The Third-Term Tradition: Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics 9780231897846

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THE

THIRD-TERM

TRADITION

ALL E. W. Kemble, Harper's THEODORE

HAIL!

Weekly, L V I ( M a y 4, 1 9 1 2 ) , 7.

ROOSEVELT'S

1912

CAMPAIGN

THE THIRD-TERM TRADITION Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics

BY

CHARLES

W.

STEIN

New York : Morningside Heights COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 1

9 4 3

PRESS

COPYRIGHT

1943

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FOREIGN A G E N T S : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS,

PRESS

Humphrey Milford, Amen

House, London, E.C. 4, England, AND B. I. Building, Nicol Road, Bombay, India PRINTED

IN T H E

UNITED

STATES

OF

AMERICA

To the Memory of MY F A T H E R

FOREWORD

I T IS SURPRISING T H A T A TRADITION W H I C H HAS BEEN SO O F T E N Dis-

cussed, so often invoked, and which has acquired so much of the odor of sanctity as that which formerly limited the tenure of Presidents of the United States to a maximum of two terms of four years each has hitherto so entirely escaped critical historical examination. At least it seems surprising. Possibly the explanation lies in a tendency which even historical students share with other branches of the human race — a tendency to avoid searching analysis of sacred dogmas until those dogmas become burdensome or inconvenient. Iconoclasm usually has a motive. It is not as an iconoclast, however, that M r . Stein has approached the history of the anti-third term tradition, but as a seeker after historical truth. H e has sought thoroughly and well among the printed sources and a considerable quantity of unpublished manuscripts, and has traced the development and application of the tradition from the earliest discussions of limitation upon Presidential tenure in the Federal Convention to its first violation in the epoch-making election of November, 1940. No time could be more fitting than the present for such a study. While the writer of this Foreword might find it necessary to dissent from the author's interpretations upon some minor points, he can heartily commend the study as a whole as thorough, conscientious, and sound. JULIUS W .

T h e University of Buffalo June, 1942

PRATT

P R E F A C E

T H I S WORK A T T E M P T S TO DISCUSS A T SOME LENGTH T H E ROLE OF T H E

anti-third term tradition in American politics. T h e plan of the book is simple. T h e writer has undertaken first a critical analysis of the development of the third-term question from its earliest stage as a part of the whole general problem of the presidential office under discussion in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to its gradual establishment as a purposeful precedent in the early years of the Republic. T h e second part of the work comprises a detailed account of those situations in which certain of our presidents were confronted with the opportunity to challenge the tradition and especially concerns itself with those men who, in one way or another, undertook such a course. T h e third and final section is devoted to a discussion of the circumstances under which in 1940 the precedent was at last shattered and includes an attempt, however futile or hazardous, to foretell the results of such iconoclasm upon the American way of life in the future. T h e writer is gravely aware of the many flaws and inadequacies which may easily result from a subject of so vast a scope. T o deal effectively with as broad a question as the third term involves, naturally, an historical survey of rather extensive proportions. Obviously, both people and ideas differed considerably in 1880 from what they were in 1790, or in 1940 from what they were in 18 80. A n y study which attempts to encompass one hundred and fifty years of growth and development in a nation must allow for the various discrepancies which existed at one time or another, as well as to provide a unifying theme to the context and orient the reader to each period as it is approached. This the writer has earnestly sought to accomplish. Broadly speaking, the problem of the third term divides itself into

X

PREFACE

two main parts. First, there are the views and opinions on a third term of those presidents whose administrations involved such a possibility. Then there are the steps by which each undertook to realize or to eschew the innovation of three terms of office. Second, there is the reaction of the American people to each and every situation involving such a contingency. The distinction ultimately reduces to one of personalities versus public opinion; each is virtually a separate entity capable of separate treatment. Hence, the writer is not unmindful of the many shortcomings and ineptitudes which have arisen from a consideration of both subjects simultaneously and under one heading. In view of this unfortunate, though characteristic encumbrance, the reader is asked to understand and to bear with the many ponderous citations of individual and public opinion which by nature constitute an integral part of the subject-matter of the third-term problem and without which no clear and comprehensive account of its history is possible. All available sources have been examined insofar as time has permitted and a sincere attempt made to consider every man fairly and impartially—in the light cast upon him by present evidence. A l l conclusions are the writer's and he alone is responsible for them. In the case of Franklin Roosevelt the lack of basic material caused by the proximity of the 1940 election has necessitated a mere sketch of his role in the third-term drama. With this exception the conclusions drawn are generally well-founded and it is unlikely that future revelations will alter basic judgments. It is the earnest wish of the writer that this study may afford some insight into the nature and history of what was perhaps America's greatest unwritten law. T h e pages which follow are offered in the simple hope that they may contribute something of value, however small, to the ever-growing number of excellent monographs on every phase of American history. CHARLES W . Buffalo, N e w Y o r k June,

1942

STEIN

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T H E PRESENT WORK IS T H E OUTGROWTH OF AN EARLIER STUDY ON

Woodrow Wilson and the third term. The writer's thanks are due to a host of people who have shown an interest in it and who have so willingly contributed to its completion. It is a pleasure and a privilege to make the following acknowledgments of courtesies and assistance rendered: first, to Mr. Joseph B. Rounds and the Reference Staff of the Grosvenor Library in Buffalo for their generous aid and cooperation in the writer's research} also, to the Reference Department of the Buffalo Public Library for granting him access to its old newspaper files; to Dr. St. George L. Sioussat, Dr. Thomas P. Martin and their assistants in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress for the many courtesies extended while using materials under their charge; to Miss Katharine E. Brand, Special Custodian of the Woodrow Wilson Papers, for her invaluable assistance in simplifying the task of examining that vast collection; to the New York Public Library and to Miss Nora Cordingley, Librarian of Roosevelt House, New York City, whose friendly cooperation renders the writer's memories of his researches most pleasant; to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson and Mrs. Calvin Coolidge for their grace in permitting him to wander at will among the unpublished papers of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Calvin Coolidge; to Professor Allan Nevins, of Columbia University, who was good enough to take time out from his own busy schedule to read the proof and to offer many valuable suggestions; to Dean Julian Park, Dr. Selig Adler, and the late Dr. Augustus H . Shearer of the University of Buffalo History Department for their many kindnesses and untiring interest; to Dr. Joseph L. Fink, especially, for constant guidance and encouragement; to Mr. William

Xll

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Frank Barr for his invaluable assistance in the tiresome work of probing newspaper files and editing manuscript} to Miss Margaret Doherty for her splendid collaboration as typist, and to Mr. Barr and Miss Mary A . Cassidy who have cheerfully discharged the tedious task of reading proof} to the Hoenig Scholarship Committee of the Federation for Social Service of Buffalo, New York, through whose largess this study now appears in print; and finally, to Dr. Julius W . Pratt, H e a d of the Department of History and Government at the University of Buffalo, at whose suggestion the work was undertaken, whose interest in the venture has been unflagging, and without whose valuable criticism of the entire manuscript, to say nothing of countless other kindnesses, success would not have been possible. C.W.S. Buffalo, N.Y. January 15, 1943

CONTENTS

Foreword, by Julius W. Pratt

vii

Preface

ix

Acknowledgments

xi PART

ONE

BIRTH OF THE T R A D I T I O N . I.

The Views of the Venerable

3

II.

The Tired Old Man

17

III.

The Fountain Head

31

IV.

The Tradition Implemented—Two Knights and a Knave

46

Interlude—The Issue Dormant

59

V.

PART

T w o

A T T E M P T S WHICH MISCARRIED VI. VII. VIII. IX. X.

The Yankee Caesar

71

Four More Years of Grover—Not Eight!

117

"Rough-Riding" over Tradition

144

Shattered Hopes

222

" I Do Not Choose to Run"

266

PART

THREE

COLLAPSE AND T H E XI.

F . D . R . — " T h e Champ"

FUTURE 317

xiv XII.

CONTENTS Prelude to Dictatorship?

341

Bibliography

353

Index

365

CARTOONS

Theodore Roosevelt's 1 9 1 2 Campaign

Frontispiece

E. W. Kemble, Harfer's Weekly, LVI (May 4, 1912), 7 Grant's 1 8 7 6 Campaign Thomas Nast, Harfer's Weekly, XIX (June 26, 1875), 524

78

Grant's 1880 Campaign J . Keppler, Puck, VI (Feb. 4, 1880), 782-83 J . Keppler, Puck, VII (March 31, 1880), 58-59 J. Keppler, Puck, VII (June 16, 1880), 266-67

94 102 110

Cleveland's 1 9 0 4 Campaign W. A. Rogers, Harfer's Weekly, XLVII (May 16, 1903), 866

136

Theodore Roosevelt's 1908 Campaign J . N. Darling, Literary Digest, XXXIV (May 4, 1907), ;oi j from the Des Moines Register and Leader 15 2 J. S. Poghe, Puck, LXI (July 3, 1907), 7-8 160 J . Keppler, Puck, Vol. LXIII (June 17, 1908), cover 164 Theodore Roosevelt's 1 9 1 2 Campaign Coffman, Literary Digest, XLIV (March 16, 1912), 518; from the New York Journal 186 Theodore Roosevelt's 1 9 1 6 Campaign Bradley, Literary Digest, LII (Jan. 22, 1916), 160; from the Chicago Daily News Hanny, Literary Digest, LII (March 25, 1916), 804; from the St. Joseph Nevis-Press

210 216

Coolidge's 1928 Campaign Doyle, Literary Digest, XCIII (May 14, 1927), 5; from the Philadelphia Record 278

xvi

CARTOONS

Talburt, Literary Digeit, XCIII (May 14, 1 9 2 7 ) , 6; from the Washington News F r a n k l i n D . Roosevelt's 1 9 4 0 C a m p a i g n Loring, Time, X X X V I (Nov. 4, 1940), 1 7 ; from the Providence Bulletin

Evening

PART ONE BIRTH

OF

THE

TRADITION

I T H E VIEWS OF T H E

VENERABLE

I T HAS LONG BEEN T H E HABIT OF AMERICAN POLITICIANS TO CLAIM T H E

sacred support of the Founding Fathers on any important problem which chances to come up for debate. Such a process is easily applicable to the question of the presidential term of office. T h e authors of the Constitution very definitely had something to say on that subject and none hesitated to expound his views to the new nation then in the formal process of creation. However, men differ by nature, and it must be remembered that the Founding Fathers differed widely on the issues which confronted them—especially on the question of the presidential office. T h e whole problem of the executive constituted a major issue to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and in this controversy the question of the presidential term played no small part. Several factors must be borne in mind in order to facilitate our understanding. T h e authcirs of the Constitution were functioning to a certain extent in a vacuumj they were attempting to construct a framework of government based on the pure theory of their own minds. T r u e , they had considerable practical experience, but 150 years of cumulative experience and undreamed-of expansion would probably have changed some, if not all, of their minds. Another factor which had great influence on the Fathers was the condition that had existed in the Colonies until the time of independence—namely, government by a monarch; for the American Colonies had been ruled by the king of England. Hence, the disadvantages of living under a long-term, or a permanent executive, were much more apparent to them, as a result of actual experience, than they have been to Americans since. Obviously, it was the aim of the Fathers to guard against anything which might resemble a monarchy. Nevertheless, a factor which influenced them in the other direction

4

VIEWS OF T H E V E N E R A B L E

was another result of their own experience—the loose-jointed, decentralized government based upon the Articles of Confederation. This plan had functioned poorly, since it had provided for no real national executive. O n this score, then, the Fathers frowned upon the idea of a temporary executive, completely dependent on Congress. Rather did they choose a longer term for the executive with a monarchial tendency. T h e r e is still another important factor involved—the question of presidential reeligibility was but one of three main problems concerning the presidency which confronted the Convention. T h e r e were, as well, the vital questions as to how the executive should be elected and how long a single presidential term should be. A l l three problems are very closely intertwined in the debates before the Convention. A t the beginning of the proceedings countless wild schemes were advanced regarding the president and his term of office. It is neither necessary nor expedient to discuss these at length here. Suffice it to say that the arrangement first agreed to, which came very close to being written into the Constitution, provided that the president be elected by Congress for seven years and then be ineligible for reelection. However, this plan was changed just eleven days before the Convention adjourned and after at least six unsuccessful attempts had been made to alter it. T h e main reason for barring reelection under this scheme was that the Fathers feared that an executive elected by Congress could not be independent and would have to curry Congress' favor to get reelected if reelection were allowed. W h e n a four-year term was finally adopted, a seven-year term was still favored by some on the ground that four years was too short a time to give a good president if he could not be reelected. In considering in some detail the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the views expounded by its members on the question of presidential reeligibility, three factors stand out preeminently. First, that reeligibility was very closely linked with the mode of election and the length of a single term for the president. Second, that the Founders were concerned only with a second term, and that if reeligibility were permitted, then a third term or a fourth could follow logically and with no objection. In other words, the Fathers of the Constitution were not concerned with a third term but with a second, and if the latter were allowed, the question of a third term would become

VIEWS OF THE VENERABLE

5

if so facto a negligible one. And, third, it must be remembered that the Fathers were not influenced or prejudiced in their views by any specific personalities; they were not guided knowingly or otherwise by an overwhelming bias one way or another for individual candidates to whom their principles might or might not apply. In short, they played no favorites. On M a y 25,1787, the Constitutional Convention was organized and began its deliberations at Philadelphia with delegates from seven states present. Sixty-five delegates had been chosen by twelve of the original thirteen states, Rhode Island being the only state not represented in the Convention at any time. Of all the delegates elected, only fifty-five members attended, and but thirty-nine of them signed the completed document when the Convention adjourned on September 17. On May 29 Edmund Randolph of Virginia submitted for the consideration of the Convention the famous Virginia plan of government. 1 It had been privately prepared by the members of the Virginia delegation in which James Madison played a prominent part. The plan provided for a national government that should operate, as the Articles of Confederation did not, directly upon individuals rather than upon states. It also proposed a two-house national legislature, a national executive, and a federal judiciary. In Randolph's own words: "Resd. that a National Executive be instituted ; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of—years . . . to be ineligible a second time." 2 In the Virginia plan the term of office of the president was as yet undetermined while ineligibility was to be made certain. The same day (May 29) Charles Pinckney of South Carolina laid before the Convention the draft of a plan for government which somehow or other was neither debated nor used in either the Committee of the Whole or the Convention.3 W e know that according to this plan Congress was to choose the President every seven years.4 There was no real mention of the term of office, however. 5 Speaking before the Convention, Pinckney further elaborated on his plan, maintaining that 1 The chief source for our information on the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention is Farrand (ed.), Records of the Federal Convention of /7Ì7. 2 Ibid., I, 11. s Hunt and Scott (eds.), Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 26 n. 4 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of '787, III, 606. 'Ibid., II, 1 3 j .

6

VIEWS

OF

THE

VENERABLE

T h e executive should be appointed septennially, but his eligibility ought not to be limited. H e is not a branch of the legislature, farther, than as a part of the Council of Revision, and the suffering him to continue eligible, will not only be the means of insuring his good behavior but serve to render the office more respectable. I shall have no objection to elect him for a longer term, if septennial appointments are supposed too frequent or unnecessary. 0

The Pinckney plan was never discussed or acted upon in the Convention. Though there would seem to be no objection in the plan, as we know it now, to a longer term than seven years, the original draft disappeared and the alleged "Pinckney Plan," printed some years later as part of the Convention record, was obviously of later origin. A few days after this (June i ) the term of the executive was debated in the Committee of the Whole. James Wilson of Pennsylvania favored a three-year term with reeligibility provided for. Pinckney was still for seven years. Roger Sherman of Connecticut also favored three years and was against rotation "as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties." 7 George Mason of Virginia was in favor of a seven-year term and against reeligibility "as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a reappointment." 8 Gunning Bedford of Delaware, on the other hand, was opposed to so long a term as seven years. "What would we do if a certain man was found to lack the qualifications?" he asked. Bedford favored a triennial election and ineligibility after nine years. 9 After much debate, the term of seven years was voted on and passed (5 ayes, 4 noes, and one divided). 1 0 It may be noted in passing that Madison himself favored seven years, remarking that he thought "exclusion forever after—or during good behavior" a good idea. 1 1 On June 13 Randolph submitted a resolution to the Convention which had been agreed to by the Committee. It proposed to appoint an executive for seven years and to make him ineligible for a second term "Ibid., Ill, 1 1 0 - 1 1 . 7 Ibid., I, 68. It is important to note that in the records of the Convention Farrand depends largely upon the accurate and detailed diary which Madison kept of the proceedings. These excellent papers provide us with most of our knowledge of the Convention. 8 9 10 11 Ibid. Ibid., p. 69. Ibid. ¡bid., p. 71 (King's diary).

VIEWS

OF

THE

VENERABLE

7

and removable by impeachment for malpractice or neglect of duty. 12 T w o days later William Paterson laid before the Convention the socalled New Jersey plan, the object of which was merely to secure an adequate revision of the Articles of Confederation. In the draft the duration of the presidential term of office was left blank. The executive was to be ineligible a second time and removable at the hands of Congress. 13 Obviously this plan did not alter the decision of the Committee of the Whole as to a seven-year term. On June 18 Alexander Hamilton informally submitted his own personal and somewhat secretive plan for government. In regard to the executive Hamilton had this to say: " L e t the Executive . . . be for life. H e appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of the public trust would require, so as to ensure the services of the best citizens." 14 Hamilton favored a permanent tenure as an antidote to the executive's quest to prolong his power which would inevitably arise under a seven-year term. A permanent executive would be a safer depository of power. In brief, what Hamilton sought was an executive to serve during good behavior. 15 As further evidence, we have: T h e Executive ought to have but little power. H e would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his ambition would be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a w a r , he would avail himself of the emergency to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. 1 8

According to the diary of Robert Yates, Hamilton's plan proposed that "an executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during life, than for seven years." 17 This, naturally, would constitute an "elective monarchy." It was such a point of view which Hamilton later expressed in the Federalist Papers. The controversy dragged on, and the seven-year term was still not accepted by the Convention. Arguments were waged pro and con on the whole subject of the executive office. It was Gouverneur Morris who led the opposition to ineligibility. Morris not only favored reeligibility, but on July 17 boldly asserted that " T h e ineligibility proposed by the 12 15

¡bid., p. 226. ¡bid., p. 292.

13

10

¡bid., p. 244. ¡bid., p. 290.

14

17

¡bid., pp. 2 8 9 - 9 0 . ¡bid., p. 300.

V I E W S OF T H E

8

VENERABLE

clause as it stood tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the hope of being rewarded by a reappointment. It was saying to him [the executive], make hay while the sun shines." 1 8 On the same day George Mason arose to oppose reeligibility, saying that it was impossible to define the term "misbehavior." Mason claimed that an executive during good behavior was only a soft name for an executive for life and that the next step would be a hereditary monarchy. 19 Then, on the next day, the clause "ineligible for a second time" was struck out, but the seven-year term was retained in the plan. 20 This revision was due largely to the efforts of Morris, William Houston, and John Sherman, all of whom opposed ineligibility. Still the controversy persisted. Jacob Broom of Delaware favored a shorter term than seven years. James McClurg also opposed the sevenyear term, favoring "during good behavior" and insisting that a single term made the executive too dependent on the legislature and hence not sufficiently independent. 21 In this he was joined by Morris. Even then, after the seven-year term had been retained, it was moved and decided to reconsider the eligibility clause the next day. On July 19 a six-year term was proposed, but ineligibility for a second time was voted down. 22 Immediately the seven-year proposal was again presented and failed to pass (3 ayes, 5 noes, 2 divided). 23 Following this came another round of debate. Rufus King of Massachusetts feared too short a term while Morris continued to advocate a short term to avoid impeachments. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut together with H u g h Williamson of North Carolina favored a six-year term with a firm executive and infrequent elections.24 But when the vote was taken on the six-year term, it passed (9 ayes to one no). 2 5 Gouverneur Morris continued his fight to kill the ban 011 presidential second terms: " L e t him [the executive] be of short duration [he declared], that he may with propriety be re-eligible." 26 Morris took a most practical stand. H e knew that, regardless of any theory of popular government and of true rulers in such free governments, once in office a president would, in all probability, want to remain there. Morris then 18

19

21

22

Ibid., II, 33. Ibid., p. 33. 2 * Ibid., p. 59.

25

Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 5 1. Ibid.

20 23 28

Ibid., p. 23. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., p. 53.

VIEWS

OF

THE

VENERABLE

9

utilized this factor as one of his most effective arguments in f a v o r of all o w i n g the executive to be reelected indefinitely: I find that the executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this have? 1 . It will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. T h e love of fame is the great spring to noble and illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road to Glory and he may be compelled to seek it by the sword. 2. It will tempt him to make the most of the short space of time allotted him to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends. 3. It will produce violations of the very constitution it is meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established character of a favorite magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution. 27 E d m u n d R a n d o l p h continued to u r g e ineligibility while R u f u s K i n g contended that " h e w h o has proved himself to be most fit f o r an office, ought not to be excluded by the Constitution f r o m holding it."

28

Pater-

son agreed with K i n g . T h e n R a n d o l p h spoke up: " I f he [the executive] ought to be independent [asserted the Virginia d e l e g a t e ] , he should not be l e f t under a temptation to court a reappointment. . . .

I t has

been said that a constitutional bar to reappointment will inspire unconstitutional endeavors to perpetuate h i m s e l f . "

29

R a n d o l p h ' s whole ar-

gument was f o r election of the executive by the legislature, and he insisted that ineligibility was more acceptable to the people. O n J u l y 2 4 another heated debate occurred. E l b r i d g e G e r r y of M a s sachusetts urged that the executive should be independent of the legislature and should continue f o r " t e n , fifteen, or even twenty years and be ineligible a f t e r w a r d s . "

30

K i n g still f a v o r e d reeligibility ; he had a

constant f e a r of impeachments. T h e n , a veritable deluge of suggestions descended upon the Convention. L u t h e r Martin urged eleven years ; G e r r y was f o r fifteen} K i n g went as f a r as t w e n t y ; while W i l l i a m R . D a v i e of N o r t h Carolina adhered to eight years. 3 1 J a m e s Wilson favored a six-year term with election by the legislature. Williamson again opposed reeligibility and, demanding a single seven-year term, asserted : " A n o t h e r objection against a single magistrate is that he will be an 27 so

Ibid. Ibid., p. 102.

28 31

Ibid., p. 5 5. Ibid.

29

Ibid., pp. J4-55.

VIEWS

I O

OF

THE

VENERABLE

elective King, and will feel the spirit of one. H e will spare no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his children." 32 For Williamson, ineligibility was the best way to prevent a king—with such a precaution, he had no objection to a longer term than seven years; he even agreed to ten or twelve.33 Then Morris spoke up again: In all public bodies there are two parties. T h e executive will necessarily be more connected with one than with the other. There will be a personal interest therefore in one of the parties as well as in the other to support him. Much had been said of the intrigues that will be practiced by the Executive to get into office. Nothing had been said on the other side of the intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of [ a ] party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will cabal with the Legislature, until he succeeds in supplanting him.* 4

James Wilson continued, saying it would be a great error if "in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he [the executive] must be cast aside like a useless hulk." 85 The next day saw no progress toward a satisfactory solution of the problem. After a proposal for the prohibition of consecutive terms had been rejected, Charles Pinckney arose to suggest that no person be eligible for more than six in any twelve years.36 George Mason and Elbridge Gerry agreed with him. Then Pierce Butler declared against reeligibility at all events, only to be confronted with Morris' flat opposition to rotation in every case.37 The day concluded with the veto of Pinckney's plan. It was not until now that the aged Benjamin Franklin expressed his opinion on the subject. It seems to have been imagined by some [he asserted] that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. T h i s . . . was contrary to republican principles. In free governments the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors and sovereigns. For the former therefore, to return among the latter was not to degrade but promote t h e m — and it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always in a state of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the masters. 38 "Ibid.,

p. I O I .

33

Ibid.

39

p. 1 1 2 .

37

Ibid.

Ibid.,

38

Ibid.,

p. 1 0 4 .

Ibid.,

p. 1 1 0 .

35

Ibid.,

pp. 1 0 2 - 3 .

VIEWS OF THE V E N E R A B L E Certainly this was a subtle argument against letting a president remain in office indefinitely and for a time it actually served to stop the movement to make presidents reeligible. T h e same day a resolution was passed favoring the seven-year term and ineligibility, the vote being 7 ayes to 3 noes. 39 F o r three days the Committee of Detail discussed the seven-year proposal with its ineligibility clause. Finally, on September 4, after nearly two months of seemingly futile polemics and only thirteen days before the Convention adjourned, David Brearley of New Jersey proposed a four-year term for president but made no mention of reeligibility. 40 Such a plan had been under discussion in the Committee of Eleven for some time. Immediately attempts were made by Richard Spaight and H u g h Williamson to insert first seven and then six instead of four years. 41 Both failed and on September 6 all states but North Carolina agreed to a four-year term. 4 2 ' Nothing was decided concerning reeligibility, but it was generally assumed to be permissible. In the final draft of the Constitution the wording of this clause reads as follows: " H e [the Executive] shall hold his Office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows." 43 W h e n the Constitution was signed and the Convention adjourned on September 17, among the sixteen who refused to sign were George Mason, Elbridge Gerry, and Edmund Randolph. A f t e r the Constitution had been written, the next step was to secure its acceptance by nine of the thirteen states. T h i s involved something of a task, for the American Constitution was not accepted with readiness on all sides. T o o often do we forget how its defenders struggled to have the country adopt it. Practically every clause of the strange new document was fought over in all sorts of speeches, debates, pamphlets, and general conversations. State conventions were held in order to secure adoption of the Constitution. T h e records of these conventions reveal the presidential term of office as constituting no real issue in the debates. Most of the discussions concerned the method of electing the president and especially his powers, rather than the length of his term. It was the former proposals of which the defenders of the Constitution had to secure 39 42

¡bid., p. 116. Ibid.

40 43

Ibid., p. 497. "Ibid., p. 525. Article II, Section one of the Constitution.

12

VIEWS

OF

THE

VENERABLE

the people's approval. O d d l y enough, Edmund Randolph, long an opponent of presidential reeligibility, publicly reversed his position and favored presidential reeligibility on the ground that this arrangement renders the executive more independent and more eager to promote the people's interests, rather than making him desirous of promoting his own ends. 44 L u t h e r Martin, in an address before the Maryland state legislature, argued strongly against the adoption of the Constitution. 45 Charles Cotesworth, the elder member of the Pinckney family, elucidated one reason why executive reeligibility was permitted when he declared: " H i s [the president's] term of service might expire during the raging of war, when he might, perhaps, be the most capable man in America to conduct it." 46 George Washington had, during the Convention, expressed no opinion on the question of the presidential term of office. But in a letter of April 28,1788, to the Marquis de L a Fayette he commented as follows in regard to the ineligibility of the same person for president after he had served a certain term of years: G u a r d e d so effectually as the proposed constitution is, in respect to the prevention of bribery and undue influence in the choice of president, I confess I differ widely myself from M r . Jefferson and you, as to the necessity or expediency of rotation in that appointment. . . . T h e r e cannot, in my j u d g m e n t , be the least danger that the president will, by any practicable intrigue, ever be able to continue himself one moment in office, much less perpetuate himself in it, but in the last stage of corrupted morals and political depravity; and even then, there is as much danger that any other species of domination would prevail. T h o u g h , when a people shall have become incapable of governing themselves, and fit for a master, it is of little consequence from w h a t quarter he comes. XJnder an extended

view of this fart

of the subject, I can see no propriety in -precluding ourselves from the services of any man, who on some great emergency

shall be deemed

universally

most capable of serving the public.4T 4 4 Elliot ( e d . ) , Debates in Convention on the Federal Convention, II, 358. In this four-volume work may be found the complete text of the debates in the various state conventions on the adoption of the Constitution. 4 5 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, III, 216—17. 46 Ibid., p. 256. 4 7 W . C . Ford ( e d . ) , Writings of George Washington, X I , 257 (italics m i n e ) .

VIEWS

OF

THE

VENERABLE

13

I n the N e w Y o r k State Convention, where the influence of H a m i l t o n was great, a proposal that the president be elected for seven years and be ineligible a second time received no consideration at all. 4 8 W r i t i n g to a friend, M . L e Viellard in France, on October 24, 1788, Benjamin Franklin explained: Y o u seem to me to be so apprehensive about our President's being perpetual. Neither he nor we have any such intention. W h a t danger there may be of such an event we are all aware of, and shall take care effectually to prevent it. T h e choice is from four years to four years; the appointments will be small; thus we may change our President if we don't like his conduct, and he will have less inducement to struggle for a new election.49 T h o u g h as early as April, 1787, before the Convention had met, James Madison had favored a national executive, it was not until some time later that he formed any definite idea as to how it ought to be constituted. 50 I n a letter of October 24, 1787, Madison had informed Jefferson, then in Europe, of the proceedings of the Federal Convention. 5 1 Madison, in opposing any form of executive tyranny, feared that the concentration of all powers in the national authority would increase the legislative burden of Congress to an intolerable degree and would result in the surrender of more and more of the legislative prerogative to the executive. 8 2 T h e n , he reasoned, the combined effect of the extraordinary expansion of executive power and patronage would enable the president by quiet means to insure his reelection time after time and ultimately to regulate the succession in whatever way he pleased. O r by g i v i n g so vast an importance to the office, this arrangement would render presidential elections so violent and corrupt that the public in disgust might v e r y possibly demand a hereditary succession. 53 Madison often recommended that the executive be made eligible to succeed himself, for he feared that otherwise the incumbent in office might be encouraged to resort to desperate enterprises to secure what would not be attainable by legitimate means. Furthermore, he was afraid that in a crisis a prohibi48

Ibid., p. 338.

49

Smyth ( e d . ) , Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin, IX, 674. Hunt ( e d . ) , Writings of James Madison, II, 339-40. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of fjSy, III, 1 3 2 - 3 3 . 5 3 Ibid., p. 359. Hunt, Writings of . . . Madison, V I , 358.

80 51 62

14

VIEWS OF T H E

VENERABLE

tion against reelection might have the effect of excluding a choice which would be necessary to the public safety.54 The Federalist Papers represent the efforts of Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay to "sell" the Constitution to the people of the United States. Written in 1788, the Federalist Papers constitute the best exposition of political theory yet produced in America. In Numbers Seventy-One and Seventy-Two Alexander Hamilton makes a masterly reply to all the agitation and controversy in regard to letting a president serve indefinitely. He thus effectively summed up the sentiments of a majority of the Founding Fathers. Too short a term of office, Hamilton claimed, might often result in a lack of interest on the part of the president, for, knowing he must soon lay down his office, he would not be moved to an energetic prosecution of it.55 The fouryear term would permit of personal firmness of the executive "in the employment of his constitutional powers" and the "stability of the system of administration, which may have been adopted under his auspices." Four years would provide ample time for the executive to pursue and effect his policies and also to win the confidence and respect of the people, while at the same time establishing himself in their good will. 56 Then, at the new election, the president could receive the verdict of the people, "in proportion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his fellow citizens." 57 Hamilton's main point is that while on the one hand a term of four years "will contribute to the firmness of the executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty." 58 We have nothing to fear, asserts this leading Federalist, from an executive of four years' duration when we see the privileges and concessions which have been wrung by the British House of Commons from the Crown. In Number Seventy-Two of the Federalist Papers Hamilton discusses the problem of presidential reeligibility thoroughly and effectively. Reeligibility, he wrote, "is necessary to enable the people, when they see reason to approve of his [the executive'sl conduct, to continue " Ibid., V, 290. " Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist on the New Constitution, p. 328. Bt " Ibid., p. 3 3 o. "Ibid. Ibid., p. 3 31.

VIEWS OF T H E V E N E R A B L E

15

him in the station, in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration." 5B T o limit the president's term of office, he added, would be for the most part "rather pernicious than salutary." 60 The author then proceeds to list five main objections to executive ineligibility for a second term. First, there is the argument that a president might be less zealous in the pursuance of his duties if he knew that a good administration could not be rewarded with a return to office. Another ill effect of ineligibility, charges Hamilton, would be the temptation "to sordid views, to peculation, and in some instances to usurpation" which a man might experience. A third ill effect would be simply "the depriving the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief magistrate in the exercise of his office." Fourth, contends Hamilton, a limited term of office would involve under certain circumstances "the banishing [of] men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety." And finally, there is the argument that the exclusion of the executive from «eligibility "would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration." 6 1 Hamilton then goes on to cite the advantages of exclusion, which are, he argues, designed to counterbalance the evils—greater independence in the executive and greater security to the people. Both of these quasi-benefits Hamilton seems successfully to refute. If exclusion is not perpetual, he argues, we cannot infer the former, for without it an executive may still sacrifice his independence.62 On the other hand, if the exclusion were perpetual, the second advantage might not necessarily ensue. A man with ambition and ability might evoke disgust from the people when he was removed without reeligibility j this could, in turn, constitute a real danger to liberty, a danger greater than "the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional privilege." 83 These arguments, then, which prevailed in I787and 1788, comprised the views of the Fathers of the Constitution on the subject of the presi•• Ibid., p. 332. « / « ¿ , p . 335.

60

Ibid. " Ibid.

41

Ibid., pp. 33»—34.

16

VIEWS OF THE

VENERABLE

dential term of office. That document was subsequently adopted, executive reeligibility and all. There was some grumbling and dissension on the part of the state conventions in the process of ratification. T h e result of all this was the plethora of resolutions recommending immediate amendments, which soon evolved into the Bill of Rights. Only a few of the proposed amendments had as their objective the blocking of the perpetual reeligibility of the president. One of these stands out as unique. It was proposed by the N e w Y o r k Convention and specifically called for a ban on presidential third terms. 61 Perhaps this may be interpreted as the first official forewarning that the problem of reeligibility might at some time become a definite third-term issue, as it finally did in 1940. A f t e r its inception as a second-term issue in the Constitutional Convention, the question of a third term for our presidents has played a relatively minor role as a real and tangible issue in the 150 years of our national existence. For the Founding Fathers the whole problem centered on whether a second term was to be allowed 5 once such reeligibility had been provided for, a third or fourth term was assumed, ipso facto, as a natural and logical consequence if the circumstances permitted. W i t h this in mind, we may now turn to an investigation of the role of the third term in American political history. 4 4 Jefferson's Autobiography, in Bergh (ed.)> Writings 1 1 9 ; Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, p. 38.

of Thomas

Jefferson,

I,

2 THE T I R E D OLD M A N

THE

TWO-TERM

TRADITION

FOR A M E R I C A N

PRESIDENTS

WAS

ESTAB-

lished by George Washington in 1796, when our first president retired at the end of his second administration. As a cold, historical fact this postulate is self-evident. Closer analysis reveals that though Washington did set the precedent, his reasons for so doing were most decidedly non-political, and that the first chief executive to reject a third term on political grounds was the founder of the present Democratic party— Thomas Jefferson. It is correct, then, to say that Washington was the first president to reject a third term for himself} but it is utterly inaccurate to suppose that he frowned upon a third term for the chief magistrate because of any principled opposition thereto. Washington had said nothing at all about the question of presidential reeligibility in the Constitutional Convention. But, as chairman, he had heard all the arguments pro and con on the subject, and a few months later indicated his complete agreement with the decision of the Convention to permit a president to serve an indefinite number of terms. H i s views were expressed, as we have seen, to his old friend L a Fayette in the spring of 1788, when he wrote: " U n d e r an extended view of this part of the subject, I can see no propriety in precluding ourselves from the services of any man, who on some great emergency shall be deemed universally most capable of serving the public." 1 T h e r e is little evidence to show that Washington ever changed his mind. Throughout his voluminous writings there is scarcely an implication of any tendency in the opposite direction. T h e only real hint of such tendency is to be 1 W . C . Ford ( e d . ) , Writings of George text of this letter, see chap, i, above, p. 12.

Washington,

X I , 257. For the complete

18

THE

TIRED

OLD

MAN

found in the tentative first draft of the Farewell Address, as a part of a letter to Madison. There is considerable evidence, however, in regard to the real grounds on which Washington retired from the presidency at the end of his second term. These reasons have nothing whatever to do with any desire on his part to set a precedent against a third term nor any belief that a third term would be hazardous or inappropriate. W h e n Washington retired from the A r m y , he was a very tired man and he had every intention of making that retirement a permanent one. Against his wishes to hold public office, he was urged first to preside over the Constitutional Convention and later to become the country's first president. Both of these offices he accepted out of his desire to serve and his sense of duty toward the new nation whose independence he had been so instrumental in winning. H e had accepted the presidency in 1789 with "extreme reluctance and with a firmly cherished resolution to retire at the earliest convenient opportunity." 2 As early as February, 1792, he had mentioned such a desire to Jefferson and shortly after to Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph. 3 For several months he had thought it over and still could not convince himself that he should stay in office. Much anxiety was expressed on the part of the people as to Washington's willingness to run a g a i n — " T h e reluctance with which he had consented to the first election was so great, that it was feared he could not be prevailed upon to remain longer in public life." 4 O n M a y 5, 1792, in a conversation with the President, Madison expressed the opinion that "his [Washington's] retiring at the present juncture might have effects that ought not to be hazarded} that I was not unaware of his inclination," but, though "his retirement might not be fatal to the public good, yet a postponement of it was another sacrifice expected by his patriotism." 6 A few deeks later, Washington responded, informing Madison: 1 have not been unmindful of the sentiments expressed by you in the conversations just alluded t o : — o n the contrary I have again and again revolved them with thoughtful anxiety; but without being able to dispose my mind to a longer continuation in the office I n o w have the honor to hold — I therefore still look forward to the fulfillment of my fondest and most 2 8 8

Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 309. Ibid. * Sparks, Life of George Washington, p. 44J. Hunt, Writings of James Madison, V I , 107, «10.

THE

TIRED

OLD

MAN

19

ardent wishes to spend the remainder of my days (which I cannot expect will be m a n y ) in ease and tranquility. Nothing short of conviction that my dereliction of the Chair of G o v e r n ment (if it should be the desire of the people to continue me in it) would involve the country in serious disputes respecting the Chief Magistrate, and the disagreeable consequences which might result therefrom in the floating and divided opinions which seem to prevail at present, could, in any wise, induce me to relinquish the determination I have formed: and of this I do not see how any evidence can be obtained previous to the Election. 6

The President requested his close friend to think about a valedictory address for him and to express in plain and modest terms, that having been honored with the Presidential Chair, and to the best of my abilities contributed to the organization and administration of the g o v e r n m e n t — t h a t having arrived at a period of life when the private walks of it, in the shade of retirement, become necessary and will be most pleasing to m e ; — a n d the sfirit of the government may render a rotation in the elective 0 fleers of it more congenial with their ideas of liberty and safety, that I take my leave of them as a fublic man?

In the italicized clause George Washington gives us the only hint to be found in all his writings that he might oppose a president's perpetuity in office on political grounds. Though this clause appeared in the prepared draft of his declaration in 1792, it did not appear in the Farewell Address as it was finally published. T h e President then concludes this very important letter to Madison with the suggestion that the next session of Congress would be a good time to announce his intention to retire. 8 Washington gave vent to much personal feeling in this letter to Madison, especially pleading deficiency in many of the qualifications for office and unfitness to judge legal and constitutional questions. But Madison had earlier told the President of his opposition to the latter's retirement, stressing, as he did, party spirit, Washington's abilities, and the harm retirement might cause the public good. 9 Still unconvinced, Washington proceeded to consult his Cabinet for the proper time and mode of announcing his retirement. A l l the mem6 7 9

W. C. Ford, Writings of . . . Washington, Ibid., p. 126 (italics mine). W. C. Ford, George Washington, II, 193.

XII, 123-24. (May 29, 1792). 8 Ibid., p. 130.

20

THE

TIRED

OLD

MAN

bers opposed it, and Jefferson, Hamilton, and Randolph wrote long letters saying that it was most important to his own reputation and to the interest of his country that he should not retire. O n M a y 23,1792, Thomas Jefferson wrote the President urging him to remain in office a while longer. In the present uncertain state of affairs, the Secretary of State had written, Washington's presence at the helm was indispensable. W o u l d not he concede long enough to aid the new Congress in getting under way? 10 It comes as no surprise, moreover, in view of his sentiments on the president's term of office, that Alexander Hamilton, now Secretary of the Treasury, should also endeavor to dissuade Washington from his professed intention to retire at the end of his first term. 1 1 Nor from Edmund Randolph, who at one time had opposed the idea of reeligibility for the president, did Washington receive approval of his intention to retire. " T h e Constitution would never have been adopted," wrote Randolph, "but from a knowledge that you had once sanctioned it, and an expectation that you would execute it. It is in a state of probation. T h e most inauspicious struggles are past, but the public deliberations need stability. Y o u alone can give them stability." 12 In the words of an early biographer, "sentiments like these [i. e., Jefferson's, Hamilton's, and Randolph's], uttered by his confidential advisers, whose political opinions he knew were at variance with each other, could not fail to make a deep impression, and the more so as they were reiterated from every quarter." 1 3 Not only from his political advisers, but from friends all over the country did Washington receive letters "urging him not to decide hastily, and, if possible, to reconcile himself to a second election." 14 H a v i n g received no encouragement from those he consulted for advice, Washington continued to prepare his farewell address. T h e friction, both personal and political, which had arisen in the Cabinet between Hamilton and Jefferson figured prominently in evoking from 10

Sparks, Life and Writings

11

Hamilton to Washington, July 30, 1792, Lodge, Works of . .

of . .

. Washington,

X , 508-9. . Hamilton,

VIII,

274-76. 1 2 Randolph to Washington, A u g . 5, 1792, Sparks, Life and Writings of . . . Washington, X, j 1 j. 1 3 Sparks, Life of George Washington, p. 4.45. 14 Ibid., p. 442.

THE TIRED

OLD

MAN

21

Washington a personal statement of his wish to retire, "lest it should be said that having tasted the sweets of office he could not do without them," while age, poor health, and a bad memory had made "public business . . . irksome, and tranquility and retirement had become an irresistible passion." 1 3 The President, with Madison's help, drew up in the summer of 1792 a draft of what should be the former's farewell address, in which he was to have announced his retirement from public office. With the authorship of this draft we are not concerned. Its significance for us lies in the fact that in it were embodied certain ideas which Washington, after laying the whole address aside for four years when he accepted a second term, finally expressed in 1796. This early draft is also important in that it contains the sole hint of Washington's tendency to favor the idea of rotation in office, which he had previously expressed to Madison. The President declared, according to Madison's abstract: " M a y I be allowed further to add . . . that an early example of rotation in an office of so high and delicate a nature may equally accord with the republican spirit of our Constitution, and the ideas of liberty and safety entertained by the people." 1 6 During a conversation with Jefferson in J u l y , 1792, the President seems to have had strong personal feelings in regard to retirement. According to Jefferson's account, when the General retired from the Army he meant it as a permanent withdrawal from public life. When he was called to set the new government in motion, he consented, but felt that in two or three years all would be well and he could once again seek the peace and tranquillity of retirement. But such was not the case, and circumstances had forced him to finish out his term. Now, he again wished to retire and again was told there would be danger in it. Yet he did not want others to think he was feigning retirement. The President felt he had too many incapacities, among them poor hearing and a bad memory. H e feared some would think one party had been carried too far, that a tendency toward monarchy might be inferred. H e still believed most 15

W. C. Ford, George Washington, II, 1 9 1 . W. C. Ford, Writings of Washington, X I I I , 197. This idea would seem to support Jefferson's assertion in the Anas (Autobiography) that when it was suggested to Washington in Dec., 1 7 9 3 , that things would never go right until the United States had a chief magistrate for life, the President "seemed struck with it and declared he had not supposed there was a man in the United States who could have entertained such an idea." P. L. Ford (ed.), Writings of Thomas Jefferson, I, 272. 16

22

THE TIRED OLD

MAN

of the people favored republicanism j yet he was profoundly disturbed by the friction in his party and by local attacks by the press, which he regarded as affronts to himself. In condemning the administration, they condemned him. Nevertheless, Washington felt that he had done right in most cases during thé past four years. H e thought the people were content, but wished to be informed if they were not. 17 One can easily perceive from this conversation the true reasons for Washington's desire to retire in 1792. H e was old and in poor health, sick of political turmoil, and sincerely tired of public life; he anxiously looked forward to retirement. So, despite all advice to the contrary, the President continued to waver and as late as October, 1792, was still uncertain.18 H e continued to be more and more irritated by the friction in the Cabinet between Hamilton and Jefferson and he finally tried to induce them to patch up their difficulties. H e sent each a letter, asking that they sink their differences. In answers which clearly indicate the many divergencies between their characters and ways, both Hamilton and Jefferson admitted their share of the blame and agreed to avoid further controversy with each other. 19 In view of this arrangement, the President could offer no further resistance and, as a recent biographer has put it, "finally acceded to what appeared to him another urgent call to duty." 20 In the words of an earlier historian, "before December [1792], Washington's doubts as to retiring had been solved, and, greatly against his own wishes he was persuaded to remain in the presidency." 2 1 After he had been unanimously reelected, the President admitted that, though such a vote warmed his heart, he had still really sought retirement, only to make again that sacrifice when his services were needed. 22 Writing to David Humphreys in the spring of 1793, Washington again expressed his desire to retire. 23 Washington's second four years were long and arduous ones. Confronted with many problems, both foreign and domestic, the President found his task a seemingly endless one. Abroad, there were the probIbid., X I I , 128-3011. Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 313. 2 0 Ibid., p. 315. "Ibid., pp. 31+-15. 2 1 W . C. Ford, George Washington, II, 202. 2 2 Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 315. 2 5 W . C. Ford, Writings of . . . Washington, X I I , 277 (March 23, 1 7 9 3 ) . 17

18

T H E T I R E D OLD MAN

23

lems resulting from the French Revolution to be dealt with, war between England and France, of which we must remain clear, Genet's mission to the United States in search of aid for France, and finally Jay's treaty with England. A l l these and many other important affairs required a firm hand in our foreign policy. A t home, the beginnings of internal development were apparent and with them came sectional interests and the subsequent political strife which soon resulted in the splitting up of Washington's own party. By 1795 the President was a very tired man, his health had been considerably undermined, and his desire for retirement intensified a hundredfold. As one writer has remarked, "if there had been, as we know full well there was not, any lingering desire in the mind of Washington to seek the presidency a third time, it would have been effectually killed by the malicious criticism to which he was subjected almost from the beginning of his second term." 24 T h u s by 1795 the force of circumstances would have imposed upon the President the sincere wish for retirement, even had not such a desire already been present. As early as January 22 of that year he had written to E d m u n d Pendleton that " A l t h o u g h I have no cause to complain of the want of health [apparently he refrained from telling his friends of his many indispositions] , I can religiously aver, that no man was ever more tired of public life, or more devoutly wished for retirement than I d o . " 2 5 Despite Washington's refusals, however, many of his friends still urged him to accept the presidency a third time. Gouverneur Morris wrote him from France in the winter of 1795: " I shall add nothing . . . except my fervent wish and earnest exhortation that you do by no means resign. Y o u cannot conceive how important it is to our foreign concerns that you should hold your seat." 26 John Jay had written the President on April 18, 1796: "Attachment to you, as well as to our country, urges me to hope and pray that you will not leave the work unfinished. Remain with us at least while the storm lasts, and until you can retire like the sun in a calm unclouded evening." 27 Washington responded in a letter dated M a y 8: ** Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 4.10. 26 W. C. Ford, Writings of . . . Washington, XIII, 33. Morris (ed.), Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 143. 27

Johnston (ed.), Correspondence and Public Pafers of John Jay, 1763-1826,

108-9.

IV,

24

THE

TIRED

OLD

MAN

I t would be uncandid, therefore, and would discover a want of friendship and confidence (as you have expressed a solicitude for my at least riding out the storm) not to add, that nothing short of events, or such imperious circumstances (as I hope and trust will not happen) and might render a retreat dishonorable, will prevent the public annunciation of it in time to obviate a misapplication of votes, at the election of President and VicePresident of the United States in December next, upon myself. 2 8

E v e n here Washington did not completely close the door to a third term in the event of a necessity to seek it for the purpose of vindicating himself. But long before December he looked forward to release from political turmoil. During these last months in office, Washington regretted that he had not earlier announced his intention to retire. H e expressed it thus in a letter of June 2 6 , 1 7 9 6 , to Hamilton: " H a v i n g from a variety of reasons (among which a disinclination to be longer buffeted in the public prints by a set of infamous scribblers) taken my ultimate determination 'to seek the post of honor in a private station,' I regret exceedingly that I did not publish my valedictory address the day after the adjournment of Congress." 29 But Hamilton responded only to plead that if it become necessary, his chief should retain the presidency. 30 N o r was Hamilton the only one to urge Washington to stay on. On June 5 Gouverneur Morris had again written the President begging him to remain at the helm of the ship of state. 31 Others, too, insisted that he remain in office. M a n y of his constituents were curious as to his intentions; yet most of these officials who surrounded him would support Washington no matter what those intentions might be. W e have as representative evidence of this the letter of Jonathan Dayton, a Federalist Congressman, to Oliver Wolcott, who had succeeded Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury. Dayton was curious as to the President's intention in regard to another term. H e wrote: D o you yet know, and are you at liberty to make k n o w n the President's determination as to the acceptance of the office which he now holds, for the next term of four years? A l l ranks of people in this state [ N e w Jersey] very anxiously wish that he may consent to serve still longer. T h e r e have been 28

W . C . Ford, Writings of . . . Washington,

29

3 0 Lodge, Works of . . Ibid., p. 220. Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, III, 82.

31

X I I I , 189. . Hamilton,

V I I I , 408-9.

T H E

T I R E D

OLD

MAN

25

great apprehensions lest he would decline, but some circumstances and late intimations seem to encourage the hope that those apprehensions will not be realized. I pray to G o d that this hope may prove well founded, and that that man, whom most of all I love and respect, will permit his fellowcitizens once more at least to reelect him.® 2

But in Washington's eyes the necessity to remain in office did not arise, and the pleadings of Hamilton, Morris, and the others were in vain. From the letters which the President wrote at this time, he contemplated retirement with great pleasure, but regretted parting from so many of his close friends. This attitude is clear from various communications which he sent to Timothy Pickering, Henry Knox, Jonathan Trumbull, and others. 33 By the beginning of 1796, Washington was certain of his determination to retire at the end of his second term. As Charles A. Beard has very neatly put it, " H e would then be sixty-five years of age and he was weary from his burdensome labors in field and forum. Since the opening of the Revolution, to say nothing of his provincial career, he had spent nearly fifteen years in public service and even while in retirement he had devoted irksome and anxious months to the movement that produced the Constitution. T h e glory of office had begun to pale." 34 But worst of all, the political turmoil had become much intensified in the past four years. The tension had so increased between Hamilton and Jefferson that in 1795 the former resigned as Secretary of the Treasury. Jefferson had been out of the Cabinet since 1793. Madison, too, had become estranged from Washington and the Federalists and, along with Jefferson, had become a leading critic of the administration. Having clearly aligned himself with the Federalists and having assumed the responsibility for the policies advanced by the Federalist party, the President had voluntarily incurred the risks of partisan attacks. And attacked 35 Gibbs (ed.), Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams (from the papers of Oliver Wolcott), I, 381. 33 See W. C. Ford, Writings of . . . Washington, X I I I , 374-80. 34 Beard and Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, I, 371. The very opposite of this point of view is put forth by William Cobbett, an English political writer, who was visiting the United States at the time. His opinion was that certain articles which appeared in the press in 1796 formed "one of the strongest reasons for his declining to serve as President a third time. . . . The true cause was 'the loss of popularity,' and the further loss from the apprehended war with France." Cited in O'Neil, The American Electoral System, p. 54.

26

T H E T I R E D OLD MAN

the administration certainly was. T h e "scurrilous editors," as Washington called them, bitterly criticized the reign of the Federalists, and, though the attacks were not so much directed at the President personally, he could not but feel the brunt of the opposition's assaults. H e was distressed no little to hear himself assailed, as he complained, "in such exaggerated and indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, a notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket." 3 5 For a man such as Washington, who had once received "respectful homage" on all occasions, to find himself "spattered with the mud of political criticism" at the end of his second administration was indeed both shocking and grievous. 38 According to another source, Washington's purpose to retire at the end of his second term had long been known to his close friends and generally suspected by the people at large. 3 1 Yet, in view of the evidence noted above, one sees reason to doubt the validity of such an assertion. T h e author of this opinion was John Marshall, who was writing only a few years after the situation had arisen. Marshall was a Federalist and a close friend of Washington ; hence nowhere does he cast any aspersions whatever on either his party or his chief. Marshall does agree, however, with the generally accepted assumption that "the resolution of the Chief Magistrate was to be shaken only by the obvious approach of a perilous crisis, which endangering the safety of the nation, would make it unworthy of his character, and incompatible with his principles, to retreat from its service." 38 Though such an emergency never arose, Washington withheld a public declaration of his intention "until the propriety of affording a reasonable time to fix on a successor should require its disclosure." 30 This silence on the part of the President gave rise to considerable suspense, which, though he still remained an object of public esteem, "seemed to redouble the efforts of those who laboured to rob him of the affection of the people, and to attach odium to the political system which he had pursued." 40 Marshall consistently maintains that there was an earnest desire on the part of many individuals, despite all party conflicts, to nominate Washington for another term. 41 38 « Ibid. Ibid. 37 38 Marshall, Life of George Washington, V, 75 1 - 5 2 . Ibid., p. 752. 39 Ibid. Ibid. 41 For Marshall's alleged naïveté in analyzing the reasons for Washington's retirement, see O'Neil, The American Electoral System, p. 54.

THE TIRED

OLD MAN

27

Having resolved upon retirement, Washington brought forth the draft of the address which he had prepared in 1792 as a farewell speech and to which Madison had given much constructive criticism. But the President had since become estranged from that gentleman and could no longer entrust such a task to him. The logical thing was for him to turn to his closest friend, the man under whose spell he found himself falling more and more—Alexander Hamilton. Washington then sought Hamilton's aid and advice in publishing what later became the famous Farewell Address. Its authorship is still in question.42 In July, 1796, the President sent a draft of the address, together with Madison's ideas, to Hamilton, with the request that he "dress them up in form." 48 This Hamilton did, using the ideas of both Madison and Washington, as well as his own, and returned the draft to the President. H e (Hamilton) then consulted John Jay and together they "dressed up" what was really Hamilton's redrafted form and returned this to Washington for final polishing. T h e President adhered to Hamilton's original draft and, revising it himself, published it thus in final form. It was not until several years later that it became known how Washington had been assisted by Hamilton in the preparation of his address. Some maintain today that Hamilton wrote the entire piece. But the President realized the value of a good secretary and for years had kept close friends informed of his intentions; as a result, these "confidantes" did much to help formulate his ideas.44 Nevertheless, Washington himself put the finishing touches on the document and made certain that it represented exactly what he had in mind. On September 17, 1796, George Washington published his immortal Farewell Address to the American people. The address had for its main purpose the elimination of himself from a third presidential term. 45 In it the President announced that in the coming election he had resolved "to decline being considered among the number of those, out of whom a choice is to be made." Such a resolution has not been taken, he continued, "without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation, which binds a dutiful citizen to his country." 46 But, he added, 42 43 45 4B

Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself, p. 498. 4 4 Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, Ibid. II, 4 1 2 . Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself, p. 497. W . C . Ford, Writings of . . . Washington, X I I I , 278-79.

28

THE

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MAN

T h e acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped, that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with my motives, which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement, from which I had been reluctantly drawn. T h e strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea. 4 7

In concluding, Washington declared that he sincerely hoped the people would not disapprove of his determination to retire. H e wished them to know that he had served them "with the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable," but that the time had come when age and failing health "admonishes me more and more, that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome." " W h i l e choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene," he declared, "patriotism does not forbid it." 48 This address was but one of the many natural and sincere acts of Washington's life. Though not generally known at the time, one of the President's chief reasons for publishing the address, outside of announcing his retirement, was to obviate as much criticism as possible.49 This was why he was so eager that Madison's draft of 1792 be incorporated into the finished document as far as possible. In a letter to Hamilton, Washington explained that the publication of the address, coming as it did when the two men who had originally known about it in 1792 were now "strongest and foremost in the opposition to the government," would do much to strengthen the general belief that he had no ulterior motive "in extending the powers of the Executive beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution." T h e announcement of his decision to retire, the President felt, would lessen in intensity the opposition of the Jeffersonian group, as well as palliate "some of the shafts which, it may be presumed, will be aimed at my annunciation of this event; among which, conviction of fallen popularity, and de47 49

4SIbid., Ibid,., pp. 279-80. pp. 281-82. Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 415.

THE

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29

spair of being re-elected, will be levelled at me with dexterity and keenness." 5 0 As Bernard Fay has put it: H a d he not done all that there had been for him to do, establish a strong central government, gather and organize around him able m e n , w h o w o u l d understand, represent and guide their country, w i n and hold the W e s t as a security and a band of their union? T h e other cares he left to his successor. 5 1

Washington's resignation was not brought about by any objection on frincifle to an extended term of office. T h e only indication of such objection, to be found in the secondary sources, is the explanation put forth by one M . D . Holmes: " H e [Washington] did not think that, in an elective government, one president should serve so long as to begin to seem like a constantly reelected king." 5 2 T h e evidence, however, does not support such an assertion. T h e reasons for President Washington's retirement at the end of his second term were of a purely personal and circumstantial nature. They in no way resulted from his opposition to a longer tenure on political grounds. For it is a matter of record that Washington had a leaning toward the monarchial system, which often tended to overshadow his democratic affinities. This tendency must be attributed in later years to his increasingly closer ties with Alexander Hamilton, under whose influence he seems to have fallen. Both Hamilton and Washington bore marked aristocratic tendencies, as opposed to the more democratic proclivities of Jefferson and Madison. Among the more significant causes for Washington's retirement poor health and fatigue figured prominently. H e was sixty-four years old at the time and was beginning to feel the infirmities which result from the passing of years. Moreover, the break-up of his party into factions, with the knowledge that he was powerless to do anything about it, impelled the President to seek rest and retirement and to make no attempt whatever at another term. Another factor, largely a result of the above, was that his administration had become the target for all sorts of vituperative and scurrilous attacks. It was only natural for 50 51 52

W. C. Ford, Writings of . . . Washington, XIII, 191-92 (May 15, 1796). Fay, Geotge Washington, Republican Aristocrat, p. 270. Holmes, George Washington, p. 357.

T H E

30

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Washington personally to feel the sting of these onslaughts. As Bernard Fay very neatly sums it up: He was tired. T h e noise and excitement had worn him out. He had never liked political quarrels. N o w they were odious to him and using up the last hours of his life. T h e violent attacks which the newspapers had launched against him gave him bitter pleasure—too bitter for an old man. It was time to g o . 5 3

By so retiring after two terms Washington set the precedent for those who should follow him and thus established the tradition.64 There is little comfort in the facts for those who would bring forth George Washington as the indoctrinator of an anti-third term tradition. As Charles A . Beard has very succinctly put it: " . . . another election was out of the question, not because he regarded the idea of a third term as improper or of en to serious objection; he was simply through with the honors and turmoil of politics" 5 5 Anyone who today endeavors to find substantial historical evidence for the hypothesis that a third presidential term will imperil such democracy as we may have must look beyond both the Founding Fathers and the Father of his Country; he must look instead, by one of the ironies of American history, to the founder of the Democratic party—Thomas Jefferson. 53

Fay, George Washington, Republican Aristocrat, p. 269. The writer suspects, though he can find no material evidence to prove it, that Washington did not abandon his presidential post merely for the sake of the relief and tranquillity which retirement would afford. Though he does not say this in so many words, there runs through the whole maze of evidence on the subject the underlying implication that Washington's unwillingness to convert the Presidency into a life office, and so give the critics of the American system a valid cause for opposition, led him to establish the precedent that two terms were enough. As William Roscoe Thayer remarked in 1922: "More than once in the century and a quarter since he retired in 1797, over-ambitious Presidents have schemed to win a third election and flattering sycophants have encouraged them to believe that they could attain it. But before they came to the test Washington's example—'no more than two*—has [up until 1 9 4 0 ! ] blocked their advance. In this respect also we must admit that he looked far into the future and saw what would be best for posterity. The second term as it has proved is bad enough, diverting a President during his first term to devote much of his energy and attention to setting traps to secure the second." Thayer, George Washington, pp. 2 2 3 - 2 4 . 58 Beard and Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, I, 371 (italics mine). 64

3 THE FOUNTAIN

HEAD

I T IS IN T H E WRITINGS AND IN T H E ADMINISTRATION OF T H O M A S J E F -

ferson that the most potent arguments against a third presidential term may be found. What Jefferson had to say is worth examining, not only from this standpoint, but also because his views on the subject were neither "personally prejudiced nor conveniently partisan, but rather the reasoned result of deeply felt political principles." 1 Jefferson had not been one of the Founding Fathers j he was in France at the time of the Constitutional Convention, serving as American Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Louis X V I . But as soon as the new Constitution was drafted and his friends had written to him about it, he began to deluge its framers with letters from France, violently objecting to some of the document's provisions. In his autobiography, written in 1821, Jefferson, somewhat displeased, remarks that when he received a copy of the proceedings of the Convention, he found certain articles extremely objectionable, among them, "the reeligibility of the President for life [of which] I quite disapproved." 2 Going further, he observes: M y fears of that feature [«eligibility] were founded on the importance of the office, on the fierce contentions it might excite among ourselves, if continuable for life, and the dangers of interference either with money or arms, by foreign nations, to whom the choice of an American President might become interesting. . . . M y wish therefore was that the President should be elected for seven years and be ineligible afterwards. This term I thought sufficient to enable him, with the concurrence of the legislature, to carry thro' and establish any system of improvement he should propose for the 1 2

Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, p. 48. P. L. Ford (ed.), Writings of Thomas Jefferson, I, 109.

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general good. But the practice adopted I think is better allowing his continuance for eight years with a liability to be dropped at half way of the term, making that a period of probation. . . . The ex amfie of four Presidents voluntarily retiring at the end of their eighth year, and the progress of public opinion that the principle is salutary, have given it in practice the force of precedent and usage-, insomuch that should a President consent to be a candidate for a third election, I trust that he would be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views.6 A t an early date T h o m a s Jefferson assumed the role of "zealous and primitive" dissenter f r o m unlimited reeligibility of the president. F r o m the time the Constitution was framed in 1787 he espoused with ardor short terms of office. W r i t i n g to John A d a m s on November 13, 1787, Jefferson commented that the American president "seems a bad edition of a Polish K i n g . H e may be elected f r o m four years to four years, for l i f e . " "Reason and experience prove to us," he added, "that a chief magistrate so continuable, is an officer for l i f e . " W h e n a few generations shall have proved this, the presidential office becomes on every occasion " w o r t h y of intrigue, of bribery, of force, and even of foreign interference." Jefferson fervently wished that the Founding Fathers had made the chief executive " f o r e v e r ineligible a second time."

4

In a letter to Madison a f e w weeks later we find much the same view expressed as in that to Adams. T h e only way to prevent disorder in the government, u r g e d Jefferson, "is to render them [the elections] uninteresting by frequent changes." T h e sole effective preventive, he contended, w o u l d have been the exclusion of a second term, since "the power of removing him [the executive] every fourth year by the vote of the people is a power which w i l l not be exercised."

5

Jefferson had

fond hopes of an amendment prohibiting reeligibility, but felt that it w o u l d not come about right away. " O f this [perpetual reeligibility] I expect no amendment at present," he wrote, "because I do not see that anybody has objected to it on your side [ o f ] the water. But it will be productive of cruel distress to our country," he added, " e v e n in your day and mine."

6

Ibid., pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 (italics mine). Bergh (ed.), Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VI, 370. 5 P. L. Ford, Writings of . . . Jefferson, IV, 477-78 (Dec. 20, 1787). ® Jefferson to A . Donald, Feb. 7, 1788, ibid., VI, 426.

8 4

T H E FOUNTAIN HEAD

33

Even to Washington, Jefferson expressed his dislike of kings and his subsequent insistence that no monarchy or lifetime ruler be permitted to stem from the Constitution. " I was much an enemy to monarchy before I came to Europe," wrote our third President, " I am ten thousand times more so since I have seen what they are. There is scarcely an evil known in these countries which may not be traced to their kind as its source, nor a good which is not derived from the small fibres of republicanism existing among them." 7 Herein lies the root of Thomas Jefferson's opposition to perpetual reeligibility—the fear that it might result in monarchy. In his capacity as Minister to France, Jefferson could not but be influenced by what he saw in the French monarchy—both before and during the Revolution. H e became impregnated with a hatred and fear of monarchy in any sense, which, after he had traveled on the Continent, became so deeply rooted that when he was informed that the new Constitution did not prevent the perpetual reeligibility of the president, his fears assumed alarming proportions. By the time he wrote to Washington, Jefferson had become convinced that a constitutional amendment was necessary which would limit the president's term of office. "The 2d. amendment [he wrote] which appears to me essential is the restoring the principle of necessary rotation. . . . Of the correction of this article, however, I entertain no present hope, because I find it has scarcely excited an objection in America." 8 In his opinion, the Constitution should be adopted as it was and an amendment be added establishing the principle of necessary rotation in the office of president.9 Writing to Madison on November 18, 1788, Jefferson had rejoiced that "three States have at length considered the perpetual re-eligibility of the President, as an article which should be amended." 1 0 But despite Jefferson's efforts and despite the fact that three states had proposed an amendment to limit the president's term, his hope in that direction bore no results. Ultimately he realized how comparatively complacent the public was in the face of his fears of a potential American monarchy. Though he still opposed 7 8

¡bid., V, 8 (May 2, 1788). Jefferson to Edward Carrington, May 27, 1788, P. L. Ford,

ferson, V, 20. 8

Writings of . . . Jef-

Ibid., p. 25 (Jefferson to William Carmichael, June 3, 1788). Bergh, Writings of . . . Jefferson, VII, 184.

10

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perpetual «eligibility, he admitted that if a majority of the people continued to favor it he would acquiesce. 11 In 1792, however, Jefferson definitely backed down in the face of Washington's presidency j for he not only consented but strongly desired that Washington retain his office until the organization and administration of the new government were adequately effected. W h e n Washington had finally given way and agreed to accept a second term, Jefferson was among those who had strongly urged him to that end. 1 2 By so doing, Jefferson himself yielded to the plan of a four-year term permitting «eligibility. " I also thought [he wrote] a longer term of service, insusceptible of renewal, would have made a President more independent. M y country has thought otherwise, and I have acquiesced implicitly." 1 3 Insofar as Jefferson's original opinions on perpetual reeligibility are concerned, he erred completely in the prognostication on which they were founded. H e was supremely certain that perpetual «eligibility would mean perpetual reelection. Perhaps he was thinking of Washington, in whose case a third and even a fourth term could have been had for the asking. But the very fact that John Adams could not even get himself elected a second time, coupled with the fact that in the last 150 years no president, until the time of Franklin Roosevelt, has succeeded in attaining a third term (many did not even gain a second), amply refutes Jefferson's prediction. N o sooner was Jefferson himself ensconced in the presidency, however, than he announced "that it was his decided purpose, when he entered the presidency, to retire at the end of one term to a life of tranquility." 14 It became apparent, as his term progressed, that Jefferson was by no means keen for reelection. T h e political atmosphere reeked with controversy that had become almost rancorous. T h e Federalists were consumed in a struggle for their very existence. Political conflict disgusted Jefferson; he was much happier in an atmosphere of friendship and serenity. 18 T h e n , too, the demands of his party fell Ibid., V I I , 324 (Jefferson to Colonel Humphreys, March 18, See chap, ii, p. 20 above. Note especially Jefferson's letter to 1 8 Jefferson to Washington, Sept. 9, 1792, P. L . Ford, Writings V I , 105. 1 4 Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson, p. 243. T h e author finds Muzzey this citation. 1 5 Bowers, Jefferson in Power, p. 2 $ j . 11

12

1789). Washington. of . . . Jefferson, the only source for

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heavily upon him; he was no longer so young, and his age was beginning to tell. But more compelling than either of these factors was the "bitterness and malevolence" of the Federalist attacks, which would have made retirement seem like defeat. 1 6 T h e President decided to put his popularity to the test. Early in 1804, according to Muzzey, he wrote to Governor McKean that "the abominable slanders of my political enemies have obliged me to call for a verdict from my country in the only way it can be obtained." 1 7 Shortly thereafter, Jefferson informed Elbridge Gerry that "the unbounded calumnies of the federal party" forced him to seek another term, when his greatest desire had been to retire at the end of his first term. " I f we can keep the vessel of State as steadily in her course for another four years," he added, " m y earthly purposes will be accomplished, and I shall be free to enjoy . . . my family, my farm, and my books." 1 8 Four months later the President confided to a friend that "at the end of the next four years I shall certainly retire. Age, inclination, and principle all dictate this." 1 9 T h e above testimony indicates that the factor which impelled Jefferson to seek a second term was his desire for vindication. H e allowed himself to be renominated by a Congressional caucus, with George Clinton, of New York, as his running mate. The desire of his party was unanimous and his reelection all but inevitable. When the votes had been counted, it was found that the Jeffersonian Democrats had been swept into office. Jefferson himself had bored deep into New England, the stronghold of Federalist support, for even Massachusetts cast all her electoral votes for him. 20 Thus by the time his first four years in the presidency had expired, Jefferson expressed no misgivings about seeking reelection. On the contrary, he seemed to feel, and even admitted, that because of the political situation which existed at the time, he owed it both to himself and to his party to accept renomination. As one author has put it: Jefferson could not bring himself to decline a second term. He can hardly be seriously blamed for this, though certainly he became guilty of still an16

17 Ibid. Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson, p. 243. Bergh, Writings of . . . Jefferson, XI, 16 (March 3, 1804). 19 Jefferson to Philip Mazzei, July 18, 1804, Berg-h, Writings of . . . Jefferson, X I , 40. 20 Bowers, Jefferson in Power, p. 266. 18

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other inconsistency, which he defended only by so-called reasons which deserved the less honorable n a m e of excuses. . . .

So the Federalists were

told that they might thank their own ill-temper for the continuance of their much hated opponent in the presidency. T h e y must seek such c o m f o r t as they could find in his asseveration that he was very unhappy about i t . 2 1

But political expediency was not to dictate Jefferson's position in regard to a third term. H e determined that two terms were enough. Just before the beginning of his second administration, on January 6, 1805, he made this clear in a very significant letter to John Taylor: M y opinion

[wrote Jefferson]

originally was that the President o f the

U n i t e d States should have been elected for seven years, and forever i n eligible afterwards. I have since bcome sensible that seven years is too l o n g to be irremovable, and that there should be a peaceable way of withdrawing a man in midway who is doing w r o n g . T h e service for eight years with a power to remove at the end of the first four, comes nearly to my principle as corrected by experience. A n d it is in adherence to that that I determined to withdraw at the end of my second t e r m . T h e danger is that the indulgence and attachments of the people will keep a man in the chair a f t e r he becomes a dotard, that re-election through life shall become habitual, and election for life follow that. G e n e r a l W a s h i n g t o n set the example of voluntary retirement after eight years. I shall follow it, and a few more precedents will oppose the obstacle of habit to anyone after a while who shall endeavor to extend his t e r m . Perhaps it may beget a disposition to establish it by an a m e n d ment of the Constitution. . . .

I had determined to declare my intention,

but I have consented to be silent on the opinion of friends, w h o think it best not to put a continuance out o f my power in defiance of all c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 2 2

Jefferson still sought to safeguard with an amendment what he hoped, in lieu of an amendment, would become a custom. Notwithstanding, further on in the same letter he admitted that he might ap21

Morse, Thomas Jefferson, pp. 239-40. Along a similar line of criticism, we have: " I t must be deeply lamented that he suffered the clamor of enemies to divert him from establishing a precedent of so much vital consequence to the purity and duration of our free institutions. The reasons he adduces for this dereliction are such as might with equal force be alleged for a continuance in the office for life. How much of real glory he lost by missing the opportunity of putting the seal of sincerity and the test of consistency on his original professions, can only be estimated by a full and just consideration of the difficulty attending the sacrifice of ambition to principle; of resisting the temptation of personal vanity for the enduring future applause of mankind." Smucker, Life and Times of Thomas Jefferson, pp. 274-75. 22 P. L. Ford, Writings of . . . Jefferson, VIII, 339.

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prove and even run for a third term in one exceptional, but very unlikely situation—namely, circumstances in which " a division about a successor . . . might bring in a monarchist." 2 3 T h e most formidable enemy of the third term in all American history here admits that he might change his mind and modify his principles "in case of an emergency." Jefferson then confided to T a y l o r that though he would make no formal public declaration to this effect, he would, in the absence of such an emergency, certainly retire at the end of his second term. 24 L o n g before the end of his second administration, in fact, two months before it even started, President Jefferson had made known his determination to retire. T h e threat of a monarchist did not appear, and he had been loaded down with honors. Moreover, he was tired. A s early as January 13, 1807, at the crest of his popularity, he had informed a friend of his intention to retire at the end of his present term. " T h e weight of public business begins to be too heavy for me," he wrote, "and I long for the enjoyments of rural life. . . . I am entitled to my discharge." 25 T h a t Jefferson was extremely weary of the cares of an office which brought "nothing but unceasing drudgery and daily loss of friends" is quite evident from his letters written at the time. 26 Jefferson's attitude reflected many of the characteristics which had marked that of Washington. " M y determination to retire," he confided to a friend, "is the result of mature reflections, and on various considerations, not the least weighty of these, is that a consciousness that a decline of physical faculties can not leave those mental entirely unimpaired." 27 Notwithstanding, the President still clung to his deeply rooted opposition to an extended term of office. H e continued to voice his opinion thus: " I f some period be not fixed, either by the Constitution or by practice, to the services of the First Magistrate, his office, though nominally elective, will, in fact, be for life; and that will soon degenerate into an inheritance." 28 In the years 1806 and 1807, before the Embargo Act and its woeful 24 Ibid., p. 340. Ibid. Jefferson to Comte de Diodato, Randolph ( e d . ) , The Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson, p. 313. 2 6 Bergh, Writings of . . . Jefferson, X I , 137. 2 7 Jefferson to William Short, M a y 19, 1807, P. L . Ford, Writings of . . . Jefferson, IX, 50. 2 8 Jefferson to Isaac Weaver, Jr., June 7, 1807, Bergh, Writings of . . . Jefferson, X I , 220. 23

25

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consequences, Jefferson's power and popularity reached their crest. As one author has put it: " B y a mere nodding of his head, by silence even, he could have been elected for a third term. Legislatures were asking him to reconsider his decision, and friends were asking him to remain at the helm." 29 On November 5, 1806, the Vermont state legislature passed a resolution inviting Jefferson to serve for four more years. 30 N o less than eight—out of seventeen state legislatures—followed this procedure. In answer to the Vermont invitation, the first of these, Jefferson made his strongest and best-known polemic against the third term: T h a t I should lay down my charge at a proper period, is as much a duty as to have borne it faithfully. If some termination to the services of the Chief Magistrate be not fixed by the Constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nominally four years, will in fact, become for life; and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance. Believing that a representative government, responsible at short periods of election, is that which produces the greatest sum of happiness to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which shall essentially impair that principle; and I should unwillingly be the person who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the example of prolongation beyond the second term of office. T r u t h also, requires me to add, that I am sensible of that decline which advancing years bring on; and feeling their physical, I ought not to doubt their mental effect. Happy if I am the first to perceive and to obey this admonition of nature, and to solicit a retreat from cares too great for the wearied faculties of a g e . 3 1

Identical answers were sent to the other seven petitions. This declaration of Jefferson's was wholly sincere. It reveals another, though secondary reason which contributed to his decision—the fact that he had grown sick and tired of the cares of state. Not only state legislatures but many of his friends as well were asking Jefferson "to remain at the helm." " Y o u are still more useful to your country by remaining at the head of its government than you were as an instrument in its declara29

Bowers, Jefferson in Power, p. 475. Bergh, Writings of . . . Jefferson, X V I , 193. Similar resolutions were also passed by seven states: Georgia (Dec. 6, 1 8 0 6 ) ; Rhode Island (Feb. 27, 1 8 0 7 ) ; New York (March 13, 1807) ; Pennsylvania (March 13, 1807) ; Maryland (Jan. 3, 1807) ; New Jersey (Dec. 4, 1807) ; and North Carolina (about the same time). Ibid. 81 Jefferson to the Vermont State Legislature, Dec. 10, 1807, Bergh, Writings of . . . Jefferson, X V I , 293-94. 80

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39

tion of independence," wrote Pierre du Pont de Nemours on August 7 , 1 8 0 7 . " H o w can you think, in such a situation, of retiring?" 3 2 But Jefferson was not to be moved from his position. As Claude Bowers has put it: I t w a s more natural for Jefferson to think of retiring than of breaking the precedent set by W a s h i n g t o n . H e had strongly regretted the absence of a constitutional prohibition of re-election to the Presidency . . . but W a s h ington's voluntary retirement at the end of a second term had reconciled him to the absence of a clause of limitation. 3 3

" Y o u suppose I am 'in the prime of life for r u l e , ' " Jefferson wrote to H e n r y Guest on January 4, 1809. " I am not; and before I am so far declined as to become insensible of it, I think it right to put it out of my own power." 34 One cannot dismiss the reasons for Jefferson's retirement from the presidency after two terms with the simple explanation that he was both opposed to a third term on principle and weary of the cares of public office. There is too much evidence to show the presence of another factor, a factor which reveals a purely personal desire for retiring — t h e failure of Jefferson's foreign policy in regard to the European war. T h e Embargo Act was more destructive to American business and agriculture than the English and French depredations on our seagoing ships. " T h e country at large, angry and impotent," writes Charles A . Beard, "broke into furious wrangling, with editors raging and Federalist politicians fuming." 35 Y e t Jefferson could not abandon his policy. In the words of one writer, " H e was pained to see his party defeated, but his chief anxiety was becoming personal, centering in the desire to escape from his embarrassing position." 36 Heartily sick of the whole matter, he gave vent to his feelings in a letter to his good friend, D u Pont de Nemours on March 2,1809. " N e v e r , " he groaned, on the expiration of his last term, "did a prisoner released from his chains feel such relief as I shall on shaking off the shackles of power. 82 Malone (ed.), Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, p. 96. " Bowers, Jefferson in Po Jackson to Van Buren, Dec. 6, 1831, ibid., IV, 379. " James, Andrew Jackson, p. 294. * 2 Buell, History of Andrew Jackson, II, 346. 83 Jackson to Brigadier General John Coffee, Nov. 21, 1831, Bassett, Corresfondence of . . . Jackson, IV, 377.

52

T H E

T R A D I T I O N

I M P L E M E N T E D

Jackson's desire for retirement after one term was indeed a sincere one. As in the case of Jefferson, circumstances arose which impelled the President to seek a second election. As one author has put it: H e [ J a c k s o n ] had no strong desire, if a n y , f o r a second term, to w h i c h he w a s mildly opposed on general principles;

he seriously doubted outliving

the term for which he had been elected; a n d he w a s naturally solicitous c o n cerning the man into whose hands the Presidency m i g h t pass f r o m his. 3 4

This was all very well until the bank issue arose and sectional conflict seemed imminent over the nullification controversy. These factors, coupled with a great outburst of public acclaim, made it appear to Jackson that it was not only expedient but absolutely necessary for him to seek a second term—if only to vindicate himself and his administration. For in 1832 he had said that reelection would satisfy him as vindication and that he would then resign, leaving Van Buren in the presidency. 33 But this last he never even contemplated after March 4, 1833, being too obsessed by his hatred of Calhoun and by the nullification situation.30 With various state legislatures constantly endorsing him for reelection, Andrew Jackson was unanimously nominated by the First National Convention of the Democratic party. What is more, the choice of Van Buren for Vice President, which Jackson had ordered, was secured. The election was an exciting one, and the President's stand was immensely popular. As was anticipated, Jackson was easily victorious over Henry Clay, candidate of the National Republican party, the newly formed opposition to " O l d Hickory." Jackson's popular vote slightly exceeded that of 1828 and even broke the opposition in New England. H e received 2 1 9 out of 288 electoral votes—74 more than a majority} Van Buren got 189, or 44 more than a majority. 37 Clay received only 49 and William Wirt, the Anti-Mason candidate, only 7. 38 Immediately, some of the more enthusiastic of the Jackson newspapers nominated the General for a third term. 38 Wirt, the Anti-Mason 34 35 38 38

W . O. Stoddard, Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, p. 2 1 0 . Bowers, Party Battles of the Jackson Period, p. 240. 37 Ibid., p. 252. Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, I, 164. 39 Ibid. James, Andrew Jackson, p. 3 1 0 .

THE

TRADITION

IMPLEMENTED

53

candidate, remarked in a letter of November 15, 1832, to John T . Lomas: WI see that General Jackson has been already nominated by one of the northern papers for a third term. M y opinion is, he may be President for life, if he chooses." 40 But the victorious one cherished other desires. Jackson paid little attention to the results of the election, being too engrossed in the nullification controversy. "What would I not give," he wrote, "to be free . . . and in retirement at the Hermitage . . . the best thing about this [huge plurality] . . . is that it strengthens my hands in this [nullification] trouble." 4 1 One writer is convinced that Jackson himself had a program in mind when he accepted a second term. H e writes: It [Jackson's running again] was an essential part of the programme. It was that which alone could make the rest of the programme possible. . . . T h e n there was a programme? Most assuredly. T h e "Jackson party" came into power against the "Secretary dynasty"; but that party had not been in power a year before it had arranged a programme of succession so long, that it would have required twenty-four years to play it out. It was divided into three parts of eight years each: Andrew Jackson, eight years; Martin Van Buren, eight years; Thomas H. Benton, eight years. It will be safe for any one to deny this, because such programmes are never put into writing, and can seldom be proved. But I am assured it is a fact. T h e intelligent reader will find evidence of it in the political history of the time. 42

This hypothesis is interesting, if only for its improbability. Another author regards Jackson's second election as a triumphant vindication of him in all the points in which he had been engaged in controversy with anybody, and a kind of charter to him, as representative, or rather tribune, of the people, to go on and govern on his own judgement over and against everybody, including Congress. 43

On March 4, 1833, Jackson assumed the presidency for the second time, with no thought of turning it over to Van Buren before the expiration of the term. Judging from his letters, the President still longed for retirement, and it was only the feeling that his services were needed which impelled him to stay on. It was a sort of call to duty to " O l d Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt, II, 331. 4 2 Parton, Life of . . . Jackson, 111,297. James, Andrew Jackson, p. 310. 4* Sumner, Andrew Jackson as a Public Man, p. 277.

40 41

54

THE

TRADITION

IMPLEMENTED

Hickory." Shortly after his second inauguration, in speaking of the bank controversy, he wrote: But such has been the scenes of corruption in our last Congress, that I loath the corruption of human nature and long for retirement and repose on the Hermitage. But until I can strangle the hydra of corruption, the Bank, I will not shrink from my duty, or my part. 44

Soon after Jackson's second inauguration mild talk arose of his accepting a third term. But it never went beyond the stage of "mere chatter." For example, on November 5 , 1 8 3 3 , the Philadelphia Sentinel proposed the President for a third term, only to have another journal retort with the observation that the suggestion that Jackson run a third time was nothing short of "a preposterous one." 45 A year later, when there was as yet no real movement in favor of a third term, a leading weekly commented: T h e report is revived, that the president of the United States lias expressed a willingness to serve a third term—if indispensably necessary [the present writer finds no evidence of such a statement by Jackson] ! W e mention the renewal of this report, but do not believe that it has any foundation in truth. T h e people, if agreeing to elect a president for a third term—will shew themselves prepared for a monarchy; which we do not "exactly" think that they are. 4 6

There was never any concerted effort to draft Jackson for a third term, though he probably could have had it for the asking, so firm was his control of his party and of the country. The "movement" toward this end remained idle talk plus a few newspaper endorsements. Early in 1835, when the state of Mississippi endorsed Van Buren for president and Ohio followed with John McLean, the country knew "which way the wind was blowing." 47 As one author has remarked, "There was some talk of a third term for Jackson, but it never grew strong. The precedents were against it. Jackson's bad health and Van Buren's aspirations were perhaps stronger objections." 48 Jackson, insofar as we know, never intimated that he either desired 44

Jackson to Rev. Hardy M . Cryer, April 7, 1 8 3 3 , Bassett, Correspondence of , . . Jackson, V, S345 46 Mies' Register, X L V , 1 6 1 , 201. Ibid., X L V 1 I , 145 (Nov. 4, 1 8 3 4 ) . 47 48 Ibid., pp. 3 13, 378-79. Sumner, Andrew Jackson as a Public Man, p. 375.

THE TRADITION IMPLEMENTED

55

or would accept a third term. He neither wanted nor would have acceded to the wishes of others in accepting another such mandate. John Quincy Adams, writing at the time, claimed that the President had "wearied out the sordid subserviency of his supporters." 49 This is not at all unlikely. Whatever the case, Jackson, who by the end of his "reign" was sick in health and nearly seventy years old, ordered and secured the nomination and election of his personal choice for the presidency—Martin Van Buren. This process had begun four years before when Jackson, against bitter opposition, had forced the rather unpopular Van Buren to be named as his running mate for the second campaign. Small wonder that Van Buren had been so eager for Jackson's reelection in 1832. The election of 1836 came off satisfactorily for Jackson. Van Buren was elected, though not by the margin the President had anticipated.80 The latter was overjoyed at the New Yorker's election. In the words of one writer, "General Jackson beheld the consummation of his most cherished hopes in the election of Mr. Van Buren to the presidency." 5 1 As for the outgoing President, he contemplated retirement with eagerness. Bemoaning his illness, he could not wait to return to the Hermitage, there to spend the rest of his days in happiness and tranquillity.52 Grimly hanging on to the end, the President wrote his friend, Nicholas Trist, two days before he was to be relieved of his duties: T o m o r r o w ends m y official career forever, on the 4th I hope to be able to go to the capitol to witness the glorious scene of M r . V a n B u r e n , once rejected by the Senate, sworn into office, by Chief Justice T a n e y , also being rejected by the factious S e n a t e . 5 3

On March 4, 1837, in his somewhat pathetic Farewell Address the aging President declared: " M y own race is nearly run; advanced age and failing health warn me that before long I must pass beyond the C. F . Adams (ed.), Memoirs of Jokn Quincy Adams, 1795—1848, I X , 3 1 2 . Van Buren himself said that he had been mentioned as Jackson's successor in 1836 "more through the ill-will of opponents than the partiality of friends." Nties' Register, X L V I I I , 2 5750 81 James, Andrew Jackson, p. 4 2 1 . Parton, Life of . . . Jackson, I I I , 593. 52 Jackson to Maunsel White, Dec. 2, 1836, Bassett, Correspondence of . . . Jackson, V, 440. « Ibid., V, 462-63.

56

THE

TRADITION

IMPLEMENTED

reach of human events and cease to feel the vicissitudes of human affairs." 54 The next day Jackson returned to the Hermitage. Like Jefferson, Jackson favored a constitutional amendment to put a definite limit on constant reelections. But he took a far stronger stand than Jefferson had ever dared to take. Jackson believed that the President of the United States should be limited not to two terms but to one. H e advocated just such an amendment in six of his eight annual messages to Congress. In a rough draft of his first annual message Jackson proposed "to limit the service of the President of the U[nited] States to a single term; whether of four or six years seems not material." 65 T h e reasons which he adduced in support of this arrangement were first, that the president must receive his power at the hands of the people, for the merit of the possession of responsibility and care is obliterated if the office is gained through any other means; and second, that a single term will make for an honest and faithful discharge of the president's duties. 56 In the message as Jackson finally sent it he merely suggested that "it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of either four or six years." 57 In his second message, on December 6, 1830, the President strengthened his appeal: In order [he said], particularly, that his appointment may as far as possible be placed beyond the reach of any improper influences; in order that he may approach the solemn responsibilities of the highest office in the gift of a free people uncommitted to any other course than the strict line of constitutional duty, and that the securities for this independence may be rendered as strong as the nature of power and the weakness of its possessor will admit, I can not too earnestly invite your attention to the propriety of promoting such an amendment of the Constitution as will render him ineligible after one term of service. 88

On December 6, 1 8 3 1 , in his third message, Jackson reiterated his recommendations.59 By the time of his fourth message the proposal M

Thorpe (ed.), The Statesmanship of Andrei» Jackson, p. 5 1 5 . As early as 1 8 3 1 , Jackson had considered the idea of publishing a farewell address to the people upon his retirement, which he at one time contemplated to be at the end of his first term. Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson, p. 228. 55 Bassett, Correspondence of . . . Jackson, IV, 99. 56 07 Ibid. Thorpe, The Statesmanship of . . . Jackson, p. 44. 59 "/W,p.no. Ibid., p. i s 1 .

THE TRADITION IMPLEMENTED

57

had grown somewhat milder in tone. The President merely called the attention of Congress to his previous suggestions.60 And well he might have, too, for scarcely a month before Jackson had accepted reelection. His failure to abide by his own principle, when confronted by domestic problems and in the absence of the constitutional prohibition he had sought, did not deter him from continuing his proposal. In his fifth annual message Jackson again repeated his request for a four or a sixyear term. 61 In his sixth message he was still insisting that a single term would offer an "additional safeguard" to the people's liberties.62 Jackson, unlike Jefferson, apparently grew tired of the "crusade." All mention of the idea of a constitutional amendment disappeared from his last two messages. Perhaps he had become discouraged. Or, what is more likely, his silence may be attributed to the fact that of the twenty-odd amendments limiting presidential tenure that were proposed in Congress during his administration, many were sponsored by his political enemies and directed solely against him. In Jackson's Farewell Address there was not even a word about following or strengthening a sacred tradition. Andrew Jackson, though he did not seek a third term, obviously did not rest his failure to do so on grounds of principle or adherence to precedent. With no amendment having been passed by Congress, acceptance of a third term would have constituted for Jackson no more a violation of his avowed principles than was acceptance of a second term. As for his proposal of a constitutional amendment limiting presidential reeligibility, there is neither reason nor evidence to suppose that Jackson was not sincere in making such a recommendation or that he was conscious of any inconsistency in repeating it in his annual messages of 1830 and 1831 when it was assumed he would be a candidate to succeed himself, or in that of 1832, when he had just been overwhelmingly reelected.63 In the words of one writer: T h e amendment of the Constitution w a s a matter for the people to act upon, and if they did not choose, even after repeated invitation, to make a change in this respect, Jackson had no scruples about availing himself of all the privileges which the instrument accorded to him. 8 4 80 88 84

01 Ibid., p. 197. Ibid., pp. 303-4. MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy, 1839-1837, Ibid.

52

p. 183.

Ibid., p. 391.

58

T H E

T R A D I T I O N

I M P L E M E N T E D

Like Washington, Jackson retired after two terms largely because he was tired, his health was poor, and old age had set in; he wanted to go home. Like Jefferson, he left the office of President, secure in the knowledge that both his policies and his philosophy of government would be continued by a "hand-picked" successor. By way of analogy, acceptance of a second term in reality constituted no more an infraction of his own principles for " O l d Hickory" than it did for Thomas Jefferson. In the eyes of both men, expediency demanded itj hence, any vestige of "principle" was lightly and politely thrown to the four winds in the face of unforeseen events. 65 President Jackson probably could have had a third term for the asking. As one author has very aptly put it: A l t h o u g h J a c k s o n apparently recognized the force of the third-term tradition, and wisely took no steps to break it, it w a s he w h o chose his successor, and forced him upon a reluctant electorate with all the energy and power w h i c h personal and official prestige, joined to control of the federal patrona g e , could g i v e . 6 6

Andrew Jackson's declination to seek a third term served to implement further the sentiment for a two-term limit. Whatever his reasons for so doing, both his attitude and his action in regard to the President's term of office designate Jackson as one of the chief opponents of indefinite executive reeligibility. It was during his administration, together with those of James Madison and James Monroe, that the precedent which Washington and Jefferson had established became firmly rooted in the American political system. By the close of General Jackson's second administration, this precedent had assumed the character of unwritten law and may henceforth be referred to as a tradition. 65 N.B. In many circles this was regarded as the case. T h e result was that in 1 8 3 2 much of Jackson's opposition stemmed from those who considered his running again as inconsistent with his former declarations and as a violation of his avowed proposal to establish a single presidential term. Niles' Register, X L , 387. ® 9 MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy, p. 292.

5 INTERLUDET H E ISSUE

DORMANT

I N T H E FIRST I O O YEARS OF OUR N A T I O N A L E X I S T E N C E OVER 1 2 5 CON-

stitutional amendments were submitted to the Congress of the United States to change the term of President and fix the period of eligibility. These stemmed chiefly from the fear that the President might use the patronage of his office to secure his reelection. M o r e than 50 of these were proposals to set the term at six years. It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss at length all of these amendments. Instead, those will be considered which specifically refer to or were directed against certain of our chief magistrates in the period from 1789 to 1870 inclusive. 1 T h e first amendment to limit the President's term to six years was advocated by M r . Hemphill, of Pennsylvania, in 1826 as one of the provisions of his resolution for the election of the President. 2 T h i s change was favored at different periods from that time on, in later years more frequently than before. M a n y of these amendments stipulated that the President should be ineligible for reelection. 3 Only one proposal was made reducing the length of the term as fixed by the Constitution. This was in the amendment suggested by Senator Hillhouse in 1808 in connection with his plan for choosing the President by lot from the retiring Senators. T h e term of office was fixed at one year. 1 For a list of proposed amendments to the Constitution limiting the President's term of office, see Ames, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 1789 to 1889, Appendix A , pp. 306-421. 2 Ibid., p. 123. T h e writer is indebted to thi« work by Herman V. Ames for much of the material in this chapter. 3 See ibid., Appendix A .

6o

THE

ISSUE

DORMANT

Other than the amendments proposing to increase the term to six years, only two proposals were made to extend the present period to any other term of years. T h e first of these, placing the term at five years, was proposed by M r . Tucker in 1 8 3 1 ; 4 the other, extending the term to eight years, was introduced by Hudd, of Wisconsin, in 1888. 5 Many of these amendments did not propose to change the term of the President as fixed by the Constitution, but to limit the number of times the same person could be chosen President. The amendments on this phase of the subject fall into three groups: 1. Propositions limiting the same person to two terms; 2. Propositions restricting the President from being eligible to reelection until after the expiration of a certain number of years; 3. Propositions restricting the President to one term only. T h e New York state convention which ratified the new Constitution proposed an amendment with the first of these objects in view. This same proposition, however, was not brought before Congress itself until 1 8 2 3 , toward the end of Monroe's second term, when sentiment became strong enough to result in the suggestion of an amendment to clinch the two-term rule. With a closely contested election impending for the first time in a quarter century, Senator Dickerson presented an amendment containing a provision that the President be limited to two terms. 6 In arguing for it, Dickerson brought the unwritten-law idea into play for perhaps the first time when he asserted that the tradition itself had already "acquired, in some degree, the force of law." 7 A somewhat similar clause was incorporated in a resolution of the Senate Committee on Elections the next year. 8 At this session a resolution limited to this subject passed the Senate by the overwhelming majority of 36 to 3, after an interesting move to modify the amendment in order to allow three non-successive terms had been voted down. 9 But the House never reported the resolution from committee, where it was allowed to die. Again, when John Quincy Adams had entered the White House 'Ibid., p. 124. 'Ibid. 'Ibid. T Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, p. J J . 8 Ames, Proposed Amendments, p. 124. 'Ibid.; Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, p. 55.

T H E ISSUE D O R M A N T

6l

without a plurality of votes, let alone even a majority, Dickerson proposed his amendment. Again, it passed the Senate, but the vote in the House showed that it could not secure the support of two-thirds of that body. 10 Obviously the House, which after all had elected Adams, against whom the amendment was in part directed, either did not agree or did not care and once more let the proposal die. In 1830 Senator Dickerson made another ineffectual attempt to secure the adoption of his amendment, but this time could not even bring it to a vote in the Senate. 11 Not until 1876 was this same proposal revived. A n amendment providing that the President should not be a candidate for reelection until after a certain number of years had expired was proposed as early as the First Congress, when M r . Tucker, of South Carolina, advocated adding an amendment to the list to be proposed to the states making it impossible for any person to remain President more than eight in any term of twelve years. 12 This and a similar amendment were lost in committee; 1 3 it might very well be that Washington was influenced somewhat by these propositions when he was urged to accept a third term in 1796. In 1803 a Senate committee reported a resolution providing that "no person who had been twice successfully elected President shall be eligible as President until four years elapse, when he may be eligible to the office for four years, and no longer." 14 W h e n acted upon, this resolution was rejected by the decisive vote of 25 to 4. Between 1826 and 1850 there were seven such resolutions proposed, four of which were introduced by Underwood, of Kentucky, to prevent any President from being eligible to office for the next term following his first. T h e idea of a single term for the executive which came so close to being adopted at the Constitutional Convention was embodied in some ninety resolutions and proposed amendments covering this period. T h e first was proposed in 1815 as one of the recommendations advocated at the Hartford Convention by the Massachusetts and Connecticut members under the direction of their legislatures. These resolutions pro1 0 Ames, Profosed Amendments, p. 125. It is interesting to note in regard to this proposal that Thomas H . Benton voted against it, though he later joined with Jackson in advocating a single term. Ibid., p. 125, n. 1. 11 14

12 Ibid., p. 126. 1 3 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., Dec. 12, 1803. Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2 x 3 - 1 5 .

62

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D O R M A N T

vided also that the President should not be elected from the same state for two successive terms and served to reflect N e w England's jealousy of Virginia. 1 5 T h i s change was not again proposed until Andrew Jackson was defeated in 1824. It then appeared repeatedly, both in the form of a direct amendment and as a provision of many of the amendments advocating a new method of electing the President. Between 1826 and 1846 this proposal was made some forty-five times. 16 A f t e r Jackson's retirement, especially, did the agitation increase for such an amendment. Sentiment had become stronger in favor of a one-term rather than a two-term rule, though this sentiment cannot truly be said to have been the result of Jackson's own declaration on the subject. Rather was it due to the fact that the country resented Jackson's complete control over the nation and his amazing success in keeping his finger in the pie another four years. As a result of Jackson's own recommendation, a proposal of this nature was considered in 1835 in some detail. 17 Congressmen from all parts of the country advocated the change at one time or another. None of the amendments was ever passed by both houses, however, and John Quincy Adams, in his "Jubilee Address" in 1839, declared: T h e example of Washington of retiring from the Presidency after a double term of four years, was followed by M r . Jefferson, against the urgent solicitation of several State Legislatures. T h i s second example of voluntary selfchastened ambition, by the decided approbation of public opinion, has been held obligatory upon their successors, and has become a tacit subsidiary constitutional law. If not entirely satisfactory to the nation, it is rather by its admitting one re-election than by its interdicting a second. 1 8

T h a t this declaration reflected public sentiment at the time is shown by the fact that within the ten years between 1832 and 1842 the legislatures of nine states proposed resolutions favoring a single term for the President. 19 Even the W h i g party committed itself to this prin1 5 See Henry Adams ( e d . ) , Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1 8 1 5 , p. 322, for John Quincy Adams' comment on this. 1 6 Ames, Proposed Amendments, 1 7 Ibid. p. 127. 1 8 Cited in O'Neil, The American Electoral System, p. 236. 1 9 Ames, Proposed Amendments, p. 127.

1800-

THE

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63

ciple in 1 8 4 0 . 2 0 A f t e r 1 8 4 6 , however, the proposal was not made again for several years. M r . Vallandigham, of Ohio, advocated an amendment embodying this restriction in the plan for electing the President recommended by him in 1 8 6 1 . H i s scheme further provided that the restriction might be abrogated at the wish of two-thirds of all the electors of each section or of the states of each section when the election devolved upon Congress. 2 1 Foremost among American jurists at this time stood J o h n Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1 8 0 1 to 1 8 3 5 . W h e n consulted about the advantages of changing the Constitution so as to prohibit presidential reeligibility, Marshall, on January 1 , 1 8 2 8 , commented thus: I . . . think the argument against the re-eligibility of the president, very Strong. Public opinion is, I believe, taking a decided direction towards this point; and, I am disposed to think, in its favor. Some difference may exist respecting the time for which the chief magistrate ought to be elected— more perhaps, than on the propriety of his being re-eligible . . . though not very fond of experiments, I should be disposed to try the effect of confining the chief magistrate to a single t e r m . 2 2 A year later J a m e s Buchanan, then a M e m b e r of Congress, but destined to become President of the United States f r o m 1 8 5 7 to 1 8 6 1 , declared in regard to a proposal limiting the executive term to four years: T h e example of Washington, which has been followed by J e f f e r s o n , M a d i son, and M o n r o e , has forever determined that no President shall be more than once re-elected. T h i s principle is n o w become as sacred as if it were written in the Constitution. I would incline to leave it to the people of the United States, without incorporating it in the Constitution, to decide whether a President should serve longer than one term. 2 3 20

Georgia ( 1 8 3 3 ) , Indiana ( 1 S 3 7 ) , Maine ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Massachusetts ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Rhode Island ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Connecticut ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Indiana ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Delaware ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Vermont ( 1 8 4 1 ) , Vermont (1842), and Kentucky (1842). 21 22 Ames, Proposed Amendments, p. 128. Nties' Register, XXXV, 314. 23 Register of Debates in Congress, 20th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 321 (Feb. 6, 1829). Buchanan in his Inaugural Address on March 4, 1857, announced that he had "determined not to become a candidate for reelection." Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Pafers of the Presidents, IV, 2962.

64

THE

ISSUE

DORMANT

William Henry Harrison "felt it a primary duty" in accepting the nomination of the Whig party in x 840 to assert the onerterm principle thus: "Among the principles proper to be adopted by an Executive sincerely desiring to restore the Administration to its original simplicity and purity, I deem the following of importance: first, to confine his services to a single term." 24 During the campaign which resulted in his election, Harrison declared: " I f the privilege of being President of the United States had been limited to one term, the incumbent would devote all his time to the public interest, and there would be no cause to misrule the country," and he concluded by pledging himself "before Heaven and earth, if elected President of the United States, to lay down at the end of the term faithfully, that high trust at the feet of the people." 2 5 But Harrison never lived to finish out his term, dying scarcely a month after his inauguration. Henry Clay, founder of the Whig party and long an eminent figure in national politics, also favored the one-term principle and publicly endorsed it in a speech on June 27, 1840, when, after asking for " a provision to render a person ineligible to the office of President of the United States after a service of one term," he explained the necessity of the amendment by saying, "much observation and deliberate reflection have satisfied me that too much of the time, the thoughts, and the exertions, of the incumbent, are occupied during the first term in securing his reelection. The public consequently suffers." 28 In a letter dated September 1 3 , 1842, while setting forth what he calls "principal objects engaging the common desire and common exertion of the Whig party," Clay proposes "an amendment to the Constitution, limiting the incumbent of the Presidential office to a single term." 27 T h e Whigs on M a y 1 , 1 8 4 4 , at their National Convention nominated Henry Clay for President and Theodore Frelinghuysen for Vice President with a platform advocating "a single term for the Presidency," as among "the great principles of the Whig party; principles inseparable from the public honor and prosperity, to be maintained and advanced by the election of these candidates." 28 This declaration was reasserted by none other than Daniel Webster, when he declared that "the limitation of a President to a single term" was among the objects 24

25

2a

28

Congressional Globe, 42(1 Cong., 2d Sess., p. 259. Ibid. "Ibid.

Ibid. Ibid., p. 260.

T H E ISSUE D O R M A N T

65

"for which the W h i g party will unceasingly strive until their efforts are crowned with a signal and triumphant success." 29 Most of this talk and activity had assumed a purely political tinge. The era of fitting second or third-term scruples to partisan ends was about to begin. Even the press fell in line, one journal vehemently opposing the one-term proposal.30 Nevertheless, the agitation in favor thereof continued. T h e election of 1864 provides us with an interesting situation. It was the first election since Van Buren's time in which a President, once elected, was seeking a second term. And twenty-five years had seen considerable sentiment spring up against a second term for any President. Such was the state of public opinion with which Abraham Lincoln found himself confronted when, after three trying years of civil war, he sought reelection in an attempt to end the struggle and to reunite the opposing factions. Lincoln, characteristically, never committed himself definitely, insofar as we know, to any single-term proposal. By closely scrutinizing a sentence of his Inaugural Address, however, it could be adduced that the Great Emancipator had pledged himself to one term and no more. T h e sentence ran: " I now enter upon the same task [as fifteen previous presidents] for the brief constitutional term of four years under a great and peculiar difficulty." 3 1 Salmon P. Chase, Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, asserted in many of his letters that it had virtually become an American tradition for the President not to serve a second term, since for thirty years no chief executive had held office for more than one term and the custom had thus been established.32 Lincoln himself had nothing to say about another term. Opinions at the time conflicted j some newspapers said he would be willing to run again j others, that he would not. In a private letter of October, 1863, he had written: " A second term would be a great honor and a great labor, which, together, perhaps I would not decline if tendered." -33 Since that time he had remained silent on the subject} he said nothing publicly which could be interpreted to mean that he would 30 Nuts' Register, L X X I I , 166 ( M a y I J , 1847). Ibid. Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years,.II, 581. 32 Ibid., pp. 582-83. Those who favored Chase for the nomination in 1864 agreed on the principle of no second term for any President. Ibid., II, 652. 3 3 Lincoln to Elihu B. Washburne, quoted in ibid., II, 583. 29

31

66

T H E

ISSUE

D O R M A N T

accept a second term. 34 When the Republican Convention met on June 7, 1864, at Baltimore and Lincoln was unanimously renominated, the President accepted without further ado. Obviously, he considered two terms neither a violation of the Constitution nor of his own principles. Yet in his early days Lincoln, as a Whig, would seem to have been automatically committed to the one-term proposal.''5 Soon after President Lincoln's renomination, a surprising movement appeared in the form of an attempt to supplant him with a "more vigorous leader" and force his withdrawal. A group of opponents of the administration met in Cleveland in convention and nominated John C. Fremont for President. 36 They adopted the following plank in their platform: "That the one-term policy for the presidency adopted by the people is strengthened by the force of the existing crisis, and should be maintained by constitutional amendments." 17 However, in September, 1864, a favorable turn in the administration's fortunes occurred, with the fall of Atlanta and Republican electoral successes in Maine and Vermont. For the sake of party harmony, various anti-Lincoln groups gave him their support. Fremont withdrew early in the fall. 3 8 Even Horace Greeley, who had long favored the "salutary One Term principle," withheld his opposition and together with Benjamin Wade and other recalcitrants supported the President, thus restoring unity to the Republican party. After the Civil War, amid the turmoil of Reconstruction, efforts were still made to effect a constitutional amendment limiting the President's tenure of office to a single term. 39 Senators Wade and Sumner, Representative Ashley, and even President Johnson repeatedly advocated this restriction. On February 20, 1866, Senator Wade declared in regard to this proposal: T h e o f f e r i n g of this resolution is no n e w impulse of mine, for I have been an advocate of the principle contained in it for many years, and I have derived the strong impressions which I entertain on the subject f r o m a very c a r e f u l observation of the workings of our g o v e r n m e n t during the period that I have been an observer of them. I believe it has been very rare that w e have been able to elect a President of the U n i t e d States w h o has not been s

3S *Ibid. lbid., I l l , 254. 37 Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, I, 3 0 1 . Ibid., p. 300. 38 39 Ibid., p. 3 0 1 . See Ames, Proposed Amendments, Appendix A . 36

THE

ISSUE

DORMANT

67

tempted to use the vast powers intrusted to him according to his own opinions to advance his own reelection. . . . There are defects in the Constitution, and this is among the most glaring. All men have seen it; and now let us have the nerve, let us have the resolution to come up and apply the remedy. 40 President Johnson, too, favored a constitutional amendment restricting the President to a single term. H e was most consistent in his advocacy of this proposal. In his communication of July 18, 1868, to Congress, he submitted a joint resolution proposing several amendments to the Constitution of which one provided that "hereafter the President and Vice-President of the United States, shall be chosen for the term of six years" and that " n o President or Vice-President shall be eligible for reelection, to a second term."

41

In his fourth annual mes-

sage to Congress on December 9, 1868, Johnson reaffirmed his recommendation " f o r an election of President and Vice-President," after which they were to be "ineligible for reelection to a second term."

42

T h e stage was now set for General Grant's rather startling stab at a third term. T h e period we have been considering saw the formation of certain forces, social and economic as w e l l as political, which paved the way for the first real attempt at a third presidential term, though it was not to come until after the Civil W a r . W e have seen how ineffectual were all the proposals to limit presidential tenure—this, despite the trend of popular sentiment in that direction. Somehow the efforts of Congressmen failed to bear fruit. T h e only tangible explanation seems to lie in the fact that the two-term arrangement had become a sort of viable tradition, had assumed the character and function of genuine unwritten l a w — a n d the conservative temperament of nineteenth-century Americans could not tamely submit to what was to them the uprooting of a sacred and vital political principle. 43 N o two-term President after Jefferson, when retiring from office 40

Congressional

41

Richardson, Messages

Globe,

39th C o n g . , 1st Sess., p. 932.

42

Ibid., p. 3889.

4:1

It may be a r g u e d that the A m e r i c a n nation, d u r i n g this period, w a s absorbed too

and Papers

of the Presidents,

V , 3841, 384.2.

deeply in the more u r g e n t and important problems of the d a y ; but it m a y also be said that had there been any real and sincere desire on the part of the A m e r i c a n

people

to restrict f o r m a l l y their President to a single term of office, they w o u l d have effected this change easily and simply. It w o u l d seem, h o w e v e r , that such a desire w a s not present d u r i n g the years w e have been considering.

68

THE

ISSUE

DORMANT

ever fulminated against the idea of a third term. Similarly, never after Jackson, save Theodore Roosevelt in 1908, did a chief executive who might have had a third term unqualifiedly refuse one. In the century between Andrew Jackson's retirement and Franklin Roosevelt's overwhelming reelection, the United States had but seven two-term Presidents. T w o of them, Abraham Lincoln and William McKinley, were assassinated long before they had served out their second terms. One, Woodrow Wilson, was virtually annihilated by the defeat of his great ideal and was, at any rate, so sick and helpless at the end of his eight years that a third term was inconceivable. T h e other four—Grant, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, and Coolidge—all philandered, mildly or seriously, with the idea of a third term—and all came closer than is generally supposed to getting one or to being nominated for one. Not one of the four ever denounced the idea of a third term with the ardor of Jefferson or the conclusiveness of Jackson. Yet it was not any determined nation-wide adherence to tradition in these years that precluded three of them from achieving a third term. T h e exception is Ulysses S. Grant, the only President ever to bump head on into the no-third term tradition.

PART TWO ATTEMPTS

WHICH

MISCARRIED

6 T H E YANKEE CAESAR

" A N D T H E 'LITTLE AMERICAN ULYSSES' SOUGHT TO BECOME A YANKEE

'Caesar' "—such is the way one can best characterize President Grant's role in the third-term drama. Grant's attempt at a third term emerges f r o m history at once as the most flagrant, the most notorious of them all. T h e reason for this is simply that General Grant's venture was the only conspicuous effort on the part of any man which failed largely because it was a bold attempt at defying the no-third term tradition. It was the Jefferson formula working out in practice: "Should a President consent to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he would be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views."

1

B y 1870 sentiment in favor of a single presidential term prevailed among several influential Members of Congress. T h i s led to the proposal of countless constitutional amendments to effect the change. None of these ever achieved its goal. Y e t the sentiment in favor thereof persisted. Before General Grant's first term had expired, cries of nepotism, "Caesarism," and unfitness arose from many quarters. Shortly before the presidential nominations of 1872, Charles Sumner arose in the Senate and attacked the President unmercifully, accusing him of every kind of treachery conceivable. In the course of his speech, Sumner announced his firm adherence to the one-term principle, declaring that Grant himself had favored it in 1869 before taking office. T h e Senator then asserted: T h e r e f o r e , in opposing the prolonged p o w e r of the present incumbent, I begin by insisting that, for the good of the country and without reference to any personal failure, no President should be a candidate for reelection; and 1

Jefferson's Autobiography, in Bcrgh, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, I, 120.

72

THE YANKEE

CAESAR

it is our duty now to set an example worthy of Republican Institutions. In the name of the One-Term principle, once recognized by him, and which needs no other evidence of its necessity than his own Presidency, I protest against his attempt to obtain another lease of power.2 This long before the Grant scandals had become known! Much of the sting was taken out of Sumner's calumny because it was recognized that the Senator was a bitter opponent of the President. Anti-Grant feeling was not strong enough to beat the General in the 1872 election. The President triumphed easily over his opponent— Horace Greeley—joint candidate of the Democrats and the Liberal Republicans. It is worth noting that in February, 1872, the Labor Reformers, meeting at Columbus, Ohio, adopted a platform favoring a single presidential term. 3 Horace Greeley and the Liberal Republicans also demanded that no President be eligible for reelection.4 Elected for a second term, General Grant still remained the object of esteem and respect to a host of admirers. Soon after the election, Republican papers began booming him for a third term in 1876. 5 Early in 1874 the New York Herald took up the matter and opposed the idea.6 The President attempted to spike the rumors by telling a friend that he had no intention of becoming a candidate again, and that he had run in 1872 only because friends had insisted.7 Many of his friends noticed, too, that talk of reelection seemed disagreeable to the General. H e asserted that the whole idea was the work of the Herald, "a journal so utterly devoid of character," that it was not permitted in the White House. 8 Marshall Jewell, American Minister to Russia at this time and close friend of the President, felt that Grant's integrity and courage would force him into prominence for a third term.9 The General's popularity, which had slipped somewhat in 1873, was restored by his veto of the inflation bill. The important state elections of 1874 were approaching. It is in these elections (especially in New York) that the premature effect of the third-term bogey is clearly re2

Congressional Globe, +2(1 Cong., 2d Sc$s., p. 4 1 2 1 ( M a y 3 1 , 1 8 7 2 ) . For coinpletc text of Sumner's speech attacking Grant see same, pp. 4 1 1 0 - 2 2 . 3 Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, I, 337. 4 Ibid., p. 343. For Greeley's own words on the one-term principle see Galaxy, X I I (Oct., 1 8 7 1 ) , 488-93. 5 New York Tribune, Nov. 26, 1872, p. 4. 6 7 Hesseltine, Ulysses S. Grant, p. 368. New York Tribune, Jan. 2, 1 8 7 4 , p. 8. 8 0 Hesseltine, Ulysses S. Grant, p. 368. Ibid.

THE

Y A N K E E CAESAR

73

fleeted. T h e President had not as yet made any declaration of his intention, either official or otherwise; still he must have realized how important the coming election would be as an augury of the presidential contest two years hence. Though the General refrained from comment, the press loudly proclaimed its views, and politicians wagged their tongues, speculating on what the little man in the White House would do. The New York Times, one of Grant's severest critics, felt inclined to comment: M o s t people see that the v e r y talk of a third term is wildly

ridiculous,

and

that such an innovation on established precedents w o u l d be the ruin of the man or party which attempted i t — a n d therefore they are not disposed to discuss it seriously. T h e Constitution does not forbid a third term, but the u n w r i t t e n l a w does. . . . 1 0

Harper's Weekly regarded the question as "not whether General Grant can be trusted for a third term, but whether it is, upon the whole, wise to establish the precedent." 1 1 Editor George William Curtis saw nothing in Grant's administration which would make it either desirable or necessary to continue the President for a third term; nor did Grant stand out preeminently as the only qualified Republican candidate; yet the Weekly did not seem ready to accuse him of the desire to make himself "emperor or pope." 12 As the summer of 1874 wore on and the White House remained silent, a somewhat skeptical state of popular opinion arose. Occasioned as it was by nothing other than the President's own taciturnity, this skepticism soon crystallized into sheer disgust. Whitelaw Reid, now the potent force behind the New York Tribune, looked upon a third term for General Grant as more or less of a joke; yet he did have great fear of the "enthronement of King Caucus." 13 Other quarters belittled Grant's silence. The New York Times jeered: N o doubt there are m a n y friends of the President w h o desire to see him elected again, but w e doubt w h e t h e r one newspaper, or a thousand, will be able to bring about that result. T h e c o m m o n sense of the people will decide that question, and, in our j u d g m e n t , it can only be decided in one w a y . 1 4 10 12 14

June 10, 1874, p. 4. Ibid. Aug. 21, 1874, p. 4.

11 13

Harper's Weekly, XVIII (July u , 1874), 574. Cortissoz, Life of Whitelaw Reid, I, 284.

74

THE YANKEE

CAESAR

On some sides Grant was considered the most likely candidate in 1876. 18 Many people were relieved to find that the Republican leaders were not talking of a third term. 16 The Nation was convinced that Grant intended to retire after his second term, holding to the view that if a man were outstandingly competent there was no good reason for turning him out. Of the General himself, the Nation observed: "That General Grant looks forward to a third term, we do not in the least believe." 1 7 In October, shortly before the election, the New York Times urged Grant to speak out, insisting that there was no ground at this time for supposing the General to have any third-term views.18 Just prior to the election the political air began to clear. But it was too late to do much good. First evidence of the opposition came when the three Republican state conventions of Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Nevada resolved against a third term, while only South Carolina declared for it. 19 Taking these events as its cue, Har-per's Weekly averred there was not enough reason to nominate Grant again and that such an act, when no emergency existed, would constitute a radical departure from established tradition.20 Still the President made no statement, and his intimate friends affirmed that he had said nothing about a third term to them.21 The principal manifestation of the damage which Grant's silence had wrought upon Republican fortunes in the 1874 elections occurred in New York State. There, a bitter campaign was under way between Governor John A. Dix, who was running for reelection, and the reform Democratic candidate, Samuel J . Tilden. Dix was opposed to the idea of a third term, but because of Grant's silence, was placed in a rather peculiar and delicate position.22 Early in September Whitelaw Reid had written to old Thurlow Weed, grand vizier of the Republican party in New York, urging him to pass a resolution in the state convention denouncing the idea of a third term and saying that otherwise the Republicans would lose in the state. " M y own interest in it [Reid wrote] is primarily the desire to have this Third Term folly stopped 15 18 17 19 21 22

Harper's Weekly, X V I I I (Aug. 29, 1 8 7 4 ) , 710. New York Times, Aug. 23, 1874, p. 4. Nation, X V I I I (Oct. 8, 1 8 7 4 ) , 230. Harfer's Weekly, X V I I I (Oct. 17, 1 8 7 4 ) , 850. New York Times, Oct. 26, 1874, p. 1 . Cortissoz, Life of W/iitela Nation, L X X X V I (March 12, 1908), 227. 1 0 2 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 502. 1 0 3 Ibid. 1 0 4 Bishop, Presidential Nominations and Elections, pp. 72-73. 1 0 5 Josephson, The President Makers: 1896-1919, p. 266.

164

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

TRADITION

dent retires, by his own determination, from his high office on the fourth of March next. His refusal of a renomination, dictated by the loftiest motives and by a noble loyalty to American traditions, is final and irrevocable." 106 From then on Roosevelt had things his own way in the convention. From the White House he dictated the entire platform. Despite his great strength the situation never became desperate. Taft's foes were hopelessly divided; L a Follette had only Wisconsin; the Foraker men abhorred the Hughes delegates j while the sentiment for Vice President Fairbanks or Senator Philander Knox was only scattered. On June 18 Taft's name was placed in nomination} he was nominated on the first ballot. At the White House, Roosevelt jubilantly declared that nowhere in "the whole country" could be found a man "so well fitted to be President." 107 Theodore Roosevelt had his way. H e had ordered and secured the nomination of William Howard T a f t much as Andrew Jackson had that of Martin Van Buren. As one writer has observed: "The spirit of the [1908] convention was wholly Rooseveltian"; had the movement to nominate him gained headway, "he would have imperatively demanded that his name be withdrawn." 108 Chauncey M . Depew, Senator from New York and long a close friend of Theodore Roosevelt, tells us: It was a Roosevelt convention and crazy to have him renominated. It believed that he could overcome the popular feeling against a third term. Roosevelt did not think so. He believed that in order to make a third term palatable, there must be an interval of another and different administration. 109

Few attempts have been made to impugn Roosevelt's honesty in 1908. "There was never one moment," writes his daughter Alice Roosevelt Longworth, "in which the chance of his mind changing or of permitting his friends to 'force' the nomination on him was within the 1 0 4 D u n n , From Harrison to Harding, II, 75. Lest this should not prove enough, Roosevelt had even written a letter, to be published should an emergency arise, insisting that the T a f t delegates remain firm until the end. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 502. 101 108 109

N e w Y o r k Tribune, June 19, 1908, p. 1. H. L . Stoddard, As I Knew Them, p. 338. D e p e w , My Memories of Eighty Years, p. 173.

CAESAR'S NO J. Keppler, Puck, Vol. L X I I I (June 17, 1908), cover. T H E O D O R E

ROOSEVELT'S

1908

CAMPAIGN

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER TRADITION

165

range of possibility." 1 1 0 Yet one or two political figures who were present at the time suspected that had a deadlock occurred in the convention Roosevelt would gladly have accepted the nomination and made the fight.111 After the convention had adjourned, Roosevelt informed his personal aide, Archie Butt, that "all the talk of a stampede to him did not worry him at all, for he had said . . . that should such a thing occur he would decline it before it could be made official. H e has never for one minute thought of accepting a third term." 1 1 2 On the same day (June 19) Roosevelt wrote Sir George Otto Trevelyan: " I don't think that any harm comes from the concentration of power in one man's hands, provided the holder does not keep it for more than a certain, definite time, and then returns to the people from whom he sprang." But farther on we have: ". . . the strong man who is good may very readily subvert free institutions if he and the people at large grow to accept his continued possession of vast power as being necessary to good government." 1 1 3 There was, however, the pressing problem of what occupation to follow. As the "day of abdication" approached, Roosevelt was not yet fifty years old; he had been the youngest man ever to occupy the office of President; and, as Henry F. Pringle has sagely remarked, "he was far too young to retire to slippered ease." 1 1 4 The President was averse to many of the suggestions and oifers which were made to him. In February, 1908, he informed R. W . Gilder, editor of the Century: " I do not think I can undertake reminiscences, and I do not want to go around the world; and I won't be Mayor [of New York] or Senator! There! That looks like a mild negative confession of faith." 1 1 5 By the summer of 1908 Roosevelt had decided upon the only possible use of his talents—he would write twelve articles a year for the Outlook, the weekly journal of opinion which most closely reflected his own political views. For this he was to be paid $12,000 a year. 116 First the President would spend a year hunting lions in Africa, not only for the Long-worth, Crowded. Hours, p. 148. J. E. Watson, As I Knew Them, p. 87. 112 Letters of Archie Butt, pp. 41-42. 1 1 1 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 93. 1 1 4 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 476. 1 1 5 Ibid., p. 492. 1 1 6 Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II, 3 1 1 - 1 2 . 110 111

166

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

TRADITION

sport but to give T a f t an opportunity to get his administration under way free and unhampered. " T h i s is my last chance," exulted " T e d d y , " " f o r . . . 'a great adventure.'" 1 1 7 There was but one other possibility—there might be another war. T h e Colonel hoped against it 3 but if it should come and he was still "physically fit," he would "certainly try to raise a brigade, and if possible a division of cavalry . . . such as . . . in my regiment ten years ago." Should there be no war, he would devote his time to "fighting for political, social, and industrial reform, just as I have been fighting for it for the twenty-eight years that I have been in politics." 1 1 8 It was with some reluctance that Roosevelt laid down the reins of office. In M a y , 1908, he informed William Jennings Bryan somewhat disconsolately: " W h e n you see me quoted in the press as welcoming the rest I will have after March the 3d take no stock in it, for I will confess to you confidentially that I like my job. . . . I have enjoyed every minute of this so-called arduous and exacting task." n w T h e following November William Howard T a f t was swept into office by a vote of 7,677,788 to 6,407,982 for his Democratic opponent, the perennial W T illiam Jennings Bryan. T h e President was jubilant at the outcome, writing Owen Wister: "Indeed, we are heartily to be congratulated on the result of the election!" 12 " O n March 4, 1909, T a f t was inaugurated President; 1 2 1 scarcely three weeks later former President Theodore Roosevelt, with his son 117

Bishop,

Tfteodore

Roosevelt,

II,

126

( R o o s e v e l t to John Strachev, N o v .

28,

1 9 0 8 ) . H e n r y L . Stoddard suggests that it was Roosevelt's strong desire f o r literary r e n o w n a l o n g w i t h his l i f e l o n g eagerness to hunt w i l d g a m e in A f r i c a w h i c h motivated his " r e t i r e m e n t " in 1908. As I Knew 118

Ibid.

120

W i s t e r , Roosevelt:

121

William

119

Letters

The Story

of Archie

Them, Butt,

p. 327. p. 7.

of a Friendship,

p. 272 ( N o v . 5, 1 9 0 8 ) .

H o w a r d T a f t entered office without a n y precommitments as to the

l e n g t h o f the term. R o o s e v e l t , f o r some reason, expressed the belief that he expected T a f t to be content w i t h one term. (Letters of Archie

Butt,

p. 1 5 6 ) . T a f t himself had

n o t h i n g to say, t h o u g h the v e r y fact that he did not hesitate to seek reelection w o u l d seem to show that he had no o b j e c t i o n to it at the time. L a t e r , h o w e v e r , when out of office and w h i l e l e c t u r i n g at C o l u m b i a University in 1 9 1 5 - 1 6 , he d e c l a r e d : " I s t r o n g l y inclined to the v i e w that it w o u l d have been a wiser provision . . .

am

to make

the term o f the President six or seven years, and render him ineligible thereafter. Such a c h a n g e w o u l d g i v e to the E x e c u t i v e g r e a t e r c o u r a g e and independence in the discharge o f his duties. T h e absorbing and d i v e r t i n g interest in the reelection of the incumbent . . . w o u l d disappear and the efficiency o f administration in the last eighteen months o f a t e r m w o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d . " T a f t , Our Chief

Magistrate

and His Powers,

p. 4.

" R O U G H - R I D I N G " OVER T R A D I T I O N

167

Kermit and the other members of his party, embarked for the African jungles. For eleven months he was to stalk the lair of real lions on the Dark Continent and royal lions in Europe. There were only occasional echoes from the jungle while he was buried in it, but on his emergence at Khartum in March, 1910, there began a triumphant procession of unprecedented sparkle. The Colonel discussed intimate problems of colonial government with a keenness that made officials gasp; he visited Kaiser Wilhelm and told him that he alone of all European sovereigns could carry his ward in New York; he fearlessly rebuked the Vatican and snubbed its critics; he lectured formally in French at the Sorbonne, at Oxford, and at Christiania, Norway, where he received the Nobel Peace Prize; at New Forest he studied the birds with Sir Edward Grey; and he represented the United States at the funeral of King Edward V I I , where he had the time of his life. Things had been happening back home. Events were shaping themselves in such a way as to make a breach between Roosevelt and his "heir" inevitable. It is neither pertinent nor necessary to explore the details of this break. From the very day William Howard Taft took office evidence of it was already apparent. Roosevelt, while abroad, had learned of the growing rift between the conservative and insurgent elements of the Republican party, and tales told on Taft were reaching him. The insurgents, led by Senators L a Follette, Dolliver, Beveridge and others, had gradually alienated themselves from the President. The latter, somewhat imprudently, had supported the reactionary "Uncle J o e " Cannon, Speaker of the House, in his "whip hand" methods. Then there was the Ballinger Case. President Taft had appointed Richard A. Ballinger, of Seattle, Washington, as his Secretary of the Interior. Ballinger became involved in a dispute with Louis Glavis, chief of a field division in Alaska, who claimed that Ballinger had violated certain conservation principles by restoring to public entry some valuable power sites. Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the Forestry Service, complained to the President, who upheld Ballinger and ordered Glavis' dismissal. When Pinchot ill-advisedly entered into the controversy, Taft reluctantly dismissed him. 122 Pinchot, who was as close a friend of Roosevelt's as was Taft, immediately went off to Italy to 122

For a good recent account of the Ballinger Case and its ramifications see Josephson, The President Makers: 1896-1919, chap. X.

168

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

TRADITION

meet his former chief; Taft's alleged laxity in regard to forest conservation was bringing down upon him the violent denunciations of the insurgents. Nor was this all. Roosevelt claimed that T a f t had not answered his letters or written him in nearly a year; he was informed that the President had not extended proper attention to Mrs. Roosevelt during her husband's absence. The break was inevitable upon the Colonel's return. T h e chief reason for the schism lay in the fact that T a f t was not Roosevelt. There is no specific incident from which the break can be dated. In the main it was due to the complete antithesis between the two men. T a f t believed in a government of laws, not of men; Roosevelt held the law lightly, believing in a government of men, or more accurately, of a single man—himself. Theodore Roosevelt was a consummate politician; Taft's four years in the White House were probably the most uncomfortable and unhappy in all his life; he had no taste for politics. Roosevelt was thickset, muscular, and impulsive. His was a dynamic, rigorous constitution. T a f t was fat, amiable, cautious—less a man of action but more a thinker and meditator. In March, 1910, Roosevelt arrived at Khartum. H e immediately told Lawrence F . Abbott: " M y political career is ended. No man in American public life has ever reached the crest of the wave as I appear to have done without the wave's breaking and engulfing him. Remember Dewey." 123 A few weeks later at Cairo, Egypt, the Colonel informed Oscar Straus that he would not be "enticed or forced into accepting any nomination." 124 It looked as if Roosevelt had made up his mind. On June 18 the Rough Rider returned to the United States. A vast crowd waited at the Battery, and New York turned out en masse on Broadway and Fifth Avenue, where the Colonel was driven after he had landed. Mayor Gaynor was present to make the official address of welcome. A delegation of Rough Riders had donned their old uniforms. Bands, whistles, flags, and unprecedented enthusiasm comprised a welcome to " T e d d y " which only New York can accord. Roosevelt in a brief address declared: " I am ready and eager to be able to do my part so far as I am able in helping solve problems. . . ." 128 "Ready 123 124 125

L . F. Abbott, Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, Straus, Under Four Administrations, p. 308. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. J34.

p. 53.

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER T R A D I T I O N

169

and eager"—did these words mean the Colonel was planning to return to public life? Henry F. Pringle thinks not.126 Archie Butt was not so sure. In his words, Roosevelt was "capable of greater good or greater evil, I don't know which, than when he left . . . . he is in splendid health and has a long time to live." 127 Many who visited the former President upon his return saw something in the wind. "Roosevelt's jaw has a new angle of determination," declared Senator Joseph Bristow after calling on him. " I want to tell you," exclaimed La Follette, soon after the Colonel's return, "that . . . Roosevelt is in fighting trim." 128 The press became suspicious j it had come forth with this little jingle when the former President set sail for home: T e d d y , come home and blow your horn, T h e sheep's in the meadow, the cow's in the corn. T h e boy you left to tend the sheep Is under the haystack fast asleep. 129

And well might people have been suspicious. For on June 29, just eleven days after his return, Colonel Roosevelt met Governor Hughes, of New York, at Harvard University's commencement exercises. The state was in a bad way politically, Hughes told the Colonel. Politics was in the throes of a conflict over the passage of the direct primary law. Wouldn't the Colonel pitch in and help the Republicans, who were having a rather tough time of it? Roosevelt agreed without hesitation and immediately plunged into the thick of the fight. Both Hughes and Roosevelt favored the method of direct primary. The following month (July), the New York state Republican machine effectively killed the measure. Theodore was furious j he ranted, he raved} he demanded vindication. As one writer has aptly put it: "Defeat was in the air; a coldly calculating politician with an eye on the Presidential nomination of 1912 would have suppressed any yearning to take part in a contest that was futile." 130 But the Colonel blundered on j he would fight Barnes and the other New York bosses j what is more, he would name the Republican candidate for the gubernatorial nomination. 124 128 130

Ibid. Sullivan, Our Times, IV, 446. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 537.

127 12 »

Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 396. Ibid., p. 441.

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Whereas Roosevelt had written Taft right before his return: " I shall make no speeches nor say anything for two months, but I shall keep my mind as open as I keep my mouth shut," 1 3 1 he now proceeded to break that pledge in less than three weeks. By virtually forcing himself upon the New York state convention he secured the chairmanship and was largely instrumental in the selection of Henry L . Stimson as the Republican candidate, as well as in the adoption of a plank endorsing the direct primary. By August reports were current that the Colonel would seek the nomination in 1912. " I suppose you will have to fight Mr. Roosevelt for the nomination," remarked Mrs. Taft to her husband in July, "and if you get it he will defeat you." To which the President optimistically replied: " I am hopeful that Mr. Roosevelt will not take the course you fear." 1 3 2 The Colonel's position was not clear. Oscar King Davis, of the New York Timesy once asked him during the summer: " . . . how about the White House again for yourself?" " I don't care that for it," Roosevelt replied, snapping his fingers characteristically, and adding: I ' v e been there for seven and a half years. I ' v e had all the work and all the fun, all the honor and all the glory, of it, and I wouldn't give that [ r e peating the gesture] for any more of it. . . . T o go to the White House again simply for the sake of being President doesn't interest me in the least. . . . T h e r e is far greater probability that another term . . . would detract from my record, than there is that it would add to the r e c o r d . 1 3 3

In 1910 Roosevelt set forth to secure Taft's renomination. In September he wrote to Elihu Root that he expected the Republicans to be beaten in New York, adding, "though I am bitterly disappointed with Taft . . . very possibly circumstances will be such that I shall support Taft for the Presidency next time. . . ." 1 3 4 The President remarked at the same time, after being closeted with Roosevelt for several hours while discussing Republican chances in New York: . . if you were to remove Roosevelt's skull now, you would find written on 131

Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 395. Pringle, Life and Times of William Howard Taft, II, 562-63. T a f t honestly believed at this time that Roosevelt would never be President again. He felt, paradoxically, that there was too much deep-seated anti-third term sentiment in the country to allow of such a contingency. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 335. 133 Davis, Released for Publication, pp. 2 0 0 - 1 . 134 Wister, Roosevelt, p. 283. 182

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171

his brain ' 1 9 1 2 . ' " 1 8 5 At this time Roosevelt was still tolerant of President Taft. Late in November we find him writing Henry White: "Whether we can elect Taft or not I do not know, but at present it looks as if it would either be Taft or a Democrat." 1 3 6 Henry L . Stimson and the Republicans were destined to go down to defeat in November. John A. Dix, the Democratic candidate, was elected governor. Theodore Roosevelt's endorsement of Stimson had failed to win votes. The issue, cried the New York World, was Roosevelt as a candidate for President in 1912 j a vote for Stimson was a vote in that direction. 137 This was really not the case. The people were simply tired of Republican rule. Most significant of all, that rising college professor, Dr. Woodrow Wilson, of Princeton University, became governor of New Jersey. Roosevelt was keenly disappointed at the outcome of the election. Yet it also served to relieve him. "The bright spot," he wrote to Lodge, . . is that I think it will put a stop to the talk about my being nominated in 1 9 1 2 , which was beginning to make me very uneasy." 1 3 8 On November 17 the New York Chamber of Commerce held its annual banquet. There was instant and prolonged applause at the mention of Roosevelt's name. The Colonel, judging by the enthusiasm with which his name was greeted, was "as much alive as ever" and most certainly a potential candidate in 1912 despite Stimson's defeat. 139 At this 135

Pringle, Life and Times of . . . Taft, II, 576. Nevins, Henry White, p. 3 1 3 . 137 Nov. 5, 1 9 1 0 . Though it is dangerous to draw analogies in history, one can point out a remarkable parallel between the elections of 1874 and 1 9 1 0 . In both cases Republican candidates were defeated; both times the outcome served to foretell what would happen two years hence. In 1 9 1 2 Roosevelt was defeated for a third term and, though Grant did not run in 1876, the victory was really a Democratic one in that disputed election. F o r an excellent account of the New York state Campaign of 1 9 1 0 and Roosevelt's part in it, see George E . M o w r y , "Theodore Roosevelt and the Election of 1 9 1 0 , " Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X X V (March, 1 9 3 9 ) , 5 2 3 - 3 4 . Mowry claims that Roosevelt had a very definite policy in the campaign of 1 9 1 0 — that of bringing the western insurgents back into the party fold and simultaneously to make the conservative East liberal enough to get Progressive support. In both endeavors Roosevelt failed, only widening the schism between the two factions and alienating himself further from both. In 1 9 1 1 , contends Mowry, the former President tried to be agreeable to both wings of the party. 138

138 Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II, 394 (Nov. 1 1 , 1 9 1 0 ) . 139 Straus, Under Four Administrations, p. 308. Roosevelt repeatedly insisted that if he had really wanted to go back to the White House, the way to get there was simply

172

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time Roosevelt had no designs on the 1 9 1 2 nomination. Writing to his friend, Joseph Bucklin Bishop on November 2 1 , he confided that he had refrained from saying he would not be a candidate in 1 9 1 2 because " I do not wish to put myself in the position where if it becomes my plain duty to accept I shall be obliged to shirk such duty because of having committed myself." " I feel convinced," added the former President, "that it will not become my duty to accept. They have no business to expect me to take command of a ship simply because the ship is sinking." 1 4 0 A few weeks later, in reply to a letter from William Allen White saying that he (White) did not wish to see Roosevelt run again for President if he "could possibly help it," the Colonel declared that "there is nothing . . . I want less" than the presidency. H e felt it would not be right for him to announce never to be a candidate again. " I t is possible," explained Roosevelt, "that circumstances might arise when it would be unpatriotic of me, when it would represent going back on my principles and my friends, to refuse to be President." 1 4 1 A change had come about in Theodore Roosevelt. In August, 1 9 1 0 , absorbed with new influences and new aspects of political philosophy, he had planned a trip across the country to propagate what he called the " N e w Nationalism." His speeches on this trip, he made it clear, were to "represent myself entirely, nobody else." 1 4 2 Naturally, this was impossible ; either the speeches represented the Old Guard or they did not. As time went on, they were construed as the expressions of the insurgent Republican movement or as those of a new movement which in 1 9 1 2 should rally around Roosevelt and not L a Follette. 1 4 3 It was indeed "an extraordinary trip to be made by an ex-President who had insisted in public and in private that he had no political aspirations." 1 4 4 By the end of 1 9 1 0 Roosevelt's position was ambiguous. Stimson to "sit tight, keep quiet in that [ 1 9 1 0 ] campaign, and let events take their natural course." Davis, Released for Publication, p. 204. 140 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 307-8. As late as May of the next year ( 1 9 1 1 ) , Roosevelt's position had not changed palpably and we find him privately expressing the belief that he could not run again. It would be, he said, "not only a misfortune to me, but undesirable from the standpoint of the party and the people. . . . I expect every real friend and supporter . . . to do everything in his power to prevent . . . my nomination." Pringle, Life and Times of . . . Taft, II, 756. 141 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 308-9 (Dec. 12, 1 9 1 0 ) . 142 New York Tribune, Aug. 20, 1910, p. 2; New York Times, Aug. 20, 1910. 143 144 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 541. Ibid.

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had been defeated; the Colonel had further alienated the Old Guard; and his tacit support of T a f t had alarmed the insurgents. " T o St. Helena," cried his opponents, predicting that the name of Theodore Roosevelt would be but a memory by 1912. 14S Publicly the former President announced that the fight for popular government had only just begun. When he made his second trip across the country in March, 1911, little interest was evinced in it. The first three-quarters of that year served simply as an interlude. But, as one writer has expressed it: "the obscurity of 1911 was . . . merely an eclipse. Roosevelt was to emerge from the shadow with even greater power and take the final steps which led to the wrecking of his party and the ascension to power of Woodrow Wilson." 148 Theodore Roosevelt was by no means alone in espousing the principles of the New Nationalism. There were others just as thoroughly imbued with the new credo. Foremost among them was Woodrow Wilson, formerly president of Princeton University, and now governor of New Jersey. In 1910 Wilson had been elected by 49,000 votes, although New Jersey had given T a f t a plurality of 82,000 votes in 1908. It was apparent to all, and should have been especially so to Theodore Roosevelt, which way the wind would be blowing in 1912. In voicing the New Nationalism Wilson stole the Colonel's thunder; the former was no longer a friendly college professor; he was more than that; he was a rival. Roosevelt firmly determined that the salvation of America should not come at the hands of a Democrat, even though he might be an ardent New Nationalist. As Henry F. Pringle puts it: "The voice of Wilson, sounding these reforms, had hastened the termination of Roosevelt's eclipse in 1 9 1 1 . " 147 With Senator L a Follette it was a different matter. The Wisconsin Senator had long been an advocate of social reform in America. Born in a log cabin, Robert M . L a Follette had worked his way up to the position of governor of Wisconsin and United States Senator. A great liberal at heart, he had, together with Senator Jonathan P. Dolliver, of Iowa, initiated Republican insurgency. When Dolliver died in 1910, La Follette continued the fight. H e was certain that the fruits of his labors in behalf of progressivism would entitle him to the 1912 nomi145 148

New York World, Nov. 9, 1910. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. j 4 j .

14T

Ibid., p. 547.

174

" R O U G H - R I D I N G " OVER T R A D I T I O N

nation j he was to die feeling that Roosevelt, in seeking the nomination for himself, had betrayed him. The relations between Theodore Roosevelt and Robert M. L a Follette in 1 9 1 1 - 1 2 have long been shrouded with obscurity. In these years it lay in Roosevelt's power to strengthen La Follette's candidacy inestimably; but the Colonel chose otherwise. He did not deliberately scheme to betray the Wisconsin Senator. Though he endorsed the L a Follette program, Roosevelt was not certain that he was the real "prophet" of the New Nationalism. The former President did not commit himself to overt endorsement of L a Follette. There are no letters extant in which the Colonel pledged support of La Follette's candidacy. The movement for La Follette began during the Christmas holidays in 1910. The National Progressive Republican League was formed in January, 1 9 1 1 , with Senator Jonathan Bourne, of Oregon, at its head. Theodore Roosevelt's name was not included among the League's sponsors; he was, nevertheless, in sympathy with it. L a Follette urged the Colonel to join, but had to be content with a moderate endorsement by the latter. This was reflected in the pages of the Outlook, to which Roosevelt was a contributing editor. The former President wrote very favorably of the Wisconsin Senator. At one time we have such comment as this: " W e can now . . . look for leadership to Wisconsin when we desire to try to solve the great social and industrial problems of the present and the future. . . . " Experiments were undertaken "with cool-headed caution and wisdom, with a firm purpose to go forward in the true progressive spirit. . . ." 148 On June 17, 1 9 1 1 , Senator La Follette announced his candidacy and began seeking delegates to the Republican National Convention.149 The Wisconsin Senator then committed a great error—he mistook Roosevelt's attitude of cordiality to imply tacit support which no available letter promised. On June 7 the Colonel had declared: " I have endorsed no man for 1912." ' 5 0 At the Progressive "Convention" of October 16, 1 9 1 1 , L a Follette was enthusiastically endorsed as its "logical 148

Outlook, X C V I I I (May 17, 1 9 1 1 ) , 144-+5. H9 fvj e w York Tribune, June 19, 1 9 1 1 , p. 1. 150 Ibid., June 8, 1 9 1 1 , p. 3. The charge was frequently made that La Follette and his supporters, fearing that Roosevelt's popularity was too great, made use of rather cheap political maneuvers in order to discourage the latter's candidacy. New York Tribune, Nov. 28, 1 9 1 1 , p. 2. Such accusations have never been substantiated.

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candidate" for the presidency. 181 For the Senator the great stumblingblock remained "the equivocal attitude or hidden opposition" of Theodore Roosevelt. 182 Until the very end of the year 1911 Roosevelt entertained no thoughts of becoming a candidate. Prior to this period he devoted much effort to discouraging further talk of his candidacy. 153 Henry L . Stoddard, who was quite intimate with the Colonel during these years, is certain that the latter at this time had no desire for a third term. H e repeatedly told Stoddard and other friends that he definitely did not want the 1912 nomination. " I couldn't go back," he declared, "without risking all I gained in the seven years I was there. . . . It would be rough on me to be nominated." 154 Prevailing newspaper opinion agreed that ". . . Roosevelt is not, and does not expect to be, a candidate for the Presidency." 188 T h e Colonel was about to attack Boss Barnes, of New York, again, and this was a sure sign he had no idea of entering the race. 186 Examination of representative publications reveals the underlying suspicion that before long there would be a potent movement launched in favor of Roosevelt's candidacy; despite the declarations by his friends to the contrary, there are indications of a stampede to the former President, planned by his supporters (the Progressives) in the coming Republican convention. 157 As one journal expressed it: "Only a few dreamers believe in the actuality of the Roosevelt candidacy"; yet a public demand for him was certainly possible.158 During these months Roosevelt materially aided in the process of the Taft administration's defeat—especially by choosing the tariff as a topic for discussion.159 In June the Colonel denied a public statement Josephson, The President Makers: i8g6-xf>ip, p. 414. Roosevelt to A. P. Moore, Aug. 18, 1911, Harper's 1 9 1 1 ) , 5. See also Mowry's article in the Mississippi Valley (March, 1939), $31-32. 1 5 4 H. L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, pp. 390-91; also, p. 166. 155 Fortnightly Review, X C (Aug. 1, 1 9 1 1 ) , 249. 156Nation, XCIII (Nov. 16, 1 9 1 1 ) , 457. 157 Independent, L X X I (Nov. 23, 30, 1 9 1 1 ) , 1153, 1165; Dec. 14, 1 9 1 1 ) , 330, 568. 158 Harper's Weekly, LV (Dec. 9, 1 9 1 1 ) , 7. 1 5 9 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 550. 151

153

1 5 2 Ibid. Weekly, L V I (March 9, Historical Review, X X V

It Costs to Be President,

Nation, XCIII (Oct. 12,

176

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TRADITION

that he was pledged to support Taft ; a month later there was considerable friction between the two over the Root arbitration treaties.160 The charge was frequently made that Roosevelt was deliberately allowing himself to be used against the President. 101 President Taft might still have won the 1912 election had it not been for the ill-advised and ill-fated reciprocity agreement which he had initiated and which Roosevelt had favored. 10 - This agreement caused extreme difficulty in both the United States and Canada. In the meantime, the Roosevelt-Taft friendship had crumbled completely. The immediate raison d'être for the break was the suit launched by Taft's Attorney-General on October 24 against the United States Steel Corporation. The government charged the company with being a steel trust, a monopoly in restraint of trade. The suit specified that the acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company by United States Steel during the panic of 1907 (an act to which President Roosevelt had given his official sanction) was one of the chief reasons for the dissolution proceedings. The Colonel was furious5 this was the last straw. In his memoirs Senator L a Follette tells of a visit from a newspaper correspondent, Gilson Gardner, who told him that Roosevelt believed he (La Follette) should "get into the fight at once," but that he (Roosevelt) could not openly support La Follette though he would continue to comment favorably upon the latter's candidacy in the Outlook.163 The Gardner papers reveal that Roosevelt said simply this to Gardner during the interview: " H e [Roosevelt] had seen no reason why L a Follette should not run, if he felt so inclined." 104 That was all; the Colonel made no promises either to support L a Follette or to remain out of the way. Gardner reported this back to the Progressive leader, who promptly retorted: "if Roosevelt gets in my way, I will fight him." 1 6 5 L a Follette claimed that Gifford Pinchot told him 180

Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, II, 169. Nation, X C I I I (Dec. 2 1 , 1 9 1 1 ) , 594; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 8 1 1 . 182 Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, II, 144-46. 163 L a Follette, Autobiografhy, pp. 5 1 2 - 1 3. 164 McCaleb, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 314. 165 ¡bid., pp. 3 1 4 - 1 5 . According to La Follette, the Congressional elections of 1 9 1 0 forecast disaster for the Republicans in 191 2. Roosevelt at that time was still looking toward 1 9 1 6 . T a f t ' s renomination and defeat in 1 9 1 2 fitted admirably into his plans. But Roosevelt's tour in the spring of 1 9 1 1 "fired his blood. . . . He began to think 181

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177

Roosevelt was not and would not become a candidate 3 we know now that this was not true. A l l that Pinchot did was to make clear to L a Follette that Roosevelt had given him "no assurance whatever that he would not be a candidate against him, or that he would support him. . . . " 1 6 6 Much of the evidence points to the conclusion that at the time of the Gardner interview Roosevelt sincerely meant to sit on the side lines. Perhaps he had decided, after all, to let T a f t be nominated and be beaten and then four years later take the field himself; but the temptation proved too great. It may be as Archie Butt suggests, that in 1 9 1 1 Roosevelt was considering 1 9 1 6 and not 1 9 1 2 . Butt cites as evidence of this the remarks of Otto T . Bannard, a close friend of both the Colonel and President Taft. In December, 1 9 1 1 , Bannard told the latter he did not believe Roosevelt would run, "but," he added, "he has not taken me into his confidence." " I f they could get . . . a confession of weakness from you," Bannard told the President, "then the Colonel would go after the nomination and make the fight. . . . H e expects you to be defeated, and to be renominated and elected four years hence." 1 6 7 The swing was definitely toward Roosevelt and not L a Follette. In the words of one writer: of 1 9 1 2 for himself." The former President could not take a chance, La Follette claims; he could not afford to become a candidate against T a f t and fail. Hence he decided to put forth another man and feel out the T a f t strength. Roosevelt is thus made out to be guilty of duplicity. Late in 1 9 1 1 he saw that T a f t could be beaten and that the Progressive movement was much greater than he had realized; he also saw that La Follette stood in the way of the 1 9 1 2 nomination. The Wisconsin Senator strongly censures Roosevelt for not stating publicly his desire not to seek the nomination; by permitting the rumors to go unsquelched, he implied that he intended to become a candidate. Did the former President enter the field in 1 9 1 2 because La Follette's candidacy was failing or succeeding? Why did he then write Hiram Johnson recommending that he (La Follette) be set aside in 1 9 1 2 , if he did not mean to seek the nomination himself? In this way does La Follette charge Theodore Roosevelt with robbing him of the 1 9 1 2 nomination and conspiring to put him out of the way. Then and then alone did the Colonel come out into the open and pull out his bag of tricks. La Follette, Autobtografhy, pp. 510—72. 166 McCaleb, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 301. 167 Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 797-98. "That is my opinion, too," responded President T a f t and shortly after buoyantly told Archie Butt: "Archie, I am going to be renominated and reelected. The only contingent . . . is the nomination of Roosevelt, and I don't believe he can be nominated." Ibid., pp. 802-3.

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F r o m the time Roosevelt retired from the Presidency there was a strong, determined, and ever active, though not entirely cohesive, organization working to bring him back to the White House. It wanted him for a third term and wanted him as the successor of T a f t . . . , 1 6 8

For a time only evasive statements came from the former President. Then, on November 26, 1 9 1 1 , the Colonel thundered forth from Sagamore Hill that he was "not a candidate, nor has he been at any time. H e has repeatedly discouraged suggestions of this character . . . and he has emphatically refused pledges of active support . . . he desires talk of his supposed candidacy to cease." 169 Though Roosevelt "discouraged the idea [of his candidacy] . . . he did not forbid it." 1 7 0 The former President's announcement gave the signal for an immediate outburst by the press. On many sides it was construed to mean his formal reentry into politics. " M r . Roosevelt may cry desist," exclaimed the Washington Star (Ind.), "but there will be no desisting." In the eyes of the New York Globe (Rep.), "the country faces a protracted period of 'Teddy will and Teddy won't.' " 1 7 1 So conservative a journal as the Springfield Union (Rep.) felt bound to admit: " I t is conceivable that irrespective of his wishes the Presidency may be forced upon him." 1 7 2 Roosevelt's letters written in the last weeks of 1 9 1 1 furnish ample evidence that he was not seriously considering the 1912 nomination. T o Senator Lodge the former President again expressed his desire to remain out of the political scene. 173 " I am absolutely sincere," he wrote to William B. Howland on December 23, "in saying that I am not a candidate and do not wish the nomination." 174 If he should be nominated, the Colonel explained to Joseph Bucklin Bishop, it must be made perfectly clear that "it is in response to a genuine popular demand." 1 7 5 Roosevelt always refrained from placing himself in a position which 188

Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, II, 168. Philadelphia North American, Nov. 26, 1 9 1 1 ; New York Tribune, Nov. 28, 1 9 1 1 , p. 6; Literary Digest, X L I I I (Dec. 9, 1 9 1 1 ) , 1079. 170 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 553. 171 172 Literary Digest, X L I I I (Dec. 9, 1 9 1 1 ) , 1079. Ibid., p. 1080. 173 Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II, 417 (Dec. 13, 1 9 1 1 ) . 174 Howland, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, p. 207. 175 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 3 1 2 - 1 3 (Dec. 13, 1 9 1 1 ) 169

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179

would make it impossible for him to follow a "plain duty." As for T a f t , that gentleman was "utterly hopeless . . . it would be a misfortune to have him in the Presidential chair for another term." 1 7 9 As the year 1912 opened, the political atmosphere was unduly tense. President T a f t languished in the White House, feebly attempting to preserve his party's solidarity; the Insurgents, led by L a Follette, prepared to make 1912 their year of battle; and at Sagamore H i l l ruminated Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, poised before a course that was to lead to naught but disaster for himself and his party. There was less popular talk of the Colonel's candidacy than might be supposed under the circumstances; it was frequently asserted that Roosevelt would not dare take the risk. James Ford Rhodes, the eminent historian, made this memorandum after a visit with the Colonel in December: H e [Roosevelt] does not w a n t the nomination . . . and is doing nothing to secure it. H e feels that the fight will be a hard one. T h e matter of waiting until 1 9 1 6 had of course occurred to him. T h i n k s if the Democrats win in 1 9 1 2 it will be easy for a Republican in 1 9 1 6 ! 1 7 7

Brand Whitlock, the perennial mayor of Toledo, blithely wrote to a friend who was abroad: . . . you would laugh if you were in this country now and were to see how the standpatters are trying to bring him [Roosevelt] out as a candidate for President again, in order to head off L a Follette, w h o is a very dangerous antagonist to T a f t . 1 7 8

Roosevelt's popularity was still at its peak. Local politicians insisted that he would overwhelmingly be chosen by the 1912 Convention. 179 In late December a petition had been presented to the Nebraska secretary of state requesting that the Colonel's name be placed on the primary ballot as a presidential candidate.180 La Follette and his supporters were furious; they bitterly attacked Roosevelt for not withdrawing his name and proceeded to adopt a course which would serve only to "smoke out" the Colonel. 181 178 177 178 179 180 181

Ibid. (Dec. 29, 1 9 1 1 ) . M . A . De W . H o w e , James Ford Rhodes: American Historian, p. 209. Nevins ( e d . ) , Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, I, 146-47 (Dec. j , 1 9 1 1 ) . N e w Y o r k Tribune, Dec. 3, 1 9 1 1 , p. 1. Ibid., Dec. 22, 1 9 1 1 , p. 3. Roosevelt made no attempt to put a stop to this action. Ibid., Dec. 27, 1 9 1 1 , p. i .

i8o

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OVER

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Roosevelt's position was enigmatic} no one really knew what the Colonel's plans were; in all probability he did not know himself. The crucial point in the whole situation occurred over L a Follette's candidacy. Back in December emissaries had come to the Wisconsin Senator and had urged him to step aside for the Rough Rider; he indignantly refused. 182 Again on January 29, 1912 Roosevelt's supporters urged L a Follette to make way, and he again refused; the same day Roosevelt-for-President headquarters were opened in Chicago. 183 Great pressure was put on the Colonel to announce his candidacy. On January 10 William Allen White, in a stinging editorial in the Emporia Gazette, bitterly attacked the leadership of President Taft, blaming him for Democratic success and a disrupted Republican party; L a Follette was denounced unmercifully; the editorial ended with the plea: "It's Roosevelt or bust." 184 The next day Frank A. Munsey, the wealthy publisher, printed an editorial saying that Roosevelt would not accept the nomination unless called. 185 In his own paper, the New York Press, Munsey made a public appeal to Roosevelt to announce that if nominated for President he would accept.186 In his reply on January 16 the Colonel repeated his stand much as he had to Lodge, Bishop, and the others.187 The former President was still not certain as to his course. Several of his close friends took pains to caution him. H . H . Kohlsaat, of the Chicago Record-Herald, urged Roosevelt to be careful lest "there . . . be an active fight for delegates between you and Taft." 1 8 8 The Chicago publisher tried his best to dissuade the Colonel from entering the field against Taft. 1 8 9 Roosevelt was beside himself; he told one friend he had "a vault full of letters from young fellows anxious to have him run for the Presidency." 190 "Present indications are that Taft will be renominated without dangerous opposition," he wrote to his older sister, 182

Josephson, The President Makers: iS96-1 g t g, p. 4 1 5 . ,M ¡bid., pp. 4 1 7 - 1 8 . New York Tribune, Jan. 1 1 , 1 9 1 2 , p. 1. 185 La Follette, Autobiography, p. 580. 189 The only way Roosevelt had any chance for victory, declared the Press, "is to come out in the open, announce himself a candidate, and enter all the Congress-district primaries against the President." Literary Digest, X L I V ( J a n . 1 3 , 1 9 1 2 ) , 5 1 . 187 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 3 1 4 - 1 5 ; Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Hard183

ing, PP- I70-79188 Ibid., p. 169. 100 Ibid., p. 167.

189

Ibid., p. 180.

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181

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, on January 12. 1 9 1 And to Henry White a few days later: " I am being bedevilled on all sides either to say I will run if nominated, or that I will not run if nominated. . . . I think this is only a flurry." 1 9 2 As January drew to a close, events were shaping themselves in Roosevelt's mind; it became apparent that he would soon speak out. On the twenty-ninth we find him writing Joseph Bucklin Bishop to this effect: I t m a y be necessary f o r m e to speak, a n d very possibly I will have to speak before the first open primaries . . . while there are a great m a n y people . . . devoted to m e

. . .

[ t h e y ] h a v e m a d e up their minds that they wish

some n e w instrument, that they do not wish m e . 1 9 3

Herein lies the first indication that Theodore Roosevelt realized that despite his popularity the people did not want him for President again and that any fight he might undertake would prove a losing one. Taft, who was deeply hurt by Roosevelt's actions, admitted that the breach was beyond healing. Late in January the President declared "that if . . . Roosevelt were nominated he would be stronger the day of the convention than ever after and there would arise up against him in four months' discussion the real reasons why he should not be made more deserving than Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln or Grant." 194 The affable Taft at last realized that his former chief actually desired to enter the field against him. "But Archie," the President lamented to his ever-faithful aide, " I am going to defeat him [Roosevelt] in the Convention. He may defeat me for reelection, and he probably will, but I think I will defeat him in the Convention." 1 9 5 The situation was indeed anomalous. As Lincoln Steffens wrote on January 24: "The Colonel is mussing up the whole Progressive situation with his 'To be or not to be.' And he won't make a statement. . . . He simply isn't clear himself." 190 Lawrence F. Abbott, president of the Outlook Company, with which Roosevelt was associated, declared that the Colonel was not a candidate and would only accept the nomina191

Cowles, Letters from Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, iSjo-tgiS, p. 299. 193 192 Nevins, Henry White, p. 3 1 4 . Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, I I , 3 1 5 - 1 6 . 194 Pringle, Life and Times of . . . Taft, I I , 7 6 1 . 195 196 Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I I , 8 1 4 . Letters of Lincoln Steffens, I, 287.

182

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

TRADITION

tion if the country demanded that he serve. 197 The former President had retired to the seclusion of Oyster Bay. Henry L . Stimson visited him there on January 7 and publicly announced that the Colonel would never take the field against Taft. 1 9 8 Confusion and uncertainty pervaded the political scene.199 As time went on, increased pressure was exerted on the Colonel. Former Senator Flinn, of Pennsylvania, Governors Glasscock, of West Virginia, Stubbs, of Kansas, and numerous others implored him not to refuse the nomination if it were tendered him. All felt that since he had permitted his name to go on the Nebraska primary he must be considered a candidate.200 George W . Perkins, formerly a partner of J. P. Morgan and Company but now a loyal supporter of Roosevelt and the Progressive cause, was spending tremendous sums to create an "overwhelming demand" for Theodore Roosevelt. 201 An organization had been formed by Perkins, together with Don Hanna, son of Mark Hanna, and others, the sole aim of which was to place Roosevelt in the running. Its plan was to produce such a "spontaneous" demand for the Colonel that there would be engineered a "self-moved uprising of the party for Roosevelt which would compel him to yield his personal wish not to be a candidate." 202 Virtually all of these supporters were wealthy financiers. The Roosevelt talk was countered with some skepticism at any rate. Colonel Henry Watterson, as caustically as ever, lashed out in his Louisville Courier-Journal (Dem.) with the following editorial: " T h e election of Roosevelt, abrogating the third-term tradition, would be a step toward absolutism. I f Roosevelt is put in the White House in 1912, we will never get him out again except feet first." 203 More sparing in its stricture, the Baltimore American (Rep.) observed that the "socalled Roosevelt boom amounts to nothing. It will simmer down, and the former President will be found at the side of the Republican nominee, provided this is not L a Follette." 204 1 9 8 Ibid., Jan. 8, 1912, p. 1. New Y o r k Tribune, Jan. j , 1 9 1 2 , p. J. 200 Independent, Ibid., Jan. 10, 1 9 1 2 , p. 1. L X X I I (Jan. n , 1 9 1 2 ) , 107. 201 N e w Y o r k Tribune, Jan. 22, 1912, p. 1. 202 Nation, X C I V (Jan. 25, 1 9 1 2 ) , 76. 203 Literary Digest, X L I V (Jan. 13, 1 9 1 2 ) , 51. 204 Ibid. Other journals such as the Outlook and the Review of Reviews saw no reason why Roosevelt should not accept the nomination if called upon to do so. 197 199

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER T R A D I T I O N

183

F o r some time suspicion had been prevalent that the Progressives had been using the L a Follette candidacy as a blind for the Roosevelt boom and at the last moment would swing the entire movement to the former President. On February 2 something happened which seemed to impart credence to this supposition. Senator L a Follette, his nerves frayed by the pangs of disappointment, spoke endlessly at a publishers' dinner in Philadelphia, rambling on, repeating himself over and over, while rude and pitiless diners called to him to sit down. T h e Wisconsin Senator's health had been poor; signs that he was being abandoned by his supporters began to appear before this breakdown; the latter served merely to give the change added impetus. 205 In a short time the L a Follette boom collapsed completely, his support disintegrated, and many contributions to the pre-convention campaign funds were transferred from his column to that of Roosevelt. Late in January, 1 9 1 2 , it became obvious that Theodore Roosevelt was a candidate for the Republican nomination. What had caused the Colonel to choose such a course? Theodore Roosevelt took a pardonable pride in his record as President; his pride was deeply hurt at the actions of the T a f t administration. What irritated the Colonel most after his return from Africa was, as he confided to Elihu Root on October 2 1 , 1 9 1 0 , that he had been "neither consulted nor considered" at any time. In spite of the anxiety of Republican politicians, he added, who had requested him repeatedly to lend a willing hand, they "were exceedingly anxious to limit that use before elections with the understanding that I should have no say afterwards." 206 Roosevelt was indignant that these men asked him to take the stump for the party's candidates (as in the case of Stimson) and at the same time tried to keep him on the shelf. Now that the Rooseveltians were beginning to desert the L a Follette camp, the Colonel was considering the best means by which he could announce his decision again to bow to the popular demand. H e 205 The familiar theory that La Follette's nervous breakdown forccd the influential Progressives to turn from him to Roosevelt no longer holds. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 554.; Josephson, The President Makers: 1896-1919, p. 420. At the time, La Follette had just recovered from an attack of ptomaine poisoning, and the day following the dinner his youngest daughter was to be operated upon. The two factors together upset his nerves. A few days later he was his old self again. 208 Roosevelt Papers; Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 305-6.

184

"ROUGH-RIDING"

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TRADITION

still felt that he was making a sacrifice and that he would in all probability be beaten.207 Yet he realized that Taft was exceedingly weak, that L a Follette had shown no real strength in the West, and that should he seek the nomination for himself it would very likely go to Taft anyway; what is more, he was certain that no Republican could be elected in November at any cost.-08 On January 18 T . R . wrote a group of governors who were anxious to have him run again, suggesting that they submit to him a petition along the lines which he indicated. Roosevelt made it clear that the petition should come in response to the popular demand and should declare simply that the people of those states wished him to run for President and desired to know whether he would refuse the nomination.209 On January 22, in the Outlook offices, it was arranged to stage the public demand to which Roosevelt was acceding in reply to the offers of support which these various governors had made. It was decided that seven or eight of them should sign a petition urging the Colonel to run again. At last the campaign was underway! 2 1 0 Support was to come from Frank A. Munsey, then owner of the New York Press, from Gifford and Amos Pinchot, and from George W. Perkins, whose affiliations with J . P. Morgan and Company had often annoyed Roosevelt. 211 It was soon announced that Illinois Republicans would be urged to support him. 212 On February 9 a petition signed by Governors J . M. Carey, of 207

Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 555. Howland, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 20+—8. 209 Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 176. Owen Wister tells us that Roosevelt became a candidate a third time because he felt it a duty to vindicate himself by the people's wish. Roosevelt, pp. 286-87. Lyman Abbott is certain the Colonel never would have run had La Follette's candidacy gone through. Silhouettes of My Contemporaries, p. 328. Corinne Roosevelt Robinson is certain her brother did not want a third term, but only wished to consummate the policies he had begun while in office. My Brother T/teodore Roosevelt, pp. 266-67. Henry L . Stoddard has declared that Roosevelt's real aim in 1 9 1 2 was to get the Republican party out of the hands of the " w a r lords" who had returned to control when he left office. It Costs to Be President, p. 166. Oscar King Davis is of a similar opinion, observing that when Roosevelt was called upon to help his party, he felt he must answer its call for support as it did his when President. " T h a t , " claims Davis, "was the real explanation of the action of . . . Roosevelt, in politics, during the last few years of his life." Released for Publication, p. 204. 205

210 211

Howland, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 2 1 0 - 1 1 . New York Tribune, Jan. 22, 1 9 1 2 , p. 1.

212

Ibid., Jan. 30, 1 9 1 2 , p. 2.

"ROUGH-RIDING"

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TRADITION

185

Wyoming j William R . Stubbs, of Kansas; Chase S. Osborn, of Michigan} Herbert S. Hadley, of Missouri} Chester H . Aldrich, of Nebraska} Robert E . Bass, of New Hampshire; and W . E . Glasscock, of West Virginia, was drawn up. It reviewed the history of the Progressive movement and declared that only Roosevelt could effectively implement the New Nationalism. 213 It was, then, to be war. Theodore was immediately off to Columbus, Ohio, to fire the opening gun. In Cleveland he paused long enough to inform a reporter, " M y hat's in the ring! The fight is on and I'm stripped to the buff!" 2 1 4 President T a f t in the meantime lashed out at the Progressives unmercifully. Had he been calmer and more judicious, the country might have listened} he was not. T a f t felt deeply the break with Roosevelt and regretted it. Gilford Pinchot, who had supported La Follette in the beginning, publicly withdrew his endorsement of the Wisconsin Senator and began to urge the candidacy of Roosevelt as the only salvation from a reactionary Republican, as well as the only man who could hold the Progressives together. 215 On February 24, in his formal reply to the governors, the Colonel declared: " I will accept the nomination for President if it is tendered to me, and I will adhere to this decision until the convention has expressed its preference." 2 1 6 The lid was off! The whole country was roused by the Colonel's action. A multitude of denunciations poured forth. The New York Sun repeated again and again in bold-faced type: T h e Most Deadly of Parallels Roosevelt's decision on November 8, 1904 : " U n d e r no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination."

22 ) 7

His decision on February 2 5 , 1 9 1 2 : " I will accept the nomination if it is tendered to me."

Ibid., Feb. i i , 1912, p. 2; Outlook, C (March 2, 1912), 475. New York Tribune, Feb. 23, 1912, p. 3; H. L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, p. 396. 2 1 5 New York Tribune, Feb. 19, 1912, p. 3. 21« Works of Theodore Roosevelt, XVII, 149 j New York Tribune, Feb. 26, 1912, p. 1 ; Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 319. 2 1 7 March 6, 1912. 213

214

186

"ROUGH-RIDING"

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T R A D I T I O N

In defending his position Roosevelt emphasized the fact that he had not changed his mind. " I said I would not accept a nomination for a third term," he declared, "under any circumstances, meaning, of course, a third consecutive term. The precedent which forbids a third term has reference only to a third consecutive term." 2 1 8 The Outlook, serving as a sort of mouthpiece for the former President, added loyally: "When a man says at breakfast in the morning, 'no thank you, I will not take any more coffee,' it does not mean that he will not take any more coffee to-morrow morning, or next week, or next month, or next year." 2 1 9 Roosevelt had thrown his hat in the ring, in spite of imperative remonstrances against such a step. Elihu Root, long a close friend of the Colonel, urgently cautioned him to be careful in making any statement regarding the presidential nomination which might at some later date cause him embarrassment.220 The former President had already made up his mind that the time was ripe to speak out; Root's entreaties proved of no avail; he did not fully believe Roosevelt would dare become a candidate.221 When the "impossible" had occurred, Root calmly observed concerning Roosevelt's "new departure": " I have no doubt he thinks he believes what he says, but he doesn't. H e has merely picked up certain popular ideas which were at hand as one might pick up a poker or chair with which to strike." 222 And again to the American Ambassador at Paris: T h e o d o r e has gone off upon a perfectly wild program. . . .

I don't think

Roosevelt will succeed in getting the nomination. H e will, however, succeed in so damaging T a f t that he can't be elected. I f Roosevelt should be nominated he could not possibly be elected. 2 2 3 218 North American Review, CXCV (April, 191 2 ) , 4 4 4 - 4 5 ; Sullivan, Our Times, IV, 49°2 1 9 Vol. C (Feb. 17, 1912), 338. This editorial impelled George Harvey to suggest that Roosevelt's "vindicator" should have employed the following illustration to present his case for the Colonel: "When a man says at breakfast in the morning, 'The wise custom which, in consideration of the public health, forbids one in my position to set a harmful example by partaking of more coffee, regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I seek or accept another cup.' " North American Review, CXCV (April, 191 2 ) , 446. 2 2 0 Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 173-76. 2 2 1 Ibid., p. «77. 222 Ibid., p. 180 (Root to Edward S. Martin, March 9, 1912). 223 Ibid., pp. 180-81 (Root to Robert Bacon, March 9, 1912).

"I C o f f m a n , Literary

WILL

Digest,

A C C E P T THE

XLIV

(March

NOMINATION."

16, 1 9 1 2 ) , 5 1 8 ; f r o m the N e w

Journal. T H E O D O R E

ROOSEVELT'S

1912

C A M P A I G N

York

" R O U G H - R I D I N G " OVER T R A D I T I O N

187

Even the pleas of Herman Kohlsaat bore no fruit. As late as March r 5 the Chicago publisher begged the Colonel not to make the fight. " I t seems to me," he wrote, "you have no show of nomination and will find yourself in the position of trying to reach the Presidency and failing.»"< More formidable attempts to deter Roosevelt were also made. On February 1 Representative Slayden, of Texas (Dem.), introduced a resolution in the House providing that a third term be declared "unwise, unpatriotic and fraught with peril to our free institutions"} a similar resolution was introduced at the same time advocating a constitutional amendment providing that the President may serve only one term. 225 The idea of a third party did not enter Theodore Roosevelt's mind to any extent in the early months of 1912. 2 2 6 He still clung to his doctrine of 1900, viz.: "At times a man must cut loose from his associates, and stand alone for a great cause; but the necessity for such action is almost as rare as the necessity for a revolution." 2 2 7 While in Wisconsin in 1 9 1 1 , Roosevelt is said to have expressed open opposition to the idea of a third party.228 Moreover, Medill McCormick, director of the National Roosevelt Committee, declared on February 25, 1 9 1 2 , that the Colonel had no intention of starting a third or "people's party" if the Chicago Convention failed to nominate him. 229 Roosevelt's sole idea early in 1912 was to take the regular Republican nomination away from Taft; the time for revolution had not yet come. That time was to come only when the Republican party refused to seat contested Roosevelt delegations at the National Convention. Then did Theodore 224

Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding, p. 182. Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1 6 5 3 ; New York Tribune, Feb. 2, 1912, p. 2. On Feb. 13 Senator John D. Works (Rep., of Calif.) proposed an amendment to the Constitution which read as follows: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of six years and shall be ineligible to a second term, and together with the Vice President, who shall hold for a like term, and shall also be ineligible to a second term, be elected as follows." Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3132. 228 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 556. 2:7 Century Magazine, L X (June, 1900), 212. 2:8 La Follette, Autobiography, p. 749. 228 New York Tribune, Feb. 26, 1 9 1 2 , p. 1. 2:5

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TRADITION

cry " f r a u d ! " and proceed to cut loose from the associates with whom he had marched through the years, " d o w n the middle of the road." A s a candidate for the Republican nomination in 1 9 1 2 Theodore Roosevelt failed lamentably to exhibit the skill which had characterized his earlier attempts. In the words of one journal: W e say that Theodore Roosevelt in this role of a third-term candidate is the most pathetic figure which American politics has offered in many a day —pathetic because it reveals a man with elements of real greatness, and with his fame secure, fallen victim to that megalomania, and the vaunting ambition that grows out of it, which has destroyed so many children of fortune. 230 T h e Republican party was still the home of conservatism j in a campaign year the right wing was destined to be dominant. T h i s by no means irritated the Colonel, who injudiciously proceeded to alienate completely the elements which controlled the nomination. As H e n r y F . Pringle has succinctly put it: They [the political powers-that-be] had endorsed him in 1898, believing him a lesser evil. They had done so in 1904. He might again have raised the ghost of ultra radicalism, have sounded the menace of L a Follette and Bryan. He did not. He said what he believed . . . and was defeated. 231 It was inevitable that many regular Republicans, especially L o d g e and Borah, should strongly disagree with several of the proposed changes which Roosevelt advocated. " T e d d y " and H e n r y Cabot L o d g e had been close friends for years; both felt badly over the present discrepancies. N o situation in his political career has " m a d e me so miserably unhappy," lamented the Massachusetts Senator 5 to which the Colonel reassuringly replied: " Y o u could not do anything that would make me lose my warm personal affection for y o u . " 2 3 2 Senator William E . Borah, of Idaho, was firmly opposed to a third party, and Roosevelt was frequently forced to propitiate his fears. " O u r friends should not think or talk about a third party," he told Borah in April. " A n y such talk would weaken us in the fight and we want no third party. T h a t 230

Milwaukee Free Press (Ind. R e p . ) , in Literary Digest, X L I V ( M a r c h 9, 1 9 1 2 ) ,

466. 231

Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 5 5 7 . Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence Cabot Lodge, I I , 4 2 3 - 2 5 . 232

of Theodore

Roosevelt and Henry

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER T R A D I T I O N

189

would only result in the election of a Democrat." 2 3 3 Borah continued to line up Roosevelt delegates for the Idaho state convention and made no move to abandon Roosevelt until the Colonel had forsaken the Chicago Convention. Before this rash step, Borah repeatedly declared: " T h e question of bolting . . . has never entered my mind." 2 3 4 When word reached the White House that Roosevelt had announced his candidacy, Mrs. T a f t remarked, " I told you so four years ago and you would not believe me." " I know you did, my dear," laughed the President, "and I think you are perfectly happy now. You would have preferred the Colonel to come out against me than to have been wrong yourself." 2 3 5 As for Roosevelt, he admitted that none of the party leaders—"not even Lodge"—would work for his nomination. 236 At one time he told a friend in Boston that " h e realized . . . the probabilities were all against his nomination." 2 3 7 T o Joseph Bucklin Bishop on March 18 the Colonel declared: " D o not get the idea into your head that I am going to win in this fight. It was a fight that had to be made and there was no alternative to my making it." 2 3 8 The sole possibility of success, and Roosevelt even considered this remote, lay in popular support. Therefore, the Colonel soon endorsed the method of direct primary and thus assumed the offensive. In this he possessed a great advantage, for he could challenge the T a f t forces all he wished; they would not dare initiate the direct primary before the convention anyway. When asked about rumors that he would bolt the party if T a f t were nominated, Roosevelt angrily denounced them as "deliberate faking." 2 3 8 T h e third-term charge was not leveled against Theodore Roosevelt as widely as it had been against General Grant. Though the accusation was frequently and very caustically made, the fulminations by no means reached the fever pitch that they did in 1880. This was because of the fact that to many persons Roosevelt's 1 9 1 2 candidacy was not looked upon as a third-term challenge. Another term was still regarded, in an elective sense, as his second. The accusation was frequently made that the Colonel desired a life 233 235 237 239

234 C. O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, p. 1 3 7 . Ibid., p. 138. 238 Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 8 so. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 354. 238 Ibid. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 3 19. New York Tribune, March 29, 1 9 1 2 , p. 5.

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O V E R

T R A D I T I O N

tenure, to be followed by hereditary succession. "Does any person believe," inquired the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph (Rep.), "that if Theodore Roosevelt is nominated and elected in November, he will ever quit the Presidency alive?" 240 While Colonel Henry Watterson wrote in the Louisville Courier-Journal (Dem.): "Unless he breaks down under the strain and is taken to a lunatic asylum . . . there can be in his name and person but one issue, life tenure in the executive office." 2 4 1 To the Brooklyn Eagle (Ind. Dem.) "the Call of the People was almost inaudible." 242 On many sides it was suspected that Roosevelt really did not want the nomination and that his real aim was to force a compromise candidate and prevent Taft's renomination.243 By his 1904 declaration the Colonel had simply "buncoed" the country.244 One journal pointed out that whereas in 1908 the demand for a third consecutive term would have been too great a breach with precedent, "so Mr. Taft was put in to keep the place warm for the great man" in I9i2. 24!i The call for " T e d d y " meant Roosevelt or defeat—or both! 246 The Nation was as bitter in its denunciation of Theodore Roosevelt as it had been of General Grant in 1880. Time and again the name of Charles Evans Hughes was hopefully suggested as a compromise candidate.247 Finally, in utter despair, the Nation burst forth: Instead of the ideal Roosevelt w e see a Machiavellian prince. . . . . . .

I t is not

a question of the validity of the tradition against a third term. I t is . . .

a question of T h e o d o r e Roosevelt's personal honor. . . . thing . . .

I t is a terrible

to destroy the faith w h i c h credulous thousands have placed in

his personal integrity . . . his reckless craving

for power is at last dis-

closed.248 " » Q u o t e d in Sullivan, Our Times, I V , 489. 242 Ibid. Literary Digest, X L I V ( A p r i l 6, 191 2 ) , 67 1. 243 Harfer's Weekly, L V I ( M a r c h 2, 1 9 1 2 ) , 4. 244 Ibid., p. 4, March 1 6 , 1 9 1 2 . Harfer's Weekly, together with the Independent, waved Roosevelt's 1904 declaration widely on their editorial pages. 245 Living Age, C C L X X I I (March, 1 9 1 2 ) , 808. 246 World's Work, X X I I I (March, 1 9 1 2 ) , 489. 247 Vol. X C I V (March 7, 1 9 1 2 ) , 2 2 6 - 2 7 ; p. 380, April 18, 1 9 1 2 . 248 Ibid., p. 202 (Feb. 29, 1 9 1 2 ) . M a n y of the newspapers, especially in New York City, which had advocated Grover Cleveland for a third term in 1904, were now furious in their denunciation of it. 241

" R O U G H - R I D I N G "

OVER

T R A D I T I O N

191

There was, nevertheless, the customary amount of sympathy for the Colonel and his cause.249 Many quarters held that if there was sufficient demand for Roosevelt the precedent should not stand in his way; being a man of great value he should be available any time the people want him.250 The no-third term tradition, observed the New York Times, "is solely the creation of Jefferson; its appearance as an article of faith dates from the attack on Grant; its solidification as a principle is largely due to Roosevelt himself." 2 5 1 Occasionally, some extreme pro-Roosevelt journal would hold forth in this fashion: If there is any historic charter of liberties in this country it is not the Constitution. It is the Declaration of Independence. . . .

If the Constitution is

property's Bible, the Declaration is the common man's Bible. A n d because Roosevelt is for the Declaration when it comes in conflict with the Constitution, so the common man is for Roosevelt. 2 5 2

On the whole, "the third term tradition [was] . . . cutting a much smaller figure than it was generally supposed to cut." 253 Roosevelt was especially strong in the Middle West where one straw poll after another favored him over Taft. 254 A survey of farmers in Missouri and Kansas gave the former President five times as many votes as his nearest competitor in either party.255 "Roosevelt looks like a winning candidate," declared the Grand Rapids Evening Press (Ind.). 256 The situation was not without its humorous aspects. Such slogans as the following swept over the pages of the anti-Roosevelt journals: Washington W o u l d n ' t , G r a n t Couldn't, Roosevelt S h a n ' t . 2 5 7 249

Literary Digest, XLIV (March 9, 1 9 1 2 ) , 466-67. Such popular journals as Collier's and the Baltimore Sun gave Roosevelt their unequivocal support. 250 Harper's Weekly, LVI (Feb. 17, 1 9 1 2 ) , 4. 251 Quoted in Current Literature, L I I (April, 1 9 1 2 ) , 368. 252 Topeka (Kan.) Capital (Rep.), in Literary Digest, XLIV (March 9, 1 9 1 2 ) , 467. 253 Current Literature, L I I (April, 1 9 1 2 ) , 370. 254 Nation, X C I V (Feb. 29, 1 9 1 2 ) , 199. 255 Literary Digest, XLIV (Feb. 10, 1 9 1 2 ) , 250. 250 257 Ibid., p. 2 5 1 . Current Literature, L I I (March, 1 9 1 2 ) , 2 5 1 .

192

" R O U G H - R I D I N G "

O V E R

T R A D I T I O N

Or: W a k e up Republicans! D o w n with the

Demagogue!

Smash the T h i r d T e r m ! Save the Republic! - ! i 8

Week after week the Nation printed columns of satirical lyrics which fairly reeked with subtle implications. Viz.: " F o r seven y e a r s , " the Colonel said, " I w a l k e d the quarter deck, I smote the trusts, and in their gore I w a d e d to the n e c k . " " I k n o w i t , " sobbed the Harvester, A n d signed another check. " T h e time has c o m e , " the Colonel said, " T o speak of m a n y things, O f Presidents, of sealing w a x , A n d hats inside of rings, A n d w h y I feel so boiling hot, A n d w h e t h e r truth has w i n g s . "

259

From Maine to California the Colonel became a pet subject of ridicule. Parables or travesties appeared in all the anti-Roosevelt organs. Above all the shouting about the third-term tradition, threatened dictatorship, and social amelioration played the American sense of humor as expressed in the Brooklyn Eagle's " N o place feels like home after you have once lived in the White House," and the Ohio State Journal's "There is a fairly well-grounded impression that Colonel Roosevelt also favors the recall of former Presidents," and the Wall Street Journal's, "Those most enthusiastic over the recall of judicial decisions are prevented by prison rules from working for the Colonel," and Life's " T h e popular demand for Colonel Roosevelt is steadily increasing; but however great the demand may become, it can never be as great as the supply." - 60 Owen Wister, the novelist and long a close friend of Roosevelt, felt that the former President's opponents were distorting the whole situation and especially his views on a third term. " A man of honor keeps a 2S8

George Harvey, in Harper's Weekly, -'"»Nation, X C I V ( M a y 9, 1 9 1 2 ) , 457.

L V I (April zo, 1 9 1 2 ) , 4. 280 Sullivan, Our Times,

IV, 490-91.

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER T R A D I T I O N

193

promise} but what law binds him never to change his mind?" was the way in which Wister defended the Colonel. 281 By April, 1912, endless recriminations were occurring between T a f t and Roosevelt. The President claimed Roosevelt had forced him into the light against his will. "Condemn me if you will," Taft declared, "but condemn me by other witnesses than Theodore Roosevelt. I was a man of straw; but I have been a man of straw long enough. Every man who has blood in his body, and who has been misrepresented as I have . . . is forced to fight." 262 In May T a f t injudiciously asserted: " I am a man of peace. I don't want to fight. But when I do fight, I want to hit hard. Even a rat in a corner will fight." 263 Roosevelt in his speeches proclaimed it was a fight for true democracy. Taft at first seemed to be winning. New York and Indiana declared for the President by the end of March; Massachusetts soon did likewise; Wisconsin and North Dakota still supported L a Follette. Roosevelt carried the primaries in Pennsylvania, Maryland, California, New Jersey, and Ohio. "It would be premature to say that the Roosevelt movement is failing," observed the Nation, "but the fact is plain to all that it is not going ahead with the rush and roar predicted." 264 President Taft was disturbed by rumors that he could not win the election in the fall and that a compromise candidate might have to be selected. "I'll name the compromise candidate," Roosevelt boasted. " H e ' l l be me. I'll name the compromise platform. It will be our platform." 265 Gradually many of T.R.'s friends who had stood by him for so many years dropped away. Elihu Root was to be temporary chairman of the Republican Convention and thus to aid in taking the nomination away from Roosevelt. Lodge was already gone. Nicholas Murray Butler, who had broken with Roosevelt before the latter had left the White House, bitterly attacked the former President. Philander Knox, Taft's Secretary of State, insisted that the Colonel was actuated by peculiar whims and antipathies. Henry L . Stimson, who after his defeat for governor of New York, had accepted the post of Secretary of War in Taft's Cabinet, declared that the latter was the true Progressive, while Roosevelt only damaged the cause.266 241 2,>3 265

2 6 2 New Y o r k Tribune, Wister, Roosevelt, p. 285. A p r i l 30, 1912, pp. 1 - 2 . 2 8 1 Vol. X C I V ( M a r c h 21, 1 9 1 2 ) , 275. New Y o r k Times, M a y 5, 1912. 2 8 6 Ibid., March 6, 1912, p. 2. New York Tribune, M a y 21, 1912, p. 2.

194

" R O U G H - R I D I N G " OVER T R A D I T I O N

Taft became very bitter in the end. His attacks upon his former chief became injudicious and poorly timed. In May he declared that "there is not the slightest reason why, if he [Roosevelt] secures a third term, and the limitation of the Washington, Jefferson and Jackson tradition is broken down, he shall not have as many terms as his natural life will permit." 267 And again: " I t is more dangerous to give . . . Roosevelt a third term now than any other man . . . we have had in our history, for the reason that he has shown recently more disposition to destroy our constitutional government, more willingness to appeal to class hatred and to stir up discontent, which are the only two things that can destroy the Republic." 268 As a result of the deep distrust of Theodore Roosevelt which had arisen, another attempt was made to bar him from achieving his goal. On April 30, 1 9 1 2 , Representative Henry D. Clayton (Dem.), of Alabama, proposed a joint resolution providing an amendment to the Constitution "fixing the term of office of President of the United States at six years and making him ineligible for a second term." 260 In the words of one understanding journal: " M r . Roosevelt's obstreperous dash for the nomination" had stimulated interest in a constitutional restriction on third terms. 270 The resolution was directed solely at Theodore Roosevelt. Senators Clark (Dem.), Root (Rep.), Crane (Rep.), and Cummins (Rep.) announced their endorsement of it; President Taft himself promised to sign it. A New York World survey revealed 37 Senators in favor of and only 3 opposed to the Clayton resolution. The remainder were doubtful. Some 209 Representatives endorsed it, 15 opposed it, and 79 were noncommittal or absent. Colonel Roosevelt immediately declared against it and labeled it "a tomfool proposition." Senator Borah, too, inclined to the negative side. The Nation and Harper's IVeekly were ardent supporters of the proposal. The latter exclaimed scornfully of the Colonel: " H e would accept a single term readily enough if it were 267

New Y o r k Tribune, A p r i l i 6 , 1 9 1 2 , p. 1 ; Independent, L X I I ( M a y 2, 1 9 1 2 ) , 9 6 4 ; Harper's Weekly, L V I ( M a y 4, 1 9 1 2 ) , 6. 288 Harper's Weekly, L V I ( J u n e i , 1 9 1 2 ) , 4. 268 Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5 6 5 4 ; B u f f a l o Express, May 1, 1 9 1 2 , p. 1 . 270 Harper's Weekly, L V I ( M a y 4 > 1 9 1 2 ) , 4.

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for himself for life. That, in fact, is what he is striving to attain." 2 7 1 Throughout the spring and summer of 1912 the resolution was debated pro and con in Congress, but no action was taken on it until February, 1913, fully three months after the 1912 election had taken place. 273 As the date for the Republican National Convention approached, it became apparent that Theodore Roosevelt would not abide by its decision if he were rejected. The Colonel had become the center of attention, inciting as he did "frenzied devotion and equally frenzied opposition." 2 7 3 Dr. Allen McLane Hamilton in public newspaper columns seriously considered the question of the former President's sanity, while Dr. Morton Prince, an early disciple of the "New Psychology," felt that a subconscious desire to be President again had poisoned Roosevelt's system before he had left the White House. In the words of Dr. Prince, the Colonel would "go down in history as one of the most illustrious psychological examples of the distortion of conscious mental processes through the forces of subconscious wishes." 274 Theodore was contemplating a bolt—a bolt which, the Philadelphia Public Ledger predicted, would become known as "Roosevelt's folly." 275 As the Colonel continued "electioneering for his third cup of coffee," there were accurate signs that he was the choice of a majority of the rank and file of Republicans. His great strength in the primaries verified this; but Taft was certain to be the nominee. Theoretically there was some justification for Roosevelt's later charge that the nomination had been stolen from him. But traditional methods had been employed in the choice of a candidate. 271 Ibid., p. 4, M a y n , i 8, 1 9 1 2 . Only the Outlook opposed the Clayton Resolution, describing it as "another effort to hamper the people." Vol. CI ( M a y 25, 1 9 1 2 ) , 152. For the Congressional debates on the Clayton and Works resolution, se? the Congressional Record, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3 1 3 2 - 3 3 , 1 1 2 5 5 - 6 4 , 1 1 3 5 5 - 6 6 , 1 1 4 3 9 43, 1 1 4 5 8 - 6 6 . Included are the speeches of Senators Works, Cummins, Borah, Capp, Heyburn, and others. 273 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 562. 274 New York Times, March 25, 1 9 1 2 . 275 Cited in Literary Digest, X L I V (June 29, 1 9 1 2 ) , 1 3 3 0 . Alice Roosevelt Longworth tells us that early in June her father had decided to put another ticket in the field if he should not be nominated. Crowded Hours, p. 196.

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T h e rules and regulations of the Republican party stipulated the election of national committeemen and the selection of committees at the close of each convention. T h e Credentials Committee had been appointed with Roosevelt's tacit consent in 1908. The new committeemen, friendly to him, would not take their seats until the Chicago Convention was ended. Such was party law; the Colonel ignored it. T h e Republican National Committee met on June 6 and began the work of settling problems in Taft's favor. Theodore ranted and raged, shouting that the committee's action was "dangerously near being treason . . . to the whole spirit of democratic free government." 2 7 6 On June 1 4 Roosevelt left for the scene of the carnage. " I t is a fight against theft," he shouted, "and the thieves will not win." " I ' m feeling like a Bull Moose," he snapped, thus inspiring the phrase which was to characterize the Progressive party. 277 T h e next night in addressing a huge throng in Chicago, Roosevelt charged that T a f t had been disloyal, had yielded to the party machine, that the delegates had not been honestly seated, and that "we have a large majority of the legally elected members of the Convention." Then, in apocalyptic tones, he began: W h a t happens to me is not of the slightest consequence; I a m to be used, as in a doubtful battle any man is used, to his hurt or not, so long as he is useful and is then cast aside and left to die. I wish you to feel this. I mean it; and I shall need no sympathy w h e n you are through with me.

. . .

It

w o u l d be f a r better to fail honorably f o r the cause w e champion than it w o u l d be to w i n by foul methods the foul victory for which our opponents hope. B u t the victory shall be ours, and it shall be . . . ing for the loftiest of causes. W e

by clean and honest

fight-

fight in honorable fashion f o r the good

of m a n k i n d ; unheeding of our individual fates; with unflinching hearts and u n d i m m e d e y e s ; w e stand at A r m a g e d d o n , and w e battle for the L o r d . 2 7 8

T h e Republican Convention that met on June 18, 1 9 1 2 , was full of dynamite. Latest polls gave T a f t 488 votes, needing 52 for a majority; Roosevelt 452, needing 88, and L a Follette 36. 27f> The sole idea of 278

New Y o r k Tribute, June 1 2 , 1 9 1 2 , p. 1. Pringle, Life and Times of . . . Taft, II, 8 0 1 . 278 Works of Theodore Roosevelt, X V I I , 204.-3 1. 279 Harper's Weekly, L V I (June 8, 1 9 1 2 ) , 4. In the state primaries, Roosevelt had carried Illinois by 1 3 9 , 4 3 6 votes; New Jersey by 1 7 , 2 1 3 ; Pennsylvania by 1 0 5 , 8 9 9 ; California by 6 9 , 2 1 8 ; Ohio by 4 7 , 4 4 7 ; in Nebraska he polled 16,769 more votes than T a f t and L a Follette combined. He carried T a f t ' s own state of Ohio. In thirteen states 277

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the convention leaders was that the Colonel should not control it and be nominated. Francis E . McGovern, Roosevelt's choice, had been defeated for the role of permanent chairman by Elihu Root, a T a f t man, 558 to 501. Root's position was a delicate one. Despite his fondness for and closer friendship with the former President, he was fully committed to his chief. 280 Governor Herbert Hadley, of Missouri, led the Roosevelt forces. T h e questions of whether 70 or 100 T a f t delegates were seated, whether Roosevelt's representation should have been increased by 60 or 70 votes, or the degree of corruption at Chicago in 1 9 1 2 as compared with other national conventions in no way affect the result. There were over 200 contested seats, but William Barnes, Jr., boss of the New York Republican machine, rose to declare: " W e have got to save the country, save the constitution, save our liberty. W e are in danger of monarchy." 2 8 1 The Republican machine operated like clockwork and, amidst cries of "robbers!" and " t h e f t ! " by the Rooseveltians, calmly proceeded to seat the T a f t delegates. It was obvious that, regardless of anything else, the Republican National Committee must and did seat enough men to secure the President's renomination. This was accomplished on June 22, when on the first ballot T a f t received 561 votes; Roosevelt, 1 0 7 ; Cummins of Iowa, 1 7 ; L a Follette, 4 1 ; and Hughes, 2. Exactly 344 of the delegates had cast no ballots at all when they saw that it was impossible to nominate Theodore Roosevelt. 2 " 2 T h e Colonel was "beside himself with rage." 2 8 3 H e knew, as did everyone else, that he was the popular choice for the Republican nomination. It was his intention, in the light of all available evidence, to bolt the party when he arrived in Chicago. When Roosevelt saw he had that had primaries there were 388 delegates. Roosevelt had 281, T a f t 7 1 , and La Follette 36. Pringle, Life and Times of . . . Taft, II, 797; Sullivan, Our Times, IV, 494. 280 Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 179. When Roosevelt saw that Root had been made permanent chairman of the Convention, he immediately severed relations with his old friend. 291 Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 362. 282 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 564. Of the contested seats 233 were given to T a f t , and only 6 to Roosevelt; in 74 decisions no roll was called. Wister, Roosevelt, p. 3 1 1 . * 8 3 Only Senator Albeit J . Beveridge has affirmed that Roosevelt's tone during the Convention was one of regret rather than of bitterness. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, p. 420.

198

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O V E R

T R A D I T I O N

no chance of being nominated, he determined that no compromise candidate should be chosen.284 T a f t was reluctant to believe that the Colonel would bolt. 285 Roosevelt rallies had been held all during the Convention at his headquarters in the Congress Hotel. Cries of " T e d d y , we want T e d d y ! " continually arose from the balconies of the Convention Hall. Such hysteria did not prevail among the leaders. When the Roosevelt delegates planned to appeal to the convention against its ruthless action, the Colonel mounted a table and announced dramatically: So f a r as I a m concerned I a m through. I f you are voted d o w n the real and l a w f u l majority will organize as such. . . . won.

I w e n t before the people and I

. . . L e t us find out w h e t h e r the Republican P a r t y is the party of

the plain people . . .

or the party of the bosses and the professional radicals

acting in the interests of special privilege. 1 > 8 B

T a f t was powerless before such showmanship. The night of the President's nomination, Roosevelt's followers, including the 344 who had not voted at the Convention, pledged their support to the Colonel. A mass meeting was held in Orchestra H a l l , where Governor Hiram Johnson, of California, presided. Most of those present were anxious to organize a new party then and there and to nominate the Rough Rider as its candidate. Brief addresses were made on all sides. Roosevelt himself spoke solemnly: I f you wish me to make the fight [ h e d e c l a r e d ] , I will make it, even if only one State should support me. T h e only condition I impose is that you shall feel entirely free . . .

to substitute any other m a n in m y place, if you deem

it better for the m o v e m e n t , and in such case, I will give him m y heartiest support.287

H e added feverishly: 284 There had been some mention in this connection of Senator Borah as a compromise candidate, but Roosevelt would not hear of it. C. O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, p. 1 3 9 . 285 Pringle, Life and Times of . . . Taft, I I , 784. 288 New York Tribune, June 20, 1 9 1 2 , p. 5. T h o u g h it is unquestionably true that Roosevelt was the choice of a majority of the people, the conclusion from this fact is not necessarily that T a f t ' s nomination was fraudulent; it is rather that under the rules and regulations for the organization of the Republican National Convention, the will of the majority could not prevail. Jessup, Elihu Root, I I , 1 9 3 . 287 Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 3 7 2 ; New Y o r k Tribune, June 23, 1 9 1 2 , p. 1.

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199

I a m in this fight for certain principles, and the first and most important of these goes back to Sinai, and is embodied in the commandment, " T h o u shalt not s t e a l ! " T h o u shalt not steal a nomination. T h o u shalt neither steal in politics nor in business. T h o u shalt not steal from the people the birthright of the people to rule themselves. 2 8 8

As Charles A. Beard has succinctly put it, ". . . Taft was renominated by the rump parliament in a sincere belief that the country was being saved from a tidal wave of dangerous radicalism." 280 On many sides Roosevelt's defeat was received with acclamation. It was not Armageddon, but Waterloo, exulted the New York World; while the Herald in the same city exclaimed: "The third term has been thrown into the well with a stone tied around its neck." 290 Harper's Weekly sympathetically observed: "It is a pity . . . that an ex-President should so have turned his country into a political cock-pit for the entertainment of civilized peoples." - 91 Senator La Follette vindictively charged Roosevelt with deliberately sacrificing the Progressive cause to his own personal ambition.292 On July 2 Governor Woodrow Wilson was nominated for President by the Democrats at Baltimore and the death knell of Roosevelt's chances in November was sounded. Most of his supporters must have realized this; for the Democrats had a liberal platform, including popular election of Senators, further trust control, publicity for campaign contributions, regulation of railroad rates, limited use of injunctions in labor disputes, and conservation. As a direct slap at Roosevelt, a plank endorsing a single presidential term was also included. After Wilson's nomination, the Colonel declared: " I shall . . . continue to stand for the Progressive nomination." 293 At first it was not certain whether a third party would be started. Some of the Roosevelt supporters became discouraged; others, such as Senator Borah, announced their decision to remain within the party and there to carry on the fight for liberal government; still others deserted to Wilson. In 288 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 335. Senator La Follette sarcastically dubbed the "Thou shalt not steal" phrase "Thou shalt not steal from me." La Follette, Autobiography, p. 657. 288 Beard and Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, II, 603. 290 Literary Digest, X L I V (June 29, 1 9 1 2 ) , 1330. 291 Vol. L V I (June 29, 191 2 ) , 4. 292 293 Nation, X C V ( J u l y 18, 1 9 1 2 ) , 46. Ibid., J u l y 4, 1 9 1 2 , p. 1.

200

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T R A D I T I O N

spite of his efforts, Roosevelt could not persuade Borah to support the Bull Moose. After the Republican Convention, he sent for the Idaho Senator and urged him to bolt and to attend the Progressive gathering} but Borah remained firm in his adherence to the G.O.P. 2 9 * T h e difficulties which lay in the way of a successful independent convention that should nominate Roosevelt were enormous. Roosevelt burned with the zeal of a crusader. The time for revolution had come at last. Frank Munsey, George Perkins, and others stood ready to finance a campaign. When Senator Beveridge advised against a rump convention, the Colonel admitted, " Y o u may be right; but it is too late to change things now." 2 9 5 A call was issued on July 7 for delegates to a convention to meet in Chicago on August 5—a call which, in the words of one journal, represented "not progressive Democracy, but Democracy in retreat, seeking refuge in the arms of the strong man." 290 The group that met on August 5 was a most unusual one. One writer has referred to it as a "great revival meeting." 297 The delegates were required to pay their own expenses. From several states many times the required number arrived. 298 Charles A. Beard has this description of the gathering: the strangest political convention

. . . since the Republican insurrection of

1 8 5 6 . T y p i c a l politicians, seasoned office-holders, and hardened m a n a g e r s of local captains w e r e conspicuous by their absence; reformers, idealists, and members of Roosevelt's "lunatic f r i n g e " filled the seats and packed the c o m mittee rooms. E i g h t e e n of the delegates w e r e w o m e n and one of the k e y note speeches w a s delivered by J a n e A d d a m s of H u l l House, the f a m o u s social settlement in C h i c a g o . 2 9 9 294 C. O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, pp. 1 3 9 - 4 1 . Later, Roosevelt was reported to have said that Borah had acted wisely in not bolting. Ibid., p. 1 6 7 . 285 Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, p. 4.21. 296 New Y o r k World, cited in Literary Digest, X L V ( J u l y 20, 1 9 1 2 ) , S8. 297 Richberg, Tents of the Mighty, p. 35. Donald Richberg, who was in 1 9 1 2 a young Bull Moose, regarded the Progressive movement as "religious; a revolt of youth against age, of idealism against materialism." Ibid., p. 32. 298 H. L . Stoddard, As I Knew Them, p. 405. For an excellent account of the Progressive movement, including Roosevelt's part in it and the Convention of 1 9 1 2 , see Oscar King Davis, Released for Publication, pp. 2 5 3 - 3 3 6 . 299 Beard and Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, II, 604. Included in the motley group were such colorful figures as Professors Albert Bushnell Hart, Charles E . Merriam, and William Draper L e w i s ; financiers like Frank A . Munsey and George W .

"ROUGH-RIDING"

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201

Ten thousand people were present when Albert J . Beveridge sounded the keynote speech, reciting the principles and aims of the Progressive party, as it had come to be known. Both the old parties had failed, declared the former Indiana Senator, and the only hope for America lay in the Progressive party. The next day Roosevelt delivered his "Confession of Faith," a voluminous document setting forth every reform for which he had fought while President and which he had advocated since 1909. The platform of the Progressives set forth these views: easier amendment of the Federal Constitution, social welfare legislation for women and children, workmen's compensation, limited use of injunction in labor disputes, farm relief, revision of the currency to assure elasticity, health insurance in industry, inheritance and income taxes, improvement of inland waterways, limitation of naval armaments, woman suffrage, and recall of judicial decisions. The platforms of all three parties resembled each other too much. As one writer has aptly put it: the Progressive platform had to be discounted along with the Democratic platform and that on which T a f t was running. . . . All three platforms pointed to Utopia. A l l were insincere. F o r all the bellows of the Bull Moose . . . the Progressive party was still Republican in its essential beliefs. 800

With banners flying the Progressive party adjourned, its members returning to their "battlements" to engage in the skirmish. It was an old and familiar story to Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, the bitter sting of defeat lay ahead of him; victory was not in the air in 1912. Woodrow Wilson, to whom all this was something of a novelty, was "fresh and vigorous and effective." 3 0 1 "As you probably see," wrote Henry Adams to Cecil Spring Rice, " . . . your old friend Theodore, has dropped us all, and has gone in pirating on his own account . . . but I much fear that our dear Theodore is a dead cock in the pit. Everyone tells me that all interest in him or the election has passed. . . . Woodrow Wilson is President till next advices." 302 To which Lincoln Steffens added: " A l l the interests [in the East] are determined Perkins; journalists like William Allen White and Oscar King Davis; and such political figures as Albert J . Beveridge, Hiram Johnson, George W. Norris, Bainbridge Colby, Chauncey Hamlin, and others. 300 301 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 567. Ibid., p. j68. 302 Gwynn (ed), Letters and Friendship of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, II, 168-72.

202

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OVER

T R A D I T I O N

to beat T . R . . . . T h e man they hate is the Bull Moose and they are bound to beat him if they can." 303 Even James Ford Rhodes was deeply grieved at the Colonel's action. " A n idol that I cherish fondly is broken," he declared, ". . . personal ambition has swayed M r . Roosevelt." 304 Nor was there complete harmony in the ranks of the Progressives. Hiram Johnson, the Bull Moose candidate for Vice President, felt that his candidacy had not been effectively utilized by the Progressive National Committee/ 105 Roosevelt's throat bothered him and he often complained of being weary; age was beginning to tell on him. Reports were current that his speeches were not as effective as they once were.:U)(i In Milwaukee on the evening of October 14 the Colonel was shot in the breast by a fanatic who shouted something about a third term. In his customary spectacular manner Roosevelt insisted on delivering the address, which he did with the bullet still in his breast. T h e next day, when the wound was found not to be serious, the Bull Moose declared to his followers: I t matters little about me but it matters about the cause w e fight for. If one soldier w h o carries the flag is stricken, another will take it f r o m his hands and carry it on. . . . T e l l the people not to w o r r y about me, for if I go d o w n another will take my place. F o r a l w a y s , the army is true. A l w a y s the cause is t h e r e . 3 0 7

W h e n the campaign neared its end, the Colonel made a final appeal to the voters in Madison Square Garden. T h e rally had all the zeal and enthusiasm of a Roosevelt gathering of other days. Once more he sounded the principles of the Progressive party; he pledged his life to the cause—"to spend and be spent" and fight on to the end for "righteousness and for brotherhood." 308 T w e l v e thousand people cheered lustily. T h e results of the election coincided with the prophecies. As Alice Roosevelt Longworth has written: " T h e farther away we got from the 'Rump' convention, the slimmer Father's chances looked for suc303 304 305 306 307 308

Letters of Lincoln Steffens, I, 308. M. A. De W. Howe, James Ford Rhodes, pp. 213-14. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 568. Davis, Released for Publication, pp. 366-67. Works of Theodore Roosevelt, XVII, 331. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 380.

"ROUGH-RIDING"

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203

cess in the election." 809 Woodrow Wilson was elected President with 435 electoral votes. Roosevelt won 88 votes and T a f t only 8. T h e Colonel, however, received 4,126,020 popular votes, as against 6,286,124 for Wilson, and 3,483,922 for Taft. It was indeed an impressive showing. Despite the fact that the regular Republicans had come in last (a poor third to the Progressives), they were soon to come back. In the words of one writer: T h e old party that Abraham Lincoln had helped to found seemed upon its last legs; while the new Rooseveltian party had made the strongest showing recorded for a third party in America since 1856. Y e t it was the Bull Moose who was fated to become an extinct animal, while the Elephant was soon to nurse himself back to health and power. 3 1 0

As for Theodore Roosevelt, " I accept the result with entire good humor," he declared. "As for the Progressive cause, I can only repeat . . . the cause in itself must triumph, for the triumph is essential to the well-being of the American people." 8 1 1 Writing to Sir Edward Grey on November 15 the Colonel admitted: " I did not believe we would win, and I can say quite honestly that I have little or no personal regret in the outcome." 3 1 2 Soon after the election a friend talked to Roosevelt of victory in 1916. " I thought you were a better politician," responded the Colonel. " T h e fight is over. W e are beaten. There is only one thing to do and that is to go back to the Republican Party. You can't hold a party like the Progressive Party together . . . there are no loaves and fishes." 3 1 3 Thus ended the famous Bull Moose campaign of 1912. Roosevelt's personality was the sole unifying force to the movement. It is amazing when one pauses to consider how close he came to being elected. Recent computations reveal that if, in November, 1912, a mere 250,000 votes out of some 14,000,000 had been transferred from Wilson to Roosevelt in certain strategic states, the Colonel would have won. 314 As Elihu Root told his biographer in 1930: 308 310 311 312 313 314

Crowded Hours, p. 2 0 j . Josephson, The President Makers: 1896-1 g 1 g, p. 456. New Y o r k Tribune, Nov. 6, 1912, p. 1. Years: 1892-1916, II, 139. Grey, Twenty-Five Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 5 7 1 . Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, p. 81.

204

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

TRADITION

Roosevelt had nothing to go on except he was so darn mad at Taft. . . . Roosevelt was the Bull Moose movement. Roosevelt could perfectly well have been reelected President if he hadn't deferred so long and said he wasn't and would not be a candidate. The real reason [for his action] was he was so damn mad. . . . When he came to bolt the Convention, he created an entirely new set of issues.315 Many writers have felt that had the Republican party allowed the preference of the majority to express itself by Roosevelt's nomination, "there is every reason to believe . . . he would have been elected." 8 1 6 What are the real causes to which Theodore Roosevelt's defeat may be ascribed? There is considerable evidence to support the claim that certain extreme and recently adopted views of the former President, such as the initiative, the referendum, and especially the recall of judges and judicial decisions, contributed considerably to the election debacle. 3 1 7 T h e Colonel's actions had been poorly timed and injudiciously carried out} the people had heard him rant and rave for many years; perhaps they were tiring of the Rough Rider and his strenuous ways. Would this seem to indicate that the Roosevelt personality, its color and magnetism, were losing their attraction to the American people—so much so that when the apostle of the New Nationalism went off "half cocked" on one of his impulsive gyrations, the public evinced a marked apathy to follow him in blind and unrequited faith? Hardly so, in view of the fact that the Colonel polled well over 4,000,000 votes. Roosevelt had by 1 9 1 2 become something of an impassioned fanatic. H e burned with the zeal of reform—even if it should necessitate "revolution." When the test came, when the prophet stood before M t . Sinai, the sheep held back a little, timid, and fearful of what the future might bring. As for the third term, though it cost Roosevelt some votes, as it would any man, it all but dropped out of sight as an important issue. It was used as a minor "talking point," but all available indications point to the conclusion that the Colonel's flouting of tradition cost him very 315

316 Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 184-85. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 382. J . E. Watson, As I Knevi Them, p. 148; Long-worth, Crowded Hours, p. 186. Both Senator James E. Watson and Alice Roosevelt Longworth believe that Roosevelt committed a great blunder in his advocacy of these changes and that this faux fas cost him more votes than anything else. Roosevelt himself admitted this at a luncheon in 1918. Wood, Roosevelt as We Knew Him, p. 272. 317

"ROUGH-RIDING"

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205

few votes. 318 Woodrow Wilson's election was due in the main to the Republican split between T a f t and Roosevelt. T h e two of them taken together beat the Democratic candidate by over 1,000,000 votes, with the former President outstripping T a f t by more than 500,000 votes. H a d Theodore Roosevelt early been able to secure the few extra delegates (he needed but 8o-odd) necessary to swing the Republican nomination in his favor, he quite possibly would have become our first thirdterm President. Far more noxious in its effects than the third-term argument was the nature of the support with which the Roosevelt movement had allied itself. It was simply sheer nonsense that the Colonel should have enlisted the aid of such moneyed interests as Frank A. Munsey and George W . Perkins and still have hoped eventually to bring big business under control. That was, as one writer puts it, "pitiable . . . selfdeception." 3 1 9 Especially ironic is the fact that this same George W . Perkins was closely involved in the United States Steel acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, was an officer of the International Harvester Company, and had interceded with Roosevelt to stop the prosecution of that corporation for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act—the very Perkins who had been a partner of J. P. Morgan and Company, whom the Colonel despised and who were backing T a f t ; all this Roosevelt knew. Yet contrast it with the creed and tenets of "Roosevelt Progressivism"—"Big business would be encouraged if 'good,' and punished if 'bad.' The wicked strong people would be controlled and the good weak people would be protected." 320 As one writer has very neatly put it: Roosevelt lost heavily from the incontrovertible fact that parties are born, not made, and his w a s gotten together without previous impulse and under the spell of a magnetic personality. . . . M o r e

[discerning m e n ] , . . .

than is commonly supposed, realized how completely the cause of reform had been sold out to the special interests when it embraced the patron saint of the system, G e o r g e W . Perkins, w h o financed the m o v e m e n t . 3 2 1 318Rodell, 319 3:0 321

Democracy

and the Third

Term, p. 80.

McCaleb, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 324. Richberg, Tents of the Mighty, pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . Dumond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 .

2o6

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

T R A D I T I O N

Conflicting testimony is furnished us concerning Theodore Roosevelt's motives and chances in the 1912 election. O n the one side we have the following explanation by Henry L . Stoddard, who tends to idealize Roosevelt : He [Roosevelt] had friends who intrusted their political fortunes to him while he was President, and they had been left to battle for themselves. T h e y called upon him in 1 9 1 0 to stand by them. He had had policies that he once was confident T a f t would follow through with, and he found them abandoned or chaotic. Both influences bore heavily upon him. Republican leadership was in a conflict between T a f t conservatism and L a Follette radicalism. O n e of the two would control the 1 9 1 2 national convention. He could not support either. T h a t feeling was at the bottom of T . R . ' s " B u l l M o o s e " candidacy. 3 2 2

Conversely, we have the following less biased but more reasonable interpretation of "Armageddon": Roosevelt headed a third party because he over-estimated the number of rock-ribbed standpat Republicans w h o never would have voted for him. It is doubtful if Roosevelt could have been elected even if nominated at C h i cago. T h e r e were a lot of Republicans in the country who were very tired of him. 3 2 3

T h e campaign of 1912 was a tragic one. T w o friends of more than twenty years became rivals for the office both had held ; both squabbled for the nomination and then contended fiercely to be elected. T a f t retired to private life, later to accept the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Theodore Roosevelt returned to Sagamore H i l l , renouncing his role of the prophet-reformer. In 1914 he tried one more major expedition, but this time one too many. H e visited the South American republics, plunging into the wilderness of the Rio de la Plata, whence from the tropical infections he narrowly escaped with his life. T h e Colonel returned to the United States and to his desk at the Outlook to watch a world at war—an older and attenuated but 322

H. L . Stoddard, It Costs

to Be President,

p. i 76. T o which O w e n W i s t e r has

l o y a l l y a d d e d : " H e [ R o o s e v e l t ] had not wished to be nominated at the b e g i n n i n g , he w o u l d not accept nomination f r o m a crooked convention at thè end, he had little belief that he could be elected by the B u l l M o o s e p a r t y , and little in common w i t h their lunatic f r i n g e . " Roosevelt, 323

D u n n , From

Harrison

p. 3 1 7 . to Harding,

I I , 198.

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

TRADITION

207

none the less still vigorous Rough Rider. T w o years later the specter of Theodore Roosevelt as a presidential candidate was again raised. By the year 1915 W o o d r o w Wilson had occupied the presidential chair for two years. T h e Democratic record had been a good one; but the war burst forth in the summer of 1914, rendering many of the recent achievements abortive. Theodore Roosevelt evinced both a deep distrust and dislike of the foreign policy of President Wilson. T h e war had served largely to heal the wounds of the break in the Republican party. Once again in 1 9 1 5 - 1 6 the great body of Republicans looked, more than is generally supposed, to the Colonel as their standard bearer. Throughout 1915 Roosevelt bitterly criticized the Wilson "peace at any price" policy. In its place the former President advocated a strong-handed foreign policy, with an extensive preparedness campaign at home. Disagreeing so violently as he did with the administration, the Colonel attracted to him not only those who had always been his followers, but a large group of voters who themselves looked upon the Wilson foreign policy with disgust and deprecation. Many Republicans turned to Roosevelt as the only man capable of effectively carrying on the delicate relationships with foreign countries which had been occasioned by the war. Toward the end of 1915 public opinion began to swing rapidly in Roosevelt's favor. A survey of Republican presidential candidates originating in Washington revealed the Colonel to have considerable strength in the Middle and Far West. 3 -' 4 Late in November the Nebraska secretary of state announced that unless the former President requested its withdrawal, his name would go before the voters in the Nebraska primary as a presidential candidate. 325 One week later Roosevelt declared that he had withdrawn his name from the Nebraska primary, stating that he had just become aware of its being placed there. 326 Meanwhile, ten of the twenty members of the executive committee of the Progressive National Committee at a meeting in New Y o r k discussed plans for the coming campaign; all agreed that influence should be brought on Colonel Roosevelt to run. 327 T h e former President's nomination on the Republican or the Progressive ticket was by no means an impossibility. On the Progressive 324

N e w Y o r k Tinus,

326

Ibid.,

N o v . 14, 1 9 1 5 , p. 14.

D e c . i , 1 9 1 5 , p. 7.

325

Ibid.,

N o v . 23, 1 9 1 5 , p. 6.

327

Ibid.,

N o v . 30, 1 9 1 5 , p. 8.

208

" R O U G H - R I D I N G " OVER

TRADITION

side, George W . Perkins, chairman of the executive committee, expressed the opinion that if the O l d Guard element again dominated the Republican National Convention, the Progressives would be forced to draft Roosevelt. 328 In the case of the Republicans, G . O . P . sentiment was especially strong for the Colonel in the Far West j in some states blank petitions had been prepared by Republican leaders to put Roosevelt's name on the primary ballots. 329 In Michigan a petition similar to the Nebraska one was entered to place Roosevelt's name on the primary ballot. M a n y erstwhile Progressives were backing the former President for the regular Republican nomination. 330 As in the case of the Nebraska petition the Colonel requested his name to be withdrawn, saying that it was not to be placed on the ballot as the candidate of any party. 331 Such popular demonstrations led one journal to observe: "Someone else may be nominated, but the Colonel is the man everyone has to reckon with." 3 3 2 In his own mind Roosevelt was firmly set against the nomination of either party. H i s letters and public statements of the time lead us to no other conclusion. T h e Colonel consciously felt that the American people would never again look to him for guidance. " Y o u are mistaken entirely," he wrote John S. L . Strachey, "in believing that the American public will ever turn to me for leadership again, in the sense of acknowledging me to be the leader." 3 3 3 A few days later he confided to a friend: " M y feeling is that harm and not good would come if I should again be a candidate. . . . T h e people have had all they want of me." 334 Late in July Roosevelt told a reporter he did not know whether he would be a candidate or not. 335 T o George W . Perkins on September 3 he admitted: " I f the Republicans ever come to . . . nominating me . . . it will be because they know they will be defeated under me and intend that I shall receive the heaviest defeat they can give me." 3 3 6 A n d again: "Don't get it into your head that there is the slightest pos328 Ibid., Dec. 21, 191 j , p. 1. There was some indication at this time that the Progressives would make a strong effort to influence the Republican nomination. 328 Ibid., Dec. 23, 191$, p. 7 ; Dec. i t , 1915, p. 4.. 830 Ibid., Dec. 25, 1 9 1 5 , ^ . 1. 331 Ibid., Jan. j , 1916, p. 1. 882 New Republic, V (Dec. 25, 1915), 181. 3 3 8 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 381 (May 29, 1 9 1 s ) . 834 Ibid., pp. 381-83. 8 3 5 New York Times, July 27, 1915, p. 2. 3 3 8 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 397.

"ROUGH-RIDING"

OVER

T R A D I T I O N

209

sibility of my returning to public life. . . . It is against our traditions as a nation; and, while I myself think these traditions are foolish, yet they exist, and that is all there is to it." 3 3 7 One of the prime factors which convinced Roosevelt he had no chance in 1916 was his preparedness campaign, which had thoroughly alienated both the Germans and the pacifists. Apropos of this, he admitted to H e n r y Cabot Lodge in December: A s you k n o w , I feel that the course I have followed about HyphenatedAmericanism, and especially the G e r m a n - A m e r i c a n vote, is such as absolutely to preclude the possibility of nominating me as a candidate, even though there had been such a possibility before, which in my judgment was not the case. 3 3 8

T h e former President's firm belief that too many people still remembered 1912 and had not forgiven him for splitting the Republicans and forming a third party clinched the argument in his mind that he should not consent to run again. Roosevelt's action in the case of the state primary petitions provides ample evidence of this decision. In late December Medill McCormick, leader of the Illinois Progressives, declared after a conference with Roosevelt that the Colonel had said nothing to him about accepting the nomination on either ticket. 339 If Roosevelt did not want the nomination, whom did he support for it? T h e Colonel's first choice was Governor Hiram Johnson, of California, his running mate on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912. A s early as July, 1915, the former President before a group of reporters had turned to the Californian and declared: " H e r e is the man, Johnson is the next President." 340 Late in the year, however, Roosevelt began telling friends that "Borah was the man to lead the party to victory against Wilson." 3 4 1 W h e n the presidential year opened, the Roosevelt boom assumed added impetus. Perhaps it was due to general dissatisfaction on the part of the public with President Wilson and his policies; perhaps to a revitalized popular attraction to Roosevelt's magnetic personality; or perhaps to the realization of his sincerity and well-meaning designs in 1912. 337

Ibid., p. 398 (Roosevelt to John S. L . Strachey, Oct. 9, 1 9 1 5 ) . 3 3 9 N e w Y o r k Times, Dec. 21, 191 j , p. 4. 3 4 1 C. O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, p. 169. Ibid., July 23, 191 J, p. 9.

333Ibid. 340

2io

" R O U G H - R I D I N G " OVER

TRADITION

Early in January, at a meeting of the Progressive National Committee, party chiefs were practically unanimous in acclaiming the Bull Moose as the only man who could beat Woodrow Wilson.342 Many regular Republicans began to jump on the band wagon. Colorado and the Rocky Mountain states openly announced their allegiance to the former President.343 The Roosevelt sentiment, declared the Washington Herald (Ind.), is developing "rather rapidly in recent weeks." If there is any scattering of opposing forces, "he is likely to run away with the convention." 344 Again in Illinois the Colonel had to request the withdrawal of his name from the primary ballot.345 As with Grover Cleveland in 1903-4, there was considerable opposition to Roosevelt's candidacy. On many sides talk of T.R. was received coldly and suspiciously. "To say that the Colonel is going to run," mocked the Boston Globe (Ind.), "is inaccurate. He is not going to •run! The Colonel is now running . . . at the rate of 1 1 0 miles an hour, and is gaining speed." 346 A Chicago Herald poll of its correspondents in forty-eight states revealed 70 percent believing Roosevelt was not growing in favor as a candidate; only 30 percent affirmed that he was gaining ground.347 Several Republican leaders talked repeatedly of a compromise candidate other than Theodore Roosevelt.348 The Colonel himself was especially determined to avoid another nomination from the Progressives, which would again insure Wilson's election. As Henry F. Pringle has put it: "One object, the defeat of Wilson, loomed so large that it obscured all others." 349 Theodore Roosevelt's hatred of Woodrow Wilson was never concealed; from the day the latter entered the W7hite House the thought that he (Roosevelt) had placed the Princeton schoolmaster there proved gall and wormwood to the former President. His hatred of the Democratic incumbent increased with every new success that crowned Wilson's efforts. By 1916 Roosevelt was motivated chiefly by the desire to beat President Taft's successor. He fully realized that another party split would simply mean another election for Wilson. That Roosevelt was reluctant to accept the 1916 nomination at the 342 343 845 348 347 348

New York Times, Jan. 1 1 , 1916, p. 1. 344 ibid., March 4, 1916, p. 4. Current Opinion, LX (April, 1 9 1 6 ) , Z33. New York Times, March 2, 1916, p. 5. Current Opinion, L X (Feb., 1 9 1 6 ) , 82. New York Times, Jan. 9, 1916, p. 7. 318 Ibid., Jan. i;, 1916, p. 4. Theodore Roosevelt, p. 570.

5ç

e ¡-i £ U

h O

£ O 1 J"b' 15> 18 Ibid., July 30, 1 9 : 6 , p. 17.

P- 419

Ibid., July 28, 1926, p. 6.

" I DO NOT CHOOSE T O R U N "

271

so consider it and defy the third-term tradition talk that is being put out by the opposition." 2 0 B y the end of the summer certain groups strongly favored M r . Coolidge. T h e Iowa state Republican convention endorsed him. The West was declared in line with assurances that the Coolidge strength was undiminished, said to have come from the Dakotas, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Missouri, and other states. 21 Newspaper editorials repeatedly contended that the President was justified in seeking another term on grounds of the success of his policies. Always Coolidge seemed to be trying to impress the people with his 1928 availabilityj in no way did he seek to discourage or squelch talk of his candidacy. The President's intimate friends believed he had every intention of running again. They affirmed that the third term would be no issue, since he was serving only his first elective term. Reelection would constitute his second. T h e anti-third term feeling had almost disappeared. As one writer put it: "That bugaboo has largely gone out of politics, or, judged by the statements made in reference to M r . Coolidge, is not applied to him so strongly." 2 2 The most unfavorable sign emanated from the West, where farm dissatisfaction was beginning to prod Congress into action. It appeared probable that the wet states might look more favorably on a candidate with more liberal views on prohibition than Calvin Coolidge. Other discordant notes came from Republican party leaders, who had no wish to renominate the dour little man who had been foisted upon them by the death of their beloved President Harding. They were extremely anxious to block his little game of silence. 23 Yet, as one political correspondent put it, "even the keenest of the Republican politicians admit that they do not see how President Coolidge is to be kept out of the nomination in 1928, if the country remains prosperous." 24 Considerable mention was made of the third-term question. T o a 21 ¡bid., Aug. t, 1926, p. 5. Ibid., Aug. 2, 1926, p. 5. -- Charles R. Michacl, "Coolidge Forces Are Lining Up for 1928." New York Times, Aug. 15, 1926, VIII, 1. 23 New Republic, X L V I I (Aug. 1», 1926), 363; World's Work, L I I (Sept., 1 9 2 6 ) , 488. It was frequently asked whether Coolidge could maintain sufficient public prestige to force an unwilling party organization to renominate him. Robert T . Small for the Consolidated Press in Literary Digest, X C (Aug. 2 1 , 1926), 9.

272

" I DO N O T C H O O S E T O

RUN"

large extent the argument was pooh-poohed. " I t may turn out," observed the New York Evening World (Dem.), "that that which Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Jackson did not want, and Grant and Roosevelt could not get, may fall to Calvin Coolidge." 25 The Washington Star (Ind.) did not feel the American people believed that Coolidge "should not be reelected in 1928 because he served nineteen months of the unexpired term of President Harding," while the Minneapolis Tribune (Rep.) saw no reason why the third-term argument should stand in the way of keeping a President on the job "just as long as the people manifest a desire to have him there." Numerous journals did not see how Coolidge could overcome the third-term sentiment. He did not impress the Philadelphia Record (Ind. Dem.) "as a man who can get what Washington refused and Grant and Roosevelt failed to secure." 28 Coolidge had never been more popular than in 1926. In the fall elections, though the country went "somewhat wet and partly Democratic," there was no evidence to show that presidential prestige had suffered. Despite the dissatisfaction among the western Republicans and the entreaties from Oswald Garrison Villard that the Progressive Senators "do their utmost to prevent the President's renomination for a third term," the Coolidge record remained unblemished.27 A shower of popular endorsements descended upon the White House from a motley group of admirers. Among them were that ancient and venerable political king-maker, George Harvey; Professor William Starr Myers, of Princeton University; C. Bascom Slemp, the President's former secretary; Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., of New York; and the aged Chauncey M. Depew, as well as many others.28 Even in European circles was it believed the President would be renominated.29 Coolidge's annoying silence provoked distress among political observers. One journal credited him with being the kind of man "capable of voluntary abdication." The President would probably accept the nomination, declared this publication, "if it could be handed to 23 27

Ibid.

New York 28 New York p. 1 ; New York 29 New York

26

Ibid.

Times, Dec. 13, 1926, p. 1 ; Nation, C X X I I I (Nov. 17, 1926), 498. Times, Aug. 30, 1926, p. 6; Nov. 20, p. 2; Dec. 12, p. 27; Deo. 25, Herald-Tribune, Nov. 5, 1926. Times, Sept. 4, 1926, p. 3.

" I DO N O T CHOOSE T O R U N "

273

him without opposition, but rather than undertake a sharp, bitter and doubtful contest he may prefer to accept retirement with a large part of his prestige and popularity still intact." 80 Frank R. Kent insisted there was no doubt that Coolidge desired another term. H e liked the White House too much, wrote Kent 5 if he ever announced he would not be a candidate to succeed himself, it would be because he believed his prospects of being reelected were slight. The President would not fight for the nomination. He expected to get it by having the machine politicians work for him.81 In regard to the third-term question, it seemed, observed one journal, that as the belief of Coolidge's renomination and election grew, "the idea that the time to depart from the eight-year tradition has arrived grows with it." 32 Present signs indicated that the "CoolidgeMellon regime" could withstand the third-term onslaughts. "Judging by the economic situation," wrote David Lawrence in the New York Sun, "the fact that a precedent is involved might carry little weight. If Mr. Coolidge were to be as fortunate in 1928 as he is today, with an unprecedented prosperity, the third-term differences will not alarm the party leaders." But, added Lawrence, should the situation be "not so good as to-day, they will use the third-term bogey as a means of selecting another candidate." 88 A year before the 1928 campaign the inscrutable Calvin really put on his little game of hide and seek—a game which he played for all it was worth until the very end of the Republican National Convention in June, 1928. The President coyly refused to be drawn into the open on the subject of his candidacy. But his campaign for a third term was being carried on quietly and without publicity. The somewhat lavish way in which the White House was entertaining party officials regularly at dinner made it appear that Mr. Coolidge was slyly and unobtrusively trying to "sew up" the 1928 nomination. Everything was being done in a subtle way, with the help of Frank Stearns and the President's other friends from Massachusetts.34 Yet New Republic, XLVIII (Nov. io, 1926), 309. " A Third Term for Coolidge?" Nation, C X X I I I (Dec. »9, «926), 685. 32 New Republic, X L I X (Dec. 29, 1926), 159. 83 Literary Digest, X C (Aug. 21, 1926), 9. 84 New Republic, X L I X (Jan. 12, 1927), 217. Political observers held that the President and William M . Butler, of Massachusetts, were lining up southern delegates 30

31

274

" I DO N O T C H O O S E T O

RUN"

no statement could be obtained as to his intentions; even the endorsement of the Kansas Republicans failed to elicit a response.35 Coolidge's silence, irritating though it was, gave rise to many attempts to smoke him out. Early in February, 1927, President Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia University, delivered an address in which he predicted that Coolidge would not run in 1928. " I am taking it for granted," declared Butler, "that when he thinks the right time has come, he will make public statement of his unwillingness to have his name considered in connection with the Republican Presidential nomination of 1928." "The Republican party," added the New York educator, "is going to have a hard enough time in 1928 without inviting certain defeat through injecting the third-term issue into the campaign." 30 There was little agreement among the press with Butler's remarks.37 "There are plenty of sound reasons for opposing Mr. Coolidge's renomination and reelection," observed the New Republic, "but an appeal to the tradition against a third term is not one of them." 38 To which the Seattle Times (Ind.) added: "If the country wants the President to run again, he will be renominated, thirdterm or no third-term." 39 "There is no law against electing a President to a third term, or a fourth, or even a fifth," exclaimed the Charleston (W. Va.) Mail (Rep.). 40 Dr. Butler's attempt to rule out President Coolidge as a candidate in 1928 had failed palpably. Coolidge was continually gaining strength among the regular Republicans, though progressive Republicans still opposed him.41 In Congress talk was heard of an anti-third term resolution. Butler's speech was not a day old when attempts were made in political circles to "smoke out" the stubborn little man in the White House. Available for 1928 in an effort to obtain as many "storm-proof" Coolidge delegates to the National Convention as possible. The President's handling of southern patronage appeared to prove this. Independent, C X V I I I (Jan, 8, 1 9 2 7 ) , 29; Feb. 26, 1927, pp. 2 2 5 26. 35 New York Times, Jan. 9, 1927, II, 3. 38 Ibid., Feb. 8, 1927, p. 2; Literary Digest, X C I I (Feb. 26, 1 9 2 7 ) , 8. 37 New York Times, Feb. 9, 1927, p. 2; Literary Digest, X C I I (Feb. 26, 1 9 2 7 ) , 8-9. 38 Vol. L (Feb. 23, I 9 2 7 ) , 16. 39 40 Literary Digest, X C I I (Feb. 26, 1 9 2 7 ) , 9. Ibid. 41 W. A. White, A Puritan in Babylon: The Story of Calvin Coolidge, p. 349.

"I

DO

NOT

CHOOSE

TO

RUN"

275

signs indicated that both Houses of Congress would be asked to express themselves for or against a third term. On February 10 Representative Joseph D . Beck, of Wisconsin, a L a Follette Republican, offered a resolution in the House similar to the Springer Resolution of 1875. It commended the practice of Presidents retiring after a second term and declared that any departure from this time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free institutions. 42 A n attempt was made to get an immediate vote but failed, and the resolution went to the House Judiciary Committee, where it was expected to slumber until Congress adjourned. This resolution was followed by another, introduced on February 21 by Representative Benjamin L . Fairchild, Republican, of N e w Y o r k , which proposed to amend the Constitution by definitely declaring no President may serve more than two terms, but barring no one who had served less than two years of a term by virtue of succession, whatever the cause. 43 In introducing the resolution Fairchild declared that the people were entitled to pass upon President Coolidge's accomplishments "unembarrassed by the third-terrr) issue." T h e next day Senator Robert M . L a Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin, proposed the Beck Resolution in the Senate, in an attempt to have that body declare against another term for Calvin Coolidge. 44 A l l three resolutions, offered for the purpose of "smoking out" the President, failed to elicit any comment whatever from him. T h e spring of 1927 saw a virtually endless chain of endorsements for the President in 1928 by prominent figures from all parts of the country. Henry Ford reiterated his faith in the sedate Calvin when he declared: " M r . Coolidge is a very capable man and a very good man"; Attorney-General Albert Ottinger, of New York, called the raising of the third-term issue "a refined form of quibbling." "Six years in the Presidency are not eight years in office," he declared to a newspaper correspondent; Representative Bertrand H . Snell, of N e w Y o r k , fully expected the President to be the 1928 nominee, while Congressional 1927, p. 2. 43 Congressional 1927, p. 2. 44 Congressional 1927, p. 17.

Record, 69th Cong., i d Sess., p. 3480; New York Times, Feb. 1 1 , Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 3 9 3 ; New York Times, Feb. 22, Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4400; New York Times, Feb. 23,

276

" I D O N O T CHOOSE T O

RUN"

the veteran Senator William E . Borah asserted that Coolidge "is entitled to the nomination and can have it if he wants it"} George K . Morris, chairman of the New York state Republican committee and later one of the "draft Coolidge" movement leaders, averred that party leaders were behind the President "to a man." 45 Practically everyone who called at the White House came away confident the President would seek the 1928 nomination.46 There were few indications of a diminution in the Coolidge popularity. It was admitted that the third-term issue might hurt the President considerably in the West. 4 7 On one side, the third term was declared to be the one issue which could eliminate him in 1928; on another, it was deemed a tradition "without essential validity." 48 David Lawrence endeavored to prove that Coolidge simply served out the unexpired term of President Harding and did not win his first election until 1 9 2 4 ; he now had the right to go before the people and seek a second election in his own right in 1928, thus not breaking the antithird term tradition. Lawrence suggested that Coolidge might seek another term and then resign on August 3, 1 9 3 1 , exactly eight years after he took office, thus confounding those critics obsessed with the eight-year idea. 49 Frank R . Kent in what would seem to be a more accurate prophecy contended that no President or party could afford to risk the no-third term tradition "without a vastly more unanimous and insistent party and popular demand than now exists for M r . Coolidge or is likely to arise." 60 Kent believed that the President was too wise to take any such chance and would like to go down in history as a chief executive who could have had a renomination for a third term but was too wise to attempt it. H e would want recognition that he could have the nomination before he renounced it. Until such time, Coolidge would employ his customary "sit still" methods. 51 45

Ibid., Feb. 1 1 , 1 9 2 7 , p. 3 ; March io, p. 2 7 ; March 1 1 , p. 1 5 ; March 30, p. 1 ; April j , p. 56. 44 Ibid., March 18, 1 9 2 7 , p. 7. 47 De» Moines Register ( I n d . ) , cited in New York Times, April 18, 1 9 2 7 , p. 2 1 . 41 Indefendent, C X V I I I (Feb. 1 9 , 1 9 2 7 ) , 1 9 8 ; Outlook, C X L V (Feb. 2 3 , 1 9 2 7 ) , 230. 48 " T h r e e Times and I n r " Saturday Evening Post, C X C I X (April 16, 1 9 2 7 ) , 162, 165. " " S o m e Men Run for Office: Calvin Sits," Nation, C X X I V (March 2, 1 9 2 7 ) , 2 3 3 . Ibid.

81

"I DO N O T CHOOSE T O

RUN"

277

T h e Coolidge sentiment continued to expand. A "Coolidge-forAnother-Term Club" was formed, absorbing all those who favored the provincial New Englander for «nomination. 62 Senator Simeon D . Fess, of Ohio, became the founder of a "second elective term" movement similar to that engendered by Senator Jonathan Bourne for Theodore Roosevelt in 1907-8. Late in April Republican National Committee members from twenty-three states declared in favor of the President's renomination, according to a poll in the Washington Star.63 It appeared that a new form of approach to the third term was being worked out by having Coolidge's friends all emerge from White House interviews "bubbling over" with reelection talk. Political observers were led to believe that the President's friends were trying to engender a "spontaneous" popular uprising for a third term. 64 In April Senator George W . Norris, of Nebraska, publicly declared that a third term was "a long step toward a monarchical form of government." 55 Senator Thomas J. Walsh, Democrat, of Montana, did not think the President would be renominated, inasmuch as Republican leaders did not want to take on the added handicap of a third-term issue.58 Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, together with Senator Edward I. Edwards, Democrat, of New Jersey, again warned against the third term, the latter insisting that no man could overcome the tradition. Republican adherents of Governor Frank O. Lowden, of Illinois, undertook a campaign against the President's renomination.67 Such opposition, though from a minority, began to cast about for some form of organization with which to clothe itself. T h e result was that an "Anti-Third-Term League" was formed in New York City under the leadership of former State Senator Henry Salant.68 The members of the League were all Republicans whose purpose was to stir up nation-wide sentiment against President Coolidge's renomination. Ten thousand letters were sent out all over the country explaining the League's aim and soliciting support j many offers of aid were received. Senators Borah, Norris, and Moses were said 52 83 65 07 iS

New York Times, April 19, 1927, p. 6. Ibid., April 2 i , 1927, p. 2. " Ibid., p. 26. 58 Ibid., April 30, 1927, p. 3. Ibid., April 22, 1927, p. 1. Ibid., May 16, 1927, p. 23; May 21, p. 2: j May 23, p. 13. Ibid., May 30, 1927, p. 20.

278

" I DO N O T CHOOSE T O R U N "

to be friendly to the idea. 59 T h e choice of candidates expressed in return letters favored Nicholas Murray Butler first, and then Governor Lowden, Speaker Longworth, Senator Borah, and others. These efforts proved futile; the swing was clearly toward the President. Though no comment could be obtained from him, his supporters, especially William M . Butler and Frank W . Stearns, were proceeding on the assumption that he would allow his name to be used. 00 Coolidge's firm veto of the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill in February, though it alienated the farm group, considerably strengthened the President in regular Republican circles. The majority of eastern leaders were quick to announce their unreserved endorsement of him for 1928. Senator Frank B. Willis, of Ohio, predicted an easy victory should Governor Alfred E . Smith, of New York, be the Democratic candidate j Ogden L . Mills, Undersecretary of the Treasury, declared that "Silent C a l " would be compelled to run for another term; Charles D . Hilles, New York State National Committeeman, answered third-term charges by blithely insisting that "there is no more danger of Calvin Coolidge becoming a monarchist than there is of his becoming a chatterbox"; in M a y the New Jersey Republican state committee publicly endorsed the President; political soothsayers announced that if he were nominated the western states of Arizona, Nevada, California, Oregon, Washington, and New Mexico would be for him. 6 1 Republican women of Pennsylvania passed a resolution on M a y 24 advocating their hero's reelection. 62 A poll of Republican leaders conducted by a former member of the National Committee indicated that 70 percent favored the President and only 10 percent Governor Lowden. 0 3 Such talk was received by the apathetic M r . Coolidge with not so much as a sign or comment. T h e President repeatedly refused to answer letters from prominent Republicans asking for his views on a third term. On some sides his silence was construed to mean that the 59

Ibid., June 2, 1927, p. 27. Fuess, Calvin Coolidge: The Man from Vermont, p. 390. 01 New York Times, May 1, 1927, p. 5 ; May 5, p. 1 6 ; May 1 8, p. 27; May 19, p. 5 ; May 29, p. 13. 62 Coolidge Papers. In the press Arthur Brisbane continued to campaign vigorously through the Hearst syndicate for Coolidge's renomination. 63 New York Times, June 3, 1927, p. 3. 60

AND

EVERYWHERE

Doyle, Literary

THAT

CALVIN

WENT,

THE

LAMB

WAS SURE

TO

Digest, X C I I I ( M a y 1 4 , 1 9 2 7 ) , 5 ; from the Philadelphia C O O L I D G E ' S

1 9 2 8

C A M P A I G N

GO.

Record.

" I DO N O T C H O O S E T O R U N "

279

eight-year tradition was not a dominating influence with him and that if he thought he could win in 1928 he would definitely run again.84 Old documents dug out of the files revealed that Coolidge had not signed an anti-third term petition against Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, despite the fact that he was charged with having done so.65 No one knew what the voters thought of the anti-third term tradition, since it had never been the issue before them. The precedent appeared to have lost its force and to be little more than a political archaism ripe for discard.68 "The third-term nonsense is nothing but a bugaboo," exclaimed the Philadelphia Inquirer (Rep.). 6T A nationwide poll of two hundred leading Republican newspapers conducted by the Los Angeles Ex-press indicated that a large majority favored another term for the President.68 The New York Times pictured Coolidge as refusing in his mind the crown so many people were offering him, but rationalizing that if "drafted" he would be compelled to respond to the call of duty.09 Late in May the Washington correspondent of the New Re-public observed that for the first time in his career the conventional man in the White House has "made up his mind to try smashing a precedent" and "is openly seizing the nomination with both hands." 70 Senator Fess insisted that the raising of the third-term barrier would not keep the President out of the White House in 1928. "Mr. Coolidge," declared the Ohio Senator, "will be the first to be nominated and elected to . . . serve longer than eight years. . . . It will not be a third term but a second elective term in his own right." 7 1 Collier's, the popular weekly, urged its readers not to "let the third-term bugaboo interfere with your preference for a Presidential candidate." 72 The magazine Forum addressed a public letter to the President calling upon him to declare himself openly on the third-term question.73 The Nation was unable to see wherein Coolidge was entitled to an honor which Washington had declined and which was denied every 64

New Republic, L (May 4, 1927), 286. New York Times, May 12, 1927, p. 3; May 13, p. 3; May 18, p. 27. 66 Literary Digest, XCIII (May 14, 1927), 5. "Ibid., p. 7. at 09 Ibid. May 20, 1927, p. 18. 70 71 Vol. LI (May 25, 1927), 17. Literary Digest, XCIII (May 14, 1927), 7 72 73 Vol. L X X I X (June 4 ) 1927), 5 4 . Vol. L X X V I I (June, 1927), 944-45. 65

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one of his successors,74 while the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Ind.) announced that "Once we inaugurate a President for the third time, even though he has served but two and a fraction terms, the injunction against the third term will have been morally undermined." 7 5 For the summer of 1927, at the invitation of Senator Peter Norbeck, of South Dakota, the Coolidges decided to go to the Black H i l l s of that state. T h e state game lodge was converted into a summer W h i t e House and Rapid City, thirty-two miles from the lodge, was chosen by the President as the place for the executive offices. O n June 15 the Coolidges arrived in the Black Hills. For weeks the most weighty problem of state centered around M r . Coolidge's piscatorial abilities. T h e President was something of a tyro when it came to fishing and time and again he astounded the nation, as well as such past masters of the art as Senators Borah and Reed, by hooking some nice ones on common ordinary angleworms. T h e newspaper reporters who had been assigned to cover the summer White House gave considerable space to the fact that the President fished for trout with worm bait. T h e Izaak Walton Leaguers had verbal hysterics and insisted that it was unethical to use worms for trout j Coolidge, as unconcerned as ever, continued to use live bait while a nation held its breath. Plenty of good stones were to come from the Black H i l l s that summer. A group of visitors from W y o m i n g presented the President with a ten-gallon hat; on July 4, his fifty-fifth birthday, a group of cowboys greeted him, and " C a l , " as placidly as ever, arrayed himself in a fancy cowboy costume; later, he was even adopted by the Sioux Indians as technical chief of their tribe. Newspaper editors insisted that political considerations had determined the President's choice of a summer vacation—that he had selected the South Dakota Black Hills in order to win back the farm vote which he had presumably lost through his veto of the McNaryHaugen bill. 78 " I k e " H o o v e r , for many years Chief Usher at the W h i t e House, tells us that the trip to the Black Hills was planned w i t h . . . every intention of m a k i n g political capital out of the stay. E v e r y detail of this trip w a s so different f r o m C o o l i d g e ' s accustomed w a y s that it 74 75

Vol. CXXIV (May n , 1927), J15. Literary Digest, XCIII (May 14, 1927), 6.

74

Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 391.

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could have but one object. Mixing with Indians and cowboys and wild horses was never cut out for Coolidge. Living miles from nowhere and travelling eighty miles a day, back and forth to a little shack called his office, was not like him. W e who knew him best realized that it must have been downright punishment to him. 77

For six weeks the political talk persisted. South Dakota Republican leaders, believing Coolidge to be receptive to the 1928 nomination, made their plans on that assumption.78 In New York it was decided to settle the third-term fight at the state convention in September. T h e opposition took advantage of the President's vacation. Senator L a Follette charged that by going West Coolidge had become an "active and aggressive candidate for a third term." 79 A group known as the "American League of Young Americans" bitterly criticized the Coolidge policies and campaigned vigorously against his renomination.80 While the President calmly went his way in the Black Hills of South Dakota, political observers bandied the third-term question to and fro. An open rostrum was conducted in Forum with letters, comments, and editorials all discussing the matter. 81 Professor William Bennett Munro and Walter Lippmann carried on a heated debate over the question, "Shall W e Break the Third Term Tradition?" 82 The North American Review was convinced that the third-term issue would not provide an important objection to the President's reelection.83 The New York Times repeatedly scoffed at the exaggerated attempts to "smoke the old man out" by crying "Caesar!" and "Mussolini ! " 8 4 Coolidge's opponents would indeed have to think up a more effective argument in order to defeat him in 1928.85 T h e Washington correspondent of the New Republic now had his doubts as to whether the President would seek the nomination. His reasons for being skeptical were threefold. First, the boom for Frank Lowden had expanded} second, there had been much talk in Congress 771.

H . ( " I k e " ) Hoover, Forty-Tioo Years in the White House, pp. 1 6 7 - 6 8 . 7 9 Ibid., July 8, 1927, p. 4. N e w Y o r k Times, June 20, 1927, p. 1. 8 0 Coolidge Papers (June 20, 1 9 2 7 ) . 8 1 Vol. L X X V I I I (July, 1 9 2 7 ) , 1 3 9 - 4 3 . 82Ibid., ( A u g . , 1 9 2 7 ) , pp. 1 6 1 - 7 2 . 8 3 V o l . C C X X I V (June—July-Aug., 1 9 2 7 ) , 179. 8 4 July 16, 1927, p. TO. 8 5 Samuel G. Blythe, in the Saturday Evening Post, CC, 88, A u g . 6, 1927. T w i c e did Arthur Brisbane write the President imploring him to accept renomination and asserting that the third-term issue was in no way involved. Coolidge Papers. 78

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recently of passing the L a Follette anti-third term amendment; and third, the announcement by William Randolph Hearst to all thirty of his newspapers that President Coolidge would not be a candidate for renomination and would soon issue a statement declining to run. 80 In respect to all this talk, the newly christened cowboy said nothing. Coolidge visitors to Rapid City affirmed that the President was definitely a candidate for the nomination and sincerely believed the people wanted him reelected. 87 Tuesday, August 2, 1927, dawned as lovely a day as ever descended upon the South Dakota Black Hills. The President rose early as usual and prepared to ride to Rapid City, thirty miles down the valley, for his semiweekly press conference. " I have been President four years to-day," he casually told Mrs. Coolidge at breakfast and then calmly proceeded to make the trip alone with his chauffeur. 8 " Senator Arthur Capper, of Kansas, who was visiting the Coolidges at the time, followed the President to Rapid City later in the day. After his regular nine-o'clock conference with the newspaper men, Coolidge unconcernedly remarked, " I f you will return at twelve o'clock, there will be an additional statement." About eleven-thirty the President called Everett Sanders, his private secretary, and neatly wrote on a small sheet of paper the twelve cryptic words: " I do not choose to run for President in nineteen twenty-eight." H e requested that a number of those lines be run off on legal-sized paper, with some extra carbons. Erwin C. Geisser, the President's personal stenographer, and Sanders followed these instructions implicitly. The President carefully cut the sheets with a pair of shears making neat little slips about two inches wide. " I am going to hand these out myself," he informed Sanders, who, walking back to his office, met Senator Capper who had arrived there not long before. The President's secretary then invited Capper, entirely unaware of what was to happen, to take his place along with the newspaper men. 89 Coolidge, after telling them the line would form on 86

New Republic, L I (July 27, 1 9 2 7 ) , 2 5 4 - 5 5 ; also Coolidge Papers. New York Times, July I I , 1927, p. 3. 8S Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 393. For this part of the narrative the writer has depended very largely on Professor Fuess, whose work contains the most recent and accurate account of the Coolidge statement. 89 Senator Capper is a newspaper man by profession. 87

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the left, handed each in turn a slip of paper. Immediately there was a wild scramble for the nearest telegraph office and long-distance telephone. Calvin Coolidge had caused a sensation which spread round the world. The excitement it created did not die out for many months.90 Why did he do it? We cannot say with certainty; Coolidge's statement was and probably always will remain ambiguous. In his Autobiography, written in 1929, there is a chapter devoted to the reasons why he "did not choose to run." " I had never wished to run in 1928," declared the laconic Calvin, "and had determined to make a public announcement . . . so that the party would have ample time to choose some one else." 9 1 Coolidge instinctively felt that the people would not have confidence in a man who appeared to be grasping for office. "The chances of having wise and faithful public service," he wrote, "are increased by a change in the Presidential office after a moderate length of time." 92 No one more than Coolidge realized how little "in the way of constructive accomplishment" a President shows during the latter part of his term. In defense of the word "choose" we have: I n making m y public statement I w a s careful in the use of words. A l t h o u g h I did not k n o w it at the time, months later I found that W a s h i n g t o n said practically the same thing. Certainly he said no more in his F a r e w e l l A d d r e s s , w h e r e he announced that "choice and p r u d e n c e " invited him to retire. 9 3

In regard to the third-term argument Coolidge had this to say: . . . irrespective of the third-term policy, the Presidential office is of such a nature that it is difficult to conceive h o w one m a n can successfully serve the country for a term of more than eight years. W h i l e I . . . f a v o r . . . the long-established custom

. . .

in relation to a third term

. . .

I do not

think that the practice applies to one w h o has succeeded to part of a term as Vice-President.

. . . T h e duties are very great and ten years w o u l d be a

very heavy strain

. . . especially long for . . . M r s . C o o l i d g e .

doubt if she could have stayed [ a t the W h i t e H o u s e ]

. . .

I

. . . for ten years

without some d a n g e r of impairment of her strength. 9 4 90 For other good though somewhat divergent accounts of the circumstances of the President's statement, see W. A . White, A Puritan in Babylon, pp. 3 5 7 - 6 2 ; H. L . Stoddard, It Costs to Be President, pp. 1 2 9 - 3 2 ; Leach, That Man Dawes, pp. 280—81. al 92 The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge, p. 239. Ibid., p. 2 4 1 . 93 91 Ibid., p. 2 4 3 . Ibid., p. 240.

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In Coolidge's eyes the party had plenty of good material} there was no need for him to exercise influence in selecting a successor. He believed the candidate should be the choice of the people and not be handicapped by the feeling that his predecessor had forced a choice. " M y election seemed assured," he concluded. "Nevertheless, I felt it was not best for the country that I should succeed myself. A new impulse is more likely to be beneficial." 95 Coolidge offered further testimony of his position in an article published in 1931 explaining that W h e n I announced my determination not to run for President in 1 9 2 8 , my decision had been made a long time. While I wanted the relief that would come to Mrs. Coolidge and me from the public responsibilities we had held so many years, my action also was based on the belief that it was best for the country. 98

Of all the apologists for Calvin Coolidge, Professor Claude M . Fuess has striven to be most convincing. Fuess, who like Coolidge is a graduate of Amherst, zealously endeavors to prove that Calvin Coolidge's motives in renouncing the 1928 nomination were sincere ones. His thesis is that late in July, 1927, the President summoned his secretary, Everett Sanders, to the improvised executive offices at Rapid City and calmly told him, " I am not going to run for President." Too astonished, Sanders could not reply, and Coolidge continued, " I f I should serve as President again, I should serve almost ten years, which is too long for a President in this country." Sanders responded that he thought the people would be disappointed. The President then handed him a slip of paper on which were written those twelve ambiguous words, with the inquiry, "What do you think of that?" Sanders, after commenting casually on the phraseology, cautiously asked, " Y o u feel sure you have reached a definite decision about the matter?" " Y e s , " replied the President. "Well," observed Sanders, "since there is no occasion for speaking now, I do not see why there should be any hurry about making the announcement." Sanders, who is still alive and upon whose testimony Professor Fuess has based his account, noted in his memorandum that he was certain Coolidge had not consulted him with the purpose of seeking advice 95

Ibid., p. 247.

68

Saturday Evening Post, CCIV (Oct. 3, 1 9 3 1 ) , 3.

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and that the President had already fully made up his mind. It was then arranged that the announcement should be made public on August 2, the fourth anniversary of Coolidge's accession to office.97 On the basis of Sanders' testimony Fuess dispels the view that Coolidge's statement was unpremeditated and was composed on the morning of August 2 during the ride to Rapid City. 98 When the President arrived there at eight-thirty, Professor Fuess points out, Sanders greeted him with the question, " D o you still intend to make your announcement to-day?" When Coolidge replied that he did, Sanders suggested that because of the difference in time between Rapid City and New York, the announcement be made at twelve instead of nine o'clock in order to have the news break at a time when its effect could be digested while the stock market was closed. Coolidge agreed, and the statement was made as planned. Mrs. Coolidge, though she felt intuitively that something was on her husband's mind, knew nothing whatever in advance of his decision or the announcement. After lunch, when Coolidge had left the room, Senator Capper casually remarked, "That was quite a surprise the President gave us this morning." When Mrs. Coolidge professed ignorance and the Senator told her of what hfid happened, she burst out, "Isn't that just like the man! H e never gave me the slightest intimation of his intention. I had no idea!" 9 9 Fuess claims there was nothing impulsive or hasty about the President's statement but that, as Sanders' testimony relates, it was deliberately and carefully planned. In view of Coolidge's own words, the theory that he was simply trying to feel out public opinion does not hold. H e knew that he would be unopposed if he agreed to accept renomination. W h y , asks Professor Fuess, if he really desired another term should he risk having his ambition thwarted? " T o assume that he was playing a trick on his party and on the American people," declares this writer, " . . . is attributing to him motives which do not fit his character." 1 0 0 Fuess is certain the third-term question did not trouble the President and was not one of his reasons for renouncing another term. Far more important was the state of his health; it is implied that Cool87

Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, pp. 392-93. * 8 Such a view has been commonly held by William Allen White and others. 100 " Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, pp. 394.-95. Ibid., p. 396.

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idge was aware he had a bad heart and had been warned not to subject himself to the burden of four more years in office. T h e President was also worried lest the strain prove too much for M r s . C o o l i d g e . A m o n g other motives, claims Fuess, was the consciousness that his work as President was almost done. A s Coolidge observed to a Cabinet member, " I know how to save money. A l l m y training has been in that direction. T h e country is in a sound financial position. Perhaps the time has come when w e ought to spend money. I do not feel that I am qualified to do it."

101

Another time, when a friend

expressed the belief that within a f e w years the country w o u l d undergo a severe economic and financial convulsion, the President replied succinctly, " I t is a pretty g o o d idea to get out when they still want you."

102

H u b e r t W o r k , former Secretary of the Interior and Post-

master-General, tells us that a few days after his statement, the President replied to W o r k ' s suggestion that he could easily be renominated and reelected, " Y e s , I believe I could be. But ten years is too l o n g for one man to be President. People would tire of him. F o u r years more in the W h i t e H o u s e would kill M r s . C o o l i d g e . "

103

W o r k has

little patience with those w h o hold that C o o l i d g e expected renomination in 1928. A n d so [ c o n c l u d e s F u e s s ] , w i t h the c o n v i c t i o n that C a l v i n C o o l i d g e

felt

c o n s c i o u s of the " w e a r i n e s s , the f e v e r , a n d the f r e t " of the P r e s i d e n c y , a n d also of the d a n g e r t h a t he w o u l d h a v e little m o r e to c o n t r i b u t e to the o f f i c e , w e c a n p e r h a p s u n d e r s t a n d w h y he did not choose to r u n . T h e decision is less m y s t e r i o u s t h a n s o m e b i o g r a p h e r s h a v e m a d e it s e e m . 1 0 4

Professor Fuess bends over backward in order to defend the President. A t times one thinks he has an ax to g r i n d ; at other times one is sure of it. T o what different conclusion can one be led, in view of a preface which boldly admits of the prejudice that C a l v i n C o o l i d g e " w a s not only a useful public servant but a great and good man"? Fuess by no means succeeds in convincing the reader of his position. O n e cannot help but feel, as he thumbs the pages, that further explanation is necessary to a complete understanding of the situation. 101 102 104

Good Housekeeping, C ( M a y , 1935), 255. 103 Ibid., C (Feb., 1935), 187. Ibid. Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 398.

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Henry L . Stoddard, the New York publisher, tries his best to convince us that Calvin Coolidge really wished to go out of office in 1929. 1 0 5 Stoddard claims the President phrased his message so that posterity could not say his retirement was other than voluntary—it was just Coolidge "simplicity." In support of his contention Stoddard cites Coolidge's remark to the effect that "When a man begins to think that he is the only one who can lead the Republic he is guilty of treason to the spirit of our institutions." 1 0 6 Many times after he made the announcement, the former President in conversations with Stoddard reaffirmed his sincerity in renouncing another nomination. Stoddard's attempted defense is quite unconvincing. So, too, is that of Charles Willis Thompson, who is certain that Calvin Coolidge sincerely meant what he said in I927. 1 0 7 B y far the most convincing explanation of Coolidge's motives in making his statement is that offered by " I k e " Hoover. In an accurate, circumstantial account Hoover leaves little doubt in the reader's mind that President Coolidge expected to be drafted and was mortified to the point of actual illness when he was not. Hoover's interpretation of the situation is as follows. Both he and the older employees of the White House were somewhat suspicious and not at all sure that Coolidge was definitely out of the race. When the President returned from South Dakota, particular attention was paid to the "right people." Many would tell him the country was determined he should run again; their hints bore no fruit. T h e President would merely remark, " I ' v e been here about long enough" or that there were "plenty of other good men." White House visitors like Senator Fess, of Ohio, who predicted Coolidge's nomination, were invited back again and again, while others, like George Harvey and Nicholas Murray Butler, who declared he would not be a candidate, seldom came back. 108 Coolidge played a "deep game." When the procession of candidates 105

H. L. Stoddard, It Costs to Be President, p. 124, chaps, xiii and xiv. Ibid., p. 1 3 5 . 107 Thompson, Presidents I've Knovm and Two Near Presidents, p. 568. Peel and Donnelly in their analysis contend that Coolidge was simply tired of the cares of office and wanted to get out without becoming embroiled in factional struggles within his party. The 1 giS Campaign: An Analysis, p. 4. 108 T h e files of the New Y o r k Times for the fall and winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928 bear out this contention. 109

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began, he remained silent, saying nothing to the Republican National Committee and discussing the situation with no one. T h o u g h the President had no candidate, he watched the situation closely by reading all the stories about the candidates and following the straw votes. In the White House it was common talk that he expected the nomination himself; he made no plans for leaving and frequently became alarmed at the success of the Hoover boom. " I k e " Hoover is certain Coolidge would have accepted if drafted. H i s veto of the M c N a r y H a u g e n bill was just a straw in the wind. W h e n the time came for a summer vacation in 1928, the President selected Wisconsin. H e even made plans to take along a larger office force than ever before. Rumors continued right up to the time of the conventioji. W h e n it opened, Mrs. Coolidge was ill in bed; the President, according to H o o v e r , was waiting to be drafted. W h e n news came that the idea of drafting had been abandoned, "the effect it created was shocking. It seemed to fall like a bomb on his [Coolidge's] wishes, his hopes, his aspirations." Moreover, when word came that Secretary of the Treasury Mellon and Chairman Butler had definitely gone over to the side of Herbert Hoover, " T h e r e was dismay at the W h i t e House, there was sadness, disappointment, regret." T h e President was "visibly distressed . . . a changed man," when Hoover's nomination became inevitable. This was apparent to all in the W h i t e House. Coolidge paid no attention to convention reports over the radio; he threw himself across his bed and lay there, taking no lunch and staying in his room all that day and night until eleven o'clock the next morning. H i s disappointment was keen; that night he left for Wisconsin. 109 Though Hoover's is the testimony of one man, he has offered convincing evidence in support of it. If we seek an explanation most closely approximating the truth, it would seem that, handicapped as we are by delicacy of subject matter and conflicting interpretations, Hoover's account is the most amenable to the facts as they are available to us. T h e Chief Usher is not alone in his belief. Senator James E . Watson, of Indiana, tells us that, though Coolidge's fear of his health and physical inability precluded him from openly seeking the 109

I. H. ( " I k e " ) Hoover, Forty-Two

Years in the White House, pp. 169-77.

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289

nomination, the President would have accepted had he been drafted or had the convention been stampeded in his favor. 1 1 0 T o return to the circumstances of the President's announcement, the statement was everywhere greeted with great surprise. Many felt that Coolidge was disturbed by the sentiment and prejudice against a third term; others believed he had just put out a feeler. His motives appeared a mystery and the field seemed wide open to such potential candidates as Dawes, Lowden, Hoover, and Longworth. Messages of regret continued to flood the President at Rapid City. A strong desire to draft him was apparent as the debate over the meaning of his statement persisted. Coolidge maintained his customary silence while his associates declared that the statement was final. His native Vermont expected him to run again anyway. Western leaders were naturally pleased, and the boom for Governor Lowden received considerable impetus. Many politicians believed that the primaries would force the President to clarify his stand. Official Washington accepted his withdrawal, although insisting that he should remove all doubt as to his intentions. There was considerable talk of candidates. Governor Lowden was held the most formidable contender, though Charles Evans Hughes was mentioned frequently. Herbert Hoover needed positive assurance of the President's withdrawal. Henry A. Wallace, of Iowa, a leading farm insurgent, regarded Hoover as the gainer by Coolidge's step. 1 1 1 Many Republican leaders immediately threw their support to the Secretary of Commerce. In New Jersey plans went forward to draft the President himself. Of significant importance, the Wall Street "Coolidge bull market" was jarred to its very foundations by the President's little joke. There was a pell-mell scramble to sell stocks, and opening prices were from 2 to 15% points lower than the previous day's close. 112 Financiers were deeply stirred. It was felt that the element of uncertainty might check the plans of large business concerns and affect foreign loans. 110

J . E. Watson, As I Knew Them, p. 252, p. 254. In the eyes of William Allen White the phrase, " I do not choose to run," was "purposely oracular"; it left Coolidge free to accept a deadlocked nomination at the hands of the convention without seeking delegates in any state. A Puritan in Babylon, p. 398. 111 112 New York Times, Aug. 4, 1927, p. 6. Ibid., p. 1.

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Banking and industrial leaders repeatedly expressed the hope that Coolidge would run again. Europe was puzzled by the President's actions. Some papers in London, Paris, and Berlin linked it with the collapse of the Geneva Disarmament Conference a few days before. One view was that Coolidge, like Prime Minister Baldwin, of Great Britain, was weary of the difficult and pressing tasks of office. In Berlin party pressure and disappointment at the Geneva failure were ascribed as causes of the announcement. Geneva itself believed the President would be forced to capitulate and run anyway. The French regarded Coolidge's statement as a "poser" while he tried to measure public opinion on a third term. Throughout the length and breadth of the United States there poured forth comments on the amazing renunciation. Politicians seized upon the statement as both an object of commendation and a target of attack. " I n his twelve words will be found compacted a great renunciation," declared Senator George H . Moses (Rep.), of New Hampshire. T o which Senator Porter H . Dale, of Coolidge's native Vermont, understandingly added, " I n Vermont the word choose is accepted to mean flan or intend.." In New York, National Committeeman Charles D. Hilles maintained the President was sincere and meant his refusal to be final, while Nicholas Murray Butler commended him for his adherence to tradition, saying his choice was a wise one. Senator James E . Watson, himself a potential candidate, accepted the declaration in good faith. The Idaho lion, William E . Borah, declared Coolidge's statement to be "the result of a profound conviction and a . . . finality." Speaker Longworth was too surprised to comment. Secretary Hoover cautiously asserted: " I t is too soon to discuss it. . . . I still believe that President Coolidge should be renominated and reelected." Vice President Dawes regretted the statement; Governor Alfred E . Smith had no comment to make. C. Bascom Slemp, former secretary to the President, was convinced that while Coolidge was not a candidate "he would accept the nomination in 1928 if such nomination is a free expression of popular will." Considerable skepticism was engendered. " I know of no man in all our history who has run away from the Presidency," observed Governor Lowden sardonically. And Senator Reed Smoot (Rep.), of Utah,

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added, " I construe the statement to mean that if the [Republican] Convention nominates him [Coolidge] again he will accept the nomination. It [the statement] does not bar him from running again in such an event." Senator L a Follette, long a bitter enemy of the President, denounced the renunciation as "political manoeuvring." " T h e announcement," he added, "is pure political buncombe." William Allen W h i t e still saw hope. "Observe the formula," he declared optimistically. " T h e President does not say 'I am not and shall not be a candidate.'" E v e n W i l l Rogers, the famous cowboy comedian, felt inclined to jeer, " I think M r . Coolidge's statement is the best worded acceptance of a nomination ever uttered by a candidate." 1 1 3 Other humorists went back to "Alice in Wonderland" and lampooned: T h e eldest oyster winked his eye, A n d shook his heavy head, M e a n i n g to say he did not choose T o leave the oyster b e d . 1 1 4

William Howard T a f t , then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, has this interpretation of Coolidge's action: I think he [ C o o l i d g e ] really wishes to avoid running for the Presidency, that he has had enough, but the peculiar form which his declination takes seems to me to be an indication that while he really wishes to avoid a renomination, he does not care to put himself in a place where by the unanimous demand of the party he may feel under obligation to run and will not be confronted with a previous statement by him that he would not r u n . 1 1 5

T w o days after Coolidge's statement the party leaders and organizers were still found to favor the President, and it was rumored a move would be launched for his renomination. 116 Senator Simeon Fess insisted he would be nominated unless he forbade it. I do not interpret the statement of the President [declared Fess] as a refusal to accept the nomination if it is tendered. His position is logical in not 1 1 3 N e w Y o r k Times, 1 9 2 7 ) , 310.

A u g . 3, 4, 13, 1 9 2 7 ; Review

of Reviews,

LXXVI

(Sept.,

Quoted in Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 398. Ibid. ( A u g . 16, 1 9 2 7 ) . On A u g . 8 Frank W . Steams wrote Coolidge commending him on a statement that was both " w i s e " and "timely." Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 399u s New Y o r k Times, A u g . 5, 1927, p. 1. 114 115

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seeking the nomination, but the convention will surely nominate him if it is not forbidden by him in a further s t a t e m e n t . 1 1 7

Among the nation's journals the President's statement provoked a deluge of comment. From Maine to California virtually every publication, large or small, had something to say about the great renunciation. 118 There is ample evidence to show the broad divergence of opinion that existed in regard to the meaning of Coolidge's announcement. An excellent example is furnished by two local newspapers in the city of Buffalo which held exactly opposite positions. In the eyes of one: T h e r e is n o reason to doubt that he [ C o o l i d g e ] meant to convey to the country the information that he is not to be considered as a c a n d i d a t e — t h a t he does not intend to run . . . conditions may arise which may make it necessary for the c o u n t r y to d r a f t him. H e could not, of course, refuse to a n s w e r such a call f o r f u r t h e r service. . . . H e has spoken, and there is every reason to believe that he has spoken with full sincerity. 1 1 8

T h e other journal was considerably more skeptical in its interpretation, implying that . . . there is a lack of finality about M r . C o o l i d g e ' s " I do not choose to r u n . " . . . T h e President's statement may fairly be interpreted as the shifting of the responsibility for a nomination in 1 9 2 8 f r o m his o w n shoulders to those of the party. H e is relieved of the charge that he seeks w h a t those opposed to him call a third t e r m ; he is free to accept w h a t is o f f e r e d without his s e e k i n g . 1 2 0

Many quarters accepted the Coolidge statement in good faith. "In his own dialect Mr. Coolidge has renounced another term," declared the New York Times.121 T o the World (Dem.) in the same city the President had spoken "without mental reservation of any kind and . . . has done a great service in the preservation of the essential spirit of the American constitutional system." 122 New England papers agreed, on the whole, with the Boston Post (Dem.) in its observation Ibid., p. 6. For an excellent summary of editorial opinion among the leading newspapers, see the New York Times, Aug. 3, 1927, p. 4. 1 1 9 Buffalo Evening Nevis, Aug. 3, 1927, p. 8. 1 2 0 Buffalo Courier-Express, Aug. 3, 1927, p. 8. 1 2 1 Aug. 5, 1927, p. 16. 1 2 2 Literary Digest, XCIV (Aug. 13, 1927), 5. 117

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that "There can be no doubt that . . . Coolidge has firmly determined on retirement. When he says he does not 'choose' to be a candidate, that, in the New England sense, is positive." 123 The skepticism and unconcealed suspicion that was engendered almost exceeded the approbation. Most professional politicians, wrote George Van Slyke in the New York Sun, interpreted the Coolidge statement "as a masterful move which leaves the President still available as a candidate, but with the fateful third-term issue shifted from his shoulders to the Republican party." In other words, as the New York American (Ind.) put it, "he [Coolidge] will submit to a little soft and gentle coaxing." 124 Both David Lawrence and Arthur Brisbane accepted the President's announcement as sincere j neither accused him of laying plans to be drafted. 125 Editorial refusal to consider Coolidge's declination as final was widespread. Many papers interpreted the renunciation merely as an expression of personal feeling, to be disregarded in case of an imperative call. Others construed the statement as a sort of "feeler" or "trial balloon," the purpose of which was to test public opinion. The Wall Street Journal prophesied a demand for Coolidge "so strong that his own personal wishes will have to be submerged for the interests of his party and the country." While not impugning the President's sincerity, the Boston Herald (Rep.) found it "hard to believe, even in the face of this message, that he would decline the nomination if the convention forced it upon him." 126 That Coolidge could be renominated and elected with ease was a foregone conclusion. The reasons advanced for his refusal ranged from objection to a third term and the farmers' demand for equality to the poor health of both the President and Mrs. Coolidge. It was now possible for other candidates to come out into the open; Charles Evans Hughes and Senator Borah were already said to have the White House's good will. 127 Among liberal journals opinion was also divided. In the eyes of the New Republic the President's decision was a wise one; he meant what he said and would accordingly resist pressure to be drafted. There was little reason to suppose that he had said "no," hoping to 128

Ibid.

125

¡bid.; Review of Reviews, L X X V I (Sept., 1927), 310. Literary Digest, XCIV (Aug. 13, 1927), 6.

126

ibid., p. 6. 127

Ibid., p. 7.

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be persuaded to say "yes." Though his motives may have been mixed, the third-term question must be considered a factor. Coolidge, through his adherence to the precedent, had done the country a great service.128 In the words of the Outlook "President Coolidge meant precisely what he said and said precisely what he meant." 1 2 9 "Personal weariness of the job," explained the Independent, "and personal conviction as to the undesirability of another term were the underlying motives." 130 Coolidge, observed this journal, "has had enough of the strain and strife of the Presidency [and] has a genuine and wholesome respect for the political meaning of the third-term tradition." 1 3 1 His laconic statement, declared the World's Work, "has temporarily stilled the third-term clamor without removing the President from the list of receptive candidates for the Republican nomination." 1 3 2 Professor William MacDonald went to great lengths to explain that the strength of the no-third term tradition exerted more influence on Coolidge than did the rebuff suffered by the administration at the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. 133 The President "made it perfectly clear," wrote Albert Shaw in the Review of Reviews, "that he is not intending to run, and that he is intending to retire." 1 3 4 Somewhat reluctantly, Oswald Garrison Villard's Nation expressed genuine skepticism of Coolidge's motives. The President, declared Villard, was not himself certain of what he meant by his statement. His refusal was based on personal grounds more than any other. He was a small man, with few plans, ideas, or policies j he knew this. By 1929 he would have been President for six years. He had enough money saved to retire on. Why should he want to go on? "Calvin Coolidge is not a fighter. He 'does not choose' to enter a struggle for a third term." 1 3 5 128

New Republic, LI (Aug. 17, 1 9 2 7 ) , 319. 130 Vol. C X L V I (Aug. 17, 1 9 2 7 ) , 495. Vol. C X I X (Aug. 13, 1 9 2 7 ) , 1+6. 131 132 Ibid., p. 145. Vol. L I V (Sept., 1 9 2 7 ) , 459. 133 Current History, X X V I (Sept., 1 9 2 7 ) , 953-56. 134 Vol. L X X V I (Sept., 1 9 2 7 ) , 235. 135 Vol. C X X V (Aug. 17, 1 9 2 7 ) , 148. The Washington correspondent of the New Republic accuscd Coolidge of "running out" on his supporters after giving them every encouragement to work for him. The Hearst group knew what was coming and withdrew their support in time. Fear that he might have to make a fight for reelection caused the President's renunciation, when at heart he really desired another term. He had no idea of permitting himself to be drafted. Vol. L I I (Aug. 24, 1 9 2 7 ) , 17. 129

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Coolidge's unpublished papers reveal that considerable support, in fact the bulk of his support in 1928, came from American business men. One survey found 88 percent of them urging his renomination. 136 Bankers, corporation heads—even agricultural-implement manufacturers—strongly urged his reelection. Added to this were many former members of Congress, clergymen like Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Women's Clubs, and numerous other organizations. "Coolidge-for-President" clubs sprang up all over the country. It was these people—the middle, professional, and upper classes—who most regretted Coolidge's renunciation. The reason was obviously the unprecedented wave of prosperity which had flooded the country and by which they themselves especially benefited. These people persisted in attributing this veritable Utopia to Calvin Coolidge. 187 On August 3 the President left no doubt in the minds of the newspaper men as to the importance of the previous day's statement. H e admitted that he had no plans as to what he would do after retirement, but he indicated that work would probably come his way. 1 3 8 Coolidge refused to interpret or amplify his statement, saying that it was "quite sufficient." During the remainder of the summer visitors came and went, and Calvin, more irascible than usual, fished and said nothing. On August 31 the Coolidges left for a trip to the Yellowstone and September 1 1 saw the official family back in the White House. The question which still disturbed people was whether Coolidge would choose his successor. But, as one writer has put it, the President "did not like the role, nor was he cast in the mould of a 'kingmaker.' " 1 3 9 H e did not care for Dawes, who had committed a personal affront against him in the Senate in 1925. Coolidge also showed a marked apathy toward Hoover, and, while he remained silent, the Secretary of Commerce's campaign went along without presidential sanction, until by the time of the convention the entire block of southern delegates was in the bag for Hoover. Coolidge made no attempt to name a successor, simply because he did not wish to become involved in the campaign. The other leading candidates for the nomination were Senator Charles Curtis, of Kansas, majority floor leader 139 137 139

W. M. Van Ostrom to Coolidge, June 16, 1927, Coolidge Papers. 138 Coolidge Papers (Aug.-Nov., 1 9 2 7 ) . Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 400. Peel and Donnelly, The 1928 Camfaign, p. j .

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in the Senatej Frank O. Lowden, former governor of Illinois} Senator William E . Borah, who, it was felt by many, had kicked over the party too often to be "safe"} Nicholas Murray Butler, who declined in favor of Lowden} Senators Frank B. Willis, a favorite son from Ohio, James Watson, of Indiana, and Guy Goff, of West Virginia} and Senator George W . Norris, of Nebraska, the leader of the remnants of the L a Follette liberals of 1924, who soon declared he was "not a candidate." Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican candidate in 1916, repeatedly affirmed he was out of the race. As the summer of 1927 drew to a close, it became apparent that the President would take no sides in the expected scramble for the nomination. Rumors persisted that he would rather see the nomination go to Hoover than to Dawes or Lowden. 140 Beneath all the talk was an undercurrent of feeling that Coolidge himself would emerge as the nominee. Meanwhile, Frank H . Vizetelly in the columns of the New York Times discussed the various meanings which could be ascribed to the word "choose." Shakespeare, claimed Vizetelly, was very free in his use of the term. "Choose," as Coolidge used it, was proven to go back to the time of Chaucer. It had now become a "Yankeeism"} New Englanders can easily interpret its meaning. The National Council of English Teachers, at its annual meeting, declared the President's meaning in " I do not choose to run" perfectly clear. 141 In the ranks of the Republican party hope continued that Coolidge might become a candidate. Party leaders in many states still operated 011 this assumption. Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee Republicans persisted in the view that he could be drafted. In New York it was felt that Hughes' nomination or the drafting of "Silent Cal" was the party's only salvation against Governor Smith. Late in August Vice President Dawes declared he was not a candidate for the nomination. 142 Hughes continued to back the President, while insisting he himself was out of the race. Many Republican National Committeemen planned to keep Coolidge's name before the public as a New York Times, Aug. 8, 1927, p. 3. Ibid., Aug. 14, 1927, VIII, 2; Oct. 9, IX, 12; Nov. 26, p. 3. Senators Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, and T . H. Caraway, of Arkansas, both Democrats, even went so far as to plan to debate the meaning of the word "choose." 142 Ibid., Aug. 23, 1927, p. 1. 140

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possible candidate. Business and industrial leaders who keenly regretted his renunciation repeatedly predicted that Mr. Coolidge would not be able to resist the demand and would be forced to run. Apropos of this, former Senator Ralph H . Cameron, Republican, of Arizona, declared that "President Coolidge will be renominated because the business interests of the country will insist upon his renomination to insure a continuation of the Coolidge policies." 1 4 3 Throughout the country people in all walks of life still expressed a desire to have Calvin Coolidge reelected. "Coolidge-for-1928" clubs, launched in Dayton, Ohio, spread like wildfire. Billy Sunday, the famous Evangelist, invoked the Divine Gospel in his entreaties to have Coolidge run again. Will Rogers offered to bet five thousand dollars that the President would be a candidate} William Randolph Hearst immediately took up Rogers' bet. Even William Allen White declared he thought Coolidge might be persuaded to accept the nomination if it should come on the first ballot. John Spargo insisted that the President would be the party's nominee in spite of his renunciation. " H e cannot refuse to be chosen," wrote Spargo. 144 There was no doubt that many refused to accept Coolidge's August statement as final. Senator Simeon D. Fess, after calling on the President, declared he had "no further doubt" that the man from Vermont did not wish another term. Fess felt that he should be forced to run and publicly expressed this view, only to be called to the White House and publicly "spanked." "Really, Senator," remonstrated the President, "you're causing me some embarrassment, and if I were you, I should stop mentioning a third term. . . . Coming from one so close to me and my family it makes it look as if I were insincere." Fess afterwards admitted that " I was very much surprised by the emphatic scolding which he gave me today. . . . I must admit that I came away with the impression that the President will not consent to be drafted." 1 4 8 By November the movement to draft President Coolidge had spread far enough to disturb a number of party leaders. The grave 148 141

Ibid., Aug. 3 1 , 1927, p. 4. "Coolidge in Spite of Himself," North American Review, CCXXIV (Sept.-Oct.,

i927)> 337-47140

443-

New York Timet, Oct. 2 1 , 1927, p. 1, p. 3 ¡ Independent, C X I X (Nov. 5, 1 9 2 7 ) ,

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uncertainty as to whether he would permit himself to be drafted was slowing up the booms of nearly all the other would-be candidates. Frequent attempts were made to elicit a more unqualified statement from the President. William M. Butler, chairman of the National Committee, and Charles D. Hilles, New York state committeeman, had gone to Coolidge but had came away without any encouragement. William Howard Taft did not know whether he could be driven into accepting another nomination.146 Senator Curtis asked the President for a frank statement, and at one time Herbert Hoover suggested that he be clear as to his position. In the coming session of Congress it was rumored that Democrats and Progressive Republicans would attempt to "smoke out" the President by their support of the L a Follette anti-third term resolution. The "draft Coolidge" movement continued to expand. A nation-wide farm poll undertaken by the Farm Journal of Philadelphia found Coolidge the recipient of more votes than anyone else. 147 Senator Fess, as unabashed as ever, declared in a New York address: "Unless the President comes out with another statement definitely taking himself out of the campaign, the 1928 nomination will obey the voice of the Republican people throughout the nation and renominate him." 148 "Coolidge may accept the . . . nomination," observed David Lawrence, "but he does not want to be in the position of having in any way encouraged the movement to draft him." 1 4 9 A canvass conducted by the New York World among members of the Republican National Committee revealed strong sentiment in favor of the President's renomination.160 Official Washington inclined to the belief that Coolidge really desired to quit, but that he would yield to pressure. On December 1 Vice President Dawes again declared he was out of the race and announced his support of Governor Lowden, assuming that the President "is in no sense a candidate." 1 5 1 Opinion that Coolidge was definitely and finally not to be considered a candidate was by no means lacking. Henry Ford was quite certain the President would not run again. Otto H . Kahn, the New 148

W. A. White, A Puritan in Babylon, p. 399. 147 f j e w York Times, Nov. 17, 1917, p. 4. 148 149 Literary Digest, XCV (Nov. 11, 1 9 2 7 ) , 12. Ibid. 150 151 Ibid. New York Times, Dec. 2, 1927, p. 1.

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York banker, expressed the belief that Coolidge would not accept the nomination if drafted. 162 Regular Republicans, observed the Washington correspondent of the New Republic, now see a chance to throw off the yoke of the "tight-lipped, cold, colorless New England group" which had been forced upon them by fatej they certainly would not miss the opportunity by drafting Mr. Coolidge.168 As the year 1927 drew to a close, William Allen White tells us, Calvin Coolidge became conscious that his fate had turned.154 All attempts to elicit word from him that he was willing to be drafted failed. Many hoped against hope that some miracle would bring about a Coolidge tidal wave. It was expected that the situation would clear at the Republican National Committee meeting in December. At that time the President informed the Committee: M y statement stands. No one should be led to suppose that I have modified it. M y decision will be respected. A f t e r I had been eliminated the party began, and should vigorously continue, the serious task of selecting another candidate from among the numbers of distinguished men available. 165

By the majority of Republican leaders the President's words were taken as final. Senators George Wharton Pepper, of Pennsylvania, Borah, Curtis, and Watson, and Chairman William M. Butler all were convinced Coolidge was out of the race; others, like C. Bascom Slemp and Senators Fess, Norris, and La Follette, were not so sure. The statement again caused a sag in stocks. Charles Evans Hughes once more announced he was out of the race. "I am not a candidate in any sense," he declared. " I am keenly disappointed by President Coolidge's decision, but so far as my own attitude toward candidacy is concerned, I stand by the statement I made last May. I have nothing to add to it." 166 The President's announcement was received with commingled reactions. Few dissenting notes were heard, and the race for the Republican nomination received added impetus.167 "The field is now open to all aspirants," declared the Philadelphia Inquirer (Rep.), 1 5 3 Vol. L I I (Oct. 19, 1 9 2 7 ) , 236. Ibid., Dec. J, 1927, p. 7 i Oct. 14, p. 8. W . A . White, A Puritan in Babylon, p. 374. 1 5 6 N e w Y o r k Times, Dec. 7, 1927, p. 1. 1 5 4 Ibid., Dec. 8, 1927, p. 1. 1 J T F o r an excellent summary of the nation's editorial comment, see ibid., Dec. 7, 1927, p. 2. 152

151

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while the Public Ledger (Ind.) in the same city observed: "The campaign was under way from the moment the President's statement left his lips." 1 5 8 Most political observers believed that Coolidge had been definitely eliminated from the 1928 race. Coolidge "die-hards" refused to accept his statement as a final and irrevocable withdrawal. C. Bascom Slemp and William R. Wood, National Committeemen, affirmed there was nothing in the announcement to the effect that the President would not accept the nomination as a duty to his party. "We reiterate our conviction that if he is named, he will not run away," declared the New York HeraldTribune (Rep.). 1 6 9 The President's declaration, observed the Democratic World in the same city, though "a strong and sincere statement of his desire not to be drafted, is not a statement that "he will refuse to be drafted." 180 In the eyes of the Review of Reviews "only a grave national emergency could induce Mr. Coolidge to accept a renomination." 1 6 1 The New Republic accused the President of playing the game both ways. " H e is apparently still willing to accept the . . . nomination," averred this journal, "if it is offered to him by a practically united party without a contest, but he will not have it on any other terms." 1 8 2 One of the greatest paradoxes in the whole history of the thirdterm issue lies in connection with those Coolidge supporters who endeavored to get him to retract or modify his statements and to seek the nomination openly. One of the leaders in this secret campaign was none other than William Howard Taft—he who had brandished the no-third term tradition so violently in the face of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. In Taft's eyes "it would be very satisfactory" if Calvin Coolidge were to run for a third term. The former President, who was now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, could see no parallel between the case of Theodore Roosevelt and that of Calvin Coolidge. The anti-third term tradition did not apply, "except to two elective terms—certainly not where a president who dies has been long enough in office to have made the appointments which give color and character to his administration." 1 8 3 158 161 163

159 140 Literary Digest, XCV (Dec. 17, 1927), 8. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid. 182 Vol. L X X V I I (Jan., 1928), 12. Vol. LIII (Dec. 21, 1927), 125. Pringle, Life and Times of William HoivarJ Taft, II, 1062-63.

REMEMBER C A I V I N TEWYCOVUJHt RIDE HIM A N D HE W A S A ROUTHRLDC*f

YES, IT'S A HORSE OF A D I F F E R E N T T a l b u r t , Literary

Digest,

COLOR.

X C I I I ( M a y 14, 1 9 2 7 ) , 6 ; f r o m the Washing-ton

C O O L I D G E ' S

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Taft's letters reveal that Coolidge might possibly have served as a candidate in 1928 had be been drafted. On October 10, 1927, the Chief Justice wrote: " M y impression is that before they get through the Convention, they will find that they need Coolidge and will demand his service." In November T a f t declared: " I am very certain that there will be an attempt to nominate Coolidge, but I really think he is quite determined to suppress it. H e may not be able to withstand it. I think he would sweep the country." By May, 1928, Taft was convinced the President would not be a candidate. "Coolidge will not run," he wrote. " I don't think his wife is in good condition, and I don't think he is, and he does not want to run, and he is a man who ordinarily does not do what he does not want to." 184 Senator George W . Norris believed the Republicans could force the President's nomination in 1928. If they did, declared the Nebraska Progressive in a letter to the Anti-Third-Term League, the Democrats, unless they stupidly chose a reactionary, would pick the next President. 165 Of all those who tried to force Coolidge to run again, none was more unceasing in his efforts than Senator James E . Watson, of Indiana. A t one time, during the course of a conversation, the President bluntly told Watson, when the latter urged that he accept the nomination, " I have studied it all over and have finally concluded that I do not want that nomination." "But, suppose the Convention nominates you," insisted the Indiana Senator, "then what?" O h w e l l , Senator [replied C o o l i d g e ]

. . .

w e might sit here all afternoon

and discuss hypothetical questions, but the basic fact remains that I do not w a n t the nomination. I think I k n o w myself very w e l l . I fitted into the situation that existed right a f t e r the w a r , but I might not fit into the next one. I m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the terrible turmoil of that great conflict, the people w a n t e d rest, and that is w h a t I w a s naturally adapted to give them and did give them. T h e y have prospered u n d e r those conditions, because the times d e m a n d e d them, a n d I w a s qualified to supply the d e m a n d . B u t a different condition n o w c o n f r o n t s us. F r o m this time on, there must be something constructive applied to the affairs of g o v e r n m e n t , and it will not be sufficient to say, " L e t business take care of itself." . . . A n d so something affirmative must be suggested, and I do not feel that I a m the man to fill that 164 185

Quoted in Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, pp. 423—14, n. Neuberger and Kahn, Integrity: The Life of George W. Norris, p. 170.

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sort of position or to undertake to meet the demand occasioned by that situation. Somebody can do it, but I do not want to undertake i t . 1 6 6

As the year 1928 opened, the movement in favor of Herbert Hoover continued to expand by leaps and bounds. Coolidge's silence, as much as anything else, proved of real aid to the Secretary of Commerce, for "despite a certain popular demand for Hoover, there was general agreement that should Coolidge show a disposition to run again he could easily win both the nomination and the election." 1 6 7 T h e President broke his silence again only to veto the McNaryHaugen bill. After that, Congress must either "sustain the veto or cut loose from him at Kansas City, which it could not do." 1 6 8 At the same time Coolidge's silence crushed the supposedly potent booms for Lowden and Dawes. T h e President evinced marked apathy toward his Secretary of Commerce and he looked askance at the rising star of Hoover's candidacy. A declaration from Coolidge would, at any time before delegates were selected, have changed the outcome of the Convention. Calvin Coolidge knew this and knew it well; he thus withheld any statement and as a potential candidate could retain control over the New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts delegations so that they could not be manipulated in favor of anyone whom he did not like. William Allen White tells us that Coolidge's dislike included all those who supported the McNary-Haugen bill (especially Lowden and Dawes), and that the only favorable light in which he held Hoover was as a result of the latter's opposition to the bill. 1 8 9 One of the major stumblingblocks to the leaders of the Hoover movement was the refusal of National Committeeman Charles D . Hilles, of New York, and several other state Republicans to accept the President's withdrawal as final. Time and again Hilles, who for four months had admitted that Coolidge was out of the race, would sound a "Back to Coolidge" note in his speeches. The Hilles strategy spread to other states. Republican leaders in Vermont, Connecticut, 166 J . E . Watson, As I Knew Them, pp. 255-56. Coolidge then declared that it was up to the convention whether or not to nominate Hoover. These remarks of the President to Watson add considerably to the view held by many that Coolidge wisely foresaw what was to come and withdrew before the debacle occurred. 147 Peel and Donnelly, The 1938 Campaign, p. 2. 1,8 Thompson, Presidents I've Known, p. 367. 18 ' W. A. White, Masks in a Pageant, p. 455.

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and Massachusetts proposed to send uninstructed delegates to the Convention so that they could swing to the President if called upon to do so. 170 Hilles was vigorously opposed to Herbert Hoover. At one time the New York committeeman told a friend that some sixtyeight delegates from that state favored Coolidge. 171 By February, 1928, the "draft Coolidge" movement had reached such alarming proportions that the President's opponents decided upon a formal attempt to stifle it. On January 31 Senator La Follette reintroduced his anti-third term resolution into the Senate. His purpose was to clear away the "third-term clouds," while the immediate cause was the action of New York Republican county chairmen in insisting that delegates instructed for Coolidge be sent to the convention. The resolution had the support of Progressive Republicans and most of the Democrats as well. 172 The New York Times in commenting noted that the present political composition of the Senate "would seem to insure the passage of the resolution [which] may be no more than a political manoeuvre [and whose] passage will have a healthful effect." 1 7 3 For several days a heavy debate followed. 174 On February 10 the resolution was passed by a vote of 56 to 26. It read as follows: Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that the precedent established by Washington and other Presidents of the United States in retiring from the presidential office after the second term has become, by universal concurrence, a part of our republican system of government, and that any departure from this time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free institutions. 175

As finally passed, the resolution did not include a clause which had been proposed commending President Coolidge for his observance of the no-third term tradition. Senator Fess moved deletion of this 170

New Y o r k Times, Dec. 17, 1927, p. 1 j Dec. 22, p. ] ; Jan. 20, 1928, p. 2.

J. E. Watson, As I Knew Them, p. 255. 172 Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2253; New Y o r k Times, Feb. 1, 1928, p. 12. 1 7 a Feb. 2, 1928, p. 22. 1 7 4 F o r the debates on the L a Follette Resolution, see Congressional Record, 70th C o n g . , 1st Sess., pp. 2608-10, 2612-28, 2780—91, 2 8 2 5 - 4 2 ; also New Y o r k Times, Feb. 8, 1928, pp. 1, i j ; Feb. 10, pp. I-2J Feb. 11, pp. 1 - 2 . Included are the speeches and remarks of Senators L a Follette, Gillett, Heflin, Bruce, Fess, Bingham, Norris, Walsh (of Mass.), Borah, Harrison, Reed, Shortridge, Robinson, Edge, and others. 171

175

Congressional

Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2842.

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clause, since it was held that Coolidge had not closed the door to «nomination and hence could not honestly be "commended" for observing the precedent. The lines along which the voting followed are indeed interesting. Eighteen Republicans, most of them insurgents, 37 Democrats, and the Farmer-Labor Senator Shipstead voted for the resolution. Twenty-two Republicans, mainly "regulars," and 4 Democrats (Walsh, of Mass., Ferris, Blease, and Ransdell) opposed it. Charles Curtis, a Republican candidate for the nomination, voted for the amendment, along with Republicans Borah, Capper, Johnson, L a Follette, Norris, and Nye. Among the Democrats who voted for it were Barkley, Copeland, Glass, Harrison, Pittman, Robinson, Wagner, and Wheeler; while Republicans Fess, Edge, McNary, Moses, Watson, Smoot, and Willis, among others, were opposed to it. T h e New York Times, in supporting the motion, observed: T h e vote of the Senate was so decisive, the number of Republicans taking a position which can be interpreted only as meaning that they would be opposed to another candidacy of M r . Coolidge w a s so large, that practical politicians would be staggered at the thought of flying in the face of such a record indicating so deep a popular feeling. 1 7 6

" B y the Senate's action," declared the New York World, "added strength has been given to the tradition which Washington planted, and Jefferson and Madison and Jackson watered. By such reaffirmations as this do traditions grow into a commanding force greater even than that of unwritten law." 1 7 7 T h e amendment had no legal effect. In the eyes of one journal the Senate had become nothing but a "committee of politicians." 1 7 8 "There has been no call for such an amendment," commented the Albany Evening News (Rep.), while the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Ind. Dem.) insisted that "nowhere in the Constitution is it said the President shall be chosen with the advice and consent of the Senate. T h e whole proceeding was outside the business and authority of a Congressional body." 1 7 9 T h e Senate vote was nothing but " a bluff and a humbug," exclaimed the Hartford Courant (Rep.). 1 8 0 In the words of one writer, the resolution did have one marked effect, namely 174 178 178

177 Feb. 1 1 , 1918, p. 16. Literary Digest, X C V I (Feb. 25, 1928), 10. Outlook, C X L V I I I (Feb. 22, 1 9 2 8 ) , 293. 180 Literary Digest, X C V I (Feb. 25, 1 9 2 8 ) , 10. Ibid.

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that of "putting a definite interpretation on the President's sentiments, if he had not already intended them to have one. From February 10 on, the race for the Republican nomination was wide open to all seekers so far as Coolidge was concerned." 1 8 1 There was an immediate scramble by all the presidential aspirants who had not already done so to announce their candidacy. Senator Curtis had tossed his hat into the ring the preceding October 26; Governor Lowden had consented to the use of his name in the Illinois primaries on February 3, as had Senator Willis, of Ohio. Now, on February 12, Herbert Hoover permitted the use of his name in the Ohio primaries. In mid-April Senators Watson, of Indiana, and Goff, of West Virginia, also formally announced that they were candidates for the nomination. Early in March a group of New York State Republicans, assuming that under no circumstances would Coolidge again be a candidate, launched a "Hoover-for-President" Club in Utica. 182 This started the ball rolling. Committeeman Hilles was furious, vociferously repeating his "draft Coolidge" cry after a visit to the White House. On March 4, 1928, Calvin Coolidge entered the last year of his term an enigma to his party. Outwardly, he remained neutral on the candidates. But the President had recently seen several Senators and he appeared to receive with unusual cordiality those who spoke against the La Follette Resolution. 183 Moreover, the draft talk continued, as potent a factor as before. Mayor William Hale Thompson, of Chicago, devised a plan to draft the sedate incumbent of the White House by asking for a Cook County delegation instructed in his favor at Kansas City. On March 1 the county convention followed Mayor Thompson's order and adopted a resolution to draft Coolidge. Immediately, a flood of "draft Coolidge" cards was mailed out, in an attempt to "create a nation-wide sentiment" which the President could not ignore. 184 From Georgia came word that the state's Republican delegation to Kansas City would support any plan to draft M r . Coolidge. 185 In a personal letter to the President Arthur Brisbane declared Peel and Donnelly, The 1928 Camfaign, p. 7. 182 William R. Lee to Coolidge, March 2, 1928, Coolidge Papers. 183 Outlook, CXLVIII (March 7, 1928), 370. is« j j e w YJ,^ Times, Feb. 25, 1928, p. 2; March 1, p. 2; March 20, p. 10. 185 /bid., March 4, 1928, p. 1.

281

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that in the interests of continued prosperity Coolidge might find it necessary to change his mind and accept renomination as a duty. 186 The very same day (March 23) Brisbane observed in Hearst's New York American that there was still hope President Coolidge would capitulate to popular demand. The doughty New Englander remained firm; his determination to go through with his renunciation had become steeled. On March 10 the Wyoming Republican state central committee formally petitioned the President to "waive his personal preference and consent to continue for an additional four years" in office.187 Eleven days later Coolidge once again checked the "draft" movement by refusing the Wyoming plea. Speaking for the President, Secretary Sanders replied that "while he . . . very greatly appreciates and thanks you for the expressions of confidence, the President directs me to say that he must decline to grant the request of the committee." 188 This indirect letter was regarded as notice to the party leaders of Coolidge's determined position. Even Senator Fess accepted it as final, admitting such a response meant the President would reject the nomination. Charles D. Hilles finally receded on the Coolidge draft plan, asserting that it was best to take the President at his word. The New York Times remained unconvinced, coyly observing that "If the original announcement . . . meant absolutely what it said, this new declination adds nothing to it. If the other was inconclusive, so is this one. It will not prevent the drafters from going on with their drafting." 1 8 9 The possibility of drafting Coolidge appeared more and more remote after his declination to the Wyoming Republicans. The President's refusal to aid his supporters left them powerless in the face of the Hoover drive. As the convention drew near, most of the newspaper correspondents, including Arthur Brisbane, went to bat for Herbert Hoover, much as they had done for "Silent Cal." It was often suspected that Coolidge, by his little game of silence, was really favoring the Secretary of Commerce.190 Right up to the last minute, a small group of friends and business men besieged the President time and again with requests to retract his statement and run again. 191 The 188 188 190 191

187 Coolidge Papers. New York Times, March n , 1928, p. 3. 189 Ibid., March 22, 1928, p. 1. March 23, 1928, p. 20. Independent, CXX (March 17, 1928), 24!. The Coolidge Papers clearly reveal this situation.

"I DO N O T CHOOSE T O

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T a f t letters indicate that Hilles, Mellon, and the Wall Street financiers "hoped to draft Coolidge . . . if he refuses . . . they want Dwight Morrow." 192 The New York state Republican committee still favored drafting the President, while Senator Fess insisted that if a genuine deadlock arose in the convention President Coolidge would be the party's nominee.103 Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, leading the Pennsylvania delegation, announced: "It is not certain that Mr. Coolidge will not consent to the use of his name. The president may be a candidate." 104 Richard V. Oulahan, writing in the New York Times, asserted that in none of the President's public communications did he say that he "would not accept if renominated by the Republican National Convention. That omission is the cornerstone of the structure of the 'draft Coolidge' movement." 195 Bernard Kelly, speaking in Forum, declared: " I don't think the country could do any better than draft Coolidge and make him run for reelection." 1 9 6 On April 20 the President had once again sought to spike the draft talk by forbidding the use of his name on the Massachusetts primary. This statement was the strongest yet made and was couched in terms suggestive of a more sweeping renunciation of a third-term nomination than ever before. In putting a damper on current draft efforts Coolidge had explained: Such action [placing his name on the primary ballot] would be most embarrassing to me and, while appreciating the compliment that is intended, I request that it not be done. M y name is being used in other States in a way that is contrary to my wishes. I have heard that in N e w Y o r k it has gone so far as to be claimed such use is with my tacit consent. In my own State to give any countenance to such a movement would tend to compromise me and lend color to the misrepresentations that apparently are being made in other States. I am, therefore, sending you this public declaration of my position and requesting that such attempts be discontinued. 1 9 7 1 8 2 W . A . White, A Puritan in Babylon, p. 375. By mid-spring T a f t was persuaded Coolidge might run again, but when Hoover's strength continued to grow the Chief Justice felt the President could not be renominated even by a coup in the convention. Ibid., pp. 3 7 5 - 7 6 . 1 9 3 New Y o r k Times, A p r i l 13, 1928, p. 7 ; A p r i l i g , p. 4. 194 Ibid., M a y 13, 1918, pp. 1 - 2 . Next to Coolidge, Mellon favored Hoover as "closest to the standard" set for the presidency. 1 9 9 M a y 27, 1928, III, 1. 1 9 6 Vol. L X X I X (June, 1928), 932. 1 9 7 New Y o r k Times, A p r i l 21, 1928, p. 1.

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" I DO N O T C H O O S E T O

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Shortly before the Republican Convention was to meet, the draft movement in the East suddenly gained ground. Party leaders were prepared to vote a big block of delegates to Coolidge at Kansas City. A stampede was expected to follow, unless the President made a definite refusal of the nomination which many quarters anticipated as forthcoming. It was commonly believed that if this last did not occur before the proceedings began, "it will be reasonable to suppose that he [Coolidge] has decided to run again." 198 In May, Mellon, Hilles, T a f t , William M . Butler, and even Everett Sanders had all gone to the White House seeking some vague indication that Coolidge would accept a nomination "which they assumed he desired"; none was forthcoming. The President's silence led such men as Butler, Herbert Hoover, James M . Beck, and, as we saw, "Ike" Hoover to suspect that he was anticipating a deadlock out of which would come his nomination.199 Chief Justice T a f t was at last forced to admit: " I do not think Coolidge has the slightest idea of running, and I think there will be quite enough men in the Convention who have assumed that he will not run, and will therefore not yield to a sweep of enthusiasm." 200 The Coolidges had planned to spend the summer of 1928 at the Wisconsin lakes, where the President would keep in touch with the convention and campaign. A move which was regarded by many with suspicion, Coolidge had himself arranged to leave for Wisconsin just at the moment when the convention would begin to select candidates. It was frequently inferred that this was all part of a deep, dark plot to secure his renomination. By making himself inaccessible on the train for about twenty-four hours, one writer pointed out, the President might wake up in the morning to find himself the nominee.201 On the eve of the convention the outlook at Kansas City was all for Hoover if Coolidge insisted he would not run. But, as the New York Times put it, " T h e Coolidge boom is too much in evidence to be overlooked." 202 Pre-convention reports indicated that unless the President made it clear he would not accept renomination he was cerNew Republic, LV (June 13, 1918), 80. A. White, A Puritan in Babylon, pp. 399-400. 200 Cited in Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 427. 201 New Republic, LV (June 13, 1928), 79-80. 202 New York Times, June 10, 1928, p. 1.

1Bi

ia>W.

" I DO N O T CHOOSE T O R U N "

309

tain to obtain at least two hundred votes on the first ballot. The "draft Coolidge" advocates clung to their hope that, not having announced he would refuse to accept if nominated, the New Englander would be the Convention's choice not later than the third ballot.203 Though the plan had not gained headway, an effort to stampede the convention to him was anticipated. A message was expected from the President which would definitely take him out of consideration for «nomination.204 As late as June 1 1 Chairman William M . Butler, of the National Committee, had received no word from the White House and immediately urged Coolidge supporters to take no stand until they heard from him.206 The Republican National Convention of 1928 opened in Kansas City on Tuesday, June 12, with the nomination of Herbert Hoover a virtual certainty. The Pennsylvania delegates, led by William S. Vare, Republican boss of the state, had on Monday afternoon swung the state for Hoover, thus leaving the Mellon candidacy suspended in the air. The Secretary of the Treasury's men immediately conceded a Hoover victory.206 Hope now vanished that word would come from the White House authorizing a "coalition" between the Hoover and anti-Hoover forces which would throw the nomination to Coolidge. 207 A few still insisted on drafting the President. This small group was led by National Committeeman J . Henry Roraback, of Connecticut, who planned to start the ball rolling by casting the seventeen votes of that state for Coolidge. The New York delegation, organized by Hilles, had arrived without a single Hoover adherent! There was considerable uncertainty as to the President's attitude. The drafters wondered if they dared proceed without incurring his wrath. Chair208 ¡bid. 204

Ibid., June n , 1928, p. 2; New Republic, LV (June 13, 1928), 94. The "draft Coolidge" leaders did not intend formally to place the President in nomination. They expected that on the first ballot the seventeen votes from Connecticut would be cast for him and that this would start the ball rolling. After two or three ballots an avalanche was anticipated. 206 W. A. White, A Puritan m Babylon, p. 403; New York Times, June 12, 1928, p. t. 207 The evidence presented by both William Allen White and "Ike" Hoover lends credence to the claim that Coolidge, thoroughly incensed at the surrender of Mellon and William M. Butler to the Hoover forces, sent Butler a furious telegram and then endeavored to recall and destroy it. White, A Puritan in Babylon, p. 401 n; I. H. ( " I k e " ) Hoover, Forty-Two Years in the White House, p. 176. 205

310

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RUN"

man Butler still had no word from the White House and expected none before the balloting was to begin. State after state, including Coolidge's native Vermont, went over to the Hoover camp. Senator Borah was certain the President was out and insisted that it was "dangerous" for the party to force his nomination.208 Everett Sanders, presidential secretary, arrived as Coolidge's personal representative, but, like Mellon, bore no announcement from the White House. Before leaving Washington, Sanders had asked the President whether he should see Mellon. " M r . Mellon will support Mr. Hoover," replied Coolidge curtly. 209 On the convention floor at Kansas City Mellon sent for Sanders and asked whether the President had sent any message. Sanders replied that while Coolidge had given no orders the Secretary of the Treasury could assume that he was not to lend the President any support. 210 Claude Fuess tells us that "it was Sanders' distinct impression at the time that Coolidge did not wish to have anyone bring up his name." 2 1 1 The President's untiring supporter, Senator Fess, delivered a rather commonplace keynote speech, after which the platform was duly presented and adopted. In the two days while this was being done "hope still burned in the breasts of Coolidge followers that some platform row or some bolt from Heaven would break the Hoover control of the Convention." 2 1 2 A telegram from James Elverson, Jr., to Coolidge, declaring that the Pennsylvania delegates still supported him and urging that a definite statement be returned, failed to elicit a reply from the White House. 213 209 208 \ e w York Times, June iz, 1928, p. 8. Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 4.27. Ibid. " I k e " Hoover implies that Everett Sanders was a "traitor" to Coolidge at Kansas City, since he got word around the convention that the President would not accept renomination. Forty-Two Years in the White House, pp. 178-79. How much truth there is in this charge we shall probably never know. 211 Calvin Coolidge, p. 427. Coolidge himself has offered testimony to this part of the story. In his Autobiograf hy (page 244) he has written: " I . . . sent . . . Everett Sanders . . . to Kansas City with instructions to notify several of the leaders of stale delegations not to vote for me. Had I not done so, I am told, I should have been nominated. The report that he had talked with me on the telephone after his arrival, and I had told him I would not accept if nominated, was pure fabrication. I had no communication with him of any kind after he left Washington and did not give him any such . . . message." 212 W. A. White, A Puritan in Babylon, p. 405. 213 Coolidge Papers (June 12, 1 9 2 8 ) . 210

" I DO N O T CHOOSE T O R U N "

311

Coolidge had intended to take a train on Monday evening for Brule, Wisconsin, but Mrs. Coolidge was ill and they could not leave until Wednesday night. 214 While the balloting was going on at Kansas City the President was in his drawing-room on the special train fast asleep. Collapse of the draft movement appeared inevitable when no word came from the White House, thus indicating that Coolidge had not accepted the opportunity to make clear once and for all the fact that, ever since he had issued it, his statement " I do not choose to run in 1928" meant that he would refuse to accept renomination. The balloting began on Thursday, June 14, in the evening. Senator Charles Curtis, of Kansas, was the first to be placed in nomination, followed by Senator Guy D. Goff, of West Virginia. 215 Then came Hoover, Norris, and Watson. Suddenly, an Ohio delegate, Ralph D. Cole, rose in his seat and in ringing tones nominated Calvin Coolidge "as my first choice and the first choice of America since the beginning of the campaign." 2 1 6 It was undoubtedly an attempt at a stampede. But it was far too late. The party leaders had already decided on Hoover and nothing at the moment could change them. The roll call of states began. On the first ballot Herbert Hoover received 837 votes out of 1,089 a n d was immediately declared the party's nominee. Seventy-four votes were cast for Governor Lowden and 64 for Senator Curtis. Calvin Coolidge, in spite of everything, received 17 votes. 217 Under Borah's direction, Curtis was chosen as the vice-presidential candidate and the convention was over. The President neared his summer home, the special train stopping only at Chicago. Coolidge was apparently oblivious to the events at Kansas City for he did not listen to the convention over the radio on the train and did not seem to be in touch with the political situation 211 This was the period in which, according to " I k e " Hoover, Coolidge's disappointment at the action of Butler and Mellon and at news of the abandonment of the draft idea became keen. 215 William Allen White tells us that Coolidge's eagerness for a deadlock in the convention reached its highest point when Curtis' name was placed in nomination and an outburst of applause lasting twenty-two minutes occurred. A Puritan in Babylon, p. 406. 216 New York Times, June I J , 1928, p. 3. 217 This, in spite of the fact that on the day of Hoover's nomination, Coolidge, through Sanders, sent word to the Connecticut delegation asking it not to cast its seventeen votes in his favor, ¡bid., p. 2.

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at all. " I k e " Hoover tells us that Coolidge's closest friends shared his disappointment, blaming it in part on the President himself, who, they said, played the game of silence too far. Many felt that he had been in "a more or less receptive mood," but that because of his statement his position had become an awkward one. In Hoover's own words, "Every sign during and after the Convention pointed to the fact that the President's friends who wished to nominate him, regardless, were right in their conclusion that he would accept." 218 The New York Times glibly observed: I t is n o w d e f i n i t e l y established t h a t w h e n

Mr.

Coolidge

said " I

do

not

c h o o s e " h e m e a n t t h a t he d i d n o t c h o o s e . B u t w h y h e did n o t c h o o s e r e m a i n s a f r u i t f u l s u b j e c t f o r s p e c u l a t i o n . U n t i l it is d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t o n e a n s w e r is n o t as g o o d as a n o t h e r t h e t h e o r y is t e n a b l e t h a t M r . C o o l i d g e d i d n o t c h o o s e t o r u n f o r P r e s i d e n t b e c a u s e he s h r a n k f r o m the t h o u g h t o f

four

m o r e S u m m e r v a c a t i o n s in the l i m e l i g h t . 2 1 8

When Hoover had been nominated, President Coolidge lost all interest in the convention} he cared not the least who should be chosen for Vice President. " I k e " Hoover tells us that the shock was a severe one, and that the usually phlegmatic Calvin never recovered from it. H e did not enter whole-heartedly into the Hoover campaign. At no time did Coolidge discuss the nominee, and we are led to suppose that the President would not have shed any tears had he been defeated. 220 Calvin Coolidge, the fifth two-term President since Jackson to live out his second term, left the White House for good at the end of it.2-1 His reasons for so doing will in all probability remain nebulous for2 1 9 June n , 1928, p. 24. Forty-Two Years in the White House, pp. 1 7 7 - 7 9 . I. H. ( " I k e " ) Hoover, Forty-Two Years in the White House, p. 179. 2 2 1 A t no time after 1929 did Coolidge consider reentering politics. " Y o u cannot realize how much I long for peace and privacy," he wrote to Henry L. Stoddard in A p r i l , 1930. As the election of 1932 approached, the former President could not be persuaded to speak for Hoover. Stoddard went to Plymouth, bent upon enlisting Coolidge's support. T h e two men talked awhile and the New Englander agreed to one speech, which was made in New Y o r k City at Madison Square Garden. On December 14, 1932, scarcely three weeks before he died, Coolidge informed Stoddard that he was "through with public life forever. I shall never again hold public office. . . . Nothing would induce me to take office a g a i n . " On Jan. j , 1933, Calvin Coolidge was in his grave. H. L. Stoddard, It Costs to Be President, pp. 134, 136-39, 1 4 5 - 4 6 . 218

220

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ever. Perhaps, as some suppose, he really intended his famous statement of August, 1927, as an absolute rejection of a third term, but, as Senator James E . Watson has written: A l l of those who were favorable to other candidates had so magnified and intensified the mild expression, " I do not choose to run," and by the time the Convention met had so thoroughly indoctrinated all the delegates with the idea that that meant he would not run, that no effort was made to nominate Coolidge. 2 2 2

Perhaps, as Claude Fuess and others imply, Calvin Coolidge was shrewd enough to foresee the oncoming crash and definitely planned to get himself and his reputation out from under before it struck. Perhaps, like Washington and Jackson, he was simply tired of being President and, as William Allen White suggests, it was probably a mixture of mischievous delight and a politician's uncanny desire to hold the situation until the last possible minute, which kept him from revealing his attitude toward another term. . . . But he was done; enough was enough. 223

At any rate, the rejection of a third term, if such it was meant to be, was not by the slightest implication the result of a firm desire to preserve a sacred tradition. Or perhaps, as "Ike" Hoover has proven with a surprisingly convincing degree of success, Calvin Coolidge's idea was that while he would not slur himself by openly seeking renomination he was definitely not averse to being drafted and having it forced upon him. In Hoover's own words, the phrase, " I do not choose to run," was never meant to bring on the results which it did: Rather it was an utterance made on the spur of the moment for a certain political effect, intended to feel out the situation. In plain words the President hoped to be the nominee, expected to be the nominee, and was disappointed and distressed when he was not chosen by the Convention. 224

Possibly Coolidge was, like Grant, being deliberately ambiguous and evasive—"purposely oracular," as William Allen White puts it, 222 224

J. E. Watson, As I Knew Them, p. 255. Forty-Two Years in the White House, p. 177.

223

Masks in a Pageant, p. 454.

3H

"I

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RUN"

thereby leaving himself free to accept a deadlocked nomination at the hands of the convention without seeking delegates in any state. 225 Perhaps, too, it was only the forceful and well-organized strength of Herbert Hoover's campaign which upset "Silent Cal's" little plan. Of the five two-term Presidents in the century between Andrew Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt none, save Theodore Roosevelt in 1908, refused a third term on principle, and four of the five came reasonably close to winning one. In the words of one writer, "One hundred years of history, up to the time of Franklin Roosevelt, left the no-third-term tradition unbloody but slightly bowed." 226 It remained for F . D . R . , the greatest iconoclast of all, to take hold of a deeply rooted tradition such as that regarding the third term, openly defy it, and thus prove that one of the greatest principles of America's unwritten law had by 1940 become nothing more than a mere archaism. 225 229

A Puritan in Babylon, p. 398. Rodell, Democracy and the Third Term, p. 85.

PART THREE COLLAPSE

AND

THE

FUTURE

1 1

F.D.R.—"THE

CHAMP"

W I T H T H E O V E R W H E L M I N G R E E L E C T I O N OF F R A N K L I N D. ROOSEVELT

in November, 1940, the once viable anti-third term tradition, keystone of American political principles for 150 years, was irremediably shattered and with one brilliant stroke relegated to the position of an academic anachronism. Roosevelt II had very skillfully accomplished what both his illustrious predecessor and General Grant had signally failed to achieve. T h e result is that today the no-third term precedent is a dead issue, a further victim of F.D.R.'s tradition-smashing crusade. H o w after a century and a half did a situation arise in which it was possible for an American President to have a third term? The answer lies in one word—war. Had there been no Second World War, the election of Franklin Roosevelt to a third term would have been as likely as the return of prohibition to the American scene. The supposedly dangerous position in which the United States found herself with a world at war may be clearly set forth as the sole raison d'etre for Roosevelt's third term. The movement for F.D.R.'s reelection was unusually slow in getting under way. No concerted effort was launched to that end until the outbreak of war in September, 1939. Then did the Roosevelt boom gain considerable impetus and continue to expand until a virtually unanimous party called upon the President to stand a third time. Faint murmurs of F.D.R. for 1940 were audible as early as 1937, scarcely six months after his overwhelming victory over Governor Landon. In June of that year Governor George H . Earle, of Pennsylvania, issued a statement urging his fellow Democrats to support Roosevelt for a third term in 1940.

318

F.D.R.

T h e r e are many leaders of intelligence and honesty in the Democratic party [declared G o v e r n o r E a r l e ] . T h e r e are, however, no men in the D e m o cratic party or any other party w h o reach knee-high in stature, mentally and morally, to Franklin D . Roosevelt. Between the third-term precedent and the welfare of the country, can any patriotic citizen hesitate as to which course he will take? . . . I am for Franklin Delano Roosevelt for President, unqualifiedly and finally. I have never discussed this matter with the President and this statement is made without his permission. 1

W i t h Governor Earle's pronouncement the third-term talk began to be taken seriously. Immediately a cry went up against the possibility of another term for F . D . R . " T h e two-term tradition has a relevance for today which makes it more than a tradition," cautioned the Nation. " I t [is] a living safeguard of our values." And, in regard to the President personally: "Despite the high regard we have for the character, abilities, and programs of M r . Roosevelt, we feel that no man is indispensable for the future of America. . . . H e must 'unqualifiedly and finally' announce that he will not be a candidate to succeed himself." 2 Governor Earle's endorsement had failed to initiate anything like a potent Roosevelt movement. T h e reason was simply that at that time ( 1 9 3 7 ) the President's popularity had reached its lowest ebb since taking office. T h e battle over the Supreme Court revision plan was at its height, and on many sides Roosevelt found himself the object of violent criticism. T h e view was not uncommon that the fight against court revision was a concerted effort on the part of conservative Democrats to break the President's hold, so that he would not be strong enough to have any influence in the choice of the 1940 candidate. 3 Throughout the rest of 1937 little was heard of the third-term question. Sporadically, figures in various walks of life would either endorse or express disapproval of F . D . R . and his policies. State governors were divided on the subject of a third term. In the main, western leaders favored the President, while those in the East opposed him. In Washington, Senators Wheeler and Pittman did not think Roosevelt would seek a third election, while Senator Copeland was certain the N e w D e a l would be victorious in 1940 with F . D . R . as its 1 3

New York Times, June 24, 1937, p. 1. New York Times, July 4, 1937, p. 1.

2

Nation, CXLV (July 3, 1937), 4-5.

F.D.R.

319

standard bearer; Postmaster-General Farley continued to evade the issue.4 In Republican circles John D . M . Hamilton, chairman of the National Committee, saw the President as the 1940 candidate, while Senator Borah predicted the Senate would go on record against a third term if the issue reached a vote. 5 B y fall the court and labor issues led some Democrats to believe Roosevelt might run again. T h e C.I.O. under John L . Lewis was firmly behind the President. In September Governor Frank Murphy, of Michigan, an ardent New Dealer, declared: W e are going through a critical period and government, as it is today in the United States, must go ahead. T o continue that progressive leadership, it may be necessary to call upon M r . Roosevelt, in the public need, to run for a third term. T h e third-term tradition must be subordinated to the need of the nation. T h e situation is such that it is not a question of party. 0

As the year 1937 drew to a close, it was obvious that the only place where strong third-term talk existed was in the West. A poll of governors undertaken by the United Press revealed only 3 out of 38 Democrats opposed to a third term for any President on principle: Quinn, of Rhode Island; Peery, of Virginia; and Clark, of Idaho. Only 6 of the 38 affirmed their support of Roosevelt in 1940: Earle, of Pennsylvania; Murphy, of Michigan; Leche, of Louisiana; Allred, of Texas; Johnston, of South Carolina; and Chandler, of Kentucky. Twenty-nine Democratic governors refused to commit themselves publicly in favor of a third term for F . D . R . 7 Emil Ludwig, the German author, declared just before publishing his book on Roosevelt that the outbreak of war might force the President to run for a third term, while if there were no war he would certainly retire at the end of his second term. Senator Norris took an entirely different view, asserting that the unfortunate opposition being given F . D . R . and the administration might result in a demand for a third term. 8 One political writer summed up the situation very well: 3i

* Ibid., Aug. 23, 1937, p. 5i Sept. 8, p. 1 6 ; Sept. 22, p. 6; Oct. 2, p. 4.; Aug. 22, II, Au g - 16, p. 12. 5 Ibid., Sept. 14, 1937, p. 19i Sept. 3, p. 38. 8 Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 1 1 , 1937, p. 1. " Literary Digest, C X X I V (Oct. 9, 1 9 3 7 ) , 12. 8 New York Times, Dec. 1, 1937, p. 1 5 ; Dec. 24, p. 18.

320

F.D.R.

Should Franklin D . Roosevelt stake his popularity against precedent, he w o u l d be the first to do so under circumstances which would force a head-on collision with the anti-third-term tradition, for while G r a n t and T h e o d o r e Roosevelt each sought a third term after a lapse of four years, no President has yet dared ask for twelve consecutive years. If Franklin D . Roosevelt should do so, there would have to be cogent reasons for his decision. 9

T h a t considerable fear of Roosevelt's designs on a third term existed is manifest by several resolutions introduced in Congress against just such a contingency. Foremost among them were the Burke resolution of January 6, 1937; the Copeland resolution of August 9, 19375 the M c L e a n resolution of January 5, 1937; the Tinkham resolution of January 5, 1937 j and the Fish resolution of August 4, 1937, all of which in some way proposed to limit the President's term of office. 10 T h o u g h none of the resolutions was ever brought to a vote, it is not unlikely that one might have passed, since there were at the time in the Senate 16 Democrats, 4 Republicans, 2 Progressives and one Farmer-Laborite who had voted for the L a Follette resolution in 1928, as well as several new members who were opposed to a third term for Franklin Roosevelt. A s the year 1938 opened and the President undertook his " p u r g e " of the faithless and rebellious, it became increasingly evident that his popularity was waning. Another business recession had set in, and labor strife was rampant. In January the American Institute of Public Opinion poll, conducted by D r . George Gallup, revealed that 67 percent of the voters were opposed to a third term for F . D . R . ; by April that majority had increased to 70 percent. Some 54 percent of the Democrats were against a third term. 1 1 In the words of Frank R. Kent, it would indeed seem that "barring the almost impossible combination of a great national crisis, a super-President, and an election year, there will be in this country no third term while our present 0 Delbert Clark, " T h e T h i r d - T e r m Issue Revives the Old Debate," New Y o r k Times, July 11, 1937, V I I I , 17. 1 0 F o r the text of these various resolutions, see Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 39, 7 1 , 8243, 8 5 1 9 ; Congressional Digest, X V I I ( M a y , 1 9 3 8 ) , 13+. 1 1 New Y o r k Times, A p r i l 3, 1938, p. 27. Compare the above figures to those of June, 1936, when only 57 percent of the voters were opposed to a third term for Roosevelt.

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321

political system survives." 12 Ironically enough, by 1940 all of these hypothetical circumstances had become tangible realities sufficiently potent to quash the anti-third term precedent. Throughout 1938 the President's popularity declined. Senator Wheeler, of Montana (Dem.), leader of the Supreme Court battle, predicted that Roosevelt could have a third nomination but that as things stood he could never be elected; Senator Vandenberg, of Michigan (Rep.), accused F.D.R. of attempting to control the succession to the presidency "for himself or an heir apparent"} Senator Holt, of West Virginia (Dem.), declared that he would introduce a resolution into the Senate similar to the L a Follette resolution of 1928. 13 As time went on, a rift between Roosevelt and Postmaster-General Farley appeared imminent as a result of the former's refusal to consider Farley as a possible successor. In Democratic circles there was even talk by the President's foes of restoring the two-thirds rule in the convention in order to block his nomination. Late in April a "National League to Oppose a Third Term for President" was incorporated in New York, led by former Assemblyman Bennett E. Siegelstein. On one occasion that hardy perennial, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, vociferously warned against the dangers of a third term. 14 Undoubtedly Roosevelt's greatest strength lay in labor. John L . Lewis, leader of the C.I.O., had long been receptive to the idea of a third term. As early as January (1938), the 600,ooo members of the United Mine Workers of America endorsed the President for another term. 15 The attention of the nation was seriously called to the thirdterm question in July when President Roosevelt was met at Pueblo, Colorado, by a set of resolutions adopted by an organization of steel workers, calling upon him to run for a third term. 10 Later, while the President was fishing, Charles Michelson, publicity director of the 1 2 " N o T h i r d T e r m For Roosevelt," American Mercury, X L I I I (Jan., 1 9 3 8 ) , 9. Kent, incidentally, prophesied that Roosevelt would retire to private life after the expiration of his second term, even though he desired a third one. F . D . R . had reveled in the White House, as had his f a m i l y ; it was to their interest to have him run again. But the tradition against a third term was too strongly imbedded in the people and would defeat the President's aspirations. Ibid., pp. 1 - 9 . 13 14 11

N e w Y o r k Times, Feb. 27, 1938, p. 10; Feb. 13, p. 40; July 30, p. 2. Ibid., A u g . 7, 1938, p. 2} June 1, p. 4 ; A p r i l 29, p. 1 4 ; Sept. 5, p. 17. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1938, p. 1. "Ibid., July 13, 1938, p. 1.

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F.D.R.

Democratic National Committee, published a statement which definitely made Franklin Roosevelt a possibility for renomination. T h e President, declared Michelson, would prefer a case of hives to a third term, but circumstances might arise under which "it may be impossible for him to lay down his burden. . . . T h e President could not say today, even if he were so inclined, that he would or would not be a candidate in 1940." 1 7 At the same time, Governor Frank Murphy, of Michigan, predicted that the country might have to draft Roosevelt in 1940; a few days later, a "Roosevelt for President in 1940 Club" was formed in Toledo, Ohio, backed by a group of ardent New Dealers. 1 8 Publicity director Michelson was again quoted on the subject late in September, asserting that he did not think the President would seek another term unless he were "badly needed." Secretary of the Interior Ickes declared in Los Angeles, when asked for his views on 1940 candidates: "It's in the lap of the gods. I think President Roosevelt would carry the United States if he ran again, and he might have to run. But for his sake I hope he doesn't." 1 9 Ickes' remarks were followed by open endorsement of F . D . R . for a third term from Senators Norris (Ind.) and Guffey (Dem.). There was considerable opinion in Washington to the effect that "if . . . Roosevelt runs again it will be because he has been forced to do so by implacable opposition to his program." 20 B y December, 1938, the Gallup poll found virtually no change in the sentiment against a third term for President Roosevelt. This despite the election setback to the New Deal in November, when the Democrats lost 8 seats in the Senate and 80 in the House! Seventy percent of the voters were still opposed to a third term. 21 As the year 1939 opened, General Hugh S. Johnson made the following shrewd comment: "Because he is the best political wind vane, the next President—like it or not—is pretty apt to be M r . Franklin Delano Roose17

18 Ibid., Aug. 7, 1938, p. 2. Ibid., July 25, 1938, p. 3 ; Aug. 6, p. 4. 20 Ibid., Oct. 20, 1938, p. 17. New Republic, X C V I (Sept. 14, 1 9 3 8 ) , 148. 21 New York Times, Dec. 14, 1938, p. 6. Forty-nine percent of the Democrats and 97 percent of the Republicans believed Roosevelt should run again; 40 percent of all voters said they would vote for him if he did, while 39 percent thought he could win if he ran again; 64 percent of the Democratic voters said they would vote for the President if he ran again, and 36 percent of all voters believed he would decide to run for a third term. Ibid. 19

F.D.R.

323

velt, elected on a distinct revision of recent Third New Deal policy to the rightward." 2 2 More and more people began to ask what Roosevelt's own views were on a third term. The President's real attitude had not yet been ascertained. His prolonged silence continued to make his position ambiguous. When it came to subtlety and craft, Franklin Roosevelt overshadowed even the astute M r . Coolidge. F . D . R . ' s invariable taciturnity in regard to a third term admitted of nothing save a vague uncertainty on all sides, By remaining uncommunicative the President initiated a rather annoying guessing game. At no time has he ever committed himself on the question of a third term. H e was thus able to retain, even more so than did Calvin Coolidge, a firm, aye a whip hand over the Congress. Obviously that timorous body did not dare risk a policy of wholesale obstruction to the President's program, unaware as it was of his plans for 1940. Roosevelt made but one slight reference to a third term. This was on March 4, 1937, when, speaking at the Democratic Victory Dinner, he declared: M y great ambition on January 2 0 , 1 9 4 1 , is to turn over this desk and chair in the W h i t e House to my successor, whoever he may be, with the assurance that I am at the same time turning over to him as President, a nation intact, a nation at peace, a nation prosperous, a nation clear in its knowledge of what powers it has to serve its own citizens, a nation that is in a position to use those powers to the full in order to move forward steadily to meet the modern needs of humanity—a nation which has thus proved that the democratic form and methods of government can and will succeed. 2 3

T h e President's position remained an enigmatic one. Every time a reporter inquired whether he would accept a third nomination, F . D . R . laughed off the query or told the reporter to put on a dunce cap and stand in the corner. As one writer glibly observed: T o be sure, M r . Roosevelt has given no indication that he desires another term; what hints he has thrown out have been of the opposite tone. Y e t he has not said in so many words that he would refuse a nomination. 24 22

"Third Term? ? f ? " Saturday Evening Post, C C X I (Dec. 17, 1 9 3 8 ) , 56. New York Times, March 5, 1937, p. 14. 24 Delbert Clark, "Who Will It Be In i 9 4 o ; The Guessing Starts," New York Times, VIII, 3, Nov. 21, 1937. 23

324

F.D.R.

Those close to the President had no idea of what his plans were. Though she "hoped" he would not seek a third term, Eleanor Roosevelt once replied to a query on the subject of whether her husband desired reelection, " I don't know. I haven't asked him." 2 5 Roosevelt's children were equally uncertain, but seemed to doubt the possibility of his running again. " I don't think father will run for another term," declared Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, the President's daughter. A third term is "up to Father," asserted James Roosevelt, while son Elliott hoped his father would not seek reelection. " I don't think my son has the slightest wish for a third term," said Mrs. James Roosevelt, mother of the President, upon one occasion.26 Roosevelt's political supporters were also kept guessing. Senator Alben Barkley, Senate majority leader, asserted that his chief had no intention of seeking another term; Postmaster-General Farley also professed ignorance. Roosevelt [declared the chairman of the Democratic National Committee] has his eye on 1 9 4 0 as well as the next man. K n o w i n g politics as he does, and realizing the danger of showing his own hand too soon, I doubt if he has confided his actual intentions to any individual. T h e paramount influence rests with him. Until he talks, a huge question mark should be placed after any and all speculation about 1 9 4 0 . 2 7

Roosevelt's position remained nebulous throughout the pre-convention campaign. Having said nothing publicly nor privately (insofar as we know) on the subject of a third term, the President gave the impression of being undecided. It may well be that when war broke forth in September, 1939, this very factor impelled him to make the decision to stand a third time. As one writer expressed it in the summer of 1938: H e [Roosevelt] knows he does not need a third term to make sccure his placc in history. O n the other hand, he is still in the fullness of his powers, and it is only human not to wish to be shelved. Almost certainly, M r . Roosevelt has not yet himself decided whether he wants an additional term. 2 8 25

New York Times, July 10, 1937, p. 8; Nov. 4, 1939, p. 18. Ibid., July 3, 1938, p. 2; July 4, 1939, p. 14; Oct. 14, 1938, p. 6; Sept. zz, 1939, p. 16. 27 Farley, Behind the Ballots (1938), p. 353. 28 New Republic, XCV (July 27, 1938), 333. 2,

F.D.R.

325

In the early weeks of 1939 a concerted effort was made by conservative Democrats to put President Roosevelt out of the picture in 1940 and thus to weaken his influence over the party. A declaration that he would not run again was sought.29 Yet, so long as F.D.R. could have the nomination if he wished it, he held the whip hand against his party opponents. When no statement could be obtained from the President, it was decided to launch a boom in behalf of PostmasterGeneral Farley. The movement got under way in April} New York took the lead in endorsing Roosevelt's right-hand man; Arizona soon followed. Farley made a planned trip to the Pacific Coast as a bid for the nomination, but later declared that all candidacies were futile until the President should make known his plans. In July Farley and his chief conferred for some time; the next day the Postmaster-General sailed for Europe, silent on both his talk with F . D . R . and the thirdterm question. The boom for "Jovial Jim" had been quietly and efficiently nipped in the bud.30 By the spring of 1939 Roosevelt's popularity appeared to have recovered considerably from the setback it received at the failure of the '38 purge and the losses suffered at the polls the preceding November. From all and sundry quarters came pledges of endorsement and offers of support. State after state federations of labor supported the President for reelection. The C.I.O. was all but unanimous in its call for Roosevelt to serve again. The bulk of Franklin Roosevelt's support lay in labor. Added to this group were entreaties from Young Democratic Clubs, the American Youth Congress, Latin American liberals, Norman Thomas, and even Earl Browder. 31 In Chicago an organization called " T h e Third Termers Club" was formed with the avowed purpose of securing another term for F.D.R. Led by Municipal Judge John Gutknecht, the group claimed to have 50,000 members. A growing horde of third-term organizations all over the country was reported to Democratic National Headquarters. 32 "The Presi» Ibid, X C V I I ( J a n . . 1 9 3 9 ) , *7330 N e w Y o r k Times, A p r i l i , 1939, p. 15 A p r i l 12, p. 13; M a y 14, p. 1; M a y p. 16; M a y 26, p. 7 ; J u l y 27, p. 4. 81 Ibid., M a r c h j , 1939, p. 4 6 ; M a r c h 26, p. 2 1 ; M a y 12, p. 4 ; M a y 25, p. J u n e 17, p. 9 ; J u n e 16, p. 5 ; J u l y 5, p. 1 ; A u g . 8, p. 6 ; A u g . 26, p. 6 ; Oct. 1, p. Oct. 6, p . 1 4 ; Nov. 19, p. 1; N o v . 20, p. 21. 32Nevisvieet, X I V ( J u l y 3, 1 9 3 9 ) , 11; New Y o r k Times, J u n e 22, 1939, p. A u g . 17, p. 2} N o v . 26, p. 4 1 .

19, 5; 7; 5;

326

F.D.R.

dent must run again," if disaster is to be staved off in Europe, cried many ardent New Dealers incessantly. Senators Hughes, Smathers, and Guffey took the lead in a movement to draft Roosevelt in 1940. High Commissioner Paul McNutt, of the Philippines, himself a candidate for the nomination, declared he would support his chief. Even H . L . Mencken—he who had prophesied that any Chinaman could win on the Republican ticket in 1936—"favored" a third term for the President. " H e ought to be made to bury his own dead horse [i. e., the New Deal]," declared the Baltimore journalist.33 It was beginning to be suspected in Washington itself that President Roosevelt, desirous of extending the New Deal program and being the strongest Democrat capable of so doing, was actually thinking of himself as a third-term candidate.34 The Gallup poll revealed a considerable upswing in the President's popularity. In the middle of June 48 percent of the voters believed Roosevelt would run in 1940; 45 percent of these thought he would be elected. Sixty-one percent of the Democrats felt the President would be reelected j only 16 percent of the Republicans were of a similar opinion. Thirty-nine percent of all voters would vote for F.D.R. against any Republican. Most significant of all, over 57 percent of the voters approved of Roosevelt as President.33 In a poll of choices for the nomination, if President Roosevelt should not be the candidate, 50 percent favored Vice President Garner over all other potential candidates.36 Ninety-one percent of British voters believed the world would benefit from a third term of Franklin Roosevelt. 37 Among liberal journals, opinion was nearly always of the same tone. For itself the New Republic approved the plan of not encouraging Presidents to stay in office too long, though it opposed elevating the tradition to the position of dogma. A third term for Franklin Roosevelt would not mean dictatorship; on the contrary, it was to be preferred to a period of reaction and confusion under another man. The choice lay between a third term and a repudiation of progressiv33

Ibid., May 2, 1939, p. 4 ; June 19, p. 7; June 22, p. 5. New Republic, X C I X (June 2 1 , 1 9 3 9 ) , 187. 35 New York Times, June 18, 1939, p. 2 ; July 23, p. 2. 36 37 Ibid., May 21, 1939, p. 4. Ibid., Feb. 1, 1939, p. 9. 34

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327

ism.38 T h e Nation, too, held the two-term tradition "in good faith," but did not regard it "a cardinal principle" of democracy.39 T h e plain fact [observed the Nation]

is that while a limitation on Presidential

tenure is normally desirable, a third term in the last analysis is good or bad depending on the candidate and the circumstances. 4 0

Perhaps the most vigorous opponent to the idea of a third term was Oswald Garrison Villard. As contributing columnist to the Nation, Villard time and again lashed out against the dangers of a third term. So long as we remain at peace, observed this outstanding liberal, the President will not be a candidate for a third term. Villard believed Roosevelt would not consciously put us into war, but felt that any man in such a position, with his domestic policies faring so badly, must unconsciously be aware that it was a bit of luck to be able to excite his fellow citizens about events abroad. I very much fear [wrote Villard] that if w a r comes abroad, whether w e are in it or not, he [Roosevelt] will be able to obtain the renomination some of his ardent followers seek for him. . . . I . . . can conceive of no situation in which we should violate the third-term tradition, especially in these times when w e too are in danger of a dictator because of the N e w Deal's inability to heal our ills and put our ten million unemployed to w o r k . . . . N o one man is indispensable to this country. T h o s e w h o say that our institutions cannot be maintained in their integrity or our domestic evils cured by anyone except Franklin Roosevelt are playing into the hands of the fascist elements. 4 1

And again: I am absolutely opposed to Franklin D . Roosevelt or anybody else running for a third term and I should consider the breaking of the anti-third-term tradition at this stage of the world's lunge towards dictatorship treachery to the Republic . . .

if you open the w a y to a third term, there is no reason

why you shouldn't give a man a fourth term or a fifth. In other words you are opening the way to dictatorship. . . .

I do not believe that any one

man in the United States is essential to any c a u s e — t h e N e w Deal or any 38

New Republic,

™ Nation, 40Ibid. 41

Ibid.

X C V I I (Jan. 11, 1 9 3 9 ) , 273.

C X L V I 1 I ( J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 3 9 ) , 687.

( J u n e 24, 1 9 3 9 ) , p. 7 1 5 . ( M a y 13, June 17, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 5 6 1 , 702.

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328

o t h e r . I f a c a u s e d e p e n d s u p o n o n e m a n f o r its s u c c e s s , t h e n t h e r e m u s t b e something w r o n g with it.42

T o Eugene Lyons, writing in the American Mercury, there was too much bureaucracy in Washington behind a third term. T h e " e m e r g e n c y " of 1 9 3 6 [ m o c k s L y o n s ] h a s r i p e n e d i n t o t h e " e m e r g e n c y " o f 1 9 4 0 , a n d by 1 9 4 4 it m a y be c h r o n i c . R o o s e v e l t — o r d o o m .

. . .

h a v e n o t y e t r e a c h e d the s t a g e o f c h o o s i n g b e t w e e n a L e a d e r a n d

W e

doom.

W h e n t h a t s t a g e is r e a c h e d t h e r e w i l l b e n o c h o i c e — d o o m w i l l be u p o n u s . 4 3

In a survey conducted by Current History on whether President Roosevelt should run again opinion was markedly divided. Alfred M . Landon, Republican candidate for President in 1936, believed a third term would set a dangerous precedent, while Raymond Moley, for several years a member of the famous "brain trust," held the tradition "valid and binding." Others opposed were Senators McCarran, Burke, and Gillette, all Democrats. Led by economist Rexford G. Tugwell, who believed a tradition should not be imposed upon the people, those who favored a third term included Senators Guffey, Smathers, Norris, and Thomas (of Okla.), all Democrats save the Independent Nebraskan; Mayor Edward J. Kelly, of Chicago j Attorney-General Murphyj Solicitor-General Jackson; and Secretaries Ickes and Hopkins. 44 On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler invaded Poland and two days later Great Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany. Europe for the second time in twenty-five years was plunged into chaos. Immediately it was realized that should war continue (which appeared inevitable), great pressure would be brought upon Roosevelt to stand for a third term. Led by Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, ardent New Dealers and conservative Democrats alike began to insist that F.D.R.'s "talents and training" were necessary "to steer the country . . . to safe harbor." 45 Time and again the Republicans, on 42 Current History, L I (Sept., 1 9 3 9 ) , 47. F o r an account of the arguments in favor of a third term for Roosevelt, see Senator Joseph F . Guffey's politically minded article, " T h e Case For a T h i r d T e r m , " Current History, L ( A u g . , 1 9 3 9 ) , 14. 4 3 "Beware the T h i r d T e r m i t e s ! " American Mercury, X L V I I ( A u g . , 1 9 3 9 ) , 391. Donald Richberg, one-time N . R . A . Administrator, was also opposed to a third term, but believed that if war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt would challenge the tradition. " W h y N o T h i r d T e r m ? " Forum, C I I ( A u g . , 1 9 3 9 ) , 6 1 - 6 5 . 44 45

Current History, L I (Sept., 1 9 3 9 ) , 4 6 - 4 8 . New Y o r k Times, Oct. 26, 1939, p. 1.

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329

the other side, called upon the President to take the neutrality issue out of politics and publicly make known his position on a third term. This last Roosevelt signally failed to do, maintaining his annoying silence on the question to an extreme. While the neutrality issue was being debated in Congress and Hitler's assaults upon Poland and the other nations continued, sentiment against the swapping of horses in midstream grew by leaps and bounds. In October, according to the Gallup poll, 52 percent of voters favored Roosevelt if the war continued; 66 percent of the Democrats would vote for him. The results of the survey are as follows: 4 6 Would Vote for Third T e r m (Percent):

Would Not Vote for

33

40

67 60

43

57

Would Vote for Third

Would Not Vote for

T e r m if W a r Contin-

Third

1939 May August October

Party Affiliation Democrats Republicans Others

Third T e r m (Percent):

Term

if

War

Continues

ues (Percent):

(Percent):

76 10

24 90

55

45

Third-term sentiment was weakest in New England and the Middle West and strongest in the South. Viz. : Would Vote for Third Region

Term (Percent) :

N e w England Middle Atlantic States East Central States West Central States South West 49

34 45

Would Not Vote for Third T e r m (Percent) : 66

32

55 68

37

63

47

39 53

61

ibid., Oct. 1, 1939, p. 8. In a survey among America's thirty-seven million women on the 1940 nomination 67 percent opposed President Roosevelt for a third term and only 33 percent supported him. Ladies' Home Journal, LVI (Oct., 1939), 12.

F.D.R.

33°

T h e President also led in the Gallup poll of candidates: 47 Candidate Roosevelt Garner McNutt Hull Farley All others

8

3 3 2

By the close of the year 63.5 percent of the voters approved of Roosevelt and his policies, whereas in May of the same year only 56.1 percent of the voters had expressed approval. 48 As the election year dawned there was no doubt that all preconvention activities were overshadowed by the one all-important question: Would Franklin Roosevelt seek a third term? Unless and until he made a definite declaration of intention, all potential candidates were considerably handicapped. Constant attempts by party leaders and others failed to elicit a satisfactory statement from the President. In reply to Alfred M . Landon's demand that he disavow any third-term intent, Roosevelt answered that he was far too busy with problems of national importance to prepare any such statement.40 Early in 1940 John L . Lewis, along with Senator Ellison D . Smith, of South Carolina, and Senator Sheridan Downey, of California (Dems.), expressed opposition to the idea of a third term for President Roosevelt. 50 The refusal of Senator Vic Donahey (Dem.), of Ohio, to become a "stalking horse" for the President in the Ohio presidential primary, as the Democratic state central committee had urged him to do, led many anti-New Dealers to believe Donahey was opposed to Roosevelt. 51 This the Ohio Senator publicly denied, insisting that he favored "the New Deal policies and was opposed 47

New York Times, Nov. 5, 1939, p. 47. A Gallup poll among voters listed in "Who's Who in America" revealed 5+ percent expecting Roosevelt to run and 55 percent expecting him to be defeated. Only 21 percent said they would vote for him. Ibid., Nov. 26, 1939, p. 4 1 . 48 49 Ibid., Dec. 27, 1939, p. 12. Ibid., Sept. 24, 1939, p. 28. 60 Ibid., Jan. 25, 1940, p. 1 ; Feb. 16, p. 1 4 ; April 23, p. 12. Lewis' abrupt change of mind is indeed ironic in view of his earlier professed allegiance to Roosevelt. 51 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1940, p. 1 6 ; Jan. 22, p. 9.

F.D.R.

331

to any candidate who did not stoutly stand for the Roosevelt program." 5 2 Evidence of support of F . D . R . came from all sections of the country. With the war raging abroad, considerable opinion developed against changing the chief executive during such an emergency. In February, 1940, the Pennsylvania Democratic state committee endorsed Roosevelt for a third term. 53 When the President's name was entered first in the Illinois and then in the Wisconsin primaries and no attempt was made to withdraw it, many construed such a situation as leaving the way open for the convention to draft Roosevelt—especially since the Illinois action had been taken without his signature. 54 T h e problem now became one of whether the President would take the nomination himself or hand it to one of the two remaining New Deal hopefuls—Robert H . Jackson or William O. Douglas. But the machine bosses of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Illinois rallied behind their chief for another term. The anti-Roosevelt, antithird term bloc appeared on the verge of collapse. It was generally conceded in Washington that the nomination would be offered Roosevelt at the convention. T h e President's silence, enormously effective, blanketed the national campaign and barred all opponents from newspaper front pages. Public opinion remained firmly behind the President in regard to his foreign policy. With the invasion of Holland, Belgium, and Norway, his renomination and election seemed exceedingly likely. A Gallup poll in April found 47 percent of the voters favorable to the idea of a third term. Undoubtedly this issue had changed abruptly since the outbreak of war, before which surveys indicated that the country was two to one against a Roosevelt third term. Of the 11,500,OOO independent voters, it was estimated that only a small majority of them opposed a third term for F . D . R . 5 5 Meanwhile, numerous other demands that he run were presented the President in one form or another. T h e Georgia Democratic execu52

53 Ibid., Feb. 20, 1940, p. 1 3 . Ibid., Feb. 4, 1940, p. 1. Ibid.; New Republic, C I I (Feb. 26, 1 9 4 0 ) , 2 7 7 ; (March 4, 1 9 4 0 ) , 293. 55 New York Timet, April 12, 1940, p. 13. A poll of American newspaper editors at the same time found 63 percent of the opinion that Roosevelt would be nominated; only 18 percent said he should be nominated. Current History, L I I (April, 1 9 4 0 ) , 46— 48.' 54

332

F.D.R.

tive committee, after its session in April, named a special committee to wait upon Roosevelt at Warm Springs and urge him to accept the nomination.56 In Maine the Democratic state convention instructed its delegates to the National Convention to cast their votes in behalf of the President. The California primary resulted in an overwhelming victory for delegates favoring Roosevelt's renomination.57 The Democratic state convention of Iowa assured President Roosevelt of Iowa's twenty-two votes in the National Convention if he should decide to run.88 Until the Convention met, insistent demands that he run emanated from all parts of the country. What had happened to the booms of the other potential candidates? As was mentioned earlier, the President's silence proved a great handicap to them. Vice President Garner, as early as December, 1939, had announced that he would be a candidate for the presidency, irrespective of any other.69 But his efforts to obtain support led to a rift with Roosevelt. In April, 1940, Garner's campaign collapsed, and with it went the last vestige of organized opposition within the party to a third term. What killed Garner was a revolt in his home state of Texas, which refused to give him a solid delegation. With Garner's collapse it became apparent that Roosevelt could nominate himself or anyone he chose. In March Postmaster-General Farley agreed to let his name go before the Massachusetts primary and said it would be presented at Chicago.60 Later, it was explained that all understood the Farley delegates belonged to the President at anytime that he might want them. Paul V. McNutt and Senator Burton K. Wheeler, of Montana, both potential candidates, withheld their names, pending the President's decision to run.61 Other Democrats whose names figured prominently in the pre-convention discussion of possible candidates were Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, Attorney-General Robert H . Jackson, and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, William O. Douglas. None of the candidacies of these individuals ever reached tangible proportions; all faded away at the increasing demand for 67 ie 81

Ibid., May 8, 1940, p. 1. Ibid., Dec. 1 7 , 1939, p. 1 . Ibid., May i , 1940, p. 20.

F.D.R.

333

So things stood when the Democratic Convention met. The big-city bosses, such as Mayors Kelly, of Chicago, and Hague, of Jersey City, moved in to handle the campaign when it was rumored that James A. Farley, out of opposition to the third-term idea, would resign as chairman of the National Committee. Public opinion was definitely in favor of Franklin Roosevelt. A last-minute Gallup poll revealed that sentiment for a third term had risen sharply since the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries and France on May 10. Whereas in August, 1939 (before the war broke out), only 40 percent of voters favored a third term for Roosevelt, by the end of May, 1940, this figure had risen to 57 percent.*2 In the Nation, Freda Kerchway and Max Lerner pleaded valiantly for the renomination of F.D.R. on a "Stop Hitler" platform.63 On all sides the evidence pointed to the conclusion that Roosevelt would be the nominee. Time and again was the cry heard that, as a trained and experienced statesman, he must consent to run again during such an emergency and when the call to duty was so audible. On June 28 the Republicans, meeting at Philadelphia, nominated Wendell L. Willkie, public utility magnate and former Democrat, and Senator Charles L. McNary as their candidates on a platform of "Americanism, preparedness, and peace." The Democratic National Convention was held in the Chicago Stadium during the week of July 15. President Roosevelt's persistent silence as to his intentions had not yet been broken. No one possessed authoritative knowledge of what he would do. Among the delegates the belief prevailed that he would be nominated and would accept. Some of the President's most influential supporters were reported from the outset as pressing less "enthusiastic" delegates to join a movement to draft him. Representative William Bankhead delivered the keynote address; Senator Alben W. Barkley, of Kentucky, was chosen as permanent chairman. Immediately following his address, in which he related Democratic accomplishments since 1933, Senator Barkley declared that he was making an announcement concerning the presidential nomination. This historic statement was as follows: The President has never had, and has not today, any desire or purpose to continue in the office of President, to be a candidate for that office, or to t2

Ibid., June j , 1940, p. 18.

93

See Vol. CL (June 22, 1940), 743-44, 752-55.

334

F.D.R.

be nominated by the Convention for that office. He wishes in all earnestness and sincerity to make it clear that all of the delegates to this Convention are free to vote for any candidate.64 Since the word " a n y " included himself, the declaration was construed to mean that Roosevelt would run if named. Objectors were deprived of the argument that even the President hesitated to overthrow the no-third term tradition. It was rumored that a plan was under way, the leader of which was H a r r y L . Hopkins, to have F . D . R . nominated by acclamation, but National Committee Chairman F a r l e y insisted that the convention be regular and that the usual methods be employed. Next in order, therefore, was the party platform, which like that of the Republicans was a lengthy one, with a similar pledge to keep out of war. T h e convention then turned its attention to the nominations. On the previous evening, after Senator Barkley's announcement, there had been a long demonstration in favor of the President. When order had been restored, Senator Byrnes, of South Carolina, rose to state what was in the minds of a great majority of the delegates: [Tomorrow night] we can proceed . . . with the nomination of a candidate for President and finish the job which we came here to do by renominating Franklin D. Roosevelt. 85 On the night of J u l y 1 7 the nominations began. Alabama, the first to be called, placed Roosevelt's name before the convention in a speech by Senator Lister H i l l , of that state. Arizona seconded the nomination, and then Arkansas yielded to Virginia, whose aged Senator, Carter Glass, placed James A . Farley in nomination. E d w a r d J . Colgan, J r . nominated Senator M i l l a r d Tydings, of Maryland, and W r i g h t M o r r o w nominated Vice President John N . Garner. Franklin D . Roosevelt was chosen Democratic candidate for President on the first ballot. T h e roll call was as follows: Roosevelt Farley Garner Tydings Hull 61

New York Times, July 1 7 , 1940, p. 1.

946 72 61 5% 05

Ibid.

" N o decrepit old nag can throw m e . " Loring, Time, X X X V I (Nov. 4, 1940), 1 7 ; from the Providence Evening FRANKLIN

D.

ROOSKVF.LT'S

1940

Bulletin.

CAMPAIGN

F.D.R.

335

Amid a tumult of shouting and marching James A. Farley moved the rules be suspended and the President be acclaimed the party's nominee. This was accordingly done, and a committee was appointed to advise Roosevelt of his nomination. Later, the nomination of Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace as Vice President was forced upon a reluctant and in many cases recalcitrant convention. Mrs. Roosevelt flew to Chicago from Hyde Park and briefly addressed the delegates. All that remained to complete the nominations was the formal acceptance of the President. This came at 2 : 1 0 on the morning of July 19 in a radio address from the White House. In part, Roosevelt said: . . . it was my firm intention to turn over the responsibilities of g o v e r n m e n t to other hands at the end of my t e r m . . . . W h e n the conflict first broke out last September, it was still m y intention to a n n o u n c e simply, at an early date, that under no conditions would I accept re-election. Swiftly m o v ing foreign events made necessary swift action at home and beyond the seas. . . . National unity in the United States became a crying essential in the face of the development of unbelievable types of espionage and international treachery. E v e r y day that passed called for the postponement of personal plans and partisan debate until the last possible m o m e n t . . . . T h i n k i n g solely of the national good and of the international scene, I came to the reluctant c o n clusion that such declaration should not be made before the national c o n vention. I t was accordingly made to you within an hour a f t e r the p e r m a n e n t organization of the c o n v e n t i o n . 6 6

Declaring that his conscience would not permit him to turn his back upon a call to duty, the President continued: T h e right to make that call rests with the people through the A m e r i c a n method of free election. O n l y the people themselves can draft a President. I f such a draft should be made upon me, I say, in the utmost simplicity, I will with G o d ' s help continue to serve with the best of my ability and with the fullness of my s t r e n g t h . 6 7

The convention was over. Franklin D. Roosevelt had been nominated for a third consecutive term of the presidency—the first man ever to be so acclaimed. In many circles, especially among those individuals who urged a strong-handed foreign policy including "all00

Ibid., July 19, 19+0, p. 2.

67

Ibid.

336

F.D.R.

out" aid to the democracies, Roosevelt's nomination was received with great satisfaction. Liberal journals, such as the Nation and New Republic, strongly supported F . D . R . as the only experienced man to occupy the presidential chair. New Deal Democrats were exultant in their joy. A few Democratic Senators, such as "Cotton E d " Smith, of South Carolina, E d w a r d R . Burke, of Nebraska, and Rush D . H o l t , of West Virginia, long opponents of the President anyway, bolted their party and went over to the cause of Wendell L . Willkie. H o l t even resumed talk of trying to push his anti-third term resolution, which had been lying dormant so many months, quickly through the Senate on a record vote. In Republican circles Roosevelt's nomination was received most favorably. Wendell Willkie went so far as to say that he was eager to "meet the champ" at the polls. T h e N e w Y o r k Times, which had long been Democratic in its affiliation, swung over to the Willkie cause, declaring editorially: W e believe that he [ R o o s e v e l t ] has s e a r c h e d his m i n d a n d heart b e f o r e m a k i n g his d e c i s i o n : that he has n o t a c c e p t e d this n o m i n a t i o n because he r e a l l y b e l i e v e s t h a t he has b e e n " d r a f t e d , " w h e n he has s e e m e d so c a r e f u l l y to p l a n this " d r a f t , " a n d c o u l d so easily h a v e resisted it. W e believe that he has a c c e p t e d it b e c a u s e he t o o b e l i e v e s in the d o c t r i n e of his o w n " i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y . " B u t both he a n d his p a r t y , h a v i n g m a d e their choice, m u s t n o w r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e are l a r g e n u m b e r s of i n d e p e n d e n t v o t e r s to w h o m the doctrine of a n y m a n ' s indispensability is d i s t a s t e f u l , a n d f o r w h o m the t h i r d - t e r m issue w i l l be i m p o r t a n t a n d d e c i s i v e . 8 8

T h e campaign of 1940 was a bitter one, and few in all American history have exceeded it in the amount of mud-slinging which was indulged in. T h e Republican nominee constantly referred to his opponent as "the third-term candidate." Wendell Willkie made virtually a barnstorming tour of the country, speaking so frequently and so long that his voice gave way upon more than one occasion. Issues appeared to be subordinated to personalities. Platforms were almost identical, containing similar pledges. T h e Republicans, instead of hitting Roosevelt squarely on his foreign policy, preferred to aim their attack at New Deal domestic policies, an act considered by many 6 8 July 18, 1940, p. 18. Cf. the New Republic's editorial to the effect that "there was nothing specious about the popular desire to draft him [Roosevelt]." Vol. CIII (July

29, 1 9 4 0 ) ,

13J.

F.D.R.

337

as politically unwise. For the administration's domestic program continued to please, broadly speaking, those who lived by employment or public support alone and to antagonize many who had a stake in productive business, property, or funds. Among the latter group, moreover, rather than the former, were a great part of the more substantial farmers, whose land formed an important aggregate investment. Issues uppermost in the minds of anti-administration circles were the policy of making a distinction between earners and owners, the treatment of agriculture, the continued vast increase of the public debt, and the question of the proper cost of a wise addition to the nation's means of defense against attack from without. Since earners cast more votes than owners and poor farmers more than rich ones, since the size of the debt meant little to the many who looked to the few to bear it, and since the effort to limit national defense must incur reproach as unpatriotic, the appeal of the issues, politically speaking, favored the administration. The Republican cause bore the handicap of not daring to handle these vital issues as freely as could their opponents. Had the Republicans squarely opposed the Roosevelt foreign policy by countering unbridled emotion with rational argument and thus "tapping" the vast undercurrent of American public opinion that was still determinedly hostile to war, their chances for success would have been enhanced immeasurably. By refusing to fight "interventionism" with "isolationism" and by adopting pledges similar to those of the Democrats of "all-aid-short-of-war" to the democracies, the Republicans and M r . Willkie let slip the sole opportunity to win the fight—they passed by the one chance to defeat Franklin Roosevelt. The conditions environing the campaign bore in some respects more resemblance to those of 1916 than to those of 1936. For war abroad lent activity to many important sorts of manufacturing, while at the same time it spread the fear of imminent danger to the country. Conditions differed from those of 1916 as to the foreign situation in that very few of the people wanted the United States to enter the European war. They also differed in that the federal government had reached the statutory limit of forty-five billions upon its debt and was engaged in a vast increase of armaments, bound to send the debt far above the highest of all older figures. At first President Roosevelt appeared reluctant to go on a campaign

338

F.D.R.

tour. Later he abandoned this policy and visited vital defense industries and made speeches in eleven states before the election. In these the President bitterly attacked what he termed the falsifications in the Republican charges against his administration; reviewed its achievements and, in particular, its course in upbuilding national defense; and, in the character of a trusted leader in a difficult time, asked for a "vote of confidence." As for the third term, it is yet too early to ascertain definitely the significance and scope of its role. Invoked the tradition certainly was, and by every Republican campaign orator. Republican newspapers waved the precedent violently on their editorial pages. In the campaign of 1940 the no-third term tradition did not suffer from lack of attention. Though the exact extent of its influence is as yet undetermined, it is quite clear that the third-term argument had no discernible effect upon the voters. Undoubtedly the attacks on France and England by Hitler greatly strengthened Roosevelt's candidacy and served to push the third-term issue further into the background. For how many, many times did one hear the remark, " W e l l , I'm really opposed to the idea of a third term for any man, but with such a madman loose in Europe, it becomes necessary to keep a trained and experienced man at the helm"? Naturally the third-term argument cost the President some votes, as it would any man. But, despite all the publicity and hullabaloo given the issue by the Republicans, not as many Americans voted against Franklin Roosevelt on grounds of the third term as might have been expected under the circumstances. As the New Re-public observed, "the third-term issue is not a serious obstacle in the minds of many who do not oppose the President on other grounds." 09 The relative impotence of the argument is further indicated by a Gallup poll taken shortly before the election. According to the results of this survey, 56 percent of the voters favored F . D . R . , third term or no third term. 7 " What better proof of the inefficacy of the argument? There is little reason to suppose that Franklin Roosevelt would ever have been elected to a third term were it not for the fact that Europe was again in the throes of total war as a result of Adolf Hitler's bold attempt at hegemony. Undoubtedly there would have 89

Vol. C I I I (Oct. 7, 1 9 4 0 ) , 504.

New Y o r k Times, Oct. i 3 ) 1940, V I I , 2 1 .

F.D.R.

339

been no third term for F.D.R. if Europe had remained at peace and the allegedly perilous predicament in which this country found itself had been avoided. As one journal remarked: T h e third-term issue might easily have defeated M r . Roosevelt if it had not been for the international situation. . . . Probably it swayed many voters w h o would have preferred the President on other grounds [sic! ] . T 1

T h e Roosevelt administration, standing clearly and fairly on the record of its domestic and foreign policy from 1933 to 1939, and without the ready-made issue provided by the war in Europe, would not have been returned to power. T o the American nation, as the New York Times wisely observed, "violation of the . . . tradition against a third term would create a precedent certain to trouble the people of this country deeply for many years to come." 72 Such may well prove to be the case—national emergency or not. On November 5, 1940, the people of the United States saw fit to continue Franklin Delano Roosevelt in office by the overwhelming majority of 449 electoral votes to 82 for his Republican opponent. The popular vote had been 27,245,422 for F.D.R. against 22,333,801 for Wendell Willkie. The Republican candidate carried only ten states—Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont. America for the first time in her history was to have one man as President for three terms of office—and for three consecutive terms at that. With the third election of Franklin Roosevelt in November, 1940, the no-third term tradition, as a tangible barrier against unlimited tenure, vanished into thin air. The circumstances surrounding its demise were such as had never before existed at a time when the question of a third term was involved. Moreover, the American people evinced a marked apathy when it appeared that the precedent, which had long been claimed a "bulwark of the Republic," would be hopelessly shattered. With war raging in Europe, few seemed to care about the anti-third term precedent; no effective opposing organization showed promise j and, as in the case of Theodore Roosevelt, the issue was used simply as a minor talking point during the campaign. Franklin Roosevelt became the recipient of that which Washington and 71

Ne 99» 1 ° « » i ° 4 > i ° 5 . >06»

107, 108, 109, n o ; on Garfield's success, 1 i o ; on presidential term, 343 Blair, Henry W . , 2 2 1 » Bonaparte, Napoleon, 351 Borah, William E., 156, 188, 194, 199, 200, 209, 278, 280, 293, 296, 3 1 0 , 3 1 1 ,

3 1 9 ; attitude toward Wilson, 231, 232, 236; toward Coolidge, 276, 277, 290, at

299,

310

Bourne, Jonathan,

153, 155,

158,

161,

«74» 1 7 7

Boutwell, George S., 93, 99, 100, 102, 106

366

INDEX

Bowers, Claude, 1 1 7 ; quoted, 39, 4 1 , 42 Bowker, R . R., 97 " B o y Orator of the Platte," « 3 1 ; see Bryan, William Jennings Brearley, David, 1 1 Brennan, George, 252 Brewer, David J . , 156 Brice, Calvin S., 1 29 Brisbane, Arthur, 268, 278«, 2 8 1 « , 293, 305, 306 Bristow, Benjamin, 76, 82, 88 Bristow, Joseph, 169 Broom, Jacob, 8 Browder, Earl, 325 Bryan, William Jennings, 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , 134, 136, 1 4 1 , 1 4 2 , 149, 232, 2 3 4 ; free silver speech at Democratic Convention: unreterved nomination, 131; T a f t ' s victory over, 1 6 6 ; amendments limiting presidential term, introduced by, 226, 233, 342 Bryce, James, quoted, 343, 345 Buchanan, James, quoted, 63 Buckner, Simon Boliver, 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 Bull Moose, 1 9 6 ; see also Progressive party Burke, Edward R., 320, 328, 336 Burleson, Albert, 246, 249 Business during Coolidge regime, 267, 289, 295; see also Big business Butler, Nicholas Murray, 149, i j i , 193, 2 1 3 , 278, 290, 296, 3 2 1 ; attitude toward candidacy of Coolidge, 274, 277, 287, 290 Butler, Pierce, 1 0 Butler, William M . , support of Coolidge, 273», 278, 288, 298, 299, 308, 309, 311» Butt, Archie, 165, 169, 177 Byrnes, Senator, 334 Cabinet government, Wilson's ideas for, 224 f. "Caesar," General Grant called, 7 1 , 350 Calhoun, John Caldwell, 49, 50, 52 Cameron, Don, 1 1 2 ; efforts in behalf of third term for Grant, 81, 85, 92, 95, 96, 100, 105, 106, 1 1 0

Cameron, Ralph H., 270, 297 Cannon, "Uncle J o e , " 167 Capper, Arthur, 282, 285 Caraway, Senator, 252 Carey, J . M., 184 Carlisle, John G., 125, 129, 130, 1 3 1 Chamberlain, Neville, 348 Chandler, Governor, 3 19 Chandler William E., 97, 105, 106 Channing, Edward, quoted, 44 Chase, Salmon P., 65 Chautauquan, excerpt, 347 Child, Richard Washburn, 270 Childs, George W., 88 "Choose," Coolidge's defense of the term, 283; meanings publicly discussed, 296 Churchill, Winston, 348 C.I.O., support of F. D. Roosevelt, 3 1 9 , 3 2 I i 3*5 Civil service reform, 84 Clapp, Senator, 155 Clark, Governor, 3 19 Clark, Champ, 194, 232 Clark, Delbert, quoted, 320, 323 Clay, Henry, j i , 5 2 ; nomination, 64; endorsement of one-term principle, 64 Clayton, Henry D., 157, 194, 228, 233 Clayton-Works resolution, 194, 226-29; text, 226 Cleveland, Grover, 68, 1 4 4 ; first Democratic President since Civil W a r ; favored constitutional limitation of one term, 1 1 7 ; attitude toward own reelection, 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 , 1 4 3 ; lost election of 1S88, 1 1 8 j the 1892 campaign, 1 1 8 2o; problems of second administration, 1 2 0 ; strong-hand methods and sound money stand leave him "a man without a party," 1 2 1 ; gold Democrats' first campaign for a third term: his own attitude toward it, 122-33, 1 4 3 ; repudiated by 1896 National Convention: virtually read out of his party, 1 3 1 ; regarded with indifference by Sound Money Convention, 1 3 2 ; crowning act of his political life, 1 3 3 ; amazing reversal of public opinion in regard to, '3+> ' 3 ® » the 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 0 4 boom for a

INDEX fourth candidacy: hi« attitude toward that, 134-435 definitely out of the race, 139, 141 ; support of Parker, 141, 142; out of politics from personal choice, not from adherence to principle or to precedent, 143; denunciation of patronage, 345 Cleveland, Mrs. Grover, 118, 122, 143 Clinton, George, 3J, 41 Cobb, Frank I., 252; quoted, 241 Cochran, Bourke, 137 Cockrell, Francis M., 141 Colby, Bainbridge, 215, 217, 245, 246, 247, 248, 2 j j , 257 Cole, Ralph D., 311 Colfax, Schuyler, quoted, 99 Colgan, Edward J., Jr., 334 "Committee or Cabinet Government" (Wilson), 224 f. Commoner, 136 Communism, threat of, in 1879, 86» Confederacy, Southern, presidential term, 342» Congress, suggestions for election of president by, 4, 5, 9 j plea for a Republican, 235; for a Democratic, 236, 263 Congressional Government (Wilson), views expressed in, with excerpts, 222*4

Conkling, Roscoe, 82, 94, 112, 113», 11 j i efforts in behalf of third term for Grant, 81, 84, 85, 88, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 101, 105 ff., 1 1 3 ; hostility toward Hayes, 89} disagreeable traits, 89, 108; at Republican Convention, i o j , 106, 107, n o ; plan for succeeding Grant, 106»; speech lauding him, 107; Grant's appreciation of, 111 Constitution, signed: task of ratification, 11, 16, 47 ; Federalist Papers in service of, 14; proposed amendments: Bill of Rights, 16 ; "property's Bible," 1 9 1 ; proposals for amendments limiting presidential term, see Term, presidential Constitutional Convention of 1787, controversy over executive and his term of office, 3-11 j Madison's diary of, 6n\

367

representation at, 5; Jefferson's absence, 31 Coolidge, Calvin, 68, *65, 3441 " I do not choose to run . . . " statement renouncing 1928 nomination, 266, 282, 285; uncertainty as to his real attitude toward the 1928 nomination: efforts of others to find a solution, 266, 283 ff.; bombshell effect of announcement, 266, 283, 289 ff. 1 vacation in Black Hills of South Dakota, 266, 280 ff.) piscatorial abilities, 266, 280; personified inaction, the thing people wanted during era of reaction, 267, 301 j prosperity linked with, 267, 29$, 3011 overwhelmingly reelected in 1924, 2675 ball started rolling in favor of third term for, 268 ff.) did not consider the short time served for Harding as a term, 268, 283; veto of McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill, 269», 278, 288, 302$ politicians puzzled by silence of, 270, 2 7 1 > 174» 178) 310; popularity, 272, 276) signs that his regime could withstand third-term onslaughts, 273) hi» little game of hide and seek continued op to 1928 nomination, 273-311 passim; anti-third-term movements directed at, 2 75> 277> 303$ the swing was clearly toward, 2785 had not signed anti-third term petition against T . Roosevelt, 2795 Ike Hoover's explanation of motives of, 280, 287, 308, 310», 311»», 312, 3131 choice of summer vacations influenced by political considerations? 280, 308; zealous defense of, by Professor Fuess and others, 282», 284-87) opinion about the third-term question, 283, 2 8 j ; defense of the term "choose," 283; why his consciousness that work as President was almost done, 286, 301 j during 1928 convention, 288, 310-12; types of persons and organizations supporting, 295, 307 j made no attempt to name successor: did not wish to become involved in the campaign, 295 > the "draft Coolidge" movements, 296-309 passim-, in eyes of supporters the anti-

INDEX

368

Democracy,

Coolidge, Calvin ( C o n t i n u e d ) third-term tradition did not apply, 3 0 0 ;

Jefferson's

political

philos-

ophy, 4 4

their refusal to accept his withdrawal,

Democratic party, Jefferson the Father,

302;

foresaw debacle and withdrew?

Jackson the founder, 4 8 ; Jackson nom-

loin,

3 1 3 ; entered last year of term an

inated by its First National Convention, Cleveland its first president since

enigma to his party, 3 0 5 ; lack of inter-

52;

est in the nominees, 3 1 2 ; never con-

Civil W a r , 1 1 7 ; Wilson's nomination:

sidered reentering politics, 3 1 2 « ; atti-

liberal platform, 1 9 9 ;

tude toward third term in no w a y result

sound

of

313;

fusion with Populist party, 1 2 1 ; Sound

285,

Bryan's speech, 1 3 1 ;

desire to preserve tradition, Mrs. Calvin,

282,

283,

issues,

free silver and 120-42

fassint;

M o n e y National Convention,

firm hand over Congress, 3 2 3 Coolidge,

money

131-33;

1 9 1 2 plank limit-

ing presidential term and prohibiting

288, 293, 311 Coolidge, John C., 2 6 6

reelection,

Coolidge clubs, 2 7 7 ,

tempts to bring about a constitutional

297

Copeland, Senator, 3 1 8 ;

anti-third-term

226;

at-

amendment providing for single term,

draft of platform for 1 9 2 4 , 2 5 7

12

Depew,

Cowles, A n n a Roosevelt, 1 8 1 , 2 1 1

2

l6

248,

M.,

150,

164,

Dictatorship, whether breaking of

anti-

126,

Dickerson, Senator, 6 0 , 61 Dickinson, Don M . , 1 2 9 ,

1 6 1

49> * 5 i > 5+> *56> °> Crane, Senator, 1 9 4 Crane, Charles R . , 2 5 3 Crowded Years ( M c A d o o ) , 2 6 3 Cummings, Homer, 2 3 8 , 2 4 3 , 2 4 6 ,

Chauncey

272

103

C o x , James, presidential candidacy, 2

text>

a Democratic Congress, 2 3 6 , 2 6 3 ; left

Cortelyou, George B., 1 3 4 , 1 4 5 , 1 6 0

C o x , General,

234;

all unsuccessful, 2 3 4 ; Wilson's plea for

resolution, 3 2 0 Cotesworth, Charles,

226,

130

Dictator, term defined, 3 4 9 third-term tradition would lead to, 3 2 7 , 247,

349-Ji Direct primary law, 1 6 9 , 1 7 0

248, 249 Cummins, Albert B., 1 9 4 , 1 9 7 , 2 6 9 Curtis, Charles, i j o , 2 9 j , 2 9 8 , 2 9 9 ; candidacy of, 3 0 J , 3 1 1 « ; nominated for Vice-President, 3 1 1 Curtis, George William, 7 3 , 8 6 , 9 3 , 1 0 4 ,

114

D i x , John A . , 74, 7 5 , 171 Dodd, W i l l i a m E . , 2 6 1 ,

264

Dolliver, Jonathan P., 167,

173

Donahey, Vic, 3 3 0 Douglas, William O., 3 3 1 ,

331

D o w n e y , Sheridan, 3 3 0 Drake, Professor, 1 5 5

Curtis, William E . , quoted, 1 2 4

Dunn, Arthur Wallace, quoted, 1 6 1 , 2 0 6 ,

262 Du Pont de Nemours, Pierre, 39

Dale, Porter H., 2 9 0 D a n a , Charles A . , 1 1 4 Daniels, Josephus, 2 4 9

Earle, George H., 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 ; quoted, 3 1 8

D a v i e , William R . , 9

Eckenrode, H. J . , quoted, 81, 1 1 6 Edmunds, George F . , 9 3 , 9 4 , 1 0 4 ,

Davis, Oscar K i n g , 1 7 0 , 2 1 4 , 218 Dawes, Charles G . , 2 8 9 , 2 9 0 , 2 9 5 ,

296,

106,

109 E d w a r d V I I of England, 167

298, 302 Dayton, Jonathan, quoted, 24

Edwards, E d w a r d I., 2 7 7

Declaration of Independence our charter

Election of executive, views of Founding

of liberties,

191

Degradation during the i92o's, 2 6 7

Fathers, 4 , 5, 9 Ellsworth, Oliver, 8

INDEX Elverson, James, Jr., 310 Embargo Act, 37, 39, 4*. 43 English system of government, 224 f. "Era of good feeling," 46 Fairbanks, Charles Warren, 130, 164 Fairchild, Benjamin L., 275 Farewell Address, of Washington, 18, 19, 20, 21 ; its authorship, 2 7 ; excerpt, 28; of Jackson, 55, J 7 Farley, James A., 319, 3 * ' . 325> 33°. 332> 333. 334, 335 > quoted, 324 Farm problem during Coolidge administration, 269, 270, 278; McNaryHaugen . . . bill, 2 6 9 « , 2 7 8 , 2 8 8 , 3 0 2 Farrand, Max, quoted, 2 2 8 « Fay, Bernard, quoted, 29, 30 Federalist Papers, 7; purpose and value, 14

Federalist party, 25, 34, 35) 4 ' Fell, Joseph, quoted, 103 Fess, Simeon D., 177, 279, 287, 291, 297, 2 9*> *99> 3°3> 3°*>> 31° Financiers, supporters of T . Roosevelt, 158, 182, 184,

205

Fish, anti-third-term resolution, 320 Fish, Hamilton, 93 Flinn, Senator, 182 Foraker, Senator, 153, 164 Ford, Edsel, 270 Ford, Henry, 268, 2 7 j , 298 Fosdick, Harry Emerson, 295 Founding Fathers, views concerning president's length of term, reëligibility, election, 3-16; Jefferson not one of, 31 Francis Joseph, Emperor, 151 Franklin, Benjamin, on presidential term, 10,

13

Free Silver movement, 120 FF., 129, 131 Frelinghuysen, Theodore, 64 Fremont, John C., 66 Fuess, Claude M., on Coolidge's renunciation of 1 9 2 8 nomination, 2 8 2 « , 2 8 4 86, 3 1 0 ,

313

Gallup, George, 320 Gallup poll results re F. D. Roosevelt and

369

a third term, 320, 322, 326, 329 f., 33'» 333. 338 Gait, Edith Boiling, 231;;*« Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow, second Gardner, Gilson, 176 Garfield, James A., 76, 99, IOI, 1 1 7 , 224 J in control at Republican Convention, 105, 106, 108; as the dark horse, 109; found to be nominee, 110 Garfield, James R., 157 Garner, John N., 326, 330, 332, 334 Garretson, Joseph, 134 Geisser, Erwin C., 282 Geneva Disarmament Conference, 290, *94 Gerard, James W., 241 German opposition to Grant, 90, 93, 96 Gerry, Elbridge, 9, 10, 11 Gilder, Richard Watson, 124, 135, 165 Gillett, Frederick B., 238 Gillette, Senator, 328 Glass, Carter, 243, 246, 248, 249, 255, 260,

334

Glasscock, W. E., 182, 185 Glavis, Louis, 167 Godkin, Edwin L., 87, 112, 114 Goff, Guy, 296, 30j, 3 1 1 Gold and free silver issues, 1 2 0 - 4 2 passim Goltra, Edward F., 232 Gould, Katherine, 240 Government, monarchial system, 3, 7, 13, 29 ; plans for, presented at Constitutional Convention, 5, 6, 7 ; Wilson's political theories and early works on, 222-26

Grant, Frederick D., TOO Grant, Jesse Root, 83, 113, 115 Grant, Ulysses S., 1J7, 224, 346; only President to bump head on into nothird-term tradition, 68; called "Caesar >" 7 ' . 35°; role in the attempt to win a third term for, 72-116; easy success at first two elections: esteemed by host of admirers, 72; silence about whether lie would run again, 7 3 - 7 7 ; famous letter to General White, excerpt, 77 f.; left door open, 78; ignored at 1876 convention, 82; pathetic last years,

370

INDEX

Grant, Ulysses S. (Continued) 82, 1 1 2 ; travels abroad, 83, 86, 88; finances, 8 3; third-term boom for, 84 ff.; its ringleaders, 8J ; upon return, welcomed as a conquering hero, 8 8; corruption during administration, 89, 1 1 4 ; having returned too soon, was hustled off to Mexico and Cuba, 90; own attitude toward his candidacy, 9 1 ; efforts to secure nomination of, at 1880 convention, 93 ff.; Conkling's encomium of, 107; Grant forces lose to Garfield, 1 1 0 ; reactions to his defeat, n o , i n f . ; factors causing defeat, 1 1 3 - 1 6 , 343; did not wish a third term, 1 1 3 ; his "Old Guard" and their unscrupulous tactics, 1 1 4 ; never succeeded in carrying third-term issue into the heat of a real election campaign, 1 4 3 ; use of patronage, 34J Grant, Mrs. Ulysses S., 78, 82, 83, 88, 91, 100, i n Grant and Ward, collapse of, 1 1 2 Grasty, Charles H., quoted, 239, 240 Gray, George, quoted, i i j , 141 Grayson, Cary T., 246, 2 J I Great Britain, Wilson's propensity toward system of government in, 224 f. Greeley, Horace, 66, 72, 127 Gresham, Otto, 130 Grey, Sir Edward, 167 Griffin, Daniel G., 132 Guffey, Joseph F., 322, 326, 328, 328» Gutknecht, John, 325

Hadley, Herbert S., 185, 197 Hague, Mayor, 333 Hale, Matthew, 94 Halstead, Murat, 94 Hamilton, Alexander, 13, 20; plan for government, 7; on presidential term, 7, 14 f.; Federalist Paferi, 14; friction between Jefferson and, 20, 22, 25; influence with Washington, 27, 29 Hamilton, Dr. Allen McL., 195 Hamilton, John D. M., 3 19 Hanna, Don, 182

Hanna, Mark, 145, 182 Hansbrough, Henry C., IJO Harding, Warren G., 1 1 5 , 256, 265, 266, 267; staggering election majority, 25' Harper's Weekly, attitude toward Grant, 73> 74, 75, 76, 79, 87, 9 3 , 9 5 « ,

104,

1 1 2 ; Cleveland, 1 3 7 ; T . Roosevelt, 156, 192, 194,

199

Harriman, E. H., 158 Harrison, Benjamin, 118, 120, 143; on presidential term, 347 Harrison, William Henry, 64 Hart, Albert Bushnell, 213 Harvey, George, 156, 157, 256, 272, 287 Hatch Act, 346 Hay, John, 93, 100, 134 Hayes, Rutherford B., 86, 88, 106, 108, 1 1 2 , 1 1 4 , 224; won 1876 nomination, 82; efforts to secure an amendment to fix presidential term, 82 f.; his clean government uncomfortable for politicians, 84, 8j, 89, i i j ; political enemies, 89 Hearst papers, attitude toward Coolidge, 268, 2 7 8 » , 2 8 2 , 2 9 3 , 294», 306

Hearst, William Randolph, 141, 282, 297 Hemphill of Pennsylvania, 59 Henderson, Senator, 97, 101 Hendricks, Thomas A., 84 Henry, Patrick, 47 Herald, New York, attitude toward Grant, 72, 84, 88; Cleveland, 1 2 7 ; T . Roosevelt, 149, 150, 157, 1 J 9 , 199 Herald-Tribune, New York, 300 Hesing, Postmaster, 130 Hill, David B., 136, 139 Hill, Lister, 334 Hilles, Charles D., support of Coolidge, 2 7 8 , 290, 298, 3 0 2 , 3 0 5 , 3 0 8 , 309

306,

307,

Hillhouse, Senator, 59 Hitchcock, Gilbert M., Senator, 258 Hitchcock, Frank H., 161, 162 Hitler, Adolf, 328, 329, 338 Hoar, George F., 94, IOJ, 106, 109, 1 1 5 Hoar, Rockwood, Judge, 99, 103 Holmes, M. D., 29

INDEX Holt, Rush D., 3 * 1 , 3365 anti-third-term resolution, 336 Hoover, Herbert, 290, 298, 308; as presidential prospect, 269, 288, 289, 302, 305, 306, 309, 310, 314.-, nominated, 3 1 1 ; Coolidge's attitude toward, 295, 296, 3 1 2 Hoover, Irwin Hood (Ike), 152, 262; on Coolidge, 280, 287, 308, 310«, 3 1 1 » , 312, 313 Hopkins, Harry L., 328, 334 Houston, David F., 253 Houston, William, 8 Howe, Timothy A., 9 7 Hudd of Wisconsin, 60 Hughes, Senator, 326 Hughes, Charles Evans, 153, 160, 164, 169, 190, 197, 1 1 4 , 217, 218, 234, 289, 293, 296, 299; 1916 nominee, 216 Hull, Cordell, 249, 330, 332, 334 Humphreys, Representative, 230, 253 Ickes, Harold L., 212, 216, 322, 328 Impeachment of president, 7, 9 Independent Republicans, 94 Insurgents, Republican, 167, 1 7 1 « , 172, 173, 179; see also Progressive movement International Harvester Company, 105 Jackson, Andrew, two-term precedent assumed character of unwritten law by time of, 45; founder of Democratic party, 48; attitude toward own second term, 48-52, 53} chief problems during administration, 48, 5 1 ; chose Van Buren as successor and secured his nomination, 49, 50, 5 1 , 52, 53, 55, 1 5 1 , 343; reasons for tremendous following, j 1, j 4 j election victory, 52; longing for retirement, 53, 55; sense of duty, 53; never intimated that he desired or would accept third term, 54; Farewell Address, 55, 57; efforts in behalf of constitutional amendment to limit presidential term, 56 f.j could have had third term, 58, 343; one of chief opponents of indefinite recligibil-

371

ity, 58; resentment against power of, cause of increased sentiment in favor of one term, 62; use of patronage, 345; a strong executive, 350 Jackson, Robert H., 328, 3 3 1 , 332 James, Marquis, quoted, 51 Jamieson, William D., 239 Jay, John, 23, 27; Federalist Pa fers, 14 Jefferson, Thomas, 20, 21, 28, 29, 47, 58, 62, 344; first president to reject third term on political grounds, 17 ; urged Washington to retain office, 20, 34; friction between Hamilton and, 20, 22, 25; out of the Cabinet, 25; hypothesis that a third term will imperil democracy, 30; potent arguments against third term in writings and administration of, 31-45, 7 1 ; role of dissenter from unlimited reeligibility, 3 2 ; attitude toward own reelection, 34 f., 58} erred in assuming that perpetual reeligibility would mean perpetual reelection, 34; malevolent attacks upon, 35> 39> 4 ' i desire for vindication: swept into office, 35; power and popularity, 38, 43; resolutions of state legislatures urging third term, 38; his reasons for declining, 38-40; failure of foreign policy re European war, 39; successors from "political family" of, 40 f., 44, 47; his candidates swept into office: nothing to indicate that he was "routed" by public, 41 ; position and feelings upon retiring, 42 f. ; changed attitude toward length of term, 43 ; real fountainhead of anti-third-term tradition: fundamental political philosophy, 44; Father of the Democratic party, 48 ; deliberately converted Washington's retirement, and his own fear of monarchy, into a precedent, 343 Jewell, Marshall, 72 Johnson, Andrew, 66, 67, 76, 97, 224 Johnson, Hiram, 198, 202, 209, 215 Johnson, Hugh S., 322 Johnston, Governor, 319 Jordan, David Starr, 15 1 Joy, James J., 107

37 2

INDEX

Jubilee Address of J . Q. Adams, excerpt, 62 Kahn, Otto H., 298 Kellogg, Frank, 147 Kelly, Bernard, 307 Kelly, Edward J . , 328, 333 Kent, Frank R., 269, 273, 276, 320, 3 2 1 » Kent, James, quoted, 34.8 Kerchway, Freda, 333 Kerney, James, 253, 260 f. King, Rufus, 8, 9 Knox, Philander, 164, 1 9 } Kohlsaat, Herman H., 180, 187 Labor, unrest since the I87O'S, 86«; support of F. D. Roosevelt, 3 1 9 , 3 2 1 , 325, 337 Labor Reformers, 72 L a Follette, Robert M . , 1 5 3 , 164, 167, 169, 1 7 2 , 179, 1 8 5 , 1 9 3 ; career: progressivism, 1735 beginning of movement for, 1 7 4 ; candidacy betrayed by T . Roosevelt? 1 7 4 , 176 f., 180, 183, 1 9 9 ; swing away from, toward Roosevelt, 1 7 7 , 179, 1 8 3 ; refused requests to step aside, 1 8 0 ; nerves and failing health: collapse of boom for, 183 ; votes received at Republican conventions, 196, 197 L a Follette, Robert M., J r . , 2 8 1 , 2 9 1 , 299; anti-third-term resolution, 275, 282, 298, 302, 303 f., 3055 text, 303 Landon, Alfred M . , 3 1 7 , 328, 330 Lane, Franklin K . , 254 Lansing, Robert, 244 Latin American liberals, 325 Lawrence, David, 2 3 m , 257-59, 273, 276, 293, 298 League of Nations, Republican Senators' opposition to, 2 3 7 ; and Wilson, 237, 238, 240, 2 4 1 , 245, 248, 261, 2 6 3 ; the issue in 1920, 239, 250, 262; Wilson's appeal for referendum on, 243, 250, 258; Cox proclaimed adherence to, 249, 260; Wilson never lost faith in, 2 5 1 ; his belief that it would constitute a peace

conference and rectify defects of treaty, 264 Lean', John J., J r . , 219, 220 Leche, Governor, 319 Lerner, Max, 333 Lewis, James Hamilton, 232, 236, 238 Lewis, John L., 3 1 9 , 3 2 1 , 330 Lewis, Sinclair, 267 Lewis, W. B., 49 Liberal journals, attitude toward F. D . Roosevelt, 324, 326-28, 333, 336, 338, 3 3 9 ; see also under names, e.g., Nation ; New Republic Liberal Republicans, 72 Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson papers in, 248, 264 Lincoln, Abraham, 68; attitude re second term, 6 5 ; failure of movement to supplant him, 66; a strong executive, 350 Lippmann, Walter, 281 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 148, 162, 163, 189, 1 9 3> 2 1 5 » 2 1 7 , 218, 262; correspondence with T . Roosevelt, 126, 157«, 178, 2 1 1 ; disagreements with hiin: friendship continued, 188 Loeb, William, J r . , 149, 160 Logan, John, support of Grant, 8 1 , 84, 85, 88, 92, 102, 105, 109, 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 112, 113« Long, John D., 1 34 Longworth, Alice Roosevelt, 164, 202 Longworth, Nicholas, 153, 156, 278, 289, 290 Lowden, Frank O., 290; candidacy of, 3277, 1 1 278, 281, 289, 296, 298, 302, 305, Ludwig, Emil, 3 1 9 Lyons, Eugene, 328 McAdoo, William Gibbs, 2 3 1 , 243, 245, 2 +7> 2 53> 254> 2 5 6 ) 2 5 9 ; announcement that he was not presidential candidate, 244; memoirs silent about Wilson's part in the 1920 campaign, 263 McCarran, Senator, 328 McClurg, James, 8 McCombs, William F., 255 f. McCormick, Senator, 242

INDEX McCormick, Medill, 187, 209 McCormick, Vance, 249 McCumber, Senator, i j j MacDonald, William, 294; quoted, 57, j 8 McGovern, Francis E., 197 McKinley, William, 68, 132, 140, 235 5 Cleveland's attitude toward, 130, 1 3 3 ; election majority, 133; attitude toward own reelection, 1 3 4 ; administration carried out by Roosevelt, 144, 145 McLean, anti-third-term resolution, 320 McLean of Ohio, 141 McLean, John, 54 McMaster, John Bach, 343 McNary, Charles L., 333 McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill, 269», 278, 288, 302 McNutt, Paul, 326, 330, 332 Madison, James, 29, 47} at Constitutional Convention, 5; diary, 6» 5 views on presidential term, 6, 13, 46; Federalist Paper:, 145 relations with Washington, 18, 19, 25, 27 i draft of Washington's Farewell Address, 2 1 , 27, 28; Jefferson's choice of, as successor, 40 f.; malevolent attacks upon, 42; continued two-term precedent, 43, 45, 46; attitude toward own reelection, 46 Magazines, see under names, e. g., Outlook Marble, Manton, 75 Marshall, John, 26, 47; quoted, 63 Marshall, Thomas Riley, 229, 230, 241 Martin, Eben W., 150 Martin, Luther, 9, 12 Mason, George, 6, 8, 10, 11 Matthews, Stanley, 89 Mellon, Andrew, 273, 288, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311« Mencken, H. L., 267, 316 Meyer, Postmaster-General, 157 Michelson, Charles, 321 Mills, Ogden L., 278 Moley, Raymond, 328 Monarchy, aim of guarding against anything resembling, 3, 13; Hamilton's plan for an elective, 7; Washington's tendencies, 29 j Jefferson's opposition to,

373

33> 343 5 »light danger of, today, 349 Money, sound: and free silver issues, 12042 fasitm Monroe, James, Jefferson's attitude toward, 40, 41 ; continued two-term precedent, 43, 45 ; era of good feeling under, 46 ; position re adoption of Constitution and ineligibility of president: attitude toward own reelection, 47 Monroe Doctrine, 128 Morgan, J . P., and Company, 121, 182, 184, 205 Morris, George K., 276 Morris, Gouverneur, 7, 8, 23, 24; quoted, 9, 10 Morrow, Dwight, 307 Morrow, Wright, 334 Morse, John T., Jr., quoted, 36, 43 Moses, George H., 277, 290 Mulligan letters, 82, 108 Mulvane, David W., 268 Munro, William Bennett, 281 Munsey, Frank A., 180, 184, 200, 205 Murphy, Charles F., 140, 141 Murphy, Frank, 319, 322, 328; quoted, 319 Muzzey, David S., 35, 42 Myers, William Starr, 272 Nation, attitude toward Grant, 74, 79, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 95, 104, i i 2 ; Blaine, 1 0 1 ; Cleveland, 123, 137, 139; T . Roosevelt, 190, 192, 193, 194, 219, 227i Wilson, 232, 235, 236, 2 4 3 j Coolidge, 279, 2945 F. D. Roosevelt, 318» 317» 333» 336 National Civil Service Reform League, 83 National Council of English Teachers, 296 National Democratic Club, Tumulty's letter to, 252 National Progressive Republican League, 174 National Republican party, j 2 National Roosevelt Committee, 187 Nevins, Allan, 262 New Deal, 1938 election setback, 322; revision of policy to the rightward,

374

INDEX

New Deal (Continued) 323; Republican campaign attacks on, 336; vital issues: classes for and against them, 337 New Jersey plan of government, 7 New Nationalism, T . Roosevelt as apostle of, 172, 173, 174, 185, 204, Wilson, 173; see also Progressive movement New Republic, attitude toward Wilson, 233, 242; Coolidge, 274, 279, 281, 293, 294, 299, 300; F. D. Roosevelt, 324, 326, 336, 338, 339 New York papers, see Newspapers, and titles, e.g., Outlook; Times Newspapers, furious denunciation of third term for T . Roosevelt by those which had advocated it for Cleveland, 190«; slogans and ridicule in the anti-T. Roosevelt journals, 191 f.; on Coolidge's renunciation of third term, 29294; attitude toward F. D. Roosevelt, 33') 336, 339; see also under names, e. g., World, New York Nietzsche, F. W., 3J1 Niks' Register, 54; excerpt, 49, 58n Nobel Peace Prize, 167 Norbeck, Peter, 280 Norris, George W., 277, 296, 299, 301, 311, 319, 322, 328, 345»; on patronage» 345 Old Guard, Republican, 114, 208; and T . Roosevelt, 172, 173; plans for return to power and plenty, 220 "Old Hickory," 51; see Jackson, Andrew Olney, Richard, 122, 140, 141 Osborn, Chase S., 185 Ottinger, Albert, 275 Oulahan, Richard V., 307 Outlook, 155», 176, 181, 184, 206, 242, 294; T . Roosevelt's association with, 165; excerpts, 174, 186 Owen, Robert L., 227 Palmer, A. Mitchell, Attorney-Gen'l, Wilson's letter to, on the single-term ques-

tion, 228 {., 230, 232, 238, 242, 248», 256; text, 228 Palmer, John M., 132, 133 Paris Peace Conference, Wilson at, 236, 238 Parker, Alton B., 139, 140, 141, 145; nominated, 142 Parker, John M., 215 Parties, political, see names, e. g., AntiMasons j Democratic; Federalist; Labor Reformers; People's; Populist; Progressive; Republican; Whig Parton, James, quoted, 53 Paterson, William, 7, 9 Patronage, Presidents who made use of, 152, 221, 345; use of, an argument against two or more terms, 344-47; two parts to the argument, 345, 346; Hatch Act a step toward rectifying evils of, 346 Peckham, Justice, 129 Peckham, Wheeler H., 141 Peery, Governor, 319 Penrose, Boies, 158 People's party, 121 Pepper, George Wharton, 299 Perkins, George W., 182, 184, 200, 205, 208; at Progressive Convention, 214, 21J; killed the Progressive party? 213, 216 Pinchot, Amos, 184 Pinchot, Gifford, 167, 176, 184, 185 Pinckney, Charles, 10; draft for a plan of government, 5; quoted, 6 Pinckney Plan, 6 Pittman, Senator, 318 "Plumed Knight," 101; see Blaine, James G. Political theories in Wilson's early works on government, 222-26 Populist party, emergence, 120; Free Silver movement, 120 ff.; fusion with Democrats, 121; Cleveland sentiment, 137; one-term incumbency pledged, 34* Power as attribute of executive, 223 f. President, length of term, reeligibilitv,

INDEX method of electing-: issue of, at Constitutional Convention, 3 - 1 1 ; at ratification meetings, 1 1 - 1 6 } how to be elected, 4, j , 9; how removed from office, 7, 9i criticisms and political attacks, on Washington, 2$, 29; on Jefferson, 35, 39, 41 ; on Madison, 42; those against whom proposals for limiting term were directed, 61-66 ; number having second term : those who came close to three, 68 ; strong executives, 144, 3 j o j T . Roosevelt's ideas of the office of, and length of the term, 146, 1 6 5 ; the patronage system, 152, 221, 344-47 ; culpable method of choosing candidates for, 197, 2 2 1 ; Wilson's views on office of, 223, 224, 225 ; weak, who bowed to Congress, 224; criticisms and abuse of Wilson, 245 ; six succeeded to office upon death of another, 266; entitled to a renomination : not forbidden from naming successor, 348; presidency an evolution: not subject to Constitutional restrictions, 348; those who have named their successors, 348; ice also Term, presidential President of the United States, The (Wilson), 225 Press, see Newspapers Prince, Dr. Morton, 195 Pringle, Henry F., 169 ; his the best study of T . Roosevelt, 1 5 2 » ; quoted, 165, 173, 188, 201, 210 Progressive movement (New Nationalism), the Republican insurgents, 167, 1 7 i n , 172, 173, 1 7 9 ; initiated by La Follette and Dolliver, 173 s relations between La Follette and Roosevelt, 174, 176 f., 180, 183, 199; swing toward Roosevelt, 175, 177, 179, 183 Progressive party, characterized as Bull Moose, 196; 1 9 1 2 convention, 200; platform, 201 j campaign, 201-3} election vote, 203 ; desire to make Roosevelt the 1916 condidate, 207, 2 1 0 ; nomination declined, 213, 216, 2 1 9 ; sabotage of party: attempts to unite it

375

with Republican party, 2 1 3 } 1 9 1 6 convention, 2 1 4 - 1 6 ; betrayed—by whom? 216, 218 Prosperity during Coolidge regime, 267, 29$, 301 Quinn, Governor, 319 Ralston, Chairman, 23$ Randolph, Edmund, 5, 6, 9, 1 1 , 12, 20, •7 Reaction, the 1920's an era of, 267 Reciprocity agreement, U. S. and Canada, 176 Reed, Senator, 280 Reform Club, 1 3 1 Reid, Whitelaw, 73, 74, 7 J , 79, 93, 1 1 4 , 120 Republican party, defeats resulting from Grant's silence about third term, 74-76 ; resolutions against third term, 77; Hayes nominated at 1876 convention, 82; reform element held sway under Hayes, 84, 1 1 5 ; contest over Grant, Sherman, and Blaine at 1880 National Convention, 1 0 4 - 1 1 0 ; Garfield's nomination, n o ; possibility of a party schism if Grant had won, 1 1 2 » ; cabinet member made chairman of National Committee, 145 ; convention of 1908, stampede toward T . Roosevelt, 158, 1 6 3 ; his part in it, 164; rift between insurgents and conservatives, 167, 1 7 1 » , 179 ; the Old Guard and Roosevelt, 172, 1 7 3 ; initiators of Progressive movement, 173 f. (see also entries under Progressive movement) ; T . Roosevelt's bolt from, 188, 197, 199; convention of 1912 and the Roosevelt-Taft battle, 196 f. ; culpable methods of choosing presidential candidates, 197, 2 2 1 ; failure of efforts to unite Progressives with, 2 1 3 ; convention of 1916, 2 1 4 - 1 6 ; plans for return to power and plenty, 220; Roosevelt's plea for a Republican Congress, 235; determination to block any Wilson peace treaty if placed in

376

INDEX

Republican party (Continued) control of Senate; 236, 2 3 8 ; fight against ratification of League of Nations, 2 3 7 , 264} Harding's election a complete victory for, 251 ; the Coolidge enigma during 1928 National Convention, 3 0 9 - 1 2 Republican party, National, 52 Republicans, Independent, 94 Republicans, Liberal, 72 Republics, limited terms of executives: transgression of rule followed by destruction, 3 5 1 Rhodes, James Ford, 87, 1 4 7 ; quoted, 179, 202 Richberg, Donald, 328» Riis, Jacob, 1 51 Robins, Raymond, 2 1 4 Robinson, Joseph T . , 249 Rodell, Fred, quoted, 349 Rogers, Lindsay, quoted, 265 Rogers, Will, 2 9 1 , 297 Roosevelt, Eleanor (Mrs. Franklin D . ) , 3*4, 33S Roosevelt, Franklin D., vice presidential nominee, 248; the greatest iconoclast of all, 3 1 4 ; third term skillfully accomplished, 3 1 7 ; how movement for it got under way, 3 1 7 ff. ; when and why popularity waned, 3 1 8 , 320, 3 2 1 ; labor's support o f , 3 1 9 , 3 2 1 , 3 2 $ , 3 3 7 ; congressional anti-third-term resolutions aimed at, 320, 3 3 6 ; Gallup polls concerning, 320, 322, 326, 329 f., 3 3 1 , 333, 3 3 8 ; prolonged silence and own attitude about a second reelection, 323, 329-33 fassitrt; by subtle silence retained whip hand over Congress, 3 2 3 ; family, 3 2 4 ; attitude of liberal journals toward, 324, 326-28, 3 3 3 , 336, 3 38, 3 3 9 ; upswing in popularity, 325, 3 2 6 ; growing horde of organizations supporting, 3 2 5 ; effect of war upon movement for, 328 if., 3 3 8 ; public opinion behind foreign policy, 3 3 1 ; Barkley's historic convention statement about candidacy of, 3 3 3 ; nominated on first ballot, 3 3 4 ; acceptance broadcast,

excerpts, 3 3 5 ; deserted by New York Times, 336; bitterness and mistakes of campaign attacks on, 336 f . ; vital issues of domestic program: groups for and against them, 3 3 7 ; attacks Republican charges, 338; effect of third-term issue, and of war, upon vote for, 338 f . ; electoral votes, 3 3 9 ; why and when called dictator, 349; slight belief that he would try to become a monarch, 349; third term for, result of an overdose of democracy in nation, 351 Roosevelt, Mrs. James, 324 Roosevelt, Kermit, 167 Roosevelt, Quentin, 220 Roosevelt, Theodore, 68, 1 3 6 , 138, 140, " 9 , 233, »35, 236, 1 7 9 , 3'4> 344, 346; on Cleveland's political status, 126, 1 3 7 ; first president to carry thirdterm issue into the heat of an electoral campaign, 1 4 3 ; forceful leadership, 1 4 4 ; elected after filling out McKinley's term, 1 4 5 ; his 1904 statement that he would not be a candidate for, or accept, another nomination, 1 4 5 ; how meant and interpreted: reactions to it, 145 ff., 185 f . ; ideas of the presidential office and length of the term, 146, 1 6 5 ; attitude toward running in 1908 for a third term, 147 ff., 153 f., 157 ff.; agitation in favor of renomination of, in 1908, 1 4 9 - 5 1 , 154 ff., 1 6 3 ; problem of what occupation to follow after retirement, 149, 165 f . ; chose T a f t as successor, secured his nomination, 152, 160, 1 6 4 ; support of his candidacy, 1 5 2 , 159, 1 6 2 ; Pringle's the best study of, 1 5 2 » ; reasons why as popular in 1908 as in 1904, i j 8 ; support by wealthy financiers, 1 5 8 , 1 8 2 , 184, 205; did everything possible to prevent own nomination, 1 6 2 ; had things his own way at National Convention: dictated entire platform, 1 6 4 ; arrangement to write for the Outlook, 1 6 5 ; reluctant to lay down reins of office: liked his job, 1 6 6 ; jubilant over Taft's election, 1 6 6 ; expected him to be

INDEX content with one term, 1 6 6 » ; lion hunting in A f r i c a : triumphal journey through Europe, 1 6 7 ; breach with T a f t : its causes, 167 f., 1 7 5 f., 1 8 3 ; attitude toward a 1 9 1 2 nomination, 168 ff., 1 7 J ff.; a consummate politician, believed in a government of men, 1 6 8 ; part taken in New York state politics, 169, 1 7 1 « ; set forth to secure T a f t ' s renomination, 1 7 0 ; trip to propagate the " N e w Nationalism": how his speeches were construed, 1 7 2 f . ; L a Follette's candidacy betrayed by? 1 7 4 , 176 f., 180, 1 8 3 , 1 9 9 ; swing away from La Follette toward, 1 7 7 , 179, 1 8 3 ; uncertainty as to his course, 1808 2 ; contest between T a f t and, 1 8 1 , 185, 186, 187, 1 9 1 , 193 f., 195, 204, 2 0 5 ; decides to become candidate: reasons, 1 8 ] , 1 8 4 » ; the campaign, 184 ff.; by third term meant third consecutive term, 186} open opposition to idea of a third party, 187, 1 8 8 ; bolt from Republican party, 188, 197, 1 9 9 ; third-term tradition not effective against, 189, 1 9 1 , 204, 2 2 1 ; a pet subject of ridicule, 1 9 2 ; supporters who dropped away, 1 9 3 ; Clayton-Works resolution limiting term of office, directed at, 194, 2 2 7 ; psychologists' opinions of, 1 9 5 ; nomination stolen from? 195, 196, 1 9 9 ; treatment of, at 1 9 1 2 National Convention, 196 f . ; his reaction, 198 ff.; as candidate of Progressive party, 200202 j loses election to Wilson, 2 0 3 ; causes of defeat, 204 f . ; expedition to South America: tropical infections, 206; movements to nominate him in 1 9 1 6 : his reaction, 207 ff.; antagonism toward Wilson, 207, 210, 2 1 6 ; nominated at 1 9 1 6 Progressive Convention, 2 1 5 ; declined nomination, 216, 2 1 9 ; enigmatic position in 1 9 1 6 election, 2 1 7 - 1 9 ; sentiment in his favor as 1920 candidate: his refusal, 220; death, 2 2 1 ; openly flouted third-term tradition: reasons why efforts were defeated, 2 2 1 ; plea for a Republican Congress, 235

377

Roosevelt Non-Partisan Leagues, 2 1 3 Root, Elihu, 1 5 7 , 186, 1 9 3 , 194, 1 9 7 , 203, 2 1 4 ; why not chosen to succeed T . Roosevelt, 1 5 2 , 1 6 0 ; quoted, 204 Roraback, J . Henry, 309 Russell, William E . , 1 2 J , 130

Salant, Henry, 277 Sanders, Everett, 282, 284, 306, 308; activities at Republican Convention, 310, 3 1 1 8 Schurz, Carl, 93, 1 0 1 , 1 0 3 Schuyleman, John L . , 247 Scott, Senator, 1 5 5 Seibold, Louis, 244 Seymour, John W., 79 Shafroth, Representative, 234 Shaw, Albert, 2 4 1 , 294 Sherman, John, at Constitutional Convention, 8 Sherman, John, of Ohio, attitude toward Grant, 8 j , 86, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 1 0 3 ; presidential campaign, 93, 97, 98, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 1 1 3 « ; satisfied that Garfield won, 1 1 0 ; on the President and his term, 352 Sherman, Roger, 6 Sherman, William T . , General, quoted, 103 Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 120, 1 2 1 Shively, Senator, 227 Shouse, Jouett, 244 Siegelstein, Bennett E., 321 Silver, free: movement, 120 ff., 129, 1 3 1 Silver Purchase Act, Sherman, 120, 1 2 1 Slayden, Representative, 187 Slemp, C. Bascom, 272, 290, 299, 300 Smathers, Senator, 326, 328 Smith, Alfred E., 278, 290, 296 Smith, Ellison D., "Cotton E d , " 330, 336 Smith, James, J r . , 139, 1 4 1 , 142 Smoot, Reed, 2 1 5 , 290 Smucker, Samuel M., quoted, 36« Snell, Bertrand H., 2 7 J Social reform, Progressives' advocacy of, 1 7 3 , 201

378

INDEX

Sound money and free silver issues, 11042 fasstm Sound Money National Convention, Democratic, 1 3 1 - 3 3 Source material, 3 5 3 - 6 4 South Dakota, Coolidge's summer White House in, 266, 280 FF. Spaight, Richard, 11 Spargo, John, 297 Springer Resolution against third term, 80, 9*. 97 Stalwarts, Grant's, 88, 93 Stearns, Frank, support of Coolidge, 273, 278

Steffens, Lincoln, 161, 181, 201 Stetson, Francis L., 141 Stevenson, Adlai E., 120, 122 Stillman, James, 140 Stimson, Henry L., 170, 171, 182, 183, 193 Stock market report by Coolidge, 289 Stoddard, Henry L., 160, 175, 211, 220, 287; quoted, 206 Stoddard, W. O., quoted, j 2 Straus, Nathan, 140 Straus, Oscar, 154, 168 Stubbs, William R., 182, 185 Sullens, Frederick, 140 Sullivan, Mark, 268 Sumner, Charles, Senator, on one-term principle: attack on Grant, 66, 71 Sumner, W. G., quoted, J3, 54 Sun, New York, 123, 185, 273, 293 Sunday, Billy, 297 Supreme Court revision plan, 318 Sweet, Edwin F., 229 T a f t , William Howard, 1J7, 173, 179, 180, 20J, 221, 229, 233, 298, 301,

307,

308; nomination brought about by T . Roosevelt, 152, 160, 164, 170; support of his candidacy, 152, 159, 162, 170; campaign boom and funds: declined first Supreme Court appointment, 152; swept into office: plurality, 166; opinion about presidential term: entered office without precommittment as to its length, 166»; breach between Roose-

velt and: its causes, 167 f., 175 f., 183; not happy in presidency: more a thinker than man of action, 168; contest between Roosevelt and, 181, 185, 186, 1 8 7 , 1 9 1 , 1 9 3 f., 1 9 5 , 2 0 4 , I O J ; became bitter and injudicious, 194; National Committee's convention methods in favor of, 196 f., 198»; votes received at conventions, 196, 197; at election, 203; retirement: made Chief Justice, 206; on Coolidge, 291; changed position re presidential term, 300 T a f t , Mrs. William Howard, 152, 170, 189

Taney, Chief Justice, 55 Tariff issue during Cleveland's rule, 118, 120

Teller, Henry M., 139 Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, 176, 205

Term, presidential: controversy over, at Constitutional Convention, 3-11; at ratification meetings, 11-16; Hamilton's proposal for a permanent tenure, 7; three or more assumed as logical consequence of reëligibility, 16; resolutions in favor of limiting term, or suggesting constitutional amendment to provide limitation, 16, 32, 33, 36, 4 3 , 5 6 f., 6 1 - 6 7 , 7 ' » 72> 77)

f 1 1 7 .

131, 157, 187, 234; two-term tradition as established by Washington, 1 7 - 3 0 ; his objection to third term personal, not political, 17, 29; Jefferson the first president to reject third term on political grounds, 17 ; was indoctrinator of anti-third-term tradition, 30, 44; Jefferson's administration and writings as most potent argument against third term, 3 1 - 4 5 ; his certainty that perpetual reëligibility would mean perpetual reelection, refuted by facts, 34; strongest condemnation of third, ever uttered by public officer, 44 ; when twoterm precedent assumed character of unwritten law, 45, 58; growth of twoterm sentiment during administrations of Madison and Monroe, 46 ; no-third-

INDEX term principle becomes a binding precedent, 47; Jackson's attitude toward own second term, 48-52, 5 3 ; toward third, 54, 58, 343; his efforts to secure constitutional amendment to limit, 5 6 f . ; one of chief opponents of indefinite reeligibility, 58; amendments which referred to, or were directed against, certain presidents from 1789 to 1870, 59-67; number of amendments submitted during first 100 years, 59; groups into which fall the number of terms same person could have, 60; amendments providing for lapse of years between elections, 615 era of fitting second-, or third-term, scruples to partisan ends, 65; Lincoln's attitude, 65; attempts to limit him to one term, 66 ; attitude toward third term, of presidents after Jefferson, 67 f . ; reasons why efforts to limit were all ineffectual, 67; Grant's the first real attempt at third, 67, 68, 1 1 6 ; number of two-term presidents: those who came close to achieving three, 68; Grant's venture a failure largely because a bold attempt at defying the no-third-term tradition, 7 1 ; his role in the drama, 7 1 - 1 1 6 ; Springer Resolution against third, directed at Grant, 80, 94, 97; first campaign for a third term for Cleveland, 122-33, 1 4 3 ; to confer character of unwritten law upon anti-third-term tradition a great folly, 126; second campaign for Cleveland, 134-43; third held unobjectionable if it be not consecutive, 139, 186; Theodore Roosevelt the first to carry the third-term issue into the heat of a real election campaign, 1 4 3 ; his 1904 statement that he would not be a candidate for, or accept, nomination to a third term, 1 4 5 : how meant and interpreted: reactions to it, 145 ff., 185 f . ; his ideas of the presidential office and length of the term, 146, 165, 186; his third-term candidacy, in 1908, 147 ff., 153 f., 1 J 7 ff.; in 1912, 168 ff., 175 ff., 200-202; Taft's opinion about length

379

of term, 166>i, 300; third-term tradition not effective against T . Roosevelt, 189, 1 9 1 , 204, 2 2 1 ; Clayton-Works resolution in favor of constitutional amendment limiting term to six year« and prohibiting reeligibility, 194, 22629; text, 226; Wilson's views on length of, 223, 224, 225, 228, 2 5 3 ; Bryan's resolution limiting, 226, 233, 342; 1916 campaign and Wilson's attitude toward second term, 229-34; campaign for third, and his attitude, 235-65 fatsim; why the no-third-term tradition not tested in 1920, 265; third-term bogey said to have passed from American politics, 268; and not to apply in case of Coolidge, 268, 300; movements in behalf of a third term for him, 2683 1 1 faaim; L a Follette, Beck, and Fairchild resolutions against third, directed at Coolidge, 275, 282, 298, 302, 303 f., 305; text, 303; successors to unexpired term excepted in anti-thirdterm resolution, 2 7 5 ; "second elective term" movement and "Anti-ThirdTerm League" directed for, and against, Coolidge, 277; anti-third-term tradition appeared to have lost force and to be ripe for discard, 279; Coolidge's opinion about third-term question, 283, 285; one of the greatest paradoxes in history of the third-term issue, 300; of five two-term presidents after Jackson, none refused third on principle, and four came close to winning, 3 1 4 ; how no-third-term precedent became a victim of F. D. Roosevelt's tradition-smashing crusade, 314, 3 1 7 40; term-limiting resolutions directed against him, 320, 336; whether breaking of anti-third-term tradition will lead to dictatorship, 327, 349-51; too early to ascertain significance and scope of third term's role, 338; will the course of America's future be affected? 339; number and nature of proposals for restricting presidential term in forty years between 1889-1929, 3 4 1 ; num-

38o

INDEX

T e r m , presidential (Continued) ber making self-succession impossible, 342 ; Southern Confederacy's provision for single term, 3 4 2 » ; appraisal of the possibilities opened by shattering of the no-third-term precedent, 343-52; summary of presidential attitudes toward, 343 f . ; patronage argument against two or more terms, 344-47; best statement of case for a single term, 3 4 7 ; case against the anti-third-term tradition largely a negative one, 348; reasons for opposing the precedent, 348 f . ; reasons for not limiting term by constitutional amendment, 349; only eleven presidents twice elected: mayors and governors having unlimited reeligibility, 350; limited terms in ancient republics, 3 5 1 ; arguments in behalf of limiting term, 3 5 1 ; and for a constitutional amendment, 352 Thayer, W. R., quoted, 30» Third term, see Term, presidential T h i r d Term National League, 150 Third-term organizations in favor of F. D . Roosevelt, 325 Thomas, Senator, 328 Thomas, Norman, 325 Thompson, Charles Willis, 287 Thompson, William H., 235, 305 Tilden, Samuel J . , 74, 75, 82«, 84 Times, New York, attitude toward Grant, 7 3 - 1 0 1 fassim; swing to Blaine, 101 ; attitude toward T . Roosevelt, 1 5 3 , 1 9 1 5 toward third-term tradition, 1 9 1 , 3 3 9 ; Wilson, 228-49 possim; Coolidge, 268, 269, 279, 281, 292, 296, 303, 306, 307, 308 j swing from F. D. Roosevelt to the Willkie cause, excerft, 336 Tinkham, anti-third-term resolution, 320 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 347 Tribune, New York, attitude toward Grant, 73, 78, 8 1 , 84, 85, 94, 102, 104, 1 1 4 5 Cleveland, 1 2 3 , 1 2 6 ; Wilson, 229 Tucker of South Carolina, 60, 6i T u g w e l l , Rexford G., 328 Tumulty, Joseph P., 230, 238, 246, 247, 250, 251 ; letter that cost him Wilson's

friendship, 2 5 2 ; deep affection for his chief, 259; his Woodrovi Wilson, 259 f. "Turkey Gobbler Strut" of Conkling, 89 Twain, Mark, quoted, 352 Tvdings, Millard, 334 Underwood of Kentucky, 61 United Mine Workers of America, 321 United States Steel Corporation, 176, 205 Unit rule, 1 0 1 , 104, 1 0 5 ; meaning, 95 Vallandigham of Ohio, 63 Van Buren, Martin, 54; chosen by Jackson as his successor, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 1 5 1 ; appointment as Minister to Great Britain, 50, 5 1 ; elected president, 55

Vandenberg, Senator, 3 21 Van Slyke, George, 293 Vare, William S., 309 Venezuelan affair, 120, 127 Versailles treaty, 243, 245, 250, 258; Republican determination to defeat, 236, 238; struggle over, becomes sole issue between Democrats and Republicans, 238; Wilson accepted defects of, because of belief that League would rectify them, 264 Vice-President, proposals for limiting term of, 67, 1 8 7 » Viereck, George Sylvester, 254 f. Villard, Oswald Garrison, 218, 243, 272, 294; quoted, 327 Virginia plan of government, 5 Vizetelly, Frank H., 296 Von Hoist, Professor H., 126 Wade, Benjamin, Senator, quoted, 66 Wadsworth, James W., Jr., 272 Wallace, Henry A., 289, 328, 332, 335 Wallace, Hugh C., 132 Wall Street, "bull market" jarred by Coolidge, 289; financiers hope to draft him, 307 Walsh, Thomas J., 277 Washburne, Elihu B., 79, 94, 104, 106, 109, 1 1 1 Washington, Booker T . , 1 5 1

INDEX Washington, George, views on presidential term, 12, 17, 1 9 ; two-term tradition as established by, 17-30 fassim; Farewell Address, 18, 19, 20, 2 1 , 27 f . ; desire to retire after first term, 17, 1 8 - 2 2 ; reasons for retirement personal: in no way resulted from opposition to longer tenure on political grounds, 17 if., 29, 34.3 ; his only hint of opposition to perpetuity on political grounds, 1 9 ; men who urged his retaining office, 20, 34; unanimously reelected, 225 problems during second term, 22 f . ; question of third term, 23-30, 6 1 ; alignment with Federalists, 2 5 ; shocked and hurt by criticisms, 26, 295 not indoctrinator of anti-third-term tradition, 30; example cited, 62, 77, 88, 14.7; T . Roosevelt's opinion about tradition established by, 1 5 8 » ; said practically same thing as Coolidge, 283 Watson, James E., 288, 290, 296, 299, 3 ° ' ) 305, 3 " , quoted, 3 1 3 Watterson, Henry, 122, 157, 182, 190 Webster, Daniel, 48, 64 Weed, Thurlow, 74; and Grant, 75, 93, 96, 98, 103 Wheeler, Burton K., 318, 3 2 1 , 332 Wheeler, Everett P., 1 4 1 Wheeler, William A., 82 Whig party, 62, 64 White, Andrew D., 1 1 3 White, Harry, Grant's famous letter to, 7 7 ; quoted, 88 White, Henry, 140, 262 White, Horace, 97 White, William Allen, 153, 1 7 2 , 180, 261, 291, 297, 299, 302, 3 1 1 » , 3 1 3 Whitlock, Brand, quoted, 179 Whitney, William C., quoted, 124 "Who's Who in America," poll among voters in, 330» Wilcox, William R., 158 Wilhelm, Kaiser, 167 Williams, Representative, 230 Williamson, Hugh, 8, 9, 1 1 Willis, Frank B., 278, 296, 305 Willkie, Wendell L., 333, 336, 337, 339

381

Wilson, Henry, 75 Wilson, James, 6, 9, 10 Wilson, William L., 128 Wilson, Woodrow, 68, 1 2 1 , 1 7 1 , 2 0 1 , 210, 3445 elected governor of New Jersey: in voicing the New Nationalism stole T . Roosevelt's thunder, 1 7 3 ; nominated: liberal platform, 1 9 9 ; elected: votes won, 203; cause of election strength, 2055 T . Roosevelt's antagonism toward, 207, 210, 2 1 6 ; efforts of Perkins to insure united front against, 2 1 6 ; background that of a scholar, 2 2 2 ; political theories in early works on government, 222-26; views on the presidential office, 223, 224, 2 2 5 ; on length of term, 223, 224, 225, 228, 2 5 3 ; by vigorous leadership carried theory of a strong executive into effective policy, 226; limitation of presidential term regarded by many as unfair to, 2 2 7 ; views on single term in the letter to Palmer, 228 f., 230, 2 3 2 ; text, 228; the 1 9 1 6 campaign and his attitude toward reelection, 229-34; attitude toward candidacy of McAdoo, 2 3 1 , 253, 259; courtship of Mrs. Gait, 2 3 1 ; marriage, 2 3 2 ; successful domestic policies, 2 3 2 ; the 1 9 1 2 one-term plank held not to be binding upon, 2 3 3 ; renominated by acclamation: 1 9 1 6 election a personal triumph, 2 3 4 ; question as to whether he would be the 1920 candidate to succeed himself for a third term, 235-65 ;passim; concern for the Versailles treaty, 2 3 6 ; plea for a Democratic Congress, 236, 2 6 3 ; Republican Senate's fight against, 236, 237, 238, 264; attended Paris Peace Conference, 236, 238; efforts in behalf of League of Nations, 237, 243, 250, 2 5 1 , 2 6 1 , 264; broken health, 239, 240, 246, 2 5 0 ; political blunders, 2 4 1 , 263 f . ; called upon to endure torrent of criticism and abuse, 2 4 5 ; commonly-held view that he wished nomination simply as vindication of his administration, 246, 2 6 1 ;

382

INDEX

Wilson, Woodrow (Continued) Democratic platform an unreserved endorsement of him and his policies, 247; hands-off policy during convention, 247, 252, 259, 262; Wilson Papers in Library of Congress, 248, 264; pleased at nomination of Cox and Roosevelt, 249, 2605 extent of his support of Cox, 249 f., 2605 made League of Nations the sole issue in campaign, 250; an echo of, in 1924 nomination, 25153 i Harding's staggering majority a thorough repudiation of, 2 5 1 ; end of friendship with Tumulty caused by latter's letter on 1924 nomination, 252 j death, 253; books on, 253-635 harsh and unfair critics, 253, 254, 2555 favorable works, 256, 257, 260, 261, 2625 Tumulty's devotion to, and book on, 259; realized that he could not perform third-term duties but believed himself capable of leadership in thought and ideals: draft of platform for 1924, 257; hypothesis concerning form of his desire for a third term in some connection with League of Nations, and its development into a plan of action, 258 f., 263-65; accepted defects of Versailles treaty because of belief that League would rectify its defects,

264; one of our strong executives, 350 Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow, first, 231 Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow, second, 231, 232, 238, 248, 255, 257, 258, 262 Windom, William, 109 Wirt, William, 52 Wister, Owen, 192 Wolcott, Oliver, 24 Women, delegates to Progressive Convention, 200; pro-Wilson sentiment among organizations of, 240 Wood, William R., 300 Work, Hubert, 286 Works, John D., 187», 195«, 228; Clayton-Works resolution, 194, 226-29; text, 226 World, New York, attitude toward Grant, 75; T . Roosevelt, 149, 199, 218; Wilson, 241, 244; Coolidge, 272, 292, 298, 300, 304 World's Work, excerpt, 348 World War I, Wilson's policies: T . Roosevelt's attitude, 207, 209 World War II, effect upon F. D. Roosevelt's candidacy, 328 if., 338 Yates, Robert, 7 Young, John Russell, 84, 88, 100, i n , 1 1 3 ; quoted, 86 Young Democratic Clubs, 325