Theophile Delcasse and Making of Entente Cordiale - Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898–1905 9781349004232, 9781349004218

Citation preview

Theophile Delcasse and the Making of the Entente Cordiale Christopher Andrew

THEOPHILE DELCASSE AND THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

THEOPHILE DELCASSE AND THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIAL£ A REAPPRAISAL OF

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY I 898- I 905

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Camhridge

Palgrave Macmillan I968

© Christopher Andrew I 968

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1968 Puhlished hy

MACMILLAN AND CO LTD Little Essex Street London wc2

and also at Bombay Calcutta and Madras Macmillan South Africa (Puhlishers) P ty Ltdfohanneshurg The Macmillan Company ofAustralia P ty Ltd Melhourne The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd Toronto St Martin's Press Inc New York Library of Congress catalog card no. 68-27597

ISBN 978-1-349-00421-8 (eBook) ISBN 978-1-349-00423-2 DO I IO. 1007/978-1-349-00421-8

FOR

JACQUES MILLERAND

Contents Frontispiece List ofMaps Preface

ix xi

Abbreviations

xiii

I

Theophile Delcasse

2

The Colonies and the French Colonialists

26

3

The Quai d'Orsay

53

4

Delcasse's First Months in Office

78

5

Fashoda and the Crisis in Anglo-French Relations

91

6

The Reshaping of the Dual Alliance

119

7

Morocco and the Boer War

136

8

The Failure of Intervention

158

9

Delcasse's Conversion to the Egypt-Morocco Barter

180

IO

The Entente Cordiale

201

II

The Agreement with Spain

216

12

The Survival of the Dual Alliance and the Worsening of Franco-German Relations

228

13

The French Empire and Morocco

255

14

The First Moroccan Crisis

268

Conclusion

302

Bibliography

309

Index

I

320

Maps West Africa in the 189o's The Partition of Morocco

37 224

Preface Theophile Delcasse's term as French foreign minister from 1 898 to 1905 was the longest in the history of the Third French Republic. These years were a major turning point in the history both of French foreign policy and of Anglo-French relations. During Delcasse's first months at the Quai d'Orsay England and France came close to the brink of war. Yet his term of office ended with the signing of the Entente Cordiale and the cooperation of France and England against Germany in the first Moroccan crisis of 1905. I have tried to explain this remark­ able shift in Anglo-French relations within the broader context of a general reassessment of French foreign policy during Delcasse's years at the Quai d'Orsay. Delcasse was perhaps the most secretive of all French foreign ministers in modern times. For that reason I have been particularly dependent on the kindness of those who have allowed me to see private papers which fill important gaps in his official correspondence. I owe an especial debt of gratitude to Delcasse's daughter, the late Mme. la generale Nogues, for allowing me to become the first historian to use her father's papers, and for her constant help and encouragement during my research in France. I am very grateful also to M. Fran-

�

so

�

�

�

C.

-,'""

MIL£$

100

150

200 zso

Q:II]l spon,sh sphuc of inffuc nct: ocCtJrdmg to dro� Franco-Spanish treaty of

8 No v. lJ02

g Spanish sphere oflnffucncc according to Franco - Spanish trea ty of

I: : : :I

3 Oct. /J 04-

Spanish protectorate established b_y Franco-Spanish treaty of 27 Nov. l:J IZ

T H E P A R T I T I O N OF M O R O C C O

The Agreement with Spain

22;

was afraid that precipitate action by Spain, like a premature publication of the partition, might lead to a Moroccan rising and make necessary the military intervention he was anxious to avoid. 1 Spain's resistance to this restraint on her freedom of action was much more obdurate than on either the terms of the partition or its secrecy. She also at first refused the undertaking demanded of her by a secret article of the Entente, that as a condition of her sphere of influence she agreed never to surrender it to another power, on the grounds that it offended her national dignity. 2 During August and September 1904 ill health compelled Delcasse to take a two month holiday, by far the longest during his term of office (though no more than average by the diplomatic standards of his time). Before leaving Paris he told Castillo that he regarded the negotiations as at an end: it was now up to Spain to accept or refuse the terms he had offered. J He wrote to his wife on 29 July: 'Agreement would have been, and still would be, desirable. But if absolutely necessary we can do without it'. 4 When Delcasse returned to Paris at the beginning of October he found Castillo ready to sign an agreement. The final settlement contained only one modification of the terms which Delcasse had offered in July. Instead of agreeing to take no steps to establish her authority within her sphere of influence until the Sultan's authority collapsed, Spain agreed instead to take no action during this period (which was not to exceed fifteen years) 'without first consulting France'. A public declaration of 3 October affirmed that France and Spain remained 'firmly attached to the integrity of the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan', that Spain adhered to the Anglo-French agreement on Morocco and Egypt, and - more vaguely - that she had agreed with France on 'the extent of rights and the safe­ guarding ofinterests resulting for France from her Algerian possessions and for Spain from her possessions on the Moroccan coast'. This was the only public hint of a partition, the terms of which were settled by a secret agreement. s Castillo regarded the settlement as a humiliation for his country and as a considerable blow to his own prestige. He divided the blame fairly evenly between Delcasse and his own government. According to 1 Monson to Lansdowne, 29 July 1 904, Lansdowne MSS., x. 2 DDF2, v, no. 289. BD, m, no. 49. J DDF2, v, no. 267. 4 Delcasse to his wife, 29 July 1904, Delcasse MSS. s DDF2, v, no. 3 5 8.

TMophile Delcasse

226

Monson he was 'nearly as bitter against his own Chiefs as against Delcasse'. 1 Radolin, the German ambassador in Paris, reported that Castillo believed that the Spanish government was principally at fault for allowing Franee and England to conclude a separate agreement: 'Spain could easily have played off one power against the other in order to secure legitimate advantages' • 2 Castillo's relations with his own foreign minister, Rodriguez San Pedro, became very strained at several stages of the negotiations with France. At one point both Castillo and San Pedro were separately trying to convince Jules Cambon that it was the other who was responsible for the delay in reaching agreement. 3 Castillo also became bitter about Delcasse with whom he had formerly been on terms of personal friendship. He claimed to the English charge d'affaires that Delcasse had 'left him under the impression' that the partition which they had tentatively agreed in 1 902 would be recognised in the agreement between France and England. 4 This could not have been literally true, since in October 1 903 Spain had already recognised that she could no longer expect Fez to be included in her sphere of influence. It is nonetheless probable, however, that in his desire to postpone talks with Spain until he had reached agreement with England, Delcasse did leave Castillo with the impression that Spanish interests in Morocco would be more sub­ stantially recognised by the Entente than they eventually proved to be. In 1 902 Delcasse had c�mplained that Spain's slowness in coming to an agreement on Morocco was due to 'a dual pressure by England and Germany at Madrid'. 5 In 1 904 he put the blame once more, and this time exclusively, on Germany. 6 He did so with far more justification than in 1 902. Radowitz repeatedly urged on the Spanish government a policy of procrastination. It was this advice, Maria Christina claimed, which saved Spain from coming to a precipitate and more disadvan­ tageous settlement. 7 In April Billow indicated that Germany could be of considerable assistance to Spain during the negotiations, but the price which he put on German support seems to have dissuaded the Spanish government from exploring his proposal: 'It is Fernando Po which is of principal interest to us, and we shall pay a good price for it, Monson to Lansdowne, 7 Oct. 1904, Lansdowne MSS., x. 3 DDF2, v, nos. 271, 292, 304. GP, xx i, no. 6483. 4 Bunsen to Sanderson, 27 April 1904, Sanderson MSS. 6 DDF2, v, no. 244. s See above, 191. 1 GP, xx i, no. 65 1 1. 1

2

The Agreement with Spain

227

if the occasion arises. If, in addition, we can obtain a port in western Morocco, that would be very useful to us.' 1 England's attitude, unlike Germany's, appeared to Delcasse to have changed completely since 1 902. While Lansdowne privately urged France to make concessions to Spain on relatively minor points (though perhaps less strongly than Delcasse's own ambassadors), he also openly urged Spain to accept the main lines of the agreement proposed by Delcasse. Immediately after the signing of the Entente, the English ambassador in Madrid told Jules Cambon that he had been instructed to offer him his 'complete support' during the forthcoming negotiations. 2 England's support was probably particularly valuable in the final stages of the negotiations. Jules Cambon wrote on 9 August: 'We can only congratulate our­ selves on this attitude of the English government'. 3 England's attitude during the Franco-Spanish negotiations served to broaden the sig­ nificance which French diplomats attached to the Entente Cordiale. For the first time since the early years of the Third Republic France and England seemed to have combined to defeat the manoeuvres of German diplomacy. The Entente had begun its transformation from a colonial barter to a defensive coalition against Germany. 1 3

2 DDF2, v , no. 1 1 . GP, xx i, no. 648 1 . DDF2, v, no. 303. San Pedro claimed that it was England's persuasion

which led him to agree to sign the clause by which Spain promised not to surrender her Moroccan sphere of influence to another power (BD, 111, no. p). Cf. DDF2, v, nos. 133, 256, 292.

Q

A .T,D .

C H A PTER TWELVE

The Survival of the Dual Alliance and the Worsening of Franco-German Relations

D

EL C A S S E 'S long term ambition was to make the Entente Cordiale only the first step in a major diplomatic revolution which would unite England, France, and Russia in a defensive coalition against Germany. This was an idea which had attracted him for at least ten years before he became foreign minister and one which he had discussed with the British ambassador during his first months in office. 1 After despairing of this objective for several years at the tum of the century, his hope of a Triple Entente revived early in 1903 after he received evidence that Edward VII and Joseph Chamberlain, the two men he then regarded as the mainsprings of British diplomacy, were both in favour of an understanding with the Dual Alliance. 2 Most European diplomats, however, continued to regard Russia and England, 'the bear and the whale', as traditional enemies, and few saw any prospect of a reconciliation between them. The German govern­ ment was convinced that the signs of a rapprochement between France and England were bound to weaken the Dual Alliance. 'The Russians are not pleased', the Kaiser jovially remarked to the French military attache, 'and one day they are going to give you a --' (William left the sentence unfinished, but thumbed his nose expressively). 3 There were many French diplomats also who suspected that the Entente Cordiale and the Dual Alliance might prove to be incompatible. Bompard, Montebello's successor in St. Petersburg, warned Delcasse in July 1903 that though 'the Russians could under no circumstances accompany us to England, . • • it would take little to persuade them to make an excursion to Berlin'.4 1 See above, 24, 9 1 . 2 See above, 196, 209. 3 Renouvin, La politique exterieure de Th. Delcasse, 19. • DDF2, m, no. 370.

The Survival ofthe Dual Alliance

229

With what Cambon called 'his incorrigible optimism', however, Delcasse was hopeful that an Anglo-French entente, so far from alienating Russia, would on the contrary encourage her to settle her own differences with England. No sooner had the Entente negotiations begun than he informed Lamsdorff that he was ready to do all in his power 'to facilitate an agreement between England and Russia'. 1 During a private visit to Paris by Lamsdorff in the autumn of 1 903, Delcasse obtained from him, at Lansdowne' s request, an assurance that the Russian ambassador in London would be 'absolutely frank' in his dealings with the Foreign Office. Slight though this achievement was, Lansdowne appeared deeply impressed by it. He saw it as a first sign of Delcasse's ability to reduce tension between England and Russia, and expressed his thanks with 'an uncharacteristic effusiveness' which took Cambon by surprise. 2 The beginning of the Russo-Japanese War on 8 February 1 904 was to upset Delcasse's calculations. It was obvious from the outset that the war would rouse Russian suspicion of England, as the ally of Japan, to a new intensity, and that this suspicion would in some measure reflect on Franee as the friend of England. Delcasse had been much slower than most European diplomats to realise the increasing likelihood of war between Russia and Japan. He was always prone to believe that the Tsar meant what he said, and unwisely accepted his assurance that Russia was determined to arrive at a peaceful settlement of her differences with Japan. J He also considered it unthinkable that Japan should launch an unprovoked attack because 'she would he bound to be beaten'. 4 His attempt to mediate in the Russo-Japanese dispute over Manchuria at the beginning of 1 904, though rejected by Japan, seems only to have strengthened his conviction that a peaceful solution could be reached. Throughout January, and even as late as 5 February, Delcasse was still giving both his cabinet colleagues and foreign diplomats a firm assurance that peace would be maintained. As a result some of them speculated heavily on the Bourse in Russian securities, and blamed Delcasse for their eventual losses. When war was finally Bompard to Delcasse, 29 Aug. 1903, Delcasse MSS. BD, n, nos. 250, 257. DDF2, 1v, nos. 49, 58. 3 G. Louis, Les carnets de Georges Louis (Paris 1926), II, 69. Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 7. 4 Diary entry by Brugere for I Feb. 1904, Brugere MSS. I

2

230

Theopkile Delcasse

declared on 8 February Delcasse had no option but to admit that he had been taken by surprise.1 Delcasse recognised that the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War had destroyed any immediate prospect of an Anglo-Russian reconcilia­ tion. He continued to hope, however, that once the war was over it would be possible to make further progress towards the creation of a Triple Entente. The English government made no secret of its desire for better relations with Russia, and after the signing of the Entente Edward VII declared himself 'determined to bring off a similar arrange­ ment with Russia'.2 Delcasse was also convinced that both Lamsdorff and Nelidov, the Russian ambassador in Paris, were personally in favour of an understanding with England.3 Russia's attitude towards England seemed likely to depend, however, on the outcome of the war. If, as was at first widely expected, Russia were to be victorious, it was generally anticipated that England would try to limit Russia's terri­ torial gains in the Far East just as a generation earlier she had success­ fully limited her gains in the Near East after the treaty of San Stefano. Bompard wrote to Delcasse on 2 April 1904: Our conduct at the conclusion of peace will be the touchstone by which it will be judged whether this rapprochement [the Entente Cordiale] is incompatible with the Franco-Russian alliance or whether, on the contrary, it is favourable to it. That will be a difficult moment for us, and it will need all your dexterity and savoir-faire to surmount it. 4 By the end of 1904, however, the prospect of Russian territorial gains in the Far East seemed increasingly remote, and Delcasse appeared optimistic about the prospect of moving towards a Triple Entente once the war was at an end. 'His great desire', wrote Sir Frands Bertie, the new English ambassador in Paris, early in 1905, 'is, he says, to bring about a rapprochement between England and Russia for if those two Powers and Franee acted together peace would have a long reign.' s In July 1905, a month after his resignation, Delcasse declared in a Combarieu, op. cit., 27 1 . Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 22. GP, x1xi, nos. 5954, 5960.Monson to Lansdowne, 15 Jan.and 9 Feb. 1904, Lansdowne MSS., x. Raffalovich to Kokovtsev, I I Feb. 1904; published in A. Raffalo­ vich, L'ahominahle venalite de la presse (Paris, 1921), 19. La Depeche de Toulouse, 15 Oct. 1905. 2 Monger, op. cit., 1 6o. 3 DDF2, v, no. 73. 4 Bompard to Delcasse, 2 April 1904, Delcasse MSS. s Bertie to Lansdowne, 17 Jan. 1905, Lansdowne MSS., x. 1

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

.23 1

newspaper interview that: 'The Entente Cordiale was the road towards the final detente between Russia and England, a detente of which the French minister for foreign affairs might have been, and might still be, the promoter'. 1 In the summer of 1905 'the final detente between Russia and Eng­ land' still seemed far away. Delcasse had, nonetheless, made an impor­ tant contribution to the eventual creation of a Triple Entente. By his success in gaining the confidence of both the English and Russian governments, he had proved the predictions of many French and German statesmen wrong, and shown that Franee could remain both the friend of England and the ally of Russia. Merely to have ensured the survival of the Dual Alliance during the early years of the twentieth century and especially during the critical period which followed the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, was in itself a considerable achievement. Nelidov was doubt­ ful whether any other French statesman could have achieved as much. He told Delcasse in April 1905: 'I have the inner conviction that with your departure the whole alliance would collapse'. 2 Bompard was equally convinced that the alliance was in real danger. The English ambassador in St. Petersburg wrote in March 1905: Bompard has one great preoccupation and that is lest the Alliance which was concluded with so much t!clat during his predecessor's time should die from inaction during his occupancy of the Embassy, for he realises what a)ack of enthusiasm the1 e is for it both here and in his own_country. 3 By the time the Entente Cordiale was signed Delcasse was probably the only statesman of stature left in France who retained a real enthusiasm for the alliance with Russia. It was no coincidence that the agreement between the Tsar and the Kaiser at Bjorko on which the Dual Alliance almost foundered in the summer of 1 905 came only a month after Delcasse's fall from power. The survival of the Dual Alliance, even more than the creation of the Entente Cordiale, was in large part Delcasse's own personal achieve­ ment. Both English and Russian statesmen combined a considerable contempt for French politicians in general with a considerable respect 1

Le Gaulois, u July 1905.

Nelidov to Delcasse, 22 April 1905, Delcasse MSS. On Nelidov's admiration for Delcasse cf. below, 298. 3 Hardinge to Sanderson, 29 March 1905, Hardinge MSS., vr. 2

232

Theophile Delcasse

for Delcasse in particular. 'The personal appearance of the French Cabinet Ministers', wrote Monson in 1903, 'impressed the King, as His Majesty told me, by no means favourably'; 1 yet Edward described Delcasse as 'a true friend' and felt 'absolute confidence' in him. 2 This dichotomy of attitude was even more pronounced in Russia. During Delcasse's seven years at the Quai d'Orsay the Dreyfus affair and the bitter conflict between French Church and State turned Russia's traditional dislike for republican government in Franee into barely disguised disgust. The world over Russian diplomats were usually on bad terms with their French colleagues. On a dispatch from Monte­ bello early in 190 1 recording the Tsar's satisfaction at the state of the alliance, the Direction Politique made the comment: The Emperor is doubtless unaware that the inclination of most of his agents is hardly favourable to the French Republic, and that even the best disposed have a frequent tendency to interpret the daily working of the alliance so as to give a privileged position to Russia. The reports of nearly all our representatives, and especially their verbal reports when they pass through Paris, are only too much in agreement on this point. l Yet at the same time Russian confidence in Delcasse grew year by year. Never before or since has the Russian government had greater con­ fidence in a French statesman than it had in Delcasse by the time he fell from power. The confidence felt in Delcasse by the Russian government was based, in part at least, on respect for his qualities as a statesman. It stemmed also, however, from Delcasse's own unshakable confidence in the strength of the Dual Alliance. Before he came to power Delcasse, like Bismarck, had believed that the strength of the alliance between France and Russia lay in the fact that 'of all the powers, they alone, by reason of their geographic positions and political aims, have the minimum causes for dissension, since they possess no interests which are necessarily in conflict'.4 Even as foreign minister he was unwilling to abandon this belief. To most other European diplomats, however, it became increasingly obvious during the early years of the twentieth century that in both the Near East and the Far East there was a serious clash of French and Russian interests. Monson to Lansdowne, 1 5 May 1903, Lansdowne MSS., IX. DDF2, v, nos. 47, 449. 4 See above, 1 3 . 3 DDF2, 1, no. 62. Cf. BD, 1, no. 1 84. 1

2

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

2 33

In the Near East Russia viewed the spread of any influence but her own - even that of her ally - as an intrusion in the affairs of her own 'backdoor'. She was still preoccupied by her age-old dream of capturing the Straits and during Delcasse's first years in power tried without his knowledge to negotiate with Germany an agreement on spheres of influence which would recognise her ambitions in the Bosporus. By the end of 1 901 these negotiations had broken down because Russia had discovered from deciphered German telegrams that Germany had no intention of signing an agreement. 1 Russia still had no thought, however, of seeking an alternative agreement with France for, said Lamsdorff: 'Unfortunately experience has proved that despite the existing relations between Russia and this Power, Russian and French interests often clash on the soil of Eastern Turkey'. 2 If an opportunity arose to seize the Straits, Russia had no intention of stopping to consult her ally. Lamsdorff wrote to his ambassador in Constantinople on 15 January 1 902: . . . If for some reason the status quo position changed, then Russia could have only one means of safeguarding its interests - namely that of capturing the Straits; then of course Russia cannot rely on the assistance of any Power, and it is doubtful whether she would need it when the time came to act quickly and decisively.J Events showed that the power most hostile to the growth of French influence in Turkey was none other than France's ally. This fact was strikingly demonstrated at the time of the Mitylene landing. Delcasse had been determined from the moment he came to power to obtain the payment by the Porte of reparations due to French citizens and to maintain the French religious protectorate.4 Although obtaining partial satisfaction on both these points, he decided in November 1 901 to force the Porte into complete submission by ordering the occupation of 1 Unpublished dispatch, Lamsdorff to Osten Sacken, no. 27 (confidential), 10 Jan. 1902 (quoting extracts from deciphered German telegrams). Lams­ dorff wrote to Nelidov on 1 3 Dec. 1901: 'Over the last three years the Imperial Government has tried repeatedly to persuade the Berlin cabinet to conclude such an agreement [ on spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire], but all these attempts have not led to the desired result'. 2 Unpublished dispatch, Lamsdorff to Nelidov, no. 974 (confidential), 1 3 Dec. 1901. J Unpublished dispatch, Lamsdorffto Zinoviev, no. 51, 15 Jan. 1902. 4 See above, 84 ff.

23 4

Theophile Delcasse

Mitylene. Germany, England, Austria, and Italy all expressed at least restrained approval of Delcasse's action, while the Vatican was clearly delighted that France had chosen to affirm her religious protectorate in so striking a manner. 1 Russia was alone in showing disapproval of the action of her ally. Hardinge wrote to Bertie: Lamsdorff is evidently displeased at the proceedings of the French fleet [in occupying Mitylene] , and it strikes me very much that Delcasse did not consult him beforehand. The Russian Press no longer applauds Delcasse's action, owing, I gather, to a hint from Lamsdorff. He com­ plains that the peace of Europe is endangered for the sake of a parlia­ mentary success, and he says that he daily thanks Heaven that there is no Russian Parliament. 2 There is no direct evidence on whether, as Hardinge believed, Del­ casse had failed to give Russia advance notice of the Mitylene operation. But it is certain that, as a rule, Delcasse took great care both to keep Russia well informed of French policy in the Near East and to try to concert the policies of the two governments - so much so as sometimes to embarrass the Russian foreign ministry. The British ambassador in Russia wrote to Lansdowne late in 1900: 'I am told . . . that the Russian F.O. is at the present moment very much embarrassed by the persistency with which the French Embassy is pressing them for prompt declarations of their views on all pending questions . . . .' 3 The extent both of Delcasse's efforts to concert Franco-Russian policy in the Near East and of Russian embarrassment at his efforts emerged clearly during the protracted negotiations over French participation in the Baghdad railway. In April 1899 a French group entered the German consortium which was negotiating a concession to build a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad, and eventually to the Persian Gulf. The Russian government was opposed to this project for both political and strategic reasons. Besides being hostile in principle to any extension of foreign influence (other than its own) in the Tur­ kish Empire, it also viewed with disfavour any measure which would allow Turkey to mobilise more quickly in the Caucasus. After the Baghdad railway and French participation in its construction had been criticised in the Russian press, Delcasse brought up the subject during his visit to St. Petersburg in August 1899. Both Muraviev and the Tsar 1 DDF2, 1, nos. 471, 474, 475, 48 1, 482, 499· 2 Hardinge to Bertie, 8 Nov. 1901, Hardinge MSS., III. 3 Scott to Lansdowne, 29 Nov. 1900, Lansdowne MSS., xx1v.

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

2

35

then appeared to accept his argument that French participation was necessary in order to 'remove such an important railway from the exclusive control of Germany'. 1 During 1 900, however, there was a revival of the Russian press campaign against the Baghdad railway, and Delcasse raised the subject once again during his second visit to St. Petersburg in April 190 1 . This time he attempted to overcome Russian opposition by suggesting Russian participation in the railway on equal terms with France and Germany: I offered to use my influence for this purpose with the consortium of the Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank. M. Witte told me that, under these conditions, he would have no objection to the project in question. The scheme which I had put forward was then passed on to Count Lamsdorff, and subsequently to the Emperor who welcomed it warmly and gave me his thanks, as did his ministers. In accordance with my promise in St. Petersburg, I set out during the summer of 1 90 1 , after my return to France, to negotiate with the Franco-German group on Russia's entry into the Baghdad railway undertaking. The consortium agreed to set aside a share which would be drawn, as I had proposed to M. Witte, equally from the 50% French holding and from the 50% German holding. It was also agreed that as soon as the definitive concession for the Baghdad railway had been obtained by the Anatolia Company, an international administration distinct from this company would be set up for the construction and running of the line. Russia would naturally have in the running of the concern a representation proportional to her participation in it. Count Lamsdorff, whom our ambassador informed of the acceptance by the consortium of my proposition, made known to me the satisfac­ tion with which this news was received by the Imperial Government.2 By the beginning of 1 902, however, the attitude of the Russian official press and of the Russian ambassador in Constantinople was once more hostile to the railway. The truth was that the Russian government had always disapproved of the Baghdad railway but had shrunk from telling Delcasse in plain language that Russia's interests in the Near East were opposed to those of France. Montebello implied as much when he told Delcasse: During your last visit to St. Petersburg, the government and the EmDraft dispatch by Delcasse to French charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg, Nov. 1 902, Delcasse MSS. 2 Ibid. 1

Theophile Delcasse

peror himself had indeed appeared satisfied with this scheme [for Russian entry to the consortium], but this satisfaction was only apparent. From the very first their desire was not to enter into a discussion with us and seem to misunderstand our good intentions . . . . 1 On this, as on other occasions, Delcasse refused to believe the evidence of Russian bad faith, and he declined to accept Montebello's advice to give up trying to persuade the Russians to participate in the Baghdad railway. During 1902 he believed once more that he had persuaded Russia to participate, and once more he negotiated the terms of her entry into the Franco-German consortium. But in 1903 Russia refused, this time finally and officially, to participate. 2 A few months later, despite strong opposition from Rouvier, the French finance minister, and the French finance houses, Delcasse persuaded the French cabinet to veto French participation also. His correspondence with Rouvier makes it clear that his main motive in so doing was to preserve the unity of the Dual Alliance. 3 The clash of French and Russian interests in the Far East was in many ways similar to that in the Near East. In China, as in Turkey, Delcasse wanted a reformed government strong enough to prevent the dismemberment of its Empire. In China, even more than in Turkey, Russia seemed to suspect all reforms not directed by herself as likely to harm her own influence. Paul Cambon complained that 'Russia wishes to preserve China in order to dominate her, which makes her opposed to schemes of partition. But, on the other hand, she uses her very great influence on the Chinese government to preserve out of date traditions and oppose reforms which might regenerate the country'. 4 And as Russian policy in Turkey was dominated by the desire to occupy the Straits, so her policy in China was overshadowed by her ambitions in Manchuria, which was occupied by Russian troops during the Boxer rebellion. Russia tried to insist that this occupation was temporary only, but even Delcasse, always slow to believe evidence of Russian bad faith, seemed by March 190 1 to realise that Russia was trying to conceal her real ambitions even from her ally: 'We can 2 DDF2, m , nos. 125, 1 3 5 . DDF2, u, no. 3 5 . Renouvin, L a politique extlrieure de TA . Delcasse, 17. The refusal to allow French participation in the Baghdad railway delayed its construction for several years. 4 DDFz, xvr, no. 23. 1

3

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

23 7

only wait for the day when they will consider it opportune to extend to the affairs of this region the exchange of views which have taken place between us on Chinese questions in general'. 1 Within a month, how­ ever, Delcasse's doubts had been dispelled. During his visit to St. Petersburg in April 190 1 he accepted at their face value the Tsar's assurances about Russian policy in China (as over the Baghdad rail­ way), and returned to Paris convinced that 'the Russians have no desire to annex Manchuria'. 2 Even Loubet and Combarieu, who were among Delcasse's greatest admirers, both felt that his judgment had been clouded by the flattering personal attentions paid him by the Tsar. 3 The later development of Russian policy in China served to confirm their doubts about Delcasse's judgment. In April 1 902 Russia signed an agreement with China promising to evacuate Manchuria by annual stages, but her subsequent failure to honour this undertaking was to lead to the Russo-Japanese War. Until early in 1902 Delcasse's attempts to concert French and Russian policy had little more success in the Far East than in the Near East. Russia's decision to accept the nomination of a German com­ mander-in-chief of the international force sent to China to crush the Boxer rebellion in August 1900,4 and her later decision to withdraw her troops from the international force, 5 were both taken without con­ sulting Franee. After the Boxers had been defeated, Russia was also the only European power to support a complete return to the status quo ante, and even tried to insist on the restoration of the Dowager Empress, who had supported the rebellion. 6 However, the news of the alliance of Russia's two principal opponents, England and Japan, on 3 0 January 1902, caused the Russian government to reconsider the advantages of cooperation with Franee. Lamsdorff suggested replying to the Anglo­ Japanese alliance by 'a similar agreement which would neutralise its effect', and proposed a sternly worded document which would declare the determination of France and Russia to take 'all the measures which they considered necessary' in the event of a 'joint military action' by DDF2, 1, no. 1 24. Diary entry by Brugere for 2 May 1 90 1 , Brugere MSS. J Combarieu, op. cit., 1 30. 4 Though the Russian government tried to explain this incident away, the Tsar rubbed salt in the wound a year later by awarding Waldersee the highest Russian decoration (DDF2, 1, no. 366). 6 DDFz , xvI, no. 285 . s DDFz , XVI, no. 286. 1

2

238

Theophile Delcasse

England and Japan. Delcasse had no desire to incur new obligations for France in the Far East, and substituted a much milder text. By a declaration of 20 March 1 902 the two governments welcomed the support by England and Japan for the principles of the Open Door and the status quo in China, and declared that they too reserved the right 'if the occasion arises, to consider the measures necessary to ensure the maintenance of these principles'. In other words, Delcasse had com­ mitted France to nothing.1 He saw this simply as a splendid oppor­ tunity to reaffirm by public declaration the strength of the Dual Alliance, and it was an opportunity which he exploited to the full; he wrote to his wife on 21 March: This afternoon in the Senate I had one of my greatest parliamentary successes..• . There seemed to be considerable satisfaction at the way in which I said that Franee and Russia envisage the Anglo-} apanese treaty, and at the aptness of the declaration by which the two governments yesterday replied to it. You will see the latter in the Figaro tomorrow. It begins thus: 'The allied governments of France and Russia . . . ' - this is the first time that in a diplomatic document addressed to the rest of the world the two powers have signified that they are 'allies'. The sig­ nificance of this will be realised everywhere.2 The only other way in which the Dual Alliance publicly reaffirmed its solidarity during Delcasse's term of office was through the exchange of state visits by President Loubet and the Tsar. After the Tsar's first visit to France in 1 896 French hopes had been high that he would return for the Paris Exhibition in 1900. However, Montebello wrote to Delcasse soon after the opening of the Exhibition: I shall only be repeating what you already know when I tell you that there is some alarm here at the tendencies of our internal politics, and that in addition there is a reluctance to press the Emperor to expose himself, even for a few days, to the risks which he might run at a time when Paris will be overrun by visitors from all countries and of all social classes.3 Delcasse wrote both to Muraviev and to General Hesse, the Tsar's aide-de-camp, urging the importance of a visit by the Tsar, but to no avail.4 When in June 1 90 1 he learned that the Tsar, who still had no P. Renouvin, La Question d' Extdme-Orient (Paris, 1946), 214-15. Delcasse to his wife, 21 March 1 902, Delcasse MSS. 3 Montebello to Delcasse, 28 April 1900, Delcasse MSS. 4 Ibid. 1

2

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

239

plans to come to Franee, had accepted an invitation from the Kaiser to attend German naval manceuvres, he was furious and instructed Montebello to make a strong protest: 'It is important that the Emperor's foreign minister should be quite convinced that this is not a question of one of those disagreeable but superficial incidents of which time soon removes all trace'. 1 Delcasse's instructions to Montebello were drafted in agreement with both Rachkowsky, the Russian secret police chief in Paris, and Prince Urussov, the Russian ambassador. 2 Soon afterwards Rachkowsky left for St. Petersburg, where his main source of influence on the Tsar seems to have been through his friend, General Hesse. J He was also in contact with a secretary at the.French embassy,'the Vicomte Greigueuil, who corresponded secretly with Delcasse without Monte­ hello's knowledge and, according to the English ambassador, was later 'accused by the rest of the [embassy] staff of having acted as a spy upon Montebello'. 4 Rachkowsky'smission to St. Petersburg ended in success, and on 3 1 July Delcasse telegraphed to Montebello that he had learned from 'a reliable and confidential source' that the Tsar had agreed to visit France. 5 Montebello himself had maintained 'the most complete reserve' about the possibility of the visit, considering that it was best to put no pressure on the Tsar, and was clearly told nothing of Rach­ kowsky's manoeuvres. He was baffled by Delcasse's telegram and replied to it: 'As for the sources of information to which you refer, I confess that I have difficulty in understanding how they could have knowledge of the personal decisions of the Emperor'. 6 The importance which Delcasse attached to the royal visit in Septem­ ber 1 901 was shown by the secrecy in which he enveloped it. With the single exception of the prime minister, Waldeck-Rousseau, the rest of 1 DDF2, 1, no. 28 1 . 2 Urussov wrote t o Delcasse o n 14 June 1 901 informing him that Rach­ kowsky would call on him on the following morning and enclosing 'the copy of the letter of which we spoke' (Delcasse MSS). This copy, in Urussov's hand, was of Delcasse's letter to Montebello protesting against the Tsar's visit to Germany. J On Rachkowsky's close relations with Hesse, see Witte, op. cit., 202, and cf. below, 241. 4 Hardinge to Sanderson, 16 Oct. 1 902, Hardinge MSS., III. Cf. GP, XVIII ii, no. 5909. Two of the three surviving letters from Greigueuil to Delcasse carry the minute by Delcasse 'Please decipher without entering on the register'. 6 DDF2, 1, no. 346. s DDF2, 1, no. 342.

TMophile Delcasse

the cabinet, already resentful of Delcasse's reticence towards them, first learned that the visit had been arranged from their newspapers. On this occasion Delcasse received a sharply worded note from Leygues, the minister of the interior: I have indeed been very surprised by the care taken by your ministry to leave me ignorant of the Tsar's reply to the invitation by the Presi­ dent of the Republic. I have been no less surprised by the note com­ municated to the Figaro by your department in which it was said that until ten o'clock on Tuesday evening the Interior knew nothing about it. 1 Like Hanotaux five years before, Delcasse made himself ridiculous by his anxiety to ensure that no detail of the visit should offend royal susceptibilities. In 1896 Hanotaux had vetoed the proposed performance of a scene from Hamlet during a gala night at the Comedie Fran�aise with the words 'You don't surely intend to put on a play in front of the Tsar in which a sovereign is killed - and written by an Englishman too?'2 In 1901 Delcasse showed similar solicitude in seeking to remove any reference to the French Repuhlic from the toasts to the Dual Alliance for fear of offending the Tsar's monarchist principles. 3 The attention to detail was perhaps even greater during the state visit of 1901 than five years before. Monson wrote to Lansdowne after the visit was over: The desire to show every attention to their Russian Majesties actuated a regard for the most intimate details; so that a special provision of what are euphemistically called 'serviettes sanitaires' was prepared for use in '!es lieux', and each individual square was embossed in one comer with the Imperial arms in silver! ! Needless to add that specimens of this pretty compliment are at this moment sought for with anxiety by collectors of curios and bibelots /4 Montebello was well aware of the displeasure aroused in the French government by his ill-concealed antipathy to its domestic policies, and sought to use the royal visit to strengthen his personal prestige. On his own initiative he secretly arranged that the programme for the visit should include the baptism of one of his grandsons with the Tsar acting Leygues to Delcasse, 2 1 Aug. 1 901, Delcasse MSS. Diary entry by Claretie for 24 Sept. 1 896; published in Revue des Deux Mondes, I Oct. 1949, 433· 3 Combarieu, op. cit., 149. • Monson to Lansdowne, 8 Oct. 1901, Lansdowne MSS., IX. I

2

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

241

as godfather. In so doing, however, he only made himself the more unpopular with the French cabinet. 'He suspects that we have had enough of him, and believes that this baptism will render him un­ touchable', W aldeck.-Rousseau told the President, 'but he is mistaken.'1 During the royal visit Madame de Montebello contrived to become as unpopular as her husband. The wives of the French ministers felt affronted by the contrast between the warmth shown by the Tsarina towards the Marquise and her relative disdain for themselves. Madame de Montebello also neglected to inform the wives that hats were de rigueur in the imperial presence, and they disgraced themselves by appearing bareheaded. 2 Montebello's replacement by Maurice Bompard at the end of 1902, however, probably owed less to the hostility of the French cabinet than to Delcasse's belief in his diplomatic ineffectiveness. In arranging President Loubet's return visit to Russia in May 1902 Delcasse once more by-passed Montebello and worked through Greigueuil and Rachkowsky. On 8 January 1902 Greigueuil wrote privately to Delcasse: Once again I take the liberty to write to let you know the result of M. Rachkowsky's efforts . . . • The Emperor and Empress will receive the President of the Republic with the greatest pleasure at a time of his choice. General Hesse, after having submitted to the Emperor M. Rachkowsky's report, reported to M. Rachkowsky that His Majesty saw no difficulty, as far as he was concerned, in fixing the date of the visit. . • . J Once again, Rachkowsky's proceedings were evidently concealed from Montebello. When Montebello returned to Russia from leave a fort­ night later he wrote to Delcasse: 'As M. Rachkowsky was still in Petersburg, I wanted to know if, for his part, he had recently been able to gather any information. He will tell you himself that the Emperor, on being questioned by General Hesse, did not seem to expect a visit from M. Loubet this year• • • .'4 Combarieu, op. cit., 1 56. This incident was later satirised by Proust in A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. See G. D. Painter, Marcel Proust, A Biography (London, 1959), 1, 1 95-6. Cf. Combarieu, op. cit., 1 5 5-6; Cambon, Correspondance, 11, 72. J Greigueuil to Delcasse, 8 Jan. 1 902, Delcasse MSS. 4 DDF2, 11, no. 50. On Montebello's attitude to the visit cf. Combarieu, op. cit., 1 84-5. 1

2

Theophile Delcasse

Besides being a diplomatic success, the exchange of visits also re­ presented a considerable political triumph for Delcasse. For several years nationalist politicians had claimed - quite rightly - that the Dreyfusard and anti-clerical policies of the radical administration had alienated the Russian government and had been responsible for the Tsar's failure to revisit France. Thus the radical Depeche de Toulouse was able to say after the Tsar's visit in 190 1 : 'This visit represents the most resounding slap in the face which the nationalists could possibly receive'. 1 The mood of nationalist disillusion was reflected in an article by Edouard Drumont on 'The Tsar in France', which gloomily concluded: 'In our epoch both anarchists and monarchs are competing together to achieve the same end. . . • Anarchists kill monarchs, and monarchs take it upon themselves to kill the monarchy'. 2 The success of the state visits could not change, though it may temporarily have obscured, the clash of French and Russian interests in both the Near East and the Far East. During 1903 the even greater success of the exchange of visits between Loubet and Edward VII symbolised a new orientation of French policy which threatened to produce a new and more serious clash of interests within the Dual Alliance, this time in Europe itself. That the Russian government continued to attach importance to the Dual Alliance despite a growing disillusion with its diplomatic value was due, above all, to Russia's continuing dependence on French loans. One of Delcasse's most important contributions to the survival of the alliance during the early years of the twentieth century was his success in keeping the Paris money market open to Russia and to Russia's Balkan friends. The importance of the financial aspect of the Dual Alliance has long been recognised. The making of the alliance had coincided with the transfer of the main market for Russian bonds from Berlin to Paris, and it was France's financial usefulness to Russia which, more than anything else, was to prevent the disintegration of the alliance after Bjorko and ensure Russia's support for France at the conference of Algeciras. By the time Delcasse became foreign minister the French finance ministry was already concerned by the rapid growth in Russian indebtedness to France and was anxious 'not to allow the opinion to spread that the [French] market is permanently open to all the attempts to borrow I

2

La Depeche de Toulouse, 24 Aug. 1 90 1 . L a Libre Parole, 1 9 Sept. 1 90 1 .

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

243

money that Russia thinks right to make without giving us any ex­ planation'. 1 The continued granting of French loans to Russia was the only aspect of Delcasse's foreign policy which was subject to cabinet decision in any more than a formal sense. To some extent Delcasse found this a positive advantage, for it enabled him to use the evident reluctance of his cabinet colleagues to agree to an increase in the Rus­ sian debt as a means of putting pressure on the Russian government to spend part of the loans on strategic railways. In 1 899 Delcasse was able to make the building of the Orenburg­ Tashkent railway a condition of the placing of Russian government bonds on the Paris market during 1900 and 1 90 1 . 2 The authorisation in 190 1 of a further bond issue during the following two years was simi­ larly made conditional on the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway and the beginning of a further strategic railway from Bologoje to Siedlce which would hasten Russian mobilisation on the German border. Despite the opposition of C aillaux, the finance minister, the cabinet accepted Delcasse's argument that the loan was necessary 'on political and military grounds', but instructed him to advise the Russian government 'that it is in the clear interest of Russia as of our­ selves that in the future she should seek access to other financial markets where she will be able to perform credit transactions'. According to Caillaux this warning was made a condition of the loan, but Delcasse made no mention of it in the dispatch instructing Montebello to inform Lamsdorff of the cabinet's decision.3 The importance of the financial aspect of the Dual Alliance went far beyond the alleviation of Russia's own financial difficulties. During Delcasse's years as foreign minister French loans to Russia's Balkan friends became as important as those to Russia herself. The placing of all foreign government loans on the French market was subject to the 1 0. Crisp, 'The Financial Aspect of the Franco-Russian Alliance , unpub­ ' lished thesis(London, 1954), 329.Mrs. Crisp's thesis provides the best available account of a difficult but important subject. It does, however, overlook the fact that French loans to Russia's friends were sometimes as important a part of the financial aspect of the Dual Alliance as those to Russia herself. Mrs. Crisp also underestimates the opposition encountered by Delcasse when she writes (op. cit., 329) that 'at no time did the ministry of finance make the demand that the French market should be closed to any new introduction or issue of Russian bonds'. 2 See above, 124. 3 Crisp, op. cit., 344-9.

R

A.T,D.

244

Theophile Delcasse

consent of the Quai d'Orsay and Delcasse's reasons for deciding whether to give his approval were, as over the Baghdad railway, almost solely political. In 1 90 1 he refused to allow a loan to Rumania on the grounds of her close relations with the Central Powers, and despite the eagerness of the banks who had the support of the finance ministry. 1 A year later, however, he approved and probably encouraged the granting of a loan to Bulgaria, almost certainly to comply with Russian wishes. There was no mistaking the strength of Russia's desire that the loan should go through, a desire which no doubt had a good deal to do with the fact that, unknown to Franee, Russia was negotiating a secret military convention with Bulgaria. After the loan negotiations had run into difficulties, Montebello telegraphed on 8 May 1902 : ' Count Lamsdorff instructs me to inform you of the very painful impression produced by a refusal for which it is difficult to understand the reasons and which has been felt deeply by the Em­ peror.'2 Four days later Montebello telegraphed again: 'There is concern at the lack of news about the Bulgarian loan'. 3 The loan was finally granted on 20 June, almost certainly after pressure by Delcasse on the banks. 4 Much more important, however, than the loans to Bulgaria were those to Serbia. In the case of the first French loan to Serbia in 1 902 there was the same pattern of pressure by the Russian government on the French government and by the French government on the banks. s Russia's motive in pressing for this loan was undoubtedly to show her support for a government which was showing signs of breaking free from its traditional dependence on Austria. Delcasse, too, saw the change in Serbian policy as the beginning of a potentially important alteration in the Balkan balance of power, and was anxious to encourage Serbia to continue her new-found friendliness towards Russia.6 z DDF2, II, no. 234. J DDF2, II, no. 244. On this occasion no direct proof survives of Delcasse's pressure on the banks. When Bulgaria obtained a further loan from France in 1904, however, Prince Ferdinand expressed his thanks for 'the active intervention of M. Rouvier [the finance minister] and M. Delcasse to persuade the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas to agree to acceptable conditions' (DDF2, v, no. 372). By 1914 France held one half ofBulgaria's public debt. 5 Narishkin to Delcasse, 23 Sept. 1 902, Delcasse MSS. DDF2, 11, no. 25 5 ; 111, no. 1 30. 6 DDF2, u, no. 469. 1

4

DDF2, 1, no. 5 3 1 .

The Survival ofthe Dual Alliance

245

Goluchowsky, the Austrian foreign minister, was not at first concerned either by the new direction of Serbia's foreign policy or by the implications of her loan from France. The French ambassador in Vienna reported to Delcasse that 'he considers Serbia to be too closely dependent on Austria-Hungary, who could ruin her by closing her frontier to the export of Serbian pigs, for him to worry whether her feelings have become more or less friendly'. 1 The situation changed dramatically, however, after the assassination in June 1903 of King Alexander of Serbia and the enthronement of the pro-Russian Peter Karageorgevich. In 1904 Pashich, the Serbian prime minister, sought a loan from F ranee which he deliberately intended as a step towards breaking the Austrian stranglehold on the Serbian economy. 2 The loan negotiations, which were complicated by Pashich's temporary fall from power and by intense competition from the Central Powers, were not concluded until 1906: but from the summer of 1904 it was under­ stood that at least a part of the loan was to be used for Serbian arms purchases from France. 3 Hitherto Austria had had the monopoly of these orders, and Pashich's use of the French loan to break free from that monopoly was an important cause of the 'Pig War' which broke out in 1906 and was the first in the series of Austro-Serb crises which led up to the Sarajevo crisis of 19 14. During the early years of the twentieth century perhaps the main value of the Dual Alliance to the Russian government lay in its financial usefulness. One of the reasons why the Russo-Japanese War had such a serious effect on the alliance was precisely because of the strain it put on financial relations between France and Russia. Though the credit­ worthiness of Russia's Balkan friends was unaffected, it became much more difficult for Russia herself to place loans in France. Even in April 1904, when Russia was still generally expected to be victorious, Delcasse had considerable difficulty in persuading the French cabinet to agree to a new loan, and was strongly opposed by Rouvier, the finance minister. 4 By the beginning of 190 5 French investors were becoming seriously alarmed by Russian reverses in the war against Japan. For several years there had been a Russian agent in Paris, the notorious DDF2, II, no. 496. L. Albertini, The Origins ofthe War of z9 14 (London, 1952), r, 144. 3 DDF2, v, no. 321. By the outbreak ofwar in 1914 France held two-thirds of the Serbian public debt. 4 Crisp, op. cit.,!3 88-92. 1

2

Theophile Delcassl

Raffalovich, whose j ob it was to bribe the French press to present an optimistic picture of the Russian economy and to support the Russian loans. 1 By March 1 905 confidence in the Russian economy was so severely shaken that Raffalovich (acting partly on Delcasse's advice) was distributing bribes to the value of 200,000 francs (about £ 8,000) a month. 2 Every French newspaper of note, with the single exception of the socialist L'Humanitl, received a share of the spoils. After Russia's defeat at the battle of Mukden early in March, however, even bribery on this substantial scale could not persuade the French investor that all was well. On 1 2 March the French banks broke off negotiations then underway in St. Petersburg for a further Russian loan. 3 In so doing they had the full support of Rouvier, who was now prime minister as well as finance minister. The foreign editor of The Times reported to Sir Charles Hardinge, the English ambassador in Russia, after a visit to Paris: Rouvier told me in so many words that if his influence prevailed, Russia would not get un sou in France until after peace was made. . . . There is, I believe, a considerable difference of opinion between Rouvier and Delcasse as to the expediency of a further loan to Russia. 4 The activity of the French embassy in St. Petersburg suggests that Delcasse was still hoping vainly to persuade Rouvier and the banks to reconsider their decision. Hardinge wrote to Sanderson on 1 2 April: Although the French Embassy has been busy spreading the report that the French loan is not really 'off' but only postponed, I hear from banking sources here and from Paris that there is no question of the negotiations being resumed until peace is assured. It is the internal situation which fills the small French investor with alann. s Though Russia found the Dual Alliance of diminished financial value during the Russo-Japanese War she also, however, found it of unexpected diplomatic usefulness when the tide of the war began to turn against her. In August 1 904, in a desperate attempt to restore her 1 A. Raffalovich, op. cit., passim. Raffalovich sometimes used J ules Hansen as an intermediary in his work of bribery ( op. cit., 1 2). 2 R. Girault, 'Aspects financiers de I' alliance franco-russe', Revue d'His to ire Moderne et Contemporaine, VIII ( 1961 ) , 71. J Ibid., 72. 4 Chirol to Hardinge, 20 March 1 905 , Hardinge MSS., vu. 5 Hardinge to Sanderson, 12 April 1905 , Hardinge MSS., VI.

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

247

fortunes, Russia decided to send her Baltic fleet to the Far East: but to make this journey the fleet needed aid from the French colonies along its route, aid which would violate France's status as a neutral power. The Russian ambassador told Delcasse: 'The concealed cooperation of the French government is indispensable for this great enterprise which is our last hope of success'.1 In the knowledge that the survival of the alliance depended on it, Delcasse gave his consent to the abuse of French neutrality, and at Diego-Suarez in Madagascar and Cam Ranh Bay in lndo-China the Russian fleet made stops which far exceeded the 48 hours allowed by international law. The French minister in Tokyo was especially alarmed by Japanese reaction to the second of these stops, and his alarm was widely shared in England as well as France.2 However, Bertie, the new British ambassador in Paris, was almost certainly right in believing that 'it was only owing to Rouvier [the prime minister] insisting' that Delcasse was eventually prevailed upon, on 20 April 1905, to ask the Russian fleet to end its long stay in C am Ranh Bay.3 The Russian ambassador in Paris wrote to Lamsdorff: . . . I can give you an assurance that here the minister of foreign affairs, at the risk of provoking, as he has done, the accusations of the socialists and the disapproval of some of his own allies and supporters, has always been unshakable in his resolve to afford all possible facilities to our fleet, whose importance (which I would almost describe as historic) he fully understands.4 Delcasse's second great service to Russia during her war with Japan was his mediation in the Dogger Bank crisis in the autumn of 1904. On the night of 21 October 1904 the Russian squadron on its way to the Far East opened fire on English trawlers on the Dogger Bank, ap­ parently believing them to be Japanese torpedo boats. The fact that Delcasse's papers contain more documents on the ensuing Anglo­ Russian crisis than on any other incident in his career is perhaps some indication of the importance he attached to it.5 These and the other 1 Paleologue, Un rand tournant, 129. Much of Paleologue's account of g this affair can be checked against other sources, notably the French diplo­ matic documents. His account appears wholly accurate. 2 DDF2, v1, no. 319. Monger, op.cit., 191-2. 3 Hardinge to Lansdowne, 8 May 1905, Lansdowne MSS., xxv. 4 MS. letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 18 May 1905. s Nearly all these documents are copies of official diplomatic correspon­ dence, the most important of which have been published in the DDF.

Theophile Delcasse

available documents on the crisis give no definite indication of how much Delcasse's good offices influenced the actions of the British and Russian governments and hence helped to bring about a peaceful solution. But at a time when even to the coolheaded Lansdowne the scales seemed finely poised between peace and war it may be that even a marginal influence by Delcasse was enough to tip those scales in favour of peace. Certainly England's thanks for his good offices went a good deal beyond the minimum required by diplomatic courtesy. The King told Cambon on 16 November: 'I beg you to tell M. Loubet how grateful I am for the attitude of Franee and for the services rendered by her to the cause of peace. As for M. Delcasse, tell him that I have absolute confidence in him, and that I am counting on his loyalty and experience to spare us the horrors of a conflict.'1 The Entente emerged from the Dogger Bank dispute significantly stronger than before. Metternich, the German ambassador in London, reported to Berlin: •The Entente Cordiale, however insignificant its services have doubt­ less been, has celebrated a new triumph here; it is given the main credit for the settlement of the dispute and will be strengthened by this incident'. 2 Russia's appreciation of Delcasse's good offices ( conveyed to Delcasse in a personal letter from Nelidov)J undoubtedly had much to do with her later appeal to his mediation in the spring of 1905 to end the war with Japan. The strength of Delcasse's attachment to the Dual Alliance was beyond doubt even at the end of his term of office. It remains to explain why, at a time when almost all enthusiasm for the alliance had disappeared in both Franee and Russia, his attachment to it remained so strong. In part, the answer was that Delcasse, influenced by a faith in the alliance that was as old as his political career, and by the flattering attentions of Russian royalty and statesmen, saw the defects of the Dual Alliance less clearly than his advisers. But his main reason for clinging so tenaciously to the alliance with Russia was a much more basic one - fear of Germany. Paleologue told Paul Cambon in November 1904: In the event (still improbable at the present time) of France being forced to choose between her ally and her friend, it is her friend that she would have to sacrifice. The motives which gave rise to the Franco-Russian 1 3

2 GP, x1x i, no.6 u 1. DDF2, v, no. 449. Nelidov to Delcasse, 31 Oct. 1904, Delcasse MSS.

249 alliance and have kept it in being have not ceased to exist and are more powerful than ever. It is impossible not to shudder at the thought of the perils to which the break-up of the Franco-Russian alliance would expose Franee. The total effective number of troops which we could put in the field against the German army would be 24 army corps, or 840,000 men. Germany could field against us 38 army corps, or 1,330,000 men. 1 The Survival of the Dual Alliance

Even Paul Cambon, who had no personal sympathy with 'our Asiatic ally', 2 agreed that, despite Russia's involvement in the Far East, the Dual Alliance still remained vital to France's security. 3 As Delcasse had formerly believed that the guiding principle of Bismarck's policy had been to prevent the birth of the Dual Alliance, so as foreign minister he believed that the guiding principle of German policy after Bismarck was to destroy the alliance it had failed to prevent. He told Paleologue early in 1904: 'I have always told you that German policy, whether directed by William, by Billow, or by Holstein has only one objective - the destruction of the Franco-Russian alliance!' 4 Even before the Boer War Delcasse had been suspicious of German policy towards the Dual Alliance, and the remaking of the alliance in 1 899 had been a direct consequence of his desire to avert a Russo­ German agreement on the future of Austria-Hungary. After the experience of March 1900, however, his suspicion of German policy acquired a new intensity. 5 This suspicion showed itself by the way in which he treated a number of minor incidents almost as major crises by interpreting them as parts of a deep-laid German plot to break the Dual Alliance. The first such incident was the German nomination of Count Waldersee as commander of the international force sent to China to quell the Boxer rebellion in August 1900. French fury at this incident arose not so much from the nomination itself as from the fact that when making the nomination Germany informed France that Walder­ see's name had been suggested by the Tsar. When the Tsar claimed that he had been misrepresented, Delcasse drew the conclusion that the incident had been part of a German plot to sow distrust between France DDF2, v, no. 434. Paleologue was repeating Delcasse's own arguments. See Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 163. 2 Chirol to Hardinge, 10 Aug. 1904, Hardinge MSS., vu. 3 DDF2, v, no. 434. 4 Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 17. s See above, 173 ff. 1

Theophile Delcasse and Russia. 1 In May 1901 the Kaiser invited the Russian ambassador to attend celebrations held in honour of the Tsar's birthday at Metz in the former French province of Lorraine. Once again Delcasse interpreted this episode not as an isolated incident but as part of a perfidious German strategy designed to destroy the Dual Alliance. He wrote to Montebello: I learn from a source whose reliability I have several times been able to put to the test [probably Balasy] that, when giving instructions to Prince Radolin on his departure for Paris [as the new German ambas­ sador], the German Emperor told him: 'I hope you will take less time to set France against Russia than your predecessor took to set France against England.' The invitation of the Russian ambassador to Metz is a manifestation of this design, which had already been revealed by the incident of the Waldersee nomination. Clearly it is not anticipated that this will have a direct influence on the cabinets of Paris and Petersburg; but it is hoped to alter their relations by unsettling public opinion in France and Russia. 2 Though Delcasse greatly exaggerated the significance of both the Waldersee nomination and the Metz celebrations, he was undoubtedly correct in his basic assumption that one of the ultimate aims of German policy was to bring about the disintegration of the Dual Alliance. The beginning of the Russo-Japanese War and the signing of the Entente Cordiale seemed for the first time to bring this aim within Germany's reach. At the time of the serious Anglo-Russian crisis caused by the 1 The Kaiser made it appear that the Tsar had taken the initiative in nominating Waldersee. Lamsdorff, however, affirmed that the Tsar had received a telegram from the Kaiser suggesting Waldersee's appointment and had merely replied that he had no personal objection to this choice (DDFz , xvI, nos. 263, 271, 273). 2 DDF2, 1, no. 254. For several years after March 1900 the German government remained unaware of Delcasse's deep suspicion of German policy. The Kaiser had actually expected French support for Waldersee's nomination; even when it became clear that Franee was showing some hesita­ tion Bulow wrote: 'It is obviously in London that the centre of opposition to a German commander-in-chief must be sought'. Munster, the German ambassador in Paris, was convinced that German policy during the crisis caused by the Boxer rebellion had actually strengthened the French govern­ ment's desire for a rapprochement with Germany. The Kaiser agreed (GP, XVI, nos. 4602, 46o8; XVIII ii, no. 5867).

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

Dogger Bank dispute in October 1 904, Holstein, the eminence grise of the German foreign office, believed that an opportunity had arisen to destroy the Dual Alliance as it then existed. On 24 October he sug­ gested a Russo-German alliance to the Russian ambassador/ and on the 27th the Kaiser made a similar proposal to the Tsar. 2 Three days later, after these overtures had been favourably received, Germany formally proposed alliance against attack by 'a European power', under the terms of which Russia and Germany would, if necessary, 'act in concert to recall to Franee the obligations she has assumed under the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance'. 3 At the same time Holstein made an inept attempt to persuade France to abandon the Entente and accept the position of junior partner in the new alliance: a piece of diplomacy comparable in its crudity to Holstein's ludicrous attempt earlier in the year to prevent the conclusion of the Entente by telling England that France was inciting Russia against her. 4 On 2 November 1 904, acting on Holstein's instructions, Radolin, the German ambassa­ dor, told Delcasse that the Russo-Japanese War seemed likely to spread to Europe and that Germany would stand on the side of Russia; through the intermediary of the Spanish ambassador he added that in such an eventuality 'It will be necessary for France to declare herself: either on the side of Russia and Germany, or on the side of England. She has no other alternative.'s Two days later the Russian Grand-Duke Paul, on a visit to Paris, revealed to Paleologue the gist of the Kaiser's offer of an alliance to the Tsar. Delcasse was seriously alarmed. 6 On 5 1 Documents published in fr.vestia, 28 Dec. 19 17; cited by .E. Bourgeois and G. Pages, Les origines et responsahilites de la Grande Guerre (Paris, 1921), 304 n. 2 GP, XIX i, no. 61 18. 3 GP, X I X i, nos. 6 1 1 9, 6 1 20. 4 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 19 March 1 904, Sanderson MSS. Even the pro­ German Lascelles admitted that 'Holstein's "friendly warning" is certainly open to suspicion that it is an attempt to sow distrust between Franee and ourselves'. 5 DDF2, v, nos. 424, 425 . (The originals of these memoranda, written by Delcasse, are in the Delcasse MSS.). Holstein's instructions were conveyed in two memoranda of 22 Oct. and given to Radolin a day later ( The Holstein Papers, IV, no. 862 and p. 3 1 2 n. 1 ). As during the first Moroccan crisis it was thought best for Radolin to deliver threats of force through an intermediary. Holstein's role in this incident, like his 'friendly warning' of March 1 904, has been overlooked by his biographers. 6 DDF2, v, no. 426. Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 1 6o.

Theophile Delcasse

November he sent Paleologue on a secret mission to London with instructions for Cambon to warn Lansdowne of Germany's designs, 1 and on the 9th he told the Russian ambassador: The personal correspondence which has been going on for several weeks between your sovereign and William II is known to me. I know that the Kaiser is offering him an alliance against England, and that he means to make us enter in this alliance by force. 2 The Tsar, however, had already written to the Kaiser two days earlier insisting that F ranee must be informed before the alliance was signed. Germany was equally insistent that the alliance must be signed before the French were told and the affair fell through. 3 The Kaiser was bitterly disappointed. He believed that the failure of the negotiations with Russia - 'my first personal defeat' - had been personally en­ gineered by 'the damnably clever Delcasse',4 and he began to think of European diplomacy in terms of a vendetta between Delcasse and himself. The abortive attempt to bring about a Russo-German alliance seemed to confirm all Delcasse's suspicions of Germany policy: to demonstrate that Germany's aim was the disruption of the Dual Alliance, and to prove that her past overtures to France had been intended, like this one, to lure her to her destruction. The whole affair is a reminder that German diplomacy under Billow and Holstein created distrust as much by its ineptitude as by its malevolence. During 1904 another quite different affair inflamed still further Delcasse's suspicion of German policy. For some time he had kept a close watch on Germany's attitude towards Belgium. Brugere wrote in his diary during the Belgian general strike in 1902: Delcasse believes that in view of the disorders in Belgium it is impos­ sible for me to leave France at the moment. He adds that the situation is very grave. If a Republic is proclaimed in Belgium, it is feared that a power (Germany) may wish to intervene. In that case it is war because we shall enter Belgium first. s During 1904, according to the later evidence of Paleologue, the French general staff learned through the treachery of an unidentified individual calling himself the Vengeur and claiming to be a senior German officer, 1 DDF2, v, nos. 428, 433, 434. Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 1 64. 2 Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 171. 3 GP, XIX i, nos. 61 24-6142. 4 GP, xix i, no. 6146. s Diary entry by Brugere for 12 April 1902, Brugere MSS.

The Survival of the Dual Alliance

253

that Germany planned in the event of war to launch an attack on Franee through Belgium. Paleologue's account was corroborated soon after its publication by a general, a brigadier, and a naval captain, all of whom had been concerned with the episode in 1904, as well as by the son of General Brugere, who had questioned some of his father's former collaborators. 1 While it therefore seems unlikely that Paleo­ logue's account was his own invention, however, it appears even more improbable that there was a real betrayal of German war plans. 2 The only explanation capable of reconciling this apparent contradiction is that the French General Staff was the victim of a successful hoax by a French imposter who earned 60,000 francs for his information. At least since the early years of the Dreyfus affair there had been frequent attempts to sell the General Staff information of doubtful authenticity on a variety of subjects. 3 The possibility of a German attack through Belgium was already becoming a common theme in military literature,4 and was therefore a likely subject for a confidence trick of this kind. The Vengeur episode of 1904 was by no means the last occasion on which the French General Staff was persuaded to pay large sums for false information. s General Brugere, who as generalissime designe was responsible for the preparation of French war plans, was himself at first sceptical of the alleged betrayal of German war plans. He felt a considerable distrust for the Chief of the General Staff, General Pendezec, whom he in­ tended to replace immediately in the event of war, and at first correctly supposed that Pendezec had been deceived. However, a secret recon­ naissance of the German border carried out on his instructions in the winter of 1904-5 convinced him that an attack through Belgium was a serious possibility. During 1905 he modified existing French war plans to take account of this possibility, although still anticipating that the main attack would come through Alsace-Lorraine. 6 At almost the same M. Paleologue, 'Un prelude a !'invasion de Belgique', Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 Oct. 1932. M. Paleologue and R. Brugere, 'Le plan Schlieffen et le Vengeur', Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 5 Nov. 1932. 2 See the review of Paleologue's articles by W. Foerster in Berliner Monatshefte, x, 103 5 ff. 1

Johnson, op. cit., 207-8. G. Ritter, The Schlie.ffen Plan (London, 1958), 42-3. s See R. Boucard, The Secret Services ofEurope (London, 1940), 27. 6 Paleologue and Brugere, op. cit. Ritter, op. cit., 42-4.

3

4

Theophile Delcasse

time the English General Staff also began to take seriously the possi­ bility of a German attack through Belgium. During the early months of 1905 a series of war games was organised in England to study this possibility, and the English Director of Military Operations made a personal tour of inspection with his deputy along the Franco-Belgian border.1 These activities were, in all probability, prompted by in­ formation received from the French General Staff. Sometime during the first half of 1905 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamber­ lain, circulated to the Committee of Imperial Defence an account of a conversation with an important though unidentified Frenchman. This account began: My friend told me that, in the event of a Franco-German war, it was now known with certainty in Paris that Germany would immediately violate the neutrality of Belgium. Her army would not advance, as was at one time supposed, through a corner of Luxembourg, but right through the heart of Belgium between Brussels and Antwerp.2 The Vengeur episode was another example of the way in which Delcasse's deep suspicion of German policy was influenced by myth. On this occasion, however, myth came close to coinciding with reality. It was ironic that soon after the Vengeur revelations, probably in the early months of 1905, Schlieffen, the German chief of staff, conceived his famous plan for an outflanking attack on France through Belgium.3 It was even more ironic that, despite the Vengeur revelations, the implementation of the Schlieffen plan in August 19 14 was to take the French General Staff almost completely by surprise. See below, 284. Austen Chamberlain MSS., AC 7/56/13. This document is headed by Chamberlain 'Note circulated by me to Committee of lmperial Defence', and is placed in a group of papers dealing with Committee of Imperial Defence matters for 1904-5. This group of papers was arranged by Chamberlain in chronological order. The memorandum in question appears to have been prepared some time during the first six months of 1905. 3 Ritter, op.cit., 45. 1

2

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The French Emp ire and Morocco

T

H E R E was a negative as well as a positive side to Delcasse's imperial vision. As foreign minister he was privately convinced that France's Asian empire would never be more than a drain on her resources. He considered lndo-China as, at best, 'matiere a echange' 1 and had the same attitude towards Madagascar which he never regarded as part of France's African empire. As prime minister from 1902 to 1905, Emile Combes, who otherwise took almost no interest in foreign affairs, tried on several occasions to interest the German ambassador in an exchange of lndo-China or Madagascar for Alsace-Lorraine. 2 The same solution to the problem of the lost provinces was also the dream of Paul Bourde, 3 and he doubtless suggested it to Delcasse - though never with the same conviction as an E gypt-Morocco exchange with England. Delcasse, for his part, would gladly have accepted an agree­ ment of this kind with Germany. Bihourd, Noailles' successor as ambassador in Berlin, wrote of a meeting with Delcasse in the summer of 1904: 'During our long conversation we talked about Alsace and Lorraine. "If there is a willingness to sell them", exclaimed the Minister, "I am quite prepared to give up lndo-China in exchange".'4 After his fall from power Delcasse told Saint-Aulaire that he would have been equally willing to offer Germany Madagascar instead of lndo-China.5 There is no evidence, however, which suggests that Delcasse ever regarded either transaction as a practical proposition. The fact that he considered them at all is much more an indication of his vision of the French Empire than of his policy towards Germany. Mme. Nogues, op. cit., 8. Combes, op. cit., 217-20. Cf. above, 49. 3 Saint-Aulaire, op. cit., 50. 4 Georges Bihourd, MS. memoir on the first Moroccan crisis, 9-1 0. s Saint-Aulaire, op. cit., 157. 1

2

Theophile Delca.sse This v1s1on was of an Empire concentrated on France's existing possessions in Africa, but with the highly important addition of Morocco. He told Paleologue late in 1904: In this immense realm [the French Empire] , a large part is of no interest to me, and if! were to find a taker at a bargain price, I should gladly sell it. Indo-China and Madagascar are colonies which are too far away and too outlandish, whose administration is inevitably very onerous and whose defence could cause us grave anxiety during a war. We are, above all, a continental power. It is therefore in the proximity of continental France that we should concentrate our efforts. Geography, policy, strategy, and our material resources lay down exact limits to our colonial empire. I see first, on the coastline of the Mediterranean, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco; then the Saharan hinterland, Tafilet, Mauritania, and Tuat; beyond, Senegal, the Sudan, the Niger, Chad, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey; finally, the Ubangi and the Congo. We should have enough there to keep us occupied for cen­ turies. But do not forget that in this colonial empire limited to Africa I necessarily include Morocco.1 Throughout his years as foreign minister Delcasse's imperial ambitions were concentrated so exclusively on the acquisition of Morocco that he regarded all other schemes of colonial expansion as likely to distract from, or even to hinder, this essential objective. As a result he became not merely indifferent, but actively hostile, to attempts to enlarge France's Asian empire. His attempt to limit the French imperial effort to Africa involved him in two important disputes. The first was a personal conflict with Paul Doumer, an ardent expansionist who has been appointed governor-general of lndo-China in 1896. During 1899 and 1900 Doumer tried on several occasions and under various pretexts to gain Delcasse's authorisation for an invasion of the neighbouring Chinese province of Yunnan.2 Delcasse's refusal led Doumer to regard him as a personal enemy. Fran�ois, the French consul in Yunnan, wrote privately to Paul Beau, Delcasse's chef de cahinet, after a visit to Doumer in August 1900: 'It amounts to a mania 1 Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 202. Cf. Hornberg, op. cit., 28; Mme. Nogues, op. cit., 8, 14; Comte de Chambrun, Traditions et souvenirs (Paris, 19 5 2) , 72. 2 M. Bruguiere, 'Le chemin de fer du Yunnan. Paul Doumer et Ia politique d'intervention frarn,aise en Chine 1889-1902', Revue d'Histoire Diplo­ matique, LXXVII (1963), 148 ff., 256 ff.

The French Empire and Morocco

against M. Delcasse and a personal feud. I assure you that both his language and his threats know no bounds'. 1 During his annual leaves in France, Doumer did his best to spread the belief in parliamentary and colonialist circles that Yunnan would welcome French rule with open arms. Fran�ois insisted that this was nonsense: I am told from Paris that Doumer was going about repeating in the corridors of the Chamber that Yunnan was his. It had been offered to him, he had only to take it, he had everything prepared. Everyone, both mandarins and men of the people, were on his side. But where did this imbecile get that idea? Either he is off his head, or else his deception has passed all limits.2 In July 1 9 0 1 Delcasse received evidence from Fran�ois that Doumer was not only continuing to plan an invasion of Yunnan but was also conducting a press campaign against him in France itself, 3 Delcasse forwarded this evidence to the prime minister, Waldeck-Rousseau, and told him in a covering letter: Any attempt to launch a surprise attack will mean a general rising in Yunnan, a very long and very costly expedition, and, very probably, complications with England. It would be goodbye to our general free­ dom of action which it is of the greatest importance to maintain for questions and interests which are more important and nearer home [i.e. for the negotiations on Morocco]. 4 Doumer could not be recalled immediately because of his part in pre­ parations for an international exhibition due to be held at Hanoi in the following year. As soon as the exhibition was over, however, he was replaced by Paul Beau, a former head of the cabinet du ministre at the Quai d'Orsay, and a man on whom Delcasse could rely to keep the peace on the Yunnan border. Even more important than Delcasse's personal dispute with Doumer was his conflict with almost the whole parti colonial over the Franco­ Siamese frontier convention of 7 October 1 902. What most infuriated the parti colonial about this convention was that by it Franee surrendered without compensation the port of Chantaboun which she had occupied MS.letter, Fran�ois to Beau, 30 Aug. 1 900. MS.letter, Frarn;ois to Beau, 6 Aug. 1 90 1 . 3 Bruguiere, op.cit., 27J-6. 4 Delcasse to Waldeck-Rousseau, 1 8 July 1 90 1 , Waldeck-Rousseau MSS., 6456. 1

2

Theophile Delcasse

in 1893 as security for reparations and for the withdrawal of Siamese troops from territory claimed by F ranee. The surrender of this port was in itself a striking illustration of how much Delcasse's enthusiasm for France's Asian Empire had declined since his time as under-secretary and minister of colonies. In 1893 Delcasse himself had been mainly responsible for the occupation of Chantaboun,1 yet in 1902 he was prepared to cede the same town to Siam even at the risk of infuriating colonial opinion. To most colonialists the surrender of Chantaboun represented an intolerable loss of face by France in the Far East. Beau wrote to E tienne: 'A European nation cannot evacuate a position which she has occupied in an African or Asian country for ten years without a loss of prestige which may have serious consequences.' 2 Dissatisfac­ tion with the frontier convention was widespread even within the French foreign service. Combarieu recorded in his journal: 'All our agents in Indo-China and the Far East are opposed to it; most of the minister's advisers (Beau, Cogordan, Bonin) are pleading with him to give it up'. 3 Delcasse was, said The Times, 'the butt of as vigorous an assault as any Minister for Foreign Affairs has had to repel since, per­ haps, the attack on Jules Ferry's Tonkin policy'. 4 His reluctant promise in February 1903 to renegotiate the treaty with Siam5 was an indication not only of the growing strength of the parti colonial but of a broader shift in public attitude towards the French Empire. In 1885 Jules Ferry had been hounded from office because of opposition to his policy of expansion in Indo-China. In 1903 Delcasse almost suffered a similar fate because of support for the same policy of expansion. Few of Delcasse's advisers shared his lack of interest in the Far East. Many French diplomats believed that the nineteenth-century scramble for Africa would be followed by a twentieth-century scramble for China and were anxious that Franee should not be left behind. During his first years in office Delcasse was urged repeatedly by both the Direction Politique and Pichon, the French minister in China, to stake out a definite sphere of influence in preparation for the partition which they declared inevitable. 6 Delcasse refused. 'Where', he asked on one occasion, 'outside Indo-China, which is too easily forgotten, is our share, a share which is neither an illusion nor an embarrassment?' 7 2 MS. letter, Beau to Etienne, 1 9 Feb. 1 903. 1 See above, 33-4. 3 Combarieu, op. cit., 229. Bonin was first secretary at the Peking legation. 5 See above, 1 98. 4 The Times, 10 Jan. 1 903. 6 DDFz , xv, nos. 201 , 242, 270. 1 DDFz, xv, no. 242.

The French Empire and Morocco

259

When in the aftermath of the Boxer rebellion, following the Anglo­ German China agreement (widely interpreted as an agreement on spheres of influence) and the evidence also of Russian ambitions in Manchuria, Delcasse was forced to consider partition as a serious possibility, he told Urussov: I have already said, and I repeat, that I do not seek any annexation of territory, and that it is sufficient for me to see the situation which we hold by treaty made secure. But if others make conquests, France cannot remain empty-handed. We have troops in the gulf of Pe-chih-li; I have also sent them to Shanghai at the same time as England, and our example has been followed by Germany and Japan. If the presence of our troops is an annoyance to certain powers, notably at the entrance of the Yangtze valley, it would be necessary to purchase their departure by the recogni­ tion of our eventual liberty of action in the area of our main interests, that is to say in Morocco. 1 It is difficult to elevate this statement to the importance of a definite policy pursued by Delcasse, for there is no other record of such a state­ ment by him and within a few months partition no longer appeared at least an immediate prospect. 2 But Delcasse's words do illustrate once more how exclusively his attention was fastened on Morocco. Delcasse believed that the acquisition of Morocco involved two separate problems, an 'international question' and a 'Franco-Moroccan question', and he drew a sharp distinction between the two. Until after the conclusion of his accords with England and Spain he was essentially concerned only with the first of these two questions. While his policy on the 'international question' was never less than adventurous, his policy on the 'Franco-Moroccan question' remained until the autumn of 1904 a model of caution. His aim was to gain international acceptance of French supremacy in Morocco and only then to begin a forward policy within Morocco itself. 3 This policy dissatisfied those who were impatient for a French protectorate. There were rumours of discontent within the parti colonial at the slow growth of French influence in Morocco, and this discontent was shared by Paul Cambon and perhaps

DDF2, 1, no. 88. Delcasse's statement to Urussov was made in February 1901, at a time when, like most other European statesmen, he suspected Russia of seeking to annex Manchuria. By the following April, however, he appeared confident that Russia had no such designs; see above, 237. 3 See above, 138. 1

2

s

A.T.D.

260

Theophile Delcasse

by other French diplomats also. The most serious unrest, however, came from the French army in Algeria. The Algerian army chiefs were given the taste for expansion by the Tuat expedition, and demanded more. They were impatient to push westwards to the river Moulouya, which they regarded as Algeria's natural frontier with Morocco. Marshal Bugeaud had reached the Moulouya at the battle of lsly in 1844, but protests by England had persuaded France to accept an ill-defined frontier further east, which was frequently crossed by marauding tribesmen from Morocco. Delcasse has often been accused of fostering unrest on the border between Algeria and Morocco, but in fact almost the reverse is true. He attached the greatest importance to the occupation of the Tuat oases because they lay in the path of a projected Trans-Saharan railway, but steadfastly opposed further expansion on the Moroccan border for fear of international complications for which he was not ready. 1 At his insistence, the Algerian generals were told in October 1 900 that 'the government declares that the question of Morocco must not, at any price, be opened by an incident on the Algerian frontier'. 2 In May 1 90 1 he secured the appointment of the French minister in Morocco, Paul Revoil, as governor-general of Algeria. 3 Delcasse looked on Revoil's presence in Algeria, like Paul Beau's presence in lndo-China, as a guarantee against military adventures. During his two years in Algeria Revoil began a policy of cooperation with Morocco which was in­ tended to prevent any military clash on the border between the two countries. In the summer of 1901 he accompanied a Moroccan envoy to Paris for talks on the frontier question in which he was the chief French negotiator. By a protocol of 20 July 1 90 1 , confirmed by another of .20 April 1 902, Morocco recognised France's occupation of Tuat, and agreed that all future border incidents caused by marauding tribesmen should be settled on the spot by joint consultations between agents of the Algerian and Moroccan governments. 4 r DDFz , xvI, nos. 1 38, 1 50, 173 , 188, 193, 364, 400. z DDFz , XVI, no. 364. J It was Delcasse who wrote to Revoil on 17 May 190 1 asking him to accept the post of governor-general (nominally appointed by the minister of the interior) and assuring him that 'far from separating yourself from the foreign ministry, the new service that you will render to the country can only accelerate the development of your brilliant and estimable career' (cited in Revoil to Millerand, [ 1904], Millerand MSS.). • Saint-Rene Taillandier, op. cit., 4-13. DDF2, v, no. 3 5 6.

The French Empire and Morocco

In April 1903, however, Revoil resigned as governor-general of Algeria as the result of a personal feud with Combes, the prime minister. He was succeeded by Charles Jonnart,1 who had grave doubts about the policy of cooperation with Morocco. J onnart claimed in a letter to Delcasse soon after his arrival in Algeria that this policy was itself one of the causes of the unrest it was designed to prevent; it enabled the Moroccan government to claim Algerian support in its dealings with the border tribes and to use the threat 'Submit and pay your taxes or the Christians will destroy you'. 2 Jonnart nonetheless assured Delcasse of his complete cooperation: 'My policy must fit in with yours by subordinating itself to yours; on that point there can be no hesitation. You consider all the problems as a whole; I see only a part of them and from a special angle.'J But within twenty-four hours of promising Delcasse his unconditional support J onnart was also assuring Etienne that he was not prepared to sacrifice indefinitely what he believed to be the interests of Algeria to the broader aims of Delcasse's Moroccan policy: 'This policy will justify itself only if the desired solution is achieved in Morocco within a very short space of time'. 4 In July 1903, only two months after Jonnart's appointment, Saint-Rene Taillandier was already complaining that the co-operation between the Tangier legation and the Algerian administration during Revoil's term as governor-general had broken down. s J onnart made little attempt to hold his army chiefs in check. Indeed, the most adventurous of them, General Lyautey (later governor­ general of Morocco), was sent to Algeria at Jonnart's own request and given the Ain Sefra command on the Moroccan border. 6 Lyautey was eager to put into practice in Algeria the methods he had learned under Gallieni in Madagascar and lndo-China. 'Military occupation', he believed, 'consists not so much of military operations as of an organisa­ tion on the march.' His aim was to create 'centres of attraction' on the 1 Jonnart had already served a short term as governor-general of Algeria from October 1900 to May 1901, but had been forced to retire because of ill health. 2 J onnart to Delcasse, I 4 June I 903, Delcasse MSS. J Jonnart to Delcasse, 17 June 1903, Delcasse MSS. 4 Jonnart to Etienne, 18 June 1903, Etienne MSS. s Saint-Rene Taillandier to Etienne, 6 July 1903, Etienne MSS. 6 Jonnart to Etienne, 5 Sept. 1903, Etienne MSS. A. Maurois, Marshal Lyautey (London, 1931), 83-8.

Theophile Delcasse

Moroccan border: fortified towns which would provide security for the surrounding population and attract neighbouring peoples to seek French protection. He rapidly became impatient with the arbitrary frontier which it was his duty to defend, believing both that tribes across the border were anxious for French protection and that outposts in Morocco were essential for the security of Algeria. In November 1 903 he established his first important post on Moroccan territory at the entrance to the Bechar oasis, commanding the passes of the Bechar mountains. He renamed the post Colomb in memory of a French officer killed in battle, thus enabling Jonnart to reply, when he received orders to evacuate Bechar, that it was Colomb that had been occupied. The French government was outwitted and the post was maintained, later becoming known as Colomb-Bechar. 1 Lyautey was made bolder by this first success. In June 1 904 he sent a detachment across the Moroccan border further north to occupy Berguent, alleging that this was necessary to survey the movements of Moroccan rebels. Delcasse was furious and regarded Lyautey's action as another attempt to force his hand. He wrote to Etienne: I appeal to you that in the name of heaven there may not be two con­ tradictory policies in Morocco. For there to be a good government policy it is inadmissible that the generals should always confront us withfaits accomplis in an attempt to push the government further along what they, who see only one aspect of the question, consider the right path, but which may end in disaster, and as far as Morocco is concerned, in the failure of an overall policy which is developing with a speed and certainty which are truly surprising.2 Etienne was unmoved; he told Delcasse that 'Lyautey has done his duty and no more than his duty'. 3 Jonnart, too, gave Lyautey his full support, told him to stay at Berguent 'whatever may be said', and convinced Combes, the prime minister, that evacuation would be a disaster. In September Delcasse reluctantly gave his consent to the maintenance of the occupation on condition that the French garrison was reinforced by a detachment of Moroccan troops. Lyautey's pres1 Ibid., 1 oo-6. Jonnart had wanted to occupy Bechar during his first term as governor-general but had been refused permission to do so (J onnart to Etienne, 28 Feb. 1901, Etienne MSS.). 2 Delcasse to Etienne, 13 Aug. 1904, Etienne MSS. 3 Etienne to Delcasse, 16 Aug. 1904, Delcasse MSS.

The French Empire and Morocco tige was immensely strengthened by this second success; he acquired the reputation of a man who could successfully defy the orders of his government. During the winter of 1904-5 he continued what he termed 'the discreet penetration of Morocco'. 1 This penetration was secretly financed by Auguste Terrier, one of the two secretaries of the Comite du Maroc, probably without the knowledge of most members of the Comite.2 In a letter to Terrier, Lyautey's second-in-command, Colonel Henrys, boasted of how much had been accomplished and how well the secret had been kept - 'If only Jaures knew!'J Delcasse's policy of caution in Morocco extended to economic as well as to military penetration. In 1 899 Eugene Schneider (head ,of the vast iron and steel complex of Schneider-Creusot) sent a representative to Tangier to explore the possibility of opening a branch in Morocco. His envoy was given a cool reception by the French legation and told by Delcasse after his return to Paris that Franee was for the moment firmly opposed to any action which might affect the Moroccan status quo: 'The appearance of a company like Schneider would be bound to lead to diplomatic complications'. Delcasse's attitude to the much smaller Etahlissements Gautsch, the only French company already established in Morocco, was no more encouraging, and in June 1901 he refused to support its attempt to obtain a concession from the Sultan to establish a mint. Only at the beginning of 1902 did his concern at the growth of English business activity in Morocco lead him to sanction a limited degree of French economic involvement. On 5 February 1 902 he gave his blessing to the formation of a French company for trade with Morocco by the Syndicat Minier, an employers' 1 13-14. Lyautey told Terrier that the subsidies would remain 'entre nous (Lyautey to Terrier, 14 Dec. 1904, Terrier MSS. 5903). At least some members of the Comitl du Maroc, notably Bourde and Chailley-Bert, would undoubtedly have disapproved of the use of the Comitl's funds for this purpose. The money was used by Lyautey for bribery ('pour soudoyer qques amis') among the tribesmen on the Moroccan border (Lyautey to Terrier, 22 Aug. 1904, ibid.). The Comitl du Maroc was also - with the knowledge of its members - subsidising the French legation at Tangier; in July 1904 it supplied 20,000 francs to found an Arab newspaper and establish schools at Tetuan and Mogador (printed memorandum, [late 1904], Terrier MSS., 595o). 3 Col. Henrys to Terrier, 19 Jan. 1905, Terrier MSS., 5900. 1

2

Maurois, Marsha! Lyautey,

Theophile Delcasse

association dominated by Schneider and including the big names of French heavy industry. But once again Delcasse showed his extreme caution. He promised support for the new company only on condition that it show patience and submit entirely to government directives: 'It is the government which will say when the era of concessions is to begin'. Delcasse even insisted that the new company drop the name 'Societe Franco-Marocaine' on the grounds that it was 'too ostentatious'. Having absorbed its potential rival, the Etahlissements Gautsch, it became instead the 'Societe des Etahlissements Gautsch', and changed its name to the Compagnie Marocaine only in December 1 903. 1 Delcasse was also reluctant to allow French banks to make loans to the Sultan. His fear of the international complications which might follow from precipitate economic penetration of Morocco was strengthened by a concern that once the Moroccan government came to rely on loans it might have recourse to other countries besides France. Delcasse refused the Sultan's first request for a loan early in 1 902 and agreed only reluctantly to another and more pressing request in November. Since the Societe des Etahlissements Gautsch was unable to raise the necessary funds, Delcasse was forced to appeal to a con­ sortium of Paris banks to provide the money. This placed him in a p osition of considerable embarrassment for he had already turned d own two requests (in July 1 90 1 and July 1 902) from the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the leading bank in the consortium, to establish a branch at Tangier because of his desire to limit French business activity in Morocco to that of Schneider and his associates and thus avoid rivalry between different firms. The Banque de Paris now had its revenge. It was able to insist that the Societe des Etahlissements Gautsch should have no part in arranging the loan, and that the French government should guarantee to take 'the necessary measures' in the event of any default by Morocco. 2 Delcasse had foreseen the complications which might follow the establishment of rival French business groups in Morocco and had tried, in vain, to avoid this situation. His fears were amply j ustified. For more than eighteen months after the first loan granted to Morocco in P. Guillen, 'Les milieux d'affaires fran�ais et le Maroc a l'aube du XXe siecle. La fondation de la Compagnie Marocaine', Revue Historique, ccxx1x ( 1963). 2 P. Guillen, 'L'implantation de Schneider au Maroc: les debuts de Ia Com­ pagnie Marocaine', Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, LXXIX ( 1965 ). 1

The French Empire and Morocco

November 1 902, Schneider and the banks were engaged in fierce com­ petition for the Sultan's favours: a rivalry which was proof of the importance that French business was beginning to attach to the future economic exploitation of Morocco. This rivalry came to a head early in 1 904 after Delcasse had at last allowed the banks to offer the Sultan a loan to consolidate all his existing debts and guaranteed by the revenue of the Moroccan customs - an arrangement he had hitherto refused to sanction for fear of English opposition, but was now willing to accept because of the progress made in his negotiations with England. The Socilte des .Etahlissements Gautsch, now the Compagnie Marocaine, secretly determined to forestall the banks by putting forward a rival scheme. With backing from finance houses in France and Belgium not represented on the existing consortium, it offered the Sultan a loan of fifty million francs in exchange for a monopoly of future concessions and control of a vast scheme of public works. By the end of April 1 904 the Moroccan government had agreed in principle to this proposal. On 2 May, however, rumours of the Compagnie Marocaine's activity reached Paris and an organised campaign was launched against it in parliament, the press, and business circles by Delcasse and the banks, accusing Schneider of putting his own business interests before those of his country. After a fortnight of this pressure Schneider gave way and agreed to abandon his scheme in return for a minor share in the loan offered by the consortium headed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. 1

By accepting the loan from the French consortium, Delcasse be­ lieved that the Sultan had 'in some degree ratified the declaration of 8 April which recognises our preponderance in Morocco'. 2 During the next few months he became increasingly confident that Abdul Aziz was now reconciled to the gradual growth of French influence in Morocco. He wrote to Etienne on 1 3 August 1 904: Would you have believed, three months ago, that the Sultan would have been persuaded to seek our help to this extent? After the loan and the management of the customs came the command of the artillery at Tangier; after the artillery came the organisation of the whole garrison of this town. And Sliman [the foreign minister) adds that the Sultan is resolved not to let matters rest there. 3 With the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish accord two months later, 2 DDF2, v, no. 228. Ibid. 3 Delcasse to Etienne, 1 3 Aug. 1 904, Etienne MSS.

1

266

Theophile Delca.sse

Delcasse believed that he was free at last to proceed to the solution of the 'Franco-Moroccan question'. Accordingly, during the autumn leave of Saint-Rene Taillandier, the French minister in Morocco, he drew up in collaboration with him a 'programme for the military, economic, and financial reconstruction of Morocco, which F ranee alone, following her accords with England and Spain, has today the right to recommend and to assist in implementing'. 1 This programme was intended to prepare the way for a French protectorate. When Saint-Rene returned to Morocco at the beginning of December, how­ ever, the Sultan attempted to reassert his independence by dismissing all European advisers. Saint-Rene's response, with Delcasse's approval, was to order the withdrawal of all French nationals from Fez (then the seat of the Sultan's court), a measure which carried with it the threat of much sterner sanctions. 2 So far, indeed, had Delcasse's policy in Morocco changed since the conclusion of his accords with England and Spain that some of his advisers were now alarmed by his apparent readiness to contemplate the use of force. J Faced with an implicit threat of force, the Moroccan government rapidly gave way. The French consul at Fez was summoned by the Sultan and assured that his government 'was ready to welcome all our advice and accept all the reforms, and that all the measures which might have offended us would be withdrawn'. 4 On 29 January 1905 Saint-Rene Taillandier arrived in Fez at the head of a French mission to begin detailed discussion of the programme of reforms proposed by Franee. Within a few months, however, the first Moroccan crisis was to prove that the attempt to move towards a French protectorate in Morocco was premature. It was premature because Delcasse had failed to resolve the international question which he himself had recognised as a necessary preliminary to the solution of the 'Franco-Morocco question'. Though he had secured the approval of ltaly, England, and Spain for French ambitions in Morocco, he had gambled on being able to dispense with the consent of Germany. Official German reaction to the French accords with England and Spain gave no reason to believe that this gamble would not be successful. In a speech to the Reichstag Billow described the Entente Cordiale as a contribution to world peace, 1 3

DDF2, v, no. 479.

Cambon, Correspondance, u,

4 DDF2, v, no. 5 1 2.

2

171.

DDF2, v, nos. 487, 488.

Paleologue, Un grand toumant,

204-5.

Tke French Empire and Morocco

and declared that 'from the standpoint of German interests we have nothing to object'. Delcasse was anxious, nonetheless, that Germany might secretly be planning a coup in Morocco. While his negotiations with England were still in progress he had given the German ambassa­ dor an assurance that France would strive to preserve freedom of commerce in Morocco, but he was well aware that this assurance would do little to conciliate the German government. As soon as the Entente was signed, he warned Saint-Rene Taillandier 'to see to it that no German influence should come to counteract the operation on which, at this very moment, we are embarking at Fez'. 1 Saint-Rene remained convinced, however, that Germany had no objective in Morocco more sinister than commercial expansion. 'The whole attitude of the German legation in Morocco', he wrote to Delcasse in June 1904, 'confirms the repeated official declarations that Germany is pursuing no territorial or political ambition' . 2 1

DDF2, v, no. 31.

2

DDF2, v, no. 24 1 .

CHAP TE R F OURTE E N

The First Moroccan Crisis

F

RAN CE entered 1905 in a weaker military position than at any time since the signing of the Dual Alliance. Against almost all informed expectation of a year before, Russia was on the verge of a crushing defeat in the Far East and had ceased to be an effective ally in Europe. In France herself General Andre's disastrous term as minister for war (from May 1 900 to October 1904) had been devoted to a campaign against monarchist and clerical influence in the higher command which had left the army demoralised and ill prepared for war. The position of the navy was no better. In 1900 the Chamber had authorised a naval building programme which Monson had described as 'terribly formidable', 1 but the new fleet had not been built. Barrere wrote gloomily to Delcasse in November 1904: I do not give the policy that you and I have practised together two years before it is utterly demolished. And how will you conduct diplomacy when the world knows or believes - which is the same thing - that we no longer have either an army or a navy? This conviction is now making alarming progress. 2 Billow and Holstein planned, not surprisingly, to profit from French weakness. Their immediate aim was to defeat Delcasse's plan to exclude Germany from the settlement of the Moroccan question, a step which they considered vital to the maintenance of Germany's prestige. Their ultimate objective, however, was much more ambitious. The German government calculated that in a confrontation over Morocco between France and Germany, England would prove un­ willing, and Russia unable, to offer France effective support. German opposition to Delcasse's Moroccan policy would therefore bring about the destruction of the Entente Cordiale, show the ineffectiveness of the 1

2

Monson to Lansdowne, 28 June 1 90 1, Lansdowne MSS., IX. Barrere to Delcasse, 18 Nov. 1904, Delcasse MSS.

The First Moroccan Crisis Dual Alliance, and perhaps ultimately draw France into dependence upon Germany. 'The French', wrote Holstein, 'will only consider approaching us when they see that English friendship is not enough to obtain Germany's consent to the French seizure ofMorocco.' 1 For some time before the first Moroccan crisis Delcasse had been apprehensive of German opposition to his Moroccan policy. Nonethe­ less he stubbornly refused any suggestion that he should seek to dispel opposition by direct negotiations. There were two main reasons for his attitude. The first was his general desire to avoid negotiation with Germany on any subject. He was still convinced that at the beginning of the Boer War Germany had tried to lure him into a reaffirmation of the Treaty of Frankfurt, and that this remained Germany's condition for any kind of cooperation with France. Delcasse restated this belief whenever negotiation with Germany was suggested to him. When Georges Bihourd, the French ambassador in Berlin, tried to persuade him to open talks with Germany in the summer of 1904, he used the same argument. Bihourd wrote later: He declared that he had no fixed prejudice against Germany and that he would not refuse to begin talks with her if he had a guarantee that he would not first of all be asked to sanction the conquest of 1871, for he would not agree at any price to sign the treaty of Frankfurt a second time. M. Loubet had already told me, for his part, that he would sooner have his right hand cut off than countenance such an action.2 The second main element in Delcasse's distrust of Germany was his fear of her ambitions as a Mediterranean power. In his early years as foreign minister he had been most afraid of a German intrusion at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Since 1903, however, he had been principally concerned by German designs in Morocco. In May of that year he had told his friend, Chailley-Bert, of the need to forestall these designs while there was still time by a swift 'solution' of the Moroccan problem. This solution, he said, must be reached before 1906; by then he believed it would be no longer possible to arrive at a settlement which excluded Germany. 3 Germany's policy during the first Moroccan crisis was interpreted by Delcasse and by some of his advisers as part of her long-term strategy to become a Mediterranean power. The veteran

GP, xx i, no. 6521; xxr, no. 7036. Georges Bihourd, MS. memoir on the first Moroccan crisis, 9. 3 See above, 2 1 1 . Cf. DDF2, m, no. 26. 1

2

270

Theopkile Delcasse

French diplomat, Armand Nisard, wrote to Delcasse on I May 1905: For William II, the future of Germany is on the waves - and on the blue waves of the Mediterranean, which has always cast a spell over men from the north, much more than on those of the Yellow Sea. If he has not yet set foot on the Mediterranean seaboard proper, he nonetheless considers that, by the situation which he has assured himself in the Ottoman Empire, by the protectorate over Islam which results from it, by the development of German enterprises in Asia Minor, by his con­ stant visits to southern Italy and the care he takes there to evoke memories of the Hohenstauffen, by the role assigned to the King of Italy, whom he secretly looks on simply as a curate of the Holy Roman Empire in the Mediterranean, Germany is virtually, here and now, a Mediterranean power - whilst waiting perhaps for an opportunity to establish herself, by a lease or monopoly, either on the Muslim coast of the Mediterranean or at its gates, at, for example, an Atlantic port in Morocco. 1 All Delcasse's most important collaborators shared in varying degrees his distrust of, and his hostility towards, Germany. Not one, however, agreed with his refusal to negotiate with Germany on Morocco. Paul Cambon had warned him as early as August 1 902: 'Do not forget to take into account the efforts which the Germans will un­ doubtedly make to thwart an agreement relative to Morocco. It would have been prudent to have talks with them.' 2 Both C ambon and the Direction Politique believed that there were 'contiguous frontiers between France and Germany in Africa where compensation might have been found for Germany'.3 Even Revoil, who was probably Delcasse's closest adviser on Moroccan affairs, complained to Com­ barieu in March 1902: The great misfortune is that he finds it repugnant to have talks with Germany. 'The Germans are swindlers', he says. But, in heaven's name, I'm not asking for an exchange of romantic words or lovers' rings but for a business discussion! Revoil, however, accompanied his criticism of Delcasse's policy with what Combarieu described as 'a great eulogy' of Delcasse himself:4 Nisard to Delcasse, I May 1905, Delcasse MSS. Cambon to Delcasse, 12 Aug. 1902 (copy), Delcasse MSS. 3 Bertie to Lansdowne, 30 April 1905, Lansdowne MSS., XI. DDF2, u, no. 333· 4 Combarieu, op. cit., 183-4. I 2

T!te First Moroccan Crisis

271

His attitude was typical of many other French diplomats. The French foreign service as a whole disagreed with Delcasse's policy towards Germany; but, as Rouvier was later to complain, its loyalty to Delcasse personally remained undiminished. The colonialist pressure group which for several years had tried to persuade Delcasse to negotiate with England was also unanimous in wanting an agreement with Germany. Paul Bourde had envisaged negotiations on Morocco with Germany as well as England as early as 1 898. 1 In the spring of 1 903, shortly after Delcasse's conversion to the principle of an Egypt-Morocco barter, Etienne wrote to Beau: 'The Moroccan question is still open - Delcasse intends at last to negotiate on it with England, but still refuses to discuss it with Germany, which seems to me the height of imprudence'. 2 As the price of Germany's consent to French ambitions, he was even prepared to concede a coaling station on the Atlantic coastline of Morocco. 3 At the beginning of 1 905 Etienne became minister of the interior in the Rouvier govern­ ment. Throughout the first Moroccan crisis he was hardly on speaking terms with Delcasse and was rumoured to be trying to replace him as foreign minister. 4 Colonialist opinion generally was critical of Del­ casse's policy during the crisis. In the Bulletin du Comiti de l'Afrique Frarlfaise Robert de Caix insisted that in failing to open negotiations with Germany Delcasse had gone against the advice given him by the

parti colonial:

A Franco-German agreement relative to Morocco would have been warmly welcomed by a public opinion which, in reality, was expecting it. It is due to a very personal policy of the minister of foreign affairs that this agreement has not been sought. s The man who was most nervous of the probable consequences of Delcasse's policy towards Germany was perhaps Georges Bihourd, his ambassador in Berlin. From the signing of the Entente Cordiale on­ wards he continually warned Delcasse of his fear that Germany was meditating a 'plan to seize the first opportunity to emerge from an 1 Bourde to E tienne, 27 Oct. 1 898, E tienne MSS. 2 MS. letter, E tienne to Beau, 10 May 1903. 3 He said so publicly in a speech at a banquet of the Union Coloniale, reported in BCAF, July 1903 (supplement no. 7). 4 Bertie to Lansdowne, 22 April and 1 8 May 1 905, Lansdowne MSS., XI. GP, xx ii, 665 2. s R. de Caix,'L'incident allemand-marocain', BCAF, April 1905.

Theophile Delcasse

isolation and feeling of exclusion which offend her self-esteem, and to have her say in the settlement of the Moroccan question'. In April 1904 alone he repeated this warning in six dispatches. 1 On 20 June, during a visit to France, he invited Delcasse to lunch and tried unsuccessfully to persuade him of the need for a written agreement with the German government: I did not hesitate to say that in my view we were falling back into the clutches of Germany, and that I hoped for an accommodating and courteous policy towards her. For if war came - and that depended on the good pleasure of William II - we should be overrun, and the enemy troops would be at Paris in fifteen days.2 Besides urging Delcasse to open formal negotiations, Bihourd also tried hard and unsuccessfully to persuade him to make some gesture to appease German, and in particular the Kaiser's, amour-propre. His most ambitious project of this kind was for a visit to France by William's eldest son, the German Kronprinz. . Towards the end of the autumn of 1904 Bihourd was staying on the Riviera not far from the Kronprinz.'s fiancee and her mother, the Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. He proposed to pay a courtesy call on the Grand Duchess and to use his visit as an opportunity to let it be known that a meeting between the fiances on French soil (a meeting which he believed they would be anxious to arrange) would 'evoke nothing but sympathy' from the French government. Delcasse, however, refused to countenance any initiative of this kind, even though Bihourd insisted that he had no intention of issuing a formal invitation. During his Christmas leave late in 1904 Bihourd met Delcasse for what was to be the last time. Once again he tried to persuade Delcasse of the need to begin negotiations with Germany, and once again he was un­ successful. In similar circumstances neither the Cambon brothers nor Barrere would have hesitated to try to force Delcasse's hand had they considered it advisable to do so. Bihourd, however, though he remained deeply opposed to Delcasse's policy towards Germany, also remained throughout the first Moroccan crisis 'resolved not to take any action without the consent of my minister'. 3 At the beginning of 1905 Delcasse was still firm in his resolve not to seek talks with Germany. During the early stages of the first Moroccan 1

J

DDF2, v, nos. 1 , 28, 44, 62, 68, 77. Jbid., I O- I I ,

2

Bihourd, MS. memoir, 9.

The First Moroccan Crisis

2 73

crisis, however, he was to be forced, very slowly and very reluctantly, to abandon that resolve. The first warning of crisis came on 7 February 1 90 5 . On that date a telegram arrived from Tangier reporting a warning by Kuhlmann, the German charge d'affaires, that Germany intended to challenge French policy in Morocco. Kuhlmann had a reputation for making outspoken statements on his own initiative, but a further telegram from Tangier on 1 1 February reported that on this occasion he claimed Billow's authority for his remarks. 1 Bihourd's reaction to Kilhlmann's statement was to write to Delcasse: At the risk of being guilty of repetition, I venture to insist on the need to make clear by an exchange of notes the significance of the two French agreements with England and Spain with regard to the commercial and industrial interests of Germany. Until then we shall remain under the threat, quite clearly formulated by the German press, of some unpleasant surprise.2 For the moment, however, the talks at Fez seemed to be going well, and Delcasse still saw no need to make any concession to Germany. Then, early in March, the situation appeared to change almost over­ night. On 7 March Delcasse still felt pleased with the progress of negotiations with the Moroccan government. 3 On the 8th he received news that Saint-Rene Taillandier was meeting opposition at Fez and that this opposition was being encouraged by Germany.4 It was almost certainly as a result of this news that Bihourd was authorised, probably on the following day, to state 'in the event of the progress of discus­ sions requiring it', that France was willing to give Germany written assurances on her freedom of commerce in Morocco. 5 Even now, how­ ever, Delcasse was still not prepared to authorise Bihourd to take the initiative in offering these assurances. The French public first became aware that a Moroccan crisis existed on 20 March after an announcement that the Kaiser intended to call at Tangier on the last day of the month during his annual spring cruise in the Mediterranean. William was considerably disturbed by the prospect of landing in an open boat through heavy seas and risking an attempt on his life by 'all the Spanish anarchists' whom he believed to inhabit Tangier. He later sought to impress on Billow that he had agreed to make the visit only 'because you wanted me to do so and because your 1

J

DDF2, VI, nos. 75, 89. DDF2, VI, no. 130.

4

DDF2, VI, no. 134.

2 DDF2, v1, no. 96. s DDF2, VI, no. 137.

274

Theophile Delcasse

policy stood to benefit'. At Tangier he told the French charge d'affaires that Germany demanded free trade and equal rights in Morocco and regarded the Sultan as the ruler of an independent country. 'When the minister tried to argue with me, I said "Good morning", and left him standing.'1 The Moroccan Grand Vizir assessed the significance of the Kaiser's visit in a picturesque metaphor: 'Whilst in the act of ravishing Morocco, Franee has received a tremendous kick in the behind from the Emperor William'. 2 After the visit Delcasse at last felt obliged to take the initiative, though not at first a direct initiative, in seeking talks with Germany. He continued, however, to cling firmly to the fiction, which he proclaimed to the Chamber on 7 April, that it was a matter only of clearing up a 'misunderstanding' by offering Germany a written guarantee of commercial freedom. There is not the slightest evidence that he was ever willing to offer Germany substantially more than this. He later reaffirmed to Bertie four days after his resignation that 'his policy had been to be ready to make commercial concessions to Ger­ many if she were willing to discuss with the French government the question of Morocco, but not to y ield anything politically or terri­ torially'. Delcasse's papers contain a draft in his own hand of the kind of commercial guarantee he had in mind. It would have been cold comfort to any German statesman, and simply reaffirmed that F ranee considered herself bound by her agreements with England and Spain to uphold freedom of commerce for Germany and all other nations in Morocco. 4 The circuitous methods by which Delcasse tried to begin talks on Morocco after the Kaiser's visit to Tangier were a measure of his continued reluctance to make an open approach to Germany. On 6 April Jules Hedemann, the London correspondent of Le Matin, called on Otto Hammann, the influential head of the press department at the Berlin Foreign Office, with instructions from Delcasse to seek 'a friendly word' from Bulow as the starting point for Franco-German talks. He was unsuccessful. 5 Three days later, on 9 April, Radolin 3

2 Saint-Aulaire, op. cit., 1 39. Balfour, op. cit., 25 5 . Bertie to Lansdowne, 10 June 1905, Lansdowne MSS., XI. 4 Undated draft, Delcasse MSS. s GP, xx ii, nos. 66o8, 66o9. Two days before Hedemann's overture Robert de Billy, the head of Delcasse's cabinet de presse, had tried to sound the Paris correspondent of the Berliner Tagehlatt on how the German government would receive a French overture (GP, xx ii, p. 305 n. ). 1

J

The First Moroccan Crisis

275

telegraphed to Berlin that several of his fellow ambassadors were pressing him 'with a nervous persistence which I shall term lack of tact' to open talks with Delcasse on Morocco. It is reasonable to suppose that, as Radolin suspected, this pressure was prompted by Delcasse himself. 1 Also on 9 April Delcasse instructed Bihourd to try to bring about a conversation on Morocco on the following day when Bulow was due to dine at the French embassy; but still he stopped just short of authorising Bihourd to take a direct initiative: If the turn of the conversation tomorrow should bring even a distant allusion to Moroccan affairs or to the general relations between France and Germany, you could refer to the last passage of my speech to the Chamber last Friday (7 April] and say to the Chancellor: 'Do mis­ understandings really exist? In that case you know that, as far as it depends on us, we are ready to clear them up.'2 Georges Louis, the directeur politique, telegraphed privately and more categorically, 'Do your best to ensure that the conversation develops in a way which leads up to the desired allusion'. Bulow, however, was careful not to give Bihourd any opportunity to introduce 'the desired allusion' and the dinner passed without mention of Morocco.J Despite the total failure of his various attempts to make indirect overtures, Delcasse was persuaded to make a direct approach to Germany only after considerable pressure from his own advisers, from Rouvier, the prime minister, and from a number of his cabinet colleagues.4 Finally, during a dinner at the German embassy in Paris on 13 April, he asked Radolin somewhat ingenuously: 'Despite everything, could there really be a misunderstanding? In that event, you know by my declaration to the Chamber, which I repeat now, that I am quite ready to dispel it.' Next day Delcasse instructed Bihourd to put the same question in Berlin.5 The German government's reply was to propose an international conference on Moroccan affairs.6 This 2 DDF2, VI, no. 261. GP, xx ii, no. 6612. Bihourd, MS. memoir, 17-18. 4 P. Muret, 'La politique personnelle de Rouvier et Ia chute de Delcasse', Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, XVII (1939), 227-9. s DDF2, VI, nos. 291, 296. 6 GP, xx ii, nos. 6623, 6624. The idea of a new international conference on Morocco had been put forward by Kuhlmann at the beginning of March. Billow himself, however, began to favour the proposal only after the Kaiser's 1

3

T

A.T.D.

Theophile Delcasse

proposal had the advantage of providing Germany with a plausible legal basis for her opposition to French policy, for a previous con­ ference held at Madrid in 1880 had guaranteed to all signatory powers (Germany included) equal rights in Morocco. Billow was confident that at a new conference Germany could count on the support of almost all the powers who had signed the Madrid convention. 'It is out of the question', he believed, 'that the conference should result in handing over Morocco to Franee'. 1 On 19 April Delcasse faced for the first time serious opposition in the Chamber to his Moroccan policy. The socialist leader, Jean Jaures, used the occasion of the debate on the foreign ministry budget to attack Delcasse for his failure to enter into negotiations with Germany on Morocco. 'Since you took the initiative', he told Delcasse, 'in inaugurating a policy capable of changing the status quo in Morocco, . . . you ought also to have taken the initiative in offering explanations and beginning negotiations.' Jaures was supported by deputies re­ presenting almost all shades of political opinion in the Chamber. 2 The strength and unanimity of the parliamentary onslaught on his policy took Delcasse by surprise. The habitual apathy of the Chamber towards foreign affairs had led him largely to ignore the possibility that it might be capable, without the prompting of the colonialists, of launching a concerted attack on his policies. For some time Delcasse had openly admitted, and indeed had almost boasted, that he had grown out of touch with parliamentary opinion. Monson had written to Lansdowne in November 1904: His Excellency never fails to impress on me that he has no claims to be a 'Parliamentary expert'; and it is notorious that he avoids as much as possible attendance to the ordinary duties of a deputy. He will never go near the Chamber if he can help it; and as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is only a stone's throw from the Palais Bourbon, he is quite content to confine his attendance to those urgent occasions when his presence can be demanded by telephone. Personally, therefore, he is not much in touch with the Chamber; and there do not seem to be at his disposal the same facilities for ascertaining and gauging the sentiments of the Deputies at large as are provided for a Minister under our own Parliamentary system. J visit to Tangier (E. N. Anderson, The First Moroccan 1 930), 202, n. 24). 1 GP, xx ii, no. 66o4. 2 J O ( Chamhre), 19 April 1905.

Crisis 3

(Chicago,

BD, m, no.

1 1.

The First Moroccan Crisis

277

Delcasse's defence of his policies on 19 April 1 905 was perhaps the least impressive of all his parliamentary performances. After briefly restating his readiness to clear up any 'misunderstanding' which might have arisen with Germany, he tried to deflect the debate towards the pacific nature of his policy in general. Rouvier's defence of Delcasse's policy was at best lukewarm. He declared that he 'covered' his foreign minister, but in the parliamentary language of the time this meant only that while he disagreed with Delcasse he was prepared to affirm his solidarity with him in order not to jeopardise the position of the government. After declaring his desire to reach an understanding with Germany, Rouvier added : 'In this policy, which is that of the govern­ ment, I exercise the role appropriate to my position and take responsi­ bility for it'. This statement amounted to a tacit assurance that Del­ casse's freedom of action was at an end and that foreign policy would in future be determined by the prime minister and the cabinet as a whole. 1 On 20 April, the day after the debate in the Chamber, Delcasse offered his resignation. His motive, almost certainly, was to use the threat of a cabinet crisis to obtain from his cabinet colleagues a less equivocal statement of solidarity than that given by Rouvier in the Chamber. 2 Within two days his object had been achieved. The official communique announcing the withdrawal of his resignation on 22 April stated categorically that 'no divergence of views had taken place between him and the cabinet'. Immediately after withdrawing his resignation Delcasse made a final attempt to open direct talks with Germany. On the evening of 22 April he sent his personal assistant, Paleologue, to see Bihourd in Berlin. The principal object of his mission was to examine on the spot 'what schemes and manoeuvres are still open to us'. Bihourd, however, was now convinced that it was too late to begin direct talks with Germany, and believed that Franee now had no option but to accept the proposal for an international conference. 3 Since it now appeared impossible to open talks with Germany either at Paris or Berlin, Delcasse believed that only one alternative remained - to use the good offices of a JO (Chamhre), 19 April 1905. Renouvin, La politique exterieure de Th. Delcasse, 47. 1

2 He made this statement a condition of withdrawing his resignation (Bertie to Lansdowne, 22 April 1905, Lansdowne MSS., x1). J Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 30 1-2. Bihourd, MS. memoir, 19-22. Cf. DDF2, v1, no. 369.

TMophile Delcassi friendly power. On 27 April he agreed to a suggestion by Barrere that their mutual friend, Luzzatti, should try to persuade Monts, the German ambassador in Rome, of the need for direct talks on Morocco between France and Germany. Monts seemed to welcome Luzzatti's overture and wrote to Bulow that in his opinion the way was clear for 'a definitive and friendly agreement with France'. Billow, however, replied that it was too late for Franco-German talks; Germany now insisted that the Moroccan question be referred to an international conference. 1 After the failure of Luzzatti's mediation Delcasse's policy entered a new phase. During the first stage of the crisis - from early February to the end of April - events had gradually forced him to seek talks with Germany. After the beginning of May he abandoned this attempt. He knew that the longer the crisis lasted, the worse the effect was likely to be both on French influence in Morocco and on his own position in France. But, as long as he could maintain his own position at the Quai d'Orsay, Delcasse was confident of the final defeat of German policy. He was assured of the support of most of Europe in his opposition to the German conference proposal. He was certain, too, that the thinly veiled threats of force appearing in the semi-official German press were bluff and that Germany would never go to war over Morocco. Barrere and Paul C ambon fully shared Delcasse's belief that Ger­ many was bluffing.2 So too did most English diplomats and statesmen. Sir Frank Lascelles, the English ambassador in Berlin, wrote to Lans­ downe on 7 April: 'It seems to me that there is a good deal of analogy between the action of Germany now with regard to Franee and her action in regard to England at the beginning of 1 896. . . . All this turned out to be bluff.' 3 Edward VII similarly told Delcasse that 'he did not believe there would be serious complications and was rather inclined to attribute the whole affair to the capriciousness which was characteristic of the Emperor William'. 4 Even Louis Mallet, who would have wel­ comed a war, reluctantly concluded that, 'unluckily for us', Germany had no intention of declaring one.5 Muret, op. cit., J 19-2 I . C . Barrere, 'La chute de Delcasse', Revue des Deux Mandes, 1 Aug. 1932, 615. 3 Lascelles to Lansdowne, 7 April 1905, Lansdowne MSS., xrv. 4 MS. letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 4 May 1905. s Monger, op. cit., 190-1. 1

2

The First Moroccan Crisis

2 79

Delcasse's own reason for believing that Germany was bluffing was a simple one. He was confident of English support against a German attack and certain that Germany dare not run the risk of war with England. He told Paleologue on 26 April: Germany cannot want war. Her present attitude is no more than bluff; she knows that she would have England against her. I repeat that England would back us to the hilt and would not sign peace without us. Do you think that the Emperor William can calmly envisage the pros­ pect of seeing his battle fleet destroyed, his naval commerce ruined, and his ports bombarded by the English fleet? 1 Modern research has generally supposed that Delcasse's confidence that England would support Franee in a war against Germany was based on a misinterpretation of a discussion between Paul Cambon and Lansdowne on 1 7 May and of their exchange of letters on 24 and 25 May. This explanation is entirely inadequate. In fact Delcasse already felt certain of English military support by the time Paleologue left Paris for Berlin on the evening of 22 April. When Paleologue arrived in Berlin on the 23rd he met Bihourd with the news that France was assured of English support in the event of war. Both Bihourd's and Paleologue's accounts of their meeting, written independently of each other, agree on this.2 Delcasse reaffirmed his certainty of English military support to Paleologue on 26 April and to the French politician, Jean Dupuy, on 1 0 May.3 He based this certainty on a series of 'indis­ cretions' by English service chiefs and statesmen which he under­ standably regarded as assurances.These indiscretions will be described later. They need first to be placed within the context of the attitude of the English people and the English government as this appeared to Delcasse. French statesmen had always believed that England's desire for an understanding with France stemmed in great part from her enmity towards Germany. After the signing of the Entente Cordiale Paul Cambon wrote to Delcasse: 'The almost enthusiastic reception given to the Anglo-French accord is, as I have already had occasion to observe to Your Excellency, due in large measure to the present feeling of hostility against the German which grows stronger every day'.4 1 Paleologue, Un grand touma nt, 308. 2 Ibid., 303. Bihourd, MS. memoir, 19. 3 Paleologue, Un grand toumant, 308.DDF2, vm, annex 2. 4 DDF2, v, no. 204.

280

Theophile Delcasse

During the closing years of the nineteenth century Lord Salisbury had several times been questioned by the German ambassador about England's attitude in the event of war between France and Germany. His answer had always been the same: 'that the course of the English government in such a crisis must depend on the view taken by public opinion in this country. . . .'1 By 1905 there seemed little doubt about the view that would be taken by English public opinion. At the begin­ ning of the year Germanophobia in England reached a pitch sufficient to cause a war scare in Germany, and in June even the cool-headed Lansdowne felt obliged to warn the German ambassador that 'if Germany were light-heartedly to seize the first pretext which presented itself to make war on France, something which he did not believe possible, it was impossible to foresee the lengths to which public opinion in England would press the government to support France'. 2 From the beginning of the Moroccan crisis, the British government seemed to French eyes to have lost no opportunity for showing its solidarity with France. Three gestures - two of them since almost for­ gotten - particularly impressed the Quai d'Orsay. The first, which came two days after the news of the Kaiser's impending visit to Tangier, was an English proposal for an exchange of visits by the English and French fleets. This proposal was interpreted in England as well as France as a prompt and spontaneous gesture of solidarity against Germany. When the news was leaked to the press on 30 March, The Times concluded a first leader attacking German policy in Morocco by saying: 'The Anglo-French entente on this question . . . is about to receive expression, it is believed, by a friendly meeting between the British and French Channel and North Sea squadrons'. Edward VII's Mediterranean cruise during April 1905 also seemed designed by England as a sustained exhibition of Anglo-French solidarity. On 6 April, while on his way to join the royal yacht at Marseille, the King had a meeting with President Loubet to which The Times ascribed 'special and unmistakeable significance'. During his cruise Edward called only at French ports. He took the impromptu and well-publicised decision to extend his call at Algiers into a visit of several days, and while there he took the unprecedented step of appeal­ ing to Delcasse by telegram not to resign. On his way home Edward 1 H. Temperley and L. Penson, Foundations ofBritish Forei gn Policyfrom Pitt to Salisbury (Cambridge, 1938), 5 19-20. 2 GP, xx ii, no. 686o.

The First Moroccan Crisis

spent a week in Paris from 29 April to 4 May. The Times repeatedly affirmed the political significance of the visit, and during it the King had two long and well-publicised private meetings with Delcasse. On 22 April, while Edward was still on his Mediterranean cruise, Lansdowne informed Bertie, the English ambassador in Paris, that 'It seems not unlikely that the German Government may ask for a port on the Moorish coast'. Bertie was therefore authorised to inform Delcasse that England was prepared to j oin with Franee 'in offering strong opposition to this proposal'. 1 In the aide-memoire which he presented to Delcasse on 25 April, however, Bertie went rather further than Lansdowne had intended. He changed the emphasis of the British assurance from a promise of help in opposing a specific and hypothetical German demand to a general statement of support for Delcasse's Moroccan policy. This statement of support was strongly phrased: The Government of His Britannic Majesty considers that the conduct of Germany in the Moroccan question has been most unreasonable in view of the attitude of M. Delcasse, and it desires to accord to His Excellency all the support in its power. 2 Thus the 'indiscretions' by British service chiefs and statesmen took place against the background of a British public more Germanophobe than at any time in living memory, and of a British government apparently bent on emphasising its solidarity with Franee. Recent research has shown that formal Anglo-French military conversations did not start until the very end of 1 905, six months after Delcasse's resignation. It has been wrongly supposed, however, that this conclusion is incompatible with later statements made during the 192o's by Lansdowne, Grey, Robertson, Sydenham, and Haldane to the effect that there had been some previous contact between English service chiefs and the French. 3 Attempts have been made to discount BD, m, no. 90.

DDF2, v1, no. 347. E. N. Anderson, op. cit., 210-1 1 . 3 Lansdowne admitted in an interview given to Temperley in 1926 that before the end of his term of office English and French 'military and naval experts . . . got together and talked about possible schemes of cooperation as was their business, and talked indiscreetly as they always will do' (H. Temperley, 'British Secret Diplomacy from Canning to Grey', Camhridge Historical Journal, VI (1938), 26). Grey wrote in Twen ty-FiYe Years (1, 74--6): 'It was not till some time after I entered office that I discovered that, under the threat of German pressure upon France in 1905 steps had been taken to concert military plans, in the event of war being forced upon Franee. 1

2

Theophile Delcasse this considerable weight of evidence on the dubious grounds that old men forget. 1 The possibility has hitherto been ignored that while there was no joint Anglo-French attempt to concert strategy against Ger­

many before Delcasse's resignation, there was nonetheless a series of

unilateral declarations of support made to the French by the English service chiefs. Yet this interpretation is indicated by the later admission of both Lansdowne and Sanderson that there had been indiscretions and 'loose talk', and is also compatible with the statements made by Grey, Robertson, Sydenham, and Haldane. 2 It was, of course, natural that Lansdowne and Sanderson should later seek to dismiss the declarations of the service chiefs as 'loose talk'. It was equally natural, however, that at the time the French should take these declarations of support as positive assurances • . . • Plans for naval and military cooperation had, I found, begun to be made under Lord Lansdowne in 1 905 when the German pressure was menacing. The naval conversations had already been direct; the military conversations had hitherto been through an intermediary. . • .' Robertson wrote in Soldiers and Statesmen (London, 1 926), 1, 48 : ' Unofficially, plans for military cooperation with France had, with the knowledge of Lord Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary at the time, been discussed between the Director of Military Operations and the French military attache in London as far back as 1 90 5 ' . Haldane confirmed that there had been 'some general conversations' with French generals in 1 905 (Richard Burdon Haldane : an Autobiography (London, 1 929), 1 89). According to Sydenham: 'The " Conversations" were quite informal in Lord Lansdowne's time. In fact, so far as I know, Colonel Repington acted as go-between' (BD, m, no. 22 1 (a) ). 1 Monger, op. cit., ch. 9. D. Hargreaves, 'The Origin of the Anglo­ French military conversations in 1 90 5 ', History, xxxv1 ( 1 9 5 1 ). 2 Sanderson mentioned indiscretions and 'loose talk' from the British side only; Lansdowne confirmed Sanderson's statement and said that he had 'nothing to add' (BD, 111, nos. 105 (a), 105 (b) ). Except for the use of the words 'conversation' and 'discussion' there is nothing in the other statements cited above to suggest that the French did more than listen to - and doubtless encourage - British indiscretions. When Grey and Robertson say that plans for naval and military cooperation had been made, this does not necessarily imply that these plans had been made during j oint talks. In fact such plans were made in the summer of 1 905 by the British acting entirely on their own initiative (Monger, op. cit., 206 ff.). It is, of course, natural that Grey Robertson, Sydenham, and Haldane should not emphasise the one-sided nature of the 'conversations' in 1 90 5 , which in any case probably became blur­ red in their minds after j oint Anglo-Frenchmilitary discussions beganin 1 906.

J.

The First Moroccan Crisis

The evidence that Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, gave France some assurance of English support against German attack, though cir­ cumstantial, is almost conclusive. From the beginning of the Moroccan crisis Fisher was longing 'to have a go at Germany' in alliance with France. 1 He believed that 'should Germany attempt to push France to extremes over the Moroccan embroglio, Great Britain would almost perforce have to come to France's assistance', and was eminently capable of saying so to France. 2 Fisher not merely made indiscretions, he gloried in them. He gave J. L. Garvin, the editor of The Observer, more secrets than his paper usually dared to print. Garvin did, how­ ever, publish in 1908 Navy Estimates three months in advance, and Fisher's only reaction to the storm which followed was to write to Garvin, 'My dear Friend! Such a joke!' 3 His plan of campaign to meet a German attack on Franee was for the Royal Navy to take the Kiel canal and land an expeditionary force on the coast of Schleswig-Holstein. 4 There is strong evidence that this plan was known to Delcasse. On 6 October 1905 Stephane Lauzanne, the editor of Le Matin, began a series of four articles entitled 'The Truth on the Moroccan Affair' with an account of the cabinet meeting of 6 June at which Delcasse resigned. Discussing Delcasse's statement that England was ready to sign an alliance, Lauzanne wrote: 'England did in fact inform the government of the Republic verbally that, if France were attacked, she was ready to mobilise her fleet, seize the Kiel canal and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein'. An exchange of letters between Delcasse and Lauzanne leaves little doubt that the article was based on confidences by Delcasse to Lauzanne (which Delcasse had not, however, intended for publication) and that Delcasse recognised its authenticity. 5 There seems no reason to look further for the source of Delcasse's informa­ tion than Fisher himself. Monger, op. cit., 189. A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. (London, 1961), I, u 2. 2 Memorandum by Fisher, [summer 1905], Austen Chamberlain MSS., AC7/56/13; Balfour MSS., 497u. 3 Colin Cross, The Liberals i n Power 19 0 5- 1 4 (London, 1963), 96. 4 Monger, op. cit., 207. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1, 1

The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 19 04- 19 19

1 1 2.

s Lauzanne to Delcasse (copy), 5 Oct. 1905; Delcasse to Lauzanne (copy), Oct. 1905, Delcasse MSS. Lauzanne wrote to Delcasse, 'The very great joy and the very great pride which I feel at having told the public a truth 12

Tlteopltile Delcassl

There is good, but not conclusive, evidence that General Grierson, Director of Military Operations, also committed an important in­ discretion. By 1905 Grierson was convinced that war with Germany was inevitable and that 'the only policy consistent with the interests of the [British] Empire was an active alliance with France and Belgium'. His views were fully shared by his deputy, Colonel (later Field-Mar­ shal) Robertson. 1 At the beginning of the year he and Robertson were already playing war games to study the deployment of a British expeditionary force to meet a German attack on Franee through Belgium, and in March 1905 they made a personal tour of inspection on the Franco-Belgian border. Grierson's official biography also records that 'by the kindness of the Governor of Paris [ a senior French general] he was permitted to make many military visits' during his stay in France. 2 Although there is no record of what he said in France, evidence has survived of later indiscretions made by Grierson during meetings with the French military attache in December 1905. Ques­ tioned later by the Foreign Office about these meetings, Grierson claimed that he had had only one 'chance meeting' with the attache at which nothing of importance had been discussed. In fact there had been two meetings at which Grierson had revealed English preparations for a war against Germany and had expressed as his personal opinion that England would support France against German attack. J It is reasonable to suppose that Grierson may have which it had the right to know concerning your resignation, are a little lessened by the fear of having caused you embarrassment by making you much against my will - break your silence'. Delcasse replied: ' You can be sure that I do not hold it against you. But you were quite right to write that, if you had consulted me, I should have begged you not to disturb a too recent past.' Lauzanne later revealed that Delcasse had disclosed the plan for an English landing in Schleswig-Holstein during a confidential interview on 22 June 1905 (S. Lauzanne, S a Majeste la Presse (Paris, 1925), 258). Cf. Earl of Midleton, Records and Reactions, 1 856- 19.39 (London, 1939), 1 8 1 . 1 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (London, 1921), 138. 2 Ibid., 1 39. Victor Bonham-Carter, Soldier True. The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Sir William Rohertson 1 860-1933 (London, 1963), 6 1 . D. S. McDiarmid, The Life of Lieut.-General Sir James Moncrieff Grierson (London, 1923), 2 1 2. 3 ED, m, no. 2 1 1 . DDF2, vm, no. 256. Monger, op. cit., 238.

The First Moroccan Crisis

been equally 'indiscreet' during his visit to Franee in March. At the lowest estimate it seems unlikely that both he and Robertson could have avoided giving any explanation for their tour of the Franco­ Belgian border. The English service chiefs were not the only ones to be 'indiscreet'. It would have been out of character if Sir Francis Bertie had failed to follow their example. Even Paul Cambon could not rival Bertie's capacity to ignore, exceed, and even contradict his instructions. Van­ sittart, who served under him in Paris, described Bertie as 'wholly disinclined to scrape a second fiddle or to become one of the mouth­ pieces which Foreign Office and Government have now made their agents'. 1 At critical points during the Algeciras Conference in 1906 and the Agadir crisis in 19 11, Bertie sought to persuade France to follow a policy opposed to that advocated by his own government. In March 19 12 during the Anglo-German naval negotiations he even begged Poincare to make an energetic protest against British policy towards Germany. 2 Bertie had exulted in the first Moroccan crisis; he wrote to his friend Mallet on 3 1 March: 'Let Morocco be an open sore between France and Germany as Egypt was between France and ourselves'. J He had always looked on the Entente as principally directed against Germany and believed 'we have nothing to fear from Germany if we remain on good terms with Franee'. 4 He was impatient to turn the Entente into an alliance. 'It is not enough to have concluded the Entente Cordiale', he told Paleologue. 'It must be given muscles, it must be given the means to show its strength. We shall preserve peace only if the obstreperous and restless elements in Berlin are afraid of us.' 5 It was probably the news that Delcasse had offered his resignation on 20 April which prompted Bertie to give Delcasse some private assurance of English military support. The effect of this resignation in England was to convince the anti-German group in the Foreign Office that the Entente was in mortal danger and that a firm British pledge of military support for France was now urgently necessary. 6 Bertie had formerly been leader of this group and undoubtedly shared its reaction Vansittart, op. cit., 5 3 . Taylor, Strugglefor Mastery, 440 n., 469, 478-9. 3 Bertie to Mallet, 3 1 March 1905 , Bertie MSS.,vr. 4 Monger, op. cit., 1 00. s Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 329. 6 Monger, op. cit., 188 ff. 1

2

286

The ophile Delcasse

to the news of Delcasse's resignation. He called on Delcasse on 22 April before his resignation had been withdrawn. 1 Though there is no record of what he said, it is significant that the first evidence that Delcasse felt certain of English military support in a war with Germany dates from the evening of the same day. 2 It is significant, too, that, after Rouvier replaced Delcasse as foreign minister on 6 June, he claimed that Bertie was trying to urge him in the direction of a military convention. J Very tentatively therefore, it is possible to date the three major English 'indiscretions' (from the English point of view) or 'assurances' (from the French point of view) as follows. Probably in March (as later in December) Grierson gave it as his personal view that England would support France in a war with Germany. On 22 April Bertie, believing the Entente to be in grave danger, may have given Delcasse a more categorical assurance of English support. Fisher's 'indiscretion' was probably made not long after, for it was the news of Delcasse's resignation which prompted him to beg Lansdowne to 'send a tele­ gram to Paris that the English and French fleets are one'. This dating is hypothetical. The fact that there were English indiscretions seems certain. The impression created by these indiscretions was strengthened by Edward VII's visit to Paris from 29 April to 4 May. The German diplomat, Baron von Eckardstein, was in Paris during the King's visit and had private talks with Rouvier and other leading French poli­ ticians. He left Paris convinced that England would support France in a war with Germany and reported to Bulow that 'King Edward had left no doubt on this subject in Paris'. 4 A fortnight later Paleologue told the Marquis de Breteuil, the King's closest French friend: 'M. Delcasse appears to me to have acquired the certainty in his conversation with Edward VII that in this event [war with Germany] all the British forces would come to our aid'. s Even Rouvier did not doubt that England 2 See above, 279. Lee, op. cit., 11, 342. 4 GP, xx ii, no. 6652. GP, xx ii, no. 6752. Cf. below, 292 n. s Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 330. Breteuil replied: 'I have no doubt that this is King Edward's inner conviction. But I find it difficult to believe that, with his habitual correctness and prudence, he used language which only his ministers would have the right to use.' This, however, was the special pleading of a close friend. Even in 1903 Edward's language in Paris had gone far beyond 'correctness and prudence'. 1

3

The First Moroccan Crisis

would be more than willing to give France her full support. Like a number of other French opponents of Delcasse's policy he suspected that the English were spoiling for a fight. 'England', he told Brugere, 'is very bellicose at this moment and wishes to draw us into a conflict with Germany.' 1 On 9 May or soon afterwards, Delcasse conferred in Paris with his two principal ambassadors, Barrere and Paul C ambon.2 All three were already confident of English support against Germany; but following the failure of the final French attempt to open talks with Germany through the mediation of Luzzatti, they felt the time had come to seek a formal assurance of support from Lansdowne. They had no doubt about his answer. 'I know well what his reply will be', said Cambon.3 Cambon saw Lansdowne on 17 May. He told Delcasse that Lans­ downe spontaneously assured him 'that from this moment the British government was ready to reach an understanding with the French government if the situation gave cause for disquiet'. On this point Lansdowne's and Cambon's versions of their conversation are in sub­ stantial agreement.4 According to his own account Cambon then asked Lansdowne ifhe could tell Delcasse that: . . . if, for example, we had serious cause to believe in an unjustified aggression, the British government would be fully prepared to concert with the French government on the measures to be taken ? 'You may', Lord Lansdowne told me, 'we are fully prepared to do so.'

There was no mention of this in Lansdowne's account of the conversa­ tion and he had probably not intended to give an assurance of this kind. His undoubted desire for close Anglo-French cooperation during the Moroccan crisis was, though Cambon did not realise it, due far less to fear of a German attack on France than to a desire to ensure that France did not suddenly give way to Germany and make a bargain with her at the expense of England. The assurance reported by Cambon to Del1 Diary entry by Brugere for I I June 1 90 5, Brugere MSS. Cf. Revoil to Millerand [late April or early May 1 905], Millerand MSS.; Bihourd, MS. memoir, 19. 2 Muret, op. cit., 332. J Barrere, 'La chute de Delcasse', Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 Aug. 1 932, 6 1 6. 4 DDF2, vr, no. 443 . BD, m , no . 94.

288

TMophile Delcasse

casse was, almost certainly, the result of a misunderstanding. It is, at any rate, unlikely that Cambon knowingly invented a statement which he repeated to Lansdowne in writing a few days later. So far from trying to use this statement to urge Delcasse to seek a formal alliance with England, he was actually attempting to restrain him from this course of action because of the unfavourable attitude of the rest of the French cabinet. 1 On 2 1 May Loubet, Rouvier, E tienne, Delcasse, Cambon and Barrere met at the E lysee to discuss the situation. Rouvier was resolutely against making any move towards an alliance, and Cambon was instructed simply to 'take note' of Lansdowne's declaration of the 17th. 2 In a letter to Lansdowne on the 24th, Cambon re­ called the statement which had been omitted by Lansdowne from his account of their conversation. Lansdowne replied on the 25th with his own version of the talk. He concluded with what he doubtless con­ sidered a tactful attempt to reduce the force of the specific undertaking mentioned by Cambon: I do not know that this account differs from that which you have given to M. Delcasse, but I am not sure that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there should be full and confidential discussion between the two Governments, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any complications to be apprehended during the some­ what anxious period through which we are at present passing. J Cambon, however, believed that Lansdowne, so far from diminishing his previous assurance, had given it 'a broader and more immediate significance'. 'It is no longer to an agreement in the event of aggression that he bids us', he told Delcasse, 'but to an immediate discussion and an examination of the general situation'. This he regarded as 'a general agreement which would in reality constitute an alliance'. 4 This interpretation was accepted without question by Delcasse and his advisers. Even before Cambon's approach to Lansdowne they had felt confident of English support against a German attack. They had sought from Lansdowne only an official declaration which they never doubted he would give. Certain in advance of Lansdowne's reply, they did not doubt its meaning when he gave it. Rouvier accepted Delcasse's 1

3

DDF2, v1, no. 480. BD, m, no. 95.

2

4

Ibid. DDF2, v1, no. 465 .

The First Moroccan Crisis

interpretation of Lansdowne's declaration. He did not, however, accept Delcasse's opinion of the importance of English support against Germany. Delcasse believed that the danger of an English attack on the German fleet would be enough to deter Germany from aggression against France. Rouvier was convinced, on the contrary, that German threats of force were very much in earnest and that, whatever England's naval strength, she could not offer effective military support against a German invasion. It was this conviction which was the basis of his opposition to Delcasse's policy throughout the first Moroccan crisis. During the early months of 1905 Rouvier gradually developed a panic fear of surprise attack which eventually led him to make secret contact with the German government and offer to jettison Delcasse. His demoralisation probably began on 18 February, three weeks after he became prime minister, when he attended his first meeting of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre and heard grave doubts expressed about the ability of Franee's frontier defences to withstand a sudden invasion. Rouvier claimed to have heard no mention of these doubts as finance minister in the preceding Combes cabinet, and President Loubet described his reaction to the meeting as 'ultra-pessimistic'. 1 Two days later, on 20 February, General Pendezec, the chief of staff, wrote to Rouvier to tell him that several members of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre considered that France's covering troops would be unable to fulfil their role effectively in the event of war. 2 Soon afterwards Rouvier called together the main members of the army and finance commissions in the Chamber to seek their assessment of French military prepared­ ness. 'There is nothing', he was told, 'no ammunition, no equipment, no stocks of provisions, and morale in the army and in the country is in an even worse state.' Rouvier took a handkerchief from his pocket and burst into tears. 3 From now until Delcasse's resignation on 6 June he regarded the prospect of war with Germany as a disaster to be avoided at all costs. 'Our military situation and the condition of the country would', he believed, 'lead us to defeat and to the Commune.'4 By the latter part of April intelligence reports from the Franco-German frontier had reduced him to a state of panic. On 26 April he summoned 1 Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, Proces-verbaux xr, 1 8 Feb. 1905. Archives du Ministere de la Guerre. 2 Renouvin, La olitique exterieure de Th. Delcasse, 46. p 4 Muret, op. cit., 345 . 3 Saint-Aulaire, op. cit., 1 5 5 .

Theophile Delcasse

the generalissime designe. General Brugere was less pessimistic than either Pendezec or most other senior French generals about the out­ come of a war with Germany; he wrote in his diary of his meeting with Rouvier: M. Rouvier spoke to me about his anxiety concerning the attitude of the Germans, who appear to be preparing for the eventuality of an imminent war. The under-secretary of posts and telegraphs told him this morning that German officers at the frontier are sending back their wives and children, etc., etc. He is afraid that the great review due to be inspected by the Kaiser at Metz on 8 May may be turned against us. Numerous postal officials fromlMetz have come to Nancy and visited the post office in that town. According to M. Berard [the under-secretary] they seemed as if they were examining how they could one day take up residence there. M. Rouvier asked me whether we were in a condition to withstand a surprise attack coming from troops who would invade our territory from the site of the 8 May review. I replied that it would be necessary to take a few preliminary precautions and that we should be obliged to give a little ground, but that it would be possible to hold out on the Meuse.1 Rouvier, however, was not to be reassured. The almost ludicrous nature of some of the evidence which he produced to support his fear of surprise attack bore witness to the extent of his loss of nerve. On the same day as his meeting with Brugere, in a highly emotional mood, he made his first overtures to Radolin and let him know through an intermediary that he would be ready to jettison Delcasse.2 Within twenty-four hours Delcasse had learned of Rouvier's action from a deciphered German telegram. 3 Unknown to Rouvier, the Quai d'Orsay had broken the most secret of the German ciphers and the cabinet noir was able to keep Delcasse well informed of Rouvier's manoeuvres behind his back.4 With characteristic optimism, however, Delcasse still believed that, despite Rouvier's evident readiness to dismiss him, it was possible for him to survive the crisis. Until almost the eve of his resignation he hoped - and Germany feared - that he could triumphantly consolidate _his position in France and Europe by Diary entry by Brugere for 26 April I 905' Brugere MSS. GP, xx ii, no. 6635. 3 Hornberg, op. cit., 42-3. Paleologue,Un grand tournant, 310 ff. 4 Delcasse included in his papers photographs of two of the deciphered telegrams describing Rouvier's approaches to Germany. These were un­ fortunately lost during the last war. I 2

The First Moroccan:Crisis

successful mediation in the Russo-Japanese war. 'This master-stroke', he believed, 'would push Morocco into the background' - and the peace conference between Russia and Japan might also provide an oppor­ tunity to open talks with Germany on Morocco. 1 Delcasse's confidant, Jezierski, wrote in La Depeche de Toulouse on April 25: 'Peacemaking between Russia and Japan, an undertaking of real seriousness and im­ portance, . . . will cause the minor alarm over Morocco to be quickly and deservedly forgotten amid the enthusiasm and gratitude of the civilised world'. On the same day Delcasse told the Japanese ambassa­ dor that to contribute to peace between Russia and Japan would be 'the crowning achievement of his career'.2 Without telling Rouvier that he knew of his approaches to Germany, Delcasse succeeded in impressing on him the importance of his future role as a mediator between Russia and Japan. At the beginning of May Rouvier sent Betzold, a French financier, to Berlin to reaffirm his intention to jettison Delcasse. 3 On his return, however, Betzold found that Rouvier's attitude had changed and that he no longer regarded Delcasse's dismissal as an immediate possibility: It was not possible to provoke a quarrel [to bring about Delcasse's de­ parture) because for the past eight days Delcasse had been concen­ trating all his efforts on the conclusion of peace at St. Petersburg and had, as a result, recovered some support. If, for example, an armistice should be reached, it would hardly be possible to arrange the departure immediately afterwards of the minister who had achieved it.4 As the immediate threat of invasion began to seem less real, Rouvier also began to recover his nerve. By the end of May he was adamant that Delcasse's continued presence at the Quai d'Orsay was absolutely necessary 'for he was in a position to contribute greatly to the peace which he hoped was going to be concluded between Russia and Japan'. 5 His attitude now was very different from that a month before: 'I cannot bring about M. Delcasse's fall at the sign of a frown from Germany', he told a member of the German embassy. 'I should always be reproached for it, always. . • _'6 1 Revoil to Millerand, 1 1 May 1905, Millerand MSS. 2 See below, 295. 4 GP, xx ii, no. 6658. 3 Muret, op. cit., 3 19-22. s GP, xx ii, no. 6675; cf. no. 6666. 6 GP, xx ii, no. 6675. This evolution in Rouvier's policy was to be repeated twice more. Strong new German pressure at the beginning of June persuaded him to get rid of Delcasse on the 6th. He then onceagain gradually u

A,T,D.

Theophile Delcasse Rouvier's revelation that Delcasse was 'concentrating all his efforts on the conclusion of peace at St. Petersburg' had a profound effect on German policy. Since the summer of 1904 the German government had believed that a successful French mediation in the Russo-Japanese War would lead to the creation of a Triple Alliance of England, France, and Russia, which might ultimately become a Quadruple Alliance by the inclusion of Japan.1 Both Bulow and Holstein suspected that such an alliance would swiftly become a 'mutual plunder society' whose mem­ bers would seek to divide the Chinese Empire among themselves.2 At the beginning of the Moroccan crisis Germany had not taken seriously Delcasse's chances of mediation between Russia and Japan. 3 After Rouvier's explanation on 8 May of his reasons for deferring Delcasse's dismissal, she began on the contrary to be seriously concerned by this possibility. On the 10th Billow wrote to Sternburg, his ambassador in Washington, that in order to save itself from defeat at the polls the Conservative government in England desperately needed a dramatic success in its foreign policy. It regarded Delcasse as 'the man most likely to win it this success' and was doing all in its power to facilitate his mediation in the Russo-Japanese War in the belief that this would make possible the creation of a new Triple or Quadruple Alliance. 4 Billow believed that it was even more important for Germany to prevent this diplomatic realignment than to defeat Delcasse's policy in Morocco.He wrote again to Sternburg on I 6 May: The [Moroccan question] is infinitesimal in comparison with the [Far Eastern question], especially for Germany whose interests in Morocco are minimal as compared with those which would be at stake at the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan.. .. recovered his nerve and for a time offered strong resistance to German pressure for a conference on Morocco. On 24 June Brugere even found him prepared to contemplate war with Germany - and an alliance with England! 'In short', he wrote in his diary, 'Rouvier views the external situation very calmly and appears to be placing great reliance on England, with whom he has still concluded no military convention although he has been asked to do so.' At the beginning of July Rouvier once more succumbed to German pressure and agreed to a conference. Thereafter his attitude towards Germany hardened yet again, and at the end of the year he gave his sanction to the beginning of the Anglo-French military conversations. 1 E. N. Anderson, op. cit., 160. 2 GP, XIX i, no. 6 148; xx ii, no. 685 1. 3 The Holstein Papers, IV, no. 879. 4 GP, xx ii, no.685 I.

The First Moroccan Crisis

On the Far Eastern question, he who negotiates the peace will for the moment achieve success. Delcasse is striving to achieve this end but, as we have learned through non-diplomatic channels, he is running up against the personal resistance of the Tsar, who is unwilling to agree either to a cession of territory or to a war indemnity. If France and England succeeded in negotiating peace, we could consider the Quad­ ruple Alliance as imminent.1 Bulow was sufficiently concerned by this possibility to seek Roose­ velt's help in preventing mediation by France and England. Roosevelt, however, replied that: 'If France and England succeed in restoring peace, I can certainly not prevent them'.2 Had Bulow known how far Delcasse had progressed, his fear of French mediation would have been even greater. On 22 March 1905, unknown to the German government, Russia had made a formal and very secret request for Delcasse's good offices. A note written by Delcasse on that date summarised a message transmitted to him by Nelidov on behalf of the imperial government: The Emperor would be willing to negotiate if Japan were not to lay down any of the following conditions, which would be considered humiliating by Russia: I. Cession of Russian territory. 2. War indemnity. 3. Limitation of Russia's military or naval forces in the Far East. On the subject of the indemnity, M. Nelidov explained that, while re­ jecting the principle, Russia would not refuse to examine certain prac­ tical points: the Trans-Manchurian railway could, for example, become a subject for reparations. In another connexion, a treaty for a fixed duration would remove any reason for Japan to fear a new war after a brief interval. In the name of the Emperor, Count Lamsdorff appeals to my friend­ ship to make enquiries about Japan's attitude with reference to the above­ mentioned conditions.3 At first the prospects for peace seemed encouraging. Delcasse had close relations with Motono, the Japanese minister, and their friendship was to continue after his fall from power. Motono had for some time been telling Delcasse of his hope for peace, and hinting broadly that his government shared that hope. On 4 January 1905, in an obvious 1

3

2 GP, xix ii, no. 6308. GP, xix ii, no. 6306 Memorandum by Delcasse, 22 March 1905, Delcasse MSS.

Theophile Delcasse reference to Delcasse's attempt to mediate between Russia and Japan in January 1904, he expressed the belief that 'What did not succeed before the war, may succeed in bringing it to an end'. 'If Russia were to show herself willing to talk', he added, 'I am convinced that my government would ask for nothing better.' 1 On 22 March, a few hours after Delcasse had received Russia's request for his good offices, Motono called at the Quai d'Orsay and again expressed his hope for French good offices to end the fighting. Without telling Motono of the Russian request, Delcasse replied that in the interests of peace he was willing to make an approach to Russia if he could first be given an assurance that Japan would make no demand for reparations or territorial concessions: M. Motono appeared moved and thanked me warmly. He acknowledged and repeated to me that for a long time he had thought that, since neither Russia nor Japan were in a position to strike a decisive blow, it was better for both of them not to continue the struggle to the point of exhaustion. . . . After consideration, he will decide whether he ought to ask my authorisation to communicate [my offer] to the appropriate authority. 2 The rest of the Japanese diplomatic corps in Europe seemed to share Motono's desire for peace. The Russian ambassador in London wrote to Lamsdorff on 24 March that Lord Rothschild had told him after a conversation with the Japanese minister that 'he was convinced that Japan was ready to negotiate as soon as desired and would not ask for an indemnity'. 3 Two days later Barrere telegraphed to Delcasse from Rome: 'The Japanese minister told me yesterday how much peace was to be desired, and he unreservedly expressed the hope that you would be the intermediary between the belligerents.' 4 The Russian government, for its part, attached the utmost impor­ tance to Delcasse's attempt to open talks with Japan. Nelidov wrote to Lamsdorff on 23 March. 'It was with profound emotion that I began to talk with M. Delcasse yesterday'. 5 'From the bottom of my heart', Lamsdorff replied, 'I send my warmest wishes for the success of the Memorandum by Delcasse, 4 Jan. [1905] , Delcasse MSS. Memorandum by Delcasse, 22 March 1905, Delcasse MSS. 3 Beckendorff to Lamsdorff, 24 March 1905; cited in MS. letter, Lamsdorff to Nelidov, 30 March 1905. 4 Barrere to Delcasse, telegram, 2 6 March I 9 0 5 ' Delcasse MSS. s MS. letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 23 March 1905. 1

2

The First Moroccan Crisis

proceedings which you have so admirably commenced to arrive at peace negotiations under the desired conditions'.1 At Delcasse's next weekly reception on 29 March, Motono's attitude was reserved Nelidov and probably Delcasse believed that on instructions from Tokyo he was waiting for further overtures to be made to him.2 Delcasse made this overture at his next reception on 5 April. He now told Motono that 'he had the firm conviction that if Japan agreed to exclude from the negotiations certain conditions offensive to Russia, such as the cession of Russian territory and the payment of an indem­ nity, it would be possible for him to bring Japan and Russia into con­ tact with a view to the conclusion of peace'. On the subject of an indemnity Delcasse added that 'there would perhaps be a method of financial arrangement which could give satisfaction to Japan without offending Russia'. Motono telegraphed to his foreign minister, Komura, that the strength of Delcasse's statement left him in no per­ sonal doubt that it was made with the knowledge and consent of the Russian govemment.3 Komura replied on 9 April by instructing Motono to ask Delcasse if he could give formal confirmation of Russia's desire for peace talks.4 Delcasse gave this confirmation on the 10th 'in the most categorical manner', and assured Motono that he was 'positively capable of bring­ ing Russia and Japan into contact' if Japan agreed not to ask for an indemnity or territorial concessions.5 On the 12th, however, Komura told Motono that Japan could not give assurances on her demands in advance of the start of negotiations.6 Given this reply on the following day, Delcasse appeared to Motono 'to react to it somewhat emotion­ ally'.1 On 23 April he again insisted to Motono 'that he wished to neglect nothing which might favour peace and that it would be the crowning achievement of his career if he could usefully contribute to the conclusion of peace between Japan and Russia'.8 Delcasse was surprised and disappointed by Japan's failure to take MS. letter, Lamsdorff to Nelidov, 30 March 1905. MS.letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 1 April 1905. 3 Deciphered telegram, Motono to Komura, 6 April 1905, Delcasse MSS. 4 Deciphered telegram, Komura to Motono, 9 April 1905, Delcasse MSS. s Deciphered telegram, Motono to Komura, 10 April 1905, Delcasse MSS. 6 Deciphered telegram, Komura to Motono, 12 April 1905, Delcasse MSS. 7 Deciphered telegram, Motono to Komura, 13 April 1905, Delcasse MSS. 8 Deciphered telegram, Motono to Komura, 25 April 1905, Delcasse MSS.

1

2

Theophile Delcasse

the opportunity for peace talks. 'This reserved attitude by Japan', wrote Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 'is somewhat different from what it was possible to observe up to the present, but it is easily explained'. The principal reason, he said, was that Japan was in the middle of a series of military operations. 1 Most important of all, though Nelidov did not mention this, the great naval battle, which had been drawing gradually nearer ever since Rozhdestvensky's squadron had left the Baltic in October 1904, was now at last imminent. Nelidov and Lamsdorff continued to express in their correspondence their profound desire for peace. They hoped, as Lamsdorff said in a letter of 25 May, that Del­ casse would be able to make progress with Japan once the great naval battle was over.2 The course of both the Russo-Japanese War and the Moroccan crisis changed dramatically at the end of May. On the 27th Rozhdestvensky's fleet was destroyed at the battle of Tsushima, and on the 28th Morocco adopted the German proposal for an international conference to discuss Moroccan affairs (though news of this latter event did not reach Europe until I June). Both these events determined the German government to increase its pressure on Rouvier for Delcasse's dismissal. There can be little doubt, however, that it was the first of these two events which had the greater immediate influence on Germany policy. After the battle of Tsushima it was widely believed that Russo-Japanese peace talks could not be long delayed and Delcasse believed he could count on English and probably American support 'with a view to putting pressure on Japan to make her more amenable'. 3 By Billow's own admission the German government was even more concerned to prevent a mediation by Delcasse than to thwart his policy in Morocco.4 Germany therefore regarded Delcasse's removal as a matter of urgency and Billow decided to serve Rouvier with an ultimatum demanding his dismissal: an ultimatum which he thought prudent to deliver through intermediaries rather than directly through Radolin. On 30 May Miquel, a secretary at the German embassy who was about to leave Paris, was instructed to warn Rouvier of 'the serious menace which the maintenance of M. Delcasse presents for Franco-German relations'. Rouvier, however, remained unmoved and still insisted that for the moment he could not MS. letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 1 April 1905. MS. letter, Lamsdorff to Nelidov, 25 May 1905. 3 MS.letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 1 June 1905. 4 See above, 292-3. 1

2

The First Moroccan Crisis

297

sacrifice Delcasse, 'for he was in a position to contribute greatly to the peace which he hoped was going to be concluded between Russia and Japan'. 1 Next day, therefore, Radolin delivered a much blunter warning through the intermediary of Rouvier's intimate friend, Jean Dupuy. 'We sincerely wish for peace but we cannot wait any longer to settle our account, if necessary by force of arms'. On I June Radolin repeated, 'We can wait no longer: either an agreement or an open breach.' 2 On 3 June, in an attempt to forestall Delcasse's mediation, the Kaiser appealed to the Tsar to seek Roosevelt's good offices: 'Should it meet with your approval, I could easily place myself - privately - en rapport with him, as we are very intimate with each other'. 3 On the same day Rouvier yielded to German pressure and undertook to bring about Delcasse's resignation at a cabinet meeting on 6 June. 4 Delcasse learned almost immediately, no doubt from a deciphered German telegram, that his fate had been decided. By 6 June his im­ pending removal was common knowledge and was confidently pre­ dicted by the whole of the Paris press. Delcasse's last cabinet meeting at the end of his seven years at the Quai d'Orsay was also the only one of which an account survives. The meeting opened at eleven o'clock with a statement by Delcasse. He dismissed German threats as no more than bluff, and declared that Franee could not afford to refuse the alliance offered her by England. Rouvier in his reply did not doubt England's readiness to sign an alliance. On the contrary, he declared : It is easy to understand that England, whose island runs no risk of invasion, should wish to throw us into the attack with her. Our com­ bined fleets would get the better of the German fleet, and the German trading posts would undoubtedly be destroyed, but in the meantime French territory would be invaded and the land battle against Germany would be very much to our disadvantage, if not disastrous. The crux of the argument between Delcasse and Rouvier was the credibility of a German invasion. Rouvier insisted that he had it on the authority of a personal emissary from Bulow that alliance with England would be followed by war with Germany, and that this threat was in deadly earnest. Chaumie, the minister of justice, left the following account of the conclusion of the cabinet meeting: The atmosphere is one of poignant emotion. Each of the ministers is 1

3

GP, xx ii, nos. 6674, 6675. GP, xix ii, no. 6193.

DDF2, vm, appendix, pp. 5 5 8, 5 64. 4 Muret, op. cit., 346.

2

Theophile Delcasse questioned in turn. We all fall in with the opinion of Rouvier. Delcasse then declares that he submits his resignation. Rouvier declares that he accepts it, but adds that the difference of opinion which shows itself today cannot cause the greatest services rendered by Delcasse since he has been at the foreign ministry to be forgotten, and he assures him on that account of our gratitude and continuing friendship. Then, turning towards the other ministers, he calls upon the minister of war to put in order as soon as possible our frontier, our armaments and our forces, assuring him that no necessary expense will be refused him. Then, speaking to us all, he calls upon us to assist him in the vital task of com­ bating anti-patriotic ideas and indiscipline, and of raising the moral standard of the country. Rouvier asks the President of the Republic to entrust him provisionally with the foreign ministry. The meeting ended at a quarter to one. I have rarely, if ever, felt a heavier weight of respon­ sibility in the decision to be taken.It was a truly tragic moment.1 Lamsdorff looked on Delcasse's resignation as a disaster for his country: 'I cannot adequately express my sorrow at the loss of Del­ casse, an unfailing friend of Russia for so many years. May he soon return to office and take into his safe hands the great task of peace­ making'.2 Only after Delcasse's fall from power did Russia accept Roosevelt's pressing offer of help in arranging talks with Japan, and even then tried at first to insist that the talks take place in Paris.J On 15 June Nelidov wrote to Lamsdorff: 'More than ever we have cause to regret his [Delcasse's] absence now that we are on the eve of beginning talks with Japan. He would have been of enormous assis­ tance to us.'4 Delcasse had no doubt that fear of his mediation in the Russo-Japanese war had been the principal reason for the German pressure which had led to his fall from power. He told Combarieu in December 190;: Germany foresaw that the foreign minister of Franee, whose authority was growing, would be the peacemaker between Russia and Japan (for it was only after his disgrace that this role was offered to Roosevelt). She foresaw that after this new service he would be raised to the presi­ dency - which would complete the bitterness of William II. Germany wished to prevent this fearful possibility.s DDF2, v1, appendix 1. 2 MS.letter, Lamsdorff to Nelidov, 8 June 1905. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 1925), 198--9. 4 MS.letter, Nelidov to Lamsdorff, 15 June 1905. s Combarieu, op.cit., 325. 1

3

The First Mo ro ccan Crisis

299

So great was Germany's fear of French mediation that this fear was still alive in mid-July, over a month after all chance of it had vanished with Delcasse's resignation. On 1 2 July Bulow delivered a memorandum to the American ambassador warning him that 'if the disinterested media­ tion of the President failed, we have every reason to expect that Delcasse's plan of indemnifying Belligerent and Mediator at the ex­ pense of China may be tried on again'.1 Delcasse was probably right in believing that his position at the Quai d'Orsay, after a successful mediation between Russia and Japan, would have been unshakeable, and that the history of the first Moroccan crisis would have been quite different. Hitherto his fall from power has been considered solely in the context of the quarrel with Germany over Morocco. In fact it also had a great deal - and probably even more - to do with the Russo-Japanese war. The first Moroccan crisis illustrated in a remarkable way the nature of Delcasse's relations with his colleagues: the remarkable loyalty he inspired within the French foreign service and the equally remarkable lack of loyalty he inspired within the French cabinet. Although Delcasse's principal advisers had opposed his original refusal to seek talks with Germany, their loyalty to him during the Moroccan crisis was unflinching. Barrere told Bertie on 1 8 May that Delcasse 'had the loyal support in the present question of all the Diplomatic Service and he was really the best possible Foreign Minister'. 2 For this reason Rouvier's attempts to find a successor to Delcasse from within the French foreign service were unsuccessful. 3 Delcasse's relations with his cabinet colleagues, however, had become very bad and had contributed to his fall from power. He had always tended to stay aloof from his fellow ministers, partly from natural secretiveness, partly from a legitimate desire not to compromise delicate negotiations by revealing them to men whose own ability to keep a secret was more than suspect. In the first three administrations in which he served as foreign minister - the Brisson, Dupuy, and Waldeck-Rousseau governments - he had been protected by the personal friendship and steadfast support of the President and succes­ sive prime ministers. During the Combes administration from June 1902 to January 1905, however, Delcasse's position had deteriorated. 1 Dennett, op. cit., 233-4. 2 Bertie to Lansdowne, 18 May 1905, Bertie MSS., VI. 3 Diary entry by Brugere for I I June 1905, Brugere MSS.

300

Theopltile Delcasse

He had quarrelled with the prime minister over his fanatical anti­ clericalism, and by the time Combes resigned the two men were barely on speaking terms. Before he became foreign minister Delcasse had had a considerable admiration for Rouvier, describing him as 'a financier of high value and a politician of broad vision'. 1 During the life of the Combes cabinet, in which Rouvier had been finance minister, however, Delcasse had had a series of quarrels with him on financial matters. He had vetoed French participation in the Baghdad railway, of which Rouvier had been a firm supporter, and had ignored Rouvier's advice in his early dealings with the Paris banks over loans to Morocco. By the time Rouvier became prime minister in January 1905 his relations with Delcasse were very strained. Delcasse privately dismissed him as a man who would 'sell his country for the sake of a speculation on the stock exchange' and already felt a premonition that 'he will stab me in the back'. 2 At the vital cabinet meeting on 6 June, Delcasse was supported by not one of his colleagues, and President Loubet, whose admiration for him remained as constant as ever, felt unable to intervene alone. Bertie wrote to Lansdowne on I 5 June: Delcasse would have fallen even if Germany had not been menacing; but he might not have fallen so soon. His elimination from the Cabinet was in great part due to his treatment of his Colleagues. He did not keep them fully informed of what he did and proposed to do. He had got to consider himself as indispensable. . . • There were constant ructions. Several of his chers collegues were jealous of him and disliked him and it ended by his being set aside. The German Government took advantage of the feeling that a scapegoat should be found. They spent money and spread about that Delcasse's mismanagement was the sole cause of the misunderstanding, and they so assisted in bringing about his fall. It has the appearance of being a sacrifice to German honour, but it is not entirely so. 3

Delcasse's last act as foreign minister was to hand Rouvier a dossier of deciphered German telegrams describing his secret approaches to Germany and his offers to dismiss Delcasse. 4 This was the only revenge Delcasse to his wife, July 1 896, Delcasse MSS. Hornberg, op. cit., 42. Paleologue, Un grand toumant, 3 1 3. 3 Bertie to Lansdowne, 15 June 1 905, Lansdowne MSS., XI. 4 L'Action Fran;aise, 20 March 1922, reproducing an article by Jean Bernard originally published in the Belair and based on interviews with Delcasse. I

2

The First Moro ccan Crisis

30 1

which he allowed himself. He later told the head of his cabinet n o ir that he had many times been tempted to reveal this dossier, 'but had always drawn back because of the disastrous consequences for Franee which could have followed from this action'. 1 Few secrets can have been harder to keep. Even on 6 June the cabinet would surely have drawn back had Delcasse shown them the German telegrams and threatened to publish them if he were forced to resign. The temptation to do so was all the greater at a moment when Delcasse believed himself about to act as peacemaker between Russia and Japan: a triumph which could have made him the next President of the Republic. In the years following his resignation, when his policy during the first Moroccan crisis was widely condemned by his countrymen, Delcasse would have found it easy to restore his reputation by publishing the evidence of Rouvier's treachery. He refused because to do so would have revealed to Germany that her ciphers had been broken. Few other French statesmen of his time would have had the strength of patriotism to take the same decision. A curiously similar situation was to arise during the other great confrontation between France and Germany before 19 14, the Agadir crisis of 19 1 1. Once again the French prime minister, this time Caillaux, made secret contact with the German embassy behind his foreign minister's back, though on this occasion only to offer Germany better terms to end the crisis. Once again the foreign minister, this time de Selves, learned of the prime minister's action through deciphered German telegrams. This time, however, the deno uement was different. In 19 u the Quai d'Orsay was a good deal less discreet than in 190 5 and used the deciphered telegrams as the basis of a whispering campaign accusing Caillaux of treacherous dealings with Germany. As a result the Germany embassy became suspicious and at least one German cipher was changed. Delcasse had stood to gain far more from the information given him by his cabinet noir in 1905 than de Selves could hope to do in 19 u . The fact that he did not use this information was perhaps the greatest test which he ever faced of his ability to sacrifice his own interests to the interests of France herself. Nothing in his term of office became him like the manner of his leaving it. 1

Hornberg, op. cit., 43.

Conclusion

O

N 6 June 1905, the day of Delcasse's resignation, Bulow was made a prince. Germany appeared to have gained her greatest victory since the Franco-Prussian War. Rouvier, for his part, had assumed that Germany would acknowledge the sacrifice of Delcasse by ceasing to insist on an international conference and agreeing to direct talks on Morocco. To his surprise he found Germany's position un­ changed. Having insisted on a conference, Bulow and Holstein felt unable to back down, and on 8 July Rouvier reluctantly agreed to their demand. 1 England was deeply disturbed by the new direction of French diplomacy. France appeared to Lansdowne to have 'thrown Delcasse overboard in a fit of panic'. 'Of course the result is', he told Bertie on 1 2 June, 'that the "entente" is quoted at a much lower price than it was a fortnight ago.'2 In Balfour's view France had, for the moment, ceased to count as a force in world affairs: 'If, therefore, Germany is really desirous of obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French assistance that we must look for our security.'J For a time in the summer of 1905 Bulow and Holstein seemed to be achieving their ambition of destroying the Entente and drawing Franee into dependence on Germany. In the long term, however, their policy achieved almost the opposite result. It strengthened French opinion against cooperation with Germany, and it solidified, instead of de­ stroying, the Entente Cordiale. At the time of Delcasse's resignation Rouvier was anxious to cooperate with Germany. He was ready to arrange French financial participation in the Baghdad railway and willing to offer compensation in the Congo for French supremacy in Morocco. Had Germany been willing to make concessions after her initial 1 Taylor, Tlie Strugglefor Mastery, 43 1-2. 2 Lansdowne to Bertie, 12 June 1 905 , Lansdowne MSS., XI. 3 Lee, op. cit., u, 344.

3o3 triumph in securing Delcasse's dismissal, she might well have convinced Rouvier and many other French politicians that cooperation with Germany had more to offer France than cooperation with England. Instead, Billow's inflexible diplomacy led even Rouvier to wonder whether Delcasse's almost total distrust of German policy had not been justified. In November 1905 Rouvier told Georges Louis, his directeur politique, 'If Berlin thinks it can intimidate me, it has made a mistake. Henceforth I shall make no further concessions, whatever the conse­ quences'. 1 A month later Jaures turned to Delcasse in the Chamber and said with exaggerated courtesy, 'I offer you my humblest apologies, M. Delcasse, your successor is even more imprudent than you were'. 2 As a direct result of the German challenge to the Entente Cordiale during the first Moroccan crisis both the French and British govern­ ments began to look on the Entente as vital to their own security. This change was apparent as soon as the international conference on Morocco met at Algeciras in January 1906. Throughout the conference France depended on English diplomatic support. Grey, the new English foreign secretary, dared not refuse that support for fear of damaging the Entente. Even when he thought the French unreasonable and believed that they should make concessions to Germany, he still maintained that 'We can't press our advice on them to the point of breaking up the Entente'. 3 The Algeciras conference represented a major defeat for German policy. Bulow had believed that France would find herself almost isolated at Algeciras and that neither England nor Russia would offer her serious support. In the event it was Germany herself who was almost isolated, supported only by Austria-Hungary and Morocco. Grey wrote during the Algeciras conference: 'An entente between Russia, Franee, and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be done'. 4 In April 1906 he began the negotiations which led eventually to the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement of August 1907. His motive in so doing was primarily fear and suspicion of Germany. He shared the view of one of his advisers that 'if Great Britain and Russia do not very soon come to an agreement with regard to their respective interests in Persia they may find themselves confronted there with Germany very much as Conclusion

1

3

Paleologue, Un grand tournant, 4 1 0. Monger, op. cit., 278.

z Jbid., 413• m, no. 299.

4 ED,

Theophile Delcasse

France did in Morocco'. 1 Grey genuinely desired to reduce the tension between England and Germany. Nonetheless, from the first Moroccan crisis until the First World War, both he and his Foreign Office advisers remained constantly afraid of taking any initiative to improve relations with Germany which might endanger the understandings with Franee and Russia on which they believed that British security de­ pended. 'If we sacrifice the other powers to Germany', Grey believed, 'we shall eventually be attacked.'2 The creation of the Triple Entente and the gradual hardening of French opinion towards Germany worked in the long run in Delcasse's favour. In June 1905 of all the Paris press only the Debats and the Matin had ventured a word in his support. Almost all shades of French opinion had believed that he had needlessly and recklessly risked war with Germany. In January 1908, however, when a speech by Jaures stung Delcasse into making the first parliamentary defence of his Moroccan policy since his resignation, he was given a thunderous ovation. Jaures was j ustified in turning on the centre of the Chamber and demanding, 'What was your reason for abandoning him [in 1905] ifyou applaud him now ?'3 The reason was that, except for the socialists, most Frenchmen were coming to the conclusion that the first Moroccan crisis had been a querelle d'allemand needlessly provoked by Germany, and that Delcasse had been right to resist the aggressive designs of German policy. The increasing tension with Germany during the next eight years served to j ustify him still further in the eyes of French public opinion. After the German declaration of war in August 19 14 Delcasse believed that his policies had received their final vindication; he wrote to his wife on 5 August: Everything is going according to plan. The system of alliances and friendships which I had instituted or made secure is coming into play. After Russia, England draws the sword against Germany; and Ger­ many's ally Italy, as I announced to the Chamber exactly twelve years ago, officially announces her desire to remain neutral. . . . In the corri­ dors of the Chamber [ after the declaration of war] I was surrounded five or six times by groups of deputies impelled by a feeling of gratitude for the architect ofthe valuable ententes which protect us now. When I left

1 3

2 Monger, op. cit., ch. 1 2. BD, 1v, no. 328. JO (Chamhre), 24 Jan. 1908.

Conclusion

the Chamber I was cheered by a crowd of two hundred people massed in front of the railings of the Palais Bourbon. I cannot take a step without hearing shouts of 'Vive Delcasse!' and having hats raised to me.1 Delcasse's appointment as foreign minister in Viviani's government of National Defence formed on 25 August 19 14 was both a logical and a popular choice. When he became foreign minister for the fir!lt time in June 1898 Delcasse had already foreseen the shape of the two armed camps which were to confront each other in 19 14. There were very few statesmen who shared his prescience. The main sources of tension in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century had little to do with either Germany or Austria-Hungary. They were to be found instead within the frame­ work of the future Triple Entente, in the mutual hostility of England and Russia and of England and France. One of the great errors of German policy during the early years of the twentieth century was to regard this hostility as a permanent factor in international relations for the foreseeable future. It was, nonetheless, an understandable mistake. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were few less predict­ able European alignments than a Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia. Delcasse's share in bringing about this improbable entente was probably greater than that of any other European statesman. His success was due above all, perhaps, to the style of his diplomacy and to his ability to inspire confidence both in French diplomats and friendly governments. It is a remarkable tribute to his diplomatic skill that both England and Russia came to feel a greater confidence in him than in any other French statesman in the generation before the Great War. This confidence was an important, perhaps a vital, factor in both the major achievements of his seven years as foreign minister - the survival of the Dual Alliance and the creation of the Entente Cordiale. In the spring of 1905 both Russia and England (in the person of Edward VII) took the unprecedented step of appealing to Delcasse not to resign. Equally remarkable was the confidence felt in Delcasse by the French foreign service, despite his habitual reluctance to confide in or to delegate to his advisers. There was prrJbably no French diplomat of importance who did not disagree with some important aspect of Delcasse's policy, I

Delcasse to his wife, 5 Aug. 1914, Delcasse MSS.

306

Theophile Delcasse

and almost all opposed his refusal to negotiate with Germany on Morocco. Yet to an astonishing degree they continued to feel confidence in the man even when they disagreed with his policies. Part of Delcasse's ability to inspire confidence, especially in his own advisers, lay in his immense professional expertise reinforced by a remarkable memory and a considerable capacity for hard work. He showed a complete mastery of subjects as varied and as technical as loans to foreign governments and African border disputes. The reputation of the French foreign service as a whole during Delcasse's last few years in office was as high as at any time in the history of republican France. The Times declared on 8 January 1 903 : 'At no time during the Third Republic has France been so efficiently represented abroad as at present. The caution and sagacity which characterise her recent foreign policy are due in no small measure to that circumstance.' The high reputation of the French foreign service as well as its obvious loyalty to Delcasse contributed to the considerable reputation which he himself enjoyed in every capital in Europe. So too did Delcasse's detachment from domestic politics. Many foreign diplomats who felt confidence in Delcasse also felt a deep distrust for the political system of which he was a part. Delcasse's obvious aloofness from party politics and his apparent immunity to successive cabinet crises and changes of government were powerful factors in creating foreign confidence in his administration. While Delcasse was foreign minister, as Lansdowne remarked later, 'one was apt to forget . . . the instability of French governments'. In its turn the respect in which Delcasse was held by foreign governments strengthened the confidence placed in him by French diplomats. That confidence rested most basically perhaps on a com­ munity of purpose which transcended individual differences of policy: on a determination to restore France beyond dispute to the first rank of European powers by strengthening her position within the states system and by adding Morocco to her Mediterranean Empire. Many who disagreed with some of Delcasse's policies felt a profound admiration for the depth of patriotism and personal integrity with which he pursued these aims. Charles Benoist, for example, believed that Delcasse had been reckless in seeking to dispense first with English and then with German consent to French expansion in Morocco. Yet his final judgment on Delcasse was a favourable one: 'For his patriot­ ism alone, for thatforcefran;aise that was within him, may all his faults

Conclusion

307 be forgiven him'. The manner of Delcasse's resignation in 1905 provided the final proof of his ability to sacrifice his own career to what he believed to be the national interest. It was proof also of his complete personal integrity, a quality which won him the respect even of many of his political opponents. Joseph Caillaux, who became an increasingly uncompromising opponent of Delcasse's foreign policy, wrote of him in his Memoires: 'I wish to pay him one tribute which he abundantly deserves. He was, in the highest degree, a man of honour, whose conduct towards both his friends and opponents was beyond reproach.'2 If Delcasse's greatest diplomatic strength was his ability to win the confidence both of French diplomats and friendly governments, his greatest weakness was an obsession with grand designs which at times robbed his diplomacy of realism and flexibility. Delcasse was tempera­ mentally incapable of sharing Lansdowne's detached approach to foreign policy. He felt an emotional need to be continually involved in some great enterprise which would raise France's standing :in inter­ national affairs. From the moment he became foreign minister he was determined to leave behind him some memorable contribution to his country's greatness. Though the determination with which he set out to achieve his objectives was in itself one of the strengths of his diplomacy, that same determination sometimes made him reluctant to abandon schemes which had become impracticable. He was among the last French diplomats to give up hope of ending the English occupation of Egypt, among the last to recognise the danger of a Franco-Spanish partition of Morocco concluded without England's consent, and pro­ bably the last of all to accept the need for negotiations with Germany on Morocco. During his second term as foreign minister at the begin­ ning of the Great War Delcasse was to show the same reluctance to abandon schemes on which he had set his heart. His determination to bring Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Allies made him deaf to repeated warnings that Bulgaria's sympathies were with the Central Powers. When Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 19 15 he was discredited and fell from power. Like many colonialists, Delcasse also tended to suppose that foreign statesmen were inspired by dreams of empire as ambitious as his own. He was too ready to suspect that American plans to send a 1 Charles Benoist, Souvenirs, III (Paris, 1934), 1 16. 2 Caillaux, Memoires, 1 5 3. 1

X

A.T.D,

Theophile Delcasse

308

fleet into European waters during the war with Spain were part of a long-term strategy to gain a foothold in Morocco. He was too ready also to believe that the activities of individual Englishmen in Morocco were part of some coordinated plan by the English government. Most dangerous of all was his willingness to believe that the erratic course of German diplomacy concealed the sinister designs of a carefully pre­ pared Weltpolitik. Delcasse's view of German policy towards France coincided with Sir Eyre Crowe's description of German policy to­ wards England in his famous memorandum of January 1907 as based on 'an entirely one-sided aggressiveness' and 'a disregard of the elementary rules of straightforward and honourable dealing'. However, Crowe's interpretation of this policy was much more flexible than Delcasse's. Crowe admitted that German 'aggressiveness' might be part of a planned Weltpolitik aiming at 'the establishment of German hegemony, at first in Europe and then in the world'. He thought it more probable, however, that 'the great German design is in reality no more than the expression of a vague, confused, and unpractical statesmanship, not fully realising its own drift . . . , that in fact Germany does not know what she is driving at, and that all her excur­ sions and alarums, all her underhand intrigues do not contribute to the steady working out of a well conceived and relentlessly followed system of policy, because they do not really form part of any such system'. 1 Delcasse seems barely to have considered this latter possibility. He persisted in looking on each new turn of German policy as part of a long term strategy, and ended by crediting the German government with grand designs which it did not possess. 1

BD, 111, appendix A.

Bibliography A. MAN U S C R I P T C O LLE C T I O N S I. P R I V A T E P A P E R S B A L F O U R MSS., British Museum. B E R T I E MSS., Public Record Office. BR u G E R E MSS., in the possession of Mme. Raymond Brugere. A u s T E N C H A M B E R L A I N MSS., Birmingham University Library. J O S E P H C HA M B E R L A I N MSS., Birmingham University Library. D E L C A S S E MSS., Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. E T I E N N E MSS., Bibliotheque Nationale (n.a. fr. 24327). FAURE MSS., in the possession ofM. Fran�ois Berge. H A N o T A u x MSS., Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. HARD I N G E MSS., Cambridge University Library. LAN S D O W N E MSS., Public Record Office. M I LLERAND MSS., in the possession ofM. Jacques Millerand. N o RD H E r M MSS., in the possession of M. Rupert Nordheim. SAL I S BURY MSS., Christ Church, Oxford. S A N D E R S O N MSS., Public Record Office. T E R R I E R MSS., Bibliotheque de l'Institut. w A L D E C K- R O U S S E AU MSS., Bibliotheque de l'Institut. The Delcasse MSS. now contain copies of a number of letters from Delcasse to Barrere, Stephen Pichon, and Waldeck-Rousseau found by the author in other manuscript collections. 2. O F F I C I A L P A P E R S Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres: Volumes in the 'Nouvelle Serie Reliee' for years 1898 to 1905. Archives du Ministere de la Guerre: Attache reports and proces-verbaux of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre for the years 1898 to 1905. Archives de la Marine: Attache reports and dossiers on the Conseil Superieur de la Marine and

310

Bibliography

Franco-Russian naval relations for the years 1 898 to 1905. Archives Nationales: Section d'Outre-Mer: The dossiers in these archives relating to the origins of the Fashoda expedition have already been exhaustively studied by previous authors. The material on the other two main issues during Delcasse's terms as under-secretary and minister of colonies - Siam and West African expan­ sion - is, for the purposes of this study, of less value than documents in the Delcasse and Terrier MSS. Other manuscript material referred to in footnotes is unfortunately not yet generally available. B. P RI N T E D S O U R C E S The following list does not claim to be comprehensive. It is intended to serve as a guide to those works mentioned in footnotes and to others which are particularly relevant to a study ofDelcasse's foreign policy. O F F I C I AL P U B L I C AT I O N S Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire for the years I 898 to 1905. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1 898- 19 1 4. Ed. G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. London, 1926-38. Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette, 1 8:7 1 - 19 1 4. Ed. J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and F. Thimme. Berlin, 1 922-7. Documents diplomatiquesfran1ais, z 8:J 1 - 19 z 4. Paris, 1929-62. I docum enti diplomatici italiani. 3rd series. Rome, 195 2-. I.

Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran1aise. Krasnyi Arkhiv.

2. M E M O I R S A N D C O RR E S P O N D E N C E ANDRE, General L. Cinq ans de ministere. Paris, 1907. BARATIER, A.-E.-A. Souvenirs de la mission Marchand. 3 vols. Paris, 1914-41. BARCLAY, Sir T. Thirty Years : Anglo-French Reminiscences. London, 1914. BARRERE, C. 'Le prelude de !'offensive allemande de 1905'. Revue des Deux Mandes, 1 February 1932, 634-41 . -- 'La chute de Delcasse'. Revue de s Deux Mandes, 1 Aug. 1932, 602-18; 1 Jan. 1933, 123-33. -- 'Lettres a Delcasse'. Revue de Paris, 1 5 April 1937, 721-63. BARYIATINSKAYA, Princess A. My Russian Life. London, 1923. BENOIST, C. Souvenirs. Vol. III. Paris, 1934. BoMPARD, M. Mon ambassade en Russie 19 0,3-8. Paris, 1937. BRAIBANT, C. (ed.). Felix Faure a l'Blysee: Souvenirs de Louis Le Gall. Paris, 1963.

Bihliography

311

BUCHANAN, M. Amlxzssador's Daughter. London, 1958. BucxLE, G. E. (ed.). The Letters ofQueen Victoria. 3rd ser., vol. III. London, 1 932. BiiLow, Furst B. von. Denlc.wiirdigkeiten. 4 vols. Berlin, 1 930-1. CA1LLAux, J. Mes memoires. J vols. Paris, 1942-7. -- Agadir: ma politique exterieure. Paris, 1 919. CAMBON, P. Correspondance 1 870-1924. Ed. H. Cambon. J vols. Paris, 1 94o-6. -- 'Lettres de Paul Cambon a Felix Faure'. Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, LXVIII (1954), 1 85r201. CARTON DE WIART, Comte E. Leopold II: souvenirs des dernieres annees, 190 1-9. Brussels, 1944. CHAMBRUN, Comte C. de. Traditions et souvenirs. Paris, 1952. CHARLES-Roux, F. Souvenirs diplomatiques d'un dge revolu. Paris, 1956. CLARETIE, J. '28 ans a la Comedie-Franc;aise.' Serialised in seventeen instalments in Revue des Deux Mondes between I Dec. 1948 and I April 195 1. CoMBARIEu, A. Sept ans a l'Elysee avec le President Emile Louhet: de l'ajfaire Dreyfus a la conference d'Algesiras, 1 899- 1906. Paris, l 932. COMBES, E.Mon ministere, 19 02-5. Paris, 1956. CoMITE DES AMIS DE DELCASSE•.A la memoire de Delcasse. Paris, 193 5 . DELCASSE, T.Alerte I Ou a/Ions-nous ? Paris, 1 882. EcKARDSTEIN, Baron von. Ten Years at the Court of St. James, 1 895- 1905. Translated and edited by G. Young.London, 1921. ETIENNE, E. Son ceuvre coloniale, algerienne, et politique. Discours et ecrits divers, 1 881-1906. 2 vols. Paris, 1907. FAURE, F. ' Fachoda (1898)'. Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, LXIX (19s ;), 2Sr39• FERRY, A. Les carnets secrets, 19 z 4- z 8. Paris, 1957. GERARD, A. Memoires d'Auguste Gerard. Paris, 1928. GRAMONT, E.de. Memoires. Les maronniers enfleurs. Paris, 1929. GREY OF FALLODON, Viscount. Twenty-Five Years, 1 892- 19 1 6. 2 vols. London, 1925. HALDANE, Viscount. Rickard Burdon Haldane: an Autobiography. London, 1929. HAMMANN, O. Deutsche Weltpolitik, 1 890- 19 1 2. Berlin, 1925. HANOTAUX, G. 'Carnets.' Ed. G.-L.Jaray. Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 April 1949, 3 8 5 -403; 1 5 April 1949, 573-88. HANSEN, J. Les coulisses de la diplomatie : 15 ans a l'ltranger, 1 86,4-1 879. Paris, 1880. -- L' ambassade a Paris Ju Baron de Mokrenkeim, 1 884-98. Paris, 1906. HARDINGE OF PENSHURST, Baron. Old Diplomacy. London, 1947. HARRIS, W. B. Morocco That Was. London, 1921. HoMBERG, 0. Les coulisses de l'kistoire : souvenirs 1 898-1928. Paris, 1938. X2

A.T.D.

3 12

Bibliography

LAROCHE, J. Quinz.e ans a Rome avec Camille Barrere. Paris, 1 943. LE GALL, L. 'Opinions de Paul Cambon sur le role, en politique etrangere de quelques ministres, et des divers Presidents de la Republique'. Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, LXVIII ( 195 4), 202-7. LEGRAND-GIRARDE, General. Un quart de siecle au service de la France. Paris, 1954. Louis, G.Les carnets de Georges Louis. 2 vols., Paris, 1926. MARCHAND, R. (ed.). Un livre noir : diplomatie d'avant-guerre d'apres !es documents des archives russes ( 19 1 0- 19 1 7). Paris, 1 922. MARDER, A. J. (ed.). Fear God and Dread Nough t : the Correspondence of Admiral ofthe Fleet Lord Fisher ofKilverstone. Vol.2.London, 1956. MEYENDORFF, Baron A.-F. Correspondance diplomatique de M. de Staal 1 88,r 190 0. Vol. 2. Paris, 1 929. MIDLETON, Earl of. Records and Reactions, 1 856- 1939. London, 1 939. MoNTEIL, P.-L. Souvenirs vecus : quelques feuillets de l'histoire coloniale. Paris, 1 924. NoGull:s, Mme. Unpublished memoir on Delcasse. Copy in Delcasse MSS. PALEOLOGUE, M. Un grand tournant de la politique mondiale, 190,rG. Paris, 1 934· -- Journal de l'a.ffaire Dreyfus, z 89,r 1 899. Paris, 19 5 5. -- 'Un prelude a !'invasion de Belgique'. Revue des Deux Mandes, 1 Oct. 1932, 481-524. -- and BRUGERE, R. 'Le plan Schlieffen et le Vengeur'. Revue des Deux Mandes, 1 5 Nov. 1932, 425-30. PATENOTRE, J. Souvenirs d'un diplomate : voyages d'autrefois. 2 vols.Paris, n.d. PAUL-BONCOUR, P. Entre deux guerres : souvenirs sur la Ille. Rlpuhlique. 3 vols. Paris, 1945-6. RAoz1w1LL, Princess C. Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe. London, 1 9 1 5 . RAFFALOVICH, A.G.L 'abominable venalite de la presse. Paris, 1921. REINACH, J. (ed.). Discours etplaidoyers de M. Gamhetta. I I vols. Paris, 1885 RICH, N., and FISHER, M. H. (eds.). The Holstein Papers. 4 vols. Cambridge, 1 9 5 5-63 . RIMLER, J. De la necessite de l'alliance franco-russo-austro-hongroise. Paris, 1 901. ROBERTSON, Field-Marshal Sir W. From Private t o Field-Marshal. London, 1921. -- Soldiers and Statesmen. 2 vols. London, 1926. Rooo, Sir. J. R. Social and Diplomatic Memories. vol. 2. Londo:R, 1923. SAINT-AULAIRE, Comte de. Confession d'un vieux diplomate. Paris, 1953. SAINT-RENE TAILLANDIER, G.Les origines du Marocfran;ais. Paris, 1930. SAINT-RENE TAILLANDIER, Mme. G. Le monde disparu : souvenirs. Paris, 1947. ScHEBEKO, N.Souvenirs. Paris, 1936.

Bibliography

3 13

STEED, H. W. Through Thirty Years, 1 892- 1922. London, 1 924. STEINHEIL, M. My Memoirs. London, 1 9 12. STINGLHAMBER, G., and DRESSE, P. Leopold II au travail. Brussels, 1 94 5. STONE, M. E. Fifty Years a Journalist. London, 1922. VANSITTART, Baron The Mist Procession. London, 1 950. WITTE, Count S. Memoirs. Translated and edited by A. Yarmolinsky. London, 1 92 1 .

3• S E C O N D A R Y W O R K S ALBERTINI, L . Th e Origins of the War of 19 1 4. Vol. I . Translated by I. M. Massey. London, 1 9 5 2. AMERY, ]. The Life ofJoseph Chamberlain. Vol. 4. London, 1 9 5 1 . ANDERSON, E . N . The First Moroccan Crisis 19 0,rG. Chicago, 1 930. ANDERSON, M. S. The Eastern Question. London, 1 966. ANDREW, C. M. 'German World Policy and the Reshaping of the Dual Alliance'. Journal of Contemporary History, I (1 966), no. 3, 137-5 1 . -- 'France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale'. Historical Journal, x ( 1 967), 89-105. AssoCIATION FRAN