The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947 9781463225506

Citation preview

T h e Turkish Straits and the Great Powers

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers

From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947

Süleyman Seydi

1 The Isis Press, Istanbul

gOÎ^ÎaS pre** 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2003 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

o

ISBN 978-1-61719-095-7

Printed in the United States of America

Born in Ordu in 1969. Having graduated from Karadeniz Technical University (Trabzon) he obtained his MA from Manchester University, Department of Middle Eastern Studies and his Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham, Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies. Is currently Assistant Professor at the History Department, Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Süleyman Demirel University (Isparta).

To my daughter Cansu Sena

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

9

Abbreviations

11

Introduction

13

Chapter

1. The Straits Question: the Great Powers and Turkish Diplomacy 1774-1936: A Historical Background

25

Chapter 2. The Montr eux Convention and the Great Powers' Politics vis-à-vis the Straits on the Eve of the Second World War

55

Chapter 3. The Turkish Straits and Great Power Policies During the Early Part of World War II from October 1939 to June 1941

85

Chapter 4. Turkey's Wartime Record as a Guardian of the Straits Chapter 5. Anglo-Soviet 1943-44

Containment Diplomacy Towards

...

121

Turkey, 149

Chapter 6. Prelude to the Cold War in the Near East Co-Operation or Confrontation Among the Allied Powers and the Straits Question at the Final Stage of the War

183

Chapter 7. America Committed: Cold War in the Near East

215

Bibliography

243

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While in the process of developing the arguments for this study, I have received invaluable advice and constructive criticism f r o m Dr. Steven Morewood which provided help in thinking through and shaping this study. I would like to express my appreciation and sincere thanks to him. I would also like to thank Dr. Rhoads Murphey and Professor Erik Goldstein, who supervised this study in the initial stage. I also wish to thank Dr. Btilent Gôkay for his encouragement to initiate this research and suggestions. 1 would like to thank the archivists at the PRO in Kew, the National Archives in Maryland and of ATASE in Ankara. Also the staff of the special Collections at the University of Birmingham Main Library for their assistance with the papers of Lord Avon, Lady Avon for allowing me to consult and use her late husband's papers in this thesis and the Archivist at Churchill College, Cambridge for access to the papers held in the Churchill Archive Centre, and the staff of the British Library for their assistance with the papers of Admiral Cunningham. I am also very grateful to all my family members for their full support, love and encouragement. I particularly owe a great deal of gratitude to my father §akir and my mother Meryem who sacrificed much for my study. Most of all I thank my wife, Nuray.

ABBREVIATIONS ADM ATASE CAB CAC CO,c DB] DGl FO FRI JC.C Km NA PHI PRI PRC RG SEC UN< US

us;

Admiralty Turkish Military Archives Cabinet Churchill Archives Centre Chiefs of Staff Documents on British Foreign Policy Documents on German Foreign Policy Foreign Office Foreign Relations of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Kilometre North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Post-Hostilities Planning Prime Minister's Minute Public Records Office Record Group Special Organisations Executive United Nations Organisation United States United Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

The period discussed in this book was one of turmoil within both Turkish and British governmental bodies, and later extended to the United States (US), involving constant Soviet pressure to amend the Montreux Straits regime of 1936 in favour of the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which wanted to become a Mediterranean naval power. This account of the Great Powers' policies falls into three major sections. The first of these is concerned with the pre-war policies of the concerned powers. The second part of the book focuses on Anglo-Soviet-German rivalry over the Straits during the Second World War, which operated until the final year of the conflict, and shows how this was affected by the concerns over the post-war settlements. The last part concentrates mainly on the post-war thinking of the Great Powers and the heavy involvement of the United States in the Straits question following the constant Soviet demands on Turkey which led up the Cold War in the Near East. The present study fills a gap concerning the part played by the Straits at the beginning of the Cold War in the Near East. The Americans were crucial players in the Cold War in the region. However, it was Britain which saw, and used her political power to confront, the Soviet threat posed towards Turkey from 1935 onwards. After this Britain believed that it must prevent at all costs any attempt by the Soviets to establish themselves on the Straits. This is why during the war the British Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) did not accept any policy which isolated Turkey vis-a-vis the USSR.

The Importance of the Turkish Straits for Turkey and the Great Powers The Turkish Straits — also called the Black Sea Straits — are composed of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, connected by the oblong Sea of Marmara. The total distance from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea is around 325 km., of which the Bosporus accounts for 31 km., with an average width of 1.5 km, — 700 meters at its narrowest point, and the Dardanelles 70 km. in length with an average width of 1.3 - 2 km, with the 225 km. stretch of the Sea of Marmara in between. By comparison to many other straits used for international navigation, the Turkish Straits are extremely narrow. The very narrow and winding shape of the Straits is more akin to that of a river. Both Straits are, however, deep enough for even the largest battleship to pass

14

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

through. With the natural height of both banks, they were, however, in a position to be easily defended even against fully equipped warships. In this respect, although they had been under Russian threat for centuries, only once had passage by hostile forces been attempted, in the First World War, and this had ended disastrously.1 The Straits constituted a natural maritime buffer zone between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Moreover, being the key to Istanbul and the meeting place of Europe and Asia made the international waterway a focus of imperial ambitions over the centuries. Napoleon perceived the supreme strategic value of the Straits when he declared his willingness to abandon mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those narrow straits. The Bolshevist Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky summed up the transcendent importance of the Straits when he said that 'if a warship has to sail from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, it must pass through the Dardanelles whether the government in Moscow is Czarist or Communist'. 2 The Straits provided the only maritime route available to Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR for communication between the Black Sea and the rest of the world. In other words, the Straits dominated the commercial and strategic communications of the Black Sea basin as well as the Danube Valley as it was the only natural outlet to the Baku and Romanian oilfields and the agricultural produce of the lower Danube. This is why Titulescu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, stressed at the Montreux Conference the fact that the Straits were the heart of Turkey, but also formed the lungs of Romania. As for the USSR, the only Soviet ports free from ice throughout the year were those in the Black Sea. In this regard, the Straits were the only way to reach warm water and take part in the affairs of the world oceans. Furthermore, the Kremlin authorities regarded the Straits as lying within the Soviet security zone along with Bulgaria. Therefore, the USSR endeavoured to obtain a foothold in the Straits in order at once to prevent other powers from threatening her Black Sea coast, and to place herself in a position to take a hand in Mediterranean affairs. At the same time, British preponderance in the Eastern Mediterranean was vital to Great Britain for the control of her oilsupplies from the Middle East as well as of her communications with the Empire and Commonwealth, particularly with India and the Far East. British policy, therefore, sought not to allow the Soviet fleet through the Straits in order to retain hegemony in the Mediterranean. This consideration made the Straits a buffer zone or clash zone particularly between Britain, the USSR and Turkey. However, Turkey had always been determined to exercise full sovereignty over the Straits which were seen as a symbol of Turkish sovereignty and integrity. 1 For the details see Nigel Steel, The Battlefields of Gallipoli (London: Leo Cooper, 1990); Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956); John Laffin, Damn the Dardanelles! The Agony of Gallipoli (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1989); Geoffrey Penn, Fisher, Churchill and the Dardanelles (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999). 2 Quoted from Hans J. Mergenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 112.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

15

There has been much work done about Turkey and the Cold War, small parts of which deal directly with the specific issues concerning the Straits during the period encompassed by this study. While there is a vast literature on the Straits vis-à-vis the Gallipoli campaign in the First World War 1 , little has been done on the specific role of the Turkish Straits during the Second World War in the lead up to the Cold War in the Near East. Therefore, the major secondary sources for this study can be found in the very narrow body of work which has been done on the Straits issue during the conflict and its role in the inception of the Cold War in the Near East, together with the much larger body of work on the general Cold War context, and studies of the foreign policies of the Great Powers. While, there are plenty of studies regarding the pre-1939 Straits issue, a glaring gap remains for the period under review. In this regard, little has been written on the Great Powers' interests in the Straits, which had stood as a stumbling block in the way of the imperial ambitions of the USSR over the Mediterranean and the Middle East not only as an aspect of wartime military strategy, but also in the post-war political strategy which led up to the Cold War in the Near East. The major secondary sources for this period focus on Turkey's neutral attitude in the 1939-45 war but without touching in depth on Turkey's application of the Convention, which should be crucial to such a study. There are also general overviews of the origins of the Cold War, which have a tendency to underestimate the importance of the Turkish Straits within the early Cold War period. 2 The primary objective of this study is to contribute to the existing literature on the Great Powers' rivalry during and after the war by offering a different approach: analysing the Turkish Straits in the framework of the interplay between the Great Powers' diplomacy and regional and local factors, 1 See for example Geoffrey Miller, Straits: British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign (Hull: The University of Hull Press, 1997); Martin Gilbert (ed.), The Straits of War: Gallipoli Remembered (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000); P. P. Graves, The Question of the Straits: The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1931); John North, Gallipoli: The Fading Vision (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1936); Lynn H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan States, August 1914 to the Inception of the Dardanelles Campaign (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986). ^ For instance, Robertson has written on the role which Turkey played in British strategy during the Second World War. However, he gives little attention the strategic role of the Straits in allied wartime strategy. See John Robertson, Turkey and Allied Strategy, 1941-45 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986). On the general stance of Turkey in the war, Deringil's work is worth mentioning here. Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Denniston gives a very useful account on British strategy, Churchill's in particular and the attitude of the Foreign Office towards Turkey in wartime. Robin Denniston, Churchill's Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and Turkey 1942-44 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1997). However, both Deringil and Denniston give little attention to the Straits role in British strategic consideration. The Straits factor does not have enough attention from the students of the Cold War either. See Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 26; Waiter Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1975 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 35-40; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-1945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York: Norton & Company, 1982).

16

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

which constituted the origins and onset of the Cold War in this area. Reading about the origins of the Cold War in the existing literature shows that what is missing is a regional and local study in this particular area. 1 From this perspective, it can be seen that, apart from the Anglo-American-Soviet aspect, the other nations and their considerations played a role as well. From this point, however, Kuniholm, in his study, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East',2 did not fail to observe the importance of the Mediterranean and the Near East, which played a crucial part in the Cold War. Nevertheless, his study mostly depended on American sources, generally ignoring the British and Turkish standpoints. This study focuses on more local developments in Turkey as far as the Straits were concerned and discusses their effect on the deterioration in the Great Powers' relationship which, in the historical context, is known as the origin of the Cold War. Therefore, Anglo-Soviet and later American-Soviet conflict over the Straits was a result of Turkey's feeling threatened by the Kremlin authorities — as well as western interests — and it welcomed Anglo-American intervention. There has been considerable work in the existing literature, which provides a historical account of the Straits question from its beginning to the Montreux Convention. 3 In particular, the works of Deluca and Routh give us a very useful account of the Great Powers' diplomacy at the Convention. 4 The literature which gives an account of the Straits issue after Montreux is based either only on unpublished British archival sources or American published archival sources, without analysing the issue in depth. 5 Pratt throws There are a number of studies regarding the origins of the Cold War, which analyse its beginnings using the perspective of the Great Powers' rivalry over the issues of Eastern Europe or Far East. See Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies Europe, 1943 to 1946 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War; Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); idem, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). However, analysing local factors such as the Straits issue in the discussions of post-war settlement would bring together the policies of the Great Powers with the local developments in the region, and discuss the interrelationships between them. 2

Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 3 For instance, A. L. Macfie, The Straits Question, 1908-1936 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993); idem, 'The Straits Question: The conference of Lausanne November 1922-July 1923', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.15, May 1979; idem, 'The Straits question in the First World War, 1914-18', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, January 1983; Geoffrey Miller, Straits:..., J. C. Hurewitz, 'The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits', Belleten, 28, n o . I l l , 1964, pp. 459-503; James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits: A Short History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940); Walter C. Hucul, 'Soviet Russia and the Turkish Straits: an Historical Sketch', World Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 27, no. 3, 1956, pp. 236-268. 4 Anthony R. Deluca, Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: the Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936 (New York: East European Monographs, 1981); D. A. Routh, 'The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits', in Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 584-649. 5 Eastern A. L. Macfie, 'The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45', Middle Studies, Vol. 25, 1989, pp. 238-248; idem, 'The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1987, pp. 75-82; Stephen G. Xydis, 'The 1945 Crisis Over the Turkish Straits', Balkan Studies, Vol. no. 41, 1960, pp. 5-90; Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and the US Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

INTRODUCTION

17

considerable light on British Mediterranean naval strategy following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia up to the Second World War. He makes clear Britain's dilemma in the face of dictatorship: while London tried to appease Mussolini by recognising Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia, it desired to stand up to the German threat. While he evaluates Turkey's place in British Mediterranean naval strategy and London's policy of Italian accession to the Montreux Convention, Pratt does not mention in his study, however, that it was an important aspect of Britain's appeasement policy of Mussolini. It is unfortunate that Turkish archives during the stated period are not available. However, some Turkish Foreign Office publications 1 and the memoirs 2 of those who had been in charge of foreign policy-making procedure at the time shed light on the Turkish perspective. Also a small amount of information recently became available from the Turkish Military Archive (ATASE). Looking through the memoirs of Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister, it can be seen that Soviet-Turkish relations during those years were not consistent with the friendly manner which Ankara and Moscow assumed. Rather Moscow had been trying to dictate an agreement in which the Soviets would share the defence of the Straits by taking advantage of Turkey's isolated position from the rest of world diplomacy. Furthermore, even soon after the Montreux Convention was signed, the Kremlin continued to put pressure on Turkey with the same purpose. As far as the second period with which this work is concerned, the existing literature which gives an account of Turkey's place in the Great Powers' policies during the war seems to miss the point of the Anglo-Soviet confrontation over the Straits, although the Berlin-Moscow talks of November 1940 receive reasonable attention. 3 In addition, these studies do not analyse the Anglo-Turkish perspective. During these years when London and Moscow were in alliance against the German threat, there had always been a rivalry over the Turkish Straits between the two capitals. Great Britain volunteered to

Tiirkiye Politikasinda 50 Yil: ikinci Diinya Savagi Yillari 1939-1946 (Ankara: T.C. Digigleri Bakanligi Ara§tirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlügü, 1973); Türk Dij Politikasinda 50. Yil: Montreux ve Savaj Öncesi Yillari, ¡935-1939 (Ankara: T.C. Di§i§leri Bakanligi Aragtirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Miidiirliigii, 1973). 2 Tevfik Riigtii Aras, Görü§lerim (Ankara: Tan Basimevi, 1956); Feridun Cemal tirkin, Di$i$lerinde 34 Yil: Amlar-Yorumlar, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1980); Idem, Turk-Sovyet ili^kileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Bajnur Matbaasi, 1968). As far as inter-war Anglo-Turkish relations are concerned, Millman's and Zhivkova's work provide a useful account for the background of this study. See Brock Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934-1940 (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998); Ludmila Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1936 (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1976). Türkkaya Ataöv, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-45 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasai Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1965); Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979); Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

18

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

support Turkey against the Soviets because the Soviet presence in the Straits was seen as a direct threat to British imperial communications by the British COS as early as 1935, along with the Italian threat to the British position in the Near East and the Mediterranean. Thereafter, the COS did not change their views regarding the disadvantages of the Soviet presence in the Straits. Therefore, Great Britain adopted a firm stand against Soviet demands to share the control of the Straits. In order to obtain Soviet co-operation against the Axis, Churchill's curious attempts during the war to provide free passage for Soviet warships met grave objections first from the British military authorities, then the Foreign Office, which objected that this would jeopardise Britain's position as a world power. At the same time, Turkish authorities were in fear that once the USSR had found a place in the Straits she would dominate the whole country. Even the guarantee given by Moscow along with London in August 1941 did not still Ankara's anxiety about the USSR, for Turkey believed that this was the result of wartime circumstances as far as the Soviets were concerned. This turned out to be the case, as Stalin raised the question again at some point following the Red Army's recovery from German attack. Turkey had sought a guarantee against Soviet aggression over the Straits since the early 1930s and also tried to convinced both London and Washington, at the end of the war, that their interests were not different from hers. The literature that provides an account of the Straits' post-war settlement can be found in the general context of the origins of the Cold War. To take the orthodox approach, the Cold War originated in the famous long telegram of George F. Kennan of 22 February 1946 and his published article, signed ' X ' , which argued that the policy of the Soviet government vis-à-vis capitalist states was fundamentally hostile, merely tempered by co-operation when deemed necessary. 1 The main theme of this view was that Roosevelt and later Truman and his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, misjudged the expansionist nature of the Kremlin's foreign policy which led them to formulate a policy of accommodation with the Soviets. The orthodox line generally argued that the Truman administration later became convinced that there was no room left to accommodate Moscow because of the latter's intransigent attitude in the United Nations and control over the production of atomic weapons, in addition to its domination of Eastern European affairs. On this basis, they were of the opinion that the USSR was seeking to extend her influence over Greece, Turkey and the whole Middle East and the Mediterranean. Furthermore, they saw the Soviet attempt to force Turkey to

^[George Kennan], " X " , 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, no. 4, 1947, pp. 566-582. For further orthodox approaches see Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York: Norton & Company, 1970); idem, Between War and Peace: the Potsdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II (London: Allen Lane, 1973).

INTRODUCTION

19

provide bases in the Straits, cede territory in eastern Anatolia and install a proSoviet Government in Ankara as a sign of the Kremlin's desire to expand its i n f l u e n c e b e y o n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e . 1 In contrast to the other orthodox commentators, Kennan did not see any rational Soviet threat either to Turkey or to any Middle Eastern country, claiming that communism and the Muslim faith were in conflict. Therefore, any threat on Turkey would be temporary, as communism would find no place to survive. 2 Harry N. H o w a r d , as a m e m b e r of the Interdivisional C o u n t r y Committee on Turkey in the State Department, contributes some useful points on American policy regarding the question of the Straits. Although the Anglo-Turkish perspective is not mentioned in his works, he claimed that the US was forced by the Kremlin authorities into the Cold W a r confrontation when the latter pressed Turkey to share control of the Straits. 3 T h e same approach is taken by Howard and Xydis, who emphasise the Soviet claim to have a base in the Straits and that their claim of territory f r o m the eastern part of Turkey shows the Kremlin's expansionist tendencies in the Near East. 4 After pointing out the Soviet note of 1946 to Turkey, Knight states that the constant Soviet pressure on Turkey persuaded James Forrestal to establish an American Mediterranean fleet in order to stop further Soviet expansion. 5 David Alvarez also provides a useful study, shedding light on American policy towards the Straits in his book on American policy towards Turkey in 194345. Overall, it serves as a useful background text to the issues involved and provides a good history of American activity in Turkey during and before the World War T w o . The work is particularly good on the policy of the State Department. Bruce Kuniholm in his study gives an account of events f r o m the T r u m a n Doctrine to T u r k e y ' s admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ( N A T O ) in 1952, w h i c h provides h e l p f u l i n f o r m a t i o n in general. 6 However, like Alvarez's work, the Anglo-Turkish approach to the Straits and how Turkey perceived the Soviet threat towards the Straits receives little attention.

1 Paul A. Rahe, 'The Beginning of the Cold War', in James W. Muller (ed.), Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech Fifty Years Later (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1999), p.

2

George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1968), pp. 315-319. - Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and the US Policy (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); idem, 'The Turkish Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects', Balkan Studies, 1970, Vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 35-60; idem, 'The United States and Turkey: American Policy in the Straits Question, 1914-1963', Balkan Studies Vol 4 no 2 1963, pp. 225-250. ' ' ' 4

Stephen G. Xydis, 'The 1945 Crisis over the Turkish Straits', Balkan Studies, Vol. no 1 1960 pp 5-90.

- Jonathan Knight, 'American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy' Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, no. 3, 1975, pp. 451-475. David Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: the United States and Turkey 19431946 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkans Studies, 1980); Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe 1946-1952 (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1984). 6

20

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

The revisionist school of thought, which was introduced mainly by William A. Williams in 1959, rejects the orthodox analysis as Westernoriented, as a self-serving capitalist exposé based on a misconception of Soviet internal reality and external goals. 1 Henry A. Wallace, Truman's Secretary of Commerce, takes the lead in this view, criticising Truman's Soviet policy: 'we should recognise that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the US'. 2 The revisionists in general argue that the USSR cannot be held responsible for starting the Cold War. Under the Stalin regime, priority was given to building up the Soviet economy, which had been badly affected by the war, while the US, the World's leading economy, doubled its gross national product. While the world revolutionary objective was a secondary matter for the Kremlin, it was the open-door economic policy of the Truman administration which provoked conflict between Washington and Moscow in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. This view explains the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe in terms of Moscow's security needs, ensuring that no further threat would emerge from the German quarter, but this does not mean that the region would have been sovietised. This school of thought further criticises the Truman administration because, as a result of the American open-door economic policy, the US seized the opportunity of stepping up competition against British Middle Eastern oil interests, using Soviet expansionism as an excuse. The revisionist approach to the Soviet demands on Turkey in the general Cold War context, therefore, differs from the orthodox. It tends to see the Soviet demands against Turkey and Iran as legitimate, regarding them as falling within a natural Soviet sphere of influence because of proximate borders. As Lafeber, one of the revisionists, claimed, the Soviet determination to gain a joint defence position in the Straits was interpreted by Washington, based on 'the domino theory', as an attempt to dominate Turkey, threaten Greece, and intimidate the remainder of the Middle East. He argues that the Missouri's mission to Istanbul and Churchill's speech at Fulton provoked Stalin to launch a series of retaliating policies, which marked a milestone in the Cold War. 3 The post-revisionists avoid blaming the start of the Cold War exclusively on either the Soviets or the Americans. In this respect, they criticise both orthodox and revisionist views, saying that while the former 1 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, Dell Publishing, 1972). 2 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 339; idem, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', Diplomatic History, Vol. no. 7, 1983, pp. 171-90. 3 Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, Kolko, The Politics of War.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

21

does not pay attention to the needs of Soviet security, the latter ignores the Soviet attitude, which caused shifts in American policy. As a leading student of post-revisionist thought, John Lewis Gaddis assumed that the Soviets could not achieve or did not intend to explore their real objective, which he believes was to ensure security through spheres of influence for a renewed effort to spread communism outside the borders of the USSR and this was what led to conflict between the two blocs. 1 In the 1970s, when the relevant British official documents became available, British historians began to challenge the largely American perspective of the origins of the Cold War by placing Britain in the centre of Soviet-American rivalry. According to the British school of thought, Britain was left alone to deal with the Soviets during the years 1945-46 as far as European affairs were concerned, while the Truman administration was seeking to accommodate the Soviets. Even Roosevelt tried to disentangle the US from Britain in order to convince Stalin that there was no Anglo-American conspiracy against the Soviets. This school argues that the US did not become concerned at the Soviet threat until the end of 1945 and then throughout 1946. And they had only just committed themselves when Britain announced its withdrawal from Turkey and Greece. As a student of the British school of thought, Harbutt disagrees with the revisionist view that the US was aggressive in dealing with the Soviets in 1945. He argues that during 1945-46 it was still unclear whether the US would engage in European affairs. In addition to American aloofness towards Eastern European affairs, the Soviet leadership was encouraged by Churchill's departure from the political scene to adopt a more aggressive policy not only towards Eastern Europe but also the Near East to achieve the historical ambition concerning the Straits and extend Soviet power towards the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. This all led to what he called 'the Soviet Cold War against Britain'. In this regard, he concludes that 'it was really Stalin who brought on the Cold War', not so much in Eastern Europe, but in Greece, Turkey and Iran. He sees Churchill's speech at Fulton as marking the realignment of American policy towards the USSR. The Missouri visit to Istanbul is also another milestone of American policy. Thus the Anglo-Soviet Cold War was transformed into the US-Soviet Cold War. 2 John Kent rightly 1 Gaddis, The United States, p. 355; idem, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis', pp. 17190. o Fräser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 117-21, 283. Hathaway and Anderson also share this view. See Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York: Columbia University, 1981); Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1981). Also see Robert Frazier, 'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine', Historical Journal, Voi. 27, no. 3, 1984, pp. 715-28; Victor Roothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-47 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982); Raymond Smith, 'Ernest Bevin, British Officials and British Soviet Policy, 1945-47', in Ann Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 32-52.

22

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

observes the close links between British policy towards the Straits and her imperial position in the Suez Canal base in the immediate post-war era, saying 'the need to oppose a Soviet base in the Straits was one of the main reasons why the British agreed to withdraw their forces f r o m E g y p t in peacetime in 1946'. 1 T h e British school of thought, in its general evaluation within the general cold war context, tends to suggest that the American involvement in the Straits affairs in 1946 was predominantly caused and influenced by British p o l i c y . H o w e v e r , the A m e r i c a n military authorities and d i p l o m a t i c representatives in M o s c o w and Ankara, who tried to convince the State Department and the President of the seriousness of the Soviet threat against the Straits, with its potential to diminish Western influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, 2 did not pay attention to the British school of thought. Moreover, T u r k e y ' s own efforts to persuade Washington to involve itself in the Straits affairs were ignored. When the Missouri visited Istanbul, Ismet inonii 3 paid it an enthusiastic visit, and also when he received the American reply to the Soviet note of August 1946 he was greatly relieved that the US was on the Turkish side. It is true that Britain took the lead, even confronting the Kremlin authorities alone during the difficult war years and before the war, while Washington remained aloof. When the US began to build its Straits policy during 1945, Britain warned Washington on more than one occasion about the nature of Soviet policy, to s o m e effect. H o w e v e r , T r u m a n ' s proposal for the internationalisation of the European waterways was then not adopted not bccause of British objections, but the opposition of the State Department. However, following the election of a Labour administration, while London was seeking to accommodate the Soviets in this matter, partly because of British inability to confront M o s c o w , after the end of 1945, in particular, the US adopted a firmer stance against the perceived Soviet policy in the Near East. This does not mean that London did not want to collaborate with the US. Rather, American assistance was vital to ensure that Britain would be able to maintain her position in the whole Middle East, which would preserve her standing as one of the Great Powers. By using both British and American archival materials, and parts of the Turkish archives, this study adds to the Cold War literature by showing that in its local aspect the Straits was one of the crucial elements which led to the Cold W a r in the Near East, according to further analysis of the policies of the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n and Turkish governments. John Kent, 'The Egyptian Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945-54', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 21, no. 3, 1993, p. 46; British Imperial Strategy arid the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), p. 122. In fact the British remained in Egypt because of the failure to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with the Egyptian government. 2 It might be true to say that this nature of Stalin's regime was the result of Soviet security requirement, as Mastny claims, against possible attack from the Mediterranean. However, one should give reasonable credit to a small power, like Turkey to seek her security requirement. Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, pp. 29-31. 3 Turkish President (1938-1950).

INTRODUCTION

23

One might challenge the comprehensiveness of this study on the grounds that Soviet archival sources have not been used. However, such deficiency should not be regarded as a major weakness in the study. The picture outlined throughout the study regarding the Soviet policy of the Straits has substantially been in conformity with the most recent works based on newly released Russian archival material. In this regard, in analysing the Soviet postwar thinking, Vladimir O. Pechalnov evaluates the prescriptions of Maisky 1 for the Soviet post-war aims on a country-by-country basis. Maisky outlined the Soviet strategic aims as to 'prevent the formation in Europe of any power or combination of powers with powerful armies' since it is the major Soviet concern to be the only great land power in Europe. In his strategic consideration, the Turkish Straits and its hinterland was seen as falling within the Soviet security zone in the post-war period. Maisky pointed out in his memorandum that 'in the Balkans, as a whole, the USSR should strive to weaken (ultimately exclude) Turkish influence by concluding mutual defencc pacts with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. It was also deemed necessary to undermine Turkey's position as a sentry at the Straits'. 2 The Soviet wartime policy for the Straits addressed throughout this study is in conformity with the limited Soviet archival studies as well. 3 It might be true to say that this feature of Stalin's regime was the result of Soviet security requirements, as Mastny claims, against possible attack from the Mediterranean. However, one should also be fair to a small power, such as Turkey, who also sought to fulfil her security requirements. As will be shown, Turkey feared Soviet power and her policies were predicated on the assumption that Moscow sought to dominate the Straits. As this study is generally about the role of the Turkish Straits in the making of the Great Powers' foreign policy during the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War, the major sources for the study are the extensive FO 371 series based at the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew; in particular, the records of the British Foreign Office Eastern Department until September 1939, then the Southern Department, which became responsible for Turkey during the war and the immediate Cold War period. The Cabinet (CAB), Prime Minister' Minutes (PREM) and Admiralty Papers (ADM) were also consulted. The private papers of Churchill and Lord Avon also provided useful information for this study. The Knatchbull-Hugessen Papers were also consulted, but were of little relevance to this study.

Ivan M. Maisky, one of the most experienced Soviet experts on the West and former Soviet Ambassador to London and an active participant in the forging of the Grand Alliance, was by then at the forefront of Soviet post-war planning. 2 Vladimir 0 . Pechatnov, The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the US and Great Britain (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Centre, 1995), p. 5. Based on Soviet archival work Gorodetsky's account also confirms the policy of the Soviet that Moscow tried hard to have a deal with Berlin, Sofia and Italy in order to secure its establishment in the Straits and its hinterland. See Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, (London: Yale University Press, 1999).

24

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

In addition to the published official documents collections in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the State Department records and military archival materials from the American National Archives in Maryland have also been consulted for inside information on American thinking and Washington's reaction to the Straits issue, in order to better comprehend how these affected the onset of the Cold War in the Near East. In particular, for the historical account of the American attitude regarding the Straits question, the Harley A. Notter files, and, for the period 1940 to 1949, RG 59 Decimal file and Micro film no. M 1292, provided useful information regarding the shaping of American policy. As far as Turkish sources are concerned, the Turkish archives for this period are still not available. However, ATASE provided some insights for the study. In addition, published Turkish archival documents, such as Turk Di§ Politikasinda 50. Yil: Montreux ve Savag Oncesi Yillari 1935-1939 (Ankara: T.C. Di§i§leri Bakanhgi Ara§tirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Mudurlugii, 1973) and Tiirkiye Di§ Politikasinda 50 Yil: tkinci Diinya Sava§i Yillari 19391946 (Ankara: T.C. Di§i§leri Bakanhgi Ara§tirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Mudiirlugu, 1973) have been very useful in revealing Turkish thinking. As for German-Soviet relations in this area, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. VIII, X, XI, XII, XIII and Jane Degras (ed.), Documents from the Archive of the German Foreign Office: Nazi Soviet Relations, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, 1933-1941 (London, Oxford University Press, 1953) threw very useful light on the themes of this study.

1 THE STRAITS QUESTION: THE GREAT POWERS AND TURKISH DIPLOMACY 1774-1936: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ever since Sultan Mehmed II seized Istanbul in 1453 the Straits had been entirely under Turkish control, a situation which lasted until 1918. Over the same period the Ottoman Turks also ruled the coast of the Black Sea, and forbade all foreign shipping to pass east of Istanbul; but the way in which they exercised their control over the Straits was not immediately a matter of major interest to other powers but gradually assumed a seminal importance. In its modern form the problem of the Straits emerged as a result of the southward expansionist policy of Russia towards the Black Sea during the eighteenth century. Thereafter, it was a constant objective of Russian policy to obtain the surest possible guarantees f o r unimpeded access to the Mediterranean. As a result, the Straits issue brought the two countries into conflict. Since then Russian ambitions to secure the Straits formed a decisive factor in Russo-Turkish relations and influenced Ottoman Turkey and its successor republic to seek protective relationships with other Great Powers. The history of the Straits from the Ottoman period up to the Montreux Convention of 1936 may be divided into three phases. The first was a phase of undiminished control by the Ottoman Sultanate, which lasted until the Treaty of Kiitjiik Kaynarca in 1774. During the period between 1774 and the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, the Great Powers were involved in policy-making for the Straits as a means of exercising diplomatic pressure, yet the Ottoman rulers were still practising theoretical control. The third phase, in which Turkish control over the Straits, following her defeat in the First World War, was transferred firstly to the Allied powers, and then to the League of Nations, was ended at Montreux. The first breach of the Ottoman monopoly of maritime traffic through the Straits was made by the Treaty of Kii^iik Kaynarca in 1774, which conceded to Russian merchant shipping the right of free and uninterrupted navigation in both the Black Sea and the Straits.' Similar rights were granted

Article 11 of the Treaty provided that there should be free and unimpeded navigation for merchant ships belonging to Russia and the Ottoman Empire in all the seas which wash their shores; the Sublime Porte granted to Russian merchants vessels a free passage from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea and reciprocally from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea; also the power of entering all the ports and harbours situated either on the sea coast, or in the passages and channels which join those seas. Treaties and Other Documents to the Black Sea, The Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus: 1535-1877 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1953), document no. 18, pp. 6-7; J. C. Hurewitz, 'The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits', Belleten 28, no. I l l , 1964, pp. 462-63.

26

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

to other powers during the next decades, 1 and these were extended by the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) in 1829 to all nations with which the Ottoman Empire was not in a state of declared war. 2 The concession made at Kii§uk Kaynarca and later in the nineteenth century did not impair the right of the Ottoman Government to forbid the passage of foreign warships through the Straits, except in 1798 when, in response to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt the Russian fleet was permitted, as part of a defensive agreement by the Sultan, to use the Straits on one occasion. Nevertheless, the Russian government's efforts to maintain its privilege in order to have access to the Mediterranean was the first attempt at an action which brought the Great Powers into conflict over the Straits. In this respect, Great Britain appeared to be a mighty protector of the Ottomans in the face of increased Russian pressure on the Ottoman Government. Thus Great Britain would secure her naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. In view of this, it might be suggested that strategic considerations brought the two countries into a kind of mutual understanding. In other words, British policy-makers thought that maintaining Ottoman territorial integrity was the best way to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean, thereby preventing Russian dominance over the Straits. For this reason, Britain sought to improve her position by concluding the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1809, which stipulated that the Straits were to be closed to the warships of all powers, according to 'ancient regulation' of the Ottoman Empire. Although, for the first time in her history, the Ottoman Empire had lost her right to open and close the Straits at her own wish, she had found an ally against Russia. 3 Nevertheless, Russia was inclined to use every opportunity to challenge the position of the Empire. For instance, when the existence of the Ottoman Empire was threatened by the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammed Ali, whose army advanced into Anatolia on its way to Istanbul, Russian military assistance appeared the only solution to secure the Sultanate against the Egyptian threat. In return the Ottoman government was forced to conclude the Treaty of Hunkar iskelesi in 1833, whereby the Ottoman Sultanate was obliged to close the Straits against the warships of any power engaged in war with Russia. 4 Yet this Treaty was not welcomed by the British and French governments and it led to protracted negotiations. First, the crises created by Muhammed Ali were disposed of. Ottoman Turks re-established their rule in

1 Austria obtained the right of passage of commercial vessels in 1784, Great Britain in 1799, France in 1802. Treaties and Other Documents, nos., 21,22,24, pp. 4-5. 2 Ibid. nos. 35,36, pp. 16-17. 3 Ibid. no. 27, p. 11; J. C. Hurewitz, 'Russia and the Turkish Straits', World Politics, Vol. XIV, October 1961-July 1962, pp. 605-632. 4 Treaties and Other Documents, nos., 38-40, pp. 17-19.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

27

Syria when Muhammed Ali's force was expelled by the Great Powers in 1840. Then Great Britain and the other European countries blocked the Russian attempt to gain a privileged position by the London Straits Convention of 1841 whereby the terms of the Treaty of 1809 were extended to France, Austria, Russia and Prussia, and Ottoman territorial integrity was guaranteed. 1 This rule, which could not be modified without the consent of all the signatories, was reaffirmed on several occasions during the nineteenth century. It was the first time an international instrument had existed to regulate passage through the Straits. The Treaty of Paris in 1856, the concluding agreement of the Crimean War, in addition to the 1841 Straits Convention, was imposed upon Russia for demilitarising the Black Sea bases. 2 This restriction, however, was lightened in 1871 when Russia seized the opportunity created by the Franco-Prussian war to reassert its naval presence in the Black Sea. After this date Russia became a major instrument in regulating the Straits regime. 3 It is noteworthy that, despite Britain's taking the lead in preventing the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, British policy regarding the Straits had undergone substantial changes in line with her security concerns over the Eastern Mediterranean, but this time from a different standpoint. It appeared that the British and Russian policy stance over the Straits had come closer. In the interval the advantages for Great Britain of excluding the Russian fleet from the Mediterranean had come to seem less substantial, and the disadvantages of her own inability to send warships into the Black Sea more evident. In 1878, arising from the Congress of Berlin, Britain took over Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire. Then, in 1882, Britain occupied Egypt and, despite numerous promises to withdraw, would remain until June 1956. The Cypriot and Egyptian factors increased Britain's influence over the Eastern Mediterranean. 4 The inability of the Russian government to send their Black Sea Fleet into Far Eastern waters during the

1

ibid. no. 46, pp. 21-22.

2

Ibid. no. 55, pp. 51-52. 3 Ibid, nos., 62-66, pp. 75-76; Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers and the Straits Question, 1870-1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 16-24; Caesar E. Farah, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861 (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), pp. 1-30; Vernon John Puryear, England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931); P. P. Graves, The Question of the Straits. 4

As early as 1878 Lord Salisbury had given expression to this new appreciation of the problem. 'The exclusion of Russia from the Mediterranean is not so great a gain to us as the loss resulting from our exclusion from the Black Sea, because we are much the strongest as a naval power'. The advantages conferred ori Britain by this superior strength at sea, when circumstances enabled it to be deployed against Russia, had been shown both during the Crimean war and again in 1878 when Russia reached Ayastefanos, just outside Istanbul. Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) FO 371/67286A, R 9068/3795/44, Foreign Office Memorandum: The Regime of the Straits, December 1, 1944. See also Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 25-84; Richard Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and after: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement, 1878-80 (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1938).

28

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

war with Japan had sharpened their sense of powerlcssness imposed upon them by the closure of the Straits. Other recent developments had also contributed to increasing the urgency of the problem from the Russian point of view. The extensive increase of German influence in Turkey after the beginning of the twentieth century led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907, since Germany's ambition to swing Turkey into the German orbit was a direct challenge to both Russian and British interests. For instance, an increased German influence on the Ottoman Sultanate, embodied in the Baghdad railway project, a prospective channel of economic and political penetration, was enough to threaten both countries' interests in the Mediterranean. However, several negotiations came to nothing, mainly because the Russian demands amounted to the maintenance of the existing regime with an exception in favour of opening the Black Sea to the warships of Russia and the other Black Sea States. Great Britain was not keen on any arrangements other than having an equal footing for all with regard to passage through the Straits.1 It was not until the opening year of the First World War that the Russian objective over the Straits was recognised by France and Great Britain as a bribe to ensure that their ally would stay in the war and not leave them exposed to threats from Germany who had coaxed the Ottoman Empire into the war. The Allied powers accepted the Russian demand for control of Istanbul and the Asiatic hinterland in the Istanbul Agreement of 18 March 1915 just before the launching of the Dardanelles Campaign. 2 In return, Istanbul was to be a free port and the Straits were to be open to commercial vessels. However, the failure of the Dardanelles expedition, aimed partly at opening up a supply line to Russia, prepared the ground for the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in October 1917. The Istanbul agreement, by which Russia would have become a Mediterranean power, was repudiated by the Bolshevik Government after the Revolution. In this respect, the Bolsheviks declared their opposition to all forms of annexation and imperialism and, by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk of March 1918, denied any Russian threat to the Straits. While the new revolutionary Soviet regime was fighting for its life against the White Russian armies, the defeated Ottoman Government was obliged to surrender all its military and naval forces and to admit an Allied Russia also approached Turkey for an alliance on similar terms with the Treaty of Hünkar Iskelesi when the Ottoman Turks had been threatened by Italy during the Tripoli War of 191112, promising that she would blockade the Straits. Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (New York: Howard Pertig, 1966) p. 20; Alan Bodger, 'Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire', in Marian Kent (ed.), The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London: Frank Cass, 1984), pp. 76-110. 2 Winston Churchill, the First Lord of Admiralty, was the chief proponent of the Dardanelles Campaign. For details see C. F. Aspinall-Oglander & A. F. Becks, History of the Great War: Based on Official Documents: Gallipoli: Military Operations, Vol. I l l (London: Willkan Heinemann Ltd., 1932); Lynn H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback ; Geoffrey Miller, Straits; Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1963); Geoffrey Penn, Fisher, Churchill and the Dardanelles-, Lord Wester-Wemyss, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd.).

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

29

force of occupation to the strategic points controlling the Straits by the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. 1 It seemed possible, therefore, as a result of the demise of the Ottoman Empire, to create conditions in which the right to send a fleet into the Black Sea would be a distinct strategic asset for the British Empire. It was decided to establish a Straits regime mainly based on Wilson's fourteenth point, which provided that the Dardanelles should be permanently open to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantee. In order to establish practical application of these principles as far as security was concerned, the Allies decided to demilitarise the Straits zone and this regime was incorporated in the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920 as a substitute for a general international guarantee. 2 The recovery of Turkish power under Mustafa Kemal, as the leader of the emerging nationalist movement after the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, quickly made the dictated pcace of Sèvres inoperative, and resulted in the opening of negotiations on a footing of greater equality at Lausanne in November 1922. The simultaneous resistance of the new Kemalist and Soviet regimes to opponents who had the backing of the Western powers had brought two traditional enemies into close co-operation during the period 1918 to 1922. Both objected to the policy of demilitarising, internationalising and opening the Straits, but for different reasons. The Bolshevik Government feared that this would make possible a repetition of the events of 1918-20, when Black Sea ports had been bombarded and occupied by Allied forces. They therefore returned to the policy which their Tsarist predecessors in default of a unilateral right of passage or direct control of the Straits had normally favoured, which was the closing of the Straits to all nonTurkish warships. Simultaneously, the Bolshevik and Kemalist governments came to terms on the Straits issue with the Treaty of Friendship signed in Moscow on 16 March 1921 to the effect that Article 5 of the Treaty declared that, in order to regulate the Straits regime, a conference of the riverain states of the Black Sea should be called to draw up an international guarantee. Any solution must not conflict with the full sovereignty of Turkey and the security of Istanbul. Despite Turkish unwillingness to agree to this proviso, the Kemalist movement in Anatolia was bound to sign this agreement because of the Greek invasion of Izmir (Smyrna) in Anatolia which had been backed by Britain. 3 By 1922 the Kemalist had made the Treaty at Sèvres unworkable, and negotiations began in Switzerland for a replacement Treaty.

1 For bargaining over the Straits during World War I see Macfie, The Straits Question pp. 6679. Also see Howard, The Partition of Turkey, pp. 119-137. 2 PRO FO 371/67286A, R9068/3795/44, Foreign Office memorandum: The Regime of the Straits, 1 December 1944; Erik Goldstein, British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Conference, 1916-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 3 PRO FO 371/96550, WU 11923/263, and also see Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye 'nin Di§ Politikasi 1919-1938 (Ankara: Gün Ofset Ltd., 1997), pp. 27-28; Cemil Bilsel, 'The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence', American Journal of International Law, no 41, October 1947, pp. 729-30.

30

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

During the Lausanne negotiations, the USSR argued even more strongly than the Turkish representatives did that the Straits should be closed to all warships including her own and for the restoration to Turkey of full sovereignty over the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Given the USSR's weak position in the Black Sea, Turkey's full control over the Straits would increase her security against other maritime powers. Nevertheless, the Turkish representative, Îsmet Înônii, in spite of resentment at the proposed limitation on his country's sovereignty, did not seem willing to find a common cause with the Soviet delegation. The reason behind the Turkish approach was Turkey's unwillingness to rely completely on Soviet backing as their attitude was not entirely different from that of their Tsarist predecessors. Apparently, Turkey did not wish to have one more experience like Hiinkar Iskelesi. Fortunately, Great Britain did not wish to leave Turkey with a strong tie to the Soviet government. 1 This could be the best investment for the future for Turkey to recover her position on the Straits. After a long period of negotiations, the Straits Convention was signed in Lausanne on 24 July 1923. Apart from the regulations regarding transit through the Straits, the main features of the convention were: (i) the demilitarisation of the Straits, of all islands but one in the Sea of Marmara, and of certain islands of the Aegean Sea; (ii) the establishment of a Straits Commission responsible to the League of Nations, charged with supervision, and (iii) an international guarantee (Article 18) by all the signatories and 'in any case by France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan', of the freedom of navigation in the Straits and the security of the demilitarised zone by all means the League Council might decide, in the event of either being imperilled by attack or threat of war. 2 The freedom of passage of warships was subject to one important limitation embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres. This was the provision, inserted as a concession to the Soviet point of view, that no power might send into the Black Sea a force stronger than that of the most powerful Black Sea Fleet. This concession would be of little value to the Soviets in the event of a hostile coalition of two or more naval powers and its effect was still further reduced by the stipulation that in time of war, Turkey being neutral, it should not be applied in such a way as to prejudice the belligerent rights of any nonBlack Sea States.

1 Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (New York: Howard Pertig, 1966), pp. 289-293. See also, James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits: A Short History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 112 113. 2 For the text of the Lausanne Straits Convention see State Department Archives, RG 59, Records of Harley A. Notter File 1939-45, 'Principal Treaties and Conventions with respect to the Problem of the Turkish Straits', box no. 70, document no. 6. For detail also see A. L. Macfie, 'The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne (November 1922-July 1923)', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 15, May 1979, pp. 212-237. Also see, Walter C. Hucul, 'Soviet Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Historical Sketch', World Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 236-268.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

31

The 'ancient rule' of the Straits regime came to an end with the Lausanne Convention. While Great Britain had gained a substantial victory in securing the passage of her warships into the Black Sea by the Lausanne Straits Convention, the Soviet Union was entirely dissatisfied with it. Therefore, although signing the Convention in Lausanne the Soviet Government never ratified it. And the Turkish attitude at Lausanne also caused the end of the Turco-Soviet honeymoon for a short time.

Turkish Diplomacy from Lausanne to Montreux The objectives of the Nationalist Movement had been largely reached by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which marked the legal acceptance of modern Turkey's existence, as recognised by the entire international community. However, for the first time in her history Turkey was deprived of the full extent of her sovereignty over the Straits, the security of which had so concerned the Great Powers. Atatiirk's Turkey was far from satisfied so long as the Straits commission and the demilitarised zones existed, since the Straits issue was closely related to the objective of being a fully sovereign country. At the same time, Turkey could not have insisted on a more final resolution at Lausanne, with British warships anchored menacingly outside Istanbul. For the moment, Turkey had to bide her time. Tevfik Rii§til Aras, one of the Turkish delegates of the National Assembly involved in the Lausanne negotiations and later Foreign Minister, pointed out that after long discussions it was concluded that though the Straits Convention did not conflict with the National Pact of 1920, 1 the clauses referring to the demilitarisation of the Straits would obviously leave Turkey in an insecure position. This would provide the necessary military measures to reach a peaceful settlement, however, so long as the four powers guaranteed the Straits' security and the possibility of a military establishment just outside the zones. 2 Indeed, the line taken by Turkish foreign policy makers, mainly Atattirk, founder of the Republic, was the consequence of their experiences from Ottoman days and the post-1918 struggle for Turkish independence, which to some extent led to the adoption of a foreign policy based on pragmatism and non-adventurism. After the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist elite had been determined to establish a nation state

The leaders of Turkish Nationalist Movement formulated their objectives in the National Pact (Misak-i Milli) in which they determined to continue resistance for the salvation and complete independence of the Turkish nation. It limited the boundaries of new Turkey inhabited by a Muslim majority, united in religion, culture and race. Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy ¡918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish National Movement (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1975), p. 17. 2 Tevfik Riijtü Aras, Görü^lerim (Ankara: Tan Basimevi, 1956) p. 122.

32

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

based on contemporary Western models. 1 The context of a pragmatic approach to foreign policy also dictated that a peaceful environment was needed to carry out reforms at home. This was part of a modernisation process aiming to complete independence in terms of political, economic and ideological reforms in order to align Turkey with the West as well as remedy her economic weakness. In fact, the leading decision-making elite was quite aware of the fact that their stance was the only way to achieve a peaceful atmosphere in such a region, geographically located as it was at the crossroads between East and West where the Great Powers had huge interests, particularly Great Britain and the USSR. A few months after the Lausanne settlement, Turkey's main concern in foreign affairs was to solve the outstanding problems left by the Lausanne settlement. One of them, the bitter Mosul dispute with Britain, was concluded in the latter's favour by the Council of the League of Nations on 16 December 1925. The Council's decision inevitably led to a revitalising of the relationship between Turkey and the USSR; in fact, the two countries signed a treaty of friendship just the day after the Council's decisions over the Mosul dispute. This agreement was not based upon ideological affinity since Westernisation was one of the main principles of modern Turkey and was incompatible with Bolshevism. 2 Nevertheless, the circumstances of the time made Turkey more vulnerable to Soviet economic and political support since the Soviet Union tried to take advantage of them in order to impose her political influence on Turkey. Indeed, this was justified by Turkey's 'slow rapprochement' with the West which began after the solution of the Mosul dispute with the signing of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty on 6 June 1926. 3 Given that territorial integrity and complete freedom were paramount to Kemalist Turkey, from its inception the country looked on the Lausanne Straits Convention as an unsatisfactory settlement which infringed her independence, exposed her to serious attack and diminished her value in the world of international diplomacy. As Turkey did not feel secure, as a consequence of the Convention she sought a way to minimise its effects. A new road was constructed within the zones in order to allow Turkey to mobilise her army in the demilitarised zone and install artillery just outside or even within the zones, as well as laying mines at the outlet of the Dardanelles 1

For Kemalism and the Turkish reforms see Andrew Mango, Atattirk (London: John Murray, 1999). 2 For the nature of the Soviet -Turkish relationships see Bulent Gokay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), pp.104-112. 3 Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement of Britain and Turkey in the age of Mustafa Kemal, 1919-38 (London: The Ethon Press, 1982), pp. 96-97. For the Mosul dispute see A. Toynbee, T h e Islamic World Since the Peaces', Survey of international Affairs, 1925, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 464-531.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

33

and entrance to the Bosporus in order to be able to close the Straits in the event of any aggression. 1 Even so, for Turkey it was a far from satisfactory solution since the Lausanne Settlement left Turkey in a position dependent on Soviet friendship. The close relationship with the USSR, although lasting less than a decade, showed that Soviet policy regarding the Straits was no different from Tsarist policy to the extent that the Soviets still continued to pressurise Turkey to secure a better position in defiance of the Lausanne Settlement. For instance, contrary to the Lausanne Convention the USSR proposed to the Turkish government that, in a war where the USSR was a party, the Straits should be closed to all belligerent warships as a kind of joint defence measure. In other words, Moscow tried by one means or another to take advantage of having a good relationship with Turkey. 2 In line with this, the Soviet government sought to set up Turkey as a barrier between herself and the rest of the naval powers, particularly Britain. However, the approaches by the USSR were not welcomed by Turkish policy makers because it was thought that having a good relationship put the USSR on an unequal footing, which was opposed to the principles of Kemalist foreign policy. Therefore the Kemalist elite was more or less determined to establish a relationship with the Western countries based on equality, through which Turkey could gain a more secure place in the region. They were also aware of the fact that every major conflict with the Western countries would give the USSR a dominant position towards Turkey, following the experience of the Mosul dispute. 3 Clearly, Turkey would not enjoy Russia becoming a dominating presence along her frontier. Instead, Turkish foreign policy makers followed the policy of establishing a good relationship with the West and all neighbours in order to take a respected place

1 Adm 116/2877, N.I.D.0116/31, The Director of Intelligence report on Turkish defence measures received from Captain Macdonald, who was one of the members of the Straits Commission at Istanbul, 24 March 1931. 2 For instance, the Soviets approached Turkey on 29 October 1933 concerning possible military co-operation and proposing a single command, that command to be Russian, in the event of the two countries being jointly involved in hostilities. Turkey rejected the Soviet suggestion, fearing that it would give the USSR a way to secure a predominant position over the Straits, which was one of the main anxieties of Turkey. PRO FO 371/ 17957, E 922/250/44, Sir Percy Loraine (Ankara) to Foreign Office, 5 February 1934. 3 One could say that in the course of the Mosul dispute Turkey realised the fact that there would be no way forward but to consolidate her policy with the West in order to maintain peace. In the course of the Mosul dispute, Mussolini threatened Turkey that if she adopted any aggressive attitude against Mosul, Italy would despatch troops to Anatolia. See D.A. Routh, 'The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits', in Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 601. France also supported Britain as she needed British backing against Germany. Therefore, Soviet friendship remained the only choice in the foreign policy. Toynbee, The Islamic World, pp. 462 and 526.

34

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

in world diplomacy as a regional power. 1 In addition, it was believed that having a good relationship with the West would lessen Soviet pressure on Turkey. In this regard, f r i e n d s h i p with Great Britain could be the best pragmatic foreign policy approach; hence T u r k e y ' s position over the Soviet Union in general and the Straits in particular. A s a first step, Turkey established good relationships with all her neighbours by signing friendship agreements, which solved frontier questions, and tried to orient her foreign policy to the West. In this respect, Turkey reached agreement with Britain over Mosul rather than fight for the disputed territory. A f t e r long insistence on the p r e s e r v a t i o n of a r e g i m e of capitulations, and compensation for the debts which resulted f r o m previous e c o n o m i c penetration by the W e s t of Turkey, France finally c a m e to an agreement with Turkey in June 1928 regulating financial and e c o n o m i c matters. Pursuing the line of improving relations with the West, Turkey signed a neutrality agreement with Italy in M a y 1928 and the difficult relationship with Greece was also n o r m a l i s e d in June 1930. Parallel agreements were concluded with the eastern countries of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan and the Balkan countries of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia during the same period. 2 All the same, the period between L a u s a n n e and early 1930 was primarily one of introspection during which foreign policy was of secondary importance. Turkey was fully occupied in defining her national identity and domestic reforms and had little time for outside distractions. By early 1930, however, Turkey was beginning to follow a more active foreign policy, turning her face towards international organisations and attending bilateral and multinational meetings during which priority was given to the Straits settlement. Turkey in f a c t took every opportunity to point out h o w the demilitarised Straits zones not only put T u r k e y ' s security in a dangerous position but also threatened regional peace. T h e r e is little doubt that this resulted f r o m a quickening appreciation of the external threat, namely Italian military activities, particularly Mussolini's ambition to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia, which was then Turkey's main anxiety. Indeed, immediately after the First World War it was a fact that the Versailles peace system only exacerbated the complex: of nationalistic sentiments which had bedevilled the whole of Europe. The struggle to create an international security system to uphold the status quo established by the peace treaties was frustrated by the countries dissatisfied by the post-war settlement. M u s t a f a Kemal

1 PRO FO 371/12308, E 3149/17/44, Sir G. Clerk (Moscow) to Sir Austen Chamberlain, No. 374, July 18, 1927. 2 Vilademir Danilov, 'Kemalism and World Peace', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergiin Özbudun (eds.), Alatürk: the Founder of the Modern State (London, C. Hurst & Company, 1981), pp. 117121.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

35

Atatiirk believed that another major conflict was imminent. He remarked in his conversation with General McArthur in 1931 that the Treaty of Versailles had not removed any of the causes which had led to the First World War. On the contrary, it had only deepened the rift between the former rivals. 1 In the case of a renewed conflict, as far as Turkish security was concerned, the Turkish Straits would be in the most vulnerable position. Therefore now was the time to take more decisive steps before it was too late in order to put Turkey in a more secure position. Unlike the method chosen by ex-enemy states, the Turkish government determined to attain their goal through diplomacy. In this sense, the acceptance of Turkey into the League of Nations in 1932 can be regarded as a huge Turkish success to escape not only from diplomatic isolation, into which Turkey had been forced by the Western countries after the First World War, but also from dependency upon the USSR. However, as Anglo-Turkish relations gradually improved, so did Soviet-Turkish relationships gradually deteriorate. Fearing, no doubt, an increase in British influence over the Straits, the Soviet government reverted to the policy of imperial Russia and sought an alliance with Turkey which gave the USSR a military base on the Straits. Growing Soviet pressure on the one hand, together with the deteriorating situation in the Eastern Mediterranean caused by Italy on the other, accelerated the Turkish rapprochement to the Western powers to whom she appealed for a revision of the current Straits regime. Turkey attached substantial importance to securing Great Britain's support in the revision since it would make a positive outcome all the more likely. In this respect, it was widely accepted that the year 1934 would mark the beginning of a new phase in Anglo-Turkish relations with the appointment of Sir Percy Loraine as British Ambassador to Ankara and Fethi Okyar, Atatiirk's close friend, to London as Turkish Ambassador accelerating the rapprochement. 2 Loraine gained the personal friendship of Atatiirk, partly by playing poker all night. Obviously Atatiirk desired to see some concrete sign of friendship, which he had been after for years. Though Loraine appealed to the Foreign Office to strengthen ties, London was reluctant to take any further step at this stage considering that this would mean some kind of security engagement which Britain, only just rearming, could not afford. 3 Nevertheless this process led to an atmosphere of greater understanding between the two countries.

1

§evket Sureyya Aydemir, Tek Adam, 1938-1950 (Istanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 1995), p.84 PRO FO 1011/199 -Loraine Papers- This file held the documents in which Turkish authorities and press praised Loraine for the skills he brought to Anglo-Turkish relations. And see George Rende), The Sword and 1he Olive: Recollection of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service, 19131954 (London: John Murray, 1957), p. 85, and Brock Milman, The Ill-Made Alliance: AngloTurkish Relations, 1934-1940 (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p. 38. 3 Ibid. p. 37. 2

36

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

Turkish Diplomatic Efforts to Seek

POWERS

Revision

After largely stabilising her domestic and external affairs within a decade, Turkey believed that it was the right time to bring the Straits question back on the agenda of world diplomacy. The World Disarmament Conference opened in late 1932 and appeared to provide a good opportunity. Besides, political circumstances were favourable. Europe was also in trouble with the re-armament of ex-enemy states and Italian imperialism, this, at the same time as growing international instability, would provide a perfect moment to draw world attention to Turkish insecurity arising from the demilitarisation of the Straits. The British Draft of November 1932, accepted by France, Germany, Italy and the USA in December 1932, suggested that Germany had a right to a 'party in armaments within the framework of the security system equal for a l l ' . 1 This encouraged the Turkish Government to officially raise the remilitarization question on 23 May 1933 at the 6 2 n d meeting for the reduction and limitation of armaments held at Geneva during the discussion of the Draft Disarmament Convention submitted by the British delegation to the General Commission on 16 March 1933. At this discussion, Tevfik Rii§tii Aras argued that the adoption of the clauses in the British draft Convention limiting land and air armaments and, in particular, Article 19, 2 would adversely affect Turkey's capacity to maintain freedom of passage and to defend the Straits zones. 3 In this sense, he proposed that a special committee, consisting of the representatives of the states bordering on the Mediterranean and Black Sea, together with representatives of the US and Japan, be established under the auspices of the Conference in order to study a possible

Ludmila Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1936 (London, Seeker & Warburg, 1976) p. 22. The reason for British proposal was to secure the return of Germany to the disarmament Conference as the Germans walked out from the Conference on 23 July 1932 on the grounds that they were not treated on equal bases. For details see Carolyn J. Kitching, Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament 1919-1934 (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 136-174. ^ Article 19 of the British Disarmament draft suggested that 'The maximum limit for the calibre of mobile land guns for the future shall be 105mm. Existing mobile land guns up to 155mm. may be retained but all replacement or new construction of guns shall be within the maximum limit of 105mm. For the purposes of this section, a gun of 4.5 calibre shall be regarded as equivalent to one of 105 mm. In the case of countries whose standard gun is of the former calibre. The maximum limit for the calibre of coast defence guns shall be 406mm.' PRO FO 371/17354, E W 3006/40/98, British Delegation at Geneva to Foreign Office, 'Draft Disarmament Convention submitted by British delegation to the General Commission on 16 March, 1933', 16 March 1933. 3 Article 19 of the British disarmament draft suggested that heavy land artillery should be abolished, whereas heavy naval artillery should be left in its present condition. Therefore, Turkey argued that heavy coastal defence guns would ensure a balance of strength between the coastal defences and heavily armed ships by which the former might be attacked. If Article 19 were extended to the cities of the Straits, it would mean that the Straits would be open to greater insecurity than at present as Turkey would not be in a position to prevent any aggression in the absence of sufficient defence rights. PRO FO 371/16986, E 3117/1575/44, British Delegation at Geneva to Foreign Office, Provisional minutes of the sixty-second meeting held at Geneva on Turkey, 23 May 1933.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

37

re-militarization of the Straits by Turkey. 1 This proposal was rejected by the British Foreign Office on the grounds that Turkey was neither under any obligation to keep the Straits open nor was her capacity to defend the demilitarised zone adversely affected as Article 18 of the current Straits Convention guaranteed their security. As far as naval strategy was concerned, the British Admiralty came to the conclusion that in every aspect the remilitarization of the Straits would be of the greatest value for the Soviet Union. Behind this objection lay doubts as to whether this was Turkey's own desire or if Soviet encouragement was behind it. 2 However, although it was true that the USSR was eager to revise the current regime, Turkish diplomatic efforts to this end were not in fact due to the USSR, since the Turkish government's main objective was to escapc from dependency on the Soviets and find a solution with the Western powers. France also took the same line as the British, fearing that any revision with regard to the Straits regime would give the Germans an excuse to refortify the demilitarised Rhineland. 3 In the meantime, within a couple of years since Turkey first raised the question of the Straits, a number of events diminished the credibility of the League of Nations Covenant. The rearmament of the ex-enemy states exposed the League of Nations as powerless with the Geneva disarmament conference collapsing in October 1933 after Nazi Germany's withdrawal. The joint guarantee of the Straits by four powers also became controversial after the Japanese withdrawal from the League in March 1933 following ineffective censure by the League of its invasion of Manchuria. Italian aggression became Turkey's prime fear, so that in addition to the threat posed from the proximate Italian-occupied Dodecanese Islands, 4 Turkey had taken alarm at Mussolini's speech in March 1934 outlining the historical objective of Italy as laying in Asia and Africa. 5 Then there was the fact that Bulgaria was re-arming itself

1 PRO FO 371/16986, E 2600/1575/44, Cadogan (Geneva) to Foreign Office, Conversation with Aras, 17 May 1933. 2 In the Admiralty's assessment, if the Straits were re-fortified, and if relations became strained between Russia and a western power, Russian pressure might possibly be brought to bear on Turkey to refuse passage to warships. Turkey could not deny her power to do so. However, as the Straits remained unfortified, Turkey could plead her inability to aid the USSR in this way. Furthermore, in the case of any naval operations in the Straits and the Black Sea, the unfortified Straits had great value to Britain. Abolishing the zones would be more likely to lead to closer Turco-Russian relations, as it would potentially improve the security of Soviet Russia. PRO FO 371/16986, E 2464/1575/44, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 10 May 1933. 3

PRO FO 371/16986/ E 2755/1575/44, British Delegate (Geneva) to Foreign Office, 23 May 23 1933. ^ Italy had already spent a vast amount on building up her navy and had militarised naval and air bases in the Dodecanese in 1934 from which pressure could be exerted on Turkey to allow favourable conditions for access through the Straits to the Black Sea, one of Italy's main trading routes (especially for oil from Romania. Esmonde M. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire-Builder: Europe and Africa 1923-36 (London, The Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 145. ^ This announcement reminded the Turks that although the Italo-Turkish Pact had been signed in 1928 and renewed in 1932 Italy had not abandoned those ambitions in Anatolia which had found expression in the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne and had shown new signs of life in December 1925, when Mussolini had threatened to invade Anatolia if Turkey went to war over the Mosul dispute. D. A. Routh, 'The Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits', Survey of International Affairs, 1937, p. 585.

38

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

through Italian supplies, contrary to the terms of Treaty of Neuilly, which caused anxiety in Turkish policy-making circles about the possibility of an Italo-Bulgarian alliance facing Turkey with a fait accompli vis-à-vis the Straits. 1 Although Italy gave assurances that she had no aggressive intention against Turkey, she did not appease Turkey's nervousness. Instead Turkey increased her feverish action through diplomatic channels and enhanced Turkish military capacity just outside the zone. 2 The formation of a defensive Balkan Pact between the four Balkan countries of Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey on 9 February 1934 added impetus to the growing pressure for a comprehensive revision of the post-war settlement. 3 One of the aims of Turkey in forming the Balkan pact was to take Bulgaria into the pact so that Bulgaria would be separated from Italy. 4 Despite the refusal of the Bulgarians to come into the pact, Turkey largely secured the support of the rest of the Balkan countries concerning the Straits issue.

Re-consideration

of Turkey's

Appeal

Aras once more raised the question of the Straits at the Council's meeting on 17 April 1935, in the light of the joint resolution passed at the Stresa Conference 5 on 14 April, which provided an opportunity to the countries affected by the Treaties of Saint German, Trianon and Neuilly to obtain the revision of military status. Aras said that Turkey regarded the military clauses relating to the Straits as being of a 'discriminatory character'. Turkey regarded the Stresa resolution as a green light to seek the revision of the Treaty of the Lausanne. On this occasion it sounded much like a warning to the powers concerned, since it was the first time Aras had used such language, saying that should there be any changes in the situation fixed by the

1

PRO FO 371/17961, E 3072/1345/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 10 May 1934. PRO FO 371/19037, E854/854/44, Loraine to Sir John Simon, enclosing annual report of 1934, 31 January 1935. 3 Arnold J. Toynbee. "South East Europe", Survey of International Affairs, 1934 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 508. 4 At this juncture, Bulgarian accession to the Balkan Pact was a crucial matter, while her outstanding aim was to acquire an outlet to the Aegean Sea, the main fear of both Greece and Turkey. Even Britain got the impression that if Turkey secured the adhesion of Bulgaria to the pact, she would be sufficiently insured against any threat to the Straits and would feel no need to apply any pressure over the question of re-militarization. PRO FO 371/17961, E 1345/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, Conversation with Aras, 20 February 1934. 5 According to Section 6 of the joint resolution declared after the Stresa Conference on April 11-14, 1935 convened to examine the general European situation after Germany infringed the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the military clauses of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly had been taken into consideration to obtain the revision of the status. Documents on International Affairs, 1935, Vol. 1, p 81.

2

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

39

existing treaties, Turkey would be obliged to take necessary steps to secure her national security, having regard to the principle of equality. 1 Against the Soviets' warm support, the Stressa powers, Great Britain, France and Italy, rejected Aras' proposal, stressing that there was no analogy between the Lausanne Treaty and those made with the ex-allies of Germany, since the former was made on the basis of equality. 2 However, Britain stressed that there was no way in which Turkey could be prevented from seeking revision of the treaty in the proper way, which meant reconsideration under Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for the reconsideration of Treaties that had become inapplicable or whose continuance might endanger peace was allowed. 3 In the meantime, the COS came to the conclusion early in August of 1935 that from a military standpoint the disadvantages of complete remilitarization in the Straits were outweighed by the importance of Turkish friendship with Great Britain owing to Turkey's strategic position in the Near East and the Middle East. It was suggested at this point that avoiding being placed in the position of taking the lead in insisting in the maintenance of the present regime was essential for securing Turkish friendship. The reason why the British COS changed their view from May 1933, the first time Turkey had raised the Straits question, was that, as the Admiralty paper stated, certain new factors had arisen since then, such as the German unilateral action at Geneva and Bulgarian rearmament which had encouraged Turkey to put forward tentative suggestions for the amendment of the Treaty of Lausanne regarding the Straits clauses. The Admiralty stressed that Turkey had been taking steps to prepare for the rapid closing of the Straits, to such effect that it was highly probable that Turkey now had the ability to close the narrow entrance of the Straits within 24 hours, which could cause unimaginable disaster to the British Mediterranean Fleet if it needed to pass through the Straits. In view of the new factors outlined above, it would be impossible to ensure an unimpeded passage through the Straits. So Turkey, the Admiralty suggested, should be encouragcd to state her case for a reconsideration of the Straits Convention. Otherwise the inevitable danger was that 'Turkey may drift over into the Russian camp or ally herself with

1 PRO FO 371/19038, E 2897/919/44, British Delegation (Geneva) to Foreign Office, extract from the meeting of 85 t h (extraordinary) session of the Council, 17 April 1935. 2 On one occasion Aras had been told by Loraine that Turkey differed from other cx-allies of Germany in that the Treaty of Lausanne was a victory. The other ex-allies of Germany had no similar position. On this point Aras agreed, but said that British warships were laying off Istanbul and in the Straits when the Treaty was signed. PRO FO 371/19038, E 4260/919/44, Morgan (Ankara) to Sir Samuel Hoare, No. 319, 11 July 1935. 3 PRO FO 371/19038, E 2918/919/44, John Simon to Loraine, no. 228, May 18 1935.

40

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

G e r m a n y , ' 1 which meant that in the event of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, Britain would lose a potential golden ally. Indeed, the recent Italo-Abyssinian crisis had highlighted Italian ambitions to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean. At this point, the Admiralty's view was that Turkey was 'an important strategic factor in the Eastern Mediterranean' which was the imperial lifeline through to British interests in the Middle East, India and the Far East. Furthermore, the situation in the A r a b world was getting worse in the face of growing Arab nationalism against 'British imperialism' with an ongoing A r a b revolt in Palestine. Thus, as far as security concerns, a common cause was created between the two countries as Italian aircraft and submarines based on the Dodecanese constituted not only a threat to the Turkish Straits but also to British lines of communication. 2 In the light of the Admiralty's assessment the Foreign Office was ready to consider the Turkish request sympathetically. However, Sir Samuel Hoare, who replaced Sir John Simon as Foreign Secretary, was opposed to the Admiralty's view that Turkey should be encouraged to take up the question of the revision of the Straits Convention. Hoare feared that this would m a k e Turkey suspicious about the British attitude. In particular, Turkey might suspect that the initiative had been taken as a result of the new situation in the Mediterranean produced by the Italo-Abyssinian crisis and this could be interpreted as a sign of weakness on the British part. Nonetheless, he agreed to support T u r k e y ' s attitude when she raised the question of remilitarization. 3 H o w e v e r , Turkey being unaware of the ongoing debate in British policy circles, did not raise the question during the meeting of the 16 t h L e a g u e Assembly in Geneva on 14 September 1935. Loraine interpreted this to mean that it was because of Turkey's fear of a British rebuff. 4

1 To complicate matters, there was a rumour that allegedly both Turkey and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement in November 1929 to add to the Treaty of 1925 an additional protocol that 'the two countries agreed unconditionally on the fortifying of the Dardanelles' if it was necessary. Moreover, according to the reports originated from the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, there was the possibility that the Soviet Union had been supplying war material to Turkey for the defence of the Straits. Russia even tried to stipulate that Soviet officers should command the defence work, but this was rejected. In fact no matter how true this was, it was well known in British political circles that the Soviet Union had been trying since 1926 to manipulate Turkey to uphold the Soviets' good position on the Straits in any conflict directed against her. PRO FO 371/19038, E 5668/919/44, Bentick (Sofia) to Foreign Office, no. 182, 12 September 1935. 2 PRO FO 371/19038, E 6070/919/44, PRO FO 371/19038, E 6070, Memorandum by the COS Sub-Committee about Turkey: Demilitarised Zone of the Dardanelles, N o . l l 9 1 - B and annex paper no. COS 387, October 1935. 3 PRO FO 371/19038, E 6418/919/44, Extract from the minutes of the 271 sl meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, entitled 'Turkey: Demilitarised Zone of the Dardanelles', 14 October 1935. 4 PRO FO 371/ E 6732/919/44, Helm minute, 15 November 1935.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

41

Hope of Peace By the middle of March 1936 the Straits question entered a new phase due to further challenges to the Versailles system which had provided Turkey with favourable grounds for her claim, namely the increasingly successful Italian campaign in Abyssinia in violation of the League Covenant and the German reoccupation of the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 in violation of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, which seriously damaged the prestige of international law. In these circumstances, Turkey appeared to be a good example of a country who would be able to show that treaty revision by agreement rather than by force would still be possible, and in Rendel's words it would 'offer us almost our only real hope of peace'. 1 Great Britain therefore could not afford for Turkey to pursue the Straits question through Article 19 of the Covenant. Moreover, under Article 19, the revision would have had to be unanimously confirmed by the Assembly of the League and it was very unlikely that all its members would agree on it. 2 This is why the Foreign Office changed its tactic and unofficially encouraged Aras in the course of his visit to London in March 1936 to raise the revision of the Straits question by the signatory states in order to roach a peaceful solution. 3 When Aras returned to Ankara, Ataturk and inonii also shared his view that the European situation was favourable to the last step in securing the remilitarization, and the Turkish Government decided to invite all the signatory powers to re-negotiate the Straits Convention with a view to the refortification of the Straits. 4

The Turkish Note On 10 April, the Turkish Government handed the text of the Turkish note to the diplomatic representatives in Ankara of the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty, inviting them to re-negotiate the revision of the demilitarisation clauses. 5 By addressing the signatory powers it obtained the maximum advantage from the contrast between the method it had adopted and 1

Rendel, The Sword and the Olive, p. 89. PRO FO 371/ 20072, E1970/26/44, Stendela Bennett minute, 11 April 1936. 3 Rendel, The Sword and the Olive, p. 89. 4 Aras, Goru^lerim, p. 125. 5 The Turkish note began by referring to the radical change in the European situation from the political and military points of view since the Straits Convention had been signed which left the Straits in an insecure position. Particularly stressing Turkey's loyalty to its international engagements, the known international situation was summarised without referring to any country by name and continued by saying that 'it cannot be said today that the security of the Straits is stiil ensured by a real guarantee, and Turkey cannot be asked to remain indifferent to the possibility of a dangerous failure to act'. PRO FO 371/20073, E 1973/26/44, League of Nations, No. C.154.M.92.1936.VII Text of note dated 10 April 1936 received from Turkish government regarding the Straits Convention of 24 July 1923, 11 April 1936. 2

42

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

that adopted by Germany and Italy, and therefore, they not only crcated a public opinion strongly in their favour, but also made it difficult for any nonrevisionist or otherwise hostile state to oppose them. The wisdom of the chosen legitimate method by the Turkish government was made clear by the reaction to the Turkish note of the governments concerned. The Soviet reaction to the Turkish note was welcomed on the grounds that it was a long-expected opportunity for the Soviet Union to achieve a new regime on the Straits more favourable to themselves; for example, restricting the passage of warships through the Straits to the greatest possible extent. 1 There is little doubt that the Straits were vital for Soviet naval construction since Baltic shipyards were open to sea and air attack from Germany, and whenever the fleet was ice-bound the Baltic Sea was required to allow their Baltic fleet through the Straits in both directions. 2 As for France, she took the same line as Great Britain and the USSR over the Straits matter. In fact, the fear of German aggression played a decisive role, as it did with Britain, changing her attitude towards the Straits. While on 2 May 1935 she had signed a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union against possible German aggression, from the beginning France had been opposed to remilitarization, which could give an excuse for a German demand over the Rhineland. After the remilitarization of Rhineland there was no reason to remain opposed to the Turkish demand over the remilitarization of the Straits. Therefore, France was prepared to agree in principle with the USSR to the Turkish demands but agreed that, when discussions took place, she would insist on a very careful examination of the guarantee of free navigation through the Straits which the Turkish Government would be required to give. 3 Simultaneously, Turkey secured the support of the states who were members of the Balkan Entente on 4 May during their meeting at Belgrade on condition that 'Turkey should always consult with them before closing the Straits in time of war thereupon, common measures could be taken by them in view of such action by Turkey'. 4

1

PRO FO 371/20073, E 2061/26/44, Lord Chilston (Moscow) to Foreign Office, no. 62, 17 April 1936. 2 Routh, The Montreux, p. 598. 3 PRO FO 371/20073, E 2267/26/44, Sir G. Clerk (Paris), No. 552(467/14/36), 24 April 1936. 4 Furthermore, in the course of bilateral conversation, Aras advised Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, to fortify the Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, which had also been subject to the demilitarisation clauses of the Lausanne Straits Convention. Metaxas did not appear to enjoy this idea as Greece would be entitled to remilitarise the rest of the islands when the existing Straits regime ended. However, he wanted Aras to support the idea of militarization of eastern Aegean islands. Aras parried the idea, but he accepted Metaxas' condition that Turkey would refuse Bulgaria's claim for an outlet on the Aegean. Donna Dontas, Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits, Lemnos and Sammothrace, p. 408.

THE

STRAITS

QUESTION

43

Turkey also approached Italy as one of the signatories of the Straits Convention, hoping to reach an understanding. However, the Italians indicated that their acceptance of the re-militarisation of the Straits would depend on Turkey's posture towards sanctions. Apparently Italy made a bargaining matter of the Turkish note in the matter of the sanctions applied by the League of Nations as a punishment for the invasion of Abyssinia. Simultaneously Signor Suvich, the Italian Foreign Minister, accused Turkey of influencing the opinion of the Balkan Entente powers of Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania against lightening the sanctions. However, Turkey did not sympathise with the Italian demand, saying that the sanctions were the League's business, and nothing to do with Turkey. 1 The Italian attitude caused anxieties in Turkish circles, and Turkey once more raised the question of early authorisation to reoccupy the Straits zones 'as a precautionary measure', under the consideration that after conquering Ethiopia Italy might turn her attention once more to the Straits with a view to ensuring oil supplies from the Black Sea. As a matter of fact this was largely due to pressure from the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, backed by a majority of the members of Grand National Assembly, who were fearful of an Italian coup de main on the Straits. Loraine assured Turkey that Italy was not in a position to attack the Straits since she knew that this would lead to a united front against her. However, he persistently emphasised that unilateral remilitarization would have an adverse impression on the British public and also on all the Lausanne signatories. Atattirk and tnonii appeased the Turkish military authorities and they abandoned the idea, but reserving of the right to re-occupy the zones if the situation became threatening. 2 As regards the Japanese, meanwhile, their initial reaction was satisfactory for Turkey as Japan had accepted in principle the Turkish attitude and had pointed out that her action deserved every encouragement. However, it was not certain whether they would attend the Conference or not, since it would be under the auspices of the League of the Nations from which Japan had withdrawn in 1933. After it became clear that the conference would not affect the Japanese position regarding the League, they decided to send a delegation to the Conference. 3 Bulgaria was one of the main sources of anxiety for Greece and Italy, as her objective was to have an outlet to the Aegean. Though the Bulgarians stated that they would not raise any objections so long as the Dardanelles remained open for Bulgarian merchant shipping, it was still suspected that Bulgaria wanted to legitimise their revision. 4

1

PRO FO 371/20074 E, 2895/26/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 20 May 1936. Loraine stated that Aras could resist pressure from the General Staff with only Inonii's support. PRO FO 371/ 20073, E2024/26/44, Loraine to Eden, no. 202, 16 April 1936. 3 PRO FO 371/20073, E 2070/26/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, no. 5, 17 April 1936 4 PRO FO 371/20073, E 2135/26/44, Bentick (Sofia), to Foreign Office, no. 103 (136/7/36), 17 April 1936. 2

44

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Aras assured Loraine in the course of a conversation on 10 April that T u r k e y ' s revision proposal referred only to the clauses regarding demilitarisation and that Turkey did not want to throw the whole convention open to revision with Loraine. 1 In order to have an exchange of views, Aras sent Numan Menemencioglu, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London on 20 May. He made it clear that his government also intended to seek changes in those articles concerning the passage of warships and aircraft and the abolition of the Straits Convention. The Admiralty greatly disliked the Turkish proposals for a revision of the clauses of the Straits Convention dealing with the passage of warships through the Straits and attached great importance to the maintenance of this part of the Convention as it stood, while it stressed the vital importance, from the naval point of view, of securing Turkish support in the Eastern Mediterranean. 2 After Menemencioglu had gone back home, reports of the plenary sessions and unofficial telegrams were received by the Foreign Office, the Turkish proposal became clear only a day before the conference. 3

The Montreux

Conference

On 22 June 1936 the Conference assembled at Montreux in the absence of the Italians due to the continuance of sanctions against her. Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner, sole British Dominion to attend, was selected as chairperson. 4 The conference began with speeches from all the delegates, who praised the method which Turkey had used. Then the Turkish draft convention was adopted unanimously as the basis for discussion. Articles 3 to 9 of the Lausanne Convention regarding demilitarisation of the Straits and articles 10 to 16 regarding the Straits Commission were omitted in the Turkish draft. There was no important provision in the Turkish draft regarding commercial navigation either in time of peace or in time of war. The major differences suggested that the Turkish draft conventions pertained to warships and to control of the Straits. According to the Turkish draft:

1

PRO FO 371/20073, E 2024/26/44, Loraine to Eden, no. 202, 16 April 1936. From the political point of view, the Foreign Office was worried that unless it was prepared to give the Turks some satisfaction on this point 'they may well go a long way to lose the Turkish goodwill which we have gained by our sympathetic attitude towards the rest of their proposal'. On this point Rendel suggested that since it would take longer to reach an agreement on the passage question they could proceed at once to the abrogation of the demilitarisation clauses of the Convention, since the Turkish General Staff was losing patience with it, and should leave the modification of any parts of the Convention for subsequent discussion. This suggestion would prevent any early action on the part of Turkey to refortify the Straits. However, Menemencioglu refused the idea, pointing out that as far as Turkish security was concerned the two questions, the abrogation of demilitarisation clauses and the new regulations for the passage of warships, were integrally connected. PRO FO 371/20074, E 3009/26/44, Rendel minute, 25 May 1936. 3 PRO CAB 21/3279, E 4633/44, Lord Stanley to Eden, 21 July 1936. 4 The chief delegates of their respective governments were Lord Stanhope (Great Britain), Paul-Boncour (France), Titulescu (Romania), Nicolaev (Bulgaria), Politis (Greece), Aras (Turkey), Sato (Japan), Litvinov (Soviet Union) and Subotic (Yugoslavia). They arrived at Montreux for the conference on 20 June 1936. PRO FO 371/20073, E 2765/26/44. 2

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

45

I.

In time of peace, non-Black Sea powers should be granted freedom of passage only for the purpose of courtesy visits and were required to give one month's notice. No one naval unit entering the Black Sea should exceed 14,000 tons, nor should the total tonnage of a non-Black Sea naval power in those waters exceed 28,000 tons, and no warships belonging to a non-Black Sea state might remain in the Black Sea for more than 15 days. There was a new provision in the Turkish draft, clearly inserted as a result of Soviet pressure, 1 that Black Sea states could send through the Straits ships of their existing fleets up to a maximum tonnage of 25,000 tons, on condition that they should pass through the Straits singly.

II.

In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, special authorisation for the passage of warships would be required from the Turkish Government.

III.

In time of war, Turkey being neutral, the same provisions would be applied as in peace time. One of the main innovations in the Turkish draft was to include a time of menace of war. If Turkey believed herself threatened by war, similar authorisation from the Turkish government would be required, the League and convention signatories having been notified. The passage of submarines through the Straits was entirely forbidden by the Turkish draft; civil and military aircraft were also forbidden over a certain zone of the Straits. 2

Turkey naturally tried to establish her full authority over the Straits both by abolishing the demilitarised zones and the Straits Commission and placing huge restrictions on the passage of warships; also by the innovation of a time of the menace of war. Meanwhile, the Turkish draft convention was much more favourable to the USSR since the total tonnage of ships of any non-Black Sea Powers which might be sent into the Black Sea was decreased. The Lausanne Straits Convention had provided that the maximum force which any one power might send through the Straits into the Black Sea would not be greater than that of the most powerful fleet among those surrounding the Black Sea, namely the USSR. She could not therefore have embarked on an important new building programme in the Black Sea without risk of inviting into the Black Sea a foreign power of equal naval power. 3 However, the Turkish draft changed the balance in favour of the Soviet Union so that she would be able to increase her fleet without restriction, while the foreign 1 In the course of a private conversation, Aras stated to Rendel that Russia was claiming the absolute right to send 25,000 ton units through the Straits in either direction on any occasion irrespective of Turkish authorisation. PRO FO 371/20075, E 3748/26/44, Lord Stanhope (Montreux) to Foreign Office, no. 4, 22 June 1936. 2 PRO FO 371/20075, E 3748/26/44, Lord Stanhope (Montreux) to Foreign Office, no. 4, 22 June 1936. 3 PRO FO 371/20075/26/44, Lord Stanhope to Foreign Office, no. 11, 24 June 1936.

46

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

powers only had a limited right to send fleets into the Black Sea. Great Britain naturally found the Turkish draft too favourable to the USSR, believing that it would not only convert the Black Sea into a Soviet lake, but would also adversely affect the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean. One could say that the British delegation was surprised by the Turkish proposal, which contained many different points from those discussed during Menemencioglu's visit to London. Moreover, it became apparent that what Aras had repeatedly assured Britain of in early May at Geneva — that the basis of the Turkish proposal regarding the passage of warships would be 'strict equality and reciprocity' that there had been an agreement with the Soviet government on it — was unfounded. 1 It might be true to say that Turkish interests lay in playing off one Great Power against the another in order to have the maximum chancc of regaining control over the Straits. In this respect it seems that from the beginning Turkey, to an extent, played the Soviet card as well as Italian. However, it seems that Soviet pressure appeared more than the Turks had expected in Montreux so that they had been left in an embarrassing situation. There is some indication that the Turkish pro-Soviet stand in the conference was mainly the consequence of this. As Rendel pointed out, Aras 'had been much under Litvinov's personal domination and that there has been practically no point on which the Turks have not been prepared to yield to Soviet pressure in the last resort whatever attitude they might previously have adopted in discussions with the other delegations'. 2 To a great extent this subservience of the Turkish delegation to the Soviet delegation had been one of the greatest difficulties with which the British Delegation had had to contend throughout the conference. By this Turkish proposal, the Soviet Union was naturally expected to be the country most satisfied with the Turkish draft since it went some way to meet her objectives. However, the Soviet delegates were not entirely agreed on it. Litvinov claimed nothing different from his Tsarist predecessor, namely complete freedom of passage in both directions for all the naval forces of the Black Sea powers. He proposed to prohibit the right of passage of non-riperian powers which would have the effect of closing the Straits in time of war not only to belligerent, but even to neutral warships of non-riperian powers when 1 PRO FO 371/20080, E5074/26/44, P. J. Henniker-Heaton memorandum on Montreux negotiations, 23 July 1936. 2 The Turkish government was clearly frightened of the Soviets and by no means anxious to see them in sole control of the Black Sea or to be obliged to act as a guardian of the Straits. It is interesting to quote here from Rendel's remarks in order to clarify the Soviet factor in the Turkish attitude: 'their fear of Russia led them to adopt an attitude of extreme timidity in debate, and while they constantly begged us in private to help them to resist Russian ambitions and designs, they seldom gave us any support in public, and, indeed, constantly let us down by capitulating at the critical moment when we were in fact fighting their battles as well as our own'. Rendel, The Sword and the Olive, p. 90.

THE

S T R A I T S

Q U E S T I O N

47

a Black Sea power other than the USSR was a belligerent. 1 Therefore, as far as naval strategy was concerned, the question of the passage of warships became increasingly Anglo-Soviet in character during the discussion regarding transit through the Straits and entry or exit into or from the Black Sea of war vessels especially in time of peace, since peacetime restriction directly impinged on the Soviet naval building programme. Lord Stanhope, the head of the British delegation in this part of the discussion, declared such impediments to be unacceptable and suggested that if restrictions on the passage of warships were to be imposed, they should be on a reciprocal basis. 2 One of the chief reasons for the British objections to the revision of the Straits regime being more favourable to the Soviet Union was its effect on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 on the grounds that growing Russian naval strength in the Black Sea would give Nazi Germany an excuse for revising the agreement. 3 As regards wartime passage, there was agreement between the Admiralty and Foreign Office that because the real importance of restrictions would depend in any case on whether they were to be applicable in time of war, it would be unwise and probably useless for Britain to try to limit the global tonnage of warships passing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. 4 However, there was little doubt of the crucial need to struggle for as much freedom as possible in the peacetime regulations, which might have an important bearing on the U S S R ' s building programme. At this stage, the Turkish delegates were, to some extent, worried about Soviet policy when the Soviet aim emerged of imposing severe limitations on the non-Black Sea Powers and complete freedom for herself to send unlimited forces through the Straits. Menemencioglu suggested to the British delegation that Turkey did not want to be 'doorkeepers to a Russian lake', allowing the Soviets to organise a powerful fleet either by building one there or by transfers from the Baltic.

1

PRO FO 371/20076, E 4058/26/44, Bennett Memorandum, 30 June 1936. Britain's point regarding peace time was that of equality of principle: she wanted reciprocal limitation on the tonnage of any fleet entering the Mediterranean from the Black Sea not exceeding the total permitted in the opposite direction. At this point differences emerged between the Admiralty and Foreign Office regarding the effect of the proposed Straits Convention on British naval strategy. The Admiralty expressed its view that equality of principle was neither practical nor desirable since the existing Straits Convention did not apply limitations upon Russia. 'The opposition to the present Russian demand should be used merely as a lever for obtaining the maximum amount of freedom for ourselves and not with the object of actually imposing limitations on Russia'. Following the Admiralty's remark the Foreign Office realised the fact that restrictions on the passage of warships on a reciprocal basis was not practical. PRO FO 371/20075, E 3839/26/44, Bennett Memorandum, 25 June 1936. •2 This agreement provided that 'German naval strength should in no circumstances exceed 35 per cent of British naval strength with the exceptional circumstances that if the general equilibrium of naval armaments should be violently upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite Great Britain to examine the new situation thus created'. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Healds (eds.), Documents on International Affairs, 1935, Vol. I, p. 143. 4 PRO FO 371/20076, E 4058/26/44, Bennett memorandum, 30 June 1936.

48

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

However, he said, Turkey realised that it might be difficult to impose restrictions on the Black Sea powers different from those imposed on the nonBlack Sea powers, in terms of exit from and entry into the Black Sea. He therefore suggested that the Black Sea fleets might be effectively limited by a sliding scale, increasing the non-Black Sea tonnage allowed through the Straits parallel with a increase in the Black Sea fleets. The British delegation therefore adopted a proposal, put forward privately, that an attempt be made to work out a sliding scale, whereby the global tonnage of non-Black Sea powers which might in peace time to be allowed into the Black Sea would increase in proportion to increases in the strongest Black Sea fleet. In other words, the main object of the sliding scale was to discourage any undue increase in the Soviet Black Sea fleet. 1 When Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, put forward to Litvinov the new proposal during a bilateral conversation on 27 June, Litvinov's attitude implied that the proposal would not meet with insuperable difficulties from the Soviet Government. As a result of these negotiations, a sliding scale was established, providing that the total tonnage allowed to non-Black Sea Powers in the Black Sea might be increased up to a maximum of 45,000 tons, these figures being open to revision every five years. 2 Litvonov's agreement on this point enabled delegates to turn their attention to the other aspects of the Turkish draft. The debate concerning the passage of warships in a conflict in which Turkey remained neutral was central to the discussion, even becoming a factor which threatened the whole conference at Montreux, to the effect that, in the case of war between the USSR and Great Britain, the Straits would be more important than the other cases due to the fact that the balance of naval strengths could turn to the disadvantage of either. The Soviet Union was in fact strongly pressing that in case of war, Turkey being neutral, the Straits should be closed to all non-Black Sea belligerents, while Britain wanted the Straits open, and proposed that nothing should be done to interfere with the exercise of full belligerents' rights by all belligerents. 3 Since at this stage the Conference had reached stalemate, on 25 June the discussion of the main issue 1

PRO FO 371/20076, E 3906/26/44, Eden (Geneva) to Foreign Office, no. 72, 27 June 1936. PRO FO 371/20076, E 3961/26/44, Eden (Geneva) to Foreign Office, no. 78, 28 June 1936. 3 Both Admiralty and Foreign Office agreed that the sole judge of whether such a situation really existed should not depend on Turkey's hand. The reason behind the Admiralty's judgement was the fear of Turkey's possible stand in case Britain was a belligerent and Turkey's desire was to remain a neutral; Turkey may be reluctant to grant the necessary permission owing to fear of compromising her neutrality. Turkey's responsibility as a neutral would not be engaged by the granting of permission to a belligerent fleet to pass through the Straits since it would obviously be undesirable to give her carte blanche to allow one belligerent fleet through and not another, even on the pretext that she was only considering her own safety. In such a case the Admiralty wanted to secure the retention of those provisions of the Lausanne Convention which laid down that, in such circumstances, the Straits should be open, and that nothing should be done to interfere with the exercise of full belligerents' rights by all belligerents. However, Turkey insisted on the observance of the proposed regulation, which would vitiate the whole proposal from the Admiralty point of view. PRO FO 371/20076, E 4068/26/44, British Delegation (Montreux) to Foreign Office, 1 July 1936. 2

THE

STRAITS

QUESTION

49

raised by the Turkish draft was postponed in order to prevent complete breakdown and the plenary session of the Conference was adjourned. While the chief delegates left to attend the League meetings at Geneva, or returned home to obtain fresh instructions from their governments, the Technical Committee of the Conference worked on the main issues. Obviously, however, the same agreement could not extend to those provisions concerning a war in which Turkey was neutral. As discussions in Geneva moved towards stalemate, Aras and Eden were anxious to bring the work of the Montreux Conference to an early conclusion because of the delicate international situation. At this precarious stage, in order not to cause a breakdown of negotiations, compromise was reached in principle and left to be worked out in detail when the plenary sessions of the Conference resumed on 5 July. In the meantime, the British delegation at Montreux came to the conclusion that the best way to get past the endless discussions, and also to achieve a more favourable outcome for Britain, would be to submit a redraft of the whole convention on the basis of the Turkish draft, since this had been officially adopted as the basis of discussion. The new version of the Turkish draft convention submitted by the British delegation was accepted as a basis of discussion in the Conference reconvened on July 6 at Montreux. 1 The major British innovation of their draft runs as follows: As for the warships and auxiliaries were concerned, a 'Marmara yardstick', accepted a tonnage limit equal to half the tonnage of the effective Turkish fleet with a minimum of 15,000 tons on warships passing through the Straits at any one time, and that this tonnage should not be composed of more than nine units. The clause in the Turkish draft, allowing the Soviet Union to send out single ships up to a maximum of 25,000 tons with the special permission of the Turkish Government was omitted in the British draft. A fixed total tonnage of 30,000 tons was allowed with a limited period of stay for warships of all non-Black Sea countries in the Black Sea, although this tonnage might, by means of a 'Black Sea yardstick', be increased to 45,000 tons, if the Black Sea fleets increased this was called the 'escalator clause'. The total tonnage which any one non-riverian power might have in the Black Sea was to be limited to three-quarters of the total tonnage allowed all non-riverian powers. If any power, having at the time no force in the Black Sea or a force less than 10,000 tons in all, should wish to send a force into that sea 'for humanitarian purposes', this power should have the right, subject to special authorisation f r o m the Turkish Government, to send ships or to increase its existing force in the Black Sea up to a maximum of 10,000 tons, notwithstanding all the provisions in the preceding articles. Such a force might remain 1

PRO FO 371/20077, E 4175/26/44, Rendel (Montreux) to Bennett, 3 July 1936.

50

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

in the Black Sea for any other purpose but might not remain for longer than one month. For the time of war, Turkey being neutral, the same conditions should apply to warships as in time of peace, subject to the provision that these conditions should not be applicable to a belligerent power to the detriment of its belligerent right. In the time of menace of war, in order to close the Straits Turkey should not only notify the League of Nations and the signatories of the convention but also, if the League Council decided by a two-thirds majority that the measures taken by her were not j u s t i f i e d , it should cancel t h e m f o r t h w i t h . T h e Straits Commission should continue to exercise its function and the new Convention should remain in force for fifty years. 1 In spite of some concessions by Britain to meet Soviet concerns, Litvinov, while accepting the 'escalator clause' in principle, lost no time in stating his case. He maintained that the Black Sea was a mare clausum so that the 15,000 tons limitation, based on the ' M a r m a r a yardstick', on which Turkey insisted for security, on warships passing through the Straits should be applicable to non-Black Sea Powers only, and the Soviet Union should have the right to send unlimited forces through the Straits in either direction. Another Soviet objection was to omitting a clause in the Turkish draft which allowed the Soviet Union to send out single ships up to a m a x i m u m of 25,000 tons. One of his objects was clearly to secure complete f r e e d o m of movement between the Baltic and the Soviet Black Sea Fleets. Litvinov also took a strong line against the British draft proposal that in a war where Turkey was neutral, no restriction should be placed on the warships of powers exercising their belligerent rights in the Black Sea; he stated that this made it unduly favourable for non-Black Sea Powers. The latter point, known as Article 16 of the British draft, once more became the main point of divergence between the Soviets with the backing of France and Romania and the British delegates causing the negotiations to be broken off. 2 In order to go some way towards meeting the Soviet objection, the British delegate submitted a new amendment on Article 16 on 8 July to the effect that if Turkey felt herself menaccd by the passage of a belligerent fleet, she might close the Straits to all belligerent powers without discrimination, and that if no Black Sea power were belligerent, she should close the Straits to all belligerents' vessels. Litvinov replied with a counter amendment providing that the passage through the Straits should be prohibited for ships of war and auxiliary vessels of all belligerent states in a war in which Turkey was neutral, except in the cases contemplated in article 23 of the British draft, provided that no stipulation of the Convention should prejudice the rights and obligations of 1

PRO FO 371/20077, E 4178/26/44, British Delegation (Montreux) to Foreign Office, 5 July 1936. PRO FO 371/20077, E 4241/26/44, Lord Stanley to Foreign Office, 8 July 1936.

2

THE

STRAITS

QUESTION

51

the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League. 1 The Soviet amendment implied an important change of attitude and showed that on this delicate point the Soviet government was prepared to abandon its previous insistence on differential treatment between Black Sea and non-Black Sea Powers in time of war. At this juncture, the Turkish delegates' attitude was ambivalent. To begin with, although the Soviet amendment seemed attractive to the Turkish delegates, who told Rendel that they would support Litvinov in this matter, after consultation with Ankara they changed their mind to the effect that the Soviet amendment would bind Turkey to take action against a power with whom she had no quarrel and who, not being a signatory to the Convention, might not regard herself as bound by it. 2 At the plenary meeting of the conference on 10 July, the main focus of the discussion on article 23 of the British Draft Convention at Montreux moved towards the mutual assistance pacts within the framework of the Covenant of the League and away from questions primarily of naval strategy. Litvinov proposed, with the collaboration of the French and Romanian delegates, that freedom of passage might be provided not only for warships but also the auxiliaries fulfilling engagements of mutual assistance under a supplementary pact within the framework of the League, whether Turkey was party thereto or not. Indeed, the Soviet, French and Romanians proposed various amendments to the British draft, particularly to Articles 16 and 23, in order to secure their regional pacts, the Franco-Soviet Pact and the FrancoRomanian alliance. 3 In this respect, their object was to make sure that if France wished to act under the Franco-Soviet Pact, or under the FrancoRomanian alliance, or if a decision was taken by the Council of the League under Article 16 of the Covenant, Turkey should be able to accord the necessary facilities to the French forces while refusing them to their adversaries. 4 These provisions were clearly designed to discriminate against Germany. Turkey hardly saw the Soviet amendment as acceptable since the most probable threat that she would face would be from Germany. It therefore caused serious anxieties among Turkish and British delegates, that if the Soviet proposal were adopted, it would bring trouble with Germany, who might regard all these pacts and the present convention as a military alliance against her, and would in consequence denounce the recent Anglo-German Naval Agreement and take an even more uncompromising and difficult line than she had already taken in general European affairs. Indeed, the dispute reached such a crucial point that it had to be broken off. Another 1

Ibid. PRO FO 371/20080, E 4456/26/44, P. J. Henniker-Heaton memorandum on Montreux negotiations, 23 July 1936. 3 PRO FO 371/20079, E 4536/26/44, Extract from cabinet conclusions 52(36), 15 July 1936. 4 PRO FO 371 /20078, fi 4335/26/44, Rendel minute, 11 July 1936. 2

52

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

serious aspect of the matter for Britain was that if the conference failed, there was little doubt that it would be followed by unilateral action on the part of Turkey in the direction not only of demilitarising the Straits but of fixing new rules of passage instigated by the Soviet Union in order to ensure privileges for herself regarding the passage of her ships, which was undesirable for Britain and even Turkey herself. However, no one wished to put an end to the discussion, which was obviously an encouragement for the revisionist states. Therefore the conference determined to reach an agreement whatever happened. Great Britain felt herself obliged to solve this matter since the whole Convention depended on the Article 23, and, even though Turkey could not clarify her position, the attitude of all the delegates, except the Japanese, seemed to be in favour of the Soviet proposal to the extent that they refused to sign the convention without it. 1 On 15 July all delegates were ready for the conference to take up the main issue of Articles 16 and 23 again. The same day the expected compromise was reached with the successful persuasion of the French, Russian and Romanian delegations by the British delegation, by which agreement was secured. The British delegate accepted the French proposal to replace the Soviet amendment to Article 16, which provided that the Straits should normally be closed in time of war, Turkey being neutral, to all belligerents, subject to certain exceptions, on condition that no change would be made in the British draft of Article 23. This acceptance, of course, brought about a complete change in the situation and the conference made rapid progress. In the meantime, the sanctions against Italy were to some extent lightened on 15 July 1936 in order to facilitate Italy's attendance at the Conference, but Italy declined to come. Besides, after reaching an agreement over Article 16 and 23 of the British draft proposal, Italy, having the objective of hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean and also over Spain, suspected that the agreement was directed against her since it would prepare the ground not only for Great Britain but also the USSR to occupy a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the increasingly unfriendly attitude of Italy towards the conference made Turkey wish to bring the Convention into force directly after it had been signed, the general desire being to make it subject to ratification by the signatories. Thus it should not come into force until it had received ratification by six powers, including Turkey. Italy was the only signatory of the Lausanne Straits Convention who did not attend the Conference. This caused anxieties, particularly in Turkish circles, that her absence would adversely affect the outcome of the Conference. However, the Italian question was settled for the time being by Article 27, which allowed for the subsequent accession to the Convention of any power. Although the final text of the conference was ready on the afternoon of 18 July the ceremony of signature had to wait until Titelescu returned from Bucharest on the 20.

1 PRO FO 371/20080, E 4456/26/44, P.J. Henniker-Heaton memorandum on Montreux negotiations, July 1936.

THE

STRAITS

QUESTION

53

It was an occasion which Turkey had dreamed of since 1923; in fact Turkish troops marched into the demilitarised zone the very day after the Convention had been signed at Montreux. However, the Convention took effect provisionally f r o m 15 August since six ratifications were needed. The final ratification of the Montreux Convention was signed on 9 November by the representatives of Turkey, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Greece, the Soviet Union, Romania, Yugoslavia and France in Paris. T u r k e y ' s efforts to regain control over the Straits were completed. 1 Turkey was the only one country which was entirely satisfied with the Convention since it restored her historical position as guardian of the Straits, and as such she could now play an important role in Mediterranean affairs. She was authorised to fortify the Straits, to close them if she were a belligerent herself or even if she felt threatened; she obtained the abolition of the International Commission and she was left with considerable discretion in interpreting the new convention. Apart f r o m the fact that the implementation of the C o n v e n t i o n would depend on the skill with which the Turkish Government handled the delicate business of keeping Great Britain and the U S S R on friendly terms, it was suspected that this could be a precedent for seeking a peaceful solution. In that sense, the attitude in particular of Italy and Germany and partly that of Bulgaria would be decisive. In spite of certain restrictions imposed upon Great Britain, she secured reasonable facilities in the Black Sea. Since the Convention allowed Turkey to escape dependency on the USSR, Britain gained more political advantage in enabling Turkey to hold the Straits, thereby gaining a potential ally in the Eastern Mediterranean. T h e primary reason for the Soviet U n i o n ' s coming to an agreement at Montreux, however, resulted f r o m the growing German threat to Eastern Europe and towards the Balkans where Soviet interests lay. The Soviet Union, however, saw little reason to be satisfied with a settlement which hampered the passage of Soviet warships and, though it restricted much more severely the entry of non-Black Sea fleets, nevertheless it depended for its implementation on a custodian w h o was now armed and believed to be falling under British influence. From the Soviet point of view, therefore, the convention did not provide for complete security for the Soviet southern flank. Soon after the conference therefore the Soviet diplomats were back in business. Apart f r o m the Soviet dissatisfaction, the absence of the Italians at the Conference and the growing German agitation in Europe complicated Turkish diplomacy as well as Britain's, which will be dealt with the next chapter.

1

PRO FO 371 E 5270 and E 7028/26/44, Vol. 20081.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS' POLITICS VIS-A-VIS THE STRAITS ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This chapter examines the immediate impact of the Montreux Convention on the Great Powers' strategic interests in the pre-war period, and deals with the question of how much the concerned powers were satisfied with the outcome of the new regime. In this sense, apart from Soviet reactions, the Italian response was of particular importance since Italy did not take part in the Montreux Conference in spite of being a part of the previous regime. London hoped that the Montreux Convention would set a precedent in seeking peaceful solutions after the unilateral denunciation of the post-war agreement by Italy and Germany. The reason for this was that a successful outcome of the issue of the Straits was also important for the League of Nations, ensuring that it could still carry out its tasks as a conflict resolution mechanism in the international arena. In this regard, this chapter begins by discussing whether the Convention contributed to bolster up the League's position as a peacemaker following its recent humiliation over Abyssinia.

Controversy over the Convention The method which the Convention adopted was criticised by the Italians as shown by their absence as one of the signatories of the old Convention. The debate about the Italian absence from the Montreux Conference brought up a series of discussions as to whether the Conference had created a precedent by revising a Convention in the absence of one of the contracting parties. Owen St. Clair O'Malley, Head of the Southern Department in the British Foreign Office, shared the Italian view, asserting that the Convention's action had been rendered invalid under Article 19 of the Covenant since it required unanimity. He further suggested that Article 19 of the Covenant might need to be revised for such cases. Therefore, he took the view that the Convention provided a precedent for the revision of an inapplicable treaty without the unanimous approval of all the parties to it. 1 Conversely, as C. Wilfred Jenks has suggested, the Italian case was not unique since something like it happened after the First World War when relations between the Soviets and the international community were strained: the latter considered themselves to be 1

PRO FO 371/28001, E 5228/26/44, O'Malley minute, 24 July 1936.

56

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

entitled to modify treaty engagements of general interest without the consent of the USSR with whom their relations were abnormal. 1 This argument was endorsed by Gerald Fitzmaurice, the legal adviser of the British Foreign Office, who pointed out that what was done at Montreux did not constitute any precedent for the revision of a treaty in the absence of one of the contracting parties since Italy's legal rights were not affected at Montreux, though the political point was that her legal right was irreparably damaged. 2 Fitzmaurice, as he partly accepted, presented a partial view on the issue as a means of ignoring the future political implications for Italian interests of the revision of the treaty. In this respect, a further debate ensued as to whether the new Convention was valid for Italy. Jenks criticised the Italian view, suggesting that a state which failed to fulfil an obligation to participate in a revising Conference could have no grounds for objecting to whatever happened at the Conference. 3 Turkey had a similar view, but a different perspective. At the Montreux negotiations, Turkey was opposed to the Italian view in the following sense: that the Straits formed a special case to which, in view of the past history of the matter, the ordinary rules of international law relating to the revision of treaties could not apply. Therefore, a sufficient majority of the interested powers could agree on the principles on which a new regime in Turkey was entitled to apply that regime vis-à-vis the entire world. 4 Britain, for her part took her stance on a legal point rather than a political one: that the old Convention remained in force for Italy, and her rights under the old Convention were still intact, even if Italy did not sign the new Convention. This was because an international Convention could only be revised by the consent of all concerned and although certain parties to a Convention might be willing to give up their rights thereunder and agree to a new regime, to be applicable among themselves, this could not affect the rights of parties to the old Convention which had not consented to the new one. This attitude of Britain supported Italian claims that the Montreux Convention had no validity for them, but only for Turkey and these other powers. 5 Patrick Stratford Scrivener from the Abyssinian Department in the Foreign Office, added a new dimension and a more conclusive argument to the debate: he said that Montreux had set an important precedent for a power in the revision of a treaty in respect of her own territory, without the agreement of all the parties to the arrangement, and showed that no single power could militate against any international co-operation for peace. However, it did not provide any precedent for frontier revision for a state at whose expense the revision would take

1 C. Wilfred Jenks, 'The Montreux Conference and the Law of Peaceful Change', New Commonwealth Quarterly, no. 2, 1936, p. 243. 2 PRO FO 371 /28001, E 5228/26/44, Fitzmaurice minute, 6 August 1936. 3 Jenks, "The Montreux Convention", p. 244. 4 PRO FO 371/28001, E 5228/26/44, Foreign Office: 'Position resulting from non-signature of Convention by Italy', 24 July 1936.

5

Ibid.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

57

place. 1 To meet this point, Article 27 was adopted in order to leave it open for Italy to sign, giving Britain an opportunity to bring Italy into an agreement in which her imperial ambitions might be appeased. Indeed, Italian ambitions over the Mediterranean could have severely complicated Britain's global position. Although the Mediterranean continued to play a vital role in the defence policy as a line of communications, Britain's defence priority in the post-World War I was the Far East and Europe, nearer home. 2 It was quite impossible for Britain to fight simultaneously in Europe while holding the Far East unless a neutral or friendly Italy could be depended on. However, Italy's friendship would not be secured unless the sanctions against Rome were lifted. Besides, having been disturbed by the German attitude in Austria, the French government soon after the sanction imposed by the League of Nations took a step back from rapprochement with Rome. The remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 raised questions within British governmental bodies about the viability of sanctions and the League: to continue sanctions effectively drew Germany and Italy closer together. This led Britain to rekindle the historical friendship with Italy after her souring over Abyssinia for the sake of detaching her from Germany. 3 In this regard, the Italian accession of the Montrcux Convention was of particular importance for Britain. Leaving British policy on this matter for the later part of the chapter, we need to review some serious arguments which arose from the issue. One of these was the question of what impact the Convention would have on the League of Nations; or whether the Convention bolstered the League by subordinating it to the Covenant. Clarence Streits, an America journalist, advocated the view that although the Montreux Convention followed on the heels of the League's failure to save Abyssinia, it bolstered the League by subordinating the Convention to the League Covenant. 4 Accordingly, the new Convention was bound to the Covenant; to effect this Turkey was obliged to open the Straits in cases arising out of the application of Article 25 of the 1

Ibid, minute, 8 August 1936. ^ Nevertheless, the Mediterranean route via the Suez Canal was still the shortest and cheapest way compared with the Cape route to Singapore and Hong Kong. See Steven Morewood, 'Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 19191941', War & Society, Vol. 10, no. 1, 1992, pp. 81-107. 3 Lawrence R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 25-34; F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946 (Leicester: Leicester University Press: 1986), pp. 221254. However, British policy over the Abyssinian affair was in some disarray. From the beginnings of the Abyssinian crisis a major debate had been in progress amongst the backbenchers of the Conservative Party about the suitability of imposing economic sanctions on the Italians. Having been a passionate supporter of the League of Nations and collective security, Macmillan believed that removing the sanction would show weakness to the dictators and encourage further action and undermine the power of the League of Nations. For details see N. J. Crowson, 'Much Ado about Nothing: Macmillan and Appeasement', in Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds.), Harold Macmillan: Aspects of Political Life (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 626-63. 4 Clarence Streit, 'The New Straits Agreement lifts the League', New York Times, 19 July 1936.

58

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Convention and the mutual assistance pact binding Turkey, which was concluded within the framework of the League Covenant. It was also registered and published in conformity with Article 18 of the Covenant and also Articles 19 and 21 of the Convention giving certain rights and privileges to signatories acting under the League Covenant. Accounting for these points, Fenwick claimed that the authority of the League was put above that of the Convention itself. 1 However, these views were challenged by Kirkpatrick and Routh: they argued that the Montreux Convention diminished the capacity of the League's effective role in international affairs, as compared with its importance under the Lausanne settlement. Their argument stated that no longer was a Straits Commission endowed with wide powers to carry out its function under the auspices of the League of Nations, as cited under Article 15 of the Lausanne Convention. 2 As can be seen from the debates on the issue, the implementation of the Montreux Convention with regard to the League Covenant left behind some vagueness of interpretation. Although the Convention was to some extent bound by Article 18 of the Covenant regarding mutual assistance pacts in practical aspects, its implementation was far from being an effective instrument if the Council failed to reach unanimous decision under Article 16 of the Covenant, which allowed any member of the League to decide for itself whether action permitted by the Covenant should be taken against a state. Another related controversy arose out of Article 19 of the Convention which stated that in a war, Turkey being neutral, the vessels of war belonging to belligerent powers should not pass through the Straits, with the exception of stipulations within Article 25. In the case of warlike acts occurring between two powers, if once the League of Nations reached a decision there could not be a problem. However, if the League were slow to act or the Council were unanimous, Turkey was left to decide who was a belligerent for the implementation of Article 19. If the Council later found the Turkish decision had led to misconduct, Turkey would be left in the embarrassing situation of not having the privilege of controlling the passage. Another debate ensued as to whether the Convention charged Turkey with using military force against any attempt to pass through the Straits. Baggallay, Counsellor of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, argued that although Article 19 of the Convention forbade belligerent powers to send warships when Turkey was herself a belligerent, neither Article 19 nor 24 made it obligatory upon Turkey

1 C. G. Fenwick, 'The new Status of the Dardanelles', The American Journal of International Law, XXX, October 1936, p. 705; Routh, 'The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits', in Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 586. 2 Helen Pauli Kirkpatrick, 'The Montreux Straits Convention', Geneva Special Studies, Vol. VII, No. 6, September 1936, p. 13; Routh, "The Montreux Convention", p. 586.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

59

to resist an attempted breach of Article 19 by force of arms. It would therefore be permissible for Turkey under the terms of the Convention to oppose such an attempt by less strenuous methods such as protests and appeals to the League. 1 However, his colleague, Fitzmaurice, argued that Turkey could not be regarded as discharging her obligations under the Convention if she were merely to protest against an unlawful passage without doing anything concrete to try and prevent it. 2 According to the latter view, under Article 18 of the Lausanne Settlement, Straits security was the responsibility of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan on behalf of the League of Nations; after re-gaining the right of remilitarization Turkey took over not only the security of the territory on both sides of the Straits but also the security of the passage. From here, the debates moved on to another subject but related to the above arguments. Routh pointed out that, when compared to the old system where an international organ such as the Straits Commission, the international guarantee of the Straits security, might have rendered an extremely valuable service, the new convention abolished an instrument of international supervision, and gave a precedent for the internationalisation of various key strategic positions on the earth's surface which might become of great value in the future evolution of the system of collective security. 3 Although the Montreux Convention, to some extent, made reference to the League of Nations, it might be true to say that the Convention did not appear as a turning point for the League's awkward position since the supervision of the Straits regime, which had been laid down under the Covenant, was now left to Turkey to carry out. In this regard, there is little doubt that the Montreux Convention represented a step backward from the dream of a post-war collective security system. It was an exceptional case rather than a model for the revision of the post-war treaties. The debate on the revision of the Convention suggested that, although the powers recognised that it was a means of undermining the credibility of the League of Nations, the interests of the concerned parties outweighed this aspect. But Turkey's appeal for the revision of the Convention had been the result of Italian aggression in the Mediterranean which would leave the Straits in a vulnerable position. Therefore, she had no trust whatsoever in the collective security system in which so conspicuously failed over Abyssinia. In other words, Turkey's appeal was to provide for her own security instead of the discredited League of Nations. So there was no point in expecting that the new regime would bolster the collective security system. Basically, what was done at Montreux was to reach a conciliation amongst the old rivals on the Straits, who had posed a threat to the stability of the Near East and the Mediterranean.

1 2 3

PRO FO/371/20094, E 6928/5280/44, Baggatlay minute, 27 October 1936. Ibid. Fitzmaurice minute, 27 October 1936. Routh, "The Montreux Convention", p. 586.

60

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

In this respect, it may be suggested that the main driving force behind the concerned parties' security considerations was to minimise the threat to the security of the region. From this angle, therefore, so long as the interests of the concerned powers were satisfied, the threat to the region would be diminished. There is little doubt that the new experimental search for peace could have worked if all the parties had been able to create common cause against the growing German and Italian threats in Europe and the Mediterranean, as it would have affected the interests of all the parties in the Straits. In order to evaluate the impact of the Convention on the balance of power in Europe, it would be better to look at the policies of the concerned parties in relation to the Straits.

Aftermath 1936-39

of the Convention:

The Great Powers Rivalry over

Turkey,

As in the First World War, the Straits area proved of considerable strategic significance, playing an important, even decisive part in determining the course of events. The powers concerned did not envisage leaving their fate in Turkish hands. Besides, they sought a way to keep Turkey on their side, as a major conflict in Europe was unavoidable. In this respect the rivalry among the powers over Turkish allegiance in the pre-war period falls primarily into two phases. The first one reflected the policy of encirclement between the German-Italian and the Franco-Soviet blocs until the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, then the second one was between the Nazi-Soviet bloc and Western powers over Turkey to bring Turkey on their side so that the Straits regime would not militate against their interests under the terms of the new settlement. The successful conclusion of the Montreux Conference might have been a great deal more effective than it was in clearing the Mediterranean air after the Abyssinian affair if it had not coincided with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War on 18 July 1936, which once more raised the whole Mediterranean security question in a new and acute form. The widening rift between the German and Franco-Soviet blocs in fact increased the tension in the European scene, thereby accelerating the rapprochement between the fascist blocs. For instance, the Spanish Civil War became a battleground between fascism and communism on the one hand, and democratic Europe and fascism and communism, on the other. It was a cardinal point of British policy that Spanish affairs must be kept out of European alliances in order to avoid creating new difficulties. 1 For instance, in addition to the Franco-Soviet Pact, 1 PRO FO 954/13, folio 85, Eden memorandum, 19 July 1939. Also see Stephen Heald (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1937 (London, 1939), p. 81. For the Spanish Civil War see Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Macmillan, 1994); David T. Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Los Angeles: University of California. 1957); George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War: the Spanish Civil War in Context 1931-1939 (London: Longman, 1995).

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

61

the French-Spanish Popular Front alliance would convince Germany and Italy that they were being encircled which would lead unavoidably to the establishment of a Fascist bloc. It would also give an excuse to the USSR to spread her influence through the Mediterranean. Therefore, it would have resulted in active Soviet participation in Mediterranean affairs. This was neither Britain's nor Turkey's desire since both wanted to keep the USSR out of Mediterranean affairs. 1 Thus, Britain adopted a policy of non-intervention in Spain. However, the USSR kept putting pressure on Turkey to have free access for her warships in order to take an active part in Mediterranean affairs. In this regard, the main concern of Britain was to prevent the formation of any bloc, which could alter the status quo in Europe and the Mediterranean. Therefore, on the one hand, she tried to repair the breach with Italy by the removal of sanctions against Italy and by encouraging her to adhere the Montreux Convention in order to detach her from Nazi influence, and, on the other, avoid any policy which would provoke Germany to further aggressive behaviour, the effect of which would be upset the whole European status quo? The recent Anglo-German naval treaty was a hopeful sign of a step towards a general settlement in European affairs. However, the conciliation policy of Britain did not bring an end to the coolness in Anglo-Italian relations because of uncertainty concerning Italy's ultimate intentions and Britain's refusal to recognise Italy's conquest of Abyssinia. A detailed analysis of the Great Powers' policies towards the Straits on the eve of the Second World War requires a closer examination of their respective positions towards Turkey and Turkey's response. The following section is concerned with this.

Soviet Policy regarding the Straits,

1936-38

Although the USSR gained a substantial victory by the Montreux Convention, she did not achieve complete security on her southern borders because effective control of the Straits was placed in the hands of Turkey, which meant for all practical purposes that the latter was in a position to allow or impede the passage of a warship. Apart from the fact that the naval presence of Germany in the Baltic made the Straits vital as a gateway for the USSR if she needed to take an active part in Mediterranean affairs, the operation of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pacts depended on Turkey's 1 PRO FO 371/20094, E 6812/5280/44, Rendel minute, 29 October 1936. PRO FO 371/20859/141/44, Drummond (Rome) to Foreign Office, conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister, No.137, 12 February 1937. 2 Avon Papers 954/13, file No. 128, Foreign Office 'The Question of Recognition of Italian Sovereignty over Abyssinia', 5 March 1937.

62

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

co-operation. The Soviet Government's fear was that the Turkish Government could be drawn into the perpetual orbit of one of those powers with whom it had a kind of rivalry for spheres of influence since the new Convention effectively gave Turkey greater independence than before from the USSR. 1 In this respect, the close friendship between Great Britain and Turkey created the Montreux process and as a corollary caused a cooling off in the friendship hitherto existing between Turkey and the USSR; as the Soviet press complained, Turkey was yielding to the pressure of imperialist powers. Therefore, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to raise her voice against the new settlement in bilateral talks with Turkey in order to try to gain a privileged position regarding the Straits regime. During the Montreux negotiations and soon after the signing of the Convention the USSR tried to impose her own terms upon Turkey. Litvinov exerted pressure on Aras for a bilateral agreement to provide a mutual defence of the Straits in which all the Black Sea powers could take part. Accordingly, he wished to play a part in supplying the armaments required for the fortification of the Straits, but, he stressed, without German involvement. 2 Litvinov played a political game using all possible means to get round Aras to form a policy of additional agreements to the Convention. For this purpose, bilateral talks went on between Litvinov and Aras until October 1936. Turkey was not in a position to ignore Soviet dissatisfaction regarding the Montreux Convention because of the disparity in military power between the two countries. The longstanding Turkish fear of the USSR in the Black Sea had never in fact been extinguished and had always been latent and had reemerged in the course of the Montreux negotiations. During the meeting of the League Council in Geneva in October 1936, Litvinov raised once more the question of the mutual assistance pact with Aras. In the face of growing pressure from Litvinov, Aras himself tried to some extent to meet the Soviet demands. Accordingly, subject to his government's approval, Aras suggested that the Soviet government should guarantee to place their Black Sea fleet and certain air forces at Turkish disposal in the event of any attack being made against Turkey in the Mediterranean, in return for Turkey's allowing no

1 PRO FO 371/20094, E 6231/5280/44, British delegation (Geneva) to Foreign Office, no. 141, 1 October 1936. 2 Litvinov complained to Zekai Apaydin, the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, about the Turkish attitude at the Montreux talks in relation to his proposal. In particular, the Turkish purchase of guns for the Straits from Germany instead of the USSR, in spite of the fact that she was in no position to supply those guns, was the source of his irritation. These all caused a slight deterioration of the relationship between the two countries. T.C. Di§i§leri Bakanligi Aragtirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Miidurliigu, Turk Politikasinda 50. Yil: Montreux ve Sava§ Oncesi Yillan 1935-1939 (Ankara: T.C. Di§i§leri Bakanligt Arajtirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Mudiirlugii, 1973), pp. 131-133. This book contains official documents, such as, telegrams and some Turkish official pronouncements, such as cabinet decisions. This publication shed some light on the Turkish perspective since Turkish archives are not available. Hereafter, this reference is cited as 'Turk Di.f Politikasinda 50. Yil'.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

63

warship of an aggressor power through the Straits against the Soviet Union. 1 Litvinov asked Aras in addition for assurances about the Straits; he was anxious about Turkish assistance in the event of a German attack on the U S S R f r o m the Romanian side. 2 In Ankara, Aras' approach to the Soviet advances found support neither f r o m Atatürk nor Ismet inönii, the Prime Minister. The latter sent a telegram to Aras with the message that any mutual assistance pact in which neither country could apparently cope with their commitment would cause T u r k e y ' s economic situation to deteriorate since Turkey's economic performance mainly depended on the German market. Moreover, he continued, Turkey's policy was to avoid causing a war in Europe earlier than expected and dragging the country into a European conflict unnecessarily. 'It would be hardly possible to undertake any commitment without breaching the Montreux C o n v e n t i o n . ' 3 However, a final answer would be given after a cabinet meeting. While Montreux led to the establishment of good relations between Turkey and Britain when the two foreign secretaries met in Geneva on 1 October 1936 Eden found the line taken by Aras very unfortunate. Moreover, because of Aras' policy, apart f r o m the strong opposition f r o m the Montreux signatories, further difficulties would arise not only with Italy, but also give grounds to the Germans for the claim that the new Convention was invalid. 4 While Britain wanted to develop a general European settlement with Germany and Italy, A r a s ' t e n d e n c y to meet Soviet points caused surprise and consternation in the British Foreign Office. If the proposed agreement went through, as Rendel stated in his minute, not only would Soviet influence again became paramount in Ankara, in contrast to Turkey's careful avoidance in recent years of committing herself too deeply to the U S S R , but also the assumption by the USSR of a serious role in the Mediterranean would greatly complicate the balance of power there. Indeed, the U S S R indicated that she intended to involve herself more actively in Mediterranean affairs. 5 While the 1 Türk Politikasmda 50. Yil, Aras to Inönii, October 1936, and also see PRO FO 371/20094, E 6231/5280/44, Eden (Geneva) to Foreign Office, no. 141, 1 October 1936. 2 Türk Dig Politikasmda 50. Yil, Conversation between Aras and Litvinov at Geneva, October 1936, p. 136. 3 TürkDis Politikasmda 50. Yil, Inönii to Zekai Apaydin. p. 139. For economic dependency of Turkey on Germany see Brock Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance, pp. 107-142. 4 PRO FO 954/28, Eden (Geneva) to Foreign Office, Tur/36/9, 1 October 1936. 5 PRO FO 371/20094, E 6768/5280/44, Foreign Office minute by Rendel, 28 October 1936. In this time, newspapers were publishing news about Soviet involvement in Spain. For instance according to the Daily Telegraph, there was a gun on the deck of a Soviet ship bringing aid to Spain which passed through the Straits. The other European papers also had been publishing news about the events in Span on the widening rift between the Soviet and Italo-German governments. When Apaydin told Litvinov about this news that Spanish affairs would lead to a conflict between the Soviet Union and the Italian-German bloc he countered that 'while they were assisting the Franco government we could not stand still and watch them. We will not be afraid of involvement in these affairs'. Türk Di^ Politikasmda 50. Yil, Conversation between Apaydin and Litvinov, p. 145.

64

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Italians and Germans were getting deeply involved in Spanish affairs, Britain assumed that the USSR might possibly at least secure the establishment of the independent Soviet republic in Catalonia under virtual Soviet control. For this reason, the Mediterranean outlet was likely to become increasingly important to the USSR if only in view of the growing German danger to Baltic ports. However, the USSR could only play an effective role in the Mediterranean if she could secure the subservience of Turkey to her interests.1 As a matter of fact, in the Aras proposal Turkey did not give any more guarantees than had been given by the Montreux Convention. As Germany had already complained about the Convention, any agreement of this kind between Turkey and the USSR would provoke the same sort of reaction. For most countries, the political implications of the USSR's guarantee to help Turkey against any attack in the Mediterranean would be that it was nothing else but a Turco-Soviet alliance, the effect of which would have been to make Turkey an accessory to the operation of the Franco-Soviet Pact. Its initial impact would adversely affect British Mediterranean strategy because Germany would demand an upward revision of the 35 percent ratio in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935. In this respect, the worries of Britain were that this would probably provoke the formation of a 'fascist bloc' by Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal. 2 There was also good reason to make common cause between Germany and Italy, since both were against Soviet expansionism, either ideological or military, in the direction of the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. In this regard Italy, and particularly Germany, attempted to explore the possibility of detaching Turkey from her connection with the USSR. The aim was to minimise the effect of the Montreux Convention on German interests. For instance, as far as Mediterranean affairs were concerned, the German government demanded that the conditions for the passage of auxiliary vessels should come under the heading of warship regulations in order to prevent Soviet ships carrying war materials or troops through the Straits on their way to Spain. 3 Indeed, there was some evidence that the USSR was supplying ammunition to Spain through the Straits. 4 The Admiralty advised that since such a development would have serious repercussions upon the strategic position of Great Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean 'every endeavour should be made to prevent Turkey entering into such an arrangement with the Soviet as envisaged by Aras'. 5

1

Turk Di§ Politikasinda 50. Yil, Conversation between Apaydin and Litvinov, pp. 145-46 PRO FO 371/20094, E 6499/5280/44, Eden to Morgan, 15 October 1936. 3 PRO FO 371/20859, E 933/141/44, Foreign Office minute, 17 February 1937. 4 Avon Papers 954, 13/1/42, N.I.S (36) 105, Memorandum on 'International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-intervention in Spain'. 5 PRO FO 371/20094, E 6707/5280/44, Admiralty to Foreign Office, No. M/P.D. 05924/36, 23 October 1936. 2

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

65

It is true that through fear of Italian aggression Turkey was seeking some guarantee from Britain against eventual Italian hostility in the Mediterranean. For this reason, when the Turkish government insisted on a Mediterranean pact the British government, since it could not take on any new commitments, declined the Turkish request. However, Aras' initiative, contrary to Zhivkova's interpretation, 1 was, as Rendel suggested, rather the consequence of Litvinov's ruthless pressure on Aras and did not reflect the seeking of an alternative. If one looks through the documents published by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Montreux ve Savag Oncesi Yillari, one can see that the proposal put forward by Aras was mainly at his own discretion under the influence of the strong pressure exerted by Litvinov. Loraine reported to London that 'the recent markedly pro-British orientation of Turkish policy' was due solely to Atatiirk himself. He maintained that even if Aras were mesmerised by Litvinov in Geneva, he would be even more strongly mesmerised by Atatiirk. 2 However, he agreed later that even Aras himself was not pro-Soviet but he could not extricate himself from Litvinov's influence. Indeed, Turkish and British interests was not different regarding Soviet ambitions to become involved in Mediterranean affairs, to the extent that Turkey refused to allow her ports to be used for the export of material and men from the USSR destined for Spain. 3 The Turkish Cabinet reached the decision that, since the proposed pact between the two countries would make the situation worse than it was, no additional arrangement to the Montreux Convention was needed, because it was also sufficient to meet Soviet interests. 4 However, in order to satisfy the USSR Atatiirk made a declaration at the opening of the National Assembly on 1 November that 'henceforward it was forbidden to warships of all belligerent powers to pass through the Straits', a form of words which corresponded exactly with the terms of the Montreux Convention. 5 The terms of the President's speech pleased Britain. However, the USSR did not welcome it at all. The similarity of view between the Turkish and British governments over the Straits issue caused additional strain to the Soviet-Turkish relationship. During the conversations between Apaydin and Litvinov on 19 November 1936, the latter complained about Turkey's diversionary stance on the Soviet proposal and was told that 'Turkey would do nothing without Britain's approval. I do not know as to whether you have any commitment to * Ludmila Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1939 (London: Seeker & Warburg , 1976), p. 48. 2 PRO FO 371/20094, E 7236/5280/44, Foreign Office minute by Rendel, 18 November 1936. 3 PRO FO 371/20859/141/44, Drummond (Rome) to Foreign Office, Conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister, no. 137. 12 February 1937. 4 Tiirk Di§ Politikasinda 50. Yd, Aras to Apaydin, p .143. 5 PRO FO 371/20094, 6929/5280/44, Foreign Office memorandum 'Turco-Soviet Relationship', 4 November 1936.

66

THE

TURKISH

STRAITS

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

Britain or you were willing to get their approval in advance'. 1 Indeed, the Soviet anxiety was that Britain's rapprochement with Italy and the German economic penetration of Turkey on the one hand and the growing close relations between Turkey and Great Britain on the other would militate against her interests in the Mediterranean. 2 Although, until about the time of the Convention, the Soviet authorities believed that they had Turkish policy in 'their pocket', they now felt that they were encircled by the fascist states thanks to Britain and her new friend Turkey. 3 In this manner, Litvinov and his deputy, Stamanyakov, warned Apaydin on several occasions, that Soviet friendship would be replaced by German or Italian influence. Although Turkey was unwilling to enter into any further commitment, given the Montreux Convention, the USSR did not let the matter rest. Since Turkey was aloof, the USSR seems to have changed tactics, using another state in order to persuade Turkey to comply. In this regard, to a great extent the USSR inspired a Black Sea pact proposal raised by Romania in early March 1937 as the scenario was unfolded during the Montreux negotiations. 4 As a matter of fact, in the pre-Montreux period, Aras had been willing to create a great pact with all nations bordering the Mediterranean and Black Sea basin to which Italy would be reconciled, and the arrival of Germans as Italy's allies on the shore of the Mediterranean would be averted. But this initiative was frustrated by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Thereafter, Aras simplified his project: one local pact with those countries bordering Mediterranean including the western powers and another with the Black Sea countries. Thus, being friends of both the strongest Black Sea naval power, the USSR, and the Mediterranean naval power, Britain, Aras counted on minimising the clash of interests between powers over the Straits. Moscow welcomed such an agreement which, in its estimation would be useful to combine the small states of the Balkan countries against the fascist states. 5 Moreover, in the Kremlin's thought this might provide a special position for Soviet naval forces in the Straits. One of the principal aims of Soviet policy in fact was to keep the smaller powers of Central and Eastern Europe out of the orbit of Germany and Italy, and reduce British influence on Turkey, at least so as to 1

Turk Di§ Politikasmda 50. Yil, Conversation between Apaydin and Litvinov, 19 November 1936, p. 141. Ibid. During the negotiations between Zckai Apaydin and Stamanyakov on 15 October 1936, the latter pointed out that Moscow quite understood their friendship with Britain, but its wish was that this would not lead to friendship with Italy, which was what Britain had been after. TUrk Di§ Politikasmda 50. Yil, p. 141. 3 Litvinov remarked to Chilston, British Ambassador to Moscow, in regard to the probable attitude of the Turkish government over the same question, 'Oh, the Turks will do what we wish'. PRO FO 371/20868, E2242/1592/44, Chilston (Moscow) to Eden, no. 183, 17 April 1937. 4 On the course of bilateral negotiations Titulescu proposed to Aras a pact amongst Black Sea states on 25 June. It became clear that this resulted from Litvinov's inspiration. Turk Dig Politikasmda 50. Yil, p. 131. 5 PRO FO 1011/61, Loraine to Hoare, 25 November 1934; PRO FO 371/20868, E 1592/1592/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 1 March 1934; Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance, pp. 44-45. 2

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

67

have a means of rehabilitating the USSR's own prestige over them. 1 A Black Sea pact would clearly serve this purpose if only through the psychological effect which it would be bound to produce. Because of this nature of the Kremlin's policy, Turkish authorities made it clear that they would not participate in a mutual assistance pact but might agree to go as far as a pact of non-aggression and consultation. 2 As the USSR could not persuade Turkey to follow her line, the Soviet press began to make violent attacks, doubtless inspired by official circles. Aras was singled out, on the grounds that he was responsible for carrying out the policy which meant that Turkey and the USSR were gradually drifting apart. The Soviet Government also blamed Karakhan, Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, for weakening Turkey's intimacy with the USSR. Therefore he was recalled in May 1937 and put in prison. This latest event enhanced the rift between the two countries, because Atatiirk had been on terms of personal friendship with Karakhan. 3 The USSR became extremely nervous about Turkey's fidelity to her Soviet connection because she had begun to be alarmed about German economic penetration of Turkey and any advice that might be given by the British to the Turkish authorities to take Italy and Germany into their confidence. At the same time, the Turkish government still could not envisage risking any kind of breach with the Soviets so that Aras visited Moscow in mid-July 1937 to re-establish good relations with the USSR. When Aras came back to Ankara he told Loraine that although the substance as well as the appearance of Turco-Soviet friendship had been genuinely reaffirmed an insidious rift had been left, since although the Soviet government had been trying to stretch the interpretation of Turkish obligations, Stalin had evinced no desire to receive Aras. 4 The Soviet government had not raised the issue by the spring of 1939.

Italian Accession to the Montreux

Convention

The continued disequilibrium in the Mediterranean caused by uncertainty over Italy's ultimate intentions led Britain to embark upon a policy of The Soviet press suggested that a group of smaller powers, including Bulgaria and Romania, should be formed in Central Europe under Soviet hegemony to act as a barrier against the aggressive designs of Italy and Germany. In this sense the proposed pact would greatly affect Soviet psychology on the ground that she would thus escape from fascist encirclement. PRO FO 371/20868, E 2242/1592/44, Chilston to Eden, no. 183, 24 April 1937. 2 PRO FO 371/20868, E 1592/1592/44, Loraine to Foreign Officc, 18 March 1937. 3 PRO FO 371/20860, E 2731/188/44, Letter from Loraine to Sir Lancelot Oliphant, 15 May 1937. 4 PRO FO 371/20861, E 4434/386/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 26 July 1937.

68

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

appeasement after the Montreux Convention in order to maintain the status quo in Mediterranean. One of the best ways to bring Italy into collaboration was to ensure her adherence to the new Convention, by which Italy might be kept in close co-operation with the League. Article 27 of the Montreux Convention was in fact left open to Italian adherence. In spite of the fact that the 'appeasement policy' eliminated many of the obstacles which militated against her adherence to the Convention, Italy's consistent policy of trading her acceptance of the Convention for a favourable diplomatic settlement of the Abyssinian affair was stubbornly maintained for a couplc of years. For instance, Italy's first objection was to the sanctions applied by the League against her because of the Abyssinian invasion; when the sanctions were lifted towards the end of the Montreux Conference, her tactic was to raise the question of full recognition of her Abyssinian conquest as the price of her adherence. From the beginning Turkey was in favour of giving support to a vigorous defence of Abyssinia through the League mechanism of collective security. Furthermore, she also took a firm stand herself against Italian policy of intimidating Abyssinia in early 1935.1 In this regard, Turkey established diplomatic relations with Abyssinia for the first time ever on 1 May 1935 following the Wal-Wal incident, and the newly appointed Turkish Chargé and Military Attaché arrived at Addis Abbas shortly after hostilities began. Aras took the view that Turkey would resent any threat to Abyssinian independence and the Turkish press became violently anti-Italian. 2 However, Italy was the crucial actor for any power which wanted to stabilise the situation in the Mediterranean. To try to persuade Italy not to support Germany, who ever since its conclusion had made every attempt to upset the Montreux settlement became the British objective. Indeed, the concession made to the previous hard line policy held by Britain affected positively the Turco-Italian relationship regarding the new Convention. The Anglo-Italian Gentleman's Agreement was signed in 19 January 1937, whereby both countries agreed to respect the status quo in the Mediterranean, whereupon Aras met Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, in Milan to discuss Italian accession to the Convention. While the agreement led to certain improvements in both Anglo-Italian and Turco-Italian relations, 3 the results were distinctly disappointing. For the rest of the year Abyssinian affairs remained the principal stumbling-block in the way of rapprochement. At their Milan conversation Ciano told Aras that Italy's adherence to the Montreux Convention, although agreed to in principle, might not be actually forthcoming until the Italian conquest of Abyssinia had been recognised by the 1 PRO FO 1011/279, Loraine audience with Atatiirk, 16 May 1936; FO 954/28, Tur/36/2/, Loraine Memorandum, 12 April 1936. 2 Milman, The Ill-Made Alliance, p. 47. 3 PRO FO 371/20860, E 686/188/44, G. Clerk (Paris) to Foreign Office, interview with Aras, 29 January 1937.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

69

League or at least by the Turkish government. 1 This was not all about Italian conditions but would facilitate matters. Then Ciano revealed a reservation on Italy's part that would be the final price for her adherence to the Convention: pending her return to full co-operation in the League she must make a reservation similar to the one made by Japan of retaining full liberty of interpretation as regards the functioning of mutual assistance pacts and assistance rendered by members of the League. However, Britain saw the Italian reservation as legally impossible while Italy was still technically a member of the League, though not the Japanese. Moreover, I t a l y ' s geographical position, which was very close to the Straits with air bases in the Dodecanese Islands, also gave no grounds for making the same reservation since the signatories would raise objections, particularly France and the USSR.2 Either the League or Turkey's failure to recognise Italy's Empire in Ethiopia sent Mussolini on a visit to Germany and caused the acceleration of the Rome-Berlin axis to come into operation. As the situation became alarming Britain grew more anxious to facilitate Italian accession to the Convention in order to detach Italy from Germany to some extent and provide for Italy's collaboration with the League. Great Britain withdrew her objection to the Italian reservation for the sake of peace. She then endeavoured to persuade Turkey to recognise the Italian Empire in Ethiopia. 3 To be able to overcome French opposition, the Foreign Office advised Italy to notify the French government to the effect that she could accede to the Convention under Article 27 without making any reservation, but would communicate only with the Turkish government in a separate note in which Turkey would make a proposal to Italy over the recognition of the Italian Empire. However, Italy notified the French government of its reservation. 4 As a result of Britishinspired decisions, adopted in the permanent Council of the Balkan Entente at

1 Ciano had made a fairly determined effort to bracket it with the de jure recognition of the Italian African Empire. However, he accepted Aras' definite statement that this could not be done and that the matter was one in which Turkey could not take isolated action. He pleaded nevertheless that Aras should make some statement or allow a Turkish newspaper to do so, to the effect that de facto recognition, afforded by the suppression of the Turkish Legation at Addis Ababa, was virtually equivalent to de jure recognition. Aras did not commit himself but promised to think it over. However, when Aras wanted to have the British view on it, he was told that suppression of the Turkish Legation was virtually equivalent to de facto recognition: but it was absurd to talk of de facto recognition being the virtual equivalent of de jure recognition. Aras replied to Britain that 'Italian adhesion would probably wait'. PRO FO 371/20859, E 933/141/44, Loraine to Eden 10 February 3 1937.

While the Japanese reservation in regard to the League was natural and inevitable having regard to their non-membership, considerable difficulty was felt at the time in accepting their reservation concerning Articlc 19 which was really the kernel of the Convention. However, it was felt possible to accept it, inasmuch as Japan was rather remote from the Straits and was unlikely to be involved in practice. PRO FO 371/20856, E 811/141/44, Minute by Baggallay 10 February 1937. 3 4

PRO FO 371/21934, E 1469/947/44, Foreign Office to Loraine, 25 March 1938. PRO FO 371/21934, E 1795/947/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 28 March 1938.

70

THE

TURKISH

STRAITS

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

its Ankara meeting, the respective governments considered the King of Italy to be accredited the Emperor of Ethiopia. 1 Then Italy adhered to the Convention, accompanied by the reservation determined by Italy's withdrawal from the League on 3 May 1938. However, this did not help Italian co-operation with the Western powers over the long term, since Italy reached a decision to ally herself with Germany during that period.

The German Objections to the Montreux

Convention

After the conclusion of the Montreux Convention, Germany claimed in her communication with the British Foreign Office that every aspect of it seemed to favour the regional pact which had been directed against Germany since Article 25 of the Convention had eased the operation of Franco-Soviet mutual pacts. Furthermore, the Turco-Soviet friendship agreement of 1925 made Turkey already a party to the Franco-Soviet pact which allowed the Soviet Black Sea fleet no longer to be confined to the Black Sea. According to this allegation, the German government also argued that as a consequence of the fortification of the Straits and of the close relations which existed between the Soviet Union and Turkey, the Soviet Union would be in a position to send her Black Sea fleet to other waters and leave the defence of her Black Sea coasts to Turkey, secure in the knowledge that the forces of the latter, supported by the fortifications in the Straits, would be able to defend those coasts as effectively as the Soviet fleet itself could do, while it prohibited Germany from sending its fleet into the Black Sea. The British Foreign Office believed that these German allegations were largely academic in character 2 and Germany might try to force a reconsideration of the Straits question and to secure German interests by means of a fresh treaty. No matter if German claims were true, it was obvious that the German strategic position had considerably deteriorated.

The meeting of the Balkan Entente took place in Ankara on 25-27 February 1938. The final communiqué stated that the question of Ethiopia had become non-existent for the Balkan Entente, since Yugoslavia had already accredited a Minister to Italy in a form involving recognition of the Italian Empire, while Rumania was about to do so. The Entente therefore recommended to its other two members, Greece and Turkey, that they follow the same course in the hope that such a step in international co-operation would eventually be followed by Italy's accession to the Montreux Convention. PRO FO 371/21934, E 1927/947/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, no. 95, 4 April 1938. See Monica Curtis, (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1938 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), Vol. 1, pp. 284-286. The British Government countered German claims to the effect that the Treaty of 1925 provided for Turkish neutrality in the event of a war in which the Soviet Union was engaged, but it was not a pact of mutual assistance, and (apart from cases covered by article 25 of the Montreux Convention) it was only a pact of mutual assistance to which she was a party that conferred upon Turkey the right to afford passage to a belligerent under Article 19 (2) of the Convention. Turkey could not, therefore, allow the Soviet fleet to pass through the Straits either on the strength of this treaty alone, or on the right of the Franco-Soviet Pact alone, or on the strength of the two combined. There was clearly, therefore, no provision in the Montreux Convention to justify the reference of the German Government to these instruments. PRO FO 371/20081, E 7916/26/44, Memorandum communicated to the Counsellor of the German Embassy by Sir Robert Craigie, 15 December 1936.

T H E M O N T R E U X CONVENTION AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

71

However, on the one hand, as Deluca observed, Germany was in a complex situation when she officially needed to respond to the new convention to the effect that as a revisionist state Germany must state her satisfaction at T u r k e y ' s success in e s c a p i n g f r o m the o b l i g a t i o n s of the L a u s a n n e Convention and regaining her right to remilitarize the Straits. On the other hand she must reveal her dissatisfaction with the new settlement, the effect of which was to disturb the balancc of power as regards naval forces and their freedom of movement in a manner detrimental to Germany and favourable to Soviet fleets. 1 Therefore the German Foreign Ministry sent an instruction to von Keller, German Ambassador to Ankara, to convey a message of German displeasure to the Turkish government in M a r c h 1937. Despite her full appreciation of Turkish remilitarization, it said, Germany could not accept the restriction of the movements of German ships by virtue of a treaty in which she had not participated. 2 It was almost an identical reservation to that of Japan and Italy to the effect that such agreement could not in any way change the situation of keeping Germany, as a non-member of the League of Nations, no less as regards the Covenant of the League than in respect of Treaties of mutual assistance concluded with reference to the Covenant. The German Government must reserve to themselves complete liberty of decision in so far as the League Covenant and the treaties mentioned in Articles 19 and 25 of the Convention signed at Montreux. 3 Britain approached the German reservation very critically and took the view that Germany had no claim to participate in the Montreux Convention. The Straits Convention of Lausanne of 1923 was in fact concluded without Germany and her claim to a prescriptive right consequently lost its validity, especially as Germany did not at the time of Lausanne invoke the right which she now claimed to be associated in any such agreement. 4 The Turkish government, particularly Atatiirk, was bitterly

1 Anthony R. Deluca, Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: the Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936 (New York: East European Monographs, 1981) p. 132. 2 Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter DGFP), Series D., Vol. V, The Director of the Political Department to Keller, 16 July 1937, no. 535. 3 PRO FO 371/21934, E 948/947/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 17 February 1938. 4 In any case Germany forfeited accession to the Lausanne Convention under Article 19, which made provision for the subsequent accession of non-signatory powers, and the fact that no signatory power was known to have used every possible endeavour to induce Germany to accede does not affect the argument. Had Germany acceded, she would have obtained the rights of a signatory, and the Convention could not have subsequently been modified without her consent. PRO FO 371/20859, E 1021/141/44, Sir Lancelot Oliphant to Loraine, 10 March 1937. As a matter of practical politics, a Straits Conference, attended by representatives of every state in the world, would have been a hideous prospect, and it was felt to be essential that the number of the participating powers should be kept to the lowest possible level, particularly as the conference was summoned as a matter of urgency to legalise the Turkish desire to remilitarize the Straits. It would have been wise to invite Germany to Montreux, but the divergence between the German and the Soviet points of view would have been so great as to be irreconcilable, arid that would have meant that there would have been no Convention, which as everyone recognised at the time, would have been disastrous. PRO FO 371/21934, E 948/947/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 17 February 1938.

72

THE

TURKISH

STRAITS

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

incensed at this German démarche. 1 Then Turkey took a firm stand against German efforts, saying that if the German reservation was maintained, Turkey would make a counter reservation disengaging herself from any obligations to apply the benefits of the Montreux Convention to German shipping. The Turkish reply to the German note further pointed out that Turkey had proposed this revision with the sole aim of acquiring a position where she could better serve the cause of order and security.2 Although Turkey had taken a firm stand against the German reservation, Aras instructed the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin to develop good channels of communication with the German Foreign Ministry to avoid envenoming the situation and to leave the door open for Germany to retract her reservation. However, if Germany remained obdurate, Aras stated, she would exclude herself from possibilities of collaboration with Turkey. Turkish efforts to minimise the German reservation seemed to work for the time being, as Germany's attitude towards the Convention became much milder, to the extent that, in Aras' words, 'their tone became almost pleading'. 3 Meanwhile, Germany and Italy began to develop a sense of common cause regarding adherence to the Montreux Convention. According to a memorandum by Baron Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, of 4 May of 1937 on his talk with Ciano, he had told the latter that Germany would recognise the Montreux Convention in a bilateral agreement with Turkey after the termination of the London Naval conversations; eventually the two Foreign Ministers agreed that Germany and Italy would consult each other prior to any definite recognition of the Montreux Convention. 4 After the conclusion of the London Naval Conversations, Keller, German Ambassador to Ankara, reopened negotiations with the Turkish government in August 1937 as his government instructed on their note regarding the Montreux Convention. Aras assured Germany that the application of the Convention regarding relations with Germany would be treated as the equal to the other signatories, but for a bilateral agreement it was Loraine interpreted Turkish resentment towards Germany thus: that 'the very ally, out of loyalty to whom they had lost their sovereignty over the Straits, very nearly lost all their European territory, and did lose most of their Empire, should now create difficulties for Turkey when by her own efforts and by entirely legal methods, she had retrieved this important part of her position. A word of friendly congratulation from their former German ally would have been appropriate and welcome, instead of which Turkey received a formal protest, which disagreeably reminded her, moreover, of undisguised incitements addressed to her own as regards the Straits'. PRO FO 371/20859/44, Loraine to Eden, 21 February, 1937. 2 PRO FO 371/20859/ E 1198/141/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 24 February 1937. And also see, DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, no. 535, The Director of Political Department to Keller, 16 July 1937, footnote 7. 3 PRO FO 371/20859, E 1333/141/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 5 March 1937. 4 PRO FO 371/20859, E 1198/141/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 24 February 1937. And also see, DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, The Director of Political Department to Keller, 16 July 1937, no. 535.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

73

necessary for the other signatory powers to be consulted. Aras also did not exclude the possibility that if ever this eventuality or the necessity for a new convention were to materialise, Turkey could d e m a n d that Germany be included. Apart f r o m the adverse effects on German naval and commercial interests, her amour propre was also involved, with the memories still fresh of her post-war humiliation of not being treated as a Great Power. Germany gave enough time f o r her reservation by the Turkish government to be examined and for an exchange of views with the concerned powers, as Aras required, before the beginning of November. Since Turkey had still not broached the German proposal, Keller on one occasion recalled the matter to the Foreign Ministry; he was told that Turkey could not assent to the German proposal for such an exchange of notes which would only be possible after further detailed examination. The Turkish government was apparently trying to avoid giving a certain answer which would bind her irrevocably. 1 Turkish 'dilatory methods' showed that Turkey did not wish to commit herself to Germany at this point. Therefore Germany tried to make common cause with Italy since she was about to adhere to the convention. The Foreign Ministry emphasised particularly in regard to the U S S R that German-Italian interests in matters of naval policy concerning the Convention were entirely parallel, especially in terms of a more sweeping definition of the auxiliary vessels which would seriously restrict Soviet transport of war material into the Mediterranean. The German Foreign Ministry instructed their ambassador to Italy to intimate that they wished to use their influence with the Turkish government to bring about a simultaneous German-Turkish settlement on this question, according to the Neurath and Ciano agreement of M a y 1937. However, the German Naval High Command clarified this point when it was raised by the Italians, stating that changes in the Spanish Civil W a r situation had since made this whole question irrelevant; besides, it would not be in the German interest to raise the general problem of auxiliary vessels. Therefore the Foreign Office refrained from raising the previous question and left Italy free to adhere to the Convention. 2 However, the German government continued to insist upon obtaining a guarantee f r o m Turkey as rumours increased of a Turco-Soviet mutual assistance pact that in the event of any conflict in which Germany was involved she should remain neutral and the Straits would be closed to all Western fleets. Menemencioglu declined this suggestion in July 1938 during his visit to Berlin, alleging that Turkey could not sign any treaty on the Straits with a third party without the prior agreement of the signatories of the Convention. However, at the same time Germany succeeded to the extent of obtaining confidential verbal assurances that Turkey would not enter into a treaty of mutual assistance which would oblige her to allow the passage of warships to assist a victim of aggression. 3

1 DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, Keller to the Foreign Ministry, Vol. V, No. 540, 23 February 1938, pp. 716-717. 2 DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, The German Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy, no.548, 29 April 1938, p. 721 3 DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, Memorandum by Ribbentrop, No. 548, 7 July 1938, p. 730.

74

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Negotiations between Turkey and Germany continued to drag on with Turkey's persisting in delaying tactics since she was reluctant to make any political commitment to Germany who wanted to adhere to the Convention, while Turkey, contrariwise, did not. 1

On the Eve of War Since the new Straits settlement had strengthened Turkey's authority regarding the passage of warships, the European Great Powers calculated that they could bring about their wish of having Turkey on the same side, as the prospect of war began to cross the European continent. Turkey, like the rest of the world, was seriously disturbed by the distribution of the balance of power in central and south-eastern Europe. Indeed, the British policy of appeasement and conciliation regarding German actions in Central Europe failed to prevent Germany from extending its political and economic domination in southeastern Europe. 2 Besides, Britain and France were losing prestige and political influence in the East European countries. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 and subsequent threat to Poland and Romania, Britain, having abandoned her policy of conciliation with the fascist states, was faced with the necessity of strengthening her political and strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. 3 Therefore, Britain thought that the best answer to German expansionism was to create a fourpower group of France, Britain, Poland and Romania, which would be extended to Turkey and Greece with Moscow's consent. 4 Britain could realise Turkey as a potential ally when the Chamberlain administration understood that the appeasement of Italy was impossible. Indeed, when the situation was starting to deteriorate with the German occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Italian invasion of Albania, Turkey was also forced to look for an immediate Although Freihcrr Wciszaker agreed to the suggestion by Menemencioglu during his visit to Berlin in January 1939 to conclude an agreement on credit of RM150 million recently granted by Germany, that the Turkish government regarded the German government as having the same rights and obligations with regard to the Straits as those enjoyed by the parties of the Montreux Convention, he later refused it. PRO FO 371/23291, E 353/138/44, Sir Ogilvie-Forbes to Foreign Office, 11 January 1939. When he returned to Ankara, Menemencioglu told Loraine that no formula safeguarding principles defended by the Turkish government was acceptable to the German government. PRO FO 371/23291, E1092/138/44, Loraine to Foreign Office, 11 February 1939. 2 Maurice Baumont, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 244. 3 Indeed, with the premiership of Neville Chamberlain on 28 May 1937, Britain had vigorously pursued the policy of appeasement in which the Prime Minister's Mediterranean policy clashed with Eden's. The latter did not accept Chamberlain's contention that the appeasement of Italy and an alliance with Turkey were incompatible, which led to his resignation on 20 February 1938. This reflected a battle of wills between the pragmatic Prime Minister and the idealistic Foreign Secretary. See Pratt, East of Malta, pp. 176-77; Larry William Fuchser, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement (New York: Norton and Company, 1982). 4 See Frank Marzari, 'Western Rivalry in Turkey', 1939-1, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, no.l, 1971, pp. 63-79.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

75

alliance against the Axis block. Turkey would be threatened both through the Mediterranean and on the Balkan side. Therefore, she needed to establish an alliance with both the USSR and France and Britain since, just as Turkey could not withstand Italian aggression without Britain's help, so she could not resist any German aggression without Soviet collaboration. 1 In his negotiations with Halifax, Aras 2 on 30 March, suggested a treaty of nonaggression pact including Romania, Poland, the USSR and Turkey and sought British backing. Regarding the Mediterranean, Aras preferred to extend the Anglo-Italian agreement with the participation of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Thus a strong Mediterranean and South eastern bloc against Germany would be created. 3 Meanwhile in addition to her bilateral declaration with France guaranteeing the security of Poland on 31 March 1939, the Italian invasion of Albania on 8 April led Britain and France to extend guarantees to Greece and Romania on 12 April 1939. These guarantees needed to be reinforced by either the USSR or Turkey or both in order to shape a firm peace front. In fact, Turkey gained even greater importance after Munich, in that with the Little Entente of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania under the patronage of France destroyed, any Balkan collective action now rested with the Balkan Entente of which Turkey was a key member. 4 Thus, they would lead eventually to the establishment of a link between Britain, France, the USSR and the Balkan Entente, with Turkey as the linchpin. Indeed, after the AngloFrench guarantee to Romania, it became of paramount importance for British diplomacy to secure not only her strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean but also the implementation of the guarantee given to Romania. For instance, if Turkey became a part of a mutual assistance pact with Britain and France regarding assistance to Romania and Poland, or if these two powers guaranteed Turkey's belligerency on their side, they would be in a position to send warships through the Straits. 5 However, this initiative came to nothing because of mutual distrust between London and Moscow, and the Soviet apprehension of Romania, Poland and Turkey.

1 ATASE, Ikinci Diinya Harbi Kolleksiyonu, Kutu no. 6, Fevzi Qakmak'in Ingiliz Askeri Heyeti ile Görü§mesi, 24 June 1939. 2 Aras was appointed Turkish Ambassador to London after Inonii replaced Atatürk as President. 3 Viscount Halifax to Hughe Rnatehball-Hugesscn, British Ambassador to Ankara, 31 March 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), series III, Vol. IV, No. 590. 4 Marilynn Giroux Hitchens, Prelude to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp.23, 87-88. 5 PRO FO 371/23190/88/65, Foreign Office minute, 6 March 1939; Hugessen to Halifax, 19 March 1939, DBFP, series III, Vol. IV, Nos. 423-24; Lynn H. Curtright, 'Great Britain, the Balkans, and Turkey in the Autumn of 1939', The International History Review, Vol. 10, no. 3, 1988, pp. 434-35.

76

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

On 28 April when Britain wanted Turkey to join her guarantee of Poland and Romania, Potemkin, Deputy Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, suddenly came to Ankara for an exchange of views about the latest events in Europe. On the Soviet side, evidence of good intentions regarding the Anglo-Turkish negotiations was to be found in the fact that before Potemkin had left for Turkey he stated that the Soviet government applauded the Anglo-Turkish understanding as regards the Mediterranean and also supported the collective security arrangement with London, Paris and Ankara. 1 As long as the USSR remained on the side of the Western democracies, Turkey, in spite of her inability to take a firm stance against Germany, determined to stay within the Western bloc as the Turkish cabinet resolved in April 1939. An alliance with Britain and the USSR was regarded as in Turkish interests since Britain had become convinced that the Straits must remain in Turkish hands. It was feared that Germany would not leave the Straits in the event of her victory as her ultimate intention was to hold hegemony in the Middle East. 2 Indeed after German aggression began in Central Europe, Turkey's apprehension about an Italian threat became a secondary anxiety. Turkey believed that Moscow's decision would be a decisive factor for the fate of peace. And she was also convinced that the negotiations for an alliance between London-Paris and Moscow would produce a fruitful result, due to the fact that the USSR had recently been seeking a mutual assistance pact and alliance with her in view of a possible aggression in the Black Sea region. However, when, in return for guaranteeing Turkey, Britain asked her to guarantee Romania, Turkey refrained from any such commitment; instead she made an interim agreement with Britain on 12 May to co-operate in the Mediterranean area, and went so far as to say that it was also necessary to ensure the establishment of stability in the Balkans. 3 Then Britain and Turkey started negotiations for a treaty, with the French becoming involved on 23 June 1939. However, these had still not been concluded when war broke out. Simultaneously, Refik Saydam, the Turkish Prime Minister, felt compelled to explain the reason for his government's abandonment of neutrality for the reason that to remain neutral would jeopardise Turkey's security since the 1 PRO FO 372/25013, R 7196/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 13 July 1940. See also Turk Dig Politikasinda 50. Yd, p. 218. 2 Ibid. pp. 196-197; ATASE, tkinci Diinya Harbi Kolleksiyonu, Kutu no. 6, Genel Kurmay Ba§kanligi, Sayj no: 15871, 27 June 1939. 3 This announcement was made in a bilateral form by Chamberlain in the House of Commons and by Saydam, in the Turkish National Assembly, on 12 May 1939. The most important parts were as follows: Article 2: It is agreed that the two countries conclude a definite long-term agreement of a reciprocal character in the interests of their national security. Article 3: Pending the completion of the definite agreement, the British and Turkish governments declare that in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, they would be prepared to co-operate effectively and lend each other all aid and assistance in their power. Article 6: The governments also recognise that it is also necessary to ensure the establishment of security in the Balkans and they are consulting together with the object of achieving this purpose as speedily as possible. Turk Dig Politikasinda 50. Yd, pp. 201-202.

T H E M O N T R E U X C O N V E N T I O N A N D THE G R E A T P O W E R S

77

emergency had extended to the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Despite Turkey's desperate search for an alliance against aggression, she was reluctant to make any commitment which was directed against the power of the Axis because in the event of war the Turkish Straits would be an Axis priority. This is why she did not enter into any further commitment in her Balkan Entente regarding the Balkans area for fear of German aggression, confirmed by the fact that simultaneously the German government put pressure on Turkey not to do so. Franz Von Papen, the new German Ambassador to Ankara, tried to prevent further Turkish moves towards the Western alliance and reverted to the question of Turkish neutrality. If she did not remain neutral, he threatened that Germany would stop all supplies to Turkey and would put an end to all economic and cultural co-operation. Von Papen made further attempts to keep Turkey in a neutral position which included trying to persuade Italy to return the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey. 1 The policy adopted by Turkey and her participation in the political encirclement of Germany was of fundamental importance to German policy. The Germans believed from past experience that the British Empire could not be defeated unless its main arteries could be cut. Unless Turkey was on a their side there was infinitely less possibility of Germany carrying out such an operation since without Turkey they would not be in a position to use the Straits, which was the only point for escaping encirclement in the Mediterranean by Western powers. 2 Germany's step in escaping from Western encirclcment did not remain limited to detaching Turkey from a possible Western alliance. Germany had begun her quest for a pact with the USSR in the spring of 1939, in order to prevent an Anglo-Soviet and French alliance and Soviet intervention in the event of a Polish-German war. It was, indeed, not so difficult to estrange the USSR from the Western powers, for the Anglo-French attitude towards German expansionism in Europe disturbed Stalin. After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, the absence of the USSR was seen as a weak point in the Western collective security system. The West in fact was in no position to aid Poland, but the Poles refused to allow Soviet forces onto their territory. On the other hand, the Germans were happy to make substantial territorial concessions to secure Soviet support where the West was not. What had London to offer but war, while Berlin promised neutrality and territory. Besides, there was a clash of interest between Britain and the Soviet Union regarding the Balkans since both regarded the region as their sphere of influence. In this regard, Berlin might be the best option for the Kremlin authorities to secure Russia's historical ambitions on her southern flank, a consideration which helped to bring the Nazi and Soviet governments into 1 PRO FO 1011/199, Hugessen to Loraine, 27 May 1939. Also see Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), pp. 35-36. 2 Franz Von Papen, Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1952), p. 443.

78

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

co-operation, notwithstanding their ideological divide, leading to a pact of convenience. 1 Indeed, German-Soviet negotiations went on behind closed doors until they announced the conclusion of a non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939. A secret protocol envisaged a new partition of Poland with the rivers Narew, Vistula and San as the approximate boundaries between the Soviet and German spheres. 2 The political situation was radically changed after this pact became public. Turkey was in a dilemma since she could no longer be both pro-Allies and pro-Soviet. Nor could she take sides without grave risks. It created the strong possibility that Turkey might be tempted to renege on the agreements of 12 May and 23 June and refrain from concluding treaties with Britain and France since Turkey had signed the agreement on the assumption that the plan of encirclement of Germany would lead to active participation by the USSR and would thus prevent a conflict. Therefore, in the following days considerable pressure was brought to bear on Turkey by Germany in order to detach Turkey from Western allegiance. At the same time, Moscow was encouraged to bring pressure on Turkey. As von Schulenburg, German Ambassador to Moscow, suggested to Molotov, it was in the interests of the Soviet government to prevail upon Turkey to close the Straits completely as Britain and France were preparing to despatch an expeditionary force to assist Romania through the Straits. 3 Schulenburg reported to his Foreign Ministry that Molotov had told him that 'they were prepared for the permanent neutrality of Turkey as desired by us. Our conception of the position of Turkey in the present conflict was shared by the Soviet government'. 4 Just before the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Molotov invited §iikru Sara£oglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, to Moscow to revive the negotiations for a mutual assistance pact on the basis of Potemkin's deal of

For the origins of the Nazi-Soviet pact see Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the road to war, 1933-1941 (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 62-92; Hitchens, Germany, Russia, and the Balkans, p. 2. 2 DGFP, Series D, Vol. VII, No. 229; Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany', Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1992, p. 70. The Second World War began on 1 September 1939 with a German attack on Poland. In fact, within a week of their invasion of Poland the Germans occupied the industrial areas of Silesia, and were approaching Warsaw. The USSR invaded eastern Poland on 17 September in accordance with the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. On 5 October Polish organised resistance was at an end. According to the terms of a secret protocol attached to the Anglo-Polish Treaty of alliance the British guarantee of assistance to Poland applied only in the case of aggression by Germany. Britain never expected to save Polish independence in the initial phase of the war. She could only hope to restore it after the allies had defeated Germany. However, when Germany invaded eastern Poland Britain did not declare war against the USSR in order not to provoke a more close German-Soviet alliance. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1970), pp. 10-13; David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-1942 (New Haven: Yale University, 1944). 3 Schulenburg to the German Foreign Office, No. 266, 5 September 1939, in Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 85. A Ibid. Schulenburg to Foreign Office, no. 254, 2 September 1939, p. 86.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

79

April 1939. In this regard, Terentiev, the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, communicated to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on 6 September that although the situation had changed, the two governments could find a common language. Terentiev pointed out that the Soviet Government would be ready to co-operate with Turkey if Turkey were prepared to resist aggression in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Straits. 1 At about the same time the Turkish government communicated to the Soviet government the first outline of its proposal for an agreement. These provided for: 1 - Co-operation and all assistance in the case of aggression by a European power in the Black Sea including the Straits, or in the Balkan area. 2 - A restrictive clause whereby Turkey in rendering aid to the USSR would be obligated only to such actions as were not directed against England and France. 2 The Soviet initiative for a pact with Turkey on the one hand, and their Nazi connection on the other, worried the Turkish government so that it instructed Haydar Aktay, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, to find out what were Soviet intentions. Although the latter reported to Ankara that the USSR did not seem to be willing to sign an agreement on Turkish terms, Molotov's invitation was discussed at a Turkish Cabinet meeting which concluded that Turkey might become a diplomatic bridge between the USSR and the Allies and re-establish relationships between the two sides, as Britain had suggested. At least it was a chance to find out what the Soviet plan was. 3 However, Sara§oglu postponed his departure to Moscow so that an agreement for a tripartite negotiation could be reached on the political side of the treaty, which under protocol II specifically exempted the Turks from taking any action, which might result in a war with the USSR, a point on which Turkey had been very insistent. The conclusion of a tripartite pact might have strengthened Turkey in discussions with Moscow, but since there was not much time to work out Soviet intentions, the Turkish delegate left for Moscow on 22 September. Sara§oglu met Molotov in Moscow on 26 September. During the first meeting, as Sara90glu reported to Ankara, Molotov seemed too eager to know more about the Tripartite Treaty which he wanted to influence in every sentence. In the middle of the conversation Molotov told Saracoglu, as if it 1

PRO FO 372/25013, R 7196/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 13 July 1940. Ibid. Also see Türk Di§ Politikasinda 50. Yil, p. 224. 3 Türk Dig Politikasinda 50. Yil, p. 226.

2

80

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

had been ordinary information, that von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, had also arrived in Moscow. The Turkish delegate hardly believed that it was coincidence; rather, the Soviet government wanted to improve their bargaining power against both countries. 1 After the end of the long negotiations, the Turkish nightmare came true. Molotov handed Saracoglu a memorandum and suggested that he took and study it. Saracoglu glanced at the memorandum and on seeing the word 'Straits' he was shocked and refused point blank. 2 During the next meeting Stalin dropped the Straits issue from the agenda as a gesture to gain Turkey's confidence but raised the question of Turkish neutrality should he declare war against the Western powers. The Turkish delegates divined at once the Soviet policy, to bring Turkey into harmony under the Nazi-Soviet pact. Indeed, behind the scenes, the Germans were putting heavy pressure on Stalin and Molotov to use the bait of a Turkish-Soviet pact to detach Turkey from the Western allies and if possible to stop Turkey signing an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty. If this happened, Turkey would close the Straits and Western supplies of war material to Romania would be prevented. 3 Since there was no prospect of reaching an agreement with the USSR, Saracoglu requested Ankara to give him leave to return home. However, inonii wanted him to stay as long as possible in order, at least, to identify the Soviet intention. 4 Simultaneously, Moscow also was anxious to avoid a break with Turkey, but for a different purpose. When Molotov requested a renewal of negotiations, the Turkish delegation postponed their departure. The Soviet offer to renew negotiations created a hopeful atmosphere in London and Ankara. However, during the meeting of 3 October, Molotov and Stalin pressed very strongly the question of Turkey's obligations under the Tripartite Treaty. The protocol offered by Turkey exempting her from hostilities with the USSR should, they said, be widened to provide that, in the event of the USSR being engaged in war with Britain and France, the entire treaty should be suspended for the duration of the war. 5 The British Government, and particularly Chamberlain, thought that some concessions should be made in favour of Soviet demands, a gesture designed to secure not only the signatures for an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty but also for a Turkish1

Feridun Cemal Erkin, Tiirk-Sovyet Ili^kUeri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Ba§nur matbaasi, 1968), p. 155. It is worth noting that Erkin was one of the Turkish delegates during the Moscow conversation. And also see, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Steinhardt (American Ambassador to Ankara) to the Secretary of State, memorandum on Saragoglu's account on background of Turco-Soviet relations during recent years, 11 June 1941. 1942, vol. IV, p. 819. 2 Ibid. p. 140. 3 Schulenburg to the Foreign Office, no. 266, 5 September 1936. Also see PRO FO 371/23871, R 362/7705/44, Hugessen (Ankara) to Foreign Office, no. 550, 3 October 1939. 4 Türk Di§ Politikasinda 50. Yil, p. 230. 5 PRO FO 371/23871, R 8362/7705/44, Hugessen (Ankara) to Foreign Office, no. 550, 3 October 1939.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

81

Soviet pact. 1 However, Britain's hope was in vain, as the USSR did not show any sign of compromise. It is clear from German documents that Germany put too much pressure on Stalin and Stalin in return put too much pressure on Turkish delegates. In fact, Ribbentrop sent an instruction to Schulenburg to inform Molotov at once that, according to reports, the Turkish government would hesitate to conclude an assistance pact with Britain and France if the USSR emphatically opposed it. Ribbentrop also instructed him to tell Molotov that, on account of the question of the Straits, he must forestall a tie-up of Turkey with the Allies. The best policy would be to dissuade Turkey from finally concluding any assistance pacts with the Western Powers and to return Turkey to a policy of absolute neutrality. 2 In Schulenburg's communication with Molotov, the latter stated that they also aimed to induce Turkey to adopt full neutrality and to close the Straits. 3 After this Molotov, in constant consultation with Germany, exacted two more conditions to the effect that the USSR should be exempted from hostilities with Germany similar to those of protocol 2 of the prospective Tripartite Treaty. Then he inserted some clauses defining more precisely the Turkish control of the Straits with Soviet co-operation, which was nothing more or less than a request for the revision of the Montreux Convention. Molotov first endeavoured to persuade Sara§oglu to agree to some modification of the manner in which Turkey would execute her obligations under the Convention insofar as the USSR was concerned. He subsequently tried to secure Saracoglu's agreement to some undertaking either written or verbal, to the Soviet advantage. The main Soviet demands for the Montreux Convention were the following: 1-

2-

34-

In time of war and peace, regardless, Turkey being belligerent or not, the Turkish and Soviet Governments should decide together regarding the passage of non-Black Sea powers. The passage of vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea belligerent powers as a result of the League of Nations' decision should not be permitted without Soviet approval. Turkey would not permit the passage of vessels of non-Black Sea powers through the Black Sea for humanitarian purposes. From now on Turkey would promise not to allow more than one fifth of the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons, which was stated in the article of the Montreux Convention.

1 Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London: Macmillan Press, 1976), pp. 20-21. 2 Nazi-Soviet Relations, Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, October 1939, No. 475, p. 110. Also see Hitchens, Germany, Russia, and the Balkans, pp. 237-41. 3 Ibid. Schulenburg to German Foreign Office, no. 493, p. 120.

82

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS

5-

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Unless they reached an agreement Turkey and the USSR would not attend any negotiation for the alteration of the Straits regime. 1

This meant obviously a major modification to those articles of the Convention regarding the passage of warships, namely Articles, 19, 20, 21, 25 on which agreement had been reached after a long controversy. Therefore, Saragoglu refused to make a single move in this matter without first consulting the signatories of the Convention. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of the Montreux Conference it could easily be gathered that the USSR would never be satisfied until she at least had some kind of military base in the Straits area to let her feel secure against any attack coming from the Mediterranean and to become more actively involved in Mediterranean affairs. Although the Soviet demand on the modification was hardly possible to implement without the physical presence of the Soviets in the Straits, different interpretations could be made, since neither British archival material nor German official sources, contrary to Deluca's account, give any accurate evidence as to whether the Soviet government had demanded a military base in the Straits area from the Turkish government during the Moscow negotiations. 2 However, Turkish sources throw clearer light on the issue that such demands had indeed been made by Stalin on one occasion. 3 Since every attempt which was made to minimise the extent of the disagreement was blocked, the Turkish delegate decided to return home on 17 October. However, both sides were anxious to avoid creating the impression of a break and wanted to leave a door open for future negotiations with a different purpose. Both sides expressed their hope of resuming negotiations. However, it seemed hardly likely unless Moscow abandoned her demands over the Convention since the exact definition of the real situation appeared in the Turkish Prime Minister's speech at the Party's Meeting on 17 October which was published by Agence Anatolie, the official Turkish press agency, to the effect that the Soviet proposals had not been regarded as compatible with Turkish policy in the Straits. Furthermore, they were also

1

PRO FO 371/23871, R 8928/7705/44, Sir S. Cripps (Moscow) to Foreign Office, 17 October 1939 and PRO FO 371/23871, R 8960/7705/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 17 October 1939, and PRO FO 371/23866, R 9659/7373/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 622, 25 October 1939. And also see, TiirkDig Politikasinda 50. Yd, pp. 234-235. Erkin, Turk-Sovyet ili§kileri, p. 142. 2 While Deluca stated that such a demand had been made by the USSR, Zhivkov stated that there was no trace for that. 3 Hilmi Uran, one of the Turkish Cabinet members, quoted in his memories from his conversation with Sarafoglu that the latter told him that the USSR demanded a military base in the Straits through Marshal Vorosilof to whom Sarajoglu had paid a friendly visit in Moscow. Then Stalin made the same demand with reference Sara§oglu's talk with the Soviet Marshal. When the Turkish Foreign Minister accurately refused to discuss it the matter had been dropped by Stalin. Hilmi Uran, Hatiralarim (Ankara: Tan Basimevi, 1959), pp. 352-53. Also see, Turk Dis Politikasinda 50. Yil, pp. 234-35-36; George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972) pp. 37-41.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE GREAT POWERS

83

not in accordance with the principles of the Franco-British-Turkish understanding agreed upon previously with the knowledge of the USSR. 1 Turkey considered it essential not to subscribe to stipulations other than those resulting from her general international engagements. At the end of October, Sara§oglu informed Terentiev that Turkey would scrupulously carry out the provisions of the Montreux Convention. 2 Sevostyanov criticised Turkey's attitude at the Moscow meeting saying that Turkey's rulers had raised an insuperable obstacle to the signing of the bilateral treaty on mutual assistance offered by Soviet representatives whose wish was to have real guarantees that the Straits would not be used by aggressive powers. 3 However, the Turkish government gave a spoken guarantee to the Soviet government on many occasions that it would not let any aggressor power's fleet go through the Straits when this question was raised soon after the Montreux Convention was signed. Besides, Soviet demands were not as innocent as they claimed. Rather they were looking for a substantial modification of the Montreux Convention, which would serve a Soviet-German understanding against Britain and her allies. This was incompatible with Turkey's national interests since both Germany and the USSR had an identical aim on the Straits in terms of putting an end to the British E m p i r e ' s life-line of communication which meant T u r k e y ' s commitment to sharing, if nothing more, her sovereignty over the Straits. Furthermore it was impossible to make any modification in multinational agreements without the consent of the other contracting parties. Strictly speaking, Turkey could not add anything to the Convention without the agreement of the other signatories. After the failure of the Moscow negotiations, a tripartite pact was signed on October 19, 1939 between France, Britain and Turkey. 4 The saving clause in Protocol II, exempting Turkey from involving herself in hostilities with the USSR and the Turkish assertion of continued Turco-Soviet friendship, did not seem to have offset the Soviet disappointment over her 1

PRO FO 371/23871, R 9352/7705/44, Hugcsscn to Foreign Office, No. 610(54/715/39). PRO FO 372/25013, R 7196/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 13 July 1940. Also see Turk Dig Politikasinda 50. Yd, p. 246. 3 Pavel Sevostyanov, Before the Nazi Invasion: Soviet Diplomacy in September 1939-June 1941 (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1984), pp. 198-199. Article 3 of the pact reads as follows: 'So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Romania by their respective Declaration of 13 April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will co-operate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees'. Protocol II reads 'the obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union'. ATASE, Ikinci Diinya Harbi Kolleksiyonu, Bajvekälet Dairesi Müdürliigii, Kutu no. 6, Kararname no: 2/12191, 18 October 1939; also see PRO WO 201/1049. 2

84

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

failure to bring Turkey into line with the 'reincarnated imperial ambitions' of the Soviet government. Initial sweet words promising to reserve a future negotiation turned to Soviet angry accusations that Turkey had not chosen the Soviet side. Indeed, in the course of conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, Hugessen's remark on the Tripartite Pact of 19 October to the effect that the pact absolved Turkey f r o m hostilities with the USSR was countered by Trentiev who said that if his government saw that they were going to have difficulties with Britain and that war was imminent they would immediately seize the Straits whether Turkey were neutral or not. 1 It seemed that the situation was regressing into the atmosphere of the nineteenth century in a manner that was more like the old Russo-Turkish rivalry for power over the Straits. It was true that the Soviet proposals put forward to Turkey in the Moscow negotiations would affect Turkey's wartime foreign policy; this implication will be addressed in the next chapter.

1

PRO FO/23871, R 9828/7705/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no 119, 6 November 1939.

3 THE TURKISH STRAITS AND GREAT POWER POLICIES DURING THE EARLY PART OF WORLD WAR II FROM OCTOBER 1939 TO JUNE 1941

Turkey's wartime foreign policy was, to a large extent, shaped by the feverish attempt of the Soviets to secure a military base in the Straits between September 1939 and June 1941. As the documents suggest, the Soviet government, following the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, hoped to come to an agreement with Germany over the Straits on the basis of sharing a sphere of influence. When Moscow realised, towards June 1940, that its objectives were out of tune with Hitler's, the Soviets adopted a 'dual policy': while the door was left open to British efforts to improve TurcoSoviet relations, with Britain hoping to lead a united front in the Balkans against Axis expansion, at the same time they tended to maintain their ties with Germany. Through its negotiations with both blocs, Moscow used a military base in the Straits as a bargaining counter as the price of her collaboration. This Soviet policy was described by Turkish foreign policymakers as the 'maverick-Machiavellian' stance of Moscow. Fortunately for the Turks, neither Hitler nor Britain was willing to pay this price, as it was not compatible with their interests. For instance, while the USSR demanded the Straits as a gateway to the Mediterranean, Germany coveted them as a bridgehead to Asia and the Middle East. As for Britain, she needed them to be able to forestall such intentions, as their potential fate put her imperial existence at stake. In this respect, only the British interest was to be in tune with Turkey's, but Britain's initial weak position and desire to obtain Soviet co-operation made Turkey suspicious, as a result of vigorous German propaganda, that Britain might sell her to Moscow. As a result of Soviet policy through the first two years of World War II, Turkish foreign policy-makers believed that if Turkey entered the war on the Allied side the Soviets would respond by occupying the Straits either as a member of the Axis or as a liberator. Even after being attacked by Germany, the Soviet denunciation of her claim on the Straits was seen rather as providing a breathing space until the German attack was parried. Moreover, Turkey realised that her biggest problem after the war would be the prospect of facing all alone a more powerful USSR.

86

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

This chaptcr will assess the Soviet factor in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy during the early period of the war up to the USSR's entry into the conflict. First, it will evaluate the Allies' attempt to secure a passage through the Straits in order to implement their guarantee to Romania and to stop Axis shipping in the Black Sea. Then it will evaluate British diplomatic efforts to improve the Turco-Soviet relationship, and Soviet use of the Straits as a bargaining counter for their co-operation either with Britain or Germany. This is important for the purpose of the argument addressed throughout the book in the sense of contributing to the extent to which Turkey's wartime and early Cold War policy affected the policy adopted by the USSR regarding the Straits during the early part of the war. It is also important in order to shed light on Cold War policy regarding the Straits. The Effect of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Naval Forces into the Black Sea

Treaty on the Allies' Right to Send

Saraijoglu's Moscow visit, to a great extent, can be seen as a watershed in Turco-Soviet relations. Although Turkey knew that the Soviet Government was not satisfied with the Montreux settlement, Ankara had been hoping to reach a kind of understanding until the Moscow negotiations of October 1939. From then on, the Turkish government believed that the Soviet government was determined to obtain Russia's age-old ambitions over the Straits by one means or another. Hence, Turkey built up a policy towards the USSR of not entering into any commitment which would endanger her position vis-a-vis the USSR, as appeared from the Tripartite Pact, signed on 19 October 1939, in which protocol II exempted Turkey from action involving her in hostilities with the USSR. Therefore, Turkey determined to stay out of the war and to invoke Article 19 of the Montreux Convention. Turkey's conviction about Soviet intentions made her commitment to Britain difficult. As a consequence of the Soviet-German pact of 1939, one distinct possibility was a German-Soviet combined attack on the Balkans. From a military standpoint, in order to cut sea communication by enemies coming from the Black Sea and also to both prevent any further German advance through south-eastern Europe and the implementation of material assistance to Romania, the First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, proposed a British naval presence in the Black Sea or in the Straits zone. 1 However, it would depend on how Turkey was going to operate the Montreux Convention. In other words, the question was how Turkey's obligations under the Tripartite Treaty would be compatible with her obligations under the Montreux Convention. Or, unless she could gain Soviet friendship, to what extent the government of Turkey would collaborate with the Western powers in order to facilitate the passage of the Allies through the Straits so that Britain could maintain her prestige in the Balkans. 1

Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell Ltd., 1983), p. 666.

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

87

Accordingly, after the Tripartite Treaty had been signed, a number of discussions were held among British policy-makers as to whether the treaty provided some way to eliminate the obstacles to the Allies' naval operations in the Black Sea which had been set out in the M o n t r e u x Convention. According to Article 3, on the assumption that the U S S R remained neutral, if Britain or France were called on to implement their guarantee as a result of an attack on Romania or Grccce by Germany, Turkey was bound to lend her allies 'all aid and assistance', including opening the Straits to Allied warships. However, the obligations incurred as a result of this treaty were indeed limited. A s a matter of fact, the new treaty did not greatly facilitate the operation of the Montreux Convention in favour of the passage of Allied warships through the Straits, because the guarantee given to Romania was a unilateral one and not a pact of mutual assistance. N o r was Turkey a party to it. 1 T h e r e f o r e , the stipulations of Article 25 of the Montreux Convention could not apply in this case. It was apparent that whatever happened nothing could compel T u r k e y ' s assistance in terms of the M o n t r e u x Convention unless she b e c a m e a belligerent. The only way in which the British fleet could be invited into the Straits zone would be when Turkey felt herself threatened with imminent danger of war, as cited under Article 21 of the Montreux Convention; or had actually declared war, as cited under Article 20. Since T u r k e y ' s position was that of a neutral and she was anxious to retain that neutrality as long as she remained free from attack, she could not invite the British fleet into the Straits zone according to Article 19 of the Montreux Convention. However, the British Admiralty saw it as necessary to obtain certain promises f r o m the Turkish government to hold a position of advantage in terms of distance in the event of Soviet or German expansion towards the Balkans through Romania. T o be able to obtain such facilities f r o m the Turkish government, Churchill suggested that British Mediterranean naval strength might be used as a 'bargaining counter' in the sense that in the event of Turkey's being mcnaccd by the U S S R or Germany, in return for Turkey's allowing naval and military bases both in Izmir and the Gulf of izmit on the mouth of the Bosphorus, the British Government would be disposed to come to the aid of Turkey with naval forces superior to those of the U S S R in the Black Sea. However, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, opposed Churchill's idea on the grounds that this would instead alienate Turkey since she was very cautious about Soviet opposition. 2 A t the same time, since the Allies' policy was to await an enemy initiative in the Balkans in early 1940, the Admiralty thought that the time factor had b c c o m e ' d o u b l y important'. This time it changed its argument to 1 2

PRO FO 371/23866, R 9633/7373/44, Halifax to Churchill, 25 October 1940. PRO FO 371/23868, R 9124/7378/44, Cabinet conclusion, no. 54(39), 20 October 1939.

88

THE

TURKISH

STRAITS

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

one which seemed more acceptable. The Admiralty, as a result of the assessment of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, 1 insisted that the Foreign Office should press the Turkish government to obtain, at least, a definite statement that Turkey would automatically — to prevent delay — permit Allied warships to proceed through the Dardanelles to give material assistance to Romania if German forces crossed the Romanian or possibly the Hungarian frontier. However, Turkey was reluctant to agree to any proposition involving a breach of the Montreux Convention, or to commit herself in advance to any action which was not already part of her obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. To overcome Turkish resistance, the Admiralty once more suggested to the Foreign Office that it should exploit Turkish apprehension of the USSR to the effect that giving a guarantee of Allied passage in advance would be in their own interests as much as in those of the British government if at any time Turkey needed British naval assistance in the event of a Soviet attack on the Straits. 2 Therefore, on the lines suggested by the Admiralty, the Foreign Office instructed Hugessen, on 10 February 1940, to approach the Turkish authorities to give an assurance in advance that they would be bound under the Treaty to come to the assistance of Britain and France, and would accordingly be justified under the Montreux Convention in opening the Straits either as a belligerent or under the threat of imminent danger of war if those contingencies occurred.3 Turkey promised to take all neccssary steps to avoid 'prejudicial delays' to provide passage for an Allied fleet through the Straits in all the circumstances in which Articles 20 and 21 of the Montreux Convention became applicable. However, the question when Turkey would operate the Convention remained in suspense since Sara§oglu further declared that 'a German attack on Romania could not necessarily bring the treaty into play, as Turkey would have to judge the nature of such an attack in relations to protocol 2'. The Foreign Office was worried about Turkey's reservations towards the USSR as justifying her deciding to wait indefinitely before determining whether Article 3 of the Treaty should take effect. 4 Further communications of Hugessen with the Turkish Foreign Ministry showed that the concept was all to do with the Turkish Government's legal considerations and designed to safeguard them against any accusation, particularly from the 1 PRO FO 371/25014, R1777/242/44, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty, no. 2159/21, 21 January 1940. 2 The Admiralty's worry was that the naval bases of Sebastopol were only some 300 miles from the Bosporus, whereas British ships, which might be called upon to resist a Soviet attack, might be as much as 850 miles away from the Straits. Inevitably, there would be some interval after the moment at which Turkey regarded herself as threatened before orders could be transmitted to the appropriate with of the Mediterranean Fleet, some of which might not in any case be immediately available or ready to sail at once. PRO FO 371/25014, R1777/242/44, Admiralty to the Under Secretary of State, no. M.02778/40, 7 February 1940. 3 PRO FO 371/25014, R1777/242/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 109, 10 February 1940. 4 PRO FO 371/25014, R 2781/242/44, Hugessen to Halifax, no. 172, 29 February 1940.

THE

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

W A R

II

89

Soviet quarter, of going beyond and against any danger of being drawn beyond the letter of the Treaty. During the interview, Saracoglu explained the Turkish view, regarding the possibility of German attack on Romania, that protocol 3 would come into effect only in the case of Soviet connivance. Both the British and French Ambassadors came to the conclusion that the Turkish government fully realised the essential importance of rapid action in the circumstanccs in question and that it would give the longest possible warning and notice with regard to the passage through the Straits by French and British warships. 1 Since the Allies were in no position to send warships into the Black Sea in accordance with either the Tripartite Treaty or the Montreux Convention, the British Foreign Office sought to exploit a loophole by which military assistance would be provided to Romania without infringing the conditions of its engagement under the Convention. Bowker, f r o m the Southern Department, suggested that the provisions of the Treaty did not strictly apply to vessels of less than 100 tons. He developed this idea out of Annex II of the Montreux Convention 2 , which gave definitions for various types of war vessel. The smallest mentioned were light surface craft, small warships and auxiliary vessels, in each case displacing more than 100 tons. In this rcspcct, Bowker pointed out that 'we could accordingly move armed launches through the Dardanelles to Romania without any infringement of the Convention'. 3 However, if one looks through the terms of the London Treaty it can be seen that the position is somewhat different from the Montreux Convention. There were the same six categories as set out in Annex 2 of the Montreux Convention, but there was a seventh category in the London Naval Treaty running as follows: 'small craft were naval surface vessels, the standard displacement of which did not exceed 100 tons'. This Treaty, therefore, unlike the Montreux Convention, covered vessels of under 100 tons, and it was therefore possible to argue that for certain purposes such vessels fell under the provisions of the Treaty. Taking into consideration the London Naval Treaty, Patrick Dean, a Foreign Office official, came to the conclusion that the Montreux Convention was quite separate from all the other naval treaties and different considerations applied. Therefore, the Foreign Office agreed that there was nothing in Annex 2 of the Montreux Convention which covered vessels of war which were under 100 tons in displacement, or indeed any other vessels except submarines. Although there was no obstacle to sending Motor Torpedo

1

PRO FO 371/ 25014, R 3126/242/44, Hugessen to Halifax, no. 155, 11 March 1940. The section of the Montreux Convention dealing with definitions of vessels of war is Article 8. This Article expressly says that for the purposes of the present Convention, 'the definitions of vessel of war and their specification' is to be taken to be that set out in Annex 2 of the Convention. Annex 2 of the Convention under paragraph (8) lays down six different categories, four of whici are 'vessels of war' of various sizes. Submarines occupy a separate category, and category no 6 includes 'auxiliary vessels' which are 'naval surface vessels' exceeding a displacement of 100 tons. 3 PRO FO 371/25014/ R 1602/242/44, Bowker minute, 31 January 1940. 2

90

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Boats of 100 tons or less through the Straits under the Montreux Convention, from the political standpoint its concern was to avoid establishing a precedent for sending such vessels through the Straits. 1 Even assuming that Turkish concurrence was forthcoming on this issue, the Foreign Office concluded that such an action would provide only an admirable excuse for the Germans to send their own vessels down the Danube. Therefore, the matter was not followed up. 2 However, Germany was the country which benefited from such a loophole in the war (see Chapter 4). When Soviet oil began to be transferred from Odessa, Baku and other ports in the Black Sea to supply the German war effort, Reynaud, the French Foreign Minister, formally proposed that the Allies should send warships into the Black Sea to stop the passage of Soviet oil and other supplies to Germany. Indeed, between January 1940 and June 1941 the Soviets delivered sixteen million barrels of oil to Germany. 3 An appeal from the French was sounded by Churchill who introduced it into a war cabinet meeting on 27 March 1940 saying 'two or three submarines would not only interrupt the Russian oil traffic in that sea, but would have a terrifying moral effect on the USSR'. 4 He suggested that Halifax should secure Turkish co-operation. 5 Halifax knew that this was hopeless; as Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State, had minuted: 'in the matter of the Straits we are not free agents. It is 1

PRO FO 371/25014/ R 1602/242/44, Dean minute, 14 February 1940. Ibid. Foreign Office minute, 14 February 1940. 3 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: 'Active' Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 93. 4 Admiral Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, also believed that the effective way to strike at Germany was through the Black Sea. He believed that, if Britain had unrestricted access, she would be in a position to implement her guarantee to Romania if Germany attacked; to control the Black Sea and thus the entry of supplies to Germany via Danube or Bulgaria; be in a position to act against Romanian oil supplies to Germany. Michael Simpson (ed.), The Cunningham Paper, Vol. I; The Mediterranean Fleet, 1939-1942 (Hants: Ashgate, 1999), p. 39, entry no. 17, 27 March 1940. 5 There was disagreement between London and Paris over the allied war strategy. At the end of November 1939 the Soviet government, exploiting the acquiescence in territorial expansion given by Germany in the Nazi-Soviet agreement, attacked Finland. The French were eager to support Finnish resistance. But London did not want to risk war with the USSR. The only agreed question was to cut off German supplies of Swedish iron-ore. After Finland surrendered, on 12 March 1940, the British government agreed to lay mines in Norwegian territorial waters to block the ice-free route used by iron-ore carriers going to Germany. It was hoped that the Germans would retaliate by invading the Scandinavian countries, then an allied expedition could at once seize the northern territories, with the iron-ore fields. In the end, Hitler acted first with his own preventive invasion. In consequence, the Allies were faced with the need to dislodge German forces who had had time to establish themselves in Denmark and Norway and who using warships as troops transport, had arrived as far north as the iron-ore port of Narvik. British troops landed in central Norway and were turned out again. Further north, Anglo-French forces recaptured Narvik, with much difficulty, and then left after the German attack on France. The resulting German seizure of Norway safeguarded iron-ore supplies and helped naval war against Britain. Simultaneously the Germans attacked Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg on 10 May 1940. R. A. C. Parker, Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 21-28. Also see Thomas MunchPetersen, The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain, Sweden and the Iron Ore Question 1939-40 (Stockholm: Militárhistoriska Forlaget, 1981); J. R. M. Butler (ed.), Grand Strategy: History of the Second World War, September 1939-June 1941,Yol. II London HMSO, 1957), pp 139-46. 2

T H E

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

W A R

II

91

most unlikely that Turkey, if non-belligerent, will tear up the Montreux C o n v e n t i o n ' . 1 This was a hard fact which Churchill, then and later, found difficult to accept. The Turkish Government remained quite determined not to get involved in any anti-Soviet activity. No matter how reluctant Turkey was to agree to it, sending Allied warships through the Black Sea was ruled out of the question by the Axis' achievements from May 1940. Besides, Britain now feared that Turkey might want naval assistance against a Soviet assault. In the early part of the war, the efforts of Great Britain and France to formulate a 'neutral Balkan bloc', in order to prevent the Axis advance through the Mediterranean and Middle East, failed not only because of failing Italian acquiescence but also of the states of south-eastern Europe's apprehension of Axis attack if they entered into a commitment to the Allies. 2 At about the time of the Italian declaration of war, suggestions were made by Britain that it might be worthwhile to try to persuade Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as Turkey, to come into the war while there was still some chance of holding the Axis powers and thus to save themselves from probable attack later on. However, the Italian entry into the war on 11 June and the collapse of France, with their fleet, made this proposal impracticable. 3 At the entry of Italy into the war Hugessen was instructed to enquire whether the Turkish Government was ready to take action to give the Allies all possible aid, as Article 1 of the Tripartite treaty suggested. 4 Turkey replied on 13 June that she could not fulfil her engagement without grave risk of war with the USSR. Therefore, she had invoked protocol II of the treaty. Indeed, the Soviet threat was not illusory for when the Turkish Ambassador had informed Molotov on 4 June that if Italy came into the war Turkey would mobilise, Molotov's reaction was unfavourable and even menacing. 5 The Italian entry into the war and Molotov's threat to Turkey not to become involved in the war on one hand and the Allies' military weakness after the collapse of France on the other created alarm among the Turkish ruling elite. 1

PRO FO 371/24887, Cadogan minute, 26 March 1940. Romania was equally nervous of U S S R and Yugoslavia and Greece were nervous of Italy. Furthermore, Hungary and Bulgaria had territorial claims against their neighbours and might think it worth while to join or even to initiate an attack against them. Romania and Greece had British guarantees and Turkey might be expected to assist in the defence of Romania against an attack likely to be the prelude to a German advance against the Straits. However, she was also very nervous of the USSR. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I, p. 23. 2

Particularly the fall of France put British homeland into a vulnerable position which exposed it to German seaborne and air attack. Indeed soon after France accepted the terms of Germany, the Luftwaffe started their raids and the Battle of Britain had begun. The prospect of invasion was to dominate until October 1940. See Sheila Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 61-87; Basil Collier, The Battle of Britain (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1962). 4 P R O F O 3 7 ] / 2 5 0 1 6 , R 6538/316/44. Cabinet conclusions 161(40) 8, U June 1940. 5 PRO FO 371/ 25016, R 6574/316/44. Hugessen to Foreign Office, No. 5 5 9 14 June 1940. Also see Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turk-Sovyet Ilijkileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Ba§nur matbaasi, 1968), p. 162.

92

THE

TURKISH

STRAITS

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

Turkey refused the Allies' demand to break off diplomatic relations with Italy and the Turkish Prime Minister, Refik Saydam, declared in the National Assembly on 26 June that Turkey would maintain her non-belligerence policy despite Italy's entry into the war. 1 This was because Turkey believed that if Turkey entered into the war in the absence of significant military supplies by the Allies it would only facilitate a German invasion of Turkey and Soviet seizure of the Straits.2 The Turkish Prime Minister's declaration seemed to be consistent with his country's obligations under protocol 2 of the tripartite treaty because of Molotov's statement. However, in the case of Soviet or Italian attack on Turkey, Britain had an obligation to come to Turkey's assistance. 3 For the sake of Turkey's confidence, Hugessen suggested that some assurance should be given to Turkey: that Britain would send a naval force through the Straits in the event of a threat from the Soviets or a combined threat from the USSR and Italy not because of the treaty but in order not to throw Turkey into the Axis sphere of influence. It was also necessary because it was evident from various indications that the Germans had made vigorous efforts to detach Turkey from Britain.4 According to Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, it would not be difficult for Germany since Turkey's longstanding foreign policy was governed by that of Russia, the hereditary enemy, whose age-old ambition was to wrest the Straits from Turkey. If they succeeded, Sargent warned, 'we must face the fact that it may not mean that Turkey will just relapse into a benevolent sort of neutrality; it may mean a complete volte-face whereby Turkey will enter into just as close relations with Germany as she entered into with us last autumn'. 5 Indeed, when Sargent minuted his anxiety about Soviet intentions Molotov was complaining to Rosso, the Italian Ambassador to Moscow, on 26 June about Turkey's tendency to dictate her own terms to the USSR about the Black Sea, claiming that she was the sole owner of the Straits. The Italian entry into the war in fact created an opportunity for Moscow to create a bloc against German 1

PRO FO 371/ 25016, R 6538/316/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 535, 27 June 1940. Erkin, Turk-Sovyet tlijkileri, p. 162. The Turkish military authorities believed that in the war the Straits would hold position in the strategy of the Axis powers. ATASE, Ikinci Diinya Harbi Kolleksiyonu, Kutu no: 6, dosya no: 6 Asim Gundiiz to Fevzi Qakmak, sayi: 15871, 16 June 1939. 3 The Treaty signed on 19 October 1939 between France, Great Britain and Turkey suggested that in the event of Turkey being engaged in hostilities with a European power, as the result of an aggression against Turkey committed by this power, France and Great Britain would cooperate effectively with Turkey and would give her every aid and assistance in their power. PRO WO 201/1049. 4 PRO FO 371/25016R 6574/316/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 572,17 June 1940. 5 PRO FO 371/25016, R 6641/316/44, Sargent minute, 27 June 1940. Halifax called the attention of Hugessen to the seriousness of a possible volte-face on the part of Turkey and added 'we should leave nothing undone to hold Turkey where she is, such as in the position of a benevolent non-belligerent; and this not merely on account of her importance as a military and strategic factor in the Near East, but because her example is bound to react on Egypt, Iraq and Iran'. PRO FO 371/25016, R 6703/316/44, Halifax to Hugessen, no 127, 29 June 1940. 2

THE EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

93

penetration into the Balkans as well as to eliminate any British threat in the Black Sea. Italy and the USSR set out to define their respective sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Black Sea. Finally Molotov recognised the primary role of the Italians in the Mediterranean in return for Italy's acknowledgement of Soviet interests in the Black Sea. 1 This association clearly served as leverage against the German penetration in Central Europe, and undoubtedly gave an advantage to the Soviets in the occupation of Bessarabia. Hitler did not hesitate to warn Mussolini about putting an end to his collaboration with Moscow since 'it might encourage the Balkan countries to pit one great power against another'. Thus the RomeMoscow understanding was brought to an end. Instead of a strong state presence, such as that of the USSR, the Germans opted for the time being for Turkey to hold the Straits in order to prevent any violent opposition to Germany's seizing the Straits when the time came. While such play had been made of the British sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, Sargent concluded his minute by saying that if Turkey felt with British impotence in the Mediterranean that 'the USSR was going to make a real effort to seize the Straits, it is quite probable that she would turn to Germany to defend her against such an attack'. 2 This would give Germany an opportunity to establish herself in the Straits as a friend. However, the Admiralty expressed its view that the loss of the French fleet and Italy's entry into the war made it impossible to undertake any commitments to send naval assistance to Turkey. It suggested that the best policy would be to prevent any friction between Turkey and the USSR. 3 Indeed, there were some indications that the Soviet government were rattled by the German victory over the Balkans. 4

British Efforts to Bring an Improvement of Turco-Soviet

Relations

The spectacular German victories in the West to some extent changed the attitude of both Britain and the USSR towards Southeast Europe, and to each other. Exploiting Hitler's involvement in the war against the West, the Soviets had exceeded the provisions of their 1939 non-aggression pact with Germany and swallowed, in addition to the Baltic States and parts of Finland, the northern parts of Romania. In the summer of 1940 the two partners were engaged in a race to incorporate the whole of Eastern Europe in their respective spheres of influence. Indeed, f r o m about June 1940 to June 1941, German-Soviet relationships proceeded on several different levels: the idea of 1 Jane Degras (ed.), Documents from the Archive of the German Foreign Office: Nazi Soviet Relations, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Voi. III, p. 458. 2 PRO FO 371/25016, R 6641/316/44, Sargent minute, 27 June 1940. 3 PRO FO 371/25016, R 6763/316/44, Admiralty to Foreign Office, no. M.012372/40, 10 July 1940. 4 PRO FO 371/24844, N 5808/30/38, Cripps to Foreign Office, 14 June 1940.

94

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

constructing an 'anti-British continental bloc' by Germany on the one hand; the German-Soviet struggle for influence in Eastern Europe, which stretched across the continent f r o m Finland in the north to Turkey in the South on the other. 1 A s a matter of fact, Hitler had already decided to attack the USSR, but the question was whether it would coincide with an attack on England. For Moscow, in spite of anxiety f r o m that quarter, Stalin was still hoping to reach some understanding with the German government. 2 W h i l e the conflict of interests between G e r m a n y and the U S S R regarding Romania increased Soviet suspicion of G e r m a n y ' s aim in the Balkans, it might create an opportunity of rapprochement between the USSR and Britain. 3 Great Britain also sought a way to cause a split between Italy, the USSR and Germany. It was believed that the ambitions of these countries over the Balkans, including Turkey, might cancel each other out. Being u n a w a r e of the recent Italian-Soviet understanding, Cripps suggested to Molotov on 14 June 1940 to find a way to bring the Balkan countries together against German and Italian aggression. In the view of the British Foreign Office, this might be a great opportunity, in the absence of British assistance against Soviet attack on the Straits, not only to remove the T u r k i s h apprehension of the USSR leading ideally to being a united front which could be created against German and Italian aggression in the Balkans, but also to prevent the possibility of Turkish co-operation with Germany. Indeed, Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to Moscow, reported that 'the desirability of adopting a policy of co-operation with Britain is clearly greater than e v e r ' . 4 It was the impression which Cripps had gathered f r o m Moscow. Moscow was equally fearful of German domination as well as that of the British in the Balkans and the Black Sea. A s the Germans advanced into R o m a n i a , the Soviet authorities might have thought that they could obtain B r i t a i n ' s agreement on a Soviet foothold in the Straits. Therefore they did not mind

1 Martin L. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy: The Balkan Clue, 1940-1941 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 70. 2 Lev Bezymensky, and Segrei Gorlov, 'On the Eve: V.M. Molotov's Discussion in Berlin, November 1940', International Affairs (Moscow), July 1991, p. 109. 3 At the end of June when the Soviet demands on Romania for the cession of Bessarabia were conceded and Romania repudiated the British guarantee, Stalin's first thought was to acquire compensation in the east for Germany's enormous gains in Western Europe, and to use the fall of France as the moment to take over the Baltic States and, soon after, to annex Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from the Romanians. This last move did not please the Germans: in August 1939 Ribbentrop had virtually promised Molotov a free hand over Bessarabia but Bukovina had not been part of the bargain, and in 1940 the Germans did not want any disturbance in Romania which would damage its economic contribution to the German war effort. The USSR had to limit her immediate claim to northern Bukovina, instead of the whole territory, before the Germans would 'advise' the Romanians to yield peacefully. Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 2; Jonathan Haslam, 'Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-41: Isolation and Expansion', Soviet Union, Vol. 18, Nos. 1-3, 1991, p. 117. 4 PRO FO 371/24844, N 5863/30/38, Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 355, 17 June 1940.

THE

E A R L Y

PART

OF

W O R L D

WAR

II

95

giving the impression that they would be ready for such a kind of approach from London. 1 Given these considerations Hugessen was instructed to work out the Turkish government's idea of approaching Moscow to improve relations. Sara50glu agreed that Turkey had common interests with the U S S R as well as with Britain in keeping Germany and Italy out of the Balkans. Although he had no intention of approaching the U S S R , since the nature of their relations with Germany was unknown, he was ready to consider an approach from the U S S R . 2 As both sides seemed to be willing to see relations improved, London did not hesitate to take action to proceed with further diplomatic efforts between the two capitals. Under instructions, Cripps delivered a message from Churchill to Stalin when he presented his credential letters on 1 June 1940. 3 Stalin replied that the Soviet government would have no objection to the British government's attempt to improve Turco-Soviet relations. After saying that the U S S R had not intended to attack Turkey, or join a coalition against her, Stalin spelled out his conditions: 'it was wrong', Stalin continued, 'that the Straits should be under the exclusive control of a single power which might abuse its position. The question of control of the Straits was one that should be dealt with and all Black Sea powers should have a say in it'. Cripps replied that Britain might be able to assist by encouraging the Turks to reach some agreement in this matter. There was no reason for Stalin to refuse this. 4 It was quite clear from Cripps' conversation that Stalin still wanted to share some form of physical control, such as a naval base, over the Straits. However, the Foreign Office was quite aware of the fact that it was an almost impossible matter upon which to reach agreement with Turkey. On the contrary, Cripps was ready to push Turkey to compromise on it; London had some reasons for suspecting the sincerity of Stalin's suggestion that the British government should help the Soviet government to bring about an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations with special reference to the question of the Straits. It seemed that Stalin had the intention of taking advantage of the difficult situation in which the Allies and Turkey found themselves. Perhaps the U S S R saw a good chance for achieving her historic aim by peaceful means. There was also, on the part of Britain, some suspicion that the arrangement which Stalin probably had in mind regarding the Straits was one which would exclude Britain entirely from the Straits while leaving the U S S R free to use them in all circumstances. 5

1 2 3 4 5

Ibid. PRO FO 371/25016, R 6670/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 629, 24 June 1940. PRO FO 371/24844, N 5863/30/38, Foreign Office to Cripps, no. 166, 25 June 1940. PRO FO 371/24844, N 5937/30/38, Cripps to Halifax, no. 4 0 1 , 2 July 1940. PRO FO 371/25016, N 5969/G, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 585, 11 July 1940.

96

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Although developing contacts with the West had, by June 1940, become one of the main preoccupations of the USSR, Stalin continued to keep in touch with the Axis powers. Stalin aimed, with this 'dual policy', to consolidate his country's objectives with Germany, but if he did not succeed, to draw closer to Britain. Indeed, just before the French surrender, the Soviet government was very receptive to the idea of some closer collaboration with the Allies. When Molotov received the French Ambassador and Cripps, upon his arrival in Moscow on 12 June 1940, he urged the necessity for rapid action in the matter of a trade agreement with Britain and indicated that there would be an early opportunity to continue the political discussions. However, Cripps reported that although Moscow was still anxious to remain on friendly terms with Britain as an insurance against future possibilities after the collapse of France, the Soviet attitude underwent a substantial change. Instead of proceeding to a rapid rapprochement, Cripps complained that he had not been able to see Molotov for a considerable time. 1 It is interesting to note here that when Britain approached Moscow with the objective of improving Soviet relations with Turkey, Molotov simultaneously informed Germany that the British had declared themselves ready to recognise the Balkans as a Soviet sphere of interest and had acknowledged Soviet aspirations in the Dardanelles. 2 Hitler had a different course in mind, namely to drive a wedge between London and Moscow through the publication of the documents of the Supreme Allied Council, seized by the Germans which exposed the Allied Plan to bomb Batum and Baku. This would inevitably lead a confrontation with Ankara. 3 For Britain there was no time left to wait for the next Soviet action since the German government had been trying to embroil Turkey with the USSR. It was important, in Britain's eyes, to make an attempt to start discussions with Turkey to co-operate against German penetration in the Balkans and the Black Sea. In any case, Halifax hoped that such discussions, at least, would provide the advantage of giving a 'breathing space' during which 1

PRO FO 371/24845, N 6243/30/38, Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 117(93/14/40/), 2 August 1940. ^ Franz Von Papen, Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch), p. 463. Also see, Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet Relation, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), Schulenburg (German Ambassador to Moscow) to German Foreign Office, 14 July 1940, p. 167. The German Government published a white book on 3 July 1940, with captured French documents on the Allied plan of air attacks on the Baku oil field with Turkish co-operation in order to stop German oil supply. The document was based on Massigli's telegram to his Foreign Office stating that there might be a possibility of Turkish co-operation. It soon became clear that, although there might be a possibility of Turkish willingness to attack the Baku oil field, the Germans had incorrectly translated certain passages from the documents not only to incite the Soviets to sever relations, but also to get Sara^oglu replaced, as he was accused of being anti-German. PRO FO 371/25012, R 6670/203/44, Hugesscn to Foreign Office, no. 761, 11 July 1940. Also see PRO FO 371/25012, R 6670/203/44, Hugessen to Halifax, no. 747, 9 July 1940. Statement on the German falsification of captured French documents. PRO FO 371/25012, R 6776/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 766, 12 July 1940. On 1 August Papen told Hitler that the situation between the USSR and Turkey should be kept fluid so that Turkey could not become the connecting link between London and Moscow. DGFP, Series D, Vol. X, Papen to Weizsäcker, no. 272, p. 393.

THE

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

W A R

II

97

the position in the Mediterranean might improve, and Stalin's sincerity might be assessed. Therefore, he instructed Cripps to inform Stalin that 'they were naturally anxious to do all they could to see a progressive improvement in the relations of the USSR and Turkey and would be quite ready to place their services at the disposal of the Soviet government with this object in view'. At the same time, Halifax instructed Hugessen to inform the Turkish government of Stalin's remarks in this connection to Cripps and enquire as to whether they would agree to the British Government as a mediator. Halifax made it quite plain that in proposing this, his government had no intention whatsoever of suggesting that Turkey should renounce any of her rights under the Montrcux Convention, nor that any special rights should be given to the USSR. 1 At this point there was a different approach from Cripps and from the Foreign Office. 2 Indeed, Cripps was so anxious about improving AngloSoviet relations that he wanted to reach an agreement at all costs with Moscow on the Straits issue. Despite his unpopularity in Moscow, 'the appointment of Cripps was seen by a desolate government in London as a lastditch attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany after the devastating collapse of France'. 3 There is little doubt that the Straits question was one of the main factors for an understanding with Moscow. Probably under this feeling Cripps raised the objection to the Foreign Office approach that unless Britain was prepared to sponsor some modification of the Montreux Convention, raising the question of the Straits would cause only a deadlock which would give a favourable opportunity to Germany. 4 Cripps thought that the Soviet démarche regarding the Straits was a part of a 'Soviet defensive measure' against Germany as they were manoeuvring towards the same position on all fronts. A more 'platonic reaffirmation' of traditional Soviet-Turkish friendship was not enough for them in face of rapid German expansion, for they knew that against Germany Turkey could not hold the Straits single-handed and the USSR was also doubtful of British ability to afford adequate help in the present circumstances. As the only chance for bringing about a Turco-Soviet rapprochement, Cripps insisted on British 1

PRO FO 371/25016, N 5969/G, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 585, 11 July 1940. Cripps had been expelled in January 1939 from the British Labour Party for extreme 'leftism'. Contrary to the anti-Soviet policy of Chamberlain, who regarded the Soviets with deep hostility and suspicion, Cripps believed in the importance of not alienating the USSR and also was convinced that he would be able lo persuade the Soviet leaders to endorse Anglo-Soviet rapprochement. Therefore, when Churchill, who also was in favour of rapprochement with the USSR, under changed circumstances became Prime Minister in early May 1940, he decided to appoint Cripps as Moscow Ambassador since Cripps personally believed that the Turco-Soviet rapprochement would lead, at the same time, to an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement. This might have been because he wanted Turkey to make some concession regarding the Straits issue in order to carry out his mission. See Gabriel Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940-42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 10-11. 3 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 21 4 PRO FO 371/25012, R 6776/203/44, Cripps to Halifax, no. 460,13 July 1940. 2

98

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

acceptance of some modification of the Convention in favour of the USSR, namely 'a modest share in control by friendly negotiations and co-operation with Turkey against an eventual German attack'. Other approaches, Cripps believed, would cause Turkey to turn her face towards Germany to protect herself either against German attack itself or a Soviet threat or both. 1 Indeed, Cripps was so impressed with the danger of the Soviet attack on Turkey that he wished Turkey to adopt a policy of 'appeasement' to the extent of Turkey making concessions as regards the Straits, which would affect her vital interests. Moreover, such concessions would provide an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations which would lead to Anglo-Soviet rapprochement. However, the Foreign Office believed that Turkey would not be willing to make an attempt to buy off the USSR. Nor it was compatible with British interests. 2 Hugessen partly shared Cripps' idea that there seemed no possibility of obtaining any results without opening up the Straits question. Besides, he thought that the Turks would never accept anything contrary to the Montreux Convention since it represented their 'Magna Carta'. Furthermore, it would not be practicable to modify such a multilateral convention in time of war. However, it could be said that machinery for such modification was provided under Article 29, which stated that any of the contracting parties could initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions five years from the date of the entry into force of the Convention. However, the best method, Hugessen suggested, would be achieving some ad hoc understanding, separate from the thorny question of modifying the Montreux Convention, between Turkey and the USSR and which would be confined to covering possible emergencies arising out of the war. 3 Such an arrangement would be more in the nature of an interpretation of Montreux than a modification of it. In the meantime, the Turkish government had no objection to Cripps' acting as a mediator as long as their full sovereignty and entire political independence were secured. At first, the Turkish Cabinet were unanimously opposed to pursuing the matter. However, Saracoglu prevailed upon his cabinet colleagues to accept the British offer. Sarafoglu agreed with Hugessen that, in the present uncertain situation, it would be almost impossible to reach more than an ad hoc agreement. Sara§oglu's solution was very simple: as long as Britain retained command of the Mediterranean it was not of vital importance whether the USSR had a share in controlling the Straits or even free passage through them. And if only mutual confidence could be established between the USSR and Turkey, a solution should not be difficult to find 1 2 3

PRO FO 371/25012, R 6776/2203/44, Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 480, 18 July 1940. PRO FO 371/24845, N 6243/30/38, Sargent minute, 22 August 1940. PRO FO 371/25012, R 6776/203/44, Hugessen to Halifax, no. 790,15 July 1940.

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

99

against the German menace. 1 By no means was he willing to compromise the role of the 'guardian of the Straits of Turkey' given by the Convention of 1936. But the Foreign Office did not expect to achieve any new settlement regarding the Straits, nor would it foster any settlement at the expense of Turkey. All it hoped was that by this means it would persuade the governments to co-operate against German penetration of the Black Sea. Therefore, as soon as the Foreign Office reached an agreement with Turkey, Cripps was instructed to inform Stalin that the British government was anxious to do her best to ensure progressive improvement in her relations with the USSR. However, because any modification of the Convention regarding the control of the Straits was a matter of great difficulty and complexity, it might be possible to reach some ad hoc agreement in protecting the Straits against the ever-present threat of German aggression. Although Halifax avoided making a definite suggestion as the basis of an ad hoc agreement between the two countries, he had an idea of what might be the best solution to overcome present difficulties. Turkey, under Article 21 of the Montreux Convention, had the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 when threatened with imminent danger of war. This right might provide a convenient point for an agreement between the two countries under which, during the present crisis, the Soviet government would lend her assistance in the actual defence of the Straits if requested to do so by Turkey. 2 However, Cripps raised an objection to acting as a mediator himself since he had ascertained from Stalin that the Soviet government were in principle willing to discuss the matter with the Turkish government. Therefore, he suggested that the next move must be made by the Turks themselves. As a matter of fact, his attitude mostly derived from the Turkish government's insistence on not giving any instructions to their Ambassador to Moscow in this matter. Cripps, on more than one occasion, asked the Foreign Office to approach Turkey to furnish their ambassador with full details on this subject. However, his appeal was not welcomed by the Foreign Office since the Turkish authorities were reluctant to approach Moscow until Stalin revealed his ideas more precisely. Therefore, the Foreign Office instructed Cripps once more to follow the matter up on the lines suggested, adding one more proposal to Stalin, that while the Montreux Convention must remain as the permanent basis, it would be open to the Soviet government to suggest a revision of it in November 1941.3

1 2 3

PRO FO 371/25012, R 6776/2203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 825, 20 July 1940. PRO FO 371/25012, R 6776/203/44, Halifax to Cripps, no. 318, 26 July 1940. PRO FO 371/25012, R 6830/203/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 693, 3 August 1940.

100

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

In British communications with the Turkish government about the proposal, Saracoglu thought that it left too many openings for the Soviet government, which would 'take advantage of whatever offers were implied on our side and refuse any advance on their own side'. He kept to the earlier policy of not expressing any opinions or making any suggestions until Stalin's views were known. 1 The Turkish reply to the British suggestion brought the matter back to where they had been at the beginning. Cripps was the one who was disappointed with the Turkish attitude. He did not see any reason to approach Stalin without Turkish co-operation. He pointed out that after six weeks to consider Stalin's earlier remark, it would merely be an irritant to go to him again without a single helpful or concrete response and 'with nothing but a request that he should hold forth afresh' on his own attitude towards Turkey. His concluding remark was that this 'would merely prejudice our relations with the USSR, as well as an increasing danger of a combined Soviet-German move to alter the status quo in the Straits'. He suggested that the time had come to make this position quite plain to the Turkish government and to intimate that failing a more helpful attitude on their part they would not propose to do anything further. 2 However, the Foreign Office opposed such action because it would be equivalent to exerting pressure on Turkey to make concessions and at the same time it would mean risking the danger which they wished to avoid of frightening Turkey to the extent of making her consider the possibilities of German protection against the USSR. 3 Therefore, it was left to Cripps' discretion either to approach Stalin as he had been instructed to or drop the proposed communication altogether. 4 Meanwhile, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow was summoned to Ankara for an exchange of views regarding Turco-Soviet relations in early August 1940. As the Ambassador would remain in Ankara for a while, Britain decided to await the outcome of consultations between the Ambassador and his government before considering this question further. 5 Despite the fact that there was a conflict of interests between Hitler and Stalin regarding spheres of influence, at the same time both of them saw the British Empire as the ultimate enemy. 6 In this regard, Britain was worried that unless a more decisive proposal were taken to convince the Soviets that they should co-operate over the Straits, the two countries might continue their collaboration in areas outside Europe. The Straits would pose a difficulty, but the Soviets and the Germans needed them for different purposes which would 1

PRO FO 371/25012, R 6830/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 954, 9 August 1940. PRO FO 371/25013, R 6987/203/44, Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 602, 11 August 1940. 3 PRO FO 371/25013, R 6987/203/44, Clutton and Bowker minute, 13 August 1940. 4 PRO FO 371/25012, R 6830/203/44, Halifax to Cripps, no. 381, 13 August 1940. 5 PRO FO 371/25013, R 7048/203/44, Hugessen to Halifax, no. 980, 14 August 1940. 6 David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 306. 2

THE EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

101

not necessarily be irreconcilable. 1 In consideration of Soviet reluctance to move to any solution which modified the basic principles of the Montreux Convention, the Foreign Office began to examine what possibilities existed of modifying the Convention in a sense which would at the same time be of value to the USSR and acceptable to Turkey and themselves. Therefore, the Foreign Office envisaged instead a compromise proposal to the USSR not only affecting Turkey's but also Britain's own rights that might lead to Soviet aid against German aggression. Britain's aim in this was to avoid giving the USSR the impression that she considered the Montreux Convention something immutable. The basis of any agreement between the USSR, Turkey and Britain about the Straits would apparently revolve round the modification or application of Articles 20 and 21 of the Convention. In this respect, the Foreign Office opened up some possibilities for discussion as follows: (a)

(b)

A limitation of Britain's rights to the possible despatch of naval forces to the Sea of Marmara with the use of bases in that area, and the grant of an explicit assurance to the USSR that this force would not pass through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea. A concession to the USSR of the unrestricted right to send naval forces from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and vice versa. 2

A further suggestion was made by Hugessen, deriving from an interview which he had with Fethi Okyar, a member of the Turkish cabinet and former Turkish Ambassador to London, whose opinion was that the USSR was ultimately seeking 'a permanent equal right' with Turkey to decide all questions of entry of the warships of other powers into the Black Sea. In the light of these views, Hugessen suggested that agreement might possibly be reached on the lines of: (a)

(b)

1

Soviet co-operation with Turkey in the control of the Bosphorus, thus ensuring that the USSR is in a position to exclude warships of other powers from the Black Sea if she wishes. The Dardanelles to remain entirely in Turkish hands, thus enabling Turkey to continue to enforce those parts of the Montreux Convention dealing with the passage of Black Sea forces to the Mediterranean, and giving her undivided responsibility for the safety of her own interests from attack from the Mediterranean. 3

Woodward, British Policy, p. 473. PRO FO 371/25012, R 6763/203/44, G. Philip Nichols to Colonel Hollis (Admiralty), 27 July 1940. 3 PRO FO 371/25012, R 6830/203/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 881, 30 July 1940. 2

102

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

The Joint Planning Committee first considered the matter and came to the conclusion that it could accept both the suggested modifications on condition that they should be open to revision at the end of the present war. Such a concession would be considered if it ensured Turco-Soviet rapprochement from which Britain should derive substantial and immediate b e n e f i t . 1 At the same time there was, of course, the danger that such a rapprochement might eventually have the effect of weakening Britain's association with Turkey. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, raised the objection that if any concession of the kind suggested were given to the USSR, they would probably be unwilling to give it up after the war. Therefore, any concession given now would be in the nature of a permanent concession. The Admiralty's preliminary view was that this proposal would not only leave the USSR greater freedom to attack British interests in the Middle East, but would also put an end to any possibility of ever stopping Soviet trade with Germany across the Black Sea. 2 In the COS's assessment of the Foreign Office's proposal on 29 August, they hardly believed that it would be practicable to withdraw these concessions at the end of the war. They were opposed in principle to any modification of the present restrictions imposed on the Soviets by the Montreux Convention and were not in favour of any limitation of the British right to the possible despatch of naval forces to the Sea of Marmara. Further, in their assessment Britain could acquire no advantage which could compensate for the Soviet right to co-operate with Turkey in excluding warships of other powers from the Black Sea. They considered that the opportunism of Soviet policy and the worthless character of any Soviet guarantee made it doubtful whether any agreement with the USSR would be of any lasting value. 3 In view of the USSR's fundamental aim of undermining British influence in the Near East, the COS were by no means convinced that, in the long view, too close a relationship between the Soviets and Turkey would be in the British interest. In their evaluation, even if Britain was convinced that the Soviet aim was not directed towards improving their strategic position at the expense of Turkey and Britain, such a relationship should be weighed most carefully to consider the possible advantages of giving the Soviets interests in the Straits, which they might feel bound to defend against a German advance into Asia, against the disadvantages of a departure from the traditional policy of keeping the Soviets out of the Mediterranean. The COS's main objection to the Foreign Office's proposal was that, contrary to British rights, the extension of Soviet rights would enable the Soviets to establish joint physical 1

PRO FO 371/25012, R 6976/203/44, Bowker minute, 6 August 1940. Ibid. Bowker minute, 6 August 1940. 3 PRO FO 371/25013, R 7419/203/44, COS Committee reports: Turco-Soviet Relations COS (40) 649,28 August 1940. 2

THE

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

W A R

II

103

control over the Straits. In such circumstances, the presence of Soviet naval, military and air forces in the area of the Bosphorus would constitute an irremovable threat to Turkey and all chances of British naval forces entering the Black Sea would be irretrievably lost. 1 In this respect, it seems that both Turkey's and Britain's policy regarding the Straits were identical. As the result of these assessments, little chance was left to reach an agreement, even if on an ad hoc basis, with the USSR regarding the Montreux Convention. However, this did not help to put Turkey at her ease despite Britain's imposition to help Turkey in the event of attack from any quarter, because of the effect of German propaganda against the combined Soviet-British intentions towards the Straits. 2 Despite all the assurances of the British government, Cripps' initiative in Moscow and also his proposal to London regarding concessions to the USSR over the Straits made German propaganda fruitful. 3 In September 1940 the Turks started to sense once again a mortal danger: that of the extension of a German-Soviet Pact to the Straits. It was feared in Ankara that, in order to obtain Soviet co-operation against England, Hitler might well make concessions in the Straits. Convinced that Hitler was about to sell them to the Soviets if, indeed, he had not already done so, the Turks tried to forestall him by themselves coming to terms with Stalin. 4 It seemed that Turkey believed that the reason for the Soviet proposals regarding the Straits was concern about the application of the Montreux Convention. Therefore, Sara§oglu intended to instruct his Ambassador in Moscow, if Britain concurred, to inform the Soviet authorities of the attitude adopted by him in response to the British request for information on the attitude of the Turkish government with regard to the passage of the Straits in the event of Britain's having made a guarantee to Romania and Saraijoglu's refusal of Britain's offer to send hospital ships after an earthquake. Thus, Sara§oglu considered that the Soviet government would have proof of Turkey's 'strict loyalty to the Montreux Convention' and would realise that Turkey had not intentionally interpreted the Convention against the Soviet interest. 5 Neither

1

Ibid. D. J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, p. 306. 3 Haydar Aktay reported his anxiety about Cripps' movement to the Turkish Foreign Office and worried that the British Ambassador could be trading the Turkish Straits to the Soviets in order to assure their co-operation against Germany. Tiirkiye Dig Politikasinda 50 Yil: ikinci Dtinya Savagi Yillari 1939-1946 (Ankara: T.C. Dijigleri Bakanligi Arajtirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Mudiirlugu, 1973), p. 68. 4 This is the purpose which Van Creveld states, based on the Von Papen report, that Turkey hoped to conclude a friendship pact with Stalin which would guarantee their frontiers in return for free passage for Soviet ships through the Straits. If this is true, it is difficult to explain Turkey's strong opposition when Britain made a similar proposal. This is more likely to be Von Papen's own interpretation. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy, p. 76. 5 PRO FO 371/25015, R 7549/242/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1136, 5 September 1940. 2

104

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

the Soviets nor Turkey could welcome the emergence of Germany as a Black Sea power since both believed that Germany might attempt to seize the Straits and gain a hold on Southeastern Europe. However, at the same time both countries had no trust for each other. In spite of Aktay's categorical assurance Moscow was convinced that Turkey, an ally of Britain, would be prepared to connive at an Allied plan for attack on Baku. The attitude adopted by Saracoglu caused some surprise in London. Halifax replied, 'I cannot see that the Turkish government stand to gain anything by taking such an apologetic stance with the Soviet government'. If the Soviet government had in fact any reason to suppose that the Turkish government had interpreted the Montreux Convention to their disadvantage they would no doubt have taxed them with it. 1 Hence, Sara§oglu abandoned his proposal. On 30 October, Cripps reported that the Yugoslav Minister had gained the impression from his interview with the Italian and German ambassadors that the Axis powers had made an offer, or an arrangement, with the Soviet government about 'some share in the control of the Straits'. Owing to the alarm at this alleged Axis plan for the Straits, Cripps asked whether the Turkish government could be persuaded to make a temporary and more attractive concession to the USSR in order to minimise this danger. 2 As a matter of fact, such a concession had already been refused by the COS. Moreover, the Foreign Office was of the opinion that, even if Turkey could be persuaded to make some attractive concession as regards the Straits, it was doubtful whether this would influence the Soviet attitude, since their chief obsession was fear of Germany. Indeed, it was in the interests of the USSR to maintain the status quo in regard to the Straits rather than to share control with the Germans, which would in practice mean complete control by the Germans. It should therefore be the main aim of British and Turkish policy in Moscow to convince the Soviet government that the status quo could be maintained. 3 However, Cripps seemed very determined to obtain Soviet co-operation at all costs. He made a series of suggestions, one after the other. He had a new proposal as soon as the previous one was returned that it might be urgently suggested to the Turkish government that if the Soviet Union alone, or in association with the Romanian government, could secure control over the mouth of the Danube and would agree to consult Turkey over the passage of any warships, other than Soviet or Romanian, into the Black Sea, Turkey would agree to consult the Soviet Union in some way as to the passage of non-Turkish warships through the Straits in so far as they had power to 1 2 3

PRO FO 371/25015, R 7626/242/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 938, 8 September 1940. PRO FO 371/25015, R 8117/242/44, Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 938, 30 October 1940. PRO FO 371/25015, R 8117/242/44, Foreign Office to Cripps, no. 735, 2 November 1940.

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

105

control traffic under the Montreux Convention. In this way, Cripps hoped that many difficulties would be created between the USSR and Germany over the Danube and would give the Turkish government an equivalent advantage to that offered to them. 1 This suggestion also was felt to be hardly acceptable. Such a proposal would depend on the supposition that the Soviet government obtained complete control over the mouth of the Danube, which in fact seemed unlikely. In any case, Germany would still be in a position to assemble submarines at Constanza. Besides, under the present proposal Turkey would be offering a substantial concession to the USSR, which could only be justified if she were certain of obtaining a corresponding advantage. Therefore, to the Foreign Office there was no point in raising the question in existing c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 2 In order to meet Cripps' proposal to make some sort of demand of the Soviets, the Foreign Office had a new offer to make to Turkey. Britain should tell the Soviet Union that in view of her offer to consult on a bilateral basis at the end of the war in regard to the post-war settlement of Europe and Asia, it would be open to Moscow to raise any question connected with the Straits. However, Hugessen saw no need to consult the Turkish government at this point since he knew already that Turkey would not commit herself and unless she did the Soviet authorities would not consider such a proposal. Moreover, at the end of the war, Turkey as a victorious belligerent was unlikely to consent to any modification of the Straits regime in favour of the USSR. 3 The Foreign Office had gathered further impression from Turkey that she might start to agitate for some form of neutralisation of the Black Sea and even tighter control than she at present possessed of the Straits themselves. 4 The British initiative did not bring anything to improve TurcoSoviet relations because of both Britain and T u r k e y ' s reluctance to compromise over anything to do with the Montreux Convention in favour of the USSR. Despite all the discussions which took place in British diplomatic circles, no further suggestion was made to Stalin after the question he had raised on 1 July. Indeed, there was no point in giving the Soviet Union a paramount position in the Straits zone, sincc in the long term it would create almost the same effect as a German presence in the Straits.

1 2 3 4

PRO FO 371/25015, R 8202/242/44, Cripps, no. 960, 3 November 1940. PRO FO 371/25015, R 8202/242/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1198, 7 November 1940. PRO FO 371/25015, R 8202/242/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen no. 1435, 6 November 1940. PRO FO 371/25015, R 8202/242/44, Glutton minute, 9 November 1940.

106

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

Soviet-German

POWERS

Trade for the Straits

By occupying Romania Germany not only obtained the oil resources at Ploesti but also had a huge strategic advantage against the possibility of a Soviet move towards the Straits as she reached the Black Sea through the Danube which became a completely German river. 1 Therefore, after the Baltic Sea outlet for the Soviets to the world oceans was closed, the Black Sea outlet was as well. In this context, the British COS expressed their anxiety that 'the USSR is likely to take all steps short of war to prevent German penetration into Turkey and the Middle East since this would cause a progressively increasing threat to her interests in the Black Sea and to the Caucasian oilfields'. 2 Indeed, to stop Hitler Stalin believed that the control of the Turkish Straits became the key to the preservation of security of the USSR. In doing so, it was necessary to establish Bulgaria as a Soviet sphere of influence. This consideration prevailed in Stalin's mind when Ribbentrop invited Molotov to Berlin in mid-October 1940. 3 The primary aim of the meeting from the Soviet perspective was to discover the real intention of Germany's proposal of the New Europe rather than to reach an agreement. Hitler had already made up his mind regarding a way to secure Soviet loyalty until he should have completed his plan against Britain. He would assume the leadership in a European coalition directed against the British Empire. Into this coalition he wanted to incorporate the USSR and Japan, as well as Italy and, if possible, Turkey, so as to create an anti-British bloc. All these countries were to come to a mutual agreement and participate in an onslaught on the British Empire, each in its own designated 'sphere of influence'. 4 By offering the Soviets the prospect of expansion at the expense of Britain in the direction of the Persian Gulf and India, Hitler and Ribbentrop hoped not only to destroy the British but also to divert the USSR from their traditional European aims and relieve German pressure on them. Before Hitler's approach to the USSR, the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, concluded on 27 September, was a first step towards the establishment of 'a grand anti-British coalition'. Then Ribbentrop sent a letter to Stalin, in which he explained Hitler's plans and invited Molotov to come to Berlin to discuss them. 5

1

Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, p. 57. PRO FO 371/24892, R 8227/5/67, COS (40) 853,21 October 1940. Grodetsky, Grand Delusion, 58. 4 Lev and Gorlov, 'On the eve', pp. 106-109. 5 DGFP, D series, Vol. XI, Letter from Ribbentrop to Stalin, 13 October 1940, no. 176, pp. 291297. 2

THE

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

W A R

II

107

In November 1940 Ribbentrop was brimming over with confidence at the prospect of negotiating an agreement between the tripartite powers and the USSR, based on mutual recognition of spheres of interest. If this succeeded, England would be confronted with the largest coalition of all time. 1 Just when some headway was being made in this direction, the announcement of Molotov's visit to Berlin struck like a bombshell and drove the Turks into a panic. 2 According to Creveld, in the last few days before Molotov's visit, Turkey made frantic attempts to embroil Stalin with Hitler by leaking reports about the latter's intention to attack Turkey and thus to destroy completely Soviet influence in the Balkans. 3 Meanwhile the Italian attack on Greece on 28 October, 'made without prior German knowledge a mere fortnight before the Berlin Conference, shuffled all the cards'. This could most likely provoke a British landing in Greece, posing a direct threat to both the USSR and G e r m a n y . 4 Under the new circumstances, the anxiety of the Moscow authorities was that the Germans might wish to make a dash to Turkey through Bulgaria. Ankara used the Bulgarian card saying to Moscow that 'Bulgaria was prepared to become a weapon' in the hands of Germany. However, this attempt came to nothing since Moscow was unlikely to trust Turkey because of its alleged tacit agreement to allow British bombers fly over Turkish territory on the way to Baku. However, the USSR did not take a firm stance against Turkey. Thereby, in case of a failure to reach an understanding with Hitler, Stalin wished to prevent Turkey from becoming a British pawn once hostilities erupted. Nevertheless, Molotov attempted to forestall German démarches towards Bulgaria by giving guarantee to Sofia despite the latter's rejection. 5 Molotov went to Berlin as scheduled, and to Ankara it seemed that the end had come. It was time, Ribbentrop told Von Papen only the day before the talks, to come to an overall agreement with the Soviets and to determine mutually agreed spheres of influence. Ribbentrop was of the opinion that one 1

Crevdel, Hitler's Strategy, p. 70. Franz Von Papen, Memoirs, p. 464. 3 Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy, p. 76. 4 Soon the Greek army forced Italian forces into retreat. Hitler decided on German intervention to ensure that British air-bases were kept out of Greece, from whence the Romanian oilfields might be bombed. Hitler decided upon an invasion of Greece in November 1940. The Germans first persuaded Romania and Bulgaria to admit their troops. Resistance to this process from Yugoslavia, after an internal coup, was crushed by a hastily prepared campaign, which lasted one week, and on 6 April 1941 the Germans invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. British forces were forced to leave Greece in German hands by 30 April. Hitler then agreed to a parachute and airborne attack on Crete to protect the Aegean Sea and keep British bases out of range of Romanian oilfields. Accordingly the Germans attack on Crete started in the early morning of 20 May, and soon German paratroopers seized the island. Cunningham Papers, Add 52573, Cunningham to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 'Reports of the Evacuation of Crete, Carried out Between 26 May and 1 July 1941, 14 September 1941. And see Parker, Struggle for Survival, pp. 55-56; Procopis Papastratis, British Policy Towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 4-5. 5 Gorodetskey, Grand Delusion, pp. 61-65. 2

108

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

of the requirements would be to provide the USSR with a warm-water exit to the world's oceans. 1 In fact, the talks on 12-13 November were to cover a much larger field and were designed to determine the fate of the European continent. It was very fortunate for the Turks that the German-Soviet talks did not proceed as Germany had planned. As a matter of fact the idea of the Berlin talks originated with Schulenburg, German Ambassador to Moscow, who had been an opponent of the Nazi regime and its foreign policy aims. He did not welcome the idea of attacking the USSR since it would be nothing more than a burden on Germany. He rather wished to bring Stalin and Hitler together. Schulenburg prepared a draft agreement for the guidelines of the German delegation: thereby Turkey was excluded from the new European Order, while the USSR received bases on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus and Germany on the European one. An alternative solution was for the USSR to control only the Bosphorus while friendly states, such as Bulgaria, would look after German interests in Istanbul. 2 However, this draft agreement was not submitted. At the first meeting on 12 November 1940 Ribbentrop presented the general German view regarding spheres of influence in order to induce Molotov to join the Tripartite Pact. He began by remarking that 'no power on earth could alter the fact that the beginning of the end had now arrived for the British Empire'. As part of the German plan to divert the USSR from the Balkans and Eastern Europe to Asia, Ribbentrop made the Straits a bargaining counter. In this regard, he suggested to Molotov that the Montreux Convention should be replaced with a new one which would be concluded between those powers that were particularly interested in the issue: primarily the USSR, Turkey, Italy and Germany. Moreover, the USSR and the adjacent countries should enjoy certain privileges in the Black Sea over other countries of the world. Ribbentrop added that it was 'absurd that countries which were thousands of miles away from the Black Sea should claim to have the same rights as the Black Sea powers'. The new Straits agreement with Turkey would, moreover, have to secure certain special privileges for the USSR, granting in principle the warships and merchant fleet of the USSR freer access to the Mediterranean than heretofore. 3 He further stressed that agreement on such a policy with Italy and themselves would enable Turkey to free herself from ties with Britain. Then he expressed his conviction that Turkey would thereby not only become a factor in the coalition of powers working against the spread of war and for an

1

Von Papen, Memoirs, p. 465. Sigrid Wegner-Korfes, 'Ambassador Count Schulenburg and the Preparations for Barbarossa', in Bernd Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), pp. 187-204; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, p. 70. 3 DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, Schmidt memorandum on conversation between Ribbentrop and Molotov, no. 325, 12 November 1940, p. 538. 2

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

109

early establishment of peace, but she would also be prepared to scrap the Montreux Convention voluntarily and, in conjunction with these three countries, to create a new Straits convention which would satisfy the just demands of all and give the USSR certain privileges. 1 Neither the Soviet place in the New World Order nor the proposed new Straits settlement satisfied Molotov. Therefore, he brought up again the Straits question during the talks with Hitler next day. Referring to the Crimean War and the events of the years 1918-19, Molotov described the Straits as 'England's historic gateway for attack on the USSR'. He further said that as Britain had now gained a foothold in Greece the situation was all the more menacing to the USSR. For reasons of security the relations between the USSR and other Black Sea powers were of great importance. In this connection Molotov asked Hitler to accept the Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria, which was the independent country located closest to the Straits. Molotov added that the USSR wanted to obtain a guarantee against an attack on the Black Sea via the Straits 'not only on paper but also in reality'. Hitler did not relish any Soviet presence in the Straits and the Balkans. Therefore, although Hitler agreed that only Soviet warships might pass freely through the Straits while the Straits would be closed to all other warships, he was not willing to accept a Soviet guarantee on Bulgaria, nor any physical presence of the Soviets in the Straits. 2 Hitler might assume that with the revision of the Montreux Convention he could dictate his own terms to the USSR. However, Molotov refused to be diverted from Poland, Romania and Finland and particularly from Bulgaria, Hitler's most recent focus of interest. Therefore, although Molotov refused the German proposal, since conflict over spheres of influence between the two countries had become explicit in the talks, he promised to submit it to Stalin. However, from the German point of view, the talks with Molotov turned out to be a disappointment. 3

Aftermath of the Berlin Talks Stalin answered the German proposals on 25 November, saying that he had decided to accept them subject to the following conditions:

1

Ibid. p. 39; Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London: Bantam Press, 1992), pp. 314-15. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, Schmidt Memorandum on conversation between Hitler and Molotov, no. 328, on November 1940, pp. 552-553; US National Archives, RG 59, Decimal File, 1945-49, 867.81/9-1045, Dewitt C. Poole, to George V. Allen, 10 September 1945. 3 DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, Hilger memorandum on final conversation between Ribbentrop and Molotov, 13 November 1940. 2

110

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Provided that within the next few months the security of the USSR in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the USSR, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease. If Turkey declares herself willing to join the Axis her independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed. Otherwise, Germany, Italy and the USSR have agreed to work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures. The Soviet reply also included a stipulation that the area of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognised as the centre of the USSR's aspirations. 1 The main difference between the Soviets and Germany with regard to Turkey was that, while the USSR sought a permanent physical base in the Straits, Germany wanted to keep the Soviets out of the Balkans area by offering free passage for Soviet warships through the Straits. Molotov might be right in his comment on the Berlin talks that the Germans wanted to appropriate Turkey under the guise of guaranteeing her security, in the manner of Romania, and to persuade the USSR by a promise to revise the Montreux Convention in her favour. 2 One thing is clear, as Deringil quotes from the diary of Haider, Hitler's Chief of Staff, that Hitler was going to get the Straits once the Soviets had been beaten. 3 However, it is hardly possible to share Molotov's claim that the Soviet objective in the Berlin talks was to improve the Straits regime through negotiations with Turkey, and not behind her back, because the Soviets proposed to take military measures against Turkey if she did not accept their terms on the Straits, because he was at the time haggling with Hitler on the Straits without Turkish knowledge. While these communications were heading back and forth between Moscow and Berlin, Ankara was in a state of some curiosity as to whether any decisions had been taken regarding Turkey. Although Von Papen assured Saracoglu and Inonii that nothing had been spoken against Turkey's interests, 4 Moscow avoided giving any information about the Berlin talks in spite of Haydar Aktay's insistence. 5

1 Nazi-Soviet Relations, Schulenburg to German Foreign Office, 26 November 1940. And also sec 'On the eve', p. 109; Lenczowski, Soviet Advances, p. 42. 2 Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941 (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 130. 3 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 116. 4 PRO FO 371/25017, R 8878/316/44. Hugessen to Foreign Office, 29 November 1940. 5 ikinci Diinya Savagi Yillari, p. 50.

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

111

Hitler's answer to Soviet demands was to instruct his Chiefs of Staff to prepare for 'Operation Barbarossa', the invasion of the USSR, by May 1941;1 Moscow at the same time decided to take unilateral action to defend Soviet interests. As for the USSR, the most important decision was to resist the German march into the Balkans by reviving the project of drawing Bulgaria into the Soviet orbit. Indeed the Soviet government considered the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as matters of security for the USSR. In this connection, Sobolev, the Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Sofia on 25 November to propose a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact. He demanded from Bulgaria air and land bases in return for Soviet guarantees for Bulgaria. To obtain Bulgarian collaboration, he made an attractive offer to them to the effect that they could have Turkish territory in Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line, which would gratify long-held Bulgarian ambitions to hold land up to the Aegean Sea. 2 Sara§oglu protested the proposed Soviet-Bulgarian mutual pact since it was a violation of the 1929 Turco-Soviet agreement in which Turkey should be consulted. In a sense, though the Soviet government did not expect its territory to be invaded soon after the Berlin talks, it was much worried about German penetration into the Balkans and towards the Straits. Molotov also feared that the proposal he made in Berlin for the Straits might be leaked to the Turks which would encourage Turkey to join either the British or the German bloc. In January 1941 when German troops were massing along the border of Bulgaria, the Soviet government became alarmed that German troops were now prepared to march into Bulgaria, fearing that their goal was the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and ultimately the Straits. It was the Soviet fear that such a movement would turn Bulgaria into a theatre of operations since Britain, in alliance with Turkey would no doubt try to forestall the advance of German troops through the Straits. In view of all this the Soviet government warned Germany that it would consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces in the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the USSR. 3 It seemed that Germany was anxious to keep Moscow on her side to prevent possible Soviet collaboration with Britain. In his reply to the Soviet note on 21 January 1941, Ribbentrop explained that Germany's aim was merely to prevent Britain from gaining a foothold on Greek soil. The German army would march through Bulgarian territory if any military operations were carried out against Greece. Moreover, he stated that because of Turkish opposition there was no way for Britain to occupy the Straits. Germany also had no such intention unless Turkey on her part committed a hostile act against German troops. Ribbentrop further stated ' Van Papen, Memoirs, p. 469. PRO FO 371/30067, R654/112/44, Foreign Office to Ankara, no. 157, 21 January 1941. 3 Nazi-Soviet Relations, Weizsacker's communication with Ribbentrop about the Soviet statement, 17 January 1941, pp. 268-69.

2

112

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

that his government still adhered to the idea of revising the Montreux Convention in favour of the USSR as Molotov had explained on his recent visit to Berlin. 1 Woodward considered that such an assurance was enough for Germany to maintain German-Soviet relations during the early part of 1941, which were seemingly as close as at any time since the signature of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939. 2 However, Soviet authorities in Moscow were far from such a conviction as they were in a state of alarm that Germany would gain a foothold in Bulgaria which could lead her to seize the Straits. Equally, they feared that Britain was seeking to embroil the USSR with Germany in order to secure her interests in the Straits. Britain also had no trust in Moscow. The British believed that Stalin was in fact on the verge of concluding a new agreement with Germany. 3 Indeed, Britain was in a difficult position as regards Balkan affairs. While Britain had failed to create a common front against Germany with Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, Germany dominated all the Balkan countries in early 1941. Turkey first signed a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria on 17 February. After this Hitler guaranteed inonil on 1 March that Germany would not attack Turkey and he ordered his troops to keep well back from the Turkish frontier. While Turkey's aloof stance to the prospect of active British cooperation strained the two countries' relations, Britain feared that it might be the Soviet intention to seek further German collaboration on the Straits because she could neither secure Bulgarian co-operation nor gain Turkey's trust. Cripps reported on 8 March that he 'would by no means excludc the possibility of further arrangement with Germany'. Indeed, Moscow was getting frightened by the German penetration of the Balkans and unless she could be made to believe that the consequences of helping Germany might be even more unpleasant than those of helping the Allies, the Russians might have felt obliged to make the 'best of a bad situation'. For instance, Cripps added, 'I do not think even Molotov could swallow an arrangement which gave Germany even partial control of the Straits, so long as she thought there was any chance of her being kept away through Soviet help to Turkey. But if she thought Germany would get there, she might think partial Soviet control better than none at all'. 4 Therefore, the British government tried to prevent Soviet co-operation with Germany on the Straits issue. At this point Moscow sounded out the British proposal. The USSR gave an assurance not to attack

1 Nazi-Soviet Relationships, Ribbentrop's reply to the statement made by the Soviet government, 21 January 1941, p. 271. 2 On 10 January 1941 the Soviet-German pact was renewed in a pact of friendship which provided for the settlement of questions relating to the Baltic countries and the frontier of occupied Poland. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 594. 3 PRO FO 371/29778, R 1476/113/67, Cripps to Eden, 21 February 1941. 4 P R O FO 371/30067, R 2188/112/44, Cripps to Foreign Office no. 198, 8 March 1940.

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

113

Turkey and in accordance with the Turco-Soviet pact of non-aggression 1 promised to stay neutral in case of any attack on the part of any foreign powers which would oblige Turkey to defend herself. 2 The Turkish government replied giving a similar assurance and proposed that these two declarations be published. However, the result was disappointing due to the Soviet insistence that the assurance should be published in a form which suggested that the declaration had been promoted by rumours in Ankara that the USSR would profit from Turkish difficulties if Turkey were attacked. The Turks proposed counter-amendments to show that the question had not been raised by their side. Finally Turkey published the communiqué without alteration. 3 Both sides were avoiding giving the Germans the impression that they were acting against them. However, Turkey was not willing to make any further attempt to improve the relationship since her distrust of the Soviets was greater than ever. Saraçoglu was of the opinion that although his approach to the Soviet government on this point had been rejected, Moscow was now so frightened of Germany that it was ready to agree to almost any demand. 4 He complained that Moscow had consistently refused to give any information about what had passed during the Berlin talks. 5 However, this time the Turkish authorities received information from Berlin on 17 March 1941 that Molotov had demanded as the price of Soviet accession to the Tripartite Pact, the cession of bases on the Straits and had been met with a refusal. 6 There was good reason to believe the truth of this German claim since Vishinsky had misinformed Turkey about Sobolcv's visit to Sofia. Though Turkey had found out that the Soviets had offered Bulgaria Turkish territory east of Thrace, Molotov told Aktay that they had offered King Boris nothing more than a pact of mutual assistance sincc Turkey intended to attack Bulgaria. 7 In addition to all this, no response was made by Moscow to the Turkish government's intimation of its readiness to examine favourably any Soviet proposal to extend the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1925. 8 These were the reasons It should be borne in mind that after the outbreak of the Italo-Greek war, Aktay asked the Soviet government for informations as to how the USSR should come to the help of Turkey if she was being attacked. The Soviet government replied that it did not understand the question, since there was no instrument binding the two countries to assist each other militarily or otherwise. PRO FO 371/30068, R 6061/112/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1407, 8 June 1940. 2 PRO FO 371/30067, R 224S/112/44, Cripps to Foreign Office no. 198, 10 March 1941, and PRO FO 371/30067, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 656, 25 March 1941. 3 PRO FO 371/30068, R 6061/112/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1407, 8 June 1941. 4 PRO FO 371/30068, R 5163/112/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 158, 12 May 1941. 5 PRO FO 371/30068, R 5558/112/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1274, 23 May 1941. 6 DGFP, D series Vol. XII, Schmidt memorandum on 'conversation between Hitler and Gerede' on 17 March 1941, no. 177, p. 308. However, Turkey did not mention this conversation to Britain. 7 PRO FO 371/30068, R6061/112/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1407, 8 June 1941. 8 PRO FO 371/30067, R654/112/44, Foreign Office to Ankara, no. 157, 21 January 1941.

114 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T P O W E R S that Turkey refused to take the Soviets into her confidence. However, von Papen was good at playing on Turkish fears of Soviet designs on Turkey. He told both Saracoglu and inonii that unless Turkey came to terms with Hitler, she would be faced with a joint German-Soviet threat. This first persuaded the Turks to move by threatening them with a German-Soviet agreement and then kept them moving by flattering them with the idea that Germany attached importance to assuring herself of Turkish neutrality before settling affairs with the USSR, 1 just four days before she signed a friendship and non-aggression pact with Germany. In spite of British efforts to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, particularly after the latter half of 1940, there had been no obvious signs of change for the better. Neither the Axis advance into the Balkans, which overwhelmed Yugoslavia and Greece, nor the failure of the Berlin negotiations, made the USSR less distant in her attitude towards Britain. Cripps' further attempts during the spring of 1941 did not succeed. Soviet policy remained one of avoiding conflict with Germany and prolonging peace for as long as possible. Thus, the Soviets might secure their interests in the Balkans. Apart from a British warning, even Soviet intelligence reports could not convince Stalin that Germany was about to attack the USSR. Stalin saw these reports more as British provocations than German war preparation and tried not to provoke Berlin. Despite all the contrary evidence, when the Germans did attack on 22 June 1941, the Soviets were surprised. 2

The Straits Question after the German Invasion of the USSR The same day that Germany declared war on the USSR Hitler denounced the Soviet demands on the Straits. Simultaneously, Churchill said in a speech on the radio that Britain and the US were ready to render aid to the USSR. However, Churchill's reference to 'Russia's having lost the fruits of victory in the last one' rthe First World War] touched a sensitive nerve in Ankara. Saracoglu told Hugessen that this meant nothing less than offering the Soviets the Straits since they already had substantial chunks of Romania, and Poland. This meant that there were no other countries but Turkey to supply territorial gains for the USSR, who had been promised the Straits since the beginning of the last war. 3

1

PRO FO 371/30126, R 6170/1934/44, Bowker minute, 16 June 1941. Roberts, The Soviet Union, ppl36-137; Alexander Dallin, 'Stalin and the German Invasion', Soviet Union, Vol. 18, Nos. 1-3, 1991, pp. 29-31. 3 PRO FO 371/30092, R 6581/236/44, Hugessen Foreign Office, no. 1577, 27 June 1941. 2

THE

EARLY

PART

OF

WORLD

WAR

II

115

Conversely, the German attack on the U S S R was very w e l c o m e to Turkey as this meant her hereditary enemy would be disposed of. As Hugessen pointed out, anyone who was at war with the U S S R had Turkish sympathy and the ' G e r m a n s reap the benefit of this'. This was what Turkey most wanted, since if it stayed neutral the U S S R would be in a powerful position. Turkey regarded this as a complete justification for the Turco-German Treaty, and indeed its main objective. 1 The Turkish press criticised the double game of the U S S R towards Turkey. Hiiseyin Cahit Yalciri asserted editorially in Yeni Sabah that Turkey had shown great generosity to the U S S R , despite her hostile attitude and intentions which were almost confirmed. The Soviets had n o w destroyed a 20-year old illusion with their demand f o r bases in the Dardanelles. The paper Haber said that the USSR continued to pursue the same Pan-Slav policy as had the 'tsarist regime' but thanks to Germany the Soviet regime would share the same fate as its predecessor. 2 A s far as public opinion was concerned, it was evident that in the first place Germany had achieved her objective in Turkey. However, in the face of Hitler's denunciation of Soviet intentions towards Turkey, both the U S S R and Britain were in great difficulty. Britain tried to convince Turkey that this was a trick of Hitler, and the Soviet government also issued a denial. As neither country knew that Turkey had already been informed about the Berlin talks Britain said to Turkey, 'what Hitler does not explain, if it were true, is how it came about that such things were ever discussed'. 3 Moreover, the Soviet Union countered Hitler's claim by giving the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow a document giving details of Hitler's plan to attack Turkey which had been captured by the Red A r m y f r o m German units on the Eastern front. This alleged secret plan provided for the occupation of Istanbul and the seizure of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and various strategic areas of Turkey. 4 The Soviet-German war had a direct bearing on some possibilities in the British mind. It placed Turkey in a position different f r o m any in which she herself had been since the present conflict began. In the last war Turkey had sided with G e r m a n y mainly bccause Germany was at war with her traditional enemy, Russia. Germany was again at war with Russia, but this time Turkey was allied to Great Britain, who, however, was now co-operating with the U S S R to defeat Germany. This brought u p the question of the possibility of Turkish-German co-operation. Britain's anxiety on this score was not baseless: Menemencioglu remarked to Hugessen just the day after the breakout of the war that the USSR, by their treaty with Germany, had

1 2 3 4

PRO FO 371/30127, R 7375/1934/44, Hugessen to Nichols, 11 July 1941. Hiiseyin Cahit Yalçin, Yeni Sabah, 24 June 1941; Haber, 'editorial comment', 26 June 1941. PRO FO 371/30127, R 6472/1934/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1452, 27 June 1941. PRO FO 371/30127, R 7362/1934/44, Reuters' message, no. 0530, 26 July 1941.

116 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T P O W E R S deliberately precipitated the European war, hoping to remain spectators, and had consistently repulsed British and Turkish advances. He hoped that Britain would 'not make an alliance with the USSR... they should now be left to fight their own battle'. 1 As a matter of fact, Turkey wanted to see the USSR destroyed as much as Germany did, and she was unwilling to maintain good relations with the USSR. Germany, for her part, guaranteed to respect the inviolability and integrity of Turkish territory. Hugessen reminded the Foreign Office of the point that Britain had not given such a guarantee to Turkey, nor, in any formal sense, to the USSR. He thought that, as a result of German propaganda, the Turks had been anxious that Britain might have been offering the USSR an identical compensation with what had been offered in the last war 2 at their expense in return for co-operation against Germany, or even an alliance, which was what Turkey feared. Therefore, some assurance should be given Turkey to convince her that such an understanding never existed. Hugessen believed that such a guarantee would be set against the advantage gained by Germany and would be a relief after the implications of Churchill's speech. Otherwise the consequence would be opening up to Germany a route to the Middle East. 3 The Foreign Office was ready to give such assurances to Turkey in return for Turkey's acknowledgement that she regarded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of October 1939 as constituting the main foundation of AngloTurkish relations. However, the Foreign Office thought that 'it would be better simultaneously to try to reassure the Turks with the U S S R ' . 4 But Cripps, to some extent, blamed the Turco-German agreement for making Moscow suspicious about the Turks and their intentions. And he added that Saraijoglu and Menemencioglu's pro-German policy seemed to be the reason for the failure of the Turco-Soviet relationship to improve. 5 The Foreign Office, however, took a different line. Bowker stated in his minute that the USSR was on the whole more to blame than Turkey for the present unsatisfactory state of Turco-Soviet relations. There was some excuse for the Turkish inclination to regard the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities as offering Turkey release from the age-long Soviet threat, and if improvement was to be brought about in Turco-Soviet relations, the first move must come from the USSR. 6 Turkish suspicions of Soviet intentions centred first and foremost round the Straits. They were fearful that the USSR might gain, or share, control of the Straits. To overcome such Turkish suspicions, the British Foreign Office approached Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to London, to see if his Government might consider a guarantee as follows:

1 2 3 4 5 6

PRO FO 371/30091, R 6388/236/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1540, 23 June 1941. PRO FO 371/30127, R 6493/1934/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 25 June 1941. PRO FO 371/30091, R 6532/236/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1558, 25 June 1941. PRO FO 371/30068, R 7264/112/44, Foreign Office to Cripps, no. 919, 29 July 1941. PRO FO 371/30068, R 7264/112/44, Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 827, 20 July 1941. PRO FO 371/30068, R 7248/112/44, Bowker minute on Turco-Soviet relations, 18 July 1941.

THE

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

WAR

II

117

That the Soviet government were ready to give an undertaking confirming their loyalty to the Montreux Convention and adding that they had no selfish designs on the Straits themselves; and secondly that they too, like the British Government, were ready to undertake to respect scrupulously the territorial integrity of Turkey. 1 While Britain was taking action to persuade Moscow to give an assurance to Turkey on the lines stated above, in order to remove the adverse effect of German propaganda, the Associated Press gave the news from Ankara that, as a result of British pressure, Stalin had sent a personal message to inonti assuring Turkey that the USSR had no intention of seizing control of the Dardanelles. 2 This news caused great anxiety in British Foreign Office circles, not only because there must be leakage of information somewhere about their representations, but also because the USSR would be reluctant to give the impression that they had sent this message under strong British pressure. Therefore, Cripps was instructed to inform the Soviets that they thought that the information might have been put out with the deliberate intention of forestalling British efforts to create a friendly atmosphere between Turkey and the USSR. 3 The USSR had no time to take it too seriously. Rather they agreed that it would be timely to put the matter before the Turkish government together. Therefore, the USSR and Britain simultaneously gave assurances to Turkey on 10 August as follows: The Soviet Government, and also the British Government confirm their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assure the Turkish government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims whatever with regard to the Straits. The Soviet government, as also the British Government are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of Turkey. While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war, the British Government and Soviet Government would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by any European power. 4

1

PRO FO 371/30068, R 7248/112/44, Foreign Office to Cripps, no. 876, 24 July 1941. The Associated Press's news was as follows: 'A personal message from Stalin to inonti assuring Turkey that the USSR has no intention of seizing control of the Dardanelles was drafted following British representations, according to a communiqué drafted late last week but its delivery has not yet been confirmed in the Turkish capital. An Associated Press message from Ankara adds that a British diplomatic source in Ankara states that Sir Stafford Cripps had been instrumental in persuading the Soviet regime that only an outspoken disavowal of alleged Soviet aspirations to occupy the Dardanelles and Bosphorus can effectively counter repeated Nazi charges that the Soviets have intrigued for military bases in the Straits. The British envoy is said to have suggested that Stalin's assurance to Turkey should take the form of a direct written communication from the Soviet Premier to the Turkish president because Hitler has already sent two letters to Inonii this year assuring him of Germany's peaceful intentions'. PRO FO 371/30068, R 7388/112/44, Bowker minute, 29 July 1941. 3 Ibid. Foreign Office to Cripps, no. 921, 30 July 1941. 4 PRO FO 371/30068, R 7615/112/44, Eden to Halifax (Washington), no. 607, 11 August 1941. See also David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945 (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 407. 2

118

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

The Times was very enthusiastic, pointing out that its first effect was to dispel much of the suspicion which had clouded Turco-Soviet relations in recent years. The news continued that Eden repudiated the suggestion made from time to time by German propaganda that the British Government might agree, or even that they had agreed, to make arrangements with any other powers at the expense of Turkey. German agents were so industriously spreading the lying tale of a secret Anglo-Soviet agreement giving the USSR complete control of the Straits that the publication of the joint assurances given to Sara50glu by the British and Soviet Ambassadors was particularly timely. 1 There was not much in the Turkish press about the declaration because of the fear of antagonising Germany. Still to some extent the guarantee was a relief in a climate of Turkish annoyance at the 'propaganda duel of the belligerents' accusing each other of having designs on the Straits. As a matter of fact, initial Turkish celebration of the German attack replaced the fear to some extent. Hugessen remarked on 30 June that the general attitude of the Turks was 'now similar to Britain'. Turkey wished the GermanSoviet war to last a very long time and bring about the exhaustion of both sides. However, German successes were not welcome as nobody doubted that a victorious German campaign would end in the conquest of the Caucasus, encirclement of Turkey and a double offensive in the autumn against Suez and India. 2 Although the Turkish government expressed its extreme pleasure at the assurances and claimed that they were ready to respond, it avoided giving any reply, using the excuse that it did not want to create the impression on the Germans'that it had asked for these offers of help and assistance. 3 However, German sources explained the truth behind the Turkish reluctance to respond to the Anglo-Soviet assurance. The Germans in fact had not yet played all their cards. There was the possibility that so far all allegations of demands on the Straits could be only for the sake of propaganda. Obviously the declaration gave the Anglo-Soviet front a more favourable status in Turkish public eyes. Immediately after the Anglo-Soviet assurance was given, Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, pointed out to Ribbentrop that he might perhaps consider letting the Turks have Molotov's proposal of November 1940 in writing as irrefutable proof of Soviet designs. 4 Indeed, Ribbentrop saw it as a great opportunity for winning Turkey completely to his own side. He explained his policy towards Turkey on this issue to von Papen, saying that to strengthen Turkish confidence Germany would promise never to make any territorial demands on Turkey. Unlike the USSR, his government would at all times regard Turkey

1

The Times, 'Britain, Turkey and Russia', 14 August 1941. PRO FO 371/30092, R 6885/286/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 30 June 1941. 3 PRO FO 371/30069, R 7636/112/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1957, 12 August 1941. 4 DGFP, series D, Vol. XIII, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, 11 August 1941, no. 193, p. 304. 2

THE

E A R L Y

P A R T

OF

W O R L D

WAR

II

119

as 'the historic guardians of the Straits'. Moreover, they could offer Turkey the Greek islands at the entrance to the Dardanelles. 1 Such a policy appeared on 19 August when Ribbentrop received H us rev Gerede, Turkish Ambassador to Berlin. First Ribbentrop tried to convince the Ambassador of German success against the USSR, then he brought up the main issue which he wanted to raise. He began by saying that the AngloSoviet guarantee 'appeared to me like effrontery'. It would be respected only so long as Turkey was important to the USSR. Then demands would surely be made for air bases in the Dardanelles and permission for Soviet divisions to enter Turkish territory. He further stated to Gerede that he even had definite reports that Britain had promised the Soviets that at the proper time she would not oppose such Soviet aspirations. Then in proof of his claim Ribbentrop showed Gerede the original of Schulenburg's telegram of 25 November 1940 from Moscow, which quoted Molotov's statements regarding Soviet demands for land and naval bases in the Straits. Ribbentrop told Gerede that this demand had been the basic cause of German-Soviet enmity, precisely because Hitler did not want to let the Soviets advancc any further. 2 This did not change the Turkish attitude towards Germany. However, it had a significant impact on Turkey's suspicions of Soviet designs, fearing that she might soon find herself confronted with a new edition of Russian imperialism if the Soviets won the war. Despite all assurances, Turkey also had some suspicions that Britain might agree to an understanding at Turkey's expense. Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941 only served to increase Ankara's apprehensions. In a way, this was not completely like the usual Turkish suspicions since the Washington correspondent of the London Times, Sir William Lewis, who was a well-known British propagandist, gave some account of the Moscow meeting to the effect that the USSR had territorial aspirations in regard to the Baltic states, Romania, Poland and the Straits. His statement, 'Soviet eyes would be on Poland and Turkey', particularly aroused the suspicions of Sarafoglu. The latter remarked to Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Ankara, that Lewis' references to Turkey and the Straits might reflect the views of a number of officials in the British Foreign Office. 3 Neither British nor Soviet assurances that nothing was said about the Straits in the Moscow meeting helped to diminish Turkish anxiety about the subject. However, shortly afterwards, an increasing decree of anxiety about the Soviets appeared in Turkish circles. On his return to Britain, Cripps, who had relinquished his post of Ambassador to Moscow on 16 January 1942, emphasised that 1 Ibid. Ribbentrop to von Papen, no. 238, p. 373. DGFP, series D, Vol. XIII, Ribbentrop Papen, 25 August 1941, no. 238, P. 304. ^ FRUS, Steinhardt (American Ambassador to Ankara) to the Secretary of State, memorandum on SaraQoglu's account on background of Turco-Soviet relations during recent years, 11 June 1941. 1942, vol. IV, p. 822 and also see PRO FO 371/33340, R 317/72/44, Hugessen to Foreign Officc, no. 67, 10 January 1942. 2

120

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

... there was no question that if we were victorious the strongest European power would be the USSR, who were likely to end the war sitting in Berlin. If we were not in friendly co-operation with them it would be for the Soviet to determine the future of Europe. 1 This was followed by a Soviet assassination attempt against von Papen on 24 February 1942, which was interpreted as an attempt to provoke war between Germany and Turkey. In these circumstances there were real dangers in Turkey's distrust of Britain as well, since there had been continuing AngloSoviet negotiations since the Moscow meeting regarding the post-war order. In this respect, Britain feared that if Turkey learned that they had been ready to recognise the right of the Soviet government to their 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Romania, and their claim to the restoration of those frontiers after the war their suspicions would be redoubled. The reason for this was that there was little doubt that Turkey thought that if Britain agreed to that they were capable also of having agreed to Soviet control of the Straits, keeping the arrangement secret in order to hoodwink the Turks. 2 Hence, before concluding any such agreement, Britain and the USSR simultaneously informed Turkey on 15 April of their intentions and reassured her that they had no aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits. 3 However, this assurance did not remove Turkish distrust of the USSR either. Ever since the USSR had begun her meetings, Turkey had been suspicious that the Turkish Straits were being haggled over. But Turkey's fear of Germany was even greater than her fear of the USSR, because the latter was already in a position in Greece, Bulgaria and particularly the island of Lemnos to make use of the Straits very hazardous. Therefore, Turkey determined to stay in a neutral position as long as possible and decided to apply the regulations of Montreux Convention to all belligerent warships. Britain believed that Germany would not want to use the Straits for the passage of warships as long as she was fighting with the USSR as the Axis had all the base facilities, it required the use of the Straits for merchant shipping in order to increase her oil supplies, and there was nothing in the Montreux Convention to prevent Germany from doing so. However, any Axis attempt to reinforce Italian naval strength in the Mediterranean with Bulgarian and Romanian light craft was one of the likely possibilities. It was likely that Turkey would find itself forced to interpret the Convention in the Axis' favour.

1

The Times, 10 and 13 February 1942. PRO FO 371/33340, R 2108/72/44, Dixon memorandum on proposed Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, 30 March 1942. 3 PRO FO 371/33340, R 2626/72/44. 2

4 TURKEY'S WARTIME RECORD AS A GUARDIAN OF THE STRAITS

The evaluation of Turkey's neutral stance in wartime would, to a great extent, depend on how Turkey interpreted the rules for the passage of the Straits under the head of each different category of vessel: merchant and war. The issue has attracted surprisingly little attention from students of the Straits question. Although the policy of Turkey and the Western Powers to resist the Soviet demand for a revision of the Straits regime in their favour towards the end of the war has been extensively evaluated, it seems that little attention has been paid to Turkey's attitude concerning the passage of either naval auxiliaries or merchant vessels. Yet their passage created great controversy between Turkey and the Allies and Turkey and the Axis powers during the war. This is important because the post-war debate concerning the necessity for a revision of the Montreux Convention rests upon an assessment of Turkey's wartime record as guardian of the Straits. In making such an assessment, Ferenc Vali drew an accurate picture by saying that the circumstances created by the commanding position of the German war machine in the Aegean, following the conquest of Greece and Crete, made the entry of Allied ships into the Straits impossible until late 1944. He went on to say that under these conditions of war, Turkey endeavoured to apply the Montreux Convention as best she could during those difficult times. 1 However, he failed to observe the further case saying that 'despite the pressures exerted on Ankara by Berlin (and counter-pressures by Moscow and the Western Allies), the Turkish government managed to prevent the passage of forbidden craft through the Straits: when misled by camouflage, it prohibited the renewed entry of each ship as soon as its real character was discovered'. 2 At this point, de Luca raised the objection that 'Turkey's willingness to observe a strict interpretation of the Montreux Convention was not as clear cut as Vali would lead us to believe'. 3 Even though de Luca is not blind to Turkey's failure to rigidly uphold the Montreux Convention regarding the passage of Italian and later on German warships through the Straits in his 1

Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p.

61. 2

Ibid, p. 61. Anthony R. de Luca, 'Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits', Political Quarterly, Vol. 92, no. 3, Fall 1977, p. 507.

Science

122

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

own brief examination of the issue, Turkey's stance towards the Montreux Convention and British policy still needs to be examined more closely. This will provide more understanding of what lay behind the discussion of the Allies regarding to revision of the Montreux Convention. This chapter then evaluates Turkey's record during the war as a guardian of the Straits. Its aim is to explore to what extent Turkey implemented her responsibility under the Montreux Convention. It also considers to what extent Montreux was appropriate to meet the modern conditions created in the years of the war, which would provide evidence as to whether the Straits regime needed to be modified, as was found necessary after every major conflict. In doing so, the chapter necessarily evaluates the passage of merchant vessels and warships and the policies of Turkey and the concerned powers, particularly Britain, surrounding the question of passage. The aim is to shed some light on the factors which determined the Straits policies of Britain and her Allies and of the USSR in the post-war deliberations. In the early stage of the war, when the Axis gained a huge advantage against the Allies in the Aegean and Black Seas, Turkey found herself in a difficult position in the face of the Axis demand for passage through the Straits. On many occasions, although Turkey had applied the strict rule of the Convention to both sides, she found herself in the midst of a dilemma as to whether she should apply the exact terms or the spirit of the Convention in accordance with the new circumstances of the war. It was a crucial point since no matter which policy she adopted, one side or the other would benefit from it. Consequently, the policies adopted by the powers concerned regarding the passage of vessels in wartime reflect the degree to which strategic and military considerations were paramount in any discussion of the Straits question.

The Passage of Italian Auxiliary Vessels: a Breach of the Convention The Axis powers began to test Turkey's application of the Montreux Convention by sending two Italian naval auxiliaries, Tarvisio and Urano, into the Black Sea on 10 June 1941. The British government claimed that this was a breach of Articles 9 and 19 of the Convention which stipulated that vessels of war belonging to belligerent powers should not pass through the Straits, and asked that the two tankers should not be allowed to return to the Aegean. In response, the Turkish government accepted their mistake on this issue. But Ankara assured Britain of the strict control of passage in the future. Despite these assurances, the Turkish government failed to stop the Urano's return to the Aegean on 19 June 1 on the grounds that these ships, having hitherto 1

PRO FO 371/30129, R 6269/2095/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1513, 19 June 1941.

G U A R D I A N

OF

THE

S T R A I T S

123

entered the Straits, had a right to be permitted to return home under Article 19 of the Convention. 1 The British Foreign Office countered that the Article was to provide for the case in which a power became belligerent after one or more of her warships had passed through the Straits and at a moment when the Straits still separated the warships from their base. It could not authorise the return of a warship whose original passage through the Straits in wartime constituted a contravention of the Convention. 2 The reason behind Turkey's stance in this matter might have been to avoid resorting to extreme measures which would have involved an act of war. In this regard, Saracogl u revealed his anxiety to Hugessen that the Turks would hesitate to take a hard line without knowing previously that they would be supported by all the other signatories of the Convention. 3 However, from a political point of view, the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 brought a new dimension into the issue of the desirability of Turkey's maintaining a strict application of the Convention, to the effect that if the Germans succeeded in occupying the Soviet naval bases it would be very desirable to try to get the Soviet fleet out of the Black Sea. In view of this possibility, the Foreign Office refrained from protesting to Turkey about violations of the Convention, seeing that Turkey, at least, had protested to the Italian government about their breach of the Convention by requesting them to take steps to prevent any further violations. 4 However, the Admiralty impressed on Turkey that an 'absolutely uncompromising attitude' needed to be adopted regarding the maintenance of the Convention, instead of the liberal interpretation of the Convention which had favoured Axis shipping. 5 Consequently, Britain demanded that, at least, the Tarvisio should not be allowed out of the Black Sea when it requested a return passage. However, when the Italians requested, on 19 August, the re-entry of Tarvisio into the Aegean, it was no longer a 'warship', notification having been given to the Turkish authorities that it had been converted into a merchant vessel. Turkey had intended to refuse permission, in accordance with the list of Italian fighting ships already communicated to her before the war. However, Rome provided a new list from which the Tarvisio had been omitted. London's reaction was that to give permission would open the way to a complete undermining of the Convention and would set a precedent for other Axis vessels of the same category and enable the Axis to pass them through the Straits as merchant ships and then convert them again into naval vessels once

Paragraph 4 of the Article 19 reads as follows: '...vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which have become separated from their bases, may return thereto'. 2 PRO FO 371/30129, R 6349/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1494, 4 July 1941. 3 PRO FO 371/30129, R 6749/2095/44, Hugessento Foreign Office, no. 1635,4 July 1941. 4 PRO FO 371/30129, R 6911/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1494,4 July 1941. 5 PRO FO 371/30129, R 6349/2095/44, Admiralty to Bowker, no. M.09809/41, 2 July 1941.

124 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T P O W E R S they entered the Black Sea. 1 It was a completely new situation which had not been foreseen in the Montreux text nor any other international convention. Turkey could not take the risk by stopping the passage of the vessel once more, for fear of being involved in war. She adopted the practicable policy of informing Rome that if the Tarvisio passed through the Straits this would be perceived as a breach of the Convention and provoke a protest. As part of her passive action against the controversial passage, Turkey also informed the Italians that she would not provide pilotage for the ship through the Straits, which were heavily mined. 2 However, the Tarviso sailed into the Aegean without any difficulties. Subsequently, the British government withdrew their protest acknowledging that Turkey's decision was the result of circumstances surrounding her which had been created by German activities in Bulgaria that were possibly directed against her. 3 As a matter of fact, it seems that the Axis powers tried to find a way to use the Straits without having to meet any obstacle from Turkey in order to secure the passage of their ships in the Aegean and Black Seas. Accordingly, they put Turkey's stance towards Montreux to the test so that the greatest possible amount of Axis shipping could be allowed entry. The passage of the Tarvisio and the Urano may be considered in this light. Although they secured the passages of these two, it seemed that this might push Turkey to take an active part on the Allied side to prevent further breaches as she had been greatly disturbed by what had happened. Simultaneously, the Axis powers tried to smuggle Italian warships into the Black Sea by a trick without infringing the Convention.

Passage of Italian Warship under the Bulgarian Flag In the summer of 1941 several intelligence reports suggested that the Italians had sold six destroyers to Bulgaria, and that Turkey would be approached regarding their passage through the Straits. In view of Bulgaria not being a belligerent, there would be no objection under the letter of the Montreux Convention, to the Turkish authorities permitting this passage. 4 However, the point was that the sale or transfer of these destroyers to Bulgaria would clcarly be a fictitious one made simply in order to evade Article 19 of the Montreux Convention. It would be enough to get the destroyers through the Straits in order that they might be employed in military operations in the Black Sea. 5 In view of the Bulgarian Navy being almost non-existent, there was further evidence which could reinforce the above contention, that the Bulgarian government would not have sufficient personnel available to man as 1 2 3 4 5

PRO FO 371/30129, R 7653/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1836,16 August 1941. PRO FO 371/30130, R 7910/2095/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2050, 23 August 1941. PRO FO 371/30130, R 7997/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, 30 August 1941. PRO FO 371/30129, R 6749/2095/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1635,4 July 1941. PRO FO 371/30129, R 6911/2095/44, Malkin minute, 12 July 1941.

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

125

many as six destroyers and that Italian destroyers masquerading as Bulgarian would partly at least be manned by Italian crews. 1 Apart from these logical reasons, the British sought to create a legal case which would prevent the passage of these ships: both the Greek and Yugoslav governments in exile notified London that their respective countries declared themselves in a state of war with Bulgaria as from the date on which Bulgaria had occupied Greek and Yugoslav territory respectively. Therefore, as a belligerent, Bulgaria was clearly excluded, under Article 19 of the Straits Convention, from passing warships through the Straits. Britain developed the further legal argument that they were not belligerent warships which had been caught at the outbreak of war cut off from their bases; this clearly did not apply either if the destroyers were regarded as still Italian or if they were presumed as Bulgarian, because they did not become so until after Bulgaria had become a belligerent. Therefore, it was impossible to interpret the provision as allowing a belligerent to acquire warships after the outbreak of war. Accordingly, London urged Ankara to oppose most strongly any request on the part of the Axis for such facilities which, if granted, could only operate to Britain's disadvantage as well as to that of the Soviet Union. 2 However, Turkey had no intention of refusing any request for the passage of vessels under the Bulgarian flag, because she did not see sufficient reason to accept Bulgaria as a belligerent merely because the exiled Greek and Yugoslav governments had declared war upon them. Britain warned that 'it not only would constitute a breach of the Convention for Turkey to admit these vessels through the Straits under the Bulgarian flag, a belligerent nation, but would seriously compromise Turkish neutrality which it was one of the objects of the Straits Convention to maintain'. 3 To overcome Turkish opposition, the British Foreign Office began to argue whether Britain should declare war on Bulgaria in order to solve the question of the passage of Italian warships under the Bulgarian flag. However, the Admiralty did not welcome the idea, on the basis of reports that Germany was trying to force Bulgaria into the war in order to share the costs of the Soviet campaign and to pose a greater threat to Turkey. 4 The Foreign Office wanted to capitalise on, if it could not prevent, Italian warships sailing under a Bulgarian flag. Therefore, they requested the opinion of the COS about whether, in the event of the Turks allowing the passage, the British government might in tern openly demand similar rights for passage of British 1

PRO FO 371/30130, R 8485/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 2057, 17 September 1941. 2 PRO FO 371/30129, R 6911/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1576, 14 July 1941. ^ P R O FO 371/30130, R 8485/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 2057, 17 September 4

P R O FO 371/30130, R 8653/2095/44, Waldock (Admiralty) to Foreign Office, no. M014544/41, 20 September 1941.

126

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

forces into the Black Sea and the passage of Soviet forces out of it. With Turkey neutral, the COS did not anticipate any requirement for the passage of British forces into the Black Sea since both were unlikely as regards Axis operations against the USSR and possible future operations against Turkey. It was to Britain's advantage to ensure that Axis naval strength in the Black Sea was not increased. However, she believed that the Turks could not do this without allowing Axis forces to enter the Black Sea, which might create a situation in which the Soviets would want to retain all their forces. Nevertheless, if Turkey let Italian warships through, after all, the COS wanted to secure the right to demand equal treatment for Britain or the USSR. 1 Meanwhile, after British diplomatic efforts in Ankara there were some indications that the Turkish government might change its attitude. Saracoglu declared at a Party meeting that Bulgaria could not be regarded as one hundred per cent neutral and Ankara would not recognise any transfer of war vessels from one belligerent. 2 Turkish newspapers published a clarifying statement that as long as Turkey remained neutral no warships of any belligerent, even under the Bulgarian flag, would be granted the privilege of passage; Bulgaria was evidently a belligerent state following Greek and Yugoslavia declarations of war against her. 3 In the end Eden saw no reason to declare war on Bulgaria on this point. He declared at the House of Commons on 8 October that his government was confident that Turkey would take such measures and precautions as were necessary to fulfil, in letter and spirit, her obligations under the Convention as guardian of the Straits. 4 Consequently, rumours of the sale and of requests for passage through the Straits appeared to have been fabricated by the Axis in the hope of disturbing Anglo-Turkish relations, since no such request had been made to the Turkish government.

A Pro-Allies Stance or a Counter-Balance Policy on the Part of Turkey? The disparity of view between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty regarding attempts to secure passage of Soviet vessels out of the Black Sea was removed when the Germans gained a huge advantage in the Black Sea area where Soviet naval bases were put under threat. Under the existing circumstances of autumn 1941 the Admiralty believed that the Soviet battleships and cruisers were of little value in the Black Sea. Then they reached the conclusion, as the Germans suspected, that it might be advantageous to transfer them to the Far East if the Turks were prepared to allow them to pass ^PRO FO 371/30130, R 8838/2095/44, COS's memorandum, COS (41), 28 September 1941. PRO FO 371/30130, R 8657/2095/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2288, 26 September 1941. 3 PRO FO 371/30130, R 8681/2095/44, Hugessen, no. 2284, 26 September 1941. 4 House of Commons Official Reports (London: HMSO, 1941), Fifth Series, Vol. 374, p. 958. 2

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

127

through the Straits in contravention of the Montreux Convention. 1 The legal position of the passage of Soviet warships through the Straits, however, was not compatible with this. The Soviet Union had the right to send submarines through the Straits under Article 12 of the Convention if they were constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea and were re-joining their base, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase had been given to Turkey, or if they were to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea, on condition that detailed information on the matter was given to Turkey. However, Article 12 was clearly governed by Article 19, which laid down that in time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, vessels of war belonging to belligerent powers should not pass through the Straits. As a belligerent, the USSR was not permitted under the Convention to send a submarine through the Straits. Since the legal position was absolutely clear, there would certainly be no object in putting the suggestion to the Turkish government for the time being, as British authorities had been dealing with the passage of Italian warship through the Straits. 2 Indeed, when Germany invaded the USSR the German Foreign Ministry insisted Turkey should not let Soviet warships out of the Black Sea through the Straits under the terms of the Montreux Convention. However, this was not all the Germans had in mind. In view of the British shortage of shipping space in the Mediterranean, the USSR could perhaps render Britain substantial aid. Therefore, Berlin was anxious to have Turkish co-operation in preventing the passage of Soviet merchant tonnage too. Thus, Berlin would have forestalled any co-operation between the USSR and Britain in the field of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. 3 As military operations against the USSR progressed in favour of Germany, Berlin put more pressure on Turkey at the end of August 1941. In this regard, Turkey was notified that, with the progressive occupation of the Soviet ports on the Black Sea by German troops, Soviet warships or merchant vessels with military personnel on board or Soviet units and aircraft could try to transfer to Turkish territorial waters or to the Mediterranean. Berlin had no doubt that Turkey would apply the terms of the Montreux Convention regarding the passage of warships. However, Germany expected Turkey to do everything to delay the passage of Soviet merchant vessels. This would leave time for the German navy to have the chance of capturing these vessels. 4 Towards this objective, the German Admiralty co-operated with the Romanian, 1 2 3

3. 4

PRO FO 371/30130, R 8838/2095/44, COS memorandum, COS (41), 28 September 1941. PRO FO 371/30129, R 6911/2095/44, Nichols minute, 11 July 1941. DGFP, Series D, Voi. XIII, Foreign Office to von Papen, footnote 1, No. 2, 22 June 1941, p. DGFP, series D, Vol. XIII, Foreign Office to von Papen, no. 227, 22 August 1941, pp. 354-

128 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T

POWERS

Bulgarian and Italian navies to prevent the Soviet merchant fleet from breaking out of the Black Sea. 1 At the same time, Berlin hoped that, with the Turkish fear of an invasion of Iran by Soviet and British troops, Ankara would openly renounce her commitment to Montreux and would impose a general ban for the time being on the passage of merchant vessels through the Straits. Berlin also tried to take advantage of her current position in the Balkans and the Black Sea. In this sense, if Turkey cancelled all her commitments, Berlin would guarantee some concession to Turkey after the war. The only alternative was to threaten: if Turkey did not close the Straits to merchant vessels until later and if the Soviet merchant fleet should succeed in escaping to the Mediterranean, any subsequent closure of the Straits would be pointless. It would be perceived by Berlin that Turkey had contributed to strengthening the means of combat of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. The Turkish government was also warned against the possibility that Soviet warships and merchant vessels might try to get out of the Black Sea under British or Turkish flags. 2 Ankara promised Berlin that Soviet warships would not be permitted passage and that any attempt to force passage through the Straits would meet with armed resistance. However, Ankara responded positively to such a request from the British. In the autumn of 1941, in consequence of the German military progress in the Black Sea, the British Admiralty, no less than the Soviet Navy, wanted to get a number of Soviet ships, including tankers and icebreakers, out of the Black Sea. However, in order to elude the Axis forces when they emerged into the Aegean it was important to secure the connivance of the Turkish authorities in their furtive and disguised departure. The Turkish government responded unofficially. Consequently, several tankers, at least one of which was a naval auxiliary, passed through the Straits heading f o r the Mediterranean, while others waited at Istanbul for a chance to run the gauntlet. 3 In addition, contrary to the Convention, the Turkish authorities constantly connived at the abuse of the Turkish flag. For instance, a British tanker from Romania, which had taken refuge at Istanbul, and four Greek merchantmen which were made over to the British while there got safely through the Straits under the Turkish flag. The Soviets tankers also resorted to the same device. However, the Soviet evacuation of their fleet was stopped 1

Ibid, footnote 3. DGFP, D Series, Vol. XIII, Ambassador Ritter to von Papen, no. 253, 26 August 1941, pp. 403-404. ^ Eden replied to a question on 12 October 1943 asked by Purbrick in the House of Commons that 'when things were going badly for the Soviets in the Caucasus, the Soviet authorities decided to evacuate part of their tanker fleet from the Black Sea. They passed a considerable number of these vessels through the Straits one of which I believe was without doubt a fleet auxiliary. The Turkish authorities knew all about this and connived at the whole business'. PRO FO 371, R 37534/10782/44, Eden to Purbrick, 22 October 1943. Also see PRO FO 371/44069, R 9961/7/44, Clutton minute, 'Montreux Convention as applied by Turkey during the war', 21 June 1944. 2

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

129

after a short while because Soviet military fortunes were getting better. Even if Turkey's connivance at the Soviet evacuation from the Black Sea might be seen as an attempt to implement a balanced policy in order to cover her inability to stop Italian naval auxiliaries, it rather justified German apprehensions of Turkey as German forces spread all round the country. It seems doubtful whether Turkey would still have allowed Soviet evacuation contrary to the Convention if Germany had not intimidated Turkey by threats relative to the future of the Straits' status quo if she connived at any Soviet passage. On the other hand, Turkey stuck to the letter of the Convention when an open request was made by either party regarding the issue of passage for both merchant vessels and auxiliary vessels for the sake of avoiding military conflict. In particular, during the years when the Germans had overwhelming possession of the Aegean and the Black Sea, and the Balkans, where the Allies were in no position to send any kind of warships into the Black Sea, Turkey adopted a strict neutrality stance regarding the passage issue. She particularly avoided refusing the Allies' demands, which would have involved arguments over the interpretation of the Convention in terms of the spirit. Rather, Ankara stuck to its exact terms, not only for fear of German attack, but also to escape any objection which could be raised after the war regarding her execution of the Convention, which would give grounds for Soviet claims on the Straits. To evaluate this policy, it is necessary first to look at the policy adopted by Turkey regarding merchant and auxiliary vessels.

Ex-French Vessels through the Straits T h e Germans did not depend upon the seaways as a line of communication as much as the Allies did because the mainstay of German logistics was movement by rail and road. Nevertheless, the Germans did move large quantities of supplies and stores by sea because traffic on rail and road was continually interrupted by the attacks of Allied air forces. 1 As far as the passage of German merchant vessels through the Straits was concerned, the Germans began to send some of their vessels through the Straits mostly to provide supplies for their troops in the Aegean. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention, Turkey had no right to stop any vessel which claimed to be a merchant one, even if it was carrying any amount of war materials not obviously intended for the armament of the vessels themselves. For instance, when Germany sent two merchant vessels, the Delchow and the Larissa, down to the Aegean, though British officials wanted them stopped, the 1 James Butler (ed.), History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, parti (London: HMSO, 1984), p. 358.

130

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Turkish government acted in accordance with the terms of the Convention. This policy was reluctantly accepted by the British Government since Turkey applied only the regulations. However, when the Germans officially demanded the cession of 140,000 tons of idle French merchant shipping from the Vichy government on 13 September 1942, for immediate use in the Black Sea, their passage became a focus of Allied diplomacy. 1 The reason was that, given the military considerations concerned, it would have been difficult for the Allies to accept this since it would have given a huge advantage to the Axis powers in the Aegean and the Mediterranean. The first objection to the passage came from Washington. The State Department expressed their view that the sending of these ships to the Black Sea could only be regarded as being so closely connected with military operations as to give the vessels the character of naval auxiliaries to which passage through the Dardanelles should be refused in accordance with the Montreux Convention. 2 The American proposal divided opinions among British policy-makers both on the legal position and the balance of advantage. The Admiralty, contrary to their policy in the Tarvisio matter, pointed out that the use of the American argument would completely stultify Britain if she wished to remove any further Soviet shipping from the Black Sea, as had been done a year ago with the help of the Turks. The basis of the Admiralty view was that Britain had then been successful in removing five Soviet tankers from the Black Sea with the connivance of the Turks, but under the interpretation now placed by the State Department upon the Montreux Convention Britain would never be able to do so again. 3 The Foreign Office took a different line with the view that the strict stand by the Turks on the Convention after the Soviets had gained to some extent a position of balance against Germany in the Black Sea. Therefore, in adopting the Admiralty's view, it would be difficult to persuade Turkey to allow the illegal passage of Soviet ships through the Straits if it were needed. Thus, the Foreign Office authorised Hugessen to be ready to support his US colleague if the latter asked for assistance to approach Ankara with the argument that this passage should be refused if the Turks took their stand on the letter of the Straits Convention. Because it was clear that the Germans only wanted to send the ships through the Straits for the purpose of taking part in or facilitating military operations in or around the Black Sea. Therefore, French ships seeking passage should not be regarded as merchant vessels but as auxiliary vessels and should be

1 PRO FO 371/33407, R 7064/7062/44, Halifax to Foreign Office, no. 4822, 25 September 1942; Department of State Archives, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1940-44, 767.68119/1038, Halifax to State Department, 17 November 1942; FRUS, Vol. IV, 1942, Hull (the Secretary of State) to Steinhardt, 25 September 1942, p. 805. 2 PRO FO 371/33407, R 7691/7062/44, Viscount Halifax (British Ambassador to Washington, to Foreign Office, no. 4822, 25 September 1942. 3 PRO FO 371/33407, R 7691/7062/44, Foreign Office minute, 28 September 1942.

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

131

treated as warships in terms of the purposes of the passage. 1 After the assessment of its Plans Division, the Admiralty changed its previous view that it was of greater importance to the Germans to get tonnage into the Black Sea to persecute their military plan than it was for the Soviets to get their merchant ships out in the event of the Caucasus being completely overrun. Accordingly the Admiralty expressed the view that 'although we realised that the legal case under Montreux is pretty thin, we feel that we must back up the efforts of the US to stop the Axis getting tonnage into the Black Sea if the point actually arises'. 2 Since all Axis shipping through the Straits would obviously recoil on the Soviets, Britain thought that they should be consulted by Washington without delay. Moscow fully agreed with Anglo-American desiderata and suggested a joint approach to Ankara. In this regard the State Department authorised their Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara, Kelly, either to make a joint representation as suggested by the USSR or separate representations after consultations with his British and Soviet colleagues. 3 Eden wrote to Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to Washington, that 'we had never contemplated a tripartite approach and the idea of a joint approach thoroughly alarms me'. This was because he knew that the Turks had always been most suspicious about the sincerity of the Soviet adherence to the Montreux Convention which masked the Soviets' real intentions regarding the future of the Straits. Hence, Eden believed that to associate London with Moscow in a joint approach would at once not merely make Ankara suspect that London had hidden motives for this action, but also that Britain was conspiring with the USSR to force the Turks to interpret the Convention in a way which suited Soviet interests. 4 Therefore, Hugessen was instructed to dissuade his US colleague from discussing this matter with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires. 5 As a matter of fact, what Britain wanted was that the Americans should take the initiative and their representative should be backed by Hugessen. Because of strong British objections to a joint approach, Hull, the American Secretary of State, finally agreed to the British proposal regarding the passage of the French vessels through the Straits. 6 Therefore, the American, British and Soviet diplomatic representatives in Ankara separately visited the Turkish Foreign Ministry on 4 and 5 November 1942. Numan Menemencioglu, the

1

PRO FO 371/33407, W 12956/7737/58, Foreign Office to Admiralty, 1 Octobcr 1942. PRO FO 371/33407, W 12956/7737/58, Admiralty to Foreign Office, no. M.051843/42, 8 October 1942. 3 FRUS, Vol. VI, 1942, Hull to Kelly (Chargé d'Affaires Ankara), 29 October 1942. Also see PRO FO 371/33407, R 7275/7062/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 5355, 30 October 1942. 4 PRO FO 371/33407, R 7275/7062/44, Eden to Halifax, no. 6680, 31 October 1942. 5 PRO FO 371/33407, R 7275/7062/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1668, 31 Octobcr 1942. 6 FRUS, Vol. VI, 1942, Hull too Kelly, 31 October 1942, p. 808. 2

132

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

Turkish Foreign Minister, maintained that the provisions of Montreux regarding the definition of auxiliary naval vessels were very precise and the Turkish Government would be precluded by these provisions from classifying merchant vessels, which were to be used for military purposes, as auxiliary naval vessels. Menemencioglu admitted that it was as much against Turkish interests that ships should pass through the Straits as against those of the Allies. Even so he could see no legal basis on which to rest a refusal. He also did not accept the delay method which had applied to the Tarvisio by saying that she was an auxiliary not a merchant vessel. He saw no possibility of refusing the passage of these ships consistent with the terms of the Convention. However, he added that if any legal basis in the Convention could be found he would be glad to examine it. 1 Since there were no legal grounds in the Convention, the British Foreign Office decided to vigorously pursue some way to secure the arrest by the Turkish Courts of any ex-Allied ship passing through the Straits. The ships which the Germans would most probably attempt to pass through the Straits would be the ex-Norwegian ships, the Regina, Langanger, President Herrenshmidt and John Knudsen, which had been arrested illegally by the Germans while they were in a French port for merchant purposes. This could be for the good reason of preventing their passage to the Black Sea. In order to do so, after making contact with the Norwegian government -in- exile in London, it was therefore agreed by the Foreign Office that possession should be instituted in the name of Norway based upon her right to possession under the Norwegian Requisitioning Decrees of 22 April and 18 May 1940. In the case of most of these ships the Norwegian government had in fact already taken effective possession of them but they had later been wrongfully deprived of it by the French. 2 Copies of the written attornments by most of the masters in favour of the Norwegian government, which had been executed when the Norwegian government first took possession, were available. Copies of these, together with copies of the relevant Norwegian Decrees, were all sent to Turkey for use in the contemplated legal proceedings. 3 It was decided shortly afterwards that as there seemed to be an equal possibility of the Germans attempting to pass other ex-Allied ships through the Straits, the same policy, namely the institution of a possession action in Turkey, should be applied to any ex-British, Dutch or Greek ships involved. In these cases the Ministry of War Transport was interested as the War Risk 1 Ibid. Kelly to Hull, 4 November 1942, p. 809. PRO FO 371/33407, R 7339/7062/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2024, 6 November 1942. 2 The Norwegian ships were on their normal course of trading at the time of the French collapse and were then illegally detained. PRO FO 371/33407, R 7339/7062/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1700, 6 November 1942. 3 PRO FO 371/33407, R 7322/7062/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1669, 31 October 1942.

GUARDIAN

OF T H E

STRAITS

133

Underwriter or as Re-insurer of War Risk Underwriters by whom total losses had been paid. It was also discovered that Danish ships were involved, but in only one case — the Nicotine Maersk — could a possession action be founded. As regards the others, the only possibility of arrest lay in seeking to enforce debt claims in the Turkish Courts. The assistance of the Enemy Shipping Claims Committee was therefore invoked for this purpose. Even successful actions would only result in delaying the vessels, in view of the uncertainties of Turkish legal procedures, but it was thought that repeated attempts to enforce these claims would have a useful nuisance value. 1 The Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942 and the consequent German occupation of Southern France altered the situation substantially. Ex-Allied and Danish ships, recovery of which was being sought in Turkey, were recovered in North, or West Africa. 2 At the same time, a large amount of French shipping became available to the Germans, some of which might at any time be despatched to the Black Sea. No possession actions could be founded as regards these French ships and the assistance of the Enemy Shipping Claims Committee was, therefore, again invoked for the purpose of asserting debt claims against any French or ex-French ships appearing in Turkish waters. 3 With increasing urgency, owing to the Allied success towards the autumn of 1943, the British government once more alerted Turkey to the fact that the Germans might try to evacuate material and men from the Aegean via the Straits under the guise of merchant shipping, or alternatively remove ex-Allied shipping from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Hugessen proposed close scrutiny of all German shipping to guard against an infringement of the Convention and, in cases where the Convention did not apply, to institute administrative delays for the ships and greater speed and more benevolence in the judicial procedure for the arrest of vessels. However, the Turkish Foreign Ministry did not consider it possible to give a favourable reply to Britain's firmness and could not lend itself to any administrative subterfuges. As for British court action with regard to ex-Allied ships, the Ministry pointed out that it could not intervene to influence the judiciary. 4 However, British officials in Turkey tried to secure the arrest of exAllied ships passing through the Straits. The first good chance of making an arrest was when the ex-Danish ship, Birgit, appeared in the Straits. However, the British did not want to take the risk of showing their hand for the sake of a comparatively small and unimportant prize. It was felt that if once the Germans appreciated what Britain proposed to do, they might well take steps

1

PRO FO 371/33407, R 8546/7062/44, Bennett to Foreign Office, no. 2245, 11 December 1942. PRO FO 371/33408, R 7811/7062/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1773, 19 November 1942. 3 PRO FO 371/33408, R 3523/7062/44, Foreign Office to Ministry of War Transport, 12 December 1942. 4 PRO FO 371/37472, R 8661/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1633, 10 September 1943. 2

134

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T P O W E R S

to strengthen their legal title to the ships in question. Since then further vessels had passed through the Straits such as the P.L.M.16, Firuz, the Ossag, which was an ex-French ship flying the German flag, and the Celeno, which was Italian. No claims existed against the first two of these vessels. However, British diplomatic representatives in Istanbul were instructed to proceed against the Ossag and the Celeno. This was only successful in one case namely that of the Johannes Maersk and even this was only temporary. 1 Finally, by the time Turco-German relations were broken off on August 1944, the legal action against ex-Allied ships had been dropped.

Passage of Vessels under 100 Tons Turkey's greatest difficulties with the Allies and vice-versa over Axis passage through the Straits had mostly concerned vessels not exceeding 100 tons, which Annex II of the Convention allowed as 'merchant ships'. This was, to a great extent, the result of British strategic considerations at the time when the Convention was signed. However, when the war came the concept of British military strategy had been affected as Germany began to benefit from it, since only the Axis held a controlling position in the Aegean. Besides, since the Convention new types of war vessels had been brought in, such as E-boats and EMS craft which were under 100 tons, but had warlike characteristics. The passage of the 37-ton German tug Seefalke through the Straits on 7 July 1941 and subsequent discussion of E-boats and the incident of the F barges and EMS craft raised the question of war vessels of not more than 100 tons. These discussions in fact indicated direct deficiencies in Annex II of the Montreux Convention to meet the new situation, as Turkey stuck to her neutral position. The Soviet Union claimed that the passage of Seefalke should not be allowed since she was a warship. However, she was examined in Istanbul by the Turkish naval authorities and by the British Naval Attaché there. It seemed clear that, although she could easily be converted into an armed tug or patrol craft, she was in fact a mercantile tug. 2 The Turkish government responded to the Soviets that the vessel was unarmed and possessed none of the characteristics of a warship. Even if she had been an ex-fast coastguard vessel there was nothing in the Montreux Convention to prevent her passage since any vessel of not moore than 100 tons must be regarded as a merchantman and allowed passage. However, Muscow was not satisfied with this explanation and protested to Turkey at the violation of paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the

1

PRO FO 371/44120, R 2500/396/44, Hugessen to Commander Oliphant, Assistant Naval Attaché, Istanbul, 2 February 1944. 2 PROF FO 371/30130, R 7200/2095/44, Hugessen, 1782,20 July 1941.

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

135

convention 1 . The British government took the line that it could not object to her passage, as she had no purely military characteristics. At the same time, London was very apprehensive that the Germans might seek passage for fast and heavily armed vessels of a plainly military character such as E-boats. On the grounds that E-boats were not over 100 tons, according to the letter of Montreux, Germany would certainly have contended that they were not mentioned in Annex II and that they were not vessels of war under the terms of the Convention. Consequently, they did not fall under the prohibition imposed by Article 19 on belligerent vessels of war. 2 Since legally the passage of Eboats was permissible, London believed that any appeal to the Turkish authorities would have to be on political grounds. Therefore, the British Foreign Office constructed an argument to persuade the Turks not to permit such vessels. One of the difficulties might regard this type of boat which did not exist at the time the Convention had been signed. Accordingly, it asserted that it was not the intention of the framers of the convention and least of all of the Turks, that belligerent warships such as E-boats, which were powerfully armed with torpedo-tubes, cannons and machine-guns, and capable of attaining very high speeds, should have an unrestricted right of passage merely because they displaced less than 100 tons. The contention in question would not only undermine the whole purpose of the restrictions imposed by Article 19 and in particular Annex II of the Convention, but also involved the ridiculous result that under Article 7 fully armed E-boats were to be regarded as merchant vessels and were governed by the provisions of the Convention applicable to such vessels, though these were plainly inapplicable to them 3 . Britain pressed further to prevent the passage of such vessels, urging that if Germany or Italy had the right to send them through the Straits then Britain had the same right. If, as would be highly probable, E-boats, or squadrons of E-boats of opposing belligerents met in the Straits, fighting would inevitably occur and the Straits would become a battle zone. This would probably lead to the intervention of belligerent aircraft so that the air space above the Straits would also become a theatre of operations. Not only would such event be seriously embarassing to the Turkish authorities and compromise its neutrality, but the safety of shipping and navigation in the Straits would be seriously impaired while life and property ashore would be endangered. Therefore, no matter if they were armed or not, Britain asked Turkey to refuse the passage of E-boats because they were warships. It could not be contended that a warship could espace the provisions of the convention either by shedding its armaments for the purpose of the passage or by deferring the fitting of armaments until it had reached a Black Sea porn. 1

íkinci Dünya Sava§i Yillari 1939-1946 (Turkish Foreign Ministry Publication: 1973), pp. 123124. Also see PRO FO 371/30130, R 8229/2095/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 4 September 1941. 2 P R O FO 371/30130/2095/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 15 Saving, 30 October 1943. 3 Ibid. 4 P R O FO 371/30130/2095/44, Malkin minute on 'Passage of Motor Torpedeos', 22 October 1941.

136

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T P O W E R S

George Clutton, Clerk in the Southern Department, thought that this appeal to the spirit of the Convention and to Article 19 would land his government in a very awkward position. He criticised the line taken by the Admiralty: although the definition of warships contained in the Annex to the Montreux Convention had been taken literally from the London Treaty, the sentence which prohibited passage of warships of under 100 tons had been omitted as a result of the Admiralty's policy. At that time the Admiralty's concern had been the prevention of the passage of the Soviet fleet from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean while the Soviet interest was to prevent the passage of a hostile fleet from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. At this point, Brittain would certainly have had no objection to E-boats passing through the Straits into the Black Sea, but would have been worrried by the idea of their passage in the reverse direction. Clutton's conclusion clearly indicated the paramount role which strategic and military considerations had played in the Straits question: he minuted that 'the passage of these vessels was surely not prohibited because we did not conceive their existence, but because no one thought it conceivable that the Royal Navy should lose control of the Aegean'. 1 This argument was supported by George Rendel, who had been of the British delegates during the Montreux negotiations. He stated: it is rather ironic that we should now be so anxious to get the widest possible interpretation of the term auxiliary vessels. At the time, the instigations of the Admiralty were to secure the greatest possible freedom for the greatest number of ships of all kinds to pass through the Straits at any time, even when the ships were belligerent and Turkey was neutral. Indeed, the Admiralty had been very disappointed that British delegates did not obtain the complete and absolute right of passage for all kinds of vessels at all times, since their thesis was that the Black Sea was an open sea and the Straits should therefore also be regarded as open. 2 In fact no E-boats seemed to have applied for passage through the Straits and the Turkish Government never defined its attitude in the matter. However, Turkey gave Britain an extremely difficult time when the F barges began to pass through the Straits.

German Fraud: The Passage of F Barges As the Germans began to send F barges from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea through the Straits in January 1943, London appealed to Ankara to stop these vessels because of their warlike character, providing photographic ipRO FO 371/30130, R 8021/2095/44, Clutton minute, 4 September 1942. PRO FO 371/33407, R 7691/7062/44, Rendel to Howard, 14 November 1942.

2

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

137

evidence of one of the barges. Furthermore, it was explained that these barges were fitted not only with a drawbridge for the landing of vehicles, such as tanks and motor transport, but also with ports in the sides of their superstructure for the disembarkation of troops. They were a recognised type of naval vessel, known as F barges, which had been found in concentrations in the Low Countries during invasion preparations and during the past year had been extensively used by the Germans in the northern Black Sea. 1 London regarded these barges as falling within the category of naval surface vessels referred to in clause B 6 of Annex II to the Montreux Convention, which referred to auxiliary vessels mounted with more than eight guns with a calibre exceeding 3-inches. Alternatively they might be seen as surface vessels of war referred to in clause B 5 of the same Annex, which described minor vessels which were designed or fitted to launch torpedoes. 2 After pointing out that the barges flew the German commercial flag and that the Turkish authorities had c a r e f u l l y examined the question, Menemencioglu put forward the following arguments: these barges could not be assimilated to minor war vessels under paragraph B (5) of Annex II of the Montreux Convention because, being of shallow draught and lacking all offensive or defensive armaments, they could not voyage or fight on the high seas. Nor could they be regarded as auxiliary vessels under paragraph B (6) of Annex II since their names were not to be found in the list of auxiliary vessels normally forming part of the German fleet. It would therefore be necessary to prove at least that they were registered as naval vessels and were sailed by naval crews or at least officers. Moreover, these barges were so constructed that they had no distinctively military features. 3 Menemencioglu claimed that the barges could equally be used for commercial purposes and there was no sign whatever in their construction of any definite war purpose. Although he did not attempt to disguise the fact that in practice these barges were for use in war, Menemencioglu concluded that there was no juridical justification for stopping them under the Montreux Convention and contended that Turkey should get through to the end of the war without ever incurring any suspicion of having stretched or infringed the letter of the Convention. 4 As a matter of fact, it was rather plausible to argue that these barges were designed and fitted to launch torpedoes since they were suitable for fitting out with guns which could exceed the permissible standards of the Convention. The difficulty for Turkey in this matter was in fact that the vessels were of a new type which had only come into service with belligerents 1

PRO FO 371/37504, R 451/284/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 84, 13 January 1943. PRO FO 371/37504, R 776/284/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 12(63/2/43), 4 January 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37504, R 1125/284/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 244,7 February 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/37504, R 1130/284/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 245,7 February 1943. 2

138

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

since the beginning of the war. Neutral governments, such as Turkey, might lack experience of this type. Therefore, the British Foreign Office made huge efforts to induce the Turkish government to see the loophole for the Germans in allowing their passage. Accordingly, the British authorities raised the further objection to Menemencioglu's approach that the barges were, of course, constructed for use in shallow water because they were designed for landing equipment and troops on open coasts. 1 Therefore, they should have no difficulty in loading tanks which would be embarked by letting down a ramp. It was also a curious claim that the Germans should be transferring these barges from the Danube for commercial operations to the Mediterranean which was not particularly suitable for their commercial employment, but was wholly suitable for military operations. 2 The British government believed that these barges had characteristics which would not normally be found in any craft built for commercial use and which served no normal commercial purpose. Accordingly, London drew the attention of the Turkish authorities to the serious risk which they might be running in opening their ports and waters to vessels having the characteristics of military landing craft, but presenting themselves in a guise which they might deem to be innocent. Indeed, barges of precisely this kind were being used extensively by the Germans in military operations. They were in fact used in supplying Rommel's forces in the battles of Egypt, Libya and Tripolitania. Numbers were being employed in support of military operations in northern Norway where they included minelaying amongst their activities. Others were used for military transport in the Gulf of Finland. 3 It was evident once more that the Convention was not enough to meet the definition of a warship under these new circumstances. Under the Convention, the Turkish Government's interpretation was to carry out their promise under Article 19 of the Convention. Yet the British government's argument was also strong and convincing in pointing to the new circumstances which had arisen since the Convention was signed. It took some considerable time to convince the Turkish authorities about the German fraud. F barges went on passing through the Straits until, in August 1943, the British and American Embassies drew the attention of Menemencioglu to a German broadcast expatiating on the merits of the F barges as war vessels. The broadcast referred to the employment of these vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, though not in the Aegean. It was rather an embarrassment for Turkey since what the broadcast revealed about the character of the vessels was along the lines which the British government had explained privately. The Foreign Office believed that the Germans would attempt to send a further flotilla of these barges 1

2 3

PRO FO 371/37504, R 6576/284/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, 1 August 1943.

Ibid. PRO FO 371/37504/44, R 451/284/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 162, 29 January 1943.

GUARDIAN

OF T H E

STRAITS

139

through the Straits in the near future. Therefore, an approach from the Allies finally satisfied Menemencioglu's often reiterated demand for proof that they belonged to the German navy. 1 From that time onwards their passage was stopped, London also notified Turkey that the Germans might at some future date attempt to pass through the Straits vessels of some other type allegedly commercial but in reality military. 2 On the same grounds, Turkey flatly refused passage in October 1943 to a number of German schooner barges, although the Germans declared that they were wanted to carry foodstuffs to Greece and the Aegean Islands. 3

The Turning Point Since their theatre of operations in the Black Sea had become so restricted as a result of Soviet victories, the Germans, at the end of May 1944, began to move shipping from the Black Sea into the Aegean where their navy desperately needed reinforcements. In this regard, to obtain the passage of KT craft, vessels of about 800 tons, and EMS craft, smaller vessels of 40-50 tons, the Germans made use of the same fraud as they had done in the case of the F barges', they dismantled their armaments planning to install them again when the ships reached their destination in the Aegean after passing them through the Straits as commercial vessels. As soon as they appeared in the Bosphorus, Hugessen appealed to Menemencioglu to stop their illegal passage. 4 Instead of any attempt to deny or delay, he said everything had been done by the Turkish authorities to facilitate their passage according to the timetable desired by the Germans. In fact, on 2 June, four KT class Mannheim vessels and eight EMS craft passed through the Straits as a result of the faulty inspection of the Turkish authorities. 5 Indeed, the attitude of Menemencioglu in these passages was somehow pathetic as appeared in his negotiations with Hugessen on 3 June. Although there had been an example of German fraud in the passage of F barges just a few months ago, he again stuck to the legal point, saying that there was no clause in the convention under which he could forbid the passage of these 1 PRO FO 371/44164/3830/44, Parliamentary question by Ivor Thomas to Eden, 14 June 1944. For the text of the German broadcast see PRO FO 371/37471, R 7952/55/44. Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1225, 25 August 1943. State Department Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 1940-44, 767.68119/1038, Steinhardt to Department of State, 13 September 1943. 2 PRO FO 371/37472, R 8662/55/44. Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1317, 17 September 1943. 3 FRUS, Vol. IV, 1943, Steinhardt to Hull, 8 September 1943. pp. 1086-1087, PRO FO 371/44120/396/44, Hugessen to Numan Menemencioglu, no. 15(248/1/44), 15 January 1944. Also see PRO FO 371/44069, R 9961/7/44, Clutton minute, 21 June 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/44120, R 8738/396/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 859, 2 June 1944. State Department Archives, RG 59, Decimal File, 1940-44, 767.68119/1047, Winant to Department of State, 8 June 1944. 5 PRO FO 371/3830/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 212(248/44/44), 3 June 1944.

140 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T P O W E R S ships. He further stated that he would be ready to go to arbitration on any individual case if anything contravened the letter of the Convention. This time Hugessen had no reason to tackle the legal issue, since this would be nothing more than continuing to give Germany the benefit of the doubt of the Convention. But he pointed out that there was every reason to believe that these were vessels of war and that the Turkish action had unequivocally favoured the Germans. 1 In the light of the inactive stance of Turkey, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean asked permission to employ the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to carry out sabotage action against German shipping in Turkish waters in order to prevent any German attempt to rebuild their shipping position in the Mediterranean. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, also agreed that from the military point of view 'it was most important that the passage should be stopped'. 2 However, the Foreign Office did not approve because of opposition by Hugessen. The latter raised the objection that even if successful action were possible in a few cases it would have repercussions in other directions that heavily outweighed the advantage to be gained. 3 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was willing to solve the passage question by diplomatic means. In a way, Turkey had been warned that future AngloTurkish relations would depend on the Turkish stance regarding the passage question. Britain determined to bring an end to the German shipping passing through the Straits since it was undermining her position in the Eastern Mediterranean. At this point, the Straits issue became a critical matter. It was evident, after all, that there was no point in taking the matter up further with the Turkish Foreign Minister, for his attitude was well defined. Instead, the one who should be approached was the President, Inonii, who was well known to be pro-British. While Hugessen was instructed to avoid any legalistic arguments, it needed to be made clear that the reason for asking for an audience was 'first and foremost to protest against action of the Turkish Government in allowing the passage of these ships'. 4 It was emphasised that the Turkish attitude regarding the German passage worked to the direct detriment of British interests in the Mediterranean. The condition of the future relationship between the two countries would depend on Turkish willingness to respect British legitimate interests by resisting any further German attempts to pass ships of these categories through the Straits.

1

PRO FO 371/44120, R 8741/396/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 863, 3 June 1944. PRO FO 371/44120, R 8997396/44, Chiefs of Staff memorandum, 'Passage of Enemy Vessels from the Black Sea to the Aegean', COS (44) 181 st meeting, 3 July 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/44120, R 8741/396/44, Foreign Office to Cairo, no. 1928, 3 June 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/44120, R 8777/396/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 695, 6 June 1944. 2

G U A R D I A N

OF

THE

S T R A I T S

141

Accordingly, Hugessen pointed out to inonii that the Allied forces had sought to destroy the German naval force in the Aegean for a considerable time and in doing so had incurred heavy losses. As a result of this Allied offensive, Germany had a shortage of warships in the Aegean Sea. However, the Ambassador claimed that the position had now been entirely changed, because Germany's available shipping and naval forces in the Aegean had been reinforced, 'thanks to the Turks having permitted the passage through the Straits of these vessels'. Hugessen gave some evidence to the President that the Germans were clearly abusing the Montreux Convention in practice, since they were camouflaging these craft as merchant vessels in order to get them to the Aegean. The intention and the spirit of the Montreux Convention were clear and in the view of the British Government both were being violated by the action of the Turkish authorities in allowing these craft through the Straits. The Ambassador went on to point out that Turkey had to decide between two things. On the one side there was the principle of the Montreux Convention, the desirability of shortening the war and the question of AngloTurkish relations in general. On the other was a pettifogging point of interpretation of the Convention, thereby assisting the German deceit. Accordingly he stressed the importance of stopping the passage of these ships immediately. 1 inonu seemed anxious 2 to restore the former close understanding between the two countries and Turkey's desire to be treated once more as an Ally and not as a neutral. However, Britain would only be ready to consider the question of future Anglo-Turkish co-operation if the issue of the passage of German vessels was out of the way. Britain also had one more condition for establishing a firm basis for the two countries' relations: that the Turkish Government should take the initiative in specifically assuring Great Britain and her Allies of its wholehearted and general co-operation within its limits, inonii was ready to co-opcrate with Britain on the basis of Hugessen's request. Nevertheless this matter was supposed to be taken up with the government and he promised to speak about the Straits issue with the Prime Minister, Sara§oglu. 3 The Foreign Office was also convinced that a policy of loyal cooperation on the basis of the alliance was impossible so long as Menemencioglu remained Foreign Minister. However, it was not to easy to tell this to the Turks. Hugessen was instructed to see his way to hinting to the President through Rauf Orbay, his close friend, and the Turkish Ambassador to London. 4 At the same time, Eden made a statement in the House of Commons

1 PRO FO 371/44069, R 9759/7/44, Record of audience of Hugessen with the Turkish President on 8 June no by Helm. No, 248/73/44, 10 June 1940. 2 In Hugessen's negotiations with the President, Menemencioglu, perhaps feeling responsible for all these passages, again raised the legal point of vessels being less than 100 tons. Hugessen remarked that conditions had greatly changed since Montreux. The Germans had abused the rule. Turkey was the guardian of, and responsible for, the Straits. If the question of revision came up, Turkey would appear in a far better light if she had stood up for the principles of Montreux rather than if she had aided and abetted Germany in reducing it to an absurdity. 3 PRO FO 371/44069, R 9126/7/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 885, 9 June 1944. State Department Archives, RG 59, Decimal File, 767.68119/1048, Steinhardt to Department of State 9 June 1944. 4

PRO FO 371/44120, R 9131/396/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 728, 12 June 1944.

142

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

on 14 June about his government challenging Turkish permission for the German vessels to pass through the Straits. 1 The heavy British pressure forced inonti and Sara£oglu to take the matter up themselves. As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the year Turco-Allied relations had been under strain (sec Chapter 5) due to Turkey's reluctance to enter the war because the war material, promised by Churchill at the Adana meeting of 30- 31 January 1943, had not been supplied. Any further strain might have led to a breaking of relations which Turkey could not risk. Inonii showed particular interest in the British request. He had been told by Feridun Cemal Erkin, Assistant Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, that the British claim about the German passage was a very grave one which Turkey should have taken much more seriously. According to Erkin, he told Menemencioglu that the German vessels should be stopped for inspection as to whether they were military in character, as Britain claimed, but the latter did not see it as a proper procedure under the provisions of Montreux. This explanation was enough to convince the President that there was something going on. Therefore, the President himself brought the issue before a cabinet meeting immediately. Menemencioglu's attitude was not different from before, but even more aggressive. The President and Prime Minister were convinced that Menemencioglu had been misled regarding the passage issue, which brought about the latter's resignation from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2 Consequently, Saracoglu took over the Ministry. After Menemencioglu's resignation a careful inspection of the German vessel Kassel was made by the Turkish authorities and the British claims about German fraud were verified. 3 Sara§oglu gave a detailed account on 16 June at the extraordinary party meeting about the incident leading to the resignation of Menemencioglu. A careful examination of the Kasse\ disclosed conccalcd automatic guns, tubes for firing depth charges and all incidental equipment, material and cases of munitions as well as wireless apparatus. Sara$oglu made it clear that the passage of the EMS and KT Mannheim through the Straits had been illegal. 4 And it was fully established that this

1 Eden Statement about German ships passing through the Straits, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth series, House of Commons, Vol. 400, Sixth Volume of Session 194344, pp. 1986-1987. 2 Feridun Cemal Erkin, Di§i§lerinde 34 Yd: Anilar-Yorumlar, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1980) pp. 140-141. 3 PRO FO 371/440069, R 9447/3830/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 923,15 June 1944. 4 According to information given by Saracoglu to the press, as quoted in Yeni Sabah, the vessel had the following characteristics: the armour plating of the hull was nine millimetres thick. The ship could berth stern on, derricks weighed thirty tons. It was built in 1943 and had the following armaments: in bow a heavy two centimetre automatic gun with four barrels mounted on very large emplacement. On poop one 3.7 centimetre gun. In wireless room amidships four wireless sets which investigation showed can serve as submarine detectors. In holds one 8.8 centimetre gun of 35 calibre which had been ascertained could be put in place of automatic guns, eightyone depth charges, twelve depth charge throwers and sixty-five cases of ammunition for armament on board. Yeni Sabah, 'Durumda Aydinlik', 18 June 1944. Also see PRO FO 371/44164, R 9574/3830/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 944, 17 June 1944. Department of State Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 1940-44, 767. 68119/1056, Steinhardt to Department of State, no. 1083, 15 June 1944.

G U A R D I A N

OF

THE

S T R A I T S

143

category of ship fell directly within that of warships according to the provisions of Montreux and that of auxiliaries implied by the provisions of the special article of the Convention. Then he declared that if any of the officials concerned were guilty of negligence and inadvertence they would be prosecuted. 1 Thus, the passage question was settled officially as Britain wanted. Furthermore, Saragoglu gave the British Government a categorical assurance of Turkey's desire to co-operate wholeheartedly with Britain. He declared in his reception of representatives of the Allied Press that Turkey was determined not to do anything which might be detrimental to the interests of her ally, Great Britain, her friend and neighbour the USSR, and her friends the US. 2 There is no clear-cut evidence that Menemencioglu used his power intentionally in favour of the Germans. He stuck for too long to the letter of the Convention ignoring the new circumstances created by the war situated. In this regard, Deringil emphasises that Menemencioglu's major anxiety in his handling of the Straits issue was to avoid showing that he was using his power for one party which might set a precedent for demands from another. He quoted from Menemencioglu's private papers: 'we were not a belligerent and our alliance with Britain by itself was not a reason for an arbitrary application of our contractual agreements'. 3 Menemencioglu believed that Turkey could have infringed her neutrality on almost any other issue but there was no possibility for taking this attitude in connection with the Straits. 4 Asim Us wrote in the newspaper Vakit on 17 June that Menemencioglu had acted prudently, applying nothing more than the terms of the Convention. Because, even though British demands to Turkey to control all vessels passing through the Straits which had not met the terms of the Convention were in her favour, it was not clear how Moscow would have reacted to it. 5 At this point, Zekeriya Sertel, the Turkish columnist, criticised Menemencioglu's attitude, saying that his worries about being faithful to the Convention and ignoring the changing circumstances of the new vessels which had been developed after the Convention made him fail to understand the nature of the passage. He went on to say that he was supposed to think that the vessels could not be used for commercial purpose in the Aegean. To sum up, Sertel concluded that he did not use his authority to interpret of the Convention to stop these vessels. 6

1 PRO FO 371/44164, R 9574/3830/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 943, 17 June 1944. ^ The Times, 'German Warships Stopped', 16 June 1944. Also see, Nadir Nadi, 'Ba§vekilin tekrarladigi hakikat' Cumhuriyet, 17 June 1944. 3 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 172. 4 Ibid. p. 172. Asim Us, 'Numan Menemencioglu'nun Istifasi', Vakit, 17 June 1944. 6 Zekeriya Sertel, 'Ortaya Cikan Bir Mesele', Tan, 18 June 1944.

144

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

The question arises to what extent the Convention gave Turkey the power to stop any vessel which had been claimed as a merchant ship or whether Turkey had been given the power to interpret any of the terms of the Convention in new circumstances, such as the advent of EMS and KT vessels. Without going too deeply into the legalistic aspect, any international agreement could never have been interpreted alone by any one of its signatories, even if they had the executive power. Either all the signatories had to agree on it, or it would need the arbitration of an international court. Accordingly, Montreux did not give any state the right to stop any vessel claimed to be mercantile. It is worth noting here that, at the time of the Montreux Conference, the British delegation strongly opposed the idea put forward by Menemencioglu of giving Turkey control over the merchant vessels passing through the Straits. 1 It can be argued that the passage of German vessels might not have been permitted under a pragmatic application of the Convention. However, Ankara was in no position to take the risk of presuming this and becoming involved in a conflict with Germany, which was exactly what Turkey wanted to avoid. At the same time, despite the fact that Article 24 of the Convention gave Turkey the power to supervise the Convention regarding the passage of vessels of war through the Straits, it was not clear in the text of the convention whether either Article 19 or 24 made it obligatory upon Turkey to resist an attempted breach of Article 19 by force of arms. 2 However, no matter how justifiably Turkey might have claimed the right to control any vessels at the Montreux Conference, the British claim of German fraud was not easy to ignore. However, there was no time to seek the arbitration of the court since the war was at a critical stage. To check the British claims, Menemencioglu should have found a way to investigate these vessels, as had been suggested by his own staff. 3 He replied to the critics rather pathetically that he had had the personal assurances of von Papen that these ships were entirely innoccnt and carried nothing which made them war vessels. 4 Yet it is difficult to judge him as the only one responsible for the entire Turkish stance throughout the war. Although Menemencioglu had a huge influence on the making of Turkish foreign policy, there should be no doubt that his policy was known by the cabinet and the Turkish General Staff. However, it seems clear that the latest passage of German vessels was his own responsibility and it had been criticised by the whole Turkish cabinet. He pursued this policy so as not to weaken Turkey' post-war authority under the Convention. In fact, it might have led a total loss of this authority if the

' Asim Us, 'Bogazlardan Geçecek Yabanci Ticaret gemileri iizerinde Tiirkiye'nin kontrol hakkx var midir, yok mudur?' Vakit, 16 June 1944. Such argument had taken place in the Foreign Office just after the convention signed. But no concrete resolutions could be reached on this matter. See Chapter II. 3 Feridun Cemal Erkin, Türk-Sovyet ilqkileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Baçnur matbaasi, 1968), p. 240. 4 PRO FO 371/44069, R 9977/7/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. (159/49/44) 19 June 1944. 2

GUARDIAN

OF

THE

STRAITS

145

President had not intervened. Sara§oglu described Menemencioglu as too legalistic on many points and as failing through a lack of broad political vision. 1 If Menemencioglu is to be compared with the latter as a Foreign Minister, it can be seen that Sara§oglu was more flexible, or rather had a political aspect, as he allowed the passage of Soviet merchant ships under the Turkish flag and Soviet war vessels through the Straits contrary to the Convention in the autumn of 1941. Just as the attitude of the Turkish government was, to some extent, affected by the recent success of the Allies' counter-attack against the Axis, so the dramatic changes in the fortunes of war also led to Allied advocacy of a liberal interpretation of the Montreux Convention. Britain found herself in a difficult situation when the Soviet Military mission in London brought up the question of sending twenty-four motor launches which had been obtained from the USA into the Black Sea in August 1944. 2 Having argued so strongly that German armed launches and similar craft were covered by the Convention, Britain could hardly turn round now and argue that these American craft destined for the Soviet Union were not covered. Indeed, their passage through the Straits was illegal under the terms of the Convention since these motor launches were submarine chasers. When Britain approached Turkey regarding permission for their passage, Turkey wanted to know about the vessels. In contrast to Britain's handling of the question of German passage throughout the last two years, she chose to answer this question on a political level rather than tackling the legal obstacles. The Foreign Office instruction to Hugessen in this instance was much more a warning to Turkey: 'we expected them as Allies to let these launches through not to waste time by asking further questions'. 3 As a matter of fact, the question whether the German craft did or did not come under the Montreux Convention was never finally settled. Turkey wanted to get away from legal considerations and wanted to lift the whole matter on to a d i f f e r e n t plane. This policy in fact appeared in Menemencioglu's resignation: the rest of the Turkish government had grown tired of his attitude, which they described as legalistic and prejudicial to the alliance. Since then passage had been refused to the German craft. In this sense, the Turkish Foreign Office tried to meet the British request completely outside Montreux saying that if the Soviet government put forward a request it should be favourably answered on the basis of a specific government decision taken in the light of the Turkish rupture with Germany and the alliance with

1

PRO FO 371/44069, R 9447/7/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 925, 15 June 1944. PRO FO 371/44164, R 13309/3830/44, Admiralty to Foreign Office, no. M. 07145/44, 25 August 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/44164, R 14378/3830/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1242, 20 September 1944. 2

146 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T P O W E R S Britain. 1 However, the Soviet government did not raise the question with the Turkish authorities. As far as the Straits were concerned, these developments indicated the importance of military and strategic considerations in the application of the Convention. 2 Inspired by the American Military Mission in Moscow in October 1944, the American and British Governments felt that re-routing of the supplies of American lend-lease material to the USSR from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea ports was a matter of great importance as the German threat lessened in the Aegean Sea. 3 Indeed, the Aegean route was much more economic than the Persian route as it was the nearest both to the fighting fronts and the main Soviet industrial areas, and also the safest one as the risks from attack were slight compared with the north Soviet route. 4 However, once again they did not take the risk of bringing up the legal issue. Therefore, Britain suggested that Turkey should be approached with a request for facilitating the passage rather than a request for permission. Accordingly, the Foreign Office and the State Department undertook to secure Turkish agreement to the passage through the Straits. They avoided particularly a tripartite approach since Soviet involvement could have added unnecessary complication because of the well-known Soviet apprehension of Turkey. It seemed that Turkey would make no trouble for the Allies after all. Without consulting the Foreign Ministry, Saraçoglu himself promised to facilitate the passage of merchant vessels carrying cargoes through the Straits for Black Sea ports even if they were heavily armed for defensive purposes. However, the Turkish Foreign Office had been intrigued by the failure of the Soviet government to follow up the Anglo-American approach. Although they were ready to give the necessary facilities for the passage, Ankara feared that such an assurance to Allied craft through the Straits might create a precedent for the future, particularly vis-à-vis the USSR. 5 As a matter of fact, the Soviets were not ready to handle all their cargo until Russian ports on the Black Sea had been repaired. When Moscow decided to use the Aegean route, Americans put forward a supplementär}' proposal that as a means of improving Turco-Soviet relations it should be suggested to Ankara that they should make a spontaneous declaration that 'they welcomed the liberation of the Aegean, since this would 1 PRO FO 371/44164, R 15241/3830/44, Helm (Acting British Ambassador in Ankara) to Foreign Office, no. 1658, 23 September 1944. 2 PRO FO 371/44164, R 15494/3830/44, Foreign Office to Helm, no. 1306, 29 September 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/44165, R 16185/3830/44, British COS to US COS, no. COS (W)383, 17 October 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/44165, R 16952/3830/44, Joint Planning Staff Memorandum on 'Convoy Routes to Russia', no. J.P.(44) 246 (final), 11 October 1944. 5 PRO FO 371/44165, R 18938/3830/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 211 Saving, 13 November 1944.

G U A R D I A N

OF

T H E

S T R A I T S

147

mean the opening up a new supply route to the USSR through the Straits'. 1 The Turkish government initially hesitated to refer to these passages of supplies to the USSR since Moscow did not welcome the Turkish attitude in the war. The British explained that the reason for the communiqué was to make it plain to the whole world, including the Soviets, that it was not the Turks who had been responsible for the closing of the Straits. The Turks were pleased with the favourable action by the Allies and issued an almost identical communiqué on 19 January as suggested. 2 As a matter of fact, once the question of the passage through the Straits had been settled with the parallel events of Menemencioglu's resignation and the process of the German retreat from the Aegean and the Black Sea, the recent strain on Anglo-Turkish relations slowly disappeared. In these difficult years Turkey probably applied the Straits regulations as well as any militarily weak state could have. This does not mean that Turkey resisted all pressure against any illegal passage through the Straits under the terms of the Convention, since from time to time she clearly failed to do so. Apart from the passage of Italian tankers in the summer of 1941 and her connivance at the passage of Soviet warship, the way in which Turkey applied the Convention to some extent was inconsistent. At one point she followed a policy of strict interpretation of the Convention, while at another she adhered to the spirit of the Convention in accordance with the balance of power. This rather reflects the deficiencies of the Convention in the new circumstances concerning the passage issue. It was indeed an expectation from many quarters that the Straits regime would be brought onto the agenda in the post-war negotiations, as had happened after every major conflict. With this consideration it was obvious that the Convention needed to be modified to make it take into account modern conditions. Indeed, this had already been put on the agenda by the Soviets at the end of 1943.

1

PRO FO 371/44165, R 17792/3830/44, Foreign Office to Peterson, no. 1450, 8 November 1944. PRO FO 371/48697, R 1695/44/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 12 Saving, 12 January 1945. Also see PRO FO 371/48697, R 1695/44/44, British Naval Attaché in Ankara to Commander -inChief, Mediterranean, no. 191101C, 19 January 1945. Department of State Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.00/1-1345, Seiden Chapin (Counsellor of Embassy in Paris) to Secretary of State, no. 665, 13 January 1945. 2

5 ANGLO-SOVIET CONTAINMENT DIPLOMACY TOWARDS TURKEY, 1943-44

The year 1942 marked a decisive turning point. Afterwards, the German defeat was only a matter of time. For both the USSR and Britain, while wartime considerations were important in the formulation of their policies, the essential factor in both countries' policies towards Turkey appears to have been to ensure that their interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in the post-war world were secured. This became clearer following the Allies' victory at El-Alamein at the end of 1942 and the simultaneous achievement of the Soviet forces against Germany on the eastern front (Stalingrad), as the consequences of these events raised the question of who would fill the gap after the German evacuation of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. In this respect, Turkey became a focus of British and Soviet containment diplomacy. In fact, the USSR did not want to see Turkey come under the influence of Britain. The converse was also true for Britain. This was because Turkey was in a geo-strategic position which could serve as a stumbling block for either country. In the light of this consideration, the USSR's wartime policy was to bring in Turkey as a combatant. However, when it was a question of British forces in the Balkans, the Soviet authorities stepped back a pace from their stance and supported the invasion of Western Europe, as this would leave the Balkans to the Soviet forces. As Hitler's defeat would remove the chief raison d'être of the Grand Alliance, each country performed a containment policy behind the scenes, so as to keep Turkey on their side as an ally or vassal. In this regard, it is fair to say that, in accordance with her reversal of the German onslaught, the Soviet Union gradually readopted an assertive foreign policy towards Turkey, which was almost identical with her policy preceding the Nazi invasion. But at the same time Turkey's friendship would be of great service to Britain as a barrier either against German expansion or against potential post-war Soviet threats towards the Middle East. However, there was a dilemma in British containment policy towards Turkey about the way in which the objective of having Turkey on Britain's side in the war could be rationalised: should it be as a neutral or a belligerent? More specifically, the Turkish Straits remained the crucial element in Britain's and the USSR's imperial policy formation as a blocking point on expansion against their own sphere of influence. Leaving aside the German wartime threat, following the Allies' ascendancy Turkey felt the Soviet threat

150

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

on her neck to be more likely than ever. Therefore, Ankara, particularly Menemencioglu, made some considerable efforts in order to establish a barrier amongst the Balkan states against Soviet expansion towards the Straits. Following the Allies' victory in North Africa towards the end of 1942, the British government was in a dilemma over the formulation of its Turkish policy between Turkey's role in shortening the war, as a short term gain and her geo-strategic position regarding the post-war Soviet threat posed mainly against the Balkans and Middle East. In the formulation of foreign policy, there was occasionally a clash between Churchill and the Foreign Office. Concerned mainly with the progress of the war, Churchill believed that Turkish entry into the war would encourage the resistance movements in Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia and the defection from Germany of Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. 1 It might be Churchill's point that this would restore British influence in the Balkans and also prevent Soviet dominance. However, the Foreign Office was rather inclined to sympathise with Turkish apprehension towards Soviet imperialism after German evacuation from the Balkans, which would result not only in the loss of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits and Istanbul but also challenge Britain's pre-eminent position in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, Turkey could do better after the war as an element of stability in favour of Britain in the Balkans and the Middle East, and also as a bulwark against Soviet imperialism. 2 Turkey was confident that if the USSR threatened her, it would be in the British interest to lend her support so that Turkey's best role lay in reserving her strength and influence in the Balkans and Middle East for after the war, as she was the only element in this part of the world which carried any weight. This was because a possible Soviet threat to the Straits would put Suez and Gibraltar in direct danger since holding a position in the Straits would be useless without Suez and Gibraltar, the Mediterranean's entrance and exit points, and Britain would never allow the USSR to acquire control of these. 3 Therefore, the Turks thought that Turkey was too important to future British policy for London to drop her or exclude her from the peace conference regardless of whether she joined the Allied cause.

Turkey's Position in Churchill's

Strategy

Churchill had long sought to open a new route to the USSR and to strike at Germany's southern flank. He surveyed the possibility of Turkey's 1 Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London: The Macmillan Press, 1976), p. 111. 2 PRO FO 371/37465, R 566/55/44, Howard minute, 23 January 1943, also see Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 118, 18 January 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37465, R 395/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office no. 81, 13 January 1943.

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

151

becoming a full belligerent and of her armies' advancing into the Balkans by the side of the Soviets in the north and the British in the south. Churchill informed Stalin on 24 November 1942 that if Turkey were to join the Allies the latter could not only proceed with operations designed to open the shipping route for the Soviet left flank to the Black Sea, but the Allies could also, from Turkish bases, bomb the Romanian oilfields, which were of such vital importance to the Axis, in view of the successful Soviet defence of the main oil supplies in the Caucasus. He also obtained Stalin's full agreement. 1 By this action, the Turkish Straits and Turkish air bases made Turkey the key to such plans. In spite of the opposition of General George Marshall, the US Chief of Staff, and Henry Stimson, Secretary for War, to any operation which might delay the invasion of France, Roosevelt accepted, at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, 'the principle of preparing the way for Turkey's active participation in the w a r ' / Roosevelt also agreed with Churchill's eagerness to play Turkey's hand. 3 Aware of Turkey's aloofness towards such an offer, the Prime Minister intended to threaten Turkey with her fear of Soviet ambitions over the Straits. At the Casablanca Conference he told Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's adviser, that he wanted to meet Inonii in order to 'push him pretty hard' on the subject of getting into the war. Churchill also said that he intended to take the line that Turkey should not wait until the last minute. If Turkish authorities were recalcitrant he would not hesitate to tell them that in the event of their remaining out, he could not challenge the Soviets regarding the Straits and that their position would be intolerable. 4 However, it was like playing with fire as it might throw Turkey into the hands of Germany. On more than one occasion during 1943 he attempted to intimidate Turkey with the same threat, but was dissuaded by his military and political colleagues. The War Cabinet was unwilling to approve Churchill's plan in view of the fact that the moment was not ripe for such an approach. It was also doubtful that Turkey would move in that way, since her apprehension of Moscow was well known. However, in consequence of Churchill's insistence, the War Cabinet authorised him to carry on with his plan. 5

1

Cordell Hull, The Memoirs ofCordell Hull, Vol. 2 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), pp. 1365-66. Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London & Co. ltd, 1951), 624-25. Department of State Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 761.6711/7-545, Wilson to Grew (Under Secretary of State), no. 916, 5 July 1945. ^ Churchill's enthusiasm for the Balkans was a source of anxiety in Washington. Recalling Churchill's disastrous campaign in the Dardanelles in the First World War, Henry Stimson, US Secretary for War, argued that his enthusiasm for the Balkans would be history repeating itself. See David Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: the United States and Turkey 19431946 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkans Studies, 1980), p. 25. 3 This soon became a source of controversy between Washington and London as British authorities argued this agreement included politic and economic matters with Turkey as well as military. State Department authorities argued it was limited to strictly military matters. However, it seems clear that it became a matter which was decided between Churchill and Roosevelt who, ignoring the State Department's feeling in this matter, usually let Churchill handle all matters connected with Turkey. State Department Archives, RG 59, Decimal file, 1940-44, 761.97/120, Wallace Murray to Secretary of State, 19 June 1943. PRO FO 371/37466, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 359, 10 March 1943. Hull, The Memoirs, pp. 1368-69. 4 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 683. 5 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 626.

152 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Churchill met with Inonii, Saragoglu and Menemencioglu at Adana, a Turkish city in southern Turkey, on 30 January 1943.1 The Turkish side tried to convince the Prime Minister that the USSR would become a grave threat to Europe. Saracoglu remarked that all the defeated countries would become Bolshevik and Slav if Germany were beaten. In particular, Sara§oglu had no faith in the efficacy of the Allied connection with Moscow due to his experience with Soviet diplomacy in the initial phase of the war. Accordingly, he expressed his conviction that Stalin might still make a separate peace on the evidence of this initial phase, basing himself on the assumption that sooner or later Soviet policy would become a threat not only to Turkish but also to British interests. He made it quite clear that, in his opinion, if such a threat materialised Britain in her own interests would be forced to help Turkey against Moscow. The USSR, he said, had overrun Poland and the Baltic States; she would attempt to overrun the Balkans. Already ensconced in Northern Persia she could threaten Iraq, Iran and India. 'What jumping-off place had we from which to deal with such a threat? Turkey was the obvious one.' 2 Churchill reassured the Turks about the USSR, and encouraged their faith in a future international organisation, which would guarantee peace and security. He also promised to deliver a huge quantity of military equipment embodied in the lavish 'Adana list'. He particularly avoided inviting Turkey to take an active role in the war. Rather he emphasised that nothing was expected until Turkey was adequately supplied and ready for action. The reward for Turkey would be full partnership at the peace conferences alongside with Britain, the USA and the USSR. 3 The Turks, however, had no such inclination to become a combatant, as they suspected Britain's ability to supply as much as Churchill had promised. Even though Britain could lessen the Turkish fear of German air attack by meeting Turkish military needs the primary Turkish concern was still Soviet imperialism after the war.

Renewed Efforts to Improve Turco-Soviet

Relations

Churchill was not at all dissatisfied with the Adana Conference. In a letter to Roosevelt and Stalin, he was hopeful of Turkey becoming a belligerent on the Allies' side before the year was out. 4 Just as the Prime Minister proposed at Adana a material improvement in Turco-Soviet relations through the direct exchange of views, so he tried to convince Stalin about 1

Ibid. pp. 626-28. He argued that in 1939-40 it had been touch and go as to whether Soviet would side with Germany. Stalin had negotiated with Hitler while the British mission was in Moscow and he had negotiated with Ribbentrop while Saracoglu himself was in Moscow. PRO FO 371/37465, R 709/55/44, Hugessen minute, 10 January 1940. 3 Feridun Ccmal Erkin, Turk-Sovyet ilqkileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Ba§nur Matbaasi, 1968), p. 193. 4 Hull, The Memoirs, p. 1366; Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 638. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

153

Turkish goodwill towards the Allies and the USSR so that any gesture of friendship on the part of Moscow would get a response from Ankara. Although Stalin had no faith in Turkish authorities because of their relations with Germany, he expressed his readiness to meet the Turkish government 'half way' regarding any suggestions that Ankara could make to improve relations between the two countries. 1 It was difficult to dispel Turkey's inveterate fear of the USSR, but it might be possible to neutralise this suspicion by bringing the two governments together. Accordingly, Churchill told tnonii that if Ankara did not wish to miss this opportunity with Moscow it was time to reach a favourable agreement. 2 In a sense, Turkey responded positively to London's initiative, according to newspaper reports. There is little doubt that these articles, considering most of the columnists at the same time were Members of the Turkish Parliament, were the Turkish government's attempt to show their readiness to consider exchanges with the USSR. Most of the articles were trying to convince the Soviet authorities of Turkey's goodwill towards Moscow and her readiness for talks. Against the background of steadily developing mistrust of Soviet designs, the attitude of the Turkish press indicated a genuine effort on the part of Turkey to placate Moscow and to support Churchill's initiative for the improvement of Turco-Soviet relations. The Turkish press produced proSoviet articles in early February, reflecting the Turkish policy. Various aspects of the question were dealt with almost daily by numerous writers. Sadri Etem wrote in Vakit on 3 February that the development and cxigcncics of the war showed that the USSR was likely to expand in the direction of Persia rather than the Straits. 3 Columnist Huseyin Cahit Yalfin, on the same date, pointed out in Yeni Sabah that the fact that Washington and Moscow had, according to radio reports, been kept fully informed of the Adana Conference was a further proof of Moscow's good intentions towards Turkey, since it showed that the USSR was in agreement with Churchill's policy of making Turkey strong. 4 Selim Sertel's view in Tan on 18 February was rather diplomatic; he pointed out the fact that Soviet Russia was acting in accordance with a joint military plan devised with Britain and the USA. He ridiculed the suggestion that it was necessary to distinguish between the old imperialist Russia and Soviet Russia, which had never shown imperialist tendencies and had always maintained friendly relations with Turkey. Sertel claimed that British and American statesmen had assured him and his companions during their journey to Washington and London last year that Stalin wanted a strong Turkey to look after the Straits. A complete Soviet military triumph would 1 Ibid. pp. 639-641. Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter CAC), Churchill Papers, CHAR 20/106, Stalin to Churchill, no. T. 121/3, 6 February 1943. 2 CAC, Churchill Papers, CHAR 20/106, Churchill to Inonii, no. T. 122/3, 9 February 1943. 3 Sadri Etem, Vakit, 3 February 1943. 4 Huseyin Cahit Yal^n, Yeni Sabah, 3 February 1943.

154

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

not mean the extension of bolshevism to the European Continent, because the USSR had not only promised Great Britain not to make a separate peace but also had a pact of friendship with her for the next twenty years. If Britain had not believed in the sincerity of these undertakings, she would not have bound herself to co-operate with the Soviet Union after the war. The truth was that 'the Bolshevist danger' was an invention of German propaganda. 1 Hiiseyin Cahit Yalym gave support to Sertel's thesis, in his column in Yeni Sabah on 20 February, saying that no one was going to fight in a 'modern crusade' organised by the Germans, who had started a world war for the purpose of establishing their own domination over the world. The result of the victory of the United Nations would be that Soviet Russia would collaborate in European affairs, after the German peril had been averted. Another columnist, Ahmet §iikrii Esmer, did not share the view of an imminent Soviet threat against Turkey. Referring to the question of the Straits in Gece Postasi, after asserting that Turkey would continue as before to act strictly in accordance with the Montreux Convention, he pointed out that in any case the British could not help the Soviets by the way of the Straits until they had cleaned up Crete, the Dodecanese and the Greek Islands, and that Germany would gain little by seizing the Straits, in view of the strength of the Soviet Black Sea fleet and of the Soviet fortifications on the Caucasian coast. He did not consider, therefore, that there was any immediate danger. 2 In a sense, Britain's success was secured when Moscow responded positively to the Turkish suggestion for an exchange of views through their respective Ambassadors as the starting point of the Adana conference. However, each side was waiting for some concrete proposal from the other in order to avoid themselves falling into a trap. 3 Soviet ambitions for the Balkans, particularly for the Straits and Istanbul, were still a concrete issue between the two capitals. While Balkan domination was a Soviet long-term ambition, Ankara's aim was to establish a Balkan federation from which Moscow was excluded. Moscow was ready to talk about everything which was discussed at Adana. However, Turkey was reluctant to discuss some parts of it, especially those concerned with the possibility of using Turkish territory to attack Ploesti, the base of the Romanian oilfields which fed the German war machine. 4 On a basis of controversy, then, negotiations were finally launched between the two countries on 14 March 1943 through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Cevat Agikalin, and Molotov. However, it soon became clear that the USSR intended to take the Turco-Soviet conversations out of the Anglo-Turco-Soviet framework and make them purely bilateral. During the 1

Selim Sertel, Tan, 18 February 1943. Ahmet §tikrii Esmer, Gece Postasi, 8 February 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37509, R 1607/650/44, Foreign Office to Washington, no. 1286, 25 February 1943; see also CAB 122/106, file no. 82. 4 PRO FO 371/37509, R2491/650/44, Hugessen to Cadogan, 25 February 1944. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

155

negotiations, Molotov was anxious to know about the nature of the Adana talks, especially whether the USSR would be part of Churchill's post-war security plan, which was shaped at the 'morning thoughts', for Europe, including the Balkans and Asia Minor. 1 However, the Soviet Foreign Minister tried hard to get away from discussion within the framework of the Adana Conference. In this respect, Molotov suggested that the two governments would do better to continue to work individually. For the time being, waiting for a more favourable moment to discuss 'questions interesting the two countries' might be wiser. However, when A§ikahn persistently asked what these questions were, Molotov avoided naming them. The latter's attempt to prove that the Turco-Soviet conversations had really begun before Churchill's message of 17 February further enhanced Ankara's anxiety. 2 The Turkish government itself believed that Molotov had two questions in mind, namely the Straits and the partition of Bulgaria. 3 London's view was identical. It had been an objective of Russian policy for two centuries to isolate Turkey and settle matters with her alone. The British Foreign Office was of the opinion that 'Morning Thoughts' had caused great anxiety in the Soviet government on the grounds that London had ambitious ideas about the role Turkey was to play in the war and immediately afterwards. It was hardly conceivable that any Soviet regime could allow itself to get into the position of endorsing a policy on the part of a third power, namely Great Britain, designed to strengthen Turkey both politically and militarily. 4 Clutton minuted, 'I doubt very much whether the Soviet Government like the Anglo-Turkish Treaty any more now than they did in October 1939.' He maintained that the Soviet authorities resented the fact that when talking to the Turkish Government they had to reckon with the fact that British Government was only just 'round the corner'. 5 Since there seemed little prospect of resolving the present impasse, the Foreign Office thought that their intervention would probably only land them in further complications with the Soviet government. Therefore, it was the best course to leave matters as they were and make no attempt to flog what was from the beginning a 'pretty anaemic horse'. 6 Consequently, the Moscow negotiations escalated Turkish anxiety about Soviet post-war intentions instead of bringing an improvement.

1 PRO FO 371/37509, R 2369/650/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, 15 March 1945; Also see Erkin Tiirk-Sowet Ìli§kileri ve Türk Bogazlari Meselesi (Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1968), p. 208. 2 PRO FO 371/37509, R 2953/650/44, Bennett (Ankara) to Foreign Office, no. 630, 31 March 1943. Also see R 2821/650/44, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 206, 28 March 1928. 3 PRO FO 371/37509, R 2953/650/44, Bennett to Foreign Office, no. 631, 31 March 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/37509, R 2821/650/44, Clutton minute, 30 March 1943. 5 PRO FO 371/37509, R 2954/650/44, Clutton minute, 1 April 1943. 6 Ibid. Also see PRO FO 371/37510 R 3018/650/44, Foreign Office, no. 487, 3 April 1943.

156

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T P O W E R S

The Straits Factor in the Formation of Turkish Policy The fear of Germany and suspicion of Soviet intentions were the two determining factors in formulating Turkish foreign policy. In fact, against the background of an Allied victory over Germany becoming a distinct possibility, Turkish apprehension of Soviet post-war intentions over the Straits became increasingly a preoccupation. The Turkish authorities had already been convinced that Turkey's participation or non-participation would not affect Soviet policy, using the example of Poland, who was now fighting with the USSR. Turkish entry into the war would only weaken her and increase the chance of Turkey becoming a satellite of Soviet imperialism. 1 Having suspicions of the British and American governments' ability to check Soviet imperialism after the war, 2 the Turkish authorities became alarmed by the belief that Great Britain was to a considerable extent willing to give the USSR her head politically in the Balkans and Northern Persia. The result was a continually developing distrust of the USSR and her ultimate objectives, coupled with a suspicion that London was only courting Turkey for immediate war purposes and if the war should end in the crushing defeat of Germany she would be left for all practical purposes to face the USSR alone. 3 Even the reason behind her receiving armaments from both belligerent camps was, to some extent, to strengthen Turkey against a possible Soviet threat at some future date. It can be speculated that Churchill's role in the 'Dardanelles expedition' in the First World War enhanced the Turkish apprehension that the Straits might be offered once more to Moscow by Britain. In these circumstances, Turkey thought that she would be safer to conserve her strength by staying out of the war. 4 It was true that concern over the post-war Soviet position was the main reason for Turkey's staying out of the war. However, Turkish policy-makers also feared that Germany could probably still seize the Straits and make them part of her defensive European lines. Growing Allied pressure on 'Fortress Europe' indeed increased the probability that Germany would try to break through the Allied investment, and that the weakest point of the investment was Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey could not envisage waging an offensive war, especially dropping bombs, on Germany. Such a possibility could also give a

1

PRO FO 371/37465, R 399/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 81, 13 January 1943. Sarajoglu told The Times correspondent, off the record, that if Germany won the war 'Turkish independence could not exist for more than five minutes'. The Allied victory was seen as a necessary but undesirable concomitant of the fears of Soviet imperialism after the war. PRO FO 371/37465, R 709/55/44, Hugessen minute, 10 January 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37466, R 1443/55/44, Hugessen to Sargent 'memorandum drawn up by Helm', 21 January 1943; The Cunningham Papers, Add52571, Admiral Kelly 'An Appreciation on the Situation in Turkey', 1 December 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/37465, R 501/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 92, 15 January 1943, also see R 556/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 118, 18 January 1943. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

157

pretext to the Soviets to establish themselves on the Straits as a liberator. 1 In justification of the recent Turkish attitude, Rauf Orbay, Turkish Ambassador to London, emphasised that the reason for Ankara's attitude was to avert such a G e r m a n danger, believing that if G e r m a n y thought that the Turkish government was about to assist the Allies she would seize the Dardanelles. 2 The Turks were not exactly unreasonable in claiming this. Clutton found the Turkish approach to some extent logical. H e pointed out that it would not be reasonable to expect the Turks to come into the war on the Allied side or to grant them facilities which might provoke a devastating German attack unless the Allies were in a position to o f f e r Turkey adequate protection. This protection would mean that there would be no repetition of Belgrade at Istanbul, Izmir or Ankara, including f u r t h e r sufficient military support to enable the Turks to hold at least a bridgehead in Europe. 3 Clutton asked: ' W h o was to say whether it would be we or the Soviets who reached Thrace and the Southern part of Bulgaria first? If it was the Soviets, then I doubt very much whether the Turks would secure full sovereignty again over the European shores of the Straits.' T h e British military authorities also confirmed the possibility of such an operation by Germany. 4 However, it might still be true to say that the Turkish attitude somehow crystallised, so that her neutrality became increasingly strict. Turkey had pointed out several times that the expression 'neutrality' should not be used to define her position, as she perceived herself to be non-belligerent. H o w e v e r , while G e r m a n y was relatively on the defensive, the Turkish press and the statement of the Turkish leader began to emphasise the neutral attitude of Turkey. 5 B y 1943 the main aim of British policy towards Turkey was to maintain her neutral position as a 'protective pad' against German penetration, whether e c o n o m i c or military, into the M i d d l e East. I n d e e d , T u r k e y ' s neutrality had been of great service to Britain since it 'prevented the Germans getting through the Middle E a s t ' . 6 However, following the Allied victory in the eastern Mediterranean theatre and in the light of the Adana Conference, the British government, and particularly Churchill, wanted to go one step further and use Turkey as a jumping-off ground for an attack on the A x i s ' weakest spot, the occupied or vassal countries of South East Europe, and above all the

1 ATASE, Ikinci Dunya Harbi Kolleksiyonu, Kutu no: 10, Military negotiations between British and Turkish authorities in Ankara, 4 March 1943. PRO FO 371/37470, R 5595/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1220, 26 June 1943. 2 PRO FO 371/37471, R 6566/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1328, 18 July 1943. 3 Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray, 1949), p. 193. 4 P R O FO 371/37471, R 6781/55/44, Clutton minute, 28 July 1943. 5 PRO FO 371/37471, R 7116/55/44, Eden to Hugessen 'Meeting with Orbay', no. 1140, 5 August 1943; see also PRO FO 371/37470, R 5584/55/44, no. 1205, 24 June 1943. 6 PRO FO 371/37469, R 5294/55/44, Foreign Office minute, 2 June 1943.

158

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

Romanian oilfields. 1 However, Turkey was reluctant to allow Allied use of her bases in view of her fear of Germany and Soviet ambiguity. Instead Turkey suggested to London that the Soviet bases should be used, claiming that they were as near Ploesti as the Turkish bases. 2 The Foreign Office considered that Turkish neutrality was benefiting the Germans, since it prevented Britain 'getting at them in the same way as heretofore it had prevented the Germans getting at Britain'. 3 This was a part of the Allies' preparation for a second front for which discussions had been going on since the summer of 1941, when Stalin drew attention to an 'urgent need for a second front somewhere in the Balkans or in France, one that would divert 30-40 German divisions from the Eastern front' as an answer for Churchill's cable soon after the German attack, promising support. This was the opening exchange in an intense Big Three dialogue which continued for the next four years. 4 Although Moscow was given some kind of a promise, Churchill opposed an early second front which would have resulted from an earlier invasion since a greater proportion of the initial invading force would have been British rather than American. Therefore, he proposed instead an invasion of French North Africa to secure the Mediterranean and open the 'soft underbelly' of Europe to possible attack. 5 It would then return to the continent in 1943 via the Mediterranean, Turkey, and the Balkans. At the same time, Anglo-American authorities faced a dilemma: if Stalin could not be promised a second front he might turn to bargain with Hitler again as he had done in 1939. Therefore, Moscow had been given 1 PRO FO 371/37466, R 2299/55/44, Foreign Office Minute 'Policy of British Government Towards Turkey Since the Adana Conference', 8 March 1943. 2 Ploesti was 450 miles from U§ak, the nearest Turkish heavy bombing base, whereas the nearest Soviet base, Krasnodar, was 650 miles and was dangerously near the front line. It would also have been possible to use more advanced air bases such as Yeni§ehir, which was another 100 miles nearer Ploesti. It follows therefore that there was a minimum advantage of 200 miles and maximum advantage of 300 miles in using Turkish bases, which would also have made the bombing of the Danube oil route possible, an operation which would have been impossible from Krasnodar. PRO FO 371/37468, R 4188/55/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 768, 18 May 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37471, R 7177/55/44, Bennett to Howard, 12 August 1943. 4 Even Stalin agreed to step back in May 1942 from his earlier condition for a territorial recognition regarding Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania in the line of Nazi Soviet Pact of 1939 to secure a second front in Europe as soon as possible. 5 At the beginning Anglo-American strategy was at variance. This was because the occupation of Africa - or the Mediterranean area — was seen as subsidiary by the Americans and the Atlantic and European area was considered decisive. However in British strategic thinking the Mediterranean area had to be given priority: because firstly it formed a large part of the periphery of Europe; secondly, substantial British and Commonwealth forces were already locked up in the Mediterranean area and, thirdly, because politically and militarily the Mediterranean aspect of Axis activities seemed the most vulnerable. A long drawn-out transatlantic argument took place for six months amongst the Anglo-American strategic planners. In the end the British plan was accepted. Then the Allied landings began in October 1942. For details see Keith Sainsbury, 'Second Front in 1942: Anglo-American Differences over Strategy,' British Journal of International Studies', Vol. 4, no.l, 1978, pp. 47-58; Walter Scott Dunn, Second Front Now, 1943 (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1980), pp. 135.

ANGLO-SOVIET CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

159

numerous promises that the second front would take place first in 1942 and then 1943. But the second front actually took place in June 1944 when the Allied troops landed in Normandy. Although Churchill secured the invasion of North Africa he was not able to dictate his own strategy of invading the Balkans, as America insisted on the invasion of Normady. 1 In spite of growing Allied success, Turkey in fact had retreated from the somewhat encouraging position she had taken up at the time of Churchill's visit to Adana at the end of spring. This even took the form of a determination to remain neutral, which involved a cooling-off of the warmer relations which had developed after the Adana conference, and an increase in 'lip-service' to the Germans. The odd thing was that this happened when the Allies had never been in a stronger military position. However, it was part of the Turkish strategy as the Turkish authorities saw clearly that a decisive military phase of the war was opening up as a result of Allied victories, and they knew that during this phase they would be asked to take the decision to enter the war. Besides, in their eyes the danger of Soviet aggression after the war increased in exact proportion as the danger of German aggression during the war grew less in consequence of Allied victories. The Soviet situation developed in quite a different manner from what Turkish statesmen had foreseen at Adana, when they assumed that Russia and Germany would once more be engaged in mortal combat after the winter. Turkey had always hoped that the war would end in a compromise f r o m which Germany would emerge strong enough, both militarily and politically, to act as an effective counterpoise to the USSR in the Balkans. She hoped, too, that all three Great European Powers would emerge so weakened from the conflict that Turkey would be courted by all of them and would thus be able to play a major balancing role in South Eastern Europe in the post-war period. Increasing chances of Allied victory made these dreams fade away. However, this only confirmed the Turks in their view that they must at all costs keep their powder dry now so as to be able to fend for themselves in an unfriendly Soviet-ridden post-war world. In any case, breaking faith with Britain in so doing did not worry them, as they were convinced that the maintenance of an independent Turkey in control of the Dardanelles was ultimately so bound up with British interests in the eastern Mediterranean that Britain could never afford to abandon her, politically speaking, however badly she behaved. 2

' Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (New York: Praeger, 1990). PRO FO 371/37517, R 6787/1027/44, Foreign Office memorandum 'Policy Towards Turkey', 5 July 1943. 2

160 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T Soviet Benefit from Turkish

POWERS

Neutrality

Turkey's failure to make some show of solidarity with the Allies provided the Soviets with the chance to manifest themselves. Although Soviet dissatisfaction with Turkey might be seen as genuine, London doubted very much whether Moscow was dissatisfied for the same reasons as themselves. Indeed, the anxiety of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR was not less than that of the Turkish authorities. For instance, Eden had a strong suspicion that the Soviets might be deliberately exploiting the present situation in Turkey as a means of attacking the whole Anglo-Turkish connection. 1 Clutton also believed that the USSR did not want to see Turkey as a belligerent, and her dislike of the Turkish attitude was not of her neutral stance, but the fact that Turkey was piling up armaments, which might be used to thwart Soviet aspirations in South Eastern Europe. 2 Despite Turkey's neutrality, in reviewing their Turkish policy following the Italian collapse, the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that no fundamental alteration was called for in the policy they had hitherto pursued. The surrender of Italy in fact had altered the whole strategic position in the operations in the eastern Mediterranean, but these took a lower priority than operations in the central Mediterranean. It seems fairly clear, owing to the paucity of Britain's military resources in the Middle East, that if Turkey had come into the war Britain could not have taken advantage of her belligerency because of her lack of modern military equipment. However, the bombing of Ploesti, which was one of the main purposes in using Turkish air bases, would soon become possible from Italian airfields. 3 The Southern Department also believed that 'Turkey might well prove to be more of a liability than an asset'. Owing to the present military position in the Levant and Middle East, it might be possible that if Turkey came into the war she would temporarily collapse, and the USSR might consequently spread over into Turkish territory. 4 The concluding point was that Turkish belligerency would not be in harmony with Britain's long-term interests. In this respect, bearing in mind the potential Soviet threat, when the State Department intended to revise their attitude towards Turkey and in particular raise objections to British policy in response to the Turkish attitude, the Foreign Office attempted to discourage Washington to prevent it 'falling out of step on so important a matter'. Eden

1

Ibid, also see PRO FO 371/37510, R 6407/650/44, Foreign Office, no. 1131, 3 August 1943. PRO FO 371/37510, R 7581/650/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1478, 12 August 1943; see also PRO FO 371/37510, R 7707/650/44, Clutton minute, 18 August 1943. 3 PRO CAB 122/973, file no. 9/72, Jacob to Churchill, 14 August 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/37474, R 10557/55/44, Nichols minute 20 October 1943. Hugessen expressed his feeling that 'it was no use cooking the dinner until we knew the date when it was to be eaten. If it were cooked too soon and the feast were put off it would get cold. I was therefore marking time and doing nothing to encourage the Turks at present to think of coming in'. PRO FO 371/37510, R 7471/650/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 93/262/43,4 August 1943. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

161

wrote to Winant that politically and militarily it would be unwise to alter, in any fundamental way, the present British policy towards the Turks, including the supply of arms at a rate agreed upon as a result of the Adana Conference. 1 At the same time, Churchill was primarily concerned with the defeat of Hitler for which active Turkish co-operation with the USSR was vital. Therefore, he thought that the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey by Britain, the USA and the USSR to act in accordance with the spirit of the Alliance. 2 This was also, in his belief, essential for her safety from the Soviet quarter. The inactivity of Turkey would remind the Russians that Britain had offered them Istanbul and the control of the Straits in the earlier part of the First World War. Therefore, Turkey should admit the British air squadrons and other forces when she was asked, in order to bomb Ploesti. In the meantime the control of the Straits and the Black Sea would be secured. 3 However, the Combined COS and British COS at Quebec in August 1943, became increasingly doubtful whether, at any rate at this stage, active participation by Turkey in the war could play a role of vital importance in the defeat of the common enemy. The time to play this role had not, in their opinion, yet come, and they did not wish the position to be prejudiced by the premature application of pressure. Accordingly, Churchill's plan was not approved at Quebec. 4 In these circumstances, the British government made it plain to Ankara that although their rights under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty remained intact they had a right to ask Turkey to give them assistance in other ways. Consequently, Turkey co-operated with Britain for a while as she was asked. For instance, Turkey used the discretion given her by the Montreux Convention in favour of the Allies to stop the passage of German invasion barges through the Straits (see Chapter 4). 5 However, Churchill was not 1

PRO FO 371/37471, R 6651/55/44, Eden to Winant, 3 August 1943. Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 58. 3 PRO FO 371/37511, R 8320/650/44, Churchill to Eden, no. M.580/3, 6 August 1943. 4 At this juncture, Churchill, whose plans for the eastern Mediterranean were predicated upon Turkish entry into the war, opted to effect Turkey's belligerency through still another source of pressure: British control of the Aegean. Then he decided to attack Rhodes in September 1943, without the support of America, whose priority was the cross-channel attack. Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 34; Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 161. ^ The Turkish government was further asked to speed up the military construction work which was proceeding as the result of an agreement between Turkish and British experts, so that when the time came and Britain called on Turkey to fulfil her obligations the necessary military preparations would be completed. The British government further asked the Turkish government to grant them facilities to send supplies, including petrol and aviation spirit, to the civilian population and British garrisons in Samos and the Dodecanese Islands captured from the Italians. These requests were responded to by the Turkish Government. PRO FO 371/37517, R 9969/1027/44, Foreign Office memorandum 'The Immediate Aims of British policy in Turkey', 7 October 1943. 2

162

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

entirely satisfied with the decisions reached at Quebec. Rather he believed that the time had come for Turkey to do something in return for the supplies she was receiving. Nevertheless he did not press the matter until he launched an attack on the Dodecanese Islands.1

Bulgaria: Back Door to the Straits Increasing Soviet success against Germany in the Balkans escalated Ankara's anxiety about Soviet imperialism. Though Turkey had no objection to the Soviet presence at Bessarabia and Bukovina, anything beyond this would cause great anxiety. In particular, the Soviet attempt to extend their influence over Bulgaria at her door was the Turkish authorities' nightmare. Accordingly, Ankara desired to see Bulgaria independent so as to constitute a barrier against Soviet land attack to the Straits. Therefore, any kind of formation, which could keep the Soviets out of the Balkans, was vital for Ankara. When Britain proposed a Balkan Confederation without any definite agenda in order to find out Turkish views, Turkey jumped at it. Although Turkey was not willing to join the war she volunteered to take part in an invasion of the Balkans with the Allies in the case of German withdrawal in order to prevent Soviet domination over South East Europe. 2 Menemencioglu suggested that if Germany suddenly retired from the Balkans Turkey should participate in a march into the Balkans once the Germans had withdrawn. Otherwise, if the question arose of participation in advance against Germany through the Balkans, the USSR would insist on taking a share. This would involve the Soviet demand that Britain and Turkey should enter Greece and Yugoslavia while the USSR entered Bulgaria, but such a step would be fatal for Turkey and would establish the USSR in the Balkans. 3 Therefore, Menemencioglu suggested that the combination of Romanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians as a safeguard against Soviet domination would be vital. 4 Rendel was in favour of collaboration with Ankara on a joint policy to re-establish the Balkan States as they were before the war. In the long run it was obvious that Bulgaria was the clash point of Anglo-Soviet strategic interests.5 However, wartime dependency on the Soviets restrained the Foreign 1

Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV (London: HMSO, 1972), pp. 492-93. PRO FO 371/37509, R650/650/44, Howard minute, 26 January 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37509, R 1593/650/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 359, 22 February 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/ 37468, R 4668/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1017, 24 May 1943. 5 When the British left Bulgaria in March 1941, they had no political commitments to any person or group. They were finished with King Boris. British policy was to see that Bulgaria restored Greek and Yugoslav territory after the war, and to see Bulgaria a membef of a future Balkan confederation; whether joining the confederation or not, Bulgaria should retain her sovereign independence which presumably meant that it should not become part of the USSR. See Barker, British Foreign Policy, p. 215. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET CONTAINMENT DIPLOMACY

163

Office from being tempted into such an initiative, since its object would be to keep the USSR out of the Balkans. 1 Therefore, British authorities decided not to plunge the Turks into the Balkan problem with the Soviet government at this stage so long as the Turks were not belligerents; they would be courting a snub and arousing Soviet suspicious. 2 Since Ankara saw that the British authorities were unwilling to agree to an active Turkish part in Balkan affairs, Turkey began flirting in secrecy with the Romanians, Hungarians and even the Bulgarians for the formation of some kind Balkan confederation, which would exclude the influence of Germany and the USSR, and to a lesser extent Britain. When this became known to London, the latter warned Turkey that without Moscow having a voice in the business it was quite useless for her to try to build up any Balkan Confederation. Moreover, there were many elements in Romania and Hungary who did not wish a pact or Balkan Confederation to be formed. 3 Moscow also was well informed of this Turkish initiative, perceiving as its object the creation of a barrier against the USSR. Therefore, the USSR asked why the Allies were supplying Turkey with large quantities of arms. 4 With regard to the Soviet threat, Warner minuted on 9 November, that there was a Soviet proposal to make a treaty with Romania giving the Russians strategic bases and inevitably, therefore, control of Romanian policy and a large stake in the Balkans. Similarly, the USSR was morally certain, after this war, to have so strong an influence over Bulgaria as to amount at least to potential control. 5 Bulgaria was a vital bar to Soviet influence over the Mediterranean. The Foreign Office thought that if the Soviets had bases in Bulgaria they would take control of the Straits and dominate Turkey, which would put British imperial existence at risk. In fact Turkey without Bulgaria would not be worth struggling for. Britain's long-term interest in Turkey was bound up with the fate of the Balkans. 6 In this respect Britain had a common interest with Turkey in obtaining some sort of undertaking from the USSR regarding the future of the Balkans. Therefore, it would be like killing two birds with one stone for Britain if she could use this opportunity for broaching the matter with Moscow. Sargent believed that in the long run Anglo-Soviet relations would benefit by Britain's avoiding discussion on the subject of the Balkans merely because this would be unpalatable to the USSR. In approaching Moscow on this basis, Molotov told Clark-Kerr that if Turkey did in fact feel any anxiety the Soviet government would be ready to 'meet her half way,' provided that

1

PRO FO 371/37466, R 1444/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 38, 22 January 1943. PRO FO 371/37509, R 1328/650/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 255, 17 February 1943; see also CAB 122/106, file no. 82, Foreign Office to Washington, 25 February 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37510,R 5907/650/44, Hugessen to Sargent, no. 92/222/43, 25 June 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/37510, R 6407/650/44, Hugessen too Foreign Office, no. 1292, 14 July 1943. 5 PRO FO 371/37474, R 11414/55/44, Warner minute, 9 November 1943. 6 PRO FO 371/37474, R 11413/55/44, Clutton minute, 9 November 1943. 2

164

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

she entered the war. He thought that the Soviet government would be willing to join in a three-fold guarantee of her independence and integrity and of a place at the peace conference. The main question was whether Turkey really wanted help. When Clark-Kerr reminded him that Turkey's anxieties were mainly concerned with possible Soviet penetration in the Balkans and asked him whether it would not be wise of the Soviet Government to consider giving Turkey some kind of reassurances about the Balkans, Molotov was not forthcoming. Instead, he said that all Turkey wanted was to keep out of the storm because they believed that this would be profitable to them after the war.1 Ankara did not feel secure about the way in which the Soviets had behaved. London was worried about the Turkish government, particularly its Foreign Minister's alternative scheme to parry this threat. Menemencioglu had ideas and schemes about the future organisation of the Balkans. The Balkans were to be a barrier to Soviet progress and Turkey was to play a prominent part in the future Balkan Confederation. Hugessen thought that although Menemencioglu was convinced that since Turkey was essential to Britain after the war, there would be no permanent breach, he could not be quite so certain that the British government held the same view. Consequently, he must reckon on the possibility of such a breach. The logical consequence of this was that he must seek such other points of support as were available. The only place for him to look was the Balkans, with the possible hope of German support behind. Menemencioglu had never wanted anything but a compromise peace. He did not wish to see Germany destroyed, and he might be working for some kind of Balkan system, based on the survival of Germany, which would be of use to him as a make weight against Russia after the war. In fact, therefore, Menemencioglu not only did not wish Germany to be destroyed, but wished the war to go on for a long time so that Allied strength would be the more reduced and therefore the possibility of Germany's surviving increased.2 In the light of the above, it was clear that von Papen had good ground to work upon. Perhaps good ground was also provided by the Balkan situation. Hugessen reported to London that von Papen and Menemencioglu had a close common interest in organising a Balkan barrier against Soviet imperialism. On the basis of reports received from his own sources, the Ambassador continued to claim that the Turkish Foreign Minister was advising Romania and Bulgaria to play along with Germany and this was the more interesting in the light of his earlier eagerness to pass on Romanian peace feelers to Hugessen and his statement the preceding summer that it was his policy to 1

PRO FO 371/37474, R 11395/55/44, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 1274, 8 November 1943. PRO FO 371/44068, R 5412/7/44, Hugessen minute, 27 March 1944.

2

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

165

encouragc Bulgaria to make peace with Britain. Hugessen believed that Menemencioglu was quite capable of engaging in some Balkan scheme with covert if not overt German support. An additional reason for his theory was that with the present suspended animation in Turco-British relations and the possibility that British support might be forfeited later on, Menemencioglu had to look for something on which to stand. The Balkans were the most obvious platform. 1

British Interests in the Straits The decreasing necessity of Turkish participation in the war as a consequence of the Italian position made the British authorities once again evaluate Turkey's strategic position in regard to their interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The chief reason for Britain's supporting Turkey was to forestall Soviet establishment in the Straits or having free passage. Bearing in mind the conditions of modern warfare, the Foreign Office asked the British military authorities as to whether the free passage of a belligerent Soviet fleet through the Straits and Soviet control of the Straits would still constitute the same dislocation of strength in the Mediterranean as before. If not, the Foreign Office felt that 'she would no longer be able to exploit our long-suffering patience by assuming, as she does at present, that however badly she behaves now we shall always in the future be compelled in our interests to bolster her up and defend her against the USSR'. 2 In their study of British interests in the Turkish Straits, the PostHostilities Planning Committee (PHP) expressed their assessment that control of the Straits by the USSR would mean that she would hold broad zones on both sides of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles sufficient for defences in depth against Turkish attack. Within these defence zones, the USSR would be able to develop airfields and deploy a large air force both for local protection and for long range attack. The distance from the Straits to the North African coast between Alexandria and Benghazi was only 600 miles and the whole of the Suez Canal area was within 800 miles. In addition, if the USSR contemplated an advance through Turkey to the Suez Canal, she could build up a large force in the Straits zone as well as upon the eastern frontier of Turkey thus dispersing Turkish resistance on two fronts and quickening her penetration to Syria. The invasion of Greece through Eastern Thrace would also be facilitated. For these reasons, if Britain's relations with the USSR deteriorated, it would be necessary to strengthen British armed forces very considerably in

1

PRO FO 371/44068, R 5481/7/44, Hugessen to Sargent, 27 March 1944. PRO FO 371/37517, R 6787/1027/44, Memorandum by the Foreign Office, 'Policy Towards Turkey', 5 July 1943. 2

166 T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S A N D T H E G R E A T

POWERS

the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Therefore, it was extremely undesirable for Britain's position in the Mediterranean that Moscow should be in control of the Straits. No circumstances arose which would justify abandoning Britain's traditional policy of maintaining Turkish control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. However, the PHP Committee considered the revision of the Montreux Convention so as to allow free passage for Soviet vessels through the Straits, as this would not threaten a vital British interest. 1 In the evaluation of the COS regarding possible Soviet designs after the war over vital British strategic interests in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, the Straits appeared to be a crucial part of the British defence formation. They shared exactly the same view as the PHP Committee regarding Soviet control of the Straits. The COS, however, regarded physical occupation and an unlimited right of passage as more or less equivalent and stated that the security of the British strategic position in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean depended on them. Therefore, it was essential that even the USSR should not be granted an unlimited right of passage. 2 General Nye stated that 'if it was no longer a matter of the first importance to deny Soviet free passage for her warships through the Straits the chief reason for our support of Turkey would have disappeared'. 3 Consequently the decision was that Britain would rather not see a revision of the Montreux Convention.

Anglo-Soviet

Pressure on Turkey

The Soviet attitude towards Turkey presented a very awkward problem for the British because of the clash of their interests. It is fair to say that the USSR had suspicions of the Allies' future strategy towards the Balkans. Ahmet §iikru Esmer suggested that Soviet authorities were convinced that Britain was tolerating Turkish neutrality in order not to weaken the Germans in the Balkans before Britain and the US were in a position to take their place. 4 The Soviet press also began to complain that the arms which Britain was sending Turkey would not be used against Germany, but rather were to be used to reinforce her against the USSR after the war. 5 Soviet determination to secure Turkish belligerency became evident, as appeared in hvestia:

1 PRO A D M 116/4884, P.H.P.(43) 5 (Final), Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-committee Memorandum 'Strategic Requirements in Turkey and the Dardanelles', 16 August 1943. PRO FO 371/37473, R 9168/55/44, Brigadier Hallice to Sargent, 22 September 1943. 2 PRO FO 371/37473, R 9168/55/44. Clutton minute, 29 September 1943, see also CAB 122/973, C.O.S. (43) Final, 14 August 1943. 3 Ibid. 4 Ahmet §iikrii Esmer, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 158. 5 George Kirk, 'The Middle East in the War', Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946 (London: London University Press, 1952), p. 458.

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

167

Turkish neutrality becomes increasingly more favourable and necessary to Germany as Turkey secures the safety of the Balkan flank for the German armies, and allows the Germans to continue to hold very limited forces there and to concentrate the overwhelming proportion of German troops on the Soviet-German front. 1 The Foreign Ministers of the Big Three, Eden, Hull and Molotov, met in Moscow on 19 October 1943. Molotov, at the very beginning, suggested that the three powers should coerce Turkey into the war, prompting 15 German divisions to withdraw from the Soviet front. Churchill was very excited by Molotov's suggestion and asked Eden to ascertain whether the Soviet authorities would be attracted by the idea of Britain's acting through the Aegean, involving Turkey in the war, and opening the Dardanelles and Bosporus so that British naval forces could aid the Soviet advance and that Britain could ultimately extend assistance along the Danube. 2 Eden also was in favour of Turkey's coming into the war, but timing was a tricky consideration considering that the Allies were relatively weak in the Mediterranean and also that Turkey was unprepared. Then he raised the question of the reason for Stalin's idea that the present was a good moment to get Turkey into the war while Istanbul was vulnerable and Britain could not fulfil her engagement to Turkey to send the air supplies which she had promised. Stalin replied, 'Why should Turkey not comc in when we were all shedding our blood? If she wanted to be at the conference table to stake her claims, she must draw off some ten German divisions.' This was the reason Turkey was being sent supplies by the USA and Britain. 3 In the meantime, Stalin was reluctant to discuss the Balkan issue. The only point about South East Europe on which the Soviet government expressed a view was that they wanted Turkey in the war as soon as possible, although they knew that this was not Britain's policy. The Foreign Office in fact was doubtful whether the proposal the USSR put forward at the Moscow Conference was in good faith. Rather it was

1

Ibid. p. 459. CAC, Churchill Papers, CHAR 20/122/72, Churchill to Eden, no. T 1758/3, 29 October 1943. Churchill next day telegraphed Inonil through Saraijoglu that a flotilla of British submarines should be allowed to pass into the Black Sea. He tried hard to convince the Turkish President that the Germans were in no position to attack Turkey. Churchill could not make the Turks believe it because of the British disastrous defeat at the Aegean. CAC, Churchill Papers, CHAR 20/122/107, Churchill to Sarasoglu, 30 October 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37474, R 10584/55/44, Eden to Churchill, no. 54 Spaces, 22 October 1943. Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 286. Barker suggests that when Stalin decided to bring Turkey into the war he must have faced with the same kind of dilemma between short-term military interests and long-term political interests as the British faced in backing the communist-led resistance movements in Greece and Yugoslavia. If Turkey came into the war, Hitler might be defeated more quickly — but the way might be opened up for British forces to appear in Bulgaria, even Romania; and this, in the long view, Stalin could not want. However, in handling this matter Stalin was tactically clever: by insisting on a time limit for Turkey's entry into the war by the end of 1943 he made it virtually certain that the Turks would refuse. Yet Stalin volunteered that if Turkey, were attacked by Bulgaria, the USSR would declare war on Bulgaria. Barker, British Policy, p. 136-7. 2

168 THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S probably nothing more than an attempt to get Britain to show her hand. 1 Glutton expressed the view that the Soviets knew that by holding their tongue they had nothing to lose since the Balkans would fall into their lap 'like a ripe plum' while any weakening of the Turks would make things easier for them. At this point Turkey's entry into the war became to some extent unavoidable. If Ankara insisted on budging from its present policy London was worried that Britain could probably never get into the Balkans before the Germans withdrew of their own accord, or before the USSR established themselves there. Therefore, future British interest in the Balkans was inextricably bound up with the entry of Turkey into the war. 2 Thus, the entry of Turkey might be the best way of stabilising the situation in the Balkans and preventing a general landslide towards Moscow. Therefore, Eden accepted Molotov's second proposal that Britain would demand the immediate use of Turkish air bases and Britain and the USSR would later demand that Turkey should enter the war before the end of 1943.3 It was decided that the British Government should take the lead in Turkey on the understanding that the ultimate objective of themselves, the USA and the USSR was the same, namely, the belligerency of Turkey. 4 In order to induce the Turkish government to accept the Allies' demand, Eden invited Menemencioglu to Cairo.

The Eden-Menemencioglu Meeting at Cairo Churchill saw the protocol as very reasonable since it might further his ambition of getting a foothold in the Aegean and opening up the Straits so that British naval forces could aid the Soviet advance. At the same time, it might provide Britain with a foothold in the Balkans which might prevent the Soviets from holding a position in the Balkan theatre. 5 The American Government also agreed, on 4 November to the decisions taken in Moscow. Churchill telegraphed to Eden saying that this might be the last chance for Turkey to come in on the side of the victorious nations. He urged Eden to use the argument that the Soviet request was a tremendous opportunity to establish a relationship with Moscow which would provide protection for Turkey. In the end, his language became threatening; the consequences of 1

PRO FO 371/37474, R 10584/55/44, Sargent minute, 26 October 1943. PRO FO 371/37474, R 10733/55/44, Clutton minute, 26 October 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37474, R 11053/55/44, Eden to Churchill, 154 Space, 2 November 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/44070, R 10407/7/44, Foreign Office to Clark-Kerr, no. 2007, 5 July 1944. As a matter of fact, Hull, at the beginning, was against inducing Turkey, at this stage, to come into the war, but after consulting his government following pressure put by Molotov he shared the view of the British and Soviet governments. But he objected to paying a price for it in view of other Allied commitments. Therefore, according to him, the early request for the Turks should be made for using air bases and transportation facilities. CAC, Churchill Papers, CHAR 2/122/89, Eden to Churchill, no. T. 1772/3, 29 October 1943. 5 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 255. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

169

refusal to take part in the war, either passively or actively, would be that Turkey was left absolutely alone and with no guarantee of any kind for her future or for the future of the Straits. 1 However, Glutton saw this argument as very weak. Britain's interest in Turkey and the Dardanelles was such that however badly Turkey behaved now, Britain still needed her. The point was also expressed by the British COS that Britain, in her own interests, could in the future be compelled to bolster up Turkey and defend her against the USSR. 2 When Eden met Menemencioglu in Cairo on 7 November the latter was still more afraid of Soviet post-war intentions than of a German invasion. Eden's response that were Turkey to come into the war this would offer a great opportunity to establish Turco-Soviet relations on a sound basis for years, served only to reinforce the most extreme Turkish suspicion that an 'AngloSoviet deal' had taken place, hinting that 'the Soviets had refrained from discussion regarding the Balkans'. 3 On one occasion Menemencioglu even accused Eden of acting as a spokesmen not only for Britain but also for the USSR. The British Foreign Secretary reminded him that Britain was also an ally of the USSR as much as of Turkey. This was not a helpful answer in dealing with the Turks. The Turkish Foreign Minister urged that granting bases to Britain would undoubtedly raise a similar Soviet demand. At this point, Menemencioglu made a very acute observation, saying that in the present century the fate of the Balkans had become as direct an interest to Turkey as the fate of the Straits in the last century. The Turks, he said, were fearful of a territorial fait accompli in Romania and Bulgaria, because they did not wish to see the Soviets in the Balkans. Referring to Stalin's wish to regain Moldavia from Romania, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that it would be hard to explain it to the National Assembly if Turkish assistance aided the establishment of the USSR in Romania and Bulgaria. 4 However, he submitted the British requests to his government.

1 PRO FO 371/37474, R 11167/55/44, Churchill to Eden, no 1752, 3 November 1943. Clutton recalled that Ankara had a copy of the record of the Adana meeting, and they would remember Churchill's statement about what Britain should send in the event of Turkey's being drawn into the war, namely the immediate despatch of at least 25 squadrons of aircraft. However, Britain now could send 6.5 squadrons of fighters plus half a squadron of night fighters for Turkey's protection. PRO FO 371/37474, R 11167/55/44, Clutton minute, 4 October 1943. 2 PRO FO 371/37474, R 11337/55/44, Clutton minute, 8 November 1943. Despite his agreement with Molotov at Moscow, Eden wrote in his memoirs that 'the weakness of the Turk's position was an unfounded suspicion that there had been some deal between us and the Russians, as a result of which the Russians had abandoned their demand for a second front and wc had agreed to put pressure on Turkey...' Lord Avon, Memoirs: the Reckoning (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1965), p. 418. 4

FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, Memorandum by Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, November 1943, pp. 180-81.

170

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Back in Ankara, the Turkish government was not willing to accept the granting of air bases since this would inevitably lead to war. Menemencioglu told Hugessen that, since Adana, nearly a year had passed and if substantial effect had been given to its conclusions Turkey today would have been ready. 1 The Turks were hardly the ones to blame. As a matter of fact, behind the formal approach the British authorities were fairly sure of both the German and Soviet threats to Turkey. Churchill's attempt to recapture Rhodes failed. In his memoirs Hugessen stated that the development in the Aegean Islands, which were a few miles from Turkey, clearly proved the devastating German capacity for aerial bombardment, which could demolish Turkish major cities and industrial areas. The Dodecanese Islands, Cos and Leros had been surrendered. However, Turkey played a far from neutral role in this campaign. During the British engagement in the Aegean and withdrawal from the Dodecanese Islands, Turkish authorities shipped supplies to the British, facilitated communications and gave the British enormous help when German aerial bombardment forced them to evacuate. 2

The Tehran Conference: The Straits in

Negotiations

Even the defeat in the Aegean did not change Churchill's belief in the need for Turkish entry into the war. Thus the Allies would benefit, in his plan, by using Turkish territory in order to clear up not only the Aegean but also the Black Sea, which would weaken the ability of German resistance, 3 though this would cause delay to Overlord, the code name for the planned invasion of Normandy. This might have been a part of Churchill's plans for the post-war period, to bolster Britain's position in the Balkans and the Middle East. However, the first thing on his mind was the winning of the war. Accordingly, Churchill intimated to Stalin at the Tehran Conference on 29 November that a failure to respond to allied invitations to enter the war might result in serious political and territorial consequences for Turkey, particularly in regard to the future status of the Straits. 4 In this sense, Kuniholm is right to say that thus the British Prime Minister re-awakened the Soviet interest in the Straits, which had been dormant in the political arena since late 1940. 5 But, as for the question of 'who had been the first leader, bringing up the question of Soviet access to warm water ports', if one looks through US 1 PRO FO 371/37475, R 12136/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2063 , 22 November 1943. The Cunningham Papers, Add52571, Admiral Kelly to Cunningham, 4 December 1943; Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray, 1949), p. 193. 3 PRO PREM 3/136/8, Record of conversation in the Soviet Embassy at Tehran, 1 December 1943. 4 FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, Bohlen minutes, p. 536. Also see Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 160. ^ Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War, p. 42.

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

171

official publications, as Kuniholm did, the conclusion could be reached that it was the Prime Minister, but British archival sources say that it was Stalin himself. 1 At this point, it is fair to say that Churchill's previous statement encouraged Stalin to have a meeting, giving the opportunity to Churchill to bring the matter up at the next meeting, when Stalin demanded a relaxation of the Straits regime. Churchill responded to Stalin that there was no obstacle to this. Stalin countered that, if so, then the question of the regime of the Straits would have to be considered. The USSR had no outlet, and perhaps a new regime could help them. Then he complained about Great Britain's suppression of the Soviet demand for a warm water port in past treaties, such as Sèvres, Lausanne and Montreux. 'Even if Britain did not want to do so now,' Stalin said, 'she would have to help.' Churchill, contrary to the evaluation of the Foreign Office and British military authorities regarding British interest in the Straits, reiterated that he hoped to see the Soviet naval and merchant fleet on all the seas of the world. 2 This was nothing less than agreeing to a Soviet demand for free passage through the Straits. At this point, one might speculate that Churchill's behaviour can be explained as a way of encouraging Soviet support in getting his plan through. However, what exactly Churchill meant by this remained unclear, even for Eden. The latter was asked by Molotov what Churchill had in mind by referring to the Straits. Eden could only respond, 'Frankly, I do not know.' 3 The Soviet authorities must have been very excited; on the following day, Molotov this time asked Churchill himself what he meant. Churchill answered that while he was away from his War Cabinet he could only say that personally he favoured a change in the regime of the Straits. In this respect, Roosevelt intervened to point out that the US would prefer that the Straits be made free to the commerce and fleets of the world, irrespective of whether Turkey entered the war or not. Subsequently, the subject was dropped since it would be unwise to discuss such a delicate subject in the wake of inviting Turkey once more to join the war. 4 Churchill expressed his feeling in his book Closing the Ring that 'I had always thought that it was a wrong thing that a mighty land-mass like the Russian Empire, with its population of nearly two hundred millions, could be denied during the winter months all effective access to the broad waters.' 5 This might be true from the logical standpoint, but it is doubtful whether it was compatible with British strategic 1

FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 566. PRO PREM 3/136/8, Record of Conversation between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at luncheon, 30 November 1943. 2

Q

FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, Meeting between Hopkins-Eden-Molotov on 30 November 1943, p. 573. See also A. L. Macfie, 'The Turkish Straits in the Second World War. 1939-45', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, 1989, p. 244. 4 PRO PREM 3/136/8, Record of Conversation at Luncheon in the Soviet Embassy at Tehran, 1 December 1943. PRO FO 371/44165, R 16013/3830/44, Sargent minute, 6 October 1944. 5 Churchill,'Closing the Ring', p. 336.

172

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

interests as the Foreign Office and military authorities thought of them. It could have provoked an invitation for the USSR to put pressure on Turkey to allow Soviet bases in the Straits. It was doubtful how much the guarantee given by Stalin against any German or Bulgarian attack on Turkey would causc a Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria to have an effect on the Turkish authorities. 1 It is hardly possible to say that the Foreign Office might be convinced that such a suggestion would work. Turkey would perceive such a guarantee as a form of Soviet establishment in Bulgaria, which would be the beginning of the end of Turkey's sovereignty, at least over the Straits and Eastern Thrace, including Istanbul. However, Churchill was very hopeful. On the last day of the Tehran Conference the Big Three decided to invite inonii to meet Roosevelt and Churchill in Cairo where Turkey's entry into the war would be solicited. 2 In a sense the Soviets' attitude at the Tehran Conference aroused further suspicion of their intentions after the war in the Balkans. Contrary to their feverish attempt in Moscow to bring Turkey into the war just a month before, Stalin was less enthusiastic as it might delay the Allied invasion of Western Europe to establish a second front. It might be speculated that the Soviets did not want to bring Anglo-American forces into Turkish territory in case they interfered in their assumed sphere of influence. 3 The United States also was not in favour of becoming entangled in Balkan affairs. 4 However, even though it would cause a few weeks' delay to Overlord, Churchill insisted on recapturing the Aegean Islands to gain access to the Black Sea ports. This would also reduce German strength in Western Europe.

The Cairo Conference and its Aftermath Churchill put pressure on Inonii, and though he did not fulfil the requirements of the Adana list, Ankara received huge amounts of supplies. And Germany was not in a position to attack Turkey. As a matter of fact, in addition to the divergence of view between Roosevelt and Churchill which appeared at the meeting, Turkey found out that Eden's suggestion in Cairo for

1

PRO FO 371/37476, R 12549/55/44 Eden to Foreign Office, 1 December 1943. PRO FO 371/37475, R 12545/55/44, Eden to Hugessen, a message form Churchill to Inonii. 3 Vojtech Mastny, 'Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences of 1943', Journal of Modern History, Vol. no. 47, (September 1975) p. 497. Eden wrote in his memoirs: 'I found the sudden shifts in Stalin's policies disturbing...', Avon, The Reckoning, p. 426. ^ Avon, The Reckoning, p. 428. 2

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

173

Turkish entry into the war was the result of Soviet pressure. 1 As a result of the meeting, on the morning of 7 December, it was agreed that the talks would go on between the military experts. And air preparations and other supplies were to be continued until February 15. On that date the Allies would request permission from the T urks to send in air squadrons. It was made clear that if the Turkish reply was in the negative the Allies would direct all their resources to another theatre, and must abandon hope of co-operation with Turkey. Inonii agreed to consult the National Assembly within four or five days. Those days could also be employed in pressing on with preparations and the sending in of specialists. 2 It is hardly surprising that Turkey would not be willing to enter into the conflict. It was true, considering the German victory over Britain in the Aegean, that the German threat was highly feasible, but behind the Turkish thinking was the Soviet factor. Turkey replied to the Cairo demands that although the invasion of the entire country was improbable, a land attack on Calaica and Gallipoli could not be ruled out and, despite the bombardment of Bulgaria and the threat of a Soviet ultimatum, the Turkish General Staff had to reckon with the possibility of a combined German and Bulgarian attack as well as an attack by Germany alone through Bulgaria or German-occupied Greece, with the risk of the occupation of Istanbul, the Straits and Qatalca. 3 Menemencioglu expressed most bitterly his sense that Turkey was being sacrificed to a bargain with the USSR. He spoke similarly and more emphatically to the US Ambassador. Turkey was being pressed to enter the war in consequence of this bargain regardless of the sacrifices which this would entail. 4 In the meantime, the Turkish authorities felt the Germans at their heels. Menemencioglu asserted that there were twenty-four German divisions in the Balkans, not to mention the Bulgarian army. Tito would very soon be shattered by the winter in Yugoslavia and German troops would be free to push down to the Straits. 5 The Turkish General Staff were also convinced that the Germans would attack by land with or without the Bulgarians and that in

During the negotiation Roosevelt's patience with the Turkish delegate's anxiety about the danger of German retaliation unless the Adana list were completed irritated Churchill, lkinci Dttnya Savagi Yiilari, p. 189. In contradiction to the British record, the Turkish record suggested that in a bilateral talk with Roosevelt the latter agreed to a Turkish scheme of preparation involving supplies to Turkey, and a plan of collaboration rather than giving an exact date for entry into the war. Inonii believed that within a certain time there would be grounds for Soviet pressure on Ankara to enter into the war. Roosevelt himself expressed the feeling that if he were a Turk he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning his neutrality and leading his country into war. 2 PRO FO 371/37477, R 12987/55/44, Eden to Foreign Office, Frozen no. 4027, December 1943. 3 PRO FO 371/37478, R 13144/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2191, 13 December 1943. 4 PRO FO 371/37477, R 13069/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2185, 12 December 1943. 5 PRO FO 371/44066, R 1505/7/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 142, 28 January 1944.

174

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

view of the state of Turkish defences, Turkey could only hold out for a few days. Therefore they gave a new list, which was found extravagant by Britain. Menemencioglu asked that a military expert should be sent at once from the Middle East to examine these points and undertook to ensure that anything in the requirements of the Turkish General Staff which was proved tp him to be unreasonable would be dropped. 1 The Turkish government suspected that the British had given commitments to the Greeks and the Soviets with respect to the Aegean and the Balkans respectively and for this reason were unwilling to allow the Turks sufficient war materials to permit them to participate actively in military operations. 2

Turkey: on the Edge of the Isolation? In view of other commitments, the British Joint Planning Staff in no way saw the Turkish demand being accepted or forming the basis of negotiations. In the end, Churchill suggested to the Foreign Office that a strong line against the Turkish Government should be taken if by February 15 they had been permitted to bring in the two thousand technical experts required and the necessary stores. Britain should then be in a position to fly in twenty squadrons and offer Turkey a very tolerable measure of protection against the German air attacks which were the only serious danger Turkey had to contemplate at this stage of the war. 'If however the bringing in of these experts was obstructed and if, when they were in position, the flying in of the twenty squadrons was forbidden, that would be the end of the alliance between Turkey and Britain'. 3 However, the British COS and Foreign Office felt that a showdown would be militarily and politically undesirable at the present time, firstly because it was still felt that they might need Turkey at a later stage in the war, and secondly because such a break would be an invaluable indication to the enemy of their future plans. To maintain a threat to the Germans from the eastern end of the Mediterranean, until Overlord was launched, was a better idea. 4 The conclusion of the Joint Planners, therefore, was that conversations should continue and supplies go on at the rate at which they were reaching

The Turkish Government was calling up one class 85,000 men for Qatalca at once. Turkish requirements were far above the 58,900 tons mentioned viz. 248.000 though their statement is accompanied by suggestions by which entirely rail-borne material could be reduced to 134 000 tons with rail carriage capacity of 1,500 a day which was equal to 90 days. 42,000 tons could be carried by sea and 72,000 tons mostly by road. Minister for Foreign Affairs is sending me full list of material required which includes 216 Spitfires and 500 Shermans and 66.800 tons petrol. For air defence they still regard 19 squadrons arranged under Hardihood as indispensable. PRO FO 371/37476, R 13069/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office no. 2183, 12 December 1943. 2 Hull, Memories, pp. 1370-71. 3 PRO FO 371/44064, R 1295/7/44, Churchill to Eden, 7 January 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/37478, R 13456/55/44, COS to US COS, 21 December 1943. See also PRO FO 371/37479, R 13526/55/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1751, 21 December 1943. PRO FO 371/37479, R 13551, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 2269, 22 December 1943.

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

175

Turkey during the summer. In the meantime the COS pointed out that from the long-term point of view the question of 'the Dardanelles hindered Britain from threatening the Turks'. 1 Though Churchill was ready to take a less drastic course he expressed his feeling that 'it would be foolish to deem ourselves inhibited from taking any action disagreeable to the Turks for fear it should get out there is a breach between us and consequently encourage the G e r m a n s ' . 2 Therefore, the British government decided to make one more attempt to persuade Ankara to agree to full and immediate infiltration and preparation of airfields. For this purpose it was proposed to make considerable concessions towards the demands put forward by the Turks and to send the three commanders-in-chief, Middle East, to Ankara to carry this discussion further. But the Turks refused to accept such high-ranking officers to Ankara for fear of provoking a German attack. 3 Then London agreed to send a lowerranking officer. However, the British military mission, led by Air Marshal Linnell, was a failure because of excessive Turkish military demands against German attack from Bulgaria. 4 The Foreign Office knew that Britain had more to lose both militarily and politically by a showdown at that time because the Turkish authorities were not likely to yield to pressure. An unsuccessful showdown would quickly become known to the Germans and would improve their position materially in south east Europe, whereas it would shatter Britain's relations with Turkey. Yet accepting the Turkish argument and demands would not be realistic with their capability. As a midway solution, therefore, the British military delegation was withdrawn without giving the Turkish Staff any reason. At the same time supplies of munitions and military stores of all kinds ceased. 5

1 PRO FO 371/37478, R 13159/55/44, Clutton minute, 15 December 1943. R 14265/55/44, Churchill to Eden, no. 485, 15 December 1943. Menemencioglu ridiculed trying to make out to Vinogradov that Britain was entirely responsible for the present hold-up in regard to Turkey's entry into the war. Turkey was anxious to come in but Britain was preventing her by withholding supplies and disregard the possibility of a land attack etc. Meanwhile the British were trying to trick her into war by infidelity. PRO FO 37144064, R 1164/7/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 112, 22 January 1944. 2 PRO FO 371/44066, R 1345/7/44, Churchill minute, no. M22/4, 24 January 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/37478, R 13459/55/44, Foreign Office to Hugessen, no. 1736, 18 December 1943. 4 Turkey alleged that Germany could attack from Bulgaria with 26 divisions. In order to provide the necessary facilities to the Allies she demanded the following military supplies. 1-Material for motorised units; 500 Sherman tanks, 4,190 lorries, 1,027 water tank and petrol tank lorries. 2-Guns; Field guns 130 Bishop's 60, 260 Field howitzers, heavy guns tractor drawn 80, heavy howitzer tractor drawn 16, 40 millimetre Bofors, tractor drawn 356, A/TK guns, 6 pounder and 17 pounder, tractor drawn 774. 3-Fuel; petrol and oils (with containers) 134,000 tons). 4- Intercommunication material; Miscellaneous signals equipment 500 tons. 5 Infantry and Machinesguns. S.A.A. 303 130 million, light Machine guns 2,000,anti-tanks mines 400,000, Pistols 50,000, special anti-tanks mines 80,000, hand renades 1 million, anti tank bombs 150,000, 6-Aircraft; Fighters (Spitfire 9) 216, fast light bombers (mosquitoes or Mitchelles) 48. 7-Anti Aircraft arms; heavy guns (9.8) 4, 40 mm guns 114 etc. PRO FO 371/37478, R 13145/55/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no 2192, 31. December 1943. Also see ATASE, ikinci Diinya Harbi Kolleksiyonu, Kutu no. 3, dosya no 3, Genel Kurmay Ba§kanhgi Malzeme Tahakkuku Talep Burosu, sayi: 80236, 1 February 1944. 5 PRO FO 371/44066, R 1366/7/44, Foreign Office to Washington, no. 840, 30 January 1944.

176

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

This move, although primarily intended as a form of pressure on the Turks to accept British demands, automatically postponed the date by which Turkey would physically be able to come into the war. The COS attached great importance to maintaining a threat against the Germans from south east Europe. They therefore felt that the Allies should be prepared to resume military supplies if the Turks reacted favourably to their present attitude. By this means they hoped to prevent the Germans being relieved from anxiety about British intentions in Turkey and the wish to maintain by every possible means the threat in this part of the world. These proposals were tantamount to saying that the COS no longer wanted Turkey in the war and that even if they did they had not the forces at their disposal to make their wish a practical proposition. All they wanted to do was to use Turkey as a part of a deception plan — the military in Turkey being mere show, because there were no forces available within the foreseeable future to use them. 1 The Realignment of Turkish Policy When the British and American governments sent notes to Ankara that they were seriously disturbed by Turkish economic relations with Germany, they found a sudden readiness on the part of the Turkish Government to co-operate with the Allies, even at the expense of prejudicing Turkish relations with Germany. Indeed, Turkey was a prime source of a German strategic product, chrome ore, which was vitally important in the manufacture of highgrade steel, and was supplied according to the Clodius agreement signed on 9 October 1941, due to expire on 30 April 1944. While German negotiators were in Ankara to arrange the renewal of the agreement the British and American governments presented an identical statement on 14 April to inonii to stop chrome ore deliveries to Germany. The outstanding instance of non cooperation with Germany was the complete embargo which the Turkish government placed on all exports of chrome to the Axis. This action amounted to repudiation of a treaty obligation on Turkey's part towards Germany. 2 It was not, however, an isolated instance of the help which Ankara was now prepared to give the Allies, and the case of the two Romanian liners, Transilvania and Bessarabia, is worth quoting. 3 There also were a number of

In view of the Turkish attitude, Stalin suggested on 2 February to withdraw the British and Soviet ambassadors from Ankara. However, Britain considered that this recall would definitely dispel all German anxieties regarding the intentions of the Turkish Government. 2 Hull, The Memories, p. 1372. 3 These two liners had been lying in dock at Istanbul since 1940. The Allies were anxious that these liners should not be used by the Axis in the Black Sea. The matter was taken up the summer before both by Hugessen and Vinogradov. But the Turkish government then declared that they were helpless in the matter, since the vessels were merchant vessels and they had no power under the Montreux Convention or under international law to detain them. When the Soviets, in their lightning campaign, reached the gates of Sebastopol, the captains of these two liners received orders from their German and Romanian masters to take them immediately to the Black Sea for evacuation purposes. Before formalities could be completed, the Turkish government intervened and removed essential machinery, placed armed guards on board them, and informed the Romanian and German authorities that, since the liners had arrived in Istanbul in 1940, the situation had radically changed and that the vessels must now be regarded as auxiliary vessels of war and detained.

ANGLO-SOVIET

CONTAINMENT

DIPLOMACY

177

hints that Turkey was ready and anxious to resume military conversations. The reason for the sudden change in the Turkish attitude perhaps was that the leading Turks had become frightened at the position of isolation into which Turkey had drifted. The policy of aloofness and indifference which they encountered during the last two months combined with the increasingly precarious position of the Balkans and the imposition of stricter blockade measures threatening Turkey with economic as well as political isolation, had at last made influential Turkish circles realise that those who had conducted the military conversations last winter had not after all been as clever as they thought they were. 1 Indeed, there was an obvious improvement in the Turkish attitude with the resignation of Menemencioglu (see Chapter 4). This was also a great opportunity for London to cultivate Turkish friendship in the interests of Britain's Balkan policy. In order to be in possession of a possible means of checking Russian predominance, Sargent minuted that it would be to Britain's advantage to restore close Anglo-Turkish relations as soon as possible and thereby lay the foundation for a possible Anglo-Turkish-Greek understanding. 2 The widening rift in Allied diplomacy over Turkey revealed that it was a strategic issue over which the USSR and Britain, supported by the US, had come into conflict. By June 1944 the conflict of interests in the Turkish matter had become more apparent. While London re-established good relations with Ankara, Moscow seemed to be undermining these initiatives. The British welcomed the Turkish decision to ban the export of chrome to Germany and their undertaking to limit exports of other strategic commodities to 50 percent of deliveries in 1945. They also welcomed the Turkish decision to ensure that the spirit as well as the letter of the Montreux Convention should be h o n o u r e d . 3 London wanted Turkey to take one more step, immediately breaking off economic and political relations with Germany and also an announcement from Ankara that it wished to co-operate wholeheartedly with Britain and her Allies. There is little suspicion that this effort was because of London's wish to strengthen her position as well as Turkey's at the peace table against possible Soviet claims over — most probably — the Straits. 4 This might be a golden opportunity too for Turkey who had been nearly on the edge of isolation because of her latest attitude. Therefore, the Turkish

1 PRO FO 371/44069, R 7509/7/44, Memorandum by Eden, 'Policy Towards Turkey', no. WP (44) 244, 6 May 1994. 1 PRO FO 371/44069, R 8866/7/44, Sargent minute, 22 May 1944. 3 FO 954/28, Foreign Office to Hugessen, 29 June 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/44070, R 10407/7/44, Foreign Office to Moscow, no. 2007, 5 July 1944.

178

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

government responded positively and was ready to break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany at any moment. 1 The Soviet government unsurprisingly did not relish the British proposal, claiming that Britain had departed from the agreement reached at the Moscow Conference whereby the three powers would work jointly to bring Turkey into the war. Therefore, the British acted without Moscow's concurrence. 2 Instead of merely proposing to ask Turkey to break off relations with Germany, contrary to his earlier stance, Molotov suggested that Britain should ask Turkey to come into the war as agreed at Moscow and Tehran. 3 However, both London and Washington replied that it was not a departure from the earlier understanding. Rather, the severance of relations was a first step towards active belligerency. Both capitals agreed that without involving any military commitment the severance of relations would have nearly the same moral effect on Germany. However, Stalin replied that Turkish action came 'too late and was unsatisfactory'. He found it necessary to leave the Turkish government to its own devices and to exert fresh pressure on her. 4 Hull held the same view as Britain that Turkey had long been a steadying influence in the Balkans and that a strong Turkey was likely to be a useful friend when Balkan matters came up for discussion in post-war conferences. 5 Therefore, when the Turkish government suggested that in return for the severance of diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and for the assurances which Turkey wanted to receive, Turkey's right should be recognised as a full ally, to participate as an equal partner in the peace settlement, the State Department and Foreign Office agreed. The Foreign Office informed Moscow that as a result of the Turkish rupture of diplomatic and economic relations with Germany on 2 August 1944, Britain had assured Turkey not only that it would afford all assistance necessary within its power to mitigate the economic disturbances which might result from the severance of relations with Germany but also that it would be in a better position than hitherto to fill that international position at the peacemaking table to which was aspired.6

1 PRO FO 371/44070, R 10450/7/44, Hugessen to Foreign Office, no. 1030, 4 July 1944. FRUS, ' The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East\ Kelly to the Secretary of State, 25 July 1944, Vol. V, p. 891. 2 PRO FO 371/44070, R 10285/7/44, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 1734 and 1735, 30 June 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/44070, R 10850/7/44, Foreign Officc to Clark-Kerr, no. 2096, 10 July 1944. 4 PRO PREM/3/447/9, Stalin to Churchill, no. T. 1453/4, 13 July 1944. FRUS, 'The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East', Vol. V, the Secretary of State to Harriman, 27 July 1944, p. 893. 5 Hull, The Memories, pp. 1374-76. 6 Ibid. p. 1374. FRUS, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, The Soviet Embassy in Washington to the Department of State, Vol. V, 10 July 1944, pp.875-78. PRO FO 371/44072, R 12062/7/44, Clark-Kerr to Molotov, 23 July 1944.

ANGLO-SOVIET CONTAINMENT DIPLOMACY

179

Soviet discontent regarding the Allies' attitude appeared in Pravda on 7 August, stating that Turkey had not yet joined those countries engaged in a bitter struggle against Hitlerite Germany and that she was still in relations with the satellite countries. Pravda pointed out that Turkey's rupture of relations with Germany was caused by fear of political isolation after the war, and that her previous policy was inspired by the conviction of an inevitable disagreement between the Allies, the opposite of which had in fact occurred. 1 This attitude naturally raised the suspicions that Moscow wanted a weak Turkey or intended to create a situation in which Turkey would be in a position of isolation so that she could not claim any right in the post-war settlement. Either way Moscow could establish Soviet dominion in the Balkans and the Straits. To prevent such a possibility Turkey made a last hopeless effort on 27 May to appease Moscow by proposing an agreement based on the solidarity of interests of both countries in securing their safety in certain zones which were of interest to them, particularly the Balkans. It also would include the statement that the USSR and Turkey would in the closest way collaborate politically in the above mentioned zones and would constantly consult each other on all matters of common interest. Moscow saw the proposal as useless in the sense that the Balkans were now in the hands of Germany which was at war with the USSR and against which Turkey was not waging war. Moreover, Turkey was connected by a friendly treaty and was rendering economic help to Germany and that the political co-operation and consultation in regard to the Balkans, proposed by the Turkish Government, would lose sense unless it meant that Turkey would radically change her relations with Germany. Therefore, if Turkey was for an agreement with the USSR, the only way to reach such an agreement was the immediate and complete rupture of relations between Turkey and Germany and Turkish entry into the war against Germany on the Allies' side. At the same time, the Soviets emphasised that such an agreement would also be in the interests of the Allies. 2 Ignoring the Soviet point, Turkey proposed again on 27 June to solemnly confirm the friendly character of the relations between the USSR and Turkey; f o r example, through the protocol of the prolongation of Acts mentioned in the protocol of 7 November 1935, which (prolongation) occurred before the term was over, or through a new separate document. Moscow's reply was identical with the former: this proposal did not correspond with the aim of shortening the term of the war. 3

London did not share Moscow's view, considering that if Turkey were asked to come into the war she would ask assistance to defend herself which the Allies could hardly spare. Contrary to the Foreign Office view, Molotov 1 2 3

PRO FO 371/44072, R 13289/7/44, Hugessen to Eden, no. 300, 14 August 1944. PRO FO 371/44070, R 10850/7/44, Eden to Clark-Kerr, no. 454,10 July 1944. Ibid.

180

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

was of the opinion that the policy of Britain was contrary to the policy agreed on at the Moscow Conference. In these circumstances it was therefore necessary to consult and secure the agreement of the USSR. 1 However, the Foreign Office in no way intended going back on what was agreed at Moscow since the Soviet insistence regarding Turkish belligerency was not without ulterior motives. In this regard, Sargent pointed out that the Soviet Union was not seriously interested in whether or not Turkey came into the war. It was using the whole Turkish question as a 'stalking horse for the pursuit of their long term objectives in the Balkans and it had been evident ever since the Moscow Conference'. What interested them was using the question of Turkey's entry into the war as a means of putting Turkey in the wrong so that at the end of the conflict she would be more or less isolated and discredited as a disloyal ally and hardened neutral and thus be unable to stand in the way of Soviet interests in South East Europe. 2 The Foreign Office was convinced that Stalin's line — that the three powers must straightaway require Turkey to come into the war — was not based upon strategical requirements, but represented the Soviet government's efforts to drive a wedge between Great Britain and Turkey. He no doubt considered that Turkey, just as much as Poland, should revolve in the Soviet orbit and that therefore she must maintain no friendships with other Great Powers such as would enable her to adopt an independent policy towards the USSR. Sargent's minute to some extent showed the Soviet factor in British policy towards Turkey adopted after the Moscow Conference. When Stalin induced the British to call upon Turkey to come into the war by a fixed date, he already knew that the military contribution which Turkey could make was not essential to the war effort. Indeed, he was aware that such a request would lead to Turkey making military demands on Great Britain which the latter would be unable to fulfil, with the result that relations between Great Britain and Turkey would deteriorate —exactly what happened. Thus Turkey would find herself so isolated that she would eventually have to submit to Soviet control in foreign affairs. Sargent went so far as to say that if Turkey did enter the war Stalin would not be altogether sorry since this would be followed by a Turkish defeat and the collapse of the Turkish regime, thus reducing Turkey to complete impotence vis-à-vis the USSR at the peace settlement and afterwards. Such a catastrophe was not impossible, given the inexperience of the Turkish army and the weakness of the Turkish government. 3 Another suspicious point was that Stalin made no reference to Bulgaria, although it was difficult to see how Turkey could effectively go to war with Germany unless she simultaneously declared war on Bulgaria. If Stalin really wished to make it

1 2 3

PRO FO 371/44071, R 11508/7/44, Molotov to Clark-Kerr, 29 June 1944. PRO FO 371/44071, R 11508/7/44, Sargent to Clark-Kerr, 21 August 1944. PRO FO 371/44071, R 11579/7/44, Sargent minute, 18 July 1944.

ANGLO-SOVIET CONTAINMENT DIPLOMACY

181

easy for Turkey to come into the war he would surely at least offer to declare war on Bulgaria as soon as Turkey did so. But all evidence tended to show that Stalin had no intention, if he could help it, of breaking with Bulgaria. For instance, the Soviet government, when asked by Britain in December 1943, refused to undertake to go to war with Bulgaria if the latter allowed Germany to attack Turkey from across Bulgarian territory. 1 Turkey found herself in a dangerous position vis-à-vis the USSR, whose intentions in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria, were alarming. Turkey sought to maintain the British guarantee against such a threat. The Turks were no doubt more anxious than ever now that the Red Army was practically on their European frontier. Britain gave some kind of guarantee that if the USSR attacked Turkey Britain could give active support against the USSR. 2 The Foreign Office had the idea that Turkey could be used as a barrier against possible attempted Soviet expansion, a role she had played against Germany in the early part of the war, towards the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. When Sir Maurice Peterson was appointed as Ambassador to Ankara, the Foreign Office informed him by memorandum that Britain's general long term interests in Turkey were 'really unaffected by Turkish behaviour in the past and the desirability of maintaining Britain's influence in Turkey which was increased as a result of the recent spread of Soviet influence in the Balkans. 3 The question was how to strengthen British relations with Turkey without upsetting the Soviets. As regards Turkey, they were inclined to make a treaty with Britain to replace the existing one without troubling about the USSR. However, Britain avoided making a new treaty with the Turks now, chiefly because the USSR's final military and political intentions in that part of the world were far from clear as yet. Therefore, Britain devised a method of keeping close to Turkey which would at one and the same time show the Soviets that Britain were determined to continue this policy, and avoid turning the Soviets even more against the Turks than they were already. 4 Therefore, when the British COS suggested the slowing down of Britain's military supplies to Turkey, and cancelled the whole British commitment to Turkey on the ground that any possible attack on Turkey had disappeared from the political standpoint, the Foreign Office raised objections until it saw more clearly what the Moscow authorities were up to in the Balkans. Sargent told them that it was all the more important, with the Soviet advance through the Balkans, that Britain should keep in well with the Turks. 5 However, if 1

PRO FO 371/44071, R 11508/7/44, Sargent to Clark-Kerr, 21 August 1944. PRO FO 371/44073, R 14611/7/44, Hugessen to Eden, 15 September 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/44074, R 15838/7/44, Foreign Office memorandum for Sir Maurice Peterson on his mission to Turkey, 5 October 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/44073, R 14197/7/44, McDermott minute, 11 September 1944. 5 PRO FO 371/44073, R 14229/744, Sargent to COS Committee 'Policy Towards Turkey', COS (440 302), 15 September 1944. 2

182

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

supplies continued, the Soviets would point out that, as they could not be intended for use against Germany and her satellites, it must be intended for eventual use against the USSR. Therefore, as the amount of supplies which Britain was prepared to give the Turks could not have much effect in strengthening them against any Soviet threat, the British government decided to withdraw British military personnel from Turkey and to slow down military supplies. Having reached such a decision, Britain was careful to avoid rubbing in the fact that 'Turkey had missed the bus' or suggesting that this decision in any way affected London's intention to maintain the alliance. London instructed Helm, acting British Ambassador to Ankara, to tell Turkish officials that the withdrawal in no way implied that Britain's feelings of friendship for Turkey or their determination to maintain the alliance had weakened but was a result of the decreasing enemy threat. 1 By 1944 there was a distinct movement by the USSR away from any united Allied line. Notwithstanding Ankara's reluctance to co-operate with the Allies during the crucial moments of the war, the coolness between Britain and Turkey gave way to a rapprochement, particularly after the D-Day landings in northern Europe as British policy-makers became much concerned at the postwar Soviet threat. In the assessments of the Foreign Office and COS Turkey was already designated a special role in protecting post-war British interests by controlling the Soviet fleet's access to the Mediterranean and co-operation against the Soviet expansion throughout the Balkans. Turkey also was prepared to meet the Allies' requirement for the sake of escape from isolation vis-à-vis Moscow after the war. Consequently, Turkey had broken off her relations with Germany in June and July 1944. At this point the differences between the USSR and Britain on Turkey once again came to the forefront. While Moscow pressed for Turkey's entry into the war, London advocated that Turkey had already taken the first step towards belligerency by the breaking of her relationship with Germany. London and Ankara saw the insistence on Turkish belligerency as an excuse to claim a modification of the Straits regime in favour of the USSR.

1

PRO FO 371/44073, R 14734/7/44, Foreign Office to Helm, no. 1236, 19 September 1944.

6 PRELUDE TO THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST. CO-OPERATION OR CONFRONTATION AMONG THE ALLIED POWERS AND THE STRAITS QUESTION AT THE FINAL STAGE OF THE WAR

Since there was a great deal of controversy over Turkey's application of the Montreux Convention during the war it was widely expected by both Turkey and the Great Powers that the Straits problem would be one of the crucial issues in the post-war settlement. Indeed, the convention was inadequate to meet the new conditions created by the war as was confirmed by the issue of the passage of German barges. This gave an opportunity to the Kremlin authorities to raise once more their desire to establish a base on the shore of the Straits in order to become a potential Mediterranean power. In doing so, the Kremlin preferred to achieve its objective by bilateral negotiations with Ankara. Then the Soviets began to test their wartime allies, Britain and the USA and also Turkey, to see whether these countries would let the USSR establish herself on the Straits by taking advantage of the AngloSaxon willingness to accommodate them in a world security organisation. The Western desire for co-operation with the Kremlin authorities within the UN Organisation on the one hand faced the uncompromising attitude of the Soviets to achieve their own goals and on the other created a great deal of anxiety about Soviet post-war plans among the American and British authorities as well as the Turkish authorities in Ankara. As far as the Straits were concerned, Washington had no strategic interests there until the Soviets launched a bitter war of nerves against Turkey. From the beginning, Britain was the only country which had been confronting Soviet designs on the Straits. In this regard, becausc of her difficult economic situation arising from the war, London desired to have a common stand with Washington against Soviet intentions towards the Straits. Truman's replacing Roosevelt in April 1945 might have been fortunate for Turkey since he was willing to reverse Roosevelt's strategy of co-operation with the USSR. However, partly because of the influential decision makers remaining f r o m the Roosevelt administration, Truman sought all possible ways of keeping the USSR within the World Security Organisation. The considerations behind Anglo-American policies over the Straits will be investigated. At the same time, in the middle of post-war negotiations a power change took place in London, as Clement

184

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Attlee succeeded Churchill as the new Prime Minister. The new Labour government created considerable anxiety in British military circles, which Eden shared, and in Turkey because of Attlee's well-known anti-imperialist views. This chapter then also tries to examine to what extent Britain's Straits policy was affected by the change of power.

Soviet Diplomacy towards the Straits and Britain's Response from the Moscow Conference of 1944 to the Potsdam Conference Eden and Churchill's Attitude towards a Revision of the Convention When it became apparent, towards the autumn of 1944, that the war would end soon in favour of the Allies, it was agreed that the Montreux Convention governing the regime of the Straits would undoubtedly be put on the agenda in post-war negotiations by the Kremlin authorities since they had already revealed their dissatisfaction with the Convention as Turkey had applied it during the war. Indeed, Stalin put forward the Soviet demands for a new regime more forcibly than he had at Tehran during Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944. Stalin urged that all the paragraphs in the Montreux Convention were controlled by Turkey, which could closc the Straits and 'hamper Soviet imports and exports and even her defences' whenever she felt that she faced a threat. But the Soviets felt that it was impossible for them to be placed at the mercy of Turkey. 'What could Britain do if Spain or Egypt were given this right to close the Suez Canal, or what would the US Government say if some American Republic had the right to close the Panama Canal?' He had no intention of allowing Turkey to abuse Soviet sovereignty and to 'grip Soviet trade by the throat'. 1 Soviet aspirations as regards the Straits, in fact, were mainly a matter of speculation. Under the present regime, her merchant ships could pass freely through the Straits both in time of war and in time of peace, except that, in time of war, her battle fleet enjoyed free rights to exit from the Black Sea. What the Soviets did not like was not to be in a position to establish the USSR as a Mediterranean power. This condition made it difficult to find a middle way in any discussion. It was not difficult to modify the Convention in terms of the changing situation at the time. The British authorities already accepted the Convention as a 'most unsatisfactory instrument'. Eden emphasised that it was drafted to fit the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which no longer existed, and indeed contained references to the League in many of its articles. Its technical articles were inseparable from the various post-war treaties for the limitation of naval armaments, all of which had gone by the board. No provision was made under 1

PRO FO 371/44207, R 18327/17223/44, Clutton minute, 8 November 1944.

P R E L U D E TO THE C O L D WAR IN T H E NEAR E A S T

185

the convention for such important naval craft as E-Boats, etc. Japan was also a signatory to the Convention. But E d e n was not in f a v o u r of having conversations in which Turkey's sovereignty would be under negotiation with the Soviets, as it would undermine the British position in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the Middle East. 1 This was the linchpin of the Anglo-Soviet controversy for decades. Eden was of the opinion that the British position in Southeast Europe vis-à-vis that of the U S S R had become very weak. With this in mind, he believed that the Anglo-Turkish Alliance, in which the Straits was one of the basic factors, represented an identity of interests between Britain and Turkey which was 'one of our few assets in our struggle to maintain our position in Southeast Europe against further Soviet expansion'. Therefore, he was in favour of avoiding giving any indication that Britain was willing to discuss the Convention, since it might suggest to the Soviet authorities that the British government was prepared for a drastic modification in its favour, which would cause Britain's last fortress against the Soviets to collapse. 2 Churchill had, however, a more robust view of the Soviet ability to threaten Britain's position in the Mediterranean. H e expressed his feeling that it was 'like breeding pestilence to try to keep a nation like the USSR from free access to the broad waters'. Churchill was quite confident that there was no need to fear the movement of a Soviet fleet through the Straits. 'Even if it were to join de Gaulle, a British Fleet and air bases in the Mediterranean would be capable of dealing with either or both. All Soviet ships, who were on the sea, warships or m e r c h a n t , were hostages to the stronger naval p o w e r ' . 3 C h u r c h i l l accordingly suggested to Stalin at the M o s c o w Conference in October 1944 that it was no part of British policy to begrudge Soviet Russia access to warm-water ports and to the great oceans and seas of the world. On the contrary, it was part of their friendship to help the Soviet Union. Britain, he insisted, no longer followed the policy of Disraeli or Lord Curzon. He simply wanted a definite proposal from the Soviet government. Then the matter was left to be discussed at some future date. 4 In responding to Stalin's demand, the British C O S did not share Churchill's optimism. Rather they stuck to their earlier view that it was most important for the security of the British strategic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean that the USSR should neither be in physical control of the Straits nor be granted unrestricted rights of passage. In parallel with the COS, the Joint Planners stated that if such a right were guaranteed to the 1

PRO FO 371/44165, R 16013/3830/44, Eden to Churchill, P.M. (M)/44/I, 10 October 1944. PRO FO 371/44165, R 16013/3830/44, Eden to Churchill, P.M. (M)/44/I, 10 October 1944. 3 PRO FO 371/44165, Churchill to Eden, no. M (TOI) 6/4, 12 October 1944. 4 PRO FO 371/44165, Clutton minute, 'Records from the Moscow meeting on 9-17 October 1944', 8 November 1944. 2

186

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Soviets this would allow the USSR to develop a submarine and surface naval threat in the Eastern Mediterranean immediately on the outbreak of war. Thereafter the USSR would require air bases and naval bases on Greek or Turkish territory before such a threat could become serious. Such a development, would, beyond doubt, weaken the position of Turkey and Greece in relation to the USSR, but Britain had a high strategic interest in close friendship with both. Any weakening of British influence in these countries in favour of the USSR, the Joint Planners concluded, would be detrimental to British strategic interests in the region. 1 Meanwhile, the Turkish government was in great fear that Churchill might make some concessions to the Soviets, as he was angry with Turkey. 2 Indeed, this almost happened. When Eden's assurance to the Turkish government, following the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow, was recalled to him, to the effect that he would never discuss with a third power matters affecting Turkey without prior consultation, Churchill said that 'it was more than voided' by Turkey's refusal to come to Britain's aid in January 1944. He also refused a suggestion from the Foreign Office to see the Turkish Ambassador before leaving for the Yalta (Crimean) Conference, saying that he had spent much time in the past two years in trying to influence Turkey in the right direction. He did not feel called upon to help 'Turkey to jump on to the bus she had missed'. 3 However, Eden raised an objection, saying that the Soviet demand was no more than an excuse to extend her navy to the Mediterranean and that it would therefore be undesirable to continue discussion of this matter without Britain having a chance to consult with the Turks. 4 Churchill did not insist, in the end, on opposing the Foreign Office demand to support the Turkish case at Yalta for the sake of long-term British interests. For instance, when Roosevelt raised the question whether the invitations to attend the discussions on the future world organisation should be extended also to those who had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, without actually taking part in the war, Churchill spoke in favour of Turkey. 5 He also responded to Stalin's attack on Turkey's attitude during the war that she had been friendly and helpful although she had not taken the chance provided a year ago to enter the war. 6

1

PRO FO 371/48697, R 4707/44/44, Post Hostilities Planning Staff memorandum, P.H.P. (45) 9 Final, 30 March 1945, PRO FO 371/48697, R 6454/44/44, COS (45) 8 9 t h Meeting, 5 April 1945. 2 Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 178. 3 PRO FO 371/48764, R 2265/1723/44, Galville (Prime Minister's Department) to Lawford (Foreign Office, 26 January 1945. 4 PRO FO 371/48697, R 1885/44/44, Eden to Churchill, P.M./44/58,27 January 1945. 5 Woodward, p. 207. Accordingly, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan, 23 February 1945. 6 FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 774.

P R E L U D E T O T H E C O L D W A R IN T H E N E A R E A S T

187

Rejecting the British government's wishes for the Straits question not to be raised at the Yalta Conference, Stalin again raised the issue at the plenary session on 10 February 1945. Stalin said that it was intolerable for the USSR to be 'at the mercy of the Turks' not only in war but in peace, and for the USSR to have to beg the Turks to let her ships go through the Straits. 1 As the Foreign Office observed: 'It was impossible to put up with a situation in which a small state like Turkey could keep a hand on the throat of a large country like the USSR.' Stalin suggested that the revision of the Montreux Convention should be discusscd at the first meeting of the three foreign secretaries who should then report to their governments, and this was agreed. 2 However, the question was not on the agenda at that meeting.

Intensification of Soviet Pressure Soon after the Yalta Conference, Moscow launched its 'war of nerves' against Turkey from different quarters. Soviet propaganda against Turkey was its highest level, particularly in Bulgaria. Soviet officials there told Turkish and Bulgarian officials that when the USSR had established Communism in the Balkans and dominated the Straits, Moscow would have the whole of Europe under her control. The Soviet objective was to dominate the destiny of the world by guaranteeing itself an exit through the Straits into the Mediterranean, so as to reach India and threaten the USA from the Pacific. Consequently, Britain would be obliged to accept the fait accompli? The War Office received further accurate evidence from their diplomatic representatives in Bucharest in the sense that a Romanian Military Delegation, which went to Moscow, was received with great cordiality by Stalin, who informed it that Soviet armies would not remain long in Romania and Bulgaria. They were being concentrated for the purpose of browbeating the Turks into accepting Soviet proposals for the Straits. 4 The Soviet press also launched a daily campaign of criticism and abuse on Turkey early in March 1945. There was no doubt that these campaigns caused great anxiety in Turkish official circles as to what lay behind them. Meanwhile the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Selim Sarper, was

1 PRO FO 371/50839, R 1688/888/70, Foreign Office Memorandum 'Argonaunt 7 l h Plenary Meeting', 10 February 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48697, R 3043, FO to Peterson, no. 238, 227 February. Also see PRO FO 371/48697/44/44, Foreign Office to Peterson, no. 238, 27 February 1944. •^National Archives, Intelligence Division Confidential Reports of Naval Attachés, 1940-46. C10-A 17462 to 17531, Box no. 446, Intelligence Reports, Naval Attaché, Istanbul, 5 Match 1945; RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 761.67/3-3145, Barnes (Bulgaria) to the Secretary of State, no. 171, 31 March 1945. 4 PRO FO 371/48774, R 11408/4476, War Office, no. M1373, 3 July 1945.

188

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

summoned to Ankara for consultation. 1 The Foreign Office thought that it might be 'part of the softening up process' in preparation for Soviet demands regarding the Straits. Therefore, they instructed Clark-Kerr to approach the Soviet authorities to the effect that the unjust radio attacks by the Soviet government against Turkey contravened the agreement reached at Yalta for a satisfactory settlement of the Straits regime. 2 It was stressed to the Soviet officials that the radio attacks might make it much more difficult to persuade the Turkish Government to accept any change which Moscow might suggest in the Straits, but to no effect. 3 Soon after London's appeal, Moscow denounced the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and neutrality of 17 December 1925, which had been automatically prolonged for two years from 7 November 1945 in the absence of notice of termination by either party before 7 May 1945. 4 In his statement, Molotov said that this treaty no longer corresponded to the new situation and required 'serious improvement'. He indicated that his government was prepared to conclude a new treaty with Turkey which would take into account changed world conditions. 5 When Sarper asked Molotov, on his way back to Ankara, what his views were about a new treaty, the latter gave an evasive answer and said he would prefer the Turkish government to make their own proposal. Although the British authorities asked the Soviets to give a note of their proposal, they persistently avoided making any proposals of their own but forced the Turks to make them instead. 6 Hasan Saka, the Turkish Foreign Minister, made the criticism that it seemed rather strange that the party which declared its dissatisfaction with the existing agreement should expect the other side to make proposals for a new arrangement. However, Saka told Vinogradov that his government was ready to study any Soviet proposals which replaced the old one. 7

1 PRO FO 371/48773, R 4972/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 340, 13 March 1945. The main lines of such criticism were the following: (a) Turkish courts tried to appear as 'champions of democracy' by penalising the Communists while 'the Partisans of Fascism, the PanTuranians' were leniently treated. In fact there was evidence that the Turkish Government was penalising Communists, but that they also penalised Pan-Turanians, (b) The alleged pro-German attitude of Turkey in the earlier stages of the war, which was said still to exist, (c) Ridiculing the Turkish declaration of war at this late stage, although there had been a hint by the Soviet delegations to the Turks at the Yalta Conference that they should enter the war by 1 March. PRO FO 371/48773, R 4972/4476, Soviet Overseas Service in Turkish, 5 and 8 March 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48773, R 4972/4476/44, Foreign Office to Clark-Kerr, no. 1383, 20 March 1945. 3 PRO FO 371/48773, R 4972/4476/44, Foreign Office to Clark-Kerr, no. 1383, 20 March 1945. 4 State Department Archives, RG 59, 761.6711/3-2145, Decimal File 1945-49, Harriman (American Ambassador to Moscow) to the Secretary of State, no. 803, 21 March 1945. PRO FO 371/48773, R 4476/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 37 Saving, 1 March 1945. 5 RG 59, 761.6711/3-2245, Steinhardt (American Ambassador to Ankara) to the Secretary of State, no. 390, 22 March 1945. 6 PRO FO 371/48773, R 5640/4476/44, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 948, 24 March 1945. 7 RG 59, 761.6711/4-745, Packer (Charge in Ankara) to the Secretary of State, no. 472, 7 April 1945. Also see Feridun Cemal Erkin, Di§i§lerinde 34 Yil: Anilar-Yorumlar, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1980), p. 146.

P R E L U D E TO THE C O L D WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

189

The Turkish government felt that immediate steps should be taken to negotiate a new treaty, as the situation would otherwise become dangerous. This might prevent a Soviet attempt to introduce a new proposal in which the Straits issue was involved. However, the Soviet government had already made a decision, as Vinogradov stated, that the question of the Straits was linked up with the idea of a new treaty between the USSR and Turkey. The British government told the Turkish authorities that if Moscow approached them on this subject they would have to be reminded of the international nature of the Convention. 1 The Soviet action was interpreted by all three capitals, Ankara, London and Washington, as being designed to put pressure on the Turkish government concerning the forthcoming revision of the Montreux Convention. Thus the Soviets was trying to reach a bilateral understanding with them regarding modification of the Convention before a new Turkish Soviet Treaty was negotiated and before the subject of the Montreux Convention itself was brought up at any meeting of the three powers. It seemed that this was part of the Soviet political manoeuvring to exclude the intervention of any third power in dealing with neighbouring states, following the example of Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. 2

Sarper-Vinogradov Negotiations: A Soviet Trick When the Turkish Delegates, Saka and Erkin, met their Soviet counterpart at the San Francisco Conference, held between 25 April and 26 June 1945, Molotov gave a vague reply regarding a new treaty negotiation. He repeated that he expected the Turks to make a proposal. Back in Ankara, Vinogradov had already initiated a diplomatic effort particularly through Sarper, who was in Ankara. As a matter of course, Sarper visited the Soviet Ambassador, who encouraged him to make further visits. During these negotiations, Vinogradov adopted a very friendly, even wheedling, tone and, though not actually using the word 'alliance', gave Sarper the impression that if Turkey were ready to contemplate 'a very advanced' treaty Moscow would not be unwilling. In view of Vinogradov's language, Sarper suggested to Saraijoglu and Nurullah Siimer, Acting Foreign Minister, that he should be authorised to put out feelers on his return to Moscow. As a matter of fact, Sarper should have realised what Vinogradov's real aim was, for the nature of

1 PRO FO 371/48773, R 5725/4476/44, Foreign Office to Peterson, no. 355, 31 March 1945. PRO FO 371/48773/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, 'Peterson talk with Vinagradov' no 396, 26 March 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48773, R 5500/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 376, 22 March 1945. RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 761.6711/3-2145, Harriman to Secretary of State, no. 853, 21 March 1945.

190

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

these negotiations was familiar f r o m past Soviet demands. 1 At the final negotiation, for instance, Vinogradov suggested an agreement with Turkey alongside the convention in order to enhance the security of the Soviets in the Black Sea. Sarper refused on the grounds that it was incompatible with the multinational nature of the Convention. Instead, he put f o r w a r d a new proposal: if the Soviet Union were involved in a war with non-Black Sea powers, the Turkish government would guarantee not to allow her enemies' warships to pass through the Straits. The Soviet Ambassador was anxious to know in the case of such an arrangement what Turkey's obligations would be regarding the Anglo-Turkish agreement. 2 Although it was glaringly obvious that Vinogradov had intended to detach Turkey f r o m her connection with Britain and reach a bilateral solution, Erkin states in his book that Sarper, under V i n o g r a d o v ' s influence, spent considerable energy trying to convince Saraijoglu and tnonii that this was a 'historical moment to establish Soviet Turkish friendship'. 3 However, both of them opposed Sarper's suggestion, expressing the conviction that no close relationships with the U S S R could be reached so long as Turkey maintained her alliance with Britain. In particular, the president stated that 'Turkey would only invite a snub or worse if she took the initiative in approaching the Soviets when the n e x t m o v e was p r o p e r l y up to t h e m ' . H o w e v e r , subsequently pressure began to be exerted on the President and Prime Minister not only by the pro-Soviet element but also by a considerable number of deputies and outside the Assembly to reconsider the Turkish government's decision. 4 Therefore, Sara£oglu authorised Sarper to make an attempt if Molotov opened the door. On his return to M o s c o w , however, Sarper proposed to Molotov, on 7 June, a treaty of friendship and alliance between the t w o countries. By making his proposal, he allowed himself to be manoeuvred by Molotov into raising the whole Straits question. This was what the Soviets were expecting to be put forward by Turkey, as this put the trump card into Soviet hands — a proposal had c o m e f r o m the Turkish side, then they made known their conditions. The Sarper-Vinogradov Conversations were also 1 PRO FO 371/59240, R 1240/52/44, Helm to Foreign Office, no. 28/25/46, Helm's Conversation with Erkin, 15 January 1946. 2 Turkiye Di§ Politikasinda 50 Yil: ikinci Dtinya Sava^i Yillari, 1939-1949 (Ankara: Di§i§leri Bakanhgi Yayinlan, 1973), pp. 254-260. 3 Ibid. p. 255. 4 PRO FO 371/59240, R 1240/52/44, Helm to Foreign Office, no. 28/25/46, Helm's Conversation with Erkin, 15 January 1946. Erkin stated in his book that Turkish officials were persuaded by Vinogradov to release two Soviet prisoners sentenced to twenty years in prison for a bomb attack against Papen in 1942 in order to create a good atmosphere. Furthermore, the Soviet citizens of Turkish origins who had joined the German army and taken refuge in Turkey were handed over to the Soviets and many of them were killed at the border in front of Turkish officials. Erkin, Di§i§lerinde 34 Yil: Anilar-Yorumlar, pp. 147-49.

P R E L U D E TO T H E C O L D WAR IN THE N E A R E A S T

191

known to the British and American representatives in Ankara; they wanted to warn Sarper but had no opportunity. Y e t Siimer had told them that the A m b a s s a d o r had returned to his post without any specific instructions. Obviously things had gone wrong because of the simultaneous absence of Saka and Erkin who had instructed Sarper on more than one occasion not to make any proposal to the Soviets. 1 Molotov replied to Sarper's suggestion in that before a new treaty could be negotiated the following three outstanding questions should be solved: 'the cession of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the U S S R which had been handed over to the U S S R under the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921; granting of bases to Russia in the Straits; and agreement between Turkey and the U S S R to revise of the Convention'. Molotov hinted darkly that there was a fourth outstanding question, settlement of which might make the solution of the other three points easier. 2 The Turkish government believed that this f o u r t h d e m a n d might be the rupture of the Anglo-Turkish alliance or a modification of the Turkish political scene so that Turkey might be reoriented, as R o m a n i a and Bulgaria had been. Ankara replied to Molotov, refusing to discuss the question of ceding Turkish territory f o r use as bases. Nor could they even consider making a private agreement regarding the Straits prior to holding an international conference. 3 When Sarper saw Molotov again on 18 June, in order to give his government's reply, Molotov had somewhat modified his previous proposals: firstly, the U S S R would require bases in the Straits only in the event of war and not in time of peace; secondly, there were a number of questions in which the Balkan states were concerned. Molotov added that once his proposals had been agreed there was no reason why Turkey and the U S S R should not conclude a treaty of alliance and collaboration. 4 This was, in fact, f u r t h e r evidence that this was part of the Soviet policy of isolating Turkey f r o m the free world. Otherwise, how could Turkey negotiate on general questions with states such as Bulgaria or Romania, which were under Allied military occupation, or how could she negotiate with the U S S R on behalf of these states? Furthermore, during the second conversation, Molotov had referred frequently to Poland. 5 The T urkish government believed

1 PRO FO 371/48773, R 10224/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 54, 14 June 1945: RCr 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 761.6711/6-2645, Wilson to Grew, no. 858, 26 June 1945. Erkin, Di^lerinde 34 Yil, pp. 147-49. 2 PRO FO 371/48773, R 11214/4476/44, Foreign Office to Halifax (British Ambassador to Washington), no. 46 Intel, 14 June 1945. FRUS, The Near East and Africa, Winant (American Ambassador to London) to the Secretary of State, Vol. VIII, 14 June 1945, p. 1235. 3 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 761.6711/6-1845, no. 817, Wilson (American Ambassador to Ankara) to the Acting Secretary of State, no. 817, 18 June 1945. 4 Molotov stated that after the First World War Poland and the USSR, when the latter was weak, had negotiated a treaty which was unjust to the USSR. Poland had now repaired this injustice and the basis was laid for a lasting entente between the two countries. R G 59, Decimal File 1945-49,761.6711/6-2245, Wilson to Grew, no. 844, 22 June 1945. 5 PRO FO 371/44773, R 11021/4476/44, Halifax to Foreign Office, no. 4437, 27 June 1945.

192

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

that behind all this Soviet behaviour lay the Soviet intention to bring Turkey, like Poland, under direct Soviet influence in respect of both her domestic and foreign affairs. Siimer stated that Turkey could not be placed in the same boat and painted with the same colours as Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania.1

The Anglo-American Response to the Soviet Demand The British government concurred with Ankara's stand and also volunteered to tell the Soviets that this was in direct conflict with Stalin's assurance regarding the maintenance of Turkish independence and integrity. Britain saw, in fact, Soviet demands on Turkey as a serious threat posed to the British position in the Middle East. Therefore, London was eager to respond firmly to Soviet claims on Turkey. However, as she was in a devastated economic state at the end of the war, Britain needed to be fully backed by Washington in order to stop the Soviet threat. 2 To be able to have this support, the Foreign Office instructed Halifax in Washington to approach the State Department in order that a common case could be created against the Soviets. The Foreign Office wanted to respond to Moscow that 'Turkey was one of the few stable parts of the world and we did not wish her stability disturbed.' It was also surprising that Molotov proposed a Turco-Soviet understanding about the Straits at a time when the British and US governments were still awaiting Soviet views, which were promised the Yalta Conference. In this sense, London wished to make a joint protest against Moscow with Washington, at the prospect of which Turkey was delighted.3 The American authorities agreed with the British that the Soviet proposals to Turkey were incompatible with the spirit and principles on which they were seeking, with the participation of the USSR, to set up a new world organisation. However, the State Department at the same time suggested that the conversation between Molotov and the Turkish Ambassador took place 'in a friendly atmosphere and was of an exploratory character'. Therefore, a protest in firm language risked over-emphasising the importance of the conversation and might prejudice the atmosphere of the forthcoming Big Three talks at 1

Ibid. PRO FO 371/48774/4476/44, Foreign to Peterson, no. 98,12 July 1945. PRO FO 371/47883, N 8674/165/38, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 468, 10 July 1945. Indeed, to fight the war Britain had accumulated debts around the world totalling £2,723,000,000. Repayment seemed impossible at a time when there was no money to buy the raw materials from abroad needed to revive the British economy. See Ritchie Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945-1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984) p. 3. In this sense, Macfie observed that the British were sceptical regarding their ability alone to sustain their strategic position in the Straits and in the Middle East in general without American support. A. L. Macfie, 'The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position', Middle Eastern Studies, January 1987, Vol. 23, no. 1, p. 81. 3 PRO FO 371/48773, R 10224/4476/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 6458, 17 June 1945. See Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945-1951, p. 3. 2

P R E L U D E TO THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

193

Potsdam regarding the Straits. 1 Still, as Turkey was expecting Britain to act, the British government decided that it would be better to warn Moscow of its views in advance of the conference, even at the risk of rendering the atmosphere more difficult in connection with this question, rather than to give them the impression that it did not intend to take any action or to spring it on them for the first time at the conference. 2 In particular, Eden determined to stand firm against the Soviets even without American support; 'otherwise they would go on prodding for a weak spot as usual'. 3 The Turkish government was disappointed by the American attitude. Sara90glu pointed out that he could not believe that Washington wanted Turkey to carry on further conversations with Moscow on matters relating to the cession of Turkish bases and territory. If the Anglo-American allies did not take a firm stand against the U S S R at the forthcoming meeting, then Sara90glu believed that the U S S R could again press territorial demands against Turkey. Then she would turn her attention to other nations in the Near and Middle East, which would 'begin to scramble to make the best terms they could and this whole region would come under Soviet d o m i n a t i o n ' . 4 Faced with this Soviet threat, Turkey appealed f o r armament supplies and credit f r o m Britain which the latter saw as reasonable. T h e Turkish government line was to convince Britain that it was vitally necessary for them to help Turkey on a modest scale when she required help for her own defence, for this would also protect Britain. Turkish friendship was essential to the maintenance of the British position in the Middle East. If Turkey was driven into the arms of the USSR, it would bring Soviet influence down to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and even if Britain were successful in pulling the U S S R back, it would offer no useful defence against Soviet influence and penetration. 5 Indeed, Britain had been worried about Soviet attempts to isolate Turkey sincc 1943. Her inability to prevent Soviet expansion in the Balkans increased her worries. Maurice Peterson, British A m b a s s a d o r in A n k a r a , stressed his fear of Soviet aggression in a letter to Sargent, asking 'at what point we were going to stop the Soviets in their drive southwards'. Britain hoped that they might indeed achieve this in Bulgaria and Romania at the M o s c o w C o n f e r e n c e , but these h o p e s proved illusory. T h e n the Yalta Conference also held out hopes that the USSR would be ineffectual in Turkey 1 PRO FO 371/44773, R 10692/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 79, 21 June 1945. Decimal File 1945-49, RG 59, 767.68119/6-1845, Joseph C. Grew (Acting Secretary of State) to Wilson, no. 649, 23 June 1945. PRO FO 371/44773, R 11226/4476/44, Peterson to Sargent, 25 June 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48774, R 11430/4476/44, Foreign Office to Clark-Kerr, no. 3766, 5 July 1945. 3 The Earl of Avon, The Reckoning, p. 543. 4 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 761.6711/7-345, Wilson to the Secretary of State, no. 898 3 July 1945. 5 PRO FO 371/ 48774, R 11548/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 708, 6 July 1945. PRO FO 371/48774, R 11559/4476/44, Grigg (Cairo) to Foreign Office 'Talk with Turkish Minister', 6 July 1945. PRO FO 371/48774/4476/44, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 3008, 7 July 1945.

194

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

by checkmating any Soviet attempt to isolate that country. Peterson observed that 'what we have got to decide now is whether these hopes also are to be proved illusory. If we fail to stop the USSR in Turkey we shall presumably next meet her in Syria and beyond'. 1 Eden also felt some apprehension about Soviet post-war foreign policy. He stressed to Churchill the importance of standing firm against Soviet demands over Turkey and though 'Churchill saw no need to say anything to the Soviets about their demands on Turkey', Eden explained the danger of such a policy with the Soviets, who were always ready to take silcnce for consent and would push on. 'If we did not mean to agree we should enter a caveat now'. Even without American support, he told Churchill that they should act alone and bring the matter up during the Conference at Potsdam. Eventually, Churchill agreed with his Foreign Secretary's points. 2

Anglo-American

Straits Policy at the Potsdam Conference and

Afterward

The USA and the Straits The chief objectives of the US in the Straits were to prevent them from becoming a potential threat to world peace and to ensure their unrestricted use for peacetime commerce. Unlike Britain, the Balkans and the Middle East held little strategic value for US policy-makers towards the end of Roosevelt's administration.^ They assumed that the Soviets would take a moderate course in their relations with the countries of South Eastern Europe. The Division of Near Eastern and African Affairs, which was concerned with Turkish affairs, therefore concentrated mainly on other serious issues such as the future of Palestine and the Great Powers' policy in Iran etc. The Straits issue hardly appeared on their agenda in a serious form as it had for the British except for some instances of German ships passing through the Straits. However, in 1943, there was a modest study by Harry N. Howard. As a student of the Middle East, Howard outlined the historical interests of the Great Powers in the Straits and put forward four possible solutions: internationalisation of the Straits; Soviet control of the Straits; control by Turkey and the Black Sea Powers, and retention of the Convention. Internationalisation seemed one of the best options, but neither Turkey nor the US and Britain would endorse this solution as it could set a precedent for the Suez and Panama Canals, key maritime highways which were currently dominated by their armed forces. Soviet domination also did not seem a good option, because it would convert the Black Sea into a Soviet lake, as in the past with Imperial Russia, and would not assure freedom of commerce through the Straits or contribute to the 1

PRO FO 371/44773, R 11226/4476/44, Peterson to Sargent, 25 June 1945. Avon, The Reckoning, p. 544. ^ Harry N. Howard, 'The United States and Turkey: American Policy in the Straits Question (1914-1963)' Balkan Studies, Vol. 4 (1963), pp. 240-241. 2

P R E L U D E TO T H E C O L D WAR IN T H E N E A R E A S T

195

political stability of the Near East in general. The third option for the Straits lay in their being controlled by those states which were most directly interested in them, namely, Turkey the USSR, Bulgaria and Romania. In fact, this solution, Howard made clear, was proposed informally by Litvinov in 1939. Such a solution implied the freedom of commerce in the Straits but closure to the warships of non-Black Sea powers. Without specific international guarantees to these countries, they would run the risk of falling under Soviet domination, and the Black Sea would again become a Soviet lake. In his study, Howard concluded that retention of the Montreux Convention was the best option, guaranteeing f r e e d o m of commerce, imposing restrictions on warships and retaining Turkish sovereignty over the Straits. Howard stated that the Convention was also satisfactory to all the parties concerned, since Britain and the USSR had expressed their satisfaction with the convention on 10 August 1941. 1 It was true, but it was not because the USSR was satisfied with the Convention; rather it was the result of circumstances surrounding the USSR, which was then fighting for survival against Nazi Germany. Deepening American involvement in the Straits question began as early as 1945 when Stalin announced that he was not happy with the Convention, and increased when the Soviets put pressure on Turkey following the denunciation of the Turco-Soviet Friendship agreement. As a matter of fact, with the Truman administration the American authorities had become more apprehensive about Soviet post-war policy in general. It was widely accepted that Truman was not willing to follow the appeasement policy of Roosevelt toward the U S S R . 2 He was supplied by Harriman with reports of the Kremlin's plan regarding the post-war period. In this sense, he reported that the USSR had three basic objectives: co-operation with the US and Britain in a world security organisation; 'creation of a unilateral security ring through domination of the countries along her Western borders; and penetration of other countries by Communist controlled parties to create a political atmosphere favourable to Soviet policies'. Harriman believed that Stalin had interpreted the acquiescence of Washington towards Soviet moves in Eastern Europe as a sign of weakness; American-Soviet relations would improve only when the British and Americans took a firmer and franker stand. The time had come when 'wc must by our actions in each individual case make it plain to the Soviet government that they cannot expect our co-operation on terms laid down by them'. In this regard, Gaddis states that 'no one did more to shape Truman's views than Harriman himself'. 3

1 State Department Archives, RG 59, Records of Harley A. Notter File 1939-45, Harry N. Howard, 'Alternative Solutions of the Problem of the Straits, State Department Archives' box no. 65, T-389, 5 October 1945. o Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-48 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), pp. 42-44; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947' (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 200201. 3 Ibid. p. 201; Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd, 1952), p.

196

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

This policy was naturally seen in Truman's Straits policy. For instance, when Edwin Wilson told Truman on 25 April 1945, before he was appointed to Ankara as Ambassador, that in view of the fact that Eastern Europe had been lost to the USSR, American interests in the Middle East, as well as her general interests in world security and co-operation, should lead them to support Turkey in resisting demands from Moscow affecting independence, the President agreed. 1 However, this does not mean to suggest that the US took a firm line against Moscow over the Straits question as soon as Truman took office. He still kept trying to maintain Roosevelt's policy of accommodating the USSR. This was partly because members of Roosevelt's influential staff, such as Hopkins, Davies and Stimpson, who all were opposed to any hasty decisions against Moscow, were involved at key points in the early days of Truman's administration. 2 Most importantly, James Byrnes, the Secretary of State, acting rather independently in foreign affairs, was one of the chief proponents of the American insistence on an nonconfrontational policy.

The Anglo-American View on the Eve of Potsdam With the possibility of the Straits issue being on the agenda at the Potsdam Conference, some differences began to appear in the foreign policymaking process of the British and American participants. In a brief for the President regarding the Straits, it was stated that the Soviet desire for the free passage of their warships through the Straits at all times was fully understandable. It was a logical consequence of similar regulations for the Suez and Panama Canals: the Suez Canal was theoretically open to the passage of warships in time of war, and the US permitted belligerent warships to pass through the Panama Canal while the US was neutral. It would be more logical, however, to extend the privilege to all Black Sea riparian powers and not merely to the USSR. 3 Moreover, the State Department was prepared to accept bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Ankara regarding the issue of establishing a base. This was exactly what Moscow desired, while Britain and Turkey opposed it because of the multilateral nature of the Convention. Allen, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, expressed the view that it would be difficult for the USA to support this objection, considering her bilateral negotiations for bases with Brazil, Ecuador and Portugal. He said 'it would be awkward for us to attempt to prevent the 1 Department of State Archives, RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49, 761.6711/7-545, Wilson to Grew (the Under Secretary of State), no. 916, 5 July 1945. 2 Gaddis, The Unites States, p. 200. 3 FRUS, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, 1945, Memorandum regarding the Montreux Convention, pp. 1013-15. In practice, the British military presence in Egypt and accompanying naval domination meant that in both world wars enemy vessels were denied free passage, in contravention at the 1888 Suez Canal Convention.

P R E L U D E TO T H E C O L D WAR IN THE NEAR E A S T

197

U S S R f r o m negotiating directly with Turkey on this subject'. 1 Therefore, the American government would have no objection to the establishment by the U S S R of fortifications in the Straits, provided these fortifications and bases were established with the free consent of Turkey. In contrast to the State Department, the Foreign Office raised strong objections to granting territory for a Soviet base in the Straits. In addition, the question of bases was not a matter of bilateral agreement between the U S S R and Turkey. From a strategic standpoint, in addition to objecting to the free passage of Soviet ships through the Straits, the British C O S challenged the American view, saying that the Soviet possession of bases in the Straits would considerably increase the threats to proximate British strategic interests. It would make it proportionately more difficult for Britain to limit the Soviet naval and air threat in the Eastern Mediterranean through the use of facilities in Crete and the Dodecanese. Besides, Turkey would inevitably drift into the position of a Soviet satellite. 2 However, the State Department withdrew its proposal when the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCOS) were found to share their British counterpart's anxiety. T h e y suggested that any proposal for granting a nation other than Turkey bases or other rights for direct or indirect military control of the Straits should be opposed. In this regard, the JCOS stated that 'the Soviets have so far succeeded in obtaining their demands because they had strength on their side and convinced the other powers that in the cases of Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Ruthenia, she would seize by force what was not granted her by agreement'. 3 The State Department revised its proposal accordingly. It might be seen as a first serious American objection to Soviet domination of the Straits.

The Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August) In the plenary meeting at Potsdam on 22 July, Churchill raised the question of Turkey orally. He reminded Stalin of his agreement with him at Tehran that the Convention should be revised, but Stalin said that he had also stressed the importance of not alarming Turkey, which the U S S R had ignored. Molotov's explanation was replete with contradictions to the previous Soviet statement. For instance, Molotov said that he had told Sarper that if Turkey was not prepared to allow the Soviet conditions for the bases and cession of territory, the U S S R was still ready to make an agreement about the Straits 1 RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49, 767.6168119/7-1545, Allen memorandum T h e Montreux Convention' to James Clement Dunn, 15 July 1945. 2 (FO 371/48697, R 11962/44/44, JP (45) 170 Final), 11 July 1945 Joint Planning Staff ' Montreux Convention and Security of the Baltic'.).FO 371/48698, R 12919/44/44, Extract from C.O.S. (45) 175 meeting, 12 July 1945, J.P (45) 170 final. 3 FRUS, Conferences of Berlin, 1945, The JOS to the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee, 17 July 1945, Vol. II, p. 1421.

198

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

regime, though he had never said this. Furthermore, in response to Churchill's opposition to Soviet demands for a base in the Straits on the grounds that it was a new issue, Molotov responded in a wholly misleading way, saying that the Russian-Turkish Treaties of 1807 and 1831 had given military bases to the Russians in the Straits. 1 The Foreign Office was of the opinion that the USSR had adopted 'the principle of telling lies or half-lies' wherever it suited them so that one must generally conclude that they were not revealing all their real motives and objectives. 2 Stalin again raised the issue of free passage for Soviet ships through the Straits in wartime. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee access in the case of complications, Stalin wanted a base for Soviet forces 'as it was in the Panama Canal by the American Navy and in the Suez Canal by the British Navy'. Although Churchill agreed to the Soviet desire for unrestricted passage of their warships in peace and wartime, he found a Soviet base in the Straits unacceptable. Stalin said that in that case the USSR should be given a base in some other place, where the Soviet fleet could be repaired and refuelled, and, together with its Allies, keep order in that area. At this point, Truman suggested a new proposal whereby the Straits should be free waterways open to all nations and be guaranteed by an international guarantee, including the Great Powers. 3 Churchill thought that this would certainly be effective. He hoped that Stalin would consider this alternative, rather than press for a Soviet base near Istanbul. Stalin accepted the international guarantee on a study basis, but still insisted on having a base. Churchill said that an international guarantee would be more than a substitute for the erection of fortifications. 4 At the end of the conference, the three governments recognised that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and Turkey. In particular, Washington would try to make Ankara see the advantage of international control of the Straits. 5 Meanwhile, as the Big Three negotiations were going on, the British delegation was replaced on 28 July by a new delegation headed by Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin, when the Conservatives lost the general election to Labour, which achieved a landslide victory. 1

PRO FO 371/48698, R 12450/44/44, Terminal (Potsdam) 6 meeting, 22 July 1945. PRO FO 371/48698/44/44, Foreign Office minute, 27 July 1945. For Details of Potsdam Conference see, Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: the Potsdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Charles L. Mee, Meeting at Potsdam (Norfolk: Lowe & Brydone, 1975); Stephen G. Xydis, 'The 1945 Crisis Over the Turkish Straits', Balkan Studies, no.l, 1960, pp. 5-90. 3 PRO FO 371/48698/44/44, Terminal (Potsdam) 7th Meeting, 23 July 1945. FRUS, Conference of Berlin, 1945, United States Delegation Working Paper, Vol. II, p. 1434. 4 PRO FO 371/48698, R 1945/44/44, Terminal (Potsdam) 8 meeting, 24 July 1945. 5 PRO FO 371/48774, R13646/4476/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 8561,12 August 1945. 2

P R E L U D E TO THE C O L D WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

199

The New British Cabinet and the Straits When Attlee, as the new British Prime Minister, and Bevin, as his Foreign Secretary, arrived at Potsdam in the early evening of 28 July there was some disbelief in Attlee's capacity to head the British delegation at such a crucial moment. In particular, his earlier proposal for changing the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and reducing Britain's role in the area in March 1945 was the chief reason for alarm in the Foreign Office and the COS. Indeed, Attlee announced as early as March 1945, when he was still in opposition, that the post-war foreign and defence policy of the next British government would be identified firmly with the principles of the New World Organisation, not with the defence needs of the British Empire. 1 In his view, the occupation and holding of particular strategic areas had only a relative importance in the light of modern war conditions in which air power transcended all frontiers and menaced all homelands. Therefore, he considered that the only effective way of meeting these claims and dealing with these problems was as part of the general world organisation for peace. 2 Turkish official circles and public opinion were also dismayed by the Labour Party's coming to power in the belief that they were less determined than the Conservatives in withstanding Soviet encroachments in Eastern Europe and more tempted to sacrifice Turkey to the general interest of closer relations with the USSR. 3 Indeed, if one took Attlee's views into account, there was a considerable clash between the Conservative and Labour foreign policy agendas. Eden was one of those who was seriously alarmed by the impact of Soviet policy on British interests in the Middle East. His letter to Churchill at Potsdam showed a particular anxiety over the Soviet demand for the revision of the Montreux Convention. Eden had no objection to free Soviet access to the high seas. However, he did not trust Soviet sincerity as the Kremlin's response to the Anglo-American agreement for the revision of the Montreux Convention at Yalta was to make another demand on Turkey which would result in placing Istanbul under Soviet guns and would probably 'be the first stage in the subjection of Turkey to the USSR'. He said: 'If we were to talk generously to the Soviets this time about access to the wider ocean, I fear that they would only regard it as an indication that we had not been shocked by their demands on Turkey and would proceed to make more and more demands on Turkey and other countries in the Middle East'. Having achieved what they

1 Raymond Smith and John Zametica, 'The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered', International Affairs, 1985, Vol. 61, no.l, p. 240. 2 PRO FO 371/50855, U 6311/2600/70, Attlee to Churchill, 23 July 1945 3 PRO FO 371/48765, R 12801/1723/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 206, 29 July 1945.

200

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

desired in Turkey, Eden believed that the Soviets' next request might be for a position at Tangier where they might give Britain much more trouble. 1 Attlee criticised Eden's account, saying that 'we should confront the Soviets with the requirements of a world organisation for peace, not with the needs of the defence of the British Empire'. 2 In this sense, he also criticised the Joint Planners' minute about the Baltic Sea Gateways and the Kiel Canal on the grounds that it was a rather short-term solution and seemed to envisage a world of potentially warring Great Powers rather than a world organised for peace. The conception of the paramount interest of the USSR in the Baltic and Black Sea exits was based on 'the old conception of naval defence'. Attlee continued, saying 'if we really believe and intend to operate a world organisation for peace we need to get away from old conceptions'. In his view the only realistic policy was that of placing all these strategic areas, not under the control of one or two powers, but under the international control of the United Nations. 3 In his letter to Churchill, just before the election, Attlee examined the Straits issue from the Soviet angle. He said the facts of geography denied the USSR unimpeded access to the oceans except in the icebound north and the Far Hast. Her weakness in the past placed her at the mercy of other powers who controlled the gateways. 'Now they were strong and did not intend to live on the sufferance of others.' Therefore, Attlee concluded that 'the Soviet intention of getting control of the exits from the Black Sea by including an agreement with Turkey and of obtaining a military base in the Straits, the possible request for a share of the Mandate in the former Italian colonies in North Africa, the raising of the Tangier question and perhaps, also, the interest displayed in Syria and the Lebanon and Soviet policy in Persia were all expressions of the determination of the USSR to assert an equal right to have free access to the oceans'. 4 He further suggested that in view of Britain's inability to resist a Soviet claim physically to dominate the Straits, the

1

PRO FO 954/26, SU/45/136, Eden to Churchill (Berlin), NO. PM/45/2T, 17 July 1945. PRO FO 371/50855, U 6311/2600/70, Attlee to Eden, 18 July 1945. 3 Ibid. 4 Attlee further remarked in his letter that 'Denmark formerly and then Germany controlled the Baltic exits. The gateways from the Black Sea were in the hands for the last century of a weak country buttressed against the USSR by the western powers. We, in our own interests, have for long controlled the Mediterranean route which we considered vital to our interests. For this reason we hold Gibraltar and have taken part in the international control of Tangier. We, with the French as junior partner, have had in our hands the Suez Canal. Egypt, from the Russian point of view, is a British satellite. The USSR in the time of her weaknesses was not invited to share responsibility for keeping open these gates. Our claim that we occupy these positions as trustees for the rest of the world that can trust our disinterested intention of seeking nothing for ourselves out of this war does not carry much weight and the subconscious retort by the Russians is why should you, you have got all you want'. PRO FO 371/50855, U 6311/2600/70, Attlee to Churchill, 23 July 1945. 2

P R E L U D E TO T H E C O L D WAR IN THE NEAR E A S T

201

question of the control of strategic areas should be taken up with the U N organisation. 1 Eden concurred with Attlee in the sense that Britain's policy must be to 'bring the future regime f o r all the important sea passages within the world wide system of security'. However, Eden suspected that the U S S R was not prepared to participate in a genuinely international security system and was intent on pursuing its own national interests. 2 Indeed, the Soviet Delegation at the Potsdam Conference rejected the British and American proposal that the Straits should be open in peace and war to the war and merchant ships of all nations under some f o r m of international guarantee. The Foreign O f f i c e believed that pursuing their present objective, the Soviet government were faithfully following in the footsteps of their Tsarist predecessors, who, for a period of about two centuries, attempted by one means or another to secure the command of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles for the U S S R . This purely nationalistic end was likely to be pursued by all possible means. 3 Cadogan also minuted his suspicion that the U S S R had the objectives of physical control of the Straits and the political control of Turkey and Greece, which would undoubtedly have an unfavourable effect on the whole British position in the Middle East and in the world. A s the Soviet intention was so obvious, Cadogan asked 'how the world security organisation could work to keep the world peace while Britain was powerless in such a key strategic area'. And what was the nature of the force Britain might conceivably hope to use to drive away the Soviets in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East? 4 The COS shared none of Attlee's ideas regarding the British position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Rather they were determined to keep the Soviets out of the Straits. In this regard Admiral Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, noted in his diary: 'Attlee has apparently written what appears to be a damned silly letter to Churchill saying that we ought not oppose a great country like the USSR having bases anywhere she wants. What an ass!' 5 Attlee was in fact independently expressing his views on the foreign issues because of the absence of day-to-day contact with departmental officials. U n d e r his premiership, in contrast to C h u r c h i l l ' s , f o r e i g n policy would become the domain of the Foreign Office rather than Downing Street. Besides, Bevin did not share Attlee's approach. Rather he seemed to want to stand up to Soviet aggression. This stance was mainly the result of the suggestion of his 1

PRO FO 371/50855, U 6311/2600/70, Attlee to Churchill, 23 July 1945. PRO FO 371/50855, U 6311/2600/70, Eden to Atlee, 23 July 1945. 3 PRO FO 371/50855, U 6312/2600/70, Foreign Office memorandum 'Problems Presented by the Russian Demand for Bases in the Black Sea Straits', 26 August 1945. 4 PRO FO 371/50855/2600/70, Cadogan minute, 29 July 1943. 5 The Cunningham Papers, Cunningham Diary, 23 July 1945. 2

202

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

permanent officials in the Foreign Office and the military authorities, who tried hard to persuade the new Foreign Secretary to stand firm against Soviet policy. 1 Eden himself wanted Bevin to take over the Foreign Office when it became clear that Labour would win the election. 2 The desire reflected the continuity inherent in Bevin's approach, his keenness to suppress the communist movement in Greece and his Churchillian sentiment that 'the British Empire cannot abandon its position in the Mediterranean'. 3 In the end there was no fundamental change in British interests regarding the Mediterranean and the Middle East and, therefore, none in the Straits. The USSR, as Dixon pointed out, might have expected that a Socialist government would be more accommodating towards them than its predecessors. However, Bevin's steadfast attitude at the negotiations proved that this was not so. 4

Truman's Proposal and its Repercussions Truman and the British authorities undertook to try to make the Turkish government see the advantage of international control over the Straits. The Foreign Office concurred with Churchill's agreement in principle at Berlin with Truman about the internationalisation of the Straits on the basis that it would constitute a possible middle way between continued Turkish control and the establishment of Soviet control. Thus, the Soviets might be induced not to raise the base issue. In this regard, Peterson was instructed to stress the importance of the President's proposal, under which the US would join in guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits. 5 At first, the Turkish government did not welcome this proposal. Saraçoglu told Peterson that the United States government and indeed the British government might have given Turkey notice that they were going to raise the question of internationalisation. He assumed that what was now contemplated was not a revision but a 'scrapping of Montreux'. Saraçoglu was disposed to consider that this would imply a return to 'the system prevailing between Lausanne and Montreux'. This, for Turkey, would imply demilitarisation and the acceptance of an International Commission in Istanbul. 6 However, later the Turkish government was inclined, in principle, to accept internationalisation provided that Turkish sovereignty was unimpaired. 7 However, the COS consistently rejected the 1 Raymond Smith, 'A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945-7', International Affairs, 1988, Vol. 64, no. 4, p. 633. ^ Smith and Zametica, p. 238. 3 Victor Roothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-47 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), p. 227. 4 Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1968) p. 194. 5 PRO FO 371/48698, R 12604/44/44, Dominion Office to Ankara, no. 1312, 26 July 1945. 6 PRO FO 371/48698, R 12667/44/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 193, 26 July 1945. 7 PRO FO 371/48774, R 13646/4476/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, 13 August 1945.

P R E L U D E T O T H E C O L D W A R IN T H E N E A R E A S T

203

internationalisation of the Straits, because from the military standpoint they believed that any form of United Nations bases, whether Britain was represented or not, would allow the USSR to station forces in the Straits area. The USSR would inevitably claim to be the predominant power there. 1 The situation was no different in Washington, as Truman's proposal did not find support from the State Department. On his return front Potsdam, Truman publicised his proposal over the 'inland waterways of Europe.' 'One of the persistent causes for wars in Europe in the past two centuries, he argued, 'has been the selfish control of the waterways of Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe that border on two or more states.' According to Truman's proposal, there would be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways with agencies to assure equal treatment for all nations. Membership of the agencies would include the USA, Britain, the USSR and France, plus those states bordering on the waterways. 2 The Turkish government was pleased with President T r u m a n ' s statement. It also received a favourable reception in the Turkish press, but there was s u r p r i s i n g l y little c o m m e n t on the r e f e r e n c e to the internationalisation of European waterways and most newspapers seemed inclined to await further details and proposals before expressing a definite opinion. American interest in European affairs was, however, warmly welcomed. Sadak writing in Ak§am on 11 August, said 'the fact that America with all her power and might has taken upon herself to seek a durable solution of the Straits question within the framework of peacc and security is alone enough to make us rejoice'. Yal§m welcomed the proposal as a 'rebuff to the Soviets'. He declared that the tactics adopted by the President were 'the best means of stemming Soviet imperialism'. He was very enthusiastic that this initiative came from the United States and the fact that it was approved and endorsed 'by our ally England is enough to satisfy us... If there is a power who will not be satisfied by Mr. Truman's proposal it can only be Russia'. 3 However, the American government did not explain further the President's exact plan regarding the Straits regime. Saka sought the attention of the US Embassy with a memorandum, to the effect that his government 1 PRO FO 371/50855/2600/70 J. G. Ward Minute, 24 August 1945, PRO FO 371/PRO FO 371/48698, R 15211/44/44, Joint Planning Staff, P.P. (45) 2 3 3 , 4 September 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48698, R 13515/44/44, McDermott minute, 'Truman's Broadcast Statement of August 9 on the Potsdam Conference', 13 August 1945. For more details of Truman's Inland Waterways Project see Louis B. Wehle, 'International Administration of European Inland Waterways', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 1946, pp. 100-120. Also see, Harry N. Howard, 'The Turkish Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects', Balkan Studies, Vol. II, Part I, 1970, p. 43. 3

PRO FO 371/48698, R 14049/44/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 33 Saving, 15 August 1945. PRO FO 371/48698, R 13515/44/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 726,11 August 1945.

204

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

was still without information as to the significance and scope of T r u m a n ' s suggestion for the internationalisation of the Straits. The Turkish government f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d the i m p o r t a n c e of A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n in the internationalisation of the Straits provided that the diminution of Turkish sovereignty or security was entailed. A second condition would be that the contemplated settlement should bring with it a relaxation of tension caused in the last f e w months by Soviet demands. 1 London was also anxious to know what exactly Washington had in mind. T h e Foreign O f f i c e had already instructed H a l i f a x to c o m m u n i c a t e with the State D e p a r t m e n t to seek clarification of T r u m a n ' s ideas regarding the internationalisation and demilitarisation of the Straits in order to explore U S intentions. In the meantime, they assumed that T r u m a n ' s line of thinking was that: ...while Turkey would remain responsible for the defence of the Straits the U S S R would be allowed to move ships in war as well as in peace. This might be guaranteed by an international commission at I s t a n b u l or m e r e l y by such a c o m m i s s i o n . C o m p l e t e demilitarisation of the Straits under the guarantee of the Great Powers. International control of the Straits by the establishment of bases by some or all of the Great powers in that area. 2

Britain's Efforts to have a Common Attitude with Washington W h e n finally Henderson divulged to Balfour, in secret, the State D e p a r t m e n t ' s considered answer to the Turkish m e m o r a n d u m , the State Department appeared to have given up both the ideas of internationalisation and demilitarisation which had been put forward by President T r u m a n at Potsdam. Rather, the State Department was inclined not to lessen T u r k e y ' s control of the Straits. Neither did it want the Straits demilitarised so as not to encourage similar suggestions regarding the Panama and Suez Canals. Instead, the State Department favoured a modification of the Montreux Convention on the following lines: (a) The Straits should be open to the merchant ships of all powers at all times. (b) T h e Straits should be open to all ships of Riparian Black Sea powers at all times.

1 PRO FO 371/48775, R 13931/4476, 44, Peterson to Foreign Office, 18 August 1945. RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49,767.68119/8-2045, Packer to Byrnes, no. 1140, 20 August 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48774, R13646/4476/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 8561,12 August 1945.

P R E L U D E TO THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

205

(c) In peace or war no warship of a Non-Black Sea power should be permitted to enter the Straits without the consent of all the Black Sea powers. (d) Nothing in this modification of the Convention should weaken the obligation of any of the powers concerned to the UN organisation.^ In their reply to the London appeal, the State Department seemed to be seeking some way by which to appease the Soviet ambition to have a base in the Straits. Having made a substantial concession by depriving themselves of their present right to send a limited number of warships into the Black Sea in peacetime without asking permission of the Black Sea powers, Henderson suggested, they would be in a position to tell the Soviet government that they had achieved all that they could reasonably demand by an arrangement which in effect enabled them to dominate the Black Sea. 2 In the meantime, as the date for the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at London approached, the Turkish government was getting impatient to receive a reply from the State Department to their memorandum regarding Truman's proposal to internationalise the Straits. When Turkey increased her pressure for a defining statement on US policy towards the Straits issue, the Foreign Office misled Ankara, saying that, according to the Potsdam decisions, the US government would undertake to speak for the Big Three, though the decision of each government separately would be discussed with Turkey. It might have been the case that British authorities wished to put more pressure on the State Department to see things from their point of view so long as they did not abandon the Turks. Turkey did not receive satisfactory response from Washington, but the US did not intend to raise the Straits question at the Council of Foreign Ministers', and would give an interim reply to the Turkish government. 3 The new American proposal seemed to be more appropriate for Britain than the original Truman proposal, as the British COS were opposed to the Straits being internationalised. Nevertheless, the British authorities were not willing to give up their right to send a limited number of warships into the Black Sea in peacetime without asking the permission of any of the Black Sea Powers. Their thesis was that the Soviets would be very reluctant to give up their demand for a base in the Straits. If the Soviet government was to abandon its demand for a base and accept a mere modification of the Montreux 1 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/9-345, James Byrnes (Secretary of State) to Truman, 3 September 1945. PRO FO 371/48775/4476/44, Balfour to Foreign Office, no. 6048, 5 September 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48775/4476/44, Balfour to Foreign Office, no. 6116, 8 September 1945. 3 Ibid. RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/9-2545, Allen memorandum, 25 September 1945.

206

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

Convention, on the lines of the American proposal, the Foreign Office believed that the USSR would try to establish indirect control over the Straits by other means, for instance, political pressure on Turkey or Greece, perhaps through Bulgaria. In such a case, the Foreign Office was anxious to know how far the Americans were prepared to join hands in resisting the Soviet tactics. 1 It seemed that the new government also did not want to see any revision of the Convention since it might lead to Soviet domination of the Straits. Thereafter there was Soviet agitation over the British position in both the Middle East or in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Office was, indeed, anxious to have a common attitude with the State Department regarding the Straits issue before the two governments replied to Ankara's enquiry. 2 Therefore, Halifax was instructed to try hard to persuade the State Department to consult the Foreign Office, particularly regarding the passage issue, as the American proposal was quite contrary to British interests. Even if it was prepared to give up the right to send British warships into the Black Sea, the British government wished to reserve the right to send them through the Dardanelles as far as Istanbul and Turkish ports in the sea of Marmara. As regards entry into the Black Sea, the Foreign Office, with the concurrencc of the COS, wanted a special provision allowing courtesy visits without the necessity of obtaining permission from all the Black Sea Powers. The British government also objected to having to obtain the permission of Bulgaria and Romania, their defeated enemies, for the passage of British warships. 3 The State Department agreed to London's point in the sense that its proposal should be modified to read 'restricted non-Black Sea Power' passage through the Straits, instead of 'entry into the Straits'. The American authorities were convinced that this was better since, if adopted, it would permit warships of non-Black Sea Powers to visit Istanbul, which was in the Straits, without obtaining the permission of all the Black Sea Powers. Accordingly, they put forward a modified version of their previous proposal. Specifically, that 'Save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of Black Sea Powers or except when acting under authority of U N . ' 4 However, the State Department firmly believed that although Bulgaria and Romania were hostile states at present this

1

PRO FO 371/48775/4476/44, Foreign Office to Balfour, no 9266,7 September 1945. PRO FO 371/48698, R 16229/44/44, Sargent to Gallman (US Embassy), 27 September 1945. 3 PRO FO 371/48698,17262/44/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 10588, 21 October 1945. PRO FO 371/48698, R 16229/44/44, Sargent to Hollis, 27 September 1945. 4 PRO FO 371/48698, R 18092/44/44, Halifax to Foreign Office, no. 7035, 24 October 1945. 2

PRELUDE

TO THE C O L D

WAR

IN THE NEAR

EAST

207

did not alter the fact that in the long view all Black Sea states had an equal interest in the security of the area. 1 In spite of the different approaches appearing between Truman and the State Department, the President pointed out to Byrnes that his idea of internationalising the Straits never changed. He was of the opinion that if some kind of solution was not found the USSR would undoubtedly take steps by direct action to obtain control of the Black Sea Straits. He stressed that 'it seems to me that an international control would be much more satisfactory to Turkey than to lose Provinces over in the North-eastern corner of the country and lose the Straits too, which undoubtedly would be the final result'. 2 Byrnes pointed out to Truman that he doubted the wisdom of putting forward anew his suggestion of internationalisation until the USSR showed their hand. However, it would still be doubtful even if the Soviets agreed, since they were inclined to oppose internationalising of the Straits. 3 However, if the President wished to go ahead, Byrnes stated that they could add to the principles suggested for the revision in the sense that 'in the event of interference from any source with the rights of passage guaranteed by the revised Convention, the states parties thereto, including the US, agree to consult and take collective action within the framework of the UN Organisation to ensure the enjoyment of such rights'. 4 However, Truman did not insist on his point for the time being, although he thought that he should keep pushing the programme so as to prevent the USSR from taking over the Straits. 5 The Foreign Office still did not welcome the American proposal. In the meantime the British government wanted Washington to delay its reply to Ankara since the question remained quiescent between Turkey and the USSR. Otherwise any initiative from either Britain and the US would provoke an unwelcome response from Moscow. Besides, the Foreign Office believed that the Soviets would accept the American proposal as a basis for a settlement, not for a study. 6 The State Department agreed to delay its communication with Turkey until it was raised by Ankara. However, Byrnes was of the opinion that the replies of the US and British governments, while not exactly coinciding with one another, would give the impression that 'they were ganging up against the Soviets'. Alternatively, they thought that the Soviets might let the matter ride on purpose for the time being, feeling that a day might come when, through internal difficulties in Turkey, a regime friendlier 1

RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/10-2445, Henderson to Byrnes, 24 October 1945. RG 59, 1945-49 Decimal File, 767.68119/12-1345, Truman memorandum to Byrnes 13 October 1945. 3 PRO FO 371/48698, R 17542/44/44, Roberts to Foreign Office, no. 4555, 15 October 1945. 4 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/10-1945, Byrnes to Truman, 19 October 1945. 5 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49,767.68119/10-2045, Truman to Byrnes, 20 October 1945. 6 PRO FO 371/48698, R 18193/44/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 10768, 26 October 1945. 2

208

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

to the USSR might be brought to power. 1 Therefore, although the State Department appreciated the significance of the British suggestion, it decided to go ahead in view of the long delay which had already occurred since Truman undertook to discuss the subject with Turkey. Indeed, the Turkish government emphasised the uncertainty which would continue to exist in Ankara as long as Washington delayed its answer. Therefore, the US government delivered, without more delay, its note to the Turkish government on 2 November 1945. 2 The American proposals aimed to leave Turkey responsible for the control of the Straits though they increased the restriction against the passage of non Black Sea powers' warships into the Black Sea. This was because the American government was trying to avoid setting a precedent for the Suez and Panama Canals as well as the specific strategic considerations. 3 The Turkish government was not much satisfied with the American proposals, seeing some difficulties in their lack of any indication of how the Black Sea Powers were to decide whether or not the warships of non-Black Sea Powers were to enter the Black Sea. This was exactly the British authorities' point. The Turkish authorities had the further objection that they might find the whole of the Soviet navy and possibly the navies of all Soviet satellites in the territorial waters of Istanbul at one and the same time. 4 Yet there is little doubt that the new American proposal was more acceptable to the Turks than the earlier ideas of demilitarisation and internationalisation. It was no use hoping to satisfy the Soviets with anything less than unrestricted exit from and entry into the Black Sea. In that respect, Sara§oglu expressed his feeling that the proposals were 'excellent'. 5 So Turkey accepted the American proposals as a basis for discussion in order to study the method of their application at the appropriate time at the international conference. However, the Turkish authorities were not willing to express their views officially and display much pleasure over the American proposal until the Soviet view became known. Otherwise, if Turkey accepted the proposal, Saka believed that the USSR would consider Turkey

1 PRO FO 371/48698, R 18343/44/44, Halifax to Foreign Office, no. 7184, 27 October 1945. RG 59, Dccimal Files 1945-49, 767.68119/10-2345, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 1357, 23 October 1945. 2 In the end American proposal read as follows: 1 -The Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times. 2-The Straits to be open to the transit of warships of the Black Sea Powers at all time. 3-Save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with specific consent of Black Sea Powers or except when acting under the authority of the UN. Certain changes to modernise the Convention such as substitution of the UN system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory'. RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/10-3045, Byrnes to Wilson, no. 1049, 30 October 1945. PRO FO 371/48699, Galmann (US Embassy) to Sargent, 2 November 1945. 3 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/1-246, Henderson to Wilson, 29 December 1945. 4 PRO FO 371/48699, R 18782/44/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 875, 5 November 1945. 5 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/11-845, Wilson to Secretary of State, no. 1423, 8 November 1945.

P R E L U D E TO THE C O L D WAR IN T H E N E A R E A S T

209

committed to that extent and would declare herself dissatisfied with the American proposal and 'raise the ante'. 1 At the same time, Turkey was anxious to receive, even unofficially, the views of the British government on the American proposals. While agreeing that a revision of the Convention was necessary, the British government was not inclined to regard this as a particularly urgent question. 2 Rather, London desired to let the matter slip on the grounds that Moscow had not raised the question since the Potsdam Conference. As a matter of fact, if any conference ended without a greater measure of agreement between the three powers, London believed that it would fail to reach any satisfactory solutions. Even accepting the principle of the American proposals, British authorities hardly believed that the U S S R would give up their earlier demands. In fact, the Soviet press campaign against Turkey re-started in October. There were some reports that Soviet troops in Romania were ordered to move to Bulgaria in order to be ready to occupy the Straits. 3 This was part of the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey and although the British government did not envisage any Soviet aggression against Turkey in the near future, it decided to continue to give Turkey help in the way of military equipment and training as before. 4 The U S S R increased the intensity of its war of nerves against Turkey at the end of 1945. Moscow announced that it would grant facilities to Armenians abroad who wished to emigrate to Armenia. The artificial population problem thus created might reinforce demands for T u r k e y ' s eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan. Furthermore, the Soviet press and radio was full of propaganda stating that thé d e m a n d for territory f o r A r m e n i a n s came f r o m historical claims. 5 In the meantime, Vinogradov saw the American proposal was far f r o m guaranteeing that denial of passage through the Straits to warships of nonBlack Sea powers would be enforced in time of war. He stated that because of this the proposal failed to offer the necessary security to the U S S R . 6 Still, the Kremlin had no intention of making a new proposal of its own but intended to stand on the position stated in Moscow and Potsdam.

1 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 767.68119/11-945, Wilson to Secretary of State, no. 1432, 9 November 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48699, R 19095/44/44, Foreign Office to Peterson, no. 733, 19 November 1945. 3 PRO FO 371/48699, R 18648/44/44, British Military Mission in Romania to War Office no RAC 3065/4740, 30 October 1945. 4 PRO FO 371/48699, R 19264/44/44, R. Price (War Cabinet) to Cadogan, 12 November 1945. 5 RG59, Dccimal File 1945-49, 760J.67/12-1945, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 1593, 19 December 1945, Also see Erkin, Tiirk-Sovyet Ui$kileri, pp. 277-78. 6 RG 59 Decimal File 1945-59, 767.68119/11-2145, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 1475, 21 November 1945.

210

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

Although the British authorities succeeded in keeping the Straits issue off the agenda they feared that, in the face of the Soviet war of nerves conducted via the press or other means, Turkey might give up her firm stand and accept the Soviet resolution. In this regard, Clark-Kerr pointed out that Turkey was standing firm on the assumption that she had Britain and, to a lesser extent, the US behind her. To keep Turkey at least where she was, he suggested that a firm Anglo-American front might suffice to make the Soviet withdraw. To do so, Byrnes could make it clear to Molotov as Bevin should, that 'the integrity of Turkey lies very near to our hearts'. 1 Bevin did not intend to raise the question at the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three in Moscow, but he volunteered to discuss Clark-Kerr's proposal with Byrnes. 2 Accordingly, the Foreign Office suggested to the State Department in advance that assurances should be obtained from the Soviets that they would stop harrying the Turks. They should suggest to Molotov that the Straits question should be solved through peaceful and friendly negotiations, without pressure and threats continually being applied to the Turks. 3 This issue came up at the Moscow Conference when Bevin asked Stalin the reason for the war of nerves against Turkey. Stalin repeated his argument regarding the Straits and the eastern provinces of Turkey. However, there was no substantial result since neither party was willing to put the Straits issue on the agenda. However, Bevin had the advantage of telling Stalin that 'Turkey's integrity was of vital interest to Britain'. 4 Byrnes was reluctant to take this matter up with the Soviets for fear of provoking them. Furthermore, he made an ingenuous statement at the end of the Moscow Conference broadcast by the BBC, that 'the USSR was at liberty to maintain her troops in Bulgaria and Romania until she was satisfied of the friendliness of these governments'. 5 Because of Byrnes' method of conducting negotiations with the Soviets, the Foreign Office mistrusted him. After the London Foreign Ministers' Conference in October 1945, Ward pointed out that Byrnes was suspected of being as 'appeasement-minded' towards Stalin as ever Chamberlain had been to Hitler. Therefore, the Foreign Office rather thought of making a direct appeal to Truman and drafted a telegram for Halifax to put to Truman that Stalin wanted an exclusively Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe without being prepared to accept British and American spheres 1

PRO FO 371/48699, R 20684/44/44, Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, no. 5270, 9 December 1945. 2 PRO FO 371/48699, R 20684/44/44, Foreign Office to Halifax, no. 12373, 10 December 1945. 3 RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49, 761.67/12-1245, Winant to Secretary of State, no. 13048, 12 December 1948. 4 PRO CAB 133/82, A meeting at the Kremlin between Bevin and Stalin on 19 December 1945. See also PRO FO 371/48775, R 21419/4476/44, Bevin to Attlee, no. 53 Worthy, 20 December 1945. 5 PRO FO 371/59232, R 22/22/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 1025, 31 December 1945.

P R E L U D E TO THE C O L D WAR IN THE N E A R E A S T

211

anywhere else. 1 Such a suggestion might not be made public, but the president himself revealed to Halifax his suspicion that there was no hope left of reaching agreement with the USSR. Indeed, apart from the demand for a base in the Straits, the USSR also raised the question of a base in Tripoli at the London Conference. Molotov seemed determined during the proceedings to put an end to Britain's position as the sole Mediterranean power; her position became unchallenged after the war as Italy and France ceased to be first-class powers. Dixon, Bevin's Private Secretary, emphasised that 'the Russians perhaps had such feeling of jealousy of our position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East that she desired to frustrate our position as the leader of the small nations of Europe and determination to run stooge governments in the Balkans'. 2 Although he went on to say that neither Britain nor America would give way to the Soviets on their intention, the next Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow ended with a compromise whereby Romania and Bulgaria were acccptcd as lying within the Soviet sphere of influence. 3 It was not so difficult to imagine what would be the next Soviet step. The Soviet government had already launched its attack on Turkey to get her demands accepted in one way or another. Wilson had warned the State Department that the Straits question as raised by the USSR, instead of being the 'crux of the matter', appeared merely a 'façade behind which lies the real Soviet objective'. However, the development of air power since the First World War fundamentally altered the question of the Straits. He argued that freedom of passage through the Straits for the USSR could not be effectively guaranteed by international agreement. Neither could actual control of the Straits guarantee access to the USSR because of proximate air power based, for example, in Crete. The Soviet objective as regards Turkey therefore was to bring about a change in Turkey's internal regime. In the chain of countries bordering the USSR to the west and south from the Baltic to the Black Sea, Turkey was the sole country which was not governed by a 'friendly' regime. A friendly regime in Turkey under Soviet domination would mean actual control by the USSR of the Straits. But more important than this, such a scenario would mean the termination of the Turco-British alliance and the end of Western liberal influence in Turkey and probably ultimately in the Middle East. 4 Kennan, American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, was also in full

1 PRO FO 50920, U8353/5559/G, Draft message by Ward for Halifax, 22 October 1945. As an American Charge d'Affaires in Moscow Kennan closely observed Byrnes in Moscow. He corrected Britain's observation about Byrnes as he pointed out that 'he had no fixed objective. His main purpose is to achieve some sort of agreement, he does not much care what... he wants an agreement for its political effects at home'. Gaddis, The United States, p. 286. Also see Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 115-155. Dixon, Double Diploma, p. 195. 3 4

Gaddis, The United States, p. 289. RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49,761.67/9-2545, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 1252, 25 September 1945.

212

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

agreement with Wilson. He said that 'we must expect that any concessions of this nature will be exploited to the utmost in Moscow with a view to the elimination of Western influence in Turkey and the establishment of a regime friendly to the USSR'. 1 There were many more reports regarding the real Soviet aims in the region. However, the American government tried at first to adopt an accommodating policy to the Soviets. Therefore, without much infringing Turkish sovereignty over the Straits they offered some modification of the Straits regime in favour of the USSR.

Getting Tough with the Soviets After the failure of the Moscow Conference, however, the President launched into a violent attack on Soviet policy on Bulgaria and Romania. He accused the Soviets of intending to invade Turkey and seize the Black Sea Straits. Truman had had enough of them and thought that the US should not play at compromise any longer. He said famously, 'I am tired of babying the Soviets'. Furthermore, the American public became much concerned about the Soviet threat to world peace. 2 It seemed that Truman himself decided to take the matter up. It became apparent towards the end of 1945 that both the American government and people were now convinced that the USSR would not be satisfied until she had control over every strategic area in the world. Britain was convinced too. However, when Turkey wanted some open support against the Soviets, neither capital was yet ready to throw down the gauntlet to the USSR, though Bevin assured Turkey that should it face any Soviet attack Britain would not stand aloof. Bevin also advised that Turkey should remain calm and keep its press steady, as there had been some recent articles bitterly criticising the Soviet attitude. Turkey was not fully convinced of this. It was not entirely because a Soviet attack on Turkey seemed imminent, but because the Turkish government was in fear of a growing tendency in Turkey to adopt a policy of appeasement towards the USSR, which meant, as Agikalin, Turkish Ambassador in London, warned Bevin, the passing of Turkey 'from the British into the Soviet orbit'. 3 Indeed, some of the articles which appeared in the Turkish press showed growing distrust, following the Moscow Conference, of the Anglo-American stand against the Soviets. It was even thought that the Anglo-Saxons had lost their solidarity. Yalcm stated in Tanin that the Anglo-Saxon countries had not succeeded in saving, despite immense sacrifices, either Turkey or Persia. The Soviets were ready to mount the attack 1

RG 59, decimal File 1945-49,761.67/9-2745, Kennan to Byrnes, no. 3387, 27 September 1945. Gaddis, The United States, pp. 288-89. Messer, The End of an Alliance, p. 158. 3 PRO FO 371/59239, R 52/52/44, Dominion Office to Commonwealth's Capitals, no. 3, 1 January 1946. 2

P R E L U D E T O T H E C O L D W A R IN T H E N E A R E A S T

213

everywhere from the Far East to Trieste, from the Turkish frontier to the suburbs of Teheran. Every day they created a new problem and abandoned none of the regions they had occupied. They would seek to eliminate Anglo-Saxon influence wherever they went and it seemed that they would succeed. 1 Sadak wrote in Ak§am that it had become evident that the USSR was the only power in Central Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East which was capable of doing something and having her deeds approved. 2 Besides, the Turkish government was also disappointed at not having a precise guarantee from either London or Washington against the Soviet threat. Meanwhile, the Soviet government began in January 1946 to seek to renew her conversations with the Turkish Foreign Ministry. This caused a great deal of anxiety amongst the British authorities who realised that the U S S R was performing a new diplomatic manoeuvre against Ankara. Therefore, Britain urged Siiincr. the Acting Foreign Minister, that an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations was desirable, but warned him not to repeat the mistake of spring 1945 when the Turkish government had let the Sarper-Vinogradov conversations run on and 'had got bashed over the head'. 3 Indeed, Vinogradov had an opportunity to approach Siimer during a dance at the British Embassy in Ankara on 4 February. The interesting point was that the Soviet Ambassador chose the stage for the conversation. He put on a good act to show the rest of the diplomatic guests that they were having a very friendly talk. Siimer later claimed that this conversation made it plain that the USSR's only real interest lay in guarantees about the Straits and not in any territorial adjustment of Eastern frontiers. The USSR was still trying to put another proposal to Turkey rather than reaching a reconciliation over their earlier demand regarding the Straits. 4 Vinogradov became increasingly annoying to the Turkish authorities, since he was trying to force them to make another mistake whenever he had the opportunity. For instance, in order not to encounter the Soviet Ambassador, Siimer did not appear at some diplomatic parties, with the excuse of having flu, although he was in fact pretty well. 5 In the meantime, Turkey was receiving a stream of information from Antonoff, the Bulgarian Minister in Ankara. The latter told Erkin that if Saracogiu were replaced as head of government there would be no further difficulties. A cabinet change in Ankara might have cleared the way to establish a pro-Soviet government in Ankara. The Turkish authorities believed that Antonoff was the stooge of the Soviet Ambassador and this seemed a new line by which the Soviets were trying in effect to weaken Turkey's internal structure. In addition to Soviet activities in the Balkans and Iran, this new Soviet diplomatic tactic over 1

Hiiseyin Cahit Yalçin, Tanin, 29 December 1945. Necmeddin Sadak, Ak§am, 4 January 1946. 3 Ibid. p. 285. PRO FO 371/59240, R 1584/22/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 65, 26 January 1946. 4 PRO FO 371/59240, R 1963/52/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 83, 5 February 1946. 5 PRO FO 371/59240, R 4436/52/44, Helm to Hayter, 11 March 1946. 2

214

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

Turkey was worrying Britain. Therefore, they did not remain aloof when the Turks requested for a public announcement regarding the Anglo-Turkish Alliance. 1 The American and British authorities had had enough of the Soviets' attitude, having tried hard to maintain a policy of accommodation during which first Poland and then Romania and Bulgaria fell under Soviet influence. Simultaneously, the constant Soviet war of nerves against Turkey aimed at establishing her troops in the Straits at last convinced both the Washington and London authorities that continuing the appeasement policy would mean Soviet rule over Turkey and the rest of the Middle East, and Greece also. Therefore, the Moscow Conference of December 1945 marked the end of the Anglo-US hope for collaboration with the Kremlin in the post-war era. The Cold War was about to begin.

1

Erkin, Turk-Sovyet iliçkileri pp. 276-77.

7 AMERICA COMMITTED: COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

There were two remarkable events in early 1946 which closely interacted with each other showing that the US was now willing to commit itself against the Soviet threat to the Near East in general and Turkey in particular: the Missouri visit to Istanbul and Churchill's keynote speech at Fulton, in Missouri which amounted to a virtual declaration of the Cold War. It became clear, after the US took a firm stand against the Soviet note of August 1946 regarding the revision of the Convention that the US did not accept any Soviet influence beyond Bulgaria, as it moved towards a policy of containment. From Potsdam onwards it was plain that Stalin was determined to block any peace treaty which would facilitate the emergence of democratically elected governments in liberated Europe as was evidenced at the London Foreign Ministers' Conference of October 1945 and the Moscow Conference of December 1945. The Soviet authorities were then encouraged by Britain's material weakness to turn towards the Straits and the Near East, where Britain's resources and pressing economic situation would have made it virtually impossible for her to prevail without American assistance. To be able to hold her position, Britain believed that the US had to be brought to realise that its interests lay in opposing the expansion of Soviet power in the Near East. Putting on the pressure was a delicate matter, however, as there was always the possibility of US isolationism. At last, however, Washington emerged as an ally in Near Eastern affairs at the beginning of 1946, which had been the main objective of Britain throughout the war. Although one could not deny British efforts to persuade American policy-makers to do this, it could not be seen as a wholly British achievement when the US took the lead in the middle of 1946. Rather it was the determination of the American military authorities and then of Truman himself to put an end to further Soviet expansion. After the failure of Anglo-American policy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (except in Greece) to prevent Soviet expansion, the US authorities could not be in the position of conceding another defeat by accepting any more Soviet demands over the Straits, which could mean the total loss of the whole Middle East and the Mediterranean. This was perceived as a direct threat to American security itself as well as to British interests. Therefore, the USSR

216

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

had to be stopped where she was at the time. Insistent Soviet demands in the Straits, along with the communist activities in Greece, quickly brought American promises in the Near East, which led to the emergence of the Cold War in the Middle East.

Preparation for a Tough Policy: The Missouri Involvement in Near Eastern Affairs?

Mission

-

American

After long and hard efforts with the Soviets in the peace negotiations were frustrated, the White House and the State Department paid more attention to their diplomatic representatives' despatches from Moscow and Ankara regarding the objects of Soviet foreign policy. In particular, the despatch of George F. Kennan, Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, had the greatest effect on leading American policy-makers. Answering an enquiry from the State Department, Kennan sent his famous long telegram to Washington on 22 February 1946 to the effect that the USSR had no intention of accommodating herself to the Western democratic countries. Rather the Soviets saw the world as split into capitalist and socialist camps, between which there could no longer be peaceful coexistence. He observed: 'we are trying to preserve a world in which a capitalistic-democratic method can continue, whereas if the USSR's adherence to truly Marxian dialectic continues their interest lies in a collapse of this system'. Kennan predicted that the Soviets would participate officially in any international organisation in which they detected 'an opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting the power of others'. Their joining the UN should be perceived from this perspective. 1 Kennan's telegram gained enormous success in official Washington circles, largely because its anti-Soviet view had already been embraced from the President down. 2 Everyone in government bodies in Washington, analysing Soviet foreign policy, had reached almost the same conclusion as Kennan's analysis of Soviet ideological objectives by February 1946: that it inevitably conflicted with the capitalist world. But there was one obvious divergence of views. Kennan did not see any rational Soviet threat either to Turkey or to any Middle Eastern country claiming that communism and the Muslim faith were in conflict. Even if communism had power over any Islamic country it would not be longlasting since it would face severe opposition. Kennan was convinced, however, that Greek communist hegemony in Greece would result in Soviet penetration there, whereby the whole of Western Europe would come under the threat of 1 Kennan said that the USSR would leave the UN (as it later did, in effect, for a time) whenever it felt that the organisation was embarrassing or frustrating its pursuit of power expansion; the Soviets would stay with it (as still later they were to return to it) if they felt that their withdrawal would fail to split the unity of the other nations or render the UN ineffective. George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1968), pp. 547-52. 2 J. P. D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994), p. 81.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

217

communism, leaving the US under direct Soviet threat. Therefore, he suggested that military aid to Greece was vital, but there was to be no military aid to Turkey, only moral support. 1 In contrast, Wilson's despatches stressed the Soviet threat posed to Turkey. Answering a request from the State Department, he repeated his argument, saying that the real Soviet objective towards Turkey was not the revision of the Straits regime, but the 'actual domination of Turkey'. In the vast security belt of the USSR which extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, composed of vassal states, Turkey constituted the sole gap. Moscow was unwilling to tolerate T u r k e y ' s connection with Western democracies. Therefore, Wilson concluded that the Soviet objective was, as he said, to 'break down this present independent Turkish government and to establish in its place a vassal or friendly regime in Turkey which will complete the security chain of subservient countries on Soviet's western and southern frontiers and put an end completely to western influence in T u r k e y ' . 2 Washington was inclined to agree with Wilson and paid special attention to Turkey's position in the face of the Soviet threat. Kennan's despatches were received with even more excitement in military circles than those of foreign policy makers in Washington. American military authorities, for instance, Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, as well as Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, were not happy with the attitude either of the President or the State Department, having been a late convert to the American policy of getting tough with the Soviets. 3 However, one must give credit to the politicians in the American foreign policy making process for educating their people before they took a major step. The military authorities were impatient to take serious measures against Moscow, believing that the Soviet demands for a base in the Straits were an effort to establish their influence on the Mediterranean littoral so as to be able to sit athwart the lines of communication of the British Empire. 4 In a letter to Byrnes, Admiral Leahy postulated a common cause between the US, Britain and Turkey to the effect that the Soviets' intentions over the Straits not only posed a threat to British interests but also directly to America's position as a world power. He believed that the Soviet demands for bases in the Straits and the provinces of Turkey was a manifestation of the Soviet desire to dominate the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, the objective of Soviet policy was to acquire a 'new springboard

1

Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 315-319. FRUS, The Near East and Africa, Vol. VII, 1946, p. 821. 3 Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd, 1952), pp. 148-49. 4 Ibid. p. 149. 2

218

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

for further Soviet expansion' in order to 'access the extensive oil resources in the Middle East; full utilisation in both peace and war of Black Sea ports to include ingress and egress therefrom and the prospect of alienating the Muslim World from British and US influence'. 1 Thus the defeat or disintegration of the British Empire, Leahy believed, would eliminate 'from Eurasia the last bulwark of resistance between the US and Soviet expansion'. Militarily, America's present position as a world power was of necessity closely interwoven with that of Britain. He concluded his letter with the conviction that under these conditions, American acquiescence in whole or in part to these Soviet demands would definitely impair American national security by weakening Britain's position as a world power and reducing the effectiveness of the UN. 2 It seemed that the American military authorities were ready to put into effect the Cold War. Truman was also well aware of the Soviets' objectives and their consequences, but his reaction remained a rhetorical one, not because of his ignorance but because of the need to convince the American public of such a policy. Churchill's appearance as Truman's guest at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March might be regarded as the President's preparation of the American people for a confrontation with the Soviets. Before Churchill's speech the Washington authorities had already decided to take a major step towards a firmer line against the Soviet threat. Indeed, when the USSR established itself in Eastern Europe and with five thousand troops in Bulgaria, Truman became worried that the Soviets were going to move down and take the Black Sea Straits. 3 He was in a dilemma about what he should do at least to stop the USSR where she was. In the end he seemed to decide to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Churchill delivered a remarkable speech entitled 'The iron curtain'. This rather appeared to be a declaration for an end to Western-Soviet collaboration and the publicising of the Cold War since his speech was devoted to the Soviet-Communist threat, in military and ideological terms, directed against Western interests. 4 Churchill warned 'nobody knows what the USSR and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits'. After he had described the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe where communist institutions had been established under Soviet control, he turned his attention to the Soviet claims and pressures on

1

RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 867.80/3-1346, William D. Leahy to Byrnes, 13 March 1946. Ibid. 3 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-50 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 63. 4 Herken pointed out that the speech essentially called for a revival of the wartime AngloAmerican alliance against a new enemy, Russia. See Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 143. 2

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

219

Turkey and Iran. Then, he warned that the threats posed to Western democracy 'will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become'. 1 Churchill wanted to forge an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviet threat which, he was convinced, the Labour government was incapable or unwilling to confront. As the speech was delivered a firmer line toward the Soviets gradually emerged from Washington. There is no doubt that the American authorities knew in advance what Churchill would say at Fulton, but the British government did not. Churchill wired to Attlee on 7 March, two days after his speech, that Truman, Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and the President's top military aides saw the speech before it was delivered. He said, 'the president liked it; Byrnes was excited, and Leahy was enthusiastic'. 2 This was another sign of American readiness to take a firm stand against the potential Soviet threat. Forrestal was one of those who shared the American JCOS's views on the Soviet threat against the Near East. He asked Byrnes if he was agreeable to the Navy preparing plans for a task force in the Mediterranean. The strategic initiative of a Mediterranean Force in global terms stemmed from Forrestal's idea of resisting the formidable Soviet threat to American interests in the postwar period. This idea took shape as the establishment of the Mediterranean Fleet, the Sixth Fleet. 3 The Secretary of State endorsed the suggestion that it might accompany the battleship Missouri, which would take back to Turkey the body of the Turkish Ambassador, Mtinir Ertegun, who had died at his post in Washington. 4 Accordingly the Missouri, which was the vessel on which the Japanese surrender had been signed and was the strongest battleship afloat, sailed from New York directly to the Mediterranean accompanied by two destroyers, the US Glennon (DD-480) and the USS Cone (DD-866) on 21 March. The battleship anchored in the Bosporus from 5 to 9 April, marking the first visit of an American battleship to Istanbul. 5 The primary purpose of For Churchill's speech at Fulton see Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963 (London: Chelsea House Publisher, 1974) pp. 7285-7293. Also see www.winstonchurchill.org/senews.htm, 'Complete Speeches of Winston Churchill: Sinews of Peace'. CAC, Churchill Papers, CHAR 5/51 A, Conservative Research Department, 19 July 1957. 2 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Vol. VII, 1945-1965, Never Despair (London: Heinemann, 1988), p. 195. Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 160. 3 Jonathan Knight, 'American State Craft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 3, 1975, pp. 453-54. 4 Milles, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 147. RG 313 Records of the Naval Operating Forces, US Naval Forces to Europe, Historical Section, COMNAEU, Monthly reports March 45- June 46, box no. 17. As a matter of fact, as Admiral Leahy and Truman informed Churchill while he was in the US, the original plan stipulated that, the Task Force would consist of another battleship of the greatest power, Wisconsin, two of the latest and strongest aircraft carriers, several cruisers and about a dozen destroyers, with the necessary ancillary ships. But the idea of a fleet of substantial proportions had been abandoned. CAC, Churchill Papers, CHUR 2/4/6-7-8, Churchill to Attlee and Bevin, 7 March 1946.

220

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

the cruise was to return the remains of the late Turkish Ambassador to the US to his own country. However, there can be no doubt that the appearance in the Mediterranean of one of the US Fleet's most powerful battleships, flying the flag of the Commander of the Twelfth Fleet, greatly increased US prestige in the area. Cruises made for flag showing purposes are generally of political and diplomatic value and importance. 1 There was an unmistakable message aimed of the Kremlin: the US was willing and able to deploy its navy in defence at the Straits. Churchill was very excited when Truman told him about the Missouri mission. The latter did not reveal the main object of it but Churchill grasped its strategic significance, writing to Attlee that this strikes me as a very important act of state and one calculated to make the USSR understand that she must come to reasonable terms of discussion with the Western democracies. I am sure that the arrival and stay of such a powerful American fleet in the Straits must be entirely beneficial, both as reassuring Turkey and Greece and as placing a demurrer on what Bevin called cutting our life-line through the Mediterranean by the establishment of a Soviet naval base at Tripoli. 2 The Missouri mission was evidence of America's willingness to stand firm against any Soviet assault against the countries of the Near East, and a clear warning to the USSR that the US would not remain aloof if the Soviets activated their aggressive intentions. Having spent three days in a friendly atmosphere with Truman, Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Forrestal, Churchill also came to the conclusion that the American Executive forces were deeply distressed at the way they were being treated by the USSR and they did not intend to put up with pressure for the Soviet expansion at the expense of Turkey or other Mediterranean countries. 3 This was, indeed, the case. The Missouri Mission aimed not only to bolster Turkish confidence in American support, but it also sought to enhance American prestige in the Near East and demonstrate to Britain, France, the USSR, and the Arabs America's interests in the region. 4

1 The Commander Twelfth Fleet broke his flag on the USS Missouri (BB-62) in Athens, Algiers and Naples as well. RG 313 Records of the Naval Operating Forces, US Naval Forces to Europe, Historical Section, COMNAEU, Monthly reports March 45- June 46, box no. 17. 2 CAC, Churchill Papers, CHUR 2/4/6-7-8, Churchill to Attlee and Bevin, 7 March 1946. 3 Churchill Papers, CHUR 2/4/6-7-8, Churchill to Attlee and Bevin, 7 March 1946. 4 Alvarez's interview with Henderson, See David Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: the United States and Turkey (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980), p. 84.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

221

The Turks were the most relieved with the Missouri visit which demonstrated that America was not going to relapse into the isolation which had succeeded the First World War. They interpreted this as an indication of the firmer attitude adopted by the US in the face of developments in the Middle East. 1 Byrnes let the Turks know that he did not want the Turkish government to think that the visit of Missouri to Istanbul was an isolated gesture. It was 'part of a determined policy'. 2

Britain in Hard Times Britain had been aware of the Soviet threat to the whole Middle East and the Mediterranean for a long time. Frank Roberts sent London an analysis of Soviet foreign policy along similar lines to those of the Kennan and Wilson despatches. During the early months of 1946 Roberts' despatches from Moscow caused the British Foreign Office to ponder more carefully the motives behind Soviet policy. Roberts warned that Soviet aims in the Middle East were becoming increasingly threatening towards British imperial interests, as the regions lying along the southern Soviet frontiers between the Bosporus and India, constituted one of the main areas of friction between the two countries. According to Roberts, the USSR was trying to detach the countries of Turkey and Iran from their connection with Britain, who was seen as the sole obstacle to Soviet expansion towards the south. 'The Soviet Government inherited the old Tsarist ambition for Istanbul (called by the Russians Tsargrad, the Imperial City). The main motive force behind Soviet policy in this area remains the drive towards the open sea. The Soviet conception of strategic protection consists of defence in depth in the form of a chain of well-organised Soviet controlled buffer states along the Soviet frontiers.. 3 In addition to the Kremlin's war of nerves, the Soviet activities in Turkey's neighbours, namely Syria, Bulgaria and Greece, were causing serious alarm in Turkish official circles. In particular, Soviet propaganda to weaken Turkey's connection with Britain caused the greatest fear: the Soviets spread the rumour that if there were a serious conflict between Turkey and the USSR, 'the US would stay indifferent and Britain would stand aside'. For this reason, Turkey was looking for a guarantee that she would not be abandoned to her fate. In a letter to Bevin on 15 February, Saka appealed for a renewal of the 1

RG 59, Decimal File, 1945-49, 867.9111/5-646, Edwin C. Wilson to Secretary of State, 6 Mav 3 1946. PRO FO 371/59312, R 7311/7311/44, Helm to Foreign Office, no. 93 Saving, 7 May 1946. Harbutt described this event as a '...unmistakable American commitment to Turkey...'. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain, p. 170. 2

3

59241, E 797/797/65, Frank Roberts to Bevin no. 30, 16 January 1946.

222

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

alliance of 1939 as insurance against Soviet attack or to divert a possible Red Army march into Turkish territory, or at least, he said, a declaration in the House of Commons expressing unequivocally the value that Britain attributes to the alliance of 1939 would appease many anxieties.1 Bevin would have been more amenable to such a proposal if the Soviets had not promised to evacuate Iran at the beginning of March. However, in the face of increased Soviet pressure on Turkey, Bevin was, to some extent, compelled to meet Turkey's appeal on 21 February in a parliamentary speech. He stressed the fact that having a base in the Straits controlled by one particular power as against another would not contribute to world peace. He further suggested the treaty of friendship be renewed between the USSR and Turkey. Finally he stressed what Turkey was anxious to hear: 'we have a treaty with Turkey ... I do not want Turkey converted into a satellite state. What I want her to be is really independent'.2 No doubt Turkey was pleased with this statement since it was the first public statement under the Labour government of Britain's determination, more or less, to stand against Soviet aggression towards Turkey. But Bcvin's statement undoubtedly annoyed the Moscow authorities, as Vinogradov stated that the speech seemed to line up Britain against the USSR. He said that this was the result of Turkey's activities in British diplomatic circles. The USSR could not accept any country like Turkey which had been a friend and ally of the Western powers at the same time as Moscow's. 3 For his part, the Soviet Ambassador tried to have an interview with the Turkish Prime Minister. Saraijoglu replied that he could only do so if he produced a written statement that the USSR would withdraw her claims regarding the north-eastern provinces and the Straits. Vinogradov replied that 'they had been put forward by Molotov and only he could withdraw them. So far as he was concerned he sent frequent reports to Moscow and all his efforts were directed towards renewing Turco-Soviet friendship'. Sara§oglu responded that, if the sending of frequent reports begot the Soviet demands which he knew about, he could only conclude that the USSR would have asked for three quarters of Asia Minor if he had sent no reports at all. Vinogradov then expressed a wish to explain the reasons behind the Soviet demand for bases in the Straits, with well-known excuses. 4

1 59232, R 3023/22/44, Asikalm to Bevin, 19 February 1946. Erkin, Turk-Sovyet Ui$kileri pp. 285-86. 2 House of Commons Official Reports. Bevin's Speech on Foreign Affairs on 21 February 1946, Fifth Series, Vol. 419, Seventh Volume of Session 1945-46. 3 FRUS, The Near East and Africa, Vol. VII, 1946, p. 817. Also see, Erkin, Turk-Sovyet ilijkileri, p. 289. 4 PRO FO 371/59240, R 4436/52/44, Helm to Hayter, 11 March 1946.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

223

Peterson had conversations with Molotov and Stalin in May on his new posting to Moscow as British Ambassador; both of them displayed their discontent with the British policy adopted against the USSR regarding the Straits question. Stalin's remarks were intended to contain a warning that the Anglo-Soviet alliance would not justify itself unless the British government was prepared to trust the USSR to the extent of giving her what she wanted in the Straits, or failing this, a base in the Mediterranean or the Aegean. When Peterson said that any revision of the Montreux Convention would secure for the USSR complete liberty of egress and ingress, Stalin responded. 'But what is the good of coming out the Mediterranean if one has no base there'. Stalin complained that the British were still keeping the Soviet Navy bottled up in the Black Sea as at old. 1 Comparing Churchill's policy during the war to ensure freedom of passage for the USSR through the Straits and Soviet access to the Mediterranean, Stalin alleged that Churchill had been more forthcoming on these questions than Labour was now and asserted that the Labour government was denying Soviet access to the Mediterranean and thereby also denying the USSR's equality as an ally. 2 Indeed, Churchill had always said when he was in power that he would welcome the appearance of a strong Soviet fleet on all the seas and in particular that he was in favour of the Soviets having free access to the Mediterranean for their merchant ships and warships. In this respect, Stalin's assertion might be seen as a genuine one, as Bevin had never promised such things in his negotiations with the Soviets. Even following Stalin's expression to Peterson of his dissatisfaction with Labour's policy regarding Soviet access to the Mediterranean, Bevin repeated, on 4 June, his disapproval of the Soviet efforts to reduce Turkey to a satellite state by asking for a base in the Straits. Instead he expressed his agreement to allowing Soviet warships access to the Mediterranean and merely mentioned the possibility of revising the current regime by a conference. He suggested that the Soviet mercantile fleet should freely visit any port of the world and Britain's merchant ships should also visit Odessa and other Black Sea ports. 'But we do not ask for a base to enable us to do s o . . . ' 3 However, when the USSR formulated its demands at the Berlin Conference and asked for military bases in the Straits for herself, Churchill opposed it, remarking that this went far beyond anything previously discussed between Stalin and himself. 4

1 PRO FO 371/59241, R 8432/52/44, Peterson to Kelly, no 50, 5 June. PRO FO 371/59241 R 7670/52/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 1812, 21 May 1946. 2 PRO FO 371/59242, R 8850/52/44, Peterson to Bevin, no. 385, 17 June 1946. 3 House of Commons Official Reports, Vol. 423, p. 1829. 4 PRO FO 371/48698, R 1945/44/44, Terminal (Potsdam) 8 meeting, 24 July 1945.

224

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

In spite of Bevin's announcement in the House of Commons, the British authorities were seeking to minimise the Soviet threat to Britain's imperial life-line by some kind of understanding, which might include, to some extent, concessions in the Straits. This may have been because of London's suspicions that Washington would not volunteer support in the region at this point, as well as Britain's military and economic incapacity to fulfil her obligations and give necessary assistance to Turkey under the AngloTurkish Treaty in the event of Soviet attack. A cabinet draft paper stated that it was a major British interest that Turkey should continue to be a genuinely independent country looking to Great Britain for support. Britain believed that the Soviet authorities no doubt wished the collapse of the present regime and its replacement by 'Soviet puppets'. In this regard, appealing to the UN might not have been a solution, since the USSR had the right of veto. Even if a majority could be obtained, there was no guarantee that the US would go to war.

UN Base in the Straits? Britain had already been aware of the Soviet objectives and their effects on British interests in the Middle East where she had already had a difficult position in the face of growing Arab nationalism. In particular, Britain's continued military presence in the Suez Canal Zone was a source of considerable Arab resentment. 1 It was true that Bevin accepted that the British Empire would not survive unless Britain held her position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Growing Arab hatred against the British presence at Suez on the one hand, and Britain's need for securing her imperial life-line through Suez on the other was forcibly linked to the issue of Soviet bases; Soviet control over the Straits and a British base in Egypt, implying British control over the Suez Canal were parallel. 2 Bevin's resolution was to trade with Moscow, by agreeing to a mainly Soviet UNO base in the Straits, to obtain a predominantly British UNO base in the Suez Canal area. Thus Britain might have secured her military presence at the Egypt which was now threatened by resurgent Egyptian nationalism. Without committing himself, during the Paris Conference Bevin discussed with Byrnes the possibility of a UN base and keeping the Dardanelles always open until the UN decided otherwise. But Bevin was in a dilemma: if this were proposed it would immediately be countered by an enquiry as to what Britain would do with the Suez Canal. Even if Britain 1

Elisabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964), pp. 154-155. 2 John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49 (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), p. 122.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

225

agreed to it, it would be a question whether Egypt would agree that the Canal should always be open on similar terms to those Bevin had suggested for the Dardanelles. Byrnes showed great interest in this until Bevin reminded him that he might be asked what was going to happen to the Panama Canal. Since these three waterways stood in relation to one another, what would be the American attitude if this question arose? 1 Because there was no explicit provision in the UN Charter for a UN base in the territories of the member states, the British Foreign Office sought a way for a UN base to be established in the Straits. In this sense, the scheme of international security for which the Charter provided was based (Article 43) upon the conception of a 'special agreement' between the members of the Security Council as a collective body on the one hand and sovereign member states of the UN or groups of such members on the other hand. There was nothing in Article 43 which required a state to submit to foreign bases on its territory but there was equally nothing which precluded such an arrangement. 2 If, therefore, five members of the Security Council, including all the Great Powers sincc the veto would apply, considered that a 'UN base' was desirable in the Straits area, they would be within their rights in asking Turkey to accord the necessary land facilities etc., according to Turkey's 'special agreement' with the Council. Article 43(3) made it clear that this agreement not only had to be freely accepted by member states, but also had to be ratified by those states in accordance with their respective constitutions. Ward commented that the Turks could therefore decline to accept the agreement, but it would not be very easy for them to stand out against the Security Council and the unanimous wish of the five Great Powers. A Turkish refusal would also mean that Turkey's 'special agreement' would not go through, and this might weaken the Turkish international position, especially if Turkey later called upon the Security Council to help her resist aggression. 3

1 PRO FO 371/59241, R 7233/52/44, FO minute, 'Extract from record of talk between Bevin and Byrnes on 3 May', 11 May 1946. 2 In the case of Iceland the US government had already sought to persuade the Icelandic government that it would be quite normal for the American bases in Iceland to be regularised by their inclusion in Iceland's own eventual contribution to the Security Council under Article 43. 3 An alternative procedure would be not to link the matter directly to Article 43 of the Charter but for the Security Council to make a recommendation in favour of an international base in the Straits, and for the necessary negotiations, leading to some sort of international convention, to be undertaken between the various interested parties at an international conference, on the lines of the Montreux Convention. The Security Council, however, had its functions closely defined in the Charter and if it did not proceed under Article 43, it would have to find grounds for making this recommendation, for instance, in connection with a dispute or situation likely to lead to international friction in the Straits brought before it by some State under Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, or even by the Secretary-General under Article 99. PRO FO 371/59242 R 9174/52/44, Ward Minute, 24 May 1946.

226

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

However, in such a case, Turkish faith in Britain would be in question. The Turks were not prepared to accept any foreign military establishments even of a UN character within the Straits area. The Turkish Ambassador, Ccvat Acikalin, informed the Foreign Office at the beginning of May that he was worried that the USSR might work to obtain the dominant share in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean in virtue of Article 43 of the Charter. He particularly stressed his fear that the Soviet government might be able by means of the Charter to require facilities on Turkish territory which the Turkish government might wish to refuse and the latter might find itself in a very invidious position. From that perspective it was clear that the Turks would deeply resent any proposals for a UN base in the Straits. Even though they might in the last resort feel compelled to agree, the whole proceeding would put the greatest strain on Anglo-Turkish relations. 1 The COS had already reached the conclusion that such a base would unavoidably be predominantly Soviet and would therefore be subject to strong military objections. These objections were that the presence of Soviet bases in the Straits would be 'a first step in bringing Turkey and in due course Greece under Soviet domination; accelerate the development of a Soviet threat in the Mediterranean on the outbreak of war; bring Soviet influence to the borders of the Middle East area; lower our prestige in the Middle East since we should have appeared to have given way to Soviet pressure; all this would be contrary to our military interests as it would weaken our military position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East' r As a matter of fact, a UNO base in the Straits would be in question since the only aggressor against which it could geographically be of use would be the USSR, which would therefore presumably dislike the idea, especially as she had herself demanded a base in the Straits for exactly the opposite reasons. From this point of view, Sargent did not see the point of pursuing the matter further as he was convinced the British service chiefs' point that once the Soviets got troops established permanently in the Straits, even in association with other powers, they would soon dominate the whole area and would not be easy to remove. Therefore, Sargent warned British delegates in Paris to have a word with the British representatives on the Military Staff Committee, to ensure that they were on the lookout for any move by their Soviet colleagues suggesting the use of Article 43 as a stalking horse for Soviet ambitions in the Straits. 3 In the circumstances, the establishment of a UNO base in the Straits area would appear to be from the British point of view, a very speculative proceeding and it recommended that the proposal should not be pursued further. If it was raised by any other power it should be opposed by the British government. 4

1 2 3 4

PRO FO 371/59242, R 9174/52/44, Foreign Office minute, 21 June 1946. FO 371/48698, R 15552/44/44, C.O.S.(45) 573, 11 September 1945. PRO FO 371/59242, R 10006/52/44, Sargent minute, 6 July 1946. PRO FO 371/59242, R 9174/52, Foreign Office minute, 21 June 1946.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

227

Bevin was still envisaging some arrangement whereby the Soviets could help in the control of the Straits without establishing a base there, such as a patrol based on Turkish ports or the Greek Islands. In this regard, during the course of the Defence Committee discussion on British strategic requirements in the Middle East, Bevin said that it might be possible to obtain Soviet agreement on British trusteeship for Cyrenaica, if a settlement could be made about the control of the Dardanelles, in such a way as to allow the USSR to close the Straits in the event of her being attacked, and not leaving this right only to Turkey. 1 However, Bevin's idea did not appear to be worth pursuing, given the Southern Department's opposition. Basing himself on Vinogradov's recent statement that 'what Russia really wanted was joint control of the Straits by the USSR and Turkey', Pinsent saw that Bevin's proposal amounted to the same thing in time of war only. He said 'it is difficult to see how the USSR could join in the control of the Straits unless there was a Soviet base in the Straits in time of war which would be open to the same objections as a Soviet base there in time of peace'. The justification for this was that it would not be difficult for the Soviets to establish themselves there in a dominant position, and permanently. Once a base in time of war were agreed to in principle it would not be difficult to stretch the principle to a base in time of peace. 2

Re-increasing

Soviet

Pressure

After a short break in her war of nerves, the Soviet Union devoted increasing attention to the Middle East area generally, and to Turkey in particular. Sarper was told by the Kremlin that Turkey could not expect any Soviet friendship so long as she remained the satellite of Britain. But if Turkey would give up the alliance with Britain, the USSR would 'contractually' give up all territorial claims on Turkey and give all possible economic assistance. 3 Such a Soviet attitude was interpreted by the Foreign Office as another Soviet effort to convince the Turks that Britain was weak and the Anglo-Turkish alliance worthless. 'What the Soviets now seem to be aiming at is securing Turkish assent to a joint Russo-Turkish plan for the defence of the Straits'. In doing this, Britain believed the Soviet authorities no doubt wished the collapse of the present regime to result and its replacement by 'Soviet puppets'. The British government believed that this manoeuvre was not likely to succeed, as Turkey's confidence in Britain remained high. 4 However, it was a fact that as a result of Soviet pressure Turkey was keeping a 1

PRO FO 371/59225, R 10898/6/44, Cabinet Offices to Foreign Office, no. C.O.S. 871/6 22 Julv 3 1946. ' ^ Ibid. Pinsent minute and Williams minute, 25 July 1945. 3 PRO FO 371/59243, R 10176/52/44, Kelly to Foreign Office, no. 436, 8 July 1946. 4 Ibid. Pinsent minute 19 July and Williams minute, 22 July 1946.

9

228

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

large army mobilised in spite of the strain that this imposed on her economy. Bevin believed that Britain could no longer confine itself to advising the Turks to keep calm, since there was a concentration of some 400,000 Soviet troops distributed along various Turkish frontiers in Bulgaria, Southern Caucasia and Northern Persia. Turkey's independence was of great importance to British interests to defend, with or without the US, to the utmost of Britain's ability. However, Bevin concluded that 'we should continue to encourage the Americans to support Turkey against Soviet claims; we should make it plain to the Soviets that we are prepared to defend Turkish independence and integrity; we should let the Turks know what we have said to the Soviets'. 1 However, this was beyond Britain's capability. Indeed, when Turkey asked for aircraft at a low price Kelly believed that 'it was as much in Britain's interest as Turkey's to strengthen the Turkish Air Force since they [sic] could in the last resort come to terms with the Soviets and further compromise the British precarious situation in the Middle East'. However, Britain's inability to supply aircraft at a discount worried him, as he said 'the appearance of bad faith in this matter must affect their general confidence in the value of our alliance'. 2

The Cold War in Effect: the Soviet Note and the Anglo-American

Response

On 8 August 1946 the Soviet government initiated the Straits question officially with a note to Turkey. The note began by citing Turkey's longalleged violation of the Straits Convention during the war when she permitted Italian and German warships to pass through. Referring to the Potsdam agreement regarding 'the revision of the Convention' the proposals made in the note were as follows: 1-The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries and 2- to the warships of the Black Sea Powers at all times. 3-Non-Black Sea powers should not be permitted except in cases specially provided for. 4- The establishment of a new regime under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers. 5- Turkey and the USSR, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, should organise joint means of defence of the Straits for the prevention of the utilisation of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers. 3

1

PRO FO 371/59141, R 7670/52/44, Draft Cabinet Paper: Turkey. PRO FO 371/59242, R 9696/52/44, Kelly to FO, no. 417, 30 June 1946. 3 PRO FO 371/59226, R11782/6/44, Koukin (Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London) to Bevin, no. 130-A, 8 August 1946.

2

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

229

The first three conditions were not much different from those suggested by the US in November 1945. Therefore, there might not be severe objections to these points on a study basis. However, the last two points were an official declaration of Soviet demands which Moscow had already pressured Turkey indirectly to accept. The Soviets' ignoring of the existence of the UN was a sinister element in their note, since it departed f r o m the idea that the Convention should be revised under the aegis of the UN. Furthermore, it was targeted at Turkey; she should be left alone with the Soviets in dealing with the Straits issue and this would provide the USSR with what it had been after for decades. For instance, if Article 4 of the Soviet proposals were accepted, it would exclude the British government and all other non-Black Sea signatories of the Convention from any responsibility for the future regime and would exclude the possibility of American participation. The fifth article would lead to the establishment of a Soviet base in the Straits. Further evidence of the Soviets' attempt to exclude any third party becoming involved in the Straits issue was their reference in the note to the Potsdam conference. Although the Potsdam agreement suggested that 'the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and Turkey', the Soviets intentionally misled Turkey by saying that 'the matter should be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three and Turkey'. Taking these facts into consideration, Wilson despatched his interpretation of the Soviet note which confirmed his earlier remark to the Department that the USSR was not interested in the revision of the Convention. Rather she was seeking a way in which she would close the one remaining gap in the chain of Soviet satellite states f r o m the Baltic to the Black Sea. He suggested that 'Turkish independence had become a vital interest to the US'. If Turkey fell under Soviet control 'the last barrier would be removed in the way of Soviet advance to the Persian Gulf and Suez...Turkey represent a great asset in the struggle to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East and we should not permit this asset to be frittered away'. 1 The Turkish government was not surprised by the Soviet note; it had even expected much worse. But it was still of the opinion that the Soviet note proposed a totally new regime rather than a revision. In his consultations with Kelly, Erkin considered that, in choosing the date for the Soviet note, Moscow had applied the procedure of Article 29 of the Convention. 2 While technically the Soviet request for a revision should be supported by two other powers, Turkey would be prepared to agree to a conference for revision if Turkish

1

FRUS, The Near East and Africa, p. 837. According to Article 29 of the Montreux Convention, a request for a revision had to be notified in detail to signatories three months prior to 9 November 1946 — the date the treaty came into force — after the lapse of a five year period; this date, 9 August was 3 months prior to the second 5 year period of the Convention, beginning in 1936. 2

230

T H E T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND T H E G R E A T

POWERS

sovereignty and independence were respected. 1 In other words the Turkish government would accept a conference if proposals 4 and 5 of the Soviet note were excluded. This was what the British government was going to suggest to the Turkish government. However, Bevin advised the Turks, as a condition for a conference on the basis of the Soviet note, to underline to the Soviets that their proposals were directly at variance with the expressed views of some of the governments interested in the Convention and the regime of the Straits. 2 He further suggested to the Turkish authorities to bear in mind in their reply to Moscow that the Soviet proposal had been made on the basis of the agreement reached at Potsdam, not in virtue of Article 29 of the Convention. There is little doubt that the Soviets had intentionally misquoted the Berlin agreement as part of their policy of excluding the Western Powers from the Straits regime and of settling the matter by direct Soviet-Turkish negotiations, regardless of the precise terms of the Convention. 3 At the same time, London advised the Turks that it could be giving an excellent excuse to reject the proposal to deal with the matter by international conference if Turkey refused in advance to discuss their proposals. 4

American Commitment to the Straits The US agreed generally with the points of Turkey and Britain regarding the Soviet note. It stressed that the Straits regime should be based on the purposes and principles of the UN. Furthermore, the State Department was of the opinion that it was essential that the Soviet Union should be made aware at an early date of the objections which the United States and Great Britain entertained towards proposals 4 and 5 of its note to Turkey. Otherwise, the Soviet authorities would be encouraged to think they could engage in dangerous manoeuvring for position which might lead mutatis mutandis to a reproduction in Turkey of the Persian crisis that spring. 5 The American authorities encouraged Turkey, in replying to the Soviets, to take 'a reasonable, but firm attitude'. In the exchange of views between Britain and the US, the latter was ready to give the Turks its full support if Turkey refused to attend a conference to discuss the Straits on the basis of the fourth and fifth points of the Soviet note. 6 The British government, however, entertained 1 RG Decimal File 1945-49,767.68119/8-1246, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 856, 12 August 1946, PRO FO 371/59226, R 1204476/44, Kelly to Foreign Office, no. 573, 15 August 1946. 2 PRO FO 371/59226, R 11937/6/44, Bevin to Kelly, no. 3 , 1 3 August 1946. 3 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12137/6/44, Warner to Cevat Açikalin, 15 August 1946. 4 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12044/6/44, Foreign Office to Paris, no. 922, 15 August 1946. 5 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12022/6/44, Lord Inverchapel (Washington) to Foreign Office, no. 5144, 14 August 1946, PRO FO 371/59226, R 12127/6/44, Bevin (an account of his talk with Byrnes in Paris) to Foreign Office, no. 517, 16 August 1946. 6 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12186/6/44, Lord Inverchapel to Foreign Office, no. 5200, 16 August 1946.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

231

considerable doubts as to the wisdom of this advice, on the grounds that it might provide the Soviets with a pretext to reject the whole proposal of an international conference. In the face of American encouragement, Kelly felt that such advice would 'be unpalatable to suggest to the Turks'. He wanted to be instructed to tell the Turks that Britain would support them if Turkey nevertheless decided, on the lines of the American suggestion, to throw down the gauntlet in its reply to the Soviet note. He believed that 'for us to oppose strongly and obstinately their own and the US view would shake their confidence in the value of Britain'. 1 On 19 August 1946, when the US government delivered its reply note to the Soviet note to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, it took the British view into consideration and reaffirmed its willingness to participate in a conference to revise the Montreux Convention. In the note, although the US government stated its agreement to the first three proposals of the Soviets, it raised grave objections and disagreement to the rest of Soviet note. 2 The British government also Look a similar line in its reply note to the Soviets on 21 August 1946. 3 In its reply note to the Soviets on 22 August 1946, which was handed to the Soviets after consulting Washington and London, the Turkish government took a reasonably firm attitude. First of all Turkey rejected, with an explanation, in the light of the American memorandum, the Soviet allegation that she permitted German and Italian warships to contravene the Convention and pass through the Straits during the war. The Turkish government recognised that the technical part of the convention regarding the control of vessels in transit was invalidated by new developments in the war and needed to be adapted to modern technical data and conditions. But it could not admit that these facts could serve as a pretext for the rejection of the convention as a whole. 'The Turkish government cannot agree that an extremely limited number of fraudulent transits through the Straits, which moreover were rapidly corrected, could in the whole field of war operations assume such an importance that they had jeopardised the security of the U S S R ' . In the final part, the Turkish note stated that if T u r k e y ' s determination to defend the Straits against any aggressor, 'as history proved', 1

PRO FO 371/59227, R 12199/6/44, Kelly to Foreign Office, no. 586, 17 August 1946. The US note continued by stating that the fourth proposal envisaged not a revision of the Convention but the establishment of a new regime confined to Turkey and other Black Sea powers. The US government could not agree with this, as it considered the Straits regime was the concern of other powers as well, including the US. As to the fifth proposal, the US government considered that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defence of the Straits. If the Straits should be threatened by attack the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would be a matter for the Security Council of the UN. FRUS, The Near East and Africa, p. 847. Meanwhile, Turkey was holding her breath over the US reply to the Soviets, since it would be a determining factor for further Soviet action. Inonii said he could not sleep the whole night until he learned the American reply. After hearing it, he was absolutely delighted, like the rest of the Turkish authorities. See Metin Toker, Tiirkiye Uzerinde 1945 Kabusu (Ankara: Akis Yaymlari, 1971), p. 105. 3 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12808/6/44, Bevin to Koukin, 21 August 1946.

232

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

still seemed improbable to the USSR, with its fears of an attack in the Black Sea as a result of aggression coming from the Mediterranean through the Straits, 'the Soviet government should have recourse to the efficacy of the UN to which Turkey for her part remained firmly attached'. 1 Moreover, Washington made it clear to Ankara that the US would take the gravest view of a Soviet threat to force the issue by limiting the question to the Black Sea Powers. The American government itself took a firm attitude into consideration. In this respect, Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs and one of the US delegates in Paris, informed Dixon on 17 August that the US government from the president downwards viewed the situation with great seriousness. 'If there was a threat to Turkey, they would go all the w a y ' . 2 Indeed, the US authorities were willing to commit themselves fully on the Straits question. Henderson, Head of Near Eastern Department, told Balfour, British Minister at Washington, that the US meant business in the Straits question since not being a party to the Convention she had particular reason for leaving the Soviets under no illusion that US was resolved to participate in the new regime and to make it clear from the outset where it stood regarding the Soviet note. 3 Truman, in spite of the political disadvantages and dangers which had been pointed out to him by his advisers, decided to take a very firm line in the face of any Soviet aggression towards Turkey. When the appropriate military authorities had debated the matter with the President, it had been made clear to Truman that there were two courses open to him: first to 'fiddle about on the fringes of the question as the United States Government were doing about the Polish Elections, and second to take the matter in all seriousness and to make it plain to the Soviets that the United States government did so'. The State Department and War Department had advocated the second course, but had warned the President that if he took it he might find himself any day 'up to the neck in boiling water'. The President had not flinched from this uncomfortable possibility and the policy recommended by the two Departments was now taking its course. 4

1 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12728/6/44, 'Text of Turkish reply to the Soviet note regarding the Revision of the Montreux Convention'. 2 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12158/6/44, Bevin in Paris to Kelly, no. 5, 17 August 1946. 3 PRO FO 371/59226, R 12186/6/44, Lord Inverchapel to Foreign Office, no. 5200, 16 August 1946. 4 59227, R 12309/6/44, Lord Inverchapel to Foreign Office, 'an account of his talk with Acheson', no. 5266, 20 August 1940; Milles, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 192. When General Eisenhower asked the President whether it was sufficiently clear that this course might lead to war, Truman explained the strategic importance of the area and said that the US should be prepared to keep it free of Soviet domination. See Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and the US Policy (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 245.

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

233

The American authorities believed that the USSR, ignoring the UN and Montreux concept of Straits control, had made a formal proposal to Turkey for a bilateral agreement regarding the joint defence of the Straits. A memorandum presented to Truman on 15 August by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, stated that once the Soviets established themselves in the Straits, they would use their forces in order to obtain control over Turkey. It was accepted by the top US authorities that if the USSR succeeded in her objective of obtaining control over Turkey, it would be extremely difficult to prevent the USSR from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East, including the Eastern Mediterranean, and in those areas being cut off from the Western World. 'When the USSR obtained full mastery of this territory, which is strategically important from the point of view of resources, and communications, it will be in a much stronger position to obtain her objectives in India and China'. The final part of the memorandum seemed to establish a foundation for the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Accordingly, it was feared that the Turkish determination to fight against the Soviets would suffer without assurances of support from the US. The only thing which would deter the USSR was the conviction that the US was prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with force of arms. 1 Truman agreed on all these points. The JCOS also stressed the identical approach regarding the Soviet threat against Turkey and the Middle East in general. Admiral Leahy emphasised the fact that strategically Turkey was the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the only thing for Turkey now was to possess a firm resolution to oppose the apparent Soviet policy of expansion in the area. Admiral Leahy observed: 'if the Soviets attained military dominance of Turkey by political concessions, [s/c] her military threat is projected so that there is grave doubt that, in case of a major world crisis, the Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean could be considered militarily tenable for the non-Soviet Powers'. The Soviet success over the Straits would have a grave effect on the faith not only of Turkey but also the rest of the countries in the region. Keeping this point in mind, successful resistance against the Soviet efforts over Turkey would rest on the continuation of the will of the Turkish authorities and nations to take a firm stand against Soviet demands. In doing so, Turkey should be encouraged by the US government to improve her military situation by means of allowing Turkey to purchase from the US military craft and other military equipment in order to strengthen the defensive ability of the Turkish armed forces. 2

1

RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119/8-1546, Acheson to Byrnes, no. 4122, 15 August 1946. FRUS, The Near East and Africa, p. 857.

2

234

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Yet despite the current indignation over Yugoslavia, it was very doubtful if the American public realised that war was possible or was psychologically prepared for it. London had doubts as to whether the President could convince Congress and American public opinion to take firmer measures which could lead to war. If the USSR put enough pressure on the Turkey to make it willing to compromise the US could be expected to protest loudly and bring the matter before the United Nations. But action beyond words was very questionable. As Rundall said: 'I doubt they would send an ultimatum. Flagrant aggression might provoke one, but I do not think that we should count on it'. 1 On the contrary, the Truman administration did not ignore public opinion but questioned whether the American public could understand the nature of the Soviet threat posed on the Straits. Forrestal therefore recommended setting in motion machinery to explain why the government was prepared to make such a commitment. Accordingly, Acheson told newspaper reporters that his government viewed the matter very seriously and asked them to make this soberly manifest in their titles. Then the media launched a campaign to explain to the attentive public their sense that the dispute over the Straits was the central subject of overall rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets. 2 Subsequent developments in the American attitude towards Turkey made the Foreign Office prediction wrong. Against the background of the Allies' accusation that Turkey violated the Convention by permitting the passage of Axis vessels through the Straits during the war (see chapter 4), as part of the strategic concept of their policy when Moscow raised the issue, both Washington and London now advocated the true nature of Ankara's application of the Convention. Accordingly, the State Department stated that in 1941 and 1942 the Turks were in an extremely difficult position, and Menemencioglu insisted on a strict juridical interpretation of questions arising under the Convention and was careful during this period to favour neither side. Jones, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, pointed out that when the Allies protested to the Turkish government regarding the Axis vessels disguised as merchantmen, Menemencioglu examined each protest in the light of the terms of the Convention and acted in accordance with these terms. It was claimed that Turkey halted the Italian vessels and prevented the passage of Vichy French vessels. When disguised German merchant vessels, which had guns hidden

1 PRO FO 371/59227, R 12306/6/66, Rundall Minute, 26 August 1946. Despite much British aid during the war, Tito was looking to advance his interests by a thorough and ultra-communist line. In 1945 New Zealand forces had excluded theYugoslavs from Trieste, an Italian port with a Slav hinterland; in 1946 Yugoslavia and the USSR pushed hard, though unavailingly, for it in connection with the Italian peace treaty, Yugoslavia reinforcing its pressure by shooting down two US supply planes en route for Austria. Dunbabin, The Cold War, p. 82. 2 Ibid. pp. 192-93. Also see Melvyn P. Leffler, 'Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO', The Journal of American History, Vol. 71, no. 4, 1985, p. 812.

AMERICA

C O M M I T T E D

235

below deck, passed through the Straits in June 1944 the Allied protest caused Menemencioglu to resign. But even in this case, Jones claimed, the Allied protest had to rest largely on the spirit and not the letter of the Convention. In general the Turks in the period of Axis ascendancy were stiffly correct, favouring neither side; as Allied fortunes rose, so the Turks interpreted the Convention more and more to favour the Allies. When German troops were cleared from the Greek Islands, thus making possible the use of the Straits as a supply route to the USSR, the Turkish government greeted the first Allied ships with an enthusiastic communiqué welcoming their use of the Straits in the Allied cause. 1 The British government's view also coincided with Washington's: 'the Turks did operate the matter constitutionally and on the whole in a matter satisfactory to the British government'. 2

The Second Soviet Note As things stood, in his analysis of Soviet policy Roberts did not assume that the Soviets would agree to participate in a conference on the terms proposed. Nor did the general political and military position of the USSR at present seem to be sufficiently favourable to have justified the Soviets, supposing that they would be able to bluff or threaten the Western Powers into agreeing to their proposals for a predominant share in the control of the Straits, unless they could feel certain that unilateral action would not lead to a major war. But they were aware of growing American interest in the question. Rather they would prefer to leave things as they were for the present and to continue the war of nerves until circumstances favoured a further turn of the screw on the Turks. 3 Turkey also had identical views. Saka stated to Wilson that the Soviets might have thought that the presentation of their proposals so soon after the formation of a new Turkish government might shake the position of that government and cause it to adopt a rather more favourable attitude than Turkey had adopted in the past. 4 The Soviet government reiterated its position on 24 September, elaborating on its proposals for a new regime and joint defence and noted the Potsdam agreement concerning the Straits. The second Soviet note seemed slightly milder than the one before with more reference to the Convention. In their reply the Turkish government, however, insisted more on point 5 of the note than on point 4 and stressed the special situation of the Black Sea as a closed sea. 5 1 2 3 4 5

RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49,767.68119/8-746, Jones to Henderson, 9 August 1946. PRO FO 371/59230, R 14992/6/44, Pinsent to Williams, 9 October 1946. PRO FO 371/59227, R 12306/4/44, Roberts to Foreign Office, no. 2714, 20 August 1946. RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49,767.68119/9-946, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 965, 9 September 1946. FRUS, The Near East and Africa, p. 860.

236

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

In an exchange of views with Britain in Paris regarding their reply note to the Soviets, the Americans were of the opinion that it would be a mistake on the part of Britain and the US to advocate the holding of a conference, or to advise Turkey to do so in its reply to the USSR. They did not believe that the Soviets seriously desired a genuine revision of the Convention, nor did they think that the Turkish government would agree to advocate the holding of a conference. In their view, therefore, it was best that the Three Powers should confine themselves to repeating their readiness to attend a Conference, leaving it to the Soviets to propose holding one. 1 At this point, in an exchange of views between London, Washington and Ankara, while the US was taking a firmer position against the Soviets, Britain still seemed to be seeking a way in which the question could be settled by the 'continuation of direct Turkish-Soviet negotiations'. There is little doubt this had an unsettling effect on Turkish foreign policy-makers. 2 As a result of Turkey's grave objection on this point, the Foreign Office tried to make its proposal milder, suggesting that the 'two capitals should have communications rather than negotiations'. Erkin told Kelly that one could not distinguish the differences between communication and negotiation; in the past, one had always turned into the other. As a matter of fact, these terms had already created a great deal of controversy between the three and the Soviets. Therefore, Turkey made an effort to convince London that if such negotiations took place they would face a Soviet fait accompli since Moscow would impose acceptance of points 4 and 5 of the Soviet notes on Turkey. It might be true that the British attitude was influenced by the Americans' unconditional support of Turkey for her willingness to stand firm. 3 After a talk with Byrnes in Paris, Bevin agreed on the same terms along with Washington and Ankara. Thus the three governments adopted an identical reply on the lines of the previous one to the Soviet's second note. But in its note to the Soviets on 9 October, Britain expressed an idea to the effect that the process of the Potsdam agreement had been completed by the exchange of views between the three capitals and Turkey. Therefore, the British government 'saw no need for, or purpose in, continuing direct correspondence on the subject'. Any further discussion of this problem should take place at an international conference. 4 In an address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, inonii declared his conviction that the Convention was applied by Turkey with the greatest attention to its impartial application during the war, and the Soviet allegation to the effect that it had been applied with a bias in 1

PRO FO 371/59229, R 14826/6/44, Bevin to Foreign Office, no. 881, 7 October 1946. PRO FO 371/59228/6/66, Foreign Office to Bevin, no. 1802, 8 October 1946. 3 Erkin stated that Wilson and even Byrnes from Washington via Bursley, his First Secretary, asked on more than one occasion if there was anything which they could do to help in this matter. Erkin, Turk-Sovyet ili§kileri, pp. 306-7. 4 FRUS, The Near East and Africa, p. 876. 2

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

237

favour of the Axis Powers was manifestly unjust. Then he stated that 'we have nothing to fear from submitting our actions to examination and decisions by arbitration'. 1 Probably because of the nature of the British note, Moscow replied only to Britain to the effect that the Soviet government was of the opinion that it would be 'premature to consider at the time the question of calling a conference to establish a new regime for the Black Sea Straits'. 2 Britain did not officially reply to the note to Moscow, but Bevin reiterated his earlier view in the House of Commons on 28 October. Turkey was of the opinion that the Soviets would reply to Washington in a couple of months followed by Ankara; in other words, that this was a matter of Soviet tactics to keep the Straits issue alive. Turkey was also not willing to maintain discussion with the Soviets since doing so would serve the Soviet purpose by exciting Turkish fears and attempting to settle the question by bilateral negotiations. When the new Ambassador, Faik Ziihni Akdur, left for Moscow, the Turkish authorities instructed him, if the question was raised not to take any initiative regarding the Straits, in order not to fall into the Soviet trap as Sarper had. In this respect, his mission was simply to report what was said without engaging in any discussion. 3 However, although the US and Britain took a firm attitude against the Soviet note, Britain's ability to maintain her influence in Greece in the face of communist activities and the economic difficulties in Turkey (bccause of the Turkish army's mobilisation against the Soviet threat) was becoming more doubtful in the autumn 1946. Despite the fact that a communist victory in Greece would terminate Britain's control of the Eastern Mediterranean, and hence put at risk her Middle Eastern strategic interests, the British government, unable to meet the cost of British troops there, began their withdrawal on 15 September. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, warned that any extension of aid to Greece after the end of March 1947 would imperil Britain's own finances. Bevin accepted the idea of withdrawal, but he was not prepared to lose Britain's position of influence in either Greece or Turkey. Therefore, London turned to Washington asking for assistance to strength the Greek army and to aid Turkey. 1 RG 59 General Records the State Department, Division of Historical Policy Research and its predecessors, Special Studies and Reports 1944-50, Box no. 7, 1 November 1946. 2 PRO FO 371/59231, R 15753/6/44, Peterson to Foreign Office, no. 3431, 28 October 1946. In the House of Commons speech on 28 October, while recognising that a revision of the Convention was necessary, Bevin stated that the British government was anxious to keep the international aspects of the Straits waterway in mind and consequently disagreed with the Soviet view on the procedure for revising the Convention as well as on the manner of guaranteeing the security of the waterway. The British view now was that the direct exchanges of view on the Straits question provided for by the Potsdam agreements had come to an end and thus any further discussion should take place at an international conference called for that purpose. House of Commons, Fifth Series Vol 427 ec 1494-95. ' ' 3

RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49, 701.6761/11-2546, Wilson to Byrnes, no. 1209, 25 November 1946.

238

THE T U R K I S H STRAITS AND THE GREAT

POWERS

The US Take-over in the Middle East Based on the JCOS memorandum on 23 August, a memorandum was prepared by Jernegan, Assistant Chief of Division in the Near Eastern Department, and became US government policy after it was approved by Byrnes and Acheson in early November 1946. In this memorandum Jenegan stressed the fact that these moves of Moscow were designed to weaken Turkey with the objective of bringing her under the direct influence of the USSR and enabling the USSR to use Turkey both as a defence against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean and as a springboard for political and military expansion into the Mediterranean and the Near and the Middle East. It was suggested that the US should maintain the firm position that it had already taken with regard to the Straits, even for the remaining issues regarding Turkey, such as her eastern provinces. 'The Turks, the Soviets and the world at large should be left in no doubt whatsoever as to our stand with regard to such a question'. 1 In the end, however, the US assumed that Britain had an obligation to provide the necessary military equipment to improve Turkish military capability. But if a case should arise where Britain was not in a position to furnish the necessary supplies, the US government was prepared to consider the possibility of furnishing such supplies to the Turks. 2 Indeed, the long-term Soviet pressure on Turkey had created a huge economic burden because of maintaining a large military establishment and the possibility of mobilisation against the threats. If this went on, as Erkin told Wilson, the 'future looks dreary indeed for Turkey'. Therefore Turkey was seeking a way, but still within the bounds of Turkish independence and sovereignty, to pursue a middle way with the Soviets — for instance, a regional agreement between the US, Britain, the USSR and Turkey for defence of the Straits in wartime. 3 It was very doubtful if Moscow would give it a thought, but it proved that Turkey might be forced to come to terms with the Soviets if she were left alone. Walter Bedell Smith, the US Ambassador to Moscow, also warned of persistent Soviet ambitions in Turkey, saying that 'Turkey has little hope of independent survival unless it is assured of solid long term American and British support'. Soviet policy with respect to Turkey was motivated not only by considerations of security, but also by an urge to gain independent access to the Mediterranean and the Arab World and by determination to sever the British Empire artery to Suez. To the Kremlin, the Ambassador said, 'Turkey represents both a corridor for attack on the USSR and an obstacle to the 1

FRUS, The Near East and Africa, p. 895. Ibid. p. 896. RG 59 Decimal File 1945-49, 761.67/12-3046, Wilson to Secretary of State, no. 1293, 30 December 1946.

2 3

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

239

achievement of Soviet objectives. The USSR will therefore not feel that it has either achieved security for her south-western frontiers or made a solid advance in the course of Near Eastern aggression until it dominates Turkey'. 1 At the same time, however, London informed Washington on 21 February 1947 that because of internal economic difficulties it would have to suspend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. London asked the Americans to take over her responsibilities. The Americans responded, as the US was already prepared for it, with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine which was the name of aid programmes to Greece and Turkey. 2 On 12 Mach 1947 Truman requested authorisation from the US Congress to extend military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey amounting to $400 million dollars for the period ending on 30 June 1948. Thereafter, Turkey's place in the Cold War concept was more crystallised in the form adopted in the JCOS memorandum: In peacetime Turkey holds a key position with respect both to the Middle East and to the A r a b world generally. T u r k e y ' s determination to stand up to Soviet pressure and the western democratic ability to support her will prove a test case to all Middle East countries. If the USSR dominates Turkey in peacetime it is highly probable that all the Middle East countries would then come rapidly under similar Soviet domination. If the USSR can absorb Turkey in peace our ability to defend the Middle East in war will be virtually destroyed. In war Turkey presents a natural barrier to an advance by the USSR to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East countries, Palestine in particular. 3 The State-War and Navy Co-ordinating Committee also added that it was important to maintain Turkish economic well-being so that social unrest would not open the way for Soviet-Communistic penetration. 4 Consequently, the Truman Doctrine manifested that Turkey was not left out of the western sphere of interest to face international isolation and an exposed position in relation to any future Soviet demands. Since tension between the West and Soviets was increasing particularly following political concessions in favour of Moscow in Eastern Europe, suggestions were offered to Truman by many quarters. For instance, Grenville 1

FRUS, The Near East and Africa, pp. 2-3. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-48 (New York: Norton & Company, 1977), pp. 279-291. 3 R G 59, Decimal File 1945-49 (Microfilm no. M 1292 Roll no. 2), 867.00/3-1347, JCOS memorandum 'Military Assistance to Turkey', 13 March 1947. 4 RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, 867.00/5-1247 no. SWNCC 358/1, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee: Survey of US Assistance to Turkey, 28 April 1947. 2

240

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Clark, a prominent Wall Street lawyer and World Federalist wrote to Truman that the internationalisation of Middle Eastern oils, the Turkish Straits, Gibraltar, Panama and Suez might be a starting point. In response, Truman did not incline to seek terms with Moscow in this sense because he had already tried it at the Potsdam Conference. He had no confidence whatsoever in Moscow's good faith saying that, 'I do not know what people expect from governments represented by Molotov, Vishinky and Gromyko who are under the influence of Peter the Great'. 1 No matter how true his belief was, this reflected Truman's determination to go all the way with the Soviets. The Soviet authorities condemned the American military assistance which it said was targeted to attack the USSR. 2 It was arguable that in the case of a Soviet military attack on Turkey, as a result of her engagement with the West, the US would respond in a military sense. However, it was important for Turkey to receive such support against the threat coming from the USSR for years, even centuries. Because of her potential utility in any war waged either in the Mediterranean or the Middle East, Turkey had become a member of NATO, along with Greece, on 12 February 1952. This followed the dangerous escalation at the Cold War when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. In the mean time, the USSR officially had not raised again the revision of the Convention after October 1946. It could have done so in accordance with Article 29 of the Convention, but, in spite of some unofficial voices, the Soviet Union made no effort to raise it in 1951. However, the Soviet threat was seen as still unchanged. On the eve of Turkey's entry into NATO, General Bradley, Chairman of the American JCOS, emphasised the military significance of Greece and Turkey to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate. He said: '...Turkey, astride the Bosporus and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south. Turkey, too, flanks the land routes from the North to the strategically important oil fields of the Middle East'. 3 In the meantime, the Soviet Union made some communication to Turkey on 30 May 1953 in the sense that Moscow renounced its claim on the eastern part of Turkey but the Kremlin seemed somehow to retain a wish to control the Straits stating that 'it is possible to protect Soviet security regarding the Straits on terms equally acceptable both to the USSR and 1 J. Garry Clifford, 'President Truman and Peter the Great's Will', Diplomatic History, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1980, pp. 372-73. 2 Leffler, Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War, p. 825. 3 Quoted from Harry N. Howard, 'The Turkish Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects', Balkan Studies, 1970, Vol. 11, no. l , p . 51. For Turkish entry into NATO and AngloAmerican security interests and Turkey's interests, see Akavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey-AngloAmerican Security Interests 1945-52 (London: Frank Cass, 1999); George McGhee, The USTurkish-NATO Middle East Connection (London: Macmillan, 1990).

A M E R I C A

C O M M I T T E D

241

Turkey'. 1 In its reply, Ankara expressed satisfaction with the renunciation of territorial claims but reminded Moscow that the Convention was still in force. 2 The USSR, however, did not attempt to denounce the Convention, though she was in a position to do so in 1954 in accordance with Article 28. Turkey kept her unique position in the Western Security System during the whole Cold War period. The Straits were of particular importance in the Cold War for neutralising the Soviet submarine threat in the Mediterranean. For instance, Richard Perle, American Assistant Secretary for National Security, emphasised on 13 March 1987 in a press conference the fact that if the Turkish Straits are not controlled by the Alliance in the event of war the Soviet Black Sea Fleet could move freely into the Mediterranean where it could expect to engage naval forces of the N A T O alliance, including the American 6 t h Fleet and in those circumstances we think we would suffer catastrophic losses. So it is very much in the interest of the security of the West to keep the largest Soviet Black Sea Fleet from having free access in wartime into the Mediterranean. 3 The Missouri visit to Istanbul and the American response to the Soviet note was evidence of the American acceptance of their new found interests in Turkey and the Near East in general. Taking account of British inability to implement their responsibilities in the Middle East against Soviet aggression, Washington took over Britain's obligations in the case of a Soviet attack on the Straits; from the President down it was decided to mobilise all possible means. Reaching such a critical decision, the IJS might have been influenced by the British diplomatic initiative. However, in the end it seems it was rather their own evaluation of Soviet objectives for the post-war period in which the West would conflict eventually with the Soviets as witnessed in Eastern European and Balkan affairs, than what was happening in the Straits and Greece. Therefore, the Truman administration decided to confront the Soviets in the Straits if the latter decided to threaten them. Thus the strategic and ideological boundaries of the Cold War in the Near East were shaped. During the whole Cold War period Turkey maintained her special position in the Western security system against the USSR as she had a special mission to fulfil within NATO: keeping the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, in the event of war, from having free access into the Mediterranean. Despite the inefficiency of the Montreux Convention, in particular the passage of auxiliary 1 Peter V. Curl (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953, Molotov's statement regarding Soviet Territorial Claims against Turkey, 30 May 1953, pp. 165-66. 2 Ibid. Statement by Turkish government regarding to Molotov's Statement, 18 July 1953. National Archives, RG 306-FP-187, Foreign Press Centre Briefings Press conference of Richard N. Perle, 13 March 1987.

242

THE T U R K I S H S T R A I T S AND THE GREAT P O W E R S

vessels, under 100 tons, as experienced in the war, no conference had been called for a modification. Although the difference in size and speed between modern vessels and those dating to the time of the Convention was enormous as far as the passage of war vessels was concerned, Montreux was still in operation but became a dead letter. In this respect, this study has shown that strategic and military considerations played a vital role behind the policies of Soviet and Western countries during the post-war discussions other than the necessity of revision of the Convention in accordance with the new conditions created by the time. Turkish sovereignty and complete control over the Straits therefore has remained intact since 1936 within the limits of the Montreux Convention. However, as far as the passage of merchant vessels was concerned, technological advancements introduced new problems, such as environmental safety and pollution. When the Convention was adopted there were no gas carriers or chemical carriers with all what that implies for a toxic disaster. Turkey has the right to exercise her regulatory and policing powers over the Turkish Straits in accordance with the Montreux Convention and international law regarding the maritime regulations developed since the 1970s. Therefore, a new set of regulations regarding maritime traffic through the Turkish Straits was put into effect by Turkey on 1 July 1994 in order to enhance the navigational and environmental safety and security in the Straits. However, Greece and Russia have opposed the regulations on the grounds that they are in violation of the provisions for freedom of navigation and passage as stipulated in the Montreux Convention. It seems that in the post-cold war era the Straits question gained a new aspect— pollution and environment safety— which still is waiting for a solution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES Public Record ADM 116 CAB 21, 122 FO 371 FO 954 FO 1011 PREM 3 WO 201 National RG 59

RG 306 RG 313 RG 319

Office, London Admiralty and Secretariat Papers Cabinet Papers Foreign Office General Correspondence after 1906 Political Avon Papers Loraine Papers Operational Papers of the Prime Minister's Office Military' Headquarters Papers: Middle East Forces

Archives,

Maryland

General Records of the Department of State Decimal File 1940 44 and 1945-49 Microfilm no. M 1292 Records of Harley A. Notter File 1939-45 Division of Historical Policy Research and its Predecessors Record of the Foreign Press Centre Briefings Records of the Naval Operating Forces Records of Army Staffs of the Army

ATASE (Turkish Military Archive),

Ankara

Kutu (box) nos. 3-6: Ikinci Dilnya Harbi Kolleksiyonu Private

Papers

Avon Papers (held in the special section in the main library, University of Birmingham) Churchill Papers (held in Churchill College, University of Cambridge) Cunningham Papers (held in British Library) Knatchbull-Hugessen Papers (held in Churchill College, University of Cambridge) Piercy I .online Papers (held in Public Record Office)

244

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT

Published

Collections

of

POWERS

Documents

Aspinall-Oglander, C. F. & Becks, A. F. History of the Great War: Based on Official Documents: Gallipoli: Military Operations, Vol. I-II (London: Willkan Heinemann Ltd, 1932). The Cunningham Papers, Vol. I: The Mediterranean Fleet, 1939-1942 (Hants: Ashgate, 1999. Curtis, Monica (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1938, (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), Vol. 1, pp. 284-286. Degras, Jane (ed.), Documents from the Archive of the German Foreign Office: Nazi Soviet Relations, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, 19331941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953). Documents on British Foreign Policy, series III, Vol. IV Foreign Relations of the United States House of Commons Official Reports Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. X, XI, XII, XIII Healds, Stephen (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1937, (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). Rapport Annuel sur le Mouvement des Navires à Travers les Détroits Turcs 'Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits signed at Montreux on 20 July 1936' (Ankara: République de Turquie Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1997). Sontag, Raymond James and Beddie, James Stuart (eds.), Nazi-Soviet relation, 1939-1941 : Documents from the Archive of German Foreign Office (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973) Treaties and Other Documents to the Black Sea, The Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus: 1535-1877 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1953). Türkiye Dili Politikasmda 50: Yil Ikinci Dünya Sava§i Yillan 1939-1946, (Ankara: T.C. Disi^lcri Bakanligi Aragtirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlügü, 1973). Türk Di§ Politikasmda 50. Yil: Montreux ve Sava§ Öncesi Yillan (1935-1939), (Ankara: T.C. Di§i§leri Bakanligi Aragtirma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlügü, 1973). www.winstonchurchill.org/senews.htm, 'Complete Speeches of Winston Churchill: Sinews of Peace'. Newspapers Aksam Cumhuriyet Gece Postasi New York Times Tan The Times Vakit Yeni Sabah

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary

245

Sources

Alpert, Michael, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Macmillan, 1994). Alvarez, David, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: the United States and Turkey 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkans Studies, 1980). Anderson, Terry H., The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1981). Aras, Tevfik Riijtii, Görü§lerim (Ankara: Tan Basimevi, 1956). Ataöv, Türkkaya, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-45 (Ankara: Ankara Ünivcrsitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1965). Athanassopoulou, Akavi, Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-52 (London: Frank Cass, 1999). Avon, Lord, The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning (London: Cassel & Company ltd, 1965). Aydemir, §evket Siireyya, Tek Adam, 1938-1950 (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995). Baumont, Maurice, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Yale University Press, 1978). Barker, Elisabeth, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1976). Bloch, Michael, Ribbentrop (London: Bantam Press, 1992). Butler, James (ed.), History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI, part I (London: HMSO, 1984). — Grand Strategy: History of the Second World War, September 1939-June 1941,Vol. II London HMSO, 1957). Cattell, David T., Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Los Angeles: University of California, 1957). Churchill, Winston, Closing the Ring (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1952). — The Hinge of Fate (London & Co. Ltd., 1951). — The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell Ltd., 1983). Collier, Basil, The Battle of Britain (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1962). Creveld, Martin L. Van, Hitler's Strategy: The Balkan Clue, 1940-1941, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Curtright, Lynn H., Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan States, August 1914 to the Inception of the Dardanelles Campaign (ThesSaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986). Dallin, David J., Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). Danilov, Vilademir, 'Kemalism and World Peace', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergün Özbudun (eds.), Atatürk: the founder of the modern state (London, C. Hurst & Company, 1981).

246

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Deluca, Anthony R., Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: the Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936 (New York: East European Monographs, 1981). Denniston, Robin, Churchill's Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the Foreign Office and Turkey (Stroud: Sutton publishing, 1997). Deringil, Selim, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Dilks, David (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945 (London: Cassell, 1971). Dixon, Piers, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1968). Donovan, Robert J., Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 194548 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977). Dontas, Donna Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits, Lemnos and Sammothrace (Athens: G. C. Eleftheroudakis S.A., 1987). Dunbabin, J. P. D., The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies (London: Longman, 1994). Dunn, Walter Scott, Second Front Now, 1943 (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1980). Erkin, Feridun Cemal, Di.sislerinde 34 Yd: Anilar-Yorumlar, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1980). — 'Tiirk-Sovyet ili§kileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Bajnur Matbaasi, 1968). Esenwein, George and Shubert, Adrian, Spain at War: the Spanish Civil War in Context 1931-1939 (London: Longman, 1995). Evans, Stephen F., The Slow Rapprochement Britain and Turkey in the Age of Mustafa Kemal, 1919-38 (London, The Eothen Press, 1982). Farah, Caesar E., The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861 (London: I. B. Taruis Publishes, 2000). Feis, Herbert, Between War and Peace: the Potsdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). — From Trust to Terror: the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York: Norton & Company, 1970). Fuchser, Larry William, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement (New York: Norton and Company, 1982). Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VII, 1945-1965: Never Despair (London: Heinemann, 1988). — (ed.), The Straits of War: Gallipoli Remembered (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000). Goldstein, Erik, British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Conference, 1916-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

247

Gorodetsky, Gabriel, Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940-42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). — Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German invasion of Russia (London: Yale University Press, 1999). Gönltibol, Mehmet and Sar, Cem, Atatürk ve TUrkiye'nin Dig Politikasi 1919-1938 (Ankara: Gün Ofset Ltd., 1997). Gökay, Bülent, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997). Graves, P. P., The Question of the Straits (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1931). Harbutt, Fräser J., The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Hathaway, Robert M., Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York: Columbia University, 1981). Herken, Gregg, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-50 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). Hitchens, Marilynn Giroux, Germany, Russia, and the Balkans: Prelude to the NaziSoviet Non-Aggression Pact (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). Higgins, Trumbull, Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1963). Howard, Harry N., The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (New York: Howard Pertig, 1966). — Turkey, the Straits and the US Policy (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). Howard, Michael, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV (London: HMSO, 1972). Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948). James, Robert Rhodes (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 18971963 (London: Chelsea House Publisher, 1974). — Anthony Eden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1986). Jelavich, Barbara, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers and the Straits Question, 1870-1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). Kennan, George F., Memoirs 1925-1950 (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1968). Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies Europe, 1943 to 1946 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Kent, John, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993). Kitching, Carolyn J., Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament 19191934 (London: Routledge, 1999). Knatchbull-Hugessen, Hughe, Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray, 1949). Kolka, Gabriel, The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-1945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).

248

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Kuniholm, Bruce Robcllct, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). — 'The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952 (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1984). Lafeber, Walter, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1975 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976). Laffin, John, Damn the Dardanelles! The Agony of Gallipoli (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1989). Lawlor, Sheila, Churchill and the Politics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Lenczowski, George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972). Macfie, A. L., The Straits Question, 1908-1936 (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 1993). Mango, Andrew, Ataturk (London: John Murray, 1999). Mastny,Vojtech, Russia's Road to the Cold War; Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). — The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Medlicott, W. N., The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlemet, 1878-80 (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1938). Mee, Charles L., Meeting at Potsdam (Norfolk: Lowe & Brydone, 1975). Messer, Robert L., The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982). McGhee, George, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (London: Macmillan, 1990). Miller, Geoffrey, Straits: British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign (Hull: The University of Hull Press, 1997). Millis, Walter (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (London: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1952). Milman, Brock The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934-1940 (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988). Millman, Richard, Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1979). Monroe, Elisabeth, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964). Moorehead, Alan, Gallipoli (London: Hamis Hamilton, 1956). Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfrd A. Knopf, 1965). Munch-Petersen, Thomas, The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain, Sweden and the Iron Ore Question 1939-40 (Stockholm: Militarhistoriska Forlaget, 1981). Nadeau, Remi, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (New York: Praeger, 1990).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

249

North, John, Gallipoli: The Fading Vision (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1936). Northedge F. S., The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946 (Leicester: Leicester University Press: 1986). Ovendale, Ritchie, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 19451951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984). Papen, Franz von, Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch, 1952). Papastratis, Procopis, British Policy Towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Parker, R. A. C., Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Pechatnov, Vladimir O., The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-war Relations with the US and Great Britain (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Centre, 1995). Penn,Geoffrey, Fisher, Churchill and the Dardanelles (Barnsley: Lee Cooper, 1999). Pratt, Lawrence R., East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Puryear, Vernon John, England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931). Rendel, George, The Sword and the Olive: Recollection of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service, 1913-1945 (London: John Murray, 1957). Roberts, Geoffrey, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War; Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941 (London: Macmillan, 1995). Robertson, Esmonde M., Mussolini as Empire-Builder: Europe and Africa 1923-36 (London, The Macmillan Press, 1977). Robertson, John, Turkey and Allied Strategy, 1941-45 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986). Roothwcll, Victor, Britain and the Cold War 1941-47 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), p.227. Sevostyanov, Pavel, Before the Nazi Invasion: Soviet Diplomacy in September 1939-June 1941 (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1984). Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950). Shotwell, James T. and Deak, Francis, Turkey at the Straits: A Short History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940). Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish National Movement (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1975). Steel, Nigel, The Battlefields of Gallipoli (London: Leo Cooper, 1990). Taubman, William, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York: Norton & Company, 1982). Taker, Metin, Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kabusu (Ankara: Akis Yaymlari, 1971). Ulam, Adam B., The Rivals; America and Russia since World War II (London: Allen Lane, 1971).

250

THE TURKISH

STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Uran, Hilmi, Hatiralarim (Ankara: Tan Basimevi, 1959). Vali, Ferenc A. The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972). Weber, Frank G., The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979). W e i s b a n d , Edward, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Wester-Wemysis, Lord, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd.,). Williams, William Appleman, The Tragedy Dell Publishing, 1972).

of American

Diplomacy

(New York,

Woodward, Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970). Zhivkova, Ludmila, Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1933-1936 (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1976). Articles Bezymensky, Lev and Gorlov, Segrei, 'On the Eve: V. M. Molotov's Discussion in Berlin, November 1940', International Affairs (Moscow), July 1991, pp. 106-122. Bilsel, Cemil, 'The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence', American Journal of International Law, no 41, October 1947, pp.727-747. Bodger, Alan, 'Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire', in Marian Kent (ed.), The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London: Frank Cass, 1984), pp.76-110. Clifford, J. Garry, 'President Truman and Peter the Great's Will', Diplomatic History, Vol. 4, no. 4, 1980, pp. 371-85. Crowson, N. J., 'Much Ado about Nothing: Macmillan and Appeasement', in Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds.), Harold Macmillan: Aspects of Political Life (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 626-63. Curtright, Lynn H., 'Great Britain, the Balkans, and Turkey in the Autumn of 1939', The International History Review, Vol. 10, no. 3, 1988, pp. 433455. Dallin, Alexander, 'Stalin and the German Invasion', Soviet Union, Vol. 18, Nos. 1-3, 1991, pp. 19-37. Deluca, Anthony R., 'Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, no. 3, 1977, pp. 503-524. Fenwick, C. G. 'The new Status of the Dardanelles', The American Journal of International Law, XXX, October 1936, pp. 701-706. Frazier, Robert, 'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine', Historical Journal, Vol. 27, no. 3, 1984, pp.715-28.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

251

Gaddis, John Lewis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', Diplomatic History, no. 7, 1983, pp. 171-90. Haslam, Jonathan, 'Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-41: Isolation and Expansion', Soviet Union, Vol. 18, Nos. 1-3, 1991, pp. 103-121. Howard, Harry N., 'The Turkish Straits After World War II: Problems and Prospects', Balkan Studies, 1970, Vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 35-60. — 'The United States and Turkey: American Policy in the Straits Question (19141963)' Balkan Studies, Vol. 4, 1963, pp. 225-50. Hucul, Walter C., 'Soviet Russia and the Turkish Straits: an Historical Sketch', World Affairs Quarterly, October 1956, 27(3), pp. 236-268. Hurewitz, J. C. 'The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits', Belleten 28, n o . l l l (1964), pp. 459-503. — 'Russia and the Turkish Straits', World Politics, Vol. XIV, October 1961-July 1962, pp. 605-632. Jenks, C. Wilfred, ' The Montreux Conference and the Law of Peaceful Change', New Commonwealth Quarterly, 1936, part 2, pp. 242-253. Kennan, Georgey, " X " , The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, no. 4, 1947, pp. 566-582. Kent, John, 'The Egyptian Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945-54', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 21, no. 3, 1993, pp. 45-65. Kirk, George, 'The Middle East in the War', Survey of International Affairs, 19391946 (London: London University Press, 1952). Kirkpatrick, Helen Paull, 'The Montreux Straits Convention, Geneva Special Studies, Vol. VII, No. 6, 1936, pp. 2-14. Knight, Jonathan, 'American State Craft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, no. 3, 1975, pp.451475. Leffler, Melvyn P., 'Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO', The Journal of American History, Vol. 71, no. 4, 1985, pp. 807-825. Macfie, A. L., 'The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-18', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, January 1983, pp. 43-74. — 'The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne (November 1922-July 1923) Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 15, May 1979, pp. 212-237. — 'The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, 1989, pp. 238-248. — 'The Straits Question at the Potsdam Conference: The British Position', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1987, pp. 75-82. Marzari, Frank, 'Western Rivalry in Turkey', 1939-1, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, no.l, 1971, pp. 63-79. — 'Western Rivalry in Turkey', 1939-II, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, no.2, 1971, pp. 201-220.

252

THE TURKISH STRAITS

AND THE GREAT

POWERS

Mastny, Vojtech, 'Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences of 1943', Journal of Modern History, Vol. no. 47, (September 1975), pp. 482-504. Morewood, Steven, 'Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 1919-1941', War & Society, Vol. 10, no. 1, 1992, pp. 81-107. Rahe, Paul A., 'The Beginning of the Cold War', in James W. Muller (ed.), Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech Fifty Years Later (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1999), pp. 49-68. Roberts, Geoffrey, 'The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany', Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, no. 1, 1992, pp. 57-78. Routh, D. A. 'The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Black Sea Straits', in Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs, 1936, (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 584-651. Sainsbury, Keith, 'Second Front in 1942: Anglo-American Differences over Strategy,' British Journal of International Studies', Vol. 4, no.l, 1978 pp. 47-58. Smith, Raymond and Zametica, John, 'The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered' International Affairs, Vol. 61, no.l, 1985, pp. 237-52. Smith, Raymond, 'A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945-7', International Affairs, Vol. 64, no.4, 1988, pp. 631-647. Toynbee, A., 'The Islamic World Since the Peace settlement', Survey of international Affairs, 1925, V. I, pp. 464-531. — 'South East Europe', Survey of International Affairs, 1934, 1935, pp. 508-577. Wehle, Louis B., 'International Administration of European Inland Waterways', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 1946, pp. 100-120. Wegner-Korfes, Sigrid, 'Ambassador Count Schulenburg and the Preparations for "Barbarossa", in Bernd Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), pp. 187-204. Xydis, Stephen G., 'The 1945 Crisis Over the Turkish Straits', Balkan Studies, Vol. no.l, 1960, pp 5-90.

PHD Thesis Isherwood, Susan Joanne, The British Foreign Office and the Postwar Settlements Towards Turkey, 1943-1946 (unpublished PHD Thesis, the University of Leeds, 1999).

INDEX A$ikalin, Cevat, 154, 155, 212, 226. Aktay, Haydar, 79, 104, 110, 113. Apaydm, Zekai, 65, 66. Aras, Tevfik Riigtii, 17, 31, 36, 39, 41, 44, 46, 49, 62-69, 72, 73, 75. Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 31, 35, 41, 43, 63, 65, 67, 71. Attlee, Clement, 184, 198-201, 219, 220. Bevin, Ernest, 198-202, 210-212, 220225, 227, 228, 230, 236, 237. Byrnes, James, 18, 196, 207, 210, 217, 219-221, 224, 225, 236, 238. Cadogan, Alexander, 90, 201. Chamberlain, Neville, 74, 80, 201. Churchill, Winston, 18, 20, 21, 23, 86, 87, 90, 91, 95, 114, 116, 142, 150-153, 155-159, 161, 167, 168, 170-172, 174, 175, 184186, 194, 197-202, 215, 218220, 223. Ciano, Count, 68, 69, 72, 73. Clark-Kerr, Sir A., 163, 164, 188, 210. Clutton, George, 136, 155, 157, 160, 168, 169. Cripps, Stafford, 94-100, 103-105, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119. Cunningham, Admiral Andrew, 9, 140, 201. Eden, Anthony, 48, 49, 63, 118, 126, 131, 141, 160, 167-169, 171, 184-186, 193, 194, 199-202. Erkin, Feridun Cemal, 142, 189-191, 213, 229, 236, 238. Forrcstal, James, 19, 217, 219, 220, 234. Halifax, Viscount, 75, 87, 90, 96, 97, 99, 104, 131, 192, 204, 206, 210, 211.

Hitler, Adolf, 85, 93-95, 100, 103, 106112, 114, 115, 119, 149, 158, 161, 179, 210. Inonu, ismet, 22, 30, 41, 43, 63, 80, 110, 112, 114, 117, 140, 141, 142, 151-153, 172, 173, 176, 190, 236. Keller, A. F. W., von, 73. Kelly, David, 131, 228, 229, 231, 236.

Knatchbull-Hugessen, Hughe, 23 Leahy, Admiral, 217-220, 233. Litvinov, M., 46, 48, 50, 51, 62, 63, 65, 66, 195. Loraine, Percy, 35, 40, 43, 44, 65, 67. Maisky, Ivan, 23, 116. Molotov, V., 78-81, 91-94, 96, 106113, 155, 163, 164, 171, 178, 179, 188-192, 197, 198, 210, 211, 222, 223. Mussolini, Benito, 17, 69, 93. Orbay, Rauf, 141, 157. Papen, von, 77, 107, 110, 114, 118, 120, 144, 164. Pound, Dudley, 102. Rendel, George, 46, 51, 63, 64, 162. Reynaud, George, 90. Ribbentrop, J., von, 81, 106-108, 111, 118, 119. Roosevelt, F. D„ 18, 21, 151, 152, 171, 172, 183, 186, 194-196. Saraijoglu, §ükrü, 79-83, 88, 89, 95, 98, 100, 103, 104, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118, 123, 126, 142, 143, 145, 146, 152, 189, 190, 193, 202, 208, 213, 222. Sargent, Orme, 92, 93, 163, 177, 180, 181, 193, 226. Sarper, Selim, 188-191, 197, 227, 237. Saydam, Refik, 76, 92. Sobolev, 111, 113. Stalin, 18, 20, 21, 67, 80-82, 94-100, 105-109, 112, 114, 117, 151153, 158, 167, 170-172, 178, 180, 181, 184, 185, 187, 195, 197, 198, 210, 215, 223. Stamanyakov, 66. Steinhardt, L., 119. Titelescu, N., 52. Truman, Harry, 18, 20-22, 183, 195, 196, 198, 202-205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 215, 218, 220, 232, 234, 240, 241. Vinogradov, S. A., 188-190, 209, 213, 222. Vishinsky, A. Y., 14, 113.