Theoretical Underpinnings of India-Pakistan Relations

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Theoretical Underpinnings of India– Pakistan Relations

India Quarterly 76(2) 294–312, 2020 © 2020 Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) Reprints and permissions: in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india DOI: 10.1177/0974928420917785 journals.sagepub.com/home/iqq

Ashish Shukla Abstract The India–Pakistan relations have historically been marked by mistrust, broken promises, unresolved issues and unending conflicts. A number of divisive factors shaped and influenced the nature of this relationship which inter alia includes large-scale violence at the time of partition, perceptual enmity and numerous unresolved issues including Kashmir. Due to all these reasons, the two countries have found themselves locked in a complex situation that could best be described using zero-sum two-person game. The author argues that perceptions play an important role in shaping the nature of bilateral relations. He goes on to identify six different prisms—three each in India and Pakistan—through which one can understand the nature and direction of this otherwise difficult relationship. Key words India, Pakistan, Muslim League, two nation theory, Pakistan Army

Introduction It has been more than seven decades since the British left the Indian subcontinent partitioning it into two separate states—India and Pakistan. Until 1947, the two countries were embodiment of one of the oldest and greatest civilisations of the world and shared a common sociocultural heritage that many refer as the Ganga– Jamuni Tehzeeb. But the partition of the British India on religious lines and innumerable loss of lives due to the large-scale violence resulted in the temporary disruption of historical and cultural linkages which over the years devoid the people of a common destiny. Thus, with partition coming into effect on 14–15 August 1947, New Delhi and Karachi1 began their new journey together but in a different direction. Since then, a lot of water has been flown down to Indus and Ganges.

Corresponding author: Ashish Shukla. E-mail: [email protected]

Shukla 295 The idea of India,2 as imagined by the leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Bhagat Singh, Sardar Patel, Baba Saheb Bhim Rao Ambedkar, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and others, could not be fully realised on the ground. However, India, despite many of its shortcomings, not only emerged as a secular democratic state, but it also earned a respectable place in the comity of nations. The present-day India—in terms of political stability, economic progress, military modernisation, scientific innovation and technological development—has successfully established itself as the most eminent force in the region. Its historical and civilisational linkages with outside world and growing economy coupled with soft power image3 make it a potent but benign force internationally. Although, due to a number of reasons, India could not fully accommodate and satisfy its immediate neighbours namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, the biggest failure of Indian foreign policy has been the relations with Pakistan. In contrast to India, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Pakistan took a quantum leap in a direction that is not quite appreciated within the region and beyond. Pakistan was imagined, though insufficiently, by its founding fathers especially Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the homeland for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent where they were supposed to pursue their civilisational destiny without being threatened or dominated by the ‘Hindu majority’ of India. A fairly large number of academics in India and elsewhere have their reservations about Muslim League’s idea of Pakistan, however, most of them tend to agree with Stephen P. Cohen that the idea of Pakistan proved to be stronger than the state of Pakistan in 1947 (Cohen, 2004, p. 93–96). The present-day Pakistan is infamously known as the epicentre of global terrorism which provides safe heaven to some of the most dangerous terror outfits and proponents of extremist ideologies. Given the complex nature of various institutions and their relations with each other, it is quite challenging to describe and define the Pakistani state. It belongs to a category in making that can be termed as ‘Abnormal State’ or ‘Hybrid State’. It is neither a democracy nor an authoritarian military dictatorship or for that matter an Islamic theocracy. Indeed, it appears to be more or less the disproportionate combination of all three. Pakistan seems to be a constitutional democracy because there is a written constitution and an elected government headed presently by cricketer turned politician Imran Khan. Then, there is an all-powerful security establishment led by the incumbent Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Like many of his predecessors, Gen. Bajwa has not only been controlling the national security discourse, he has tightly gripped key areas of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Notwithstanding all these, there is a religious right with immense street power resisting every single attempt of ruling elite to introduce changes aimed to modernise the society. And finally, the unaccounted number of terrorist outfits and most of their splinter groups are considered to be ‘strategic asset’ and ‘foreign policy tool’ by the politico-security elites. The end result of all these have made the lives of ordinary Pakistanis pathetic. In spite of the religious minorities, Pakistani state has failed to meet the modest expectations of its Muslim citizenry for which it came into being. The discontent and disgruntlement among the

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Mohajirs,4 Baloch, Hazaras, and more recently in Pashtuns is the telling testimony of Pakistani state’s failure in serving its people. The Mohajirs, once a privileged minority who played an important role in the movement for the creation of Pakistan and settled primarily in urban Sindh, have become victims of state policy (Siddiqi, 2019) and lost their influence in a Punjabi dominated system. In the name of dealing with terrorists and criminals, the security establishment, in recent past, not only targeted prominent Mohajir leaders and activists, but it also facilitated the breaking up of Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)—the de facto political voice of ethnic Mohajirs in Pakistan. Their plight can be understood with the fact that many in Pakistan refer Mohajirs as ‘fifth column’ and often term them as ‘Indian agents’ (Raghavan, 2016). The highly educated and politically conscious Mohajir diaspora is well aware of the ground situation and sense of deprivation among the members of the community. They take active interest to highlight their community’s plight at every possible national and international stage. In January 2019, a US-based group of expatriate Mohajirs put forward the demand for the creation of ‘Greater Karachi’ as an autonomous region to address some of their genuine concerns (The Hindu, 2019). Baloch have historically been waging an armed conflict against the Pakistani state. Their struggle for an independent Balochistan, in spite of Pakistani armed forces’ continued atrocities, has now been running into the fifth phase. The movement, both armed and peaceful, is being led primarily by an emerging middle class that has better ways to reach out to international community and Baloch diaspora (Shukla, 2018). The Baloch leaders, mostly living in exile, point out the brutal systematic state repression and seek international support to realise their nationalist aspiration. They accuse Pakistani state and its armed forces of merciless killing and maiming Baloch population. The persecution of Hazara Shias is not a new phenomenon in the region. They have had historically been targeted by extremist forces in neighbouring Afghanistan. Many analysts believe that their persecution in Pakistan is an extension of that approach (Sumbal, 2013). However, they fail to underline the fact that the State of Pakistan and its various institutions have never been in a position to ensure their physical and material well-being. Most of the sectarian outfits targeting Hazaras have some linkages with the predominant security establishment of the country, while few have anti-state leanings. In the recent past, questions were also raised by ethnic Pashtuns regarding the extrajudicial killings and other injustices done by Pakistan Army. Founded in 2014 by eight students in Gomal University, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) has become the symbol of Pashtun voice in the country. Instead of addressing the genuine concerns of the Pashtun community, the politico-security elites have decided to resort to an iron-hand approach. Of late, Pakistan’s all-powerful army has branded PTM a part of ‘fifth generation warfare’ which is being manipulated by hostile external elements (Syed, 2019). Director General (DG) of military’s media wing namely Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Major General Asif Ghafoor in a press conference on 29 April 2019 unequivocally accused PTM of taking money from Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies for creating trouble inside Pakistan. He warned PTM of consequences and asserted that their time was

Shukla 297 up (Masood et al., 2019). This shows the nature of state and its powerful institutions’ attitude towards their own people who, for one reason or the other, raise their voices in a democratic manner.

Shared Heritage, Different Trajectories The question which people in the region and outside often pose is why the two countries adopted quite different trajectories when they had so much in common between them including the administrative and governing structures? Remember, the two countries started with the same Government of India Act 1935 and the India Independence Act 1947. It is not an easy question to answer why the two countries ended up where they are today. However, there are certain points which one can think of while analysing the historical developments. Unlike India, Pakistan was insufficiently imagined. The All India Muslim League (AIML) under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah unambiguously put forward the demand of a separate state for the first time in March 1940 when the Lahore Resolution was passed. Since then the Muslim League devoted all its energy to mobilise public opinion in favour of its demand. Jinnah, who at one point of time in history was regarded as the ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity,5 was now on the way to become individual most responsible for the partition of British India. He considered himself, as Ayesha Jalal suggested, being the sole spokesman of all the Muslims living in any part of the British India (Jalal, 1994, p. XV). In his presidential address to Muslim League’s Lahore Session in March 1940, Jinnah categorically stated that: The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based on mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions … Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government … Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state. (Jinnah, 1940)

It is clear that in later part of his life, as stated earlier, Jinnah very much wanted a separate state but till the end he was not quite sure whether he would get that or not. And possibly, that was the reason he kept the negotiation open ended till the last moment. This dilemma or confusion did not allow him and his colleagues from the Muslim League to prepare a well-thought out plan to cope with the challenging issues of nation building and state building. Thus, Muslim League’s dream of a separate state of Pakistan was realised in less than a decade and that too without a mass movement. In contrast, the Indian National Congress took more than six decades to effectively mobilise public opinion and launch the national movement against the British for India’s independence. Before launching the Quit India Movement in 1942, Congress exhausted all other means, including constitutional, to convince the British regarding Indian aspirations of self-rule.

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Unlike the idea of India, there was no consensus over the idea of Pakistan. Many prominent Muslims of undivided India such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni were part of Congress-led anti-colonial movement against the British. Even members of clergy and religious leaders from Deoband including Maulana Abul A’la Maududi and Allama Inayat ullah Mashriqi were not in favour of Pakistan as a separate state. Most of the Islamic scholars and preachers were of the view that Muslims do not need territorial nationalism and separate state to protect their interests. The idea, based on the twin pillars of Islam and Two-Nation Theory, was in fact the reflection of political frustration of Muslim elites (Qureshi, 1972–1973). Unlike India, Pakistan, right from the beginning, lacked a viable national identity. It primarily relied on Islam thinking that the religion would work as binding cement in keeping every sections of society together. That was not to be the case at all. The heated discussions in the Constituent Assembly between the Muslim and non-Muslim members underlined the gravity of the problem. Most of the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly wanted an Islamic State and some even argued that Pakistan did not need any constitution as Koran and Sunnah provided everything necessary to govern the people. When the Objectives Resolution was introduced on 7 March 1949, all the non-Muslim members opposed it tooth and nail. B. K. Dutta during his speech underlined that ‘I feel I have every reason to believe that were this Resolution to come before this House within the lifetime of the Great Creator of Pakistan, the Quaid-e-Azam, it would not have been in its present shape’ (Parveen, 2010). He warned the dangers of mixing politics with religion and stated that ‘Politics and religion belong to different regions of mind … Politics belongs to the domain of reason, but you mix it with religion … You (have) condemned us forever to as inferior status’ (Ali, 2011, p. 28). Congress leader S. C. Chattopadhyaya argued in the Constituent Assembly that ‘You are determined to create a Herrenvolk … This resolution in its present form epitomises the spirit of reaction. That spirit will not remain confined to the precincts of this House. It will send its waves to the countryside as well’ (Ali, 2011). Although the non-Muslim members raised a number of pertinent questions and proposed several amendments, Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan and mover of the Objectives Resolution, responded by saying that ‘Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this subcontinent wanted to build their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam’ (Haq, 1996). Such a response on the floor of the Constituent Assembly by none other than the then Prime Minister of Pakistan makes it clear that the early leaders either did not see through or deliberately ignored the inherent contradictions within Islam and downplayed other ethnic or linguistic identities. When the amendments, proposed by the non-Muslim members, were put to vote, they were rejected by a margin of 21 to 10 votes. And when the Objective Resolution was placed on the floor for approval, it was adopted by the majority vote while all the non-Muslim members voted against it. Even today, many Pakistanis are not sure about the identity of Pakistan as a modern nation state. Prominent historians of Pakistan still opine that Pakistan is

Shukla 299 in search of its identity. Farzana Shaikh in her book Making Sense of Pakistan categorically wrote that: Despite broad (if uneasy) acceptance that Pakistan meant (and continues to mean) different things to different people, its multiple meanings have invariably frustrated the cohesion of a national community that is anchored in, and is still widely judged to be representative of, an undifferentiated religious community. (Shaikh, 2009, pp. 25, 46–47)

Mubarak Ali, in his study Pakistan: In Search of Identity, underlined the fact that Pakistan lacked a viable national identity and was still in search of it. In his own words: Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been in search of a separate identity and legitimacy in order to distinguish itself from India … In asserting her identity, Pakistan is in a dilemma: in case of rejection of the Pakistan ideology, it has to repudiate the very basis of its separation from India; to keep and preserve the ideology means to alienate the non-Muslim minorities from becoming a part of the Pakistani nation. (Ali, 2011, p. 7)

Unlike Congress, Muslim League did not have enough second and third rung leadership that could match the qualities of the top leadership and work relentlessly to fulfil their vision. Unlike Congress, Muslim League failed to transform itself into a mass-based political party. Barring East Bengal, the demand for a separate state was stronger in those parts of undivided India, especially North India, where Muslims were in a numerical minority but Pakistan came into being on a land where Muslims were already in a majority and had practically no fear of being dominated by Hindus. Thus, the Muslim League leadership, soon after the creation of Pakistan, found its political base very shaky and deliberately delayed the introduction of democratic practices in the country. Unlike Nehru, Jinnah died very early and Liaqat too got assassinated soon, leaving the Muslim League into disarray. Unlike India, Pakistan could not resist the pressures from the religious right and ended up giving them ample space to manipulate sociopolitical developments in the country. Besides, ruling elites, having no strong political base, used religious right in one way or the other to manufacture some sort of political legitimacy at home. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949 ceded religious right enough space in the political system. It stated, among other things, that: Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust … Whereas the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed. (Government of Pakistan, 1949)

Unlike India, Pakistan took longer than the generally expected time to arrive at a consensus over the constitution. Whereas India adopted its constitution in November 1949 which came into effect in January 1950 making it a democratic

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republic, Pakistan spent almost 9 years to produce a constitution in March 1956 declaring it to be an Islamic Republic. Unlike India, in Pakistan there was no consensus among various stakeholders over the constitution which made it unsustainable from the very beginning. As the events unfolded in October 1958, President Iskender Mirza abrogated the constitution paving the way for military to take over the reins of power in the country. Pakistan Army, once in the driving seat, strengthened its grip over the state to the extent that civilian leaders soon found themselves completely marginalised in the country. Unlike India, Pakistan soon got involved into Cold-War power politics. Right from the beginning, it had sought an alliance with one of the two Superpowers of that time. It tried and used its geostrategic location as a bargaining chip to garner economic and military aid from its western ally. It is important to note that even before Pakistan became a separate state, Mohammad Ali Jinnah at his Bombay (now Mumbai) residence met two US officials namely Raymond A. Hare and Thomas E. Weil in May 1947. During this meeting, Jinnah sought American economic and military assistance and in return assured the visitors that Pakistan along with other Muslim countries would stand together against any Soviet advance in the region (Venkataramani, 1982, p. 1). All these factors made a difference between the two countries and the trajectories they adopted which led them where they are today. This is not to suggest that Pakistan failed completely on all fronts, but it could never ever come close to realising what its founding fathers had thought of achieving.

The Nature of Bilateral Relations The India–Pakistan relations have historically been marked by mistrust, broken promises, unresolved issues and unending conflicts. A number of divisive factors shaped and influenced the nature of this relationship which inter alia includes large-scale violence at the time of partition, perceptual enmity and numerous unresolved issues including Kashmir. Due to all these reasons, the two countries have found themselves locked in a complex situation that could best be described using zero-sum two-person game in which two players A and B, in this case India and Pakistan, engage each other for exactly opposite objectives (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953, p. 98). The zero-sum game, as it is known popularly, works in a way where intended gain for one side is often viewed as an equivalent loss to the other. According to K. Natwar Singh, India’s former foreign secretary, the India– Pakistan relationship is ‘chronically accident prone’ (The Economic Times, 2018) for Pakistan is too changeable and unpredictable which makes normalisation impossible (The Economic Times, 2011). The two countries, over the last seven decades, have witnessed numerous breakdowns and very few breakthroughs. In less than seven decades after the tragic partition, the two archrivals met each other in three full-scale wars (1947– 1948, 1965 and 1971), one ‘half-war’ in Kargil (1999) and countless other skirmishes at the Line of Control (LoC) and international border. Both the countries regularly accuse each other of supporting non-state actors to foment trouble inside their respective territories. New Delhi and Islamabad officially

Shukla 301 deny meddling in each other’s internal affairs and at least in principle agree to coexist peacefully and resolve all the outstanding issues through dialogue and negotiation. However, the situation on the ground is diametrically opposite. Pakistani state apparatus, particularly its all-powerful security establishment, uses terror outfits as ‘strategic asset’ and ‘foreign policy tool’ against India. Despite a blowback of this strategy,6 there is no sign Pakistan altogether abandoning it in near future. In between various breakdowns and breakthroughs, the relationship acquired its own momentum and dynamism. The continuing hostility has vitiated the geopolitical environment in the region and made a negative impact on the activities of the existing peace constituency on both sides of the border. Those talking peace are no longer welcome in either of the two countries.

Perceptions Matter The scholars, practitioners and members of the strategic community have attempted to explain and interpret the dynamics of this difficult relationship from time to time. However, mostly these works focused on analysing a series of events and historical developments to make sense of this peculiar relationship. Others trying to give it a theoretical touch often ended up in analysing some aspects of the bilateral relations, while completely ignoring some other. For example, most of the theoretical work either focused on the unending conflict between the two nations or attempted to explain the limited cooperation that happen from time to time. Mohammad Ayoob’s subaltern realism underlined the fact that the International Relations theories do not give proper attention to domestic variables making an impact on the conflict. He went on to suggest that international conflict is an extension of internal conflict in developing countries and as such is a product of state-making and nation-building (Ayoob, 2002). Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argued that there is a lot of continuity in domestic, regional and global levels of security dynamics. The regional security complex theory (RSCT), as it is called, provides a conceptual framework that gives importance to regional actors. It unambiguously establishes the fact that rather than being the mechanical reflection of the distribution of power, regional systems are dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 40). Sridharan’s attempt to theorise India–Pakistan relations lead him to reject the deterrence theory. Instead, he was of the view that the combination of subaltern realism and RSCT explains much of the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan (Sridharan, 2005). Various strands of liberalism including classical and neoliberalism offer convincing explanations on why the two countries should cooperate. Republican liberalism asserts that democracies never fight with each other. Democratic peace thesis too supports this argument. However, it is difficult to proclaim, despite the fact that there are civilian regimes at the helm in New Delhi and Islamabad, that India and Pakistan are really democracies. Commercial liberalism talks about free trade bringing prosperity and paving the way for peace. Neoliberalism underlines that though the international system is anarchic, there is ample space for sustainable cooperation between the two states. It actually prioritises national

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economic welfare over national security. However, when one tries to analyse the bilateral relations in a holistic manner, s/he ends up believing that it defies the logic of liberalism (Mehsud, 2017). As far as India–Pakistan relations are concerned, there has been no serious attempt to study the prevailing perceptions in both the countries that shape their foreign policies. How the two countries perceive each other and what their people think of each other could be important to understand the nature and behaviour of the respective countries. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) constitution declares: That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is the minds of men that the defences of peace must be re-constructed; That ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war. (UNESCO, 2018)

It is often said that wars are first fought in the minds of people and then on the battlefield. Shared beliefs/ideas of any society are the most important factor in making or unmaking of perceptions. Therefore, in order to understand the behaviour of a society, one needs to carefully study the prevailing perceptions of the time as well as factors that influence and shape it in one way or the other. The sociological theory of knowledge, widely known as social constructivism, could be of some help in studying perceptions. In the most general sense, social constructivists argue that shared belief of a society/community/state is socially constructed phenomenon. Alexander Wendt argued that there are two basic tenets of constructivism; first, structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas and second, these shared ideas play an important role in constructing identities and interests of purposive actors (Wendt, 1999, p. 1). The social constructivist assumption underlines the fact that shared beliefs/ideas lead to the formation of a specific and distinctive identity which in turn determines the interests of a given society/community/state, and in the end these interests determine the action or the behaviour of that society or for that matter the state. Having said that, let us examine the strategic thinking in India and Pakistan.

Indian Strategic Thinking Historically, strategic thinking in India has primarily been influenced and informed by the worldview of Jawaharlal Nehru. More or less, this particular view dominated the foreign policymaking in India at least till the end of Cold War. However, as Professor Kanti Bajpai suggested, it has been in ferment since then and three different streams of thinking—notably Nehruvian, neoliberal and hyperrealist—are vying for dominance (Bajpai, 2007). Although Bajpai termed these as schools, he graciously accepted it to be a case of overstatement. Instead of calling schools, one should refer these as distinctive prisms or lenses. It is through these prisms/lenses, one can see through and analyse the nature of India–Pakistan relations and their respective foreign policy behaviour. It would be pertinent to

Shukla 303 note, at the outset itself, that there is no watertight distinction between these prisms. At times, one could find an overlap among them.

The Nehruvian Prism For Nehruvians, Pakistan is an artificial creation (Khan, 1995) that came into existence on the basis of erroneous and highly communal ‘Two Nation Theory’. It puts a question mark over the identity of Pakistan as a state and its ideology, however, concedes India’s failure in dealing with her most complex neighbour. Although Pakistan is a difficult neighbour to deal with, everything is not lost. For Nehruvians, the root cause or source of this enmity and hostility is the lack of trust and misunderstanding between the two countries. The Nehruvian remedy for India therefore is to remain patient as well as vigilant and rely on long-run diplomacy while dealing with Pakistan. Although one cannot guarantee an outright friendship between the two, a workable and somewhat peaceful relationship is quite possible provided the two countries continuously engage each other at multiple levels including the government to government and people to people. Those having faith in this thought process favour bilateralism over great powers’ involvement or third-party mediation. Proponents of this particular view include members of academic community, some seasoned politicians, senior journalists, civil society and a few retired bureaucrats. The most vocal voice in India is that of Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar’s who coined the phrase ‘uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue’ with Pakistan. In present circumstances, the Nehruvian prism seems to have lost its charm as no one from the official circle refers to such thinking. However, a careful analysis makes it clear that the approach has not been abandoned completely. When Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won the parliamentary election in 2014, all the neighbouring countries including Pakistan received an invitation to grace the oath taking ceremony of Shri Narendra Modi as Prime Minister of India. This was in complete sync with the Nehruvian approach. The political exigencies at home and Pakistan’s inability to deliver on its promises regarding terrorism later led India to toughen its stand. In response to US President Donald Trump’s repeated assertions to help mediate between the two nuclear-armed archrivals, India stood firm and rejected the offer (MEA, 2020). Same was the fate of the offer made by United Nations General Secretary (UNSG) Antonio Guterres during his Pakistan visit in February 2020 (The Nation, 2020). These instances not only give a glimpse but refresh the memories of Nehruvian thought process.

The Neoliberal Prism The neoliberals agree with Nehruvians over maintaining broad-based relationship with Pakistan, especially with the people. Unlike Nehruvians, they give top

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priority to economic engagement and somewhat downplay military measures when it comes to dealing with a state like Pakistan. The neoliberal argument revolves around the idea that India’s sociocultural diversity and its continuously growing economy certainly have some positive impact at least on a section of Pakistani society that is exposed to outside world in general and India in particular. In line with commonly held belief that economic cooperation creates certain favourable conditions for cooperation in other areas, neoliberals argue in favour of creating a constituency in Pakistan that has a stake in peaceful and friendly relations with India. They are of the opinion that in reality, if practiced appropriately, economic logic in the end will trump political sensitivities. Thus, the neoliberal prescription for New Delhi is to cooperate with Islamabad and bring them to the negotiation table when it is in its own interest and does not care much about the kind of regime at the helm in Islamabad. Unlike Nehruvians, neoliberals are not averse to great powers’ involvement in the region as they believe that keeping great powers (USA, Russia, China and EU) out is futile, worse and positively harmful for Indian interests (Bajpai, 2011). Proponents of this thought process include primarily the economists and big business houses as well as some seasoned politicians and senior journalists. Being the most important economic force in South Asia, India has always been willing to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation and strengthen economic engagements with the immediate and extended neighbourhood. It is part of its Neighbourhood First approach which requires it to focus on a priority basis over economic and developmental aspects while dealing with neighbouring countries. During the 18th SAARC summit in Kathmandu, Prime Minister Modi had not only underlined the infrastructural weakness in the region, but he also almost lamented while telling how Indian companies were investing billions abroad but only less than 1 per cent of their total external investments in the region (Shukla, 2019a). It was Pakistan which did not agree to endorse SAARC Regional Agreement on Railways and Regulation of Passenger and Cargo Vehicular Traffic in South Asia. Some aspects of neoliberal thinking are definitely part of New Delhi’s approach towards Islamabad, however there is no indication of it abandoning bilateralism to resolve outstanding issues.

The Hyper-realist Prism Hyper-realists are the most aggressive as well as the most pessimistic lot who believe that inter-state conflicts cannot be resolved through peaceful means. Brahma Chellaney suggested that these conflicts can only be managed by threat and use of violence which require states to accumulate military power and be prepared to use force for achieving peace with their adversary. Hyper-realists consider Pakistan not only a dangerous state, but also essentially a threatening phenomenon for Indian state and its interests. Unlike Nehruvians and neoliberals, they rule out cooperation with Pakistan in any field and are extremely critical to outside powers offering economic and military aid to Pakistan. The core idea of hyper-realist thinking is that Pakistan does not understand any other language but brute military force. Thus, from this perspective, India should focus on maximising

Shukla 305 its hard power capacities to the extent that it could dictate terms to Pakistan. Instead of being reactive to Pakistani provocations, as Brahma Chellaney argued, India should take the fight to Pakistan. This thought process is closely in line with John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism which talks about states being power maximisers (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. xxi). To quote a former foreign secretary of India, Mr Kanwal Sibal: How should India deal with a Pakistan in turmoil? The romantics in India never lose faith in the possibility of friendship with Pakistan. To that end they will advocate the proposition of an uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue with Pakistan, one that removes any pretence of a link between dialogue and terrorism and therefore suits Pakistan. (Sibal, 2011)

In nutshell, hyper-realists argue in favour of choking Pakistan on all fronts— military, political and economic. There is a section which routinely advocates exploiting ethnic, linguistic and sectarian fault-lines to arm, train and funding separatist forces in Pakistan and push for its final breakup into Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Pashtunistan. A defeated and broken Pakistan would never be in a position to create problems for India. Proponents of this thought process include primarily members of armed forces (both serving and retired), politicians belonging to right-wing parties, some retired bureaucrats, members from academic community and a few journalists. In recent past, the hyper-realists have gained an upper hand in influencing India’s Pakistan policy and Nehruvians as well as neoliberals were pushed into a tight corner. This happened primarily because the ruling elites started taking masses for granted whereas the right-wing outfits toiled hard to get their narrative mainstreamed. In the absence of an effective counter by both the ruling elites and liberal intelligentsia, hyper-realist thinking gained momentum. It got remarkably strengthened with the right-wing BJP led NDA coming to power in 2014. Once at the helm, BJP provided unreserved patronage to other right-wing outfits peddling hyper-realist narrative. India’s toughened position on bilateral relations with Pakistan and its aggressive posture on terrorism is directly linked to the increasing hyper-realist influence. Phrases such as ‘talks and terror cannot go together’ and ‘blood and water cannot flow together’ have come into prominence. India now publicly owns cross-LOC and cross-border raids and defends its decision to go inside Pakistan to punish the perpetrators of terrorism. The September 2016 surgical strike and February 2019 air strike in Balakot are cases in point. The changed Indian approach also reflects the general sentiments and perceptions prevailing particularly in north Indian states that are popularly known as Hindi heartland. In a democratic society, it is always difficult for policymakers to ignore popular public perceptions.

Pakistani Strategic Thinking Unlike Nehru in India, Jinnah’s ideas and vision could not become the focal point of Pakistan’s foreign policy discourse. His successors not only referred, and

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continue to refer, him as the great leader making the dream of a separate Muslim nation possible, but also they often vowed to create ‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’. However, in reality, none of the ruling elites made an honest attempt to realise his dreams on the ground. Pakistani society and the state, that exist today, do not qualify to be termed as ‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’ for a number of reasons. In Imran Khan’s Naya Pakistan (New Pakistan) too, although Jinnah’s portraits are visible in every government offices and buildings, his ideas are still struggling to find a proper space. All these give rise to questions about growing irrelevance of Jinnah in the present-day Pakistan. In its outlook, Pakistan appears to be a paranoid state that came into existence in 1947 ‘to provide homeland’ to the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent where they could pursue their civilisational destiny without being dominated by the Hindu majority of India. However, in less than two and a half decades, it lost over half of its Muslim citizenry and territory that came to be known as Bangladesh. Over the years, it rightfully earned the dubious distinction as the ‘epicentre of global terrorism’ and one of the ‘most dangerous spots on the world map’. In spite ofbecoming the homeland for South Asian Muslims, the state miserably failed to meet even the modest expectations of their populace. In the recent past, one finds that Muslims are being killed by their fellow Muslims and not by Hindus or for that matter India. One can identify three prisms/lenses through which Pakistanis generally view India. These are military-strategic, religious-extremist and liberalpragmatic. The first two prisms could be compared with hyper-realist prism, whereas the third one could be placed opposite to neoliberal prism in India.

The Military-strategic Prism This particular prism is used primarily, but not exclusively, by people having some association in some form with the armed forces of Pakistan. The militarystrategic thinking revolves around India being the existential threat to Pakistan. It maintains that India is a hegemonic state which has never accepted the creation of Pakistan as a separate state and is constantly looking for opportunities to undo the partition and swallow up Pakistani territory. Military is the most dominant political force in the country, and according to Shuja Nawaz, during Pervez Musharraf’s time, ‘A small group of some 150 officers of general rank, perhaps an even smaller group of some twenty corps commanders and principal staff officers at GHQ effectively helped the president, who was also the COAS, control the political destiny of Pakistan’ (Nawaz, 2008, p. xxxv). The situation has not changed much even after the restoration of democracy in 2008. Pakistan Army still has a dominant say in country’s foreign policymaking. In general, it is opposed to normalisation and has no so secret desire of bleeding India with 1,000 cuts. It has constructed a powerful national security narrative in the country and, for all practical purposes, hijacked the Pakistani state by penetrating almost every section of Pakistani society, including media and academia (Shukla, 2017, p. 162). Proponents of this thought process are the members of armed forces, majority of political elites, academic and journalists across the spectrum.

Shukla 307 This particular thought process is the most dominant in the country. It revolves around the national security narrative and is primarily India-centric. Anyone trying to challenge national security narrative is seen as ‘potential threat’ to military’s strategic interests. Such ‘potential threats’ are generally neutralised through various ways including intimidation and actual use of violence. In case the challenge comes from someone holding powerful political position in the country, s/he may end up losing the position itself. Pakistan Army has been notorious in removing even the prime ministers of the country. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was the latest casualty in this respect to whom the security establishment got removed through a judicial process. In his third stint as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif in a fast-changing geopolitical and geostrategic environment felt the need to reach out to India and resolve some of the issues in an amicable manner. This cost him dearly, as the top echelons of the security establishment did not like the idea. However, of late they realised the utility of having a semblance of normalcy with India and thus allowed Imran Khan to accept New Delhi’s proposal to open up Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur for Indian pilgrims (Shukla, 2019b).

The Religious-extremist Prism The religious right-wing elements and several radical outfits that exist in Pakistan are the main proponents of such thinking. They are the self-appointed flag bearers of religion and protectors of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology. They want to adopt a kind of Islamic system within the country and possibly beyond it in which Islamic rules regulate every aspect of human life. Some of them even want to implement Islamic laws and make Pakistan a theocratic state. Most of the religious political parties and indigenous militant outfits, created, trained, aided and abetted by Pakistan’s security establishment, are part of this discourse. Those having faith in this particular thinking or thought process are the most intolerant lot and believe in al-Jehad al-Asghar—the violent Jehad. Having been deeply engrossed into the Two Nation Theory, they consider India a Hindu state which oppresses its Muslim population, especially in Kashmir. They declare that the true believers in Pakistan are under divine obligation to fight against Kafir India for the freedom of their Muslim brothers and to wrest control of Kashmir from India. Many of these radical Islamists invoke Hadees and openly talk about Ghazwae-Hind (The Battle of India). Hadees are basically the oral traditions attributed to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). There are several Hadees. One version of Hadees mentions Prophet Muhammad telling his freed slave Thawban that ‘There are two groups of my Ummah whom Allah will free from the Fire: The group that invades India, and the group that will be with Isa bin Maryam’ (Haqqani, 2015). In a version of Hadees, Hazrat Abu Hurairah underlined that ‘In this Ummah, troops would be headed towards Sindh & Hind’ (Pandita, 2018). In the second Hadees, he talked about war with India and emphasised that ‘Definitely some of your

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troops would fight a war with Hindustan; Allah would grant success to those warriors, as far as they would bring their Kings by dragging them in chains/fetters’ (Pandita, 2018). Husain Haqqani discussed about another version of Hadees in which Hurairah narrates that: The Messenger of Allah promised us that we would invade India. If I live to see that, I will sacrifice myself and my wealth. If I am killed, I will be one of the best of the martyrs, and if I come back, I will be Abu Hurairah al-Muharrar. (Haqqani, 2015)

The al-Muharrar literally translates as the one freed from the fire of hell. Many interpret it as the final battle between true believers and unbelievers that is to be fought in India. The present-day Islamists believe that they would win the battle and hoist Islamic (Pakistani) flag at the Red Fort in New Delhi.

The Liberal-pragmatic Prism This particular thought process is the most marginalised in Pakistan. Many of those who share this worldview are of the opinion that under the garb of continuing hostility and unending conflict with India, some institutions in Pakistan have been working to achieve their narrow self-interest which in turn denies ordinary people their due share in the resource cake. Those having faith in liberal pragmatic approach argue that cooperation with a neighbour like India is not only important for peace in the region, but it is also necessary for economic prosperity and wellbeing of the Pakistani people. They advocate for people-to-people contact, liberalisation of visa regimes and increasing trade and economic engagements. The proponents broadly include members of civil society, business community, rights activists, sections in mainstream political parties, some academics and few journalists. Since civil society in Pakistan is a toothless minority, it hardly finds itself in a position to influence major policy decisions. There are well-meaning people present in almost every section of society who have a critical approach and are not quite prone to be easily manipulated by the official propaganda and India-centric national security narrative. In recent times, such voices are not given ample space in the print and electronic media of Pakistan due to which their views do not reach out to a wider audience within the country and beyond. Besides, those raising their voices regularly run the risk of being branded as ‘Indian agent’ by those associating themselves with military-strategic prism or religious-extremist prism. The first two prisms—military-strategic and religious-extremist—reflecting perceptions in Pakistan have one thing in common—they thrive on anti-India sentiments. The followers or believers of these two often cooperate in their attempts to put India in a difficult situation within the region and beyond. Whenever India adopts a tough position vis-a-vis Pakistan, these thought processes receive a boost. The Pulwama terror attack after which Indian Air Force conducted strikes inside Pakistan, which led the two forces locking horns in the air, demonstrates how Pakistan’s security establishment and religious right wing

Shukla 309 change the narrative. In early August 2019, soon after India diluted the provisions of Article 370 regarding Jammu and Kashmir and created two union territories, Bajwa presided over the Corps Commanders’ Conference and declared that ‘Pakistan Army stands by the Kashmiris in their just struggle to the very end. We are prepared and shall go to any extent to fulfil our obligations in this regard’ (ISPR, 2019a). In less than 2 months, Bajwa again chaired the Corps Commanders’ Conference in which he reiterated Pakistan Army’s preparedness and determination to defend honour, dignity and territorial integrity of motherland. He also added that ‘Kashmir is jugular vein of Pakistan and no compromise shall be made which denies right of self determination to our brave Kashmiri brethren’ (ISPR, 2019b). In between the world community patiently listened to a number of provocative statements and threats of nuclear conflict from Pakistan.

Conclusion There is hardly any doubt about the fact that despite having shared sociocultural heritage and initial structures of governance, India and Pakistan adopted different ways to organise, govern and serve their people. While India decided to celebrate its diversity and plurality at home and maintained strategic autonomy in foreign policymaking through Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Pakistan emphasised on its Islamic identity and chose to be part of the Cold War power politics to strengthen itself and serve its interests. Various factors such as the ideological differences, partition time violence and conflict over Kashmir complicated the situation to the extent that the two countries ended up having inimical views of each other. Over the years, certain sections in both the countries developed a stake in the continuation of conflictual relationship. The most suitable example in Pakistan is the security establishment that benefits from continuing hostility. In India, the same can be attributed to far-right forces. In the wake of recent developments—Pulwama terror attack, air strikes in Balakot followed by dogfight in the sky and Indian move to end the special status of state of Jammu and Kashmir and divide it into two union territories—such forces have gained prominence in either country. However, the prevailing tensions have not stopped some sections of civil-society focusing their attention to discuss and try to find out ways to resolve outstanding issues. Given the shared sociocultural heritage, it is assumed that India and Pakistan can certainly devise a mechanism for workable relationship based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. Attempts to improve the bilateral relations or for that matter any goodwill gesture by one side often evokes similar sentiments and response from the other side. The opening up the Kartarpur Corridor in November 2019 is one such silver lining in otherwise a hopeless relationship that keeps the hope alive. Amid quite a tense situation, two countries held several rounds of dialogues to finalise the modalities to allow Indian pilgrims to visit Gurudwara Kartarpur Sahib in Pakistan without visa. This could be termed as a ‘rarest of the rare moment’ in India–Pakistan relations.

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For the time being, hyper-realists in India and their counterparts in Pakistan seem to have gained upper hand and are expected to influence the foreign policy decision-making in their respective countries. The history of India–Pakistan relations suggest that the hard-line approach adopted by the two parties could not be sustained for a long time. Developments such as the Kartarpur Corridor will continue to inject optimism that could be used to moderate the discourse. Once the dust settles on the recent Indian move in Kashmir, situation would most certainly improve. Ashish Shukla is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes 1. Initially the southern port city of Karachi was Pakistan’s first national capital. In mid1960s, Islamabad was made the new capital of Pakistan. 2. India was imagined by her forefathers as a socialist, secular and democratic republic. Given the socio-cultural, lingual and other diversities, many observers and critics thought that it would not be able to survive as a modern nation state. However, post-1947 India proved all those critics wrong and decided to celebrate its diversity. It evolved a unique concept ‘unity in diversity’ which emphasises on unity without uniformity and diversity without fragmentation. Most of these values are incorporated in the preamble of the constitution and are considered to be inseparable. 3. In light of some recent developments, especially Indian move to introduce changes in J&K followed by a prolonged lockdown, implementation of National Registers of Citizens (NRC) in the state of Assam, amendment in India’s citizenship law through Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), India’s international image suffered a dent. 4. Mohajir or Muhajir is an Urdu word which means an immigrant. In early Islamic history those Muslims who migrated from one place to the other were called Mohajir. Although Muslims from many parts of British India migrated to Pakistan during and after the partition, but all of them are not considered Mohajir. Only those people who migrated from Muslim minority provinces, in official Muhajir narrative, are Muohajirs. 5. The political guru of Mahatma Gandhi, Gopal Krishna Gokhle, once referred Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the best ambassador of Hindu–Muslim Unity. 6. Pakistan’s strategy of using non-state actors for regional objectives backfired, especially in post-9/11 period when it was forced to join US-led War on Terror. Certain terror outfits turned their guns against their former masters and started targeting Pakistani state and its institution.

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