operation of workers' councils would disappear. In 1957, however, this future did not seem near at hand.23 TABLE 6 City

Belgrade Zagreb Ljubljana Rijeka 2enica Karlovac Tuzla

To peoples committees

55 62.3 70 77 40 58 45

To the enterprises

45 37.7 30 23 60 42 55

Allocated for wages

15.3 13.7 7.4 14.1 24 12.4 48 a

* The high proportion of enterprise funds allocated for wages in Tuzla reflects the fact that major economic activity there involved much new plant construction financed directly by the federal government. SOURCE: Radivoje Petkovic, Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1955), p. 39.

POLICE AND SECURITY In addition to their economic-control functions and the ordinary business of local government, people's committees had also become important units of the police and security system.24 Under the 1949 law, people's committees were an administrative arm of the federal ministry of internal affairs, although security work was performed under the direct supervision of the federal ministry, which appointed the local official in charge. Under the present law, internal affairs jurisdiction of the people's committees was much broader, with federal appointment of officials in this sphere eliminated. Organization of the militia—ordinary uniformed police—was decentralized, and all militia units were now under the jurisdiction of a people's committee, with their officers subject to

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removal by local initiative. Under the law on courts of 1954, people's committees also played a leading role in organization and control of judicial organs, other than the federal and republic supreme courts.25 All courts below the level of the supreme courts had both regular judges—professional legal experts—and lay judges, who were ordinary citizens named to serve for limited periods. The people's committees elected all judges of district courts—the basic court of first instance— and also the lay judges for circuit courts, which were appellate bodies but had original jurisdiction in more important criminal cases. Under the law, with the power to elect went the power to remove, so that most courts operated under the supervision of the people's committees. An important restriction to local authority in internal affairs was the fact that the UDBA, the secret political police, was still a highly centralized organization and excluded from people's committee jurisdiction. One interesting example of government decentralization in this area, however, was the right of people's committees under certain conditions to issue visas and passports for crossing the border.26 PART CONTROL VERSUS AUTONOMY Although the decision of the Communist party that local party secretaries must not be officials of people's committees made local government in Yugoslavia more independent, there was still a high measure of indirect party control.27 Slightly more than half the members of people's committees belonged to the League of Communists, with the percentage of party membership usually higher in the producers' councils than in the other chamber. Most of the secretaries of people's committees, who presided over the administrative apparatus, were party members. Furthermore, more than 90 per cent of members of people's committees belonged to the Socialist Al-

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liance. 28 Both party and Socialist Alliance work in local government was emphasized in Yugoslavia, and Socialist Alliance activity at the local level was termed "the principal content of their work." 29 Further, the trade-union Sindikat used its influence in securing conformity not only in workers' councils but also in local government, especially with regard to the producers' councils.30 Each Sindikat organization had a legislative committee with the job of following closely the work of people's committees. In Split, for example, the author was told by Sindikat officials that "advice" to the local council of producers was one of the union's most important tasks, and in Skoplje he attended a voters' meeting, called by the people's committee, where the principal event was an address by the president of the Macedonia Sindikat. As a result of these various influences, increased autonomy in local government did not involve the likelihood of opposition to central authority on fundamental issues. Influence by the party, the Socialist Alliance, and the Sindikat was furthered by the inadequacy of local officials generally. Of the 126,160 local officials in Yugoslavia, in 1952, for example, only 6.2 per cent of them had university education. Only 11 per cent had completed high school. The majority— 50.3 per cent—had had only primary education; 5.3 per cent was altogether without schooling.31 This low educational level of local officials was one reason why the secretary of the people's committee, especially in smaller communities, still wielded exceptional power. Even in larger cities, the practice was for the secretariat to prepare the agenda for people's committee meetings and draft the statutes.

THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES AT WORK In general, proposals put before people's committees in the first instance—drafted by the administrative apparatus—

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tended to be those desired by the federal and republic governments, the party, the Socialist Alliance, the Sindikat, or the people's committee president. However, particularly in the cities, there was evidence of independence in people's committees' deliberations. Usually, the council of producers and city council met separately, as a rule at least twice a month, with joint meetings called only in the event of disagreement between the two houses. Where there was disagreement, the president played a leading role in trying to work out differences. If he was unsuccessful, the issue was then referred to the republic assembly for decision. There were comparatively few instances of ultimate failure to reach agreement. For example, there were apparently none in the Belgrade people's committee during the twelve months between August, 1953, and August, 1954. During this period, there were thirty cases of disagreement between the two houses of the Sarajevo people's committee, but only in six were the questions at issue finally referred to the BosniaHerzegovina assembly; agreement was worked out in the others. Out of sixty cases of disagreement in the people's committee of the district of Mostar, only four had to be submitted to the republic authorities in the same twelve months. In Skoplje, only one disagreement was reported, and this was settled when both chambers accepted a compromise proposed by the president of the people's committee. In Dubrovnik only two disagreements occurred, and these, too, were settled by compromise.32 Although most local laws were prepared in the first instance by the administrative apparatus, the people's committee members showed little hesitation in voting them down. Out of some 350 proposals for legal action made to the Belgrade people's committee by its apparatus during the twelve months between August, 1953, and August, 1954, a hundred were rejected by both chambers and more than seventy-five others

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were remanded back for changes. In Sarajevo, proposals of the administrative officials were accepted without change in 170 out of 250 instances. The Mostar people's committee rejected or refused to act on about a third of the two hundred proposals submitted to it. The record in Dubrovnik was about the same. In Zagreb, it was said that only twenty-five proposals out of several times that number were accepted by the peoples committee without change. The matters involving disagreement between the chambers were seldom fundamental. For example, the author attended a meeting of the Sarajevo producers' council where three items in disagreement were considered. One involved the qustion of whether a city garage should be considered a part of municipal government or an independent economic enterprise run by its workers' council. The city council passed a ruling that it should belong to the city. The producers' council had earlier voted that it should be an independent enterprise. Another dispute involved salaries of policemen. A third concerned an earlier vote by the producers' council on allocation of investment to competing construction enterprises; the producers' council had called for an equal distribution of available funds, while the city council had voted for a larger amount to one enterprise considered more efficient. None of the questions was acted on at this meeting. The president of the people's council, Dana Albina, a former metal worker, who had completed his education via the workers' university after the war, asked for an opportunity to confer with members of the city council on these questions, and this was apparently granted, although without a formal vote. In Dubrovnik, the author sat in on a meeting of the city council, which took up two matters of disagreement with the producers' council. One concerned traffic regulations. In this case, a commission of three members was named to sit with an equal number of members of the producers' council and

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try to work out differences. The second involved a city council vote to increase the rent for certain private shops housed in city-owned buildings. The producers' council had called for a still higher rent. The people's council president, Ivo Suljak, said he thought a new proposal compromising the differences should be worked out, and there was general agreement to this. In a joint session of the chambers of the Ljlubjana people's committee, the author witnessed a sharp exchange of views over the social plan. At issue was the question of whether to accept certain changes in the city plan proposed by the Slovenian Republic officials. The changes were finally adopted by a margin of three votes. The lead in advocating the official point of view was taken by the president, a Communist, who buttressed his position with frequent theoretical arguments. One of his opponents was an architect who was a member of the city council. At one point, the architect declared: "I, too, am a good Communist, but I say theory is not important here." The most outspoken opponent of the president was a non-Communist engineer.

"DIRECT DEMOCRACY"

The development of "direct democracy" in Yugoslav local government was seen as a part of the "withering away" of the state. 33 Although this added up to something different than the system of aktivs in the Soviet Union, it served in part the same function in regard to broadening the base of local government and drawing a wide variety of citizens into government relationships. In Yugoslavia, however, this popular participation involved a certain degree of autonomy and governmental and management responsibility that was lacking in the Soviet aktiv system.34 There were four elements of "direct democracy" in Yugoslav local government: (1) ex-

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tension of the people's committee system to municipal and district subdivisions, or wards; (2) establishment by people's committees of advisory councils, bringing large numbers of private citizens into government operations; (3) the general public meetings of voters, carried over from the 1949 law and given additional responsibilities; and (4) the concept of "social management" of nongovernmental functions such as education, hospitals, and publishing. The decentralization of authority to local government organs was carried a step further with the organization of what are in effect subpeople's committees in subdivisions of districts and cities. These subdivisions were uniformly called opstina—which was usually—if inadequately—translated as "ward." The district wards coincided with the small municipalities, whereas city wards were simply areas within the city, as are wards in the United States. Authorization to create such subdivisions was given in the 1952 law on people's committees. Some ward people's committees, especially in the districts, took on many of the attributes of full-fledged local governments, although legally they were strictly subordinate to the people's committees that created them. For example, the people's committees of the Gracanica district in Kosmet reported in 1954 that it had transferred "most of its functions" to the ward committees. These functions included maintenance and building of roads and schools, construction of electric power lines, and collection of taxes. Three ward committees—those of Kosovo Polje, Gracanica, and Obilic—even "participated in the profits of larger enterprises" and financed their own operations without subsidy from the district people's committee. 35 The city wards performed more limited tasks, including collection of certain taxes, passing on social insurance allowances, and allocation of housing space. In the summer of 1954, the Belgrade people's committee transferred to its ward committees economic jurisdiction over handicraft, retail trade, and

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catering businesses, running of schools and all municipal inspections.36 Despite this, however, there was criticism that the wards were not given enough authority. Complaining that the city people's committee occupied too much of its time with minor questions, Bozidar Vorkapic, president of the Palilula ward people's committee, publicly asked that the Belgrade wards be given authority to make decisions also on capital investment. He pointed out that during 1954 the budgets of the wards amounted to 1,300,000,000 dinars as against 6,000,000,000 for the city people's committee, and he said this was too small. "Wards would know to a far greater extent how to spend this money in the most useful manner," he wrote to Borba.S7 Each people's committee had a series of "associate bodies," known as councils.38 Originally, one council was to be organized for each working commission of the people's committee, with ad hoc councils set up for specific tasks. The former were more formalized in the 1956 reorganization act, however, and it was specified that there should be councils for internal affairs and general administration (separate in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia), economic plan and finance, agriculture and forestry, labor, education, health, social insurance, and economic affairs.39 This last was in fact broken up into several councils for various branches of the economy in more developed districts. The councils were composed of both members of the people's committees and private citizens. Under the law, the chairman was a people's committee deputy. Private citizen members were elected by various social and economic organizations, at the suggestion of the people's committee, or directly selected by the people's committee. They served without pay but with compensation for expenses and time lost from employment. Under the law, these councils "were to be entrusted with execution of the laws . . . as well as with the execution of

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other executive tasks and may issue orders and instructions." These actions of the councils had to be signed by the president of the people's committee, although the council could appeal a veto to the full people's committee. In fact, the councils were thus far almost entirely advisory bodies, which assisted compilation of statistics, drawing up of people's committee statutes, and rendering technical aid and advice on questions involving such things as public health, road building, water supply, and construction.40 These associate bodies played an increasingly important role in regard to some technical matters but little or no role in general legislative matters. In the author's experience, the practice was for members of associate bodies to attend meetings of people's committees but for the most part to sit silently except when called upon to make formal reports. There was an integral connection between the advisory councils and the general public meeting of voters.41 The voters meeting had no legal power. But it heard reports not only from the people's committee but also from the advisory councils. It could make recommendations to the people's committee and nominate citizens for membership on the advisory councils. Voters' meetings were required to be called at least once every two months to hear reports from local government organs, and frequently there were meetings in between. The most important function of the general voters' meeting was the nomination of candidates not only for local but also federal and republic offices,42 and on several occasions, doubtless responding to official pressure, they demanded the recall of deputies accused of not adequately representing their constituents.43 The author had the opportunity in 1954 to visit only three general voters' meetings—in Nis, Skoplje, and Novi Most. The Nis meeting was lively, with a number of pointed questions and exchanges from those present, but those in Skoplje and

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Novi Most involved almost no comments from the floor except on the part of representatives of the League of Communists and the Sindikat. In all three meetings, reports of people's committees' associate bodies were made by the chairmen, who were local deputies. It would not be safe to generalize from these examples, but they bore out the opinions of federal officials that the character of voters' meetings varied considerably from place to place. SOCIAL MANAGEMENT Of broader significance, at least potentially, was the new concept of "social management." This involved essentially the joint management of certain public but nongovernmental activities by boards comprised of persons directly concerned with the activities and groups of private citizens.44 Social management in Yugoslavia in 1954 was in effect only in a few instances on an ad hoc basis, although general statutes dealing with the matter were under discussion.45 It was planned generally for educational, health, and scientific institutions, and cultural institutions such as libraries. What was implied was that such institutions would be run by boards corresponding to local school boards, hospital boards, and library boards in the United States. Once put under social management, these institutions would be "no longer a component part of the state authority, no longer institutions falling within the province of state administrative law," but independent in the same sense and to the same extent as are economic enterprises. 46 The main difference was that because of their predominately public character, the institutions under social management were not run alone by workers' councils—which existed in each of them—but by them in conjunction with private citizens having no vested interest in the operation. In most instances, local people's committees named the public

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members of the new management bodies and had responsibility for general supervision. Education furnished the best example of social management, both because that was the area where it was in operation most extensively and also because it was in connection with education that the principles of social management were most frequently discussed by Yugoslav officials. By 1954 a law dealing with social management of the universities was enacted, 47 and consideration by the Assembly of a bill applying it to elementary and secondary education encouraged Professor Djordjevic late that year to speak of "the enactment of a new system of social management in the field of public education." 48 Although both the republic and federal governments were to retain some administrative control of elementary and secondary schools while the university organs manage the universities altogether, the general scheme would be the same in both. The universities were to be managed by university councils, including both university and nonuniversity personnel, as well as by university boards, consisting of the rector and deans. The lower schools were to be managed by school boards, including teachers and outside citizens, and also councils of the teachers themselves, in addition to directors.49 The school boards were specifically enjoined not to interfere with actual teaching, "not to go ordering the history teacher to represent the Battle of Kosovo differently, the biology teacher to devote more hours to Darwin . . . and so forth, but . . . only [to] demand that the school itself solve the problems of the day." 50 There was also discussion in 1955 on the question of pupil participation in the work of the school boards—since university students under the law participate in university council activities—but no decision apparently had been reached. 51 Indicative of the scope of social management was the extension of it by the Federal Executive Council to Tanjug, the

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official Yugoslav news agency, and to the Lexicography Institute, and the preparation of a law extending it also to general publishing concerns. The idea seemed also to be lending itself even to eventual application to economic enterprises, in the form of "councils of consumers" to watch over workers' councils. 52

THE END PRODUCT: THE COMMUNE Local government in Yugoslavia was in one sense in a period of transition. For in addition to the reforms discussed above there was still to come the "commune." This transition was characterized as "the most momentous event in Yugoslav life," 5 3 and Kardelj referred to the concept of the commune as the end product of socialist decentralization, 54 as important to Yugoslav development as workers' councils. 55 There was endless discussion by Yugoslav officials about the commune, but much of it was vague—and even contradictory —and exactly what the commune was to be or what shape it would finally take was not clear. Apparently, the commune was seen as a more or less self-contained and self-supporting political and economic administrative unit embracing both countryside and agriculture on the one hand and the town and industry on the other. 56 Yet Kardelj, in discussing local government in general, emphatically asserted that "we do not indulge in petty-bourgeois anarchist Utopias about self-sufficient communes" because "functions common to society should be managed from the center." 57 The commune, it was held, would integrate agricultural activity with consumer needs and make for the "gradual liquidation of the great differences and contradictions . . . between the industrial and the agricultural settlements." 58 Still the commune had no connection, Kardelj said, with the Soviet concept of an agrogorod, or agricultural city. 69 Petkovic saw it as "a self-governing socio-

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economic entity which would also be the basis for the organization of state authority," 60 whereas to Djordjevic it was "a socialist self-governing cell, a new form of the social and political organization of the country . . . that basic cell of the socialist organization which Marx, Engels and all the great socialist thinkers called 'the free association of free producers.' " 61 It was clear, however, that the first step toward the establishment of communes would have to be a reorganization and enlarging of districts, followed by an extension of the political jurisdiction of cities to the surrounding countryside. The commune was not to replace the district people's committee, but the number of people's committees was reduced and their functions altered. Many municipal governments were to have authority stemming not from federal law and the constitution as much as from the new communal authority. 82 Particularly, the communes were to take over most economic functions, become "the chief investors," and "exert the strongest influence on the expanded social and economic activities." 63 Although the concept remained vague, much effort has gone into trying to make it more concrete. A special federal commission and special republic commissions have dealt with it since 1954. The Permanent Conference of Cities has occupied itself to a large extent with the question of communes, as have special committees of the people's committees. For all of this labor, the General Law on Organization of Communes and Districts, adopted in June, 1955, was something of a mouse. Nor did it do much to clarify the concept of the commune. Under this law, the commune was clearly a subdivision of the district. The commune was given most of the "socioeconomic" tasks of the district; the district's main function seemed to be that of coordinating the work of the communes. The exact division of responsibility between the two units was not spelled out in the statute. 64

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Generally speaking, it was envisaged that each town and surrounding rural area would be a commune. 63 For the time, this was to mean little change in the actual pattern of local administration. The first reorganization had already taken place in May, 1955, in Kranj, Slovenia. In Kranj the commune consisted of the town of Kranj and adjacent agricultural areas and appeared to be coextensive with the district of Kranj, which had already included the same territory. 66 The Kranj commune was regarded as something of a model. The pattern that seemed to be planned for Rijeka was slightly different. There the idea appeared to be to consolidate the city and district of Rijeka into a single district having under it five communes. These were to consist of the city of Rijeka itself as one and the municipal areas of Opatija, Kastav, Bakar, and Grubnik. 67 Down in Macedonia there was discussion of the city of Skoplje and environs becoming a single district and also a single commune. 68 Kardelj explained that the commune system envisaged a cut in the number of districts from 4,121 to 1,438.69 There was much discussion as to whether communes would have singlechamber peoples committees or would also include councils of producers. Originally, there was a strong disposition on the part of the leaders to eliminate the council of producers in the commune. This evoked such widespread opposition, however, that the final decision was made in favor of direct worker participation in the new bodies. But in the beginning, communal councils of producers were to exist only in those units —for example, larger towns—which already had them, pending a future election. Of the 1,471 communes reported to have been organized by 1957, only ninety-five had councils of producers, and the future of this body at the commune level was still not clear.70 Other districts followed that of Kranj in forming communes, but not as swiftly as Belgrade hoped. One reason—in addi-

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tion to the vagueness of the concept and the inherent difficulties involved—was that the Yugoslav authorities took the position that no integral unit of local government would lose its legal status without its consent.71 The people's committee of Opatija, for instance, held up plans for the Rijeka commune for months by refusing to come in.72 Although the 1956 administrative reorganization laws were vague in dealing with the organization of commune people's committees, by 1957 the mode in official Yugoslavia was to speak as if communes existed and were in operation throughout the land. Yet at the same time Borba spoke of the need to "push organization of communes." 73 Whether communes were formally organized or not, however, it seemed likely that their importance would be more theoretical than practical until further expansion of industry provided the necessary economic and cultural base for their successful development. 74 Although there was no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Yugoslav leaders in their belief that the organization of communes would further their type of decentralized socialism, still their eagerness to accelerate the matter appeared to involve other factors as well. For one thing, since the districts, under the new plans, would be supervisory agencies, of a sort, over lesser people's committees, this might well help to avoid some mistakes being made because of the low cultural level of many local government officials. Furthermore, the regrouping of the districts was being arranged so as to give industrial workers more and peasants less of a say in district government. This resulted from the fact that in about 75 per cent of the new districts nonagricultural income exceeded or would exceed 50 per cent of over-all national income. Since the councils of producers were elected on the basis of contribution to national income, this meant, in Kardelj's words, that "the predominant influence of the socialist forces has been made secure . . ." and able to "exercise a strong influence upon

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those districts also in which the socialist sector still lacks a decisive economic role." 7 5 At the same time, however, since the communes were to deal with agriculture they might provide a better means of tackling some of the acute difficulties facing that sector. 76 Particularly, since the commune was assigned especially economic supervision, this new unit might be in a position to curb some of the lacks and excesses of local government resulting from decentralization of economic controls. In this connection, it was interesting to note the reluctance with which councils of producers were set up for the communes. Kardelj himself indicated more than once that difficulties with the economic system constituted one of the reasons for the drive to organize communes and consolidate local government units. At the same time, however, he asserted that the creation of communes would further develop both the institutional and psychological framework for popular government 77 and provide "the best confirmation of the correctness of our basic orientation . . . thereby becoming an important experience for international socialism." 78 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS A series of new laws since 1948 extensively reorganized local government in Yugoslavia and gave it increased autonomy. The people's committees became the basic administrative units in the country, with all power not delegated in the constitution to federal and republic governments, and the key organs for control of economic operations. This decentralization of governmental authority was considered a part of the "withering away" of the state. People's committees existed at the level of the opUina, or rural area; the srez, or district; and the grad, or city. The latter two categories were bicameral bodies, each having a gen-

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eral council and a council of producers elected primarily by workers. Their most important functions concerned regulation of independent economic enterprises run by workers' councils, where, through their virtually unlimited taxing authority, they came more or less to determine the wage structure. They also became the basic administrative units for police and security activity, with the exception of the secret political police. However, indirect but adequate control of people's committees by the Communist party, the Socialist Alliance, and the tradeunions made negligible the possibility of opposition to central authority on fundamental issues. Local government reforms also included elements of "direct democracy," bringing large numbers of private citizens into relationships with government. These included advisory councils of citizens to assist people's committees and general meetings of voters, to which the local government units must report periodically. In addition, there was the development of "social management" jointly by workers' councils and boards of private citizens of public institutions, such as universities and schools. Social management was just beginning in 1954, and neither the advisory councils nor voters' meetings appeared to play vital roles. Local government in Yugoslavia was in something of a period of transition, which would be completed with the establishment of new units called communes. Although the concept of the commune was unclear, Yugoslav officials placed great emphasis on it as the end product of socialist decentralization. Plans for the commune involved a reorganization and consolidation of district people's committees and an integration of industry and agriculture and urban and rural life. There was evidence also that the importance of the commune lay in part in the role it might play in making local government more efficient and effective, especially as a regulator of workers' council activity, enhancing the position of workers as

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GOVERNMENT

against peasants in district affairs and, possibly, also dealing more directly with difficulties in agriculture. The low cultural level of many local officials in Yugoslavia made the people's committees more easily subject to control, not only by the party but also by their own administrative apparatus. At the same time, people's committees, especially in the cities, frequently gave evidence of independence. But, whereas there was often disagreement between the two chambers of people's committees, it was rarely on significant issues. On the whole, therefore, there seemed to be in local government, as in other areas in Yugoslavia, a gap between theory and formal structure on the one hand and actual operation on the other. Despite this, however, it would be difficult to deny that there was more real autonomy in local government than formerly or that Yugoslav local government was different in some fundamental respects from that in the Soviet Union. The new governmental and semigovernmental institutions created by the reforms offered mechanisms not only for wider and more meaningful popular participation in local government but also for independence on the part of people's committees. Although precisely how the commune would further this process was not clear, the concept was in line with the general Yugoslav approach to decentralized socialism. But the implementation of the new local institutions, in any real sense, still depended in large measure on how rapidly the cultural level of the country would be elevated.

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VIII

the reforms in agriculture I N A T T E M P T I N G TO

apply the theory and practice of communism to agriculture, the Yugoslavs faced acute and peculiar problems. These problems lay both in the nature of Yugoslav agriculture and in the political and social situation in the country. Uncertainty resulting from these problems may explain to a considerable extent why Yugoslav policies in agriculture, both before and after the dispute with the Soviet Union, were less clear and of a different nature than policies applied to the industrial sector of the economy. In general, Yugoslav postwar agricultural policies may be divided into five periods. The first, begun in 1945, was characterized by confiscation of land and limited efforts to force collectivization. The second, coming in 1949, involved an in-

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tense drive to form kolkhoz-type collectives. The third, emerging in 1951, began a more liberalized attitude, based on the insistence that cooperatives be profitable and there be a modification of discrimination against private peasants. The fourth period was marked by the permission granted in 1953 for peasants to leave cooperatives and the abandonment of most collectives. The fifth period, starting a year later, saw elimination of most forms of economic discrimination against the private peasant and the virtual end of collectivization, although question marks and ambiguities in policy remained. BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAV AGRICULTURE The enormous importance of agriculture in Yugoslavia was obvious. Between the wars, more than 86 per cent of the population was dependent on agriculture for its livelihood, and 76.3 per cent of the active working population was directly engaged in it. 1 Moreover, this agriculture was characterized by the following: 1. Extreme backwardness. In the interwar period, productivity of Yugoslav agriculture was the lowest in Europe. 2 The average income of the three-fourths of the population in agriculture amounted to only one-third of the average income of the other fourth of the population. 3 In addition, war damage had been devastating. 4 2. Overpopulation of the land. In Yugoslavia, there were 114 persons per 100 hectares of agricultural surface, with only Bulgaria, out of all the European countries, having a higher number (116). But since almost two-thirds of Yugoslavia's area is unsuitable for cultivation, because of mountains and other topographical conditions, there were 192 persons per 100 hectares of arable land. 6 3. Prevalence of dwarf holdings. The average size of a holding was about 5 hectares, but the average size per capita was

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less than 1 hectare.6 An anti-Communist agricultural expert, commenting on the pattern of these "dwarf holdings which were barely, if at all, able to supply their owners with a subsistence income," declared: "It is even doubtful if complete expropriation and division of the large estates would have solved this problem. . . . " 7 In some areas of Yugoslavia, even small plots were divided into strips often separated by some distance. 4. Tradition of the zadruga. For centuries, the zadruga, or family cooperative, had been a fundamental form of peasant social structure in Croatia, parts of Serbia, and eastern Slovenia. The term zadruga technically referred to a collective farm formed voluntarily by several families. It is now often applied to cooperatives in general. The old type zadruga all but disappeared during the nineteenth-century land reforms, but family cooperatives—also usually called zadruga—were widespread.8 During the interwar period, it is estimated that they constituted 5 per cent of all peasant holdings in Yugoslavia.9 Though their plots might be of inadequate size, Yugoslav peasants were generally characterized by the traditional peasant passion for land ownership in some form. This was no less so in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, where peasant-land relationships were based more or less on feudal concepts until the end of World War I, than in Serbia, where many peasants had owned their own land for more than a hundred years.10 Although there were 200,000 landless peasant families,11 the tradition of land ownership was thus set much more firmly in Yugoslavia than in countries like Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, where continuance of large landed estates down to World War II had produced a large nonlandowning "agricultural proletariat."12 The main political factor involved in postwar Yugoslav agriculture was the large peasant membership in the organiza-

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tions on which Tito relied for support. Because of the predominate peasant population in Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the Partisans were peasants.13 Soon after the war, half of the 470,000 members of the Communist party of Yugoslavia were peasants, whereas out of the 7,000,000 members of the People's Front not more than 500,000 were industrial workers.14 The relationship of the Yugoslav Communists to the peasants was thus different than that of the Communists in other Eastern European countries, whose advent to power was owing almost entirely to intervention of the Soviet Union, rather than to local following. THE 1945-1948 PERIOD The initial action of the Tito regime in regard to land reform was the same as that of other Communist governments: confiscation. The Land Reform Law of 1945 nationalized a total of 1,566,030 hectares.15 It limited individual peasant holdings to 25 to 35 hectares and holdings involving the leasing of land or use of hired labor to 45 hectares. Half of the land thus made available was distributed to individual peasants, many of whom were resettled from less arable areas. The remainder was ultimately distributed to the so-called "socialist sector" of Yugoslav agriculture.16 The socialist sector involved newly established state farms, peasant work cooperatives, and general agricultural cooperatives.17 It was this concept of the socialist sector that proved later to be an important issue in the dispute with the Soviet Union. Of the several forms of peasant work cooperatives, only one resembled the Soviet-type kolkhoz, with peasants renouncing ownership of their land, although all peasant work cooperatives were collective farms. The general agricultural cooperatives—5,041 of which existed at the end of the war—consisted of private peasants working their own land and sometimes also

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land belonging to the cooperative—for which work they were paid wages—and pooling their efforts for collective buying, selling, and so on. State farms were formed on the Soviet model and utilized both for agricultural production and experimentation. 18 In 1945, Tito saw collective farming as "a question of life and death," both because of ideological desirability and the belief that it was inextricably tied up with industrialization. 19 His government began to encourage it in the customary way of discriminating against private peasants in favor of collectives. Private peasants were denied any kind of credit, and agricultural prices were kept down. 20 Machine tractor stations had seized all mechanized equipment and served only state farms and peasant work cooperatives,21 and hiring of agricultural labor was forbidden. A system of compulsory deliveries was introduced, based on the total agricultural area of a holding, rather than on sown or arable areas.22 Escape from burdensome taxation was possible only for peasants in collectives.23 By 1948, the number of general agricultural cooperatives had grown to 8,666,24 but there were only 932 peasant work cooperatives.25 These latter were largely in Vojvodina, the most fertile part of Yugoslavia, where many former Partisans had been resettled on land which had belonged to German and Hungarian minority groups.26 Peasant work cooperatives accounted for about 2.6 per cent of total arable land, while state farms made up 3.6 per cent, the private sector accounting for 93.8 per cent. 27 Peasant opposition to collectivization even before 1948 was a source of worry and disappointment to the Tito government, and there was much discussion about "the peasant question." 28 The sharp decline in output and repeated peasant protests forced a recognition of the fact that the system of compulsory deliveries "entirely deprived the peasants of all incentive for production." 29 In 1947, the compulsory delivery system was

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eased and a year later was linked up with issuance of special incentive coupons for purchase of manufactured goods.30 Viewing Yugoslav agriculture in 1948, the Cominform was able to charge that "there is a growth of capitalist elements . . . individual peasant farming predominates . . . much of the land is in the hands of kulaks . . ." with no differentiating between rich and poor peasants. 31 This Soviet view that "correct Marxist policies" were not being applied apparently was based not so much on the extent of collectivization as on the facts of individual ownership in peasant work cooperatives, the inclusion of the general cooperatives in the "socialist sector," and the revised system of compulsory deliveries.32

REACTION TO COMINFORM RESOLUTION Although the Yugoslav Communists denied the Cominform charges, it is interesting to note that the real "crackdown" on peasants, with a much speeded up drive to form peasant work cooperatives, began only in 1949, nearly a year after the Cominform resolution. The resolution of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist party making establishment of peasant work cooperatives a priority matter seemed almost in answer to the Cominform charges, and the policies that it produced were then responsible for further Cominform accusations that, if collectivization in Yugoslavia had been too slow, it was now too fast. 33 Blithely ignoring four years of experience, the Central Committee's resolution declared: "The peasant work cooperatives proved to be the most successful means for the socialist transformation of our countryside and the advancement of our agriculture. . . ." 3 4 An enormous propaganda campaign was carried out.35 Private peasants were threatened, 38 and new discriminatory price and tax measures were rushed through the Federal Assembly.37 The Basic Law on Agricultural Cooperatives of 1949 still pro-

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vided for four types of peasant work cooperatives, stressing the fourth, or kolkhoz, type.38 These types were now spelled out in detail, as follows: Type 1. Members still retained ownership of their land and received a fixed rent from the cooperative. Type 2. Members retained ownership of land and received interest on a sum fixed as the value of the land. Type 3. Members retained ownership of land but renounced any benefits from interest or rent. Type 4. Members transferred the land entirely to common ownership. Whereas in the first three types membership was considered to be on a three-year basis, in the fourth type it was permanent. Although the four types were much the same as under the 1946 law, the new measure sought to encourage the fourth category by decreasing advantages—interest, credit, machinery, and so on—of the first three. For instance, special mechanization and investment funds were created to assist type-four collectives.39 Legal measures were bulwarked by various pressures not infrequently including "strong-arm" tactics.40 The result of this campaign was a sixfold increase in the number of these collective farms. By the end of 1949 there were 4,263 of them, and by the end of 1951 the number had risen to 6,804.41 There was also a sharp increase in peasant resistance. Because the bulk of the peasants hustled into the new collectives were unwilling, this resistance was manifest not only among private land owners but in the cooperatives also. The 1950 drought may have obscured the extent of peasant refusals to sow and harvest, but by the fall of 1951 observers thought it had reached the proportions of "a nationwide slowdown strike."42 Even before this time there began to be a change in the attitude of the Yugoslav Communists toward collectivization. This change had little to do with the new theories of com191

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munism that were now being heard but was characterized by a sort of reluctant pragmatism. The late Boris Kidric, for example, told the author in the fall of 1950 that "there can be no question that collectivization is the right approach to our agricultural problem" but "perhaps overenthusiastic measures" were pushing it too rapidly in certain areas. When, in 1950, machine tractor stations were abolished, 4? their equipment was divided up among the peasant work cooperatives, and private peasants were still forbidden to purchase machinery. The measure reflected a less doctrinaire approach, but it seemed clearly aimed at eliminating inefficiency of the machine-tractorstation system for the benefit of the collectives only. The three-year term of many peasants who had been rushed into collectives in 1949 expired in 1951, and there began a movement to leave and take back their land. It soon became apparent that the right to leave was not meaningful. Widespread arrests of peasants were reported, as well as arrests of lawyers who assisted in drawing up applications for leaving.44 Despite a relatively good year, weather-wise, the harvest again fell drastically below plan. 45 THE 1951 "EASING OFF" The resulting crisis in agriculture ushered in a new and more cautious policy toward collectivization. It was heralded by a resolution of the Politburo of the Communist party on November 24, 1951. The resolution declared that peasant work cooperatives should be reorganized and those unable to show a profit disbanded. Peasant work cooperatives should henceforth be concentrated in the more fertile areas of the country. They should be put under the management of their own members—workers' councils—as was becoming true in regard to industrial enterprises. Organization of general agricultural cooperatives should again be emphasized but should be en-

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trusted to district people's committees and unions of cooperatives.46 This rather abrupt shift in policy met opposition in both government and party bureaucracy. Edvard Kardelj later charged that the year following the Politburo resolution was characterized by efforts of officials "to maintain at any price the peasant work cooperatives in their entirety." 47 Notwithstanding this, however, the number of these collectives declined to 4,524 by the end of 1952.48 It was now officially admitted that organization of peasant work cooperatives under the 1949 law had been "overenthusiastic," and the trend continued away from the earlier "hardboiled" discrimination against private peasants and toward freeing the agricultural sector of the economy along the same lines that the industrial sector was being freed. The trend was marked by these developments: 1. Abandonment of compulsory deliveries for potatoes, fats, and hay in 1951, for grain in 1952, and for wool, the last commodity subject to the "otkup," in 1953.49 2. Possibility of limited credit for individual peasants, permitting loans for purchase of medium-sized agricultural machinery (purchase of which had previously been denied them). 50 3. A change in the tax system which took into consideration the fertility of the land and type of crops, in addition to area. Although cooperatives were still given more favorable tax treatment, some of the unfairness against private peasants was thus eliminated. 61 Although these developments were acclaimed by the Sixth Congress of the Communist party in Zagreb in the fall of 1952, however, there was still no hint of a major reversal of over-all Yugoslav agricultural policy. It was still denied that peasants were "forced" into collective farms or that the peasant work cooperatives were similar to Soviet kolkhozi, and it remained 193

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"clear to Yugoslavia's leaders that only socialization on a large scale can solve the problems posed by given conditions." 52 Tito reiterated the party line on collectivization: "The cooperatives are still one of the most important questions for us. They represent the most important element of socialism in the villages. Without the victory of the socialist sector in our villages, there can be no ultimate victory of socialism in our country." 53 Meanwhile, however, at the same time that the new reforms in the economy and government were developing in Yugoslavia, the agricultural crisis deepened. The combination of another drought in 1952 and a reduction of area sown in grain as a result of faulty pricing policies and continued peasant resistance, again forced importation of foodstuffs. These imports amounted to more than $350,000,000 in the 1950-1953 period, with a resulting balance of payments deficit of $170,000,000.54 A further factor, according to Vladimir Bakaric, the leading party authority on agriculture, was the reluctance of the Communists to liquidate unprofitable collectives, despite the 1951 Politburo resolution. 55

ABANDONMENT OF COLLECTIVIZATION By the spring of 1953, it was apparent even to the most enthusiastic supporters of collectivization that the policy had to be changed. Admitting the failures of past policy, Kardelj declared: It cannot be denied that agricultural cooperation, and in the first place that of the peasant work cooperative type, is experiencing very serious internal difficulties, which are manifesting themselves in the wavering of a considerable proportion of the membership of the peasant work cooperatives. . . . Various means were used to offset such processes . . . but they neither removed nor overcame the internal difficulties. It is therefore primarily necessary to secure, really and

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THE REFORMS IN AGRICULTURE consistently, complete voluntariness in connection with the joining or leaving of cooperatives. . . . There is no doubt that this measure will reduce the number of work cooperatives, and also the cooperatives that remain will lose in membership. Whether more or less of this will occur is not essential. The essential thing is that the principle of voluntariness should be implemented consistently and the work of the cooperatives thereby placed on a healthy economic basis.68

This complete reversal of the previous line on collectivization was reflected in the Regulation on Property Relations and the Reorganization of Peasant Work Cooperatives of March 30, 1953. 57 This law for all practical purposes spelled the end of collectivization in Yugoslavia. The new law proclaimed the right of all peasants to leave any type of collectives at any time, taking with them their land and equipment. It authorized the disbanding of whole collectives on decision of their members and made mandatory the dissolution of those deemed to be unprofitable. It further gave those collectives that remained independence from direct government control. Under the regulation, property acquired by a collective— over and above land brought in by peasants—was not divided among members of a disbanded cooperative, however, but was transferred to the district cooperative union, presumably for further distribution to general agricultural cooperatives. The liquidation itself and procedure for distributing land were put under special commissions consisting of members of the district people's committee, the district cooperative union, and the collectives' workers' councils. Further, it was provided that remaining collectives and any new ones that might be formed were to be organized on the basis of contracts among the members, providing, among other things, for direct money wages based on work performed, rather than the early system of artificial "work-days," often

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paid for in kind. The size of individual plots which members of collectives were permitted to retain for themselves was increased. The rush to leave the collectives was a clear indication of how unpopular the former policy had been. By the end of 1953, only 1,258 peasant work cooperatives remained. 58 Even in Vojvodina, the most fertile area and the heart of the peasant work cooperative movement, out of 123,000 peasant households in collectives, 85,000 left during 1953, including 4,000 households without land. 59 There was but a slight reduction in the number of general agricultural cooperatives, one reason probably being that so many of these were engaged in commercial activities rather than actual farming. 60 AN AGRICULTURAL NEP? The new agricultural policy, while representing a drastic shift in approach to collectivization, appeared in 1953 still to be in the nature of a temporary attitude only, an agricultural NEP. The new measure seemed to be for the purpose of correcting errors and appeasing peasants—in short, meeting an emergency situation—rather than charting a new permanent course.61 Tito reflected this pragmatic attitude in an interview. "For us," he declared, "the collective farms are not a matter of dogma. We are not concerned about the forms—whether they are socialist or not. What we need is more agricultural production—more bread. We are trying to find means of getting it." 62 There was, however, clearly an effort to bring agricultural policy into line with that being followed for the rest of the economy. Kardelj declared that "the first principle that we have to adopt without reserve . . . is that our agriculture, too, should be freed from elements of administrative management 196

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and have its development based upon a free competition of economic forces." But he quickly added: In the general line of our fight for socialization of agriculture we have not too much to change. . . . [The new policy] does not mean that we surrender peasant agricultural production to spontaneous development, independent of the socialist sector of our economy. . . . [This] would mean inevitably and permanently the reintroduction of capitalist relations into the village.63

Resentment against peasants for the failure of collectivization was apparent on the part of many Communist leaders. Kardelj, for example, charged that "a large part of the peasants joined the work cooperatives so as to get more from society, that is, to give less thereto, and not so as to produce more and better and thereby improve their living standards." 64 A Communist commentator asserted, almost petulantly, that "the peasants changed even those cooperatives which had all potentialities for successful development into units that on the whole made no progress" by laziness and following wasteful practices.65 Tito himself, somewhat more philosophically, implied that peasant individualism was responsible. In a speech at Ruma in September, 1953, he admitted: It has become apparent that we got off to a bad start. There was a desire to work too fast, to have everybody enter the cooperatives at once. But the psychology of man, formed in the course of thousands of years, cannot be changed in one or two years. That is an impossible task. Men are living beings. They have traditions which stem from the past, and it is impossible to effect changes at once. 66

The belief that the new line on collectivization reflected only an agricultural NEP was bolstered when the law permitting dissolution of collectives was soon supplemented by another measure, designed to make leaving less palatable for

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some peasants. This was the law on the Agricultural Land Fund of May 27, 1953, which limited maximum private holdings of an individual peasant to 10 hectares.67 The law permitted family cooperatives to hold up to 15 hectares, and in certain instances more. The maximum might be increased by republic executive councils in less fertile areas, but, generally speaking, all land in excess of 10 or 15 hectares had to be sold to a public land fund. The land fund thus created was to be distributed to cooperatives and industrial enterprises. Some 272,000 hectares of land were taken over under this law, of which, by the spring of 1954, 93,000 hectares were distributed to agricultural cooperatives, including general cooperatives, and 122,000 to "agricultural farms," including state farms and those associated with industrial enterprises.68 This amounted to approximately an average of 3.8 hectares per holding for the entire country, and an average of 5.4 hectares in Vojvodina.69 About 50,000 dinars per hectare, or 15,355 million dinars, in bonds, were paid by the government for this land.70 The purpose of the new restriction on land holding seemed clearly to penalize peasants who left the cooperatives and to further collectivization. Although because of the small size of holdings generally, no great proportion of peasants was affected, the big depletion in peasant work cooperatives' land resulted from the departure of peasants with more than 10 hectares.71 Further, it was reasoned, since dissolution of collectives re-created in part the problem of landless peasants, these would have sought employment on larger farms, "thus developing capitalist relationships."72 In fact, some peasants who took advantage of their new freedom to leave peasant work cooperatives did later return. Some of these were landless peasants and those with the smallest holdings who, in effect, had no alternative. Others were apparently motivated by a combination of the restrictions they

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still faced as private peasants and the new, liberalized form of the collectives. The total number of returning peasants was not great. 73 Borba saw the 10-hectare restriction as "a step forward in respect" to the original land-confiscation law of 1945.74 And Kardelj, discussing the measure, wrote: "When we declared the freedom of entry into and withdrawal from peasant work and other cooperatives, we did not renounce the fight for the socialist transformation of agriculture, but, in this struggle, we were obliged to adjust the weapons to changed conditions." 75 The weapons to be adjusted seemed to be—in addition to the limit on holdings—chiefly the so-called basic proportions of the social plan, which would determine investment, credit, and taxation, in addition to the volume of machinery, fertilizer, and other things needed by agriculture. Also, price policy was to be important because, as Kardelj said, a "socialist society disposes of enough means to be able to influence decisively its economic formation." 76 Thus, although peasants would no longer be kept in cooperatives against their will and agriculture was to be freed from direct federal control, it appeared that the policy of discrimination against private peasants would remain in an indirect effort to force further collectivization. Even the law on Regulation of Agricultural Cooperatives of January, 1954, still further liberalizing the collectives,77 left many observers with the impression that "no substantial changes have taken place, since the individual peasant still is, and apparently will continue to be, regarded as the 'class enemy.'" 7 8 FAILURE OF THE NEP POLICY The year 1954, however, brought further changes in policy that cast doubts on the NEP character of the reforms in agri-

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culture and indicated a possibly permanent cessation of warfare against the private peasant. They grew in part out of an aggravated agricultural crisis that threatened the economy, but they also reflected increasingly liberal tendencies in the Yugoslav state. Peasant dissatisfaction with even the new state of affairs again radically interfered with spring sowing.79 The number of peasant work cooperatives further declined, 80 and those that remained were slow in claiming land from the public land fund. 81 These factors, combined with still another severe drought, cut the anticipated harvest in half. 82 Even if the planned harvest had been reaped, it would have been necessary to import at least some 30,000 to 40,000 wagonloads of wheat. 83 As it was, about 1,300,000 tons of wheat had to be imported, at a cost of nearly $100,000,000.84 Yugoslavia was forced to default on her international obligations, and Tito had to plead with his people to eat less bread. 85 The price of bread increased sharply. 88 The shortage produced long queues in the cities, and on at least one occasion a nearriot ensued in Belgrade when a truck drove up with loaves of bread. 87 The measures adopted during 1953 and 1954 had been aimed at increasing crop yield. Now Moma Markovic, the leading party figure in the cooperative movement, admitted not only that "all those measures have failed" but that they had "provoked a constant regression in agricultural production and difficult living and working conditions for the peasants." He told the Cooperative Union flatly: "The condition in the village is becoming increasingly complicated, and agriculture and cooperation are experiencing a serious crisis there." 88 At the same time, decentralization of government under the new constitution had eliminated both federal and republic ministries of agriculture. A federal agricultural board to deal with policy existed, and in 1956 a secretariat for agriculture

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and forestry was established in the Federal Executive Council, but the governmental administrative apparatus was still inadequate. Operationally, the districts dealt with agriculture. The inadequacy of district people's committees, especially in the more industrially backward but also agriculturally important areas, has been discussed in the preceding chapter. The development of communes might help, but at the same time the accompanying reorganization of districts still further cut agricultural representation. The Cooperative Union exerted great influence on policies of collectives, which, moreover, were supervised by people's committees, but collectives concerned an increasingly small sector of agriculture. The Yugoslav government and party were committed to eschew direct economic controls, while many of the indirect controls were still aimed at fostering collectivization and penalizing the private peasant. 89 RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE PEASANT

The seriousness of the agricultural situation, plus the logical consequences of their ideological position, drove the Yugoslav leaders at last into recognizing the individual private peasant as the bulwark of their agriculture. The importance of the private peasant was recognized by a whole series of measures during 1954 at the same time that the peasant work cooperative was abandoned—apparently permanently—as the ideal. The new measure included the following: 1. Credit. For the first time, a special fund for general credit to private peasants was included in the social plan. In 1954, this amounted to 2.3 billion dinars, with promises of greater sums in 1955. Credits for fertilizer and seed were made available on a one-year basis, credits for consumer goods on a twoyear basis, and credits for agricultural machinery, livestock, and irrigation on a five-year basis. The interest rate was fixed 201

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at 6 per cent annually and in some cases could be lowered. 90 In certain instances, private peasants could also receive shortterm credit for hiring agricultural labor. Special terms were available to poorer peasants. 91 2. Price support. Private peasants were offered prices above market price, partly payable in advance, for wheat and corn. In 1954, this amounted to 23 to 24 dinars per kilo for wheat, 4 to 5 dinars above the market price, with 10 dinars per kilo down for promised delivery. The price paid for corn was from 15 to 17 dinars per kilo.92 3. Tax adjustment. Although tax discrimination against the private peasant was not completely eliminated, it was lessened both by reduction of tax rates and a new system—in the 1954 social plan—of taxation. Under the new system, instead of local officials making arbitrary assessments on differing standards, there was now cadastral assessment according to a uniform standard enabling the peasant to know in advance his tax base. Agricultural taxes were fairly progressive, if optimum output was assumed. The 1956 social plan fixed basic tax rates—which might vary from area to area—at not less than 10 per cent and not higher than 44 per cent of cadastral income, with local people's committees directed to add a surtax of 3 per cent. 93 4. Authorization, under the 1954 law on cooperatives, for collectives to assist private peasants, both with loans of machines and manpower. 94 5. Authorization for private peasants to purchase land up to the maximum of 10 and 15 hectares, with the possibility of receiving credit for such purchases. 95 These developments added up to a complete abandonment of collectivization in any formal sense. Commenting on them, Kardelj declared: "It is true that our abandonment of the former, Soviet-type policy toward collectivization is permanent. We realize that collectivization cannot be forced. . . ." 98

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Reviewing events of 1954, the leading Yugoslav Communist expert on agriculture was even more positive: "We have not found a solution yet, but it is clear that we will never go back to collectives, forced or otherwise." 97 CONTRADICTION AND CONFUSION Despite the abandonment of both direct and indirect force in collectivization and the comparatively equal economic treatment accorded private peasants, there still remained deep contradictions in Yugoslav agricultural policy. One of these was the continued insistence of the Communists that socialization in the villages was a vital goal at the same time private peasants were, in effect, being strengthened. Another was the continued political discrimination against private peasants, both through their virtual exclusion from producers' councils and through the continued preoccupation of the government with problems of industrialization and workers. Although the private peasant was now recognized as the most important factor in Yugoslav agriculture, the recognition was often accorded shamefacedly. Thus an official handbook of the Yugoslav government began: "The means of production in Yugoslavia, with the exception of a considerable part ( % ) of the means in agriculture . . . are social property." 98 Neither the Communists nor the private peasants were happy with this state of affairs, nor did it guarantee a solution of the main problems of Yugoslav agriculture. As far as the Communists were concerned, abandonment of collectivization left their leadership in the villages confused and often dispirited. 99 Many peasants feared resumption of discriminatory policies. Official statements contributed to the aura of uncertainty among both Communist and non-Communist peasants. For example, Slavko Komar, a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists and a Croatian agri-

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cultural expert, declared in August, 1954: "The line of our League of Communists in the countryside has not changed at all. . . . The final aims . . . are socialist reconstruction of agriculture and the establishment of full socialist relationships in the countryside. What is new is that we have changed the method and means of how to attain that goal. We have become much more realistic with respect to the time when we shall attain this goal." But in the same speech, Komar said: "The private sector of our agriculture is the important sector now. Particularly in the private sector interest in production is growing. . . . The task of the League of Communists in agrarian policy is to see to it that our peasants, no matter to which sector they belong, become modern agriculturists. . . 100 Komar's further statement, that "still certain remarks can be heard which confuse the uninitiated," might well have been a commentary on his own speech. Although Tito himself had assured private peasants that no further restrictions on land ownership beyond the 10-hectare limit was contemplated, 101 the author often heard peasants express fears on this score during the summer and fall of 1954, especially in Croatia. 102

EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION

The discrimination against peasants in the new system of producer representation in government, already referred to in chapter v, stemmed both from the fact that the total number of peasant members possible was based on a more or less arbitrary federal evaluation of their contribution to national income and from the exclusion from elections of peasants not in cooperatives. The distinction between the "socialist and private" sectors of the economy did not obtain in local people's committees, and district councils of producers were sometimes 204

THE

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AGRICULTURE

dominated by peasants up to 1955. In that year, however, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the regrouping of districts was, in effect, "gerrymandered" so as even here to give workers a more dominant voice. Table 7 gives the membership in federal and republic producers' councils in 1954. TABLE 7

Republic Serbia Croatia Slovenia BosniaHerzegovina Macedonia Montenegro Total

Federal industry

Agriculture

Total

Republic industry

Agriculture

Total

44 35 18

30 14 4

74 49 22

67 74 59

50 33 13

117 107 72

25 10 3

12 5 2 67

60 45 30 335

22 29 22 169

82 74 52

135

37 15 5 202

504

SOURCE: Leon Gerskovic, "The System of Producers' Councils in Yugoslavia," International Labor Review, Vol. LXXI (Geneva: 1955), p. 47.

To the extent that peasants were apolitical or eschewed political activity generally, they did not always consider this discrimination to be a grievance. Evidence of this was seen in a report of the Federal Election Commission that the proportion of eligible peasants in attendance at nominating meetings for councils of producers was only half that of industrial workers and craftsmen. Further, peasant participation in nominating meetings to name candidates for the general sufferage bodies was similarly low. The "essential cause" of this situation was said to "lie in the difference and degree of political consciousness" among the two groups.103 The more politically conscious among the peasants, particularly the private peasants, could not, however, help but be aware of the discrimination against them in connections with the important producers' councils. It was often extreme,

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not only at the federal and republic levels but also at the local level and was so even before the 1955 reorganization. The city of Zagreb, for example, although comparatively heavily industrialized, had within its jurisdiction large agricultural areas and many peasants. In the 1954 election to the Zagreb producers' council, only one out of ninety-five members chosen was a peasant. 104 In conversations with officials of the Croatian Republic Assembly, Cakovic was cited as an example of a district where there was active and popular participation in politics. The population of this district was overwhelmingly peasant. Yet of the forty-five members of the Cakovic producers' council in 1954, only fourteen were from agriculture. 105 Moreover, since the overwhelming bulk of agricultural members of the producers' councils came from general rather than peasant work cooperatives, they were often not actual peasants but managers and operators of the cooperatives' various subsidiary enterprises. 106 Indicative of this was Borba's comment that from general agricultural cooperatives "agricultural experts and progressive farmers have been elected in the majority of villages." 107 The semiexclusion of peasants from the government and the absence of federal or republic agricultural ministries had resulted in both formation of impractical policies and faulty administration, all to the detriment of the agrarian situation generally. For example, despite availability of new, easier credits to private peasants, few took advantage of them, one major reason being that there was no concentrated plan for "selling" the idea to peasants. 108 Politika, admitting that "the volume of present credits is below expectation," blamed it on the fact that peasants were too busy in the fields, on "insufficient information of agricultural producers, and on, to a certain extent . . . narrowness of regulations." 109 Another instance was the impact of the drought on the

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special advance prices paid for wheat. The payment of 10 dinars per kilo in advance carried with it a penalty of 20 dinars for nondelivery. As a result of the 1954 drought, many peasants were genuinely unable to deliver. Although time-extensions were sometimes granted, generally the penalty was assessed— via district people's committees—with resulting hard feeling among the peasants.110 Agricultural output was also hurt by an application of the 10-hectare-limit law, which grew out of an ignorance of agricultural problems. Markovic severely criticized implementation of the law. It did not become known until time for fall sowing which lands would go into the land pool, he declared. Further, he denounced local government commissions for delays in allocating the land and for failing to organize cooperatives to take it over. 111 In addition to all this, the socialist government, presiding over a comparatively uncontrolled economy, had difficulty coping with the peasants' urge for profit. Apparently ill-advised credit policies permitted excessive livestock purchases.112 There were repeated instances of peasants growing nonessential but more profitable crops, reflecting a failure of pricing policies. In one village, for example, a private peasant earned more money growing tobacco on 0.7 hectares of land than a neighbor received for wheat and corn raised on 7 hectares. In the same village, 7 hectares of garlic brought a higher return than that obtained from an adjacent 70-hectare holding under wheat. 113 Having decided perforce to rely on the private peasant producers and to remain devoted to decentralization, the Yugoslav Communists still might be able to overcome many of these difficulties by taking the peasants into the government in a meaningful way. Yet if they were to do so, they would jeopardize continued progress toward socialism, since the peas207

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ants generally were hostile or apathetic. The crisis in Yugoslav agriculture, however, was bulking so important that failure to increase production might be economically disastrous. SOCIALISM BY OSMOSIS The Yugoslav leaders had not faced up to this dilemma. Even privately, they minimized its significance and still insisted a gradual approach would work. Their policy appeared to be based on the hope that socialism would come to agriculture through a sort of socioeconomic process of osmosis. As explained by Kardelj, this was based on the following views: 114 1. Collectivization through force or any kind of pressure was abandoned because experience showed it would not work and it was contrary to principles of democratic socialism. 2. Socialism in the villages was necessary for a socialist Yugoslavia. However, socialism meant only "some form of cooperation," not necessarily the kolkhoz-type collective. 3. Any type of cooperative was "good," even a simple cooperative for buying seed. There was reason to have faith that cooperatives of some sort would develop, both because of economic determinism and because of the historical development of Yugoslav agriculture, that is, the zadruga. 4. The process of industrialization and socialization would bring this about. Peasants were inescapably a part of their society, like everyone else. In America, farmers had a capitalist orientation because America was capitalist. In Yugoslavia, as socialism develops, through industrialization and otherwise, Yugoslav peasants would come to have a socialist outlook. When this happened, the cooperative movement—and socialism—would be victorious. 5. What kind of cooperatives would develop, "we don't know. We are searching our way. One thing our experience

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with the Soviet Union has taught us is to beware of being dogmatic." 6. All this would take a long time, "maybe 25 or 50 years before socialism in the villages can win out." As far as agricultural policy was concerned, the main practical application of this Fabian approach was the encouragement of specialized cooperatives, participated in by private peasants, for limited purposes. Formation of such new, specialized cooperatives were authorized in January, 1954. By the end of that year, there were four hundred of them in existence. 115 However, general-type cooperatives, another form still encouraged by the government, not only failed to increase during 1954 but registered some decline.116 Yugoslav authorities continued to bank on greater development of specialized cooperatives as further industrialization permitted construction of storage space, slaughterhouses, refrigerators, sugar refineries, and processing plants. 117 Both the 1955 and 1956 social plans increased investment for agriculture, the latter boosting it by 19 per cent over 1955 while cutting industrial investment by 17 per cent,118 and the 1957 social plan called for still further increases for agriculture. 119 In 1957, Vladimir Bakaric, the party's top expert on agriculture, was still worried about the continuing crisis in agriculture, despite prospects that year for the best crop since 1948. It was not enough, Bakaric contended, to blame difficulties in agriculture "on the so-called administrative period," that is, the period of enforced collectives. From that time to the present, he declared, "much water has passed over the dam. And yet no revolutionary progress has been made in agriculture." Bakaric held that "we have not sufficiently investigated the causes of our failure so far." He thought the general backwardness of the country—especially of farming methods—was responsible. The way out, he indicated, was to make available 209

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—presumably to private peasants—"the most modern technical means in agricultures." And yet, at the same time, he urged further "stimulation of socialist forms," and stopped short of advocating concrete methods for increasing the size of private land holdings, without which it was difficult to see how "the most modern technical means" could be applied even if they were available.120 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Although discriminating against private peasants to force them into collectives, the Tito government's agricultural policy up to 1948 was temporized by its relationship to the peasants in the wartime Partisan organizations and the postwar Communist party and People's Front. Following Soviet criticism of their policy toward collectivization, in 1949, the Yugoslav Communists stepped up their drive to form peasant work cooperatives of the kolkhoz type. The failure of this policy more or less coincided with the development of the new approach to socialism, and the whole agricultural policy was modified in 1951. The 1951 policy called a halt to the use of force in forming collectives and began the dissolution of unprofitable cooperatives. Starting from this point, the Yugoslavs eased tax discrimination against private peasants and abandoned compulsory deliveries. However, continued opposition of peasants in and out of collectives, drought, and faulty agricultural policies aggravated the agricultural crisis. The government was then forced into the virtual abandonment of collectivization. A law enacted in the spring of 1953 permitted peasants to leave collectives at any time, taking their land with them. Within a year less than a thousand peasant work collectives remained. The government supplemented this law, however, with a measure requiring the sale 210

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of all private individual holdings in excess of 10 hectares and family holdings in excess of 15 hectares. These measures appeared at first to have the character of an agricultural NEP required by practical difficulties and only temporary in nature. Yugoslav Communists emphasized that socialization of agriculture remained the goal and that merely the methods had changed. However, finally, further deterioration of the agricultural situation in 1954 forced the recognition of the private peasant and what appeared to be the permanent abandonment of collectivization. Credit, price, and tax policies were adjusted to favor the private peasant. Although the Yugoslav Communists still insisted that socialism in the villages was necessary, they now saw it coming only voluntarily over a period of 25 or 50 years. Any association of private peasants came to be regarded as beneficial. The theory was that as industrialization and socialism progressed in the country, this would over the long run influence the outlook of the peasants in favor of socialist forms. There remained, however, an essential contradiction. Although the private peasant was now given more equitable economic treatment, sharp political discrimination against him remained in connection with producers' councils. Further, the government remained basically oriented toward industrial rather than agricultural problems, and decentralization had resulted in inadequate administrative machinery to deal with agriculture. This situation in turn produced both unworkable policies and faulty administration in the field of agriculture, which was becoming increasingly critical in Yugoslavia. The practical situation might be improved by taking private peasants meaningfully into the government, but this would jeopardize continued progress toward socialism. However, failure to surmount the crisis in agriculture would run the risk of economic disaster. Encouragement of specialized cooperatives with increased

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over-all investment available for agricultural purposes seemed to be the only practical application of the Yugoslav Fabian theories on how to socialize agriculture. Although it might be true that further industrialization would facilitate development of these, it was difficult to see how the present acute agricultural problems could be solved without increasingly favorable treatment of private peasants. (Adequate rainfall, of course, also would help.) Under these conditions, even if one does not agree with Lenin's dictum that private peasants breed capitalism every hour and every day, Kardelj's estimate of "25 or 50 years before socialism in the villages can win out" may be optimistic. On balance, the new agricultural policies, although they partly reflected the new Yugoslav attitude toward communism, were still ambiguous. Abandonment of forced collectivization as well as of the kolkhoz-type collective farm appeared to be permanent, but what, if anything, aside from the private peasant would take their place was still unclear. It could not be ruled out completely that, if favorable weather conditions markedly improved agricultural output, the Yugoslav leaders might again resort to economic discrimination against private peasants. Thus far, however, indications were to the contrary.

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X

reflections on titoism A F T E R NEARLY A DECADE OUTSIDE THE

Cominform, Tito's Yugoslavia stood somewhere between Soviet Communist totalitarianism and Western capitalist democracy. Although it had elements of each—with more of the Soviet system than of the Western—the post-Cominform Yugoslav system itself was neither. The changes that occurred in Yugoslavia after 1948 produced few departures from the essence of socialism, but differences from Soviet communism were evident in both theory and practice. Perhaps even more important, they were also evident in the changed psychological attitude that occurred. This change in psychology, born of the shock of expulsion from the Cominform, appeared to be fundamental and likely to withstand even later international developments involving a foreign policy rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

REFLECTIONS ON TITOISM

NATIONAL COMMUNISM The most obvious factor setting Yugoslav communism apart from communism in other countries was its complete independence from the Soviet Union. Yugoslav communism was national, rather than international, despite insistence that, theoretically, the Yugoslavs envisaged a world in the future that would be all Communist. The Titoists eschewed not only the theory of Soviet infallibility, and even of Soviet leadership, but also the concept of direct or indirect intervention in non-Communist countries and the concept of world revolution. They also rejected the Third International viewpoint that socialism of the Western European type is wrong. They established informal liason with Second International Socialist groups as a part of their belief that all countries were moving steadily toward communism in their own way and that one form of socialism was as good as another. At the same time, rejecting Bernsteinism, they insisted that the dictatorship of the proletariat might be necessary and communism must remain the ever-present goal.

THEORETICAL POSITION Perhaps the most basic theoretical difference the Yugoslavs had with the Soviet Union concerned the role of the state. Yugoslav theory insisted that socialism means the beginning of the "withering away" of the state and where there is no process of "withering away" of the state there can be no socialism. Stemming from this theory were differences also in the theory of ownership under socialism and in the theory of surplus value. Yugoslav dogma held that state ownership of the means of production—as in the Soviet Union—represents only the first and lowest form in the gradual devebpment of com-

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munism and if it continues it constitutes in itself an impediment to communism. Thus the Yugoslavs advanced the concept of national but not state ownership and of social but not state control. Rejecting Stalin's contention that Marx's theory of surplus value applies only in a capitalist state and not in a socialist state, the Yugoslavs contended that there is always surplus value. Under neither capitalist nor state ownership systems does surplus value accrue to the workers, and therefore, Yugoslav theory held, the Soviet system is only a form of state capitalism. These theoretical differences formed the basis for differences in economic organization. To eliminate state ownership and control, the Yugoslavs turned operation of factories over to councils elected by workers. Neither the workers nor their councils owned the factories; the factories were owned by the whole people. But the workers, rather than the state, controlled them while the state merely laid down principles of operation under which the workers shared in the surplus value they created. This was the essence of social democracy, as the Yugoslavs saw it.

DECENTRALIZATION To accomplish this, it was necessary to decentralize the economy and government. Decentralization was seen as "the first and most vital step toward democracy." There was no question that "this first and most vital step" had been taken in Yugoslavia, not as a temporary, utilitarian measure, but as a long-run, principled step. The highly centralized Soviet-type planning system was abolished, and in its place was created— within the limits imposed by socialism—a more or less freemarket economy, strongly influenced but no longer formally directed by the state. The 1953 constitution provided for newtype legislative bodies at all levels of government, each having

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one chamber composed of representatives elected directly by the workers, with special rights in economic legislation. T o guard against "bureaucratic evils," executive policy-making functions, lodged in a president and a federal executive council—named by the Assembly—were in theory separated from administrative functions, which were lodged in five government secretariats. Despite a new concept of federalism, which deemphasized the national divisions in Yugoslavia, republic autonomy was widened. And under the constitution all power not specifically delegated to the federal and republic governments resided in local people's committees. These people's committees became the basic administrative units in the country, with broad authority especially in the economy.

FAILURE OF COLLECTIVIZATION Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Communists saw the failure of their efforts at collectivization of agriculture. The relation of the Tito regime to the peasants had always been ambiguous, because of the role the peasants played in the wartime Partisan organization, the People's Front, and the Communist party itself. The serious drive to push Soviet-type collectivization began only in 1949. In 1951 an abrupt halt was called, and restrictions against private peasants were eased. At first this seemed to be only a temporary N E P line, but peasant resistance and a production crisis soon forced the government to permit the dissolution of collectives and finally to abandon discrimination against private peasants. Socialism in the villages and some non-Soviet types of cooperatives remained the goal, but even indirect pressure was abjured, and socialization of agriculture was seen as coming only over the long run, and as the result of socialism in the rest of the country.

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ROLE OF THE PARTY The significance of these developments cannot be properly assessed without looking at the role of the Communist party —in 1952 renamed the League of Communists. There was no question that the direction of the state was in the hands of the party and that the party was in the hands of its top echelon of leaders. To this extent, the position of the party in Yugoslavia remained the same as that of the party in the Soviet Union. Both in theory and methods of operation, however, important differences developed. Yugoslav theory held that, since the acute danger of counterrevolutionary activity had subsided, the party should relinquish its political monopoly and its position as the sole interpreter of Marxism. The party must not formally direct the state, as the Yugoslavs saw it, but operate only through its individual members as a part of a larger, national organization embracing various shades of opinion—the Socialist Alliance. The Yugoslavs saw bureaucratic dangers in the party as well as in the state. To alleviate them, they decreed an end of special privileges for party members. The party organization was to some extent decentralized so far as operations were concerned, with more autonomy granted to lower party bodies. Local party functionaries were ordered not to hold government posts, while the party generally disassociated itself from formal government direction. The party apparatus was drastically reduced and many of its functions eliminated or turned over to the Socialist Alliance. The party's role was to be confined to "ideological education" and its ideas were to be put into practice only as its members, because of their ability, secured leading positions in the government and economy. There was also advanced the concept that as the state "withered away" the party would also disappear.

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The new position decreed for the party produced widespread confusion among the rank and file of members, although in fact party control of the country was not substantially weakened. Evidence indicated that the Socialist Alliance was completely dominated by Communists and actually functioned only through their activities. Although a separation of function between party and government had been decreed, party views prevailed in the government at all levels. Even though direct intervention in factories had been abandoned, party control of workers' councils was assured by the tradeunion Sindikat and party factory committees. Where party members faltered in seeing to it that the party line was carried out, they were berated by the leadership. The party organization as such, however, was disrupted by the new concept of the party that had been put forward at the Sixth Party Congress in November, 1952. The following June, the Central Committee demanded a tightening of party discipline and a renewed emphasis on democratic centralism, declaring, in effect, that any talk about the "withering away" of the party was premature. It was the effort of Milovan Djilas to fight against this new trend that brought about his ultimate downfall and showed conclusively that, however much the role of the party might be changed, Yugoslavia was to remain a one-party state for the foreseeable future.

RELAXATION OF TOTALITARIANISM

At the same time, the over-all view of communism held by the party leaders had altered sufficiently to produce a relaxation of totalitarianism that was not evident in the USSR and the countries under its domination. The psychological impact of their ouster from the Cominform had shocked the Yugoslav Communists out of their rigid mould of thinking. Although communism remained their goal, they were no longer certain

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how to get there. They still used the dialectical method of reasoning, but they no longer talked about "object truth." Instead, they said: "We are searching for our way." They were still capable of pronouncing heresy—as witness the Djilas affair—but the area that constituted heresy had been narrowed, and even heresy itself was looked on as a less-drastic crime. It is doubtless true that this came about first because the Yugoslav leaders themselves were not only heretics but confused heretics, not sure precisely what they did believe. More freedom of expression was permitted in part simply because the leaders were not certain what they wanted to prohibit. But as time went on, this essentially negative attitude gave way to a more positive one, reflected in laws and institutions. Notable among these were a new criminal code, new laws on criminal procedure and on the courts, and a new election statute. These resulted in curbing the activities of the police, guaranteeing rights for persons accused of crime, increasing the independence of the courts, and creating the possibility of opposition candidates in elections. It is true that the extent to which these new measures were meaningful depended largely on the will of the government leaders to live up to them. It seemed clear that the regime would never permit them to stand in the way of coping effectively with any threat to its position, and in areas of potential threat, such as elections, operation of the new laws was carefully restricted. No matter how many democratic tendencies appeared, they did not stem from any belief in democracy or the democratic processes as such. Tito and his aides repeatedly made it clear that they were opposed to both Western-type democracy and Western democratic forms. This would seem to belie the belief held by certain American observers that the liberalizations in Yugoslavia were simply part of an attempt to please the West. Western influences were admitted, but basic Western political philosophy was time and

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again explicitly rejected. The increased freedom in Yugoslavia, therefore, was largely utilitarian and dependent on the fact that the regime did not consider it a threat. Yet this very fact provided soil in which the more liberal and humanized psychology of the Yugoslav leaders, which set them apart from their erstwhile comrades across the Danube, could grow and develop. In many ways, the Djilas affair was typical of the new Yugoslavia. As Tito himself more or less admitted, Djilas did little more than carry to their logical conclusion the ideas that Tito himself had enunciated. Yet these conclusions challenged the position of the ruling group. The names of those in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries who have been physically liquidated for lesser heresy are legion. But Djilas' offense was treated altogether as a party affair without physical penalties, and Tito, at least, spoke of it more in sorrow than anger. Only later when Djilas, now no longer in the party, gave a foreign press interview calling for a formal, organized opposition party, were criminal charges preferred. The secret nature of the Djilas-Dedijer trial almost certainly violated the criminal procedure act, yet other guarantees of liberty were observed. There was no pretrial imprisonment and no effort to extort a confession. Djilas and Dedijer had competent nonCommunist counsel. However, the language of the "hostile propaganda law," which Djilas and Dedijer were accused of violating, was broad enough to encompass almost any published criticism of the regime, and conviction was a foregone conclusion. The extreme lightness of the sentences, permitting both convicted defendants to go free, was an indication that the regime did not feel itself seriously jeopardized by their crimes. Since neither Djilas nor Dedijer had wide personal following in the country, the conclusion was understandable. It was difficult to see, therefore, what the regime had to gain by

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bringing the pair to trial and then persecuting them further. True, it served notice that there were definite limits to freedom of expression in Yugoslavia, but the way such notice was served—plus Borbas declaration that Djilas and Dedijer were still entitled to advocate their opinions, only not through foreign channels—could hardly be calculated in itself to frighten serious opposition—if such still existed—into inactivity. The same could even be said of the actual imprisonment of Djilas, although the nature of Yugoslavia's peculiar relationships with the USSR may have been a factor. That is to say, if Djilas and Dedijer did not constitute a threat, their trials were unnecessary, and even harmful, since they cast doubt on the regime's professions of democracy and called attention to ideas considered wrong. On the other hand, if they did constitute a threat, then the way it was met was inadequate. It was almost as if the Yugoslav leaders were still prisoners of a totalitarian mould—which made them act against dissent—but a mould so altered in shape as to be unable to serve the purpose for which it was originally intended. As far as political democracy is concerned, it would, perhaps, be unrealistic to expect more than this. It was highly doubtful if the objective conditions for successful "bourgeois democracy" existed in Yugoslavia. The same factors which Tito said made difficult worker-management—such as the low levels of culture and education—stood as impediments to democratic government. Moreover, there was also an absence of a democratic tradition in any Western sense and of a tradition of popular participation in politics as far as the masses of people were concerned. It was quite probable that a majority of the people of Yugoslavia—if some vehicle for determining their views existed— was not in favor of the Tito government. It was almost equally probable, however, that the number of Yugoslavs who would give support of some kind to the present regime was greater 240

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than the number who could agree on an alternative. Given the nationalistic particularisms and social and religious conflicts that have rent Yugoslavia in the past, it was far from clear what an alternative to Tito would be. A Western democrat might feel that the way to have democracy was to set up democratic reforms, no matter what. But the Yugoslav leaders, whatever else they might be, were not Western democrats. Because they were not, they feared— perhaps unduly—that a trend toward "bourgeois democracy" would be, as Djilas expressed it in the days before he began his campaign of dissent, "but a mask for turning back" to the "semifeudal" conditions which existed before World War II. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in 1957 Djilas, now not merely a non-Communist but a violent antiCommunist, ignored this earlier point of view more completely than its merits may warrant. In his book The New Class,1 he charged that the Yugoslav Communist leaders opposed political democracy only because it would jeopardize the perquisites of their position. The book, a series of vitriolic, denunciatory statements against all communism—Yugoslav no less than Soviet—contended that the ruling Communist groups in Eastern Europe were simply a new class of owners, acting just as previous owning classes had except that they were able to subjugate others to their will more completely because their monopoly of ownership was complete. Drawing on his own case, Djilas concluded that there was no real difference between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia because of the insistence on "obligatory ideological unity of the party" in both countries. ". . . this is the inescapable road of every Communist system," he maintained. "The methods of establishing totalitarian control, or ideological unity, may be less severe than Stalin's, but the essence is always the same." In Yugoslavia, he contended, even the Titoists' proudest claim to being more democratic—worker-management—is not

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valid because in the absence of "universal freedom" only "crumbs from the table and illusions have been left to the workers." "National communism is only communism on the decline." The New Class made a number of telling points against communism in general and Yugoslav communism in particular. However, some of the views of Djilas the extreme antiCommunist were as open to question as the views of Djilas the extreme Communist. Neither was altogether logical nor accurate. The system of worker-management in Yugoslavia— however much its practice might depart from its theory— could not be entirely gainsaid merely by polemics, nor could the decentralization and increase in freedom which accompanied it. Furthermore, although Djilas asserted that the "essence" of the Yugoslav and Soviet systems was the same, he later also insisted: ". . . the essential thing in every policy is first of all the means. . . ." And even Djilas admitted a difference of means as between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Without in the slightest condoning Djilas' shameful treatment at the hands of the Tito government or denying the validity of many of his arguments against communism in general, still The New Class had to be read as at least in part the reflection of the bitterness of a brashly courageous, defeated, and defiant man over the unhappy personal situation into which events had forced him. In any event, the real issue in Yugoslavia was not whether the regime was democratic. The real issue was whether the regime could continue to exist part totalitarian, part democratic. There seemed to be a major contradiction growing out of maintaining socialism and a one-party state and at the same time decentralizing the economy and government and permitting more freedom. The inability thus far to resolve that contradiction produced the ideological confusion that was one of the outstanding characteristics of Titoism. This contradiction was reflected particularly in three major 242

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problems. These concerned the decentralized economy, agriculture, and the party. PLANNING VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION The history of state planning so far has been that planning begets more planning and controls beget more controls. The Yugoslav innovations in the decentralized economy sharply reversed this trend. The so-called social plan still set production goals for major items of the economy, but it did not attempt to specify how much of each commodity must be produced by every factory. These decisions were left to individual workers' councils. Although ceiling prices were fixed for about a dozen commodities, prices generally depended on the law of supply and demand and were set by the workers' councils. So were wages and investment, although here the local people's committees had great influence through their taxing powers. The federal government sought to keep this decentralized economy on an even keel in the main by a series of incentive and penalty taxes, a flexible turnover tax, and control of the interest rate on bank credit, through which all industrial operations are financed. In addition, individual producing units were kept somewhat in line because workers' councils were in effect controlled by the Sindikat, which in turn was dominated by the Communist party and thus was an instrumentality for effecting the wishes of the government. The system has worked imperfectly. Generally speaking, industrial production increases approached desired goals, but serious imbalances in the economy resulted at the same time. To the extent that decentralization was real, the concept of a planned, socialist economic system was jeopardized. To the extent that the government intervened in the interest of maintaining a planned, socialist economy, the concept of decentralization was jeopardized. One big problem was the desire of individual workers' coun-

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cils to increase profits. This was natural not only because their wages depended on profits but also because the government, seeking greater and more efficient production, exhorted them to make greater profits. The easiest way to increase profits was to increase prices, and, despite indirect controls, prices and wages rose far out of line in many industries, affecting other industries adversely and raising havoc with the plan. Moreover, these monetary increases often did not reflect either increases in production generally or increases in desired types of production. Despite all efforts to guide them differently, workers' councils tended to pursue their own interests at the expense of others. Inflation, unemployment, uneconomic use of resources, and sometimes even cold and hunger were the results. The people's committees were clothed with more authority in an effort to combat some of these practices, but they themselves were neither able nor willing to cope fully with the situation. The presence of producers' councils at times resulted in connivance between workers' councils and local governments. In their efforts to build up local industry, people's committees often encouraged uneconomic investment. However, in seeking to increase local revenues, they sometimes taxed industries to the point where inadequate funds remained for operation and necessary investment. Government credit controls, a key feature of the social plan, had failed to stem the tide of increasing investment, and the reinstitution of wage norms was necessary to help limit rising wages. In an effort to make their system work properly, the Yugoslavs not infrequently resorted to direct government intervention, sometimes contrary to law, often contrary to principle. There is no question but that they have had to back down in some instances from the extreme decentralization originally decreed, and that they have tried to get around the effects of decentralization by the use of nongovernmental bodies such

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as unions, cooperative organizations, chambers of commerce, and the like. At the same time, they have insisted on maintaining generally the decentralized, free-market economy, with freedom for workers' councils to run their own enterprises, even when this produced adverse results. Thus, in a sense, they were captives of two seemingly incompatible theories. Trying to pursue them both simultaneously, it was little wonder that Vukmanovic-Tempo once felt the "entire system has entered a blind alley." The difficulties of decentralized socialism were enormously intensified by the poverty and backwardness of the economy. It might be that if the Yugoslavs succeeded in reaching a higher industrial level and overcoming their international financial difficulties, their system could afford its decentralization more easily. However, the very process of industrialization seemed likely to accentuate balance-of-payments difficulties because the area for increased exports was limited at the same time that the necessity for increasing raw material imports became greater.

SOCIALISM VERSUS THE PEASANT One way out of the dilemma might be found in agriculture, but here the Yugoslavs were up against another, and possibly even more important, manifestation of the major contradiction in their system. In a sense, it appeared that the Yugoslav Communists, since the failure of their efforts at collectivization, had more or less given up on agriculture. Nearly 70 per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture, and before the war Yugoslavia was a large exporter of agricultural products. Destruction from the war and difficulties with collectivization made agricultural exports impossible in the 1947-1949 period, but Cominform Yugoslavia broke even and did not have to import. A combination of severe droughts and mounting peasant

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resistance to collectivization efforts so reduced agricultural production that Yugoslavia has had to import wheat every year during the 1950-1955 period, and in increasing amounts. In 1954 these imports accounted for about 50 per cent of the balance-of-payments deficit of some $300,000,000, and Yugoslavia was forced to default on its international loans. In an effort to raise agricultural production, the government finally abandoned forced collectivization, dissolved most of the Soviet-type collectives, and ended most economic discrimination against private peasants. But, remaining Communists and being therefore opposed to the private peasant on principle, the Yugoslav leaders were not able to reconcile themselves to dealing with him positively. The result was that, although the government ceased trying to develop collectives, it had no real farm policy for a noncollectivized agriculture. This in part stemmed from, and in part caused, the additional anomaly that the private peasants—representing a sizeable majority of the population—were discriminated against politically. The area of this discrimination was in elections for the councils of producers, which overwhelmingly represented nonagricultural workers. Peasants were thus by and large left out of policymaking councils of Yugoslavia, while the leadership was dominated by professional Communists whose whole outlook was geared to emphasis on industry and the industrial proletariat. These factors produced unworkable agrarian policies that made it difficult if impossible to mobilize the resources of the villages—human and material—to boost agricultural production. However, the leadership apparently realized that, since the peasants as a group were backward and opposed to socialism, to take them into the government in any real sense would jeopardize the drive toward socialism and communism, to which the government was committed. The Yugoslav leaders, reversing Lenin's dictum, now contended that socialization of the country was necessary for so-

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cialization of the villages, rather than the other way around. The goal of socialized agriculture, manifested in cooperatives of some sort, remained, but it was to be achieved only through long-run, Fabian processes. The dilemma in which the Yugoslav Communists found themselves was that this policy of "socialism by osmosis" involved a risk of economic disaster unless it was supplemented by other policies that might interfere with socialism itself. Thus far there was a disposition to risk economic disaster rather than interference with socialism. It was difficult to see how the Yugoslavs could avoid ultimately facing up to the hard fact that the danger of the one involved the danger of the other.

TITOISM VERSUS THE VANISHING DIALECTIC The problem faced by the Communist party might be termed the problem of Titoism and the vanishing dialectic. It, too, grew out of the contradiction involved in trying to build socialism and expand individual liberty at the same time, but whereas the problems of the economy, generally, and of agriculture, were more or less operational in nature, the problem of the party involved the essence of political power. What might be called the Leninist method, according to which Cominform Yugoslavia operated, involved using the Marxian dialectic to determine "objective truth." This means there is a dialectical line toward socialism and communism which must be followed. The Communists, as experts in "Marxist science," are able to discover this line. But since the leaders of the party are—theoretically—the most skilled Marxists, they in fact determine the line within the limits of democratic centralism. Since they are therefore responsible for it, democratic centralism must be strictly observed, with no opposition to party decisions. This is the Leninist rationale for the dictatorship of the party leadership. 247

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However, as Kardelj admitted, the post-Cominform Yugoslav system added up to an abandonment of Leninism in both form and operational theory. The Yugoslavs were searching for their way and had no definite line. Whereas "truth" could be arrived at previously according to the dialectic, now it could be found only through free discussion in the party at all levels. This meant, as Djilas argued, abandonment of strict democratic centralism. Quite logically, a decentralization and democratization of the party organization was decreed, and it seemed at the time that this was a first step toward permitting free discussion in the party. But the trend stopped short of any relaxation of democratic centralism. The Central Committee was horrified when some members of the party continued to debate the correctness of government measures after they had been decided upon. And when Djilas, carrying the new theory of the party to its conclusion, advocated the formation of ad hoc opposition groups within the party, the leadership clamped down altogether. There could not be free discussion in the party once the top command had spoken. Leninist theory had gone, but the Leninist concept of the Communist party remained, although shorn of its theoretical justification. Underlying the whole structure of the Yugoslav reforms in general would seem to be a belief that socialism was now "safe" in Yugoslavia, that the masses of people, especially those favorably disposed toward socialism, could be relied upon to make their own decisions and still keep on the socialist path. In denouncing the ideas put forth by Djilas, Tito took the position that they would have meant "the end of our socialist reality." If he were right, then the premise on which Titoism has developed was questionable. Djilas charged that such a dictatorship as Tito and his aides were maintaining—freed of dialectical limitations—was bound to be capricious. If, as Kardelj has asserted, the party leader-

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ship was responsible for the reforms in Yugoslavia, then it was no less true that the party leadership was also responsible for the errors that had been made. The very confusion over the role and position of the party seemed to reflect confusion among the leaders themselves. Without dialectical guidance, and without the benefits of free discussion, they would be extraordinary dictators indeed if they were able to free themselves from the dilemmas, both theoretical and practical, in which they seemed to be entangled. One of the major questions of the twentieth century is whether it is possible to have a collectivist society and at the same time have political democracy. The Yugoslavs were trying to show that it is. Some of their innovations were highly encouraging, but they had not yet proved it could be done.

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X I a postscript on yugoslav foreign policy F E W THONGS BETTER nxustrate Yugoslavia's unique position as an independent socialist country than its foreign policy. If to many in the West it seemed that Yugoslavia had executed not one but two—or more—aboutfaces, in Belgrade it was held that "Yugoslavia's foreign policy has proved its consistency and principled character." 1

Sometimes, however, it was not easy to see the consistency. In 1948, Yugoslavia's relations with the West were perhaps the worst of any of the Eastern European countries in the Soviet hegemony. At swords' points with the United States over the shooting down of her aircraft, Yugoslavia was also the focal point of aid to Greek revolutionists, whose efforts to in-

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stall communism in Greece brought on the Truman Doctrine. In those days, the Yugoslavs saw the West as imperialist and aggressive and the world as irrevocably divided into hostile Communist and capitalist camps. A 1949 VIEW It has been emphasized in the foregoing pages that Yugoslavia did not withdraw from the Cominform but was expelled, that the break came on Soviet initiative, not Yugoslav. It was only after a year of the Cominform's bitter, violent campaign against Yugoslavia that the Tito regime became convinced that the breach with Moscow would be a lasting one. But even then, it is interesting to note, Tito refused to admit the possibility of friendly relations with the West. At the Third Congress of the People's Front in 1949, Tito denounced the "Western reactionary press" for "lies and fabrications [in saying] that we have no other course but toward the West." He ridiculed reports that "the American government is considering the question of giving aid to Yugoslavia, that Tito met with Western representatives." Such "lies and slanders against us," the Yugoslav Communist leader declared, are simply "fabrications" designed to widen as much as possible "the rift which was created by the Cominform Resolution [and] therefore no fault of ours." 2 Nor did Tito in 1949 fear aggression from the Soviet Union. "Tales . . . about a concentration of troops in the direction of Yugoslavia in the countries of the People's Democracies and the USSR, about our alleged troop movements in the frontier regions, etc.," he asserted, were only a "veritable hysteria of warmongering . . . [by] the Western reactionary press and over the radio, calculated to provoke fear and alarm in our country and to prevent peaceful work on the Five Year Plan. . . . All this is calculated to create a psychosis of war and

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distrust among the peoples of our country and the People's Democracies and the USSR." 3 U.S. AID A N D RAPPROCHEMENT

Then Tito asked: "Well, what now? Reaction in the West hates us. We are not loved in the East. Can we go on this way?" His answer, perhaps consistent if not quite accurate, as it turned out, was: "Of course we can, because we must, because at present there is no other way." 4 The "way out" came sooner than Tito expected. In part on the theory that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," the United States government was already cautiously working up to aiding Yugoslavia. In the early fall of 1949, the Export-Import Rank granted Yugoslavia a $20,000,000 loan. The Relgrade press, however, referred to it casually as "simply an ordinary commercial transaction." 5 Actually, the Yugoslav economy was in dire straits. Geared as it had been almost entirely to the East, the Soviet economic blockade brought it almost to a standstill. When economic distress was compounded by a severe drought in 1950, the need to survive won out over brave words. Direct American economic aid was hastily sought and accepted without dialectical shillyshallying. Thus Yugoslavia backed into a rapprochement with the West. It would be inaccurate to say that Western economic and military aid alone was responsible for the pro-Western Yugoslav foreign policy which began in 1950. Already, the Yugoslavs had begun to reëvaluate the Soviet doctrine of the inevitability of capitalist hostility. Rut their réévaluation was indisputably fostered by the largess of the United States and its allies, which, of course, proved the falseness of the Soviet theory, at least as far as Yugoslavia was concerned. 252

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A CHANGE OF VIEW The rapprochement with the West was, perhaps, not as curious as the change in Tito's views about the military threat from the Soviet bloc, which he had earlier declared did not exist. Late in 1950, he signed an agreement for continuing Western aid—both economic and military. And, accepting a U.S. military mission in Belgrade, he declared that the USSR was "a menacing threat to our country and world peace." 6 Whereas in 1949 it was denied that satellite troop concentrations menaced the country at all, a later military evaluation declared that "ceaseless sabre rattling on the frontiers of Yugoslavia" had "been pursued ever since the appearance of the Cominform Resolution." Particularly, concentrations of Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian troops were now said to "have been going on all the time since 1949. . . ." And it was held that "such encampments and manoeuvres . . . provide sufficient evidence of the aggressive designs of the satellite countries and the USSR." 7 Early in 1950, when Moscow's anti-Yugoslav crusade was at a high pitch, Belgrade still saw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as "a provocative force." 8 But a year later Tito spoke of NATO as "the logical consequence of Soviet policy" and pledged collaboration with the Atlantic Pact countries on "all questions of an international character . . . where there is no conflict with our principles."9 At the same time, asked what the United States got in return for its aid to Communist Yugoslavia, he replied cryptically: "The United States gets several years."10 It is difficult to discount entirely the possibility that at least part of the changed Yugoslav attitude about the danger of Soviet military aggression was determined by the belief that

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there existed a close connection between American economic aid and the apparent necessity for military assistance. Although now frankly speaking of the dangers of military aggression from the Soviet bloc, Tito at the end of 1951 still turned a cold shoulder on Western attempts to nudge him into a Balkan alliance. "Even today," the marshal stated, "we say that we do not wish to create any pacts, not even a regional pact with Greece and Turkey." 11 But two years later Yugoslavia joined with Greece and Turkey in signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In August, 1954, the Balkan Pact was signed, uniting the three countries in a military alliance. In October, 1954, Tito declared: "We regarded the Balkan Alliance from the beginning as an absolute, vital necessity for the Balkan countries." Although he said "the military element [of the Balkan Pact] is not of primary importance," he carefully warned against "underestimating its significance for the prevention of aggression. . . ." 12 The Balkan Pact, joining Yugoslavia with two countries belonging to NATO and having a clearly anti-Soviet orientation, was all the more remarkable because, even before it was concluded, the trend toward what Belgrade called "normalization of relations" with the Soviet Union had begun—on Moscow's initiative. And at the same time that Tito hailed the Balkan Pact as "an absolute, vital necessity," he also declared: "This beginning of normalization [with the USSR] fills us with hope that the process will continue to develop." 13 This seeming ambivalence on Yugoslav foreign-policy views doubtless reflected the anomaly of Yugoslavia's position as a Communist nation outside the general Communist community as well as the unclearness of the new Yugoslav ideology generally. Unquestionably the scorn of the rest of the Communist world was difficult for the Yugoslav Communists to take. Fur-

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thermore, as suspicious as he was of the Soviet Union, Tito never entirely lost his suspicions of the anti-Communist West, nor ceased to be embarrassed at having been forced by circumstances to rely, at least in part, on an anti-Communist coalition. Speaking of the Atlantic Pact, Tito phrased his dilemma this way: . . . The Atlantic Pact is increasingly becoming painted with a political, that is, an ideological color—its fight against communism. They say it is just against Soviet communism, but it is more than that. . . . We are painted with a socialist complexion, and there is no room for us in a bloc which has an antisocialist tendency. But we are cooperating to some extent with the Atlantic Pact . . . on questions pertaining to the preservation of our country and that of other countries here in the Balkans. 14

THE TREND TOWARD "NORMALIZATION"

The early Soviet overtures toward "normalization" were met not only with hope but also with caution in Belgrade. Having tended to blame most of their troubles with the USSR on Stalin, the Yugoslav Communists were not altogether surprised by a new approach on the part of his successors. They did not discount the possibility that it was only a Soviet tactic. A 1951 foreign analysis had described the Soviet Union as a country in which "political and ideological somersaults are practicable with greater ease, thanks to the impotence of public opinion. . . ." 15 But Tito was sure he could not be fooled. Referring to foreign suspicions that "offers for normalization conceal a trap," Tito declared: "If anybody is called upon to judge about this, then it is we, with our experience, who have the greatest right to it, as we know how to distinguish between a maneuver and a positive step." 16 Furthermore, Tito began emphasizing his theory that tactics

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can have a great impact on strategy. 17 And by the fall of 1954 he had apparently become convinced that if the Soviet overtures had begun as a tactic they now reflected a basic, strategic policy. He said the days of the Soviet Union being considered a "highly menacing, aggressive power" were "now over." And, referring to the reéstablishment of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc, he added: "We are not a people who brood. . . . We have said, let bygones be bygones." 18 Although Tito was careful to point out that Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet bloc would "never again be 100 per cent of what they once were," a trade agreement signed with Moscow in the fall of 1954 was a harbinger of things to come. One factor unquestionably was that the Yugoslavs believed by the end of 1954 they had, with substantial Western aid, gotten over the economic hump and that, with the new Soviet policy, there was now a chance of gain from the East. Not only did they no longer feel menaced by Moscow, but now they saw the hope of collecting millions of dollars worth of goods paid for before the Cominform break but not delivered as a result of the Soviet-imposed blockade. "Today," Tito said in September, 1954, "we are not in any desperate position." 19

TITO A N D THE WESTERN REACTION

Nevertheless, Tito worried about the Western reaction to the new trend of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. At the time of the trade negotiations, he sent emissaries to the United States Embassy in Belgrade to pledge that no exports of strategic materials would be involved, and the Yugoslavs did turn down attractive Soviet offers to buy mercury, lead, and zinc.20 "Normalization," explained Tito, in referring to Western fears, would be "a contribution to peace." But "normaliza-

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tion" could not be by "words alone" on the part of the Soviet countries. It was necessary for them "to prove [their new intentions] in deeds as well. . . . We cannot merely embrace one another and say we love each other as though everything is now over. No, this normalization cannot and must not disturb our present foreign policy. . . . We will [not] change our relationships with the countries of the West with which, during our most difficult moments, we have . . . developed cooperation. . . . Nothing shall change with us; we shall continue to cooperate with them as we have done so far. Nor can this normalization have any influence upon our domestic policy. This normalization must exclude all interference in internal affairs of others." And Tito asked: "Can anyone, no matter what side they are on . . . object to this?" Tito believed, obviously, they could not, particularly as he emphasized: "Normalization cannot and must not change our present foreign policy. We will not change our relations with the West. We must in the future continue our policy of friendship and cooperation." 21 Again, at the end of 1954, Tito, stressing that "normalization" was initiated "by the Soviet Union followed by the other Eastern countries, but not by our country," warned Moscow and reassured the West as follows: W e have already said, and we repeat it today, as I want to make it clear to the other side, namely the Soviet Union and the Eastern countries, that we cannot improve our relations with them at the expense and to the detriment of our relations with the Western countries, that they must realize once for all that we are conducting our own policy, that we cannot quarrel or break off our relations with the Western countries or permit the relations we have created with them so far to deteriorate for the sole purpose of improving our relations with the East. We cannot now retract all we have said and done so far. . . . Western countries like the United States, Great Britain and France . . . have not shown themselves

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A POSTSCRIPT ON YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY to be our enemies: they have proved to be friends in need. W e therefore consider them as such and have no reason to sever, nor the slightest intention of severing, our relations with them. 22

A note of exasperation crept into his voice, however, when in the spring of 1955, again taking cognizance of Western worries, he told the Yugoslav Federal Assembly: Some people in the world are seriously worried because of normalization with the Soviet Union and the Eastern countries and make various predictions and speculations about what it means. It only means that we have agreed to that normalization in keeping with the basic principles of our foreign policy. 23

Two months later, Tito promised that forthcoming negotiations in Belgrade with the Soviet leaders would be open "before the whole world," and pledged that he had "no intention of maneuvering behind the scenes at the expense of someone else." Western observers, he said, "who imagine . . . that we will no longer be what we are will be mistaken." And Tito added: . . we are grateful to the Western allies, particularly America, which extended and continues to extend us aid. . . . " 2 i Although Tito clearly wanted "normalization," he did not want it badly enough to mince words with the Russians. Even as the Soviet campaign for rapprochement gained momentum, Tito sharply criticized not only the satellite leadership but also Foreign Minister Molotov for continuing to imply that Belgrade as well as Moscow had altered its policy. Bluntly labeling Molotov's statement "not in keeping with the facts," Tito half-threatened to halt the "normalization" process. He said: W e consider this as an attempt to hush up the actual before their peoples, and this again at our expense. It is time matters were explained as they really are and as developed, instead of stopping normalization halfway

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continuing to create doubts among our peoples. Such manifestations . . . check this process which anyhow is not easy after all that has been done to our country and after all the insults which we had to endure through no fault of our own.25 THE KHRUSHCHEV-BULGANIN VISIT Even the Yugoslavs were startled, however, by the ardor of the Soviet wooing. When it was announced that Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Soviet Communist party, and Nikolai Bulganin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, would visit Belgrade in June, 1955, "many people," Tito said, "were extremely surprised." 26 They were also surprised at the dramatic, humbling spectacle presented by the two heads of the USSR confessing error and asking forgiveness. From Tito down, the Yugoslav leaders met Soviet warmth and ebullience with caution and reserve. Ignoring Khrushchev's public plea for a resumption of party ties, Tito stressed that the relationships were only between governments. Although Khrushchev called Tito "comrade," the Yugoslav leader was scrupulously careful to refer to Khrushchev simply as gospodin, or mister. But the Russian penitents made all the right responses. On the eve of their visit, Tito undertook to explain his foreign policy. It was, he said, a policy of "active coexistence." This meant that Yugoslavia welcomed the opportunity "to develop the best possible relations with all countries which are prepared to recognize the principles of independence and equality." 27 As a result of the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit, accompanying policy declarations in Pravda 28 and the Belgrade Agreement, concluded between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders, the Yugoslavs considered that the Soviet Union now recognized "the principles of independence and equality." Tito saw the new Soviet leaders as "men who wish to follow a new path," and he was "convinced that the Russians want peace no less

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than the Americans. . .

POLICY

H e described the talks with

Khrushchev and Bulganin this w a y : They convinced themselves that Yugoslavia was independent and that she wanted to remain independent, both of West and East, that she had her own road of development, that she could not permit any interference in her internal affairs, etc. They agreed with this position, and we were consequently able to find a common language. It then became easier to take up the questions of our future cooperation, economic and otherwise.30 The Belgrade Agreement emphasized the Yugoslav positions of noninterference in the affairs of other countries, "peaceful coexistence," and condemnation of aggression as well as efforts at political and economic domination. But it also brought the Yugoslavs closer to some Soviet foreign-policy positions. It called for prohibition of atomic weapons and admission of Communist China to the United Nations and referred to the "legitimate rights" of Peking to Formosa. 31 Both sides announced that the Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel was over. "Normalization" was an accomplished fact. FRIENDSHIP FOR WEST REITERATED Hardly had the Belgrade Agreement been signed when Yugoslavia hastened to assure the United States once again that neither a return to its old satellite status nor any lessening of friendship for the West was involved. Secretary of State Dulles was invited to Belgrade for talks with Tito. The Western reaction to the Belgrade Agreement had been mixed but hardly enthusiastic. In London, Paris, and Athens, the foreign offices expressed themselves as satisfied that Yugoslavia retained its independence. The U.S. State Department spokesman was "gratified at the apparent acceptance of the USSR of Yugoslavia's independence . . . " 3 2 But privately many American officials had their doubts, and Ambassador

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POLICY

Riddleberger was summoned from Belgrade to report. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were openly critical. Speaking of Tito, one said: "I never trusted the guy." And another, calling for reconsideration of funds for Yugoslavia in the foreign-aid bill then pending before Congress, asserted that the Belgrade Agreement was a "tip off" that Tito was lining up "squarely against us and the United Nations." 33 As eager as they seemed to keep close relations with the United States, the Yugoslavs indicated some pique at American questioning of their new policy. Almost as if to advise Secretary Dulles in advance, a semiofficial statement on the eve of his visit declared: The announced visit of the American foreign secretary to Yugoslavia has given rise to various speculations and conjectures about American-Yugoslav relations. Some of these views are so deeply imbued with the bloc mentality that they are unable to comprehend the independent attitude of Yugoslavia, their sole concern being to establish the exact position of Yugoslavia, i.e., whether she is in the West or slipping Eastwards. It would probably be futile to try to explain to such people the independent position of a country whose policy is not bound to any side nor depends on any. 34

However, the same commentary added that even with differing social systems "two friendly countries can entertain different views on certain political events in the international sphere." Such differences did not have "to imply breach of friendship" but could be "rather an opportunity for better mutual acquaintance." "Ill-intentioned elements" might "assign undue significance to such minor difficulties or differences of view" but "such a tendency to make mountains out of molehills never occurred in our relations with the U.S.A." 35 In Belgrade, Mr. Dulles, speaking over Radio Belgrade, told the Yugoslavs: "More than once your people have made it plain that they will not be anyone's satellite. We applaud this

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A POSTSCRIPT ON YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY stand." 3 6 A joint Tito-Dulles communique issued after the discussions was reserved but spoke of "further effort toward expansion of friendly cooperation between the two countries." 3 7 Yugoslav publications hailed "friendship between the United States and Yugoslavia." 3 8 Yugoslav analysis of the talks noted that "the two statesmen did not discuss any question which could produce some practical consequences," and seemed primarily concerned that Dulles' presence showed that "the position of Yugoslavia has received the final acknowledgement from America's foreign policy" and that "Yugoslavia's independent and non-bloc position is recognized." But it was also concluded that the talks were "a step toward closer friendship between the two countries" and "another proof of the realism of American foreign policy." 3 9

CRITICISM OF PACTS One of the most obvious differences between Yugoslav and American foreign policy was the constant Belgrade criticism of military pacts. This included the Atlantic Pact cautiously, the Warsaw Pact even more cautiously and, not cautiously at all, the Baghdad Pact, to which Yugoslavia's fellow Balkan Pact member, Turkey, was a signatory. 40 Although the Yugoslav concept of "active coexistence" officially excluded "neutralism," which, it was held, "would only aid the aggressor in his intentions," 41 Tito constantly made a big point of friendship and cooperation with India, Burma, Egypt, and other noncommitted countries. He regarded this informal alliance not as a "third force," which would be "nonsense . . . when neither we nor they have the necessary armaments," but rather as a "moral force consisting of all those who love peace and freedom." 4 2 This was generally considered neutralism in the United States. The difference over pacts, however, Bel-

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grade insisted, still should not mar friendship between Yugoslavia and the pact nations. 43 IMPACT OF THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS If any serious doubts lingered in the minds of Tito and his ideologues that the Kremlin had sincerely changed its ways, they were, apparently, dispelled by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The policies enunciated at the congress, to which Tito sent "comradely greetings" and at which he had an observer, changed Soviet-Yugoslav relations from that of formal accord to that of real intimacy. Certainly the pronouncements at the congress regarding independent paths to socialism were precisely in line with Yugoslav policy, and some of the charges leveled against Stalin had been heard in Belgrade for six years previously. Kardelj, heralding the congress as "a positive and decisive move," also saw the relaxation of certain totalitarian features and the trend toward administrative decentralization as bringing the Soviet Union closer to the Yugoslav position.44 And as regards international relations generally, a semiofficial commentator declared that the Twentieth Congress "came very close to a correct appraisal of the world situation." 45 Mose Pijade, president of the Federal Assembly and one of the originators of Yugoslavia's anti-Stalinist theories, was most enthusiastic of all. Of the congress, he said: "Such a decisive and daring breach with Stalinism can be taken as firm proof of the deep and significant changes in the Soviet Union. We Yugoslavs have many reasons to be satisfied." 46 The Yugoslav appraisal of the congress was not totally without reservations, however. Kardelj, for example, was careful to note that internal administrative changes announced in connection with the affair "do not seem to produce many new 263

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things of principle" and pointed out that "many other aspects [of socialism] were not elaborated on by the Congress." 47 Another commentary, although asserting that "a change has taken place in the Soviet Union's views," cautioned: "It is true that every new conception must be tested in practice before any definite judgment can be passed on it. . . ." 4S Still another Yugoslav analyst, noting Western views that the new Soviet policy "is only a well-masked Stalinist policy and, as such, all the more dangerous," declared: "We have no intention here to refute such interpretations and forward arguments in support of other views; and, what is more, this would not be theoretically possible." 49 However, when Milovan Djilas, the deposed Yugoslav Communist leader, a short time later wrote a series of articles for the International News Service, attacking Khrushchev and warning that the new Soviet policies were essentially tactical while the Soviet system itself remained "aggressive in content," 50 there was no hesitation in denouncing him violently. Borba accused Djilas of "base slanders and dirty insinuations," 51 while Politika termed his articles "wicked, malicious and reactionary." 52 Belgrade's position on the Soviet Party Congress clearly was that, regardless of the exact significance of the changes in the Soviet Union, the changes were for the better and should be applauded. One Yugoslav review, pointing out that even before the congress "there were certain indications and signs which showed . . . the Soviet Union was approaching a revision of its earlier positions," contended: What is important is to recognize facts as they exist, to appraise them correctly, for that is essential for determining one's own attitude and action, and finally, also for the cause of war and peace. . . . To admit that changes of a fundamental nature are taking place in the Soviet Union, and that they lead in a direction which is diametrically opposed to 264

A POSTSCRIPT ON YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY that of the Stalinist era, would not and need not mean anything else but a recognition of the facts as they really exist. That is the least that can be expected of those who still view events with so much reserve. 53

The significance of what the Twentieth Party Congress did not do seemed further eclipsed when, two months later, the Cominform was dissolved as no longer meeting "new conditions." The announcement, although it praised the Cominform's work, called on Communist parties now to cooperate "at their own discretion and taking into account specific conditions of their work."04

AN IMPORTANT CONTRADICTION

There was logical reason for Yugoslav restraint. For when Kardelj declared that "many other aspects [of socialism] were not elaborated upon by the Congress," he seemed to be touching, at least indirectly, on an important theoretical contradiction between the official Yugoslav ideology on the one hand and the new rapprochement with the Soviet Union on the other. Yugoslav theory as elaborated since 1948 had held that the Soviet Union deviated from Marxism-Leninism not only because it denied the right of other countries to choose their own paths to socialism but also because of the structure of Soviet society. A state is not socialist unless it begins "to wither away," according to the Yugoslavs. Mere state ownership of the means of production, unless it rapidly changes, is "state capitalism." Because the Soviet state was not "withering away" but getting stronger and because it was therefore not really socialist but state capitalist, the USSR was held to have strayed onto the path of imperialism and to have become a danger to the world.55 Manifestations of peaceful intentions, admission of the right of each country to organize its socialist system as it sees 265

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fit, liberalization of totalitarianism, and denunciation of Stalin did not change the basic structure of the Soviet Union from a Marxist point of view, which sees ownership and control of the means of production as the basic—indeed the sole—determining factors. Analyzing Stalin's statements to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, a Yugoslav commentator declared that there was "no prospect of Soviet foreign policy becoming peaceful and ceasing to be imperialistic." And the commentator added: "These things should be viewed through the prism of internal policy of the Kremlin, if there is a wish to avoid wrong conclusions." 56 In Yugoslav Marxist theory, the decisive step in the New Yugoslav system came when state control of production and distribution of surplus value ended and management of factories was placed in the hands of workers. In 1957 Moscow had begun to decentralize its administrative bureaucracy, but even then there was no indication whatsoever of relinquished state control in the Yugoslav pattern. The contradiction was all the stronger when Tito, visiting Moscow much as a conquering hero in the summer of 1956, heralded the "Leninist policy of the government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" and referred to "the two countries marching along the path of Marx, Engels and Lenin." 57 Tito now looked forward to relations with the Soviet party. The Soviet leaders were no longer gospodin; now they were definitely "comrades." 58 And at the same time, Veljko Vlahovic, the Yugoslav expert on relations with foreign Communist parties, acclaimed the Twentieth Congress as the most important event in Soviet history since the October Revolution and predicted: "A further development of Socialist forces and Socialist social relations is inevitable." 59 There appeared to be two explanations for the fact that the Yugoslav stand on Soviet development contradicted Yugoslav

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theory. One, and most important, probably, was that Tito now saw himself as occupying a role of pivotal importance in the Communist world and intended to use it to influence the direction of the entire Communist movement along the Yugoslav path. He then saw the Kremlin divided between "Stalinists" and "anti-Stalinists," and it seemed to be his hope that by heralding the policies of Khrushchev and Bulganin as a return to "true Leninism" he could bolster support for the "antiStalinist" forces.60 Such efforts were seen not only as working for "true socialism" but also working for peace by helping to promote understanding between the Communist world and the West. 61 On the way back from Moscow, Tito stopped off in Bucharest, where his influence was apparent in a communique issued after talks with Gheorghiu-Dej and other Rumanian Communists.62 Further, apparently, the Yugoslav Communists anticipated that the new Soviet approach would lead toward decentralization of fundamental proportions. As indicated above, Kardelj was encouraged by certain administrative decentralizations in the Soviet Union. The significance of the Twentieth Congress, Kardelj said, lay not only in "decisions it concretely formulated but also in the processes it initiated or stimulated by its decisions." 63 The communique issued in Moscow at the time of Tito's talks with the Soviet leaders dealt specifically with both government and party relations. And it pledged the two Communist organizations to make a "comprehensive mutual study of Socialist development in the two countries."64 The Yugoslav Communists well knew the Soviet system, large chunks of which they had discarded. It was primarily the Russians, they felt, who had something to learn from a "comprehensive mutual study."

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INDEPENDENCE—WITH A DIFFERENCE There was no doubt that the Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations of July, 1956, brought the two countries closer together. "Our friendship is based on common aims and mutual understanding," declared Khrushchev. And Tito responded by saying: "We have easily found a common language and mutual understanding. . . . Our ways differ from your way, but that does not mean that our aim is not the same." 65 Despite all this, however, there was no indication that either the Yugoslav government or the Yugoslav party intended to give up any of their hard-earned independence. Tito's added comment about party relationships—that they would be "just as we have relations with Socialist parties and other progressive movements"—seemed to preclude any formal relationship of the Cominform type. Yugoslav spokesmen in Moscow hastened to correct reports that Tito had described Yugoslavia as "part of the Soviet family." What he said was: . . we are part of the same family—the family of Socialism." 66 The communique brought Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet position on German unity, calling for negotiations between East and West Germany. But when Marshal Zhukov hailed Yugoslavia as a military ally, Foreign Secretary Popovic asserted quickly that no military alliance with the USSR was planned. 67 And even as he was enjoying the Kremlin's lavish hospitality, Tito once more declared the constancy of his friendship for the United States and reiterated that internally as well as externally Yugoslavia would stick to its independent path. 68 In the years between 1948 and 1955, Yugoslavia, perhaps, could have been called neutral, but neutral for the West and against the Soviet Union. By 1956 her neutrality was not

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against the West but was, if not actually for the USSR, at least not against it. The Yugoslav explanation was simply that Moscow had changed its policies to fit the Yugoslav position. Moreover, seeing the East-West division becoming less important in the future, the Yugoslavs could minimize the significance of this new relationship for Western interests. None of it, in any event, seemed to imply serious departures, if any, from the new ideologies and practices mapped out in Belgrade after the Cominform break, but it was clear that independence in step with the rest of the Communist world was a preferred state. Some might doubt Tito's statement to the Soviets that he always "believed the time would come when everything separating us would be overcome and when our friendship would receive a new and still more firm foundation." But there was no mistaking his satisfaction when he proclaimed: "This time has come." 69 As it turned out, however, this statement was a little premature. Tito's satisfaction, of course, was neither all ideological nor all idealistic. As a result of "normalization," Yugoslavia benefited handsomely in a material way. In addition to receiving goods previously paid for and concluding large and beneficial trade agreements, Yugoslavia obtained during the first half of 1956 nearly $300,000,000 in credits from the Soviet bloc, at an interest rate of only 2 per cent. Total Soviet assistance of all sorts from July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1957, was valued at $465,000,000.™ At the same time, American aid to Yugoslavia had continued, although reduced in volume. Many indeed would consider an understatement the modest boast made by the Yugoslav undersecretary for foreign affairs when he declared: "Our foreign policy, it seems to me, can be satisfied with the results it has been achieving. . . ." 71

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THE IMPACT OF TITOISM The visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin made it clear that Titoism had had an impact on the rest of the Communist world that few would have predicted in 1948. The recognition of it by the Soviet leaders made the impact much greater. But if they thought that by giving in to Yugoslavia they could use the Titoism there to combat Titoism abroad they were sadly mistaken. Hardly had Khrushchev and Bulganin returned from Belgrade in 1955 than the Poles were taking them at their word about independent paths to socialism. 72 The Polish Communist leadership tried in vain to head off the nationalists by a variety of reforms, but the Poznan riots in June, 1956, spelled their defeat. Gomulka became the "Polish Tito." The Yugoslav press hailed his advent to power as a "great victory for socialism." 73 In Hungary there were also stirrings, but in Hungary there was neither a Tito nor a Gomulka. Following the hard-line Stalinist Rakosi, there was only Gero, and then Nagy. The Russians tried hard to get Tito to support Gero, and he did so, despite his view that "Gero differed in no way from Rakosi," because he "hoped that by not isolating the Hungarian party we could more easily influence that country's development." 74 But developments in Hungary had gone further than Tito realized. Hardly had Gero returned from a visit to Belgrade in the fall of 1956 than the bloody and tragic Hungarian uprising broke out. Twice Soviet troops poured into Budapest to put it down. There was little doubt that the Yugoslav Communists were stunned by this affair. They were also put in a very difficult position. They felt themselves threatened not only by the ruthless action of Soviet troops. They also felt themselves threatened by the strength of an anti-Communist uprising in a coun270

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POLICY

try on their very borders. The Yugoslav newspaper reports of the situation in Hungary were usually accurate and sometimes vividly so.75 From Brioni, Tito rushed up the Istrian Peninsula to give the line in a now-famous speech at Pula. The line was in many ways typical: it was logical and ambivalent at the same time, and it fit neatly the needs of Yugoslav foreign policy at the moment. Tito frankly condemned the Soviet Union, not only for forcing Gero onto the Hungarians but also for armed intervention. But he did so in a way that perplexed many. In fact, he seemed to blame the Hungarians, Gero and Nagy, respectively, more than he did the Russians.76 There were, as Tito pointed out, two uprisings and two Soviet interventions. Tito distinguished sharply between them. The first uprising, he declared, was by "progressive elements" understandably fighting against Stalinism. It was a "fatal mistake" for the Gero government to call on Soviet troops for help, he said, and for the Kremlin to have answered the call was "absolutely wrong." There was no question in Tito's mind that both uprisings were spontaneous. The first Soviet intervention, he said, "had the effect of still further enraging the people. . . . They were no longer interested in the kind of independence they would gain, in whether there would be restored a bourgeoisie and reactionary system, but only that they should be nationally independent. It was this idea that prevailed among the people." But this second uprising was soon taken over by "reactionary elements," and Nagy, who replaced Gero after the first flare-up, was unable to cope with them. As a result, "the justified revolt and uprising against a clique turned into an uprising of the whole nation against socialism and against the Soviet Union." Had this second Hungarian uprising been successful, in Tito's opinion, "it was clear that there would be a terrible massacre [of Communists], a terrible civil war, in which socialism

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could be completely buried and out of which a third world war could break out . . . because the renewed coming to power of the Horthyites and the old reactionaries could not have been tolerated by the Soviet government." Reiterating that he was against "the interference and use of foreign troops," Tito saw the choice as between the lesser of the evils: . . chaos, civil war, counterrevolution and a new world war, or the intervention of Soviet troops. . . ." For Tito the choice was clear: "If it meant to save socialism in Hungary, we shall have to say, although w e are against the interference, that the Soviet intervention was necessary." That is why, Tito explained, that he was "deeply convinced" that the Soviet intervention was not "a purely interventionist action." Whatever one may say about Tito's reasoning here, it raised the question of whether his position involved a contradiction of the Yugoslav theory on just and unjust wars, referred to in chapter iii. In elaborating that theory, Kardelj specifically excluded from the category of "just wars" attempts of "the Soviet Union . . . to bring happiness to other peoples by forcing its political system and hegemony on them." Tito's stand on the second Soviet intervention was doubtless based more on the practical political situation than on theory. That is, apparently he was convinced that Western support of an established anti-Communist Hungarian government would pose such a threat to the Soviet Union that the Kremlin, right or wrong, would intervene and this would involve the risk of a third world war. There was also the implication, however, that intervention to save socialism was somehow different than other kinds of intervention. Once again, at least in nonCommunist Western eyes, there seemed to be an element of schizophrenia in Yugoslav foreign policy. Although Djilas' conclusion that the Hungarian events spelled the doom of communism—along with his attack on the ambiguity of Tito's stand—brought down on him the jail

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sentence that had been hanging over his head for two years, in some ways Djilas' position was not too different from Tito's.77 In the events in Hungary, Tito mourned, "socialism has been dealt such a terrible blow. It has been compromised." Tito added, however—presumably for the benefit of the Kremlin: "Do you not recall, comrades, that we often said that such methods would only compromise socialism? We did say that. I should not now want us to beat our breasts and say gleefully, 'We told you so.'" 7 8 THE POST-HUNGARY PERIOD If Tito thought that by these attempts at understanding sympathetically the Soviet Union's point of view he could avoid marring his good relations with the Kremlin, he was mistaken. Angered, apparently, by Tito's criticism, the Soviets soon came to feel that Yugoslavia had a great responsibility in the Hungarian uprising. Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1957 took a turn for the worse. Soviet and satellite spokesmen, in fact, became so critical of Yugoslavia at one point that Tito compared the attack to that following the Cominform Resolution.79 Addressing the Fifth Plenary Session of the Socialist Alliance in April, 1957, Tito blamed the new difficulties onto the fact that "our Soviet comrades" were irritated because Yugoslavia would not affiliate with the "Socialist bloc." The shift in Soviet attitude raised the question, Tito declared, "Can we ever again trust them . . . ?" To answer no, he concluded, would be a mistake because "one day, we hope not in the too distant future, this improper, insincere and uncomradely behavior toward us will gradually subside." 80 Part of Tito's hope was doubtless based on the trend toward decentralization in the Soviet Union that followed the Twentieth Party Congress. In his Pula speech, Tito had observed that the "cult of the individual," so much denounced in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, "is the product of a system." And he

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complained that the Soviet leaders, despite their words, "did not join battle against that system. . . ." The summer of 1957 brought not only a purge of Soviet leaders considered to be "Stalinists" but also introduction of a sweeping, new decentralization of the Soviet economy. This drastic change resembled some of the reforms in Yugoslavia in that it abolished most of the economic ministries in Moscow, but it involved nothing like elimination of the Gosplan system, or institution of worker-management. 81 Although the Yugoslavs noted its lacks, nevertheless they praised it. For one Yugoslav commentator, the new decentralization raised hopes that the two countries might continue to improve relations "if they should follow at least roughly similar roads of development regardless of the concrete forms of social organizations. . . ." 82 If such improvement was to come, it had not yet appeared when Tito addressed the First Congress of Workers' Councils on June 25, 1957. He devoted much of his speech to denouncing continued Soviet criticism of the Yugoslav system. "I think it is time to stop this," Tito declared. "We are not indifferent to the light in which Yugoslavia is shown. . . . We demand that the truth be written and spoken about us. . . ." 8 3 On the strength of all that has taken place and is taking place, it was not unlikely that Soviet-Yugoslav relations would mend anew. This did not mean, however, that any mending would shake the Yugoslavs from their stubborn—and almost painful—independence in foreign affairs. At the same time, however, it was a question of how far Tito would go in the interests of "socialist unity." Some thought already he was appeasing the USSR in the fall of 1957 by new persecutions of Djilas if not by the recognition of East Germany. 84 If there were other explanations, they were slow in making themselves known. Certainly Tito was willing to risk losing American aid by his frequent espousal of views held by the Kremlin.85

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Yet there was no doubt that he would draw the line. Although his representatives in Moscow at the time of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution joined with other Communists in a plea for peace (that endorsed many Soviet policies), they pointedly refused to sign the major Communist communique excoriating the West and calling for Soviet leadership in the world Communist movement.86 THE YUGOSLAV BRIDGE Tito frequently pictured Yugoslavia as constituting "the bridge between East and West." 87 The last Eastern European country that so considered itself was Czechoslovakia. If it were recalled to Tito what happened to that "bridge," he would, of course, make the point of the change in Soviet leadership and Soviet policies. Yet, at the same time, one could not help but recall a remark the Yugoslav president himself made in the fall of 1954, when the process of "normalization" was just beginning. "One must first watch the outcome of all this," he said then, "for there is considerable confusion in the world. I must also say that there are not very many people who can predict what is going to happen." 88 As he rides to work each day in his Rolls-Royce, Tito might do worse than ponder the symbolism posed by his ancient capital city of Belgrade. Belgrade lies astride the Danube. More of it is on the western bank than on the eastern bank. The Yugoslav Communists wanted to expand the city eastward and failed. On the side of the Danube closest to the Soviet-dominated area lie the hulks of unfinished buildings that were abandoned. They were built on treacherous, sandy soil that lacked firm foundation, and the experiment was enormously costly to Yugoslavia.

275

notes CHAPTER I

Introduction (Pages 1-14)

1 Doreen Warriner, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), pp. 19-20; and Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (London: Methuen & Co., 1950), pp. 220-223, 246-248. See also account of early Tito measures in Savka Dapcevic-Kucar, Politicka Ekonomija (Political Economy) (Zagreb: Skolska Knijiga, 1953). 2 Odelenje Zastite Narodna. It was later called UDBA, or Uprava DrZavne Bezbednosti. "Robert J. Kerner, ed., Yugoslavia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949), pp. 380-382. 'See Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), chaps, xii, xiii, and xiv. See also accounts in Nikola Kapetanovic, Tito ana the Partisans (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Knjiga, 1949), chap, vii; Mose Pijade, Prica o Sovjetskoj Pomoöi za Dizanje Ustanka u Jugoslaviji (The Story of Soviet Help in the Yugoslav Uprising) (Belgrade: Fitzroy Maclean, 1950), Escape to Adventure (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950). 5 Cf. Kapetanovic, op. cit. ' They are discussed in Kerner, op. cit., chap, xxi; Warriner, op. cit., chap, iii; and Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), chaps, iii and iv. See also Yugoslav point of view in Josip Broz Tito, Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1948); and Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 171-395. 7 Hereinafter referred to as Cominform. In Eastern Europe, this organization tended to be called Informburo, although after 1952 the term Cominform gained vogue in Yugoslavia. 8 The Soviet charges and Yugoslav defense, as well as the Cominform Resolution expelling the Yugoslav party, are published in The SovietYugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948). 9 Dedijer, op. cit., p. 365. 10 Tito, Political Report of the Central Committee, p. 136. 11 See accounts in the London Times, Aug. 11, 1948, p. 4; and the New York Times, Aug. 12, p. 12, and Aug. 13, p. 4, 1948. u Tito, Political Report of the Central Committee, p. 131. 13 See New York Times, July 4, 1948, p. 1. 11 In the fall of 1950 the author talked with several old regime officials who in prior years had been afraid to see him.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I :

INTRODUCTION

Borba, Nov. 13, 1951, p. 1. For a discussion of these issues, see the Department of State Bulletin Vol. XVIII, no. 447, pp. 117-119; no. 456, p. 423; no. 459, pp. 521-522; Vol. XIX, no. 474, pp. 137-149; no. 477, pp. 225-235; no. 479, p. 301; Vol. XX, no. 403, p. 231; and Vol. XXI, no. 543, p. 832. 17 The President's letter, dated November 29, 1950, is in the Congressional Record, 81st Cong.; 2d sess., Vol. XCVI, Pt. 12, p. 15954. "Fred Warner Neal, "The Reforms in Yugoslavia," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. VIII (April, 1954), p. 228. 16 See analysis in Milovan Djilas, "Lenjin o Odnosima medju Socialistickim Drzavama" ("Lenin on Relations between Socialist States"), Komunist, no. 3 (Sept.), 1949, pp. 1-53. 28 Ibid. See also statement by Pijade in Borba, Nov. 12, 1949, p. 1; and Tito's address to Federal Assembly, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 21 Tito's address, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 22 Edvard Kardelj's address to Federal Assembly, Borba, April 2, 1952, 16 16

P-123 Jovan Djordjevic, "The Organization of the Yugoslav Federal and Republic Governments after the Reorganization of April, 1951," New Yugoslav Law, nos. 2-3 (April-Sept.), 1951, pp. 28-30. 24 Quoted by Fred Warner Neal, "Certain Aspects of the New Reforms in Yugoslavia," University of Colorado Studies, Series in Political Science, no. 1 (June), 1953, p. 53. 25 Boris Kidric, "O Reorganizaciji Drzavne Uprave" ("On the Reorganization of the State Administration"), Arhiv za Pravne i Drukvene Nauke, no. 2, 1950, pp. 8-9. 26 See discussion in Radivoje Petkovic, Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1955), pp. 65-115. 27 Ibid. See also Kardelj's remarks in Borba, Oct. 23, 1954, p. 1. 28 Tito's address to Federal Assembly, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 29 See, for example, Djordjevic, "The Organization of the Yugoslav Federal and Republic Governments after the Reorganization of April, 1951," op. cit., pp. 22-35; and Edvard Kardelj, "The Meaning and Importance of the Changes in the Organization of the Economy and SelfGovernment of Yugoslavia," New Yugoslav Law, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.), 1951, pp. 35-48. M Decentralization of agricultural administration and taxing authority were especially criticized as "excessive" and "harmful" in my conversations with U.S. officials. 31 This was the conclusion, for instance, of Professor Raymond McKelvey in a radio discussion over Los Angeles station KFI, February 23, 1955. 32 See Jovan Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Yugoslav Socialist Democracy," Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, no. 7 (Sept., 1953), pp. 18-19; and Edvard Kardelj, New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Union of Journalists of Yugoslavia, 1953), pp. 35-36. See also Djordjevic's remarks in Novi Ustav Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavife (New Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista FNRJ, 1953), pp. 124-125.

278

NOTES TO CHAPTER I :

INTRODUCTION

See Tito's statement in Politika, May 3, 1954, p. 1. Kardelj, New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia, p. 35; and Djordjevic, Novi Ustav, p. 127. 36 Kardelj, ibid., p. 32; and Djordjevic, ibid., p. 125. 86 See discussion by John N. Hazard, "Soviet Law: An Introduction," Columbia Law Review, Vol. XXXVI, no. 8 (Dec., 1936), pp. 1236-1266. See also Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR 1917-1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 7-9. Historically, this was so even where the legal forms were the same as in the West, primarily because of the autocratic and personal methods of administration and policymaking. See Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), chap, vi, especially pp. 148-152. 37 Boris Kidric, "From State Socialism to Economic Democracy," Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 2 (Feb., 1952), p. 14. m Edvard Kardelj, "Jugoslovenski Put u Socijalizam" ("The Yugoslav Road to Socialism"), Nasa Stvarnost, no. 3, 1954, p. 5. 39 Kardelj's opinion that some of the laws "will probably have to undergo the most profound amendments" (quoted in Politika, Nov. 1, 1951, p. 1) was soon borne out and remained pertinent thereafter. See, for example, speech of Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo to congress of Communist party in Montenegro, Borba, Oct. 23, 1954, p. 2. 40 For example, when the author asked the Yugoslav minister of education in 1950 how his rewriting of history textbooks differed from similar practices in the Soviet Union, that official answered: "We are doing it on the basis of Marxist-Leninist truth." Told that the Soviets said the same thing, the minister declared: "But ours is the true Marxism-Leninism." 41 See severe criticism of Yugoslav economy by Svetozar VukmanovicTempo, Borba, Oct. 23, 1954, p. 1. 42 Vukmanovic-Tempo threatened "administrative intervention" in certain instances of excessive wage funds. Ibid. See also discussion on price of bread, Borba, Oct. 7, 1954, p. 3. In the summer of 1954, the author was told by the director of a company producing pit props for mines that he had been directly ordered by the Federal Secretariat for Economic Affairs to cancel an existing contract and execute a new one. 43 For example, Alex N. Dragnich, Tito's Promised Land—Yugoslavia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 187. 44 Cautioning the West "not to make out of us what we are not," Tito declared: "We are Communists. . . ." Borba, Sept. 19, 1954, p. 1. 46 See Statisticki Godisnjak FNRJ 1954 (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1954) (Belgrade: 1954), p. 149; and F.O.A. Report on Industrial Production in Yugoslavia (Washington: 1954). See also table 5, chap. vi. 46 Josip Broz Tito, Radnici Upravljaju Fabrikama u Jugoslaviji (Workers Manage Factories in Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Jugostampa, 1950), p. 34. 47 One of the most interesting examples of this new attitude is the debate on "Socialism and Democracy" carried on in the columns of Medjunarodna Politika, a periodical published by the Union of Yugoslav Journalists, and other publications, by Rodoljub Colakovic, a leading Communist official, ana Jaj Bjork, secretary for international affairs of the Social Democratic Workers (Socialist) Party of Sweden. Medjuna33

31

279

NOTES TO CHAPTER I I : THE NEW DOCTRINE rodna Poltiika, Nov. 16, 1952, pp. 1-4; Dec. 16, 1952, pp. 1-5; Jan. 1, 1953, pp. 4-8. CHAPTER II The New Doctrine (Pages 15-33) 1 Josip Broz Tito, Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1948), pp. 128-133. 2 See Doreen Warriner, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), pp. 51-54. 3 Josip Broz Tito, Radnici XJpravljaju Fabrikama u Jugoslaviji (Workers Manage the Factories in Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Jugostampa, 1950), pp. 10-11. * Fred Warner Neal, "The Reforms in Yugoslavia," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XIII (April, 1954), p. 228. 6 Milovan Djilas, "Lenjin o Odnosima medju Socijalistickim Drzavama" ("Lenin on Relations between Socialist States"), Komunist, no. 3 (Sept.), 1949, p. 4. " Ibid. See also Rodoljub Colakovic, "Socijalizam i Demokratija" (Socialism and Democracy"), Medjunarodna Politika, Nov. 16, 1952, p. 4. 7 Ibid., Dec. 16, 1952, pp. 1-2. See also Edvard Kardelj's comments on his tour of the Scandinavian countries, Borba, Oct. 17, 1954, p. 1. 8 Tito's address to Federal Assembly, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 9 See articles by Colakovic, op. cit. 10 This view is expressed by Edvard Kardelj, Medjunarodna Seena i Jugoslovenski Polo&aj (The International Scene and the Yugoslav Position) (Belgrade: 1941), pp. 6-8; and by Milovan Djilas, is Stalin Turning in a Circle? reprinted from Borba, Oct. 11, 12, and 13, 1952, by the National Committee for a Free Europe, New York. u Conversation of author with Josef Vilfan, secretary to President Tito, on August 24, 1954. 13 Djilas on Stalin, Borba, Oct. 12, 1952, p. 3. u Ibid. See also Kardelj, Medjunarodna Seena i Jugoslovenski Polo&aj,

p. 8.

11 Tito's

address to Federal Assembly, Borba, Oct. 26, 1954, p. 1. Cf. Djilas, Is Stalin Turning in a Circle? p. 15. See also Kardelj's address to Fourth Congress of People's Front, Yugoslav Review. Vol. II, nos. 3-4 (March-April, 1953), p. 4. 16 Tito's speech at Ostrajnica, Borba, Sept. 20, 1954. 17 Kardelj, Medjunarodna Seena i Jugoslovenski PoloZaj, p. 10. u Cf. The Zagreb Conference for Peace and International Collaboration (Zagreb: 1951), especially pp. 11-20. The ambivalent Yugoslav attitude toward the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, and Tito's approval of the second invasion in particular, seem clearly contrary to this theoretical position. 19 See Kardelj's remarks at Third Plenum of Central Committee, Komunist, nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954, pp. 32-41. 20 Kardelj, "The New Social and Political System of the Federal People's 16

28o

NOTES TO CHAPTER II: THE NEW DOCTRINE Republic of Yugoslavia," New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Union of Jurists' Associations of Yugoslavia, 1953), pp. 7, 19, 48-49. 21 In September, 1957, Tito flatly denied that either he or Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish Communist leader, were "National Communists" because they both wanted to lay the foundation for "genuinely constructive cooperation" among all countries that are "building Socialism." New York Times, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 1. 22 Tito's address to the Federal Assembly, Botha, June 27, 1950, p. 1. Also see Edvard Kardelj, "The Meaning and Importance of the Changes in the Economy and Self-Government in Yugoslavia," New Yugoslav Law, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.), 1951, pp. 36-37. 23 Edvard Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija (Socialist Democracy) (Belgrade: 1952), p. 9. See also Tito's speech to the Assembly, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 24 Kardelj's address to Federal Assembly, Borba, April 2, 1952, p. 1. 25 Jovan Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," New Yugoslav Law, nos. 3^4 (July-Dec.), 1952, p. 16. 29 See Tito's comments, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 27 Djilas, Is Stalin Turning in a Circle? p. 13. See also Kardelj, Socijalistiika Demokratija. 28 "The leading role of the working class," says Kardelj, is "the foremost principle in our state system. . . ." Kardelj, Socijalisti&ka Demokratija, p. 23. Both Tito and Kardelj denounced Djilas at the time of his first heresy for ignoring this principle. Komunist, nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954. 29 Karl Marx, Capital, English translation by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Vol. I (Chicago: C. H. Kerr and Company, 1909), pp. 45-46. 80 J. V. Stalin, "Ekonomicheskie Problemi Sotsializma v SSSR" ("Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"), Bol'shevik, no. 18 (Sept.), 1952, pp. 9-10. 81 This theory has been stated by most of the Yugoslav ideological spokesmen. Perhaps the most explicit formulations of it are in Djilas, Is Stalin Turning in a Circle? pp. 6-10. See also Edvard Kardelj, "O Socijalizmu i Demokratiji" ("On Socialism and Democracy"), Komunist, nos. 1—2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1952, pp. 1-29. 32 Cf. Jovan Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, no. 7 (Sept., 1953), pp. 18-22. 83 Tito, Borba, June 25, 1950, p. 1. 84 Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 20. 86 Cf. Boris Kidric, "From State Socialism to Economic Democracy," Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 2 (Feb., 1952), p. 5. s° Tito, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 87 For a good statement of this theory of planning, see "Planirovanie Poslevoennii Period i Novaya Struktura Gosplana" ("Planning in the Postwar Period and the New Structure of the Gosplan"), Planovoye Khoziaistvo, no. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), 1946, pp. 5-10. 88 Kidric, "From State Socialism to Economic Democracy," op. cit., pp. 6, 14. ü8l

NOTES TO CHAPTER II: THE NEW DOCTRINE 39 Cf. Kidric, "O Reorganizaciji Drzavne Uprave" ("On the Reorganization of the State Administration"), Arhiv za Pravne i Drukvene Nauke, no. 2, 1950, p. 8. 40 Kidric, "From State Socialism to Economic Democracy," op. cit., p. 14. 41 Jugoslovenski Ekonomski Sistem 1954 (Yugoslav Economic System 1954) (Belgrade: 1954), p. 2. 12 Cf. Kidric, "From State Socialism to Economic Democracy," op. cit., p. 6. 43 See his report to Fourth Plenum of Central Committee, New Yugoslav Law, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.), 1951, p. 3. 44 Quoted in Fred Warner Neal, "Certain Aspects of the New Reforms in Yugoslavia," University of Colorado Studies, Series in Political Science, no. 1 (June), 1953, p. 53. 46 Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 19. "Ibid. 47 Ibid. Djordjevic was head of the Legal Council and secretary for legislation and organization in the Federal Executive Council. 48 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija, p. 36. 49 Cf. Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," op. cit., pp. 18-19. 50 Cf. Jovan Djordjevic, "O Socijalistickoj Demokratiji" ("On Socialist Democracy"), Medjunarodna Politika, Jan. 1, 1953, p. 18. 61 See Tito's remarks, Komunist, nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954, especially pp. 162-164. 62 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija, pp. 28-29. Kardelj spoke these words to the Federal Assembly on April 1, 1952. In retrospect, they sound like a warning to Djilas, who later was to propose more or less a multiparty system. See chap. iii. 53 Fred Warner Neal, "Yugoslav Communist Theory," American Universities Field Staff Reports, FWN-5-'54, p. 11. 54 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija, pp. 30-31. 56 Ibid., pp. 32-34. 66 Actually, Soviet theory also makes the distinction. See J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1934), chap. v. The Yugoslav quarrel with the USSR here, therefore, is more one of practice than of theory. 67 Tito, Radnici Upravljaju Fabrikama u Jugoslaviji, p. 30. 58 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija, p. 23. *'Ibid„ p. 25. M "Preview of the Sixth Congress," Yugoslav Review, Vol. 1, no. 8 (Oct., 1952), p. 3. 61 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, Politika, Nov. 7, 1952, p. 1. 62 Tito's report, Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953), p. 56. The name of the party was formally changed at this congress to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. See chap. iii. 63 Statute of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1952), Article I. 64 V. I. Lenin, Works, Vol. XXIV (New York: International Publishers, 1936), p. 53.

282

NOTES TO CHAPTER IH: THE COMMUNIST PARTY 05 Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh (Communist International in Documents) (Moscow: 1933), pp. 100-109. 88 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratifa, p. 29. 67 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1952), p. 428. 68 Tito, commenting on Djilas' ideas, Borba, Jan. 18, 1954, p. 1. " Tito's address to Federal Assembly, Borba, June 27, 1950. 70 Neal, "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 12. 71 Ibid., p. 13. 73 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija, p. 39. 73 Ibid., p. 38. 74 Neal, "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 13.

CHAPTER III The Communist (Pages 34-81)

Party

1 In 1952 the name of the Communist party of Yugoslavia was changed to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (in Serbo-Croat, Savez Komunista Jugoslavije). The organization is still often referred to as "party," however, in this chapter and elsewhere the terms "party" and "league" are used interchangeably. 2 J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1934), p. 34. 8 Ibid., p. 38. 4 This is discussed in Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 32. 6 Half the membership in 1948—some 225,000—was peasant, whereas workers made up only 30 per cent. See report of Aleksandar Rankovic to Fifth Party Congress, Borba, July 23, 1948, p. 1. "This was one criticism made by the Cominform Resolution. See The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), pp. 43-^6, 63-65. 7 For a discussion of this situation, see Doreen Warriner, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), p. 52. 8 Hebrang, the leading defender of the Cominform point of view in the Communist party of Yugoslavia, differed from his comrades on industrialization plans. Ibid., p. 53. See also Ulam, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 9 Stalin, op. cit., p. 39. 10 See, for example, Monty Radulovic, Tito's Republic (London: Cold Harbour Press, 1948), especially chap. ii. 11 Rankovic's report to Fifth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. u Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, Borba, Nov. 4, 1952, p. 1. 13 Ibid. See also Ulam, op. cit., p. 116. "Ulam, op. cit., p. 115. 15 Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the Fifth Congress (Belgrade: 1948), p. 136. ieIbid. 17 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. 18 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, Politika, Nov. 9, 1952, p. 1. M Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. 20 Ibid.

283

NOTES TO CHAPTER III: THE COMMUNIST PARTY Ibid. See chap. i. 23 Fred Warner Neal, "Certain Aspects of the New Reforms in Yugoslavia," University of Colorado Studies, Series in Political Science, no. 1 (June), 1953, p. 53. 24 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. 26 Warriner, op. cit., p. 5. 26 The late Boris Kidric told the author in the summer of 1950 that popular resentment against certain privileges of Communists was "a source of concern" and that measures were then being prepared to deal with it. 27 See reports of Tito and Rankovic to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit. 28 Yugoslav Newsletter, Oct. 23, 1950, pp. 1-2. 29 M. S. Handler in the New York Times, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 1. 30 The directives are discussed in Komunist, no. 4 (June), 1952, in the reports of Tito and Rankovic to the Sixth Party Congress, op. cit. 81 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. "Ibid. 83 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. "•Ibid. 88 "Preview of the Sixth Congress," Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 8 (Oct., 1952), p. 3. 88 "Report on the IVth Congress of the People's Front," Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, nos. 3-4 (March-April, 1953), p. 17. 87 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 88 Ibid. 89Ibid. 40 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. 41 Ibid. 42 "Resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the Role and Tasks of the Communist League of Yugoslavia," Sixth Congress of the Communist Tarty of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953), p. 128. 43 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. "Ibid. 48 See items on the Sixth Congress in Borba, Nov. 7, 1952, pp. 1-4; and reports of Tito and Rankovic to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit. 48 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 47 Edvard Kardelj's address to Fourth Congress of the People's Front, Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, nos. 3-^4 (March-April, 1953), p. 17. 48 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. "Kardelj's address to Fourth Congress of the People's Front, op. cit., p. 17. 50 Ibid. 81 A 1920 resolution of the Comintern held that "the necessity for a political party of the proletariat" would cease "with the complete abolition of classes," at which time the Communist party would "become dissolved completely in the working class. . . ." Kommunisticheskii International v Dokumentakh (Communist International in Documents) (Moscow: 1933), p. 100. 21 22

284

NOTES TO CHAPTER III: THE COMMUNIST PARTY 63 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1952), pp. 428-^31. 63 Ibid. 61 Fred Warner Neal, "Yugoslav Communist Theory," American Universities Field Staff Reports, FWN-5-'54, p. 5. K Address of Milovan Djilas, "On the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953), p. 88. 66 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 67 This information was given to the author by officials of the secretariat in Belgrade on August 27, 1954. 68 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 68 Statement of Blazo Jovanovic, chairman of the Montenegro Central Committee, to the author on September 24, 1954. 60 Borba, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 4. 81 "Toward Greater Democracy in Party Organization," Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 8 (Oct., 1952), p. 3. 02 Ibid., pp. 3, 15. 03 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. M See the Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje, Dec. 21, 1954, p. 1, and Komunist, nos. 11-12, 1956, p. 14. 06 Rankovic's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. "Ibid. m Pobjeda (Titograd), Oct. 24, 1954, p. 2. 68 Oslobodjenje, Dec. 21, 1954, p. 1. 69 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 1. 70 For a discussion of this, see Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, ibid. In the fall of 1957, use of "voluntary" work brigades was resumed, although on a limited scale. 71 See discussion on party dues in Komunist, nos. 9-10 (Oct.-Nov.), 1954, pp. 20-25. 72 The author's estimate, based on the breakdown of membership in table 2. 73 Discussion of party dues in Komunist, nos. 9-10 (Oct.-Nov.), 1954, pp. 20-25. 74 See chap. vi. 76 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 76 See chap. vi. 77 See Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 78 Ibid. 79Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Relatively high officer membership is indicated in the "other" column in table 2. 82 Tito's report to Sixth Party Congress, op. cit., p. 2. 83 Oslobodjenje, Dec. 24, 1954, p. 2. 84 Ibid. 86 Vjesnik (Zagreb), Aug. 4, 1954, p. 1. " Borba, Nov. 2, 1954, p. 4.

285

NOTES TO CHAPTER III: THE COMMUNIST PARTY Borba, July 12, 1954, p. 2. Politika, Dec. 15, 1954, p. 4. 89 Oslobodjenje, Dec. 27, 1954, p. 2. 90 Oslobodjenje, Aug. 7, 1954, p. 3. m Politika, Jan. 12, 1954, p. 2. 92 Kardelj's address to Fourth Congress of the People's Front, op. cit., p. 18. 93 Oslobodjenje, Aug. 7, 1954, p. 3. 94 Borba, Jan. 5, 1955, p. 1. See also p. 75, below. 96 Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1. 90 Stalin, op. cit., pp. 299-300. 97 See, for example, discussion on demands of rank and file to clarify frontiers between the Communist party and the Socialist Alliance and between the party and the government in New York Times, June 14, 1953, p. 12. 98 The Brioni Plenum and its decisions are discussed in Komunist, no. 4 (July), 1953. This was officially the Second Plenum, as the number of plenums began anew after the party became the League of Communists in 1952. 99 Thomas Taylor Hammond, "The Djilas Affair and Jugoslav Communism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, no. 2 (Jan., 1955), p. 301. 100 See, for example, various articles in Borba, July 4, and Sept. 29, 1953, exhorting Communists to prevent workers' councils from making decisions contrary to government and party policy. 101 New York Times, March 14, 1953, p. 2. 1M Borba, Sept. 19, 1953, p. 1. See also admonition to party members regarding election in Borba, Sept. 8, 1953, p. 1. 103 See Djilas' second statement at Third Plenum, Komunist, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954, p. 157. 1MIbid. los Tito's first speech to Third Plenum, ibid., p. 4. 106 Borba, Dec. 27, 1953, p. 3. 107 Ibid. 108 Borba, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 3. 109 Borba, Dec. 27, 1953, p. 3. 110 Borba, Jan. 4, 1953, p. 3. 111 Borba, Dec. 6, 1953, p. 3. ™ For Djilas' analysis of his own reasoning, see "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 6. 113 "Anatomija jednog Morala" ("An Anatomy of Morals"), Nova Misao, Jan., 1954, p. 7. 111 The article criticized not General Dapcevic or his wife but the top party echelon, including its distaff side, for snubbing an earnest young woman simply because she did not have an ideologically approved past. According to rumor current at the time in Belgrade, Djilas himself was enamored with Mrs. Dapcevic. "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 7. 115 Hammond, "The Djilas Affair and Jugoslav Communism," op. cit., p. 308. 87 88

286

NOTES TO CHAPTER Hi: THE COMMUNIST PARTY Vjesnik u Srijedu (Zagreb), Jan. 6, 1954, p. 3. Oslobodjenje, Jan. 8, 1954, p. 2. ™Ibid„ Jan. 9, 1954. 119 Hammond, "The Djilas Affair and Jugoslav Communism," op. cit., p. 304; and speeches by Tito and Kardelj, Komunist, nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954, pp. 3-13, 7-23. 120 Kardelj, ibid., p. 28. 121 The speeches and decisions of the Third Plenum are in Komunist, nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954. 123 "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., pp. 7-8. 123 Ibid. ™ Komunist, nos. 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.), 1954, p. 163. la "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 9. 126 Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 2. 127 These statements were made to the author in the summer of 1954. 128 Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 2. ™Ibid. 130 The following anecdote, widely recounted throughout Yugoslavia, is doubtless apocryphal, but it illustrates the point: An old Montenegrin peasant was boasting about how he knew all the famous Yugoslav leaders "from way back." He was asked about Tito. "I nursed Tito's wounds during the war," he said. He was asked about Blazo Jovanovic. "Why," declared the peasant, "I held Jovanovic in my arms when he was a baby." And Djilas? "Djilas?" said the peasant. "I never heard of him in my life." m Cf. Rankovic's remarks at Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, Komunist, no. 3 (March), 1954, p. 10. 133 Conversation of the author with Blazo Jovanovic, a member of the National Central Committee and chairman of the Central Committee of Montenegro, on September 24, 1954. 133 Proverka is a Russian word generally used in Eastern Europe for such examinations. For information regarding the Control Commission's examinations, see New York Times, Dec. 22, p. 9; Dec. 23, p. 5; Dec. 26, p. 29; Dec. 29, p. 1; and Dec. 31, p. 1, 1954. See also Politika, Jan. 7, 1955. 134 Times (London), Dec. 22, 1954, p. 8. 135 New York Times, Dec. 25, 1954, p. 1. Djilas' views were not "cooked up" on the spur of the moment, however. He had confided them to the author in a conversation almost two months earlier. See "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 9. 13a New York Times, Dec. 28, 1954, p. 1. See also Kardelj's remarks to the Second Congress of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Borba, Dec. 28, 1954, p. 1. 137 Borba, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 1. 138 Ibid. 139 Associated Press dispatch in Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 1. 140 New York Times, Jan. 7, 1955, p. 1. 141 See, for example, Borba and Politika, Jan. 4, 1955. 142 New York Times, Jan. 25, 1955, p. 1. u0

117

287

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV: THE LEADER Cf. San Francisco Examiner, June 11, 12, 13, 1956. See Djilas, "The Storm in Eastern Europe," op. cit. Djilas gave a similar statement to Agence France Presse. 145 New York Times, Dec. 13, 1956, p. 1. 148 The New Class (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). See also discussion in chap. x. "'New York Times, Oct. 6, 1957, p. 1. 148 See New York Times, Sept. 22, p. 28, and Sept. 26, p. 9, 1957. 14' "Research and Freedom in Undeveloped Countries," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XIII, no. 7 (Sept., 1957), pp. 238-242. 160 New York Times, Oct. 13, 1957, p. 17. 161 See chap. x. 152 Ibid. 163 Cf. New York Times, Nov. 22, p. 1, and p. 6, 1957. 14a 144

CHAPTER IV The Leader (Pages 82-88) 1 For an objective yet intimate essay on Tito, see Fitzroy Maclean, The Heretic (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957). See also Vladimir Dedijer's more partisan but valuable Tito (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953). "Dedijer, op. cit., p. 76. 8 In the spring of 1958, Vukmanovic-Tempo replaced Salaj as chief of the Sindikat. ' Bakaric's chronic ill-health would mitigate his chances.

CHAPTER V The New Governmental System (Pages 89-117) 1 Edvard Kardelj, "The New Social and Political System of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Union of Jurists' Associations of Yugoslavia, 1953), p. 21. See also Jovan Djordjevic, No vi Ustav Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije (New Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista FNRJ, 1953), p. 51. Both works contain the texts of the 1953 constitution, one in English, the other in SerboCroat. Excerpts from the constitution in this chapter are taken from Novi Ustav. "Jovan Djordjevic, Ustavno Pravo Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije (Constitutional Law of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Arhiva za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke, 1953), p. 3. a Ibid., p. 192. See also Kardelj, op. cit., p. 7. 4 Cf. Kardelj, ibid., p. 10. 5Ibid. 'Ibid., p. 12.

288

NOTES TO CHAPTER V:

NEW GOVERNMENTAL

SYSTEM

Ibid. Cf. articles 4 and 6 of the constitution. 8 This is the claim of Professor Djordjevic in "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, no. 7 ( Sept., 1953), pp. 18-22. See also Ales Bebler, quoted in Fred Warner Neal, "Certain Aspects of the New Reforms in Yugoslavia," University of Colorado Studies, Series in Political Science, no. 1 (June), 1953, p. 51. 10 Djordjevic, Ustavno Pravo, pp. 201-202. See also Mose Pijade, "Ustavno Pitanje Savezne Narodne Skupstine" ("A Constitutional Question of the Federal People's Assembly"), Naia Stvarnost, no. 11, 1954, p. 3. 11 Kardelj, op. cit., p. 27. 12 Ibid., pp. 26-27. u Djordjevic, Ustavno Pravo, especially pp. 122-127. For a discussion of people's committees, see chap. vii. 14 See Pijade, "Ustavno Pitanje Savezne Narodne Skupstine," op. cit., p. 3. 15 Cf. Kardelj, op. cit., pp. 42-45. See also discussion of limitations on Federal Executive Council in M. Vuckovic, "Uredjenje Saveznog Izvrsnog Veca" ("Organization of the Federal Executive Council"), Nova Administracija, no. 4 (July-Aug.), 1954, pp. 1-18. 10 See below, pp. 94-95. 17 Kardelj, op. cit., p. 37. 18 Cf. Sluibeni List, no. 13, March 11, 1954. See Pijade's view of this change, below. 18 SluZbeni List, no. 35, Sept. 8, 1953. For an explanation, see Jovan Djordjevic, DrUavno Uredjenje Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije (State Organization of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Saveza Udruzenja Pravnika Jugoslavije, 1954), pp. 38-43. See also Jovan Djordjevic, "Veca Proizvodjaca" ( "Producers Councils"), Medjunarodna Politika, Oct. 1, 1954, especially p. 18. 20 Jugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1954), p. 41. 21 Djordjevic, "Veca Proizvodjaca," op. cit., p. 17. 0 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 23 Cf. Article 40 of the constitution. For an explanation of these provisions, see Kardelj, op. cit., pp. 34—35. 21 For Pijade's view of this provision, see below. Œ Borba, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 3. " Cf. Article 95 of the constitution. " Kardelj, op. cit., p. 35. 28 See Radomir D. Lukic, "Nacelo Jedinstva Vlasti u Saveznom Ustavnom Zakonu" ("The Principle of Unity of Powers in the Federal Constitutional Law"), Arhiv za Pravne i DruStvene Nauke, nos. 1-2. 28 Kardelj, op. cit., p. 37. 80 Ibid. 81 For a discussion of the presidency, see Ivo Krbek, "Pretsednik Republike" ("The President of the Republic"), Arhiv za Pravne i DruStvene Nauke, nos. 1-2, 1953, pp. 36-40. 82 Its organization and work is discussed in Vuckovic, op. cit., pp. 1-18. See also Djordjevic, Dr&avno Uredjenje, pp. 55-57. 7

8

289

NOTES TO CHAPTER V:

NEW GOVERNMENTAL

SYSTEM

SMbeni List, no. 19, May 5, 1954. SMbeni List, no. 27, June 30, 1954. 86 Cf. SMbeni List, no. 33, July 20, 1955. m Kardelj, op. cit., p. 39. 87 See Lukic, op. cit., p. 43. 38 Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 5. 811 Kardelj, op. cit., p. 50. '"Ibid., pp. 39-40. 41 Law on Organization of the State Administration and Law on State Administration, SMbeni List, no. 13, March 28, 1956. The laws are discussed in detail in New Yugoslav Law, no. 2 (April-June), 1956. 43 Borba, March 24, 1956, p. 1. a Ibid. 41 Professor Djordjevic's opinion, in conversation with the author in 1957. "Articles 100-112 of the constitution deal with the republic governments. 18 In the republics, the president of the executive council was in fact the chief executive officer, but the distinction made between the president of the republic and the Federal Executive Council was absent. See Article 108 of the constitution. 47 Before the war Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina were considered integral parts of Serbia and had no autonomy. 48 Cf. articles 102-118, "Ustavni Zakon o Osnovama Drustvenog i Politickog Uredjenja i o Organima Vlasti Narodne Republike Srbije" ("Constitutional Law on the Bases of the Social and Political Organization and on the Organs of State Authority of the People's Republic of Serbia"), SMbeni Glasnik NR Srbije, no. 5, Feb. 21, 1953. 4" Cf. "Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine" ("Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina"), SMbeni List AP Vojvodine, no. 5, April 3, 1953; and "Statut Autonomne Kosovsko-Metohiske Oblasti" ("Statute of the Autonomous Kosovo-Metohija Region"), SMbeni List Autonomne Kosovsko-Metohiske Oblasti, no. 1, March 10, 1953. 60 Article 5 of the constitution. 61 Kardelj, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 62 See especially chap. ix. 63 Author's conversation with Professor Djordjevic, July 10, 1954. 64 Borba, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 3. 65 Typical is the decree authorizing the Federal Executive Council's economic committee to act in regard to individual foreign-exchange transactions. Slu&beni List, no. 20, June 3, 1954. "Kardelj was previously minister of foreign affairs, and Rankovic was minister of internal affairs. It is said that the UDBA, the secret political police, is still under Rankovic's personal supervision. 67 Conversation with the author, August 28, 1954. 58 Kardelj, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 69 Borba, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 3. 80 Borba, July 8, 1954, p. 2. 83 34

290

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL Borba, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 3. "Ibid. 63Ibid. 64 Varying percentages are given in Yugoslav publications. It is put at both "three-fourths of the population" and 68 per cent of the population on the same page of Jugoslavia, p. 103. It is given as 61 per cent in Petko Rasic, Agricultural Development in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1955), p. 75. The 1953 census also gives 61 per cent (Statisticki Godisnjak FRNJ 1955 [Belgrade: 1955], p. 61). However, in the summer of 1954 officials of the Federal Statistical Institute in Belgrade told the author that the agricultural population was "about 65 per cent," whereas some Yugoslav economists insisted in conversation that it was "between 65 and 70 per cent." 86 Rasic, op. cit., p. 75. T o r a discussion of agricultural developments in Yugoslavia, see chap. viii. 07 Leon Gerskovic, "The System of Producers' Councils in Yugoslavia," International Labor Review, Vol. LXXI (Geneva, 1955), p. 47. See table 7, chap, viii, for a breakdown of industrial and agricultural representation in the councils of producers. 88 Kardelj, op. cit., p. 16. "Ibid. 70 The Federal Administration—exclusive of the state secretariats for foreign affairs and for internal affairs—had 47,310 employees in 1948, according to Kardelj, as compared with 10,328 in 1956, including the foreign affairs and internal affairs secretariats. See his remarks reported in New Yugoslav Law, no. 2 (April-June), 1956, p. 3. The number of federal employees in 1953 had earlier been reported to be more than 35 per cent less than in 1952. Cf. "Statistika Sluzbenika u Drzavnoj Upravi u 1953" ("Statistics of Employees in the State Administration in 1953"), Nova Administradla, no. 3 (May-June), 1954, p. 3. 71 See chap. vii. 73 For a discussion of the relaxation of totalitarianism generally, see chap. ix. 73 Kardelj, "The New Social and Political System of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 150. 61

CHAPTER VI Management and Control (Pages 118-159)

of the

Economy

1 Marshal Tito, addressing the Yugoslav National Assembly, Borba, June 27, 1950, p. 1. 2 Milovan Djilas, Borba, Oct. 13, 1952, p. 1. 3 Cf. decree on confiscation, Sluibeni List, no. 2, Feb. 6, 1945. See also remarks of Boris Kidric, Politika, April 10, 1948, p. 1. 4 Sluibeni List, no. 98, Dec. 6, 1946. 6 Ibid., no. 35, April 29, 1948.

291

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL " For a description of the system, see "Uprava Narodnih Preduzeca" ("Management of People's Enterprises"), Privredni Pregled (Zagreb), nos. 2-3, 1949, pp. 15-21; and Kidric, Borha, Aug. 26, 1951, p. 3. 7 Tito, op. cit., p. 1. See also Djilas, op. cit., p. 1. 8 Cf. Edvard Kardelj, "The Meaning and Importance of the Changes in Organization of Economy and Self-Government in Yugoslavia," New Yugoslav Law, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.), 1951, p. 37. See also Tito and Djilas, op. cit. " Slu&beni List, no. 43, July 5, 1950. The law applies to the workers' council system to agriculture as well as industry but its real significance is in the latter segment of the economy. 10 Tito, op. cit., p. 1. ^ Kardelj, Borba, April 2, 1952, p. 1. "Ibid. 13 Article I of the law on worker-management. The text of this statute is published in English in New Yugoslav Law, nos. 2-3 (June-Sept.), 1950, pp. 75-82. "Apparently this was the intention of Article 41 of the 1950 law, although the wording is ambiguous. See Boris Kidric, "O Reorganizaciji Drzavne Uprave" ("On the Reorganization of the State Administration"), Arhiv za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke, no. 2, 1950, pp. 6-10. 15 Cf. Sluibeni List, no. 40, June 12, 1950. For a discussion of this decree, see Fred Warner Neal, "Certain Aspects of the New Reforms in Yugoslavia," University of Colorado Studies, Series in Political Science, no. 1 (June), 1953, pp. 58-60. 16 See Kardelj's remarks on the interim system, Politika, Nov. 1, 1951, p. 1. 17 These include both laws and decrees of the Federal Executive Council. They are listed and their major provisions given in Jovan Djordjevic, Ustavno Pravo (Constitutional Law) (Belgrade: Arhiva za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke, 1953), pp. 102-115. See also Sluibeni List, no. 51, Dec. 24, 1953. 18 See description of method of hiring and firing managers in A. Deleon, 33 Questions, 33 Answers on Workers' Self Government in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1956), pp. 46-48. 19 Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 107-110. According to the official government handbook, the three forms of property in Yugoslavia are "people's, cooperative, and private" (Jugoslavia [Belgrade: 1954], p. 48). Apparently "nationally owned" property is the same as "people's" property. Both terms are used interchangeably in various laws. 20 Cf. Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 377-379. See also basic law on internal revenue code, Slu&beni List, no. 1, Jan. 2, 1952, and regulation on distribution of revenue of economic organizations, SluZbeni List, no. 54, Dec. 28, 1954. 21 Jugoslovenski Ekonomski Sistem (Belgrade: 1954), especially p. 16; and Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 104-107. 23 Ibid. See also OpSti Zakon o Narodnim Odborima (General Law on People's Committees), and Ekonomsko Pravne Odred.be Zakona o Narodnim Odborima (Economic Legal Decrees of the Law on People's Com2Q2

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL mittees) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista FNRJ, 1953). The activities of people's committees are discussed in chap. vii. 23 Borba, July 4, 1954, p. 2. 24 See discussion in Deleon, op. cit., pp. 71-73. 25 Cf. Zakon o Planskom Upravljanju Privredom (Law on the Planned Management of the Economy) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista FNRJ, 1953). 28 Borba, July 25, 1954, p. 1. 27 Sluibeni List, no. 19, April 26, 1956. 28 See discussion of investment in Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 2 (Feb., 1952), especially article by Boris Kidric, "From State Socialism to Economic Democracy," pp. 5-6, 14. 29 Zakon o Potvrdi Drustvenog Plana za 1954 (Law on the Confirmation of the Social Plan for 1954) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista FNRJ, 1954). See also Vidoe Smilevski, "Osnovne Karakteristike Saveznog Drustvenog Plana za 1954 Godinu" ("Basic Characteristics of the Federal Social Plan for the Year 1954"), Pregled, no. 1, 1954, pp. 1-10. 30 Cf. "Finansiranje Investicija" ("Financing Investment"), Privredni Pregled, June 16, 1954, pp. 8-10; and Jugopres Information Bulletin, Vol. I, no. 26 (1954). See also "Rad na Predlogu za 1955 Godinu" ("Work on Proposals for the Year 1955"), Ekonomska Politika, July 1, 1954, pp. 1-2; and F. F., "Nova Organizacija Naseg Kreditnog Aparata" ("New Organization of Our Credit Apparatus"), Robni Promet, nos. 2-3, 1954, pp. 1-6. 81 This operation was described to the author by Vojin Guzina, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, during a conversation October 5, 1954. In 1954, the total amount of credit available for the housing industry was provided through the social plan. Cf. Fred Warner Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," American Universities Field Staff Reports, FWN-4-'54, pp. 4-6. 82 See Borba, March 20, 1955, p. 1. For general descriptions of the credit system, see "Izmene Kreditnog Sistema" ("Changes in the Credit System"), Privredni Vjesnik, July 7, 1954, p. 1; and A. Puljevic and D. Cvijetic, "O Novom Sistemu Kratkorocnog Krediteranja" ("On the New System of Short-term Crediting"), Finansije, nos. 5-6, 1954. 83 Cf. Jugoslovenski Ekonomski Sistem, pp. 11, 13. See also Uredba o Platama Radnika i Sluibenika Privrednih Organizacija (Decree on the Payments of Workers and Employees of Economic Organizations) (Belgrade: Nova Administracija, 1954). 84 Ibid. See also remarks of Sergei Krajger, director of the Federal Planning Institute, Borba, July 25, 1954, p. 1. * Cf. New York Times, March 18, 1955, p. 16. For actual method of application of the system in 1956, see Slu&beni List, nos. 19-20, April 26, 1956, and no. 22, May 18, 1956. 86 This example was given to the author in the fall of 1954 by Kiro Gligorov, then a member of the Federal Planning Institute. Following the governmental reorganization of 1956, Mr. Gligorov became chief of the Federal Executive Council secretariat for economic affairs. 37 See Ivan Barbalic, "Spoljnotrgovinska Komora" ("The Foreign-Trade Chamber of Commerce"), Nova Trgovina, no. 5, 1954, p. 14.

293

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 88 See amendments to the 1953 foreign-exchange law, Slu&beni List, no. 11, March 10, 1954. See Mesecni Bilten, Narodne Banke FNRJ, for foreign-exchange rates and statistics. 89 This information was supplied to the author by Kiro Gligorov, of the Federal Planning Institute in the fall of 1954. 10 In 1954 the author talked with a former plant director, recently released from prison, who said he had been jailed in 1948 for opposing the party committee in his factory. 41 See examples reported in Borba, July 12, 1954, p. 1, and Nov. 2, 1954, P.

2.

(Titograd), Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1. This was the range reported to the author in 1954 by party secretaries and Sindikat officials in Zagreb, Skoplje, Titograd, Split, and Sarajevo. Around Belgrade, it was said to be somewhat higher, and around Ljubljana, slightly lower. " A n excellent short account of the role of the trade-unions in the Soviet Union is given in Margaret Miller, Labour in the USSR (British Association for Labour Legislation, 1942), see especially pp. 22-26. 46 Josip Broz Tito, Radnici Upravljafu Fabrikama u Jugoslaviji (Workers Manage Factories in Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Jugostampa, 1950), p. 39. See also Tito's discussion of the role of trade-unions in Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1953), pp. 42-44. 4" Borba, March 27, 1952, p. 2. 47 This information was given to the author by Ivan Bozecevic, secretarygeneral of the Sindikat of Yugoslavia, in a conversation on August 24, 1954. 48 Tito's report, Sixth Congress of the Communist Party, p. 43. 48 This information was given to the author by Bozecevic. On the other hand, Statisticki Bilten (Vol. VI, no. 38) put the number of nonunion lists proposed in 1954 at only 151. °° The author attended the meeting of the workers' council at which the proposal was adopted. 61 This information was given to the author by Bozecevic. For a discussion of low educational standards in Yugoslavia and the union's role in education, see Tito's report, Sixth Congress of the Communist Party, p. 42. M Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 25. 63 Review of International Affairs, July 1-16, 1957, p. 3. 64 Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 22. 66 Yugoslav Review, Vol. VII, nos. 2-3 (Feb.-March, 1957), p. 30. M Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 3. 67 Ibid., p. 22. 58 Deleon, op. cit., pp. 86-88. M See accounts in Fred Warner Neal, "Worker Management of Industry in Yugosalvia—How It Operates and How It Is Controlled," American Universities Field Staff Reports, FWN-3-'54. 60 Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 6. 61 Neal, "Worker Management of Industry in Yugoslavia—How It Operates and How It Is Controlled," op. cit., p. 5. 42Pobjeda 43

294

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 63 See his speech to the First Congress of Workers' Councils, Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957. 83 Ibid., pp. 26, 27, 28. 64 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 66 This was attempted on an informal, extralegal basis in Croatia. Cf. J. Cazi, "Komunisti u Radnickom Upravljanju Industrijom" ("Communists in Workers' Management in Industry"), Komunist, Vol. VII (1955), pp. 413-419. 66 Ibid., p. 28. " Ibid., p. 19. 68 Borba, Aug. 14, 1954, p. 1. 69 Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 3. 70 Borba, Oct. 23, 1954, p. 1. 71 The Federal Statistical Institute publishes wage figures only for government workers. One reason is doubtless the difficulties of collecting these statistics in the decentralized system. 73 This was the private opinion given to the author by several Yugoslav economists. 73 This figure applies to "average wages," according to Sergei Krajger, director of the Federal Planning Institute. Borba, July 25, 1954, p. 1. 74 Cf. "Cost of Living Down in 1953," Yugoslav Review, Vol. Ill, no. 5 (May, 1954), p. 12. 76 See remarks of Vukmanovic-Tempo, Borba, Dec. 28, 1954, p. 1. 76 New York Times, Oct. 17, 1954, p. 4. 77 Borba, Nov. 21, 1954, p. 2. Klbid. 79 Vukmanovic-Tempo, Borba, Oct. 30, 1954, p. 1. 80 Vukmanovic-Tempo, Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1. 81 New York Times, Oct. 17, 1954, p. 4. 82 Cf. Borba, Nov. 21, 1954, p. 2. See also Vukmanovic-Tempo, Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1. Public utilities are considered subject to government regulation in the normal course of affairs. See, for example, decree regulating profits of railroads, Sluzbeni List, no. 51, Dec. 8, 1954. 83 Slu&beni List, no. 51, Dec. 8, 1954. 84 For an account of "measures to stabilize the market," see Borba, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 1, and Ekonomska Politika (Belgrade), March 10, 1955. 86 Borba, Aug. 14, 1954, p. 1. 88 Borba, July 25, 1954, p. 1. 87 Yugoslav Facts b Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 2. 88 Ibid., p. 15. 89 "The Resolution on the Social Plan for 1957," Yugoslav Review, Vol. VII, nos. 2-3 (Feb.-March, 1957), p. 10. 90 Vukmanovic-Tempo, Borba, Dec. 28, 1954, p. 1. 91Ibid. 92 This was the opinion given to the author, for instance, by Robert Hochstetter, production consultant of the FOA mission in Belgrade in the fall of 1954. 98 Vukmanovic-Tempo, Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1.

295

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL " From conversation with the author on September 21, 1954. Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 2. 98 These cases were cited to the author in the fall of 1954 by secretaries of people's committees. 97 See New York Times, March 9, 1954, p. 2. "'What happened was that interest bidding at each credit offering started with the rate fixed at the last competition. Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," op. cit., p. 6. 99 See Borba's comments, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 1. 100 Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 17. 101 Ibid., p. 6. 102 Ibid,., p. 2. See also remarks of Vukmanovic-Tempo, Pobjeda, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1; and Borba, Oct. 30, 1954, p. 1. 103 New York Times, May 10, 1952, p. 11. 104 Politika, Aug. 10, 1953, p. 1. 105 Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 32. 106 See statements of Vukmanovic-Tempo, Borba, Oct. 30, 1954, p. 1; and Kardelj, Borba, Aug. 14, 1954, p. 1. 107 This information was related to the author by Kiro Gligorov of the Federal Planning Institute in the fall of 1954. 108 New York Times, March 6, 1955, p. 26. 109 This information was given to the author by Kiro Gligorov of the Federal Planning Institute. See also Vukmanovic-Tempo's comments, "Some Basic Characteristics of Economic Development in Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Review, Vol. IV, nos. 2-3 (Feb.-March, 1955), pp. 17 ff. 110 This transaction was related to the author by the American importer involved, Juan A. Grupe, director of Robin International, Inc., 11 West 42nd Street, New York. m The author learned of this case from Yugoslav sources involved. l u See Vukmanovic-Tempo, Borba, Dec. 28, 1954, p. 1.; and Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," op. cit., pp. 9—11. 113 Borba, Aug. 14, 1954, p. 1. 114 Author's estimate, based on official U.S. figures and unofficial American and Yugoslav information. ** Vukmanovic-Tempo, "Some Basic Characteristics of Economic Development in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 18. The end of 1957 had been set tentatively for completion of 136 key industrial projects, which comprise the basic industrialization goal. See analysis of Yugoslav economy's potential self-sufficiency by J. V. Mladek, E. Sturc, and M. R. Wyczalkowski, "The Change in the Yugoslav Economic System," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. II, no. 3 (Nov., 1953), pp. 407-438. ue Borba, Aug. 14, 1954, p. 1. 117 Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 33. 118 Ibid., p. 19. ™Ibid.,?. 35. 120 Cf. Kardelj, "Contemporary Yugoslavia," Review of International Affairs, Jan. 1, 1955, p. 2. See also Borba, July 4, 1954, p. 2. 131 See discussion in Deleon, op. cit., pp. 71-73. m Yugoslav Facts ir Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 36. 96

296

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII: REFORMS IN GOVERNMENT Deleon, op. cit., pp. 71-73. ™Ibid., p. 45. 123

CHAPTER VII The Reforms in Local Government (Pages 160-184) 1 See Jovan Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XII (April, 1953), pp. 188200; and "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, no. 7 (Sept., 1953), pp. 18-22. "Radivoje Petkovic, Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1955), p. 13. See also Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 188. ' The term in Serbo-Croat is Narodni Odbor. 1 Petkovic, op. cit., p. 15. 6 Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 193. " The text of the law is given in English in New Yugoslav Law, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.), 1950, pp. 30-37. 7 Edvard Kardelj, Rorba, May 25, 1949, p. 1. 8 Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., pp. 191192. 9 See, for example, Boris Kidric, "O Reorganizaciji Drzavne Uprave" ("On the Reorganization of the State Administration"), Arhiv za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke, no. 2, 1950, pp. 6-10. 10 Rorba, July 2, 1951, p. 1. See also New York Times, July 6, 1951, p. 5. u Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 194. 13 Opsti Zakon o Narodnim Odborima (General Law on People's Committees) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista FNRJ, 1952). 13 Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 194. 14 Ibid., p. 197. 15 See chap. v. M Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 21. 17 These terms are used loosely in Yugoslavia, particularly in translation into English. In Serbian, particularly, there is a tendency to refer to all types of local unit as opstina, or commune. Opstina is also, however, translated as "ward" when applied to divisions of cities or districts, whereas the term komuna is employed to signify the new-type commune discussed below. "Petkovic, op. cit., p. 18. 19Ibid., p. 20. See also Djordjevic, Ustavno Pravo (Constitutional Law) (Belgrade: Arhiva za Pravne i Drustvene Nauke, 1953), pp. 373-375. 20Zakon o Planskom Upravljanju Privredom (Law on the Planned Management of the Economy), OpUi Zakon o RudZetima (General Law on Rudgets), and Zakon o Drustoenom Doprinosu i Porezima (Law on Social Contribution and Texts) (Belgrade: Sluzbenog Lista, 1953). 21 For a discussion of planning techniques at the local level, see Petkovic, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

297

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII: REFORMS IN GOVERNMENT Ibid. Yugoslav Facts b- Views, no. 28, July 12, 1957, p. 33. 24 Petkovic, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 26 SluZbeni List, no. 30, July 21, 1954. 26 When the author sought to cross the Yugoslav frontier near Bled for a brief trip to Austria in August, 1954, the exit and reentry visas for his passport were obtained from the district people's committee office for internal aifairs, without apparent reference to Belgrade. 27 See chap. iii. For official comment on the relation of local party officials to people's committees, see report of Aleksander Rankovic, Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1953), p. 71. 28 These estimates were given the author by officials of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in Belgrade in the summer of 1954. Later observations tended to bear them out. 28 Petkovic, op. cit., p. 65. 30 As explained in chap, vi, all members of producers' councils belong to the Sindikat. 31 Kardelj, Socijalisticka Demokratija (Socialist Democracy) (Belgrade: 1952), p. 51. 32 These examples, as well as those cited directly below, were reported to the author in 1954 by officials of the various people's committees. 33 Cf. Djordjevic, "Local Self-Govemment in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 197, and "Some Principles of Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 18. 34 See discussion of the role of aktivs in Soviet local government in Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 207, 398-399. Djordjevic has testified to Soviet influence in the conception of people's committees in general. "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 191. 36 Borba, Aug. 7, 1954, p. 4. 36 Borba, Aug. 26, 1954, p. 1. "Ibid. 38 These are dealt with in Opsti Zakon o Narodnim Odborima, chap, d, sec. 3. " Cf. Petkovic, op. cit., p. 20. For 1956 system, see Slu&beni List, no. 13, March 18, 1956. 40 See Djordjevic, "Local Self-Government in Yugoslavia," op. cit., p. 197. 11 Petkovic, op. cit., p. 22. 42 See "The Yugoslav Electoral System," Yugoslav Review, Vol. II, no. 9 (Dec., 1953), especially p. 4. "Especially in connection with the Djilas affair. See chaps, iii and ix. 44 See Djordjevic, "New Forms of Social Management," Review of International Affairs, Nov. 15, 1954, pp. 8-10; and Petkovic, op. cit., pp. 45-59. 45 Djordjevié, ibid., p. 9. "Ibid. "SMbeni List, no. 27, June 30, 1954. 48 Djordjevic, "New Forms of Social Management," op. cit., p. 8. 22 23

298

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII: REFORMS IN GOVERNMENT " Ibid., p. 9. M Petkovic, op. cit., p. 56. 61 Petkovic, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 62 See chap. vi. For application of social management to publishing concerns, see Izvestaj Saveznog Izvrsnog Ve£a za 1954 Godinu (Report of the Federal Executive Council for the Year 1954) (Belgrade: Savezna Narodna Skupstina, 1955), p. 55. See also A. Deleon, 33 Questions, 33 Answers on Workers' Self-Government in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1956), p. 45. 63 Petkovic, op. cit., p. 65. 64 Borba, Oct. 23, 1954, p. 1. Kardelj elaborated on this point in conversations with the author on November 8, 1954. 65 Borba, Aug. 14, 1954, p. 1. M See Kardelj's remarks, Borba, Oct. 23, 1954, p. 1. 67 Kardelj, Socijalistiêka Demokratija, pp. 34-35. 58 Djordjevic, "From Local Self-Government to Communes," Review of International Affairs, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 13. 69 Author's conversation with Kardelj, November 8, 1954. 80 Petkovic, op. cit., p. 73. 61 Djordjevic, "From Local Self-Government to Communes," op. cit., 63 R. Mitrovic, "Socijalisticka Democratija u Jugoslaviji" ( "Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia"), Medfunarodna Politika, Dec. 1, 1954, p. 9. 64 SluZbeni List, no. 26, 1955. A partial text of the law is given in translation in New Yugoslav Law, no. 3 (July-Sept.), 1955, pp. 28-31. See also Borba, June 17, 1955, p. 1. œ Kardelj, "The New Organization of Municipalities and Districts," New Yugoslav Law, no. 3 (July-Sept.), 1955, pp. 3-27. This, of course, applies primarily to towns subordinate to district people's committees. 66 See texts of statutes of new commune and district of Kranj, op. cit., pp. 31-39. 87 Conversation of the author with officials of the Rijeka People's Committee in the fall of 1954. 68 Conversation of the author with Pero Korobor, secretary of the Commission on Laws of the Macedonian Executive Council and one of the leading Yugoslav experts on the commune. 69 Kardelj apparently referred to all local communes, regardless of size, as municipal communes. "The New Organization of the Municipalities and Districts," op. cit., pp. 17-19. 70 Cf. "Election of New Workers' Councils," Yugoslav Review, Vol. VII, nos. 4-5 (April-May, 1957), p. 7. See also Kardelj's article, op. cit., and discussions in Borba, Dec. 30, 1954. 71 Kardelj, Borba, Dec. 30, 1954, p. 1. 73 Author's conversation with Rijeka officials. Petkovic reports that "subsequently analyses revealed that Opatija too would find it more beneficial to join the projected community, and its citizens agreed." Petkovic, op. cit., p. 92. 73 Borba, July 3,1957, p. 1.

*99

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII: REFORMS IN AGRICULTURE 74 This view was implicit in Kardelj's remarks in Borba, Dec. 30, 1954, p. 1. Certainly even after the adoption of the law on communes and their formal establishment, functional progress continued to lag considerably behind organizational and operational development. 76 Kardelj, "The New Organization of Municipalities and Districts," op. cit., p. 19. " S e e chap. viii. 77 Borba, Dec. 30, 1954, p. 1. 78 Kardelj, "The New Organization of Municipalities and Districts," op. cit., p. 27.

CHAPTER VIII The Reforms in (Pages 185-212)

Agriculture

I The March, 1931, census, cited in Petko Rasic, Agricultural Development in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1955), p. 7. 'Ibid., p. 16. 'Economic Survey of Europe in 1953 (Geneva: Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe, 1954), p. 109. 4 See discussion in Rasic, op. cit., pp. 21-22. " Rasic, op. cit., p. 16. ' Ranko M. Brashich, Land Reform and Ownership in Yugoslavia, 19191953 (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1954), p. 38. These figures are based on the government Statistiöki Godisnak za 1936 (Statistical Yearbook for 1936), Vol. II (Belgrade: 1937). 7 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 8 See Dinko Tomasic, Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics (New York: George W. Stewart, 1948), pp. 149-157, 162-186, and 189-197, for a discussion of the zadruga. 8 Brashich, op. cit., pp. 62-65. 10 See Brashich, op. cit., pp. 1—43, for a discussion of differences of land tenure in Yugoslavia. I I Rasic, op. cit., p. 20. u C f . Doreen Warriner, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), chap. vii. "Vladimir Dedijer, Dnevnik (Diary), Vol. I (Belgrade: 1945), emphasizes the peasant character of the Partisans. See especially pp. 48-57. 11 Warriner, op. cit., p. 51. 15 SMbeni List, no. 64, Aug. 23, 1945. "Brashich, op. cit., p. 51. 17 See Basic Law On Cooperatives, Slu&beni List, no. 59, July 18, 1946. ™ Informativni Prirucnik o Jugoslaviji (Information Handbook of Yugoslavia), Vol. I (1949), p. 199. 18 Cf. Sir Malcolm Darling, "Collective Farming in Yugoslavia," Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 24, 1952, p. 7. "Brashich, op. cit., p. 56. See also credit regulations in Sluibeni List, no. 75, Sept. 25,1945, and no. 6, Jan. 1,1947.

300

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII: REFORMS IN AGRICULTURE 21 See law on organization of machine tractor stations, Slu&beni List, no. 19, April 3, 1945. 22 Brashich, op. cit., p. 56. 23 See early tax laws, SluZbeni List, no. 90, Oct. 26, 1945. 24 Informativni Prirucnik, p. 199. 26 Rasic, op. cit., p. 39. Statistics from various sources on general agricultural cooperatives tend to agree, but statistics on peasant work cooperatives vary considerably, especially for the 1945-1948 period, for which no official figures are available. Brashich, admitting that "knowledge is very imperfect," estimates there were 1,318 peasant work cooperatives in 1948. The confusion is compounded by the fact that where official statistics are given, the Prirucnik and the official Statisticki Bilten (Statistical Bulletin) do not always agree. Further, it is not always clear whether figures on "cooperatives" refer to both types or only to the peasant work cooperatives. 26 Cf. Brashich, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 27 See articles by Vlajko Begovic in Zbirka Clanaka i Tekstova za Proucavanje Ekonomike FNRJ (Collection of Articles and Texts for Economic Research FPRY), Vol. I (Belgrade: 1949), pp. 40, 588. 28 Borba, Feb. 5, 1948, p. 1. 29 Rasic, op. cit., p. 65. 30 Ibid. 31 See The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948), pp. 62-63. 32 See "A False Understanding of Marxist Principles," For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy (The Cominform Journal), Bucharest, Aug. 10, 1949, p. 1. 33 Ibid. 34 Milan Zujovic, ed., Zbirka Clanaka i Tekstova za Proudavanje Ekonomike FNRJ (Collection of Articles and Texts for Economic Research FRPY) (Belgrade: Naucna Kniga, 1950), p. 348. 35 See Borba, June 15, 1949, p. 1. 36 The author heard of many such cases during his travels in Yugoslavia during the summer and fall of 1950. 37 See, for example, price laws in SluZbeni List, nos. 30-56, April 6 June 27, 1949; ana tax laws in Slu&beni List, no. 32, April 4, and no. 88, Oct. 11, 1949. 38 Sluzbeni List, no. 49, June 9, 1949. 39 Rasic, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 40 For example, the author talked in 1954 with a Serbian peasant, still a member of a collective farm, who said he had been jailed in 1949 for arguing against converting his collective farm into a type-four collective. Another peasant claimed his pigs were poisoned for the same reason. 41 Rasic, op. cit., pp. 39, 46. 42 New York Times, Oct. 31, 1951, p. 1. 43 By Law no. 526, Sluzbeni List, no. 58, Oct. 3, 1950. 44 See the London Times, Feb. 4, 1951, p. 5. 45 See "Difficulties in Agriculture," Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 8 (Oct., 1952), pp. 6-7.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII: REFORMS IN AGRICULTURE Borba, Nov. 25, 1951, p. 1. See also "Farm Cooperatives Enter a New Phase," Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 1 (Jan., 1952), p. 9; and Brashich, op. cit., p. 69. 17 Borba, March 29, 1953, p. 1. 48 Rasic, op. cit., p. 45. "Ibid., p. 66. 50 See "Agricultural Credits in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," Bulletin of Information and Documentation, Glavni Zadruzni Savez FNRJ, Vol. Ill, no. 3 (1954), pp. 1-3; see also Brashich, op. cit., p. 56. 51 Cf. "Osnovni Zakon o Drustvenom Doprinosu i Porezima ("Basic Law on Social Contributions and Taxes"), Sluzbeni List, no. 1, Jan. 2, 1952. 62 "Why Cooperatives?" Yugoslav Review, Vol. I, no. 1 (Jan., 1952), p. 10. See also "Peasant Work Cooperatives," Bulletin of Information and Documentation, Glavni Zadruzni Savez FNRJ, Vol. I, no. 3 (1952), pp. 3—4. 53 Tito's report, Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1953), p. 36. 51 Rasic, op. cit., p. 75. 66 Borba, April 6, 1953, p. 1. 60 Borba, March 29, 1953, p. 1. 67 Sluibeni List, no. 14, March 30, 1953. 68 Rasic, op. cit., p. 47. ™ Cf. "Cetvrtina Vojvodjanske Zemlje Opstenarodna Imovina" ("A Quarter of Vojvodina Land People's Property"), Ekonomska Politika, no. 89 (Dec. 10, 1953), p. 989. 60 Brashich, op. cit., p. 109. 01 This was Brashich's opinion, ibid., pp. 100-101. See also Fred Warner Neal, "The Reforms in Yugoslavia," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XIII (April, 1954), p. 236. 62 "Interview with Marshal Tito," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. XXXIV, no. 16 (April 17, 1953), p. 26. 63 Borba, March 29, 1953, p. 1. 64 Ibid. K Franjo Gazi, "Razvitak, Uspjesi i Perspektive Zadrugarstva u Hrvatskoj" ("Development, Success and Perspective of the Cooperative Movement in Croatia"), Ekonomski Pregled, no. 12 (Dec.), 1953, pp. 551-553. 66 Borba, Sept. 28, 1953, p. 1. 67 Sluibeni List, no. 22, May 27, 1953. 68 Report of Moma Markovic, president of the managing board of the Cooperative Union of Yugoslavia, Bulletin of Information and Documentation, Glavni Zadruzni Savez FNRJ, Vol. Ill, no. 2 (1954), p. 18. 68 "Jos Uvek Malo Pravnosnaznih Resenja o Otkupu" (Still Little Legal Strengthening of the Decision on Compulsory Land Sale"), Ekonomska Politika, no. 93 (Jan. 7, 1954), p. 28. 70 Rista Antunovic, "Uloga Zadruge" ("Role of the Cooperative"), Ekonomska Politika, no. 108 (April 23, 1954), pp. 321-322. 71 Brashich, op. cit., p. 114. n See remarks of Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo in Borba, May 22, 1953, p. 1. 49

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NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII: REFORMS IN AGRICULTURE " This is discussed in "Povratak u Zadruge" ("Return to the Cooperative"), Ekonomska Politika, no. 81 (Oct. 15, 1953), especially p. 524. M Borba, May 22, 1953, p. 1. 75 Edvard Kardelj, "Svaki Napredak u Poljoprivedi Znacice Spontano Jacanje Socialistickih Snaga na Selu" ("Every Advance in Agriculture Means Strengthening of Socialist Power in the Village"), Komunist, nos. 5-« (June), 1953, p. 336. 76Borba, March 29, 1953, p. 1. 77 Sluibeni List, no. 5, Jan. 29, 1954. The law permitted members of collectives to reorganize in any form they saw fit and to operate subsidiary enterprises and regularized their autonomy under workers' councils and management boards. 78 For example, Brashich, op. cit., p. 122. ™ Borba, May 19, 1954, p. 2. 80 The Federal Statistical Institute reported to the author in the fall of 1954 there were "less than 1,000 peasant work cooperatives whose principal activity was crop production." 81 Report of Moma Markovic to Glavni Zadruzni Savez, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 82 Cf. Tito's Ostrajnica speech on September 19, 1954, published during that year by Yugoslav Information Center, New York, under the title President Tito Speaks, p. 1. 83Ibid. 84 Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," American Universities Field Staff Reports, FWN-4-'54, p. 10. 86 Cf. President Tito Speaks, pp. 2-3. 86 Borba, Aug. 11, 1954, p. 1. "Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," op. cit., p. 9. 88 Report of Moma Markovic to Glavni Zadruzni Savez, op. cit., p. 23. 88 See Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," op. cit., p. 9. 90Position of Individual Peasants in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Jugopres, 1954), p. 4. a Politika, Oct. 29, 1954, p. 2. M See the several price decrees, Slu&beni List, no. 33, Aug. 5, 1954. They are also discussed in Borba, Aug. 12, 1954, p. 2. 93 Sluzbeni List, no. 14, March 30, 1956. The general agricultural tax system is discussed in Rasic, op. cit., pp. 69-70. " See, for example, "The Mrzovic Cooperative and Short-handed Peasants," Bulletin of Information and Documentation, Glavni Zadruzni Savez FNRJ, Vol. Ill, no. 3 (1954), p. 19. 86 Position of the Individual Peasant in Yugoslavia, p. 4. M Neal, "Yugoslav Communist Theory," American Universities Field Staff Reports, FWN-5-'54, p. 13. 97 Vladimir Bakaric, quoted in the New York Times, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 8. 88 Jugoslovenski Ekonomski Sistem (Belgrade: 1955), p. 1. 98 See criticism of village Communist leadership in Borba, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 3. 100 Vjesnik (Zagreb), Aug. 1, 1954, p. 1. 101 See Tito's remarks at Third Congress of the League of Communists of Serbia, Borba, April 29, 1954, p. 1.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER I X : RELAXATION OF TOTALITARIANISM Such fears are also reported by Brashich, op. cit., p. 115. Jovan Djordjevic, "Veca Proizvodjaca" ("Councils of Producers"), Medjunarodna Politika, Oct. 1, 1954, p. 19. 104 Botha, Aug. 18, 1954, p. 2. 105 Ibid. 108 This was a common complaint the author heard from those peasants who evinced an interest in producers' councils elections. 107 Borba, Oct. 25, 1954, p. 1. 108 See Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," op. cit., p. 9. 109 Politika, Oct. 29, 1954, p. 1. u o Neal, "Decentralized Communism in Action," op. cit., p. 9. m Report of Mona Markovic to Glavni Zadruzni Savez, op. cit., pp. 18-19. ™ For example, credit for livestock purchases in 1954 amounted to 93.2 per cent of total granted credit in Serbia. Politika, Oct. 29, 1954. 113 See Borba, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 2. 111 Neal, "Yugoslav Communist Theory," op. cit., p. 13. 115 Position of Individual Peasants in Yugoslavia, p. 5. ™Ibid. 117 Rasic, op. cit., p. 76. ua Sluzbeni List, no. 14, March 30, 1956. """The Resolution on the Social Plan for 1957," Yugoslav Review, Vol. VII, nos. 2-3 (Feb.-March, 1957), p. 10. 130 See report on his address to the Federal Assembly, ibid., p. 11. 103

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