The Status of the Individual in East and West 9780824885168

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The Status of the Individual in East and West

The Status of the Individual in East and West E D I T E D BY C H A R L E S A. M O O R E WITH T H E A S S I S T A N C E OF A L D Y T H V. M O R R I S

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS

HONOLULU

1968

Copyright 1968 by the University of Hawaii Press Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 67-14717

Dedicated

To the cordial spirit of these Conferences To the outstanding participants who have made them significant To the many contributors—of time and/or fund; who have made them possible

Contents

ix xi

Foreword Preface GREETINGS

xvii xviii XX C H A R L E S A. M O O R E

3

T H O M E H . FANG

23

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

47

G. P . M A L A L A S E K E R A

65

UEDA Y O S H I F U M I

77

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

91

Thomas H. Hamilton, President, University of Hawaii Neal S. Blaisdell, Mayor of the City of Honolulu John A. Burns, Governor, State of Hawaii Introduction: T h e conference, the problem, the program SECTION

SECTION T'ANG C H U N - I

101

P . T . RA J U

121

NAKAMURA H A J I M E

141

H A R O L D E. M C C A R T H Y

161

181

METAPHYSICS

II /

METHODOLOGY

T h e individual and the world in Chinese methodology Indian epistemology and the world and the individual Consciousness of the individual and the universal among the Japanese Knowledge, scepticism, and the individual SECTION

WING-TSIT CHAN

I /

The world and the individual in Chinese metaphysics T h e status of the individual in Indian metaphysics T h e status of the individual in Theravada Buddhist philosophy T h e status of the individual in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy A brief note on individuality in East and West

III / R E L I G I O N

T h e individual in Chinese religions

Contents

vii

T h e world and the individual in Indian religious thought T h e status of the individual in Islam

T. R. V. MURTI

199

FAZLUR RAHMAN

217

HORI ICHIRÖ

227

J O H N E. SMITH

251

H SIEH Y U - W E I

271

T h e status of the individual in Chinese ethics T h e individual in Indian ethics T h e individual in Japanese ethics T h e status of the person in Western ethics

T h e appearance of individual self-consciousness in Japanese religions and its historical transformations T h e individual and the JudeoChristian tradition SECTION IV / ETHICS

SURAMA DASGUPTA

285

FURUKAWA TESSHI

301

W. H. WERKMEISTER

317

SECTION V / SOCIAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICES Y . p. MEI

333

T h e status of the individual in Chinese social thought and practice

S. K . S A K S E N A

347

KÖSAKA MASAAKI

361

E. W . STRONG

377

T h e individual in social thought and practice in India T h e status and role of the individual in Japanese society Searches for agreement by persuasion SECTION VI / LEGAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS

J O H N c . H. w u

391

TARA CHAND

41 1

KAWASHIMA TAKEYOSHI

429

MIGUEL REALE

449

RICHARD MC K E O N

453

RAYMOND POLIN

473

T h e status of the individual in the political and legal traditions of old and new China T h e individual in the legal and political thought and institutions of India T h e status of the individual in the notion of law, right, and social order in J a p a n Legal status of individuals T h e individual in law and in legal philosophy in the West About the political status of the contemporary individual in the West

viii

Contents APPENDIX Public Lectures STERLING M.

MCMURRIN

487

The individual in American philosophy The individual and the universal in East and West The individual person in Zen

REGAMEY

503

SUZUKI

519

MCKEON

535

C H A R L E S A. M O O R E

547

The individual in East and West: review and synthesis Concluding remarks

579

Who's Who

601

Index

CONSTANTIN

DAISETZ T.

Summary and Concluding Remarks RICHARD

Foreword

This volume is the last book edited by Senior Professor Charles A. Moore—Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii since 1936, Chairman of the Department until 1954, Director of the 1939, 1949, 1959, 1964 East-West Philosophers' Conferences, and Editor of Philosophy East and West from its inception in 1951 until his death, April 14, 1967. If time and events bear out Bertrand Russell's surmise that the next major infusion of ideas into the history of Western philosophy may likely come from Asia, there is no philosopher of our time more appropriately to be termed the foremost pioneer in the "New Frontier" than Charles Moore. T h e promotion of cultural rapprochement by way of philosophical understanding between the people of East and West was his mission ; to that end he gave his life. Every care has been taken by those responsible for the publication of this volume to ensure that the high standards set by Professor Moore have been scrupulously adhered to. In the completion of this task special recognition and appreciation must be accorded to those who so generously and painstakingly gave of their knowledge and time: Chung-ying Cheng, Kenneth K. Inada, Walter H. Maurer, S. K. Saksena, Yukuo Uehara, and Beatrice T. Yamasaki. WlNFIELD E . NAGLEY

Honolulu December 1967

ix

Preface This volume is the "official" Report of the work of the Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1964. The volume is composed primarily of the papers presented at the formal meetings of the Conference (plus some of the Public Lectures). T h e essence of the work of the Conference was provided by these formal papers, and so this volume presents the substance of the Conference in its essentials. It contains also—in the form of questions and answers —some of the substantial and extensive, and also enlightening and frequently controversial, discussion that took place at formal meetings, informal and special coffee hours, five receptions, and six weeks of constant personal interchange among the some 125 members of the Conference. Of course, no volume of this type could do full justice to a Conference which involved so much constant give-andtake discussion and formal and informal intellectual encounter and dialogue. This Conference was like the three preceding East-West Philosophers' conferences, except that, this time, the work was centered around one basic problem—namely, the comparative status of the individual in the major philosophical and cultural traditions of Asia and the West. As at the earlier Conferences, the work of the 1964 Conference was divided into six "Sections," in each of which one special aspect of the over-all problem was presented in formal papers and discussed extensively and in depth for an entire week—such discussion involving, as already said, not only that which took place at the formal meetings, but also that which occurred at informal coffee hours (which, by the way, were unanimously considered of great value), and that at informal—and practically continuous— personal discussions. This division of the work into six major Sections, each dealing with one of the basic aspects of the problem, provided the opportunity for concentrated explanation and discussion—although, as is stated in the Introduction to this volume, such rather strict demarcation, calling for possibly artificial divisions of the problem, was questionable and may have been somewhat misleading for the members from Asia. I n format, this fourth Conference resembled the previous Conferences. This consisted of (1) formal Conference meetings (four nights per week), at each of which, on most occasions, one formal paper was read in its entirety by its author and then discussed, first and primarily by the Panel Members, and then by the general xi

xii

Preface

membership (unfortunately, for too short a period of t i m e ) ; (2) daily coffee hours, at which the paper presented at the formal meeting the night before was discussed by the full membership in informal fashion and in much more detail than was possible at the formal meeting alone; (3) one Public Lecture by a Panel Member each of the last five weeks of the Conference; and (4) a few special coffee hours, at which supplementary papers or lectures (or papers which could not be included in the formal program because of the time factor) were presented and fully discussed. The format of this volume, in general, conforms with that of the Conference, and the order of the papers follows the order of their presentation at the formal meetings of the Conference and in the Conference program—Section by Section. (Professor William Ernest Hocking's paper—sent to the Conference and read by his son, Dr. Richard Hocking, because of Professor Hocking's inability to follow through on his original intention of participating in the Conference—is included in Section I, because it deals primarily with the metaphysical aspect of the problem.) At the end of most papers there are some Questions and Answers to represent what the authors considered the most important items in the discussion of their papers. Following the formal papers are some of the Public Lectures. (The lectures by Dr. Chan and Dr. T a r a Chand are not published herein, since these two Conference members have formal papers in the earlier Sections of the book.) One of the rather serious difficulties of organizing and editing this volume has been the matter of the length of the individual papers. This has been at times a rather delicate matter in some cases. The "rules of the game" called for papers of such length that they could be read at the formal Conference meetings within a 45-minute time limit—so as to provide the writer ample time for the presentation of basic pertinent ideas and also to provide for significant discussion. It was very difficult in some cases for the writer to restrict himself to this limit—and some did not do so. Accordingly—and unfortunately—the papers in this volume are of unequal length. In fairness to those who kept the length of their papers within prescribed limits, some attempt has been made to edit a few of the papers so as to bring them more into line with the "required" limits of length. This was most difficult, sometimes unsuccessful, and at times practically impossible. The technical problems of editing a volume like this are immense, because of the very nature of its contents, in terms of the variety of language and cultural perspectives, the necessity for Asian members to express themselves in sometimes difficult English terminology, the variety of styles which the several authors individually prefer in such matters as italics, capitals, hyphenation, personal names, trans-

Preface

xiii

literation, translations of the same words or titles from Asian languages, dates, etc. While consistency of style in all such matters is clearly the ideal—for the sake of clarity in reading—the editor has not felt that consistency throughout the volume is of such importance as to justify ignoring or rejecting the technical stylistic preferences of the outstanding scholars whose papers comprise this volume. This is not to say that the volume presents a carelessly permissive miscellany of styles. Consistency of style is sought as f a r as feasible, and consistency within each paper has been achieved. An attempt was made to achieve uniformity or consistency of style in the transliteration in the papers on the Far East without violating the expressed professional preferences of the authors. This attempt was unsuccessful. It was decided, therefore, to leave names and titles—including capitalization and hyphenation—in the papers and in the footnotes as the authors presented them. Uniformity of style will be achieved in the index, in spite of necessary conflict between entries there and the corresponding items in the text. Capitalization and hyphenation have been constant causes of concern to the perhaps overzealous editor. In neither case has precise uniformity been insisted upon or achieved, except within the several papers. Hyphenation has been used rather abundantly—wherever it seemed advisable for ease of reading on the part of those not too familiar with Asian languages, but not at the cost of technical accuracy. Technically, there is no precisely correct style of hyphenation, nor, in many cases, any consistent system of uniformity, in any of the Asian languages. "Correct" hyphenation in titles of books and articles proved next to impossible of achievement in the uniformity of styles preferred by authors. This was especially true in the footnotes. In some papers, hyphenation (and capitalization) was not changed at all in the editing process. Also, in some cases, footnotes were left unedited. Capitalization is decidedly "inconsistent" in the volume as a whole, and occasionally within individual papers. These differences are not inaccuracies. T h e capital and the lower case, in most instances, are used to indicate different meanings or statuses of the words underlined—metaphysical status usually calling for the capital, empirical status for the lower-case letter. Examples are numerous : Heaven or heaven, Nirvana or nirvana, Dharma or dharma, the Buddha and buddh.a-na.ture (and related terms), Sunyata or sunyata, Soul a n d / o r Self ( A t m a n and atman), State, Nature, Moral Law, etc. Following the wishes of authors of papers in this volume, italics for emphasis have been generally retained. Sometimes technically inaccurate styles have been used, for ease

xiv

Preface

of reading and in deference to common usage; for example, the formation of plurals of Sanskrit words by the terminal "s" (e.g., brdhmanas) ; and such terms (very occasionally) as "brahmin" instead of the correct "brdhmana"; also e.g., átman and karma (instead of karman). It has not been considered the prerogative of the editor—in this case, possibly less than sufficiently "strict"—to insist upon any mandatory or arbitrary style for the volume as a whole, partly because in many cases there is no "correct" style, but primarily out of respect for the judgment of the outstanding authorities responsible for the papers that make up this volume, and also because of the very nature of the volume, a symposium of papers by representatives of various traditions and cultures who do not think or write or express themselves in any one restricted manner. However, the editor assumes full responsibility for revising usage employed by some Chinese authors—and common usage—in cases of published items—called "chuans"—which are in fact articles or chapters or parts of standard works. These are enclosed within quotation marks and are not italicized. It should probably be mentioned that, since this book is in English, an effort has been made in the editing to make it as readable and intelligible as feasible, without committing too-gross violations of accuracy. For example, the aforementioned general Western practice of adding a final "s" to form plurals of Asian terms has been employed, although it is not technically accurate. Also, as mentioned, common usage has been followed occasionally. Also, there is some inconsistency in the matter of italicizing foreign words —sometimes common Asian words are italicized, sometimes not. These are matters of individual preference, complicated by an editor's somewhat obligatory reliance upon English dictionaries in the case of terms which have become matters of common usage in English. It is not felt, however, that any of these discrepancies will cause serious confusion—in fact, the opposite has been the purpose of the editing practices adopted. Small superior letters, comparable to footnote numbers, will be encountered frequently in articles by representatives of China and Japan. These letters indicate Chinese a n d / o r Japanese characters which are provided at the end of the respective articles. Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic terms, especially in cases where there is any possible doubt of translation, will be found within parentheses after the English (or the English will be in parentheses after the Asian terms, if the author prefers that style). Both in the text and in the footnotes, English equivalents of all terms, titles, and expressions in Asian languages will be given.

Preface

xv

In many instances—for the sake of clarity and historical perspective—dates are provided for some historical periods and outstanding thinkers in the Asian fields. Recognition—and sincere thanks—should be given here to those who have been so significantly helpful in the preparation of the papers and of the volume for publication, and there are many who deserve special mention and commendation. Without going into detail concerning specific ways in which they were helpful—and most co-operative—the editor personally wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Wing-tsit Chan, the editor's constant guide and advisor, Professor Kenneth K. Inada, Professor S. K. Saksena, Professor Chung-ying Cheng, Professor Richard P. Haynes, and to Professor Beatrice Yamasaki (who assumed responsibility for preparation of the Who's Who items found in the Appendix)—for specific and valuable help with editing chores; to Mr. Thomas Nickerson, Director of the University of Hawaii Press; to Mr. Robert Sparks, Managing Editor of the University of Hawaii Press; and to those authors of papers and lectures who co-operated so well in the editing of their contributions. Dr. Inada went far beyond "the call of duty," examining, with the editor, almost innumerable detailed and specific problems in the Asian papers during a final re-checking of all papers just before publication. He has been extremely helpful and deserves and hereby receives the editor's enthusiastic appreciation. (The editor, of course, assumes sole responsibility. ) A special expression of appreciation must go to Mrs. Aldyth V. Morris, the "very special assistant" to the editor of this volume—as she was also of the volumes from the two preceding conferences (.Essays in East-West Philosophy, 1949; and Philosophy and Culture —East and West, 1959). An attempt to recognize her unusually significant contribution has been made by citing her on the title page. The editor's secretary, Mrs. Floris Sakamoto, must also be included in this list and thanked for her industriousness, co-operative spirit, and patience throughout the long and difficult and confusing, and at times frustrating problems of typing and re-typing parts of the manuscript, and the many other chores involved—and there were many. To all who have been helpful, my sincere appreciation. To those who may find the editing too far short of perfection, my apologies. The editor assumes full responsibility for all errors for which editors are responsible—but not for discrepancies which were more or less beyond his control. To take one's work as editor as a very serious responsibility and at the same time to recognize the high scholarly

xvi

Preface

stature of those whose work constitutes the body of a volume—that is a rather precarious predicament. CHARLES A .

MOORE

Honolulu September 1, 1965 Video and audio tapes and 16-mm. films of many of the activities of the Conference are available for purchase—at cost. These include the reading of the formal papers, the discussion at formal meetings, the public lectures, and weekly summaries (plus an introductory statement and an over-all summary). For detailed information, please write to University of Hawaii Communications Center, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.

Greetings T H O M A S H. H A M I L T O N President, University of Hawaii Whenever one is asked to participate in the opening of a conference such as this, he inevitably tries to reflect on what may be its central significance. This is difficult, because gatherings like this result in important ends in a number of ways—some of which can be predicted, others of which cannot. But it seems to me that certainly one of the central essentials of this Conference being held here at this time is its appropriateness. And it seems to me appropriate in a number of ways. First, physically it is being held in these Islands, which lie geographically almost half way between the great land masses of North and South America and the continent of Asia. It is, in short, symbolically appropriate from this geographical point of view that there would be a place where those from the West and those from the East could convene to discuss their philosophical traditions as they relate one to the other. It is appropriate, too, that this Conference is held here because of the unusual composition of our citizenry. Over half of our citizens can trace their cultural and ethnic lineage directly back to the continent of Asia, while an almost equally large group were born of the intellectual tradition which stretches from Plato and Aristotle through St. Thomas, Rousseau, Locke, Mill, and Thomas Jefferson. There is, as far as I know, no place on earth where there live together in harmony groups with these diverse cultural affinities. It is appropriate, too, that this Conference is being held on a university campus. As we develop historical perspective, it becomes increasingly evident to us that ideas have consequences in the affairs of men. And it is ideas to which this Conference is devoted, and trafficking in ideas is the primary business of a university. As John Erskine has said so well, "We believe that the virtues wait upon intelligence—literally wait, in the history of the race. Whatever is elemental in man—love, hunger, fear—has obeyed from the beginning the discipline of intelligence. We are told that to kill one's aging parents was once a demonstration of solicitude; about the same time men hungered for raw meat and feared the sun's eclipse. Filial love, hunger, and fear are still motives to conduct, but intelligence has directed them to other ends. If we no longer hang the thief or flog the schoolboy, it is not that we think less harshly of xvii

xviii

Neal S. Blaisdell

theft or laziness, but that intelligence has found a better persuasion to honesty and enterprise. "But the lover of intelligence must be patient with those who cannot readily share his passion. Some pangs the mind will inflict upon the heart. It is a mistake to think that men are united by elemental affections. O u r affections divide us. We strike roots in immediate time and space, and fall in love with our locality, the customs and the language in which we were brought up. Intelligence unites us with mankind, by leading us in sympathy to other times, other places, other customs, but first the prejudiced roots of affection must be pulled up. These are the old pangs of intelligence. "Yet, if intelligence begins in a pang, it proceeds to a vision. Through measureless time its office has been to make of life an opportunity, to make goodness articulate, to make virtue a fact. But all that intelligence has accomplished dwindles in comparison with the vision it suggests and warrants. Beholding this long liberation of the human spirit, we foresee, in every new light of the mind, one unifying mind, wherein the h u m a n race shall know its destiny and proceed to it with satisfaction, as an idea moves to its proper conclusion; we conceive of intelligence at last as the infinite order, wherein man, when he enters it, shall find himself." 1 Thus, it is my pleasure to welcome you on behalf, not only of the University of Hawaii, but of the East-West Center, to this singularly appropriate Conference.

NEAL S. B L A I S D E L L Mayor of the City of Honolulu It is indeed a privilege to welcome this distinguished group to the Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu. We know that you citizens of the world of ideas feel very much at home here —as one of your Conference members has said, "In Hawaii no one is a stranger or foreigner"—and we are proud that you have chosen Honolulu as an appropriate meeting place during the period of our most significant development as a microcosm of East-West rapprochement. However, it might be even more appropriate for you to welcome the people of Honolulu and Hawaii to the world of the ideas you bring to our academic center, which is still rather remote from the periphery of our workaday world. You may observe here in Honolulu the processes of acculturation which have taken place almost instinctively and inevitably, the way a child gradually develops without being conscious of the process. 1 J o h n Erskine, " T h e 1913-14, p p . 184-185.

M o r a l Obligation to be I n t e l l i g e n t . "

Hibberl

Journal,

vol.

12,

Greetings

xix

We, on the other hand, are only beginning to observe, analyze, and direct those processes as our economic, political, and social activities are studied by professors and researchers. Probably very few of us have had the time, the training, or the tendency to view our own way of life from the objective and universal viewpoints you bring to this Conference. And so, we are, in a way, strangers in our own society, while you are visiting a community which is familiar to you as a significant point between the past and the future of man. One of your speakers at the 1959 Conference, Professor Gray L. Dorsey, of the Washington University Law School, traced the influence of philosophy on law and politics in Western civilization. He said that from the earliest beginnings of Western civilization a central purpose of society has been power, whereas the central purpose of Chinese society was the establishment and maintenance of universal harmony. Here in Honolulu we can trace these two concepts as they gradually approach and include each other. We can see in the history of Hawaii, during the past century, the introduction of Western technology and the corporate system, concurrent with the introduction of Oriental hand-labor and the family system of thrift. We see those systems merging to produce that segment of our community—Americans of Chinese ancestry—which now has the highest per capita income in Hawaii, and still retains its closeknit family structure in modern business enterprises. Professors of religion and philosophy from Japan, in 1959, analyzed the factors which have contributed to the complex character of the Japanese people, such as the ancient codes of concord in all human relationships, the avoidance of dissent and self-assertion, the strong attachment to both family and state, and the preoccupation with immediate, tangible pursuits. As Professor Nakamura, of Tokyo University, said, Japan alone among Asian nations made rapid progress in modernization because of this emphasis on practical affairs. Here in Hawaii, we have observed their characteristic of noninvolvement modified by the rapid political ascendancy of the Nisei, who now constitute a majority in our state and local governments. And this has been accomplished without any appreciable loss of their socially mature qualities of courtesy, self-control, and concern for the feelings of others—qualities greatly needed in Western political life. Dr. S. K. Saksena, Head of the Department of Philosophy at Lucknow University, pointed out that in the West the term "practical" refers to man's control of his environment, whereas in India it has the opposite meaning of mastery of one's own self. He said it was heartening that one of America's great sociological thinkers,

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John A. Burns

City Planner Lewis Mumford, was advocating as much emphasis on individual redevelopment as on urban redevelopment. This more advanced concept is now a recognized necessity for our rapidly growing metropolitan area. At a recent Urban Renewal Conference in Honolulu, special interest was shown in the discussions of social planning for individual enrichment. And so, in the day-to-day life of our multi-racial community, we are receptive to the philosophical ideas first propounded at conferences such as this one. We are overwhelmingly involved in the economic or political or social obstacles to the accomplishment, and, indeed, we may never see the fulfillment of advanced ideas in one lifetime. But, since you have walked and talked among us, we in Honolulu and Hawaii are more aware of our singular role in the long evolution of civilization, which was summed up at your 1959 Conference by Chancellor Radhakrishnan, of Delhi University, when he said, "History is not made by the tumult and uproar, but it is made in silence by changes in the minds of men." We are grateful to those among us who have made it possible for you to come here every five years, so that ideas and action may accelerate together in a harmonious environment conducive to progress.

JOHN

A.

BURNS

Governor, State of Hawaii

Mr. Mayor, President Hamilton, Dr. Moore, and distinguished participants in the East-West Philosophers' Conference, my fellow Americans. We in Hawaii are distinctly pleased, we are heartened in our endeavor to meet our challenges, we are overwhelmed by our opportunity to be your hosts at this most meaningful Conference. I would perhaps take a small exception to President Hamilton's placement of the relationship of ideas. It seems from the course of history that we can remove intelligence from man and have him act like an animal. But we can never make him act as a totally intelligent being would. We all hope this day can change, and perhaps the beginning of the change is with the confrontation of those who are possessors and proponents of ideas as they meet here to exchange those ideas with one another and offer the exchange for public consideration. Diverse as ideas and presentations may be, we gain by the very diversity with a special dividend of strength and development in this time of battle for the minds of men. As we approach the twenty-first century, nothing is more impor-

Greetings

xxi

tant than the development of an ability to accommodate, to reason together, as our great President Lyndon Baines Johnson has so frequently said. If we are to carry forward the heritage and the civilization that we have today, we must find a means of reconciling different ideas, different philosophies. We must be able to move forward with strength born of the very diversity that binds us together. I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge the very great debt the State of Hawaii owes to Dr. Charles Moore. It was my privilege to experience his energetic persuasiveness and his steadfast persistence prior to the last East-West Philosophers' Conference when he sought to have a certain gentleman, now the President of India, His Excellency, Mr. Radhakrishnan, participate in the Conference. I know and I think we should all know that Dr. Moore, laboring against overwhelming odds, has been the father, the Godfather, and the midwife of the East-West Conferences. I think we ought to acknowledge contributions of others, too, who have stimulated these meetings held in the hope and confidence that the minds of men can be brought to understand philosophies held by others. Proper recognition should go to Dr. H u n g Wo Ching, who determined after attending the last Philosophers' Conference that ten years was too long to wait for another. As a consequence of his initiative and persistence, with the co-operation of Dr. Moore, we have let only five years elapse between East-West Philosophers' Conferences. To all participants, we extend our heartiest Aloha. May you not only find exhilaration and experience a contribution to your thinking, but may you also find in Hawaii the true spirit of Aloha, the true brotherhood of man, and may you return whence you came heartened by the evidence that a brotherhood of man can be made to work, not only in Hawaii, but throughout the world. We are delighted to have you with us. We hope that you not only labor productively here during the Conference, but that you also learn to know something of Hawaii and our people. Mahalo and God bless you.

The Status of the Individual in East and West

C H A R L E S A. M O O R E

Introduction: The conference, the problem, the program* Now that you outstanding philosophers from many parts of the world have been welcomed by the President of the University, by the Mayor of Honolulu, and by the Governor of the State of Hawaii —in that order—may I on behalf of the Steering Committee of the Conference and the Department of Philosophy, and for myself as Conference Director, welcome you, thank you for joining us in our work, and express the hope that you will enjoy your stay here and find the Conference a rewarding personal and philosophical experience. And, on behalf of the Steering Committee of the Conference, the Department of Philosophy, and myself, I welcome this happy opportunity to express our enthusiastic appreciation for the fine co-operation we have received from the Administration of the sponsoring University of Hawaii and, particularly, its able and philosophically oriented President, Dr. Thomas Hale Hamilton. This Introduction is essentially a "work paper" to describe the background, the purposes, and the program of the Conference; to suggest some of the many problems which are significantly pertinent for our consideration; and, if I may, to set the tone of our deliberations. The University of Hawaii has conducted East-West Philosophers' Conferences at ten-year intervals over the last quarter of a century —1939, 1949, and 1959. This is the fourth such Conference. This one is being held after only five years, thanks to the voluntary co-operation and generosity of some 100 individuals, business organizations, and Foundations in Hawaii—under the leadership of Dr. Hung Wo Ching—who provided all the funds necessary to finance the Conference. The raising of these funds and the donations themselves reflect the spirit of these Conferences and the spirit of Hawaii, dedicated as both are to the attempt to enhance and to embody mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and the West. We cannot begin this Conference without calling attention to this truly remarkable and completely multiracial achievement and * T h e substance of this introduction is a revised combination of part of a p a p e r distributed at the public ceremony opening the Conference and remarks made at that meeting.

3

4

Charles A. Moore

without thanking all those who have thus made this Conference possible. All of these Conferences originated and have continued with three ideas and ideals in mind: (1) to help develop greater mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and the West at the level of philosophical conviction; (2) to encourage total or global perspective in philosophy; and (3) the conviction that provincialism is both philosophically unsound and dangerous, possibly tragic, in the contemporary world. These are philosophy conferences, but they are unique in several ways and for several reasons. For one thing, we have never been concerned exclusively with the purely intellectual or academic or technical examination of philosophical concepts and problems as such—or with philosophy in the abstract, or with its problems in a vacuum. We have been concerned, rather—and here we may reveal evidence of learning from the East—with the significance of philosophy as the ground or foundation for living and for culture, in the conviction that genuine understanding can be achieved only by an understanding of the fundamental ideas and ideals and attitudes of peoples and cultures. These Conferences are unique also in the sense that we have deliberately sought, not only mutual understanding among peoples, East and West, but also the generic philosophical goal of total perspective—and in this we claim genuinely unique philosophical status. Also, we have insisted that the philosophies of the several major peoples and cultures with which these Conferences have been concerned must be represented by scholars from and within those philosophical and cultural traditions. They understand their cultures better and therefore can very probably explain them to others better than "outside" (although perhaps more objective) scholars and interpreters. We have worked on the premise that understanding can come only through seeing and understanding others as they see themselves. These Conferences are unique also—up to this one, at least—in the sense that the underlying attitude has been almost exclusively that of trying to understand and comprehend and even "feel with" the other fellow. Mutual understanding is, in our judgment, based upon openmindedness and cordiality to alien ideas, rather than mutual criticism (the trademark, alas, of much of scholarship). Unphilosophically perhaps, we have not so much sought solutions of philosophical problems by mutual criticism as we have sought the deepest possible mutual understanding and respect. I think we can say that this spirit of these Conferences is unique. And, further, these Conferences have been unique in the specific

Introduction: T h e conference, the problem, the program

5

delimitation of the area or areas under special consideration, namely, East and West. Of course, East and West comprehend the whole of mankind, but, in the light of the now recognized profound significance of the great philosophical traditions of Asia and because of Hawaii's special interest in and qualifications for the search for mutual understanding between these traditions and the West, we have resisted—even in our search for total perspective in philosophy —the attempt to become an all-comprehensive international conference. That work is done by others. Perhaps this East-West delimitation also emanates from the conviction that Asia has great philosophical wisdom to offer to the total perspective of philosophy, but, tragically, that it has been widely ignored by the West. It has been our purpose to work in the direction of overcoming this unphilosophical lack of total perspective. We have one other uniqueness, and that is the six-week length of the Conferences. This has been one of the happiest aspects of the program: the chance to become really acquainted personally and philosophically. This long opportunity for personal and informal talks, chats, and discussions—and arguments on occasion—has been unanimously and strongly cited in the past as one of the chief advantages of these Conferences, and the major factor in producing genuine understanding and mutual respect—as well as lasting personal and professional friendships. These friendships have carried the spirit and the substance of our work into succeeding years in many ways and with many valuable results, such as collaborative projects, professional correspondence, visiting professorships, etc., as well as the warmth of personal respect and of respect for the traditions which these new friends represent. Another unusual and valuable—though supplementary—feature of these Conferences has been the offering of a number of special and especially related courses in the Summer Session of the University of Hawaii. These courses—usually some eight in number—deal with Chinese, Indian, Buddhist (and Japanese), and East-West Comparative Philosophy. Courses at the elementary and at the advanced level are offered in each of the major traditions of Asia. "Seminars" are offered in East-West philosophy. In these seminars topics and problems encountered at Conference meetings are frequently brought up for discussion in the context of the course. These courses are all taught by authorities in their field, all Conference members. These special courses are in addition to the several regular courses in Western philosophy offered by the Department of Philosophy of the University. I recommend that in our deliberations we keep constantly in mind three major lessons from our past Conferences. First, there is the great significance of historical perspective (in our descriptions, in

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Charles A. Moore

our j u d g m e n t s a n d interpretations, a n d in our comparative evaluations) as so forcefully emphasized in 1959 by D r . H u Shih. Second, there is t h e frequently cited unsoundness a n d injustice of the comm o n practice of disparagingly c o m p a r i n g one's own ideals with the practices of others. And, third, there is the constant danger of falling into the colloquial t r a p or cliché of thinking of "the East" a n d "the West" in utter violation of the great philosophical a n d cultural complexity a n d variety in a n d a m o n g all the areas a n d traditions t h a t are our special concern. T h e problem of the present Conference is more specific t h a n that examined by any of o u r preceding Conferences. But, even so, our problem requires clarification so as to prevent our w a n d e r i n g afield. Formally, our problem is " T h e World a n d the Individual in East a n d West." In the revised Brochure a n n o u n c i n g the Conference, I have taken the liberty of a d d i n g a clarifying subtitle, namely, " T h e status of the individual in reality, thought, a n d culture in East a n d West." W e shall still be vitally concerned with the basic p u r poses of all of our past Conferences, namely, m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the b r o a d e n i n g of perspective in philosophy, but we shall now be directly a n d primarily concerned with this one specific problem of the individual. T o quote f r o m the official B r o c h u r e : " T h e status of the individual has been a constant a n d basic problem in the history of philosophy in both Asia and the West a n d in practically all the m a j o r philosophical a n d cultural traditions within each of these areas. T h e [at least alleged] varying status of the individual has also been the basis of serious m u t u a l criticism a n d misunderstanding between East a n d West, a n d is a most crucial problem in the contemporary world—socially, politically, religiously, a n d philosophically. " I n view of the p r o f o u n d a n d far-reaching significance of this problem, the Conference will study its philosophical aspects in d e p t h a n d as comprehensively as time a n d circumstances permit. T h e Conference will consider concepts, theories, attitudes, a n d practices —past and present—in the m a j o r philosophical a n d cultural traditions of East a n d West. I t will e x a m i n e — a n d a t t e m p t to overcome — c o m m o n pertinent misunderstandings a n d antagonisms which exist between East a n d West. I t will thus come to grips, philosophically, with one of the most f u n d a m e n t a l problems facing the cont e m p o r a r y a n d changing world of Asia a n d the West." T h e general belief here—call it a cliché—has been widespread, a n d serious, on both sides, namely, t h a t in t h e East (the entire East) there is no respect or dignity or even autonomy for the individual,

Introduction: The conference, the problem, the program

7

who is lost, sometimes said to be annihilated, in an Absolute, in nothingness, in the family, in the state, or in social tradition, whereas in the West, on the other hand, the individual is everything, and the group, no matter what it is, is of relative insignificance. T h e cliche in the West is that the group exists for the individuals. We hear of Western democracy and "Oriental despotism." We hear of Western individualism and that life is cheap in the Orient. We hear of personal immortality in the West and ultimate absorption or annihilation in the East, and on and on and on, but all to the same effect. And that effect is the basis of fundamental mutual criticism and disrespect—and frequently mutual antagonism —because the alleged gap is so great and the issue so vital. T h e six Sections of our agenda correspond to the six specific areas of concentrated attention with which we will attempt to bring into focus for special consideration the six major aspects of the over-all problem. T h e point to note here is that our problem is fraught with many difficulties, great complexity, and much confusion. We must be willing to have our claims and counterclaims examined thoroughly if we are to achieve either mutual understanding or greater philosophical knowledge and perspective. There are certain negative aspects of our problem—what our problem is not. For one thing, the cold war and the political East-West orientation. This is not a conference on communism versus democracy or the free world versus the communist world—although what we say and do here could have clear implications for that relationship. We are concerned here and now—as at all these Conferences—with the traditional, the philosophical and cultural, East and West. Also, we are not here concerned directly—certainly not primarily —with the nature of the individual, except insofar as that problem is inseparable from the many-sided problem of the status of the individual. Nor will we be concerned directly with "individualism" or "the meaning of humanism." The Conference is based upon the thought that the status of the individual is a sufficiently distinct and significant problem to be examined in its own right. We are concerned with the status of the individual human being regardless of how the respective traditions interpret the essence or nature of that individual human being. It is of vital importance that we limit ourselves to this specific problem; otherwise, our work will not be done and we will vastly increase the difficulties we will have to face. I suggest that we will have our hands full, first, trying to determine what we mean by significant status—freedom, equality, equality of opportunity, independence, self-responsibility, or whatever—and in determining the acceptance and recognition of these marks of a

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Charles A.

Moore

genuine individual in the areas and traditions with which we are concerned. Again, we are not to limit ourselves, this time, to explanatory description, which has been the general mode heretofore because of our dominant and almost exclusive interest in understanding each other. We are again seeking deeper understanding of the several traditions, East and West, but, this time, also the way for possible advance in both theory and practice with reference to the status of the individual. To this end, we must engage in mutual examination, comparative evaluation, and both philosophical and ordinary criticism, in the hope of achieving such theoretical and practical progress. In the course of our work this time—especially in the areas devoted to social thought and practices and to legal and political thought and institutions—we shall encounter sensitive problems and situations, matters which because of current prominence are fraught with emotion. It is incumbent upon us all to realize the fundamentally philosophical nature of this Conference and to avoid every temptation to ignore or to destroy the spirit and character of our approach to the specific problems at hand—and to avoid emotional reactions. Specifically, we are not here to fight the cold war or the battle of civil rights in their political and emotional ramifications —this is not a conference on race relations, discrimination, or integration versus segregation, although many of us in the United States are acutely aware of and concerned about these problems. In this procedure, involving mutual questioning, thorough examination, comparative evaluation, and forthright presentation of the facts, it is hoped that the spirit of our earlier Conferences will be maintained, namely, the attitude of cordiality, openmindedness, and friendliness of discussion—expressed in the Brochure in the words "frank but cordial" examination of each other's points of view. Criticism as such is not our purpose. But we must resort to "the kind of face-to-face dialogue which is necessary in such cases," to use the words of a U N E S C O publication. We will assume that, as someone has said, "instead of widening differences, candor [may] bridge them." T h e plan of work has been formulated by the Steering Committee in a manner intended to produce both comprehensive and detailed examination and understanding. The main feature of this plan is the division of the problem into six major Sections. In these special areas we shall attempt to understand and evaluate—mutually—the status of the individual in what seem to be the six major aspects of the problem. Let me identify these six areas and illustrate each— and its importance—by one concise example or problem.

Introduction: T h e conference, the problem, the program

9

First, we shall consider the metaphysical—or the ontological— status (or statuses) of the individual in the several major traditions as perhaps the most fundamental aspect of our problem, because here we shall be concerned with ultimates. T h e cliché here, of course, refers to the monistic East and the pluralistic West. Second, we will investigate the question as to whether or not the several traditions emphasize—generally or exclusively—certain epistemologica! approaches to knowledge or certain methodological idiosyncrasies or ways of thinking and philosophizing which either indicate or determine that tradition's basic attitude toward the status of the individual. For example, we will investigate the cliché that the mystical East obviously must and does downgrade the individual, or denies him or ignores him, whereas the empirical and scientific West must obviously recognize the individual and belittle the universal or Absolute, or its equivalent. Third, in the area of religion, we shall be concerned with both the empirical and the ultimate status of the individual. Here the cliché is one of extreme dichotomy, to the effect that the West is dominated by the concept of a personal God, the infinite value of the individual spiritual human being, personal and individual immortality, and never, except in heterodoxy, the loss or denial of such individual status in any form of substantial identity with God or a mystic One. On the contrary, the East—and that is the phrase the cliché uses—is dominated by mysticism or Absolutism, which, of course, ignores or transcends or absorbs—and perhaps, in one special form, annihilates—the individual in the ultimate reaches of spiritual achievement. Fourth, we shall examine the problem of the status of the individual in the area of ethics. Our primary concern here will be the question as to whether or not the individual has the right of personal, or private, or individual conscience or moral convictions which may stand up against or at least challenge social or traditional morality —or whether the individual has no choice in attempting to be ethical but to submit to the rules and regulations of the moral code of his tradition, whether they come from God, from society, or from history. Here, too, the cliché sets the East over against the West. T h e common interpretation is that in the East the individual has no right of private conscience or moral right to challenge the tradition or group morality, especially the family, perhaps; whereas, in emphasis at least, the ethical autonomy of the individual and the right of conscience are mandatory and fundamental in the tradition of Western ethics. In the fifth Section, entitled "Social Thought and Practices," we may wander somewhat from the strict domain of technical philosophy by being concerned with practices as well as social philosophy

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Charles A. Moore

as such, but it is an indispensable part of our work to attempt to determine, under the guidance of our social philosophers, not only the status of the individual in the social thought-pattern of the respective traditions, but also whether or not these social philosophies, taken somewhat as ideals, are borne out in practice insofar as the status and importance of the individual are concerned. T h e cliché here also divides East from West, in both theory and practice, since it is thought widely that in both social thought and practice in the East the individual is dominated by and subservient to the grouping to which he belongs, primarily the family but also the social structure as a whole, and, perhaps especially in Japan, the state; whereas in the West the individual is thought to have prior or primary significance in social philosophies and societies, the emphasis being that society exists for the individuals and that the individual is not required to submit to social conditions or social practices to anything like the degree to which such subservience dominates the Eastern traditions. T h e sixth and last area of our work is that of legal and political thought and institutions—certainly a comprehensive and complex area. T h e political problem—in our cliché context—may be thought of as "Oriental despotism" and political authoritarianism in the East, as opposed to democracy and liberalism and political individualism in the West, such that all Western totalitarianisms, past and present, are untypical. Here, as everywhere in our work, we must consider both traditional and idealistic theories and contemporary realities. And specifically, for example, we must face the alleged lessening of genuine democracy in the contemporary West and the problem of the authenticity, as it were, of the newly developed democracies of Asia. T h e legal part of our problem may be expressed in the contrast of the scientific and rationalistic legal philosophy characteristic of the West—a legal philosophy sometimes called by Northrop "law of contract"—as contrasted with the legal philosophy of Asia, the "law of status." In this Western concept, all men are "equal before the law," "enjoy equal protection under the law," or are a part of "our tradition of freedom under law." In the East, on the other hand, one's legal status seems to be determined primarily by one's biological or family status, and mediation or avoidance or compromise of the law is the rule—in serious contrast to the more rationalistic, more mechanical, more absolutist, and more universalistic legal philosophy of the West. Equality of individuals before the law is the crux of the matter, and in this interpretation it again seems that East is East and West is West. Our work is thus divided into six specific areas. There is possibly a serious defect here. This is that any such departmentalizing of the

Introduction: The conference, the problem, the program

11

problem is unsound—certainly and fundamentally to our Asian colleagues. This division of the problem into six separate topics or areas is a falsification of the actual unification or unity of life in its many aspects. T h e falsity of our analysis thus lies in virtually forcing Easterners to think in Western terms. T o the Asian, the six-way approach may seem to make it impossible even to clarify the issues. In fact, some of our Asian representatives have had great difficulty preparing their papers for the Conference because of this division of work, which must seem to them artificial and perhaps even arbitrary. There is some overlapping among the papers from Asia, Section by Section, because of this intrinsic Asian attitude toward the wholeness of life and experience and thought. Part of our work could be—and perhaps should be—what may be called "unfinished business." That is, the problem of this Conference was anticipated, if not necessitated, by a number of observations that have been made by members of previous Conferences —but never followed up or challenged. For their suggestiveness, let me cite a few such statements, both for their explanatory value and also for the problematic character of the interpretations implied. In this way, we can look more fully and perhaps more critically, so as to see more clearly and possibly to ask some questions. (Every one of the following statements was made by a member of one or more of these Conferences.) "Rigidity and conservatism, the inherent tendencies of every legal system, were accentuated in the case of the shari'a ["a formalized code of conduct extending over all of life"]. . . . The most important implication of all this . . . was the danger it brought to the autonomy of ethical action. Is there a question of ethical action if individuals are expected merely to perform what is obligatory and avoid what is prohibited? Would ethics not become merely a catechism?" "Just as religion was the basis of the ethical thinking of the Indians, family the basis of the practical morals of the Chinese, so the State was the basis of all thought in Japan. T h e Japanese way of thinking is undergoing a change, but their thinking is an inheritance, a tradition." " H e [the Japanese] holds onto the traditions of the past with one hand and with the other reaches for the future. . . ." "Science demands individuality in the sense of freedom of thought on the part of the individual—and . . . personal moral integrity." In India, ". . . man, the embodied self, is conceived of as possessing potentiality for infinite perfection. . . . It is the duty of the

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Charles A. Moore

ideal State to create conditions and opportunities that will gradually help man overcome his ignorance, selfishness, and immoral tendencies, so that a harmonious community may evolve in which every individual can advance toward the supreme goal of spiritual freedom. . . ." "Asians are not especially fond of the law because of its rigidity and its impersonality, but no one [from the East] denies the significance of universal or absolute law in matters of great importance." "Each of the major areas [considered at the 1959 Conference] considers itself decidedly democratic in basic political philosophy, in spite of obvious differences in detail both in theory and in practice in the course of history." " T h e nationalistic spirit [in Japan] . . . produced a national unity that produced the idea of a strong centralized State. . . . Confucianism produced in China and in Japan diametrically opposed results." " T h e Japanese have learned to attach unduly every importance to their human nexus in disregard of the individual." "Every nation has a way of living and thinking which is more less peculiar to it, constituting, as it were, its distinctive spirit. . For instance, the American way of life is marked by the spirit democracy and fair play. The spirit may not be fully realized actual practice, but that makes no difference. . . ."

or . . of in

" T o love freedom is an elementary human trait on which Americans have no monopoly." "Do those traditions where mysticism is prominent or prevalent mean by freedom, not freedom of man in Nature and in society, but freedom from them?" " T h e Chinese never went behind sensed objects to postulated objects [as compared with the West which always goes behind sensed objects to postulated objects or principles]." " I have not run across any of this [religious domination] in accounts of Eastern thought, which was in general individualistic. . . ." "Freedom is inherently individualistic. . . . Freedom pertains primarily to an individual mind and world." "Emphasis on the importance of the individual is common to all the Indian systems of philosophy." " T h e individual's right to life and freedom of development is recognized [in Indian philosophy] as the fundamental right."

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13

"Confucians consider the family as the foundation of society." "Respect for individual dignity, the worth of the individual personality, the belief that man is sacred, himself an end and not to be used as means—these were identified as universal ideas and not confined to either East or West." (From a Seminar Report in 1949.) " T h e Orient has never proposed individualism as a primary principle, nor the sacredness of personality." " W e have tried to instill into the Orient a disposition to fight injustice, and to reform its institutions in the interest of individual freedom of action. . . . And the modern Orient . . . finds the germ of individual, aggressive effort in its own philosophy and fans these into new life." " T h e ethical world has to be a world of plurality." "Oriental philosophy as a whole has been believed to allow no reality for the individual. T h e individual is nothing more than a drop of water in the ocean, it is believed. In the ultimate sense this is true in Hinduism, Taoism, and Buddhism. . . . Taking all Oriental philosophies together . . . there is undoubtedly the fact that the Many are definitely subordinate to the One, on which it depends for its ultimate reality. In other words, Oriental philosophy is at bottom monistic. . . ." " T h e West has always felt the same longing for an all-embracing unity. It achieved it in the reason which permits unequivocal communication and does not dissolve the particular. . . . In the East, the ultimate unity is realized through elimination of every distinction; in the West, the distinctions are carefully emphasized, and the unity has to be achieved through their harmonization. . . . The Western search for unity discovers the totality which maintains individual and personal distinctions. . . ." " T h e Chinese political authority may be summed up in a few words. Political authority is a trust conferred by the Mandate of Heaven upon the government for the welfare of the people. T h e government is created for the people. . . ." These striking statements and interpretations indicate the complexity and the difficulty of the problem and its vital significance both for philosophy and for mutual understanding. We who are and have been connected with these Conferences are happy about the purposes behind the Conferences, the work done at them, the spirit embodied in our deliberations, and the results achieved. Some of these results are quite tangible and direct—books, articles, seminars, conferences, courses, etc.—while others are intan-

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Charles A. Moore

gible and indirect—such as a greater recognition of and respect for the philosophies of Asia. While it would be immodest and inappropriate here to enlarge upon this aspect of our work, let us hope that these Conferences have contributed significantly to the enhancement of total perspective in philosophy—what Professor E. A. Burtt has called "world philosophizing"—and to greater mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and the West. One final matter, a question. Why hold these Conferences in Hawaii time after time? T o answer this, let me mention four specific items. First: At the end of the 1959 Conference I politely suggested that we might consider holding the next Conference somewhere in Asia, at New Delhi, or Tokyo, or Taipei, or elsewhere. T h e reaction was one of strong and unanimous disapproval springing from the apparently unanimous conviction that only in Hawaii could such a conference be held in the spirit in which such a conference must be held, namely, the spirit of cordiality, openmindedness, and the deliberate attempt to understand each other, as is so well exemplified in the life of multi-racial Hawaii and in its famous racial harmony. Second: T h e fact that at the end of the last Conference one Asian member told the Chairman of the Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii, "This is the first international conference my Oriental colleagues and I have ever attended where we felt on an equal footing with everybody else." Third: A fellow Asian representative supplemented that by saying, " I n Hawaii nobody feels like an outsider or a foreigner." And, fourth: This particular Conference is being held here—partly, at least—for the practical reason that it is directly the result of local support and generosity and of the spirit of mutual understanding that pervades the life and thought of Hawaii, as evidenced by this voluntarily proffered support. Speaking now to our outstanding guests: we in Hawaii consider these Conferences—and the purposes underlying them—most fitting to Hawaii because of the cordial, harmonious, interracial, and intercultural spirit which pervades and characterizes these Islands. We also consider it a great opportunity to undertake the work of these Conferences. We further consider it a special responsibility, one which derives from our extreme interest in and our unique qualifications for this particular undertaking. May I, as Conference Director and as representative of all those responsible for this Conference, and on behalf of all who are here tonight and thousands besides, welcome you to the Conference and request that all of you join us in the responsibility of carrying it out successfully and significantly—together. It seems appropriate to list here the personnel of the Conference.

Introduction: The conference, the problem, the program

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T h e donors whose generosity m a d e this Conference possible will be listed in my "Concluding Remarks." T h e following is a list of the members of the Conference—with their academic institutional affiliations (the names are printed in Western style). Apologies are hereby extended to any members whose names are not included—the reason for this being admitted lack of certainty concerning attendance, etc. Relatively brief Who's W h o items about the Panel Members are included later in the volume.

STEERING COMMITTEE

Wing-tsit Chan, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire Cornelius Kruse, Emeritus, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut Sterling M . M c M u r r i n , University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii, Chairman H a j i m e N a k a m u r a , University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan S. K . Saksena, University of Hawaii W. H . Werkmeister, University of Southern California, Los Angeles

ADVISORY M E M B E R S

Willard Wilson, Secretary of the University of Hawaii J o h n M . Allison, Deputy Acting Chancellor, East-West Center Shunzo Sakamaki, Dean of Summer Session, University of Hawaii

HONORARY MEMBERS

William Ernest Hocking, Emeritus, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts (by paper, in absentia) F. S. C. Northrop, Emeritus, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (unable to attend) Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of India (unable to attend) Gregg M . Sinclair, President Emeritus, University of Hawaii D . T . Suzuki, Emeritus, Otani University, Kyoto, Japan

PANEL MEMBERS

Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Visva-Bharati West Bengal, India

University,

Santiniketan,

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Charles A. Moore

Wing-tsit Chan, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire T a r a Chand, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, India Mrs. Surama Dasgupta, Luc know University, Lucknow, India Thomé H. Fang, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, China John N. Findlay, King's College, University of London, London, England M a x H. Fisch, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois Tesshi Furukawa, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Ichiro Hori, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan Yu-wei Hsich, New Asia College, Hong Kong Takeyoshi Kawashima, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Masaaki Kosaka, President, Tokyo Gakugei University, Tokyo, Japan Cornelius Krusé, Emeritus, Wesley an University, Middletown, Connecticut G. P. Malalasekera, Emeritus, University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, Ceylon (by paper, in absentia) Harold E. McCarthy, University of Hawaii Richard P. McKeon, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois Sterling M. McMurrin, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah Y. P. Mei, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa Shöson Miyamoto, Emeritus, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii T . R . V. Murti, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, U.P., India Winfield E. Nagley, University of Hawaii Hajime Nakamura, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Raymond Polin, The Sorbonne, Paris, France Karl H. Potter, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota Fazlur Rahman, Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi, Pakistan (by paper, in absentia) P. T . Raju, The College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio Miguel Reale, Säo Paulo University, Säo Paulo, Brazil (by paper, in absentia) Constantin Regamey, Lausanne University, Lausanne, Switzerland S. K . Saksena, University of Hawaii John E. Smith, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut Edward W. Strong, University of California, Berkeley, California Chün-i T'ang, New Asia College, Hong Kong Yoshifumi Ueda, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan W. H. Werkmeister, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California John C. H. Wu, Seton Hall University, South Orange, New

Jersey

Introduction: The

conference,

the problem,

the program

17

GENERAL M E M B E R S H I P

B. L. Atreya, Emeritus, U.P., India

Banaras

Hindu

University,

Varanasi,

Paul J . Braisted, President, Edward W. Hazen Foundation, New Haven, Connecticut Cecil C. Brett, Monmouth College, Monmouth, Illinois D. Mackenzie Brown, University of California, Santa Barbara, California Robert W. Browning, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois Jane Cauvel, The Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado T e Chen, New Asia College, Hong Kong Chung-ying Cheng, University of Hawaii John W. Clifford ( T h e R e v . ) , National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, China Robert A. Cornett, Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, Virginia Charles L. Crowe, Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Virginia D. H. Daugherty, American Council of Learned Societies, New York City, New York Richard J . DeMartino, Otani University, Kyoto, Japan Ryösetsu Fujiwara, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan Edwin N. Garlan, Reed College, Portland, Oregon Wallace Gray, Southwestern College, Winfield, Kansas Floyd A. Harper, Institute for Humane Studies, Stanford, California Philomène Harrison, South Pasadena, California Kyosho Hayashima, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Richard P. Haynes, University of Hawaii Maylon H. Hepp, Denison University, Granville, Ohio Teikichi Hiraoka, Kagoshima University, Kagoshima City, Japan Grimsley T . Hobbs, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana Richard Hocking, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia Clarence S. Howe, Humboldt State College, Areata, California Siu-chi Huang, Beaver College, Glenside, Pennsylvania Ronald M . Huntington, Chapman College, Orange, California Félix C. Ilärraz, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho Kenneth K . Inada, University of Hawaii Yuho Kasuga, The Japan Defense Academy, Tokyo, Japan Charles Landesman, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas Leta Jane Lewis, Fresno State College, Fresno, California Shu-hsien Liu, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan, China Ryoen Minamoto, Nihon Women's University, Tokyo, Japan

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Charles A. Moore

Prem Nath, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India N. A. Nikam, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota Jennings G. Olson, Jr., Weber State College, Ogden, Utah Troy Organ, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio Tze-yau Pang, Christian Study Center, Hong Kong Herta Pauly, Upsala College, East Orange, New Jersey John C. Plott, Honolulu Joseph Politella, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio William L. Reese, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware Hugo Reimann, Goetheanum, Dornach, Switzerland Michael D. Resnik, University of Hawaii Dale Riepe, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York Dorothy (Mrs. W. C.) Roberts, Honolulu Mary Edith Runyan, Elmira College, Elmira, New York Mitsuyoshi Saigusa, Kokugakuin University, Tokyo, Japan Hiroshi Sakamoto, Otani University, Kyoto, Japan Herbert L. Searles, Emeritus, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California B. B. Singh, University of Gorakhpur, Gorakhpur, U.P., India Bhek Pati Sinha, The City College of the City University of New York, New York City, N.Y. Malcolm F. Stewart, Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois Fred G. Sturm, Western College for Women, Oxford, Ohio Franklin S. Takei, Clarion State College, Clarion, Pennsylvania S. M. Tewari, University of Gorakhpur, Gorakhpur, U.P., India T . K . Venkateswaran, Colorado Woman's College and University of Denver, Denver, Colorado William S. Weedon, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia Donald A. Wells, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington James E. Whitehurst, Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Illinois Beatrice Yamasaki, California State College at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California Tokuryu Yamauchi, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan

STUDENT MEMBERS

(AUDITORS)

Robert S. Anderson, University of British Columbia, Canada John S. Barbour, University of Hawaii Anne Berens, University of Hawaii

Vancouver,

Introduction: The conference, the problem, the program

19

Harold A. Bassford, University of Hawaii Charles Bush, University of Hawaii Fred Burian, University of Hawaii David K. Coe, University of Hawaii Douglas D. Dayne, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Kuang T. Fan, University of Hawaii Arnold M. Hall, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California Bruce Halverson, University of Hawaii David Ishizaki, University of Hawaii Charles J. Jones, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado W. Michael Kavanaugh, University of Hawaii John M. Roller, University of Hawaii Rhoda P. LeCocq, University of Hawaii ' Michael J. Makibe, University of Hawaii Ashok Malhotra, University of Hawaii Jeffrey L. Masson, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Bimal Krishna Motilal, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Anne Pic'l, University of Hawaii Gerald Poliks, University of Hawaii Douglas Price, University of Hawaii Paul S. Rosenberg, University of California, Berkeley, California Melvin Sakaguchi, University of Hawaii Norman Steffenson, DePauw University, Greencastle, Indiana Gerald Walker, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Robert E. Walters, University of Hawaii John A. Young, University of Hawaii

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

(AUDITORS)

John M. Allison, Acting Deputy Chancellor, East-West Center, University of Hawaii George Chaplin, Editor, T h e Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu H u n g Wo Ching, President, Aloha Airlines, Honolulu Mrs. George P. Conger, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota Robert C. Elliott, Honolulu William H. Ewing, Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Honolulu Erich Kraemer, University of Hawaii Joseph Krimsky, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia Samuel Lambert, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, St. Louis, Missouri

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T h e Rt. Rev. Robert Mackey, President, Chaminade College, Honolulu Richard K . Morris, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut Harold S. Roberts, University of Hawaii Joseph R . Royce, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada Shungo Sakamaki, University of Hawaii Willard Wilson, Secretary, University of Hawaii Paul C. Domke, Department of State, Honolulu

SECTION I

Metaphysics

THOME H. FANG" The world and the individual in Chinese

metaphysics*

i The trends of Chinese metaphysical thought, taken in its entire range, may be roughly likened to the bar-lines across the stave. At regular or irregular intervals, different modes of speculation are marked out in bars, each running in compound triple time with beats in varying accentuation. From time immemorial to the middle of the twelfth century B.C., the metaphysical moods would be the chords sounded in the triad of myth, religion, and poetry. Thenceforward, until 246 B.C., for a creative period of more than nine hundred years, there came to be the articulation of primordial Taoism, Confucianism, and Moism b . This period was followed by a long epoch (246 B.C.-A.D. 960) of fermentation and absorbent creation, tending to bring forth eventually a type of highly creative speculation in Chinese Mahayanic Buddhism. From A.D. 960 down to the present day, we have had a re-awakening of metaphysical originality in the form of Neo-Confucianism somewhat imbued with the spirit of Taoism and Buddhism. In this period of regeneration, there have come into prominence three trends of metaphysics: (a) Neo-Confucianism of the realistic type; (b) Neo-Confucianism of the idealistic type; and (c) Neo-Confucianism of the naturalistic type. Apropos the systems of Chinese metaphysics, two essential points must be noted. (1) T h e world is not taken for what it is in natural regard; it awaits to be transmuted into a moral universe for the Confucians, into an aesthetic realm for the Taoists, and into a religious domain for the Buddhists. T h e world, philosophically considered, should be a transfigured world., taken in its ideal regard. The task of Chinese metaphysics is an analysis of facts issuing in an understanding of destiny. T h e transfigured world is nothing less than a teleological system of axiological importance. (2) T h e individual is a very complicated concept; its richness of meaning is not exhausted by a simplified unitary procedure of approach. T h e status of the individual is not a problem to be posed once and for all; its answer is not to be found ready-made once and for all. T h e question about it has to be continually asked. In different epochs of time and * In this paper (except in some of the notes) the author's capitalization has in the main been retained—Editor's note.

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in various contexts of thought, the answer would be radically different. Throughout the history of Chinese philosophy, Yang Chu c (521 ?—442? B.C.) was the only one who spoke audaciously for the actual individual. But all other things have looked askance at him. To the Confucians, the individual should be ceaselessly edified; to the Taoists, he should be constantly liberated; and, to the Buddhists, he should be perpetually purified before his status can be firmly established in the transfigured world of moral and aesthetic and religious perfection.

ii Let us now proceed with a discussion of the three major systems of Chinese metaphysics in successive order. Two important features may be discerned in the metaphysical system of Confucianism. The first asserts the creative power of the heavenly Tao, whereby the dynamic world of all beings comes into existence; the second emphasizes the intrinsic value of human nature in congruence with the cosmic order. These two, together, constitute the architectonic structure of Confucianism from classical antiquity to the present day. The most important embodiment of this mode of thought is found in The Book of Changed to be supplemented by The Book of Menciuse and The Works of Hsiin Tzu{, which, apart from re-enforcing a set of original metaphysical ideas, elucidate the cardinal doctrine of a philosophical anthropology.1 The Book of Change is a formidable historical document. There are involved in it (1) a very complicated stratified historical frame, (2) a complete system of symbolic constructions based upon strict rules of logic, and (3) a set of interpretations making out the meanings of these symbolic constructions, expressible in the systematic syntax of language. All these three are the prelude to a theory of time conducive to the working out of a set of metaphysical principles explanatory of the cosmic order. The revolutionary philosophy of change, initiated by Confucius (551-479 b.c.) himself and, upon the evidences2 of Ssu-ma T'an g and Ssu-ma Ch'ien h , further elaborated by Shang Chii1 (b. 522 b.c.) and others, was really a long evolutionary product. Its new features might be diversified into four different forms: (1) A new philosophy of enlivened Nature permeated with the dynamic confluence of Life. Nature is power or vital impetus, creative in advance and conducive to the fulfillment and consummation of Life capable of being partaken of by all beings.3 (2) An exposition of intrinsic moral goodness in human life adorned with beauty. Such a moral-aesthetic perfection was characteristic of the unique human personality.4

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(3) A general theory of value in the form of the Supreme Good assimilating into it all the relative ranks of values prevalent in the entire universe.5 (4) The final formulation of a value-centric ontology asserting the fullness of Being in its entirety. The archetypal time-man, represented by the Confucians, deliberately chooses to cast everything—whether it be the life of Nature, the development of an individual, the frame of society, the achievement of value, the attainment to the fullness of Being—into the mold of time in the order of its authentic existence. The question is, What is time? 6 The essence of time consists in change ; the order of time proceeds with concatenation ; the efficacy of time abides by durance. The rhythmic process of epochal change is wheeling round into infinitude and perpetually dovetailing the old and the new so as to issue into an interpénétration which is continuant duration in creative advance. This is the way in which time generates itself by its systematic entry into a pervasive unity which constitutes the rational order of creative creativity. The dynamic sequence of time, ridding itself of the perished past and coming by the new into the present existence, really gains something over a loss. So, the change in time is but a step to approaching eternity, which is perennial durance whereby, before the bygone is ended, the forefront of the succeeding has come into presence. And, therefore, there is here a linkage of being projecting itself into the prospect of eternity. Hence, in the nexus of the dynamics of time, "The Book of Change contains the measure of heaven and earth, enabling us to comprehend the all-pervasive Taoi and its order." 7 Based upon the concept of time, three metaphysical principles may be set out. ( 1 ) The principle of extensive connection. Three essentials are involved in its formulation. Logically, it is a system of consistent deduction demonstrated rigorously.8 Semantically, it is a syntax of language in which the rules of formation and transformation of significant statements indicate unerringly a relation of co-ordination and a relation of dovetailing and mutual relevance so as to discriminate what is licit from the illicit and to change the latter into the former. 9 Metaphysically, the philosophy of change is a system of dynamic ontology based upon the process of continuant creativity in time, as well as a system of general axiology wherein the origin and development of the idea of the Supreme Good is shown in the light of comprehensive harmony. Thus, the principle of extensive connection asserts at the same time that the confluence of life permeating all beings under heaven and earth partakes of the creative nature of time and achieves, as a consequence, the form of the Supreme Good. (2) The principle of creative creativity. Confucius in The Book

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of Change—the philosophical part of it designated as the chuans —and his followers in The Book of Proprietyk—including The Doctrine of the Mean1—diversified the all-pervasive Tao10 into (a) the Tao of Heaven as the primordial creative power, giving rise to all creatures, comprehending them in the cosmic order of dynamic transformation conducive to a perfectly harmonious fulfillment, and issuing in the attainment of the Supreme Good; (b) the Tao of Earth, which, as the power of procreation, is a continuation and extension of the creative origination, sustaining all forms of existence; and (c) the Tao of man, who, with an assured status at the center of the universe, in communion with the creative and procreative power of Heaven and earth should come to the full awareness of the Spirit and thereby become co-creative agents in the perpetual continuance of Life as a whole. With the Confucians, this spiritual awareness has given rise to a sense of individual moral excellence, a fellow-feeling of the intrinsic worth of other forms of existence, as well as a rational insight into the identifiable unity of the equitable Being of all beings. (3) The principle of creative life as a process of value-realization. In the "Hsi-tz'u" m we find a theory set out by Confucius that "what is called Tao operates incessantly with the rhythmic modulation of dynamic change and static repose, thus continuing the creative process for the attainment of the Good and completing the creative process for the fulfillment of Nature, which is Life. . . . It manifests itself in the rational sentiment of humanity but conceals its great function unawares, propelling all beings in a swing of vitality without inciting the anxieties of the holy. Its richness of virtue, its grandeur of enterprise is of all things the most sublime. Superabundance is what is called the deed-act; forevermore creativeness is what is called the supreme value. . . . The unfathomed mystery underlying the rhythmic modulation of the dynamic energy and of peaceful repose is what is called the Divine." 11 Elsewhere Confucius said: "Embracing all in its comprehensiveness and investing each with its magnificence, it ensures that anything and everything will enjoy the concordant bliss of well-being." 12 "Of all values, the Good exhibited in the primordially creative-procreative is towering in its supremacy. Concordance in the sport of bliss is the convergence of all that is beautiful. Benediction in the realm of Life is the pervasiveness of all that is righteous. Consummation in the deed-act is the fundamentum of the world of enterprise."13 In the light of the above principles, the objective order of the universe is constituted by the superabundant power of creativity in the dynamic process of time. The human individual is thus confronted with a creative world. He must be equally creative in order

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to fit in with it. And, therefore, the Confucian dynamic valuecentric ontology, once completed, evoked a system of philosophical anthropology. It was averred in The Doctrine of the Mean that the most truthful and sincere man in all the world, after completely fulfilling his own nature in the course of life, would extend his boundless sympathy by doing the same with other men, as well as with all creatures and things. In doing so, he could participate in the cosmic creation through the process of transformation and thereupon become a co-creator with Heaven and Earth. 14 As the natural and moral order of life was initiated by the creative power of Heaven, so man can cope with the most high in creative potency. In some such way the Confucians developed a homocentric conception of the world as a prelude to the value-centric conception of man. This is why Mencius (372-289 B.C.) maintained that the spiritual stream of a superior man's life was concurrent with that of Heaven and Earth. He went further in asserting that a real man, relying upon his own intrinsic goodness, could, in virtue of his beautiful endowment, develop himself to the utmost into a great man. This greatness of character, enhanced by a subtle touch of spiritual exaltation in the process of transformation, would make him, first, a sage and, finally, a holy man invested with inscrutable magnificence. 15 Not only Mencius. Even Hsiin Tzu (313-238 B.C.), who started with the empirical observation of the ill nature of man, ventured to assert that man through a course of perseverent endeavor of cultivation could come to achieve greatness. Among the primordial Confucians, Hsiin Tzu was the only one who seemed to be "fed up" with the value-centric conception of Heaven. Just for this reason, he wanted to set up the supremacy of man apart from unnecessary complication with Nature, which is nothing more than a neutral order 16 with physical energies in store for human utilization. According to Mencius, man, by virtue of his inborn goodness, is spontaneously great. In the opinion of Hsiin Tzu, man's greatness is cultured in the best sense of the word. Allowing this difference between them, man is ultimately great just the same. What, after all, is the rationale of human greatness? In The Book of ProprietyP compiled by Senior Tai Te n , Confucius is reported to have said, in reply to the queries of Duke Ai of Lu°, that there are five types of men in a rational linkage of development. Among (1) the common run of men, the individual can be educated to be (2) a learned and enlightened person who, with an insight of knowledge and with sagacity in action, issuing in the noble art of life, will become (3) a superior man, adorned with beauty of character and balance of mind. Through further edification he can come

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to be (4) a man of excellence. His choices and forsakings are in accord with the high standard of values acceptable to mankind as a whole. He always tries to act in the right without sacrificing the least part of the fundamental principles. His utterance of truth sets a good standard to the world without the loss of his own integrity. Finally, he becomes (5) a sage, or holy man. With perfect wisdom at his command, he acts in congruence with the ways of the great Tao, adapting himself to any circumstance of life in the flux of change without confronting any crises of danger or encumbrance. This he does because he thoroughly understands the true nature and disposition of all things. In virtue of such perfect understanding, all his decisions of value are made in accordance with the great function of reason. And, therefore, the achievement of greatness knowingly keeps abreast of Heaven and Earth in creativity. This development of man from the natural capacity to the ideal perfection by way of the function of reason is the Confucian rationale of human greatness. In the light of this rationale man copes with the most high in potency. All of this leads to the natural conclusion that the world and the individual must be always in reciprocal communion.18 In such a communion, the cosmic status of the individual is firmly established for the reason that the full capacities constitutive of his personality are, now, developed to the utmost. T o the Chinese, the Confucian type of man is near and dear, like an ideal figure who has been cut by his own noble art of life in a set of expanding spheres representing gradually enlarged and qualitatively perfected humane relations, and toward whom all other persons, intimate in spiritual linkage and sympathetic in moral aspirations, are subtly attracted in such a way that there is always an interfusion and interplay of exultation in the influence of exalted personality. This is what makes of the Chinese world and Chinese society a natural domain of moral democracy incessantly leveling up to a higher plane of ethical culture which has sustained the Chinese national state ever since Confucianism came into vogue.

in But, when we come to a consideration of the Taoists, we are suddenly transferred to a different world—a visionary dream-world. The Taoists make the best type of space-man. They are wont to take flights into the realms unfrequented by the common run of people, in which they uplift us, level after level, each more exalted and mysterious than the last. From their vantage point at a height,

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unafraid, they gaze disinterestedly upon the stratified world below in which the tragi-comic persons are involved in the regressive lapse into folly and wisdom, illusion and truth, appearance and reality, all falling short of supreme Perfection, the Truth, and Reality. Tao is the supreme category in the system of L a o Tzu p (561?467? B . C . ) . It may be diversified into four cardinal points. (1) Ontologically, Tao is the infinite ontic substance which was multifariously characterized by Lao Tzu (a) as the fathomless unity of all beings, prior in existence even to God; 1 9 (b) as the fundamental root of heaven and earth, infinite in nature, invisible in shape, but really great in function because all creatures are begotten from it; 2 0 (c) as the primordial One having ingression into all forms of beings; 2 1 (d) as the unique pattern of all kinds of activities, discursive but wholesome, twisted around but straightforward, emptying out but remaining full, worn out but forever renovating, eventually comprehensive of all perfection; 22 (e) as the Great Form 4 , or the receptacular Matrix, wherein all creatures are embraced, free of harm, and full of peace, like babies held close to the bosoms of their mothers; 23 and (f) as the final destiny whereto all creatures, after emptying out every kind of "quixotic" energetic activities in the course of life, will return for the ease and peace of rest, conceived under the form of eternity and achieved in the spirit of immortality 24 —thus, on the score of eternity, consciously discerned, all come to be complaisant, equitable, noble, natural, and spontaneous, in full accord with the imperishable Tao. (2) Cosmogenetically, the infinitely great Tao is the all-pervasive function with an inexhaustible store of powerful energy exerting itself in two different ways. On the one hand, being invisibly subsistent up in the transcendental realm of Nothingness 1 and deeply sheathed back in the noumenal realm of unfathomed Mystery, it darts itself out and down into the realm of Being 8 . Thus we can say that in the beginning there was Being, and Being was with Nothingness. 25 Henceforward, the Tao is the primordial begetter of all things. On the other hand, the supplied energy, within the bounds of Being, may be spent and exhausted through dispersion and waste. The immanent world of Being, in a state of urgent want, will resort to the transcendental world of Tao for a fresh impartation of energy. Hence, L a o Tzu has every reason to lay emphasis upon "the reversal of procedure in the dynamic transformation of Tao." The function of Tao is dyadic in track. Progressively, the fundamental Nothingness in Tao gives rise to the being of all forms in the world, 26 whereas, regressively, the immanent Being in the whole world depends upon the Nothingness of the transcendental Tao for the performance of adequate function. Hence the pronouncement:

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" T h e fulfillment of Being leads to eudaemonia, whereas the attainment to Nothingness fulfills the performance of function." 2 7 (3) Phenomenologically, the attributes of Tao can be classified under two headings, namely, natural attributes and arbitrary attributes. T h e natural attributes are discerned as so many properties inherent in the Tao conceived under the form of eternity. They may be enumerated as follows: 1) Integrity of Tao revealing itself as substance in the realm of Nothingness and as function in the realm of Being; 2) Conformation of non-action in which nothing is left undone'; 3) The primordial incentive in the begetting of all things with no claim of origination; 4) Accomplishment of work on the cosmic scale with detachment 11 ; 5) Sustenance of all things without domination^ 6) Creation without possession w ; 7) Energizing activity with no egocentric claim of merit. On the contrary, the arbitrary attributes are those which are affirmed from the subjective viewpoint of men and inappropriately portrayed in terms of the inadequate h u m a n language. Apart from these, the Tao conceived per se is the really real Reality, or, what is the same thing, the mysteriously mysterious Mystery intelligible only to men of supreme wisdom like the sage. (4) Characterologically, the supreme excellences, manifested as the natural attributes, originally pertain to the nature of Tao but will come in ingress into the integrity of the sage, who is really the exemplar of the Tao in this world. T h e sage, as an ideal man, has transcended all limitations and weaknesses by reason of his exalted spirit and by virtue of his assessment of ever higher worth. He knows how to gain a world of love and reverence by employing himself generously for the world. Having lived for the benefit of other men, he is richer in worth; having given all he has to other men, he is more plentiful in being. "And, therefore, the sage is always skillful and whole-hearted in the salvation of men, so that there is no deserted m a n ; he is always skillful and whole-hearted in the rescue of things, so that there is no abandoned thing." 2 8 Thanks to Lao Tzu, we have come to the consciousness that the essence of each individual man, when realized in full, consists in an endeavor to attain to the ideal of the sage. Man's mission is constantly to make a campaign for the realization of this ideal. Thus the "wages" of winning a sure status in the world is his own inward sageliness. Many perplexities in the system of Lao Tzu came to be cleared away by Chuang T z u 1 (b. 369 B.C.) in an attempt to push through the nullifying process far back into mystery after mystery, so that there would be no final Nothingness in the serial regress. Similarly,

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what was posited in the being of Being could be infinitely iterated, back and forth, thus forming a set of endless bilateral processes of progression and retrogression. T h e original antithesis between Nothing and Being was theoretically reconciled inasmuch as both Being and Nothing should merge into the profound mystery in such a way as to form an interpenetrative system of infinite integral Reality. 29 Finally, Chuang Tzu brought out the chief tenet of Lao Tzu as positing both the eternal Nothing and the eternal Being5, predominated over by the supreme unity, thus affirming the authentic Reality in the form of vacuity, which would not destroy the reality of all things 2 . 30 For the same reason and in the same sort of way, the discrepancy between eternity and temporality was dissolved. 31 Chuang Tzu could accomplish so much because, besides being a great Taoist, he was also much influenced by Confucius and Mencius, 32 as well as by his bosom friend, Hui Shih aa , from the logicoanalytical camp. In the philosophy of change, Confucius thought of time as though it had a definite beginning in the past but an indefinite progression into the future. Chuang Tzu, however, accepted the indefinite stretch into the future but denied the definite origination in the past through the agency of creation. This is because he knew how, on the basis of "the reversal of procedure" in the function of Tao*b, to probe mystery after mystery ac without coming to a standstill in the remote past. Thus, time is literally infinite in respect to the past as well as to the future. Time is a long-enduring natural process of transformation without any beginning and ending. Hence, the Confucian assumption of the primordial power of creation—in fact, all necessity for the cosmic creation—is theoretically extirpated. Not only is time infinite in span; space, likewise, is infinite in scope. Furthermore, with the metaphysical acumen of his poetic vision, he transformed, by a subtle touch of imagination, the obstructive mathematico-physical space into the infinite "painterly" space as a liberated realm of spiritual exultation whereunto he is to infuse "the wondrous proceeding of the Tao" in order that his own exalted "soul" may reach the most sublime for its ultimate acquirement. In a word, the metaphysics of Chuang Tzu is an elaboration of the great Tao, projected into the frame of infinite Space and Time, into a way of exalted spiritual life. Such is the metaphysical import implied in the story of "A Happy Excursion"*"1 described in poetico-metaphorical language. Like the great magic bird, p'engae, Chuang Tzu could lift himself up into an intellectual solitude unafraid and exulting insofar as the greatness of his liberated nature would partake of the omnipotent with the support of the infinite Tao.

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T h e "most fantastic" story of " A H a p p y Excursion" has been variously interpreted by different thinkers. T h e true meaning should be m a d e out in the light of the philosophy of infinity under discussion by following up the clues indicated by C h u a n g Tzu himself in the context of the relevant chapters. (1) It is asserted that the supreme man should lead his own spirit up to the primordial in its infinite regress, reposing blissfully in the realm of Nowhere, doing away with all petty knowledge about lowly things and getting entirely free from the bother of their burdens. 3 3 (2) At the culmination in the realm of perfect truth and in abidance by the fundamentum of the eternal Tao, his elevated spirit, being thus estranged from the physical world and disencumbered of all material allurings, would become independent and free from all restraint. 3 4 (3) U p o n entering the gate of infinitude, and having an excursion in the realm of supreme bliss, he would immerse his unique spirit in the exuberant light of the celestial and lose his identity in the eternal harmony of cosmic order. 3 5 (4) At the attainment to sagehood, he would abandon himself to the vast concord of all perfection. H e is, now, the archetype of m a n in the full capacity of the omnipotent (Tao) to be cast into the mold of cosmic life as a whole wherein he gains nothing in particular and loses nothing in full. H e forgets himself and forgets that he is really immersed in the bliss of Tao, just as fish swim in the river and sea and forget all about it. 3 6 (5) T h e perfected and perfect m a n is now what he is by virtue of his identifiability with the " C r e a t o r , " imparting his potency to all the world without becoming the center of fame, the contriver of plans, the director of works, and the claimer to knowledge. H e embraces infinity within the range of his experience and rambles in the realm of the infinite with levity and freedom. 3 7 H e fulfills all that is natural in him without a sense of gain. In the spirit of vacuity, he employs his mind and heart like a mirror, impartially reflecting all that there is in the world without showing a trace of lure, dejection, or injury. It is then, and only then, that the final status of his exalted individuality is firmly established in the infinite world of Tao. All these spiritual modes of life are, as it were, the rockets that launch the Taoistic type of space-man into the realm of the infinite, in which he is to find a vantage point called by Chuang T z u "the acme of the Celestial" 3 ' whereon he can survey the World-All from height to height, from width to width, and from depth to depth. T h e happy excursion into the realms of the infinite all along embodies C h u a n g Tzu's philosophy of spiritual liberation in the course of life. This is the Taoist temper of mind, which has incited the best of Chinese poetry as an expression of inspiration.

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T h e exalted individual, once achieved, becomes a true sage who, upborne by the wondrous procedure of Tao, can penetrate in insight into the Very O n e T r u t h comprehending the entire universe. All the partial appearances, viewed from different angles in varying heights, will be facet-symbols for beauty susceptible of being interfused into the integral whole of reality. All differences in viewpoints will be reconciled in the over-all perspective which forms a complementary system of essential relativity, going anywhere and anywhen, as well as everywhere and everywhen, with the full swing of the all-pervasive Tao. This is the pivotal point of his theory of leveling up all things.38 Thus it is that the system of essential relativity is an all-inclusive system in which everything can find a place of its own fitness and in which no one thing can claim to have an especially privileged position so as to impose its surreptitious importance upon all others. At the same time, the system of essential relativity is an interpenetrative system wherein all entities come to be what they are by interlacing their own essences with one another so that nothing in it can stand alone in complete isolation. It is a system of interrelatedness and mutual relevance in which any one thing has its own intrinsic importance that will bear out valuable results as unique contributions to the make-up of any other. Furthermore, it is a system in which the infinite Tao operates as the unconditioned that will embrace all the conditions originally uncontrollable by any one individual outside the system. Especially the h u m a n individuals before their entry into this infinite system have suffered limitation, restraint, and bondage. Now that they, through the spirit of liberation, being aware of what ridiculous figures they have cut within the bounds of contracting narrowness, have discovered the authentic sagely Self by sharing the nature of Tao, they must cry for joy in writing with the Ineffable and Inscrutable in the realm of the infinite, which breaks forth entirely from the limitations of any arbitrary scheme of thought, feeling, and action in life. As a result of all these characteristics exhibited in the infinite system of essential relativity, Chuang Tzu has set out a great theme: " T h e universe and I sustain a relation of co-existence; I and all beings have the same entry into the One." 3 9 Thus, being most inward with the Infinite, the individual in the exalted mode of life has well established himself in the world in congruence with all others. IV

For an epoch of some five hundred years (241 b . c . - a . d . 240) China in the Asian world was not unlike Rome in the West. People of all

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ranks were busy doing work in the conquest of the practical world. Speculative interest waned in the intellectual realm. T h e real revival of metaphysical contemplation dated from the year 240, when Ho Yen*« (190-249) and Wang Pi a h (226-249) made an attempt to reconcile the differences between Confucius and Lao Tzu by laying importance upon the category of Nothingness for the interpretation of Tao.i0 Historically, Ho Yen was primarily a Confucian in that he tried to absorb Taoism into the system of Confucianism, 4 1 whereas Wang Pi was essentially a Taoist with an intention of assimilating Confucianism into the system of Taoism. What was common in them consisted of an attempt to bring forth the unity of infinite substance as the core of metaphysical inquiry. In his Commentary on the Lao Tzu, Wang Pi elucidated the central theme that all things considered as Being, taking shape in manifolds subject to limitation, should be, in the last resort, redeemable by the integral Tao, which, though designated as Nothing, is really everything transmuted into infinite perfection. It is in this light that he came to see the import of the philosophy of change. The whole world of dynamic being, begotten by the creative power exhibited in a plenitude of incessant change and variegated transformation, must revert to the fundamentum of Tao for its primordial unity, which, reposing in the form of Reason and in the spirit of eternity, will prevail over all multiplicities. Confucianism, as understood by Wang Pi, reveals only the origin of all things in the world of Being, while Taoism helps it to see into the ultimate destiny in which all of Being in every mode of change is brought back to a final consummation of perfection which is Nothing, that is, nothing in particular but everything in full.42 It is the end result of all changes, borne out by the inexhaustible richness of function, that should be grasped as the infinite substance. T h e spirit of Buddhism encompasses two alternative realms of thought: one conceived under the form of incessant change and the other conceived under the form of eternity. Should we include Hinayana Buddhism, we would find more causes to fight against the fluctuating mundane world, in which bigoted individuals plunge themselves into the deep waters of miserable blunders and sufferings. The vehicle of deliverance would have to bear them up through the fluctuations of time before reaching the other shore. In this sense, the Buddhist is a time-man, and he is such not in the blessed spirit of a Confucian. But, if we should take Mahayana Buddhism into consideration, the enlightenment it attained would illuminate before us an upper world of Dharmaal and Dharma-fulfillment in which the tragic sense of life in the process of time would be superseded by the bliss of eternity. 43 So, in this way the liberated spirit of

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a M a h á y á n i s t would undertake a h a p p y excursion into the poetically inspired space-world with the Taoist. H e could, now, a f f o r d to forget the tragic sense of life enmeshed in the wheel of changing time. U n d e r this circumstance, the spirit of a Buddhist was quite congenial with that of a Taoist.

v It h a d taken a long epoch of more than seven centuries ( 6 7 - 7 8 9 ) for Chinese B u d d h i s m to run its course of full development, which was, of course, conditioned by the continual works done in translation 4 4 a n d by the creative works done in system-building. F r o m 789 onward until 960, the Buddhist tradition only went on a n d slid down in elaboration. Chiefly in the sixth century, the forerunning sects were to be f o r m e d and eventually in the period of S u i - T ' a n g ^ ( 5 8 1 - 9 6 0 ) the ten different schools of Chinese B u d d h i s m were completed. I cannot here attempt to outline their systematic theorizings which, because of their doctrinal complexity a n d elaborateness, should f o r m an independent study by themselves. 4 5 T h e most I can do now is to select some features of B u d d h i s m as ways of expressing the singular power of the Chinese mentality. U p o n being first introduced, B u d d h i s m could have taken deep root in the Chinese mind only by coming under the d o m i n a n t influence of Chinese thought. It goes without saying that Chinese Buddhistic metaphysics was evoked and re-enforced by the spirit of T a o i s m a n d not vice versa. 4 8 T h e Taoists all along h a d claimed f u n d a m e n t a l Nothingness to be a supreme category in their own system. A n d Buddhists like L o k a k s i n a k (resident in C h i n a during 1 7 6 - 1 8 9 ) , C h i h C h ' i e n " ( 1 9 2 - 2 5 2 ) , a n d K ' a n g S e n g - h u i a m (d. 280) continually laid extreme importance upon the category of f u n d a Tathata an mental Nothingness, which they took to be equivalent to (thusness) , 4 7 D u r i n g the fourth century, the i m p a c t of T a o i s m u p o n the philosophy of Prajiidao was most obvious in the school of T a o - a n a p ( 3 1 2 - 3 8 5 ) and his contemporaries. As regards the controversies about wu a n d yu (Nothingness and B e i n g ) , there were, then, six or seven schools 4 8 diversified into twelve trends 4 9 of thought discriminating the genuine truth f r o m m u n d a n e creeds. O n the evidences successively given by the monks T a n - c h i a 9 (ca. 4 7 3 ) , Seng-ching a r ( 3 0 2 - 4 7 5 ) , H u i - t a a a ( c a . 4 8 1 ) , a n d Y u a n K ' a n g a t (ca. 6 4 9 ) and on the further evidence 5 0 of Chi-tsang a u ( 5 4 9 - 6 2 3 ) , the above set of theories may be tabulated as follows:

36

Thomé H. Fang

( a ) principle

(b) originator .av av

1 ) fundamental Nothingness

Tao-an

2 ) non-differentiation'aw

monk Shen bc

3 ) nothingness exhibited in 3" the realm of matter-ax

Chi-tun 6 "

4) nullity of mind a y

monk Wen -

5 ) embracement in consciousness',az

Yu Fa-kai h -

6) illusory transformation 1 " 1

monk I b K

7) assemblage of conditions 1 *

Yu Tao-sui ,jh

(c) consequence ^ vacuity of the ontic substance

^ nullity of mind (by implication : : affirmation of objective Being ) nullity of matter (by implication: affirmation of mind )

I n the above tabular scheme, ( 1 ) is more f u n d a m e n t a l than the other six, which are all derived therefrom. According to T a o An, " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l Nothingness is the prius of all transformations, and vacuity is the beginning of all the visible w o r l d . " All modes of the true Dharma are by nature vacuous a n d pure, spontaneously ensured from, and essentially identifiable with, the Bhuta-tathata ( T h a t n e s s of b e i n g ) b l denuded of any contamination by defiled elements. T h e trends of thought in the seven schools of Chinese Buddhism during the fourth and fifth centuries were centered around the metaphysical thesis which a d v o c a t e d the importance of Nothingness. F r o m now, the Buddhists would join h a n d s with the Taoists and f o r m a united front against traditional Confucianism. T h e influence of C h u a n g T z u is even more prominent in the school of K u m a r a j i v a ( 3 4 3 - 4 1 3 ) . His contribution lay in the field of the philosophy of Sunyata ( E m p t i n e s s ) b k . U l t i m a t e Reality is that which has emptied out all fantastic whims so as to show its own purity of essence in the form of Thusness. A m o n g a great number of his pupils, Seng-chao b l ( 3 8 4 - 4 1 4 ) and T a o - s h e n g b m (374P-434) stood out as the twin stars never waning in their spiritual illuminancy. T h e synoptic visions of Seng-chao are diversified into three cardinal theses: (1) correlative motion a n d rest; ( 2 ) reconcilable Being and Nothing, or inseparable substance and f u n c t i o n ; and ( 3 ) the dovetailing of knowledge a n d " n o - k n o w l e d g e " transmuted into supreme wisdom. ( 1 ) I have no time here to go into his penetrative arguments in this regard except to call attention to the two conclusions he arrived at. ( a ) M e n of the world, engulfed in the flux of change, would have no sense of assurance, inasmuch as life in a shifting course of

The world and the individual

in Chinese

metaphysics

37

action would lead to death likely to destroy everything achieved in life. They are always sick of life and sick for unattainable nirvana1"1. (b) The man of wisdom can discern permanence in the midst of change. He knows how to remain non-active in a state of spiritual repose and yet will not dispense with the world of action. It is only he who, being immortal in spirit, can plunge into the deep waters of life with no danger of annihilation. In his approach to nirvana, he has attained it, and yet he will not stand attached to it, out of keeping with the changing world. (2) Tao-an and his associates relied too much upon the fundamental Nothingness by asserting the vacuity of the ontic substance, or the nullity of matter, or the illusiveness of mind. Seng-chao, however, dissented strongly from all of them. Generally, in the usage of linguistic expressions or "ostensible names," we talk about an "objective" which is neither simply real as posited in Being nor simply unreal as denied in Not-Being or Nothing. T h e said "objective" may be either, and it may be both. In the light of the Mádhyamika-sástrab0, to be or not to be: that is the one-sided question. It takes a man of supreme wisdom to discern Nothing in all modes of Being and to observe Being in the midst of Nothing. The ontic Substance and the complete truth thereof cannot be rent into grotesque pieces. (3) Seng-chao's metaphysics is a philosophy of the supreme wisdom which is concerned with Ultimate Reality, Nirvana, Dharmakaya (lit., Law-body) b p , Bhüta-tathatá, and Dharmata (Reality as such) b q . All of these are to him different names of the same "objective." In order to avoid misunderstanding, however, a distinction should be made between supreme wisdom per se and wisdom in the form of upáya-kausalyabr, i.e., expedient wisdom. T h e power of the former penetrates deep into the objective, whereas the function of the latter adapts itself to all beings in the changing world. In virtue of wisdom per se, we are to illuminate the nature of the Void, while, by means of expedient wisdom, we are to launch into the world of fluctuating Being. In dealing with Being in full, we shall have no misgivings with the nature of the Void. And, therefore, we can encounter the realm of Being without attachment. T h a t being the case, we can illuminate what is essentially vacuous without falling back upon it tenaciously. In the midst of knowledge in acquaintance with the world we shall arrive at a wondrous state of the liberated spirit with no knowledge whatever. The reason is that, if you know something in particular, there will be numberless other things that you do not know. Just because the spirit of the divine is with no knowledge in particular, there will be nothing that it does not know, freely and ail-pervasively. Hence, the knowledge of no-knowledge embraces all that there is to be known. This may sound quite per-

38

Thome H. Fang

plexing, but men of great genius, e.g., Shakespeare in the West, have understood it quite well. O, out of that "no hope" What great hope have you! No hope that way is Another way so high a hope that even Ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond, But doubt discovery there. 52 The objective of the knowledge of no-knowledge is intent on the spirit of the divine. The divine spirit reposed in a state of vacuity, having no fumblings to get rid of, can be said to possess no knowledge. No knowledge that way is not the same as the supposed knowledge about Nothingness, which is something nullified into nothing. It is far above mere knowledge correlative with the limited modes of being. It is completely denuded of nescience, which is sheer ignorance. In a word, it is Enlightenment 1 " 5 and Prajna fused into the One. Enlightenment shades off what is extrinsic to itself and is essentially inner light in the form of no-knowledge, while Prajna is an out-pouring of the inner light over the world-all by denuding it of fallaciousness. I have mentioned Seng-chao and Tao-sheng as the twin stars in the ethereal sky of Chinese Buddhistic speculation. But there is a difference between them. Seng-chao formulated a system of principles explanatory of the nature of wisdom, whereas Tao-sheng turned the Mahayanic theory into a way of spiritual life wherein human nature is fulfilled to the extent that it can partake of Buddhanature b t . Hitherto, Chinese Buddhists had looked upon the mundane world as a case of malady and thought about the actual individual as a source of blunder. Any acceptance of the world in its illusory appearances and any affirmation of the individual in his fantastic grimaces would indicate a silliness of view. But the monk Hui-yuan b u (334-416) had a different turn of mind. The world could exist in the form of permanence constitutive of Ultimate Reality. The human being could come to the possession of a real Self in intimacy with the Buddha. This line of thought had quite an influence upon Tao-sheng in formulating his philosophy of Buddha-nature. For brevity's sake, his fundamental ideas 53 in this regard may be enunciated as follows: (1) T h e all-pervasive function of Prajna and the substantial nature of Nirvana are inseparable in the make-up of Ultimate Reality, which will embody the true Dharma and the perfect Buddhata (Buddhahood) in the unity of Buddha-dharma^. (2) T h e ideal of Nirvana is realizable in the midst of fluctuating life and death. Hence, the pure land of the Buddha is not different

The world and the individual in Chinese metaphysics

39

from the existent realm of all creatures. By way of moral purification, all creatures dwelling in the defiled world of blunders will be reinstated in the world of the noble and sublime, won over through the employment of Reason. Abidance in the enlightening Reason of the Buddha enables each and all to see every facet of the world as pure-as it can be. (3) The conquest of the darkened mind by the potency of Reason is the only way to emancipation. In pursuance of this, the real self of spontaneous freedom is achieved by the righteous mind which has been restored to the original purity of nature through the exertion of Reason. Thus all human beings—not even excepting the icchantika (forsaken one), endowed with intrinsic Reason, can come to share equally the ubiquitous Buddha-nature and to unfold the illuminating Buddha-wisdom implicit in their own conscience. In this sense, human individuals are spiritual comrades, equal in cosmic importance with the Buddha. (4) As the light of supreme wisdom has a most direct penetration into his own rational essence, each man through devout devotion can come to a sudden awakeningbw of the Buddha-nature within the inner constitution of his own nature and achieve Buddahood on his own accord. This is the chief tenet of Mahayana Buddhism. Tao-sheng's philosophy of Buddhahood is of great importance for several reasons, (a) It evoked a number of interpretations of Buddha-nature during the fifth and sixth centuries, (b) His emphasis on the perfectibility of human nature after the model of Buddhanature is quite congenial with the Confucian theory of the original goodness of man. This is evidenced by the fact that the poetphilosopher, Hsieh Ling-yiin bx (385-433), in hearty sympathy with Tao-sheng's idea of sudden awakening, made a very favorable comparison of the spiritual achievement of Confucius with that of the Buddha. 54 (c) His theory of sudden awakening by reverting to the inmost nature of the mind anticipated the later philosophy of Ch'an by (Zen), (d) His concept of the importance of Reason in gaining an insight into Ultimate Reality even anticipated the NeoConfucianism of the Sung Dynasty bz (960-1279). In short, Taosheng was, on the one hand, the culmination of the line of thought in the linkage of Buddhism with Taoism, and, on the other, a bridge over which several schools of Buddhism were to make headway in alliance with some schools of Confucianism. In the epoch of Sui-T'ang (581-960) ten different schools of Buddhism flourished in China. "A beggar of time" like me, finally, cannot refrain from mentioning, in particular, the categorical scheme of Hua-yen™—the Avatamsaka school—as a powerful expression of Chinese comprehensive harmony. Theoretically, if not

40

Thomé H. Fang

entirely historically, the Hua-yen school may be made the line of convergence along which many systems of Buddhistic thought would have their confluence. T h e categorical scheme of Hua-yen 5 5 was an attempt to integrate all the differentiating worlds, all the noble deed-acts, and all the achieved end results of the Buddhas in the past, present, and future into a sum total of the True Realm of Dharma in the form of supreme perfection with a view to showing that each h u m a n being, inherently possessed of wondrous excellences, could awaken in himself, all at once, Buddha-nature, adequately, spontaneously, and congruently. T h e one real Realm of Dharmacb is not far from this actual world of man, if everyone knows thoroughly how to live and act wisely by way of participation in the fundamental wisdom of the Buddha. Buddha-nature in toto has the potentiality of coming in ingress into the perennial spiritual constitution of man. This is the equality and equanimity of Dharma. T h e spiritual sun sheds its exuberant light over and into all living beings, and all living beings, in turn, assimilate and reflect and interfuse and re-enforce this spiritual light uniquely and reciprocally. Thus, all modes of the spontaneous function of reason, manifesting themselves in infinite varieties, would, at the same time, be actuated into a concert of life activities, in unison with the One T r u e Realm of Dharma, equanimous in essence. In the midst of enriched varieties, the light of Tathata (Thusness) radiated by the Buddha and witnessed and shared by all men alike will gladden the differentiating minds and the differentiating worlds into the non-differentiation of Reality perfectly embedded in the integral truth, which is Enlightenment, inherent in each and interpenetrative into all. Taken in its all-inclusive unity, this One T r u e Dharma-dhatu (Realm of Dharma or Law) evinces the omnipresence and omnipotence of Mind constitutive of the noumenon of all the phenomenal worlds, diversifying itself into (a) the differential Realms of Events, (b) the integrative Realm of Reason, (c) the interpenetrative Realm of Reason and Events, and (d) the interlacing Realm of all Events. T h e theoretical formulation of the categorical scheme, 56 initiated by Tu-shun c c (557-640), developed by Chih-yen cd (602-668), elaborated by Fa-tsang ce (643-720), and further expounded by Ch'engkuan c f (760-820) and Tsung-mi e g (d. 841), embraces three grand views, 57 i.e., ( 1) of the true Void c h , (2) of the congruence of Reason and Events 01 , and (3) of the dovetailing of all Events in the form of universal coherence 05 . I n the first view, an attempt is made to show (a) that the worlds of physical properties can be dissolved into the nature of the Void, just as phenomena are transmutable into the noumenon; (b) that

The world and the individual in Chinese metaphysics

41

the Void as the Ultimate Reality is constitutive of, and identifiable with, the assemblage of purified physical phenomena; (c) that the Void and the physical are mutually congruent; and (d) that, eventually, after the impenetrable inertia of the physical is explained away in terms of the efficacy of mental and spiritual transmutations and through the insinuation of the ontic essence—the true nature of the Void—into the physical, all one-sided characterizations in respect of the physical and the Void are transcended in the highest integral truth of the middle path. In the second view, it is maintained that reason and events can be melded in a perfect manner. Reason is the wondrous function deeply rooted in Bhuta-tathata and has its efficacy anytime anywhere in virtue of the omnipresence of the Buddha. This can be accounted for in the following ways: (a) Reason as a whole, denuded of any specification, is universally present in all the worlds of events, however differentiated the latter may be, inasmuch as the Dharmata is manifesting itself incessantly without limitation. And, therefore, even the minutest event-particles are immersed in the integral truth and imbued adequately with Reason, (b) T h e items of events which, as such, are differentiated must be restored into unity in the integration of Reason, just as the wavicles, spreading forth f a r and away, are losing their own unique momenta and can be re-enforced and saved only by taking u p continually with the oceanic ingratiation. Hence, it may be asserted that events, each and all, are constituted according to the Reason which is exhibited thereof. Though they are interrelated, the truth, however, is not simply events which, once constituted, would overshadow the Reason inherent in them, and the events are not simply the truth which, if verified, would supersede the events limitative in their differentiation. In the third view, it is asserted that the dovetailing of all events will vindicate the universal coherence of truth. This can be shown as follows: (1) Reason operates for the sake of events. It makes the events what they are in the mode of existence, in the way of differentiation, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, and in the process of change and transformation. Hence, the function of Reason issuing in truth will come in ingress into all the differentiating worlds of events. (2) T h e events, each and all, abide by Reason in virtue of which they would go through the process of change in incessant successions and remain permanent in the realm of eternity. And, therefore, the events in observance of Reason would permeate all modes of Dharma. (3) T h e events, as implied in Reason, would bring forth the following modes of implication: (a) one implicates another; (b) one implicates every other; (c) one implicates all others; (d) all others implicate one; (e) all others implicate every

42

Thom£ H. Fang

other one; and (f) all others implicate all others. Thus, the whole and the parts, the one and the many, as well as the universal and the particular, will be intertwined. T h e above consideration brings into prominence the principle of mutual implication, the principle of mutual relevance, and the principle of all-pervasive coherence. All these principles, taken together, are explanatory of the integral infinite Dharma-dhatu. In the way of mutual implication, any one dharma can gather up any other one unto itself and enter into the constitution of that one; any one can gather up all others unto itself and enter into the constitution of that one; all others can gather up all others unto themselves and enter into the constitution of those others. Hence, the principle of mutual relevance needs no further elucidation. Furthermore, the principle of all-pervasive coherence holds on the following conditions: (a) one dharma gathers up another one into itself and enters into that one; (b) one gathers u p all other dharmas into itself so as to enter into that one; (c) one gathers up another one so as to enter into all others; (d) one gathers u p all others in order to enter into all others; (e) all other dharmas gather u p one so as to enter into another one; (f) all other dharmas gather up all others so as to enter into any one; (g) all others gather up one so as to enter into all others; and (h) all others gather up all others in order to enter into them all. When all of these are melded together, the ultimate result is the integrity of the infinitely perfect Dharmadhatu. If the above conditions are fulfilled, then the ten approaches to the metaphysical profundity and the six characteristics of all dharma will be clear in the light of day without further elucidation. In view of such a philosophy, if any person is to gain a firm footing in the One Real Dharma-dhatu, he must live and have his being in the spirit of infinity.

VI

In the above I have tried to depict tersely the ways in which the Chinese contemplative minds have been fascinated with the world and the human individual, which are taken, however, not so much in natural as "in dramatic regard." 5 8 T h e world and the individual, taken "in natural regard," would be the exhibitions of related facts, definite in content, determinate in nature, specific in conditions, articulate in forms, full in being, or substantial in essence. All of these, characteristic of scientific explanations, are, of course, very important for the understanding of man and the world. But Chinese philosophers choose to take a step further than this in their modes of contemplation. From their viewpoints, the world, taking shape in

The world and the individual in Chinese metaphysics

43

Ultimate Reality, must transcend the limitations of these relatively specific characterizations before all of its complete nature can come to the light of day. T h e actual world, strictly philosophically conceived, should be transformed into an ideal pattern adorned with the axiological unity of supreme perfection. T h e Chinese always aspire toward the transfigured world of liberating art, of edifying morality, of contemplative truth, and of religious piety. Any other world short of these will be a realm of anxiety making us look pale and tired. This is why Confucians have craved so much for the continually creative potency of the heavenly Tao in the shaping of the cosmic order as a whole. This is why the Taoists have wholeheartedly cherished the ideal of Nothingness for its coming to the rescue of all things relative in the realm of Being. And this is also why Chinese Buddhists have vehemently struggled for the partaking of the Buddha-nature embedded in the integral truth of the ultimate spiritual Enlightenment. As to the nature and status of man, the Chinese, either as a unique person or as a social being, takes no pride in being a type of individual in estrangement from the world he lives in or from the other fellows he associates with. H e is intent on embracing within the full range of his vital experience all aspects of plenitude in the nature of the whole cosmos and all aspects of richness in the worth of noble humanity. Anything different from this would be a sign of the impoverishment in the inner constitution of personality which is miserably truncated in development. This accounts for the concerted efforts of Chinese philosophers to advocate the exaltation of the individual into the inward sageliness and the outward worthiness which together make u p the intrinsic greatness of m a n as M a n . ' C f . m y Chinese View of Life ( H o n g K o n g : T h e U n i o n Press, 1 9 5 7 ) , c h a p . 3, p p . 87-115, especially p p . 9 9 - 1 1 5 . 2 In the Shih chi (Verifications of Meanings in C h u a n g T z u ) . ( S h a n g h a i ; C o m m e r c i a l Press, 1930), Vol. 33, p p . 18-19. 31 Cf. ibid., Vol. I l l , chap. 6, p p . 7, 10; Vol. V I , chap. 17, p. 10; Vol. V I I , c h a p . 21, p. 24; Vol. V I I , chap. 22, p p . 36, 39; Vol. V I I I , chap. 23, p. 9; Vol. V I I I , c h a p . 25, p. 34. 32 Cf. ibid., Vol. V I I I , c h a p . 24, p. 22; Vol. X , c h a p . 31, p. 9 ( K u o Hsiang's n o t e s ) . T h e m o n k Te-ch'ingdc, in the M i n g Dynasty (1368-1643), in a c o m m e n t a r y on the Chuang Tzu, said emphatically t h a t Mencius h a d a tremendous influence upon this great Taoist. 33 Cf. The Works of Chuang Tzu, Vol. X , chap. 32, p. 12. 34 C f . ibid., Vol. V, c h a p . 13, p. 24. 3 5 Cf. ibid., Vol. I V , c h a p . 11, p. 26. 3 « Cf. ibid., Vol. I l l , chap. 6, p p . 7, 9-10, 15-16. 37 Cf. ibid., Vol. I l l , chap. 7, p p . 22-26. 38 Cf. C h a n g T ' a i - y e n r t d , Ch'i-wu lun shihAe ( C o m m e n t a r y on the Theory of Leveling All T h i n g s ) , p p . 1, 3, 11, 14, 18-19, 21-25, 51-55. 39 The Works of Chuang Tzu, Vol. I, chap. 2, p. 25. 40 T h e Chin shud< (History of the Chin D y n a s t y ) , ( S h a n g h a i : Commercial Press, 1934), Vol. 43, p. 8. 41 Cf. C h a n g C h a n ' s d s citations f r o m H o Yen in the c o m m e n t a r y on The Works of Lieh Tzu** ( C h e k i a n g : C h e k i a n g Book Co., 1876), Vol. I, chap. 1, p p . 4 - 5 ; Vol. I V , chap. 4, pp. 4 - 5 . 42 Cf. W a n g Pi a n d H a n K ' a n g - p o d l , C o m m e n t a r i e s on The Book of Change (Shanghai: C h u n g H u a Book Co., 1922): (a) W a n g ' s portion in Vol. I l l , p. 4 ; Vol. I, p p . 2, 5 - 6 ; Vol. II, p. 11; Vol. I V , p p . 2-3; (b) H a n ' s portion in Vol. V I I , pp. 3-4, 6 - 9 ; Vol. V I I I , p p . 5 - 6 . See also W a n g Pi, Chou-i liieh-liai (Sketchy Exemplifications of t h e Principles of C h a n g e ) in the same edn., Vol. X , p p . 1-3, 6 - 8 . 43 Cf. the Mahä-parinirvänasütra™ in Chinese trans. ( S h a n g h a i : 1913, 1926), Vol. 2. c h a p . 2, pp. 11, 19; c h a p . 3, pp. 23-5, 28; Vol. 3, chap. 4, p p . 11, 15; a n d the MahSprajnä-päramitä-sütradI in Chinese trans., portion 16 (published in Ssuch'uan, 1940), Vol. 596, p p . 4 - 6 . 44 Cf. Liang jen-kung chüan-chi&m (Collected Essays of L i a n g c h ' i - c h ' a o ) , 1st series ( S h a n g h a i : Commercial Press, 1923), p p . 1-23; 81-134; 155-254. 45 See J u n j i r o T a k a k u s u , The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (3rd e d n . , H o n o l u l u : Office Appliance Co., 1956), a n d C h i a n g Wei-ch'iao, Fo-ksiieh kai-lun ( I n t r o d u c t i o n to Buddhism ) d o (Shanghai, 1930). 46 T ' a n g Y u n g - t ' u n g has given ample evidences to demonstrate this fact in the Han-Wei Liang-Chin Nan-pei-ch'ao fo-chiao shihdv (History of Chinese Buddhism D u r i n g the Period of 67-588) (2nd e d n . , T a i p e i : Commercial Press, 1962), P t . I, c h a p . 6, p p . 89-111. 47 Cf. the T a t h a t a - p a r i v a r t a of the Dasa-sahafrika (Prajnä-päramitä-sütra)dl in different Chinese translations by Lokäk§in and C h i h C h ' i e n . See the Taisho edn. of the Buddhist T r i p i t a k a in Chinese. N o . 224, p . 453; N o . 225, p . 474. 48 C f . H u i - t a , Chao-lun hsiidT (Preface to Seng-chao's Discourses). See the Taisho e d n . of the Buddhist T r i p i t a k a in Chinese, N o . 1858, p. 150. 49 Cf. Yiian K ' a n g , Chao-lin su (Commentary on Sengchao's Discourses). See ibid., N o . 1859, p p . 162-163. 50 Ai Cf. Chi-tsang Chung-kuan lun shu ( C o m m e n t a r y on t h e Mädhyamika-sästra). See ibid., N o . 1824, p. 29. 51 Cf. his "Wu pu-ch'ien-lun," "Pu-jen-kung-lun," "Pan-jo wu-chih-lun"du (Discourses O n t h e Perennial, O n the Non-Vacuous, a n d O n the Prajnä as N o - K n o w l e d g e ) . See the Buddhist T r i p i t a k a in Chinese, N o . 1858, pp 150-7. 52 The Tempest, Act 2, sc. i. 53 Tao-sheng's ideas are scattered in the c o m m e n t a r i e s on the Saddharma-pun^arika-sütra, on the Mahä-pariniruäna-sütradv a n d on the Vimalakirti-nirdesa-sütraAw 54 Cf. Hsieh Ling-yiin, Pien-cheng lun(Essays on the Discrimination of Doctrines) in the F u r t h e r Collection of Essays on Buddhism, Vol. 18, p p . 13-19. 12

13

The wrirld and the individual in Chinese metaphysics

45

55 Cf. Chieh-huan^, Hua-yen ching yao-chiek (Essentials of the Avatamsaka-sutra compiled in 1128. Nahking Centre for Buddhist Publications, 1872. 50 For the impo/tant literature on the Hua-yen school, see the Taisho edn. of the Buddhist Tripitaka'in Chinese. No. 1836, pp. 71-76; Nos. 1866-1890, pp. 477-792. 57 Here I am utilizing Tsung-mi's Chu Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men (Elucidations of the Hua-yen View of/the Dharma-dhitu), which is essentially more systematic than the earlier expositions by Tu-shun and Fa-tsang, (ibid., No. 1884, pp. 6 8 4 - 6 9 2 ) . 58 Cf C Lloyd Morgan, Mind at the Crossway.i (London: Williams & Norgate, 1929), pp. 2-4, 13-14, 20-21, 224-227, 230-235, 267-272.

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