289 50 6MB
English Pages [222] Year 1966
T H E SOCIETAL STATE
THE SOCIETAL STATE The modern osmosis of State and Society as presenting itself in the Netherlands in particular A case study of a general trend
PROEFSCHRIFT TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN AAN DE RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT TE LEIDEN, OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS DR. J. DANKMEIJER, HOOGLERAAR IN DE FACULTEIT DER GENEESKUNDE, TEN OVERSTAAN VAN EEN COMMISSIE UIT DE SENAAT TE VERDEDIGEN OP WOENSDAG 29 JUNI 1966 TE 16.00 UUR
DOOR
PAUL ERIK KRAEMER IN
GEBOREN TE MALANG (N.O.-L, THANS INDONESIË) IN 1926
J. A. BOOM EN ZOON, UITGEVERS TE MEPPEL
PROMOTOR: PROF. DR. F. VAN HEEK
IV
PREFACE
Every study is a cumulative experience. Everyone engaged in scholarly exercises cannot but underscore the words of Dewey which the present writer has chosen as the motto to the introduc tory chapter of this particular study. No study is feasible without the contributions of many others, without their thought and research, without their stimulation and encouragement, and without their endurance. All this is obvious. Yet, not everything which is obvious can be taken for granted. Indebtedness to many is not to say that there are not a few to whom one feels especially indebted, to whom one owes gratitude beyond adequate expression. It is such gratitude, however, that the writer of this study wants to express to Hen riette, his wife, to his parents Hendrik and Hyke Kraemer, and to Dr. W. Banning and Dr. J. M. van Veen, one-time chairmen of the board of trustees of the Sociological Institute of the Netherlands Reformed Church.
V
TABLE OF CO N TEN TS
Preface
V
Introduction
\
THESIS - ANTITHESIS - SYNTHESIS
1. Absolutism versus Liberalism 2. State and Society Separated 3. Two Pre-20th Century State-Society Relations A Typology 4. The Modern Synthesis 5. The Societal State in First Draft 6. The State-Society Relations Typology Completed A Summary
Chapter I
2 3 5 10 13 18
21
FROM FREE SOCIETY TO SOCIETAL STATE: A GENERAL SURVEY
1. The Axial Year 1848 Two Revolutions in Joint Operation (23) From First into Second Gear (27) 2. Heinrich Heine Partly Refuted The Premium on Backwardness (32) Poverty and Stagnation (33) A Change of Spirit and Structure (37) 3. The Crumbling of a System The Supplementary State (44) Some Telling Statistics (47) Four Phases (51) Two Conclusions (57)
Chapter II
22
31
43
59
FROM FREE SOCIETY TO SOCIETAL STATE: A THREEFOLD ANALYSIS
1. The Growth of Organizationalism Big Business (63) Big Labour (72) Big Agriculture (75) Big Go vernment (80) Three Major Types of State-Society Interpéné trations (85) 2. The March of the Masses In the Line of Liberalism (90) Emancipation in Quadruplet (92) From Emancipation to Integration (106) 3. The Voice of Conscience Capitalist Industrialism and the Social Conscience (114) The Dynamics of Social Criticism (118)
60
89
113
Vll
Chapter III
^
SOCIETAL STATE AND RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY: A CONFRONTATION
1. The Societal State X-Rayed Two Essential Characteristics (127) From the Angle of Human Aspirations — The Idea of Solidarity As an Empirical Fact (130) From the Angle of 'Immanence' — T he Effect of the Sorcerer's Apprentice? (139) 2. The 'Responsible Society’ As a Criterion The Concept Outlined (149) The Concept Applied (155)
126
148
Appendices
163
NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES BRIEF SUMMARY IN DUTCH INDEX
164 188 200 202 204
VIII
STELLINGEN
I Met betrekking tot het vaderschap van de sociologie lijkt een Salomo’s oordeel van de volgende strekking gewettigd: dient Augus te Comte geëerd als naamgever, Lorenz von Stein kan aanspraak doen gelden op erkenning als grondlegger van de sociologie als een afzonderlijke, empirische wetenschap, welke in de maatschappij, begrepen als zelfstandige werkelijkheid naast de staat, haar eigen lijke voorwerp bezit. L. von Stein, Der Begriff der Geselschaft und die sociale Geschichte der französischen Revolution bis zum Jahre 1830 (Leipzig 1855, 2e dr.), Einleitung
II Sociologie is niet louter een vakwetenschap, welker beoefenaren hun taak vinden in het verifiëren van nuchtere feiten zonder meer, maar dient evenzeer — en zeker op sociaal-politiek-terrein — te wor den beschouwd als een specifieke discipline van denken en bena deren, die gericht is op het critisch doorlichten van tot probleem gestelde (c.q. te stellen) samenlevingssituaties; opdat in gezamen lijk 'engagement’ met de in deze situaties betrokkenen zélf tot in zicht en doorzicht wordt bijgedragen, en aldus actieve deelname kan worden bevorderd in het streven naar oplossingen voor de be wust als ’eigen’ ervaren vraagstukken van ”een bestemming zoeken de menselijke groeperingen”. P. Thoenes, D e verloochening van het Marxisme (Assen 1964), p. 17; en tevens, in Sociologische Gids, V (1958), pp. 2 4 lv.: Sociologie en nonconformisme
III Het marxistisch postulaat van de uiteindelijke afsterving van de staat is vrucht van dezelfde bodem als die waarin het liberalistisch beginsel van maximale staatsonthouding tot ontwikkeling kwam.
IV De kern van het sociale vraagstuk, zoals het zich stelt in de Wes terse democratieën van de tweede helft der twintigste eeuw, wordt gevormd door de vraag naar daadwerkelijke realisering en effec tuering van persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid in een samenlevingsbestel gericht op collectieve solidariteit. V Medezeggenschap als vraagstuk, d.w.z. als nog geenszins algemeen onderschreven principiële vooronderstelling, op economisch terrein duidt op het bestaan van een 'conceptual lag' in de hedendaagse Westerse democratieën, waar politieke medezeggenschap sedert decenniën tot de vanzelfsprekendheden behoort. H . D . Wendland, Botschaft an die soziale W e lt (Hamburg 1959), pp. 228v.; D. G. Agger e.a., T h e T riple Revoluüon (Santa Barbara, Calif. 1964), pp. 12-13
VI De in kerkelijke kring opgeld doende bedenkingen, als zouden de zgn. para-parochiële experimenten leiden tot louter op specifieke groepen gebaseerde gemeentevormen, getuigen van een binnen kerkelijke c.q. kerk-centrische wijze van denken, welke een wezen lijke miskenning betekent van het 'inner-weltliche c.q. 'saeculumcentrische motief van vele der genoemde experimenten, die hun innerlijke bezieling minder vinden in het tot de kerk (terug)voeren van de betrokken groepen, dan in het exploreren van specifieke velden voor een reële confrontatie van Evangelie en Saeculum, waarin het gemeente-zijn ontstaat, gebeurt, tot werkelijkheid wordt in en door dit aldus bezig zijn. G. Winter, T h e N e w Creation as M etropolis (N ew York 1963), chs. IH II
VII Publicatie van wetenschappelijke geschriften in een andere, aan zienlijk wijdere verbreiding hebbende taal, dan het Nederlands, verdient aanbeveling in het belang van de 'universalisering van wetenschappelijke inzichten, waaraan een ernstige belemmering in de weg is gelegd sedert het in onbruik raken van het Latijn als wetenschappelijke 'lingua franca.
VIII De ook door Nederlandse uitgevers meer en meer gehanteerde 'absolute copyright-clausule, inhoudende dat uit een uitgave niets mag worden verveelvoudigd en/of openbaar gemaakt op welke wij ze ook zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uit gever, vormt een bedreiging voor de vrijheid van het wetenschap pelijk bedrijf, en vertegenwoordigt als zodanig een dysfunctioneel optreden van het commercieel belang.
behorende bij P. E. Kraemer: The Societal State
INTRODUCTION
THESIS - ANTITHESIS - SYNTHESIS
The new vision does not arise out of nothing, but emerges through s e e in g ... old things in new relations. . . W hat one person and one group accomplish be comes the standing ground and starting point of those who succeed them. JOHN DEWEY1
The day is the Ides of April, 1655. For the second time in a few weeks the Parliament of Paris is convened. This time, however, not en lit de justice’, but with its own Premier Président Pomponne de Bellièvre in the chair. At last he has given in, unable to with stand any longer the pressures which have been put on him by those who strongly voice their grievances in this meeting. In passionate orations and fiery protestations the hurt feelings and strained sentiments find expression. Should this noble body really resign itself to being called together only if the King wishes so, in order to hear His decrees and decisions ceremoniously proclaim ed? Does not each member have the privilege of free speech and, therefore, of fearlessly delivering his opinion on every single one of the levies made public during the last... All of a sudden dead silence falls. Through the doors His Majesty marches in, still in boots, and whip in hand, as He has hurried back from a hunt in the Bois de Vincennes. Casting but a moment’s glance at the gathering so abruptly silenced, the King of France speaks out, His voice curt and sharp. "Anybody knows what great troubles your Assemblées have excited in my State, and what dangerous effects
2
THE SOCIETAL STATE
have been produced thereby. Yet, so I understand, you pretend to their continuation on the pretext of discussing the edicts that recendy have been read and registered in my very presence. But I have come here expressly to order an immediate end to these deliberations of yours, Messieurs les Enquêtes, just as I want to make it perfecdy clear to you, Monsieur le premier Président, henceforth neither to tolerate, nor to concede to whatever re quests !” * Are these the words Louis XIV has actually spoken — by posterity they have been condensed into the famous 'formule de l'absolutisme', the classic device of that political system most bril liantly personified by the Roi Soleil: l’Êtat, c'est M o i... / 1. ABSOLUTISM VERSUS LIBERALISM
Absolutism means the triumph of the fully autonomous and sovereign State, embodied in the royal ruler whose wish is the law of the land. The source of authority is not to be found any more in the community of the people, as represented in the es tates, but in the Raison d'État, the Interest of the State transcend ing everything. The comprehensive order of a strongly centralized administration has superseded the feudal multitude of limited local powers as the result of a slowly ripened process; a process which, in itself, is of a rather paradoxical nature. The tendency to control and regulate from above is reinforced from below, the trend towards concentration by the State coalesces with the dyn amics of Society. By supporting the new national state the mer chants and manufacturers are provided with the firmer frame work and wider scope their zest for enterprise requires, and it is in Mercantilism that this community of interests between princely centralism and bourgeois expansionism becomes manifest. However, such an alliance cannot last. Initially proving in dispensable (and profitable, too) state predominance turns out to be a vexing impediment as soon as economic life starts progressing from early to more modem capitalist conditions and wants to follow the dictates of its own momentum instead of those of power pol itics. Before long, banking and commerce with their continually growing international orientation as well as the new and révolu-
STATE AND SOCIETY SEPARATED
3
tionizing world of mechanical industry, have little need for the monopolistic web of royal ordinances aimed at the protection and strengthening of the national resources. In fact, they are thwarted rather than furthered by it, and so the call for a 'laissez faire, lais sez passer resounds louder and louder. Moreover, at the same time there is a steadily increasing resentment at the states political tutelage among those whose economic position is as significant as their influence in public affairs is negligible. Over against the autocratic monarchy, and its inherent arbitrariness, one demands that the citizens be entitled to a voice in a legally constituted government; over against the divine right of the king one desires the natural rights of man to be respected. Liberty, equality and property, security and resistance to oppression — these are the ideals that, by dissemination through the philosophers' treatises, ever more cast their spell over men's minds. And when, in due course, they are set ablaze in revolutions and wars of independence the Ancien Régime is ousted, and a New Era is hailed. The Era of Liberalism. The era in which, in consequence of the interplay of economic and political, spiritual and social forces, the bourgeoisie is enabled not only to proclaim but also to exper ience its coming of age as the 'general class' of a Society now be ing freed from the fetters of the States. 2. STATE AND SOCIETY SEPARATED
Viewed from a certain angle, the exclamation attributed to King Louis, l’Etat cest Moi, has its counterpart in the widely circu lated words of the American captain of industry and one-time secretary of Defence, Charles E. Wilson: W hat is good for General Motors, is good for the country\ Louis XIV completely identifies the state, the interest of the nation, with his own personality, i.e. the personality of the absol ute monarch being King by the Grace of God. He himself is the State, to which everybody and everything is subordinated. Wilson, although living in the 20th century, shows himself heir to the 19th. This, at least, seems to be suggested by his words in which the echo may be heard of the creed of classical Lib eralism. The main article of this creed reads that there is a natural
4
THE SOCIETAL STATE
harmony between general welfare and private self-interest. Econ omically, it believes in the free competition of all individuals, disposing of their property and labour unhampered by any outside restraint. Politically, it believes in a constitutional democracy in which government does not wield supreme power over its subjects but, on the contrary, is controlled by the people whose lives and goods it is to guard and whose fundamental freedoms it is to guarantee. Spiritually, it believes in the inevitability of Progress, if only the spontaneous development of things personal and social is relied upon6. In brief, this threefold Liberalism is living by the idea — an idea it sees rooted in reality — of the superiority of Society. In the contrast of these two sayings the two opposite poles of the relation of State and Society are exposed : the one claiming the primacy of the State, the other of Society. However, the very notion of such a relationship existing between two independent entities does but gradually pervade the minds of those who are honoured today as the (fore)Fathers of Sociology. It is not until the middle of the 19th century that Society is clearly and consciously distinguished as a phenomenon having a reality of its own, as a concept being essentially different from the State. The first one to make this distinction is, in all probability, Lorenz von Stein. To be sure, a distinction between State and Society has already been made by men like Fichte and Novalis at the close of the 18th century , and later on also by Hegel — i.e. in the realm of philosophy. However, this notion has yet to be brought, as Maclver has put it, to the realm of (social) science. And it is exactly to this that Hegel's pupil Von Stein may be con sidered to have given, if not the first, then at least a most decisive impetus in his Begriff der Gesellschaftβ. Von Stein has published this study in immediate reaction to the revolutionary events of 1848/49 in France and, spreading from there, in several other continental countries. The unmistakable so cial character of these events has opened his eyes to what must be — phrasing it after the fashion of the time — the true laws of human community life (or, a little more modestly, to the under lying societal causes of the commotion showing on the political surface, especially since 1789). Every human community he finds
TWO PRE-20TH CENTURY STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS
5
to have two vital elements, viz. the State, as the "organische Ein heit ihres Willens", and Society, as the "eben so feste, eben so groszartige, eben so mächtige organische Einheit ihres Lebens, . . . durch die Vertheilung der Güter bedingt, durch den Organismus der Arbeit geregelt, durch das System der Bedürfnisse in Bewe gung gesetzt und durch die Familie und ihr Recht an bestimmte Geschlechter dauernd gebunden". Considering, on the other hand, that the natural aim of the State is the furthering of the public good, whereas Society by its very nature is moved by the particular interests of individuals and groups, Von Stein arrives at the con clusion that the essence of the inner history of any nation consists of the continuous conflict between both. But however much these two elements may be clashing in principle, in practice they prove to be one as the State, having no life or power of its own, is bound to be subordinated to the order of Society7. What Von Stein is doing, in other words, is more than distin guishing Society as a separate entity next to, or even over against the State. He also posits the Primacy of Society. He finds the ac tual driving-force of social life working in Society and not the State. In his opinion, the State is merely the exponent, the 'power symbol' of the dominant societal class. 3. TWO PRE-20TH CENTURY STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS A TYPOLOGY
One can hardly deny that the views of Lorenz von Stein fit in, at least to a very great extent, with the facts and strivings of the mid-19th century days. Are these not the days of the emerging liberalist parties jealously guarding the rights of the individual citizens, and apt to suspect in any interference therewith an as sault on the separation-of-powers which has been designed to de prive the State of its absolute authority? And are these parties not the political vehicles for the economic interests of the new ruling and propertied classes of the bourgeoisie, composed of many different groups, but unanimous in their demands that an indus trial and commercial policy fostering free and private enterprise be substituted for the abhorred system of mercantilist regimenta tion? And these demands and interests, are they not greatly gen-
6
THE SOCIETAL STATE
erated through the ideological movements and material develop ments which, gathering momentum since the second half of the 18th century, proclaim, and initially also sustain, Society’s inde pendence of, and prevalence over the State? By the middle of the 19th century a complete reversal, indeed, has come about in State-Society relations. By then, one might say, the one-time thesis of the Absolutist State appears to have been converted into the antithesis of the Free Society. To preclude possible misunderstandings, it should be stressed that, in the present context, both Absolutist State and Free Soci ety are not so much to be taken as political concepts, but, first and foremost, as typological indications of the consequences of specific ideological points of view regarding the relationship of State and Society. That is, they are to be taken as ’ideal-typical’ concepts; they are meant to typify — as is visualized in Figure 1 — two polar phases which can be discerned in the thinking on Society and State and their relationship in Western Europe in the period ranging from approximately 1600 to 1900. FIGURE 1
State-Society Relations Typical of Absolutism and Liberalism
During the 17th and the greater part of the 18th century the State’s primacy is evident, if not in practice, at least in theory. Generally speaking, this is the outcome of a situation of which a parallel can be observed in our own age, in the new-born nations
TWO PRE-20TH CENTURY STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS
7
of Asia and Africa that one after the other take recourse to strong one-party governments. In a more or less analogous way to today's so-called underdeveloped (or developing) countries, in 16th and 17th century Europe the rise of definitely centralist, totalitarianstyle administrations is, in fact, accepted as the preferable alter native. "What was the alternative?" it has been asked. And the answer given reads: "The very things which men feared and h ated . . . loc alism, ecclesiastical strife, and oppression by tyrannical individuals and overlords. T he choice among alternatives can come only when there are alternatives theoretical or actual, and at the origin of things there are, by hypothesis, none". Consequently, "the (absolute) state enjoyed the benefits of an almost complete consensus"; the more so as it "entered a field in which the extent of its territory and popula tion was a singularly important condition of success in the things men w anted. . . international mercantile and colonial success, and the regulation of domestic conditions to ensure this" 8. As to the parallel with the underdeveloped nations of today, the following quotations may be illuminating. "Where there is no wellorganized market, where there is often only a small and unenter prising business class with little experience in modem industrial or ganization, where economic development involves such fundamental social and cultural transformations, where there are great masses of illiterate and technically untrained people, and where there is very inadequate social legislation and an even less developed sense of public responsibility to protect the economically weak, the only feasible approach seems to be through state action for economic devel opment. ( . . . ) Today it must even be asked whether the moderate, democratically conceived ’socialistic pattem of society* favored by countries like India will be able to produce quickly enough the de sired economic change, or whether eventually it will not be necessary to resort to more authoritarian state control. Many you th . . . feel that all talk about freedom and democracy is hypocrisy and sham unless it can produce effective action. Many are ready to give practically unlimited power to any party, movement, or leader truly concerned about the social and economic problems of the nation" ·.
The absolute State is found to be the only unit powerful enough to put an end to the divisions and internal ruptures of the crumbling medieval system, and to enter into a successful struggle for political and economic unification; a struggle, moreover, which, in its being aimed at territorial extension and national enrichment, concurs to a high degree with the acquisitive fervour and lust for enterprise of the early capitalist Merchant Adventurers. In short,
8
THE SOCIETAL STATE
the 'statist' State that is symbolic of the absolutist and mercan tilist phase in Western history may be viewed as the exponent of post-medieval Society’s need for a larger-scale and more potent structure of coordination (or frame group, as Mannheim puts it) than can be provided by feudal lordships and chartered towns1·. Not unlikely, the objection will be raised that all this does not apply to the country with which this study is going to deal in par ticular. In Holland, Absolutism bas never been really existent (since the timely abjuration of King Philip II of Spain), nor has the Dutch Republic ever known any effective form of centralized government. In answer to this objection, which, historically speaking, is well founded, a few comments may be made. (1) In the 17th and 18th century, the Dutch situation represents a complete — but rather unique — exception to the general rule of authoritarian-centralist regimes in the then politically dominant countries. And it is with this general rule that we are concerned in this introductory chapter which is meant to trace, in very broad outlines, the respective ’dia lectical’ stages that can be distinguished in the evolution of StateSociety relations in Western Europe since the close of the Middle Ages. (2) There can be no doubt, indeed, that the first stage — i.c. the thesis of what, with a view to the general situation, has been termed the Absolutist State — cannot be found in 17th and 18th century Hol land. But this is not to say that it is totally non-existent in Dutch his tory. In a mitigated form, this initial stage, the essential characteristic of which is the unmistakable primacy of the State, does occur in the Netherlands during the early 19th century reign of the neo-mercan tilist King Willem I. (3) In addition, it may be worthwhile to stress that the absence of Absolutism does not mean the absence of a defin itely paternalist and distinctly mercantilist frame of mind among the politically and economically dominant oligarchies. T o be sure, in the Dutch Republic (and, to a certain extent, also in England, where Absolutism is checked at a relatively early date: the Glorious Revolu tion of 1688), the role of the State is a much more limited one than in France, Portugal, or Spain. In commercial matters, e.g., the central government delegates a considerable part of its authority to overseas trading companies created by private merchants; but it is quite clear that, in the final analysis, this delegation implies a lease by the government of specific ’statist’ monopolies to what, paradoxically speaking, might be characterized as mercantilist states-within-theState on a private basis n .
In the 19th century, the situation is thoroughly different Circa 1850, the classical Liberalist schools of thought — the doc trines of which reflect, or, at least, foreshadow the break-through
TWO PRE-20TH CENTURY STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS
9
of modem capitalist industry and bourgeois hegemony — are at their zenith. As a matter of course, even at that time Liberalism is far from uncontested, but its critics in no way represent the predominant trend in political and economic thinking12. The great, and then most influential, majority of writers on questions of Soci ety and State view the latter as wholly subsidiary to the former. Practically unchallenged, therefore, reigns the conception of (Free) Society as the sum total of independent individuals who know their own interests best and are fully capable of pursuing these to the well-being of each and of all. And this conception's corol lary might be labelled the Abstinent State; a state in its actions reduced to the indispensable minimum of protecting the nation from violence and invasion, establishing the administration of jus tice, and promoting the public good, provided that any interven tion undertaken to this end does not hamper the individual's free dom. As laid down in the bible of economic Liberalism, T he W ealth of Nations, this minimum government program reads: "first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as pos sible, every member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact admin istration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain". At first sight, the manner in which we do paraphrase the third duty puts a seemingly false construction on Adam Smith's words, or even intentions. T he more so as an authority like Finer takes pains to counter the erroneous opinion that Smith is the creator of laissez faire’. According to Finer, Smith "was in fact too clever to surrender to the utter inactivity of the state proposed by the phy siocrats", for "he recognized that a state has other needs besides material welfare, such as defense and instruction, and that these may not be attainable in the undirected higgling of the market" 1#. On second thought, however, we believe our paraphrase to be justified in that it points out the inevitable dilemma with which all true 19th century Liberalists are coping when confronted with the question, whether some government action is in the public interest. It is the dilemma of the vicious circle resulting from their dearest convictions: (a) nothing exceeds individual freedom but the public interest, versus (b) nothing can possibly be in the public interest which does curtail that same individual freedom. Such a notion of the public interest is a very hazy one, indeed M.
THE SOCIETAL STATE
10 4. THE MODERN SYNTHESIS
Judging by their phraseology, quite a few polemics on the political and economic issues of today — not to mention such staunch 'defensores fidei liberalis' as L. von Mises, or F. A. von Hayek — make it appear that the leading 19th century theme of Man versus the State, as Herbert Spencer has termed it, still pre vails. Even though the main maxims of 'laissez faire' champions like Spencer have already succesfully been refuted by contem porary writers such as D. G. Ritchie end J. F. Stephen15, several of these maxims seem to be ineradicable till this day; e.g., the ones that State activities necessarily lead to centralization and bureau cratic inefficiency, or are practically always inferior to spontaneous individual activities. Assertions to this effect are persistendy re peated especially during election campaigns by speakers who scornfully accuse the State of being an ever to be watched busy body which impairs private initiative in a free society. In fact, in recent years, there appears to be a renewed harping on these strings. Now that the Great Depression of the 1930's and the (post war period of the 1940’s — both necessitating all sorts of reformist measures, as well as an (extra) increase in government action are more and more remote, the critics of State interference are quite alive again. And listening to many of these critics one gets the impression that the dilemma adds up to nothing but a simple choice pro or contra State interference — a choice which is not seldom equated with that between Socialism and Liberalism, or, even more distorted, between doctrines extolling or despising the State Omnipotentie. However, such clean-cut alternatives are, to put it mildly, rather irrelevant to the fundamental problems of our age. The lat ter are not to be solved by checking State influence as much as possible, but only by searching for the answers to questions like these: which tasks and services can best be performed by public and semi-public bodies, and which ones should preferably be accomplished by private organizations? The cardinal issue with which up-to-date politicians and economists have to deal is: what division of labour between governmental and 'free' societal agen cies and institutions is most adequate to meet the multitudinous and varied needs of a highly developed and differentiated social
THE MODERN SYNTHESIS
1]
order? For the outstanding feature of this social order is neither the separation, nor the antagonism, but the osmosis of Society and State17. In point of fact, more often than not it is hardly pos sible to discern where the one sphere ends, and where the other begins. According to one of the most prominent students of the field, Karl Mannheim, ” . . . the obsolete dual conception of ’state* and ’society’ . . . has little basis in fact today. . . This dualism usually equates state with bureau cracy, and society with the conglomeration of vigorous organizations that successfully claim the epithets ’free and private’ ” .. .the old dispute regarding bureaucracy or no bureaucracy seems merely ideological for private bureaucracy is no better in itself than state bureaucracy. Both can be improved if adequate measures are taken, so that the real question becomes: What form of organization is best adapted to solve the problems in a given situation? W hen, where and to what extent shall we centralize or decentralize, when and where shall we admit or encourage private initiative, where shall we favor delegation of powers or self-government by small governing bodies?” And: ’’Once we free ourselves of the bogey that whatever the state and its bureaucracy do is wrong and contrary to freedom, and that what ever others do is efficient and synonymous with freedom, we can squarely face the true issue. Reduced to a single phrase, the issue is that in our modern world everything is political, the state is every where, and public responsibility is interwoven in the whole fabric of society” 18.
In sum, halfway into the 20th century a new phase in the relation of State and Society has indubitably appeared: in the dem ocracies of the Western world, there has evolved from the thesis of the Absolutist State and the antithesis of the Free Society... the synthesis of the Societal State. It is with this modem synthesis, as it presents itself in one Western democratic country in particular, to wit the Netherlands, that this study is concerned in the following way. In the first two chapters, an attempt will be made at demon strating how and why the new synthesis has originated from the settings of the past. An analysis wil be offered of the political and socio-economic developments of the last 100 years, not so much in order to prove that the Societal State is a fact, but rather with a view to tracing the main forces and motives which not only
12
THE SOCIETAL STATE
underlie the emergence of this fact but also have their bearing upon its present implications. In the third chapter, the principal findings of our historico-sociological analysis will be critically sum marized. That is, the purpose of this final chapter is twofold: (a) to gain a general insight into the nature of the present relationship of State and Society, and (b) to formulate some critical conclusions by viewing the major problems arising from the empirically given situation of the Societal State in the perspective of what may be called the normative concept of the Responsible Society. This concept, which is of paramount importance in the statements of the World Council of Churches on social questions, "is not an alter native social political system, but a criterion by which we judge all existing social orders and at the same time a standard to guide us in the specific choices we have to make” ie.
As indicated, our study will primarily be confined to the si tuation in the Netherlands. This is not to say, however, that our principal concern is with the Dutch variety of the modem osmosis of Society and State; on the contrary, our principal concern is with this osmosis as a general phenomenon in today’s Western democracies. W hat it does say, in other words, is this: we take the view that it is possible, and justifiable as well, to trace the chief characteristics and fundamental implications of this general phe nomenon through analyzing the particular ’case’ of the Netherlands (which happens to be the present author’s native country, and, thus, offers the opportunity of combining, so to speak, the case study method with the method of participant observation). As a matter of course, this particular case provided by the Nether lands differs in several ways from the ones provided by the other democratic nations in the Western hemisphere, but it is fair to assume that it is a difference in details, and not in essentials. This assumption is based on the following considerations. In one way or another, all these nations have been, and still are, exposed to the same complex of revolutionizing forces; the complex of forces, that is, of which — as will be shown later — the Societal State is the ultimate product. For this very reason it is no coincidence that the existence of the State-Society osmosis is generally acknowledged by a wide range of political and social scientists, irrespective of the specific country they have in mind. And judging by these authors’ observations, there seems to be ground for regarding the Netherlands as a quite suitable field
THE SOCIETAL STATE IN FIRST DRAFT
13
of study. In a number of respects which may be seen as important indications of the modern interlacing of State and Society, Holland is far from lagging behind. In the matter, e.g., of public-legal consulta tion and institutionalized forms of cooperation between management and labour on the one hand and the central government on the other, Holland can very well stand the test in comparison with the coun tries with which it has thrown in its lot in the European Common Market,0. 5. THE SOCIETAL STATE IN FIRST DRAFT
Before embarking upon the venture described above, a little more terminological clarity is required. Why do we think it neces sary to introduce the neologism of the Societal State? Is not the phenomenon we are hinting at equally well designated by the already existing term Welfare State? In our opinion it is not. First of all it should be borne in mind that the phenomenon in question refers to a specific way in which the State stands to Society, and vice versa (just as in the case with the phenomena we have termed the Absolutist State and the Free Society). Consequently, it goes without saying that the Societal State can never be a possible synonym for the Welfare State, in its strict sense. Strictly speaking, the Welfare State is a state as such, or, to be more precise, a new aspect characteristic of the modern states of the Western world which are now not only dem ocratic and constitutional states, but welfare states as well. Thanks to this new aspect, the 19th century ’Rechtsstaat' has de veloped into the ’sozialer Rechtsstaat' of the 20th century (Heller), the ’démocratie libérale’ of a few decades ago has become the present day ’démocratie sociale’ (Burdeau)21. But also in its more popular connotation, the term Welfare State is to be considered inadequate for our purposes —even though the thing it denotes in this instance has a very close resemblance, indeed, to what we prefer to label the Societal State. In general, the Welfare State is invariably seen in direct relation to Society; ’ordinary citizens’ and ’scholarly experts’ usually understand by it a state which is actively engaged in economic and social life. This finds expression both in the fact that the Welfare State is also called a Social Service State, a Social Security State, a Full Em ployment State, etc., and in definitions like these:
14
THE SOCIETAL STATE
” . . . the Welfare State is the State which regards itself as partly responsible for the well-being of the community, and therefore pro vides a certain amount of guidance and management in the struggle to achieve that well-being, intervening to this end in various fields of social affairs”; 'T h e distinguishing characteristic of the Welfare State is the assump tion by the community, acting through the State, of the responsibility for providing the means whereby all its members can reach minimum standards of health, economic security and civilized living, and can share according to their capacity in its social and cultural heritage"
In common parlance, the Welfare State stands for the State which is taking over ever more domains of human welfare former ly fully left to the activities of private individuals and groups. Some accept this development, and even applaud it, because they believe it to be a prerequisite for curing the ills of an ailing Soci ety, and for achieving and safeguarding socio-economic security and equal opportunities to all citizens. Others, however, vigorously denounce this constandy increasing State interference, for, in their turn, they are convinced that it will eventually lead to the virtual extinction of free societal enterprise, and to a resurgent totalitar ianism having "Marxian socialism and absolute government in its pedigree” M. Apart from the fact (constituting a somewhat doubt ful asset in scientific matters) that the term Welfare State, as con noting the encroachment of the State on Society, obviously evokes political passions, it also has the defect of offering an inaccurate and, therefore, false interpretation of the actual relationship be tween Society and State. W hat is occurring is neither a one-way process, nor is it jusdy called an encroachment, i.e. an intrusion on others rights or territory. Of course, nobody can possibly deny that the State is now intervening in many ways and in many fields beyond those of protecting the nation and of administering justice. But to this should be added, in the first place, that the State has — willy-nilly; and more often nilly than willy — been forced into this almost omnipresent intervention. In order to promote the gen eral good, the State cannot but shoulder the task of controlling and directing, of coordinating and integrating the multitude of functions to be performed in our modem complex world. And the second point to be stressed is that of these very functions a considerable number are executed by societal organizations and
THE SOCIETAL STATE IN FIRST DRAFT
15
corporations which have gained in power and scope to such an extent that nearly every one of their actions is of public signif icance and deeply affects the general welfare. In a word, the one time primacy of Society has not given way, again, to that of the State, but to a situation in which neither can claim any primacy at all. It is for these reasons that we have framed the concept of the Societal State, and, in connection with it, speak of a modem syn thesis. Thus we mean to give expression, not only to the fact of the close interrelatedness of State and Society nowadays, but also to our conviction that this interrelatedness results from a develop ment which may be characterized better as a 'societalization' of the State than as a 'starification' of Society. History does and does not repeat itself. It is certainly true that the present period represents — in its extensive government regulation of human life — a rather remarkable replica of the preSmithian epoch. And there is quite some sense in regarding today's so-called Welfare State as more or less akin to Mercantilism, es pecially in its enlightened variety of the 18th century Cameralist Toliceystaat'; both have many a family trait in common. "Mercantilist doctrine is, in fact, characteristic of any period in which liberal theories are at a discount", says Harold Laski24. The apparent meaning of this matter-of-fact-statement may be clear; yet, in our opinion, its wording is a litde bit too simple. In using the historical concept of Mercantilism in the general sense of any system favouring State activity, Laski creates the impression that there is no difference whatsoever in the nature of Mercantilist and present day State action. Apart from this, however, we like to emphasize that those com mon family traits are not necessarily to be interpreted in a negative way, as is often done. Tw o 18th century definitions of the term Police, or Policey, may illustrate this point. So, the German cameralist Von Justi understands by it, in its narrower sense: "everything which is requisite for the good ordering of civic life, and especially the main tenance of good discipline and order among the subjects, and promo tion of all measures for the comfort of life and the growth of the sustaining system". And a French author, writing in 1722, declares that "la p olice. . . est donc toute renfermée dans ces onzes parties: la religion, la discipline des moeurs, la santé, les vivres, la sûreté et la tranquilleté publique, la voirie, les sciences et les arts libéraux, la
16
THE SOCIETAL STATE
commerce, les manufactures et les arts mécaniques, les serviteurs domestiques, les manouvriers et les pauvres” 25. There is much (positive) resemblance, indeed, between these cam eralist and colbertist programs, and those of a modem Welfare State.
In spite of all this, however, it is a fallacy to hold that the 20th century marks a return to the old order. Notwithstanding some striking similarities, the 1750’s and the 1950’s reveal essential differences26 — as essential, say, as those between despotism (how ever benevolent) and fundamental democracy, between princely established manufacture of luxury and publicly controlled mass industries, between relief for the poor and social security for all. The only possible way to account for these differences is to draw into focus the happenings of the intervening age; an age which appears as an abrupt break between centuries of wholesale State activity, but constitutes, in reality, a distinct link in the continuous chain of events bringing forth the modem situation. In other words, the modem situation cannot be understood in its own right without taking into consideration the impact which the Liberalist 19th cen tury has had on its formation. What is this impact? As suggested before, it is during the era of Liberalism that the self-styled ’general class’ of Society, the bourgeoisie, succeeds in throwing off the yoke of the tutelary State, and gains independence. In performing this notable act, to put it very concisely, Liberalism entails the emancipation of Society as such. For in the wake of the ’third estate’, advocating the universal principles of liberty and equality, and proving in practice its pol itical and economic effectiveness, other ’estates’ follow in due time; and, thus, a development is set in motion which gradually leads to the participation of the entire citizenry in the national life. This ’new fact’27 is of basic importance for a clear appreciation of the radically changed character of present day State activity as compared with that of 200 years ago. It implies that, since the 19th century, Society has definitively reached the stage of maturity, and is to be recognized as an autonomous entity determining itself in full freedom from the external authority of the State28. That is to say, in our post-Liberalist age, the rationale of State action is by no means to be sought in the Raison d'État, the Interest of the all-inclusive State, but in the Raison de Société, the Interest of
THE SOCIETAL STATE IN FIRST DRAFT
17
nowadays thoroughly organized and fundamentally democratic So ciety. Midway in the 20th century, the State is not, as in the days of Absolutism (whether enlightened or not) imposing itself upon Society for the attainment of its own ends — however much these ends may, originally at least, have been running parallel with the needs of a Society then being in a condition of 'underdevelop ment', if not 'in statu nascendi'. (Once again we like to stress the latter point as it is quite easily overlooked by us who are strongly inclined to judge Absolutism not so much on its own merits as by the Freedom-loving standards we have inherited from Liberalism.) The mid-20th century State is, on the contrary, summoned by Soci ety to render assistance in preventing maladjustments and in tackling the numerous problems of ever growing intricacy and magnitude that private initiative alone cannot solve. Modem Soci ety — constituting an exceedingly complex organism in which there is a constant clashing of interests between many highly interdepen dent social units, each pressing for an equal right to self-realization — requires the State as its indispensable complement. The State has as it were become an integral part of Society itself; it functions as the central societal agency called upon to curb the damaging tendencies of the free play of forces, and to procure an equil ibrium of checks and balances of such a nature that each separate unit is enabled to take an appropriate share in the life of the community. "From our point of view there can be no antagonism between state and society. The state is to be looked upon merely as that part of society which performs the political function". These words of Gaetano Mosca, dating from 1895, Mannheim considers — and so do we — "still pertinent today" w. And according to Burdeau, the State has lost "l'originalité de son visage propre, pour n'être plus que l'expression algébrique de la manière d'etre de la totalité des forces qui s'affrontent dans les rap ports sociaux. ( . . . ) Aujourd'hui, la nouveauté es t . . . dans le fait que (l'action du peuple) s'exerce par l'entremise de l’état" 30.
In conclusion: the phenomenon we are confronted with, the Societal State, is the fusion of today's emancipated Society with the exponent of its own urgent need for a balanced structure of powers and interests, to wit the State.
THE SOCIETAL STATE
18
6. THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS TYPOLOGY COMPLETED A SUMMARY
Putting the Societal State in the typological diagram of StateSociety relations presented above (section 3), Figure 2 results. Each one of the three typifications in this scheme indicates a spec ific relationship prevalent in socio-political thinking at a certain time in the history of post-medieval Western Europe; a specific relationship between Society — which we would like to define here, in its widest sense, as the complex body of social configurations and struc tures, processes and operations resulting from the intercourse of individuals and groups, and State— as the Wirkungsform der Gesellschaft” (Heller), or, a little less concisely put, as the special organization invested FIGURE 2
Three Stages in the Development of Post-Medieval State-Society Relations
THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS TYPOLOGY COMPLETED
19
with supreme authority, and having ’government’ as its executive agency, to ensure order in, and to further the inter ests of Society, the power relations of which it reflects*1. In sum, what we term the Absolutist State typifies the situ ation which prevails during the centuries when Society is in trans ition from feudalist to (early) capitalist conditions, and its cor relate, the State, ranges from totalitarian to paternalistic approach es in its attempts to bring about communal fusion and commer cial and industrial expansion on a nation-wide scale. The Free Society, on the other hand, is characteristic of the heyday of Lib eralism when rising industrialist and individualistic (bourgeois) capitalist Society, which is based on the principles of private prop erty and free competition, wants the State to abstain as much as possible from interfering with the self-regulating societal organism, and to limit itself to ’only provide the legal framework for the smooth functioning of the innumerable processes of voluntary as sociation and free enterprise” (Mannheim) **. And, finally, the So cietal State serves as an indication of the present day interrelated ness, now that the State is called in to coordinate and adjust the pluriform system of modem heavily industrialized and fully dem ocratized socio-capitalist Society, and has to assume responsibility for a whole new series of general welfare functions no private agency is qualified to perform.
CHAPTER I
FROM FREE SO C IETY T O SO C IETA L STA TE A General Survey
. . . ist es eine Binsenwahrheit, dasz die ökono mische die politische Revolution gewaltig geför dert hat, aber nicht minder ist das Umgekehrte wahr, dasz die politische Revolution der ökono mischen Pate gestanden h a t. . . WILHELM RÖPKE1
On February 8, 1849, three leaders of the Rhineland district Democratic committee have to appear before a Cologne jury on the charge of incitement to rebellion. Actually, they have issued an appeal to effectuate, by substituting active for passive resist ance, the Prussian National Assembly's resolution of November 15, 1848; a resolution which urges people not to pay taxes to the new government of Count Brandenburg as it has been unconstitutional ly appointed by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. This appeal has been published in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, the editor of which is one of the accused. And it is this man, Dr. Karl Heinrich Marx, who steals the show by emphatically refuting the prosecutors ar guments. It is sheer hypocrisy, so he exclaims, to bring him and his fellow Democrats to trial. W hen the Crown makes a counter revolution the people rightly reply with a revolution. The real culprit is the government which itself has tom the law to shreds, and not those who denounce the forces of Reaction and call for violence. Besides, what is the law? It is nothing but a juridical presumption that society rests upon the law. In fact, it is rather the reverse. The law is the expression of the relations within so-
THE SOCIETAL STATE
22
ciety at a certain stage in the development of the material modes of production, and as soon as these relations alter the law of yester day becomes a mere scrap of paper. W hat confronts us these days, the defendant continues, is not a conflict between two political fac tions in the same societal situation, but a struggle between two different forms of society. It is a social conflict in political disguise. It is the struggle between ancient feudal bureaucracy and ma dem bourgeois society, between the society of guilds and the sa ciety of free competition, the society of landed property and indus trial society, and between the society of faith and the society of knowledge. After short deliberation the three accused are acquitted, and — as the story goes — the jury is so impressed with the defence of Herr Doktor Marx that the foreman thanks him on behalf of all his colleagues for the "extremely informative speech" *. This story is plausible, indeed ! For can there be any doubt that the Marxian analysis must have had a most illuminating effect on the minds of those jurors, entangled as they must have been in the seemingly chaotic concurrence of political and social tensions which come to a head in the late 1840's? I. THE AXIAL YEAR 1848
1848 is a most, if not the most, crucial year both in the pol itical and social history of 19th century Western Europe. Today, it may righdy be considered a platitude (not in the least because Marxian insights have become common property)8 to state that the violent upheavals then occurring almost everywhere are to be seen as overt evidence of a societal crisis which has come to a de cisive climax. We now know that through the outbursts of 1848 and 1849 — however anticlimactic in their immediate consequen ces — the final blow has been dealt to 'ancient feudal bureaucracy, and the way has been prepared for the triumph of modem hourgois society. "Les révolutions de 1848", says Pouthas, "ont brusquement réa lisé une Europe nouvelle, conforme à l'idéologie des partis avancés nés de la réaction contre l'oeuvre de 1815. Elles ont réunis le pouvoir aux mains d'hommes nouveaux, sans expérience des affaires, qui ont
THE AXIAL YEAH 1848
23
voulu modeler l’état selon les conceptions du libéralisme et de la nationalité”. To be sure, ”le monde qui s'organise par la suite n’est pas celui qu elles avaient envisagé”; and, even worse, the "échec (du mouvement de 1848) a marqué la chute de la liberté politique: partout l’autorité des souverains ou des gouvemments l'a supprimée ou res treinte”. Yet, "les régimes autoritaires qui lui succèdent, sont tout autre chose que les régimes réactionnaires de 1815", for ”1848 laisse derrière soi le suffrage universel, au moins un suffrage considérable ment élargi: cela suffit pour donner au pouvoir une origine ou une orientation nouvelles. 1848 a détruit le régime féodal: la disparition des vieux cadres et des privilèges. . . , qui maintenaient des inégalités au-delà de leur raison d’être et de la puissance créatrice qui les avait justifiées, a rendu possible la naissance d’une société fondée sur l’exal tation de l’individu” 4.
The truly epoch-ending significance of 1848 is perhaps no where better expressed than in the 'abdication' of Metternich, the architect of Restoration and the symbol of Reaction. However, 1848 does not merely mark a culminating point. It marks a turning point, too. A turning point, that is, in the dialectic process out of which the synthesis of the Societal State is to emerge. Even as the year 1789 signals the negation of the thesis of the Absolutist State, so the year 1848 spells the untenability of the antithesis of the Free Society — even though, at that time, the Free Society has as yet far from reached the ascendancy. In this 'mad year', it becomes manifest that the two revolutions which are chiefly responsible for the thoroughgoing structural changes in the Western world since the middle of the 18th century have arrived at a momentous junc ture. Two Revolutions in Joint Operation. The one revolution, prim arily political and ideological in nature, is usually named after the scene of its most dramatic appearance on the stage of history, the French Revolution. The other, first of all of an economic and social character, is generally known by the term which the elder Arnold Toynbee (1852—1883) is believed to have coined, the Industrial Re volution 5. In itself, it is a somewhat arbitrary (and far from exhaustive) way in which we characterize each one of these revolutions. It may be true that their chief fields of operation can respectively be viewed as being primarily ideo-political and socio-economic, but to this must,
24
THE SOCIETAL STATE
of course, immediately be added that the French Revolution also has all kinds of important social and economic effects, whereas the Industrial Revolution is certainly not devoid of ideological moments, and profoundly affects politics.
Looked upon from our present vantage point, two main phases can be discerned in the development of these revolutions. For, in accordance with modem views, the French and the Industrial Re volution must not be regarded as single and mere historical events, but as utterly interdependent processes, set in motion long before their first results are to come to light in the latter part of the 18th century, and gaining in momentum, width, and depth ever since. In the initial phase, all the revolutionary forces at work seem to bear out the teachings of the Enlightenment, penetratingly expressed in Jean Jacques Rousseau’s call: ’l ’homme est né libre”. (A call, in other words, which urges man to do away with the artificial barriers that keep him from acting upon his innate good ness and from following the dictates of the Providence-given law of self-effectuating harmony.) On both sides of the Atlantic, Free dom and Progress are obviously on the march, in spite of occasional set-backs. In the realm of politics, war is successfully waged upon the autocratic powers of the past. The bourgeois middle classes, asserting themselves as the true representatives of the underpriv ileged masses, begin to predominate both as the protagonists and as the foremost beneficiaries of the abstract democratic ideals now put into practice by trial and error. Step by step, headway is made in the framing of constitutional guarantees expressly devised to prevent the State from interfering with the individual rights of its citizens. Perhaps even more important, however, is that together with the elaboration of a body of constitutional rights — such as security of person and family, equality before the law, and free dom of conscience, but also security of property, and freedom of labour, contract, and enterprise — the conditions are created which men like François Quesnay and Adam Smith have been advocating as indispensable for the efficient exploitation of the nations’ sour ces of wealth. In farming, trading, and manufacturing, the time honoured customs and traditional institutions, the old restrictive regulations and long-standing monopolies prove entirely incompat ible with the demands of a new utilitarian rationalism which de
THE AXIAL YEAR 1848
25
rives its greatest stimulus from that unprecedented and extraordi narily portentous factor — the introduction of mechanical tech niques into productive methods and modes of transportation. The process requires a maximum of initiative on the part of the indi vidual entrepreneurs. Not external State control but internal free dom of competition, coupled with the prospect of substantial pe cuniary rewards, turns out to be the most effective incentive to improve the quality of products, reduce prices, and prompt the active utilization of the new technological means that lead to a rapid increase in the output of commodities and entail an incessant search for ever wider domestic and foreign markets. Thus, in pretty close congruity with the philosophers postulates, the whole of econ omic life assumes the aspect of an autonomous system — a system in which, through a refined and apparendy spontaneous division of labour, the different tasks in the production and exchange of goods are distributed among a large variety of mutually compet itive, privately owned business enterprises. The French and the Industrial Revolution — or the revolutions in things, institutions, and ideas, as they are referred to by Crane Brinton® — do not cease, however, once they have brought about the downfall of the Ancien Régime and Mercantilism. On the con trary, this is but the first prominent result, and it is only after this that the full consequences begin to make themselves felt. These consequences, to which we shall later return in greater detail, can be epitomized as follows: (1) With the continued growth of modem capitalist industrial ism, the tenets of classical Liberalism appear to be more and more in contrast with reality. In the long run, the free play of forces becomes a mere mockery and shows itself much less self-regulative than self-destructive, as it generates strong tendencies towards concentration and large-scale organization. And it is under the im pact of these tendencies, which, when left alone, definitely do not produce natural harmony but are quite likely to cause chaos and oppression, that there emerges an urgent need for deliberate plan ning and coordination on the private and on the public level. (2) The very success won by the ’third estate’ in its struggle with the privileged orders, the nobility and the clergy, engenders powerful emancipatory sentiments among other social classes and
THE SOCIETAL STATE
26
groups, several of which emerge along with the societal changes accompanying industrialization. And as these groups, in their turn, irresistibly press for active participation in political and economic life, the bourgeois 'minority' democracy is gradually transformed into popular 'mass democracy. (3) The confrontation with the harsh and uprooting effects of industrial capitalism excites an awakening 'social conscience and, thus, quickens the realization that individual political liber ties alone are not enough. Certain basic provisions are required in order to ensure to every member of society, regardless of his social status or economic position, access to the fundamental free doms to which a human being is entided. In other words, the same forces which usher in the so-called Era of Laissez Faire in the end also give rise to the conditions which are characteristic of what today is generally known as the Welfare State. Set in schematic form:
FIGURE 3
Two Phases in the Joint Operation of the French and the Industrial Revolution
FRENCH & IN DU STRIA L REVOLUTION
Phase I FREE SOCIETY spontaneous self-regulation ase II
bourgeois democracy
political liberties
I SOCIETAL STATE
coordinated organization
fundamental democratization
political liberties & social rights
THE AXIAL YEAR 1848
27
From First into Second Gear. The year 1848, and what it stands for, may be considered an unmistakable indication that the French and the Industrial Revolution are as it were in the process of changing from first into second gear. In spite of the double risk involved in this statement, there is, in our opinion, ground for making it. Above all, this can be seen from the basically social character of the events of that year. We do not simply mean to say that the 'social question' is playing a more or less pivotal part in them, but rather that their pattern and their course is dominat ed, to a hitherto unparalleled extent, by the determined action of the masses. The two risks that have to be accounted for may be explicidy stated in the following way. First, it cannot be denied that by 1848 the French and, in particular, the Industrial Revolution have far from reached the same stage of development all over Western Europe. So, there is no small kernel of truth in the contention that 1848 is for many European nations what 1789 has been for the French. And with respect to the Industrial Revolution it is quite clear that, in comparison with England, practic ally all continental countries are in a condition of underdevelopment (to use a modem term). Objectively speaking, the break-through of industrialism does not occur before 1860 in France, and in Germany it happens still a decade later. However, does it really need stressing that, long before these dates, this objective' break-through has been in the making and, consequendy, has exerted strong 'subjective' in fluences? Just as in our days the so-called development countries can righdy be considered 'areas in rapid social change', so there is much sense in stating that in the early part of the 19th century most coun tries of Western Europe are deeply involved in the all-embracing structural crisis which the French and the Industrial Revolution are bringing about, even if the storm centre of these revolutions is as yet at a distance7. The second point is that the all but pan-European revolution of 1848 represents "by no means one great movement, or even a complex of concurring actions", as Ijzerman phrases it. This is not to say, how ever, that there is no common denominator. So, Pouthas says: "La révolution de 1848 éclata à l'improviste et, en quelques semaines, s'étendit à 1' Europe entière. Cette soudaineté ne doit pas faire croire à un phénomène accidentel; cette ampleur manifeste qu’elle se rat tache à des causes profondes. Celles-ci sont de triple nature: politique, idéologique, économique". And De Ruggiero points out that the revo lutionary movements, whatever their differences in the various coun tries, have all been developing along essentially the same lines as in
28
THE SOCIETAL STATE
France where they can be studied in their "strictest simplicty, be cause the case is uncomplicated by any other factor than the purely social question". There are divergencies, no doubt, but these should not be overstressed as they are, on the whole, due to the presence of more or less complex motives. "The force set in motion by France... was (elsewhere) complicated by the interference of a second motive: a claim on the part of the peoples as yet deprived of national unity to freedom from foreign domination". The main thing to be emphasized is that "the social character of these revolutions, even if attenuated, was everywhere perceptible. On every side it was the liberal and democratic bourgeoisie that excited the revolutionary movement and attempted to limit its operation, but was overwhelmed by the action of the masses which it had itself set in motion, and which were resolved to profit by it on their own account even at the expense of their allies"8.
The significance of this social, or ’mass, character of the re volutionary events of 1848 has already been perceived by many a keen contemporary observer, such as Von Stein, or De Tocque ville who, in a speech in Parliament, on the 27th of January, 1848, puts the pointed question: ”Do you not see that the passions, from being political, have become social?” · In the present context, this significance can probably be expounded no better than by referring to some of the main lines of thought put forward with great co gency in a study of the Israeli historian J. L. Talmon on the origins of ”the Revolution which Failed to Come OfF\ The truly volcanic forces underlying the movements of 1848, as is shown in this comprehensive and penetrating investigation, are the product of a complex of ideas and realities, under the impact of which the quest for self-expression is more and more shifting from the exclusively individual level, where it is posed by the rationalist philosophies of Enlightenment, to the collective one. "The age of reason failed to grasp the organic character of a society and an age, with the various aspects intertwined and merging into each other. Sharply defined individuals, fundamentally equal, of their own free will and in full awareness of what they are doing, enter into contractual arrangements. T his type of individualism was natural to a pre-industrial society, and to an age that was so thrilled with the discovery of Reason that it became totally oblivious of his tory". "The Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, and still more the In dustrial Revolution, brought home to men the significance of collec tive forces, the reality of highly complex relationships".
THE AXIAL YEAR 1848
29
"The effect of the new experience was not the renunciation of the supreme end of securing means of self-expression to the individual, but the emergence of the idea that genuine self-realiza tion of the individual was possible only through his integration into a cohesive collective force’*10.
In the first half of the 19th century, when the ideological clim ate is coloured both by the vast changes which the French Re volution has inaugurated, and by the entirely new problems loom ing large in the incipient Industrial Revolution, there arises an acute consciousness of the latent conflict between the at once com plementary and antithetical principles of Liberty and Equality. A fundamental chasm between two camps becomes visible and augurs a massive explosion. "Those whom we roughly call Liberals, swore by liberty: the others — whatever the differences dividing them — who may together be called socialists demanded that the state should provide security for the poor. The Liberals, with their eyes fixed on Royal despotism and on the Jacobin tyranny of 1793, dreaded the extension of state power and were fascinated by the theory of checks and balances. The socialists decried formal liberty, without social security, as sham and humbug. The liberals, aided and fortified by the belief in the iron laws of economics. . . saw in the uprising of the masses from below the onslaught of barbarism. The ignorant, uncouth and savage would swarm the ramparts of civilization and destroy its beautifully poised fabric based on the natural property relationships and the sense of responsibility accompanying them. The State, the provider, which they would then make all-powerful, would kill all individual spon taneity. The answer of the socialists was that bourgeois liberalism not only monopolized all wealth, but quite openly and cynically claimed the right to employ state power for the defence of existing property relationships and for keeping down the masses by restrictive laws and sheer force". "The problem of property was revealed in all its nakedness, as never before. It was a decisive moment in European history. All in equalities had disappeared, except that of property. To the property less this privilege alone was more significant than all the privileges of birth which had been abolished. For it was the most effective. With it, all the powers secured by the old privileges were more than restored. Without it, all the formal rights and liberties, as well as marks of equality, were of no u se . . . In bourgeois society, which had done away with the privileges of nobility and of the Church, property became all-important and all-pervading. In the past, it was only one of numerous privileges and inequalities, and officially not the decisive
30
THE SOCIETAL STATE
one. Now it stood alone, as Tocqueville pointed out, in a society which took pride in having come into being by the destruction of all privilege and inequality” n .
The eruption of 1848 may be considered a sign that the incuba tion period of the French and the Industrial Revolution is drawing to a closell. The shining ideals of the rights and dignity of man, which have been triumphantly proclaimed by the middle classes in the name of all Humanity, have seeped down to the lowest levels of society, and here they begin to set aglow the hearts of the socially and spiritually uprooted masses who now start crowding the new urban and industrial centres; the urban and industrial centres where the misery and squalor, the hardships and insecur ities of everyday life prove to be incomparably more debasing and harsher to endure than what these poorest of paupers have ever experienced in their former rural surroundings18. A critical point has unmistakably been reached in the minds of the people who have been declared sovereign de jure, but de facto are deprived of all rights; the point, that is, where dumb suffering turns into resentment and resignation changes into purposeful protest. The lofty doctrines extolling individual freedom are now exposed as having only face-value, and it is realized that the abstract theories once raising high hopes of social justice have to be translated into a concrete programme pertinent to the emergencies of the prol etarian situation: the State is to provide a quarantee of work for all citizens, of existence for the workman by his work/ and the cry is for 'the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, ’the organization of labour by way of association1, and 'the establish ment of a democratic republic’14. In short, the year 1848 presents strong premonitory indications that the masses are going to take the revolutionaries of 1789 fully at their word. They, too, want to reap the fruits of Freedom and Progress, and they will no longer put up with just being the means by which those, who are parading as the so-called general class, rise to a position of exclusive and profitable prominence. To be sure, in 1848 and 1849, the masses are bitterly defeat ed; but it is (to reverse the phrase) a Pyrrhic defeat. In the dec ades to come, the bulk of the popular demands will be translated into law as the inevitable outcome of the selfsame forces of which,
HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
31
so far, the liberalist bourgeoisie has been the chief protagonist, but which it now desperately tries to stem. How desperate these at tempts are is displayed by the monstrous alliances which the 'third estate' is ready to conclude, in those ominous years, with its own arch-enemies, the powers of conservatism and reaction, in or der to stem the possible danger of the underprivileged classes assuming the role of the sorcerer's apprentice. The phrasing of this last paragraph may clarify the difference between Talmon’s and our own interpretation as to how and why the proletarian demands eventually reach the statute books — espec ially with respect to the part played by the bourgeoisie in this process. In his Conclusions, Talmon states that the post-1848 reforms "were not the fruit of a victorious Revolution, but a means of taming the Revolution. They were not as much conceded out of fear, as out of a sense of self-assurance. The bourgeoisie did not so much yield as think it wise and prudent to open the gates more widely to those who had in their eyes passed the noviciate to respectability” 15. In our opinion, however, the emphasis should be put just the other way round. Talmon attributes a far too active and positive role to the bourgeoisie. Too positive, because the ’defence tactics’ of the bourgeosie are — as P. Geyl rightly says in a review of Talmon’s study16 — inspired by fear and narrow class interests to a much greater extent than Talmon tends to admit. Too active, because it is not so much the bourgeoisie which is granting the reforms but rather the proletariat which is able to gain ground as a result of the work ing of immanent forces. As to these forces (to which we will return in greater detail in ch. II), it is worthwhile to draw attention to the following words of J. Romein, in which he summarizes one of the characteristics of the period of 1840—1885 in the history of the Nether lands: ”in those fourty years, th e . . . liberal conception has become common property to such a degree that, in this very same span of time, it dialectically oudived itself, and began to turn into its own opposite” 17. In other words, the contributions of the bourgeoisie (whether liberalist or 'confessional’ in orientation) to the post-1848 reforms are to be seen as part and parcel of the dialectic process which results from the continued operation of the French and the In dustrial Revolution (see later, ch. II/2 —3).
2. HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
"When ever the world’s end is near I'll move to Holland, for in that country everyhing always happens thirty years later"18. Whether it is thirty years, or even half a century, as still more
32
THE SOCIETAL STATE
unkind versions run, in its general purport the validity of this saying attributed to the German poet, journalist, and satirist, Hein rich Heine, cannot be contested — at least during his lifetime (1797 -1856). B u t... precisely because of the general truth these words convey, they are not true in every respect. The Premium on Backwardness. The key to these apparent riddles is to be found in the following paradoxical circumstances. By the middle of the 19th century, socio-economic conditions in the Netherlands19 lag behind those existing in many adjacent coun tries. Yet, it is in this very country that in 1848 Liberalism gains, almost without pains, the great political victory it has elsehwere, in more advanced surroundings, been labouring for in vain. In France and Germany, e.g., the liberal middle classes badly fail in consolidating the concessions they have initially wrested from their rulers. In point of fact, after much travail and bloodshed resulting from the self-evoked proletarian onslaught, they end up by put ting themselves and all their liberties at the mercy of a resurgent authoritarianism. In Holland, however, conservative reluctance and governmental fence-sitting with regard to constitutional reforms, the desirability of which has been pleaded already for a number of years, are overcome as at one blow. Deeply impressed by the threatening tidings from abroad, King Willem II (who is a much less dominating personality than his father, the ’benevolent des pot’, Willem I) abruptly changes front, and thus paves the way for that fundamental and far-reaching revision of the constitution which, once for all, shifts the centre of gravity in the state from the Crown to Parliament. On November 3, 1848, this revisionis officially promulgated; a date deserving special mention, because it is then that the cornerstone is laid upon which the country’s present day democratic form of government is principally based”. In this sudden, as well as lasting, success of the Dutch liberal minded bourgeoisie, a striking piece of evidence can be found in support of Jan Romein’s theory, viz. that in the dialectics of his torical development a premium is very probably put on backward ness*1. For the fact that this triumph was not to be annulled again stands, to a very large extent, in direct causal relation to Holland’s socio-economic lag of that time. It is true, the ’volte-face’ of Willem
HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
33
II is greatly inspired by the same fears that in 1848 are haunting practically all European heads of state22, but nowhere these fears prove to be more unfounded than in the Netherlands. Here, the Liberalists are not compelled, in the end, to forfeit their initial achievements for the sake of exorcizing the 'spectre of Commu nism'. In this country, the sparks of political reformism do not kindle the tinder of social revolution, not so much because there is no tinder, as because the material of which it is made is as yet too amorphous to catch fire and set off an explosion imperilling the fabric of the existing society. To be sure, in 1848 and the years before, several signs of social unrest are discernible, but, on the whole, these are merely symptoms of despair2S. The riots that occur are, first and foremost, the blind outbursts of starving mobs craving for food and work, instead of manifestations of a proletarian upris ing with a programme of its own, and inspired by the vision of a world which has done away with the injustice of all privileges, in cluding that of property. It hardly needs to be stressed that the two forms of social unrest we distinguish are of a fundamentally different nature. The one belongs essentially to the elemental outbursts of the suffering poor that are known through all ages; the other, the ’programmatic’ prole tarian uprising, is a typical phenomenon of the post-(French and Industrial)-Revolution era24. Of course, ’socialists’ — of the utmost utopist brand, that is — are not completely lacking in Holland in 1848. They are even among the main instigators of the turmoil taking place in The Hague, on March 14, and in Amsterdam, on March 24. However, they do not appear to have had the demonstrations (which, as indicated, are far from revolutionary in character) well in hand. Nor can they be con sidered true representatives of the Dutch masses: either they are in tellectuals of good family but in bad repute (’the heroes of the libel press', they are labelled by one historian), or they belong to the mem bership of a so-called Arbeiterbildungsverein, an association for the moral betterment of the working classes, predominantly made up of German workmen and small artisans who have found refuge in the Netherlands *5.
Poverty and Stagnation. In mid- 19th century Holland, the 9so cial question', which in its true sense is a joint product of the French and the Industrial Revolution, is totally absent. Class rivalry, let alone class struggle, between a powerful capitalist bourgeoisie rul-
34
THE SOCIETAL STATE
ing chiefly in its own interest, and an industrial proletariat awaken ed to the intolerable curtailment of its rights, is a thing entirely unknown. Society is still static, not divided (socio-psychologically, at least) into the two fully estranged nations Disraeli is distinguish ing in 1845 in England, the haves and the have-nots; it is still composed of the traditional orders, to each one of which is allotted its God-willed place and the duties belonging to it. Those of rank and respectability are to be just stewards of the worldly goods entrusted to them, and in this capacity they are under a moral obligation to lighten the burden of their fellow creatures living in destitution; whereas the latter, in their turn, should acquiesce in their lowly state, and take a pride in being good servants. Charity, on the one hand, and sufferance, on the other, are the all-important pillars on which social relations rest, and these virtues are heavily tested, indeed. For the one and only problem present in those years is that of poverty*·. Especially in the 1840's, this problem has acquired added vir ulence. In this decade, the number of persons dependent on poor relief, in one way or another, amounts to 500.000 or 600.000, that is between 16 and 20 per cent of the total national population according to one rough calculation. A second estimate mentions a maximum of 15 per cent, but this relates only to the 'outdoor poor. And a third holds that the percentage of all people living on public alms has been rising from 13 in 1841 to 27 in 1850 **. This cata strophic increase in the 1840's is mainly due to accidental circum stances — such as bad harvests and, in particular, the appearance in 1845 of the potato disease — but poverty itself is by no means an incidental phenomenon on the Dutch scene. On the contrary, it has been a mass phenomenon already for scores of years. As far as official statistics are available, since 1816, they show that the proportion of the population to which charity is distributed aver ages 10 per cent at the least*8. And, what is more, pauperism is in Holland not an inevitable consequence of an economy in pro gressive transition, as is the case in neighbouring countries like England or Belgium, but it is a dismal indication of an economy which is completely stagnant, and, in fact, is more and more falling behind.
HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
35
For comparative purposes, it may be worthwhile to add the per centages of people on the dole in England between 1840 and 1847:*· 1 8 4 0 - 7 .7 1 8 4 4 - 9.0 1841 - 8.2 1 8 4 5 - 8.8 1 8 4 2 - 8.9 1 8 4 6 - 7.9 1 8 4 3 - 9.5 1 8 4 7 - 10.1 Another indication of the quite desperate conditions in this period, so far as the Netherlands are concerned, can be found in the rapid growth of the numbers of emigrants: 1 8 4 4 - 171 1 8 4 5 - 680 1 8 4 6 - 1755 1 8 4 7 - 5223 1 8 4 8 - 2160 (The 2160 emigrants in 1848 equal 678 households, of which 60 are leaving the country for reasons of religious nonconformism).80
One of the most important causes of the economic stagnation in the Netherlands is what may be called, with a term borrowed from the present day sociological jargon, the nation's predominandy 'tradition-directed* frame of mind. Even when the great hopes nourished during the Napoleonic occupation soon prove to have no basis in reality, once independence is regained, the mer chants continue to dream of a revival of the old staple-market. They fail to grasp that, in this respect, there has been a definite change to the disadvantage of the Dutch seaports, and for this reason they meet with distrust and misunderstanding whatever efforts are undertaken to adopt new methods. And this the more, as these methods seem to run counter to their true, or just imagin ary, interests — such as is the case with the protectionist measures of the energetic King Willem I who, after the neo-mercantilist fashion, wants to make use of the excellent opportunities offered in the Belgian part of his kingdom for building up a strong export industry, not in the last place with a view to giving Dutch com merce a solid basis which is to further prosperityS1. All through the first half of the 19th century, Dutch society is essentially early-capitalist in oudook, and a conservative mood prevails. The entrepreneurs (if there are any deserving that name) run their businesses, of which they are the sole proprietors, in pretty much the same way as their fathers and grandfathers have done.
36
THE SOCIETAL STATE
They are not bent on making as large profits as possible, in order to extend their enterprises, accelerate production, and boost sales Sticking to the well-tried methods of the artisan, they content them selves with producing for the local market, and with investing their money in real estate, or safe government securities. And if there is a growing demand for their wares, they prefer doing works of mercy (by putting an additional number of pauperized hands on their pay-rolls, which are not seldom supplemented by municipal ity or parish) to switching to such newfangled things as steam powered machines. In painting this general picture, it goes without saying that there are exceptions, but these exceptions are extremely rare. This may be illustrated with the help of some figures. So, in 1837, all eleven Dutch provinces together do not count more than 72 odd TABLE 1
Number of Steam in Factories and Workshops, 1837-1860* Holland
Year 1837 1853 1860
Nr. 72 392 794
Belgium
Year 1838 1850 1860
Nr. 1044 2040 4410
steam engines installed in workshops and factories, as contrasted with 1044 in Belgium in 1838 (Table 1). Or, taking another example, whereas the latter country has already 559 kilometers oi railway in exploitation by 1843, in Holland there are two years later only 153 (Table 2). TABLE 2
Kilometers of Railway in Exploitation, 1839—1870” Holland
Year Km. Year Km 1839 16 Belgium 1835 25 1845 153 1843 559 1850 176 777 1849 1855 311 1860 335 1859 1713 1865 776 1870 1418 3136 1870 For fairness' sake, a few explanatory notes should be added to the comparative figures presented in Tables 1 and 2. An important factor retarding the introduction of steam engines
HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
37
in Holland — a factor which is not valid for Belgium — one may find in the high costs of coal, because (apart from heavy excise-duties) supply lines are long and transport is slow. The construction of railroads in Holland meets with extra dif ficulties, too, as a result of the peculair (marshy) nature of the soil in vital parts of the country, and the presence of numerous rivers, brooks, and canals which have to be bridged. Moreover, precisely because the country has such an extensive network of waterways, the need of changing to a new transport system is not urgendy felt. On the other hand, however, it should be emphasized that the railroad makes its appearance in Holland at a, relatively, very early date; it is just an exception to the rule that the revolutionizing technical inventions of the second half of the 18th century are carried into effect in Holland with a time-lag of 75 to 100 years84.
In sum: although the comparisons with Belgium (then having the most advanced economy of the continent) are not fair in every respect, they do make understandable the sorry sigh of a contem porary Dutch observer that his compatriots just go the same old round, and are dragging their feet while others hurry A Change of Spirit and Structure. Self-criticisms of this kind are increasingly heard in the years following the abdication of King Willem I in 1840. And, no doubt, at that time they may be taken as clear signs that a change of spirit is in the making. Together with a steadily growing uneasiness as to the nation's state of stagna tion, there is a dawning consciousness of the desirability of replac ing the paternalist policies of the late Merchant-King by the more liberal policies, of which the worthwhile effects are manifest in several surrounding countries. The willingness to adopt a new ec onomic course is, first of all, simply a matter of expediency, but soon after the political victory of the liberalist circles in 1848 it becomes a matter of principle, too. Both stimulated, if not impelled, by steps taken abroad (especially in England), and firmly guided at home by Thorbecke, the grand old man of Dutch Liberalism, an ever more resolute attack is launched in order to free commerce, agriculture, and industry from the manifold restictions and reg ulations formerly imposed for protective purposes. Beginning with the Tariff Act of 1845, a multitude of liberalizing measures are carried out, as is shown below in the chronological (though by no means exhaustive) list88.
THE SOCIETAL STATE
38 TABLE 3
Chronology of Liberalizing Measures Executed between 1845-1870 A t Home 1845
1846
1847
1849
1850
1851
1852 1855 1857 1857 1862
1862
1863 1865 1869 1869
General lowering of transit duties, reduction of import duties on many articles Abolishing of National Industry Fund, putting an end to all government subsidies to industry Repeal of ’Scale Act’ of 1835, re placement by low import duties on com Cessation of all subsidies on export of cotton prints by Dutch Trading Com pany to East Indies Abrogation of differential shipping duties, of shipping and transit duties on Rhine navigation, and lowering of import duties on materials for ship building industry Abolishing of provincial committees of agriculture; encouragement of priv ate associations Abolition of excise-duties on mutton and pork Abolition of excise-duties on flour Abolishing of all protective regulations on sea-fisheries Repeal of ’Ban on Usury’, removal of restrictions on rates of interest Abrogation of all export duties; fixation of low import duties on manufactured and semi-manufactured articles; no import duties on raw materials Repeal of Royal Decree of 1820 aimed at protection of national wool industry Abolition of excise-duties on coal Abolition of excise-duties levied by municipal governments Abolishing of all patents Abolition of stamp-duties on news papers and advertisements
Abroad
1846
Repeal of English Com Laws
1849
Reform of English Navigation Laws
1860
Cobden Treaty be tween England and France, including most-favoured-nation clause
HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
39
The period from about 1850 to 1870 is not only characterized, however, by continuous and, in the main, quite successful attempts at substituting freedom for protection, private initiative for State interference. The principal motive underlying the programme of 'free trade and tax reform, by which Thorbecke c.s. set so much store, is to be found in their wish to remove all obstacles that impede the spontaneous development of economic life. Yet, the impressive legislative activities during these two decades amply testify to the fact that the third government duty formulated by Adam Smith as: "the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions”, is by no means treated in a negligent and half-hearted way. In the true liberalist fashion, the individual members of Society are chiefly held responsible for the wealth and welfare of the nation, but at the same time it is keenly felt that the State should not shy away from its distincdy positive task, viz. "to promote the development of self-reliant pow ers" (as Thorbecke puts it towards the end of his life in his Epi logue, published in 1869). And that, in acting upon this conception, the State is inevitably becoming a highly creative force may be demonstrated by the following collection of government instigated laws (Table 4), which in many cases meet with the reproachful op position of the more doctrinal advocates of 'laissez faire'... and sometimes even of Thorbecke himself. Thorbecke votes, e.g., against the Railway Act of 1860, because he is opposed to State construction, as proposed by the conservative government then in power. However much he is showing himself a true to type supporter of baissez faire' principles in this instance (or in that of the North Sea Canal project which he introduces in Par liament in 1862, when he is in office again), yet, in by far the most cases it is quite clear that he is not adhering to a right-or-wrongprivate-enterprise-doctrine. So, in the Epilogue, he testifies that he wants to be reckoned among "the constructive, organizing, not among the polemizing, purely negativist liberals". Evidence of what he means by this is not only furnished by nearly all the laws mentioned in Table 4, but also by a considerable number of bills he has failed to get passed — such as his proposal of 1851 for State poor relief and State supervision on church and private charitable institutions *7.
One may, indeed, have one’s doubts as to which is the most important aspect of Dutch Liberalism in its early days of hegem-
THE SOCIETAL STATE
40 TABLE 4
Chronology of State Instigated Provisions in the Public Interest, 1850—187087 1850
1851
Post Office Act reform of the expensive and inefficient postal service: lowering of rates, and strict enforcement of the regulations on the State’s mail monopoly Expropriation Act expropriation permitted "for the general benefit", and not any longer only in the very limited number of specific cases listed by the now repealed law of 1841
1852 Telegraph Act telegraph service organized by the State to secure the exploita tion of both remunerative and unremunerative communications 1857 Elementary Education Act municipal authorities are charged with the obligation of providing sufficient opportunities for public elementary education; freedom of establishing (non-provided) 'confessional' schools 1860 Railway Act State construction of a railway network of about 800 kilometers, the exploitation of which — in 1863 — was to be granted to a private company 1863
Canals Act State provided guarantees of interest to the concessionaire of the Amsterdam North Sea Canal project; ƒ 6 million grant to the department of Public Waterworks (Rijkswaterstaat) in behalf of the Rotterdam N ew Waterway project
1863
Secondary Education Act instituting a new type of school (HBS), not almost exclusively preparing for the university, as does the old-time Latin school, or the somewhat more modem Grammar school (Gymnasium), but meant for the training of "that considerable part of the middle classes w h ich . . . strives for general information, education, and preparation for the various trades of the industrious society"
1863
Bank Act enactment of a new charter enabling the Bank of the Nether lands, by virtually granting it a status of monopoly, to develop into the national bank of issue and, in due time, also into the country’s central Bankers’ bank 1865 Medical Acts State supervision on medicine and pharmaceutics, uniform regula tions on the qualification for, and the practising of the medical and pharmaceutical professions
HEINRICH HEINE PARTLY REFUTED
41
ony: that of removing obstacles, or of sponsoring public provisions? But there can be no doubt at all that, thanks to this ’double-edgedness, the Thorbeckian epoch marks a highly notable break in the history of the 19th century Netherlands. Then, the sites are being cleared, and the first foundations are laid for the country's modernization. Nearly everywhere a new spirit is noticeable, and new trends, foreshadowing a thorough change of structure, become perceptible (as Table 5 attempts to show). Means of transport and communication are improved, trade and commerce begin to flour ish again and are slowly but surely organized on different lines, modem banking is coming into existence, industry is increasingly mechanized, and enterprises are gradually growing in size, number, TABLE 5
Tentative Indices of Beginning Socio-Economic Change, 1850-187588 Letters mailed (x 1000) Telegrams sent (x 1000) Kilometers of railway in exploitation Receipts passengers & goods (x ƒ 1000) Total import (x ƒ 1 million) Total transit (x ƒ 1 million) Total export (x ƒ 1 million) Limited Liability Companies Sea-going sailing vessels Sea-going steam vessels Steam engines for industrial use Increase urban population (1830 = 100) Increase rural population Persons receiving poor relief (x 1000) Totally illiterate conscripts (%) Net government expenditures on elementary education (x ƒ 1000) Pupils lower techn. ('Ambachts')schools Pupils lower second. ('Burgerschools Pupils second.schools for girls (MMS) Pupils higher second, schools (HBS) Pupils Latin & Grammar schools Students State universities Students Polytechnic school
± 1850 7449 1 176 1676 286 92 230 137 1781 12 392 115
±1865
±1875 46225 2196 1619 16627 785 188 649 486 1749 86 2873 153
117 640 23
451 18
143 197 12
1279
3576
6173
124 1453 34 1418 1214 1297 91
473 3972 691 3847 1260 1684 263
1807 1226
THE SOCIETAL STATE
42
and variety. Closely bound up with these developments, unem ployment is declining and with that the problem of poverty appears to be of a much more intricate nature than hitherto has been realized. The more the facts come to light in a concentrated form as a result of the beginning drift from the country to the already overcrowded urban slums, the more clearly it is felt that not all paupers should be lumped together. And just as the emergence of the 'social question’ points to a breaking away from the fatalistic view of society as a God-ordained order in which the rich are predestined to be rich, and the poor to be poor, so the introduction (on however modest a scale) of more, and more up to date edu cational opportunities for both the lower and middle classes sug gests that the necessity is felt of enabling larger groups of the population to have their share in shaping the nation’s future11. The transitions Holland is passing through during the 1850’s and 1860’s do not only occur in social and economic fields. In the sphere of politics, too, there are all sorts of indications that the ideas embodied in the revised constitution of 1848 are bound to be accompanied by the emergence of a novel order of things. So, to begin with, mention might be made of the passage of that note worthy trio of organic laws, the Provincial Act, the Electoral Act, both of 1850, and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1851. All three together bring about such a thorough reform of the country’s pol itical organization that, in essentials, this organization has wel stood the test of time up to the present day. And even though it is clear from the last two laws that the principle of direct elections is for the moment interpreted in a most conservative way (see Table 6), no serious contemporary politician disguises the fact that, once table
e
Percentages of People Entitled to Vote at General and Municipal Elections, And of Persons Over 24 Years (to Total Population), 185O-187041 Persons to vote at General elections Persons to vote at Municipal elections Persons over 24 years of age
1 8 5 0 /’51
1870
2.6 4.4 48.3
2.9 4.8 49.9
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
43
this principle has been introduced, there is no escaping from extending the franchise step by step to ever larger groups of the population (if not to the entire adult population, as is already pre dicted by Thorbecke in 1844, and dreaded by the prominent orthodox-Protestant politician Groen van Prinsterer in 1850). In the second place, in this period the seeds can be found of a certain alignment of political parties, as well as the beginning emancipa tion, if not yet of the working classes which start forming their earliest associations for mutual assistance in 1861, then at least of another group of ’second-rate citizens, the Roman Catholics, who in 1853 — to the utter chagrin of the Protestant majority — are restored to the freedom of having their own bishops. Or, to cite a last example, there is the dispute about what may gently be called the question of the ’royal prerogatives’ (but, in actual fact, refers to the problems resulting from King Willem Ill’s highhanded ness), and about the exact meaning of the concept of ’ministerial responsibility’; a dispute which comes to a head in the years 18661868, and ends in the further consolidation of the position of the legislative over against the executive branch of government41. In short, by 1870 the Dutch nation has, on the whole, reached the point where it is ready to turn its back on the remnants of the past, and to enter a new era — the era of modem Capitalism and maturing Democracy. 3. THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
’’Laissez faire was never an absolute rule of government, or even approximately absolute. . . ” This general statement made by H. Finer4* holds true also for the Netherlands after 1848. It cer tainly holds for those first two decades when, under the able guidance of Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, Liberalism is rising to suprem acy. As a matter of fact, the quite imposing series of activities then undertaken by the central government should, to a consid erable extent, be viewed in the light of the particular task which the new leaders have set themselves in these years: to bring the country out of the ’house of bondage’ of the (mitigated) Policeystaat established by the neo-mercantilist King Willem I, and to lead it towards the ’promised land’ of the liberalist état policier. But even
44
THE SOCIETAL STATE
when, in the 1870's, or, at any rate, in the 1880's, this task appears to be largely fulfilled, it is altogether out of the question that the government can completely refrain from interfering in societal mat ters. In this respect, there is, at the very most, a difference in de gree, and not in essence, between the two periods that are marked off here in 19th century Dutch Liberalism. For not only the dynamics of socio-economic development, but — paradoxically enough also the prevalent doctrines of the day, which so strongly stress Man's inborn capacity for self-dependence, keep the State contin uously and busily engaged in the process of providing and securing the conditions Society needs in order to be able to care for its own affairs43. From what Finer says with regard to Western Europe in general it is evident that the Dutch scene presents — although at a later date — nothing hut a replica of the situation in other countries: " ...a l l governments made laws at great speed, on numerous aspects of social life, and saw to it that their rules were executed”. However, when this same author adds the following words: "There are few fictions so misleading as that which looks back at the early nineteenth cen tury and says it was an ’era* of laissez faire”, he is somewhat over stating his case. In our opinion, Trevelyan comes closer to the mark ”At no period was laissez faire in force in all directions at once”44· To be sure, laissez faire* has never been practised to the full. But, on the other hand, it goes without saying that, as a principle, it has been most highly esteemed during most of the 19th century. At that time, it does set the ideal which, broadly speaking, motivates all decisions and directs all actions in the political, economic, and social realms.
The Supplementary State. Apart from this paradox and its interesting implications, however, there is something else to be not ed. Whatever part the government actually plays in the Nether lands during the years that Liberalist theories are swaying the miné, it is principally seen as a subsidiary one, as an exception to the golden rule of societal self-regulation. Society — as comprising the grand total of all independent citizens, acting either as single per sons, or in voluntary association with each other — is presumed to fare best, if everybody is let to follow his particular interests as he thinks fit; whereas the State, being strictly confined within the boundaries of the most narrowly defined public domain, is just
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
45
required to stand by, be it for rendering emergency services, or for taking care of certain indispensabilities that are beyond the indi viduals powers. The State is, so to speak, conceived of as the handmaiden of Society, and its one and only function is to attend to the smooth operation of the politico-economic system which rests upon such sanctified pillars as free enterprise and so-called perfect competition, private initiative and the indefeasible right to exclu sive command over one’s own property and energy. So, in accor dance with these views, the — Municipal Corporations Act of 1851 enables the municipalities to enter upon expropriation procedures for the purpose of laying out new streets and canals, but for the rest (apart from some min imum prescriptions on public health and building requirements in troduced piece-meal) all town planning, or rather the absence of it, and all housing construction are left entirely to the interplay of free forces; — Poor Law of 1854 stipulates the priority, as well as the total exemption from any official supervision, of non-public charitable institutions; only in case of absolute inevitability’, i.e. if and when the said institutions are unable or unwilling to grant assistance, and (as is newly emphasized in the law’s first revision in 1870), none the less, relief is deemed imperative to prevent a possible disturb ance of the peace, (local) government authorities are allowed to come to the rescue; — Railway Exploitation Acts of 1863 are based on the assumption that it is not for the central government to work the railroads which it has been committed to construct under the Railway Act of 1860 (see Table 4), but that this is to be in private hands; —Steam Act of 1869, which establishes a uniform system of licen ces together with a central inspection agency, is devised to safe guard the public at large from steam-boiler explosions — but (just as the Public and Private Nuisance Act of 1875, in which it is in corporated) it does not include any specific safety regulation in behalf of the ones most directly concerned, the factory workers, for to do such a thing would be an intolerable infringement of the autonomy of the individual employer; — Public Means of Conveyance Act of 1880 gives preference to the ’free’ operation of all regional and local transport services (al-
46
THE SOCIETAL STATE
though, in practice, companies running city tramways have to apply for a concession, because they cannot avoid making use of mun icipal property); — Merchandise Marks Act of 1893 lays down the formal registra tion of trade marks as a means to protect the consumer against unfair competition methods — without interfering, however, in some way or other (e.g. through such unheard-of devices as price control, quality supervision, or the like), with the manufacturers’ freedom of production". In fine, as this small sample of ’laissez faire' inspired legislation suffices to show, it would be an incorrect exaggeration, indeed, to contend that in the 19th century Liberalist system there is no role whatsoever assigned to the State. But, at the same time, it is even more manifest that —in the Netherlands as much as anywhere else — this role is firmly believed to be of a purely supplementary nature. This belief, however, is clearly belied by the facts. And, what is more, it is bound to be; not so much because of the unforseeable march of events, as because this belief emanates from a basic misconception of the relation of State and Society. The ar dent advoctates of a Free Society hold that the best guarantee for the realization of their lofty ideal is the Abstinent State, or, at least, a State which is only to be kept available as a kind of first aid agency. This assumption is, in itself, quite understandable. It is a logical consequence of what might be termed the inbred Sta* tophobia of the Liberalists. In view of the situation at the time of origin of this (Liberalist) species, it is far from surprising that they cannot help having the gravest misgivings as to the State and its intentions. To them the State is, as it were, a never-to-be-trusted power-mongering institution, from which they recoil by reflex - a reflex conditioned by the reminiscence of Absolutist usurpation and Mercantilist regimentation and meddlesomeness. Their great est concern, therefore, is to keep this ill-reputed institution in con stant check, and to push it back, as much as possible, into a position of secure subordination. And hence also their incessant preoccupation with the maxim of the separation of State and Society. For being untiringly vigilant in upholding the separation of State and Society as a thoroughly solid principle in politics, Lib·
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
47
eralism is to be paid a well-deserved tribute of praise by all true democrats. However, Liberalism is to be blamed for its taking for granted that the same maxim is sound, too, in regard to the social and economic domains. In doing so, it has blinded itself (and the many who, direcdy or indirecdy, have been under the spell of its theories) to a clear appreciation of actual developments. What are these developments? And what do they suggest with respect to the nature of the State-Society relations in the Nether lands since about 1850? Some Telling Statistics. In answering these two questions, at tention may first be drawn to a set of comparative data which, in a very general way, can serve as a sort of graduator of the impress ive changes that have occurred over the last 100 years in the mat ter of State action. As presented in Tables 7 and 8, these data readily lead to the following conclusion: in flat contradiction to the expectations of 19th century 'laissez faire' enthusiasts, the State has definitely not been reduced to an agency of only secondary importance but, instead, turns out to have developed into a truly mammoth organization. This becomes unmistakably clear both from the more than tripled number of government members and in the almost rocket-like rise of the total amount of government TABLE 7
Number of Central Government Departments and Government Members, And Total Expenditures on All Existing Departments, 1850-1960“ *() 1850 Number of departments Number of government members Total expenditures on all departments in existence in the respective years
7H 7H
1900 8 8
I960 13 24
117 6177 (in ƒ millions at current prices) 23,09 117,29 10,37 ƒ per (:aput; 1960 at 1900 price level) 31
(*) the departments/ministers of Reformed and Roman Catholic Worship, which are soon to disappear after 1850, are not included in the numbers.
THE SOCIETAL STATE
48
expenditures. The latter are in 1960 nearly 200 times higher than in 1850, when expressed in current prices; taking into account the increase in population, from 3 to over 11 million, as well as the sharp fall in money value, especially since 1900, the 1960 and 1850 expenditures are in the ratio of 11.3 to 1. By far the most interesting point, however, is disclosed by a somewhat more detailed examination of the proportional distribut ion of central government expenditures over the different depart TABLE 8
Central Government Expenditures Classified According to Departments, 1850—196047 Government Departments Anno 1960
1850
1900
1960
in percentages 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
General Affairs Foreign Affairs Defence Justice Home Affairs (incl. Overseas Affairs) 6. Education, Arts & Sciences 7. Agriculture & Fisheries 8. Housing Sc Building Trade 9. Welfare Work
10. Social Affairs Sc Public Health 11. Economic Affairs
12. Transport Sc Public Works
0.3 4.0 26.7 3.6
1.6 50.1 7.3
0.7 34.6 5.1
3.6 excl.
3.1 excl. [-S S ’ !
Γ ΊΤ *
1 1 1 ! 0.2 I 1 1
1 0.9 1 ! ai 1a 1 ! ° ·7 1
! : ! 1.0 ! !1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 .2 1 11 0.4 I
1—
{
7.2 21.8 3.9 7.5 2.1 7.4
! 0.1 ! L . 0 ..4 j excl.
1.9
23.5
6.5
! . 7 . 1 . 11 [ I ____ J
excl. IB. Finance
24.5
21.2
7.2
TO TA L
100.0
100.0
100.0
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
49
ments in the respective years. Such an examination reveals a re markable shift in the national budget s centre of gravity from the traditional departments to the more recendy formed ones. Thus, the relative importance of the former departments —including even the Ministry of Defence, or of Finance — has decreased consider ably; namely (combining nrs. 2—5 and 13, in Table 8): from 87.1 % in 1850 to 64.7% in 1900 to 48.7% in 1960. Statistically speaking, this decrease is not particularly starding as it is the rather self-evident effect of the many additional tasks the State has taken upon itself in the course of time. Yet, the shift in question is highly significant, if looked upon from the point of view that the newer departments — which, for the greater part, have evolved from Home Office sub-divisions in existence already in 1850 —practically all fall under one common heading; the head ing, that is, of the last of the three legitimate minimum-functions of the State as indicated by the revered patriarch of classic Lib eralism, Adam Smith. In other words (and as Table 9 illustrates in a most salient way), the vast increase, both in size and in scope, of the State's activities has not so much been due to greater obligaTABLE 9
Central Government Expenditures on Some Departments Classified According to the Three Classic Liberalist State Functions, 1850—196048 State Functions/Departments (*)
1850
1900
I960
in index numbers Protection from outside violence Defence department (3) Administration of justice Justice department (4) Providing for public institutions New departments (6-12) Total Expenditures (1-13) (*) the numbers refer to Table 8
100
153
604
100
158
566
100
592
4353
100
222
1227
50
THE SOCIETAL STATE
tions in maintaining the nation's external security and internal law and order, but rather to increasing demands for the provision of such services and institutions as no private citizen is able or willing to supply but with which Society as a whole cannot possibly dis pense. This point is worth noting. For it clearly suggests a trend of things which is completely contrary to the one so positively pre dicted before. It appears to have been the irony of fate that State intervention has made greatest progress in those fields where, in compliance with Liberalist fundamentals, it ought to have become well-nigh superfluous. Despite the once emphatically proclaimed assertion that the surest way to bring about the general good is to liquidate the ancient government controls and to give every individual maximum freedom to mind his own business, the actual course of events makes it fairly evident that the obvious clue to the (re-)emergence of the State as a highly active regulatory force in economic, social, and cultural affairs is to be found in the appar ent indispensability of the State as an instrument for promoting the public weal. In fact, virtually from the moment it is put into practice, the theoretically specious system of spontaneous societal self-help proves to be subject to a process of constant crumbling. That is to say, almost from the very outset, it produces a number of harmful effects that can only be remedied by resorting to the State. Init ially, people are not particularly worried about this, seeing that even the best set-up is likely to show some imperfections. As time goes on, however, it becomes more and more manifest that these shortcomings are not just to be seen as simple, though deplorable, by-products of the essentially sound principle of enlightened selfinterest but that they rather proceed from the system's inherent inadequacy at harmonizing the widely variant — and more often than not sharply conflicting — needs of a Society on its way to in dustrialization and democratization. Or, to put it in slightly differ ent terms: step by step, one is forced to admit that the well-being of increasingly large groups of the population is vitally dependent on protective government measures — with the final result that, by now, State interference in behalf of the general welfare unques tionably represents the rule, instead of the exception.
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
51
Four Phases. It may be worthwhile to look a little further into this crumbling process and its pattern of development. And in doing so, we distinguish four successive phases, in each subsequent one of which State intervention not only shows considerable growth in volume but also a remarkable change in nature. It goes without saying that, in reality, these phases overlap each other in no small measure (which, incidentally, renders any attempt at dating them a rather hazardous undertaking), but this need not stop us from tracing out their main, distinctive features. So, I. The earliest phase that can be discerned might be characterized as the one in which the State is called in, simply and solely, for purely repressive purposes. During this period, covering the palmy days of Liberalism, the faith put in the individual's ability to do what is most beneficial both to himself and to the community as a whole is still totally unshaken — even though it has to be acknow ledged that, once in a while, some nasty abuses do crop up which call for governmental intervention. II. Before long, however, the first shadows of doubt start to spread over the optimistic vista of life as presented to the world by Lib eralist doctrine. Towards the end of the century, it becomes in creasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that the free interplay of societal forces appears to be persistently attended with certain detrimental, if not downright disruptive, tendencies. Consequently, in an ever growing number of cases, it is deemed expedient to have recourse to State regulations of an avowedly preventive na ture. III. Then, with the outbreak of World W ar I and, most definitely, with the advent of the Great Depression, uneasy doubts give way inescapably to dismal certainties. Under the devastating blows of these catastrophes, the high hopes of Society's harmonious self evolution are radically shattered, and people are rudely awakened to the fact that the system founded on free enterprise and free competition proves to be badly wanting both in efficiency and in quality. From sheer necessity, therefore, an urgent appeal is made to the State, in order that steps be taken for correcting the gravest defects. IV. Quite soon, though, it is found that steps of the latter type alone are not enough. If the serious troubles in Society are to be
52
THE SOCIETAL STATE
cured efficaciously, not mere correction, but over-all reconstruction of the socio-economic order becomes imperative. And, for this reas on, the States help is enlisted — in a rather incidental way during the years immediately preceding World W ar II; on a more sys tematic scale since 1945 — in carrying out structural reforms. In the present context, this detailed distinction between (oui phases is to be preferred to the more general one which reduces all government activities that are not aimed at reconstruction-throughstructural-reforms to the same denominator of coirection-without-putting-the-principles-of-Liberahsm-to-the-test. To be sure, the general distinction is a very essential one41, but for the moment we are not so much interested in essentials as in doing justice to the different shades of motivation underlying the in creasing reliance upon State action as a result of the slow but sure crumbling of laissez faire'. So, the terms 'correction* and 'reconstruc tion', by which we characterize phase III and IV, are not meant to imply that the principles of Liberalism have not yet been put to the test in the former case, while they are in the latter. In point of fact, in phase III the belief in the superiority of free enterprise is already badly shaken. The main difference between the two phases in question, therefore, is a difference in degree. During the corrective phase one finds oneself forced to take refuge in a rather haphazard policy of palliatives, in order to stave off the worst dangers resulting from the (more or less grudgingly acknowledged) collapse of the free economy; whereas in the next phase one is turning to a more systematic and deliberate policy of restructuring the societal order on the basis of democratic planning.
Let us illustrate these four phases, which briefly may be lab elled as follows: I. Repression of obvious abuses, II. Prevention of detrimental effects, III. Correction of inherent defects, and IV. Reconstruction through structural reforms, by means of the chronological list (Table 10) of a score of important enactments in the field of so-called Social legislation, in its three fold sense of labour legislation, social insurance legislation, and leg islation (ultimately) aimed at striking a balance between planning and freedom in the (re-)organization of the socio-economic system.
THE CRUMBLING O F A SYSTEM
53
TABLE 10
Tentative Classification of Social Legislative Enactments According to Four Phases of Both Increasing and Changing State Intervention60 I: REPRESSION OF OBVIOUS ABUSES (e)
1874
Children's A ct total ban on (industrial) labour by children beneath the age of 12; no special enforcement agency is established II: PREVENTION OF DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS (·)
1889 Labour Act regulations on industrial working conditions of women and young persons between the ages of 12 and 16, whose working hours are limited to 11 hours a day; establistment of a government agency for the enforcement of this act, the Labour Inspectorate * revisions in 1911 and 1919, the last one introducing the general 8-hour working day 1895 Safety A ct regulations on safety and health conditions in factories and work shops where at least 10 persons are employed and engines or furnaces are in operation * in 1934 completely revised and, in principle, extended to all industrial and agricultural enterprises 1901 Industrial Accidents Insurance A ct compulsory accidents insurance of workers in a specified number of industries; establishment of a new public agency, the State Insurance Bank for the act's administration * in 1921 revised and extended to all workers, with the exception of those covered by the Seamen's Accidents Insurance Act 1919 and the Agricultural and Horticultural Accidents Insurance Act 1922 1905 1906
Caisson Act Coal Mines Regulation Decree safety prescriptions for specific, dangerous trades and first defin ite regulations on the hours of labour of adult male workers
1907
Labour Contract A ct improving the legal status of employees (for whose weaker econ omic position full allowance is made), and legally recognizing the practice of collective bargaining
(**) see note at the end of Table 10
54 1913 1913
1916
1919
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Disability Insurance Act Sickness Insurance Act compulsory disability, old-age, and sickness insurance of workers earning a certain minimum wage; introduction of functional decentralization and labour-management cooperation on parity basis in social insurance administra tion by entrusting the implementation of these acts to newly form ed Boards of Labour and accredited (employers’) Occupational Associations, both with equal representation of employers and employees Unemployment Decree 100% additional allowances by State and municipalities to (trade unions’) Unemployment Funds; establishment of a central Government Unemployment Insur ance and Labour Exchange Service and an Unemployment In surance Advisory Committee * State supported compulsory unemployment insurance is given legal footing by the Unemployment and Reduced Pay Insurance Act 1949 OldrAge Insurance Act voluntary old-age insurance of self-employed persons with low incomes * nation-wide compulsory old-age insurance comes into operation with the General Old-Age Insurance Act 1956 III: CORRECTION OF INHERENT DEFECTS (·)
1919
1923
1927
1930
Supreme Labour Council Decree establishing a supreme advisory body on all labour questions, the membership of which consists of equal numbers of govern ment, management, and labour representatives Labour Disputes Act instituting a body of independent individuals, the Government Conciliators, with persuasive powers in the field of prevention and setdement of labour disputes Collective Labour Agreements A ct introducing more detailed statutory regulations on collective lab our agreements Employment Exchange A ct sanctioning by statute the greater part of the gradually devel oped system of public and private labour exchanges, and giving uniform regulations on the functioning of public Employment Offices in behalf of ensuring as effective a balance as possible between demand and supply on the labour market * in 1941 the responsibility for employment exchange and labour supply is entirely taken over by the State
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
55
1933
Industrial Councils Act providing a legal basis for the formation of consultative bodies for the different branches of industry, with chiefly advisory powers in the field of labour conditions, and with equal representation of members appointed by officially recognized employers' and employees' organizations 1935 Act on Making Manufacturers' Agreements Generally Binding or N ot Binding enabling the Minister of Economic Affairs to make price and production agreements of cartellized manufacturers generally binding, or not binding, if the public interest requires such 1937 Act on Making Collective Labour Agreements' Provisions Generally Binding or N ot Binding enabling the Minister of Social Affairs to declare provisions of collective labour agreements to be generally binding in the whole or in a part of the country, or to make such provisions not binding when incompatible with the public interest 1937 Small Trades' Requirements Act regulations on minimum standards of solvency, commercial and professional knowledge required of small traders in the manage ment of their businesses 1938 Industrial Licences Act empowering the Minister of Economic Affairs to prohibit, at the request of individual or organized manufacturers, and with due allowance for the public interest, the establishment of new, or the enlargement of existing, industries, so as to prevent the disturbance of the delicate balance between productive and consumptive capacities IV: RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH STRUCTURAL REFORMS (·)
1945
1945
Labour Relations Emergency Decree instituting the (reorganized) Board of Government Conciliators as the executive organ of the wage control system, in which cap acity it is entrusted with the power to make binding regulations on wage rates and other working conditions, and to approve or disapprove all collective labour agreements; in questions "of more general importance", the Board is com pelled to seek the advice of the Foundation of Labour, a private body for cooperation between organized management and labour, and recognized by the government as the principal advisory agen cy in the social field Central Bureau of Economic Planning (CPB) establishment of a central government institution for planning and research, the main task of which consists of analyzing and making prognoses of current and anticipated economic develop ments in behalf of the coordination of economic, social, and finan cial policies on a nation-wide scale
56 1950
1950
1952 1953
1958
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Industrial Organization Act establishing the framework of so-called public-legal industrial organization (PBO), a cooperative system which is made up of many bodies for furthering the various interests of all parties concerned in the socio-economic process; under this act, the following public bodies — authorized to make regulations enforceable by law in their specific fields - are set up: Vertical* Product Boards (comprising trades and industries engaged in producing and distributing the same commodities), ’horizontal' Industrial Boards (combining the enterprises of a par ticular branch of industry), both with equal management-labour representation, and the Social Economic Council, as the system's supreme coordinating and supervisory agency, which is to advise the government on all matters regarding the industrial organiza tion, as well as on other socio-economic problems, and which has a tripartite membership of persons appointed on parity basis by the Crown, the central employers* associations, and the em ployees’ unions (see Figure 5 below, ch. I I / 1) Enterprise Councils Act obliging, in principle, the head of any business enterprise of cer tain dimensions to form councils of joint consultation between himself, acting as ex officio chairman, and the elected repre sentatives of the employees; such councils do not only have a great variety of powers in social matters but also are granted an advisory voice in internal technical and economic questions Social Insurance Organization A ct Social Insurance Coordination A ct giving detailed regulations aimed at the unification and coordina tion of the financing and implementation of all social insurance acts in operation, and bringing the entire administrative machin ery — which is based upon the principles of decentralization and management-labour cooperation — under the general super vision of the Social Insurance Council, a body consisting of an equal number of members representing the government, the em ployers, and the employees Economic Competition Act enlarging the powers of the Minister of Economic Affairs in promoting optimum competitive conditions, in particular by enabling him to curb monopolistic business positions, and to de clare cartel provisions of a certain nature or tendency incom patible with the public interest
(*) Precisely because the phases overlap to a greater or lesser extent, the classification of laws according to the four phases can be made on a tentative basis only. The first Labour Act of 1889, e.g., might
THE CRUMBLING OF A SYSTEM
57
also be classified under phase I as it is principally meant to protect just another category of 'personae miserabiles' who (in contrast to male workers) are supposed to be unable to stand up for their own interests. Yet, we have decided in favour of phase II on account of the establishment of the Labour Inspectorate, as this significandy marks the introduction of direct State intervention (even though it is not before 1896 that the powers of the staff of this agency are sufficiendy enlarged for effective enforcement purposes). Similar dif ficulties arise with respect to various other laws included in this list, in particular those classified under the heading of phase III, most of which show many an element which is also characteristic of phase IV.
Two Conclusions. W hat do all the facts mentioned above amount to? Do they, by any chance, suggest that the 19th century état policier has been replaced again by a new and extremely vigorous variety of the Policeystaat of old? It is no use denying that nowadays there is very little left of the once almost unlimited freedom of action enjoyed in the socio-economic domain. The aver age citizen of today is bound hand and foot; on practically every side, he is hemmed in by an intricate web of restrictions and reg ulations, most of which are strictly State enforced. But this is not to say — as traditional Liberalists prefer to put it — that the State has made the heaviest inroads upon Man's indefeasible right to be the sole and sovereign judge of his own best interests. Such views on the happenings of the past scores of years testify to ideological shortsightedness and consequent mistaking of the shadow for the substance. There cannot be the least doubt, indeed, that State interven tion in societal affairs has increased in the extreme. Those, how ever, who appear to interpret this as a sure sign of regression to the oppressive paternalism of bygone days are, obviously, still thinking in terms that may have been quite pertinent to the situa tion of roughly one hundred years ago, but that are simply obsolete now. They stubbornly stick to their (deep-rooted) conviction that the State must necessarily be regarded as the ever to be dreaded opponent of Society, and they seem to overlook the disparity be tween this idea and the outstanding facts of present day reality. This conception of the State — historically understandable though it may be — is entirely inconsistent with the two principal con clusions which can be drawn from our short survey of the major
58
THE SOCIETAL STATE
trends discernible in the relationship of Society and State since the close of the 19th century. Concisely formulated, these conclusions read as follows: (1) The tremendous growth of government interference has far less to do with an indomitable lust for power on the part of the State, than with an irrepressible cry for help on the part of Society. (2) However much it may be true that the State has deeply in vaded the territory of Society, it is, at the same time, equally (if not more) true that Society has firmly ensconced itself in the strong holds of the State — in order to ensure that the multifarious pres sures brought to bear upon the authorities are kept well-balanced and due account is taken of all the often widely divergent needs of the many different groups that constitute the nation. In a word, the progressive expansion of State action since 1850, and especially since 1900, is simply beyond dispute. But this ex pansion is by no means a cause, let alone the cause, of the grad ual downfall of the so-called Free Society. On the contrary, it is first and foremost, an inevitable repercussion of this Society's in ability to cope adequately with the ever more complex and highly intricate problems arising from its ongoing emancipation.
CHAPTER II
FROM FREE SOCIETY TO SOCIETAL STATE
A Threefold Analysis
Les formes de la vie politique sont comman dées par la nature des forces dont les gouverne ments peuvent se prétendre les instruments. GEORGES BURDEAU1
Occasionally, history seems to play tricks on its makers. Or, to put it in different but hardly less anthropomorphic terms: once in a while, history apparently shows a special liking for paradoxes. A most clear case in point is the development of State-Society rela tions which follows the great 19th century event of the decisive victory of Liberalism over the age-old forces of political paternal ism and economic regimentation. By those who energetically en gage in gaining and consolidating this victory it is firmly believ ed that, thanks to their efforts, (a) Society is bound to become ever more emancipated, and, consequendy, (b) the States regulatory role is sure to be progressively reduced to an eventual utmost minimum. And, indeed, the first half of this assumption proves to have been very right. But, precisely because of this, the second half has not come true — however much it should have according to the rules of Liberalist logic. W hat actually has occurred is exact ly the reverse. The more Society is given full scope, and the more its many component parts start acting upon the freedoms they are told to be entitled to by the Order of Nature, the more the State is required to render active assistance in preventing things
60
THE SOCIETAL STATE
from 'spontaneously getting out of control and in promoting a deliberately 'organized' harmony of public and private interests. So far, all this has been depicted in a rather general manner, and in broad outlines only. In the foregoing chapter, one might say, the transition from Free Society to Societal State has been pointed out as such, and an attempt has been made at demon strating that it has come to pass. Now, however, attention has to be focused on the how and why of this transition. That is, we have to embark, in this chapter, on a more detailed analysis of the complex of immanent processes out of which the present day re lationship of State and Society has inevitably emerged. Advisedly, the terms immanent and inevitably are used here, for, viewed in retrospect, there can hardly be any doubt that the processes in question have taken place by sheer necessity. To all appearances, the latter do not spring from some sort of historical whim but, in stead, are the product of history's consistency. Once the double break-through of industrialist capitalism and bourgeois democracy — which underlies the triumph of classical Liberalism in its divers manifestations — has taken place as the first result of the joint effect of the French and the Industrial Revolution, the continued effect of these revolutions is slowly but surely leading to a situation in which a highly developed Society finds the State to be an indis pensable "source of help, security and indulgence"*. 1. THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATTONALISM
To the advocates of societal self-determination, who become increasingly prominent in one Western European country after the other during the 19th century, it is indisputable that the key prin ciple of sound statecraft is to give the individual citizens as much free play as possible in the pursuit of their interests and in the unfolding of their initiative. This firm conviction is not only derived from philosophical views on man's inherent right to freedom, but is also rooted in some plain facts. At a time when enterprises are of modest dimensions, their relative influence on the widely ex panding markets is small, and the whole of economic life is still of a rather uncomplicated character, the said principle works quite effectively*; and, what is more, its application fits extremely well
THE GROWTH OF OHGANIZÀTIONÀLISM
61
with the requirements of those who boldly bet on the incipient system of mechanical manufacturing which, by its very nature, de fies all traditional patterns and cuts across all hitherto existing structures. "If we look at early capitalism and liberalism", says Karl Mann heim, " . . . it becomes obvious that their ’sacrosanct’ institutions — the free market and free competition, based on the absolute concept of private property with no external intervention — were the products of a unique and transient situation. They exactly correspond to the stage in economic development when expansion could no longer be carried out by tribal or local units, which were too small and too parochial in outlook. Later economic expansion took the form of individual penetration on the part of ’pioneers’, men with an intrepid spirit of enterprise and venture. The right to absolute disposal of individual property, as upheld against the older notion of family and corporate property and as a defense against state interference, can be fully understood as the only adequate stimulus for these individual entrepreneurs. T he concept of private property operated as a dynam ic force in the individual’s mind, continually spurring him to risk his capital, to save the profits for further accumulation and invest ment, to give up leisure and pleasure for power and profits". And G. D. H. Cole underlines the historic indebtedness of indus trialism to 'laissez faire’ policies by pointing out, in accordance with a Marxian contention, that "only under the control of the autocratic individual entrepreneur could the new technical forces have found free play". For: "Certainly it needed a strong directing authority to break up and replace the mercantile capitalism of the pre-industrialist era, to destroy the domestic system of small scale production and concentrate the workers in factories and towns, to accumulate capital at the expense of the immediate standard of living and to force upon the state an attitude toward industry consistent with the free growth of the new powers of production’’ 4.
There is conclusive evidence that the theories of economic Liberalism have a solid basis in early- and mid-19th century real ity, and that, in practice, they gready contribute to the expan sion of modem capitalist industrialism by meeting its urgent de mand for unrestricted elbow-room. In doing so, however, these the ories also contribute to their confutation-to-come: for, in its turn, this same industrialism proves to be the paramount factor which is going to put an end to the free and self-regulative market, and will bring into being what has been designated nowadays 'organ izational economy 5.
62
THE SOCIETAL STATE
In essentials, all this holds true for the Netherlands, too. As shown above (ch. 1/2), it is in the decades immediately following the year 1848, when Liberalism makes a successful bid for pol itical power and starts dominating the societal scene, that the coun try's economy ever more clearly reveals the marks of moderniza tion. It is no mere coincidence that these two phenomena occur at the same time, and it, in fact, strongly supports the truth of the words of Röpke heading the preceding chapter, viz. that "die politische Revolution der ökonomischen Pate gestanden hat”. It is simply beyond dispute that what we have called the 'double edged' policy of obstacle-removing and sponsoring public provisions for individual as well as collective self-reliance, which has been carried into effect since the late 1840's (cf. Tables 3 and 4), may be considered to have played a vital part in bringing about the structural transformations the Netherlands are passing through dur ing the 1850's and 1860's (Table 5). Prominent students of Dutch economic history invariably mention the political reforms of 1848, and the ensuing change to Free Trade and full trust in Private Initiative, in close connection with Holland's entry into the ranks of modem industrial nations by about 1870*. These students do more, however, than suggesting implicidy, or stressing explicidy, the instrumental role of Liberalism in start ing capitalist industrialism in the Netherlands. From their descrip tions of the developments since the middle — and, in particular, the last quarter — of the 19th century, there is yet another con clusion to be drawn. Namely that, as soon as the industrial (devolu tion begins gaining momentum, it appears to be accompanied hy a set of specific trends, which, on the one hand, are of an entirely immanent nature, and, on the other, unmistakably point to the emergence of an order of things which is far removed from the Liberalist blue-print of a harmonious and automatically balanced interplay of free societal forces. In many different ways, in a great variety of forms, the ef fects of these trends come to light, both in the field of industry as such and in the field of socio-economics as a whole. But all in all they can be reduced to the two-fold denominator of concentra tion and large-scale organization.
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALIS M
63
In the present context, in other words, the terms concentration and large-scale organization comprehensively denote a series of pro cesses — such as (geographical) centralization, rationalization, special ization and integration, or vertical organization, horizontal organiza tion or concentration on national and international level, institution alization, e.g. as reflected in the replacement of the 19th century ‘entrepreneur1 privately owning and personally conducting his bus iness, by the 20th century ‘manager’ of the large corporation financed by innumerable absentee-investors. These processes, the enumeration of which mainly represents a condensed compilation of the ones listed by the afore-mentioned economic historians, are all closely related variations on a central theme; the theme, that is, for which we have chosen the common heading of concentration and large-scale organization7.
Big Business. The trends towards concentration and largescale organization, basically rooted in the mechanization of pro duction and its intrinsic requirements of bringing many workers together under one roof and aggregating substantial amounts of capital, manifest themselves, first of all, in the steady increase in the size of industrial establishments. So, Tables 11 en 12 show, with regard to a limited number of enterprises in two important TABLE 11
Number of Power-Looms and Weaving-Mills in the City of Enschede, 1866—1913® 1866 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913
M itts 14 13 16 16 15 14
Total of Looms 2609 3358 4376 6085 8130 13649
Looms per M ill 186 258 273 380 542 975
TABLE 12
Number of Workmen of Nine Engineering-Works, 1867—1897® 1867 1877 1887 1897
Total of W orkm en 1522 2103 2174 3671
Workmen per Enterprise 172 234 242 408
TH E SOCIETAL STATE
64
branches of industry, a considerable growth in productive capacity, resp. manpower, per enterprise during the closing decades of the 19th century and the early beginning of the 20th. Naturally, these figures are of a very incidental nature, but in the absence of more systematic statistics for this particular period they may suf fice. Besides, they are suggestive of the tendency which is fully corroborated by the material presented in Table 13. This material, covering the whole of industry in the Netherlands over the last 60 years, makes indubitably clear that the scales have been turned ever more in favour of the large-sized units. T h e larger the units are, the more they appear to have grown in number, as well as in TABLE 13
Classification of Industrial Enterprises (excl. Building Trade) into 4 Size Groups, 1903—19601® Size Groups
n
1— 10 workers 10— 50 workers 50—500 workers 500 + workers
E W E W E W E W
1903
1920
1950
in percentages 85 82 12 15 11 13 17 20 3 4 36 38 0.3 0.4 35 27
84 22 13 26 3 38 0.1 13
Index Μ I960 (1903 = 100 136 177 212 283 288 409 704 1241
75 8 19 16 6 35 0.7 41
(*) E = Enterprises W = Type-workers (1 type-worker equals 300 working days) TABLE 14
Manufacturing Industries (excl. Building and Dairying), Employed Persons, and Total Turnover, in 196111 Size Groups 10— 50 50— 500 500—1000 1000 -f
persons persons persons persons
Enterprises
Em ployed Persons
67 30 2 1
14 38 12 36
Total Turnover 11 37 14 38
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
65
volume, with the result that, today, the largest ones — although comprising not yet 1 per cent of all enterprises — have more than 40 per cent of the entire industrial labour force on their pay-rolls. This dominant position of big industry in modem economic life also finds expression in Table 14, which demonstrates that in 1961 only 3 per cent of Dutch manufacturing industries has pro duced well over half of the total worth of industrial output (viz. nearly 19 milliard of a total of 36 milliard guilders). And a closer view of the 1 per cent or, in absolute figures, 127 enterprises employing 1000 persons or more, reasonably warrants the conclu sion that Holland, too, has its 'business Napoleons'12. For these 127 enterprises give work to 386.457 people, i.e. an average of 3043 per enterprise, and they have an annual turnover of 14 milliard guilders, or 110 million each. A second series of indications of the trends leading towards concentration and large-scale organization in the field of business is furnished by the data compiled in Tables 15, 16, and 17. These data do not so much refer to the continuous growth of bigger and bigger units of production as to the rise of many different kinds of more or less extensive and complex units of control. Examples of these latter units, varying from downright amalgamations to looser associations, present themselves in the Netherlands almost from the very outset of the country's industrialization: the earliest one of the economic combines and agreements mentioned in Table 15 dates from 1883 (nr. 12), the same year in which there are re ported to be only 45 margarine factories left of the more than 70 in 1880” . TABLE 15
Economic Combines and Agreements Affecting Dutch Trades and Industries, ± 190014 INTERNATIONAL COMBINES AND AGREEMENTS
1. Asiatic Petroleum Company, central sales organization of cartellized Russian and Dutch oil-producing companies (being a formative element of the later Royal D utch /S h ell concern) 2. American Petroleum Company/D e Automaat, Dutch sales agency of the Standard O il Company, combining several (foreign and Dutch) oil trading firms
66
THE SOCIETAL STATE
3. Nederlandsche Steenkolenhandelsvereeniging, agency of RheinischWestfälische Kohlensyndikat, combining 5 Dutch coal-trading firms 4. Consortium van Nederlandsche Handelaars in R uw Kalizout, agency of Stassfurter Kalisyndikat, combining 14 Dutch dealers in fertilizers (potassium) 5. Superphosphaat Syndihaat, combining 8 Belgian and 5 Dutch manu facturers of superphosphate 6 . Maatschappij tot Exploitatie der C. G . Rommenhöllersche Koolzuur en Zuurstofwerken, operating company forming part of a syndicate of German manufacturers of carbon dioxyde and oxygen 7. Manufacturers* agreement of German, French, Belgian, and Dutch manufacturers of hydrochloric and sulphuric adds 8. Manufacturers* agreement of foreign and Dutch soda works 9. Manufacturers’ agreement of foreign and Dutch manufacturers of starch 10. Manufacturers* agreement of foreign and Dutch petrol companies 11. Nederlandsche Basalt Maatschappij, forming part of a cartel of Ger man basalt quarries 12. Manufacturers’ agreement of Belgian and Dutch manufacturers of candles 13. Manufacturers' agreement of Belgian and Dutch manufacturers of pot tery 14. Manufacturers* agreement of German, French, Belgian, and Dutch manufacturers of glassware 15. Verhand der Amsterdamer Rheinschiffahrtsinteressenten, combining German and Dutch Rhine navigation companies 16. Combines of navigation companies serving Amsterdam/Rotterdam London, and Amsterdam/Rotterdam — H u ll/G oole 17. International Mercantile Marine Com pany (J.P. Morgan), shipping con ference of North-Adantic navigation companies, to which the HollandAmerika Lijn is a party, together with many other German and British companies COMBINES AND AGREEMENTS OF DUTCH FIRMS
18. Agreement of Stoomvaart Maatschappij N ederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd on transport conditions on their liners to the Netherlands East Indies 19. Combine of several Zuiderzee navigation companies 20. Combine of all firms dealing in gravel from Dutch rivers 21. Zout Conventie, combining 42 Dutch salt-works 22. Schelpkalk Conventie, combining 48 Dutch lime-burners 23. Manufacturers* agreement of all 4 Dutch glue factories 24. Manufacturers* agreement of Dutch manufacturers of botdes 25. Manufacturers* agreement of Dutch manufacturers of wall-tiles 26. Manufacturers* agreement of Dutch manufacturers of earthen pipes 27. Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Steenfabrikanten, at the same time a
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATTONALISM
28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
67
trade association and an employers’ association of the brick-manufact urers in the central part of Holland; similar (double function) asso datons in other parts of the country (*) Bond van Beetwortelsuikerfabrikanten, combination of Dutch man ufacturers of beet-sugar Eureka — Vereenigde Nederlandse Aardappelmeelfabrikanten, com bining the manufacturers of potato-flour in the province of Groningen Manufacturers' agreement of Dutch manufacturers of peat-litter Manufacturers' agreement of Dutch manufacturers of straw-board Agreements of Dutch fire- and transport-insurance companies
(*) Trade associations we take to be organizations which are primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with economic questions; whereas em ployers' associations denote organizations mainly dealing with sodal (labour) matters, and which are antipodal to the employees’ or work ers’ unions
These combinations and agreements, in particular the ones that are known as cartels, have been described as Kinder der Not, and, no doubt, there is a very great deal of truth in this15. In a most salient way, this is illustrated by the forms of economic cooperation in the Dutch cotton industry; for, as it is put by an author who has made a special study of them, "the combinations were only called into existence in those cases in which necessity forced the manufacturers, who were individualistically inclined, partly to relinquish their independence" ie. TABLE 16
Forms of Economic Cooperation in the Netherlands Cotton Industry, Prior to 1940 ASSOCIATIONS
1. Nederlandsche Patroonsvereeniging van Katoenspinners en -wevers (1907), founded as Dutch representative association to be affiliated with the International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufact urers Associations, the purpose of which is "to watch over and protect the common interests of the Industry, and to advise Associations of the actions to be taken against any common danger" 2. Nederlandsche Vereeniging van Katoenweverijen (1917—1922), weavers' organization for coping with the problems resulting from war conditions 3. Onderlinge Katoen Distributie Vereeniging (1917—1919), ad hoc combination of spinners for distributing the limited supply of raw materials through self- (instead of impending government) imposed regulations; after the war giving rise to:
THE SOCIETAL STATE
68
4. Nederlandsche Vereeniging van Katoenspinners en Spinners-Wmen (1919), organization of spinners for promoting the members’ common economic interests 5. Bond van Loonbleekerijen (1919), organization of bleachers, originally only acting as employers’ association but gradually also assuming econ omic functions (*), especially in the matter of production regulation and quotation of prices 6. Economisch Instituut voor de Textielindustrie (1930), central institute for economic research and advice on behalf of the entire textile in dustry, playing an instrumental part in preparing many of the cartel arrangements mentioned below 7. Katoen Commissie (1931), central agency representing the cotton in dustry in matters of trade policy regulations (import restrictions) issued by the government 8. Vereeniging van Sarongwevers (1936), advisory agency, especially active in mediating between government and manufacturers with respect to the restrictions on sarong imports 9. Nederlandsche Weversvereeniging (1937), organization of webbingweavers, particularly active in the field of supply of yams CARTEL ARRANGEMENTS
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
Twentsch Kolensyndikaat (1930), buying combination for coal Verf Combinatie (1931), buying combination for synthetic dyes Production and price regulation for printed shirtings (1933) Six separate price regulations for special types of cotton goods (1934, 1935, 1937, 1939) Garen Centrale (1934), regulation of production (and prices) of cotton yarns for the home market Manufacturen Export Centrale — M anex (1934), production and price cartel regulating, in close connection with governmental protective trade policies, the export of bleached staple goods to the Netherlands East Indies Manchester Combination (1934), regulation of prices and production of cords for the home market Pluche Conventie Engeland (1934), regulations of production and prices of plush fabrics for the British market Pluche Conventie Nederland (1935), regulation of production and prices of plush fabrics for the home market Nederlandsche Textiel Conventie (1935), condition cartel comprising nearly the entire cotton weavers’ trade Kunstzijdedrukkers Condities Conventie (1935/1939), price, condi tion, and calculation cartel of the manufacturers of printed artificial silks for ladies’ dresses
(*) See note at the end of Table 15
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
69
21. Export Dekens Combinatie (1939), production and price cartel of the manufacturers of cotton blankets, called into existence on the basis of government export subsidies 22. Internationale Kunstzijde Conventie (1939/1940), international agreement of Dutch, French, Italian, and German manufacturers of artificial silk materials, with price regulations for the Dutch market
On the other hand, however, it should be borne in mind that these so-called 'Kinder der Not’ are (if we may be excused for the metaphor) nothing but self-begotten children. Or, to be more precise, the 'Not' of which they are the offspring is the logical concequence of the espousal of capitalism and industrialism. In a system based on mechanical manufacturing of goods for private profit, there are powerful, immanent forces at work which, in a process of cumu lative causation, lead to large-scale production and large-scale control. In a such a system, efficiency increases with size, but size implies vast capital investments. And these very investments require the safeguarding of returns sufficiently remunerative and stable to be attractive, which necessitates the elaboration of devices for keeping the output as responsive to demand as possible. In a clear exposition of the facts governing the modern organ ization of industry, H. M. Croome states: "The characteristic of all heavily capitalized industries is that if they are not to make a loss, owing to heavy interest charges, they must run at or near capacity. (. ..) Capacity running is only possible if there is a steady flow of orders; an d . . . orders do not come in at all steadily. But they come in a great deal more steadily over the industry as a whole than they do to any particular firm; therefore the advance planning of produc tion is much easier for an organization extending over the whole in dustry, or even over a large part of it, than it is for the firms con sidered individually. A central organization can calculate that, taking swings and roundabouts together, so much is likely to be wanted in the course of the next six months or year; it can then divide the production up among the various firms in the industry, having due re gard to any specialized advantages of equipment; close down some works and run others to capacity, choosing the most suitable and efficient; and in general run the industry in the way best suited to its technique and to the state of demand. That is ’rationalization* ” 17.
In other words, both the technical and commercial conditions typic al of the industrial-capitalist method of production inevitably put a premium on the formation of cartels and trusts, and all similar types of economic integration, the underlying motive of which is
70
THE SOCIETAL STATE
TABLE 17
Interlocking Directorates of 604 Limited Liability Companies, As Presented in a Recent Dutch Study (1961)18 Number of Interlockings 0 2 -3 4 -5 6 -1 0 1 1 -2 0 2 1 -5 0 Total
Number of Managing Directors 7 3 3 - 44.5 % 4 7 2 - 28.7 2 0 4 - 12.4 1 7 3 - 10.5 472.9 171.0 1 6 4 6 - 100
%
Number of Board Directors 3 7 9 - 29.7% 4 3 2 - 33.9 1 7 1 - 13.4 1 9 3 - 15.1 8 3 - 6.5 191.4 1 2 7 7 - 100 %
to replace wasteful· competition by 'rewarding rationalization. And, for this reason, it is no wonder that this integration move ment (of which Table 17 provides another example) makes itself felt from the very beginning of the said method's introduction in the Netherlands up to the present day, in periods of slump, as much as in periods of boom. In fact, in recent years — which, so far as Holland is concerned, are years, if not of boom, then at least of near boom — business integrations abound (cf. Table 18, listing the most important fusings that have occurred in one single year). Only in part this is due to the oncoming European Common Market, for, as J. Wisselink points out with great emphasis, one should not overlook the influence of several other "structural changes", such as the "intensified fight for the consumer’s dollar" and "increasing capital intensivity" ie. TABLE 18
Business Integrations in the Netherlands in 196220 CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
I — ( 1) ( 2) ( 3)
Koninklijke Z ou t/K etjen , Hengelo Sikkens Groep, Sassenheim Gebrs. Struyck Kleefstoffenfabriek, Zutphen ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
II — ( 4)
( 5)
Heemaf, Hengelo Electrotechnische Industrie v /h W illem Smit en Co, Slik kerveer
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
in - ( 6) ( 7) (
8)
71
W illem Smit en Co’s TransformatorenfabHek, Nijmegen AFO Apparatenfabriek ”Overijssel”, Hattem Coq’s Belegging en Beheer Maatschappij/C o q - Fabriek van hoogspanningsschakelmateriaal, Utrecht RUBBER INDUSTRY
IV - ( 9) ( 10)
Rubberfabriek Vredestein, The Hague Vereenigde N ederlandsche Rubberfabrieken Hevea, Hevea dorp ARTIFICIAL SILKS
( 12)
Algemene Kunstzijde Unie (A K U ), Arnhem Internationale Viscose Compagnie / La Seda de Barcelona
VI - (13) (14)
Koninklijke Papierfabrieken van Gelder Zonen, Amsterdam Koninklijke Berghutzer Papierfabriek B. Cramer, Wapenveld
VII - (15) (16)
Zwaardemaker’s Handel en Industrie, Zaand^rp Meelfabrieken der Nederlandsche Bakkerij (Meneba), Rot terdam Bensdorp Cacao- en Chocoladefabriek, Bussum Blooker’s Cacao- en Chocoladefabrieken, Amsterdam
V - (ID
PAPER INDUSTRY
FOODSTUFFS
VIII - (17) (18)
TRADES
IX - (19) ( 20) ( 21)
X - (22) (23)
(Groceries wholesale; Postorder) Gebr. D. Schuitema, Amsterdam W ijnbergh en Co, Amsterdam B. Oosterhuis, Amsterdam W ehkam p’s Algemene Postordercombinatie, Dedemsvaart Great Universal Stores (GUS), England ACCOUNTANCY
XI - (24) (25)
Frese en Hogeweg, Amsterdam Meijer en Höchner, Amsterdam SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT
XII - (26) (27)
Rotterdamsche Lloyd, Rotterdam Reimann, Stok en Kerskens Vereenigde Expeditiebedrijven, Rotterdam BANKING
XIII - (28) (29) (30)
R. Mees & Zoonen, Rotterdam Hope en Co, Amsterdam Morgan Guaranty Trust, Paris
THE SOCIETAL STATE
72 INSURANCE
XIV — (31) (32) (33)
Nationale Levensverzekering-Bank, Rotterdam Nederlanden van 1845, T he Hague Orion Insurance, England HOTELS
XV — (34) (35)
Hotel Polen ”H et Poolsche Koffiehuis”, Amsterdam Grand Hotel Krasnapolsky, Amsterdam REAL ESTATE, ETC.
XVI -
(36) (37)
XVII - (38) (39) (40) (41)
Friesch-Groningsche Hypotheekbank, Amsterdam ”Gemeenschappelijk E ig en d o m M a a tsch a p p ij tot Exploitatie van Woon- en W inkelhuizen, T he Hague Landbank, The Hague Exploitatie Maatschappij Scheveningen (EMS), Scheveningen Grand Hotel Brittania, Vlissingen Vereenigde Vorstenlandsche Cultuur-Maatschappij, Amster dam
Big business — as exemplified most conspicuously by the giant corporation which alone, or together with a few co-giants, controls half or more of the total production in its particular branch of industry — may be considered the first fruit of the processes in herent to capitalist industrialism and tending towards concentra tion and large-scale organization. But it is by no means the only fruit. Parallel, and closely bound up with it, there emerge several other structures of more or less mammoth-like dimensions - such as big labour, big agriculture, and, last but not least, big govern ment. It goes without saying that, in addition to the ’big four’ explicitly mentioned (business, labour, agriculture, government), one can point to a whole array of lesser ones, be it in the realm of economics and politics, or in that of education, welfare, communication, recreation, and so on. Limited liability companies or cooperative societies, polit ical parties or professional associations, labour unions or farmers’ and shopkeepers’ combinations, social work agencies or institutions for instruction and research, public utility services or organizations promoting the interests of mass tourism or mass sporting — all these testify to the fact that ’’bigness, centralization, and bureaucracy are products of the forces which have developed in modem society”*1.
Big Labour. Trade unionism is, by definition, a symptom of the trends towards concentration and large-scale organization
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
73
issuing from the industrial economy. Just as the manufacturers seek to protect themselves against the fluctuating market by entering into all sorts of agreements and arrangements to keep machines running at a remunerative rate, so the workers aim at strengthening their bargaining position by uniting those who individually can never be a match for the employers and yet are needed by the latter to man the factories and offices. In Holland, the earliest be ginnings of the process of organizing and concentrating labour in the struggle for better working conditions, as well as for recognition of the employees' rights of advice and consent in the manage ment of industry, date back to the 1860's — as can be seen from the following enumeration of early instances in Dutch trade-union history:11 - 1861, first local association, made up of workers of one trade (typographers), being more than a mutual aid society in the tradit ional sense as it also is meant to provide help in case of unemploy ment in order to prevent undercutting of wages; - 1866, first national federation of local associations of workmen of the same trade (typographers); - 1869, first 'planned' strike, i.e. led by a strike-committee and backed up by a strike-fund (Amsterdam ship-carpenters); - 1869, first Dutch section of the so-called First International (founded in 1864 by Karl Marx c.s.), formated in Amsterdam by workers of different trades (in 1871, the 3 Dutch sections then in existence federate but fail in the attempt to develop into a nation wide league of workmen’s unions); - 1870, first provincial federation of workers' unions (Friesland); - 1870, first local union leaders' league (in Amsterdam, soon also in Rotterdam, The Hague, and Arnhem); - 1871, first successful national federation of workers' associations representing different trades (ANWV) — however fleeting this success may be in terms of membership figures: 3400 in 1872, soar ing to 12000 in 1874, but down again to 5500 in 1876, and dwin dling to a mere 2730 in 1887. By 1871 the first principal steps have been taken on the long and tortuous road to the effective organization of labour. But it is not before the turn of the century that the end of this road is in sight. Indirect proof of this can be found in the fact that also about
TH E SOCIETAL STATE
74 TABLE 19
Employees* and Employers* Unions Anno 1960, Classified According to their Date of Formation21 Date of Formation
Employees’ Unions
Employers’ Unions Total - of which in Industry
5 6 11 25
2 4 9 13
1 3 3
1900’s 1910’s 1920’s 1930's 1940-'60 ?
35 56 37 24 129
48 90 50 84 581 90
16 32 13 22 184 22
TOTAL
295
971
296
-1 8 7 0 1870's 1880’s 1890’s
1900 the employers start forming, in rapid succession, associations of their own (Table 19). To be sure, these associations are certainly not all to be regarded as counter-unions; many have primarily economic functions, others are concerned with both economic and social questions (cf. Table 15, nr. 27, or Table 16, nr. 5). Yet it is quite evident that their emergence in this particular period has a lot to do, not only with the employers* growing organizationmindedness as such, but also with their growing realization of the necessity of taking the actions of the joined workers seriously*4. The decisive moment, i.e. the moment when organized labour definitively changes tack and escapes the dilemma of submission to paternalist patrons and falling a prey to utopist radicalism, arrives soon after the sobering effects of the railwaymen*s strikes of 1903 (see later, ch. II/2). In 1905 and subsequent years, the (solid) foundations are laid of the three major central federations of trade unions which together pre-eminently represent Big Labour in the Netherlands of today: the social-democratically oriented NW, the Protestant CNV, and the Roman Catholic NKV. Quantitativdy, this pre-eminence comes to light in the data compiled in Table 20. And, qualitatively, it is manifest in the fact that, since World War II, these three federations have been granted virtually a mon·
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
75
TABLE 20
Membership and Capital of Trade Unions, 1910—1961 M Items
1910
1920
1930
1947
1961
644
1143
Membership (x 1000) Major Central Federations (N W , CNV, NKV) - in % of all trade union members All trade unions together
59 32% 185
456 67% 683
454 73%
81%
625
791
82% 1399
Capital (in ƒ millions at current prices) Major Central Federations (N W , CNV, NKV) All trade unions
6
18
33
116
25
36
126
opoly position as the only officially recognized spokesmen of lab our in numerous public and semi-public bodies with advisory or regulating powers. This official recognition of the three federations in question may, ironically enough, be considered as having some bearing on their rather weak numerical position: in 1961, their total membership com prises no more than 32 or 33 per cent of all wage and salary workers (for all trade unions together this figure is 40 per cent). Precisely because labour is represented at the national conference tables, great numbers of workers do not see the need to become active (i.e. sub scribing) trade unionists. And, furthermore, precisely because only the N W , C NV , and NK V send representatives, they are exclusively blamed for acting with too much self-restraint and being too often inclined to rank the public interest higher than the particular interests of those whom they represent2·.
Big Agriculture. Among the structures in modem society which are quite notably affected by capitalist industrialism and its in herent trends towards concentration and large-scale organization, agriculture is also found. This is far from surprising, considering the two following facts. The first one is that the impact of capit alist industrialism is of a total nature; it pervades all spheres, revolutionizes everything, and casts the whole of socio-economic
THE SOCIETAL STATE
76
life into a mould which is machine-made and market-orientated17. And the second fact to be taken into account is that the existence of agriculture is most direcdy at stake in an ever more industrializ ed economy; agriculture is continually in danger of being the loser. These two facts together warrant the inference that in the defence of agriculture against, as well as in the adjustment to the domin ance of industrialism, the same weapons will be used, viz. organiz ation and concentration. The need to resort to these weapons is already felt at a very early date, and it grows with the increasing dependence of agricul ture on outside influences. This can be illustrated with the help of a survey of a few developments. It is significant that they all occur at about the same time. TABLE 21
Synchronous Developments in Early Agricultural Organization and Concentration18 1835 and after — formation of the first provin — expanding international demand cial Agricultural Societies (in for com, particularly in con 1837/1843 and after) - volun sequence of the growing popul ation of industrializing Eng tary farmers’ associations active land; a development which in promoting the modernization favourably affects Dutch agri of Dutch farming; founding culture of Neth. Rural Economy Con gress ( 1846), organizing annual national conferences on agri culture problems l$ 6 0 ’s and 1870’s — emergence and flourishing of — persistent, but abortive, at new industries led by private tempts of Neth. Rural Economy entrepreneurs: beet-sugar, po Congress to interest the gov tato-flour, straw-board, dairyernment in setting up official products, margarine representative bodies (so-called — emergence of many difficulties Chambers of Agriculture) for Dutch farming: paraffin — emergence of 'village casinos' and gaz start ousting colza oil, - associations for joint buying discovery of coal-tar dyes ruins of fertilizer and fodder, organ the demand for madder, reizing mutual insurance, or
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
77
strictions of cattle imports in England and Germany for san itary or simple protectionist reasons, decline in butter quality endangers export to England which turns to super ior Danish butter, rapid drop in com prices because of enorm ous American produce
arranging instruction courses — first farmers’ cooperatives: cheese factory (1875), buying cooper ation for fertilizer, seed, and fodder (1877)
1880 - 1 8 9 5 -
severe agriculture depression due to (a) cumulative effects of the com crisis, and (b) re volutionizing inroads of new developments (such as intro duction of substitutes: marga rine, mineral oils, synthetic dyes, etc.) requiring thorough changes in methods and crops
— formation of Neth. Agricultur al Committee (NLC, 1884), central federation of farmers' associations, for coping with farming problems on a national level, in close collaboration with the government — first cooperative dairy factory (1886) , soon followed by many others, and beginning of mark eting cooperatives for vegetables (1887)
± 1900 — gradual improvement of Dutch agriculture which becomes more and more (international) market-orientated
-
(price-rigging) agreements and combines of private manufactu rers of potato-flour, strawboard, and beet-sugar (1897), and also of 14 potassium deal ers (1898)
(*) (’ ) See Table 15, nrs. 4, 28, 29, 31
— rapid spreading of local co operative credit banks (1896), and establishment of two cen tral combinations (Coop. Cen tral Raiffeisen Bank, and Coop. Central Agricultural Credit Bank, 1898) — first cooperative dairy export association (Frico, 1898), com bining 7 dairy factories in the province of Friesland — establishment of first cooper ative potato-flour (1897), strawboard, and beet-sugar factories (1899), and also of a central purchasing agency on behalf of all local buying cooperatives in Holland (Central Bureau, 1900)
78
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Once the organization and concentration process in agriculture has started, it becomes self-propelling, all the more as in the course of this process agriculture is increasingly involved in the capitalistindustrialist system. An illuminating case in point is the develop ment of the cooperative movement in Dutch farming since about 1900. By this time, the cooperative societies of many kinds do not only successfully perform their original function of meeting the farmers' need of collective action in coping with the problems of modernization and in countering the undesirable practices of priv ate dealers and manufacturers, but also begin to assume an ad ditional function. The function, that is, of being the means by which the farmers become far from negligible competitors to priv ate enterprise in a considerable number of industries. In fact, through the cooperative societies, the farmers turn out to be quite effective industrialists and businessmen themselves, and are, con sequently, equally subjected to the forces which emanate from the modem economy. Thus, one may point to the Central Bureau and the Frisian Co operative Dairy Export Association (Frico), both mentioned in Table 21. The Central Bureau has developed into a thriving concern, with an annual turnover of hundreds of millions of guilders (in the year 1947/48, e.g. ƒ 130.966.000), and today it is the biggest national com bine of purchasing and selling cooperations. Together these combinations control a very large part of the trade in agricultural products and requirements, as is shown by the figures listed under (b) below“, The Frico represents but one of many similar (regional or nat ional) combinations formed by manufacturing and marketing cooper atives for the purpose of selling their products at uniform prices on the home or foreign market. And apart from such central selling agencies, all kinds of other combinations have emerged, simply be cause commercial and technical conditions — as well as the necessity of keeping up with privately owned business enterprises — force the cooperations to go in for large-scale organization and concentration in various ways. Instances of this are the Coop. Condens Factory Friesland and the DOMO, which are specialized industries jointly set up by cooperative dairy factories in the northern part of the country, the United Coop. Sugar Mills and the Federation of Coop. Cattle Mark eting Associations, which both prove to be formidable competitors to such big private concerns as the Central Sugar Company (CSM) and Unilever. The important position held by the farmers* cooperations is dearly demonstrated by the following percentages indicating the share of (a)
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
79
manufacturing cooperatives in the total production of listed items in 1953, and (b) buying and selling cooperations in the total volume of goods in 1955: *· butter cheese powdered milk condensed milk powdered whey whey paste casein sugar potato-flour straw-board bacon
82% 86 77 40 78 84 100 63 85 65 50
(b) butter cheese powdered milk eggs vegetables fruit flowers fertilizer cattle-feed agricultural tools & machines
60% 44 40 40 100 80 90 50 50 6
The cooperative movement, in which nearly 90 per cent of all Dutch farmers participate80, strikingly illustrates the high degree of organization-mindedness which is characteristic of Dutch agri culture as a whole. W ith the exception of the major industrial employers perhaps, no other group with a vital stake in the nation al economy shows such a great proportion of persons affiliated with the central representative organizations as the farmers do. Comparing a few groups on this matter, one finds that nowadays approximately 32 per cent of the wage and salary workers, 45 per cent of the independent shopkeepers and traders, an d... 75 per cent of the independent farmers are organized into nationally fed erated unions and associations which (officially) represent their respective interests81. The percentage for the farmers is very high indeed, if one takes into account that this group is supposed to be of a strong individualistic disposition. The reason for this can, no doubt, be found in the farmers' realization that only by joining forces as much as possible they can hope to strengthen effectively the fundamental weak position of agriculture in the modern mark et economy. And the extent to which their organizational efforts bear fruit may be gathered from the fact that the national govern ment spends about half a milliard guilders a year on behalf of farm ing (i.e., circa 6 per cent of the total annual budget) and, more over, makes the consumer pay excess prices for many agricultural products
THE SOCIETAL STATE
80
Big Government. Parallel with the growth of big business, big labour, big agriculture, and a whole array of other developments of a less spectacular nature, the government has increased in size and scope, too. This increase — of which Tables 22 and 23 are most illustrative, in spite of their being based on rather incomplete mat erial — results from many reasons and has one purpose. There are as many reasons as there are societal organizations and concentra tions which cannot but affect, in one way or another, the public order in the performance of their function of furthering the inter ests of those whose specific needs they are meant to satisfy. And the one purpose for which the government is compelled to devel op into big government is that of keeping all these special-interest groups in balance and of coordinating them for the sake of the common good. TABLE 22
Government Employed Civilian Personnel, 1850—1955” Year
Number of Government Employees
Index (1930 = 100)
1850 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
20.000 55.000 69.000 91.000 204.000 212.000
9 26 33 43 96 100
1.6 3.1 3.4 3.7 6.9 6.7
2.3 4.3 4.6 5.0 8.7 8.4
1930 1939 1950 1955
196.000 224.000 374.000 399.000
100 114 191 204
6.2 6.4 9.4 9.5
7.8 8.0 12.1 12.2
In percentages of econ. active all wage and population salary workers
we adhere to some kind of economic determinism. In the present context, however, this is a risk resulting from our wish to lay due This manner of putting things may create the impression that stress on the fact that the rise of big government is an inevitable concomitant of the trends towards large-scale organization and con centration which are characteristic of modem industrialist society. Yet, at the same time, it may equally be emphasized that, in our opinion, the necessity of balancing and coordinating an ever grow ing number of powerful pressure groups is certainly not the only
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
81
factor to be taken into account. Evidence of this may be found in the following sections of this chapter, if it has not been suggested by quite a few items inserted in Table 23. TABLE 23
New Tasks and Functions Assumed by the (Central, Provincial, Municipal) Government Since 1850u I.
PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HOUSING
1. Supervision of industrial and traffic safety * Labour Inspectorate, Navigation Inspectorate, Government Civil Aeronautics Authority, Traffic Police 2. Supervision of public health and public housing * State Supervision of Public Health, Food Inspection Services, Build ing and Housing Inspection 3. Public sanitation and medical provisions * Public Abattoirs, Public Baths, Municipal Cleansing and Desinfec tion Departments, School Health and Dental Health Services, Municipal Health Departments 4. Public housing and town development provisions * Municipal Boards of Works and Public Buildings, Municipal Parks Departments II.
LABOUR SUPPLY AND SOCIAL SECURITY
5. Care for the unemployed, employment exchange, readjustment and rehabilitation, supplementary employment * Employment Offices, State Workshops for Technical Training, Municipal Departments of Social Affairs 6. Social security * Social Insurance Bank, Boards of Labour 7. Wages and other working conditions * Board of Government Conciliators III.
EDUCATION, INFORMATION, RESEARCH, CULTURAL PROVISIONS
8. General secondary education, elementary, secondary, and higher tech nical, home economics, and agricultural education * Educational institutions 9. Information, research, documentation * Municipal Press and Information Services, Economic Information Service, Agricultural Information Service, Experimental Stations, Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, Central Planning Bu reau, Central Bureau of Statistics, Municipal Statistical and Sociographic Offices
THE SOCIETAL STATE
82
10. Recreational and cultural provisions * State Parks, Municipal Playgrounds, Stadiums, Theatres, Museums, Public Libraries IV.
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
11. Construction, maintenance, and administration of traffic and transport systems * Public Works Departments, Municipal Harbour Works and Storage Companies, Airport Authorities 12. Administration and operation of telephone, telegraph, and wire broad casting system * State Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone Service 13. Transportation of goods and passengers * Netherlands Railways, Tramway and Bus Services 14. Administration and operation of financing, clearing, and savings insti tutions * Postal Cheque and Transfer Service, Bank of the Netherlands, Savings Banks V.
POWER SUPPLY AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
15. Production and distribution of gas, water, and electricity * Gas, Water, Electricity Works, Directorate for Power Supply 16. Winning and processing of coal * State Mining Industry, State Mines Chemical Industries 17. Industrial development * Directorate for Industrial Development VI.
LAND RECLAMATION AND IMPROVEMENT, FOREST ADMINISTRATION
18. Land reclamation and land improvement * Zuiderzee Works Department, Government Service for Land and Water Use 19. Administration of forests, dunes, etc. * State Forest Administration, Public Water Companies VII.
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND REGIONAL PLANNING
20. Regulation of industry, commerce, and finance * Central Im- and Export Service, Directorate for Economic Regula tion Affairs, Directorate for Internal Finance 21. Stabilization of prices and wage control * Directorate for Prices, Wage Control Service 22. Regulation of transport * Directorate for Transport
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
83
23. Regulation of housing construction * Central Directorate for Public Housing and Building Trade 24. Regional planning, town planning * Government Service for Regional Planning, Provincial Planological Departments, Municipal Departments for Town Development VIII. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
25. Personnel management and related affairs * Government Psychological Service, Central Personnel Division, Pen sion Board
A few salient aspects of the balancing and coordinating process in which the government is increasingly involved (and which re sults in an ever extending range of activities) will be expressly mentioned. The first striking instance is the rather paradoxical sit uation that the need for governmental intervention is an immediate consequence of the effectiveness of societal self-help. The more the private citizens succeed in organizing themselves into power ful combines and associations for the promoting of their manifold and often conflicting interests, the more they undermine the con ditions that are essential to the actual functioning of the classical Liberalist concept of an automatically achieved equilibrium of freely competing societal forces. And the more this spontaneous harmonization proves to have little relation to reality, the more the government is impelled to interfere in order to secure a delib erately regulated and planned integration of interests. It hardly seems necessary to elaborate this point which has been treated at full length and with great cogency by many a dis tinguished scholar in the field — as the following quotation of the (pertinent) words of one of them may illustrate:35 "The main thesis of the theory of perfect competition w a s. . . that if the economic units are infinitesimally small in relation to the size of the market, and if they do not act together, then no unit can by its own actions have any influence in the market. ( . . . ) This perfect market was understood, of course, never to have existed. A more important thing, however, . . . is that for a long time reality has been moving steadily further and further away from this liberal idealisation. Technological and organizational developments have in many fields been increasing the size of the units in relation to the markets. At the same time, in all other fields the individual units have found the means by which to combine. ( . . . )
84
THE SOCIETAL STATE
When this happens on a large enough scale, a fundamental in stitutional change has occurred in the position of the human beings in relation to each other and to the community. I do not need to recall to what extent practically all markets are manipulated at the present time. Many markets are dominated by one or a few sellers or buyers. But, apart from these cases, almost every individual person in any one of the Western countries who has something to sell, or who earns an income, or who seeks a profit, is associating himself with his compeers with the intention of influencing the conditions un der which he is acting. This development compels the state to large-scale measures of intervention. They become necessary simply to prevent the actual disorganisation of society which would result from the organization of the individual markets, if this development were not controlled and coordinated. And they are needed in order to prevent those who have acquired a stronger bargaining power from exploiting the others”.
Yet, in the present context, it may be worthwhile to pay some additional attention to one particular aspect of the development in question; the more so as it is closely connected with the second characteristic aspect we want to draw into focus, viz. regarding the balancing and coordinating process in which government plays a pivotal part. This particular aspect is that, in the modem oligop olist and multi-group economy, big interventionist government has not come into existence by overpowering free enterprise and priv ate initiative but precisely by being appealed to as the indispen sable guarantor of it. To support this a whole series of measures can be referred to that have been carried into law in the Nether lands since the 1920's and 1930's, if not even since the year 1890 when the so-called Railway Agreements are reached in order to reorganize the then chaotic situation in this sector. For the two fold concept of competition and concentration' on which these agreements are based (although, in this special case, not with suf ficient success to avert eventual nationalization) is in principal the basis of practically every enactment in the field of economic reg ulation and planning. The statutory licensing system introduced in 1926 for passenger transport by bus (and the subsequent Motor Transport Passengers Act and Motor Transport Goods Act, resp. of 1939 and 1951), the Proportional Cargo Allocations Act of 1933 (replaced by the inland W ater Transport Act of 1951), the Small Trades' Requirements Act of 1937 and the Industrial Licenses Act
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONÀLISM
85
of 1938 (both revised in 1954), and the Economic Competition Act of 1958 (replacing the Manufacturers’ Agreements Act of 1935 and the Cartel Decree of 1941), all have two essential traits in common. On the one hand, they are directed against economic power posi tions which tend to create a monopoly and threaten to hurt the interests of other private groups as well as of the public in general. But, on the other, they support, and even stimulate, those forms of societal self-regulation which aim at the curbing and prevention of cut-throat competition which is equally detrimental to the priv ate and public good. Briefly, their central objective is to bring about optimum competitive conditions through a system of close cooperation between the government and ’free’ societal organiza tions 8e. Three Major Types of State-Society Interpénétrations. This last point in particular is of paramount importance. It is indicative of the fact that, in a Western democracy like the Netherlands, the typical role of present-day big government is that of the partner (and certainly not that of the opponent) of self-organized Society. This partnership, which more often than not is even better des cribed by the term osmosis, becomes apparent in many different ways, in many fields, and on all levels. Indeed, it comes to light in such a multitude and variegation of forms that any attempt at surveying them is bound to suffer from incompleteness. Yet, some sort of survey should be given, and this we would like to do by discerning and illustrating, however roughly, three major types of interpénétrations of Society and State. W e do not want to create the impression that our three types are exhaustive. On the contrary, it is beyond doubt that they do not cover all the actually existing forms of State-Society partnership. Nor do they represent distinct categories which contain mutually exclusive items. In fact, they merge into one another in no small measure, and, consequently, many an item lends itself to classification under more than one heading. The vastness, complexity, and pluriformity of the material here under discussion is such that any attempt at being complete and doing justice to the wealth of subde differences that can be discerned, especially from a juridical point of view, is sure to bear ? likeness to Sisyphean labour. And as even jurists seem to have difficulties in telling apart the various shades of mixed (private- and public-legal)
THE SOCIETAL STATE
86
Forms in this field and wisely confine themselves to only very generally classified cases37, we see no point in trying to improve upon them. Besides, for our present purpose there is not so much need for exhaustiveness and detailed distinctions as for making dear that the partnership of State and Society is by no means a one-way process: the State has not only penetrated Sodety, but the reverse has also occurred, with the final result of a complete interfusion. The three types here distinguished adequately serve this purpose.
(A) The first type that can be distinguished refers to (mun icipal, provincial, and central) government authorities joininginthe activities of coundess voluntary associations and private institu tions — such as sports clubs, theatrical companies, and non-commer cial broadcasting associations, societies for adult education, or for promoting traffic safety, health organizations, welfare agencies, housing associations, school boards, research bodies, and so on; a joining in, that is, by providing accomodation and equipment, by setting standards, and above all by granting subsidies. This govern ment support of private initiative, as it may be labelled, not only entails a governmental say in the matters of the organizations in question but also implies the official recognition of the latter as organizations which, to a greater or lesser degree, are of public significance and, therefore, are entided to support from the public purse in order that they can adequately perform their particular functions for the general benefit. (B) The second type represents as it were the counterpart of the first. It relates to the situation that, today, an exceedingly diverse group of societal organizations join, in their turn, in the activities of the government. Business, labour, and manifold other interest-groups, cooperating in coordinative bodies that have their origin in spontaneous self-help or are deliberately created to this specific end, play a vital part in the planning and carrying out of governmental measures. Illustrative of this private participation in the determination and administration of public policies are, on the one hand, the Foundation of Labour, the Committee on Economic Competition (*), the Chambers of Commerce, or the Consumers’ Contact Organ, the National Council for Social Work, and many similar institutions which, in practically every field, exert their inH cf. Table 10, phase IV (1945, 1958)
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONALISM
87
fluence and/or are accorded an advisory right of say, whether ’de jure’ or ’de facto’. On the other hand, one can point to the Boards of Labour, the so-called occupational associations, the sick and pension funds, engaged in the implementation of social in surance legislation (Figure 4), as well as to a multiplicity of agen cies by means of which organized Society takes part in the execu tion of State enactments that are aimed at the regulation of the different sectors of socio-economic life. (C) Finally, mention should be made of what might be termed interpénétrations which are almost complete and had better be called integrations. For it concerns organizations and institutions in which Society and State appear to be blended to such an extent that, in actual fact, it is quite impossible to say whether they be long to the category of the one or to that of the other. A great variety of instances of these amalgamations of public and private FIGURE 4
Social Insurance Administration88
N.B. Apart from the Social Insurance Bank which is a State agency, all other can be classified under the (B) and (C) types of State-Society interpénétrations (see also Table 10, phase II and IV).
THE SOCIETAL STATE
88
interests into completely integrated aspects of State and Society can be given. Apart from such complex systems as the Social In surance Administration (Figure 4), attention can be drawn to sev eral sorts of amalgamations, ranging from: — entirely commercially run business enterprises, of which the cap ital in shares is partly owned by the government because of their essential importance to the national economy (e.g. the IJmuiden steel-works, or the Royal Dutch Air Lines), to: — coordinative agencies in many different areas (e.g. the provin cial Foundations for Social Work and Economic Technological In stitutes, or the Central Organization for Applied Physical Research and the Netherlands Reactor Centre) in which private initiative and public authorities are coordinated; and — official consultative and advisory bodies which play a prominent part in making decisions in specific domains, and with a mixed membership of both government and 'free1 societal representatives: e.g. the Central Council of Public Health, the Academic Council, FIGURE 5
Membership of Social-Economic Council, January 1, 1962*
GOVERNM ENT 15 LABOUR 15
MANAGEM ENT 15
1 3 farmer’s federations
1(KNLC, KNBTB, NCBTB) ... .4 industr.employers’ fed’s l(CSW V, V N W , N K W V , PCW V ) J4 tradespeople fédérations J(KNMB, NRKM, CMB, N V M ) . . |8 wholesalers’ assoc’s ......................... J16 transporters' assoc’s ..................... |5 bankers' associations ..................... 14 insurers’ associations .....................
1 3|
1
1 jN eth . Federation of Trade
4
Unions (NVV) .................. ?! 1 |N eth . Cath. Trade Unions 3 | 1Federation (NKV) ............. 5| 21 |Prot. Chr. Trade Unions 1 (Federation (CNV) b| 1| 1 1 1
89
THE MARCH OF TH E MASSES
and, last but not least, the supreme organ of the Public-legal Indus trial Organization (*), viz. the Social-Economic Council (see Fig ure 5)40. Summarizing one might say that the interpénétrations — or the osmosis — of State and Society are the result of a cumulative dev elopment. Schematically, this development can be presented as follows: organization & concentration
coordination
collectivization
1
—>
socialization
osmosis
In a modern industrialist society, organization and concentration are prerequisites. In order to promote their own interests as well as their common interests, the individual citizens are forced (and apt) to organize themselves into as powerful units as possible; and the more they do this, the more their actions become collective actions which make them increasingly influential and at the same time increasingly dependent upon one another and upon the socio economic order as a whole. This increase in strength, number, and (inter)dependence of the societal power groups inevitably neces sitates their coordination by a central agency, to wit the State; a central agency which, in its turn, can only effectively perform its comprehensive task in conformity with the public will, if it se cures and stimulates the active participation of the parties con cerned, by means of a deliberate policy of decentralization and delegation.
2. THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
The growth of organizationalisrn is to be considered one of the fundamental factors in bringing about the osmosis of State and Society. In addition to it, however, and also closely connected with it, at least two other factors have to be taken into account. These two factors, which equally emanate from the forces set in motion by the French and the Industrial Revolution, are the pro cess of overall emancipation and the movement towards what may (*) See Table 10, phase IV (1950)
90
THE SOCIETAL STATE
be called the equalization and maximization of liberty. These fac tors can hardly be studied separately; they form, so to speak, an inseparable pair, they belong together as form and substance, as action and motive. Yet, in the present context of our analytical approach to the major developments that have given rise to the Societal State as a characteristic phenomenon in Western dem ocracy, an attempt should be made at dealing with each factor as separately as possible. In the Line of Liberalism. As has been repeatedly indicated above, the rise to predominance of the Dutch liberal minded bour geoisie, which finds political expression in the promulgation of the revised constitution of 1848, ushers in a period of thoroughgoing transformations in a great diversity of fields (ch. 1/2, esp. pp. 37f.). Politically and economically, socially and culturally, the decades following the coming into power of the Liberalists are full of signs that Holland is unmistakably on the road to modernization. Signif icantly enough, the first government led by Thorbecke — the man who is chiefly responsible for the framing of the new constitution, and whose statesmanship decisevely influences any government during the rest of his lifetime, whether he is actually in office or not —has been labelled the’ministry of reform' (1849—1853); a label which, to some extent, also holds for quite a few of its successors41. A Dutch historian, when comparing the Netherlands of the first half and the last quarter of the 19th century, concludes that "one beholds as it were two different worlds. Backwardness and quiet which prevailed in former days have now disappeared; everywhere there is life, activity, and progress, too. One is inclined to characterize the contrast by the terms static and dynamic, however incorrect the term 'static' may be from a historical point of view "4*.
All this is not to suggest, of course, that the societal transition phase which starts around 1850 is caused by the rise of Liberalism to political prominence. To be sure, the two phenomena are closely related to each other but, principally speaking, it is not a relation of cause and effect. Both phenomena are the joint outcome of one basic process. They are parallel as well as highly interdependent symptoms of the fact that Holland has definitively entered what
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
91
may be called (on the analogy of W . W . Rostow) the 'take-off stage of the French and the Industrial Revolution48. Having said this, however, it should immediately be added that, practically speaking, the ascendancy of Liberalism is a factor of primary im portance. It is simply beyond dispute that 19th century Liberalism is to be seen as the exponent and the stimulator of the all-per vading structural changes which foreshadow the emergence of an entirely new societal order. The part played by the Liberalists during their palmy days, which in the Netherlands run from the late 1840's to approximately the 1880's, or 1890's44, is not only symptomatic but also catalytic. In a word, it is the part which per haps is expressed best in the popular saying that where one sheep goes follows another. The triumph scored by the advocates of the universal princip les of liberty and equality, to wit the Liberalist upper-middle classes, has the effect of a clarion call which, sooner or later, rous es the masses of the underprivileged of various sorts to follow suit. In the years after 1848, when this triumph becomes manifest in the political realm in particular, and when the said principles are put into practice in an energetic (though limited and definit ely non-universai) way, the conditions are created of the eman cipation of the whole population. In these years, another Dutch historian says, "A new foundation was la id . . . The organization of the nation in its political forms was completed, freedom was inaugurated. The building of the liberal state could be raised” 45.
The major cornerstones of this newly erected building are, in ad dition to free trade and tax reform (cf. Table 3), the principles of direct elections, provincial and municipal self-government, par liamentary democracy, and last but not least such basic constitu tional rights as religious liberty and freedom of association and assembly4®. And once these cornerstones have been laid, they prove to be of such quality that they are not only capable of sup porting the original edifice of classic Liberalist design but also the internal reconstructions and external annexes that are successively made necessary in order to meet the needs of those who may be considered (whether they care to admit it or not) rightful claimants to the earliest occupant's property.
THE SOCIETAL STATE
92
Emancipation In Quadruplicate. The first ones to take time by the forelock are the Roman Catholics. It is no wonder that the leaders of this substantial group, which makes up about two* fifths of the total population and for several centuries has been subjected to a position of second-rate citizenship in practically every respect, tend to back up the Liberalist forces in the yean before and after 1848. For only on the basis of the constitutional reforms that are urged and effectuated by the Liberalists, real progress can be made on the road which, in theory, has been opened up to the Roman Catholics by the proclamation of the separation of Church and State and the equality before the law of all citizens. Only on the basis of the Liberalist programme of TABLE 24
Tentative Indices of Roman Catholic Emancipation, ± 1850-1960" ± 1850 (a) training institutes for regular clergy average annual number of ordinations of regular priests idem secular priests * R.C. population
1930
± 1950
i960
in index numbers ^
343
900
100
669
1969
100 100
169 153
193 316
percentages to totals concerned
(b)
pupils denom.primary schools, inch: — pupils R.C. schools pupils denom.second, grammar schools, inch: — pupils R.C. schools R.C. univ. students (excl. theol. students) R.C. univ. professors (all universities) R.C. civil servants * R.C. population
± 1900
62
73
73
36
44
44
39
57
65
18
29
35
4
17
27
30
1
11
22
35
36
30 38
31
9
13 38
31 40
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
93
1848, which includes the abolition of the ’right of placet1, as well as the guaranteeing of the freedom of organization and education, the Roman Catholics can hope to come into their own. And, indeed, they are not disappointed. W ithin a very few years already, the papo-Thorbeckian alliance becomes effective. In 1853, the govern ment does not object to the re-institution of the episcopal hier archy (of which Dutch Roman Catholics have been deprived since the end of the 16th century); in 1855, the Right of Free Assem blage Act is passed, which removes all statutory bars regarding the founding of monasteries and religious societies; and, in 1857, the Elementary Education Act gives legal footing to the freedom of establishing denominational schools, although on a non-provided basis. In a word, all these measures (the third one included, how ever much it may still be of a discriminative nature) signify a most fundamental step forward. They equip the Roman Catholic part of the population with the indispensable tools for acquiring civil equality, now not only in the political domain, but also in the religious, social, and cultural sphere48. The extent to which the Roman Catholics have profited by the good start made in the 1850's may be illustrated with the help of Table 24. For a better understanding of the (interrelated) trends which ap pear in this table, it may be worthwhile to insert the following quotations. "The abnormally high number of seminaries", says Dellepoort4·, is partly due to the fact that the new missionary congregations came into being in the beginning of the catholic emancipation in the Netherlands, hut especially to the foundation of the socalled 'refugeehouses', a consequence of the persecution of the religious abroad to wards the end of the 19th century. ( . . . ) A direct consequence of the development of the number of training institutes for the orders and congregations was a complete change in the numerical relation be tween the ordinations for the seculars and regulars. ( . . . ) On the other hand the ordinations for the dioceses (were) out distanced more and more by the increase of the population. . . The decline in the number of ordinations may partly be accounted for by a wearing out or a turn of the favourable factors. . . (such as, m D's words, the growth and development of catholic elementary schools, the increasing prosperity of the catholic population, the broadening of the social basis for the recruiting of priests by the new congre gations and particularly the new missionary movement after 1917), and partly also by the rise of new phenomena with an unfavourable
THE SOCIETAL STATE
94
influence on the recruiting of seminarians and their perseverance. Chief among these are the progress of the emancipation as a result of which nearly all functions in social life opened out to Catholics; the establishment of denominational lycea and grammar schools (two types of Dutch High Schools) in practically all parts of the country..
In another way, too, the Roman Catholics (and other groups as well) benefit by the post-1848 regime. In conducting a deliber ate policy of freeing industry, commerce, and agriculture from the web of neo-mercantilist regulations and restrictions, this regime con tributes in no small measure to the country’s entry into the sphere of modem industrial capitalism and the socio-economic advance that goes with it (ch. 1/2, pp. 37f.). In addition to Table 5, which refers to the period of 1850—1875, Table 25 demonstrates that this advance is obviously of a permanent nature. However, Table 25 not only indicates that there is a steady rate of progress since 1870; it also suggests that it is not before the end of the 19th century, or the beginning of the 20th, that this rate shows a marked accelTABLE 25
Tentative Indices of Socio-Economic Progress, ± 1870—1920 w 1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
in in d e x n u m b e rs
houses with 2 firesides ratable value of houses ratable value of furniture savings-banks deposits number of deposit books pupils primary schools pupils lower secondary schools * total D utch population
100 100 100
122 131 132
160
191
178
207
*
1 1
269 272
385
1
156
Γ
164
176
1 212
— 1477
2379
3248
2187
2818
1 194 -J
221
443
863
161
192
100
331
746 1
100
251
651
1 1 1437 11— —
100
116
138
158
100
104
129
i---------1 246
100
112
126
143
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
95
eration. Especially this last point is of interest here, for, to a cer tain extent, it may serve as an illustration of the fact stressed by J. Romein. This fact is that the progress, which in the years after 1850 becomes visible in the socio-economic field, chiefly concerns the middle classes (and not so much the far more numerous work ing-class)81. In other words, the first ones to profit from the im proving material conditions are, apart from the bourgeoisie, the socalled 'small people', composed of shopkeepers and traders, farm ers, lower-grade civil servants, clerks, and the like. And it is to these groups that — amongst others — relatively large numbers of Roman Catholics belong, not in the last place as a logical conse quence of their longstanding status of second-rate citizens who are excluded from the opportunity of holding high offices and similar positions of high rank52. Another group, strongly represented among the 'small people', whose gradually increasing prosperity provides an economic basis for their political, social, and cultural emancipation, consists of the humbler people among the orthodox-Protestant, or rather orthodoxCalvinist, part of the nation5S. In several respects, this group is the natural ally of its confessional counterpart, the Roman Catholics. Besides the fact that both belong in so great numbers to the same social stratum of the 'petite bourgeoisie', which stands so to speak in a love-hate relation to the new ruling class of the 'haut(ain)e bourgeoisie', they have a common bond in their religious under privilegedness and in the anti- and/or pre-Revolutionary sen timents which underlie the political and social conceptions of their leaders. In the modemist- and Liberalist-dominated setting of mid19th century Holland, not only the Roman Catholics but also the orthodox Protestants suffer, in actual fact, from discrimination; and, what is more, in their struggle to redress this situation, the two groups show a remarkable ideological parallelism. Characteristic of each is their rejection of the political and social philosophy, in its basic principles as well as in its practical consequences, of the Liberalists, as the protagonists of the French and the Industrial Revolution. This rejection partly springs from a keen perception of the uprooting effects of capitalist industrialism, and partly orig inates in a nostalgic longing for a return to a non-secularized and non-individualistic, but corporatist and organically conceived, order
96
THE SOCIETAL STATE
of things, either of the medieval type, or of the theocratic type which, in principle at least, has existed during the golden age of the Dutch Republic54. Paradoxically enough, however, these two allies who are soon to join hands after the initial (and quite profit able) flirtation of the Roman Catholics with the Liberalists has changed into enmity during the 1860's, and 1870V5, owe their emancipation to the break-through of economic and political Lib eralism. On the basis of this break-through, they are enabled to grow in material welfare, and to use the means, which are placed at their disposal by the constitution of 1848, for asserting them selves politically and socially, religiously and culturally. The foremost question which makes the Roman Catholics and orthodox-Protestants unite forces is that of the discrimination of denominational schools. This question becomes the chief rallyingpoint for the emancipatory actions of those who have become aware of their underdog status in religious matters in particular. These ac tions have many results in all sorts of fields, but above all they concentrate on the struggle for the equalization of private, denomina tional schools, and, for this reason, converge in a deliberate at tempt at gaining as powerful political positions as possible. Public meetings are held, mass demonstrations staged, petitions bearing the signatures of hundreds of thousands are presented, coundess pamphlets are sold, newspapers published (particularly after the abolishing of stamp-duties in 1869), and associations formed. But all this agitation culminates in the drafting of political programmes, the founding of centrally organized political parties, and... the urging for an extension of the franchise in such a way that not only the upper but also the lower middle classes are entitled to vote M. Illustrative of this culminating, as well as cumulative, process are the following occurrences: — in 1860, the Association for Christian National Education is set up as the first one of many similar organizations which propagate, and provide the means for, the establishing of denominational schools over against the officially subsidized, 'modernist-imbued' public schools; — in 1868, the Dutch episcopacy, acting upon the principles laid down in the papal encyclical Quanta Cura and the added Syllabus Errorum of 1864, declares the religiously indeterminate State schools unfit for R. Catholics, and, thereby, defies the Liberalists, on the one hand, and
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
97
prepares the ground for the future Catholic-Protestant coalition, on the other; — in 1872, the Provisional Central Committee (of the orthodox-Calvinist, Anti-Revolutionary Party, which is to be constituted in 1879 as the first true to type political party in Dutch parliamentary his tory) is called into existence at a meeting convened by Anti-Revolu tionary electoral associations and the Anti-School Law League (which itself is also transformed into an electoral association in 1874); — in 1878, the (Anti-Revolutionary) Programme of Principles is of ficially adopted, and in 1883 a Draft Programme for a Catholic Party is published — both envisaging a political and social order which rests on liberty of conscience and democracy, in the sense that all citizens be offered the opportunity of participating in the life of the nation in accordance with their personal views; — in 1878, a purely Liberalist-inspired revision of the Elementary Education Act is passed, in spite of a petition movement, which is backed by 305.000 Protestant and 164.000 Catholic subscribers, and which makes clear that (a) the roughly 122.400 persons, who are then eligible for the franchise, in no way reflect the feelings of large groups of the population who are excluded from the vote, and, consequently, (b) the only hope for those who urge the equalization of denominational schools is to press persistently the point of electoral reform; — in the years after 1878, all efforts of the anti-Liberalist coalition of Roman Catholics and orthodox-Protestants are focused on political mobilization, with the result that (a) in 1888, the coalition secures an absolute majority on the basis of the electoral reform of the year before, and (b) the Liberalist domination of the political scene is brought to an end, initially in 1888, and definitively in 1901 (cf. Figure 6).
In the same years, in which the various factions in Parliament have the prolonged tactical debates which finally result in the first substantial increase in the number of voters (from a little over 120.000 to nearly 300.000, or from 6 per cent of the population over 24 years in 1880 to 14 per cent in 1890; cf. Figure 7), a popular movement outside Parliament advocates a much more radical change, viz. that of universal suffrage. This movement is composed of many different elements, varying from well-to-do left-wing to lower middle class progressives and working class trade-unionists of most diverse ideological backgrounds — all of whom have in common, however, the recognition of the cardinal importance of the ballot as a means of effectuating more or less thoroughgoing changes in society. To be sure, the movement as a whole decays,
THE SOCIETAL STATE
98 FIGURE β
Principal Political Groupings in the Second Chamber of Parliament, 1850—191857
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - V- - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
1850
'59
'69
79
’88
’97
1- - - - - - - - - - - -
1901 Ό9
1918
Election years (*)____________________________________________
(*)
The 1918 figures relate to the first elections based on universal suf frage (for men; women are enfranchised a few years later) and the system of proportional representation (instead of territorial constituen cies)
after a turbulent climax in 1885, long before its ultimate goal is reached (by about 1920, as can be seen from Figure 7); and the reason for this is not in the last place to be found in its lack of internal coherence and homogeneity. Yet, in the present context, this movement is of interest in at least two respects. First, it pro vides all sorts of groups who in a rapidly changing society have become alive to their underprivilegedness, and who are less and
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
99
less willing to acquiesce, with a useful and apparently efficacious outlet for their various frustrations. This applies in particular to those who, unlike the Roman Catholic and orthodox-Protestant ’small people', are deprived of that other outlet of the struggle for denominational schools. To the lower class people without strong confessional leanings, and notably to those of Socialist lean ings, universal suffrage represents the instrument which will im mediately do away with all the wrongs and miseries they suffer from. In their opinion, the putting into practice of the principle of one man, one vote' will logically — i.e. with the logic of num erical preponderance — lead to the weakening, if not the overthrow', of the propertied classes who seem to have a vested interest in political and economic inequality; and, thus, the basic condition FIGURE 7
Persons Entitled to Vote at General Elections, in Percentages of Population Over 24 Years, 1870—1920“
98
100
THE SOCIETAL STATE
will be created for the lightening, if not the removal, of the burdens of the underprivileged masses. In other words, the suffrage move ment may well be considered a symptom of radicalization. It is a sign that the workers are no longer content with forming associa tions for mutual assistance and/or for demanding (either by means of desperate defiant actions, or by means of humble peti tions) more tolerable conditions of life and work from those who uphold the status quo, but that they become alive to the necessity and the possibility of obtaining a position of political power of their own in order to promote the emergence of a new, or at least drastically modified, social order. This interpretation certainly holds for the Socialists. But it holds true also for the other groups. For the mere fact that the latter par ticipate in the movement, and keep participating (however hesitantly and embarrassedly) even when it is more and more led by the Social ists, demonstrates that a critical point has been reached. At this point these groups, who have relied on the benevolence of the upper classes, have come to the conclusion that, as a rule, this is in vain. Further indications that such a point has been reached towards the close of the century, are e.g.: — the slow but sure decline of the General Dutch Workmen's Fed eration (ANWV), which takes up the moderate position of cooperation with the employers, over against the growing pull of the far more radically minded Socialist unions; — the fact that, in 1888, not only the Roman Catholics and orthodoxProtestants pool their votes but that the latter even assist the free thinker, and one-time minister, Domela Nieuwenhuis in taking the first Socialist seat in Parliament; — the unequivocal plea for 'architectonic critique' which is made at the first Christian Social Congress, in 1891, by the leader of the orthodox-Protestant 'small people', Dr. Abraham Kuyper; a plea which reflects the mounting pressure for a clear-cut programme of social action to replace the policy of the paternalists.
In addition to being a symptom of radizalization, the suffrage movement also serves as a catalyst in the process of the political maturation of the working classes, in particular (once again) of those of Socialist leanings. This appears most clearly in the years when the movement as such has passed its culminating-point. By the middle of the 1880's, another period of economic decline sets in, and it is under the stress of this 'test case' situation (as, with good
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
101
reason, it may be called) that the differences of opinion are sharply revealed. In themselves, these differences are nothing new. As already indicated, the movement has been divided against itself from the very beginning. Now, however, the inherent controversies not only come to a crisis but, at the same time, lead to a re-align ment of positions. Especially so far as the Socialists are concern ed, who have formed the backbone of the movement, two trends become ever more manifest. On the one hand, there develops an extremely left-wing group which, under the leadership of the exclergyman Domela Nieuwenhuis, entirely loses faith in the efficacy of the franchise and finally ends in resorting to the anarchosyndicalist reliance on general strike. Whereas, on the other hand, a second group, headed by a new generation of leaders among whom the lawyer Pieter Jelle Troelstra and the man of letters Frank van der Goes are most prominent, sticks to the parliamentarist line and, therefore, continues to set great store by the fight for universal suffrage. This division between parliamentarists and anti-parliamentarists — a division at that time common to the So cialist movement all over Europe — marks the cleavage between the ones who may be termed the workers of the first hour, who of necessity tend to be strongly emotional in their appeal to the proletariat still to be roused from lethargy, and those whose ap proach reflects the needs of a later hour. The latter are certainly not less revolutionary in intension, yet they realize that, in practi cal politics, the roused hopes for a better world can only mater ialize by concentration of all forces on the attainment of a series of well-defined objects and step by step improvements. In 1894, this practical and opportunist approach finds expression in the founding of both the Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) and the General Dutch Diamond-Cutters Union (ANDB). Before long, and particularly after the failure of the railwaymen's strikes of 1903 so painfully exposing the weak position of the syndicalists, these two organizations turn out to be very effective instruments in furthering the political and socio-economic emancipation of the lower ranks of society. The one by agitating unremittingly, outside as well as inside Parliament, for universal suffrage (cf. Figure 7), while simultaneously embracing the opportunity of exercising in fluence on legislative reforms (which increases as the Social Dem-
THE SOCIETAL STATE
102 ^
TABLE 26
Membership of Old-Type Labour Unions, 1906, and of Modern-Type Central Federations, 1906—192050 1906 OLD:
Non-Denominational Denominational total in % of econ. active population NEW: N W (Soc. Dem.) CNV (Orth. Prot.) NKV (Rom. Cath.) total in % of econ. active population
1910
1914
1920
26.200
40.600 6.500 12.600
84.200 11.100 33.200
248.000 67.000 141.000
1.2
2.2
5.3
13.1
69.500 33.100 4.7
ocratic representation grows; cf. Figure 6). The other by setting the pattern of strict centralization and disciplined action on the basis of which, in 1905 and following years, Social Democrats, Protestants, and Roman Catholics alike form new federations of trade unions that soon outnumber the older labour organizations, and in due course become increasingly powerful agents in the struggle for the welfare of the working classes (see Table 26, and also Table 20) *°. Besides the three emancipation movements of Roman Cathol ics, orthodox-Protestant ’small people’, and Socialist workers, a fourth should be mentioned which equally emerges during the so cietal transformations Holland is passing through since about 1850. It is the women’s movement. This movement is worth noting, not simply for the sake of completeness, but rather because it makes, so to speak, an excellent ’case’ for illustrating the close interrelation of the processes with which we are dealing in the present chapter. An analysis of this particular movement (both before and after the 1870’s, when it emerges as a ’movement’ in the true sense) reveals, in a most illuminating way, the interrelation with the complex of immanent developments which underlies the transition from Free Society to Societal State. These developments indicate a trend to wards ’organizationalism’, as well as a growing pressure of polit ically and socially ostracized groups of the population for an ap propriate share in the national life, and the growth of the ’social
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
103
conscience. And, as can be seen from Table 27, essential elements of each one of these developments are clearly reflected in the prin cipal fields of action, objects, and methods of the women’s move ment. For it is by means of forming organizations and con centration of powers that the respective objects are pursued, to wit : (a) abatement of social evils, especially as bearing upon women and young girls in wretched conditions, (b) training women, more particularly the unmarried of upper and middle class status, to professions in order that they be enabled to support themselves, and (c) political enfranchisement. In another respect, too, the women’s movement may serve as a ’typical’ example. It is characteristically illustrative of all the emancipation movements in question, not only as to their being integral parts of the intricate pattern of processes which we consid er essential in bringing about the Societal State, but also as to the basic roots of the emancipation movements. Two series of factors are invariably considered the major causes of the women’s mov ement. The apparendy contradictory effects of these factors cannot but engender strong resentment; resentment which, sooner or later, finds expression in coordinated actions of protest. These two series of factors may be summarized as follows: (1) the growth, on an increasing scale during the 19th century, of the ideas of individualism, liberty, and equality, proclaimed in the name of all men, and of the belief that ’knowledge is power’ and that education and schooling are the prerequisites of material progress, (2) the all-pervading changes in the socio-economic domain that accompany industrialization and that thoroughly affect the tradit ional patterns of community and family life and the position of womenel. In fact, the position of women is affected by these changes in two ways. On the one hand, women find themselves increasingly in a position of social insulation, in consequence of the process of urbanization, the separation of home and work, the 'sodetalization' of culture, and related developments. On the other, they (the women of the upper and middle classes that is, and especially the unmar ried) are more and more reduced to economic dependence and idle ness as the factory takes over the industrial tasks of the family.
104
THE SOCIETAL STATE
TABLE 27
Main Fields of Action of the Women’s Movement in the Netherlands, rib 1870—1920“ A Abatement of Social Evils
B W om en ’s Rights to Education and Occupation
C Womens Suffrage
Philanthropic activities in the field of poor relief and (moral) rescue work lead, in the 1840’s and after, to such organizations and institutions as: — association for sick-nursing, — deaconesses’ hospitals, — training school for poor girls, — association for training young widows to economic independence, — ’Steenbeek’, asylum for released female convicts, — training colleges for nursery & primary school teachers, — industrial schools for girls 1870
Exhibition of women’s needlework
1871
First girl student admitted to university
1871 1872
'Arbeid A d elt’, ’T esselschade’, organizations for provision of work & stimulating professional training of women
1872 /7 3
Tour of public readings, by Betsy Perk & Mina Kruseman, from their own works satirizing the degraded position of women
1884
Women's League for Moral Improvement, fighting legalized prostitution
1889
Free W om en’s Association, propagating intellectual & political education
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
105
1893 1894
Dutch Nursing League Comittee for Improving the Social & Legal Status of W omen
1897
Manifesto to the Electorate, demanding deference to the personal rights of women
1898
National Exhibition of W om en’s Activities, a joint demon stration of 10 women’s organizations, on the occasion of the accession to the throne of Queen Wilhelmina National Council of W omen, combining 25 women’s organiza tions in all fields of emancipatory action
1898 1899
Association for Women’s Suffrage
First school for social work
1907
Women’s Suffrage League
1908
International Congress for W omen’s Suffrage
1913
1913 ff.
'De Vrouw 1813-1913 ’, national display of women’s activities, on the occasion of the centenary of the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Continuous & con certed agitation for constitutional equalization of men & women
1918
First woman in Parliament
1919
’Jacobs Act’ (on the motion of H. P. Marchant), introducing full enfranchisement of women
1922
Constitutional equalization of men & women
In brief, the women’s movement is, essentially, the product of the French and the Industrial Revolution. And, as scholars on the field of the womens movement show (or as may also be concluded
106
THE SOCIETAL STATE
from the previous analyses, either explicitly or implicitly), in this the women's movement is representative of all the emancipation movements with which we are concerned in this section. From Emancipation to Integration. From the point of view of the four underprivileged groups, Roman Catholics and orthodox Protestants, workers and women, the years shordy before and after 1920 are momentous years. Between 1917 and 1922, every single one of the respective objects which they have pursued for many decades is achieved. So, — in 1917, Parliament assents to the constitutional ’package deal’ which entails both universal manhood suffrage and financial equal ization of private denominational schools and government spon sored public schools; — in 1919, the so-called ’Jacob Act’ is passed which results in the enfranchisement of women — in 1920, the Elementary Education Act is revised on the basis of the ’pacification’ principle of 1917; and — in 1922, the equality of men and women in relation to voting is embedded in the constitution. In other words, by about 1920 emancipation, i.e. of those groups of the population who so far have officially been discriminated against in one way or another, is a juridical fact; and thus the formal foundation has been laid for the material integration of these groups in the life of the nation. From the point of view, however, of the nation as a whole, it should be stressed that this process of material integration has started already at a much earlier date. In fact, this process may be said to have its starting-point at the very moment when the respective groups pressing for freedom and equal rights pass the stage of self-awakening and turmoil, and turn into ’Realpolitikers’ who prefer substantial improvements now to high (but vague) hopes of complete satisfaction in days still to come. The exact moment when this occurs is, of course, hard to ascertain. Yet, it seems fair to assume that it has occurred as soon as the emanci pation movements in question produce organizations which are not formed merely for the purpose of voicing grievances but rather for the purpose of critical, yet constructive action. Such organiz-
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
107
ations are, firstly, the political parties, or federations of electoral associations, founded on the basis of a specific programme by the orthodox-Protestants in 1879, by the Roman Catholics in 1904 (after several unsuccessful attempts in previous years), and by the Socialists in 1894; secondly, the modem kind of labour unions which develop in the early years of the 20th century after the example of the General Dutch Diamond-Cutters Union of 1894, and concentrate upon the improvement and protection of the im mediate economic status and conditions of the workers; and, thirdly, the various women’s rights groups, as e.g. the Committee for Improving the Social and Legal Status of Women and the As sociation for Women’s Suffrage, both of 1894 (cf. Table 27), which unremittingly advocate the equality of the sexes. All these organ izations are critical, in the sense that they vigorously denounce the injustices and deficiencies of the existing social and political order. At the same time they are constructive, in the sence that they aim at increasing their influence as much as possible within the framework of this very order, so that it may become more just and less deficient. And in doing so, it is obvious that the emancipa tion movements become definitely involved through these organiza tions, in the process of integration, i.e. : "the process of interaction between members of a group (c.q. various groups of a nation) which results in reciprocal accomodation and an increased sense of identification with the group (c.q. the nation)” w.
The conclusion seems warranted that the first decisive steps on the road from emancipation to integration have not so much been taken in the (politically momentous) years 1917—1922, when the four main categories of underprivileged citizens officially come into their own, but rather in the (socially momentous) years im mediately before and after 1900. For it is in these latter years that the two characteristic aspects of the integration process, viz. recip rocal accomodation and increased identification, clearly begin to take shape. To illustrate this point, we must turn to the developments that have occurred in two most vital fields. The first field is that of politics, a field which has also undergone the immense changes which the whole of Dutch society undergoes at about the turn of
THE SOCIETAL STATE
108
the century. Indeed, one unmistakable symptom of these changes is the formation of modem political parties; that is, of parties which are marked by central leadership, a well-defined political program me, and a strong belief in the necessity of democratizing the vote. And, what is more, it is significant to note that these modem pol itical parties originate from the emancipation movements. As already indicated, the orthodox-Protestant 'small people’ lead the way in 1879, when the so-called Anti-Revolutionary Party is founded on the basis of the Programme of Principles which, as drafted by their 'strong man’ Abraham Kuyper, has been adopted the year before. In 1883, the Roman Catholic priest Dr. Hermanus Schaepman follows suit by publishing his Programme for a Catholic Party. As this initiative meets with much misunderstanding, if not mistrust, on the part of the majority of his politically active co-religionists who still mainly think in traditional, if not conservative, terms, Schaep man does not succeed in uniting the R.C. members of Parliament on a common programme before 1896, and in establishing the national League of Roman Catholic Electoral Associations before 1904 (an or ganizadon which, in 1926, is transformed into the Roman Catholic State Party). In 1894, the Social Democratic Workers Party is called into existence, as the result of the definitive split of the Socialist move ment on the controversial question of parliamentarism versus anti parliamentarism, and in 1895 this new political party, which for many years to come is to be led by the 'practical marxist’ P. J. Troelstra, adopts a constitution which is largely modelled on the Erfurter Pro gramm of 1891 of the German Social Democrats. The most influential political grouping during the greatest part of the second half of the 19th century, the Liberalists (cf. Figure 6), does not succeed in achieving some sort of organized unity on a nation-wide scale until 1885. In this year, the Liberal Union is founded, a combination of various factions (including the conservative right wing, but excluding the left-wing Radicals who form their own party in 1892) which is held together, not by an expliddy formulated body of principles but, above all, by the common dislike of the clerical parties and their growing influence. (In this respect, the Liberal Union may be compared to the earliest employers' associations: both emerge, so to speak, as a tribute to the effectiveness of the organizations of the ’homines novi’ M.)
The reason for this movements in this ments have waked practical changes in
apparent pace-setting role of the emancipation particular field is obvious. Once these move up the masses, and begin to obtain certain the existing socio-political structure, it is quick-
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
109
ly realized how greatly the aims can be effectively furthered by a maximal use of the opportunities inherent in this very structure. Such opportunities are, e.g., the freedom of association, coupled with the experience of the power of organization and concentra tion, and the principle of direct elections within the setting of a constitutionally guaranteed parliamentary system. In other words, the emancipation movements can only profit by fully exploiting the means which, in principle or in practice, are at their disposal in the Dutch society of the late 19th century. In view of the rel atively large numbers of their supporters, they may rest assured that in rallying these supporters round their specific grievances, and in adding to this massive quantity the quality of central leader ship and organization, they will sooner or later tip the parliamen tary scales in their favour. All this is obvious. At the same time, however, it is equally clear that, in this process, the emancipation movements themselves are affected too. The more they concen trate on the struggle for an enlarged proportional control of, and a more decisive voice in, the affairs of the community, the more they will identify themselves with this community, and the less they will remain emancipation movements in the true sense, i.e. movements which only pursue the freedom of their own group. The more they aim at becoming influential factors in parliament, the more they tend to develop from 'special-interest' movements into full-grown political parties which, on the basis of a compre hensive programme for building a new social and political order, strive for a better future for the entire nation·5. This development can be illustrated with the help of the follow ing list of a number of significant dates in the history of the chief political organization of Dutch Socialism, the Social Democratic Work ers Party (SDAP). These significant dates are: — 1894, formation of the SDAP in reaction to the increasingly antiparliamentarist course of the then most prominent Socialist leader, Domela Nieuwenhuis; a reaction which does not imply the substitution of the principle of parliamentarism for the principle of revolution but, rather, the useful recognition of parliamentary action as a means of revolutionary obstruction, and, at the same time, a pressure for immediate improvements in the lot of the working classes; — 1913, following the success at the polls, which raises the number of Socialist members of Parliament from 7 to 18 (even though it is brought down to 15 after second ballot), the SDAP is invited to par-
110
THE SOCIETAL STATE
take in the formation of a new government; an invitation which is declined after prolonged party discussions on the tactical and principal implications of renouncing the line of political non-conformism; — 1918, stirred by the politically explosive atmosphere abroad and at home, the leader of the SDAP, Troelstra, is tempted to agitate for a Socialist 'coup d’état’; a ’mistake’ (as T . soon admits) which typically discloses the wavering position of the SDAP at that time as to which direction, the democratic or the revolutionary, should be taken in pursuing the object of establishing a Socialist society; — 1932, acceptance of a resolution, at the Haarlem Congress, in which the SDAP declares that democracy is an essential element of its prin ciples and ideals; — 1935/1937, publication of the Plan of Labour and a revised Pro gramme of Principles, which both stress the need of planning the socio-economic system of the nation and the interest of all its groups, and show, explicitly or implicitly, that the SDAP considers itself a national party instead of a class party; — 1939, the SDAP assumes government responsibility by accepting two portfolios; — 1946, incorporation of the SDAP, together with several other bour geois-type’ political organizations and groups of the pre-war period, in the newly formed Labour Party which, on the basis of a democratic, reformist-Sodalist programme, presents itself as a national party in the full sense of the word ee.
The second field to which attention must be paid for the pur pose of elucidating the point that the aspects of reciprocal ac comodation and increased identification begin to take effect at the close of the last century, is the socio-economic field. As shown in Table 10 (ch. 1/3), the steady flow of social legislative enact ments (in their specified threefold sense) starts with the Labour Act of 1889. In the present context, it may be worthwhile to add that Table 10 is not exhaustive, so far as the period after 1889 is concerned. It does not make mention of such items as the insti tution of the Chambers of Labour in 1897, the Housing Act and the Compulsory Education Act, both of 1901, or the government measures as a result of the railwaymeris strikes of 1903. In other words, the first firm foundations of the present-day Welfare State in the Netherlands are laid by about 1900, and, from that moment onwards, are continuously enlarged and consolidated. This is cer tainly no mere coincidence. Generally speaking, the gradual devel opment of the Dutch Welfare State since the 1890’s is closely
THE MARCH OF THE MASSES
111
bound up with the growth of the modem industrial-capitalist system which, as has been demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, definitely gains momentum during the last decades of the 19th century. In addition to this, however, there can hardly be any doubt that it also presents a symptom of accomodation. The causal relationship between the said development, particularly in its early stages, and the emergence of underprivileged groups - or, for that matter, of privileged groups in fear of their advan tageous position —which need organization to make their influence feit, comes clearly to light in the immediate, as well as more longrange, consequences of the truly catalytic event of the 1903 strikes. These consequences can be summarized under two headings67: (1) inevitability of government intervention. The strikes of the railwaymen, i.e. of workers in a sector of the highest public impor tance, simply force the government to take action in the then still strictly private domain of the relations between the railway com panies and their employees. On the one hand, this action takes shape in a statutory provision against the right to strike of public servants and railway functionaries. But, on the other, it results in government-guaranteed regulations concerning the working condit ions and the legal status of the railwaymen. And this, in turn, is of necessity followed by government interventions of an ever more far-reaching nature. Thus, the government is almost immediately confronted with the difficulty of making fiercely competing rail way companies comply with the legally prescribed wage rates and service conditions. This difficulty is finally solved by nation alization of the railways. At the same time, the insight gains ground that the government should not only take corrective and protec tive measures but also preventive measures, in particular in the field of the settlement of labour disputes. This insight eventually leads to the institution of an official mediation board (cf. Table 10: 1923), and this automatically implies the recognition of 'bona fide trade unions; (2) stimulation of organization-mindedness. This finds expression in various ways — but, most of all, in a change of climate which af fects both workers and others. A first symptom of this change, e.g., is the just mentioned implication of accepting 'bona fide' trade unions as indispensable parties to the settlement of labour disputes.
112
THE SOCIETAL STATE
A second symptom is provided by the statement of a prominent businessman, A. G. Kröller, who, in a series of articles in a leading Dutch newspaper, analyzes the course of events during the 1903 strikes, and admits that there is a need for labour unions as the growth of big industry has severed the contacts between employ ers and employees. And a third symptom can be found in the fact that, in orthodox-Protestant and Roman Catholic circles, the plea for (more radical) Christian social action is resumed with new vigour; a plea which shows that one keenly feels the need, not only for a distinct, non-Socialist, note in the struggle for social and econ omic justice, but also for efficient labour unions that should not be hampered by the patrons’ paternalist influence. This last point is worth noting in the present context, as it leads to a fourth symp tom. This symptom is that orthodox-Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Socialist workers alike show an increasing awareness of the importance of following the example set by the General Dutch Diamond-Cutters Union (ANDB). They flock in steadily growing numbers to organizations which aim at furthering their interests as much as possible, by means of strong centralization, strict dis cipline, and concentrated economic action (cf. Tables 20 and 26). With the effect that the employers also come more and more alive to the necessity of joining forces, in order to meet their opponents, the employees, on equal ’organizational’ terms (Table 19). And this is really the fifth symptom. In sum: on the basis of this one significant instance, there is ample evidence for the conclusion that the growing ’countervail ing power’ (as it is termed by J. K. Galbraith) of underprivileged groups results in a process of reciprocal accomodation in the truest sense. For, explicitly or implicidy, the analysis of the conse quences of the railwaymen’s strikes of 1903 is indicative of the following three facts: first, that ’’the support of countervailing power has become in modern times perhaps the major domestic peacetime function of the (central) government”; secondly, that’’the business class is likewise responding. . . , by developing a working relationship of industrial government through collective bargaining and by submitting to the economic encroachments of the... state”; and, thirdly, that labour, by thus being accomodated to, cannot but accomodate itself, by assuming responsibility ’’for a policy
THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
113
which ensures socio-economic security. .. not only to the working classes but to the entire Dutch nation” M. The extent to which labour is integrated in the affairs of the nation as a whole, can be illustrated with the help of a list of na tional organizations in which the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (N W ) is officially represented. This list numbers 28 organizations in the fields of socio-economic policy, social insurance, social welfare work, public health, employment exchange, industrial training, na tional defence, European integration, and ’developing countries'. Another list about the Christian Federation of Trade U nions (CNV) even mentions 139 national policy-making bodies in the activities of which C NV representatives take part·9.
3. THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
It may be said that in the previous section emphasis has prim arily been laid on the fact that in a society in which the effects of the French Revolution have been firmly established, an inevit able process is set in motion. It has been made clear that, on account of the successful proclamation of the principles of liberty and equality (which, in Holland, find expression in the promulga tion of the revised constitution of 1848), all sorts of groups cannot but become acutely aware of their underprivilegedness. These groups wish to see these principles put into practice, not only to the benefit of the ruling classes, but to their own benefit as well. In this section the emphasis needs to be shifted to another fact. Namely the fact that the above mentioned process acquires added momentum in a society in which the French Revolution converges with, and at the same time lends impetus to, the In dustrial Revolution. In such a society, the contrast between the universally proclaimed, as well as constitutionally embodied, rights and liberties of the citizen, and their actual extension to but a privileged minority, becomes the more marked. For with the pol itical deprivation goes the socio-economic deprivation which, at least from the point of view of those living at the lowest subsistence level, is even harder to bear. Or to put it in slightly different terms: in such a society, the call for justice, i.e. the call for the effectuation de facto of the rights to which all citizens are entided de jure, is bound to be stronger, as the debasing suffering of
114
THE SOCIETAL STATE
socio-economic exploitation is coupled with the suffering of pol itical exclusion. Capitalist Industrialism and the Social Conscience. Admitted ly, human society has known the problem of poverty from times immemorial, and in the most massive and hideous forms. Never theless, it should immediately be stressed that from times imme morial, too, human society has accepted poverty as a matter of course, as a problem for which there is no help but public and private alms-giving and/or the provision for such arrangements as can ward off the endemic danger of popular excesses. And it is precisely this age-old pattern which, in the Western hemisphere, undergoes notable changes in the latter part of the 18th and in the 19th century, as a result of two forces, or rather two series of forces. These forces are: (a) the sentiments of humanitarianism, arising in close relation with the advance of medicine, the science of economics, and social fact-finding, and (b) the growth of new industrial conditions which have devastating social consequences (in the earlier stages) and at the same time promising material and psychological prospects (in the long run). With respect to this latter point, it may be noted that Finer lists among the forces at work from 1776 to 1870 what he designates as ”the economy of industrial environment” and "the psychological in fluence of manufactures”. And in reference to these forces, he says: ”. . . a new type of subordination came into existence with the new industry. Traditional feelings of fellowship between master and ser vant were now overwhelmed by the ambition to inherit the new riches promised by machines”; 'T h e mere existence of manufactures gave men a startling sense of power. If their economic well-being was so easily obtainable by the mere institution of machines, why not their general social well?”; ”The impetus to economic and social planning was inherent in the new industrialism, in the discontent with its inequities, and the new sense of social power and competence suggested by machinery, scientific cause-and-effect, and inventions” 70.
In the Netherlands, as has been shown above (ch. 1/2), the early part of the 19th century stands out as a period in which poverty is as it were the order of the day — not because the economy is in rapid transition but, on the contrary, because it is in a state of stagnation. There is no doubt that this fact is closely
THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
115
related to another fact which marks the same period, viz. the keen interest in the problem of poverty. The massive, as well as chronic, character of poverty (which surprises the contemporary observer the more as it is out of keeping with his expectations of a return of prosperity after the Napoleonic war years) urges many to put such questions as: why is this so, and what remedies should be applied? Thus, the years after 1815 abound in publications on the subject, as is reflected in the (not exhaustive) bibliography of an author who has made a special study of the development of social thinking in the Netherlands during the 19th century. In this study, four successive phases are distinguished, and for each phase the following numbers of titles are included in the bibliography : 71 Conservatism (1815—1822) —18, Passive Liberalism (1835—1852) —55, Disquieted Liberalism (1853—1870) — 29, Social Conscience (1871—1881) —34. For the time being, however, i.e. during the earlier phases, the answers given to the said questions are more impressive in quan tity than in quality. On the whole, they lump all poor together, regard poverty as inevitable, if not in principle, at least in practice, and tend to lay most of the blame for the miserable conditions of life from which so many able-bodied workers suffer not on the lack of opportunities but, rather, on laziness, thriftlessness, want of discipline, and similar vices that are considered typical of the lower classes. And, consequently, the remedies are primarily sought in spontaneous or organized acts of charity, and in measures aimed at the provision of work in combination with poor relief, labour conscription, moral improvement, and (young) workers' education, etc. It is not before about the middle of the century that these conservative and traditional views give way to a more critical ap proach, both with respect to the causes of poverty and with respect to the remedies. Poverty, so it is perceived, is not simply a 'nat ural· phenomenon to which in the last resort one has to resign oneself but is also conditioned by the existing fabric of society. It is not so much due to the divine order of things (which is princip ally inscrutable and unchangeable) but, obviously, has its roots in
116
THE SOCIETAL STATE
basic imperfections of man-made institutions (which, by definiton, are under human control). And, parallel with this, there is a grow ing awareness of the complex nature of the problem, as well as of the need of protective and preventive, if not reconstructive, measures, instead of the old philanthropic palliatives. It is realized that a clear distinction should be made between two categories of poor; that is, between the ones who will ever be chargeable to the rates in consequence of physical disability or the like, and those who are fully capable of supporting themselves but are not able to do so because of circumstances beyond their power, which are inherent in the socio-economic structure of the time, and keep them from getting a fair, or even sufficient, reward for their labour. According to several scholars of Dutch social history, this changed attitude is caused since about 1850 by the following fac tors. (a) In the wake of the successful penetration of Liberalist conceptions, the study of political economy steadily gains ground. This leads to a more systematic comprehension of the new, cap italist-industrialist production process, and a more realistic assess ment of the vulnerable position of the working people in it. (b) The practical consideration of many a manufacturer that a better fed, better educated, and less exploited, working class is an ad vantage. This urges the manufacturer to plead actively for a pol icy of protection against abuses, and of promoting improved stand ards of living, (c) The advance of medicine, as a result of which attention is drawn to the causal relation between physical environ ment and health; while subsequent statistical studies throw a clear light on the most unsatisfactory housing and working conditions to which the large majority of the labour population is exposed. These factors are significant in two respects. Firstly, they clearly indicate the vital part that is played by the upper layer of society in drawing the public's attention to what, in due course, will be perceived as the key 'social question' of the century. Ad mittedly, there can hardly be any doubt that the reports of social upheaval abroad during the late 1840’s have also brought their pressure to bear7*. Yet, at this particular stage, it is the critical in sight of keen political economists, thougtful employers, concerned members of the medical profession, and other humanitarian mind ed representatives of the higher classes into the real issues of
THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
117
this question which eventually leads to a widespread awareness of the extreme contrasts in the existing society — especially as reflected in the 'yoke little better than slavery itself"78 which has been laid upon the proletarian masses. At the same time, however, it should be stressed that the new trend in social thinking which emerges in upper class circles can not possibly be looked upon as the only, let alone the fundamental, cause of the general awakening to the 'social question'. For, in the second place, the above mentioned factors strongly suggest that the new trend is itself the effect of another, twofold cause. As indicated, the growing interest in the study of political economy is closely related to the increasing popularity in the Netherlands of the Liberalist doctrines which (as has been shown in ch. 1/2) begin prevailing during the 1840's. On the other hand, it stands to reason that this study cannot lead to the results referred to, until capitalist industrialism, both as a system of production and in its wider social effects, has made at least some progress. And this (as has also been demonstrated in ch. 1/2) is not the case until about 1850 and later, when the new economic policies are followed by an unmistakable change of economic structure. Similarly, there is an obvious connection between early industrialism and the practi cal experiences which set several manufacturers thinking. This is not only explicitly indicated by various scholars in the field but is also implied by the fact that among the most prominent manu facturers in question one finds such typical 'captains of industry' as the owner of a textile mill (S. Le Poole), the director of a large distillery and yeast-making industry (J. C. van Marken), and the founder of the first steam-powered weaving- and spinning-mills in the Netherlands and of an iron-foundry which today has become one of the biggest engineering-works of the country (C.T. Stork). And finally: to some extent, the same applies to the social inquiries made by physicians and others. A very early inquiry, held in 1841 at the instigation of the Minister of Home Affairs, leads to no effects whatsoever, since the employers, who are asked for information, either refrain from doing so, or are believed at their word. Nevertheless, this inquiry is of interest because of its motivation: the situation in the Netherlands, thus it is said in the ministerial letter introducing the investigation, is not as bad as in
118
THE SOCIETAL STATE
industrial (sic!) England, yet it is the duty of the government to attend to the making of laws against abuses. In the years that follow, and especially after 1850, many studies are published and all sorts of associations are called into existence which concentrate on collecting facts and gradually begin to look at these findings in a wider context. From the medical point of view, stress is laid upon the dangers caused to public health by bad housing, in partic ular in the cities, by long working hours and by exhausting produc tion procedures, and above all by the practice of child labour. Whereas the growing dissemination of Liberalist economic theories contributes to the realization that the disconcerting data on these and other conditions of the working classes have something to do with the developments that attend the rise of capitalist indus trialism 74. In short, the three principal factors underlying the increasing awareness of the labour question and its ramifications, which con stitutes the crucial ’social question’ of the day, can by no means be considered factors sut generis. In effect, they are nothing but symptoms of a much more fundamental process. They signify the more or less obvious changes in the ideological and material struc ture which, since the middle of the 19th century, start making themselves felt in Dutch society, and which, in their turn, mark the beginning break-through of the French and the Industrial Rev olution in this country. The Dynamics of Social Criticism. As time goes on, the causal relationship between the ideological and material changes of structure, which emanate from the French and the Industrial Rev olution, and the growth of a public consciousness of diverse social evils becomes increasingly manifest. First of all, this can be illus trated by the fact that, especially after the year 1870, when the hegemony of Liberalism is solidly established and industrialism definitely begins to gain momentum, the ’social question’ is not only pressed by, but also arouses the conscience of, ever larger groups of the population. A significant case in point is the founding, in 1870, of the socalled Committee for Discussing the Social Question. In its com position as much as in its motivation, this Committee makes clear
ΓΗΕ VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
119
that, by this time, the critical mood with regard to the existing and/or newly emerging fabric of society has passed its 'incubation period', and has become inflammatory. Granted, the Committee membership is still largely made up of typical representatives of that very category of keen-sighted men of science and other indi viduals of good social position who so far have almost exclusively been active in this field. But, in addition to these well-to-do gendemen, who are all convinced supporters of the new economic school of thought, there are also members who are leading represen tatives of those orders of society which hitherto have had no choice but to be resigned or to rebel in blind despair. And this is certainly no coincidence. On the one hand, it reflects the beginning move ment of labour emancipation, which in these very days finds ex pression in various, more or less successful attempts at organized action and the forming of trade-union federations — such as, most notably, the First International (1869) and the General Dutch Work men’s Federation (ANWV, 1871; see ch. I I /l, p. 73). On the other hand, however, the participation of labour in the activities of the Committee is deliberately sought by those modemist gendemen who make up its programmatic core. In fact, this participation is considered an essential element by the latter in pursuing the object they have in view. For it is through cooperation with labour and through arranging public consultations that the Committee is meant to contribute to improved class relations and to rouse the nation at large, i.e. workers, bourgeoisie, and government alike, from its inertia in relation to the attendant social problems75. In the present context, it is not necessary to deal with the question whether this particular Committee has or has not succeeded in attaining its end and to what extent. It suffices to say that in the years after its beginning there is a rapid increase in the number of instances which indicate that public opinion is stirred. Among practically all parts of the nation, and in all layers of society, critical voices are raised by worried, if not alarmed, in dividuals; as well as by all sorts of associations and groups which concentrate on a variety of activities, ranging from the collecting of data on the situation of the working classes and the study of the underlying conditions to the presenting of petitions and the formulation of programmes of reform. These voices which all stress
1 20
THE SOCIETAL STATE
the need of discerning the signs of the times, gather more strength as industrialism makes headway and as the uprooting effects of the automatisms that are characteristic of the capitalist system lead to a radicalization of those who are most directly affected. This is especially manifest in the 1880's, and subsequent years, when the country is seriously hit by economic depression. Then the moderate labour leaders, who, either as a result of Liberalist leanings or on the basis of Christian principles, favour cooperation with the em ployers, lose ground because of the growing appeal of the Social ists who, inspired by the ideals of Liberté, Fraternité, and (above all) Égalité, agitate for revolutionary changes of structure. Then, the relatively small, but influential, group of men of higher rank who are among the originators of social criticism, reaches a posi tion which (according to one author) may roughly be characterized as Socialism minus the rejection of private property, and incessantly harps on the string of legislative measures in the interest of the exploited masses. Then, a new note is struck also in church circles, pardy as an uneasy reaction to the spirit of radicalism, but part ly also out of genuine concern for the utterly defenceless "toilers who are as poor as Job" and who are abused "like tools" (as it is put by the prominent Protestant leader Abraham Kuyper, in the opening address to the First Christian Social Congress76, in the same year 1891 in which the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum lends decisive impetus to Roman-Catholic social action). And then, finally, Parliament and government embark upon a series of official inquiries and consequent social legislative enactments, out of which eventually emerges the complex socio-economic system, the most outstanding feature of which is the inextricable interrelation of the public and the private sphere (cf. Table 10, phases II-IV; also ch. I I / 1, pp. 85f., and ch. II/2, pp. 110f.)77. Prior to the 1880’s, official inquiries constitute exceptions to the rule, whereas all sorts of investigations are made a rather inciden tal basis by private individuals and associations. Such exceptions are the above mentioned inquiry of 1841, initiated by the Minister of Home Affairs, and the inquiries of the early 1860’s and in 1869-1872 which result in the Children’s Act of 1874. (The initiative for the latter two is, significantly enough, taken by individual persons, to wit resp. the steam-engineering official D e Vries Robbé and the men who have been instrumental in founding the Committee for Discus-
THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
121
sing the Social Question.) In the 1880’s and subsequent years, however, this pattern is more and more reversed. By that time, private initiative in this matter does not disappear (as can be demonstrated by the investigations of the Frisian People’s Party, in 1889, of the Frisian branch of the Protes tant workers' organization ’Patrimonium’, in 1892, or of the Socialist union of railwaymen, in 1890), but it is clearly overshadowed by such important government inquiries as those which lead to the Labour Act of 1889 and the Safety Act of 1895, or relate to the so-called Strike Bills of 1903
However, the dynamics of social criticism do not only become apparent from the fact that, since about 1870, ever larger parts of the nation become aware of the 'social question'. It is also of interest to note that, at the same time, the scope of criticism is increasingly widened. This is unmistakably clear from Table 28 in which, by way of illustration, an attempt is made at classifying the gradual change in the subjects for consideration under the heading of the 'social question’ during the last quarter of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. This classification shows that two main phases can be distinguished (however much they may overlap for part of the period which is covered), and that each one of these phases can be divided into a few sub-phases. In other words, it shows that a step-by-step development has occurred. And by viewing the illustrative data of Table 28 against the background of the material which has been dealt with in previous sections, the nature of this development can be formulated as follows: Phase A. From about 1870 to World W ar I, the so-called ’social question' (and, with that, social criticism) predominantly, if not exclusively, centres round the labour question. That is the question issuing from the position of complete economic dependence, social deprivation, and political powerlessness, in which the working masses appear to find themselves in the emerging capitalist-indus trialist society. And in reaction to this ever more and ever louder voices of conscience and of protest resound in reference to, suc cessively, (i) the living and labour conditions of the lower classes in general, and of children (and, somewhat later, also young persons and women) in particular, (ii) the need for instruments of organized self-help, economically
THE SOCIETAL STATE
122 TABLE 28
Classification of 137 Publications on the 'Social Question According to Subjects Covered, i t 1870-195071 Main Subjects Covered (*)
1870 - ’90
1890 -Ί 0
1910 -3 0
1930 -'SO
PHASE A
Labour Conditions
47
Labour Legislation
6
Self-Organizing Society — cooperative associations — right to vote — labour organizations — employers’ organizations
12 21
10 12
23
12 12
45
10
2
3
14
4
PHASE B
Social Insurance Legislation (incl. Soc. Insur. Organization)
3
14
18
Unemployment
3
5
16
9
7
4
3
19
35
10
20
42
45
Correction / R econstruction of Socio-Economic System — labour contract, collective labour agreements, etc. — (publ.legal) industrial organization, copartnership, etc. — socialization, overall planning of socio-economic order Total Numbers of Publications ( = 100%) (*)
33
the figures represent percentages of totals of each 20-year period
and socially (mutual aid societies, cooperative associations, labour unions), as well as politically (suffrage movements, party organ izations), (iii) the enactment of legislative regulations of a protective and preventive nature, initially in the interest of the 'personae mise rabiles' (children, young persons, and women), next in that of spec-
THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE
123
ific categories of male workers, and finally extended to all adult workers. Phase B. Since approximately the late 1910's and the 1920's, a fur ther evolution takes place, to the effect that the 'social question* is increasingly understood to be the question of the readjustment and reconstruction of the socio-economic order as a whole. This evolution finds expression in a process of accumulating develop ments, such as (i) the establishment of a system of legal and social security, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of the employees, and to ensure a certain minimum level of subsistence to the economic ally weak, not only in the case of physical disability but also in the case of crisis situations in consequence of structural defects of the prevalent organization of the economy, (ii) the growing insight that basic accomodations are required, both in the field of labour-management relations and in that of keeping conflicting tendencies under control and maintaining the fragile equilibrium of productive and consumptive capacities on behalf of the public interest, (iii) the introduction of systematic reforms aimed at reconstruct ing the socio-economic order on the basis of democratic planning, as well as for the purpose of promoting optimum conditions of cooperation and participation of the entire population in utilizing the nation's resources — reforms which require an elaborate net work of public, semi-public, and private agencies and institutions which is based on the principles of functional decentralization and equal representation of all the parties concerned. The forces underlying this development are manifold and com plex. In the final analysis, however, they can be summarized under the two major headings of the French and the Industrial Revolu tion, or, to be more specific, of the processes of industrialization and emancipation. The inner logic of the proces of industrializa tion is such that it progressively affects the whole of society. And when, in addition, the uprooting effects of this process are great ly enhanced by the disruptive tendencies of the capitalist form of economic organization, the focus of the 'social conscience' cannot but shift from the plight of the 'personae miserabiles' and the work-
124
THE SOCIETAL STATE
ers in general to that of all sorts of other groups of people who (either as a result of their economically weak and socially periph eral position, or because of other factors beyond their control) are unable to stand up for their own interests. Whereas, at the same time, it is more and more realized that, in order to combat the troubles of these special groups and to ensure certain basic guaran tees for their individual and collective well-being, structural changes must be introduced. On the other hand, this shift of focus and, parallel with it, the gradually gaining insight into the need of fundamental reforms is likewise furthered by the process of emancipation which is equal ly expansive in nature. In a society which is founded on the prin ciples of liberty and equality, yet is harassed by strong tendencies towards the monopolization of wealth in the hands of the ’haves’ and the curtailment of the opportunities of self-realization of the ’have-nots’ —in such a society, social criticism is bound to be fanned by the rising demands, and the increasingly effective forms of or ganized pressure by those who want to come into their own, too. The result is that the ’social question’ is found to be essentially the problem of the just ordering of that very society; an ordering which implies two things. In the first place, it implies that the individual civil and political rights be supplemented by a set of social, economic, and cultural rights such as the right to work and to social security, the right to form and to join organizations for the protection of social and economic interests, the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of every member of society, the right to education and to the full human development. And, in the second place, the question of the just ordering of the community as the key ’social question’ to be solved implies that the State is increasingly called upon to function as the principal executive agency through which Society, in all its component parts, strives for the materialization of those fundamen tal human rights in the interest of each and of all80.
CHAPTER III
SOCIETAL S T A T E A N D R E S P O N S IB L E SO C IE T Y
A Confrontation
. . . if it is true that history is moved on by remorseless forces greater than any man, it is nonetheless true that individual men by individual decision can channel, or defdy guide, those impersonal forces either for the good or to disastrous collision. THEODORE H. WHITE1
At 12:30 in the afternoon on Friday November 22, 1963, two shots cut short the life of the man to whom the words quoted above refer. This man is John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th Pres ident of the United States of America, and at the moment of his brutal death it is as if the world stands still. For in the eyes of countless people this man personifies a new era of fascinating vit ality, a new perspective of inspiring imaginativeness which now seems to have been shattered at one blow. Thirty four months and two days before this fatal date, on the 20th of January, 1961, Kennedy has taken his oath of office and has delivered his inaugural address in which he speaks the mem orable words that there is nothing to fear but fear itself. These words are characteristic of the ’Kennedy approach’, not only to wards international diplomacy in an age of nuclear power politics, but towards the whole range of serious problems which confront mankind in the exceedingly complex and hazardous situation of present day technological mass society; an approach which is char acterized in its turn by two basic qualities. The first quality is a deep sense of historical and sociological
126
THE SOCIETAL STATE
realism. It is marked by a clear perception of the fact that in all history and particularly in our own time, the life of man is moulded by forces like steamrollers of which man is the product rather than the producer — even though he may have been the initial instrument to set them in motion. These forces assail man and tend to get control over him rather than that he controls them —but, precisely for this reason, one cannot possibly resign to them as to blind forces but, on the contrary, one should scrutinize their work ings in order to define their nature and to ascertain their course. And this leads immediately to the second quality, viz. the sober recognition that none of the problems which beset the human race is good or bad as such, but that it depends on man himself what he makes of these problems by using his gift of discernment and his manipulative skill. This quality is characterized by the stubborn refusal to be checkmated by the drift of events, and by the equally stubborn preparedness to be challenged by these very events to a spirit of probing inventiveness in finding the fresh starting-points from which man can continue to carve out his own destiny. In short, it is the quality which is rooted in the essentially human belief (and experience) that "never, at any moment,... men were powerless to ask new questions or define new rules, or that indi viduals were helpless as the engines of history’ rolled toward them"1. 1. THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
The engines of history’ which have brought into being the So cietal State, and which stamp its nature and its problems, are the French and the Industrial Revolution. This fact is of great signif icance, both from an analytical point of view and from the point of view of evaluation. In the previous chapters, an attempt has been made to anal yze in broad outlines as well as in greater detail, the ideological movements and material developments which pre-eminently under lie the present day osmosis of Society and State. It has been point ed out that these movements and developments can be considered to fall under the headings of three fundamental processes. And with regard to these processes it has been stressed that they can
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
127
be looked upon as the continued effects of the revolutions in things, institutions, and ideas (as Crane Brinton has specified them) which, in the first phase of their joint operation, have brought about the transition from Absolutist State to Free Society. That is to say, it has been demonstrated that, once these revolutions have started gaining momentum, they move on in truly ’engine-like’ fashion. Once they have unleashed powerful energies under the impact of which a system emerges that is based upon societal self-help, constitutional democracy, and guaranteed political liberties, the basic conditions are created out of which a subsequent system will inevitably emerge. This is based upon large-scale organization and coordination, fundamental democratization, and the materializa tion of individual political liberties through the elaboration of a complementary body of economic, social, and cultural rights. In brief, our analysis has made it clear that the Societal State has grown dialectically out of the complex of irreversible forces eman ating from the French and the Industrial Revolution. Two Essential Characteristics. However important in itself, this point is even more so when viewed in the perspective of critical appraisal. It indicates two essential characteristics of the Societal State and the problems arising from it. The first one is the imman ent nature of the present situation. The Societal State has devel oped by sheer necessity from the settings of the post-Revolutionary past. It is not an incidental phenomenon that has occurred by a coincidence. On the contrary, it represents the inescapable result of the interplay of political and economic, social and spiritual forces which has dictated the logic of events in the Western world since the latter part of the 18th century. It is the outcome of a process which we can deplore, or applaud, but which we cannot possibly get rid of, unless we would like to make a (vain) attempt to put back the clock of history and consequently to dispense with all things, good and bad alike, that have accrued from the devel opments which have made the clock of history tick over the past two centuries, and make it tick today. Precisely because of this immanent nature of the developments in question, our analysis of the Dutch ’case’ has predominantly foc used attention on the course of events during the second half of
128
THE SOCIETAL STATE
the 19th century. It is during this fermentative period of modem Dutch history that the essentials of the dialectic processes out of which the Societal State is to emerge are most clearly revealed. In this period not only the first effects of the French and the Industrial Revolution become manifest in the break-through of bourgeois dem ocracy and industrial capitalism, but the so-called continued effects, viz. the growth of organizationalism, the march of the roused masses, and the quickened pangs of (social) conscience, start making them selves felt too3. Of course, all this does not imply that we disagree with the many students — among whom we ourselves can be found 4 — who lay due stress on the thoroughgoing structural changes which have resulted in more recent times from such dramatic and even catastrophic events as the Great Depression and the two World Wars. It is beyond doubt that these changes have gready enhanced the emergence of the present political and socio-economic situation of which the close interrelation ship of State and Society is a typical concomitant. Nevertheless, it should be noted that we use the verb 'enhance' advisedly. In the final analysis the said 20th century events and the ensuing structural changes have not caused but only stimulated and accelerated the developments which have resulted (among other things) in the Societal State. Even if the additional impulses issuing from 'total wars’ and equally 'total' depressions would not have occurred (which is hardly imaginable, particularly in the latter case, as depressions are inherent in industrial capitalism as long as it is founded on the principles of economic Liberalism), the ultimate result would have been the same. For this result is rooted basically in the highly interdependent, ideopolitical and socio-economic processes which have been set in motion rince the late 18th century 5.
But yet another thing is implied in the fact that the Societal State is essentially the product of the complex of cumulative forces which originates from the French and the Industrial Revolution. This implication is that the Societal State is, equally essentially, the product of human forces. The French Revolution and the In dustrial Revolution are, in the full sense of the word, Human rev olutions. They mark the most decisive turning-point until now in man's relationship to his material and social environment. They set in movement an unprecedented extension of the cultural sphere, and initiate an era of astonishing human creativeness in the sub jection of nature and in the organization of society. In one word, they are the motive powers of the so-called Third Culture Phase ( R. Behrendt) which is typical of modem Western civilization,
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
129
and which has given birth in its turn to a new type of man. This new type of man can be defined in many different terms and can be classified under many different headings, such as: technically competent man who sets free immense mechanical energies which he bends to his will; 'homo faber' who considers and experiences 'his' world, with the human beings living therein, as 'makeable', as an object for manipulation and man-imposed change; mobile man who no longer acknowledges the life-long imprints resulting from his geographic, spiritual, or socio-economic whereabouts, but who asks for maximal mobility, in accordance with his capacities and potentialities; conscious man and man come of age, i.e. man who becomes aware of both his external conditions and his inner self, who frees himself of the transcendentally or traditionally given bonds, and who lays claim to the right to make his own auton omous decisions in view of the new situations in life with which he is confronted. Prominent features of these new situations — as listed by Richard Behrendt, from whom the above mentioned characterizations have also been taken · — are e.g. the following: — the substitution of magical, mythical, and traditional methods by impersonal, rational procedures which are based on 'objectively' de fined and generally applied norms; — the ever-increasing control of physical nature, accompanied by the rise of science and technics as powerful social determinants; — the significant shift in the relative importance of the three prin cipal sectors of economic production, which finds expression in Jean Fourastié's noteworthy estimation that the percentages of the persons employed in the primary (agricultural), the secondary (industrial), and the tertiary (services) sector will develop from 8 0 - 1 0 (or 40, in 1900) •10 resp., in 1800, to 1 0 - 1 0 - 8 0 , in 2 0 0 0 7; — the discovery and, in part, the realization of progress as a con tinuous and socially all-inclusive movement towards improved material and physical conditions of life; in close connection with — die demand for, and partly also the realization of, fundamental democratization by the substitution of the principle of achievement and the forming of 'functional élites' for the hereditary privileges of a dominant minority, and as a result of the trend towards the homog enization of material security and other opportunities of human development.
In short, our analysis has shown that the Societal State has emerged as an integral part of the thoroughgoing changes which
130
THE SOCIETAL STATE
have been brought to pass in the Western world under the joint impact of the cumulative effects of the French and the Industrial Revolution. Consequendy, the Societal State cannot but reflect the two salient aspects that are characteristic of these changes. The first aspect is that these changes are produced by a series of con current developments which, once set in motion, have run their dialectic course as it were by iron necessity. And the second aspect is that these very developments have not only been generated by a (long-prepared) outburst of human inventiveness and imagination but that they have led, at the same time, to a situation in which the full richness of human talents and possibilities becomes ac tualized for the first time in history. It is against this background that the Societal State must be viewed, not only for the sake of realistically understanding its principal motives ,and underlying forces, but also for the sake of critically examining its present implications. For it is against the background of these two characteristic but rather paradoxical as pects that the Societal State reveals the tension which is inherent in its nature, or, to put it even more pointedly, which constitutes the essence of its nature. That is to say, the true nature of the present osmosis of Society and State and of its intrinsic problems needs to be defined in polar terms. If this nature is to be perceived in its full dimensions, it needs to be expressed in terms of the polarity which is typical of all developments originating in the French and the Industrial Revolution; the polarity between the drift of historical and sociological immanencies and the drive of human aspirations. From the Angle of Human Aspirations — the Idea of Solidarity As an Empirical Fact. In the Introductory chapter we have started out by referring to the well-known, though apocryphal, words of Louis XIV, VÊtat eest Moi, in order to characterize succinctly the relationship of State and Society prevailing in the days of Absolut ism and Benevolent Despotism. In these days, the State, as person ified by the monarch, autocratically imposes itself upon the Society which is under political and socioeconomic tutelage. Principally and practically the whole life of the community is governed by the Interest of the State, as interpreted by the princely ruler who
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
131
wields supreme power over his subjects — even though this inter pretation is not seldom for the benefit of these very subjects, as the Colbertist and Cameralist programs testify which have been cited before (cf. Introduction/5), and which define the part to be played by the State in the best paternalist tradition. In the Western democratic nations of today, however, the rela tionship of State and Society appears to be the exact opposite. It is a relationship which might be characterized by paraphrasing the winged words of Louis XIV as follows: C'est Nous qui sommes l'Êtat, We are the State. In these nations, the whole life of the com munity is governed by the Interest of the 'We', by the Interest of the total body of the fully emancipated Society which has emerged as a result of what Burdeau has called the "avènement du peuple réel”, the actual coming into power of the entire population8. And it is to this interest that the State is made subservient in the highest degree; it is in this interest that the State finds the only rationale for its actions. In fact, in today's Western democracies the State is societalized in the full sense of the word. It is the instrument of the whole Society for the whole Society. It is the central 'ad-ministrative'· agency in which all orders of Society (instead of only a few privileged ones, whether parading as the 'general class' or not) have a stake and "through which the concern of each for the good of all (and vice versa) is principally expressed"10. What does this complete reversal in the relationship of State and Society indicate? Speaking in stricdy sociological terms, it indic ates nothing but the sober fact that Society requires a different "Wirkungsform" (Heller) in the different stages of its development, and is accompanied by a different "organische Einheit ihres Wil lens" (von Stein). The absolute State, of whatever variety it may be, generally meets the need of a Society which struggles to over come political and socio-economic parochialism for a more com prehensive, centralist frame group, the establishment of which nec essitates a definitely paternalist, if not totalitarian, approach. In such a Society, 'statism' is very likely to be a prerequisite. Finding itself in a condition of so-called underdevelopment and endangered by internal divisions such a Society is apt to accept, i.e. to consent to the external authority of the Policeystaat as "requisite fo r... the maintenance of good discipline and order among the subjects,
132
THE SOCIETAL STATE
and promotion of all measures for the comfort of life" n. The present day State, however, which is known as the sozialer Rechtsstaat (Heller), the démocratie sociale (Burdeau), or the Welfare State, is of an essentially different nature since it is the correlate of an essentially different Society. It is, in the truest sense, a serving agency which derives its authority from a Society that is permeated with the principle, as well as the practice, of self-determination. In this Society, the State does not act as the more or less enligthened regent’ who exercises an all-inclusive mandate for those who are incapable of setding their affairs by themselves, and who are there fore compelled willy-nilly to acquiesce in the terms of this mandate which are set by that selfsame regent in accordance with his own interest (or rather with that of the privileged power groups of whom he is the august representative). On the contrary, in this Society the State merely acts as the ’administrator’, the managing deputy of the entire population of which all members are not only proclaimed to have an equal right to self-development, but what is more, who agree basically that this equality involves ”a bal ancing of claims in the interests of greater freedom on the whole”, and that it consequendy implies that these claims are in the last resort ’’directed not at the state but at one another” lf. It may be worth while to stress that this interpretation of the modem relationship of State and Society is neither the product of wishful thinking, nor the result of unwarranted generalizations. This point needs to be stressed in view of the doubts expressed by some authors. Thus Schaper raises the question whether the concept of the Wel fare State is sufficiently general in nature to express adequately "a typical political manifestation o f . . . the 20th century industrial-tech nological mass society", and whether it is not too much based upon a development which, "especially in its typical features, stems from the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly England". And Vervoort even holds that "the Welfare State is ’made in Britain’ and unfit for export”, as "the English system of ’social security’ corresponds to a unique sociocultural and political situation". In a way, these authors give the same reason for their views. Although Schaper ultimately concludes that the Welfare State is by no means an exclusively British phenomenon, and he points out, moreover, that the term ’Statism’ cannot possibly be considered a correct equivalent, he nevertheless calls attention to the fact that the
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
133
phenomenon in question, in whatever form it appears, evokes but little enthusiasm. Similarly, Vervoort suggests that only in England a solution has been found for "the problem of a socially secure society which in spite of intensive state interference is not exper ienced as a threat to individual freedom and responsibility"; for, as he puts it, "England is probably one of the few countries of which can be said that the sentiment of national solidarity has more than sur vived the war years, and where the continental antagonism in the relation between society and state is absent, or at least considerably less acute than on the continent" 1S. In other words, both authors lay stress on the fact that nearly everywhere the Welfare State rouses mixed feelings among its sub jects. As will be clear from what follows (in the next sub-section of the present chapter), we do not have the slightest intention to deny this fact. Yet in our opinion this fact cannot be regarded as con clusive evidence of the lack of a societal consensus as a crucial motive in the development of today’s relationship of State and Soci ety. It is much more evidence of the consequences that necessarily follow from this very consensus (and with which we shall deal later, when the Societal State is viewed from the angle of 'immanence’). For according to us the consensus underlying the ’ad-ministrative' State (whether this State evokes enthusiasm or not) is not so much rooted in sentiments of national solidarity that are produced or stimul ated by the war years, but it springs rather from far more fundamen tal developments which are inherent in all Western, fully democrat ized and industrialized mass societies.
The interpretation of the modern democratic State as the in strument through which Society acts upon the conception referred to above, viz. that the claims of all citizens to liberty and equality are directed at one another, is logically implied in the foremost conclusion to which we are led by our historico-sociological anal ysis of three basic processes underlying the Societal State, and emanating from the (continued) effects of the French and the In dustrial Revolution. This conclusion is that the Societal State re flects a situation in which the State is the exponent of collective, societal solidarity. To preclude possible misunderstandings, it should be pointed out that the term 'solidarity is not used here in the sense of a normative moral concept or quality, but simply and solely repre sents an attempt at designating, as adequately as possible, an em pirical fact. Namely the fact of the fully emancipated Society, and its inevitable implications. Due to the interplay of the 'growth of
134
THE SOCIETAL STATE
organizationalism’, the march of the masses, and the Voice of conscience, the principle of emancipation has been universalized and collectivized in the most literal sense. These three processes together bring about a development which provides all groups and segments of the community with the means of asserting themselves politically and economically, socially and culturally. And for this very reason they increasingly confront the component parts of Soci ety with the necessity of reciprocal accomodation, of recognizing one another as partners in the quest for individual and collective self-determination. In other words, this development leads to the "affrontement des intérêts"14 on a nation-wide scale, to the equal ization of the claims of all those who as members of the commun ity are not only officially granted the opportunity of participating in the national life, but are also enabled to seize this opportunity to a greater or lesser extent, i.e. up to the measure in which they succeed in organizing themselves powerfully and/or in rousing the public opinion in their behalf. The proclamation of fundamen tal rights common to all men, coupled with the establishment of a modem industrial system "which constantly puts new vigour in to the masses", and at the same time is marked by "the ever-increasing degree in which individual activities are being linked up with one another into larger wholes"15 — all this eventually entails the emergence of "the idea of solidarity, or social and political integration"1·. Or, putting it in terms borrowed from an author who attempts to outline a so-called 'conflict-sociological model’: in national communities, based on the acknowledgement of a prin cipally universal set of values concerning man's right to autonomy and affected by the growth of conditions which provide for the practical realization of this right, the adjustment of conflicting claims is not merely of the nature of a compromise between the different parties in consequence of changed power relations, but this adjustment is also likely to develop into a consensus among the parties concerning the legitimacy of their respective claims17. And it is in acting upon this basically societal consensus that the modem (Welfare) State finds the rationale of its vasdy extended range of operations, which are directed at the coordination and integration of the demands and needs of the citizens aspiring ef fectively to self-determination.
THE
s o c ie t a l
sta te
x -r a y e d
135
It is this development which, in the field of natural rights, ”the trends away from individualism” and ”the growth responsibility”. For, as Ginsberg points out, in tracing these trends by following up the developments which individualist doctrines have undergone over the last one hundred years : underlies of social
"In the first place, it was recognized that the doctrine in its earlier forms tended to erect too sharp an antithesis between the personal and the social. It was the contribution of the Idealist philosophers to show that as T. H. Green put it, 'without persons no society, without soci ety no persons'. From this point of view it came to be seen that though in a sense rights inhere in the human person as such, they have no meaning except as defining relations between persons sharing a common life. ( . . . ) In the second place, criticism was directed against the tendency to treat rights as self-subsistent, or to allow particular rights. . . to dominate all others. It was seen that owing to the complexity of social relations, rights founded on one set of relations might conflict with rights founded on other relations. . . The recognition of this conflict has in fact led to legislation restricting the freedom of con tract by fixing wage rates and conditions of work. Similarly, the principle of equality may be, and has been, used to define rights so as to equalise freedom. This point can also be illustrated from the right of contract. Liberal criticism seized on the point that freedom implied substantial equality between the parties, and that there was no such equality, for example, in the case of a factory owner who employed children or entered into a bargain with unorganised adult workers. ( . . . ) In the third place, and partly as a result of the recognition of the need of balancing conflicting claims, the notion of rights and of equality in rights has been slowly extended from the political to the economic and social spheres. ( . . . ) The use of the public resources and of public power to assure a greater diffusion of educational oppor tunity, to control and eliminate disease, to improve conditions of work, to abolish slums no doubt means an interference with the liberty of some individuals, but it tends on the whole to maximise liberty. What social liberalism has been concerned to maintain is that the principle of equal freedom must be taken more seriously than was done by the individualists, and that the power of the State may be rightly used to reduce or remove arbitrary inequalities, and to ensure that the common resources should not be employed for selfish ends, but for the general well-being. Finally, the universalist implications of the notions of die rights of man have come to be more fully realised. This can be seen in the various efforts to reduce arbitrary differences, such as those based
136
THE SOCIETAL STATE
on sex, religion and colour and, more recently, in the attempts to find concrete expression for the idea of human rights in the sphere of international relations. These movements point, I think, to a val uable element in the theory of natural rights, namely, the subordination of politics to ethics” 18.
However, the development towards societal solidarity as a vital condition of the Societal State is not only apparent from the criticisms to which individualism is subjected by the philosophers. It also becomes manifest in a good number of facts which are without any doubt common to the everyday socio-economic and political life of the modern democracies of the Western world. Sev eral of these facts have been dealt with more or less extensively in our previous analyses. It has been shown that, in the political sphere e.g., the principal political parties of today fully consider themselves and also act as national parties. That is, they are or ganizations which have changed from emancipation movements pursuing the freedom of their own group into organizations which have the welfare of the whole population at heart. Similarly it has been demonstrated that, in the socio-economic domain, organ ized labour nowadays is not merely interested in obtaining greater security for the working classes but deliberately assumes respon sibility for a policy of ensuring security for the entire nation. Whereas the employers completely consent to the practice of cooperation with labour in matters concerning industrial govern ment and in matters concerning the ordering of society as a whole. (See ch. II/2, 106f.) W ith respect to these instances it hardly needs to be made clear that they are symptomatic rather than incidental in nature. Management and labour, or political parties founded on the basis of a comprehensive programme, are by no means the only ones who show a changed attitude towards one another and towards the affairs of the total community. For the Netherlands, this can be illustrated with the help of the findings of a recent study in which a survey has been used, based on a stratified random sample of the population of a middle-sized in dustrial city in the heavily urbanized, Western part of the coun try1·. In the present context, the answers to a few questions of the survey are of particular interest. Thus it is found that 85 per cent of the respondents are in favour of the changes which have
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
137
taken place in Dutch society since 1945 — changes which have led to the firm establishment of the Welfare State. And the scores of those who appear to be of the opinion that the present day sit uation as to such specific questions as the distribution of income and property and co-determination of workers in industrial man agement should be continued, or even needs to be improved, read as follows: In favour of Present situation continuation/improvement income distribution 53% 36% property distribution 46 45 co-determination 37 49
Not in favour 6%
2 6
No comment 5% 7
8
In short, these findings clearly suggest that the idea of solidarity is, to say the least, certainly not an incidental phenomenon but rather seems to appeal to very substantial parts of the population at large. On the other hand, it is obvious that these instances are not characteristic of only one country in the Western hemisphere. They can be found in every nation which is affected by the ideological and material processes which have originated from the French and the Industrial Revolution. In support of this reference can be made to the statement of a German industrialist who speaks of a five fold responsibility of the modern entrepreneur: viz. the respon sibility towards the consumers, the competitors, the workers, the investors of capital, and the government and public opinion. Or one can point to such institutions as the President's Advisory Coun cil of Labor-Management Policy in the United States of America, the National Production Advisory Council on Industry in Great Britain, and many other equivalent bodies, on all sorts of levels and in all sorts of fields, in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and so on. These are all bodies through which in some way or other the reciprocal responsibilities of the parties concerned in the socio economic order of the nations in question are expressed. Further more, a very significant case in point is the issue of co-determina tion and co-partnership (or in the more general, German term: of 'Mündigkeit') which is almost universally recognized as an issue of the greatest importance in industry as well as in other sections of society *°.
138
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Both the significance and the universality of this question of ’Mündigkeit’, especially in the realm of industry, are perhaps most clearly reflected in the conclusion of an investigation into the attitudes of industrial leaders in — paradoxically enough — a definitely nondemocratic country, viz. Spain. This conclusion reads: the larger and the more modem an industrial enterprise, the more likely it appears to be the case that the management adheres to a policy which rejects unilateral paternalism and which is based on a ’universalistic’ treat ment of the subordinates*1. In passing it should be noted that this Spanish instance testifies to the same fact which, in a much wider context and on a much larger scale, can be and has been observed in present day Russia. Namely that industrialism as such appears to be a powerful factor in producing democratic tendencies**.
Finally, ample evidence of the emergence of the idea of societal solidarity as a typical phenomenon in Western democracy is fur nished by a recent survey of economic developments, social struc tures, and political parties in many European countries. To men tion just a few salient points which this survey reveals: — due to the growth of bureaucratic 'abundance, as well as of economic prosperity, a social and political order has developed in which the class struggle is reduced to a minimum, collective bar gaining has become standard procedure, and every group fully acknowledges the legitimacy of the claims of the others to repres entation at the conference tables; — the diminishing class antagonism has contributed to a general trend towards consensus and to the weakening of the ideological factor in politics and in the field of socio-economics, for in nearly all the countries surveyed the two following facts are manifest: (a) many of the old politico-economic questions at issue have been solved in a manner compatible with the Social-Democratic ideol ogy, and (b) the leading circles in society have become aware of the advantages to be gained by the economic reforms, whereas the 'traditional' advocates of structural changes, such as the So cialists and trade-unionists, realize how gready the effectuation of these changes is furthered by the active support of their political adversaries; — there is a general agreement as to the need of government plan ning and government intervention for the purpose of economic growth and full employment, and in order to protect the interests
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
139
of all kinds of dependent groups; and a similar agreement has increasingly developed concerning the right of the representatives of the lower classes to have a voice in the making of regulations relevant to the public interest, whether on the level of national government or on that of industrial governmentM. From the Angle of Immanence* — the Effect of the Sorcerer's Apprentice? There is much sense in recalling in the present con text the story of the poor young man, known as the Sorcerer s Ap prentice, who is swept away by the magic powers he has released. With good reason the question can be raised whether a similar fate is in store for today's Western democratic nations. It is a ques tion which can be raised with a view to the general situation in which these nations find themselves as a result of the fact that they have reached a high level of industrial development and are thoroughly imbued with the idea that every citizen is entided to a fair share in the material welfare of the community, and can lay claim to indefeasible human rights in the political and econom ic, social and cultural sphere. And consequendy, it is also a ques tion which can be raised with a view to the particular aspect of this general situation, i.e. the aspect of the osmosis of Society and State which interests us especially. As goes without saying, in this study we shall deal only with this question in its latter, more restricted sense. But, as is equally clear, this does not imply that we can refrain entirely from dealing with this question in its wider sense. The particular aspect cannot possibly be assessed without examining it in the context of the general situation — and even less because the one represents nothing but a symptom of the other. In fact, the osmosis or fusion of Society and State simply reflects the fusion of all spheres of communal life which is inher ent in the workings of the two basic trends towards fundamental democratization and total industrialization. Wherever these trends make their influence felt, powerful (and self-propelling) forces are at work which inevitably further the process of societal integration and solidarity. Or, to put it in slighdy different terms: they create of necessity a social and political order in which two principles are of paramount importance. The first one is that of the colleo
140
THE SOCIETAL STATE
tivization of all individual interests. Once the right to autonomy is not only universally proclaimed, but operates at the same time under conditions which greatly enhance the opportunities of the citizens to actualize this right, a plurality of formations of power (and countervailing power) emerges, all of which bring their mas sive pressures to bear upon one another and upon the community as a whole. And from this immediately springs the second principle. It is that of the societalization of all private attempts at self-deter mination. The very rise of all sorts of collectively organized specialinterest groups makes that the ’faits et gestes of every single one of these groups are no longer of a purely private nature, but definitely acquire public dimensions*4. There can be no doubt that under the impact of these prin ciples a situation has developed which can hardly be valued enough from the point of view of human self-realization. The ’magic powers’ which have been released by Western man since the days of his first successful attempts to break through the bar riers of rigid social and political structures (which were allegedly ordained by the Divinity) and of forbidding physical conditions beyond human grasp (and therefore regarded as an object of fear rather than as a subject for technical exploitation); these magic powers have, once they were released, slowly but surely led to the establishment of a society which has set man free to a very con siderable extent to do what he ’’has desire, competence and means to do” *5. The considerable extent to which this is true can be per ceived when a comparison is made of the Western democracies with the so-called areas of rapid social change in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The latter are in rapid social change, not in the last place because of their struggle for the achievement of the very aims of responsible emancipation, human dignity, social jus tice, and freedom, which have been achieved, however incom pletely, in the former nations*·. But precisely this development, of which the Societal State is a significant indication, carries with it a number of paradoxical consequences (to say the least). A few of these consequences, which are paradoxical in the sense that they strongly tend to jeopardize human self-realization, can be made clear as follows. (1) The first paradox which needs special comment is closely
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
141
related to the above-mentioned principle of collectivization as a dominant factor in the shaping of the complex pattem of societal integration which is typical of the present day, fully democratic and industrialized communities of the Western world. This prin ciple is a prerequisite for the realization of human self-dependence on an all-inclusive scale. Yet, at the same time, to put this prin ciple into practice necessitates a development which increasingly narrows the margins of autonomous decision and independent ac tion. The more man progresses in the elaboration of institutional ized forms of justice and freedom, which are indispensable means of envisaging the materialization of these goals, the more he finds himself dependent on the requirements of these institutions which are meant to serve him. This is shown most clearly by the rise of the ad-ministrative’ State which, in order to perform its function as servant of the emancipated Society, is bound to develop into the administration, in the sense of the managing, regulating, and inplementing agency, par excellence. At the same time, however, it is beyond dispute that a similar development takes place in So ciety as a whole. In fact, the rise of the ’ad-ministrative’ and, there fore, administrating State is the exponent of the rise of a plurality of societal institutions which, for the very purpose of ministering to the particular needs and interests of the many different groups and segments of the community, necessarily turn into highly spec ialized, managing apparatuses which are both ad-ministered’ and administrated by equally specialized functionaries — the experts or functional élites, the 'technocrats’ and ’apparatchiks’27. The general nature of this development can be illustrated in sev eral ways. Thus, Banning lists 7 areas in which the increasing power of the bureaux and the bureaucrats can be observed, and only one of these areas relates to government bureaucracy: (1) government, (2) business and industry, (3) management and labour, (4) political parties, (5) churches, (6) ’free societal organizations', (7) mass communication media f8. Or one can point to the rapid growth of the percentages of the 'Angestellten', the 'fonctionnaires', i.e. of those who are employed in the tertiary sector of the economy which is called significantly the service sector. This growth is by no means limited to the domain of the State, but is manifest in the whole of Society — as can be seen e.g. from the following two sets of (roughly comparable) figures con cerning the ratio of (a) clerical, non-manual to manual labour in the
142
THE SOCIETAL STATE
(private sphere of the) French 'industrie de transformation, and of (b) 'Angestellten' to manual workers in (both private and public spheres in) Germany in generalw : (a)
1866 1906 1931 1948
1 1 1 1
24 15
8 5
(b)
1885 1907 1933 1953
1 1 1 1
13 9 5 3
The problems involved in this development have been dis cussed from many different angles by scores of scholars in the field of social and political science. And it is evident that, es pecially from the point of view of the subject matter of our present study, these problems give rise to quite a number of critical questions. Thus, from the point of view of political democracy in particular, a whole series of problems can be listed under the fol lowing headings: the tension between democracy and the Welfare State, the problem of the party system, the problem of the oppo sition, the problem of creeping corporatism, the problem of public opinion, the problem of public information, the problem of com munity organization and democracy#0. In the present context, how ever, it is neither necessary nor possible to deal with all these questions in detail. For our purpose of viewing 'from the angle of immanence', it may suffice to draw attention to one or two of these questions only — that is, in so far they can be helpful in throwing a particularly vivid light on the inherent dilemma with which the Societal State is confronted. As has been indicated, an essential characteristic of the So cietal State is that the entire population is not only entided, but also enabled to participate in the determination of the affairs of the community. And this implies, as has also been made clear, that the basic motive of State action is no longer found in pater nalisms of any kind but in the fundamental rights of the citizens to full human development. Precisely these characteristics, how ever, appear to be imperilled by their inevitable concomitants of large-scale service institutions and corporate coordination systems which, in their turn, necessitate the growth of an increasingly in fluential group of highly specialized intermediaries. Participation de jure can only be realized de facto, as far as the large majority of citizens is concerned, by delegating the latter to those who have
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
143
FIGURE 8
Schematic Diagram of the Distribution of Influence on Decisions31 Amount of influence T op Policy Makers 8c Final Decision Takers
HIGH
Expert Mediators of Private Interests and Public Policies
,§.t
Organized Citizens
LOW N um ber of persons
sufficient knowledge, influence, and power to handle the intric acies which are involved in the preparation and the effectuation of the proper decisions. Thus, the average citizen finds himself in a position, if not of virtual non-participation, at least of gready limited participation (cf. Figure 8); a position which subjects him in fact to a new paternalism, namely that of the expert mediators whose offices are indispensable both for the promotion of private interests and the execution of public policies, and who become, for that reason, clothed with monopolistic powers of responsibility. In discussing the relations between the individual and the in stitutions which have their rationale in the interests of the individual, Petzäll says: ” . . . les organes, les organisations, les institutions, sont nécessaire comme des représentants des individus. Le rayon où nous pouvons toi et moi décider de nos intérêts ou même y veiller devient de plus en plus restraint. ( . . . ) Est-ce qu'on ne va pas nous transfor mer en automates? Je ne crois pas que l'automation de l’homme soit possible. Peut-être que ceux qui ont confié leurs intérêts à Vinstitution deviennent des automates, mais en tout cas on ne peut pas transfor mer les hommes placées aux postes-clé en des machines'' 82. These italicized words are significant in two respects. In the first place, they clearly indicate the great responsibility of the men in
144
THE SOCIETAL STATE
institutional key positions, and, consequently, the obvious need of an "ethos of the apparatuses" M. In the second place, they are strongly suggestive of a (rather peculiar) paternalistic state of mind, for they seem to imply that, as long as the men at the key positions are aware of their human individuality, Human Individuality as such is safeguarded — irrespective of the question whether the masses with whose interests those men in key positions are entrusted, have been transformed into automatons.
(2) A second, parallel paradox relates to what we have desig nated as the principle of societalization, i.e. the principle which of necessity prevails in a community governed by powerful forces which aim at the maximization and equalization of the claims of all the constituent parts of the community. In such a community, no private interest which is organized for self-realization can achieve its goal without affecting other private interests which are organized for the same purpose. Or, to put it in slightly different terms: all such interests become, in some way or other, of public interest, and are thus forced to enter into a process of reciprocal accomodation and identification. But the more this process advan ces and the insight gains ground that, popularly speaking, any body s business is everybody's business, the more a situation devel ops in which the adjustment of claims becomes more important than the claims themselves. And with that another dilemma, in herent in the Societal State, becomes apparent. As has been pointed out, the Societal State is the expression of a situation in which the State is made completely subservient to the realization of the rights and liberties of all its citizens. In this situation a basic consensus exists, to the effect that nobody can be deprived of the privilege of aspiring, to the full, after what he considers essential to the satisfaction of his needs, provided that, in doing so, he does not deprive his fellow-citizens of the same privilege. And it is in consequence of this consensus that the State is necessarily transformed into the indispensable, central agency whose pre-eminent function consists of guaranteeing the op timum conditions for the effectuation of the societal aspirations which function it can only perform by integrating these aspirations into a complex whole of coordinated and balanced institutions of private, semi-public, and public nature. Implicit in this function
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
145
and its performance, however, are a number of trends which ser iously endanger the order of things of which it is a typical indica tion, viz. that the State (as we have said before) is the instrument of the whole of Society for the whole of Society. One of the trends in question can be mentioned very briefly, since it has already been dealt with in our discussion of the sub ject matter of the first paradox. In its function as the foremost integrative agency, the State is increasingly dependent on a manag ing élite whose expert knowledge and qualified intermediate ser vices are requisite to carry into effect the liberties of the citizens but which are, at the same time, of such intricate nature that these very citizens can hardly be blamed for feeling themselves bereaved of the enjoyment of their primordial democratic right of checking those to whom they have entrusted the promotion of their interests. This particular trend, in reference to which we speak advisedly of a managing élite, is closely connected with another development which is both fundamental and detrimental to the role of the State as the principal instrument through which the whole of Society is enabled to come into its own. In assuming this role, the State acts in fact as the managing executive who has to see to it that the political decisions which have been taken will be carried out as adequately as possible by means of technical and administrative measures. This development simply reflects the situation which is bound to emerge as soon as a general consensus exists among the various groups and segments of Society that every single one of them can lay equal claim to the materialization of its aspirations. In other words, it is a situation which is basically a-political in nature, which lacks real areas of tension and struggle between diametrically opposed, ideological alternatives. In a Society which is based on the essential recognition of the claims of all its mem bers, political life is sapped by the absence of clear-cut, fundamen tal issues that are vital to large groups of the population and rouse them to active engagement. In such a Society, there seems to exist no real difference of aim but only of administrative ways and means, and this, in its turn, is very likely to lead to a low degree of public consciousness among the 'common men' who show instead a strong tendency to indulge in minding their own, priv ate business84.
146
THE SOCIETAL STATE
This development is not only manifest in the political realm, but can be observed in other fields as well. Trade-unionism can be mentioned as a case in point. W ith respect to this particular instance it has been pointed out, on the basis of a series of surveys in four countries (the United States of America, Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands), that the percentage of 'completely apathetic' union members, in the sense that they never or hardly ever attend meetings of their organization, averages a little over 50 (i.e. it varies from a minimum of 38 to a maximum of 65) S5. And so far as ’apathy’ in terms of non-membership is concerned, we can refer back to the figures (presented in ch. I I / 1) indicating the weak numerical position of trade unions in the Netherlands: in 1961, the total membership of all unions together comprises no more than 40 per cent of all wage and salary workers, whereas that of the three officially recognized federations comprises only 32 or 33 per cent. To some extent, this striking lack of interest can be character ized as the typical attitude of the 'absentee owner' who sees no need to bother because his fundamental interests are effectively taken care of by the 'managers'. On the other hand, however, there can be no doubt that the said lack is also caused by an increasing incapacity of the rank and file to understand the complex, technical problems involved in the safeguarding of their interests. This is dear from the following conclusion drawn from an "index of subjective political influence" which results from the answers to a number of questions put to 400 inhabitants of a modem residential district of the city of Utrecht (Holland), including both members and non-members of a labour union or political party. This conclusion reads: the tendency to non-affiliation is greatly enhanced by the sense of political aliena tion 8e.
In itself, the above mentioned tendency to mind ones own affairs can be regarded as a positive quality. That is to say, it can be regarded as an indication of a situation in which the public guarantee of the citizens' liberties is effectuated to such an extent that full enjoyment of these liberties in the private sphere is ex perienced as an unmistakable fact. In our opinion, even the slight est chance that such an interpretation is correct (and we see no reason not fo give it the benefit of the doubt) should be seen as a priceless product of the emergence of the Societal State. It ap pears to be the irony of fate, however, that this very product is apt to be threatened by the conditions which are necessarily re quired to ensure the same. The more the satisfaction of individual needs is pursued, the more a demand arises for collective provisions
THE SOCIETAL STATE X-RAYED
147
which imply the inevitable encroachment of the public sphere on the private sphere — with the effect that the individual citizens feel thwarted in their experience of freedom. In one word, this development which in reality relates to the third dangerous trend inherent in the principle of societalization, is of the nature of a true circulus vitiosus. The impact of this vicious circle manifests itself, among other things, in the phenomenon of social and politic al fringe movements of what one might call the 'poujadist' type, which ventilate the baffled feelings of those who consider their individual freedom cornered by the exigencies of collective free dom 87. For illustrative purposes, mention can be made of the names of several of the 'splinter-parties' which have tried their luck at the polls in the Netherlands (where compulsory voting and the system of proportional representation facilitate the rise of this kind of parties) over the last decades, and which have done this on the basis of a mixture of vague political principles and the (subjective and/or objec tive) frustrations of specific problem groups*8: Parties Tradespeople Party Party for Justice, Freedom & Prosperity Farmers Party / Party for Agricultures & Trades Party Economic Appeal Liberal Union / Safe Traffic & 100.000 Houses A Year
1948
1952
0.8 %
0.5 %
1959
1963
0.3 0.7
2.1 0.6 0.3
The names of these parties are significant, and the more so when they are viewed in relation to the following enumeration of negative aspects which, according to a Dutch economist*·, are inherent in the present day Welfare State, viz: (a) the problems caused to the con sumers by the strong monopolistic position of the producers in a per manent sellers' market; (b) housing construction as a sector of partial scarcity, and the difficulties involved in giving it priority over other sectors of the economy; (c) the agricultural question resulting from the fact that purely economic solutions on the basis of the principle of 'survival of the fittest' run counter to the essential Welfare State conception of protection of the weak; (d) the tension between public investments and private spending, leading to lagging provisions, e.g. in the field of road building and the upkeep of properly functioning communication services, which hamper the welfare of the citizens.
148
THE SOCIETAL STATE
In fine, all these immanent tendencies can be summed up by referring to the points made in a social scientist's essay "zur Para doxie der Freiheit"40. Freely translated, these points read as fol lows: (1) Social security weakens individual responsibility, but, at the same time, social security frees us from want; (2) Liberty and equality are incompatible, yet the same applies to liberty and in equality; (3) True freedom is only conceivable under conditions of a minimum of State intervention, but it can only be ensured and maintained by means of an elaborate system of regulations endors ed by the State for the purpose of integrating all sorts of institu tionalized forms of give and take. 2. THE ‘RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY’ AS A CRITERION
Two conclusions can be drawn from our attempt at evaluating the Societal State on the basis of the insights gained in the pre vious analytical chapters. The first conclusion is that in a com munity which is thoroughly exposed to the processes emanating from the French and the Industrial Revolution, the State is bound to become the exponent of the need for social and political in tegration, i.e. to function as the chief agency in which the idea of collective solidarity finds expression. In such a community, the State is societalized, not only in the 'empirical' sense of being the crystallization point of the maximized interests of a fully eman cipated Society, but also in the 'moral sense that, through it, all citizens assume responsibility for one another. The second con clusion is, however, that precisely because of this a variety of trends has emerged, as a result of which essential human rights tremble in the balance. The Societal State, as it stands, does not guarantee the full realization of the basic ideas which underlie its develop ment and for which it appears to have laid indispensable founda tions, viz. the ideas that man is entided to conditions of life that enable him, not only to earn his bread and to obtain justice, but also to possess the greatest possible measure of acting in his proper vocation as a true human person, or, in brief, to experience his attained majority, his ’M ündigkeit'41. Taken together these two conclusions, which are inevitable counterparts, can be considered to warrant the one conclusion which
THE ‘RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY’ AS A CRITERION
149
can be formulated as follows. The Societal State is an important step, but at the same time no more than a step, on the road to a Responsible Society. The Concept Outlined. At the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, meeting in Amsterdam, Holland, in 1948, the concept of a Responsible Society was officially coined, and received its basic definition in the report of Section III, which was entided "The Church and the Disorder of Society” 4I. M A responsible society”, the report states, ”is one where free dom is the freedom of men who acknowledge responsibility to justice and public order, and where those who hold political au thority or economic power are responsible for its exercise to God and the people whose welfare is affected by it”. To this general definition is added concreteness as the report continues: ”Men must never be made a mere means for political or economic ends. Man is not made for the State but the State for man. Man is not made for production, but production for man. For a society to be responsible under modem conditions it is re quired that the people have freedom to control, to criticise and to change their governments, that power be made responsible by law and tradition, and be distributed as widely as possible through the whole community. It is required that economic justice and provis ion of equality of opportunity be established for all the members of society”. And, for that reason, the report explicitly condemns: ”1. Any attempt to . .. impair the freedom of men to obey God and to act according to conscience, for those freedoms are implied in mans responsibility before God; 2. Any denial to man of an opportunity to participate in the shaping of society, for this is a duty implied in man's responsibility towards his neighbour; 3. Any attempt to prevent men from learning and spreading the truth”. Up to the present day this concept, which, thus defined, has become a key concept in ecumenical social thinking, is of great im portance in the interpretation of political, social, and economic issues — not in the last place because it has been conceived of in
150
THE SOCIETAL STATE
principle, and it has been treated in practice, as a dynamic con cept. In principle it has emerged, from the very outset, as an idea relating ethics to the facts of reality. As Walter G. Muelder puts it, who has devoted considerable energy to spell out this relation in several fields43: "This theme is an effort within the ecumenical movement to state norms which are adequate in economics, politics, and social relations both domestically and internationally. Responsible society as a norm is still developing, for it is not a deduction from static principles. Like all social standards it is an emergent out of the matrix of ethical principles and concrete situations".
And the same author concludes: ”As a specific theme it has a history”. If one passes by the early history, i.e. the process of cumul ative studies, conferences, and movements through which the idea has been coming to birth during the decades prior to the basic definition of the Amsterdam Assembly of 1948, the context within which this definition is then placed, as well as the subsequent at tempts at elaborating it and at examining its implications and ap plications, clearly show that the idea of a Responsible Society does not only have a (continued) history in itself but forms also part of the dynamic pattern of developments and settings out of which the (continuing) history of man and his world consists44. In this connection, it should be noted in the first place that the general heading under which the Amsterdam Section III delineates the concept in question is significant. As indicated, this heading is "the Disorder of Society”. This is a specification of the general theme of the Amsterdam Assembly, viz. ”Man s Disorder and God's Design”. In an introduction to this general theme, it is point ed out that " . . . at a moment of peril for all mankind which is without prec edent . . . frustration and fear grip the minds of men and women. This is true not only of the masses who feel themselves caught in a fate over which they have no power, but hardly less of their leaders who hold in dieir hands the guidance of events which they are unable to control. At this fateful m om ent. . . Man's Disorder is inescapably manifest in every aspect of the world's life to-day. It is not merely a result of the recent war. Before the war, the sickness of civilisation was far advanced. The disappearance of common standards, the denial of
THE Έ Ε β Ρ Ο ^ ΙΒ Ι,Ε SOCIETY' AS A CRITERION
151
a law of God above the wills of men and states, the disintegration of family life, the dissolution of community, loss of faith save the false faith in human wisdom and goodness, emptiness and meaninglessness in the souls of men — these symptoms of sickness were clear enough· At almost every point, war and its aftermath have aggravated Man's Disorder. And now has been added the greatest dread of all, that man’s mastery of atomic energy foreshadows the annihilation of man and all his works” 45.
In other words, the theme of Man's Disorder focuses the attention on a situation of unparallelled crisis — a crisis which is painted in glaring, but at the same time rather 'generalizing colours that have as dominant elements the loss of political and economic, social, and moral orientation which has found climactic expression in the closely related disasters of the Great Depression and the World Wars. And it is in deeply concerned reaction to this that, in par ticular, the batde cry for a Responsible Society is raised. It is a batde cry against the ideology and practice of 'laissez faire' Cap italism (and such utterly aberrant offshoots of Western civilization as man-debasing Nazism and Fascism), as well as against that of totalitarian Communism, and for a world to be rebuilt on the foundations of righteousness and justice, of freedom and the limitation of powers which dehumanize and depersonalize both those in authority and those who are called the "little men in big societies". As history moves on, however, and it does so quickly these days, there is a growing awareness that, in relating ethics to the facts of reality, specifics rather than generalities should be taken into account. Thus, when the Second Assembly of the World Coun cil of Churches convenes in Evanston, Illinois, in 1954, two notable differences are reflected in the report of the Section dealing with this special topic. The first difference is apparent from the title of the Section report, which reads : "Social Questions — The Res ponsible Society in a World Perspective". That is to say, the emphasis has been shifted from a concern with problems which are primarily viewed within a context centred in the Western world (if not in Europe), to one with problems which are understood to be of a world-wide scope. Consequendy, one deals not so much with Capitalism and Communism for which the development of a positive third alternative is urged, but rather one makes a dis tinction between the interdependent questions (a) at issue in the
152
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Western Welfare States which have been established meanwhile; (b) those in the conflict between Communists and Non-Commun ists affecting the life of nearly every nation in the world, and (c) those at issue among the newly emerging peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America who press for rapid changes in their political, economic, and social conditions. And the second difference is that the Evanston report concentrates not only on the regulation but al so on the substance of a society which is truly based on freedom and justice. It is realized that powers should not merely be control led, but that they can be of crucial importance in the building of new orders to secure the object in view, whereas, on the other hand stress is laid on the necessity to create small groups, as well as large groups, in which free personal relations can be exercised, and through which people can actively influence the conditions which affect their lives. "True justice is dynamic and its forms must vary to meet changing needs”, it is stated with a view to any form of government, political system, or economic organization. ”Jusitice involves the continuous effort to overcome those economic disadvantages which are a grievous human burden and which are incompatible with equal opportunity for people to develop their capacities. Justice requires the develop ment of political institutions which are humane as they touch the lives of people, which provide protection by law against the arbitrary use of power, and which encourage responsible participation by all citizens”. And considering new trends and new problems, in economic life in particular, it is pointed out ”that disputes about ’capitalism’ and ’socialism’ disguise die more important issues in the field of economic and social policy. Each word is applied to many different social forms and economic systems. It is not the case that we have merely a choice between two easily distinguishable types of economic organization. Private enterprise takes many shapes in different countries at differ ent stages and in different parts of one economy and is profoundly affected by the forms of government regulation. The operations of the state in business also take various form s. . . In all types of economy there is to be found a variety of forms; there is no one pattern that is universally valid. . . The concrete issues in all countries concern the newly-evolving forms of economic organization, and the relative roles of the state, organized groups and private enterprises” 46.
In the years after Evanston the need for increased concrete ness underlies the launching of a project to study 'areas of rapid
THE RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY* AS A CRITERION
153
social change’4\ and it is not in the last place against the back ground of this study that the discussion of the meaning and the applications of a Responsible Society shows a marked trend to wards what can perhaps best be characterized as a pragmatic approach. The Responsible Society is viewed as ”a standard to guide us in the specific choices we have to make” (Evanston re port) in all the particular situations which constitute the present day ’’one world” of both highly industrialized and economically and socially underdeveloped nations, either of which are, however, involved in a complexity of converging political and technological revolutions. As a result, the Third Assembly of the World Council, meeting in New Delhi, India, in 1961, is extremely reticent on the passing of abstract judgments, and emphatically draws attention to the existence of many different systems, expressing different at tempts at serving the urgent social and economic needs, and re flecting different experiments to develop patterns of political life which correspond to the stage of political maturity. And here, in these different situations, the Christians are encouraged to be ac tive in public life, in solidarity with their fellow-men, and to use the opportunities that may exist to work for institutions which enable participation by all citizens, and which contribute to both a man’s freedom and his human dignity. ”We live in a highly dynamic situation with many quite different nat ional experiments. ( . . . ) Some of these systems are more authoritarian than those whose outlook has been moulded by the western tradition of democracy would find acceptable for themselves. Yet the difficulty of maintaining order, of avoiding civil strife, of establishing govern ments strong enough to deal with the desperate need for economic development, may call for new forms of political life. Recognition of the limitations under which Christians must live and work in many nations does not mean that one form of government is as good as another, that Christians can be indifferent to the nature of political institutions. It is possible for a Christian to live (or die) with integrity under any political system.. . But some political struc tures are more favourable than others for the development of res ponsible citizens. The Church cannot identify itself with any particular economic, social or political system. However, both because of the opportunities afforded by political action for the improvement of conditions and be cause of many forms of evil and suffering which result from the
154
THE SOCIETAL STATE
misuse of political power, the Church should encourage the individual Christian to be active in the public life of his country. This is a form of loving service to the neighbour in solidarity with the life of the nation’ 48.
Precisely this call for solidarity, however, and the encouragement to judge critically the opportunities for active participation in en visaging a Responsible Society, makes it increasingly imperative to find out what one means by that, in different situations and under different conditions. Even more important than the statements made by the New Delhi Assembly, is, therefore, in our opinion, the authorization by this very Assembly of a study project under the direction of the W orld Council Department on Church and Society, concerning the many questions involved in (1) ”the change from traditional to dynamic societies”, (2) the ’problems of modem industrial societies”, and (3) the ’’racial and ethnic tensions in a changing world community”. A few of the questions with which this study is required to deal, and which are particularly relevant to our subject, read as follows : — ’’Economic development is for the sake of freedom (from hunger, from helpless dependence on other men). W here is freedom located in large scale complex economic organization and social planning (socialist or in the various forms it may take under capitalism, and in mixed economies)?” — ”The Welfare State at various stages of development and in various forms is a feature of our times. It has its origin partly in reaction to the failures of earlier capitalism, partly in modem abundance, partly in socialist theory, partly in the Christian tradition of love for the neighbour. W hat ethos is the W elfare State developing? Is there any danger in too much security? Are there special problems for moral personality arising in the most advanced Welfare States? Does the Welfare State require moral resources not available in actual Wel fare States? ( . . . ) W hat kind of educational provision both popular and at higher levels is required?” — ”T he Dynamic Economy is controlled by the economic motive and the autonomous energies of science and technology. ’Maximum pro duction and maximum consumption’ is its principle. This results in disturbance to the pattern of life in industry, trade and all economic functions and those engaged in them. T he stimulation of consumer demand gives rise to intensive mass advertising and salesmanship related to economic interest rather than moral purpose. What are the results in distorting ethical values, imposing artificial burdens on per sons and stresses in their relationship?”
THE «RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY« AS A CRITERION
155
The Concept Applied. The answers to these questions are not yet clear, and it can be doubted whether there will ever be definite answers. Relating ethics to the realities of the dynamics of modem history is a never-ending challenge to man as a critical being, in the fullest sense of that term. It is the challenge which, by res ponding to it, makes him what he is intended to be, viz. (as stated in the Amsterdam report) 'created and called to be a free being, responsible to God and his neighbour”. In due consideration of all this, it is yet fair to say that some insights have been gained in the course of the 'responding process' over the last decades, insights which stand out as basic elements of "a criterion by which we judge all existing social orders” (Evanston). These insights are: (1) A Responsible Society is a society where men are free-in-com munity. It is a society in which truly individual self-determination and self-development are realized in reciprocity, and in which a man s freedom is expressed through his accountability to his fellowmen for the proper use of it, i.e. the use of it in the interest of their freedom as well. And, for that reason, it is a society where freedom is not only a matter of coming into one's own individually but of all persons coming into their own institutionally. Which is to say that, on the one hand, no person in such a society can exper ience real freedom without taking into account the structural re quirements to ensure this very experience for all others; but that, on the other hand, none of these structural forms can serve its purpose without being constandy measured by the standard of its sole raison d'être', viz. to secure full human developmentM. (2) A Responsible Society is a society which is based on the prin ciple of partnership. It is a society where self-determination is understood, and practised, as co-determination. It is a society in which freedom-in-community, freedom as an act of solidarity with, and as an experience of responsibility to and for one another, is carried into effect by the devising of adequate methods through which the members of the community are enabled and qualified to participate meaningfully and decisively in the shaping of the conditions which are requisite for the actualization of this end. It is a society which develops "Konventionen. . . , durch welche die Glieder der Gesellschaft zur Realisierung mitmenschlicher Verantwortung erzogen werden, mit de-
156
THE SOCIETAL STATE
ren Hilfe sie lemen, sich selbst und die anderen als aktive Teilhaber und mitbestimmende Träger des Institutionen zu verstehen” 81.
When one applies these two basic elements of the truly critical, ethical concept of the Responsible Society to the empirical fact of the Societal State, the first conclusion which seems fully warrant ed is that the Societal State represents undoubtedly an important step on the road to a Responsible Society. (Cf. for definitions of the Societal State pp. 17 and 132, and of a Responsible Society p. 149.) The elements of partnership and freedom-in-community find expression in no small measure in the industrialized democ racies of the present day Western world where, as has been in dicated, the State is the exponent of the principle of solidarity put into collective practice. The Societal State reflects the conditions prevailing in a community the members of which acknowledge their mutual responsibilities for the effectuation of their respective claims through the creation of a network of institutions which are integrated by the supreme administrating agency, to wit: the 'ad ministrative State. As a matter of course, when we say this it does by no means imply that the Societal State can be interpreted as something which permits equation, however roughly, to be "an emergent out of the matrix of ethical principles and concrete situations" (as reads Walter G. Muelder's characterization of the Responsible Society as a dynamic norm). The Societal State is certainly not such a thing, not even by approximation. Here should be repeated with great emphasis what has been stressed before: while reflecting the said conditions, the Societal State is not indicative of the more or less successful development of a normative moral concept, i.e. that of solidarity, imposed from-on-high, but it is merely evincive of the combined effects of the utterly 'down-to-earth' forces and mot ives which, emanating from the entirely man-made (and, there fore, highly ambiguous) French and Industrial Revolutions, have inevitably led to a situation of complete interdependence of human aspirations. In brief, the Societal State simply reflects the "collec tive morality" (J. H. Oldham) in which 20th century industrial and democratic man finds himself in logical consequence of the powers he has released.
THE ‘RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY' AS A CRITERION
157
Yet it is just this collective morality which, due to its fun damental requirements for survival, strongly tends to turn the So cietal State into a formidable stumbling-block on the road to a Responsible Society. For it is on account of this collective morality, as an empirical emergence out of the matrix of concrete human acts to satisfy concrete human needs, that: "the growth of organization has for immense numbers of people greatly restricted the sphere in wich they are free to take indep endent responsible decisions. The nature of the acts which they daily perform is determined by conditions beyond their control and where, as members of a party, a trade union or an employers' as sociation, they have a partial, or at least nominal, responsibility, the power of an individual to influence the collective decision may often seem negligible". And thus, it seems, "a point has been reached in human develop ment when the reality of the individual person no longer resides in himself. It is the socialised man who is the contemporary reality. The individual person of traditional religious and liberal-political thinking has become largely an illusion. Willy-nilly the socialised man, which each one of us in greater or less degree is to-day, does what society as a whole does. H e may as an individual think what he pleases; he may say at least a good deal of what is contrary to the ideas pre vailing in society; but in the realm of action he is compelled to a large extent to do what society as a whole does” “ .
And what is more, it will not be an easy task to remove this stumbling-block, or even to turn it into a stepping stone (to use the pithy formula of the great ecumenical pioneer, John R. Mott). For that is clearly a task of Sisyphean dimensions. In support of this, we may point to the two inherent paradoxes which accompany the Societal State, (a) Precisely because the Societal State represents an order of things which, from the point of view of the Responsible Society, possesses considerable, positive qualities, it is confronted with a number of immanent developments which gready endanger these very qualities, (b) And any attempt to abate the developments in question might very well result in an enhancement of the crucial dilemma in which the Societal State has been caught, especially when viewed in the perspective of the Responsible Society. Nevertheless, any such attempt should be undertaken; and, thus, the following considerations about the task which lies ahead are presented.
THE SOCIETAL STATE
158
(1) The first thing which seems to be necessary, if further progress is to be made on the road to a Responsible Society, is that the claim to human self-determination will not only be recog nized in the form of institutional guarantees but that it will also become manifest in the substantial sense of being capable of knowing the facts and of weighing the alternatives, individually and independently. Real self-determination means the exercise of one's critical powers, on the basis of sufficient information and relevant insights in the discernment of what is actually at stake, and the ability to take decisions. Such substantial self-determina tion is the best safeguard against paternalisms of any kind, either old or new, and it proves at the same time to be instrumental in countering the trend towards alienation and non-participation. This last point can be illustrated with the help of the following diagram which has been taken, with some minor terminological adaptations, from an empirical study about "the use of political resources”58: Citizens with: adequate resources
inadequate resources there-
participate in politics
have polit, confidence
fore
\
// te\ \
fail to participate
lack polit, confidence
fore
In other words, it is imperative that the Societal State does not only take care of the need for socio-economic security and polit ical representation, but that it concentrates at least as much at tention on an all-out strategy to train he masses of individuals in the development and use of their critical capacities, and to pro vide them with the indispensable resources for it. This implies the elaboration of a well-equipped and, above all, creatively inspired programme aimed at the cultivation of what can jusdy be called the art of responsibility, that is the art of taking into account the consequences of one's own actions (or non-actions) in due consid-
THE ‘RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY* AS A CRITERION
159
eration of those of others — an art which must be learned and applied in the private as well as in the public sphere, at the lowest level no less than in the higher ranks of the expert mediators and the top administrators. (2) It is obvious that the immediate counterpart of this urgent need to stimulate the independence of mind and to encourage critical responsiveness is the equally urgent need for structural op portunities to bring about this independence and responsiveness. It is not enough to train and educate the individual citizens to act responsibly. At the same time, the community as a whole should be (re-)constructed in such a manner that its members are enabled to operate in a setting through which they can experience their responsibility, and in which they can live up to the test that they are accountable for their acts. For, as has rightly been pointed out, responsibility is not only a matter of intention but also of context u . And for this very reason, the Societal State, which abounds in a multitude of highly complex service institutions and exceedingly intricate coordinative procedures, must be reconstructed to such an effect that the principle of self-determination can be translated effectively from a lofty but frustrating abstraction into a concrete reality of actually practised co-determination. On this basis only, i.e. on the basis of organizations cut down to the size of units that permit active, personal involvement in the shaping of the decisions and policies which concern the interests of one and all — only on such a basis can a similar circular development like the one which has been mentioned above be set in motion. Just as participation and confidence appear to reinforce one another, so it is evident that a circularity of the following, schematically presented nature is likely to develop : “ Citizens showing: a high score on action index
fore
a low score on action index
fore
160
THE SOCIETAL STATE
(3) The odds are, however, that in acting on the requirements briefly outlined in the two foregoing points, the problems which weigh upon the Societal State will not be eased, let alone solved, but rather that they will be aggravated, or, at any rate, assume new dimensions. In a very specific way this can be illustrated with the help of the following quotations from a report on a recent project of community organization in the city of Syracuse (in New York State), and which has led to a controversy with the official welfare agencies5·. The project in question is carried out on the basis of the principle written into the Office of Economic Opportunity legislation57, viz. that "maximum feasible participa tion" of the poor is necessary to ensure that they are not passive recipients but active combatants, and it is patterned on the "progress-through-power" techniques that have been developed by the Chicago sociologist Saul D. Alinsky. This project is described by its local director "as nothing more than encouragement and guidance toward do-ityourself democracy. ( . . . ) 'W e want to help the neighborhoods develop strong democratic organizations with as wide a base as possible that will achieve an additional level of power — enough power to enable those individuals excluded from the community to enter it. The poor are outsiders; the problem is, How can they enter the community? If you just give them services, it doesn't pull them in. The failure of past welfare programs proves that'. T he poor can enter the main stream of the community 'only in a process where people are in charge of their own lives'".
The city's established social welfare agencies, however, hold that such a social-action approach is very likely to have a potential for promoting civic strife. This opinion finds expression in the follow ing words of one of the representatives of these agencies: "I thoroughly distrust any program that identifies two distinct classes of society. In this case, the 'poor' and the 'affluent'. This social-action program follows all of the old patterns of class distinction and hate, so easily identified with Marxism. T he obvious cleavage away from the established resources of social welfare and charity in our com munity by the action group only makes the identity of the classes more distinct. If ever the circumstances that create hostility among these occur, we then have a situation that — by the grace of God has never happened in our city".
THE ‘RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY* AS A CRITERION
161
In addition to this particular instance, we can refer to the French sociologist Georges Gurvitch who, in a more general man ner, calls attention to the fact that the very attempt to activate and stimulate ”la liberté créatrice” may well result in a situation of increased tension and struggle between an ever growing num ber of groups who bring their criticisms and pressures to bear on one another and on society as a whole. Consequently, this situation will call even more urgently for a complex system of checks and balances, and for the services of an administrative, managing elite; and, as a result, "les participants collectifs et individuels se demandent avec inquiétude s’ils ne vont pas jouer la rôle d’apprentis sorciers et si, au terme de tant efforts et de sacrifices pour promouvoir la liberté-création à la tête du déterminisme sociologique, la liberté humaine ne va pas être plus que jamais à l’impuissance dans l’engranage des structures sociales que'elle se propose de dominer"58.
Yet, if that is the challenge — and the present author believes that that is the challenge which emerges from the confrontation of the Societal State with the Responsible Society; if such is the challenge, there is no choice but to respond to it. To respond to it in the conviction which, according to tradition, has been ex pressed, and, at any rate, has been lived up to by William the Silent, prince of Orange, and father of the Dutch nation as a refuge (however incomplete) of liberty: N est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, Ni de réussir pour persévérer.
A P P E N D IC E S
NOTES*
INTRODUCTION: THESIS - ANTITHESIS - SYNTHESIS
1 Dewey (1934), p. 49, 50 2 This eyewitness report is cited by Hanotaux (1924), pp. 280—281. Cf. also Lavisse & Rambaud (1924), pp. 36—37 3 For the transition from Absolutism to Liberalism, as outlined in a nutshell in this section, see: Banning (1957), Part 2, chs I-II, Part 3, ch. I; Bouman (1948), chs I-VI; Cassirer (1955), chs Χ-ΧΠΙ; Laski (1948); MacIver (1953), chs III-V, VIII; Mannheim (1951), chs I and V; Ruggiero (1948) and (1959), Introduction; Stark (1952), pp. 8f, 22f; Tempel (1962), chs I I /7 and ΠΙ/1 4 The reason why these particular words, which in actual fact are just a small part of a statement made by W ilson in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in 1952, have drawn so much attention is that they apparently have been understood as a 'freudian' slip of the tongue.
* The figures in brackets, e.g. (1934), after the author's name refer to the year of publication of the cited title in question. For full titles see Bibliography. In the notes, authors' names are presented as follows: e.g., A. van Braam as Braam, P. de Bruin as Bruin, T . P. van der Kooy as Kooy. This is done for the sake of brevity, and in order to facilitate reference to such names in the Bibliography, where they are listed in the manner which is common practice in Dutch, German, and other non-Anglosaxon bibliogra phies, viz. A. van Braam as: Braam, A. van; P. de Bruin as: Bruin, P. de; T. P. van der Kooy as: Kooy, T . P. van der.
165
NOTES
In reply to the question: ”If a situation did arise where you had to make a decision extremely adverse. . . to the company in the interest of the United States Government, could you make that decision?,” Wilson says: "Yes sir, I could. I cannot conceive of one because for years I thought what is good for the country is good for General Motors, and what is good for General Motors is good for the country”. For checking W ilson’s statement in the official records (Library of Con gress, 1952), I am indebted to Mrs. Sarah Blair Winter, Chicago, 111. Furthermore, I am indebted to Mr. J. A. Mommersteeg, of Keesings His torisch Archief, Amsterdam, for his kind efforts to find out the details of this Wilson affair as presented in the N e w York Times, Sept 27, 1961 5 Cf. Romein (1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 ), p. X. 6 According to Von Stein himself, his study — the first edition of which is published in 1850 — is ”der erste Versuch, den Begriff der Gesell schaft als einen selbständigen hinzustellen und seinen Inhalt zu entwickeln”. Stein (1855), p. VII. See on this question also: Geiger (1931), pp. 203—204; Heller (1931), p. 609; Maclver (1948), pp. 2 3 5 -2 3 6 ; Maus (1955-1956), pp. 1 6 -1 7 . For a more detailed discussion of State and Society as objects of sociological study, cf. Kraemer & Tombe (1964), wbo point out (p. 117) that the term ’Society’ has been in use already since about 1700, in the general, philosophical sense of gesittete M enschheit, i.e. the community of men who live their lives within the context of a set pattern of moral values, manners, and customs. 7 Stein (1855), pp. Ill, XXVHIf, XLVUI-L, LXX. On this last page, Von Stein states in short: ’’Der Staat hat keine wirkliche Existenz auszer der Gesellschaft”. 8 Finer (1949), pp. 39 and 38 9 Abrecht (1961), pp. 1 4 5 -1 4 7 10 Bouman (1948), pp. 21—3 1 ,6 1 —85; Heckscher (1948); Mannheim (1951), p p . 1 0 9 -1 1 0 11 On the uniqueness of the Dutch situation in the 17th and 18th century, very explicidy: Bouman (1949), pp. 79, 87. W ith respect to the mer cantilist frame of mind, on the other hand: Bouman (1948), chs XVI-XX; Heckscher (1948); Kooy (1931), chs II-IV; and also Tempel (1962), ch. I I I /1, who distinguishes — in the period 1575—1750 — absolutist-mercantilist, oligarchic-mercantilist, and early capitalist systems, resp. in France, Eng land, and Holland. For King W illem I of the Netherlands (1813—1840), see the study of Brugmans (1950), pp. 38—50, on: Koning W illem I als Neo-Mercantilist. To this subject we return later on (ch. 1 /2 of the present study).
12 13 14 15
See e.g. Barth (1958), Einleitung Finer (1949), p. 43 Esveld (1946), pp. 16—17 James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (London
THE SOCIETAL STATE
166
1873); David George Ritchie, T h e Principles of State Interference (London 1891). For a summary of the main arguments of both authors in their criticism of resp. John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, see Finer (1949), pp. 49f. 16 In formulating this paragraph we have based ourselves in par ticular on newspaper reports of public statements and speeches of politic ians during the early-1959 election campaign in the Netherlands. This campaign is of special interest as it follows the significant event of Decem ber 1958, when, for the first time since the end of World War II, the Labour Party is forced to go into opposition, and, consequently, the question to be decided upon at the polls is, whether this party will be returned to power or not (or, as many non-Socialist spokesmen tend to put it, expliddy or impliddy: whether State intervention will be checked or extended). A summary of the main issues of this campaign can be found in the weekly Hervormd Nederland, February 21, 1959, in which prominent mem bers of Parliament are interviewed. It is not only in the Netherlands, however, that this interminable debate pro or contra State interference can be observed. See esp. Myrdal (1960), ch. 1, who speaks of a "protracted public debate" concerning "a stale and confused controversy" which "has always been unrealistic and is becoming ever more so". 17 The first one who (in the Netherlands) seems to have used this term 'osmosis*, is Poelje (1931). 18 Mannheim (1951), pp. 42—44. T o these quotations innumerable other ones can be added, all being variations on the same central theme of the inextricable intertwinement of State and Society today. Since it is simply impossible to supply a complete, or even approximately complete, list of tides from which such quotations might be taken (just think of the vast literature on Planning, an indication par excellence of the State-Society osmosis), it may suffice to mention only a rather haphazardly selected number of writers. So, one can refer to: Banning (1955—1958), Burdeau (1956), Dahl & Lindblom (1953), Galbraith (1957), Ginsberg (1959), Hans· meyer (1957), Mannheim (1948), Myrdal (1960), Valkhoff (1948) and (1961).
19 W C C (1 9 5 5 ), p p . 4 8 - 4 9 20 In addition to the authors
listed in note 18, mention may be made of a few others, whose contributions cannot but lead to the conclusion that the 'Welfare State' trend is common to all modem Western democ racies: Bremme (1961), Briggs, Boettcher, Reynaud, and Marshal (1961); Donner (1957); Ponsioen, Veld (1962); Schaper (1963). With regard to the situation in the Netherlands, in comparison with that in neighbouring countries, see esp. Schmelzer (1962), pp. 660f, and also Rooij (1959), pp. 365—366. Furthermore, for general information on the present day socio-economic structure of the Netherlands: NGIS (1958) and (1963) 21 Donner (1957), p. 558 22 Cf. resp. SCOR (1953), and P. M. Hall, T h e Social Services of
NOTES
167
Modem England (London 1952), who is dted by Donner (1957), p. 553. Very near to our conception of the Societal State comes Thoenes’ view with respect to the Welfare State. "Although called a state, it is more", as he points out: "it is also a societal form with specific economic, social and political institutions". Thoenes (1962), pp. 124—125, 240, and 253, note 2. As to the above mentioned synonyms for the Welfare State, it will be clear that these are not of a completely exact nature. So, Briggs (1961), p. 228, ic of the opinion that a distinction should be made between the Social Service State, already emerging before World War II, and the W el fare State which h&» developed after 1945 and goes beyond the former. The Social Service State is described as "a state in which communal resources are employed to abate poverty and to assist those in distress", whereas the Welfare State "brings in the idea of the optimum’ rather than the older idea of the 'minimum'. It is concerned not merely with abate ment of class differences or the needs of scheduled groups but with equal ity of treatment and the aspirations of citizens as voters with equal share? of electoral power". 23 Pound (1952), p. 213 24 Laski (1948), p. 122 25 Von Justi’s definition, as translated by A. W . Small, The Caw eralists (Chicago 1909), is quoted by Finer (1932), vol. I, p. 67, note 3 The French author is cited by Banning (1957), p. 56 26 On similarities, as well as essential differences, see also Briggs (1961), pp. 241f. 27 In a section entided U n fait nouveau, Burdeau (1956), pp. 22,23, makes clear that "La puissance qui compte désormais c'est celle du peuple réel. ( . . . ) Par sa généralité et l’étendue de ses conséquences, l'apparition, sur la scène politique, du peuple réel comme source légitime du pouvoir et instrument de son exercice, constitue sans aucun doute le phénomène historique le plus important qui se soit accompli depuis deux siècles". 28 On emanidpation — the process of wich "is in the last resort the supersession of authority by autonomy" — cf. esp. Domer (1908—1926) 29 Mannheim (1951), p. 44, quoting G. Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York 1939), which is a translation of Elementi di Scientia Politiba (Rome 1895) 30 Burdeau 1956, pp. 25, 26. He says, furthermore: "La vie politi que n’est plus seulement constituée par le fonctionnement des techniques destinées à régir le social; elle est l’expression de la manière selon laquelle vit la société elle-même. Π n'y a plus, à proprement parler, superposition d'une activité politique à un donné social qui la déterminerait; il y a extériorisation sous des formes — dont la spécificité ancienne tend d’ailleurs à s’atténuer — de l'être collectif devenu, tout à la fois, l'objet et le moteur de la vie politique" (p. 26). 31 Heller (1931), p. 610. See also Doom & Lammers (1959), pp. 20, 202-203, and König (1958), pp. 96f, 147f. 32 Mannheim (1951), p. 111
168
THE SOCIETAL STATE
CHAPTER I: FROM FREE SOCIETY TO SOCIETAL STATE (1)
1 2
Röpke (1942), p. 78 For more or less detailed reports on this episode, see Banning (1960), p. 41 ; Mehring ( 1918), pp. 182—187; Nicolaievsky & Maenchen-Helfen (1936), chs XIII-XIV. 3 For the sake of fairness, it should, of course, not be omitted that Marx is neither the only, nor the first, one to point out the fun· damental importance of socio-economic conditions. Once more, mention can be made of Lorenz von Stein who has developed ”the beginnings of an economic and class interpretation of history" (under the influence of the doctrines of, amongst others, Saint Simon), to the effect "that industry was the real force of the modem age and that modem history represented a struggle between feudal and industrial economic systems" — as it is put by Salomon (1948). Even before Marx starts his journalistic activities on behalf of the Rheinische Zeitung in 1842—43, as a result of which he begins to realize the preponderance of material interests in social problems, Von Stein foresees a new revolution in the making in France — not just political in nature, but social. And as he finds this prediction corroborated by the facts of 1848 he publishes a revised edition of his earlier study, Der Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs (1st ed., Leip zig 1842), now entitled Der Begriff der Gesellschaft und die Sociale Ge schichte der französischen Revolution bis zum Jahre 1830 (1st. ed., Leipzig 1850), and including a lengthy introductory chapter, Der Begriff der Gesell schaft und die Gesetze ihrer Bewegung. Yet, it is Marx whose ideas, unlike those of Von Stein or others, have become influential. The main reason for this is, as is widely accepted, that his theories are a rare combination of ’science* and ’prophecy*, ol ’faith’ and of ’knowledge’, well suited to the needs of the masses and the thoughts of the intelligentsia of his days. Schumpeter (1950), p. 6, says e.g.: " . . . preaching in the garb of analysis and analyzing with a view to heartfelt needs, this is what conquered passionate allegiance and gave to the Marxist that supreme boon which consists in the conviction that what one is and stands for can never be defeated but must conquer victoriously in the end". 4 Pouthas (1948), pp. 1—2. On 1848, see also: Postgate (1955); Ruggiero (1959), Part I, chs II-IV; Talmon (1960); Ijzerman (1948), ch. I 5 Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England (London 1884). On both revolutions in general, and on their high degree of interdepen dence, as well as on the two phases we distinguish in their development, one may consult: Banning (1955—1958), vol. I, ch. I; vol. II, chs Ι-ΠΙ; Banning (1959), esp. chs II-V; Barnes (1946), chs 1—3; Boulding(1953), Parts I-Π; Bouman (1948), chs VI-XI; Brinton (1948); Finer (1949), ch. Ill; Gal braith (1957), chs II-IV, IX-X; Heaton (1948); Mannheim (1948), Introduc tion and Part I; Mannheim (1951), Parts I-II; Myrdal (1960), Part I; Röpke
NOTES
169
(1942), Part I, ch. I; Ruggiero (1948), and (1959), Introduction and Part II; Seidel (1955). 6 Brinton (1948), pp. 125, 127 7 As to the actual break-through of industrialism in France and Germany, see: Beckerath (1930); Clapham (1936); Pouthas (1948) 8 For the resp. quotations: Ijzerman (1948), p. 30; Pouthas (1948), p. 5; Ruggiero (1959), p. 193. (The italics are mine, K.) 9 Ruggiero (1959), pp. 191—192 10 Talmon ( 1960), p. 22. This appreciation of collective forces —which leads to a greater awareness of historical factors, and, in the case of what Talmon calls the political Messianists, eventuates in ’’the profound faith that the march of T im e is tantamount to an ever-growing integration and cohesion of human and social contents, which in turn make possible an ever higher measure of individual self-expression through the activization of all the forces of man within a harmonious whole”; this apprecia tion of collective forces is typical of both the ’nationalist’ and the ’so cialist’ branches of early 19th century Messianism. The only difference is that in the one case "the vehicle of regeneration” is the nation, in the other the proletanan society. Talmon (1960), pp. 25, 29—30.
11 12
Talmon (1960), pp. 2 7 -2 8 Cf. Pouthas (1948), p. 604, who is very explicit on this point. 13 Talmon (1960), pp. 26—27, 365—366. T he importance of the fact that in the mid- 19th century the overwhelming majority of the urban and industrial proletariat is of rural and agricultural descent can be illustrated, e.g., by the point Ijzerman stresses: a good many of the demands and ideals of the beginning labour movement are, in essence, of a ’reactionary' nature, because they reflect the longing for a return to the conditions of the former pre-urban and pre-industrial environment (which, not seldom, is more romanticized and idealized as the situation in the cities and factories grows worse). Ijzerman (1948), pp. 32—33, 51, 64. See also Clapham (1936), sections 68 and 79. 14 Clapham (1936), pp. 2 6 7 -2 6 8 15 Talmon (1960), p. 512 16 Geyl (1960). See also Briggs (1961), p. 240 17 Romein (1955—1958), p. xi 18 T o all probability these words are apocryphal; none of the Heine experts consulted by prof. J. Presser, of Amsterdam University, to whom we are indebted for his kind help in this matter, are willing to guarantee the authenticity of this saying. Yet, however apocryphal this saying may be, it is of the same tenor as the following words in which Heine clearly expresses his rather low opinion of the Low Countries. ”In der Sprache der Düsseldorfer”, says he, who has been bom in this town, and whose mother is of Dutch descent, ’’merkt man schon einen Übergang in das Froschgequäke der holländischen Sümpfe. ( . . . ) Es mag sogar wahr sein, dasz unsere eigene deutsche Sprache, wie patriotische Linguisten in den Niederlanden behauptet haben, nur ein verdorbenes Holländisch sei. Es
170
THE SOCIETAL STATE
ist möglich. Dieses erinnert mich an die Behauptung eines kosmopoliti schen Zoologen, welcher den Affen für den Ahnherrn des Menschen geschlechts erklärt. . Memoiren, Heinrich Heine's Sämtliche Werke, Band V, p. 295 (Hamburger Originalausgabe, Hamburg/Berlin). 19 For the sake of clarity, it may be stressed that in using, alter nately, the terms Holland and the Netherlands, we refer to the 11 provin ces that together form the territory of the present Kingdom of the Nether lands. In oher words, these terms do not include Belgium. This country will, if necessary, be named exphddy, even when we are dealing with the period 1815—1839 during which it constitutes a part (though from 1830 to 1839 only formally) of the U nited Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the state framed by the Congress of Vienna, and headed by King Willem I, is called. 20 Brugmans (1955—1958); Oud (1954), ch. I; Postgate (1956), pp. 48f, 98f, 244f; Verbeme (1958), vol. II, ch. IV /ii; Ijzerman (1948), pp. 9f, 4 5 -4 6 21 Romein (1937), pp. 9—64: D e dialektiek van de vooruitgang, esp. p. 29 22 Bosch Kemper (1882), pp. 2 3 If, 237f; Rogier (1958), pp. 32, 43; Verbeme (1958), vol. II, pp. 160, 166; Romein (1949), pp. 487-488, 532 23 For social unrest in the 1840's in Holland, cf. Bosch Kemper (1882), pp. 88, 126-127, 2 4 3 -2 4 5 , 2 7 0 -2 7 3 , 3 8 1 -3 8 2 24 On this difference, see, e.g., Talmon (1960), pp. 26—27 25 Postgate (1956), pp. 100—104; Romein (1949), p. 490; Verbeme (1958), vol. II, pp. 159, 165—166; Ijzerman (1948), pp. 12 and 45, note 1 26 Brugmans (1958), ch. V; Hoefnagels (1957), ch. I. An interesting study on the social question, from the Roman Catholic 'solidarist' point of view, is that of Bruin (1956), esp. chs V and VI 27 Bosch Kemper (1851) Tabel No. 1; Roland Holst (1932), ch. IV; Verbeme (1958), vol. I. ch. Il/iv; Verbeme (1959), ch. II 28 The estimation of 10 per cent for the years after 1816 is a minimum, indeed, for it is based on the numbers of 'outdoor paupers' and 'parish poor' only, and does not include the persons in charitable institutions, workhouses, etc. Roland Holst (1932), p. 113 29 SSJ-1850, p . 338
30
S S J-1 8 5 0 , p p . 2 7 8 - 2 7 9
31 Bouman (1949) (a); Brugmans (1950), pp. 38—50: Koning W illem I als Neo-Mercantilist; Kooy (1931), chs III-VII; Verbeme (1958), vol. I, ch. Π/i. 32 For Holland: SSJ-1855, p. 69, and SJK-1863, vol. II, p. 310. For Belgium: Houtte (1955-1958), p. 203 33 For Holland: Jonckers Nieboer (1938), Appendix J. For Belgium: Houtte (1955-1958), p. 228; Jonckers Nieboer (1938), p. 41; SSJ-1850, p. 323. 34 35
The latter point is stressed, e.g., by Klompmaker (1955), p. 21 Brugmans (195 5 -1 9 5 8 ) (a), and (1958), esp. pp. 51-52, 66f,
NOTES
171
85-88; Verbeme (1958), vol. I, pp. 141f, 171f, 181f. 36 Brugmans (1955—1958) (a), pp. 269f.; Brugmans (1961), esp. ch. IU/ii; Verbeme (1957), vol. I, pp. 83f.; Verbeme (1958), vol. II, pp. 146f. 37 Cf. Banning (1948), pp. 38f.; Bouman (1949) (a), pp. 502f.; Brugmans (1955—1958) (a), pp. 266f, 273f.; Brugmans (1961), pp. 227f, 236f, 260f; Goedmakers (1955), pp. 82f.; Oud (1954), pp. 59—60, 103— 104; Verbeme (1957), vol. I, d is Π /i, III; Welderen Rengers (1905—1907), vol. I, pp. 32, 53f, 7 3 -7 4 , 1 6 4 -1 6 6 , 196f, 202f, 26 2 -2 6 5 , 273. 38 The figures are taken from the following sources: Letters and telegrams in 1850 and 1875: JC-1881, pp. 102, 105 Railway kilometers in 1850 and 1875: Jonckers Nieboer (1938), Appendix J; railway receipts in 1850 and 1875: JC-1881, p. 107 Import, etc. in 1850 and 1871: JC-1881, p. 20 Liability companies, i.e. the ones assessed for licence fee, in 1850 and 1875: JC-1881, p. 81; Brugmans (1958), p. 71 Merchant marine in 1850 and 1875: JC-1881, p. 47 Steam engines in 1853: SJK-1863, vol. II,p. 310;in 1876: SSJ-1877, vol. Π, p. 75 Population increase of munidpalities which in 1899 have respectively over 20.000, and less than 20.000 inhabitants: Brugmans (1958), p. 81. The index numbers given for 1875 are the mean of the ones in 1869 and 1879. Poor relief in 1849: SSJ-1852, p. 42; for the years 1865 and 1875: JC-1891, p. 57 Eliterate conscripts percentage given for 1850 is the average 1846—1858 percentage: SSJ-1877, vol. II, p. 39; for 1865 and 1875: JC-1881, p. 173 Expenditures elementary education in 1850, 1865, and 1875: JC-1881, p. 123 Pupils technical and lower secondary (day and evening) schools in 1866 and 1875: JC-1881, pp. 1 2 4 -1 2 5 Pupils secondary girls' schools and higher secondary (day) schools in 1865 and 1875: JC-1881, pp. 127, 129 Pupils Latin and Grammar schools in 1848: SSJ-1852, p. 29; for 1865: SSJ-1874, vol. II, p. 22; for 1875: JC-1881, p. 131 University students in 1851: SSJ-1850, pp. 25—26; in 1865: SSJ-1874, vol. II, p. 21; for 1875: SSJ-1877, vol. II, p. 35 Polytechnic students in 1864 and 1875: JC-1881, p. 130 39 In addition to the authors mentioned in foregoing notes, see also: Tijn (1955—1958), section 4; Vrankrijker (1959), ch. Ill 40 SSJ-1860, p. 286; JC-1901, p. 238; JC-1940, pp. 6 - 7 , 353 41 Kossmann (1955-1958), p. 17; Oud (1954), chs I-V; Romein (1949), pp. 532f.; Vries (1955-1958) (b); Verbeme (1957), vol. I, ch. ΙΠ; Welderen Rengers (1905—1907), vol. I, p. 35; Zwager (1958), pp. 163f, 168-169. 42 43 44
Finer (1949), p. 43 A similar conclusion is reached by Thoenes (1962), pp. 155—156. The quotations are to be found in Finer (1949), p. 44, and in
THE SOCIETAL STATE
172
Trevelyan (1946), p. 544. See on this question also Briggs (1961), pp. 232f. 45 See the following authors as to: Municipal Corporations Act: Fockema Andreae (1957), pp. 40, 107, 162163; Brugmans (1961), p. 278 Poor Law: Goedmakers (1955), pp. 92f, lOOf. Railway Exploitation Acts: Brugmans (1961), p. 228; Welderen Rengers (1905-1907), vol. I, p. 266. Steam Act: Fockema Andreae (1957), pp. 1 5 3-154; Brugmans (1958), pp. 248—249. It is not until 1895 that a (workers') Safety Act is passed Public Means of Conveyance Act: Fockema Andreae (1957), pp. 111-112; Brugmans (1961) pp. 349 and 371 Merchandise Marks Act: Brugmans (1961), pp. 311—312 46 Sources: SSJ-1850, pp. 134f.; JC-1901, pp. 246f.; /0-1957/1958, pp. 244—245; StA-1961, p. 7 and passim. T he 1850 and 1960 figures are budgetary ones, those for 1900 give definitive expenditures. As to currency devaluation: while it is practically negligible between 1850 and 1900, the effect of this phenomenon cannot possibly be ignored for the 1900—1960 period. Taking 1938 as basic year ( = 100%), prices have risen from 70% in 1900 to about 325% in the late 1950’s. So, all 1960 amounts have been divided by the factor 3 2 5 /7 0 = 4,64. Cf. Andriessen (1959), pp. 161-163. 47 For sources, see note 46. As the departments are classified ac cording to the situation in 1960, the War and Navy Offices in 1850 and 1900 have been taken together (Defence); nor are the Departments of Reformed and Roman Catholic Worship expressly mentioned in 1850, but they have been combined with the Finance Department, of which they become subdivisions a few years after 1850. For the same classificatory reasons, and in order to facilitate comparisons between the different dates, the 1850 and 1900 Department of Home Affairs, the 1900 Department of Public Works, Commerce & Industries, and the 1850 Finance Department do not include the specified sub-divisions namely: education, etc. (nr. 6); forestry, agriculture, veterinary service (nr. 7); poor relief (nr. 9); medical police, labour & factory inspection (nr. 10); commerce & industries, weights & measures (nr. 11); public works, postal services (nr. 12) — which have developed into full grown departments. 48 The index numbers are calculated on the basis of per capita expen ditures, while the 1960 expenditures are expressed in 1900 currency (see note 46), and the 1850 and 1900 expenditures for the new departments are raised with a proportional amount of the (administrative) 'department costs’ of the ministries of which they are sub-divisions at that time (i.c. Home Office, Treasury, and Ministry of Public Works, Commerce & Industries). The index numbers of each of the new departments read: Departments Education, etc. Agriculture, etc.
1850
1900
I960
100 100
1057 1150
12176 22600
NOTES
173
Housing, etc. Welfare Work Social Affairs, etc. Economic Affairs Transport, etc.
100 100 100 100
50 2800 125 561
2490 173200 2775 766
49 It is made, e.g., by Burdeau (1958) 50 In compiling Table 10, the major sources of reference are: Amelink (1939); NGIS (1963); Molenaar (1953-1958); Andriessen (1959)
CHAPTER Π: FROM FREE SOCIETY TO SOCIETAL STATE (2)
1 2
Burdeau 1956, p. 21 Braam (1957), p. 40, quoting K. Young, Handbook of Social Psy chology (London 1946), p. 553 3 Galbraith (1957), pp. 13f, and Mannheim (1951), pp. 7f, 79—80, 110-111 4 Resp. Mannheim (1951), pp. 10 -1 1 ; Cole (1948), p. 26 5 This term is — according to Zoetewey (1955), p. 149, note 2 — introduced by Calvin B. Hoover (Institutional and Theoretical Implications of Economic Change, American Economic Review, March 1954, p. 12), and denotes an economic system composed of powerful organizations, such as industrial, financial, agricultural, and labour organizations, as well as the State itself. This abundance of organizational things in contemporary soci ety - cf. also Boulding (1953) and Myrdal (1960), ch. 4, who speak of the 'organizational revolution' and the 'organizational state' — has prompted us in coining, as a sort of comprehensive term, the word 'organizationalism' in the tide of the present section. 6 In particular: Brugmans, in his (1961), p. 213; (1958), p. 218; (1955-1958) (a), pp. 269f; (1960), p. 121. Furthermore: Bouman (1949) (a), pp. 502 f; Pen & Bouman (1961), pp. 89—90; Verbeme (1957), vol.I, p. 83 7 Bouman (1949) (a), pp. 506, 509f, mentions centralization and concentration. In addition to these two trends, Brugmans (1961), ch. IV /2, speaks of the rise of the factory system, specialization, integration, inter nationalization, 'scientification', and so on; cf. also his (1950), pp. 123f. Pen & Bouman (1961), pp. 91—92, just refer to institutionalization, in the widest possible sense. Other authors to be mentioned in this context are, e.g., Banning (1959), ch. V, and Boulding (1953), esp. Part II. A few words may be added with respect to specialization. In our opinion, the inclusion of this particular process in the series of variations on the central theme of concentration and large-scale organization may be jus tified on the grounds that it is logically implied in the general process of organization. This is not only suggested by the fact that the said authors always mention specialization in the same breath with the other processes, but it is also obvious from any definition of the phenomenon of organiz-
174
THE SOCIETAL STATE
ation. Such definitions — like the following one by Fairchild (1955), p. 2 1 0 make clear that specialization and integration are inevitable counterparts: "Organization is that process which differentiates one part from another in a functional sense and which at the same time creates an integrated com plex of functional relationships within the whole". 8 Kroese (1945), p. 526 9 Hülsmann (1898), p. BOO 10 Sodale Verzekeringsbank, O n g e v a lle n s ta tis tie k , 1903 and following years. 11 CBS (1963), p. 39, table 55 12 Cf. Boulding (1953), p. 139 13 For the differentiation between units of production and units of control, see Croome (1948), pp. 63f. As to the margerine factories: W ilson (1954), vol. II, p. 105 14 W ibaut(1903),pp. 88f, 9 If, lOOf, 107f. International combines of which it is not explicitly stated that Dutch firms are involved have not been entered in Table 15. W ibaut stresses that his material is probably very incomplete. 15 F. Kleinwächter, Die Kartelle (Innsbruck 1883), p. 143 16 Kroese (1945), p. 523. This same monograph provides the material on which Table 16 is based. 17 Croome (1948), p. 65. See also W ibaut’s (1903) lucid analysis of the cartel movement as basically inherent in capitalist industrialism. 18 Table 17 is a summary of two tables presented in the study of Vinke (1961), p. 277 19 Wisselink (1961), and (1963) 20 H et Parool, Dec. 31, 1962, publishing, on its ’economic page’, a special report on prominent business integrations in the year 1962. A few details mentioned in this report may be added to the enumeration of merged companies in Table 18, in order to illustrate the cumulative nature of the process in question: — Kort. Zout/Ketjen (1) is a merger, effectuated in 1961, of Kon. Ned. Zoutindustrie and Kon. Zwavelzuurfabriehen v /h Ketjen, which to gether have over 30 daughter-companies; — Sikkens Groep (2) has in preceding years steadily extended its sphere of influence, not only in the lacquer and colour trade, but in shipbuilding as well; — W illem Smit en Co's Transformatorenfabriek (6) has repeatedly been in the news in recent years for its merging activities; — Vredestein (9) and Hevea (10) also are reported to have holdings in 5 other rubber and textile companies; — Landbank (38) has for several years in the early 1960's been noted for what, without exaggeration, may be called its empire-building practices.
21 Miller & Form (1951), pp. 836. These words are written with a view to the United States of America in particular, but they hold good
NOTES
175
for any Western industrialized nation. See, e.g., Banning (1959), ch. V, and Fockema Andreae (1957), ch. X. 22 For trade unionism: Brugmans (1958), ch. V III/a, and (1961), pp. 280-284, 4 2 0 -4 2 3 , 4 9 3 -4 9 7 ; Jong (1956); Ruppert (1953), vol. I; Verbeme (1959); Visser (1898) 23 SER (1960), and CBS (1963) (a), Appendix A, B, C. Our tabulation does not include the central federations, such as the Federation of Nether lands Employers (V N W ), the Royal Netherlands Agricultural Committee (KNLC), the Royal Netherlands Tradespeople Federation (KNMB), or, for the employees, the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV), and its respective (non-)denominational equivalents. 24 Brugmans (1961), pp. 423—424; and Jong (1956) (a), pp. 85f, who is very explicit on this point. 25 Membership on January 1 of the years mentioned; capital (exd. that of special Health Funds, amounting to ƒ 2 million in 1960) on Decem ber 30 of the year before. Sources: CBS (1963) (a), p. 6, table 2, p. 16, table 23; JC-1951/52, pp. 299-300; JC-1931, p. 104; JC-1921, p. 98; Mok (1947), pp. 142-143. The 1950 and 1961 figures do not include the (communist) United Trade Unions Centre (EVC) as its present membership is unknown. In 1950, EVC membership is 163.300 - JC -1947/1950, p. 320. 26 For percentages of trade union memberships to total of wage and salary workers: CBS (1963) (a), p. 6, table 2; Andriessen, Miedema & Oort (1963), p. 53, who also list some more reasons for the relatively weak num erical position of organized labour. As to the critics of N W , C N V , and NKV policies, see esp. Hoefnagels (1961) and (1962). Several other (Dutch and foreign) critics are mentioned by Vail (1963), pp. 9 3 -9 4 . 27 As this fact is generally acknowledged by any author dealing with industrialism (see, e.g., the authors mentioned in note 5 of ch. I of the present study), the following two quotations may suffice. "The in dustrial mode of production has given rise to an economic organization that influences all parts of society. Industrialism as a configuration of technology, economy, and business values emerges as a culture system, one of the most widely spread systems in human history. N o modem social institution has escaped the influence of the economic organization of society". Miller & Form (1951), pp. 829—830. These same authors look upon modem society as composed of four concentric patterns, viz. the factory, as the hub, the corporation, which "ties the work plant into the economic organization of society", the city, as "the great labor center for the factory”, and the mass market, upon which the economic organization of modem society is entirely dependent, and in relation to which they d te Karl Polanyi, T he Great Transformation (New York 1944), p. 57: "Instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system. The vital importance of the economic factor precludes any other result. For once
176
THE SOCIETAL STATE
the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on spec ific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a market society”. 28 Cf. Bouman (1943); Brugmans (1961), pp. 208—211, ch. IV/2; Minderhoud (1943) and (1949); Sneller (1943), chs. II-ΠΙ; Wibaut (1903), pp. 215f. 29 For these data: Minderhoud (1949), esp. pp. 49f, 95f, 124f, 134f; Hofstee (1957), pp. 51f, 7 2 -8 2 ; Stuijvenberg (1959), pp. 279f. 30 The total membership of the (farmers’) cooperations is not known. However, according to a study made in 1953/54, and based on a represent ative sample of 3000 farmers with at least 1 hectare ( = 2.5 acres) of land, ’’the Dutch farmer belongs on the average to 3 cooperative societies”, and "only 10% of the farmers do not belong to any cooperative, 20% belong to 3 cooperatives and 40% to 4 or more”. Abma (1956), p. 49 31 Andriessen, Miedema & Oort (1963), pp. 5 3—54,68,72. The percen tage of the centrally organized major industrial employers is not known, but according to the same authors (1963), p. 62, practically all major industrial employers are, directly or indirectly, affiliated to one of the large central federations. 32 Andriessen, Miedema & Oort (1963), pp. 72f. See also, with respect to the weak position of agriculture in an(y) advanced economy, Boulding (1953), pp. 112f, and Pen (1962), ch. 16. The ƒ 500 million spent on farming is just a rough approximation. Adding the negative balances of the Agricultural Equalization Fund to the central government expenditures on the Department of Agriculture, JC-1959/1960, pp. 254—255, shows the following amounts: 1959 ƒ 653 million ƒ 358 million 1955 1956 1960 421 million 675 million 1957 643 million 1961 650 million 1958 796 million 1962 595 million The (budgetary) central government expenditures on the Department of Agriculture are ƒ 665 million for 1963, or 6% of the total budget; as compared with ƒ 191 million (2%) on Economic Affairs, and ƒ 562 million (5%) on Social Affairs & Public Health. Cf. Andriessen, Miedema & Oort (1963), p. 137 33 Table 22, which is reproduced from Braam (1957), pp. 22,25, is based on (mainly) two different sets of sources applying different definitions of government employed persons. For this reason the pre-1930 and post-1930 figures (which are not all-inclusive) do not fit exacdy. According to Braam (1957), p. 25, the total number of government civilian employees of every possible kind may be estimated as 16 or 17% of all wage and salary workers. Applying this percentage to the results of the 1960 Census, we arrive at an all-inclusive number of 530 or 560.000. Cf. CBS (1963) (b), p. 3. 34 Table 23 is a slightly condensed and revised form of Braam’s table (1957), pp. 40—43, which, as the author points out, is by no means exhaustive
NOTES
177
but just covers the principal items. 35 Myrdal (1960), pp. 22—23 36 Cf. Andriessen ( 1959), pp. 89f, 112f, 328; Gijzels (1962); Muiswinkel (1962); Schouten (1959); Rooij (1959), pp. 363—364 37 See, e.g., Fockema Andreae (1957), ch. IX, and Valkhoff (1961), pp. 273f. 38 Prisma (1956), vol. II, pp. 73f; N G IS (1963), pp. 6f.
39
S E R (1 9 6 3 ), p p . 8 7 - 8 9
40 The most important sources on which our illustrative survey of the three types of State-Society interpénétrations is based are: Abma (1961), pp. 303f; Fockema Andreae (1957), ch. IX; Valkhoff (1961). Furthermore, use has been made of N G IS (1958), (1963), (1963) (a); Prisma (1956), vol. II; StA-1961. For a descriptive account of the situation on the local level in one particular Dutch community, see Gadourek (1956), ch. ΠΙ. 41 Oud (1954), ch. II; Vries (1955-1958) (a) 42 Brugmans (1961), p. 286 43 W . W . Rostow, T h e Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, 1960). Cf. Bouman (1961), pp. 54f; and Pen & Bouman (1961), pp. 86f, 89f. 44 See Romein (1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 ), p. xüi 45 Zwager (1955-1 9 5 8 ), p. 95 46 Brugmans (195 5 -1 9 5 8 ), pp. 65f; Vries (1955-1958) (a) and (b); Zwager (1955-1958), pp. 76f. 47 T he index numbers in Table 24 (a) are calculated on the basis of data presented by Dellepoort (1955), pp. 33, 45—47, 52. The average annual numbers of ordinations refer to the years 1853—1860,1895—1904, and 1951— 1952. For the total R.C. population: JC-1882, p. 10 and /C-1959/1960, p. 54. For the percentages in Table 24 (b), the following sources have been used: pupils denominational schools: EC, Cath. volume, Compendium, p. 132; Idenburg (1960), p. 112; students in 1900, 1930, and 1954—55: Matthijssen (1958), p. 35; in the year 1958-59: CBS (1960), p. 15; professors: Matthijssen (1958), p. 34; civil servants ca. 1850: Zwager (1955—1958), p. 74; male civil servants in 1947 and 1960, resp. Braam (1957), p. 247, and CBS (1963) (c), table 15 c, page 33; total R.C. population: JC-1882, p. 10; CBS (1959), p. 26; CBS (1963) (d), p. 8. 48 On the history of (early) R.C. emancipation in the Netherlands, see esp. Jansen (1955—1958), Rogier (1956), chs I-II, Versluis (1948) 49 Dellepoort (1955), p. 306 50 In compiling Table 25, the following sources have been used: houses with 2 firesides, ratable value of houses and furniture in 1866/67, 1876/77, 1886/87, 1896/97, 1907, 1910 (houses with 2 firesides), 1917 (ac cording to changed tariff of 1897): JC-1901, p. 78; JC-1911, p. 83; JC1921, p. 99; savings-books deposits and deposit books: JC-1921, p. 131;
178
THE SOCIETAL STATE
pupils primary schools: SSJ-1877, vol. II, p. 244; JC-1921, pp. 45—46; CBS (1959), p. 30; JC -1959/60, p. 62; pupils lower secondary schools (1875—1920): JC-1911, p. 47; JC-1921, p. 62; total population of the Netherlands: JC-1940, p. 4. In order to eliminate the effect of currency devaluation, which increasingly makes itself felt after 1900, and especially after 1910, the index numbers of the ratable value of houses and furniture, as well as of savings-books depos its, are calculated on the basis of amounts that are corrected as follows: 1900—1910 a devaluation percentage of 4 ,1 9 1 0 —1917a percentage of 10, and 1910—1920 of 24. Cf. Andriessen (1959), p. 162. 51 Romein (1949), pp. 539—541 52 Verwey-Jonker (1961), p. 107. Also Goddijn (1957), pp. 48, 50f, and Rogier (1956), pp. 123, 298. 53 Verwey-Jonker (1961), p. 109. In Dutch 19th century history, the emancipation of the ’small people’ — which is meant to be a literal trans lation of what may be called a ’terminus technicus’ in Dutch social history: kleine luiden — is, usually, first of all equated with that of the orthodoxCalvinist part of the nation which organizes itself in the Anti-Revolutionary Party under the leadership of the theologian, journalist, and statesman, Abraham Kuyper (1837—1920). 54 Banning (1948), esp. pp. 84f, 125f; Kossmann (1955—1958), pp.2f; Rogier (1956), chs I I / 1 and I I I /1. On the principle of so-called 'sovereignty in individual sphere’, which may be considered the Neo-Calvinist equivalent of the R. Catholic key-concept of 'subsidiarity', see Dengerink (1948). 55 The main reasons for the rupture between Catholics and Liberals are, during the 1860’s: (a) the 'Roman question’in which the Liberalists show themselves strongly in sympathy with Cavour’s anti-Vatican policies; (b) the encyclical Quanta Cura, together with the Syllabus Errorum, issued by Pope Pius IX (1864); and (c) the consequent charge of the Dutch episcopacy (1868), in which the papal stand against the falsity of Liberalist doctrines is translated into an uncompromising repudiation of the unreligious state schools. In the 1870’s, this rupture between the Roman Catholics and the Liberalists is widened by the Liberalists' growing anti-clerical doctrinairism, which finds expression both in the withdrawal of the Dutch Minister to the Holy See (1872), and the revised Elementary Education Act of 1878 which discriminates denominational schools even more than the original act of 1857. See on this, e.g., Kossmann (1955—1958), p. 10; Rogier (1956), esp. pp. 137f; Romein (1949), pp. 5 3 5 -5 3 6 ; Versluis (1948), pp. 97f. 56 The paramount importance of the school issue in Dutch political history has even led to the observation that, "With some justification, it may be said that Holland has known two 80-years wars. T he first one was waged for the sake of freedom of conscience and national independence (1568— 1648), the second was a 'civil war', made with bloodless weapons in the political arena, for the sake of educational liberty. T he entire political atmos-
NOTES
179
phere of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th is for a great part dominated by the school question with which every single government until 1920 has been forced to deal”. EC, Prot. vol., Compendium, p. 103. See furthermore, on this and the illustrations given below: Langedijk (1953); Kossmann (1955—1958), pp. 9f; Idenburg (1960), pp. lOlf; Oosterlee (1929), esp. pp. 232f; Ouden (1928); Rogier (1956), pp. 287f; Verbeme (1957), vol. II, pp. 11—21; Verwey-Jonker (1961), pp. 114—115; /C -1901, p. 238. 57 The percentages, as visualized in Figure 6, are the following: Election Years 1850 1859 1869 1879 1888 1897 1901 1909 1918
Conserv. 30 35 24
10 1
Liber.
Orth. Prot.
R. Cath.
44 36 48 58 44 52 35 33
4
22 21
28 23 33 35
22
20 (-f
8 9
19
12
20 26
22 2)
25 25 30
Socialists
1 2 (+ 6(+
1) 1)
7
22 ( + 4 )
(The percentages in brackets relate to minor factions of dissident groups.) The present author is greatly indebted to Mr. C. Offringa, of the History Department of Leiden University, for his kind permission to make use of the material on which Figure 6 is mainly based. This material consists of a systematic classification of all members of the Second Chamber of Parlia ment, in the period 1850—1901, according to political affiliations; a classific ation which is the result of comparing all M .P /s, as listed in J. A. de Bruyne, De geschiedenis van N ederland in onzen tijd (Schiedam 1891—1901), with data concerning their affiliations in the handbooks of Dutch parliamentary history. As far as possible, the material of Mr. Offringa has been checked (and completed, for the period 1901—1918) with the help of: CBS (1959), p. 27; Diepenhorst (1928); Oud (1954), pp. 2 4 9 -2 5 0 ; Verbeme (1957), vol. Π, chs IV and V; Vries (1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 ) (a); Welderen Rengers (1905-1907), vol. I, p. 190, and vol. II, p. 204; Zwager (1955—1958), p. 81 58 T he absolute numbers and exact percentages (i.e. in percentages of the total population over 24 years of age) of voters, as given in and calculated on the basis of JC-1940, pp. 6—7, 353, read as follows: Years 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
N um ber of Voters 103.538 122.481 295.570 569.768 854.539 3.250.247
Percentages 5.8 6.4 13.9 23.5 30.7 97.6
180
THE SOCIETAL STATE
59 On membership of labour unions: CBS (1907), pp. xxxii-xxxiii; Ruppert (1953), vol. I, pp. 75, 131, 173, and vol. II, p. 190. On economically active population: CBS (1959), p. 43. 60 On the suffrage movement and related questions: Jong (19551958), pp. lOOf; (1955-1958) (a), pp. 287f; and (1956), chs H I; Rogier (1956), ch. I I I /2 - 3 , ch. I V /2 - 3 ; Rogier (1964); Romein (1949), ch. XXVIII; Rüter (1935), chs MI; Verbeme (1957), vol. I, ch. II; and (1959), pp. 113f; Zwager (1958), pp. 166f. 61 Heringa-van Ruth (1955—1958), p. 229; Romein-Verschoor (1957), pp. 45f; Schokking (1958), pp. 14f; Verwey-Jonker (1961), pp. 106—107. 62 Couvee & Boswijk (1962), pp. 29f, 219—249; Heringa-van Ruth (1955-1958). Table 27 is confined to the activities of upper and middle class women, and, consequendy, does not contain items relating to the Social Democratic, or Roman Catholic women's organizations. T he reason for this is that the latter organizations primarily form part of the other emancipation move ments (such as those of the working classes and the Roman Catholic 'secondrate' citizens), and are, on the whole, only indirecdy involved in the struggle of the (bourgeois) women's movement as an emancipation movement in its own right. Cf. Schokking (1958), pp. 17f; and Verwey-Jonker (1961), p. 114. 63 Thus reads the definition of group integration, in Fairchild (1955), p. 159. (The additions in brackets are mine, K.) 64 Rogier (1964), pp. 248f. 65 Verwey-Jonker (1961), p. 116; See also Doom & Lammers (1959),
pp. 2 9 3 —295. 66 Drees
(1962), pp. 62f, 75f; Oud (1954), pp. 235f, 317f; Rogier (1964), pp. 262f; Ruitenbeek (1955), pp. 26f, 33f, 37f; Verbeme (1957), vol. II, p. 154f. 67 For these consequences, see esp. Rüter (1935), chs VI, VII, and IX. Also: Jong (1956), ch. II. 68 The quotations are resp. from: Galbraith (1957), p. 136; Boulding (1953), p. 132—133; and Vail (1963), p. 71, who quotes from Welvaartsplan van het Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (Amsterdam 1952). 69 Vail (1963), pp. 7 1 -7 2 . 70 Finer (1949), pp. 44f. 71 Vrankrijker (1959) 72 Considering the fact that, in the political realm, the revolutionary events abroad have gready contributed to the constitutional reforms of 1848 in the Netherlands (see ch. 1/2), it is only fair to assume that Vrankrijker (1959), p. 65, is right in stating, with a view to the social realm, that "Socialism and Communism constituted a real threat which acted as a sharp exhortation". In our opinion, therefore, Brugmans (1958), pp. 256—257, is misleading in his belief that the increased interest in and growing concern about the wretched conditions of the working population is only due to the activities of upper and middle class people, and that no influence whatsoever has been exerted by the fear of a proletarian uprising. T o be sure, the Dutch
NOTES
181
proletariat may have been much too amorphous and apathetic at that time, but there is not sufficient reason for discarding the plausibility of the point which is made by Vrankrijker (1959), pp. 117—118, that "the utopists and the revolt of 1848 (in France and Germany, and the social character of which is beyond doubt, K.) produce alarm”. 73 Rerum Novarum, section 2, as edited by Fremande (1963), p. 22 74 See for all this: Brugmans (1958), ch. V, V ll/f; Jong (1956), pp. 8f; Verbeme (1959), pp. 3 If. 75 Cf. especially Brugmans (1958), pp. 255—256, and Vrankrijker (1959), pp. 98f. 76 Kuyper (1891), pp. 22, 40. 77 In particular: Jong (1956), pp. I lf., and Vrankrijker (1959), ch. IV. 78 Cf. Jong (1956), pp. 9f.; Rüter (1935), pp. 350f, 543f. 79 Table 28 is based on the bibliographies of Jong (1956), chs I-IV, VI, and Vrankrijker (1959), I-a, 1870f. These bibliographies consist entirely, or largely, of ’basic sources’ with the help of which the development of social thinking, resp. the history of the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (NVV), is studied. Not all tides listed in these two bibliographies are included in Table 28, but only those which are clearly classifiable according to specific categories of subjects, and are of an ’actual’ nature. That is to say, tides referring to more comprehensive studies and publications (e.g. handbooks of political economy, collections of parliamentary speeches, and the like), and historical studies of the labour movement, or biographies of prominent leaders, which are written from a ’removed' vantage point, are not mentioned. And the same holds for the tides dealing with special events (such as particular strikes and their aftermath), and with some subjects that in themselves are easily clas sifiable but are, so to speak, too specific (such as the minutes of local wage boards) and for this reason cannot be brought under one of the major headings which are suggested by the bulk of the tides listed. In three single cases, in which one tide covers two subjects (viz.: un employment and unemployment insurance), the tide is brought under the heading of Social Insurance Legislation. 80 On the evolution of the ’social question’, see e.g.: Banning (1955— 1958), vol. I, ch. VI; Esveld (1946), (1956), and (1958), chs IV, VII; Hoef nagels (1957); Hoogerwerf (1965), ch. V; Kraemer & Tombe (1963), pp. 118f.; Ven (1957) and (1961).
CHAPTER III: SOCIETAL STATE AND RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY
1 White (1963), p. 382. 2 W hite (1963), p. 382. For details of the happenings on November 22, 1963, see Tim e, Nov. 29, 1963, pp. 9f. 3 In support of this, reference can be made to such authors as, e.g.: — Wibaut (1903), passim, who already at this early date demonstrates with
182
THE SOCIETAL STATE
great acumen on the basis of ample evidence that the cartel movement, or the substitution of cooperation for competition in the economic realm, is the necessary consequence of industrial-capitalist production; — Romein (1949), pp. 542—543, who cites all sorts of political and econo mic, social and cultural developments which fully support the conclusion which he emphatically stresses in his (1955—1958), pp. ix f. — that the very period in which Liberalism becomes increasingly prominent (i.e. from about 1840 to 1885) is marked in the first place by the (beginning) osmosis of Society and State as a result of the Industrial Revolution, and secondly by the gradual transformation of Liberalism into its own opposite, as a result of the fact that the "liberal conception has become common property to such a degree th at. . . it dialectically outlives itse lf..." ; — Jong (1955—1958), pp. 103—104, and (1956), pp. 13—14, who explicitly states that the social legislative enactments which follow the government inquiries of the 1880’s and 1890’s, usher in a new era, i.e. the era of the interpenetration of State and Society. This becomes apparent from the establishment of such agencies and institutions as the Labour Inspectorate, the State Insurance Bank, or the Chambers of Labour — even though these Chambers remain a dead letter, as Rooij (1959), pp. 25, 367, points out, because the "organizational substratum in the free society which is essential to the statutory regulated cooperation of employers and employees” is then still lacking. 4 Kraemer & Tombe (1964), pp. 122f. 5 Cf. Kraemer (1963), pp. 44—45. W ith a view to the economic realm, this point finds expression in the following words of Myrdal (1960), pp. 117—118: "The succession of international crises could n o t ... have had such far-reaching and lasting effects in gradually shaping national policies... but for the historically dramatic constellation of this international devel opment with the internal development in all the rich countries of the Western world. ( . . . ) The presence and the increasing strength, in all Western nations, of internal forces pressing towards the goals of the Welfare State strengthened the inclination to take defensive action against the repercussions of the international crises in order to preserve stability and welfare at home. From the opposite point of view, the necessity and, grad ually, the habit in these countries from the First World War onwards of taking large-scale interventionist action to affect the play of market forces in order to defend the national community against the effects of international crises opened up opportunities without which the Welfare State would not have developed so soon or so rapidly. Once more we see circular causation at work, and the cumulation of forces. Every new emergency in the inter national sphere gave the occasion for taking a new step towards perfecting the Welfare State". Very explicit on this aspect of immanence is especially Banning, e.g., in his (1959), pp. 94f. 6 Behrendt (1964), ch. I ll 7 Fourastié (1952), p. 88.
NOTES
183
8 Burdeau (1956), p. 21. 9 In its literal sense, the term 'ad-ministrative' means: ministering to, rendering service to. Thus, in speaking of the State as the ’ad-ministrative’ agency, we want to lay due stress on the fact that today the State ministers to acts as the servant of Society. 10 Boulding (1953), p. 10. The addition in brackets is mine, K. 11 As reads the Cameralist definition of Von Justi, which is quoted by Finer (1932), vol. I, p. 67, note 3. As has been indicated before (Introduction/3, note 8), the latter author stresses ’’the almost complete consensus” enjoyed by the absolute State. Furthermore (and once again — cf. Introduction/3, note 9), reference can be made to the words of Abrecht (1961), pp. 145f, with respect to the (parallel) situation in the present day 'developing countries’. 12 The two quotations are from Ginsberg (1959), p. 6, and Marshall (1961), p. 295, respectively. 13 Cf. Schaper (1963), pp. 131, 164-165; Vervoort (1963), pp. 63-64. Vervoort apparently bases his interpretation on Marshall (1961) in particular, who speaks of ’’the crucial p oin t. . . that the Welfare State was bom into a world of austerity”. In fact, Vervoort’s suggestion that the Welfare State in post-war England enjoys a greater and more permanent consensus than on the continent seems to be plus Marshaüist que le Marshall. For the latter says, in his (1961), pp. 299f: "By the middle of the 50 's the Austerity Society has passed away and the Affluent Society was taking its place. ( . . . ) It was in these circumstances that the basic principles of the Welfare State came under attack”. In support of this, Marshall quotes (amongst others) the then Lord Hailsham (now Quintin Hogg) who "asked whether a system of social services 'determined by the spectacle of Victorian poverty and under-employment between the wars' was he ideal system 'for a society enjoying full employment in mid-twentieth century conditions' ". And Marshall concludes: "So it seems that the Welfare State as we knew it in the 1940's, or at least the consensus which sustained it, has been smothered by the Affluent Society”. But to this Marshall immediately adds: ’’But this does not mean th at. . . welfare measures will be scrapped. Much has been built which will un doubtedly endure. But there is need for a new model. Perhai» one feature of this model is foreshadowed in the graduated pensions scheme of the Labour Party, which mirrors the arrangements of private enterprise and sets out to beat it at its own game". In our opinion, this feature (as well as the other ones Marshall mentions) does in no way indicate that the new model in the making is not based on the "conception of the claims of all citizens, directed not at the state but at one another". On the contrary, it rather indicates that the new model is even more based on this conception. For the only (but significant) difference with the 'old' model seems to be that the citizens rely less on the State, and more on ’private", societal agencies, as "the instrument
THE SOCIETAL STATE
184
through which the concern of each for the good of all is principally ex pressed" (Boulding). Apart from this specific point, it may be stressed that the contention, to the effect that the Welfare State is an 'austerity phenomenon', is in sharp contrast with the conclusions of other authors. Thus David Thomson, quoted in Donner (1957), p. 559, says in a review of Burdeau's study (1956): "The Welfare State is here to stay" — that is, regardless of war or peace, of austerity or affluence. And further mention can be made of Hartog (1963), p. 497, who states explicitly that a basic condition of the present day Welfare States is precisely the existence of a highly developed, affluent economy. 14 Cf. Reynaud (1961) 15 Cf. Mannheim (1948), Part I, chs ΠΙ and IV, in which he considers the two essential principles characteristic of modem industrial society, to wit: the principle of fundamental democratization, and the principle of in creasing interdependence. For the quotations, see op. cit., pp. 45 and 44. 16 Marshall (1961), p. 296. For the development towards integration as a typical phenomenon of a modem Western democracy see, e.g., also Groen man (1961). 17 Thurlings (1965), pp. 93, 103f. 18 Ginsberg (1959), pp. 5f. In this context, mention should also be made of Petzäll (1957) and McKeon (1957). Especially the latter's article is of in terest in that it indicates the emergence of the concept of responsibility and the kinds of new problems in society which bring this concept into prominence. 19 Hoogerwerf (1965), pp. 146f, 162. Being a study on Protestantism and political attitude, the sample has been stratified for the purpose of including sufficient respondents of three Protestant denominations. As, "according to the results of the survey taken in D elft in 1962, the members of the Protes tant denominations in question (Reformed — both hervormden and gerefor meerden — and Remonstrant) are les frequently progressive with respect to socio-economic policy than are Roman Catholics and unchurched people” (op. cit., p. 261), it may be worthwhile to point out that the Protestants are overrepresented in the sample to quite a considerable degree — as can be seen from the following comparison of the sample and the census percen tages:
Sample 1962 Census 1960
Hervormd 22.1 26.0
Geref. 20.6 9.1
Remonstr. Nonchurch. R. Catk. 14.8 20.8 21.6 0.9 26.0 36.7
For census figures: CBS (1963) (d), p. 58—59. 20 The German industrialist, quoted by Groenman (1959), p. 303, is O. A. Friedrich, president of the Board of Directors of the Phoenix Gummi werke A. G., Hamburg-Harburg: Vortragsreihe des Deutschen Industrie instituts, No. 1, Jan. 5, 1959. On the institutions expressing reciprocal responsibilities, see e.g.: Schmel zer (1962), pp. 659, 661.
NOTES
185
On co-determination, cf. Lammers (1965), p. I lf. In the Netherlands, this question, especially in relation to industry, is in fact order of the day. It is the subject of countless articles in newspapers and periodicals, of study groups of all major federations of employees and employers, of political study centres, and of official government committees; and it ranks high among the topics currently under discussion among social scientists. 21 Lipset (1964), p. 262, who quotes Juan Linz. The article of Lipset has also been published in Daedalus, Winter 1964. 22 See in particular Mehnert (1961) 23 Lipset (1964), pp. 257f, 261f. 24 Cf. Mannheim (1948), pp. 155f; Valkhoff (1961) 25 Rees (1964), p. 276, who quotes D. Fosdick, W hat is Liberty? (New York 1938), p. 7 26 See Vries (1961), pp. 234f, who mentions these basic needs for responsible emancipation, human dignity, social justice, and freedom, and who points out that today they are revealed as common needs, constituting "the common challenge” to all the citizens of the present day W e world’. Cf also WCC (1959), pp. 7f. 27 For this double aspect of ’administration’, see Harrison (1964), esp. p. 10, A 1 and A 2. 28 Banning (1959), p. 98. See also by this same author (1963) and (1963) (a) 29 The French figures are calculated on the basis of the percentages presented by Vail (1963), p. 27, Diagram IV, who is indebted in his turn to M. Collinet, Essai sur la condition ouvrière (Paris 1951), p. 38. The German figures are taken from W . Linke, Die Stellung der Ange stellten in der modernen Gesellschaft (1962), p. 32, as cited by Banning (1963), p. 13. For the Netherlands similar figures are mentioned by Bierens de Haan (1949), pp. 9 1 -9 2 . 30 Cf. Couwenberg (1964), esp. pp. 131f. There is a vast literature on these problems. T o give only a very few authors, in addition to those men tioned in note 28, we can refer to: Dahrendorf (1961), esp. chs 10—12; Mannheim (1951) and (1948); Mills (1956) and (1959); Thoenes (1962). 31 Figure 8 is remodelled after Dahl (1961) p. 163, Figure 12.1. It should be pointed out that the Diagram, as presented by Dahl, relates to direct influence, whereas he also presents a diagram of the distribution of indirect influence. This last diagram is different because ’’most citizens. . . possess a moderate degree of indirect influence, for elected leaders keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents constantly in mind in deciding what policies to adopt or reject” (p. 164). However much this may be true for elected leaders, i.e. in the field of political representation, it does not, or hardly, apply to the ’expert mediators’, who are not elected and who are — as will be shown later, when paradox (2) is discussed — primarily active in the much more technical field of socio-economic administration. See in this connection also Dahl (1963).
THE SOCIETAL STATE
186
32 Petzäll (1957), p. 96. T he italics are mine, K. 33 Banning (1959), pp. 112f. 34 For a brief summary of this development and the underlying factors, mentioned by many scholars in the field, see Daalder (1964), pp. 6—8, and p. 42, notes 3 and 4. Cf. furthermore: Couwenberg (1964), Hoogerwerf (1963), and Thoenes (1962), esp. pp. 156f. 35 Vail (1963), pp. 1 7 7 -1 8 0 36 Vail (1963) (a), pp. 1 7 8 -1 7 9 37 Cf. Komhauser (1960), pp. 7, 228, 237 38 CBS (1949), pp. 26— 27; (1959) (a), pp. 28— 29; (1963) (e) p. 29. In 1963, the Farmers Party is the only one left of the 1959 combination of Farmers Party and Party for Agriculture & Trades. On the functions and dysfunctions of the small parties, Niezing (1963). 39 Hartog (1963), pp. 497f. 40 Achinger (1963), pp. 64f. 41 This threefold distinction is made by Meynen (1961), pp. 6f. 42 W CC (1955), p. 19. In actual fact, the term and its definition, as they are given in the Section III report, are primarily derived from a preparatory paper written by J. H . Oldham for the Amsterdam Assembly. Cf. Oldham (1948). 43 Muelder (1959), p. 16. 44 For (both the early and the continued) history of the concept, see: Duff (1956), esp. chs III-IV; Lange (1966), pp. 34f; Muelder (1959), pp. 16f, 258f; West (1960); W CC (1955), pp. 5 -1 2 ; W C C (1964). Unless indicated otherwise, our brief outline of this (continued) history is based on these authors. 45 W CC (1948), p. 9 46 W CC (1955), pp. 50, 52. 47 The results of this study are recorded in the report of the Thessa lonica Conference, W CC (1959), and in Abrecht (1961) and Vries (1961). 48 Thus reads the N ew Delhi report of the Section on "Service”, dealing with 'T h e Responsible Society — Freedom, Order and Power". WCC
(1 9 6 2 ), p p . 9 9 - 1 0 2 . 49 W CC (1962), pp. 180—181. On this study, the results of which will be discussed by a World Conference on Church and Society to be convened in 1966, see also Parijn (1963), W endland (1965), and WCC (1964). 50 See Wendland (1965, pp. 1— 4. Cf. also Petzäll (1957), pp. 94f, who emphatically points out that "la responsabilité est toujours laffaire dune communauté" (pp. 96—97). 51 Wendland (1965), p. 5. It is to this author that we are primarily indebted for our summary of the basic elements of the concept of the Res ponsible Society as it stands today. See, furthermore: Banning (1961), pp. 14f; W est (1960), p. 4. 52
Oldham (1948), pp. 1 3 4 -1 3 5
NOTES
187
53 Dahl (1961), p. 292. In this connection, it is of particular interest to note that the availability of adequate resources is essential to set into motion a development which, once it has been set in motion, becomes a circular development, which takes care of itself so to speak. As Dahl points out: "The importance of confidence to political activity is indicated by the fact that the sharp differences between middling and working strata in the extent to which they participate very nearly disappear if one considers their level of political confidence" (pp. 289, 291). It hardly needs saying that all this does not only apply to politics, but, mutatis mutandis, also to other realms. 54 Winter (1961), p. 130 55 This diagram is based on Dahl (1961), Figure 26.6. In relation to this Figure, Dahl says: ’O n e of the striking characteristics of the activist in politics is his relatively high confidence that what he does matters; by con trast, the inactive citizen is more prone to doubt his effectiveness. A citizen who tends to feel that people like him have no say about what the local government does, or that the only way he can have a say is by voting, or that politics and government are too complicated for him to understand what is going on, or that local public officials don’t care much what he thinks, is much less likely to participate in local political decisions than one who dis agrees with all these propositions" (pp. 286—7). In this connection, mention should also be made of the influence of "or ganizational size" on the effectiveness and the rate of participation of in dividuals in groups. Cf. D oom (1960), esp. p. 7. 56 Knoll & Witcover (1965), pp. 21, 20. 57 T he Office of Economic Opportunity is in charge of the so-called Anti-Poverty Program of the federal government of the U.S.A. 58 Gurvitch (1955) pp. 2 9 3 -2 9 4 .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A GN
CBS DSS EC ESS JC N G IS SCOR
SER SJK SSJ StA
wcc
Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, eds. J. A. van Houtte et al. Vols. IX-XII. Zeist/Antwerpen: W . de Haan/Standaard Boekhandel (1955-1958) Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics) A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, eds. J. Gould & W. L. Kolb. N ew York: The Free Press of Glencoe (1964) Encyclopedie van het Christendom, eds. J. C. Groot & C. W. Mönnich. Amsterdam/Brussel: Elsevier (1955-1956) Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed. E. R. A. Seligman. N ew York: MacMillan Company (1948) Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1881Netherlands Government Information Service Commissie voor sociale zaken van de Oecumenische Raad van Kerken in Nederland (Social Committee of the Dutch Ecumenical Council of Chuches) Sociaal Economische Raad (Social Economic Council) Statistisch Jaarhoek(je) voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1850Staatkundig en Staathuishoudkundig Jaarhoekje, 1849-1884 Staatsalmanak voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1859iVorld Council of Churches
BIBLIOGRAPHY
189
Abma, E.: Boer en coöperatie in Nederland, vol. I. Wageningen: Afdeling Sociologie en Sociografie van de Landbouwhogeschool (1956) - Verenigingen in verleden, heden en toekomst, in Hollander (1961), pp. 287-316 Abrecht, P.: T he Churches and Rapid Social Change. London: SCM Press (1961) Achinger, H.: Wohlfahrtsstaat und Person, Unsere Freiheit morgen, ed. G. Böse. Düsseldorf/Köln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag (1963), pp. 64—77 Amelink, H.: De sociale wetgeving. Hoorn: Edecea (1939) Andriessen, J. E. (ed.): Repertorium van de Sociale Wetenschappen — Eco nomie. Amsterdam/Brussel: Elsevier (1959) Andriessen, J. E., B. Miedema & C. J. Oort: De sociaal-economische bestu ring van Nederland. Groningen: P. Noordhoff (1963) Banning, W.: Hedendaagse sociale bewegingen. Arnhem: Van Loghum Slaterus (1948) - Moderne maatschappij-problemen. 2 vols. Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn (1955— 1958) - Maatschappij, Kerk en Evangelie in drie perioden der Europese geschie denis. Arnhem: Van Loghum Slaterus (1957) - Machten en Mensen. Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn (1959) - Karl Marx. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Aula Boeken. Het Spectrum (1960) - Inleiding tot de sociale ethiek. Den Haag: Servire (1961) - Sociale, politieke en morele problemen der moderne industriële maat schappij, in SCOR (1963), vol. II, pp. 7—18 - Moderne elites en politiek, in W ending, X V II/12, (1963) (a), pp. 782— 791. Barnes, H. E.: Society in Transition. N ew York: Prentice-Hall (1946) Barth, H.: Der konservative Gedanke. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag (1958) Beckerath, H. von: Der moderne Industrialismus. Jena: Verlag Gustav Fischer (1930) Behrendt, R. F.: De mens en zijn toekomst. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Aula Boe ken. Het Spectrum (1964) Bierens de Haan, J.: Bureaucratie, Sociologisch Jaarboek III. Leiden: E. J. Brill (1949) Boettcher, E.: Soziale Marktwirtschaft oder Wohlfahrtsstaat? Die deutsche Erfahrung, Archives Européennes de Sociologie (1961), pp. 259—267 Bosch Kemper, J. de: Geschiedkundig onderzoek naar de armoede in ons vaderland. Haarlem: Erven Loosjes (1851) - Geschiedenis van Nederland na 1830. Amsterdam: vol. IV (1875); vol. V (1882) Boulding, K. E.: T h e Organizational Revolution. N ew York: Harper & Brothers (1953) Bouman, P. J.: Landbouworganisaties, in Sneller (1943), ch. IX - Van Renaissance tot Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam: H. J. Paris (1948) - Leerboek voor economische geschiedenis. Amsterdam: H. J. Paris (1949)
THE SOCIETAL STATE
190
— Van vroeg- tot modem kapitalisme, in J. & A. Romein, De lage landen hij de zee, ch. 21 (1949) (a) — Industrieel klimaat. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1961) Braam, A. van: Ambtenaren en bureaukratie in Nederland. Zeist: W. de Haan (1957) Bremme, G.: Freiheit und soziale Sicherheit. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Ver lag (1961) Briggs, A.: The Welfare State in Historical Perspective, Archives Européen nes de Sociologie (1961), pp. 221—258 Brinton, C.: The Revolutions, ESS, vol. I (1948), pp. 125—144 Brugmans, I. J.: Welvaart en histone. 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff (1950) — De opkomst van het Liberalisme in Nederland, 1840—1848, A G N , vol. X, ch. II (1955-1958) — Economische en maatschappelijke verhoudingen in het Noorden, 1840— 1870, AGN, vol. X, ch. X (1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 ) (a) — De arbeidende klasse in Nederland in de 19e eeuw, 1813—1870. Utrecht/ Antwerpen: Aula Boeken. H et Spectrum (1958) — Paardenkracht en mensenmacht. Sodaal-economische geschiedenis van Nederland, 1795—1940. *s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff (1961) Bruin, P. de: H et sociaal probleem. Antwerpen/Amsterdam: StandaardBoekhandel (1956) Burdeau, G.: La démocratie gouvernante, son assise sociale et sa philosophie politique. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (1956) — De Tétât spectateur à l’état dirigeant, Economie et Humanisme, Jan./Feb.
(1 9 5 8 )
, pp. 1 8 -2 4
Cassirer, E.: The M yth of the State. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books (1955) CBS: Statistiek der vakvereenigingen van werklieden in Nederland, vol. I: Vakbonden en andere centrale organisaties. Bijdragen tot de Statistiek van Nederland. Nieuwe volgreeks N o. LXXXIII. ’s Gravenhage: Gehr. Belinfante (1907) — Statistiek der verkiezingen 1948. Utrecht: W . de Haan (1949) — Statistiek der verkiezingen 1952. Utrecht: W . de Haan (1953) — Zestig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1899—1959. Zeist: W . de Haan
(1 9 5 9 ) — Statistiek der verkiezingen 1959. Zeist: W . de Haan (1959) (a) — De sociale en regionale herkomst der studenten hij het hoger onderwijs, 1958/’59. Zeist: W . de Haan (1960) — Maandstatistiék van de industrie, January (1963) — Omvang der vakbeweging in Nederland op 1 januari 1962. Zeist: W. de Haan (1963) (a) — Mededelingen Volkstelling 1960, N o. 9, January (1963) (b) — Uitkomsten van de 13e Algemene volkstelling, 31 mei 1960. Nederland. (1963) (c)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
191
- I3e Algemene volkstelling, 31 mei 1960, Deel 1 B, Kerkelijke gezindte. Zeist: W . de Haan (1963) (d) - Statistiek der verkiezingen 1963. Zeist: W . de Haan (1963) (e) Clapham, J. H.: T he Economie Development of France and Germany, 1815— 1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1936) Cole, G. D. H.: Industrialism, ESS, vol. VIII (1948) Couvee, D. H. & A. H. Boswijk: Vrouwen vooruitl Den Haag: Bert Bakker/ Daamen (1962) Couwenberg, S. W . et al.: Problemen der democratie, Oost-West, vol. III (1964) Croome, H. M.: T he Approach to Economics. London: Christophers (1948) Daalder, H.: Leiding en lijdelijkheid in de Nederlandse politiek. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1964) Dahl, R. A.: W ho Governs? N ew Haven/London: Yale University Press (1961) - Modem Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N . J.: Prentice-Hall (1963) Dahl, R. A. & Ch. E. Lindblom: Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper & Brothers (1953) Dahrendorf, R.: Gesellschaft und Freiheit. München: Sammlung Piper (1961) Dellepoort, J. J.: De priesteropleidingen in Nederland, 's Gravenhage: Pax (1955) Dengerink, J. D.: Critisch-historisch onderzoek naar de sociologische ont wikkeling van het beginsel der 'souvereiniteit in eigen kring' in de 19e en 20e eeuw. Kampen: J. H. Kok (1948) Dewey, J.: A Common Faith. N ew Haven: Yale University Press (1934) Diepenhorst, P. A.: D e Anti-Revolutionaire Partij in de Staten-Generaal, Schrift en Histone, pp. 293—364. Kampen: J. H. Kok (1928) Donner, A. M.: Over de term "Welvaartsstaat". Mededelingen Kon. Ned. Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 20, No. 15. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgeversmaatschappij (1957) Doom, J. A. A. van & C. J. Lammers: Moderne sociologie. Utrecht/Antwer pen: Aula Boeken. H et Spectrum (1959) Doom, J. A. A. van: Schaalvergroting als een proces van sociale verande ring, Sociologische Gids, V I I /1 (I960), pp. 2—20 Domer, A.: Emancipation, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edinburgh/ New York: T . & T . Clark/Charles Scribner's Sons (1908—1926), vol. V. Drees Sr. W.: Zestig jaar levenservaring. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers (1962) Duff, E.: T he Social Thought of the W orld Council of Churches. London/ New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. (1956) Esveld, N . E. H. van: De ontplooiing van het individu in het arbeidsrecht. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgeversmaatschappij (1946) - De uitdaging van het sociale vraagstuk. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1956) - Treub. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1958)
192
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Fairchild, H. P.: Dictionary of Sociology. Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams & Co. (1955) Finer, H.: T he Theory and Practice of M odem Government. London: Methuen & Co., 1st ed. (1932); rev. ed. (1949) Fockema Andreae, S. J.: Een mensenleven in Nederland. Alphen/Rijn: N. Samson (1957) Fourastié, J.: Le grand espoir du X X e siècle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1952) Fremantle, A.: T he Social Teachings of the Church. N ew York: MentorOmega Books (1963) Gadourek, I.: A Dutch Community. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1956) Galbraith, J. K.: American Capitalism. London: Hamish Hamilton (1957) Geiger, Th.: Gesellschaft, Handwörterbuch der Soziologie. Stuttgart: Ferdi nand Enke Verlag (1931), pp. 2 0 1 -2 1 1 Geyl, P.: De revolutionaire geest en 1848, Vrij Nederland (1960), Sept. 24 Ginsberg, M.: The Growth of Social Responsibility, Law and Public Opinion in England in the 20th Century, ed. M. Ginsberg. London: Stevens & Sons (1959), pp. 3 - 2 6 Goddijn, W . Katholieke minderheid en protestantse dominant. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1957) Goedmakers, H. J. P. J.: D e periode van 1854 tot 1912, Honderd jaren Ar menwet, 1854—1954, ed. J. C. van Dam et al. Alphen/Rijn: N . Samson (1955), pp. 6 7 -1 4 9 Groenman, Sj.: Wijzigingen in het beeld van de Nederlandse samenleving, Ondernemend Nederland, 1899—1959, ed. M. Rooij. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1959), pp. 302—333 — De integratie der delen, in Hollander (1961), pp. 209—226 Gurvitch, G.: Déterminismes sociaux et Liberté humaine. Paris: Presses Uni versitaires de France (1955) Gijzels, F. J. W.: Kartelbeleid in Nederland, Maatschappij-Belangen, April (1962), pp. 2 2 4 -2 3 4 Hanotaux, G.: Histoire de la nation française. Vol. IV /2 . Paris: Librairie Plon (1924) Hansmeyer, K.-H.: Der W eg zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. Frankfurt a. Main: Fritz Knapp Verlag (1957) Harrison, W.: Administration, D SS, pp. 10—12 (1964) Hartog, F.: Spanningen in de verzorgingsstaat, Maatschappij-Belangen, Sept. (1963), pp. 4 9 5 -5 0 1 Heaton, H.: Industrial Revolution, ESS, vol. VIII (1948) Heckscher, E. F.: Mercantilism, ESS, vol. X (1948) Heller, H.: Staat, Handwörterbuch der Soziologie. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag (1931), pp. 608—616 Heringa-Van Ruth, E.: Vrouwenemancipatie (in Nederland), A G N , vol. XI, ch. XII, PP. 2 9 9 -3 0 9 (1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 ) Hoefnagels, H.: Een eeuw sociale problematiek. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1957)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
193
Hofstee, E. W.: Rural life and rural welfare in the Netherlands. The Hague: Government Printing and Publishing Office (1957) Hollander, A. N . J. den et al. (eds.): Drift en Koers. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1961) Hoogerwerf, A.: Sociaal-politieke strijdpunten: smeulend vuur, Sociologische Gids, X (1963), pp. 2 4 9 -2 6 3 - Protestantisme en Progessiviteit. Meppel: J. A. Boom & Zoon (1965) Houtte, J. A. van: Het economisch leven in België, 1830—1880, A G N , vol. X, ch. VIII (1955-1958) Hülsmann, J. H. H.: Handel en nijverheid, in Ritter (1898), vol. I, pp. 281 -3 4 8 Idenburg, Ph. J.: Schets van het Nederlandse schoolwezen. Groningen: J. B. Wolters (1960) Jansen, H. P. H.: H et herstel van de kerkelijke hiërarchie. De Aprilbewe ging, AGN, vol. X, ch. IV (1955-1958) Jonckers Nieboer, J. H.: Geschiedenis der Nederlandse Spoorwegen, 1832— 1938. Rotterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar (1938) Jong Edz., Fr. de: D e Nederlandse arbeidersklasse zoekt haar weg, A G N , vol. XI, ch. IV (1955-1958) - Het politieke leven in Nederland tussen 1901—1914, A G N , vol. XI, ch. XI (1955-195 8 ) (a) - Om de plaats van de arbeid. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers (1956) Klompmaker, H.: Sodaal-economische inleiding, Honderd jaren Armenwet, 1854—1954, eds. J. C. van Dam et al. Alphen/Rijn: N . Samson (1955), pp. 1 -6 6 Knoll, E. & J. Witcover: Fighting Poverty — And City Hall, The Reporter, June 3 (1965) König, R. et al.: Soziologie (Fischer Lexikon). Frankfurt a. Main: Fischer Bücherei (1958) Kooy, T. P. van der: Hollands stapelmarkt en haar verval. Amsterdam: H. J. Paris (1931) Komhauser, W.: T h e Politics of Mass Society. Londen: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1960) Kossmann, E.: D e groei van de anti-revolutionaire partij, A G N , vol. XI, pp. 1 -23 (1955-1958) Kraemer, P. E.: D e welvaarts- of verzorgingsstaat — la belle et la bête, in SCOR (1963), vol. II, pp. 3 9 -5 1 Kraemer, P. E. & H. de Tombe: Staat en maatschappij als voorwerp van sociologische bestudering, W egw ijzer in de sociologie, eds. J. S. van Hessen et al. Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy (1963), pp. 105—130 Kroese, W . T.: Vormen van samenwerking in de Nederlandsche Katoen industrie, 1929—1939. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1945) Kuyper, A.: H et sociale vraagstuk en de christelijke religie. Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser (1891) Lammers, C. J. et al.: Medezeggenschap en overleg in het bedrijf. Utrecht/ Antwerpen: Marka-Boeken (1965)
194
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Lange, H. M. de: De gestalte van een verantwoordelijke maatschappij. Amsterdam: W . ten Have (1966) Langedijk, D.: De geschiedenis van het Protestants-Christelijk onderwijs. Delft: Van Keulen (1953) Laski, H. J.: The Rise of Liberalism, ESS, vol. I (1948) Lavisse, E. & A. Rambaud: Histoire générale du IVme siècle à nos jours, vol. IV, Paris: Armand Colin (1924) Lipset, S. M.: Veranderde klassestructuur en hedendaagse Europese politiek, Socialisme en Democratie, April/M ay (1964), pp. 257—275, 357—371 Maciver, R. M.: Sociology, ESS, vol. XIV (1948) — The W eh of Government. N ew York: MacMillan Company (1953) Mannheim, K.: Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1948) — Freedom, Power & Democratic Planning. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1951) Marshall, T. H.: The Welfare State: A Sociological Interpretation, Archives Européennes de Sociologie (1961), pp. 284—300 Matthijssen, M.: De intellectuele emancipatie der Katholieken. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1958) Maus, H.: Geschichte der Soziologie, Handbuch der Soziologie. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag (195 5 -1 9 5 6 ), 1. Hälfte, pp. 1 -1 2 0 McKeon, R.: The Development and the Significance of the Concept of Responsibility, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, X I/39 (1957), pp. 3—32 Mehnert, K.: Der Sowjetmensch. Frankfurt a. Main/Hamburg: Fischer Bücherei (1961) Mehring, F.: Karl Marx. Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei (1918) Meynen, J.: Werknemers-medezeggenschap en de oplossing van het sociale vraagstuk in de onderneming. Voordracht gehouden bij gelegenheid van de uitreiking van de Henri Sijthoff Prijs. Amsterdam: 7 december (1961) Miller, D. C. & W . H. Form: Industrial Sociology. N ew York: Harper & Brothers (1951) Mills, C. W.: W hite Collar. N ew York: Oxford University Press Galaxy Books (1956) — The Power Elite. N ew York: Oxford University Press Galaxy Books (1959) Minderhoud, G.: De landbouwindustrie, in Sneller (1943), ch. IX — Landhouw-coöperatie in Nederland. Groningen: J. B. Wolters (1949) Mok, S.: De Vakbeweging. Amsterdam: Vrij Nederland (1947) Molenaar, A. N.: Arbeidsrecht, vols. I, II-A, II-B. Zwolle: W . E. J. Tjeenk Willink (1953-1958) Muelder, W . G.: Foundations of the Responsible Society. New York/ Nashville: Abingdon Press (1959) Muiswinkel, F. L. van: H et kartelbeleid in Nederland, MaatschappijBelangen, Feb. (1962), pp. 5 4 -5 7
BIBLIOGRAPHY
195
Myrdal, G.: Beyond the W elfare State. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. (1960) NGIS: Digest of the Netherlands 2 — Finance and Economy. The Hague: NGIS (1958) - Digest of the Kingdom of the Netherlands — Social Aspects. The Hague: NGIS (1963) — Digest of the Kingdom of the Netherlands — Education, Arts, and Sciences. T he Hague: NGIS (1963) (a) Nicolaievsky, B. & O. Maenchen-Helfen: Karl Marx. London: Methuen & Co. (1936) Niezing, J.: D e kleine partij — enkele hypothesen, Sociologische Gids, X (1963), pp. 2 6 4 -2 7 2 Oldham, J. H.: A Responsible Society, in W CC (1948), ch. X Oosterlee, P.: Geschiedenis van het Christelijk onderwijs. Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn (1929) Oud, P. J.: Honderd jaren, 1840—1940. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1954) Ouden, R. A. den: D e Anti-Revolutionaire Partij in den lande, Schrift en Historie, pp. 389—418. Kampen: Kok (1928) Patijn, C. L.: D e Wereldraad van Kerken op zoek naar een nieuwe sociale ethiek, W ending, X V III/8 (1963), pp. 556—565 Pen, J.: Harmonie en conflict. Amsterdam: D e Bezige Bij (1962) Pen, J. & P. J. Bouman: Een eeuw van toenemende welvaart, in Hollander (1961) , pp. 8 5 -1 0 4 Petzäll, A.: La responsabilité individuelle et la société, Revue Internatio nale de Philosophie, X I/3 9 (1957), pp. 88—99 Poelje, G. A. van: Osmose. Een aantekening over het elkander doordringen van de beginselen van openbaar bestuur en particulier beheer. Alphen/ Rijn: N . Samson (1931) Ponsioen, J. A.: T he Evolution of Social Policy since Industrialization, Essays on Unbalanced Growth, ed. E. de Vries, 's Gravenhage: Mouton & Co. (1962) Postgate, R.: 1848. Story of a Year. London: Jonathan Cape (1955); Amster dam: H. J. Paris, Dutch ed. (1956) Pound, R.: T he Rise of the Service State and its Consequences, The Welfare State and the National W elfare, ed. Sheldon Glueck. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press (1952) Pouthas, Ch. H.: Démocratie et Capitalisme (1848—1860). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1948) Prisma: Vraagbaak, vols. I-II, eds. A. F. M. van Haaren et al. Utrecht/ Antwerpen: H et Spectrum (1956) Rees, J. C.: Freedom, D SS, pp. 2 7 5 -2 7 6 (1964) Reynaud, J. D.: La Securité sociale en France: du conflit doctrinal à l'af frontement des intérêts, Archives Européennes de Sociologie (1961), pp. 2 6 8 -2 8 3
196
THE SOCIETAL STATE
Ritter, P. H. (ed.): Een Halve Eeuw, 1848—1898. Amsterdam: J. L. Beijns & J. Funke (1898) Rogier, J.: Om algemeen kiesrecht en sociale revolutie (1879—1918), 500 Jaren S taten-G eneraal in de Nederlanden, eds. S. J. Fockema Andreae & H. Hardenberg. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1964) Rogier, L. J.: Katholieke herleving. *s Gravenhage: Pax (1956) — De eerste twee koningen uit het huis Oranje, in Verberne (1958), Introduction Roland Holst, H.: Kapitaal en arbeid in Nederland. Rotterdam: W . L. & J. Brusse (1932) Romein, J.: Het onvoltooid verleden. Amsterdam: E. M. Querido (1937) — Inleiding A G N , vol. X (1955-1958) Romein, J. & A.: De lage landen bij de zee. Utrecht: W . de Haan (1949) Romein-Verschoor, A.: Man en vrouw, Spelen met de tijd. Amsterdam: Em. Querido (1957), pp. 2 8 -5 0 Rooij, M.: Terugblik en perspectief, Ondernemend Nederland, 1899—1959, ed. M. Rooij. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1959), pp. 334—373 Röpke, W.: Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart. Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag (1942) Ruggiero, G. de: Liberalism, ESS, vol. IX (1948) — The History of European Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press (1959) Ruitenbeek, H. M.: H et ontstaan van de Partij van de Arbeid. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers (1955) Ruppert, M.: De Nederlandse Vakbeweging, vols. I-II. Haarlem; Erven F. Bohn (1953) Rüter, A. J. C.: De spoorwegstakingen van 1903. Leiden: E. J. Brill (1935) Salomon, G.: Lorenz von Stein, ESS, vol. XIV (1948) Schaper, B. W.: Tussen machtsstaat en welvaartsstaat. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1963) Schmelzer, W . K. N.: Institutionele samenwerking en mede-verantwoordelijkheid in en van het bedrijfsleven, Maatschappij-Belangen, Nov. (1962), pp. 6 58-661 Schokking, J. C.: De vrouw in de Nederlandse politiek. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1958) Schouten, C. H.: De ordening van het bedrijfsleven in de praktijk van het vervoerswezen, Ondernemend Nederland, 1899—1959, ed. M. Rooij. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1959), pp. 210—266 Schumpeter, J. A.: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. N ew York: Har per & Brothers (1950) SCOR: The Changes in Society and State and the Church's Call for a Responsible Society, T h e W elfare State from the Christian Point of View. Ecumenical Study Documents (mimeographed). Geneva: W CC Study Department (1953) — Sociale stroomversnellingen in Nederland, vols. I-II. Amsterdam: W. ten Have (1963)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
197
Seidel, B.: Industrialismus und Kapitalismus. Meisenheim/Glan: Verlag Anton Hain (1955) SER: Overzicht van vrije ondernemersorganisaties in Nederland. Den Haag: SER (1960) - Verslag over 1962. Den Haag: SER (1963), no. 12 Sneller, Z. W . (ed.): Geschiedenis van den N ederlandschen landbouw, 1795—1940. Groningen: J. B. Wolters (1943), Stark, W.: T he History of Economics in its Relation to Social Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1952) Stein, L. von: Der Begriff der Gesellschaft und die sociale Geschichte der französischen Revolution bis zum Jahre 1830. Leipzig: Otto Wigand Verlag (1855) Stuyvenberg, J. H. van: D e landbouw op de stroom van de tijd, Onder nemend Nederland, 1899—1959, ed. M. Rooij. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1959), pp. 2 6 7 -3 0 2 Talmon, J. L.: Political Messianism. T he Romantic Phase. London: Martin Seeker & Warburg (1960) Tempel, B. van den: T he Evolution of Social Systems. London: Robert Hale (1962) Thoenes, P.: De elite in de verzorgingsstaat. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1962) Thurlings, J. M. G.: Strijd om nieuwe orde, Sociologische Gids, XII (1965), pp. 8 9 -1 0 5 Trevelyan, G. M.: English Social History. London: Longmans, Green and Co. (1946) Tijn, Th. van: Op de drempel van de nieuwe tijd: Nederland omstreeks 1870, A G N , vol. X, ch. XI (1955-1958) Valkhoff, J.: Een eeuw rechtsontwikkeling. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers (1948) - Vermaatschappelijking van recht en staat, in Hollander (1961), pp. 265 -2 8 6 Vail, M. van de: D e vakbeweging in de welvaartsstaat. Meppel: J. A. Boom & Zoon (1963) - Participatie in de vrijwillige organisatie, Mensen, groepen, organisaties, e.d. M. Mulder, vol. I, pp. 167—204. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1963) (a) Veld, J. in 't: Public Administration in a Changing World, Essays on Unbalanced Growth, ed. E. de Vries. 's-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co. (1962) Ven, F. J. H. M. van der: Sociale grondrechten. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Het Spectrum (1957) - Theorie der sociale politiek. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1961) Verbeme, L. G. J.: Geschiedenis van Nederland, in de jaren 1850—1925. Vols. MI. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Prisma Boeken, Het Spectrum (1957) - Geschiedenis van Nederland, in de jaren 1813—1850. Vols. I-IL Utrecht/ Antwerpen: Prisma Boeken, Het Spectrum (1958)
198
THE SOCIETAL STATE
— De Nederlandse arbeidersbeweging in de negentiende eeuw. Utrecht/ Antwerpen: Aula Boeken, Het Spectrum (1959) Versluis, W . G.: Geschiedenis van de emancipatie der Katholieken in Neder land van 1795-heden. Utrecht/Nijmegen: Dekker & Van de Vegt (1948) Vervoort, C . E.: Prolegomena tot de sociologie van de welvaartsstaat, Socio logische Gids, X (1963), pp. 58—68 Verwey-Jonker, H.: De emancipatiebewegingen, in Hollander (1961), pp. 105 -1 2 5 Vinke, P.: De maatschappelijke plaats en herkomst der directeuren en com missarissen van de open en daarmede vergelijkbare besloten Naamloze Vennootschappen. Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese (1961) Visser, J. Th. de: De Arbeidersbeweging, in Ritter (1898), vol. I, pp. 4 0 3 -4 2 2 Vrankrijker, A. C. J. de: Een groeiende gedachte. Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. (1959) Vries, C. W . de: Ministeries onder liberale invloed, 1853—1866, AGN, vol. X, ch. VII A (1955-1958) (a) — De strijd om het parlementaire stelsel, 1866—1887, A G N , vol. X, ch. VIIB (1955-1958) (b) Vries, E. de: Man in Rapid Social Change. London: SCM Press (1961) WCC: The Church and the Disorder of Society. London: SCM Press (1948) — Statements of the W orld Council of Churches on Social Questions. Geneva: Department on Church and Society. Division of Studies (1955) — Dilemmas and Opportunities. Christian Action in Rapid Social Change. Report of an International Study Conference, Thessalonica, Greece, July 25 — August 2, 1959. Geneva: W C C Department on Church and Society. Division of Studies (1959) — The N ew Delhi Report. The Third Assembly of the W CC, 1961. London: SCM Press (1962) — Major Issues in Christian Social Thought and Action, Bulletin, Division of Studies, WCC, vol. X / l (1964), pp. 3 - 8 Welderen Rengers, W . J. van: Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1891. Vols I—III. 's Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff (1905-1907) Wendland, H.-D.: Der Begriff der 'Verantwortlichen Gesellschaft" in seiner Bedeutung für die Sozialethik der Ökumene, Zeitschrift für Evange lische Ethik, I X /1 (1965), pp. 1—16 West, C. C.: The Concept "Responsible Society". Mimeographed paper Consultation on 'Responsible Society' and Christian Social Decision. Bossey: Ecumenical Institute, June 6th—11th (1960) White, Th. H.: T he Making of the President I960. London: Jonathan Cape (1963) Wibaut, F. M.: Trusts en Kartellen. Amsterdam: A. B. Soep (1903)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
199
Wilson, Ch.: Geschiedenis van Unilever, 2 vols. 's Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff (1954) Winter, G.: T he Suburban Captivity of the Churches. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company (1961) Wisselink, J.: Basic Reasons for Concentration in the Wool Textile Industry, Economisch-Statistische Berichten, June 21 (1961) — Bedrijfseconomische aspecten van concentratie, Maandschrift Economie, June (1963) Ijzerman, A.W.: H et revolutiejaar en het Communistisch Manifest van Marx en Engels. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers (1948) Zoetewey, B.: National W age Policy: the Experiences of the Netherlands, International Labour R eview, Feb. (1955), pp. 148—179 Zwager, H. H.: Een nieuw fundament in het Noorden, AGN, vol. X, ch. I ll (1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 ) — De motivering van het algemeen kiesrecht in Europa. Groningen: J. B. Wolters (1958)
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
1. State-Society Relations Typical of Absolutism and Liberalism 2. Three Stages in the Development of Post-Medieval State-Society Relations 3. Two Phases in the Joint Operation of the French and the Indus trial Revolution 4. Social Insurance Administration 5. Membership of Social-Economic Council, January 1, 1962 6. Principal Political Groupings in the Second Chamber of Par liament, 1850—1918 7. Persons Entitled to Vote at General Elections, in Percentages of Population Over 24 Years, 1870—1920 8. Schematic Diagram of the Distribution of Influence on Decisions
6 18 26 87 88 98 99 143
Tables 1. Number of Steam Engines in Factories and Workshops,1837—1860 2. Kilometers of Railway in Exploitation, 1839—1870 3. Chronology of Liberalizing Measures Executed between 1845—1870 4. Chronology of State Instigated Provisions in the Public Interest, 1850-1870 5. Tentative Indices of Beginning Socio-Economic Change, 1850—1875
36 36 38 40 41
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 6. Percentages of People Entitled to Vote at General and Municipal Elections, And of Persons Over 24 Years (to Total Population), 1 850-1870 7. Number of Central Government Departments and Cabinet Mem bers, And Total Expenditures on All Existing Departments, 1850-1960 8. Central Government Expenditures Classified According to Depart ments, 1850—1960 9. Central Government Expenditures on Some Departments, Clas sified According to the Three Classic Liberalist State Functions, 1850-1960 10. Tentative Classification of Social Legislative Enactments Accor ding to Four Phases of Both Increasing and Changing State Inter vention 11. Number of Power-Looms and Weaving-Mills in the City of En schede, 1 8 6 6 -1 9 1 3 12. Number of Workmen of N ine Engineering Works, 1867—1897 13. Classification of Industrial Enterprises (excl. Building Trade) into 4 Size Groups, 1903—1960 14. Manufacturing Industries (excl. Building and Dairying), Employed Persons, and Total Turnover, in 1961 15. Economic Combines and Agreements Affecting Dutch Trades and Industries, ± 1900 16. Forms of Economic Cooperation in the Netherlands Cotton In dustry, Prior to 1940 17. Interlocking Directorates of 604 Limited Liability Companies, As Presented in a Recent Dutch Study (1961) 18. Business Integrations in the Netherlands in 1962 19. Employees1 and Employers' Unions Anno 1960, Classified Accor ding to their Date of Formation 20. Membership and Capital of Trade Unions, 1910—1961 21. Synchronous Developments in Early Agricultural Organization and Concentration 22. Government Employed Civilian Personnel, 1850—1955 23. N ew Tasks and Functions Assumed by the (Central, Provincial, Municipal) Government Since 1850 24. Tentative Indices of Roman Catholic Emancipation, ± 1850—1960 25. Tentative Indices of Socio-Economic Progress, ± 1870—1920 26. Membership of Old-Type Labour Unions, 1906, and of ModemType Central Federations, 1906—1920 27. Main Fields of Action of the Women's Movement in the Nether lands, ± 1 8 7 0 -1 9 2 0 28. Classification of 137 Publications on the 'Social Question' According to Subjects Covered, ± 1870— 1950
201
42
47 48
49
53 63 63 64 64 65 67 70 70 74 75 76 80 81 92 94 102 104 122
BRIEF SUMMARY IN D U TC H
Zoals de titel van deze studie wil aangeven, wordt de hedendaagse ver houding tussen Staat en Maatschappij niet slechts gekenmerkt door een nauwe wederzijdse vervlechting, maar tevens door het feit van de Vermaat schappelijking’ van de Staat. D e nadruk wordt erop gelegd, dat het verre gaande staatsingrijpen, zoals dat zich tegenwoordig voordoet, geen terug keer inhoudt tot de zo-geheten Policey-staat uit de dagen van het Cameralisme en Colbertisme. Ondanks opmerkelijke overeenkomsten, is er een we zenlijk verschil tussen het handelen van de Staat (en de motivering daar van) thans en in de dagen vóór de opkomst van het Liberalisme. Dit ver schil is een gevolg van de gezamenlijke krachtencomplexen, welke door de Franse en de Industriële Revolutie in werking zijn gezet en die, als een eerste resultaat, geleid hebben tot de overgang van de ’Absolutist State’ naar de ’Free Society’ — een overgang die tot uitdrukking komt in de genoemde opkomst van het Liberalisme (Introductie). Het negentiende-eeuwse Liberalisme is echter niet enkel een resultaat van de werking van de Franse en de Industriële Revolutie. Het blijkt tevens een systeem in te houden, dat tot verval gedoemd was als gevolg van de voortgaande inwerking van dezelfde krachten, die er aanvankelijk aan ten grondslag lagen. Noodzakelijkerwijs riep dit systeem een aantal ontwikke lingen in het leven, die op den duur de ’Free Society’ plaats deden maken voor de ’Societal State’, de vermaatschappelijkte Staat (Hoofdstuk I). Deze ontwikkelingen, die in dit geschrift worden geanalyseerd aan de hand van empirisch materiaal over de sociaal-economische geschiedenis van Nederland van de laatste honderd jaar, worden onder een drietal noemers beschreven: de groei van wat het ’organizationalisme’ genoemd wordt; de opmars van de tot emancipatie komende volksgroepen; en de gewekte stem
b r ie f
su m m a ry
in
d u tc h
203
van het 'sociale geweten’. Onder invloed van deze ontwikkelingen wordt de Staat tot een centrale instelling die, in de meest letterlijke zin van die term, 'ad ministreert', dienstbaar-is-aan de samenstellende delen van de Maat schappij in hun streven naar zelfbestemming (Hoofdstuk II). Dit resultaat nu van genoemde ontwikkelingen wordt tenslotte critisch gewaardeerd in het licht van het normatieve concept van de 'Verantwoor delijke Maatschappij', een concept dat een belangrijke plaats inneemt in het denken over maatschappelijke vraagstukken in de Wereldraad van Kerken sedert de eerste Algemene Vergadering van deze Raad in Amsterdam (1948). De conclusie van deze evaluatie is tweevoudig. In de eerste plaats wordt ge constateerd dat de 'Societal State' een belangrijke stap betekent op de weg naar een 'Verantwoordelijke Maatschappij'. De 'Societal State’ weerspiegelt de omstandigheden welke gevonden worden in een samenleving, waarvan de leden een wederzijdse verantwoordelijkheid erkennen voor de verwezenlij king van ieders recht op menselijke zelf-ontplooiing. Anderzijds moet echter worden vastgesteld, dat de 'Societal State’ een aantal tendensen vertoont die een ernstige bedreiging inhouden voor de menselijke zelf-bepaling, juist omdat hij een complex van 'administratieve' instellingen en procedures ver eist terwille van de veiligstelling van de collectieve solidariteit. Waar dan nog bijkomt, dat die maatregelen, welke denkbaar zijn om bedoelde geva ren tegen te gaan, veeleer een verdere bedreiging betekenen, althans ten zeerste bijdragen tot de last der onopgeloste problemen die eigen lijken te zijn aan de 'Societal State’ als (gunstig te waarderen) uitdrukking van daad werkelijke, collectieve solidariteit (Hoofdstuk III).
INDEX
Absolutism, 2, 6—8, 17, 46, 130 Absolutist State, 6, 8, 11, 13, 19, 23, 127 Abstinent State, 9, 46 ’Ad-ministration’, 131—133, 141, 183 Africa, 7, 140, 152 Agriculture, 37, 75—79 big agriculture, 72, 75—80 Alienation, 146, 158 Alynski, Saul D., 160 Ancien Régime, 3, 25 Angestellten, 141—142 Apparatchiks, 141 Areas in rapid sodal change, 27, 140, 152-153 Asia, 7, 140, 152 Authoritarianism, 7—8, 14, 19, 32, 131, 153 Autocracy, 3, 24, 61 Automation de Vhomme, 143 Autonomy, see Self-determination Banning, W ., 141 Behrendt, R. R , 1 2 8 -1 2 9 Belgium, 3 4 -3 7 , 137, 170
Bourgeoisie, 2—3, 5, 9, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 2 8 -3 3 , 60, 90, 95, 119, 128 Brandenburg, Count, 21 Brinton, C., 25, 127 Burdeau, G., 13, 17, 131-132 Bureaucracy, 10—11, 22, 72, 138, 141 Business, big, 63—72, 80 business mergers, see Cartels ’business Napoleons’, 65 Cameralism, 15—16, 131 Cartels, 5 5 -5 6 , 6 5 -7 2 , 77, 85, 174 Capitalism, 2, 7, 9, 19, 25—26, 33, 3 5 ,4 3 ,6 0 -6 2 , 69, 72, 75, 78, 9 4 -9 5 , 111, 114, 116-118, 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 123,128,151-152, 154 Centralism/centralization, 2, 7—8, 1 0 -1 1 , 63, 72, 102, 112, 131 Charity, 34, 39, 45, 114-115, 160 Christian Sodal Congress 1891,
100, 120 Class struggle, 33, 138, 160
INDEX
Co-determination, 122, 137, 155, 159 Colbertism, 16, 131 Cole, G. D. H., 61 Collective bargaining, 53—55, 112, 122, 138 Collective morality, 156—157 Collectivization, 89, 139—141 Communism, 33, 151—152 Community organization, 142, 160 Competition, 46, 56, 70, 84—85 free, 4, 19, 22, 25, 51, 61, 83 'perfect', 45, 83 Concentration, 2, 25, 61—63, 65, 7 2 -7 3 , 7 5 -7 6 , 78, 80, 84, 89, 103, 109, 112 Consensus, 133—134, 138, 144— 145, 183 Constitution of 1848, 32, 42, 90, 96, 113 Cooperatives, 72, 77—79, 122 Coordination, 8, 14, 19, 25—26, 5 5 -5 6 , 80, 8 3 -8 4 , 86, 8 8 89, 127, 134, 142, 144, 159 Corporations, 15, 63, 72 Corporatism, creeping, 142 Countervailing power, 112, 140 Croome, H. M., 69 Decentralization, 11, 54, 56, 89, 123 Democracy, 4, 7, 13, 1 6 -1 7 , 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 43, 60, 91, 97, 110, 1 2 7 -1 2 8 , 138, 142, 153, 156, 160 democratization, 19, 26, 50, 108, 1 27-129, 133, 139, 141 Démocratie libérale, 13 Démocratie sodale, 13, 132 Depression, Great, 10, 51, 128, 151 Developing countries, 7, 27, 113, 153 Disraeli, B., 34 Domela Nieuwenhuis, F., 100— 101, 109
205 Elections, direct, 42, 91, 109 Élites, functional, 129, 141 managing élite, 145, 161 Emancipation, 1 6-17, 25, 43, 5 8 59, 89, 9 1 -9 6 , 101-103, 105-109, 119, 123-124, 131, 133-134, 136, 1 4 0 141, 148, 167 Employees, 5 3 -5 4 , 56, 73, H i l l ^ 123 organizations, 55 -5 6 , 67, 74 Employers, 45, 54, 56, 73 -7 4 , 79, 100, 112, 116-117, 120, 136 organizations, 55—56, 74,108, 122, 157 employers' vs. trade asso ciations, 67—68, 74 England, 8, 27, 3 4 -3 5 , 37, 7 6 77, 118, 132-133, 137, 146 Entrepreneurs, 25, 35, 61, 63, 76, 137 Equality, 3, 16, 24, 29, 91—93, 103, 106-107, 113, 120, 124, 132-133, 135, 148-149 Equalization of liberties, 90, 96— 97, 105-106, 135 of claims, 134, 144 Etat policier, 43, 57 Ethics, 136, 150-151, 155 Feudalism, 2, 8, 19, 22—23 Fichte, J. G., 4 Finer, H., 9, 4 3 -4 4 , 114 Fourastié, J., 129 France, 4, 8, 2 7 -2 8 , 32, 137 Franchise, see Suffrage Free enterprise, sec Private initiative Free Society, 6, 9, 10-11, 13, 19, 23, 26, 46, 58, 60, 102, 127 Free trade, 39, 61—62, 91 Freedom(s), 4, 7, 9, 11, 17, 24, 26, 30, 39, 50, 52, 59 -6 0 , 91, 93, 106, 109, 132-133, 1 3 5 136, 140-141, 147-149, 151-155
THE SOCIETAL STATE
206 freedom-in-community, 1 55-156 individual vs. collective, 147 French Revolution, 23—31, 33, 60, 89, 91, 95, 105, 113, 118, 123, 126-128, 130, 133, 137, 148, 156 Friedrich Wilhelm IV, 21 Galbraith, J. K., 112 ’General class’, 3, 16, 30, 131 General good/welfare, see Public interest Germany, 27, 32, 77, 137, 142, 146 Geyl, P., 31 Ginsberg, M., 135 Glorious Revolution, 8 Goes, F. van der, 101 Government, 3—4, 7—10, 13, 39, 4 3 -4 5 , 50, 5 4 -5 6 , 7 6 -7 7 , 7 9 -8 6 , 88, 111-112, 1 1 8 121, 137-139, 141 defined, 19 action/intervention, see State action/interference expenditures, 47—49, 79, 172-173 big government 72, 80—85 Groen van Prinsterer, R., 43 Gurvitch, G., 161 Hayek, F. A. von, 10 Hegel, G. W . F., 4 Heine, H., 32, 169 Heller, H., 13, 18, 131-1 3 2 Holland, see Netherlands Humani tarianism, 114, 116 'Immanence’, 127, 130, 133, 142, 148 immanent processes, 60, 69, 102 India, 7 Individualism, 10, 23, 28, 61, 1 35-136 Industrial government, 112, 139
139, 62,
103, 136,
Industrial Revolution, 23—31, 33, 60, 62, 89, 91, 95, 105, 113, 118, 123, 1 26-128, 130, 133, 137, 148, 156 Industrialism, 19, 22, 25—27, 34, 6 0 -6 2 , 69, 72, 7 5 -7 6 , 7δ! 80, 89, 9 4 -9 5 , 111, 114, 1 1 6 -1 1 8 , 120-121, 128, 134, 138, 156, 175 Industrialization, 26, 50, 65, 103, 123, 133, 139, 141 Industry, 3, 9, 16, 35, 37, 41, 5 5 56, 6 1 -6 5 , 69, 7 2 -7 3 , 112, 114, 1 3 7 -138, 141, 154 agricultural, 76—79 Integration, 106—113, 134, 139141, 1 4 4 -145, 148 Italy, 137 Justi, Von, 15 Justice, 141, 148-149, 151-152 Kennedy, J. F., 125 Kröller, A. G., 112 Kuyper, A., 100, 108, 120 Labour, 13, 30, 5 4 -5 6 , 72-75, 86, 88, 1 1 2 -113, 119-121, 123, 13 6 -1 37 , 141 big labour, 72—75, 80 Labour unions, 54, 56, 72—75, 97, 10 0 -1 0 2 , 107, 111-113, 119, 1 2 1 -1 2 2 , 138, 146, 157 Laissez faire, 3, 9—10, 26, 39, 4 3 -4 4 , 4 6 -4 7 , 52, 61, 151 Laski, Η., 15 Latin America, 140, 152 Liberalism, 2—4, 6, 8—10, 15—17, 19, 23, 25, 2 8 -3 3 , 37, 39, 4 3 -4 4 , 4 6 -4 7 , 4 9 -5 2 , 57, 5 9 -6 2 , 83, 9 0 -9 2 , 95-97, 108, 1 1 5 -118, 120, 128, 135 Liberté créatrice, 161 Liberty, 3, 16, 29, 91, 97, 103, 113, 120, 124, 133, 135, 148, 161 liberties, 26, 29, 32, 113, 127,
INDEX 144-146 Louis XIV, 2 - 3 , 130-131 Lower/working classes, 25, 30, 33, 4 2 -4 3 , 95, 97, 9 9 -1 0 2 , 109, 113, 1 1 5 -116, 118 -1 1 9 , 121, 136, 139 Maclver, R. M., 4 Management, 13, 54—56, 73, 86, 88, 123, 1 3 6 -138, 141 Managers, 63, 146 Mannheim, K., 8, 11, 17, 19, 61 Manufacturers’ agreements, see Cartels Marken, J. C. van, 117 Marx, K., 2 1 -2 2 , 73, 168 Marxism, 14, 22, 61, 108, 160 Masses, underprivileged, 7, 24, 2 7 -3 1 , 33, 91, 98, 100, 108, 117, 1 20-121, 128, 134, 144 Mediators, expert, 142—143, 145, 159, 185 Mercantilism, 2, 5, 8, 15, 25, 46, 61 Merchant Adventurers, 7 Metternich, Von, 23 Middle classes, 24, 30, 32, 40, 42, 9 5 -9 7 , 103 Mises, L. von, 10 Monopolies, 3, 8, 24, 29, 40, 56, 7 4 -7 5 , 85, 124, 143, 147 Mosca, G., 17 Mott, J. R , 157 Muelder, W . G., 150, 156 Mündigkeit, 137—138, 148 Mutual assistance societies, 43, 73,
100, 122 Nationalization, 84, 111 Neo-Mercantilism, 8, 35, 43, 94 Netherlands, 8, 1 1 -1 3 , 31f, 43f, 47f, 62f, 90f, 113, 114f, 136, 146-147, 170 Novalis, 4 Occupational associations, 54, 87 Oldham, J. H., 156
207 Organization, large-scale, 25—26, 6 2 -6 5 , 7 2 -7 3 , 7 5 -7 6 , 78, 80, 8 3 -8 4 , 89, 103, 109, 111, 124, 127, 154 ’organizationalism’, 61, 89, 102, 112, 128, 134, 173 Orthodox-Calvinists/Protestants, see Protestants Osmosis of Society and State, 11— 12, 85, 89, 126, 130, 139 Parliamentarism vs. anti-parliamen tarism, 101, 108—109 Participation, 16, 26, 86, 89, 97, 123, 134, 142-143, 149, 152-156, 158-160, 187 Paternalism, 8, 19, 37, 57, 59, 74, 100, 112, 131, 138, 142-144, 158 Parties, political, 43, 72, 96—97, 107-109, 122, 136, 138, 141-142, 146, 157 national vs. class party, 110, 136 'splinter-parties’, 147 Partnership, 134, 155—156 Personae miserabiles, 57, 122—123 Petzäll, A., 143 Philanthropy, 104, 116 Philip II, of Spain, 8 Physiocrats, 9 Planning, 25, 52, 55, 69, 8 2 -8 4 , 110, 114, 122-123, 138, 154 Policeystaat, 15, 43, 57, 131 Political economy, 116—117 Pomponne de Belhèvre, 1 Poole, S. le, 117 Poor, the, 29—30, 33—34, 42, 1 1 5 -116 poor relief, 16, 34, 39, 41, 45, 104, 115 Portugal, 8 Pouthas, Ch. H., 22, 27 Poverty, 34, 42, 1 14-117 Private agendes/institutions, ΙΟ Ι 1, 14, 19, 5 4 -5 5 , 83, 8 6 -8 8 , 123, 144
THE SOCIETAL STATE
208 Private initiative, 5, 10—11, 14, 17, 19, 39, 45, 5 1 -5 2 , 60, 62, 78, 84, 86, 88, 121, 152 Private interest, 4—5, 44, 60, 75, 83, 85, 8 7 -8 8 , 144 Production agreements, see Cartels Progress, 4, 24, 30, 129 Proletariat 3 0 -3 4 , 101, 117, 169 Property, 3—4, 19, 24, 29, 33, 45, 61, 120 distribution of, 137 Protestants, 43, 74 orthodox, 4 3 ,9 5 -9 7 ,9 9 -1 0 0 , 102, 106-108, 112, 120-121 Public interest, 4—5, 9, 14—15, 19, 40, 50, 5 5 -5 6 , 60, 75, 80, 8 5 -8 8 , 123, 135-136, 139, 144 Public-legal institutions, 13, 56, 85, 8 8 -8 9 , 122 Public agendes/institutions, 9 —10, 39 49, 5 3 -5 4 , 56, 75, 8 7 89, 123, 144 Quanta Cura, 96, 178 Quesnay, F., 24 Radicalization, 100, 120 Raison d’Êtat, 2, 16 Raison de Société, 16 Rationalization, 63, 69—70 Rechtsstaat, 13 sozialer, 13, 132 Reforms, structural, 52, 123—124, 138 Rerum Novarum, 120 Responsibility, 7, 11, 14, 133, 135, 137, 143, 148 -149, 155, 157-159, 186 Responsible Sodety, 12, 14 9 -1 5 1 , 153-158, 161 defined, 149 Rights, 3 - 4 , 24, 26, 2 9 -3 0 , 34, 91, 105-107, 113, 124, 127, 134 -136, 139, 142, 144, 148 Ritchie, D. G., 10
Roman Catholics, 43, 74, 92—97, 9 9 -1 0 0 , 102, 106-108, 112,
120 Romdn, J., 31—32, 95 Röpke, W ., 62 Rostow, W . W ., 91 Rousseau, J. J., 24 Ruggiero, G. de, 27 Russia, 138 Schaepman, H., 108 Schaper, B. W ., 132 Schools, denominational, 40, 92— 94, 9 6 -9 7 , 99, 106 Scurity, 3, 14, 16, 24, 29, 60, 81. 113, 1 2 3 -12 4 , 129, 1 3 2 133, 136, 148, 154, 158 Self-determination, 60, 129, 132, 134, 1 4 0 -1 41 , 155, 158-159 Self-help/regulation, sodetal, 19, 2 5 -2 6 , 44, 50, 61, 67, 83, 8 5 -8 6 , 1 2 1 -1 2 2 , 127 Self-interest, enlightened, 4, 50 Self-realization, 17, 28—29, 124, 140, 144 Semi-public agendes/institutions, 10, 75, 123, 144 Service sector, 129, 141 Service institutions, 142—143, 1 5 9 -1 6 0 ’Small people’, 95, 9 9 -1 0 0 , 102, 108, 178 Smith, A., 9, 24, 39, 49 Sodal action, 100, 112, 120, 160 Social conscience, 26, 102—103, 1 1 4 -1 1 5 , 118, 121, 123,128, 134 Sodal-dtraocracy, 138 sodal-democrats, 74,101—102, 1 0 8 -1 1 0 Sodal justice, 30, 112-113, 140 Sodal legislation, 7, 52—56, 87,
110, 120, 122 ’Sodal question’, 27—28, 33, 42, 1 1 6 -1 1 8 , 1 21 -1 2 4
209 Socialism, 7, 10, 14, 109-110, 120, 152, 154 socialists, 29, 33, 99—101, 107-110, 112, 1 20-1 2 1 , 138 Socialization, 89, 122 Societal State, 11—13, 15, 18— 19, 23, 26, 60, 90, 102-103, 126-130. 133, 136, 140, 142, 144, 146, 1 48-149, 156-161 defined, 17, 132 Societalization, 140, 144, 147 of State, 15, 131, 148 Society, 2 - 6 , 8 - 9 , 11, 1 3 -1 9 , 39, 4 4 -4 6 , 5 0 -5 1 , 5 7 -6 0 , 85, 124, 1 30-134, 141, 145, 148, 165 defined, 18 Interest of, 16—17, 131 Solidarity, 130, 133 -1 3 4 , 1 3 6 139, 148, 1 5 3 -1 5 6 Spain, 8, 138 Special-interest groups, 80, 86, 89, 109, 140 Specialization, 63, 173 Spencer, H., 10 State, 2 -1 1 , 1 3 -1 9 , 2 9 -3 0 , 39, 4 4 -4 7 , 4 9 -5 4 , 5 7 -6 1 , 89, 124, 1 3 0 -135, 141, 1 4 4 145, 148, 152, 156 defined, 1 8 -1 9 , 89 absolute, 7, 14, 131 ’ad-ministrative’, 133, 141, 156, 183 Interest of, 2, 16, 130 liberal, 9, 4 4 -4 5 , 91 minimum functions, 9, 14, 39, 49 State action/interference, 5, 7—10, 14 -1 6 , 19, 2 4 -2 5 , 39, 44, 47, 4 9 -5 8 , 61, 8 3 -8 4 , 1 1 1 112, 133, 138, 142, 148, 152 State-Society relationship, 4—6, 8— 9, 1 1 -1 5 , 1 8 -1 9 , 4 6 -4 7 , 5 8 -6 0 , 8 5 -8 9 , 128, B O 133 Statism, 8, 1 3 1 -1 3 2
Stein, L. von, 4 - 5 , 28, 131, 168 Stephen, J. F., 10 Stork, C. T., 117 Strike, 73, 111 general, 101 railwaymen’s 1903, 74, 101,
110-112 Suffrage, 43, 9 6 -9 7 , 101 movement, 97—102, 122 universal, 23, 97—99, 101, 106 women’s, 98, 103, 105-107 Syllabus Errorum, 96, 178 Talmon, J. L., 28, 31 Thorbecke, J. R., 37, 39, 41, 43, 90 Tocqueville, A. de, 28, 30 Totalitarianism, see Authoritarianism Toynbee, A. (the elder), 23 Trade vs. employers’ associations, 6 7 -6 8 , 74 Trade unions, see Labour unions Trevelyan, G. M., 44 Troelstra, P. J., 101, 108, 110 Underdeveloped countries, see De veloping countries Unions, see Labour unions United States of America, 77, 125, 137, 146 Universal suffrage» see Suffrage Upper classes, 91, 96, 100, 103, 116-117, 119 Utopism, 33, 74 Vervoort, C. E., 132-133 Vries Robbé, De, 120 Welfare State, 13—16, 26, 110, 132-134, 137, 142, 147,152, 154, 167, 183-184 Willem I, 8, 32, 35, 37, 43 Willem II, 32 Willem III, 43
210 William the Silent, 161 Wilson, Ch. E., 3, 164-165 Wisselink, J., 70 Women's movement, 102—107 Workers, 7 3 -7 4 , 100, 102, 1 0 6 107, 111-112, 115, 119, 123, 135, 137, 146
THE SOCIETAL STATE World Council of Churches, 12, 149, 151, 1 5 3 -1 5 4 World Wars, 51—52, 74, 121, 128, 133, 150-151 Ijzerman, A. W ., 27