Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters with the East and the West: Historical Encounters with the East and the West 0765623285, 9780765623287

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Maritime Taiwan Historical Encounters with the East and the UJest

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SHIH-SHRH HENRY TSHI

An East Gate Book

c{M .E .Sharpe Armonk, New York London, England

The publisher gratefully acknowledges a grant from the Ts’ao Yung-ho Foundation in support of the publication of this book.

An East Gate Book Consulting Editor: Doug Merwin

Copyright © 2009 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. Maritime Taiwan : historical encounters with the East and the West/by Shih-shan Henry Tsai, p. cm. “An East Gate Book.” Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7656-2328-7 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Taiwan—Relations—Foreign countries. I. Title. DS799.625.T73 2008 303.48*251249—dc22

2008020050

Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984.

@ BM(c)

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For Ts’ao Yung-ho, Taiwan Studies pioneer, and for H siu-chuan, W en-chi, and Chun-yueh

Contents

List o f Tables and Illustrations Acknowledgments Note on Transliteration 1. Introduction

ix xi xiii 3

2. Taiwan’s Seventeenth-Century Rulers: The Dutch, the Spaniards, and Koxinga

19

3. Trading Networks: Taiwan, Southeast A sia, and Coastal China

45

4. British Footprints on Taiwan: Consulates, Trading Firm s, and Presbyterian Churches

63

5. A Strategic Vantage Point: The French Cam paign in Taiwan

87

6. Late to the Scene: The U nited States A rrives in Taiwan

105

7. The Roots o f the Japanese Empire: The Colonization o f Taiwan

128

8. Taiwan During World War D: From Colony to Haven

149

9. Postw ar Taiwan: The Growing American Presence and Influence

174

Notes

207

G lossary o f Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese Characters

235

Bibliography

243

Index

257

About the A uthor

266

vii

List of Tables and Illustrations

Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3. 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 4.1 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.3

D utch G overnors in Taiwan, 1624-1661 VOC’s Principal Personnel on Taiwan Deploym ent o f D utch M ilitary Forces in 1654 Spanish G overnors in Taiwan, 1626-1642 Census o f Indigenous Peoples in Taipei Basin, 1647-1656 Revenues vs. Expenditures o f VOC in Taiwan, 1632-1661 Foreign Custom s O fficials in Taiwan, 1865-1895 The R elative Im portance o f Taiwan’s Four M ajor Ports Japanese Govem ors-G eneral in Taiwan, 1895-1945 Taiwan’s M aritim e Shipping M other Tongue-Speaking Fam ilies in Taipei Japanese/Taiwanese Student R atio at Taihoku Im perial U niversity A reas and C ities Occupied by the Japanese during W orld W ar n W orld W ar II Prisoners-of-W ar in Taiwan U.S. Im ports to Taiwan, 1951-1965 U.S. Foreign A id to Taiwan Taiwan’s Trade Im balance w ith the United States

23 25 26 28 32 38 61 81 132 143 153 158 165 170 184 185 200

Illustrations M ajor Ports o f Taiwan 2.1 D utch U nited East India Company Board M embers, Seventeenth Century 2.2 Dutch Fort Zeelandia, B uilt 1632 2.3 Dutch G overnor in Taiwan 2.4 Surviving Sam ple o f St. M atthew in Parallel D utch and Sinkan Languages 3.1 Chinese Im m igrants in Taiwan

2 21 22 24 36 49 IX

x

3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 5.1 6.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.3

LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Eighteenth-Century Trading Junk o f Taiwan Navy W arship o f C h’ing Dynasty N autical Chart o f Coastal Taiwan, 1850s Bringing Cam phor from the H ills, 1860s Taiwanese Troops in Training Governor Liu M ing-Chuan, 1885-1891 Japanese Governor-General Kodama Gentaro, 1898-1906 C hief C ivil A dm inistrator Goto Shim pei, 1898-1906 Japanese-owned Sugar M anufacture Company Entrance o f Im perial Taipei University, Founded by Japanese in 1928 School G irls in Exercise During WW n Expatriation o f the Japanese From Taiwan, 1945-1946 American A gricultural Expert in Rural Taiwan, Late 1950s Shipyard at the Keelung H arbor During the Vietnam W ar

51 58 73 84 99 124 135 136 139 157 172 175 183 199

Acknowledgments

Initial research for this book was conducted in Taiwan on and off since 1996, but it was during 2005-2006, when I was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute o f Taiwan History, A cadem ia Sinica, that I wrote the bulk o f the m anuscript I am indebted to the Institute for m aking available to me a wide range o f prim ary and secondary sources— including Dutch, Chinese, English, French, and Japanese—and for inviting me to present my papers for discussion and critique in its regular sem inars. I have benefited from the works o f fellow Taiwanese scholars who have done detailed research in various aspects o f Taiwan’s m aritim e history, in particular Huang Fu-san on Jardine, M atheson & Com pany’s trading mechanism; C h’en Kuo-tung on Taiwan’s sea experi­ ence from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century; Chou W an-yao on Taiwan’s m elting pot culture; Hsu Hsueh-chi and Hui-yu Caroline Tsai on Taiwanese-Japanese soldiers and auxiliaries; Chen Tsu-yu on Taiwan’s coal mining industry; Chung Shu-m in and Lin Yu-ju on the Taiwan Developm ent Corporation during World War II; Chang Lung-chih on late nineteenth-century Chinese and Japanese sovereignty and territorial issues over Taiwan; and Lin M an-hung on overseas Taiwanese investm ent and trade activities. My son Rocky once again gave me his unfailing support throughout the project’s duration, including taking tim e out from his extrem ely busy law practice to copyedit the Introduction. I also wish to thank Doug M erwin who provided invaluable advice and painstakingly edited the entire m anuscript. My old friend and B ritish historian Thom as C. Kennedy read C hapter 4, “B ritish Footprints on Taiwan; Consulates, Trading Firm s, and Presbyterian Churches” for me; my neighbor and World W ar II historian Evan B. Bukey critiqued C hapter 8, ’Taiw an During W orld W ar II: From Colony to Haven” ; my colleague and French historian Richard D. Sonn read Chapters 5 and 6, “A Strategic Vantage Point: The French Cam paign in Taiwan” and “Late to the Scene: The U nited States A rrives in Taiwan” ; and another colleague, Donald W. Engels read C hapter 2, ‘T aiw an’s Seventeenth-Century Rulers: The Dutch, the Spaniards, and Koxinga.” I especially want to thank Dr. Shih Fang-long for inviting me to the London School o f Economics to present a xi

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

paper, “Revisiting the N ineteenth-Century Anglo-Taiwanese R elationships,” in January 2007. In addition, several friends and scholars from Taiwan and America have provided inspiration, suggestions, and assistance. They include Liu Ts’ui-jung, Ts’ao C h’ang-p’ing, Chuang Ying-chang, June T. Dreyer, M urray A. Rubinstein, Chen Chiu-kun, Shih Tien-fu, Ena Chou, Fay Chou, Wu Jui-jen, and Hung Li-wan. Above all, I want to thank my younger brother W en-chi, who drove me around Taiwan so that I could investigate significant historical sites, where nineteenth-century European and Am erican diplom ats engaged w ith C hi­ nese officials and where foreign shippers and merchants traded with their Taiwanese counterparts. The places he showed me include the Tamsui Red Fort, Palm Island, and Yen-liao off Keelung harbor; the historical ports o f Lukang, G och’e, and Anping; the British consulate at Kaohsiung harbor; and the tiny isle o f Ch’i-tsin, where m issionary Jam es M axwell set up his first chapel. I also appreciate the encouragem ent and assistance provided by Lin W en-ch’in, Ho M ing-chang (Anthony) and Lin Jung-kun (Jackson). My research assistant M att Parnell o f the U niversity o f Arkansas helped me with interlibraiy loans and out-of-print books and journals. Ms. Teng Ya-pin o f Taiwan’s N ational Chiao Tung U niversity provided logistical support. Finally, it was my wife Hsiu-chuan and my physician daughter Shirley who took care o f fam ily business so that I could devote my tim e and energy to the com pletion o f this project. I am grateful to Taiwan’s Yuan-liou Publishing House for perm ission to use historical photographs from its Taiwan history collection. Publication o f the book was supported by a subvention from the Ts’ao Yung-ho Foundation o f Culture and Education.

Note on Transliteration

The W ade-Giles system is used for transliterating Chinese characters w ith some exceptions: names that have long been fam iliar in the W est, such as Amoy (instead o f H sia-m en), Canton (instead o f K w ang-chow), Tamsui (instead o f Tan-shui), Koxinga (instead o f Cheng C h’eng-kung), and Chiang Kai-shek (instead o f Chiang Chieh-shih). Names o f prom inent officials in the People’s Republic o f China are Rom anized in the pinyin system , such as M ao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

Maritime Taiwan qbq& c& c& q& c& qK rf& qbqfcqfccjbc& qfbqbqfbcÿ,

Major porte of Taiwan

1 Introduction

The O rigins o f “Taiwan” In Europe, the Treaty o f W estphalia sanctified the sovereign concept o f the m odem state in 1648. In East A sia, the nations o f China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam entered the modem era with vastly different historical backgrounds. A lthough their cultures and institutions have some sim ilarities, attributable to geographical proxim ity and the shared influence o f Buddhism and Confucianism , each o f the East Asian countries has its own unique pattern o f nation form ation and cultural am algam ation. Chinese records show that in 108 b.c.e. Han Chinese conquered the northern part o f the Korean peninsula and established a province called Lo-lang. C hi­ nese influence there, which included writing, the monetary system, rice culture, and political institutions, would continue until 313 c.e., when the indigenous tribal kingdom o f Koguryo drove the Chinese deep into M anchuria. D uring m ost o f the second century until 111 b.c.e., northern Vietnam was under a secessionist Chinese state called Nam -yueh, in the region o f the Red R iver delta. N orthern Vietnam, w ith a Chinese w riting system , classical Confucian learning, and a Chinese bureaucracy, was incorporated into the Chinese em pire for over one thousand years until 939 c.e., and again during the M ing dynasty from 1407 to 1427. U nder the rule o f Prince Shotoku (373-621), Japan began to borrow the form s and term inology, but not the essence and underlying principles, o f Chinese governm ent and the fundam entals o f Chinese thought and art. W ith this eclectic borrowing from China, Japan rem ained separate from C hina by differences o f race, language, and custom throughout its history. Taiwan presents a som ewhat different story. Contrary to a w idespread m isconception regarding the history o f ChinaTaiwan relations, Chinese influence was not significantly felt in Taiwan until the second half o f the seventeenth century, even though the island is separated from m ainland C hina by only a 100-mile strait. M oreover, the transm ission o f Chinese culture to Taiwan was continually m et w ith com peting countercur­ rents em anating from the larger m aritim e world. 3

4

CHAPTER 1

In 1644, the Jurchen M anchus founded a new dynasty in China called the C h’ing, which reached its zenith around 1800 but steadily declined thereaf­ ter. In Japan in 1603, a m ilitary regim e known as the Tokugawa shogunate established a feudal state and soon closed the country to the outside world, except for the Chinese and the Dutch, until 1854. Three decades after the M eiji Restoration (1868), Japan emerged as a strong, unified, modem nation. Korea remained a “hermit kingdom” under the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), which was adamantly opposed to the influence o f the West, but becam e a victim o f Japanese m ilitarism between 1894 and 1945. A fter three decades o f internal struggles and dynastic rivalries, Vietnam was divided into the three states o f Annam, Tonkin, and Cochin China in 1673, and ultim ately suffered French colonial intervention. And in 1648, Taiwan fell under the sway o f the Dutch United East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie [VOC]), which reaped considerable profits by using the island as a distribution center for Chinese silks and porcelain, Japanese silver and copper, and Southeast Asian spices.1 However, during the next three-and-a-half centuries, the his­ tory o f Taiwan was to be one o f frequent turm oil as the island fell victim to repeated invasions by superior external powers. Prior to the sixteenth century, the island o f Taiwan was inhabited by a few indigenous tribes who did not make contact or trade with any other peoples, including the Chinese, partly because the island was endowed with plentiful resources and partly owing to its geographic isolation. To be sure, the Chinese had been active since the eighth century in coastal shipping and foreign trade. However, when their sampans and cargo junks sailed to and from South Asia and Southeast Asia, they always stayed as close as possible to C hina’s coastal sea lanes. As a consequence, other than the fact that Chinese fishermen began settling in the Pescadores (Portuguese for Fisherm en’s Islands) beginning in the tw elfth century, and that the M ongol em pire had also established an outpost there, Chinese traders and sailors rarely set foot on Taiwan. Indeed, until the turn o f the seventeenth century, the very existence o f the island was rarely even mentioned in Chinese literature. W hen Taiwan first came within their ken, the Chinese used names such as Liu-ch’iu (or Ryukyu)— which ap­ peared in the annals o f the Sui dynasty (589-618) (Sui shih) and o f the Sung dynasty (960-1279) (Sung shih)— to identify the island. These names, how­ ever, were employed in so vague and variable a manner that they ultim ately did not survive. In the end, the two names by which the island has been m ost commonly identified during the modem era—Form osa and Taiwan—are not Chinese in origin, but were, first coined by seafaring Europeans. Sometime near the end of the sixteenth century (probably 1582), when a ship from M acao severely damaged in a storm was searching for shelter along the coast o f the island, its Portuguese sailors were so im pressed with

INTRODUCTION

5

its natural beauty that they cried out Ilha Formosa! or “Beautiful Island.” Onboard the Portuguese ship was a Dutch officer nam ed Linschotten, who quickly jotted down this nam e on his chart, thus giving the island its first name. The first detailed m ap o f Taiwan was subsequently draw n by the cartographer Los Rios Coronel around 1597, thus bringing the island to the attention o f the W estern w orld.2 The name ‘Taiw an” is m ost likely derived from the seventeenth-century Dutch colonial capital o f the island, Tayouan. Located in the southern coastal town o f A nping in a suburb o f present-day Tainan City, Tay-ouan was pronounced by die natives as ‘Tai-w an,” hence m em orializing the legacy o f the D utch on the island. Following suit, the Chi­ nese also called the island Taiwan (w hich translates to ‘T erraced Bay”), thus clouding the provenance o f the name. Like the popular but dubious Parson W eems’s fable o f the youthful George W ashington chopping down a cherry tree with his hatchet and then confessing what he had done, the m yth that the name ‘Taiw an” is Chinese in origin is widely subscribed to by the Chinese today, despite overwhelm ing evidence to the contrary. In the age o f rising nationalism, both Chinese governments, the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist in Taipei and the Com m unist in Beijing, have chosen to inculcate this linguistic fable in their school curricula. U ntil the seventeenth century, Taiwan rem ained an unclaim ed land. It is likely that medieval Chinese were aware o f the existence o f the island, and by the late sixteenth century, in addition to the aboriginal tribes, a sm all num ber o f Chinese, prim arily fisherm en, m arginals, and pirates, resided on the island. But Taiwan was definitely not a part o f the M ing em pire (1368-1644), the Chinese having neither the interest nor the need to intervene in a far distant island inhabited by a generally uncivilized people. Any scholar who has ever burrowed in the M ing archives, including the M ing shi lu (M ing veritable records), can attest to the fact that the name “Taiwan” never existed throughout the M ing period.3 The first Chinese territorial claim to Taiwan did not occur until Septem ber 8,1683. Initial Chinese interest in and contact with Taiwan started only tow ard the end o f the sixteenth century when the island’s three freshw ater and provision stations for fishermen (at Peikang, Keelung, and Tamsui) were turned into pirate strongholds by outlaw s and renegades from China. The 1574 edition o f the M ing Veritable Records referred to these out­ laws as “Tung-fan, or Eastern Barbarians.” All these events took place about half a century before the D utch built their fortresses, w arehouses, churches, and governm ent offices on the island. The first credible Chinese historical account on Taiwan was C h’en Ti’s Tung-fan-chi (Treatise on the eastern barbarians, 1603), w hich was based on C h’en’s personal investigations o f piracy in Taiwan. A native o f Fukien Province, C h’en H studied m ilitary strategy and, during the w inter o f 1601 when he turned sixty-tw o years old,

6

CHAPTER 1

accom panied M ing com m ander Shen You-jung in the latter’s hot pursuit o f pirates who were then using Taiwan as a refuge.4 As part o f the contem porary debate on the em otional issue o f w hether Taiwan should unify w ith C hina or rem ain independent, Chinese proponents often cite Ch’en Ti’s historical account, arguing that the territory o f the Eastern B arbarians belonged to the M ing em pire. A fam iliar and m eretricious argu­ m ent, it is ultim ately both baseless and facile. Shen’s hot pursuit was a brief and singular thrust into the island, then inhabited prim arily by aboriginal tribes. A fter Shen’s w ithdraw al, the M ing did not leave any garrison troops. M oreover, when the Dutch later entered the scene, the Chinese did nothing to stop these w hite-skinned European “barbarians” from exercising their jurisdiction not only over the aboriginals, but also over the sm all num ber o f Chinese then living on the island. In fact, it was the D utch who offered incentives, including cash, buffalo, and free transportation on Dutch ships— aim ed at enticing m ore Chinese to settle on the island. D utch colonists, however, chose not to induce Japanese to com e to the island because o f an anti-C hristianity cam paign in Kyushu— w hich led to the execution o f 120 m issionaries and converts in 1622— and because o f a serious trade dispute which resulted in an attem pt by the Japanese captain Hamada Yabei to harm the D utch governor o f Taiwan Pieter Nuyts and his young son Laurens Nuyts in the summer o f 1628.5 During the thirty-eight-year D utch rule o f Taiwan (1624-1662), the Dutch used the island as an entrepôt for its Asian trade, linking this trade with its worldwide com m ercial networks. The Dutch geographer Philippus Daniel M eij van M eijensteen conducted the initial land survey o f Taiwan. Dutch protestant m issionaries introduced both C hristianity and the Latin w riting system to the island’s aborigines, thus ushering Taiwan into the historical era (details in C hapter 2). In the meantime, the Spanish had also established a settlem ent in northern Taiwan to challenge the Dutch dom inance o f the Asian trade. In 1642, the Dutch expelled their Spanish rivals from the island and continued their im pressive proselytization and flourishing commerce in Taiwan. However, the Hollandization o f Taiwan came to an end in 1662 when the Dutch were driven from the island by Ming loyalists led by Koxinga (Cheng C h'eng-kung, 1624-1662)— whose m other was Japanese. Even after the prem ature death o f Koxinga in June 1662, Taiwan’s Cheng regime vigorously pursued open commercial intercourse with Japan and Southeast A sia, as well as clandestine dealings with China. In order to feed the troops, Taiwanese trading junks carried Chinese and Tonkinese silks, Japanese silver and copper, and Siamese gold in exchange for the abundant and cheaper rice in Southeast Asia. Factional strife weakened the Cheng ruling fam ily and, after a devastating defeat in the Pescadores, Cheng’s fleet was wiped out and

INTRODUCTION

7

Koxinga’s grandson officially subm itted him self to his M anchu overlord on Septem ber 8,1683. For a long tim e the im perial court in B eijing was not sure w hat to do w ith the “dangerous and distant” island o f Taiwan. In fact, Chinese authorities even tried to persuade the Dutch to buy back Taiwan. However, the D utch, who had helped the Chinese defeat K oxinga’s troops, declined the offer.6 In 1895, when C hina realized that she was about to be defeated by Japan, the im perial authorities in Beijing decided to cut their losses. Once again, Beijing had come to the conclusion that continuing to hold on to the island was not w orth the cost and thus offered to sell Taiwan to G reat Britain. However, B ritish Prim e M inister the Earl o f Rosebery and Foreign Secretary Lord Kim berley tw ice declined the Chinese offer.7 U ltim ately, in 1895, B eijing ceded the island to Japan, totally ignoring the w ishes o f the Taiwanese. The starting point in the transform ation o f Taiwan from a nearby menace into a dispensable pawn in international politics began on M ay 27, 1684, when the C h’ing authorities in B eijing made Taiwan a prefecture (or fu ) o f Fukien Province, w ith the governm ent site rem aining where the Dutch had built Fort Provintia (now called Taiwanfii). In 1685, the K ’ang-hsi em peror (r. 1662-1722), the new m aster o f Taiwan, took a series o f measures to resume the m ainland’s m aritim e trade w ith the island. Taking advantage o f this economic opportunity, hundreds o f Chinese junks annually carried such Taiwanese raw m aterials as rice, sugar, peanut oil, deerskins, indigo, and hemp to Amoy, Foo­ chow, C h’uan-chou, Ningpo, Shanghai, and even to C hina’s northern port o f Tientsin. W hile rice, peanut oil, and indigo found their m arkets in China, sugar and deerskins were generally re-exported to Japan. The Taiwan-bound junks often carried cotton cloth (nankeen), silver, ironw are, and herbal m edicine, but m ost o f them sim ply sailed with ballast. Though m ost o f the junk owners were from southern Fukien Province, trading boats from Chekiang, Kiangsu, northern China, and Southeast A sia were also involved in the Taiwan trade. During the early eighteenth century, three m erchant guilds (called chiao in Taiwanese) w ere established in Taiwanfii to facilitate com m odity trading and other business transactions (details in C hapter 3). Taiwan and O ther M aritim e N ations Thanks to its unique geographical location and rich resources, Taiwan quickly resum ed its im portant role in the m aritim e trade netw ork o f A sia that was started by the D utch in the early seventeenth century. A t the height o f the China-Taiwan trade, more than one thousand Chinese junks visited the island every year. By 1850, however, the laiger, faster, and more efficient Am erican and European steam ships, including vessels from B ritain, Prussia, France,

8

CHAPTER 1

Denmark, Portugal, and Peru, had replaced the smaller, slower, and riskier Chinese junks in transporting Taiwanese cargo across the dangerous Taiwan Strait. Subsequently, W estern m aritim e traders brought their business know­ how as w ell as a steady stream o f cash to bear on the subtropical island, all the w hile helping to disrupt the m andarin trade monopoly (in such products as cam phor), which encouraged piracy and sm uggling in Taiwan. Am erican firms (such as Robinet, Nye, and W illiam s) and English com panies (includ­ ing Jardine M atheson & Co., Dent, and Elies) regularly sent their ships to Tamsui, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Taiwanfu. In 1855, American m erchants spent 45,000 U.S. dollars to upgrade the port facilities o f Kaohsiung while the B ritish lighthouse keeper G eoige Taylor installed and m aintained lighting systems at the entrances to Taiwan’s m ajor ports. Eighteen kilometers upstream o f the m outh o f the Tamsui River, some twenty foreign m erchants—m ost notably Jam es M ilisch (Germ an), John Dodd (Scottish), and Frank Cass (American)— bunded the Twa-tu-tia w aterfront, right next to the northern w all o f the city o f Taipei. They built a “commodious” clubhouse, established several stores, and functioned as commercial agents for foreign firms in m ajor Taiwanese ports. A handful o f W estern-style buildings still stand on presentday Kuei-te Street. W hile the foreign merchants sold the islanders opium, using the proceeds to purchase tea and cam phor for export and making huge profits for them selves, they were also the ones who introduced the Taiwanese to the modem w orld o f banking, business management, and international trade. To be sure, there were often trade disputes; and China, at least on paper, had a sophisticated legal tradition that encom passed business and adm inistrative m atters. However, Chinese law was prim arily penal and harshly applied, with little attention to procedural justice and the concept o f im partiality. The result was an antipathy tow ard Chinese law among the islanders. W hile the authoritarian—or, as it was once called, ‘’O riental”— society o f C hina deprecated com petition and innovation, failed to create a modem economic system, and denied legitim acy to private efforts to negotiate w ith the mandarins; the Taiwanese, on the other hand, had long contact with seafaring Europeans and Americans and thus were fam iliar with the principles o f law, com petition, and individual self-interest. Indeed, Taiwanese called the w aterfront on the Tamsui R iver the “foreigners’ quarters,” and it was there that the Taiwanese intelligentsia, under the leader­ ship o f the philanthropist Lin H sien-t’ang (1881-1956) and the prom inent physician Chiang W ei-shui (1891-1931) oiganized the Taiwan C ultural As­ sociation, or Taiwan Bunkakyokai, in 1921 to advance Taiwanese culture.* The issue that continues to divide historians is w hether Taiwan was con­ verted into an “O riental” society during the 212-year C h’ing rule, or w hether Taiwan managed to avoid China’s inward-looking inertia and develop its own

INTRODUCTION

9

outw ard-looking m aritim e society. Before this question can be satisfactorily answered, one fact needs to be em phasized. Throughout its tw o-century-long de ju re rule over the island, the im perial governm ent in B eijing did not have de facto jurisdiction over the larger part o f Taiwan. As a physical entity, Taiw an's rem oteness and isolation spared the islanders from C hina’s affinity for m onolithic authority and im perial institutions. The em peror’s absolutist authority was further underm ined by the corruption and ineffectiveness o f the handful o f m andarins sent from the m ainland, on the one hand, and by the unruly character o f the frontier islanders, on the other. The islanders did leam the Confucian morality, and also worshiped at Taoist and Buddhist tem ples and pavilions, where they practiced Chinese custom s and rituals. Some o f the island’s elites, w hether out o f com pulsion or from shared convictions, also accepted the values o f the m andarins who governed from the dom inant center. They learned the Confucian classics and took part in the civil service exam inations and, when and if successful, becam e gentry in Taiwan’s upper social echelon. This “trickle-dow n” Sinicization, however, had only a lim ited effect on the population at large, and the mandarin hauteur ultim ately failed to fundam entally convert Taiwan into a genuinely “O riental” Chinese society. Traditional Chinese society always extolled stability and harmony, honored antiquity, but discouraged the developm ent o f resources. However, the im ­ m igrants from Fukien and Kwangtung risked all and braved the dangerous Taiwan Strait and wilderness, mainly because they wanted to live freely with­ out strict rules im posed on them and to freely pursue econom ic self-interest w ithout inhibition. As a consequence, the frontier Taiw anese frequently defied C h’ing authorities, organizing resistance against arbitrary restraints, bureaucratic rapacity, and im perial control. C h’ing officials in Chiayi County and Changhua County were still m ired in the adm inistration o f rural Taiwan as late as 1836. From 1684 to 1895, there was a total o f 159 m ajor uprisings, and in the period betw een 1768 and 1887, fifty-seven arm ed clashes were reported.9 A lso, during the reign o f the C hia-ch’ing em peror (1796-1820), the notorious Fukienese pirate-chief Tsai C h’ien (7-1809) m ustered a m otley band o f freebooters and invaded the coastal town o f Lukang in 1804. Two years later, his pirates annihilated the entire C h’ing garrison force in Taipei, then headquartered at the M ankah district along the Tamsui River. A fter pro­ claim ing a dynasty called “Enlightenm ent” in Taiwan, Tsai sealed off the high seas betw een Taiwan and the m ainland. For the next tw o years, Tsai acted like the real king o f Taiwan, extracting “protection fees” from each and every ship that passed through the Taiwan Strait. It is no w onder that the C h’ing official record states: “Every three years there was an outbreak, every five a rebellion, among Taiwanese.” 10 During his tenure as the first governor (hsun-fu) o f Taiwan (1885-1891),

10

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General Liu M ing-ch’uan, appointed by Beijing, attem pted to increase the land tax from a total o f 183,366 silver taels annually to a much higher figure. But the islanders, particularly the wealthy clans (ta-tsu-hu) and the land developers (hsiao-tsu-hu), vigorously resisted. In 1888, Taiwan’s provincial government collected far less than the 674,468 silver teals in land tax that was projected by Liu. Liu’s fiscal shortfall, a derangem ent associated with a lack o f governmental jurisdiction, was a byproduct o f the semiautonomous state o f Taiwan. It rem ained for the Japanese colonial adm inistration to initiate a thorough land survey and a m ajor land tax reform . Liu M ing-ch’uan installed modem machinery for coal mining in Keelung and electric lights in northern Taiwan, constructed some 22 kilom eters o f new railw ay lines around the Taipei region, and established telegraph service, but only erratically. There were no highways worthy o f the name, and the streets were dusty and crooked. In fact, Liu had to rely on custom s receipts, which averaged 1,084,364 silver taels annually between 1888 and 1893, to pay for his modernization projects.11 Because the C h’ing em peror could not trust Chinese officials alone at the custom s office, he had to hire foreigners to manage duty collection at the treaty ports. Ultimately, it was the foreign custom s com m issioners—including Friedrich H irth (a German stationed at Tamsui Custom s), Hosea B. M orse (an American at Tamsui/Keelung), P.H.S. M ontgomery (a Briton at South Form osa Custom s), and W illiam F. Spinney (an American at Tainan/Kaohsiung Custom s), among other foreigners—who helped increase local production and develop trade to yield large maritim e custom s revenues. Although Beijing’s em pire-builders yearned for stability and attem pted to apply their universalist law and order to a dangerous and distant Taiwan, their local officials found it hard to stabilize and harmonize the island frontier. China’s aspiration o f maintaining a fixed idea o f mandarin rule on the island turned into an outdated, foolhardy enterprise. In the end, the C h’ing governm ent did not and could not exercise com plete jurisdiction— territorial, judicial, or fiscal—over Taiwan. Essential differences rem ained between the m ainland and the island as Taiwan persisted as a m aritim e frontier region owing to geographical factors and historical circum stances. Geographically, the dangerous strait functioned as a natural barrier, separating mainstream Chinese culture from the frontier pioneers in Taiwan, who were forced to adapt to the unruly environment, sultry climate, tropical diseases, measureless swamps, impenetrable mountains, wild beasts, typhoons, earthquakes, and indigenous aboriginals. Thus, although Chinese life did come to the island, Taiwan modified and developed that culture into one with its own uniquely Taiwanese characteristics. Throughout the eighteenth and into the first half o f the nineteenth century, Taiwan was a m eeting ground o f savagery and civilization. Because the C h’ing govern-

INTRODUCTION

11

m eat's w rit barely ran beyond the city w alls, the pioneer farm ers o f Taiwan greeted the aboriginals arm ed w ith weapons. Even among the Chinese im­ m igrants, subethnic rivalry was a way o f life. For exam ple, the H oklos (who spoke a distinctive southern Fukienese dialect) constantly fought against the Hakkas (literally m eaning G uest Settlers) for land and water. The clannish feuds betw een the two largest groups o f the Hoklos, one that em igrated from Chang-chou County in Fukien and the other from C h'uan-chou County, often escalated into ferocious regional battles.12 The fact that there are hundreds o f such recorded historical events makes Taiwan a poor model for the study o f the so-called M ing-Ch’ing “m acrore­ gions.” On the contrary, because o f its deep and far-reaching involvem ent with seafaring Europeans, Southeast A sians, coastal Chinese, Japanese, and Am ericans, Taiwan instead represents an ideal case study for global m aritim e history. Shipwrecks and other violent incidents, as w ell as the unflagging desire to procure coal, tea, freshw ater, and food provisions, often drew the attention o f m ajor m aritim e pow ers to the island. It is well-known that dur­ ing his historic trip to open up Japan in 1853-1854 Commodore M atthew C. Perry (1794-1858) recom m ended an Am erican “protectorate over Taiwan,” because, as Perry reported to President M illard Fillm ore (1800-1874), “This significant island [of Taiwan], though nom inally a province o f China, is practi­ cally independent.” O ther know ledgeable A m ericans, such as businessm an Gideon Nye, m issionary Peter Parker (1804-1888), and diplom at Townsend H arris (1804-1878) also “recom m ended outright purchase o f the island” for as much as ten m illion dollars in cash (details in C hapter 6).13 As early as 1825, English m erchants cam e to Keelung to purchase camphor, o f which Taiwan was the w orld’s largest producer. In 1842, two English ships were wrecked off Keelung harbor and 197 o f the surviving sailors were executed. Simon Long points out that England “at one point toyed with the idea o f turning Taiwan into a penal colony, like A ustralia.” 14Later, in 1868, England dispatched gunboats to Taiwan over the issue o f controlling the cam phor m arket (details in C hapter 4). Protected by gunboats and a web o f treaty rights, foreign m issionaries felt secure enough to once again spread the Christian gospel in Taiwan. It had been nearly tw o centuries since D utch and Spanish m issionaries began their energetic evangelical efforts in Taiwan. B ut w hile the first European wave o f spreading Christianity ended in tragic failure, owing to Koxinga’s brutality, the efforts o f the second wave o f Christian m issions to the island, struggling with difficulties at the outset, would ultim ately lead to a long and lasting success. U nder the auspices o f the Presbyterian Church o f England, Dr. Jam es L. M ax­ w ell, W illiam Cam pbell, and their fearless colleagues preached the C hristian gospel to the Taiwanese from the m ountainous villages to the coastal towns

12

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o f Taiwan. By 1885, they had established thirty-five Presbyterian churches in central and southern Taiwan. In the meantim e, Dr. George L. Mackay, under the auspices o f the Canadian Presbyterian Church, had also established tw enty chapels in northern Taiwan in full communion w ith C alvinistic theol­ ogy. Together with Anglo-Am erican trading practices, the Anglo-Canadian m issions not only brought the island to the steam ship age, but also improved its transportation, com m unication, m edical, and educational infrastructure. In so doing, they made Taiwan an integral part o f global m aritim e trading and thrust Taiwan into the m odem w orld, decades ahead o f any provinces in m ainland C hina.15 By the m id-nineteenth century, China had lost its vigor, drained by increas­ ing foreign incursions and the destructive Taiping R ebellion, and Chinese society was hopelessly sliding into the undulant abyss o f decadence. The decline o f im perial China began with the deadly albatross o f the Opium W ar with G reat Britain (1840-1842). During the second half o f the nineteenth century, the disintegration o f the Chinese em pire accelerated until she lost control o f nearly all o f her buffer states and strategic territories— including Vietnam and Canton Bay to France; Taiwan and Korea to Japan; Kiaochow Bay (near the Shangtung peninsula) to Germany; Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Tibet to Britain; and the Liaotung peninsula and M ongolia to Russia. In 1874, Japan sent a punitive expedition o f some 3,600 troops to the southeast coast o f Taiwan against aborigines who, three years earlier, had killed fiftyfour shipwrecked Ryukyuans. Ten years later, in 1884, France occupied the Pescadores as well as Tamsui and Keelung, and blockaded the Taiwan Strait for nearly a year. During the French blockade o f Taiwan (details in Chapter 5), policy makers in Beijing finally realized that w hoever gained control o f Taiwan could pose a serious threat to the mainland. As a consequence, they upgraded Taiwan into a province in 1885. The four subsequent governors made some piecemeal reforms with funding coming prim arily from Taiwan’s foreign trade revenues. Then, in 1894-1895, an econom ically anemic and politically stagnant C hina was soundly defeated by a rising Japan in an acrim onious dispute over Korea, and was forced to sign the Treaty o f Shim onoseki, by which Taiwan and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan. During the initial phase o f the Japanese colonial rale, Japanese troops brutally suppressed a stiff protracted resistance by the Taiwanese. However, after killing over 10,000 Taiwanese, Japanese colonial rulers changed their governance tactics and made a concerted effort to win over the hearts and souls o f the islanders. In 1898, Tokyo appointed a physician nam ed Goto Shim pei (1857-1929) as the chief civil adm inistrator o f Taiwan and began a series o f reform s. Goto replaced the m ilitary police with regular police, adopted the hoko m utual-aid system to penetrate into local com m unities, and

INTRODUCTION

13

provided economic and educational opportunities for the island’s elite. During his tenure in Taiwan, from 1898 to 1906, Goto succeeded in m itigating the hostile feelings o f the islanders and in m axim izing their quality o f life. The Governm ent-general o f Taiwan (Japanese colonial authorities) also made a land survey and conducted a population census and, in 1899, established the Bank o f Taiwan. The land survey recorded 618,744 acres o f land that were not previously registered on the governm ent tax roll. As a result, Taiwan’s land revenues tripled from 920,000 yen in 1903 to a total o f 2,980,000 yen in 1905.16 Once land had becom e a commodity, Japanese zaibatsu firms quickly made inroads into Taiwanese m arkets. By 1926, more than 500 Japanese com panies had set up enterprises in Taiwan. Even though a typical colonial economy was already in place, the colonial governm ent built more than 6,500 kilom eters o f railroad lines and highways, constructed concrete dams and reservoirs, and developed 16,000 m eters o f canals to facilitate irrigation and harness hydroelectric power. In conjunction w ith this econom ic policy, the Japanese governm ent turned to native Taiwanese to help execute its ’’South Advance Policy.” The G overnm ent-general o f Taiwan provided grants to encourage Taiwanese to move to Southeast A sia to grow rubber trees, M a­ nila hemp, sugar, and tea plantations, ensuring that Japan had access to the region’s raw m aterials. Taiwan’s foreign trade gradually expanded to include not only Japan and N ortheast A sia, but also Hong Kong and coastal China. Before Am erican forces had effectively occupied the central Pacific islands and started their relentless bom bing o f Taiwan and Japan in 1945, tw enty-one regularly scheduled shipping lines provided service betw een Taiwan and the world (details in C hapter 7). In the meantime, Japan attem pted to assim ilate the Taiwanese by encourag­ ing the islanders to speak the Japanese language, to adopt Japanese names, and to ’’dress, eat, and live as Japanese do.” By 1930, only 12.36 percent o f Taiwanese had become literate in Japanese, but this percentage grew to 37.38 percent in 1937 and to 51 percent in 1940. By 1943, over 80 percent o f the Taiwanese could understand and speak Japanese.17But the so-called komin-ka cam paign, which was designed to turn the Taiwanese into loyal subjects o f the Japanese emperor, was less successful. N ear the end o f 1941, only 70,000 islanders (out o f a population o f m ore than 5.7 m illion) had changed their Taiwanese names to Japanese names. By the end o f the Japanese colonial rule in 1945, only 1.7 percent o f Taiwanese fam ilies, or 2 percent o f the island’s population, had chosen to adopt Japanese nam es.18In die final analysis, even though the vast m ajority o f Taiwanese did learn how to speak the Japanese language, they were not w illing to jettison their own national identity. In 1936, the Governm ent-general o f Taiwan established the Taiwan De-

14

CHAPTER 1

velopm ent Company (TDC) to exploit raw m aterials in Southeast A sia and to cooperate w ith the Japanese troops invading China. By 1942, the TDC had invested in a total o f thirty-tw o projects, ranging from m ining, fishery, forestry, and agriculture to livestock, real estate and construction, transpor­ tation, and commerce. Thousands o f Taiwanese technicians and specialists were sent to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Hainan Island, M anchuria, and elsew here to work on and help manage these projects. The irony was that Taiwanese in Southeast A sia and some parts o f China had in their own way become “temporary colonizers” as they were forced into solidarity with their Japanese colleagues. For exam ple, a Taiwanese native by the name o f Hsieh Chieh-shih served as the foreign m inister o f the Japanese puppet state o f M anchukuo. O ther prom inent Taiwanese also held responsible positions in such Japanese occupied cities as Tientsin, Nanking, and Canton, and on Hainan Island. A fter the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo not only effectively turned Taiwan into a launching pad for Japanese m ilitary conquests in the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, but also system atically mobilized Taiwan’s labor force and m aterial resources to support the escalation o f Japan’s war machine. Japan recruited Taiwanese volunteers to join the rank and file o f its military. Taiwanese armed personnel, m ilitary auxiliaries, and nurses were deployed to Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, Borneo, Timor, Celebes, Rabaul (in the Solomon Islands), New Guinea, M anchuria, Siberia, and many other places then occupied by the Japanese military. A total o f 207,183 Taiwanese armed personnel fought during W orld War n and an estim ated 30,304 perished on the battlefield. In addition, more than 8,000 Taiwanese child laborers were brought to Japan to make aircraft parts for the manufacture o f bombers and kamikaze suicide planes. It has been more than sixty years since the formal signing o f the Instrum ent o f Surrender took place on Septem ber 2, 1945 (Septem ber 3 Japan tim e), on board the USS M issouri in Tokyo Bay, but new stories o f Taiwanese involvem ent in World War II continue to emerge (details in C hapter 8). Surviving Taiwanese veterans have generally shied away from the notion that they embodied both the valor and the cruelty o f Japanese martial culture exhibited in com bat against the A llied troops. N evertheless, during W orld War n, hundreds o f thousands o f Taiwanese left their footprints on the bloody ground o f Asian battlefields and prisoner o f w ar camps. C om petition O ver Taiwan The five-and-half m illion war-weary Taiwanese generally welcomed the news o f the Japanese capitulation; in fact, a number of leading Taiwanese had begun to advocate an independent Taiwan as soon as Japan surrendered Taiwan to

INTRODUCTION

15

the Suprem e Command«* for the A llied Pow ers (SCAP) at Yokohama on Septem ber 3. However, on O ctober 25, the last Japanese governor-general o f Taiwan, Ando Rikichi, delivered Taiwan, together w ith an estim ated 2 billion U .S. dollars w orth o f Japanese properties, to N ationalist C hinese General C h’en Yi (1883-1950). It was thus that the half century o f Japanese rule over Taiwan was brought to an end by Am erican bombs and A m erican forces. Thereafter, the status o f Taiwan rem ained unsettled since neither the C airo D eclaration (Novem ber 27,1943) nor the Potsdam D eclaration (July 26,1945) specified who should be the legal recipient o f Taiwan. Perhaps fit­ tingly, the Taiwanese were doomed to experience yet another identity crisis ju st as their grandparents did in 1895 when the Japanese took over Taiwan from the C h’ing authorities, and ju st as their distant ancestors did in 1661 when K oxinga’s troops drove the D utch out o f the island. During Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese developed new perceptions o f and attitudes tow ard the Chinese, w hich only intensified during the war. These new mental and em otional patterns, juxtaposed with the unrelenting exploitation o f the island’s resources by the N ationalist Chinese (KM T) to support their civil w ar against the Communists on the m ainland, ultim ately triggered an island-w ide revolt on February 28, 1947. During the ensuing weeks, the KMT rulers deployed m ilitary troops to m assacre tens o f thou­ sands o f Taiwanese. The Taiwanese independence m ovement has draw n its inspiration from this national traum a ever since. Partly owing to W ashington’s desire to keep the N ationalists fighting the Communists, and partly for postw ar security and stability in East A sia, the U nited States viewed Taiwan as at m ost a tertiary issue in 1947 and chose not to interfere in the KMT’s brutal suppression o f the Taiwanese revolt. Neverthe­ less, U.S. Secretary o f State John Foster D ulles (1888-1959) did exclude both the Republic o f C hina (ROC, the KMT on Taiwan) and the People’s Republic o f C hina (PRC, the Chinese Communist Party in B eijing) from the postw ar peace conference w ith Japan held in San Francisco on Septem ber 8, 1951, and attended by forty-eight nations. D ulles subsequently pressured Japanese Prem ier Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967) into signing a separate peace treaty with Taipei’s ROC, instead o f w ith B eijing’s PRC, on A pril 28,1952, the very day on w hich Japan officially regained its sovereignty. In both peace treaties, Japan renounced her “right, title, and claim ” over Taiwan and the Pescadores, but the beneficiary o f the renunciation was, once again, not specified; nor did the treaties provide for a transfer o f sovereignty to the PRC. Form er Dutch Prim e M inister Andreas van Agt, a specialist on international law, says that in legal term s, these treaties rendered Taiwan “terra nullius,” not held by any recognized political entity. Fram ing this historical tableau in term s o f the current debate on indepen­

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CHAPTER 1

dence versus unification w ith China, van A gt points out that there are two schools o f thought regarding Taiwan’s status. Some hold that the ROC ac­ quired Taiwan, since it dem onstrated effective occupation o f the island after Chiang K ai-shek and his KMT governm ent retreated there in 1949. Van Agt him self, however, says he doubts that this doctrine fits Taiwan’s post-W orld War II history “because the repressive KMT regim e was marked by the ever sm oldering and sometimes flaring opposition against a repressive regim e and a waxing aw areness. . . o f Taiwan’s own identity.” A nother faction holds that the country is in a state o f legal limbo. M embers o f this group are generally proponents o f sovereignty who believe that the people o f Taiwan have the right to decide their own political future. Van A gt quoted the English Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who noted in 1955 that Form osa and the Pescado­ res were territory the de jure sovereignty o f w hich was both uncertain and undeterm ined.19 Christopher Hughes has pointed out that ’Taiw an was not listed as a prov­ ince in the Chinese Republic’s draft constitutions o f 1925,1934, or 1936.”20 D uring W orld W ar II, when the struggling Communist Chinese were pinned down by both the Nationalist Chinese troops and the Japanese army in povertystricken northwestern China, Chairman o f the Chinese Communist Party M ao Zedong told the American journalist Edgar Snow that he wanted to help Korea and Taiwan “in their struggle for independence from Japan.”21 Several decades later, the more truculent Communist China habitually lacerates the sentiments o f Taiwan’s fledgling dem ocracy and repeatedly threatens to invade Taiwan if the islanders dare to change their constitution. The United States has never unequivocally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, w hether claim ed by the People’s Republic o f C hina or the KMT regim e led by Chiang Kaishek. Dean Rusk—A ssistant Secretary o f State for Far Eastern A ffairs under the Truman adm inistration and later Secretary o f State under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson—prom ulgated A m erica’s ’T w o China” policy as early as M ay 1951, when he called B eijing’s regim e “a Slavic M anchukuo on a larger scale” and pledged to support Taiwan because o f “their historic dem and for independence from foreign control.”22 Peng M ing-min, an international law professor and a Taiwanese independence leader, writes: ’Technically speaking, the international status o f Form osa and its people was not defined. Even the United States-N ationalist [Chinese] M utual Defense Treaty o f December, 1954, avoided the issue.”23 In a policy debate over the issue o f C hina and Taiwan on A ugust 17,1954, exactly seventeen days before Communist Chinese mounted a heavy artillery attack against Quemoy and a few months before the U.S.-Taiwan M utual Defense Treaty passed the Senate, Senator Wayne M orse (1900-1974, DOregon) made the following statem ent before the U.S. Senate:

INTRODUCTION

17

There is going to come a time, Mr. President, after there is some chance of peace in the world, when I think the Formosa issue is going to be settled in an international judicial tribunal, and many years away that is—maybe SO, 75, or 100 years. In that judicial tribunal who, under international law, has the right to exercise territorial and governmental jurisdiction over Formosa.24 Like the Dutch Prem ier A ndreas van A gt, W ayne M orse was also an international law specialist, becoming the then-youngest law school dean in America in 1936 at the University of Oregon. One o f the only two sena­ tors to vote against the G ulf o f Tonkin Resolution in 1964, M orse's political judgm ents and legal opinions were highly respected by his peers and his countrymen, particularly during the Vietnam War era. W hether or not M orse’s prophecy regarding the future o f Taiwan becomes a reality, Taiwan has made tremendous strides on many fronts since Senator M orse made his prediction. Owing in significant part to military, econom ic, educational, and technologi­ cal aid from the United States (details in C hapter 9), Taiwan’s economy is the nineteenth hugest in the world, its society has become more civil, its m edia m ore free (some m ight say too free), and its politics dem ocratized and liberal. These advances have given the island a new identity distinct from the culture o f its still tightly controlled Communist Chinese neighbor. Over the last four centuries, Taiwan has witnessed—and this book strives to convey— innumerable vignettes o f the island’s deep and far-reaching relationships with such historically seaborne nations as Holland, B ritain, France, Japan, and the United States. The convergence of m aritim e cultures and W estern values can still be found in glim pses o f the Taiwanese landscape, including echoes and vestiges from ports to ruined fortresses, from churches to medical clinics, from property deeds to geographic names, from business and banking practices, to nearly forgotten cem eteries filled with fallen foreign soldiers. The past is indeed present everywhere in Taiwan. The eleven-story Presi­ dential Office in Taipei, which took the Japanese eight years (1911-1919) to construct, has been an im portant symbol o f Taiwan’s sovereign power since the 1950s. National Taiwan Normal University and National Taiwan University, established by the Japanese in 1925 and 1928, respectively, re­ main prom inent Asian universities where past, present, and future Taiwanese political leaders, scholars, scientists, and engineers were and are educated and trained. From the D utch United East India Company in the seventeenth century to the French cartographer M oyriac de M ailla o f the Society o f Jesus in the eighteenth century, from the Scottish tea m erchant John Dodd, the English botanist R obert Swinhoe, the Canadian medical missionary George Leslie Mackay, and the American customs commissioner Hosea Ballou M orse

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in the nineteenth century to the Japanese civil adm inistrator G oto Shim pei at the turn o f the tw entieth century, and the U.S. M utual Security M ission D irector W esley C. Haraldson in the late 1950s, a variegated m elting pot o f legacies and influences have helped to stim ulate and steer the developm ent o f Taiwan. The following chapters w ill docum ent the Taiwanese experience with the m aritim e world, demonstrating that throughout the last four centuries, Taiwan has existed not m erely as a sinicized appendage o f the revanchist China, but as a dynam ic attractor o f cultures w ith a rich colonial past and a uniquely m aritim e tradition.

2 Taiwan's Seventeenth-Century Rulers The Dutch, the Spaniards, and Koxinga

As the m aritim e nations o f the seventeenth century discovered that interna­ tional trade, overseas shipping, and colonization had becom e a new source o f wealth, adventurers, pirates, fishermen, and traders o f all kinds turned to the island o f Taiwan because it was situated along the busy sea routes between East A sia and Southeast Asia. Pirates o f many nationalities found the island to be a safe retreat, where they could recuperate and divide their plunder w ithout w orrying about the long arm o f the governm ent. Among the notori­ ous pirates a num ber o f leaders stand out: Lin Feng (also spelled Lim ahong), Yen Shih-chi (known to Europeans as Pedro China), and Cheng Chih-lung (N icholas Iquan). Reportedly, 600 Japanese outlaw s joined Lin Feng’s rav­ aging activities. Yen Shih-chi led his m arauders to Taiwan in 1624 and for a w hile settled at a coastal colony called Beikang (N orth Port). A fter Yen’s death created a pow er vacuum, N icholas Iquan (whose Japanese w ife bore him a son, Cheng C h’eng-kung, known to the Europeans as Koxinga) com ­ bined legitim ate trade w ith pirate raids along the Taiwan Strait. In addition, because the waters surrounding the island held all sorts o f valuable fish— including m ullet, halibut, w hite belt fish, shrim p, and oysters— fishermen thrived. Finally, seafaring A sians and Europeans realized that the island was an ideal rendezvous for traders to exchange goods such as spices, silk, gold, silver, garm ents, and porcelain ware, as w ell as swap inform ation and cut business deals.1It w ould not be long before Taiwan cam e to the attention o f tw o European m aritim e powers—H olland and Spain—who then wanted to explore and colonize the island. Dutch Settlem ent o f the Island In 1595, the first D utch expedition rounded the Cape o f Good Hope off southern A frica and reached die Far East; its commander, Cornelius Houtman, signed a trade treaty w ith the sultan o f Bantam in Java. In order to control and protect its trade interests in A sia, the newly independent Dutch Republic o f the N etherlands founded the U nited East India Company (VOC) in 1602. 19

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CHAPTER 2

It not only granted the company tax-free monopoly trading rights between the Cape o f Good Hope and the Strait o f M agellan off South Am erica, but also the authority to negotiate treaties, construct fortresses, m int coins, main­ tain m ilitary forces as required, and establish colonies w ithin the enormous space between the A tlantic and Pacific Oceans. U nder the capable leader­ ship o f several governors, the VOC not only replaced the Portuguese as the dom inant pow er in Southeast A sia, but also defeated the British fleet during three successive wars betw een 1652 and 1674. As a consequence, the Dutch Republic o f the seven U nited Provinces not only achieved full international recognition, but also gained access to the English Channel and the North Sea from their home harbors.2 A t the turn o f the seventeenth century, the D utch became more active and aggressive as they utilized their fleet to secure trading rights and strategic posts in Asia. They realized that Taiwan was especially well suited for undermining the Portuguese and Spanish trade with China and Japan. Accordingly, soon after they had established a foothold in Batavia (in Java), the Dutch began probing the neighboring w aters o f Taiwan. Commanding a 700-ton ship, the Hollandia, and a 500-ton ship, the Vlissingen, Dutch Admiral W ijbrand van W aerwijck reached the Pescadores (called P’eng-hu by the Chinese) on A ugust 7, 1604. The Dutch stayed there for a total o f 131 days, surveying the neighboring w aters along the coast o f Taiwan, then left for Patani in southern Siam on Decem ber 15. In 1609, the VOC established an operational governm ent-general at Batavia and allied with the British to vie against the Portuguese and Spanish to control the trading routes to Persia, India, China, and Japan.3 It was against this background that as soon as Jan Pietersz Coen, the VCO governor-general in Batavia, learned that the Spaniards were looking for strategic bases on Taiwan, he ordered Com elis Reyersen to lead a fleet to occupy the Pescadores. Ever since the Southern Sung dynasty (1127-1279), the Pescadores had been a Chinese fishing ground, and during the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), M ongol rulers established outposts there to facilitate junk trade. The second half o f the fourteenth century witnessed the rise o f what the M ing government labeled the “dw arf pirates“ (wokou). These “wokou” raiders included Japanese m asterless samurai (ronin), Chinese desperados, Korean outlaw s, and other Asian sailors who m asqueraded as Japanese pirates. They plundered China’s coastal towns and smuggled contraband goods to and from mainland China and stored them on desert islands. The Hongwu em peror (r. 1368-1398) o f the M ing dynasty took a series o f measures against the pirates and smugglers, including ordering the inhabitants o f the offshore islands to move inland. W ith this decree, the M ing government abandoned the Pescadores and also cut off the links between Taiwan and the mainland.4 Consequently, when the Dutch

TAIWAN’S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RULERS

21

Figure 2.1 Dutch United East India Company Board Members, Seventeenth Century

fleet sailed into the Pescadores’s m ajor harbor, M akung, on July 11, 1622, it confronted little or no resistance from the Chinese. This tim e, the Dutch recruited 1,000 Fukienese fishermen to build three small fortresses. Like the Chinese and Japanese raiders, the Dutch made profits by mixing trade with piracy. During their sojourn in the Pescadores, the Dutch found a better trading base at Tayouan which the natives pronounced “Tai-wan,” and was only within one-day’s sail from the Pescadores. Beginning in late October 1622, the Dutch laid the foundation for a square-shaped fortress called “Orange” (the name of the Dutch royal family) there, on a high and dry sandbank to the west of the Tayouan river. Primarily using baked brick, they had erected three parapets at the comers and two walls, and had installed six Cartouw and Saecker guns by November 20. Owing to sickness among the soldiers and insufficient materials, however, the construction moved rather slowly. Not until September 26,1623, did they complete the fourth parapet and fill them all with sand. In addition, they installed twenty-three more guns and covered the fort with planks. From then oh, approximately 100 Dutch troops were deployed to guard the fort.3 On August 1,1624, the vessel Zeelandia arrived at the Pescadores. On board

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Figure 2.2 Dutch Fort Zeelandia, Built in 1632

was a physician named M artinus Sonck, who came to relieve Commander Reyersen and take over the management o f Dutch affairs. Sonck soon ordered the destruction o f the forts and the withdrawal o f all Dutch personnel from the Pescadores; then on Septem ber 10, 1624, the D utch sailed their thirteen ships eastw ard toward Tayouan. Afterward Sonck was appointed governor o f Taiwan, and the fortress at Tayouan was renamed Zeelandia, after the very ship Sonck had sailed aboard to the island. Because Sonck realized that there was no moat or palisade to protect the fort, he had his troops and hired Chinese masons and carpenters strengthen the two inside walls w ith four-foot-thick stones and erect a six-foot-thick stone wall around Fort Zeelandia.6 Repairs, additions, and embellishments, including paintings to decorate the Governor’s House in the Fort, continued until 1632, when the sign “Te Casteel Zeelandia Gebouwd Anno 1632” was finally placed atop the main gate to the fort.7 In January 1625, Sonck traded fifteen bolts o f cangan cloth with the friendly Sinkan tribe (meaning New Port, a tribe that had about 500 people at the tim e) for the land along the Tayouan river. He then constructed residences for VOC employees as well as a m edical clinic and w arehouses, among other structures. At the same tim e, he welcomed refugees from China to populate what was then called Provintia (present-day Tainan City), but called Taiwanfu between 1683 and 1885. It should be remembered that the prim ary reason for the Dutch colonization

TAIWAN’S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RULERS

23

Table 2.1 Dutch Governors in Taiwan, 1624-1661 Name 1. Martinus Sonck 2. Gerard Fredrickszoon de With 3. Pieter Nuyts 4. Hans Putmans 5. Johan van der Burg 6. Paulus Traudenius 7. Maximilian le Maire 8. Francois Caron 9. Pieter Antoniszoon Overtwater 10. Nicolaes Verbürg 11. Cornells Caesar 12. Frederick Coyett 13. Hermanus Klenk van Odesse

Date Entered Office 8/7/1624 9/10/1625 6/30/1627 6/21/1629 9/10/1636 November, 1641 1643 8/10/1644 1646 1650 1653 1656 7/30/1661

Date of Departure 9/17/1625 1627 1629 10/5/1636 1640 1643 8/10/1644 1646 1650 1653 1656 6/10/1661

o f Taiwan was to establish bases for the trade and transshipm ent o f goods to some twenty-nine Dutch trading stations scattered all over the world. It proved to be a good investm ent because Taiwan ultim ately becam e one o f the m ost profitable branches o f the VOC in the Far East. In 1649, the D utch operation in Taiwan accounted for 26 percent o f the com pany’s worldwide profits. Thus, the sm all num ber o f D utch colonists in Taiwan were concentrated in VOC businesses and accounting. They also m aintained a small navy and army to protect their interests on the island. As o f D ecem ber 1644, some 500 soldiers were stationed at Fort Zeelandia and in the Tayouan vicinity. At this juncture, tens o f thousands o f Chinese, who were fleeing from the political chaos and social and econom ic dislocation brought on by the M anchu onslaught, had m oved to the island. By 1648, approxim ately 40,000 Chinese had joined the more than 63,800 indigenous people under Dutch rule.8 A fter serving ju st over one year, Sonck was replaced by Gerard de W ith, who decided to build yet another fort called Zeeburg north o f Fort Zeelandia. Fort Zeeburg was destroyed by a violent storm in 1656, but Fort U trecht, which was built in 1634 near Zeelandia, and Fort V lissingen, constructed in 1636 at P’u-tai harbor north o f Tainan, both survived the Dutch defeat in 1662. The tenure o f the D utch governors in Taiwan generally lasted between two and four years, as the table above illustrates. D uring the Dutch w ar o f independence against Spain, the O range-Nassau fam ily played an im portant role both in Europe and overseas. Therefore, the princes o f the O range-N assau fam ily represented the royal sym bols, religious leaders, and the de jure Dutch pow er in Taiwan. In executing VOC policy,

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Figure 2.3 Dutch Governor In Taiwan

the highest Dutch authority in Taiwan was the governor. The VOC also set up the Zeelandia Council as a check and balance against the governor’s admin­ istrative powers, and during the absence o f the governor, the president o f the council functioned as acting governor. Before the governor made decisions or executed policies, he was required to obtain advice and consent from the council, whose members were selected from among VOC business managers, prom inent tradesm en, senior m ilitary officers, and fleet commanders. Below the governor and the council, there were local adm inistrators, revenue collec-

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Table 2.2 VOC’s Principal Personnel on Taiwan Name Maximilian Le Maire Cornelis Cesar Adriaen van de Burch Nicasius de Hooge Gabriel Happen Eduard aux Brebis Schillemans Anthonij Boeij

Background business manager business manager business manager business manager tradesman unknown tradesman assistant tradesman

Positk>n(s) held president of the council administrator of the north prosecutor, clinic director accountant and church deacon fiscal clerk manager of bulky merchandise revenue collector administrator of the south

tors, accountants, prosecutors, judges, directors o f orphanages, physicians, and warehouse m anagers. Based on a report subm itted on D ecem ber 27,1644, by (eighth) Governor Francois Caron, the VOC’s principal personnel on Taiwan included those listed in Table 2.2.9 Dutch troops w ere deployed at strategic points around the island. In A pril 1631, VOC’s total m ilitary force on Taiwan was about 400, w ith nearly half o f them stationed at Fort Zeelandia, Fort Provintia, Fort Zeeburg, and Sinkan Village. By 1636, tw ice as m any arm y and navy personnel were deployed to guard these forts and their environs. As the D utch steadily expanded their jurisdiction to the south and the north and to the central m ountain ranges, the num ber o f their garrison troops also increased, from 633 in M arch 1642, to 701 in D ecem ber 1644, and exceeding 1,200 after 1650: Table 2.3 shows the num ber o f the D utch m ilitary forces in 1654 and w here they w ere deployed.10 Even before the D utch settlem ent o f Tayouan, the Spaniards had consid­ ered establishing a colonial base and trading entrepôt in East A sia. In 1619, a Dom inican friar by the name o f Bartolom e M artinez advised the Spanish governor in M anila to occupy the island for the follow ing reasons.11 It is better for M anila to start here [Isla Hermosa] than in Pinar or in some other part of the Chinese coastline, or even in M acao.. . . Isla Hermosa will be hosting huge fairs and markets throughout the year with a great quantity of goods freely coming and going and without any trouble from the mandarins. Since this island is very close to Chincheo [Ch’uan-chou], where the bulk of Chinese trade takes place, and because it is also near China’s wealthier areas, small and light merchandise may be transported quickly at any time of the year.

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Table 2.3 Deployment of Dutch Military Forces In 1654 Area Fort Zeelandia Outer Zeelandia Fort Utrecht Fort Zeeburg Fort Vlissingen Pimaba Varovorongh Fort Provintia Tayouan City Caija River Offices Hospitals Schools Tamsui Keelung Others Total

Number Troop Composition 333 captain (1), 2nd lieutenant (1), sergeants (8), corporals (19), MP (29), drummers (3), rank and file (272) 187 lieutenant (2), sergeants (7), corporals (11), MP (20), drummers (3), rank and file (144) 29 sergeant (1), corporal (1), solders and marines (26) 26 sergeant (1), corporal (1), soldiers and marines (24) 20 sergeant (1), corporal (1), soldiers (18) 18 sergeants (2), corporals (4), soldiers (12) sergeants (2), corporal (1), soldiers (28) 31 33 lieutenant (1), sergeant (1), corporals (3), drummer (1), soldiers (27) 13 corporal (1), soldier (12) 8 sergeant (1), soldier (7) 16 35 34 68 59 51 961

The Coming o f the Spaniards W hen the Spaniards learned about the Dutch settlem ent in southern Taiwan, they feared that their monopoly o f China trade was in jeopardy. Furthermore, owing to the ravaging of the pirates, the high duty tariffs levied by the Chinese authorities, and Spain’s deteriorating relationship with Japan, trade in M anila had substantially diminished. The Spaniards therefore believed that in order to retrieve their lost trade position they needed to occupy northern Taiwan. As a consequence, in the late spring of 1626, Fernando de Silva, the Spanish governor in M anila, dispatched Antonio Carreno de Valdes to Taiwan. With two large Galera-class vessels, a dozen sampans, and a few hundred troops, the Spanish fleet left the port o f Cagayan in the northern Philippines on May 5, conducting surveys as it sailed along the east coast o f Taiwan. They arrived on May 11 at the island’s northern cape, located precisely at twenty-five de­ grees north latitude, and named it Santiago (in Taiwanese San-tia-gak). They entered the Keelung fjords the next day without any resistance and named the port Santisima Trinidad. Once they realized that the harbor was deep and large enough to accommodate 500 vessels at a time, they did not hesitate to construct a fort called San Salvador on little Ho-p’ing (Peace) Island (also known as

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Palm Island) and erected a small chapel near San Salvador’s shipyard. In the meantime, a corporal named Pedro de Vera drew three maps o f Taiwan, high­ lighting its strategic and geographical features, while the Spanish governor in M anila assiduously prepared for a showdown with the Dutch forces on Taiwan. But owing to tempestuous storms and violent typhoons, the Spanish expedition­ ary troops did not reach Taiwan in tim e to drive the Dutch from the island.12 Early in 1628, the Spanish occupied Tamsui or Tan-shui (“freshw ater”), a seaside tow n near present-day Taipei, and subsequently built a fortress called Santo Domingo to extend their control in the northern end o f Taiwan. Called Hu-wei or Senar by the natives and rom anized by the foreigners as Höbe, Tamsui was the nam e o f both the river and the port town. By 1634, there were approxim ately 300 Spanish colonists living around Keelung Bay and about 200 settled along the ram bling north bank o f the Tamsui estuary, with m ore than half o f them actually ethnic Filipinos. A t that tim e Tamsui was inhabited by eight o r nine different aboriginal tribes. Among them , the Taparri tribe and the Quim auri tribe were constantly at w ar with each other. W hen Dom inican Father Jacinto Esquivel arrived, however, he converted both tribes to Christianity, thus ending their long-standing feud. Som etim e in A ugust 1632, Father Esquivel led a group o f eighty Spaniards and aborigines and sailed up the Tamsui River. To their pleasant surprise, they reached the confluence o f the Tamsui R iver and the Keelung River, where Taipei City now stands. Esquivel named the latter the Kimazon River, whereon they continued their inland voyage all the way to K eelung.13In 1645, five years after driving the Spaniards out o f northern Taiwan, the Dutch took a census o f Tamsui and recorded thirty-seven Senar households w ith a total o f 131 inhabitants; in 1650 Tamsui’s population increased to forty households w ith 160 people, but, perhaps because o f a sm allpox epidem ic, decreased to only tw enty-tw o fam ilies w ith eighty-one persons in 1655.14 The highest authority o f the Spanish colonists was a sergeant major, who also functioned as the governor o f Taiwan (see Table 2.4) and who had the pow er to grant business and mining licenses. Beneath him w ere a num ber o f corporals who com m anded soldiers and supervised garrison tasks, as well as commanding special m ilitary personnel like m arines and artillery gunners. In addition, there were Spanish accountants, physicians, carpenters, m asons, and the like. They generally earned m eager salaries, and their food and supplies, m ostly shipped from M anila (or socorro de M anila in Spanish), rem ained a constant problem . It was reported that during the m ost difficult tim es, they were even forced to eat rats and dog m eat. B ut the m ajority o f the soldiers were actually Filipinos who were either conscripted w ith the prom ise o f a two-m onth tour o f duty, or crim inals brought to w ork in the galleys as pun­ ishm ent for their crim es.13According to D utch sources, as o f A pril 1631 the

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Table 2.4 Spanish Governors in Taiwan, 1626-1642 Name 1. Antonio Carreno de Valdes 2. Juan de Alcarazo 3. Luis de Guzman 4. Bartolme Diaz Barrera 5. Alonso Garcia Romero 6. Francisco Hernandez 7. Pedro Palomino 8. Cristobal Marquez 9. Gonzalo Portillo

Duration of Tenure 1626 1630 1630 1632-34 1634 1635-37 1637-39 1639-40 1640

Location of Office Keelung Keelung Tamsui Keelung Keelung Tamsui Keelung Keelung Keelung

total Spanish m ilitary forces included 300 to 400 Filipinos from Pampangos Province, and between 200 and 300ethnic Spaniards. But the Spanish sources state that only 100 or at best 150 Spaniards were stationed in Taiwan. In any case, the m orale o f these troops, coerced conscripts for the m ost part, was not high. For one thing, the budget for Taiwan in 1637 was reduced by 50 percent o f that o f the previous year, and was cut again in 1638. For another, the colonists could find only very sm all am ounts o f silver and gold on the island.16 Because o f these problem s and hardships, the mood o f the Spanish colonists soon changed from high expectations to disappointm ent, and from disappointm ent to despair. N ext to the core m ilitary personnel, the m ost im portant Spaniards were a sm all num ber o f dedicated friars, who were affiliated w ith the Dominican, Franciscan, Augustine, and Jesuit orders. In addition to Father Jacinto Es­ quivel, four other Dom inican friars (Bartolom e M artinez, Francisco M ola, Jeronim o M orel, and Juan Elgueta) and a Japanese Catholic priest named Sailoku Zaemon also accom panied the first Spanish expedition. The m ission o f these friars, who were not under the m ilitary jurisdiction, was to convert the Taiwanese aborigines to Catholicism in what they called “policiacristiana.” To achieve this goal, Father Bartolom e M artinez attended a regional eccle­ siastical conference in M anila on M ay 5,1627, and raised enough money to construct a church in Keelung’s Chinese quarters o f Parian. Father M atinez subsequently cam e to Tamsui to spread die gospel among the indigenous tribes, but before he could establish a foothold there he was drowned in a boating accident, on A ugust 1,1629. A t this tim e, there were about 1,500 natives scattered in northern Taiwan, from Ilan (Santa C atarina) and Keelung, to Tamsui, the Taipei basin, and Taoyuan (Parakucho in Spanish). However, when the natives first heard the deafening sounds o f artillery, they were so frightened that they all ran off to

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hide in the hills. It was now up to the friars to bring them back to the plains to live as Spanish Christians. A Japanese resident, and his w ife, a Pepohuan (low land aborigine) woman nam ed Insiel Islena, and their two children repre­ sented the first Christian converts in K eelung.17In 1630, violent storms caused the chapel in the Chinese quarters to collapse, but Father Jacinto Esquivel salvaged w hat was left and brought additional m aterials to construct a new chapel called San Juan B autista at Tapparri, north o f Tamsui. In addition, the energetic friars erected the San Jose church at Quim auri (betw een the coastal towns o f W an-li and Chin-shan, w est o f the Keelung harbor) and the N uestra Senora de Rosario chapel in Tam sui.18 By 1632, because o f the steady grow th o f Catholic parishioners in Tam­ sui, Father Esquivel decided to set up a sm all sem inary there, where he and his theologian colleagues offered courses in Latin, Spanish grammar, and theology. In addition, Esquivel com pleted the Tamsui Vernacular D ictionary (Vocabulario de la lengua de los Indios Tanchui en la Isla Herm osa) and the Tamsui Christian D octrine M anual (D octrina cristiana en la lengua de los Inios Tanchui en la Isla H erm osa).19 A nother Spanish father nam ed Fran­ cisco Vaez de Santo Domingo loved to m ediate disputes between the two m ost bellicose aboriginal tribes, but was killed by a Pepohuan on January 27, 1633. The Japanese Dom inican friar, Sailoku Zaemon, after spreading the gospel in northern Taiwan for three years, decided to return to Japan in 1629 at the risk o f violating the Tokugawa exclusionist edict. He was caught by Japanese authorities on A ugust 4 ,1 6 3 4 , and died a week later w hile on a hunger strike. Father Lucos G arcia spent five years (1631-1636) in Taiwan, diligently bringing the teachings o f C hrist to the natives in Keelung, Tamsui, and even to the Ilan plain.20 Though friars som etim es sent out exaggerated reports to their superiors, surviving Spanish documents suggest that the Spanish Dominican friars m ight also have reached such present-day cities as Taoyuan, Hualien (Chicasuan or Saquiraya), Taitung (Tabaron), and others.21 In a report to King Philip IV, the Spanish governor in M anila m entioned that there were 300 Catholics in Taiwan in 1630. In 1634, during a raging sm allpox epidem ic, w ithin the short span o f eight days Father Teodoro Quiros de la M adré de D ios alone baptized 320 dying patients in the Tamsui river aboriginal community, w hile in ju st five days other Dom inican friars baptized 141 Santiago natives on their deathbeds.22 The Dutch C hallenge Spanish Authority W hile the Spaniards w ere colonizing northern Taiwan, the D utch in the south grew increasingly concerned. They feared that the Spanish could now intercept

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their yachts and other vessels on their way to China and Japan. M oreover, the memory o f the Dutch war o f independence lingered on, and the rivalry between Protestant H olland and Catholic Spain continued. A gainst this backdrop, the Dutch governor o f Taiwan Pieter Nuyts, with approval from Batavia, sent two contingents to fight the Spanish in 1629. One contingent m arched northward from Hsinchu while the other sailed directly to the Tamsui River. By late July 1626, when the invading Dutch force engaged the defending Spaniards at Tamsui, the form er suffered heavy casualties and withdrew. During the next few years, the Dutch colonial governm ent kept surveillance on Spanish activities in the north w hile attending to a num ber o f other urgent m atters. For exam ple, Governor Nuyts was sent to Japan (1633) as a hostage so that the VOC could win special trade privileges from the Tokugawa shogunate. D utch troops were preoccupied with suppressing and subduing the aboriginal tribes in present-day Tainan County, including the M attau (about 2,000 people subdued in Novem ber 1635), the Taccarejangh (1,000 subdued in Decem ber 1636), and the Saulang (1,000 subdued in January 1636).23 Finally, under the prodding and persuasion o f Reverend Robert Junius, delegates o f twentyeight tribes (fifteen northern tribes and thirteen southern tribes extending all the way to Longkiau, the southern tip o f Taiwan), gathered together at the annual grand cerem onial feast held at Sinkan. During the feast, tribal chiefs swore their allegiance to the D utch governor Hans Putm ans by presenting him with a coconut seedling planted in mud. The governor then bestow ed on each chieftain a flag o f the Dutch Republic (called prinsvlag, or prince flag), a garm ent, and a rattan cane.24 Beginning in 1641, this kind o f cerem onial assembly was called oostelijke landdag (diet). During this assembly the Dutch rulers took pains to explain laws enacted by the governm ent and to admon­ ish the delegates to attend church and to get along with Chinese im m igrants. However, the form and functioning o f the landdag w ould not be com pletely institutionalized until 1644, when Francois Caron becam e the (eighth) gov­ ernor o f Taiwan.25 There was a persistent rum or that there was gold in southeastern Taiwan. G overnor (the fifth) Johan van der Burg, form erly councilor-extraordinary for the Indies, dispatched a small army to make contact with the leaders o f the dom inant Pim aba (or Pilam ) tribe in early 1638. The expeditionary army com prised 106 Dutch soldiers, fifty Longkiau braves, and 150 Lowaen war­ riors, and was commanded by Johan Van Linga, who, on February 2,1638, successfully secured an agreem ent with the regent o f Pim aba, who was named M agol. W ith this agreem ent, not only did the VOC secure the exclusive right to mine gold north o f the Pim aba territory, but also it was a stim ulus to extend its influence to the east coast o f Taiwan.26 In the meantim e, the D utch contin­ ued to m onitor Spanish activities in the north. They learned that the Spanish

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governor in M anila needed to move some o f his troops in Taiwan to suppress rebels in the Philippines, that the Spanish did not have funds for the upkeep o f Fort Santo Domingo in Tamsui, and that M anila had given up hope for trading w ith Japan. U nder these circum stances, m aintaining a colony in Taiwan was no longer a priority strategic consideration for the Spaniards. Indeed, only 400 troops were left to guard the Keelung garrison in 1640. On A ugust 26, 1641, the D utch (sixth) governor Paulus Traudenius sent the following letter to Spanish governor G onzalo Portillo at Keelung27: We inform you that in case Your Honor is willing to leave your fortification at La Sanctissimo Trinidado and other fortresses on Kelang, with your men . . . we will continue to treat Your Honor and your men reasonably . . . ; otherwise we shall be compelled to act towards Your Honor and your men as is customary when things o f this nature are done by fo rce. . . In his tough response, dated Septem ber 6,1641, Portillo not only refused to surrender, but also rem inded his counterpart o f his w ar experience in Flanders and elsew here. U ltim ately, the Zeelandia leadership decided to settle the issue by force before the end o f the monsoon season. It appointed Captain H endrik Harouse com m ander o f a punitive fleet o f five ships, two yachts, and 690 troops. On A ugust 3,1642, H arouse’s troops landed at Tamsui and quickly overcam e a sm all Spanish defense force, which was com posed o f a mere tw elve Spaniards, eight Filipinos, and forty native archers. They bom barded Fort Santo D om ingo w ith heavy artillery, and the defenders surrendered after a feeble resistance. W hen the D utch sailed to H o-p’ing Island on August 21,1642, only 100 Spaniards and ISO Filipinos (from the Pam panga region) were guarding the Keelung colony. A fter holding out for five days and w ithout firing a shot, the garrison com m ander o f San Salvador raised a white flag and surrendered. The D utch also captured five Dominican theologians and one Franciscan friar, who were brought to Zeelandia for brief incarceration and then sent to Batavia for interrogation; but all were released one m onth later.28 In Septem ber 1642, the D utch celebrated their victories for eight days and proclaim ed them selves the undisputed m asters o f Taiwan. Soon afterw ard, they built factories and w arehouses and repaired forts in K eelung (changing the nam e from San Salvador to N oord H olland) and Tamsui, using bricks and stones to strengthen their northern garrison. A dm inistrators and troops were quickly dispatched to consolidate their control o f northern Taiwan. By 1648, the D utch could exercise their authority (by collecting license fees from hunters and fisherm en) over forty-seven villages in the region from the Taipei basin to the Pacific. Two years later in 1650—generally considered

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Table 2.5 Census of Indigenous Peoples In Taipei Basin, 1647-1656 Year 1647 1648 1650 1654 1655 1656

No. of Villages 246 251 315 271 223 162

No. of Families 13,619 13,955 15,249 14,262 11,029 8,294

Total Population 62,849 63,861 68,657 no less than 49,324 no less than 39,223 no less than 31,221

the pinnacle o f the Dutch rule— 315 villages were under their jurisdiction. The indigenous population, however, probably infected by sm all pox and other infectious diseases brought by the Europeans, started to decline, as the above table shows.29 Nearly Four Decades o f Dutch Rule A t the beginning o f Dutch rule, the whole island was adm inistratively di­ vided into four districts (Politiken) to which the VOC sent troops, agents, and m issionaries to ensure mutual political collaboration and m ilitary alliance. Each district exercised jurisdiction over several villages, whose tribal elders functioned as interm ediaries between the natives and the Dutch. Though there were no fixed taxes required o f the aborigines, Dutch rulers did impose on villages various kinds o f tributes, such as hogs, deer skins, hides, rice, com , and even corvée to build chapels. In January 1637, the Baccaluwangh tribe built a chapel and a clergym an’s residence in six days. Tribute was collected by tribal elders, who delivered them to the VOC agents or m issionaries. For instance, M aarten W esseling, a barber-surgeon and also a VOC agent, was stationed in Pim aba from 1638 to 1641. During his tenure, he collected deer skins, bamboo m aterials, and gold for the VOC. In September 1648, Rev­ erend A ntonius Hambroek collected fifty-four parcels o f rice at M attau.30 Such tribute, in a rather significant way, helped to bolster the revenue o f the Provintia government. Take the year 1644, for example: fees and charges totaled 88,000 guilders (or gulden), but if the tribute from the various tribes was added, the total came to 98,500 guilders.31 On the other hand, once a year, village delegates could attend the Umddag and present their grievances before reaffirming their loyalty to the Dutch governor. Landdag meetings were usually held between M arch and April at Fort Provintia. In 1652, the num ber o f districts (Politiken) was increased to seven, five lying north o f Tayouan on the w est coast, one on the south coast, and the other on the southeast coast.

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However, the landdag assem blies in the north (Tamsui’s for exam ple) and those in the south (like Pim aba’s) w ere irregular ow ing either to outbreaks o f sm allpox or to local disturbances.32 The Dutch M issionaries There were approxim ately 1,000 w ell-trained and w ell-arm ed Dutch troops, a third o f whom were deployed at Feat Zeelandia and around Provintia. De­ spite the fact that the D utch army literally decim ated the inhabitants o f the Little Liu-ch’iu Isle (off the coast o f P’ingtung) and killed nearly half o f the M attau tribe, the effective D utch rule o f Chinese farm ers and aboriginals in Taiwan was not owing to m ilitary force but to a sm all group o f dedicated C alvinist m issionaries, who w ere appointed w ith the public approbation o f the VOC and under the com m ission o f the governor-general in Batavia. The VOC would send out m inisters as needed, usually for a service tour between two and five years. That m eant that at any given tim e, there would be only about six D utch clergym en preaching the word o f G od to the w hole island. For the first ten years, there were only one or tw o m issionaries, and in 1654 none o f the three resident m issionaries wanted to go to the rem ote southern region. From a legal and political point o f view, a m issionary was bound by contract, and under an unw ritten obligation, to preach once a month in Fort Zeelandia and to celebrate Holy Communion on Christm as w ith the governor at the Fort. Between 1627 and 1662, a total o f tw enty-nine m issionaries (w ith three o f them serving tw o term s) cam e to Taiwan. The Company annually allocated about4,000guilders for salaries and the support o f the ecclesiastical staff in Tayouan, such as the clerk in Holy O rders, Hans Olhoff. Salaries for clergym en ranged from 75 to 120 guilders m onthly per person as against 200 guilders for the governor, 150 for die president o f the council, 75 for the VOC business manager, 80 for an army captain, and 20 for a sergeant.33 G enerally speaking, clergym en sent by the VOC to Taiwan labored hard to m aster the languages o f the natives, lived among them , and were perm it­ ted to m arry native women. W ith the exception o f one or tw o, like Joannes Schotanus (served 1638-39), the vast m ajority o f the D utch clergym en were not only devout Christians and men o f sound character, but also engaging teachers. For one thing, they occasionally distributed a few cangans (pieces o f cloth) among the natives, treated the principal tribal elders w ith kindness and civility, and entertained them w ith food and drink. Thus, they used the elders as a m agnet to attract the entire population.34 For another, they taught the natives agricultural skills, how to read a booklet w ith the title A, B, C, and how to w rite Rom anized vernacular with black ink and a quill pen (from a m oulted goose feather). The first school was founded at the Sinkan village

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in 1636; hence the Rom anized vernacular was called the Sinkan language. By 1638, forty-five m ales and between fifty and sixty fem ales were enrolled in schools. But later, as more church-schools were established across the island, enrollm ent grew dram atically. In 1639, there were 326 pupils, and they had increased to m ore than 600 four years later. Indeed, there were even fifty aboriginal teachers to help teach m ore than 1,000 adult students. From 1648, m ale adults were encouraged to go to school at dawn for one hour ev­ ery day, w hile adult women attended their classes also for one hour daily but at 4:00 pm .35 From then on, all Taiwanese correspondence, docum ents, and contracts were w ritten in the Rom anized Sinkan language. Some 130 surviv­ ing docum ents indicate that, as late as 1813, Taiwanese w ere still using these Latinized words to w rite their contracts. M oreover, the D utch m issionaries also developed a Sinkan num eral system for m athem atics and book-keeping. There is no question that it was the Dutch, not the Chinese or the Japanese, who ushered Taiwan into the “H istorical A ge."36 The first D utch missionary, G eorge Candidius, arrived in Tayouan on M ay 4,1627. Brimming with affection and enthusiasm , Candidius believed that the Christian religion would attract the natives. But the very first thing he needed to do was to m aster the language o f the natives. Thus, he decided to live in Sinkan village instead o f the guarded Fort. He soon com piled a vocabulary o f the Sinkan vernacular so that he could teach his parishioners how to read and w rite. Using the Romanized Sinkan spelling he him self developed, Candidius also com piled the prayers o f the church, as well as the principal articles o f the C hristian faith. He stayed on until 1638 before requesting that a successor be appointed to take his place, but he would return again to Sinkan and work there from 1633 to 1637.37Candidius’s successor and colleague, the Reverend Robertus Junius, arrived in 1629 and would stay there for two terms until 1643. Junius also labored hard to acquire the native language, prepared catechism s for both long sessions and short sessions, and translated portions o f the B ible into the Sinkan language. By 1638, an estim ated 1,000indigenous Taiwanese were baptized.38W ith the conversion o f the Sinkan people going smoothly, the governor built stone houses for them in the village o f Sinkan. Throughout his career in Taiwan, Candidius alone adm inistered baptism to 5,900 Taiwanese. He had indeed sowed the seeds for Christian growth on the island. Soon after his arrival (July 11,1647), Reverend Jacobus Vertrecht visited all the places belonging to his district and “found everything in excellent order."39 The Dutch missionaries concentrated their proselytizing on the area around modem Tainan, Chiayi, and the central plains on the west coast. The southern region was too hot and humid for the Dutchmen. Likewise, after Hans O lhoff’s mission to Vonovorong from 1644 until his death in 1631, no more resident m inisters were sent to the south. Despite the fact that the Dutch drove the

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Spaniards from Tamsui and Keelung in 1642, it would take twelve years before Reverend M arcus M asius set up the first Dutch mission at Tamsui in 1655. Generally speaking, the Dutch cleigymen did everything they could to discredit indigenous female inibs who practiced witchcraft, to promote vow-taken mar­ riage between husband and wife, and to discourage abortions. A t the end o f the Dutch rale, the Dutch missionaries had measurably changed the customs and cultures o f the seventeenth-century Taiwanese natives.40 But the irony is, instead o f receiving grace from their savior Jesus Christ and winning election to providence, many o f them actually suffered different kinds o f retribution. O f the twenty-nine Dutch Reformed Church m issionaries (as against more than thirty Catholic priests working in northern Taiwan during Spanish rale from 1626 to 1642), eleven died while proselytizing in Taiwan. Three (Antonius Hambroek, Petrus M us, and Amoldus A W insem) were executed on orders from Koxinga, while two others were captured and imprisoned in China.41 D uring his service betw een 1647 and 1651, the Reverend D aniel Gravius not only purchased 121 head o f cattle to cultivate land in Soulang village, but also prepared a m anuscript titled Formulary o f Christianity. The first page o f this work reads as follows: “ 1:1 O ulat ki kavouytan ti Jezus Christus, ka na alak ti David, ka na alak ti Abraham” (1:1 The book o f the generation o f Jesus Christ, the son o f David, the son o f Abraham ). And after his arrival in Taiwan on M arch 22,1648, Reverend A ntonius Hambroek, who brought his fam ily w ith him , proposed that the south, w hich was a m ore bellicose region, should be wholly entrusted to him. W ith the assistance o f some linguists, Hambroek translated the gospels o f St. John and St. M atthew into the Sinkan language. W ith funding approved by the Company, the manuscript was printed in Holland in 1661 in parallel colum ns icamp-vere), both in Sinkan and Dutch languages (see next page for a surviving sam ple o f St. M atthew in parallel Sinkan and D utch languages).42 The H ighly Profitable VOC The successful proselytizing o f Christianity on the island definitely helped die colonial administration, but also enhanced the business o f the VOC. O f the nineteen transshipm ent centers in Asia, Japan (at Nagasaki) was the m ost profitable and Taiwan ranked second while nine other centers, including those at Sri Lanka and Siam, lost money. Two items, namely silk and silver, made huge profits for the VOC. In the first half o f the seventeenth century, China, a country with a paucity o f silver mines, needed the bullion for its monetary circulation. Japan, on the other hand, was a silver producing country, but desired Chinese delicate silk fabrics. Indeed, during the 1630s, silks accounted for over 80 percent o f Dutch imports to Japan. Thus, the Dutch, playing the role o f a

36

CHAPTER 2

Figure 2.4

Surviving Sample of S t Matthew In Parallel Dutch and Slnkan Languages

fol: i

Cap, j .______________ H c t H . E uangelium

H a g n au k a D ’llig h

tut \de befcbrijvmge\

M atiktU ha na faßvlat ti

M A T T H E I . MATTHEUS. Naunamou U Ibagb kißu lat.

Her cerfte Capittel.

E T Boeck tr0 ŒfQatJitt*

su

J i-

C hristi,

1be* toon* ft«* b(b0 / be* Coon* a b lau t* . a flbjakam getoon JfR* at» enbe Jfaat getoan Ja« rob. rnbe Jacob g&etoan JnOam / rnbe fl/ne bjoe*. **10*

3 Cnbf Juba* g}etoan ftare* tube Zara bp are0 iketoan Cfrom. tnbt ïfrom getoan fleam. 4 Cnbe Aram getoan fl< mfnabab. enbe flmfnabab getoan £aa£on. enbe Jßa* affon getoan Salmon. 5 Cfnbe Salmon gf}r< toan Boöj bj Kacbab. enbe Bo5i getoan JDbeb by »ut*. enbe fl)beb gfcetoan Jede. 6 (Ende Jede gfcetoan 9)abib ben «toning}. rnbe feabib be luming} getoan Salomon bp be gbrne die «rfa*

O u lat ti J l t s t u s , D avid,

ki ktvouytan U S C hri­ ka na alak li ka na alak d

Abraham . l T i Abraham ta ni-pou-alak ti Ifaac-an. d H u e ta ni-pou-alak ti Jakob-an. d Jacob ta ni-poualak d Juda-an, ki tx'i-a-papar’appa (jn-da. 3 T i Judas ta ni-pou-alak na F ares-an na Zara-an-appa p’ouhkoua ti Tham ar-an. T i ra re s ta nipou-alak d Efrom-an. T i Efrom ta ni-pou-alak ti Aram-an. 4 T i Aram ta ni-pou-alak ti Aminadab-an. T i Aminadab ta nipou-alak ti Naallbn-an. T I Naafibn ta ni-pou-alak ti Salmon-an. 5 T i Salmon ta ni-pou-alak na Boös-an p'ouh-koua ti Rachaban. T i B oot ta ni-pou-alak na O bed-an p*ouh-koua ti Ruth-an. T i O bed ta ni-pou-alak ti JcfTe-an. 6 T i Jefle ta ni-pou-alak ti David-an ka na M ei-ufou ka Si bavau. T i D avid ka na Mct-fafou ta ni-pou-alak ti Salomon-an p’ouhA koua

Chap. 1. (r) T he book of the piciatioB of Jesus Christ, the soo of David, the too of Abraham, (a) Abraham begat Isaac ; mad Isaac bun t Jacob ; a^d Jacob begat Judas and his brethren ; (3) aad Judas begat Phares and Zara of Thamar ; ai ; Pharos begat Esron j and Earora begat Aram ; (4) and Aram begat Aminadab ; and Aminadab begat Naasaon ; and Naaaion begat Salmon ; (5) and Salmon begat Boos of Rachab; and Boos begat Obod of Ruth ; and Obed begat Jesse; (6) and Jesse begat David the king; and David the k b « begat

middleman, bought bulky raw silks from coastal China (from 135 to 145 taijl a picul— 16.54 piculs equals a metric ton, or 3 piculs equals 400 lbs), packaged and branded them in Taiwan, and then shipped them to Japan and sold for silver. On their return trip, the VOC ships loaded Japanese soma silver and copper for inventory and storage in Taiwan. During 1636-67, VOC records show that Dutch ships hauled away a total o f20,727,492 taels (equivalent to 777,281 kilograms) o f silver from Japan. O f this amount, 14,899,031 taels (558,713 kilograms), or 71.9 percent, were shipped to Taiwan. The bulk o f these bullion would be used to pay for Chinese silks and porcelain. However, during 1650 and 1661,

TAIWAN’S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RULERS

37

90 percent o f the silver stored in Taiwan was actually sent to India and Persia.43 This indicates that the Dutch made money not only by trade, but also by taking advantage o f the profit margins in international currency exchange. In addition to silk and silver, the VOC also profited from selling Chinese porcelain to Europe. R eliable statistics show that betw een 1602 and 1682, Dutch tradesm en bought a total o f 16 m illion porcelain item s (averaging 200,000 annually) from China. Once again, these porcelain cargoes were first brought to Zeelandia for storage and inventory. Records also confirm that there were 890,328 pieces o f delicate chinaw are stored at Zeelandia warehouses in 1638; but the next year (1639), 470,000 pieces o f such porcelain were shipped from Taiwan to H olland.44 It makes perfect business sense that the shrewd Dutch merchants always waited for a good price before unloading their m onopolized m erchandise in various European m arkets. Also from Southeast Asia, the VOC tradesm en bought such items as amber, pepper, coral, lead, and a variety o f clothes, w hich were first processed and stored in Taiwan before being shipped out to m arkets in China, Japan, and elsew here. But the VOC also exported m erchandise that was produced in Taiwan locally, including hemp, preserved ginger, white and red gilam s, sulphur, deer and stonebuck skins; as well as eland, cow, and buffalo hides, and white and brown sugar. In order to increase the productivity o f such valuable crops as sugar and hemp, the D utch welcom ed the thousands o f Chinese refugees fleeing from the war-ravaged and poverty-stricken mainland. By relying on a small number o f Chinese Christian converts and pirates-tum ed com pradors (Dutch called them Cabessa), the VOC gave each refugee three silver taels as a bonus incentive, and provided cheap lands with low rent, as w ell as “a buffalo for a fam ily o f three.” By 1660, there were an estim ated over 100,000 Chinese claim ing lands along coastal Taiwan, and turning swamps and hilly slopes into productive fields. In addition to paying regular fees for brewing liquor and for hunting and fishing licenses, each Chinese m ale, with the exception o f VOC em ployees, was required to pay an annual poll tax. But the enforce­ m ent o f taxes and licenses was rather lax since one out o f three Chinese im ­ m igrants never paid them . Chinese im m igrants concentrated on cultivating and producing rice and sugar. By 1656, the colonial governm ent registered a total o f 1,837.3 morgen (D utch unit o f land; one morgen equals 2.116 acres) o f sugarcane land, and 6,514.4 morgen o f rice paddies, with the latter located prim arily in the Tainan region. Because rice was a staple o f the Chinese, there was not much surplus for export. Sugar, on the other hand, quickly becam e a valuable cash crop and was exported to Japan, Persia, and Batavia. W hile a paddy rice farm er had to pay 10 percent o f his crop to the VOC, a sugar fanner paid no rent. Thus, annual production o f sugar increased from 3,000 to 4,000 piculs in 1637 to 20,000 to 30,000 piculs in 1650.45

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Table 2.6 Revenues vs. Expenditures of VOC in Taiwan, 1632-1661 Year 1632 1633 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661

Income 89,897 193,391 137,163 223,807 119,122 203,321 132,622 268,933 233,095 162,350 346,484 318,037 194,933 238,283 402,342 806,239 1,070,000 882,611 713,704 731,562 667,701 593,624 567,289 536,255 not available 930,153 598,799 425,352 257,048

Expenditure 76,959 96,980 230,655 132,601 168,626 287,645 302,86 255,34 216,56 223,666 150,481 234,186 232,562 264,254 246,686 236,340 603,000 360,677 344,294 390,126 328,784 375,049 453,367 372,741 not available 528,866 393,091 418,009 386,596

Difference +12,938 +96,411 -93,492 +91,206 -49,504 •84,324 -170,247 +13,589 +16,533 -61,315 +196,003 +83,851 -37,629 -25,971 +155,656 +569,899 +467,000 +521,934 +369,410 +341,436 +338,917 +218,575 +113,922 +163,514 -74,691 +401,287 +205,708 +7,343 •129,548

The other valuable crop was deer, with its skins exported to Japan for leather use and dried m eat sold to C hina for m edicinal purposes. Chinese im ­ m igrants designed all kinds o f clever ways, including trapping, to hunt deer and stonebucks. In 1638, the VOC harvested a total o f 150,000 skins. Dutch efforts to explore the island’s m inerals, on the other hand, were not success­ ful. W ith m ilitary support, the VOC conducted three gold explorations in the southeastern Pim aba region, but all failed.46G enerally speaking, however, the D utch governors in Taiwan m aintained fiscal solvency and lived up to the pe­ cuniary expectations o f the company. Nakamura Takashi, the leading Japanese Dutch scholar, produced the above chart to illustrate revenues vs. expenditures o f the VOC in Taiwan between 1632 and 1661 (based on guilder).47 Annual VOC expenditures included salaries, foods and provisions, con­

TAIWAN’S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RULERS

39

struction and m aintenance o f fortresses, clinics and w arehouses, and m ilitary expeditions against aboriginal tribes, the Spanish, and Chinese pirates. VOC income, on the other hand, derived largely from the profits of its maritime trade, plus various kinds o f licenses and taxes. Even though the Chinese em peror (Dutch called him coninck while referring to the Japanese shogun as keijzer) never forbade Chinese junks from trading freely w ith the D utch in Taiwan, the D utch ships w ere not expected to enter a Chinese port. However, w ith the connivance o f local port authorities, the D utch often brought cargoes in and out o f Chinese ports. U nder the circum stances, their C hina trade rem ained for a long tim e capricious, largely depending upon bribing corrupt Chinese officials, and collaborating with Chinese pirate-m erchants. The latter could be charming and shrewd, but if the D utch refused to pay the price they demanded for their goods, they could quickly turn ruthless and brutal. Even before their colonization o f Taiwan, D utch shippers had learned how to work with the powerful but treacherous pirate-tum ed-m erchant Li Tan (known as Andree D ittus to the Europeans), as w ell as w ith L i’s successor Hsu Shin-su, who was a native o f Amoy who bribed corrupt Chinese officials on behalf o f Li Tan. Li Tan was so pow erful that before his death in A ugust 1625 at Hirado, Japan, his ships dom inated a huge trading netw ork from the C hina coast to Hanoi, M anila, Taiwan and southern Japan. He could and did occasionally m uster sampans to intercept D utch yachts on the high seas. In business transactions, Chinese alw ays dem anded “earnest m oney" before they would deliver silks and porcelain. However, there were tim es when Hsu Shin-su, the well-known fixer, took the D utch deposits, but failed to deliver the goods as he prom ised. He then turned around and asked Chinese authorities to prevent VOC ships from entering Amoy or Foochow to haul m erchandise, as he did during the spring o f 1625.4* Enter Iquan, Koxinga, and O ther Pirates Between 1627 and 1629, pirate chief Li K uei-chi (known as Q uitsicq to the Europeans) m ustered a fleet o f 200 vessels, and when his raiders occupied Amoy in N ovem ber 1629, no D utch ship was to be found betw een Taiwan and China. Subsequently, the D utch cooperated with yet another pirate chief nam ed Chung Pin (Toutsailacq) to annihilate Q uitsicq’s fleet. D uring the autumn o f 1636, there em erged a new pirate chieftain by the name o f Jang Lauw (Liu H siang), who had 100 junks under his command and fought the M ing governm ent troops along the Chinese coast. Again, the D utch shippers were flexible enough to pay Jang Lauw “passage money” so that they could continue their China trade uninterrupted.49Finally, there was Cheng Chih-lung, the m ost pow erful and notorious o f all. Known to the seventeenth-century

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m aritim e world as Nicholas Iquan, Cheng Chih-lung (hereafter Iquan) started his career as a comprador, then becam e a pirate, and finally was appointed a M ing navy commander. There have been conflicting reports on the life and tim es o f Iquan and his illustrious son Cheng C h’eng-kung (or Koxinga, 1642-1681). Generally speaking, the Dutch portrayed them as “villains” and “evil and cruel pirate chieftains,” while the Chinese historians, though having reservations about Iquan, alm ost all honored K oxinga as a patriot, a hero, and a man o f courage and principle. Contemporary Taiwanese historians, on the other hand, in their attem pt to deem phasize China’s influence on the island, point out that Koxinga’s mother was a Japanese (née Tagawa) and that he lived in Japan until he was seven years old. A t any rate, in his report to Batavia, the D utch governor in Taiwan at the tim e Nicholaes Verbürg attem pted to belittle Iquan by claim ing that the pirate had once worked as a tailor for Governor Putmans in 1625-1626 and also served as an interpreter for Governor De W ith in 1629. But Chinese and Japanese sources contradict this report by citing the fact that by 1628 Iquan had already emerged as a “successful merchant” in the ports o f Nagasaki, H irado, and Fukien.30 W ith a small band o f raiders, Iquan sometimes allied him self with the Dutch and sometimes fought against other pirate groups. In 1628, Iquan was able to m uster som e1,000 ships and boats and kill the pirate-m erchant Hsu Shin-su, thus gaining control o f the shipping lanes between Japan and China and also occupying Amoy and H ai-ch’eng (H aijton), a notorious haunt o f pirates. Then Iquan elim inated the pirate chief Q uitsicq and turned against Toutsailacq, wiping out the latter’s entire band in M arch 1631. Four years later, on M ay 23,1635, in a naval battle against pirate chieftain Jang Lauw, Iquan finished off Jang’s rem aining 600 to 700 pirates, including some Por­ tuguese and Japanese, thus making him self the ruler o f the China seas. From then on only shippers with a “sailing perm it” issued by Iquan were allowed to navigate the Taiwan Strait. In addition, he used his position to reap even more profits as he traded Chinese silks for peppers and lumber, which the Dutch transported from Southeast A sia to Fukien. In the 1630s, Iquan’s annual income was reported to have exceeded 100,000 silver taels.31 W ith his form idable fleet and enorm ous assets, Iquan curried favor in a tim ely way with both Chinese and Japanese high officials until finally, in May 1636, he was appointed the naval com m ander o f Foochow. W ith Iquan in command, the VOC was able to declare that by the end o f 1636 that there were no longer any pirates in Chinese waters. As a m atter o f fact, the VOC trade in Taiwan, when measured by both volume and profit, jum ped substantially as compared with those o f the previous years. In 1637, fourteen Dutch ships were carrying to Japan cargo with a total value o f 2,460,733 guilders. Among this cargo, 80 percent, or 2,042,302 guilders worth o f goods,

TAIWAN’S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RULERS

41

came from Taiwan.32As his financial assets and reputation continued to grow, Iquan was promoted to become the “Fukien General” in 1640, adding China’s three southeastern provinces to his jurisdiction. Between 1641 and 1643, as he reveled in his pow er and made huge profits from m aritim e trade, his ships carried between 62 and 79 percent o f all Chinese raw silks, and between 30 and 80 percent o f silk fabrics.53 It was during this tim e that the M ing forces disintegrated w hile the M anchus ascended to power. Soon after the last M ing em peror hanged him self on Coal H ill in the Forbidden City, the M anchus seized Beijing and established a new dynasty called the C h’ing, while a M ing royal scion fled to Foochow and set up an auxiliary capital in the summer o f 1645. Both Iquan and his son Koxinga pledged their loyalty to a forty-four-year-old man known to the M ing loyalists as the Lung-wu emperor. But after only tw o months on the shaky throne, the Lung-wu em peror drowned him self to avoid being taken prisoner by M anchu warriors. One year later, the opportunistic and pragm atic Iquan decided to surrender to the new C h’ing em peror in Beijing, but the M anchu commander Po-luo did not trust him and had him im prisoned for life. Kox­ inga was vehemently opposed to his father’s decision to collaborate w ith the enemy. In 1648, Koxinga gathered a great force and fought the enemy at sea and on land, and by 1649 he had recovered seven provinces in the south and southeast for the struggling M ing. However, by 1651 Koxinga’s forces had begun to lose ground to the M anchus. This was in spite o f his troops nearly reaching Nanking in the summer o f 1658, and inflicting heavy casualties on M anchu troops at Amoy and Quemoy in June 1660. To counter Koxinga’s naval prowess, the M anchus forced m illions o f inhabitants to evacuate eigh­ teen kilom eters inland from the coast, then erected block forts at a distance o f every four or five kilom eters in the vacated land. In so doing, the M anchus effectively cut off Koxinga’s supply routes and inland connections with other M ing partisan forces.34U nder the circum stances, Koxinga was forced to look for safer and more fertile grounds. Koxinga was aware that there was a substantial num ber o f Chinese immi­ grants in Taiwan, mostly from his home district o f Ch’uan-chou (which M arco Polo called Zaitun), who stood ready to welcome him. Indeed, on the Autumn M oon Festival night o f 1652, a Fukienese native named Kuo Huai-yi led a serious revolt at Fort Provintia to overthrow VOC authority in Taiwan.33 It should also be noted that Koxinga’s frustrating campaign against the M anchus had frayed critical cooperation between his navy and the D utch trading fleet. On his part, Koxinga suspected that the Dutch had been providing arms to his enem ies in exchange for future com m ercial concessions once the m ainland was under the control o f the M anchus. As a m atter o f fact, many o f his junks had been chased, attacked, and sunk by Dutch naval vessels. Consequently,

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Koxinga sent a m essenger by the name o f Nachoda Banqua to dem and that the Dutch pay com pensation o f hundreds o f thousands o f silver taels for his damaged and lost junks. However, it took a long while before the D utch real­ ized that a real threat was looming across the Taiwan Strait. On June 8,1658, Joan M aatzuyker, the D utch governor-general in Batavia, tardily replied to Koxinga by em phatically denying Koxinga’s charges and accusations, and by refuting the M ing general’s “bold pretensions” and “false claim s” against the VOC. W hile affirming that his company did not owe a single candareen to Koxinga, the Dutch governor-general also regretted His H ighness’s invective paranoia and groundless suspicions.36 Chinese historians generally agree that Koxinga’s decision was made in January 1661 as he earnestly prepared for an am phibious assault on Taiwan during the next two months. On M arch 23,1661, Koxinga led a staff o f twentyfour commanders, an arm ada o f 900 ships, and 25,000 people from Amoy. He crossed the 100-mile strait separating C hina from Taiwan, and reached Lu-erh-m en (the D eer Ear G ate) north o f Tayouan on A pril 30,1661. On M ay 1,1661, Koxinga’s archers, shield-bearers, and troops manning cannons and bearing muskets started marching on Forts Zeelandia and Provintia. A t this critical moment, the Dutch leadership realized that there was no way they could save both forts from K oxinga’s army, and thereby decided to abandon Fort Provintia and withdraw all D utch personnel, along with w hatever weapons, provisions, and foods they could carry, to Fort Zeelandia. W hile preparing for a prolonged siege o f the fort, they also thought about m obilizing aboriginal tribes to help them resist the enemy, but it was too late. By M ay 3, Koxinga and his 12,000-strong army were encam ped on the open field around Fort Provintia. The next day Koxinga and his arm y captured the fo rt A t this juncture, the D utch governor o f Taiwan Frederick C oyett (16201681) sent Koxinga a letter (w ritten in Dutch but translated into Chinese), in w hich C oyett asked Koxinga why he was hostile tow ard his longstanding trading partner the VOC, and why Koxinga had suddenly taken a hostile at­ titude tow ard the Dutch. In this letter, C oyett repeatedly pleaded his case that the D utch wished to restore friendship with Koxinga. But C oyett failed to sway Koxinga, who replied that in order to have a successful prosecution o f his w ar against the M anchus, he needed to take possession o f Taiwan. Then with characteristic bluntness, Koxinga added, “You H ollanders are conceited and senseless people; you w ill m ake yourselves unworthy o f the mercy which I now offer; you w ill subject yourselves to the highest punishm ent. . . Do you now wish to be w iser? Let your losses at least teach you, that your power here cannot be com pared to a thousandth part o f m ine.”37W ith that, Koxinga ordered his troops to cross at night over to the Tayouan sand plain near Fort Zeelandia and to im m ediately construct trenches and erect batteries. W hen

TAIWAN’S SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RULERS 43

the siege began, Fort Zeelandia had a total o f 1,733 people. Among them w ere 870 infantry and thirty-five gunners, the rest were women and children. A t this critical juncture, the Council o f India at B atavia appointed Hermanus Klenk van O desse to be the new governor o f Taiwan, and on July 5 they de­ cided to dispatch to Taiwan a fleet o f nine ships with 725 troops. A fter many inducem ents w ith great prom ises o f generous com pensation and rew ards, an inexperienced graduate o f the Academy o f Leyden nam ed Jacob Caeuw volunteered to command the fleet. B ut when his vessel Hoogelande reached the entrance to the port o f Tayouan on July 31, the fleet and Hermanus Klenk were greeted by huge M ing flags sm eared with blood. C iting bad w eather as an excuse, the governor never set foot on Taiwan soil and quickly ordered the ships to sail for Japan. Jacob Caeuw, who traveled separately, sought refuge in die Pescadores, and his fleet and relief troops finally entered Tayouan port on September«), 1661.58 W hen relief forces arrived from Batavia, D utch m orale lifted as Koxinga faced a new challenge. O n Septem ber 16, D utch cannonballs fell in Koxinga’s cam ps, and his gunners fought back. This particular batde cost betw een 200 and 300 Dutch casualties, plus three sm all boats. A fter that, the Dutch could no longer m ount an offense. In the meantim e, m ore and m ore Chinese personnel, weapons, and supplies were being shipped across the strait from Fukien to Taiwan. Com m ander Caeuw recognized that it was a lost cause. So on Decem ber 3 ,1661, he salvaged what he could and led his shattered fleet out o f Tayouan port.39 K oxinga’s army, w hich was several thousand strong, ultim ately overpow ered the few hundred hapless D utch defenders. G overnor Coyett, an honorable but unfortunate man, surrendered the island to the M ing loyalists by signing a treaty on February 1,1662. He was condem ned by the Council o f Justice in Batavia and banished to the island o f Pulo Ay near Banda until M ay 1674, when the Prince o f O range ordered his release. C oyett was finally allow ed to return to H olland under very strict conditions. One year later, C oyett published 't Verwaerloosde Formosa (The neglected Form osa), in w hich he charged that he was deceived by the Batavian authorities, in par­ ticular by the notoriously stubborn and capricious N icholaes Verbürg, who intentionally delayed tim ely preparations and failed to dispatch sufficient reinforcem ents to defend Tayouan.60 Koxinga, the new sovereign “King o f Yen-p’ing,” intended to establish a kingdom on the island first, then to use Taiwan as a base to reconquer m ain­ land China in the future, but he died w ithin a year at the age o f thirty-nine. N evertheless, K oxinga’s exodus to Taiwan also brought thousands o f M ing partisans, scholars, and refugees o f all kinds, who started to develop Taiwan on the m odel o f a declining and degenerating M ing society. Ironically, after the disintegrating forces o f M ing culture entered the w ilderness o f the island,

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they revitalized the island, establishing an orderly frontier society. In the 1670s, there were an estim ated 150,000 C hinese living on the island, surpassing the approxim ately 110,000 indigenous persons for the first tim e in the history o f Taiwan. Chinese now becam e the official w ritten language, and Confiician schools soon replaced European Christian teachings. As a consequence, the identity o f the island abruptly changed from a quasi-European outpost to a m iniature M ing society. But once again, change was on the horizon. Follow­ ing K oxinga’s death, the M ing resistance movement against the M anchus began to lose its vigor. Endless dom estic conflicts gradually weakened Tai­ wan’s defense, and in 1683, K oxinga’s generals surrendered the island to the M anchu emperor.

3 Trading Networks Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and Coastal China

Taiwan Under Koxinga’s Rule In his effort to defeat the M anchus and recover C hina for the M ing dynasty, Koxinga m aintained an army 100,000 strong and drew his economic resources prim arily from the three coastal provinces o f Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwang­ tung. His other financial and m aterial resources came from the m aritim e trade w ith Japan and Southeast A sia. Having inherited some o f his father Iquan’s expertise and trading personnel, as well as part o f his fleet, Koxinga quickly expanded Iquan’s netw ork from southern C hina all the way to the Strait o f M alacca in die Indian Ocean. He also set up trading stations in Southeast Asia, appointed officials to command his fleet, and delegated overseas Chinese to m anage his business transactions in situ.1D uring the summer o f 1656, how­ ever, the M anchu com m ander T ’un T ’ai, who knew the source o f Koxinga’s strength, petitioned the newly established C h’ing governm ent to cut off Ko­ xinga’s inland supplies. A fter the M anchu forces suffered a crushing defeat at Amoy and the offshore island o f Quemoy in m id-June 1660, Huang Wu, a M ing turncoat, suggested m oving all the inhabitants who lived w ithin thirty to fifty li (ten to seventeen m iles) o f the coast to the interior. This draconian policy affected inhabitants along the coastline from Canton all the way to the Liaotung peninsula in M anchuria. In 1661, the Shun-chih em peror (r. 1644-1661) com plied w ith T ’un and Huang’s proposal and issued a decree by which m illions o f people, including those living on the offshore islands, were forced to abandon their dw ellings and bum their boats. Thus, “not a splinter o f tim ber would be allow ed to go to the sea, not a single kernel o f grain to cross the new boundary” becam e the w ar cry o f the tim e.2 By com ­ m itting to this defensive scorched-earth policy, however, the C h’ing court not only conceded the high seas to Koxinga, but also forced him to look for more m aritim e resources to wage w ar against the “hom ed” M anchus. U nder the interdiction policy, no vessels o f any kind, regardless o f their type, cargo, or purpose w ould be allow ed to put out to the sea. V iolators o f the decree w ere to be hanged. A s a consequence, the C hekiangese, Fukienese, and Cantonese who relied on fishing and m aritim e trade for their

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livelihood suddenly found them selves in a perilous position. However, en­ forcem ent o f the prohibition law was porous as risk seekers found ways and means to smuggle goods in and out o f China, many by simply paying bribes to border-town guards or port authorities. Chiang Jih-sheng, a seventeenthcentury scholar, observed, “A t the tim e border guards and soldiers enjoyed the most power. But after accepting bribes, they let you go and did not ask where you were going to or coming from.”3M eanwhile, foreign shippers from Portugal, Siam, Holland, and Britain repeatedly asked to trade with China. In 1678, a Portuguese merchant named Bento Pereyra de Faria presented him self as an envoy from the Kingdom o f Portugal and petitioned to bring tribute to Beijing. The Ch’ing Court found a loophole and allowed him to come to Canton, not by sea, but overland from M acao.4 Prior to the proclamation o f the prohibition policy, Koxinga’s vessels were mostly manufactured in Fukien. Known as “Fu Ships,” these vessels had a capacity o f between seventy-seven and 500 people per ship.5 The number o f his vessels, both combat and cargo, fluctuated over time. In his report to the English East India Company in 1670, Captain Ellis Crisp stated that there were 200 various sizes o f wooden ships belonging to Taiwan. Eighteen of them were Japan-bound that year, and the rest were under the command o f Taiwan’s sovereign ruler.6 It is noteworthy that when Koxinga was forced to retreat to Taiwan, countless Ming partisans refused to shave their heads and wear the customary M anchu queue, thereby opting to flee mainland China. Almost all o f them ended up in Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Siam, Cambodia, M alaya, Java, and the Philippines. Some o f them were also engaged in maritime trade and were eager to do business with Koxinga’s agents from Taiwan. Dutch sources reveal that by the spring o f 1655 twenty-four o f Koxinga’s vessels were engaged in cargo trade. O f them, six went to Batavia, two to Tonkin (in North Vietnam), ten were bound for Siam, four were assigned to do business with Quinam (in south Vietnam), and one sailed for M anila.7 At this tim e, Tokugawa Japan was enforcing a “closed country policy,” under which only Chinese and Dutch ships were perm itted to visit Nagasaki, and no other port. Hayashi Razan (1583-1657, also known as Doshun), a neoConfucian scholar and also an advisor to Tokugawa Ieyasu, was responsible for most o f the secretarial work required by the Tokugawa shogunate in its early days. R azan’s son Gaho (1618-1680) and grandson Hoko (1644-1732) were later charged with recording every Koxinga ship that ever made Japan a port o f call. H ayashi’s scattered records indicate that three o f Koxinga’s junks sailed from Nagasaki to Cam bodia in 1676, four sailed to Siam to trade in 1680, at least one vessel was sent to Cam bodia in 1681, and four voyaged to Siam to purchase rice and gunpowder in 1682. In addition, eight junks flying Koxinga’s flags were transporting sugar and rice between Taiwan and Siam

TRADING NETWORKS 47

in 1683.* And according to a 1672 report prepared by Symon Delboe for the English East India Company, four or five Taiwanese ships regularly set sail for M anila in January and returned to Taiwan in A pril or May.9 Like the Dutch before them , Koxinga’s trade officials also learned how to play the role o f middleman by transshipping goods from Japan via Taiwan to Southeast A sia and vice versa. Between 1661 and 1683, a total o f 201 Taiwanese Ships were involved in triangular transshipping activities, which reached their peak when twenty vessels set sail in 1671, and sixteen ships in 1672.10 Again em ulating the D utch, K oxinga’s ships brought all sorts o f goods, including spices, from Southeast Asian countries to Taiwan for processing and packaging. Together with such Taiwanese products as sugar and deerskin, this valuable m erchandise was then shipped to Nagasaki and exchanged for Japanese silver, copper, swords, helm ets, and armor. Some o f these bullion and weapons would then be shipped out to Cam bodia and Siam and exchanged for produce or sim ply sold for profit.11 A t this tim e, Taiwan produced about 50,000 piculs o f sugar and some 100,000 pieces o f deerskin annually. And since these com m odities were a governm ent monopoly, the Taiwanese authorities then used one-third o f the island’s annually produced sugar and deerskins in exchange for B ritish ironw are and m uskets.12 It was obvious that by operating from the small island o f Taiwan, Koxinga traded territorial dim inution and troop reduction for com m ercial expansion and econom ic enhancem ent. In the meantim e, several M anchu officials in the coastal provinces had realized the incredible hardships the scorched earth policy imposed on the people. Time and again they—particularly General Shih Lang, who later crushed the Taiwan resistance forces—petitioned the court to ease the prohibitory policy. But as late as 1681, the K ’ang-hsi em peror still refused to rescind his father’s decree by saying, “The pirates have not been w iped out; therefore ships should not go to sea.” 13But after K oxinga’s grandson Cheng K ’e-shuang surrendered to G eneral Shih Lang on Septem ber 8,1683, the Kang-hsi em peror rem arked, “Now that they have surrendered, and the pirates have been wiped out and we are cleansed o f them , officials in Fukien’s coastal area should take flexible m easures to enforce the prohibi­ tory policy.” 14N ear the end o f the year, the em peror dispatched 111 Chin, vice m inister o f the M inistry o f Personnel, and Grand Secretary H si-chu to Fukien and Kwangtung provinces to redraw the prohibitory boundaries so that people could move back to repopulate the deserted coastal regions. Taiwan Under M anchu Rule By July 1684, the em peror not only agreed to move the prohibitory boundaries closer to the sea, but also ordered resum ption o f fishing and trading activi­

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ties, provided that local authorities took m easures to impose fees and tariffs. There was a catch, how ever no cargo was to exceed 500 piculs.15 One year later (1685), four custom s houses were set up respectively in Shanghai (in Kiangsu Province), Ningpo (in Chekiang), Amoy (in Fukien), and Canton (in Kwangtung) to levy tariffs on domestic trade as well as on foreign tribute. Small fishing boats without masts or canvas paid license fees to local officials. Tax liabilities for large vessels, on the other hand, were assessed and collected by customs officials according to the number o f masts and canvases.16Foreign shippers soon followed suit and took advantage o f these four custom s offices to resum e their trading activities. The custom s houses would continue to manage China’s m aritim e trade until 1757, when the C h’ien-lung em peror (r. 1736-1795) decreed that all foreign trade had to be conducted at C anton.17 There were several com pelling reasons why the Ch’ing court decided to lift its prohibitory policy and grant its people the right to resum e maritim e activities. For one thing, China desperately needed to im port silver and cop­ per, which were used as currency, to grease its economic engine. W ithout the continuing supply o f silver from M anila or Japan, tight currency circulation had caused the Chinese economy to stagnate. For another, the populations that inhabited hilly Fukien and Kwangtung had long relied on fishing and export­ ing local products— in particular silk, tea, and lum ber—for their livelihood. Any way one looks at it, the forty-year m aritim e embargo had deprived these people o f their livelihood, making their distress and suffering acute. Finally, the C h’ing court needed new sources o f income to supplem ent its revenues, which had been depleted by numerous m ilitary expeditions. Across the strait, the Koxinga regime had given great impetus to sugar cultivation in Taiwan by introducing large quantities o f seed plants and new methods of cultivation and manufacture from Fukien. During the rule o f the Koxinga family, sugar production increased significantly on the island. In some parts o f southern Taiwan, rice was planted in rotation with sugar every two or three years. In the north, sweet potatoes, peanuts, and beans were sometimes grown in alternate years. A great portion o f the sugar consumed in north China came from Taiwan, but sugar could also bring in ready foreign rem ittances. For exam ple, in July 1685 the C h’ing government sold twentythree shiploads o f sugar in the Japanese m arket in exchange for silver.18 It set a quota for the export o f Taiwanese sugar. In 1685, a total o f 6,000 piculs was allotted to Taiwan County, 1,500 piculs to Fengshan County and 3,500 piculs to Chulo (Chiayi) County. A year later, the quota for the entire island was increased to more than 20,000 piculs.19 For convenient custom s supervision and effective tariff collection, the Ch’ing dynasty more or less followed the so-called “port-to-port” direct trade system. M oreover, three ports in Fukien were designated for direct trade w ith

TRADING NETWORKS 49

Figure 3.1 Chinese Immigrants in Taiwan

their counterparts in Taiwan, namely Hankang (Fukien) with Lukang (Tai­ wan), Foochow with Tamsui, and Amoy with D eer Ear Gate (Lu-erh-men) in Tainan. In other words, shippers from Amoy could only trade at D eer Ear Gate but not at any other ports, and the cargo from Tamsui could only be brought to Foochow and nowhere else. Furthermore, shippers were required to register and obtain perm its before setting sail for Taiwan. W hen a ship arrived, custom s officials first verified the sailing perm it, the crew roster, and the item ized cargo before allowing the crew to go ashore.20 However, experienced and unscrupulous ship owners knew where the good m arkets for their merchandise were and often violated the regulations. As irregularities became rampant, the Ch’ing government decided to send navy junks to escort cargo ships to their designated ports. Despite this, violations and illegal trading practices persisted unabated. Finally, in 1718 the Board o f Revenue in Beijing, responding to the request o f the M anchu governor-general o f Chekiang and Fukien, Chieh-lo-m an-pao, issued a new regulation requiring all cargo ships, coming from or going to Taiwan, to first register at the Pescadores and then pay their tariffs at the Amoy Custom s before proceeding to any other ports. In 1778, several hundred vessels anchored in Tainan annually, and fifty years later, the Am oy G azetteer recorded that more than 1,000 vessels crisscrossed between Amoy and Tainan every year.21 On paper at least, for the next sixty-six years (until 1784) the port o f Amoy and Deer Ear Gate in Tainan would exclusively handle the trade between China and Taiwan. However, since there were another seventeen navigable ports in

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Taiwan, risk-taking shippers found it more profitable and convenient to take their cargoes from one o f these ports and sail directly to Vietnam, M acao, or Tientsin (instead o f Amoy). By following this practice, the shippers not only evaded paying tariffs, but also cut through the red tape o f custom s. Between late July and O ctober o f 1731, for exam ple, a total o f fifty-three Fukienese junks, each junk usually manned by about twenty sailors, carried Taiwanese w hite sugar, brown sugar, and candies directly to Tientsin. U ltim ately, the C h’ing governm ent realized that one port was not enough to m eet the in­ creasing m arket needs across the strait. As a consequence, in 1784 Lukang (on the central-w est coast) was allow ed to trade directly with the port o f Hankang in Fukien, and four years later Tamsui was added to the list o f ports perm itted to trade directly with Foochow. N evertheless, during the next five decades, Tainan rem ained the busiest Taiwanese port as m ost Chinese junks preferred to buy and sell goods there. By 1826, two other ports— Hai Feng (in Changhua) and W u-shih (in Dan)— also becam e governm ent-designated trading ports with their counterparts in Fukien.22Finally, on June 29, 1810, the C hia-ch’ing em peror (r. 1796-1820) told his G rand Secretariat to lift the port-to-port direct trade restrictions because shippers were not alw ays able to manage the monsoon rains and the unpredictable storm s that frequently forced their vessels to sail to nondesignated ports.23 Until the mid-nineteenth century, trade between Taiwan and China was al­ ways dictated by latter’s needs and markets. Taiwan exported such agricultural products as rice, peanut oil, sugar, hemp, and indigo to the mainland, but rarely did die islanders im port large volumes o f goods from China. As a consequence, only a few Taiwan-bound junks carried cotton cloth (nankeen), ironware, herbal medicine, and the like, but most o f them simply sailed with ballast Small junks could cany between 2,000 and 3,000 piculs o f cargo, while large junks had the capacity o f transporting between 5,000 and 6,000 piculs o f merchandise. Junk owners w o e mostly rich Fukienese merchants from Ch’uan-chou and Changchou counties, and they formed informal guilds, called chiao. There were three such chiao in Taiwanfu. H ie northern chiao comprised more than twenty trading houses and concentrated its business between Taiwan and Ningpo, Shanghai, and Newchwang, as well as Yentai and Tientsin in northern China. The south­ ern chiao had more than thirty member companies and sold Taiwanese goods to Quemoy, Amoy, Chang-chou, Ch’uan-chou, Hong Kong, Swantow, and M acao. Finally, there was the sugar chiao, the brainchild o f the “sugar king,” Li Sheng-hsing, whose chiao controlled most o f the Taiwan sugar business. Prototypes o f Taiwanese commercial capitalism, each chiao organized a board o f directors, elected its own president, and regularly reinvested its proceeds in order to gam er more profits.24 Because o f its subtropical clim ate and plentiful rainfall, Taiwan provided

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51

Figure 3.2 Elghteanth-Century Trading Junk of Taiwan

ideal farm land for growing rice. Rice requires extrem ely m oist soil, either rain-fed or artificially flooded, and the Taiwanese farm ers, from the north to the south, kept the paddies under w ater during most o f the growing season. W hile the total acreage devoted to rice production can not be ascertained, dur­ ing the second half o f the eighteenth century Taiwan was capable of producing

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between 1.26 m illion and 2 m illion piculs o f rice every year.23Taiwanese rice was not only used to feed the people in such hilly Fukien counties as Foochow, Chang-chou, and C h’uan-chou, but was also found in the m arkets o f Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Tientsin. M oreover, Taiwanese rice was frequently used for the relief o f fam ines in China. In 1741, nearly 100,000 piculs o f white and brown rice were shipped to the m ainland for m ilitary and civilian consum ption, and during the early 1820s an annual average o f one m illion piculs o f rice was hauled to C hina from Taiwan. Even fishing boats o f under 500-picul capac­ ity were engaged in transporting Taiwanese rice in exchange for “luxurious goods” produced in the m ainland, including silk and cotton fabrics, wine, and kitchen utensils. By the early nineteenth century, one official at Lukang reported that during bum per crop years, quasi-governm ent junks conveyed m ore than 2 m illion piculs o f Taiwanese rice from governm ent-designated ports to the m ainland.26 One can im agine that thousands more piculs o f rice were annually hauled out o f the island by unscrupulous dealers but were unaccounted for by governm ent statisticians. It was estim ated that no less than 35,000 acres o f land, mostly in Chiayi, Tainan, and Fengshan, was devoted to the production o f sugar. Each acre could produce from 160 to 320 piculs (21,280 to 42,560 pounds) o f cane, and by the 1720s, sugar production in Taiwan had reached one m illion piculs. A t harvest tim e, women and children stripped off the low er leaves while men cut the cane. O ver a thousand individually owned sugar m ills, each em ploying ten to fourteen w orkers, crushed the cane to extract sugar. In 1833, the Canton Register stated that more than tw enty vessels arrived annually in Tientsin w ith Taiwan sugar.27 During the m id-nineteenth century, Taiwan annually exported 160,000 piculs o f sugar, valued at some $470,000. In 1856, the Am erican R obinet Company established a firm in Kaohsiung— which had by then supplanted Tainan as the largest port in southern Taiwan—and exported Taiwan sugar to Japan and C alifornia. Prior to 1870, the total export o f sugar had never exceeded 37 m illion pounds, but during that year exports o f sugar doubled, and continued to increase from that point on. In 1872, a total o f 5.2 m illion pounds o f Taiwan sugar was shipped to London. Also, because o f a growing demand in A ustralia, a representative o f M elbourne Sugar houses visited Kaohsiung and placed large orders in 1873.28 Sandy soil in southern Taiwan, including in the Pescadores, was most suit­ able for growing peanuts (called groundnuts by the Taiwanese). Chinese loved to eat these nuts for food, extracted the oil for cooking use, and also crushed the nuts into thick cake for fertilizing. Taiwan’s peanut cakes were widely used for feeding pond fish and for fertilizing young rice seedlings prior to transplanting to the paddy field. Peanuts were a valuable export from Taiwan to China. In 1896, Dr. A ugustine Henry identified 1,428 Taiwanese plants for

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the Transactions o f the Royal A siatic Society o f Japan. Several o f these plants produced indigo, in particular the brilliant blue w hich was highly valued in C hina for cloth dying. Blue indigo along with sugar and hem p was shipped out o f Tainan and Tamsui to Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Tientsin as key exports. Jam es W. Davidson reported that in 1856 Taiwan exported 7,000 piculs (931,000 pounds) o f indigo, but the figure increased to 21,000 piculs in 1888. By then, it had become third in tonnage and value o f all Taiwanese junk export cargo, exceeded only by rice and coal.29 In the river low lands, Taiwanese farm ers grew seeds o f the ju te plant in late spring, and its stem s (generally known as hem p skins) were ready for harvesting by September. D ried skins were used for the m anufacture o f rope, another Taiwanese product desired by the Chinese. The Taiwanese also grew m ulberry trees and scraped their bark to m anufacture paper. D ried m ulberry papers were used for paper um brellas, lanterns, and rain shawls. Finally, products made out o f the tropical rush palm -leaf, grown along the Ta-chia R iver in central Taiwan, also becam e a popular export item . Tan is the natural color o f dried rush, w hich was made into beautiful soft and flex­ ible hats, m ats, and bed m attresses. These item s becam e favorite souvenirs o f Chinese visitors to Taiwan, who brought them back to the m ainland for use in hot weather. U ntil 1840, Chinese junks dom inated the m aritim e trade in East A sia and Southeast Asia. At the turn o f the nineteenth century, an estim ated 5,800 junks were engaged in various trading activities along the C hina coast. They could carry up to 680,000 tons o f goods with a value o f 26.4 m illion Spanish silver dollars, the principal trading specie o f A sia at the tim e.30As late as the 1820s m ost o f the trading junks sailing in Asian waters were manufactured, owned, and manned by Chinese, or Chinese o f the diaspora who sojourned overseas. Hosea B. M orse reported that in 1820 a total o f 295 Chinese junks with a total capacity o f 85,200 tons were engaged in trade between China and Southeast A sian countries; whereas the vessels that the English East India Company deployed in China trade averaged only 21,432 tons annually. A t that tim e, China’s annual foreign trade accounted for more than 6.9 m illion Span­ ish silver dollars. But in 1818, the cargo brought into Canton by all foreign com panies com bined was worth about 4.3 m illion silver dollars while the m erchandise exported out o f Canton by foreign shippers was worth less than 6 m illion silver dollars.31 These statistics dem onstrate that the Chinese junks were a good match for European and American trading vessels. However, after European ship captains helped the Siam ese governm ent build its first lorcha in 1833, Chinese junks gradually lost their com petitiveness. And when the vessel Great Britain, pow ered by a steam engine, successfully sailed across the A tlantic Ocean in 1843, it rang the death knell for Chinese junk trading

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once and for all. Sim ply put, Chinese junks could no longer com pete with the speedy and larger foreign steam ers on the open seas. A t the height o f the China-Taiwan trade, more than 1,000 Chinese junks visited the island every year, but during the entire year o f 1850 only 150 junks dropped anchor in the ports o f Taiwan for business purposes. By this tim e, there were only twenty or thirty trading junks left in Amoy.32The reason was because larger, safer, faster, and low er-freight-cost foreign steam ships had replaced the smaller, slower, and riskier junks in transporting rice, coal, sugar, and other cargo from Taiwan to the mainland and elsewhere. But the decline o f the Chinese junk trade requires a more detailed explanation. Strictly speaking, foreign shippers were not allow ed to trade with Taiwan until 1862. However, Anglo-American shippers, having discovered that selling opium to Taiwan and then hauling away Taiwanese camphor, sugar, and coal could generate huge profits, had long disregarded Chinese trade regulations. On the other hand, the m andarins could not stop such “illegal” trading activities, mainly because they did not and could not exercise com plete jurisdiction over Taiwan. One m ust rem em ber that owing to its geographical location and related storm patterns, Taiwan was especially notorious for shipwrecks, therefore rendering trade between the m ainland and the island hazardous. Between 1850 and 1869, a total o f 150 foreign vessels were wrecked and lost on or near Taiwan’s unlighted and unpatrolled coasts. M oreover, on average, more than ten Chinese transport junks were sunk every year w hile trying to cross the Taiwan Strait.33 W orst o f all, these lost junks were usually not replaced. Then there was the threat o f the numerous pirates who lurked along the uncharted coast o f Taiwan. Generally speaking, these pirates loved to defy the M andarin escort junks, but were afraid o f die cannon-equipped W estern steam ers. In view o f all these factors, one can understand why old-fashioned junk trading had become a “sunset business” by the 1860s. This situation ultim ately created a ripple effect on Taiwan’s m aritim e trade as a whole. In 1823, the navigation channel at D eer Ear Gate was silted up by a severe storm, and by the 1850s it was difficult for large foreign vessels to navigate, thus the foreign captains turned to trading at Tamsui and Kaohsiung thereafter. The upshot was that trading activities at Tainan steadily decreased, and the previously thriving trading houses under the chiao system also declined and ultim ately disappeared. Pirates Ravage the Island The rapacity o f the m andarins incited the people to rebel and the mobs to take advantage of the law less conditions to advance personal interests. But perennial and pernicious piracy also rendered M andarin rule in Taiwan

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ineffective and gravely dim inished Chinese jurisdiction over the islanders. Freebooters and bandits utilized guerrilla tactics to harass the ill-equipped and disorganized governm ent troops and crush them , despite their superior numbers. During the piratical excesses o f the 1790s, more than ten pirate bands regularly ravaged the coastal provinces o f Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung. The m ost widespread and destructive raiders cam e under the command o f the Fukienese Tsai C h’ien, who generally operated north o f Amoy, and the Cantonese Chu Fen, who controlled the waters from Amoy to the South China Sea. A native o f T ’ung-an D istrict in C h’uan-chou County, Tsai C h’ien grew up in poverty, although he did not turn to piracy until he was about forty-five years old. Tsai’s 100-plus pirate vessels cruised the China coast and attacked government junks and trading ships while inducing the discontented classes to rebel. Treasure chests under the custody o f m andarins, governm ent granaries, as well as quasi-official vessels w hich conveyed governm ent tribute had be­ come favorite targets for his raiders. However, Tsai C h’ien kept a vow not to harm innocent merchants and civilians. Probably because o f the influence o f his fearless and crafty wife (also a native o f C h’uan-chou), Tsai also strictly forbade his pirates to harm or rape the women they captured.34 By the end o f the eighteenth century, Tsai Ch’ien had between 15,000 and 20,000 hardened sailors, political refugees, and raiders under his command. He frequently used Taiwan as a safe retreat to count and hoard his riches hence becom ing well acquainted with the island. In 1800, Tsai C h’ien’s raiders plundered governm ent coffers at Tamsui, M ankah, and Dan in the north, and at Tainan and Fengshan in the south, sparing no Taiwanese town in between. The futile efforts o f the m andarins to suppress them only made Tsai’s pirates stronger and m ore aggressive. In 1801, the second pirate chieftain, Chu Fen, also made several raids along the Taiwan coast, all the way from the port o f Lukang to Tamsui in the north. During the summer o f 1803, Tsai C h’ien shared with Chu Fen several thousand piculs o f Taiwanese rice and countless taels o f silver that his band had plundered from government granaries and treasuries. From that point on the combined forces of Tsai and Chu and other form idable buccaneers were reported to have grown to betw een 600 and 700 vessels.35D uring M ay and June o f 1804, Tsai led a fleet o f sixty vessels to plunder Lukang, the Pescadores, and D eer Ear Gate. W hile at the port o f Lukang, Tsai took advantage o f the interclan feud between the Chang-chou and C h’uan-chou to plunder several com m unities in the vicinity. A fter inflicting great dam age on each other, the two clans reconciled and for a tim e settled down in peace so that they could concentrate on piracy. But because the garrison troops failed to prevent the pillaging, people became angry at the reprehensible negligence o f the mandarins. Two culpable C h’ing navy com m anders, C h’ien W an-kuei and Tsan Sheng, were later cashiered.36

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By the w inter o f 1804, Tsai C h’ien had moved south to join forces with the insurgents o f Fengshan district. Tsai’s men attacked Fengshan and gutted the m agistrate’s office. A fter dealing a crushing blow to the C h’ing troops, they also captured the fishing port ofTung-kang. During the battle near Tung-kang, however, Tsai’s wife was grievously wounded and soon died.37 During the early summer o f 1805, Tsai C h’ien’s freebooters again became very active around the estuaries o f Taiwan. A fter landing at Tamsui and D eer Ear Gate, they quickly made contact with both the underground M ing parti­ sans and outlaw s who were fleeing persecution by the despised M anchus. It was reported that several thousand bandits from the Chiayi area had joined Tsai’s forces; among them were a handful o f intellectuals who agreed to do secretarial work for Tsai C h’ien, including drafting an inauguration decree. W ith a pseudo-m onarchical decree posted in every town under his control, Tsai proclaim ed him self T s’en-hai wei-wu wang (the king who stabilizes the seas and who possesses m ilitary m ight), and announced his intention to establish a dynasty called the K w ang-m ng (enlightenm ent) in Taiwan to rival that o f the C h’ing on the mainland. Accordingly, he em ulated Chinese dynastic tradition by issuing banners, making royal seals and protocols, and investing his relatives and commanders with ranks o f nobility.38This alarming developm ent finally drew the attention o f the im perial court in Beijing, which reacted by assigning 1,000 fresh troops to its navy com m ander Li Changkeng (1750-1808) o f Chekiang and Fukien provinces. General Li wasted no tim e in landing his m arines at Lukang and proceeding to the south to chase the pirates off the island. But the patient and resourceful Tsia Ch’ien waited until Decem ber 1805 to once again return to Tamsui. This tim e, he scored a spectacular victory by annihilating the entire C h’ing garrison force, including two dozen officers and 2,000 troops, then headquartered at Taipei’s M ankah D istrict along the Tamsui River. The shock wave quickly spread southward to Changhua, Chiayi, Tainan, Fengshan, and even sm aller communities. The whole island was in convulsions. The raiders then attacked Anping and laid siege to Taiwanfii while Tsai C h’ien directed the amphibious operation on board his flagship at a safe distance from the city. The famed Battle of Taiwanfii went on for three weeks, with both sides taking heavy casualties, until the C h’ing General Li Chang-keng’s fleet arrived in early 1806. The nimble Tsai Ch’ien again made a tactical retreat, returning to D eer Ear Gate in M arch 1806, where he continued to ravage coastal Taiwan at will. Even though he lost between fifty to sixty vessels and an estim ated 10,000 troops and his dynastic ambition was thwarted, Tsai’s fleet rem ained a form idable force.39 Tsai C h’ien’s repeated invasions o f Taiwan clearly dem onstrated the im potence o f the Chinese rulers on the island. During the one-year span

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(1805-1806) when Tsai C h’ien launched his full-scale, system atic attacks on coastal Taiwan, the raiders sacked and burned the county offices o f Tamsui, Chiayi, and Fengshan. According to official Ch’ing reports, Tsai’s pirates stole 5,822 piculs o f rice from the Tamsui granary in M ankah, nearly 2,870 piculs o f grain from the two largest granaries o f Chiayi County, and 63,660 piculs o f rice and 12,514 taels o f silver from Fengshan County in the south. During the late spring o f 1806, Tsai’s raiders killed no few er than 1,578 militiam en plus thousands o f poorly trained im perial troops. But in his wake he left a total o f 441,381 refugees.40 It must be noted, however, that Tsai distributed some o f the rice and money he exacted from the mandarins among the refugees. As a m atter o f fact, many o f the islanders chose to serve as Tsai’s scouts during his battles against the im perial troops. Others were recruited as local manag­ ers in safeguarding or transporting Tsai’s loot and provisions. One can also speculate that some o f his buccaneers took native women for w ives, which is common during the invasion and occupation o f a foreign land. Legend has it that the offspring o f Tsai C h’ien’s pirates forged the nucleus o f a sm all coastal community called P’u-tai in Chiayi County, where 85 percent o f the population today bear the fam ily name o f Tsai. For the next two years, Tsai’s corsairs, in full command o f the strait, sealed off the high seas between Taiwan and the mainland. A ssisted by his adopted son Tsai Erh-lai and nephew Tsai H en, Tsai Ch’ien acted like the “King o f Tai­ wan’’ as he extracted from 400 to 800 silver taels from every junk that passed through the Taiwan Strait. M oreover, in January 1808, he managed to defeat and kill his nem esis, the C h’ing general Li Chang-keng, off the Kwangtung coast near Swatow’s “Black W ater Ocean.”41 Wang Te-lu (1770-1841) was then appointed to succeed General Li as the navy com m ander o f Chekiang and Fukien provinces. But the elusive Tsai continued to frustrate the new navy commander until the summer o f 1809, when Wang was finally able to com er Tsai in the fishing grounds off Chekiang near Ting-hai Island. During the ensuing naval battle, Wang was wounded by shattered cannonballs and Tsai C h’ien and several members o f his fam ily drowned them selves rather than face capture. W hen news o f Tsai C h’ien’s death reached Beijing, the Chia-ch’ing em peror was so pleased that he rewarded Wang Te-lu with the hereditary rank of a third class earl. A few months later, Chu Fen, Taiwan’s second-m ost notorious pirate chief, also m et his end near Quemoy.42 The deaths o f the pirate chieftains Tsai C h’ien and Chu Fen brought temporary tranquility to the waters between Taiwan and the mainland. The peace did not last for long, however, because the im perial governm ent failed to tackle the root causes o f the insurgency, such as the calum ny o f corrupt officials, poverty, overpopulation, and internal dissension. During this cycle o f dynastic decline, the im perial bureaucracy deteriorated while social and

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Figure 3.3 Navy Warship of the Ch'lng Dynasty

economic dislocations worsened everywhere, including in the coastal prov­ inces. W henever pirates and insurgents were weakened by disputes among them selves, an im perial decree would pardon and forgive the rebels. On the other hand, when conditions becam e ripe for piracy, it quickly became ram ­ pant and again infested the coast. By the 1830s and 1840s, Chinese pirates often worked in collusion with plundering raiders from Southeast A sia and acquired larger vessels, sometime three to four tim es bigger than the im perial junks they were engaging. Periodically, older im perial junks were required to anchor for long intervals to clear the hulls o f barnacles, which hindered their speed. On the other hand, pirate ships were generally newer and equipped with heavy guns and larger cannons that had been purchased from Europeans. The cannonballs used by the im perial junks weighed only one or two catties each (one catty is equivalent to 1.33 pounds or 604.53 grams) but the artillery balls used by the pirate ships were not only bigger, but had a greater velocity and a longer trajectory.43

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By the m id-nineteenth century the forces o f C h’ing disintegration were greatly accelerated by outside events. On August 26,1841, when British troops took Amoy, guild merchants in Taiwanfu and Lukang were devastated because 80 to 90 percent o f their businesses located in Fukien ceased to operate.44 In his m em orial to the Tao-kwang em peror (r. 1821-1850), the com m ander o f Foochow said, “Previously, several dozen guilds were engaged in m aritim e trade, but since Amoy fell to the B ritish, only one or two stores rem ained open w hile eight or nine out o f ten wealthy merchants were driven into bankruptcy, causing widespread unemployment.“45 Even though the situation in Amoy im­ proved slightly during the next few years, the bloom was clearly off the rose. Around 1850, the triad lodges in Shanghai and Amoy organized the “Sm all Sword Society“ with the aim o f exterm inating the M anchus and restoring the M ing dynasty. Early in 1853, members o f the secret society, who wore caps and a badge o f red cloth on their bluejackets, took possession o f Amoy w hile sim ultaneously seizing Shanghai. In the heat o f battle, several incom petent and cow ardly C h’ing officials subm itted to the rebels. And when Amoy fell to the hands o f the Small Sword Society, ship owners and guild m erchants were once again forced to pack up and run for their lives. By February 1855, however, W esterners in China decided to help the im perial forces by taking part in m ilitary operations against members o f the Society in both places.46 By this tim e, rebellions o f various kinds had also broken out in north China and quickly spread to several other places, including Taiwan. From the 1830s to the 1850s, several unchecked rebellions, intervillage feuds, lineage or “clan“ vendettas, and conflicts over land and w ater rights accom panied the grow th o f the Chinese population on the island. Population growth—from an estim ated 500,000 near the end o f the eighteenth century to 2 m illion by the m id-nineteenth century— cam e from both natural births and new im m igrants from the m ainland. On one occasion, angry mobs were strong enough to seize the Taiwanfu capital and drive the im perial troops out o f the city.47 In the final analysis, the m enace o f foreign w arships, the unruly island, and the unstable m arkets in C hina made it very difficult to bring Taiwanese sugar, rice, indigo, and other m erchandise to die m ainland. Based on the data from C h’ing official reports and the gazetteers o f Taiwan’s m ajor ports, C h’en Kuo-tung calculates that at the height o f the Taiwan-China trade (1780-1820), the volum e o f goods Taiwan shipped to the m ainland annually ranged from 1.9 m illion piculs (133,000 tons) to 2.25 m illion piculs (157,500 tons). By the tim e o f die Opium W ar (1840-1842), it had decreased to only 500,000 to 600,000 piculs (35,000 to 42,000 tons).48 D ecreasing trade volum e led to low er custom s revenues, which contrib­ uted to a depression o f the overall economy. B ut C hina’s shrinking revenues can also be attributed to the rise o f the “unequal treaty” system that resulted

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from the Opium Wars. First, the Treaty o f Nanking was im posed on China by B ritain in 1842. This was followed by the Treaty o f the Bogue (1843 with Britain), the Treaty o f W anghia (1844 with the United States), the Treaty o f W hampoa (1844 with France), and the treaties o f Tientsin (1858 with B ritain, France, the United States, and Russia). As a result o f these agreem ents, China was forced to open five ports— Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, Amoy, and Canton—for trade with the West and residence for foreign officials. The m ajor powers also obtained a fixed custom s tariff o f 5 percent ad valorem , which precluded a Chinese protective tariff in the future. In addition, Europeans and Americans enjoyed extraterritoriality, w hich allowed their consuls to try their own subjects, granted them m ost-favored-nation status, and guaranteed their right to anchor their w arships at the five ports to protect commerce and control their sailors. Finally, the treaties also gave the m ajor powers the right to adm inister entire foreign “concessions” in the treaty ports. These treaties tended to enrich and reinforce one another. In conjunction with later agreem ents, C hina also agreed to allow foreigners to direct its Im perial Custom s Service. By 1854, British, Americans, and Frenchmen had begun to serve as inspectors o f Chinese custom s in the five treaty ports. In 1861, H oratio N. Lay was appointed the inspector-general o f custom s until he was replaced by Robert H art in 1863. Under H art’s leadership, an interna­ tional custom s service for China was developed and em ployed seventy-one British, eighteen French, fourteen Am erican, and nine German em ployees by 1875. Among the Americans were Henry F. M errill, Charles Cecil Clarke, Hosea B. M orse, and W illiam F. Spinney, all cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa graduates o f the Harvard Class o f 1874. O ver the next two decades, the four Harvard graduates would serve the Chinese M aritim e Customs in posts in various provinces, with M errill as full com m issioner at Ningpo, Spinney as acting com m issioner at Kaohsiung-Tainan in southern Taiwan, and M orse as acting com m issioner at Tamsui-Keelung in northern Taiwan.49 Table 3.1 is a list o f custom s officials in Taiwan during this period. In the 1850s and 1860s, the unequal treaty system provided essential fa­ cilities for the m ajor powers to expand their commercial activities not only in coastal China, but also to Taiwan when Taiwanfu (Tainan) and Tamsui were both designated as treaty ports. Corollary to the opening o f Taiwan for foreign trade was the inundation o f Taiwanese port cities by Europeans and Americans, as well as a steady m igration o f m ainlander Chinese to the island between 1860 and 1890. Each year, over 10,000 Chinese com pradors and merchants o f various kinds, mostly from Amoy and southern Fukien, came to do business in Taiwan. In addition, the bountiful resources o f the island lured much-needed new settlers. According to an 1892 British report, more than one percent o f these m ercantile Chinese chose to stay on the island per-

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Table 3.1 Foreign Customs Officials In Taiwan, 1865-1895 Year 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895

Northern Taiwan no record no record H.Kopsch E. C.Taintor H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson W. Lay W. Lay W. Lay W. Lay W. Hancock H.J. Fisher H. J. Fisher E. Farrago E. Farrago E. Farrago J. L. Chalmers J. L. Chalmers H.Kopsch F.Hirth F.Hirth H. B. Morse H. B. Morse H. B. Morse H. B. Morse

Southern Taiwan H.J. Fisher F.W. White F.W. White A. J. Man W. Cartwright W. Cartwright no record no record J. H. Hart H. Edgar H. 0. Brown T. F. Hughes H. E. Hobson H. E. Hobson F. A. Morgan W.B. Russell A. Novion A. Novion G. C. Stent H.W. Merrill E. F. Creagh J. Mackay F.E. Woodruff A. Lay J. R. Brazier J. R. Brazier R H. S. Montgomery H. Edgar W. F. Spinney W. F. Spinney W. F. Spinney

Source: Ch’en Ruo-shui, ed., A Bibliography o f English-language Sources o f Taiwan H istory. Taipei: Lin Ben-yuan Cultural and Educational Foundation, 1995,15-16.

manently.30 To be sure, many o f these com pradors prospered by buying and selling opium , tea, sugar, indigo, and cam phor for W estern firm s.31A t Tamsui, for instance, the Kim-m o-hop firm becam e an indispensible hong (company, referred to by W esterners as “warehouse” or “factory”), through w hich the B ritish Jardine, M atheson & Co. and the Am erican Robinet Co. dispersed im ported opium to addicted islanders. Since the ow ners o f the Kim-m o-hop firm—Koa Son Jeea (father) and Koa Kin Huen (son)— also controlled the rice and sugar m arket in southern Taiwan and dom inated the cam phor and tea m arket in the north, foreign m erchants generally relied on them to purchase

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Taiwan’s local com m odities for export to Hong Kong, India, and beyond.32 A nother exam ple was the com prador Li C h’un-sheng, who grew up in poverty in Amoy but made his com m ercial fortune in Taiwan by working for John D odd’s tea-processing business in Taipei for a num ber o f years. Li eventually set up his own tea and cam phor firms and established him self as a leading Taiwanese entrepreneur.33A few other com pradors also becam e com m ercial magnates and wealthy landowners in Taiwan. They included C h’en C h’ien-fu in sugar, the Lin fam ily o f W u-fang (Lin H sien-t’ang’s im m ediate ancestors), Lin W ei-yuan (1838-1905) o f Pan-ch’iao (in Taipei County), Lin Nu-mei in Hsinchu, P’an Yun-ch’ing o f Shih-lin (in Taipei C ity), and Huang N an-ch’iu in the Hakka com m unity o f M iao-li, all o f whom made their fortunes prim ar­ ily in cam phor or tea.34 By the 1870s and 1880s, the new m aritim e powers, in particular Britain and the U nited States, would introduce the Taiwanese to a new kind o f m ercantile experience, far exceeding that o f the Spanish and the Dutch in the seventeenth century. In the m eantim e, the Presbyterians, after a 200-year hiatus, picked up the C hristian banner in Taiwan and replanted seeds o f the Church on the island. But the success o f the m ission aroused the jealousy and prejudice o f the Confucianist elite and Taoist healers, resulting in many anti-Christian riots. A lso, betw een 1850 and 1870, m ore than thirty wrecked foreign ships were beached in Taiwan. But when their cargoes were pillaged, vessels or chapels burned, shipwrecked survivors or Christian converts killed, the foreign war­ ships and m arines and aggressive diplom ats would quickly make their pres­ ence known to the Taiwanese. For the rest o f the nineteenth century, thanks to China’s bungling and m aladm inistration on the island, the m aritim e stories o f Taiwan belonged to the B ritish, Am ericans, French, and Japanese.

4 British Footprints on Taiwan Consulates, Trading Firms, and Presbyterian Churches

The English E ast India Company As early as 1632 the English East India Company had already discussed the feasibility o f setting up a trading post either in the Pescadores or at the port o f Anping (Zeelandia). By M ay 1626, however, the Spanish had already con­ structed a fort called San Salvador at Keelung H arbor and two years later built another fort called Santo Domingo at Tamsui. In the m eantim e, Jan Pietersz Coen, the Dutch em pire-builder from B atavia (in Indonesia), had claim ed Taiwan as a colony o f the N etherlands. By Septem ber 1642, the D utch forced the Spaniards to abandon all claim s to the island and established Taiwan as one o f their nineteen m ain trading centers in Asia. During these tim es, the B ritish were not welcom e to do business with their European adversaries on the island o f Taiwan. However, a group o f M ing dynasty loyalists and pirates, led by Koxinga, drove the Dutch out o f Taiwan in early 1662. Koxinga in­ tended to establish a kingdom on the island first, then use Taiwan as a base to reconquer China from the M anchus, who were already attacking China proper. A gainst this historic backdrop, the B ritish offered to trade weapons, which K oxinga’s troops desperately needed, for Taiwanese products such as sugar and deerskins. Thus, it took the B ritish nearly four decades to fulfill their desire to enter the Taiwan trade. On June 23, 1670, the East India Com pany’s one-m asted cargo vessel Pearl, escorted by the m an-of-w ar Bantam Pink, entered Anping Harbor. A ssisted by a Chinese m erchant from B atavia nam ed Succo, Ellis Crisp, the m an-of-w ar’s commander, presented to K oxinga’s son (Cheng Ching, the king o f Tung-ning, or Eastern Tranquility) a letter from the Bantam branch m anager o f the East India Company requesting perm ission to trade w ith and establish residence on Taiwan. During their seven-day stay in Taiwanfu, then the capital o f Taiwan and located ju st three m iles inland from the port o f Anping, the B ritish delegation was warmly received by the rulers o f Taiwan. W ithin less than three m onths (on Septem ber 10), the B ritish had subm itted 63

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to the Taiwanese authorities a com m ercial agreem ent whose significant ar­ ticles included the paym ent o f a 3 percent duty for incom ing cargo, freedom o f trade and residence, and protection o f B ritish nationals on the island. On their part, the rulers o f Taiwan requested that the B ritish supply them w ith m atchlocks, gunpowder, and gunsm iths.1The differences between the B ritish proposal and Koxinga fam ily's counterproposals were ultim ately ironed out and modified, and on O ctober 13,1672, a com m ercial treaty was officially signed betw een the tw o parties, launching England’s trade relations w ith the island o f Taiwan. In the meantim e, the English East India Company was also establishing a trading post in Japan and intended to use Taiwan as a transshipm ent station. For exam ple, during their initial voyage, three B ritish vessels— the Experim ent, the Return, and the Camel—sailed betw een India and Japan, making stops in Thailand, M acao, and Taiwan. The cargoes they brought from Europe and India usually included firelock m uskets, gunpowder, iron, peppers, coral, and amber, in addition to broadcloth and various kinds o f textiles, such as bow dye scarlet, green cloth, fine m orees, and perpetuanoes. En route to Japan, B rit­ ish shippers unloaded some o f these goods in Taiwan, then purchased sugar, deerskins, and other com m odities from Taiwan and sold them in Japan.2 On return trips to Europe, B ritish ships carried cargo such as alum , tea, silver, C hina roots, and Japanese copper, as well as various kinds o f silk, includ­ ing dam ask, gelong, and red and w hite brocade. Among these A sian goods, Taiwanese sugar was in great dem and in England and Iran, w hile Chinese tea and silk, as well as Japanese copper, commanded high prices in European m arkets. Because the trading route was prone to attack by pirates, these trading vessels were often escorted by men-of-war. One such arm ed vessel was the Formosa Frigate, w hich was constructed by R obert Castel in a Tham es R iver dockyard. Between 1676 and 1677, the Formosa Frigate tw ice shipped heavy loads o f weaponry and am m unition to Taiwan, then carried copper, gold, and silver off the island.3 By Novem ber 1673, when trade relations w ith Taiwan had becom e stable and the profits from trade measurably increased, the East India Company appointed Symon D elboe, assisted by an eight-m em ber staff, m anager o f its Taiwan trading house. U nfortunately for the Company, its profitable trade w ith Taiwan was soon threatened by defeats inflicted on Koxinga fam ily forces along the China coast by M anchu troops. W hen the latter took Amoy in the summer o f 1680, the East India Company decided to withdraw some o f its personnel from Taiwan. As hostilities escalated during the next three years, B ritish trade with Taiwan was also reduced substantially. W hen the ruling Cheng fam ily surrendered to M anchu forces in Septem ber 1683, agents o f the East India Company, including Thomas Angeir, Thomas Woolhouse, and Solomon Lloyd,

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who managed to continue trade with the island, attem pted to bribe the new m asters o f Taiwan. But because the British had aided Koxinga’s troops during the war, the victorious Chinese commander, Shih Lang, who was a Koxinga turncoat, ordered British properties in Taiwanfu to be confiscated and also threatened to put the Company agents on trial.4 Thanks to precautions taken by the Company in dealing with the viceroy at Canton and M anchu higherups, m ost o f the B ritish agents w ere allowed to be transferred from Taiwan to Canton. Finally, in June 1686, the Board o f the Company ordered the trading house in Taiwan to be closed.3 Som etim e in 1704 w hile trade betw een Taiwan and B ritain rem ained suspended, the island was brought to the attention o f society in London by a book entitled An H istorical and Geographical D escription o f Formosa, w rit­ ten by a m ysterious character named George Psalmanazar. The book was a wonderful account o f the unique religion, custom s, m anners, and government o f Taiwan. Even though the literary circle o f London, including Dr. Samuel Johnson, was quickly won over by the apparent accuracy and veracity o f Psalm anazar’s description o f the exotic island, the author was later exposed as an im poster, and not a Japanese Christian convert from Taiwan as he claim ed. On the other hand, it is highly possible that Psalm anazar acquired his knowledge o f the tropical island from Englishm en who had served the East India Company in Taiwan.6 In 1717 the C h’ing (M anchu) governm ent issued a prohibitory edict on m igration and trade, by w hich all Chinese sojourning abroad were ordered to return home and to pledge their allegiance to their homeland. In effect, the governm ent attem pted to close China to the outside world so as to control its population. Then, in 1757, Jam es Flint, a representative o f the English East India Company, becam e involved in a virulent trade dispute in Tientsin. As a consequence, the C h’ing court decided to lim it all European and American traders to Canton under the strict “factory system,” in which British merchants endured all kinds o f restrictions and were prohibited from further trade with Taiwan. The British Return to Ihiw an A fter enduring restrictive and prohibitive practices o f every kind for several decades, the East India Company had, by 1831, decided that it could no longer trade w ith the Chinese on their term s. Subsequently, the Company took more aggressive measures in exploring new trading possibilities in East Asia. For instance, it sent three exploratory ships to survey the South C hina Coast, as w ell as Taiwan. The Company also hired Karl F.A. G utzlaff, a Prussian mis­ sionary and linguist, as an interpreter. During his second voyage, G utzlaff

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reached W oo-teaou-keang (present-day Hai-feng H arbor south o f Lukang) in central Taiwan. Later in 1833, G utzlaff published his Taiwan exploration experiences in two volumes, confirming the island’s rich resources and trade potential. Viewing Taiwan as a convenient and desirable trading post, the East India Company actually lobbied the British governm ent to occupy the island by force and, thereafter, to grant the Company a trade monopoly there.7In the m idst o f the opium and trade disputes betw een England and China, W illiam Huttmann, a B ritish national, wrote to Foreign Secretary Lord Palm erston, pointing out China’s benign rule over Taiwan and the strategic and commercial im portance o f the island. He then suggested that a B ritish warship, with less than 1,300 troops, could not only occupy the east coast o f the island, but also spread Christianity to the natives, w hile sim ultaneously developing English trade with the island.8 D uring the Sino-British conflicts over the issue o f opium (1840-1842), British m en-of-war frequently patrolled the Taiwan Strait and the Pescadores. On August 25,1841, when the British troops broke the defense o f Amoy, Chi­ nese defenders along the coast were alarm ed and shaken. Suddenly however, a British shipwreck in northern Taiwan provided a rare chance for M andarin bravado. Between Septem ber 22 and Septem ber 26, a deadly typhoon swept across the northern coast o f Taiwan and broke the m ast o f the B ritish transport ship Nerbudda. As the damaged ship was drifting toward Keelung Harbor, the captain and a handful o f English officers managed to escape safely. However, m ost o f the crew o f274 men—tw enty-nine Europeans, five Filipinos, and 240 Indians, who were serving m ainly as deckhands and sailors— were rescued by villagers who in turn handed them over to M andarin officials. Between October 19 and October 27, the British sloop-of-war Nimrod sailed to Keelung waters and offered to pay 100 dollars for every shipwrecked survivor. But after learning that the Indians had been transferred south to Taiwanfu for incarcera­ tion, Captain Pearse ordered the bombardment o f the harbor and dem olished twenty-seven sets o f cannon before returning to Hong Kong.9 In the meantime, Taiwan’s C h’ing commanders, Ta-hung-ah and Yao Ying, who were eager to report any “victory” over the British “barbarians,” filed a disingenuous report to the Tao-kwang em peror in Peking. In their report, they claimed that as soon as the Chinese defenders saw the enemy ship approaching the harbor fortress o f Keelung on Septem ber 30, they fired guns and artillery shells. In all, their braves “killed five white barbarians, five red barbarians, twenty-two black barbarians and also captured 133 black barbarians, ten bar­ barian artilleries, and several books, maps, and docum ents.” 10 Im m ediately upon receiving these glad tidings, the em peror sent handsome rew ards to his Taiwan commanders. But in truth Ta-hung-ah and Yao Ying’s troops never engaged the British m arines at Keelung Harbor. The enem ies they claim ed

BRITISH FOOTPRINTS ON TAIWAN 67

to have slaughtered were none other than those shipwrecked Nerbudda crew­ men, plus another fifty-four shipwrecked survivors from the opium vessel A nn, w hich belonged to Jardine, M atheson & Co. Chinese docum ents reveal that the Taiwanfu m andarins had the shipwrecked sailors publicly paraded in front o f a cheering crow d before they were all executed.11 D uring the course o f negotiating the Treaty o f Nanking, the victorious English representative Sir Henry Pöttinger, assum ing the crewm en were still alive, tim e and again pressed to have the Nerbudda crew released. For their part, Ta-hung-ah and Yao Ying continued to stonew all the fate o f these pris­ oners, giving the im pression that the prisoners were still alive. But when the B ritish sloop-of-w ar Serpent sailed into Anping H arbor on O ctober 8,1842, to bring their sailors and coolies home, Captain H. N eville was told that only nine English prisoners rem ained incarcerated. On Novem ber 21,1842, Pöt­ tinger received a report on the shipw reck o f the Nerbudda and the wanton execution o f its survivors. Pöttinger, who “put diplom acy before trade and force before diplomacy,” then demanded the beheading o f the m andarins who w ere responsible for die execution o f the crew. It m ust be noted that at this tim e the B ritish flagship Queen still commanded a fleet o f some fifty ships along the China coast and could easily renew hostilities if the im perial govern­ m ent continued to cover up the truth o f the Nerbudda incident and refused to com ply w ith the B ritish dem ands. A fter a lengthy inquiry and investigation, the Chinese em peror ultim ately learned about the “false victory” report sent by his officials from Taiwan. Both Ta-hung-ah and Yao Ying w ere rem oved from their posts and, during the summer o f 1843, brought to the M inistry o f Pun­ ishm ent in B eijing for trial. A fter the trial, however, the Tao-kwang em peror was convinced that his Taiwan commanders “only com m itted exaggeration in their reports.” In fact, after serving only tw elve days in jail, both Ta-hung-ah and Yao Ying were released on order from his majesty. Two m onths later, on D ecem ber 16,1843, Ta-hung-ah was assigned to a new post at Hami in the northw estern frontier province o f Sinkiang, w hile Yao Ying received a new appointm ent in Szechuan Province.12The shrewd Pöttinger never learned o f such Chinese cunning and, as a m atter o f fact, the B ritish governm ent did not learn about the “prom otions” o f both men until John Francis D avis, the new British m inister to China, informed foreign m inister Aberdeen in a confidential report dated M arch 1 1 ,1845.13 N evertheless, as a result o f the Opium War, the B ritish m erchants were now perm itted to trade in five treaty ports— Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, Amoy, and Canton. In addition, their m en-of-w ar w ere allow ed to visit these coastal ports. Between 1844 and 1843, the B ritish ships frequently sailed be­ tw een Keelung and the Pescadores. R ear A dm iral S ir Thom as Cochrane even com m issioned a team o f surveyors and experts to collect data on Taiwan’s

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geography and topography, with some o f these findings later published by The Chinese Repository in June 1845. In O ctober 1846, G reat B ritain’s Com­ m issariat Office issued a report, which stated that Taiwan m ight be able to provide all o f the sugar and coal that the B ritish m ilitary personnel needed in the Far East. But owing to the different interpretations o f the treaties, Chinese and foreigners continued to disagree on various issues, including the visiting rights o f foreign warships and m ilitary personnel in the five treaty ports and beyond. G enerally speaking, the Chinese governm ent wished to lim it the ac­ tivities o f the British m en-of-war in Chinese w aters. B ritish officials, on the other hand, insisted that the clauses o f the treaty stipulated in the Treaty o f Nanking (1842) and the Treaty o f Bogue (1843) gave them the right to protect their com m ercial interests on the high seas and that m aritim e patrol was one o f the B ritish navy’s established practices and prerogatives. In 1847, based on this assertion, the British navy sent Lieutenant D.M. Gordon to purchase 100 piculs o f coal in the northeastern part o f Taiwan and send it to England’s M useum o f Economic Geology for testing.14 Once the Royal Geographical Society confirmed that Taiwan’s coal was superior to both Liverpool and Amoy coal (June 1848), the B ritish officials quickly recom m ended substitut­ ing Taiwan for Foochow as one o f the five treaty ports.13 Even though this suggestion was unacceptable to the Chinese government, in 1847 the B ritish Peninsula and O riental Steam Navigation Company pur­ chased 300 tons o f Taiwan coal at a price o f seven silver taels per ton. It is to be noted that at this tim e the price o f coal in London was tw ice that amount. In addition, American navy captain W. S. Ogden had also confirmed that the quality o f Keelung’s coal was equal to N ew castle’s best. Accordingly, the British persisted. Early in 1850, W. Reymond G ingell, British consul at Foochow, dem anded that Governor-General Liu Yun-ke not only rescind the ban on coal mining in the northeast part o f the island, but also perm it B ritish nationals to purchase coal there. Liu, who had jurisdiction over both Fukien and Chekiang provinces, declined to comply with their request. In his cor­ respondence with the British official, Liu cited the reason that the native Taiwanese believed in traditional geomancy (or feng-shui) and feared that digging the “dragon m ountain” might bring m isfortune to them and their de­ scendants. Thus, when the British sloop Reynard sailed into Keelung H arbor on M ay 7,1850, not a single local dealer had either the means or audacity to provide coal for the B ritish.16 N evertheless, a few Taiwanese sm ugglers, risking punishm ent and rough seas, managed to bring a small am ount o f coal to Amoy and Hong Kong for sale, and coal smuggling persisted during this tim e between Keelung and Amoy. By 1853, the price o f coal in England shot up again. Consequently, British steam ship com panies in the Far East once again paid attention to the

BRITISH FOOTPRINTS ON TAIWAN 69

Taiwan coal. A t this juncture, Dr. John Bowring, the B ritish consul at Canton, suggested that the B ritish navy ask its foreign m inistiy to negotiate a coal agreem ent with Beijing. By February 1854, the B ritish navy signed a contract with the Peninsular and O riental Steam Navigation Company as carrier for all o f the B ritish m ails in the Far E a st To carry out this m ission, the Company would need more than 38,000 tons o f coal annually to operate in Chinese w aters. As soon as the contract was signed, John Bowring, a man o f great vigor and a strong believer in free trade, was appointed governor o f Hong Kong and concurrently B ritish m inister plenipotentiary to China. Among the urgent assignm ents Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon gave Bowring were: working with the French and A m ericans in pressuring C hina to revise trea­ ties, increasing the num ber o f ports where B ritish m erchants could trade and reside, legalizing opium trade, and securing enough foreign coal for B ritish steam ships in the region. In order to accom plish these goals, Bowring was authorized to use force and coercion if necessary.17 A t this tim e, piracy and law lessness rem ained serious problem s for the Chinese governm ent in the C hina coast betw een Hong Kong and Shanghai. Because the Chinese pirates usually dared not to attack well-arm ed Europe­ ans, m andarin officials would from tim e to tim e ask the B ritish navy to deal with this menace. During his negotiations with Chinese authorities, Bowring rem inded them o f the aid British ships had given to help suppress pirates. In this regard, in Septem ber 1854, Harry S. Parités, B ritish consul at Amoy, tw ice offered m ilitary assistance to suppress rebels in Fukien’s Changpoo— a notorious haunt o f pirates—-on the condition that the governor-general perm it Englishm en to extract coal on Taiw an.18Though Parkes, later B ritish m inister in Japan and China, failed to obtain a clear-cut response from Chinese officials, he realized that the m andarins on the island did not em phatically enforce the m ining ban. In his “R eport on the coal m ines o f Killing in Form osa,” dated Novem ber 25,1854, Parkes stated that the B ritish could easily obtain 100 to 200 tons o f Keelung coal every week. And if there was no interference from the local m andarins, the B ritish shippers could haul away some 1,000 tons o f the finest coal in the w orld w ithin a few w eeks.19 W hile Parkes continued, unsuccessfully, to negotiate w ith Fukien authori­ ties on the issue o f the Taiwan coal, A m ericans got an entirely different re­ sponse from the mandarins on the island. W hen the USS M acedonian called at Keelung in July 1854, the Chinese m arine m agistrate Li Chih-ou asked Captain Joel A bbott to help him suppress insurrections and to protect his port against pirates. In return, Li offered A bbott coal and other gifts as com pensation, but the Am erican captain refused the Chinese request. A month later, m andarins at Tamsui offered another Am erican, C aptain M onice, $3,000 to sail his ship the Zyphr into the harbor so that he could help them defeat the pirates who

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were ravaging northern Taiwan.20Captain M otrice likew ise declined their of­ fer. D espite these rejections, by June 1855 Am erican m erchants had obtained perm ission from the Taiwanfu taotai (circuit intendant) Yu T ’uo to trade at the port o f Kaohsiung. Learning that piracy rem ained a deadly problem for shippers, Am erican m en-of-w ar started escorting their com m ercial vessels and also occasionally purchasing Taiwan coal. In view o f the long-festering problem s o f piracy, the m andarins on the island did not object to such prac­ tices.21 Thus, for all practical purposes, by 1856 the m ining ban in Taiwan had becom e a dead letter because foreign merchants had started trading with the islanders, with or w ithout im perial perm ission. In fact, for the next four decades, Keelung coal was to become one o f the m ost popular com m odities exported from Taiwan. Beginning in 1858, the B ritish consulate in Foochow regularly hired two transport ships to haul Taiwan coal for British warships and steam ers. During the late spring o f the same year, the B ritish m an-of-war Inflexible arrived at Keelung. Its m etallurgical engineers not only reconfirmed the high quality o f Keelung coal, but also discovered that the coal there could be made into gas. It was against this background that the B ritish insisted that all the island’s ports be opened for foreign trade.22 The B ritish navy had another reason for wanting to set up a station on this bountiful but defenseless island—providing rescue and shelter for English shipw recked survivors, such as the unfortunate crews o f the Nerbudda and the Ann. D uring the monsoon period, betw een June and October, the ex­ traordinarily heavy sw ells created by violent typhoons lash the entire Taiwan coast and often play havoc w ith shipping. It is believed that betw een 1844 and 1851, a total o f five B ritish vessels— including the Nym ph, the Kelpie, the Antelope, and the Sarah Trotman— were shipwrecked and w ent down in Taiwan w aters. But the tragedy that drew B ritish attention to the island was the fate o f the shipwrecked Larpent. In Septem ber 1850, on its trading route from Hong Kong to Shanghai, this cargo vessel hit a shallow reef in southern Taiwan. Twenty-three o f its crew members w ere slaughtered by the natives w hile three surviving sailors were sold into slavery.23 Two other distressed B ritish ships—the Bintang and the Gitana— sought shelter from storm s in the Pescadores in Septem ber 1850 and O ctober 1852, respectively. Rumors had it that after the natives picked up the B ritish sailors, they first plundered their cargo and then abused them and forced them to w ork in sulphur m ines, among other m istreatm ents. A nother case was the M ary M ackertoom, which set sail from Singapore in the late summer o f 1857, but was swept by storm s to the northw estern coast o f Taiwan. Thousands o f villagers cam e on board the vessel and quickly looted anything o f value.24 To counter such law lessness and to ascertain that there w ere no English subjects stranded on the island, B ritish naval vessels occasionally conducted

BRITISH FOOTPRINTS ON TAIWAN 71

searches for survivors. For example, in June 1851, the Salamander carried out a search m ission at the tip o f the South Cape for more than ten days. During the summer o f 1858, the Inflexible posted hundreds o f rew ard notices in Taiwanfii and other major towns. Accompanied by Robert Swinhoe, an interpreter, armed British m arines searched for survivors at South Slope (present-day P’ing-tung County), then moved over to the east coast o f the island. They also checked the Keelung coal mines, the sulphur mines in Tamsui, the w est-coast port towns o f W u-hsi (pronounced G o-ch’e in Taiwanese but rom anized as Go-chea by foreigners, now part o f Taichung H arbor), and Kuo-sai (presentday Chi-ku, located north o f Anping), before returning to Amoy.23 On M arch 14,1860, the British sloop Acorn and gunboat Opossum sailed into Tamsui Harbor, demanding that local m andarins, who had failed to stop the looting of the distressed B ritish m erchant ship Eena, com pensate the ship ow ner w ith a sum o f 12,000 silver taels. A fter several rounds o f negotiation and the threat o f force, the Tamsui officials ultim ately relented and coughed up 4,000 silver taels to put the issue to rest.26 It is interesting to note that w henever foreign diplom ats demanded that the Chinese governm ent take measures to protect shipwrecked sailors, the m andarins in Taiwan always tried to absolve them selves o f the responsibility by claim ing that the people responsible for harming foreigners were either bandits or aborigines who were beyond Chinese jurisdiction. However, when foreigners requested perm ission to m ine for Taiwan coal, to survey Taiw an's coastlines and harbors, or to trade with the islanders, the mandarins consis­ tently refused such requests by insisting that Taiwan belonged to China and that foreigners were not allowed to engage in any unauthorized activities w ithout im perial approval. Such an ambiguous position made it clear that there was really no effective governance on the island and that foreign pow­ ers could probably take Taiwan away from China with little effort. W hile China rem ained stagnant and im potent, England's industrialized economy and m ercantile policy were inspiring and pushing its venturesome citizens to find w hatever raw m aterials and m arkets they could exploit. The island o f Taiwan proved to be an ideal place for this endeavor. Taiwan Opened for Foreign D a d e Taiwan was officially open to foreign trade after the Treaty o f Tientsin was signed on June 18, 1858. But in 1851, a Portuguese lorcha (a vessel used on the C hina coast in this period that combined a European hull with Chinese rigging) was reportedly hauling goods to the port o f Anping in Taiwanfu, while seven British vessels were transporting sugar and rice between Taiwan’s northern ports and Foochow. Because vigilant pirates of all kinds were lurking

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between Taiwan and the m ainland to ambush governm ent transport junks, Chinese officials were often forced to hire foreign naval vessels as escorts. In 1854, a ship owned by D ent & Co. in Hong Kong brought opium to Tamsui in exchange for Taiwan’s camphor, and the Tamsui officials did not raise any fuss. In fact, as long as the mandarins acquiesced in such ’Illegal” trading activities, foreign merchants began to believe that the government trading ban in Taiwan, like so many other im perial edicts and proclam ations, was mere fiction. Consequently, British officials, including Hong Kong governor John Bowring and Amoy consul Harry Parkes, openly supported British m erchant activities in Taiwan. For instance, near the end o f 1854, the British survey ship Saracen, captained by John Richard, investigated the nautical features o f Taiwan, creating maps and charts for safer navigation. Richard paid par­ ticular attention to Kaohsiung and Kuo-sai and believed the fo rm » would develop into an im portant entrepot for the island.27 In the meantime, Jardine, M atheson & Co. sent its agent Thomas Vincent to investigate Taiwan’s m arket conditions. On July 2 ,1855, Vincent’s schooner, carrying opium, arrived at W u-hsi. On its return voyage, the ship carried a quantity o f rice and cam phor that Vincent had purchased. By 1856, an ever-increasing number of foreign shippers frequented Taiwan’s coastal towns. Records from die British foreign office show that a total o f twelve English vessels loaded goods in Taiwan before sailing for Amoy, and eleven ships sailed from Amoy to Taiwan, all in ballast The port o f Kaohsiung alone reported between forty and forty-five foreign ships—including British, Ameri­ can, Chilean, Dutch, German, and Peruvian—calling there to trade. Foreign merchants usually sold opium and porcelainware to the islanders and hauled away rice, sugar, camphor, and tobacco in large quantities. British trade with Taiwan continued to increase during the next year as twenty ships flying the Union Jack sailed from the island to Amoy, all loaded with Taiwanese goods, while twenty-four ships entered Taiwan ports, all in ballast except one.28By the mid-1850s it was clear that maritime nations other than G reat Britain wished to trade with Taiwan. Accordingly, among the instructions Lord Elgin received when he led the British fleet to Tientsin in 1858 was to legalize British trade with the island, which had been carried out “illegally” for several years. Since illegality usually induced irregularities, single-m ast ships entering Kaohsiung were required to pay 50 silver taels for port service fee in 1855, but this was raised to 100 taels in 1860. At the same tim e, new tariffs were imposed on imported opium (at 20 taels per chest), medicine (at 80 taels on each box), and other goods. Finally, by virtue o f Article 14 o f the Treaty o f Tientsin and also a clause in the m ost-favored-nation agreement, Britain, die United States, France, Russia, and other European countries were all entitled to open consul­ ates in Taiwan and to engage in legal trade with the islanders.

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73

Figure 4.1 Nautical Chart of Coastal Taiwan, 1850a

In 1860, when China lay open to W estern economic and evangelical ex­ ploitation, the British governm ent wasted no tim e in appointing the botanist Robert Swinhoe as its first vice consul to Taiwan. Prior to his appointm ent to this post, Swinhoe had twice visited Taiwan (in 1856 and 1858) to investigate the m arket potential o f cam phor and coal and also published an article about the general conditions o f the island in the journal o f the Royal A siatic Society (1859). Swinhoe first chose Tamsui to be the site o f the British consulate, but soon, because he discovered that trade volume in southern Taiwan was twice that in the north, moved his office (then on the Jardine, M atheson & Co. ship Adventurer) to Taiwanfii, the capital o f Taiwan. On July 6, 1861, Swinhoe boarded the warship Cockchafer at Amoy and in no tim e raised the Union Jack over the city o f Taiwanfii, which was surrounded by a wall about five miles in circum ference. And in mid-December o f the same year, another British man-of-war, the Hardy, escorted Swinhoe to set up England’s first consulate at Tamsui. A t this juncture, the governments of Denmark and Germany asked Swinhoe to represent their interests on the island, as B ritish

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diplom atic leadership was param ount in the Taiwan trade. But the port o f Anping, through which English vessels brought cargo in and out o f Taiwanfu, was narrow and shallow and therefore not suitable for the bustling trade to come. Therefore, on Novem ber 7, 1864, the B ritish vice consul decided to move the consulate to Kaohsiung. In the meantime, he placed Thomas W atters and W illiam Gregory in charge o f B ritish consular and com m ercial affairs at Taiwanfu and Tamsui respectively.29 A t this point, the m ain task o f the British consulate was to advance the commercial interests o f two Hong K ong-based British firms, namely, Jardine, M atheson & Co. and its Scottish rival Dent & Co. Beginning in 1858, both o f these firms had bought large quantities o f Taiwan cam phor and transported it on their own ships to the Hong Kong market. These so-called “agency houses” not only engaged in trade them selves but also acted as banker, bill broker, ship owner, freighter, insurance agent, and purveyor, all rolled into one. U ntil they were established at Tamsui, with agents and shroffs (moneychangers) residing ashore in 1862, their ships, at anchor in the harbor also functioned as the com­ pany offices. And when Jardine & M atheson lent its vessel Pathfinder to the British vice consul at Tamsui, Dent also lent its Tem ate to the B ritish officials at Kaohsiung. It was against this backdrop that the Custom s House o f Tamsui was erected three years later and custom s branches were set up in Taiwanfu, Kaohsiung, and Keelung. An Englishm an named John W illiam Howell was appointed com m issioner o f custom s to issue port clearance and collect mod­ est duties on opium im ports to Taiwan, as well as to facilitate foreign trade with the islanders. Vessels trading with other ports were required to proceed to Tamsui to have their cargo assessed before they could sail to Kaohsiung or Keelung to offload. Although m ast dues and fixed tariffs on articles that could be im ported and exported legally had been drawn up, foreign m erchants were frustrated by governm ent red tape, mandarin irregularities, and w orst o f all, periodic em bargoes declared by Taiwan’s taotai. A ccording to the Treaty o f Tientsin, only a diplom at with the rank o f con­ sul could conduct business with the taotai, whereas a vice consul could only deal directly with a county m agistrate. Until he was prom oted to the rank o f a consul in 1865, Robert Swinhoe, being a British vice consul, found it very difficult to make an appointm ent with the island’s highest authority— the Taiwan taotai, who often sidestepped B ritish requests by referring them to his m agistrate.30 Swinhoe’s successors, including Thom as W atters and Charles C arroll, experienced sim ilar frustrations. It sometimes required the threat o f attack by w arships and the personal diplomacy o f the British resident m inister in Beijing to resolve longstanding issues. A case in point was the rice embargo established in 1866 by the Taiwan taotai, Ting Jih-chien. Only after M inister Rutherford A lcock’s visit to Taiwan and his intense personal diplom acy with

BRITISH FOOTPRINTS ON TAIWAN 75

the B eijing authorities did Ting agree to allow B ritish ships to carry rice off the island. The disputes over die cam phor monopoly involved the threat o f gunboats as well as A lcock’s repeated negotiations with Prince Kung before the m onopoly was finally lifted.31 The Com ing o f the B ritish Presbyterian M issionaries Protected by a web o f treaty rights, foreign m issionaries, like their m ercantile countrymen, becam e m ore aggressive in proselytizing C hristianity in Taiwan. In the fall o f 1860, English Presbyterian pastors C arstairs Douglas and H. L. M ackenzie cam e to Tamsui and Taipei to spread the C alvinist Protestant gospel in the southern Fukien d ialect Based upon the positive reports o f Douglas and M ackenzie, the Foreign M ission Society in London authorized a Taiwan m issionary outreach. Four years later, Scotsm an Jam es Laidlaw M ax­ w ell, who was w illing to devote him self to the study o f the southern Fukien dialect, established a Bible school at Taiwanfu. M axwell studied m edicine and took his degree at Edinburgh University. He was an elder in the Broad Street Presbyterian Church in Birm ingham before being sent to Taiwan by the Presbyterian Church o f England. A ssisted by Douglas A. W ylie and three Taiwanese, M axwell quickly handed out 300 translations o f the Bible on the streets o f Taiwanfu, w hich had a population o f about 70,000. On June 16, 1865— the date now celebrated by Taiwan’s Presbyterians as the anniversary o f the founding o f their church on the island—the m issionaries took posses­ sion o f a dilapidated building outside the w estern wall o f the city and had it rem odeled as a chapel and m edical clinic. Because o f their success in curing fever-related and ophthalm ic diseases, xenophobic elem ents, particularly the Confucian literati class and Taoist priests, spread vicious rum ors that M axwell cut out human hearts, brains, and eyes to enhance the taste o f opium so that he could use such “m agical drugs” to induce conversions. On July 9, a boister­ ous crow d gathered in front o f M axw ell’s chapel, threw rocks, and dem anded the w ithdraw al o f his m ission. Four days later (July 13), M axwell was forced to withdraw to a rem ote sandy island called C hi-tsin off Kaohsiung H arbor where he resum ed his labors o f preaching and healing.32 W hen Charles Carroll took charge o f the B ritish consulate in Kaohsiung, he arranged for Dr. M axwell to visit several southern towns, looking for ideal com m unities in which he m ight establish congregations. M axwell carried on his m edical practice w ith em inent success as a means o f converting Taiwan­ ese and aborigines. In 1867, M axwell established his second chapel-clinic at the village o f Pei-tao in Fengshan County, but in less than ten days local inhabitants had ransacked his station and taken all the pews and Christian fixtures, including crucifixes, away. Worse still, his associates were threatened

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on all sides. For exam ple, during the spring o f 1868 a law suit was brought against M axw ell’s associates, accusing them o f practicing w itchcraft and o f dispensing drugs and am ulets to women at Communion and baptizing them on the Sabbath with poisoned holy water. O ther parishioners w ere either ostracized or beaten. One Christian convert named Chuang Ching-feng was killed. W hen the conflicts betw een the tradition-oriented inhabitants and the Christian converts becam e unm anageable, the antagonistic local authorities ordered the chapel closed or dem olished. B ritish authorities, for their part, always dispatched warships and troops to protect their missionaries when antiChristian harassm ent or violence escalated and the m andarins failed in their halfhearted attem pts to apprehend and punish rioters. Dr. M axwell persisted against these challenging conditions and patiently laid the foundations for the Presbyterian Church o f Taiwan.33 W hile in Taiwan, M axwell also served as chaplain and doctor to the sm all foreign community. Among the B ritish adventurers in Taiwan was a young tidew aiter (custom s official who guards against smuggling) named W illiam A. Pickering. Pickering spoke the Taiwanese dialect and had cultivated ac­ quaintances among both Taiwanese and aborigines. He often accom panied Dr. M axwell to rem ote m ountainous villages in southern Taiwan, first to heal, then to convert the unsubdued aborigines. In 1867, Pickering was lured away from his custom s post to work for M cPhail Brothers, w hich was later restruc­ tured as Elies & Co. Pickering becam e a legendary figure in Taiwan, often found in the thick o f m ajor events such as the so-called “cam phor war,” and Am erican shipwreck rescue efforts. Pickering left Taiwan in 1870, but later in life he published Pioneering in Formosa ( 1898), a personal rem iniscence that provided invaluable insights into the conditions o f die mid-nineteenth-century Taiwan. Pickering represented the arrogance, aggression, and im patience o f W esterners, who clashed w ith a class o f corrupt, inefficient, and equally ar­ rogant m andarins on the rem ote island in the W estern Pacific. Dr. M axw ell soon received additional support from his hom e church. In June 1869, he left Reverend Hugh Richie and his wife in chaige o f the expanding Kaohsiung mission so that he could return to Taiwanfu to rees­ tablish a dispensary and clinic for his congregation there. In 1870, more than 2,000 natives— mostly illiterate, low-income Taiwanese, as well as Pepohoan aborigines— sought medical treatm ent at his clinics in both Taiwanfu and Kao­ hsiung. Then in D ecem ber 1871 the energetic Reverend W illiam Cam pbell, who would spend a half century evangelizing throughout the island, arrived. Reverend Cam pbell journeyed northw ard to C hiayi and preached among purely Chinese com m unities, instead o f working in Pepohoan villages, which were Dr. M axw ell’s m ain focus. Cam pbell stayed in Taiwan for forty-six years (1871-1917), preaching the gospel, editing a dictionary, and collecting

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ethnographical specim ens and cultural artifacts. As a consequence, by the tim e M axwell retired to London in 1885, thirty-five Presbyterian stations, from the m ountainous rem ote villages to the coastal towns, were served by two B ritish m issionary societies.34 Both o f M axw ell’s sons, Jam es Preston and Jam es Laidlaw M axwell Jr., also became medical m issionaries, with the latter serving in the Tainan hospital from 1900 to 1923. W hile the Presbyterian Church o f England w as m aking headw ay in spreading the Gospel in southern Taiwan, the Canadian Presbyterian Church, through the adm irable service o f George Lesley M ackay, was doing the same in northern Taiwan. A native o f Oxford, O ntario, and a graduate o f Princeton Theological Seminary, M ackay worked briefly w ith the Richies and M axwell in the south but then decided to blaze his own trail in Tamsui. He arrived at this port town o f about 5,000 “heathens” on M arch 9, 1872, and began his m issionary work under the most difficult circum stances. M ackay rem ained until his death in 1901. He was despised and severely persecuted by both the m andarins and the natives among whom he dwelled. A fter laboring for a year, he could count only tw enty “inquirers” attending his Sunday services. But Mackay, who was also a dentist and surgeon, persevered, and with his untiring energy, enthusiastic disposition, and his skills in advanced W estern m edicine, gradually becam e a trusted friend and spiritual counselor o f a great num ber o f people. By 1882 the Canadian m ission had established tw enty chapels, each w ith a Taiwanese preacher and each attended by over 300 parishioners in full communion with Presbyterian theology.33 M ackay’s evangelical experience in northern Taiwan was not unlike that o f the British m issionaries in the south. He was personally abused, his chapels attacked, and his converts brutalized. For exam ple, on November 15,1875, his chapel in H sin-tien (a village now integrated into Taipei C ity) was burned; on June 5 ,1 8 7 6 , his church in Nankang (also in Taipei, near the site o f the present-day Academ ia Sinica) was dam aged and his Nankang parishioners attacked by a mob o f over 1,000 natives; on D ecem ber 12,1877, a legal dis­ pute over the rental o f a M ankah building, which M ackay had converted into a clinic-chapel, aroused an angry mob o f 200 townspeople who destroyed the building.36 During the month o f O ctober 1884, when French w arships block­ aded the Tamsui River, seven churches in Tamsui D istrict were ransacked and severely damaged. As was their practice, British diplomats, with some success, dem anded com pensation on behalf o f their Canadian cousins. In particular, the persistent, uncom prom ising, and m eticulous Alexander Frater, the B ritish vice consul at Tamsui, rendered this valuable service to the Canadian m is­ sionaries in northern Taiwan. As a consequence, General Liu M ing-ch’uan, the new governor o f Taiwan, ordered the preservation o f every chapel with a roof at least twenty m eters high and paid a sum o f 10,00 silver taels for the

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repair and reconstruction o f the chapels, which had been damaged during the Sino-French war.37 In addition to m issionaries, a num ber o f British scientists also cam e to Taiwan to conduct research. It is widely recognized that Taiwan was a para­ dise for botanists, entom ologists, animal scientists, and ethnologists. Robert Swinhoe, for exam ple, studied innum erable rare and beautiful plants as well as many species o f beasts and birds, one o f which was given the name “Swinhoe’s Blue Fowl.” Thanks to subsequent field studies conducted by B ritish botanists such as H. J. Allen, Augustine Henry, and W illiam Hancock, the Kew Park Botanic Gardens and British M useum o f Natural H istory have in their collections many rare species from the tropical island. In 1866, assisted by British consulate interpreter Thomas Lowden Bullock, Cuthbert Collingwood, a well-known Oxford U niversity botanist, made a field trip to Tamsui and Suao Bay on the northeast coast o f Taiwan. In 1867, Tamsui custom s officer and geographer Henry Kopsch surveyed the rivers o f northern Taiwan and made keen observations on Taiwan’s riverboats and fisheries.38In A pril 1871, John Thom son, accom panied by Dr. Jam es L. M axwell, conducted a short scientific tour in southern Taiwan. In order to docum ent the natural geography o f Taiwan and its inhabitants at that particular tim e, Thom son took a total o f sixty pictures during his short visit to the island. In this way, Thom son was able to record Taiwan’s ecological environm ent, species o f unique animals, the people, and the island’s econom ic potential. He even drew a chart for the study o f the language o f an aboriginal tribe.39W ith the assistance o f Thomas Bullock and W illiam Cam pbell, Joseph B. Steere, a British national who taught anthropology at the U niversity o f M ichigan, spent the first six months o f 1874 studying at least five different aboriginal tribes in the mountain region o f central Taiwan. During the 1860s and 1870s, custom s officer George Taylor and medical doctor Patrick M anson conducted research in their respective fields o f Taiwan’s m ultiple ethnicity and tropical diseases.40 Taiwan’s Com m odities A ttract English Traders As trade increased, more and m ore W estern ships visited the island; unfortu­ nately, many were also wrecked along the island’s coast. From 1861 to 1867, a total o f tw enty-eight foreign ships— including four American and ten B rit­ ish vessels— sank in Taiwan’s territorial waters. A fter the com pletion o f the Suez Canal in 1869, the tim e required to sail from Europe to the Far East was substantially reduced. Accordingly, an increased num ber o f European ships sailed to China, Taiwan, and Japan, and as a consequence, from 1869 to 1874, another twenty foreign ships, all but four flying the Union Jack, were either wrecked, stranded, or lost on or near the Taiwan coast.41 Foreign ships that

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crisscrossed the Taiwan Strait generally weighed between 100 and 300 tons; occasionally, 600-ton ships called at Keelung. Because G reat B ritain was the only country with a consulate in Taiwan, British diplom ats were often called on to assist shipwrecked m ariners. Once again, C h’ing m andarins and B ritish officials clashed on the ways and means o f conducting these rescue efforts. By the 1860s and 1870s, the mandarins generally treated shipwreck victims more humanely, but wrecked vessels continued to be plundered and foreign property stolen. British vice consul Robert Swinhoe routinely demanded that the mandarins compensate the British shippers, but such demands were always quickly dism issed by local authorities. Ultimately, the British government de­ cided that the best way to protect their shipwrecked seamen and vessels from abuse was to send m en-of-war to patrol Taiwan’s coasts and visit her ports each month. Ideally, such patrol warships were also staffed with com petent interpreters so that they could effectively aid m ariners in distress. One vessel that carried out periodic patrols was the HMS Dwarf, captained by Bonham Ward Bax. During 1871-1874, the ship not only regularly visited the ports o f Taiwan, standing by to rescue shipwrecked m ariners, but also providing escort for English missionaries traveling to hostile areas. By the presence of his warship and displaying superior force, Captain Bax kept the ruling authorities in line while intim idating xenophobic brigands. Indeed, the monthly patrol o f the British warships not only bolstered the confidence o f English missionaries, but also helped to calm the nerves o f Taiwan’s Christianized natives.42 N ot to belittle the dogged efforts o f and hardships endured by the many Protestant m issionaries, the success o f the English and Canadian missions in Taiwan, to some extent, should be attributed to the unfailing support rendered by British diplom ats, w arships, as w ell as wealthy English merchants. A case in point was the 103 English pounds that Donald M atheson o f the Tait & Co. in Tamsui gave to the Reverend George L. M ackay so that the latter could recruit a Canadian medical doctor to help him spread the Word in Taiwan.43 M ost o f the English com panies in Taiwan im ported opium, textiles, gunpow­ der, and saltpeter and bought Taiwanese camphor, tea, sugar, silver, sulphur, and rice. During the 1868-1895 period, tea, sugar, and cam phor constituted 94 percent o f Taiwan’s exported goods. One foreign firm dom inated nineteenth-century Taiwan trade: Jardine, M atheson & Co., headquartered in Hong Kong. Even before trade with Tai­ wan was legalized, Jardine had brought large quantities o f Bengali opium to the island. The rounded Benares and the cakelike Patna brands commanded the highest prices on the island. In 1868, for example, the price o f the New Benares was priced between $760 and $800 a chest. In addition, opium could also be used to barter for Taiwan’s coal and other commodities. In 1868, for instance, a chest o f New Benares was priced at $860 when it was used to

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purchase Keelung coal. On the other hand, five chests o f the Old Benares could be bartered for several thousand dollars worth o f peanut oil.44 Jardine, M atheson & Co. also brought to the islanders various kinds o f textile goods, including cloth for making gray and white shirts, brocades, turkey reds, as well as some English cam lets and Scottish long ells. Statistics between 1865 and 1870 show a steady increase o f textile im ports, from a total o f 5,921 items in 1865 to 9,202 in 1866; 17,533 (1867); 24,065 (1868); 32,251 (1869); and to 38,100 item s in 1870. O f these im ported item s, the 8.6 pounds o f gray shirting, which could be sold for $3.10 per piece or used to barter for tea or cam phor in 1870, was the m ost popular among the islanders.43 In its early trade with the islanders, Jardine, M atheson & Co. engaged in what the B ritish called the “supercargo or captain“ operation. Between 1855 and 1859, Thom as Vincent and A lexander M orrison served as ship captains and purchase agents for the company. A Jardine ship brought cargo into a Taiwan port and its captain was authorized to trade with the natives, usually through a comprador. For instance, on June 11, 1859, Captain M orrison o f the Celestial brought over fifteen chests o f Old Benares opium to Kaohsiung and quickly disposed eight chests at $880 per chest. M orrison w rote the company that he kept the rem ainder with prospects o f selling them at a higher price.46 A fter 1860, Jardine decided to send its own business agents and ac­ countants to the island and established its own warehouses and offices at the four legally designated ports—Tamsui, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Taiwanfu. From January 1860 until June 25, 1864, Sullivan and M orrison took turns as Jardine’s business agents in charge o f Tamsui and northern Taiwan. Glo Rorie, on the other hand, supervised the com pany’s trade in Kaohsiung and southern Taiwan from A pril 14, 1860, until his departure on June 19,1863. Captain A lfred Roper then succeeded M orrison at Tamsui until Septem ber 11,1865. Thereafter, Jardine, M atheson & Co. delegated foreign m erchants, such as Jam es M ilisch (a native o f Prussia) and the John Dodd o f Scotland, to function as its agents on the island. Jardine’s ships also visited Taiwan’s sm aller ports, such as W u-hsi, Hsiangshan (part o f present-day Hsinchu City), Huo-lung, Tung-kang, and Suao, to “illegally’’ purchase and haul goods. Because British commercial ships were generally arm ed with cannon and guns, neither the C h’ing navy nor pirates dared to interfere with their trading activities. Jardine’s agents in Taiwan were paid $250 monthly, plus an annual bonus between $200 and $800. In addition, the company paid its agents a free round-trip fare to Amoy or Hong Kong every year and a round-trip ticket to Europe every five years. Jardine’s mail ship arrived once every three weeks so that foreign merchants and their families on the island could replenish their household necessities, such as cloth­ ing, shoes, paper, m atches, wine, sweets, and fresh foods. She also brought

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Table 4.1 The Relative Importance of Talwan’a Four Major Porta Port Kaohsiung Taiwanfu Tamsui Keelung

Time Span 1856-1881 1860-1901 1860-1898 1864-1881

General Correspondence 209 56 941 64

Private Letters 8 14 12 1

old newspapers, including the London and China Express, Hong Kong D aily Press, Friend o f China, and China M ail.47 Jardine, M atheson & Co. considered Taiwan and C hina as separate cat­ egories; accordingly, the com pany’s Form osa File (which was donated to Cam bridge U niversity Library M anuscript Room) contains not only sea cap­ tains’ reports o f weather, ships’ conditions, arrivals, departures, difficulty o f the m ails, prices, and m arket conditions, but also receipts, notes, summaries, ledgers, cash books, journals, accounts, invoices, and loose papers o f various kinds prepared by its business agents. The historian George W illiam s Car­ rington created the above table (Table 4.1 ) to illustrate the relative im portance o f Taiwan’s four m ajor ports.48 Clearly, Keelung, a subtreaty port, was the least im portant as far as Jardine, M atheson & Co. was concerned. Taiwanfu was also a lesser concern and, while Kaohsiung was the firm ’s earliest interest, Tamsui ultim ately became the vital port for Jaidine’s business. In addition, Jardine readjusted its op­ eration according to new m arket conditions, changing from “supercargo” to “agents” and again to “agencies,” indicating its com m ercial savvy. Certainly, inducing the islanders to smoke opium had blackened Jardine’s reputation, but the com pany literally put Taiwan on the w orld’s trading map. M oreover, its innovative m anagem ent helped Taiwan to upgrade the quality o f tea, brought the island into the age o f the steam ship, and improved Taiwan’s transportation and communication infrastructure. It was Jardine that made Taiwan an integral part o f the m aritim e trading w orld and laid the foundation for the island to enter the m odem w orld earlier than m ost other Asian nations. Britain E stablishes C onsulates in Taiwan Since diplomacy was to serve the interest o f trade, in 1867 G reat Britain signed a “perm anent lease” o f the Tamsui fort from China’s im perial governm ent and established a consulate there in 1878. Though Germany and the N etherlands both sent consular personnel to Taiwan, die B ritish Consulate in Tamsui

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represented all other European and Am erican countries on the island. Thus, whenever there was a trade dispute the British consulate was always involved, and when and if the disputes developed into altercations, loss o f properties, or threats, w arships flying the Union Jack were alw ays called in as the final arbiters. In a nutshell, diplom atic relations between Taiwan and Britain during the second half o f the nineteenth century dealt prim arily with trade disputes and anti-C hristian crises. That was why several British m inisters accredited to China, such as Rutherford A lcock and S ir Thom as F. W ade, requested their governm ent to keep a gunboat stationed off Taiwan at all tim es. Indeed, during the second half o f the nineteenth century, British authorities regularly sent armed expeditions to Kaohsiung Harbor, to wit: the sloop Scylla (in D ecem ber 1865), the Janus (A pril 1868), the Icarus (Septem ber 1868), and the Persons (D ecem ber 1868). They utilized these w arships to intim idate local officials and also to pressure the Chinese governm ent to dism iss offend­ ing m andarin officials on Taiwan. The mere presence o f B ritish w arships in Taiwan’s territorial w aters generally gave B ritish firms the upper hand dur­ ing business transactions and in settling grievances w ith Taiwanese dealers. A rchival docum ents indicate that agents o f the B ritish firms frequently relied on their w arships to obtain receipts from Taiwanese by force and to collect m onies owed B ritish nationals. In the 1860s and 1870s there were too many com m ercial disputes and church-related riots to recount here in detail, but some notable exam ples should suffice to illustrate the nature o f the BritishTaiwanese relationship in those years. In 1862, arm ed Indian sailors from the B ritish schooner Vindex landed in Tamsui to disperse a crow d that opposed the construction by D ent & Co. o f the first foreign house in the port town. During the same year, the B ritish war­ ships Snap and Snake were deployed to Tamsui to resolve a dispute between Jardine’s agent Thom as Sullivan and a Taiwanese cam phor m erchant named Huang L u-t’ou.49 In M ay 1863, when the m anager o f D ent & Co. (a Mr. Rainbow) was injured by Tamsui’s dockyard workers during a labor dispute, the British vice consul George C.P. Braune w asted no tim e in requesting the British gunboat Staunch, which was on port call at Tamsui, to postpone its return to Foochow so that that ship could help D ent & Co. deal with the rowdy longshorem en.30On January 13,1865, the B ritish gunboat Bustard sailed into Tamsui to silence villagers who opposed the rem oval o f the trees and bush surrounding the m ilitary ram parts o f the Tamsui fort. In the summer o f 1866, when Taiwan taotai Ting Jih-chien declared a rice embargo, the British diplo­ m at Thomas W atters retained the service o f the warship Grasshopper to escort two M cPhail & Co. cargo ships to “illegally” transport rice out o f Kaohsiung H arbor w ithout going through custom s inspection.31 Even a m inor dispute could trigger British m ilitary intervention: in 1866, a B ritish lieutenant named

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Luard used his gunboat Harvoc to help his servant gain the upper hand in a sedan-chair fare dispute in Keelung. Luard later burned two houses in Tamsui because the owners allegedly plundered goods from the wrecked D utch ship Bintang Anam .52 In 1868, thanks to the presence o f the British warship Janus at the Tamsui port, the widow o f a rich Taiwanese cam phor merchant was forced to com pensate Dodd & Co. with a sum o f 4,800 silver taels.53 B ritish disputes over the taotai’s monopoly o f the cam phor trade w ere also num erous and frequently led to hostilities, which W illiam A. Pickering, who was then em ployed by Elies & Co., characterized as the “cam phor w ars.” Pickering was only twenty-two when he first joined the China Im perial Cus­ tom s Service in Foochow in 1862. He was one o f a few Europeans who could speak a fair jum ble o f pidgin M andarin as well as im perfect Taiwanese dialect. During his sojourn in Taiwan (1863-1870), Pickering was very much involved in Taiwan’s cam phor wars. By the late 1860s, the situation grew worse mainly because local authorities had no real control over cam phor sm ugglers, who opted to trade w ith foreigners for higher profits and easier transactions. Taiwan’s coastal towns, such as Lukang, W u-hsi, and H siang-shan, becam e popular trading posts for B ritish m erchants and Taiwanese cam phor dealers. In order to m aintain their prestige vis-à-vis local m andarins, the B ritish tim e and again deployed m en-of-war to protect the interests o f their m erchants and m issionaries. For instance, during a cam phor dispute in July 1868 J.D. Hardie, the agent o f Tait & Co., was beaten by Fengshan County security guards. To retaliate, the B ritish utilized their gunboats the HMS Algerine, Bustard, and Pearl to occupy Anping port, the key to the capital o f Taiwan, for nearly two m onths, from Novem ber 21,1868, until January 18, 1869.54 During this oc­ cupation, Lieutenant T. Philip Gurdon, captain o f the Algerine, ordered the bom bardm ent o f Anping at least seven tim es. Gurdon then consulted w ith Vice Consul John Gibson, the Reverend Jam es L. M axwell, C aptain Cecil Johnson o f the Bustard, as well as representatives o f B ritish trading firms, to m ap out a strategy to deal with the Taiwan taotai Liang Yuan-kuei. W ith Anping in their possession, the B ritish dem anded and received “indem nity money” o f 10,000 taels o f silver from the m andarins. U ltim ately, the case went all the way to B eijing when Liang Yuan-kuei was rem oved from office in exchange for the return to the Chinese o f the 10,000 silver taels that the B ritish had extracted from the taotai.55 A pologists for B ritain’s gunboat diplom acy claim that deploying w arships to Taiwan’s ports was not aggression but self-defense. Ib is raison d’être seems reasonable, but the history o f British-Taiwanese relations leads one to the conclusion that English diplom ats and naval officers served prim arily as tools to enable English capitalists and business adventurers to enrich them selves. The form er seldom acted against the latter, but some officials and business

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Figure 4.2 Bringing Camphor from the Hills, 1860s

agents were not the best choice to represent the British people. British diplo­ mats and naval officers rarely com plained to the London governm ent about the violent and illegal conduct o f the British subjects living on the island, assaulting mandarin officials or violating custom s laws, for exam ple. A good example is the aforem entioned W illiam Pickering, who was a rough, arrogant, and condescending fortune-seeker. Though he despised m andarins and tim e and again clashed with local authorities, Pickering’s im prudently forthright rem iniscences, Pioneering in Formosa, recount that he always traveled on horseback or sedan-chair, ju st like the Taiwan taotai. He was armed with a Spencer rifle, a C olt revolver, and double-barreled fow ling pieces. He was also usually accompanied by European m issionaries (either Dominican fathers

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or Presbyterian pastors) as well as by a M alayan bodyguard and Taiwanese servants. On the other hand, there were the many hum ble and sincere m issionaries who labored day and night trying to save Taiwanese souls, as well as a hand­ ful o f m odest and conscientious diplom ats and physicians. A good example o f this class o f Britons was Acting Consul A.R. Hewlett, who replaced the controversial John G ibson and, in the spring o f 1870, did his best to get the British merchants under control by convincing them to live up to their respon­ sibilities. Thanks to H ew lett’s fair-m inded and cooperative gestures, the new Taiwan taotai. Le Chao-t’ung was w illing to relax contraband and sm uggling enforcem ent, including: (1) m odifying cam phor trade regulations for native agents, (2) perm itting cam phor dealing at inland locations, and (3) reducing red tape on the issuance o f passports to foreign agents.36 As a consequence, the cam phor wars simmered down in the 1870s. In the 1880s, as chem ical research in the W est began to pay close attention to the m ultiple benefits o f w hitish cam phor crystals, cam phor became a hot commodity on the world m arket Under the circum stances, its price rose a staggering 100 percent from $16 to $18 per picul in the late 1860s to $30 to $36 in the early 1890s. In 1880, Taiwan, the w orld’s leading producer, exported 12,000 piculs (or 1.6 m illion pounds) o f camphor, with a m arket value o f 150,000 taels o f silver. And on the eve o f the Japanese annexation o f Taiwan (in 1894), W estern traders, mostly British and American, hauled away a total o f 51,000 piculs (or 6.8 m illion pounds) o f cam phor from the island.37 The British, Am ericans, and other foreign nationals in Taiwan did not believe that C hina had effective jurisdiction over the larger half o f the island. This perception was prim arily owing to the island’s physical separation from the m ainland, the ineptitude and corruption o f the handful o f officials sent from China, and the unruly character o f the natives. Because the British de­ sired Taiwan’s natural resources and also valued its strategic location, they did at one tim e contem plate annexation o f Taiwan following the withdrawal o f the English East India Company from China in the 1830s. However, after Britain had gained possession o f Hong Kong in 1842, she chose not to oc­ cupy Taiwan, but instead established trading posts on the island to meet its commercial needs. And as mentioned earlier, British trading practices brought the island into the steamship age, improved its transportation and communica­ tion infrastructure, and made Taiwan an integral part o f the m aritim e trading world. Notwithstanding that the Christian population on the island would rem ain small, British and Canadian Presbyterian missionaries had established a solid foothold on the island. In 1883, Mr. and M rs. George Ede joined the Presbyterian m ission staff in Taiwan. Mr. Ede soon founded and became the first principal o f the Chang-jung M iddle School for boys in Tainan. By the end

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o f the nineteenth century, though the island was not thoroughly W esternized, several segments o f the Taiwanese society had been modernized. In late A pril and early May o f 1895, when the Japanese troops were about to enter the city o f Taipei, the British warships HMS Centurion, Spartan, Redbreast, and Patrol took turns sailing up the Tamsui R iver to make sure that British subjects in that city were not harmed.38And when China realized that her defeat by Japan was im m inent, she offered to sell Taiwan to Britain. However, B ritish Prim e M inister Lord Rosebery and Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley, who wanted Taiwan to remain a free m arket open to British trad­ ers, tw ice declined the Chinese offer.39 During World War II, following their victory in early 1942, the Japanese expelled all British subjects and diplomatic personnel from Taiwan and sealed off the British consulate at the Tamsui fort. But right after Japan’s unconditional surrender, the B ritish reclaim ed the fort, and in 1972 announced their intention to convert it into a museum and fly the U nited Nations flag in perpetuity. But while the British chose not to annex Taiwan in the nineteenth century, the United States eventually found the island a desirable strategic location for the U.S. Navy and expanding Pacific com­ merce, and the French seized northern Taiwan and Pescadores in 1884-1885 as a m aterial guarantee for Chinese troops to withdraw from Annam. The next chapter w ill further illustrate Taiwan’s strategic im portance in international politics as French imperialism collided with a declining Chinese em pire in Southeast Asia.

5 A Strategic Vantage Point The French Campaign in Taiwan

Early French C ontact with the Island Four years after the construction o f Fort Zeelandia at Anping in 1632, some 2,800 Dutch colonists decided to build a second and sm aller fortress called Provintia on the island’s highest elevation, in present-day Tainan. By this tim e, a num ber o f European m issionaries were spreading the Christian gospel among the few hundred-thousand islanders, consisting prim arily o f aborigines, some 25,000 Chinese, and a significant num ber o f Japanese m erchants. The Dutchman Georgius Candidius was the first European m issionary to arrive in Taiwan, in about 1627. He was followed by the reverends Robertus Junius, Antonius Hambroek, and the French Jesuit Joseph de M ailla. W hile engaging in missionary work, Father de M ailla also collected all sorts o f data about the island and surveyed the size and contours o f the land. He described Fort Provintia as “a structure with three stories, strengthened by pavilions at four com ers; and with the full view o f the harbor, fortress guards have sufficient tim e to prepare for defense against any enem ies who come ashore.” 1In 1703, at the request o f Chinese authorities on the mainland, Father de M ailla returned to Taiwan. Accompanied by two other French Jesuits, Regis and Hinderer, he spent about a month in Taiwan to create a map, as well as to gather inform a­ tion on the aborigines. Father de M ailla was especially im pressed with the innocent, gentle, loving, and unselfish nature o f die aboriginal women. In his view, these so-called “savage” people understood m orality better than the well-educated Confucian philosophers, because the form er did not buy and sell women, but the latter did.2 Seventy years after Father de M adia’s visit to Taiwan, M aurice-August Comte de Benyowsky, a Hungarian nobleman by birth and a Polish cavalry commander against the Russians by choice, escaped captivity with ninety-six other prisoners from Kamchatka (in eastern Siberia) in 1771. They comman­ deered a Russian battleship, sailed to several locations in A sia, and finally landed at a spot north o f Pdam on Taiwan’s east coast. The motley band o f soldiers and fugitives soon got involved in the island’s tribal w arfare and, 87

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thanks to their superior European weaponry, easily subdued their enemies. Ul­ timately, Benyowsky boarded a French ship and reached France to serve in the court o f King Louis XV (1715-1774). Benyowsky then presented a grandiose plan to the French king, advising his majesty to make Taiwan a French colony. But by that tim e the Icing already had his eyes on the biggest island off the African coast. Instead o f giving him a charter to colonize Taiwan, the French court com m issioned Benyowsky to establish a colony in M adagascar, where he established a foothold at Antongil Bay in 1774. Benyowsky’s adventures cam e to end in M adagascar, where he was killed in battle in 1786.3 In spite o f the fact that the French king did not take Benyowsky’s advice to im m ediately colonize Taiwan, by the 1780s France was com peting with other European powers in m aritim e explorations and establishing footholds overseas. Thus, French explorers, m issionaries, and diplom ats could be found in many places in Southeast A sia and China. In order to find lucrative m arkets and natural resources, the French objective was to investigate virgin lands and great rivers that had yet to be explored. In 1783, the French navy m inister serving under King Louis XVI (1774-1792) asked Philippe Vieil­ lard, the French vice-consul at Canton, to subm it a report on the conditions o f the island o f Taiwan. In com plying with the request, Vieillard wrote a tenpage memorandum, in which he described Taiwan’s ethnic com position and socioeconom ic conditions, and analyzed the island’s geopolitical im portance in the context o f East A sia and its tenuous relationship with m ainland China. It should be noted that Vieillard never personally set foot on the island and that the inform ation he gathered for the report came prim arily from French m issionaries and Chinese traders. As a consequence, the report was filled with errors, m isinform ation, and faulty data. N evertheless, the fact that the French court was inquiring about the island dem onstrated France’s renewed interest in the Taiwan Strait. One possible m otive was that the B ench government was considering the seizure o f the island to force China to open its ports for trade with European countries.4 The next Frenchman to gain knowledge about Taiwan was the great ex­ plorer Jean-François de Galaup, count de La Pérouse, who on A pril 27,1787, spotted the Dutch Fort Zeelandia at Anping. Though he did not go ashore, his two ships sought refuge near Taiwanfu for several days to avoid strong northeast monsoons. In his diary, La Pérouse described the shoals and rocks o f Taiwan’s coastline, but also expressed frustration that native fishermen could not understand the French language. N evertheless, La Pérouse did learn that there has been a recent uprising and that the Chinese governm ent had dispatched 20,000 troops to suppress the island’s rebels.3 In 1830, another French adventurer, Jules Dumont d ’U rville, sailed along the Taiwan coast and encountered the island’s aborigines, whom he described

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as the m ixed blood o f Chinese, M alays, and Japanese. He recorded the fol­ lowing rem arks: The jurisdiction of the Chinese government in Formosa is limited to the plains on the island’s west coast. The mountain range on the east side separates the subjugated population from the savages___Among the many natural resources, there remains some degree of inconvenience, which almost negates all of the advantages. The inconvenience has to do with the unwholesome water, which could easily cause foreigners their lives.6 The Sino-French War over Vietnam By the 1780s, France was definitely weighing a few options as to where in Asia the country could establish footholds. As a consequence o f the Seven Years’ War, France lost her territorial holdings in India and Am erica to England; this caused the French to be more cautious when engaging in im perialistic expansion. Ultimately, France chose to carry on her im perialist inroads into Indo-China and the southw est Chinese provinces and to becom e an ally, in­ stead o f an adversary, o f G reat Britain in the so-called “Europeanization o f A sia.” In 1787, thanks to the prodding o f the French m issionary Pineau de Behaine, a Nguyen dynasty (1802-1955) scion signed a treaty with France at Versailles. W ith French assistance, in 1830 the H ui-based Nguyen unified Annam by force. Subsequently, France also signed a treaty with the kingdom o f Ryukyu soon after Commodore M atthew Perry forced the Tokugawa shogunate to open Japan to international intercourse in 1854. However, French activities in Taiwan were m inim al when com pared with those o f the British and the Am ericans at this tim e. By the late 1850s, Britain took the lion’s share o f Taiwan’s foreign trade and the Americans held second place. French vessels occasionally visited the ports o f Taiwan and French nationals, such as Baron de M eritens, served as Im perial Customs officials at Tamsui (which the natives called H obei). Soon after Taiwan was officially opened for foreign trade, the French governm ent appointed the English m erchant Jam es M acPhail as its consul to oversee French interests on the island. But the m urder o f the French m issionary A ugustin Chapdelaine in C hina’s southw estern province o f Kwangsi in February 1856 triggered a FrancoB ritish m ilitary expedition against the M anchu governm ent, w hich resulted in the Treaty o f Tientsin in 1858. W ith the com pletion o f the Suez Canal in 1869, it took only about forty days for a French vessel in M arseilles to reach Saigon (now Ho Chi M in C ity). In June 1874, the king o f Annam signed a treaty with France making Annam a protectorate o f France. However, Annam preferred the m andarin style o f court life and continued to send tribute to

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the em peror o f C hina as had been the practice o f the rulers o f this Southeast A sian kingdom for centuries. The French chose to disregard these special ties betw een the C hinese and the A nnam ese and set their sights on going up the M ekong R iver to find a w ater route fo r trade w ith C hina’s south­ w estern province o f Yunnan. But because they found that the M ekong was not navigable, the French colonial rulers, led by Jean D upuis, decided to explore the Red R iver inland from H aiphong and H anoi; a plan that would facilitate their am bition to unleash an outflow o f natural resources from both northern Vietnam and southw estern C hina. U ltim ately, the am bitious French plan in the Tonkin Bay alarm ed the An­ nam ese and Chinese governm ents. Anti-French forces resisted French pen­ etration o f Annam and killed French and Spanish priests and their converts. Even though French warships periodically patrolled the Red River, Annamese continued to resist and repeatedly sought help from their northern neighbor. They recruited Chinese troops called the Black Flags, m ost o f whom had been rebels in the Taiping Rebellion o f 1850-1864 under the command o f Liu Yung-fu. In M arch 1883, French Prim e M inister Jules Ferry (1832-1893) form ed a new governm ent and decided to assert French colonial control over Annam. Ferry convinced the French parliam ent to approve a budget o f 3.7 m illion francs for expeditionary expenses. But in the spring o f 1883 French com m ander H enri R ivière and m ore than 300 troops were killed by Liu Yung-fii’s irregular forces at a place called the Paper Bridge in the Red River D elta. It was against the backdrop o f this defeat that France dispatched a fleet carrying 2,000 m arines under the command o f Vice Admiral Amedee Anatole Courbet to occupy the Annamese capital o f Hui. In the meantim e, in order to diffuse sim m ering tensions, G overnor-general Li Hung-chang o f C hina and French negotiator F. E. Fournier signed an agreem ent in Tientsin on M ay 11, 1884. However, before the ink on the agreem ent had dried, fighting resumed on June 25,1884, when Liu Yung-fu’s forces scored yet another land victory at the Chinese-Annam ese border town o f Lang-shan (or Lang Son), killing tw enty-eight French officers and soldiers and wounding forty-six others.7 Reacting to this defeat, Paris appointed a new envoy, Jules Patenotre, to deal w ith the situation. Upon his arrival in Shanghai on July 1, 1884, Patenotre decided to seize Taiwan as a m aterial guarantee (w hat the French called gages) for Chinese troops to withdraw from Annam. In addition, the French envoy demanded an indem nity paym ent o f 2.5 m illion francs from his Chinese counterpart, Tseng Kuo-ch’uan. Tseng, who helped his older brother Tseng Kuo-fan suppress the Taiping rebels in the early 1860s, em phatically refused Patenotre’s demands. D ining a standoff in the negotiations, die French cruiser Volta, which was equipped with seven cannons and carried 157 troops, appeared at Taiwan’s K eelung Bay, dem anding coal and supplies. U nder

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repeated threats, local m andarins com plied with the French request, finally ridding them selves o f the menacing intruders. In the meantim e, the Chinese governm ent called the veteran com m ander Liu M ing-ch’uan (1836-1896) out o f retirem ent on July 10 and appointed him the im perial com m issioner o f Taiwan to prepare for a French assault on the island. Liu, a native o f H o-fei, Anhui Province (as was Li H ung-chang), hurriedly recruited a staff o f twelve m ilitary advisors and 134 escort guards, as the Shanghai A rsenal prepared to provide him w ith 3,000 m uskets, twenty pieces o f artillery, ten torpedo m ines, and plenty o f am m unition, including cannonballs. Liu’s contingent landed at Keelung harbor on July 16 and w asted no tim e in mapping out a defense strategy. By then Liu had concluded that in order to protect the island, Keelung m ust not fall into the hands o f the enem y; saving Keelung was the key to the defense o f the harbor.* Prior to Liu M ing-ch’uan’s com m ission, Liu Ao (d. 1888), a Hunanese general, was the taotai o f Taiwanfu and had been in charge o f the island’s defense since 1881. A Hunanese protégé o f G eneral Tso Tsung-t’ang, Liu Ao had been the Taiwan taotai for four years. D uring his tenure, he was reported to have taken graft and practiced nepotism while neglecting the defense o f the island. In 1883, Liu Ao commanded a total o f forty com panies, including 4,000 regular troops plus more than 7,000 m ilitia deployed to the five circuits throughout the island. The north circuit covered the territory from the Ta-chia R iver northward to Hsinchu, Tamsui, Keelung, Dan, and Suao; the central circuit included Taichung, Changhua, and C hiayi; the south circuit stretched from the Tseng-wen R iver to the southern tip o f the island; the rear circuit was responsible for the defense o f the east coast; and the vanguard circuit covered the Pescadores. O ut o f the forty com panies, nine were deployed in the north circuit but were for the m ost part armed with outdated weapons.9 The new com m issioner, Liu M ing-ch’uan, therefore decided to transfer tw o companies from the south circuit to the north circuit to help bolster the defense o f Keelung. A fter inspecting a new 300-foot-long fort, w hich was built 100 feet from the beaches and had five 1881-model Krupp guns in place, Liu gave instructions to im prove the effectiveness o f tw o or three other old forts.10 He then issued a proclam ation that all coal mines should be sealed off and no dealers allow ed to buy or sell coal. A fter this initial round o f inspection and issuing a series o f instructions and orders, on July 20 Liu M ing-chuan went straight to his headquarters at Tw a-tu-tia in Taipei. The French Fleet Invades Northern Taiwan Two days later, on July 22, 1884, the French corvette Villars sailed into Keelung harbor and anchored there. The Villars was a large ship armed with

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a battery o f fifteen 14-inch cannons, eight revolving cannon revolvers, and 260 m en.11As the Villars posed a real threat to Keelung, the Chinese govern­ m ent hired the German steam er Welle to transport a cargo o f torpedo mines, telegraph wire, gear, and am m unition from the Shanghai A rsenal to Keelung. But since tension was increasing in the w aters off Keelung, the German skip­ per tried to avoid confrontation with the Villars. The Welle made a detour by bringing the m ilitary cargo to Tamsui where it was transferred to Chinese junks, which offloaded it in Keelung. On A ugust2,1884, Admiral Courbet was instructed by his governm ent to occupy Keelung and its nearby coal m ines.12 Two days later, the French ironclad La G ailissoniere, commanded by R ear Adm iral Lespes and supported by the gunboat Lutin (carrying seventy-eight soldiers), also appeared on the scene. A truly m enacing w arship, particularly from the Chinese point o f view, La G ailissoniere was armed with tw o cannons o f 24-centim eter tourelle (turret), four cannons o f 24-centim eters, six cannons o f 10 centim eters, eight cannon-revolvers, plus equipage for 260 m en.13As soon as another ironclad, the Bayard (armed with tw elve cannons and car­ rying 450 troops) joined the fleet, Lespes im m ediately dem anded that Ts’ao Chih-chung, Chinese com m ander at Keelung, surrender the port city to him as collateral for the indem nity payment. Ts’ao, in turn, transm itted Lespes's dem and to Liu M ing-ch’uan. Liu chose to ignore the demand, and the French commander considered the silence to be a rebuff. Lespes therefore cleared the deck and, on the morning o f August 5,1884, ordered the bom bardm ent o f Keelung. A t this juncture, a small contingent o f foreign residents as well as native Taiwanese in Keelung sought refuge on either the German schooner Johann Carl or the B ritish gunboat Cockshafer, both o f which w ere then anchored in the Tamsui River.14 The cannons from the Villars were so effective that by 8:45 a . m . , they had not only reduced the new fort to rubble, but also destroyed two or three smaller, older forts on the hillsides. A fter killing m ore than sixty Chinese defenders and chasing off the rest, the harbor suddenly became dead quiet. One or two uneasy hours passed, and when Lespes still could not find the rem aining de­ fenders, he gave the order to build beachheads. Eighty French m arines used small boats to land at the south side o f the harbor. By 10:00 a . m . a Colonel M artin led 200 French m arines from the Bayard and landed on Er-sha Bay, a higher ground located at the east side o f Keelung. They planted the tricolor on the ruins o f the new fort, and after destroying all the rem aining barriers in the late afternoon they marched tow ard the city o f Keelung. It rained all that night as the invading French soldiers cam ped out in a field. By the m orning o f A ugust 6, when the rain finally stopped, 260 scout vanguards, led by Cap­ tain Jacquem ier, also landed. By this tim e, Liu M ing-ch’uan had returned to Keelung and personally taken chatge o f the troops.13

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By now, m ore than 450 Frenchm en had moved to the barracks evacuated by the troops under General Ts’ao’s command. W ith the im m ediate objective o f securing provisions o f coal, the French were fighting their way to occupy the Government Colliery, located some 10 kilom eters to the east o f the harbor. Learning o f the intention o f the French, Liu M ing-ch’uan ordered the plant and the machinery at the Pa-tou-tzu C olliery destroyed, the pits flooded, and the some 15,000 tons o f stockpiled coal set afire with kerosene.16In the mean­ tim e, the Chinese defenders, num bering some 2,000, dug trenches on the high ground, waiting for the French to distance them selves from the protection o f their w arship cannons. U tilizing their num erical superiority and fam iliarity with the terrain, the Chinese fought the battle on their term s and were able finally to chase the French back to the beach. A fter three long hours o f fierce fighting, the French m ade a 1,200-meter beach withdrawal and retreated to their ships. As in every battle, there w ere conflicting reports on the num ber o f casualties. The Chinese claim ed to have suffered only very light casual­ ties w hile inflicting more than 100 on the French invaders. Such exaggerated “glories” were also depicted by the Shanghai Tien-shih-tsai Pictorial Journal (owned by an Englishman named Ernest M ajor) in its July-Septem ber edition. But John Dodd, a Scottish tea m erchant who was a resident o f Taipei during the conflict and who had access to both Chinese and foreign sources, stated that at m ost three Frenchmen were killed, six wounded, one taken prisoner, and four cannons and two French flags captured. On the other hand, many wounded Chinese soldiers were brought to M ackay’s M ission H ospital in Tamsui for treatm ent.17 A fter initially failing to occupy the coal-harbor city, French com m ander Lespes, through the good offices o f Keelung custom s official Brownlow, invited Liu M ing-ch’uan to com e aboard the La G ailissoniere for negotia­ tions. Liu declined, claim ing he was not authorized to leave his command post. Liu then countered the French offer by inviting Lespes to com e ashore to m eet with him , which Lespes also refused to do. Soon afterw ard, all the French ships except La G ailissoniere left for the Fukien coast to gather intel­ ligence and clear barriers from navigation channels. In due tim e, they joined the Courbet-led Tonkin Fleet in its assault on the Chinese M a-chiang naval base. The French diversion, in effect, gave the Chinese defenders in northern Taiwan a little breathing room. In fact, on A ugust 9, Liu M ing-ch’uan felt confident enough to leave Keelung to the command o f his subordinates. He w ent to inspect the defense o f Tamsui, where the Chinese had erected new earthen batteries on the hillsides and laid down six mines inside the bar. A t this juncture, according to L iu’s own account, he received a hero’s welcome and an im posing parade in Taipei.18Thus, after the first round o f com bat, the situation had com e to an impasse; that is, the French had succeeded in holding

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the beach at Keelung, but were unable to advance inland. In the meantime, the Chinese continued to build earthw orks and dig entrenchm ents on the hills on the east side o f the bay, where they could overlook the enemy w arships. By the end o f August, not a single foreigner, not even custom s officers, could be found in Keelung. N evertheless, foreign trade in Tamsui and Tw a-tu-tia had resum ed, but tensions rem ained high and the lives o f foreigners there were very much constrained.19 On August 16,1884, Prem ier Jules Ferry (who was also concurrently the French foreign m inister) obtained a vote o f confidence from both chambers o f the French parliam ent; he thereupon cabled French envoy Patenotre to halt peace talks in Beijing and to prepare for m ilitary action. Four days later, on A ugust 20, the French M inistry o f the Navy instructed Admiral Courbet to attack the Southern Chinese Fleet, destroy the Fukien Arsenal and the M awei Shipyard, and wipe out the defense o f the M in River.20A t this tim e, the Chinese Southern Fleet consisted o f four cruisers, two transport ships, two communication ships, two gunboats, and one armed wood vessel, with a total o f forty-seven cannons and 1,220 sailors and marines. In addition, there were several hundred troops manning various guns along the M in River and at the naval base.21As soon as Courbet received the go-ahead, he combined his Tonkin Fleet with some o f the ships o f Lespes’s China Fleet, creating a form idable lineup. It included the flagship Volta, the first-class cruisers Duguay-Tromn and D ’Estaing (each armed with many 19-centimeter and 14-centimeter can­ nons), the gunboats L ’Aspic, Lynx, and La Vipere, and two torpedo boats. W hile the Nantai and four steamboats undertook to clear the channel and sweep for torpedo mines, the communications ship Saone and the second-class cruiser Chateau Renaud patrolled the bay to prevent the Chinese from sinking ballast junks filled with stones on the bar o f the M in River.22 Admiral Courbet started his mission on the afternoon o f August 23 by firing at Chinese cruisers, w hich could not easily m aneuver at ebb tide. The assault continued until dusk, when heavy rains slowed the French action. The next day, after inform ing all foreign consulates in Foochow o f the im m inent at­ tack, the French split their fleet into three colum ns and fired on every Chinese ship and boat they could find. On the afternoon o f August 24, French Torpedo Boat no. 46, commanded by Douzans, unleashed a 13-kilogram torpedo and crippled the Chinese flagship Yang-wu, which was later sunk by fire from the Volta. A t this tim e, the French ironclad La Triomphante (armed with 13 cannons and carrying 380 men) also joined the battle. All told, seven Chinese warships were sunk, two severely damaged, and more than 1,000 m arines plus 500 m ilitia killed. W ith the Chinese Southern Fleet virtually wiped out, sm aller French m en-of-war could m ethodically destroy the infrastructure o f the shipyard and the defense installations along the M in River. A fter taking

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such a beating and anticipating a public uproar, the C h’ing im perial court of­ ficially declared w ar on France on August 26,1884. Oddly enough, three days later, on August 29, Courbet declared the end o f the cam paign in Foochow when he addressed his officers and m arines: Our soldiers were victimized by the disgraced betrayal at the Lang-shan campaign. It has been exactly two months. Such a violent act has been re­ venged by your valor and that of your comrades from Keelung. However, France demands an even more glorious compensation. With courageous sailors like you, our country can achieve anything.23 W ith the annihilation o f the Chinese Southern Fleet, all threats against the French ships in the open sea disappeared. Because the French navy had total control o f China’s southeast coast, Courbet could now concentrate on his plan to invade Taiwan. He first combined Lespes’s China Fleet with his Tonkin Fleet and renamed it the Far East Fleet, with him self as the com m ander-in-chief and Lespes the vice com m ander-in-chief. On Septem ber 2, Courbet boarded the Triomphante, escorted by the Bayard and the Lutin, and arrived at Keelung Bay. A fter a cursory survey and inspection o f the northern Taiwan coastline, Courbet becam e convinced that in view o f the strength o f the position Liu M ing-ch’uan had developed, any frontal attack would present great difficul­ ties. To be successful, the adm iral concluded, it would require forces three tim es as great as those currently under his command. He then suggested to his governm ent that instead o f invading Taiwan his fleet should sail north to seize W ei-hai-wei (at the northern tip o f Shantung peninsula) or Port A rthur (at the southern tip o f Liaotung peninsula). However, the French cabinet vetoed his ideas and insisted that he take northern Taiwan as a guarantee o f the indem nity paym ent. Obviously, Courbet was not happy with the cabinet decision, as he com plained to a friend in a letter dated Septem ber 18: I don’t know who gave Mr. Jules Ferry and his politician friends such a terrible idea, that only by occupying Keelung and its nearby coal mines can we find the coal supplies for our ships. I can tell you that I shall never forget this incompetent cabinet and their mistaken policy. If we continue like this, a year from now we will still be where we are now unless we use up all of our budgeted revenues before then.24 The French Blockade o f Taiwan Caustically contem ptuous o f French cabinet members for their apparent ig­ norance and inexperience, Admiral Courbet nevertheless faithfully executed

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the orders from Paris. On Septem ber 17,1884, he led a total o f 2,000 fresh m ilitary personnel— including infantry regim ents, artillery battalions, and coolies, plus heavy artillery, w hich had been put aboard the first-class trans­ port ship N ive in Saigon, and set sail for Keelung. By the end o f September, there was a total o f eleven French w arships in Taiwan waters—three under the command o f Lespes with 300 troops w aiting to attack Tamsui and eight under the command o f Courbet with 2,000 troops ready to take Keelung. C ourbet’s im m ediate objective was, first, to occupy Palm Island (which the Chinese called H o-p’ing Island), w hich was situated at the northeastern end o f the bay, hard by the left shore o f the entrance to Keelung Harbor. Lespes was to sail his w arships up the Tamsui R iver and then land his m arines on the north shore o f the port town. Facing French reinforcem ents and pronounced intentions, G eneral Liu M ing-ch’uan, on Septem ber 17, telegraphed C hina’s im perial court to send additional troops and ammunition. Ten days later, on Septem ber 27,350 Chinese soldiers aboard a chartered ship attem pted to enter the Tamsui River, but were scared off by the French warships Chateau Renaud and Vipere. As a consequence, these troops from the m ainland had to land at Hsinchu, then m arch all the way to Taipei to join Liu’s forces.23A heavy storm was developing in northern Taiwan as wealthy Chinese m erchants in Tamsui chartered a foreign ship, the D orita, to evacuate their fam ilies and friends in case the French attacked. A lso, by this tim e, five Chinese soldiers kept guard at every foreign company in northern Taiwan to keep looters away.26 At precisely 6:00 a .m . on October 1,1884, Courbet gave the order to attack the Chinese defenders at Keelung’s fortifications. Lieutenant-M ajor Ber o f the first battalion led 619 marines and landed at the southeast side o f the beach, with the aim o f occupying Clement Hill (Hsien-tung). More than 100 Chinese defenders fired Krupp guns and muskets from the earthworks against the invaders, but after two hours of heavy fighting, retreated from the hill.27Liu then ordered his soldiers to fire all six o f his 40-pound cannons and momentarily slowed down the French advance. However, with Lieutenant-M ajor Lacroix leading the second battalion and Lieutenant-M ajor Lange leading the third, by 11:00 a .m . both battalions had landed on the beach and successfully silenced the defenders’ guns. That night, Liu M ing-ch’uan ordered a withdrawal o f his remaining 300 troops to a barricaded place called Chi-tu (which means No. 7 Barrier) and hurried back to direct the defense o f Tamsui.28The three French battalions joined forces and moved swiftly to occupy the entire western district o f Keelung City. Admiral Courbet quickly went ashore and set up his command post, flying the tricolor French flag. On October 4, the invaders extended their control to the southern district o f Keelung and its downtown. By October 8, the entire city was in the hands o f the French. The week-long campaign cost the lives of six French soldiers, but hundreds o f Chinese w o e either killed or wounded.29

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French accounts o f Liu M ing-ch’uan were generally contemptuous, charac­ terizing him as “clever, wily, and fussy,” but “illogical, and ignorant o f modem weaponry” and “an old man who was afraid o f beheading” by the em press.30 Am erican news correspondent Jam es W. Davidson charged that after Liu had “fled” from the battlefield he planned to take “the treasure, money, and stores to a w alled town some thirty m iles south o f Tamsui.” But when the folks in Taipei learned about this, “they seized his hair and dragged him out o f his sedan chair, beating him and cursing him as traitor and coward.”31 In his m em orials to the im perial court, however, Liu M ing-ch’uan declared that he abandoned Keelung after only one day o f resistance in order to make a tactical retreat. He realized that the French had superior weapons and better-trained troops. On the other hand, he had the homefield advantage and with a w ell-plotted defense could force the enemy to spread their occupying forces too thin and to w ear down their patience. He reasoned that Keelung was twenty m iles (or thirty kilom eters) away from Taipei, and the rough terrain would make it very difficult for the French to get there. Tamsui, on the other hand, was only thirty li (ten m iles) away from Taipei and was wide open to attack; with the w ell-equipped French arm ada in place it was much more vulnerable. And, he reasoned, if Tamsui fell to the French, Taipei would follow suit. Once Taipei fell, the entire island would be vulnerable. It was with this tactical thinking that Liu decided to give up Keelung, return to Taipei with about 1,000 soldiers, and prepare to throw everything he had into the defense o f Tamsui.32 Before the French invasion, Tamsui was protected by a sm all battery at w hat the French called the W hite Fort on the north shore o f the river. A fter the arrival o f Liu M ing-ch’uan, a new battery was put in place on the hilltop Red Fort near the Custom s House and the British Consulate, where the C hi­ nese m ounted several Krupp guns m anufactured by the Shanghai Arsenal. On Septem ber 3, the Chinese sank stone-filled ballast boats at the river entrance and laid nine torpedo m ines in the river. To help the new battalion from m ainland China defend Tamsui, Liu recruited a num ber o f Hakka hill people and arm ed them with m atchlocks and encam ped them in tents on hillsides and in small valleys.33 Because there were a num ber o f foreign com panies in Tamsui— such as Brown & Co., Boyd & Co., Dodd & Co., Lapraik & Co., and Tait & Co.— the French Fleet did not want to blockade the port until near the end o f Septem ber 1884. But on O ctober 1, A dm iral Lespes signaled Captain H.H. B oteler o f the British ship HMS Cockshafer that “during the next tw enty-four hours our bom bardm ent w ill destroy the defense facilities o f the port; European residents need to seek their own safety.”34 W hile the foreigners were taking measures to protect property and lives, the m enacing French warships— La G ailissonie re, La Triomphante, the Duguay Trouin, and the Vipere—guided by a chart drawn by a British river pilot, sailed

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up the Tamsui R iver ready for action. And as expected, on the m orning o f O ctober 2, tw o French ironclads were outside the bar and skirm ishes began. Eyew itnesses reported that ferocious cannon shelling and gunfire was relent­ less, and by 10:00 a . m . W hite Fort was being destroyed. The first day, the bom bardm ent lasted for thirteen hours and betw een 1,000 and 2,000 rounds were fired. However, the heavy morning fog caused the French gunners to miss their targets. Even though they knocked out both batteries and no foreigner was reported injured, they also hit foreign houses. M oreover, the foretopm ast o f the Vipere was struck.33 During the next tw o days, sporadic shelling and firing continued. The French then sent sm all reconnaissance team s to check for torpedo mines and scout the shoreline; the French forces refused to land. Then on O ctober 5, Courbet dispatched 600 m arines from Keelung, some o f whom were conscripts from A lgeria and Annam, to join Lespes’s forces. But an equinoctial gale prevented them from landing until O ctober 8, when a Chinese commander, Sun Kai-hua, a man o f cunning and pluck, had his 1,000 poorly equipped troops well positioned and scattered out o f sight along the north shore o f die Tamsui River. A t 9:00 a . m . on O ctober 8,1884, when the w ater was thirteen or fourteen feet deep on the bar at the mouth o f the Tamsui River, Lespes ordered his ma­ rines to board sm aller transport boats and to clear the way for a landing. W ith cannons firing from every ship and every weapon fully loaded, five French contingents, form ing a line 1,000 m eters long, advanced tow ard the dunes. By 9:35 a . m . , an estim ated force o f 500 to 800 French troops had landed on the northeast shore o f the silt islet known as Black Beacon (Sha-lun). From the beachhead, the French moved quickly inland, but when they got closer to the tree line G eneral Sun opened fire. By 10:10 a . m . , heavy fighting and gunfire deafened the Red Fort area when the Chinese charged from three highground directions. There was only 100 m eters separating the Chinese from the French. By 11:45 a . m . , Colonel Boulineau signaled that his men had used up all their am m unition and it was tim e to withdraw. B ut the gale-force winds that had com e up made the retreat m ore costly and difficult for the invaders. Chinese sources claim that the French were hopelessly chaotic, but a French sailor who took part in the com bat reported that the withdrawal was orderly and it took only forty-five m inutes to rescue all o f their wounded comrades and bring them safely aboard the French ships.36 Based on the num ber o f wounded soldiers treated at M ackay’s M ission H ospital, the Chinese casualties must have been very high. Even after the bom bardm ent, many Chinese w ere killed or wounded by either tam pering w ith unexploded shells found on the riverbank or by accidentally tripping m ines. On the other hand, the Vipere was ablaze, and a navy captain named Fontaine from La Gailissormiere plus eleven other wounded French m arines,

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Figure 5.1 Taiwanese Troops in Training

were captured and beheaded. Their severed heads were publicly exhibited on bamboo poles. Once again, the Shanghai Tien-shih-tsai Pictorial Journal, as a means o f selling more papers and stirring up further resentm ent against the French, depicted scenes o f the beheading. The Chinese claim ed to have killed 300 French invaders, an inflated num ber that was even published in the 1988 edition o f the Tamsui County G azetteer,37 These casualty figures, however, were disputed not only by Tamsui Customs official Edmond Far­ rago, who vouched for only twenty dead Frenchm en, but also by the French authorities, who reported only seventeen dead and forty-nine wounded, among whom were four officers.38 And w hile the foreign residents o f Tamsui were disgusted and frightened by the many heads o f Frenchm en exhibited in their neighborhood, the em press dow ager issued a decree on N ovem ber 6 an­ nouncing a Chinese victory at Tamsui. She praised the valor o f General Sun K ai-hua and sent 10,000 silver taels from the Im perial Treasury, three w hite jade rings, and other rew ards to shower on Sun and to celebrate the gallantry displayed by his troops.39 A fter another failed landing, Lespes became convinced that his sailors were not properly trained for fighting on land. On his part, Courbet felt a strong sense o f frustration even though his forces o f about 2,000 were now in possession o f Keelung and its surrounding hills overlooking Wan Wan, only about a fivehour m arch to Taipei. M oreover, his governm ent reinforced his troops w ith

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over 900 fresh A lgerian conscripts in late January o f 1885. By February, the French forces in Keelung consisted o f 971 foreign legionnaires, 900 A frican battalions, 350 marines infantrymen, and 800 bluejackets.40However, the only road betw een Keelung and Taipei was full o f thick underbrush, long grasses, hidden caves and pits, and narrow pathways, an environm ent m ost favorable to the Chinese defenders, who in the m eantim e had increased the num ber o f their troops to alm ost 6,000. M oreover, from January to M ay was the rainy season in Keelung, which made campgrounds w et and unhealthy. The fighting was particularly fierce at Yueh-mei-shan (M oon Eye H ill) between January 18 and January 21, and resulted in French control o f the northern shore o f the Keelung River. But the battle at the Wan Wan Bridge between M arch 16 and M arch 20, 1885 was even bloodier, as the French suffered nearly 200 casualties and the Chinese over 1,000.41 W hat turned the French expedition into a protracted stalemate was a tropical epidem ic the French called cachalot, which was commonly known as cholera, a disease o f the stomach and bowels. C ontact with the Chinese soldiers was the source o f this and other diseases suffered by the French. That was why, during their seizure o f northern Taiwan, the French felt like sitting ducks in a distant foreign land. On O ctober 20,1884, in order to adapt to this unexpected developm ent, Courbet declared a blockade o f the entire coast o f Taiwan and gave foreign m en-of-war three days to leave the ports o f Taiwan. Three days later, on O ctober 23, Courbet also sent a telegram from his cruiser Bayard to his governm ent in Paris, explaining his predicam ent. Our troops encounter difficulties, with most of them infected with fever of typhoid and many also have symptoms of cholera. Between the eleventh and twenty-third [of October], we have lost eleven men. At present, there are fifty-six sick soldiers being treated in the hospital, among them twelve who are critically ill. Until the unhealthy season comes to an end, we’ll manage by not deploying our troops. However, this might slow down vari­ ous projects and intelligence gathering.42 W ith La G ailissoniere guarding the entrance o f the Tamsui R iver and four or five other ships patrolling the coastline o f northern Taiwan, the blockade was designed to cut off the island’s trade and com m unication with the outside w orld, and by so doing, and, it was hoped, create dissent w ithin Liu M ingch’uan’s staff. As a m atter o f fact, ju st a few days after the blockade began, General Liu and the Taiwanfii taotai Liu Ao began to accuse one another o f incom petence, em bezzlem ent, and cow ardice as the tw o Lius (not related) sent memorials o f recrim ination to B eijing.43The French blockade started first with boarding and checking ships near the island’s coast. One month later, it

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extended to cover an eight-kilom eter navigation zone, and by February 1885, Courbet declared rice contraband, subject to search and confiscation by French authorities on the high seas. By enforcing this new dictum , the French fleet effectively blocked the rice produced in southern China and Taiwan from being transported to north China, causing serious fam ine in the Beijing region. The blockade continued through Christm as o f 1884 until the early spring o f 1885. During this long stretch o f five months, life in Taiwan’s foreign com­ munity became unbearable. But suddenly, on M arch 24, the French left the Tamsui port unguarded for the first tim e since the blockade was established on October 23. Simultaneously, the French began a partial evacuation of Keelung so that they could com bine the Keelung troops with other forces to occupy the Pescadores, an archipelago o f some forty-five islands. W ith this move, the French intended to put more pressure on C hina because during this tim e the Japanese were inching tow ard Korea. As a m atter o f fact, the Japanese sloop Am aki was closely watching the French operation on the Taiwan coast.44 In January 1885, realizing that the Pescadores functioned as the gateway to Taiwan, die Chinese governm ent started to dispatch troops from Foochow to these scattered isles. By M arch, an estim ated 3,500 troops under the com­ mand o f Liu Ao had been deployed on the three m ajor islands—Pescadore, W hite Sand, and Fisherm an—plus two other populated islands. The French, on the other hand, had a total o f seven warships, including two ironclads, three cruisers, and two transport vessels, readying them selves for action. The Legacy o f Adm iral Am edee Anatole Courbet On route to the Pescadores w hile his fleet was at anchor at A nping, Adm iral Courbet asked the British consul to invite Liu Ao for a m eeting. On board the French flagship, Liu Ao told the French commander, “We are friends today, let’s be merry and not m ention unpleasant m atters.” The confident Courbet pressed, “W ith a sm all city like Taiwanfu and a weak army like the one you have, how can you fight?” Liu replied, “W hat you say is true, but the city is built o f earth, and soldiers com e and go like paper. However, the hearts and resolution o f our populace are like iron.” It was reported that Courbet drank to his heartfelt satisfaction and then ordered his fleet to leave Taiwanfu un­ harm ed.49The story o f this encounter between Liu Ao and Courbet as well as other exchanges between the tw o adversaries were recorded by a Taiwanese historian nam ed Lien Heng; but this story should be taken with some degree o f skepticism . W hatever the case, both men would later become victim s o f the war. Liu was exiled by the em press dowager to the Hei-lung-chiang frontier near Siberia and Courbet died o f a tropical disease during his occupation o f the Pescadores.

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A t 6:55 A .M . on M arch 29, 1885, boarding Le Bayard, Admiral Courbet signaled his ships and personnel to get ready for the assault against the Pesca­ dores. W hen the French vessels were about 2,000 m eters off the main island, their gunners started firing their cannons, which continued for a half hour and successfully dem olished all the shore batteries. A t 8:20 a . m . , Courbet called off the shelling and firing, but let Le Duchaffaut and Le Bayard continue to level the defensive barriers north o f M akung, the county seat and also the largest town in the Pescadores with a population o f 10,000 at the tim e. O ther sm aller ships, such as D ’Estaing and the freshly repaired Vipere, sailed among big and sm all islands to knock out every possible defensive facility. By 4:00 p . m . , Courbet changed his flagship to L ’Annam ite and ordered a landing at a sm aller harbor instead o f M akung, a port easily accessible to vessels o f large tonnage. Four com panies o f the Second Regim ent subsequently landed with­ out encountering any resistance from the defenders; nor did the French come across any mines along the way.46 On the morning o f M arch 30, the Vipere sailed into Makung harbor without encountering any resistance, clear evidence that the people there were only human and “their hearts were not made out o f iron.” French m arines quickly took positions at w ill as the Chinese defenders had fled either to Taiwan o r m ainland China. By 5:15 p . m . , when the marines arrived at the county office, they found a substantial cache o f unused weapons and ammunition abandoned by the Chinese. For all practical purposes, the French occupation o f the Pescadores took less than three days. On April 1, the Bayard fired a twenty-one-gun salute, and when the French tricolor was raised at M akung, Admiral Courbet renamed the Pescadores “les Pecheurs, the Fisherm an’s Islands” and declared them a French possession.47 Once again, there were discrepancies in the num ber o f French casualties. Official Chinese sources claim ed forty Frenchmen had been killed, but the French authorities counted only one dead and one wounded during the first day o f the landing assault, and four dead and eleven wounded during the second day.4* W ith the occupation o f Keelung and the Pescadores, the French forces were now spread too thin—there were not enough French warships to enforce an effective blockade. In fact, shippers o f all sorts found ways and means to smuggle machinery, supplies, money, and m ail in and out o f Taiwan. Some o f these w ere first smuggled to southern ports, such as Kaohsiung or Anping, then brought overland to Taipei. To be sure, many o f the smugglers’ boats were confiscated or burned by the French.49Also, to the chagrin o f Admiral Courbet, a Chinese general by the name o f FengTze-ts’ai scored new land victories over the French army at Bac Ninh in Annam and Lang Shan near the end o f M arch 1885. These defeats, plus onerous m ilitary expenditures, ultim ately helped to change public opinion in France and Jules Ferry’s governm ent fell. The new government, with Charles de Freycinet as premier, agreed to accept the

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mediation o f Sir Robert Hart, who was then serving as the inspector-general o f Chinese M aritim e Custom s. O n A pril 4, H art’s personal representative Jam es Duncan Cam pbell, on behalf o f China, signed an arm istice treaty with the new French foreign minister, A lbert Billot, in Paris. This treaty called for an immediate cease-fire, as well as the reinstatem ent o f the Li-Foum ier Agree­ m ent o f M ay 11,1884. W ith that, the French governm ent cabled Courbet to lift the blockade on Taiwan on A pril IS, 1885. Eight weeks later, on June 9, Li Hung-chang and the French envoy Patenotre m et in Tientsin and finalized a ten-article peace treaty, which, among other things, recognized Annam as a French colony and stipulated the withdrawal o f die French from Keelung and the Pescadores. Both parties also agreed to exchange prisoners o f war. But ironically, there was no m ention o f the indem nity paym ent in the treaty, since it was over the sticking point o f a m aterial guarantee (the gages) that the French governm ent sent warships and troops to Taiwan in the first place.30 During the blockade o f Taiwan, Courbet at one point commanded a total o f twenty warships, and periodically received new troops, equipm ent, am­ m unition, and fresh supplies and provisions from Annam, Africa, and France. But once again, cholera, typhoid, and fever became the biggest enem ies o f the French. In the Pescadores, there are three cem eteries, each crowded with French graves. Like his troops, the fifty-eight-year-old Courbet was overex­ tended and exhausted and, finally on June 11,1885 (two days after the peace treaty was signed), succumbed to cholera-induced dysentery and anemia. His body was brought back to France on his flagship, the Bayard, for a glorious state funeral. The American joum alist-tum ed-diplom at Jam es W. Davidson called Courbet “a kindhearted adm iral” who undertook quite a few construc­ tive projects in the occupied Pescadores, including a thorough survey o f the island chain and the publication o f Pescadores Islands: Inner Anchorages. Perhaps for this and other reasons, many o f the islanders actually mourned his death.51 On June 21, after nearly nine months o f occupation, General Duchesne ordered the withdrawal o f his rem aining troops and equipm ent from Keelung. Chinese sources state that “the Chinese defenders held the French at Lion Ball H ill for eight long months. The French could not sustain the stalem ate and finally retreated.”52Today, in the Keelung public cemetery, between 600 and 700 Frenchmen are buried en m asse; among them 120 died in com bat, about 150 died o f wounds, and the lives o f the rest were lost due to clim ate, bad water, and infectious diseases.53 By July 22,1885, the French had com pletely abandoned the Pescadores for Saigon. M uch has been w ritten about the eleven-month French campaign in Taiwan and, as in alm ost every international conflict, there are biased accounts, selec­ tive memories, embellishm ents, exaggerations, and even fabrications on the causes o f the war, the principal personalities involved, the outcome o f various

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battles, the num ber o f casualties, and the peace settlem ent.34From the French point o f view, it seemed a pyrrhic victory, with few gains but a great many sacrifices. As for the Chinese, it was another hum iliation suffered at the hands o f W estern powers. Nevertheless, Beijing had learned a very im portant lesson from this war, that Taiwan is palpably im portant, both politically and strategi­ cally, to its possessor. In other words, whoever gains control o f Taiwan can constitute a real threat to China. Realizing Taiw an's geopolitical im portance, the Chinese government declared Taiwan its new est province as soon as the French had left the island, then appointed Commander Liu M ing-ch’uan as its first governor. But the Taiwanese, who had been corralled as hostages, treated as expendable im perial property, or used as collateral for an old indemnity paym ent, were not consulted beforehand; nor was there any plebiscite. As a m atter o f fact, on April 17,1895, China’s imperial court agreed to cede Taiwan to Japan as a result o f yet another Chinese defeat that had nothing to do with the Taiwanese in the first place. N evertheless, on May 20,1895, a delegation o f Taiwan gentry offered the island to France as a protectorate. The basis o f the offer was that China would retain de jure nominal sovereignty and the land tax, while France “should have sole control over the adm inistration, the cost o f which should be borne by dues and duties.”33 France rejected the of­ fer, but in the chess game of world politics, Taiwan was again sacrificed as a pawn. The interests o f the islanders were totally ignored and their wishes counted for nothing. Nearly a century later, in 1991, despite Communist China’s strong diplo­ m atic pressure and enticing financial bait, France agreed to sell sixty D assault M irage 2000-5 fighter jets to help Taiwan control its airspace and safeguard the Taiwan Strait. On June 5,1991, the François M itterand government announced its intention to sell Taiwan six electronically equipped LaFayette-class missile frigates for 12 billion francs. However, when Taipei and Paris were about to sign the final bill o f sale on August 12, 1991, the price was increased to 16 billion francs, a staggering 33 percent increase. It seems that several French and Taiwanese high officials, including the French foreign m inister, Roland Dumas, were involved in a very complicated scheme of bribeiy and kickbacks. But the most ironic tw ist was that in order to “buy C hina’s silence” Taiwan had to pay a sum o f US$100 m illion to B eijing’s Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. In addition, some 400 m illion francs were used to bribe M itterand’s m istress, Anne Pingeot.36One wonders whether, if the Taiwanese had raised enough ransom money to pay off the French gages in 1884, they might have warded off the French armada.

6 Late to the Scene The United States Arrives in Taiwan

Early Am erican Knowledge about Taiwan U ntil the m id-nineteenth century, Americans had little or no knowledge o f Taiwan, a tropical island situated between 22 and 26 degree north latitude and 120 and 122 degrees east longitude. M ost Americans think that the name Taiwan is o f Chinese origin, but it is, in fact, a D utch name, derived from the first D utch settlem ent at Tayouan (present-day Anping in the city o f Tainan) in 1624. In the seventeenth century, the natives pronounced Tay-ouan as Tai­ wan; since that tim e the name has been retained by the Chinese settlers on the island.1Prim ary A merican knowledge about the island came either from European publications or from sketchy reports by Am erican adventurers, including a 1704 book titled An H istorical and Geographical D escription o f Formosa by a dubious author named George Psalmanazar. Nine decades later, there was a brief chapter on Taiwan contained in the 1795 English transla­ tion o f Abbe G rosier’s French work, A General Description o f China. Nearly forty years elapsed before the Reverend Charles Gutzlaff, a versatile Prussian m issionary and interpreter for opium traders, reported on the prosperous but unruly islanders in his The Journal o f Three Voyages along the Coast o f China, which was published in 1833 by Thomas Ward and Company in London. In this book, Gutzlaff, who once served as a surgeon on a British ship, also highlighted Taiwan’s unique m aritim e geography and its rich resources in sugar, rice, and camphor. W hile European sources provided bits o f inform ation for American read­ ers, a handful o f American adventurers who had m ercantile interests in the Far East also began to make sketchy reports on the island. For instance, New Yorker W illiam Shaler published his navigational encounter with Taiwan in The American Register (1808), the American sailor Amasa Delano published A Narrative o f Voyages and Travels in Boston in 1817, and The North American Review carried an article on Richard J. Cleveland’s record voyage around the northern tip o f Taiwan.2In 1834, the American missionary David Abeel printed a Journal o f a Residence in China and the Neighboring Countries, in which 105

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he discussed the efforts o f D utch m issionaries to convert the Taiwan natives to C hristianity in the seventeenth century and the interm arriages betw een the European colonists and the islanders.3 A lm ost every W estern account confirm ed the lack o f law and order on the island. On land, robbers, clan feuds, and savage aborigines often rendered the roads im passable. A long the coast, pirates terrified fisherm en and traders and ravaged villages. As discussed in C hapter 3, the notorious pirate chief­ tain Tsai C h’ien m ustered a private navy and invaded the coastal tow n o f Lukang in 1804. Two years later, his pirates annihilated the entire Chinese garrison force along the Tamsui R iver in Taipei. He then sealed off the high seas betw een Taiwan and the m ainland, and for the next tw o years acted as the chief arbiter o f Taiwan’s fate. Even as late as the 1830s, there were constant insurrections against the ineffective C hinese authorities, whose arm ies w ere generally equipped w ith only m atchlocks, spears, tridents, and m edieval halberds, and whose fleet— consisting m ainly o f old junks— would not put to sea for the next thirty years. On the other hand, W esterners who had know ledge about the island w ere im pressed w ith the abundant w ealth o f Taiwan, w hich gave great prom ise o f quick fortunes and great opportunities. For exam ple, in The Chinese: A G eneral D escription o f the Empire and Its Inhabitants (1836), John Francis D avis not only treated Taiwan separately from C hina proper, but also suggested that the location o f the island was ideal for trade and exploitation. D avis’s book was soon selected by the Am erican Society for the D iffusion o f U seful Knowledge as one o f the “m ust read’’ books for young people. It becam e a popular school text, w ith several edi­ tions subsequently printed.4 D uring the 1840s, scattered reports on Taiwan continued to appear in A m erican periodicals and journals, but they w ere generally sketchy and superficial. Even in the first edition o f The M iddle Kingdom (1848), the Rev­ erend Samuel W ells W illiam s devoted only a few pages to Taiwan and the Pescadores. W illiam s, the eldest son o f a U tica, New York, publisher, cam e to China in 1833 as a printer for the Am erican Board’s Canton M ission and the editor o f Canton-based The Chinese Repository, and had learned to read and speak Chinese. During his furlough in the United States in 1845, W illiams gave a series o f speeches on China, which becam e the basis for The M iddle Kingdom. In this book, W illiam s provided a map that shows Taiwan separate from the Chinese Empire. He claim ed that the natives o f Form osa seem ed to have more affinity w ith their neighbors in Luzon and southward than w ith the Chinese. A t the most, the Chinese em peror could only claim dom inance over the plain on the w est coast and over one or tw o ranges o f coastal hills; while the m ountains in the interior, the south cape, and the entire eastern half o f Taiwan were inhabited by various indigenous tribal groups, none o f whom

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were Chinese. Even w ithin the C hinese-ruled area, the m andarins had only achieved w eak and lim ited jurisdiction as big landowners established their own quasi-autonom ous realm s am id incessant civil strife and rebellions. The North American Review gave W illiams’s book a rave review and recommended the volum e to its readers.5 N evertheless, in the second quarter o f the nineteenth century, no book in any W estern language dealt thoroughly w ith the island. But m ore and more Europeans and Am ericans engaged in w haling and trading in the western Pacific, wary o f sailing through the Taiwan Strait, particularly during the m onsoon season when severe storm s and tow ering waves could easily cause shipwrecks. A lso, the hidden reefs along the rugged shores o f Taiwan made coastal navigation exceedingly dangerous. For these reasons, “old C hina hands”— W esterners who resided in C hina and had a keen know ledge o f Chinese affairs— offered tips to help their countrym en do business in that part o f the w orld. For exam ple, in 1827, an American m erchant in Canton named W illiam B. Wood rented an English printing press to publish The Can­ ton Register and began to dissem inate inform ation about China and trading w ith the Taiwanese. In 1832 Am erican m issionary Elijah C. Bridgm an began publishing The Chinese Repository, also in Canton, w hich was to becom e a valuable prim ary source for China researchers. In addition to inform ing its readers o f Chinese history, geography, politics, commerce, and society, the Repository also occasionally carried articles on Taiwan, in particular stories warning Anglo-American sailors o f the danger o f sailing through the strait and around Taiwan.6 In January 1834, for exam ple, Am erican m issionary Edwin Stevens w rote a tw elve-page article for the journal, in w hich he provided a map o f Taiwan, described various groups o f the inhabitants o f the island, gave a brief account o f Taiwan’s past, and offered an analysis o f Taiwan’s econom ic potential and com m ercial value.7 Three years later in 1837, The Chinese Repository published an article entitled “Coast o f C hina,” which described Taiwan’s w est coast in great detail and also provided guidelines for navigating between the mainland and the island. In 1845, the journal published a guide for safe navigation to the Pescadores.8 Up to that point, tw o prim ary Am erican groups had shown interest in Taiwan—the m erchants, who desired trade w ith Taiwan and exploitation o f Taiwan’s rich coal and m ineral deposits, and the m issionaries, who wanted to save the souls o f the islanders. In tim e, however, the U.S. governm ent, through its navy and diplom ats, expressed increasing interest in the island. Early in 1834, U.S. consul in B atavia (Java) John Strillaber w rote to Presi­ dent Andrew Jackson, pointing out A m erican interests off the coast o f China. Around the same tim e, a navy officer on the U.S. frigate Potomac showed a passing interest in Taiwan, w hile a doctor on the USS Peacock expressed his

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belief that Taiwan, owing to C hina's m aladm inistration and the chaos on the island, was up for grabs by W estern powers.9 By 1847, Thom as B utler King (1800-1864), a native o f Hampden County in M assachusetts and chairm an o f the House Naval A ffairs Com m ittee (30th Congress), had suggested that the U.S. governm ent establish a commercial shipping line from either San Francisco or M onterey across the Pacific all the way to Canton. Congress­ man King suggested that the navy should set up a coal station in Taiwan to facilitate such trans-Pacific voyages.10 Congressm an K ing's trans-Pacific proposal reflected the ideals o f M ani­ fest D estiny— w ith expansionists, im perialists, adventurers, and publicists o f all kinds turning to the W est C oast and beyond for extending Am erican influence. Thus, trans-Pacific trade and the developm ent o f steam ship tines becam e a popular calling, particularly during the tim e when King was serv­ ing as custom s collector for the port o f San Francisco (1850-1852). U nder the circum stances, it was im perative that the U nited States establish some coal stations in the region. As early as 1849, Com m ander Jam es Glynn o f the USS Preble called for setting up coal stations and freshw ater depots on Taiwan. In January 1849, John W. D avis, U.S. com m issioner to C hina at Canton, actually procured coal sam ples from the island and sent them to W ashington D.C. to test their burning properties. G enerally speaking, Tai­ wanese coal burned faster and was sm okier, but when mixed w ith Welsh or Am erican Cum berland coal, Taiwanese coal could help to ignite the B ritish or Am erican coal." Soon thereafter American navy Captain W.S. Ogden who, in late June o f 1849, sailed his ship, the USS Dolphin from Amoy to Keelung Bay, which was known to be a great coal mining region. Situated on the island’s northern tip, Keelung was form erly a Spanish settlem ent but was eventually captured and held by the Dutch. By this tim e, Keelung was producing large quantities o f bitum inous m inerals for export. Ogden confirmed that Keelung’s coal was not only abundant, but its quality equaled the best from N ew castle.12 During 1850-51, American shippers generally paid between $7 and $8 per ton for Taiwan coal after it had been shipped to M acao on junks. That retail price, however, was much higher than the m arket rate o f $1.50 to $3 if Americans could buy directly from Taiwanese coal miners. The navy also wanted to establish some sort o f station on the island o f Taiwan in order to provide shelter for survivors o f American shipwrecks. For many years, European crews o f shipwrecked vessels suffered from plunder­ ing by the so-called “wreckers’’ on the west coast and by the headhunters in the south cape o f Taiwan. They also endured ill treatm ent at the hands o f Chinese officials, who gave no quarter to castaways. In 1841, when the B rit­ ish transport ship Nerbudda and the opium vessel Ann were wrecked along

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Taiwan’s northern coast, the Chinese had the 187 crew survivors imprisoned, then paraded them outside the capital city Taiwanfu (Tainan) before they were executed. On O ctober 27,1847, the American clipper Paragon sank at north latitude twenty-two degrees, southwest o f Taiwan, on her way from M anila to Amoy. Two English opium clippers Kelpie and Antelope, with American passengers on board, suffered the same woeful fate in O ctober 1848 and May 1851, respectively. In June 1851, the USS M arion nearly hit a shallow reef in northw est Taiwan. Finally, the story o f the three surviving crew members o f the British ship Larpent, which was wrecked off Taiwan, increased American concern about Taiwan. On June 27, 1851, the American com m issioner to China, Dr. Peter Parker, asked W.B. Walker, the commander o f the U.S. East India Squadron (at various tim es also known as the U.S. Asiatic Squadron and the U.S. East Asian Squadron), to dispatch reconnaissance ships to Taiwan to rescue American survivors, who were reportedly being enslaved by the natives. In September 1854, the American reconnaissance gunship Porpoise was separated from the commanding squadron northw est o f the Pescadores and was not heard from again.13 M atthew Perry and Am erican Attem pts to Colonize Taiwan W hile Parker, form erly an ophthalm ologist and missionary and now a diplo­ m at (U.S. Com m issioner to China), was seeking a suitable diplom at to go to Taiwan in search o f shipwrecked Americans, Commodore M atthew C. Perry, who had successfully opened Japan to the W est in 1853-54, sent two o f his ships, the M acedonian and the Supply, to survey and chart the Taiwan coast. It was Perry’s belief, and also that o f nearly every W esterner at the tim e, that China’s ties with Taiwan were tenuous at best. The island was constantly troubled by rebellions in part because o f m isrule and oppression by C h’ing officials. Indeed, when the M acedonian called at Keelung in July 1854, the Chinese m arine m agistrate, Li Chu-ou, actually asked Captain Joel Abbott to help him suppress insurrections and to protect his port against pirates. In return, Li offered Abbott coal and gifts, but the American captain refused the Chinese request. Nevertheless, the chaplain o f the M acedonian, the Reverend George Jones, a Yale graduate who had considerable knowledge o f geology, surveyed eight coal mines and personally selected samples from twelve pits in the eastern district o f Keelung before w riting a positive report on the rich coal deposits o f this northern Taiwanese seaport.14 A fter studying firsthand reports of A bbott and Jones, Perry became con­ vinced o f the strategic value o f Taiwan, either as an entrepôt for American trade, or as an American naval base. In his own correspondence to President M illard Fillm ore (1850-1853), Perry proposed the idea o f an American settle-

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m ent on the island either by conquest or occupation. He elaborated on his proposal in a docum ent called N arrative o f the Expedition o f the Am erican Squadron to the China Seas and Japan (generally known as the Perry Expedi­ tion), published by the 33rd U. S. Congress in 1856. The portion pertaining to Taiwan states: The United States alone should assume the initiative. This significant island, though nominally a province of China, is practically independent. The imperial authorities maintain a feeble and precarious footing only in isolated parts of the island; a large portion being in possession of indepen­ dent tribes, and yet such is its productiveness in minerals, drugs, and the more valuable products of these genial regions, that at this time a revenue, estimated at a million dollars, is collected, though little of none of it goes into the imperial treasury. Perry went on to say: It may, I think, be safely assumed that an American settlement at Keelung would be looked upon with favor by the Chinese, for reason o f the ad­ vantages of protection that would be secured to them by the presence and cooperation of the more warlike settlers, in the defense of thè port and its neighborhood from the depredations of the numerous rebels and pirates who infest the whole island and its coast. Grants of land and important privileges, including the advantages of working the coal mines, could, doubtless, be obtained by purchase at nominal cost, and without looking to any other protection from the government at Washington than that which could be rendered by the occasional presence of one or more vessels of the China and Japan squadron, a flourishing community of Americans might soon be established, which would contribute greatly to the convenience and advantages of our commerce in these seas.19 A fter his successful opening o f Japan, Perry spoke with new authority in identifying Am erica’s strategic interests in that part o f the world. Specifically, Perry had his eyes on the port o f Keelung, designing to establish it as America’s first naval base in the Far East. In addition, he realized that the resources o f the fertile island were either underdeveloped or w asted and the island’s rich natural resources, such as rice, sugar, camphor, sulphur, and top-grade hard­ woods, could becom e a potential source for Am erican com m erce and trade. Taiwan’s rice, w hich was abundant and o f very high quality, had been shipped to China and Japan. Taiwan’s tea, branded later as Form osa oolong by the Scottish pioneer o f the tea trade, John Dodd, was extensively cultivated. Some

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o f the oolong tea was consum ed by the Chinese in the Straits and the Dutch East Indies, but the greater part went to America. In addition, a considerable quantity o f refined sugar was exported to Japan and A ustralia. W ith the great prestige that Perry com m anded, an adm iring Am erican public echoed his bold proposal. In fact, some even envisaged Taiwan as a full-fledged Am erican protectorate, serving as an outpost to guarantee peace and order along the w estern Pacific Rim. Among them were several U.S. diplom ats accredited to China, as w ell as Townsend H arris, a prom inent New Yorker then located at M acao who later becam e W ashington’s first envoy to Japan. Citing authoritative English, French, Dutch and Portuguese sources on Taiwan, H arris concluded that because Taiwan was distant from the m ainland and perennially infested by piracy, and because C hina held only part o f the island and collected little or no revenues from the islanders, Taiwan could easily be stripped away from C hina in the first w ar with any W estern power. Based upon fliese prem ises, Townsend believed that the United States should either offer to buy Taiwan for a sum o f money determ ined by the Chinese or directly negotiate with the aborigines and purchase their title to the w est coast. In a 119-page evaluation report (dated M arch 24,1854), H arris, through his friend Secretary o f State W illiam L. Marcy, suggested to the new president, Franklin Pierce (1853-1857), that the island be purchased for the follow ing reasons: (1) to gain access to Taiwan’s enorm ous natural resources, (2) to develop Taiwan as the gateway through w hich the com m erce o f the Ameri­ can W est Coast could pass to China, (3) to convert the island into a Christian bastion from w hich Am erican culture could radiate to other Asian countries, (4) to use Taiwan as a depot for m erchandise transshipm ent betw een south China and north China, and (5) to use the island to further enhance American relations with Japan.16 On July 31, 1855, Secretary o f State M arcy presented H arris’s detailed proposal on the annexation o f Taiwan to President Pierce. There was no ques­ tion that both the thirteenth (Fillm ore) and the fourteenth (Pierce) presidents o f the U nited States agreed w ith Commodore Perry and Townsend H arris that the U nited States should establish a base or colony somewhere in the W estern Pacific. In the spring o f 1854 Pierce appointed R obert M. M cLane to be U.S. com m issioner to China. D uring Andrew Jackson’s presidency (1829-1837), M cLane’s father had served as secretary o f the treasury and tw ice as m in­ ister to England. The younger M cLane had graduated from W est Point and also represented M aryland in Congress for tw o term s. He was sent to China to check the B ritish im perialist schem e in Asia, and to coordinate with the U.S. Navy in advancing Am erican interests in the region. To follow up this diplom atic move, Pierce also appointed Townsend H arris to be the first U.S. consul general and m inister to Japan.

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Camphor A ttracts Am erican M erchants to Taiwan Enterprising Am ericans who had resided in the Far East or had engaged in the C hina trade w anted to establish a steam ship line to travel betw een C alifornia and Asia. Among the resources that the Am erican shippers were particularly interested in buying was camphor. Taiwan was unique in the world in growing the peculiar evergreen tree called the Camphor laurus. Cam phor as a chem i­ cal com m odity is extracted by steam -distilling from cam phor wood, which could be found in Taiwan’s high interior mountains. Since the early eighteenth century, the w hitish cam phor crystal had becom e a prized rare chug because o f its m edicinal properties and its aroma. It was used in the m anufacture o f celluloid to kill bugs and insects, as well as for incense and burial purposes. By the m id-nineteenth century, W estern researchers had discovered that cam­ phor could also be used for explosives, man-made ivory, and also for film, m edicine, and perfum es. Since 1725, the Taiwan taotai was charged with administrative control o f the island and had a specialized function connected with the cam phor monopoly. A hundred years later in 1825, the taotai began to levy fees from licensed m erchants called chun-kung-chiang (army carpenters) to cut down cam phor trees, process the chemicals, and sell cam phor to foreigners. A single tree could yield as much as seven tons o f camphor, which, in the 1830s, would be worth about U S$3,000, at 21 cents a pound.17As a consequence, the taotai received an im pressive em olum ent from the fees on camphor. In 1855, an American firm named A ugustine Heard & Co. (founded in Canton in 1840) sent the twom asted clipper Rosita to Tamsui and Taipei in northern Taiwan. A fter selling off all o f its opium , Captain C.F. Harding used the proceeds to purchase cam ­ phor. Furtherm ore, H arding negotiated with a Taiwanese licensed company to purchase a total o f 1,300 piculs o f cam phor for a discount price o f 15,000 Ferdinand (Spanish) silver dollars for future delivery. Once these cam phor cargoes were brought to the Hong Kong market, Augustine Heard compradors sold them off w ithin tw o days and netted a profit o f 50 percent.1* Because the profit margin was so high, the natives frequently violated the governm ent m onopoly decree and secretly cut down the cam phor trees in the m ountainous regions inhabited by the aborigines. The illegal acts induced by cam phor trade w ith foreign m erchants frequently led to violent clashes betw een the sm ugglers and the aborigines. D uring the cam phor troubles, Taiwan’s aboriginal C hristian converts, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, suffered varying degrees o f persecution by virtue o f their connection w ith Europeans and Americans. Because the profits were so lucrative, unscrupulous foreigners often chose to buy cam phor from sm ugglers, leading to diplom atic conflicts between the effete Chinese officials and the foreign traders. On many

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occasions, as discussed in C hapter 5, European m en-of-war were deployed as the final arbiter to force the C h’ing officials to relinquish their monopoly over the cam phor trade. In order to ward off pirates, the Rosita and a leased three-m asted vessel, the M iceno, carried guns and 100 pounds o f am munition provided by Joel A bbott, com m ander o f the U.S. East India Squadron.19D ur­ ing the second half o f 1856, H eard & Co. deployed yet another three-m asted vessel nam ed M elanie w ith George H. Roberts as skipper exclusively to carry opium to Taiwan. On its return trip the M elanie transported Taiwanese cam phor to Hong Kong and Canton m arkets. Augustine and A lbert Heard were certainly not the first Am ericans who saw the opportunities for trade with Taiwan. O ther American firms— W. M. Robinet & Co., Nye Bros. & Co., Anthon W illiams & Co, Russell & Co.— had also succeeded in making various arrangem ents with C h’ing officials on the island. Early in 1855, a three-m asted clipper named the Louisiana sailed all the way from San Francisco to purchase an entire cargo o f Taiwanese rice, sugar, and indigo in southern Taiwan. Because the trade was potentially very profitable, the ship’s owner, C.D. W illiams, personally came from Hong Kong to Taiwan to inspect the island’s coastline, choose a residential location for his staff, and make com m ercial arrangem ents with local licensed agents. On his subsequent trips to Taiwan, W illiam s w ent to W u-hsi (G och’e) and Hsiangshan to purchase camphor.20 Finally, three o f the Am erican firms— Robinet, Nye, and W illiams—decided to joint forces by acquiring a three-masted clipper nam ed the Science for the sole purpose o f m onopolizing Taiwan’s cam phor trade. Captained by George A. Potter, the Science was adequately armed with advanced weapons and personnel. On June 27, 1855, Potter signed an agreem ent with Taiwan taotai Yu T ’uo, by w hich the Am ericans secured the exclusive right to trade at the m ost southerly port o f Kaohsiung. One o f the articles in the agreem ent required the Am erican company to assist in the m aintenance o f order against pirates and to loan a m ilitary vessel to the Taiwan authorities (w ith a consigned Chinese dragon flag) w henever the situation called for it. Kaohsiung was a shallow harbor, and because drift sand and silt filled up the lagoon over the years, among the first things the Americans did was to build a sixty-yard-wide channel to facilitate the passage o f vessels from the entrance o f the port to the inner harbor. In the ensuing m onths, the A m ericans also constructed a stone warehouse, two residences, a wharf, a bridge, and a lighting system at the entrance to the port. But m ost im portantly, they erected a facility for the Stars and Stripes to fly every day at this sm all but rising Taiwanese town where m ost o f the inhabitants were fishermen. The total cost was about US$45,000, and it took an entire year to com plete. In addition, the A m ericans agreed to pay tonnage dues, to respect Taiwanese properties, and to cause no harm to civilians. Because some o f the

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other ports in Taiwan w ere too narrow for the Science, the A m ericans soon constructed a tw o-m asted vessel called the Pearl and used this sm aller fast­ sailing ship to haul cargo weighing under eighty tons, including camphor, rice, sugar, peas, and beans, from all over the island. They generally paid $8 for a picul o f camphor, and by being able to bring over 10,000 piculs o f the com­ m odity to the Hong Kong m arket every year, they reaped huge profits.21 W hile W ashington was slow to respond to H arris and Perry’s proposal to annex Taiwan, A m erican m erchants such as W.M. Robinet, G ideon N ye, and C.D. W illiams w ished to expand their com m ercial activities on the island. Nye, a native o f A cushnet, M assachusetts, w ent to Canton to work for his cousin in 1833 at the age o f tw enty-one. W ithin a decade, Nye was reported to have made a fortune o f $6 m illion in the tea trade. Nye was a good M end o f C aleb C ushing, the U .S. m inister plenipotentiary, who negotiated the first Sino-Am erican treaty with Com m issioner C h’i-ying in 1844 at Wanghsia (near M acao) and later served as attorney general in President Pierce’s adm inistration. Unfortunately, N ye’s brother Thom as died in a shipwreck near Taiwan in 1848. The tragedy drew N ye’s attention to Taiwan and he soon wanted to m onopolize the island’s cam phor trade. In order to achieve this goal, he suggested that the U nited States acquire the entire island for as much as $10 m illion in cash. On February 10, 1857, Nye subm itted a plan for the purchase o f Taiwan to Dr. Peter Parker, pledging that he and other Am ericans would assist the U.S. governm ent in its colonization o f Taiwan. A month later, Nye also w rote to Caleb Cushing, who was at this tim e the U.S. attorney general. Nye inform ed Cushing that he and other enterprising Am ericans sought to gain sovereign control o f Taiwan. On A pril 10, 1857, Nye sent a sim ilar letter to Commodore M atthew Perry.22 W hile Commodore Perry knew that the new adm inistration in W ashing­ ton would not approve N ye’s proposal to take Taiwan away from China, Dr. Parker, the U.S. m inister to China, was undoubtedly persuaded by Nye, as he hoped to see the A m erican flag hoisted on the island permanently. Between D ecem ber 1856 and M arch 1857, Dr. Parker repeatedly and em phatically urged his governm ent to acquire Taiwan. He cited the strategic and commer­ cial value o f the island, as w ell as the argum ents o f civilization, progress, and religion. According to a confidential report sent to B ritish Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon by Sir John Bowring—then B ritish governor o f Hong Kong and concurrent m inister to China—Parker arranged a m eeting w ith Bowring and French m inister A lphonse de Bourboulon at M acao on A pril 2,1857, to map out a three-pow er strategy against China. A t the m eeting, Parker, who had lived in C hina for three decades, suggested that the United States should occupy Taiwan, B ritain should seize the Chou-shan (Chushan) islands off the Chekiang coast, and France should take over K orea.23 It is obvious that

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Parker was worried that Britain m ight take Taiwan for Queen Victoria before W ashington could act. B ut if B ritain was given the “first refusal” to occupy the Chou-shan islands, she would be content not to interfere with A m erica’s scheme for Taiwan. Parker’s scheme, however, would go nowhere because, by this point, there was a new president in W ashington, Jam es Buchanan (1857-1861), who once served as U.S. m inister to G reat B ritain. Inaugurated in M arch 1857, he was preoccupied with serious dom estic crises, in particular the loom ing conflict betw een the abolitionists and the secessionists. The new president appointed W illiam B. Reed, a professor o f Am erican history at the U niversity o f Penn­ sylvania, as the new U.S. m inister to C hina to replace Parker. In the summer o f 1857, Lord Napier, British m inister to W ashington, gained assurances from John Appleton, American assistant secretary o f state, that the United States had indeed no plan to occupy Taiwan. In the fall o f 1857, the new adm inistration, for all practical purposes, had vetoed the scheme for an Am erican protector­ ate in distant Asia. And since there were no American officials on the island o f Taiwan to look after their interests, the lucrative cam phor trade gradually passed over to the B ritish.24 As Reed was instructed to m aintain “peace and com ity with China” and to respect C hina’s “territorial integrity,” the United States rem ained neutral during the Anglo-French w ar against China between December 1857 and May 1858. On the other hand, during the negotiation o f the Treaty o f Tientsin, Reed was instrum ental in persuading the Chinese governm ent to open Taiwan to foreign trade and residence. However, old C hina hands such as Parker and Nye believed that the U.S. A siatic Squadron and M arines could easily have seized and perm anently occupied Taiwan during C hina’s troubled tim es in the late 1850s. Notw ithstanding the U.S. governm ent’s benign neglect o f the island, A nglo-Am erican trade with Taiwan grew by leaps and bounds during the 1850s. B ritish and Am erican m erchants established trading stations on Taiwan, such as those at the Ape’s H ill lim estone bluff north o f Kaohsiung Harbor. Based on A rticle 14 o f the Treaty o f Tientsin, im posed on C hina on June 18,1858, both G reat Britain and the United States were entitled to open consulates in Taiwan. N evertheless, despite the fact that the Stars and Stripes started flying at the port o f Kaohsiung one year before the Union Jack did, the U nited States, prim arily owing to a lack o f funds, could not find a suitable Am erican who was w illing to serve as consul. A lthough the post rem ained vacant, during the summer o f 1865A.L. Clarke, the first American vice-consul at Foochow, made a visit to Taiwan.23 By 1860, Britain, as discussed in C hapter 4, had established a consulate in Taiwanfu and engaged in trade in Kaohsiung, Tamsui, and Keelung. London also appointed the botanist Robert Swinhoe as vice consul for the whole island

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in 1861 and placed George C.P. Braune in charge o f British consular affairs at the port o f Tamsui. In 1867, the British secured a “perm anent lease” on Tamsui’s old D utch Red Fort and converted it into the B ritish consulate. In the meantim e, the governm ents o f Denmark and Prussia both asked Swinhoe to represent their interests on the island. C hief among Sw inhoe’s instructions was to advance the com m ercial interests on the island o f such well-known Hong Kong firms as Jardine, M atheson & Co., and D ent & Co. In the m iddle o f 1863, the first custom s house was opened in Taiwan at Tamsui; subsequent custom s branches were set up in the other three ports to facilitate trade with the local population, which had been previously conducted under irregular and difficult conditions. From then on, a fixed tariff on all articles that could be im ported and exported legally was stipulated, and the Englishm an John W illiam Howell was appointed com m issioner o f custom s to issue port clear­ ances and collect paym ents o f the tariff duties for the island o f Taiwan.26 By this tim e, the C ivil W ar raging in the United States had forced Wash­ ington to put its Far Eastern affairs on the back burner. However, American ships continued to come to Taiwan for various com m ercial activities. N ear the end o f 1861, for example, the American twin-m asted vessel Iskanderia loaded rice in Kaohsiung, but on its way back to Amoy ran aground and was stranded on the sand shoals near P’u-tai Cape, several m iles north o f Taiwanfu. W hile Captain Frank J. Ruders was appealing to local officials for help, all o f the cargo on his vessel, worth $18,000, was plundered by the local inhabitants. The U.S vice consul at Amoy, T. H art H yatt, Jr., asked the Chinese govern­ m ent for com pensation, but to no avail.27 Eleven m onths later, the American three-m asted Lucky Star, en route from Shanghai to Hong Kong loaded with cotton worth $80,000, was forced by severe gales to seek shelter near the port o f Tamsui. Again, the dam aged vessel was plundered and C aptain Charles Nelson, his wife, and eight members o f his crew were kidnapped and detained by the plunderers for a week. In the end, British A cting Vice Consul George Braune and French custom s official Baron de M eritens had to raise a ransom to secure their release.2* Frequent shipwrecks and the reported harsh treatm ent o f survivors ulti­ mately came to the attention o f Anson Burlingam e, U.S. m inister to China. Though Burlingam e did not press the Chinese governm ent hard enough to win com pensation for the loss o f the Iskanderia and the Lucky Star, he de­ manded better protection by Chinese officials in Taiwan for American sailors and property in the future. In the meantim e, the custom s house was built on the shore at Anping (site o f the old Dutch Fort Zeelandia) and W illiam A. Pickering, an English tidew aiter in Kaohsiung, was placed in charge o f the Anping port in 1865. During Pickering’s tenure with Anping Custom s, the Am erican schooner General Sherman sailed from Shanghai for Taiwanfu in

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ballast. The Am ericans had come to load Taiwan sugar for m arkets in North China and Japan. Interestingly, on board was a General Burgevine, the noto­ rious Am erican adventurer who once commanded the Ever Victorious Army but who, after a bitter quarrel with Li Hung-chang, went over to the side o f the Taiping rebels.29In 1867, Pickering was lured away from his custom s post to work for the M cPhail Brothers trading firm. Functioning at the same tim e as consul for France and the N etherlands, Neil M cPhail soon established the largest European trading firm in southern Taiwan. But after a heavy loss in the opium trade and a tea cargo wreck off the Pescadores, the rem aining M cPhail Bros, stock was sold to another British firm, Elies & Co., with Pickering in charge o f E lles’s Taiwanfu branch. Shortly after Pickering assumed his new post, yet another American ship was wrecked, and Pickering would ultim ately be dragged into the escalating U.S.-Taiwan disputes. U.S. Gunboats and W recked Ships Along the Taiwan Coast On M arch 12,1867, the Am erican barque Rover, sailing from Swatow north­ ward to Newchwang, struck the Vele Rete rocks off the extrem e southern tip o f Taiwan. The badly dam aged vessel sank, but the captain, Joseph W. H unt, his w ife, and his tw elve-m an crew m ade it ashore. G eneral Charles W. Le G endre, then U .S. consul at Amoy, confirm ed the death o f nine men but suspected that the rem ainder m ight still be alive. Bom o f a French father and an Am erican m other, Le G endre had practiced law earlier in his career; he had fought all through the C ivil W ar and sustained a severe wound in his left eye. D uring his tenure as U .S. consul at Amoy, he wore a glass eye and was as aggressive a diplom at as he had been a gallant officer.30 By early A pril 1867, he had persuaded A dm iral H.H. B ell, com m ander o f the U.S. A siatic Squadron, to order the USS A shuelot to search for A m erican survivors on Taiwan. Accom panied by Le G endre, Com m ander J.C. Ferbiger and his crew sailed first to Tamsui and then to Taiwanfu, w here he arrived on A pril 18. The C h’ing officials in Taiwanfu told the A m ericans that south cape was inhabited by uncivilized aborigines who w ere beyond the im perial dom ain and the pale o f Chinese civilization. They then advised the foreigners to obey the boundary policy and not venture into the forbid­ ding aboriginal territory. The irony is that w hile the Chinese governm ent, under international pressure, tried to shirk all responsibility w ith regard to the shipw recked survivors, it also renounced claim to som e tw o-thirds o f the total territory o f Taiwan. But while Chinese authorities m eant to absolve them selves o f any respon­ sibility and refused to provide assistance in the rescue efforts, the Ashuelot sailed southward to Kaohsiung Harbor. On A pril 24, 1867, the American

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rescue team reached the locale where the fatal shipwreck had occurred. A fter surveying the jungle from offshore, Americans realized that without amphibi­ ous capabilities and logistic support, they could not land safely. Commander Ferbiger suspended the search and returned to Amoy the same day.31 A t this juncture, Isaac J. Allen, U.S. consul at Hong Kong, rekindled Commodore M atthew Perry and M inister Peter Parker’s interest in acquiring the island “for the protection o f home interests” and for “the greatest boon” o f American commerce. He suggested that W ashington take possession o f Taiwan either by force or by purchase. In addition to reiterating Perry and Parker’s argum ent for U.S. occupation o f the island, Allen em phasized that the m ajor European powers had all established bases in the Far East, while the United States had neither harbors nor naval bases in the area from which to protect American interests. He hoped also to thw art the am bitions o f the other m ajor powers on Taiwan.32 Convinced that China’s de facto rule over the island was indeed lim ited and ineffective, Admiral Bell decided to use force to rescue A merican survivors on his own without bothering to ask for perm ission from Chinese authorities. He then mustered 178 m arines, five artilleries, and more than 120 rifles, and prepared four-days-worth o f provisions and water. On June 13,1867, B ell’s flagship, the Hartford, and the USS Wyoming appeared at the scene o f the shipwreck. Soon after the m arines landed, they started a frontal attack by moving uphill and burning the thick green jungle and green grass, including huts and buildings. The natives took heavy casualties while using guerrillalike tactics from 9:00 a . m . until 2:00 p . m . and managed to kill Lieutenant Commander A lexander S. M ackenzie. Ultimately, the intense heat, cases o f severe sunstroke, and the death o f M ackenzie brought the search to an unsuc­ cessful conclusion.33 G eneral Charles Le G endre’s Footprints on Taiwan Alm ost three m onths had elapsed before Charles Le Gendre decided to go ashore at Longkiau Bay, on the west side o f the south cape. During his difficult search to the south, beginning on Septem ber 10 and lasting until O ctober 30, Le Gendre was assisted by W illiam A. Pickering, whose knowledge o f the natives and their language was invaluable. Le Gendre was also accom panied by the Taiwanfu general Liu M ing-teng. They explored many m ountainous districts, traveled through narrow paths into the interior, and interviewed both the Chinese settlers and the aboriginal tribesm en. Though Le Gendre failed to find any m issing Americans, he had a meeting with the chieftain who repre­ sented the confederation o f eighteen Koalut aboriginal tribes in that area. The chief, Tsou Chi-tu (known to W esterners as Tauketok or Tooke-tok), expressed

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regret over w hat had happened to the survivors o f the Rover and prom ised to protect future shipwrecked foreigners. Le Gendre also concluded a ten-article agreem ent with G eneral Liu on how to apply necessary measures to protect distressed foreigners in the area, including erecting a fortified observatory at the southern end o f the bay. Before returning to Amoy, General Le Gendre held a m em orial service for Lieutenant Commander M ackenzie on the very spot where he was killed.34 The number and intensity o f several naval battles, commercial transactions, and personal contacts show W estern interests in dealing independently with native Taiwanese. A t the tim e o f the Rover incident, Taiwan’s w estern plain had about three m illion Chinese, w ith an estim ated half m illion “civilized ab­ origines,” plus an uncounted number o f “savage aborigines.” A fter Le Gendre’s m ilitary and diplom atic endeavor, he became convinced that in dealing with the Chinese officials, who had an inordinate sense o f superiority and were also skilled at double talk, American warships should be used to persuade them. Compared with the Chinese officials, on the other hand, Taiwan’s aborigines, whom Le Gendre insisted were not cannibals, were sim pler, m odest, and less cunning, and should be treated with empathy, straightforw ardness, and kind­ ness. G enerally speaking, the island’s indigenous people distrusted and hated the Chinese but were friendly tow ard w hite men except when the m andarins interfered. During his tenure as U.S. consul in Amoy, the impetuous Le Gendre worked indefatigably to enhance American com m ercial interests in Taiwan, in particular attem pting to reduce the red tape in trade and to abolish a dozen excise taxes (on top o f the established custom s duties) that were levied on goods com ing in and going out o f Taiwan harbors.35 It is worth noting that o f the 3.61 m illion pounds o f tea produced in Taiwan in 1874, the bulk was exported to the United States. On many occasions, Le G endre personally investigated Taiwan’s coal mines, sending rock oil samples to New York for laboratory tests. In 1869, he strongly supported a join t venture organized and financed by American busi­ nessman C.E. Collins, M ilisch & Co. (German), and the Taiwanese landlord P ’an Kuan-sheng to introduce W estern technology and new m achines for extracting Keelung coal. N evertheless, local Chinese officials vetoed the joint venture and P’an was required to return the earnest money he had received from Collins and Jam es M ilisch. The persistent Le Gendre continued to lobby the Chinese governm ent to privatize Keelung coal mines until P’an Kuan-sheng died w hile incarcerated.36 In the ensuing months, Le Gendre, showing his clear contem pt for the C h’ing officials in Taiwan, demanded that the Chinese governm ent term inate its cam phor monopoly and allow Taiwan’s aborigines to engage in direct trade with foreigners. He had many disputes with local m ainland officials and drew the ire o f his American superiors. Like the Briton

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W iliam Pickering, Le Gendre harbored a negative opinion o f the Chinese. He was also known throughout East Asia as a ‘Taiw an expert.” It was not long before Le Gendre had the opportunity to apply his tough “gunboat diplomacy” to settle a dispute with the Chinese in Taiwan. In the fall o f 1868, the English firm Dodd & Co., looking for an office along the Tamsui R iver in Taipei, rented property from a woman named Huang Chuang, whose xenophobic clansm en vehem ently opposed such a deal. The firm ’s manager, Crawford D. Kerr, disregarded the wishes o f Huang’s relatives, took posses­ sion o f the property, and set off a melee. W hen British merchants suffered severe injuries and substantial m erchandise damage, Henry P. H olt, then British vice consul in Tamsui who also served as a U.S. consular agent, sent a dispatch to Amoy, asking Le Gendre for help. On O ctober 23, Le Gendre sailed aboard the U.S. steam ship Aroostook to Tamsui and, together with the British gunboat Janus, forced the Huang clan to pay for all the damages and injuries sustained by Dodd & Co. and also pressured the Chinese authorities to dism iss their Taipei officials.37 W hile Le Gendre was getting tough on the Chinese, he was kinder and gentler toward the aborigines. For exam ple, on February, 21 1869, he came to Kaohsiung first, and together with Pickering and a custom s official named Alex J. M an, went back to the savage land o f the south cape. He gave C hief Tsou Chi-tu soap, beads, red cloth, small m irrors, jew elry, steel im plem ents, and weapons, including pistols and rifles. In return, the chief reiterated his com­ mitm ent not to harm foreigners and also pledged to continue cordial relations with the Americans. This appeasem ent policy appeared to work well— since, for the next two years, no shipwrecked crews were hunted down by the natives. In fact, despite the indifference o f the Chinese officials, C hief Tsou Chi-tu and his tribesmen twice provided refuge for shipwrecked foreigners and afterward transported them to Kaohsiung. But when the foreign shippers sent money to the tribesm en to thank them for helping their crews, the Chinese officials in Taiwan kept it to line their own pockets. By sharp contrast, while the stench o f mandarin corruption and obstructionism hung over the intervening months, Le Gendre again cam e back in person to the south cape to give the tribesm en gifts and renew his friendship with the chief. During another visit in late Feb­ ruary and early M arch o f 1872, he brought a thirty-eight-m em ber entourage, which included sailors, doctors, surveyors, interpreters, photographers, and coolies. Among other issues, Le Gendre discussed the possibility o f direct trade between American merchants and the tribesm en.38 A fter ending his role as an Am erican official in Taiwan, G eneral Le Gendre worked for the Japanese in 1872 as a counselor in the settlem ent o f diplom atic disputes with China over Taiwan. He accom panied a Japanese special envoy to B eijing to negotiate w ith Chinese officials over the m urder

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o f some fifty-four Ryukyuan fishermen in 1871 by the aboriginal Peony tribe (the Botans) o f Taiwan, w hich was not affiliated w ith the eighteen-tribe confederation headed by C hief Tsou. Subsequently, Le G endre recruited an Am erican interpreter, Jam es Johnson, U.S. naval officer Douglas C assel, and army lieutenant Jam es R. W asson to train Japanese soldiers. On behalf o f the Japanese governm ent, he leased an A m erican m ail steam er called the New York from the Pacific M ail Steam ship Company to transport Japanese expeditionary troops to Taiwan. W hen the Japanese thum bed their noses at the Chinese governm ent by ignoring Chinese claim s o f sovereignty over Taiwan and finally took action against the Peony tribe in late M arch 1874, an Am erican news reporter by the name o f Edward H. House journeyed to southern Taiwan to cover the m ilitary action, thanks to Le G endre’s adroit m aneuvering.39 In addition, the USS M onocacy sailed to the southern tip o f Taiwan to m onitor the Japanese landing. However, Adm iral A.M . Pennock, the new com m ander o f the U.S. A siatic Squadron, instructed his vessels and personnel to m aintain neutrality while C hina did nothing to stop the Japanese from slaughtering hundreds o f Peony tribesm en.40 In late A ugust 1874, in order to justify Japanese m ilitary action in Taiwan, Le Gendre anonymously published in Shanghai a slim pam phlet w ith the provocative title Is Aboriginal Formosa a Part o f the Chinese Empire? The booklet was like a bom bshell throw n at m andarin officialdom when it was translated into Chinese tw o days later. In addition to this booklet, Le G endre also donated thirty-one Taiwanese ethnographic specim ens and cultural artifacts to New York’s A m erican M useum o f N atural History. As late as the 1870s, the United States continued to use its Amoy consulate to look after its commercial interests in Taiwan. From tim e to tim e, American consuls in Amoy would appoint consular agents to be stationed on the island. During the 1870s, for exam ple, John G. Cass and John Dodd successively functioned as U.S. consular agents in Tamsui and Keelung. Dodd was a pugna­ cious Scot who arrived in Tamsui in 1864 and made a fortune by improving the quality o f Taiwan tea and creating a worldwide m arket for Form osa oolong. Beginning in 1865, he imported clippings of the tea plant from Fukien, making loans to Taiwanese tea farm ers to extend its cultivation. Freshly picked green tea leaves were then fired and dried to be packaged and exported. During the 1870s and 1880s, Dodd & Co. shipped some 300,000 half-chests o f this brand o f oolong tea to Am erica annually.41 Alexander Frater, another Englishman functioning as a U.S. consular agent, was on hand in Taiwanfii and Kaohsiung to assist A merican traders in southern Taiwan. Since Le G endre’s departure from his Amoy post, with the exception o f the shipwreck o f the American vessel Forest Belle in 1878, there were no significant issues between Taiwan and the United States.

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However, American trade w ith the island was reduced in 1883-1885 when China and France had an acrim onious dispute over Vietnam: the French blockaded the Taiwan Strait, captured Tamsui and Keelung, and occupied the Pescadores. Am id increased concern about the precarious status o f the island, on O ctober 12,1885, China announced that it had established Taiwan as a new Chinese “province,” and Liu M ing-ch’uan, who directed the island's defense against the French, was appointed its governor (hsun-fu). G overnor Liu fos­ tered a m odernization program by introducing railway, postal, telegraph, and steam ship system s and by erratically developing the Keelung coal m ines. In June 1886, an American named Jam es H arrison W ilson cam e to Taiwan and revealed his plans to build railroads, but he was unsuccessful. U ltim ately, the British and Germans won bids to build Taiwan’s first twenty-two kilom eters o f rail lines. By this tim e, however, Taiwan was im porting Am erican petroleum , cotton goods, and certain classes o f hardw are in increasing quantities, while A m erica bought nearly all the Taiwanese tea and sugar available for export.42 Having divided the island into four prefectures, eleven counties, and five subprefectures, the am bitious governor moved the capital from the historical city o f Tainan to Taipei. He also attem pted to create a new im age o f Taiwan by reining in bureaucratic growth, cutting back on frills, and bolstering Taiwan’s revenues. One quick and effective way to raise revenues was to yield more m aritim e custom s fees on such com m odities as opium, tea, coal, gold, and camphor. Thus, among his first acts Liu im posed a special im post known as the likin (excise tax) on top o f the usual custom s duties on both outgoing and incom ing goods. Once im plem ented, the likin would also be levied on cargo being transferred from one Taiwanese port to another, such as from Keelung to Lukang, or from Tamsui to Kaohsiung, or even from A nping to Tainan. U nder the circum stances, the farther the cargo went, the m ore fees foreign shippers had to pay.43 Chartes Denby’s M ission to Taiwan European and Am erican m inisters objected to these new custom s taxes and m et in B eijing on January 18,1888, to com e up with counterm easures. As a result, Colonel C harles Denby, U.S. m inister in Beijing, lodged a protest w ith the Chinese governm ent, dem anding that the Taiwan governor stop levying new duty fees.44W hile the dispute over the new fees was brewing, the governor also attem pted to resurrect the cam phor monopoly. He decreed that cam phor be brought under tighter governm ent control with strict regulations on fell­ ing gigantic laurel trees, the m anufacturing o f cam phor stills, the sale and purchase o f the chem icals, and so on. U nder the circum stances, no foreigner could buy camphor except through the governor’s office and on the governor’s

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term s. By this tim e, when Taiwan annually produced more than 10,000 piculs o f this product, there was a great dem and for cam phor in A m erica, with one picul selling for tw elve silver taels. The governor now decreed that the price o f cam phor would be raised from tw elve to thirty silver taels a picul. Also, under the new m onopoly system , the governm ent was entitled to collect a 25 percent fee for every picul o f cam phor sold to a foreign m erchant.43 This new policy cut deeply into the profits o f both foreign m erchants and their Taiwanese agents. B ut as the price o f camphor, valued for its anesthetic and antiseptic properties, continued to soar in the w orld m arket, sm uggling activities reached their highest levels ever. In spite o f the checkpoints erected by the provincial governm ent at H ou-lung, Ta-chia, Lukang, and other cam phor trading districts betw een Tamsui and Taiw anfu, Taiw an’s coastline was a sieve as illegal activities continued unabated. W orse still, the policy set off feuds am ong clandestine Chinese dealers, who form ed sem iprivate arm ies to attack the aborigines in the northern m ountains, where the laurel trees w ere abundant. For their part, the defending aborigines lured the C hinese intruders into their forbidding hills, trapped them , and killed them tim e and again.46 There is no question that any A m erican who had ever dealt with China or Japan would soon realize that Taiwan possessed a unique geopolitical location and was rich in natural resources, to w hich they and nationals from the other world powers m ust pay close attention. It was for this reason that during the early summer o f 1888, the U.S. m inister to China, Charles Denby, decided to visit Taiwan to gain firsthand knowledge o f the situation on the island. The D epartm ent o f the Navy instructed the U.S. A siatic Squadron to keep watch over the m inister’s tour. Boarding the USS Juniata in Shanghai on M ay 11, 1888, Denby arrived in Amoy. Together with Captain W.T. Burwell and U.S. Amoy consul W illiam S. Crow ell, Denby sailed across the strait and arrived at Keelung on M ay 19. He was warmly received by representatives o f the C h’ing governm ent Denby inspected Keelung’s Arm strong breech-loading cannon, its coal m ines, and its rail system. The A m erican m inister was then carried by sedan chair to Taipei, which was surrounded by a new and w ell-constructed wall o f rubble masonry, about eighteen feet high and ten feet thick. G overnor Liu showed Denby several o f his new ly installed m odernization projects, such as a cartridge factory, the telegraph lines betw een Tamsui and Foochow, a W estern-style school, and a m odem lum beryard. B ut the conversation betw een the A m erican m inister and the governor focused prim arily on a huge debt the Taiw anese com prador Chen Shou-li ow ed the A m erican m erchant Frank C ass, whose unfulfilled am bition was to construct a railroad netw ork for the island.47 On M ay 23, Denby took a sm all boat to Tam sui and investigated the sulphur

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Figure 6.1 Governor Uu Ming-Chuan, 1885-1801

m ines nearby. He found that the islanders were friendly tow ard A m ericans and, because alm ost all o f Tam sui’s export goods ended up in A m erica, he urged his governm ent to establish a consulate at Tamsui. Even though there was no diplom atic breakthrough o f any sort, D enby’s long-held con­ viction about the strategic im portance and the rich resources o f the island was augm ented and reinforced by his fact-finding tour.48 Indeed, near the conclusion o f the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Denby told his superiors in W ashington that China ceding Taiwan to Japan was sure to be a condition o f any peace settlem ent.49

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Two Harvard G raduates Take Charge o f Taiwan Custom s In June o f 1891, Governor Liu M ing-ch’uan left office because o f political disputes and illness. Ironically, only a few weeks before Liu departed from Taiwan, the monopoly policy on the island’s cam phor was also term inated, thanks to four years o f persistent pressure from the diplomatic corps in Beijing, as well as unruly m arket forces. In the m eantim e, within a period o f fourteen months, Taiwan had a new governor named Shao You-lien and a new American custom s com m issioner at Tamsui, H osea B. M orse. A H arvard graduate and old China hand, M orse was to function as the interm ediary between G overnor Shao, who was a form er Shanghai taotai and diplom at, and A lexander H osie, the British consul in Taiwan. Upon their arrival at Tamsui in January 1892, M orse’s wife, who “had never been particularly fond o f China or the Chinese,” surprisingly fell “in love with what she [saw o f Taiwan’s] external aspect.”90 On the other hand, M orse also had to work with an ineffective custom s su­ perintendent named Shao W en-p’u, who “did practically nothing and was lethargic at w hat he did.” But because Shao was a relative o f the governor, M orse tried to m aintain a perfunctory relationship with him .91 M orse pledged to help the governor find new sources o f revenue, includ­ ing m averick ideas about privatizing the island’s coal and gold mines and making a thorough search for the island’s oil and gold reserves. In 1892, M orse collected $300,000 in duties on tea, and in 1893 he brought in 700,000 silver taels from the cam phor trade. In the meantim e, M orse could also count on an annual custom s incom e o f $200,000 in gold.92 In 1892 some 5,000 Taiwanese worked at digging and washing gold sand on the Tamsui R iver and the Keelung R iver for a perm it fee o f 10 cents a day. A year later, a new discovery at the Chin-kua-shih mine near Keelung harbor attracted between 6,000 and 7,000 w orkers, who paid 20 cents each for the right to work the sand.93A m erican oil had dom inated Taiwan’s kerosene m arket for a decade, with its volume o f im port increasing steadily each year. However, at the tim e M orse assumed his customs post, cheaper Russian oil gradually gained a niche in Taiwan’s m arket. As a consequence, M orse designed various schemes to ensure A m erica’s dom inant position in the island’s m arket in general and the sale o f kerosene oil in particular. W ithin a year o f M orse’s arrival, the trade that passed through the dozen or so European and American houses doing business in Taiwan was valued at £4.5 m illion.94 By 1894, two Harvard graduates were managing duty collection for Taiwan Province, with M orse in charge in the northern half o f the island (Tamsui and Keelung) and W illiam F. Spinney in the southern half. N evertheless, when the w ar betw een China and Japan broke out in the summer o f 1894, the lives and careers o f the few (but im portant) Am ericans in Taiwan were greatly dis-

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rupted. For one thing, B eijing prom oted the form er provincial treasurer T ang Ching-sung to be the new governor. Instead o f consulting with the B ritish and Am ericans, T a n g , less im pressive than his predecessor, relied heavily on the advice o f the wealthy German m erchant Count A. Butler, who sold the governor 5,000 M auser rifles. As an em ployee o f the Chinese government, Custom s Com m issioner H osea B. M orse was obligated to help T a n g raise money to defend the island against the Japanese. However, Governor T a n g was not cut out to manage a crisis o f international proportions. Being a native o f Kwangtung Province, T a n g replaced local Taiwanese with Cantonese to defend Keelung Harbor, but the latter were quickly routed. On A pril 2,1895, M aritim e Custom s Inspector-G eneral R obert H art w rote to both M orse and Spinney, w arning them that Taiwan was doomed; if it was not ceded to the Japanese it would be occupied w ithin the month.33 As the situation deteriorated, the loom ing danger set off a wave o f panic among the 180-odd foreign residents, made up m ostly o f English and Ameri­ cans, a few Germans, and a sprinkling o f Scandinavians. In the m eantime, disorder spread to many parts o f the island when angry Taiwanese attacked G overnor T a n g in his Taipei office. By late A pril 1895, tw enty-five German sailors and thirty B ritish m arines were deployed with their gunboats along the eastern bank o f the Tamsui R iver in Taipei, as well as at Kaohsiung H arbor in southern Taiwan. It should be remembered that during the peace negotiations, it was form er U.S. Secretary o f State John W. Foster who m ediated between the Chinese and the Japanese. It was also Foster who escorted the Chinese representative Li Ching-fang (Li H ung-chang’s adopted son) to Keelung H arbor to surrender Taiwan (on June 2,1895) to Adm iral Kabayama Sukenori (1837-1922), Japan’s first governor-general o f Taiwan. A fter briefing Foster and Li Ching-fang in person at Keelung, M orse ordered the w ithdrawal o f his Keelung staff to Taipei.36 On May 25,1895, the islanders had launched an independence movement by declaring Taiwan a republic and hoisting a tiger flag over all governm ent sites to replace the yellow dragon flag o f C h’ing China. Unfortunately, the republic was poorly organized, and the Taiwanese m ilitia lacked a cohesive central command and heavy weapons. At this juncture, T a n g Ching-sung, now “President o f the Republic o f Taiwan,” asked M orse to continue collecting custom s revenues. M orse com plied, but beginning on June 8— the day when Japanese forces occupied the port o f Tamsui— he handed the customs revenues over to the Japanese instead. In the ensuing days, as T a n g C h’ing-sung and his staff were fleeing Taiwan, M orse handed over the custom s departm ent and its accounts to S. J. Nomura, the Japanese com m issioner o f custom s for the port o f Tamsui, then returned with his fam ily safely to China.37Ironically, it was another A m erican, Jam es W. D avidson, a correspondent with the New

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York H erald who, on the morning o f June 7,1895, serving as a Japanese scout, led the occupying troops into the city o f Taipei. On June 17, the trium phant Kabayama Sukenori arrived in Taipei and in a cerem ony there inaugurated the beginning o f Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan.3* K now ledgeable A m ericans such as Le G endre, Denby, and D avidson seemed to favor an orderly and m odernized Japan over a stagnant and semifeudalistic China, but the islanders refused to surrender to the new colonial master. N either would they ever w illingly leave the “im m ortal island,” so proclaim ed by their forefathers. The upshot was a prolonged Taiwanese insur­ gency against the Japanese rulers.39As for the United States, prim arily owing to the American C ivil War, it m issed the opportunity to acquire the island as it was strongly and repeatedly urged to do by its own navy officers, diplom ats, and m erchants. By the tim e the United States realized that it also needed a base in the Far East, Taiwan had already been grabbed by the Japanese, and therefore the United States decided to take the Philippines in 1898. A m erica’s relationship with Taiwan has gone through many perm utations since the Japanese occupation o f the island, from treating Taiwan as the colony o f a m ortal enemy, Japan, during W orld W ar U, to allying with the island against Communist C hina during the Cold W ar era. C hapter 9 details how the United States helped the Taiwanese to create a dem ocratic governm ent in harmony with American traditions and values in recent decades. Before investigating the later relationship with the United States, Japanese influence on the island m ust be discussed.

7 The Roots of the Japanese Empire The Colonization of Taiwan

Early Japanese Interests in Ihiw an For centuries, Taiwan was a haven for m erchant-pirates. During the early seventeenth century, when European vessels first appeared in the Far East, local Japanese lords tw ice sent envoys to Taiwan (A rim a Harunobu in 1609 and M urayama Toan in 1616). But both attem pts failed to establish any trade relationship with the islanders.1Between 1634 and 1640, the Dutch m erchants frequently bought raw silk and silk textiles in China, then used Taiwan as a transit station for exchanging silk products for Japanese silver bullion. Owing to the Tokugawa shogunate’s isolationist foreign policy, however, Japanese docum ents scarcely m entioned Taiw an because nothing significant had happened betw een the two. Indeed, a Japanese map o f Taiwan did not even exist until 1849 when Lord Asakawa Kanae, the daimyo o f H izen (in northern Kyushu), ordered the com pilation o f a biography o f Koxinga, whose m other was Japanese.2N evertheless, after the U.S. fleet led by Commodore M atthew P eny forced Japan to open up to trade and diplom acy in 1854, a num ber o f Japanese thinkers began to express an interest in taking over Taiwan. In his Yushuroku (Recording while under incarceration), Yoshida Shoin (1830-1859) mapped out a security plan for his country that would incorporate Taiwan in a regional strategy chain. Katsura Taro (1847-1913), a Yamaguchi samurai and a victorious com m ander during the Sino-Japanese W ar o f 1894-1895, succinctly characterized Taiwan’s strategic im portance, “It is not only the m ost ideal location for expanding [Japanese] pow er to southern China, but also to the islands in Southeast A sia.’’3 But the event that caused the government o f Japan to deal with Taiwan headon cam e from a shipwreck. In Decem ber 1871, a Ryukyu fishing and trading vessel out o f M iyako Island was wrecked on the southern coast o f Taiwan and fifty-four o f its crew were believed to have been m urdered by the Botan (Peony) tribes. Although this would have ordinarily been an international maritime safety issue, the newly revived Japanese government decided to make it a territorial sovereignty issue and launched a punitive expedition against 128

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the aboriginal tribes. During the course o f preparation, Japan enlisted AngloAmerican m ilitary advisors and chartered the B ritish steam ship Yorkshire and the Am erican Pacific M ail ship New York to transport troops and ammunition. On May 9, 1874, five ships carrying several thousand Japanese troops and laborers, under the command o f Admiral Saigo Tsugumichi, younger brother o f Saigo Takamori (1827-1877), landed at Longkiau Bay (the very spot where U.S. m arines had landed to search for shipw recked A m ericans on June 13, 1867). Heavy fighting continued throughout June and July against the eighteen tribes, com prising 2,300 braves. However, sw eltering heat and tropical diseases deterred the Japanese advance. In Septem ber 1874, the Japanese governm ent sent Okubo Toshimichi (1830-1878) to be the High Com m issioner in Beijing. A leading statesman o f the M eiji restoration, Okubo challenged C hina's sovereignty over aboriginal Taiwan, saying, “According to international law, territory w ithout jurisdiction cannot be recognized as a part o f a domain. Therefore, I am fully convinced that aboriginal Taiwan is not Chinese dom ain.’’4 The crisis lasted until October, when the Chinese im perial court agreed to pay 500,000 silver taels for the m urder o f the Ryukyu fishermen, as well as for defraying Japanese m ilitary expenditures. A fter successfully dealing with C hina’s diplom atic stratagem , Okubo made a personal visit to his fellow Satsum a w arrior Saigo and the Japanese troops in southern Taiwan before returning to Tokyo tow ard the end o f November. Admiral Saigo survived the ravages o f Taiwan diseases, which killed more than 500 Japanese soldiers and coolies, and landed at Nagasaki on December 7 , 1874.5 The decade following the Taiwan expedition witnessed a growing Japanese public interest in Japan’s overseas trade, settlem ent and m igration, including m igration to such distant places as Hawaii and Brazil. A gainst this backdrop, more and more m ainstream Japanese w riters began to pay attention to nearby Taiwan, an island noted for its exotic beauty and economic potential. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834-1901), Japan’s forem ost internationalist, for exam ple, called the attention o f his fellow Japanese to the heaven-blessed and richly endowed island o f Taiwan. Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919), a Tosa (in southern Shikoku) sam urai and one o f the m ost influential political figures and w riters o f the M eiji era, noted that besides its economic and commercial value, Taiwan could also play an im portant role in Japan’s m aritim e defense. Itagaki believed that because o f its im portant geographical location, a new East A sia order m ust include the island.6Echoing Itagaki’s views, notable Japanese navy strategists such as Saigo Tsugumichi and Kabayama Sukenori openly advocated m ilitary occupation o f Taiwan, arguing that the island could serve as a strategic naval base in expanding the im perial dom ain o f Japan into southern China and the Southeast A sia.7

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Taiwan Becom es a Japanese Colony The previously mentioned ardent advocates for taking Taiwan notwithstanding, Japanese policy m akers rem ained reticent when discussing colonization o f the island, partly because the issue o f Korea dom inated Japanese politics between the late 1870s and the early 1890s. Ironically, it was an acrid dispute over K orea betw een Japan and C hina that ultim ately decided the fate o f Taiwan. Japan’s resounding victory over C hina in 1895, its quest for international prestige, and the proposal o f the Japanese Im perial Navy to establish Taiwan as a base made it inevitable that Japan would include the acquisition o f Taiwan as one o f the term s set for the Treaty o f Shim onoseki. This treaty concluded the Sino-Japanese W ar and was signed by Li Hung-chang and Ito Hirobumi on A pril 17, 1895. A fterw ard, L i’s adopted son, Li Ching-fang, boarded a German ship to Keelung harbor and, in his capacity as the Chinese Im perial Com m issioner, surrendered Taiwan to Adm iral Kabayama Sukenori. On the eve o f June 6,1895, a sm all contingent o f occupying Japanese troops entered the city o f Taipei. Eleven days later, Kabayama arrived in Taipei w ith his victorious army and held a cerem ony to m ark the inauguration o f Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan.8 A t the outset o f their colonial rule, the Japanese were m ore concerned about the natural resources than inhabitants o f the island. Fukuzawa Yukichi, for exam ple, editorialized in his ow n new spaper, the Jiji Shinpo (D aily newspaper) that the islanders who w ere considered barbaric and uncivilized be expelled. In order to pacify the island and develop the rich resources with the hands of our Japanese people, the goal of managing Taiwan should focus solely on the land while ignoring the natives. We should first issue orders to correct all barbaric customs such as men wearing the queue [pigtail] and women’s foot binding. Opium smoking should be strictly prohibited, as it is in Japan proper. We should punish without reservation those who break the law. And we should consider those who cannot bear the pains of reform as beyond the pale of our civilization.9 Fukuzawa clearly viewed the Chinese who smoked opium, wore the queue, and im posed foot binding on their women as “uncivilized and undesirable.” G enerally regarded as the m ost influential man in M eiji Japan outside o f governm ent service, Fukuzawa’s advice was heeded by Japanese authorities, who offered all the residents o f Taiwan a tw o-year grace period in w hich to choose their affiliation. Any resident w ho w ished to leave the island was per­ m itted to do so before the deadline o f M ay 8,1897. But to the chagrin o f the

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Japanese, instead o f a mass exodus o f Chinese residents from the island to the m ainland, only 4,456 out o f a population o f 2.8 m illion (a m ere 0.16 percent) actually packed up and left Taiwan. M oreover, because o f the geographic proxim ity, close business and fam ily ties betw een Taiwanese and Chinese who lived in C hina’s coastal provinces, particularly those who resided in Amoy, a substantial num ber o f Fukienese claim ed to be Taiwanese nationals (Sekimin). In 1896 alone betw een 4,000 and 5,000 such Sekim in applied for Japanese passports. They petitioned the Japanese consulate to allow them to stay and w ork in Amoy, but w ithout revocation o f their Japanese passports. But the Japanese consular officials were fully aware that if these claim ants were issued Japanese passports, they would be entitled to consular protection and other treaty port privileges, such as extraterritoriality and paying low er tariffs on goods they im ported to China. For these and other considerations, Taiwan’s new colonial m asters rejected their pleas. But the Sekim in persisted, and ultim ately it took five years, including a personal v isit by G oto Shim pei (1 8 5 7 -1 9 2 9 ), T aiw an’s c h ie f civ il adm inistrator, to Amoy in A pril 1900 to resolve the nationality issue o f the Taiwanese residents in China. In D ecem ber 1912, the governm ent-general o f Taiwan finally issued a restrictive four-point im m igration policy, which set a high hurdle for Chinese to become Taiwan Sekimin. It would only accept those who could prove that they had established residence in Taiwan as Taiwanese nationals before A pril 1895. M oreover, according to Japanese nationality law, w ives, children, and grandchildren o f Taiwanese would also be accredited as Taiwanese nationals and accorded Japanese passports and privileges. Japanese governm ent records show that during 1912 a total o f 1,282 Chinese applied for Taiwan Sekimin passports at its Amoy consulate; none, however, applied during the next three years.10 It should be pointed out that the islanders refused to leave Taiwan because they and their ancestors had chosen the land to be their feng-lm hsien-tao (or p ’eng-lai hsien-tao in Chinese, which means immortal island), a prodigious promise o f a world where men could live a fulfilled and happy life in the emerg­ ing backwoods society. Likewise, at the beginning o f Japanese colonial rule, the frontier culture and the islander’s temperam ent caused the Taiwanese to refuse to yield to the new authorities and to immediately launch an independence movement. On May 25,1895, the Taiwanese proclaim ed the establishm ent o f a republic—the first in the history o f Asia. But due prim arily to poor organiza­ tion and the lack o f advanced heavy weapons, the republic lasted less than five months. N evertheless, during its short-lived existence the Taiwanese initiated a singular national entity by expressing them selves as Taimin or Taijen (the people o f Taiwan), instead o f Huajen (the people o f C hina).11 Taiwanese historians generally divide the Japanese occupation o f Taiwan

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Table 7.1 Japanese Govemors-general In Taiwan, 1895-1945 Name 1. Kabayama Sukenori 2. KatsuraTaro 3. Nogi Maresuke 4. Kodama Gentaro 5. Sakuma Samata 6. Ando Sadami 7. Akashi Motojiro 8. Den Kenjiro 9. Uchida Kakichi 10. IzawaTakio 11. Kamiyama Mannoshin 12. Kawamura Takeji 13. Ishizuka Eizo 14. Ota Masahiro 15. Minami Hiroshi 16. Nakagawa Kenzo 17. Kobayashi Seizo 18. Hasegawa Kiyoshi 19. Ando Rikichi

Rank Admiral Lt. General Lt. General Lt. General General General Lt. General Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian Admiral (Ret.) Admiral (Ret.) General

Tenure 5/1895-6/1896 6/1896-10/1896 10/1896-2/1898 2/1898-4/1906 4/1906-5/1915 5/1915-6/1918 6/1918-10/1919 10/1919-9/1923 9/1923-9/1924 9/1924-7/1926 7/1926-6/1928 6/1928-7/1929 7/1929-1/1931 1/1931-3/1932 3/1932-5/1932 5/1932-9/1936 9/1936-11/1940 11/1940-12/1944 12/1944-8/1945

Native of Satsuma han Choshu han Yamaguchi han Tokuyama han Yamaguchi han Tokyo fu Fukuoka ken Hyogo ken Tokyo fu Tokyo fu Yamaguchi ken Akita ken Fukushima ken Yamagata ken Toyama ken Nigata ken Hiroshima ken Tokyo fu Miyagi ken

into three phases: Taiwanese resistance and m ilitary rule (1895-1918), the forced assim ilation (1919-1937), and the w ar years (1937-1945). There w ere nineteen Japanese govem ors-general, o f whom ten came from m ilitary ranks (1895-1919 and 1936-1945) and nine from a civilian background, as shown in Table 7.1. The nineteen govem ors-general were invested not only with executive pow er but also legislative and judicial authority. During their half century o f colonial rule, they issued m ore than 500 rescripts, w hich had the force o f law. Taiwanese R esistance to Japanese Rule Initially fierce Taiwanese resistance quickly caused Japan’s ruling oligarchy to decide that the island should be under m ilitary occupation. As a consequence, only high-ranking officers o f the army or navy in active service would be appointed to serve as the govem ors-general o f Taiwan. Thus Adm iral Kabayam a Sukenori, an old w arrior from the Satsum a fief and a form er navy m inister, was chosen to enforce the early stages o f the occupation. Even though Kabayam a’s large contingent had crushed the main resistance, by the end o f O ctober 1895 he had lost a com m ander and over 30,000 soldiers, m ost o f them to tropical diseases such as m alaria, cholera, and typhus. In the

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ensuing months and years, the insurgency persisted as the Taiwanese partisan bands attacked and harassed the Japanese throughout the island. From 1896 to 1913, Taiwanese insurgents, generally led by low-ranking members o f the gentry class, assaulted fifty-four Japanese installations and staged ninety-four attacks. But the insurgency also cost the Taiwanese dearly, sometimes with great losses, as nearly 10,000 lost their lives. Several notable cases enshrined the islanders’ stubborn resistance. For instance, Chien Yi organized a band 600 strong, set up a quasi-revolutionary entity in the central Taiwan prefecture o f Yunlin, and launched attacks against Japanese garrison forces. In June 1896, Japanese troops retaliated by slaughtering some 6,000 Taiwanese at the town o f Touliu (Chien’s headquarters) and fifty-five surrounding villages, burn­ ing down more than 4,200 houses in the process.12 Operating from a rem ote southern Taiwanese town near Kaohsiung (Takao in Japanese), Lin Shao-mao and his several hundred partisans launched deadly guerrilla attacks, harassing the Japanese at every opportunity. Lin constructed a bamboo palisade and a m oat around his stronghold; his fighters built roads and canals, grew crops and raised livestock, distilled homemade liquor, and ran a casino, a brothel, and a m edical clinic. But the Japanese lured Lin out o f his den and killed him on M ay 3 0 ,1902.'3 Katsura Taro, the second governor-general o f Taiwan (who later served three term s as Japan’s prim e m inister and earned three titles o f nobility: count, m arquis, and prince) lasted only five m onths, occupying his Taipei office for few er than ten days. K atsura was succeeded by his fellow Yamaguchi war­ rior Nogi M aresuke (1849-1912). A national hero in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1903) and also the tutor o f the crown prince (later Em peror Taisho, 1912-1926), Nogi adopted a triple-guard system to quell the Taiwanese reb­ els. He com bined army units, m ilitary police, and civil police to deal with w hat he called the Taiwanese dohi, or bandits. In conjunction with this new tactic, Nogi established 1,000 police stations throughout the island, with one police station assigned to keep watch on every 3,000 islanders, including those living in the most rem ote areas. By using this triple-guard system, the Japanese forces managed to kill approxim ately 12,000 Taiwanese partisans and to terrify hundreds o f thousands o f townspeople and villagers between 1898 and 1902. Because Japanese police always followed orders from their superiors and because they had the habit o f urinating indiscrim inately outdoor like anim als, resentful and fearful Taiwanese called the ubiquitous and brutal Japanese policem en “four-legged dogs.” But the pacification program was also costly because the colonial gov­ ernm ent was forced to earm ark no less than 40 percent o f its civil budget to m aintain its police force and because the num ber o f casualties from both disease and com bat were running very high.14On several occasions when the

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situation was out o f their control, Japanese rulers would offer not only amnesty but also positions o f pow er to some o f the partisan leaders. A few Taiwanese collaborators, notably Ku Hsien-jung (1866-1937), who was elected to be a mem ber o f the Japanese House o f Peers in 1934, were called to serve as m ediators and to persuade partisan leaders to give up their resistance. This pacification scheme, however, was nothing but an expedient Japanese strategy. On May 25,1902, for exam ple, Japanese troops ambushed and slaughtered more than 260 partisans at a “surrender ceremony” in central Taiwan. Events such as this quickly evoked new waves o f violent reaction from the islanders. Also, during the 1910-1915 period anti-Japanese sentim ent was fueled by the Chinese Revolution o f 1911 and an indigenous Taiwanese religious fervor. In 1913, M iaoli Hakka leader Lo Fu-hsing recruited 500 fighters and began a m ajor insurgency. Following Lo’s martyrdom (he was strangled to death by the Japanese), large-scale insurrections persisted. N ear the east coast port o f Hualien, an aboriginal tribe organized its own independent domain at Taroko Gorge. In 1914, Sakuma Samata (1844-1915), the fifth governor-general o f Taiwan, deployed more than 10,000 troops and used 200 machine guns to put down the insurgents who fought back from behind the marble monoliths and limestone cliffs o f the gorge. The seventy-year-old Sakuma, who personally directed the assault, was to become the most famous casualty o f the Taiwanese insurgency as he was severely wounded and died soon afterward. In 1915, Yu Ch’ing-fang organized a religious group at the Hsi-lai Buddhist temple in Tainan and openly challenged Japanese authority. The 1,413 hardcore resisters in what became known as the Tapani Incident w o e later captured by the Japanese and brought to trial. Yu C h’ing-fang and 200 o f his followers were executed. Though organized rebellion and open defiance had subsided during the 1920s, out o f nowhere a group o f aboriginals suddenly attacked the Japanese in the central Taiwanese community o f W ushe in October 1930. The uprising in this mountain region lasted for fifty days and cost some 200 Japanese lives.13 Goto Shimpei: Japan's C hief C ivil A dm inistrator From the vantage point o f Tokyo, the unyielding spirit and prolonged resistance o f the Taiwanese not only created headaches for the Japanese colonists, but also cost the new em pire too much money and too many lives. Individuals such as Lieutenant-General Kodama Gentaro (1852-1906, served 1898-1906), who succeeded Nogi as governor-general, began to question if m ilitary suppression was the most effective means o f subduing the Taiwanese. Kodama learned that Taiwan had over 1,700 private schools that were financed by local gentry and run by traditional Chinese schoolm asters. The lieutenant-general, who was from a Yamaguchi samurai background, decided to turn this kind o f old-

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fashioned tutorial education into a modem Japanese educational system and to teach Taiwanese children technical and scientific skills. Kodama saw education as an avenue through which the Japanese occupiers could win the hearts and minds o f the still restive population, thus ultimately establishing a civil society in the Japanese tradition. Because Kodama held concurrent positions in Japan, he appointed forty-tw o-year old physician Goto Shimpei to serve as his chief civil adm inistrator (m insei chokan). It was now up to the German-educated Goto to survey and catalog the island, to improve public health, and to lay the foundation for its economic and educational development. Early in 1898, Goto presented a blueprint with the title, “Urgent Remedy for Taiwan Governance,” with an agenda to respect native custom s and to

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Figure 7.2 Chief Civil Administrator Goto Shlmpei, 1898-1906

restore the island’s ancient practice o f self-governm ent. Upon taking his post, Goto ordered both a land survey and a population census. In order to im prove the island’s public heath and medical service, Goto hired the Scot­ tish hygiene engineer W illiam Kinninmond Burton (1856-1899) to design and build a sewage disposal system and to install w ater pumps to supply drinking water. A t the same tim e, Goto established a public hospital and a m edical college in Taipei, and founded treatm ent centers around the island to control tropical diseases and deal with the problem o f opium addiction. The governm ent-general of Taiwan then issued a rescript, which stipulated that only the governm ent could cultivate, im port, and sell opium and that Taiwanese addicts could only buy opium from licensed dealers provided they

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also agreed to seek medical treatm ent. Thanks to a strict enforcem ent policy and the addiction treatm ent program , the num ber o f Taiwan’s addicted opium smokers dropped from 165,000 in 1900 to only about 16,000 in 1930. B etter still, by the early 1920s there were no more reported opium smokers among the islanders who were thirty years old or younger.16 Providing better health services to the islanders was only one tactic used by G oto to reduce the violence and m itigate the fear am ong the population. He also replaced the m ilitary police w ith regular police and forbade governm ent officials and schoolteachers to w ear uniform s and carry sw ords. C learly it was the tenacious Taiw anese partisan resistance that led G oto to m odify Japanese colonial policy on the island. In his re­ port to his superiors in Tokyo, G oto m aintained that the Japanese should function only as an external force and the Taiw anese should take the lead in m aintaining their ow n social order because this w as the essential path to effective colonial ru le.17W ith this conviction, G oto decided to adapt the C hinese pao-chia system by converting it into a new Japanese controlling m echanism called the hoko system . The system recruited hoko headm en (w ith each one representing 100 constituent households called pao, or w ard), and trained them to w ork closely w ith the Japanese police and to exercise close supervision over the inhabitants o f their com m unity. For exam ple, the headm an o f the w ard was charged w ith the task o f selecting m ales betw een seventeen and fifty years o f age to serve in the local m ilitia and to assist in com m unity service projects such as m alaria prevention cam paigns. He was required to supply corvée for the construction o f roads and buildings and for other public w orks. H is responsibilities also included collecting taxes and fees fo r the governm ent and helping the police keep tabs on crim inals, unregistered opium sm okers, and unruly m em bers o f his w ard. By 1903, Taiw an had a total o f 4,815 recorded pao and 41,660 chia, w ith 134,600 m ilitia volunteers organized into 1,058 regim ents. Even though the headm an o f a pao w as unpaid, he enjoyed a certain degree o f authority, ultim ately form ing w hat C aroline Ts’ai calls the fourth level o f the colonial adm inistrative hierarchy, w hich enabled the Japanese to penetrate further into local com m unities." By allowing certain influential Taiwanese to take part in local politics, Goto was able to im plem ent a “cultural rule policy” that focused on the education o f the island’s gentry. A fter identifying 151 Taiwanese elites, Goto person­ ally invited them to attend a weekly literary sem inar at Tamsui. And between 1898 and 1900, he also organized four “Respect the Elderly” parties, inviting a great many octogenarians to dinner at the governor-general’s office. But courting Taiwanese elders and elites was only a means to an end; G oto’s teal aim was to persuade the islanders to gradually shift their loyalty to the

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new rulers and to start learning Japanese culture. Since language is the key to any cultural understanding, G oto’s top priority was to begin teaching the Japanese language to the islanders, starting in elem entary school (there was no m iddle school for the Taiwanese until 1915). G oto’s ultim ate goal was to turn the Taiwanese into loyal Japanese subjects who identified them selves w ith the Shinto religion, the im perial chrysanthem um , and the Sun goddess Am aterasu. Goto had the Taiwan Shinto Shrine built in Taipei (on the site o f the present-day Grand Hotel) in 1901. G oto’s im m ediate successors started building the eleven-story Taiwan governor-general’s office in 1912. W hen it was com pleted in 1919, it was the largest building in northeast A sia and was an im portant symbol o f Japanese power. G oto’s reform s were pragm atic rather than altruistic. He was fully aware that Tokyo wanted him to find ways to stop bloodshed on the island as well as to make the island more econom ically independent. A t the outset o f the Japanese occupation o f Taiwan, the annual budget for the colonial government was about 10 m illion yen, with 7 m illion coming directly from the budget o f the im perial governm ent and 3 m illion from the resources o f the island itself. By 1897, Tokyo decided to rein in colonial expenditures by reducing its subsidy to Taiwan from 7 m illion to 4 m illion yen. In the m eantime, Tokyo urged Taiwan’s colonial governm ent to find new sources o f revenue from the island—an area not quite equal to one-tenth o f Japan proper—to help pay down its own budgetary deficit Thus, Goto undertook a series o f economic initiatives— including a land survey, a population census, and the establish­ m ent o f the Bank o f Taiwan (in 1899)— to stim ulate Taiwan’s economy and to broaden the colonial governm ent’s tax base. Among these new economic projects, the land survey turned out to be G oto’s most im portant achievem ent (particularly from the Japanese point o f view), because it established modem landownership rights and obligations in Taiwan. W hen this am bitious project was com pleted, it yielded 257,810 chia o f land (1 chia is equivalent to 0.97 hectare or 2.4 acres) that were not previously registered on the government tax roll. Records o f the governm ent-general o f Taiwan show that the island’s land revenues tripled from 920,000 yen in 1903 to 2,980,000 yen in 1905.19G oto’s accomplishments in Taiwan were duly recognized by the imperial government, as he was later appointed president o f the South M anchurian Railway Company (M antetsu), selected to serve as mayor o f Tokyo, foreign m inister and home m inister o f Japan, and finally made a count in the House o f Peers. The Com ing o f the Zaibatsu G oto’s land survey created many large Taiwanese landholders, but the real beneficiary was the colonial governm ent, w hich took possession o f an enor-

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Figure 7.3 Japan—

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Owned Sugar Manufacture Company

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«

mous am ount o f unclaim ed wooded and arable land. M ore importantly, land had become a commercial commodity and, with the establishm ent o f internal security, would soon draw Japanese investm ents in the island. Indeed, the government-general o f Taiwan sold many acres cheaply to Japanese companies and Japanese im m igrants. By 1926, more than 500 Japanese com panies had set up enterprises in Taiwan—each with capital exceeding 300,000 yen— ultim ately turning Taiwan into a valuable resource in the em pire’s economy. Since little sugar was produced within Japan itself, it had been im porting more than 80 percent o f its sugar from abroad. But the Japanese had known for a long tim e that tropical Taiwan was an ideal sugar-producing island. Thus, once they held sway over the island, they bought a substantial amount o f Taiwan’s farm land, mostly in the central and southern coastal plains, and converted it into sugarcane plantations. By 1902, the Japanese had invested 2.7 m illion yen in eight sugar refineries on the island, o f which one m illion yen cam e from the M itsui Banking Corporation. In the meantime, Taiwan’s colonial governm ent provided generous subsidies for sugarcane plantations as well as various facilities to prom ote scientific farm ing and increase sugar production. As a result, Japanese investm ents in sugar-refining plants in­ creased from 9.2 m illion yen in 1908 to 15 m illion yen in 1912. Among the hugest refineries owned by Japanese zaibatsu were the Dai Nippon Sugar M anufacturing Corporation at Huwei (in Yunlin County), the M eiji Sugar M anufacturing Corporation in M atou (Tainan County), the Yen-shui-kang Sugar M anufacturing Corporation (north o f Tainan), and the M itsui Taiwan

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Sugar Corporation in Pingtung. By 1939, Taiwan had becom e the w orld’s seventh largest sugar producer.20 Japanese zaibatsu also took advantage o f the lenient policy and generous subsidies o f the colonial governm ent and developed Taiwan’s coal m ining industry, expanding coal production from northern Taiwan to central Taiwan and the Pescadores. Coal was used for sugar refineries, railroad locom otives, the production o f coke, as well as for household consumption. But the m ajority o f tiie coal was exported to southern China, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Japan, and Southeast Asia. The M itsui Corporation was the biggest investor in the island’s coal mining industry as its subsidiaries— the Taiyang Coal M ining Company and the Rilong Coal M ining Company— accounted for nearly twothirds o f the coal production in Taiwan. By utilizing their m onopolized export network, the Japanese zaibatsu made huge profits. In 1920, for exam ple, the M itsui Corporation sold 830,000 tonners (about 72 percent o f the total output) o f Taiwanese coal.21 The collusion between the colonial governm ent and the zaibatsu ultim ately led to the developm ent o f a typical colonial economy on Taiwan, making the island an im portant econom ic appendage o f Japan. In this way, Japan im ported high-grade lum ber and agricultural products from the colony and exported industrial products to the island. Ironically, because Tokyo sought the econom ic growth o f Japan in Taiwan, the colonial governm ent built a sound econom ic infrastructure on the island; to w it, it constructed m ore than 6,500 kilom eters o f railroad lines and highways, a north-south arterial railway (com pleted in A pril 1908), a num ber o f concrete dams and reservoirs to har­ ness hydroelectric power, and 16,000 m eters o f canals to irrigate farm lands. In 1922, Japanese agricultural scientists in Taichung developed a tasty and sticky m edium -grain rice called Feng-lai (or P’eng-lai in Chinese) rice. This new strain quickly gained popularity in Japan and helped to solve Japanese rice shortage problems.22A t the same tim e, the colonial government took measures to m onopolize the production and sale o f com m odities, including tobacco, liquor and wine, camphor, opium , and salt. It also established com panies to control com m ercial shipping, railroads, and telegraphy. No sooner had the Japanese secured the harbors o f Keelung and Kaohsiung in 1896 before a fleet o f Japanese ships was transporting these goods between Japan and Taiwan. Thanks to generous annual subsidies from Taiwan’s colonial governm ent, O saka m erchant ships, such as the H orai M aru, the Fuso M aru, and the M izuho M aru, regularly came to the island to haul away rice, sugar, lumber, camphor, salt, tea, coal, and construction m aterials. Nippon Yusen K aisha (which later evolved into the M itsubishi Corporation) also financed a num ber o f 10,000-ton class ships, including the A sahi M aru, the Yoshino M aru, and the Yamato M aru, to facilitate trade with Japan’s new colony.23W ith

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the infrastructure in place, the island’s productivity increased while more and more enterprising Taiwanese ventured to Southern China, Hong Kong, and Southeast A sia to engage in business. D ata published by Taiwan’s colonial government showed a steady increase of Taiwanese immigrants to coastal China, from a figure o f 335 in 1907 to more than 20,000 in 1936. Holding Japanese passports and under the protection o f Sino-Japanese treaties— such as extraterritoriality and excise tax exemption—these Taiwanese concentrated in Fukien Province, where they spoke the same language and shared m ore or less the same culture with the Fukienese. They were engaged in all sorts o f businesses—from hardware, textiles, consumer goods, electronic and chemical industries, to banking and trust, medicine, construction, restaurants and hotels, and even brothels. Since it took only one day to sail from Taiwan to the Fukien coast, by the mid-1930s Amoy had an estim ated 18,000Taiwanese, Foochow had 2,000, and Chang-chou and Ch’uan-chou, several hundred each.24 According to a survey conducted by the Japanese consulate in Amoy, o f the more than 460 shops owned by people who held Japanese passports, only seventy-one o f the proprietors were Japanese, a trickle were Koreans, and the rest were ethnic Taiwanese. By O ctober 1938, a total o f 3,583 Taiwanese (belonging to 1,564 fam ilies) who lived in Canton were engaged in various cultural and economic activities. In 1941, the m ajority o f the Taiwanese in Shanghai, ranging from a total o f 900 in 1938 to approximately 4,000 in 1941, chose to engage in real estate, buying and selling seafood, clothing, and m edicine. However, prim arily owing to concerns about cold weather and security issues, such as banditry, few er Taiwanese merchants and investors were w illing to go to C hina’s northeastern frontier. Between 1931 and 1945, an estim ated 5,000Taiwanese lived in M anchuria, most o f whom were young physicians, teachers, and their fam ilies, as well as engineers and technicians who worked for the South M anchurian Railway Company.23 A gainst this backdrop, Taiw an’s foreign trade gradually expanded to include not only Japan and northeast A sia, but also Hong Kong and coastal China. M ore ships were required to provide transport for Taiwanese cargo and businessm en, as well as tourists and migrants. Before 1905, British ships dom inated Taiwan’s m aritim e transportation and foreign trade service. But after 1906, Japanese shippers took die lead in both tonnage and the num ber of vessels. By 1912, there were Japanese shipping lines between Keelung and Dairen (at the southern tip o f the Liaotung peninsula in M anchuria), as well as between Kaohsiung and Dairen. In 1916, the colonial governm ent o f Taiwan appropriated a budget o f 6 m illion yen for establishing a shipping line between Keelung and Southeast Asia. This was the beginning o f Japan’s socalled “South Advance Policy,” a move designed to explore the rich resources o f the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, British Strait colonies, and Borneo, as

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well as the D utch colony o f Indonesia. A t the start o f W orld W ar I in Europe, most English-registered ships and German-owned vessels were called to serve their respective countries for the war effort, leaving Japanese ships to dominate the sea lanes in Asia. Thus, by 1914, Japanese shipping com panies, such as O saka Com m ercial Shipping Corporation, Kinkai (N ear the ocean) Shipping Company, and N ippon Yusen K aisha, had deployed lighter and faster vessels to provide transportation between Kobe and Keelung. On average, these ships made about tw elve round trips per month and reaped huge profits.26Ironically, the ordeal o f total w ar helped to raise ship design and nautical technology to a new level o f sophistication. W hen the Japanese first occupied the island, it required from six to fifteen days to sail betw een Taiwan and Japan. By 1926, to the delight o f Japan’s rulers, it took only two days and two nights to reach M oji in Kyushu from Keelung, hence greatly reducing the tim e required to travel between Taiwan and Japan proper. Furtherm ore, Taiwan was now well connected w ith Japan’s international m aritim e routes, which utilized ships weighing from 8,000 to 10,000 tons to reach Europe and Am erica.27Table 7.2 provides a glim pse o f Taiwan’s shipping transport and foreign trade during the 1920s and 1930s.2* W orld W ar I helped Japan to turn its foreign trade around, as the nation accumulated a trade surplus o f 2.7 billion yen. The war and the thriving foreign trade also created a new overseas m arket for Taiwan’s coal, steel, rice, salt, sugar, camphor, sulphur, as w ell as various types o f construction m aterials. Even Form osa oolong tea w as in high dem and. Taiw anese new spapers frequently carried exciting news about the favorable conditions o f the island’s economy. For instance, the Taiwan nicht nichi shim po (Taiwan daily news) reported: This war caused belligerent nations to send some 5 million troops to the batdefield. Just to feed these soldiers, everyone was looking for provisions and foods, and some of them had come to our island to negotiate for purchase. Even Russia sent a delegation to Taiwan__ This war will certainly stimulate our trade with Europe, an unexpected positive effect of the war.29 But the one region in w hich Taiwan’s colonial businessm en and investors made a significant inroad was Southeast A sia. In collaboration with the two leading Taiwanese banks (the Bank o f Taiwan and the Bank o f South China), the government-general o f Taiwan established a number o f funds to jum p-start business relationships with the region. Between 1915 and 1934, Taiwan’s colonial governm ent gave grants totaling 1,947,795 yen to subsidize various Taiwanese and Japanese businesses, agricultural projects, and industries in Southeast Asia. For exam ple, in 1915, it provided a grant o f 3,500 yen to the Southeast A sia A gricultural Expansion Society to prom ote Taiwanese

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Table 7.2 Taiwan’s Maritima Shipping Name of Route Keelung-Kobe Line Kaohsiung-Yokohama Line Taiwan East Coast Line Taiwan West Coast Line Taiwan-China Line Taiwan-Korea Line Keelung-Hong Kong Line Keelung-Dairen Line Keelung-Southeast Asia Line Keelung-Java Line Keelung-Amoy Line Takao-Canton Line Takao-Dairen Line Keelung-Osaka Line Keelung-Yokohama Line Yokohama-Kaohsiung Line Keelung-Naha Line Taiwan-Hokaido Line Takao-Yokohama Line

Shipping Company Mandatory* Free1 M Osaka, Kinkai Osaka, Kinkai M M Osaka M Osaka Osaka M Kinkai M M Osaka Kinkai M Osaka M M Osaka M Osaka M Osaka M Osaka F Osaka F Osaka Osaka, Yamashita, Kawazaki F F Osaka Kawazaki F F Nippon, Osaka

a Shipping company required to provide regular, scheduled route service, i.e., at least one or two trips per month, and to make the same port calls along the way. b Indicates irregular sail services, such as one round trip per m onth, or four sailing trips per month, depending on m arket conditions. Free line ships could also change routes and make random stops along the way.______________________________________________

em igration to the region. The heaviest subsidy went to the U.S. colony o f the Philippines, as evidenced by the 173,380 yen the Taipei authorities allotted to grow rubber trees, M anila hemp, and coconut trees there.30 Japanese and Taiwanese investors concentrated on developing hemp plantations and rope manufacture at Davao on M indanao’s southeast coast, and engaged in logging and lum ber industries along the Tagurano and the Talomo rivers. The next target was Borneo, including both Dutch Borneo and British Northern Borneo. For exam ple, in 1917, about 1,000 Tainan farm ers were sent to Tawau in northern Borneo to work on a rubber plantation subsidized by a Yamaguchi tycoon nam ed K uhara Fusanosuke (1869-1963). O ther enterprises that received colonial governm ent subsidies included sugar and tea plantations in Java, coconut businesses in Celebes, and trading firms in Singapore. By the early 1930s, more and more ethnic Taiwanese were recruited to go to South­ east A sia to help manage these Japanese-invested enterprises. In Septem ber 1931, when the Japanese Kwantung army occupied M anchuria, followed by the Japanese assault on Shanghai in early February 1932, the N ationalist Chinese government in Nanking called for a boycott against Japanese goods. Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia enthusiastically responded to this call,

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making the Japanese suddenly persona non grata. Thus, in order to m aintain its m arkets and access to the region’s raw resources, the Japanese governm ent had no choice but to turn to the Taiwanese for help with its so-called South A dvance policy.31 A ssim ilation Did N ot M ean Equality N ear the end o f W orld W ar I, Lieutenant-G eneral Akashi M otojiro (1864— 1919), a native o f Fukuoka Prefecture, was named governor-general o f Taiwan. Formerly a com m ander-in-chief o f the m ilitary police in Korea and a Japanese army chief o f staff, Akashi did not intend to bring about equality for the Tai­ wanese. Accordingly, Akashi issued an education rescript in 1919 requiring strict segregation between Japanese and Taiwanese students. In spite o f the fact that only 6 percent o f Taiwanese school-age children attended school at the tim e (as against 90 percent o f Japanese children in Taiwan enrolled in prim ary school), Akashi w ent so far as to designate names for Taiwanese educational institutions distinctly different from the common titles for Japanese schools. In an attem pt to make the Taiwanese more cooperative and more invested in Japanese national interests, Akashi sought to educate enough Taiwanese to work as government clerks, interpreters, agricultural technicians, teachers and doctors. To his thinking, these kinds o f Taiwanese were the ideal professionals who could really serve the interest o f the Japanese em pire. W hen Den Kenjiro (1855-1930) succeeded Akashi in O ctober 1919, Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan had begun to shift to a new phase generally characterized as “forced assim ilation.” Being the first civilian governor-general, Den Kenjiro signaled a broad version o f assim ilation when he proclaim ed that the N ipponization o f Taiwan and the assim ilation o f the Taiwanese people to be his m ajor goal.32 A railroad tycoon-tum ed-politician, D en’s business acumen had made him a fortune and also made him a baron in the House o f Peers. Den was serving as the m inister o f com m unications when, in the wake o f the Versailles Peace Conference, he was suddenly reassigned to Taiwan. Like Goto Shim pei, Den did not w ant to see Taiwan existing only as a com m ercial m arket or a source o f raw m aterials for Japanese industries. Instead, he wanted Taiwan to be an integral part o f the Japanese em pire. Indeed, his public announcem ents gave die im pression that he was very serious about transform ing the Taiwanese into genuine Japanese imperial subjects (komin-ka) by educational and other means. A lso, during his tenure as the governor-general o f Taiwan, Den generously subsidized Taiwanese who were w illing to move to C hina or Southeast A sia to work for Japanese-ow ned enterprises. In his diary, Den was not coy, and often frankly jotted down his innerm ost thoughts and private conversations with his confidants. W hile historians can use Den’s diary to criticize his close

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ties and collusion w ith several infam ous Japanese businessm en, they m ight also com e away with the sinister im pression that the reason Den was trying to induce Taiwanese to em igrate to C hina and Southeast A sia was because he wanted more Japanese to settle in Taiwan.33 But cynicism aside, D en's liberal policy was simply an extension o f liberal party politics in 1920s Japan, w hich resulted in placing the adm inistration o f the colonial governm ent in the hands o f civilians. Corollary to this liberal policy, for the first tim e, Taiwanese were adm itted to the highest circles o f the colonial governm ent in an advisory capacity, Taiwanese entrepreneurs were given a level playing field to com pete with the Japanese, and educational op­ portunities for the islanders were increased, particularly in practical vocational training, teaching, and the medical profession. For example, in December 1922 a Tamsui native by the name o f Tu C h’ung-m ing (1893-1986) becam e the first Taiwanese to graduate from Kyoto Im perial U niversity w ith a doctorate in m edicine. In 1928, Taiwan’s first university, Taihoku Im perial University (present-day N ational Taiwan University), was established at the southeastern com er o f the city o f Taipei. The 1920s also witnessed the blossom ing o f Taiwanese publishing and literature. Thanks to the Japanese monopoly o f the print m edia, the islanders previously could only subscribe to three Japanese newspapers: Taiwan nichi nichi shim po, Tainan shim po (Tainan new s), and Taiwan shimbun (Taiwan news). In A ugust 1927, however, the Taiwanese were able to publish their first daily newspaper, the Taiwan mimpo (Taiwan people’s news). A gainst this backdrop, Taiwan produced a cohort o f indigenous poets, including Yang H ua (1906-1936) o f Pingtung; Lai Ho (1894-1943) and Chen Hsu-ku (1891-1965), both natives o f Changhua; as well as the accom plished w riter Chang W en-huan (1909-1978), a native o f Chiayi. In the case o f Chang W en-huan, he actually wrote in Japanese and edited ajournai called Taiwan bunga (Taiwan literature), w hich sold between 2,000 and 3,000 copies per issue. However, there rem ained a lim it on how m uch the Taiwanese literati could truly and freely express them selves. W hen Yang H ua’s and Lai H o’s works attem pted to expose colonial oppression and protest social injustices, they were both apprehended by the colonial authorities and chaiged with spreading “dangerous thoughts.”34 N evertheless, between 1921 and 1934, the Taiwanese subm itted a total o f fifteen petitions to the Im perial D iet o f Japan, requesting the establishm ent o f a Taiwan Assembly and an elective Taiwanese representation in the Im perial D iet. D espite the fact that these petitions were all rejected by the Japanese rulers, the Taiwanese quest for some sort o f autonom y never ceased. The driving force behind the hom e-rule cam paign was the Taiwan C ultural As­ sociation, w hich was established on O ctober 17, 1921, by a sm all group o f

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w ell-educated and wealthy Taiwanese in Taipei's historical Twa-tu-tia. The A ssociation elected the philanthropist Lin H sien-t’ang as its first president and sponsored some 300 public speeches annually, reaching out to more than 110,000 people in an attem pt to inculcate nationalism among the masses. The Association also offered summer school at Lin’s home at W ufeng (in Taichung) and published a bilingual m agazine, in both Japanese and Chinese, called Taiwan seinen (Taiwan youth). To make sure that the m agazine would prom ote his brand o f hom e-rule governm ent, Lin appointed his private sec­ retary, Tsai Pei-ho, as editor. Tsai was jailed in 1923 for prom oting Taiwan’s nationalistic self-rule. Taiwan Youth continued to publish its bilingual issues in Tokyo until 1932 when it was moved back to Taipei.33 The Taiwan C ultural A ssociation subsequently split into a nationalist right wing and a socialist left wing in 1927, over resistance strategies. The right-w ing m em bers then form ed the Taiw anese People’s Party (Taiwan M inshuto)—the first political party legally registered with Japanese authori­ ties. H ie Taiwanese People’s Party continued to vigorously champion broader Taiwanese constitutional rights until 1931, when it was forced to dissolve by the colonial governm ent Taiwanese w riter and self-rule activist Ong Joktik (or Wang Yu-te) characterized the Taiwanese nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s as sturm und drang, because its leaders were either jailed or forced into exile.36 In the final analysis, the Taiwanese political movement did not bring about any im m ediate, tangible results because, throughout the half century o f Japanese colonial rule, only four Taiwanese were elected to the H ouse o f Peers, the first in 1934 and the other three near the end o f World W ar II. N evertheless, Edward I-te C h’en points out that these movements and publications helped the islanders learn about the many hitherto totally alien concepts o f W estern democracy, including the consent o f the governed, popular elections, universal suffrage, separation o f governm ental pow ers, and home rule.37 Japan’s rulers realized that language is not only the means o f communication between people, but also a tool for political, social, and cultural assim ilation. Scarcely had Kabayam a Sukenori inaugurated Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan on June 17, 1895, before a Japanese language school was set up in a suburb o f Taipei. Then, on M arch 31,1896, Taiwan’s governm ent-general issued Rescript No. 94, by which fourteen so-called m other tongue [Japanese] learning schools were set up on the island. By 1897, prom oting the Japanese language had becom e a priority and a consistent objective o f Japan’s colonial education.38 However, as islandw ide resistance against the foreign rulers continued unabated and the m ajority o f the islanders had no desire to work for the colonial governm ent, the Taiwanese were not particularly interested in learning the language o f their colonial m asters. In addition, traditional

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Taiwanese tutorial schools, num bering 1,707 in 1898, continued to provide ample opportunity for aspiring youngsters who wished to leam basic reading and w riting. Thus, enrollm ent in Japanese-language schools rem ained low until the Chinese language was added to the Japanese school curricula.39 The colonial governm ent issued a new education rescript in July 1898, by w hich a new six-year public elem entary school system was to supplant the m other tongue learning school. Financed by the local government, 70 percent o f the new school’s curricula were devoted to the learning o f the Japanese language. However, enrollments in Japanese elem entary schools remained low and the drop-out rate persistently high. O f the 53,401 Taiwanese elem entary school pupils in 1918, who constituted a m ere 1.51 percent o f the island’s population, one out o f eight dropped out o f school before graduation. Taiwan’s intelligentsia, who were despondent about their own dim inished weight, even called for a boycott against learning the Japanese language. By 1920, only 2.86 percent o f Taiwan’s population could understand and speak Japanese. It was against this backdrop that Governor-general Den sought to nourish the island­ ers with the Japanese spirit. He issued an integration rescript in 1922, m aking all public schools accessible to both Taiwanese and Japanese pupils. However, there was a catch to the integration: pupils who spoke good Japanese would be adm itted to prim ary school (shogako), whereas pupils who spoke little or no Japanese would be enrolled in common school (kogako). U nder this policy, school children bom to Japanese parents and those who could speak better Japanese always had an advantage over their Taiwanese counterparts. As a consequence, only a very sm all percentage o f Taiwanese children were qualified to enroll in prim ary schools, where pupils were taught the same lessons as their counterparts in the Japanese homeland by well-trained teachers brought from Japan. The vast m ajority o f the Taiwanese pupils, on the contrary, were lim ited to learning m ore practical vocational skills and those that were directly applicable to their daily lives, such as arithm etic, agriculture, commerce, health, physical education, handicrafts, and m anual arts.40As “liberal” as Den claim ed to be, he obviously also harbored a certain desire to m aintain Japanese supremacy over the Taiwanese. Thus, the assim ilation o f the Taiwanese did not necessarily mean equal­ ity w ith the Japanese. Clearly, the Japanese rulers designed their elem entary education curricula with the aim o f indoctrinating Taiwanese pupils to be­ com e loyal and productive im perial subjects o f Japan. But in 1926, when the adm inistration o f the colonial governm ent was organized into five provinces (shu) and tw o subprovincial jurisdictions (cho), the daily wage o f a Taipei carpenter was 1.8 yen, w hile a Japanese carpenter o f like skill earned 3.5 yen a day. Notw ithstanding such wage discrepancies and educational inequality, when Kawamura Takeji (1871-1955) became the governor-general of Taiwan

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in 1928, Japan had by and large subsumed Taiwan. The optim istic Kawamura then vowed to make the Taiwanese “dress, eat, and live as Japanese do [and] speak the Japanese tongue as do Japanese bom in Japan.“41 In the long run, with civilian and “liberal“ govem ors-general like Den Kenjiro, Kamiyama M annoshin, and Kawamura Takeji consistently throwing governm ent resources behind public education and rigorously prom oting the m other tongue, public school attendance steadily increased and more and m ore Taiwanese youngsters becam e w illing to leam how to speak and w rite the new language. By 1930, a few months after Kawamura Takeji had left his governor-general post, 12.36 percent o f Taiwanese had become literate in Japanese.42 N evertheless, the domains and spheres o f the colonial language in Taiwan rem ained rather lim ited, as the vast m ajority o f the islanders still preferred to use their native tongue (w hether southern Fukienese dialect, Hakka, or an aboriginal language) for family conversation, social intercourse, and business transactions. On the other hand, Taiwanese hostility tow ard the Japanese had subsided and a higher percentage o f the islanders finally came to accept the rule o f their new m asters, albeit passively and reluctantly.

8 Taiwan During World War II From Colony to Haven

Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan In the years under Japanese rule, Taiwanese schoolchildren received six years o f com pulsory elem entary education. They learned to speak Japanese, including Japan’s national anthem “Kimigayo,” w hich praised the emperor. M any pupils dropped out while m ost others did not attend or finish second­ ary school. Only a sm all num ber o f more am bitious and/or wealthy children pursued a higher education, either to enter a five-year program in a Japaneselanguage school to train as a teacher, attend m iddle school, or pursue a career in m edicine. W hile tuition at the Japanese language school was free, there were quite a few strings attached and the teachers’ salaries were meager. Training to becom ing a medical doctor required a total o f at least eleven years o f study, and the tuition was high and scholarships difficult to obtain. Because there were only a handful o f public middle schools in Taiwan and the colonial governm ent still adhered to a double-standard adm ission system in favor o f Japanese pupils, it was extrem ely difficult for Taiwanese natives to gain adm ission to governm ent-run middle schools. The Taipei First M iddle School, a five-year secondary education institution, was established in 1908. This school was designed prim arily to serve Japanese students, as revealed by the enrollm ent record o f 1939:963 Japanese, but only 28 Taiwanese. Once again, Japanese youths enjoyed preferential treatm ent, and even the brightest Taiwanese could not easily enroll in this middle school. But the combination o f a soaring urban population, increasing literacy, and a newly thriving economy spurred the trend o f continuing secondary education among Taiwanese middleclass children. Thus, in 1922 the colonial governm ent was forced to open up a second middle school in Taipei. W hereas the Taipei First M iddle School adm itted predom inantly Japanese students, the Taipei Second M iddle School was geared to serving both Japanese and Taiwanese. In 1939, for example, 508 Taiwanese and 217 Japanese were enrolled there.1M eanwhile, in August 1935, the Tamsui Presbyterian M iddle School, founded in the halcyon days o f 1914 by George L. M ackay’s Taiwanese son, was required to conform to the 149

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Japanese public school curriculum , including com pulsory m ilitary drills on campus. In 1938, it was finally accredited by the Japanese M inistry o f Educa­ tion when A risaka Issei, a scholar o f English literature, replaced the Reverend Hugh M acM illan (BD, MA, PhD) as principal. Thereafter, the faculty o f the Tamsui M iddle School was exclusively Japanese, mostly from the Kyushu region, so the degrees granted by that school were recognized in Japan. The student body at the Tamsui M iddle School, however, was predom inantly Taiwanese (mostly from wealthy fam ilies from all over the island), compared with 15 percent Taiwanese at the Taipei Second M iddle School, and the de facto zero percent Taiwanese at the Taipei First M iddle School.2 The m andatory curriculum o f a Japanese public m iddle school included languages (Japanese, Chinese, and English), geography, history, mathem at­ ics, health, arts and m usic, and the natural sciences. But the one unique and im portant course was shui-shin, w hich m eans, literally, character education or ethics. Twice a week, instructors taught the Japanese code o f ethics and social norms, such as loyalty to the state o f Japan, filial piety, and cultivation o f the five Confucian human relationships—father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, m aster and servant, and friend and friend. It also prom oted such virtues as rectitude, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity and sincerity, honor, and self-control.3 Teachers in Japanese m iddle schools all wore dark uniform s and black caps rim m ed with gold lace. The students, on the other hand, were required to w ear gray uniform s, visored caps, and puttees. Every M onday m orning, teachers and students at Taiwan’s m iddle schools had to bow reverently in unison tow ard the im perial palace in Tokyo, even though it was a thousand kilom eters away. The school naturally adopted the traditional Japanese holidays, including February 11, the National Founding Day (Kigensetsu)— the day selected by the M eiji governm ent to m ark the m ythical founding o f the Yamato state in 660 b . c . e . Japanese faculty and students also observed Septem ber 24 as the autum nal Im perial A ncestor Festival when they offered sushi at their neighborhood association’s equi­ noctial service. During the early 1930s, Japan reacted to the devastating im pact o f the G reat Depression by becom ing more violent at home and more bellicose and aggressive abroad. The period w itnessed the invasion o f M anchuria by the Kwantung Army, the dem ise o f party governm ent in the Im perial D iet, the assassinations o f several political and financial leaders, secession from the League of Nations in 1933, outbursts o f terrorism, and finally the rise o f fascistlike movements. In 1935, the Education Reform Council was established as an advisory body to the education m inister that was charged with the m ission o f ascertaining the direction in which Japanese education should proceed. A fter one year o f deliberation, the C ouncil subm itted a recom m endation that

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IS1

called for the reform o f learning and education centered on the concept o f national polity (kokutai) and the Japanese spirit.4 In other words, the prem ise o f Japan’s w artim e educational reform was based on the trinity o f Shintoism , the state, and indoctrination. Thus, the purpose o f education was to serve the state and, indeed, it ultim ately did serve that purpose. The fate o f Taiwanese adolescents was henceforth inextricably tied to the increasingly m ilitaristic Japanese em pire, and their bodies and souls were to be shaped according to the needs o f their colonial m asters. Students were required to undergo intense physical and military training, which included rigorous calisthenics, cold-water m orning baths, and three hours o f weekly m ilitary drills, m arching behind the traditional rising sun flag “Hinom aru.” In com pliance w ith the governm ent’s decree, every Taiwanese m iddle school set up a dojo, or training hall, for instructing students in the Japanese m artial arts, such as judo and kendo. Taiwanese schoolchildren were indoctrinated to support the so-called Japa­ nese divine m ission to liberate Asian peoples from W estern im perialism . In their spare tim e, students were required to clean parks, dig ditches, and pick up trash and fallen leaves in the streets. This was because the Taiwan economy and virtually all o f its m anpower had been mobilized to serve the w ar effort, so that local governm ents could not provide even routine municipal services. In fact, during the period o f Japan’s m obilization for total w ar (1937-1945), schools as well as public offices in Taiwan had only a handful o f custodians or none at all. M iddle school students usually woke up early in the morning and began cleaning the school’s toilets and sweeping the floors o f the corridor and classroom s before sunrise. They also m aintained sm all garden plots on the school grounds and carried human excrem ent in buckets to fertilize their vegetables.3 The Japanese believed that manual labor and self-reliance were practical survival skills, which would come in handy when and if these pupils were sent to fight on the battlefield. But the emphasis on manual labor and m artial arts training constituted only one spoke in the com plex wheel that was to become what Prem ier Fumimaro Konoe (1891-1945) called the New O rder in East A sia. In the early spring o f 1937, Japan’s M inistry o f Education published a new textbook, entitled Cardinal Principles o f the N ational Polity (Kokutai no hongi), with the intent o f indoctrinating young students in Japan as well as in Taiwan. Essentially a propaganda text, it was w ritten to instill Japanese patriotism , im bue young m inds w ith loyalty and obedience to the Japanese em peror, and justify Japanese im perialism and totalitarian policies.6A t the same tim e, the Taiwan governm ent-general banned the publication o f all Chinese-language books, newspapers, and m agazines. Bilingual new spapers, w hich had been perm it­ ted for the convenience o f older readers, were now prohibited. The one and only Taiwanese-owned paper, Hsing-nan shimbun (Rising South news) was

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ordered to merge with the Osaka m ainichi shimbun (O saka daily news). Sub­ sequently, all other papers in Taiwan w ere absorbed by the Taiwan nicht nichi shim po (Taiwan daily new s), w hich ceased to publish its Chinese colum ns.7 But as Japanese indoctrination o f Taiwanese youths had become so pervasive, a sensational event or a political assassination could instantly induce acts o f m isguided heroism and martyrdom . Indeed, m illions o f im pressionable Taiwanese youngsters, although not all, who read the governm ent-censored Taiwan nichi nichi shimpo daily, now blindly obeyed the state orders and would soon becom e w illing cogs in the Japanese w ar machine. W hen Crown Prince H irohito conducted a tw elve-day inspection tour o f Taiwan, from A pril 16 to A pril 27,1923, a quarter century had elapsed since Japan set up its colonial governm ent on the island. By that tim e, the overwhelm ing m ilitary force o f Japan as well as its effective utilization o f the patriarchal Taiwanese hoko system had already substantially reduced Taiwanese resistance to Japanese rule. Fifteen years later, after Japanese troops had occupied Nanking in*1937, Hirohito (with the reign title Showa) was worshiped by a majority o f Taiwanese students as their Personal God. A Cog in Japan’s W ar M achine In conjunction with this series o f propaganda and indoctrination program s, Japanese efforts to assim ilate the islanders also intensified. Before the mid1930s, Japan w anted m erely to assim ilate (do-ka) the Taiwanese, but after the outbreak o f w holesale w ar w ith China in 1937, it sought to im perialize (kom in-ka) the entire island population, including the aborigines. Thus, A dm iral Kobayashi Seizo (r. 1936-40), the seventeenth governor-general o f Taiwan and a man o f considerable international experience, set out to achieve the follow ing goals: first, to speed up developm ent o f Taiwan’s strategic in­ dustries, such as chem icals, m etals, and shipbuilding, so that the island could m aterially support the w ar effort; second, to use Taiwan as a springboard for Japan’s southward advance into China and Southeast A sia; and third, to vig­ orously prom ote the im perialization cam paign. As a consequence, beginning in A pril 1937, the colonial governm ent encouraged the Taiwanese to speak Japanese at home and in public so that they could' be fully integrated into Japanese culture and achieve genuine komin-ka (union with the Em peror’s people) in mind as well as spirit. Because o f decades o f educational discrim ination, political inequality, and social injustice, the Taiwanese faced roadblocks in their access to political rights, housing, employment, and social equality. There was a well-recognized glass ceiling that Taiwanese professionals could not get past. U nder the circum stances, being able to speak and w rite Japanese could becom e a means

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Table 8.1 Mother Tongue-Speaking Families In Taipei Year 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 Total

Mother Tongue-Speaking Families in Taipei* 216 318 412 324 460 652 1,066 3,448

♦Numbers represent new familes for each year.

to im prove an individual’s social, econom ic, and political conditions. Thus, the colonial governm ent used both carrots and sticks to prom ote speaking the m other tongue (junsei naru kokugo). The governm ent adopted a variety o f measures to discourage Taiwanese from speaking their own dialects at bus and train stations, in w orkplaces, and shops. For exam ple, factory workers were subjected to language proficiency tests every other month; consum ers could only use Japanese when purchasing toys or buying bus and train tickets. Fam ilies that spoke Japanese and hung signs on their houses proclaim ing, M other T ongue- S peaking F amily, would receive a certificate, a medal, and the better class o f w artim e coupons, allow ing them extra rations for food and daily necessities. Every local governm ent established a M other Tongue Fam ily Board (M TFB) to investigate, review, and award certificates to fam ilies who spoke Japanese all the tim e. The MTFB in H sinchu Province held the aw ards cerem ony only once a year (on April 19) to give away certificates, while Taipei and Taichung perform ed the cerem ony tw ice a year, on February 11 and June 17, respectively.8 Fam ilies who had a certificate from the MTFB could enroll their children in better schools, yet betw een 1937 and 1943, out o f a total o f 252,719 fam ilies in Taipei Province only 3,448 certificates were issued by the M TFB, or a m ere 1.3 percent.9 The increase in the num ber o f m other tongue-speaking fam ilies in Taipai is shown in Table 8.1. D espite the fact that legal restrictions against interm arriage betw een Japa­ nese and Taiwanese were lifted and an increasing num ber o f “mixed-blood” children were bom on the island, as o f A pril 1942, the entire island had only 9,604 certified m other tongue-speaking fam ilies (77,679 individuals). In 1943, the total population o f Taiwan was 6,133,867, w hich also m eant that

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only about 1.3 percent o f the islanders belonged to m other tongue-speaking fam ilies.10 But even though the percentage o f these fam ilies rem ained veiy low, an increasing num ber o f islanders had learned sufficient Japanese for com m unication, growing from 37.38 percent in 1937 to 51 percent in 1940. And by 1943, over 80 percent o f the Taiwanese could ‘“understand and speak” Japanese.11 So the Japanese achieved considerable success in prom oting the adoption o f the Japanese language by Taiwanese citizens during the war. In early 1940, the im perialization cam paign kicked into high gear. The colonial governm ent issued a nam e-change policy on February 11, 1940, to encourage the Taiw anese to change their nam es into Japanese nam es so that they could be fully im perialized. This required that only a fam ily, but not an individual, could apply fo r a nam e change. Each fam ily was free to choose w hatever new Japanese surnam e it w ished, w ith the follow ­ ing exceptions: (1) reign titles o f Japanese em perors, (2) nam es o f famous historical personalities, (3) birthplace names o f applicant’s Chinese ancestors, and (4) inappropriate nam es.12 Once approved, every m em ber o f the fam ily would bear the same new surname. Once again, the m ajority o f the Taiwanese opted to retain their original names. A fter ten months of intensive campaigning, only 1,357 fam ilies had changed their names to Japanese nam es; by the end o f 1941, the figure had increased to 70,000 Taiwanese (out o f a population o f m ore than 5.7 m illion), and by the end o f 1943, a total o f 17,526 fam ilies (or 126,211 persons) had applied to change their names. This means that near the end o f Japanese colonial rule, only 1.7 percent o f Taiwanese fam ilies, or 2 percent o f the island’s population, had chosen to adopt Japanese nam es.13 But w hether the Taiwanese agreed to change their nam es or not, they were uniform ly coerced to dem onstrate their allegiance to Em peror H irohito and to w orship at public Shinto shrines. Every Taiwanese fam ily was required to set up a Shinto altar (a kam idana) and display on it emblems o f the sun god­ dess and her latest descendant, the Em peror H irohito. M any fam ilies did not com ply with this requirem ent. C riticizing or questioning Shinto supremacy was treated as sacrilege by Japanese officials. By 1942, Taiwan had a total o f sixty-eight large Shinto shrines plus 128 sm aller shrines.14 (Taiwan’s two largest Shinto shrines, both in Taipei, were eventually converted into the G rand H otel and the Central Library. The Tainan Shinto Shrine was replaced by a gymnasium, and the only large shrine that rem ains intact is in Taoyuan, now under governm ent protection.) D uring the kom in-ka cam paign, the Taiwanese found it cheap and con­ venient to adopt Japanese wooden clogs (geta) and m at-floored (tatatm ) room s in their living quarters. However, very few islanders replaced their traditional attire with the more expensive Japanese kimono. Educated younger Taiwanese, who m odeled them selves after m odernized Japanese, generally

TAIWAN DURING WORLD WAR U

ISS

opted for W estern-style dress. As for popular entertainm ent and theater, sumo tournam ents becam e increasingly popular. But the colonial populace at large continued to prefer their own dram a to Japanese Kabuki or Noh, in which the use o f archaic language and subtlety were generally beyond Taiwanese com prehension. In alm ost every Taiwanese community, youngsters o f both sexes were induced to jo in the Youth Corps, which sponsored regular evening program s to cultivate the Japanese spirit. The 1940 G azetter o f H sinkang (“New Port” in Chinese, a sm all community in Chiayi district), shows ten such youth corps with a total membership o f 4,190.IS It is obvious that the Japanese attem pted to force the Taiwanese to fully assim ilate to their Yamato culture, rather than ju st creating a “bilingual” society on the island. As a consequence, the kom in-ka era was a difficult and confusing tim e for the islanders in general and for Taiwanese students in particular. A t home, youngsters preferred to speak Taiwanese with their fam ilies, but in school, out in public, or at Youth Corps gatherings, they had to speak Japanese, or else face ostracism and punishment. If culture means a people adhering to the same values and traditions, speaking one common language and observing a generally adopted m ode o f ethics, custom , and religious belief, then the Taiwanese were on the brink o f losing their ethnoculture. Needlessly to say, millions o f Taiwanese faced a serious identity crisis in the early 1940s. M any struggled w ith these identity problem s and finally succumbed to the high-handed Japanese policies; others managed to preserve the continuity o f their indigenous Taiwanese ethno-culture. For exam ple, Lin H sien-t’ang, the m ost prom inent cham pion o f Taiwan’s self-rule, preferred to speak Taiwanese and refused to change his name or have anything to do with assim ilation. However, Lin’s nephews, under pressure from Japanese officials, ultim ately relented and adopted Japanese nam es.16 As the w ar against the Allies expanded and escalated, Japan’s M inistry o f Education decided to shorten the school term at secondary and higher educa­ tional institutions so that the military could secure a greater supply of combat and working personnel. It then created a Science Board with the aim of increasing and expanding school and university departments for scientific and technical education. W ithin the four-year span between 1941 and 1945, the graduates o f the science and engineering departments numbered about 100,000, accounting for nearly 23 percent of all college graduates.17 During the w ar a substantial number of Taiwanese students completed their courses in middle school in less than four years, instead of the previous requirement o f five years. With either a diploma or simply a nominal endorsement from a middle school principal, a middle school student could sit for a higher education entrance examination, which tested his or her proficiency and knowledge of, among other subjects, Japanese language and literature, mathematics, English, and Chinese language.

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Those who failed the examination either attended school in Japan for advanced education, or simply found jobs and joined the workforce. The select few who passed enrolled at any one o f the eight higher schools in Japan, or could attend the island’s celebrated Taihoku Koto Gakko (Taipei Higher School). The Taipei Higher School (present-day National Taiwan Normal University) was established in 1925 for the sole purpose o f offering preparatory courses for students to advance to specialized colleges or universities. Its red-brick, Gothicstyle buildings, voluminous library (which held Chinese, English, Japanese, and German books), and beautiful green Vienna palm trees created the kind o f environm ent that helped nourish the minds o f the college-bound students. The faculty members were all Japanese and the num ber of Taiwanese students adm itted to the school was kept well below the number o f Japanese. Students were generally sons o f high-ranking Japanese officials, doctors, professionals, and businessmen. Even though 5.7 m illion Taiwanese (as compared with only 346,630 Japanese) lived on the island in 1940, the records o f that year show that 334 Japanese students were enrolled at the Taipei Higher School, but only eighty-seven Taiwanese. In 1941, the student body was composed o f 363 Japanese and 104 Taiwanese.18W ithout a doubt only the few brightest and also w ealthiest Taiwanese youths could gain admission to this prestigious prepara­ tory school. The Taipei Higher School offered four preparatory categories: A category and B category in the humanities and social sciences, and A category and B category in sciences and technology. Each category in each class had between forty and fifty students; typically only four or five o f these were Tai­ wanese. During the war, many students, Japanese and Taiwanese, managed to pass the college entrance examinations after only two years o f study at the preparatory school, instead o f the three-year requirem ent during peacetime. The curriculum at the Taipei H igher School was generally the same as those in other preparatory schools in the Japanese homeland, in part designed to cultivate a true and unsullied Japanese spirit. Required readings included early Japanese mythology and poetry, as well as Japanese classical literature and history. For exam ple, students studied the Kojiki (Record o f ancient m at­ ters, com piled in 712), in w hich indigenous Japanese myths and legends were selected and interw oven into history. This quasi-history taught that Japan had been the land o f mighty gods and goddesses. This kind o f history course could easily lead an im pressionable Taiwanese youth to believe in the divinity o f the Japanese em peror and the national superiority o f the Yamato nation. Students also read Bushido: The Soul o f Japan, a little volum e w ritten by N itobe Inazo (1862-1933), the quintessential apologist for Japanese colonialism . First published in 1889 and running to ten editions in six years, Bushido was a summary o f the Japanese code o f ethics and social norm s, discussing such issues as rectitude, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity and sincerity,

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Figure 8.1

157

Entrance of Imperial Taipei University, Founded by the Japanese In 1928

honor, self-control, treatm ent of women, suicide, and redress. The preparatory schools’ assignm ents also featured Lady Sei Shonagen’s miscellany, The P il­ low Book, and Lady M urasaki Shikibu’s The Tale ofG enji (Genji monogatari), both detailing the court life of Japan around 1000 c . e . Another required history book was the Tale o f the House o f Taira (Heike m onogatari), which describes the wars between the Taira clan and the M inamoto clan, the latter’s triumph over the form er in 1185, and the establishm ent o f the first shogunate. This heavy fare was usually diluted with Japanese romantic literature called shosetsu, a kind o f confessional, autobiographical fiction that, after the turn o f the tw entieth century, became enormously popular among young Japanese. Abe Jiro’s (1883-1959) Santaro ’s Diary (Santaro nikki), for example, portrays a defiant youth who rebels against the restraints o f Japanese society. In Grass on the Wayside (M ichikusa), the famed novelist Natsume Soseki (1867-1916) wrote movingly about his childhood, his harsh father, his heartless adoptive parents, and the fact that he often skipped meals in order to save money to buy books.19 In addition, students read Japanese translations o f W estern works, published by Iwanami Shoten. The more popular titles included Lawrence o f Arabia, A lbert Einstein’s The Birth o f Physics, and Johann W olfgang von G oethe’s Faust. By contrast, there were far few er Anglo-American popular books, such as Daniel D efoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Sir W alter Scott’s Ivanhoe, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter, or Herman M elville’s M oby Dick. In addition to the Taipei Higher School, there were a number o f specialized higher schools (equivalent to present-day junior colleges), such as the Taipei

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Table 8.2 Japanese/Talwanese Student Ratio at Taihoku Imperial University Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Japanese students 283 235 196 388 384 268

Taiwanese students 90 85 61 69 69 85

H igher Com m ercial School, the C hiayi A gricultural H igher School, the P’ingtung A gricultural H igher School, the Tainan Norm al School, and the Taichung Normal School. In 1928, Japan’s M inistry o f Education designated Taiwan as one o f the em pire’s ’’university districts,” and therefore established the Taihoku Im perial U niversity in the city o f Taipei. G enerally following the three-year European system , Taihoku Im perial U niversity contained only two colleges— the College o f M edicine and the College o f Liberal A rts and Political Science. The university had a library o f more than 400,000 volumes, o f which approxim ately half were in W estern languages. Designed prim arily as a research institute, Taihoku Im perial U niversity’s chief goal was to for­ ward Japanese colonial interests. Consequently, its core curriculum focused on tropical m edicine, tropical agriculture, and the subtropical regions o f South China, Southeast A sia, and the Indies. In keeping with this research orientation, there were m ore faculty and researchers than students, as the records show a teaching and research staff o f 708 and only 373 students in 1939. N ot surprisingly, because it was a university o f the Japanese, by the Japanese, and for the Japanese, Taiwanese teachers were rare, and only a few Taiwanese students were adm itted. Table 8.2 reflects an enrollm ent heavily skewed in favor o f the Japanese.20 The m ajority o f the Taiwanese students enrolled at the island’s only uni­ versity studied m edicine, with only a handful m ajoring in the hum anities and social sciences. Records from the university registrar show five Taiwanese youths studying the liberal arts and political sciences in 1940, three in 1941, 1942, and 1943, and tw o in 1944. But the fact that the Japanese did provide opportunities for the best and brightest Taiwanese students also indicates their am bivalent feelings tow ard the Taiwanese people.21 Taiwanese W ork in the W ar Zones To dem onstrate that the Japanese governm ent had started treating Taiwanese as the subjects o f the em peror w ithout discrim ination, G overnor-G eneral

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K obayashi, generally considered a thoughtful naval officer, sent several Taiwanese auxiliaries (gunzoku) to C hina, on Septem ber 2 7,1937, to serve as arm y doctors, interpreters, occupation security personnel, and the like.22 As the Japanese expanded their territorial control o f the m ainland, m ore Taiw anese w ere needed in agricultural production and construction o f transportation and com m unication infrastructure, am ong other tem porary jobs. Known as the “w hite elastic sleeves team ” (shirodasuki m i), 1,000 Taiw anese auxiliaries landed in Shanghai on O ctober 2 ,1 9 3 7 , to transport am m unition to the front lines. A fter the Japanese expeditionary troops had occupied Shanghai on N ovem ber 9, the auxiliaries w ere also assigned to grow vegetables and other food for Japanese troops, who took N anking in only 33 days (by D ecem ber 12,1937). These Taiw anese m ilitary auxiliaries w ere paid handsom ely, from 30 to 154 yen a m onth, as against a 36-yen monthly salary for a senior policem an in Taiwan.23M ost o f them would return to Taiwan after five m onths o f w ork in C hina, but, after a b rief hiatus, were assigned to other battle zones. A native o f Taipei by the nam e o f Su H si was recruited as a tem porary auxiliary four tim es. His first assignm ent was in July 1939, when he was sent to cultivate vegetables in N anking. In N ovem ber 1941, Su was dispatched to Luzon in the northern Philippines, but his w ork was cut short because o f a w ound he received during an Am erican bom bing. The third tim e he worked for the Japanese m ilitary was in late O ctober 1942, when he was shipped out to G uadalcanal. For the first tim e, he was issued a rifle, a bayonet, and live am m unition. Finally, in N ovem ber 1943, at the Japanese base o f R abaul on New B ritain in the Solom on Islands, Su was m ade a bona fide Japanese soldier (gunjin). He survived the ordeal o f the w ar and safely returned to Taiwan in A pril 1946.24 The tem porary w artim e w ork started as a boon for Taiw anese auxiliaries, but it ultim ately turned out to be a bane as many died abroad before the w ar ended. A case in point was a native o f Yuanlin in Changhua Prefecture nam ed Chen H an-chang, who started serving as an auxiliary in D ecem ber 1937 and did sim ilar jobs tw ice m ore before, on February 6, 1940, he was killed by a bom bshell in South C hina.23 The period between 1931 and 1941 was an eventful tim e for Taiwan and the world at large. During this period, Japan invaded M anchuria and North China, and in the sum m er o f 1937, launched an all-out w ar against China. Japan then set up a string o f puppet governm ents in M anchukuo, Inner M ongolia, B eijing, and N anking; and signed the Tripartite Pact w ith Germany and Italy in Septem ber 1940. But this sequence o f aggressive acts caused the U nited States to em bargo the sale o f scrap iron to Japan in O ctober 1940. However, the Japanese, anticipating this, had found several alternative sources o f raw m aterials to feed its w ar m achine. In the 1930s, in order to gradually reduce

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its reliance on goods exported and im ported from Europe and Am erica, Japan m ethodically expanded trade w ith South China and Southeast A sia through such ports as D airen, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, and Singapore. B efore the Japanese attacked Pearl H arbor in D ecem ber 1941, it had not only had gained a dom inant m arket position in A sia, but also had successfully integrated various sm aller econom ic spheres into its im perial econom ic scheme. By utilizing their established netw orks in Japan, Korea, M anchuria and Taiwan, Japanese zaibatsu could afford to price their goods cheaper, but by selling higher volum es at low er profit m argins, they m anaged to m onopolize A sian m arkets. For exam ple, during the five-year period betw een 1931 and 1935, w hile the w orld econom y and trade were severely depressed, Japanese trade w ith A sian regions actually increased by 11.1 percent.26 On Septem ber 22, 1940, the Japanese governm ent signed, w ith Jean D ecoux, the Vichy governor-general in Vietnam, an agreem ent that would allow 30,000 Japanese troops to be stationed in French Indochina and use Vietnam ’s m ajor airports. M oreover, one day after attacking Pearl Harbor, Japan signed yet another alliance pact w ith Thailand, intending to gain access to the latter’s raw m aterials. Thus, the Japanese successfully executed a policy in Southeast A sia sim ilar to that o f the Germans in the Balkans during W orld W ar II. The Taiwan Developm ent Company D uring the process o f em pire building, in 1936 the Taiwan governm entgeneral established the Taiwan Developm ent Company Lim ited (Taiwan takushoku kabushiki kaisha; TDC) to execute Tokyo’s econom ic policies and to exploit raw m aterials in Japan’s own colonies, as well as in South China and Southeast Asia. H eadquartered in Taipei, the TDC had an initial capital o f 30 m illion yen, half o f w hich came from the governor-general’s coffer and the other half from such zaibatsu as M itsui, M itsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. Kato Kyohei, a seasoned corporation m anager closely affiliated with the M itsubishi conglomerate, was chosen as the TDC’s chief executive officer. In Taiwan, the TDC aim ed to expand productivity; in Southeast A sia to gain raw m aterials, and in South China to cooperate with the invading Japanese troops in various construction projects, such as building drinking-w ater plants in Kwantung Province. Under the circum stances, the TDC was able to invest in a variety o f industries and businesses in Taiwan, Hainan Island, Indochina, and elsewhere. These included m ining, fishing, forestry and agriculture, real estate and construction, and transportation and commerce. By 1942, the TDC had invested in a total o f thirty-tw o projects, with eight

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overseas and tw enty-four in Taiwan (thirteen in Taipei, four on the island’s east coast, three in Kaohsiung, two in Taichung, and one each in Tainan and H sinchu).27The m ajority o f these enterprises were for business developm ent and industrial grow th, but after 1943, mining became one o f its investm ent priorities. Because o f their unspoiled frontier land and uniquely rich resources, the TDC tapped into Taitung and Hualien on Taiwan’s east coast to develop a num ber o f specifically designated enterprises. For instance, o f the three TDC companies in Taitung, Taitung Kinfa (rising prosperity) was intended to exploit aboriginal labor for sugar and forest production, and also for harvesting wild anim al skins. Taiwan Cotton Company was to cultivate cotton to m eet the needs o f the Japanese cotton textile industry, which by 1933 had surpassed Britain to become the forem ost m anufacturer in the world. The H oshi-gina Company was a pharm aceutical firm (H oshi means star and gina means trees), which was to plant South American trees and extract quinine for curing m alaria. The TDC set up the Hoshi-gina Company in August 1938 in Taitung with an initial capital o f250,000 yen. This was increased to one m illion yen in 1941 in order to m eet the m edical needs o f the Japanese em pire. In addition, the TDC established a m etal firm, a nitrogenous fertilizer company, and an asbestos plant in Hualien H arbor to take advantage o f the abundant hydraulic pow er and m ineral resources in the vicinity.28 On February 10, 1939, Japanese troops occupied Hai-kuo harbor at the northern tip o f Hainan Island. In less than three weeks, the TDC had set up an office at Hai-kuo, standing by to receive instructions from the Im perial Navy, which considered the occupation o f this particular island a critically im portant prerequisite for Japanese expansion to Southeast Asia. According to a study by Adam Schneider, o f the 1,146 m illion yen the Japanese invested in all o f the areas occupied and adm inistered by the Im perial Navy, nearly 479 m illion yen (or 42 percent) were invested in Hainan Island.29 For exam ple, several other Japanese com panies—Asano Cem ent, Japan N itrogenous Fertilizer, and Ishihara Industries to nam e but three— had divided the conqueror’s spoils as they all invested in the island’s m ining, electrical appliances, and telecom m unications industries. Likewise, beginning in M arch 1939, the TDC selectively but heavily invested in the tropical island’s agriculture and forestry, livestock, transportation, ice-m aking, brick and tile, and lum ber industries. However, because o f the growing num ber o f occupation personnel in south C hina and later in Southeast Asia, improving rice, sugar, and food production had soon become TDC’s priority on Hainan Island. During their occupation o f Hainan Island, the Japanese consumed some 6,000 tons o f gasoline every year. Since it took 10,000 piculs o f brown sugar to make 200 tons o f alcohol, the Japanese decided to find local energy

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resources to m eet the needs o f its war machine. Also, in order to feed both m ilitary and civilian populations on the island, the Japanese had to im port 6,000 tons o f rice from Vietnam in 1942, which increased to 16,000 tons in 1943.30 U nder the circum stances, the TDC established tw o main offices, one at H ai-kuo in the north and the other at San-ya (later changed to Yu-lin) in the south, to coordinate all o f its investm ents. The Hai-kuo office was charged with cultivating and growing sweet potatoes, m elons, cabbages, tom atoes, eggplants, as w ell as planting seedlings o f sugar cane, hemp, rubber trees (for Bridgestone Tire Co.), and other tropical plants. It was also responsible for raising poultry, hogs, and cattle, as well as increasing the production o f cheese, animal hides and shoes, and ice refrigeration. The Yu-lin office supervised two m ajor agricultural farm s, one livestock farm, a charcoal plant, and a forest station. It also supplied labor and m aterials to the m ilitary and facilitated the construction o f San-ya N aval Base, H uang-liu Airfield, and Yu-lin harbor.31 As the zaibatsu were w illing to invest in so many enterprises in the newly occupied location, the Japanese governm ent offered all sorts o f incentives, including no-interest loans for five years, to encourage both Japanese and Taiwanese to com e to the island. By 1942, however, only ninety-six Japanese fam ilies (a total o f 260 people, mostly from Okinawa and Kyushu), agreed to em igrate to Hainan Island. There were simply not enough trained technicians or high school graduates to manage so many farm s, stations, and projects. The TD C, assisted by the governm ent-general o f Taiw an and Taihoku Im perial U niversity, periodically held ‘T D C Technical Conversations” to recruit Taiwanese to move to Hainan Island. Statistics vary on how many Taiwanese— including those who worked for the TDC, arm ed personnel, m ilitary auxiliaries, nurses, and so on—actually went to Hainan Island during the occupation period. At the tim e o f the Japanese surrender, however, the A llies created four POW camps on the island, at Hsiu-ying port, San-ya Na­ val Base, Pei-li, and Ling-shui. O f the four camps, the San-ya cam p interned 8,220 and the H siu-ying camp between 4,000 and 5,000 Taiwanese. C iting data provided by the N ationalist Chinese governm ent, historian Tang Shiyeoung states that by 1946 there were a total o f 23,000 Taiwanese stranded on Hainan Island.32 Though it is im possible to docum ent accurately, there is no question that the Taiwanese had made significant contributions to Hainan Island’s overall economic development, particularly in the agriculture, forestry, and construction industries. Among other accom plishm ents, Taiw anese technicians introduced fifty-eight different strains o f rice and three new species o f sugar cane (P.O.J2878, P.O.J2883, and P.O.J2725) to Hainan Island during the war.33 In addition to exploiting Hainan Island’s resources, the TDC managed to obtain from Vietnam such im portant raw m aterials as iron ore and manganese,

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and by early 1941 was able to acquire chrome, phosphate, and nickel mines there. By late 1941 and early 1942, the TDC had established eight sites for experim ental cultivation o f crops such as cotton, jute, tim ber, and rice in Indochina. Owing to the shortage of manpower during the war, the TDC relied heavily on the Taiwanese in its operations, which required more than 6,000 em ployees by the end o f the war. Thus, Taiwanese, as well as Japanese bom and raised in Taiwan, played an im portant role in the TDC. Adam Schneider points out that though m ost o f the Taiwanese worked in the countryside on agricultural projects while Japanese managed offices in Hanoi and Saigon, the TDC treated the Taiwanese and Japanese m ore equally in Southeast A sia than in Taiwan. Schneider cites Taiwanese like Wu Lien-I and Liao Tsuyao, who worked as farm station technicians and m anagers and supervised Vietnamese peasants and laborers. The ironic tw ist is that the Taiwanese in Southeast A sia, being forced as they were into solidarity w ith their Japanese colleagues, became “tem porary colonizers.”34 Throughout its existence, the TDC worked hand in glove with the governm ent-general in Taiwan and with the Japanese m ilitary. For exam ple, the Japanese navy charged the TDC with developing seven production program s w hile the army com m issioned it to develop sixteen projects. In 1942, the navy again asked the TDC to develop salt production in the Celebes and also on the Sunda Islands.33W ith its sprawling businesses throughout the Japanese em pire, the TDC was able to provide raw m aterials to feed Japan’s w artim e m ilitary and industrial com plex. As the w ar raged on, the TDC grew bigger and its profits m ounted higher, w ith its financial assets exceeding 135 m illion yen near the end o f the war. But the TDC’s monumental assets collapsed with the fall o f the empire. On September 30,1945, the Supreme Commander for the A llied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo ordered the closure o f the TDC and its tw enty-nine subsidiaries.36 A Launching Pad for Japanese Conquests in Southeast A sia Adm iral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, a form er vice-m inister o f the navy and com­ m andant o f the Yokosuka Naval Yards, was Taiwan’s govem er-general from Novem ber 1940 until Decem ber 1944. Hasegawa not only effectively turned Taiwan into a launching pad for Japanese m ilitary conquests in the Philip­ pines and other Southeast Asian countries, but also system atically m obilized Taiwan’s labor force and m aterial resources for supporting the escalation o f the war. To accomplish these goals, Hasegawa organized the Imperial Subjects Public Service A ssociation (komin hokokai), which was used to intensify Japan’s control over the social and cultural life o f the islanders, as well as to increase the tem po o f w artim e indoctrination and propaganda. School textbooks, governm ent-controlled new spapers, journals and m agazines,

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pictures and cartoons, and radio broadcasts were all filled w ith topics and discussions about Japanese faith and religion, about state and patriotism , and about the existing Japanese kokutai (polity), w hich vigorously prom oted the so-called fam ily-state ideal o f the governm ent. In such a governm ent, the em peror becam e the suprem e leader o f a hierarchy under w hich the Japanese society was structured. Every action taken by the state was justified in term s o f patriotism . Taiwanese were encouraged to forsake their traditional wedding and funeral rituals and instead adopt Japanese Shinto cerem onies. M utual-aid clubs, patriotic clubs, and other civic groups were organized to do everything the state required o f them. W ives or daughters o f Taiwanese soldiers would stand on street com ers or at factory entrances asking 1,000 different passersby to each stitch a sm all knot on a large piece o f w hite cloth. The “ 1,000-stitch cloth” (sennin ban) would then be sent to the front lines, dem onstrating to the husband or father that he had 1,000 adm irers at hom e.37 A fter the Japanese attacked Pearl H arbor on D ecem ber 7 (D ecem ber 8 in Taiwan), 1941, Taiwanese were frequently asked to bring lanterns and join nighttim e victory parades in the streets o f m ajor cities and towns. This was re­ peated whenever Japanese troops occupied a m ajor city, such as the occupation o f Hong Kong (on D ecem ber 25,1941), M anila (January 2,1942), Singapore (February 15,1942), and Rangoon (M arch 8,1942). It is noteworthy that many Taiwanese drank in the euphoria o f victories and conquests, believing that the mighty sun goddess Am aterasu Omikami had m ade Japan invincible. Indeed, m ilitary tidings from various battlefields repeatedly corroborated w hat they had read, further deepening their belief in the divinity o f the Japanese emperor. Table 8.3 shows the sequence o f Japanese victories and may help to explain why m ost Taiwanese cam e to em brace the side o f the w inners.3* Taiwanese in Japanese M ilitary Uniform s There is no question that consciously or unconsciously many Taiwanese had been indoctrinated to live for the state, to fight for the state, and if necessary, to die for the state. G iven this rousing esprit de corps, Governor-General H asegawa recruited the first division o f Taiwanese arm y volunteers (rikugun shiganhei) in A pril 1941 and started training Taiwanese naval volunteers (kaigun shiganhei) in M ay 1943. As expected, Taiwanese youths in general were quite enthusiastic about volunteering and joining the m ilitary services. Some volunteers even used their own blood to fill out application forms; others simply wrote so-called “blood letters” to the newspapers or to the M obilization Board. In the early summer o f 1942, a total o f 425,921 Taiwanese signed up for the 1,000 available army slots. W ith a total population o f 3 m illion eligible Taiwanese males at the tim e, this meant that out o f every 100 Taiwanese males,

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Table 8.3 Areas and Cities Occupied by Japanese during WWII Year 1941

Month 12

1942

1

2

3

Day 10 16 17 23 25 2 6 11 11 23 24-27 Last week 4 8 15 16 17 24 27 5 8

4

1st week

5

9 29 3 6 20 8

6

Occupied Areas, Cities Guam Victoria Point (Burma) Kuching (Borneo) Wake Island Hong Kong Manila, Cavite (Philippines) Brunei (Borneo) Jesselton (Borneo) Celebes Rabaul (New Britain) Makassar Strait Malaya (except Singapore) Amboina Makassar City Singapore Palembang (Sumatra) Bali (Indonesia) Timor (Indonesia) Java (Indonesia) Batavia (Jarkata) Rangoon (Burma) Lae-Salamaua (E New Guinea) Bougain (Solomon Islands) Bougainville (Solomon Islands) Admiralty Islands Bataan (Philippines) Central Burma Tulagi (Solomon Islands) Corregidor Island (Philippines) Complete capture of Burma Attu (Aleutian Islands)

Former Colonial Master U.S.A U.K. The Netherlands U.S.A. U.K. U.S.A. U.K. The Netherlands The Netherlands Australia None U.K. The Netherlands The Netherlands U.K. The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands U.K. Australia Australia Australia Australia U.S.A. U.K. Australia U.S.A. U.K. U.S.A.

fourteen of them tried to enlist. During the second round o f recruitm ent in early 1943, an even more im pressive figure o f 601,147 Taiwanese men volunteered for only 1,000 army slots.39And by July o f 1943, more than 316,000Taiwanese had applied to volunteer for the navy. But since com pulsory armed service was im m inent, volunteering for the navy came to a halt in 1944, and the army follow ed suit in 1943. By then, there were already 16,500 Taiwanese volunteer troops, with 5,500 serving in the Im perial Army and 11,000 in the Im perial Navy. The auxiliaries, on the other hand, were organized into various corps, such as the A gricultural Righteous Bravery Corps (nogyo giyudan), A gricultural Instruction Vanguard Corps (nogyo shido teishindan), Taiwan

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Special Labor Service Corps (Taiwan tokusetsu romu hokodan), Taiwan Special A gricultural Corps (Taiwan tokusetsu nogyodan), Taiwan Special Construction Corps (Taiwan tokusetsu kensetsudan), and so on.40 Beginning in early May o f 1943, Colonel Sawai H ideo o f the Im perial Navy asked Japanese school principals and teachers in Taiwan to cajole and tw ist the arm s o f young Taiwanese schoolchildren, aged thirteen to sixteen, to “volunteer” to work in the navy’s C A ircraft Factory (renam ed the Koza Navy Factory after April 1,1944) in Kanagawa. A total o f 8,419 impoverished Taiwanese child laborers (shonenko) were brought to Japan, trained for three m onths, and quickly dispatched to make aircraft parts for bom bers and light kam ikaze suicide planes. They were prom ised good wages and were told that after three years o f work they w ould receive an engineering degree equivalent to a junior college diplom a. C onstantly laboring under the most difficult conditions, these Taiwanese youngsters helped Japanese aeronautical engineers assem ble such planes as the Zero Com bat, the Purple Light, the Thunder Light, the M oonlight, the M eteorite and the M ilky Way. Among them the “M oonlight” fighter planes were used to attack Am erican B-29 Superfortress bom bers (called “B-san” by the Japanese). The story o f the Taiwanese wartim e child laborers was first revealed by a 2003 docum entary film produced and directed by a Taiwanese nam ed Kuo Liang-yin, but the details, the num ber o f casualties, and the im plications are yet to be told. At any rate, mandatory conscription in Taiwan began in April 1945, and until Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945, Japanese governm ent records show a total o f207,183 Taiwanese armed service personnel—including com bat troops (80,433) and auxiliaries (126,750)— fighting and serving in W orld W ar Ô. O f these, an estim ated 30,304 perished in the battlefields and thousands o f others died in postw ar prison cam ps and during repatriation. The m ajority o f the casualties were m ale Taiwanese, but there were also a substantial num ber o f aborigines (takasago zoku), as well as Taiwanese fem ales serving as nurses (kango-fu) and “com fort women” (ianfu).41 Japanese m ilitary training was harsh as it stressed discipline, loyalty, and victory at all costs. It aim ed to turn each soldier and sailor into an au­ tom aton who never questioned authority and would do only what he was expressly ordered to do. It is to be expected that Taiwanese com bat troops and auxiliaries would be sent to the newly occupied areas, doing the bidding o f the Japanese m ilitary. In an oral history project (com pleted in 1997), Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai interview ed m ore than two dozen Taiwanese com bat veterans and auxiliary survivors and docum ented their w artim e experiences in Southeast A sia, the Pacific Islands, and elsew here. Included among the W orld W ar II survivors she interview ed were tw o nurses who worked for an

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army hospital in Canton, a com bat veteran who fought on Timor Island in Indonesia, a Hakka navy volunteer who was im prisoned by the Soviet Red Army in Siberia, an agriculture expert assigned to supervise a farm at Rabaul in New Britain in the Solomon Islands, a war prisoner first sentenced to die in North Borneo but whose sentence was later commuted to a ten-year jail term , a ship mechanic serving in a M indanao navy airport in the Philippines, an auxiliary who worked in both Hainan Island and Rabaul; a public health expert sent to Hainan Island to prevent and cure m alaria, an autom obile mechanic dispatched to repair military vehicles in Nanking, and a police officer assigned to Hainan Island. Ts’ai also interview ed four aboriginal auxiliaries and soldiers— a paramedic in the Philippines, a navy security guard in Hong Kong, a m arine who fought in New G uinea, and a m ason who constructed barracks and bunkers at Rabaul. Prisoners o f War H istorian Chung Shu-ming docum ents Taiwanese who served as security guards at various prison camps during the war. Because so many prisoners-ofw ar were captured by Japanese troops, at least 600 Taiwanese were recruited to process and watch prisoners at Camp O ’Donnell in San Fernando, the Philippines, in Shanghai, at Kuching and Sandakan in Borneo, and elsewhere. Generally ignorant o f the Geneva Convention code relating to the treatm ent o f POW s, 173 low-ranking Taiwanese soldier-guards were later indicted for com m itting crim es against humanity—tw enty-six were sentenced to death and the rest to serve jail term s o f various durations.42 Stories o f the Taiwanese soldiers serving in the Japanese m ilitary were generally sad, with some o f them epitom izing the basic human instinct for survival. A case in point would be the hellish experience the Taiwanese at the Japanese Rabaul naval base suffered. Based on a report in Taiwan’s Hsinsheng pao (The new life newspaper), near the end o f what the Japanese call the “G reater East Asia War, or Daidoua senso,” there were at least 7,536 Taiwanese com bat troops and auxiliaries stationed at Rabaul. The figure could easily exceed 10,000 if the Taiwanese serving in New Britain and New Ireland were also included.43 Beginning in January 1944, U.S. carrier-based and land-based planes methodically bombed and shelled W est New Guinea. From then on, between 1,500 and 2,000Taiwanese were ordered to do nothing but dig trenches and graves each day. By February 20,1944, American forces had destroyed the Rabaul base. On A pril 22, American m arines landed at Hollandia, capital o f West New G uinea and within less than four months gained control o f all of West New Guinea and forced the Japanese to withdraw from East New Guinea.

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It was during this period that thousands o f Taiwanese perished in the “Death M arch” across the jungle. Chou W an-yao interview ed a Taiwanese survivor, Hsieh Tien-lai, who said that his Rubaul unit had a total o f 1,013 troops, pri­ m arily Japanese but also including many Taiwanese and a few Koreans. W ith the exception o f those who were sick and opted to stay behind, the rest o f the more than 900 people perished during the march. Hsieh swore that as far as he could rem em ber he was the only Taiwanese in his unit to have survived the relentless A llied bombings, the swamps, the diseases, the humidity, and the hunger.44 In American history books and popular culture, the stories of the Bataan Death M arch and the American survivors at the fiendish Camp O ’Donnell in northern Philippines are told tim e and again to sa v e as a reminder o f the cruelty o f the Japanese. But younger Taiwanese have ju st begun to leant the whole story o f their forefathers’ suffering during World War II. The Taiwanese who survived the w ar experienced vastly different postw ar treatm ent at the hands o f different victors in different places. G enerally speaking, if they were captured by the Am ericans, they had better food and decent cam p facilities. A fter standard POW processing, American Liberty Ships (standard cargo vessels, hastily constructed right after Pearl Harbor to transport troops to various w ar theaters) were ready to bring Taiwanese expatriates home. The treatm ent they received at the hands o f the English, the Dutch, and the A ustralians varied from cam p to camp. In a court m artial trial conducted by the A ustralian military, ninety-one Taiwanese were convicted as w ar crim inals and seven o f them were executed. However, alm ost every Taiw anese w ar prisoner com plained about the inhum an and despicable treatm ent they received from the Chinese N ationalists, in particular at the hands o f the cam p guards in Hainan Island. Chinese officials and guards were shabby, corrupt, and vindictive. They pocketed money, m edicine, and rations for them selves, but allow ed cam p facilities to deteriorate to an unbearable condition, like cattle bam s. Worse still, the Chinese were extrem ely slow in expatriating Taiwanese veterans back to Taiwan— some o f whom were not returned hom e until 1947. One bitter repatriated Taiwanese charged that only one out o f four Taiwanese on Hainan Island made it home alive. However, Tang Shi-yeoung, who relies prim arily on KMT governm ent docum ents, claim s that out o f 23,000 Taiwanese w ar prisoners on Hainan Island, 22,500 (or 98 percent) were ultim ately and safely repatriated.43 The ashes o f the dead Taiwanese were stored in Tokyo’s Yasukuni Memorial Shrine but their identity tablets were later sent to a Buddhist shrine in Hsinchu Prefecture in northern Taiwan. O f the approxim ately 40,000 dead Taiwanese soldiers and conscripts, approxim ately 20,000 have not been claim ed by their fam ilies.46 N ear the end o f 1974, a Taiwanese soldier named Li Kuang-hui (his aboriginal name was Suliyung and his Japanese name Nakamura Teruo)

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was discovered in the jungle o f Indonesia thirty years after W orld War II had ended. L i’s reem ergence quickly rekindled bitter memories o f the w ar among Taiwanese. As a consequence, Taiwanese World War II veterans organized the Formosan Club o f Japan on M arch 15,1975, to demand com pensation by the Japanese governm ent for the money they and their com rades had deposited in the Japanese m ilitary savings pension. M embers o f the Formosan Club o f Japan and their dependents asked for a sum of $250 m illion in com pensation. It then set up twenty-nine registration offices throughout the island. On the first day o f registration, m ore than 10,000 people showed up with their m ilitary savings books. Subsequently, several Taiwanese veterans filed a class-action suit in a Tokyo district court demanding com pensation. A lthough the Tokyo H igher Court ultim ately rejected the case, the Japanese D iet in 1988 passed a consolation law, under which 2 m illion yen—approximately U S$21,900—was allocated for each Taiwanese veteran who had suffered severe injuries during W orld W ar II, and for each fam ily that had lost a soldier in the war. On M arch 31,1995, com pensation was sent to the fam ilies o f 29,645 identifiable Taiwanese soldiers and auxiliaries.47 Several thousand Anglo-Am erican and Dutch prisoners-of-w ar were also incarcerated in Taiwan during the war, prim arily following Japan’s initial victories in the Pacific. In June 1942, the first group o f 2,400 war prisoners set sail from M alaysia, but none o f them made it to Taiwan because the ships they were aboard were sunk in A llied bombings. On A ugust 2, tw elve Dutch and five American POW s reached Kaohsiung, followed in m id-August by another 179 from the Philippines. Among them was U.S. M ajor General Jonathan W ainwright, who had assum ed command o f American troops in the Philippines after Douglas M acA rthur’s (1880-1964) retreat to A ustralia. N ear the end o f August, die Japanese command in Singapore dispatched to Taiwan a group o f 399 high-ranking POW s, including Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival (British com m ander in M alaya), Sir Shenton Thomas (B ritish civil governor in M alaya), M ajor General B.W. Key (British com m ander in India), among others. Again, on Novem ber 14, 1942, a large contingent o f 2,000 POW s arrived in Taiwan from M alaya. In 1943, o f the 1,155 POW s captured in Java, only 33 were sent to Taiwan, the rest to Japan. In 1944, another group o f 1,287 POW s died on their way from Singapore to Taiwan when their ships were attacked by American planes. In 1945, Japanese military authorities decided to move 702 POW s from Taiwan to Japan.48 Table 8.4 illustrates the nationality and num ber o f the POW s incarcerated in Taiwan with data gathered from Japanese intelligence agencies.49 Although most o f the POW s were interned at the Chin-kua-shih (Gold M elon Rock) gold mining area near Keelung Harbor, they were frequently m oved around the island. Their living quarters (som etim es in caves and

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Table 8.4 World War II Prlsoners-of-War In Taiwan Year USA 1942 235 1943 236 1944 50 1945 86

The Deaths in Britain Netherlands Canada Australia Others Total Camps 2,114 2 2,408 38 25 2 30 37 2,430 114 2,061 90 0 6 34 22 2,036 107 1,925 0 5 24 1 1,156 12 2 1,281 0

bam s) were terrible and their food rations scant and poor. M oreover, they were regularly required to perform all sorts o f labor, ranging from work­ ing on sugar plantations and in factories and digging pebbles in rivers for construction m aterials to hauling logs and working in gold and coal mines. W orse, near the end o f the war, they were sometimes used as human shields against A llied air raids. A ccording to a Taiwanese cam p guard, the prisoners, including General Jonathan M . W ainwright, were often subject to verbal insults and physical beatings.30Among the survivors o f these cam ps, B ritish officers Jack Edwards and Paul C. M altby, and Dutch officer Paul Schölten managed to keep rudim entary diaries, or attem pted to jo t down their experi­ ences from memory after their release. Taiwanese eyew itnesses at the camps and the records from the w ar crim e trials generally corroborate the bitter accounts o f the POW s.31 The End o f the Ordeal W orld W ar II historians generally agree that after the Battle o f M idway in June 1942, the Im perial Japanese Navy lost its offensive capability— or at least its fighting spirit—and once American and A ustralian troops gained control o f Guadalcanal on February 8, 1943, the Japanese gradually began to withdraw to the west. By the late summer of 1943, Admiral C hester W. N im itz’s (1885-1966) forces had effectively occupied the central Pacific Is­ lands and commenced bombing Japanese bases. From that tim e forward, the U.S. Navy frequently disrupted the twenty-one regularly scheduled shipping lines that connected Taiwan to the world. In 1944, a group o f 300 Taiwanese naval volunteers en route to Japan for training, boarded the Japanese cruiser Fukoku go (Protecting the nation), but the ship was sunk by an Am erican submarine, resulting in 212 deaths. By early 1944, when the demand for more troops, m unitions, planes, and ships was becoming increasingly insistent, the em pire’s economy was starting to collapse. Also, because o f the shortage o f manpower, Taiwanese women, children, and the elderly were m obilized

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for labor in factories and in farm ing villages for nearly a third o f the year. D uring the first week o f July 1944, the Am ericans took Saipan, and Japanese food shortages becam e a serious problem . Everything became scarce: tofu, eggs, noodles, sugar, pork, and fish. Even rice was becoming more and more difficult to procure. Popular festival foods, such as rice cakes, were hard to come by, and because o f pow er shortages, there were frequent blackouts. On July 18, Tojo Hideki (1884-1948) resigned as prim e m inister and m unitions m inister. Imm ediately, General Kuniaki Koiso (1880-1950) form ed a new cabinet while G injiro Fujihara, an accom plished industrialist and a M itsui executive, took over the m unitions m inistry portfolio.52 But after Japan lost six carriers at the Battle o f Leyte G ulf in the Philippines, Taiwanese students enrolled in Japanese universities were forced to volunteer for m ilitary duty. If they had refused to volunteer, their names would be posted in prom inent public places. By O ctober 1944, General Douglas M ac A rthur had kept his vow to return to the Philippines. On Novem ber 13, 1944, more than 1,000 American planes, prim arily carrier-based fighters and some B-29s, bombed m ajor Taiwanese cities. W ith the shadow o f defeat spreading over the Japanese em pire, the colonial governm ent in Taiwan organized the C ivilian Volunteer Corps during the spring o f 1945 to prevent a popular uprising. A lso, through the hoko sys­ tem , Taiwanese males under sixty years old were being m obilized to repair bom bed-out plants and roads, to dig trenches and tunnels in the hills, and to build pillboxes and barbed-wire barriers along the coast. Regimentation o f the population was soon extended to women, who were assigned to haul rocks and sand for m ilitary installations, and to serve as emergency nurses. Even schoolchildren had to suspend their studies so that they could help prepare for a last-ditch resistance. And as the bombing raids increased, the most celebrated Taiwanese puppet m aster, Li TIen-lu, was recruited by Japanese authorities to perform anti-A m erican puppet shows around the island. In L i’s show, called “A nnihilating Anglo-American Pilots,” Taiwanese m ilitia shot down allied airplanes and captured Am erican pilots.33 In the meantime, Japanese headquarters in Tokyo and Taipei were paying close attention to W ashington’s next move. A nticipating a possible Arma­ geddon, General Ando R ikichi (1884-1946), who was appointed to be the nineteenth and last governor-general o f Taiwan at the end o f 1944, called up approxim ately 180,000 troops and began to prepare for a long siege.34 Because the Philippines was only a few hundred kilom eters from Kaohsiung, and because the Japanese fleet was now in tatters, it was assumed that Kaohsiung was a prim e target for an A merican invasion. For over three centuries, Kaohsiung had been considered an im portant strategic location by its citizens. The neighboring town o f Tsoying was used by Koxinga and

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Figure 8.2 Schoolgirls In Exercise During World War II

the M anchus to garrison their troops and train their navy. The Japanese m ilitary-zaibatsu complex further developed Kaohsiung into a m ajor har­ bor in order to facilitate their expansion into southern China and Southeast Asia. The Kaohsiung garrison headquarters was located on Longevity Hill (Anglo-Am ericans called it Ape H ill), which was 390 m eters high and had a panoramic view o f the entire city and its harbor. It was atop this hill that the Japanese installed most of their anti-aircraft batteries. However, Japanese radar was not up to the task, so Japanese anti-aircraft batteries were inef­ fective in preventing B-29 firebombing from destroying transport facilities, industrial and power plants, gasoline depots, and houses, as well as killing civilians. Spectacular victories scored by U.S. naval forces in the central and western Pacific quickly caused W ashington to change its offensive strategy against the Japanese em pire. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to invade Okinawa and thus canceled their w ell-planned Operation Causeway, the A llies’ code name for the invasion and conquest of Taiwan. By this tim e, some Taiwanese had begun to sense the growth o f American power and the weakening o f Japanese m ilitary might. Their confidence had started to wane when the w ar brought many islanders to the brink o f starvation. The islanders consumed only about 1,400 calories daily and faced ever-increasing hardships. Then, sometime after the fact, came the news that on August 6,1945, the first atomic bomb had been unleashed by the Americans against Hiroshima, killing between 130,000 and 140,000 Japanese, and on August 9, the second bomb killed another 60,000 to 70,000 people in Nagasaki. The Taiwanese, like the

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vast m ajority o f Japanese, did not im m ediately learn o f these honors, but the governm ent-controlled newspapers did carry a special announcement that the Americans had used a new weapon that had caused considerable damage to the two cities. On August 15, Em peror H irohito agreed to accept the term s o f the unconditional surrender demanded by the Allied leaders at the Potsdam Conference on July 26. Two weeks after H irohito’s “Jade Voice” broadcast announcing the surrender, a trium phant General M acArthur arrived in Japan and wasted no time in disarming and demobilizing the Japanese troops. By the end o f November 1945, as dem obilization neared com pletion, all Taiwanese com bat troops and auxiliaries stopped receiving m ilitary allowances. Fortu­ nately, the United States had already commenced shipping emergency supplies to Taiwan, including grain, m eat and dairy products, as well as clothing and blankets. The five-and-half-m illion islanders generally welcomed the news o f Japan’s surrender; in fact, a num ber o f leading Taiwanese had begun to bid for an independent Taiwan as soon as Japan surrendered Taiwan to SCAP at Yokohama on Septem ber 3. However, early in A pril 1944, the N ationalist Chinese governm ent had already set up a Taiwan Investigation Commission in Chungking, taking preparatory m easures for the recovery o f Taiwan from the Japanese. The commission was headed by a long-time associate o f Chiang Kai-shek named Ch’en Yi (1883-1950), who, like Chiang, had graduated from the Japanese m ilitary school Shimbu Gakko. On October 25,1945, GovernorGeneral Ando Rikichi delivered Taiwan, together with Japanese properties worth an estim ated US$2 billion, to C h’en Yi.ss Thus, thanks to the allied victory, the half century o f Japanese rule over Taiwan had finally come to an end. Thereafter, however, the status o f Taiwan rem ained unsettled because neither the Potsdam Declaration (July 26,1945), nor the peace treaty signed in San Francisco between Japan and the A llies (Septem ber 8,1951), nor the Sino-Japanese peace treaty (April 28, 1952) specified who had legal claim to Taiwan. As in the past, the island’s inhabitants had not been consulted as to who should govern their country.

9 Postwar Taiwan The Growing American Presence and Influence

The United States Pigeonholes Taiwan W hen Japan accepted the unconditional surrender dem anded by the A llied powers on A ugust 15,1945, there w ere approxim ately 5.5 m illion Taiwanese who generally believed that they had been liberated by the W estern A llies but not by the Nationalist Chinese under the Kuomintang (KMT). It was American liberty ships that brought home hundreds o f thousands o f Taiwanese service­ men and civilian expatriates over the course o f the following fifteen months. On September 1,1945, four Americans, escorting a KMT secret police colonel and the m ayor o f Amoy, arrived in Taiwan. Four days later, a special U.S. fleet was anchored in Keelung harbor to pick up some 1,300A llied prisoners o f war. On Septem ber 10, fifteen members o f the U.S. Office o f Strategic Services (OSS) flew from Kunming (in C hina’s Yunnan Province) to Taiwan to conduct a large-scale public opinion poll on the island. The result o f the poll showed that the United States was die islanders’ first choice to be their “guardians," or “trustees,” w ith a sm all percentage choosing continuance o f Japanese sovereignty; but very few wanted to be ruled by the Chinese.1Finally, on O ctober 5 ,1945, more than 100 staff members from Lieutenant-General A lbert C. W edemeyer’s headquarters formed an American Liaison Group. The Group utilized Am erican ships and planes to transport thousands o f Chinese troops, N ationalist (KM T) officials, and their fam ilies from the m ainland to “recover" Taiwan from the half century o f Japanese colonial rule. In the ensuing m onths, the American Liaison Group trained the N ationalist Chinese 204th and 205th D ivisions in Taiwan. Then a U.S. diplom atic corps headed by Consul General Leo Sturgeon, a United N ations R elief and Rehabilita­ tion A dm inistration (UNRRA) team , Am erican m issionaries, and visitors on special m issions or personal business subsequendy arrived in Taiwan.2 At this juncture, the Am ericans were there theoretically to help the Nation­ alist Chinese establish them selves in Taiwan, and to organize the repatriation o f the Japanese civilians and troops then interned on the island. On April 1, 1946, when the last Japanese soldier had left Taiwan, the Am erican Liaison 174

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Figure 9.1 Expatriation of the Japanese From Taiwan, 1945-1946

Group also withdrew from the island. A month later, however, an American consulate, staffed with an officer named Robert C atto from the United States Inform ation Service and an UNRRA office, w ere established in Taipei.3 Since the American consul, Ralph J. Blake, was personally indifferent to the Taiwanese home rule movement, Vice Consul George H. K err wrote most o f the politically sensitive reports for the State Department. K err had studied Japanese history and politics from 1935 to 1937, taught English at Taipei Higher School from 1937 to 1940, attended the Form osa Research Unit at Colum bia U niversity from 1940 to 1942, and then served as a U.S. naval attaché at the American consulate in Taipei from 1945 to 1946. He kept in close contact with several prom inent Taiwanese and, during the war, became intim ately involved w ith intelligence-gathering on the island. He wrote a Tai­ wan Civil A ffairs Handbook, collected operational field maps, and translated unpublished m aterials for the anticipated American invasion o f Taiwan, codenamed O peration Causeway. An astringent critic, from personal experience, o f the conditions in postw ar Taiwan during 1945-1947, K err had developed a distaste for the KMT rulers and referred to them as “bew ildered rag-tag” and the “incom petent bob-tail.” Conversely, he had a genuine sympathy for the plight o f the Taiwanese.4 In addition to the approxim ately US$2 billion worth o f civilian properties (nonm ilitary) mentioned earlier, Japan handed over enormous stockpiles o f foodstuffs, m edical supplies, and arms and ammunition to the N ationalists. In due course, the Americans became a buffer between the incom ing Chi­

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nese and the Taiwanese when the latter w ere bullied by the rapacious new m asters from the m ainland. Instead o f treating the Taiwanese as their own brothers and sisters, the Chinese wasted no tim e in exploiting Taiwan’s rich resources— including coal, rice, sugar, cem ent, and tim ber—to support their own tottering economy and corrupt political machine. In late M arch 1946, after a visit to Taiwan, an Am erican reporter named W illiam D. Newton published several astonishing headlines in the Scripps-Howard papers in W ashington. They included, “Corrupt Chinese Rule Bleeding Rich Isle,” “Chinese Exploit Form osa W orse Than Japs D id,” “Form osa Plants R ust As China Bungles Rule,” “U.S. Partly Blamed for Formosa’s Woes,” and the like. W hile UNRRA reported that plague and cholera had returned to the island, The Washington Post, in a M arch 29,1946 editorial on the “Form osan scandal,” characterized the new Chinese m asters o f Taiwan as “extraordinarily stupid, avaricious, and incom petent” men. It went on to say that “The Chinese have instituted a regim e o f terror, wholesale looting and even dow nright highway robbery . . . The Chinese satrapy has taken over the Japanese trading monopoly and appears to be operating it as a m ost outrageous racket, enorm ously enrich­ ing them selves and greatly m ultiplying the hardships o f a people suffering from the effects o f four years o f w ar inflation and scarcity, and o f incessant Am erican bom bardm ents.” It then urged the U nited States not to stand by w hile the N ationalist C hinese “m ade such a mockery o f all the w artim e ’lib­ eration’ prom ises.”3 The 2.28 M assacre D ifferent m ental and em otional patterns had evolved among the Taiwanese during the w ar years as they had formed new beliefs and perceptions about the mainland Chinese. The w ar experience intensified their feelings of being unique vis-à-vis the mainland Chinese. Before, during, and after the war, the Taiwanese were sensitive to vice and corruption among the Chinese authorities. These inexorable social forces and the KMT m isrule o f Taiwan, augmented by the deterioration o f the island’s economy and m assive unemployment among the repatriated Taiwanese soldiers, steadily escalated the tensions between the m ainlanders and the islanders. A t this juncture, fighting between the Commu­ nists and the N ationalists broke out in earnest on die mainland. M eanwhile, in Taipei, on the eve o f February 27,1947, a small team from the KMT Taiwan Tobacco and Wine M onopoly Bureau harassed a Taiwanese widow who was peddling cigarettes with her two small children and killed a bystander. Tragi­ cally, the KMT regime, beset by favoritism and mismanagement, refused to heed the signs o f an impending Taiwanese revolt But there were clear indications that something was afoot in the hours immediately following the incident. A t noon

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the next day (February 28), an angry crowd ransacked the M onopoly Bureau’s stocks and beat to death two o f its officials. By early afternoon, between 2,000 and 3,000 armed Taiwanese had taken over the governor-general’s office and occupied Taiwan’s national radio station. Since Taiwan was a compact island and news traveled fast, the incident quickly sparked an island-wide Taiwanese revolt against the KMT authorities. On M arch 8 and 9, 1947, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) dispatched 2,000 m ilitary police and 11,000 heavily armed troops to brutally suppress the Taiwanese rebels and dissidents in what became known as the 2.28 M assacre, after the initial date o f the upris­ ing. A scathing investigation later estim ated that between 10,000 and 20,000 people were slaughtered. But this grim account did not tell the whole story; hundreds o f other educated Taiwanese professionals were either imprisoned or driven abroad. The U.S. government characterized the 2.28 M assacre as ’’spontaneous protest and unorganized riots.”6 But the chilling effect o f this incident would linger on the island for many years, and younger Taiwanese were henceforth taught to stay away from public service because in the jungle o f Chinese politics, it was an eye for an eye. In July 1947, a pall had fallen over Taiwan and a group o f Taiwanese dis­ sidents petitioned General Wedemeyer to intervene. Though the commander o f Am erican forces in China assured the KMT authorities that the U nited States had no territorial am bitions tow ard Taiwan, he sent the following m essage to Secretary o f State George C. M arshall on August 17,1947: The [Taiwanese] people anticipated sincerely and enthusiastically de­ liverance from the Japanese yoke. However, Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly, and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population. The [Chinese] Army conducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police operated freely to intimidate and to facilitate exploitation by [KMT] officials___ The island is extremely productive in coal, rice, sugar, cement, fruits and tea. Eighty per cent of the [Taiwanese] people can read and write, the exact antithesis of conditions prevailing in the mainland of China. There were indications that Formosans would be receptive toward United States guardianship and United Nations trustee­ ship. They fear that the [KMT] Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine, and I think their fears well founded.7 The Taiwanese Independence M ovem ent Even though General W edemeyer’s moral support was not a quick balm to the Taiwanese national traum a, his idea o f a “U.S. guardianship” excited several

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Taiwanese dissidents, including the Liao brothers—W en-yi (Thomas) and W en-ki (Joshua)— Lin H sien-t’ang, and Huang Chi-nan. Son o f a wealthy landlord in Yunlin Prefecture, Thom as Liao earned a doctorate in engineering from O hio State U niversity and m arried an A m erican woman. A ccording to Huang C hi-nan’s memoir, George K err had been in contact with two other prom inent Taiwanese during the 2.28 M assacre. One was Chen Yi-sung, who prom oted a U.S. guardianship for Taiwan, and the other was Yang Chao-chia, who organized a sm all ’Taiw an Independence” group. In June 1946, Huang Chi-nan sent a petition to the U.S. consulate in Taipei requesting an island­ wide plebiscite under U nited N ations supervision.8 During the summer o f 1947, Thom as Liao, Huang Chi-nan, and several other activists form ed the ‘Taiw an R e-Liberation League” (T ai-w an tsai chieh-fang lien-m eng), and near the end o f Septem ber 1947, Thomas Liao led several members o f his newly form ed League to deliver a petition to John Leighton Stuart, then U.S. am bassador to China.9 A ccording to Richard C. Bush, George K err had the ear o f the m issionary-tum ed-am bassador Stuart, who “decided that the carnage o f the 2-28 Incident could not be ignored” and urged Chiang Kaishek to replace C h’en Yi with the civilian Wei Tao-ming as the governor o f Taiwan.10In responding to the Taiwanese petition, Stuart was reported to have replied, “The Form osan independence is a long and hard way, but worthwhile to struggle.” 11 The KMT governm ent im m ediately outlaw ed the Taiwan independence m ovement and branded its leaders as “agents o f foreign pow ers,” “Com­ m unist collaborators,” “am bitious separatists,” and “traitors to the Chinese nation.” On Septem ber 1, 1948, in defiance o f the repressive KMT policy, the Taiwan League, in the name o f 7 m illion islanders, petitioned the United N ations to tem porarily place the sovereignty and adm inistration o f Taiwan under an international body appointed and supervised by the United N ations. The petition also called for a plebiscite to be arranged later.12But even as the Taiwanese activists were searching for international support to dislodge their home island from the N ationalist governm ent, the KMT was losing the civil w ar on the m ainland. In D ecem ber 1948, follow ing the defeat at the B attle o f Huai-Hai and the rapid deterioration o f the m ilitary situation in northern and central China, the N ationalist governm ent requested that shipm ents o f U.S. material purchased under the grants be delivered to Taiwan. During the ensuing weeks, Com m unist forces shellacked the N ationalists alm ost everywhere. In late A pril 1949, M ao Zedong’s liberation army crossed the Yangtze R iver in strength. They occupied Nanking on A pril 24, took Hankow on M ay 16-17, and Shanghai fell on M ay 25 and Tsingtao on June 2. A fter the Huai-Hai debacle, Chiang K ai-shek was forced to resign from his presidency on January 21,1949. However, he refused to relinquish m ilitary

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command and prepared to move his governm ent to Taiwan and to evacuate some 400,000 civilian refugees and over 300,000 orphaned troops from the m ainland to the island. W ith C hiang’s arrival near the end o f May 1949, the prospect o f an American guardianship o f Taiwan or a United Nations trusteeship o f the island had suddenly become dim. Conversely, m artial law, originally im plem ented for the sole purpose o f suppressing the Communists on the m ainland, was now extended to the island. It abrogated the constitution (which was adopted on Christm as Day o f 1946), deprived the Taiwanese o f their liberty and basic human rights, placed restrictions on public assembly and the m edia, and censored academ ic publications. At this juncture, the KMT secret police, under the leadership o f Chiang K ai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo (1910-1988), interrogated and terrorized tens o f thousands o f ’Taiw an independence” and Communist elem ents, as well as critics o f the KMT and the Chiang fam ily.13 Uncounted num bers o f innocent people were either executed or im prisoned, including several supporters o f Thomas Liao’s independence movement. In February 1950, a group o f exiled Taiwanese ac­ tivists gathered in Kyoto and form ed the Taiwan Independence League. For all practical purposes, however, the KMT had silenced its m ost vociferous critics on the island. And for the next three decades, the intolerance practiced by the KMT was a compound o f political intim idation, intellectual sloth, and cultural neglect. W hile the KM T atrocities w ent on unchecked in Taiwan, the old C hina hands at the U .S. State D epartm ent w ere fed up and, after the Com m unist seizure o f Nanking and Shanghai in A pril to M ay 1949, they becam e in­ creasingly disenchanted w ith the KMT leadership. B ut President H arry S. Truman (1884-1972) was under trem endous public pressure not to recognize the newly established Com m unist regim e in Beijing. Because the pro-KM T “C hina Lobby” coterie in the C ongress and the Dean A cheson-led State D epartm ent were not m arching in lock step, a sharp controversy developed in die U nited States over w hat should be done w ith Chiang K ai-shek’s refu­ gee regim e in Taipei. A t the end o f February 1949, Secretary o f State D ean A cheson instructed Livingston M erchant, then attaché o f the U .S. Em bassy in N anking, to go to Taiwan and investigate the feasibility o f establishing a separate Taiwanese governm ent totally beyond the jurisdiction o f China. Afterward, M erchant reported that a political entity separate from the Chinese m ainland m ight not be able to defend itself. Then on N ovem ber 3,1949, U.S. C onsul-G eneral John M acDonald visited Chiang K ai-shek to rem onstrate his KMT governm ent for denying “the legitim ate aspiration o f the popula­ tion o f Taiwan” and also to inform him that he could no longer count on the U nited States to send troops to defend Taiw an.14 Seeking to cover his policy m istakes and to hide the chaos in W ashington, Truman finally decided

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to w rite off the KM T regim e as he m ade the follow ing announcem ent on January 5 , 19S0: The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.13 The Korean W ar and the Fate o f Taiwan On February 14,1950, only a few weeks after Truman made the announce­ m ent, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic o f China signed a thirtyyear m utual-aid pact, which bound each country to come to die aid o f the other if attacked by a third power. On June 25, 1950, a Russian-equipped and Russian-trained North Korean army struck across the 38th parallel, im­ mediately throwing South Korean forces into disarray. The invasion o f South Korea by Kim D Sung caught the United States in the m iddle o f a foreign policy debate, rising tensions with looming Communist bloc countries, and a failed China policy. All o f a sudden, American policy m akers decided that they had to resist the Communist aggression not only on the Korean penin­ sula, but also at other points in A sia and, for that m atter, everywhere in the w orld. W hen Am erica threw itself into the fight, it m arked a m ilestone in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. The United States, having excluded Taiwan from the American security zone only six months earlier, was forced to reverse its position on Taiwan by proclaim ing the neutralization o f the island and by dispatching the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent the Chinese Communists from invading Taiwan. On June 27, 1950, President Truman issued this statement: I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Sev­ enth Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration of the United Nations.16 Thus, in the wake o f the outbreak o f the Korean War, Truman’s adm inis­ tration decided to support the Chinese N ationalists in defense o f Taiwan but at the same tim e asked Chiang’s governm ent to desist from attacks on the

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m ainland from Taiwan. For over half century afterw ard, Truman’s policy not only neutralized the Taiwan Strait, but also separated the ROC on Tai­ wan from the PRC on the m ainland. The U.S.-enforced de facto separation henceforth lent credence to interpretations that the U nited States had adopted a ‘T w o China” or “One China and one Taiwan” policy. On July 28, 1950, U.S. Charge d ’A ffaires Karl Lott Rankin arrived in Taiwan. Three days later, General Douglas MacArthur, then com m ander o f the United N ations forces, made a one-day whirlwind visit to Taipei (July 31-A ugust 1) to consult with Chiang Kai-shek on the possibility o f “unleashing” the N ationalist troops against the C hinese Communists. A fter his visit, M acA rthur summarized the strategic importance o f Taiwan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accom plish offensive strategy and at the same tim e checkm ate defense or counter-offense operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.” 17 American fear o f and hostility tow ard the People’s Republic becam e even more pronounced when, in late O ctober 1950, Chinese Communist arm ies crossed the border into Korea to aid North Korean forces. In fact, by Janu­ ary 1951, C hina’s overwhelm ing “volunteers,” estim ated to total 2.3 m illion strong, had driven the United N ations forces back to the 38th parallel. Ac­ cordingly, when the United States inaugurated its new policy o f “contain­ m ent,” Taiwan becam e one o f the w orld’s vital spots in the struggle against Communism. U nder the circum stances, W ashington hurriedly increased the am ount o f econom ic and m ilitary aid to the Chiang regim e. A lso, despite the fact that the Truman administration chose not to enlist the N ationalist troops to fight in Korea or elsew here, or to grant Chiang’s refugee governm ent greater legitimacy, W ashington did establish in Taiwan the M ilitary A ssistance Ad­ visory Group (M AAG), with M ajor General W illiam C. Chase as its chief. During W orld War n , General Chase launched his First Cavalry Division from New G uinea to drive Japanese defenders from Los Negros Island and M anus Island in the Southwest Pacific and later accom panied G eneral M ac A rthur to Tokyo when the First Cavalry D ivision became part o f the Eighth Army in the occupation o f Japan. Later, in D ecem ber 1952, during President Dwight D. Eisenhow er’s (1890-1969) three-day stay in Korea, Chase traveled to Korea for consultation and, together w ith top U.S. m ilitary officials, review ed w ith Eisenhow er strategic conditions throughout the W est Pacific. Soon after the Korean meeting (on February 2, 1953), Eisenhow er an­ nounced that the United States Seventh Fleet would no longer stand in the way o f offensive operations launched by the N ationalists in Taiwan against the Communists on the m ainland.18Corollary to this change o f policy by the Eisenhow er adm inistration, the MAAG was charged to (roister the fighting effectiveness o f Chiang K ai-shek’s troops. The MAAG soon grew from thirty-

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three American m ilitary personnel in May 1951 to 116inA ugust 1951, to 400 in 1952, and finally to a total o f 2,347 by 1955, when every N ationalist bat­ talion was staffed w ith at least one or two American advisors. General Chase reached retirem ent age in 1955 and was succeeded by M ajor General George D. Smythe, who in turn was replaced by M ajor G eneral Frank S. Bowen, Jr. In addition to training and equipping the 650,000 N ationalist troops, General Smyth and G eneral Bowen were also engaged in im plem enting the M utual Defense Treaty (discussed below) and overseeing U.S. m ilitary aid to Taiwan, w hich totaled US$2.4 billion from 1950 to 1967.19 The U.S. Aid M ission to Taiwan In the fall o f 1951, in conjunction with the anti-Communist containment policy, the U.S. Congress passed the M utual Security Act. Taiwan was one o f the beneficiaries o f this policy. A U.S. A id M ission was created as W ashington earm arked nearly $1.49 billion in nonm ilitary aid for Taiwan, averaging ap­ proxim ately $100 m illion per year until 1965, w hich was the equivalent o f 10 percent o f Taiwan’s GNP. H alf o f the aid was granted to stim ulate Taiwan’s economy, as well as to provide technical assistance and surplus agricultural com m odities (such as cotton, soy bean, flour, and butter) to ease the plight o f the m assive num ber o f refugees from the m ainland. The other half was in loans, such as an industrial project loan, a general industrial loan, and a com m ercial procurem ent loan. During the three-year span betw een 1949 and 1951, a total o f $65.8 m illion in American loans had been allotted to several Taiwanese industrial projects, including cement, w ater reservoirs and hydraulic electricity, railw ays, fishing refrigeration, alum inum , and glass. The loan was charged with a token 0.75 percent annual interest and was paid off in full by 1994 under President Lee Teng-hui’s (1923- ) governm ent. W ithout this aid from the United States, Taiwan’s highly touted “economic m iracle” would not have been possible. Between 1952 and 1986, Taiwan’s econom ic growth exceeded 8 percent annually. For one thing, the aid package constituted one-third ofT aiw an’s capital and made it possible for the Taiwan­ ese to build a functioning econom ic infrastructure, to w it, the no. 10 w harf at Kaohsiung harbor (com pleted on A pril 21,1952, w ith Am erican money), the H si-luo Grand Bridge in central Taiwan (com pleted in Septem ber 1953), the Shih-men Reservoir and Hydraulic Power Plant (became operational on July 7, 1955), and the N orth-South Highway on Taiwan’s rugged east coast (became operational on M ay 8,1960). For another, it drastically changed the island’s im port-export dynam ic as Taiwan exported m ore industrial products (from 7.9 percent in 1950 to 46 percent in 1965) and im ported more capital goods (from 13.3 percent in 1950 to 29.3 percent in 1965) and agricultural products

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Figure 9.2 American Agricultural Expert In Rural Taiwan, Late 1950a

(from 40.7 percent in 1950 to 65.6 percent in 1965).20American capital goods (such as machine tools and parts, crude and lubrication oil, hardware, rubber products, chem icals, and medical supplies) and surplus agricultural m aterials (including cotton, wheat, soy bean, fertilizer, butter and powder milk, tobacco, com , flour, cooking oil) indeed constituted the m ajority o f Taiwan’s im ports as illustrated in Table 9.1. In order to wring m ore aid value from dollars and to achieve the objective o f a self-sustained economy on the island, the U.S. Aid M ission (renamed M utual Security Agency, M ission to China, on January 5,1952) established a watchdog regim e called O peration Program. Directed by Hubert G. Schenck, the operation consisted o f four procedures: ( 1) authorization, (2) appropriation, (3) allotment, and (4) obligation, plus several regulations and restrictions relat­ ing to procurement and expenditure, such as the end-use check system. Joseph L. B rent served as the director of the M utual Security Agency (MSA) from M arch 3,1954 to January 25,1958, and was followed by Wesley C. Haraldson, who directed the M SA from February 16,1958, until August 9,1962. Among the fourteen m ajor program s that received the benefit o f American financial support and technical advice was the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). From 1951 to 1963, the JCRR budget amounted to 24 percent o f total American aid to Taiwan. As a m atter of fact, 59 percent o f Taiwan’s investm ent in agriculture during this period came from JCRR subsidies. Five JCRR com m issioners (two appointed by the president of the U nited States and three by the president of the ROC) devised and m onitored

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Table 9.1 U.S. Imports to Taiwan, 1951-1965 (Unit: US$ million) Year 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

Total Import (A) 143.3 207.0 190.6 204.0 190.1 228.2 252.2 232.9 244.4 252.2 324.1 327.5 336.8 410.4 553.3

USA (MSA) Import (B) 56.6 89.1 84.0 87.9 89.2 95.4 98.7 82.3 73.2 90.9 108.2 80.1 76.1 39.7 65.9

A/B Ratio (%) 16.7 39.5 43.0 44.1 43.1 46.9 42.3 39.2 35.4 30.1 36.0 33.4 24.5 22.6 9.7

Source: Wen Hsing-ying, Ching-chich’i-chi tipei-huo: T ai-w an Mei-yuan dùng-yen ti cheng-ching fen-hsi [Behind the economic miracle—Political and economic analysis of American aid to Taiwan (1951-1965)]. Taipei: Tsu-li wan-pao [The independence

evening post] (1990): 203.__________________________________________ various rural projects in Taiwan, including agricultural economics, agricultural extension, botanic production, forestry, hydraulic engineering, food and fertil­ izer production, rural hygiene, soil preservation, and stockbreeding.21 U nder the auspices o f the MSA, the JCRR com m issioned American agricultural specialists, such as I.H . Kauffman and W.I. M yers, to initiate pioneer projects in Taiwan and to set up agricultural co-op and loan agencies for farm ers. It also hired Am erican engineers from Tippetts-A bbett-M cCarthy-Stratton and M orrison-Knudson International to help design and construct Green Grass Lake, Tseng-wen, M ing-te, and other w ater reservoirs.22 U nder the U.S. ‘Technical A ssistance” program , a total o f 3,003 Taiwan­ ese scientists, technicians, educators, and others received scholarships for advanced training in the United States betw een 1951 and 1971. The follow ­ ing is the breakdown o f the scholarship recipients offered by this program: 751 in agriculture (25 percent o f the total), 763 in industry and mining (25 percent), 163 in com m unication and transportation (5 percent), 29 in labor managem ent (1 percent), 204 in public health (7 percent), 496 in education (17 percent), 308 in public adm inistration (10 percent), 21 in social welfare (1 percent), 203 in broadcast and m edia (7 percent), 17 in investm ent and trade (0 percent), and 48 in DFS (D irect Forces Support) (2 percent).23 The entire U.S. aid package is item ized in Table 9.2.

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Table 9.2 U.S. Foreign AM to Taiwan

Year 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 TOTAL

Grand Total DS*/DL* 90.8/80.1 75.8 /62.5 100.3/72.0 108.3/74.5 132.0 / 97.5 101.6/78.7 108.1/77.0 81.6/53.3 128.9/62.2 101.1/68.2 94.2/45.7 65.9/3.9 115.3/19.8 83.9/56.2 56.5/— 4.2/— 4.4/— 29.3/— 1,482.2/851.6

General Economic Aids (MSA) TC* DFS* 0.2 10.5 0.2 12.7 1.8 26.5 31.4 1.9 2.4 29.5 3.3 10.0 3.4 6.7 3.5 7.8 6.4 2.6 2.4 3.8 2.4 2.0 — 2.7 — 1.8 — 1.5 — 0.4 —

—

Unit: US$ million DLF* SAC* —

—

—

0.4

— — — — — —

30.6 19.1 16.1 — — — — —

—

—

—

—

—

—

30.1

147.7

65.8

—

0.5 2.6 9.6 21.0 17.0 27.1 7.6 28.0 59.3 93.7 26.2 56.1 4.2 4.4 29.3 387.0

Source: Economic Planning Commission, ROC Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data Book (1977), 219. *DS (Defense Support), DL (Development Loan), TC (Technical

Cooperation), DFS (Direct Forces Support), DLF (Development Loan Fund), SAC (Surplus Agricultural Commodities based on Act #480).____________________________ American aid not only solved Taiwan’s postw ar problems o f food shortage, trade imbalance, and inflation’s vicious cycles, but also provided the islanders with valuable raw m aterials, up-to-date equipm ent, technical know-how, and capital; w ithout U.S. aid, Taiwan’s industrial grow th and robust international trade would not have been possible. For exam ple, between 1951 and 1959, Taiwan im ported 91.8 percent o f the raw cotton (under the MSA program) that it desperately needed to develop its fledgling textile industry.24American aid also stim ulated the growth o f Taiwan’s shipping industry in general and the developm ent o f Kaohsiung harbor and Keelung’s port in particular. For exam ple, in 1953, a total o f 416 ships carried American cargo to Keelung fo r offloading. A lso, K eelung’s total im port and export tonnage jum ped from 1,207,261 tons in 1951 to 4,115,799 tons in 1965.23 Even after the aid had expired (officially in 1965, but the last aid allotm ent arrived in 1968), the United States continued to provide the biggest m arket for Taiwanese m erchandise. M oreover, the way the MSA was set up and the procedures

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by w hich Am erican grants and loans were dispensed constantly challenged Taiwanese governm ent officials, the private sector, the college elites, and all sorts o f specialists to coordinate and work collectively to improve the islanders’ econom ic and social lives. M ore im portantly, American aid in the 1950s and 1960s unexpectedly prepared the Taiwanese for m anaging their own foreign aid, which they donated to Third W orld countries in A frica, Latin America, and Southeast A sia in the 1980s and 1990s. And thanks to the large quantity o f Am erican wheat, the Taiwanese diet began to shift from predom inantly rice to noodles and bread. In 1953, the average Taiwanese consum ed 15.2 kilogram s o f flour and 141.2 kilogram s o f rice per year. By 1980, the average Taiwanese ate 23.6 kilogram s o f foods made out o f flour but consum ed ju st 106.5 kilogram s o f rice per year.26 Taiwan Becom es an A lly o f the U nited States A gainst

Communism It is im portant to rem em ber that the generous Am erican aid was aimed at keeping the KMT governm ent in line w ith the global strategy o f the United States. A m erica’s containm ent policy m akers believed that only if allies such as Greece, South Korea, and South Vietnam were econom ically self-sufficient and socially and politically stable could they forestall Communists from en­ gulfing any m ore free peoples and, in the case o f Taiwan, ward off the potent threat o f Communist China. In January 1953, Karl L. Rankin, the U.S. Charge d ’A ffaires in Taiwan, was made ambassador, which concurrently gave greater legitim acy and higher international status to the N ationalist government. The U.S. Em bassy was to im plem ent the various facets o f American policy there, including coordinating aid strategy w ith a num ber o f Taiwanese governm ent agencies, not ju st on m ilitary and security m atters, but also on health, rural reconstruction, and education. Rankin, assisted by Howard P. Jones as coun­ selor and R obert W. Rinden as chief o f the political section, was a congenial and cautious career diplom at. D escribing him self as “a man o f few words,” Rankin usually avoided public speaking in Taiwan for fear o f m isinterpretation in the press. N evertheless, in his book China Assignm ent (1964), he wrote that “The chief distinctions betw een the average inhabitant o f Form osa and o f the C hina m ainland are that the form er is in better physical condition, has had m ore education, and enjoys a higher living standard.”27 But as tensions escalated across the Taiwan Strait, R ankin’s prom otion went hand in glove w ith his increasing responsibilities and new diplom atic challenges. A t dawn (4:45 a . m . ) on Septem ber 3,1954, Chinese Com m unist troops in Amoy suddenly m ounted a heavy artillery attack against Quemoy (Kinmen) and Little Kinmen (w hich were located only nine kilom eters from the main­

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land coast), killing two members o f the MAAG and seriously threatening the Taiwan Strait. But even before the Quemoy bombardment drew W ashington’s attention to the dangers o f the Taiwan Strait, Karl Rankin and General W il­ liam Chase o f the MAAG had repeatedly advised their governm ent that these offshore islands were “substantially related to the defense o f Taiwan” and that bolstering their defense was “essential” in maintaining the Nationalist strategic and psychological edge over the Communists. As a m atter o f fact, in late May 1954, during his meeting with Congressional leaders, President Eisenhow er gave the strongest possible signal when he acknowledged that “those offshore islands were an integral part o f the Form osa defense.”28 Eisenhow er was on vacation in Denver, Colorado, when he received the news o f the Quemoy bombardment. A fter being briefed by Deputy Secretary o f Defense Robert B. Anderson that the fighting had not escalated beyond the offshore islands, Eisenhower felt somewhat relieved but decided that something had to be done. On Septem ber 9, Secretary o f State John Foster D ulles, on his way home from M anila, stopped in Taipei and consulted with Rankin, General Chase o f the MAAG, and Chiang K ai-shek for five hours. Prior to the bombardment, neither the State D epartm ent nor the D efense D epartm ent wished to extend the perim eter defense o f the Seventh Fleet, for fear o f provoking a m assive retaliation by the Chinese Com m unists.29 Upon D ulles’s return (on Septem­ ber 12), Eisenhow er called a special N ational Security Council meeting in Denver. Though no specific decisions were made at the m eeting, D ulles was instructed to ask New Zealand to present the Quemoy bom bardm ent case to the United Nations Security Council. But because o f Chiang K ai-shek’s strong opposition to the New Zealand proposal, the United States, in order to bolster its anti-Com m unist stance and m aintain its prestige in East Asia, decided to negotiate a bilateral defense treaty with Taiwan as urged by Admiral A rthur W. Radford, com m ander o f the Pacific Theater.30 A ssistant Secretary o f State for Far Eastern A ffairs W alter S. Robertson believed that Beijing’s decision to shell Quemoy was meant to force the United States into face-to-face negotiations with the PRC and to change the Taiwan situation. It was Robertson who led actual negotiations with the N ationalist representatives in both Taipei and W ashington. Robertson arrived in Taipei on O ctober 12,1954, and inform ed Chiang K ai-shek o f W ashington’s desire for a bilateral defense treaty.31On O ctober 23, B ritish Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden told D ulles in Paris that as long as the defense treaty would not make Taiwan a “privileged sanctuary” (for the KMT regim e), G reat Britain would not oppose such a treaty.32Thus, earnest negotiations began on Novem ber 2, with George K.C. Yeh (Taiwan’s foreign m inister) and W ellington V. K. Koo (Chiang K ai-shek’s am bassador to W ashington) representing the N ationalist government, and Robertson and W alter P. M cConaughy, director o f the Office

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o f Chinese A ffairs in the State D epartm ent, representing the United States. D ulles only attended the first and the last m eetings during the negotiation process.33 On Decem ber 2, 1954, when the M utual D efense Treaty (MDT) betw een Taiwan and the United States was signed in W ashington, the KMT m outhpiece, the Central D aily News, headlined the news on the front page and published the entire text. On January 24,1955, the U.S. Congress passed the following join t resolution: That the President of the United States be and hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands.34 Following the passage o f this Form osa Resolution, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on February 9,1955. President Eisenhow er signed it on February 11, and it was exchanged with Taiwan on M arch 3 to bring it into effect. The treaty called for the U nited States to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, but reserved to the president o f the U nited States the pow er to decide w hether the offshore islands were to be defended w ith Am erican m ilitary force. In the exchange letters that accom panied the treaty (on D ecem ber 10), the United States also insisted that before the ROC took any m ilitary actions against the m ainland, it was obligated to consult with the U.S. governm ent. For the next tw enty-six years, the M DT was the cornerstone o f the U.S.-Taiwan relation­ ship, establishing the legal basis for long-term , com prehensive cooperation betw een the two allies. W hile safeguarding the survival o f a free Taiwan, the M DT actually worked to consolidate A m erica’s dom inant pow er and interests in the W est Pacific and also served as a policy guide for the State Departm ent to vigorously defend and protect Taiwan’s perm anent seat on the United Na­ tions Security Council.35 In essence, the M DT did save the N ationalist governm ent from Communist attack, but the exchange letters, w hich constituted legal binding force, also tightly “leashed” the N ationalist forces to the island, a status quo desired by Dulles. This was so because, without prior American approval, the Nationalists could not unilaterally launch any offensive cam paigns to “recover m ainland C hina.” In other words, the U.S. security com m itm ent tow ard Taiwan was lim ited only to supplying defensive arm s and to protecting Taiwan from Com m unist attacks, but not to assisting the N ationalists in recovery o f the m ainland. As a m atter o f fact, the Eisenhow er adm inistration successfully persuaded Chiang K ai-shek to withdraw his troops from the small Ta-chen island group before the M DT was signed. Even though Taiwan, for the first

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tim e since 1937, regained a sense o f stability and security, the Taiwanese public learned about the treaty itself, but not about the defensive nature o f the exchange letters. The KMT regim e openly claim ed that the treaty was negotiated on the principle o f reciprocity, but refused to disclose this “catch” to the Taiwanese people. It continued to insist that Taipei was only the tem­ porary capital o f China and that “overthrowing the Communist regim e and recovering m ainland China” was its “most urgent and top priority.”36 In the meantime, the Eisenhower adm inistration was pursuing a ‘T w o China” policy by directly negotiating with Beijing representatives, first in Geneva in 1955 and later in Warsaw in 1958. A lso, in early January 1958, Rankin was reassigned as U.S. am bassador to Yugoslavia and his Taipei post was filled by Everett F. Drum right, who had been A ssistant Secretary W alter S. Robertson’s deputy and later consul general in Hong Kong. Drum right was in turn succeeded by W alter M cConaughy in 1966. The Quemoy C rises and U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan In July 1956, the U .S. Congress unanim ously passed a resolution opposing the seating o f the PRC in the U nited N ations. B eijing view ed the m utual defense treaty, U .S. inducem ent o f 14,209 Korean W ar Chinese POW s from K orea to Taiwan in early 1954, U.S. opposition to the PRC seating in the UN, W ashington’s continued em bargo on trade with Com m unist China, etc., as A m erican attem pts to use Taiwan as a base for expanding its aggression against China and as a m eans o f helping Chiang K ai-shek to regain the m ainland. To counter the U.S. containm ent policy and to divert the attention o f his countrym en from his failed G reat Leap Forw ard econom ic policy, M ao Zedong ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Fukien to start yet another artillery assault against Quemoy. On the evening o f A ugust 23, 1958, during the first two hours o f bom bardm ent, shells poured down like hail, causing 440 N ationalist casualties and severely dam aging the island’s com m unications network. Reacting to this aggression, the N ationalist gov­ ernm ent deployed nearly 100,000 troops, alm ost a quarter o f its effective force, to the defense o f the offshore islands. W ashington view ed such tactics as “foolish,” but Taipei believed that had they given up the offshore islands, it would be tantam ount to surrender. Careful not to fall into trap o f another Korean War, the U.S. Seventh Fleet agreed to escort N ationalist supply ships, but generally stayed away from the five-kilom eter lim it o f the com bat zone. N evertheless, three tim es (on Septem ber 18,21, and 27), the Seventh Fleet brought several American giant eight-inch cannons from Okinawa, Japan and Guam to Quemoy. These huge advanced artillery pieces plus the superior N ationalist com bat planes, which w ere equipped with U .S.-m ade rattlesnake

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m issiles, worked quickly to inflict heavy casualties on the Communist troops. A ll told, during the forty-four days o f the heavy bom bardm ent, Com m unist troops fired an estim ated 480,000 artillery shells into tiny, 148-squarekilom eter Quemoy Island.37 On O ctober 6 ,1958, the paper o f record o f the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People ’s D aily, carried D efense M inister Peng D ehuai’s order (as dictated by M ao) to halt the bom bardm ent for a week. On O ctober 23, after three days’ strong-arm talks in Taipei, Secretary o f State D ulles persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to announce that the N ationalist government had no intention o f using m ilitary force to regain m ainland China. A fter that, the Communist shelling gradually tapered off. D ulles later took credit for his “strokes o f brinkm anship” to deter the Com m unist aggression, but critics characterized his handling of the long-festering Quemoy problems as the “Formosan folly.”38 The fact rem ains that neither side could deliver a coup de grâce. The Com­ m unists continued their artillery attacks against the offshore islands on oddnum bered days until January 1,1979, when M arshal Xu X iangqian, China’s m inister o f defense, ordered his troops to halt the shelling.39 In return, the Nationalist defenders also ceased their token counterattacks on even-numbered days. It is also im portant to note that the status o f the offshore Quemoy-M atsu islands subsequently becam e ensnared in U .S. presidential election politics. In 1960, during A m erica’s first television debate betw een presidential can­ didates, Republican Richard M. Nixon, who visited Taipei briefly during the summer o f 1956, pledged to defend Quemoy and M atsu, while Democrat John F. Kennedy announced that he w ould turn the problem o f the beleaguered islands over to the United N ations instead o f com m itting Am erican forces to Chiang K ai-shek’s defense. Kennedy seem ed to be im plying that if elected, his governm ent was bound by treaty only to defend Taiwan, but not to sustain or aid the KMT governm ent for any other purpose. The M aking o f a New U.S.-Taiwan-China Triangular R elationship D uring the K ennedy-Johnson adm inistrations, C hiang K ai-shek’s KMT governm ent lost some clout w ith the W hite House. Kennedy was annoyed by C hiang’s insistence that his refugee governm ent in Taipei rem ained the sole legitim ate governm ent o f all China. In A pril 1964, Secretary o f State Dean Rusk visited Taiwan to reiterate A m erica’s obligation to the security of Taiwan. However, the secretary declined to reaffirm a questionable American com m itm ent to the notion that the N ationalists rem ained the only legitim ate governm ent o f China. In this way, Rusk clearly signaled that the United States was prepared to consider a “tw o-China” option. But w hile W ashington

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was realigning its China policy according to existing international realities, the obstinate Chiang continued to cling to an old Chinese adage “H an-tsei pu-liang-li” (Han people and thieves do not live together), thus repeatedly rejecting U.S. suggestions for dual representation at the United Nations, that is, one seat for C hina (PRC) and one seat for Taiwan (ROC). Chiang even threatened to veto a Soviet-proposed UN membership for O uter M ongolia because Chiang insisted that O uter M ongolia was still a part o f his ROC. From 1964 to 1969, U.S. policy m akers from Lyndon B. Johnson and Dean Rusk to UN representative A rthur Goldberg, A ssistant Secretary o f State for Far East­ ern A ffairs W illiam Bundy, and A ssistant Secretary o f State for International Organizations Joseph Sisco agonized over and debated various approaches to preserve the N ationalist seat in the United Nations. Unfortunately, Chiang K ai-shek was so obsessed with “recovering the m ainland from the Com­ m unists” that he rem ained in a state o f denial. Senator J. W illiam Fulbright (D -A rkansas), who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee, called Taiwan “a very substantial country” and “would prefer that they both [ROC and PRC] be members” o f the United N ations.40 But because o f Chiang Kaishek’s opposition to the American “universality-dual representation” strategy, Taiwan lost a great opportunity and would later pay the heavy price o f losing its UN seat without any recourse. Soon after Richard Nixon became president in 1969, in order to find a solution to the bloody and unpopular Vietnam War, to reduce overall U.S. risks and costs in A sia, as w ell as to forestall the chances o f a Soviet assault on China, his adm inistration took steps to im prove relations with the PRC. N ixon’s much touted Guam D octrine o f 1969 im plied dim inished m ilitary support for Taiwan and reconciliation with China. W ithin the Nixon admin­ istration, Secretary o f State W illiam P. Rogers and UN A m bassador George H.W. Bush wanted to retain a UN seat for Taiwan, though they would also welcome a seat for the Beijing regime. On the other hand, Henry A. Kissinger, N ixon’s national security advisor, was more interested in reaching some sort o f rapprochem ent with Communist China. In order to counter the Soviet U nion’s global influence, K issinger was so eager to play the so-called “China Card” that he stood ready to sacrifice Taiwan’s interests.41 In O ctober 1971, w hile K issinger was secretly negotiating with C hina’s prem ier Zhou Enlai in Beijing, the United N ations G eneral Assem bly took up an A lbanian proposal (Resolution 2758), and voted 76 to 35, with seventeen member countries abstaining, to expel Taipei (ROC) and adm it B eijing (PRC) as the sole legal governm ent representing China. And when the Nixon adm inistration raised no rigorous objections to the UN decision, the Taiwanese were dism ayed and severely shaken. During this same year, more than a half dozen countries broke diplom atic relations with Taipei and moved their em bassies to Beijing. Among

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others, they included Belgium , Ecuador, India, Iran, Lebanon, M exico, and Peru. But the heaviest blow s cam e when Nixon announced, in July 1971, his proposed trip to mainland China, Canada severed diplom atic ties with Taiwan, and in Septem ber 1972 Japan recognized the PRC governm ent and broke its longstanding relations with Taiwan. This series o f diplom atic setbacks cast a cloud o f gloom over Taiwan and transform ed the island from what one Tai­ wanese w riter called an “A sian orphan,” to an “international orphan.”42 On February 28,1972, Zhou Enlai and Nixon signed the historic Shanghai Communiqué. This docum ent stated that, w ith regard to the issue o f Taiwan, the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.43 The Shanghai Communiqué was the first step toward norm alizing U.S. relations w ith B eijing and the beginning o f détente with Com m unist China. However, it also changed the political geography o f Asia as W ashington started to im plicitly dissociate itself from the strong positions it had taken on Taiwan since Truman made his June 1951 announcement. N evertheless, over the next tw o decades, the Communiqué was subject to varying interpretations. W hile Nixon and K issinger agreed to “acknowledge that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part o f China” (author’s em phasis), they avoided referring to the island as part o f the People’s Republic o f China; They also were not com m itted w ith regard to w hich governm ent spoke for China. In his memoirs, Nixon observed: Taiwan was the touchstone for both sides. We felt that we should not and could not abandon the Taiwanese; we were committed to Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent nation. The Chinese were equally determined to use the communiqué to assert their unequivocal claim to the island— We knew that no agreement concerning Taiwan could be reached at this time. While both sides could agree that Taiwan was a part of China—a position supported by both the Peking and Taiwan governments—we would have to oppose the use of military force by Peking to bring Taiwan under Com­ munist rule.44

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In spite o f N ixon’s public statem ent that “our action in seeking a new relationship with the PRC w ill not be at the expense o f our old friends,” his opacity left no doubt about Taiwan’s fragile international standing.43 By the end of 1972, a total o f thirty-three countries had established diplom atic relations with the PRC while concurrently breaking diplom atic ties with the ROC on Taiwan. M oreover, the U.S. governm ent replaced its am bassador to Taipei, W alter M cConaughy, with a senior career diplom at and also began withdrawing m ilitary forces and installations from the island as Nixon had prom ised to do in the Shanghai Communiqué. Although the M utual Defense Treaty, the centerpiece o f Taiwan’s security, would not be abrogated until 1979, American troop levels fell from 9,000 in 1972 to under 2,000 in 1976. In spite o f the fact that the KMT governm ent maintained some 500,000 active com bat personnel plus a reserve force 2.2 m illion strong, Taiwan’s public had grown increasingly dissatisfied w ith the ruling KM T’s frozen political process. The N ationalist governm ent, which was staffed with canny civil war survivors, lacked a genuinely dem ocratic consensus process. The decision structure was never developed w ithin the boundaries o f the constitution, and there were no checks and balances as practiced in a true democracy. The pow er lay with the leader o f the KMT party, who had the power to back up his political ambitions. From 1948 until his health failed in the 1970s, Chiang Kai-shek, serving as com m ander o f the N ationalist troops, chairm an o f the party, and president o f the state, was clearly the man in power. His son Prem ier Chiang Ching-kuo, had the ear o f the then-bedridden president and had inherited his father’s pow er in the early 1970s; Chiang Ching-kuo possessed “the real authority on all policy m atters and m ajor personnel appointm ents with few institutional constraints.”46 Finally, on M arch 21,1978, alm ost three years after the death o f Chiang Kai-shek, the members o f the National Assembly elected Chiang Ching-kuo to be the sixth president o f the ROC. In the wake o f this series o f diplom atic disasters and crises in confidence, however, thousands o f w ell-educated Taiwanese who had com pleted or were pursuing their graduate training in the United States, Japan, and Europe be­ cam e more actively engaged in the anti-KM T cam paign. M embership o f the W orld U nited Formosans for Independence, form ed in 1970 in Kearny, New Jersey, grew larger and stronger, sponsoring occasional protests in m ajor U.S. cities, including in front o f UN headquarters in New York City. On A pril 24, 1970, two Taiwanese graduate students named (Peter) Huang W en-hsiung and Cheng Tzu-ts’ai attem pted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo when Chiang, then vice prem ier o f the N ationalist governm ent, was on a state visit to the United States. The attem pted assassination took place at the Plaza Hotel in New York City, and both Huang and Cheng were arrested on the spot. The abortive assassination attem pt immediately piqued the American news media’s

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interest in Taiwanese grievances. The Am erican news m edia, with its blunt rem onstrations against its own government officials and sometimes sharp criti­ cism s o f U.S. policies, ultim ately exerted varying degrees o f influence on the political views o f the Taiwanese students. They were often led to com pare the American dem ocratic and free society w ith the Leninist-style political system o f their native land, where strikes were not allow ed, free speech and publica­ tion were curtailed, and the right o f assem bly was restricted. O ver the next two decades, anti-KM T publications and the money o f Taiwanese-Americans easily found their way to the island and provided invaluable support for the anti-KM T opposition. As a consequence, by the 1970s and 1980s, dissent inside Taiwan had grown louder, m ore visible, and m ore frequent than it had been during the 1960s.47 Jim m y Carter Breaks O ff R elations with Taiwan Com m unist Chinese leadership has repeatedly charged that the U nited States is the m ajor obstacle to China’s unification w ith Taiwan. Ironically, however, the one country that could really help speed up China’s unification with Taiwan is also the United States. In July 1981, PRC strongm an Deng Xiaoping told National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was then visiting Beijing, “You and I together overcam e the last difficulties” o f norm alization.48 And since the increasingly unpopular Jim m y C arter was w orried about his own reelection and the grow ing Soviet threat, Brzezinski advised him to play the “China Card,” by seeking a diplom atic breakthrough w ith Beijing. In midD ecem ber 1978, the W hite House hastily instructed the State D epartm ent to inform the Taiwanese governm ent tw elve hours before C arter announced the recognition o f the PRC “as the sole legal governm ent o f China,” as well as to find new ways to “peacefully resolve the dispute betw een the Chinese on the m ainland and Taiwan.”49 A ccording to U.S. A m bassador to Taiwan Leonard S. Unger, the State D epartm ent gave him only two hours to prepare Chiang Ching-kuo for the shock. Brzezinski was concerned that if Taiwan had too much tim e to prepare for the president’s television announcement, the KMT authorities might ask the pow erful Senator Jesse Helms (R-N orth Carolina) to block C arter’s scheme.30 Accordingly, around 2:00 a . m . on December 16,1978 (Taipei tim e), Unger, ac­ companied by ROC Deputy Foreign M inister Frederick F. Chien and President C hiang’s secretary Jam es C.Y. Soong (who served as Chiang’s interpreter), rushed to wake up Chiang Ching-kuo in C hiang’s Taipei residence. Unger inform ed Chiang o f W ashington’s intention to establish diplom atic relations with B eijing w hile sim ultaneously severing its diplom atic ties w ith Taiwan, as w ell as abrogating the M utual D efense Treaty, on January 1,1979. C arter’s

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nationally televised announcem ent on the evening o f D ecem ber IS (Wash­ ington tim e) quickly sent shock waves across the island as the Taiwan dollar plunged in value and the Taipei stock m arket plummeted by nearly 10 percent in one day. But the KMT leadership obviously knew it was com ing because in its official statem ent, “an anticipated, predrafted, stashed away document, Chiang Ching-kuo’s governm ent said that the C arter adm inistration has not only ‘seriously dam aged the rights and interests o f the people o f T aiw an/ but also broken the repeated ‘assurances to m aintain diplom atic relations with the Republic o f C hina.” ’ It w ent on to rem ind the A mericans and the world that the PRC was a regim e o f “terror” and “totalitarian dictatorship” and that the C arter A dm inistration’s decision was a “great setback to human freedom and dem ocratic institutions.” Finally, it vowed never to negotiate with the Com­ m unist Chinese regim e, nor to give up Taiwan’s “sacred task o f recovering the m ainland and delivering the com patriots there.”31 Though Chiang Ching-kuo continued to rely on his grating anti-Communist rhetoric o f unwavering resolve, the Taiwanese felt betrayed by the United States and disheartened. In Taipei, angry crowds denounced Jim m y C arter as “the invertebrate American” and threw stones and eggs at the American embassy. A nother anguished crowd gathered in front o f the Foreign M inistry Office on Taipei’s Po-ai Road to protest the KMT government’s incompetence. And when Deputy Secretary o f State W arren C hristopher arrived in Taipei for a postm ortem discussion on D ecem ber 27,1978, thousands o f Taiwanese protestors greeted him at the airport with eggs, tomatoes, paint, and rocks. They broke through the security line, smashed his car windows and punched him in the face. In the United States, C arter’s decision to recognize the PRC also m et w ith a wide range o f reactions. Though the U.S. Congress was in recess and could not react as a group, Senator Frank Church (D -Idaho), chairm an o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, described it as a “gutsy, courageous decision.” On the other side o f the political spectrum , George H.W. Bush, then chairm an o f the Republican N ational Com m ittee, condem ned C arter’s initiative as having “not only dim inished American credibility in the w orld, but also darkened the prospects for peace.”32 The D ilwan R elations A ct W hen Congress reconvened in early 1979, it quickly worked on legislation to repair some o f the dam age and to soften the adverse im pact o f the “C arter Shock” on Taiwan. It drastically altered and improved a poorly w ritten and highly inadequate W hite House draft, called the Taiwan Omnibus Bill. And w ithin tw o m onths, Congress finalized and passed the bill by a lopsided m ajority— 90 to 6 in the Senate and 345 to 55 in the House o f Représenta-

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tives.53 During the drafting and the debate o f the Tawan Relations A ct (TRA), C arter was w orried about offending Com m unist China; he therefore repeat­ edly threatened to veto the act. On A pril 10,1979, however, C arter relented and signed the TRA into law. The TRA defines, governs, and oversees future relations betw een the United States and Taiwan, and reiterates the U.S. com­ m itm ent to the security o f the (then) 20 m illion Taiwanese. Even though the signal to defend Taiwan sent by the C arter adm inistration had becom e less clear, som e scholars believe that the TRA actually restores Taiwan’s sovereignty because it treats Taiwan as “a nation-state.” Section 4 (b) (1) o f the TRA provides, “W henever the laws o f the U nited States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governm ents, or sim ilar entities, such term s shall include and such laws shall apply w ith respect to Taiwan.” Section 4 (b) (7) further stipulates that the capacity o f Taiwan to sue and be sued in U.S. courts should not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherw ise affected by the absence o f diplom atic relations or recognition. As a m atter o f fact, the TRA not only guarantees the legal status o f Taiwan in U.S. dom estic law, it also m irrors a “one China, one Taiwan” policy because it does not “regard Taiwan as a part o f China unless the population there wants unification.”34 On the day C arter signed the TRA into law, the U.S. governm ent established the Am erican Institute in Taiwan (ATT) at Rosslyn, Virginia, to function as A m erica’s “unofficial” agency for “the continuation o f com m ercial, cultural and other relations” betw een the peoples o f the two countries. In addition, Section 12 (a) o f the TRA requires that “the Secretary o f State shall transm it to the Congress the text o f any agreem ent betw een AIT and the Taiwan authorities as though it w ere subject to the Case A ct.”53Thus, in com plying with the requirem ents o f the TRA, the ATT was staffed with career diplom ats, governed by a three-person Board o f Trustees appointed by the secretary o f state, financed by governm ent funds as a line-item in the State D epartm ent budget, and subject to Congressional notification, review, approval requirem ents, and procedures. Secretary o f State Cyrus Vance soon appointed an old C hina hand nam ed David Dean to be the first chairm an o f the AIT. To help Dean manage this new office, the State D epartm ent also sent career diplom at C harles T. Cross to head the ATT office in Taiwan, which, by the sum m er o f 1979, had a staff o f m ore than sixty. N eedlessly to say, both Dean and Cross were accorded the same authority and subject to the same scrutiny as other U.S. foreign service personnel. In the m eantim e, Taiwan established a quasi-official agency called the C oordination Council for N orth Am erican A ffairs (CCNAA) to replace its em bassy in W ashington. A lso, in order to keep its am bassadorial residence, called Twin O aks, from Chinese claim , Taiwan sold it to a pro-Taiwan organi­ zation, then bought it back at a much higher price w ith an understanding that

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the CCNAA representative would only use it to entertain guests but would not live there any longer. On the other hand, under section 6 o f TRA, twentyfive bilateral and at least fifty-five m ultilateral existing agreem ents between the United Sates and Taiwan were to continue in force. And since January 1, 1979, the two countries have negotiated and concluded thirty-eight new agreem ents, dealing with m atters such as air transportation, cultural and edu­ cational program s, m aritim e affairs, nuclear energy, science and technology, and trade, as well as issues regarding reciprocal privileges, exem ptions, and immunities o f American and Taiwanese personnel.36To facilitate Taiwan-U.S. diplom atic intercourse and to im plem ent these various agreem ents, Taiwan converted its old consulates into CCNAA branch offices in such m ajor cities as New York, Los Angles, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, Houston, A tlanta, Seattle, and Honolulu. And exactly like the old consulates, these branch of­ fices were staffed with economic, scientific, cultural, and information attachés, who enjoyed custom ary diplom atic im m unities and privileges while serving in the United States. The United States and Taiwan’s Dem ocratization A t the tim e o f U.S. de-recognition o f the ROC, a num ber o f Chiang Chingkuo’s American friends, such as Richard “Dixie” W alker (ambassador to South Korea) and Ray Cline (CIA deputy director), urged Chiang to declare Taiwan independent. Chiang refused, because he felt it would delegitim ize the KMT and Taiwan’s minority “mainlander Chinese.”37M me liberal Americans, on the other hand, repeatedly warned Chiang to loosen his repressive and tight grip on Taiwan because the TRA contained provisions that expressed concern for hum an rights and for political dem ocratization. Ironically, however, Chiang C hing-kuo’s governm ent used the “C arter Shock” to suspend the scheduled 1978 year-end election for “supplem ental seats” in the N ational Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. The governm ent also jailed some sixty leaders o f the Taiwan independence m ovement (known as the Form osa [M agazine] Incident) in Decem ber 1979. M oreover, the secret police were believed to have com m itted a series o f brutal political m urders, including the m urders o f the leading Taiwanese dissident Lin Yih-shyong’s m other and two daughters on February 28, 1980, the violent death o f Professor C h’en W en-cheng o f Cam egie-M ellon U niversity on July 2,1980, and the killing o f the ChineseAm erican journalist Henry Liu in a San Francisco suburb in O ctober 1984. These wanton m urders ultim ately becam e hot-button issues in the U.S. Congress. During 1981-1982, the House Subcom m ittee on A sian and Pacific A ffairs scheduled a series o f hearings to find out if KMT spies w ere violating the Foreign A gents Registration Act. Upon conclusion o f the hearings on the

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death o f Professor C h’en W en-cheng, Congressm an Jim Leach (R-Iowa), a Princeton graduate and form er foreign service officer, said, “without question, agents o f the Taiwan governm ent have engaged in harassm ent, intim idation, and monitoring o f Taiwanese Americans.’’3' An editorial in The New York Times called the m urder o f Henry Liu “a blatant act o f terrorism ” by the long arm o f a “police state” that was ruled by “one family, one party and one cause.” A m erica’s m ost influential paper w ent on to criticize the KM T’s “aging leaders who cling to views hardened since their flight from the m ainland in 1949 and have ruled with m artial law ever since.”39 Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-New York) subsequently secured passage o f an am endm ent to the Arms Export C ontrol A ct (1981) that requited that “arm s sales to a foreign governm ent be term inated if it is found to have engaged in a consistent pat­ tem o f intim idation and harassm ents o f individuals in the United States."40 In M ay 1986, Solarz, Leach, and several other members o f the U.S. Congress, including Geraldine Ferraro (D-New York), Senators Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) and Robert G. Torricelli (D-New Jersey), formed a Taiwan Democratic Steering Committee. The committee stressed the fact that native Taiwanese, who were 85 percent o f the island’s 20 m illion inhabitants, could vote only for “supplemental” seats in the national legislature, whose m ajority consisted o f lifetim e members elected on the m ainland in 1947-1948. It not only called for the lifting o f m artial law in Taiwan, but also warned the KMT governm ent that, without dem ocratic reform s, the alternative would be violence or w orse.61 Thus, in a direct and blunt way, members o f the U.S. Congress attem pted to force the KMT to loosen its repressive and dictatorial rule on Taiwan. In the m eantime, an increasing num ber o f prom inent Am ericans also came out in support o f the Taiwanese struggle for democracy and human rights. Ultimately, a rap­ idly growing economy, a rising college-educated population, and a series o f dem onstrations staged by the increasingly emboldened opposition activists, all contributed to the political liberalization o f Taiwan in the 1980s. In addi­ tion, Chiang Ching-kuo’s apprehension o f being assassinated, plus constant pressure from his American friends and critics, who by the way also supported Corazon Aquino o f the Philippines and the Korean dissidents, caused him to take a new approach toward the developm ent o f political pluralism in an affluent Taiwanese society. Although the U.S. Congress spoke in generalities o f the KMT’s human rights record, and in spite o f opaque U.S. overtures to Communist C hina in the late 1970s and early 1980s, W ashington sold Taiwan seventeen World W ar II warships (fifteen destroyers and two subm arines) and also provided $150 to $250 m illion in credit to Taiwan to build F-5 fighters to counter the MIG fighters o f Communist China. And in cooperation with the N orthrop Corpora-

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Figure 9.3 Shipyard at Keelung Harbor During the Vietnam War

tion, Taiwan began in 1974 to build its own F-5E je t fighters.62 Between 1972 and 1979, W ashington transferred $1,167 billion-w orth of m ilitary hardware to Taiwan through the channels o f foreign m ilitary sales and com m ercial sales. In the meantime, the United States found other ways to help Taiwan by strengthening econom ic ties between the two countries. Among other things, it authorized the Taiwanese governm ent to open four new consulates in the United States, for a total o f fourteen. This greatly facilitated the twoway trade, which increased from $1.8 billion in 1972 to $4.8 billion in 1976. M oreover, an American trade center was established in Taipei in 1973, the U.S. Export-Im port Bank approved $350 to $400 m illion in credit to Taiwan, direct American private investm ent in Taiwan exceeded $400 m illion in 1975, and, by May 1976, eight American banks had set up branches on the island.63 Over the next decade, Taiwan’s foreign trade continued to grow until it reached a total am ount o f $88 billion, or the thirteenth hugest in the world (1987). Its trade surplus with the United States constituted nearly 16 percent o f Taiwan’s dom estic growth product as illustrated in Table 9.3. In the 1980s, despite its ongoing normalization process with the PRC, which included exchange visits o f the heads o f state, the United States provided new m ilitary technology to upgrade Taiwan’s capability for self-defense. Because Beijing refused to renounce the use o f force against Taiwan, U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) did not trust the Communist regime and gener-

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Table 9.3 Taiwan’s Trade Imbalance with the United States Year 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Export (NT$ million) 144,590 332,499 388,945 725,890 912,451 925,055 1,080,781 1,261,974 1,296,049 1,646,189 1,996,394

Import (NT$ million) 186,862 342,495 451,589 684,144 876,234 841,126 926,743 1,044,069 998,912 1,241,342 1,563,258

(Exp-Imp) /GDP -0.0718 -0.0119 -0.0626 0.0294 0.0207 0.0467 0.0796 0.1027 0.1343 0.1665 0.1593

Source: Director-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, ROC Executive Yuan, National Income o f Taiwan, ROC, various years.___________________________

ally showed sympathy and support for Taiwan. On the other hand, Reagan’s aides, such as M ichael Deaver and Oliver North, seemed to believe that Chiang Ching-kuo would take drastic measures to curtail the KMT culture of extremism and violence. U nder the circum stances, the Reagan adm inistration continued to annually transfer U.S. weapons to Taiwan valued at approximately US$700 million. However, owing mainly to Secretary o f State Alexander H aig’s desire to establish a “strategic relationship" with Beijing, the Reagan Administration prohibited direct access to U.S. governm ent offices by Taiwan’s CCNAA of­ ficials in W ashington. In early 1982, Taiwan’s request for advanced F-X je t fighters was also rejected, even though this particular request was endorsed by fifty-nine U.S. senators. N evertheless, W ashington was w illing to sell C-130H transport planes and SM -I and AIM -7F m issiles to strengthen Taiwan’s air defense.64 But on June 29, the W hite House announced that George P. Shultz was slated to replace Haig as secretary o f state; and two weeks later (July 14, 1982), Reagan gave Taiwan the following six assurances: The United States: (1) has not agreed to set a date for ending arms to the ROC, (2) has not agreed to hold prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to the ROC, (3) will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing, (4) has not agreed to revise the TRA, (5) has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan, and (6) will not exert pressure on the ROC to enter into negotiations with Beijing.63 Soon after these assurances were given to Taipei, W ashington signed the fol­ lowing join t communiqué with B eijing on August 17,1982:

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Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States government states that it does not seek to cany out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.66 Known as the “8.17 Communiqué,” the language and tone once again made the Taiwanese very nervous. However, thanks to Chiang Ching-kuo’s contri­ bution o f US$1 m illion to O liver N orth’s secret Swiss account for Contras, the Reagan A dm inistration not only supported Taiwan’s mem bership in the Asian Development Bank, but also agreed to facilitate a joint venture between General Dynamics and Taiwan to m anufacture a stripped-down version o f the F -16 je t fighter, as well as selling blueprints and parts for construction o f the O liver Hazard Percy-class frigate.67 When George H.W. Bush became the forty-first president of die United States in 1989, he fully realized that Taiwan remained strategically important to U.S. national interests. Bush likewise followed a resolute and prudent “One China and One Taiwan Policy” as opposed to Jimmy Carter and Henry Kissinger’s support o f the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, which in essence reduced Taiwan to a subnational status. In a nutshell, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances o f 1982 continued to govern U.S. policy toward Taiwan. In conjunction with this policy, Bush unequivocally supported Taiwan’s mem­ bership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was changed to the World Trade Organization by the tim e Taiwan received its membership in 2001.68 In 1991, when China purchased twenty-four Su-27 fighter planes from Russia with every intention o f deploying them close to the Taiwan Strait, the Bush Administration was alarmed. Faced with a difficult reelection campaign and concerned about a depressed domestic defense industry, Bush, on September 2, 1992, reversed W ashington’s longstanding policy by announcing the sale o f ISO Lockheed M artin F-16s to Taiwan.69 Despite a hefty price tag o f US$6 billion, to be paid from 1993 to 2001, President Lee Teng-hui was elated be­ cause he intended to replace Taiwan’s 360-odd aging F-5E and F-104 combat squadrons with these advanced fighter planes, when the delivery of the latter was completed in 1997. In addition, the Bush Administration agreed to lease three Knox-class cruisers to Taiwan with an understanding that after the five-year lease, these American vessels, prim arily for defense purposes, would belong to the Taiwanese navy. Specifically, Taiwan paid US$3.94 million for leasing the USS Bnewton (FF1086), $6.34 million for the USS Robert E. Peary (FF1073), and an undisclosed amount for leasing the USS Kirk (FF1087). According to

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a U.S. Department o f Defense report, by 1999 Taiwan had four submarines, including two Sea Dragon-class boats built in the 1980s, seven U.S. Perry-class missile frigates, nine Knox-class frigates, some two dozen destroyers, four Hawkeye airborne early warning planes, fifteen Chinook helicopters, and a variety o f short-range surface-to-air and Patriot missiles.70 By the mid-1990s when Taiwan’s favorite son, Lee Teng-hui, became the ROC president, Taiwan was no longer satisfied with its existing level of diplo­ matic recognition and was using foreign aid to break diplomatic isolation and to rejoin intergovernmental organizations. Needless to say, Beijing remained the major obstacle. But since Taiwan had about $100 billion in foreign exchange reserves—then the second largest in the world after Japan—it decided to pursue what was characterized as “money diplomacy.” A confident and engaging presi­ dent, Lee established the ROC Overseas Development Fund to court countries in Southeast Asia, Central America, Africa, and the M iddle East, attempting to break out o f China’s containment and to achieve international legitimacy for Taiwan as a sovereign state. In 1995, Lee even offered US$1 billion to the United Nations for a seat in the cash-starved international body. (Thus far, Taiwan has tried fourteen times to bid for UN membership without success, thanks to China’s strong opposition). As a result of Lee’s persistent and tireless diplomatic efforts, Taiwan had, by 1995, staffed some 130 embassies, consul­ ates, or unofficial representative offices in ninety countries. In addition, Taiwan had established forty-five agricultural, medical, technical, and other assistance programs with ‘Taiwanese friends” all over the world.71Also, by lobbying and mobilizing Taiwanese friends in the U.S. Congress, Lee got him self invited to deliver the Spencer T. and Ann W. Olin lecture at his alma mater, Cornell Uni­ versity, on June 9,1995. China lodged fierce protests and objections to Lee’s visit, threatening to cancel the purchase o f several Boeing jetliners. Moreover, during Taiwan’s first-ever direct election o f its president in M arch 1996, China not only test-fired three unarmed ballistic missiles into waters near Taiwan’s two major ports— Keelung and Kaohsiung—but also conducted a live-ammunition military exercise across the Taiwan Strait to intimidate Taiwanese voters. Presi­ dent Bill Clinton, obligated by the TRA “to be concerned about the security o f Taiwan,” dispatched two U.S. carriers—the Nim itz and the Independence—to nearby Taiwan waters. But as Richard C. Bush, U.S. chairman o f ATT during the Clinton administration, put it, the communications between Washington and Taipei had become “ragged” during the late 1990s.72 A cooling o f U.S.-Taiwan Relations U.S.-Taiwan relations became “ragged” because the Taiwanese were upset by President Clinton’s China policy, which had shifted from “containm ent”

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to “engagem ent.” D uring the 1992 presidential cam paign, C linton, who had previously visited Taiwan four tim es as governor o f A rkansas, assailed then-President George H. Bush’s com prom ise w ith “the butchers o f Tianan­ men.” But after occupying the W hite House, President Clinton changed his tune and becam e interested in establishing a “strategic partnership” between China and the United States. In 1997, C linton invited PRC President Jiang Zem in to visit the United States, and during his reciprocal state visit to China in early summer o f 1998, Clinton praised C hina’s econom ic reform s, among other positive remaries. Then, at a roundtable discussion in Shanghai, Clinton shocked his audience by revealing that he had privately told Jiang Zim in, “We don’t support independence for Taiwan, or tw o Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirem ent.”73 C linton’s tilt toward C hina and his impromptu “three no's” statem ent caused consternation in the U.S. Congress as well as dism ay in Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, in Japan. C linton’s deeds and words also stim ulated more debate on the sovereignty issue among Taiwan’s various political groups. Though the U.S. State De­ partm ent dispatched Richard C. Bush to Taiwan to offer reassurances and to explain that U.S. policy on Taiwan had not changed, the islanders’ desire to establish a statelike presence for Taiwan in the world arena had suffered a severe setback.74A gainst this backdrop, President Lee Teng-hui, in an inter­ view with Deutsche W elle Radio o f Germany on July 9 ,1999, dem anded a “special state-to-state" diplom atic apparatus in which future China-Taiwan negotiations would be conducted. By the 1990s, a great num ber o f Am erican business executives viewed the China m arket—w ith 1.3 billion consum ers plus the fastest growing economy in the world for a decade— as a gold rush, and were eager and w illing to invest in the mainland. On the other hand, cautious and tough-m inded policy makers considered the rise o f an inim ical China, both econom ically and m ilitarily, to be a threat to American interests. A fter only ten weeks in the W hite House, the forty-third president, George W. Bush, confronted an unexpected crisis that forced him to take a firm stance on Taiwan. On A pril 1, 2001, a U.S. naval EP-3 plane, while on a routine surveillance flight to m onitor C hina’s m ilitary threat, was forced to crash land on C hina’s Hainan Island by Chinese fighters, creating a Sino-American confrontation. A fter the crisis was over, ABC news reporter Charles G ibson interview ed President Bush in the W hite House. G ibson asked the president, “If Taiwan were attacked by China, do we have an obligation to defend the Taiwanese?” W ithout any hesitation, Bush replied: “Yes, we do and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.” Gibson continued his inquiry: “W ith full forces, barring m ilitary?” “W hatever it w ill take to help Taiwan defend herself,” Bush answered with a firm and

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determ ined tone. And w ithin w eeks, the U nited States sold a new range o f sophisticated weapons to the Taiwanese.73 For many years, the U nited States has m aintained w hat today’s diplom atic argot term s “a strategic am biguity” policy tow ard Taiwan, that is, the United States recognizes the governm ent o f the PRC as the sole legal governm ent o f C hina and concurrently deals w ith Taiwan as a de facto independent political entity based on the TRA. Though intentionally ambiguous, this policy has proved to be pragm atic and flexible as W ashington skillfully perform s a risky high-wire balancing act in its dealings with China and Taiwan. However, since the terrorist attacks on New York’s W orld Trade C enter and the Pentagon in W ashington on Septem ber 11, 2001, the U nited States has desperately sought m ore allies or even quasi-allies in its battle against global terrorism . In particular, in its announced policy to forestall North Korea and Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the Bush adm inistration has designed a new tactic by subcontracting the North Korean problem to the care o f China. Under these circum stances, the United States did not lodge a strong protest when in 2005 C hina passed a so-called “anti-secession law,” w hich provides justifica­ tion for C hina to invade Taiwan when and if Taiwan declares independence. W ashington’s signal to defend Taiwan has once again becom e less clear, as if Taiwan were now less relevant to A m erica’s global strategy. In light o f the international terrorist threats and a rising China, the Bush A dm inistration, w hich had its hands lull in A fghanistan, Iraq, the Korean peninsula, and elsew here, began to exert considerable pressure on Taiwanese leaders to tone down their hyped-up state nationalism and fitful policy toward China. The U nited States is no longer enthusiastic about Taiwan’s proposed plebiscite to revise its constitutional and political attributes, for example, changing their country's name from “Republic o f China” to ’Taiw an,” or giving up the claim o f O uter M ongolia as “the territory o f the Republic o f C hina.” Even more egregiously, in order to avoid B eijing’s wrath, the U.S. governm ent even refused to accord custom ary diplom atic privileges to Taiwan’s head o f state. In the early sum m er o f 2006, the U.S. State Depart­ m ent would not perm it Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, then en route to Central A m erica, to make a transit stop in a m ajor Am erican city, such as New York or Los Angeles. T he UJS. “Policy o f A m biguity” N ot unexpectedly, the U.S. policy to nudge Taiwan tow ard less sovereign status has also helped to transform Taiwan’s political dynam ic, from the previously harm onious landscape into raging debates over future relations with China. Even though Taiwan has a dizzying variety o f racial adm ixtures,

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its own colonial past, and a unique m aritim e tradition, decades o f the KMT’s “Chineseness” indoctrination have led a high percentage o f Taiwanese, par­ ticularly children and grandchildren o f the Chinese refugees who fled with Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1949-1950, to possess the antiquated notion that their identity is grounded in the same racial, ethnic, and cultural traditions as those o f the Chinese on the mainland. Some o f these people, who desire to establish business ties with China’s cheap labor and booming economy, and who also want to see a weakened Taiwan-U.S. relationship, generally favor unification with China and are politically identified with the blue color—the color o f the KMT emblem. The recoil o f the pan-Blue (which has become Taiwan’s new political lexicon) from the anti-Com m unist stance seems to suggest that they are chasing the chim era o f a powerful, revivified Chinese em pire to challenge the hegemony o f the United States. On the other side o f Taiwan’s political spectrum is the majority o f the island­ ers. These individuals consider themselves ethnically and culturally Taiwanese (instead o f Chinese) and are no longer satisfied with Taiwan’s nonstate status without international recognition. In their “unmaking o f Chineseness,” they have been demanding an increasingly independent sovereign state o f Taiwan. They generally support the platform and policy o f the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and are identified with the green color. However, with a panGreen governm ent o f neophytes in pow er since 2000, Taiwan’s hard-earned democracy is in danger o f derailing into perpetual political gridlock and hyperpartisanship. During the last few years, Taiwan’s legislators have spent more time and eneigy in fistfights and vilification o f their opponents than performing their parliam entary duties. Indeed, in 2006 alone, the pan-Blue legislators, despite three attem pts, failed to recall the popularly elected DPP president, Chen Shui-bian. Endless antigovem m ent street protests and dem onstrations, political hearsay and innuendo, which is crudely tw isted and instantaneously transm uted by Taiwan’s perverse m edia and poorly trained journalists, fur­ ther inflame virulent ethnic tensions and polarize Taiwan’s society. W ithout rationality, civility, and tolerance of different opinions, the pan-Blue and the pan-Green are now farther from the center and closer to their own poles. For sanguine Taiwan observers, such a phenomenon is normal and even healthy because building a m ature democracy takes a long tim e and usually follows a tortuous path. They also believe that despite the several hundred m issiles China deploys to intim idate Taiwan, it w ill be a long while before the PRC can build up sufficient amphibious forces to successfully invade the island. O ther China scholars and Taiwan observers even predict that the repressive and abusive Communist regim e is bound to collapse before it can mount a full-scale attack against Taiwan. For the pessim ists, however, Am erica’s continued neglect o f the Taiwan­

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ese quest for a higher international status and W ashington’s accession to the dim inution o f the island’s legitim acy w ill ultim ately lead to calamity. They fear that the real danger for Taiwan w ill actually com e from within, not from without. A nightm arish scenario should not be ruled out. Some o f the pan-Blue activists, particularly the pro-Beijing media, have designed a scheme to gradually and system atically undermine Taiwan’s polity and have been em ulating the ancient G reek soldiers inside the Trojan horse in order to deliver the island to the PRC, repeating what happened in 1683. W hen and if this happens, would the U nited States, the w orld’s only superpower, come to Taiwan’s assistance? And if so, as pledged by President George W. Bush, would it be too late and at too high a price for the Am ericans? Though history cannot alw ays be useful as a predictive tool, it can at least offer what the poet W alt W hitman called ‘’them es, hints, and provokers.” The past 400 years in Taiwanese history has provided am ple hints that the island, like a soccer ball in the international arena, w ill be kicked around by world powers in the tw enty-first century. At the same tim e, it should provoke readers to ponder if Taiwan can continue to exist as a free and independent political entity in the tw enty-first century without the protection o f the United States. It should also provoke the thought that if dem ocratic Taiwan falls into the hands o f a hostile behem oth again, the United States w ill lose not only the “unsinkable aircraft carrier and subm arine” (as General M acA rthur charac­ terized the island), but also the strategic control o f two o f the w orld’s most im portant international sea lanes— the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel. This, in turn, would shatter East A sia’s geopolitical equilibrium and spell trouble for Japan’s free access to M iddle Eastern crude oil and Southeast A sian raw m aterials. But w orst o f all, it would mean the beginning o f the end o f A m erica’s supremacy in the W est Pacific.

Notes

Notes to Chapter 1

1. Ts’ao Yung-ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepot in East Asia in the Seventeenth Cen­ tury,” Itinerario 21, no. 3 (1997): 100. 2. James W. Davidson, The Island o f Formosa: Past and Present (London: Macmillan, 1903), 10. Other sources claim that Spanish Jesuit Alonso Sanchez and Portuguese Jesuit Francisco Pirez had also referred to the island as Tlha Formosa.” See Jose Eugenio Borao, Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1 (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 2001), 10,13. 3. For more on the Ming dynasty and China’s empire-building, see Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Eunuchs in the M ing Dynasty (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996) and Tsai, Perpetual Happiness: The M ing Emperor Yongle (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). 4. For more see Chou Wan-yao, “Ming-Ch’ing wen-hsien chung ‘T’ai-wan fei Ming pan-tV lieh-cheng” [Using examples in the Ming and Ch’ing archives to prove that Taiwan was not a part of the Ming empire], in C h’eng C h’ing-jen chiao-shou ju n g -t’uei chi-nien lun-wen-chi [Collected essays commemorating Professor Cheng Ch’ing-jen’s retirement] (Taipei: Tao-hsiang Publishing, 1999), 267-293. See also, John E. Willis, Jr., “Sèventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New H istory (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999; expanded edition 2007), 87. 5. Ts’ao Yung-ho, Tai-w an tsao-ch'i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi [Revised studies on early Taiwan history] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing, 2000), 59-61. 6. John E. Wills Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K ’ang-hsi, 1666-1687 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), 148,151. 7. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 265-266. 8. Long Stream Taiwan History Commission, ed., Tai-pei li-shih sheng-tu lueyou [Deep journey into the history of Taipei], vol. 3 (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2000), 96-99. 9. Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Im perial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), 26, 48, 55, 58. See also Maurice Meisner, “The Development of Formosan Nationalism,” China Q uarterly 15 (July-September, 1963): 92; Ramon Myers, ‘Taiwan Under Ch’ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895: The Traditional Order,” Journal o f the Institute o f Chinese Studies o f the Chinese University o f Hong Kong 4, no. 2 (1971): 495-520. 10. Long Stream Taiwan History Commission, Tai-pei li-shih sheng-tu lue-you, 207

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vol. 3, 6; also Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Im perial China: M ilitarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 24-27,51. 11. Myers, ‘Taiwan under Ch’ing Imperial Rule,” 385; Lin Man-hung, “WanCh’ing T’ai-wan ti cha, t’ang, chi chang-nao yeh” [Taiwan’s tea, sugar and camphor businesses during the late Ch’ing], in Tai-pei wen-hsien [Taipei historical documents] 38 (1976), 5. See also, William M. Speidel, “The Administrative and Fiscal Reforms of Liu Ming-ch’uan in Taiwan, 1884-1891: Foundation for Self-strengthening,” Journal o f Asian Studies 35, no. 3 (May 1976): 453-55. 12. Harry J. Lamley, “From Far Canada to Set Up the First Tamsui Churches,” Free China Review 43, no. 5 (May 1993): 56. See also, Chen Chiukun, “From Landlords to Local Strongmen: The Transformation of Local Elites in Mid-Ch’ing Taiwan, 1780-1862,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New H istory , 133-160. 13. George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1965), 5; Thomas A. Bailey, ADiplomatic History o f the American People (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1964), 315; and Simon Long, Taiwan: C hina’s Last Frontier (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 18. 14. Ibid., 17-18. 15. For more on foreigners’ impact on Taiwan in the early nineteenth century, see George Wiliam Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 1841-1874 (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1978). 16. Lo Chi-p’u, Ye-hsing ti-kuo: Jih-pan ching-yin T ’ai-wan ti tse-m opo-hsi [Am­ bitious empire: analysis of Japanese management and policies in Taiwan] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 1992), 112,119-120. 17. Hsin-nan shin-wen [Rising south newspaper], July 12,1943, evening edition: 1. 18. Ibid., January 24,1944, evening edition: 2. 19. Cited from the keynote speech van Agt delivered at the International Confer­ ence on the History and Culture of Taiwan at the National Central Library in Taipei, May 29,2006. 20. Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society (London: Routledge, 1997), 5,12. 21. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Penguin, 1978), 128-129. 22. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (May 28,1951): 847. 23. Peng Ming-min, A Taste o f Freedom: M emoirs o f a Formosan Independence Leader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 93. Also, Frank P. Morello, “The International Legal Status of Formosa,” Ph.D. dissertation, St. John’s Univer­ sity, 1965. 24. Senator J. William Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas Special Collec­ tions, Series 71, Box 7, Folder 26, under “Congressional Record—Senate,” August 17,1954,14162-14164. N otes to Chapter 2

1. Nakamura Takashi, “Ho-lan shih-tai T’ai-wan-shih yen-chiu ti hui-ku yu tsanwan” [Retrospect and prospect of Taiwan historical research of the Dutch period], in Hsu Hsien-yao, trans. Ho-lan shih-tai T ’ai-wan-shih lun-wen chi [Collected essays on Taiwan historical research of the Dutch period] (Ban City: Buddhist Light College of Humanities & Social Sciences, 2001), 237. 2. For more on the Dutch rising maritime trade in Asia, see William Campbell,

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209

Formosa under the Dutch (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1903), 47-74. See also, Ts’ao Yung-ho, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch ’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi [Revised studies

on early Taiwan history] (Taipei: Uen-ching Publishing, 2000), 52. 3. Ibid., 53-54. 4. M ing Tai-tsu shih-lu (Hung-wu veritable record), Photographic reprint, 257 chuan (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1962), 70:3a-3b, twelfth moon of fourth year, Hung-wu reign. 5. The narration of this sequence of events is based on Reyersen’s instructions, diary, and correspondence, which are preserved in a library in The Hague and are also recorded in W.P. Groeneveldt’s De Nederlanders in China: Eerste D eel (1601-1624) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1898). For Reyersen’s time spent in the Pescadores, see Yen Shang-wen, ed., Hsu Peng-hu hsien-chih [Supplement to the Pescadores Gazetteer] (Pescadores: Pescadores County government, 2005), 100-106. 6. Campbell, Formosa under the D utch , 34-36. 7. There are conflicting records on the date of completion of Fort Zeelandia. Japa­ nese Dutch specialist Murakami Naojiro believed it was 1632, while the French Jesuit father Joseph de Mailla, who visited the fort in 1714, claimed that it was completed in 1634; and the first British consul to Taiwan, Robert Swinhoe, when visiting the fort in 1861, remembered seeing the completion date as 1630. For more information, see Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang [Historical outlines of early Taiwan history] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Book Store, 1994), 182. 8. Ibid., 183; see also Chou Wan-yao, T ’ai-wan li-shih t ’u-suo [Pictorial history of Taiwan, from prehistory to 1945] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing, 1997), 56. 9. Murakami Naojiro, trans, Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia , Naka­ mura Takashi, ed., Ba-ta-vi-a jo nikki (Diary of Batavia City), vol. 2 (Tokyo: Heibon sha, 1975), 331. 10. Ibid., vol. 1,109,147,173, and 260. Also Nakamura Takashi, “Dutch Admin­ istration of Taiwan,” Bulletin ofT enri University (Nara, Japan: Tenri Daigaku), no. 43 (March 1964): 78. 11. José Eugenio Borao Mateo, Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1 (Taipei: SMC Publish­ ing, 2001), 16-17. 12. See Ts’ao Yung-ho, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi, 55-57. Also Jose E. B. Mateo “Spanish Presence in Taiwan, 1626-1642,” N ational Taiwan Uni­ versity H istory Journal, no. 17 (1992): 317. Ho-p’ing Island was previously called Sber-liao Island and also Keelung Isle by the Chinese; but the Anglo-American and French name was Palm Island. 13. Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang, 211-212. 14. Chiang Tao-chang, ‘T ’ai-wan Tan-shui chi li-shih yu mao-yu” [Trade and history of Tamsui in Taiwan] in T ’ai-wan ching-chi-shih shih-chi [Taiwan economic history] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Research Office, 1966), vol. 10, 156. Jose E. B. Mateo cites a total of600 families at Tapani from Spanish sources. See his “Spanish Presence in Taiwan,” 321. 15. Ibid., 318-319; also Liao Han-ts’en, “Hsi-pan-ya-jen ju-T’ai kao” [Studying the Spanish occupation of Taiwan], in T ’ai-pei wen-wu chi-k’an [Taipei folklore quarterly], vol. 1, no.l (December 1952): 42. 16. Fang Hao says only 300 troops took part in the Spanish expedition to Keelung in 1626, while Jose E. B. Mateo cites 600. See Fang Hao’s T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shihkang, 206, and Jose E.B. Mateo, “Spanish Presence in Taiwan”: 317,326-327. 17. Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang, 208-209.

210

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

18. Eng Chia-yin, “Hsi-pan-ya Tao-ming-hui tsai pei T’ai-wan ti hsuan-chiao” [Spanish Dominican proselytizing in northern Taiwan], T ’ai-wan chiao-hui km g-pao [Communique of Taiwan church], no. 2381 (October 19,1997): 10. 19. Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang , 212-213. Father Esquivel, whose original assignment was to Japan instead of Taiwan, boarded a ship to Japan in 1633 with another priest, but the ship owner murdered them and presented their severed ears and noses to the authorities in Nagasaki. 20. Ibid., 213-215. For more see Henry Rowold, “Seventeenth Century Roman Catholic Missions in Taiwan,” South East Asia Journal o f Theology, vol. 15, no. 2 (1974): 68-79. 21. Eng Chia-yin, “Hsi-pan-ya Tao-ming-hui tsai pei Tai-wan ti hsuan-chiao,” 10. 22. Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang, 214. 23. In T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi (p. 37), Ts’ao Yung-ho states that fifty-seven aboriginal tribes had pledged their allegiance to the Dutch rulers by the end of 1636. 24. Murakami Naojiro, “Ho-lan-jen ti fan-she chiao-hua” [Dutch efforts in civi­ lizing the aboriginal tribes], in Hsu Hsien-yao, trans., H o-lan shih-tai T ’ai-wan-shih lun-wen-chi, 27-29. 25. Nakamura Takashi, “The Modem History of Formosa,” Lai Yung-hsiang, trans., in T ’ai-wan wen-hsien [Taiwan historical documents], vol. 6, no. 2 (June 1995): 57. 26. Peter Kang, “Inherited Geography: Post-national History and the Emerging Dominance of Pimaba in East Taiwan,” Taiwan H istorical Research, vol. 12, no. 2 (December 2005): 2-3. 27. William Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 62. 28. There are minor discrepancies regarding the number of Spanish defenders at both Tamsui and Keelung in 1642. See Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang, 220-21; Davidson, The Island o f Formosa, 22; and Murakami Naojiro, “Gi-lung ti hung-mao-cheng tsu” [Site of Keelung’s red-haired fort], in Hsu Hsien-yao, trans., H o-lan shih-tai T ’ai-wan-shih lun-wen-chi, 47-48. 29. The figures come from The Hague Algemeen Rijksatchief, cited by Nakamura Takashi in “The Modem History of Formosa,” 57. 30. Peter Kang, “Post-national History and the Emerging Dominance of Pimaba in East Taiwan,” 5-6; Campbell, Formosa under the D utch, 230; Murakami Naojiro, trans., D iary o f Batavia City, vol. 1,298. 31. Murakami Naojiro, D iary o f Batavia City, vol. 2,280-86. 32. James Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 23-24. 33. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 104. 34. Ibid., 92. 35. Fang Hao, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i shih-kang, 165-66,173; Ts’ao Yung-ho, T ’aiwan tsao-ch’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi, 73. 36. For more on the Sinkan language see Murakami Naojiro, Sin-kan mun-sho [Sinkan manuscript] (Taipei: Chien-you Publishing, 1995). 37. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 78-79,97,101. 38. Ts’ao Yung-ho, T ’ai-wan tsao-ch’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi, 73. 39. Nakamura Takashi, “The Modem History of Formosa,” 58; Campbell, Formosa under the D utch, 228. 40. G. H. Bondifield, “The Dutch and Dutch Missions in Formosa,” Chinese Recorder 35 (April 1904): 161-171; also Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 81, 248,251,261,311.

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 2 AND 3

211

41. Ibid., 84-86,275. For more see J. J. A. M. Kuepers, The Dutch Reform ed Church in Formosa, 1627-1662: M ission in a C olonial Context (Switzerland: Nouvelle Revue de Science Missionaire, 1978). 42. Daniel Gravius, The G ospel o f St. M atthew in Formosan (Sinkan D ialect), 1662 edition (London: Trubner & Co., 1888), 1. See also Fang Hao, T a i-w a n tsao-ch ’i shih-kang, 172, and Chou Wan-yao, T a i-w a n li-shih t ’u-sou, 5. 43. Silver statistics are cited from Ch’en Kuo-tung, T a i-w a n ti shan-hai chingyen [The mountain and sea experience of Taiwan] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2005), 389. 44. Porcelain statistics cited from ibid., 391. In July 2002, the author personally inspected many pieces of such exquisite porcelain at Peterhuff, the Baltic summer palace of Russian Czar Peter the Cheat. 45. Nakamura Takashi, “The Modem History of Formosa,” 58. 46. Ibid. 47. Nakamura Takashi, “Dutch Administration of Taiwan,” 67-71. 48. Nagaseki Youko, “Ho-lan ti T’ai-wan mao-yi” (Dutch trade in Taiwan), in Hsu Hsien-yao, trans., H o-lan shih-tai T ’ai-w an-shih lun-wen-chi, 251-259. 49. Ibid., 262-63. See also Ts’ao Yung-ho, T a i-w a n tsao-ch ’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi, 64-66. 50. Ibid., 65-68; Nagaseki Youko, “Ho-lan ti T’ai-wan mao-yi,” 271. See also R.A.B. Ponsonby Fane, “Ming chung-ch’en Ch’eng-shi chi” [Recording the Ming Loyalist Koxinga], in T a i-w a n ching-chi-shih shih-chi [Tenth volume of Taiwan economic history] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Research Office, 1966), 10. 51. Ibid., 12 52. Ts’ao Yung-ho, T a i-w a n tsao-ch ’i li-shih yen-chiu hsu-chi, 68. 53. Nagaseki Youko, “Ho-lan ti T’ai-wan mao-yi,” 312. 54. Ponsonby Fane, “Ming chung-ch’en Ch’eng-shi chi,” 31,34. 55. Once again, there are conflicting reports on the Kuo Huai-yi revolt. Chinese sources claim that thousands of Chinese were killed as a result of Kuo’s revolt, but a Dutch source states that no one but a handful of ring leaders were executed. For more see Fan Hao, T ’ai-w an tsao-ch ’i shih-kang, 195-198. 56. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 67-69. 57. Ibid., 421-423. 58. Murakami Naojiro, trans., D ia ry o f the B atavia C ity, vol. iii, 244-245, 308-311. 59. Sequence of events is based on Frederick Coyett’s ‘t Verwaerloosde Formosa [Neglected Formosa] (1675), Inez de Beauclair, trans. (San Francisco: Chinese Ma­ terials Center, 1975). In this book, Coyett also recorded the following: “. . . Coxin beleghert hebbende’t Casteel Zeelandia op Formosa zedert primo May 1661 tot heden den eersten February 1662 ter eeure” (Koxinga besieged Fort Zeelandia in Formosa from May 1661 until now, February 1,1662). 60. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 69,72-74,439. N otes to Chapter 3

1. Ts’ao Yung-ho, T a i-w a n tsao-ch ’i li-shih yen-chiu [Studies on early Taiwan history] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing, 1979), 373-396. For more on Koxinga, see Ralph C. Croizier, Koxinga and Chinese N ationalism : H istory, M yth, and the H ero (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, East Asian Research Center, 1977).

212

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

2. Ta-Ch 'ing hui-tien shih-li [Legal code and precedents of the Great Ch’ing dynasty], Shun-chih reign, chuan 776, “Criminal and military affairs at borders and ports,” reprint (Taipei: Chi-wen Publishing, 1963) 11,28. See also Fang Hao, Fang H ao liu-shih tse-ting-kao [Fang Hao’s reflections at sixty], vol. 1 (Taipei: printed by the author, 1969), 663-682. 3. Chiang Jih-sheng, T ai-w an w ai-chi [Taiwan miscellany], 17th century edition, vol. 6, reprint (Taipei: Taiwan Historical Documents Commission, 1993), 236. 4. Ch’en Kuo-tung, Tung-ya hai-yu i-ch ’ien-nien [One thousand years of East Asian waters] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2003), 261. 3. For more see Koizumi Teizo, The Operation o f Chinese Junks, A. Watson trans. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 2-12. 6. Iwao Seiichi, ed., Chou Hsueh-p’u trans., H istorical Sources on Seventeenth Century Taiwanese-Anglo Trade (Taipei: Bank ofTaiwan Economics Research Room, 1939), 27, 33, 191. For more see Anthony Farrington, ed., The English F actory in Japan 1 6 1 3 -1 6 2 3 ,2 vols. (London: British Library, 2002). 7. Ts’ao Yung-ho, T a i-w a n tsao-ch ’i li-shih yen-chiu, 377. 8. Hayashi Hoko et al., eds., K ayi hentai [Changing attitudes of the Chinese bar­ barians], 17th century edition, vol. 4, reprint (Tokyo: Toyo bunko, 1938), 167-168; vol. 7,307-308,327; vol. 9, 355-357,374,392,3%. 9. Derek Massarella, “Chinese, Tartars and Thea’ or a Tale of Two Companies: The English East India Company and Taiwan in the Late Seventeenth Century,” Jour­ nal o f the R oyal A siatic Society, Ser, 3,3,3 (1993): 393-426. See also Iwao Seiichi, Taiwanese-Anglo Trade, 58. 10. Iwao Seiichi, “Kinsei Nisshi boueki ni kansuru shoryoteki kousa” [Investiga­ tion on the volumes of Sino-Japanese trade during the modem centuries], in Shigaku zasshi [Historical magazine] 62, no. 11 (November 1953): 12-13. 11. Chiang Jih-sheng, T ai-w an wai-chi, vol. 6,237; Hayashi Hoko, K ayi hentai, vol. 7,304. 12. Iwao Seiichi, Taiwanese-Anglo Trade, 23-32, 54-57, 64. For more see Lai Yung-hsiang, ‘Trade Relations between Koxinga’s Family and the East India Com­ pany,” Taiwan wen-hsien [Taiwan historical documents] 16, no. 2 (1965), 2-9. 13. China’s First Historical Archives Bureau, ed., K ’ang-hsi chi-chu-chu [Re­ cording daily activities of the K’ang-hsi emperor], vol. 2 (Beijing: Chung-hua Book Store, 1984), 657. 14. Ibid., 1066. 15. Ibid., 1320-1322. 16. Kung Kang ed., Ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li [Legal code and precedents of the Great Ch’ing dynasty], Kuang-hsu reign, chuan 239, on “customs tax,” reprint (Bei­ jing: Chung-hua Book Store, 1991), 815-816. 17. Known as the James Flint case. Flint was a representative of the English East India Company whose lurid behavior in Tientsin caused the Ch’ing court to limit all European and American traders to Canton under the strict “factory system.” However, shippers from Asian countries were allowed to continue visiting other ports without hindrance. 18. Kimiya Yasuniko, Chu-Nikki koutu shi [History of Sino-Japanese commu­ nications], Ch’en Chieh trans. (Taipei: Nine Thoughts Publishing, 1978), 336; also James W. Davidson, The Island o f Formosa: Past and Present (London: Macmillan, 1903), 445-447. 19. Ts’ao Yung-ho, ’Taiwan as an Entrepot in East Asia in the Seventeenth Cen­

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

213

tury,” Itinerario xxi, no. 3 (1997): 105; cf T ’ai-wan wen-hsien ts ’ung-k’an [Collected volumes of Taiwan historical documents], no. 13 (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Research Room, 1958), 67-68; no. 84 (1960), 169. Hereafter cited as TWTK. 20. Chou Hsien-wen, C h’ing-chi T a i-w a n ching-chi-shih [Economic history of Taiwan during the Ch’ing role] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Economic Research Room, 1957), 80. 21. Chang Ben-cheng, C h ’ing Shih-lu T'ai-wan-shih tsu-liao tsuan-chi [Special edition on Taiwan’s historical documents contained in the Ch ’ing Veritable R ecords] (Foochow: Fukien People’s Publishing, 1993), 59,82-83. Ch’en Kuo-tung, T ’ai-w an ti shan-hai ching-yen [Taiwan’s mountain and sea experience] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2005), 237. 22. Ibid., 63; also Li T’ing-pi et al., eds., Changhua G azetteer in Chung-kuo fan gchih ts ’ung-shu [Collected edition of China’s gazetteers], 1836 edition, vol. 16, reprint (Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing, 1983), 204-205. 23. Chang Ben-cheng, C h’ing Shih-lu T ’ai-w an-shih tsu-liao tsuan-chi, 722. 24. Li Pa-kang, ’T ’ai-wan ti chiao-shang” [The chiao-merchants of Taiwan], col­ lected in Chung-kuo fang-chih t s ’ung-shu [Collected edition of China’s gazetteers, Taiwan district #97], 1836 edition, reprint (Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing, 1983), 603-604. 25. Wang Shih-ch’ing, “Ch’ing-tai T’ai-wan ti mi-ts’an yu wai-hsiao” [Taiwan’s rice production and export during the Ch’ing dynasty] in T ’ai-w an wen-hsien [Taiwan historical documents] 9, no. 1 (March 1958): 16-17. 26. Ch’en Kuo-tung, T ’ai-w an ti shan-hai ching-yen, 232-33; cf. History and Linguistics Institute ed., M ing-C h’ing shih-liao [Historical documents of the Ming and Ch’ing], vol. E, Book 9 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1953-54), 812a; Yao Ying, Chung-fu-t’ang hsuan-chi [Selected works of Yao Ying], TWTK, no. 83 (1960), 169; Yeh-chien Wang, “Food Supply in Eighteenth-Century Fukien,” Late Im perial China 7, no. 2 (December 1986): 90-91. 27. Huang Shu-ching, T ’ai-hai shih-chai-lu [Recording my mission across the Taiwan Strait], TWTK 4 (1957), 21; also Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 445,447. 28. Ibid., 445-446. 29. Ibid., 514-515. 30. John King Fairbank, Trade and D iplom acy on the China C oast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 312,321; also Hen Ju-kang, “Another Study of the Development of the Chinese Junk Trade Between the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in U -shih yen-chiu (December 1957): 7. 31. Hen Ju-kang, “The Place of Chinese Sailing Vessels in Shipping and Trade of Southeast Asia from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,” Li-shih yen-chiu (August 1956): 15-18; Hosea. B. Morse, The Chronicles o f the E ast India Com pany Trading to China, 1635-1834, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926-29), 344-45; vol. 3, appendix, “East India Company’s Ships at Canton, 1805-1820.” 32. Ch’en Kuo-tung, T ’ai-w an ti shan-hai ching-yen, 237-39. 33. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 180; also Yao Ying, Chung-fu-t’ang hsuan-chi, 119-122. 34. Hsieh Chin-ran, ed., T ’ai-w an hsien-chih [Gazetteer of Taiwan county] (1807), reprint (Taipei: National Defense Research Institute, 1968), 379-87. For a general discussion of Chinese piracy, see Dian H. Murray, P irates o f the South China Coast, 1 790-1810 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). 35. Hosea B. Morse, E ast India Com pany Trading to China, vol. 3,7.

214

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

36. Huang lien-ch’uan, ‘Tsai Ch’ien Chu Pun hai-tao chi yen-chiu” [Study of pi­ rates Tsai Ch’ien and Chu Pun], in Tainan wen-hua [The Tainan culture] 6,1 (August 1958): 78. Also Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 93. 37. Ibid.; also Hsieh Chin-ran, ed., T a i-w a n hsien-chih w ai-pen [Supplement to the Taiwan County gazetteer] (Taipei: National Defense Research Institute, 1968), 387-388. 38. Kuo Ting-yi, T ai-w an shih-shih k ’ai-suo [General narrative of Taiwan history] (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book Bureau Publishing, 1958), 132. 39. Hsieh Chin-ran, ed., T a i-w a n hsien-chih w ai-pen , 378-382. 40. T ai-w an t ’ung-chih [General gazetteer of Taiwan], compiled during the Kuanghsu emperor’s reign, reprint (Taipei: National Defense Research Institute, 1968), 527. In 1723, the Ch’ing government established Tamsui County [t’ing], which included all of northern Taiwan. At that time, the city (or town) of Taipei was nonexistent. Taipei was then known as Twa-tu-tia,just like Paris was known as Ili-de-France in Charlemagne’s time. The Tamsui garrison was first established in 1727 at the entrance of the Tamsui River, but its headquarters was later moved to Mankah. Taipei fu, a relatively new ad­ ministration, was not established until 1875 when Tamsui County was separated from Taipei fu, as the latter also incorporated Mankah into its new administration. 41. The date of Li Chang-keng’s death was the twenty-fifth of the twelfth lunar moon, the twelfth year of the Chia-ch’ing reign. For more on Li Chang-keng, see Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Em inent Chinese o f the C h ’ing P eriod (Washington, DC: Government Printing House, 1943), 446-447. 42. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 94. 43. Su T’ung-pin, “Hai-tao Tsai Ch’ien shih-mo” [Complete story of pirate Tsai Ch’ien], in Taiwan wen hsien 25, no. 4 (December 1974), 5. 44. Yao Ying, Chung-fu-t’ang hsuan-chi, 97-101. 45. Ch’eng Kuo-tung, T a i-w a n ti shan-hai citing-yen, 241-43. 46. Jean Chesneaux, Secret Societies in China in the N ineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1971), 85-87. 47. Yao Ying, Chung-fu-t’ang hsuan-chi, 86-87,113-16. In the real sense of the term, Taiwanfu (or Taiwan fu) is a broader administrative name because a fu , in ad­ dition to its capital city, also covers a number of counties and districts in vicinity. But because Taiwanfu was headquartered in the City of Tainan, nineteenth-century Europeans and Americans often referred to Tainan as Taiwanfu, and vice versa. As a consequence, Taiwanfu and Tainan became synonymous in their correspondence with London and Washington. 48. Ch’eng Kuo-tung, T a i-w a n ti shan-hai ching-yen, 276-277. 49. For more on Chinese Imperial Customs, see John King Fairbank, H. B. M orse, Custom s C om m issioner and H istorian o f China (Lexington: University Press of Ken­ tucky, 1995), 20,127,214; and J.K. Fairbank et al., eds., The LG. in Peking: Letters o f R obert H art, Chinese M aritim e Custom s, 1868-1907, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 50. British Parliamentary Papers, China (1892), vol. 17, Embassy and Consular Commercial Reports (Irish University Press, 1971), 646. For more on compradors see Yen-p’ing Hao, The Com pradore in N ineteenth Century China: B ridge betw een E ast and West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 51. Edward LeFevour, Western Enterprise in Late Ch ’ing China, A Selective Survey o f Jardine, M atheson & C om pany’s O perations, 1842-1895 (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1970), 16-17.

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 3 AND 4

215

52. Huang Fu-san, “Evolution of Jaidine’s Trading Mechanism in Taiwan before and after Taiwan Was Open for Trade,” in T ai-w an shang-ye ch 'uan-tung lun-wen-chi [Collected essays on Taiwan’s traditional commerce] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999), 92-93; cf Jardine, Matheson Archives (JMA) in Cambridge University Manuscript Room, “Thomas Sullivan to JM&C,” Takow, February 23,1860, and March 7,1860, “Glo Rorie to JM&C,” Takow, April 14,1860. 53. Robert Gardella, H arvesting M ountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1 757-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 64-65. For more see Hao Yen-p’ing, The Com m ercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The R ise o f Sino-W estem M ercantile C apitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 54. Lin Man-hung, “Wan-Ch’ing T’ai-wan ti ch’a, t’ang, chi chang-nao yeh” [Tea, sugar, and camphor businesses in Taiwan during the late Ch’ing period], in Taipei wen-hsien (Taipei historical documents), vol. 38 (1976): 5. Also see Kyoko Ishikure, “The Lins of Pan-ch’iao,” The Journal o f the B laisdell Institute (of Claremont Col­ lege, CA) 9, no. 2 (1974): 39. Notes to Chapter 4

1. William Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch (London: Kegan Paul, 1903), 501-502; Lai Yung-hsiang, ‘Trade Relations between Koxinga’s Family and the English East India Company, 1670-1683,” Taiwan wen-hsien [Taiwan historical docu­ ments] 16, no. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan Historical Document Commission, 1965), 2-6. 2. Hosea B. Morse, The Chronicles o f the E ast India Com pany Trading to China, 1635-1834 , vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926-29), 36,41-49. These are popu­ lar seventeenth-century clothing brands. Bow dye scarlet was rich, bright red cloth; moiré fabric had a wavy, watery appearance; perpetuanoes were made of strong and durable wool or cotton. 3. Lai Yung-hsiang, ‘Trade Relations between Koxinga’s Family and East India Company,” 9; See also “Revised Article between the King of lywan and the Company’s Factory,” in Montague Paske-Smith, W estern B arbarians in Japan and Form osa in Tokugawa D ays, 1 6 0 3 -1 8 6 8 (Kobe: J. L. Thompson & Co., 1930), 86-88,95-97. 4. Ibid., 106. For more see Chang Hsiu-jung et al., eds., The English Factory in Taiwan, 1670-1685 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 1995). 5. Lai Yung-hsiang, ‘Trade Relations between Koxinga’s Family and East India Company,” 13-14. 6. The book was first published in Latin and its English edition reprinted by R. Davis in London in 1964. See also F. J. Foley, The G reat Formosan Im poster (St. Louis: St. Louis University Press, 1968). 7. W.G. Goddard, Formosa (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 114; also James W. Davidson, The Island o f Formosa: Fast and Present (London: Macmillan, 1903), 171. 8. “Huttmann to Palmerston,” January 27,1840 (Great Britain Foreign Office, China [hereafter cited as F.O.]), microfilm 17/41. On British Foreign Office archival materials relating to Anglo-Taiwanese relations, see Yeh Tsun-hui, “Ying-kuo waichiao-pu you-kuan T’ai-wan wen-chien chien-chieh” [A brief introduction to the British foreign office’s documents relating to Taiwan]” Taiwan wen-hsien [Taiwan historical documents] 36, nos. 3,4 (December 1985): 433-502.

216

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

9. “Pöttinger to Auckland,” February 5,1842, F .0 .17/60:217-218. 10. Yao Ying, Tung-min tsou kao [Memorials from military circuit of Taiwan] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Research Room, 1959), 32-35. 11. Chinese R epository, vol. 11, 684 and vol. 12, 115-117; see also William A. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa: R ecollections o f Adventurers, M andarins, Wreck­ ers, & H ead-hunting Savages (London: Hurst And Blackett, 1898), 46. 12. Chao Er*hsuan et al., C h ’ing-shih-kao [Historical draft of Ch’ing dynasty], vol. 2 (Hong Kong: Wen-tsuan yen-chiu-she, 1927) 1391; Yao Ying, Chung-fu-t’ang hsuan-chi [Selected works of Yao Ying] in T a i-w a n wen-hsien tsung-k'an [Collected historical documents of Taiwan] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan Economic Research Room, no. 83,1960), 209,254. Hereafter cited as TWTK. 13. “Davis to Aberdeen,” March 11,1845, F .0 .17/98:95-98. 14. Chinese R epository, vol. 14,249-257,304; “Davis to Palmerston” March 20, 1847, F .0 .17/124, no. 41:113-114; Journal o f the R oyal G eographical Society, vol. 14 (1849): 22-25. 15. Of the five treaty ports, English shippers seldom traded at Foochow or Ningpo. For example, only five English ships traded at Foochow during the entire year 1848, and there is no record of any English ship visiting Foochow in 1847. 16. Chinese R epository, vol. 19: 163; Bonham to Liu Yun-ke, March 20, 1850, F.O. 677/26, no. 21:43; Bonham to Palmerston, August 12, 1850, F.O. 17/168, no. 76:264-65. 17. Clarendon to Bowring, February 13,1854, F.O. 17/210, no. 2:54-67 and no. 4:80-81. 18. Parkes to Yen Ying, September 16,1854, F.O. 663/61, no. 38: 68; Parkes to Bowring, November 27,1854, F.O.228/171:189-195. 19. Ibid., F.O. 228/171: 205-213. 20. Francis L. Hawks, ed. “Abbott to Perry, July 22, 1854,” in N arrative o f the E xpedition o f the Am erican Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, 3 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1856), U.S. Congress, 33rd Cong., 2nd session, House Executive Documents No. 97, vol. 2 (1856): 142-143; F. 0 . 17/218:111-116. 21. Rough translation of the agreement entered into with the intendant of circuit in Formosa about carrying on trade on the island, sent to W. M. Robinet by the captain of the Science, in U.S. National Archives (hereafter USNA), Dispatches from Ministers to China (MD), M-92, R-15; see also C.F. Harding to Augustine Heard & Co., Cok Si Kou, November 16,1855, Harding’s Letters Book (Cambridge, MA: Baker Library of Harvard University), 41-44. 22. F.O. 228/254, no. 89:100-101; also China M ail (Hong Kong), no. 700 (July 15,1858): 110. 23. Ibid., no. 329 (June 5,1851), 90; no. 330 (June 12,1851): 94. 24. Bowring to Clarendon, March 31,1857, F.O. 17/266, no. 155:215-218; also China M ail, no. 665 (November 12,1857): 182. 25. For more see Robert Swinhoe, “Narrative of a Visit to the Island of Formosa,” in Journal o f the N orth-Chinese Branch o f the R oyal A siatic Society, old series 1 (1859): 145-164. 26. Gingell to Bruce, February 29, 1860, F.O. 228/285, no. 23: 1-2; Gingell to Bruce, March 21, 1860, ibid., no. 31: 29-32; also Swinhoe to Bruce, December 9, 1861, F. O. 228/325, no. 14:11-14. 27. Parkes to Bowring, November 22,1854, F.O. 228/171:183-88; Government Notification, February 24,1855, F.O. 17/235:277-78. Also Huang Fu-san, “Evolution

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

217

of Jardine’s Trading Mechanism in Taiwan Before and After Taiwan Was Open for Trade,” T a i-w a n shang-ye ch ’uan-tung lun-wen-chi [Collected essays on Taiwan’s traditional commerce] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999), 88. 28. Morrison to Bowring, December 31,1856, F .0.228/233:61-62; Morrison to Bowring, June 5,1857, ibid.: 98-99; F .0 .17/298: 80,84-85,90. 29. Swinhoe to Bruce, July 13,1861, F.0.228/313, no. 1: 8-11; ibid., December 20,1861, no. 15:45-48; also Wade to Swinhoe, October 1,1864, F .0.228/374, no. 10:152-53; Wade to Swinhoe, October 25, ibid., no. 11:154. 30. Swinhoe to Wade, January 19,1865, F.0.228/397, no. 9:128-135; also British Parliamentary Papers, China (BPPC), vol. 6 (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 470-73; John King Fairbank, Trade and D iplom acy on the China C oast, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 61. 31. Alcock had previously served as British consul at Amoy, Foochow, and Shanghai. Alcock to Prince Kung, T’ung-chih reign, 6th year, 26th of 8th moon, F.O. 230/80, no. 30:102-103; Prince Kung to Alcock, T’ung-chih reign 6th year, 29th of 3rd moon, in F.O. 230/81. no. 17: 88-89; Prince Kung to Alcock, T’ung-chih reign 6th year, 1st of 9th moon, F.O. 230/81, no. 42:116. 32. George William Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 1841-1874 (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1978), 299. See also, information from a brochure (printed in 2005) obtained by the author from the Presbyterian chapel founded by Dr. Maxwell at Chi-tsin in Kaohsiung Harbor. 33. For more see William Campbell, Formosa M ission o f the Presbyterian Church o f England (London, 1898), and Hollington K. Tong, C hristianity in Taiwan: A H is­ to ry (Taipei: the China Post, 1961), 22-32. 34. S. Wells Williams, The M iddle Kingdom (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1883), vol. ii, 349; Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 238-240,253-259. 35. Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 269-276; Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 605. 36. For more see Tsai Wei-chun, “Religious Strife in Pre-Provincial Taiwan Part I, (1872-1885),” Taipei H istorical D ocum ents, vol. 133 (September 2000): 177-230. 37. Ibid., part ii: 231-55. 38. See Cuthbert Collingwood, “Visit to the Kibalan Village of Sau-o Bay, Northeast Coast of Formosa,” Transactions o f the Ethnological Society o f London, 6, (1868): 135-143, 362-363; Henry Kopsch, “Notes on the Rivers in Northern Formosa,” Journal o f the R oyal G eographical Society, 14 (May 1867): 79-85. 39. John Thomson, “Notes of a Journey in Southern Formosa,” Journal o f the R oyal G eographical Society, 43 (1873): 97-107; see also Douglas L. Fix, “Review­ ing Nineteenth Century Images, or What’s Wrong with Our Historical Pictures?” Proceedings o f 2006 International Conference on H istory and Culture o f Taiwan

(Taipei, Taiwan, May 2006): 8. 40. T.L. Bullock, “ATrip into the Interior of Formosa,” The Scottish G eographical M agazine, 12 (March 1887): 266-272. 41. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 180-82,216-217. 42. Bonham Ward Bax, The Eastern Seas; Being a N arrative o f the H.M.S. "D w arf' in China, Japan, and Formosa (London: John Murray, 1875), 28-36. 43. Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 275, cf Mackay to Donald Matheson, April 3,1874, Formosa correspondence file (London: Archives of Presbyterian Church of England).

218

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 4 AND 5

44. Jardine, Matheson & Co. Archives in Cambridge University Manuscript Room, B8/7, Tamsui, Banca, L. 311 (186S, 11,3); L. 137 (1868, S.4). 43. H. E. Hobson, Tamsui Trade Report (Tamsui: Customs House: 1869-1870), 157. 46. Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa , 184; cf Jardine, Matheson & Co. archives, Takao3 (1859), 6,11. 47. For more on the operation of the British firms in Taiwan, see Huang Fu-shan, “Ch’ing-tai Tai-wan wai-shang chi yen-chiu—Milisch & Co.,” Tai-wan feng-w u (Taiwan Folkways) 33, no. 1 (1983): 93-136. Huang Fu-san, “Evolution of Jardine’s trading mechanism in Taiwan,” 83-104. 48. Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 183. 49. Braune to Bruce, December 31,1862, F.0.228/330:26-36; Moresby to Braune, December 16,1862, ibid.: 59. 50. Braune to Bruce, June 2,1864, F .0.228/351, no. 14:45-48. 51. Watters to Alcock, July 11,1866, F. O. 228/420, no. 12: 27-39. 52. Luard to Gregory, December 15, 1866, F.O. 228/440: 106-108; Gregory to Alcock, February 20,1867, F.O. 228/440, no. 4: 81-86. 53. BPPC, vol. 1, Holt to Fung, September. 7, 1868: 522-523; Holt to Alcock, October 27, 1868:525-526; Clarendon to Alcock, February 17,1869:528-529. 54. BPPC, vol. 29, Gibson to Alcock, December 14, 1868: 101-107; Gibson to Commodore Jones, December 2,1868: 107-111 ; also Gibson to Alcock, November 25, 1868, F. O. 228/459, no. 35: 285-290; Gurdon to Gibson, December 2, 1868, F.O. 228/459: 320-326. 55. BPPC, vol. 29, Gibson to Jones, December 2,1868:107-111 ; ibid., Keppel to Alcock, December 26,1868:113; ibid., Gibson to Gurdon, December 3,1868: 111; ibid., Keppel to the Secretary of the Admiralty, January 6,1869: 112-113. 56. Carrington, Foreigners in Form osa, 242-244. Also Hewlett to Wade, July 11, 1870, F. O. 228/495, no. 21: 225-26; Le to Hewlett, July 31, 1870, F.O. ibid., Enclosure 1 in no. 25: 235-39; Hewlett to Wade, September 12, 1870, F. O. ibid., no. 28: 261-264A. 57. Samuel P.S. Ho, Econom ic D evelopm ent o f Taiwan, 1860-1970 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 14; Robert Gardella, “From Treaty Ports to Provincial Status, 1860-1894,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A N ew H istory (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999; expanded edition 2007), 172-173. 58. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 271-274,305.' 59. Ibid., 265-266. N otes to Chapter 5

1. Chantal Zheng, Les Européens aux portes de la Chine: l ’exem ple de Formosa au XIXe siecle, trans. Shunde Zheng (Taipei: Nantien Publishing, 1999), 25; cf. Camille Imbault-Huart, V ile Formosa (1893), reprint (Taipei: SMC, 1995), 23. 2. Zheng, Les Européens, 32-33, reference from Joseph de Mailla, Lettres difiantes e t curieuses (Paris: Société du Pantheon Littérature, 1843). Also, James W. Davidson, The Island o f Formosa: Past and Present (London: Macmillan, 1903), 68. 3. Imbault-Huart, V ile Formosa, 110-16; also Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 83-84. 4. For more, see Stephane Corcuff, “Le ‘Memoire sur Formosa’ du Consul de France Vieillard de 1784 et la géopolitique du détroit de Taiwan au XVIUe siecle,”

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

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Proceedings o f 2006 International Conference on H istory and Culture o f Taiwan

(Taipei, 2006), 120. 5. Jean Baptiste de Lesseps, Voyage de Laperouse (Paris: Club des Libraires de France, 1831), 229-31. Also George Williams Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 1841-1874 (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1978), 9. 6. Dumont d’Urville, Le Voyage P ittoresque autour du M onde (Paris: L. Tente et H. Dupuy, 1834), 342. 7. On the sequences of Sino-Franco negotiations, see Academia Sinica, ed., Chung-Fa Vietnam chiao-sher tan [Archives of Sino-Franco negotiations over Viet­ nam], 7 vols. (Taipei: 1983), vol.l, 85-91,156-165; vol. 2,709-12. 8. Taiwan Historical Document Commission, Wen-hsien tsuan-k ’an [Special edition of historical documents], chuan 4, no. 1-2 (Taipei: 1953), 9. 9. Liu Ao, Hsun-Tai t'ui-ssu-lu [Reminiscences of my circuit assignments in Taiwan] (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1958), series no. 21,219-222. 10. John Dodd, Journal o f A B lockaded R esident in N orth Formosa during the Franco-Chinese War, 1 8 8 4 -5 (printed for private circulation in Hong Kong in 1888 and reprinted by Ch’eng Wen Publishing Co., Taipei, 1972), 4-5. See also, Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 221. 11. Le Capitaine Eugene Gamot, L ’expedition Française de Formosa, 1884-1885 (Paris: Librairie CH. Delagrave, 1894), 26. 12. Ibid., 24. 13. Ibid., 26. 14. Dodd, A B lockaded R esident, 7; see also Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 221. 15. Gamot, L ’expedition d e Formosa, 29-30; Dodd, A B lockaded R esident, 8. 16. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 222. 17. Tien-shih-tsai P ictorial Journal, 1884, July 1-10 edition, A12, reprint (Canton: Guangzhou People’s Publishing, 1983), 92; 1884, August 1-10 edition, B3,21; 1884, September 1-10 edition, B6,42. See also Dodd, A B lockaded R esident, 8,13. 18. Liu Chuang-shi-kung chou-i [Memorials of Liu Ming-ch’uan], vol. 1 (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1958), 171. 19. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 223. 20. Gamot, L ’expedition de Formosa, 31. 21. Maurice Loir, L'E scadre d e L ’am iral C ourbet, N otes e t Souvenirs (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1886), 176. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid.; also Gamot, L ’expedition de Formosa, 31-32. 24. Ibid., 35-36; also Chantal Zheng, Les Européens aux p o rtes d e la Chine, 111. 25. Dodd, A B lockaded R esident, 24-25. 26. Ibid., 11-12,16. 27. Liu Ao, Hsun-Tai t ’ui-ssu-lu, vol. 3,284. 28. M em orials o f Liu M ing-ch’uan, vol. 2,174. 29. Gamot, L ’expedition de Formosa, 45-46. 30. A series of letters written by a French sailor named Jean to his mother and friends during Admiral Courbet’s expedition from August 23,1884, to June 22,1885. They were originally published as a series in La Terre Illustrée pictorial journal with the title Le m ousse de l ’A m iral C ourbet. In 2003, Shunde Zheng translated this book into Chinese for the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica. See letter dated September 26,1884,36,178.

220

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

31. Davidson, Island o f Form osa, 227', Also Chinese Historical Society, ed., Chung-Fa tsan tseng [The Sino-Franco War], vol. 6 (Shanghai: New Knowledge Publishing, 1955), 192. 32. M em orials o f Liu M ing-ch’uan, vol. 1,141. 33. Ibid., 144-145,175. 34. Gamot, L ‘expedition d e Formosa, 49. 35. Dodd, A B lockaded R esident, 35. 36. Le m ousse d e l ’A m iral C ourbet, letter dated October 15,1884,53,198. 37. Tien-shih-tsai P ictorial Journal, July 10-20,1884, B7,50; April 1-10,1885, D3, 39. Also Bai Chun-jen et al. eds., Tamsui County G azetteer, vol. 2 (Tamsui: Tamsui County Office, 1988), 578. 38. Archives o f Sino-Franco N egotiations, vol. 4,2256; also, Le m ousse d e l ’Am iral Courbet, letter dated October 15,1884,53,198. 39. M em orials o f Liu M ing-ch’uan, vol. 2,175-177. 40. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 233. 41. M em orials o f Liu M ing-ch’uan, vol. 2,193-94; Gamot, L ’expedition d e For­ m osa, 170-176. 42. Ibid., 74. For more on Taiwan’s epidemic diseases, see George L. Mackay, From Far Formosa : The Island, Its People and M ission, J.A. MacDonald, ed. (Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferner, 1896), 28. 43. For more, see Hsu Hsueh-chi, “Liang-Liu chi-tseng yu wan-Ch’ing Tai-wan cheng-chu” [The fight of two Lius and Taiwan’s political situation during the late Ch’ing period], Taiwan H istorical R esearch, vol. 14 (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan His­ tory, Academia Sinica, 1985), 127-158. 44. Dodd, A B lockaded R esident, 55. 45. Lien Heng, Tai-wan t ’ung-shih [Ageneral history ofTaiwan] (Taichung: Taiwan Historical Document Society, 1976), chuan 33,704-708. 46. Hsu Hsueh-chi et al., eds., Supplem ental G azetteer o f the Pescadores County, vol. 2 (Makung: Pescadores County Government, 2005), 118-20. 47. Le m ousse de l ’A m iral C ourbet, letter dated April 5, 1885, 120, 270. For a detailed report on the Pescadores operation, see Gamot, L ’expedition d e Formosa, 180-204. 48. Hsu Hsueh-chi, G azetteer o f the Pescadores, 120-121. 49. Archives o f Sino-Franco N egotiations, vol. 4,2424; M em orials o f Liu M ingch ’uan, vol. 2,180. 50. Liu Yen, Chung-kuo w ai-chiao-shih [Diplomatic history of China] (Taipei: San-ming Publishing, 1977), 116; also Kuang-hsu reign Tung-hua-lu [Records of East China] (Taipei: Chung-hua Publishing, complete edition, 1958), 1911. 51. Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 240. Also French Government Survey, Pescadores Islands, Inner Anchorages (1895). 52. Keelung City Historical Document Commission, ed., Keelung G azetter (Keelung, 1954), 18. 53. Gamot, L ’expedition de Formosa, 73; Davidson, Island o f Formosa, 240. Also see Christophe Rouil, Formosa, des b atailles Presque oubliées (Taipei: French Book Store Le Pigeonnier, 2001), 150. 54. For more see, Wen-tang Shiu, “Literature, History and Collective Memory on the Keelung and Tamsui Battles in the Sino-Franco War of 1884-1885,” in Taiwan H istorical Journal (Fall 2006): 1-36. See also Lise Boehm, Formosa : A Tale o f the

NOTES TO CHAPTERS S AND 6

221

French Blockade o f 1884-1885 (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1906; reprint (Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing, 1972). 55. John King Fairbank et al., H.B. M orse: Custom s Com m issioner and H istorian c f China (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 129. 56. Tsu-you shih-pao [The liberty times] (March 13,1996).

Notes to Chapter 6

1. For more see Chou Wan-yao, “Ming-Ch’ing wen-hsien chung ‘T’ai-wan fei Ming pan-tV lieh-cheng” [Using examples in the Ming and Ch’ing archives to prove that Taiwan was not a part of the Ming empire] in Ch'eng Ch'ing-jen chiao-shou ju n g-t'u ei chi-nien lun-wen-chi [Collected essays commemorating Professor Cheng Ch’ing-jen’s retirement] (Taipei: Tao-hsiang Publishing, 1999), 267-293. See also John E. Wills, Jr., “Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A N ew H istory (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999; expanded edition 2007), 85-106. 2. Grosier’s translation, which was printed by Dunning and Hyer in Philadelphia, contains only nineteen pages on Taiwan (Book II, Chapter 6). Shaler’s article was titled, “Journal of a Voyage between China and the North-Western Coast of America, made in 1804.” 3. David Abeel, Journal o f A R esidence in China and the N eighboring C ountries (New York: Leavitt, Lord and Co., 1834). 4. See the “Preface” of the 1939 edition of John Francis Davis’s, The Chinese: A G eneral D escription o f the Em pire o f China and Its Inhabitants. 5. The North Am erican R eview (October 1848), 265-291. See revised tion, The M iddle Kingdom , vol. 1,44,137-141; vol. 2,55,180,433-438.

1883 edi­ For more on S. Wells Williams, see Murray A. Rubinstein, “The Missionary as Observer and Image Maker: Samuel Wells Williams and the Chinese,” Am erican Studies (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1980): 31-44. 6. Chinese R epository 1, no. 2 (June 1832): 37. 7. Ibid., 2, no. 9 (January 1834): 409-420. 8. Ibid., 6, no. 1 (May 1837): 8-16; 14, no. 6 (June 1845): 249-257. 9. U.S. National Archives: Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton (microcopy) no. 101, roll l.Strillaberto the President, April 20,1834 (hereafter USNA: CD). The name of the navy officer on the Potomac was J.N. Reynolds and the doctor on the Peacock was W.S.W. Ruschenberger, both wrote books to express their views on Taiwan. 10. Thirtieth U.S. Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 596, Steam Com m unication with China and the Sandwich Islands (accompanied by Joint Resolution H.R. no. 28), by T. Butler King, May 4,1848,1-17. 11. Leonard Gordon, “Early American Relations with Formosa, 1849-1870,” H istorian 19 (May 1957): 265; Davis to Buchanan, January 27,1849, USNA: CD, China, M-92, R-6. 12. Ibid., Forbes to Secretary of State, December 6,1844; CD, Canton, M-101, R-3; Bradley to Clayton, March 23,1850, CD, Amoy, M-100, R-l. 13. Ibid., Gideon Nye Jr. to Peter Parker, June 23, 1851, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to China, M-92, R-7; also Chinese R epository 20, no. 5 (May 1851): 285-286; Joel Abbott to J.C. Dobin, Shanghai, September 5, 1855, USNA: Dept, of Navy, East India, M-89, R-l 1 (hereafter cited as USNA: DN).

222

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

14 George Jones to M.C. Perry, July 22 and 28,1954, in N arrative o f the Expedi­ tion o f the A m erican Squadron to the China Seas and Japan , 33rd U.S. Congress, 2nd session, in 3 vols under House Executive Documents, no. 97, (1856); vol. 2,142-143; 153-154; and 156-163. The narrative was edited by the Reverend Francis L. Hawks, a New York rector, author, and orator. 15. Ibid. vol. 2,143-145,173,177-178. For more, see lyier Dennett, Am ericans in E astern A sia (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1941), 270; William L. Neumann, “Re­ ligion, Morality, and Freedom: The Ideological Background of the Perry Expedition,” Pacific H istorical R eview 23 (August 1954): 247-257. 16. Harris to Matey, March 24,1854. USNA: CD, Macao,” M-109, R-l. For more on Harris’s life and career, see Mario Emilio Cossenza ed., The Com plete Journal o f Townsend H arris, F irst Am erican Consul G eneral an d M inister to Japan (New York: Doubleday, Doron & Co. for Japan Society, 1930); Eldon Griffin, C lippers and Con­ suls: Am erican Com m ercial and C onsular R elations w ith Eastern A sia, 1845-1860

(Ann Arbor: Edwards Bros, 1938), 40. 17. Walter A. Durham, Jr., “The Japanese Camphor Monopoly, Its History and Relations to the Future of Japan,” in Pacific A ffairs (September 1932): 797. 18. Augustine Heard Collection, deposited in Baker Library of Harvard University, V. HM-24,491,524. 19. Ibid., C.F. Harding to Augustine Heard Jr., Woosung, September 18,1855, V. GM-1, in folders. 20. “Visit to the Island of Formosa,” an article carried by The San Francisco D aily H erald (July 28,1855); also James W. Davidson, The Island o f Formosa, Past and Present (London: Macmillan & Co, 1903), 400-402. 21. Augustine Heard Collection, C. F. Harding to A. Heard & Co., Gahu, Formosa, October 16, 1855, in Harding’s Letters Book, 5-7, 11-15; W.M. Robinet to Peter Parker, Hong Kong, March 2,1857, USNA: MD, China, M-92, R-15. 22. Harold D. Langley, “Gideon Nye and the Formosan Annexation Scheme,” Pacific H istorical R eview 34 (1965): 398-399,405-406; Thomas R. Cox, “Harbin­ gers of Change: American Merchants and the Formosa Annexation Scheme,” Pacific H istorical R eview , 42 (1973): 163-184. See also the New York Times obituary, March 4,1888. 23. Bowring to Clarendon, April 4, 1857, Foreign Office of Great Britain (mi­ crofilm), 17/267, 31-33.; U.S. Congress, Senate Executive Document no. 22, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., 1205-1206. 24. Ibid., pp. 1208-1209; also Harold D. Langley, “Gideon Nye and the Formosan Annexation Scheme,” 402-412, and Leonard Gordon, “Early American Relations with Formosa,” H istorian 19 (May 1957): 272, 277. See also, Ward to Case, Dec. 10,1859, USNA: DD, China,” vol. 18, M-92, R-10. 25. A.L. Clarke to William H. Seward, Foochowfoo, June 20, 1865, USNA: M-105.R-3. 26. William A. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa: R ecollections o f Adventures am ong M andarins, W reckers, and H ead-hunting Savages (London: Hurst and Black­ ett, 1898), 47. 27. T. Hart Hyatt, Jr. to William H. Seward, Secretary of State, February 20,1862, USNA: CD, Amoy, M-100, R-2. 28. Ibid., Charles Nelson to George F. Seward, U.S. Consul at Shanghai, Tamsui, December 11, 1862; Oliver B. Brandford to William H. Seward, Amoy, December 31,1862.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

223

29. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa , 108-112. The G eneral Sherman was later destroyed in Korea and its crew massacred. 30. Ibid., 174. For more on Le Gendre’s background, see “General Le Gendre,” in The Far E ast (a monthly journal published by J.R. Black in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Japan) III, no. 4 (October 1876): 87-94. 31. Taiwan Yin-hang, Taiwan fanshi, wuchan yu shangwu [Aboriginal affairs, products and commerce of Taiwan], Tw 46 (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1960), 79. See also, Le Gendre to the General, Tao-tai, and Prefect of Taiwanfoo, on board the U.S. Steamer Ashuelot, April 19, 1867, USNA: CD, Amoy, M-100, R-3; Le Gendre to William H. Seward, Amoy, May 10,1867, ibid. 32. Isaac J. Allen to William H. Seward, Hong Kong, April 7,1867, USNA: CD, Hong Kong, M-108, R-6; Charles W. Le Gendre to William H. Seward, Amoy, May 10, 1867, USNA: CD, Amoy, M-100, R-3; also George E. Belknap, commander of U.S. flagship H artford, to H.H. Bell, at sea, June IS, 1867, USNA: DN, Asiatic Squadron Letters, Jan. 1867 to April 1868. 33. George C. Belknap, Commander of H artford, to H.H. Bell, at sea, June IS, 1867; Charles H. Page, Assistant Surgeon, to Belknap, at sea, June IS, 1867, USNA: DN, Asiatic Squadron Letters, Jan. 1867 to April 1868. 34. S. Well Williams to William H. Seward, Peking, March 13, 1868, USNA: MD, China, M-92, R-2S; Le Gendre to H.H. Bell, Foochowfoo, November 28,1867, USNA: DN, Asiatic Squadron Letters, Jan. 1867 to April 1868. 35. Le Gendre, H ow to D eal w ith China, a L etter to D e B enneville Rand Keim, Agent o f the U nited States (Amoy: Rosario Marcal & Co., 1871), 69-71. 36. Huang Chia-mu, M ei-kuo yu T ’ai-w an [The United States and Taiwan] (Tai­ pei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1979), monograph series no. 14, 255. 37. Henry Holt to Le Gendre, Tamsui, October27,1868, USNA:CD, Amoy, M-100, R-4. More on Le Gendre’s diplomacy in Taiwan, see George Williams Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 1841-1874 (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1978), 152-76, and Sophia Yu-fei Yen, Taiwan in C hina’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874 (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1965), 127,141-142,151-153. 38. Commander R.R. Wallace to John Rodgers, USS Ashuelot, Swatow, March 17, 1972, USNA: DN, Asiatic Squadron Letters, July 1871 to Nov. 1872; see also Le Gendre to Frederick F. Low, Amoy, April 17,1872, USNA: CD, Amoy, M-100, R-6. 39. House later published a book in Tokyo with the title, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa (Tokei, 1875). 40. A.M. Pennock to A. Kauta (telegram), Yokohama, June 4,1874; Pennock to G.M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, Yokohama, June 17,1874, USNA: DN, Asiatic Squadron Letters, Vol. 1874. 41. John Dodd, “Formosa,” Scottish G eographical M agazine, 10 (November 1895): 569. 42. For more see James H. Wilson’s China, Travels and Investigations in the M iddle Kingdom : A Study o f Its C ivilization and P ossibilities (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1887), ix-xvi, 295-307. 43. For more, see William M. Speidel, “The Administrative and Fiscal Reforms of Liu Ming-ch’uan in Taiwan, 1884-1891 : Foundation for Self-strengthening,” Journal o f A sian Studies 35, no. 3 (May 1976): 441-459. 44. Charles Denby to TTiomas F. Bayard, Peking, January 26,1888 and Feb. 15, 1888, USNA: MD, China, M-92, R-83.

224

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 6 AND 7

45. Notifications issued by the General Office of the Sulphur and Camphor Ad­ ministration in Formosa. Kwang-hsu reign, 16th year, 3rd moon, 20th and 30th day, USDA: MD, China, M-92, R-89. 46. John King Fairbank et al., H.B. M orse: Custom s C om m issioner and H istorian o f China (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 105. 47. Charles Denby to Thomas F. Bayard, Peking, July 20, 1888, USNA: MD, China, M-92, R-84. 48. Ibid. 49. Charles Denby to W.Q. Gresham, Peking, February 26,1895, and April 25 and 29,1895, USNA: MD, China, M-92, R-98 and R-99. 50. Fairbank et aL, H.B. M orse , 106,139. In 1939, Mrs. Nan Morse advised John K. Fairbank not to go to China because the Chinese “will poison you.” 51.Ibid., Ill, 114; cfMorse to Robert Hart, S/O 34. July 26,1893, in Morse Letter Books, pressed copies of Morse’s semiofficial letters to Hart and others, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Hereafter cited as ML. 52. Fairbank et al., 111-112; cf ML, Morse to Robert Hart, S/O 7, June 27,1892; S/O 45, Jan. 8,1894; S/O 48, Feb. 24,1894. 53. Ibid., Morse to Hart, S/O 36, August 24,1893; S/O 52, April 25,1894. Also, China Imperial Maritime Customs: Tamsui Trade Report for the year 1890 (by F. Hirth), 318-21; Trade Report for the year 1891 (by F. Hirth), 338-41. 54. Ibid., Tamsui Trade Report for the year 1892 (by H.B. Morse), pp. 339-342; Also, William A. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa , 39. 55. Fairbank et al., H.B. M orse, 125-127. 56. Ibid., 129-130. 57. Ibid., 130,132; H. B. Morse, International R elations o f the Chinese Empire, The Period o f Subjection, 1894-1911, vol. 3 (London: Longmans, Green, 1910-1918), 48-49. 58. James W. Davidson, Island o f Form osa, 257-260,306-307. 59. See Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan ’s Q uestfo r Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 10-13. N otes to Chapter 7

1. Tsao Yung-ho, T ’ai-w an tsao-ch ’i li-shih yen-chiu [Study of early Taiwan his­ tory] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing, 1979), 327. 2. Ino Kanori, Taiwan bunkashi [Cultural treatise on Taiwan], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Toko shoin, 1928), 146.3. 3. Matsunaga Masayoshi, ’Taiwan ryoyu ton no keipu” [Genealogy of the discourse of Taiwan occupation], in Taiwan kingendai sh i kenkyu [Studies in mod­ em Taiwan history] 1 (1976): 5-39; Liang Hua-hung, “Jih-pan pen-t’un T’ai-wan ti yun-rang chi chi tung-chi” [The motives and agitations of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan], N ational Cheng-kung U niversity H istory Journal (Tainan, Taiwan) 1 (1974): 140-141,156-157. 4. Japanese Foreign Ministry, ed., Nihon Gaiko Bunsho [Diplomatic documents of Japan], vol. 7 (Tokyo: Gaimusho, 1953), 233. 5. For more on Japan’s 1874 expedition to Taiwan, see Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” Am erican H istorical Review, 107, no. 2 (2002): 388-418; Mori Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei [Military expedition to Taiwan] (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1996), and

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

225

James W. Davidson, The Island o f Formosa: Past and Present (New York: Macmillan, 1903), 121-169. 6. Chen Yi-hsiung, trans, “Fukuzawa to Taiwan ion zetu,” [Fukuzawa Yukichi’s treatise on Taiwan], in Taiwan feng-w u [Taiwan folkways] 41, no. 1 (March 1991): 95; 42, no. 1 (March 1992): 132. Also, Chen Yi-hsiung, trans., “Itagaki to Taiwan ton zetu” [Itagaki Taisuke’s treatise on Taiwan] in Taiwan feng-w u, 39, no. 3 (September 1989): 83-85,98-99. 7. Osawa Murekichi, Saigo Totoku to Kabayam a Sotoku [Commander-in-chief Saigo Tsukumichi and Governor-general Kabayama Sukenori] (Taipei, 1936), 6-7; also Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and Am erican Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 26-62. 8. For more, see Edward I-te Ch’en, “Japan’s Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-1895,” Journal o f Asian Studies 37, no. 1 (1977): 61-72. 9. J iji Shinpo (Daily Newspaper) editorial, August 8,1895. 10. Japan’s Foreign Ministry, Gaim usho kiroku [Records of the foreign ministry] (Archive File, 3-8-7-18, Official No. 93, on ‘Taiwanese Sekimin” (Tokyo: Archives of Diplomatic Documents, September 1907-August 1915). 11. For more, see Harry J. Lamley, “The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modem Chinese History,” Journal o f A sian Studies 27, no. 4 (August 1968): 739-762. Also see, Stephane CorcufT, ed., M em ories o f the Future: N ational Identity Issues an d the Search fo r a New Taiwan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), xiii, 3-20. 12. Weng Chia-in, T ’ai-w an H an-jen wu-chuang kang-Jih-shih yen-chiu [Study of the history of Taiwanese armed resistance against the Japanese] (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986), 92-95. 13. Lo Chi-pu, Ye-hsing ti-kuo: Jih-pan ching-yin Tai-wan ti tse-m o p o -h is [Ambitious empire: analysis of Japanese management and policies in Taiwan] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 1992), 85. 14. Ibid., 81,90. 15. Ibid., 97,99-100. 16. Goto Shimpei, G oto Shim pei bunsho [Papers and documents of Goto Shimpei] (Tokyo: Yushodo Publishing, 1980), R4-33; also Lee Teng-hui and Nakajima Mineo, Ajia-no-chiryaku [Intelligence and tact of Asia] (Tokyo: Koubunsha, 2000), 164. 17. Goto Shimpei, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” in Okuma Shigenobu, ed., Fifty Years o f New Japan (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1909), 538-539. 18. Ts’ai Hui-yu Caroline, “One Kind of Control: The Hoko System in Taiwan under Japanese Rule” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1990), 46-47, 65, 74-82,102-106,574-575. 19. Lo Chi-pu, Ye-hsing ti-kuo, 112, 119-120. For a critical appraisal of Goto Shimpei’s colonial administration in Taiwan, see Patricia Tsurumi, ‘Taiwan Under Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shimpei,” in Albert Craig, ed., Papers on Japan 4 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977) and Chang Lung-chih, “From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874-1906” (Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 2003), 166-188. 20. Hugh Borton, Japan ’s M odem Century (New York: The Ronald Press, 1955), 273. See also Poultney Bigelow, Japan and H er C olonies (London: E. Arnold & Co., 1923). 21. Tsu-yu Chen, “The Development of the Coal Mining Industry in Taiwan

226

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

during the Japanese Colonial Occupation, 1895-1945,” in Sally M. Miller et al., eds., Studies in the Econom ic H istory o f the Pacific Rim (London: Routledge, 1998), 187-193. 22. See Chang Han-yu and Ramon H. Myers, “Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship,” Journal o f A sian Studies, 22 (4) (August 1963): 441-455; Ramon Myers and Marie R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese C olonial Em pire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 420-452. 23. Irie Buntaro, K iryu fu doki [Folkways of Keelung], (1933; reprint, Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing, 1985), 141. Also, “Yokohama syogo kaigijo” [Yokohama commercial conference place], Yokohama kaiko gojunen shi [Fifty-year history of Yokohama harbor] (Tokyo: Meicho Publishing, 1973), 373. 24. Taiwan sotokufu gaijibu [External affairs of Taiwan’s government-general], ‘Taiwan and Southern China,” Investigation Report No. 236, November 10,1937,13. For more on Taiwanese immigrants in China, see Lin Man-hung, “Reflection on the Concept of the Greater China Economic Zone: Overseas Taiwanese Trade Experience during the Japanese Colonial Period,” in Institute o f M odem H istory C ollected Edition, No. 29 (Taipei: Academia Sinica), 52-62. 25. Ibid., 67-69. Also see Hsueh Hsueh-chi, Taiwanese E xperience in M anchuria during the Japanese O ccupation, Oral History Series, no. 79 (Taipei: Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica, 2002). 26. Ishizaka Sosaku, K iryu ko [The Keelung harbor] (1931), 65-68; Chien Wanhuo, Keelung chi [Treatise on Keelung] (1931), 74-76. 27. Murakami Tamakichi, Taiwan kiyou [Recording significant affairs of Taiwan], (1899; reprint, Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing, 1985), 194. 28. Ishizaka Sosaku, K iryo loo, 65-68; Chien Wan-huo, Keelung chi, 74-76. 29. Taiwan niefti nichi shim po [Taiwan daily news]. No. 5122 (September 17, 1914). 30. Chung Shu-ming, “The South China and South Seas Policy of Taiwan Governor-general: Focusing on Its Measure of Subsidizing Business,” N ational Taiwan U niversity H istory Journal (Taipei: National Taiwan University) 34 (December 2004): 160-161. 31. Ibid., 162-192; also Taiwan nichi nichi shim po, October 22,1935. 32. Harry J. Lamley, ‘Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Murray Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A N ew H istory (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999; expanded edition 2007), 221. 33. For more see Wu Wen-hsin et al. eds., Taiwan Chong-tu Den Kenchiro ji-ch i [Diary of the Taiwan governor-general Den Kenchiro] (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2001). 34. John Balcom, “A Literary Revolution,” Free China R eview 43, no. 5 (May 1993): 73-81. Also see, Chao-cheng Chung, “The Plight of Taiwanese Literature As Seen From Taiwan’s Literary History,” in N orth Am erica Taiwanese P rofessors’A s­ sociation B ulletin 4, no. 2 (December 1984): 5. 35. For more on the Taiwan Cultural Association, see Huang Fu-san, Lin H sient ’ang chuan [Biography of Lin Hsien-t’ang] (Nan-tou City: Taiwan Historical Commission, 2004), 41-51; Wu Mi-ch’a, T ’ai-w an-shih hsiao-shih-tien [Dictionary of Taiwan historical trivia] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2002), 128,132. 36. For more see George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule M ovem ent, 1895-1945 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), 123-124;

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 7 AND 8

227

Ong Joktik, “A Formosan’s View of the Formosan Independence Movement,” in Mark Mancall, ed., Formosa Today (New York: Praeger, 1964), 163-164. 37. Edward I-te Chen, “Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937,” Journal o f A sian Studies 31, no. 3 (May 1972), 4%; also Wu Mi­ ch’a, Tai-wan-shih hsiao-shih-tien, 148. 38. Taiwan Education Association, ed., T ai-w an chiao-yu yen-ke-chi [Evolutionary history of Taiwan education] (1939; reprint, Taipei: Ku-ting Publishing, 1973), 166, 211- 212.

39. Ibid., 984. 40. Patricia E. Tsurumi, Japanese C olonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), SO. 41. Ibid., 109; cf Kawamura Takeji, Taiwan no ichinen, 6. 42. Taiwan sotokufu, ed. Taiwan jijo [Taiwan affairs] (Taipei: Taiwan Governmentgeneral, 1936), 201-202. N otes to Chapter 8

1. Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Q uest fo r Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 27,30; also Patricia E. Tsurumi, Japanese C olo­ nial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 118. 2. Ibid., 251. 3. Taiwan sotokufu, ed., Kogako shushin sho [Public school ethics books], vols. 1-5 (Taipei: 1914,1928,1930,1942,1943). For more on shui-shin curriculum, see Chou Wan-yao, H ai-hsing-hsi ti nien-tai [Last eight years of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, 1937-45] (Taipei: Yun-ch’en Culture Publishing, 2004), 295-363. 4. Makoto Aso and Ikuo Amano, Education and Japan ’s M odernization (Tokyo: Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), 49-50. 5. Lee Teng-hui, Tai-wan ti tsu-chang [With the people always in my heart] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2001), 40. For details, see also Peng Ming-min, A Taste o f Freedom: M em oirs o f a Formosan Independence L eader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 17-18. 6. A modified version of Kokutai no hongi was translated into English by John O. Gauntlett, edited by Robert K. Hall and published by Harvard University Press in 1937. 7. Wu Cho-liu, W u-hua-kuo [The fig] (Monterey Park, California: Taiwan Publishing Co. 1984), 108. 8. H sin-nan shin-wen [The rising south news], February 13, 1940: 4; May 2, 1943:2. 9. Chou Wan-yao, H ai-hsing-hsi ti nien-tai, 93-94. The numbers in Table 8.1 represent new mother tongue-speaking families for each year. 10. Ibid., 95. 11. H sin-nan shin-wen, October 12,1943, evening edition: 1. 12. Taiwan nichi nichi shim po [Taiwan daily news], Februrary 11,1940: 3. 13. H sin-nan shin-wen, January 24,1944, evening edition: 2. 14. George Kerr, Formosa: lic e n se d Revolution and the H ome Rule M ovem ent, 1895-1945 (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1974), 168; Wu Mi-ch’a, Tai­ wan shih hsiao-shih-tien [Dictionary of Taiwan historical trivia] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2002), 141,154. See also George W. Barclay, C olonial D evelopm ent and Population in Taiwan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

228

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

15. Yen Hsing-chu, ed., Ta-k’a i H sin-kan jen ti hsian g-p’u [Open up the picture album of the people in the New Port county] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 1997), 124-125. 16. Yeh Jung-chung, U n H sien-t’ang hsien-sheng chi-nien-chi [Collected works for commemorating Mr. Lin Hsien-t’ang] (Taichung: Lin Hsien-t’ang’s Commemorating Commission, 1960), 24-41. For more, see Leo T. S. Ching, Becom ing Japanese: C olonial Taiwan and the P olitics o f Identity Form ation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 17. Makoto Aso and Ikuo Amano, E du cation a n d J a p a n ’s M odern ization , 52-54. 18. Tsurumi, Japanese C olonial Education in Taiwan , 127,253,280. 19. For more on autobiographical shosetsu, see Howard S. Hibbett, “The Portrait of the Artist in Japanese Fiction,’’ Far E astern Q uarterly, 14, no. 3 (May 1955): 347-352. 20. Tai-wan-sheng wu-shih-I-nien la i t ’ung-chi t ’i-yao [Statistical summary of Taiwan province for the last fifty-one years] (Taipei: Tai-wan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu t’ung-chi-shih [Statistics office of Taiwan provincial executive office], 1946), 1214-1217. 21. Ibid.; Also see Kerr, Formosa: U cen sed Revolution, 179; Tsurumi, Japanese C olonial Education in Taiwan , 123-124. 22. Wu Mi-ch’a, ed., T ’ai-w an shih h siao-sh ih -tien , 152. See also Hsu Hsuehchi, Taiw anese E xperien ce in M anchuria du rin g the Japan ese O ccupation , Oral History Series no. 79 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica,

2002).

23. Taiwan sotokufu gaijibu [External affairs of Taiwan’s government-general], [Results of Taiwanese assistance in southern China] (Taipei, 1943), 72-73. 24. Chou Wan-yao, H ai-hsing-hsi ti nien-tai, 131-134. 25. Taiwan nichi nichi shim po [Taiwan daily news], March 21,1940:5. 26. Shen Pao (Shanghai) “Special Economic Issue,” December 17,1934:4; and Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute, ed., Toyo oyobi nanyo shokoku no kokusai boeki to nihon no chii [Japan’s position vis-à-vis her international trade with the countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia] (Tokyo: Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute, November 1933), 6. 27. Taiwan takushoku kabushiki kaisha [Taiwan Development Company], Showa juchijinen do jig y o gaikyo sho [Business conditions of 1942] (Taipei: Taiwan Development Co., 1943), 67-69. 28. For more see Lin Yu-ju, “War, Frontier, and Colonial Business: The Wartime Investments of the Taiwan Development Company in Eastern Taiwan,” Bulletin o f the Institute o f M odem H istory, vol. 43 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2004): 122-164. 29. Adam Schneider, “The Business of Empire: the Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936-1946” (UMI Dissertation Services, 1999), 284-286. 30. Chung Shu-min, “Business Operations of Taiwan Development Corporation on Hainan Island,” Taiwan H istorical Research 12, no. 1 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2005): 97. 31. Taitaku shahou [Communique of Taiwan Development Company], no. 96, January 31,1942: 2-20,36; ibid., no. 108, July 31,1942: 3-6; ibid., no. 119, Janu­ ary 15,1943: 1-2. Taiwan no Nanpo kyoryoku ni tsu ite

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

229

32. Tang Shi-yeoung, “Returning to Taiwan: Treatment and Repatriation of Formosans on Hainan (1945-1946),’’Taiwan H istorical Research, 12, no. 2 (December 2005): 172-176; see also Hui-yu Caroline Tsai, The L ives and Times o f Taiwanese Veterans, Oral History Series, no. 1 (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 1997), 430. 33. Chi Chang-chien et al., eds., H ai-nan tsu-yuan yu kai-fa [Resources and development of Hainan] (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing, 1956), 138; Hsu Kung-wu, H ai-nan-tao [Hainan island] (Nanking: New China Publishing, 1977), 42,46. 34. Adam Schneider, “The Taiwan Development Company and Indochina: Subimperialism, Development, and Colonial Status,” Taiwan H istorical Research 5, no. 2 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1998): 115-116,122-126. 35. Te-lan Chu, “Network Relations of the Taiwan Development Company Limited (1936-1945),” Taiwan H istorical R esearch 12, no. 2 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2005), 99. 36. Schneider, Taiwan D evelopm ent Com pany and Indochina, 127-128; Chung Shu-min, ‘Taiwan Development Corporation on Hainan Island,” 107. 37. Photos of “1,000 Stitched Cloth” often appeared in a wartime propaganda monthly pictorial journal called Taiwan fujin kai [The world of Taiwanese women]. High school girls were also asked to mate 1,000 stitched cloths, which were then sent to anonymous soldiers. 38. Sources come from Chou Wan-yau’s H ai-hsing-hsi ti nien-tai, 161-62, and Hui-yu Caroline Tsai, The Lives and Times o f Taiwanese Veterans, 547-550, among others. 39. H sin-nan shin-wen, June 10,1942:2; and February 13,1943, evening edition: 2. 40. Taiwan sotokufii, Showa nijunen Taiwan tochi gaiyou [Outlines of the 1945 Taiwan governance] (Taipei, 1945), 72. 41. Chou Wan-yao, H ai-hsing-hsi ti nien-tai, 141. 42. Chung Shu-min, “Fu-lu suo-jung-shou—chin-tai Taiwan-shih ti yi-tuan pei-ker” [Places to incarcerate prisoners-of-war—a sad song of modem Taiwan history] in T s’ao Yung-ho hsien-sheng pa-sh i-ta-shou lun-wen-chi [Collected essays celebrating Mr. Ts’ao Yung-ho’s 80th birthday] (Taipei: Lo-yu Book Store, 2001), 262,276-281. 43. Taiwan H sin-sheng pa o [The new life newspaper], April 19,1946. 44. Chou Wan-yao, H ai-hsing-hsi ti nien-tai, 169-170. 45. Cheng Li-ling interview records, Taiwan jen Jih-ben-bin ti chan-tseng chingyen [War experiences of the Taiwanese-Japanese soldiers] (Ban-ch'iao City: Taipei County Culture Center, 1995), 78,85,91. See also Tang Shi-yeoung, “Returning to Taiwan,” 201. 46. Chuang Yung-ming, ed., Tai-wan shih-chih hui-wei [Scanning Taiwan] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2000), 24. Twice a year, during the spring and fall, monks in the Jihua Shrine, located in Peipu County in Hsinchu prefecture, offer a memorial service for these fallen Taiwanese. See Sina N et, October 27,2002. 47. Chung-hua jih -p a o [The China daily news], February 27,1975, and Chungyang jih -p a o [The central daily news], March 5, 1976. For more see also Hung Chin-chu, “Sino-Japanese War: A Long Way to Go,” in Free China Review (October 1995): 54-57. 48. Hoiyo jo houkyoku [Prisoners-of-war Intelligence Bureau], H oryo toria tukai no kiroku [Records derived from prisoners-of-war] (Tokyo: Bouei cho bouei kenkyojo

230

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 8 AND 9

[Defense Research Institute, Department of Defense], 19SS), 7-8,18-20; also Chung Shu-min, “Fu-lu suo-jung-shou,” 269-272. 49. Chaen Yoshio, D aidoua senka g a iti no horyo syuyoujo [World War II overseas places for incarcerating prisoners-of-war] (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1987), 24,36. 50. Conversation with an eyewitness. On August 3, 2005, the author was on a northbound express train from Kaohsiung to Taipei and sat next to an old Hakka man named Chung. He told the author that he was a guard at Keelung’s Chin-kua-shih POW camp in 1944 when he was only seventeen years old. On August 16, 1945, General Wainwright, a POW since May 6,1942, was released from a POW camp in Manchuria. Less than three weeks later (on September 3), Wainwright returned to the Philippines to accept the surrender of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, the Japanese commander, at Baguio. 51. For more, see Jack Edwards, Bunzai, You Bastards! (Hong Kong: Corporation Communications, 1991); Jane Flower, Japanese A rm y an d English P risoners o f War— 1941-1945 (Tokyo: POW Intelligence Bureau, Defense Department, Defense Research Institute, 1955); and Paul Maltby’s unpublished “The Diary of a Prisonerof-War in the Far East, 1942-1945.” 52. Kuniaki Koiso was among the twenty-eight top Japanese officials who were tried at the Military Tribunal of the Far East between 1946 and 1948. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Yoshida Shigeru, who became the first postwar premier of Japan, replaced Fujihara in December 1944. 53. See The P uppetm aster (1993), a docudrama directed by Taiwanese filmmaker Hou Hsiao-hsien. 54. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution an d the H ome Rule M ovem ent, 228. 55. General Ando, probably because he could not endure the humiliation at the hands of the Chinese, hanged himself in a Shanghai jail on April, 19,1946. N otes to Chapter 9

1. Yang Chao-chia, Yang Chao-chia hui-yi-lu [Reminiscences of Yang Chao-chia] (Taipei: San-min shu-chu, 1978), 353. 2. George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed R evolution and the Home Ride M ovem ent, 1895-1945 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), xv; also Kerr’s other book, Formosa B etrayed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 81. See also U.S. State Department, The China W hite Paper (Stanford: Stanford University Press, August 1949), originally issued as U nited States R elations with China, 347. 3. Ibid., 9 6 , 106,143. 4. Many of Kerr’s reports are classified as Record Group (RG) 59, in the Depart­ ment of State Decimal File. Significant documents pertaining to Taiwan include: RG 59,1946, No. 9,13,14, 30,1206; RG59,1947, No.36,45,405,449,499,500,893, 894A., 2788; RG59,1948, No. 2, A-9, A-65,110,450; and RG59,1949,894A.00/1749, CSBM, 894A.00/1-2349, CSBM. 5. The Washington Post (March 29,1946): 18. 6. For more on the U.S. government stance toward the 2.28 Incident, see U.S. State Department, China W hite Paper, 926-938. 7. Ibid., 309. 8. Huang Chi-nan, Huang Chi-nan chi-hsueh m eng-hui-lu [Huang Chi-nan’s reminiscences in bloody tears and circular dreams] (Taipei: Tu-chia Publishing, 1991), 137-139,146.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

231

9. Ch’en Fang-ming, H sieh Hsieh-hung p ’ing-chuan [Acritical biography of Ms. Hsieh Hsieh-hung] (Taipei: Vanguard Publishing House, 1994), 382. 10. Richard C. Bush, A t C ross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan R elations since 1942 (Armonk. NY: M.E. Sharpe. 2004), 47,49.82. 11. Huang Chi-nan ’s Rem iniscences, 173. In his Fifty Years in China: The M em oirs o f John Leighton Stuart (New York: Random House, 1954), Stuart did not record this particular meeting with the Taiwanese; neither did he mention his working relation­ ship with George H. Kerr. 12. Huang C hi-nan’s Rem iniscences, 204. 13. Jay Taylor, The G eneralissim o’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo an d the R evolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 191-192. 14. Foreign R elations o f the U nited S tates 1949 , vol. 9, “The Far East: China” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 289,337-341,401-403,406. Hereafter cited as FRUS. 15. U.S. State Department, Am erican Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 , Basic Documents (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), 2448-2449. 16. U.S. D epartm ent o f State Bulletin (July 3,1950). For more on Truman’s policy toward Taiwan, see Su-ya Chang, “Pragmatism and Opportunism: Truman’s Policy to­ ward Taiwan, 1949-1952,” Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1988. 17. Joseph W. Ballantyne, Formosa: A Problem fo r U nited S tates P olicy (Wash­ ington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1952), 153. 18. Thomas A. Bailey, A D iplom atic H istory o f the Am erican People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), 826. See also, The M em oirs o f John Leighton Stuart, 307. 19. For more on MAAG, see Kerr, Formosa B etrayed, 406-407; Wu Mi-ch’a, T ’ai-w an shih hsiao-shih-tien [Dictionary of Taiwan historical trivia] (Taipei: Yuanliou Publishing, 2000), 171; and Karl L. Rankin, China Assignm ent (University of Washington Press, 1964), 274-275,315. 20. Economic Planning Commission of ROC Executive Yuan, Taiwan S tatistical D ata Book, 1 9 7 7 , 219-220 and Taiwan S tatistical D ata Book, 1 9 8 1 ,4-6. 21. Wu Mi-ch’a, T ’ai-w an shih hsiao-shih-tien, 166. See also Chao Chi-ch’ang, M ei-yuan ti yun-yung [Utilization of American aids] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing, 1985), 31,115-135. 22. For more see Neil H. Jacob, U.S. A id to Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1966), 195-97. 23. Chao Chi-ch’ang, M ei-yuan ti yun-yung, 29-30. 24. Shiau, Chyuan-jenq, “The Political Economy of Rice Policies in Taiwan, 1945-1980” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1984), 121. 25. Keelung Harbor Administration Bureau, Kee-lung-kang chien-kang pai-nien chi-nien wen-chi [Collected essays in commemorating the 100 Year anniversary of the Keelung harbor] (1985), 131. 26. Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), Taiwan Food Balance Sheet (Taipei: JCRR, 1953 and 1980). 27. Rankin, China Assignm ent, 129,202. 28. Notes on Eisenhower’s meeting with Congressional leaders. May 24, 1954, U SF R 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ,14( 1): p. 429n3, Tel.28 from Taipei, July 15,1953, ibid., 14( 1): p. 229; Tel.34 from Taipei, July 17,1953, ibid., p. 230; Memorandum of Conversation (MC), Chase and Major St John of Defense, Robertson, et al., re General Chase’s Observation about the situation in Formosa, July 20, 1953, 794a.5/7-2053, RG 59,

232

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

National Archives (NA). See also Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower:

Soldier and

P resident (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 38S. 29. Rankin, China Assignm ent, 206-207.

30. Memo on the 214th NSC Meeting, September 12, 1934, USFR 1952-1954, 14 (1), 623. Tel.244, Rankin to Robertson, October 5,1934, ibid., 682-683; Memo, Robertson to Dulles, October 7,1934, ibid., 14(1), 706. 31. Memo, Robertson to Dulles, re Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, August 25,1954, F R U S1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 , 14(1): 548; MC, Chiang with Robertson et al., October 13,1954, ibid., 14(1), 728-753. 32. MC, Dulles with Eden et al. in Paris, October 23,1954, ibid., 14(1), 790-792. More on British attitudes toward the offshore islands, see Tracy Lee Steele, “AngloAmerican Tensions over the Chinese Offshore Islands, 1954-58” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1992). 33. MC, Dulles with Yeh and Koo, re Proposed Mutual Security Pact, etc. (1st Meeting), November 2,1954, USFR 1 9 5 2 -1 9 5 4 ,14(1), 849. 34. U.S. Statutes at Large, LIX, 7; see also J. R. Beal, John F oster D ulles: A Bi­ ography (New York: Harper, 1957), 219-221. 35. Rankin, China A ssignm ent, 214. For more see U.S. Senate, R epublic o f China M ilitary R elations, 1971, vol. 1,918-1146. 36. For more on the negotiation of Sino-American MDT, See Su-Ya Chang, “John Foster Dulles and the Making of the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954,” EuroAm erica, vol. 24, no. 2 (Taipei: Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, June 1994): 51-99; Tang Tsou, The Em broilm ent over Quemoy (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1959). 37. Political War Department, ROC Ministry of Defense, Niu-tsuan ch ’ien -k’un ti yi-chan: Kin-men pa-er-san p 'au-chan san-shih chou-nien chi-nien tsuan-chi (The battle that changed the world: Special edition commemorating the August 23 Artillery Battle’s thirtieth anniversary] (Taipei: 1988), 2,19. 38. Earlier in January 1958, Chiang Kai-shek had also assured Ambassador Rankin that the United States “needed have no fear of his government’s attempting a ’return to the mainland,’ without consulting [Washington] in advance.” However, Chiang also believed that preparations should be made for the event. See Rankin, China Assignm ent, 312; see also Thomas Bailey, D iplom atic H istory o f the Am erican People, 852-853. 39. See “Message to the Taiwan Compatriots” from the Executive Committee of the People’s Congress,” in The P eople’s D aily (January 1,1979). 40. J. William Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas Special Collections, Series 72, Box 26, Folder 1, Under “Reporters Round-Up Release,” March 20,1966,6. For a detailed discussion of the dual PRC and ROC representation, see Richard C. Bush, A t C ross Purposes, 1 9 4 2 , 108-109,110-115. 4L Richard M. Nixon, The M em oirs o f Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 556-557. For Kissinger’s negotiation with Zhou Enlai on the question of Taiwan, see Henry Kissinger, W hite H ouse Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 782-783,1072-1084. 42. See Wu Cho-liu, Ya-hsi-ya te ku-erh [Asia’s orphan] (Taipei: Grass Root Publishing, 1995). 43. For the entire Shanghai Communiqué, see Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter, A m erica and Island China: A D ocum entary H istory (Lanham, MD: Uni­ versity Press of America, 1989), 111-114.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

233

44. M em oirs o f Richard Nixon, 570-571. Also see John H. Holdridge, Crossing the D ivide : An In sider’s Account o f N orm alization o f U.S.-China R elations (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 92-93. 45. Jerome Alan Cohen, “Recognizing China,” Foreign Affairs, 50(1) (October 1971): 31. 46. Tien Hung-mao, The G reat Transition : P olitical and Social Change in the R epublic o f China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 73. 47. For more see Fupian Chen, H ai-wai T ’a i-t ’u yun-tung-shih [History of Overseas Taiwanese Independence Movement] (Taipei: Vanguard Publishing House, 1998), 61-108. 48. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Pow er and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 230,233; see also B eijing Review 38 (September 22,1986): 5. 49. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, M em oirs o f a P resident (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 190-191. Other scholars, including June Dryer, maintain that Michel Oksenbetg, then director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council, was in­ strumental in the decision to recognize die People’s Republic of China. 50. Chou Yu-k’ou, ’Today’s Early Dawn—Ten Years Ago,” in Lien-ho pao [The united daily news] (December 16,1988). 51. Harry Harding, Jr., C h inaan dthe U.S.: N orm alization and Beyond (New York: China Council of the Asia Society and the Foreign Policy Association, 1979), 10. 52. Ibid., 2. 53. U.S. Public Law 96-8, April 10,1979,96th Congress. See also John Copper, “The Taiwan Relations Act: A Ten-Year Record,” in Chang King-yuh, ed., ROC-US R elations Under the Taiwan R elations A ct: P ractice and P rospects (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1988), monograph series no. 33,3-6. 54. Ibid., 6-14; see also David Chou, “ROC-US Political Relations as seen from the Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act,” in ibid., 14-22. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter, A m erica and Island China: A Docum entary H istory, 222-229. 55. Lester L. Wolff and David Simon, eds., Legislative H istory o f the Taiwan Rela­ tions A ct (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982), 262. 56. Federal R egister, 51, January 14,1986,1558-1559; see also Office of Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, 1987). 57. Information on Walker and Cline’s advice to Chiang Ching-kuo was provided to the author by Professor June T. Dreyer of the University of Miami in January 2006. 58. Time (U.S.) (August 10, 1981): 19. See also U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, M artial Law on Taiwan an d U.S. Foreign P olicy Interests, hearing, 97th Congress, 2nd sess., May 20, 1982 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 231. 59. Ibid. The M urder o f H enry Liu, 100th Congress, 1st sess., February 7, March 21, and April 3,1985,93-95. See also, The New York Times (February 11,1985). 60. Richard C. Bush, A t C ross Purposes, 195-196. 61. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.-China Relations, 11 Years after the Shanghai Communiqué, 98th Congress, 1st sess., Feb. 28,1983, p. 124; and Senate Committee on Foreign Re­ lations, The Future o f Taiwan, 98th Congress, 1st sess. (November 9,1983), 14-23. 62. Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., “American Relations with Republic of China,” in John

234

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

Chay, ed., Problem s and P rospects o f Am erican-E ast A sian R elations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), 92. 63. Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1978), 27-28. 64. Robert G. Sutter and William Johnson, eds., Taiwan Entering the 2 1 st Century (Lanham, MD: The Asian Society and University Press of America, 1988), 63. 63. Gibeit and Carpenter, Am erica an d Island China , 326. 66. Ibid., 312-314. 67. Jay Taylor, G eneralissim os’ Son, 391-393. See also Far Eastern Econom ic Review (July 24,1986): 27. 68. The New York Times (November 10,1990): A22, reported a letter Bush wrote to Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana). The United States supported Taiwan's entry to GATT/WTO as the customs union arrangement that the ROC government had proposed. Thereby it did not impinge on the sovereignty issue. 69. Financial Times (September 4,1992): 18. 70. N ewsweek (April 1, 1996): 31; also U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 99 Appropriation Bill,” D tfen se LINK (March 4, 1999): 8. 71. Richard R. Vuylsteke, “Taiwan in World Affairs, The Road Less Traveled,” Free China Review (July 1995): 56. Hereafter cited as FCR. 72. Richard C. Bush, A t C ross Purposes, 232. 73. Richard Halloran, “The Clinton-Jiang Summit, Who Calls the Time,” FCR (September 1998): 40. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that Clinton’s public iteration of the “three noes” in Shanghai represented an unofficial statement by the American president. 74. Richard C. Bush, A t C ross Purposes, 231-232. Clinton actually gave the PRC the “three noes” secretly, in writing, after dispatching the two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in early 1996. 75. Quote from the documentary “Dangerous Straits,” a Public Broadcasting Service Frontline documentary, 2004.

Glossary of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese Characters A

mu

Ch’en Yi

Ah-ahan-ah

HUifr

Cheng Chih-lung (Iquan) f 2 1 Cheng Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga) WA 4

Akashi Motojiro

m um

Cheng K’e-shuang AndoRikkhi

m um m

Anping

se*

B

Chia-ch’ing

mm

Chiang Ching-kuo

mmm

Chiang Kai-shek

( Ä't’IE )

Chiang Jih-sheng

2B A

Botanahe

Chiang Wei-shui

mm*

c

Chino

»

ben-aheng-jen

Campbell, William

*«A

HUM

Chang-chou Changhua Ch’en Ch’eng ChenShui-bian Ch’en Wen-cheng

Chiayi (Chulo) Chieh-lo-man-pao

B it

mm m *m m %0t

mm nm m u

Ch’ien-lung

mm

Chien Yi

nm

Chin-kuo-ahih Chi-tain

** 235

Digitized by

Google

Original from

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

236

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS

C hu Fen

**

H ai-kuo

C h’uan-chou

mm

H an-tse-pu-liang-li

D D aidouaSenao

D en K cnjiro

f tP

« ft

H oklo

**2119

mum»

H siang-shan

#U4

H ai-chu

Jfttt

D PP (D em ocratic Progressive P atty ) R i tt X Haien C hieh-shih

F H sinchu

«Ht

Fengahan Fukien

Fukuznwa Yukichi

FusoMaru

XX

«ax« »»A

m ±m

H sin-tien

mm

H sun-fu

G

H ualien

G oto Shimpei

H uang Chi-nan

Gunzoku

H uang N an-ch'iu

H H akka

Hsin-sheng-pao

TEX x ie rn X ftft

Hung-m ao-cheng

«X Hu-w ei (Tam sui)

Hasegawa Kiyoshi

MM

ÄÖJIIft

XU

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS

I

KatsuraTaro

« *»

Ianfu

*& »

Kawapiuri Takeji

jimm »

Dan

*■

Keelung

mm

Itagaki Taiauke

a a iitt

Kim-mo-hop

ItoHirobumi Iwanami Shoten j

Kinmen (Quemoy)

±n

Kobayashi Seizo

'J'ttM ft

KodamaGentaro

Ä S ***

Jiang Zeming kogako

K Kabayama Sukenori kaigun ihiganhei Kanagawa kangofu

a u ia iB ***** # * jii ***

K’ang-hai Kaohsiung KatoKyohd

mm **#¥

237

Kokugo (Japanese) komin-ka

■a * R fb

Komin Hokokai Ku Hsien-jung

*■ «

Kuan-yin-shan

«*1Ü

Kuhara Pusanosuke x m m z B h Kuniaki Koiso

'J '* * «

238

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS

Kuo Huai-yi

Kuomintang

Kno-sai

* * -

■ sa um m

L Lee Teng-hui

Lin Shao-mao

Lin Haien-t’ang (Rin Kendo)

#01

a

mmm

Lin Yih-shyong

Liu Ao

mm

Liu-chiu (Ryukyu)

mm

Liu M ing-ch’uan

mmm

Liu Ming-teng

mmm

Liu Yun-ke

» a s*

LoFii-hsing

■aa

$aa

Li Chang-keng

Li Ching-fang

LiChu-ou

LiChun-sheng

Li Hung-chang Li Sheng-hsing

Longldau

m »m

Lu-eih-men

«an

I Jilrang

mm

U Tan

Liang Yuan-kuei

m3c t t

M Ma-tsu

Liao Wen-yi (Thomas)

mm

m xm Mackay, George L.

Lien Ya-t’ang

mm

a»*

mm

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS

Nitobelnazo

Makung

Mankah

239

mm

Nogl Maiesuke

o Mao Zedong Okubo Toshimichi Matou Matsu

ms

am

P P‘an Kuan-sheng

Maxwell, lames L.

aaa pao-chia

Mizuho Maru

mmm mm

m m *. P’eng-lai hsien-tao (Feng-lai hsien-tao}

Moji

na

S X tllA P’eng-Uri-mi (Feng-lai-mi)

mm*

Peng Ming-min

mmm

Penghu (Pescadores)

mm

Motoori Norinaga

N Nankang

Nantou

mm Pepohuan

mmm

Pilam (Pim aba)

mm

Pingtung

mm

am

Natsume Soadd Ningpo

mm P’u-tai

Nippon Yusen Kaiaha

240

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS

Provintia

M

B

g

Wa

Q

Sinkan

mm

Suao

mm

«**

Qian Qichen

Sun Kai-hua

ana

R rikugun shiganhei

T

s

Ta-hung-ah

Saigo Tsugumichi

m m utm

Sakuma Samate

ÄAW&J■ *

Taichung

Taihoku (Taipei)

Sekimin

HR

TaihokuKotoGakko

Shanghai

±m

Taijen

Shogako

mmm

M it

■ d t* « * « ■à

Ta i m in

RK

Shao You-lien

mmm

Tainan

RR

Shen You-jung

a t* «

Taitung

mm

Shi Lang

a«

Taiwan Bunkakyokai

Shui-shin

Taiwanfu

Taiwan Minshuto

8»/ff m nR w m

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS 241

Taiwan nichi nichi shimpo

M 0 0 UfH

Taai Pei-ho (Sai Baika)

Taiwan Seinen

Taiwan aotokufii

Toulio

SftttffJff

Taiwan ukushoku kahwahiki kaiaha

Ta'ai Chien

4* ***

mm

TaoChi-tu

■«IE«*«*« Tso-ying Ta-chia

Tamaui

**

Tang Ching-iung

ft« «

Twa-tu-tia

Tu Ch’ung-ming Tung-kang

Ung-wai

Tao-kwang

u MX Uraga(Poft)

Tao-tai

mm

Taoyuan

mm

wai-aheng-jen WangTe-lu

Tay-ouan (Taiwan)

Wei Tao-ming

TBÄ

mmm

W

Taroko

TingJih-ctnen

mmm mm

Woo-teaou-keang

nmm

242

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND TAIWANESE CHARACTERS

Wu-hsi (Go-ch’e)

ff*

Yu-tuo

Wuahe

litt

z

Wufeng

««

Zeelandia

ZhouEnlai

Y Yamato Maru Yang-ming-shan

YaoYing

nm m mm

Yasukuni Shrine

Yen Shih-chi

*«*

Yen-shui-kang

Yi-mn-miao

m &m

Yoahida Shigeni

ÄEBÄ

Yunlin

a#

Yu Ching-fang

***

Yulin

mmmm

Bibliography

I. A rchives, C ollections, and Government Docum ents

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Index

A

B

Abbott, Joel, 69,109,113 Abc Jiro, 157 Abeel, David, 105-106 aborigines and camphor dealers, 123 Catholic conversions of, 28-29 land rights violated, 112 languages of, 78 murders of, 121 population of, 32 trade with, 119,120 women, treatment of, 87 in World War II, 166 Acheson, Dean, 179 Acorn, 71 Adventurer, 73 Akashi Motojiro, 144 Alcock, Rutherford, 74-75,82 A lgerine, 83 Allen, Isaac J., 118 Amaki, 101 Amaterasu Omikami, 164 American Museum of Natural History, 121 American Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 106 Anderson, Robert B., 187 AndoRikichi, 15,171,173 Angeir, Thomas, 64 Ann, 67,70,108 Annam, 89-90 A ntelope, 70,109 Anthon Williams & Co., 113 Appleton, John, 115 Arima Harunobu, 128 Arisaka Issei, 150 Arms Export Control Act, 198 A roostook, 120 A sahiM aru, 140 Asakawa Kanae, 128 Asian Development Bank, 201 Asian trade expansion, 141-142 assimilation, 146-147,152-154 atomic bomb, 172-173 Augustine Heard & Co., 112

Baccaluwangh tribe, 32 Batavia, 20 Battle of Huai-Hai, 178 Bax, Bonham Ward, 79 Bayard, 92,95,103 Bell, H.H., 117 Benares brand, 79-80 Benyowsky, Maurice-August Comte de, 87-88 Ber (Lieutenant-Major), 96 Billot, Albert, 103 BintangAnam , 83 Black Flags, 90 Blake. Ralph J., 175 “blood letters,” 164 Boteler, H.H., 97 Boulineau (Colonel), 98 Bowen, Frank S., Jr., 182 Bowring, John, 69,72 Braune, George C.P., 82,116 Brent, Joseph L., 183 Bridgman, Elijah G , 107 Britain. See also East India Company coal trade, 68-69,70 commodities wanted, 78-81 consulates established by, 81-86 merchants and piracy, 69 military excursions from, 86 missionaries from, 75-78,84-86 scientists from, 78 shipwreck survivors, 66,70-71 trade prohibited by Manchu, 64-65 trade with, 74,89 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 194 Buchanan, James, 115 Bullock, Thomas Lowden, 78 Bundy, William, 191 Burton, William Kinninmond, 136 Bush, George H.W., 191,195,201, 203 Bush, George W., 203-204 Bush, Richard G , 178,202,203 Bustard, 82, 83 Butler, A., 126 257

258

INDEX

c Caeuw, Jacob, 43 Calvinist missionaries, 33-35 Camel, 64 Camp O’Donnell, 167-168 Campbell, James Duncan, 11,103 Campbell, William, 76-77,78 camphor, 72,74,83-84,85,112-117, 122-123 “camphor wars,” 76,83-84,85 Canadian missionaries, 77-78 Candidius, George, 34,87 Caron, Francois, 25,30 Carroll, Charles, 74,75 Carter, Jimmy, 194-195 Cass, Frank, 8,123 Cass, John G., 121 Castel, Robert, 64 Catholicism, 28-29,35,112 Catto, Robert, 175 C elestial, 80 Centurion, 86 Chang Wen-huan, 145 Chapdelaine, Augustin, 89 Chase, W illiam C, 181,182,187 Chateau Renaud, 94,96 Ch’en, Edward I-te, 146 Chen Han-chang, 159 Chen Hsu-ku, 145 Chen Shou-li, 123 Chen Shui-bian, 204,205 Ch’en Ti, 5-6 Ch’en Wen-cheng, 197 Ch’en Yi, 15,173,177, 178 Cheng Ch’eng-kung. See Koxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung) Cheng Chih-lung (Iquan, Nicholas), 19,40 Cheng Ching, 63 Cheng Kai-shek, 187 Cheng K’e-shuang, 47 Cheng Tzu-ts’ai, 193-194 Chiang Ching-kuo, 179,193,194-195,197,

201 Chiang Jih-sheng, 46 Chiang Kai-shek, 16,173,177-180,188, 191,193 Chiang Wei-shui, 8 Chieh-lo-man-pao, 49 Chien, Frederick F., 194 Chien Ch’ien-fu, 62 Ch’ien Wan-kuei, 55 Chien Yi, 133 child laborers, 166 China and Annam, 90 arms sales from France, 104 and camphor dealers, 123

China (continued) claim to Taiwan, 4-5,12,14-18 culture in Taiwan, £-13 and Dutch trade, 39 immigrants from, 41 mutual aid pact with Soviet Union, 180 nationalist atrocities by, 176-177 and opening of trade with Taiwan, 71-75 port treaties with, 58-60 and prohibition of British trade, 64-65 refugees from, 17th century, 37-38 resources, exploitation of, 176 Taiwan regarded as separate from, 106-107 and Taiwanese nationals (Sekimin), 131 U.S. merchants' dispute with, 120 and U.S. relations, 190-194 war with Japan, 130,151 China Fleet, 95 Ch’i-ying, 114 cholera, 100 Chou Wan-yao, 168 Christianity, 11-12,28-29,32,33-35,

112 Christopher, Warren, 195 Chu Fen (pirate chief), 55,57 Chuang Ching-feng, 76 Chung Shu-ming, 167 Church, Frank, 195 Clarke, A.L., 115 Clarke, Claude Cecil, 60 Cleveland, Richard J., 105 Cline, Ray, 197 Clinton, Bill, 202-203 coal, 10,68-69,70,108,119,140 Cochrane, Thomas, 67 Cockshafer, 73,92,97 Coen, Jan Pietersz, 20 Collingwood, Cuthbert, 78 Collins, C.E., 119 “comfort women,’’ 166 commodities, 78-81 Communism, 178,179,186-189 Confucian morality, 9 Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), 196-197 copper, 48,64 Courbet, Amedee Anatole, 90,92-93, 95-96,99-100,101-104 Coyett, Frederick, 42,43 Crisp, Ellis, 46,63 Cross, Charles T., 196 Crowell, William S., 123 Cushing, Caleb, 114 customs, 4 9 , 61, 74,122-124, 125-127

INDEX

D Dai Nippon Sugar Manufacturing Corporation, 139 Davidson, James, 97,103,126-127 Davis, John Francis, 67,106 Davis, John W., 108 de Behaine, Pineau, 89 de Faria, Bento Peteyra, 46 de risle, Louis Briérc, 102 de Mailla, Joseph, 87 de Meritens, Baron, 89,116 de Silva, Fernando, 26-27 de Valdes, Antonio Caireno, 26 de Vera, Pedro, 27 De With, Gerard, 23,40 Dean, David, 196 Deaver, Michael, 200 deer, 38 Delano, Amasa, 105 Delboe, Symon, 64 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 205 democratization, 197-202 Den Kenjiro, 144-145,147 Denby, Charles, 122-124 Dent & Co., 72.74.82,116 D ’Estaing, 94,102 Dodd, John. 8.80,93,110,121 Dodd & Co., 62.83,97,120,121 D orita, 96 Douglas, Carstairs, 75 Douzans, 94 Duchesne (General), 103 Duguay-Trvuin, 94,97-98 Dulles, John Foster, 15,187 Dumas, Roland, 104 Dupuis, Jean, 90 d’Urville, Jules Dumont, 88-89 Dutch coionialization administrative divisions of, 32 Christianity in, 32,33-35 in conflict with Spanish authority, 29-32 early trade with Taiwan, 6-7 Koxinga’s battles against, 42-43 licensing, 31 pirates, payment to, 39,40 and trade with China, 39 Dutch Republic of the Netherlands, 19-26, 23,25 ,2 6 “dwarf pirates” (wokou), 20

E East India Company, 63-65,85 Ede, George, 85-86 Ede (wife of George), 85 Eden, Anthony, 187 Edwards, Jack, 170 E tna, 71

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 181,187,188 Elgin. 72 Elgueta, Juan, 28 Elies & Co.. 83 Empress Dowager (Cixi), 99,101 Esquivel, Jacinto, 27,28,29 ethics (shui-shin), ISO ethnic diversity, 204-205 Experim ent, 64

F Far East Fleet, 95 Farrago, Edmond, 99 Feng Tze-ts'ai, 102 Ferbiger, J.C., 117 Ferraro, Geraldine, 198 Ferry, Jules, 90,94 Fillmore, Millard, 109, 111 Flint, James, 65 Fontaine (captain), 98-99 food shortage, 185-186 Forest B elle, 121 Formosa Frigate, 64 Formosan Club of Japan, 169 Formulary o f C hristianity, 35 Fort Orange (Fort Zeelandia), 21 Fort Provintia, 25,32-33,42,87 Fort San Salvador, 26 Fort Santo Domingo, 31 Fort Utrecht, 23 Fort Vlissingen, 23 Fort Zeeburg, 23,25 Fort Zeelandia (Fort Orange), 21,22,25, 31,42 Foster, John W., 126 Fournier, F.E., 90 France arms sales to China, 104 blockade of Taiwan, 95-101 initial interest in Taiwan, 87-89 Frater, Alexander, 121 French Torpedo Boat no. 46,94 Fujihara, Ginjiro, 171 Fukien dialect, 75 Fukienese trade, 50 Fukokugo, 170 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 129,130 Fulbright,J. William, 191 Fumimaro Konoe, 151 F usoM aru, 140

G Garcia, Lucos, 29 G eneral D escription o f China, 105 G eneral Sherman, 116-117

Geneva Convention, 167 Gibson, Charles, 203

259

260

INDEX

Gibson, John, 83,83 Gingell, W. Reymond, 68 Glynn, James, 108 Gordon, D.M., 68 GotoShimpei, 12-13,131,134-138 Grasshopper, 82 Gravius, Daniel, 35 G reat Britian, 53-54 Great Depression, 150-151 Grosier, Abbe, 105 Gurdon, T. Philip, 83 GutzlafT, Charles, 105 Gutzlaff, Karl F.A., 65-66

H Haig, Alexander, 200 Hainan Island, 168 Hambroek, Antonius, 32,35,87 Hancock, William, 78 Hardie, J.D., 83 Harding, C.F., 112 Hardy, 73 Harouse, Hendrik, 31 Harris, Townsend, 111 Hart, Robert, 60,103,126 H artford, 118 Hasegawa Kiyoshi, 163 H avoc, 83 Hayashi Gaho, 46 Hayashi Hoko, 46 Hayashi Razan, 46 Heard, Albert, 113 Heard, Augustine, 113 Henry, Augustine, 52-53,78 Hewlett, A.R., 85 Hinderer (Jesuit), 87 Hirohito, 152,154,173 Hiroshima, 172-173 Hirth, Friedrich, 10 HMS Dwarf, 79 H ollandia, 20 Holt, Henry P., 120 H oogelande, 43

Ho-p’ing (Peace) Island, 26,31,96 H orai M aru, 140

Hosie, Alexander, 125 House, Edward H., 121 Houtman, Cornelius, 19 Howell, John William, 116 Hsieh llen-lai, 168 Hsu Shin-su, 39,40 Huang, (Peter) Wen-hsiung, 193-194 Huang Chi-nan, 178 Huang Chuang, 120 Huang Lu-t*ou, 82 Huang Nan-ch’iu, 62 Huang Wu, 45

Hunt, Joseph W., 117 Huttmann, William, 66 Hyatt, T. Hart, Jr., 116

I Icarus, 82

Imperial Subjects Public Service Association, 163-164 independence movements, 106-107,145146,174-176,177-180,193,197-202 indigenous languages, 75,78 indigo, 53 Inflexible, 70,71 infrastructure development, 136-138,161, 182-183,184 inibs, 35 Insiel Islena, 29 Iquan, Nicholas (Cheng Chih-lung), 19,40 Iskanderia, 116 Itagaki Taisuke, 129 Ito Hirobumi, 130 Iwanami Shoten, 157

j Jackson, Andrew, 107 Jacquemier (Captain), 92 Jang Lauw (Liu Hsiang) (pirate chief), 39, 40 Janus, 82,83,120 Japan assimilation efforts by, 144-148,149-152 claim on Taiwan, 12-14 closed country policy of, 46-47 colonial education in Taiwan, 149-152 colonial rule, end of, 130-132,174 and diplomatic work with Japan, 120-121 early interests in Taiwan, 128-129 education system of, 155-158 food shortages, 171 governors-general in Taiwan, 132 and the Great Depression, 150-151 infrastructure work by, 136-138 and intermarriage, 153-154 merchant ships of, 140-141,142 military service, Taiwanese, 158-160, 164-167,166 name changes from Taiwanese, 154 Pearl Harbor attack, 164 resources benefiting, 138-140,143-144, 161 self-governance supported by, 134-138 and Sino-French War, 101 southeast Asia, conquests in, 163-164 and Taiwanese nationals (Sekimin), 131 Taiwanese resistance to, 132-134 and trade, 140-144,160 war with China, 130,151

INDEX

Japan (continued) and World War U. 155-156,170-173 zaibatsu, 138-144,160 Jardine, Matheson & Co., 61,67,72-73,74, 79-81,116 Jiang Zemin, 203 JijiS h in po, 130 Johann Cari, 92 Johnson, Cecil, 83 Johnson, James, 121 Johnson, Lyndon B., 191 Johnson, Samuel, 65 Jones, George, 109 Jones, Howard P., 186 Journal o f a R esidence in China and the N eighboring Countries, 105-106 Journal o f Three Voyages along the C oast o f China, 105

Junius, Robert, 30,34,87 junks, 50,53-54

K Kabayama Sukenori, 126,127,129,130, 132 Kaohsiun, 81 Kaohsiung, 113-114 Katasura Taro, 128 KatsuraTaro, 133 Kauffman, I.H., 184 Kawamura Takeji, 147-148 Keelung, 31,81 K elpie, 70,109 Kennedy, John F., 190 Kennedy administration, 190-191 Kerr, Crawford D., 120 Kerr, George H., 175,178 Key, B.W., 169 Kim H Sung, 180 Kimberley, Lord, 86 King, Thomas Butler, 108 Kinkai (Near the ocean) Shipping Company, 142 Kissinger, Henry A., 191-192 Klenk, Hermanus, 43 Koa Kin Huen, 61 Koa Son Jeea, 61 Kobayashi, 158-160 Kodama Gentaro, 134-135 K ojiki, 156 Koo, V.K., 187 Kopsch, Henry, 78 Korean War, 180-182 Koxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung), 19,35,40, 42-43,45-47,63-64 Ku Hsien-jung, 134 Kuhara Husanosuke, 143 Kuniaki Koiso, 171

Kuo Huai-yi, 41 Kuo Liang-yin, 166 Kuomintang (KMT), 174-176,176-177

L La G alissoniere, 92,93,97-98,100

La Pérouse, count de (Jean-François de Galaup), 88 La Triomphante, 94,95,97-98 La Vipere, 94 Lacroix (Lieutenant-Major), 96 Lai Ho, 145 landdag, 30,32-33 Lang (Lieutenant-Major), 96 L ’Annamite, 102 Larpent, 70,109 L ’A spic, 94 Le Bayard, 102 Le Chao-t’ung, 85 Le Duchaffaut, 102 Le Grendre, Charles W„ 117,118-122 Lee Teng-hui, 182,201,202,203 Lespes (Admirai), 91-94,96,97,98-99 Li Chang-keng, 57 Li Chih-ou, 69 Li Ching-fang, 126,130 Li Ch’un-sheng, 62 Li Chu-ou, 109 Li Hung-chang, 90,103,117,130 Li Kuang-hui, 168-169 Li Kuei-chi (pirate chief) (Quitsicq), 39 Li Tan (Andrée Dittus), 39 LiTien-lu, 171 Liang Yuan-kuei, 83 Liao, Wen-ki (Joshua), 178 Uao, Wen-yi (Thomas), 178,179 Lien Heng, 101 Li-Foumier Agreement, 103 Lin Feng (Limahong), 19 Lin Hsien-t’ang, 8,62,146,178 U n Nu-mei, 62 U n Shao-mao, 133 U n Wei-yuan, 62 Lin Yih-shyong, family of, 197 Uu, Henry, 197-198 LiuAo, 100,101 U u Ming-ch’uan, 77,92-93,96-97,100, 104,119,122-123,125 Liu Yung-fu, 90 Liu Yun-ke, 68 Lloyd, Solomon, 64 Lo Fu-hsing, 134 Longkiau tribe, 30 Louis XV, 88 Louis XVI, 88 Louisiana, 113 Lowæn tribe, 30

261

262

INDEX

Luard (British lieutenant), 83 Lucky Star, 116 Lung-wu emperor, 41 Lutin, 92,95 Lynx, 94

M Maatzuyker, Joan, 42 MacArthur, Douglas, 169,171,173, 181 MacDonald, John, 179 M acedonian, 69,109 Mackay, George Leslie, 12,77,79 Mackay, (son of Geoige Leslie), 149 Mackenzie, Alexander S., 118,119 Mackenzie, H.L., 75 MacMillan, Hugh, 150 MacPhail, James, 89 Madagascar, 88 Magol, 30 Major, Emest, 93 Maltby, Paul G , 170 Man, Alex J., 120 Manchu empire, 41,45-47,48-54,64-65 Manifest Destiny, 108 Manila, trade in, 26 Manson, Patrick, 78 Mao Zedong, 16,178,189 Marcy, WilliamL., I l l Marshall, George G , 177 Martin (Colonel), 92 Martinez, Bartolome, 25,28 M ary M ackertoom , 70 Masius, Marcus, 35 Matheson, Donald, 79 Mattau tribe, 30 Maxwell, James Laidlaw, 11,75-77,78, 83 Maxwell, James Laidlaw, Jr., 77 Maxwell, James Preston, 77 McConaughy, Walter R, 187-188,193 McLane, Robert M., 111 McPhail Brothers (Elies & Co.), 76,82,117 Meiji Sugar Manufacturing Corporation, 139 M elanie, 113 Merrill, Henry F., 60 M iceno, 113 Milisch, James, 8,80, 119 Milisch&Co., 119 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 181 military self-defense, 198-202 Ming dynasty, 20,41,46 Ming empire, 5 missionaries, 11-12,33-35,75-78, 106, 174 Mitsubishi, 160 Mitsui Taiwan Sugar Corporation, 139 Mitterand, François, 104 M izuho M aru, 140

modernization program (infrastructure), 122, 123 Mola, Francisco, 28 Montgomery, P.H.S., 10 Morel, Jeronimo, 28 Morrice (Zyphr captian), 69-70 Morrison, Alexander, 80 Morse, Hosea B., 10,60,125-126 Morse, Wayne, 16-17 Mother Tongue Family Board (MTFB), 153-154 mulberry papers, 53 Murayama Than, 128 murder investigation. Peony tribe members,

121 Mus, Petrus, 35 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), 188,193 Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 182-183 Myers, W.I., 184

N Nachoda Banqua, 42 Nagasaki, 172-173 Nakamura Takashi, 38 N antai, 94 Napier, Lord, 115 Natsume Soseki, 157 Nelson, Charles, 116 Nerbudda, 66-67,70,108 Neville, H.,67 N ew York, 121,129 newspapers, 80,145,151-152 Newton, William D., 176 Nguyen, 89 Nimitz, Chester W., 170 Nimrod, 66 Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 140,142 Nixon, Richard M., 190, 191 Nixon administration, 191-194 Nogi Maresuke, 133 Nomura, S.J., 126 North, Oliver, 200, 201 Northrop Corporation, 198-199 Nuyts, Pieter, 30 Nye, Gordon, 114,115 Nye, Thomas, 114 Nye Bros. & Co., 8,113 Nymph, 70

o Ogden, W.S., 68, 108 oil, American, 125 Okinawa, 172 Okubo Toshimichi, 129 Olhoff, Hans, 33, 34 Ong Joktik (Wang Yu-te), 146 opium, 66,79, 136-137

INDEX Opossum, 71 Orange-Nassau family, 23

P’u-tai Cape, 116 Putmans, Hans, 30,40

P

Q

Palm (Ho-p*ing) Island, 26,31, % Palmerstone, Lord, 66 P*an Kuan-sheng, 119 P’an Yun-ch’ing, 62 Paragon, 109 Parker, Peter, 109,114-115, 118 Parkes, Harry S., 69,72 Patenotre, Jules, 90,94,103 Patna brand, 79 peanuts, 52-53 Pearl, 63,83, 114 Pearl Harbor attack, 14,164 Pearse (Nim rod captain), 66 Pedro China (Yen Shih-chi), 19 Pell, Claiborne, 198 Peng Dehuai, 190 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 68,69 Pennock, A.M., 121 Peony (Botan) tribe, 128-129 Peony tribe, 121 People's Liberation Army (PLA), 189 Percival, A.E., 169 Perry, Matthew C , 89,109-111,114, 118 Persons, 82 Pescadores Islands: Inner Anchorages, 103 Pickering, William A., 76,83,84-85, 116-117,118 Pierce, Franklin, 111 Pimaba (Pilam) tribe, 30 Pingeot, Anne, 104 Pioneering in Formosa, 76,84 piracy, 69, 112-113 pirates, 19,20,39-44,54-62,69-70 poets, 145 policiacristian a, 28-29 Po-luo, 41 porcelain, 37 Porpoise, 109 Portillo, Gonzalo, 31 ports, major, 19th century, 81 Portugal, 4-5,20 Potom ac, 107 Potsdam Declaration, 173 Potter, George A., 113 Pöttinger, Henry, 67 Preble, 108 Presbyterian Church of Taiwan, 11-12, 75-76 prisoners of war, in Taiwan, 169-170 prisoners of war, Taiwanese, 167-169 Psalmanazar, George, 65,105 publishing, 145-146,157

Quemoy Crises, 189-190 Quimauri tribe, 27 Q uitos de la Madie de Dios, Teodora, 2 9 Quitsicq (pirate chief), 40

R Rainbow, Mr., 82 Rankin. Karl Lott, 181,186-187 Reagan administration, 201 R edbreast, 86 Reed, William B.. 115 Regis (Jesuit), 87 Return, 64 Reyersen, Cornells, 20,22 Reynard, 68 rice, 46,50-52,140,162 Richard, John, 72 Richie, Hugh, 76,77 Rinden, Robert W„ 186 Rivière, Henri, 90 Roberts, George H., 113 Robertson, Walter S., 187-188 Robinet, W.M., 114 Robinet Company, 8,52,61 ROC Overseas Development Fund, 202 Rogers, William P., 191 Roper, Alfred, 80 Rorie, Glo, 80 Rosebery, Lord, 86 R osita, 112,113 Rover, 117, 119 Ruders, Frank J., 116 Rusk, Dean, 16,191 Russell & Co.. 113

s Saigo Takamori, 129 Saigo Tsugumichi, 129 Sailoku Zaemon, 28,29 Sakuma Samata, 134 Salamander, 71 San Jose, 29 San Juan Bautista, 29 Santiago (name for Taiwan), 26 Santo Domingo (fortress), 27 Sarah Trotman, 70 Saulang tribe, 30 Sawai Hideo, 166 Schenck, Hubert G., 183 Schölten, Paul, 170 Schotanus, Joannes, 33 Science, 113, 114 Sekimin (Taiwanese nationals), 131

263

264

INDEX

September 11,2001, terrorist attacks, 204 Seven Years* War, 89 Shaler, William, 105 ShaoWen-p’u, 125 Shao You-lien, 125 Shen You-jung, 6 Shih Lang, 47,65 Shintoism, 154 shipwreck survivors, American, 108-109, 116,117-118 shipwreck survivors, English, 70-71, 78-79 shipwrecks, 54,66,76-79,108-109,114, 121,128-129 Shotoku, 3 Shultz, George P., 200 Siam, 46 silk, 35-37,64 silver, 35-37,48 Sinkan, 22,25,33-35 Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 183-184 Sino-French war, 89-91,101-104 Sino-Japanese peace treaty, 173 Sisco, Joseph, 191 slavery, 70 smallpox epidemics, 27,29,33 Smythe, George D., 182 Snow, Edgar, 16 Solarz, Stephen J., 198 Sonck, Martinus, 22,23 Soong, James C.Y., 194 Soviet Union, 180 Spain, 6,25,26-29 Spanish colonialism and Catholicism, 28-29 in conflict with Dutch authority, 29-32 governors in Taiwan, 28 military hierarchy of, 27-28, 28 Spinney, William F., 10,60,125-126 Staunch, 82 steamships, 53-54 Steere, Joseph B., 78 Stevens, Edwin, 107 Strillaber, John, 107 Stuart, John Leighton, 178 Sturgeon, Leo, 174 Su Hsi, 159 Suez Canal, 89 sugar, 46,48,53,64,139-140,162 Sullivan, Thomas, 82 Sumitomo, 160 sun goddess, 164 Sun Kai-Hua, 98,99 Sung dynasty, 20 Swinhoe, Robert, 71,73,74,78,79, 115-116

T ‘t V erwaerioosde Formosa, 43 Tagawa (mother of Koxinga), 19,40 Ta-hung-ah, 66-67 Tait & Co., 79,83,97 Taiwan, naming of, 3-6,26 Taiwan Cultural Association, 145-146 Taiwan Development Company, 160-163 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 195-197 Taiwanese nationals (Sekimin), 131 Taiwanese People’s Party, 146 Taiwanfii, 81 Tamsui, 27,31,81 Tamsui C hristian D octrine M anual, 29 Tamsui County G azetteer, 99 Tamsui Vernacular D ictionary, 29

T’ang Ching-sung, 126 Tang Shi-yeoung, 168 Tao-kwang, 59 Tapani tribe, 27 Taylor, George, 78 tea, 64,110-111,121 Thomas, Shenton, 169 Thomas Ward and Company, 105 Thomson, John, 78 1,000-stitch cloth (sennin bari), 164 H en-shih-tsai P icto ria l Journal, 93,99 Ting Jih-chien, 74-75,82 Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, 184 Tojo Hideki, 171 Tonkin fleet, 93,95 Torricelli, Robert G., 198 Toutsailacq (Chung Pin) (pirate chief), 39,40 trade with aborigines, 119 Asian expansion, 141-142 with Britain, 64-65,68-69,74 with China, 39,64-65,71-75 with the Dutch, 6-7,39 Fukienese, 50 with Japan, 140-144 in Manila, 26 with United States, 89,112-117,119 Traudenius, Paulus, 31 Treaty of Bogue (1843), 68 Treaty of Nanking (1842), 68 Treaty of Tientsin (1858), 71,72,74,115 Truman, Harry S., 179,180 Ts’ai, Caroline, 137 Ts’ai, Hui-yu Caroline, 166 Tsai G i’ien (pirate chief)» 9,55-57,106 Tsai Erh-lai, 57 Tsai Pei-ho, 146 Tsai Tien, 57 Tsai (wife of Ch’ien), 55,56 Tsan Sheng, 55 Ts’ao Chih-chung, 92,93

INDEX

Tseng Kuo-ch’uan, 90 Tseng Kuo-fan, 90 Tsou Chi-tu (Tauketok), 118-119,120 Tü Chin, 47 T u n T ’ai, 45 ‘Two China” policy, 189 2.28 Massacre, 177

U Unger, Leonard S., 194 United East India Company (VOC). 4, 19-20,23-25,30,32,35-41 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 174-175 United States aborigines, trade with, 119,120 aid mission to Taiwan, 182-186 camphor, trade in, 112-117 colonization attempts, 109-111 and Communism, Taiwan as ally against, 186-189 and democratization of Taiwan, 197-202 early knowledge about Taiwan, 105-109 and the Korean War, 180-182 merchants’ dispute with China, 120 missionaries from, 174 and piracy, 69-70 “policy of ambiguity,” 204-206 post 9/11 relationship, 202-204 and the Quemoy Crises, 189-190 shipwrecks, 117-118 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 195-197 termination of relations, 194-195 tips to merchants, 107 trade, 19th century share in, 89 and triangular relation with Taiwan and China, 190-194 USS Ashuelot, 117-118 USS D olphin, 108 USS Juanita, 123 USS M arion, 109 USS M issouri, 14 USS M onocacy, 121 USS Peacock, 107 USS Wyoming, 118

V Vaez de Santo Domingo, Francisco, 29 van Agt, Andreas, 15-16 van der Burg, Johan, 30 Van Lingaa, Johan, 30 van Odesse, Hermanus Klenk, 43 van Waerwijck, Wijbrand, 20 Vance, Cyrus, 196 Verbürg, Nichotaes, 40,43 Vertrecht, Jacobus, 34 Vieillard, Philippe, 88

265

Vietnam, 89-91 Villars, 92 Vincent, Thomas, 72,80 Vindex, 82 Vipere, 96.97-98 Vlissingen, 20 VOC. See United East India Company (VOC) Volta, 94

w Wade, Thomas F„ 82 Wainwright, Jonathan, 169,170 Walker, Richard “Dixie,” 197 Watters, Thomas, 74,82 Wedemeyer, Albert C.. 174,177 Wei Tao-ming, 178 Welle, 92 Wesseling, Maarten, 32 wildlife studies in Taiwan, 78 Williams, C.D., 113,114 Williams. Samuel Wells, 106-107 Winsem, Amoldus A., 35 wokou (“dwarf pirates"), 20 women, treatment in aborigine society, 87 Wood, William B.. 107 Woolhouse, Thomas, 64 World United Formosans for Independence, 193 World War 1 ,142 World W arn, 155-156,158-160,170-173 Wylie, Douglas A., 75

X Xiaoping, Deng, 194

Y Yamato M aru, 140 Yang Hua, 145 Yang-wu, 94 Yao ring, 66-67 Yasukuni Memorial Shrine, 168 Yeh, George K.C., 187 Yen Shih-chi (Pedro China), 19 Yen-shui-kang Sugar Manufacturing Corporation, 139 Yoshida Shigeru, 15 Yoshida Shoin, 128 Yoshino M aru, 140 Yu Ch'ing-fang, 134 Yu T’uo, 70 Yuan dynasty, 20

z zaibatsu firms, 12-14,138-144,160 Zeelandia, 21-22

Zhou Enlai, 191-192 Zyphr, 69

About the Author

A native o f Taiwan, Shih-shan Henry Tsai has taught history at National Taiwan University, U niversity o f C alifornia, Los A ngeles, U niversity o f California at Berkeley, and the U niversity o f Arkansas. He was a Fulbright scholar at St. Petersburg State U niversity in Russia and a Visiting Senior Fellow at Academ ia Sinica o f Taiwan. He is currently C hair Professor at the National Chiao Tung U niversity o f Taiwan. In addition to numerous articles on M ing maritime explorations and overseas Chinese, Tsai is the author o f seven books, including Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Q uest fo r Identity.