Egypt and the Formation of the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512817874

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EGYPT AND T H E FORMATION OF T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E OF 1904

It is itnfossible to exaggerate the importance of the Entente Cordiale as a factor in "world, -politics, and every scrap of information in regard to its origin and development is worth having. G. P . Gooch, R E C E N T R E V E L A T I O N S IN E U R O P E A N D I P L O M A C Y , London, 1930

EGYPT AND T H E FORMATION OF T H E ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE OF 1904

A DISSERTATION IN HISTORY P R E S E N T E D TO THE FACULTY OF THK GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE R E Q U I R E M E N T S FOR T H E D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

JOSEPH JAMES MATHEWS

PHILADELPHIA 1939

Copyright 1939 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS Manufactured

in the United States of America

To Father and Mother

P R E F A C E

of the Egyptian question, in its relationship to the formation of the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, has frequently been suggested by writers in the field of pre-War diplomacy. But with the exception of one German student,1 who did not use some of the essential materials in English and did not have access to the Documents Diflomatiques Français, no systematic attempt has been made to trace the Egyptian question through the process of the formation of the Entente. The lack of such a study, together with the belief that the rôle played by the Egyptian question in the development of the Entente has not received sufficient emphasis, constitutes the chief justification for the present volume. T H E SIGNIFICANCE

T h e attempt has also been made in this study to examine the additional factors which influenced the formation of the AngloFrench Entente of 1904, though there has been no pretense of examining all of them in detail. The writer's idea has been to use the Egyptian question as the central thread of the account but at the same time to achieve a balanced perspective by showing its relationship to the various factors involved. Occasionally the necessity has been felt for including events with which the Egyptian question was not directly connected. In the entente negotiations of 1902, for example, the question of Egypt was hardly discussed, but the negotiations of 1902 form a necessary prelude to later developments. Moreover, the interpretation at which the writer has arrived regarding the 1902 negotiations differs from the standard treatments and, he hopefully believes, sheds some light on the whole approach to the Entente. Even in a work so small as this the writer finds that he has become indebted for much assistance. H e is indebted most to Professor William E . Lingelbach of the University of Penn1

Erhard Richter, Lord Cromer, Âgyften und die Entstehung sich-englischen Entente von 1904 (Leipzig, 1 9 3 1 ) . VU

der

franzo-

PREFACE

vin

sylvania. It was in Professor Lingelbach's seminar that the work was begun, and since then the author has constantly had the advantage of his helpful advice and of his encouragement. D r . Dan H . T h o m a s of T e m p l e University read the manuscript and offered numerous beneficial suggestions. An early draft of the work was read by Professor E . M . Carroll of D u k e University, and the writer is grateful for his criticisms. D r . Dudley R . Hutcherson of the Department of English of the University of Mississippi rendered invaluable aid through his suggestions for the improvement of the style of the manuscript. An lastly, thanks are due to the staffs of the University of Pennsylvania Library, Widener Library, and the Library of Congress. J J M Oxford,

Mississippi

August 10,

1938

C O N T E N T S

Chapter

Page

PREFACE I.

II.

vii

THE

D I F F I C U L T P O S I T I O N OF G R E A T

BRITAIN

IN E G Y P T

I

Egypt a Focal Point for European Concern British Interests in Egypt T h e International Fetters on British Control

I 2 7

T H E G E N E S I S OF T H E E N T E N T E

16

Status of the Egyptian Question Following Fashoda T h e Increasing French Interest in Morocco T h e Anglo-French Negotiations of 1 9 0 2 III.

T H E G R O W T H OF A N G L O - F R E N C H A M I T Y

T h e Development of the Rapprochement during the First Half of 1 9 0 3 T h e International Situation Sir Thomas Barkley and the Popular Movement Influence of the Statesmen: Delcasse, Cambon, Loubet, fitienne, Lansdowne, Chamberlain, and King Edward V I I " L e t the Negotiations B e g i n " IV.

THE

16 20 23 43

43 45 46

51 54

D E V E L O P M E N T OF O P I N I O N A N D P O L I C Y

ON T H E

EGYPTIAN

AND M O R O C C A N

QUES-

TIONS

56

Continued Rumors of a Moroccan-Egyptian Barter T h e Quarrel between Delcasse and the French Colonials, and its Results A Bargain between Delcasse and the Colonials? T h e Program of the Colonials for Friendship with England: Concessions to England in Egypt Significance of £tienne's Visit to London ( J u l y 1903) ix

57 57 61 62 66

CONTENTS

X

V.

EGYPT

AND T H E

NEGOTIATIONS

FOR

THE

ENTENTE

President Loubet's Visit to London and the Beginning of Comprehensive Negotiations ( J u l y 7, 1903) T h e Egyptian Question in the Early Negotiations Diplomatic Bargaining and Disturbing Factors T h e Significance of the Egyptian Question in the Negotiations Problems Facing the Diplomats from December to March VI.

T H E E N T E N T E AND I T S R E C E P T I O N

Scop« of the Agreement T h e Declaration Respecting Egypt and Morocco T h e Khedivial Decree: Changes in the Egyptian F i nancial System British Determination to Settle the Egyptian Question with the Powers Russian and German Acceptance of the Permanency of the British Occupation of Egypt Public Approval of the Entente in England T h e Reception of the Agreement in France Looking T o w a r d an Anglo-Russian Entente Germany and the Entente VII.

CONCLUSIONS

68

69 71 76 84 88 96

96 96 100 102 103 105 11 o 113 115 119

BIBLIOGRAPHY

129

INDEX

135

I

THE DIFFICULT GREAT

POSITION

B R I T A I N IN

OF

EGYPT

BY THE LAST QUARTER of the nineteenth century E g y p t had been reduced to the unenviable status of being one of Europe's gravest international problems. T h e L a n d of Paradox, as L o r d M i l n e r has so aptly characterized the country which has excited the imaginations and inspired the pens of historians from Herodotus to the present, had become another tragic example of the inability of a semi-civilized country to deal with modern finance and modern financiers. During the course of the nineteenth century the Egyptians had attempted to assume some of the ways of Europe. Notable advances had been made in irrigation, in the erection of buildings, in the extension of communications, and in increasing production and trade. But, unhappily, at the same time tremendous debts were contracted at ruinous rates. Failure on the part of the Egyptian Government to cope adequately with its obligations, along with threatened and actual disorders, led the British Government in 1 8 8 2 to take armed possession and to assume a veiled protectorate. 1 T h e step was of crucial importance in the development of European international relations. Once in control, although the action had been taken avowedly as a temporary expedient, 2 Great Britain became increasingly unwilling to relinquish that control. Unfortunately for her, however, other interests, especially those of France, were often fiearly as great and in some cases greater than her own. France had 1 T h e literature oil the subject is copious. Some of the better accounts of the diplomatic phases are given in W i l f r i d S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt ; L o r d Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, chs. x i i i - x v i i ; Charles de Freycinet, La Question d'fcgypte, ch. iii; and W . L . L a n g e r , European Alliances and Alignments, 1 8 7 1 - 1 8 9 0 , ch. viii.

* Accounts and Papers. State Papers, 1 8 8 3 ( E g y p t No. 2 ) , X L V I I , 3 4 ; sard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, C C L X X I I I , 1 3 9 0 .

1

Han.

2

EGYPT

AND

THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

blazed the Egyptian trail, only to step aside in a moment of indecision and permit Great Britain to forge ahead. T h e error was irremediable, but the French could and did cling tenaciously to any possible footing. Moreover, all of the great powers possessed treaty rights in E g y p t . T u r k e y held vague rights of sovereignty over the country. Egyptian trade was sufficient to invite considerable rivalry. And lastly, but above all, the almost universal interest in the great Suez Canal made the country a focal point of general European concern. A comprehensive treatment of the complicated Egyptian question during the quarter-century preceding the Anglo-French Entente, or even of British interests in the region of the Nile during the period, is obviously beyond the reach of the present study. This account will be restricted primarily to a summary of British interests and to those rights and interests of the other powers which constituted a hindrance to British control of E g y p t . T h e diplomacy leading to the Entente of 1904 with France is intelligible only if one keeps in mind the anxiety of the British statesmen to free themselves from some of the entangling meshes by which they were bound in E g y p t . T i m e and again during the Entente negotiations L o r d Lansdowne and his colleagues declared themselves ready to abandon the whole arrangement with France rather than compromise their Egyptian demands. T h e most obvious and perhaps the strongest British interest in E g y p t has been first and last a strategic one. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, E g y p t became the keystone of imperial communications. In the somewhat overworked but apt phrase of Bismarck, the relationship of the Canal to the British Empire was "like a spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain." F r o m the strategic viewpoint alone, British concern was patently a necessity. In a study of British policy which was written for the use of the Foreign Office, Sir James HeadlamM o r l e y has concluded: T h e chief and for many years the sole motive-of our policy in E g y p t , as, indeed, throughout the L e v a n t , was the maintenance of our communications

with

India

and the security of

our

Indian

D I F F I C U L T POSITION OF G R E A T BRITAIN

3

E m p i r e . T h e history of British policy is the record of the d i f f e r e n t methods by w h i c h , in c h a n g i n g circumstances, this motive w a s p u r sued. 3

It is, therefore, little short of startling today to recall that British statesmen not only looked upon the building of the Suez Canal with apprehension but did everything in their power to prevent it.4 F o r one thing they feared that it would extend French interests too much, and this it might well have done had not the war of 1 8 7 0 placed France for a time where she could not afford to offend British sympathy. But if the French built the Canal, the British, as was expected, made the most use of it. During the first two and a half years of the Canal's histoiV, seventy per cent of its traffic was British and, while there were fluctuations, the proportions averaged more than that for the whole period preceding i 9 0 4 . ( T h e Canal route shortened the distance between Europe and India nearly five thousand miles. 5 Disraeli's dramatic purchase of the Khedive's Canal shares in 1 8 7 5 made E n g l a n d the largest single shareholder and for all practical purposes gave her a leading voice in the affairs of the company, but it was the occupation of E g y p t in 1882 which drastically changed the British relationship to the Canal. One of the primary motives for occupation was that of protecting the Canal, 0 and regardless of what conventions and agreements might say, the fact remained only too obvious that in the event of a war which involved Great Britain, control of E g y p t meant " S i r James Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, p. 63. Several recent works have covered the earlier phases of British policy toward Egypt in connection with the Canal and other communication problems: Hoskins, British Routes to India; Hallberg, The Suez Canal; and Lt. Col. Sir Arnold T . Wilson, The Suez Canal. "Hallberg, Suez Canal, pp. 377, 380-381. In the first years of the Canal, however, the Cape Route drew actually more traffic than the Canal, and as late as 1880 greater portions of certain products were being shipped around the Cape. The British traffic with India and China which passed through the Canal in the year 1880 formed approximately ten per cent of the total British imports and exports. But before 1905 practically all of the Indian trade had been diverted through the Canal route, and a part of the trade to Australia and New Zealand as well (Ibid., pp. 388-391). 'Hallberg, Suez Canal, pp. 254-277. 4

4

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

/

control of the Canal. 7 It had long been a generally accepted idea that the Canal should be neutralized, and proposals regarding its neutralization had appeared many years before its construction. While various proposals and declarations were made, nothing like an international agreement was reached until the Convention of 1888 declared that the Canal should be open in time of war as well as in time of peace to all vessels, whether merchantmen or warships. Fortifications were not to be erected, and protection of the Canal in case of danger fell first to the Egyptian Government. As a sop to France it was provided that the consular agents in Egypt of the signatory powers should meet to inform the Egyptian Government in case the Canal were threatened, and that they should convene once a year "to take note of the due execution of the treaty." 8 T h e strategic factor, however, did not continue to be one of the live issues, in that Great Britain, prior to the entente negotiations, had abandoned any thought of getting out of Egypt. The point deserves emphasis for our present purposes only because it was one of the basic motives strengthening British determination in regard to Egypt. 9 Indeed, it might even appear at first glance that the strategic importance of the country had been forgotten. " I n all the great mass of documents published about E g y p t , " writes Headlam-Morley, "there is scarcely any mention of the Suez Canal. Lord Cromer devotes to it a single brief chapter. It is not mentioned by Lord Milner nor by Sir Auckland Colvin. It was Egypt herself, Egypt for her own sake, to 1

This, of course, proved to be the case during the World War (Ibid., pp.

325-349)* This provision of the Convention remained in abeyance until the AngloFrench Agreement of April 8, 1904.. The British refused to withdraw a stipulation by Sir Julian Pauncefote giving Great Britain the right to land troops in the Canal zone (Memorandum by A. H. Oakes, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 18g8-19:4. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly,

I, 3 1 9"3 2 1 ) •

" S i r James Headlam-Morley declared: " T h i s is, indeed, the only point which emerges clearly from this tangled history. If we were to be quite sure that in case of war our use of the Canal would not be impeded, we must continue our occupation of E g y p t . " (Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, p. 8 1 ) .

D I F F I C U L T POSITION OF G R E A T B R I T A I N

5

which attention was directed.. . . " l 0 Some writers have even felt that the financial interests were the chief motivating influences behind the British policy. 11 Lord Cromer rather bluntly declared: " T h e origin of the Egyptian question in its present phase was financial."12 At times the interests of the bondholders do seem to have predominated over all else. The great banking houses of London and Paris—the Rothschilds, Friihlings, Oppenheims—had floated the loans for the Egyptain Government, and for the most part the bonds were held in England and France. 13 The total indebtedness of the Egyptain Government in 1882 was approximately £90,000, and it was usually estimated that around onethird of the amount was held in England. A larger proportion was held in France, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact facts. As L o r d Cromer explained: " I t is impossible to speak confidently about the distribution of the debt as it is certain that a large number of the coupons paid in Paris are sent from London to avoid payment of the income tax.'" 4 Difficulties arising from the debt and their effect on British control in Egypt will be treated in a later connection. Regardless of the financial influence on the origin or continuation of the Egyptian question, it is necessary to recognize that reforms which were begun as steps to aid the bondholders became an end in themselves. " I invented a theory," Cromer noted in his unpublished Memoirs, "which was wholly novel at the time, and which I was able to get adopted by my French colleague, to the effect that the interests of the bondholders and taxpayers 10

Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, p. 75. One of the most able studies along this line is Theodore Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin, though he overemphasizes the financial aspects of the question. u Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, 1 1 . 1 F o r the firms floating the various bond issues, see Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Annual Reports. 1 Cromer to Lansdowne, Oct. 30, 1903, B. D., II, 3 2 1 . The Official Journal, Sept. 25, 1902, estimated that two-fifths of the debt was held in France {ibid.), but during the period of the Entente negotiations the French usually claimed to hold as much as two-thirds. See Le Temps, Jan. 3, 1 9 0 4 ; Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin, p. 29; Clinton E. Dawkins, " T h e Egyptian Public Debt," in The North American Review, Oct. 1 9 0 1 , C L X X I I I , 487-507. 11

6

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

were identic.15 T h e long record of reforms in favor of the fellaheen, the constructive irrigation work, and the improved educational and agricultural facilities gave abundant opportunity for the imperialistic members of English society to glow with pride. It is doubtful, wrote an American professor who visited Egypt in 1902, "if in any other country the results of constructive statesmanship can be so accurately measured in bushels of produce, in pounds and pence of revenue, in decreasing percentage of illiteracy, and in increasing numbers of righteous instead of corrupt court decisions.'"6 If the Land of the Nile became something of a model exhibit for the imperialistic school, it was by no means ill fitted for the rôle. The publication of Lord Milner's book, England in Egypt, in 1892, did most to bring recognition of these achievements. Furthermore, a personal knowledge of the country was gained by hundreds of persons of the ruling class who began to visit Egypt during the winter seasons. The increase in general Egyptian prosperity is evidenced in the gradual growth of foreign trade during the period of British occupation. Cotton, which had received a considerable impetus in growth and exportation during the American Civil War, continued far in the lead among the articles of export. In the three years preceding the British occupation (1879-1881) the average Egyptian foreign trade was approximately £E20,000,000.17 In the year 1903 Egyptian foreign trade totaled £E35,871,677, and, of this, the share of the British Empire was 5 2 % . France's share was a little over 9%. 1 8 While for a time the British abandoned the Sudan, it eventually became one of the more prominent factors which influenced the continuation of British interest in Egypt. The scramble for " M a r q u e s s o f Z e t l a n d , Lord

Cromer,

p. 7 1 .

" J e r e m i a h W . Jenks, " T h e E g y p t of T o d a y , " in The terly,

International

" £ E 1 equaled £1 Os. Y^d; £13,000,000 of the total w e r e exports England

in Egyft,

" Statesman's

pp. 1 1 2 , Year

Book,

Abstract

for

the

United

(Milner,

213). 1 9 0 5 , p p . 1 2 6 1 - 1 2 6 3 ; Ministère du T r a v a i l et de

l a P r é v o y a n c e Sociale, Annuaire cal

Quar-

Sept. 1 9 0 2 , v o l . 6, p. 89.

Statistique,

Kingdom,

B r i t a i n ' s share in the E g y p t i a n

1 9 0 5 , X X V , 1 5 8 - 1 5 9 ; and

XLVI,

116-117,

LI,

trade w a s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y

o c c u p a t i o n than a f t e r ( M i l n e r , England

in Egyft,

p. 2 1 5 ) .

122-123.

StatistiGreat

larger before

the

D I F F I C U L T POSITION OF G R E A T BRITAIN

7

the upper valley of the Nile, or Egyptian Sudan, presents one of the most dramatic incidents in the imperialistic struggle for Africa. It reached its height in the famous Fashoda incident of 1898, which clearly indicated the British determination that the mastery of the Nile region should be shared with no other European power. T o the British, spurred on by French rivalry and the tragic death of Gordon, the reconquest of the Sudan easily became a matter of national honor. A n d after the establishment in the Sudan of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium, 1 9 it became more impossible than ever f o r Great Britain voluntarily to weaken her position in E g y p t . T h e factors which prevented the British f r o m obtaining anything like a free hand in E g y p t , however, were almost countless. " I can hardly move a step," Cromer told L o r d Salisbury in 1 8 9 1 , "without a jar of conflicting international interests." 20 B y f a r the most annoying among the British problems was the attitude of the French. British patience was sorely tried by the Gallic "policy of pinpricks," but there was no difficulty in understanding the reasons for it. French failure to resent the position which Great Britain attained in E g y p t after 1882 would have been unnatural in the extreme. Throughout the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, France had laid foundations and built hopes in the land of the Pharaohs. " F r o m the time of Napoleon onward," to quote M . de Freycinet, " F r a n c e was never indifferent to the affairs of E g y p t , not for a single day. A t times it even seemed to her that her prestige in the world was to be measured by the role which she played on the banks of the N i l e . " 2 1 D u r i n g the course of the century French influence in E g y p t itself became strongly entrenched. France, alone among the European powers, supported E g y p t in her struggle for independence from T u r k e y . M e h e m e t Ali turned to France for officials and teachers to aid him in his attempt to modernize the country. F o r more than a " Accounts and Papers. State Papers, 1905 (Egypt No. 2 ) , vol. 6o, pp. 109 ff. ,0 Cromer to Salisbury, Jan. 2, 1 8 9 1 , Zetland, Lord Cromer, p. 1 8 3 . 21 Charles de Freycinet, Souvenirs, i8y8-i8g}, p. 2 1 5 , cited in W. L . Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 252.

8

E G Y P T AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

half-century, French lawyers, engineers, military men, and French men of learning were engaged in giving Egypt most of what she borrowed from Europe. 21 The Suez Canal was the work of a French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, and was built in the face of indifference, and often opposition, on the part of the powers other than France. 23 The groundwork of French influence in Egypt, and the veneer of French civilization which overspread the country, must be kept in mind in order to appreciate the problem which confronted Great Britain. In the first years of the twentieth century, after twenty years of British occupation, French, next to Arabic, remained the prevailing language in official and bureaucratic circles. Englishmen in official Egyptian service were writing letters to one another in halting French. 24 T h e Egyptian postage stamps and names of the streets were in Arabic and French, and in Alexandria and Cairo there were at least as many daily papers published in French as in the vernacular. English was employed by only a few journals. 25 T h e Egyptian law codes were based on French models.26 When the members of the leading Egyptian families received a European education they received it in France. The French citizens residing in Egypt formed an important part of the European group there.27 Naturally any native movement against the English looked to the French for sympathy. While it did not constitute a serious difficulty, Egypt was still nominally a part of the Turkish Empire. Although the exact status of Egypt in its relation to Turkey was one of the classic problems in international law—that is, whether it should be classified as a half-sovereign state, a privileged province, or a n

Milner, England in Egypt, p. 339. " Hallberg, The Suez Canal, chs. I X - X I I I ; Wilson, The Suez Canal, pp.

.5 ff.

" M i l n e r , England in Egypt, p. 339. " The Times, May 15, 1 9 0 1 ; Le Temps, Jan. 3, 1 9 0 4 ; Cogordan to Delcassé, Feb. 19, 1 9 0 1 , Documents Diplomatiques Français, ser. 2, I, 107109. " J a s p e r Yeates Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, pp. 1 4 5 ff. " According to the census of 1897 the number of French citizens was 1 3,000 out of a total of 1 1 3,000 Europeans, though, as Lord Cromer points out, a portion of these were Levantines (Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, I I , 245 ff.).

D I F F I C U L T POSITION OF G R E A T BRITAIN

9

vassal state—the actual relationship was fairly clear. 28 B y a firman in 1 8 4 1 the Sultan had conferred the hereditary viceroyalty or governorship on Mehemet Ali and his successors in return for a yearly tribute of £360,000. Thus E g y p t became for administrative purposes largely independent of Turkey. T h i s arrangement remained the basis of the relationship, but later firmans gave the Egyptian ruler the title of Khedive, increased the annual tribute to £682,000, and restricted the Egyptian army to 18,000 men, who in theory belonged to the Ottoman forces. 29 T h e Khedive could not legally succeed to office without being invested by a firman from the Sultan. As for the actual government in E g y p t , the Khedive had a cabinet of six ministers who, in the name of the Khedive, nominally formed the law-making and administrative body. T h e r e were two larger bodies, a legislative council and a general assembly, which acted in advisory capacities.30 M o r e important than these in the really significant decisions of the government were the British officials who were attached to the more prominent officers of the Government and whose nominal duties were to advise the officers to whom they were attached. W h i l e in theory the British occupation of E g y p t did not alter the international status of the country, or its machinery of government, from the practical standpoint it had far-reaching results. English advisers were placed in the chief departments and were given full knowledge of the workings of the departments. Their function was to g i v e what has been termed "authoritative advice." Most important among these was the Financial Adviser. H i s duties, in keeping with the vague British position in the country, were not v e r y clearly defined, but he was present at all of the meetings of the Council of Ministers, and no important financial step could be taken without his consent. Because of his position, he could and did give advice on non-financial matters as well. " See Gabriel-Louis Jaray, " L a Situation internationale de l'Égypte depuis l'Accord franco-anglais du 8 Avril 1904," in Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée, vil. VI, pp. 408 ff. " G . L. Beer, African Questions at the Peace Conference, pp. 349-355. A clear description of the machinery of government is given in Cromer, Modern Egypt, II, 160-279.

IO

E G Y P T AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

But, as every one knows, the real director of affairs in E g y p t was the British Consul-General who, as far as his title indicated, was merely one of the many foreign diplomatic representatives there. In this position E v e l y n Baring, L o r d Cromer ( 1 8 8 3 1 9 0 7 ) , became an institution in his own right. Enjoying the confidence of successive English governments, this remarkable man had an influence that is difficult to overemphasize. Englishmen not only held the higher offices, but a great number of them found places in the lower positions. T h e y composed a large minority of the civil service officers, and many were acting in capacities of under-secretaries and school teachers. 31 Not only British civilians, but soldiers as well were placed in key positions. T h e Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, or according to his Egyptian title, the Sirdar, was an Englishman. A majority of the superior offices in the army, whether departmental or regimental, were given to Englishmen. Additional support, if needed, could be given to the English advice by the British army of occupation, a force of approximately five thousand men, which continued to remain in E g y p t and a part of the expenses of which the Egyptian treasury bore. 32 T h e above constituted the Turkish, Egyptian, and AngloEgyptian portions of the Government. Very little in the Turkish or Egyptian portions could be said to constitute any real obstruction to British control. A much greater difficulty lay in the control exercised by the M i x e d Administrations. These were administrative boards, composed either wholly or largely of representatives of the powers, which had charge of the administration of certain governmental institutions. T h e y had been created from time to time by agreements made between the Egyptian Government and the powers. N o r could these arrangements be changed without the consent of the governments concerned. T h e M i x e d Administration which gave the British the greatest concern was the one which controlled Egyptian finance. It is difficult to imagine a more intricate financial labyrinth than that produced by the fifty-two different khedivial decrees which con31 K

Cromer, Modern Egypt, II, 280-300. Accounts and Pafers, 1905 (Egypt No. 1 ) , L X , 26.

D I F F I C U L T POSITION OF G R E A T B R I T A I N

n

tained the various agreements relating to the Egyptian debt. They had been made as a result of a complicated series of agreements, conventions, declarations, and protocols between the nations concerned. The fundamental elements of the international control of Egyptian finances are to be found in the powers and functions of the Caisse de la Dette, or the Commission of Public Debt, in the provisions of the Law of Liquidation of 1880, and in the provisions of the Convention of 1885 which modified the L a w of Liquidation. 33 The Caisse de la Dette had been forced upon Ismail Pasha in 1876, when he was compelled to go into bankruptcy. T h e six members (previous to 1885 there were only four), representing Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, and Italy, were technically appointed by the Khedive but were actually selected on the recommendation of the powers. Essentially they were the guardians cf the interests of the bondholders, but they represented their respective governments as well by looking after the execution of the various agreements which had been made by the powers. While originally the members of the Caisse had been little more than receivers of the revenue on behalf of the creditors, by means of the L a w of Liquidation and the later Convention they had come to have vastly greater powers. Without giving a detailed description, which necessarily would be both tedious and technical, it can be said that the revenues of the state were divided into two nearly equal parts, one of which was to go to the Caisse for the benefit of the bondholders, and the other to the Government for the purpose of defraying the expenses of administration. T h e bondholders' share was much the better protected of the two, for if there was a deficit, the Government must make it good to the Caisse; on the other hand, if there was a surplus, the Caisse even had a claim on one-half of the Government's share of the surplus. Moreover, an ideal figure was fixed for the governmental expenditure, a sum which in the opinion of the powers Egypt ought not to go beyond. If the revenue of the Government exceeded this figure, then the Government was to be regarded as having a surplus no matter what its expenditures might " Milner, England

in Egypt, pp. ¡1

S.

12

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

have been.34 Thus it is seen that however successful the British and Egyptian officials might be in increasing the revenues, they could get only partial control of the surplus funds for the ever increasing expenditures of the Government.35 Their inability to control the finances of the state constituted one of the main complaints of the British. Furthermore, in the actual working of the arrangement, the Egyptian Government could make no new loans or changes in the taxing system without the consent of the Caisse, because this would affect the interests of the bondholders. Besides the Caisse de la Dette there were three additional Mixed Administrations—the Railway Board, the Commission of the Daira, and the Commission of the Domains. Each of these boards consisted of three members—an Englishman, a Frenchman, and an Egyptian—and formed another stumbling block in the way of efficient administration. "Few, save those behind the scene," wrote Lord Cromer, "have probably recognized fully that the Anglo-French Agreement was only signed just in time to prevent a complete breakdown of the Railway administration."36 The latter two Commissions had control of vast estates which had formerly belonged to Ismail Pasha but which, because of loans, had been pledged to the creditors. Since Egypt was still a part of the Ottoman Empire she was bound by the international obligations of Turkey. Among these obligations the remarkable series of treaties known as the Capitulations conceded to outside powers rights which in many cases had later outgrown their usefulness and had even become serious abuses. The earliest of these concessions dated back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and before the twentieth century all of the great powers in Europe, and the United States and " C r o m e r , Modern Egypt, II, 3 0 4 - 3 1 0 ; Milner, England in Egypt, pp. 52-56. " I n 1888 an arrangement was made creating a reserve fund which might be applied to defray "extraordinary expenses incurred (by the Government) with the previous consent of the Caisse de la Dette." T o this agreement Cromer attributes much of the success of the public works. Between 1888 and 1904 this Reserve Fund supplied about f E i 0,000,000 which was spent largely on irrigation and drainage. (Accounts and Papers, 190$ (Egypt No. 1 ) , vol. 60, pp. 13 ff.). * Cromer, Modern Egypt, II, 3 1 2 .

D I F F I C U L T POSITION OF G R E A T BRITAIN

13

Brazil in America, had been granted Capitulations by T u r k e y . In E g y p t the privileges granted had in some cases, because of the greater weakness of the Khedive, been extended beyond the original concessions. 37 T h e Capitulations varied considerably with the individual concession. T h e y conferred such privileges as immunity f r o m taxes, except custom duties and land taxes, inviolability of domicile, and exemption from the jurisdiction of the local courts. T h e immunity granted to foreign residents from a large number of the taxes was unfair and worked a hardship on the natives. 38 T h e violation of domicile usually required the presence of the consul of the suspected violator, and if this official were so inclined he could be conveniently absent and hence make all sorts of trouble f o r the local authorities in their efforts to apprehend smugglers and the like. T h e exemption from the jurisdiction cf the local courts, however, was never uniform or complete. In criminal cases it was a fairly well established principle that a crime committed by a foreigner would be tried before his consul or before a court of his own country as the particular Capitulation might provide. In civil cases the situation was much better. In some respects the most successful phase of Egyptian justice was to be found in M i x e d Tribunals, which had jurisdiction over most civil cases that concerned a plaintiff and a defendant of different nationalities. T h e members of these tribunals were appointed by the Khedive, but in each case the foreign members were in the majority. 3 9 Each of these elements of international control in E g y p t added its bit in making the position of the British difficult. T h e sum total of their effect was to make Great Britain, despite her own strong position there, dependent upon other powers f o r the realization of her ambitions. " E g y p t , " as Profesor F a y has concluded, " w a s like a noose around the British neck which any great power could tighten when it wanted to squeeze a diplomatic concession from the Mistress of the Seas." 40 Indeed, this was '' " " "

Milner, England in Egypt, p. 39. Ibid., pp. 48-52. Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, pp. 77-82, 349-352. Sidney B. Fay, Origins of the War, I, 126.

14

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

an ever present and ever discomforting factor. In the face of the generally hostile attitude of France, the British position was made possible only by the support of the Central Powers. It was indirectly the benevolent attitude of Bismarck which made the British occupation of E g y p t possible. 41 W h e n the German Chancellor for a short period in 1884-85 decided to cooperate with France rather than with Great Britain, he easily brought about the complete frustration of British financial plans for E g y p t and taught the English statesmen a bitter lesson. 42 Although by the end of the century there was little thought of British evacuation, the earlier pledges which had been made to this effect could be most embarrassingly brought to the attention of the British Government. 4 3 Cromer felt that war was the only eventual solution. In 1896 he wrote: Eleven years ago I said that the ultimate solution of the Egyptian question would depend on the relative naval strength of England and France. At the time no one believed me. I hold to that opinion more strongly than ever now. The force of circumstances, much more than the faults of any Ministry or of any individuals, has driven us into a situation which renders war a not improbable solution of the whole mess. . . . I wish the works at Gibraltar were finished.44 But the support which was required from the Central Powers, since Russia after her alliance with France usually sided with her ally, was a lever in the hands of Germany which the English could not relish. T h e situation was made even more difficult in periods when the general foreign policy of the two countries was at odds. Thus Sir E d w a r d G r e y recounts in his memoirs his feelings upon the signing of the Anglo-French Entente: It was a feeling of simple pleasure and relief. I saw all that had been most disagreeable in my experience at the Foreign Office 18921895 swept away. W e should no longer be dependent on German " L a n d e r , European

Alliances

and Alignments,

p. 2 7 8 .

" Ibid., pp. 299, 307, 3 1 5 if. " F o r a list of pledges and statements made in regard to E g y p t see Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin, pp. xvii-xxiii. T h o u g h plentiful before that time, there is a noticeable lapse of such pledges after 1 8 9 3 . " C r o m e r to Rosebery, A p r i l 1 3 , 1 8 9 5 , Zetland, Lord Cromer, pp. 2 1 4 , 2 1 5 .

DIFFICULT support in E g y p t

POSITION

OF

G R E A T

BRITAIN

15

with all the discomforture that this dependence

entailed. I had no desire to t h w a r t G e r m a n interests, but w e should n o w be able to negotiate with G e r m a n y without the handicap of an E g y p t i a n noose round our necks. 4 5

W h e n in the early years of the twentieth century the older diplomatic alignments began to be faced with a new turn of affairs, especially with the Anglo-French rapprochement and the growing Anglo-German rivalries, the Egyptian problem naturally loomed large in the eyes of British statesman. If there was the possibility of losing German support or if friendship was to be had with France, an understanding must be reached in regard to Egypt. " L o r d Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, I, 50. It is interesting to note in this connection a statement of policy made by Bulow in 1 8 9 5 . " W e sa-.v England go into E g y p t , " he wrote, "without envy ar.d helped her to establish herself there. Since Germany is not in a position to render political service gratis, we expect a corresponding return, as the natural outcome of our action where we have rendered important assistance." (Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1 8 9 5 , German Diplomatic Documents, I I I , 3 2 . )

II

THE

GENESIS OF T H E

ENTENTE

THE FASHODA incident which brought England and France so perilously near to war in 1898 did not mark a direct turning point in Anglo-French relations. There can be little doubt that Delcassé favored a rapprochement with Great Britain from the beginning, 1 but the diplomatic defeat suffered in the conflict over the Sudan left him discouraged and somewhat embittered. 2 While no proof is contained in either Die Grosse Politik3 or the Documents Di-plomatiques Français, it seems likely that for a time he was open to suggestions for cooperation with Germany. 4 France naturally smarted under the defeat, and a great deal of bitterness against England continued to find place in important sections of the press.5 French public opinion, like that of almost all of the continental powers, was exceedingly hostile to England during the Boer W a r . Ill feeling between the two countries was also perpetuated by the refusal of the British press to forget the Dreyfus case. T h e Fashoda incident itself, of course, was concerned with the Sudan rather than Egypt. Delcassé had probably intended to raise the whole Egyptian question but in the latter part of " O n September i , 1 8 9 8 , D e l c a s s é told M o n s o n that he had a l w a y s r e g a r d e d an a g r e e m e n t between E n g l a n d , F r a n c e , and Russia as " e m i n e n t l y and o f f e r e d his services in p a v i n g the w a y t o w a r d such a g o a l Salisbury,

Sept.

1,

1 898, B.

D.,

I,

216).

He

is reported

desirable"

(Monson

to h a v e

said

to in

N o v e m b e r 1898 to the publicist V i c t o r B é r a r d : " I d o not intend to l e a v e this office until I h a v e reestablished g o o d relations with E n g l a n d . " ( B e r n a d o t t e E . Schmitt, England France

and Germany,

et Guillaume

to be f o u n d in B. D., Grosse

Politik,

First

Moroccan

Crisis,

preuves

et aveux,

p. 4 2 .

etc., X V , 406, 4 0 7 n .

* E . B o u r g e o i s et G . P a g e s , Les Origines Guerre,

La

I , chs. I V , V .

* E . N . A n d e r s o n , The ' Die

1 7 9 0 - 1 9 1 4 , p. 1 2 4 , c i t i n g V i c t o r B é r a r d ,

II, p. 2 3 ) . V a r i o u s additional instances of this attitude are

et les Responsabilités

de la

Grande

pp. 2 7 8 - 2 8 1 .

' E . M . C a r r o l l , French

Public

Opinion

p. 202. 16

and Foreign

A fairs,

iSyo-xgt

THE

GENESIS

OF

THE

ENTENTE

the negotiations, when it appeared that the decision would go against France, he took great pains to disassociate the two.6 There could be no doubt, however, despite Delcasse's care, that the outcome had greatly strengthened Great Britain's position in the whole region of the Nile. In the years immediately following the Fashoda crisis the question of Egypt remained almost entirely in the background. " A f t e r Fashoda," says Freycinet, "silence fell about the subject of Egypt.'" Pride and the memory of defeat made the subject distasteful to the French. Even in the English newspapers and periodicals the subject of Egypt received relatively little notice. As The Times noted early in 1903: South A f r i c a has lately occupied our attention so fully that North A f r i c a has fallen into the background, and the opening of the great dam, one of the engineering wonders of the world, has scarcely availed to attract more than momentary attention to the affairs of E g y p t and the Soudan. 8

It does not follow, however, that the question was a dead issue. The majority of the problems which had earlier confronted the English in regard to Egypt still existed. During the Fashoda crisis Cromer had urged that very definite reforms be made which would break the French hold on the Egyptian financial system. " I do not say that the adoption of this measure," he wrote to Salisbury, "would get rid of all our international top-hammer. . . . But it would be a step in the right direction. The moment for putting forward proposals of this nature seems opportune. There appears to be little doubt of the general drift of English public opinion. It may be that it is inclined to go rather far in the direction of insistence on British claims and views; but, however this may be, it seems a pity not to utilize the favorable breeze in order to get the ship more or less into harbour." 9 * Morrison B. Giffen, Fashoda, The Incident and its Diplomatic Setting, pp. 2 1 0 - 2 1 4 . ' C. de Freycinet, La Question d'tgyfte, p. 4 2 1 . ' The Times, Jan. 30, 1903. "Cromer to Salisbury, Nov. 15, 1898, Zetland, Lord Cromer, pp. 261-262.

18

E G Y P T

AND

T H E

ANGLO-FRENCH

E N T E N T E

Y e t none of the reforms desired by Cromer was made. T h e mere passing of time did little or nothing to alleviate British difficulties in E g y p t . Regardless of how f a r into the background the problem might appear to have faded, no one doubted that if it were resurrected it would arouse latent memories and create bitterness between Englishmen and Frenchmen once again. In the spring of 1903 M . Étienne, chief of the colonial group in the French Chamber of Deputies, in an English magazine article intended to be conciliatory, could say: T h e r e is such a thing as an E g y p t i a n question. N o one in F r a n c e forgets it, and I am willing to believe that no one forgets it in E n g l a n d either, f o r no declaration has denounced the f o r m a l assurance given again and again by the authorized representatives of the g o v e r n m e n t that the occupation of the country by British troops w a s but provisional and that the protective mission assumed by E n g l a n d w a s but t e m porary.10

Cambon and Delcassé insisted convincingly during the entente negotiations that it would require an immense amount of nerve (d'estomac) for any French Government to make the attempt to settle the Egyptian question in England's favor. 1 1 On the other hand the Fashoda settlement, in a more remote sense, contributed toward making the Anglo-French Entente possible. It augmented a growing conviction on the part of influential French leaders that the valley of the Nile had been lost by France unless she meant to go to war with Great Britain. Pierre de Coubertin who, to be sure, was something of an Anglophile, wrote for English periodicals as early as 1 9 0 1 that " T h e number of people who think that we ought to make every effort to recover our ground in E g y p t is diminishing every d a y . " 1 2 Cambon, even while insisting to Lansdowne in August of 1903 that the French nation still clung to the idea of an eventual British evacuation, admitted that it was with no very 10 Eugène Étienne, " T h e Colonial Controversies between France and E n g land," in The National Review, J u l y 1 9 0 3 , X L I , 7 3 4 - 7 3 5 . " L a n s d o w n e to Monson, August 5, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 306. " Pierre de Coubertin, " T h e Conditions of Franco-British Peace," in The Fortnightly Review, June 1 9 0 1 , L X X V , 1 0 1 6 .

T H E GENESIS OF T H E

ENTENTE

!9 13

definite expectation that the hope would be fulfilled. As long as the relations between England and France ran smoothly in other respects it seemed probable that the Egyptian question would continue its status of a mere potential trouble-maker, a state of affairs that pleased no one. In order to placate the English completely the French Government would obviously have to make concessions that it would be unwilling to make unless there were very good reasons indeed. T h e idea that Great Britain might offer to France concessions in Morocco in return for concessions in E g y p t appeared and was discussed not infrequently in the press and elsewhere before it became a matter of diplomatic negotiation. Suggestions of the possibility of such a barter appeared in certain Enlish journals during the Fashoda crisis. 14 The \Vestmmster Gazette sent a representative to Paris during the crisis to ask of persons in authority what terms they would accept for the settlement of the Egyptian quarrel. T h e representative returned with the report that he had received the same answer everywhere he inquired: " T h e free hand in Morocco." 1 3 T h e Russian Ambassador at M a d r i d reported to Drummond-Wolff in J u n e of 1900 the rumor that E n g l a n d and France had made a secret agreement respecting E g y p t and Morocco. 1 0 Eckardstein states that in February 1902 he overheard Chamberlain and Cambon discussing E g y p t and Morocco in a "most animated manner." 1 7 Rumors connecting these two North African countries with an AngloFrench agreement became widely current by the spring of 1903, 1 8 but before the English and French governments began officially to consider such a project relations between them had undergone a decided change. T h e rapprochement between the English and French peoples was well under way. IS

Lansdowne to Monson, August 5, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 306. The Spectator, October 1 5 , 1 8 9 8 ; The Westminster Gazette, October 1 2 , 1 8 9 8 . Napoleon I I I is said to have suggested to Palmerston in 1 8 5 7 that France seize Morocco while E n g l a n d in turn could take E g y p t from T u r k e y (Headl a m - M o r l e v , Studies in Diplomatic History, p. 5 5 ) . 15 The Westminster Gazette, April 1 1 , 1 9 0 4 . " D r u m m o n d - W o l f f to Salisbury, J u n e 9, 1 9 0 0 , B. D., I I , 2 5 8 . " Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, p. 2 1 8 . " See below, chapter I V . 14

20

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

T h e factors which worked to bring about the rapprochement were as varied as they were numerous. M a n y of them were more or less intangible, but the most definite and one of the most influential desires on the part of the English was that of settling the Egyptian question. For their part the French had become equally as anxious, if not more so, to make an agreement with Great Britain respecting Morocco. French determination in regard to Egypt decreased in almost exact ratio with the increasing French desire for Morocco. In fact, a tremendously increased interest in Morocco is one of the most striking characteristics of French opinion during the first two or three years of the twentieth century. Of course even before the end of the nineteenth century many Frenchmen had come to regard Morocco as necessary to the completion of their imperialistic ambitions. T h e conquest of Algeria by France had naturally led her to take a special interest in the tranquillity of Algeria's neighbor. Later there followed economic interests and diplomatic rivalry which made French concern the more intense. Y e t it was not until after the turn of the century that the Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, the official organ of the group most interested in popularizing African matters with the French people, began to devote any great amount of attention to Morocco. By 1902 the French position in Morocco had become the chief concern of the Comité de l'Afrique Française. Organized in 1889 by M . Percher and M . Auguste Terrier, the Comité at first had a small but select membership. A colonial group was founded in the Chamber of Deputies and a similar organization sprang up in the Senate. 19 By 1903 the colonials numbered around two hundred members in the chamber and were playing a rôle in the direction of French foreign policy that is all too frequently ignored. T h e president and leading spirit of the colonial group in the chamber was M . Eugène Étienne, Deputy for Oran in Algeria, and for years a close friend of Delcassé. A militant colonialist, Étienne devoted him** Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 5-9; Seignobos, L'Evolution République ( 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 1 4 ) , pp. 393 ff.; West Africa, M a y 30, 1903.

de la 3'

THE GENESIS OF THE E N T E N T E

21

self to the extension of French influence in North Africa and particularly in Morocco.20 For several years prior to the formation of the Anglo-French Entente he assembled at monthly luncheons the politicians and journalists who were especially interested in Morocco. Also associated with the Comité were the former Foreign Minister M . Gabriel Hanotaux, M . Paul Deschand, and the publicists M . Alcide Ebray and Count Robert de Caix. Nor was the increased interest in Morocco confined to an interested group or groups. By 1903 practically all of the French parties considered French claims in Morocco to predominate over those of any other power. Even M . Jaurès, leader of the socialists, admitted, though reluctantly, that French interests in Morocco had created for her a special position in that country.21 In general Delcassé's policy with respect to colonial matters was in relatively close accord with the views of the colonial group. 22 Though necessarily more moderate in expression because of his official position, there seems little to distinguish his views on Morocco from theirs. As M r . E. N. Anderson in his able study, The First Moroccan Crisis, has concluded, Delcassé "seems from the first to have coveted that country." 23 During the year 1901 he made open declarations in the Senate concerning France's special interest in the land and expressed the theory that Morocco, at least the eastern part of it, was a geographic and economic prolongation of Oran." The development of French foreign policy under the direction of Delcassé in the first years of the twentieth century was, to be sure, much wider in its scope and more far reaching in consequence than the mere attempted fulfillment of French desires in Morocco. But if Morocco was of less fundamental significance, it might almost be said that the tail wagged the dog. In the Francox Le Temps, May i 8, 1 9 0 4 ; Abel Combarieu, Sept Ans à l'Élysée, pp. 2402 4 1 , 246; Charles W. Porter, The Career of Théophile Delcassé, 64-65. 21 Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, Dec. 1903, X I I I , 3 7 1 . î! For a bitter quarrel between Delcassé and the colonial group in the winter of 1902-03 see below, Chapter IV. ! * Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 9.

"Stephen H. Roberts, History 549-

of French

Colonial

Policy

1870-1914,

II,

22

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

Italian rapprochement, in the Anglo-French Entente, and in the French negotiations with Spain, the securing of French interests in Morocco looms larger than any other single factor. At times Delcassé seemed willing even to turn to Germany if other means failed. 25 Nothing shows Delcassé's readiness to follow a purely opportunistic policy more clearly than his turning from one power to another in his attempt to further French claims in Morocco. Agreement with the other powers interested in Morocco, or at least agreement with a combination powerful enough to overcome the objections of those left out, was obviously enough a necessity if Delcassé and the French expansionists hoped to be successful in pushing their claims in Morocco. Italy, Spain, Germany, and Great Britain each harbored ambitions with regard to Morocco, though in varying degrees, and each held commercial or political interests, or both, in the country.26 Italy was the least interested of the powers and it was with her that Delcassé reached his first Moroccan agreement. This first step was the Franco-Italian secret accord of December 1900, which preceded the more famous Franco-Italian agreement of November 1902. In an exchange of notes France declared that she harbored no designs on Tripoli, and secured in return what was interpreted as an Italian sanction to French aspirations in Morocco.27 13

Holstein to Billow, August 8, 1 9 0 1 , G. P., X V I I , 3 4 1 ; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 45-50. " For the respective commercial interests in Morocco, see The Statesman's Year Book, 1905, pp. 924-925; Eugène Etienne, " T h e Colonial Controversies between England and France," in The National Review, July 1903, X L I , 739; Sir Thomas Barclay, Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 276. The total amount of foreign trade with Morocco was relatively small and the statistics are unreliable. Roughly, Morocco's foreign trade in 1903 totaled 109,495,888 francs; of this France and Algeria enjoyed 3 1 % , Great Britain 4 1 . 6 % , Germany 9 % , and Spain 8.4% (Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 2 ) . " Barrère to Delcassé, December 29, 1900, Documents Diplomatiques Français, ser. 2, I, 1 ; Barrère to Delcassé, January 10, 1 9 0 1 , ibid., pp. 20 ff.; A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 18jç-1 ç 14, ed. Coolidge, II, 227, 240-245. The agreement was so ambiguously worded as to be open to several interpretations; the actual strength of it in such a case naturally depended upon later developments. It became rather generally known to the

T H E GENESIS OF T H E

ENTENTE

T h e year 1 9 0 2 was emphatically a crucial one in the development of Delcassé's foreign policy. It witnessed not only the continuation of the Franco-Italian rapprochement and negotiations with Spain which almost produced a Moroccan agreement with that country, but, and vastly more signficant, an attempted rapprochement with Great Britain. A f t e r his first successful agreemen with Italy regarding Morocco, the French Foreign Minister made suggestive moves of one sort and another toward Germany, 28 and Cambon dropped hints from time to time to L o r d Lansdowne that France would value very highly permission by Great Britain to use a free hand in Morocco. 29 T h e n during the summer and f a l l of 1902, while Cambon was making more farreaching proposals to Lansdowne in London, negotiations were begun with Spain looking toward at least a division of Morocco into spheres of influence as an eventual solution of the problem. W h i l e Spain f r o m the last years of the nineteenth century on had lived in almost constant fear that Great Britain and France might arrive at an agreement with regard to Morocco, and it had become the rather frequent task of the British Foreign Minister to give assurances that rumors to that effect had no basis,30 she eventually refused the French proposals. A s it finally turned out, Spain would have profited more from these proposals than she actually did in the agreement which followed the Anglo-French Entente. 3 1 newspapers during 1901 and was verified by Delcassé himself in the French Chamber, Jan. 2 1 , 1902. Subsequent notes indicate that the rights of Italy in Tripoli were to be considered on a par with those of France in Morocco (Journal officiel de la République Française, Débats Parliamentaires. Chambre de Députés. 661, p. 1 3 0 ) . See below for the later agreement. * Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 45-50. Monson to Lansdowne, June 1 4 , 1 9 0 1 , B. D. II, 2 6 1 . "Salisbury to W o l f f , Jan. 1 1 , 1899, B. D., II, 2 5 5 ; Wolff to Salisbury, June 9, 1900, ibid., 2 5 8 ; Wolff to Salisbury, Oct, 1 1 , 1900, ibid., 2 5 8 ; Lansdowne to Durand, April 1 5 , 1 9 0 1 , ibid., 260; Monson to Lansdowne, June 4, 1 9 0 1 , ibid., 260-261. " Unsigned Memorandum, July 1 5 , 1902, Documents Diplomatiques Français, ser. 2, II, 397-400; Delcassé to Saint-René-Taillandier, Sept. n , 1902, ibid., 473-474; Proposed Franco-Spanish Convention, Nov. 8, 1902, ibid., 5835 8 7 ; Patenôtre to Delcassé, Nov. 18, 1902, ibid., 6 1 1 - 6 1 3 ; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 38-39.

24

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

T h e Anglo-French Entente negotiations of 1902 form an interesting and vital prelude to the more successful negotiations of the two succeeding years. The fact that in 1902 they proved to be premature is not so important as the fact that many of the conditions drawing France and Great Britain together had developed by that time. In a sense the earlier attempt was a dress rehearsal for the later. A study of the 1902 negotiations, particularly a careful scrutiny of the reasons for their failure, sheds valuable light on the whole rapprochement movement. But first of all it is necessary to consider the events leading to the beginning of the negotiations. Before the nineteenth century had come to an end there were indications which presaged a new departure in British foreign policy. There were evidences of a growing belief on the part of British statesmen that the time had come for Great Britain to depart from her traditional policy of "splendid isolation." Almost constant friction with France and Russia in various parts of the world, dependence upon other powers for the maintenance of her position in Egypt, and the fear of cooperation between members of the two systems of alliance against British interests, both in the F a r East and nearer home, were among the more important factors influencing a change from the historic policy. Even Lord Salisbury, who was never to be converted to the idea of breaking with "splendid isolation," hinted to Germany in 1895 that the time had come to partition Turkey, 3 2 and in 1898 suggested to Russia an agreement on spheres of influence in both Turkey and China. 33 Then the Boer W a r startlingly opened the eyes of the British to the continental antagonism which could be stirred up against England, and made them feel the advisability of a dependable friendship. 34 Definite action arising from the British anti-isolation feeling came with the series of Anglo-German alliance negotiations from 1898 to 1901. The failure of these attempts was due not so much ** Sidney B. Fay, Origins of the War, I, 127. Salisbury to O'Connor, Jan. 25, 1898, B. D., I , 8. " Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, A. W. Ward & G. P. Gooch, editors, III, 260 ff.

THE GENESIS OF THE ENTENTE to British unwillingness to make the break from isolation to alliance as to the inability of the promulgators of the negotiations to overcome the coolness, suspicion, and even antipathy between both the governments and the people of the two countries. It was recognized by the statesmen that public opinion in neither country was favorable to such an alliance. 35 While L o r d Salisbury continued to refuse to admit that Great Britain stood in the need of an alliance, 36 L o r d Lansdowne's difference in opinion on the subject of isolation was very marked. In November of 1 9 0 1 he wrote: " I think, however, that we may push too far the argument that because we have in the past survived in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the effect of that isolation in the future." A n d in regard to the Japanese negotiations then under way, he added: " I n approaching the Japanese we have, indeed, virtually admitted that we no not wish to stand alone." 3 7 Official conversations with Japan on the subject of an alliance began in August 1 9 0 1 . T h e " A g r e e m e n t , " as it was called, which was eventually signed between the representatives of the two powers on January 20, 1902, was in reality a formal treaty of defensive alliance. T h e definite break from isolation had been made. 38 B y the end of the year 1 9 0 1 , when the alliance negotiations were dropped, feeling between Great Britain and Germany had taken a definite turn for the worse. T h e Boer W a r , while creating bitterness against England in all the continental countries, furnished a long-drawn-out series of opportunities for vehement attacks in the German press which seem at times to have been beyond the understanding of the German statesmen. In all probability " t h e anti-English feeling in Germany was stronger than the anti-German feeling in England," 3 9 but the feeling in E n g l a n d was so high that Lansdowne doubted whether any sort "Memorandum by Lansdowne, Nov. 1 1 , 1 9 0 1 , B. D., II, 78; Holstein to Chirol, Jan. 3, 1902, B. D., II, 84; Fay, Origins of the War, I, 1 2 9 - 1 4 1 ; Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, Ch. V. 36 Memorandum by Salisbury, May 29, 1 9 0 1 , B. D., II, 68-69. "Memorandum by Lansdowne, Nov. 1 1 , 1 9 0 1 , B. D., II, 77. "Anglo-Japanese Agreement, Jan. 30, 1902, B. D., II, 1 1 4 - 1 2 0 . ^ Fay, Origins of the War, I, 1 3 6 .

26

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

of agreement with Germany would be sanctioned by the British parliament/ 0 Already certain sections of the English press had embarked upon a strongly anti-German policy. 41 Violent feeling between the two countries reached a crest in the winter of 1901-1902 following a remark by Joseph Chamberlain which in itself was a mere trifle. T h e British colonial secretary, who so recently had played a leading rôle in the movement for cooperation with Germany, initiated the controversy during a public address at Edinburgh on October 25, 1901. As a reply to accusations of atrocious actions on the part of the British troops in South Africa, he referred to "the action of those nations who now criticise our 'barbarity' and 'cruelty,' but whose example in Poland, in the Caucasus, in Algeria, in Tonquin, in Bosnia, in the Franco-Prussian war we have never approached." 42 Obviously the French and other nations as well had as much reason for being offended as the Germans, but the remark passed virtually unnoticed in France, while in Germany it created a veritable furor. German chauvinists took occasion to become horrified, and sections of the German press descanted vigorously and at length. A large student meeting of protest was held, and a group of 680 ministers signed a petition solemnly remonstrating against the "wanton audacity" of M r . Chamberlain. Eventually the affair became a matter of diplomatic correspondence, and Chancellor von Biilow attempted to secure an official denial from Lansdowne that Chamberlain had meant any offense to Germany. Lansdowne naturally refused to make an official statement, though he readily gave his personal opinion to the effect 40 Memorandum by Lansdowne, Nov. n , 1 9 0 1 , B. D., II, 7 8 ; for a brief list of illustrative articles in English periodicals expressing anti-German feeling, see Halévy, Les Impérialistes au Pouvier, p. 4 1 1 note; see also an article in The Times Jan. 1 3 , 1902 (Continued Jan. 1 4 ) with the caption " T h e Literature of German Anglophobia." 41 Oron J . Hale, Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 1 7 ff. A discussion of the English press attitude is given below. " Mr. Chamberlain's Defense of the British troops in South Africa against the Foreign Slanderers, p. 4. This was a pamphlet reprinted from the Standard including speeches, newspaper articles, etc., on the controversy. Funds were supplied by interested individuals for the distribution of 30,000 copies among the British troops in South Africa.

T H E

GENESIS

OF

T H E

E N T E N T E

that no harm had been meant.43 When Biilow later inferred to the Reichstag that he had secured an apology from the British Government, Lansdowne immediately threatened to publish the whole correspondence." In January 1902, when the matter came before the German Reichstag, one German extremist characterized the British army as a "pack of thieves and brigands," and Chamberlain as the "most accursed scoundrel on God's earth." Of course he was rebuked by the Chancellor, but far too moderately to suit The Times which, in a leading article, expressed the opinion that Biilow himself had used a "gratuitously insulting tone towards England." 45 The whole affair was an unpleasant anticlimax to the breakdown of the Anglo-German negotiations. There had been a considerable amount of moderation shown by sections of the press in each country, but it had hardly been characteristic. For the time being, at least, there was little chance for the renewal of negotiation even if there had been an inclination to do so. The change in the British attitude was rather strikingly stated by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, who wrote in April 1902 to Miss Lascelles, daughter of the English Ambassador to Berlin, as follows: Y o u w o u l d be interested to see the effect created in E n g l a n d

by

the G e r m a n treatment of us. T h e change is extraordinary. E v e r y o n e in the office and out talks as if w e had but one enemy in the world and that G e r m a n y . . . . T h e change in C h a m b e r l a i n ' s mind is most r e markable. T h e last time I s a w him he w a s a mad philogerman, and now!46

For their part the Germans were inclined to blame the whole bitterness of English feeling on Joseph Chamberlain and The " L a n s d o w n e to Buchanan, Nov. 26, 1901, B. D., I, 2 6 3 - 6 4 ; Lansdowne to Buchanan, Dec. 3, 1 9 0 1 , B. D., I, 265-66. 44 Lansdowne to Lascelles, Jan. 14, 1902, B. D., I, 266-67. 45 The Timet, Jan. 10, 1902. See also W. L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, II, 7 7 4 - 7 7 5 ; The Times, Oct. 27, Nov. 2, 5, 7, 14, 22, 1 9 0 1 , Jan. 9, 11, 1 9 0 2 ; B. D., I, 2 6 3 - 2 6 9 ; G. P., XVII, 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 , 1 4 9 - 1 5 2 , 1 9 5 - 1 9 7 ; D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 1 6 - 1 7 , » I - * * , 26-27, 43"+5" The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, I, 750.

28

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH

Times,"

ENTENTE

and to exaggerate the importance of Chamberlain in

the formation of English opinion. In September Eckardstein warned the German Chancellor that Your Excellency must not ignore the fact that Chamberlain is in the new cabinet, perhaps even more than in the old, the Minister who determines the policy of the country and who holds a position of authority with the great mass of the population which is at the present dominant and unattackable. So long as we have to count on the passionate hostility of Mr. Chamberlain, it seems impossible for us to ameliorate relations with England to the point of being able to check the growing spirit of dissatisfaction and distrust among the English people in regard to Germany. Mr. Chamberlain is master of a large part of the English press which blindly follows any signal he gives it.48 A n d when the Kaiser paid a visit to E n g l a n d in November 1902, he wrote to B u l o w : His [Chamberlain's] influence is absolutely the determining factor — h e is all-powerful in England, and all classes of the population are back of him. The ministry simply dance when he whistles and do nothing important without consulting him—never anything against him." W h i l e obviously the interpretation of Chamberlain's position by Eckardstein and the Kaiser is an exaggerated one, there can be no doubt that his position with the English people in 1902 was extremely strong and that his influence was tremendous. T h e popularity of the colonial minister was at its height between the ending of the Boer W a r and the initiation of the tariff controversy. A study of the English press of the period indicates that nearly all sections of it were highly interested in and attached significance to almost every word and act by M r . Chamberlain. Sir E d w a r d Grey in his memoirs comments: It is interesting to observe how inevitably one comes, in this period, to quote Mr. Chamberlain to illustrate tendencies in foreign policy. " Mettemich to Bulow, June 1 5 , 1 9 0 1 , G. P.t XVTT, 210-11. "Eckardstein to Bulow, Sept. 14, 1902, G. P., XVII, 224. " W i l l i a m II to Bulow, Nov. 12, 1902, G. P., XVII, 116.

THE

GENESIS O F

THE

ENTENTE

. . . It was as if he had been the most sensitive barometer by which to read tendencies in foreign policy. 50 H i s influence on the break w i t h G e r m a n y is clear e n o u g h , but it is much m o r e difficult to d e t e r m i n e C h a m b e r l a i n ' s exact rôle in the British r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h France. M e t t e r n i c h rep o r t e d to t h e G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office in January

1902

that

C a m b o n a n d C h a m b e r l a i n had been negotiating f o r ten d a y s r e g a r d i n g a settlement of all outstanding colonial differences between F r a n c e and E n g l a n d , 5 1 a n d Eckardstein states that he o v e r h e a r d a conversation between the same g e n t l e m e n in February on the subjects of E g y p t a n d M o r o c c o . 5 2 T h e Diplomatiques

Français,

Documents

h o w e v e r , include no reference to such

conversations. Possibly C a m b o n ' s f r e q u e n t trips to Paris permitted him to discuss t h e m w i t h D e l c a s s é orally. B u t the indications are clear that C a m b o n w a s inclined to place much

less

emphasis on t h e attitude of C h a m b e r l a i n than on that of other British ministers, and especially that of L a n s d o w n e .

Delcassé

m a d e a notation on a report f r o m his minister in L i s b o n , w h o had secured i n f o r m a t i o n as to C h a m b e r l a i n ' s f a v o r a b l e attitude, which suggests that C a m b o n h a d said little r e g a r d i n g C h a m b e r lain's views. 5 3 O n another occasion C a m b o n warned his F o r e i g n Office that C h a m b e r l a i n , w h i l e u n d o u b t e d l y sincere, was a man w h o c h a n g e d his opinions r a p i d l y and easily and was not to be counted u p o n too h e a v i l y . " O n J a n u a r y 6, 1902, in a public address at

Birmingham,

C h a m b e r l a i n d e c l a r e d h i m s e l f in f a v o r of continued isolation. " W e h a v e the f e e l i n g , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , " said the minister, " t h a t w e h a v e to count upon o u r s e l v e s a l o n e , and I say, t h e r e f o r e , it is t h e d u t y of British statesmen a n d it is the d u t y of the British p e o p l e to count u p o n t h e m s e l v e s a l o n e , as their ancestors d i d . I say alone, yes, in a s p l e n d i d isolation, surrounded and supw

Grey, Twenty-Five

Years, I, 48.

" M e t t e r n i c h to the German Foreign Office, Jan. 30, 1902, G. P., X V I I ,

342-43™ Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, p. 228. " R o u v i e r to Delcassé, Oct. 5, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 5 1 7 . " Cambon to Delcassé, Jan. 22, 1903, D. D. F., ser. 2, III, 47-48.

30

E G Y P T AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

ported by our kinsfolk.'" 5 In all probability, however, this was more in the nature of a reaction against Germany than a serious declaration of policy, and there was a tendency in the press to regard it as such.56 It should be remembered that Great Britain signed her alliance with Japan before the end of the same month, and that Chamberlain himself was possibly engaged in conversations with Cambon at the same time or shortly afterward. This Anglo-German estrangement the French viewed with considerable interest.57 Would there now be an inclination on the part of the English to look in the direction of France for a friendship? The idea did not seem entirely untenable. Early in 1901 there had been a number of anti-German articles appearing in English periodicals, particularly in the Fortnightly Review and the National Review, which had favored an understanding with France's ally, Russia.58 After the article on "British Foreign Policy" by A B C in the November 1901 National Review, the idea of a Russian agreement attracted increased attention.59 Professor Langer ably presents the view that in 1901 the British statesmen generally would have preferred an arrangement with Russia to any other.60 However that may have been, the rapprochement with Russia was not to come until after the one with France. Moreover, the situation in 1902 appeared to Delcasse and Cambon to be of such a nature as to warrant an effort to arrive at a general understanding with Great Britain, particularly an understanding that would settle the Moroccan question in France's favor. In comparison with the conditions of a year or more later, however, evidences of a general desire for an Anglo-French understanding in 1902 seem few indeed. In the discussion of 13

The Times, Jan. 7, 1902. ** The Times, Jan. 7, 8, 1902. " Noailles to Delcasse, Jan. 9, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 1 6 - 1 7 ; Cambon to Delcasse, Jan. 10, 1902, ibid., pp. 2 1 - 2 2 ; Noailles to Delcasse, Jan. 1 2 , 1902, ibid., pp. 26-27; a n d Noailles to Delcasse, Jan. 19, 1902, ibid., 43-45. " L a n g e r , Diplomacy of Imperialism, II, 725-726. "¡bid., pp. 754-759; Metternich to Biilow, Nov. 14, 1 9 0 1 , G. P., X V I I , 534-35 ) Biilow to Metternich, March 1 3 , 1902, ibid., pp. 1 4 9 - 1 5 2 . Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, II, 725-726, 736, 742, 754 ff.

T H E GENESIS OF THE ENTENTE

31

foreign affairs in the French chamber in January 1902, there had been a marked tendency on the part of the opposition to criticize the government for not pursuing a stronger foreign policy during the moments of opportunity afforded by British preoccupation with the Boer War; and almost every phase of British policy that concerned France had been criticized.61 From various of its agents the French Government throughout 1902 received expressions of fear that Great Britain, now that the Boer War had ended, would give greater attention to her imperialistic ambitions and thus jeopardize French interests.62 Count Robert de Caix, writing for the Bulletin in June, expressed the same belief. "Everywhere," he declared, "England or her dominions are becoming active in the territory where we have interests . . . on all sides we fear a renewal of former difficulties with English policy." 63 The colonials were especially worried over the possibilities of interference with their Moroccan aspirations. In February and again in March, de Caix expressed thorough dissatisfaction with Delcassé because of the weakness of his Moroccan policy.64 The general incompetence of the young Sultan, disorders on the French border, and threats of uprisings in the interior threatened a Moroccan crisis. Moreover, the Sultan had surrounded himself with English favorites and advisers rather than with French; hence the French found it quite difficult to exert any personal influence over him.65 They particularly resented the position of the Englishman, Kaid Maclean, who had been made a sort of commander-in-chief of the Sultan's forces.66 Early in July the French minister in Morocco, G. Saint-René-Taillandier, sent " The Times, Jan. 2 1 , 22, 1902. D'Amade to André, May 14, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 304-306; Prinet to Delcassé, June 7, 1902, ibid., 3 4 5 ; Rotard to Delcassé, Aug. j , 1902, ibid., 435"Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, June 1902, XII, 220. 64 Ibid., Feb., 1902, XII, 5 3 - 5 5 ; and March, 1902, XII, 107. G. Saint-René-Taillandier, Les Origines du Maroc Français, pp. 1 5 - 1 8 , 21-22. ** Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 22, 1902, B. D., II, 262 ; ibid., July 23, 1902, p. 2 6 3 ; Bulletin du Comité de L'Afrique Française, Oct. 1 9 0 1 , X I I , 3 4 5 - 3 5 4 .

32

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

a long report to the French Foreign Minister reiterating his former statements of French difficulties in the country and urging the necessity for something being done. This report, Taillandier believed, was the final deciding factor in leading Delcassé to begin conversations with L o r d Lansdowne. 67 Thus the possibilities of increased difficulties, in Morocco and elsewhere, acted as an incentive for approaching the British. Without doubt the Moroccan question was the immediate and pressing reason for approaching Great Britain, and happily there were certain circumstances apparently favorable to such an approach. King Edward was known to favor the French, and in early March of 1902 he had, through the British Ambassador at Paris, expressed the desire to pay a visit to Paris. Plans for the visit did not materialize, 68 but it is quite interesting to speculate what the effect might have been on Anglo-French relations had plans for the visit gone through in the spring of 1902 rather than in 1903. There were also indications that the French colonial group, lately so inclined to criticize Delcassé's policy and to view pessimistically future Anglo-French relations, would not be averse to a settlement with England, provided they could get what they wanted. De Caix in the June number of the Bulletin, even while expressing fears of future collisions with England, suggested that the best settlement would be a "comprehensive arrangement, concluded with liberality between the two countries, making an intelligent division of regions where the interests of one or the other is truly predominant." 69 The discussion was taken up by M r . E . D. Morel in an English colonial magazine, West Africa.70 In the opinion of the West Africa, de Caix, pessimistic as he seemed, was much more conciliatory than other French colonials.71 T h e idea continued to be discussed by the Bulletin, but without attracting a great deal of attention. T h e " Taillandier, Les Origines du Maroc Français, pp. 82-86. " Delcassé to Cambon, March 5, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 1 4 1 ; Cambon to Delcassé, March 13, 1902, ibid., p. 169. " Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, June 1902, XII, 221. ° West Africa, July 5, 1902. n Ibid., Aug. 30, 1902.

T H E GENESIS OF T H E E N T E N T E

33

general tone was that the colonials would not be unconciliatory if only England would take into consideration the interests and desires of France, and it was not difficult to infer that the Bulletin particularly referred to Morocco.72 It noted with considerable interest that several suggestions looking toward an Anglo-French understanding were made by English liberals in the House of Commons during the month of July. Mr. James Bryce stated on July 3 that he considered it "of the greatest possible importance that questions still outstanding between France and us should be cleared up; and now that peace had been restored in South Africa, and that a friendly and capable minister was at the head of foreign affairs in France, the time was opportune for the settlement of those questions."73 Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Gibson Bowles expressed the fear that an arrangement might prove difficult because or French aggression in Morocco,74 but Sir Edward Grey several days later expressed his desire for Enland and France to march together in policy.75 , On July 23, 1902, the French Ambassador to London approached Lord Lansdowne with the idea of an agreement between France and England respecting Morocco. His words left no doubt as to the type of Moroccan settlement he had in mind. H e declared that the French Government was desirous of maintaining the status quo in Morocco but it was not enough that the British and French should declare their desires to maintain the status quo. They should be "prepared for eventualities." Cambon expressed the idea that the English were, after all, interested mostly in the fate of Tangier, and an arrangen^ent could easily be made whereby that city should be neutralizedJAccording to Cambon he had made these suggestions upon his own initiative, but obviously it is unlikely that he would have done so without knowing the views of Delcassé.76 In Lansdowne's own words, n

XII,

Bulletin du Comité, etc., August 1902, X I I , 288-290; ibid., Sept. 1902, 316-317.

™Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. n o , 730. " Ibid., pp. 70J, 7 1 1 - 1 2 . "Ibid., vol. I l l , 304-307. The D. D. F. include no correspondence between Cambon and Delcassé on the point.

34

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

he replied that when Cambon had secured Delcasse's official sanction for such discussions, "he would find me perfectly ready to discuss them . . . in the frankest possible manner." In reporting the incident to Monson, Lansdowne did not indicate that he offered at the time any objection to Cambon's interpretation of British interests in Morocco." It is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that Lansdowne himself was quite open to such negotiations. Cambon's reports to Delcasse emphasize Lansdowne's favorable personal attitude throughout the 1902 conversations, though Lansdowne's later letters present quite a different picture of the conversations than that given by the Ambassador. Cambon states that on July 30, Lord Lansdowne, after having talked over the matter with Prime Minister Balfour and having found him favorably inclined to Moroccan conversations, inquired anxiously whether Delcasse had as yet given his official sanction.78 Manifestly Cambon and Delcasse were counting heavily upon Lansdowne's favorable attitude.79 Significantly the French proposals came immediately upon the retirement of Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister, which event took place on July 12, 1902. On the whole, it was with some considerable hope of success that Cambon, with the official sanction now of the French Foreign Minister, resumed the discussion on August 6. T h e scope of the French proposals of August 6 was considerably broader than that of the previous suggestions of Cambon. T h e French Ambassador suggested that it should be possible for the two governments to move in accord in their general colonial policies since both were "f artisans du status quo fartout." This should be easier in that France was not really a competitor of Great Britain, commercially speaking, as were Germany and "Lansdowne to Monson, J u l y 23, 1902, B. D., IT, 263-264. " Cambort to Delcasse, Aug. 6, 1902, D. D. F.t ser. 2, I I , 440. ™ Sir Thomas Barclay states that he had a long conversation with Delcasse in May of 1902 just after he had returned from London and a conversation with Lansdowne. He, like Cambon, presented Lansdowne's attitude as very favorable to the movement f o r Anglo-French amity (Barclay, Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 2 1 1 ) . Barclay's efforts for an Anglo-French rapprochement were well under way at this time.

T H E GENESIS OF T H E E N T E N T E

35

the United States. Cambon proposed that a settlement be reached with regard to Siam and Morocco. As for Morocco, he repeated that the French Government had no desire for the question to pass into an "acute stage"; France particularly feared that some of the English advisers of the Sultan might encourage him to take steps that would lead to conflict with France and hence precipitate trouble. Nevertheless, the French felt that there should be a discussion of what action the two governments might be forced to take in the event of Morocco passing "into liquidation." Cambon suggested that Spanish interests would have to be reckoned with, and again intimated that the French would be willing to neutralize Tangier, though they would not be willing to see it pass into British or other strong hands. H e also made it clear that Germany was not to be considered in any settlement. F o r his part, L o r d Lansdowne expressed interest in the proposals of M . Delcasse and declared that he concurred with some of the views, without stating which ones. 80 According to Cambon, the British Minister suggested bringing Newfoundland into the discussion.81 H e also said that he regarded with great apprehension the possibility of provoking a Moroccan crisis, and reminded Cambon that Germany, Italy, and Spain all had interests in the country. It is obvious, of course, that the French could not have expected to gain the position they desired in Morocco without making more concessions than those suggested. Great Britain, as has been seen, possessed a larger share of Moroccan trade than any other country. In Gibraltar she held one of the pillars of Hercules, and for strategic reasons could never see the opposite pillar at Ceuta fall into the hands of a strong European power. So long as it remained in the weak hands of Spain there would hardly be any serious apprehension, but the important city of Tangier must either be neutralized, as the French suggested, or at least provision made to prevent it from belonging to anyone other than the British. And, regardless of the attitude Cambon "Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, B. D., II, 264-266. " Cambon to Delcasse, Aug. 9, 1902, D. D. F.t ser. 2, II, 443.

36

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

might assume for the purpose of diplomatic dealings, for Great Britain to give way to France politically in Morocco would be a very real concession. That the question of Egypt did not come into the 1902 negotiations is because of the fact that the negotiations did not proceed far enough. The British did not get to the point of stating what their counter-demands would be. Inevitably, in any general colonial settlement, the question of Egypt would have occupied the foremost place. Lansdowne's answer to the proposals made by Cambon on August 6 was not given until after more than two months had elapsed. The government holidays had intervened to make it impossible for the cabinet to give the French proposition full consideration. Meanwhile, news of the nature of the LansdowneCambon conversations was secured by certain individuals who used it in such a manner as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the successful continuation of the negotiations. Possibly the British cabinet would have been unwilling at the time to consider the French proposals, but the evidence indicates that the Foreign Office, at least, was highly displeased with the turn that events took. In what precise manner the "leak" occurred the writer has been unable to determine, but in early September knowledge of the negotiations came into the hands of M r . Walter B. Harris, the well-known writer on Morocco, and Times correspondent at Tangier. M r . Harris, who had been in Morocco since 1887, occupied a position of considerable influence in that country. During the year 1902 he spent a great deal of time at the Moorish Court and was on very good terms with the young Sultan. 82 Occasionally he was used by the British Government on official missions of one sort and another.83 It is conceivable, therefore, that Harris received his information either through misguided confidence or from an official source which was opposed to the idea of British concessions to France in Morocco. At any rate, Harris hurriedly returned to Morocco early in September of 85 Walter Burton Harris, Morocco That Was, pp. 6-8, 44-46, 5 2 ; Cambon to Delcasse, Aug. 9, 1902, D. D. Fser. 2, II, 438-439. ** Harris, op. cit., pp. 2 3 - 3 1 .

THE GENESIS OF THE E N T E N T E 1902 from a short visit in London and gave a report of the negotiations to the Sultan. Shortly afterward he made similar disclosures to the German consular agent at Fez. According to Maenss, the German consul at F e z , Harris claimed to have had his information confirmed by L o r d Lansdowne, to whom he had presented himself as having been admitted into the secret by the English legation at T a n g i e r . " Harris's report exaggerated somewhat the French proposals. According to his story, France was to be permitted a protectorate over Morocco, Tangier and a strip of the Moroccan littoral opposite Gibraltar were to be neutralized, English trade was to be protected, and Great Britain was to receive compensation in E g y p t and elsewhere. T h e presence of the idea of compensation for Great Britain in E g y p t lends weight to the theory that the Egyptian problem would certainly have been brought into the negotiations had they proceeded further. Whatever his motives, though doubtless they were sincerely patriotic, Harris had the definite object in view of breaking up the negotiations. H e suggested to the German consul, though carefully requesting that his name be kept out of the affair, that an appeal for information by the German Government would bring an end to the discussion. H e also wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Minister at Tangier, that unless the negotiations were broken off he would proceed to make publications that would be highly embarrassing to the British Government. 8 5 Lastly, his information, and doubtless his advice, was responsible for the hurried mission of Kaid Maclean to London. Maclean, having been entrusted with a personal letter from H i s Shereefian Majesty to King E d w a r d , and with various verbal messages to be given to the Foreign Office, 86 traveled from F e z to Tangier in near record time and embarked on September 18 for London. It was announced that he had gone to consult an oculist.87 In " Mentzingen to Richthofen, Sept. 14, 1902, G. P., X V I I , 344. " Ibid. The conversation between Harris and the German consul took place on Sept. 10, 1902. M Memorandum for Kaid Sir H. Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, B. D., II, 272-273. *' Cambon to Delcasse, Oct. 4, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 5 1 5 .

38

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

London he carried the messages from the Sultan to the King and to the Foreign Office, and conferred with Mr. Balfour and Lord Roberts.88 The Sultan requested that Great Britain should guarantee the integrity of Morocco or, failing that, proposed that Great Britain and Germany should jointly guarantee Moroccan integrity for a period of seven years, during which time the Sultan would make specified reforms and developments in his country. He also presented plans regarding a new loan, and proposals for the development of the Moroccan railways.89 Apparently Maclean was to imply the threat that if Great Britain refused to listen, he would turn solely to Germany. The Kàid's persistence appears to have set none too well with Sir Thomas Sanderson, the permanent under-secretary, who wrote to Nicolson that "Kâid Maclean is rapidly developing into a perfectly phenomenal bore."90 British diplomacy in the meantime was having to deal with the other phases of the Harris campaign to put an end to the Moroccan negotiations. Around the first of October the Austrian chargé d'affaires in Paris called on Ambassador Monson to express his anxiety over the rumored negotiations.91 A reasonable guess seems to be that the German Foreign Office was choosing this indirect method of following the suggestion made by Harris. On September 29 Harris received a letter from Sir Arthur Nicolson stating that Harris's information regarding the Anglo-French conversations was incorrect, and that such negotiations were not taking place—he did not say that they had not taken place. As for the threat by Harris to resort to the press, Nicolson declared that there would probably follow an official denial from the Foreign Office which would place Harris in a bad light.92 The British Documents do not indicate whether Note Communiquée par la Section Renseignments de l'État -Major de l'Armée, Oct. 7, 1902, D. D. F.t ser. 2, I I , 522-524. "Memorandum for Kaid Sir H. Maclean, Oct. 23, 1902, B. D., II, 272" H a r o l d Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, p. 108. Monson to Lansdowne, Oct. 3, 1902, B. D., II, 267. At least this is the account given by Harris to the German consul at Fez, and there seems to be no reason for doubting it (Maenss to Mentzingen, Sept. 29, . 9 0 2 , G. P., X V I I , 34.7). 91

T H E

GENESIS

OF

T H E

E N T E N T E

Nicolson had been instructed by the Foreign Office in his answer, though it seems entirely likely that he should have been. Evidence of Nicolson's displeasure with the conduct of Harris during the whole episode is given in a conversation between Nicolson and Taillandier. T h e British Ambassador expressed his annoyance at Harris and his apprehension regarding Harris's influence at the Sultan's court, and declared that he had complained to the Foreign Office about him." 9 3 B y late September, rumors of the Cambon proposals had also found their way into the London press and hence to Madrid, where they were creating considerable excitement. 94 Hence L o r d Lansdowne and the British cabinet were confronted on numerous sides with indications of opposition arising from the disclosures of the French proposals. Favorable propaganda for the cause of Anglo-French agreement had not as yet prepared the way as it had a year later. T h e British answer could hardly have been anything but a refusal, or at least a refusal for the time being. As Cambon's account of the manner in which the British answer was made differs considerably from that of L o r d Lansdowne, the degree of finality with which the negotiations were closed is difficult to ascertain. On October 1 5 , Lansdowne wrote to Monson that Cambon had again brought up the subject of Morocco and had dwelt upon the argument that the British had no political concern with the interior of the country. According to the Foreign Minister's letter he replied: I refused to admit that this w a s a correct description, and I again said that w e w e r e not prepared to discuss a possible " l i q u i d a t i o n " of M o r o c c o , 9 5 and that so far as I could understand the terms upon w h i c h it w a s suggested that such a liquidation m i g h t take place, they a p peared to me to be of a kind which w e should have difficulty in accepting. 9 6

Cambon failed for a week to report this conversation, and then " Saint-Rene-Taillandier to Delcasse, Oct. 2 3 , 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, I I , 556-557M Le F a i v r e to Delcasse, Sept. 25, 1 9 0 2 , D. D. F., ser. 2, I I , 493. " 5 In the August 6 interview Lansdowne had expressed "great apprehension" over dealing prematurely with the Moroccan question, but the evidence does not indicate that he had previously refused to consider it. Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 1 5 , 1 9 0 2 , B. D., I I , 270.

40

EGYPT

AND

THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

did not indicate that Lansdowne's language had been so strong. According to Cambon, Lansdowne had merely been evasive and had declared that the cabinet, because of the necessity of dealing with the Education Bill, could not take up the proposals for the time being. 97 In all probability Lansdowne's account was the more accurate. H e could hardly have had reason for writing to Monson as he did unless he was telling the truth. On the other hand Cambon had previously presented such a favorable picture of the possibilities to Delcasse that he might well have temporized as long as there seemed to be any hope for success. Cambon also pointed out that Lansdowne's answer, along with Maclean's visit and certain other factors, was not a very good omen. 08 Regardless of the possibilities of evasiveness by Lansdowne in answering Cambon, his language in a memorandum for Kaid Sir H . Maclean, dated October 24, in reply to the proposals entrusted to that gentleman by the Moorish Sultan, is clear enough: A s for ourselves w e have always regarded, and still regard the Moorish question as one in which w e have a special interest, but any attempt to interfere with the integrity and independence of M o r o c c o would be a matter of general concern, and there is not the slightest chance of any one Power being given a free hand in that country. G r e a t Britain will not acquiesce in any such attempt. 98

Moreover, in the following month, when the threat of a rebellion among the Moorish tribes became serious enough to suggest the possibility of a Moroccan crisis, the English at once sent additional ships to stand in readiness at Gibraltar. 1 0 0 Cambon did not report the rejection of the French proposals until December 17. 1 0 1 Delcasse at once instructed him to insist upon France's desire to maintain the status quo in Morocco— Delcasse had, of course, always emphasized this point even while proposing action that might be taken in the event that a "liquida** Cambon to Delcasse, Oct. 23, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 559. "Ibid., pp. 559-561. "Memorandum for Kaid Sir H. Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, B. D., II, 273. 11,0 Delcasse to Cambon, Nov. 14, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 603; ibid., Nov. 1 7 , 1902, p. 6 1 0 ; Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 3 1 , 1902, B. D., II, 274. 101 Cambon to Delcasse, Dec. 17, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 660.

T H E GENESIS O F T H E E N T E N T E

41

tion" became inevitable—but to suggest that, in the event of a crisis arising because of present difficulties in Morocco, the interested powers should take counsel together. 102 Lansdowne expressed himself as being in agreement with the idea of the interested powers taking counsel together and of restricting the number of interested powers to as few as possible. W h e n , however, Cambon specifically indicated Germany as a non-interested power, Lansdowne declared the matter too delicate to express an immediate opinion on. 103 W i t h this late December exchange of opinions the negotiations came to an end for a period of several months. Delcasse had retreated from the proposals as gracefully and as logically as possible. H e had insisted all along that he had no desire to disturb the status quo, and that an understanding between Great Britain and France would be the best means of preserving it. If the English were not prepared to take up his suggestion of a general colonial understanding, or to make an agreement regarding a possibly inevitable liquidation of Morocco, he could continue blithely to declare his support of the status quo. W h e n Sir Edward Monson, in a conversation with the French Foreign Minister, used the term "passing into liquidation" with reference to Morocco, Delcasse "assumed an air of innocence, and affected complete ignorance of the subject." Monson was inclined to believe that Cambon had got some of his own personal views confused with those of Delcasse in repeating them to Lansdowne, 10 * but the correspondence between the French Minister and Ambassador leaves little if any doubt that Delcasse's views on a possible liquidation of Morocco were accurately presented. 105 L o r d Lansdowne entertained no illusions as to the intent of the French proposals. W i t h a touch of irony he commented to Monson on December 3 1 : " " D e l c a s s e to C a m b o n , Dec. 30, 1 9 0 1 , D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 683. ' " ' L a n s d o w n e to Monson, D e c . 3 1 , 1902, B. D., II, 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 . " " M o n s o n to Lansdowne, J a n . 9, 1903, B. D., II, 2 7 J . "" C a m b o n had returned to Paris to receive oral instruction f o r the A u g u s t 6 interview

but the nature of

the instructions can be clearly seen f r o m

the

account sent to Delcasse of the interview ( C a m b o n to Delcasse, A u g . 9, 1902,

D. F. F.,

ser. 2, II, 4 4 2 ) .

42

E G Y P T

AND

T H E

ANGLO-FRENCH

E N T E N T E

A t that t i m e [ A u g u s t 6 ] the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t seemed to c o n template w i t h e q u a n i m i t y , if not w i t h satisfaction, a " l i q u i d a t i o n " of M o r o c c o , u n d e r w h i c h that c o u n t r y w o u l d be, if not partitioned, at a n y rate divided into spheres of influence under the control of F r a n c e , E n g l a n d a n d Spain. T o d a y he made n o reference to any such p o s sibilities, a n d

represented

the F r e n c h

Government

as the

leading

a d v o c a t e of n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n and of the maintenance of the 106 quo.

status

Because of the circumstances, the British Foreign Minister had rejected the proposals of the French and had even taken a stronger attitude toward Morocco than formerly, but more propitious circumstances would undoubtedly find him again in a receptive mood. Something of this attitude can be inferred from a speech delivered on December 12, which came after his answer to Cambon. H e referred to the current rumors that negotiations were proceeding with the French to settle all outstanding difficulties, and denied their existence. H e added, however, that he was glad that such rumors existed because they were proof that the public agreed with him in desiring a better understanding with France. H e then referred to the fact that in certain uncivilized regions civilized countries were apt to be played one against the other to the point of creating difficulties between them. It would be much better, he declared, for the two governments to settle the question like men of business.107 Hardly more than six months were required for the British cabinet to make a complete volte face from its Moroccan attitude and for the renewal of the negotiations. 10

" Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 3 1 , 1 9 0 2 , B. D., II, 2 7 5 . H a l e v y , History of the English People, jgpf-rpos, I, 506. It is interesting and not without significance to note that M r . Chamberlain expressed himself in early December of 1 9 0 3 as believing that the time had come f o r an A n g l o - F r e n c h entente. T h i s declaration was made in E g y p t , where the colonial secretary had stopped f o r a short visit on his way to South A f r i c a , and made, apparently, with the definite idea of having it repeated to M . Le Compte, the French agent in E g y p t . Circumstances had prevented an earlier plan f o r an interview between L e Compte and Chamberlain. In that M r . Chamberlain had not left E n g l a n d until November 25, well after the time when Lansdowne claims to have rejected the French proposals, the most reasonable conclusion seems to be that Chamberlain considered the rejection merely as a temporary one. ( L e Compte to Delcasse, Dec. 1 2 , 1 9 0 2 , D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 6 5 3 - 6 5 6 ) . 107

ILL THE

GROWTH

OF

ANGLO-FRENCH

AMITY DURING 1902, when the first efforts toward an Anglo-French Entente were made, there were indications in both countries of a growing interest in the cause of amity between them, but at the time the movement was a relatively restricted one. Undoubtedly the British and French diplomatic forces were several steps ahead of their respective publics. L o r d Lansdowne appears to have brought the conversations of 1902 to an abrupt end rather than have the idea leak out that the British Government were considering concessions to France in Morocco. Certain interested groups and individuals, to be sure, had labored for several years to bring about better relationships between the two countries, but their efforts had hardly produced any noticeable effect upon the two nations as a whole. E n g l a n d and France had been diplomatic opponents too long, and too often enemies in war and rivals in colonial matters in all parts of the world, to permit a sudden conversion to close and lasting friendship. Not until the spring of 1903 did the newspapers and periodicals begin to speak confidently of better Anglo-French relations. E v e n then M . Paul Cambon feared that the new spirit could not continue, 1 and no one had worked more assiduously f o r better feeling than M . Cambon or perhaps understood better how that feeling had been achieved. T h e crucial stage of the rapprochement came and passed successfully when K i n g E d w a r d made his visit to Paris in M a y 1 9 0 3 . T h e movement swung into f u l l stride with the return visit of President Loubet and the French parliamentarians in J u l y of the same year. B y the time of the signing of the entente agreement in April 1904, favorable propa1

Cambon to Delcasse, March 13, 1903, D. D. F., ser. 2, III, 185. 43

44

EGYPT

AND

THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

ganda had produced the desired effect, and the agreement itself was received with almost universal acclaim in each country. It was evidently with conviction that Lansdowne declared as follows to the House of Lords: F o r throughout the long months during which the negotiations have been continued, w e had the absolute certainty that w e had behind us the general public feeling of this country, and that the public feeling w o u l d be grievously disappointed if w e had to bring those negotiations to a close without a friendly and satisfactory solution of these international questions. 1

T h e r e is no easy explanation of the Anglo-French rapprochement. T h e movement was the result of a great variety of efforts and was motivated by widely diversified interests. T h e most striking feature was the lack of homogeneity among its supporters. Friendship between England and France meant utterly different things to different groups. A French socialist could welcome a rapprochement with England as a counter-balance to the Russian Alliance, while a less radical Frenchman saw only the possibility of bringing England into the Franco-Russian Alliance. English liberals and pacificists hailed the cessation of enmity with France as an opportunity for the reduction of armaments; others smiled upon the movement chiefly because of their hatred for Germany. M a n y were attracted largely because of the hope of better trade relations. Some were impressed chiefly by the advantages to be gained from an imperialistic point of view. Enrolled under the banner of better relations between the two countries were to be found statesmen and politicians, socialists and chauvinists, imperialists and pacificists, trade unionists and members of royalty. T h e courtship of two great nations is indeed a strange and wonderful thing. But happily in all this confusion certain of the more predominant views can be found, and some of the more basic motives for the rapprochement can be shown. T h e public of each country was drawn toward the other because the arguments seemed convincing that France and Great ' Parliamentary

Debates,

4th series, C X X X I I I , 487.

G R O W T H OF ANGLO-FRENCH

AMITY

Britain were now striving for similar goals. T h e English attitude, as has been noted in a previous chapter, 3 had by 1902 undergone a decided change in regard to its nineteenth-century policy of splendid isolation. Commercially Great Britain and France were not rivals, politically they were both democracies, and they harbored a mutual fear and distrust of Germany. If the proper spirit were shown, the colonial difficulties between the two could be settled. Even better still, an Anglo-French understanding would permit the achievement of specific imperialistic ambitions. Moreover, the type of friendly agreement which was soon being discussed in the press seemed to the English to offer most of the advantages of an alliance without its disadvantages. And to those in each country who wanted a stronger arrangement, it could be viewed as a step in that direction. An understanding which offered peace betv/een two traditional rivals, which appeared to promise better Anglo-French trade relations, and which probably would act as a check to Germany, presented a far-reaching appeal indeed. W h e n the Anglo-German alliance attempts had ended with ill feeling stronger than ever between these two countries, not only was the possibility of any arrangement between them gone but the situation tended inevitably to draw Great Britain toward France and Russia. T o all appearances the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, however, which was signed in January 1902, made it possible for Great Britain to be drawn into war with Russia, and even conceivably with France, the ally of Russia. A s difficulties grew between Russia and Japan, Great Britain's position with relation to Europe naturally became increasingly precarious. T o some, a friendly arrangement between England and France, under the circumstances, seemed out of the question, but the more general feeling in both England and France was that agreement was now even more of a necessity for the sake of insuring Anglo-French peace. T h e effect of the Franco-Italian rapprochement upon AngloFrench relations was not particularly great, although some Eng* See chapter I I .

46

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

lishmen felt that it had weakened Anglo-Italian ties. T h e new friendship did strengthen decidedly France's international position. T h e Franco-Italian rapprochement had not stopped with the accord of December 1900, which was concerned with Tripoli and Morocco.* Prinetti, who became Italian Foreign Minister in 1 9 0 1 , was an emphatic Francophil, and in cooperation with Barrere, the French Ambassador at Rome, worked assiduously for better feelings between the two countries and for a closer agreement. Though Italy joined in renewing the Triple Alliance in M a y 1902, in November of the same year she signed the famous agreement with France, promising Italian neutrality in the event that France became the object of aggression on the part of one or several powers, or in case France was constrained to take the initiative because of direct provocation. Of course France made the same promises to Italy. 5 Henceforth Italy's loyalty to both of the European camps was questionable, a position which she was to occupy to the outbreak of the World War. Any study of the work of promoting Anglo-French amity must take cognizance of the efforts of Sir Thomas Barclay. Some of Barclay's aims were not given very serious consideration by the diplomatists of the day, but his labors were none the less effective. As chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris he was able to bring the annual meeting of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom to Paris in 1900. T h e hospitality extended by the French, the favorable reaction of the five hundred visiting English merchants, and the approval of members of the governments of both countries convinced him that the time had come for the promotion of a definite program of better Anglo-French relations. In the following March he presented this program, the first step of which was advocacy of an Anglo-French treaty of arbitration, in an address to the French Arbitration Society. Much to his disappointment only a handful of pacificists braved a snowstorm to attend the meeting, but the following day the address was re4 5

See Chapter II. Fay, Origins of the War, I, 14.7-149.

GROWTH

OF

ANGLO-FRENCH

AMITY

p r o d u c e d in f u l l on t h e f r o n t p a g e of t h e Figaro

47

and the impres-

sion g i v e n that " t h o u s a n d s h a d a t t e n d e d the m e e t i n g . " 6 Sections o f t h e press of both countries g a v e accounts of his a d d r e s s , a n d s o m e j o u r n a l s , i n c l u d i n g t h e Daily Bloc,

Le

Temfs,

a n d Le

Progress was slow

Français,

Chronicle,

Clemenceau's

Le

were immediately favorable.7

but the idea of a t r e a t y

of

arbitration,

w h i c h it w a s s a n g u i n e l y h o p e d w o u l d p u t an e n d to m a n y possible difficulties b e t w e e n t h e t w o countries in t h e f u t u r e , b e c a m e s o m e t h i n g of a r a l l y i n g

point f o r b u r y i n g t h e

Anglo-French

hatchet. T o t h e F r e n c h a n d British g o v e r n m e n t s t h e idea at first h a d little a p p e a l , t h o u g h t h e y

finally

accepted it, w i t h r e s e r v a -

tions, as a " s t e p in t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , " a n d because it w o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d b y p u b l i c opinion as " s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o g r e s s . " 8 C h a m bers of c o m m e r c e in both countries f o u n d t h e idea

singularly

a p p e a l i n g . I t fitted w e l l w i t h their hopes f o r peace a n d f o r better t r a d e relations. P e a c e societies on both

sides of t h e

channel,

F r e n c h municipal councils, a n d E n g l i s h t r a d e unions soon g a v e their s u p p o r t a n d c o o p e r a t e d w i t h the special c o m m i t t e e s f o r m e d " i n his monograph, Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, ¡8j6igo6, Sir Thomas gives a detailed account of his interesting work and experiences which it is impossible to recount here. A somewhat similar work was attempted earlier though with less success. In 1895 a small group of persons interested in better trade relations between England and France invited Sir John Renais, Lord Mayor of London, to visit the International Exposition at Bordeaux. He was welcomed by large crowds and good feeling between the neighbor countries was loudly proclaimed. Under the leadership of M a j o r Roper Parkington, who had accompanied the Lord Mayor, a society was organized in London under the name of Entente Cordiale Association. Its declared purpose was that of establishing better relations by organizing public meetings and conferences and by the circulating of favorable literature. Some dozen or so members of the House of Commons joined, but in France the politicians gave the idea less favor. Finally in 1897 a French branch of the Society was organized under the presidency of de Lanessan, but the movement in both countries soon died out for lack of support ( J . L . de Lanessan, Histoire de l'Entente Cordiale franco-anglaise, pp. 2 0 9 - 2 3 5 ) . * Sir Thomas Barclay, " A general Treaty of Arbitration between England and France," in the Fortnightly Review, June, 1 9 0 1 , L X X V , pp. 1 0 2 3 ff. * Monson tô Lansdowne, May 22, 1903, B. D.t II, 290-291. For a lengthy discussion from a practical viewpoint see Gabriel-Louis J a r a y , La Politique franco-anglaise et l'Arbitrage International, pp. 72-327.

48

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

for the specific purpose of advancing the idea of arbitration. B y the time of King Edward's visit to Paris ( M a y 1903), twentyseven British chambers of commerce, forty-one French chambers, thirty-five trade unions in England representing 2,000,000 workers, eighteen French municipal councils, and nineteen peace societies had given their support to the movement. Nine cities had special committees, and religious groups such as the Methodists, the Jews, and the Society of Friends had declared their advocacy.9 M . d'Estournelles, a well-known Anglophile and former attaché to the French Embassy in London, organized a group of two hundred French deputies.10 The Commercial Committee of the House of Commons accepted the leadership of the movement in the English parliamentary body, and it was through the two last named organizations that visits between the members of the legislative bodies of the two countries were brought about. The economic angle of the Anglo-French rapprochement deserves greater consideration and research than it has received. T o what degree the French and English benefited themselves commercially by the Entente, or to what extent the Entente was related to the changing economic theories of the period, is beyond the scope of the present study. T h e significance of the use of economic arguments in formulating favorable opinion, however, cannot be overlooked. In all of the literature of the rapprochement it would be difficult to find a more frequently used argument for Franco-British friendship than the claim that the two countries were not trade rivals but good customers of one another. 11 When Ambassador Cambon first suggested a general Anglo-French understanding to Lord Lansdowne in August 1902, he reminded the British Minister that the step should be ' B a r c l a y , Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, pp. 1 1 4 - 2 1 5 . A list of supporting organizations and of prominent individuals who gave their support is given in appendices, vii, pp. 346-353. 10 Monson to Lansdowne, M a y 22, 1903, B. £>., II, 290. " F o r an illustrative article see Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les Relations Economiques entre la France et 1'Angleterre," in Revue des Deux Mondes, Dec. 1 5 , 1903, X V I I I , 786-816. See also Gabriel-Louis Jaray, La Politique francoanglaise et l'Arbitrage International, pp. 22-27, 41-45-

GROWTH OF ANGLO-FRENCH

AMITY

much easier in that France was not really a competitor of Great Britain, commercially speaking, as was Germany and the United States. 12 One of Barclay's aims was to emphasize the fact that England was France's best customer. 13 Illustrative is the petition of the Council of Charente to the French Government in the autumn of 1903 which requested that advantage be taken of the circumstances to draw up a "treaty of commerce and friendship" with Great Britain. 14 During the visit of the French legislators to England in J u l y 1903 the idea of an economic entente received especial emphasis. Louis Sinclair, founder of the Commercial Committee in the House of Commons, spoke at length favoring the idea, and Sir Edward Sasson doubtless expressed the sentiments of many of the assembled legislators when he said: "Our aim should be to arrive at the one entente which is really stable, that based on material interests." 15 And, to quote one more example, King Edward, in the most famed of his speeches in Paris in the spring of 1903, declared: " I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent." 16 A l l of these arguments, of course, directly or indirectly presented the Anglo-French relation in sharp contrast to the increasing AngloGerman commercial rivalry. T h e attitude of both the British and the French press, it can be added, was one of the chief contributing factors to the rapprochement. Despite strenuous efforts by apologists to deny that the British were motivated by Germanophobe feelings in approaching the French, it is impossible to concur with the view. The anti-German sections of the English press nearly always, if not always, advocated an entente with France. Cambon, who watched the English public with an understanding eye, was convinced early in 1903 that the English people were approaching France at the same rate that they were drawing away from Germany. 17 " T h e Anglo-French Rapprochement," Metternich a

Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, B. D., II, 263-265. Barclay, Thirty years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, pp. 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 . " The Times, August 2 1 , 1903. " André Tardieu, France and the Alliances, p. 59. " Quoted in the Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 307. " C a m b o n to Delcassé, March 1 3 , 1903, D. D. F., ser. 2, III, 1 8 4 - 1 8 5 .

11

50

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

informed Biilow in June 1903, "is a product of the general dislike of Germany. . . . Without the Anglo-German estrangement an Anglophil feeling would not have been possible in France, and . . . without the feeling against Germany the British Press would not have been working for months in favor of a reconciliation with France. . . .'" 8 The Times, Daily Mail, Spectator, and National Review were the most anti-German of the British press organs. Professor Hale, in his study Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, has shown how the men who directed the policy of The Times became, in one way or another, anti-German in feeling,19 and in regard to foreign affairs The Times was indisputably the leading English daily. The German Ambassador at London felt that The Times was chiefly responsible for the hatred between Germany and England, and designated as those especially responsible the Berlin and Vienna correspondents.20 Alfred Harmsworth, owner of the Daily Mail, Evening News, Daily Mirror, Observer, and Weekly Dispatch, is credited with having declared that he would not permit the "least thing that might injure France" to appear in his papers, and that he should not like to see anything agreeable to Germany in them. Other sections of the British press, especially the authoritative Liberal organs, and to a lesser extent the Pearson papers, were much less Germanophobe.21 The Liberal organs, however, were almost without exception more friendly toward France than toward Germany. As for the French press, there were sections which remained much more hostile to England than any of the English press organs did toward France. The Autorité, Patrie, and Intransige™ Metternich to Biilow, June i, 1903, German Diplomatic Documents, selected and translated by E. T . S. Dugdale, III, 176. " Oron James Hale, Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 2 1 - 2 3 . "Metternich to Biilow, June 1 5 , 1902, G. P. X V I I , 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 . The successor of M. de Blowitz as Paris correspondent, M. Lavino, also worked to foster better Anglo-French relations. See article by M . Alcide Ebray in Journal des Débals, Jan. 20, 1903. " H a l e , Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 17-26. Included as authoritative Liberal organs are the Manchester Guardian, Westminster Gazette, and Daily Nevis. The leading Pearson paper was The Express.

G R O W T H O F ANGLO-FRENCH A M I T Y

51

ant were generally hostile, though the Patrie, organ of the Ligue des Patriotes, printed articles from Déroulède favoring the entente along with anti-English attacks by its editor, Lucien Millevoye.22 On the other hand, the Siècle, one of the few continental journals to do so, escaped Anglophobia during the Transvaal War and consistently worked for an entente with England. 23 The more moderate journals such as Le Temps, the Journal des Débats, and the Figaro came sooner or later to advocate friendship with England. Notable among the journalists friendly to England was M . Alcide Ebray, who usually wrote for the Journal des Débats, but there were many others who were also friendly to Great Britain including Finot, de Coubertin, Tardieu, Clemenceau, and de Lanessan. The growth of the movement toward rapprochement was altogether pleasing to the eyes of the men responsible for formulating the British and French foreign policies. Indeed they had been somewhat ahead of their respective publics as shown by the negotiations of 1902, and a number of them had openly aided the rapprochement. Delcassé's well-known partiality to a friendship with England had existed from the time of his acceptance of the portfolio for foreign affairs. He was ably backed by a coterie of influential French statesmen who, for the most part, wished to see not only a friendship with England but a new group of friendly powers including France, Russia, England, and Italy. Notable among these were the French Ambassador to Italy, Barrère, and the French Ambassador to Great Britain, Paul Cambon. Cambon, if anything, was more anxious than his chief for the success of the rapprochement with England. Rarely did he let pass the opportunity of attempting to convince both the French and the English of the good will that existed in each country toward the other. Had Cambon looked as skeptically toward the rapprochement as, for instance, did Sir Edward Monson, British Ambassador at Paris, the path would have been much more difficult. M . Loubet, as President of the French Republic, M. d'Estournelles, self-styled leader of the pro-British B

Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, p. 202. " The Times, Oct. 22, 1903.

52

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

sentiment in the Chamber of Deputies, and M . Eugène Étienne, leader of the French colonial group, were all anxious to promote the accord. The attitude of Étienne, who was the leader of one of the most difficult groups to reconcile with British imperialism, was especially important.24 In England, the retirement of Lord Salisbury in July 1902 placed the direction of foreign affairs more completely in the hands of Lord Lansdowne, a man who was certainly convinced of the advisability of a continental friendship for Great Britain. 25 With the failure of the Anglo-German negotiations in late 1901 he began to turn toward France as the logical continental friend. While Salisbury's successor, Balfour, was not one of the more prominent figures in the rapprochement, Cambon as early as the autumn of 1902 considered him as favoring an arrangement with France. 28 With the exception of Lord Lansdowne, perhaps Chamberlain was the most active minister in the new orientation of British policy. It should be noted, however, that the French placed considerably less emphasis upon the attitude of M r . Chamberlain than did the Germans, 27 and that the colonial secretary was absent from England on his South African visit from November 25, 1902, to March 14, 1903. During this four-month period a considerable part of the shift in opinion occurred. Yet, shortly after his return from South Africa, Chamberlain was giving his support not only to the idea of a settlement of difficulties with France but to a similar settlement with Russia.28 The death of Queen Victoria in 1901 brought Edward V I I to the English throne in time to play a rôle in the movement toward the Anglo-French rapprochement that his predecessor would never have accepted. T h e belief became current some time after the formation of the entente that the King "both conceived and facilitated it, while many still believed that the movement was " See below, Chapter IV. "Salisbury had retired as Foreign Minister in 1900, but as long as he remained as Prime Minister his influence was very great. "Cambon to Delcassé, Aug. 9, 1902, D. D. F.t ser. 2, II, 440. See above, Chapter II. " Radolin to Bulow, May 18, 1903, G. P., XVII, 585-587; Lansdowne to Scott, July 29, 1903, B. D., II, 212.

GROWTH OF ANGLO-FRENCH AMITY

53

premature." 2 8 That this view is untenable is generally recognized, 30 but that the British sovereign did at an early date favor the entente and that he did much to facilitate it is undeniable. H e had been anxious to make an official visit to Paris in the spring of 1902, but the plans had fallen through. 3 1 In March 1 9 0 3 , when plans were again formed for such a visit, President Loubet viewed the idea with enthusiasm. Monson wrote to Lansdowne: The intimation of His Majesty's desire was welcomed by the President with unmistakable delight, as I had expected would be the case. He said that a visit from the King would, in the present temper of France, do an amount of good which is probably not realized in England. He hoped, indeed, that H. M. G . were already aware of the extent to which cordiality to England had increased in France, but probably the public at large were not to the same extent informed as to the growth of that sentiment in Paris and throughout the country. 32 Delcasse, Cambon, Monson, and Lansdowne were all eager for the visit to take place. It would act as a test of public opinion in both countries and would serve as a medium for furthering good spirit. In the results they were not to be disappointed. T h e circumstances attending this visit, which occurred early in M a y 1 9 0 3 , have been so widely published that it hardly seems necessary to relate them here. As the Prince of Wales, King E d w a r d had been exceptionally popular in Paris and had acquired many friends through numerous visits. H i s reception, though at first 38

Tardieu, France and the Alliances, p. 60. In criticism of a statement made attributing the policy of the entente to K i n g Edward, Balfour in 1 9 1 J wrote to Lansdowne as follows: " . . . so far as I remember, during the years which you and I were his Ministers, he [ E d w a r d ] never made an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of policy" (Balfour to Lansdowne, Jan. 1 1 , 1 9 1 5 , Newton, Lansdovme, p. 2 9 3 ) . Lord Hardinge, who at the time was Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign affairs, attributed the "primary initiative" of the entente entirely to President Loubet and King Edward ( T h e Times, June 4, 1 9 2 6 ) . See also Cambon's interview in The Times, Dec. 22, 1920. n

Delcasse to Cambon, March 5, 1902, D. D. F., ser. 2, II, 141 j Cambon to Delcasse, March 1 3 , 1902, ibid., p. 169. Monson to Lansdowne, March 1 3 , 1903, Newton, Lansdovme, p. 275.

54

EGYPT

AND

THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

cool, soon became notable for its warmth. The public utterances of the King almost overflowed with cordiality, and the more sentimentally minded journalists spoke of his visit as having "won the heart of France." While ha Patrie and some of the more recalcitrant periodicals urged that the King be greeted with coolness, the Répiblique Française declared: T h e inhabitants of Paris will go forth joyfully to the duty imposed on them by international courtesy, and will welcome with sympathy a soverign w h o was their friend before he ascendcd the throne and who has shown on every occasion that he has remained the same since then. T o act otherwise would be to cause too much joy in Berlin, and people who lend themselves to such a criminal game have lost the very sense of patriotism. 33

French citizens were informed by George Villiers (André Tardieu) that the visit had no secret political motive.34 The République Française, on the contrary, expressed the belief that there was such a motive: " W e do not know," it declared, "what political object His Majesty is pursuing in coming to pay a visit to the head of the French nation. But what can be affirmed is that whether Morocco, Macedonia, or Egypt be the question, Edward V I I is now coming to Paris for a political reason."35 In England the Manchester Guardian expressed the belief that something of a political nature was afoot. It hoped that a "political understanding might make possible a reduction of armaments."36 The actual significance of the King's visit lay in the fact that it gave the highest possible official sanction to the agitation which The Times took delight in referring to as "the consentaneous movement of two great peoples toward closer comradeship."37 The royal visit and the journalistic exuberance were both efforts to create, and at the same time expressions of, the new AngloFrench good will. By July, when President Loubet returned " Ré-publique Française, April 23, 1903. " Figaro, May 4, 1903. u République Française, May 1, 1903. M Manchester Guardian, May 2, 1903. The Times, July 9, 1903.

GROWTH

OF

ANGLO-FRENCH

AMITY

King Edward's visit, the atmosphere had been well cleared for the diplomats to give more material evidence of the acclaimed friendship between the two countries. On July 11 L.e Temps stated the case very succinctly: Nothing is to be gained by an artificial discretion concerning questions the importance of which is revealed by a glance at the map. F r a n c e has ambitions. So has E n g l a n d . . . . Without even looking at world policy, A f r i c a , even North A f r i c a alone being taken into account, all the world knows what w e can offer and what she can give us. . . . L e t the negotiations begin. . . . 3 8

Even the most sanguine supporters of the new friendship knew well that questions like Egypt and Morocco, points which had so long kept the governments at loggerheads, could if provoked soon turn the flow of good words into mere hollow statements. To a very large degree, the Entente would be a success or failure depending upon how well it settled the Egyptian and Moroccan questions. Fortunately events were taking shape to make it possible for their settlement. Therein lies another, and perhaps the most important phase, of the entente development. m

Le Temps, July 1 1 , 1903.

IV THE

DEVELOPMENT

POLICY

ON

THE

OF

OPINION

EGYPTIAN

MOROCCAN

AND

AND

QUESTIONS

THE EARLIER WORKERS for better relations between England and France had little to offer in the way of a solution to the Egyptian problem. Barclay could only suggest that time would somehow smooth out the situation. In 1 9 0 1 he wrote: T h e E g y p t i a n question remains. I t is the only one w h i c h occasions real difficulty. E n g l a n d has given permanence to a state of things originally understood to be provisional. In practice, the de facto situation is not disputed; in theory F r a n c e has never w a i v e d her reservations, though the neutralisation of the S u e z C a n a l has removed one of the chief complaints on the part of F r e n c h m e n . T h a t G r e a t Britain should evacuate E g y p t no one seriously expects. I f the matter w e r e susceptible of provoking w a r , it w o u l d long since have broken out. . .

T h e idea of settling the Egyptian problem in connection with Morocco, however, was a solution obvious enough to attract attention from the press from time to time and to give currency to numerous diplomatic rumors. 2 Before the suggestion gained acceptance it was necessary to overcome powerful opposition. W h e n the diplomats resumed the entente negotiations in J u l y 1903 they were apparently still somewhat uncertain as to the nature of a Moroccan-Egyptian settlement, but influential support for such a settlement had been formed. Especially was this true in France. M o r e o v e r , the French colonial group, supposedly the most recalcitrant of all Frenchmen when it came to the Egyptian question, had worked out and publicized a fairly definite program for the settlement of colonial matters. Only its intense interest 1

Thomas Barclay, " A General Treaty of Arbitration between England and France," in The Fortnightly Review, June 1 9 0 1 , L X X V , 1 0 2 2 - 1 0 2 9 . * See above, Chapter II.

56

DEVELOPMENT

OF OPINION AND

POLICY

57

in Morocco made the colonial g r o u p w i l l i n g to grant concessions in E g y p t . D u r i n g the 1902 negotiations for an A n g l o - F r e n c h Entente, as has been noted, the question of E g y p t was apparently never brought into the official discussions. It seems entirely possible that the British were considering bringing it in, but the negotiations were halted before they progressed that far. H a r r i s , whose information concerning the conversations was otherwise accurate, reported to the G e r m a n consular agent at F e z that the British were to receive compensations in E g y p t . 3 T h e idea that E g y p t was to have been the quid fro quo for M o r o c c o in the proposed arrangement of 1902 received wide discussion in the press foll o w i n g an article by the M a d r i d correspondent of The

Times

which appeared on February 2, 1903. " T h e essential characteristic of these proposals," declared the M a d r i d

correspondent,

" w a s that France and E n g l a n d should settle the Moroccan question in connection with the question of E g y p t . In compensation f o r French official recognition of the British occupation of E g y p t , France was to be allowed a free hand in dealing with Moroccan territory save on the N o r t h African Coast line." 4 T h e correspondent added that L o r d L a n s d o w n e had not received these proposals unfavorably, and that their acceptance was m e r e l y being put off until South African affairs and the question of V e n e z u e l a could be settled. W i d e s p r e a d speculation concerning these disclosures led the French colonials in the C h a m b e r of Deputies to question Delcassé as to their authenticity. In answer to the query, the French F o r e i g n Minister p r o m p t l y denied that the problem of E g y p t and that of M o r o c c o had ever been connected in negotiations with E n g l a n d . 5 T h e s e Moroccan-Egyptian barter rumors became current just at the time when the French colonial g r o u p , aided by members of the opposition, were in the midst of an open revolt against the conduct of French foreign policy as exercised by M . Delcassé. T h e revolt was significant in several respects and had an impor' Mentzingen to Bulow, Sept. 14, 1902, G. P., X V I I , 344. ' The Times, Feb. 2, 1903. ' J . O. Chambre, Débats parlementaires,

Session ordinaire de 1903, p. 1104.

58

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

tant bearing upon the formulation of policy and opinion leading to the Anglo-French Entente. In the first place, despite Delcassé's original intention to ignore their objections, and despite his ability to hold the support of the more important journals, he was forced to reconsider his Siamese treaty, around which the colonials chose to center the attack. Thus the strength that the colonials could muster was strikingly shown. Secondly, the quarrel resulted in a compromise between Delcassé and the more important colonials in which they apparently reached an understanding for working toward the same ends as regarded AngloFrench policy. And lastly, M . Eugène Etienne, nominal leader of the colonials, gained a position of considerably greater prominence and influence during the course of the episode. The schism between Delcassé and the colonials began in October 1902 when an anonymous article attacking the Minister's foreign policy, especially as it related to imperialistic questions, appeared in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire and created something of a sensation.6 It was first attributed to Hanotaux, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who denied it, but was shortly attributed correctly to M . René Millet, ex-Resident General of Tunis. 7 A second article appeared in the November issue of the same periodical, and in December and in January others were published which were signed by Millet. Delcassé's predecessor, Hanotaux, backed by the colonial group, soon joined the attack in the open. The opposition of the colonials was the result of their dissatisfaction with what they considered an unnecessarily timid colonial policy on the part of the Foreign Minister. From their point of view Delcassé was not producing results, particularly with regard to Morocco, and they were consequently becoming restive. The Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française had expressed dissatisfaction earlier in the year with Delcassé's attitude toward the Moroccan question.8 By late October, Étienne had joined the attack and had declared to Combarieu, President * "Quatre Ans de Politique Extérieure," in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, X X X I V , 5-38. 7 The Timts, J a n . 1 0 , 1 9 0 3 . " Bulletin du Corniti> de l'Afrique Française, Feb., 1 9 0 2 , 53-55.

D E V E L O P M E N T O F OPINION A N D P O L I C Y

59

Loubet's secretary, that he would never permit the Siamese Treaty, which Delcassé had signed on October 7, 1902, to pass the French parliament.9 With the backing of Étienne and Hanotaux, who incidentally became a member of the Comité de l'Afrique Française in August 1902, the attack began to center chiefly on the convenient Siamese Treaty. In an attempt to better relations with the Siamese, Delcassé had made concessions in the Treaty, but there was little justification on that basis alone for the violent attack. Naturally the situation furnished an opportunity for the malcontents in general to attack the Combes Ministry, but for the most part it was an attack by the colonials on Delcassé. The colonials were unable to appreciate the difficulties of the Foreign Minister and failed to understand that his aims were scarcely out of accord with their own. Étienne had been fairly close to Delcassé but hardly would have known of the secret proposals to the English regarding Morocco. Besides, these proposals were rejected just as the revolt against Delcassé was getting under way. Delcassé's difficulties were increased by the fact that he was personally out of sympathy with a considerable part of the program of the Combes Ministry and with several of his colleagues.10 During December and January the revolt gained in momentum, and by late February it had reached a crisis. Delcassé was able to marshal his "squadron" of journalists in favor of the Treaty, but it was to prove of no avail. Le Tem-ps bitterly attacked the attitude of the colonials and considered the Treaty entirely reasonable.11 George Villiers gave his support in the Figaro,12 and Alcide Ebray, who was a contributor to the Bulletin du Comité de VAfrique Française, defended the Foreign Minister in the Journal des Débats.13 Rather than face the colonials in the approaching debates in the Chamber, however, Delcassé * Combarieu, Sept Ans à l'Élysée, pp. 2 1 7 - 2 1 9 . 10 Combarieu, Sept Ans à Élysée, pp. 228, 285-287; Porter, Delcassé, pp. 198-201. Combes' policies frequently drew Delcassé into the church and state quarrel against his will and tended to embroil his foreign policies. Le Temps, Feb. 25, 27, 1903. " Figaro, Feb. 26, 27, 1903. " Journal des Débals, Feb. 27, 1903.

6o

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

on February 25 asked Etienne, President of the Commission on Foreign and Colonial Affairs in the Deputies, permission to withdraw the Treaty until further negotiations could be made. 14 This virtually was a complete retreat from the Minister's treaty stand and while the Éclair, which had led the attack on Delcassé, declared that the only honorable thing for him was resignation, 15 the timely withdrawal had the effect of halting the attack at least for the moment. Delcassé was so provoked over the victory of the colonials and at the Cabinet, a majority of whom refused to support him on the issue, that, according to Combarieu, he favored a coup d' état which would overthrow the Government and set up a strong ministry responsible to the president.16 The attack which had centered on the Siamese Treaty not only had effected the withdrawal of that particular treaty but also had concentrated French attention on colonial matters as nothing else had done for several years. René Millet, who had initiated the controversy with his article in October, shifted the scene of debate in January to North Africa, critizing particularly the abandonment of Tripoli to Italy and Delcassé's conciliatory attitude in regard to Morocco. 17 H e was answered, semiofficially according to The Times correspondent in Paris, in an article by M . Victor Bérard in the February 15 issue of the Revue de Paris. Bérard's arguments were that French policy regarding Morocco must necessarily be one of pacific penetration. H e declared that even if Cambon's proposals to Lansdowne in August 1902 had been successful, little change would have occurred in the Moroccan Sultan's status. Eventually the Sultan would have become a partner (Associé) in the French African Empire, but the means used in accomplishing this end would have been peaceful. 1 8 When the parliamentary debates finally came in March, Delcassé explained carefully that French interests in Morocco would 14

Figaro, Feb. 26, 1903. " T h e (London) Morning Post, Feb. 27, 1903. " Combarieu, Sept Arts à l'Élysée, p. 228. " René Millet, "Notre Frontiers dans l'Afrique du Nord," Politique et Parlementaire, Jan., 1903, X X V , 40-81. " The Times, Feb. 16, 1903.

in

Revue

DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION AND POLICY

61

be upheld, and declared that they concerned nobody but France. H e stated that the integrity of Morocco would be maintained as an essential guarantee to the safety of Algeria. H e was interrogated specifically by M . Déloncle whether in the diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain the question of Morocco had at any time, to any degree whatsoever, been connected with the question of Egypt. Fears on the part of some of the colonials, which had been aroused by the newspaper rumors of a MoroccanEgyptian barter, were quieted by the answer that if such a connection had been made, it had been while he was asleep.19 Of immediate significance as a result of the Delcassé-colonial altercation was the recognition of the fact that Étienne and his colonial sharpshooters were a force to be reckoned with in the conduct of French foreign affairs. Ebray declared in the Journal des Débats that the colonials were beginning to dominate foreign policy, and warned against permitting their influence to become too great. Ebray's warning is the more significant in that admittedly he was a pro-colonial himself. 20 In general the journals which supported Delcassé were disinclined to admit the increased strength of the colonials. They held to the thesis that Delcassé's policy was consistent throughout and that he had not even suffered a defeat with his Siamese Treaty: it had merely been withdrawn for additional negotiations on minor points. Although some sections of the press were disposed to continue the quarrel, the Foreign Minister and his former supporters among the colonials were soon working in accord once again. When on M a y 22 Étienne dined with Combarieu he talked enthusiastically of his reconciliation with the Foreign Minister. His disagreement with Delcassé over the question of Siam had been an "old woman's quarrel." Delcassé had even ceased his negotiations with Spain in which he had come near renouncing Fez. More important still, Étienne declared that Delcassé now •preferred to grant the English complete liberty in Egypt and elsewhere in return for the French acquisition of all rights and " J . O. Chambre, Débats farlementaires, Journal des Débats, March 2, 1903.

Session ordinaire de 1903, p. 1 1 0 4 .

62

E G Y P T AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

titles to Morocco.2l Undoubtedly the idea of such a trade was pleasing to Étienne. But could the complete abandonment of Egypt in return for Morocco have been the premeditated policy of Delcassé throughout the approaching negotiations with the British? If so, the diplomatic game of gradually retreating from a position, of using that position to gain every possible advantage, and of invoking the bogey of a wrathful French public, was never played with more consummate skill. Other than Étienne's statement to Combarieu, the evidence to support the contention that Delcassé at this early date, or before, had reached the decision to abandon Egypt is tantalizingly scarce. Yet in the light of developments it seems the most reasonable explanation of French policy. The acceptance of this view sheds light upon the sudden campaign which the colonials began early in May for a reconciliation with Great Britain which included a Moroccan-Egyptian settlement. It also offers an explanation for the fact that it was Étienne who in early July made what apparently were the first overtures to Lansdowne for the resumption of the Anglo-French negotiations.22 The colonials issued their program for an agreement with Great Britain immediately following King Edward's visit to Paris in May of 1903. It should be recalled, however, that the Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française had advocated a "comprehensive arrangement" with Great Britain during the summer of 1902. 23 While there were extremists among the colonials who could never forget Egypt nor forgive the British, the majority of the group were realists who were willing to turn to an English friendship, provided that the bargain was sufficiently favorable, at a much earlier date than that which is usually accepted. It is only natural, however, in view of the party's long policy of accentuating Anglo-French colonial differences, that the colonials should have been considered an almost insurmountable barrier to friendly relations with the English. German newsn

Combarieu, Seft ans à l'Élysée, p. 14.9. "Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, B. D., II, 292-293. " Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, June 1902, XII, 2 2 1 ; Aug. 1902, XII, 288-290; ibid., Sept. 1902, XII, 316-317.

ibid.,

D E V E L O P M E N T OF O P I N I O N A N D P O L I C Y

63

papers were still pointing out during King Edward's Parisian visit that the colonials would never favor a rapprochement with England." This significant change of heart on the part of the French colonials was first widely noted by the public when two articles by Henri Lorin appeared in the May 13 and May 19 issues of the Depeche Coloniale. M . Lorin was a professor of colonial science at the University of Bordeaux, and the Depeche Coloniale was considered the official organ of the colonial group. Professor Lorin, in the first of the two articles, viewed the visit of King Edward as having exceptional significance and presented arguments for a businesslike settlement of differences between the two countries.25 On May 19 the article continued by stating explicitly what France wanted and what she would be willing to give. Professor Lorin accepted the keynote that had been sounded during the March debates in the Chamber and declared that there must be no partitioning of Morocco between the powers. France must be recognized as the predominant power and possibly granted a protectorate, though it would be feasable for her to make economic concessions and to neutralize Tangier and a portion of the African Coast. Moreover, in return for the desired gains in Morocco, France would be willing to make concessions in Egypt. H e was careful, however, as were the other colonials who expressed their views, to state that favors granted to England in Egypt could be of an economic nature only. The statement regarding Egypt is worth quoting: We are no longer strong enough in Egypt to exercise real control, but we are still in a position to hamper the free movements of the English. . . . Would it not be expedient, while reserving the maintenance of our intellectual works in Egypt, to come to an understanding as to the two substantial rights which we still possess—namely, the mixed tribunals and the administration of the Egyptian debt? That would be a genuine renunciation on our part and would unquestionably be a source of regret to the highly meritorious French Colony in Egypt. It is, therefore, necessary that England should make us some " The Times, April 4., 1903. " The Times, May 14, 1903.

64

EGYPT

AND

THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

concessions elsewhere, for instance in Morocco. A s we have set apart the question of political preponderance, that concession could only be of an economic nature.' 6

Whereas the suggestions made in the Bulletin du Comité de VAfrique Française during the previous summer which looked toward an agreement with Great Britain had fallen upon deaf ears, the ground had now been prepared for a better reception.27 In a leading article, The Times commented quite favorably on Lorin's articles although it declared that too much was asked in requesting a protectorate over Morocco without granting political concessions in E g y p t . " The Spectator, in expressing its endorsement of the terms suggested, took the view that the French colonials would be willing to resign all claims in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco.29 The Manchester Guardian refused to believe that the French were seriously contemplating Morocco as a possession, but expressed the opinion that British naval strategists would probably not be much worried over such a solution.30 Naturally there were some unfavorable reactions in England. Mr. A. J . Dawson declared in the Fortnightly Review that "there could be no more serious menace to Britain's supremacy afloat than the establishment of a French Morocco, linked to Algeria and Tunis, and forming a North African Empire." 31 Étienne himself reiterated Professor Lorin's views on the subject of Morocco at a banquet of the Union Coloniale Française on June 17 although he did not on this occasion make any reference to the possibility of concessions to Great Britain in Egypt. 32 By far the best statement of the colonial leader's views, and easily the most publicized, was his article in the July issue * The Times, May 2 1 , 1903, citing Dépêche Coloniale, May 19, 1903. 17 The English press had been favorably impressed with the tone of the French parliamentary debates, including the attitude of the colonials, in March (Cambon to Delcassé, March 1 3 , 1903, D. D. F., ser. 2, III, 1 8 3 - 1 8 4 ) . " The Times, May 22, 1903. " Spectator, May 23, 1903. " Manchester Guardian, June 5, 1903. " A s quoted in Manchester Guardian, June 5, 1903. "Le Temps, June 18, 1 9 0 3 ; The Times, June 18, 1903.

D E V E L O P M E N T OF OPINION AND P O L I C Y

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of The National Review.13 The article was an attempt to discuss all of the outstanding colonial difficulties between England and France, and was notably conciliatory in tone. The frontier question between the Niger and Lake Tchad, the French Shore in Newfoundland, Siam, New Hebrides, Egypt, and Morocco were the questions listed as requiring settlement. According to Étienne none of them should cause real difficulty. His views on Morocco differed little from those expressed by Professor Lorin. As for Egypt, he did not go so far as to suggest a recognition of the permanency of the British occupation, but he did state pointedly that he had no desire to propose a time for the fulfillment of the promises of evacuation. "That is England's affair," he declared, "and England will not break her word." 34 A variety of misleading information appeared in both the English and French press regarding Anglo-French developments during the summer of 1903, but there was little reason for the careful observer's failing to know substantially what was being planned. Étienne's views were fully discussed on both sides of the channel and were frequently treated as bearing almost an official stamp. The Paris correspondent of the Times informed the English public that " M . Étienne speaks on colonial matters in France with an authority which can be compared to that of M. Chamberlain in England, and his views on such subjects are generally endorsed by all parties in the country."35 No one doubted that a majority of the colonials were in agreement with him, although he had declared that the views expressed in his National Review article were entirely his own. Some of the French journals which ordinarily gave their full support to Delcassé were slow to accept the significance of Étienne's stand. Le Temfs, for instance, had attacked the colonial leader bitterly during the altercation over the Siamese treaty and had continued to refuse to be reconciled with him. Only after the National **A translation of the article appeared in the Dépêche Coloniale, J u l y i , 1903. ** Eugène Étienne, " T h e Colonial Controversies between France and England," in The National Review, J u l y 1903, X L , 732-749. 15 The Times, J u l y 2, 1903.

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E G Y P T AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

Review article had made a "great reverberation" among the English did Le Temfs consider it in more than in a perfunctory manner. By July 17, however, Le Temfs was speaking of M . fitienne's high position in the French political world, the fact that for twenty years he had been the center of French expansion, and of his authority as leader of the colonial party.36 The striking similarity between the program for an agreement with England which was put forward by the colonials and the program which the Government presented when negotiations were resumed in July can hardly fail of notice. Cooperation between the French Foreign Office and the colonials is obvious enough. If additional proof were required, it could be found in the next move of M . Etienne, which was to pay a short visit to London just prior to the visit of President Loubet and Delcasse. On July 2 he called on Lord Lansdowne at Downing Street and declared that he had come "in the hopes of promoting a good understanding between the two governments." H e then proceeded to outline his views on Anglo-French relations and on the possibility of arriving at a settlement of the various colonial difficulties.37 In one sense the significance of Etienne's visit and conversation lies in the fact that it afforded Delcasse an opportunity for unofficially sounding out Lansdowne's views prior to any definite commitments by the French Government. Delcasse knew of the conversation, of course,38 and it would have been amazing indeed had he not known the views set forth by fitienne and Lansdowne's reactions to them. In all probability the visit was Delcasse's idea. Some writers on the subject have erroneously considered fitienne as the French Minister of Colonies.39 In that case he would merely have been acting as something of an advance guard and as an official representative of his government. " Le Temfs, July 1 7 , 1903. Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, B. D., II, It was mentioned in the subsequent conversation Lansdowne on July 7 (Lansdowne to Monson, J u l y 7, " F a y , Origins of the War, I, 1 6 6 ; Schuman, War French Republic, p. 1 70.

293. between Delcasse and 1903, B. D., II, 296). and Diplomacy in the

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67

Actually Étienne had no official connection with the Combes Ministry. With his increased prestige since the beginning of the year, he had become a vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies and had been made president of the Union Démocratique. The Union Démocratique, however, was the most critical and least certain of any of the groups upon which the Combes bloc counted for support. Étienne himself was by no means certain to support the Ministry on domestic matters. In the second and more significant sense, then, it was as the leader of the French colonial group that Étienne paid his visit to Lansdowne. Hardly any other step could have better proved to the British Foreign Minister that the colonials, formerly so critical of England, were ready to make terms. By July of 1903 the stage was well set for the British and French diplomats to begin the work of arriving at agreement. Apparently they had done very little even in the way of informal discussion since the dropping of the French Moroccan proposals in December of 1902. 40 Circumstances were incomparably more favorable by the summer of 1903 than they were a year earlier. " T h e Anglo-French rapprochement is an accomplished fact," declared Le Temps.*1 There could be no doubt of a tremendously increased desire on the part of large sections of the public in both countries for Anglo-French cooperation. Yet it is all too easy to overemphasize this desire. There were still French colonials who would never consent to acknowledging the loss of Egypt, and there were French nationalists who would not so readily place their trust in the English. In England there was no organized group which was concerning itself with the gaining of concessions in Egypt and consequently willing to propagandize in favor of return concessions in Morocco. The English public did not consider the Egyptian question as a matter of immediate and pressing concern ; at least they were not so concerned about it as the French were over Morocco. Nine long months of precarious negotiation lay ahead of the diplomatists in July 1903. w 41

Evidence on the point is discussed below, Chapter V. Le Tempi, J u l y I I , 1903.

V EGYPT

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IF ONE of the purposes of M . fitienne's visit to L o r d Lansdowne on J u l y 2 was to discover for Delcasse whether the British were ready for the opening of negotiations, he was not to be disappointed. Lansdowne, in his account to Monson, stated that he had replied to Etienne's suggestions for settling Anglo-French colonial differences: . . . that nothing w o u l d give me greater satisfaction than to p r o mote a reasonable " g i v e and t a k e " a r r a n g e m e n t between the

two

governments, and that if the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t would put their cards upon the table and say w h a t they wished to obtain, and w h a t they w e r e prepared to concede with that object, w e should be ready to meet them in a similar spirit. A l l our diplomatic discussions upon these questions had been perfectly amicable, and characterized by a spirit of consideration on both sides, and even if w e had as yet not been able to come to terms, I thought, with him, that w e had probably never been in a better position for doing so. 1

This reply to fitienne is the first evidence in the published documents that the British Government had arrived at the point where they were ready for the negotiation of a general understanding^Cambon and Lansdowne had been discussing points of difficulty between the two countries even after the breakdown of the 1902 negotiations, but how inclusive these discussions were, or how far they went in looking toward a comprehensive agreement, is a matter of conjecture. Both Cambon and Lansdowne later referred to them in an offhand manner. 2 A t any 'Lansdowne to Monson, J u l y 2, 1903, B. D., II, 293. "Cambon to Delcasse, J u l y 22, 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, I I I , 4.73; Lansdowne to Monson, J u l y 7, 1 9 0 3 , B. D.t II, 294. See also Cambon's interview in The Times on the occasion of his retirement from London in 1 9 2 0 ( T h e Times, 68

N E G O T I A T I O N S FOR T H E E N T E N T E

69

rate, Delcassé accompanied President Loubet on his visit to England with the assurance that the English were ready to talk business. The French President's visit to England, which occurred early in July, gave the English a chance to show that they could outdo the French when it came to the matter of extending warm welcomes. At Dover, where a goodly number of the members of the House of Commons had come to greet him, President Loubet landed "amid cheers which had not had their like in Dover for nearly a generation." At least the reception was such as to make M. Paul Cambon wear a "particularly cheerful look."3 Nor did the pace slacken when the Presidential party had reached London. One sentimental French journalist, M. Cornély of the Siècle, was prompted to say that there was but one word to describe the demonstrations of which M. Loubet was the object in London—they were "touching."4 The more serious business of the visit was composed of conversations between Delcassé and various members of the English cabinet, and between Landsdowne and members of the French party.5 The document which was prepared for the purpose of coaching the French visitors in the attitudes and susceptibilities of the leading English political figures is not only interesting but throws some light upon the relative importance attached by the French to the opinions of different British leaders. The document is quoted in part in the memoirs of President Loubet's secretary and apparently was drawn up by Cambon. Prime Minister Balfour was represented as being a very charming gentleman but without influence in the country and incapable of resistDec. 22, 1 9 1 0 ) , and "Interview de M. Delcassé au sujet de l'accord francoanglais," in Questions Diflomatiques et Coloniales, April 16, 1904, X V I I , 606. ' Manchester Guardian, J u l y 7, 1903. 'The Times, July 1 0 , 1 9 0 3 ; The Journal des Débats (July 7, 1 9 0 3 ) declared that the French themselves had never acclaimed one of their presidents as the English were acclaiming President Loubet. The Times in a leading article said: " M . Loubet has won golden opinions from all who have seen him, and has called forth popular sympathy for himself and his country which it is given to very few men to elicit" ( T h e Times, J u l y 9, 1 9 0 3 ) . Cambon to Delcassé, J u l y 22, 1903, D. D. F., ser. 2, III, 473.

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ing the opinions of M r . Chamberlain. Lord Lansdowne was spoken of as "discreet, very polished, and very kindly," as having "French blood in his veins," and as being sincerely desirous of reaching an accord with France. M r . Chamberlain, according to the document, was a man "without general ideas, without a critical mind, and without knowledge of outside things," but "inclined to wrap himself completely in the idea of the moment and to pursue it ruthlessly." M r . Chamberlain was also, according to this description, very susceptible to compliments. T h e document declared that in all probability he was headed for the Prime Ministership.6 Cambon was careful to have Delcasse placed next to Chamberlain at one of the dinners, and Delcasse did not forget to speak in especially complimentary terms of Chamberlain to the press upon his return to France. 7 T h e formal discussion between the two Foreign Ministers which occurred on July 7 was most cordial, and they at once agreed that the points at issue between the two governments seemed "by no means incapable of adjustment." Delcasse placed greatest emphasis on the settlement of the question of Morocco. If the two governments could only "come to terms as to that country, all other difficulties would disappear, or become comparatively easy to deal with." " T h e French Government," said Delcasse, "had no desire to get rid of the Sultan or to annex his country. T h e y wished on the contrary to maintain the Sultan's rule. Such a system was more convenient than French administration, pure and simple. . . . It was, however, obvious that the authority of the Sultan was waning rapidly, and that it was insufficient to maintain order in the country, and the French Government could not regard with indifference the prevalence of chronic disorder in Morocco, or admit that it was the business of any other Power but France to undertake the task of regenerating the country. In these circumstances, what they desired was ' C o m b a r i e u , Seft * he

Temps,

Am

a Vtlysee,

pp. 2 5 1 - 2 5 4 .

J u l y 1 4 , 1 9 0 3 . T h e interchange of visits between the heads of

the t w o states w a s f o l l o w e d shortly by an interchange of visits between l a r g e representations f r o m the l e g i s l a t i v e bodies. T h e French parlementarians

went

to L o n d o n late in J u l y and the E n g l i s h legislators to P a r i s late in N o v e m b e r .

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a reasonable assurance that their policy would not be obstructed by Great Britain." Lord Lansdowne, after stating the nature of the British interest in the Mediterranean seaboard, especially in Tangier and in the adjacent coast, and the necessity of taking care of Spain's interests, along with British trade, expressed his readiness to consider the Moroccan problem. T h e n , since Delcassé had not mentioned it, he turned to the subject of E g y p t : I n the e v e n t of s u c h a s e t t l e m e n t b e i n g a r r i v e d a t , w e s h o u l d also h a v e t o take s t o c k of the situation in E g y p t . N o o n e , I supposed, f o r a m o m e n t b e l i e v e d t h a t w e w e r e likely to r e t i r e f r o m t h a t c o u n t r y , a n d I l e a r n e d w i t h pleasure f r o m L o r d C r o m e r t h a t the F r e n c h s e n t a t i v e s in E g y p t

w e r e on e x c e l l e n t t e r m s w i t h o u r s ;

repre-

but I

was

u n d e r the impression that it m i g h t still be possible f o r F r a n c e , if she chose, t o g i v e us t r o u b l e in m a t t e r s of detail, a n d w e s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y h a v e t o consider this p o i n t if a g e n e r a l s e t t l e m e n t w e r e to be a t t e m p t e d . M . D e l c a s s é r e p l i e d that he w a s entirely in f a v o r of a c o m p r e h e n sive s e t t l e m e n t , a n d that the E g y p t i a n question f o r m e d a p a r t of the l a r g e r A f r i c a n q u e s t i o n w h i c h c o u l d , he f e l t s u r e , be disposed of satisf a c t o r i l y if o n l y w e c o u l d c o m e to an a g r e e m e n t as t o the position of F r a n c e and

Morocco.8

This is the first recorded occurrence, with a view to making a settlement, of the Egyptian question in either the British Documents or the Documents Diplomatiques Français. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the question had not previously been a matter of diplomatic negotiation. There is a slight possibility that conversations had occurred in reference to clearing up the financial difficulties in Egypt. Lord Cromer, in his reply to Lansdowne's account of the conversation with Delcassé, referred to "the financial proposals recently under discussion." 9 O n the other hand, it seems more likely that this reference was entirely to English discussions. T h e French Foreign Office had been informed in February, and at greater length in April, 1903, by the French diplomatic agent in Cairo, that L o r d Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst, financial adviser to the Egyptian Government, were formulating a gigantic plan for changes in the Egyptian 'Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903, B. D., II, 294-297. ' C r o m e r to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, B. D., II, 300.

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debt and financial system. 10 This information had been obtained secretly by the French agent, and as late as June 29, 1 9 0 3 , a " n o t e " had been prepared at the Quai d'Orsay summarizing possible reasons that might be used by Cromer to support his plan and summoning arguments against it. 11 That any discussion affecting the political status of E g y p t had occurred seems much less likely. Cambon's reply when Lansdowne broached the subject of E g y p t on J u l y 29 was that Lansdowne had said "nothing particular about E g y p t to him." 1 2 Moreover, Cromer expressed surprise that Delcasse was willing to treat of the Egyptian question in a larger sense. H e wrote: . . . I certainly did not expect M . Delcasse to go so f a r as to say that " h e w a s entirely in f a v o r of a comprehensive settlement, and that the E g y p t i a n f o r m e d part of the larger A f r i c a n question, w h i c h

could,

he felt sure, be disposed of satisfactorily if only w e could come to an agreement as to the position of F r a n c e and M o r o c c o . " I cannot help thinking that, in m a k i n g these remarks, M .

Delcasse w e n t

rather

further than he intended, and that it m a y subsequently be found that, under pressure exerted by the permanent officials at the Q u a i d ' O r s a y , and others, he will be reluctant to face the F r e n c h C h a m b e r with a n y Egyptian

proposals w h i c h

w o u l d be thoroughly satisfactory to us.

H o w e v e r that m a y be, w e are for the m o m e n t perfectly justified in taking him at his w o r d . 1 3 10

Essentially the plan was to convert the government debt into one huge unit and to give the Egyptian Government control of its own finances, which would mean the practical abolishment of the Caisse (Bouliniere to Delcasse, A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, I I I , 2 4 8 - 2 5 1 ) . 11 T h e note was prepared, according to the editors of the D. D. F., because of the appearance in the Monthly Review of an article entitled "Emancipation of E g y p t , " which had attracted attention in the French press. It was believed that it had been published for the purpose of serving as a test of European opinion on the subject (£>. D. F., ser. 2, I I I , 2 4 9 ^ ) . It is quite likely that Cromer and Gorst were forming some sort of plans in the hope of reforming the financial system, which Cromer termed "intolerable." Cromer's biographer states that plans had been made prior to the beginning of the negotiations in J u l y to send Gorst to Paris in the autumn to confer with French holders of the Egyptian debt (Zetland, Cromer, 2 7 2 ) . Sir Sidney Lee in his King Edward VII speaks of a high Egyptian official, T i g r a n e Pasha, who was sent to Paris and London to sound out the creditors on a conversion of the Egyptian debt but does not give the date of his mission (Lee, King Edward V I I , I I , 2 1 9 ) . " L a n s d o w n e to Monson, J u l y 29, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., II, 305. " C r o m e r to Lansdowne, J u l y 1 7 , 1 9 0 3 , ibid., 298-299.

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73

Subsequent negotiation soon proved the truth of L o r d Cromer's suspicion that Delcasse did not intend, at least not immediately, to agree to a settlement of the Egyptian question that would be "thoroughly satisfactory" to the British. Either the French Foreign Minister had not intended to suggest a general Egyptian settlement in his conversation of J u l y 7, or it suited his purposes to pretend that he had not. H i s account to Cambon of the remarks made in regard to E g y p t differed materially from Lansdowne's account: F i n a l l y he

[Lansdowne]

broached the subject of E g y p t . I n the

face of m y extreme reserve, he did not touch the political phase of the question. H e spoke only of obstacles to the financial order which might give difficulty. I told h i m that he k n e w m y spirit of conciliation and that it w o u l d be easier to manifest it without exciting opinion in F r a n c e , if the opinion which watched M o r o c c a n matters with jeal ous care sensed that our action in M o r o c c o w a s to be exercised not only without opposition, but with the favor of E n g l a n d . 1 4

I n all probability Delcasse had determined well before the renewal of the negotiations in J u l y to grant the British whatever concessions were necessary in order to get what he wanted in Morocco. As suggested in the letter of J u l y 21 to Cambon, he was determined not only to get concessions f r o m the British, but if possible to gain British backing for making good French predominance in Morocco. E g y p t furnished the only real lever by which he could achieve those ends. T i m e and again throughout the negotiations he used this fever to pry additional concessions from the English. Hence it is not strange that his approval to any far-reaching concessions in E g y p t was given very gradually and with a great show of reluctance. Cambon's correspondence during the first weeks of the negotiations indicates that he was in some doubt as to how f a r his chief would be willing to go in granting Egyptian concessions. Although fitienne probably had an understanding with Delcasse as to Egyptian concessions, 15 he had "Delcasse to Cambon, J u l y 2 1 , 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, III, 4 7 1 . When Cambon later ( J u l y 3 1 ) reported Lansdowne's view of the conversation, Delcasse made a note affirming that his own account had been correct (ibid., p. 4 9 9 n - ) • " See above, Chapter IV.

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not mentioned the subject of E g y p t to Lansdowne, and in his article in the National Review he had been careful to state that France still expected Great Britain eventually to evacuate E g y p t . Delcasse, Cambon, fitienne, and the British statesmen as well, were f u l l y aware of the dangers of raising the Egyptian question once again. Only an adequate quid pro quo would make it possible at all. On J u l y 29, after a visit to Paris and a discussion with Delcasse, Cambon took up the conversations with Lansdowne where the two Foreign Ministers had left off on J u l y 7. As for M o rocco, Cambon proposed that the two governments agree upon the maintenance of the existing constitution of that country "au

-point de vue politique" as well as "au point de vue territorial." T h e British Government, however, should "accord f u l l recognition to the fact that France, having a frontier of vast extent coterminous with that of Morocco, has a peculiar interest in maintaining peace within that country, and in assisting the Moorish Government to bring about the administrative, economical, and financial improvements of which Morocco stands so much in need." Since the French Ambassador had made no reference to E g y p t , Lansdowne had to broach the subject: . . . I called his attention to the fact that he had made no mention of one country in which both France and England had interests, and which it would be impossible to exclude from consideration if a comprehensive settlement were to be attempted. I referred to Egypt. I was sure M . Delcasse would bear me out when I said that I had particularly mentioned the question of Egypt to him. M. Delcasse had said to me in reply that Egypt, like Morocco, formed part of the "African question," and that if we could come to terms as to Morocco, there would probably be no great difficulty in coming to terms as to Egypt also. M . Cambon said that my recollection was not in fault, but that I had said nothing particular about Egypt to him, and that he had no instructions on the subject from M . Delcasse. Would it not, M . Cambon asked, be possible for us to deal with other points which he had enumerated, and to leave Egypt alone for the present? I replied that it was, to my mind, out of the question that we should leave Egypt out of consideration. It was quite true that our

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75

representatives in Egypt at this moment were on excellent terms, but I could well conceive that difficulties might some day present themselves to us in that country. M . Cambon said that there was one difficulty which would certainly have to be faced in the near future—he referred to the conversion of the Egyptian Debt. His own idea, however, was that an arrangement might be come to as to Egypt upon the basis of a recognition of existing institutions. He cited particularly the interests of France in Egyptian archaeological researches, which she had done so much to promote. She would expect to retain her museums and other scientific institutions. 10 In recounting this conversation to Delcassé, C a m b o n declared that L a n s d o w n e had not made his statements l i g h t l y . T h e y w e r e probably the v i e w s of the G o v e r n m e n t . H e n c e C a m b o n u r g e d that the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t give in on this point in return f o r additional concessions in Morocco or elsewhere. 1 7 Delcassé's rep l y was that he would not refuse to consider the question of E g y p t if the additional concessions could be obtained. 1 8 T h e r e f o r e , in the conversation which occurred between L a n s d o w n e and C a m b o n on A u g u s t 5 , the chief principle of the a g r e e m e n t was reached. L a n s d o w n e ' s most interesting and enlightening account of it is as f o l l o w s : . . . I replied that . . . M . Delcassé . . . must not forget that I had consented to deal with the question of Morocco only upon the condition that it was discussed as forming part of a general settlement which was to comprehend other points in which both Governments were interested. I said that since our last meeting I had submitted to the Cabinet a report of the conversation which had taken place between us. I had found my colleagues unanimous as to the necessity of including Egypt in any arrangement which might be made, and / was convinced that they would not entertain any proposals which did not include one for the régularisation of our position in that country}9 M . Cambon said that M . Delcassé had understood me to refer merely to the necessity of removing certain financial restrictions which we " L a n s d o w n e to Monson, J u l y 29, 1 9 0 3 , B, D., I I , 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 . Cambon to Delcassé, J u l y 3 1 , 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F.} ser. 2, I I I , 499. Delcassé to Cambon, A u g . i , 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, I I I , 5 1 1 . " T h e italics are my own.

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f o u n d inconvenient, and that a f o r m a l recognition by F r a n c e of o u r position in that c o u n t r y w a s a m o r e serious matter. I could have n o idea of the extent to w h i c h "l'esprit F r a n ç a i s " w a s m o v e d by the E g y p t i a n question. F r a n c e

had missed her opportunity

in

Egypt;

w e had seized ours; but w e had a n n o u n c e d that our occupation w a s not to be p e r m a n e n t . T h e F r e n c h nation c l u n g to this idea, and held us in theory to that e n g a g e m e n t , a l t h o u g h , perhaps, w i t h n o v e r y definite expectation that w e should fulfill it. A n y F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h proposed to r e c o g n i z e the p e r m a n e n c y of our hold upon the c o u n t r y w o u l d require an immense a m o u n t of nerve

(d'estomac) ;

but M . Delcassé w a s not deficient in courage and w a s prepared to face the attempt. W e

must, h o w e v e r , clearly understand that, if it

w a s to be m a d e , a n d if F r a n c e w a s to be obliging as t o e x t r a c t this " b i g thorn f r o m the foot of G r e a t B r i t a i n , " she w o u l d look for " u n e grosse c o m p e n s a t i o n . " I t m i g h t take the shape of greater liberty of action in M o r o c c o — s o m e t h i n g less remote and c o n j e c t u r a l hypothétique")

("moins

than she had yet asked for. W e should, m o r e o v e r ,

r e m e m b e r that the E g y p t i a n question concerned not F r a n c e

alone,

but other P o w e r s , w i t h w h o m w e should have to reckon. I f , h o w e v e r , w e w a n t e d concessions in E g y p t , M .

Delcassé t h o u g h t w e

should

f o r m u l a t e our requirements. I said that I w a s prepared to do so, and that I had, indeed, a l w a y s contemplated the necessity of putting in a statement of the concessions w h i c h w e should require in return for those w h i c h F r a n c e hoped to obtain at our hands, and I b e g g e d his E x c e l l e n c y to r e m e m b e r that, if w e w e r e to g i v e F r a n c e w h a t she desired in M o r o c c o , w e , too, should require the same kind of nerve w h e n w e came to j u s t i f y our proposals to the people of this country. 2 0

W h e n the French agreed to recognize, in addition to financial reforms, the permanency of the British hold on Egypt, and Great Britain agreed to concede to France greater liberty of action in Morocco than she had yet asked for, the most significant principle of the entente had been reached. For both governments it constituted a volte face from their previous attitudes. Lord Lansdowne had made it quite plain that the British Government would entertain no proposals which failed to provide for the regularization of the British position in Egypt. On the gaining " Lansdowne to Monson, August 5, 1903, B. D., II, 306.

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of this point the British were quite ready to hinge the success or failure of the negotiations. Moreover, they knew what the French price in Morocco was likely to be. L o r d Cromer stated the situation quite baldly when he answered L o r d Lansdowne's first account of the beginning of negotiations. " I think," he wrote, "it would be found, in practice, that if once the French succession were secured, the agony of Morocco would not be of long duration. Some opportunity would speedily occur f o r putting an end to it. Hence, in spite of M . Delcasse's statement, of which I do not doubt the sincerity, that the French Government have no desire to 'brusquer les choses ' I have very little doubt that, when once the French are assured that they can make good their rights to the succession, without any risk of serious interference on our part, Morocco will, to all intents and purposes, become before long a French Province. T h e question, therefore, to my mmd is this: have we any objection to Morocco becoming a French Province?" 2 1 As Lansdowne expressed it, the cards of both governments were now on the table, but difficulties had just begun. T h e troublesome and circuitous path which the negotiations were to follow for the next eight months seemed, on several occasions, to be completely blocked. Some of the problems arose in regard to mere matters of detail upon which neither government wanted to compromise, and others seem to have been extended simply for bargaining purposes. W h e n the demands of the British in E g y p t were formulated, Delcasse declared that they were more " f a r reaching" than he had anticipated and that he did not see how the French Government could agree to them. Likewise the British were unwilling to accede completely to French demands in Morocco. O v e r the "bait" question in Newfoundland the negotiations came perilously near ending. T h e outbreak of the RussoJapanese W a r created a change in the international situation and added a series of problems for the negotiators. Finally, both governments were faced with distracting problems at home during the period of the negotiations. " Cromer to Lansdowne, July 1 7 , 1903, B. D., II, 299.

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Domestic politics in France were in an unsettled state throughout the period of negotiations. T h e existence of the Combes Ministry, which was made up of a bloc consisting of Republicans, Radicals, Socialist Radicals, and Socialists, depended upon a certain amount of anti-clericalism. Combes himself was one of the more extreme opponents of the church, and favored pushing anticlerical legislation. W i t h this Delcassé was completely out of accord, largely because of the danger to his foreign policies inherent in any eruption in the French political arena. His quarrels with M . Combes were more or less an open secret. 22 Moreover, Delcassé was at odds with other members of the cabinet, including the Minister of W a r and Minister of Marine. 2 3 Obviously the Foreign Minister was not in the best position for unhindered negotiation. In England, dissension was growing among the conservatives over the tariff question. T h e issue tended to distract attention f r o m matters of foreign policy. In October 1903 it brought about a ministerial crisis during which several members of the cabinet tendered their resignations. 24 T w o months elapsed after the decision had been reached as to the questions which were to be included in the negotiations before the British statement of their demands was ready. T h e delay was occasioned by the government holidays and by the ministerial crisis. Meanwhile the Arbitration Treaty, which had received no attention for a time, and had again been taken up after the visit of K i n g E d w a r d to Paris, was finally signed for H

On one occasion Combes tried to silence such rumors by denying them so emphatically that his denial had the opposite effect (Manchester Guardian, M a r c h 2, 1 9 0 4 ) . See also Westminster Gazette, March 2 3 , 1 9 0 4 ; Combarieu, Sept ans à l'Élysée, pp. 2 8 5 - 2 8 7 . Porter, Delcassé, pp. 1 9 8 - 2 0 1 . * A m o n g those who resigned was the Duke of Devonshire, who was well known to be friendly to Germany rather than France. According to Count von Bernstorff, German chargé d'affaires in London, the resignation occurred because of Devonshire's difference of opinion with B a l f o u r and Lansdowne on the subject of an agreement with France (Bernstorff to B u l o w , Oct. 1 2 , 1 9 0 3 , G. P.t X I X , 1 3 ) . Devonshire's correspondence relating to his resignation, as given in his biography, is concerned only with the changed attitude of the party toward the tariff question (Bernard Holland, Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of Devonshire, II, 290-371).

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a five-year period on October 1 4 , 1 9 0 3 . In that matters affecting national honor, independence, and vital interests were not to be included among the disputes which were to be referred to the H a g u e Tribunal, the Treaty itself was not particularly far reaching. It was considered by the press, however, as an earnest of the wider agreement which was now being openly discussed. 25 On October 1 , Lansdowne submitted to Cambon a statement of the conditions upon which the British Government would be willing to accede to an arrangement such as had been under discussion. H e proposed conditions for the settlement of the questions of E g y p t , Morocco, Newfoundland, Siam, New Hebrides, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Madagascar. 2 6 Cambon and Delcassé replied that the majority of the matters dealt with were of "comparatively secondary importance," and that the really significant questions were those of Morocco and Egypt. 2 7 And with L o r d Lansdowne's proposals in these connections they were not satisfied. In regard to E g y p t , Lansdowne had declared that the British Government had no desire to alter the political status of that country, or at the moment to raise questions, so far as powers other than France were concerned, affecting Great Britain's international status there. W h a t they did desire was that the French Government should recognize the permanency of the British occupation, and permit the British and Egyptian government» to arrange a conversion of the Egyptian debt and a reorganization of the railway administration. F o r the moment the capitulations were to remain intact, but the French Government should declare itself ready to examine proposals for their abolishment when the British should suggest it. In that eventuality, * Delcassé, particularly, had viewed the idea of an Arbitration T r e a t y with coolness. He was influenced to some extent by his non-cordial relations with d'Estournelles, the leader of the movement in the French Chamber of Deputies. D'Estournelles had well-known ambitions toward the Foreign Office (Monson to Lansdowne, M a y 29, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 2 9 0 - 2 9 1 ; Monson to Lansdowne, J u l y 24, 1 9 0 3 , ibid., p. 3 0 3 ) . F o r expressions of public opinion on the T r e a t y see B a r c l a y , Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences, pp. 3 3 5 - 3 4 2 . The Times, Oct. 1 6 , 1 9 , 1 9 0 3 ; Questions Diflomatiques et Coloniales, X V I , 1 - 1 3 , 9 7 - 1 1 1 , 1 6 9 - 1 8 0 , 3 6 7 - 3 7 3 , 444-+63Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1 , 1 9 0 3 , B. D I I , Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1 9 0 3 , ibid., p. 3 1 7 .

311-317.

8o

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

Great Britain would agree to consultation with regard to similar Moroccan proposals. As for Morocco, Lansdowne declared that the British Government were ready to recognize the preponderance of French influence if France would promise to meet certain conditions. These conditions were that British commercial rights already enjoyed in Morocco should remain intact, that the major portion of the Moroccan seaboard, beginning at the Algerian frontier and extending to Mazaghan, be neutralized, and that an adequate and satisfactory recognition of Spain's interests be agreed upon.28 Cambon objected to these measures on the grounds that France would not receive in Morocco "a sufficient equivalent for the immense concessions which she was asked to make in E g y p t . " All France was to get in Morocco was "a hope" while England was to get immediate advantages in Egypt. Would it not be possible, he proposed, "to proceed gradually . . . with the Egyptian Debt and Control on the understanding that these changes should be introduced fari fassu with correlative changes in Morocco." Naturally Lord Lansdowne immediately rejected these proposals. H e answered that he was merely asking the French Government to recognize the facts as they existed.28 By the latter part of October the chief difficulty centered in the conversion of the Egyptian debt. In the earlier part of the negotiations Delcasse had been more willing to face this step than that of a recognition of the British position in Egypt, but objections had been raised by the French holders of Egyptian bonds. " I f you will allow us to postpone the conversion," Lansdowne wrote to Cromer on November 17, "our difficulties will certainly be diminished and the retention of the control, although with its wings clipped, will no doubt make the French easier to deal with." 30 The British had originally contended for the complete abolition of the Caisse de la Dette, but in the face of determined French opposition they offered a compromise. The Caisse should be maintained but with its function "strictly limited to receiving the sum necessary for the service of the debt, with the right to " L a n s d o w n e to Monson, Oct. i , 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 3 1 1 - 3 1 4 . Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 3 1 7 - 3 1 8 . " L a n s d o w n e to Cromer, N o v . 1 7 , 1 9 0 3 , Newton, Lansdovme,

p. 2 8 5 .

NEGOTIATIONS FOR T H E E N T E N T E

81

sue the Egyptian Government in the Law Courts should that sum not be punctually paid." Secondly, the French Government should agree to join the British in addressing the other powers for the purpose of securing their assent to these proposals, and it would be understood that, should the consent of the other powers be refused, France would not oppose "any steps which His Majesty's Government may hereafter find it expedient to take for the purpose of giving effect to the Agreement "which the French and British Governments will have arrived, at." And in the third place the French Government should not oppose complete conversion of the Egyptian debt when an opportune moment for effecting this operation should occur.31 After considerable hesitation, and with reservations which made the French bondholders more secure, Delcasse agreed to the general nature of these proposals.32 The French, in consenting to join the diplomatic forces with the British for the purpose of securing the Egyptian changes, were merely agreeing to a principle which Delcasse had suggested with reference to Morocco in his first conversation with Lansdowne, 33 though for the moment the idea was not reapplied to Morocco. It had been previously decided that when the general lines of policy had been decided upon, Sir Eldon Gorst, " L a n s d o w n e to Cambon, Nov. 1 9 , 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 3 2 5 - 3 2 6 . On the request that the French Government abandon its rights to oppose the conversion of the Egyptian debt Delcasse observed: " T h e conversion of the Egyptian Debt is a matter of considerable importance to the French Government. T h e French creditors, who are the most numerous, had already suffered a very severe loss at a time when the rate of interest was reduced from 7 to 4 per cent. T h e debtor State having provided f o r a system of amortisation, they had the right to expect that their shares should no longer be liable to repayment or conversion, it being a fundamental rule that a debt subject to amortisation can neither be converted nor repaid at the pleasure of the debtor." (Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1 9 0 3 , B. D.t I I , 3 3 0 ; Delcasse to Cambon, Dec. 6, 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, I V , 164.). T h e final arrangement provided for the conversion of the debts in 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 1 2 . " D e l c a s s e to Cambon, Dec. 6, 1 9 0 3 , D. D. Fser. 2, I I I , 1 6 3 - 1 6 6 . Delcasse added the request that France be given trade privileges in E g y p t equal to those granted to England in Morocco. He also proposed a twenty-year limit on the trade agreements (ibid.). ** See above.

8a

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

Egyptian financial adviser, should go to Paris to negotiate details with the French bondholders and the French Government. Gorst left Egypt in the middle of November but remained in London until Christmas Eve before going to Paris.34 Gorst's negotiations of the technical aspects of the Egyptian question were carried on with the experts M . Cogordan and M. Georges Louis, both of whom had had experience in Egypt.35 The chief Moroccan difficulty which remained to be settled concerned the extent of the seaboard which was to be neutralized. Delcassé was particularly anxious that Rabat should not be included in the neutralized territory though he declared that the French had no desire to fortify this port. It had been fairly well agreed that the neutral territory would extend from Melilla on the Mediterranean to either Rabat or Mazaghan on the Atlantic.36 On the whole, the British press was raising surprisingly little objection to the rumors which were now current that the Government was giving way to France in Morocco. The Manchester Guardian very early took the attitude that British interests in Morocco were for the most part commercial and not necessarily incompatible with a French protectorate.37 The commercial organizations interested in Moroccan trade were the first to become seriously perturbed.38 It was somewhat later that the Morning Post,39 the Spectator, and Mr. Aflalo began to oppose concessions in Morocco. The interested merchants, however, called meetings " Z e t l a n d , Cromer, pp. 278-279. One difficulty which yet remained concerned the question of putting into operation the Suez Canal Convention of 1 8 8 8 . England was prepared to abandon her general reservation but upon Cromer's suggestion insisted that Article V I I I , which provided that Consular Agents of the signatory powers should watch over the execution of the treaty, should be eliminated as being incompatible with the British occupation of Egypt (Lansdowne to Cambon, Nov. 10, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., I I , 3 2 6 ; Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1 9 0 3 , ibid., p. 3 3 1 ; Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 1 1 , 1 9 0 3 , ibid., p. 334. Le Temps, April 1 2 , 1904. " L a n s d o w n e to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, B. D., II, 329. "Manchester Guardian, Sept. 20, 24, Oct. 1 2 , 1 5 , 1 9 0 3 ; Bulletin Comité de l'Afrique Française, Aug. 1 9 0 3 , X I I I , 242-243. " C a m b o n to Delcassé, Oct. 2 1 , 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, IV, 37-38. " Morning Post, J a n . 1 5 , 1904.

du

NEGOTIATIONS FOR T H E E N T E N T E

83

in Manchester and in London for consultations on the question and resolved to request the Government to defend their interests. On November 5 a body, comprising practically all of the influential persons engaged in trade with Morocco, called on Lord Lansdowne and requested assurance that no foreign power would be permitted control over Morocco to the point of hindering British trade. T h e Foreign Minister gave them a statement in which he said: I t is no use, I think, disguising f r o m ourselves that at this m o m e n t the future of M o r o c c o is s o m e w h a t obscure . . . [ a t ] this m o m e n t the Sultan is evidently in a position of g r e a t difficulty, barely able, if able at all, to hold his o w n against his rebellious tribesmen. T h e r e f o r e , I do not think a n y of us can forecast w h a t m a y or m a y not happen in M o r o c c o during the course of the next f e w years . . . but . . . you m a y take it f r o m m e that, w h a t e v e r be the result of passing events in M o r o c c o , his M a j e s t y ' s g o v e r n m e n t will make it their business to see that the trade of the country shall in the f u t u r e enjoy the same equality of opportunity which it n o w enjoys. 4 0

T h e tone of L o r d Lansdowne's public reply left little doubt among well-informed observers that the British government contemplated a Moroccan retreat. Naturally the French colonials, whose attention to Morocco was now overshadowing all other interests, were elated. 41 Moreover Lansdowne made admissions to the German Ambassador, Metternich, in a conversation on November 26 which left little doubt in that gentleman's mind that England planned to abandon Morocco to France. 42 In its Moroccan policy the Government evidently had the approval of the Board of Trade. Lansdowne conferred with the Board on the parts of the agreement which pertained to Moroccan trade, and, according to Cambon, the proposals in this regard which were submitted by Lansdowne were actually the proposals of the Board. 43 " The Times, Nov. 19, 1 9 0 3 . T h e individuals and firms making the request are also given in the article. See articles by de Caix in the Journal des Debats, Nov. 1 1 , 1 9 0 3 , and in the Bulletin du Comite etc., Nov. 1 9 0 3 . " Metternich to Billow, N o v . 26, 1 9 0 3 , G. P., X V I I , 362-363. " C a m b o n to Delcasse, March 28, 1904, D. D. F., ser. 2, IV, 5 1 3 , 5 1 3 n. 3.

84

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cromer were both convinced that Great Britain was getting more in Egypt than she was giving up in Morocco. "Who would have imagined only a short time ago," Cromer wrote, "that we should ever have got so f a r ? " " Lansdowne's reply was, " I do not disagree with you in thinking that we are asking for a good deal, and of course the French see this as clearly as you do. But they are extremely anxious to have their position in Morocco recognised, and we must turn this feeling to account."45 Having made up his mind that the agreement was worth the price, Lansdowne was ready to face whatever criticism might be made. On December 7 he wrote to Cromer: "But I have told Balfour that he must make up his mind to be told by the Spectator and critics of that kidney that we have given away the Western Mediterranean and betrayed the interests of the Empire at other points. We must make up our minds to face that sort of music, and I don't want a Bagdad Railway fiasco."46 In general, the English press during the earlier part of the negotiations was inclined to take the view that France no longer had serious ambitions with regard to Egypt and that settlement of the Egyptian question should not prove difficult. Some portions of the press, both French and English, refused throughout to admit that any serious changes were even being contemplated. As late as March 18, 1904, the Manchester Guardian and the Matin declared that only minor financial changes were being made with regard to the Caisse de la Dette.*1 The Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française spoke almost exclusively of the necessity of securing French claims in Morocco. When a French journal did admit the possibility of concessions in Egypt, it was always careful to indicate that they could be made only at the " Cambon to Lansdowne, Nov. 1 , 1 9 0 3 , Newton, Lansdovme, p. 283. "Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 1 7 , 1903, ibid., p. 285. Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, Lansdovme, p. 287. Lansdowne was referring, of course, to the press campaigns of April 1903, which had forced the Foreign Office to drop plans for British participation in the Bagdad Railway scheme. T h e Sfectator had been one of the leaders of the attack against participation (Wolf, The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railway, pp.

38-4s)-

"Manchester

Guardian,

March 18, 1904.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR T H E E N T E N T E

85

price of very great concessions in return. In the January 2-3 issue of Le Temps48 there appeared a long, evidently "inspired" article on the subject of French interests in Egypt which attracted a considerable amount of attention.49 The whole tone of the article suggests that it was written to recall for the British that the French could still make the Egyptian situation an unpleasant one if they chose. The article indicated, however, that if the consideration were pleasing enough, the French could and would be conciliatory.50 This attitude was the keynote of the French diplomats as well as of the journalists throughout the negotiations. However anxious Delcasse and Cambon were to secure French interests in Morocco, they were clever enough to recognize the British determination in regard tcr Egypt and turn it to French advantage. " I am of the opinion that we should give in on nothing, should take our time, should not show haste" Cambon wrote Delcasse in November. " W e are in a position to be difficult; the English have more interest in making an arrangement with us for Egypt than we have in concluding one with them for Morocco. They will become intractable if we seem too desirous of bringing things to an end." 51 For their part the British diplomats were urging haste. " W e are now waiting for the next move on Delcasse's side," Lansdowne wrote on December 7. " I have tried, I think successfully, to convince Cambon that delay is fatal." 52 But all through the negotiations the most constant advocate of hastening the negotiations was Lord Cromer, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt. His role in the formation of the Entente is deserving of special treatment. It was not until the publication of the British Documents on the Origin of the War that the important part taken by Lord Cromer in the negotiations became generally known. His Modern Egypt, which was published just after his retirement in 1908, devoted a chapter to the formation of the Entente 48

A single issue of the paper which bears a double date. " T h e Manchester Guardian Paris correspondent considered it "inspired" (Manchester Guardian, Jan. 4, 1904.) 50 Le Temps, Jan. 2-3, 1904. Cambon to Delcasse, Nov. 18, 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F., ser. 2, IV, 1 1 6 . " Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, Lansdowne, p. 286.

86

EGYPT

AND THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

but made no mention of the author's connection with it.53 Lansdowne, upon the occasion of Cromer's retirement, attributed a large part of the success in reaching an understanding with France to Cromer, but mentioned only the exceptional tact with which he met difficult problems in Egypt itself.54 The British correspondence relative to the formation of the Entente, however, shows that Cromer was consulted at practically every turn, not only on matters which related to Egypt, a step which might have been expected, but also on many phases of the agreement which did not affect Egypt. 55 For Cromer the regularization and stabilization of the British position in Egypt meant the happy culmination of his life's effort. He had long been at odds with the French and at times had felt even that war with France was the only possible solution to the Egyptian question.56 Count von Bulow and Ambassador Metternich had considered him definitely as a Germanophil.57 But when the opportunity was offered for the withdrawal of France from her position in Egypt, he became the strongest advocate among the prominent British statesmen for agreement. As he rather laughingly stated it: "About the French negotiations I find myself, strangely enough, occupying rather the position of Vavocat du diable,"58 From the first Cromer urged the Foreign Office not to lose time. On July 17 he wrote Lansdowne: In all diplomatic negotiations there is always a danger of moving " C r o m e r , Modern Egypt, II, ch. X L V I I I . M Lansdowne's tribute, which was delivered in the House of Lords, July 30, 1907, was as follows: " I t would be unjust to Lord Cromer if I did not refer to my conviction that the satisfactory understanding attained by the late Government with the Government of France in regard to many outstanding questions, and notably in regard to Egyptian affairs, would not have been obtainable on so satisfactory a basis, if it had not been for the exceptional position which Lord Cromer occupied amongst the representatives of the other great Powers in E g y p t . " {Pari. Debates, 4th series, C L X X I X , 7 0 1 ) . " Some of Cromer's correspondence in reference to the Entente which is not to be found in British Documents has been published in Newton's Lord Lansdovme, and still more in Zetland's Lord Cromer. The D. D. F., also shed valuable light in many places on the role played by him. See above, Chapter I. "Metternich to Bulow, J u l y 9, 1902, G. P., X V I I , 2 1 4 . " Cromer to Lansdowne, Jan. 1 5 , 1904, Zetland, Cromer, p. 280.

NEGOTIATIONS

FOR

THE

ENTENTE

87

either too fast or too s l o w . I n the present case possibly the d a n g e r lies r a t h e r on the side of m o v i n g too s l o w . P e r s o n a l l y , I should be i n c l i n e d not to delay too l o n g , but to take a d v a n t a g e of the present phase of A n g l o - F r e n c h t e n d e n c i e s and relations. I t is c o n c e i v a b l e that it m a y not last. 5 9

A n d again on November 1 he urged: I most earnestly hope, not m e r e l y on E g y p t i a n but on m o r e g e n eral g r o u n d s , t h a t y o u w i l l continue the negotiations v i g o r o u s l y . Such an opportunity as the present is not likely to r e c u r . W e m u s t m a n a g e to c o m e to t e r m s — t h o u g h a n y display of excessive e a g e r n e s s to do so w o u l d , of course, be inadvisable. P e r s o n a l l y , I r e g a r d this as by far the m o s t i m p o r t a n t d i p l o m a t i c a f f a i r that w e have had in hand for a l o n g t i m e past. W e c a n n o t , of course, e x p e c t to get all w e w a n t , but there is a m p l e r o o m f o r a notable and v e r y beneficial a c h i e v e m e n t . T h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s a n d intricacies of the E g y p t i a n part of the business are beyond description. I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m has m a n a g e d to t h r o w a net o v e r this c o u n t r y — l e g a l ,

financial,

and d i p l o m a t i c , w i t h

the

result that no sooner does one see a w a y of b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h the meshes in one d i r e c t i o n , than a d a n g e r of being c a u g h t in s o m e other direction t u r n s up. . . . We

must not fail. I f w e once come to t e r m s w i t h the F r e n c h , w e

are b o u n d to c a r r y the t h i n g t h r o u g h , a n d this on e v e r y

ground—

n o t a b l y because, if w e accept d e f e a t , the F r e n c h w i l l h a v e g o t all t h e y w a n t o u t of us, a n d w e shall have g o t little or n o t h i n g out of t h e m . W e should not h a v e secured one of our m a i n objects w h i c h is to g e t a f r e e h a n d for d e a l i n g w i t h the finances of E g y p t and the S o u d a n . 6 0

L o r d Cromer made a journey to London in August in order to discuss at first hand the Egyptian question, and shortly after his return Gorst came to watch over the Egyptian part of the negotiations. 61 Cromer also watched carefully for opportunities to conciliate French sentiment whenever possible. A n example of " C r o m e r to L a n s d o w n e , J u l y 1 7 , 1903, B. D., I I , 300. C r o m e r to L a n s d o w n e , N o v .

1, 1903, N e w t o n , Lansdoivne,

pp. 283-284.

" T h e visit of C r o m e r took place either in A u g u s t or September. told Delcasse on A u g u s t 5 that C r o m e r was c o m i n g to L o n d o n D e l c a s s e , A u g . j , 1 9 0 3 , D. D. F.,

ser. 2, I I I , 5 2 0 ) . A n d on Oct. I J C r o m e r

spoke of h a v i n g been in L o n d o n ( C r o m e r to B a l f o u r , Oct. 1 j ,

Cromer, p. 274).

Cambon

( C a m b o n to

1903, Zetland,

88

EGYPT

AND

THE

ANGLO-FRENCH

ENTENTE

this can be seen in the changing of the name of Fashoda, which was such an unhappy reminder to the French, to Kodok. " I am glad that you have rechristened Fashoda," Lansdowne wrote him on December 7. " I t was a happy inspiration, and if the newspapers don't find it out, I shall contrive some means of making them do so. O u r French friends will certainly be pleased." 62 T h e French diplomats were well aware of the influential position occupied by L o r d Cromer. His influence with the British Foreign Office and his anxiety to gain as much in Egypt as possible afforded the wily French occasional opportunities for displays of backdoor diplomacy. Although the Egyptian question after December 1903 appeared to have been reduced to the stage of negotiation of detail, the Quai d'Orsay continued to use it as a valuable lever. T h e controversy over territorial compensation, which the French demanded in return for concessions in Newfoundland, furnishes an interesting example of this. In the middle of January 1904 the negotiations came to a deadlock when the French insisted upon receiving either Gambia or territory on the right bank of the Niger as a quid -pro quo for the loss of rights in Newfoundland. T h e French Foreign Office thereupon sent the following suggestion to their agent in Cairo: " I t would be a good thing for you to see Lord Cromer and tell him, as though it came from you, that the sort of arrangement projected concerning Egypt is being subordinated to the compensation which is in question." 63 T h e day following the delivery of this message L o r d Cromer sent another urgent telegram to London: I am inclined to think that the risk of a breakdown is serious. I need hardly say that I hold that it is worth some sacrifice to avoid this. I n any case, I recommend settling the matter quickly. T h e negotiations are being allowed to drag on rather too long. 6 4

T h e negotiations came perilously near breaking down completely over the matter of compensation to France in return for " Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, Lansdowne, p. 287. M Cogordan to Bouliniere, Jan. 19, 1904, D. D. Fser. 2, IV, 274. " C r o m e r to Lansdowne, Jan. 2 1 , 1904, Newton, Lansdowne, p. 289.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE E N T E N T E

89

her relinquishment of fishing rights off the N e w f o u n d l a n d coast. Comparatively the question was not of great importance, though undoubtedly Delcasse feared criticism for what he felt to be an inadequate quid, pro quo. But, in addition, a variety of factors were working together to place difficulties in the way of successful negotiation. " T h e spirit in which our G o v e r n m e n t and the F o r e i g n Office are negotiating is much too stiff. . . . , " Gorst complained to C r o m e r in early January. 6 5 A n d the F r e n c h , f o r their part, were showing no more inclination to compromise than were the British. B y far the most serious of the complicating factors, however, was the increasing menace of a Russo-Japanese war. Obviously a war between Russia and Japan m i g h t throw the w h o l e train of negotiations off the track. A n g l o - F r e n c h efforts to arrive at an entente had been logically f o l l o w e d by attempts to bring about an Anglo-Russian agreement. T h e hopes of the French that E n g l a n d and Russia might be brought together are too w e l l known to require repetition here. A s for the E n g l i s h , there were indications of willingness, even of anxiety, to come to terms with Russia which reach back into the period w h e n Russian ambitions w e r e E n g l a n d ' s worst nightmare. 6 6 W h e n circumstances first drew E n g l a n d and France toward one another^ some E n g l i s h m e n viewed the French rapprochement primarily as a stepping stone to Russia. Chamberlain and L o r d Rothschild, of the English branch of that famed banking family, appear to have become converted to the idea of rendering aid to the French financiers in carrying the Russian loans. According to R a d o l i n , w h o got his information f r o m Betzold, a confidential agent of the Rothschilds, the conversion of L o r d Rothschild was the work of A l p h o n s e Rothschild of the Paris house. 67 D u r i n g Delcasse's visit to L o n d o n in J u l y 1903 " G o r s t to C r o m e r , J a n . 6, 1904, Z e t l a n d , Cromer, " L a n g e r , Diplomacy "

of Itnferialtsm,

p. 280.

I I , 465 ff., 682 ff., 7 5 1 ff., 783

ff.

R a d o l i n to B u l o w , M a y 18, 1 9 0 3 , G. P., X V I I , 5 8 5 - 5 8 7 . It is interesting

to c o m p a r e the tenor o f this report, in w h i c h R a d o l i n argues that an

Anglo-

Russian combine is a v e r y real p r o b a b i l i t y , w i t h his report sent e a r l i e r in the same d a y but before he h a d talked to B e t z o l d ( i b i d . , X V I I , 5 8 1 - 5 8 5 ) . In the earlier report, Radolin f e l t that there w a s little chance f o r such a combine. T h e revelations made by

Betzold

regarding

the attitudes of

Chamberlain,

Lord

go

E G Y P T AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

Chamberlain assured him that Great Britain favored the idea of an understanding with Russia. Delcasse hastened to repeat the conversation to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, and, as a consequence, Lansdowne was approached by Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador at London. Lansdowne referred to the fact that more than once he himself had suggested an amicable arrangement with Russia and declared that " H i s Majesty's Government would . . . not repel any overture which might be made . . . but . . . it would be necessary for Russia to show us more confidence than she had hitherto vouchsafed." 68 When Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, visited Paris in October he agreed with Delcasse on the value of settling differences with both England and Japan, and shortly afterward Benckendorff was authorized to hold conversations with Lansdowne on points of difficulty. 69 Thus negotiations began, but they failed to make any substantial progress. One can hardly fail to get the impression from reading the documents that of the two countries England was the more anxious for a settlement. Lansdowne was soon complaining that " F r o m the want of precision of his Excellency's [Benckendorff's] language and ideas, I am disposed to think that our discussions are not likely to have much result." 70 The conversations indicate too much suspicion on the part of each country for much in the way of accomplishment to have been possible at the time. T h e English recognized that while Count Lamsdorff looked toward Great Britain with favor, his influence on the formation of Russian policy was none too strong. Nor had the British public been prepared to greet Russia as a friend as it had been in the case of France. From the Russian point of view, friendship with Great Britain was difficult to reconcile with the policies of the two countries in the Far East. These difficulties Rothschild, and B a l f o u r completely changed his mind. See also: Eckardstein to B u l o w , M a y i o , 1 9 0 3 , ibid., X V I I , 5 6 7 - 5 7 0 ; and ibid., X V I I , 5 7 0 - 5 7 2 , 577-58O, 588-590, 590-594. " L a n s d o w n e to Scott, J u l y 29, 1 9 0 3 , B. D., II, 2 1 2 . Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 4, 1 9 0 3 , B. DII, 221-222. " L a n s d o w n e to Spring-Rice, Nov. 1 7 , 1 9 0 3 , B. D., IV, 1 8 3 - 1 8 + .

NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ENTENTE m i g h t have been obviated, however, had it not been for the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. W i t h the coming of that event both parties agreed that it seemed inadvisable, for the time being at least, to continue the negotiations. Lansdowne, as early as December 1 1 , 1903 recognized the probability of a conflict between Russia and Japan and suggested to Cambon that the British and French governments " d o all in their power to keep the peace." 7 1 Both governments were eager to do this and were even more desirous of localizing the conflict if it did come, but each was also cautious not to offend its ally. Delcassé h o p e f u l l y believed up to the v e r y eve of the war that peace would be maintained. If we may believe P a l é o l o g u e , D e l cassé assured the French cabinet, on the day before the Japanese Ambassador to Russia asked for his passports, that he personally w o u l d answer foi peace. 72 Since the beginning of negotiations with E n g l a n d , Delcassé had been worried because some factions in France felt that an agreement with E n g l a n d was incompatible with the Russian A l liance. 73 H e had taken every possible step to indicate that the A l liance with the great Slavic power remained a cardinal principle of French foreign policy. It was, therefore, a matter of great embarrassment to him when, on the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, M . Jaurès, French socialist leader, led a newspaper attack on the Russian Alliance. 7 4 A counter-attack which was led by the Figaro threatened to prove equally as embarrassing for the new friendship with E n g l a n d . Beginning on February 18, the Figaro

published articles and documents which attempted to

prove that Russia had remained staunchly loyal to France d u r i n g the Fashoda crisis. 75 Fortunately f o r the continuation of

the

Anglo-French negotiations the more moderate journals refused to become excited. The

Times

regretted the reopening of the

" L a n s d o w n e to Monson, Dec. 1 1 , 1903, B. D., II, p. 224. Paléologue, The Turning Point, pp. 32-33. " Newton, Lansdowne, p. 286. "Journal des Débats, Feb. 17, 20, 21, 1904; The Times, Feb. I J , 19, 23, 1904. ™ Figaro,

Feb. 18 ff., 1904, citcd in The Times,

Feb. 19 ff, 1904.

92

E G Y P T AND T H E ANGLO-FRENCH E N T E N T E

Fashoda incident/6 and de Caix declared in the Bulletin that the Russo-Japanese war made it more imperative than ever for England and France to come to terms." Ebray insisted in the Journal de Débats that there was no incompatibility in friendship with both Russia and England.78 By March 3 The Times was able to rejoice that '-Every day now brings fresh evidence of it being taken for granted that the Russo-Japanese conflict will not disturb friendly relations recently established between Great Britain and France.'"* In fact, once the effect of the first impact of the war between their respective allies had been overcome, the result was to accelerate rather than retard the progress of the AngloFrench conversations. On March 14 Lord Lansdowne reported that "The French negotiations, after sticking in all sorts of ignoble ruts, suddenly began to travel at the rate of an express train."80 Lord Lansdowne had insisted in the earliest stages of the parleys that the interests of Spain in Morocco would have to be given due consideration and that any arrangement between France and England "affecting the balance of power in Morocco" would have to be acceptable to the Spanish Government.81 Delcassé had readily agreed to this demand but had suggested that France and Spain should deal with the matter individually. As the negotiations progressed, however, he made no attempt to settle with Spain. He was anxious that Spain should not be consulted until after France and Great Britain had come to terms. Lansdowne objected to the delay, and in the latter part of February even informed Spain that negotiations in regard to Morocco were under way,82 but in the end he allowed Delcassé's view to prevail. In the final Anglo-French agreement, an article was included which provided that certain territory, adjacent to Melilla, ™ The Times, Feb. 2 3 , 1904. " Robert de Caix, " L a Guerre russo-japanese et la politique de la France," in Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, Feb. 1904, X I V , 43-49. n Journal des Débats, March 12, 1904. ™ The Times, Lansdowne "Lansdowne "Lansdowne

March 3, 1904. to Cromer, March 14, 1904, Zetland, Cromer, p. 2 8 1 . to Monson, July 7, 1903, B. D., II, 296. to Egerton, Feb. 27, 1904, ibid., pp. 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 .

NEGOTIATIONS

FOR

THE

ENTENTE

93

Ceuta, and other Presides, should fall within the sphere of influence of Spain if the Sultan of Morocco should ever cease to exercise authority over it.83 Both the English and the French were aware of the difficulties of an arrangement from the point of view of how it might be regarded by Germany. In November Lansdowne wrote to Cromer: I have felt from the first, and so has Cambon, that we shall have to reckon with G e r m a n y . Metternich has made several inquiries as to w h a t we were about, and the newspapers have made so many disclosures of late that they probably k n o w the whole story, even if they did not know it before. It would not surprise me if they were to ask for Rabat. I do not know w h a t our Admiralty would say to this, but the French have always assumed that we were to keep other Powers out of Morocco, and the Spaniards cannot bear Germany and impute to her the most sinister designs. 84

T h e English statesmen were even more concerned as to what the attitude of Germany would be to the Egyptian proposals which were to form a part of the agreement. W h i l e Germany's interests in E g y p t were much less significant than those of France, and it had generally been the German policy to support the English position in E g y p t , German consent to changes in the Egyptian financial system was just as legally necessary as was the that of France. 85 Fearing possible opposition from Germany, or from other powers, the British became insistent upon gaining French diplomatic support for carrying out the Egyptian proposals. " W e have constantly kept in view," Lansdowne wired Cromer on March 25, "the desirability of obtaining from the French Government an engagement that they will assist us in bringing about the execution of the Decree [the Khedivial Decree which attached to the final agreement], and I am insisting on retension of clause to this effect." 86 In that each country promised its diplomatic support to the other in carrying out the terms of " Secret Article III of the "Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco." " L a n s d o w n e to Cromer, N o v . 17, 1903, Newton, Lamdo S3-SÎ.

66-68

63. 78; influence

65;

visit

on the formation of the Entente,

Evening

Nevis, 50

52"i 3

Express,

50

Egypt, British interests in, i - i j , 1 1 9 9ff.,

to

Lansdowne,

F

1 2 1 ; French interests in, 1-2, 7-8, ' 4 , 15. 67. n o . government,

Review

article, 64-65; influence 011 foreign

Fashoda, the incident of, 7, 19, 88,

81 ; relationship to Turkey, 2, 8-9,

9 1 , 9 2 ; effect on Anglo-French re-

1 2 , 2 4 ; trade, 6, 105, 1 0 6 ; finan-

lations, 16-18

cial difficulties, i , 3, 5, i 7 f . , 72,

Fay, S. B., 13, 24, 25, 46, 66

79-81,

Fez, 3 7, 5 7

87,

IOO-IOI,

120-121}

Egyptian question following Fash-

Figaro,

oda, 1 6 - 1 9 ; relation of Egyptian

113

question to Anglo-French negotia-

Finot, 5 1

tions of

Fortnightly

1902,

negotiation

of

37;

and

Entente

1903-04,

71-77,

47, 5 1 , 54, 59, 60, 9 1 ,

Review,

no,

The, 1 8 , 30, 47-

56, 64, 109, 1 1 0 , 1 1 6

138

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

Français, Le, 47 France, interests in Egypt, 1 - 1 , 7, 8, 14, i j , 1 8 - 1 9 , s 7> 93> 94» »oi, 1 1 0 ; increasing- interest in Morocco, i o ; and Italy, 22, 23, 4J-46, 5 1 , 1 2 1 ; and Spain, 22, 23, 92-93, 98-100; and Russia, 44, 5 1 , 52, 89-92, 1 1 3 - n j ; press of, 4 9 - j 1 , 53, 84-85, 1 1 0 - 1 1 4 , 120. See also Morocco, Anglo-French Entente, and Anglo-French rapprochement Freycinet, Charles de, 1, 7, 16, 17 Friilings, 5

Hallberg, C. W., 3, 8 Hanotaux, G., 2 1 , 58 Hardinge, Sir Charles, 53 Harmsworth, A., 50 Harris, W. B., 57, 1 2 2 ; and the Anglo-French negotiations of 1902, 36-39 Headlam-Morley, Sir James, 2, 3, 4, 5 Holland, B., 78 Holstein, Baron Fritz von, 22, 104 Hoskins, H. L., 3

15,

G

I

Gambia, 88 Gaulois, 11 o, 113 Germany, 22, 23, 44, 123, 1 2 5 , 1 2 6 ; and England, 25-30, 44, 49, 50, 104-105, 1 1 5 - 1 1 8 , 122 ; and Egypt, •4> ' 5 , 93> 94! 103, 104, 105, 1 1 6 ; interests in Morocco, 22, 35, 4 1 , 93; and the Anglo-Franch negotiations of 1902, 37, 38; and the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, 1 1 5 - 1 1 8 ; British and French fear of, 9 3 ; press, 25-27, 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 Gibraltar, 35, 37, 40, i n Giffen, M. B., 17 Gooch, G. P., 4, 24 Gordon, Gen. C. G., 7 Gorst, Sir Eldon, 7 1 , 72, 81-82, 87, 89, 100

Intransigeant, 50 Ismail Pasha, 1 1 Isvolski, A., 103 Italy, 60, 93, 103, 104, 126, 1 2 7 ; rapprochement with France, 22, *3, 4Î-4«, S>> m

Grey, Sir Edward, 33, 107, 1 1 7 ; on pleasure at Egyptian settlement, 1 4 - 1 5 ; on Chamberlain's influence, 28-29; o n meaning of AngloFrench Entente, 108 H Hale, O. J . , 26, 50, 1 1 6 , 1 1 7 Halévy, É., 26, 42

J Japan, Alliance with England, 25, 30, 45, 1 2 2 ; war with Russia, 91-92 Jaray, Gabriel-Louis, 9, 47, 48, n o , m Jaurès, J., 2 1 , 91 Jenks, J . W., 6 Journal des Débats, 5 1 , 59, 61, 83, 91, n o , 1 1 3 Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, 23, 57, n o , m , 1 1 2 K Khedive, of Egypt, 3, 100; governmental powers, 9, 1 1 , 13 Khedivial Decree, of 1904, 93, 94, 96, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; British negotiations with Russia and Germany for acceptance of, 102-105 Khedivial Library, 105 Kühlmann, Richard von, 1 0 3 , 1 1 5

INDEX L

Melilla, 82, 92 Mentzingen, 37, 57

Lamsdorff, Count, 90, 103, 1 1 4

Metternich, Count, 28, 30, 83, 86,

Lanessan, J . L. de, 47, 51

93, 1 0 5 ; and Cambon-Chamberlain

Langer, W. L., 1 , 1 4 , *7. 3 ° . 89 Lansdowne,

139

Lord,

2,

5,

i8f.,

23,

conversations, 29; on British hatred

i6ß.,

48, 49, 53, 60, 62, i o i f f . ,

for Germany, 49-50; on nature of

109,

ii6f.,

secret articles in Anglo-French En-

British

122,

isolation,

125,

126;

on

25;

and

the

tente, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8

Anglo-French negotiations of 1902,

Millet, René, 58, 60,

33-42;

Millevoye, Lucien, 51

favors

friendship

with

m

France, 34, 5 2 ; on public opinion

Milner, Lord, 1 , 6, 8, 1 1 , 1 3 , 100

on

Mixed

Anglo-French

rapprochement,

44; necessity for including Egypt in negotiations,

72-76;

and

£ti-

enne's visit, 66-68; and Delcasse's visit, 6 9 - 7 1 ; and Entente negotiations of

1903 1904,

68-95;

negotiations for German consent to Khedivial Decree, 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 8 Le Compte, 42 Lee, Sir Sidney, 72, 103 Le Faivre, 39 Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre, 48 Ligue des Patriotes, 51 Lloyd, Lord, 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 Lorin, Henri, 63-64, 65 Los Islands, 95, 96 Loubet, President, 43, 5 1 , 53, 54, 66, 69

Administrations,

10-13, Mixed E

IOI

Courts

£ y P f ) 1 3>

Monthly

in

Egypt,

> (or

Tribunals),

in

101

Review,

Monson, Sir

72

Edward,

39. 47. 4«, 5 i . 79.

16, 10

23,

9> " 3 i

38, on

Delcassé and Moroccan

"liquida-

tion," 41 ; on President

Loubet's

pleasure at King Edward's visit to Paris, 53 Morning

Post,

The

(London),

60,

82, 106 Morel, E. D., 32 Morocco, 2 1 , 29, 3 1 , 36, 37, 40, 4 1 , 4 * . 43. 46. 54, SS, 59. 60, 63, 64, 65,

67,

io6ff. ;

69S.,

77,

80,

Declaration

84,

85,

respecting

Egypt and, 96-100, 1 0 3 , 105, 106,

Louis, G., 82

108, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ;

importance in En-

tente agreement,

M

119;

trade,

82,

8 3 ; British interest in, 2 1 ; increas-

Maclean, Käid Sir H., 3 1 , 40; mis-

ing French interest in, 20; attitude

sion to London in 1902, 37-38

of British merchants toward con-

Madagascar, 79, 96

cessions in, 82-83; Spanish interests

Maenss, 37, 38

in, 92-93

Malta, 1 1 1 Manchester

Moroccan-Egyptian Guardian,

5o, 54, 64, 69,

78, 82, 84, 85, 106

settlement,

56-

57, 62, 96-100, 1 1 5 , 1 2 3 ; first appearance

of

idea in

newspapers,

Meakin, Budgett, 1 1 o

1 9 ; Delcassé decides on, 6 1 ; basis

Mehemet Ali, 7 , 1 1 1

for Entente, 76-77

140

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales,

N National

Review,

The,

i8, 22, 30,

j o , «5, 74, >>6 Nelidov, A. I., 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 Newfoundland, 65, 77, 79, 88, 89, 95, 96, >°7, >»*, >15 New Hebrides, 65, 79, 96 Newton, Lord, 80, 86, 87, 88, 9 1 , 93, 95, >01 Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 37, 38, 39 Niger River, 65, 88, 96 Nigeria, 79 Nile river, 2, 102, i 2 j Noailles, 30 North American Review,

The, 5

O Oakes, A. H., 4 Observer, 50 O'Connor, 24 Oppenheims, 5 P Pages, G., 16 Paléologue, M., 91 Parkington, Major R., 47 Parliamentary Debates, 33, 44, 106, 107, 108, 109, 1 1 o , 1 1 6 Patenôtre, 23 Patrie, 50, j i , 54 Pauncefote, Sir Julian, 4 Percher, M., 20 Percy, Earl of, 1 1 7 ; statement on Anglo-French Entente, 107-108 Petit Journal, 11 o Porter, Charles, 59, 78 Pressense, F. de, 1 1 0 Pribram, A. F., 22 Prinet, 3 t Prinetti, 46

Q Quai d'Orsay, 72, 88

69, 79, n o , >>4 R Rabat, 82, 93 Radolin, Prince, 52, 89, 1 1 J Renais, Sir John, 47 République Française, 54, 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 Reuter Agency, 1 1 6 Revue Bleue, 112 Revue des Deux Mondes, 48, 1 1 1 Revue de Droits Internationals et de Legislation Comparée, 9 Revue de Paris, 60, 1 1 o Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 58, 60 Richthofen, Baron, 104, 105 Roberts, Lord, 38 Roberts, Stephen H., 21 Rosebery, Lord, 106 Rotard, 31 Rothschild, Alphonse, 89, 90 Rothschilds, 5, 89 Rothstein, Theodore, 5, 14 Rouvier, M., 29 Russia, 14, 24, 93, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 , 1 2 6 ; Franco-Russian Alliance, 44, 45, 5 1 , 52, 9 ' , 1 >3, >i4i RussoJapanese War, 77, 89, 91-92, 1 1 4 , i 2 j ; and Khedivial Decree, 1 0 3 ; and Great Britain, 30, 89-91, 103, 104, 1 1 4 , 123 S Saint-René-Taillandier,

23, 3 1 ,

32,

39 Salisbury, Lord, 7, 17, 23, 2 j , 34, 52, 108; on British isolation, 24 Samoa, 104 Sanderson, Sir Thomas, 38 Sasson, Sir Edward, 49 Saturday Review, 106 Schmitt, B. E., 16

INDEX Secret Articles, in Anglo-French

En-

141

T i g r a n e Pasha, 72 Times,

tente, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8, 9 9 - 1 0 0

The

( L o n d o n ) , 8, 1 7 , 27, 30,

Siam, 35, 6 1 , 65, 79, 96

3 1 1 49> 5 ° . 5 1 , 5 4 , 5 7 . 5», 60, 63,

Siamese T r e a t y , quarrel between Del-

64, 65, 68, 69, 83, 9 1 , 92, 1 0 6 , 1 1 0 , 112,

cassé and Colonials over, 58-61 Siecle,

T r i p l e Alliance, 46, 1 1 6

Sinclair, Louis, 49

T r i p o l i , 22, 46, 60,

Sontag, R . J . , 1 0 4 , 1 1 7 Spain,

22,

with

117;

1902

France,

Morocco,

negotiations

23;

35,

71,

interests 92,

1 2 5 ; and Anglo-French negotiations, 9 2 - 9 3 , Spectator, 112,

116

Tonquin, 26

5 1 , 69, 1 1 o

in

93,

T u r k e y , 2, 8, 9, 1 2 , 1 3 , 24

117, U

Moroccan

98-100

Union Coloniale

50, 64, 82, 84, 1 0 6 ,

111,

Union

Française,

Démocratique,

iij

V

Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, on Chamberlain and G e r m a n y , 27 Standard,

Year Book,

Victoria, Queen, 52 V i g o u r o u x , Louis, 1 1 2

106

Statesman's

Villiers,

T h e , 6, 22

Sudan, A n g l o - E g y p t i a n , 7, 87,

George

120

French

interest in, 3 ;

in,

Con-

vention of 1 8 8 8 , 4, 98

Dispatch, 20

Westminster

Gazette,

1 9 , 50, 78,

Review,

The, 11 o 104

W o l f , J o h n , 84

5, 8, 4 7 , 5 1 , 55, 59, 64,

W o l f f , 23

no,

Z

114

Thibet, 1 0 3 , 1 2 7

The,

115

Wilson, Lt. Col. Sir A r n o l d T . , 3, 8

T e m p e r l y , Harold, 4

T e r r i e r , Auguste, 20

50

West Africa,

Wilhelm I I , E m p e r o r , 28,

T c h a d , L a k e , 65

113,

Weekly

Westminster

T a n g i e r , 3 3 , 35, 36, 3 7 , 63, 71 T a r d i e u , A n d r e , 49, 5 1 , 5 3 , 54

Le,

Ward, A . W . , 24

106, 1 1 4 ,

T

6 5 , 66, 67, 70, 82, 85, i o j ,

Tardieu),

W

Suez Canal, 82, 1 1 2 , 1 2 0 ; European interest in, 2 ; British interest

(André

54, 59

Stuart, G . H . , 1 1 o

Temps,

64

67

116

Spender, J . A . , 1 0 5 ,

2-4;

ili

Tunis, 64

Zetland, Marquess o f , 6, 1 4 , 82, 86, «7. 89, 92, 94