The sacred and the secular : Bengal Muslim discourses, 1871-1977 9780195637014, 0195637011

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THE

SACRED AND

THE

SECULAR

1

DIVIDED

BENGAL

IN DIVIDED INDIA yt

+ ARABIAN SEA

BAY OF BENGAL

+

THE

SACRED AND THE SECULAR Bengal Muslim Discourses, 1871-1977

TAZEEN M. MURSHID

y

CALCUTTA

OXFORD DELHI

UNIVERSITY BOMBAY

1995

PRESS

MADRAS

qed

bs 48s . B493 msi 1995"

Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calouna ‘Cope Town Dar'es Salaam Del Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore

© Oxford University Press 1995

ISBN 019 563701

1

Typeset at Compuset International., Calcutta 700 016 Printed in India at Trio Process, P 128, CIT Road, Calcutta 700 014 and published by Neil O’Brien, Oxford University Press, 5 Lala Lajpat Rai Sarani, Calcutta 700 020

Grod

PL 430-3

R-2F-47-

To my parents

CONTENTS

~

LIST OF TABLES LIST OF APPENDICES LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FOREWORD Introduction

viii xiii

xv

PART I: 1871-1947

Chapter 1: THE EMERGENCE OF A MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA IN BENGAL: SOCIAL ORIGINS, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT Chapter 2:

SOCIETY AND CULTURE: THE RELIGIOUS AND

Chapter 3:

RELIGION IN POLITICS, 1937-1947

COMMUNAL QUESTIONS

120

169

PART I: 1947-1977

Chapter 4:

Chapter 5: Chapter 6:

Chapter 7: Conclusion

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE POST-PARTITION PERIOD CULTURE AND LANGUAGE: ‘THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

FAITH, AUTHORITY AND THE CHALLENGE.

OF SECULARISM RELIGION, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS

GLOSSARY BIBLIOGRAPHY SUBJECT INDEX

233

331 382 433 445

452

484

LIsT OF TABLES Table 1.1

Hindu and Muslim Population of Bengal,

28

Table 1.2

Muslim Population by Rank in Bengal,

41

Table 1.3

1872-1931

1872-1931 Male Muslim and Hindu Students as Proportion of Total in Arts and Professional

Colleges for Men, 1926-27 and 1931-32

Cost of Education for Different Types of

3

Cost of Education in Bengal for Different

14

Students in Residence in Dacca University,

79

Table 1.7

Europeans, Hindus and Muslims in

81

Table 1.8

Hindus and Muslims Engaged in Public

82

Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 1.6

Table 1.9

Madrasahs, 1933

‘Types of Institutions, 1937-38 1921-22 — 1936-37

Government Services, 1871-1901

Administration, Professions and Liberal Arts, 1911, 1921 Distribution for Selected Groups of 1,000 Earners" by (Principal)

83

Occupational Sub-Classes, 1931 Table 3.1

Table 4.1

Table 4.2 Table 4.3

Enfranchisement for Muhammadan Constituencies by Number and Percentage Middle and Lower Middle-Class Occupations in the Non-Agricultural Labour Force of East Bengal : 1951, 1961 and 1974 Urbanization in East Bengal, 1951-1974

Middle-Class Professions in the Non-

Agricultural Labour Force (10 Years and Above) by Educational Level, 1961

191

236

237 241

List of Tables Table 4.4 Table 4.5

Non-Agricultural Muslims in the Labour Force According to their Occupation in January 1951 Middle-Class Occupations as Subsidiary

Occupations of the Agricultural Labour Force

ix 243 245

— 1951, 1961 Table 4.6

‘The Number and Percentage of Non-

Agricultural Occupations Comprising the

246

Intelligentsia 1951, 1961 Table 4.7 Table 4.8 Table 4.9

Table 4.10 Table 4.11

Percentage Distribution of the Major Religious Communities in Bangladesh, 1951-74 Graduation Trends between 1951 and 1961 in East Pakistan Percentage of Muslims and Non-Muslims at Various Levels of Education, 1951 and 1961 Religious Workers between 1951 and 1961

Madrasah Education in Bangladesh :

Reformed and Old Scheme Senior and Junior,

247 249 250 251 252

Recognized and Unrecognized Madrasahs, 1948-49 to 1975-76

Table 4.12

Total Number of Scholars in all Types of

Educational Institutions in Bangladesh,

254

1947-48 to 1968-69

Table 4.13

Percentage of Students at Different Levels of

256

Table 4.14

Pupils (Boys) by Different Communities

257

Table 4.15

Stage in 1954-55 and 1961-62 Demographic Differences between East and

265

Table 5.1

Opinions on the Type of Script for Bengali,

315

Table 6.1

The’ Number. and

358

Education in East Bengal, 1953-55

Distributed over Five Classes of the Primary West Pakistan, 1951-61

1949

Percentage of Valid Votes

Polled by Political Parties in the Contested

Constituencies of East Pakistan in the 1970

Elections Table 7.1

Attitude Towards Family Planning, 1974

403

LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix. 1.A Appendix 1.B Appendix 1.C

Appendix 1.D

- Muslim Social Divisions : Traditional Groupings — Muslim Social Divisions : R. Ahmed’s Categories

109

— The Ratio of Hindus to Muslims in

110

Various Grades of Government

109

Employment, 1869-71

— Vakils or Pleaders Attached to the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlat, 1813-33

110

Appendix I.E ~ Muslim Pupils in Primary Schools, Madrasahs, Arts and Professional

Appendix 1.F . —

Colleges 1870-71 to 1939-40

Muslim Pupils in Each Stage of Different

Types of Institutions in Bengal, 1870 to

112

1940

Appendix 1.G — Muslim Pupils Attending Ordinary

Secondary Schools and Madrasahs in

Appendix 1H

113

Bengal, 1881-82 to 1939-40

113

Appendix 1.K

— Persentage of Muslim and Hindu Boys in Different Classes - Examination Results in Government Colleges, 1937 ~— Number of Students and Average Cost in Government Colleges 1932-33 to 1939-40 — Hindus and Muslims by Economic

Appendix 1.L

— Hindus and Muslims by Economic

116

Appendix 1.1 Appendix 1.J

Activity, 1911

Activity, 1921

114 11S 116

List of Appendices

xi

Appendix 1.M — Various Methods of Appointment by the

7

Appendix 1.N

The Distribution of Officers by

117

Appendix 1.0

Heads of Departments, 1940 Muslims in the Teaching Staff of Colleges

118

Appendix 1.P

Hindu and Muslim Teachers in Various

118

Appendix 1.0

Appointments in Non-Ministerial

119

Social Origins’ of Prominent Bengal

223

Social Origins of Prominent Bengal

227

Appendix 3. Appendix 3.B

Appendix 3.C

Public Service Commission, 1937-38 to 1938-39 Communities in the Secretariat and as

in Bengal, 1917

Types of Schools 1926-27 and 1931-32

Education Services, 1934

Muslim Politicians

Muslim Politicians (activists in the 1930s

and 1940s)

Number and Percentage of Population

Enfranchised in General & Muhammadan

229

Constituencies of the Legislative Assembly in Various Divisions of Bengal, 1937

Appendix 4.A

Percentage of Non-Agricultural Labour

276

Appendix 4.B

Percentage Share and Growth of Middle-

276

Appendix 4.C

Force in Middle and Lower Middle-Class Occupations, 1951-74

Class Occupations Social Background of Dacca University

Teachers in Selected Departments of the

277

Arts Faculty Appointed between 1935 and

Appendix 4.D

Appendix 4.E

1957 Percentage of Muslims and Non-Muslims at Various Levels of Education, 1951 and 1961 Religious Workers as Percentage of the Labour Force

279

280

xii Appendix 4.F Appendix 4.G Appendix 4.H Appendix 4.1 Appendix 4.) Appendix 4.K Appendix 4.L Appendix 6.A Appendix 6.B

The Sacred and The Secular

Madrasahs and Pupils (in all Types of Madrasahs)

280

Maktabs, Madrasahs and Forquanias

281

Drop-Out from Class I to II : Pakistan and Provinces

281

Retention Rate at the Secondary Level : Pakistan and Provinces

282

Occupations of Guardians of Dacca University Students, 1957

282

Occupations of Fathers of Jahangirnagar University Students, 1974-75

283

Occupational Categories of Dacca University Students’ Guardians, 1974

283

Person Types State Typologies

381 381

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AIML

AL

APWA

BAR

BBS

Bengal QR BIDS

BLA BLC

BML

BMSP

All India Muslim League

Awami League

All Pakistan Women’s Association

Report of the Administration of Bengal Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

Bengal Quinquennial Review

Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies

Bengal Legislative Assembly Bengal Legislative Council

Bengal Muslim League

Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Patrika

BSBD

Bengal Secretariat Book Department

12th meeting CABE,

Report of the Committee appointed by the

BS.

1946

CAP Debates

CLA

CNL

DG

DU Records Floud Commission

Report

Bangla Sal; Bengali year

Central Advisory Board of Education in

India, 1946. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates

Central Legislative Assembly Calcutta National Library District Gazetteer

Dacca University Records Bengal Land Revenue Commission

Report 1938

GOB

Government of the the People’s Republic

GOP

Government of Pakistan

KPP

Krishak Praja Party

TEP IOR Isc

of Bangladesh

Isalamik Ekademi Patrika India Office Records Indian Statutory Commission

xiv Report MAC

The Sacred and The Secular

Report of the Education Advisory Committee

Muslim League Report PIB

Report PIEB

Pipur Report

Masik Mohammadi

Report on Public Instruction in Bengal Report on Public Instruction in East Bengal

Report of the Inquiry Committee Appointed

by the All India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in

Pirzada Documents Pak. Obs.

QR R.C.M.Ed. REAR.C.

RROB SDB SPB SYB

‘Congress Provinces

Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of -Pakistan. All India Muslim League Documents. Vol.2.

The Pakistan Observer Permanent Settlement

Quinquennial Review on the Progress of

Education in Bengal

Report of the Committee on Muhammadan

Education Report of the East Bengal Educational System Reconstruction Committee

Report of 1932-37 Statistical Statistical Statistical

the Refoms Office, Bengal,

Digest of Bangladesh Pocket Book of Bangladesh Yearbook of Bangladesh

United Front United Muslim Party

FOREWORD

Tazeen Murshid’s book is written with deep insight into the nature

and problems of Bengali and Bangladeshi Muslim society, and raises questions of importance for those concerned with other societies in which Islam is the dominant religion. How far can social and po-

litical life in the modern world be controlled by principles derived

from the religion of Islam, and how precisely can such principles be drawn from the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet? As

Dr Murshid shows, there is a wide spectrum of answers to such

questions, ranging from complete secularism to uncompromising as-

sertion of the traditional teachings of Islam. She suggests, however,

that too much emphasis should not be placed upon these extreme

positions: ‘the widely-projected inherent contradiction between Islam

and secularism needs to be examined seriously’, and ‘Islam can best

be understood in the specific context of time and space’.

‘The specific context she examines in this book is that of Bengali

Muslim society and culture in the later nineteenth century and the pre-

sent century, and she shows how different they were, in many ways,

from the societies and cultures of other Muslim regions. Musli in Bengal co-existed with Hindus, who until the last half-century or so

formed the majority and the greater part of the educated elite. Within

the Muslim community itself, there were various tensions, including

that between the ashraf, the old dominant elite, many of them claiming descent from immigrants coming from lands further west and preserv-

ing a tradition of Arab-Persian high culture, and the rest of the population, indigenous to the region, descendants of converts from Hinduism

or Buddhism, and having traditions and practices not very different, in ‘some ways, from those of their non-Muslim neighbours.

xvi

The Sacred and The Secular Such tensions were reflected in complex linguistic divisions. While

the ashraf used Urdu as their language, and retained something of the Arabic and Persian literary heritage, most others spoke Bengali, but here too there were distinctions between ‘Sanskrit Bengali’, the

language of the modern educated class, with its flowering of great lit-

erature in the modern period, and the popular Bengali of the majority, itself having Hindu and ‘Musulman’ varieties. Until the early years of the present century, there seems to have

been a symbiosis between differént groups, and there was little apparent conflict between being Muslim and being Indian. Dr Murshid shows

how the situation has been affected by the political events of the last

half-century. When Bengal was divided in 1947, and the eastern part

of it became Eastern Pakistan, it was not long before rifts appeared. Most of the non-Muslim population emigrated to India; later, the attempt of the Urdu-speaking elite to maintain its supremacy, and conflicts of interest between Eastern and Western Pakistan, led to secession and the creation of the state of Bangladesh. Within the new state, how-

ever, tensions persisted in new forms. The problem of identity was still there. The religion of Islam provided symbols and idioms of unity and mobilization, but the question remained: what kind of Islam?

ALBERT HOURANI 30 November

1992

INTRODUCTION

‘There are several studies of Bengal Muslim elites in the recent

literature on Bangladesh and East Pakistan. These are mainly concerned

with their political and economic concerns.’ This study deals with the

tole of the Bengal Muslim intelligentsia in politics, social change, and the articulation of cultural values. Its particular concern is with the persistent tension between a religious and a secular outlook in all these

areas of their activity and consciousness. At one level, it is a study of the constructedness of identity formation which was constantly being rearticulated against an ‘other’. Changes in the geographical boundaries of South Asia were accompanied by shifting identity formations. The

Muslims of Bengal were first Indians. They then became Pakistani in

1947 and Bangladeshi in 1971. Their significant ‘other’ changed from Hindus to Punjabis. However, conflicting nationalisms continue to vye for popular loyalty in Bangladesh today where a Bengali identity is Pitted against a Bangladeshi one.

Ideas derived from Islamic history and thought, both in terms of

Practical and doctrinal considerations, have influenced the behaviour of Muslims throughout the world. But these ideas have been tempered by interaction with local cultures and value systems giving rise to new syncretic and eclectic systems of thought as well as cultural patterns. The ba’ul and marfati songs of Bengal stand as testimony. The history

of Islam is replete with such examples. In classical Islam, the body of knowledge

that

has

been

created

over

300

years,

embodying

a

theological, legal-moral and political system that has moulded the ethos of the Muslim community, owes much to the local institutions of con-

quered territories.”

2

The Sacred and The Secular

Interaction leading to such end results may be marked by accom-

modation, confrontation and tension. Accommodation occurs in a spirit

of compromise,

during

periods

of affluence

and

tolerance,

in

the absence of a culture of violence or threat, or when opposing forces are equally strong and balance each other out. It gives rise to syncretic

and eclectic cultures. Confrontation occurs when conflicting powers or ideologies are unequal or untested but are seen as potentially threaten-

ing, e.g. that between Islam and Christianity during the conquest of Spain in the medieval period; or more recently, the battle between com-

munism and capitalism as fought out in Europe. Confrontation can also occur because of perceived rather than actual threats to the economy,

culture and values, resulting in violent xenophobic action provoking

progroms as in Hitler’s Third Reich. In Pakistan, Ahmadiyas were declared non-Muslims in 1951 in the same spirit.

Tension is a state between accommodation and confrontation, a state

of uneasy balance constantly oscillating between the two. It is often

caused in the process of accommodation. British society today affords

an example of such tension which verges on confrontation : there is no consensus as to the nature of this society, on whether it is multior monocultural or whether the dominant culture should be British or English. Although schools are encouraged to offer a multi-cultural

curriculum, pronouncements by some Tory officials in government

reflect

clearly

the

view

that

the

dominant

national

culture

is English within which other cultures must merge. This culture is marked by widespread racism and discrimination which however does

not go totally unchallenged. Directives requiring state schools to offer Christian worship during Assembly have largely been ignored by

Head Teachers who consider it unworkable as pupils belong to a multifaith community?

The history of Muslims in Bengal offers another example of tension. Having moved through a period of accommodation with local cultures as a result of the activities of sufis and saints, Muslims began to reevaluate their culture and heritage when confronted with colonial subjugation. Initial resistance through jihad and mutiny

gave

way

to

profound self-criticism and accommodation. On the one hand, their

perceived loss of power was attributed by some to their having deviated

from the true path of Islam. On the other, they found doctrinal support

to ‘obey those in authority’. But the interactions between Islam and

Introduction

Christianity,

between

Oriental

3

and Occidental thought and be-

tween local and Middle Eastern cultures generated their own conflicting

ideological and intellectual loyalties. In colonial and post-colonial so-

cieties, whenever Islam has been confronted by non-Islamic traditions, debate and discussion has followed about notions of bid’a, haram and halal. The religious has been measured against the non-religious; the

sacred against the profane; the acceptable against the unacceptable influences on Islam. The debates reveal a spectrum. of opinion on any

given subject indicating that there is no monolithic view of the world

or about Islam among the Muslim intelligentsia. Reflected at one end

of the spectrum are perceptions of the profoundly religious; at the other

end are the views of those who would be categorized as atheists and communists. In between is a wide grey area reflecting many shades of

opinions. The use of ijtihad or individual reasoning allows scope for

various interpretations, but this has led to profound ideological dis-

agreements among people versed in theology. The tension between re-

ligious and secular perceptions which characterized the psyche of the intelligentsia can be understood partly in this context.

of

One

dimension

accommodation

of

this

between

tension

the

derives

great

from

tradition

the

of

process

Islam

with its foreign roots and the persistent little traditions of folk be-

liefs and customs of local origin. The eclectic and syncretic elements

in Bengali life have been treated by some as lying within an irreligious, and hence secular, domain. As such these have been targets

of attack during periodic purificatory movements aimed at restoring

Bengali Islam to an imagined pristine purity. Seen in this context, eclecticism would appear to have a ‘secular’ dimension to it. Its impact was not confined to the vita religiosa of Bengal Muslims.

It provided space for ideological accommodation with Hindus in the material contest for power and resources.

This book contends that a persistent tension between religious and secular perceptions influenced the Muslim intelligentsia in twentieth-

century Bengal and had

a profound impact on every aspect of their

social and political life. The role of the intelligentsia in politics, social change, and the articulation of cultural values is shown to be marked

by such tension. A variety of influences determined its scope

and content : the social bases of the intelligentsia and their educational orientation; variations in their responses to the syncretic nature

4

The Sacred and The Secular

of Bengali Islam and periodic purificatory religious movements;

attitudes to western

ideas and values, their political and eco-

nomic interests as well as the changing power relations between an

upwardly mobile intelligentsia and an entrenched group which invoked

Islam to maintain the status quo. The dominance of a particular world-

view, whether religious or secular, is influenced by power relations,

because the powerful have access to the instruments of authority, coercion and control. It does not automatically reflect the view of the

majority, especially where democratic institutions are not in operation. Hence, although a religious ideology permeated the authoritarian state machinery of Bangladesh from 1975 to 1990, it was not a response to

the demand of a popular will.

This is not to underplay the

role of Islam in the social life of

Bengal and Bangladesh, which continues to have a great impact on social mores, family laws, the position of women, literature and the fine arts. In fact, alongside other customary practices, perceptions derived from various interpretations of the Koran and sunnah continue

to influence the daily life of most Bengal Muslims. However, one ten-

dency among them is to reject the politicization of Islam which is seen to serve only party politics and individual self-interest. By extension,

one could suggest that the separation of religion and politics would be

seen as desirable by the representatives of this tendency. An opposite tendency is to advocate that Islam should dominate and control all

aspects

of

life — social,

cultural

and

political.

These

ideologi-

cally contrary views reflect a deep schism in society with the contending groups

advocating

the

primacy

of

religious

and

secular

concerns respectively. At times the two assume confrontational pos-

tures. This latter tendency characterized Bengali experience in the events leading to the genocide of 1971. Later in the eighties, in an atmosphere of increasing political violence often fuelled by ideological differences, students killed their room-mates* and in the nineties po-

litical parties have engaged in a campaign of secret killings. Before

1947,

the

life:

of

Bengal Muslims

was

dominated

by

acolonial culture. It was bolstered by the introduction of a land market, cash crop economy, peasant exploitation, missionary activity and an unequal education system dominated by western values at the expense of local traditions. This had a two-fold impact on the intelligentsia :

one, a re-examination of their own culture in the light of new

Introduction

5

knowledge; two, an augmented assertion of perceived traditional values

and culture. The movement for the Emancipation of the Intellect in the twenties and thirties is an example of the former. The Wahabi and Faraizi movements of the nineteenth century are examples of the latter. No attempt has been made here to start with a prior definition of the term ‘secularism’ because it has specific connotations in the context

of Bengal which are explored..However, the accepted European understanding of the term as

‘a separation between the spiritual and

the temporal’ has informed this study.° In the colonial and post-colonial

contexts the strong secular traditions of Indian and trans-Indian Islam

which often bypassed orthodoxy, suffered a setback. The secular

tendency

among

Muslims

was

systematically

repressed

whenever

it seemed to challenge the authority of the orthodoxy. Even the move-

ment for the Emancipation of the Intellect in Bengal was crushed by

an orthodoxy which felt threatened by perceived influences of western thought. In

Bengal,

the relationship

between

Muslims

and

Hindus also

defined the debate between secularism and religiosity. Communal conflict,

intense

competition

for jobs

and

education;

social

distance between Hindus and Muslims, especially the latter’s experience and perception of social slight, the politicization of religion and

the use of religious symbols were factors which soured this relationship. ‘Secular’ came to be defined as the binary opposite of ‘communal’

implying a tolerance of other religious communities. The idea of religious tolerance was enshrined in the Constitution of India as sarba-

dharmasamabhaba and in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh as

dharmanirapekshata. While the former stressed the equality of all religions before the state, the latter invoked religious neutrality. In neither

case does the state dissociate itself from matters pertaining to religion.

Instead, it seeks to act as an impartial broker between the various re-

ligious communities. The term secularism, however, retained its other meaning as the binary opposite of ‘religious’ implying an outlook un-

concemed with religion and matters outside the purview of religious life. Conversely, religiosity came

to be identified

with a commu-

nal mentality by some, while retaining its traditional connotation of a deep loyalty to the faith and traditions of Islam, belief in one God

and

in Prophet Muhammad as his last messenger. In this context, the

6

The Sacred and The Secular

1972 Constitution debarred the communalization of politics in the name

of religion while acknowledging the right to freedom of worship.

An increasing tension in the world-view of the intelligentsia has

characterized colonial and post-colonial societies where Islam has been the dominant religion. Muslim societies and states have succumbed to

increasing revivalist pressures which were largely a reaction to

colonialism and neocolonialism. This stands in sharp contrast to the long record of policies pursued by these societies in earlier times where

temporal authority has been stronger than spiritual authority and which

were much more eclectic and less strict in the enforcement of religious

laws than Christian Europe. One may cite, as examples, the Abbasid

state, the Timurids in India, the Umayyads in Spain, and Bengal under

the Sultans. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European travellers

have noted the religious tolerance and freedom of speech allowed in

Mughal India where Christians have not been punished for publicly calling Prophet Muhammad an imposter. Eighteenth-century India is a spectacular example of Muslim elite and masses working out a near

perfect accommodation of their secular and religious concerns. In India,

it was the decline of Mughal power and encroaching alien traditions

which allowed the rise of ‘revivalist’ forces. Muslims have attempted to create a world-view which takes into account their new situation of

loss of power, technological change, and the constraints faced by post-

colonial governments to create ‘modern’ states after the western model.

Liberal nationalism in Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia, nationalist Muslim ideology in India, and the ideology which led to the creation of Pakistan are instances of successful ideological formulations.

However, sections of the Muslim intelligentsia of new nation states

have experienced tehsion as a result of efforts by their governments to generate economic progress, adopt new technology and encourage in-

stitutional development. In Iran, Turkey and Egypt, as in Pakistan, poli-

cies of secularization were adopted while religious institutions were

neglected. Yet in Turkey, after a quarter century of Kemal Ataturks’

secular policies, the state had to give religious education a place. On

the other hand, particularly after the 1952 revolution in Egypt, the state itself took up the role of reviving religious institutions. While in 1961,

it instituted the reorganization of the Al-Azhar, the Islamic seminary of learning, and constitutionally designated Islam as the state religion,

religious institutions and groups were denied a political role. As in

Introduction.

7

Ayub Khan’s Pakistan, the Sadat regime in Egypt sought to keep the ulama at bay by pretending to appropriate the responsibility for the

‘correct’ interpretation of the faith and undertook programmes to ‘strengthen Islamic educational and cultural institutions. Byt, the Islamic Brotherhood and the conservative ulama opposed’ to secularism

and

reforms, continued to force the regime to take a more conservative

stance.’ Comparable experiences have characterized political developments in independent Bangladesh.

Bangladesh inherited the structures laid down by Pakistan wherein the state, contrary to its founder’s unambiguous initial pronouncement,

appropriated the role of defender of the faith. However, after a short flirtation with secular ideals and assassinations, the state, while under

military rule, bowed to pressures from the orthodoxy to Islamize the country) Measures adopted included dropping ‘secularism’ as a princi-

ple of state policy in 1977 and declaring Islam to be the state religion

in 1988, both through constitutional amendments. In post-colonial East Bengal, two religious movements were particularly striking : the

Tabligh Jama’at for its emphasis on making Muslims ‘better Muslims’,

and the Jama’at-i-Islami for its interest in establishing a politically powerful Islamic order. These continue to influence political and social

developments in Bangladesh today.

‘The ideological conflict in the country partly centres round opposing

views on how a society could be governed best. Should government

be based on a separation of religion and politics, whereby religion is

treated as a private matter, or should the state machinery use its powers

to enforce the shariah. While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League championed the former view, Maulana Maududi of the Jama’ at-

i-Islami represented the latter.

The central thrust of my work lies in its attempt to explore whether there is such a thing as a monolithic ‘Muslim mind’ which

works in a way peculiar to itself in colonial and post-colonial con-

texts. The recent debates about Islam in European countries like the United Kingdom where there are sizeable Muslim communities who feel the need to rise up in defence of ‘embattled Islam’

impart a measure of urgency to this exercise. The burning of Salman Rushdie’s

The Satanic

Verses by some Muslims

in Bradford,

the

wearing of head scarves by a few Muslim girls at a French School,

the reaction of European

Muslims to the Gulf War of 1991, have

8

The Sacred and The Secular

provoked considerable negative media attention. Attempts to define Muslims

and Islam have led to vast generalizations and the presen-

tation of Islam ‘in terms of culturalist differentialism, The media in

Europe has portrayed Islam as a primitive religion and Muslims as

fanatics. It would, of course, be misleading to assess Islam and define Muslims

with

groups, but even

reference

to the acts of some

individuals

and

ignoring such banalities, the recent developments

in Muslim societies raise important questions. The widely projected

inherent contradiction between Islam and secularism needs to be examined

seriously.

My work explores the diversity of thoughts and views which: has

characterized Muslim society, at certain points in time and over a period

of time. The choices made by the protagonists in my story, like all human decisions, are determined by a wide range of factors and not

by their religious predispositions alone. They act as ordinary people

anywhere, guided often by motives of self-interest, personal gain, desire for social status and prestige, as well as cultural and spiritual concerns which go beyond short-term maximization of material gains.

My approach differs from that of scholars whose explanations of

political developments in Muslim societies revolve primarily around

comparisons with western systems, such as the nature and structure of

the clergy and its relation with the masses." Thus, one view of domi-

nance of the clergy in Iran's politics is attributed to the ‘informality of the structure of [its] relations with the masses’. Another view is:thet

this informality provides no advantages : Islamic countries lag in institutional development because they have to organized priesthood.”

Politics in Bgypt is said to be authoritarian because there are

no mediating institutions between the state and its citizens. The, basic assumption behind such arguments is the desirability of the western model

against which all else is measured

and found

wanting. Such

explanations are inept in so far as they do not take into account the specific context of particular Islamic countries, the existing traditions and institutions, the impact of colonial and neocolonial policies as well

as that of western propaganda. Studies of fundamentalism in Iran, for

example, often tend to underplay its origins in the overthrow of a working constitutional order engineered by Britain and the USA. Some

studies of Islam have tended to revolve around simplistic

generalizations as to what Islam and Islamic politics is. Only of late

Introduction

-9

is recognition gaining ground that Islam can best be understood in

the specific context of time and space, that despite the homogeneous

values shared by Islamic societies, local influences have left their mark on Islam as understood and practised in different parts of the

world. The seminal work by Albert Houmani and the contribution by Ira M. Lapidus on the history of Islamic societies as macro stud-

ies of Islam redress this imbalance to an extent."° To quote Aziz

Al-Azmeh : ‘Like other religions, Islam is not a generic essence,

put a nominal entity that conjoins, by means of a name, a variety

of cultures,

religion

histories and politics...The

is always

determinate

historical...A religion

existence

is always

of a

produced

and reproduced according to the exigencies of society and polity, though this is almost invariably undertaken in terms of a fundamentalist motif, a myth of origin claiming a particular textual

genealogy...there is little that is generically Islamic about Islam."

When Christianity spread to Brazil, Christian saints replaced gods

and goddesses of the native pantheon but acquired some of their characteristics. When Islam spread to Bengal, Anadi Nar became Adam. It is said that when Islam spread to Indonesia it appropriated a Civilization but did not construct one. In Morocco, Islam incorporated the Maraboutic tradition and became the ‘Islam of

‘saint worship and severity, magical power and aggressive piety’.’”

This is the way small traditions reflected by folk religions maintain a hold over the great traditions which attempt to replace them. Over

time, however, as purificatory movements emerge, many of the per-

ceived remaining accretions are discarded from the little traditions.

But many remain as integral aspects of local customs and patterns of behaviour. These at times come to represent an eclectic-secularcultural challenge to the tendency towards religious consensus which

aims to smooth out differences between Islamic societies based on

a constant ‘reference to what is believed by many to be the original

source of Islamic law, the Koran. But Islam has never been a

monolith, nor can it be explained away with a few generalizations."

‘Though simple for the believer, Islam poses complex challenges to

the interpreter —

a crucial one being that of time and space.

Whether Islam is studied as’a civilization, an ideology, or a way of life, or whether aspects of it are placed under scrutiny such

as ‘Islamic politics’, meaningful results cannot be obtained without

10

The Sacredand The Secular

studying it at the micro-level. Indeed I would argue, that there is no such thing as ‘Islamic politics’ though there is such a thing as Islamic

political thought." Guidelines are often sought from this body of

thought when Muslims contemplate political action. I would also argue

that there is no such thing as ‘Islamic behaviour’ as there is no such thing as Christian, Jewish or Hindu behaviour applicable to all Christians, Jews or Hindus alike. Hence a study of Islam as conduct, in terms of what Muslims do, rather than as doctrine, is no more a

study of Islam than a study of Christianity as conduct rather than doctrine is a study of Christianity. Not all actions of Muslims are defined by Islam. People do not always act as Christians or Muslims, although that may bea religious ideal for-many. They often act simply as human

beings — their actions being determined by influences such as local customs, education, upbringing, interaction -with other cultures and religions. The approach of some scholars and the western media would suggest that there is a uniformity in Muslim behaviour which

actually does not exist. It also denies that individuals belong to several

social and cultural groups and hence have many identities. There can be no monolithic Islamic behaviour as there can be no monolithic

Christian behaviour.

My study offers a micro-view of the experiences and attitudes of Bengal Muslims at a particular juncture in their centuries old history. It is not a study of Islam per se, but Islam has acted as a major driving

force behind the thoughts and actions of the protagonists in my story. Karl Mannheim’s definition of the term ‘intelligentsia’ as those so-

cial groups or individuals ‘whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society’, is used for the purposes of this study.'° Thus the concept may include all or some of the following

overlapping categories : middle-class professionals, such as civil servants, lawyers and doctors; the advanced educated, such as university

teachers and students; other intellectuals, such as writers, public men, journalists, social thinkers and school teachers; and members of the traditional learned professions, such as the ulama.

In colonial and post-colonial societies, the intelligentsia have played

significant roles as leaders of protest and reform, as opposition to the established elite, as allies of a ‘power elite’ and sometimes, as seekers

of power through revolution.'® Sometimes, the intelligentsia has thrown

up national political leaders who have become the decision makers or

Introduction

i

the power elite, in C. Wright Mills’ terms.'’ However, it would be

inaccurate to refer to the intelligentsia.as a single elite category, for

there are intellectual elements in different elite groups.'* Mannheim too

found it too differentiated to be regarded as a single class. The Bengal

Muslim intelligentsia, for example, is not a homogeneous group. It

spans a wide range of incomes, differing levels of educational attain-

ments and varying ‘status’ and ‘power’ in society. Nor is this a static

eategory : its composition changes by recruitment into or slippage out

of the category.'? Education probably is the only unifying bond™ be-

tween all groups of intellectuals besides a certain sense of shared sym-

pathy and social consciousness.

While elite studies are essentially studies of power relations and

political processes, a study of the intelligentsia should cover their social, cultural and political roles as well as their role of formulating an intellectual ideology for the community. Lasswell admits the role of intellectuals in shaping the perspectives of the nation state.”' Intellectuals have played crucial roles in historical epochs as

different as the Italian and Bengal Renaissance and exercised tremendous influence on public opinion. In developing countries, the intelligentsia can be said to form a part of the elite as both terms are linked to notions of superiority, prestige and power. Although power resides mainly in the political elite, in South Asia this elite was predominantly intellectual, drawn largely from the middle classes. And it was this group, which, as a result of its striving for independence in colonial

Societies, was awarded high status.” After independence, it formed the new political elite along with the non-intellectual but affluent agriculturists who came to acquire political clout.” This elite tended to widen

its leadership from political to economic and social fields. But in Bangladesh, it must be remembered that till 1971 this political elite was essentially a non-Bengali speaking group, whose authority came to-be challenged by segments of the ‘vernacular Bengali speaking in-

telligentsia’, for the most part a section of the non-governing elite. For the purposes of this study the term ‘intelligentsia’ will be used rather than ‘elite’. This is a sufficiently loose term, which incorporates the powerful political elite of post-colonial societies, the less powerful but influential middle-class intelligentsia, which is part of the nongoverning elite, and allows consideration of the role of individual intellectuals. The concepts, ‘intelligentsia’ and ‘intellectual’ have often

12

The Sacred and The Secular

been used interchangeably, but it is worth remembering that although

all intellectuals are members of the intelligentsia, not every member of

the intelligentsia is an intellectual.“ Harry J. Benda, using the terms interchangeably,

describes the intelligentsia as

‘the ruling class par

excellence in non-western societies’.”* Shils excludes ‘traditional intellectuals, largely religious in their political concerns’ from his definition

of the intelligentsia, while not denying their influence in political life.

He defines intellectuals as all persons with an advanced western education and intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with

it

They come from professions such as the civil service, journalism,

teaching and medicine.” Students too are regarded as intellectuals by

him. Shils’ is a narrow definition in so far as only those with an advanced western education are considered to be intellectuals.

The concept as, used in this study differs from Shils’ in including traditional intellectuals as members of the intelligentsia in view of their crucial role in Pakistani and Bangladeshi politics and the ideological-cultural

realm.

It naturally

follows that ‘western’

education

is not a prime criterion for identifying intellectuals nor is advanced education

were

a crucial

factor, for not all Bengal

highly educated.

My

approach

Muslim

intellectuals

to the concept approximates

Sabyasachi Bhattacharya’s understanding of it, in not identifying the intelligentsia

in terms only of occupation, and in including writers,

public men, journalists and thinkers among them.” However, one cannot accept his view

that in terms of social position the intelli-

gentsia is predominantly petty ‘bourgeois’.

The various definitions of the term ‘intelligentsia’ stress the requisite of advanced education on the possession of knowledge. Seal echoes Shils when referring to the intelligentsia as those ‘educated in the west-

‘ern mode’. While the possession of knowledge marks off the intelligentsia as superior to the non-intelligentsia, in Bangladesh, advanced

western education was not an essential characteristic particularly till

the fifties and sixties as will be seen in course of this study. In the

seventies and eighties, however, with a glut in the job-market and the emergence of an increasingly competitive society, advanced education

became one of the hallmarks of status, as well as a means of entry into intellectual professions like teaching, research, official

employment, etc. Status

is an

important

characteristic

of the

intelligentsia,

for

Introduction.

13

it determines the extent of influence and hence the extent of power a

group or class may indirectly exert. Broomfield’s bhadralok are re-

spected men who enjoy a superior social status both in rural and-urban

areas.”' Although the term as used by him, implying those ‘who claimed

and were accorded recognition as superior in social status to the mass of their fellows’, could be applied to the Bengal Muslim intelligentsia,

the definition is too loose. However, in his explanation Broomfield

uses economic categories’ and occupational differentiation as well.”

Ironically, he rejects the ‘intelligentsia’ as a social group for the same

reason that one can reject the bhadralok

: ‘The use of the word under-

lines the fact that this was a status group, not an economic or occupa-

tional class’. Whereas

all members

of the

intelligentsia

are

bhadralok,

not

all bhadralok are members of the intelligentsia true. For example, while

the village matabbar (village head .or leader) or mullah is referred to

as a bhadralok on account of his influence, power or respectable status,

he is not a member of the intelligentsia because he lacks a certain basic formal education and a certain type of intellectual concern linked to a

particular world-view or ideology articulated at least to some degree.

The Bengal Muslim intelligentsia was not homogencous either in

terms of intellectual orientation or membership of cultural/ideological

groups. As discussed earlier, the term ‘secular’ acquired two different

meanings in the socio-political vocabulary of the region. This fact reflected the pervasive impact of religious ideology and the history of communalism which left its mark on that ideology. The meanings

of secularism were understood thus : one, as opposed to communal,

implying a tolerance of other religious groups; and two, as opposed to

the religious, implying a lack of concern with religious perceptions and sanctions at least in matters affecting public life. There were

thus elements in the intelligentsia which were both tolerant and relig-

ious; irreligious and communal; tolerant and irreligious; religious and communal. This range of possibilities indicates that the intelligentsia was by.no means an ideologically homogeneous group. On the contrary,

as will be seen later, they switched group membership frequently.

‘The intelligentsia may also be differentiated on a socio-cultural-

cum-linguistic basis, into ‘vernacular’

and

‘non-vernacular’

intelli-

gentsia depending on whether they spoke Bengali or some other language, usually Urdu; whether ‘they identified with the

14

The Sacred and The Secular

Bengali speaking masses or the Urdu speaking privileged group in

Bengal; and whether they emerged from the atrap peasantry or were

descended from the urban ashraf upper strata claiming non-Bengali

and often non-Indian origin. The line of demarcation is not absolute :

some members of the vernacular intelligentsia identified completely with the ruling group, preferred to speak Urdu

upon the Bengali language and culture in order a negative identity. On the other hand, some vernacular intelligentsia identified totally with Bengali speaking middle classes. The reasons

and looked down

to escape, as it. were, members of the nonthe aspirations of the for such inconsisten-

cies in one’s perceived identity are complex including those attributable to political and economic that

identity

imparted.

These

interests as well as to the value

groups

may

be identified

as

the

counter-vernacular and the counter non-vernacular intelligentsia. The Sacred and the Secular : Bengal Muslim Discourses, 1871-1977 grew out of my Oxford D.Phil. thesis, which had as its title ‘The

Bengal Muslim Intelligentsia, 1937-1977 : The Tension between the Religious and the Secular’. The book is about Islam only in the sense

that it offers discourses on interpretation, not doctrine. More precisely,

it is about

a Muslim

community

in a region

of South

Asia

called Bengal. The community grew rapidly in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; engaged in a quest for identity through

debate, discourse, jihad and purificatory movements; began to partici-

pate in the political process and gradually asserted its power within a colonial context; and in the post-colonial phase displayed the divisions characteristic of an intelligentsia in a neocolonial state. Islam provided

the backdrop with reference to which this community operated socially,

culturally and politically. But there were other ideological attractions

contending for its loyalty — the eclectic-syncretistic modes inherited

from the early period of cultural accommodation, the western secular values obtained through

colonial

contact,

and

the communal/non-

communal ethos derived from an acceptance/rejection of twentieth-

century-communalism. The process of accommodation between these

contending forces or identities was marked by tension which can best be described as religious versus secular. The tension was aggravated

during periods of perceived threat to Islam or the Muslim community,

whether imagined or real. This study is presented in two parts : the first deals with

Introduction

15

pre-partition Bengal, and the second focuses on events in post-partition

East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971. My inquiry starts in

1871 when distinct changes in policy had a profound impact on Muslim

fortunes, particularly on educational opportunities. The focus moves on to 1937 when the political concerns of the Bengal Mustim intelligentsia

acquired a distinct shape and some basis in real power. It happened

when the religious-communal identity became the basis of their politi-

cal existence and aspirations. The acceptance of the Pakistan ideology accentuated this dimension of their identity. My initial enquiry is con-

cerned with the extent to which the political ideology and aspirations

of the period were based on religious or secular considerations. It also

assesses the tension between these two dimensions of concern in social,

political, cultural and religious life itself. The apparent paradox of the religio-secular tension in religious life is resolved when one remembers

that one dimension of secularism in our context was a non-communal

attitude perfectly consistent with deep religiosity in personal life.

After 1947, following the establishment of Pakistan, when anxieties

associated with the status of a religious and communal minority in the sub-continent became less important, new tensions arose from the un-

equal distribution of power and resources between the two parts of

Pakistan. In this context, the book explores the ways in which the

intelligentsia or rather the different sections thereof, sought a redefinition of the relative roles of secular and religious concerns in public lifé. The specific relevance of political and economic interests as well

a8 of ideology including the nature of religious commitment is dis-

cussed. The broad themes, with reference to which these tensions are

analysed include political aspirations, national identity, social mores

such as. the role and status of women, and the world-view of

the intelligentsia. The tensions are studied both synchronically and

diachronically especially with reference to the ups and downs in secular concerns as a result of changes in the political scene.

Cliapter 1 traces the emergence and development of a Muslim

middle

class

in Bengal

which

gave

rise to an

intelligentsia.

The

chapter is concerned with the social origins and educational orientations of this intelligentsia, British education and employment poli-

cies resulted in the growth of a religious and secular intelligentsia with a strong potential for mutual conflict as well as a class of

allies to counter the nationalist Hindus. Chapter 2 discusses their

16

The Sacred and The Secular

cultural and social concerns and identifies the religious and secular tendencies. These are expressed through religious and rationalist movements such as the Faith Movement and the Movement for the

Emancipation of the Intellect which deeply influenced the Muslim psyche.

It also analyses the social dimensions

of the communal

question in terms of Muslim relations with the Hindu community.

Chapter 3 deals with the growing political self-assertion of the in-

telligentsia which manifested itself ultimately in the partition of India

in 1947, as a consequence of which religiosity and communalism came to be seen as conterminous. Chapter 4 traces the further

growth and development of the intelligentsia in the post-partition

period, looking into its social bases and educational orientations. It indicates that the majority still have rural roots and are deeply influenced by the syncretic tradition of Bengali Islam. Chapter 5 is about the world-view of the post-1947 intelligentsia, its attitudes to questions of identity, language and script—at least one section was willing to look at culture and language in secular terms despite strong opposition at the state level. Chapter 6 explores the political

dimensions of the religious-secular tension. It identifies the role of the state and the ruling elite in determining

religious

terms,

which

however

political ideology in

is not ‘an accurate indication

of the religiosity or its absence in a people. Chapter 7 examines the

debates on the role of religion in social life, especially attitudes to

social mores, family laws, the position of women and the fine arts.

It shows that perceptions derived from the Koran and sunnah con-

tinue to influence the daily life of most Bengal Muslims.

A large number of foreign words, Bengali and Perso-Arabic, occur in the study. I have kept to the accepted convention in modern South

Asian studies of not using diacritical marks. In transliterating words of Perso-Arabic origin, I have followed the convention of transliterating their Bengali version : e.g., Koran, not Qur’an. The transliteration of

Bengali words is complicated, since the older convention of treating

them as Sanskrit words is no longer universally accepted. Thus andolan rather than andolana occurs in the text. I have compromised on the

transliteration of consonants and semi-vowels, e.g. using s rather than

sh to transliterate * , though the latter represents more accurately the pronunciation of the letter. I have also stuck to certain old accepted

spellings of proper names rather than the recently adopted versions,

Introduction

17

e.g. Dacca and not Dhaka. This is because, the time covered in the study and most of the material used, belong to a period prior to the

official introduction of the new spelling. The old spellings of proper

names have also been kept in Appendix 1.D as these were the ones given in the source.

Generally, East Bengal, East Pakistan and Bangladesh may be read interchangeably for these refer to geographic location rather

than political status. Both ‘Muslims’ and ‘Bengalis’ refer to Bengal

Muslims unless otherwise stated; i.e. to Bengal before 1947 and to East Bengal thereafter.

Various people and institutions have made this book possible and it is virtually impossible to thank all of them. I am deeply indebted to the

late Professor Albert Hourani who read through the final stages of the

entire manuscript in autumn 1992 shortly before he passed away. He

convinced me of the value of placing my study in the context of the

wider scholarship on Islam and Islamic societies. To my D.Phil. thesis

supervisor, Professor Tapan Raychaudhuri who has offered me invalu-

able advice and provided deep insights even as he read parts of the

final manuscript. I owe a profound intellectual debt to Professor Abdur Razzak. I would like to thank Professors Mushirul Hasan, Francis Robinson and Aziz Al-Azmeh for their incisive comments on some of the chapters. The late Professor Mahmood, Dr Gowhar Rizvi,

Dr Sudipta Kaviraj and Dr Gopal Krishna offered suggestions and

ideas, some of which have been incorporated. Valuable comments were also made by Dr Chitta Panda who looked at parts of the manuscript.

Sugata Bose allowed me access to some material. Several people have helped in my research by granting interviews : the late Professor

Mahmood, the late Justice S. A. Masood, Mrs Gauri Ayub, Mr P. N. Roy, Begum Saleha Khatun, Mrs Noor Jehan Murshid, Professor Salahuddin Ahmed, Mr Mushfique Ahmed and Professor Syed Ali

Ashraf.

Grants from the Arnold Historical Essay Fund, the Bryce and Read

Fund, the Graduate Studies Committee and the George Webb

18

The Sacred and The Secular

and Medley Fund at the University of Oxford have helped cover research and travel expenses. Grants from the Beit Fund and the election to the Frere Exhibition have helped meet maintenance costs during the

course of research. The revision of the thesis for the purpose of publication was undertaken in part at St Antony’s College, Oxford where I was offered a Research Fellowship, and at Homerton College, Cambridge where I: was a Visiting Fellow.

I am grateful to the following libraries which allowed me to use

their collections : the Indian Institute, Bodleian Library, the Queen

Elizabeth House Library, the Social Studies Faculty Library and the

Nuffield College Library in Oxford; the University Library and the Centre for South Asian Studies in Cambridge; the Indian Office

Library, the British Library and the Library of the School of Oriental and

African

Studies

in

London;

the

Library of the Congress,

Washington, DC; the Bangla Academy Library, the Dacca University

Library and the Law

Library of the Banglatlesh

Secretariat in

Dacca; the National Library, Calcutta, the Delhi Centre for

Social

Studies, and the Viswa Bharati Library in India. Here, I would like

to thank the late Mr Ranjan Borra, of the Library of the Congress, for his kind assistance during my research there.

A special note of thanks is due to Humaira Erfan Ahmed for proc-

essing the manuscript and to Hashidi (Mrs Pratima Raychaudhuri) for

the many kindnesses she has shown to an at times weary researcher,

including through her culinary expertise. To

my

parents,

Professor K. S. Murshid

and

Mrs

Noor

Jehan

Murshid, I owe much in both intellectual and material terms, for their strength of conviction in my ability to complete the study and for providing a secure base to work from whenever needed. I am grateful to

my husband, Willem van der Geest, whose constant support and en-

couragement compelled me to finish the book, and my daughter Dina for being such a wonderful source of joy despite the severe constraints placed on her patience and playfulness each time I went to my desk.

Notes

1, Tushar Kanti Barua, Political Elite in Bangladesh (Leiden, 1980); Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State - The Case of Pakistan (Kent, England, 1970); Raunay Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (Dacca, 1973); Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 2nd ed. (Lahore 1976); Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development : Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, 1967); Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury, The Civil Service of Pakistan (Dacca, 1969); Braibanti and Spengler, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, N C, 1966); the mutual relationship between peasants and elites in the formation of Pakistan is portrayed by Tajul Islam Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia : the Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947, Boulder: Westminister Press, 1992; the interplay of religion and politics is examined in R. Ahmed (ed). Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh, (New Delhi 1990). 2, Pazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity : Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago, 1982) pp. 85-86 3. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of UK from 1979-90, expressed her fears ‘that the country might be swamped by people with a different culture’ in an interview on television, ‘World in-Action’, Granada TV, 1979. The rise of Scottish nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Welsh ‘culture is barely reflected in the school curriculum. On the worship issue see Independent on Sunday, London, 3 July, 1994. 4, In December 1990, President H. M. Ershad, an army general, was overthrown as a result of a popular movement in favour of democracy. ‘The new government formed by the Bangladesh National Party on 3 March, 1991, relied for its majority in parliament, on support from the Islamist party, the Jama’at-i-Islami, The government was therefore likely to follow a policy which would keep the Islamists appeased. 5. This happened at Chittagong University in 1986. 6. This is not to suggest that the phenomenon of secularism is a western accretion to Islamic thought. Some scholars have controversially argued that the rationalist tendency in Islamic thought was represented by the Mu'tazilites and the ideas of the philosophers al-Farabi (d 60), Ibn-sina (980-1037) and Ibn Rushd (1126-98). Recent scholarship has identified a secular tendency in the thoughts of Shah Waliullah (1703-64) and Jamal-al-Din-al-Afghani (4 1897). It has been claimed that Shah Waliullah’s views of an egalitarian social order foreshadowed those of Adam Smith, Henry George and Locke. On aspects of secular ideas among thinkers in medieval Islam especially with reference to the

10.

il. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

17. 18.

19,

The Sacred and The Secular Mu'tazilites and al-Gazzali's opposition to the rationalist philosophers, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity, pp. 33-34. For a discussion of rationalist movements in early Islam and ideas of eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars, Shah Waliullah and al-Afghani see Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: the Politics of Islam, (London, 1982) pp. 51-52, 61-62, 64-70, 109-17. William Foster (ed), Early Travels in India, 1583-1619 (London; OUP, 1921) pp. 271-72, 315, 331; Francis Beier, Travels in the Mughal Empire, AD 1656-1668 (London; OUP, 1914) pp. 289-92, 306. One particular view emphasizes the need for the creation of a secular order to achieve modernity. See Manfred Halpem, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, (Princeton, 1963) as well as The Cambridge History of Islam, (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 698-730. Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, (Albany, 1980), p. xv.; Clement H. Moore, ‘Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society : the Case of Nasser's Egypt’, Comparative Politics, 6 (1974) p. 216: Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, (Cambridge, 1988); Albert Hourani, Islam in European Thought (Cambridge, 1991); A History of the Arab Peoples (London, 1991). Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London, 1993), ch3, p. 60. Clifford Getz, Islam Observed : Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, (Chicago, 1968) pp. 9, 11-12. Edward Said argues cogently that generalizations about Islam whether by scholars or the media do not convey the truth, Covering Islam, (London, 1981). For Piscatori's view of Islam see J. P. Piscatori, Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge, 1983) pp. 2-10. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London, 1936), p.9. For detailed discussion of the concept, see ‘The Sociological Problem of the Intelligentsi pp. 136-46. J. O. Morris, Elites, Intellectuals and Consensus : A Study of the Origins of the Industrial Relations System in Chile, 1990-1938 (Ithaca, NY, 1966), p. 30. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London,

1966), p. 3.

Thom Kerstiens, The New Elite in Asia and Africa, 2nd ed. (London, 1966), p. 10. ‘Though slippage was not common, many Syeds who traditionally belonged to the upper class were engaged in menial jobs in the 1931

Introduction

census findings. 3.4% for example, were in domestic service: Census of India, 1931, vol. V, pt. I, Bengal and Sikkim (Calcutta, 1933), p. 300. K. Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 136-46. HD. Lasswell and D. Lemer (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 20. ‘Thom Kerstiens, op. cit., p. 8. In some Arab countries such as Egypt the political elite was dominated by the bureaucracy and business interests but not by intellectuals. See M. Kalecki, ‘Social and Economic Aspects of Intermediate Regimes’, Chaper 14 in Selected Essays in the Economic Growth of the Socialist and Mixed Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1972. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, ‘Notes on the Role of the Intelligentsia in Colonial Society : India from Mid-Nineteenth Century’, Studies in History vol. 1 (1979), p. 98. For a wider discussion of the concepts, see James O. Morris, op. cit. Hany J. Benda, ‘Non-Westem Intelligentsia as Political Elites’ in J. H. Kautsky (ed), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (NY, 1962), p. 237. E.A. Shils, ‘Political Development in the New States’, Studies in Society and History I! (1960), p. 269. Ibid,, p. 199. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, op. cit., p. 98. ‘The petty bourgeois includes artisans, clerks, small shopkeepers etc. They tend to be conservative and try to maintain the status quo. Marx sees the petty bourgeois as a part of the proletariat, whereas Lenin does not. Lenin sees the group as reactionary and as an obstacle in the path towards socialism since they defend their interests more strongly. Anil Seal, The Rise of the Nationalist Movement (Cambridge, 1979). The term bhadralok was used to refer to the westem educated Hindu intelligentia which emerged in colonial Bengal during the nineteenth century. For a discussion of his concept of bhadralok see J. H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 5-14. Ibid. Quoted in S, Bhattacharya, op. cit., p. 93.

BRS 32. 33.

2

PART I : 1871-1947

CHAPTER

1

THE EMERGENCE OF A MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA IN BENGAL SOCIAL ORIGINS, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

:

Introduction

The formation of a Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal is related to the emergence of a-middle class which was extremely small till the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was only thereafter that a significant middle class with roots in the peasantry be-

gan to appear. British policies played a major role in bringing this

about. Several published works have studied the effect of British rule

on the. growth of a self-assertive Muslim middle class in Bengal

without actually analysing its consequence for the emergence of an

intelligentsia; nor do these explain comprehensively the reasons for

the growth of such a middje class.' This chapter aims to understand

the’ nature of the intelligentsia which eventually arose and the proc-

ess that led to it. This intelligentsia was not a homogeneous

lith, either in terms of education or intellectual orientation.

mono-

‘Two definite types of influences on the intelligentsia may be iden-

tified — one religious and the other secular. This was largely due to the education available to them; whether of the madrasah or the general

variety. The importance of establishing this relationship is far reaching.

It is a commentary on the deceptive way in which British education

policy operated, for the real meaning of policy statements were

rarely made explicit. It is a challenge to the myth harboured by many nationalist Hindu historians that after 1871, British policy towards the

Muslims was somehow unconditionally more favourable than towards

26

The Sacred and The Secular

Hindus. My contention is that while British policy aimed at creating a

counter-intelligentsia to the increasingly nationalistic Hindu bhadralok, it made sure that this intelligentsia remained a weaker one so that it

could be placated and protected. It is precisely for this reason that madrasahs proliferated even as the British professed to discourage denominational education. In the long run, such a heritage was to have a disastrous effect on Pakistan as ‘demagogues’ and ‘heretics’ began to fight for political control. The demagogues who found in ‘quotas’ the means to establish their strength in India, also found in large sections of the madrasah graduates their natural supporters for an Islamic

state of Pakistan. Those fundamentally opposed to the idelogical basis of Pakistan in Islam were the ‘heretics’, an odd mixture of Muslim graduates from the Muslim Hall of Dacca University, the Presidency

College, and some from Islamia College. The graduates of this last institution developed along strikingly different directions and included

some of the most secular as well as orthodox sections of the intelli-

gentsia; e.g. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the one hand and Syed Ali Ashraf on the other.”

This chapter is not about the intellectual orientations of the intelli-

gentsia except in so far as a difference is implied by the different types

of education available to Muslims. The thrust here is not on a communal analysis of the effects of British educational policy. It is not a

study of the Hindu experience, though a comparison is inevitable when

statements relating to the size and growth of the middle class and the ” intelligentsia

are

made.

However,

it indicates

how

British

poli-

cies affected Hindus and Muslims in different ways, particularly among

the upper classes, while among the poorer sections the conditions of both

communities

were

similar

and

life

chances

equally

bad.

This chapter is about the nature of the intelligentsia in terms of their

socio-economic basé, educational orientations, occupational experience

and growing self-assertiveness.

The formation of the ‘first’ Muslim ministry in Bengal in 1937

marked

a distinct

change

in the province’s

social

and po-

litical structure.’ Until the end of the nineteenth century, there was hardly a Muslim

middle class which could politically assert itself.

Those who then spoke up for Muslim rights were remnants of the Bengal Muslim aristocracy. By the early tweritieth century, a small

Muslim middle class had emerged but it was timid and its political

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

27

activities were limited to making petitions to the Raj for quotas on a

community

‘the 1905-11

basis

in

education

and

employment.

During

partition of Bengal they were quiescent loyalists who

acknowledged the advantages that partition brought to them. In the twenties, a more assertive, though still ineffective voice could be heard. By 1937, however, the Bengal Muslim middle class had beome

openly

and

effectively

assertive

in politics. Several

factors

made this possible : the formation of a middle-class intelligentsia following the rise of a Muslim

middle class in Bengal; the encour-

agement of Bengal Muslim self-assertion as part of the British policy to create a counter force to the .Hindu nationalists; the changing

demography of Bengal which made Muslims the majority commu-

hity; the growth of community based on politics and the emphasis

on communal solidarity in the electoral process. The formation of the Muslim ministry indicated that a middle class had already es-

tablished itself. During 1937-47 this middle class continued to grow.

The process of its emergence and development had however begun

about the middle of the nineteenth century and is centrally relevant

to the theme of tension between religious and secular perceptions among

the Muslim

intelligentsia.

‘The controversy over the social origin of Bengal Muslims reveals

the contradictions in their self-ascription and the identity ascribed to

them by their significant other, the Hindus and also the British. The

Perceptions projected by all three groups were often based on pure

conjecture for want of accurate evidence. Nevertheless, a discussion

of the social origins of Bengal Muslims is important, given the in-

fluence particular views have had on their ideological predisposition both before and after independence in 1947.

This chapter will inquire into the ethnic and socio-economic origins

of the Bengal Muslims and show how the intelligentsia was constituted.

While analysing social stratification and patterns of social mobility, the

indicators of the emergence and growth of the intelligentsia and its Telative strength in education and employment vis-a-vis the Hindus will

be discussed. Although the focus here is not on British policy, it is

acknowledged that official policy had a crucial effect on the growth

and development of an intelligentsia. The aim of the exercise is to examine the relationship between the social bases of this intelligentsia and their educational and intellectual orientations.

28

The Sacred and The Secular

1.1 The Social Origin of Bengal Muslims

Islam spread to Bengal in the thirteenth century after it became a part of the Turkish Sultanate. A striking phenomenon of the late nineteenth century was the sudden realization among British officials

that Muslims formed the majority community in Bengal. This is significant because Bengal is located in North-eastern India, which, un-

like the other Muslim majority region located in the North-west, is

not contiguous

with the dominant centres of Muslim culture and

civilization. Debate and discussion focussing on this fact led to the formulation of rival theories about the origin of the Bengal Muslims, their ethnic and socio-economic roots. Table 1.1 : HINDU AND MUSLIM POPULATION OF BENGAL, 1872-1931*

Year 1872 ** 1891

1911

1921 1931

*

Hinds No, T7112,985 18,068,655

20,945,379

20,809,148 22,212,069,

® 49.24 44.72

45.23

Muslim % Total No. —*16,680,643—«48.0——=—«34,751,339 ‘19,582,349 48.47, «40,398,265,

24,237,228

5234

46,305,642

43.72, 25,486,124 53.55 47,592,462 43.47__—27,810,100——54.43_——_—51,087,338

Includes Cooch Behar, Tripura and Sikkim. The 1901 census for Bengal covers areas like Orissa, Chota Nagpur etc. not considered in previous and later censuses and therefore has been omitted. ‘** 1872 figures exclude Sylhet and Cachar. Sources: 1891 Census of India, Bengal, vol. iii, Report, pt. i (Calcutta, 1893), pp. 147, 36, 1911 Census of India, vol. v, Bengal, pt. ii (Calcutta, 1913), table VI, pp. 23-4; 1921 Census of india, vol. v, Bengal, pt. ii (Calcutta, 1923), table vi, pp. 28-9; 1931 Census of India, vol. v, Bengal, pt. ii (Calcutta, 1933), table xvi, pp. 220-21.

The 1872 census of India found Hindus to be the majority community in Bengal, but by the 1891 census a new pattern had emerged (see Table 1.1). The Muslims were now more numerous than Hindus accounting for 48.47 per cent of the population. The census of 1911 showed an accentuation of this tendency : Muslims formed 52.3 per cent of the population. This was to have significant implications for Muslim participation in future electoral politics. The upward trend continued until partition in 1947. From just under 50 per cent in 1881, the Muslim population rose to over 54 per cent in 1931.‘ Consequently,

the proportion of Hindus fell. For example, between 1921 and 1931,

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

29

Muslims increased by 9.1 per cent and Hindus by 6.7 per cent. In 1931, Muslims were 51.2 per cent more numerous than in 1881.° The increase

among Hindus was only 22.9 per cent. The increase in Muslim popu-

lation was not attributed to proselytization. On the contrary, there was

some conversion from Islam into Hinduism and Christianity owing to

Christian missionary. activities and the suddhi and sangathan move-

ments of the Arya Samaj. In the province as a whole, Hindus formed

the majority of the urban population and Muslims were mainly rural. However, in West Bengal alone, a larger proportion of Muslims were Urban rather than rural, although they formed only 14 per cent of the total population of the province in 1931.’ In East Bengal, the population

was predominantly Muslim and rural.

The rapid increase in the size of the Muslim community surprised

British officials and led to some discussion on the subject in the late

nineteenth and carly twentieth centuries. They had assumed Muslim

conquest and rule to be similar to their own, a small foreign ruling class reigning over a vast indigenous population. Their census analysts,

Beverley, Risley, Gait and Wise among others, put forward the theory of conversion mainly from lower Hindu castes.’ The theory was based on doubtful and unscientific anthropological studies of blood groups, and the nasal heights of lower caste Hindus and Muslim jail inmates.

No similar comparison was made between upper caste Hindus and respectable Muslims such as Syeds and Pathans. The inference was that

the Muslim

community at large had originated in the lower Hindu

castes. It is probable that most Muslims were descended from converts, in which case all that could be said was that low caste Hindus and Muslim criminals shared the same origin. These analyses have attrib-

uted the resemblance between Hindus and Muslims of Bengal to conversion. Indeed the Hindus and Muslims of North India also resemble

each other, but no such theory has been put forward there. The fact is,

unless groups are closed and endogamous, physical characteristics ap-

proach the mean for the population over a few generations. It is for this reason that most European Jews and Gentiles resemble one another.

However, the conversion theory could not explain the rapid rise in

the Muslim population of the nineteenth century. During colonial rule,

when Muslim influence was waning, conversion to Islam was in fact

negligible. Indeed, the incentive to convert must have been limited at this time as there were no Muslim rulers to offer patronage to converts.

30

The Sacred and The Secular

Yet in Dacca district, the Muslim population, which was estimated to

be equal to Hindus during 1801-60, had increasedto 62.3 per cent by

1901, In the 1912 District Gazetteer of Dacca, it was suggested that the Muslim community might have. originally swelled because of conversion, but later increase was due to a higher birth rate. The 1891 census*shows that the increase in Muslim population was the highest in eastern Bengal. Between 1872 and 1891, out of every

10,000 persons, Islam had gained

100 persons in

northern,

262 in eastern and 110 in western Bengal. The average for the

whole of Bengal proper was 157; the losses to Hinduism being in direct proportion. The spread of Islam was most marked in some of the eastern districts of Mymensingh, Dacca and Tipperah where

400 in every 10,000 (4 per cent) persons reportedly converted to Islam from Hinduism, attracted by ‘the republican character of the

domestic constitution of Musalman society’.'° interpretation is unclear as to Islam in the nineteenth such a significant number.

The

basis

for

this

there was virtually no conversion century. However, 4 per cent is not

Bogra, one of the most thickly populated districts in North Bengal after Pabna, also had the largest Muslim population for any district. In 1872, Muslims formed 80.7 per cent of the population there. In 1881 and 1891 their percentage remained stationary at 80.8. By 1901, they

had increased slightly to 81.8 per cent. This increase was explained-in

the 1910, Bogra District Gazetteer, as being ‘entirely due to natural

causes’

and

not to conversion,

for the

‘number of converts to

the Islamic religion during this time has been so small as to be almost negligible’.'" The -natural causes cited refer to the supposed greater virility of Muslims due to their different dietary habits, and the practice of widow marriage. A possible fall in the birth rate among Hindus could be a cause oft heir decreasing proportion in the

population.'”

Studies of the origin of Bengal Muslims and explanations of their increasing number pointed to two theories. One was pro-

pounded by British officials and found support mainly among Hindu

scholars. It stressed conversion to Islam of Hindus, often low caste,

and of some Buddhists as a major factor. The other, put forward by Muslim

scholars, suggested that Islam was spread by settlement

and not by the sword, a claim that periodically provoked Hindu

The Emergence of a Muslim‘Intelligentsia in Bengal

31

extremists to clamour for the expulsion of Muslims from India as

aliens.'> When they did admit to conversion, Muslims emphasized

their Buddhist origin on the ground that Buddhists formed the majority population of Bengal at the time of the advent of Islam in

the ‘thirteenth century.'*

The studies undertaken by British officials on the origin of Bengal

Muslims and the explanations offered for their increasing numerical strength provoked a sharp response from the Muslims. The issue was highly

sensitive.

They

saw

in

these

pronouncements

an attempt

to denigrate them and undermine their prestige.'* In their perception,

a Christian colonial power which was engaged in dismembering the Islamic world including the Ottoman Empire and which had displaced

a once mighty power, was now, in effect, telling the descendants of

that power that they were not high born, and their Pan-Islamnic, transIndian loyalties had no real basis, for they were largely Buddhist and low caste Hindu converts. This hurt the self-esteem of Muslims who

valued their trans-Indian roots, though frail, and took pride in seeing

themselves as descendants of the early Muslim conquerors. Khondoker

Fuzli Rubbee, Dewan.of the Murshidabad nawab family put forward

the settlement theory in an 1895 publication. He held that the spread

of Islam was by settlement and not by conversion, whether forceful or

otherwise. He pointed to linguistic differences between Bengali Hindus

and Muslims in support. He identified many prominent well descended

families in Bengal and suggested that the proportion of the genuine ashraf,-high born, was greater in the districts of North and West Bengal — for example in Murshidabad, Hooghly, Burdwan, Malda, Rajshahi

and Bogra.*

“In the nineteenth century, Bengal was witnessing Islamization movements aimed at purifying religious practices. It was no wonder

that Muslims were reluctant to entertain the idea that their ancestors could have been converts. Indeed, one’s position on’ this

issue reflected a particular ideological position and perception of identity.

Muslim

scholars

today

concede

that

conversion

had

occurred but disagree on its scale.'’ Kamruddin Ahmed held that conversion occurred primarily among Buddhists who were attracted by sufism, the ideas of which

were familiar to them, and

because

they wished to protect their interests against the powerful Aryans."

Ali, in a recent study, supported a 1901 estimate by A. A. Guznavi

32

The Sacred and The Secular

that 20 per cent of Bengal Muslims were lineal descendants of settlers, 50 per cent had an admixture of foreign blood and 30 per cent were descended from Hindus, Buddhists and other converts. The 50 per cent group would appear to have both exogenous and endogenous roots. There is however, no reliable evidence to make an exact estimate.

‘The conversion theory found its supporters largely among Indian

scholars.

Some

latched on to the notion of low caste conversion,

for example, among the rajbansis and namasudras, and conveniently ignored

that Bengali

Muslims

also consisted of descendants

of the

early settlers, their mixed race descendants, and those of upper caste converts. The impression created was that of a monolithic Muslim experience

in Bengal.

Central

to Basu’s

thesis

is the poverty

of

Bengal Muslims, attributable to their low. caste origin, which prevented their full participation in the British education system.” Low

caste conversion is also basic to Asim Roy's thesis of the spread of Islam through cultural mediators, an Islam which was understood and interpreted by ‘half-converts’ in ways which drew from their Hindu

heritage thus- assuming a deviation from a ‘pure’ Islam.”

While these theses have a basis in reality, they are applicable only to some sections of the Muslim population which were often mar-

ginal to the community, and not to the body at large. For even if

Gait’s low estimate is accepted, approximately 17 per cent of the population were descended from early conquerors and the disbanded soldiery.”" Buddhists and upper caste Hindus have also contributed

to the size of the Muslim population. Their experiences are not reflected in these studies, which gives the impression that they never existed. There is strong evidence that Bengal Muslims were deeply influenced by local customs. Although there was no inter-dining, Hindus and Muslims shared in each other’s festivities. Rightly or wrongly, some saw in these practices evidence of a common origin. Though both settlement and conversion account for the spread of Islam, the tendency among Muslims is to emphasize their foreign roots and neg-

lect their more numerous local connections. While there were pockets of settlement of early Muslim conquerors who intermarried with non-Muslims, the vast majority of Bengal Muslims were of local origin though not necessarily converts from the

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

33

lowest caste groups. In his travels, Ibn Batuta noted that the inhabitants

of Srihatta (Sylhet) turned to Islam when they saw the supernatural

powers of Muslim fakirs such as Shah Jalal.” The population of this area comprised both upper and lower caste groups.. However, numerous

instances of conversion from occupational groups and lower castes have been recorded. The 1910 D.G., Bogra notes that the Koches and Meches who inhabited the area suddenly embraced Islam in the

sixteenth century.”

The upper- and lower-strata of Muslim society usually had Perso-

Arabic names.

Some,

in addition,

had pet names that were often

Bengali in origin. However, the great mass of the lower strata, though Muslim, had not received the new designations or surnames,

usually of Arabic or Persian origin, which the new religion (Islam) had ‘introduced in other parts’. Functional groups had ‘Hindu names

and titles’.* Some common names were Kali Sheikh, Braja Sheikh, Gopal Mandal

etc.

Upper- and lower-strata Muslims differed in their social practices and habits. Those who originated from among the lowest Hindu castes could be categorized as ‘statistical Muslims’, for there was little to differentiate them from their Hindu forbears.* Though few

in number, there were certain’ ‘indeterminate’ social groups which

could

not clearly be classified as either Hindu

or Muslim.

Their

existence proved the syncretic nature of Indian culture, the deep

impact that Hinduism and Islam had on each other to the point where differences were nearly obliterated. Besides mutual influence, Indian Islam and Hinduism shared a social world which transcended

the exclusiveness of their great traditions. As in Indonesia, Islam

did not pretend to purity, but to comprehensiveness; not to intensity but

to largeness

of spirit.

One

communally

indeterminate

group

known as bhagawania or satya-dharma (true religion) though small in number, was found in Jessore and Khulna.” It had both Hindu

and Muslim members who neither intermarried or dined together, nor followed the orthodox injunctions of Hinduism and Islam. The Hindus of the sect had renounced the practice of daily ahnik and sandhya devotions and the Muslims did not observe the annual Ramzan fast or the daily prayers, namaz. Recruits to the sect from among the Brahmans kept the sacred thread; Muslims did not practice circumcision or eat meat and onions. Like Hindus they

34

The Sacred and The Secular

shaved their heads and faces and revered the éulsi plant. What

is

more surprising, they buried their dead not according to Muslim

Tites but with vaishnava samadhi rites.

It must be remembered, however, that these groups formed a

tiny*fraction of the community

and were socially marginal. Never-

theless, their existence offers a strong indication not only of the influence of primordial, local practices on some Muslims, but also of the conversion

of some

Hindus

to Islam,

who

continued

with

their earlier practices. Other such ‘indeterminate’ groups were the chitrakars or patuas of West Bengal and the kirtanias of Pabna and

Mymensingh. The classification of these groups was quite a problem for the preparation

of the

1931

census report on account of the

discrepancy between what they claimed to be and what they prac-

ticed. While these groups claimed to be Muslims, the chitrakars, for

example,

made

images of Hindu gods and goddesses and did not

practice circumcision or burial of the dead; the kirtanias, on the other hand, did not observe roza or namaz and were vegetarians. Their practices have been described in the 1931 census report as

‘consistent with orthodox Hinduism’. Evidence of shared local links was also to be found in customs common to Hindus and Muslims, particularly among functional

groups. Even in the seventies they could be found in certain areas of

Bangladesh.

In

Rajshahi

district,

for

example,

identical

local customs prevailed among some sections of low-class Hindus

and Muslims. There were Muslims who would not eat with or drink

water touched by three Muslim groups known as bansphors, abdals

and bediyas. Marriage and divorce among abdals did not follow the ‘formalities as prescribed by Muslim law’. ‘No “‘muliah” was called

upon’ to perform the marriage sacrament. While the bride sat inside the house and the bridegroom outside, the bride’s brother, ‘who was

most probably her guardian’ simply said ‘you are married, you are a : : customs observed by low class Muslims of Rajshahi district to this day are ‘tinged by Hindu superstitions’. When a child is ill, verses are chanted from the padma purana, a Hindu religious ‘text, ‘and if there is cattle disease, gorakher laru is sung. During marriage ceremonies a sort of puja, called mangat chandijay, is performed. Pictures are painted on the walls; milk, plantains and sindur

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

35

(vermilion) are placed on the floor; incense is burnt; and women

sing throughout the night from evening till daybreak. The general belief is that such a ceremony brings mangal or good fortune to the bride and bridegroom.’”.

‘The. indeterminate groups belonged mainly to the lowest of the occupational groups who had little contact with Islam. They may

have converted to escape caste prejudices. But such prejudices continued

to discriminate

against them

as they

were

thought

to be a

degraded lot, the arzul, among whom were the scavengers, toddy tappers, cleaners and washermen.

‘The examples above reflect the experience of some marginal

groups in society. Similar instances cannot be found among upper

and middle class Muslims, except for participation in certain religious festivals such as janmashtami in honour of the birth of Lord

Krishna and saraswati puja to propitiate the goddess of learning. It

is possible that they had greater contact with Islam, either through

descent or learning. It is also possible that being upwardly mobile they discarded practices inconsistent with Islamic teaching, either in Tesponse to purificatory movements

status.

in Islam or in search of social

Shared customs may, originate in common

:

primordial roots, loy-

alties and experiences. These may also have other explanations.

Shared customs may not necessarily indicate conversion or local ori-

gin. They

may

simply result from mutual co-existence and fellow

feeling. Centuries of interaction and harmonious co-habitation

resulted

in the exchange of ideas and influences between

have

Hindus

and Muslims. Munsef Bari of Comilla, largely Mughal and Pathan descended, kept astrological charts (kushti) of births following the tradition of their forbears among

the Muslim

ruling classes. These

were destroyed at the turn of this century in response to purificatory

pressures. Participation in Hindu festivals is indicative of the strong influence of the dominant culture on Muslims

rather than of con-

of Christmas

alike. For

version. A modern day Western European parallel is the observance by Christians

and

non-Christians

the non-

Christian, this is a mark of respect rather than an aspect of faith or conversion.

.

36

The Sacred and The Secular

1.2 Social Divisions among Bengal Muslims

Sociologists and anthropologists of South Asia refer to two distinct strata among Muslims. These are the ashraf and the ajlaf, which are

distinguished by ethnic origin, descent, economic activity, status and

cultural practices.” The Bengal Muslims recognize these social

sions, but refer to the ashraf also as sharif which is singular of ashraf,

and instead of ajlaf, use a corrupted form of the term, atrap or atraf. The ashraf

or ‘noble born’

were in fact landholders and North

Indian traders. Among Bengal Muslims they constituted the upper class and included, according to Levy, all undoubted descendants of foreign

Muslims such as Arabs, Persians, Afghans, and Mughals, as well as converts from the upper Hindu castes. The fourfold division within the

ashraf was according to birth or ancestry. Syeds were believed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad; Pathans of Afghan descent; and

Mughals traced their lineage to Central Asia. Sheikhs were generally

converts from upper caste Hindus,” but in the Arab context they were the chiefs. The atrap were considered ‘low-born’ and in fact belonged mostly to occupational groups and crafts, such as jolahas (weavers),

nikari (fishmongers),

dhunia

(cotton-cleaners),

hajjam

(barbers),

etc.” The ashraf, like the higher Hindu castes, considered it degrad-

ing to accept ++ Menial service or to handle the plough and they look down upon all other ranks of Bengal Muslims whom they call ajlaf or ‘coarse rabble’. These include the functional castes such as weavers, cotton carders, oil-pressers, barbers, tailors etc., as well as converts from originally humble castes.””

A third group, the arzul, was recognized by Gait in the 1901 census

as the ‘degraded class’ and by S. M. N. Karim as the ‘lowest of all’, and included such groups as toddy-tappers, butchers, scavengers, gyp-

sies, etc., forming a ‘Muslim counterpart of the Hindu untouchable’.

In pre-British times, Indian Muslim ‘social classes’ were patterned ‘roughly in imitation of the four main Hindu caste divisions’

according to Karim. They divided themselves into Syed, Mughal,

Sheikh and Sudra categories.* This fourfold division did not correspond

to the Hindu

caste structure entirely. The

members

of each

group belonged to various strata of Muslim society and they also

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 37 intermarried up to a point, which was not the case with Hindu

castes. The Muslim social divisions, therefore, were not as rigid as the Hindu caste system. Although these four groups did not corre-

spond strictly to the social divisons in East Pakistan, Karim suggests that higher class Muslims

were distributed among

the ashraf and

atrap, and the Sudra category may be said to have corresponded to the arzul. The Muslim social divison was an imitation of the ancient Arab practice of distinguishing (alleged) descendants of the Prophet

or his clan (ashraf) from those who were not : hence the premium set on status determined by birth or origin. Influenced

by concepts

of social origin and social superiority associated with ashraf status, Bengal Muslims like their co-religionists elsewhere in the subcontinent, tended to divide themselves into Syeds, Sheikhs, Mughals and

Pathans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For a diagram-

matic description of the traditional grouping of Muslim social divisions see Appendix 1.A.

Such a categorization, however, failed to take note of changing so-

cial phenomena from the late nineteenth century onwards. Vast numbers of people suddenly began to claim ashraf status. While the 1872 census for Bengal including Sylhet and Cachar, reported only 232,189

people as Sheikhs, the 1901 census returned approximately 19.5 million as such out of a total Muslim population of slightly over 21.5 million

(excluding Sylhet and Cachar).” The vast majority of Muslims of the

relatively affluent districts of Bogra and Dacca also returned themselves as Sheikhs in the census — 81.8 per cent in Bogra and 94.9 per cent in Dacca respectively.*

A slight contradiction may be noted here. If Sheikhs were upper

caste Hindu converts and Muslims were averse to claim Hindu descent

why should they declare themselves to be Sheikhs? It is possible that they attributed to the term the Arab meaning of ‘chief’ or simply re-

garded it as a symbol of higher status and superior birth. However, it has been suggested by census analyst J. N. Gupta, that most of them

were actually converts'from low Hindu castes.” It has also been sug-

gested that in 1891 there were not more than ‘a quarter of a million true Syeds, or half a million of real Pathans’ in Bengal proper, but that

these titles were ‘adopted by families of the higher rank of Mohammedan

Society’.

Similar patterns have been established

in ethnographic studies of Uttar Pradesh where it has been ‘common

38

The Sacred and The Secular

practice on the part of the lower caste individuals to claim ashraf descent along with a rise in socio-economic status’."’ The

effect of such

a trend has made

it virtually impossible

to

distinguish ajlaf from ashraf over an extensive grey area. The vast majority of Bengal Muslims are still.engaged in agriculture, a nonashraf occupation. In 192, there were 19.7 million (77.4 per cent) ‘ordinary’ cultivators, 2.2 million (8.7 per cent) field labourers ‘and 0.6 million persons engaged in other forms of production such as raw materials and minerals, out of a total Muslim population of 25.4 million.” The number of people who returned themselves as Sheikhs was 24.4 million (95.8 per cent).° (See Table 1.2 for the distribution of Muslim

population by rank between

1872 and 1931). It is’ obvi-

ous that all of them could not be true Sheikhs of ashraf descent if the original conquerors who entered Bengal were just a few in number. The 1872 census probably presents a closer picture of the size of the ashraf community as 1.52 per cent for Bengal proper.“ The

claimants to foreign descent were. concentrated more heavily in the relatively affluent western and central districts comprising Burdwan,

Presidency and Rajshahi divisions (2.06 per cent) than in the poorer eastern districts comprising Dacca and Chittagong divisions (0.89 per cent). . The claim of Indian Muslims to ashraf status and foreign descent can easily be explained sociologically in terms of the tendency of subjugated

races and

lower classes to imitate the ways

and aspire

to the status of the upper classes.° Such claims derived partly from

the desire for economic gain since ‘in the administrative system the positions of status were assigned to members of families of foreign origin who had either originally accompanied the. invading armies or had descended from the original immigrants’. This concern may

‘also partly be attributed to greater awareness of a Pan-Islamic consciousness. The need to identify with the ashraf may be an assertion of a distinct Muslim identity. It may also imply a rejection of local Hindu connections. The tendency among Muslims to dissociate from

their pagan past continues to this day in Bangladesh.’ Similar ex-

periences characterized the Christian world as Christianity strove to

gain ascendancy over pre-Christian, pagan belief systems.”

The numerous subdivisions among Muslim functional groups were analogous to the Hindu jatis. Sometimes clear distinctions of race were

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

39

maintained by these groups; sometimes these were like live trade guilds, although the hereditary occupation was not strictly enforced. The functional groups of the greatest numerical importance were the jolahas.”

They were not strictly endogamous; but there were restrictions on mar-

riage and social intercourse between the kulus (oil-pressers), bediyas (gypsies), jolahas, etc.” The main difference between them and Hindus lay in the fact that their order was less rigid. Secondly, since the immense mass of the Muslim population belonged to one ‘caste’, i.e., the Sheikhs, there was virtually no such thing as caste among Muslims. The social divisions which emerge from Rafiuddin Ahmed’s study match the material reality of early twentieth century Bengal more

closely than traditional divisions. His categorization takes into account changing. patterns of mobility among Bengal Muslims. These may roughly be described in the following manner : one, an upper ashraf consisting of the Mughal ashraf and the mufussil gentry; two, a lesser ashraf represented by small landholders, imullahs, kiondhars and people of similar status who called themselves ashraf and were recognized as such by many (see Appendix 1.B). The lesser ashraf also included, tural Syeds and all persons who could lay some claim to foreign an-' cestry and had some property or wealth to back their claim. This category has also been described as the rural ashraf. The bulk of Muslim population is described as belonging to non-ashraf categories, i.e., to ggricultural classes and to ‘certain lowly service or craft occupations’. ‘Ahmed’s third and fourth categories are thus described as agricultural Sheikhs and occupational groups. The agricultural Sheikhs' have also been described as ‘cultivating Sheikhs’ or rural Sheikhs.*' Among the

lower status groups, occupation was the basis for caste differentiation and hierarchy. The ‘respectable’ occupations among them were those of darzi (tailor), jildgar (book-binder), juti-wala (shoeseller), nanbai (baker),

etc.

while

the

‘dishonourable’

professions

were bajunia (musician) and nilgar (indigo-dyer). Totally degraded status was associated with occupations such ‘as grave-digging, clothes-washing, etc.” Social distance between the ashraf and atrap was inevitable as the upper strata in any society tends to look down upon the lower.** Not

only did the pervasiveness of the caste system influence Muslim soci-

ety, it also reinforced the distinctness of the two streams of culture represented by the two ‘classes’. However, the ‘lesser and rural ashraf

40

The Sacred and The Secular

had culturally more in common with the cultivating Sheikhs than the

upper ashraf. It would be appropriate to introduce a category called

middle ashraf to include those who were at home in both streams of culture. This would include the mufussil gentry and the khondkar for example, as well as those of mixed race descent. Upper ashraf culture

was foreign in origin and patronized by a small Urdu, Persian and Arabic-speaking

aristocratic

urban

elite, while

atrap

culture

was

indigenous in origin and common to numerous Bengali-speaking rural people some of whom also spoke Urdu. The former was replete with Persian-Arabic customs specific to Islamic culture which manifested

itself in ashraf language, dress and manners, and was emulated by

upper

Hindu

society. The indigenous cultural heritage on the other

hand, cut across religious and sectarian barriers.” Thus, while the upper

ashraf used Persian and Arabic names, the atrap had local names such as Mandal, Sarkar, Pramanik, etc., which were ‘also common among

Hindus.

There

was

limited contact between

the common,

rural,

Bengali speaking atrap and the aristocratic, non-vernacular upper

ashraf. Moreover, the upper ashraf did not quite accept the atrap on an equal footing as proper Muslims. There are several possible reasons

for this. One view is that Islam as practised in Bengal was corrupted

by the influence of mysticism through contact with sufis;* but sufi

influence in North India was not insignificant either. The other view implies that corruption was due to accretions which crept into Bengali Islam due to contact with Hinduism.” The fact that Bengali Muslims

and Hindus shared local customs and that Muslims attended Hindu

pujas and festivals was seen as proof positive. The belief in the superiority of North Indian Islam as practised by the upper ashraf influenced the official decision in Pakistan after 1947.

to Islamize

East

Bengali

culture

Muslim society at the lower level, though caste-like, was less rigid

than the Hindu caste system in that it constituted a ‘more flexible sys-

tem of social stratification’. This flexibility could exist because caste

practices among Muslims were based not on religious sanction, but on local practice whereby

restrictions and: prejudices

were tradition-

ally associated’ with each caste-like occupational group. Dhopas (washermen)

and hajjams (barbers) were more strictly endogamous

than khujas (vegetable-sellers)

or jolahas,

while darzis (tailors)

and kulus (oil-pressers) followed no marriage restriction at all.* But

The Emergence of a Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal 4 upward mobility became possible through change in occupation and accumulation of wealth, as evidenced by the popular saying, ‘last year I was a jolaha, this year I am a Sheikh, next year if prices rise I shall be a Syed’.” In fact, almost any rural Muslim could rise to the status

of ‘cultivating’ or rural Sheikhs, ‘but the rural Sheikhs were never admitted to the ashraf community’. The cultivating Sheikhs, as a status group was so ‘open’ that entry into it was possible even by simple

changes in family names.” The striking ashrafization phenomenon of the late nineteenth century bears testament to this.’ Between 1872 and 1891 the proportion of Muslims claiming ashraf status in Bengal rose

from 1.5 per cent to 99.1 per cent. The maximum increase was. in the category of Sheikhs indicating its remarkable openness (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.2 : MUSLIM POPULATION BY RANK IN BENGAL, 1872-1931* (Including Indian States)

Year 1872 1891 1921 1931**

Total 17,609,135 21,648,049 25,486,124 27,810,100

‘Sheikhs 232,189 20,644,294 24,414,664 =

Syeds 9,858 (256,239 140,499 162,905

Mughals 2,205 28,917 —=

Pathans 22,126 $25,683 306,165, -

* Some differences with Table 1.1 are caused by inclusion of Indian States. ‘** The 1931 census, for reasons of economy, gave figures only for Syeds and a category called jolaha, ‘Sheikh Mumin’ in which there were 270,292 people. The other cate‘Bory included the vast majority of the population, i.c., 27,376,903. Source : R. Ahmad, The Bengal Muslims, Oxford University Press; p. 115; 1891 Census of India, Bengal Report p. 269;

1921 Census of India, vol. V, Bengal, ptA

& -B, table XIII, pp 166-75; 1931 Census of India, vol. V; Bengal, pt Il, pp 223-42.

Upward social mobility among Bengal Muslims was fairly rigid until the end of the nineteenth century although zamindar fortunes experienced tremendous fluctuations.* Around the turn of the century, new

aspirations

and

expectations,

coupled

with

opportu-

fiities for employment and education, loosened the system. The poorer and low status Muslims now sought and, in some measure achieved, upward mobility. The new aspirations were partly the outcome, of the ashrafization phenomenon and a self-perception of Bengali Muslims as being, equal to the more lucky and afflyent urban non-Bengali Muslims. Similarly, they wished to command the respect

of Hindu zamindars. During the July 1930 unrest among the peasants

42

The Sacred and The Secular

of Kishoreganj, Pakundia and Hossainpur thanas, Muslim tenants demanded the right to sit in the landlords’ kacchahri and be addressed by the polite apni rather than the familiar tui, an expression reserved for use by the superior to the inferior in age or status.” Upward mo-

bility was also facilitated by changes in the economic condition of the peasantry through the accumulation of surplus wealth and the acquisition pf land. Some participated in the land market which emerged in the 1860s as a result of the increased pressure on land and the rise of famine and distress sale.“ The Report of the Committee on

Muhammadan Education, 1914, noted that ‘the cultivators have recently profited from the jute trade and this has been accompanied by

a growing ‘interest in English education’. Saha also suggests that the

introduction of cash crops brought some cultivyors to a relatively affluent situation as a result of which they could afford to send their sons to schools and

colleges.

Other than an interest in

achieving upward occupational mobility, the Muslim cultivator was averse to being defended by Hindu lawyers in the endless litigation they tended to be involved in and preferred to see their co-religionists

as pleaders.”

By the thirties, patterns of social mobility changed dramatically. In 1931, out of a group of 1,000 earners, only 379 jolahas were engaged in their traditional occupation. The distribution of jolahas in the various occupational groups indicates that a high degree of occupational mobility had taken place. Out of every 1,000 earners, 366 were engaged ° in the exploitation of animals and vegetation, 7 in the extraction of minerals, 137 in industries, 14 in transport, 33 in trade, 2 in public services, | in public administration and 7 in the arts and professions. ‘The corresponding distribution of Syeds in these occupational categories was as follows : 604 depended on animals and vegetation, 6 on minerals, 68 on industries, 24 on transport work, 10 on public services, 16 on public administration and 98 in the arts and professions. A large proportion of Syeds were not employed in ashraf occupations; while only 9.8 per cent of Syed earners were engaged in arts and professions,

60.4 per cent lived ont the exploitation of animals and vegetation which was definitely a non-ashraf profession. Significantly, 3.4 per cent of Syed earners were also engaged in domestic service.* Thus while many

jolahas, traditionally a low-status group, experienced upward mobility, many Syeds, traditionally a high-status group, became downwardly

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

43

mobile. By now, the acquisition of English education and accumulation of wealth, under a new dispensation rather than mere birth, was be-

‘coming the hallmark of success and the Syeds could no longer hold their own. 1.3.

The Formation of a Bengal Muslim Middle Class

There is little evidence available about the pattern of social mobility before the British colonial period. The process of bringing local chieftains under Mughal rule and introducing its administrative mechanisms inevitably involved a certain degree of mobility. The Mughals, like the British after them, worked in close co-operation with native agents for purposes of revenue collection. Todar Mal, for example, was in charge of making assessments for reveniie collection during the reign of Akbar in the sixteenth centiry.” Raja Man Singh was made viceroy of Bengal in 1594. The native Afghans and Hindu chieftains who submitted to Mughal authority at this time were granted jagirs and zamindari rights.” Others were

drafted into the imperial service as mansabdars or officials. Tbe Mughal administration set-up required a range of official positions.

Faujdars,

sardars and thanadars were officers in charge of

administrative areas. There were dewanis, gazis (law officials, judges), kotwals (police chiefs), sadrs (officers in charge of grants), karoras (revenue collectors) and other general purpose officers such as mansabdars, ahadis and subedars. Clerical and menial staff as well as hired labourers were employed by the state machinery. A large proportion of the middle ranks in the scale of social stratification in the Mughal courts ‘was filled by upper-class Hindus. Indeed the courtiers and financiers of Siraj-ud-Daula’s court were largely Hindu. A significant proportion of officers and courtiers must have been Muslim, given the fact that five thousand of prince Salim’s troops were granted

jagirs in Bengal” and that Muslims dominated in certain offices such as that of qazi.

However, taking the population of Bengal at large, one would be inclined to believe that there was a small ashraf consisting of the nobility and the landed aristocracy and a non-ashraf community

composed of the peasantry and occupational groups. Upward mobility from the latter categories was restricted probably due to

44

The Sacred and The Secular

the social distance between the two groups and the influence of

caste

rules

on

lower-status

Muslims

such

as

the

occupa-

tional groups.” Mughal society was ascriptive, status was determined

by birth, and entry into the bureaucracy was, in principle, at the tuler’s discretion.” British India was not considerably different ex-

cept that it introduced a system of competition whereby the lowerborn could, theoretically speaking, achieve upward mobility. In practical terms, however, this was very difficult. During British rule, Bengal had a highly mobile society and patterns of mobility were both upward and downward. For the ashraf, for example, the trend was largely downward for the first hundred years until specific policy measures were directed at reversing this

tendency. Peasant fortunes came to be affected by the working of

a land market about half a century later. The formation of a Muslim middle-class intelligentsia in Bengal is closely linked to the impact of colonial rule and the intended or unintended results of British policy. Some attempt will be made in this chapter to understand the effect of British rule on the formation and growth of a Muslim intelligentsia before partition. The Condition of the Upper Classes until 1871 British rule introduced a new concept of respectability, status and power, based not on superiority of birth, but of education and wealth.

Education became a marketable commodity, thus virtually replacing

the earlier system of free education maintained through wagfs,

endowments and trusts. Land too became a saleable item from the midnineteenth century. The British followed a policy of concentrating power in their own hands. The effect was to divest the Muslim

aristocracy of its principal sources of income : landholding, adminis-

trative, and

military positions. The agrarian, educational, and admin-

istrative policies adopted to achieve this aim had far-reaching effects

‘on the Indian polity — it transformed the existing social order, created new classes breaking across caste barriers, set an unprecedented degree

of social mobility

and in many cases weakened the power of hereditary

status groups. British officials described it as ‘a time of upheaval, the

old order was changing and the old families who had long held the

neighbouring zamindaris were dying out, or, encumbered with debt,

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 45 were being forced to relinquish their possessions’.” m4 The reorganization

of Indian society which ensued saw the Bengal Muslims as ‘a race ruined under British rule’. In 1871, Hunter wrote : During the last seventy-five years, the Musalman Houses of Bengal have either disappeared from the face of the earth, or are at this moment being submerged beneath the new strata

of society which our Rule has developed ....’>

Hunter’s statements need to be treated with caution. Many Hindu

zamindars also lost their landholdings. However, proportionately fewer

Muslim families were able to survive the onslaught. Prior to the

1793

Permanent Settlements, of the 12 great zamindaris of Bengal in 1790,

only one,

the

Birbhum

Raj,

was

owned by a Muslim fam-

ily.’ In the Nawabi period, the pattern of ownership of land was no

different. In 1728, two out of 15 large zamindaris and two of the 21 small

zamindaris

belonged

to Muslims.”

All

these

families

were

adversely affected by the Settlement. However, the loss incurred by the leading families was greater than that of the lesser ones. The former lost 61 per cent of their original holdings, while the lesser zamindars lost only 26 per cent. At the same time, the Hindu zamindars showed

greater resilience and power of self-preservation than the Muslims through benami purchases of holdings. Of the 12 great houses of Ben-

gal, 4, all of them Hindu — the rajas of Burdwan, Dinajpur, Rajshahi

and Raja Roghunath Singh — were able to preserve themselves. Sirajul

Islam estimates that about 45 per cent of the landed property was transferred to new owners; of this at least one-third

remained within the

established landed class.” The Floud Commission Report of 1938 states

that within twenty years of the Permanent Settlement, one-third of the

landed property of Bengal was supposedly sold for arrears of rent, thus radically altering the distribution and ownership of land.”

The new strata of society which emerged had accumulated enough to buy titles

to

landholdings

which

were

being

sold

for

defaulting

on rent payment.” It was mainly, but not entirely, Hindu. Often, existing zamindars, and not always Calcutta merchants, became the new rent receivers and collectors of these areas. Khan bari of Brahmanbaria

in East Bengal lost most of its landed property and houses to established local Hindus

century.

through

the auction of holdings

in the mid-nineteenth

46

The Sacred and The Secular

The Muslim landed nobility was least able to protect itself from the ‘Sunset Law’ imposed to secure the timely collection of revenue. The saleability of the zamindaris often tempted landholders to incur loans to meet their expenses."' Often inexperienced landholders were

dealt with treacherously by their amlas or officers ‘who were almost

always Hindus ... they embezzled funds, transferred property into their

own names and left the treasury bankrupt’: this was the case of the Raja of Birbhum, Muhammad Zafar Khan, at the end of the eighteenth

century.”

Among the purchasers of auctioned land, the most predominant group was the established zamindar class, followed by traders and government officials including financiers and revenue collec-

tors. Islam estimates that about two-thirds of the land transferred to

new hands was purchased by not more than thirty families. His list of families contains no Muslim names, although he refers in a footnote to the family of Nawab Khwaja Abdul Gani of Dacca which became a substantial landed family in the 1830s and 1840s."°

Muslims had no share in the.cash accumulation which led to the

rise of a commercial elite among the Hindus in Bengal in the eight-

eenth and nineteenth centuries. Binoy

Ghosh

writes that there were

practically no dewans, banians or mutsuddis among Muslims at this time.“ Muslims in Bengal had, by the mid-eighteenth century, very little ‘of trade and commerce. Therefore, when trade policies under the Company's rule favoured Indian agents, only Hindus — of the trading as well as non-trading castes — went forward, often acting as brokers, interpreters, cashiers,’ middlemen and paikers (suppliers of finished goods) in’ the transactions of the Company as well as its European servants. It was this group which accumulated wealth and could later invest in land.”*

The relative poverty of Bengal Muslims worsened as British policies succeeded in destroying the former structures of Muslim power, “the three streams of wealth for the Muslim aristocracy — military command, collection of revenue, and-judicial or political employ’."* While Europeans replaced Muslims in top administrative positions, Hindus preserved their subordinate positions in the services as in Mughal. times. Only such ‘native commissioners’ as amins and munsifs were allowed to function as temporary judicial officers

of the government; they tried only such cases as were referred to

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 47. them by European judges. The Nawab’s grant of £ 420,000 payable to him from 1765 onwards was reduced to £ 160,000. The reduction

of the Nawab’s military establishment threw many high-ranking

Muslim officers out of employment. The ‘Select Committee’ of 1783 noted that ‘all the lucrative situations of the arniy, all the supplies

and contracts of whatever species that belong to it are solely in the

hands of the English’ As Europeans consolidated power, Muslims

lost predominance even in lower-paid positions. In 1856, out of 366

persons listed as holding appointments in the judicial and revenue service in Bengal

with salaries of Rs 50 upwards,

only 54 were

Muslim." The proportion of a race which once enjoyed ‘the monopoly of government’, fell to ‘less than one twenty-third, of the whole administrative body in gazetted appointments’ within a hundred years.” Its numbers in relation to Hindus became insignificant. In 1869 the ratio of Muslims to Hindus was

in lower ranks of office

1:120. It deteriorated further by 1871.'In the highest grades of

office the discrepancy was somewhat less at this time but continued to deteriorate for Muslims

(see Appendix

1.C).

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, particularly until the change in court language from Persian to English, Muslims continued to be appointed as pleaders. Appended is a list of vakils or pleaders, attached to the court of Sudder Dewany Adalat, Calcutta, from 1813 to 1833. Out of 22 persons appointed, 15 were Muslim,

5 Hindu and 2 European (see Appendix 1.D). Although Muslims

predominated in the judicial services, by 1861 there were very few

of them left. All the 32 advocates of the Supreme Court in Calcutta were European; out of 51 pleaders in the small causes courts, only 2 were Muslim, 26 were Hindu and the remaining 23 either

European, Anglo-Indian or Christian.” Many

established

Muslim

families

were unable to survive

the

onslaught during the first hundred years of British rule. While a small Muslim landed class did exist in Bengal in the nineteenth century, it was in a continuous state of decline. Delawarr Hosaen Ahmed Meerza wrote sadly in 1869-70 :

Zamindaris are passing away from our hands; wellknown families have been steadily declining for several genrations, and in almost all towns there are many well-descended gentlemen who live in comparative indigence.”

48

The Sacred and The Secular

Muslim dissatisfaction about their state was recorded in a letter by Blochmann of Calcutta Madrasah, ‘Everywhere in Bengal the Muhammadans

complain of the Inquilab-i-zamana or “the bad turn

of circumstances” and the ashraf gardi or “the upsetting of respectable classes”. The two terms I have heard thousands’ of” times’.” There was a small Muslim

middle class in Bengal which

was

also decaying. In 1838, there were 1,260 Muslim pupils in vernacular schools and

1,558 in Persian and Arabic schools. They formed

5.19 per cent and 42.63 per cent of the total number of scholars in these institutions. Quite unexpectedly, Hindus outnumbered

Muslims

even in Persian and Arabic schools. Between 1841 and 1856, the decline continued in absolute terms. The number of Muslim students

in government schools and colleges dropped from 751 to 731, ie. from 18.61 per cent of the total to 10.3 per cent.” The obstacles to Muslim education will be discussed later. There was no emergent

Muslim intelligentsia at this time corresponding to the Hindu bhadralok who were the new respectable people emerging from the new

aristocracy of wealth and status—the mercantile, trading and rent-

receiving families.

Agrarian Condition until the 1930s

Two opposing characteristics marked the condition of the peasantry

following the onset of colonial rule : one, continued impoverishment

and growing inequality among the masses eventually giving rise to communal tensions; two, the emergence of a group of upwardly

mobile peasants with higher aspirations which were articulated in the form of demands for access to better education and participation decision-making bodies. There are various opinions on the condition of the peasantry during the first half of British rule. Increasing peasant indebtedness during the period has been attributed to exac-

tions levied by the Permanent Settlement.’ Others have attributed

their indebtedness to subsequent legislative changes, acts and amendments aimed at defining agrarian relations which strengthened the position of zamindars and increased the insecurity of tenants.” Several

social

scientists

argue

that

the Permanent

Settlement

caused much ‘distress and beggary’; that it introduced a semi-feudal economy

which kept the peasant at a level below subsistence, thus

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 49 restricting the internal market and drying up possibilities of production of economic surplus, and that it caused ‘long-term deleterious effects on the structure of rural society’.” The strict collection of high revenue

prevented

investment. The ance against the encouraged the with the result

land from

becoming

an attractive area of

subinfeudation of holdings as a measure of insur‘risk’ of landlordism was injurious to peasants. It growth of a class of rent-receiving intermediaries that the rental burden of the peasantry increased.

Increasing indebtedness forced the peasants to mortgage and sell

land. Nationalist and radical intellectuals believed that a system of peasant proprietorship was being replaced by a system where landlords were declared ‘absolute proprietors’ of the soil.” It was pointed out that the Permanent Settlement brought about the loss of

certain rights previously possessed by peasants : for example, the

right to occupy land unconditionally on payment of rent and the right to have the rent determined by the state.”

It is argued that effective possession of land, though not legal ownership, was vested in the peasantry and that the Permanent Settlement

explicitly regulated only the relationship between zamindars and the

state, while leaving zamindar-raiyat relations to be decided by local

custom, i.e., by the balance of class forces at the local level —

for

zamindars were the agents who collected revenue from the raiyats for

the British.” In Bast Bengal where ‘landlords are weak and the tenants

strong’ legislation was aimed at protecting landlords. For example, Act X of 1859, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, and the amendments of 1928 reflected waning landlord power since a rich stratum of peasants in East Bengal (unlike Bihar) had managed to constitute themselves as

a significant force." Abdullah notes :

...contrary to what is often asserted, the increase in the value

of agricultural produce during the nineteenth century, due to extension and intensification of cultivation as well as market

penetration, was not siphoned off entirely by the zamindars,

but was on the contrary divided between them and a stratum

of rich peasants who achieved, in this period, a significant de-

gree of economic, social and even political power, though the last they could exercise only indirectly." The important factor for our purposes is whether the situation of

the peasantry was conducive to the emergence of an educated middle

50

The Sacred and The Secular

class and, hence, of a middle-class intelligentsia. Peasant uprisings — like and

the Faraizi movement of the 1820s and 1840s, the Pabna Rajshahi disturbances of 1872-73 and 1883-88 respectively,

the sanyasi and fakir raids of 1773 — had become endemic in late

eighteenth and nineteenth century Bengal, both a consequence and

proof of their increasing economic deprivation.'* Such developments suggest that conditions for education among the peasantry were not economically favourable. But a process of differentiation which had

begun in the mid-nineteenth century was well advanced by the 1920s and

1930s.

particularly

Substantial

in the

raiyats came

western

to enjoy superior rights,

districts of Bengal. Certain

areas

like

Dinajpur, which had a high rate of produce per head, gave rise to a class of rich peasants who successfully prevented zamindars from siphoning off all the surplus. In every village there were substantial cultivators." The hypothesis may be advanced that since the majority

of the East Bengal peasantry was Muslim, at least a section of these rich peasants would also be Muslim and constitute the stratum from which a Muslim middle class could emerge.

In Dinajpur, 1 out of 16 farmers rented 30-100 acres, used ploughs

and hired

additional men.' Small farmers and adhiyars borrowed grain

and seed and were thus indebted to them. If discontented they moved

to some other estate where there was wasteland which their stocks

could clear.'™ The creation of a land market through revenue policies

resulted in further differentiation among the peasantry. The type of rich peasant, however, varied from area to area. The pramaniks, mandals

and pradhans of Rangpur were basically power brokers or touts who

became rich through fraud and chicanery. The gantidars and jotedars of Jessore held land at concessional rates in return for services as tax

farmers to zamindars while the rich peasants of Dinajpur, who derived

power from their economic role, were the real owners of the land they rented. Rajshahi, like Rangpur, had no visible class of rich farmers

corresponding to that in Dinajpur.'”’ Here, too, there were village head-

men called pramaniks or mandals who served as intermediaries between the villagers and the landlord or government functionaries and who were not ‘always honest and often sided with the zamindar for

personal gain’.'* In Bakerganj too, there was no noticeable class of rich peasants. The main struggle was between an oppressive class of zamindars and an oppressed and relatively homogeneous peasantry.”

The Emergence of a Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal

51

Rural indebtedness did increase gradually. In the initial years of British rale it was limited to a few regions.'” As the land market was limited, moneylenders and creditors did not find it profitable to confiscate indebted peasants’ land. Instead, undervalued services in

kind were obtained. This was the case in Rajshahi, for example,

until 1888. By the 1890s, the picture was very different. In 1894, of the 47,030

voluntary transfers registered,

6,745

transferees, or

about one in seven, were mahajans.'"' Not all mahajans came from

non-agricultural ‘classes; a large proportion of them were well-to-do

cultivators. With increasing demand’ for land and rise in agricultural Prices, possession of land had become attractive to creditors. Trans-

fers were made largely to raiyats and mahajans. The raiyats even bought

superior holdings

including

144

whole

(zamindari)

estates

and 2,392 shares in estates. In trying to ascertain whether these implied any real changes in rural society, Abdullah suggests that

‘this was a period when the rich peasant, at least in some areas,

was quietly consolidating his position’.'” The Permanent Settlement assessed that 90 per cent of the total

revenue would go to.the treasury and 10 per cent to the zamindar.

But a 1918-19 estimate indicated that proprietors and intermediate

tenure-holders had appropriated 76.7 per cent of the gross rental,

and a very small proportion was collected as land revenue.'” This difference between

rent and revenue

along

with savings acquired

through inheritance, dowry, profit from petty trade and commerce,

and professional income, was often invested in buying proprietary

or intermediary rights in land which guaranteed a secure income.

Whole or part of estates or tenure-holding rights, were bought from

proprietors unable to manage their estates. By the 1870s, a process of

differentiation

was

apparent

between

the

older

wealthy

zamindars and a large group of petty proprietors —tenure-holders-

cum-professionals. Towards

the end of the nineteenth century,

Bengal politics came to be dominated by this class of small rentiers in land. This class was the core of the bhadralok and mainly Hindu

in composition. With the spread of commercial crops like jute and rice, a differentiation within the peasantry also set in by the late nineteenth century. There came to be a few wealthy proprietors at the top and a

vast proliferation of petty estates. In 1937, only 1,951

Proprietors or zamindars qualified for voting rights in the

52

The Sacred and The Secular

landholders’ constituencies of Burdwan and Presidency divisions for

the Legislative Assembly, i.e only 1,951 zamindars could pay revenue of over Rs 3,000 or cess of over Rs 700.'" By the beginning of the twentieth century, the proliferation of estates was accompanied by rising food prices and rents. It led to land transfers and subletting of tenures to new groups of traders-

cum-moneylenders western

including

substantial raiyats in some of the

and northern districts. Chatterjee comments

:

Such transfers were most marked in the 1920s after the depression; in the 1930s in the districts of the Burdwan and Presidency divisions and in Bakarganj, Noakhali, Tipperah, Dinajpur and Pabna, all of which were also with an aspiring class of richer raiyats.... Many small landlords took to moneylending or trading themselves; almost all of them sought to get into urban ‘middle-class’ occupations." By the twenties Muslim talukdars and grihasthas were visibly involved in this process of acquiring property rights. Sometimes it was a talukdar selling out to a grihastha.'"* In Noakhali, for example, many Muslim

cultivators had ‘risen to become middlemen howladars and talukdars, and a few even zamindars, and many continued to cultivate even after acquiring superior rights.'"” The fairly recent emergence of well-to-do

Muslim cultivators is evidenced by a reference to them as the ‘nouveau riche’, highly covetous of social status, in the Khulna Settlement Report.'*

‘The bulk of raiyati holdings in each district was settled cash-paying

tenancies with occupancy rights. Such tenancies were more preponder-

ant in the eastern and northern districts of Bengal than in the western

and central districts.'"? This is significant in the context of political

organizations, movements and ideologies in the twentieth century in Bengal. In the eastern districts, over 60 per cent of families had less than

2 acres of land and less than 15 per cent had over 5 acres. In the

western districts around 40 per cent had over 5 acres of land.'” In

other words, the eastern districts had a

less differentiated and more

preponderant small peasantry than the western districts. At the same time, the landed property in East Bengal was highly differentiated and the peasantry relatively undifferentiated. According to a survey by the land revenue commission ii 1938-39, the predominant mode of

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 33 cultivation in Chittagong, Rajshahi, Mymensingh and Jessore was by

the owner and his family, but in some western and central districts as

in Khulna, Burdwan and Murshidabad, it was done by hired labour for

the landholders were not cultivators.'"! Of those holding raiyati rights of occupation and cultivation, the more substantial often acquired superior rights. Until the early decades of the twentieth century, the aspiration of the substantial cul-

tivator was to acquire such rights. Such superior raiyats were a more

common phenomenon in the western than in the eastern districts and in areas of new reclamation and settlement like Midnapore,

24-Parganas, Khulna, Noakhali, Tipperah and parts of Bakarganj in the southern

coastal region and in the northern area of Jalpaiguri,

Dinajpur and Rangpur. The process of differentiation was facilitated in these

areas

and

was

also affected

by the rise in prices

of

foodgrains in the twentieth century and the spread of irrigation in

areas like Burdwan and Midnapore. It was now possible for superior

raiyats to enrich themselves through exploitation by produce rents, moneylending,

grain-lending

and

mortgage

holdings.'” Therefore, to quote Chatterjee :

and

transfer of raiyati

Whereas in the western and some of the northern districts, there

‘emerged among landlords — proprietors, tenure-holders of superior raiyats — a common interest in subjugating the poor or landless working peasantry, in the eastern districts, the vast mass of relatively undifferentiated raiyat peasantry had a strong basis to unite in common battle against exactions by zamindars and tenure-holders."®

‘The history of the Bengal peasantry is full of organized peasant opposition to landlord excesses, like the nineteenth century Faraizi and in-

digo rebellions as well as the peasant riots of the twenties and thirties. These struggles were linked to aspirations for upward social mobility.

By the 1920s and thirties, agrarian relations had come to influ-

ence organized Muslim politics. While the majority of the peasants were

Muslim,

the zamindars

were

mainly

Hindu.

Hence economic

considerations tended to be demarcated along communal lines. The strongest exponent of peasant rights at the time was the Krishak

Praja Party (KPP) which was led by Muslim talukdars and middle

classes. The party sought to ameliorate the conditions of raiyats and under-raiyats through

legislation. Yet every move

provoked

bitter

54

The Sacr and Theed Secular

opposition from the Hindu bhadralok"* They were already worried

by the spirit of non-co-operation which had ‘spread into the lower

stratum of society’ and saw spectres of civil War provoked by the

‘campaign of non-payment of taxes’."* In December 1925, when the Tenancy Act Amendment Bill, aiming to’ give occupancy rights to raiyats, was introduced in the Legislative Council, the

Hindu bhadralok used every means possible to obstruct its passage.

During the discussion of the 1920 Tenancy Act, the Swarajists op-

posed every motion by the KPP to enhance the rights of peasants.’

These events show that the interests of Muslims and caste Hindus

were in obvious conflict. The Muslim talukdars were closer to the peasantry which was their social and political base. The Hindu landed interests looked

upon

them with general distrust.

The rise’ of rich peasants from among the Muslim community

was accompanied by a growing interest in acquiring English educa-

tion. By this time, Muslims came to accept that this was the ladder to success within the new dispensation. However, as will be discussed later, Muslim access to education was fraught with obstacles.

These related not only to the relative poverty of the community, but more importantly, to the repercussions of British administrative and

economic policies.

Indigenous Education and British Policy : 1801-1871

Contrary to popular perception a small but dwindling middle class ex-

isted among Muslims even in the early nineteenth century. Their attendance in Persian and vernacular schools was not only less than that

of Hindus, but was also rapidly falling. Records from the period when the

British

started

taking

an

interest

in Indian

that Muslim education was already in decline.

education

According to an estimate based on official documents

note

and mis-

sionary reports, there were 80,000 schools in Bengal just prior to

British occupation.” But there is no record of the exact state of indigenous Muslim education since the annexation of Bengal in 1757 and the surveys of vernacular education by Adam in 1835, 1836

and 1838—seventy-eight years and more later.'*

Adam's reports,

although much cited, do not actually offer conclusive evidence on the state of Muslim

education.

He admitted

that he did not study

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia'in Bengal

55

the subject, as the loose form of private schooling which existed did not lend itself to systematic scrutiny. He also left out of his purview institutions founded by endowments and wagfs, for he defined indigenous education to include those establishments

started by local initiative but excluding those founded by religious societies and philanthropists. This would exclude almost all Muslim

institutions, for these were funded by religious endowments, wagfs

and charities. It is possible that these exclusions resulted from the fact that the British were in the process of taking over the admini-

stration of these funds often on the grounds that they were being misused. Under the circumstances these reports can only

give a biased picture.'”

However, Adam's reports have been cited by scholars such as Basu

to imply that there was little or no education which could have reached

rural Muslims.’ Adam makes no such claims although he was sur-

prised not to find Muslim private institutions in high density Muslim

areas like Mymensingh. But that would be impossible given the terms of reference of his study already cited. Basu is surprised that Adam found no significant-centre of Islamic learning in Calcutta where a

large proportion of affluent Muslims allegedly lived. It cannot be said

with certainty that this was so throughout the history of Bengal. In 1757, according to letters to the Dutch government from its East India

Company officials, after the British took back Calcutta and Fort

William from Siraj-ud-Daula, surrounding villages were burnt and the

‘Moors’ were either killed or driven out. A facade of Muslim rule was

maintained in Bengal by supporting a pensioned nawab, Mir Jafar and

his descendants, who possessed no real power. It was highly unlikely

for centres of Islamic learning to flourish there after that date. far

Adam suggests that indigenous Hindu institutions of learning were more

organized

than

Muslim

ones.

Such

statements must

be

carefully weighed against the fact that he has admittedly omitted a detailed study

of Muslim

education.

He,

however,

does give

con-

siderable examples of places where Muslim education flourished, as in Pandua and Hooghly. In Hooghly, for example, there were several in-

stitutions other than‘ those founded by the philanthropist Haji

Mohammad Mohsin. His reports do not convey the totally bleak picture portrayed in some recent studies. That Muslim education was in a state of decline in the early nineteenth century is well recorded. What is not

56

The Sacred and The Secular

recorded is its condition before the onset of decline. Therefore, Basu’s

doubt as to whether there was any Muslim indigenous education among

the lower classes is hard to accept. What is known, however, is that affluent families usually supported the education of their less successful neighbours and co-religionists, through establishing maktabs,

madrasahs

and lodgings,

of which there are numerous examples.'”'

Rahim presents a more acceptable account of Adam’s findings. He lists a number of the institutions in operation, while indicating the number which had deteriorated. In Pandua, for example, there was a time when

every Muslim land proprietor, opulent farmer and village head had teachers in his employ for the benefit of poor children in the neigh-

bourhood. That class had dwindled by the time Adam appeared and so had the schools. By

1801, within forty-four years of the Battle of

Plassey, there were 20 Sanskrit institutions in Murshidabad, the Mughal capital of Bengal, but only one of Arabic and Persian learning.’

To suggest that poverty was the cause of poor participation of

Muslims in education is to offer a simplistic and inadequate explanation. It does not take into account the fluctuations in economic circumstances and the changing patterns of mobility whereby seg-

ments of the upper clases and castes had to relinguish their hold over education and the’ professions

they had dominated.

As noted

earlier, by 1931 Syeds in Bengal had begun to undertake menial services and beharas and jolahas had begun to enter the professions. Similarly, the monopoly of Madras Brahmins over higher education was threatened by the lower castes since the twenties.

In this context, it would be useful to look at the effect of British

administrative and economic policies on Muslim

to

consolidate

its

position

in

education. In order

Bengal, the East India Company

sought a support base in the indigenous population. This necessarily

involved creating a system of patronage which depended on establishing

financial

and

administrative

control

over the colony.

Such

control was effected through a number of measures such as the appropriation of all sources of revenue including large revenue-free land

grants

and

rent-free endowments

which

supported

indigenous

education. Education was privatized and submitted to the vagaries of market forces, an action which could only benefit the affluent. Administrative control was

further strengthened

by the replacement

of Persian by English as the official language. The language of the

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

37

ruler became the dominant language of officialdom and initiated a

period of colonial cultural hegemony. Directly, or indirectly, these and other similar measures Muslim education.

had a long-term deleterious effect on

Resumption proceedings were initiated from 1793 onwards whereby

grants of revenue free land (known as la-khiraj revenue free mu’afi grants) donated

for the maintenance of educational

establishments,

scholars, and places of religious worship were resumed." Such grants

had been made by both the Muslim and Hindu nobility. The loss of these funds particularly hurt Muslim education. As discussed earlier,

the Muslim nobility was in decline and there was no substantial group

of Muslims in the middle ranks of the professions to offer alternative

sources of support to education, as among the Hindu community.

The British introduced fees for schooling and turned education into

a marketable commodity. The most expensive schools were the Government English schools aimed at the moneyed classes. Vernacular

schools were for the poorer people. Even where fees were small, these

were ‘beyond the reach of the people’ largely due to the poverty of

the community.'*

The Despatch of 1827 stated that funds were to be concentrated ‘at

places of greatest importance’ and among ‘the superior and middle

classes of the natives’ from among

Government

whom agents required for

services were to be drawn.'* Urban centres such

as Calcutta and Hooghly were obviously ‘places of greatest impor-

tance’, and Hindus predominated among ‘the superior and middle classes’. The effect of this initiative was to favour the funding of Hindu

institutions of learning, thus conciliating the influential and discrimi-

nating against the weak.

Macaulay’s ‘Minute’ and Bentinck’s ‘Resolution’ of 1835 favouring

Anglicist rather than Orientalist education implied that teaching would

be through the medium of English rather than in the classical language. ‘This created problems for Perso-Arabic education favoured by Muslims

in general and the ashraf in particular.'* Education was available in

English for the upper classes and in the vernacular for the lower. And

while the upper ashraf looked own upon engali as an inferior language,

the lesser ashraf too had its prejudices, which were shared by the non-

ashraf, and markedly preferred ‘Musalmani Bangla’ to the Sanskritized

Bengali taught in pathsalas.'’ The effect of this policy was to render

58

The Sacred and The Secular

a large number of Muslims, virtually illiterate as the upper classes used

Persian as their language of discourse and the lower classes ‘Musalmani_ Bangla’. This factor was to affect their educational prospects for a long

time to come.

The Despatch of 1854 stipulated that, while private schools could

continue to function on a system of grants-in-aid without interference

in their religious

instruction,

Government

schools

would

provide

secular education since these were meant for the entire population.

However, explanations voluntarily sought by pupils on Christianity would be provided after school hours.'* The state machinery

was

thus geared to establish a new ideology and began to trample on

the old. Other policies affected Muslim education indirectly by striking at

the employment possibilities of Bengal Muslims. The substitution of

Persian by the vernacular in the lower courts in 1837 meant that the

judiciary, which was previously manned almost entirely by Muslims,

would no longer be open to them.’ Harding’s Proclamation of 1844,

giving preference to those with an English education for service in public offices, meant that very few Muslims from Bengal would get into the civil service. Even as late as 1901, the census notes no male literacy in English among the Bengal Muslims, while it was 0.9 per

cent for the total population, concentrated mainly among the upper caste

or relatively

affluent

Hindus

such

as

Kayasthas, Subarnabaniks and Gandhabaniks.'”

Brahmans,

Baidyas,.

Besides the obstacles to their education and employment already

cited, a few more could be added, namely, the misappropriation of the remaining rent-free grants and endowments like the Haji Mohsin Trust

for purposes other than meant for, such as promotion of European literature and science, and Christian rather than Muslim education.'*' Although all colleges of oriental learning were not abolished, their

funds were tampered with and often appropriated. The practice of supporting students was largely discontinued.’ Government funds were

no longer spent on the printing of oriental, mainly Persian and Arabic,

works. The emergence of a Muslim middle-class intelligentsia thus suffered

from multiple handicaps attributable largely to British policy. Muslim education received a setback, not because the majority of Muslims were rural and agricultural, or because many of them originated in low Hindu

The Emergence ofa Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal

59

castes, but because of the limited access to educational opportunities.

‘The loss of their educational funds and the support system previously

* available to scholars, the decline of the aristocracy, the absence of a substantial middle class, the sudden slide into _illiteracy-caused by a

regime seeking a new class of allies and a clerical support base, the privatization of education and introduction of a curriculum that was

not user-friendly were key factors that hampered Muslim education, limited their access to the professions and hindered other intellectual

pursuits. The Hindu community was able to withstand ‘these changes

and benefited from them, largely because it was more willing to par-

ticipate in the new system and partly because it had the financial ca-

pacity to sustain itself.

The Resolution of 1871

By 1871, when the Resolution on Muslim Education was passed, the British were already aware of the need for forging new loyalties. There

were threats not only from rural Bengal but also from an increasingly nationalistic Hindu bhadralok challenging the existing social and political order. Hunter’s constant references to the spread of ‘fanatic’

tendencies in the vast rural peasantry of Bengal gives away British

fears of the possible radicalization of rural Bengal.’ Under the political tnd administrative guidance of Dudu Mian

(1819-62),

the Faraizi

movement spread all over Eastern Bengal, to the districts of Faridpur, Bakerganj,

Jessore,

Tipperah,

Dacca,

Mymensingh,

Pabna

and

Noakhali. Delawarr Hosaen Ahmed Meerza (1840-1913), writing in 1869-70 notes that the success of the Faraizi leaders was complete because

‘the

great

majority

of

the

Mosalmans

of

Eastern

Ben-

gal became Faraizis — and the practice and opinions of those who did not, considerably changed and showed decidedly puritanical tendencies’.'“

The British aim was to ‘isolate and contain the actively disaffected’ by offering favours to those Muslims with ‘something to lose’."“5 The livelihood of orthodox or ‘traditionalist’ mullahs was threatened

by

the

‘reformist’;

the former

were

therefore

likely

to

respond to British overtures. The remnants of the declining ashraf aristocracy also had ‘something to lose’, for ‘the security afforded

by the British Government was by decrees raising these classes in

60

The Sacred and The Secular

material prosperity’.+146 The Bengal upper ashraf were, generally speaking, not willing to support the Faraizis; they were following a policy of reconciliation with the British and were appalled by attacks ‘on landlords,

a class to which

many

of them

belonged.

Mawlana

Keramat Ali Jownpuri (d. 1873) issued a fatwa (religious decree) under the goods offices of Nawab Abdul Latif (1828-93) declaring India dar-al-Islam (abode of Islam), where jihad was consequently

no longer necessary.” Muslims thus differed over their vision of

political destiny and identity, the divide being along rural-urban and class lines. ‘The urban upper ashraf was too far removed from the peasantry to appreciate its needs. Even Delawarr Hosaen Ahmed Meerza who was very conscious of this distance merely saw the Faraizis as revivalists and the ‘social results of the revival’ as ‘pernicous’.'* While recognizing that the movement had positive influences such as ‘the development of co-operation and democratic feeling’, he feared that it was putting a ‘check on the redevelopment of liberal

ideas’ and raising ‘fresh obstacles’ to the cause of ‘civilization and

progress’. While free of the prejudices against the Bengali lan-

guage shared by his fellow ashraf, he believed that the ashraf should lead the non-ashraf, for the latter were ‘of the lower order’, ‘ready to receive new impressions of religion’ and tended to be ‘bigoted’.'® A major problem that precluded appreciation of the Faraizis perhaps was its attitude to western education : the Faraizi prohibition of western learning stood in total opposition to the ashraf realization that this alone could emancipate the Muslims.'*

British interest in Muslim education was not inspired only by a desire to contain the possible radicalization of rural Bengal. There was an anxiety to win allies among the upper-class Muslims who already opposed the activities of the peasantry and would form a counter-intelligentsia to the increasingly nationalistic Hindu bhadralok.'* By the 1870s new cultural patterns were emerging which were more assertive and more aggressively national.’ The British

had already

decided

after the

1857

mutiny

not to destroy

mosques and temples, which would only serve to unite Hindus and Muslims, but to ‘do it in the manner best calculated to leave them divided ... and to inspire them with the greatest possible awe of

our power’.'* Now that the political need for change was felt, the

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

Resolution of 7 August

1871

61

was passed.’ Access to education,

which was the means of recruitment to upper- and middle-class jobs

and professions and hence to these classes, would set forth new patterns of mobility among Bengal Muslims, who in the competition for jobs would be a threat to the well-established Hindu bhadralok. Positive Discrimination : Quotas and Representation

To facilitate Muslim entry into the role of a counter-intelligentsia, a

‘system of quotas in education and employment was introduced fot them

as members of a deprived community. As early as 1882, the education

commission went out of its way to suggest that the provincial government should consider appointment by patronage of a proportion of

Muslim public servants. Indeed, in 1885, the Government of India published a resolution recommending greater employment of

Muslims ‘to prevent the depression of a numerous and influential class,

and secure their co-operation for the general benefit of the administra-

tion.”"* Bengal under the British failed to become a meritocracy, precisely because of resolutions such as these. In 1914, it was observed

that ‘among the 100 members of the Calcutta Senate, only 6 were Muhammadans’. The Government of India, therefore, suggested ‘the appointment of a reasonable number of Muhammadans to Committees (where such exist) of government institutions and to the governing bod-

ies of aided institutions.’"’ The idea of reserving quotas for Muslims,

sacrificing notions of merit and quality to those of expediency and

quantity, an attitude which Muslims soon learnt to adopt, found support

in these government resolutions.'*

Until 1924, the government policy was to raise Muslim appoint-

ments

to

their

proportion

of

the

total

population.

In

1925,

Nawab Mosharraf Hossain Khan Bahadur moved a resolution before

the Bengal Legislative Council voicing Muslim claim to proportionate

appointment in government services. This was conceded by C. R. Das

and his Swarajya Party. The selection criteria changed from competition

to reservation. Government order No. 458-Edn. of 9August, 1926 stipu-

lated that when direct recruitments were made by the local government

to fill collegiate appointments, preference should be given to a Muslim applicant provided he had qualifications and experience equal to the

62

The Sacred and The Secular

best non-Muslim applicant. This process was to continue until the proportion of Muslims on the staff of every college equalled the proportion of Muslim students on its rolls. In 1927, in its order No. 552-53 Mis., (26 February 1927) the Government of Bengal (Ministry of Education) held that the duty of the government was ‘to ensure’ the ‘general interest’ of the Muslim

community; its activitiés were ‘for the benefit

of the whole nation’ and therefore, it should ‘prevent the monopoly of public employments by any one class or community’. The Government

of Bengal, therefore, decided to allot a sufficient share of ministerial appointments to Muslims. The Moslem Education Advisory Committee

(1935) even suggested that the 1926 rules be modified so that until Proportional appointment for Muslims was achieved, the formula of

appointment

non-Muslim.'®

to

vacancies

would

be

two

Muslims

for

one

Although official policy'seemed to favour Muslims, in practice their

representation in government services and colleges continued to be far

lower than that of Hindus. In 1933, Muslims held 121 out of 333 min-

isterial appointments (i.e. 36.3 per cent) in the education department

of Bengal although they formed 54.4 per cent of the population. They held relatively more posts in the Lower Division of the education department than in the Upper Division. Three out of 16, or 20 per cent of appointments in the Upper Division, and 15 out of 37, or 40 per cent in the lower division were held by them.'® Their repre-

sentation in colleges was worse. In 1926-27, out of a total of 30,072 male students, 25,342 (84.2 per cent) were Hindu and 4,300 (14.2 per cent) Muslim. In 1931-32, the proportion had not changed much. Out

of a total of 26,062 male college students, 84.1 per cent were Hindu and 13.6 per cent Muslim. (See Appendix 1.E.). However, a comparison of the proportion of Hindus and Muslims in education and employment in the late nineteenth century and midtwentieth century reveals the ups and downs in Muslim and Hindu fortunes. Between 1886 and 1940, the share of Muslims in state employment rose from 8.5 per cent to 37.95 per cent, while for Hindus,

it fell from 83.78 per cent to 59.14 per cent.'* Such changes in the

composition of the middle classes had deep political implications. Strengthened by number and official support, the emerging Bengal Muslim intelligentsia challenged bhadralok dominance in middle-class professions.

The. Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

63

‘This threat also existed in the field of college education. While

Hindus had maintained their position of dominance, their proportion

relative to Muslims had fallen. Between 1871 and 1940 the propor-

tion of male Muslim pupils in arts colleges rose from 4 per cent

to 19.57 per cent, and that of Hindu pupils fell from 96 per cent

to 78.3 per cent.'?

‘The policies which favoured the emergence of a Muslim middle-

class intelligentsia in Bengal also created conditions for conflict along

communal lines. The effect of the quota system implied that often less

qualified Muslims got into professions where better qualified Hindus

could not.'® The British aim of maintaining stable rule implied keeping a secure grasp over middle-class aspirations. One way of doing this

was to encourage the people to see themselves as members of different

communities. Such a self-perception was generated by measures like the introduction of census categories based on religious and communal

identities as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists etc. Other forms of intervention which helped create distinct identities included the partition of Bengal in 1905, the Communal Award of 1932, and the seg-

regated development of communities through segregated institutions of learning such as madrasah education for Muslims and the use of the

quota system.

In this context it is pertinent to observe another aspect of British

rule which manifested itself through the education system and con-

tributed to the growth of communal ill will. This was the indoctri-

nation of young Indians to look upon the period of rule under the

Muslim dynasties as one of misrule when Hindus were maltreated and when trade, commerce and the interests of the poor were ne-

glected. Charles J. Montagu’s introductory lecture in history to students

of Hindu

College

in 1847

may

be cited as an example

of

such indoctrination. He depicted Siraj-ud-Daula as ‘cruel and effeminate’. Muslim rulers were charged with ‘exterminating the Idolators

of India’. Their own motive for conquest was ascribed to them;

was presented as an anxiety to conceal their ‘meanness of birth’

and

it

‘attraction to the fertility and wealth of India’. He conceded

that a few

humanity,

of the

rulers

but concluded

were

distinguished

that all of them

for their justice

and

‘must suffer under the

charge of neglect of that duty which they as sovereigns owed to India’.'* These duties referred to trade, commerce, education and

64

The Sacred and The Secular

the prevention of wars. The obvious message of the lecture was to project British rule as benevolent in comparison to ‘Muslim rule’. Such images defined ‘Muslim rule’ in India and generated a false

consciousness which fuelled communal

strife.

Hindus were con-

vinced of the horror of ‘Muslim rule’ and Muslims were ashamed

of their ancestors. As an example of the impact of such indoctrina-

tion on Hindu minds, Babu Amrita Basu’s paper read in Simla in 1873 may be cited :

... under the tyranny of the Mohammedans, our Philosophy and logic [was] buried in oblivion — our glory decayed — and consequently we ourselves were sunk into the very depth and quagmire of superstition and ignorance for centuries together. But fortunately for us the star of the Mohammedans has now

come down, and English education made its appearance in the country ...'*

Notwithstanding inaccuracies in these assumptions, sentiments such as these fuelled communal extremism in pre- and post-partition India. Thus communalism was neither natural nor intrinsic to HinduMuslim relations, but rather it was a colonial construction.’ 1.4

Bengal Muslim Intelligentsia : Educational Orientations

and Tensions

.

The education and employment statistics clearly show that by the 1940s a sizeable intelligentsia

had

emerged

among

the

Bengal

Muslims.

Appendices 1.E and 1.F show the relative size and weight of Muslim

pupils in relation to the total number in different grades of institutions in Bengal from 1870-71 to 1939-40, To estimate the size of the intel-

ligentsia it is perhaps most appropriate to consider only the arts and

professional colleges for these are the institutions that directly produce

an intelligentsia in colonial societies.

The number of Muslim boys in arts colleges went up from only 52

in 1870-71 to 4,405 in 1936-37, indicating a tremendous increase in

educational participation. In percentage terms their weight increased from 4 to 15.4 per cent. By 1939-40 it had risen further to 19.1 per cent. In professional colleges the increase was less striking — from

194 boys in 1876-77 to 620 in 1936-37 — an increase of about 220 per cent. However, in relative terms, it decreased from 13 to 11.1 per

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

65

cent. From this, it would be incorrect to surmise that Bengal Muslims preferred arts education to professional education : in reality, cost was often a factor constraining educational choices. In 1936-37, while the average cost per pupil in arts colleges for men was Rs 146.20, it was Rs 1,175.35 at the Bengal Engineering College, Sibpur.'”

As a proportion of the total number, Muslim scholars in arts and professional colleges formed 0.44 per cent in 1870-71, 0.05 per cent in 1876-77 and 0.16 per cent in 1936-37. Opportunities in these fields of higher education had declined in relative terms. The emerg-

ing Muslim intelligentsia, it may thus be assumed, was a minute fraction as compared to the Hindu intelligentsia. Its size continued to remain

very small until the twenties and thirties. In 1926-27,

male

Muslim scholars formed 14.2 per cent of all men enrolled in universities and in arts and professional colleges, while Hindus formed 84.2 per cent. In 1931-32, the relative position changed sightly to 13.6 per cent Muslim and 84.1 per cent Hindu (see Table 1.3). Table 1.3 : MALE MUSLIM AND HINDU STUDENTS AS

PROPORTION OF TOTAL IN ARTS AND PROFESSIONAL COLLEGES FOR MEN, 1926-27 AND 1931-32

All colleges

Arts colleges Professional colleges Of which : Law Medicine Engineering Teaching

Per cent of Total by Community Total Muslims Hindus 1926-27 _1931-32| 1926-27_1931-32 | 1926-27 _ 1931-32 30,072 — 26,062}

23813 6529

20912] 5510]

3638 2527] 1594 1,303] a7] 136

144

14.2

143 141

13.6

137] 13.1]

169 175] 8979} 99}

36.0

35.4)

842

843 840

B41

B42 84.0

823 BLS 89.2878 884.

61.0

Commerce 475 70} 2122] Veterinary 125 169] 320 _—'165|_— 568 Source : Report of the Moslem Education Advisory Committee (1935), p. 26.

618

98. 71.0

While the bulk of college-going students among Muslims had a

liberal arts education, their enrolment pattern in professional colleges shows the preference to be law, teaching, veterinary training, engineer-

ing and commerce, in that order. However, a comparison with the

Hindu enrolment pattern in 1931-32 indicates that 35.4 per cent of

66

The Sacred and The Secular

students in teaching, 17.5 per cent in law, 16.5 per cent in veterinary

science, 11 per cent in engineering, 7.9 per cent in medical and 2.1

per cent in commerce colleges were Muslim. While Muslims are known to be. traditionally

averse

to com-

merce, their poor representation in engineering and medicine could be explained, among

other reasons, in terms of the heavy expendi-

ture necessary for such education.'* In 1936-37, the average cost per

pupil

in

the

three

major

medical

colleges

of Calcutta

was

Rs 615.51. At Ahsanullah College of Engineering it was Rs 350.44.

The cost was highest at the Bengal Engineering College, Sibpur.

For law classes and colleges the cost was lowest and not more than Rs 91.38. Given the earlier discussion of the relative poverty of Bengal Muslims it is understandable that a large number of them studied law rather than medicine or engineering. However, their tra-

ditional preference for the professions should not be ignored. Their relative strength in veterinary and teaching colleges was because en-

try was not competitive as Hindus were not particularly interested

in these disciplines; the average cost per pupil at Veterinary College,

Belgachia was quite high at Rs 778.'°

Madrasahs, which were equivalent to secondary schools, also threw

up a large section of the intelligentsia. From less than half a per cent in 1881-82 the proportion of students attending madrasahs sharply increased to about five per cent of the total by 1939-40. In fact, between

1936-37 and 1939-40, there were about as many pupils in madrasahs

as in secondary schools with the tilt in favour of the former. This does

not mean that Muslims were particularly enamoured of madrasah edu-

cation, for until 1921-22, a much larger proportion attended other secondary schools. The trend, however, changed by 1926-27. There was a sharp increase in the number of madrasah pupils and a corresponding

decrease in secondary pupils. Although the number of secondary school students increased in absolute terms, as a percentage their share fell below that of madrasah pupils (see Appendix 1. G). Official reports explained the gradual increase in the number of madrasah pupils rather simplistically as Muslim preference for ‘special

institutions like maktabs and madrasahs’.'” In the same vein, the shift in enrolment structure from 1931-32 onwards—revealing again a grad-

ual increase in the number and proportion of secondary pupils and decrease in that of madrasah pupils—was interpreted as a growing

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal realization

among

them

67

of ‘the value of secular education’.'”'

‘An explanation for the preponderance of madrasah education in the twenties and thirties is called for here particularly in view of its relative

insignificance in the 1880s. This will also bring into focus the background of the religious-secular tension among the intelligentsia. In Appendix LF. it is shown that till the first decade of the twentieth

century, the proportion of Muslims in educational institutions was very small and that the majority was concentrated at the primary stage (see

also Appendix I.E). The higher stages of learning reveal a progressive decline in the proportion of Muslim to Hindu students (see Appendix LH). By the second decade of the twentieth century, the Committee on Muhammadan Education which submitted its report in 1914, affirmed that Muslims held their own ‘in the matter of primary education’. By the third decade they had made some advance in secondary education, but ‘in respect of higher education their numbers’ were ‘far below their proportion to the population’ .'”

Official explanations have concentrated on certain stereotypes : the religiosity of Bengal Muslims and their love for religious learning as a deterrent to western education. Many nineteenth century studies have

revolved around theories of the racial superiority of Hindus and their

greater aptitude for learning, rather than on the inadequacy of facilities for learning made available to Muslims.'” Hunter blamed the British

system of public instruction as ‘unsuited to the requirements, and hateful to the religion of the Mussalmans’.'™ Official explanations in the second and third decades of the twentieth century refer to .. the apathy of the people, the dispersion of the Muhammadan population in villages, often far from secondary schools, the. scarcity of Muslim managed highschools, the preference for special institutions like madrasahs and maktabs controlled by Muslims, and teaching Islamic ritual and religion. Add to them the proverty of the mass of Muhammadans who are small farmers and peasants.'7>

In Reports of the Committees of the Indian Statutory Commission, the smaller proportion of Muslim scholars in higher stages of instruction is accounted for by the poverty of the community and ‘the absence of institutions of higher grades controlled and staffed by Muslim managers and teachers’.'”°

68

The Sacred and The Secular

The Committee on Muhammadan Education, 1914, as well as the Indian Statutory Commission (1929, 1930) also relied on steroe-

types and placed emphasis on the religiosity of Bengal Muslims to explain their low participation in general education. The 1914 report

comments that ever since the substitution of English and vernaculars for Persian, Muslims were initially afraid that English education

would interfere with their religion. It goes on to say that the more

enlightened members had since realized that the government had no desire to interfere with their religion, ‘but there are still a number

of Muslims especially in Northern and Eastern Bengal who have no desire

for any

education

other

than the semi-religious education

which has up to the present been given in madrasahs’. These North

and East Bengal Muslims have been identified as consisting ‘mainly

of conservative Muslim cultivators’.'””

A similar comment is made in the ISC, Report of the Committees:

“Muslim pupils are generally drawn from poorer classes, to whom noth-

ing appeals which is denuded of Islamic religious instruction’. The

slow increase of Muslim pupils in general schools is attributed to their preference for madrasahs and maktabs where ‘the traditional and re-

vered ideals of Islamic culture and Islamic piety’ could be preserved.'”,

While Bengal Muslims, particularly the rural ones, were deeply

religious, the explanation for their small numbers in general schools

in terms of religiosity is a gross oversimplification. It will become clear later in this study that : in the interests of economy and stable

rule cheap institutions were set up as a way of reaching the maximum

number

of people at a minimal

cost; that the financing of

madrasahs was cheaper than that of secondary schools; and that Muslims went to the only schools they could afford or the only ones accessible to them.

It is worth

noting that neither early twentieth-century of-

ficial reports, nor those after the thirties refer to the Muslim love for religious instruction or maktab/madrasah education as a deterrent to their acceptance of western education. Instead, Muslim withdrawal from western education

of Education

is explained

in the Report on the Progress

in Eastern Bengal and Assam,

1901-02—1906-07

in

terms of ‘the practice among well-to-do Muhammadans of educating

their children at home...the unwillingness felt by the better born to associate with those lower in the social scale...pride of

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

69

race, memory of by-gone superiority’, as well as the ‘poverty’ of Bengal Muslims, their ‘religious fears’ and the language problem.'”

Religious scruples do not imply a desire for maktabs and

madrasahs,

but

rather

an

apprehension

of being

swamped

by

an

instruction

or

alien, un-Islamic environment pushing a new ideology. Government schools

of general.

Arabic

and

education

offered

no religious

courses in the languages of discourse of the Muslims which were Persian.

In

pathsalas

the

less

familiar

Sanskri-

tized Bengali rather than Musalmani Bangla was taught by Hindu teachers. Texts contained Hindu myths replete with images from the Hindu

pantheon. They did not reflect Muslim

experiences —

relig-

ious and social. Indeed, education was not culture-neutral or free from bias. A misrepresentation of Muslim religiosity in the interim

period,

however,

provided

the justification

for the founding

of maktabs and madrasahs, the running costs of which were lower than those of general schools. The charge of ‘apathy of the people’ as an explanation for low

Muslim participation in the higher stages of general education cannot

be sustained. The Bengal ashraf had already demonstrated their will-

ingness to contribute to such education by opening schools.'” Even

cultivators who had profited from the boom in jute trade had begun to display an interest in education outside the madrasah

system.'*'

Sections of Muslims at times showed antagonism, not just apathy, to

the new British system but such ‘apathy’ was not a Muslim monopoly. Many Hindus were equally apprehensive about the influence of western

education on Hindu society. Indeed the poorer classes, whether from

among Hindu or Muslim peasantry, were both equally ‘apathetic to any education, whether it was the pathsala variety or the English system.’

And those village Muslims who could send their sons to schools sent

them to a village maktab or pathsala: the choice of institutions

depended often on physical proximity rather than any explicit preference. The Report of the Muslim Education Advisory Committee (1935)

clearly suggests that the obstacle to Muslim education was not prejudice

against learning English.’

Two major reasons kept Muslims away from general education and

partly explain the high drop-out rate in the higher stages of education. ‘These were the failure of the system to provide religious instruction,

as well as facilities for learning Arabic or Persian which were aspects

70

The Sacred and The Secular

of traditional Muslim literary education. These facts were recognized both by British officials and members of the Bengal ashraf who wished

a reorientation of the school system.'™ Despite British realization of

the importance of religious instruction, its early education policy

was to keep it confined to private schools.'** Government schools were supposed to remain secular. But the vernacular schools were Hinduoriented—since the texts were full of traditional stories of Hinduism—

while English schools were Christianity-oriented.' However, although

government schools were not allowed to employ teachers of religion or offer religious instruction, the 1882 commission stipulated that ex-

planations voluntarily sought on Christianity would be provided after school hours. Such bias in the education system was acknowledged neither by Hindus, nor by British officials who insisted that education

was secular. The Resolution of 1904 hoped to remedy the situation but

for a different reason. It noted that ‘secular education in government

institutions stimulated tendencies unfavourable to discipline’, referring

to the rise of nationalist stirrings among the youth, and sought a remedy

in carefully selecting and training teachers, instituting hostels and selecting proper text books. It therefore recognized the possibility of giving religious instruction outside school hours, but did not make it

compulsory for regular teachers to give such instruction or meet the necessary expenditure from school funds.'” This policy made no dif-

ference for most of the schools were staffed and managed by Hindus

who were not obliged to cater to Muslim needs."™ Sharp's suggestion

in 1913, was to arrange for religious instruction at the secondary level

in privately managed hostels attached to government institutions. How-

ever, even by the late twenties the need for religious instruction was

not substantially met in government institutions." The debate about the type of moral and religious education to be imparted in schools

continued in the mid-forties.'” But the attitude to it had become integrative, rather than exclusive and divisive, looking for common-themes

in prayers acceptable to all communities.

Government efforts to mitigate the problem of poverty among the

Muslims through special scholarships and endowments fell short of actual

requirements.

The

best

solution

would

have

been

the es-

tablishment of general schools and colleges with provision to meet

Muslim needs. But these were not undertaken on grounds of insufficient

funds. Sharp suggested in 1913 that ‘a certain number of vacancies for

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal ny Muhammadan pupils’ could be reserved in institutions of good repute, selling the idea once again of establishing quotas.'”

The Government of India made several suggestions at this time

regarding secondary and collegiate education. i) Improvement of existing institutions for Muslims, such as the Calcutta Madrasah, Islamia College, Lahore and Islamia Schools. ii) Establishment of separate institutions for Muslims in places where this could be done without detriment to efficiency or discipline and

without unreasonable expense. iii) When this was not possible (and it was apprehended that it would rarely be so) addition to the staff of a school, of a teacher or teachers, who would be able either to teach in English or Urdu and to give special help to Muslim boys where knowledge of some other vernacular was desirable either for the study of English or for general reasons. iv) Maintenance of hostels for Muslims under private management

with religious teaching. Significantly, these suggestions gave no special encouragement to secular education or to the establishment of secular institutions for Muslims. Only ‘separate institutions’ which would not incur ‘unreasonable expense’ were encouraged.'* Bengal Muslims were much

more

concerned

with

secular education

than the Government

of

India would admit. They recognized the need for a combination of Teligious and secular education and therefore demanded

‘that imme-

diate steps be taken for the introduction of moral and religious training in schools and hostels’. Instead of changing textbooks found distasteful to Muslim feeling (in vernacular schools), the official pol-

icy was to encourage special schools which were basically mullah

schools or maktabs, to which a secular course had been added."

In this way, Muslim educational needs were marginalized and met not through regular and secular institutions of learning but through low-cost religious ones.

While the demand for religious instruction could have been met within the normal school system, official policy was adamantly against it since the government allegedly viewed ‘without enthusiasm

the practice of giving religious instruction in schools and colleges’.'™

Therefore, provisions were made for the education of Muslims in

72

The Sacred and The Secular

‘segregated’

institutions.'°* Government policy regarding madrasah

education was to ‘sidetrack it’ into a ‘watertight compartment outside the pale of the university’. Between 1871 and 1873, active

encouragement led to the multiplication of old-type madrasahs." The Calcutta Madrasah

had all the outward

paraphernalia of an af-

filiating university without being included in the university system.

A comprehensive scheme of education of 18 years’ duration, drawn up by Shams-ul-Ulama Abu Nasr Waheed in 1906, which aimed at a Muslim university with secular and religious instruction and considered a ‘revolution in the system of madrasah education’ by

Sharp, was presented to the Government of East Bengal and Assam

in 1910 and was rejected as ‘too ambitious’. Nathan’s view was that the curriculum should be simple and adopted by as many

madrasahs as financially possible. Several attempts to raise the standard of English taught in madrasahs proved futile, primarily because proposals made were either rejected or not implemented on grounds of financial stringency. This was the case between 1882

and 1921 when education was a concern of the Centre. The 1882 Commission made 17 recommendations to make English education

attractive to Muslims,

‘but left Calcutta Madrasah

untouched.

In

1903, proposals were made to teach two courses in fourth year

classes of the Calcutta Madrasah —

one, part English and part ori-

ental, the other, purely oriental.” They were rejected.

In 1907-08 the Earle Committee recommended that besides teach-

ing English as an optional subject, it should be taught for two years

as a special course for those who had passed the Senior fifth year with

English

course.

Such

equivalent

as optional

graduates

and

could

to a university

for those

degree

who

had

taken

the Title

be treated as possessing a degree for the purpose

of government

service. But the two-year special course was not introduced. The Shamsul

Huda Committee

the condition — staff,

scholarships,

of 1921, was constituted to inquire into

management, courses, qualifications and duties of admission,

etc.

—

of the Calcutta

Madrasah,

which had been left outside the Reformed Madrasah Scheme. It rec-

commended that Senior fourth year students be allowed to appear successively in the English papers of the Matriculation, Intermediate and

BA

examinations

of

the

university,

and

that

successful

BA candidates in English be permitted to appear for the MA in

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal Arabic,

Persian

and

English

examinations

and

B also

that

they be allowed to join Bar-at-Law courses." These recommendations were not put into effect. The opportunity for madrasah

stu-

dents

was

to branch

out

into

professions

other

than

theology

virtually blocked by the system. Funds were a major factor behind the proliferation of madrasah

education. Table 1.5 shows that it was far more expensive to run general primary and secondary schools than maktabs and madrasahs which were their equivalent. In 1937-38, the average cost of a secondary school at Rs 5,270.56 was about twice as high as that of a madrasah

which was Rs 2,080.04. The average cost per pupil, Rs 31.61 and

Rs 19.83 respectively, reflected a similar pattern. Senior madrasahs were more expensive than Junior ones. This was

a major reason why there were more of the latter type (see

Table 1.4). After the introduction of the reformed scheme in 1915, with some added costs and subjects of study, including secular ones,

greater emphasis was placed on reformed junior madrasahs. These

catered

to a larger number

of madrasah

students at a fairly cheap

rate of Rs 1,606 per institution and Rs 18 per pupil. This was lower

even than that of an Old Type Senior Madrasah where cést per

institution was Rs 4,155 and per pupil Rs 33.

Table 1.4 : COST OF EDUCATION FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF MADRASAHS, 1933

(in rupees per year)

Type of

No. of

No. of

Cost of

5,662

269,023

7912

48

49,847

896,189

1,606

18

4s

5,654

187,001

4,155

3

88 725

4,520 65,883

31,688 1,383,901

360

Madrasah — Madrasahs Reformed Senior 34 Reformed Junior 558 Old Type

Senior Old Type Junior Total

Pupils © Maintenance

* Figures are rounded Source : Report, PIB, 1933-34 (1935), p.28

Cost per*

Madrasah

Pupils,

7

4

The Sacred and The Secular

Table 1.5 : COST OF EDUCATION IN BENGAL FOR DIFFERENT ‘TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS, 1937-38 (in rupees) Primary — Maktabs Secondary Arts = Madrasahs** Schools Schools _Colleges* Total Expenditure 8,564,764 1,146,445 17,529,900 3,874,372 1,589,153 Average per school 142.57 88.04 5,270.56 90,101.16 2,080.04 ‘Average per pupil 331 2.16 31.61 145.01 19.83

* Colleges for male students only ** Including Junior, Senior, Reformed and old Scheme Madrasahs Source

: Report on PIB,

1937—38 (1938), pp. 7,10,14,16,17

Abul Hussain, a Dacca University lecturer and a vakil of the Judge’s Court in Dacca, writing in 1928, attributed the decrease in the number of Muslims in schools and colleges and the low number of passes among them to the spread of Junior madrasahs which really did not give an adequate training. He accused the state of a policy aimed at keeping Muslims half-educated : low cost junior madrasahs were being opened by unemployed, semi-educated mullahs, for the government sanction was barely Rs 50-120 per school.'” Other factors contributing to increasing enrolment in maktabs and madrasahs till the late twenties were the measures adopted after the 1905 partition of Bengal and more significantly, the introduction of the Reformed Madrasah Scheme in 1915, which made special provisions for grants to these institutions. As has been pointed out, there was a drop in the number of Muslim pupils in middle and high stages of schools between 1916-17 and 1926-27. This was a result of the response to the Swarajya and Non-co-operation movements. But the number of madrasah pupils continued to increase though at a much lower rate than in the preceding years. While some Muslim families were dissuaded from sending their sons to madrasahs in response to the nationalist struggle, a large section

continued to see their interests as separate from those of the nationalists,

thus forming a support base for continued British rule. In terms of British policy, there were shrewd reasons behind funding madrasahs rather than general schools. By the late nineteenth century the British had already decided to treat Muslims as a distinct political interest. ‘The diversity of races in India and the presence of a powerful Mahomedan community’ were seen as circumstances undoubtedly ‘favourable to our rule’ by Dufferin.”

The need to treat Indians as communities and to have them see

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

5

themselves as such had already culminated in the identification of Indians by religious affiliation in the 1872 census and confirmed through

establishing

a

system

of

separate

electorates in 1909.

Official reservations about denominational education quoted by Ahmed do not really carry weight against active encouragement of

‘segregate institutions’ on the grounds of insufficient funds.” The

advantage to the British in encouraging segregated education, as provided by maktabs and madrasahs, was the reinforcement of religious

identity”” of Muslims, a necessary strategy, if they were to see

themselves as a separate community. The

British

held

that

they

had

lost America

by

establishing

schools and colleges and they were not going to repeat the same mistake in India.”* But a certain amount of education was necessary

to create a ‘class of interpreters’ between the ruler and ruled.™ After

the 1857 Mutiny, ‘the heavy hand of the British’ had fallen undoubtedly more on Muslims than on Hindus, and Muslims were considered ‘unquestionably more dangerous to our rule’.”* However, by the late nineteenth century, British antagonism was against ‘the worshippers of Shiva and Vishnu’. Secular education had created a strong bhadralok class. Derozio’s Young Bengal, Ram Mohan Roy’s

Brahmo Samaj, and the Indian nationalists were already playing

lively social and political roles, challenging existing social and poli-

tical authorities. The new class of ‘interpreters’ to be sought among

Muslims had to be a weaker group in relation to Hindus if it was

to be placated and protected while it acted as a provocative counter-

foil to the bhadralok. The British were thus reluctant to raise the

standard of education in Muslim institutions.” Besides providing political

gains,

the

strategy

would

keep

expenses

low

and

give Muslims just enough to keep them from being disgruntled and dangerous to British rule.

‘The emergent Muslim intelligentsia, particularly those from Islamic

institutions, was largely weak and dependent, with a continuing need

for protection and patronage. Graduates of both madrasahs and Islamia colleges generally displayed a relatively low level of performance, although there were many exceptions.

Islamia College was the only government college for Muslims;

but the standard and achievement of this college fell far below the average for most other colleges. A. K. Chanda notes in the

76

The Sacred and The Secular

Ninth Quinquennial Review on the Progress of Education in Bengal, 1932-37: Financial and other considerations stood in the way of Islamia College being as well staffed or as well equipped as the majority of the other government colleges... It does not offer its students any training in science for the degree course and it does not come to the standard of teaching at the Presidency College on any subject. The result has been that the best Muslim students in Calcutta do not always join this college. This has been reflected in the results in the various University Examinations. Islamia College has not been doing as well as even many of the private colleges and its percentage of passes is lower than the university average.” In 1937, for example,

its percentage of passes among Interme-

diate Arts and Science students was the lowest among all government colleges —

48.8 and 39.1 respectively against the university

average of 68.5 and 69.5 (see Appendix

1.1), At the BA

level, the

performance of Chittagong College was the worst. Islamic Intermediate

Colleges

at Dacca

and Chittagong

had

a

much higher percentage of passes but these were not general insti-

tutions of learning like the other colleges. Rather, these were ‘institutions

were

with

Intermediate classes attached to High

‘intended

at the University

to

lead

of Dacca’.

to

the

The

courses

Islamic

of

Madrasahs’

Islamic

Intermediate

and

studies

College

at

Dacca, was described as a ‘C’ type college contemplated by the

Calcutta University Commission Report. It consisted of six classes — two Intermediate and four High Madrasah classes. In 1932-33

the number of Intermediate students increased and that of madrasah students fell. The increase was attributed to the introduction of English and History as additional subjects in the college.”

The proportion of Muslim students and the average cost per student

in various government colleges for men in the thirties is given in Appendix 1.J. Presidency College, the most reputed of them, accommodated only 11.25 per cent of students who were Muslims in 1937-38.

Rajshahi, Chittagong and Dacca Intermediate Colleges had a sizeable

proportion of Muslim students ranging from 35 to 54 per cent. The percentage of passes in these institutions was well above the university average. These colleges, on the whole, were better staffed and equipped than Islamia College. The average cost per student was rather low at

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

71

Islamia College until the formation of the Muslim ministry in 1937. In 1932-33, it was second lowest; in 1937-38, the highest; and by 193940 it had levelled down towards the average for all government colleges. The Muslim ministry in its exuberance to improve Muslim education initially devoted itself to funding Islamic institutions. But in

the second phase, it concentrated its efforts on getting more Muslims accepted into general and inter-communal institutions of learning,

where graduates were better equipped for competition. Appendix 1.J.

Shows

that

there was

a considerable

increase

in the percentage

‘of Muslims in all government colleges between 1932-33 and 1939-40.

In Presidency College, it rose from

15.8 to 17 per cent; in

Dacca Intermediate College from 53.97 to 71.76 per cent; in Krishnagar

College from 9.5 to 13.6 per cent etc. The increase in Hooghly College was less striking.

Muslim pupils from special, schools were ‘seriously handicapped in

climbing the educational ladder’; only a few could get into High

Madrasahs and ultimately into one of the three Islamic Intermediate

Colleges which contributed Muslim pupils to universities. In 1927,

there were 63,000 Muslim pupils in segregated institutions out of a

total Muslim student population of 1,109,237, but only 881 were read-

ing in the first year Islamic Intermediate class, whereas there were

50,999 boys in recognized madrasahs.” Between 1915 and 1932 only

82 students of Islamic Studies graduated from Dacca University.”””

The maktabs and madrasahs were ‘extremely inefficient’ and the students of these institutions could rarely ‘compete successfully with those

who had been taught in ordinary high schools’. This was the unanimous

verdict of Muslim school inspectors as reported in the Interim Report

of the Indian Statutory Commission. The Junior Madrasahs which cor-

responded to middle English schools had a heavier course since the

children had to learn four languages — English, Bengali, Arabic and Urdu. Often, the maktabs had only three classes instead of the standard

five and were single-teacher schools."

The low standard of: Muslim education both in and outside the madrasah system can be explained in terms of the British fear of losing

control over middle-class aspirations. Unequal development of the two

communities, Hindu and Muslim, was necessary if the weaker was to receive official patronage and ‘preferential treatment’. An atmosphere

of free competition, whether for education or employment, would not

7B

The Sacred and The Secular

arouse any significant conflict between them. But reservation of seats

for an apparently incompetent group would and did. The education

system available to Muslims perpetuated social inequality. The inability

to compete with Hindus for the university entrance examinations persuaded Muslims to seek redress for inequality through a system of quotas even after the Muslim ministry was formed in Bengal in 1937. ‘The formation of the Muslim-dominated government led to dramatic changes in Muslim fortunes. The Q.R. 1942-47, notes that during the quinquennia 1932-37 and 1942-47, the history of government effort in education ‘was mostly a story of special advantages given to Muslims’. In Bengal Engineering College, 40 per cent of the total admission was reserved for Muslims and 66 special stipends were created for them. A proposal was made for 50 per cent reservation of seats for them in other colleges which did not materialize into any scheme because of partition.”? Communal ratio rules were

made to safeguard government services by reserving roughly 50 per

cent of appointments for Muslims.” The Q.R. 1942-47 notes that

there was ‘no rule for reservation in vacancies filled by promotion’, but 50 per cent of the promotions were given to Muslims.” The strong members

of the intelligentsia were often, though

not

exclusively, those who managed to enter Hindu-dominated colleges like Presidency and Hooghly. Their numbers were few (see Appendix 1.J). In 1932-33 there were 162 Muslim boys to 844 Hindu boys in Presidency College; for every 100 Muslim boys there were 520 Hindus. By 1939-40, the gap had somewhat reduced to 198 Muslims to 951 Hindus — a proportion of 100 Muslim to 479 Hindu boys. Here, too, a large section was at a disadvantage psychologically for they paid lower fees than the majority of students, which made their relative poverty obvious. The Muslim Hall of Dacca University also contributed a small section of the intelligentsia."* In 1921-22, eighty-seven (25.9 per cent)

out of 336 students in residence, were from the Muslim Hall, and in 1936-37, it accommodated 268 (54.9 per cent) of the 488 students in residence. Table 1.6 shows how the Muslim Hall became more important in the period 1921-22 to 1936-37 as the number of students in residence trebled, while of those in residence in Dacca and Jagannath Halls #eclined.

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

719

Table 1.6 : STUDENTS IN RESIDENCE IN DACCA UNIVERSITY, 1921-22—1936-37

‘Year 1921-22 1926-27 1931-32 1936-37

Total 336 569 385 488

Dacca Hall 148, 150 2 110

Jagannath Hall 101 2 4S 110

Muslim Hall 87 208 178 268

Source : 9th Q.R., 1932-37 (1939), table 59, p. 88.

The emerging intelligentsia was thus neither homogeneous in

terms of the level or standard of education attained, nor in endow-

ments. While those educated in poorly equipped madrasahs would

generally provide a weak religious intelligentsia which would continue to need patronage

and protection,

the stronger

intelligentsia

would come from among those Muslims who could compete with Hindus, such as graduates of Presidency College or Muslim

‘According to Professor Mahmood, the Bengal Muslim

Hall.

intelligentsia

came not from Islamia College but from Muslim Hall. This is true

to the extent that he meant that Muslim Hall provided a stronger and

relatively

more

successful

secular intelligentsia than Islamia

College. In terms of ideology, however, the graduates of Islamia College subscribed to a range of views including religious and secular perceptions. In the thirties a student of Muslim

against, Dacca

University

to

keep

the

Hall filed a case

dining room open dur-

ing Ramzan; the student won and he had the support of his Muslim

colleagues. However, the Islamic History Department of the univer-

sity did provide a few orthodox types; one wanted ‘to free this Hall from the contaminated influence of the “black coated coterie”’, re-

ferring to the more radical group in the hall.”

While this education

system

perpetuated

inequality

between

Hindus and Muslims contributing to the growth of communalism,

it

also fostered inequality among the Muslim intelligentsia. A much

larger proportion of this intelligentsia came from general rather than

religious institutions..And the general school graduates were likely to dominate decision-making. Thus the education system was to have

deep implications for religious-secular tension among the emergent intelligentsia.

80

The Sacred and The Secular

1.5 Employment in Public Services

In

the

field

of

employment

a

slow

rise

was

notable

in

Bengal Muslim fortunes. This was partly due to the 1885 Resolution

aimed at preventing the decline of a numerous and influential class and securing its co-operation for the general benefit of the admini-

stration. By the 1940s, a sizeable Muslim community was repre-

sented in every sphere of middle-class occupation such as the civil

service, the police inspectorate, the teaching profession as well as the government educational service. But their share was lower than

their proportion in the population. All these services were dominated

by Hindus. Within these services Muslim representation was higher

at the lower income levels. As a proportion of the population, however, the number of people engaged in these occupations was small

both for Hindus and Muslims. Thus, the intelligentsia emerging from these groups was tiny indeed for both communities.

The emergence of such a group was facilitated by a system of posi-

tive discrimination whereby a certain proportion of appointments was

reserved for Muslims. The aim was to continue reservations until their

population proportion was reached. The upper caste Hindus were inevitably alienated. as their preponderance in these services was threatened. It exacerbated tension in an acutely competitive atmosphere

where public service posts were being axed. The system of quotas and reserved seats contributed to a segregationist mentality. The implied

separate development of the two communities was acceptable to many

Muslims. At another level, the introduction of separate electorates re-

inforced this mentality. Among other reasons, this was a key factor which drove a deeper wedge between the two communities and inevitably led to the demand for Pakistan.

The proportion of Muslims in government services increased from

4.3 per cent in 1871 to 10.3 per cent in 1901, but Hindus dominated these. The representation of Muslims did not rise dramatically in suc-

cessive years despite British pronouncements to reserve jobs for them.

In 1905, only 7.4 per cent of police inspectors and 12.39 per cent of police sub-inspectors in Bengal were Muslim.”” The partition of Bengal

in 1905, ostensibly for better administration, effectively aimed at cre-

ating a Muslim power to challenge Hindu power, for it led to a sig-

nificant increase in the number of Muslims in the public services.”"* In

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

81

1911, there were 231,312 Muslims in the professions, public admini-

stration and the liberal arts.” This was a considerable improvement

from 1886, when there were only 53 Muslims in the administrative and judicial departments of the public services (see Table 1.7). The ratio of Hindus to Muslims in these services in 1911 was approximately 4:1,E. A. Gait noted :

«+. the Hindus are less than twice as numerous as the Muhammadans. Of the 1,823 appointments held by Hindus, about eight-ninths are held by members.of the Brahman, Baidya and Kayastha castes, although these castes contribute less than onetwelfth of the total Hindu population.” Table 1.7 : EUROPEANS, HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES, 1871-1901

‘Senior Govt. Positions 1871 (%Y_ 1338 63.4

Earopeans Hindus Upper caste =» 681. 32.2] Lower caste Muslims 92 44 Total 2111 1000]

Public Services ‘Senior Govt. (Admn. + Judicial) 1886 Positions Adm —_Jud. ‘Tot (%Y_1901_——(%). 43 T 4 71/ 788 364 «249-273 44 339

S52

843]

9 53 86] 284619 100.0}

1,106 51.0 131 141 2,164 * 100.

*, Based on enquiries of selected departments only. Source : Report of the Public Service Commission 1886-7 (Calcutta, 1888), p. 38; B. Ghosh, op. cit, p. 25; Census of India, 1901, vol. VI, pt. I, pp. 486, 506.

In 1911, Bengal Muslims comprised 36 per cent of India’s Muslim

population of more than 66 million.” In Bengal they were 52.3 per

cent of the population while Hindus formed 45.2 per cent. The 1911

census classified more than 90 per cent of Muslims as economically

active in agriculture and pasture and only 9.3 per cent in industrial, trade or professional occupations. The percentage proportion of Hindus in the professions stood at 29.3 (see Appendix 1.K). A great majority of the Muslims were cultivators, and they outnumbered Hindu cultivators by two to one.

The landlords, on the other hand, were mostly Hindu, the proportion

being seven to three.” Table 1.8 also shows the dominant

position

of Hindus in trade, industry, transport, public administration, liberal arts and the professions. In 1921, out of 25.5 million Muslims, the vast majority, 21.9 million were engaged in agriculture and only 3.6 million

82

The Sacred and The Secular

belonged to professional categories like trade, industry or public administration (see Appendix 1.L). The proportion of the population engaged in the professions and liberal arts was 629 Hindus to 132 Muslims; i.e. a ratio of4 to 1 as in 1911. There were 2.7 million Hindu bhadralok against only 74,000 Muslim Syeds; a ratio of 37 to 1. However, the Muslim equivalent of the bhadralok would also include other members of the ashraf and hence the categories bhadralok and Syeds are not really comparable. However a comparison of Brahmans with Syeds shows the latter to be considerably smaller in size as the ratio of Brahmans to Syeds was 17 to 1.7 Table 1.8 : HINDUS AND MUSLIMS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*, PROFESSIONS AND LIBERAL ARTS, 1911, 1921 (Number and as percentage of own community) 1911 912,549 231,312 3.95:1

Hindu Muslim Ratio HIM

% 4.36 095

1921 849,553 222,108 3.83:1

% 4.08 087

* Includes public forces Source : R. C. M. Ed., 1914, p. 1; 1921 Census of Bengal, vol. V, pt. Il, table XX, p. 367.

The intelligentsia formed a minute fraction of the total popula-

tion, more so in the case of Muslims. Table 1.8 indicates the per-

centage of Hindus and Muslims engaged in public administration,

the professions and liberal arts in relation to the total Hindu and

Muslim population respectively in 1911 and 1921. Clearly Muslims

formed a much smaller section of the intelligentsia in both absolute

and relative terms. In 1911, while 4.36 per cent of the Hindu population was engaged in the professions which threw up the intelligentsia, the relevant percentage

of Muslim

was

0.95.

In

1921

the

respective percentages for Hindus and Muslims were 4.1 and 0.87.

There was a drop in size and proportion of the intelligentsia of both communities. Clearly, the scope for employment in these services

was decreasing, thus sharpening competition for these jobs.

The 1931 Census of India for Bengal, gives the occupational distribution for selected groups of 1,000 earners among certain castes and groups (see Table 1.9).* Among Muslims, figures are given

only for

Syed

and

Mumin

(jolaha,

i.e.

traditionally

weavers).

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

83

Comparing these groups with two upper caste Hindu groups we see that in a group of 1,000 earners who were Syed, 114 were in public administration,

arts and professions; among

there were 283 in these categories.

1,000 Brahman

earners

The figures for Baidya and

Mumin were 407and 8 respectively. The relative affluence and general position of advantage of the Hindu castes is clearly discernible. Table 1.9 : DISTRIBUTION FOR SELECTED GROUPS OF 1,000 EARNERS BY (PRINCIPAL) OCCUPATIONAL SUB-CLASSES, 1931

Categories Number of people

Distribution per 1,000 :

Exploitation of animals

and vegetation

‘Extraction of minerals Industries

‘Transport ‘Trade

Public force

Public administration Arts & professions

Persons living on

their own income Domestic service Insufficiently described ‘occupations ‘Unproductive

Total

Baidya

‘Brahman

(Hindu)

‘Syeds

(Hindu)

Murnin

(Muslim)

——Jolaha)

110,739

1,447,691

162,905

250

334

604

10 65

5

6

70

68

37

30

24

59

(Mustim)

270,292 366 7 137 79)*

4

63

66

33

2

14

10

2

83 136

a 90

16 98

1 7

20 33

a 75

14 co

6 23

88

92

30

1s

10

13

30

10

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

(188)*

(166)*

+ Figures refer to those engaged in traditional caste occupations (in addition to figures, not in brackets) Source : Census of India, 1931, vol. v, pt. 1, Bengal and Sikkim, p.300 pt. Il, Bengal, pp. 223-42.

In the 1930s, the total number of posts appointable through the public service commission continued to fall while the number of Muslims appointed continued to increase, In 1937-38, Bengal Muslims held 55 out of 145 (37.93 per cent) appointments made through the public service commission through competitive examinations, and in 1938-39 they held 59 out of 133 posts (44.36 per cent). The figures

84

The Sacred and The Secular

for Hindus were 85 (58.62 per cent) and 68 (51.13 per cent) respec-

tively. Communal tension was fuelled by developments such as these. As a result of the communal ratio rules, Muslims were to be selected for 50 per cent of appointments through the public service commission in 1937-38, but in 1938-39 their share fell to a third of the total ap-

Pointments made (see Appendix 1.M). The

appointment

method

through

selection

(percentage

quota) favoured Muslims, but nevertheless senior ranks in govern-

ment services continued to be dominated by Hindus. In 1940, there were 21 Hindu, 18 Muslim and 16 other officers in the Secretariat. The majority of the officers of both the Hindu and Muslim com-

munities

belonged

to the lower category of assistant secretaries.

However, Hindus were well represented in the senior category of

deputy secretaries (four out of six), where Muslims were not represented at all (see Appendix 1.N). Although Muslims were underrepresented in the officer category in general, they exceeded their

population proportion in the districts of Burdwan and Midnapore.

Appendices 1.0, and 1.P show the proportion of Muslim teachers

in colleges and schools during the years 1917 to 1932. Appendix 1.Q

presents Muslim strength jn the inspectorate and non-ministerial posts

of the Bengal education services in 1934. The findings of the Calcutta

University Commission, 1917-19, show that in 1917, Bengal Muslims

formed only 5.66 per cent of the teaching staff of all colleges (aided, unaided, government, missionary and university staff); the bulk of them, i.e. 19.41

per cent, were teachers of oriental subjects, whereas

only 3.47 per cent taught other subjects (see Appendix 1.0). By 1930, the situation had not improved markedly. The Report of the Committees

‘of the ISC comments thus on Calcutta University :

Representation of Muslims is very meagre in the university which guides the destiny of higher education... although Muslim

candidates

for

the

University

Examination

form one-sixth of the total of such candidates, representation of their interest in the university may

next to nil.”

be characterized as

There were very few Muslim headmasters, professors or lecturers in non-commercial institutions. In 1934, there were no Muslim principals.

They held 4 out of 109 (3.9 per cent) professorships of colleges, 8 out of 42 (19 per cent) headmasterships of high and normal schools, and

The Emergence of a Muslim’ Intelligentsia in Bengal 85 only 6 out of 88 (6.8 per cent) lecturerships in the subordinate educational services (see Appendix 1. Q). In fact, it was in the lower stages of education that Muslims pro-

vided a substantial proportion of the teaching staff — 53.9 per cent of primary school, 27.5 per cent of middle school, and only 15.3 per cent

of high school teachers in 1931-32 (see Appendix 1.0). A gradual increase was however noticeable in the overall number and percentage of Muslim teachers of all grades and classes. Between 1921-22 and

1936-37, their percentage increased from 37.18 to 42.63. Muslims com-

prised more than 50 per cent of the teaching staff in Dacca, Rajshahi

and Chittagong divisions.”* By

1940,

Muslim

officers

constituted

37.15

per

cent

of

the Bengal Educational Services, 43 per cent of them teaching general subjects and 27.3 per cent were lecturers in Bengali. Muslims

held all the 19 teaching posts in Arabic and Persian. But there were no Muslim lecturers in engineering and commercial subjects. Muslim

representation was also very poor in the women’s branches of the educational service : they held only 3 out of 32 posts (i.e. 9.4 per cent) in the Bengal Educational Service and none in the Bengal

Senior Educational Service.”

Although by the forties, Bengal Muslims had not caught up with

their population percentage in the services, they had made a significant advance in that direction. However, an examination of the educational

cadre shows that they were prominent only in the lowest rungs of the

service ladder” Their proportion dwindled into insignificance in the higher services. On the other hand, the figures for 1940 do reveal some improvement since 1933-34.

‘The data reflects the gradual growth of a Bengal Muslim middle

class, which had become a force to be reckoned with ever since the first partition of Bengal. The formation of a Muslim ministry in 1937

confirmed this. By the 1940s the position of the community had improved significantly since the last quarter of the nineteenth century in terms of education, employment and the exercise of political power." CONCLUSION While Bengal under the British witnessed a high degree of occupational

and

social

mobility

it did

not

become

a meritocracy

entirely.

86

The Sacred and The Secular

Recruitment to jobs and membership of the Council and Assembly did not depend

solely on merit or on democratic competition. Elections

were never based on universal adult franchise. The legislature was almost wholly or partly nominated until the 1919 Act, when a

partially responsible government was introduced. The Government of India Act, 1935, enfranchised 13.4 per cent of the Bengal adult popu-

lation over twenty years of age and almost anyone who paid any tax,

rate or fee.” There was a phenomenal increase in the number

of Muslims enfranchized who now accounted for 12.6 per cent of the community as against 2 per cent in 1919. But elections continued to

be held under a system of separate electorates introduced in 1909."

The rapid growth of a middle class in the twentieth century was largely a result of British policies aimed at ensuring stable rule and a secure control over middle-class aspirations. While in the 1870s, the aim was to control the peasantry and mollify the remaining Mus-

lim aristocracy so as to prevent their radicalization, by 1905, the prime concern

was

to make

rising Indian

nationalism

ineffective.

This objective was sought to be achieved by creating an articulate

and separate political interest among the: Muslims. In order to do so a certain level of affluence had to be generated through education

and employment. The partition of 1905, like the Communal Award

of 1932, created new aspirations and hence new interests among Bengal Muslims, which were opposed to Indian nationalist

concerns.™ ‘The Report of the Bengal Committee presented to Parliament in May

1930 notes :

The principle of communal representation should be carried to local bodies including the municipalities, the district

boards and the local and union boards. The destiny

of Bengal can be built up only if the Hindus and Muslims are given equal facilities in the field of education and administration under proper guidance.”>

These policies allowed Muslims to receive preferential treatment as members of a deprived community. The benefits conferred were of a. doubtful nature. One possible intended result of the British strategy was to keep the Muslims permanently weak and dependent on their

patronage. Those who were aware of this, like Maulana Akram Khan,

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal were powerless in getting

their point

across

87

to their co-religionists

intoxicated as they were by the new opportunities.

In the second decade of the twentieth century, it was a timid and

staunchly loyal middle class which made petitions for quotas and was

interested primarily in Muslim education. By the 1920s, it was more

politically involved but in a narrow sense — interested only in the welfare of the Muslim community. Muslims —

whether members of

the Swarajya Party or not — were united in defence of their communal

interests. By the thirties and forties some Bengal Muslims had become

more committed to Indian nationalism and also interested in the con-

dition of the peasantry. But their position tended to be ambivalent as the Pakistan idea gained momentum.

The gradual increase in the size of the middle class was not simply

a result of British polices; it reflected the growing self-perception of Bengal Muslims

as members

of a deprived and distinct community

with separate interests which could be achieved through loyalty to the Raj.”* As Muslims struggled to catch up with economically and educationally advanced

Hindus and the British encouraged the political

development of India as ‘a patchwork of interests’, the communal divide, which first manifested itself in the debate on Muslim response

to the Congress (1886-88), widened further until Bengal had to be divided a second time, and irrevocably, in 1947.

The composition of the Muslim middle class in Bengal induced

certain attitudes to religion and to all questions with a potentially re-

ligious dimension. The upper ashraf, for example, unlike the rest of

their co-religionists, were non-Bengali in their cultural orientation, if not in their ethnic origin as well. But, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, the belief in a basic contradiction between Bengali and Muslim iden-

tity appears:to have been accepted by all Bengal Muslims, Bengali

Hindus and even the British. The fact that Bengal Muslims were identified as Muslims rather than as Bengalis in the first quarter of the

twentieth century, emphasized the religious, at the cost of the cultural, basis of identity. The community thus experienced an irreconcilable tension between its secular and religious concerns in matters affecting its basic self-perception and identity.

Among the new upwardly-mobile groups were those who rose from the peasantry and the local ashraf, especially the rural religious divines. These groups were influenced by the fundamentalist Wahabi and

88

The Sacred and The Secular

Faraizi

movements

which had penetrated

nineteenth-century rural

Bengal and left their mark on the population for generations to come.

‘The traditional as well as the emerging rural gentry hence had a deeply

religious, often puritanical, streak-in their mental make-up. An empha-

sis on correct ritual observance was one manifestation of the fact. As

new issues — political, social and cultural — affecting the life of the community came to the fore, the emergent middle class necessarily felt

constrained to assess these, inter alia, in terms of the religious tradition. The strongly Hindu component of literary education in Bengal aggra-

vated such concerns.

The growth of the intelligentsia took place in the context of a

multi-level competition with the relatively advantaged Hindu middle classes. Here was one more factor which helped emphasize an ethnic

identity based on’shared faith. The Muslims were drawn away from

Indian nationalism by their special interests. Indian nationalism came

to be equated with Hindu interests, fundamentally antagonistic to the

community of Muslims.” The concerns of the Muslim intelligentsia were thus consolidated around their reli-gious identity. The long-run

implication as shown in Chapter 6, was a persistent tendency to see all Muslim concerns as conterminous with Islam. Whatever the Mus-

lim League stood for before 1947 — separate electorates, for example — came to be seen afterwards as Islamic. Here, incidentally,

was potential for tension and even conflict in the interpretation of what constituted the Islamic. Hindu

communalism

also

helped

aggravate

an

exclusive

and

aggressive Islamic identity among the Bengal Muslims. While they had long accepted inter-communal distance in social intercourse, they were

no longer willing to take what they felt were manifestations of Hindu

contempt.

The

ritually-prescribed

restrictions

on

commensality ob-

served by most Hindus came to be strongly resented. At the same time, Hindu middle-class efforts to safeguard their relative advantage mani-

fested, for instance, in the demand for quotas for caste Hindus, further

polarized

the already

divided

communities..

The

line demarcating

the secular and religious dimensions of their concerns was thus blurred in the eyes of the Bengal Muslims.

The Emergence of a Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal

89

Notes

A recent study on the subject was completed at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS); see Muhammad Shah, ‘The Emergence of a Muslim “middle class” in Bengal : Attitudes and Rhetoric of Communalism, 1880-1940", Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1990. While both studied at Islamia College, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman espoused a secular political ideal. Syed Ali Ashraf, on the other hand, decided to exile himself to Saudi Arabia when Bangladesh emerged as a secular democracyin 1971. He returned after 1977 when secularism ino longer formed a pillar of the state, He is currently the Director of Islamic Academy at Cambridge . Interview with Syed Ali Ashraf, Cambridge, 13 Sept, 1989. Although there were Muslim ministries in Bengal before, these had come into office through a very small electorate, The total size of the electorate, including Hindus and Muslims, increased from 12,000 under the 1909 Act, to 1,228,000 under the 1919 Act, and to 6,279,940 under the 1935 Act. The percentage of Muslim voters to the Assembly in relation to the total Muslim population increased from 2 per cent in 1920 to 12.6 per cent in 1936-37. ‘Fhe 1937 ministry was the first Muslim ministry to be formed under the 1935 Act, and therefore by a much larger electorate. The ministry, dominated by Muslimmajority parties, did include some non-Muslim members. See Indian Statutory Commission (hereafter abbreviated to ISC), vol. Ill, Reports of the Committees, (Govt. of Bengal, 1939), p. 131; Reports of the Reforms Office, Bengal, 1932-37 (hereafter abbreviated R.R.O.B.), pp. 23, 289-90. ‘The calculation here takes accountof developments from 1881 because the. 1872 census excluded Sylhet and Cachar. The 1941 census gave inflated figures because of the rise in communal feeling in politics and is therefore not here. The percentage share of Muslims by region in 1931 was 71 in East Bengal, 60.8 in North Bengal, less than 50 in Central Bengal and just over 14 in West Bengal, 1931 Census of India, Bengal, vol. V, pt. I, p. 384. Thid., p. 386. The growing size of the Bengal Muslim community indirectly affected Hindu-Maslim relations as Muslims: began to fight for proportional representation; it also gave political advantage to the community by adding the strength of numbers when bargaining for privileges, reserved seats, and quotas. Teid., pp. 390-94,

x

The Sacred and The Secular

Ibid,, p. 387. See Beverley, 1872 Census of Bengal, pp. 134, 165; James Wise, ‘The

Muhammedans of Eastern Bengal’ (communicated by Risley), Journal

of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (hereafter JASM), vol. LXIII, p. Ul, no. 1, 1894; E. A. Gait, 1901 Census of India, Calcutta, 1902;

10. 1. 12.

13.

14,

VI i,

Report pp. 165-81. District Gazetteer, Dacca 1912, pp. 62-63. (hereafter D.G.) Note that Dacca was the Mughal capital of Bengal since 1612 and would be likely to have a relatively large Muslim population. The capital was shifted to Murshidabad in the eighteenth century by the Nawab of Bengal. 1891 Census of India, Report, vol. II (Calcutta, 1893), pp. 146-47. D.G. Bogra, 1910, pp. 30-31. ‘Amalendu De gave the following reasons for the fall in Hindu birth rates: 1) decay in upper Hindu castes due to rigidity of the caste system; 2) prohibition of widow remarriage; 3) reduced possibility of the number of marriages due to the dowry system; and 4) other rigid social regulations of Hindu society, Roots of Separatism in Nineteenth Century Bengal, (Calcutta, 1974), pp 24, 30-31. On the conversion theory see, for example, Beverley, 1872 Census of Bengal, p.,165; James Wise, ‘The Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal’; E. A. Gait, 1901 Census of India, vol. VI; Report pt. I, pp. 165-81; D.G. Bogra, 1910, p. 33; A. De, Roots of Separatism, pp. 24, 51-55. On the settlement theory see Khondoker Fuzli Rubee, The Origin of Musalmans of Bengal, first published in 1895 in Persian, entitled Hagigat-i-Musalman-i-Bangala. Reprinted as appendix to the Journal of the East Pakistan History Association (Dacca, 1968); also translated into Bengali by Muhammad Abdur Razzak as Banglar Musalman (Dacca, 1968). For a more recent study in favour of the settlement theory see Muhammad Mohar Ali, History of the Muslims of Bengal, vol. 1B; Survey of Administration, Society and Culture (Riyadh, 1985) pp. 751-88. A recent study argues that a slow process of conversion occurred as the geographical, agricultural and political frontiers of Bengal moved eastwards. The cultural accomodation was such that local people were not even aware of the changes to their world view. See Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760 (Berkeley, 1993) ch. 5 and Introduction Controversy surrounds the rare and scanty explanations of what happened to the Buddhists of Bengal who once dominated the region. One view is that they escaped into Islam from oppressive, inegalitarian Hinduism. The other, less convincing view, is that they escaped further east and

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 91 north from iconoclastic Islam. But, in fact, Islam spread to Bengal through sufi activism and not state sponsorship. For discussions of conversion of Buddhists to Islam see, M. A. Rahim, Social and Cultural History, vol. I, p. 70; R. C. Mitra, The Decline of Buddhism in India, (Visvabharati, 1954), p. 82; EB. A. Gait, Report on the Census of Bengal

15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

21.

1901, pt. I (Calcutta, 1902), p. 171; and Kamruddin Ahmed, A Socio Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh (Dacca : Pioneer Press, 1967, 4th ed. 1975), pp. xxi-xxii. For an opposite view see Romilla Thapar, A History of India, vol. I, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 263-64; Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretist Tradition in Bengal (Princeton, 1983), pp. 35-36. M. A. Rahim, Social and Cultural History of Bengal, vol. 1 (Karachi, 1963), p. 57. K. F. Rubee, The Origin of the Musalmans of Bengal, pp. 38-39, 56-57; Mohar Ali, A History of the Muslims of Bengal, p. 788. On various positions on this issue see M. A. Rahim, Social and Cultural History, pp. 56, 64, 68; Rafiuddin Ahmed, Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906 : The Quest for Identity (Delhi : OUP, 1981), pp. 18-20; Mohar Ali, A History of the Muslims of Bengal, pp. 751-88. Rahim attributed 30 per cent of the population to foreign descent and 70 per cent to conversion. Of the converts, half came from Buddhists and the upper strata of Hindu society and the rest were from the lower castes. Ahmed does not provide any estimate but concludes that most of the Muslims came from non-ashraf categories, agricultural classes, and from certain lowly service and craft occupations. Ali tilts the balance in favour of foreign.roots, although the proportion of lineal descendants of foreign extraction come close to Gait’s estimate of 17 per cent.

Kamruddin Ahmed, A Socio-Political History, pp. xx-xxi.

Apama Basu, The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920 (Delhi, 1974), p. 152. A similar view is upheld by Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge, 1971), p. 301; Romilla Thapar, A History of India, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin Books, 1966, 1982 edition), pp. 278, 289-90. Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton, 1983). On his view that most of the conversions took place from low caste Hindus see pp. 22-31. E. A. Gait, Report on the Census of Bengal, 1901, pt. I (Calcutta, 1902) p. 169. For a conservative view on the growth and distribution of the Muslim population in British India, see P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, 1972) pp. 2-11.

°8

EB OR

Kazi Abdul Wadud, Hindu musalmanera biradha, Visva Bharati Studies No, 6, Calcutta, 1936 p. 16. D.G. Bogra, 1910, pp. 32-34. Ibid. See Rafiuddin Ahmed, ‘The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906 : The Quest for Identity’ (published Oxford University, D. Phil. thesis, 1979), pp. 197-201, 326. His dissertation carries strong evidence of the local origin of Bengal Muslims. He shows that the Bengal Muslim masses, who tended'to share names and customs with Hindus, suddenly began to adopt Arabic and Persian names in the late nineteenth century, emulate the upper strata of Muslim society in dress and manners, and attempt what Ahmed calls an ‘Islamization’ of their culture, i.e., a purification of Bengali Muslim culture by expunging local customs and superstitions. ‘The term ‘statistical Muslim’ has been used by scholars in the context of Islam in Indonesia where large sections of those converted to Islam are only nominally Muslims. Their case offers an interesting parallel to many Muslim groups in Bengal. See Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morotco and Indonesia (Chicago, 1968), p. 16. This phenomenon also finds its parallels in many parts of the newly converted Christian world as in regions of Latin America. 1931 Census of India, vol V, pt. 1, Report, p. 382. In. Khulna only 92, were returned as such of which there were 49 male and 43 female. Ibid. D.G. Rajshahi, 1976, pp. 56-57. Ibid. ‘The phenomenon his been discussed by S. M. Nazmul Karim, Changing Society in India and Pakistan, (Dacca, 1956), p. 12; Imtiaz Ahmed, “The Ashraf-Ajlaf Dichotomy in Muslim Social Structure in India’, Indian Social and Economic History Review, vol. II, 1966, Delhi, p. 268-75; and Rafiuddin Ahmed, “The Bengal Muslims’, ch. 1, pp. 1-38; R. Levy, Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge, 1957) p. 73. S.M.N. Karim, Changing Society, p. 12. For a list of occupational groups, see R. Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims p. 18, R. Levy, op. cit., p. 73. S.M.N. Karim, op. cit, pp. 120-22; see also S. M. N. Karim, Changing Society of India and Pakistan, reprinted in Bessaignet (ed.), Social Research in East Pakistan, Asiatic Society of Pakistan Publications No. 5 (Dacca, 1960), pp. 296-97. S. M. N. Karim, in Bessaignet, pp. 296-97. For a description of traditional social groupings among Muslims see R. Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, pp. 8-10.

R SBBS

The Sacred and The Secular

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 37. 38.

1901 Census of India, vol. V1, pt. I, p. 444. MUSLIM SOCIAL DIVISION IN BOGRA AND DACCA DISTRICTS IN 1901 :

Syeds Sheikhs Pathans Mughals Jolahas (weavers) Kulus (oil-pressers) Bediyas (gypsies) Total 39.

4. 42. 43.

45.

47.

93

Bogra

2,136 668,820 2,960 59 12,559 9,653 2,998 659,185

Dacca

3,472 1,559,268 10,797 447 59,380 7511 1,829 1,642,704

see D.G. Bogra, 1910, p. 43. and D.G. Dacca, 1912, p. 64 J. N. Gupta, Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers-Bogra, (Allahabad, 1910), p. 43. 1891 Census of India, Bengal; vol. IH, pt. I, Report, pp. 269-70. See Imtiaz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 274; also see G. Ansari, Muslim Culture in Untar Pradesh, (Lucknow, 1960). See Yamadatta, ‘Islam in Danger’, Modern Review, 70 (1941), pp. 491-92. 1921 Census of India, vol. V, pt. A & B, table XIII, pp. 166-175. The 1872 census returned 266,378 people out of a population of 17.6 million as belonging to higher status groups. 232, 189 were returned as Sheikhs, 9,858 as Syeds, 2,205 as Mughals and 2,216 Pathans. 1872 Census of Bengal, tables i b and v b, pp. xxxii, xecv. In Bengal, as in Uttar Pradesh, when a low caste person achieved a higher economic status, he found it degrading to remain a member of his caste. If an individual felt his caste status to be below his social status, he adopted an ashraf title and assumed ashraf descent. See I. ‘Ahmad, op. cit, p. 274 and R. Ahmed, “The Bengal Muslims’, p. 21. For example, jolahas who had joined the ranks of the Sheikhs who cultivated land stopped calling themselves jolahas. K. M. Ashraf, Life and Condition of the People of Hindustan (Delhi, 1959), pp. 61-63. In 1982, an old statue was found in a village in Sylhet to the great constemation of its elders. It was deemed to have no relevance to the heritage of the locals but was considered to be of value to Indians across the border. A suggestion that it was a part of the heritage of Bengal Muslims provoked considerable anger. The story was told by Ruhul Amin, a film director in London who hailed from that village.

&

The Sacred and The Secular

49.

Pre-Christian beliefs were often ascribed to the devil. In order to destroy the power of animistic beliefs, animals were portrayed as Satan's creatures. For a discussion of early Christianity, see Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians (London, 1986) and Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity (London, 1976). The 192] Census of India gave the following estimates of the number ‘of Muslims in major Muslim functional groups : Behara (palanquin bearer) Jolaha (weaver)

Kulu (oil-presser)

50.

Male

Female

120,754 136,405

272 118,759

40,926

Source : Bengal, vol. V, pt. A & B, table XIII, pp. 166-75. D.G. Dacca, 1912, p. 64; R. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 19; 1891 Census of India, vol. IM, p. 270.

The ‘agricultural’ Sheikhs have been described by Gait as ‘cultivating Sheikhs’. 52. For his discussion of Muslim social divisions and status ascribed to them

Si.

53.

54.

56.

57. 58. 59.

see, R. Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, pp. 13-15, 18.

S. Joarder, ‘The Bengal Renaissance and the Bengali Muslim’ in David Kopf and S. Joarder (eds.), Reflections on the Bengal Renaissance, (Dacca, 1977), p. 49, refers to distance between the two groups as a reason why village Muslims tuned to ‘semi-educated reformers’ like Dudu Miah, Haji Shariatullah and Titu Mir in nineteenth century Bengal rather than to the urban ashraf. A. F. S. Ahmad, Social Ideas and Social Change in Bengal, 1818-35 (Calcutta, 1976), p. 4. M. Ali, The History of the Muslims of Bengal, pp. 800-809. R. Ahmed, ‘The Bengal Muslims’ D. Phil. thesis, 1979, pp. 8-9. Thus, while

Muslim

peasantry

had

more

in

common

with Hindu

peasantry, the Bengali ashraf interacted much more with the Muslims of upper India than with the atrap of Bengal. D.G. Mandelbaum, Society in India, vol. Il (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1970), p. 549. 1891 Census of India, vol. III, pt. 1, p. 270. Fazlur Rashid Khan, “The Caste System of the Village Community of Dhulandi in the District of Dacca’, in J. E. Owen (ed.), Sociology in East Pakistan (Dacca, 1962), p. 225. R. Ahmed, The Bengal Muslim, pp. 21-22. ‘The ashrafization phenomenon has been studied by R. Ahmed, ibid., p.2.

.

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 95 62. Zamindar fortunes fluctuated as a result of the strict enforcement of the timely collection of revenue in the late eighteenth century. The failure to meet payment deadlines often led to sale of rights to revenue collection or land transfer. Among those to gain from this phenomenon was Khwaja Alimullah, son of a Kashmir merchant, Maulvi Abdullah. He bought zamindaries in the districts of Dacca, Chittagong, Barisal, Faridpur, Mymensingh and Tipperah. His descendants later became hereditary nawabs of Bengal, a reward from the Raj for their loyalty; see F. B. Bradley Birt, Twelve Men of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century (Calcutta, 1910), pp. 173-75. See Sugata Bose, ‘Agrarian Society and Politics in Bengal, 1919-1947" 63. (Ph. D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1982), p. 201. On the working of a land market and legal measures to control landlordtenant relations, see Asok Sen, Partha Chatterjee and Saugata Mukherj Three Studies on the Agrarian Structure in Bengal, 1850-1947 (Calcutta, 1982), pp. 2-3. 65. Report of the Committee on Muhammadan Education, 1914 (Calcutta, 1915), p. 2. (henceforth abbreviated to R.C.M.Ed.) Sanat Kumar Saha, ‘Social Context of Bengal Renaissance’, in D. Kopf and S. Joarder (eds.), Reflections on the Bengal Renaissance, pp. 147-49. 67. Most of the court officials were Hindu, see R.C.M.Ed., 1914, p. 3. The attitude of wanting to have Muslim pleaders is reflective of the growing alienation of Muslims. 1931 Census of India, vol. V, pt. 1, Bengal and Sikkim, p. 300. Unfor68. tunately occupational breakdown of other Muslim groups apart from the jolahas and Syeds is not included in the 1931 census. Certain occupations were considered unthinkable for the ashraf — i.e. weaving and other menial jobs. Some even considered government jobs to be incompatible with their aristocratic pride and notions of faith. See R. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 11; R. Levy, op. cit., p. 73. J. E, Webster, Eastern Bengal and Assam Gazetteers, Noakhali (Allahabad, 1911), p. 74; B. Moore, Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy, 6th ed. (Harmondsworth, 1977), pp. 325-26. 70. Tapan Raychaudhuri, Bengal under Akbar and Jahangir : An Introductory Study in Social History (Delhi, Munshiram Monoharlal, 1969, 2nd ed.), pp. 50-51, 63-64. For a discussion of the rise of intermediate groups in the eighteenth century, see C.A. Bayly Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge : CUP, 1988)

T. Raychaudhuri, ibid., p. 50. Historians and social scientists agree that caste provided the framework

The Sacred and The Secular

73.

14. 75.

76.

33

77. 78.

81. 82. 83.

for the organization of life in the village. T. K. Barua, The Political Elite in Bangladesh, p. 222; B. B. Misra, op. cit, p. 5; M. N. Srinivas, “The Caste System in India’, in Andre Beteille (ed.), Social InequalityCollected Essays, 3rd ed. (Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 272. T. K. Barua, op. cit, 219-20; B. B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes (London, New York, Bombay, 1961), p. 46; Barrington Moore, op. cit., pp. 319-20. F. B. Bradley-Birt was a civil servant. He expressed this view in his 1910 publication, Twelve Men of Bengal, pp. 174-75. W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, p. 157. By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century the British had succeeded in achieving this objective. For his views on the effect of British policies on Muslims, see pp. 144-57. The British-held notion that the Permanent Settlement had fundamentally altered the structure of rural society has been challenged; see Ratnalekha Ray, Change in Bengal Agrarian Society c. 1760-1850 (Calcutta, 1979). For a discussion of the Permanent Settlement, see Sir Francis Floud, Bengal Land Revenue Commission Report, 1938 (Calcutta, 1940), pp. 14-36, (henceforth abbreviated as Floud Commission Report, 1938) and B. B. Misra, op. cit., pp. 131-32, 277. On the effect of the Permanent Settlement on great zainindaries of Bengal see Sirajul Islam, The Per‘manent Settlement in Bengal - A Study of its Operation 1790-1829 (Dacca, 1979), pp. 3, 128. W. W. Hunter's theory that Hindu zamindars displaced and replaced Muslim zamindars has been refuted by Anisuzzaman, in Muslim manas o bangla sahitya (Calcutta, 1971), pp. 6-21. Anisuzzaman, ibid., pp. 6-7. Sirajul Islam, op. cit., pp. 152-58. The reasons behind abolishing the monopoly of landed property were both financial and political — ‘so as to render their wealth and influence less dangerous to the governing power’, pp. 77-78. Floud Commission Report 1938, pp. 33-34. Ratnalekha Ray suggests that auction purchases merely constituted sale of titles rather than actual sale of land. The real owners of land were not zamindars but raiyats who tilled the soil. Titles changed hands but under tenure-holders in intermediate positions below the zamindars remained in control of the land; see R. Ray, Change in Bengal Agrarian Society, pp. 249-53. T. K. Barua, op. cit., p. 234; S. Islam, op. cit., p. 134. S. Islam, ibid., pp. 130-35. See S. Islam, ibid. The collectors’ description of professions of the purchasers of auction-land disposed of from 1794 to 1801, table 10,

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

89. 91.

92.

B28

93.

97

pp. 158-61, 171-90. Also see F. B. Bradley-Birt, Twelve Men of Bengal, pp. 173-82, on the background of Abdul Gani. Binoy Ghosh, Banglar bidwatsamaj (Calcutta, 1973), p. 23. Misra, op. cit., pp. 76-78, 83-85, 132. W. W. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 150-51. B, B. Misra, op. cit, 186-87; T. K. Barua, op. cit., pp. 236-37. A. R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal, 1757-1856 (Dacca, 1961), p. 50. 'W. W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 162. Misra, op. cit., p. 327. Sultan Jahan Salik (ed.), Muslim Modernism in Bengal : Selected Writings of Delawarr Hosaen Ahmed Meerza, 1840-1913 (Dacca, 1980), p. 74, Letter from H. Blochman to J. Sutcliffe, Principal of Calcutta Madrasah, Calcutta, 19 Oct. 1871. See Pradip Sinha, Nineteenth Century Bengal : Aspects of Social History (Calcutta, 1965), pp. 51-52. The decline of the ‘Muslim upper classes has been chronicled in Abd-al-Karim Khan, Taraph Gaurangir Itihas (1343 BS. (1935)). It is the history of a village called ‘Gaurangi in Zila Mymensingh of Tangail Mahakuma. It notes that many well-descended villagers were living in comparative poverty, and gives information on the history of various Muslim families collected between 1904 and 1930 from various sources, pp. 5, 90. Adams Third Report, 1838. Cited by A. R. Mallick, op. cit., pp. 164, 277-82. The figures have been calculated from Tables I-IV. For a discussion of the concepts of ‘respectability’ and bhadralok, see Broomfield, op. cit., pp. 5-9. For these views see R. Gopal, British Rule in India : An Assessment (Bombay, 1963), p. 35; V. B. Singh, Indian Economy Yesterday and Today (Dethi, 1970), pp. 6, 13; Amit Bhaduri, “The Evolution of land Relations in Eastern India under British Rule’, Indian Economic and Social History Review (IESHR) vol. XIII, no. 1 (Jan.-March 1976), p. 49. ‘Asok Sen, ‘Agrarian Structure and Tenancy Laws in Bengal, 1850-1900, in Asok Sen, Partha Chatterjee and Saugata Mukherji, Three Studies on the Agrarian Structure in Bengal, 1850-1917 (Calcutta, 1982), pp. 1-27. See Gopal, Singh and Bhaduri, op. cit. P. C. Roy, The Rent Question in Bengal (Calcutta, 1883), p. 33. Statement by Ibert when presenting the Bengal Tenancy Bill to the Council of the Governor-General. Proceedings of the Council of Governor-General of India, 2 March 1883, Govt. of Bengal, 1920, p. 43.

100. Abu Ahmad Abdullah (1980a), ‘Landlord and Rich Peasant under the

98

101.

102. 103.

104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110.

The Sacred and The Secular

Permanent Settlement’, pt. 1, The Calcutta Historical Journal vol. 1V, no. 2 (Jan.-June 1980), pp. 13-15; Ratnalekha Ray, Change in Bengal Agrarian Society, p. 7. A. Abdullah (1980b), “Landlord and Rich Peasant under the Permanent Settlement’, paper presented at the seminar ‘Eastern Regions of India — Historical Problems and Sources at Calcutta’, 7-9 Feb. 1980, pp. 29-31; statement by Ilbert, op. cit, p. 42; Asok Sen, ‘Agrarian Structure and Tenancy Laws’, pp. 11-24. A. Abdullah (1980b), pp. 32-33. For a discussion emphasising the aspect of religious revival in the Faraizi movement, see Muin-ud-Din Ahmed Khan, History of the Faraidi Movements in Bengal : 1818-1906 (Karachi, 1965). For a discussion of the economic dimensions of the movement, see Shamsun Nahar, “The Agrarian Uprising of Titu Mir. 1883; The Economics of a Revivalist Movement’, The Journal of the Institute of Bangladesh Studies vol. 1 (1976). On the Sanyasi and Fakir raids see D. G. Pabna, 1978, pp. 40-41, 45-50; D. G. Rajshahi, p. 39. Partha Chatterjee, ‘Agrarian Structure in Pre-Partition Bengal’, Perspectives in Social Sciences 2: Three Studies on the Agrarian Structure in Bengal 1850-1947 (OUP, Calcutta, 1982), p. 156. A. Abdullah (1980c), ‘The Peasant Economy in Transition : The Rise of the Rich Peasant in Permanently Settled Bengal’, Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, vol. VIII, no. 4 (1980), p. 4; Abdullah (1980b), p. 55. Francis (Hamilton) Buchanan, ‘A Geographical, Statistical and Historicat Account of the District, or Zillah of Ronggopur’ (unpublished MS in IOL, London, 1815), p. 235; Abdullah (1980c), p. 55. Abdullah (1980c), pp. 54-58, 63. W. H. Nelson, Final Report of the Rajshahi Survey and Settlement Operations, 1922 (Calcutta, 1923), (henceforth abbreviated as SSR, RaJishahi), p. 2A. J.C. Jack, SSR, Bakerganj, 1900-1908 (Calcutta, 1915), pp. 83, 86-87. Stratification within the peasantry in Faridpur was not significant; the cultivators were more or less a homogeneous class. See also J. C. Jack, SSR, Faridpur, 1904-1914 (Calcutta, 1916). p. 81. Landlord-tenant struggle was not a critical feature of this district. The enquiries of the Grain Department of Bengal between 1794 and 1801 revealed the extent of rural indebtedness; see Binay Bhushan Chowdhury, ‘The Process of Depeasantization in Bengal and Bihar, 1885-1947", The Indian Historical Review, vol. Il, no. 1 (July 1975), pp. 107-08.

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal 9 111. Abdullah (1980b), pp. 85-86, 89; Govt. of India 1895, Selection of Papers on Indebtedness and Land Transfer (Calcutta, 1895), p. 36. 112. Letter from R. C. Dutt to Secretary, Govt. of Bengal, Revenue Deptt, on 11 Feb, 1896, Revenue Letter No. 124 R. Quoted by Abdullah (1980b), pp. 36-37, 89-90.

113, Abdullah (1980b), p. 90. 114, Abdullah (1980b), pp. 14, 16, 115. Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-1947 : The Land Question (Calcutta, 1984), p. 21. 116. Fazlur Rahman, Jamidari mahajarii. (Dacca, 1922). 117. W. H. Thompson, SSR, Noakhali, 1914-1919 (Calcutta, 1919); P. Chatterjee, The Land Question, p. 21. 118. L. R. Faweus, Final Report on the Khulna Settlement, 1920-1926 (Calcutta, 1927), p. 69. 119. P. Chatterjee, The Land Question, p. 27. 120, The eastern districts comprised Bogra, Patna, Dacca, Faridpur, Chittagong, Bakarganj, Tipperah and Noakhali, The western districts included Burdwan, Jessore, Rajshahi and Dinajpur. On differentiation among the peasantry in these districts see P. Chatterjee, ‘Agrarian Structure’, pp. 150-51 and The Land Question, pp. 31-35. 121. P. Chatterjee, The Land Question, pp. 40-42. 122, Ibid., pp. 31, 61. Also see P. Chatterjee, ‘Agrarian Structure’, pp. 150-51, 197, 199. 123, P. Chatterjee, The Land Question, p. 61. 124, Tipperah Guide, Comilla, 24 Jan, 1922; Herald, Dacca, 9 Feb 1922. 125. J. H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society : Twentieth Century

Bengal (Berkeley, 1969), p. 269. 126., Motions were raised by Tamizuddin Khan, Asimuddin Ahmad, Kasiruddin Ahmad and Fazlul Hug. See P. Chatterjee, The Land Question, pp. 81-87. 127. See S. M. Jaffar, Education in Muslim India — Being an Inquiry into the State of Education during the Muslim Period of Indian History, 1000-1800 (London, 1936), p. 149. 128. However, there is evidence in Ain-i-Akbari that during the reign of Akbar a great deal of interest was taken in education and in making learning easy. A range of subjects was taught including morals, arithmetic, geometry, physiognomy, household matters, rules of government, logic, medicine and tabii, riyazi and ilahi, sciences and history.

Sanskrit students were urged to learn Byakaran, Nayay, Vedant and Patanjali. Selections from Educational Records, 1781-1839, OP. 2150.379.02(1), p. 2.

100

The Sacred and The Secular

129. Ed. Joseph di Bona, One Teacher, One School — The Adam Reports on Indigenous Education in Nineteenth Century India (N. Delhi, 1983), pp. 30-31. Rent-free lands supporting education and scholars were resumed both in Bengal and Punjab generally under the pretext that these were not being used for their original purposes. But in fact, the colonial government misappropriated these funds for its own advantage. The Haji Mohammad Mohsin Funds were used to fund an English college in Hooghly, for example. In 1821, the property of the Trust was sold for Rs 6 lakhs and invested in govemment security. See also F. B. Bradley-Birt, Twelve Men of Bengal, pp. 42-54. 130. A. Basu, The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920 (Delhi, 1974), pp. 152-55. 131. J. Long (ed,), Adam's Report on Vernacular Education, 1835, p. 40. The system continued in various forms even in the 1950s. In Dacca, jagirs were offered to poor students from the mufassil by local residents, usually

on a cost-free basis, but services in kind were accepted in return. Similar provisions existed in Comilla and elsewhere. Abul Mansur Ahmed records attending a local pathsala founded by the local landlord. Wajed Ali Khan Panni set up similar institutions in Karotiya. Kharezi madrasahs exist to this dayin Bangladesh for the education of poor people. These are run by private individuals from their own resources, based on a polite understanding between teacher and pupils as in earlier days. 132. M.A. Rahim, Muslim Society and Politics in Bengal, ab 1757-1947 (Dacca, The City press, 1978), pp. 112-18. Also see J. Long, ibid., p.63. 133. In order to receive as much revenue from land as possible, the East India Company issued regulations for the ‘investigation and resumption of those holdings which did not possess unimpeachable title deeds properly registered by the collector’. It had to be proved that la-khiraj holdings were in possession for at least 12 years before British rule. Land less than 50 bighas was exempted from resumption. See Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 40-41. 134, A. R. Mallick, op. cit, pp. 157-61. 135. Mallick, ibid., p. 185. 136. ISC, Interim Report (Delhi, 1929), p. 11. 137. On Muslim attitudes to language see Mustafa Nurul Islam, Bengali Muslim Public Opinion as Reflected in the Bengali Press (Dacca, 1973), pp. 221-22; Ibne Majuddin Ahmed, Amar sangsar jiban (Calcutta, 1914); and also see A. R. Mallick’s Introduction, op. cit, p. 156. 138. Proceedings of the Twelfth Meeting of the Central Advisory Board of

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

101

Education in India, beld at Mysore on 24, 25 and 26 Jan, 1946; Bureau of Education, India, pamphlet no. 32, p. 62; (henceforth referred to as 12th Meeting, CABE, 1946). 139, RCM.Ed, 1914, p. 11; B. B. Misra, op. cit, pp. 186-87, 327. 140. On Hardinge’s proclamation see S. K. Saini, Development of Education in India : Socio-Economic and Political Perspectives (New Delhi, 1980), p. 39. On literacy figures see 1901 Census of India, vol. VI, pp. 297-303. 141. ‘The case of the Hooghly Endowment has also been discussed by Hunter, as well as in Report of the Moslem Education Advisory Committee (Calcutta, 1935), hereafter abbreviated to Report MAC. Emperor Shah Jahan’s endowment of an estate valued at Rs 8,000 was used to support a madrasah in Kasbah Bagha in Rajshahi. This too was taken

142. 143.

over. See also Joseph di Bona, op. cit., p. 31. Saini, op. cit., pp. 41-42. Religious fanatics were accused of preaching sedition ‘in every village of our most populous districts’. See W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, pp. 41-42, 62-63, 76, 106, 114.

Sultan Jahan Salik (ed.), Muslim Modernism in Bengal : Selected Writings of Delawarr Hosaen Ahmed Meerza, 1840-1913, vol. 1 (Dacca, 1979), p. 77. (henceforth referred to as Meerza, Selected Writings.) 145. P. Hardy, op. cit., p. 60. 146. Meerza, Selected Writings, p. 76. 147. A. Anwar, ‘Renaissance in Bengal : The Question of Identity and Certain Conceptual Reconsiderations’, in D. Kopf and S. Joarder (eds.), Reflections on the Bengal Renaissance (Dacca, 1977), pp. 164-66. _ 148. Meerza, Selected Writings, p. 77. He saw the distance between ashraf and the non-ashraf as being largely due to the lack of a common language of communication. Educated Muslims persisted in learning Persian and Urdu, refusing to learn Bengali, the language of a people ‘long subject to our rule’. See pp. 75-76. 149. Ibid. p. 78. 150. Tbid., pp. 76-78. A proof of the absence of prejudice against the Bengali language was his resentment of the fact that the Koran had not been translated into the vernacular. See also p. 65. 151. Among most members of the ashraf who opposed the Faraizis and supported western education for Muslims were both fundamentalists and modernists : for example, Nawab Abdul Latif, whose response to the westem impact was conservative, i.c., desirous of preserving the traditional and religious order; Sir Syed Ahmad may also be mentioned, for, though from northern India, he greatly influenced the 144,

102,

The Sacred and The Secular

Bengal ashraf such as the Pannis of Karotia; and Syed Amir Alli (1849-1928), whose response to western impact was reformist, ie., seeking to reinterpret and reform the old order in the light of contemporary knowledge and criticism. See articles by M. S. Qureshi, ‘Seizure of Consciousness and Position : Role of the Muslims in the Bengal Renaissance’; S. Joarder, “The Bengal Renaissance and the Bengali Muslims’; A. Anwar, ‘Renaissance in Bengal : The Question of Identity and Certain Conceptual Consideration’, all in Kopf and Joarder (eds.), op. cit. Also see Meerza, Selected Writings, pp. 77-78. For Sir Syed’s reformist views, see Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern

. Muslim India, (Lahore, 1950), p. 55; A. Aziz and G. E. van Griinebaum

(eds.), Muslim Self-statement in India and Pakistan, 1857-1968 (Wiesbaden, 1970), p. 4. 152. By 1869, the earliest expression of nationalism had already begun. At this time, Chandranath Bose and later in 1873, Bholanath Chandra, both called for protective tariffs to encourage the development of indigenous factories and industries. See Blair B. Kling, The Blue Mutiny : The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 1859-1862 (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 27. 153. Warren Gunderson, “The Self-Image and World View of the Bengali Intelligentsia as foynd in the Writings of the Mid-ninteenth Century, 1830-1870" in E.C. Dimock (ed.), Bengal Literature and History (East Lansing, Michigan, 1967). 154, Letter No. 93 of Letters to the President of the Board of Control, Jan to Dec, 1857. Letter from Canning, Canning Papers. 155. Mayo’s note of 26 June 1871, P. Hardy, op. cit., p. 90. 156. Resolution 7-215-25 dated 15 July 1885 of the Home Department of the Government of India. 157. RCMEd, 1914, p. iii, 158. ‘A common pattern in the methods employed by the British to impose their will on the Muslims was to go ahead and implement their policies with insufficient prior consultation but with the conviction that ‘they’ would soon ‘see the advantages’ to their community of these actions. ‘This was precisely how the 1905 partition, and the Communal Award of 1932, were put into effect. Sure enough they got considerable support for these acts post facto. In the context of the partition of Bengal, see letter from Maulvi Syed Erfan Ali, Birbhum Anjaman i-Islamiya, to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 7 Aug, 1905. See Shan Muhammad, The Indian Muslims : A Documentary Record, vol. 1 (Meerut, 1983); p. 97. 159. ‘Two formulae were adopted by the Council : one, that recruitment for direct appointment in the higher public services from among qualified

The Emergence ofa Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

103

members of the two important communities should be made on the basis of, though not necessarily in accordance with, their respective

populations; and two, that promotion from one service to another higher service or from one appointment to a higher appointment should be regulated by the record of work or seniority, Report MAC, pp. 126-27,

130-31. 160. ‘The ministerial appointments include all offices other than that of the

Director of Public Instruction, ibid., p.130.

161. In 1871, Muslims formed 48 per cent of the total population of Bengal, but held only 4.35 per cent of superior government jobs, while Hindus held 32.25 per cent of them. In 1886, Muslims formed just under 50 per

cent of the total population and held 8.5 per cent of the posts in the executive and judicial services, while Hindus held 83.78 per cent. In 1940, Muslims held 893 (37.9 per cent) of judicial, executive and police posts, while Hindus held 1,419 (59.14 per cent) out of a total of 2,399

in the whole of Bengal; B. Ghose, Banglar bidwatsamaj, p.253; Report of the

Public

Service

Commission,

1886-87

(Calcutta,

1888), p.38.

Bengal Muslims held 12.9 per cent of executive and 3.1 per cent of the judicial positions in the uncovenanted civil service. The 1940 figures

were calculated from Appendix B, Table D of Hosainur Rahman's HinduMuslim Relations in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Bombay, 1974), pp. 182-86.

162. In 1871, there were 52 (4 per cent) Muslim boys in Arts Colleges and

1,235 (96 per cent) Hindus out of a total of 1,287. In 1939-40, there

were 31,534 boys in men’s colleges of whom, 24,694 (78.3 per cent) were Hindus and 6,205 (19.57 per cent) were Muslims. See Report MAC, p. 10; Report on Public Instruction in Bengal, 1939-40 (Calcutta, 1942),

163.

Pp.7-18, (henceforth cited as Report, PIB, 1939-40.)

Tarak Sen, an outstanding scholar with a first class all through

his education lost a job to Wadud, who ‘though bright’ had obtaineda second class MA. This was in the 1930s when Khwaja Nazimuddin was

the Education Minister. His defence was, ‘there is no difference between

first and second class. Besides, Muslim boys do not receive much help from their Hindu teachers outside the class room.’ This statement is an oblique reference to the formal and institutional links between Hindus

and Muslims, Interview with Prof. Mahmood,’ retired Professor of

Presidency College, Calcutta, Feb., 1985.

164. ‘Montagu Papers, Centre for South Asian Studies, Cambridge. 165. Mukherjee Papers, Centre for South Asian Studies, Cambridge. 166. Pandey argues that communalism is a colonial construct. But it was per-

ceived as

a pathological condition defining Indian society to be

essentially irrational and full of religious bigotry, a condition which was

104

The Sacred and The Secular

grave and endemic. See Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Com-

munalism in Colonial North India (Delhi : OUP, 1990) pp. 7-10. Francis

Robinson argues that the religious differences between Hindus and Muslims were so great that they were predisposed towards separation. See Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims, 1860-1923 (Delhi : Vikas, 1975) p. 13. This

view is contradicted by Paul Brass who holds that separatism was not

pre-ordained; it resulted from the manipulation of selected symbols of identity by elite groups in competition with each other. See Paul R. Brass,

Language, Religion and Politics in North India (London : CUP, 1974) ch. 3. 167. Report PIB 1937-38 (1939), derived from pp. 14, 16-17.

168. Other causes relate to inadequate accommodation, lengthy courses and strict admission tests, Report MAC (1935),

pp. 64-65. Moreover, the

Imperial Government was keen to withhold high technology from Indians and dominate the highly-skilled professions. See A. Basu, The Growth

of Education, pp. 6-10, 60-100, 102-04. 169. In Report PIB, 1937-38, the total number of law students and the annual expenditure of two of the Calcutta based institutions, University Law

College ahd Ripon Law College is given, but not those for thé

law department of Dacca University; see pp. 16, 17-18. Compare with Table 1.5 in the text on average cost of educating a student at a Government College for men in 1937-38.

170. K. Zachariah, Seventh Quinquennial Review (Calcutta, 1928), p. 72 (here-

after abbreviated to Q.R.); M. Mitra and K. Zachariah, Eighth Q. R., 1927-32 (1933), p. 79. 171. A. K. Chanda, Ninth Q. R., 1932-37 (1939), pp. 107, 112. 172. R.C.M.Ed., 1914, p. i. The Indian Statutory Commission (ISC) had also noted that Muslims held their own in secondary education. But at the

same time, there were only 19.3 per cent Muslims in the middle stage

and 15.5 per cent in the higher stage, while they formed 55 per cent of the population of the Bengal Presidency. Even at the primary stage the progress was more apparent than real for many pupils never passed be-

yond the lowest class and 39 per cent of children relapsed into illiteracy within five years of leaving school. See ISC, vol. VIII, Bengal, p.

vol. Ill, Report of the Committee, p. 185.

173. Reverend

Long

believed

that Muslims

had

less aptitude

for learn-

ing English than Hindus. See Transactions of the Bengal Social Science Association, I & II (1968), p. 62. Cited by R. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 134. A. R. Mallick’s study of Calcutta Madrasah up to 1856 shows that Muslims were more than willing to learn English, but adequate

The Emergence ofa Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal

105

provision was not made. English was not integrated into the compulsory

syllabus, but left as an optional subject and taught by a poorlypaid and poorly-qualified teacher; see A. R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims

in

Bengal,

1757-1856

(Dacca, 1961), pp. 189-93.

174. W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, p. 177. 175. Bengal Q.R., 1912-17, p. 72; also Seventh Q.R., 1922-23 —

1926-27, p. 72 and Eighth Q. R. 1927-32, p. 79. This view is shared in the ISC, Interim Report (1929), p. 209.

176. ISC, vol. HH, p. 185.

17.

RCM.Ed,

1914,

p.3;

ISC,

voll;

ISC, Interim Report

1929): ISC, vol. Ill. p. 185; ISC, vol. VIII on Bengal, p. 51.

(Delhi,

178. 179. Report on the Progress of Education in Eastern Bengal and Assam,

1901-02 — 1906-07, vol. 1 (Shillong, 1908), pp. 93-94.

180. ‘See Abdul Kasim, Banglar pratibha (Calcutta, 1940) for the contribution

of Bengal Muslims to general education even when first generation affluent. For example, when pathsala educated Munshi Meherullsh

Tose to prosperity, he founded the Mohanpur Minor School in Jessore Zilla (A. Kasim, pp. 34-48). Haji Mohammad

Laek Chowdhury estab-

lished the Jubilee School in Calcutta on 22 June, 1878 when his fortunes improved (ibid., pp. 56-57). Wajed~ Ali Khan Panni (1860-

1936) established a high school, a high madrasah as well as Sahadat

College in 1926 with a waaf of his zamindari (ibid., pp. 30-32).

181. R.C.M.Ed. 1914, p. 1; D. G. Dacca, 1912, p. 161; Anisuzzaman, op. cit., 182.

p. 86. R. Ahmed,

op. cit, p. 139; the comment of the Director of

Public Instruction in the General Report on Public Instruction

1871-72, p. 25; Census of India, 1901, vol. VI, pt. A : I, subsidiary

Table V, pp. 309-10; Ninth Q.R.,

183. Report, MAC, p. 16. 184, For the views of the

1932-37, p. 107.

Indian Education Commission, see Report, MAC,

pp., 11-12, See letter of H. Sharp, Joint Secy., Govt. of India, Deptt. of

Education, to the Sec. of the Govt. of Bengal, Gen. (education) Deptt. letter of 3 April 1913, no. 585-95 in R.C.M.Ed., 1914, pp. ii-iv; ISC, vol. III, Report of the Committee, pp. 185-87; ISC, Interim Report, p. 193. For Muslim preferences see R:C.M.Ed., 1914, vi-vii; ISC, Interim

185.

Report, pp. 185, 203.

For British policy regarding religious instruction between 1854-1946

see 12th Meeting, CABE (1946), pp. 62-64. 186. ‘See Sharp's letter of3 April 1913 reproduced in R.C.M.Ed. 1914, p. iii. 187.

See 12th Meeting, CABE (1946), pp. 62-63.

106,

The Sacred and The Secular

188, Sharp notes that in certain parts of the country, the great majority of

secondary schools were managed by Hindu bodies and that among the

100 members of the Calcutta Senate only 6 were Muslims (R.CM.Ed., 1914, p. iii). The Reports of the Committees ISC (1930)

attributed the small percentage of Muslims in higher education to the

scarcity of Muslim staff, managers and teachers. At the time of preparing

the report, Muslims constituted only one per cent of the total strength of the teaching staff and formed nine per cent of the governing bodies of

the colleges. Seeibid., p. 185. 189. ISC, Interim Report, pp. 193, 203.

190. ‘Summary of Recommendations of the First Meeting of the Religious Education Committee of CABE,

p. 61.

1944’; 12th Meeting CABE (1946),

191. R.C.M.Ed,, 1914, p. i , Resolution XV of the committee in p. vi. 192. Ibid., Resolution XIII, pp. iii i.

193. Ibid., Letter of Sharp, p. see also Report, MAC. 194,

i , resolutions, especially Resolution XIII,

Stated in the Govt. resolution of 1904. See 12th Meeting CABE (1946),

p. 63. 195. Segregated institutions may be distinguished from ‘separate’ ones where the courses were the same as in ordinary schools and included the teach-

ing of Islamic religion and culture. It was the latter type which proliferated in Bengal; see ISC, Interim Report, p. 194.

196. Old Type Madrasahs were orthodox institutions outside the general line of education and not integrated with the university system. 197. Report, MAC, pp. 74-76.

198. The Calcutta Madrasah was left out of the Reformed Madrasah Scheme which was introduced in 1915 ‘to teach the orthodox course without

English or with English as an optional subject’; ibid., pp. 74-75, 79. 199. Abul Husssain (MA, BL) wrote a proposal for the improvement of the Reformed (New) Scheme Madrasah; Abul Hussain, Bangali musalmaner siksha samasya (Calcutta, 1928), pp. 26, 29.

200. Dufferin to George Allen (ed.), The Pioneer (1 Jan., 1887); cited by

P. Hardy, op. cit, pp. 134-35. 201. R. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 143; R.C.M.Ed., 1914, pp. 202.

i -v.

A main activity of schools is ‘to teach particular status cultures both in and outside the classroom’. C. Collins and J. Halsey (eds.), Power and

Ideology in Education, p. 31. 203. Second Report of the House of Lords (1852-53) on Indian Territories, speech by Clark Marshman, cited by Anisuzzaman, op. cit., p. 23; Rokeya

The Emergence of a Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal

107

R. Kabeer, Administrative Policy of the Government of Bengal,

1870-1890 (Dacca, NIPA, 1965), p. 12. T. B. Macaulay, “The Necessity of English Education’, 2 Feb. 1835,

in C. E. Dobbin, Basic Documents in the Development of India and Pakistan, 1835-1947 (London, 1970), p. 18. William Howard Russell,

My

Diary

in

the

Years

1858-59, vol. I

(London, 1860), pp. 73-74, cited by P. Hardy, op. cit, p. 70.

‘This is reflected in the failure to raise the level of English in madrasahs and in the decision not to integrate Calcutta Madrasah into the university

system, see Report, MAC, pp. 74-75, 76, 79.

Ninth Q.R., 1932-37, p. 111.

Tbid., pp. 83-84, 110.

ISC, Interim Report, pp. 194-95. Report MAC, p. 82.

210. 2u1. ISC Interim Report, pp. 195, 200. 212. QR, 1942-47 (W. Bengal, 1951), p. 83. 213. Bengal Services (communal ratio) Recruitment Rules of 1940,

contained McSharpe’s formula of representation in Bengal services by

which 50 per cent of recruits were to be Muslims, 30 per cent

scheduled castes and 20 per cent general (i.e. caste Hindus, Jains,

Buddhists, Anglo-Indians);

see Bijay Behari Mukharji’s article in

Moder Review, Nov. 1946, p. 371. 214. QR., 1942-47, p. 83. 215. ‘The Muslim Hall was the only hall of residence for Muslim students.

Jagannath Hall was for Hindu students, Although Dacca Hall was cos-

mopolitan, it mainly accommodated Hindus and a few Christians. In-

terview with Prof. Mahmood, who went to Dacca University and

resided in the Muslim Hall from

1928-30.

216. Interview with Prof. Mahmood, Feb. 1985. 217. P. Hardy, op. cit., p. 151. 218. Broomfield details the administrative reasons for partitioning Bengal in J. Broomfield, Mostly about West Bengal, Essays in Modern South

Asian History (New Delhi, Manohar, 1982), pp. 26-40.

219. R.C.M.Ed., 1914, p. 1. 21.

E. A. Gait, 1911 Census of India, vol. I. pt. I, Report, p. 429. Toid.

Tbid,, p. 2.

Yamadatta, ‘Islam in Danger’, Modern Review 70 (Calcutta, 1941),

pp. 491-92,

Data from the different censuses has not been integrated in a single table

because the categories used vary.

BB

The Sacred and The Secular

R

Hossainur Rahman, Hindu-Muslim Relations in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Bombay, 1974), p. 174. In 1940, Muslims held 37.2 per cent of the political, executive and police posts and Hindus 59.1 per cent; ibid., pp. 182-86, 191-92. . ISC, vol. II, p. 186.

229.

Ninth Q.R., Table 86, p. 115.

H. Rahman, op. cit, pp. 193-94. ISC, vol. Il, p. 186.

231. For the contribution of the Muslim ministry for the betterment of

backward classes, see Two Years of Provincial Autonomy (Calcutta, 1939), p. 81 and Third Year of Provincial Autonomy (Calcutta, 1941), pp. 20-21.

232, E. Rahim, Provincial Autonomy in Bengal 1937-1942 (Dacca, 1981),

pp. 30-31.

R.R.O.B., 1932-37, pp. 3, 289-90, ISC, vol. Il, p. 131.

BERS

ISC, vol. Ill, Reports of the Committee, p. 186.

ISC, vol. VIII, Bengal, pp. 109-10.

See memorandum of Alhaj Sir Abdul Karim Ghuznavi to Hartog

Committee on Bengal Muslim entitlement to ‘Reparations’. He demanded Rs 10 crore for Muslim education on grounds of ‘fairplay and justice being long overdue to the Muslims of Bengal’. He quotes Hunter’s

237.

study of the causes of Bengal Muslim

backwardness

for

which the state was entirely responsible; see JSC, vol. III, Reports of Committees, pp. 183-84,

See Chapter 3.

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

109

Appendix 1 A

MUSLIM SOCIAL DIVISIONS : TRADITIONAL GROUPINGS ‘Ashraf ‘Atrap ‘Arzul, Groups ‘Syeds, Pathans, jolahas, dhunias, ules — Mughals, Sheikhs Origin Descended from Prophet converts from upperlow-class Muhammad; eame from caste hindus Hindu converts ‘Afghanistan, Central Asia etc. Customs Same as among Local indigenous customs N. Indian, Central Asian, ‘Arab and Persian Muslims

oil-pressers, poters,

tailors, barbers, cotton-carders

butchers,

scavengers, gypsies

Appendix 1. B ‘MUSLIM SOCIAL

Ashraf : Upper ashraf Lesser ashraf or Rural ashraf Non-ashraf :

DIVISIONS : R. AHMED’S CATEGORIES

Mughal ashraf — exclusive, e.g. Amir Ali Mufussil gentry — some local contact, €.g., Panis of Karotiya Khondkars, e.g., Faziul Huq Mullahs Rural Syeds Cultivating sheikchs — rural sheikhs

Occupational groups — jolahas, dhopas, etc.

110

The Sacred and The Secular Appendix

1. C

THE RATIO OF HINDUS TO MUSLIMS IN: VARIOUS GRADES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, 1869-71

Grade of Employment Highest grade Second grade ‘Third grade (Hindus and Englishmen to Muslims) Lower ranks (Hindus and others to Muslims)

1869 2:1

1871 3:0 10:1 82:1 156: 1

‘Source : W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, p. 160. Appendix

1.D

VAKILS OR PLEADERS ATTACHED TO THE COURT OF SUDDER DEWANNY ADAWLAT, 1813-33

Name

Date of Place Appointment T. Dadar Buksh Khan 28.10.1813 Colingah, Calcutta 2. Moonshie Hossein Ally 23.11.1814 Sealdah, Zilla 24-Perganas 3. Moonshie Haider Ally 28.12.1815 Taultaullah, Calcutta 4. M, Faker Mohamed ——‘18.1.1816 Colingah, Calcutta 5. Lalla Doomun Singh ——24.1.1816 Chorebaugun, Calcutta 23.9.1820 Colingah, Calcutta 6. . M, Ullec Oollah 7. . M, Gholam Butoo! 76.1822 Bhowanipore, Calcutta, 24-Perganas 8 Cassinath Pundit 202.1823 Shickdorepara, Calcutta 9. Moulvi Kurroum Hossain 5.11.1824 Maullaugah, Calcutta 10, Sudda Shookh Pundit 6.12.1824_Shickdorepara, Calcutta 11, M. Mahomed Ally Khan 11.12.1827 Mebdeebaugun, Calcutta 12, Joogul Kishore Sookul _1.8.1828_ Bhowanipore, 24-Perganas 13, Lalla Busee Lal 78.1828 Taultaullah, Calcutta 14, M, Abbas Ally 26.1.1829 Mehdeebaugun, Calcutta 15. M. Mahomed Haneef -—18,6,1829Sealdah, 24-Perganas 16. Syed Oobedoollah 18.12.1829 Colingah, Calcutta 17. M. Boo Ally 18.12.1829 Sealdah, Calcuta 18, M. Gholam Ahmad Khan 18.12.1829 Colingah, Calcutta 19, M. Daumzaman 35.1831 Colingah, Calcutta 20. NBE. Brille 23.1832 Chowringhee, Calcutta 21. Charles. Freach 135.1832 Baliaghat, Sealdah, Calcutta 22, Husseem Ooddeen 303.1833 _Allypore, near Calcutta Source : Bengal Selection No. 22, Bengal Catalogue No. 10002, Rack 13, No. 32, IOL, Bengal Almanac. Collection of Prof. Abdur Razzak, National Professor of Bangladesh.

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112

The Sacred and the Secular

Appendix

1. F

MUSLIM PUPILS IN EACH STAGE OF DIFFERENT

TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS IN BENGAL, 1870 TO 1940 (as per cent of total number of pupils) Year

Primary

Stage

1870-71 1876-77 1881-82

145 Boe 167

Middle

Stage =

‘High

Colleges

Colleges

= —87

40 43 38

= 130 156

Total Pupils 144 18.0 238

81633

56

36

28.4

25.0147

18

= — 13.7

208

13.6

1901-02

19.4

Wd

120

4it

25.1

148

S14

193

15.5

1911 ()

1913-14 **

1916-17 ** 1921-20 **

1926-27

1932-33, 1933-34 1936-37 1937-38 1938-39 1939-40

04

426 42 902

_—_% of Muslim

Stage

1886-87

1896-97

ArtsProfessional

U6 08

4S 7 550-246 49 3 557-2560 53300 6 $53 287

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199 170

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* Figures for boys only; percentages of girls in middle and high stages are very low. ** Figures for 1913-14 —1921-22 relate to the Presidency of Bengal as constitutedin 1912.

‘Sources : Compiled from R.C.M.Ed., 1914, p. 2; ISC, Interim Report (1929), pp. 187-90; Report, PIB, 1939-40, pp. 27-29; Report of the Moslem Education Advisory Committee, 1935, p. 10, 15, 20, 26-29; Report, PIB, 1937-38 (1939), p. 28; Report, PIB, 1933-34 (1935), p. 27; 11th Q.R. on Public Educationin India (1940), p. 242; P. Hardy, op. cit. p. 120

The Emergence of a Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal Appendix 1.

113

G

MUSLIM PUPILS ATTENDING ORDINARY SECONDARY SCHOOLS

‘Year 1881-82 1886-87 1896.97 1901-02 1913-14 1916-17 1921-20 1926-27 1931-32

1936-37 **

AND MADRASAHS IN BENGAL, 1881-82 TO 1939-40 * (as per cent of total number of pupils) ‘Secondary Schools Madrasahs No. % No. 16,598 633 1,088 22,266 6.06 1,480 31,220 654 2,981 35,817 74 3,887 31,533 417 13,545 44,789 5.19 20,115 31,685 3.60 24,726 34,484 3.02 55,810 54,166 376 67,685

1937-38 ** 1938.39 ** 1939-40 ** *

T2642

78,491 82,664 97418

438

441 451 499

72,164

80,114 89,632 97,613

% Oat 0.40 0.62 083 179 233 2.80 439 470 439

450 489 5.00

Boys only

Appendix L H PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIM AND HINDU BOYS IN DIFFERENT CLASSES

1926-27 Muslims Hindus Class Tnfant 417 372 445 542 I 0 616 373 rut 610 312 Vv 16.1 21 v 18 203 17.7 803 vi 155 825 va 142 42 vill 156 82.9 x 818 x 46.3 525 TOTAL Source : Report, MAC (Calcutta, 1935), p. 53

1931-32 Hindus 388 48.1 51.0 58.5 48 ng BS 166 78.7 80.2 .

Muslims 00 506 417 398 334 26.2 m2 24 197 18.2 168 499

The Sacred and The Secular 14

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The Emergence ofa Muslim intelligentsia in Bengal

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116

The Sacred and the Secular

Appendix 1. K HINDUS AND MUSLIMS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1911

‘Agriculture and pasture Industry Trade and transport Public achainistat Professions & liberal arts

Hindus 13,557,038 2,371,008 2,337,983

‘Muslims 20,856,662 1,040,685 867,352

912,549

21312

Source : R.C.M.Ed., 1914, p. 1

Appendix 1. L HINDUS AND MUSLIMS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1921

‘TOTAL POPULATION Ordinary cultivators Field labourers Other forms of production of raw materials, minerals etc. Trade, industry, transport etc. Public administration and liberal arts Domestic servants, persons living on their incomes etc. Inmates of jails

Beggars and vagrants

Procurers and prostitutes

Hindus 20,809;148 10,179,505 1,924,881

Muslims (25,486,124 19,721,851 2,210,050

1,806,345 4,782,624 849,553

620,426 1,882,879 222,108

1,044,529 5,652

600,596 8,082

31,214

11,936

184,865

Source : 1921 Census of Bengal, vol. V, pt. Ul, table XX, pp. 362-68.

208,196

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

117

Appendix 1.M VARIOUS METHODS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 1937-38 — 1938-39

1937-38 1938-39) Through By Selection] Through By Selection Competitive Competitive Exam. Exam. No. % No. %|_No. = % No ® Caste Hindus 85 5862 12 3750| 68 S112 19 Sz78 Scheduled Castes 42.75 1 343} 5375 1 278 Muslims 55 3793 16 50.00] 59 44.36 «= 12.33.33, Minority comm. 1 068 863 937) 1 O75 4st TOTAL 145 32 3 36 Source : H. Rahman, op. cit., pp. 174, 175-79

Appendix 1. N THE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS BY COMMUNITIES IN THE SECRETARIAT AND AS HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, 1940

industries etc.

aI Bl wane

Under Secretaries Assistant Secretaries Special Officers Senior Ranks TOTAL Heads of Depts, ic. forest, registration,

Daw |

Deputy Secretaries

Muslims Others 1

8

4

15

a!

Joint Secretaries

Hindus 2

Ruvnel

‘Secretariat (including BLC & BLA depts.) ‘Secretaries

BLC = Bengal Legislative Council; BLA = Bengal Legislative Assembly Source : H. Rahman, op. cit, table C, pp. 180-81.

118

The Sacred and the Secular

Appendix

1. 0

MUSLIMS IN THE TEACHING STAFF OF COLLEGES* IN BENGAL, 1917 Teachers of Oriental subjects (Sanskrit, Bengali, Pali, Persian,

Arabic)

Teachers of other subjects

TOTAL

Total

Hindu

Muslim

European

Muslim to Total (%)

170

137

33

-

19.41

1,065

912

”

116

347

1,235

1,049

7

16

5.66

Source : Calcutta University Commission 1917-79, Report, vol. I, pt. lp. 164.

Appendix

1.P

HINDU AND MUSLIM TEACHERS IN VARIOUS TYPES OF SCHOOLS 1926-27 AND 1931-32 (and per cent) Primary* ‘Secondary Middle School High School 1926-27 “Total_Hindus Muslims| Total Hindus Muslims| Total Hindus Muslims Govt& Board 7,108 440 553] 370 59.7 400) 704 67.7 302 Aided 40,771 47.3 $1.4] 6740 71.7 253] 5,963 814 165 Unsided 4,943 43.5 53.4] 2.244 757 243] 5858 87.1 LS TOTAL 52822 465 $21] 9,354 721 256}12525 933 149 1931-32

Govt.&

Bord 8,708 44,2 S62] 365 Aided 48,723 455 533] 7472 Unsided 5,070 420 520] 2801 TOTAL 62,501 450 $3.9] 10,638 * Primary School only within the Presidency Source : Report MAC, (1935), pp. 45, 56

548 449] 724 716 268] 6440 726 269] 6428 71.3275) 13,592 of Bengal

656 320 804 176 884 111 834153

The Emergence of a Muslim Intelligentsia in Bengal

119

Appendix 1.Q APPOINTMENTS IN NON-MINISTERIAL EDUCATION SERVICES (ON 1st JANUARY, 1934)

Educational Services Principalships of institutions * Professorships etc. of colleges * ‘Headmasterships of high and normal schools * LLecturerships etc. in subordinate educational service* Other positions in subordinate educational service : a) Teaching b) Inspecting ©) Miscellaneous Divisional, district and second inspectorship

Toul Appointments 12 109 1 ager 88 #00 1s 314 4

39 seee

Appointments of Muslims = 4 8 6 403 152 3 6

* Other than communal institutions ** Includes Superintendent of Reformatory and Industrial Schools of Alipore ‘* Includes Ahsanullah School of Engineering and temporary posts (8 in total) ‘s*e Bxclodes Inspector for Chittagong Hill Tracts Source : Report MAC (1935), p. 128

CHAPTER

2

SOCIETY AND CULTURE : RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNAL

QUESTIONS Introduction

‘The Bengal Muslim intelligentsia was constantly torn by the opposing

pulls of religious and secular concerns in every aspect of their lives — social, cultural and political. This tension manifested itself in pre-

and post- partition periods and was influenced by religious and secular

movements, western ideas and values, local customs, as well as the

history and tradition of Islam itself. Many of the post-1947 tendencies in religious-secular tension had their antecedents in earlier phenomena.

This chapter explores these phenomena, particluarly in matters pertaining to the social and cultural life of the intelligentsia and the articulation

of their identity.

In many respects the Muslim experience was not entirely unique.

The cultural and intellectual world of nineteenth-century Bengal was at least in part, suffused with religiosity. Religion was an important

element in determining the Bengali

world-view and definition of

identity. For example, the need for religious reform provided the motive for the emergence of the Brahmo Samaj in the nineteenth

century. The ‘terrorist’ movement of the twentieth century received inspiration

through

the

Bhakti

cults

and

from

invocations

to

the goddess Kali.' The religious nature of the inspiration behind the ‘terrorist’ movement has not been duly acknowledged by nationalist

Hindu historians until recently who preferred to interpret it as a

purely secular movement. Muslims too were moved by emotions

similar to these. The Khilafat movement in the 1920s was founded

Society and Culture

121

among other considerations, on religious nostalgia. The decision to accept western education required a discussion about its acceptability

in Islam.” The fact that political mobilization was facilitated by religious symbols — Gandhi’s Ramrajya and Jinnah’s_ Pakistan — is not surprising in this context.’ What is surprising, however, is the

accompanying communal conflict, particularly with regard.to the de-

velopment of the Pakistan idea. Thé question which naturally arises

is whether such a conflict would have emerged if secular symbols

acceptable to all communities could have been offered. This leads to related questions, such as, whether ‘Pakistan’ was a religious or

secular symbol; whether the Pakistan resolution was a religious or secular decision; whether such a demand was an inevitable outcome

of the emergence and development of the Bengal Muslim intelli-

gentsia; whether communalism was somehow religious or religiosity was inevitably communal; whether the road to ‘Pakistan’ was inevitable or were there alternative resolutions possible and were these

Possibilities based on religious or secular considerations.

Between 1937 and 1947, the separate identity of most Bengal

Muslims took shape in the idea of Pakistan and in its implementa-

tion. It was, however, preceded and accompanied by tensions in their

cultural and social life and in the definition of their identity. These

are reflected in the various socio-economic, religious and political movements of the times.

Muslim thought in twentieth century Bengal was influenced in the main by Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school, sufism, Wahabi ideas, west-

ern rationalism and by local customs and beliefs. In response to colonial

tule and the threat of Hindu domination, both political and cultural, its stance gradually moved from a tolerant syncretic to an aggressively

exchisive one. As a nation in the making Muslims were still groping

towards a linguistic and cultural identity. Bengali was just being recognized as an appropriate medium of self-expression, but many levels of conflict, both inter-communal and intra-communal, marked Muslim

thought and influenced their attitudes. These were reflected not only

in social, religious and humanist movements

which characterized

Bengal since the nineteenth century, but also in the literary and cultural concerns of many Muslims. This chapter will attempt to portray these conflicts and concerns and show how religious communalism gathered momentum, although a flicker of secular rationalism continued to glow.

122

The Sacred and The Secular

2.1 Society and Retigion : Religious Movements in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Bengal

While religion has played’ .a large part in Bengali Muslim life, the specific context of its impact has varied from time to time. Their concems have also covered a wide spectrum and contributed to the tension between religious and secular perceptions of events in a variety of ways. In the nineteenth century, economic emancipation movements

in rural Bengal also incorporated religious purification programmes.

‘The followers of Haji Shariatullah (1781-1841), inspired by the egali-

tarian principles of Islam, resisted the illegal levy of cesses by landlords. This agitation, known as the Faraizi Movement, aimed at certain fundamental socio-economic and ethical changes but very much within

a religious framework. Even secular programmes, like non-payment of

rent or resistance to exploitation by zamindars, were projected

as religious duties. It also had overtly fundamentalist prescriptions against certain common practices supposedly against the shariat — prohibition against decoration of tombs, raising of mausoleums over graves, preparation of tazias, offering fatiha for the dead,

marriage ceremonies which required loans from moneylenders, pros-

tration before pirs, etc.’ Some ofthese injunctions were revived in the

Tabligh-i Jamaat movement, more precisely known as the Faith

Movement, which also aimed at purifying Islamic practices. The move-

ment was started by Maulana Ilyas in Mawat in 1927. It found fertile

ground later in East Bengal after the partition. It has a rural as well as an urban following

The Faith Movement was deeply influenced by sufi thought. Ilyas

selectively combined elements of the thought the practices of the four

sufi orders

known

as the Chishtiya,

Qadiriya,

Suhrawardiya

and

Nagshbandiya.® Of these, he was most influenced by the simple aus-

terity of the Chishtiya vow and the sensitivity of the Naqshbandiya approach. In dress and lifestyle he adopted the Chishtiya pattern of simplicity; in matters of conformity to the shariah he was almost as strict as the Nagshbandiya. Like the Chishtiya, he believed that religion

could be separated from politics; and like the Nagshbandiya, he believed that recitations in praise of God should be inaudible; he did not expect women to put away their veils in the presence of their spiritual guide or take part in his work. Unlike the Nagshbandiya and

Society and Culture

123

Suhrawardiya, his main concern was not proselytization, but to make ‘Muslims better. He did not show any hatred towards other religions as did the Nagshbandiya. The movement appears to have adopted some of the more severe practices of the four orders. For example, he not

only rejected music and singing but also the recitation of poetry in

praise of God. Such an attitude may be seen as a denial of celebration

and joy.”

In the field of jurisprudence, Maulana Ilyas was a Hanafi but in

some cases he considered Shafii law more appropriate. It is worth noting that both schools acknowledge the same sources of Muslim law, i.e. the Koran, the sunnah (the actions of the Prophet which are incorporated in the recognized traditions), ijma (consensus of the scholars)

and kiyas (method of reasoning by analogy). However, the Shafii school considered ijma and giyas to be subservient to the Koran and sunnah.

The Hanafi school, on the other hand, was more liberal in allowing scholars to exercise their personal preference or opinion in cases where

‘strict adherence to analogical reasoning would lead to undesirable re-

sults. Although such an approach could cause confusion it reflected

Ilyas’ attempt to bring about unity between the various schools of Muslim law in the same way that he attempted to accommodate the various sufi orders. It is thus a spirit of accommodation that charac-

terizes the Faith Movement.

In Bengal the Faith Movement was influenced both by Wahabi and Waliullahi thought. The former originated in an eighteenth century movement in Arabia under the leadership of Ibn Abdul Wahab of Nejd

and spread to Bengal in the nineteenth century through the efforts of

Saiyad Ahmad Shah of Rai Bareilly and Saiyad Shahid Berelvi. The Walliullahi movement which originated in North India was also influ-

enced by the Wahabi movement. It rejected the glosses of the Imams

and denied the authority of the Sultan; made comparatively light of the

authority of Prophet Muhammad in relation to the Koran; forbade the

offering of prayer to a prophet or a saint and insisted on waging war

against all infidels." The influence of Deobandi thought, which also owed an intellectual debt to Waliullah, is clearly noticeable in the pre-

scriptions of the Faith Movement, such as those against false sufism,

certain Shia practices and some popular customs.” The great doctrinal

divide between Muslim sects in East Bengal has been identified by

L.S.S. 0’ Malley as that separating Sunnis from Wahabis.

The

124

The Sacred and The Secular

distinction made is inaccurate and somewhat strange given the fact that ‘Wahabis were Sunnis as well. But unlike the majority of the Muslims of East Bengal who were Sunnis of the Hanafi sect, Wahabis were Sunnis of the Hanbali sect. While all Sunnis accept the authority of all the successors of Muhammad, Hanafis believe in the free interpretation

of traditions in the light of analogical reasoning exercising personal

‘preference’ or istihsan where the strict application of analogy leads to undesirable results. Hanbalis admit istihsan as a controversial principle

of Islamic law and cautiously accept the principle of analogical rea-

soning which is given a lesser place compared to the other sources of Islamic law i.e. the Koran and sunnah of the Prophet as incorporated in the recognized traditions. Though Ibn Hanbal, its founder, had re-

luctantly accepted the principle of ijma or consensus of scholars as a source of Islamic law, later Hanbalis, particularly the Wahabis influ-

enced by his disciple, Ibn Taymiyya, rejected this principle. Hanafis, however, continue to believe in ijma.’”

Educated Muslims generally belonged to the Hanafi sect. Among

the lesser educated and the uneducated many subscribed to the new social

and

puritanical

movements.

O’Malley

wrote

in 1916

: ‘The

educated Muhammadans of Rajshahi are Hanafis, while the uneducated masses mostly belong to the modern puritanical sects called variously, Wahabi, la-mazhabi, Rafiyadain, etc.’'' Although sectarian conflict did not culminate in a serious political crisis in East Bengal, it did represent a certain degree of religious intolerance which per-

sisted in Bengali Islam and resulted in periodic efforts to purify faith and practice.

Some Hanafis looked down upon non-Hanafis as la-mazhabis or

non-Muslims, even in the mid-twentieth century. Abul Mansur Ahmad, a politician and writer, noted that as a child he felt discrimi-

nated against for being a Muhammadi.’? Muhammadis

pray with

their palms crossed over the chest and Hanafis with them crossed below the navel. Ahmad and his brother were thrown out of a

mosque in Mymensing on the grounds of defiling it by praying in the Muhammadi fashion. Some followers of Dudu Mian called themselves Muhammadi. A.M. Ahmad’s ancestors had joined the muja-

hids of Saiyad Ahmad Shahid obtaining the title of Faraizi. Their descendants considered themselves to be neither Faraizi nor Wahabi,

whereas Saiyad Ahmad Shahid was in fact a Wahabi.'” Perhaps with

Society and Culture

125

improved economic conditions, Ahmad’s ancestors internalized urban’ upper class prejudices against Wahabis and Faraizis as being neither

progressive nor enlightened.’

The tendency among some Hanafis to look upon non-Hanafis as la-mazhabi persisted in the thirties. During the 1937 election cam-

paign, A.M. Ahmad would generally refuse to pray at public places

for fear of embarrassing his colleagues. The discovery of his being

@ /a-mazhabi caused a minor crisis among his maulana political al-

lies. If the news had spread, the Krishak Praja Party could have

lost votes to the Muslim League, particularly in areas where the

influence of madrasah and Deoband graduates was strong.'* The

problem was resolved when his colleagues accepted Ahmad’s deci-

sion not to pray in public places so as not to affect the popularity

of the Krishak Praja movement.'® 2.2

Emancipation of the Intellect

A year before the founding of the Faith Movement, another movement

emerged in Bengal; it started slowly but had a long lasting effect on

the changing self-perception of many Muslims. At the same time, it revealed the stark differences in their psyche and exposed the opposing

pulls of religious and secular tendencies among them. Buddhir Mukti, a movement for the emancipation of the intellect, stood in sharp con-

trast to the Faith Movement, because its inspiration was this-worldly

with its accent on joy and celebration of life. It aimed at making people

more humane and rational. Although the members were respectful of Islam, religion was not central to their world-view. However, they were

vehementally critical of orthodox opinion and opposed to mullah ac-

tivism. Hence the movement was treated with intolerance and its adherents were threatened with persecution by its opponents.

‘The movement was started by a group of Dacca teachers and writers

who in January 1926 formed a

literary society, called the Muslim

Sahitya Samaj (Muslim Literary Association). The forum, despite its

name, was not a communal organization, and its mouthpiece Sikha (flame) had the motto : ‘Where knowledge

is confined, the intellect

inactive, emancipation is impossible’."” Its objective, as the publisher

of the first volume declared without self-consciousness, was nothing short of ‘a change of direction in the social and intellectual life of

126

The Sacred and The Secular

Muslim society’."* Contemporaneously with Sikha, which appeared

‘once a year, the monthly Saogat, which proved to be one of the most

enduring of Bengali periodicals, acted as a vehicle for the ideas of the Sikha group and its supporters.

‘The leaders of the group (the Sahitya Samaj) were Abul Hussain, Quazi Abdul Wadud and Quazi Mutahar Hussain. Among their enthusiastic collaborators were Abdul Qadir and Abul Fazl. The move-

ment attracted men like the poet Kazi Nazrul Islam, the nationalist politician Humayun Kabir, and writers like S. Wajed Ali and Lutfur

Rahman; it influenced a host of others.” It represented a critical

stirring and a craving for a richer intellectual and emotional life among a significant section of educated Muslims. Sikha stopped appearing after five issues. Even in its short career, it had to make

one strategic retreat.” However, deaths, dispersal and the advent of Pakistan failed to extinguish the spirit which had inspired it. The Sahitya Samaj held seven conferences after the discontinuation of Sikha, the last being presided over by Sarat Chandra Chatterjee, the

eminent

Hindu

ever, communal

novelist,

in

1937.

Towards

differences in the country

the

end,

at large assumed

how-

such

proportions that ‘a non-communal and rationalist forum like Sahitya

Samaj

later."

became

meaningless’,

recalled Wadud

sadly

thirty years

The members of the Samaj drew their rationalist-humanist creed, as Wadud claims, ‘from Kemal Ataturk, Rammohan, Rabindranath, the

Persian poet Sa’adi, and the Prophet Muhammad’.” They proceeded

from a keen sense of the material and spiritual poverty of Muslim

society to question its attitudes to religion, morality, education, the status of women and their rights. They were also concerned with economics and politics. They stressed the need for common sense, reason,

and tolerance in the community’s approach to life and society, and

advocated, in particular, a more personal and life-enriching view of religion than was evident in Muslim society. Wadud complained that

“the Islam that our predecessors have handed down to us supports

women’s loss of freedom, rejects the system of interest, has no use for

the fine arts, and would limit the exercise of the intellect to the study of the Koran and Hadith’.” Abul Hussain headily claimed the right to judge and decide for himself, in the light of reason and needs of modern

man, how religion could be made to serve society : ‘If an Islamic

Society and Culture

127

injunction is found to be an obstacle to the progress of mankind, it must be repudiated with courage and a new one framed to occupy its

place’. The views of Wadud and Hussain were echoed and re-echoed

from the platform of the Samaj : ‘the shariat could not be a satisfactory

guide to every soul’; a ‘commandment. truly fulfills itself where it

shows the way to truth’; and finally, ‘the religious sense withers in the

absence of the intellect as bigotry takes its place’.* ‘The influence of Hanafi values is traceable in the thoughts expressed

both by Wadud and Abul Hussain. By asserting the need for reasoning,

the exercise of personal preference, and the right to choose between

the acceptable and the unacceptable Yaces of Islam, they in fact acted according

to

the

Hanafi

spirit.

Their

insistence

that

Muslims

look beyond the Koran and the Hadith in order to find solutions to the

problems of contemporary life offended

traditionalists who believed

that these were the only authoritative sources of Muslim law. Even

those Hanafis who believed in ijtihad (individual reasoning) would be

uncomfortable with the bold statements of Wadud and Abul Hussain

and would challenge their right to exercise ijtihad. Indeed, in orthodox

opinion, only religious scholars could be allowed to exercise such

rights. In declaring the inadequacy of the shariat as a satisfactory guide

the humanists were admitting what many sufis had acknowledged long

ago in choosing not to follow it strictly. Inevitably, however,

their attacks on religious. bigotry were accompanied by a criticism of

Abul Hussain pilloried Muslims for hindering, ‘through their folly

and wreichedness,

Hindu society’

every

good

initiative of the progressive

and located the cause of such attitudes in the system

of education chosen by many of them.” The Sahitya Samaj deplored communal education through separate institutions for Hindus and

Muslims as a divisive evil.™ It denounced the madrasah system as a

useless way of learning ancient scriptures by rote and as the basic cause

of Muslim backwardness. It advocated a common educational ideal for both communities ‘in order to establish unity in the body politic’.”

Members of the Samaj viewed education as the key to intellectual

emancipation. They were aware of the deep influence exercised by the

ulama on the illiterate masses and felt that the education imparted by

the ulama was wanting. They also felt that the masses failed to appreciate the finer values of life and of Islam because they were uneducated.

128

The Sacred and The Secular

These two factors combined to provide fertile ground for bigotry and the presentation of religion as a bundle of rituals and dogmas. S. Wajed Ali held that the absence of the best educated among the ulama was

causing Muslim youth and educated people to tum away from religion.” The ulama were criticized for not being aware of the changes

undergoing in society and for not addressing themselves to the moral

and religious issues of the time. They were accused of peddling religion as a saleable commodity instead of being devoted preachers adhering

to the ways prescribed by the Koran and the sunnah in their personal

lives. Furthermore, Ali felt that the ulama needed to find independent

sources of income in order not to let their personal interests interfere

with their religious duties. In fact, this was believed to be the case as most of the ulama were preaching for a living. One result of the activities of the semi-educated religious leadership was to render Muslim society ‘lifeless’ and singularly ‘joyless’. A spe-

cific example of such activities was the advocacy of austerity, not unlike that found in certain forms of orthodox Christianity. Quazi Mutahar

Hussain held that a society which could not experience hearty pleasure

pran khola ananda, or sheer joy without being constrained by the

fences of adab-qaida and ain-ganun ie. etiquete and regulations —

stifled itself and tended to lose its sense of freedom. Muslim society, he felt, was in a sense griha-hara or homeless and lakshmichha without

€.g. grace; it was lacking in sophistication and good taste which were

the result of poor education. Thus many Muslims did not sing, paint,

or appreciate the fine arts. ‘A Muslim will not laugh in front of his father, play in front of his older brother, protest against the unjust demands of elders... He does not entertain the thought of pleasure in

this life but of heavenly bliss in the company of hurparis in the next

life.’*' Hussain vehemently criticized contemporary Muslim society as

‘a place where there are men but no women; where there is desire but

no endeavour; where there are people but no personalities’. He made

a strong plea for ananda or joy in Muslim homes, where women were

totally subservient to their husbands and where ‘the elevated thoughts

and pleasures that bring beauty and contentment to the countenance

are not known’.

Concerns such as these suggest that the Sahitya Samaj did

not advocate irreligiosity but rather an enlightened attitude to religion.

While recognizing the need for religion in society, its members held

Society,and Culture

129

that religion should serve man because the welfare of humanity was

of primary importance in Islam.“ The Samaj wanted Muslim society to accept the importance of change, open out to the Hindu community,

and regard a free exercise of the intellect as a precondition of life, including religious life. Needless to say, this vision of Muslims fulfilling themselves materially and spiritually through the zest of their souls,

reason, and beauty, was too sophisticated to be widely understood.-In so far as it was aimed against orthodoxy, it aroused the hostility of the

traditionalists and the mullahs. While many among the religious intelligentsia had their training in

Deobandi schools, by far the largest numbers were products of the

madrasah system sponsored by the British.’ Compared to Deoband

students the average madrasah student in Bengal was relatively poorly

provided for in terms of education. The effect is found in the actions

and pronouncements of madrasah graduates which led the more learned

sections of society to refer to them as. semi-educated. Most of these

men took to preaching as a means of livelihood and earned the ill-famed title of Aath-mullahs (illiterate mullahs). In sharp contrast Deoband

graduates became scholars and theologians. Little concerned with the ideals of Islam, many Muslims were to-

tally given to the external rituals and practices of Islam, rather than its ideals. Thanks to them, Islam was equated with certain habits and ritual practices of the Islamic peoples which were the outward signs of faith,

e.g. eating dates, wearing a beard, performing roza-namaz and tasbih-

telawat (a form of prayer, where the names of God are recited with a rosary). Islam was identified with the practice of charity, the spirit of

which is best reflected in the statement, ‘Give me a penny and God

will give you seventy’, and with keeping women in strict purdah. The

mullahs believed with unshakeable conviction that no one had the right

to question

the

views

of the ancient

interpreters

of the

Koran

and Hadith for none other knew their meaning better.”* Such an attitude

reflected the tendency among some Muslim groups, such as the one

headed by Maulana Maududi, of presenting their own position on the

sources and interpretation of Islamic law as correct and all others as wrong. This stood in contrast to the approach of Ilyas, for example,

who sought to accommodate various views in order to create unity in

the body politic : he accepted both the Hanafi and Shafii laws and acknowledged -all the four major sufi orders. Finally, mullahs were

130

The Sacred and The Secular

prone to treat trivial differences in ritual or doctrine with deadly seriousness and involved their followers in fierce disputes over them, thus

dividing Muslim society into feuding fragments.”

Some of the ‘emancipated’ went.so far as to form a ‘League against Mullahism’. One of its aims was to prove that there was nothing unIslamic in cultivating some of the practices of more civilized peoples. ‘Thus Maulana Malihabadi pointed out that the Prophet Muhammad had asked Muslims to wear beards because the most civilized people of the time, the Romans, did so. He stressed that it was important to look well-dressed and cultivated and that it would be perfectly in accordance with Islamic mores to copy the west in dress and habits, for it was the most advanced civilization of the day.

The exponents of Buddhir Mukti held mullahs, or their kind of mentality, responsible for Muslim backwardness.” Understandably therefore, a coalition of forces representing this mentality, led by Ahsan Manzil, a symbol of political authority and religious orthodoxy in Dacca,

denounced

prominent

members

of the

group,

such

as

Abul Hussain and Quazi Abdul Wadud, as ‘enemies of religion’ and

‘detractors of Islam’. Ahsan Manzil represented the stronghold of the

nawab family — Khwajas Nazimuddin and Shahabuddin. The role of the Khwajas is discussed more fully in the next chapter. As members of a politically powerful group, the Muslim League — which was forging its loyalties based on shared faith, at a time when a Muslim nationhood was being created and Muslim exclusiveness was on the rise, just prior to the demand for Pakistan — the secular, anti-communal and humanist stance of the Sikha group was seen by the nawabs as a direct political threat. They came out in favour of the mentality which provided their support base and asserted the right of the politically powerful to be the spiritual and moral guides of society. The members of Sikha sought social, cultural and religious reform through an intellectual regeneration of their community. They saw themselves, and were seen by others, as rebels. Their rebellion, as Wadud acknowledged, was, however, within the framework of Islam. The Prophet was one of their inevitable points of reference. The story of Wadud’s temporary recantation of his ‘radical’ views, obviously under threat of social ostracism or worse, was told by Abul Hussain himself in a letter to Sanchay, a Dacca monthly in December 1927. The letter shows that

it was not genuine capitulation. It was the disappointment and sorrow

Society and Culture

131

of a philosopher who cared for his people and expected to be under-

stood and heeded, but was not. As a contemporary noted in the same issue of the journal, both Hussain. and Wadud continued to write as

much as before."

In one sense, the movement failed as it aroused the antagonism of some; its secular attitude to education and politics was powerless against the tide that led to Pakistan. In another sense, it succeeded because it stirred some sections of the Muslim community to revaluate their traditions and values. More than that, it articulated a spirit of

questioning. The poetic counterpart of this rebellion was provided most

colourfully by Kazi Nazrul Islam who was the first to express his sense

of identification with the Sikha group. This critical-humanist spirit was

the. guiding force behind a number of other periodicals published at about the same time from Dacca and Calcutta, such as Gan-

abani (August 1926), Naoroz (June 1927), and Jayati (April 1930) —

all rather short-lived but noteworthy. Even after the movement had lost some of its strength owing to

orthodox opposition, Humayun Kabir continued to lecture his students

‘on the necessity to cultivate the intellect, of using one’s own judgement based on a rational approach to arrive at the truth, and to achieve a

sanskar varjita citta, ‘a mind free from superstition’. He appealed to their religious, political and economic

sensibilities : he suggested that

the problem of Muslims in India was not a religious or communal one; that the current communal conflict was one between Hindu and Muslim

middle classes; that real independence lay in the economic emancipation of the downtrodden; and that the communal problem was causally linked to the established system of education.“ Kabir, it may be noted

here, demonstrated the strength of his humanist convictions by marry-

ing, in defiance of social codes determined by religion, a Hindu woman

who had not converted to Islam. Abul Mansur Ahmad, who considered himself part of the movement and, as he records in his autobiography, changed his appearance under

its influence by shortening his beard and hair and discarding the long

kurta and tahband for a short punjabi and payjama, laid a good deal

of stress on outward appearances.” He was not really a humanist : the

humanists were, he complained, more interested in reforming Islam

than in helping Muslims, his own concer being mainly for the welfare of his own community.”

132

The Sacred and The Secular

There were other overt forms of conflict at various levels of society. Tt would now be pertinent to examine the implications of some of these

for social relations and the religious-secular dichotomy. 2.3 Socio-Political Conflicts and their Implications

As pointed out in the first chapter, the Bengal Muslim intelligentsia was by no means a homogeneous group — linguistically, culturally,

socially or economically — and the structure of education helped

perpetuate their heterogeneity. Conflicts at many levels marked the

relationship between various groups. This fact had serious implica-

tions for religious-secular tension. At one level, the secular intelli-

gentsia had to face the emergence of the mullah type; the conflict here was over the correct observance of Islamic rituals. At another

level, the upper ashraf intelligentsia, hitherto acknowledged as the

repository of Islamic traditions, resented the growing challenge from the middle

and rural ashraf: an established landlord class was

threatened by an emergent nouveau riche class representing upwardly

mobile agricultural interests. This particular tension resulted in a split

in the Krishak Praja Party and the formation of the United Muslim

Party before the 1937 elections. The full implication of this conflict between two socio-economic classes in terms of religious-secular

tension became fully manifest in the post-1947 period, when the ashraf intelligentsia invoked its traditional prejudices against Bengali

Islam as an inferior sub-species of the faith, to claim the sole right to determine state ideology. Their real aim, the retention of ascen-

dancy and political power, was purely secular, but the rhetoric and formal ideology had strong religious overtones. In the pre-1947 socio-political arena, inter-communal

conflict

gained more momentum than these intra-community tensions. The

dismemberment of India into two states was its ultimate result. The postures of religiosity came to be associated with communalism, and of secular attitudes with

communalism.

tolerance of other communities,

or non-

Protest or Sacrilege In the years immediately preceding the emergence and popularization

Society and Culture of

the

Pakistan

idea,

with

its

anti-Hindu

133 overtones,

sections

of

the intelligentsia were bold enough to assume openly agnostic and even

anti-religious positions. They ignored the ire of the mullahs without the least compunction. This. situation was, however, shortlived. With

mounting communalism came a new emphasis on the observance of

rituals. Those who wished to maintain the religious character of Muslim

society gained in power and it became perilous to defy them overtly. Thus after the thirties, the dominant cultural-intellectual concerns shifted from self-scrutiny and social-religious reforms to an assertion

of aggressive communal identity and exclusive political aspirations.

A group of agnostic young students lived in Salimullah Muslim

Hall of Dacca University between

1928 and 1930. Mainly interested

in getting good jobs, they affected .an affluent lifestyle, especially in dress and manner.“ In 1931, out of 150 boys in S. M. Hall, about ten

were supported financially by their families or had fathers who were

in the civil service — the rest came from sampanna grihastha (rich

peasant) families.” The externals of western civilization — dexterity

in the use of knives and forks and a stylish width of coat-lapel — were the yardsticks they used to measure and project their upward social mobility. Many

of these boys initially wore dhuti and punjabi and

winter.”

sartorial shifts suggest that urban Muslim

gradually shifted to payjama, shirt and jacket, the last being worn in Such

youth

in Bengal in the twentieth century accepted Europeans as their models.

By contrast, until the early nineteenth century, the emerging Hindu bhadralok, such as Dwarkanath Tagore, or established Hindu rajas,

emulated the Muslim aristocracy in such matters.” This agnostic group

was referred to as the

‘black coated coterie’

by the more religious

minded students, who wished to rid the Hall of their ‘contaminating

influence’.”

In the thirties, the Esha (night) prayer was compulsory at Muslim

Hall; Dr Muhammad

Shahidullah

was then provost and responsible

for this rule. In 1933-34, a group ‘of Muslim boys led by a student

called Abdul Hai Masud called a protest against this rule, by claim-

ing the right to pray at a separate congregation, because ‘we belong to a different sect’. This

‘new

sect’ got hold of an Urdu-speaking

bearer of the Hall to act as the ‘imam’ of their congregation, who

then uttered some gibberish.” The protest took on a sacrilegious

form since the ploy was a farcical hoax. It shows, however, that a

134

The Sacred and The Secular

section of the emerging intelligentsia, did not wish to be bound by rituals and dogmas and were able to mock the institution of namaz itself.

However, it was not always possible to get away with free ex-

pression, particularly if the act implied a rejection of Islamic traditioas. In the thirties, Shamsul Huda, who later became a poet, wrote

an article denying the relevance of the Koran and Hadith—composed

1,300 years ago when Arabs sold dates—to his twentieth cen-

tury life. Dr Shahidullah reacted to this with a sense of outrage: ‘If

he were my son, I would have beaten him up.’ This statement was

taken as an indication of the good doctor’s wishes by the ‘panchayat

of

22’,

an

association of

Urdu-speaking

kuttis”

mahallas (areas) of Dacca, which had the Nawab

of

different

of Dacca as its

president. The ‘panchayat of 22’ gave Shamsul Huda a thorough

beating. Free thinking and expression turned out to be dangerous luxuries. The kuttis of Dacca constituted an orthodox

fered strong-arm support to the educated

stronghold

and of-

‘orthodox’ intelligentsia,

for example, members of the Ahsan Manzil, the Nawab bari (home of the nawab family) of Dacca and others. This trend continued

after partition, for instance, when the language controversy had be-

gun to take root. It would be wrong to assume, however, that the kuttis were a conservative group opposed to the liberal education-

offered in the University of Dacca. They were interested in the wel-

fare of the Muslim community and offered jaigirs (a system of providing board and food to students in local homes) to students, but

for which many boys would have gone without university education

altogether.” Their predicament was similar to that of their more respectable counterparts

: ‘orthodoxy’

was

a part of communal

self-

assertion and questioning it was considered’ an act of betrayal. Education and Identity

In pre-1947 Bengal there was some noticeable tension between Muslims educated in madrasahs and their co-religionists who had the

benefit of a ‘secular’ education. There was a parallel tension between

Bengali-speaking and Urdu-speaking Muslims. Both can be explained

partly in terms of different types of education and partly in terms of

Society and Culture

135

culture conflict. Despite the introduction by the British Government of

the Reformed Scheme in madrasah education in 1915, madrasah graduates were unable to compete with students from general institutions and -were ‘handicapped in climbing the educational

ladder’. The maulvis emerging from madrasahs had limited scope for

employment. Their accepted role in society was that of purveyors of Islamic education and religious ideals, which would liberate Muslims

from the influence of alien faiths, cultures and education. The editor

of Mohammadi complained that they were poor missionaries, that the

Arabic-educated youth had no ambitidn and were happy with a Rs 20

job.” Being cheaper, madrasahs drew students from poorer homes un-

like the more expensive general schools. No doubt partly for this reason, Muslim students studying other subjects looked down upon those

opting for Islamic History, who were frequently madrasa graduates.

‘The culture conflict was not confined to tension between different

groups. Its most powerful manifestation was in the Muslim psyche itself

tom as it was by opposing pulls : one, leading him to identify with

the world of Islam and the ashraf who symbolized all that was best in that world; the other, forcing him to come to terms with the reality of

living in a non-Muslim majority country, where contact with local cul-

ture had rendered his Islam ‘impure’.” Thus, Islamization often in-

volved ‘ashrafization’, i.e. the adoption of ashraf values, language,

dress and manners by the lesser- and non-ashraf.* This was also the

source of the ashraf’s power over the non-ashraf, for the former was

thos placed in the privileged position of dictating ideologies and world-

views. This power went relatively unchallenged until after partition,

but it nevertheless formed the basis of an identity and culture conflict particularly among the emerging intelligentsia who aspired towards

ashraf status.”

This identity conflict was most powerfully expressed in the debate over the mother tongue of Bengali Muslims. Urdu enjoyed a special

status among the ashraf. As the last remnant of an age and culture in

decline, it was a reminder of their rich Mughal heritage and symbolized

all that was good in it. Such sentiments however were not shared by

the numerous non-ashraf and the upwardly-mobile middle classes who had not experienced that culture. The language debate found these groups at opposite ends of an argument. It also brought out the close

association between religion, language, culture and identity. Urdu as a

136

The Sacred and The Secular

language written in the Persian script which was similar to the Arabic was perceived as being: closer to Islam as the Koran was revealed in

the Arabic language. Hence Urdu was more acceptable than Bengali—a derivative of Prakrit and Sanskrit but written in the Sanskrit script. At the same time, competition for jobs and education made the learning

of ‘alien’ languages, English and Bengali, necessary. The language issue inevitably resulted in a tension between religious and secu-

lar approaches. Simultaneously, choices were closely linked to specific political interests such as the desire to achieve political dominance. The

Urdu-speaking ashraf had much to gain if Bengal Muslims acknow-

ledged Urdu as their mother tongue. The Perso-Arabicized Bengali ad-

vocated by some Muslims was a way of challenging the advantage

enjoyed by Hindus in education, jobs and — up to the twenties — politics.

2.4 Language and Identity It is suggested in the first chapter that the intelligentsia came from two social groups : the traditional ashraf who took to western education,

and the rural or middle ashraf, the class of tenants and rich peasants or sampanna praja, who took to the professions. There was a certain degree of contact between these two categories as well as some inter-

marriage between them which enabled the latter to enter the ranks of

the higher ashraf‘' The former, however, tended to look down upon the latter as lesser Muslims. But as the ashraf community was small

and the peasantry large, the process of mobility in nineteenthand twentieth-century Bengal implied dilution of the ranks of the

ashraf. Thus, in certain families, Bengali came to be spoken only after

intermarriage with Bengalis.” But this tendency also reinforced ashraf

desire to maintain their exclusiveness and social dominance by holding

on to ashraf culture.

A brief cross-section of opinions among Bengal Muslims regard-

ing the position of Bengali in the first quarter of the twentieth cen-

tury reveals the historical prejudices. inherited by the ashraf intelligentsia. They were later to be among the rulers of Pakistan

and to opt for

a policy

of replacing Bengali by

Urdu as the only.

state language of Pakistan, a policy which Bengal Muslim supporters

of a United Bengal had foreseen before the partition of India.° The

Society and Culture

137

reaction of the ‘vernacular’ intelligentsia to these policies and preju-

dices played an important role in the emergence of Bengali nationalism. The ulama and the urban aristocratic Muslims, also described

as the, ‘hotch-potch Muslims of Calcutta’, spoke Urdu. Among them

were Bengalis, non-Bengali businessmen: and some people married to Urdu-speaking women who lived in towns and had no connection with rural society.

They disliked Bengali as the ‘language of cow-

ards’. They pretended to have forgotten or not to know Bengali.

AkEslam records the proclamation of a fatwa declaring Bengali to

be the language of Hindus and therefore not worthy of respect.“

The aim of these fatwa was

to advocate a single mother tongue for

all Indian Muslims including Bengalis by conferring upon Urdu the

status of mother tongue. ‘... it is -in Urdu that we must converse with each other and indeed even dream’. Such statements clearly

reveal the intellectual crisis faced by some important segments of

the community.

‘There was a feeling among some that Bengali was a vehicle for

ideas related to the expression of Hindu religion and as such not

the correct vehicle for the conveyance of Islamic thought. They held that holy books like ‘the Koran and Hadith cannot be translated

into it, nor can our religious concerns be discussed in it’. The

ulama failed to disseminate knowledge among the rural masses because of their ignorance of Bengali which they refused to learn. Men like Maulana Akram Khan who were interested in freeing Islam of abarjana (garbage) suggested in B.S. 1340 (1933) that Bengali be

made compulsory in old scheme madrasahs so that graduates could

speak, write and debate in Bengali and become qualified adminis-

trators in society.” As discussed here later, in the nineteenth century,

large sections of rural Muslim society spoke Do-bhashi which had a large admixture of Perso-Arabic words. The punthi literature produced bears testimony to this. However, with the vernacularization Of education this language gradually fell into disuse among the educated and came to be associated: with illiteracy. But in the twentieth century rural Muslim society, by and large, spoke a ‘vigorous natural Bengali’. Though ignorant of Urdu, they too, paradoxically, inclined to some of the aristocratic prejudices against Bengali, a feeling which persisted long after partition in some quarters. The western-educated learnt Sanskritic Bengali which was taught

138

The Sacred and The Secular

in schools. They tended not among rural Muslims, such as washing before prayers), gochhal (God), Rasul (the Prophet) — Hindu

pundits.

to use words of common parlance — behesht (heaven), wadu (ritual (bath), halal (ritually pure), Allah words treated as ‘alien’ by many

Instead, they translated such

words

into Sanskritic

literary Bengali. Such people were thus considered linguistically ‘Hinduized’. Abu Sayeed Ayub (1906-82), born in an Urdu-speaking immigrant family from Bihar, chose to live in Calcutta and speak in Bengali—Urdu in Calcutta was not aristocratic. He did not feel that he could have much intellectual contact or exchange through Urdu in Calcutta, where the majority spoke Bengali, and where Muslims were not in the cultural or political mainstream. But being self-taught, his Bengali was bookish and highly Sanskritized. Having chosen to integrate himself into the cultural milieu of Calcutta, Ayub became isolated from Muslim society which considered him Hindu-ghensha, too close to Hindus. Therefore, in the

context of mounting communalism, he felt that by standing between

two communities, one belonged to neither.* He chose not to opt

for Pakistan at the time of partition, thus identifying himself with nationalist Muslims. In the nineteenth century, rural Muslims wrote and spoke a variant of Bengali best known as Musalmani Bangla or Do-bhashi, which was Bengali with a large admixture of Persian and Arabic words. Punthi literature provides examples of this language.” Do-bhashi emerged in Bengal as the counterpart of Urdu in Uttar Pradesh and Hindi in North India, each a result of interaction between Persian and local Indian languages. The mingling of new Persian and Arabic elements with the vocabulary of Bengali led to its division into Hindu Barigla and Musalmani

Bangla, although Sanskritic literary Bengali also had

a large Perso-Arabic component. Rural Muslims reluctantly came.to adopt a more Sanskritized Bengali with the vernacularization of schools

in 1835.” They had considerable difficulty, however, as the Bengali spoken at home was different from that taught in schools.” Despite

the loss of popularity of Do-bhashi by the late nineteenth century, sporadic publications of punthi literature continued beyond the twenties.” At the same time, rural educated Muslims lamented the neglect of Musalmani Bangla among modern, urban educated circles.” A number of emergent Muslim writers and social thinkers such as Abdul Gafur

Society‘and Culture

Siddiqui, Muhammad

139

Nasiruddin and Muhammad Wajed Ali be-

moaned the neglect of a popular linguistic style which could

have

been a proper vehicle for the conveyance of Muslim thought

and literary effort. These concerns foreshadowed deliberations on no-

tions of gladeshi The stronger In 1900,

a Pak Bangla culture in post-partition Pakistan and a Banculture in the post-1971 period. sense of culture conflict or a conflict of identity was among Bengali Muslims in the 1900s than in the 1930s. a statement in Nur-al-Iman read : ‘We Bengali Muslims

have no language of our own’.®

By the second and third

decades of the twentieth century, however, more and more Bengali

Muslims admitted that Bengali was their mother tongue.” In the

works of Abul Kalam Shamsuddin and Abul Mansur Ahmad, for

example, there was no uncertainty about their mother tongue, although there was some debate as to which type of Bengali was

most

desirable.”

In

this they

echoed

the lament

of Sid-

diqui, Nasiruddin and Ali cited above. Even as Bengali Muslims gradually came to reconcile themselves

to Bengali as their mother tongue, they continued to distinguish be-

tween the Bangla of Hindu pundits, and Musalmani Bangla, and

considered the latter more desirable.” Several Muslim writers felt that the language of Bankimchandra and Sarat Chandra emulated by

many Muslims was artificially fleeced of the diction and vocabulary of the majority Muslim population of Bengal; it, therefore, did not really reflect Muslim heritage, culture, philosophy or even their life-

styles in the treatment of subject matter. Some even challenged the

representative character of these works because they were full of Hindu symbols and Sanskritic vocabulary, and bereft of the influence

of. Islam.” However, by the thirties the Bengali used by Muslims

was neither highly Sanskritized, nor highly Persianized. There was a continued attempt to create a proper language that would include

‘Musalmani’ words like kalam, dowat, kagajand asman, rather than

lekhanki, masyadhar, bhurjapatra and gagan.” Most Muslims were

not actively in favour of artificially introducing Arabic and Persian words. into their language, a tendency which developed later with the growing communalization of politics. Incidentally, the bulk of the Hindu intelligentsia had also abandoned the — pedantically ‘Sanskritized Bengali of the nineteenth century and unhesitatingly

140

The Sacred and The Secular

‘used Perso-Arabic words such as those mentioned above which were

integral to the everyday language of all Bengalis. But for the influ-

ence of politics, language perhaps would not have been a matter of dispute

between

the

twenties and thirties.

Hindu

and

Muslim intelligentsia

in

the

The conflict regarding linguistic identity persisted throughout the

period in one form or another. The controversy over whether Hindi

or Urdu should be India’s lingua franca had the effect of ‘mobilizing greater support for Urdu in Bengal’, thus ‘affecting the earlier controversy over the mother tongue of the Bengali Muslims’*' This

was so because the growth of a separate Muslim identity drew clear lines of division on the basis of religion, religious communities, and

language. Hindi, therefore, was seen as the language of another ‘religious community.

But where Bengali was challenged by Urdu, the

conflict over identity went beyond purely commynal issues and be-

came involved in cultural and religious self-perceptions. Although

by the thirties Muslims had come to engage in literary activities in Bengali on an appreciable scale, they did not consider it the lan-

guage of their religion. Urdu, on the other hand, was viewed as the

‘carrier of Indian Muslim religion, civilization and culture’.” There

were, however, attempts to make Bengali more Islamic. Al-Koran, published from Chittagong held the view that Bengali should be

written in the Arabic script.” The monthly Mohammadi lamented

the absence of a distinct Muslim trend or ‘Musalmani image’ in the Bengali Muslim literature of the thirties, unlike the medieval literary

scene in the region.”

‘The religious-secular tension affected religious life itself. On the

one hand, some Muslims like Maulana Akram Khan, felt that the juma khutba (Friday sermon) should be delivered in Bengali if people were

to understand its meaning. On the other hand, they were tormented by

their failure to find any prescription in the Hadith and Koran permitting

khutba in any language other than Arabic. The problem, according to the editor of Masik Mohammadi,

was that if khutba was allowed in

any other language, then the same principle would also have to be

applied to namaz (prayers) and azan (call to prayers). This would be not according to the shariat but opposed to it. Muslims were believed

to have a special and compulsory relationship with Arabic since namaz

Society and Culture

141

in Arabic was considered essential. Therefore, if translations were allowed, it was feared that the meaning of the Koran would be distorted.**

Another reason for the preference for Arabic, Persian and Urdu perhaps was that by making any of them the mother tongue one could aspire to higher social status. Not only did Arabic give the Bengali Muslim aristocratic status, it also linked him with the Arab and Islamic worlds outside. Muslims throughout the world, in this view, constituted

one indivisible nation. This concept of nationhood did not derive from

tribe, profession or country, but solely from religion, with Arabic as

the only language uniting Muslims the world over. It was argued by

some that neither Bengali nor Urdu but only Arabic could be the na-

tional language of Bengali Muslims : ‘It is necessary to give pride of place not to what we love (Bengali) but to what is best (Arabic).'* Works of religious instruction tended to be written in Musalmani Bengali or Do-bhashi not only because this was ‘the language of the mass of Bengali Muslims’ but also because the maulvis and maulanas were reluctant to write books in or translate religious works into Bengali which they considered to be a ‘kaferi language’.” However, in 1910, Abdul Latif wrote : “The influence of the Persian language is no longer felt in Bengal.’ This statement was not entirely

accurate because even in the thirties textbooks for maktabs and madrasahs were written in a language with a large proportion of Persian and Arabic words.” Suffice it to say that Do-bhashi was

losing its influence. Some books on religious instruction were written in pure Bengali because ‘nowadays English and Bengali are gradually

replacing the Persian and Arabic languages. Therefore our children

from the very start are being taught Bengali or English in place of Arabic or Persian’. However, apart from language, literature provides

an important vehicle for the articulation of identity and the world-view of the intelligentsia. 2.5

The World-View of the Intelligentsia as Reflected in Literature

The concerns of the intelligentsia as expressed through literature

spanned a wide range of issues. Much of punthi literature of the nineteenth century was religious in nature. The most popular subject,

whether in verse or prose, in Musalmani or pure Bengali was Islam

142

The Sacred and The Secular

itself." The writings suggest that Muslims had to fight the assaults of

Christian missionaries who were often in charge of education. They

also saw Hinduism as a threat to their language and religion, particularly in view of the attacks on Muslims and Islam by Hindu writers. The concerns of writers of the early twentieth century were primarily social. There was some romantic literature : classical tales of love between people of Persian or ndn-Indian origin, the characters often hav-

ing no apparent connection with Bengal. This preoccupation reflected their tendency to look for inspiration outside Bengal and identify with

a trans-Indian tradition. One major work on the universal theme of love and sorrow, Mir Musharraf Hussain’s Bishad sindhu (Ocean of Sorrow)— a historical romantic novel located in the background of the mar-

tyrdom of the Prophet’s grandsons — was humanistic in inspiration.

Its language was pure Bengali, without any artificial intrusion of for-

eign words. The reference to mandir and upasana — terms commonly used by Hindus for temple and prayer — rather than masjid and namaz

as used by Muslims, aroused some controversy, but nevertheless, con-

tributed to a sense of timeless universalism.” e.g.

Criticism

late

of

marriage

‘social vices’

of women

figured

and

in

much

women’s

of

the

literature,

emancipation.

Kalir

sasur (The Father-in-Law of the Kali Age) by Maulvi Nur Muhammad

written in 1893 in Do-bhashi is an instance in point. There was also much criticism of immoral and irreligious practices affecting Muslim

society.” The failings of women were attributed to the evil influence

of Hindu customs. The message projected was quite straightforward :

adherence to and accentuation of every practice which distinguished Muslims from Hindus. Muslims were asked not to accept food from Hindus and encourage widow remarriage as desirable. Besides, imita-

tion of English manners was discouraged. Muslim imitators of the west

were identified as ‘atheists’. Some of the literature was puritanic in

nature and echoed Wahabi ideology : e.g. pilgrimage to the tombs

of pirs and saints was discouraged as un-Islamic, although similar maraboutic cults were widely practised in Middle Eastern states like Morocco.

Although, the intelligentsia were deeply concerned with their

religious life, they were equally interested in the economic con-

ditions of the down-trodden among them, both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In 1891, Nausher Ali Khan Yusufzai dealt with

Society and Culture

143

the plight of peasants in his Vangiya musalman. In 1910, Muhammad Dad Ali wrote Samaj siksha in which he urged

trade and

commerce. In 1914,

Ibne

Muslims to take to

Majuddin (pseudonym) wrote

Amar sangsar jiban (My Family Life), an autobiographical account of the economic and religious activities he engaged in to enhance the material and moral qualities of his family life.

Events of local and international political import were not re-

flected in literary works in the early twentieth century. However, the Muslim press was acutely aware of developments in the rest of

the Islamic world

with which it identified. Much

discussed issues

were the abolition of the Khilafat by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and

the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The former caused great concern among Indian Muslims in general including those in Bengal who desired the preservation of the Khilafat. The Khilafat movement

was mounted in the twenties with this aim. Women, Religion and Social Control

The position and role of women was another major preoccupation.

While some sections considered the emancipation of women desirable, they nevertheless debated the need to define precisely the values which should guide women. Such deliberations were aimed at maintaining the social status quo and on keeping a hold over the rising aspirations of women who too came under the influence of western ideas. An ideol-

ogy associated with religious beliefs — or perceived as such — was

a major consideration in all this. Even the secular-minded could not

afford to ignore it. The conservative thinkers were particularly concerned about protecting society from the corrupting influences of west-

emnization and the accompanying secular tendencies.

Down to the forties, the conservative perception of ideal woman-

hood was often the same among Hindus and Muslims. The ideal woman was thus described in the dedication of a book in the periodical Muslim Bharat :

Her wealth is beauty, humbleness her attire, and wisdom is her strength; to her love is eternal, forgiveness unlimited, patience unending; her work is her friend, her religion her protector; her heart is simple, her words sweet, and she is tirelessly caring.”

144

The Sacred and The Secular

Such women are ‘oblivious of their own happiness, sympathetic to oth-

ers’ woes and are content with very little’.* The orthodox attitude to women

acknowledged the necessity of

educating them just enough to make them good wives and mothers.

‘Their seclusion or purdah was upheld as a ‘holy custom’ by which ‘the purity of women’ was maintained and the superiority of Islam and the Muslim people over all others triumphantly established. It

was also seen as a ‘means by which the respectable may be distinguished from the lowly’.”

While some authors had reservations about women’s education

‘others worked. for their emancipation. Abdul Hamid Khan Yusufzai

advocated

the

education

and

social

uplift

of | women.”™

Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain (1880-1932) believed that ‘economic independence’ was essential for women in order to achieve independence from slavery. She wrote in an article entitled ‘Our Decline’ in the journal Naba

Nur in 1904

:

Women could not raise their heads from servitude, primarily because whenever a woman tried to do so, it was seen as an attack against religion and the shastras. Women lowered their heads again thinking this to be a religious injunction. We are told that we are born servants and we will remain servants. Thus even our souls became servile. Men have used religion to keep us in the dark. Today, we should no longer accept the lordship of males with our heads bowed. Note, wherever the ties of religion are too strong, women are oppressed. Proof-Sati.”

‘She brought religion into the discussion because religion had ‘strength-

ened the chains of slavery’. Men, in the name of religion were ‘lording it over women’. There was considerable public reaction to this article. S. A. Al Musavi replied in Naba Nur (Aswin B.S. 1311) that ‘women

would never be equal,to men’.

But in their religious propaganda, Muslim preachers always stressed

the concern for equality in Islam. They emphasized that in Islamic law

women enjoyed rights to property and inheritance and for this reason Islam was superior to Christianity and Hinduism. In the thirties women

began to challenge this superficial notion of equality. Begum Sitara

Khatun, for instance, pointed out that Muslim women inherited only

half of what their brothers did, a practice justified by preachers

Society and Culture

in terms

of women’s

rights

of inheritance

145

from

their husbands.

She argued that this was pure sophistry, because men too inherited

from their wives.'”

In the thirties, discussion about women invariably centred on their

rights and obligations as laid down in Islam. The influential monthly, Mohammadi, tried to identify the rights conceded in Islam but socially

not in vogue. Many of these were ignored by the British legal code in

India, or had somehow lapsed and come to be considered un-Islamic. Female attendance at congregational prayers was one practice that had

fallen into disuse. But, the Hadith permits it for Eid-jama’at and the

Koran allows women to pray Faraz-namaz — Bokhari, Muslim,

Abudaud, Nasai, etc. — in a mosque if they so wish. In the days of

the Prophet, women had the right to divorce their husbands by foregoing mehr, but the Mohammedan Law in force in India made no such

provision.'” The fatwas and Indo-Muslim law only provided for auto-

matic dissolution if one of the partners converted to another faith. Thus

many oppressed Muslim women who could not get a divorce in court escaped into Christianity or Hinduism.'?

The Muslim Dissolution of Marriages Act, 1939, was the result of popular pressure to define the rights of women. The Act was

+. designed to give Muslim women certain rights of divorce which according to some schools of Muslim Law

they already possessed but which, whether they originally possessed them or not, had either lapsed through disuse and the opposition of Muslim men or failed to be inferred

under Anglo-Muhammadan Law.'> The

Bill

went

through

much

modification

before

it became

a

law." It provided for three things : the application of Maliki

and Hanafi interpretations ‘in such a way as to secure the least degree of hardship for Muslim women desirous of obtaining a divorce’; ‘the trial of Muslim divorce suits by Muslim presiding officers’; and ‘a decision that apostasy was not in itself a necessary ground for the dissolution of a marriage’.'*

Another area of social control was the sphere of the arts and literature, a sphere of creativity where the unbounded imagination reigns supreme. It is an area where conservative Muslims like their counterparts among some Jews and Christians have sought to assert their moral superiority.

146

The Sacred and The Secular

The Arts and Literature There was no consensus among Bengal Muslims regarding the correct attitude to the arts such as music or painting. Orthodox Mus-

lims preferred a puritanical stance. In their view, painting, music, fiction and drama, all had a corrupting influence on men. In 1920

Al-Eslam pointed out that ‘the painting of human and other sentient

beings’ was prohibited by Islam. This was doubly anathema because

such activity was seen to be ‘a prominent part of Hinduism’ and it was

impossible for a religious Muslim ‘to imitate Hindu tastes’. Music came to be seen as an ‘instrument of immorality’ on the ground that it aroused quiescent lust.' Fiction was considered addictive like drugs

for it provoked undesirable thoughts and evil desires by inflaming the

mind with enticing descriptions ... [of] the joys of union, the tender t2t2-A-t8tes of lovers and other titillating allusions to ‘physical beauty’.'77

However, some journals like Masik Mohammadi and Saogat did provide instances of ‘music being encouraged and approved by the Prophet. In 1928, Masik Mohammadi acknowledged that the Prophet and

his disciples appreciated music:

the leading Imams

of Islam,

such as Abu Hanifa (699-767), Malik ibn Anas (713-95), Al-Shafi (767-819) and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855), conceded that music was legitimate. Imam Malik was in fact an expert in musicology.'* In

1929

(B.s.

1336)

Saogat

related

the story

of how

the Prophet

acknowledged music as an integral part of rejoicings when Umar scolded the girls of his family for singing loudly on Eid day.'” The literary effort of the intelligentsia has been marked bya steady decrease in the number of works of a purely religious character such as biographies of Muhammad and other holy men and by a corresponding increase in fictional and didactic writings with secular themes . The Muslims’ sense of insecurity in a Hindudominated world had evidently lost its intensity. In the twentieth century, the number of Muslim writers increased and their concerns came to cover a wider spectrum. Interest in religious works such as the didactic nasihatnamas and hagiographies declined. The Muslim intelligentsia felt a growing enthusiasm for literature, culture and language.

Society and Culture

147

D. G., Dacca, 1969, mentions 179 publications by Muslim writers born in the early twentieth century.' Of these, 56 can be classified into seven broad categories as follows :

Religious Social and humanistic Political

23 1 5

Biographical

6

Foreign lands and cultures

4

Patriotic

Bengali language and literature

_16

1

56

The remaining 123 were mostly fiction and plays.

‘The gradual decrease in interest in works of a purely religious char-

acter does not necessarily prove an unmistakably secular trend in outlook. The struggle for survival in an increasingly competitive world had its harsh logic. Non-religious, economic and other secular concerns gained

precedence

over

the religious.

The

world

of competition

in British India demanded acceptance of secular criteria for occupa-

tional mobility. In entering that world one had to recognize that a knowledge of the new rulers’ language, and education imparted in it, alone could bring wealth and status. The prestige and opulence that

went with a reputation for Islamic learning were now things of the past. The most prominent expfession of the new concern was an appar-

ently non-religious approach to education. Besides an increased interest in general education, there were efforts to secularize maktabs and

madrasahs through the introduction of general subjects and non-Islamic languages like English and Bengali.'"'

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Muslim achieve-

ment was negligible compared to the powerful outbursts of literary creativity among Bengali Hindus. Kaikobad (Poetical Works), Mir Musharraf Hussain (Bishad sindhu), and Munshi Riazuddin, to name a few, were among those acclaimed by the Hindu literary lions. The

chastity of their language, i.e. freedom from the accretion of Perso-

Arabic words, was a major point in such praise. The fact that it was impossible to distinguish these writings from those of the Hindu authors

was often emphasized. Other pioneers of Bengali Muslim writing included Maulana Akram Khan (Mustafa charit) and Abul Mansur Ahmad

(Satires).'"?

Their

concern

was

with

problems,

148

The Sacred and The Secular

feelings and sensibilities characteristic of their community — a predominantly secular but exclusive preoccupation. Most significant, however, were the contributions of Kazi Nazrul Islam to Bengali language

and literature. It was he who secured a firm place for Muslim contribution in the mainstream of Bengali literature — without chauvinism and without any compromise. Bidrohi Kabi, Kazi Nazrul Islam

Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899-1976) is unique in his contribution to Bengali literature, its vocabulary and subject matter. Before him, with the ex-

ception of Mir Musharraf Hussain, there was no author of comparable genius who’ portrayed the place of Muslims in Bengal as boldly and clearly. He wrote at a time (1919-42) when Muslims scarcely figured

in Bengali literature. Only rarely did one encounter a Muslim character

in the fiction written by Hindu authors — like the not very communicative Gafur in Sarat Chandra’s Mahesh. Until the late thirties when

Manik Bandyopadhyaya wrote a novel on the life of fishermen of the

River Padma in East Bengal, Muslims were practically unrepresented

in literature. Even the Hindu from East Bengal was not a familiar figure

in the fiction of the period. The occasional appearance of the country

bumpkin in nineteenth-century literature was meaningful inasmuch as it indicated the distance that separated rural eastern Bengal from the smart cultural centre of Calcutta. Some Muslim writers were aware of their poor contribution to literature and identified the problem in cul-

tural terms.'? Muslim men and women had rather limited opportunities

for social interaction because women were primarily kept in seclusion.

Hence a major source of literary raw material — that of relationships

between the sexes — was denied to them. According to Abul Fazl, Muslim heroines of novels were rarely like ordinary Muslim women, but were rather like Hindu women one saw or read about. Outside their

own families Muslim experience of the opposite sex was negligible.

‘The literary achievements of Kazi Nazrul Islam were identified by Sirajid Islam Chowdhury as follows :

+. could write unapologetically in a language which the Bengali Muslims used in everyday conversation. At once he performed several difficult tasks. First, he projected the Muslim

Society and Culture

149

mind into the Bengali language, enriching its literature with new sentiments. Secondly, by drawing freely on both Hindu and Muslim pantheons, and using words of Arabic and Persian origin he added to the strength and expressiveness of the Bengali language. Thirdly, he gave the Muslims a new sense of confidence and made them desirous of coming out of their places of withdrawal. The Muslim middle class in Bengal was peculiarly puritanical; he rehabilitated in their consciousness the joys of the arts. Finally, he helped to create a new understanding between the two communities in a manner no writer before him was able to do." His poems of revolt championed the cause of the have-nots. In Kuli o

majur (Coolies and Labourers) he wanted those who worked and toiled to be ‘the rulers of today’ — ‘the chiefs’ — and declares that it is ‘for them I sing’.'"S Nazrul sang of ‘equality’ between men, and in his most

famous poem, Bidrohi (The Rebel), declared eternal war on all oppressors :

Battle-weary Rebel, I shall know peace Only when the cry of the oppressed will no more Echo through the sky and air

And the tyrant’s sword wield terror in the field of battle.""*

way

full

Nazrul

offered

no

philosophical

system.

He

was

in

a

a social radical given to religious ecstasy; he exercised to the

the

poet's

prerogative’

of contradicting

same poem, Bidrohi, he defied God —

himself.

In the

‘I crush under my feet the

vainglory of the Almighty’. In Bala bir (Say, Hero) one notes the vitality and novelty of the individualist who refused to bow down to any authority, for before him, even ‘the Himalayan peaks bend low in shame’. No wonder, Nazrul was .castigated by the Bengali Muslim press for his ‘godless’ and ‘satanic’ writings."”

He drew his imagery freely from both Hindu and Muslim mythology. Indrani and Brahma figured as naturally in his poetry as Israfil. He wrote of God, sought his guidance, and defied him with

equal passion. His devotion to God is expressed in “The Wine of God’s

Love’, in which he went on to describe how ‘I seek my God’ as the ‘sunflower hungers for the sun’. His faith in Allah and Islam is asserted with :

In this world of Islam

T know that ultimate victory will be mine.'*

150

The Sacred and The Secular

Nazrul had no communal feelings and contracted a highly publi-

cized marriage to a Hindu girl. His attraction to religion, Islam in particular, was emotional, almost mystical. But that did not prevent him

from being castigated as ‘a wild young man’ who had received ‘no Islamic instruction — his brain full of Hinduism’, and a ‘complete

incarnation of Satan’ because his works were ‘inspired by Hindu ide-

als’. His critics found him devoid of religious feeling and charged him with believing in the divisibility of God as well as eulogizing and

worshipping Siva, Kali, Durga and Saraswati. He was censured for

comparirtg C. R. Das to Hazrat Ibrahim. ''?

Kazi Nazrul Islam’s position vis-a-vis the religious-secular dichot-

omy in Bengal Muslim thought is fascinating. Like Munshi Emdad Ali, he stood for communal harmony and inter-communal peace. Like Mir Musharraf Hussain, but in a profounder sense, he secured

a place for Muslims in the cultural life of modern Bengal and gave

them a sense of identity and pride. He did so without recourse to

any aggressive chauvinism. He earned the praise and censure of both communities.

While

both Muslims

and

Hindus

praised

his genius,

the former criticized his use of Hindu mythology and called him an ‘atheist’ and the latter criticized him for polluting the Bengali lan-

guage with foreign words. He was deeply influenced by both Hindu

and Muslim ideas, myths and ways of life. This did not make him an ‘atheist’ or a heretic, but rather, an ecstatically religious Muslim who invoked the syncretic tradition of Islam in Bengal in terms of a new aesthetic sensibility.

Religiosity, Communalism and Non-Communalism The opposing pulls of religiosity-cum-communalism and religiositycum-non-communalism were already strong in the 1920s. These two tendencies were reflected for example in two influential journals, Moslem Darpan and Muslim Bharat. ‘The former addressed itself exclusively to Muslims and their religious concerns. The latter wrote for Hindus as well as Muslims and on issues both religious and secular. Moslem Darpan, which described itself as the ‘only religious organ of the Musalmans in Bengal’ had a circulation’ of 20,000. It covered mostly religious themes, especially the question of ritual rectitude

Society and Culture

1S

according to the shariat. Hajj, Ramadan, prayer, Muharram, Islam,

shariat, the Prophet, God, as well as advice on how to be a proper

Muslim in every way including dietary practice, were the favoured

topics of the articles it published.'” There were some articles on the

ideals of marriage in Islam and others which criticized degenerate and idolatrous deviations from the true faith such as the tendency to idolize

pirs.

Muslim Bharat was a non-communal paper in that it opened its doors to Hindus as well. It accepted that the two communities shared

the same language though not the sanie religion. Its founders did not

look down upon Bengali. In fact, their aim was to use the language to create a Bengali Muslim

literature. In 1920 it commented

: ‘Today

Bengali Muslims are accepting Bengali as their mother tongue’.'" Its opening issue invited contributions both from Hindus and Muslims.

‘The themes discussed covered a wide range of issues — social, eco-

nomic, literary and religious. The following random samples give an

idea of its interests : the problem of a common language in India; rural poverty blamed on the callous indifference of urban people; azan;

atomic theory in Islamic philosophy; political issues such as the non-

co-operation movement; discussions of a philosophical nature about the

religion of man; literary contributions such as short stories, poems,

ghazals, etc. Even Rabindranath Tagore wrote for it — a token of its

catholicity.'”

‘The Hindu-Muslim dichotomy was expressed vividly in Bengali

literature, with each community having a literature exclusively of its

own, despite a shared heritage. It was only during the latter half of the

nineteenth

century,

that a problem

arose due

to the sectarian

nature of Bengali literature, a problem which worsened with increasing political separatism in the twenties and thirties. Muslims began

to react adversely to heavily Hinduized texts which were the prod-

ucts of the Hindu renaissance. Some Muslims became ‘Hinduized’, others sought to retaliate against such Hinduization.

tendency

in

many

works

by

prominent

Hindu

There was a

writers

to

malign Muslim historical personages, the object being to stimulate

patriotism by representing Muslim dynasts as oppressive alien rulers. ‘Aurangzeb, much revered by Indian Muslims, was portrayed as a despicable character

Shahjahan (1909).

in

D. L. Roy’s

Bankimchandra

Durgadas

was

(1906)

and in

heavily criticized

by

152

The Sacred and The Secular

Muslims for what they perceived to be his anti-Muslim bias and his hatred of Muslims in his works. His book, Anandamath earned notoriety for the depiction of Muslim rulers as evil, and for the callous

disregard of Hindu warriors for the lives and property of poor Muslim villagers. On

the other hand, his literary achievement also won

the ‘love, sympathy and respect of a large community’

of Bengali

Muslims."* Early Bengali Muslim poetry of the Pathan and Mughal period is marked by a total absence of religious intolerance. It projects a deep and sympathetic appreciation of Hindu religion, its rites and ceremonies. On the one hand, as the dominant political power, Muslims felt no threat to their religion and culture; they promoted Bengali literature

and allowed local traditions and belief systems to flourish. On the other hand, the neo-converts could not renounce their past traditions of thou-

sands of years; ‘they reconciled their old ideas with the new faith by

identifying Iswar with Allah, avatars with Prophets, priests with pir-

muslim, Anadi Nar with Adam, Kali with Bibi Hawwa, Chaitanya with

Muhammad, Basudeb with Khwaja-Khizr, the twelve Gopals with the

ashabs or companions of the Prophet, and sages with auliyaas’.'* In such an atmosphere baul and ma’arfati songs about the essential oneness of mankind flourished.

In the later period, however, a section of the intelligentsia was pro-

voked into writing profusely on the need for a separate Bengali Muslim

literature, which reflected their heritage.'* This literature was to be based on the foundation of Islamic civilization, e.g. the Koran, Hadith,

Islamic law, philosophy, history and the sciences, and it was to be in

the everyday language of common people, i.e. Muslims, since they were in the majority.

S. Wajed Ali, contributing to Saogat in its

velop their

so that Hindus could understand them better.

Agrahayan issue B.S. 1335 (1928) wrote that Muslims

literature

needed to de-

Some Muslims, however, found this attempt to create a separate litera-

ture indicative of a narrow mentality. But they were in a no-win situ-

ation. Even those Muslim writers who were deeply influenced by their Hindu predecessors could not keep out the Musalmani character or rup (style) of their works, and hence aroused the hostility of Hindu pundits who felt that Bengali literature was being threatened. Muslims,

likewise,

were

unhappy

with

these

writers

and

considered

them

‘Hinduized’. On the whole, however, the Muslim press was highly

Society and Culture

153

critical of ‘pro-Hindu’ Muslim authors. Kaikobad was found guilty of ‘pro-Maratha sympathies’, of failing to ‘evoke Muslim ideals’ despite

possessing good poetic qualities.'”” Such an attitude reflected the tension that dominated society at large : Muslims perceived themselves

as a once powerful group now in decline and strove to assert themselves

culturally

against

the

onslaught of another threatened but

currently more successful group, the Hindus. This stood in sharp con-

trast to concerns in early Bengali Muslim literature. The works of modern Hindu writers were deeply imbued with their cylture and ideology. Muslims could not possibly identify themselves

with their trace their imaginary centred on

outlook. The consequent sense of isolation and failure to backwardness to lack of adaptability, rather than to some fall from Islamic grace, induced an aggressive chauvinism Islam and the Muslim identity. There were fervent efforts

to acquire a sense of pride qua Muslims : Ismail Husain Shirazi praised Islam and its heroes ‘at the expense of Hinduism’.'* Mozammel Huq,

Azhar Ali, Syed Imdad Ali, Akram Khan, and Dr Shahidullah wrote with a clearly defined object — to educate Muslims in their history While much of the literature of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was communal, some writers were deeply interested in communal harmony. Munshi Emdad Ali was deeply disturbed by the tension and misunderstanding between Hindus and Muslims and their failure to unite despite a common lan-

guage, ethnic base, habitation, and history including their colonial subjugation by the British. His object was to bridge the gulf between

the two communities which were living ‘like brothers in Bharat for

many years’.'® He also projected the syncretic view that Allah and

Iswar were the same. His ‘monograph’ is in the form of a debate between a Hindu and a Muslim each expressing what he dislikes about the other’s customs. The spirit is rational. Angry polemics are

eschewed. The following indicate some of the points of friction between Hindus and Muslims at the time : 1. Hindus worship the cow as their mother;

Muslims eat beef.

Hindus consider cow dung to be pure; Muslims do not.

2. Hindus take a dying person out of the house and later cremate him; Muslims leave him in bed covered with a blanket until death and later bury him.

154

The Sacred and The Secular

3. Hindus, unlike Muslims, keep their heads uncovered. 4. Hindus do not circumcise their men.

5. 6. 7. 8.

Hindus do not observe strict purdah. Unlike Muslims Hindus do not divorce their wives. Muslims allow widow remarriage unlike Hindus. Muslims eat from one side of the banana leaf and Hindus from the other.

9. Muslims do not worship idols and refer to Hindus as kafir.

10. Hindus shave their beard and moustache, Muslims do not.'” The rest of the book is a commentary on these matters from both Muslim and Hindu points of view. The aim, however, was to

explain and justify Muslim practices to those who misunderstood them. The need for purdah, for instance, was explained as follows :

If women are not kept in purdah and allowed to see other men :

1. Their devotion to their husbands will decrease since they will

desire more attractive men.

2. Legal cases will increase. 3. The number of illegitimate children will increase. 4. There will be an increase in meha rog o chakshu drishtihinata (venereal disease and loss of eyesight).

5. The only advantage — inexpensive servants will be available. bh Emdad Ali saw a parallel between women and valuable jewels which could not be left unguarded in the open for fear of theft.

He justified widow remarriage, permitted in Islam, in rational but

rather male chauvinistic terms, e.g. prevention of illegitimate births.

He quoted Vidyasagar and Hindu scriptures to prove that the practice

had their approval. This humane and often rational author, in quest of

communal harmony, functioned strictly within the orbit of religious

prescriptions. His was a liberal and anti-communal approach. The outlook, however, was far from secular in the western sense. 2.6 Social Distance between Hindus and Muslims

‘The communal distance between Hindus and Muslims, generally traced to the growing competition for employment and to British policies in their quest for allies, may also be attributed to a new sensitiveness about the social distance between the two communities. This was partly

Society and Cillture

155

due to. Hindu ritual taboos on commensality with non-Hindu commu-

nities which now gave offence to the upwardly mobile Muslim middle

class. It was also traceable to the latter’s often valid perception that the Hindu bhadralok was inclined to treat them with contempt. As early as 1906, Rabindranath Tagore had already anticipated that the Muslim praja would not tolerate for long the humiliation to which he was subjected to by the managers of the zamindar’s kacchari. In Tagore’s own estates, a Hindu praja seeking audience with the manager

was allowed to sit on the mat on the floor, whereas a Muslim praja

could sit only in that corner of the floor not covered by the mat. Tagore commented : ‘We have made deep the ditch of division between each

other in the name of social custom’.'"*

By the thirties, Krishak Samitis had mushroomed and were active in defending peasant interests. It is noteworthy that, among other things, the Muslim peasant demanded better seating arrangements in

the zamindar’s kacchari than compulsory squatting on bare floors.

He clearly sought to put an end to some of the most galling and overt forms of discrimination he suffered in his old relationship with the Hindu zamindar and his men. His assertion of his dignity came

not a day too early.

There was very little social contact between Hindus and Muslims, especially in urban areas. The limited contact was largely professional,

for instance, between a zamindar and his praja, a lawyer and his client

(vakil and makkel) or a teacher and his student. In school, they sat on

separate benches.'” In college they lived in separate wings of student

hostels. In the university, there were separate halls of residence for

Muslim and Hindu students.'*

Despite these distances, there are numerous instances of friendship

at the inter-personal level. However, inter-dining between the two communities was minimal. In the rare instance when a Muslim student would be invited to a Hindu home for a meal, he would often have to pretend that he was a Hindu in order to avoid giving offence to the host’s orthodox relations. Sushil Mukherji of Bhatpara invited his friend A. F. Salahuddin Ahmed — who later became Professor of History,

Dacca University — to his home for a meal with ‘you can eat at my

place, but for a while you must become a Hindu Brahman’.'* Though

Mukherji was free from prejudices, he accepted the ritual taboos observed

in his home.

156

The Sacred and The Secular Muslims on the whole accepted this ritual distance between the two

communities. But what the emerging intelligentsia could not accept was the element of contempt with which they were treated. Abul Mansur Ahmad resented the Hindu reluctance to call Muslims bhadralok. He felt annoyed by the treatment of Muslims as inferiors

and reacted against the disrespect with which Muslim pupils were

treated in schools. He refused to accept this without protest. Thus, when addressed as tui by the naib of the zamindar’s kacchari at Dhanikhola, Ahmed retaliated in like manner causing an uproar in the village and

almost getting his parents into trouble.'*

It was the new awareness of being discriminated against which contributed to the widening of the Hindu-Muslim divide. A contributor to

Masik Mohammadi recalled an incident from his student days which left an indelible mark on him. In 1926, he went to Calcutta University to collect his MA provisional certificate which he needed in order to register for the civil service examination. As he was clad in a dhuti

and wore no cap he could not be distinguished from a Hindu. The clerk initially asked him to come back in an hour, but on suddenly noticing his Muslim name on the form, shrieked, ‘Hey! this is a Mochhalman.

Then it can’t be today, it can’t be today.”!”

Discrimination took many

forms. As a youth, Muhammad

Shahidullah was not allowed to study Sanskrit at Presidency College

because he was a Muslim.

And despite protests from the Muslim com-

munity, the Government could do nothing about it. Later, in 1934, he

was

appointed a teacher of Sanskrit at Dacca University.'* The

selection of school and college textbooks displayed crass insensitivity

to Muslim sensibilities. Throughout the greater part of the thirties, Muslims mounted a steady compaign against the selection of Bengali texts prescribed for the matriculation examination because it had ‘no

place for Islamic thoughts and ideals’. The Mohammadi complained

that the texts were in bad taste, full of superstition, illicit love, oppres-

sion of women, communalism, idolatry and corruption.’ Works of

Muslim

writers were discriminated against in the selection of texts.

Thus Mir Musharraf Hussain’s Bishad sindhu was considered unworthy

of inclusion in the prescribed reading.

Muslim writers were faced with a two-edged sword comparable to minorities elsewhere. Either they were criticized for not being Bengali

enough if they kept to their own ways or were treated with disdain if

Society and Culture

157

they engaged in literary activities in Bengali. They were not treated well in literary meetings and societies; organizations like Rabi-basar

and Bangla Sahitya Sevak Samiti kept Muslims away. They were thus compelled to set up separate literary associations or journals like Mihir o Sudhakar, Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samiti, Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Patrika and Musalman Sahitya Samaj. Their journals, how-

ever, did accept contributions from Hindu writers.

The Muslim lack of confidence in their Hindu superiors had reached

a point where they did not expect justice from Hindu judges and teach-

ers.'“' In 1939, one Pratimarani, requested Mohammad Hussain to take

her away and save her from being forced into prostitution by her family, relates Masik Mohammadi. He complied reluctantly and only at her insistence, but was later charged and convicted for kidnapping.’ As

noted earlier, during Khwaja Nazimuddin's term of office as education minister (1933-34), a Muslim with a second class MA got a job for which there was a Hindu candidate with a first class MA. In the row which ensued, Khwaja Nazimuddin reflected the Muslim opinion of those days by his curious statement that there was no difference be-

tween first and second class and that Muslim boys did not receive much help from their Hindu teachers outside the classroom.” In con-

trast, there were many instances where Hindu teachers were very sup-

portive of their Muslim students. At Dacca University, teachers maintained open houses for students who were in the habit of dropping in for discussions. ‘The growing Muslim antagonism was expressed in several ways. One of these was an opposition to Hindu symbols and idioms. The rejection of Sri and Padma as symbols of Calcutta University in 1937 is just one example. Sri means wealth, good fortune and beauty;

it also represents the Hindu goddess

of wealth, Lakshmi.

Padma, ‘lotus’, is a central motif in Hindu religious symbolism. Muslims found these symbols unacceptable in view of their exclusively Hindu

character and began to agitate for their removal. The

Hindu view, reflected in Prabasi, argued that the symbols had no religious connotation since Sri sitting on the Padma neither prayed nor meditated.“ The rejection of Anandamath and Bande Mataram

was even more vehement as the novel and the idolatrous song were held responsible for spreading the ‘poison of communalism’: What; ever the real intention of this patriotic novel — which was believed

158

The Sacred and The Secular

to be anti-British — Muslim

rulers

of

it was ostensibly seen Bengal

because

the

as an attack on the pejorative

mlechchha were freely applied to the latter."

yavan

and

Many Muslims became die-hard communalists after they developed

a sense of insecurity or experienced a threat to their persons

and possesions, for example, during ‘communal riots. Dr Kudrat-eKhuda, who was Principal, Presidency College, and lived in a Hindu

area, Bhowanipur, had a lifestyle indistinguishable from that of his Hindu neighbours. After the attack on his residence during the 1946

riots, he became a convinced communalist.'*

There was nothing inherently ‘religious’ in the growing anti-Hindu

feeling among the Muslim intelligentsia. This negative sentiment, however, helped accentuate an exclusive and aggressive sense of commu-

nity based on religious faith. It became difficult to discuss even purely

secular matters of interest to the community without reference to issues

of correct doctrine and ritual. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyse the religious and dimensions of the social and cultural concerns of secular the intelligentsia which was influenced by colonial contact as well as relationships with the Hindu community. It has traced the socio-

cultural causes of the growth of separatism between Hindus and Muslims

monolith:

in Bengal.

they

It has shown

represented

a

that the Muslims

spectrum

of

did not form a

opinions,

concerns

and intellectual orientations. Hence not all Muslims were separatists.

It also indicates that cultural separatism gradually emerged from the late nineteenth century onwards with the increasing popularity of writers like Bankimchandra Chatterjee. One could conclude that po-

litical separation was naturally linked to the repercussions of separation in the literary and cultural spheres, although politico-economic factors and elite interests played a crucial role in its development. If Muslim exclusiveness in Bengal derived from multiple sources,

it also had a solid basis in self-interest thanks to British policies of

wooing

the community

as an ally against nationalists,

who

were

mostly Hindus. With the passing of the 1935 Act, politicized Muslims in Bengal felt they had a chance of holding power

Society and Culture

in the. province if they acted as a community.

159

The emergence of

the Muslim community as a political constituency created new ten-

sions between the secular and religious concems of the intelligentsia.

Notes 1.

Muzaffar Ahmad, Amar jiban o bharater kamunist parti, vol. 1, 11 (Calcutta, 1969, 1984), p. 9; Bankim Chandra’s Anandamath and hymn ‘Bande Mataram’ provided inspiration to terrorists. Editorial, “Alochana : Anandamath', Masik Muhammadi (hereafter M.M.) 10th year, no, 12, Aswin 1344 (1937), p. 892; Al Farug, ‘Anandamather Adarsa’, M.M. \1th yr., no 2, Agrahayan 1344, pp. 113-30. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India — A Social Analysis (Lahore, 1943, 1947), pp. 7-26, 47-60, 68. For an understanding of the Bengali Muslim dilemma in terms of culture and values, see Syed Sajjad Hussain, ‘The Cultural Problem in Pakistan’, The Pakistan Observer, 1 May 1955; and Sufia Ahmed, Muslim Community in Bengal, 1884-1912. (Dacca, 1971), pp. 334-37. A. Hashim, In Retrospection (Dacca, 1974), p. 137; Editorial ‘Alochana’, M.M., llth yr., no. 7, Baisakh 1345 (1938), p. 507. Biharilal Sarkar (n.d.), pp. 54-55, cited by Shamsun Nahar, op. cit., p. 109; R. Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, p. 40. K.M. Mohsin, “Tabligh Jamat and the Faith Movement in Bangladesh’, paper presented at the Workshop on Bangladesh: History, Society and Culture held 25-27 Aug., 1984, at Dhaka University (South Asia Studies Group, University of Chittagong). For recent developments of the movement in Bangladesh, see Emajuddin Ahmed and D.R. J. A. Nazneen, ‘Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics’, Asian Survey, vol. XXX, no. 8, Aug. 1990, p. 798. For a detailed discussion of the sufi orders see M. Anwarul Hug, The Faith Movement of Maulana Eliyas (London, 1972) pp. 45-76. ‘The Chistiya are particularly known for the expression of their religious experience through music and poetry. This is known as sima. This was also practised by the Qadiriya though without musical accompaniment. D. G. Rajshahi, 1976, p. 53. For a detailed discussion of Deobandi thought, see Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982).

160

The Sacred and The Secular

10.

For a detailed discussion on the points of legal similarities and dissimilarities, see J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford, 1971, 3rd ed.) particularly chapter 9, pp. 57-68. 11. D. G. Rajshahi, 1976, p. 53. 12. Abul Mansur Ahmad, Atmakatha (Dacca, 1978), pp. 155-75. 13. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 14.

Upper class prejudices against Faraizis are clear in the writings of D. H.

A. Meerza, Selected Writings, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 15. A.M. Ahmed, Atmakatha, pp. 171-75. Although the Deoband School

did not support the Muslim League, it represented an orthodox position.

S88

16. Ibid., p. 175. 17. Sikha, vol. 1 (1927), extract from Anisuzzman (ed.), Muslim banglar samayik patra (Dacca, 1969), p. 473. 18. Ibid. 19. A contemporary writing in 1928 listed the Calcutta based Muslim writers Wajed Ali, Abul Mansur Ahmad, Abul Kalam Shamsuddin and Taheruddin Ahmed, among the contributors to Saogat, who were immediately influenced by the Sikha creed; M. Ashgar Ali. ‘Saogat banam tarundal’ Sanchay, vol. 2, no. 3; extract: Muslim banglar samayik patra. Quazi Mutahar Hussain included the following among those influenced directly or indirectly by the spirit of the Samaj: Mahbubul Alam Dr Shahidullah, Sufia Kamal, Ibrahim Khan, Abul Hasnath, Mansurud Din, Shamsul Huda, Nur Ahmed, Didarul Alam and Wahidul Alam; see S. M. Ikram and Percival Spear (eds.), The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan (Dacca, 1955), p. 143. 20. See below for detailed discussion. 21. Banglar jagaran (Calcutta, BS. 1363 (1965), pp. 194-95. Ibid. Sikha, vol. 1 (1927), extract: Muslim banglar samayik patra. ‘Abul Hussain, ‘Adeser nigraha’, Sikha, vol. II (1928) extract: ibid., p. 484, ‘Abdur Rashid, ‘Muktir agraha adeser nigraha’, Sikha, vol. II (1928), extract: ibid., p. 485. 26. Ibid.; Sikha, vol. I (1927) extract: ibid., p. 477. id., vol. I (1927), extract: ibid., pp. 478-79. 28. Q.M, Hussain, ‘Dharma o siksha’, Sikha, vol. 4 (1929), extract: ibid., p. 471. Abul Hussain, ‘Bangali musalmaner siksha samasya’, Sikha, vol. I (1929) extract : ibid., p. 487. 29. For a discussion of Muslim attitude to the arts see a later section. 30. See the collected works of S. Wajed Ali, in Syed Akram Hussain (ed.), S. Wajed Ali Rachanavali, vol. 1 (Bangla Academy, Dhaka, 1985); in

Society and Culture

31. 32. 33.

37.

38.

161

particular see the article ‘Dharmer prachar’, pp. 100-03 on which this paragraph is based. ‘This paragraph draws largely on ‘Ananda o musulaman griha’, Abdul Hug (ed), Quazi Mutahar Hussain Rachanavali, vol. 1, pp. 80-84. Ibid,p. 84, Q. M. Hussain, ‘Ananda o musalman griha’, extract : Muslim banglar samayik patra, p. 484,

S. Wajid Ali, Rachanavali, op. cit., pp. 113-14. The Darul Ulum at Deoband in the district of Saharanpur, UP, was established in 1867 through private efforts as a centre of Islamic learning. The guiding spirit of the venture was Maulana Nanawtayi who had fought at Shamli in 1857. The founders and followers of the Darul Ulum resented British rule and rejected official interference. The centre provided the bulk of the nationalist wlama. The curriculum of the centre was known as the Dars-i-Nizamiya named after Mulla Nizamuddin (d. 1748) who designed it and not after the Nizamiya at Baghdad. The Darul Ulum attracted students from far and wide (see Ziya-ul-Hasan Farugi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, Bombay, Calcutta : Asia Publishing House, 1963, pp. 22-25, 27-42). The number of graduates produced by Darul Ulum, Deoband, during 1867-1967 in West Bengal was 151 and in East Bengal, 1,672, whereasin 1937-38 alone the total number of pupils in government reformed and unreformed madrasahs was 80,114. The average annual expenditure per pupil at Deoband during this period of a hundred years was Rs 219, whereas that for a government madrasah pupil, for example, was Rs 26.53, in 1933-34 alone. The total cost per Deoband graduate was Rs 1,314 since each received six years of schooling, Report, PIB, 1933-34, pp. 110-11; also in British India, pp. 133-35. Besee Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival tween 1880 and 1900 branch schools of the madrasah at Deoband were founded in areas like Dacca, Calcutta and Chittagong mainly through the private initiative of earlier Deoband graduates. It appears that a large number of Bengalis went to Deobandi schools in northern India. At the tum of the century, one-third of the pupils at the Madrasah-yi-Aminiyya in Delhi were from Bengal. See, Report PIB, 1933-4 (1935) p. 28. “Mullader prabhab o sikshita samaj’, Saogat, vol. V, no. 12 (May 1928), extract : Muslim banglar samyik patra, p. 456; A.M. Ahmed, ‘Atmakatha, Disputes would occur over whether one should say amin loudly or softly at the end of prayers, or whether the palms should rest on the breast or over the navel during prayers, ibid., p. 201. Ibid,,p. 225.

162 39.

Al. 42. 43. 45.

47.

49,

Si. 52.

53.

55. 56. 57.

58.

The Sacred and The Secular

‘They were by no means alone in doing this, for by the late 1920s mullahs were already recognized as one of the three enemies of the more progressive intelligentsia, the other two being the British and the Hindus (speech by Sir Abdur Rahim in 1928, quoted by A. M. Ahmed, Amar dekha réjnitir panchas bachhar, ‘pp. 52-53; henceforth Amar dekha). For orthodox opposition, see Mahmud Fiusain, ‘Dacca University and the Pakistan Movement’; C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India : Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London, 1970), p. 370. Bengali, vol. 2, no. 4 (B.S. 1336/1928), extract : Musliin banglar samayik patra, pp. 546-49. . Humayun Kabir, Dharabahik (Calcutta, 1942), pp. 123-28. Ibid., pp. 145, 160, 172. A.M, Ahmed, Atmakatha; pp. 200-201. Ibid., p. 174. He was deeply religious and could not countenance being a believer in a religion of man without denominational constraints. Interview with Prof. Mahmood (Calcutta, Feb. 1985). Interview with Prof. Abdur Razak, National Professor of Bangladesh. He lived in S. M. Hall in 1931 (Dacca, April 1985). Interview with Prof. Mahmood. On the practice of wearing dhuti among Bengal Muslims in the 1920s and 1930s, see Mohiuddin Ahmed, ‘Chintadhara : Kalikata bisvabidyalay samparke du-ekti katha’, M. M. 10th yr., no. 1 Kartik 1343. A\lso reflected by the family photographs of Purnendu Narayan Roy, son of the Raja of Balihar, Rajshahi, and grandson of Rani Bhawani. Interview with Prof. Mahmood. Ibid. Kuttis were Dacca locals who spoke a form of Urdu mixed with Bengali. ‘They were generally engaged in trade and business and were relatively affluent. Interview with Prof. A. Razzak. ‘Through the Reformed Scheme certain general subjects were introduced into madrasahs; ISC, Interim Report, 1929, pp. 194-95, 200. “Alochana’, M. M., 7th yr., no. 12, Aswin BS. 1341, pp. 882-83. Interview with Prof, Mahmood. For a discussion of the values inherited-by Bengal Muslims, see Syed Sajad Hussain, “The Cultural Problem in Pakistan’, Pakistan Observer, 1 May, 1955; Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 334-37. Imtiaz Ahmed, ‘The Ashraf-Ajlaf Dichotomy in Muslim Social Structure in India’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. III (1966), pp. 274-75; R. Ahmed, “The Bengal Muslims’, (OUP), pp. 197-201, 326.

Society and Culture

59.

61.

For a study of the culture conflict among Bengal Muslims, see Badruddin. Ushar, Sanskritir sankat (Dacca, 1967), p. 49. A. H. Sharar, Lucknow : The Last Phase of an Oriental Culture, OUP, London, 1975; see the introduction on how Urdu language and literature continved to flourish even as the Mughal empire came t an end. Fazlul Hug, for example, came from a salukdar background and married Kurshid Talat Begum, the daughter of Nawab Syed Mohammad Khan Bahadur, and granddaughter of Nawab Abdul Latif, CIE; see Kazi Ahmed Kamal, Politicians and Inside Stories (Dacca, 1970). Abul Hashim belonged not to a landed aristocracy but to a family with some landholdings which yielded an annual income of about Rs 12,000 and whose main occupation was government service. His grandfather was Nawab Abdul Jabbar, a deputy magistrate, whose brother was Khan Bahadur Abdul Monim. The family culture was influenced by that of Bihar and UP. ‘The family did not adopt Urdu as their mother tongue but they adopted Urdu as a medium of instruction in schools and colleges’. Abul Hashim married Mahmoodah Akhtar Meher Banu Begum, the granddaughter of Maulana Obaidullah Obaidee, a reputed scholar of Arabic and Islamic studies. Maulana Obsidee was also the grandfather of Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy; see Abul Hashim, In Retrospection, op. cit., pp. 3, 10-11. ‘The grandfather of litterateur Abu Sayed Ayub (1906-82), and Abu Asad Mohammad Obaidul Gani (1903-73), Maulvi Elahad moved from Darbhanga, Bihar, to Calcutta in the mid-nineteenth century. There was no Bengali in the family until the granddaughter, Jamila Khatun (1885-1964), married Maulvi Lutfur Rahman (1877-1959), a vakil from Kushtia, who came from a Bengali-speaking mokhtar family; interview with Saleha Khatun (b. 1902) wife of AAMO. Ghani, 9 Feb., 1985, Calcutta. Millat, Baisakh 18, BS. 1354 (2 May 1947). AL-Eslam, 2nd yr., no. 6, Aswin, BS. 1323 (1916), quoted in M.N. Islam, Bengali Muslim Public Opinion cs Reflected in the Bengali Press, 1901-1930 (Dacca, 1973), pp. 221-12. Naba Nur, \st yt.; no. 9, Paush BS, 1310 (1903); Al-Eslam, 2nd yr., no. 6 (1916). AL-Eslam, ibid. Editorial M.M., 7th yr., no. 12, Aswin 1341, pp. 882-83. M. N. Islam, op. cit, p. 225; Sheikh Habibur Rahman, ‘Chintadhara : samaj sankarer ka-ekti katha’, M.M., 7th yr., no. 1, Kartik Bs. 130. Interview with his wife Gouri Ayub on 12 Feb. 1985, Calcutta. ‘The term Musalmani Bangla which also came to be known as Do-bhashi

SB

£8

62.

163

164

710.

73. 74. 75. 76. 71.

8.

81.

The Sacred and The Secular

was first used by Revd. Long in 1854 in his catalogue of Bengali books to differentiate Bat talar punthi from scholarly works. See Md. Enamul Hug, ‘Musalmani bangla’, M.M., 9th yr., no, 12, Aswin BS. 1342 (1935). Punthi, literally book or manuscript, was the term used to describe a particularly popular literary genre — mostly tales or didactic writings. Muhammad Wajed Ali, ‘Sahitye satantra kena?’ Saogat, Agrahayan, BS. 1335 (1928), in Muhammad Nasiruddin (ed.), Bangla sahitye saugat jug, op. cit., p. 372; also see A. R, Mallick, British Policy, op. cit., pp. 154-55. Muzaffar Admed, op. cit., p. 2. The demise of Do-bhashi began with the loss of social and political power suffered by Muslims in British Bengal, and neglect due to the persistent use by upper-class Muslims of Urdu as their mother tongue. Other causes relate to the inability of Muslims to adjust to the changing environment through contact with English education and literature, the absence of talented poets, and.lifelessness of traditional poetry uninspired by the new experiences. Sufia Ahmed, ‘op. cit., p. 308. For an example of such punthi literature see Moyajjam Ali, Amir saudagaro bheloa sundarir punthi (1922) (CNL : 182 Nb, 922.9). Tone Majuddin, Amar sangsar jiban (Calcutta 1914), introduction. Muhammad Nasiruddin (ed.), Bangla sahitye saogat jug. Dhaka, 1985 (reprint of articles from the monthly Saogat), pp. 352, 370-75. Nur-al-Iman, \st yt., no. 3, BS. 1307 (1900).

Islam Pracharak, 8th yt., no. 11, Banga nur, Ist yr., no. 3, Magh BS. 1326 (1920). Ghulam Murshid; ‘Bangali musalmaner svaruper sandhan : duti bipratip drishtanta’, Jijnasa, Magh-Chaitra, 3rd yr., no. 4, BS. 1389 (1982), p. 379. Muhammad Zahurul Hug, ‘Siksha o musalman’, M.M., 7th yr., no. 5, Phalgun 1340, p. 359. For a detailed Muslim view on this theme, see Muhammad Wajed Ali, op. cit., pp. 370-75; Abul Kalam Shamsuddin, ‘Sahitye sampradayikata’, Barsik saogat, BS. 1334 (1927); Abul Fazl Rachanavali vol. 1, Chittagong BS. 1832 (1975), ‘Musalman katha sahityer gati o parinati’, pp. 561-76. S. Wajed ali, ‘Bangla sahitya o bangali musalman’, in Md. Nasiruddn (ed.), Bangla sahitye saogat jug, op. cit. pp. 384-87. See M, Zahural Hug, Siksha 0 musalman and also see Khan Bahadur Ismail (B.L,) ‘Bangla bhasa o jana sahitya’, M.M., 7th yr., no. 1, Kartik 1340 Bs. (1932), pp. 60-62. The lingua franca controversy is an old one dating back to the late nineteenth and carly twentieth centuries which hit Bengal: in

3

REE

BS

Society and Culture.

165

the second decade of the twentieth century and persisted in the 1930s and 19408; M.M., 11th yr.,.no. 10, Sraban BS. 1345 (1938), pp. 726-28; M.N. Islam, op. cit. p. 225. M.M,, \1th yr., no, 10, Sraban BS. 1345 (1939). Zarin Kalam, ‘Hindu musalmaner birodh’, M.M.,

11th yr., no. 2, Paush

BS. 1344 (1937), pp. 167, 170. M.M,, 1th yr., no. 11, Bhadra 1345 (1939). “Alochana’, M.M., t1th yr., no. 12, Aswin'BS. 1345 Mohammad Wjad Ali, ‘Bangla bhasa o musalman Musalman sahitya patrika, \st yr., no. 4, Magh BS. translated by MN. Islam. ‘This is taken from a speech of Dr Shahidulluh in

(1937), pp. 371-72. Sahitya’, Bangiya1325 (1919). Quote Azharuddin Khan’s

BR8SRSESS

©

888

Bangla sahitye muhammad shahidullah (Calcutta, 1968), pp. 129-30.

Quoted by S. Ahmed, op. cit. p. 336. Azharuddin Khan, op. cit., pp. 230-31. Sufia Ahmed quotes Shaikh Abdur Rahim who in 1872 had written a book in pure Bengali entitled Islam. For a discussion of the linguistic problem, see S. Ahmed, op. cit, pp. 306-08, 325, 336. For a discussion of themes in Bengali Muslim literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see S, Ahmed, op. cit. pp. 334-43. Mir Musharraf Hussain, Bishad sindhu (Calcutta, reprint, 1936).

M. D. Ali, Samaj siksha (Nadia, 1920). Tone Majuddin Ahmed, Amar ‘sangsar jiban, op. cit. ‘Muslim Bharat, \st yr., vol. 1, no. 2, Jyaishtha BS. 1327 (1920), p. 100. Ibid. Moslem Darpan vol. 1, no. 8 (1925), p. 13. Sufia Ahmed, op. cit., p. 343. Naba nur, Bhadra, BS. 1311, cited in Abdul Kadir (ed.), Rokeya

rachanavali (Dacca, 1973), pp. 11-12.

Begum Sitara Khatun, ‘Muslim samaje narir sthan’, M.M., 8th yr., no. 8, 101.

Jyaisbtha 1342 (1935). For a discussion of the codification of Muslim law during colonial tule and its impact on customary rights enjoyed by women, see G. C.

Kozlowksi, ‘Muslim Women and the Control of Property in North India’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. XXIV, no. 2,

April-June 1987, pp. 163-82. A‘recent study reveals how the codification on Hindu laws of property and inheritance denied certain traditional rights enjoyed by women in India before colonial rule. Nandini Bhattacharya Panda, ‘Hindu law of Propesty in Bengal : Invention of Tradition’, seminar paper, St Antony's College, Oxford, 12 May, 1992.

166 102.

The Sacred and The Secular Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan, ‘Eid sanmelane narir sthan’, M.M.,

8th yr., no, 5, Phalgun BS. 1341 (1935), pp. 327-28.

103. Public and Judicial Department : Minutes of 24 May, 1939. 104. For the opinions of the intelligentsia on the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Bill (introduced by Quazi Muhammad Ahmed Kazemi,

MLA,), see paper no. V, Govt. of India Legislative Assembly Deptt. Opinion no. 10 for Bengal pp. 69-70. IOR:/L/P&J/1065.

105. Minutes of 24 May, 1939. 106. M.N. Islam, op. cit. pp. 137-39. Particularly see the citation from Islam

darsan of 1921 on p. 138. 107. Ibid., pp. 139-40, quote from Al-eslam, 1920. 108. Mohammad Akram Khan, ‘Samasya o samadhan’, M.M., Ist yr., no. 12, Aswin BS. 1335 (1928); also see ibid., p. 139.

109. M. Rahimunnisa Khanam,

‘Sangit charcha’, Saogat 7th yr, no. 1,

Bhadra BS. 1336 (1929); also see M.N. Islam, op. cit. p. 139. 110. These writers were all born before 1930. See D.G. Dacca,

pp. 334-38.

111. AK.F.

1969,

Hug had proposed in the primary Education Bill, 1934,

to integrate maktabs and junior madrasahs into the primary education system. See ‘Alochana’ on the future of maktabs and madrasahs, M.M.,

8th yr., no. 1, Kartik BS. 1341; pp. 77-79.

112, ‘Bengali Literature’, Pakistan Miscellany, vol. II (Karachi, 1958).

113. ‘Musalman katha sahityer gati o parinati’, Abul Faz! rachanavali vol. 1. BS. 1382 (Dacca, 1975), pp. 561-76. 114. For a discussion of Kazi Nazrul Islam's contribution to Bengali literature see S. I. Chowdhury, Introducing Nazrul Islam, 2nd ed. (Dacca, 1974),

pp. 11-12. 115. Kabir Chowdhury, Selected Poems of Nazrul Islam (Dacca, 1973).

116. Author's translation ; Bidrohi rana-klanta/ami sei din haba santa./jabe

utpiriter krandan roVakase batase dhwanibe na/atyacharir kharga kripan/bhim ranabhume ranibe na. 117. M.N. Islam, op. cit., p. 152.

118. The citations are from Kabir Chowdhury’s translations, op. cit., pp. 86, 119.

120.

92, ‘Allah is my Lord, I fear no one’. Islam Darsan, 3rd yr., no. 2, Kartik B.S. 1329 (1922), Choltan, 8th yr.,

no. 41, 17th Phalgun BS. 1330 (1924); Islam darsan, 5th yr., no. 5, Phalgun BS. 1332 (1926). Moslem Darpan vol. I, nos. 7, 8 and 10 (1925); also see particularly Kazi Ali Hussain, ‘Samaj chitra’, on criticism of the veneration of pirs

worship in issue no. 10.

Society and Culture 167 121. “Amader katha’, Muslim Bharat, \st yr., Ist no., Jyaishtha BS. 1327 (1920), pp. 3-4. 122, Ibid., pp. 21-26, 66-68, 71-73, 134-36, 460-63, 640-63. 123. See the various citations from periodicals and journals, and by M.N. Islam on the dichotomy in Hindu Muslim literature and Muslim perceptions of these; op. cit., pp. 136, 142-47. 124. Bankim’s attitude to Indian Muslims is complex for he also makes favourable statements about them. But the overriding impression one has about him is a passionate hostility to Muslims. For a brief analysis of his attitude to Indian Muslims, see Tapan Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered (Delhi, 1988), pp. 134-36 and Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A Derivative Discourse, (London, 1986), p. 77. For an analysis of Bankim’s philosophy see chapter 3. 125. A. R. Mallick writes of the un-Islamic practices which have passed into Indian Islam. The influence of Hindu mythology and custom in the work of Muslim writers of Bengal lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century. After the beginning of the Wahabi movement, it gave way to literary activities which can be considered puritanical; op. cit., pp. 135-45; Quazi Mutahar Hussain, ‘Bengali literature’ in Ikram and Spear (eds.), Cultural Heritage of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 138. For a detailed study of syncretism in Bengali Islam see Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton, 1983). 126. For examples of such concems see Bangla sahitye saogat jug, op. cit., pp. 344-46, 370-75, 379. 127. See M. N. Islam, op. cit., pp. 149-50. 128. Q. M. Hussain, op. cit. p. 141. 129. Munshi Emdad Ali, Milanyug ba niti rahasya (The Age of Unity or Mysteries of True Morality) Barisal, Bs. 1327 (1920), p. 120. 130. Ibid., pp. 2-4. 131. id., pp. 34, 40. 132. Rabindranath Tagore, ‘Swami Sraddhananda’, Kalantar, Rabindra Rachanavali, vol. 13, Essays, B.S. 1368 (Calcutta, 1961). This had started in the aftermath of World War I to enable peasants to bargain collectively with landlords and creditors partly as a result of British encouragement: See Broomfield, op cit. p. 3; S. Bose, Agrarian Bengal : Economy, Social Structure and Politics (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 185-86. 133. A.M. Ahmad, Atmakatha, pp. 108-10. 134. Dacca University Calendar (Dacca, 1921). 135. Interview with Prof. A. F. S. Ahmed, Professor Emeritus, Dept. of History, Dacca University, March-April 1985.

168

136. See 137. 138. 139. 140. 141, 142, 143. 144, 145. 146.

The Sacred and The Secular

A. M. Ahmad, Amar dekha Ist ed. (Dacca, 1968), chapter 1, and A.M. Ahmad, Amakatha, pp. 108-13. 211. Mohiuddin Ahmed, ‘Chintadhara : kalikata bisvabidyalay samparke du-ekti katha’, M.M., 10th yr., no, 1, Kartik Bs. 1343 (1937). MM, 8th yr., no. 2, Agrahayan BS. 1341 (1934). MM., %h yt., no. 8, Jyaishtha BS. 1343 (1936), p. 531; for a criticism of the texts see pp. 521-25. M.M., 10th yr., no. 2, Agrahayan BS, 1343 (1936), pp. 151-52; 11th yr., no. 2, Paush BS. 1344 (1938), p. 169. Interview with Prof. Mahmood. M.M., 12th yt., no, 6, Chaitra BS, 1345 (1939), p. 443. Interview with Prof. Mahmood. Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan, ‘Alochana-prabasite sri-padma’, M.M,, 10th yr., no. 12, Aswin BS. 1344 (1937), pp. 892-94. Maulana Akram Khan, ‘Alochana : Anandamath’, M.M., ibid., p. 892. Interview with Prof. Mahmood, Calcutta, Feb. 1985.

CHAPTER

3

RELIGION IN POLITICS, 1937-1947

Introduction

‘The political attitudes of the intelligentsia in the 1930s and forties reveal several strands. These include a clearly defined allegiance either

to a religious or a secular ideal. In some instances, individuals and groups manifested in their action and pronouncements a sharp tension between the two. The Krishak Praja Party (KPP) and the Muslim League (ML) represented two contending ideologies vying for Muslim

support in Bengal. The one broadly represented peasant and tenant in-

terests, the other, business and the zamindar interests. The one stressed

secular issues like economic inequality, the other, linked those eco-

nomic issues to the disadvantages suffered by Muslims as a community based on doctrinal faith and declared that the only way of overcoming

this state of deprivation was by emphasizing their communal identity

defined by religion and a solidarity based thereon.’

This chapter explores the interplay of religious and secular values in politics with reference to specific issues. Some of these are: the political vision of the intelligentsia and the ideological contradictions it displayed; the growing assertiveness in Muslim politics; methods of

political mobilization for the idea of Pakistan and the Muslim League;

the impact of the electoral process on the rise of Muslim exclusiveness,

the 1905 partition of Bengal, the Communal Award of 1932 and other similar institutions introduced by the British; and the relation between

religiosity and communalism. The chapter begins with an examination

of the ideology and programmes espoused by the two major political

parties mentioned above.

170

The Sacred and The Secular

The Muslim League, formed in 1906 through the joint efforts of

Sir Salimullah — representing primarily ashraf and upper class interests

—and the British, was largely a body of knights and nawabs, claiming

to represent the interests of all Muslims. It was effective as a rallying point for Muslims at the all-India level, on questions such as representation in the services and legislatures, e.g. in relation to the Com-

munal Award of 1932, but otherwise had little to offer to Muslims. The League, which had been practically a defunct body since 1920, was revived in 1934 under M. A. Jinnah. It continued to work under the old charter of Muslim rights, i.e. separate electorates granted first by the 1909 Act and confirmed again by the 1919 Act

and the Communal Award. However, it was not until 1936, when Jinnah visited Bengal, that the Bengal League came to be formed.

Its prime architects were two Calcutta businessmen, Ispahani and

Abdur Rahman Siddiqui. The League thus represented an alliance of landed and business interests.

The KPP originated in the Praja movement which had organized

the first All Bengal Praja Conference in Mymensingh in 1914. Its lead-

ership came from the middle and upper classes. Its aim was to improve

the status of Muslims and to obtain equal rights for them. Although

many of the leaders and activists were highly class conscious and took

great pride in their superiority of birth and ethnic origin, ie. ashraf status, their concern for the rights of tenants and poorer Muslims was

genuine. Their disappointment with the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928, which gave more rights to landlords, led them to form the Nikhil Banga Praja Samiti (All Bengal Tenants’ Association) in 1929 with Maulana

Akram Khan as secretary.”

‘The resignation of Sir Abdur Rahim from the presidency of the

Samiti in 1934, found the Bengal Muslim leadership divided along

east-west

lines as well

Maulana

Akram

as along class and ideology.

In the contest

for presidency the majority of delegates from West Bengal, including Khan,

supported

Khan

Bahadur

Abdul

while East Bengal delegates supported A. K. Fazlul Huq.’

Momen

‘Two other parties with a more marginal influence on society were

represented by the Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH) and the Communist

Party. The former included religious divines, many of whom were non-

Bengali. Its membership also consisted of nationalist Muslims who viewed

the

creation

of

territorial

nation

states

as

un-Islamic.

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947 Some

71

nationalist Muslims were entirely secular in outlook and were

inspired by a spirit of humanism. Among them were agnostics or even

ath>

Indiz

s, who believed in social equality and accepted the partition of

Within each of these groups, there were internal contradictions often caused by the clash of class interests. Jatindra Nath De has suggested that the KPP ‘reflected the growing political aspirations of certain newly emerging power groups in Bengali Muslim society

— the jotedars and the sampanna prajas, the moderately affluent

tenants’ and that it did not really launch a composite movement of the lower strata of Hindus and Muslims

against the exploitation of

zamindars.’ His charge that the KPP served only Muslim interests

contradicts the more popular view that it was an inter-communal

party representing the downtrodden.’ The party, incidentally, had a

large scheduled caste Hindu component.

The clash of interest between the KPP and the Muslim League,

while having explicit class dimensions, also reflected more clearly a

tension between religious and secular approaches to political mobilization. The election of Fazlul Huq as the secretary of the Nikhil Banga Praja Samiti in 1935, the incorporation into the party of peasants who were largely from the eastern districts, and its being named as the

Krishak Praja Party, made the leadership and the rank and file sharply

aware of its role as an organ of their aspirations as a class, or rather, a group of interlinked but at times mutually contradictory interests. The articulation of peasant demands such as the abolition of zamindari without compensation was unacceptable to the landed, upper

class Muslim leaders from Calcutta and the western districts, such as Akram Khan, Abdur Rahim and Shahid Suhrawardy — who broke away in 1936 to form the United Muslim Party (UMP), which later

merged with the Muslim League.* Unable to accept the radical demands

of the KPP, the UMP stressed the need for communal solidarity, hoping

to undermine the supra-communal policies of the KPP. In the absence

of proper organization and support in the eastern districts of Bengal

the UMP saw some advantage in the Muslim League’s claim to represent all Bengal Muslims and suggested that the KPP was ‘not a purely

Muslim organization’.’ In other words, the UMP was emphasizing the communal identity of Muslims to serve its own class interests. But

since this identity depended on allegiance to a shared faith, religion

172

The Sacred and The Secular

was introduced once again into politics for tactical reasons.’ The real motive behind this was not only secular but cynical self-interest.

‘The nationalist Muslims and the Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind projected

a consistent vision of Muslim political destiny, although after the creation of Pakistan men like Maulana Maududi, founder of the Jama’at-

iHslami, rushed to Pakistan claiming the right to formulate its ideology.

But Maududi in his desire to make Pakistan a theocracy was not govemed by the ideals of ‘exclusivists’ like Sir Syed, Iqbal or Jinnah, but by the pan-Islamist and traditionalist views of the nationalist Maulana

Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958)? Maulana Azad though greatly impressed by the views on modern education by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan

(1812-98)

stood

against his speculative

rationalism

and

that of

the Aligarh School which regarded the Koran as being ‘in harmony

with science and reason’ and as the only infallible source of Muslim

law." Sir Syed considered the Hadith as irrelevant to modern times, accepted the validity of ijma or consensus of theologians as a source

of Islamic law, but broadened the horizon of ijtihad or use of individual

reasoning as the birthright of every Muslim. To him, ijtihad was a principle that could be employed rationally for the revitalization and ‘modernization’ of Islamic law and life. Azad, like Maududi after him,

believed in the primacy of revelation over reason and laid emphasis on form, ritual and strict adherence to the letter of the law.'' 3.1

Internal Contradictions among the Intelligentsia

Lack of consistency, or a certain ambivalence regarding their political destiny and ideological outlook characterized the majority of the

intelligentsia in the pre-partition period. This ambivalence was notice-

able in the vacillating political careers of individuals like Fazlul Huq, Shahid

Suhrawardy, Abul

Hashim,

Abul

Mansur

Ahmed, Maulana

Akram Khan ete. (For a brief outline of the background and careers of each of them see Appendix 3.A.) It was also manifest in their attitude

to the Muslim League, the Pakistan

idea and the idea of

a

united Bengal. For example, Abul Mansur Ahmed considered himself

a liberated man, but was communal in so far as his main concern was

for his community alone. He accused reformers like Abul Hashim of

being more preoccupied with reforming Islam than with helping

Muslims." But Abul Mansur Ahmad was not anti-Hindu. In politics,

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

173

he was a nationalist and a Congressite. He believed in Hindu-Muslim

unity along the lines suggested by C. R. Das and was involved in the Krishak Praja movement.” He was one of those Bengal Muslims who found it difficult to accept the partition of India in 1947, even though

he left the KPP for the Muslim League as late as 1944, four years after the Pakistan Resolution was passed. Apparently, his non-communal ide-

ology eventually gave way to a more exclusive concern for Muslim

communal interests because of his harsh experience of Hindu attitudes. Among other things, he was upset by the Hindu refusal to accept the

vocabulary commonly used by Muslims as part of the Bengali lan-

guage. This

was

a

phenomenon

which

persisted

from

the

time

of the non-co-operation movement until long after the formation

of the KPP-ML coalition ministry in Bengal. In 1938 the education department had refused to publish a school textbook he produced be-

cause it contained no glossary of words of ‘foreign’, meaning Arabic or Persian, origin. He contempt for Muslims. Muslim Sahitya Samiti, unlike members of the

was upset by the growing awareness of Hindu This compelled him to align with the Bengal an association he considered to be ‘communal’ Samiti.

The shifting spectrum of ‘national’ goals and objectives mark the

intelligentsia as unstable in more than one sense and yet striving to-

wards a definite identity and well-defined inter-communal as well as intra-communal relationships. In terms of religious and secular perspec-

tives and ideals, the ambivalence represented the internal tensions and contradictions within the intelligentsia.

Abul Mansur’s communalism was largely a reaction to Hindu chauvinism, which amounted to what may be called ‘Hindu separatism’. In

1944, he refused to acknowledge the works of Rabindranath Tagore,

Vidyasagar and Bankimchandra as representing East Bengali culture, because they did not depict the life of Bengali Muslims nor used their

language." This attitude persisted in the post-partition period when he supported the official ban in 1967 on broadcasting Tagore songs.'® He

saw his identity in terms of a basic opposition to what he perceived to be Hindu identity,

but-in Pakistan, bereft of a Hindu threat , he

became somewhat less of a political exclusivist. However, he saw the

culture of East Bengal, which he called Pak-Bangla, as different from that of West Pakistan.'” Yet in some ways, he shared the values of the

174

The Sacred and The Secular

ruling ashraf, but in supporting the language movement in East Pakistan he also shared the aspirations of the vernacular intelligentsia. Changing Concerns among the Intelligentsia

Such internal contradictions may be traced to changing concerns and

perspectives of the emerging Bengal Muslim intelligentsia. The early intellectuals —

as

Nawab

whether they came from the ashraf aristocracy (such

Abdul

Latif,

Syed

Amir

Ali

Khan,

Sir

Salimullah,

Mir Musharraf Hussain and Wajed Ali Khan Panni) or rose to ashraf

status from poor rural backgrounds through their hard work, like Munshi Meherullah, Danshil Ketabuddin, and Munshi Bu Ali — were all social reformers in one way or another with a deep concern

for the education of their community.'* As spokesmen for their com-

munity, their voices were, however, weak. Often lacking the power of wealth and conviction about their own merit, their activities were lim-

ited to filing petitions seeking quotas for jobs and looking for official

patronage rather than competing for their legitimate rights."® Politically,

they were quiescent loyalists vis-a-vis the Raj. Unlike the later intellectuals, these early reformers concentrated not only on making pleas

to the rulers for concessions but also on building mosques and schools.

They were especially concerned about upholding the religious and social mores considered desirable. In their actions and concerns

they replicated the behaviour patterns of ‘good’ Muslims as understood

in their times. To the modern reader this may imply a conservative tilt

towards

traditional

Islamic

codes

of conduct.

Their

stance

in

most matters was generally apolitical. In later years, while the concern for education remained paramount, Muslim reformers became deeply

involved in politics, and a rather aggressive brand of politics ‘at that.

Of the later intellectuals, a large proportion came from an ashraf with strong rural links, while a significant section descended from

the urban aristocracy with weak rural connections. Those belonging

to the latter group included Maulana Akram Khan, Nawab Abdur Rahim, Shahid Suhrawardy, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Ghuznavi, etc.

Among the former were A. K. Fazlul Hug, Kazi Nazrul Islam, Abul Mansur Ahmad, Abul Hashim, Comrade Muzaffar Ahmed, etc.” Some of these men adopted a rather rebellious posture in sharp contrast to the earlier loyalist stance of the aristocratic intelligentsia.

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

175

The later generation of intellectuals, though more vocal and asser-

tive than their predecessors, represented a spectrum of attitudes — radi-

cal, moderate and conservative. Muzaffar Ahmed,

Suhrawardy and

Khwaja Nazimuddin may be cited as representatives of these three ten-

dencies respectively.

_ Comrade Muzaffar Ahmed represented the most radical trend of the times in accepting a communist philosophy. His work, unlike Nazrul

Islam’s, was not limited to writing. As a founder of the Indian

Communist Party he was actively engaged in organizing a communist

support base. He was deeply impressed by the 1917 Russian

Revolution. Born in a Do-bhashi speaking family in a village in Chittagong

district,

Muzaffar

Ahmed

grew

up to realize that

his father was ‘somewhat progressive’; he taught his son the Bengali alphabet at a time when Bengali Muslims tended to look down

upon that language.”' Though attracted to the ‘terrorist movement’ in

Bengal, there were obstacles to his joining it. The ‘terrorist’ revolutionaries drew their inspiration from Bankimchandra Chatterjee’s

Anandamath, a book ‘filled with ill-will from beginning to end’. The fundamental

message

of

the

novel

‘lay

in

Bankimchandra’s

Bande mataram’. Monotheist Muslims could not worship the motherland in the figure of Durga and bring themselves to utter lines such as

Thou as strength in arms of men,

Thou, as faith, in hearts, dost reign, And fame from temple to temple Thine, O Goddess,

For, Thou hast ten-armed Durga’s power ....7

Since 1916, Muzaffar Ahmed had been attending anti-British demonstrations organized by the nationalist Indians. In 1920 he decided to

devote himself completely to politics rather than to literature.

Though religious as a child, with some madrasah and general education, Ahmed accepted an atheistic philosophy as he came into contact with Marxist and humanist thought.” But Bengali Muslim

society in the thirties was not yet ready for men like Nazrul Islam and Muzaffar Ahmed, men who were admittedly inspired by the humanist tradition of M. N. Roy and upheld the ‘religion of man’ above all communal considerations. These men had espoused

176

The Sacred and The Secular

communistic and socialistic ideals as their goals but were politically ineffective

because

the religious

faith in such ‘godless’ people.“

and

conservative

masses

had

no

Fazlul Huq and Suhrawardy represented moderate tendencies. The latter, though from an urban ashraf background unlike the former,

represented

that independent

brand

of politicians,

who,

like Huq,

could not be bought by titles and as such remained objects of sus-

picion to the British. Nazimuddin, their ‘blue-eyed boy’ descended

from

a family

which acquired much of its power and status by

helping the Raj during the Sepoy Mutiny, was specially groomed

by the government to mule.”* Of the three, Huq brought a new style

of politics to the fore. Like Nazrul Islam in the field of literature,

he in his own field demanded the legitimate rights of the people,

rather than official patronage. Huq derived his power from this con-

tribution to the welfare of the masses, his slogan of ‘dal-bhat’ (i.c. ‘tice and dal’ symbolizing basic sustenance) and his championship

of krishak and praja causes. Yet, his political career was marked by a degree of ambivalence. In 1916, he supported the Lucknow

Pact, and stood for Hindu-Muslim unity. In 1920, he opposed the

‘Swarajist call to students to leave government schools probably be-

cause he saw education as the only source of salvation for Muslim youth. In 1929-30 he opposed Muslim participation in the

Civil Disobedience Movement as not conducive to the best interest

of ‘Muhammadans’”” In the thirties, he was deeply involved with the KPP, which was inter-communal in character. In 1940, he moved

the famous Lahore Resolution which later came to be known as the

Pakistan Resolution. In 1941, he quit the Muslim League and formed a coalition with Syama Prasad Mookherjee of the Hindu Mahasabha.

Again in 1945, when the Muslim League was championing Islam

and Pakistan,

Hug was

in the opposition. But in September 1946,

Huq applied to join the Muslim League.

On the one hand, Huq was well-known for his fierce communal speeches, partly a political strategy and partly a reaction to the constant attack on him by Calcutta dailies like Ananda Bazar Patrika, Forward,

Advance, etc." On the other hand, he had close associates among Hindus including the controversial Syama Prasad Mookherjee.

His generosity extended not only to Muslims, but also to Hindus for

which the latter called him Data Karna.” He has also been

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

177

characterized as essentially a humanist who believed that there was no

‘diversity’ in religion, that ‘all religions must be, from the basic point

of view, One’. Hug hoped to combine religious, secular and communal

ideals in his political philosophy. Once forced to leave the Muslim

League

he planned to found a Progressive Muslim

League, which

would be ‘Islamic in its ideals’, ‘keep in view the interest of the country as a whole’ and recognize the ‘legitimate rights of other communities’. Huq

wanted both inter communal

harmony

and at the same time to

please Muslims by talking of Islam and of ‘unity between Muslims’.” The first loyalty of Suhrawardy, a moderate, was to his community.

In his youth Suhrawardy, was a follower of the great Swarajist, C. R.

Das, the one Bengali Hindu leader most sympathetic to Muslims.

Although he could not be bought by titles,

he could never be radical

enough to give up the interests of his class and accept land reforms.”

In the forties, he worked along with Abul Hashim to popularize the Muslim League among the Muslim masses of Bengal. And yet, faced

with the reality of Pakistan, he revealed the contradictions of his times by advocating a united Bengal. This united Bengal was envisaged as a non-communal and socialistic society, where the minority community

would decide whether to have joint or separate electorates.” The issue of electorates was the most significant single issue to divide Hindus and Muslims since the 1909 Act.

Suhrawardy has been accused not only of being responsible for

the Calcutta killings in 1946 but also of having organized them.”

Though as Chief Minister, Suhrawardy was responsible for law and order in Bengal, it must be remembered that 16 August was declared

Direct Action Day by Jinnah, not Suhrawardy. Abul Hashim’s state-

ment to the press issued on 13 August declared that the Muslim

League would observe Direct Action Day to demonstrate its griev-

ances against British imperialism.“ Khwaja Nazimuddin and Raja

Ghaznafar Ali Khan of Lahore saw their struggle as being ‘against

the Congress and the Hindus’. It has in fact been suggested that

the targets of Direct Action were the Hindus as the British and the

Christians were left unmolested.” According to S. A. Masud, who

defended Suhrawardy

on behalf of the Muslim League along with

B. A. Siddiqui, an inquiry into the killings revealed that the riots

had begun even before Direct Action was defined. He places the blame squarely on the ‘Mahasabha and Hindu communalism’. Masud

178

The Sacred and The Secular

recalls that the earliest incidents of rioting occurred at 8 a.m. that day. Others

have

suggested

that it began at 6 a.m.

It started

with

the looting and burning of an entire Muslim area on Bow Bazar

Street in Central Calcutta.” Suhrawardy drove alone to the spot to try and bring the incident under control. A strike had been called on that day and several meetings

were scheduled

to be held,

such

as the one at Islamia College at 4 p.m. and another at the Maidan

at 3 p.m. Muslims were totally unaware of the trouble brewing. S. A.

Masud,

Abul

Hashim

and

others

went

to the Maidan

with

their little children.’ Muslim women students from Munnujan Hall, a post-graduate hostel for women, headed for Islamia College on foot, and waited there for several hours before being

warned that a

communal riot had started.” In the meantime, the hostel had been attacked, the valuables looted and furniture burnt. The

to take shelter in the office of the weekly

Millat.”

women

had

At 3 p.m.

Suhrawardy requested the Muslim public to return to their homes;

for while the men had assembled at the Maidan leaving their homes unguarded, Muslim pockets and bustees (slums) had been attacked.

To quote S. A. Masud: Hindus planned to make Direct Action Day unsuccessful so that the British Government would think that the people of Bengal did’ not want Pakistan ... while the Muslims were coming to the Maidan and returning back to their homes they were attacked by gunfire from rooftops and with bricks which were collected in Hindu houses along the main roads.“'

To quote Abul Hashim :

‘The Muslim League had no knowledge, no apprehension or anticipation as to the unprecedented violence that started ... the Muslims were unarmed and unprepared to meet the situation «++ If we had apprehended any danger we would not have taken our sons and grandsons to the Maidan.”

The accusations against Suhrawardy seem implausible on two

counts. As Chief Minister, he would be held responsible for any breakdown

in law and order which would also discredit his ministry. He

could not want a riot on his hands while he was in government. If he

was responsible for organizing the riots he would certainly not have wanted a united Bengal, but a divided one. Nor would public meetings

be organized in such a way as to encourage Leaguers to attend them

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

179

with their children; and women would not have been encouraged to

participate in these public meetings if rioting on such a scale was anticipated. Abul Hashim writes in his memoirs that when Suhrawardy

realized that the Calcutta police force was not strong enough to tackle

the situation, he requested Burrows, the Governor of the province, to

call out the army, but the army did not come. Finally, after five days

of rioting, the situation was brought under control with the help of a big contingent of armed constables sent on request by the Government

of Punjab.“ In the meantime, Suhrawardy himself took charge of the

control room at Lal Bazar Police Headquarters and directed the police

operations at grave risk to his life.“ He could not rely on

the Commissioner of Police who was a European, but received help

from his Hindu friend, Hiren Sarkar, who was an Inspector of Police. Notably, another factor which helped quell the riots was a

peace procession on 21 August, led by all party leaders including

Suhrawardy, Sarat Bose, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Kiron Shankar Roy, M.A. Ispahani, J. C. Gupta, Shamsuddin Ahmed, Abul Hashim, etc,”* The accusations against Suhrawardy came primarily from the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, British officials and other nonMuslim scholars such as the Sikhs. Notably, the Sikhs had taken the side of Hindu extremists in attacking Muslim localities during

the

riots.

It

is

not

the

intention

here

to

discuss

the merits

and demerits of these charges except to point out that Muslims had a totally different perspective on the issue. Apportioning blame for the riots instead of attempting to understand why they happened is

an exercise in futility. The evidence cited is generally unreliable and faulty as the witnesses were inevitably partisan. Impartiality could

not be expected of British officials, including Governor Burrows whose inaction or belated action contributed to the spread of the

carnage. Few are willing to talk about those horrific and shameful events today, let alone admit to participating in them although many

are still alive. The Hindu Mahasabha had made clear in no uncertain terms

that

it

would

prevent

the observance of

hartal (strike)

on Direct Action Day. Along with the Congress, it resented the

declaration of a public holiday on this day by the government and resolved to foil it. The police force was guilty of inaction. The

Congress had exhibited total disregard and contempt for Muslim as-

pirations by refusing to come to any understanding with the Muslim

180

The Sacred and The Secular

League on the formation of an interim government. The Muslim

League minority obviously wanted Direct Action Day to be success-

ful in terms of the observance of hartal and had built up a sense

of fervour in order to ‘win Pakistan’ by force if necessary. The

League ministry, though in charge of law and order, had to rely for

help on senior European and Hindu officials which was not forthcoming.

The

scene

was

therefore

set

for

accusations

and

counter-accusations. Speculation has continued since these charges were not investigated

exhaustively and the results were not published. Suhrawardy’s connec-

tions with the goonda (hooligan) underworld of Calcutta was often

cited as proof of his role in the Calcutta killings, although other politicians from the Congress and the Mahasabha also had similar connec-

tions. The fact that Suhrawardy took charge of the police control room

set up by the European Commissioner to monitor developments in the

city was seen as a sinister act of mischief by some investigators. Little

notice was taken of the fact that he did so at grave risk to his own life

only when the European Commissioner and the Police force controlled

by him failed to act in order to restore order. His alleged release of

eight Muslim rioters was highlighted though the number is paltry con-

sidering that 10,000 people, most of them Muslims, were killed in the carnage. Although he was Chief Minister, his use of official vehicles

to patrol the streets and offer of protection and shelter to those caught in the crossfire, was misrepresented as an example of his misuse of

the state machinery to incite rioters and show them ‘sympathy’. The anomaly

in the evidence

cited has

not

always

been

explained.

For example, Das states that 65 per cent of property destroyed belonged

to Hindus and 25 per cent to Muslims. However, a larger number of

arrested goondas were Hindu, 1,704 as against 1,192 Muslims and the Proportion of Muslims killed in the massacre far exceeded that

of Hindus. Such facts raise doubts about his claim that Muslims had

‘organized’ the riots, nor lend credence to his silence on the extent of

Hindu preparation which went into the massacre.” While

elite and popular communalism

may

have played

a part

in the Calcutta killings, the riots could not all have been entirely

‘organized’. If Muslims had planned the event they would have taken care to protect themselves, particularly their “women and children, and stayed indoors. The responsibility for the killings

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

must

be

shared

by

all

parties

and

181

active

politicians of the

time. The nightmare was created by politicians, both Hindu and

Muslim, who had successfully whipped up the emotions of their

co-religionists and created an atmosphere of fear, intimidation and expectation of violence. It became a wish fulfilling prophecy. Hatred

and suspicion was generated by the distribution of provocative leaf-

lets, threats and speeches. The breakdown of negotiations over the interim government

also contributed to the exacerbation of commu-

nal tension to an unprecedented degree. This highly charged atmos-

phere set the scene for mindless

and frenzied

killings. The guilt

must be shared by all concerned. Although Suhrawardy’s main con-

cern before partition was the welfare of his community, after parti-

tion he became a champion of minority rights. He cannot be bracketed

with

the

extreme

communalists

of

were responsible for killing in the name of religion.

his

time

who

‘The understanding of and response to the Pakistan idea best illus-

trates the inconsistencies, contradictions and ambivalence in the political vision of the intelligentsia. The tension between their religious and secular concerns in the pre-1947 period was most clearly articulated

around this issue.

3.2 The Pakistan Idea : its Meaning and Implications

The interplay of religion and politics during the Pakistan movement

was driven by a motive force quite different from that during the Khilafat movement. For one thing, the leadership of the latter came

from the ulama, while that of the former from the western-educated

intelligentsia, which often consisted of secular-minded politicians engaged in competition over resources. For another, the dismemberment of the Turkish empire was seen as the destruction of something sacred,

the holiest office in Islam. But during the Pakistan movement, as the

meaning of the term ‘Pakistan’ was not very clear, there were no immediate associations of sacredness with it. Over time, however, such

a connotation emerged. This explains the growing passions aroused by

the Pakistan idea, the slogans of ‘Islam in danger’ and the view that

anyone opposed to the creation of Pakistan was somehow not a good

Muslim.

Thus at its very inception Pakistan took on the characteristics of a

182

The Sacred and The Secular

religious or ideological state. Paradoxically, this was not what the founders had in mind. For Jinnah, Pakistan was a bargaining tool vis-a-vis

the Congress for a greater share of power at the centre. To Kamruddin

Ahmed, the Lahore Resolution was a measure to divide India rather

than one aimed at creating an Islamic state.” The religious orthodoxy,

represented by the Jama’ at-i-Islami of Maududi felt that Pakistan would serve no purpose, although after partition they changed their mind. Yet, for those who did believe that Hindus and Muslims were two nations,

the establishment of an Islamic state was apparently the implicit pur-

pose of the Pakistan movement. But Pakistan was an idea, a poet’s

vision of utopia, and until realized, this vision meant little that was clear or concrete. Igbal, whose contribution to the development of the Pakistan idea has been acknowledged by Jinnah, visualized an Islamic state.” On

28 May 1937, he wrote to Jinnah suggesting that the Muslim League

should try to win the support of the Muslim masses by assuring them that it would get rid of their poverty through the establishment of Islamic law. He believed that Nehru’s socialism would not be acceptable to ordinary Muslims.

Iqbal wrote

:

But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam

is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or

states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots.

I fear that in certain parts of the country, e.g. N.W. India, Palestine may be repeated.*!

But even as the Pakistan Indian Muslims, it was given the Lahore Resolution, also passed, Jinnah’s Presidential

idea began to take root in the minds of no concrete shape. In March 1940, when known as the Pakistan Resolution, was speech concluded :

‘Come forward as servants of Islam, organize the people eco-

nomically, socially, educationally and politically, and I am sure that you will be a power that will be accepted by everybody.

Note the use of the word ‘power’; it was crucial to Jinnah’s political stand and psyche. He wanted to establish Muslims as ‘a power’, to

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

183

call them ‘forward as servants of Islam’, to see Islam as the uniting

principle for all Muslims. Yet, he did not ask them to organize them-

selves according to Islamic principles. By asking the people to organize

themselves ‘socially’ he might have had their religion in mind for he had understood Islam and Hinduism as ‘not religions in the strict sense

of the word, but [as] different and distinct social orders’.® It seems

that his major concern was not so much with the religious aspirations

of his people as with their political and economic future. Kamruddin Ahmed, a member of the Bengal Muslim League described the Pakistan movement as a ‘movement of the

Muslim middle class against the Hindu middle class’. The adoption of the Pakistan

demand

for it incorporated

‘simplified

a demand

the task of political agitation’,

for quotas

in the services,

protest

against requiring Muslim children to sing Bande Mataram in schools

and resentment of Hindu domination among the Muslim masses.°*

While there was a feeling that the then Muslim peasant culture would be purified in an Islamic environment, of greater weight to Muslims was the belief that ‘Pakistan’ would allow Indian Muslims

to maintain their cultural and political identity.

The fear of being swamped by the majority community was more acute among Muslims of the provinces where they were in a minority than where they were not. And these people were most vocal in their demand

for Pakistan.

According

to Jinnah,

in the Central

Provinces and Bihar, ‘Muslims! were both small in numbers and poor in status and they had been “thrashed” by the Congress there more

than in any other province’. The Muslims of the United Provinces though not large in number ‘had greater status and more power, and

they had been able to hold their own with greater success’. Jinnah

reflected the Muslim League view that ‘in all minority provinces the Muslims

had sampled

Congress Rule

and were

determined

not

to submit to any constitution which would install Congress domina-

tion over the whole country’.”

Ispahani, a business magnate from Bengal, admitted that there was

an

‘almost fanatical determination’

among Muslims

not to be domi-

nated by Hindus any longer, for ‘it was impossible for the Muslims to achieve

economic

emancipation

at

the

hands

of

the

Hindus’.

‘The implication was that ‘adequate safeguards’ could have been an alternative to Pakistan. However,

the attainment of Pakistan was

184

The Sacred and The Secular

presented as a goal and a remedy that would open the way to the transformation of the lives of the Muslims

in India. The vision was

capable of sustaining unlimited hope and enthusiasm. In the Muslim

majority provinces, where the appeal of Pakistan was initially limited, major changes occurred during 1942-45. The Unionists of Punjab and large sections of the KPP of Bengal were co-opted into the Muslim League. Its following, which used to be ‘strongest in the towns and

among the intelligentsia’, gained ground rapidly also among the agri-

cultural masses.”

Some historians are of the view that Jinnah was not very serious about a sovereign state of Pakistan, but was interested in wresting some

vital concessions from both the British Government and the Congress.

Pakistan was his trump card, his means of bargaining for power. This

was why the idea remained undefined. The Raj view, in fact, was simi-

lar. It was not sure initially, even in January 1942, whether Pakistan

would in the long run be pressed as a ‘bargaining asset or as a genuine

objective’.*' It saw Pakistan as a ‘political slogan’ and doubted it as ‘a counsel of despair’ for which Jinnah provided support ‘by consistent

vagueness in his definition’. There were pressures from the Raj for

a ‘showdown on Pakistan...to define it and subject it to scrutiny’.

But in 1945, Khawaja Nazimuddin of the Dacca nawab family assured

Casey, the Governor of Bengal, that Pakistan ‘was not a bargaining

counter’ and explained that Jinnah had not put up any concrete proposals because he suspected

that these would

‘merely

be torn to

pieces’.“ However, on 6 October 1944, Jinnah categorically stated in

an interview that the idea was

to divide India into two sovereign parts of Pakistan and Hindustan by the recognition of the whole of the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, Bengal and ‘Assam as sovereign Muslim territories as they now stand.

By November 1945, it was announced that Pakistan would be a state based on the holy Koran and the political philosophy of Islam. While there was considerable response to the religious appeal of the Pakistan idea among the masses, the real upholders of Islamic orthodoxy, the Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind and the Deoband school stood aloof from the movement. Here too Muslim’ ranks were divided. The Jamiyat and Deoband provided the bulk of the

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

185

nationalist ulama most of whom co-operated with the Congress; but

some joined the Muslim League when the collapse of the Khilafat movement

brought about a split. After the Lahore Resolution

was

passed, the orthodoxy attempted to define the concept of an Islamic state

and

determine

its administrative structure.” The

role

of

Maududi in this may be noted. Maududi, who founded the Jama’ati-Islami in 1941 believed that nationalism would seduce people away

from Islam. He argued that the struggle for an ‘Islamic state’ was

being waged on rather ‘un-Islamic’ principles, for territorial nationalism was not considered compatible with Islam. Muslim nationalism is rooted in the concept of Islamic civilization. A nation is equated with a community of the faithful, with a ‘consensus’ of faith irrespective of geographical location or spatial boundaries. In the traditional Islamic view, states are multiracial, where communities

co-exist and enjoy autonomous nationhood. ‘Pakistan’ was a modi-

fication of this concept in so far as it had a geographical formation. The Deoband conception of Islam was legal, traditional, orthodox, conservative and not amenable to reinterpretation. The Deoband

school was convinced that the western-educated League leadership was exploiting Islam to appeal to the religious emotions

of the masses. The League leadership was cut off from the Islamic past and educated in a different mould of intellectual tradition; hence it failed to produce an Islamic ideology. The ulama were shocked by Jinnah’s opposition to the Shariat Bill of 1935. They did not believe that men like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were capable of

building an Islamic state.

3.3. Intellectual Responses to the Pakistan Idea The intelligentsia displayed considerable ambivalence in their attitude to ‘Pakistan’, Fazlul Hug, who had moved the Lahore Resolution and believed that any form of Muslim alliance with the Congress would be like striking a ‘death-below to Islam’, himself formed a coalition ministry with the controversial and communal Syama Prasad Mookherjee of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1941. Later, when the movement for Pakistan gathered momentum he was in the opposition. While he was not the architect of the Lahore Resolution neither was he, it has been suggested, a believer in the two-nation theory. Amalendu De

186

The Sacred and The Secular

contends that Hug realized his mistake immediately after the resolution

was passed and thought that the proposition was unrealistic and opposed to India’s interests.” This view underestimates the ambivalence of his character and fails to explain the Huq-Jinnah split, based

on political rather than ideological grounds.

The split was really over Jinnah’s ‘high handedness’; his attempt

to acquire bargaining power at the centre required the total loyalty and subordination of provincial interests to the All India Muslim League.

His determination to be the sole spokesman of all Indian Muslims entailed following a communal line of politics. The conflict between Huq and Jinnah was over the latter’s — what Huq called — ‘arbitrary use

of power’. When on 21 July 1941, Linlithgow called on Hug, Sikander

and Sadullah to join the National Defence Council without referring

to Jinnah, the latter called upon the Muslim members to resign. Huq

broke with the All India Muslim League in protest ‘against the manner in which the interest of the Muslims in Bengal and Punjab are being imperilled by Muslim leaders of provinces where the Muslims are in

a minority’.” Here too, his argument invoked the Islamic frame of reference. He found the Muslim League atmosphere undemocratic’. He commented that

‘un-Islamic and

the policy pursued by the present Muslim League is neither Islamic nor patriotic. It serves neither the Muslims nor anybody else. It pretends to be exclusively Muslim, claiming to serve ‘Muslims alone, but really leading even the Muslims to political ruin and disaster.” Pakistan meant different things to different people; to politicians like Jinnah, it was a bargaining counter; to the masses,

it provided the

hope of escape from Hindu domination and the possibility of realizing more fully their separate identity; to the orthodox, it was a misappli-

cation and misuse of Islamic principles. The roles of Abul Hashim

considerable

lack

and Kamruddin

of consistency

Ahmed

too display a

in their political-ideological

and

religious-secular vision. Both of them, along with other members of

the Bengal Muslim League, worked very hard to propagate the League

creed and build grass roots support for it. Ideologically, however, they were more left-oriented and believed in wresting power from landlord

and business interests and vesting it in the middle classes.”

The vision of an independent united Bengal was short-lived. There

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

187

was an element of contradiction in the idea. The Lahore Resolution

envisaged three independent states instead ofa united India.” But while the methods of mobilization for the Pakistan idea emphasized the com-

munal and religious identity of Muslims, united Bengal was conceived

along non-communal and socialistic terms. But to Abul Hashim, Islam

was

not

only

a

religion

but

also

a means

to

economic

and

social freedom. He believed in what he called ‘Islamic socialism’.” But the success of the idea of a united Bengal would largely depend on the support of the Bengali Hindu community which would require

a greater emphasis on secular symbols. When the issues were put to

vote in the legislature, the Muslim League voted in favour of joining Pakistan rather than India in one session. In other sessions, the Muslim

League legislators of both East and West Bengal voted against partition

while the Hindus voted in favour.” Kamruddin

nalism

and

Ahmed

saw a link between religiosity and commu-

felt that one

inevitably

led to the other. At the same

time, he felt that the bond of religion was essential for social order,

which could be achieved only temporarily in a classless society.”

To him, therefore, Islam and socialism were not contradictory terms since he felt the necessity both achievement of equity.

The

vision

of a united

for the maintenance

Bengal

of order and

as a socialistic

society

where minorities would decide about major issues such as joint and separate electorates, could not really offer a solution to the commu-

nal problem. Years earlier, in 1940, the Congress itself had suggested

a similar solution to the communal

problem

: whatever the

constitution adopted for India, the party would fully guarantee the

rights and interests of minorities who would themselves choose the

necessary safeguards, for the protection of their rights.” Muslims were

not

convinced

then,

just

as

Hindus

were not suffi-

ciently reassured, to opt for a united Bengal in 1947. 3.4

The Development of the Pakistan Idea :

The Rise of Muslims as a Political Force

Quiescent loyalists became a political force as the Pakistan idea began to gain ground. An increasingly numerous intelligentsia began to assert itself in the political arena. An explanation

188

The Sacred and The Secular

is necessary of the factors leading to the development of the Pakistan idea and its growing popularity in order to ascertain

whether the issues involved were religious or secular. The formation

of the Muslim ministry in 1937 in Bengal already indicated that the

community had become a force to reckon with, that it would no longer be satisfied with a supplicant role and that a vocal Bengal

Muslim

middle

class

was

in

the

game

of wresting

power

and decision-making. In 1937, the Bengal Muslim ministry had to be a coalition because none of the three major contending parties,

the Congress, KPP and Muslim League, had an absolute majority.

‘The election results also showed that Muslim ranks were not united.

The Muslim League polled 27.10 per cent of the Muslim votes while

the KPP secured 31.5 per cent of them in Bengal.” Independents

and the Congress got the rest. In 1946, the League secured 83.6

per cent of

the Muslim votes and the KPP only 5.3 per cent. The

Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind and Nationalist Muslims, both supported by the Congress, won 1.2 and 0.2 per cent respectively of the Muslim

votes polled.” The voting pattern displayed tremendous unity. The

Muslim

League won

75 per cent of the Muslim

votes in India in

of the

123 Muslim

seats in 1946 against just 40 out of 117 in

1946 compared to only 4.5 per cent in 1937. In Bengal it won 114 1937."' The Congress won very few Muslim seats in 1937 and 1946.

Many nationalist Muslims and KPP workers lost their deposits in the latter election. The verdict of 1946 indicated massive Muslim sup-

port for Pakistan. This was the culmination of a process set in mo-

tion by the British in 1871 with the overt decision to encourage

Muslim education and development and the covert desire to create

a counterforce td the increasingly recalcitrant Hindu bhadralok.

‘The arena of Bengal politics witnessed increasing Muslim par-

ticipation from the second decade of the twentieth century. The bulk

of new participants

came

the emerging intelligentsia. an element of confidence educational

and

from

employment

the new

Their greater that resulted

facilities made

middle

classes

and

assertiveness reflected from the increasing available to them

as

well as the political and economic advantages which their grow-

ing numerical strength secured for them. In the scramble for political

and

other

forms of patronage, the self-identification of Indians in

terms of communities, a phenomenon encouraged by the British, and

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

the weightage allowed on a communal

189

basis had come to play an

important role in determining the bargaining power of the contend-

ing groups. In 1917, when Montagu, the Secretary of State, visited India, 222 associations addressed representations to him. ‘The 112 deputations which won audience with Montagu had clearly been or-

ganized in terms of categories advised by the British’, e.g. owners,

businessmen,

classes etc.

Muslims,

high-caste

land-

Hindus and depressed

In the twenties and thirties several factors helped the Muslim intel-

ligentsia to gradually secure an ascendancy in Bengal politics.

The Muslims had, on the whole, stood apart from nationalist politics after the failure of the Khilafat and non-co-operation agitations to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity. This alienation being favourable to

British interests, earned the support of Europeans and Anglo-Indians

in the Council, and enabled Muslims to dominate the Calcutta Corpo-

ration.” In 1935, Fazlul Huq was elected its mayor. The Muslim policy

of agrarian reforms to benefit the masses, advanced the interests of

lower-caste Hindus, and earned their support as well in the Council.

Muslim alliance with the Hindu peasantry in East Bengal led to the Hindu bhadralok’s loss of control over many local boards in the elections of 1927 and 1931. The legislations enacted to relieve peasant indebtedness by the Huq ministry since he came to office in 1937,

threatened the super-structure of bhadralok economic power, that is,

the power of moneylenders and zamindars.“

During the decade, 1927-37, constitutional reforms were under discussion, and every decision favoured Muslim domination of the political system

in provinces

where they were in a majority. Since

1927, each successive ministry was headed by a Muslim as a result of the collusion of the European group, .nominated officials, and

elected Muslims Congress

sent

in the Council.’ Throughout this period the

‘Congressmen

into legislatures

for

wrecking

the

constitution’. This was the policy of C. R. Das and his Swarajya Party who believed that swaraj would

come

if dyarchy

could be

destroyed.” Thus the interests of Congressmen and Muslims in the Council pulled in different directions. David Page has established that the operation of the 1919 Act gave politicized Muslims in Muslim-majority provinces a vested interest in separatism and

opened the door to partition.”

190

The Sacred and The Secular

The Electoral Process

The Communal Award of 1932 and the extension of the franchise according to the 1935 Act cut at the roots of bhadralok power.

The Award allotted 119 seats out of 250 in the Bengal Legislative

Council to Muslims; of the 80 seats allotted to general Hindu constitu-

encies, 30 were reserved for the depressed classes under the Poona Pact

and caste Hindus were left with 50 seats.A major purpose of the British in encouraging

the

separate

political

development

of dif-

ferent communities through such measures was to induce Indians to see the communities ‘as the basis of political constituencies and under-

mine the potentiality of cross-communal alliances on the basis of class or group interests. The Bengal Hindus denounced the Award with one

accord. The Muslims, however, were divided on the issue. Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan and Dr R. Rahim in a resolution in the Bengal Legislative Council considered ‘reservation of seats for the majority

community in Bengal’ as ‘detrimental to their own interest’. But A. K. Fazlul Hug along with thirty prominent Muslims, some of them mem-

bers of the Legislative Assembly, regarded the Award as a ‘distinct advance’ and were ‘pleased with it’.” The British reaction to the dis-

appointment expressed by some Bengal Muslims was that they were

‘likely gradually to realize solid advantages they have gained’.” Hindu reaction was naturally hostile. For example, at the fourth

session of the All India Hindu Yuvak Conference which was affili-

ated to the Hindu Mahasabha, the Communal Award was denounced as being the ruin of Hindus in Bengal, Punjab, Sind and the North

West Frontier Provinces.” The Mahasabha accused the Congress of

being responsible for separate electorates. The Congress had agreed to separate electorates in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and the Nehru

Report of 1928. Later it adopted a policy of neutrality instead of ‘opposition while attending the Round Table Conference in London when the Communal Award was approved ‘perpetuating this evil in

the new Constitution’.”

The electoral process continued to encourage the separate political development of Hindus and Muslims. Nominated legislatures prevailed until 1909 when the Indian Councils Act ‘created an indirect system

of election

... with

small

separate electorates for Muslims

and separate constituencies for special ‘interests’. The Government

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

191

of India Act, 1919 introduced partial responsible government by en-

-larging the electorate, but kept 13 per cent of Council seats reserved

for nominated officials and continued the system of separate torates.“

The

electoral

roll

of India Act, 1935 enfranchised

prepared

under

elec-

the Government

13.4 per cent of the adult population

of Bengal over twenty years of age. Almost anyone who paid any

tax, rate or fee now had the right to vote.”

Table 3.1 : ENFRANCHISEMENT FOR MUHAMMADAN CONSTITUENCIES BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE

‘The Elections of 1920, 1923, 1926 and 1936-37

Date of Election 1920 1923 1926 1936-37

‘Council No. of Percentof Voters Muslims 465,127 18 463,386 18 529,995 20 19,610 0.07

Assembly No.of = —Per cent of Voters Muslims 53,935 02 45,401 02 63,320 02 3,462,767 126

Source: Compiled from ISC, vol. VIII, p. 131. Report of the Reforms Office, Bengal, 1932-37, pp. 289-90 While the 1919 Act enfranchised 1,020,000 lakh people, the 1935

Act gave 6,695,483 people the right to vote.” Under the Montagu-

Chelmsford system, 2.5 per cent of the Bengal population had the fran-

chise, whereas the percentage for Bengal Muslims was 1.8 and that for the whole of India, 2.8.” The electoral process favoured the domination

of non-Muslims.

While Muslims

formed

55.3 per cent and non-

Muslims 44.7 per cent of the population in the rural constituencies,

they formed 48.8 per cent and 51.2 per cent of voters in these con-

stituencies respectively for the 1926 elections. In the combined rural and urban constituencies Muslims formed 53.5 per cent of the population but 45.9 per cent of the voters whereas non-Muslims formed

43.7 per cent of the population but 54 per cent of the voters.

Table 3.1 above gives the number and percentage of Bengal

Muslims enfranchised for Muhammadan constituencies in the 1920,

1923, 1926 and 1936-37 elections. Under Dyarchy, franchise quali-

fications were very high, therefore, not many Muslims could qualify.

For rural constituencies of the Legislative Council it was payment

192

The Sacred and The Secular

of cess of not less than one rupee and union rate or chaukidari tax

of not less than five rupees per annum.” For urban areas the re-

quirement was somewhat higher — one rupee eight annas a year; for Howrah

it was three rupees. For general constituencies of the

Legislative Assembly, the qualifications were higher still : cess or

union rate of five rupees." Therefore, the size of the electorate for the Assembly was much smaller than that for the Council. ‘The slight increase in the number and percentage of Muslim voters between 1923 and 1926 has been attributed partly to an increase in the wealth of the community

and partly to the granting of franchise to

women. The proportion of Muslims who actually voted in 1926 was 14.82

per

cent

higher

than

in

1923

whereas

for

non-Muslims

the voting turnout was 22.44 per cent higher.” This could be due to increasing political awareness, especially among Hindus. Among Muslims, the increase in voter turnout was much greater for elections to the Assembly (26.4 per cent) than to the Councif (14.9 per cent)

indicating a greater level of motivation among the moneyed classes.”

The 1935 Act enfranchised only 0.07 per cent of Muslims for the Council but 12.6 per cent for the Assembly (see Table 3.1). Such a large electorate for the Assembly would include the entire intelligentsia

and many others. On the one hand, the growth of the electorate may

be taken as an indicator of the rising educational and economic levels

of a community because only a certain level of economic well-being

and educational achievement qualified one for the franchise. On the

other hand, it was also largely determined by the British decision to give the franchise to a certain percentage of the population. Montagu and Chelmsford had wanted to introduce universal adult franchise in

1919, but were ‘afraid of the weight of numbers, particularly illiterate

numbers’.'® The Lothian Committee had proposed 16 per cent enfran-

chisement in 1932 but the electoral roll listed only 13.4 per cent of the

adult population.'™ The decision to enlarge the franchise was primarily

the result of the struggle of Indian communities for a greater say in The proportion of Hindu and Muslim voters to the Assembly under

the 1935 Act was the same and stood at 12.6 per cent of the population.

The policy of equalizing the two communities which lay behind the 1919 reforms was being put into effect. This was achieved by considerably lowering the franchise qualifications to the Assembly

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

193

since the 1919 Act. Property qualification was reduced to the payment of six annas as chaukidari tax and union rate, and eight annas as cess

and municipal tax or fee.""’ The educational qualification was now set

at successful completion of the upper primary course for men and literacy for women. Wives of propertied men could also vote. However, enfranchisement for the Bengal Legislative Council became more difficult as it was based on ‘high property qualifications, somewhat lower than those for the Council of State’.' This explains the fall in the number enfranchised for the upper house from 1926 to 1936-37. Appendix 3.C. gives the number and percentage of enfranchised population in the general and Muhammadan constituencies of the Legislative Assembly in the various divisions of Bengal. The enfranchisement for the Assembly was highest for Muslims in Rajshahi division (13.7 per cent) and for Hindus in Dacca division (15.0 per cent) and lowest for both in Burdwan division (10.1 per cent for Muslims and 11.1 percent for Hindus). The highest enfranchisement occurred in Rajshahi city both for Muslims (17.7 per cent) and Hindus (18.0 per cent). Also notable was the position of Hindus in Calcutta (17.7 per cent) and Muslims in Faridpur city (16.1 per cent). This offers some indication of the relative levels of affluence, educational achievement and political influence of Hindus and Muslims by divisions and ci Communalism The

growing

self-assertion

of

Muslims

in

Bengal

politics

was accompanied by an increasing competition for jobs and patron-

age as well as greater emphasis on observing religious customs unacceptable to other communities, such as the sacrifice of

cows. These led to an increase in inter-communal tension. Although

the history of communalism is not an integral part of this study, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon, for it contributed to the

growth of Muslim nationalism widely identified as separatism and the consequent formulation of the Pakistan demand. There

are

sev-

eral theories explaining the emergence of Muslim alienation. Hunter

attributed it to Muslim backwardness traceable to British discriminatory policies. Indian nationalist historians traced it to the British

policy of divide and rule. Seal rejects these theories on the ground

194

The Sacred and The Secular

that these assume the Islamic community in India to be a monolithic

block of people with the same interests. He sees the growing rift between Hindus and Muslims in terms of competition rather than un-

equal development, as disparities also existed between groups within

each community.” Francis Robinson saw it as an ‘unintended result’ of the attempt by the British to reconcile Muslims

and Hindus to

their rule.'* Others attribute Muslim communalism to the failure of Indian nationalism to develop a truly non-communal

ethos. Indian

nationalism was associated with aggressive Hindu revivalism, Hindu

symbols, idioms and inspirations.'” Many Muslim historians support

the view that Muslim separatism was a natural expression of the realization that Indian Muslims were a separate community and that this was evident from the time of the invasion by Muhammad Bin

Qasim in the eighth century. An extension of this argument is that Muslims were compelled by dictates of their faith to aspire for nationhood in a state ruled by Muslims."

A number of factors contributed to the felt exclusiveness of many Muslims as belonging to a separate and distinct community or nation. Some

of these have been discussed

in earlier chapters

:

for example, the effect of low-cost, separate, and segregate institu-

tions of religious learning with a narrow syllabus on the psyche of the emerging intelligentsia; the impact of Faraizi and ashrafization movements

on the assertion of an Islamic identity; as well as the

alienating effect of Hindu chauvinism and the ritual social distance between Hindus and Muslims. Developments within the educational

and social spheres had their counterparts in the political arena. These were inevitably linked to the measures initiated by the Raj appar-

ently for ‘administrative’ reasons, but which, under scrutiny, appear

far more complex. Among the most consequential of these measures

was the first partition of Bengal in 1905. This has been analysed by Cronin as a classic example of ‘divide and rule’.'"'

The 1905 partition of Bengal was embarked upon by the Raj at a

time when the Hindu bhadralok were seen as increasingly hostile to European domination. There was no such demand from the Muslim

population at the time. The partition was carried out along communal lines; it created

a Muslim-majority

province comprising

the east-

em districts and a Hindu-majority province comprising the western districts. It cut at the sources of power of the educated classes, primarily

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

195

Hindu, who resided in the west but held landed property in the east or had legal business there. The Muslim community, though initially di-

vided on the partition issue, came to see its Benefits in terms of better

opportunities for education, employment and the recovery of some lost glory.'? The partition boomeranged on the Raj as it provided greater

stimulus to the nationalist movement in Bengal, led to heightened communalism, hastened the end of British rule and laid the foundation for the subsequent partition of 1947. The partition of Bengal both created and exposed deep divisions between Hindus and Muslims. On the one hand, it threatened bhadralok power and on the other, sought to create a vested interest in the partition itself among the Muslim community. Inevitably, Hindus and Muslims

differed considerably in their responses to the partition, the resignation of Fuller and the subsequent annulment of the partition. For example,

even as the anti-partition agitation and the Swadeshi movement proto second thoughts about partition, Muslims were urg-

ing their co-religionists ‘to remain loyal and faithful to the laws and

wishes of our August Sovereign, the King—Emperor Edward VII’. A

proclamation in Gaya district warned Muslims not to be deceived into participating in the Swadeshi movement and risk the benefits that would

be conferred on them ‘on condition that we remain aloof from all these silly and disloyal acts’.'"” The strain on Hindu-Muslim relations took

various forms. In Dacca, Muslims kept away from the Janmashtami festival altogether and ‘refused to lend carts or drag them’ because a group of Hindu weavers had threatened to caricature Fuller whom they saw as a friend.'“ In Mymensingh and Silchar, Hindu landlords pressurized their Muslim tenants to join the Swadeshi movement.''®

The partition failed to weaken bhadralok power and increase Muslim employment in public services for want of suitable candidates. Its main success was in gaining control of private schools and colleges

largely patronized by the educated Hindu community and which were seen as a breeding ground of seditious youths. It also succeeded in increasing Muslim participation in education, giving them a taste of better times in a region dominated by them, thus creating a vested

interest in political separatism. Communal antagonism began to mount only after’1925. The death of C. R. Das brought to a close the brief period of Hindu-Muslim unity which had begun in 1916 with the signing of the Lucknow pact. The

196

The Sacred and The Secular

pact had embodied a spirit of accommodation between the Congress

and the League but at the cost of the Muslims in provinces where they

were a majority. It accepted the principle of weightage for minority communities : Bengal Muslims who constituted 52.6 per cent of the

population were allotted only 40 per cent of seats in the legislature." Communalist

Hindus,

like Lajpat Rai of Punjab and Mahasabhites,

however, opposed the pact and frustrated the chances of a new one

when the all parties conference reconvened in Delhi on 23 January 1925. Hindu-Muslim relations began to worsen after this. In Bengal, the death of C. R. Das brought to the fore internal divisions within the

Congress. Sengupta, the successor of Das, continued the pact for a

while, but met with much opposition from the Karmi Sangh, a Congress

workers’ party with revolutionary sympathies inspired inter alia by Hindu mythology. The Lucknow Pact was dropped in 1926 as the price of an electoral alliance with the Sangh, though it alienated Muslim supporters. Relations between the Congress and Muslims deteriorated

to such an extent that no Muslim would stand on a Congress ticket by

1926, whereas in 1923 there had been at least 15 Muslim Swarajists.'"”

The sharpening of communal antagonism has been attributed to ‘the

manner in which the reforms of 1919 shaped political life’.'"* The fact

that Dyarchy had introduced partially responsible government meant

that Indian ministers acquired the power to dispense political patronage,

at least in the transferred subjects such as local self-government, edu-

cation, public health, public works and agriculture. They often used

their discretionary powers to benefit their own community. Huq, as education minister, for example, forced the founding in 1926 of Islamia

College," the only government college for male Muslims. Communal

antagonism

in

the

twenties

revolved

around

bitter

debates in the legislatures on questions like prohibition of cow slaughter. Riots in the name of religion became a

particularly

in

the

thirties.”

The

recurrent feature in Bengal,

Dacca

Disturbance

Enquiry

Committee attributed these to the growth of political jealousy among the educated classes since the inauguration of the ‘first reforms’. Until

self-government became a possibility, Muslims had ‘nothing specially

to fear from the political predominance of the Hindus’. But now they

recognized the need to fight ‘for their full share of representation’. The Hindus on the other hand recognized their failure to obtain Muslim trust and assistance as the chief obstacle to Home Rule. They never-

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

197

theless accused the latter of selfishness and inability to put the interests of their country before those of their particular community. The enquiry

committee stated that distrust bred distrust ‘and the Hindus instead of

giving way to the Muhammadans on all non-vital points’ were still offending the Muslims ‘by talk of revenge and threats of economic ruin’.

Several causes have been cited for the subsequent riots: continued ill-feeling from previous events; economic causes related to the fact that Muslims were mainly cultivators who were depressed by low jute prices and deeply indebted, whereas the landlords and moneylenders to whom they owed money were Hindus; the Muslim fear of Hindu political predominance, a fear which intensified with the approach of self-government.'” It has been argued that riots occurred when the social symbiosis which regulated rural credit relations broke down once rural credit dried up.'” The riots have also been explained in terms of the interaction between elite and popular communalism.'™ Other causes were the repercussion of riots elsewhere

as in Calcutta, the effect of the Government Tenancy Acts, the extension of the franchise which was opposed by the Hindu zamindars as well as the rise in sectarian passions brought about by the Khilafat movement.'*

‘The manipulation of religious symbols in these riots was common. Slogans of Allah-u-Akbar and Bande Mataram became religious war cries underlining the mutual exclusiveness of Hindus and Muslims and further consolidated their religious-communal identities. The ‘other community’ came to be seen as the enemy, which made frenzied mutual killing possible. Constitutional politics dealt with essentially secular concerns but also made possible terrible outbursts of mutual violence in the name of religion. The Hindu-Muslim communal divide affected day-to-day politics. The Muslims criticized Hindus for taking undue advantage of their

majority in the Calcutta Corporation; of appropriating, for example, all

offices in the Corporation and by keeping Muslims out of such offices as alderman, mayor and deputy mayor.'* Muslims generally kept aloof from the Civil Disobedience Movement as ‘it was not conducive to the best interest of the Muhammadans’.'” The movement was condemned

in meetings in some districts of East Bengal. This attitude was shared by the Bengal Muslim Conference and the Khilafat Conference held

198

The Sacred and The Secular

in Calcutta in August 1929. This attitude of the Muslims towards the Congress modified and restricted the campaign for civil disobedience so that in areas where Muslims predominated it made little progress. The Hindu bhadralok fear of loss of political, social and economic dominance manifested itself in the demand in 1926 for the provision of communal representation for Hindus in the legislatures.

Muslim

alliance with the lower-caste Hindu peasantry was also considered a threat, for the Namasudras and Muslims were seen as uniting against the upper classes.’ Needless to say, agrarian reforms instituted by the

Huq ministry met with considerable criticism in the Hindu press, which reflected the interests of the propertied classes. The Bengal Administration Report 1929-30 commented that Muslims and Hindus tended to range themselves in opposite camps on any contentious question and that there was no apparent reason why the Primary Educational Bill should be a communal issue as Hindus

in the Council attempted to make it so.'® When Jinnah suggested in 1937 that Muslims formed a

third party in India between the Congress

and the government, Nehru’s rejoinder was that Jinnah’s ideas were ‘medieval and absolutely out of date’ for he was encouraging ‘a communal consideration of political and economic problems’.'® The

Congress view was that the communal problem would resolve itself

once power was transferred.'"' The Muslim League insisted that this

problem had to be solved first. To quote Jinnah’s address to the Muslim

League session at Lahore on 22 March

1940:

Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority Government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon-the minority communities can only mean Hindu Raj." Muslim

fears of Hindu domination

discrimination against

the Muslims

were reinforced

in Congress-ruled

by tales of

provinces

where they were in a minority. The committee set up on 20 March 1938 by the council of the All India Muslim League to inquire into

Muslim grievances in the Congress provinces of UP, Bihar, Orissa,

Central

Provinces,

Madras

and

Bombay

reported

that

‘the

Indian National Congress’ conception of nationalism [was] based on

the establishment of a national state of the majority community in which

other nationalities

and communities

[had]

only

secondary

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

199

rights." Amongst the allegedly discriminatory measures undertaken were

the abolition

of Muslim

representation

in Debt Conciliation

Boards (earlier each board had at least one Muslim member) and

the withholding of licences for cow slaughter in the Central Provinces. Cow

slaughter had been one of the main causes of conflict

between Hindus and Muslims and the Congress policy was in favour of cow-protection. There was conflict over the lingua franca of India and the Congress decision to foist Bande Mataram as the national anthem of the country ‘in callous disregard for the feelings

‘of Muslims who considered the song to be positively ‘anti-Islamic

and idolatrous”’ in its inspiration and ideas.""™ A departmental in-

quiry instituted by Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, revealed that the

Muslim

League had exaggerated

stories of Congress

‘atroci-

ties’."* But these findings failed to persuade the Muslims to reconsider their views of the Congress. Both

Hindu

and

Muslim

politicians,

however,

were

aware

that economic issues were often being given a communal colouring.'*

The demand for Pakistan was put forward against the background of such communal tension.

It would not be correct to attribute the success of the Pakistan idea

solely to the use of religious symbols and ideology or the religiosity of the people. For the Congress too adopted religious symbols and

recruited members of the ulama to canvass in its favour. These ulama

wore green, the colour symbolizing Islam, carried the Islamic flag and cried Allah-u-Akbar at meetings.'” The Pirpur Committee claimed that

the Muslim League had not used the ulama for the purpose of mobilizing support. It rejected Congress accusations of trying to gather votes

with slogans like ‘Islam in Danger’ since ‘every Muslim believes that

Islam can never be in danger’.'* But Sir Stafford Cripps in a letter

dated 24 August 1936 to Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for India, wrote that public servants were canvassing for the United Muslim Party

(which later liquidated itself and merged with the Muslim League) in

the name of religion. Among them were Professor Altaf Husain of

Islamia College, Calcutta and K.G.M. Murshed, ICS.' On 29 January

1937, a resolution was passed by the Legislative Assembly against ‘un-

ruly conduct and the persuading of voters to vote or not to vote in the name of religion’. It was demanded that local authorities stop such

practices.

200

The Sacred and The Secular

‘The Muslim League projected itself as the defender of the faith and

called for the support of the faithful in the name of religion. However,

it was the combined effect of an economic programme and hopes of

political self-determination along with religious inspiration which was responsible for its growing popularity and the wide acceptance of the

Pakistan idea. 3.5

Muslim League Membership and

Methods of Mobilization

The factors which helped the Muslim League emerge as the most pow-

exful force in Bengal Muslim politics reveal the relative weight and mutual tensions of secular and religious concerns. In 1927 the total

membership of the All India Muslim League was 1330.'' By 1946, its formal membership had risen to over ten million.” During this period, League policies underwent changes which allowed it a mass base. On 12 April 1936 at its twenty-fourth session, it undertook a policy and

programme of mass contact. In keeping with this plan, Jinnah’s fourteen

points were adopted by the party as its election strategy on 7 June

1936.'® It gave due importance to the opinion of the Jamiyat-i-Ulama-

i-Hind and the Mujtahid on the religious rights of Muslims. The points

in the programme which were particularly appealing to Muslims were

those regarding free elementary education, relief from agricultural indebtedness, reduction of taxes and uplift of the general condition of Muslims. The party’s less exclusive concerns included the repeal of repressive laws, the desire to uphold India’s interests and the improve-

ment of the economic conditions in the country. At this time Jinnah still believed that Hindus and Muslims could work together if they could evolve a common platform.'“

Entry into the League, previously dependent upon wealth, social

position and education, was made much easier by 1937. The annual

membership fee was reduced from one rupee to two annas.'** Provincial

and district branches were set up on a proper footing and volunteer corps organized. The use of ‘Swadeshi’ articles and rural uplift, familiar

items in the Congress programme, were now adopted. The effort to

mobilize support was undertaken not only by students, but also by the ulama, the khaksars, Muslim League volunteers and the National

Guards. The volunteer organizations had a large student component.'

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947 the

-

201

In Bengal, the popularity of the League rose particularly after Lahore

Resolution.

Dacca

University,

which

till then

was

no

special League stronghold, suddenly became one. Fazlul Hug, though

a very popular leader, had to face black flags in almost every city

of East Bengal when he left the League and formed the Syama-Huq

Ministry in 1941.” Mahmud Hussain, a teacher of Dacca University

at the time, wrote that the most active contribution of the university students

to the

Pakistan

movement

occurred

1947.'" They did not support Gandhi's 1942.

In July

that year,

Fazlur

Rahman,

between

1940

‘Quit India’ movement an

ex-student

and

in

of Dacca

University started a fortnightly called Pakistan. In September 1942,

the East Pakistan Literary Association was formed. Inspired by the

Pakistan idea, its members developed a keen concern for their literary heritage. Pakistan became the mouthpiece of the association,

thus bringing about the union of a political and a cultural movement

and representing the new consciousness. The students of East Bengal

actively involved themselves in the struggle for Pakistan by offering

themselves as volunteers to the League for the 1946 elections. Their

influence was strong in rural areas. During the Sylhet referendum

in 1947, students went from house to house in the villages of Sylhet

in an attempt to convince

voters to join East Pakistan rather than

remain with Assam in India in the forthcoming partition.” Partici-

pating in demonstrations was a popular way of showing solidarity with the cause of Pakistan and

‘winning’

it.

A major feature of the League strategy was to incorporate existing

organizations into its fold in order to extend its support base. In UP the khaksars of Allama Mashriqui, who addressed themselves to social

and religious issues, found themselves influenced by politics and sharing common concerns with the’ Muslim League. These khaksars were

unwittingly drawn into mass political mobilization when politics began to turn on religious issues. Its network had crossed provincial boundaries and by 1939, had branches in the NWFP, Punjab, Bihar, Bombay

and Bengal. By now there was a significant rise in the League’s grass roots activism.'*’

In Bengal, by October 1937, the Muslim League began to win over supporters of the KPP, largely as a result of the coalition ministry

formed by the two parties. Measures, such as the abolition of salami and the right of zamindars to realize rent through certificates, the ban

202

The Sacred and The Secular

on rent increase for a period of ten years, etc., undertaken by the Muslim ministry made the KPP an almost redundant party.'*'

In coming to a compromise with the Muslim League, Huq had to give up some of his more radical aims, such as the abolition

of zamindari without compensation, although he had fought the elec-

tions on the slogan of dal-bhat and ‘land to the tiller of the soil’. Even the Floud Commission constituted in 1938, had recommended the abolition of Permanent Settlement and the zamindari system." Although several legislations relating to the amelioration of peasant conditions were enacted, Hug lost the support of a considerable section of the KPP and almost the majority of the scheduled caste group.'® The loss

of radical support forced him to rely more and more on the League,

thus striking at the core of his most loyal political base. In the process,

however, the League became stronger at the expense of the KPP. Men like Abul Hashim and Shahid Suhrawardy made considerable contribution to building up grass roots support for the League. Suhrawardy had a large following among students. And whatever

the politics of Abul

Hashim,

he and his men

successfully

brought

into the League persons who otherwise might have stayed out of it. ‘A major weakness of the League organization was the dearth of old hands. In 1944, leftists in the League invited some of the old guard of

the

KPP

and

the

Congress

to

join

it.

Among

those

invited, Humayun Kabir and Ashrafuddin Chowdhury preferred to join the Congress. Abul Mansur Ahmad, Maulana Abullah-il-Baqui, Shamsuddin Ahmed and Nawabzada Syed Hassan Ali were among those who came over to the League. These men sided with the urban ashraf elements, Shahid Suhrawardy and Akram Khan, but not with the left-oriented Hashim group.’

Hashim’s workers made grass roots contact particularly at the time

of the Bengal famine. They came into contact with KPP workers and

engaged in a common struggle against starvation. These links helped

the league to co-opt KPP workers.'*

Abul Hashim, secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, in his annual report of 1944, asserted that the League had become a ‘revolutionary’, ‘mass’ movement and had penetrated rural Bengal. He claimed that in 1944 about 550,000 members had been enrolled in Bengal. Of these, 160,000 were from Barisal, 105,000 from Dacca and 52,000 from Tipperah.'®* The figure apparently exceeded the number

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

203

scored by any other organization in the province. As the Pakistan idea

gained ground, prominent local Muslims came under pressure from the

community to support the League. Ali Ahmed Khan (1900-66), a liberal but

religious

lawyer

from

the

small

town

of

Brahmanbaria

in

the Tipperah District, greatly admired C R Das and Gandhi, vehe-

mently opposed separate electorates, stood for Indian unity but felt

compelled to join the League. He was elected to the Bengal Legislative

Assembly on its ticket in 1946.'"

The Muslim League’s political strategy for support mobilization included the’ manipulation of religious sentiments such as ‘Islam in danger’ and equating Pakistan with the revival of the Khilafat. In

this, the traditional method of seeking religious sanction was used.

Speeches would begin with ‘Brethren in Islam’ and conclude with ‘we must fight the battle of Islam alone and with all our re-

sources’.'* Jinnah’s presidential speech at the 27th AIML session in Lahore in March

1940, concluded

: ‘Come forward as servants

of Islam...’.'® But a paradox lay in the League’s opposition to the

Shariat Bill proposed by Kazemi and in its fighting the 1946 elections in the name of Islam. This contradiction was not easily

acceptable to the masses. Despite the help L. A. Khan received for the election campaign from Jinnah, Aligarh students, and members of the ulama, such as Zafar Ahmad Osmani of Dacca University,

he won against Kazemi by a narrow margin of only 800 votes.'”

Among the Bengal Muslim lower middle classes and rural folk, the

appeal of communism was negligible because the communists were

believed to be anti-Pakistan and anti-religion. The attitude to religion

was absolute. Thus, in 1937, Kazi Nazrul Islam failed to be elected

and even lost his deposit. Not only was he believed to be an atheist

because of his communist sympathies, but he was also considered to be a kafir, because of the nature of his literary output and his lifestyle including his marriage to a Hindu woman.’ In 1946 the attitude to Humayun Kabir was no different. The latter too was a communist with

a Hindu wife.

Another aspect of the Muslim League strategy was to focus atten-

tion on the communal question and attack the Congress for aiming to

establish Hindu Raj. Ramrajya which was proclaimed and practised by the Congress rank and file, revived in the Muslim mind a strong com-

plex of fear and aversion.'®? The Congress endeavour to impose Bande

204

The Sacred and The Secular

Mataram in \egislatures and its policy of making Hindi a compulsory

language in Congress-ruled provinces, were seen as factors that would

prevent Muslims from enjoying their ‘religious rights freely’. Ample grounds

for such

accusations

were

provided

by

the findings

of

the Pirpur report, i.e. the ‘ill-treatment and oppression of Muslims in the Congress-governed provinces’, a recurrent theme of discussion in

the

AIML

sessions

of

1937-40,'°

despite

official

findings

to

the contrary. Huq, in his speech of 1938 at the Calcutta session of the AIML,

expressed

his

fear

of Congress

determination

to

‘crush

and subdue the Muslims with all its might’."“ Thus, any Muslim who chose to join hands with the Congress was dubbed as having ‘betrayed

the Muslim cause’. They were reminded that they held ‘the integrity and safety of Islam as a sacred trust’. Hug, who in 1937, had himself attempted to form a coalition with the Congress, reprimanded the very next year those Muslims who had broken away from the Coalition

Party including the KPP and the Independent Praja Party, as ‘misguided Muslims’ attempting ‘to build a house apart from the united

house of Islam’.'© Ironically, in 1945-46, he was himself branded a kaumi-gaddar, or national traitor, when he formed the major opposition

to the Muslim League in the forthcoming elections." Jinnah accused him of being a ‘curse to the Mussalmans’.' In appealing to Muslim

voters, Leaguers stressed that Muslims alone could best ‘safeguard the political and religious rights of the Muslims beside their culture and language’. The message was therefore, to ‘call a halt to the intervention

of the non-Muslim organization in our problems by electing representatives of the Muslim League’.'*

The discussion above indicates the significant role played by religion in providing the idiom, vocabulary and symbols for support mobilization. Muslims

were recruited in the name of Islam :

Islam became the principle which defined the community or the

millat. Non-Muslims came to be seen as oppressors. The Muslim League, seen as the ‘house of Islam’ thus came to be equated with

Islam, and all those Muslims who supported parties other than the League

were

labelled

as traitors to Muslims

and

to Islam.

Such

slogans were to become catchwords and provide a recurrent pattern in post-independent Pakistan. However, economic considerations remain paramount.

Economic problems were often given a communal colour. In 1941,

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

205

Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman stated before the Cabinet Mission that, to strike at the zamindari in the UP was to strike at the roots of Muslim

existence. This was in sharp contrast to the anti-zamindari stance of most Muslims in Bengal, where the bulk of them were relatively poorer

than the UP Muslims.'® In Bengal, zamindari was certainly not the typical mode of Muslim livelihood. The bulk of Bengal Muslims, com-

ing from the peasantry, supported the abolition of the Permanent Settment. Muslim associations representing tenants strongly supported

the demand.'” But the middle and upper classes who came from a

rent-receiving background opposed abolition through organizations

such

as the Middle

People’s Association

Class

People’s

Association

in Mymensingh,

in Dacca, the Bar Associations, and landlords’

associations such as the Mymensingh Landholder’s Association.'”' The

choices were determined purely by economic considerations which transcended religious or communal concerns.

In fact, it is doubtful if the League would have achieved its high Jevel of popularity if it had not supported peasant interests. During the

election campaign, it was sometimes more useful to shout slogans de-

signed to appeal to peasant needs than voice the demand for Pakistan.

During the election campaign of 1945-46 the Gaffargaon area of Mymensingh district turned out to be one of the difficult areas for the Muslim League. It was the stronghold of Maulana Shamsul Huda of

the Emarat Party, who had successfully organized a religious-cum-praja

movement, on the same lines as Haji Shariatullah a century earlier. He

had a well organized following among the peasantry. It fell upon Sham-

sul Hug and Abul Mansur Ahmad to organize public meetings, with the help of volunteers, on behalf of the League. But when these men arrived, they were met by the strong men of Maulana Huda, carrying

spears, ramdas and swords, ready to attack. Tajuddin Ahmed, who later

became Prime Minister of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in

1971, suddenly began to shout populist slogans like langal jar jami

tar (land to the tiller), zamindari nipat jao, (down with zamindari). He never once said, ‘Muslim League zindabad’. The strong men slowly

became silent and left them alone.'”

3.6 Communalism and Religiosity The growing self-assertion of Bengal Muslims, the increasing

206

The Sacred and The Secular

popularity of the Pakistan idea and the accompanying communal conflict

led

to

the

association

of religiosity

with

communalism.

Secularism came to be seen as anti-religious. A religious person was

now branded as communal. But before partition, the Muslim orthodoxy was least interested in communal politics or in Pakistan. On the conit had produced a large number of nationalist, non-communal

s. The majority of the vernacular intelligentsia were also very

jous. Some of them supported the Pakistan ideology and the Mus-

lim League position; others did not. Most of them had, at one time or another, fought for the cause of their community, but did not consider themselves communal. On the contrary, they defended themselves as both religious and non-communal. Abul Hashim, Abul Mansur Ahmad

and Kamruddin Ahmed, all fell into this category. However, this was

not quite the way they were viewed by others. The fact of Pakistan

gave rise to a stereotype in much of the nationalist historiography of the period : all Pakistanis were regarded as communal, especially those who had worked for the Muslim League. Exaggerations aside, League

politics did exploit communal

and religious sentiments abundantly at

a time when the Congress was hoping to achieve Indian independence through a strategy based on a broader, inter-communal perspective. The

problem was that the Congress too had communalists within its ranks. While the masses voted for Islam and Pakistan in 1946, it is not clear what the politicians voted for. A section of the Bengal Muslims, faced with the reality of Pakistan, tried to retract and opt for a united

Bengal — a move which led to their persecution in later years. Jinnah

clearly visualized a secular state where majority and minority communities would live in harmony and mutual tolerance, where every citizen

would enjoy equal rights.” Liaquat Ali Khan, on the other hand, felt

compelled to declare that the Muslim struggle for Pakistan was also a

struggle for a place where Muslims could live according to their own

laws and principles.'* Clearly, this statement was intended to retain

the goodwill of the masses. The real object was to ensure that the League as the party that had led the struggle for Pakistan, remained firmly

in control

of power. He was, however, to be disappointed

because there were other claimants to that power. Maulana Maududi with his orthodox following among the Jama’at-i-Islami, although ear-

lier opposed to the creation of Pakistan, now entered the scene as the custodian of the correct practice of Islam. The vernacular intelligentsia

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

207

became another source of challenge to the Muslim League and the aristocracy which controlled the party. The Muslim League Left

Bengal Muslims enjoyed no monolithic unity at the time of partition.

Their divisions, both horizontal and vertical, became more explicit later.

The political vision of the intelligentsia was uncertain and vacillating. It moved erratically between the poles of inter-communal harmony and bitter separatism. The choices at times were determined by religiouscommunal

ideals and at other times depended on political considera-

tions. The economic programmes were the least affected by religious ideology. While the KPP desired the abolition of zamindari without

compensation, the League did not. The political process was such that

power came to be concentrated in the non-Bengali, urban, upper ashraf intelligentsia, headed by Jinnah and supported by the Ispahanis, the

Liaquat Alis, and other Muslims from outside Bengal. This was partly

a result of the coalition between the KPP and the Muslim League in

1937, whereby the former lost much of its support base to the latter. For, while Huq compromised on basic issues such as the abolition of

zamindari, the League adopted the socio-economic programme of ame-

liorating the condition of the peasantry. With Huq’s ouster from the

League in 1941 and the ultimate collapse of the Syama-Huq ministry in 1943, political initiative passed out of Bengali Muslim hands."

However, even as the League came to be dominated by a non-

Bengali-speaking ashraf, certain members from the vernacular intelligentsia began to contemplate ways of wresting political power and

investing it in the middle classes. There was a feeling that the upper ashraf aristocracy was too far removed from the common man, the peasant.

The former did not empathize

debt, disease and hunger.

Such feelings

with peasant problems

were

of

intensified by the

Bengal famine of 1943.' It was time for the middle classes, which had their roots in the soil, to take up a more active political role.

On the occasion of his being elected General Secretary to the Bengal

Provincial League in November

1943, Abul Hashim

made a speech

criticizing the party’s inability to meet people’s needs. He said that the League had thrice pawned itself : its political leadership was pawned

to the nawabs of Ahsan Manzil since the time of Sir Salimullah; its

208,

The Sacred and The Secular

publicity rights were pawned to the owner of the daily Azad, Maulana Akram Khan; and its financial responsibilities were pawned to the business tycoon, Ispahani. Hashim pledged to free the League from these shackles and let the Bengal middle classes find their rightful places.'”

Although the then leadership did not take his speech seriously on account of his youth and political inexperience, it held a special message for those involved in Dacca politics. In East Bengal, particularly in the Dacca scene. political power was indeed vested in the Ahsan Manzi In 1944, Abul Hashim visited Dacca and Narayanganj at the invitation of the district Muslim League. He gathered around him men who had worked for the old guard of the Krishak Praja Samiti, such as Fazlur Raman — men who had organizational experience. Hashim attracted the youth but not the elderly. The latter preferred to accept

faith without question and did not appreciate his analysis of Islam in the light of scientific reasoning.'™ To Abul Hashim, Islam was not only a religion, but also a path to economic and social freedom, and after 1947, as editor of Islamik Ekademi Patrika, he devoted most of his time to 1 debates and discussions on various matters of practical concern relating to faith. In Dacca, several meetings were held with Hashim and a decision was taken to organize a left wing within the Muslim League, primarily to fight the power and influence of the Khwajas and Ispahanis. Accordingly a ‘Party House’ was set up at 150 Mogultuli, with a group of four permanent workers. They were Shamsul Hug, Shamsuddin, Tajuddin Ahmed and Muhammad Shaukat Ali. They brought out a weekly paper called Hushiar which was used as a party paper. Some of its activities were similar to later nineteenth and early twentieth

century discourses attempting a rationalistic explanation of Islam. They discussed and worked on the life of Prophet Muhammad, the works of Maulana Maududi, Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Rushd and Imam Ghazzali. They published pamphlets on democracy and socialism.'” Religion continued

to play a role in the political life of the League's left wing even though it was preoccupied with economic concerns. ally, fifty per cent of the money to run the ‘Party House’

came from the personal funds of Rezai Karim, a son of the nawab

family. Curiously, the nawab family supported groups with opposing

interests—a strategy to remain politically powerful. In June 1944, it

was decided that a membership fee of two annas would be charged

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

209

from every male Muslim in the union. Of this, two paisa would go

to the Union League and two paisa to the sub-division League office.” It was believed that this was necessary to create political

awareness among common men.

The aim of the League’s left wing was gradually to take over

leadership of the union, city and sub-division Leagues, and quietly

replace

the agents

of the Khwajas

by

their own

men

in

the sub-division councils. This aim could not be realized until after

partition. Many of the early political struggles in East Pakistan were Telated to this aspiration. Conclusion

The Bengal Muslim intelligentsia was heterogeneous in terms of its

political interests which were marked by both religious and economic

considerations. The consequence of its increase in numbers, access to

education and employment, along with the growing participation in the electoral

process,

was

to

make

it increasingly

assertive

in poli-

tics. However, it remained ambivalent about its political goals, particularly regarding the division of Bengal in 1947.

Several strands of opinion influenced the political choices made by the intelligentsia. These included communist, socialist and humanist thought which exemplified concern for all men. The adherents of these ideas favoured the idea of a united India. A more numerous section,

politically moderate, was influenced by socio-economic considerations, but its greatest concern was for members of its own community. The

members of this group were ambivalent’ about their political destiny, but most of them wanted an undivided Bengal if India was partitioned.

Indeed it has been argued that a persistent Bengali sub-nationalism was

the causative factor behind such an outcome" The religious orthodoxy

shared with communists and socialists the idea of maintaining a united

India, but its reasons for doing so were religious. However,

mobilization for the Pakistan idea inevitably invoked

religious issues and sentiments, although Muslim League leaders were secular politicians. The vagueness about the meaning of Pakistan

was

both

a

strength

and

a

weakness

of

the strat-

egy employed. It allowed various shades of opinion to come together

and raised expectations, but it was to be unable to meet these. The

210

The Sacred and The Secular

notion that Muslims could only expect justice in an Islamic state

began to take hold gradually, especially in response to Hindu communalism. There is no indication to suggest that a persistent desire for an

Islamic

state

was

the

key motive

inexorably to the creation of Pakistan.”

that

led

inevitably

and

A growing communal antagonism accompanied the political stale-

mate between the Congress and the Muslim

League which failed to

arrive at an amicable agreement regarding independence and the

transfer of power. The increasing popularity of the Pakistan idea

also had a bearing on this. In this context, religiosity came to be

associated with communalism and Hindu.

The

Muslim

in the minds of many,

intelligentsia

lost

the

political

both Muslim

initiative

to

non-Bengali Muslims largely due to their own weaknesses, such as the lack of a clear view about their political destiny and the division

in their ranks. However, the emergence of a left wing in the Muslim

League with clear leanings in favour of tenants and peasants and a

determination

to wrest power

away

from the aristocracy and into

the hands of the middle classes was tg affect future political devel-

opments in independent Pakistan,

“

Notes

1.

Jatindra Nath De characterizes the KPP as a communal organization with a. communal leadership indulging in communal politics. “The party identified its targets along communal and not class lines — a process made easier by the fact that in many East Bengal districts the bulk of the zamindars, moneylenders and shopkeepers happened to be Hindus while the peasants were mainly Muslim’. His study, however, is based on a communal rather than a class analysis; see J. De, ‘The History of the Krishak Praja Party of Bengal, 1929-47: A Study of Changes in Class and Inter-community Relations in the Agrarian Sector of Bengal’ (Ph.D. thesis, Delhi University, 1977), pp. 2-4. For a class analysis of peasant movements and riots in the agrarian sector, see Sugata Bose, ‘Agrarian Society and Politics in Bengal, 1919-47" (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge

mo

yay

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

10.

il. 12.

13. 14, 15.

16.

21

University, 1982), later published as Agrarian Bengal, Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919-1947 (Cambridge, 1986). K. Ahmed, A Socio-Political History of Bengal (4th ed., Dacca, 1975), p. 21. On the social origins of Maulana Akram Khan and A. K. F. Hug, see Appendix 3.A. Tbid,, pp. 29-30. J. De, op. cit,, pp. 1-3. ‘Ayesha Jalal interprets the policies of the KPP as supra-communal; see ‘Tinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan’ (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1983), pp. 48-50, later published as The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, 1985). K. Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 29-34; Jalal, thesis, p. 48. Statementby Khwaja Nazimuddin, Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-47 (New Delhi 1976), p. 75. Religion was previously introduced to politics during the Khilafat and Non-co-operation Movements in the 1920s. A. H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India (Lahore, 1950), p. 147. Despite his religiosity, Maulana Azad had broken away from the orthodox ways of his family and freed himself ‘from all conventionalties"; see Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, the Complete Version (Madras, 1988) pp. 3-4. For an assessment of the views of Sir Syed and Maulana Azad see Aziz Ahmad and E. G. van Grunebaum (eds.), Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857-1968 (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 4, 16-17. F. Abbott, Islam and Pakistan, (Ithaca, NY, 1968), p. 4. Abul Mansur Ahmad, Atmakatha (Dacca, 1978), pp. 201-05, 222-23, 227-29, 230-36. Even when deeply against the rituals of Islam and mullah activities which had earned disrespect for Islam, his love for Muslims never diminished. ‘Abul Mansur Ahmad, Amar dekha rajnitir panchas bachhar (Dacca, 1968), pp. 59, 71-99. (hereafter Amar dekha). A.M. Ahmad, Atmakatha, pp. 272-76. Speech at East Pakistan Renaissance Society, Calcutta; cited by Ghulam Murshid, ‘Bangali musalmaner svaruper sandhan : duti bipratip drishtanta’ (‘The Bengali Muslim Quest for Identity : Two Contrasted Examples’), Jijnasa, 3rd yt., no. 4, Magh-Chaitra, BS. 1389 (1983), ed. Shibnarayan Rai, p. 380. For a discussion of the official attitude to Tagore’s works and responses of the Bengali intelligentsia, see Kamaluddin Ahmed, ‘Bengali: Intellectuals and Social Change in Bangladesh’ in U.K. Malik (ed.), South

212

17. 18. 19.

21. 22. 23.

27. 28.

29.

The Sacred and The Secular

Asian Intellectuals and Social Change —A Study of the Role of Varnacular-speaking Intelligentsia (New Delhi : Heritage, 19822) pp. 147-49. Ghulam Murshid, op. cit., pp. 381, 384, On the life histories of these men, see Abul Kasim, Banglar pratibha (Calcutta, 1940), pp. 34-48, 60, 68-78. Although Muslims were angry over the re-unification of Bengal in December 1911, the Nawab of Dacca cautioned them against rash action for ‘he could see no viable alternative to a policy of dependence on the British’. They were determined to gain as many concessions as possible as reparation for their loss; see J. H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in the Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal (hereafter, Elite Conflict), (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), pp. 46, 51. See Appendix 3.A and 3.B for a brief description of the background of these men. Although Abul Hashim and Fazlul Hug may be identified as rural ashraf, they had strong links with the aristocracy by marriage or birth, and also strong rural connections; see A. Hashim, In Retrospection (Dacca, 1974), pp. 3-6.

Muzaffar Ahmed, Amar jiban o bharater kamunist parti, vols. I and Il, 2nd ed. (Calcutta, 1984), pp. 1-2. (hereafter, Amar jiban). Author's translation of citation quoted in Amar jiban, ibid., p. 9. Ibid., pp. 3-5, 63-65. The humanist tradition in Bengal can be traced back to the thoughts of early sufis who sought the oneness of man with God through devotion and love. Love of man was central to their worldview. Indeed, it has been claimed that vaishnavas such as Chaintanya were influenced by sufi thought; see Ahmad Sharif, ‘Banglar sufi © kabi pariciti’ and “Bhab biplab caitanyadeb o vaishnava sahitya’ in his Bengali o bangla sahitya (Dhaka, 1983) pp. 120, 146, 161-71. Muzaffar Ahmed, Kazi Nazrul Islam: Smritikatha (Dacca, 1973, 1976), pp. 302-305. Kazi Ahmed Kamal, Politicians and Inside Stories (Dacca, 1970), p. 115. For a discussion of the Lucknow Pact, see Debendranath Banerjee, East Pakistan, a Case Study in Muslim Politics (Delhi, 1969), pp. 18-19. Bengal Administration Report (hereafter BAR), 1929-30 (Calcutta, 1931), P. xxiv, For example, his speech at the special session of AIML, Calcutta, 17-18 April, 1938; see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan: AllIndia Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947, vol. Il 1920-47 (Karachi, 1970), p. 289. (hereafter Pirzada Documents). Data karna means one who gives generously. Discussion with P. N. Roy, F. Hugq’s Public Relations Officer in the 1940s.

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

30. 31. 32. 33.

35. 37. 38. 39.

41.

42.

43.

45.

213

A. De, Pakistan prastab o Fazlul Huq (Calcutta, 1972), pp. 129-32. (henceforth Pakistan prastab). ‘As a member of the United Muslim Party, he was opposed to the abolition of zamindari as proposed by A. K. F. Hug. On his mobilization activities see, Kazi Ahmed Kamal, op. cit., p. 56; on the vision of a united Bengal, see Millat, 2 May and 30 May, 1947. On non-Muslim perspectives on the riots see A. I. Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947, (Delhi, 1987), pp. 181-88; G. P. Khosla, Stem Reckoning: a Survey of the Events Leading up to and Following the Partition of India, (New Delhi, 1952), pp. 49-67; S. Das, Communal Riots, op. cit., pp. 178-79. A Hashim, In Retrospection, pp. 115-16. Ibid, p. 117; K. Ahmed, A Socio-Political History, p. 72. A.L. Singh, The Origins of the Partition, pp. 182-83. Discussion with Justice S. A. Masud, retired Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, April 1984 and February 1985, in Calcutta. Ibid. ‘A. Hashim, In Retrospection, p. 116. Discussion with Noorjehan Murshid, She was the ex-minister for social welfare and family planning, Government of Bangladesh, April 1985, Dacca. She was then called Noorjehan Beg, superintendent of Munnujan Hostel and was one of the women caught unawares by the riots; also see Kamruddin Ahmed, Banglar madhyabitter atmabikas (Self-realization among the middle class in Bengal), vol. 2 (Dacca, 1975), p. 76. (hereafter Atmabikas). A. Hashim’s memoir, In Retrospection, corroborates this incident, p. 118. Discussion with S. A. Masud. A. Hashim, In Retrospection, p. 116. Das, Khosla and other Indian scholars suggest that the Muslim League knew that Direct Action Day would be violent as they were preparing to larke lenge Pakistan o ‘fight and take Pakistan’ as the rhetoric goes; see S. Das, Comunnal Riots, op. cit., pp. 165-68. At the time, Calcutta had a 1,200-man police force of whom only 63 ‘were Muslim. With the Governor’s approval, he appointed 1,200 Punjabi Muslim sepoys and posted 21 Muslims as officers in charge in 21 out of the 22 thanas in order to contain the riots and introduce a balance in the police force; see Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, ed. M. H. R. Talukdar (Dhaka, 1987), pp. 23-26. ‘A. Hashim, op. cit., p. 117; discussion with S. A. Masud. A. Hashim, In Retrospection, p. 118. ‘The evidence cited by some scholars to prove that Subrawardy organized the riots of 1946 is drawn from Hindu-owned newspapers and views of

214

The Sacred and The Secular

British and Hindu officers submitted to the Spens Enquiry Committee. All of them had a stake in pointing an accusing finger at Mus-

lims. Rhetorical statements by Nazimuddin, Akram Khan as well as

propaganda tracts by one Usman have often been cited. Significantly, they have totally omitted the views of Suhrawardy’s defence. An oft-cited source for these scholars is Gopal Das Khosla’s Stern Reckoning. This

work is the outcome of a study sponsored by the Government of India in 1948 to understand the nature and impact of pre-partition riots on

people particularly in Punjab and Sindh. The section on the Calcutta riots of 1946 is drawn mainly from interviews and official documents obvi-

ously from a Congress perspective. Subsequent scholars have drawn

heavily from Khosla to come to similar conclusions. But much of the

incriminating proof offered has not been substantiated with evidence;

(see S. Das, Communal Riots, pp. 6, 178). The suggestion that Suhrawardy transferred Hindu police officers in order to allow uncon-

trolled rioting is preposterous, since the police force was headed by a European commissioner. Hindus formed more than 60 per cent of the

police force and very few Muslim officers held senior positions in it. ‘Only a large scale transfer of Hindu officers along with promotion of Muslim officers could bring the force under Muslim control; it would require connivance of the European side. There is no evidence that this

happened. In anticipation of violence, the Muslim minority alerted its

volunteer corps while the Commissioner of Police set up a control room to monitor events. Das interprets the Ministry's action with suspicion, as

47.

49. 50. Si.

having foreknowledge of the riots rather than as acknowledgment of the dominant mood among the public. S. Das, Communal Riots, pp. 172, 185. For a detailed discussion in support of this theme see Ayesha Jalal, The

Sole Spokesman.

K. Ahmed, Agmabikas, p. 11.

A History of the Freedom Movement, vol. Il (1906-36) part II, prepared by the Board of Editors (Karachi, 1963), p. 535.

Letter from Iqbal to Jinnah, 28 May 1937, in G. Alana, Pakistan Movement Historic Documents (Department of International Relations, Uni-

versity of Karachi, 1967), pp. 130-31. (hereafter Alana Documents).

52. 53.

Pirzada Documents, p. 339.

54, 55. 56.

K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, pp. 51-52.

Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, vol. I (Lahore, 1952), p. 177. Keith Callard, Pakistan, a Political Study (London, 1957), pp. 36-37. Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, in

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

D. E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Religion and Politics (Princeton, NJ, 1966), pp. 389-99. Lumley refers to his conversation with Jinnah in Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to Linlithgow, 15 January, 1942, Mss. Bur. P. 125/56, TPI. p. 27. Entry in Casey's diary, 2 Jan., 1946, Photo/Bur. 48/4, TPS, p. 732. ‘Note by F. M.’, n.a. L/PLI/10/59: ff 61-63 TPS, pp. 766-67. S. K. Chakravarty, The Evolution of Politics in Bangladesh: 1947-78 (New Delhi, 1978), p. 15, Debendranath Banerjee, op. cit, p. 33. Letter, Linlithgow to Amery, 8 Jan. 1942, Mss. Bur.F. 125/11, TP/, pp. 16-17. Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug., 1945, TP6, p. 71. Wavell to PethickLawrence, 20 Aug., 1945, TPO, p. 106; Pethick-Lawrence, letter 592/14, 21 Aug., 1945, TP6, p. 113; A. Clow to J. Colville, 23 Aug., 1945, TPS, p. 149. Letter, J. Colvile to Wavell, 20 Aug., 1945, TPO, p. 94. Entries in Casey's diary, 1 and 11 Sept, 1945, Photo/Eur. 48/4, TP6, pp. 194, 246. Letter, A. Clow to J. Colville. Speech by Nawab Ismail Khan at Allahabad; see Ziya-ul-Hasan Farugi, The Deobund School and the Demand for Pakistan (London, 1963), p. 119. M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London, 1967), pp. 400-401. For a discussion of the debates on Islam and nationalism see ‘Selections from the Munir Report’ in Ahmad Aziz and B. G. Van Griinebaum (eds.), Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 190-94; Keith Callard, Pakistan, p. 234., Ishtiaque Hussain Qureshi, “The Background of Some Trends in Islamic Political Thought’ in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph Spengler (eds.), Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (London, 1961), pp. 208-11; H. Rahman, HinduMuslim Relations in Bengal 1905-47 (Bombay, 1974), p. 99; F. Abbott, “Pakistan and the Secular State’ in D. E. Smith (ed.), op. cit., pp. 374-75. At the All India Muslim League (AIML) special session-at Calcutta, 17-18 April, 1938, Fazlul Hug chided the group which had broken away from the KPP-ML coalition, as working towards ‘the virtual effacement of the Muslims as a separate political entity’ and of attempting ‘to build a house apart from the united house of Islam’. Pirzada Documents, p. 287. A. De, Pakistan prastab, pp. 103-06, 107. On the relations between Hug and Jinnah see Zaidi, ‘Introduction to Z. H. Zaidi’, (ed.), M.A. Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence, 1936-48 (Karachi, 1976) pp. 7-72; see especially pp. 22-23, 28-40, 43. For a similar

S33

57.

Ba

Ra

8B

61.

70.

n.

215

216

72. 73. 74.

Bas

15.

The Sacred and The Secular

analysis in a more recent study see Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, pp. 6, 111. A. De, Pakistan prastab, pp. 130-31. K. Ahmed, Atambikas, p. 19. C. H. Phillips, H. L. Singh, and B. N. Panday, Selected Documents on the History of India and Pakistan, 1857-1947 (London, 1962), pp. 354-55. K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, vol. 2, speech in 1944, p. 24. A Hashim, In Retrospection, p. 136. K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, vol. 2, p. 13. Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad’s Presidential address, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 20 March, 1940, p. 16. Shila Sen, ‘Some Aspects of Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-46 and Fazlul Huq’, Journal of the Bangladesh Itihas Samiti, vol. 1 (1976), p. 28. A. Singh, D. Phil. thesis, p. 182. Alana Documents, pp. 149, 395-97. A. Seal, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in India’ in J. Galagher et al. (eds.), Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 18701940 (Cambridge, 1970), p. 19.

B. A. R. 1934-35 (Calcutta, 1936), p. xii; B.A. R. 1929-30, (Calcutta, 1931), p. xxiv. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 280-87.

89.

91.

Ibid., p. 284. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 2 Jan, 1937, Bhai Parmanand’s attack ‘on Congress policy. See David Page, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932 (Delhi, 1982). B. A. R. 1932-33 (Calcutta, 1934), p. xxvii. For a recent study on the Communal Award, see Bidyut Chakrabarty, ‘The Communal Award of 1932 and its Implications in Bengal’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. XXIII, no. 3, 1989, pp. 493-523. H. Rahman, Hindu Muslim Relations, pp. 76-78. For a discussion of the Muslim attitude see B. Chakrabarty, ibid, pp. 495-98, 509-10, 516-17, 523. Home Political Proceedings 41-4/32. Telegram to the Secretary of State for India, London, 22 Aug. 1932; cited by H. Rahman, ibid., pp. 76-78. Also see B. Chakrabarty, ibid, pp. 500-501. Amrita Bazar Patrika, Jan., 1, 1940, p. 10. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 12 Jan, 1937, p. 4. The Nehru Report, however, rejected separate electorates.

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

217

Report of the Reforms Office Bengal, 1932-1937 (Alipore, 1938), pp. 2-3. (hereafter R.R.O.B., 1932-37). The Indian Councils Act, 1909, is also known as the Morley-Minto Reforms. 94. Ibid., p. 15. Out of 139 members of the Council, 113 or 81 per cent would be elected. The 113 seats would be divided thus under a system of separate electorates: non-Muslims (46), Muslims (39), Landholders (5), Calcutta University (1), European Community (5), Buropean Commerce (11), Anglo-Indian Commerce (2), Indian Commerce (4). 95. E. Rahim, Provincial Autonomy in Bengal, 1937-1943 (Rajshahi, 1981), pp. 30-31. RRO, 1932-37, p. 15; E. Rahim, Provincial Autonomy, pp. 30-31. 97. RRO.B, 1932-37, p. 3. ISC, vol. III, p. 172. Ibid. 100. ISC, vol. VIII, p. 134. 101. Ibid., pp. 130-31. 102. Ibid., pp. 134-35. 103. RROB,, 1932-37, P. 3. 104. Tbid,, p. 4. 105. RROB., 1932-37, p. 7. 106. Ibid,, p. 10. 107. Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism : Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 338-39. 108. For a discussion of these theories see Francis Robinson, Separatism ‘among Indian Muslims — the Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 1-3, 132. 109. See Amrita Bazar Patrika, | Yan., 1940, pp. 7-10; 18 March, 1940, p. 7. For a discussion of Muslim perspectives, see ‘Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Historical Origins of Some of Pakistan's Persistent Political Problems’ in Wilson and Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration, (London, 1982) pp. 28-29. Anisuzzaman notes that nationalism and Hindu revivalism became synonymous; see his Muslim manas o bangla sahitya (Calcutta, 1971) pp. 81, 96-97. Sumit Sarkar makes a similar point. Patriotism was identified with Hindu revivalism. ‘Hindu’ and ‘nationalism’ came to be used as synonymous terms; see his The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal (Delhi, 1973) p. 411. Partha Chatterjee observes Bankim’s nationalism as purified and regenerated Hindu ideal; see his Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World:A Derivative Discourse (Delhi: OUP, 1986) pp. 72, 77. In a recent study, Poromesh Acharya notes that nationalism in Bengal had Hindu moorings 93.

218

The Sacred and The Secular

and developed on the basis of Hindu cultural identity in spite of claims

that it was a secular ideology; see his ‘Education and Communal Politics in Bengal: A Case Study’ Working Paper Series WPS-109 (88), Indian

Institute of Management, Calcutta, Sept., 1988.

110. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam (Bungay, Suffolk: the Chaucer Press, 1979) pp. 11-12. This idea forms the core of Farzana Shaikh’s thesis; see Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim

Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947 (Cambridge, 1989); also 111.

see A. Seal, Indian Nationalism, pp. 298-99. While official statements stressed the administrative basis of the partition,

the underlying motives are revealed in the confidential minutes of the

‘Government of India held at the National Archives of India and the pri-

vate papers of Lord Curzon. These sources have been consulted by Cronin for his analysis of the 1905 partition of Bengal; see Richard Paul

‘Cronin, British Policy and Administration in Bengal, 1905-1912. Partition and the New Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam (Calcutta, 1972)

pl.

112. The Mohammadan Literary Society articulated the doubts that some Mus-

lims had on the partition of Bengal; see The Pioneer, 16 Nov. 1905.

Maulvi Syed Erfan Ali, secretary of the Birbhum Anjuman-i-Islamia in

Bengal wrote to the private secretary to the Viceroy on 7 Aug., 1905 that the Muslim community ‘have recognized the wisdom of his Excel-

lency ... that the partition is calculated ultimately to bring about the largest amount of benefit to an anglomeration of races at present thrown together in confusion’; sec Shan Muhammad, The Indian Muslims. A

Documentary Record, vol. 1, (Meerut, N. Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan,

1983) p. 97, hereafter Shan Documents. The anticipated advantages of

the new province were that Dacca would regain its lost grandeur, Chittagong would thrive as an important port in the Indian Ocean, railway

communications would improve, ‘the natives of the province will have a better and fairer share in the public service’. The Pioneer, 2 June 1906. 113. The Pioneer, 24 Nov. 1905. 114, Letter from Hare to Minto, 2 Sept., 1906, Government of India, Home

Department, Proceedings, Oct. 1906, Shan Documents, pp: 117-19.

115. Minto Papers, correspondence in 1906; see Shan Documents, vol. |,

pp. 123-24, 116. D. Banerjee, East Pakistan, p. 19.

117. D. Page, Prelude to Partition, pp. 121-40. 118. P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge,

1972), p. 201.

Sce pp. 199-202 for Hardy's discussion of the working of dyarchy.

119. A. K. Chanda, Ninth Q. R., 1932-37 (Calcutta, 1939), p. 108.

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947 120.

219

In 1926, there were 151 deaths and 1,490 injuries in communal rioting.

See ISC, vol. V (London, 1930) pp. 108-20; D. Page, Prelude to Partition, p. 74, For a discussion of riots in the thirties from an official per-

spective see B. A. R., 1930-31 (Calcutta, 1932), p. xxi. For a detailed ‘study of the history of the communal basis of riots in Bengal, see Suran-

jan Das, Communal Riots, pip. 17-37, 161-206. For a discussion of the

economic dimensions of the communal conflict see S. Bose, Agrarian 121. 122.

Bengal, particularly pp. 98-145, 181-232.

B.A. R. 1929-30, (Calcutta, 1930), p. xxiv. B.A. R., 1929-30, (Calcutta, 1931), p. xxvii.

123. For a detailed discussion of the economic basis of communalism in terms of the breakdown of rural credit relations, see Sugata

Bose,

Agrarian Bengal, chapters 4 and 6 in particular, pp. 98-145, 181-232.

124, S. Das, Communal Riots, see in particular pp. 17-37, 59-102, 161-206.

125. Tajul Islam-Hashmi, ‘The Communalisation of Class Struggle: East Bengal Peasantry,

1923-29", Indian Economic and Social History Review,

vol. XXV, no. 2, April-June 1988, pp. 171-204; see in particular

126.

pp. 171-72.

For studies of conflict between rival elites over government jobs, etc., see J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 209-95; Shila Sen, Muslim Politics, L. A. Gordon, Bengal in Nationalist Movement, 1876-1940,

(New York, 1974); here Hindus claimed that 80 per cent of the Calcutta

Corporation's income came from Hindu rate payers, Amrita Bazar Pa-

trika, 18 March, 1940, p. 7. For a communal perspective see, Jayanta Maitra, Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1855-1906: Collaboration and Con-

frontation (Calcutta, 1984) pp. 127-55.

127. Speech by Faztul Huq at a meeting of the District Moslem Association held at Barisal in June 1929, B. A. R., 1929-30, pp. xxiv-xxv.

128, Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 273.

129. B.A. R., 1929-30, p. xxv. 130. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 17 Jan. 1937, ‘Editorial’. 131. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 18 March 1940, p. 9. With hindsight one is prone

to concede Jinnah’s concem that, without an arbitrator, Hindu dominance

would assert itself, in ways which could have resembled the assertion of

Serbian dominance in disintegrating Yugoslavia since 1990. 132, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 26 May 1940, p. 9.

133. Report of the Inquiry Committee, Appointed by the Council of the AIML

to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces (AIML, 1938),

134, 135.

pp. 2-3, (hereafter Pirpur Report).

Ibid., pp. 20-25. ‘Note on the use of Special Responsibilities and other safeguards by

220

The Sacred and The Secular

Governors of Congress Provinces, July 1937 to October 1939° JOR:L/P&I/8/645. Rizvi refutes Muslim League allegations against the Congress as ‘difficult to sustain’; see Gowher Rizvi, Linlithgow and India: British Policy and Political Impasse in India, 1936-1943 (London, 1978),

136, 137. 138. 139, 140. 141. 142. 143.

144. 145. 146.

147, 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154,

pp. 98-105. Maulana Azad claims Muslim League stories to be

‘pure invention’; see his India Wins Freedom, p. 16. For the Muslim League view see Pirpur Report, p. 6; for the Congress view see Amrita Bazar Patrika, 25 March, 1940.

Pirpur Report, pp. 10-15. Ibid. Also see ‘Elections in India in 1937. Interference by Public Servants. Bengal’, [OR: L/P&J/7/1126. “Elections in India in 1937. Interference by Public Servants’.

Ibid. A. Singh, Oxford D. Phil. thesis, p. 3. M. A. H. Isphani, The Case of Muslim India (New York, 1946), p. 7. See Pirzada Documents, p. 265 on the Muslim League's programme of mass contact. On Jinnah’s 14 points see Z. H. Zaidi, ‘Aspects of the Development of the Muslim League Policy, 1937-47’, C. H. Phillips and M. D. Wainwright (eds.), op cit., p. 252. Speech on 7 Jan., 1937, Pirzada Documents. Kamruddin Ahmed, Atmabikas, p. 28. For student involvement, see Mahmud Hussain, ‘Dacca University and the Pakistan Movement’, in C. H. Phillips and M. D. Wainwright (eds.), op. cit., pp. 369-73. For a discussion on Khaksar and volunteer roles, see S. Chander, ‘The Congress Ministries and the British Authorities in the working of Provincial Autonomy, 1936-39; Aspects of the conflict between the Congress and the Raj’ (M. Litt. thesis, Oxford University, 1983), pp. 89-98. On the Bengal ulama and pir threat of excommunication see A. Singh, D. Phil. thesis,p. 175. On the role of students and youth, see A. Hashim, In Retrospection, pp. 44-45. Mahmud Hussain, ibid., p. 370. Ibid., p. 372. Ibid. TOR: L/P&j/678, ‘Note on Volunteer Movement’, 1 Oct., 1938, Dec., 1939, 11 March, 1940. A.M. Ahmed, Amar dekha, p. 162; Pirzada Documents, p. 289. Sir Francis Floud, Bengal Land Revenue Commission Report, 1938, vol. 1 (Alipore, 1940), (hereafter Floud Commission Report). Govt. of Bengal, Publicity Deptt., Two Years of Provincial Autonomy of Bengal (Alipore, 1939), pp. 1-3, 4, 17; S. Sen, op. cit, pp. 33, 35-36. K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, p. 44,

Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

221

155. A. Hashim, In Retrospection, p. 59. 156. Z. H. Zaidi, op. cit, p. 268. 157, He was the founder editor of a Bengali weekly called Purba Bangla which was the only opposition paper at the time of the first provincial elections in Bast Pakistan in 1954, 158. A. K. F. Hug’s speech at the special session of the AIML, Calcutta, April 1938, see Pirzada Documents, p. 28. 159. Jinnah’s speech in ibid., p. 339. 160. K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, p. 57. 161. Ibid., pp. 48-49; Muzaffar Ahmed, Kazi Nazrul Islam: smritikatha (Dacca, 1973, 1976), pp. 283, 302-305. 162. Govt. of Pakistan, Director of Foreign Publi ity, Pakistan, The Struggle ofa Nation (Washington, 1949), p. 26. 163. Pirzada Documents, pp. 294, 328. 164. Speech by Pazlul Hug in 1938, Ibid., p. 282. 165. Ibid. pp. 286-87. 166. A. Hashim, In Retrospection, p. 129. 167. Pirzada Documents, p. 405. 168. Hindustan Times, 30 June, 1937. 169. Floud Commission Report, vol. V, pp. 270-77, 369-98; vol. VI, pp. 1, 73. 170. The Dacca District Muslim Federation, the Rajshahi Muhammadan Association, Anjuman or religious associations such as Anjuman-Millatul-Islam, Hooghly, Anjuman-e-Islamia, Mymensingh, and Anjuman Effefaquee-Islam, Nadia, and political parties representing rural interests such as Bakarganj District Krishak Party and the Nikhil Bangiya Krishak Praja Samiti were among these organizations; ibid., vol. VI, p. 198, 171. Thid., also see Floud Commission Report, vol. V, pp. 227-318. 172. K, Ahmed, Atmabikas, p. 63. 173. Jinnah’s address to the Constituent Assembly on 11 Aug., 1947; see chapter 6. 174, Liaquat Ali Khan's speech in the Khaligdina Hall on 20 Feb., 1949; see chapter 6.

175. For a detailed discussion of how the Bengali Muslims lost the political initiative, see Tazeen M. Murshid, “The Bengal Muslim Intelligentsia: a House Divided’ in D. A. Low (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan (London, 1991), pp. 144-72. 176. K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, p. 34. For an in-depth discussion of the divisions in the Bengal Muslim League in terms of the differences between the Khwaja group and the Hashim-Suharawardy group, see Harun-or-Rashid,

222

‘The Sacred and The Secular

The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics, 1936-1947 (Dhaka, 1987) pp. 160-93, 239-340. 177. K. Ahmed, Atmabikas, p. 21. 178. Ibid., p. 25. 179. Ibid, p. 27. 180. Ibid, p. 28. 181. See Harun-or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, op. cit., pp. 345-46. 182. An opposite theory has been offered by Farzana Shaikh. She holds that in Islamic political thought, Mustims can only live according to their own religious values and customs within an Islamic state. Therefore, it was an imperative for Muslims of India to create such a state as they came out of the shackles of colonial rule. As such Jinnah wanted Pakistan, however moth-eaten it was. Shaikh is uncomfortable with the sixteenth-century Din-i-Ilahi experiment of Akbar and treats it as an exception (to this imperative). She’ presents an ideal position supported by a doctrine that has not been practised by all Muslims everywhere. The demand for a Muslim-dominated state was a rather belated one when it was felt that all other possible avenues for equal participation were closed and when Muslims were convinced that they would not get justice at the hands of Hindus. The expectation that this state would be run on Islamic principles was confined to a few which cenainly did not include the founding fathers except only in thetoric; see F. Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam : Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947 (Cambridge, 1989).

223 Religion in Politics, 1937-1947

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PART II : 1947-1977

CHAPTER

4

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE POST-PARTITION PERIOD

Introduction

Huntington's view about the emergence of a middle class being a des-

tabilizing event is borne out by the history of Bengal Muslims in the

pre- and post-partition periods. Huntington traces the evolution of a middle class through several phases.’ The first middle class elements

to appear on the social scene were ‘intellectuals with traditional roots but modern values’. Early stalwarts like Syed Amir Ali and Nawab

Abdul

Latif,

who

fought

for Muslim

emancipation

and

the re-

interpretation of Islam despite heavy criticism from the orthodoxy, fit this description perfectly. The proliferation of civil servants and army

officers, teachers and lawyers, engineers and technicians, entrepreneurs

and managers which is the next phase in Huntington’s paradigm was

slow and gradual in the case of Bengal Muslims. In fact, most of the

emerging middle class in the 1920s were lawyers. There were some

civil servants and hardly any technocrats. Huntington

goes on to say that generally non-bureaucratic,

non-

business segments tend to be prone to opposition, violence and revo-

lution. ‘Of all segments of the middle class those most inclined in these

directions are intellectuals.’? Since Bengal Muslims held only a rela-

tively small number of government jobs and were practically uninvolved in any business enterprises, probably the bulk of them would

have fitted into this category if the British had not successfully won

their collaboration. However, non-bureaucratic, non-business elements

including politicians such as Abul Hashim and Kamruddin Ahmed as

234

The Sacred and The Secular

well as some university teachers and students did display a tendency

to opposition. Challenge to authority became a central concern of the

intellectuals in the post-47 period although there was little inclination to revolution or violence. After partition, decision-making at the national level was largely in

the hands of people in the direct line of descent from men like Syed Amir Ali in terms of ideology, tradition and social origin — the non-

vernacular ashraf intelligentsia. The main thrust of the opposition came

from another set of people, the vernacular intelligentsia which had

strong rural links. Within the context of developments in independent Pakistan, the

categories of ashraf and non-ashraf were applicable only to a limited

extent. The categories themselves had fallen into disuse, but not the mentality or attitudes subscribed by the members. It is in this sense

that the terms have been used. A more appropriate categorization spanning ideological and linguistic orientations and reflecting social origin is put forward here. This includes the vernacular and the non-vernacular

intelligentsia. Within the latter there was a strong ashraf component which

came

from

both

the upper

and

middle

ashraf categories.

It included non-Bengalis who came from other parts of India, such as Uttar Pradesh, Bombay,

Bihar and Punjab, and enjoyed a

position of

political dominance in East Bengal. The vernacular intelligentsia had

strong rural links even though many could claim ashraf origin. Ideo-

logically, there was no clear-cut divide between these two categories

as each could claim a counter-intelligentsia which supported the views

held by members of the other category.

A sizeable middle class had emerged by 1947,

but its Bengali-

speaking members lost their political effectiveness in the last years leading to partition. This happened even though their co-operation was

essential for the Muslim League victory in the name of ‘Pakistan’ and

‘Islam’. A struggle for power developed between the Bengali speaking and non-Bengali speaking Pakistani political elities, including the vernacular

and

non-vernacular

intelligentsia. The

conflict

came

into

the open over a range of political and cultural issues. The vernacular

intelligentsia failed to compel their opponents to arrive at a political

understanding despite the numerical strength of their supporters. This

was partly due to their inability to control the army. In fact, the ten-

dency to opposition among the vernacular intelligentsia, slight in the

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

235

forties and fifties, became assertive and violent by the late sixties. Their reaction to the central government's policy — seen as one of cultural-

political-economic: subjugation of the Bengali people and their frustrated aspirations — have been cited as explanations of this

development.’ Raunaq Jahan, for example, discusses the imbalance be-

tween the economic growth policies of Ayub Khan which resulted in

the creation of new forces, and political institution building with its

limited capacities for their mobilization and participation.‘ A corollary

of this argument is that the mass movement of the late sixties, initially an urban middle class phenomenon, occurred when there was a large, established, urban middle-class, but opportunities for mobility were re-

stricted. The post-47 period witnessed new opportunities for further growth and development of a middle class and hence an expanded middle-class intelligentsia.

This chapter describes this process of growth. As in Chapter 1, the

size of the intelligentsia, both religious and secular, is estimated using

census data on education and employment.

The social base of the

emerging intelligentsia is explored drawing on existing socio-economic

studies of university students at various points in time. Finally, the intelligentsia is located in the political-ideological context, particularly

in relation to religious-secular, ashraf-non-ashraf and vernacular-nonvernacular divides.

4.1

The Labour Force

An accurate quantitative estimation of the labour force or the middle class is difficult because the relevant definitions differ from census to

census. While in the 1951 Census of Pakistan all persons aged 12 years

and above were considered to be the labour force, the age limit was 10 years for the 1961 Census of Pakistan and 1974 Census of

Bangladesh.’ All three identify the following categories: civilian labour

force, non-civilian labour force, and dependents. The civilian labour force includes both agricultural and non-agricultural occupations. The main categories in the agricultural labour force were cultivators, those

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Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

237

Those ‘not in the civilian labour force’ were defence servicemen, eco-

nomically inactive retired persons, pensioners, beggars, vagrants, pros-

titutes, and inmates of jails, asylums and hospitals. In

the

absence

of

more

accurate

sources

of

information,

the census figures for 1951, 1961 and 1974 help us to determine the approximate size of the labour force, the middle class and the intelligentsia (see Table 4.1). While the bulk of the population of

East Bengal were dependents, the vast majority of the civilian labour force was engaged in agriculture. In

1951, 69 per cent and 31 per

cent of the total population were dependents and members of the civilian labour force respectively. Of the latter, 83 per cent belonged

to the agricultural labour force.’ In 1961, the agricultural labour

force formed 85 per cent of the civilian labour force and in 1974,

this was 77 per cent.’ The percentage of the agricultural labour force

saw a relative decline between

1951

and

1974. Although the pro-

portion of the labour force engaged in non-agricultural occupations increased slightly, it remained a fraction of the population through-

out the period — 5.17 per cent in 1951, 5.05 per cent in 1961 and

5.84 per cent in 1974 (see Table 4.1). As a proportion of the civilian

labour force, its percentage increased from 16.84 per cent in 1951

to 20.39 per cent in 1974. In absolute terms it increased by 192.59

per cent between 1951 and 1974, The growth of the non-agricultural

labour force may be attributed partly to the increase in urbanization

(see Table 4.2) and partly to the new policies of growth adopted during the sixties and seventies.

Table 4.2: URBANIZATION IN EAST BENGAL, 1951-1974

Year 1951

Per cent of population in urban areas 43

1961

52

1974

8

Source: 1974 Bangladesh Population Census Report, p. 34. R. Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (Dacca, 1973), p. 11. 4.2

The Middle Class

If education is taken as a criterion for ascertaining the strength of the middle class, its size in 1961 was 8.36 per cent of the non-agricultural

238

The Sacred and The Secular

labour force. It was 0.42 per cent of the total population if the criterion

is matriculation and above (calculated from Table 4.3). But in the fifties

and sixties people with very poor education held rather important posts.

According to the 1961 census, out of 100,883 teachers, 5,834 (5.78 per cent) had nil to below primary education; 8,484 (8.4 per cent) had primary education, 31,733 (31.45 per cent) had secondary education,

43,622 (43.24 per cent) were matriculates; and only 11,210 (11.11 per

cent) had degrees. Among physicians, surgeons and medical specialists, the vast majority were matriculates (81.5 per cent): some were degree-

holders (11.4 per cent) and the rest had below primary to secondary

education (about 7 per cent), (see Table 4.3).

The better educated groups were architects, engineers, physical

scientists,

lawyers,

judges

and

public

service

officials.

And

even among them a large proportion was only matriculate. According

to

the

1961 Census of Pakistan,

and judges,

36.26 per cent

were

out

of

matriculates

4,889

and

lawyers

the

rest

were degree holders; out of 4,117 architects, engineers and survey-

ors, 80.05 per cent were matriculates and only 19.95 per cent were degree holders.

Public

service officials probably had the best edu-

cation. While 82.1 per cent of them were degree holders, only 17.9 per cent were matriculates (see Table 4.3). The middle class may be defined according

to educational

achievements or in terms of occupation and income. However, in

East Bengal, which experienced rapid mobility after partition largely due to the creation of new opportunities and vacancies arising from

the migration of Hindu middle classes which were often filled by

less qualified Muslims, occupation is perhaps a better criterion than

education

in determining

the size of the middle class. Thus. an at-

tempt is made here to quantify the size of the middle class by using occupation as a criterion.

In Table 4.1, the non-agricultural labour force engaged in middle

and lower middle-class occupations are categorized by the censuses of 1951,

1961

and

1974

into : professional technical;

managerial

administrative; and sales and.related occupations. The first category

includes engineers, architects, transport managers, pilots, professors, teachers,

religious

workers,

physicians,

surgeons,

nurses,

health workers, artists, writers, judges, lawyers, chemists and metallurgists. The

second

includes business executives, administrators in

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

239

government and public services, officers and clerical workers. The

third category refers to sales workers and shopkeepers.

Like the labour force, the middle class grew in absolute numbers;

but in relative terms, the growth was less significant. During the period

1951-74 the size of the middle class increased by 46.28 per cent; but

as a proportion of total population it grew only by 0.18 per cent. As

a proportion of the non-agricultural labour force it decreased by 1.27

per cent (see Appendix 4.A). Its share in the total population was en-

tirely insignificant — 1.98 per cent, 1.8 per cent and 2.16 per cent in 1951, 1961 and 1974 respectively (see Table 4.1).

Only a small proportion of this middle class was engaged in professional and technical occupations (see Appendix 4.B). In 1974, this category accounted for 24.21 per cent of the middle class but formed

only 0.52 per cent of the total population (see Table 4.1). Yet, this

category experienced the highest growth when compared to the other two categories of managerial-administrative and sales-related occupa-

tions (see Appendix 4.B).

Growth in middle-class occupations during the first two census periods was relatively slower than that during the next two.

Between 1951 and 1961 it was 10.6 per cent and during 1961-74, 68.32 per cent. For certain occupational categories such as

managerial

and administrative, the growth was negative between

1951 and 1961. The relatively slow, or even negative growth of this

period has been variously explained in terms of the dislocation in the post-independence period, the absence of adequate schooling and training facilities, financial stringency, insufficient allocation of resources,

etc.

as

well

as

the

exodus

to

India

of

Hindus

sionals, officials and landholders at the time of partition.”

Part of

who accounted for a disproportionately large share of the profesthe explanation relates to east-west relations as the bureaucracy was

dominated largely by Punjabis from West Pakistan. Growth between the census

years

of

1961

and

1974

was

to a great extent due to

policies adopted during the sixties and seventies.

In 1951, non-Muslims, a majority of them Hindu, formed 23.1

per cent of the population (see Table 4.7) but 40.19 per cent of the

non-agricultural labour force was engaged in middle- and lower middle-class occupations (calculated from Table 4.4). Their strength in

professional and technical jobs was the highest — 49.33 per cent;

240

The Sacred and The Secular

in administrative jobs it was the lowest — 34.96 per cent. In sales

and related occupations, the strength of non-Muslims

was 43.27 per

cent. The percentage of Muslims in these fields was 50.68 per cent, 65.05 per cent and 56.73 per cent respectively, while they formed

59.81 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force (see Table 4.4). The exact loss due to Hindu migration cannot be ascertained because the 1961 census fails to give an occupational breakdown

by religious communities. However, the effect of migration could be seen in educational

institutions which could no longer provide

adequate facilities and well-qualified teaching staff. While Dacca University met the problem by appointing teachers from abroad and

incorporating into the teaching staff fresh graduates from the university, many smaller institutions were forced to close down.’ A.

G. Stock, a British lady who was appointed professor and head of

the department of English at Dacca University in the summer of 1947, just before partition, wrote in her memoirs : ‘Only one out of nine teachers was Muslim; of the others, four had crossed the

border by Christmas and a fifth moved early the next year.’ The

riots of 1950 had a particularly devastating effect on the remaining few, most of whom decided to leave for India. The fear that uni-

versity education would virtually come to a standstill, provoked the

university

authorities to use semi-coercive

methods

to keep them

from leaving e.g. by not paying their Providence Fund, a sort of a self-contributing pension plan.

Certain categories among the agricultural labour force could be

classified as middle class because of the nature of subsidiary occu-

pations they engaged in. They formed a small percentage of the agricultural labour force and a pool from which the urban middle classes would be recruited. These include school teachers, private tutors, imams, religious workers, local medicine men, health workers,

lawyers, legal assistants, clerks, etc. In 1951, they accounted for 2.09 per cent of the agricultural labour force and in 1961, only 0.53

per cent (see Table 4.5). The heavy drop in the number and proportion of persons engaged in such subsidiary occupations in 1961

was due partly to the closing down of many primary and secondary schools and partly to migration

into urban areas. The exodus

affluent Hindus was also an important factor.

of

241

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

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Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

245

Table 4.5 : MIDDLE-CLASS OCCUPATIONS AS SUBSIDIARY OCCUPATIONS OF THE AGRICULTURAL LABOUR FORCE — 1961, 1961

‘Occupations ‘School teachers, Private tutors Imams, Muazzins, Religious workers Hakims, Apothecaries, Midwives, other Health workers Lawyers and Legal assistants Clerks and moharris TOTAL Agricultural labour force Middle-class occupations as per cent of agricultural laboor force

1951 41,667 15,012

1961 25,287 23,654

27,062 2,032 132,530 224,303 10,715,467

19,181 84 10,162 79,108 14,872,004

2.09

0.53

‘Source : 1951 Population Census of Pakistan, vol. 3, table II-C, pp. 11-25. 1961 Population Census of Pakistan, vol. 2, table 48, pp. V-80.

43° The Intelligentsia Although the intelligentsia may not be strictly occupation-related, certain occupations tend to be associated with it because of their intellec-

tual response to the state of the world. A list of these occupations may

be derived from the 1951 and 1961 censuses under the category of the

non-agricultural labour force.'? Professors, teachers, judges, lawyers,

physicians, surveyors, religious workers and government and public service officers who come under the broad categories of professional-

technical

and

administrative-managerial

occupations

are the

groups most relevant to our discussion. Though journalists too form a part of the intelligentsia, this category has been omitted as it is not included in the list of non-agricultural occupations in the censuses. The intelligentsia, so defined, formed

12.81 per cent of the middle class,

0.82 per cent of the civilian labour force, and 0.25 per cent of the total

population in 1951. The respective percentages in 1961 were 16.12 per

cent, 0.85 per cent and 0.29 per cent (calculated from Table 4.1). It

must be noted that while the percentage of the middle classes in relation

to the total population declined by 0.18 per cent between 1951 and

1961, the intelligentsia continued to grow. The 1974 census does not

The Sacred and The Secular

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Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

247

offer information from which inferences on these points can be drawn.

Teachers and professors comprised the bulk of the intelligentsia and

they also experienced the fastest growth (see Table 4.6). The other

categories, except those of physicians and surgeons, increased absolutely but not in relative terms.

In the fifties, however, a large section of the intelligentsia was

non-Muslim and mostly Hindu. According to the 1951 census, 48.7

per cent of the intelligentsia engaged in non-agricultural middle-class

occupations were non-Muslim (see Table 4.6). This was greatly in

excess of their proportion in the population which was 23.1 per cent

(see Table 4.7). It may be assumed that the majority of the non-

Muslim intelligentsia was Hindu for it comprised the majority of non-Muslims and was also educationally the most advanced.

Table 4.7 : PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MAJOR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN BANGLADESH, 1951-74

Year 1951 1961 1974

All Communities 100 100 100

Muslim 169 80.4 85.4

Hindu 2.0 18.5 135

Others: Ld La Ld

Source : 1974 Bangladesh Population Census Report, table 20, p. 23. Non-Muslims,

particularly Hindus,

outnumbered

Muslims

in cer-

tain areas, for example, the legal and medical professions (see Table

4.8). These had been dominated by Muslims before colonial rule and now suffered most as a result of the migration of professional Hindus.

The number of physicians and surgeons fell from 28,400 in 1951 to

7,152 in 1961 (see Table 4.6).

In the case of religious workers non-Muslims outnumbered Muslims

by far in 1951. But despite the exodus, this category grew considerably

in absolute terms by 1961. It may be surmised that the bulk of the growth occurred among Muslims.

While Muslims provided the bulk of teachers and professors, a large

proportion of senior posts in higher education was filled by nonMuslims."° And despite the migration of Hindu intellectuals, the num-

ber of teachers and professors more than doubled during 1951-61. But a close look at the 1961 census shows that only 11.11 per cent of them

248

The Sacred and The Secular

were degree holders. The rest were educated up to the matriculation

level (see Table 4.3). Thus, as late as the sixties it was possible to gain entry into the middle classes and even the intelligentsia with minimal

education. This phenomenon was probably speeded up by the exodus.

The Muslim community thus experienced rapid mobility. For example,

the majority of teaching appointments at Dacca University after parti-

tion were from the Muslim community. Between the academic years 1947-48 and 1951-52, 145 new teachers were appointed. Of these, 128

(88.27 per cent) were Muslim and only 17 (11.72 per cent) non-Muslim

— 11 (7.58 per cent) Hindus, 5 Christians and 1 Buddhist. Between 1957-58 and 1961-62, 63 new appointments were made. Of these 60 (95.23 per cent) were Muslims and only 3 (5 per cent) non-Muslims — 2 (3.17 per cent) Hindus, and 1 Christian (see list of appointments

made by Dacca University between 1935 and 1957 in Appendix 4.C).'*

In the years following partition, the proportion of non-Muslims

in the middle class and among the intelligentsia decreased, while that of Muslims increased. This is also true for trends in education. While there was a general decline in education between 1951 and

1961 the total number of matriculates — Muslim and non-Muslim

— increased, though faster in the case of the former. At higher

levels participation in education from both communities fell significantly — by 32.33 per cent at the graduate and 11.96 per cent at the postgraduate

level. The

annual

rate of decrease

was

3.83

per

cent and 1.27 per cent respectively (derived from Table 4.8). For Muslims, the annual rate of growth during 1951-61 was plus 0.87 per cent at the matriculation level minus 1.92 per cent at the graduate, and

minus

1.53 per cent at the postgraduate

levels. For

non-

Muslims, it was plus 0.6 per cent, minus 7.76 per cent, and minu:

0.67 per cent respectively. Only at the postgraduate level, were the

losses for non-Muslims less than those of Muslims (see Table 4.8).

Here, the proportion of Muslims fell from 70.44 per cent to 68.61

per cent, while that of non-Muslims increased from 29.56 per cent

to 31.39 per cent (see Appendix 4.D). This was the only category in which the proportion of non-Muslims increased slightly in com-

parison with the 1951 figures.

In all other categories the non-Muslim proportion dropped. In overall terms, their participation in eduction fell from 32.67 per cent in 1951 to 29.94 per cent in 1961, while that of Muslims increased

249

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250

The Sacred and The Secular

from 67.33 per cent to 69.96 per cent (see Table 4.9). Since the bulk of the non-Muslims were Hindus, it can be assumed that they suffered the greatest losses. Table 4.9 PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS

AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF EDUCATION, 1951 AND 1961 1951

Matriculates Graduates Postgraduates Total Number

Total Muslims 100 «67.59 100 64.86 100 70.44 331,759 223,340

1961

2956) 108,419]

NonTotal Muslims Muslims 100 69.34 30.66 100 76.84 23.16 100 68.61 31.39 335,182 234,481 100,701

Source : Derived from table 4.10.

The Hindus gradually prior to partition. By lation. The landlords affluent among them.

ceased to be the powerful middle class they were 1961 they formed only 18.4 per cent of the popuhad left and so had most of the educated and Politically they became ineffective as they con-

stituted a minute opposition in the Assembly.’ In the absence of a

national-level political party they tended to speak for themselves as individuals. At the same time, the official policy of persecution of communists and the tendency to identify Hindu intellectuals as communists further drove away a large number of the remaining Hindu middle classes.'* They however, left their mark on the cultural and

intellectual life of the local community. 4.4

The Religious Intelligentsia

An approximate idea of the relative sizes of the religious and secular intelligentsia may be deduced from Tables 4.1 and 4.6. One may expect that as a first hypothesis the categories of professors and teachers,

judges and lawyers, physicians and surgeons, as well as government officers, were likely to generate a more secular intelligentsia; and that

the category of religious workers, imams and muazzins, was likely to supply the bulk of the religious intelligentsia. In 1951 religious workers formed 24.6 per cent of the intelligentsia in non-agricultural occupations. The percentage dropped to 22.14 in 1961 although there was an absolute increase from 26,235 to 32,849

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia 251 during the period. (see Tables 4.6 and 4.10). As a percentage of total population, they were just 0.098 per cent in 1951 and 0.111 per cent in 1961 (Table 4.10). This slight increase took place in both the agricultural and non-agricultural labour force; in the former the increase was from 0.14 per cent in 1951 to 0.16 per cent in 1961, whereas in

the latter, it was from 1.2 per centto 1.27 per cent in the same period.'”

The proportion of religious workers to the agricultural labour force was

significantly less than in the non-agricultural labour force in 1951—it was 0.035 per cent in the agricultural and nearly double, 0.062 per cent in the non-agricultural labour force (see Appendix 4.E). The difference was somewhat less in 1961 : 0.046 per cent and 0.064 per cent respectively. Table 4.10 : RELIGIOUS WORKERS BETWEEN 1951 AND 1961 (per cent of labour force and population) Religious workers ‘Non-agricultural religious workers (as per cent of non-agricultural c.f) Non-agricultural Muslim religious workers (as per cent of non-agricultural c.Lf) Non-agricultural Muslim religious workers (as per cent of Muslim non-agricultural c.Lf.) Agricultural religious workers (as per cent of agricultural c.f) All Muslim and non-Muslim religious workers (as per cent of population) ‘Non-agricultural Muslim religious workers (as per cent of population) Non-agricultural retigious workers (as per cent of agricultural intelligentsia) ‘Non-agricultural Muslim religious workers

(as per cent of non-agricultural intelligentsia) Non-agricultural Muslim religious workers (as per cent of non-agricultural Muslim intelligentsia) Agricultural religious workers (as per cent of agricultural middle class) Lf. = civilian labour force

Source : Calculated from Tables 4.1, 4.5 and 4.6

1951 12

1961 127

047

-

086

-

0.14

0.159

0098

OL

0.024

-

246

22.14

9.64

_

188 669

299

‘The Muslim component of this category was even smaller. In 1951 it was 0.024 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force alone, whereas the proportion of non-Muslims was 0.038 per cent (calculated from Table 4.4), Corresponding calculations for 1961 cannot be made for

252

The Sacred and The Secular

want of specific information. But the increase in number and proportion of religious workers, despite migration of Hindus, suggests that this

increase was largely among Muslims. The educational breakdown by

occupational categories in the 1961 census indicates that the majority

of non-agricultural religious workers, 50.81 per cent, had nil to below-

primary education; 28.7 per cent had primary education; 14.41 per cent studied up to the middle stage; only 4.14 per cent were matriculates

and 1.93 per cent degree holders (see Table 4.3). Taking education as

a criterion for defining the intelligentsia one must note that it was

possible to enter the ranks of the intelligentsia with a minimal education in the fifties and sixties. If, however, one adopted a somewhat stricter criterion — for instance, matriculation and above—then only, 1.993 or

6.07 per cent of the religious workers could be considered as belonging

to the intelligentsia. Such an assessment, however, does not reckon with the influence and social role of the less educated workers. Table 4.11 : MADRASAH EDUCATION IN BANGLADESH : REFORMED AND OLD SCHEME SENIOR AND JUNIOR, RECOGNIZED AND UNRECOGNIZED MADRASAHS:

‘Number of Institutions and Pupils, 1948-49 — 1975-76

Year 1948-49 1954-55 1955-56 1960-61* 1961-62 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1972-73

Number of Madrasabs 1,360 2,037 2272 2.974 3.203 473 581 6,260 6,565

Numbers of Pupils 134,872 200,719 274,705 235,443 244,408 628,065 586,686 716,202 739,163,

1974-75¢

6471

756,235

1973-74

1975-76*

6,807 7971

844,479

808,000

‘Including forquania madrasahs. Sources : Report P.LE.B, 1948-49, p. 25; Report P.LE.B. 1954-55, p. 47; Report P.LEB. 1955-56, p. 40; Annual Report on Public Instruction, East Pakistan, 1961-62, pp. 54-55; Statistical Digest of Bangladesh (S.D.B.), no. 8, 1972, table 13.1, pp. 252-53; Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh (S.Y B.), 1975, table 7.1, p. 177; Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh (S.P-B.), 1978, pp. 252-53; S.P-B., 1979, pp. 402-403.

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

253

Madrasah education may be taken as a more adequate indicator

of the size of the Muslim

religious intelligentsia. Table 4.11 and

Appendix 4.F gives the number and percentage of institutions and the number

of students in them from

1948-49

to 1975-76.

They

show a gradual increase in the total number of institutions and students. The number of madrasahs and maktabs increased from 3.44

per cent of all educational institutions in 1948-49 to 13.5 per cent

in 1968-69. The number of madrasah pupils as a percentage of all

pupils in educational institutions rose from 4.06 per cent in 1948-49 to 7.6 per cent in 1968-69. As a percentage of the total population it increased from 0.47 per cent in 1954-55 to 0.48 per cent in 1961-

62, and 1.06 per cent in 1974-75. The figures here are considerably

higher than those based on occupation (e.g. for 1951), showing that

not everyone with religious education became a religious worker.

An interesting feature of the seventies was that the number of

institutions continued to increase at a rate higher than in the sixties,

while the annual growth rate of pupils was considerably slower. The

growth of madrasahs in the seventies could be explained in terms of Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman's

attempt to dispel

fears that his secu-

larism was an anti-religious one. Ayub Khan in the sixties did not

particularly heed the orthodoxy until he needed orthodox support for

the 1964-65 elections. His regime was criticized by the orthodoxy

for being too secular as religious education and values were alleg-

edly being neglected.'*

The late sixties (see Appendix 4.G) show phenomenal changes

in the number of madrasahs and student intake. Between

1968-69

and 1969-70 the number of institutions increased by 1,088 but that

of students fell by 41,379. On the other hand, between 1969-70 and 1970-71

the number of students rose by 129,516 but that of insti-

tutions grew only by 449, which, however, is still higher than the

average

annual

increase

for

the

period,

1960-61-1968-69.

These could be explained in terms of the turbulent atmosphere of the

late

sixties

(1968-71

in

particular),

the

secular

threat

from Bengali nationalists leading to a greater assertion of religious

identity among some, and government attempts to preserve the re-

ligious character of the state by building religious institutions.

254

The Sacred and The Secular

45

Education and Development of a Middle-Class Intelligentsia

Census figures clearly indicate that the Muslim middle class developed slowly

in East Bengal

even

after partition. Crucial

perhaps

for

an assessment of this phenomenon is the effect on the education system of the dislocation caused by partition. Table 4.12 shows that the number

of educational institutions steadily declined between 1947-48 and 1954-55, and there was no significant increase in the number of schol-

ars. This created a situation quite opposite to what was hoped for and

expected by erstwhile Indian Muslims for the territories chalked out as Pakistan. Table 4.12 : TOTAL NUMBER OF SCHOLARS IN ALL TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

(recognized and unrecognized) IN BANGLADESH, 1947-48 — 1968-69

Year

No. of Institutions

No. of Scholars

1947-48 1948-49 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55

36,801 39,540 32,379 32,125 32,104

3,239,436 3,321,712 3,366,276 3,362,506 3,332,921

1962-63 1963-64 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69

35,155 36,009 31,800 32,878 33,636 34.987

1961-62

34,298

Pupils as per cent ‘of population

4,352,673

4,749,080 5,139,586 5,277,033 5,701,704 6,445,470 8,257,245

78 19

84

Sources : Report, P.I.E.B., 1948-49, pp. 3, 30; Report, P.LE.B., 1953-54, p. 1; Report, P.LEB,, 1954-55, pp. 1-2; Statistical Digest of East Pakistan, no. 2, 1964, p. 188; no. 3, 1965, p. 296; no. 5, 1968, p. 294; no. 14, 1970-71, p. 276.

It has been suggested that the problems which East Bengal faced after partition were ‘so huge and complicated that they seemed to unhinge the

whole

educational

system’.'”

The

most

important

problem

cited officially was ‘the overall shortage of qualified teachers conse-

quent on the exodus of Hindu teachers in large numbers’.” Also, the

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

255

fact that a considerable number of Hindu students left the province of East Bengal ‘caused almost a breakdown in the financial position of

many an educational institution’."

Moreover, the government had adopted a ‘policy of concentration

rather than expansion’ in 1952-53. The objective was to allow ‘undesirable schools’ a ‘natural death’ and emphasize the ‘quality’ of

education rather than the ‘quantity’ of institutions? Among the

undesirable schools were a number of primary, middle, special and unrecognized schools which were not viable due to a lack of adequate

funds, facilities and trained teaching staff. In 1953-54 for example, a

number of girls’ primary schools were closed down.” In 1954-55 the Rangpur District School Board adopted a policy of gradually abolishing

aided boys’ and girls’ primary schools.* Some middle schools were

downgraded because they could not function with only a few students or just one class. The fall in the number of special schools from 2,095 in 1952-53 to 2,078 in 1953-54, was due to the closing down of a

number of adult schools.’ Many unrecognized schools were forced to

close down because of the lack of adequate support from local man-

agers. The official policy was to encourage this tendency.

The decrease in the number of institutions and pupils was particu-

larly sharp in 1954-55. This has been attributed partly to the devastation

caused by floods and partly to the inability to re-accommodate pupils

from the abolished schools.” There was no significant improvement in

the participation of Bengal Muslims in education in the immediate postpartition period : only a small percentage of the population received

any education at all, although Muslims did begin to form a large pro-

portion of the school going population.” A large number of pupils

came from rural areas, but they constituted a smaller percentage of the tural population as compared to urban pupils as percentage of the urban

population. For example, in 1954-55, out of 3,332,921

pupils

from all communities, 3,086,527 (92.6 per cent) came from rural areas

and 246,394 (7.4 per cent) from urban areas; they constituted 7.6 per cent and 13.3 per cent of the rural and urban population respectively.”

The urban people thus represented an expectedly larger propor-

tion of the educated population. It could also be said that the education system reflected an urban bias, particularly at the advanced stages of

learning. Although urbanization was 4.3 per cent according to the 1951 census, a disproportionately higher number of pupils in these stages

256

The Sacred and The Secular

were of urban origin.” In 1957, 22.1 per cent of college and 24.8 per

cent of university students were town-born.” This urban bias is partly

explained in terms of the important political role played by the urban

population and partly by the nature of social demand for education. It

is worth noting, however, that the vast majority of pupils receiving

education were rural in origin.

‘The distribution of pupils over various stages did not change

significantly after independence. The vast majority

went to primary

schools and only a handful to the university. Table 4.13 shows that

in 1954-55, of the total number of students, 78.15 per cent were in

primary school, 0.75 per cent in university and arts colleges, and only 0.07 per cent in professional colleges.

Table 4.13 : PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EDUCATION IN EAST BENGAL, 1953-55

University Professional High Arts College College School 1953-54 0.75 0.06 955 1954-55

0.75

0.07

1031

Middle School 365

Primary Special Unrecognized School School’ School 7887 609 — 1.03

3.417815

6.55

0.76

Source : Report P.LEB., 1954-55 p. 2.

Educational Drop-Out As in pre-partition years, there was heavy wastage in schools, the dropout rate being highest at the primary stage. Of all the boys and girls who were in Class I in 1950-51, only one in every seven boys and one in every nine girls reached Class V in 1954-55." Wastage was higher

among female pupils. Also more Muslim boys dropped out than Hindu boys.” Among Muslims, for every 740 boys in Class I in 1954-55, there were 100 boys in Class V, a ratio of 7.4:1. In 1961-62, the ratio had dropped to 6:1. But among Hindus, the ratio became slightly worse, rising from 4.9:1 in 1954-55 to 5:1 in 1961-62 (calculated from Table 4.14). The education reports do not explain the higher wastage

among Muslims, but the fact that it decreased over time indicates that

the community was getting better economically and could contribute larger numbers to the intelligentsia.

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

257

Table 4.14 : PUPILS (BOYS) BY DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES DISTRIBUTED OVER FIVE CLASSES OF THE PRIMARY STAGE IN 1954-55 AND 1961-62.

Class Pre-primary I 0 ri Vv v

Pre-primary I u mM Vv v

Total No. of boys

Muslim

166 1,002,387 413,089 269,711 198,496 148,404

947 1,208,829 533,095 349,058 267,819 209,477

Hindu Christian Buddhist

Other

153 801,586 325,589 205,423 148,386 108,293

1954-55 13 190,272 84,261 62,091 48,660 38,838

NA NA NA NA NA NA

NA NA NA NA NA NA

10,529 3,239 2197 1,450 1,273

757 948,591 413,532 258,538 206,697 158,209

1961-62 118 246,562 114,213 86,663 58,791 49,495

4 (2,864 1,599 1,223 118 546

10,366 2,549 2,499 1,524 1,155

446 202 99 89 n

NA : not available * includes Christians and Buddhists for 1954-55

Source : Report on P.LE-B,, 1954-55, p. 13; Annual Report on Public Instruction, East Pakistan for 1961-62 (Govt. of East Pakistan, Directorate of Public Instruction, E.P.G.P., Dacca, 1965) p. 30

A study on ‘The Problem of Educational Drop-out in East Pakistan’ published in 1969 observed that the rate of retention in urban schools was higher than in rural schools. The reasons for rural drop-out based on an investigation of 251 rural primary students of Dacca and Noakhali districts were very similar to those before-1947, namely : ... domestic and other work, parental neglect, poverty, school failure, lack of interest in schools, the plea of having grown up (in the case of girls), marriage, admission to madrasahs, and lack of transportation.>>

This means that the bulk of rural Muslims could not contribute to the formation of an intelligentsia. Neither could a certain socio-economic

class of the urban population for whom dropping-out was largely due

258 to

The Sacred and The Secular factors

such

as

poverty,

‘the forced

repetition

of

grades’,

‘over-academic and verbal type’ of curriculum and ‘traditional methods

of teaching’. The single most important cause of school drop-out was

the child’s experience in his first year of school which he did not wish

to repeat — that of being ill-taught in overcrowded and ramshackle rooms

by

harassed

and

incompetent

teachers

who

relied.

on

fear

to maintain order.™ Notably, none of these studies refer to the absence

of proper religious instruction as a cause of wastage unlike pre-partition official documents. On the contrary, admission to madrasahs is taken

as an example of dropping out. Appendices 4.H and 4.1 indicate that the rate of drop-out was higher for East Pakistan than for West Pakistan although it declined in both wings between 1958-59 and 1963-64. The drop-out rate from Class I to Class II for boys and girls in East Pakistan was 56.4 per cent and 36.3 per cent in West Pakistan. In 1963-64 it fell to 52.9

per cent and 30.6 per cent respectively. This trend continued at the secondary

level where the rate of drop-out from Class V to Class

X between 1959 and 1964 for East Pakistan was even highér — 65.3 per cent. In other words, the rate of retention was 34.7 per

cent. For West Pakistan, the rate of drop-out was 46.63 per cent,

ie, a retention rate of 53.37 per cent. This difference between the two wings denotes an imbalance in their socio-economic organization and indicates that East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) was likely to generate a smaller middle-class intelligentsia than West Pakistan.

Higher Education In the immediate post-partition period the proportion of urban students

in universities was greater than in schools. In the fifties urban areas supplied only 7.4 per cent of all students and 23.5 per cent of university and college students, but only about 0.8 per cent of the total number

of students

receiving

any

instruction

went

to the

university

and

colleges, including professional ones.”* It may thus be assumed that a

smaller proportion of school going children were urban. At the same time,

there

were

sional colleges than

more

urban

students

in

science

and

profes-

in arts institutions : 29.3 per cent science

students compared with 20.6 per cent studying the arts and commerce

in 1957. As compared to the rural population, urban people showed

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

259

more interest not only in higher education, but also in the more tech-

nical and professional subjects. This was a change from the earlier

emphasis on purely liberal arts oriented education, although official

policy always stressed such education as it was cheaper than profes-

sional education and could be provided more universally, even if it meant a fall in standards.” When funds are scarce and the aim is universal education, standards of education are sacrificed, as in the Islamic

colleges and madrasahs of pre-partition Bengal.” Again, in the colonial

period, liberal arts education rather than scientific or professional edu-

cation was emphasized.” This had the dual political advantage of keep-

ing large sections ‘of the population, who would otherwise receive no

education, satisfied, and at the same time keeping a control on the aspirations of the middle classes, for power is a crucial variable in the

setting of educational requirements.” In terms of the development of an intelligentsia it meant that only those with access to power, wealth,

and prestige would have a better chance of entering the ranks of the professional and ruling intelligentsia. And in the context of Bangladesh,

this privileged group was largely an urban one. But throughout the period under investigation education continued to be arts biased, for example, in the distribution of teachers and students in Bangladesh universities in the seventies. The arts and social science departments

of universities had a greater proportion of teachers to students than the science faculties.“ This is likely to happen when funds are scarce and the aim is to reach as many people as possible, for science education is more expensive than liberal arts education.

By 1974 a far greater proportion of Dacca University students

were urban. About 25 to 40 per cent of male ‘students in the faculties of arts, sciences, and commerce were born in small or large -urban centres. Among female students the relevant percentages were

higher and ranged from 64 to 85 per cent. At the same time, many

students who spent their early years in villages, had their later edu-

cation in urban centres as is indicated by the change in place of residence of guardians. For example, while 60-75 per cent of the MA, MSc, and commerce students were born in villages, only 51-60 per cent of parents continued to reside there. Among law students,

75 per cent of the guardians had urban residence; among female science students this was 92 per cent.”

The

pattern

which

emerges

is

that

of

an

increasingly

260

The Sacred and The Secular

mobile population, moving outwards from villages towards towns and cities. This is more true of Dacca, the capital city, than of Rajshahi or Jahangirnagar where the proportion of village-based stu-

dents was higher than in Dacca.” Several studies associate urbanization with a certain laxity in the observance of religious rituals. A study by A.F.A. Hussain published in 1956 notes that those who left home to work in cities ‘do not adhere

to rituals as rigorously’. K.B. Sayeed wrote a decade later that : ‘the

educated groups when separated from their rural homes become either indifferent or lax in the observance of the rituals’.“* Urbanization is thus accompanied by a greater tolerance of deviant behaviour whereby not all social norms are observed strictly. This tolerance of which the increase in female education along with laxity in the observance of

purdah are examples, may be taken as a sign, in certain instances, of

progressive thinking challenging established tradition or of a liberalization of the intellect. From this it follows that Dacca University, with

the largest proportion of urban-based students, was most likely to throw

up an intelligentsia which would be liberal and secular in orientation. 4.6

Social Base of the Intelligentsia

An attempt is made here to trace the socio-economic base of the in-

telligentsia in order to establish linkages between their social base and ideological orientations. Since university students are included in the category defined as the intelligentsia, the analysis is based on available surveys of their living and working conditions. According to a 1957 survey on the living and working conditions of students of Dacca University and colleges by A. N. Muniruzzaman, approximately 76.5 per cent of the students were born in villages. However, at the time, the main occupation of East Pakistani people was agriculture: about 82 per cent of the families depended on agricultural and allied occupations but supplied only about 18 per cent of the students. The majority of students — about 82 per cent — came from families engaged in non-agricultural occupations like service, profession and business. Families depending on services and professions, i.e. the middle-class, accounted for about 60 per cent of students, while the business community, many of whom could be considered as belonging to the middle class, sent another 18 per cent.”

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia 261 Appendix 4.} gives the social background of Dacca University stu-

dents in 1957. The distribution of the total annual and per capita monthly income of families to which the students belonged reveal that higher education was practically confined to the middle classes. The

largest share of students 38.7 per cent, came from the middle income category earning Rs 2,000-5,000 a year. Some

later surveys

of East

Bengal

university

students

indicate

that a smaller proportion came from families emgaged in government

service or business, while a larger proportion had guardians and fathers involved in cultivation or related occupations. Talukdar Maniruzzaman’s 1968 survey of 463 students of Dacca, Rajshahi,

and Chittagong universities, found 38 per cent of respondents’ fa-

thers engaged in cultivation and related occupations—about 20 per

cent more than in 1957. Non-agricultural occupations provided 54

per cent of students —28 per cent less than in 1957. Only 24 per

cent came from families with a government service background,

15

per cent from those engaged in business, and a similar proportion

from professions such as law, medicine and teaching.” A. H. Talukder’s mid-1972 study of Rajshahi University students found that 69 per cent of them came from rural areas,

urban and

17 per cent were

14 per cent had homes in both towns and villages. But

the last group had primarily a rural background

and was

included

in the rural category of the report. The main occupation of the fa-

thers of 45.9 per cent of the students was agriculture, while those

of another 49 per cent were engaged in non-agricultural occupa-

tions” such as government service, the professions and business.

Families depending on service and the professions provided 30.8 per cent and 6.0 per cent of students respectively while business families

contributed 12.2 per cent.

In 1974-75, M.A. Tayyeb studied the attitudes and aspirations of

Jahangirnagar University students. They noted that a majority of stu-

dents were born in rural areas and that a majority of fathers were engaged

in cultivation. Appendix 4.K gives the distribution of re-

spondents’ fathers’ occupations : a much smaller proportion of the fathers were in government service.”

However, another 1974 study of Dacca University students revealed certain changing trends in their socio-economic origins. The pattern, while different from that in the late sixties, was quite similar

262

The Sacred and The Secular

to that in the fifties. For example, a greater proportion of the students came from families engaged in government service than in

farming (see Appendix 4.L). This not only indicates the existence

of a stable urban middle class, but also the patterns of mobility and recruitment into the middle classes for the level of education of

fathers in the 1957 and 1974 samples was much higher than in 1968. The percentage of illiterate fathers was 2.9 per cent and 21

per cent in 1957 and 1968 respectively.” In 1957, 22.7 per cent of

the fathers were graduates and above; in 1974 the relevant percent-

age stood at approximately 50.

In other words, students in the 1957 and 1974 samples for Dacca

University came from relatively more prosperous backgrounds and

had more educated fathers engaged in middle-class employment than

in the 1968 sample for Rajshahi, Dacca, and Chittagong Universities. But the 1974 sample had fathers with a greater level of educational

attainment than that of 1957,

indicating a trend towards

a more

meritocratic society, where high education was becoming an impor-

tant hallmark of entry into the middle classes.

In the late sixties and early seventies the proportion of rural-based

students and of fathers/guardians engaged in cultivation was greater in Jahangirnagar and Rajshahi Universities when compared with Dacca University. Perhaps, Dacca being the capital city, and having a comparatively older and better university, attracted the more affluent urban

population than Rajshahi and Jahangirnagar could.

The 1974 survey revealed that during 1972-74, the student popu-

lation of the university had doubled

but the percentage

from

rural

areas had fallen.* The percentage of male students with farmers as guardians

was 47 at the MA/MSc

level, and 30.81

at the BA/BSc

rural areas to adverse economic

conditions, but

level respectively (see Appendix 4L). The study attributes the drop in admission

does

not

from

state

the

cause

of

the

hardship.

Apparently

only

three years separated the BA/BSc students from the MA/MSc stu-

dents in 1973-74. But while the latter were admitted before the 197t

war, the former were admitted afterwards, and during this war

much havoc had been perpetrated in the countryside, contributing to rural economic decline. The surveys of university students indicate that the vast majority

were of rural origin although their guardians were not all engaged in

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

263

agriculture. In fact, immediately after partition, the vast majority of students came from the middle classes and their fathers were often civil servants and professionals. In the sixties and seventies however, a greater proportion of students of all universities except Dacca University came from families where the fathers were engaged in cultivation reflecting changing patterns in mobility. These families represented the richest groups in rural society. Over two-thirds of Dacca University

students with a farming background came from the wealthiest segment

of rural society owning holdings larger than the country’s average size of 2.5 acres. About 38 per cent of students came from the largest land-

owning group, holding 21 bighas or more. Nationally, only eight per

cent of the population had such holdings.” The pattern, therefore, indicates.a continuous process of recruitment into the middle-class intelligentsia from the rural sector. 4.7

Process of Recruitment into the Intelligentsia

The new middle class was drawn largely from the rich peasantry,

and the intelligentsia from the middle class. The early intellectuals of both the pre- and post-1947 periods came from an established middle

class with strong links with the landed classes or civil servants and

professionals. For example,.the fathers of Dacca University teachers in the forties were more often urban, civil servants, or professionals

farmers, although many

than

were also landed (see Appendix 4.C).*

‘The stronger rural base of intellectuals in the later phase

as revealed

by recruitment patterns into East Bengal universities indicates an increased degree of social mobility in the sixties and seventies as com-

pared to the forties and fifties. Entry into the middle classes was open though. selective. The development policies of Field Marshall

General Ayub Khan and new opportunities for education and

employment in independent Bangladesh ble”

made such mobility possi-

The case of Dacca was somewhat different. Its status as the capital created a great pressure on opportunities for employment and education,

with the urban people having greater access than those from rural areas,

particularly after a sizeable urban middle class had emerged and com-

petition for scarce resources increased. The fall in recruitment into

Dacca University of rural based youths whose fathers tended to be ci-'il

64

The Sacred and The Secular

servants and professionals indicates that the continued growth of the middle class was somewhat arrested and that social mobility into the middle class had become limited.

Indeed, it may be noted that the two revolutionary upheavals which

shook the population and resulted in the creation of new nation states in. 1947 and 1971, both occurred when there were large established

urban middle classes and restricted opportunities for mobility in the major urban centres, such as Calcutta in the forties and Dacca in the late sixties and early seventies.

The Muslim intelligentsia which continued to emerge in East Bengal after partition could be described as rural and vernacular not only because of their origin in rural society but also because of the language they came to accept as their own, viz. Bengali. This phenomenon

stood in sharp contrast to the earlier uncertainty about

their mother tongue. It also distinguished them from that other section of the intelligentsia which could be identified with the upper

ashraf either in terms of ideology or social origins. 4.8

Occupational Structure : Absence of

Complex Differentiation

Although the size of the middle class had increased in absolute terms between the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, it was assumed, by and large, to be not well-differentiated. Bertocci’s study of two villages, Hajipur and Tinpara, led him to claim that ‘the relative recency of settlement and a limited range of variation in the size of landholdings have resulted in a surprisingly little-differentiated occupational structure in the villages’.

‘The absence of a well-differentiated occupational structure im-

plies the absence of articulate interest groups. It has been suggested

that the egalitarianism of East Pakistan was one of poverty.’ Ac-

cording to Anisur Rahman, East Pakistan had no upper class but only a proletariat and a middle class. The destruction of feudalism through a series of land reforms since 1859 was not accompanied by any significant capitalist industrial growth. East Pakistan had no landlords nor any class of rich entrepreneurs who could build its industry. Such advantages were concentrated in the West Pakistan oligrachy.? Rahman writes :

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia 265 The absence of any pull from a significant upper class and a sense of shared deprivation of privileges have resulted in a preservation of emotional and cultural bonds between the middle class and the proletariat, to the extent that the former still seeks its roots in the heavily impoverished peasantry.® Sanderatne and Zaman refer to Rahman while commenting on why a class that could control political power and influence public opinion failed to emerge in East Pakistan : ‘the dominant political philosophy that evolved out of the widespread poverty was a radically egalitarian one’. Political: power was largely vested in West Pakistan during 1947-71. This is reflected in demographic differences between the two wings of the country (see Table 4.15). While West Pakistan had a smaller population, it enjoyed much greater advantages in urbanization and literacy. Table 4.15 : DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN, 1951-61

Year “Total population (million) Population density : (Persons/sq. mile) Urbanization : (percentage) Literacy : (Percentage)

1951

East Pakistan a9

West Pakistan 337

1961

50.8

429

1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961

701 922 43 52 21 215

109 138 178 2s 164 163

Information adapted from 1961 Population Census of Pakistan, vol. I, pt. Il, statements 23, 2.11, 2.14; pt. IV, statements 4.1, 4.4. ‘Source : Raunag Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (Dacca, 1973),p. 11. 4.9

The Vernacular and Non-vernacular Intelligentsia

The vernacular intelligentsia was most vocal in trying to find the right-

ful place for Bengalis — socially, politically and culturally. In the proc-

ess, it came to challenge the traditional patterns of authority embedded in the non-vernacular ashraf intelligentsia which formed the power elite

in the immediate post-partition period.

This latter group comprised the Urdu-speaking upper class of

266

The Sacred and The Secular

Bengal, as well as migrants from the Punjab and the Muslim minority provinces of India. Because of the origin of a large section of the

intelligentsia in provinces other than Bengal, such as Uttar Pradesh and

Bihar, their mother tongue was not Bengali. They tended to be of ashraf

descent — Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, is

a prime example. Even those members who were bilingual, could claim ashraf heritage either by birth or marriage, for example, political figures like Muhammad Ali of Bogra, Nurul Amin, Shahid Suhrawardy, Fazlul

Hug, and Kamal Hossain. This bilingual group was not ideologically

united. Faced with deep political implications, a section, including Muhammad Ali and Nural Amin, sided with the non-vernacular ashraf intelligentsia while another section, including Suhrawardy and Fazlul Hug, supported the vernacular intelligentsia.

The vernacular and non-vernacular intelligentsia were not ideologi-

cally homogeneous or closed groups. Some among the non-vernacular

intelligentsia supported the vernacular intelligentsia; Azam Khan, for

example, who was governor of East Pakistan, represented such a

counter-tendency. Among the vernacular intelligentsia were people fike Monem Khan, also a governor of East Pakistan, Professor Syed Sajjad

Hussain, and the politician Mahmud Ali, all of whom supported the non-vernacular intelligentsia and could therefore be considered to rep-

resent a counter vernacular intelligentsia.

Even in terms of religious and cultural affiliation and self-perception the Muslim intelligentsia were divided. The vernacular and the counter non-vernacular intelligentsia tended towee culture and language in secu-

lar terms, but not so the non-vernacular and counter vernacular intel-

ligentsia, who preferred a religious perception of culture.© Similarly, while members of the vernacular and counter non-vernacular intelligentsia

tended

to

usually

religious,

be

agnostic,

sometimes

atheistic,

and

generally

tolerant, the non-vernacular and counter-vernacular intelligentsia were

dogmatic

and, at times,

communal.

Among

the vernacular intelligentsia, the first ‘revolutionaries’ were a handful of teachers, like Abul Kasem, and a few students including Munier

Chowdhury, from the Muslim Hall of Dacca University.”

During the first decade of independence, Bengal Muslims held most

of the top 50 per cent of the government positions.* However, the

influential members among them belonged to the non-vernacular intelligentsia. The first issue of the Gazette of Pakistan dated 15 August

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia 1947,. declared

Muhammad

Ali

Jinnah

267

as the Governor-General

of Pakistan. Among those appointed as ministers, L.A. Khan, Jogendranath Mandal and Fazlur Rahman represented East Bengal, the

other four being representatives from West Pakistan.” But L.A. Khan was from Uttar Pradesh and had no constituency in East Bengal,

Jogendranath Mandal was a Hindu, and Fazlur Rahman, though from East Bengal by birth, identified himself wholly with the centre located

in West Pakistan. As such, East Bengal hardly had a voice at the centre.

As spokesmen for East Bengal even the Bengali members of

the Muslim League were quite ineffective. Towing the party line meant

supporting the centre, or at least maintaining a discreet silence. When

all of East Bengal was agitated by the provisions for a strong centre in the Report of the Basic Principles Committee in 1950-51,” the main,

though weak, resistance in the Assembly came from the opposition

consisting mainly of Hindus” and a handful of Muslims. Thus at the moment of partition, the politics and economy of Pakistan, including

East’ Bengal, was dominated by non-Bengalis, particularly from the

Punjab.

.

Such non-Bengali domination of the decision-making apparatus pro-

vided the political background for the tension between the religious

and the secular among the intelligentsia. The non-vernacular ashraf

intelligentsia, replete with prejudices against Bengali Islam as inferior Islam, used these attitudes and beliefs as weapons with which to main-

tain their position of dominance over the vernacular intelligentsia. The vernacular intelligentsia, on the other hand, retaliated not by adopting Islamic symbolism, but by emphasizing the secular dimensions of ideology and public life. A greater level of tolerance was noticeable among

the vernacular than the non-vernacular intelligentsia and could be partly

explained in terms of the differences in social origins. The former origi-

nated in local rural society where customs and values were shared with

non-Muslims and the latter originated largely in an urban ashraf not only isolated from the peasantry, but also belonging to a group of mi-

grants from states where they were in a minority and which had not been incorporated into Pakistan. The non-vernacular intelligentsia, with their traditions and experiences as minority communities in India, were

inclined to be more conservative and aggressive in preserving their

influence and position of political dominance. The Punjabis, on the other hand, were not a minority community

in their area. But their

268

The Sacred and The Secular

experience of communal violence, far more severe than in East Bengal, left them considerably more aggressive and anti-Hindu than

the Bengalis.”

In 1947, the representation of the vernacular intelligentsia in the national power elite was limited. Out of 133 Muslim officers of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service (ICS/IPS) who opted

for Pakistan, only one was a Bengali Muslim.” In the political arena,

however, the representation of the vernacular intelligentsia was in ex-

cess of its proportion in the population. While East Pakistan accounted

for 55.42 per cent of the population of Pakistan (of which 98.16 per

cent was Bengali-speaking, 76.8 per cent Muslim, and 22.0 per cent

Hindu) it provided 62.27 per cent of the Bengal delegation to the Constituent Assembly in 1947." However, Bengalis lost even this

advantage soon after independence.”* The assembly failed to use the

power within its reach’ due to the unrivalled status enjoyed by Jinnah.

There are detailed studies of the poor representation of Bengalis in

the national decision-making apparatus and the consequent frustration leading to an emphasis on Bengali ethnic identity. These studies concentrate on the economic and political disparity between the two wings

of Pakistan, and on official policies which aggravated the problem, leading to a final breach of trust. While the economic and political roles of the intelligentsia are discussed in these studies, there is no

attempt to explain their social role and attitudes. Conclusion

After 1947, the intelligentsia constituted an infinitesimal fraction of

East Bengal’s population. Their isolation from the majority was modi-

fied by social and cultural ties with the rural masses. In cultural terms

there was a discourse with the vast majority and distance was mitigated

by the element of social and cultural continuum between the two. This

contrasts quite sharply with the social distance of the Hindu bhadralok

from the masses. The intelligentsia would have been isolated from the

majority but for their special relationship with rural society : emerging

as they did from the new middle classes, included among them were a large section whose fathers and grandfathers still had close contact with village life, or still actually lived in the countryside.

Growth and Development of the intelligentsia

269

At least till 1971, the intelligentsia had little direct role in decision-

making. They did not operate as free agents for they functioned as a

small group amidst a vast ‘non-intelligentsia’. This fact determined the stand they could take on socio-cultural issues. Therefore,

their own

world-view which was heterogeneous and fluctuated over a wide spec-

trum, had to accomodate the attitudes of the vast majority. For example,

the intelligentsia could not defy the shariat. They did, however, play an important political role which became more significant on account of the support they received from Muslim society at large.

The vernacular intelligentsia of East Pakistan were in relatively in-

significant positions compared to their West Pakistani counterparts in key roles in society and government. Their relative powerlessness in

politics and administration virtually deprived them of any influence in decision-making. The consequent tension was likely to affect the equilibrium between religious and secular concerns, because the ruling class located in West Pakistan frequently invoked Islam to sustain the char-

acter of the state which protected and even augmented its interests.

Although the vernacular intelligentsia were relatively impotent in

decision-making, the fact that East Pakistan accounted for the bulk of the population of the new-born state was the source of some strength

— so long as a democratic framework persisted. Discussions among

the intelligentsia had an impact on society. They, and not the non-

vernacular intelligentsia, controlled the mobilization of public opinion among Bengali Muslims. Though their small size was a source of weak-

ness, they had channels of communication with the majority. Shared social roots and, hence, up to a point, shared values guaranteed this

continuity of communication. Despite ethnic homogeneity, the vernacu-

Jar intelligentsia was diversified in its social origins. The type and level

of education received by different sections also varied greatly. These

diversities were reflected in and interacted with the emerging cultural

and intellectual concerns. The context of tension between secular and

religious concerns was thus defined. Political conflicts often drew upon and accentuated these tensions. The deep religiosity of the rural Muslims remained a powerful .influénce. The new members of the intelligentsia, recruited largely from an upwardly-mobile agricultural

class, had an imperfect of modern life.

commitment

to the

urban-secular values

270

The Sacred and The Secular

Notes

1. *SamwelP. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London, 1968), pp. 289-90. 2. Ibid. pp. 289-90. 3. The subjugation policies have been discussed by Rehman Sobhan and Muzaffar Ahmad, Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime — a Study of the Political Economy of Bangladesh (Dacca, 1980.) 4, Raunag Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (Dacca, 1973). 5. 1951 Population Census of Pakistan (Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs) vol. 3, pp. 11-14; 1974 Bangladesh Population Census Report (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics), p. 34. 6. Derived from 1951 Census, op. cit. 7. Derived from 1974 Census Report, p. 34. 8. Report on, Public Instruction in East Bengal, 1948-49 (Govt. of East Pakistan, Dacca, 1952 (hereafter Report P.LE.B,, 1948-49), p. 1; Report P.LE.B., 1953-54 (Dacca, 1959), p. 1; Report P.LE.B., 1954-55 . (Dacca, 1959), pp. 2, 30. 9. Report P.LE.B., 1948-49, p. 1; Report P.LE.B., 1953-54, pp. 1-2; Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, pp. 1-2, 30; A. G. Stock, Memoirs of Dacca University, 1947-51 (Dacca, 1973), p. 79. 10. M.A. Rahim, The History of Dhaka University (Dacca, 1981), pp. 81-83. Report P.I.E.B., 1953-54, p. 2; Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, p. 2 11. A. G. Stock, Memoirs of Dacca University, p. 79. 12, Note that the subsidiary occupations of the agricultural labour force which could be called middle class have not been taken into consideration here, although these too provided a section of the intelligentsia. 13. M.A. Rahim discusses the loss to university education as a result of the migration of Hindu intellectuals; M. A. Rahim, op. cit., pp. 81-83. 14, On ‘Appointment of Teachers’, M. A. Rahim, op. cit., pp. 215-17. 15. In the immediate post-partition period, members of the General seats in the Assembly (who. were Hindus) formed the only weak but vocal opposition. See C.A.P. Debate on the East Bengal Public Safety Act on 8 April 1950; on the language issue on 29 March, 1952, etc. 16. See CA.P, Debates, 9 April 1951; 26 March 1952 on communist activities. 17. For the size of the agricultural labour force in 1951 and 1961 see Table 4.7. 18. A.K.M. Ayub Ali, History of Traditional Islamic Education in Bangladesh (Dacca, 1983), pp. 179-83.

Bs

SRRSBRS S8B

Growth and Developmerit of the Intelligentsia 2m Report P.LE.B., 1948-49, op. cit. p. 1 Tid. In 1953-54, there were 2.7 teachers per primary school. While 42,181 primary ‘school teachers were trained, 29,723 were untrained; and of those untrained, 17,368 were under-qualified. See Report P.LEB., 1953-54, p. 2. Report P.LE.B., 1948-49, p. 1. Report P.LE.B., 1953-54, p. 1; and Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, p. 2: Report P.1LE.B., 1953-54, p. 1. Report P.1LE.B., 1954-55, p. 2. Report P.LE.B., 1953-54, p. 1. Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, p. 2.

. In

1954-55

Muslim

pupils

constituted

8.1

per

cent

of

the

Muslim population. See Report P.ILE.B., 1954-55, p. 2. While Muslim pupils constituted ‘68.7 per cent of the pupils in 1948-49, by 1954-55 they constituted 78.13 per cent of the pupils; Report P.LE.B., 1948-49, p. 25. Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, p. 3. Raunag Jehan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration, p. 11. A. N. Muniruzzaman, The Living and Working Conditions of Students of the University and Colleges of Dacca, 1957 : A Sample Survey (Dacca,

31. 32. 33.

34,

35.

37. 38.

1961), p. 5 (henceforth referred to as Living Conditions of Students 1957). Report P.LEB., 1954-55, p. 13. Report P.LE.B., 1953-54, p. 2. Manzoor Ahmed, ‘The Problem of Educational Drop-out in East Pakistan’, Education in Progress : Proceedings of the Symposia — East Pakistan Education Week, 1968 (Education Extension Centre, Dacca, December 1969), pp. 95-101. Research was conducted by the Institute of Education and Research, Dacca University cited by Manzoor Ahmed. This was the finding of a study investigating the causes of drop-out among utban secondary school children in Dacca. Of the 1,427 students who were in Class VII in 1961, only 544, ic., 39.22 per cent passed the Secondary School Certificate Examination in 1965; cited by M. Ahmed, op. cit, p. 102. See Table 4.13 above; also see Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, p. 3; A. N. Muniruzzaman, Living Conditions of Students 1957, p. 5. A.N. Muniruzzaman, ibid, This theme has been discussed in chapter 1 for the pre-partition period. For developments after 1947, see Report P.I.E.B., 1948-49. A. K. Chanda, Ninth Q. R,, 1932-37 (1939), pp. 110-11.

272 39.

41. 42.

43.

The Sacred and The Secular Aparna Basu, The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920, pp. 102-103. Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey (eds.), Power and Ideology in Educa-

tion (New York, 1977), p. 31. For example, see M. A. Tayyeb,

Jahangirnagar University Students’

Attitudes and Aspirations (Dacca, 1975), pp. 21-22.

Ellen Sattar, A Socio-Economic Survey of Dhaka University Students (Dacca 1974), pp. 12-13 (henceforth, Socio-Economic Survey 1974.)

In 1972, about 83 per cent of students of Rajshahi University came from villages, See A. H. Talukder, Rajshahi University Students and the Bang-

ladesh Liberation Struggle — A Survey Report — A Committee for Conducting a Survey of the Financial and Social Conditions of Rajshahi

University Students, 1972 (Rajshahi, 1972), p. 23 (henceforth Rajshahi

University Students 1972). Also see M. A. Tayyeb, op. cit., pp. 31-32. A. F. A. Hussain, Human and Social Impact of Technological Change 45.

in Pakistan, vol. 2 (Dacca, 1956), pp. 148, 184, 260, 305, 311.

Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’ in D. E. Smith (¢d.), South Asian Religion and Politics (Princeton, N. J., 1966),

p. 410.

In the fifties, while there was a fall in the number of male Muslim pupils,

there was a general increase in the proportion of women pupils at every 47.

stage of education. See chapter 7. A. N. Muniruzzaman, Living Conditions of Students 1957, p. 5. Out of 3,861 students a sample of 212 (5.49 per cent) was interviewed.

Distribution of the total annual income of students’ families

Percentage of Students

Yearly Income University Colleges in Rs Below 1,000 83 147 2,000 181 190 5,000 422 34.2 5,000-10,000 200 192 ‘Above 10,000 na 122 Source : Living Conditions of Students 1957, p. 8.

49.

50.

Univ. & k 185 387 197 ng

Eight per cent of ‘respondents gave no answer about their father's occupation, Talukdar Maniruzzaman, ‘Political Activism of University Students in Pakistan’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. IX, no. 3, pp. 234-45; (henceforth ‘Political Activism’). AH. Talukder, Rajshahi University Students 1972, pp. 21, 23. The fathers

Si. 52.

53.

55.

59.

61.

62. 63.

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia 273 of the remaining 5.1 per cent of students were engaged in more than one ‘occupation. Ibid., p. 23. Out of a total of 904 students at Jahangimagar University, 90 were interviewed on the basis of a random sample. See M. A. Tayyeb, Jahangimagar University Students : Attitudes and Aspirations, pp. 31-32. Living Conditions of Students 1957, p. 10. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, ‘Political Activism’, p. 239. Ibid., Ellen Sattar, Socio-Economic Survey 1974, p. 23. Bllen Sattar, Socio-Economic Survey 1974, The survey was conducted in two parts; first, data was collected from the admission forms of students kept at all the halls of residence; second, a questionnaire was circulated to a sample of students which comprised 5.67 per cent of the total student body. Those in the sample were in the second year Honours and final year Masters classes. See p. 2. ‘Students admitted to first year Honours classes in 1969, sat for the MA. final examinations in 1975. Ellen Sattar, Socio-Economic Survey 1977, pp. 3, 22. This assessment is based on interviews, surveys of accessible biographies and personal files of Dhaka University teachers, kept in the Record Room, Registrars Office, General Department, Dhaka University. See Appendix 4.C. For Ayub Khan’s growth policies, see R. Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration, chapters 3-6; Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development — Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); M. Ahmed and R. Sobhan (eds.), Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime (Dhaka, 1980), pp. 20-76. P. J. Bertocei, Elusive Villages : Social Structure and Community Organization in Rural East Pakistan (Michigan, 1970), p. 37. Anisur Rahman, ‘East Pakistan : The Roots of Estrangement’, South Asian Review 3 (1970), pp. 235-39. N. Sanderatne and M. A. Zaman also hold this view. See “The Impact of the Agrarian Structure on the Political Leadership of Undivided Pakistan’ (The Land Tenure (LTC), Wisconsin University, Nov. 1973) LTC — paper no. 94, Anisur Rahman, op. cit., p. 237. Also see R. Sobhan and M. Ahmed, Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime, pp. 57-62. Anisur Rahman, op. cit., p. 237. Mahmud Ali, a staunch supporter of Bengali culture and the interests of East Pakistan, suddenly sided with the non-vernacular intelligentsia in 1970-71 and opted for Pakistan, though himself a Bengali. Md. Nuruzzaman, Who's Who (Bast Pakistan, 1968), p. 14; biographical note

214

The Sacred and The Secular

on Mahmud Ali in his book Nation and Nationality (Lahore, +976), pp. 7-11.

:

R238

‘On the religious and secular perceptions of culture, see chapter 5. See chapter 6 on the political alignments of the intelligentsia. ‘See chapter 5. Munier Chowdtury — a well-known young radical of the carly post-partition days of Dacca University, a distinguished professor of Bengali and a dramatist — was assassinated by the pro-Pakistan death squad called ‘Al-Badr’-in 1971. 68. Distinction has been made between Bengal Mustim and Bengali Muslim. The former refers to’ all Muslims living in East Bengal and the latter only to Bengali-speaking Muslims. The positions in goverment reflect the central political elite in Pakistan, 1947-58. Allana Documents, pp. $92-95. See Pakistan Observer, Sep. 1950-Feb. 1951. C. A. P. Debates, 22 October, 1950, 27 March, 1951, 9 April, 1951. On the greater determination of Muslims from the minority provincesto resist Hindu domination, see Sir R. Lumby to the Marquess of Linlithgow, 15 Jan. 1942, TPI,-no, 13, p. 27. The letter records Jinnah’s views on the subject. ft the Panjab, a total exchange of population occurred due to intense commurial hatred. Bengal did not experience anything as severe, although there were riots. A. G. Stock, Memoirs of Dacca | University, 1947-51, pp. 20, 85-86. Stock makes observations on differ| Suces in the experiences of Bengalis and Punjabis in relation to communalism. 73. ‘Ralph T. Braibanti and'J. J. Spengler, Research on the Bureacracy of Pakistm (Durham, N.C. 1966}, p. 49 74. See 1961 Population Census of Pakistan, vol. 1, pt. Il, statement 2.3, pt. IV; statement 5.3, pt. I; statement 2.18, Table 5. The Bengal delega-

tion at the Constituent Assembly had 44 members, of which 4 were non-Bengalis, 13 Hindus and 27 Bengali Muslims. The total number of delegates for all of Pakistan was 69, i.¢., 25 for West Pakistan. See Jayanta Kumar Ray, Democracy and Nesionalism on Trial — a Study of East Pakistan (Simla, 1968), p. 10. 75. Bengal Muslimé lost their advantages to the Punjabi-dominated political elite due to inherent weaknesses in their ranks; politically, financially and in terms of intemal divisions. See Tazeen Murshid, ‘The Muslim Intelligentsia of Bengal : A House Divided’, in D. A. Low (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan (Basingstoke and London, 1991), pp. 144-72. 76. See Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh —Contemporary Events ang Documents (Dacca, n.d.); Bangladesh Mukti

Growth and Development of the intelligentsia 215 Samgram Sahayak Samity, Birth ofa Nation (Calcutta, 1971); Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh (New Delhi, 1971); Shyamati Ghosh, ‘East Pakistan Awami League’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1980) and R. Jahan; Fazlul Quader Quaderi; Bangladesh Genocide and World Press (Dacca, 1972); Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (Dhaka, 1974).

276

‘The Sacred and The Secular

Appendix 4.A PERCENTAGE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOUR FORCE IN MIDDLE AND LOWER MIDDLE CLASS OCCUPATIONS, 1951-74

‘Occupations

195119611974

Professional, Technical

559°

Managerial, Administrative Sales and related Total

958 B14 38.31

7.35

8.97

789 2054 35.78

5.72 22.35 37.04

Source : Derived from table 4.1.

Appendix 4.B PERCENTAGE SHARE AND GROWTH OF MIDDLE CLASS OCCUPATIONS

Middle-class occupations Professional and Technical Managerial and Administrative Sales and related occupations Source : Derived from table 4.1.

1951 1961 100100 14.60 20.54 25.00 22.03 60.38 57.52

1951-61 (% increase) 10.60 5554 253 5.17

1974 100 221 15.45 60:30

1961-74 (% increase) 68.32 98.43 18.05 7138

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

277

Appendix 4.C SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF DACCA UNIVERSITY TEACHERS IN SELECTED DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARTS FACULTY APPOINTED BETWEEN 1935 AND 1957

Name year of appointment

Department

‘Ahmad, A. F. Salahuddin

Hist.

(na)

‘Ahmed, Nafis (°56) Ahsan, S. A. ('49) ‘Alam, Nurul (°53) ‘Ali, S. Moquesued ('50) Alim, A. K.M. Abdul ('51) Ashraf, Abu N. A.('46) ‘Aziz, Md. Abdul (’50) Begum, Nadera ('56)

Geog. Beng. Econ, Pol. Sc. Isl. Hist. Eng. Int. Rel. Eng.

Bachelor's Father's Degree profession (University year) Pres. Coll, 1942 Civil servant na Dacea, 1943 Dacca, 1951 Dacca, 148 Pres. Coll, 1948 na Dacca, 1945 Calcutta, 1948

Civil servant Govt. service Govt, Service — — Govt. service Landed Bengal Civil

Pol. Sc. & Int. Rel. Choudhury, Mufazzal Haider Beng. (33) Choudhury, Munier (’50) Engl. & Beng.

Calcutta, 1945 : Visva Bharati, 1946 Dacca, 1946

Landed

Choudhury, Muzaffar Ahmed (4a) Choudhury, Sirajul I. ('57) Dani, A. H. ('50) Fakhruzaman, Mir ('S3) Faug, Hanif ('51) Habibullah, A.B. M. (°50)

Dacca, 1943

Eng. Hist. Phil. & Psych. Pers. & Urdu Isl. Hist.

Dacca, 1955 Nagpur, 1944 Dacca, 1953 Lucknow, 1945 Calcutta, 1931

Hai, Abdul ('48) Hai, Abdul (°49)

Beng. Phil.

Halim, A. ('48)

Hist,

Dacca, 1941 Isl. Coll, Cal, 1939 Dacca, 1926

Choudhury, G.W.(°49)

Pol. Sc.

Haque, Serajul ('28) ‘Arab. & Isl, Std. Dacca, 1926 Hasan, M. Saghie (°46) ‘Arab, & Ist, Stud. Dacca, 1943 Hossain, Khondodar T. (°53) Econ. Dacea, 1951 Huda, M_N. (°48) Econ. na.

‘Service (DM)

Zamindar District Magistrate _Landholder & teacher Govt. service — landed. — Inspector of Schools, Burdwan — Landholder & Teacher Scholar of Persian — — — Landed

218

The Sacred and The Secular Appendix 4.C (Contd.)

Name year of appointment

Department

Hoda, M. Zafrul ('51)

Pers. & Urdu

Hussain, Mocharaf ('51)

Eooa.

‘Hussain, Mahmud ('48)

Int. Rel.

Bachelor's

Degree (University year)

—

Dacca, 1948

Govt. strvice and business — — ‘set. Registrar, High Court — Doctor Inspector of Schools,

na

Eng. Beng. Hist.

Dacca, 1941 Calcuna, 1939 ma, 1950

Islam, Aminal (’S7) Islam, Mahzarul ('53) Islam, Nurul ('55)

Geog: Beng. Econ.

Dacca, 1953 Dacca, 1951 Dacca, 1949

Jilani, Ghulam ('40) Kabir, Lutful (°55) Kabir, Mafizallah ('48) Karim, Abdul ('51)

Phil. Law Hist, “Hist

Lahore, Dacea, Dacca, Dacca,

Econ.

na

1933 1941 1946 19

Karim, Nurul ('37) Karim, Sarder F. ('46)

Hist. ne Phil & Pol. Sc. Dacca, 1945

Karim Khan, Fazle ('53) Khan, A. Majeed ('50)

Geog. Patna, 1943 Isl, Hist. & Cult. Calcutta, 1941

Latful Hug, M. A. Q. ('56)

Mahmood, A..N.M.('49) Molla, Jasimuddin ('37) Momen, Nurul (°46) Muhammad, Qazi Din ('50) Muhiuddin, Md. (na) Munim, A. K. M. ('53) Murshid, K. S. (°47) Nagari, S. H. (°55)

Rahim, Reza-ur (’S1) Rahman, Wadudwi (‘50) Razak, Abdur ('35) Rizvi, I. H. (49) Sabjwari, Syed S. ('45)

Geog.

Econ. Beng. Law Beng. Econ. Eng. Eng. Geog.

Dacca, 1954

Dacca, nd. Caleatta, 1931 na. Dacca, 148 0 A.M. Coll, 1948 Dacca, 1941 Dacca, 14S M. U, Align, 1945 Isl. Hist. & Arab, Pres. Coll., 1945 Hist. Dacca, 1942 Econ. & Pol. Sc. Dacca, 1934

Geog. Pers. & Urdu

profession

Patna, 1938

Hussain, Syed Sajjad ('48) Ibrahim, Neelima ('56) Imam, Abu (’51)

Karim, Enayat ('50)

Father's

na Punjab, nd.

-

Chittagong

Doctor — Landed — =

Cuultivatoe/ agricaleuralist —

-

Police officer — — Landed Pir Lawyer — — _Landholder Inspectorof Police —

Growth and Development of the intelligentsia Appendix 4.C (Contd) Name year of appointment Department Bachelor's Father's Degree

‘Sadeque, Syeda F.('50) ‘Shahidullah, Md. ('21) Sharif, Ahmed ('57) Siddique, A. A. (49)

profession

‘(University year) na. =

Arab. & Inlam Std. Beng. Pres. Coll,, 1911 Landed Beng. Chigagong, 1940 — Pers. & Urdu = M.U,, Aligarh, | — 1939

Siddique, N.U.A.(42) Syeed, A. F. M. ('49) Talukder, A. H. (35)

Law Hist Phil.

na. Comilla, 1928 Calcutta, 1929

Uzair, Md. (°51) Zaidi, S. M. Hafez ('S0)

Econ. Phil.

Allahabad, 1949 M.U,, Aligarh, 1948

TOTAL 6 : SUBIECTS : History (incl. Is) Bengali

12 10

Economics

10

Other Languages

Other (incl. na)

10

24

279

(GRADUATED FROM : Dacea 29 Calcutta 12

Other

Not Available

14

u

Civil servant — Inspector of Schools — —

‘OCCUPATION OF FATHER Public ul Private 7 Not Available

8

1 (749) refers to administrative year 1949-50, etc. 2 Pres. Coll. refers to Presidency College, Calcutta; Dacca to Dacca University, idem for other geographical names. Source : Dacca University Records, Personal Files and Current Records consulted in Dacca, Feb.-March 1985 and interviews with Professors Razzak and Salauddin Ahmed Appendix 4.D PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF EDUCATION, 1951 AND 1961

Total Matriculates Graduates Postgraduates Total number

1951 Muslims

1006759 100 64.86 100 70.44 331,759 223,340

Source : Derived from table 4.8.

© Non-

‘Total

1961 Muslims

(32.41 34.14 «(29.56 108,419

100 100 100 335,182

69.34 7684 6861 234,481

Muslims

Ne

‘Muslims

(30.66 23.16 (31.39 100,701

280

The Sacred and The Secular

Appendix 4.E RELIGIOUS WORKERS AS PERCENTAGE OF THE LABOUR FORCE

1951 ‘Number, 26,235 15,012 41,247

Labour Force ‘Non-agricultural labour force Agricultural labour force Total Source : Tables 4.1 and 4.6

%__ 0.062 0.035 0.097

1961 Number (32,849 (23,654 __ $6,503

% 0.064 0.046 out

Appendix 4.F

MADRASAHS AND PUPILS (IN ALL TYPES OF MADRASAHS) (Per cent of all educational institutions, the number of pupils and population) Year 1948-49

Madrasahs as % — of all educational institutions

Madrasah pupils 2 % of all pupils

‘Madrasah pupils as % of total population

6.35 9.40 13.50 =

6.02 5.62 7.60 _

047 048

1954-55 1961-62 1968-69 1974-75

Source : Table 4,11 and 4.1

3.44

4.06

1.06

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

281

Appendix 4.G MAKTABS, MADRASAHS AND FORQUANIAS (number) ‘Average annual increase 1948-49 — 1975-76.* Period 1948-49 — 1954-55 1954-55 — 1960-61 1960-61 — 1968-69 1968-69 — 1971-72 1968-69 — 1969-70 1969-70 — 1970-71 1970-71 — 1972-73 1972-73 — 1915-16 ‘*Figures are rounded. Source : Calculated from table 4.11.

Institutions 113 156 219 593 1,088 449 m2 469,

Students 10,975 5.787 49.077 37,033 41,379 129,516 22,961 22,946

Appendix 4.H

DROP-OUT FROM CLASS I TO II : PAKISTAN AND PROVINCES (in percentages)

‘Year/Sex 1958-59 Male/femnale Male Female 1963-64 : Male/fernale Male Female

Pakistan

East Pakistan

‘West Pakistan

$0.1 414 58.1

564 s45 607

363 323 $0.2

45.5 443 488

529 524 343

30.6 298 334)

Source : M. Ahmed, “The Problem of Educational Dropout in East Pakistan’, p. 95.

282

The Sacred and The Secular

Appendix 4.1 RETENTION RATE AT THE SECONDARY LEVEL : PAKISTAN AND PROVINCES (1959-64 Cohort)

Region/Sex East Pakistan : Male/female Male Female West Pakistan : Male/female Male Female

v

vi

100 100 100

5230 5746 30.00

100-9398 100 9988 100 68.74

Classes vo Vl 43.81 49.14 20.72

39.65 44.91 1685

«7.597799 81.27 75.12 61.88 += 5687

bg

x

40.17 45.66 16.36

34.70 39.22 15.13

70.54 = 53.37 706 «49.98 70.42 67.89.

Source : M. Ahmed, “The Problem of Educational Dropout in East Pakistan’, p. 97.

Appendix 4.3 OCCUPATIONS OF GUARDIANS OF DACCA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, 1957

(Occupation of Guardians Service Profession Business Training Others TOTAL

University 479 129 143 18.2 67 1000

Percentage of Students Colleges Univ. & Colleges 452 466 103 17 219 179 175 19 Sa 59 100.0 100.0

Source : A. N. Muniruzzaman, Living Conditions of Students 1957, p. 8

Growth and Development of the Intelligentsia

283

Appendix 4.K OCCUPATIONS OF FATHERS OF JAHANGIRNAGAR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, 1974-75.

“Occupation

Number Per cent.

Cultivation Business Service Total

82 32 25 139

Rn 2» B 126

‘The total number and percentage exceed the number of respondents because many mentioned more than one occupation. Source : M. A. Tayeb, Jahangimagar University Students, table 6, p. 32.

Appendix 4.L

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF DACCA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS’ GUARDIANS,* 1974 (%)

BA/BSc Male

Government/Service Profession Farming Pension holders Business Othert** *

n=435 30.34 8.04 30.81 5.52 20.92 437

Data from admission forms

MA/MSc

BA/BSc_

MA/MSc

Male

Female

Female

n= 236 18.54 9.64 47.00 5.83 18.23 0.76

38.27 2037 1.23 16.67 12.96 10.50

n=56 32.75 20.00 5.45 10.91 18.19 12.72

Average n= 889 29.97 1451 21.12 973 17.57 7.08

n= number

Note: Professions include law, engineering, teaching and banking. Others*** include journalists, craftsmen, religious officials, artists, homeopaths, housewives, armed forces personnel, etc. Source : Ellen Sattar, Socio-Economic Survey of Dhaka University Students (University Grants Commission, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1974), table 1.

CHAPTER

5

CULTURE AND LANGUAGE : THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

Introduction

It has been suggested in previous chapters that the intelligentsia was not homogeneous either ideologically or in terms of their educational

or cultural orientations.

This had a bearing on the religious-secular

dichotomy which characterized their social and political perceptions.

The intellectual split, clear from 1947, often along lines of interest

based on wealth, ownership of land, place of origin and social status could also be traced along religious-secular lines. The tensions became

manifest over a number of issues which clearly affected the basic identity of the Bengal Muslims. Some of these issues are discussed below : the official state language policy, the introduction of the Arabic script

for the Bengali language and the ban on Tagore music. 5.1 The Changed Milieu

In post-partition East Bengal, there was no strong Hindu presence. The

absence of a Hindu threat automatically relieved the pressure of com-

munalism; organizations such as the Yuba League (Youth League)

founded in 1947 and the Awami Muslim League, a political party founded in 1951, actually worked towards inter-communal harmony.'

The state, on the other hand, constantly projected the alleged threat

from India and the underlying fear that the two Bengals would unite.

In fact, any stress on cultural similarities between East and West Bengal

was interpreted by the Punjabi-dominated government as a desire for

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity such

unification?

and

a denial

of the two-nation

285 theory

on

which Pakistan was founded. The struggle to establish Bengali as one of the state languages was perceived to be a major threat to the ideology

of Pakistan, for Bengali was one of the cultural links between the two parts of Bengal. The official ban on the broadcasting of Tagore songs on radio and television in 1966, was mainly to counter such sentiments

of affinity. Reaction to the ban was varied : to one group of poets and writers, Tagore was

‘an integral part of the cultural existence

of Bengali-speaking Pakistanis’; to another, this assertion was ‘not only

misleading but also fundamentally opposed to the principles of

Pakistan’. The legacy of communalism was played up with suspicions

cast on the Hindu community, a tiny minority : there were dark hints

about their possible role as a fifth column working for the disintegration of Pakistan and merger of East and West Bengal. For example, The Morning News, voicing official opinion, attributed the language movement to the leadership of Hindus and a few communists, as well as to

‘external provocation’ conspiring to destroy the state.’ Hindus were

often harassed as communists, particularly in areas of peasant distur-

bances; nor were Hindu urban intellectuals spared.’ In the absence of

the Hindu threat of the pre-1947 period, a more secular and tolerant

culture might have developed in post-partition East Bengal, were it not

for a state policy which constantly played up the fear of an Indian

threat, communist incursions and Hinduphobia. At the same time, Islam came to be accepted as state ideology and was treated as the bond between the two wings of Pakistan. In such a situation minorities would have been treated as second class citizens were it not for the strong

opposition from a section of the intelligentsia. At Dacca University,

for example, Hindu teachers had the support of students and colleagues alike. Observing the lack of strain in inter-communal relations at Dacca University during 1947-51, a visiting British professor noted in her memoirs : When Hindu teachers were ready to stay, neither students nor

colleagues showed the slightest hostility to them. The admin-

istrator, or more probably the government sometimes did, and

there were lively moments of protest when students saw or thought they saw teachers they respected being pushed out by

pressure from above.

Suhrawardy’s defence of minority rights is worth mentioning here, for

286

The Sacred and The Secular

it is partly in this context that the religious-secular tension developed

after 1947.’ But more importantly, it is in the context of a power strug-

gle in which the ashraf-dominated Muslim League sought to maintain its position of dominance in the name of Islam and the national inte-

gration of Pakistan that the religious-secular tension became significant and impinged on the domains of language, culture and identity. This

phenomenon is discussed in detail in the next chapter. The religious basis of identity acquired a special importance because, as shown in the next chapter, religion was politicized in Pakistan.

‘The pull towards a secular definition was, however, inevitable. It was

a form of protest against the official world view, and was reinforced by the Bengal Muslims’ natural attraction towards their eclectic local

cultural roots. These were somehow seen to be contrary to Islamic

culture, because of the perception that they shared customs with the Hindus of West Bengal—a perception derived from an essentialized

view of a pure and underived Islamic culture, notwithstanding the fact that

this

culture

evolved

through

centuries

of

interaction

with

the systems of newly conquered territories and was therefore, neces-

sarily hybrid in character. Nevertheless, the secularists were suspect in

official circles as a possible threat to the integrity of Pakistan. The Bengal Muslim

was confronted with the dilemma of choos-

ing between a religious and a secular basis of identity as popularly

understood. If he accepted the former, he also accepted the status

quo, that is, the right of the Muslim League to ‘determine what

Islam is’: but if he opted for the ‘latter, he was labelled a renegade who

denied

Pakistan

and

therefore

had

to

be

controlled.

The religious-secular tension straddled political and cultural spheres and accentuated

the Bengal

Muslim’s

identity conflict.

Another important. factor contributing to the religious-secular tension relates to the schizophrenic or culturally-ambivalent self-image of the intelligentsia — its basic inability to come to terms with its identity.

As discussed in the first chapter, while the intelligentsia idealized

ashraf ethics and values supposedly derived from the Middle Eastern

Islamic world, the harsh reality was that the majority of them were of

peasant stock and descended from converts, spoke Bengali and shared nothing with the ashraf except religion—hence the fear that Bengali

Islam was contaminated by local and unlslamic practices. The ortho-

doxy was harsh against those who accepted local customs. They were

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

287

referred to as a ‘class of fossilized imbeciles and foggies, who live in

a cloud of unlslamic superstitions

inherited from the local pagan tra-

ditions’.* The dichotomous self-image was not as devastating for the intelligentsia in the forties and fifties as it was till the twenties, when

they were still talking in terms of ‘choosing’ their mother tongue.”

Nevertheless, the perceptions of ashraf ideals determined cultural and

linguistic choices until groups could break from the established mould and assert that culture and identity be determined by secular criteria.

At the time of partition, the intelligentsia were still striving towards

a definition of their linguistic and cultural identity. Although the ques-

tion of the mother tongue was resolved in favour of Bengali, the fear

that it was a lesser language than Urdu or Arabic persisted. So experiments were made on writing Bengali in the Arabic script.'° The consequent tension was largely between a secular and religious approach

to language and identity. It not only divided one group from another

but generated deep conflict in the individual consciousness. The schizo-

phrenic self-image of the Bengali Muslim psyche is traceable largely to this unresolved tension.

The process of resolving this tension involved defining not only

their cultural identity but also national objectives in the context of

the new state of Pakistan. The emphasis on religion as the guiding

force behind the idea of Pakistan, the need of giving structure to a

modern state, the fact that the founding fathers of Pakistan were secular politicians, and that Bengal Muslims were divided as to the

nature of the state and the role of Islam, gave rise to considerable

debate. In the process, sections of the intelligentsia became deeply involved, both individually and collectively, in articulating their view of their world

— should take. 5.2

and of the form

and shape

that world

—

Pakistan

The World-view of the Post-partition Intelligentsia

The world-view of the intelligentsia in the immediate post-partition period reflected their acute need to define their social, cultural, linguis-

tic and political identity. In the later period, political considerations became paramount while socio-cultural ones receded to the background

to re-emerge only after the creation of Bangladesh. The forties and

fifties saw a continuing reassessment of ideals and values — a trend

288

The Sacred and The Secular

which began at the turn of the century. It was a period of hope, full of dreams of what Pakistan was going to be. There was

a sense of

confidence and pride in the assertions made by the intelligentsia de-

tiving from the assumption that it was up to them to give shape to the

new country.'' This mood of optimism, however, did not last long. The

upper ashraf and Punjabi-dominated national political elite’s determi-

nation to hold on to power at all costs effectively crushed such idealistic

dreams. ‘The concerns of this period were rooted in pre-partition ideologies covering a wide spectrum —orthodox, pan-Islamist, humanist and communist. Maududi and his Jama’at-i-Islami, with its mouthpiece

Al-Islam, followed the traditionist path of Indian Muslim thought in prescribing a strongly Islamic state. The ‘New Values group’, deeply

influenced by humanist thought, envisaged a liberal democratic society

where culture belonged to the secular arena. This was one way of re-

solving the religious-secular tension over culture and identity. Organizations such as the Yuba League or Youth Leage, heavily infiltrated by communist ideas, undertook political-cultural activities with

decidedly secular objectives. Other organizations such as the Tamaddun

Majlis, which had deep religious orientations, nevertheless recognized

a secular dimension to questions of language, identity and culture. Nor

were their motives free from self-interest and considerations of political advantage, a fact which underlined the hard secular core of avowedly Teligious aspirations.

The orthodox view was unwilling to allot a neutral, non-religious

or secular zone to any aspect of life, be it cultural or political—for life, or the ‘Process of Reality

... is one unitary flow’ and

it cannot

tolerate duality.’ There could not be a secular sector of human ex-

istence distinct from the religious. The concept of secularism was

identified with ideas of profanity, disregard for the sacred, scepticism of religious truth and opposition to religious education. Although

some understood the term as dunyawiyyat or care for

lily and

worldly affairs, they would nevertheless assert the indivisibility of the religious and secular spheres, because the codes of conduct prescribed in Islam recognized no such distinction. It was asserted that

‘what is criminal is what is immoral, and what is immoral is what

disrupts

the essential

cultural

values

of society’."®

The

forces

which distorted cultural values were identified as western values,

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

289

industrialization, materialism, emancipation of women and local pa-

gan traditions."*

Orthodox rigidity was most clearly manifest in the sphere of leg-

islation. The belief that Islam caters to every aspect of life — social,

political and religious—and that it offers a complete code of conduct,

induced severe criticism of the periodic reformist attempts at interpret-

ing Koranic laws as a means of adjustment to changing times.'° But

this was anathema since it was held that divine or Islamic law derived

from two immutable sources : the Koran containing God’s words, and

the ideal conduct of Prophet Muhammad. But in fact, Islamic law, like Islamic culture, evolved through centuries of contact with the legal systems of defeated civilizations. Notwithstanding this, the authority of

the Koran itself was invoked by the orthodox as proof positive : It is not for the faithful, man or woman, to decide by themselves

‘a matter that has been decided by Allah and His messenger,

and whosoever commits an affront to Allah and His messenger

is certainly on the wrong path. (Koran, xxiii, 36)"

Followed to the letter, this injunction allows no scope for reinterpre-

tation. But Maududi, the founder of the Jama’ at-i-Islami, affirmed that there was scope for limited human legislation subject to the supremacy

of Divine law. It was permissible, for instance, to explore the nature

and extent of the law, its true meaning and applicability to practical

situations and to work out the details where such laws were too brief. This is the realm of ijtihad, which means ‘maximum effort to ascertain’

the correct meaning from which the law is derived. Since the death of Prophet Muhammad, Muslims have attempted to ascertain

exactly

what

the established sunnah

There

been differences in this ascertainment

was

and

whether

any novel factor (bid’a) was entering the system through forgery.” have

of the sunnah.

While it is generally agreed that no one has the authority to change the injunctions of the Koran

and the sunnah, the use of ijtihad in

exceptional circumstances is accepted."* The germs of conflict and dissent lay in this flexibility. Maududi

would

have liked to reserve

the right of ijtihad for the ulama alone. But the Muslim League government had already staked its claim immediately after partition and declared itself to be the defender of the faithful.” Culture, identity and the ruling ideology would all be determined

290

The Sacred and The Secular

by that group which had the right to interpret these laws or, in other

words, actually ruled the state. But even those who did not rule could exercise pressure to mould the state according to their concept of the

ideal polity. The teachers and students of Dacca University played a significant role in this regard. They however failed to continually adopt

a religious argument against the status quo primarily because their aims

were not always political. They sympathized with the disadvantaged Hindu minority and desired a more tolerant and in this sense, a secular

society. They feared the religious argument with its implications in

favour of orthodoxy, puritanism, religious revivalism and intolerance of other ways of being. And indeed, as non-theologians, it would have

been foolhardy for them to engage in theological debates with

the ulama. In 1950, the editor of New Values, a quarterly, commented that culture

should

be

so

conceived

as

to

allow

the

uninhibited

self-expression of the entire population : ‘A secular attitude to cul-

tural values, will in our context, keep culture from egocentricity and exclusion and make it absorptive of outside influences’.” Such an attitude to culture stood in sharp contrast to the orthodox Jama’at view which insisted on a rejection of all external influences.

The liberal mood in the fifties favoured attempts to find guidelines

for society through open discussion of current issues. New Values was

founded in 1949 by Sarwar Murshid, a young teacher of English at Dacca University with precisely such an aim in mind. The editorial of the first issue identified the object of the journal :

to direct a searching enquiry into the roots of our beliefs and attitudes and help remove some of the obstacles to intelligent action as a means to good life.”

‘The aim was to look for ‘new social values’ in ‘our particularly groaning and travailing times’ and meet the need for ‘newer assumptions on

which to build’. The journal was to provide a forum for informed dis-

cussion, for it was believed that argument was ‘the only way of making

truth acceptable’.” This desire to arrive at values, to give society a

direction and to try and make these acceptable distinguished the intelligentsia from the non-intelligentsia.

Although New Values did not represent any one point of view as

it was meant to be a forum for debate and discussion, its bias was

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

291

towards a rational and secular society. The editor and contributors were

deeply influenced by men like Humayun Kabir and Kazi Abdul Wadud. Both were humanists and involved in the movement for the ‘emancipation of the intellect’, a theme discussed in Chapter 2. Incidentally, Humayun Kabir opted to remain in India after partition, but his writings continue to influence intellectual thought in East Bengal. Humayun

Kabir

saw

an

‘affinity between the basic concepts of

Islam and the principles which govern science’. He argued that ‘em-

phasis on the unity of God and, therefore, of nature broke down the

distinction between the natural and the supernatural’. This was a precondition to the emergence of natural law and science. In the fieldof

religious experience, this emphasis ‘led to the breakdown of the

distinction between the secular and the religious’. In a sense, therefore, he was in agreement with the orthodox position that there is no distinction between the religious and the secular. But his rationalism

was based on the belief that ‘the Prophet of Islam laid down that religion must be based on reason, not authority’, that the Prophet would

be followed by reformers not prophets. The implication was that ‘every

article of faith and belief, every institution of society and polity would

be subject to continual scrutiny, analysis and revision’.” Such scrutiny

falls within the realm of ijtihad but Kabir rejected the orthodox position

which allowed its use only in exceptional circumstances. He carried

forward the tradition of reformist interpretation of Islam by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and followed by Syed Amir Ali.“

started

Kazi Abdul Wadud, in an article in the journal, rejected the idea

of the shariat being the basis of Pakistan on several grounds. He argued that if the shariat was introduced as law, a conflict would ensue in the

minds of those Bengal Muslims who were attracted to the liberal democratic traditions of the West; for crimes which would require chastisement with ‘unforgettable punishments’ like stoning to death or

mutilation according to the shariat were, in his day, viewed as ‘social maladjustments to be set right with the help of education and redi

bution of wealth’. Further, if Muslims were forced to obey religious

injunctions, the true spirit of Islam would be replaced by the mere

hypocritical observance of rituals. Wadud thus addressed himself to

the age-old debate between reformist and traditionalist Muslims.

Reformists argued that the permanent basis of Islam was the spirit of the Koran, not the specific words aimed at a seventh century audience.

292

The Sacred and The Secular

Traditionalists stuck to the letter of the law, placing form and ritual

first and

maintaining

that

without

them

the

spirit could

not

be

approached. The Tabligh Jamat or the Faith Movement continued the tradition of the Wahabi and Faraizi movements. It stressed that rituals

were an integral part of faith and that the repetition of rituals, even as

just a matter of form, would ultimately lead to their internalization and

become a part of behaviour pattern.”” Wadud was firmly opposed to such trends. The dream of reviving the shariat, he conceded, derived

from the idea of Muslim self-determination. If fulfilled, it would isolate Bengal Muslims from the rest of the world, and antagonize the non-

Muslim community. He found support for his contentions in the Koran and Hadith and concluded :

... those who know that Islam means submission to Allah, in other words, truth and goodness, (and hence a Muslim is ever a friend to creation?) will have no difficulty in realising that the foundations of state in Islam are common sense and the good of man.* Creation is the family of Allah — the dearest to Allah of His creation is he who is the kindest to His creation (Hadith). ‘*He does not truly believe in Allah, he does not truly believe in Allah, he does not truly believe in Allah ... whose neighbour is not safe from his injuries (Hadith).™

This emphasis on the good of man and the assertion that what is not

true, i.e. beneficent, is not Islamic, approximates the ideals of radical

humanism as propounded by M.N. Roy who preached that ‘man must

be the measure of everything’, and that ‘individual freedom is the only measure of progress’.”

The Sahitya Patrika was published several years later in 1957

by the Bengali department of Dacca University.” It represented the growing cultural consciousness of Bengali Muslims and as such was secular in outlook. Its aim was to contribute to the understanding of Bengali literature. It projected no vision of an ideal society. The

contributors were concerned with culture as literature and education. Some felt compelled to address themselves to educational problems.

Muhammad

Abdul

Hai, the founder-editor, emphasized

the need to

preserve universities as neutral places of learning’ — an oblique

reference to political interference in the functioning of universities.

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

293

Since partition, the intelligentsia had taken a stand on issues of national importance. But these issues usually had a political import. It

responded to the cultural subjugation of East Bengal and to problems

of economic and political disparity between the two wings of

Pakistan,” often in a militant fashion. But they never seriously

addressed themselves to social issues such as the hypocritical observance of rituals or aimed at social transformation — for example to

free society from superstition, establish equal rights for women, fight religious and moral prejudices, or analyse the nature of current social

problems. Some of these issues have become matters of intellectual concern only in the eighties.”

Intellectual preoccupation among prose writers in the years after

1947 focused on an ‘anxiety to assess themselves and their environ-

ment

in the light of their post-independence experience’. As else-

where in Pakistan, one central question was the rightful place of Islam in society. In the ensuing deliberations, the religious ideal was

constantly measured against the secular ones of freedom, democracy

and humanism. Their heart-searching is summed up in an article in

New

Values :

Should Pakistan try to be an embodiment of the popularly understood Islamic concept of life? Will the pursuit of such an ideal not mean Pakistan's isolation from the progressive trends of modem thought? Is there really a basic opposition between Islam and modem thought? Is no reconciliation possible? What can an Islamic ideal mean in the context of poetry or politics? Can a poet improve upon the quality of his output or of his craftsmanship by adhering to the Islamic concept of life? Can democracy whose value no one questions, connote in the context of Islam a form of government other than the type known as democratic all over the free world? Is it true that Islam in its attitude to fundamental, social and economic problems is allied to systems of thought which the free world considers illiberal or totalitarian? 5.3

Problems of Identity

‘The identity problem of the intelligentsia was accentuated by a range

of factors — cultural, religious and political. Most of these related to the duality in their self-perception, the discrepancy between the ideal

-

294

The Sacred and The Secular

and practice, the coming to terms with their social origins, not to men-

tion the trauma of twice forging new states out of old territories, each involving the need to redefine the nation, nationhood and national identities,

At the turn of the century, there was hardly any conflict in the

Indian Muslim self-perception over being Indian and Muslim. Maulana

Muhammad Ali (1878-1930), one of the leaders of the Khilafat move-

ment, noted ‘where God commands, I am nothing but a Muslim’, but

where India was concerned, ‘I am nothing but an Indian’.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the politically-conscious

Bengal Muslims tended to be Congress members. Fazlul Huq’s early

speeches fiercely asserted his Indian identity, but after 1940 he invari-

ably declared himself to be a Muslim first. Yet many Muslims could not accept the partition of Bengal although they had campaigned for

the partition of India. Abul Mansur Ahmed went to East Pakistan only

in 1951. Suhrawardy maintained dual residence until it became an obstacle to his remaining in Pakistani politics.

What was true of politicized Muslims in Bengal was not equally

true either of the community

the

tiny

intelligentsia.

The

at large or even of all members

tradition

of

distinguishing

of

be-

tween a Bengali and a Muslim provided grounds for some of the identity problems which confronted Bengali Muslims later on.

In

the early part of the century, they identified themselves and were

defined by others as Muslims, not Bengalis; soccer games were played between ‘Bengali’ and ‘Muslim’ teams, though the Muslim

teams were as Bengali as their rivals.” Hindus, Muslims and the

British shared this confusion.* For Muslims, language came to play

a key role in the effort ensuing

conflict

of

the

in self-perception

intelligentsia both

to

before and

resolve

the

after inde-

pendence — but along very different lines in the two phases.

Till the mid-sixties, there was no conflict in East Bengal as to

whether one was a Bengali or a Pakistani.” However, the movement

leading to the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 induced the intelligentsia to define their identity once again.

‘Bengali’

acquired a

secular connotation emphasizing the cultural dimension of identity.

‘Pakistani’ implied a continuing belief in the two-nation theory and

an emphasis on religion as an overall guiding principle. But in fact,

the distinction was not as clear-cut as this. Abul Mansur Ahmed

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

295

saw the emergence of Bangladesh as the ‘restoration of the Lahore Resolution’. His basic faith in the two-nation theory remained intact. So far as language was concerned, his enthusiasm for Bengali had a curious slant — he made a clear distinction between the language

of West Bengal and what he called ‘Pak-Bangla’.”

A new dimension was introduced into the culture conflict after the

assassination in 1975 of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami

League and President of independent Bangladesh. As discussed in the next chapter, nationality, which was until then defined in terms

of Bengali ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identity since independence

in 1971, was now sought to be redefined on the basis of political considerations. The new definition required a distinction to be made between East and West Bengal, an issue which was not very important

in 1947 although there was some sentiment in favour of Pak-Bangla as distinct from the Sanskritic Bengali of West Bengal. In 1978, under President Zia-ur-Rahman’s military regime, Bangladesh citizens came

to be known as ‘Bangladeshi’, rather than as ‘Bangalee’ which was

how they were described in the constitution of 1972. Bangladeshis, Zia

implied, were different from the Bengalis of India and so were their

culture and language

: the language had to be moulded ‘in our own

way’."' His speech to this effect reminds one of Jinnah’s famous statement distinguishing the cultures and religions of Hindus and Muslims

as two different social orders. Zia thus asserted the precedence of po-

litical identity over the cultural. In ideological terms, this was some-

thing of a rejection of Mujib’s secular stance. Although the preference

for ‘Bangladeshi’ over ‘Bangalee’ had no strong religious connotation, it was accompanied by a constitutional change in 1977—the dropping

of one of the fundamental principles of state ‘secularism’, from the constitution of 1972. Though Zia’s political party, the Bangladesh

Nationalist Party, asserted through its manifesto that Bangladeshis had

freed themselves from ‘the evils of communalism’ because of the ‘great teachings of Islam’, Zia’s actions have invited speculation to the con-

trary. It may be argued that by emphasizing the distinct and separate identity of Bengali Muslims

vis-a-vis the Bengali Hindus he has in

fact created the marginalization and exclusion of Hindus from effective

political participation.” To this extent, he acknowledged again the concept of two-nations on which Pakistan founded and

once was

which was rejected by a large segment of the population

296

The Sacred and The Secular

through the 1971 war of liberation . The basic complexities of defining culture and identity which existed during Pakistani rule persisted in Bangladesh.

5.4

The Language Issue

There was little or no significant revolutionary politics in East Bengal, at least in the classical sense, to bring about radical socio-economic

change. No communist movement could develop owing to repressive

measures by the Pakistan government. There were, however, move-

ments which sought to bring about limited socio-political change as

well as challenge the status quo and the structure of political leadership.

Of these, the most important in the formative phase of the new nation-

alism which led to the emergence of Bangladesk was the language

movement, which began in the immediate post-independence period in 1947. It merged into the movement for autonomy of East Pakistan

which began in 1966. Both these movements — spearheaded by stu-

dents and supported by teachers, intellectuals, lawyers and politicians

— show that perceptions regarding Bengali identity, language and cul-

ture, on the one hand, and Islamic society on the other, were changing,

particularly among some sections of the middle classes. A non-religious

approach to culture and politics emerged, an approach influenced by Indian eclecticism and supportive of a secular stance in these matters.

‘The language movement is of manifold significance. It pinpoints

the contradictions in the self-perception of the intelligentsia. The stands

taken were often determined by political choice. But these also reflected the mutually opposed emphasis on the religious and secular dimensions

of identity. In the case of many individuals and groups, the tension was manifest as a very painful ambivalence. The concern here is with reactions to official policies on language

rather than the policies themselves or the policy makers, who either belonged primarily to the ‘old’ ashraf category-or aspired to it.” Over time, the small group of upper ashraf was disappearing either through

downward mobility or through dilution by intermarriage with non- and middle-ashraf categories. As discussed in the previous chapter a new

middle-class intelligentsia was emerging and getting to the fore in the

East Bengal socio-political scene. Segments of this new intelligentsia

had rural, atrap roots and rose to middle-ashraf status by acquiring

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

297

wealth and education. They had very little connection with the older

upper-ashraf culture. The leadership and activist cadres of the language and autonomy movements came largely from this new intelligentsia.

At the moment of partition in 1947 Bengal Muslim politics was

dominated by a non-Bengali-speaking ashraf. Although Bengalis formed the majority in the first Constituent Assembly, real power was exercised by Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan along with a few others,

mainly Punjabis, who believed in a strong centre.“ The bureaucracy

and military, which largely influenced decision-making, had only 30

per cent and 5 per cent Bengali representation respectively.” Ashraf ideology was dominant and legitimized by the massive Muslim vote

in favour of Pakistan. It encouraged an exclusive perception of society

and politics, attributed high status to ethnic origin and ashraf descent,

accepted prejudices against popular Islam in Bengal as inferior, and

believed in the two-nation theory as the essential basis of Pakistan. Before

partition,

only

a

few

May 1947, that Urdu

would

replace

Bengali Muslims

expressed

doubts about the implications of this ideology. Abul Hashim, who was against the partition of Bengal, expressed his fear in the Millat of 2 Bengali

as the national

lan-

guage in East Bengal when it became part of independent Pakistan.

His fear was well founded. Linguistic difficulty was a major obstacle to education among Bengal Muslims of colonial India: most of them were forced to receive public instruction in languages other than those

of their choice, or what they considered to be their mother tongue.” Three

years before the creation of Pakistan, the East Pakistan Renais-

sance Society

had

announced that Bengali would be East Pakistan’s

language. The question of the mother tongue was by no means settled

for Bengali Muslims even in the forties, though many young scholars

had begun to cultivate Bengali. On 31 March 1940, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, who had been invited to chair an ‘Iqbal Day’ meeting, was forced to leave because he had given his speech in Bengali, not Urdu, and this had caused a terrible uproar among the students and young

people present.” The duality in the Bengal Muslim psyche was only exacerbated by the Muslim League’s assertion that Urdu was an Islamic language and that after religion it was the chief bond of union among

the Muslims of India.

Given this historical context, it was only natural for some people to expect that in a Pakistan free of Hindu domination and British

298

The Sacred and The Secular

masters, Islamic values would dominate. Urdu and Arabic, made redundant in officialdom

until partition, would be expected to thrive;

and Urdu, the Islamic counterpart of Hindi in India, would be the

national language. Because of the belief that Pakistan was created in order to provide a homeland for the Muslims, the acceptance of

Islam as its ideology seemed natural. Yet, this was largely a result of orthodox Jama’at-i-Islami

pressure. As for politicians, they were

caught off guard by the implications of their own rhetoric. However,

in the post-partition period, popular response to the slogan of ‘Islam in Danger’ began to dwindle. The increasing support for the Bengali language, first among the middle classes, and then among the work-

ing classes, in defiance of government proclamations Urdu as an ‘Islamic’ language suitable for Pakistan,

in favour of is a case in

point, The paradox lay in the fact that Urdu, and not Bengali, was

considered an Islamic language, in an area where the majority of Muslims spoke Bengali.”

In 1951, there were 168 Bengali news-

Papers and journals in East Bengal, as against only five in Urdu;

obviously even among the literati, knowledge of Urdu was limited to a few.*' The conditions for conflict lay in this dichotomy. The

introduction of Urdu as the only national language of Pakistan would imply the replacement of Bengali as the medium of public instruction and as the official and court language. Such a

situation would

place Bengalis at a disadvantage in the competition for education

and employment and ensure their position of inferiority in the future.

Such apprehensions had surfaced as early as September 1947, but few dared to voice these for fear of reprisals, both by officials and

the local kutti population.”

In formulating its state language policy the government overlooked

the changing influence of indigenous traditions on the population. For some among the middle classes, their syncretic culture and language caused no conflict : they no longer felt like aliens on their own soil, and could accept Sanskritic Bengali without any

feeling of uncertainty.

This was probably due to an altered perception of religion which al-

lowed separate space to language and culture that could be secular or

neutral vis-a-vis religion. Arab descent was no longer universally rec-

ognized as a necessary precondition of being a good Muslim. Such

perceptions also were possible because the emerging middle classes

had very little connection with the former ashraf culture, and therefore

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

299

did not share in its values. Besides, some of them emerged as separate

political interest groups who necessarily challenged the dominant ashraf ideology.

The reaction against the official state policy on language was an

assertion of pride in local culture, a demand that culture be viewed in secular terms. The language movement was an act of two-fold self-

assertion — cultural and political — in an essentially political power struggle. It implied no self-conscious denial of Islam. 5.5 The Language Movement : Growth and Impact

The movement to get official status for Bengali in East Pakistan began

with the birth of organizations like Tamaddun Majlis.” Ostensibly

founded as a cultural body, the implicit aims of the Majlis were po-

litical. On 15 September 1947, it brought out a book called Pakistaner rashtra bhasa : bangla na urdu (The National Language of Pakistan : Bengali or Urdu). In the introduction Professor Abul Kasem demanded

that Bengali be given the status of a national language.” But not more

than five persons bought the book. Most of the students approached felt this to be a dangerous and impractical issue : Pakistan had just come into being, religious sentiments were high, and they did not want to antagonize the masses. The common urban folk still adhered strongly

to ashraf ideology. They had become so incensed by Majlis activities

that they even beat its members forcing many to leave Dacca city.

The Majlis tried to mobilize support in many ways. Its members individually called on students living in the Dacca University’s halls of residence in order to mobilize them; they held discussions with

literateurs and government officials; organized meetings; and sought help from political organizations, like the Awami

the Congress, Among

the

the Communist Party

vernacular

intelligentsia

and

Muslim League,

the Student Federation.

concerned

with

the

lan-

guage question were those who had opposed the partition of Bengal, such

as

Abul Hashim

members of Tamaddun

and

Majlis;

who were sons of wealthy

Abul Mansur Ahmad;

the founder-

students like Munier Chowdhury,

government officers but were politically

left-oriented; liberal intellectuals, such as Abdur Razzak, with a

strong belief in the democratic system; and members of political parties like the Awami Muslim League.

300

The Sacred and The Secular

Initially, the language movement was limited to a handful of intel-

lectuals and students, especially from Dacca University. It soon gained support from civil servants who as quickly dropped out of it thanks to

government pressure.” The support of early enthusiasts, like govern-

ment officials and university teachers, was based on pragmatic consid-

erations. They were concerned because villagers and poor people found

filling Urdu registration forms difficult. It was also believed that learn-

ing Bengali would be easier for the majority and thus prevent national wastage. Bengali politicians, whether Muslim Leaguers or Communists,

supported the movement secretly in order to avoid giving it a political tinge and be dubbed traitors. In 1947, most Bengali Muslim members of the Assembly belonged to the Muslim League, and therefore, could

not openly associate themselves with the struggle. At a later stage, however, their involvement became more direct. In April 1951, a public

meeting chaired by the district Muslim League president, Sadruddin

Ahmad, was organized at Barisal town hall. There, lawyers and Muslim

Leaguers expressed support for Bengali as a state language. In 1952,

some members, like Abul Kalam Shamsuddin, resigned from their Assembly seats in protest against the shooting of university students

on 21 February.”

‘The Communist Party led by Muzaffar Ahmed initially refused to

be directly involved in the movement.

‘We are not interested’,

he

declared when approached by the Majlis.” The reasons were twofold :

he was not sure of the depth of commitment and seriousness of the organizers; and he did not wish to invite government reprisal on the movement as a communist-inspired one. However, sympathetic mem-

bers were not debarred from associating with it. It was only as late as 1952, when the movement had acquired a certain momentum, that the

Communist Party took a more active stand; it circulated a secret pam-

phet among members, called Bhasa andolaner paryalochana (An Analysis of the Language Movement).

Communist support was explicit since 1951, when the Cominform

published in its mouthpiece a political note, entitled, ‘For a Lasting

Peace, for a People’s Democracy’, praising the Awami Muslim League for its commendable struggle against feudalism and colonialism.° The East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP) saw this as a signal

to work through the Awami Muslim League and other popular front

organizations. At that time, the EPCP’s membership had dropped to a

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

301

few hundred from about 10,000 in 1947 as a result of official containment policies backed by the United States.” Government reprisal had forced most of its Hindu members, who formed the majority, to flee to West Bengal. In an interview with Ali Ashraf, a one time activist,

Talukder Maniruzzaman asserts that the East Pakistan Youth League founded in 1951 was actually organized by the communists as a front

organization.”

Communist

infiltration, however,

the organizers

of

the

movement

implied

and

a secular influence on

subsequently

on _

its

supporters. According to Talukder Maniruzzaman, an atmosphere for ‘secular nationalist appeals’ was created by the leftists who exploited

‘the delicate and sensitive issues of language, autonomy and eco-

nomic distress’. These developments provided the government with

an excuse to crack down indiscriminately on students, intellectuals, university teachers and Hindu politicians. These were the people

Maulana Akram Khan referred to when he spoke of ‘the group of people opposed to Urdu language in East Pakistan’ who were the ‘enemies of Islam’.

Amongst other groups which worked to achieve national status

for Bengali was the East Pakistan Democratic Youth League (Purba

Pakistan Ganatantrik Yuba League). It was founded on 6 September 1947 as a non-communal and anti-imperialist student and youth organization with the help of politically-committed radical intellectuals like Shahidullah

Kaiser,

Muhammad

Toaha

(Communist),

Shamsul

Huq (Muslim Leaguer, who later became a member of the Awami Muslim League), Ataur Rahman (of Rajshahi), Aziz Ahmed, Shamsuddin

2 February

Ahmed,

1948

Tasadduk

the Youth

Hussain

League

and

Hazera

decided,

Mahmud.

On

at a meeting

in Rajshahi, to demand state language status for Bengali. Previously,

its manifesto only said that the language of the majority had to be

given priority.” This organization could not last long in the face of

the government's drive against communism. In 1951 it regrouped itself as the East Pakistan

Youth

League.

This was

a leftist youth

organization which believed that Pakistan was created by an imperialist conspiracy. It attracted young people like Muhammad Sultan, who

were non-communal

League to be communal.*

in orientation and considered the Muslim

‘The Pakistan Students’ Rally was organized probably in 1948 with

302

The Sacred and The Secular

a more self-conscious objective — to provide students with ‘a vision

of ideal society which they should try to realize in their own lifetime’

and thus prepare themselves to be ‘full-fledged citizens of a sovereign

state’. The Rally felt that the ‘country’s future’ belonged to them. It

upheld the ideal of freedom. In its draft constitution, the Rally stated

that its ideal was :

freedom in its political, economic and social context. By free-

dom we mean all-round freedom, i.e. freedom of the mind as

well as the body; freedom for men as well as women; freedom for individuals as well as for society. This freedom implies not

only emancipation from political bondage but also equal distribution of wealth, abolition of caste barriers and social inequi-

ties, elimination of communalism and religious intolerance.”

The Rally noted that existing student organizations were attached to.

political parties pledged to ideologies such as communism, socialism,

and communal nationalism, and that certain organizations were

“fostering premature social revolution’. It felt the necessity for an in-

dependent non-communal students’ organization. The ‘Pakistan nation-

alism’ it advocated, was opposed to ‘communal nationalism’ and had a ‘socialistic

content

for the economic

ious

promotion

and

social

liberation

of

the masses’.” In its programme it included the following : removal of obnoxcustoms;

of communal

harmony;

free compulsory

primary education; religious education in denominational schools for religious communities desirous of it; coeducation after the secondary stage; prohibition of early marriage. It also addressed itself to the

lingua franca of the country. It was of. the opinion that both Urdu

and Bengali should be state languages and that Bengali should be treated as the provincial language with immediate effect.”

By 1951 student activism became somewhat aggressive. Dacca University students organized themselves into The Dacca University State Language Committee of Action. In April, the Committee submitted a memorandum to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly : ‘We, the students of Dacca University, who initiated the lan-

guage movement in East Bengal three years ago, who are now

more determined than ever to secure for Bengali the status of

state language of Pakistan, will take this opportunity, while you

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity 303 are all assembled at Karachi, to press once more, our legitimate claim.” The memorandum considered the claim of Urdu to be an Islamic language as ‘absurd’ : We refuse to believe that any language under heaven can be Islamic or Christian or Heathen.” They argued that Bengali had

a greater claim to be called

Islamic because more people spoke it. They rejected the idea that Urdu could be a unifying factor between the provinces of Pakistan,

because

‘it is equally foreign to all parts of Pakistan’. They echoed the feelings

of a section of Dacca University teachers by suggesting that the im-

plementation of Urdu as the only state language would create a ‘privileged class’, ‘nourish disaffection’, and jeopardize the country’s

material and intellectual development. They were bold enough to suggest that if Pakistan was to have one state language it had to be Bengali, and if more, then Bengali had to be one of them.

Although intellectuals did not organize themselves into associations for the purpose, they took an active interest in the state lan-

guage issue. On 23 February 1951 a deputation consisting of ‘Dr Muhammad Shahidullah, Principal Ebrahim Khan, and Dr Quazi

Mutahar Hussain waited upon the Prime Minister, Mr Nurul Amin

with an application widely signed by MLAs, MCAs, professors, officials, writers, lawyers, publishers and students requesting him to immediately introduce Bengali as the official language of the province’. Among the reasons cited were the following : it was the mother tongue

of most Bengalis; the majority of Pakistanis spoke Bengali; on 8 April 1948 the then Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, had moved a reso-

lution in the Provincial Legislature, which was passed, accepting the

claims of official status for Bengali; the Language Committee recommendations if implemented would modify the Bengali script and so

there could be no valid objection to the acceptance of Bengali as a state language. Intellectuals at this time saw themselves as builders of society.

‘The spirit with which some teachers of Dacca University addressed

themselves to the state language issue with its multifarious political

304

The Sacred and The Secular

implications make

this evident. They saw themselves as citizens of

a democrative state who had ‘the right to disobey ‘the pernicious injunctions — Legislative or Executive — of the Government’. The

‘attempt to make the National Language of Pakistan distinct from

the medium of instruction of any part of Pakistan’ was, to them, ‘a pernicious act’. In a letter to the editor of the daily Observer, they wrote in a note of challenge :

Pakistan

‘The effect of this act becomes dangerous when the ‘national language’ is the same as the medium of instruction in some other parts. For in such a situation the citizens of the second area become a privileged class in relation to the rest ... It is a deliberate limitation to the opportunities of the citizensof the first group. The existence of a privileged class, whatever the criteria by’ the application of which the privileged class is discovered, is dangerous to the existence of a state. Under such circumstances it is the duty of every citizen of Pakistan, as it is ours, to disobey any law which may attempt to introduce a national language for Pakistan which is not the medium of instruction of one part but may be in another.’

Opposition to the Language Movement The language movement faced opposition from several sources. The

government insisted on viewing it as communist-inspired and godless in orientation. Its mouthpiece, the daily Morning News, in its propaganda against the movement, misrepresented facts : it suggested that only a handful of Hindus were behind the ‘trouble’. Local oppo-

sition too was a source of threat, as already pointed out. This came largely from the kuttis who originated in Bihar, the recent muhajireen, as well as other common people who sensed a threat to Pakistan and Islam. On 12 December 1947 a group of people pretending to be students turned up at Plassey Barracks student quar-

ters and the Engineering College hostel to attack the students. This

happened six days after the Morning News had announced that an education conferencé at Karachi had proposed that Urdu alone be the national language of Pakistan. It immediately provoked a student meeting presided over by Professor Abul Kasem, which culminated

in a protest procession to the houses of ministers Syed Afzal, Nurul Amin and Khwaja Nazimuddin. The subsequent attacks on students,

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity it was believed by members

305

of the movement, had the backing of

the government and the Muslim League.” Towards the end of December

1947, the Rashtrabhasa Sangram

Parishad (the State Language Committee of Action), was constituted

with members from the Democratic Youth League, the Muslim Student League, Tamaddun Majlis etc. The aim was to keep up the movement

and spread it. By January 1948 most of the arts and science students of Dacca University were won over to the cause. But one section of

the Student League headed by Shah Azizur Rahman — who later be-

came Prime Minister of independent Bangladesh under the Zia regime — was not.” In fact, a counter-movement in support of Urdu began

at the same time. It was led by a student leader called Shamsul Huda

and attracted a large section of the Dacca student community. The late forties were marked by a series of confrontations between the supporters of Bengali and those of Urdu; among the latter were the govern-

ment, the kuttis, and the upper class Urdu-speaking ashraf. It was

believed that the Nawab of Dacca got many Bengali-supporting marchers beaten up at Phulbari.”

By early 1948 saboteurs had penetrated the movement. Their ac-

tivities were aimed at provoking official retaliation. On 11 March 1948, while supporters of the movement

were picketing peacefully

at the

Secretariat, a minister was forcibly made to sign a letter of resignation

should he fail to make Bengali a state language. Minister Abdul Hamid’s garden was destroyed. The beard of another minister was pulled. Innocent policemen were badly beaten up. Such insults

infuriated the general public who chased away the students. When they marched toward the Secretariat again the next day, they were stopped

by policemen who used tear gas and lathi-charged them. Until 1948, it was impossible to hold meetings in favour of Bengali in Rajshahi,

Chittagong and Sandwip—areas given to strong religiosity. In Noakhali and Jessore, however, such meetings could be held.”

Official Position In March 1948 the Samgram Parishad placed a seven-point demand before Nazimuddin which was conceded after much disagreement.” The first two points demanded that Bengali be made a

state and pro-

vincial language; the next two, asked for the unconditional release of

306

The Sacred and The Secular

those arrested during the language movement, and the withdrawal of restrictions imposed upon newspapers such as Ittehad, Amrita Bazar,

Anand Bazar, Jugantar, etc. The fifth point was a demand against vic-

timization of government officers involved in the movement; the next, that a press note be issued stating that the movement was not being

conducted by the enemies of Pakistan. Lastly, an open apology was

demanded from Nazimuddin for the methods of suppression employed by the government. Nazimuddin implemented most of these points ex-

cept the one on national language. Jinnah explained later that Nazimud-

din had been intimidated : it was not for Nazimuddin but the Constituent Assembly to take such a decision for the Governor had no

authority to do so.”

,

During his only visit to Dacca, Jinnah reiterated the central gov-

ernment position that Urdu alone would be the national language of Pakistan, first at the Race Course Maidan on 21 March 1948, and again on 24 March, at the Curzon Hall convocation ceremony. On both occasions some in the audience shouted ‘no! no!’. Jinah later spoke to

various student representatives and members of the Samgram Parishad —Syed Nazrul Islam, Professor Abul Kasem, Naimuddin Ahmed,

Toaha, Tajuddin Ahmed and Oli Ahad. Jinnah’s personality was such that many students began to have second thoughts about the move-

ment.” Between 1948 and 1952, the language issue lay fairly dormant.

Occasional

meetings

were

held

and

Rashtrabhasa

Language Day) was observed annually on 11 March.

Dibas

(State

Official circles often revived the bogey of India and cries of Islam and Pakistan in danger to corner the opposit Such tactics, of course, had little to do with religion and much with politics. The Pakistan

Observer, in its editorial of 7 May 1951 noted that ‘certain irresponsible

remarks’ made by Maulana Akram Khan and Begum Ikramullah at an Urdu conference in Karachi ‘gave rise to the language contro-

versy again’. In his presidential address to the conference on 15 April the Maulana had said :

‘The group of people opposed to Urdu language in East Pakistan took their inspiration and support from quarters who were opposed and antagonistic to everything which was Islamic." To him the ‘peculiar significance’ of Urdu was that it had ‘a role to

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

307

play’ as ‘a binding force’ to keep ‘the various component parts. of Pakistan together’. His branding of Bengalis as ‘enemies of Islam’ in-

troduced an ‘irrational heat’ into the debate and resulted in a flood of critical letters to the editor of The Pakistan Observer. Significantly, both Begum Ikramullah and the Maulana belonged to the old ashraf.

The former, though a Consembly member from East Bengal, came

from an established Urdu-speaking wealthy family from Calcutta, and consequently, favoured Urdu.

The attitude of the centre was to dismiss any valid claims of East

Bengal, whether of a political, cultural or economic nature, as the ‘evil of provincialism’.”” The official aim was ‘to eradicate’ this evil. One of the ways by which this was sought to be achieved was by pursuing

a policy of one nation and one culture. Although Bengali was eventu-

ally recognized as the official language of East Pakistan, there were

attempts to introduce the Arabic script for Bengali. Then, it would

share the same script with Urdu, but the natural flow and progress of the language would be obstructed. Middle-class professionals and intellectuals feared that this would ‘check the progress of education in

East Bengal’.

Thus far the language movement achieved some politi-

cal, but little cultural, success.” The methods employed to fight provincialism aroused popular hos-

tility. Some of the measures which galvanized literate opinion against

the government were : the proposals made by the Basic Principles

Committee Report in 1950 aimed at establishing a strong centre and

recognizing Urdu as the only state language; the ruthless drive against communism, in the name of which innocent Hindus were victimized,

Hindu peasants harassed, government officials punished, press freedom

curtailed, and students arrested; and finally, the communal riots of 10

February 1950 believed by some to be partly instigated by hired goon-

das (toughs), the muhajereen, local kuttis and also the government. The

government’s declared aim was ‘to take effective steps to combat all

subversive activities prejudicial to the security and integrity of Pakistan’. This was, Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani’s answer to a question

by Nur Ahmed regarding the likely measure which could be adopted

by the government against communists or communist-like activities.”

Hindu members of the Assembly complained about oppression on their co-religionists. On 6 March

1949, Professor Raj Kumar Chakraverty

spoke in Parliament of the ‘panic’ and fear in Hindu minds and their

308

‘The Sacred and The Secular

consequent exodus, which could be checked by ‘more tactful handling

of the situation’! The riot of 10 February was only partly a spontaneous reaction against the attacks on Muslims in West Bengal (which

in turn was a reaction to the Muslim League government’s attack on Hindu peasants in Khulna). But when some Dacca University students organized a march in protest against the riots others were prevented from joining them by members of the East Pakistan Muslim Student League and the All-Pakistan Muslim League. One, Ruhul Amin,

was

maltreated as a Hindu agent. Mahmud Ali was arrested in Sylhet be-

cause he formed a peace committee to protect Hindus.” These events and the resulting resentment induced a

loss of confi-

dence in the Muslim League government. The expected effect on the

government was to make it feel shaky and therefore aggressive. When

Suhrawardy, disappointed with the Muslim League, broke away from

it to

found

what

he

hoped

would

be

a national party,

the

Awami Muslim League —Liaquat Ali Khan, called people like him

“dogs let loose by the enemies of Pakistan’”

The Press

The sympathies of the press were divided on the language issue. The line of division was determined by the pattern of ownership. Government mouthpieces like The Morning News and Dawn were hostile. So

was Azad, a Bengali daily, founded in 1949 by Maulana Muhammad Akram

Khan. Sangbad,

Amin’s government,

another Bengali daily sympathetic to Nurul

sought to popularize the Muslim League view

among the masses. Apparently its loyalties swung to the opposite side, for it ‘was exploited by anti-League forces and lost its prestige’.* The

press at the time was not free, contrary to government claims.” The Pakistani Observer,

founded

in 1949 by Hamidul

Huq

Chowdhury,

was banned in 1952 by Nurul Amin’s ministry for supporting the Bengali cause. The ban was however removed in 1954 by the United Front ministry which was formed after it won the elections that year.

Ittefaq started as an Awami League weekly under the editorship of Tafazzal Hussain; therefore, it was branded as communist-inspired or as acting for Indian interests. According to the commentator, Ittefaq

“felt the pulse of the people and began clamouring for their rights’.

It was, therefore, critical of the government. After the dismissal in 1954

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

309

of the United Front ministry, shortly after it came into being, Ittefag was banned.

Owing to restrictions on the East Bengal press, locals had to rely

on Calcutta newspapers. But restrictions were also imposed on the im-

port of these. Ittehad, a Calcutta paper founded by Suhrawardy, was

‘sympathetic to the Bengali cause.” But the West Pakistan press was less friendly. Following the acceptance of Mohammad Ali’s language formula recognizing Bengali as a national language, nine newspapers

went on a protest strike on 7 May 1954." 21 February 1952 and its Aftermath

‘The event which shook the foundations of the Muslim League govern-

ment and had long term repercussions on the ideology and politics of

East Bengal was the shooting of university students on 21 February 1952. This day is popularly known

as marking the beginning of the

language movement. On 26 January, Khwaja Nazimuddin declared at

Paltan Maidan that Urdu alone would be the state language of Pakistan after having agreed in March 1948 to give national status to Bengali.”

‘The vernacular intelligentsia, already agitated by the Basic Principles

Committee Report, became more restless.'* The result was a student

strike on 30 January. A procession was taken out despite opposition from the student wing of the Muslim League, the East Pakistan Muslim

Student League. The Rashtra Bhasa Samgram Parishad called for a strike throughout Dacca on 4 February in which about 10,000 people participated, including approximately 2,000 women.'" The Parishad called for a province-wide strike on 21 February. But one day before

the event, the government banned the assembly of more than four per-

sons under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This deterred the Parishad, but a radical section within it was determined to challenge the law. Among them was the leftist Oli Ahad, secretary of the Youth

League, and Ibrahim, a member of the Islamic Brotherhood.'* The religious-secular divide on the language issue was no longer clear-cut.

‘The events of the next few days occurred swiftly in a mounting

tempo of violence, excitement, and mobilization in favour of the language movement. On 21 February students defied Section 144 and came out of the Dacca University campus in groups of ten to offer Satyagraha on the advice of the Communist Party after it failed to

310

‘The Sacred and The Secular

persuade them not to break the law. At first, the police arrested large numbers and took them away in trucks and buses until there were no

more vehicles left." They then lathi-charged and tear-gassed them.

Some students retaliated by brickbatting. Finally, the police opened

fire. Among those dead were four students and a rickshaw-puller. On 22 February the students erected a memorial (shahid minar) for the

martyrs; they went on a protest march wearing black badges and car-

tying the bloodied clothes of the shahids (martyrs). More shooting and

arrests followed. On 24 February, the shahid minar was destroyed by

the police. There was more marching and more shooting.'™ The events

caused an open split in Muslim League ranks. Bengali members walked

out of the Assembly; one resigned. By March, the movement lost its

tempo as the organizers were forced to disperse. But it left a long memory; it created a stronger sense of Bengali ethnic consciousness

than ever before, a consciousness once again of ‘us’ and ‘them’, a consciousness which became more secular with each successive clash

with the government. It culminated in the rejection of ashraf ideology which was later reflected in the United Front victory over the Muslim

League in the 1954 East Bengal elections. The 21-point election mani-

festo of the United Front incorporated the decision to make Bengali

one of the state languages of Pakistan.'” Here the secular consciousness

opposed the communal. Although Islam was the declared state ideol-

ogy, what was actually practised by: the state could be described as ‘religious communalism’.'®

During 1952-55, various cultural institutions such as the Samskriti

Samsad kept alive the spirit of the language movement. The Samsad was based in Dacca University. It did not publish bulletins but organ-

ized plays to raise people’s consciousness.” Moreover, every year,

students persisted in observing 21 February as a day of mourning and

protest even after the Bengali language was given national status in the 1956 constitution. The day came to acquire a ritual and symbolic significance.

oppression.

In

later

years

it came

to

represent

freedom

from

The following is a typical example of events commemorating the

death of the first language martyrs. On 20 February 1955, students of educational institutions of Dacca ‘attended their classes barefooted and

observed fast’.'* Dacca College students refrained from attending

classes. Instead they assembled in the college premises and shouted

Culture and Language : the Problem of Idéntity

3il

slogans. The college authorities instantly called the police who arrived with rifles. At this the students left the colleges and went home. How-

ever, at about 9 p.m., loud slogans such as ‘Rashtrabhasa Bangla chai’

(Bengali for national language), ‘Rajbandider mukti chai’ (freedom for political prisoners), ‘Shaheed smrity — amar houk (long live the memory

of martyrs)

were heard from Salimullah Muslim

Fazlul Huq Muslim Hall.

Hall and

The Plea for Arabic as Lingua Franca On 28 April 1950, Zahid Hussain, Governor of the State Bank, and

later, on 24 January 1951, Dr Muhammad Shahidullah, both proposed

an alternative solution to the language controversy — the adoption of Arabic rather than Urdu as the state language. The latter also suggested

that regional languages be the official languages of regions or prov-

inces. Among the many reasons cited by Dr Shahidullah for his choice,

were what he called the ‘religious sanctity attached to Arabic’ and the

declaration in the Objectives Resolution that ‘Pakistan shall be built on the solid rock of Islam’, of which Arabic is the linguistic symbol. If chosen on a democratic basis, Bengali, spoken by 66 per cent of the

population had priority to be the state language. ‘It is only in favour

of Arabic that we Pakistanis in both the parts, should be able to waive the claim of our regional languages, in the greater consideration of

Islamic solidarity all over the world’. Dr Mahmud Hussain of Dacca

University saw the use of Arabic as a way of developing a common

culture and language in Pakistan.'"° Such sentiments found support

among the maulanas and some office bearers of the Muslim League, but not among government officials or even hard core Muslim Leagu-

ers, the ashraf. They considered it a ‘thoughtless agitation’ and though

recognizing Arabic as the language of the scriptures they found it a

difficult language which could not be spread easily among the masses.'"' This was the very same argument used by the vernacular

intelligentsia when they canvassed against Urdu and in favour

of Bengali. The officials were more worried about the consequence of abandoning Urdu. They echoed the sentiments of the pre-partition Bengal ashraf: ‘Bengali will continue to play the dominant role as before in effecting the denationalization of the Muslims of our Eastern

Pakistan’."* Their obvious aim was to dominate the Bengal Muslims

312

The Sacred and The Secular

themselves, both culturally and politically, thus establishing the pri-

macy of their secular interests over religious considerations. They

strongly believed that the ‘cultural conquest of the Muslims of East

Bengal was effected by the medium of Bengali’.

Hence, they were

determined to replace that medium either by Urdu, or ‘Pak-Bangla’ to be created by reforming the existing Bengali script and by coining new

words or by replacing it with the Arabic script." Thus language was

treated as essential to nation and state building.

Language and script were seen as symbols of power both by the

Hindu and Muslim intelligentsia which included the political elite in

undivided India.'* These were also linked with the concept of identity. “Political elites of the religious communities have struggled to make

religion and language congruent to erect further symbolic barriers to effective

communication

between

groups’

in

order

to differenti-

ate themselves from each other and to obtain political benefits.""* The

national political elite of Pakistan in insisting on one language for the

whole of Pakistan pursued a policy of one nation and one culture.''®

Among them were Urdu-speaking Muslims from Bengal, members of the ‘old’ urban ashraf, such as Nazimuddin, Nurul Amin, Maulana Akram Khan and Mohammad Ali of Bogra. Unlike them, the vernacular

intelligentsia, who provided the main thrust of opposition to national

language policies, had strong rural connections and were therefore in-

fluenced by a syncretic tradition which was rooted far more in local culture.'” This is embodied in the works of Nazrul Islam.'* 5.6

Arabic Script and Cultural Assimilation

In the process of constructing the Pakistani nation, the leaders of the new country followed a policy of cultural assimilation. This essentially

involved suppressing popular Islam in Bengal as syncretic and impure while upholding the Islam of the urban ashraf as authentic and therefore

to be emulated. The policy of Pakistanization adopted by the ‘old’

ashraf and supported by the ulama created further conditions for conflict. The attempted purification of Bengali language and culture which followed is reminiscent of the nineteenth century phenomenon of Islamization in rural Bengal. There was an attempt to suppress Bengali literature as it was common to both Bengals, such as the works of

Tagore and Nazrul.'"” The idea was to create a new Islamic literature

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

313

in East Bengal distinct from that of West Bengal. While the Muslim

Political elite needed a separate Muslim culture and identity before

1947 in order to bé tecognized as a powerful force at the centre, a

monolithic Muslim identity was later felt to be the sole means whereby

that power .could be retained. Those critical of government policies

were branded as ‘enemies of Pakistan’ and of Islam, who got

‘their

support from quarters who were opposed and antagonistic to everything

which was Islamic’;

However, in March 1948, by accepting the seven-point demand

of the Samgram Parishad, the Prime Minister Nazimuddin had con-

ceded national status to Bengali. Perhaps the object was to take the wind out of their sails before Jinnah’s expected arrival in Dacca.

For even though Bengali was recognized as the official language of

East Pakistan, there were attempts to impose the Arabic script. By

April 1951, the government had spent Rs 60,000 on adult education

centres in East Bengal

‘to see whether literacy [could] be imparted-

more quickly through the Arabic script’.’' The policy of cultural assimilation coritinued. The

vernacular intellegentsia feared that the

Arabic script, if adopted, would obstruct the natural flow and progress of the Bengali language. The debate next centred around the style of Bengali to be adopted.

In September 1950, the Pir Sahib of Sarsina, president of Jami-

yat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, East Pakistan, gave his support to the adoption

of the Arabic script. The Jamiyat, at the time, was ‘not prepared to

express any opinion on the subject’.'” Later, in January 1957, it

passed a resolution, urging the provincial government to ‘replace current

Bengali

in Sanskrit script by ‘Pak-Bangla’’ in Arabic

script’.'” Others were unwilling to go so far, although they agreed

that the language needed to be developed and modified to suit the special needs of East Pakistan. Some

felt that Perso-Arabic words

which already had recognized ‘niches’ in the language could bé used in literature, but the’usage should appear natural, not forced.'™ Others felt that the existing form of the tanguage was too complicated; the script needed to be simplified and the number of letters which

then stood at 400, should be reduced.'* The script issue shows the extent, to which perceptions of language and culture were dervied from

religious

and

secular

motivations

and

indicates

the

lines of

alignment among different social groups. The findings of the East

314

The Sacred and The Secular

Bengal Language Committee set up on 9 March 1949, are relevant in this context.

The language committee was formed according to the terms of the Government of East Bengal Resolution No. 590 Edn., ostensibly to examine the ‘question of the standardization, simplification and reform of the Bengali language current in East Bengal’, but its major objective

was to see whether the Bengali script could be retained or replaced by

the Arabic script.’ With this aim in mind, the committee circulated a questionnaire among secondary school, college, and university teachers;

teachers of madrasahs; officers of the education, executive and judicial

departments; members of the legislature, district boards and district

school boards, newspapers and journals, etc.'”’ In total, 301 respondents gave clear answers to the question as to whether in their opinion the

Bengali script should be replaced by any other script such as Arabic

or Roman (see Table 5.1). The findings show that 62.16 per cent of

the respondents wanted no change in scripts; 31.86 per cent wanted

the Arabic script; while 5.98 per cent preferred the Roman script. No-

tably, 25 per cent of those who desired the Arabic script were professors

and teachers of madrasahs, while 31.25 per cent were officers of the

executive and judicial departments. Secondary school teachers (12.5

per cent) formed the next largest group to favour the Arabic script.

Significantly, the teachers and professors of madrasahs opting for the

Arabic script, also formed 75 per cent of madrasah teachers surveyed,

while the 30 officers of the executive and judicial departments in favour of the proposal accounted for 50 per cent of those surveyed from these

departments. The unanimity of view between a large section of the

ulama and the bureaucracy is notable. The reasons given in support

and opposition of the proposal indicate the religious/secular bias in

their approaches to this issue.

The arguments in favour of adopting the Arabic script emphasize

its importance, not only as a link between various regions of Pakistan

but

also

with

the

‘Muslim world in general’.

As

a tool

of

the

Pakistanization, and hence Islamization, policy espoused by the gov-

ernment, it would free the Bengali language ‘from some of the undesirable influences of Sanskrit’. It would solve the problems of a multiplicity of scripts since it would enable Muslims to read the Koran, the regional language, and the state language in the same script. It would maintain continuity in the education of children since they

Culture and Language

: the Problem of Identity

315

would begin their alphabet in the Arabic script. One argument presup-

posed a great and widespread love for the ‘Quranic’ script, whose very

adoption, it was believed, would ‘act as a charm and give a fillip to the spread of mass education: among Muslims, more than 90 per cent of whom were believed to.be familiar with the Arabic script. Thus, it

was held that no legislation would be required for the introduction of compulsory primary education as the purpose would be served simply

by adopting the Arabic script.

Table 5.1 : OPINIONS ON THE TYPE-OF SCRIPT FOR BENGALI, 1949

(Categories of correspondents,

Professors of university Professors of colleges ‘Teachers of secondary schools Professors and teachers of madrasahs Officers of education department executive and judicial departments Members of legislatures district boards and district school boarde Othess

No change of script,

12 1 33

8

12 27

Opal Change for ° Total number

“Arabic

2 2

Roman

=

1

of advocates

1s 3 46 32

12 1 uo4 3

21

8

so 2

2

4 2

1

4

1

28

»

30

5

Source : Report of the East Bengal Language Committee, 1949-50, p. 22 Some contradictory opinions were expressed regarding the structural changes which would be necessary, in both the Arabic script and Bengali language, if the former was to be the medium of the latter. ‘The professors of Rajshahi College maintained that the Bengali script

was superior to the Arabic’ script from the phonological point of view,

for the Arabic alphabet was poor in representing sounds other than

Arabic ones.'* Many Bengali consonants like @ G @ etc. are unknown to Arabic phonology.” While Bengali letters always carry vow-

els with them, Arabic letters do not. In the Arabic system; ‘reading is

entirely anticipatory’ while in the Bengali syst#m, it is ‘mainly phonetic

and almost entirely unspeculative’. The professors of Rajshahi College,

therefore,

did

not

consider

the

Arabic

script

a fit

medium

for

316

The Sacred and The Secular

the Bengali language. If the necessary vowel points were inserted into the Arabic script to accommodate Bengali sounds, they believed that Arabic letters would ‘lose all their charm with loss of speed

and legibility’.'”

Those in favour of the Arabic script seemed to be swayed more by

sentiment than by science, for they simply asserted that no such adverse

structural changes would occur.’ On the contrary, they saw the possibility of a rich language reflecting the culture and tradition of the

majority and maintaining essential aspects of the mother tongue intact.

The majority of those who wanted no change in the script were

members of the legislature, and teachers of secondary schools, colleges

and Dacca University. Responses were received from 85.29 per cent

of the former and 84.21 per cent of the latter categories. Their views, based on a rational and scientific approach indicated a more secular

stance. The teachers of Rajshahi College pointed out that political dif-

ferences between groups did not disappear through the sharing of a

script; if so, European states which share the Roman script would have experienced no differences.” They argued that the experiment would entail heavy wastage. As proof they pointed to Maulvi Zalfigar Ali’s Huruful Quran, a Bengali weekly in Arabic script which was a colossal failure as it had few subscribers.'” They held that the introduction of

the Arabic script would reduce the litereacy percentage; there were not enough teachers to teach even in the Bengali script, let alone in Arabic. Transcription of major literary works would be difficult and expensive,

which, if not undertaken, would cut off Bengalis from their literary

and cultural heritage embodied in the works of Nazrul, Tagore, Alaul and Kaikobad, etc. The process of adopting a new script would be time-consuming, require a new printing technique and lead to extensive unemployment.

The positions of the two groups indicate their different interests.

The madrasah teachers, who already knew Arabic, stood to gain by

introduction of the Arabic script; pupils of madrasahs would be at an advantage in the job market. The non-Bengali dominated bureaucracy

was largely Urdu-speaking and as such, knew the Arabic alphabet.'* Moreover, this group did not share the enthusiasm of Rajshahi College

teachers for Bengali cultural and literary heritage."

‘The language committee acceded to majority wishes in recommending retention of the Bengali script.'* Maulvi Shaikh Sharifuddin, prin-

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

317

cipal of the Islamic Intermediate College, Dacca, dissented. He saw

cultural fusion of the two wings of Pakistan through the Arabic script as ‘an urgent necessity’ for his ultimate goal was to have all Pakistanis

lea

Urdu."

Adamuddin, Rajshahi.

There was no opposition,

professor,

Islamic

however, from A. Q. M.

Intermediate

College,

Naogaon,

‘The committee recommended the adoption of a reformed Bengali,

to be called Sahaj Bangla (easy Bengali),'* which incorporated only

40 of the 400 letters in the alphabet. It wanted Sahaj Bangla to be

allowed to develop through the natural process of evolution as opposed

to evolution brought about by the agency of any mechanical device,

and new elements from all advanced languages to be introduced without

prejudice except where it militated ‘against the genius and culture of

the people of East Bengal in particular and of Pakistan in general’.'”

Dr Shahidullah along with seven others, maintained that Sanskrit, as a

source of material for coining new words, could not be ruled out al-

together, except for words of Muslim religious significance.”

Reactions to the script policy of the central government reveal a deep schism in the Bengali community which had no clear-cut

line of demarcation along a religious-secular divide. There were divisions within the ulama,

the bureaucracy,

as well as educationists

and members of the Constituent Assembly.'“' But on the whole, the

ulama supported the policy while the main thrust of opposition came from

intellectuals and university teachers.

However,

another

recommendation

was

made

to the follow-

ing effect. When official correspondence, newspaper material and

books for educational use were written in sadhu or chalti-bhasa (i.e.

chaste or colloquial Bengali), the following rules would have to be observed : Sanskritization of language would be’ avoided as far as pos-

sible by use of simple phraseology and easy construction in vogue in the speech common to the people of East Bengal; the expressions and

sentiments of Muslim writers would strictly conform to Islamic ideol-

ogy; and words, idioms and phrases in punthi and popular literatures would be introduced in the language more freely."

For teachers and writers who constituted the membership of the

Tamaddun Majlis the very emergence of such a debate suggested the existence ofa conspiracy hatched by the central government." Not all

members of the vernacular intelligentsia were equally averse to the idea

318

The Sacred and The Secular

of the Arabic script. A. M. A. Hamid, who represented the East Bengal Muslim League at the Constituent Assembly said on 27 March

1951 :

‘With this script we read the Holy Quran; we are Muslims’, and the

change of script Muhammad

‘will not be anything new’

Habibullah

or any

‘innovation’."“

Bahar pointed to the miserable failure of a

similar attempt 200 years earlier and said, ‘We want ideas and not the

script..."

Initially, even the Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam was unclear about its

position on this issue, because of its delicate and controversial nature.'* When

the Pir Sahib of Sarsina expressed his support for the Arabic

script, he did so in his personal capacity, for the secretary of the Jamiyat

immediately pointed out in a statement noted in The Pakistan Observer in September 1950 that this was not the view of the Jamiyat.'”

Conclusion ‘The language controversy gradually polarized interests in East Bengal.

Initially, the small vernacular intelligentsia giving leadership to the movement was isolated and unable to mobilize much support. The

cleavage was along horizontal as well as vertical lines. The vernacular intelligentsia had as much to fear from the ire of the masses as from

the national political elite. But the lines of alignment did not long re-

main so clear-cut. The controversy over the introduction of the Arabic script as the medium of Bengali is a case in point. The line of demarcation became even more unclear when, with the growth of the lan-

guage movement,

it attracted rickshaw-pullers and members of

extremist organizations like the Islamic Brotherhood. Its rapid growth

is a striking phenomenon in view of the fact that in 1947 it was imPlicitly understood by all Muslims that Urdu would be the only national language. This change was largely due to a reaction to official policies

among the vernacular intelligentsia and the violent methods adopted

by the administration to implement them. In espousing such policies,

the government overlooked the changing influence of indigenous tra-

ditions on the population as well as the composition of the middle-class

intelligentsia with their rural links. For some middle-class intellectuals, like Abul Hashim their syncretic culture and language generated no conflict in identity. Like the early rural Muslims of the Bengal frontier they did not feel like aliens on their own soil. They were no longer

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

319

looking for inspiration from Persian culture and Arabian ethics like their

nineteenth-century

forebears.

This

was

probably

due

to

an

altered perception of religion which allowed a secular or neutral space

to language and culture. Such a perception was possible because the new middle classes had little connection with older ashraf culture and

were trying to reject ashraf domination on both the political and cul-

tural plane.

‘The reaction against the state language policy was an assertion of

pride in local culture and origins. Although initially a cultural move-

ment confined to a small segment of the middle class, the language

issue rapidly acquired political significance as it mobilized wider seg-

ments of the population including members of the working class. It

focused the self-assertion of a region in a political power struggle. It

did not deny Islam, but it did underplay any concern with the received faith.

During the language movement, the organizers made no appeal of a religious nature. However, no such movement would have been pos-

sible in the twenties, for example, without a fatwa. Members of the Tamaddun Majlis, the Youth League, and their communist supporters

were careful not to let the movement become overtly political, at least in its initial stages. But inevitably it did become political, for it had

obvious political implications from the very beginning. Those involved

in it did form an effective pressure group threatening to continue agitation if their demands were not met. Although the appeal of the language movement was secular in nature, student activists did operate within a religious framework. Hom-

age was paid to martyrs through special prayers, fasts, and by wearing

white and black for mourning. The ideal of martyrdom invoked in this context was the greatest glory a Muslim could achieve in a jihad. At

the same time, the influence of indigenous traditions could be seen :

floral offerings at the shahid minar and singing of dirges at times resembled devotional offerings common among Hindus.

‘The secular reaction to the politicization of religion by the national

political elite indicated

a ‘new ideology’

which

rejected received

prejudices regarding the inferiority of Bengali Islam, language

and culture. It demanded a new set of ideological criteria in terms of secularism, equality and parity. The achievement of national status for

Bengali was a political, not cultural, success. The cultural conflict cer-

320

The Sacred and The Secular

tainly persisted till 1971. It has not come to an end even in independent Bangladesh.

In the post-independence period, the lines of alignment changed

once again. The secular basis of identity which was gaining ground

through the rejection of ashraf ideology symbolized in the emergence

of independent Bangladesh came to be questioned in the mid-seventies.

The death in 1975 of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the man behind the secular thrust in Bengali politics, brought to the fore new rulers strug-

gling to forge new ideologies in the hope of creating new loyalties and identities. The sacrifice of the secular ideal, one of the four fundamental

principles of state, was an essential aspect of the new ‘ruling ideas’

which opened up once again the delicate but controversial questions

of Bengali Muslim language, identity and culture.

Notes

1. For the non-communal stance of the Yuba League, see ‘Purba pakistan yuba league-dacca jela sakhar abedan’ in Badruddin Umar (ed.), Bhasa andolan prasanga : katipay dalil, vol. 1 (Dacca, 1984, hereafter cited as Umar Dalil), p. 168; Anisuzzaman identified the Yuba League as the first non-communal organization. See Anisuzzaman, ‘Bangla-bhasa 0 bangladesh’ in Ekuser prabandha — 1985 (Dacca, 1985), p. 12. 2. A. Ghazi reflects this attitude in looking for possibilities for the political unification of the two Bengals, although he concedes that there was no emotional upsurge for such a union. But he points out that Tagore’s “Sonar bangla’, an anti-partition song, became the national anthem of Bangladesh. ‘Muslim Bengal : A Crisis of Identity’, West Bengal and Bangladesh Perspectives from 1972, Barbara Thomas and Spencer Levan, eds., Occasional Paper no. 21, Michigan State University (Michigan, 1972), pp. 147-48. 3, Abul Mansur Ahmad, ‘Cultural Identity of East Pakistan’, Concept of Pakistan, vol. IV, Aug. 1967, p. 11. Abul Mansur Ahmad believed that

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

321

cultural expressions of East Bengal were distinct from those of West Bengal. East Bengal had a rich heritage of punthi literature and music. ‘Among the musicians were Nazrul Islam, Alauddin, Abbasuddin and Khusro. Its folk heritage included bhatiali and murshidi songs. The musical heritage of Pak-Bharat is an integral aspect of Muslim civilization and the heritage of Arab-Persian and Turkish traditions. East Bengal shares this heritage. Abul Mansur Ahmad did not see Tagore as a representative of this tradition. See Abul Mansur Ahmad, Bangladeser kalchar (Culture of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 3rd edition, 1985), pp. 37-48. “Statement of the East Bengal Communist Party’, Feb. 1952, Umar Dalil, pp. 322-23; (‘Secret Circular to members of the Communist Party on the administration of the language movement’) ‘Bhasa andolaner paryalochana — jatiya samgram’, Umar Dalil, p. 349. Jyoti Sen Gupta gives detailed accounts of reprisals in areas of peasant disturbances where Hindus were particularly singled out for punishment, History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh, 1943-1973 — ‘Some Involvement (Calcutta, 1974), pp. 26-36; for a discussion of the role of communists, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh (Dacca, reprint 1975), p. 6; on Hindu grievances, see Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates (hereafter, CA.P. Debates) 6 March, 1949; 26 March, 1952. A. G. Stock, Memoirs of Dacca University, 1947-1951 (Dacca, 1973), pp. 82-83. See speech of Suhrawardy in the Constituent Assembly, C.A.P. Debates, 6 March 1948, for his view on minority rights. Note that it was previously stated that one dimension of the relgious-secular dichotomy was & communal versus non-communal perception of socio-political and cultural phenomena. Al-Islam, 15 Dec., 1961. Curiously such attitudes reflect ignorance of the fact that Islam as it spread east incorporated many local traditions and practices including legal codes. Local customs and traditions have also persisted in North-West Indian Islam. This had not been acknowledged by the political elite. Bangla Nur, \st yt., 3rd no., Magh 1326 Bs. (1920). The Report of the East Bengal Language Committee, 1949-50 (Govemment of Bast Pakistan, Dacca, 1958), pp. 6-11, 15, 22, 26; speech of Muhammad Habibullah Bahar at the Constituent Assembly, C.A.P. Debates, 27 March 1951, pp. 471-72; Constitution of Pakistan — Basic Principles as adopted in the Grand National Convention, Dacca, 21 Jan., 1953, Umar Dalil, p. 139. Pakistan Student Rally—Aims, Objects and Programme : Draft Consti-

322

12, 13, 14, 15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

25. 26.

The Sacred and The Secular

tution, Umar Dalil, p. 66; S. Murshid, ‘Editorial’, New Values, vol. 1 no. 1, Sep. 1949; ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Pakistan Observer (hereafter Pak. Obs.), 1 March, 1951. A.G. Stock records the literary and intellectual stirrings in East Pakistan which found focus in New Values; see her Memoirs of Dacca University, p. 52. Al-Islam, 1 June, 1963. Al-Islam, 15 Oct., 1961; 1 Oct., 1961; 1 Jan., 1962. Marium Jameelah, ‘Should Muslims Change as Conditions Change’, AlIslam, 15 Oct., 1961; 15 Dec., 1961. Orthodox Islam, like orthodox Christianity was wary of any new innovations or interpretations which might threaten the supremacy of the orthodoxy and resultin the formation of new sects and denominations. ‘Thus the Ahmadiyas and Muhammadis have been persecuted in Pakistan. Al-Islam, 1 Oct., 1961. Maududi, “The Sunnah and Ijtihad : Some Doubts Clarified’, Al-Islam, 15 Oct, 1961. Maududi even contradicts himself by suggesting that deviations from the injunctions of the Koran and sunnah through the use of ijtihad may be allowed under special circumstances to suit the exigencies of time; ibid., 1 Oct., 1961; 15 Oct., 1961. Speech by Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, at the first session of the Pakistan Muslim League Council held on 20 Feb. 1949 in Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi, Govt. of Pakistan Publication (English translation of Urdu speech). S. Murshid, ‘Editorial’, New Values, vol. 2, no. 1 (1950), p. 50. In the years immediately after partition, East Bengal was witnessing cultural and literary stirrings which at once attempted to define the identity of the people and give them direction. New Values focussed much of these concems; New Values, vol. 1, no. 1 (Sept. 1949), pp. 88-89. Ibid., p. 89; see also A. G. Stock, Memoirs of Dacca University, 19471951 for her assessment of developments in the university in general and the contribution of New Values in particular, p. 52. Humayun Kabir, ‘Islam and Science’, New Values, vol. I, no. 1 (Sept. 1949), p. 19. For the views of Syed Ahmed Khan, see A. H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India (Lahore, 1950), pp. 36-60; A Aziz, Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, p. 4. Kazi Abdul Wadud, ‘The Foundations of State in Islam’, New Values vol. I, no. 1 (Sept. 1949), pp. 1-6. For a discussion of this issue, see Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (New York, 1969), p. 24.

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

323

27. Interview with Mushfique Ahmed, a member of the movement and a

teacher at Rajshahi University (Dacca, March 1985).

29.

K. A. Wadud, “The Foundation of State in Islam’, p. 6.

M. N. Roy, ‘Economic Determinism and Freedom’, New Values vol. 1, nos. 3-4 (Nov.-Dec. 1949), pp. 13-14,

This could well have been a response to an indictment in a local daily

that ‘the progress of our literary activities has not kept pace with the spectacular development of political consciousness of the people of East Bengal’. See ‘Editorial : Bangla Academy’, Pakistan Observer, 5 Dec. 5, 1955. For a history of the Sahitya Patrika, see Muhammad Muniruz-

31. 32.

zaman, ‘Sahitya patrika panchis bachhar’, Sahitya Patrika, Panchis bachhar purti-samkhya, 25th yt., no. 2, Barsha 1389 Bs. (1982), pp. 173-208.

Muhammad Muniruzzaman, Dacca biswabidyalayer bangla bibhager iti-

has, 1921-81 (Dacca, 1982), p. 112. ‘The group around Kamal Hossain, an adviser to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

who later became foreign minister of Bangladesh, has been a major forum of such views. The group included Rehman Sobhan (economist), Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury (political scientist), and Anisur Rahman (economist), among others — all teachers at Dacca University. Their

mouthpiece, founded in 1969, was called Forum. The more militant sec-

tion was a faction of the Student League led by Abdur Rab, who, even before the military operation in March 1971, burnt the Pakistani flag and

hoisted that of independent Bangladesh. Hasanuzzaman, Antarjatakik prekshapate bangladesher chhatra andolan (Dacca, 1984), p. 26. 33. In the fifties, a group of women, mainly members of the All Pakistan

‘Women’s Association, pressurized the government to improve women’s

rights. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was thus passed; see chapter 7. In the eighties, Bichitra and the programme called ‘Ain o adalaut’, on Bangladesh Television, have given some coverage to the social oppression of women with an eye to improving their position. Similarly, the journal Ekal, later known as Edesh ekal has explored the condition of women; see issues of 1986-91.

‘Syed Sajjad Hussain, ‘Contemporary Non-Fictional Prose Writing in East 35. 36. 37.

Bengal’, New Values vol. 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1955), p. 22.

R. Symonds, Making of Pakistan (London, 1966), pp. 42-43.

For an analysis of the consequent culture conflict, see B. Umar, Sanskritir sankat (Dacca, 1967), pp. 2-3. ‘Comment by Professor Zillur Raham, see Ali Anwar (ed.), Dharmanirapekshata (Dacca, 1973). Even in the eighties comments such as ‘Oh,

you are a Muslim, I thought you were a Bengali’ could be heard in West Bengal.

324 38.

39.

The Sacred and The Secular British officials generally had Hindus in mind when they referred to Bengalis, and Muslims were called ‘Mahommedans’; see Shan Documents, vol. I, pp. 81, 114. Howard, Schuman, ‘A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Na-

tionalism’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78, no. 2 (Sep. 1972). Abul Mansur Ahmad, End of a Betrayal and Restoration of Lahore Resolution (Dacca,

1978); Bangladesher Kalchar (Dacca,

1985). His Pak-

Bangla incorporated the diction and vocabulary of punthi literature, the language used by common people in rural Bast Bengal as well as PersoArabic words which had entered the language spoken by them, but had been weeded out of Bengali in West Bengal. For some, Pak-Bangla meant Bengali in Arabic script, or replete with Perso-Arabic words; to others,

41.

it incorporated the dialects and vocabulary of East Bengalis which were different from those of West Bengal.

Zia’s speech in 1978, cited by Abul Fazl Huq, “The Problem of National

Identity in Bangladesh’, The Journal of Social Studies, no. 24, April 1984, p. 58.

42.

On Zia’s party manifesto , see ibid., p. 60; G. Hossain, General Ziaur

43,

For example, Nurul Amin, Khwaja

Rahman and the BNP : Political Transformation of a Military Regime (Dacca : UPL, 1988), Appendix IV p. 119. Mohammad Ali of Bogra.

Nazimuddin, Maulana Akram Khan,

Liaquat Ali Khan, for example, adamantly asserted that his primary loyalty was with the Muslim League and not the Constituent Assembly. See K. Callard, Pakistan — A Political Study (London, 1957), pp. 38-39; K.

Ahmed, A Socio-Political History of Bengal and Birth of Bangladesh,

45,

4th ed. (Dacca, 1975), p. 97. R. Jahan, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (Dacca, 1973), p. 25.

In 1946, while secretary to the Bengal Provincial Muslim League, he had already submitted a manifesto to the Provincial Council asserting that Bengali was ‘our mother tongue’ and that this should be the medium

of instruction in East Bengal after partition. See B. Umar, Purba banglar bhasa

47.

49.

andolan

o

tatkalin rajniti

(Language

Movement

and Con-

temporary Politics in East Bengal), vol. I, revised ed. (Dacca, 1979), pp. 18-19. RCM.Ed., 1914, pp. Abul Mansur Ahmad, Amar dekha, p. 250. Ahmed Rafiq, ‘Bhasa andolan o jatiyatar jatrapath’, Samakal, 1st no. 1384 Bs. (1977).

Muslim League resolution of 1910. See Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The

Emergence of Pakistan (New York, 1967), p. 365-66; R. Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906, pp. 130-31.

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

50.

SL. 52. 53.

55. 56.

58. 59. 61.

62.

325

In 1961, 98 per cent of the population of East Pakistan spoke Bengali; 18 per cent was literate in Bengali, 4 per cent in English and only 1 per cent in Urdu; see R. D. Campbell, Pakistan : An Emerging Den:>cracy (London, 1963), p. 226. Statement of Khwaja Shahabuddin, C.A.P. Debates, 5 April 1951. ‘Memoir of Abul Kasem’, Ekuser sankalan, 1980 — Smriticharan (A collection of memoirs), (Dacca, 1980), p. 2. (hereafter Smriticharan). Considerable work has been done on the language movement and the social, political and economic contexts in which it emerged. Of particular note are the collections published annually by the Bangla Academy. See the annual volumes of Ekusher prabandha,, 1986-1994 (Dhaka : Bangla Academy, 1986-1994); Ekusher sharakgrantha, 1987-1994 (Dhaka : Bangla Academy, 1987-1994), Also see Bashir al-Hilal, Bhassha andolaner itihas (Dhaka : Bangla Academy, 1985; MM. Akash, ‘Bhasha andolan : tadanin tan sanmaj of rajniti’ Edesh ekal vol Il, no. 8, 1988, pp. 51-56 and vol. III no. 1, 1989, pp. 51-56. The Tamaddun Majlis was founded by Professor Abul Kasem, Syed Nazrul Islam (a student of Salimullah Muslim Hall, who later became a politician and member of the Awami League Cabinet in the early 1970s), and Shamsul Alam (a government official) on 1 Sep., 1947. ‘Memoirs of A. Kasem’, Smriticharan, pp. 1-2. The book was written by Quazi Mutaher Hussain and Abul Mansur Ahmad. See ‘Memoirs of Gaziul Hug’, Smriticharan, p. 99. “Memoirs of Abul Kasem’, op. cit., pp. 2-3, 6-7, 10. CA.P. Debates, 27 March 1951; 12 April 1951. Pak Obs., 1, 8 March 1951. “Memoirs of Abul Kasem’, op. cit., p. 10. Pak. Obs., 6 April, 1951. “Memoirs of Hassan Hafizur Rahman’, Smriticharan, p. 48. “Memoirs of A. S. M. Nurul Hug Bhuiya’, Smriticharan, p. 44. In a statement on 24 Feb. 1952, the Pakistan Communist Party announced : ‘Those giving leadership to the movement today, represent different groups and opinions. The workers of the Communist Party have also joined this historical movement like many others.’ See Umar Dalil, pp. 322-33, 341-49. K. G. Mustafa, ‘Awami League Manifesto : Hopes and Realities’, Holiday (Dacca Weekly), 14 June, 1970. Marcus F. Franda, ‘Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan’, Asian Survey 10, no. 8 (Aug. 1970), pp. 588-606. Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh (Dacca, 1975, reprint), p. 6.

BSBIRS

326

71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

RRESSSSIRA

6.

87. 88. 89. ol. 92. 93.

The Sacred and The Secular

Ibid., p. 3. Pak. Obs., 17 April and 7 May, 1951. “Memoirs of Gaziul Huq’, Smriticharan, pp. 98-100. ‘Memoirs of Muhammad Sultan’, Smriticharan, p. 76. Pakistan Students Rally, Draft Constitution, Umar Dalil, p. 67 Tbid., pp. 69-70. Ibid., pp. 72-74. Pak, Obs., April 5, 1951. Ibid

Pak. Obs., 24 Feb., 1951. Letter to the editor jointly signed by four teachers of Dacca University — Abdur Razzaq and Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury, both lecturers in political science, Enayat Karim, lecturer in economics, and Sarwar Murshid, lecturer in English; Pak. Obs., 1 March, 1951. 21 Feb. 1952, was the fateful day when students laid down their lives for their mother tongue. The Morning News reported that only Hindus closed down their shops to observe the strike that day; Umar Dalil, pp. 322-23. Among the active students were Munier Choudhury, who later became a writer and university teacher; Abdur Rahman, who became a Supreme Court judge, etc. ‘Memoirs of Gaziul Huq’, Smriticharan, pp. 100-101, 103. Tbid., pp. 101-03. “Memoirs of Abul Kasem’, Smriticharan, p. 11. Ibid, pp. 11-12. Ibid., pp. 13-14, K. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 101.

Ibid. Pak. Obs., 17 April, Editorials, Pak. Obs., S. Ikramullah, From 17 April, 1951. Pak. Obs., 28 April,

L 1951. 17 April, 7 May, 1951. Purdah to Parliament (London, 1963); Pak. Obs., 1950.

‘Letters to the Editor’, ibid., 3 June, 1950.

B. Umar, Samskritir samkat (Dacca, 1967), p. 82. See C.A.P. Debates, 26 March, 1952, p. 484. CA.P. Debates, 6 March, 1949, pp. 270-71. See ‘Memoirs of Gaziul Huq’, Smriticharan, pp. 128-30, for this and other such events. Pak. Obs., 14 Sept. 1950. On the formation of the Awami Muslim League see issue of 31 Aug., 1950.

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

327

Majid Nizami, The Press in Pakistan, Problems of Pakistan series IL (Dept. of Political Science, University of Punjab, 1958), p. 25. 95. Report of the Press Cammission, 1959 (Govt. of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1959); Twenty Years of Pakistan : 1947-67 (Govt. of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1967). See section dn the press pp. 239-51 — a passage reads: ‘there is no censorship of the press ...’. For press control, also see C. A. P, Debates, 10 March 1949, pp. 606-07. Majid Nizami, op. cit., p. 25. Tbid., p. 26. Also see ‘Memoirs of Abul Kasem’,.op. cit., pp. 13-14. As mentioned, one of the demands made by the Samgram Parishad in March 1948 was that restrictions on newspapers coming from West Bengal, like Ittehad, Amrita Bazar, Ananda Bazar, Jugantar, etc., be withdrawn. New York Times Index, 1954, p. 815. K. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 110. 100. Pak. Obs., Oct-Nov., 1950. 101. Section 144 prohibits the gathering of more than three people in one group in public places. See ‘Memoirs of Gaziul Haq’, op. cit., pp. 135, 137. of about 11 students came to this decision on the night of 20 102. A group Feb. See ‘Memoirs’ of Habibur Rahman and Muhammad Sultan in Smriticharan, pp. 57, 79. For the views of the Islamic Brotherhood see their Bulletin no. 1, ‘Islam bhasa samasya o amra’ (Islam, the Problem of Language and Us), 16 April, 1952, Umar Dalil, pp. 292-99. 103. “Memoirs of Muhammad Sultan’, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 104. “Memoirs of Gaziul Huq’, op. cit., pp. 149-52. 105. See One Year of Popular Government in East Pakistan (Govt. of East Pakistan Publications, Dacca, 6 Sept. 1957), p. 15. 106. CAP Debates, 6 March, 1948, p. 262; see B. Umar, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Dacca, 1974), p. 119, for a discussion of the term religious communalism. 107. Some of the members were Abdul Gaffar Chowdhury, Abu Zafar Obsidullah, Abid Hussain, Amir Ali, Sakhawat Hussain and Obaidul Hug Sarkar. Hassan Hafizur Rahman, the president of the Samsad, had contacts with Pragati Lekhak Sangh (Progressive Writers’ Guild), the cultural front of the Communist Party, some of whose members were Munier Chowdhury, Mustafa Nurul Islam, Alauddin-al-Azad, Al-Mufti Sharfuddin and Borhanuddin Khan Jahangir. ‘Memoirs of Hassan Hafizur Rahman’, Smriticharan, op cit., p. 51. 108. Pak Obs., 21 Feb. 1955. ‘Shaheed Day Today’. 109. Pak. Obs., 28 April 1950; 24 Jan. 1950. 110. Pak. Obs., 8 May 1951.

88

94,

328

The Sacred and The Secular

il, Pak. Obs., 23 Aug. 1951. 112. Pak. Obs., 23 Aug. 1951. 113. C.A.P. Debates, 27 March 1951, pp. 471-72. Pak. Obs., 16 Jan., 1951.

‘The Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam referred to Bengali in Arabic script as ‘Pak-

114.

115.

Bangla’.

See Francis Robinson's study of nineteenth century UP; Separatism

Among Indian Muslims — The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims

(1860-1923) (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 70-77. Paul R. Brass, Language,

p. 28.

Religion and Politics (London,

1974),

116. Raunaq Jahan has used the term to refer to those in the government and those who had influence on it, viz. the civil-military-bureaucracy. By the ‘old national elite’ she means the old guard Muslim League and landlord interests. See Pakistan : Failure in National Integration, Pp. 6, 24-28. I have used the term to refer to her ‘old national elite’

and the Urdu-speaking, i.e. the non-vernacular intelligentsia as well as

the Bengal Muslim ashraf or what was left of it. The tendency of this group was to perpetuate the imbalance in Bengali representation in117.

herited at the time of independence.

By the mid-twentieth century, those Bengal Muslims rising into prominence were generally from a rural background. Bengal Muslim members

from villages and small towns constituted 62.5 per cent of the second Constituent Assembly. Muhammad Nuruzzaman gives short biographical

sketches of 16 such members who framed the 1956 Constitution. Of

these, 10 were given as born in villages and small towns; see Muhammad

Nuruzzaman, Who's Who (Dacca, 1968), pp. 136-54. Smriticharan also

gives biographical information on six activists prominent in the language

movement, four of whom were born in villages; op. cit., pp. 173-78. A sample survey conducted in 1957, showed 76.5 per cent of students of

the university and colleges of Dacca as bor in villages; see AN. Maniruzzaman, The Living and Working Conditions of Students,

1957 (Dacca, 1961), pp. 4-5. For local influences on some sections of low-class Muslims of Bengal, see the 1931 Census of India, vol. V, pt. I,

p. 382; D. G. Rajshahi, (1976), pp. 56-57. Syncretic cultural patterns

existed in Bengali Muslim literature and social behaviour till the midnineteenth century. It was after the Wahabi and Faraizi movements began that this tendency gave way to literary activities which could be called Islamic. See A. R. Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal, 1957-1856 (Dacca, 1961), pp. 3-25. But in the twenties Bengal Muslims

were asserting their dual identities, both culturally and politically, in language and literature; see L. Gordon, ‘Divided Bengal: Problems of

Culture and Language : the Problem of Identity

329

Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition’, The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. XVI, no. 2 (July 1978), p. 141. 118. S. I. Chowdhury, Introducing Nazrul Islam (Dacca, 1974), p. 41. See N. Islam’s poems such as “The Rebel’ or ‘Of Equality and that Happy Land’ in Kabir Chowdhury (ed.), Selected Poems of Nazrul (Dacca, 2nd ed., 1973), pp. 1-6, 33-34. : 119, Catherine Houghton, ‘East Bengali Language and Political Development in Socio-Linguistic Perspective’, Bengal in the 19th and 20th Centuries, J. R. McLane ed. (East Lansing, Michigan, 1975), p. 129. 120. ‘Statement by Maulana Akram Khan, Pak Obs., 17 April 1951. Also see the editorials of 17 April and 7 May 1951 for Bengali Muslim reaction to this. Note that the paper was founded by Hamidul Huq Chowdhury and generally was sympathetic to the language issue. 121. CA.P. Debates, 12 April 1951, p. 1150. 122. Pak. Obs. 20 Sept. 1950. 123, Ibid, 16 Jan. 1951. 124. Abdus Salam, ‘The Future of Bengali’, ibid., 10 Sept, 1951. 125. Speech by Muhammad Habibullah Bahar, CAP Debates, 27 March, 1951, p. 471. 126. The Report of the East Bengal Language Committee 1949-1950 (Government of East Pakistan, Dacca, 1958), p. 2. (hereafter Language Committee). 127. Ibid,, pp. 16, 20. 128. Tbid., pp. 22-24. 129. Ibid,, p. 23 130. Ibid,, p. 24 131. Ibid,, p. 26 132. Ibid, p. 24 133. Ibid,, p. 25 134, Raunag Jahan, Pakistan, p. 25 135, ‘They believed that the cultural conquest of East Bengal was achieved through the medium of Bengali by the enemies of Pakistan, i.e. by Hindus and Indians; see Pak Obs., 23 Aug. 1951. Language Committee, pp. 6-14 136. 137. Ibid, p. 15 138. One of the members of the committee, Muhammad Habibullah Bahar, also a member of the Constituent Assembly, said that without reform, Bengali in the existing form was too complicated to be introduced effir ciently in schools and offices; CAP Debates, 27 March 1951, p. 471. 139, Language Committee, p. 7 140. Ibid,, p. 30

330 141. 142. 143, 144. 145. 146. 147.

The Sacred and The Secular

See Pak. Obs., 20 Sept. 1950; 16 Jan. 1 March 1951; CAP Debates, 27 March 1951, p. 471. Language Committee, p. 7. “Memoirs of Abul Kasem’, op. cit., p. 18 CAP Debates, 27 March 1951 p. 471. Ibid. Pak Obs., 20 Sept, 1950 and 16 Jan., 1951. He said, ‘At present the Jamiyat is not prepared to express any opinion on the subject’; ibid, 20 Sépt. 1950.

CHAPTER

6

FAITH, AUTHORITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF SECULARISM

Introduction This chapter explores the tension between religious and secular approaches to politics. It spans developments in post-partition Pakistan

and in Bangladesh after liberation. Specifically, it examines the ideological bases of Pakistan and Bangladesh in terms of this tension and locates these in assumptions about the people’s political identity. A

number of specific instances when religion entered politics are ex-

plored. They explain how and why religion was politicized in Pakistan

and later in Bangladesh. Some of the cases presented include discus-

sions about the status of minorities in the new state of Pakistan, the relationship between the government and the opposition, the contro-

versy over whether a woman could be head of an Islamic state, and the debate about what constitutes a secular state. The reasons why Mujib’s secular experiment failed, paving the way once again for the interplay of religion and politics in the region, are analysed. Inevitably,

the chapter begins with an explanation of why genocide occurred in 1971 and Bangladesh emerged as an independent sovereign state carved out of Pakistan, and ends with the threat to the secular vision of the founder of the new state.

6.1 The Religious-Secular Tension in Politics: Background and Trends

‘The emergence of Pakistan in 1947 and of Bangladesh in 1971 were

332

The Sacred and The Secular

both the result of processes for which primary responsibility lay with

the largely non-vernacular upper ashraf intelligentsia which dominated

the region’s politics. While partition in 1947 was the result of years of political manoeuvering, independence in 1971 came suddenly. It was not pre-planned but the holocaust perpetrated by the West Pakistani

dominated mainly Punjabi-junta in defence of its decision not to share

power or resources with East Pakistan inevitably led to the formation

of a new state."

A clear explanation of why the genocide occurred is difficult. West

Pakistan has found it hard to accept responsibility and has- projected

the view that it was attempting to save Pakistan and Islam from Indian aggression. In much of Pakistan’s state-sponsored literature, the horror is either denied or explained as defensive retaliation for the ‘massacre

of Biharis’ by Bengalis. The Awami League is accused of treachery

and of leading people astray. So-called ex-freedom fighters have anony-

mously written propagandist literature to such effect. Some of these books were published from London and edited by one Matiur Rahman.”

An inquiry committee set up immediately after liberation to look into

war crimes found that a fanatical member of the Jama’at-i-Islami of the same name, was responsible for drawing up hit-lists of progressive intellectuals who were to be eliminated in order to create a

purer Islamic atmosphere. General Rao Farman Ali, who was also responsible for drawing up a scheme for the annihilation of intellectuals,

tried to clear himself and the army by placing the responsibility for

the entire tragedy squarely on Bhutto and Yahya Khan; other Pakistani generals share his views.” Both he and Mahmud Ali, a one-time Bengali nationalist who had fought the 1970 elections on a Pakistan Democratic Party ticket as an Islamic nationalist, exonerated Mujib and the Awami

League of charges of secessionist intentions.’

A genocide like the one in East Pakistan is hardly possible without

a background of fascistic mentality, and more specifically a sense of

ethnic superiority, which the Pakistani rulers dubiously claiming purer Islamic roots possessed. As discussed in Chapter 1, urban Indian

Muslims of foreign origin with a claim to ashraf status tended to look

down upon common people, the non-ashraf and lesser ashraf. In their

perception of status and social hierarchy, the non-vernacular ashraf

intelligentsia certainly adhered to the historical prejudices against Bengali Islam, language and culture as contaminated and incurably

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

333

inferior. The average West Pakistani considered the East Pakistani to

be ‘hungry, naked and uncultured’. He saw Islam as the only bond

between the Muslims of the two wings. In such a context, perception

of a threat to that solitary bond aroused fears of national disintegration

and, at a less idealistic level, of the loss of political control enjoyed

by the West Pakistani elite in both wings of the country. As the relationship between the two wings was economically and

politically unequal, the West Pakistani power elite insisted upon underplaying economic issues and addressed itself to religious and cultural

concerns. This obviously, was not very satisfactory from the point of

view of the politicized East Pakistanis. In the controversy over the

character of the state in 1956, some East Bengal Muslims demanded in the Assembly that the economic basis of the state should be clarified.

Ataur Rahman Khan of the Awami League commented that during the

struggle for Pakistan, neither he nor the local organization had ever

heard that the future Muslim homeland would be an Islamic state; the

highest goal of a state, he felt, was ‘the improvement of the lot of the common people’. Abul Mansur Ahmed, in contrast, projected a vision of the state that had a religious as well as a secular dimension. Pakistan was to be an Islamic Socialist Federal Republic where the economy

would be based on Islamic socialism; it would be an exploitation-free,

non-capitalistic and democratic state. However, in the constitution of 1956, Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic with 47 voting for

the motion and 22 against. Markedly, those voting against were miNorities and some members of the Awami League and the Pakistan

Democratic Party, including Mahmud Ali.

West Pakistan had acknowledged that the East Pakistan intelligent-

sia was more secular in outlook than its western counterpart.” In his

assessment. of the 1971 crisis, however, Farman Ali did not consider this as a factor behind the army action. The Memoirs of the Lt. Gen.

Gul Hassan Khan clearly suggest that the army considered its primary

duty was to maintain national unity, by coercion, if necessary.’ The

Bengali struggle however, was for sheer survival rather than an attempt

to build a secular polity, even though inspiration was sought in slogans like ‘Jai Bangla’, which had no religious connotations whatsoever.

Yet, Bangladesh came to be associated with secular symbols and

ideologies, until the state controlled reversals in the post-Mujib period,

whereas Pakistan was often equated with Islam and Islamic ideology.

334

The Sacred and The Secular

The explanation probably lies in the nature of the struggle which the

vernacular intelligentsia engaged in to exact their rights. The autonomy

movement of the sixties, which was a sequel to the language movement

of the fifties, addressed itself mainly to economic and political issues.

The language movement had created a cult that carried the message

that culture be allotted a neutral zone. The vernacular intelligentsia had

adopted the religious argument only to the extent of pointing out that it was not receiving Islamic justice.” But they refused to adopt Islamic

ideology in public life and in matters of state largely out of a concern for the minorities who would then be left out of the national mainstream. However, they never overlooked the religious factor : the manifestos of every political party reiterated that no law repugnant to the

Koran and sunnah would be enacted or entertained."°

In the meantime, the upper ashraf intelligentsia, which came to include the politically-dominant Punjabis after partition, was constantly invoking Islam to keep the vernacular intelligentsia from voicing

their economic and political grievances. These were equated with ‘the

curse of provincialism’.

Jinnah, in 1948, clearly stated that unity be-

tween the wings was possible because of ‘Faith in Almighty God’, but that this unity was threatened by ‘fifth-columnists ... who are financed by outsiders’.'' He set the tone of the political vocabulary adopted by

the non-vernacular ashraf intelligentsia. In his address to the youth of East Bengal, he said :

+» Of late the attack on your Province, particularly, has taken

a subtler form. Our enemies, among whom I regret to say, there

are still some Muslims, have set about actively encouraging provincialism in the hope of weakening Pakistan and thereby

facilitating the re-absorption of this Province into the Indian Dominion. ... Our duty to the state comes first; our duty to

‘our province, to our district ... and ourselves, comes next.’

The speech reveals how ideology was constructed at the state level.

Jinnah associated the voicing of regional economic grievances with

provincialism. Such provincialists were considered guilty of collaboration with a foreign

financed

plot

to reunite the two Bengals.

Such

arguments put the politically conscious Bengali into a tight comer : he

could not speak for an equitable share of resources without becoming

apologetic or defensive. The onus was on him to prove that he was

not an Indian agent, and that he was not against Islam or Pakistan.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism In the post-partition period, provincialism

was

335

treated as an

un-Islamic act and Pakistan, as already noted, was equated with Islam. The

regional

publicity

office of the Government

of Pakistan

in

Dacca brought out a publication, entitled Provincialism is un-Islamic."

Liaquat Ali Khan, in a speech in February 1949, clearly established a

link between Islam, Pakistan and the Muslim League, as if these were conterminous. He sought legitimization for Muslim League political dominance not only in Islam but also in its past contribution towards

the founding of Pakistan. He claimed that the Muslim League had the

sole right to interpret ‘what Islam is and what those principles are

which should determine and control the conduct of this state’.'* Such

claims found justification in certain upper ashraf prejudices against Bengali Islam as inferior. It was held that the struggle for Pakistan was

also a struggle for Islam in so far as the Muslim League wanted a Place where the Muslims could live according to their religious laws

and principles. To quote Liaquat Ali, ‘We wished Pakistan to be a laboratory where we could practice the Islamic principles’. He asserted

that ‘a strong Muslim

League means

a strong

Pakistan’.'* By

thus equating the Muslim League, Islam and Pakistan, the ruling group

could construe opposition to any one of these as opposition to the other

two. The founding fathers of Pakistan continued to bring religion into

politics because they were reluctant to let the country out of

their control.

The introduction of religion into politics, which enabled Muslims

of pre-partition India to assert themselves politically and economically

continued afterwards as well. The object of the exercise was now different. Religion was invoked so that the Muslim League could neutralize all opposition in general, and Bengali Muslim aspirations in

particular, and maintain itself in power. In the struggle for Pakistan,

religion had become a political rather than a personal issue, particularly

because religion determined nationhood. At the same time, the fact that

Islam does not distinguish between the spheres of religion and politics,

meant that religion could acquire a greater political significance. In the

context of Pakistan, politics became religion-centred in a superficial sense although Islam was inevitably declared the state ideology.

Legitimacy, in terms of religious sanction, was sought in this manner

by the ruling Muslim League. The party did not hesitate to sacrifice democratic principles in order to remain in control of the state.

336

The Sacred and The Secular

The vernacular intelligentsia represented a secular challenge to

such politicization of religion in terms of the symbols, ideologies

and political idioms they adopted. They emphasized economic griev-

ances and drew attention to their position of relative deprivation in terms of their ethnic identity. Such forms of opposition to the poli-

ticization of religion were not meant to contradict the earlier demand

for a separate homeland for Muslims. It did not, as some suggested,

prove that the vernacular intelligentsia had become less religious. A 1963-64 study revealed that to the East Pakistani Muslim there was no acute sense of conflict between his identity as a Bengali, a

Muslim and a Pakistani. A 1966 study of university students on

the other hand, showed that while 80.8 per cent of West Pakistani students believed Islam to be an effective bond of unity between the two wings only 46.6 per cent of East Pakistanis felt the same

way." The secular opposition was neutral in relation to the personal

religiosity of the vernacular intelligentsia. However, it did indicate their disillusionment with successive non-Bengali dominated central governments which constantly invoked Islam to keep them from voicing their legitimate grievances.

Their

leadership

expressed

this

disillusionment

pointedly.

Suhrawardy accused Liaquat Ali of continuing to appeal to religious sentiments without justification and of trying to establish a ‘Corpora-

tion’ —

You are establishing a Corporation; you are appealing to relig-

ious sentiments; you are raising the cry which was raised at

the time [of the struggle for Pakistan] ... that the rights of Muslims were in danger ... Now you are raising the cry of

Pakistan in danger for the purpose of arousing Muslim senti-

ments and building them together in order to maintain you in

power."

He warned that such a

state ‘got together by raising the bogey of at-

tacks’ and kept together by keeping up a ‘constant friction’ with the sister Dominion, India, would be ‘full of alarms and excursions’. There would be ‘lawlessness’, which, though against non-Muslims

now,

would later turn ‘against the Muslim gentry itself” once ‘fratricidal tendencies have been aroused’.” In retrospect, this premonition of Suhrawardy appears danger-

ously accurate. The slogan, ‘Islam in danger’, was used against the

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

337

minority Islamic sect, the Ahmadiyas in the Punjab in 1953; it was used to enforce the migration of minorities aided by hired hooligans

as in the riots of 1950 in East Bengal; and finally it was used to

subdue a nationality through genocide in East Pakistan in 1971.”

In the years after partition, a gradual shift occurred in the central

concerns of politics from a religious to a secular perspective. The first nine years witnessed much debate and discussion on the nature

and role of an Islamic state. Between 1958 and 1962, by contrast, Ayub

Khan

was preoccupied

tions, although

primarily

after his formal

with socio-economic ques-

decision

to ‘enter politics’

he too,

quite suddenly, began to evoke Islamic ideology. The concerns of the intelligentsia since independence had more to do with their so-

cio-economic situation than with their religious identity. Mild com-

plaints of neglect in 1948-49 turned to allegations of exploitation in

1955. By 1963, a bitter East-West controversy had emerged. The’

separation of the two wings in 1971

this conflict.

was the ultimate resolution to

‘The immediate areligious concerns after partition, revolved around

the task of nation-building and economic recovery from the ravages of

war and riots. Further impetus to a secular outlook was provided by

the mass exodus of Hindus, which virtually eliminated competition. It

was now irrelevant to emphasize the communal identity of Muslims,

whereas before 1947, this along with a stress on the relative deprivation

of Bengal Muslims compared to Hindus, was essential in any campaign to redress their grievances.

While the absence of the Hindu threat facilitated the adoption of

non-communal symbols and ideologies among the vernacular intelligentsia, a different conflict emerged because there was also a new

interest in politics on the part of ostensibly religious bodies. Aspiring orthodox groups such as the Jama’at-i-Islami, hoped to seize

power because they considered themselves best suited to rule an Islamic state. The

government

was caught

in its own

rhetoric and

had to set up some of the outward paraphernalia of an Islamic state.

In 1948, a board of Islamic affairs, the Talimat-i-Islamiya was es-

tablished to advise the government on religious matters.”' In April

1952, a resolution was passed by the Constituent Assembly to set

up

an

Islamic

Research

Institute

‘for the correct presentation

dissemination of Islamic thought’.”

and

338

‘The Sacred and The Secular

The political issues in the immediate post-partition period were

such that the main thrust was towards a degree of secularization,

although there was a continuous religious presence. As these secular

trends emerged in politics, the vernacular intelligentsia faced several problems such as the fear of being branded as faithless or kafir by

mullahs : they had to stand against the religious propaganda of the

non-vernacular ashraf intelligentsia who dominated the political elite; they had to compete with the non-secular tendency within their ranks represented by the counter-vernacular intelligentsia” as well as con-

tend with those who

were

basically secular but used relig-

ious symbols. They also had to face the wrath of the local kuttis, the orthodox

masses

which

included

the

non-Bengali

refugees

they were themselves

forced to

from Bihar and other parts of India; and finally, they had to cope with internal contradictions when appeal to religious sentiments.

The political history of post-partition East Bengal is replete with

examples of clashes between religious and secular ideologies. Some-

times bitter controversies were witnessed over the role and nature of the Islamic state. Sometimes the region saw religion being har-

nessed for political purposes: for example, to determine whether a woman could be head of state. At times political consolidation was

sought on the basis of shared faith, as in the mobilization of religion

in the name of Pakistan. A heightened religious consciousness fed

‘on a heightened political consciousness before

1947; at the same

time political consciousness received powerful support from an enhanced awareness of religious-communal identity. Often, purely secu-

lar matters, like the decision of the Muslim League leadership not

to share power, were projected and justified in religious, not secular, terms. Among the major issues over which the religious-secular tension was projected or exploited were the debate over the position

of Bengali language and culture, the rights of minorities as reflected

in the Constituent Assembly debates, and the eastern wing’s share in the political decision-making process, particularly after the elections of 1954 and 1970. Even after the creation of the new state

of Bangladesh with an avowedly secular state ideology, these ten-

sions were not resolved—the state ideology was now challenged in

the name of religion by the religious and the not-so-religious. The

secular-minded ruling elite were at pains to prove that religion was

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

339

not being sacrificed to mundane concerns. In the post-Mujib period,

the policies aiming at Islamizing the state have faced no comparable

challenge from the secular-minded until the nineties, the vernacular intelligentsia being in disarray and the counter-vernacular intelligent-

sia at the helm of affairs. 6.2

The Period of Constitutional Governments : 1947-1958

The experience of authoritarian rule under a colonial government left Pakistan with a tendency to authoritarianism. However, the first eleven years experienced constitutional governments and experiments

with parliamentary democracy. Though short-lived, there was a kind

of democracy at work. But there were unconstitutional dismissals of East Pakistani prime ministers and the Constituent Assembly by

West Pakistani governor-generals.”* The vernacular intelligentsia displayed a democratic spirit though — a spirit which was under constant threat of extinction by the politically powerful. It was also a time when

open debate highlighting religious-secular tensions was at its height.

The position of minorities formed a major theme in this controversy. The Minority Question

The emergence of the new state put the Pakistan ideology to the test.

The pre-partition minority problem persisted — only here Hindus

formed the largest minority group accounting for 22 per cent of East

Pakistan’s population in 1951. In India too, there remained a large

Muslim minority and its position became more insecure as a consequence of the partition.

Partition had not resolved the Muslim question in India. Further-

more,

ill-treatment of Hindus

in Pakistan

only

meant

retaliations

against Muslims in India and vice versa. Under such circumstances,

there was a fear that the minority problem would only exacerbate if Islam was to be a fundamental guiding principle of the new

state. In the event, such a fear has come to pass in India, where

the rise of the Hindu fundamentalist party, the Bharatiya Janata

Party, since the eighties, has whipped up communal tension in parts

of northern

India

along

the Hindi-belt

where

it

dominated.

The ramifications of this reverberated across the borders in Pakistan

340

and

The Sacred and The Secular

Bangladesh

particularly after the destruction of the sixteenth-

century Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in December 1992.”

During 1947-56, the attempt to crystallize state ideology and formulate policies for the Constitution unveiled several problematics. Chief among these was a conflict between the religious and secular

views about the basis of citizenship. Jinnah’s perception of citizenship rights was secular.* He envisaged a state where Hindus and

Muslims were equal. The Objectives Resolution, 1949, guaranteed the following fundamental rights to all communities :

++ @quality of status and of opportunity, equality before law, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, and social, economic, and political justice, subject to law and public morality.”

It also allowed minorities to profess their religions and develop their

cultures freely. The orthodox position on the other hand, sought to curtail the political rights of religious minorities.

Maulana Maududi, head of the Jama’at-i-Islami, who had a considerable following among Bengal Muslims both for his religious and

political ideas,” accepted the equality of non-Muslims with Muslims

in matters of civil and criminal law. As for marriage, divorce and in-

heritance, he had no objection to the application of personal laws.”

But he wished to deny non-Muslims the right to worship publicly in ‘Muslim’ cities, build or repair churches as are acceptable in classical

theory, or let them hold key positions in administration, the defence

services, or parliament. They could only propose codifications and amendments to their own personal laws. Otherwise, he advocated

that they should live as dhimmies

who would enjoy the protection of

life and property but hold no political power. In exchange, they should

be compelled to pay jizya, the tax payable by non-Muslims when living

in an Islamic country.” Maududi’s views provided a stark contrast to

the spirit of religious tolerance and mutual co-existence announced in the Objectives Resolution. Although his views were not popular among the founding

fathers of Pakistan, these constituted the hard core of

opinion at one end of the spectrum which continued to influence Muslim opinion and so could not be totally disregarded.

The Assembly was divided on the minority issue. Suhrawardy, a

member of the counter-non-vernacular intelligentsia, clearly wished to

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

341

see minorities integrated in the national political life. He wished to see

them assertive and strong even if they provided the only opposition in the legislature. He therefore wanted a national inter-communal party

and joint electorates for all communities.” The non-vernacular ashraf

intelligentsia who actually wielded decision-making power were sus-

picious of Hindus and wished to minimize their influence on national

politics. They argued that joint-electorates were un-Islamic. Indeed Muslim League practices before 1947 were given the weightage of religious the Muslim

sanction in everyday parlance. Therefore, whatever League stood for before partition, including separate

electorates, was treated as sacrosanct.” Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime

Minister of Pakistan, assured minorities that whatever the nature of the

future constitution of Pakistan, whether based on the shariah or not, their rights, privileges and honour would be protected; but he refused

to take up Suhrawardy’s challenge to turn the Muslim League into an inclusive inter-communal party. On the contrary, he pointed to the existence of non-communal parties like the Congress as ‘proof positive

that the Pakistan Government does not discourage anyone who wants

to form or be in an organization whose membership is open to every-

body’.** Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, a member of the counter-vernacular intelligentsia, supported the ruling group and implied unsympathetically that

those

minorities

who were leaving for India had ‘no faith in

Pakistan’ and wanted ‘Pakistan to sink’.

Partition provoked a massive Hindu exodus which continued until

the fifties. Several factors were responsible. The strongest was a sense of insecurity

that life in an Islamic

state governed

by the

shariat would be intolerable. They were already terrorized by the loss of houses which were requisitioned for official purpose. Professor Raj Kumar Chakraverty of the Congress Party noted in March

1948 that 80 per cent of the houses requisitioned in Dacca belonged to non-Muslims. They could no longer hold the annual janmashtami

procession peacefully, despite the attendance of the Prime Minister ‘on one occasion.” They feared the loss of their occupational security

through discriminatory appointments. Peter Paul Gomez, addressing

the Constituent Assembly on 21 February 1956 pointed out that the chamber of commerce had issued circulars to certain firms to em-

ploy only ‘Pakistanis’, a veiled order to recruit only Muslims.* To

make matters worse, Hindus had to constantly fight suspicions di-

342

The Sacred and The Secular

rected against them. Of greatest significance was the hint of accu-

sation that they were collaborating with the Hindu Mahasabha and

the communists for the reabsorption of Pakistan into India and the

reunification of East and West Bengal. The exodus was seen as an

invitation for Indian intervention rather than as a sign of mounting

Hindu insecurity.” Slogans of ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘United Bengal’ during

some arrests in a police operation in Narayanganj were interpreted as further proof of such motives.” The Congress position, however, was that agents provocateurs were responsible for such slogans.“ The Hinduphobia at times knew no natural bounds. The Muslim

League rout in the 1954 East Bengal provincial elections, and

the United Front victory, were attributed to help from Hindus by the

non-vernacular ashraf intelligentsia.” A Muslim Leaguer from East

Bengal heaved a sigh of relief even though he was disappointed by the

Muslim League defeat : As a result of the sweeping of the polls by the United Front, the 73 Hindu members have lost their bargaining power. Had 83 or a few more seats been captured by the United Front, the Hindus would have bargained with the National Front and actually there would have been trouble for us and our interests would have been jeopardised.”

The fear of Hindu domination which plagued Muslims in the forties

continued to influence them in the fifties for no apparent rational reason.

Suhrawardy and Joint Electorates

Suhrawardy was not troubled by such fears. He saw in joint electorates and a national inter-communal party a solution to the minority problem.

These would help integrate minorities into the larger society, give them

a better sense of participation in the administration of Pakistan and restore their confidence. He championed the minority cause because he believed that a minority could not take care of itself : its grievances were construed as divisive. This stand made him vulnerable to allegations of disloyalty to Pakistan. The fact that he held dual residence in

India and Pakistan was suddenly held against him in an attempt to

throw him out of Pakistani politics.”

Suhrawardy represented the ambivalence experienced by many

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

343

Bengal Muslims who found it hard to accept a totally communal

perception of reality. He too had fought for Pakistan in the name

of ‘Islam in danger’, thus invoking religion for a secular objective.

His later decision to work for minority welfare on the basis of a

secular socio-economic programme

was probably partly inspired by

his belief in a secular polity and partly by a desire to atone for the

sense of guilt he felt regarding the Calcutta riots in 1946 when his

ministry was in power. However, in seeking support for joint electorates, he too had to invoke

the Islamic idiom, even if only to

prove that separate electorates had nothing to do with Islam.

The electorates issue was only one of the many questions over

which political and ideological division between the two wings of

Pakistan became apparent. The issue was treated as if

it was mixed up with the doctrine of Islam; as if it was one of its basic concepts; as if Islam is differently understood in East

Pakistan from its connotation in West Pakistan.“

Although the issue of separate electorates was one of the fundamental

elements in the ideology of the partition, in the context of a united

India with its overwhelming Hindu majority it was mainly a device to enable Muslims to assert themselves and safeguard their interests. To

say that it was an injunction of Islam, as suggested by the West domi-

nated Republican Party, was, according to Suhrawardy, ‘to throw a dodge to other Muslim countrits which have no separate elec-

torates among them’.””

By largely ignoring the economic and class basis of Pakistani society and underlining only its religious and communal identities, the Muslim

League government insisted on treating the minorities

exclusively along communal

lines and thereby marginalizing them.

But the appropriation of Islam in support of such a policy was to

misrepresent it. The real objective was to curtail Bengali aspirations

and prevent a possible Hindu alliance with the Bengali Muslims in

the legislature and thus obstruct political domination by the numeri-

cally-superior eastern wing.

‘The line of alignment on the 1956 Electorate Bill — on whether

there should be a single electorate for all communities, or whether

minorities should return separate representatives in national and pro-

vincial elections — was along East-West and secular-religious lines,

344

The Sacred and The Secular

though not in a very clear-cut way. Those in favour of joint electorates were

in the majority

in the 1954

United Front coalition. It

comprised the East Pakistan Awami League and the Hindu community. Those against joint electorates were the Muslim League, the Nizam-e-Islam Party which was a constituent party of the United

Front, and the Republican Party which had formed the coalition gov-

ernment with the Awami League at the time.

It was thus quite in keeping with the East-West, Bengali-

non-Bengali and secular-religious divides that the government's Elec-

torate Bill, when introduced on 10 October 1956, provided for joint

electorates in East Bengal and separate electorates for West Pakistan.

Later, however, in March 1958, the Electorate Amendment Bill introduced the system of joint electorates in West Pakistan as well. Government and Oppositon Successive governments in Pakistan resorted to the politicization of

religious sentiment whenever sufficiently threatened by other claimants

to power. The nature of politicization, however, depended on the type of government in power, the extent of its insecurity, its sense of legiti-

macy, and the kind of opposition it faced. The politicization of religion

was usually accompanied by the construction of religion-based ideology

and identity while seeking legitimacy. During the parliamentary period, a non-Bengali dominated Muslim League controlled the decision-making apparatus. It had legitimacy to

the extent that it was popularly elected as the representative of Indian

Muslims. In Pakistan, however, this legitimacy was increasingly questioned as the Muslim League government delayed framing a constitu-

tion and setting a date for general elections. The Pubjabi-dominated

civil-military bureaucracy which exercised real power feared the possible loss of power to the more numerous East Bengalis. Only months

after the emergence of Pakistan, the legitimacy of the Muslim League government came to be challenged by forces, both from within and

outside the party. For example, Suhrawardy felt that such a communal party which refused to take non-Muslims into its fold could not best

safeguard the interests of the people.” In the public spheres already by

September 1947, a ripple of discontent was discernible among a tiny

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

345

section of the vernacular intelligentsia, which was agitating for Bengali

to be declared as one of the state languages. ‘The Jama’at-i-Islami was a serious contender for power in the new

state. Although at the time it had a small membership, particularly in East Pakistan, by 1969-70 it had the second largest following in the Eastern wing. Its leadership at that time was drawn from the lower

middle classes : school and college teachers (56 per cent), lower-level

government officials (8 per cent), small businessmen (24 per cent),

people in service in private firms (8 per cent), and in the legal profession (4 per cent). A large proportion were graduates (72 per cent) and

a smaller proportion madrasah educated (20 per cent), while the rest

were matriculates.” The Jama’at-i-Islami, which had earlier opposed the creation of

Pakistan because it was of the opinion that territorial nationalism was not sanctioned by Islam, regrouped itself in Pakistan in 1949 and demanded the creation of an Islamic state. This state was to be

based on the shariat, ruled by the best believers and guided by a

council. The council would be dictatorial, not democratic, since it was to be a law-interpreting rather than a lawmaking body. The Jama’at was also of the view that ‘Islamic law was complete and

merely required interpretation by those who were experts in it’.

Therefore, the council did not need to be representative, nor would there be any need for political parties. Such a state would have the

right and duty to suppress ideas or activities which frustrated its

efforts to make Islamic ideology permeate the life of society.” The

Jama’at presented itself as best qualified to run such a state. How-

ever, such views articulated by Maududi in the fifties continue to influence politics in Pakistan and Bangladesh today. At the time,

these statements had no impact on the government. The

Muslim

League

government

tackled

these

contenders

for power in the parliamentary period by appropriating a cluster of symbols whereby Islam was equated with Pakistan and the Muslim

League. Such were the idioms adopted and ‘myths’ created by successive rulers like Ayub Khan in the military phase of Pakistani

politics. Through these symbols and idioms the state projected itself as the defender of the faithful and branded all opposition as inimical to Islam and Pakistan. It also gave religious sanction to the adoption

of a hard line on communists who were portrayed as non-believers

346

The Sacred and The Secular

and traitors.” In such a context the opposition, particularly those

sympathetic to minorities and possessing a secular outlook, was invariably portrayed as communist-inspired, heretical and working as Indian

agents.

Thus

when

Suhrawardy

and

Bhashani

founded

the

Awami Muslim League in 1949 as an inter-communal and national

party, they were described by Liaquat Ali as ‘dogs let loose by the enemies

of Pakistan’. On

30 May

1954

the United

Front ministry

in East Bengal headed by A. K. Fazlul Huq of the Krishak Sramik Party, was dishonourably dismissed in the same contemptuous vein by Ghulam Muhammad, the Governor-General of Pakistan. The United Front coalition had won 237 out of 309 seats, whereas

the Muslim League won only 10 in the first Provincial Assembly elections held in 1954.™ In a broadcast, the Governor-General said that the dismissal was not because it ‘was not a Muslim League

ministry’ but because there were ‘disruptive forces and enemy agents

actively at work in East Bengal to undermine the integrity

of Pakistan’.®* In January, Suhrawardy was accused of entering into a pact with Sarat Bose to form a sovereign Bengal. In the arrests which followed, both Fazlul Hug, leader of the United Front, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,

who later became the undisputed leader of

East Bengal during the autonomy movement, were rounded up. Such

disregard for election verdicts and disrespect for the opposition became a permanent feature of the political culture of Pakistan.

The official explanation of these events was that the United Front

was infiltrated by communists and received active support from them, a view shared by American journalists.” Moreover, Fazlul Huq’s emo-

tional outburst in Calcutta where he declared that there would be no

visa or passport between Pakistan and India, was taken literally to mean

that he wanted the destruction of Pakistan and its reabsorption into India. In reality, Bengalis had not yet fully comprehended the impli-

cations of the partition and expected the trade and cultural exchanges

between East and West Bengal to continue as before. Undoubtedly, the

Punjabi-dominated civil-military bureaucracy which exercised real political control over Pakistan was suspicious about the commitment of

East Bengal to the state of Pakistan. However, the real objective behind such unconstitutional acts was to maintain Punjabi domination.

At this time the United States was trying to enter into a military pact with Pakistan in which East Bengal was not particularly inter-

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

347

ested.” The central government most likely acted under US government

instructions in imposing Section 92-A of the Government of India Act over East Bengal. On 12 April 1954 Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin

addressed the Constituent Assembly and hinted that the then Prime

Minister, Mohammad Ali, was receiving private letters and telephonic

instructions on the Bengal elections from the American ambassador to Pakistan. He complained that the American ambassador had interfered in ‘the internal affairs of our country by making

an ill-advised pro-

nouncement at Peshawar as reported in the newspapers of the first of April 1954 with regard to the effect of the recent Bengal elections on the position and policies of the Central Government of Pakistan’. He

felt insulted because ‘our subservience to the American policies’ was

no longer ‘a secret’. 6.3

The Military Phase : 1958-1971

In 1958, Ayub Khan took over power in a bloodless military coup. The

West

convinced

Pakistani

that

Bengal

military-bureacracy

Prime

Ministers

and

like

industrialists

were

Mohammad

Ali,

Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy, though members of the upper ashraf, could not really serve their interests. Suhrawardy, for example, was

following a parity principle whereby large numbers of East Bengalis were given business licences and government employment. Such poli-

cies were not viewed favourably by competitors in West Pakistan.

Iskandar Mirza, the Governor-General of Pakistan, himself invited Ayub Khan to take over power and establish the authority of the civilmilitary-bureaucracy. The Ayub Period

Ayub Khan did not particularly concern himself with Islam until the popularity of his opponent, Fatima Jinnah, made him feel sufficiently

threatened during the presidential election campaign of 1964. Suddenly,

he too became the champion of Islam and Pakistan. The Muslim League

had split into three, and he aligned himself with the faction that claimed the true heritage of the old Muslim League, the Convention Muslim

League. Unlike Liaquat Ali, he created no new myths with which to fight the opposition. He simply usurped the existing political idiom.

348

The Sacred and The Secular

Ayub Khan had a distaste for politics, politicians, mullahs and re-

ligious fanaticism. His concerns immediately after taking over power on

7 October 1958

were

decidedly

secular.

His

declared

aim on

2 December 1958 was to deal first with land reforms, settlement of refugees, modification of educational and legal systems and then work

on a new constitution.“' To this effect, several reform commissions

were set up. As a military man, Ayub could do what previous constitutionally formed regimes dared not for fear of arousing orthodox an-

ger. By enacting the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance in 1961, which restricted polygamy and allowed women the right to file for divorce, Ayub encroached upon a domain which was the exclusive preserve of the

orthodoxy.

He

could

even

afford the displeasure of the West

Pakistan Provincial Assembly which, in 1962, had recommended

the

repeal of the ordinance to the National Assembly. The bill to repeal the ordinance, however, was defeated on 26 November twenty hour debate. A month later, the Findamental

1963 after a

Rights Bill, an

amendment to the 1962 Constitution, extended somewhat the role of

courts by making all the lawmaking principles of the constitution defendable in court but ‘specifically excluded the Family Laws Ordinance

from review’. Ayub neglected ideology as an instrument of national integration. until the election campaign got into full swing. Even the 1962 Con-

. Stitution did not declare Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic until an

amendment was enacted in July that year. His opposition to religious

fanaticism led him to ban the Jama’at-i-Islami on 9 January

1964 and

arrest its leaders on grounds of ‘subversive activities against the state’. Ayub’s quest for legitimacy began with his decision to revive political

activities and enter politics himself. Despite his aversion to politics and

politicians, the Political Parties Act of 1962 was enacted and political

activities were made legal. He joined the Convention Muslim League in 1963 inheriting the mantle of the Muslim League and announced

that elections would be held in January 1965. The announcement

brought together parties with different ideological backgrounds and po-

litical interests whose main aim was to overthrow dictatorship and es-

tablish democracy. The Combined Opposition Party thus formed, like the United Front coalition before it, was an alliance of religious and

secular interests with clear political objectives.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism The 1965 Presidential Elections

349

In East Pakistan, the Combined Opposition Party consisted of the East Pakistan

National

Awami

Party

(EPNAP),

the

Awami

League,

the Council Muslim League, the Nizam-e-Islam Party and the Jama’ at-

i-Islami. Of these EPNAP and the Jama’at stood at ideologically op-

posite poles, the former wanting a secular system and the latter an Islamic constitution. The parties were ‘caught in a whirlpool of con-

troversy’ whipped up by components of the alliance themselves rather than by any ‘outside elements’. The inclusion of a provision for the

review of the family laws ordinance in the combined programme upset

the EPNAP and the Awami League considerably. The former believed

that this would ‘disrupt the democratic movement in the country’ — a veiled reference to the opposition campaign against the dictatorship

of Ayub Khan. The other three coalescing parties — the Jama’at, the

Nizam-e-Islam, and the Council Muslim League — were adamantly in

favour of reviewing the ordinance.

By 16 September 1964, several opposition leaders decided to nomi-

nate Fatima Jinnah to contest the presidentship. As Jinnah’s sister, she

was held in high esteem by many. Being a non-Bengali she would be

acceptable to West Pakistan and her promise to restore parliamentary democracy would find favour with East Pakistanis. It is significant that among those who nominated her was Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, a man criticized at times for beinga communist and therefore

suspected of being godless. At other times he was considered a religious

fanatic. His choice this time would suggest that at least in politics he

was a liberal,” for a large section of Pakistanis both from the East and West traditionally believed it to be right and Islamic to keep women

out of public life despite several instances to the contrary in the history

of early Islam. Notions of purdah and propriety demanded such exclusion according to them. The nomination of Fatima Jinnah whipped up a tremendous con-

troversy, not only along religious-secular lines, but also within the or-

thodoxy and the western-educated intelligentsia. Justification, both for

and against the idea of a women as head of state was sought in Islam and Islamic history. Although her candidacy was not a conscious chal-

lenge to religious institutions, it came to be perceived as such by some. ‘The controversy

reveals

a clash

of interests and

attitudes

which

350

The Sacred and The Secular

obfuscate distinctions between religious and secular positions. There were differences within the orthodoxy and the non-orthodox intelligentsia. Segments

of the orthodoxy and the more secular and modernist

elements of society were also at odds with each other over the issue.

Basically, the controversy highlighted the mobilization of religion in

support of specific interests. : Those members of the ulama who favoured a return to democracy were caught off guard. But even those like Maulana Shamsul Haq, a member of the All Pakistan Ulama Board, who could not immediately comment on the choice, felt that the Ayub Khan government needed to be replaced :

.. every Muslim should for the sake of Faith and Islam, try to replace in a lawful manner, the present government in the forthcoming elections so that Islamic law and order and Islamic

social values of justice could be brought into practice in the country.*

He thus invoked Islam both for an essentially secular end, the overthrow of dictatorship, and for a religious purpose—the establishment of an Islamic order.

Initially, the Jama’at

could

not

take

a

stand.

Its

founder,

Maududi, was in detention for ‘subversive activities’. But he had categorically declared in his book, Islamic Law and Constitution, that politics and administration should be of no concern to women, that it was un-Islamic to drag a woman into the affairs of state.? After Maududi’s release late in September, the Jama’at arrived at a decision. On 2 October 1964, it declared :

... in the present unusual situation the candidature of a woman

as head of state is not against the shariat.”

The ‘unusual situation’ referred to the military dictatorship of Ayub Khan which had curtailed the fundamental rights of citizens. Fatima

Jinnah, on the other hand, promised: ‘...freedom of the press, funda-

mental rights, and freedom of expression’.”” Democratic principles were

treated as Islamic and so Fatima was favoured. Ayub’s rule was authoritarian, which Maududi appreciated, but did not consider acceptable in

an Islamic context.

At first, Ayub Khan and his henchmen did not feel particularly

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

351

threatened by the candidature of Fatima Jinnah. But evidence of her

tremendous

popularity, especially in East Bengal, where thou-

sands flocked to her meetings, caused some nervousness. There was mounting criticism in both secular and religious terms, of Fatima and the men kehind her. On the one hand Ayub characterized them as weak and ‘incompetent’, and on the other, Fatima was charged with offering

herself as a ‘tool of disruption’.” Such accusations against the opposition were common

in the political culture nourished

in Pakistan.

‘Ayub’s pet line of propaganda was to warn about ‘enemies within and

enemies without’ and the possibility of a major war if the Indo-Pakistan

conflict persisted. Such speeches aimed at creating an atmosphere in which the need for a strong government would be felt. At the same time, Ayub claimed to be the true inheritor of Muslim League ideology, thereby conferring upon himself the exclusive right to interpret and

defend the ideology on which the state was founded. He labelled people simply as good and bad: good people were those who were ‘patriotic’, ‘God-fearing’, and never sided with those who opposed the

ideology of Pakistan; bad people were those who opposed Pakistan and ‘in the name of democracy ... were seeking ... to weaken, dismember,

and destroy Pakistan’. He echoed the propaganda of the pre-

vious Muslim League regime insinuating that the opposition had traitors and ‘bad’ Muslims.

The attacks on the opposition, and appeals to people were initially

made in secular terms.

Later,

as

the

sense

of insecurity

mounted,

legitimacy was sought in religious sanction. Religion came to figure

more and more prominently in political discourse. In October, Monem

Khan, the Governor of Bengal, tried to convince the nation that the

‘Ayub regime was not repressive since political detenus could not be held without trial for more than two months. In support of this claim,

he pointed out that during the governorship of Nurul Amin, 1,214 peo-

ple had been held without trial and during the United Front period, the number similarly held was 456." By December his tone had changed

completely. He began to project the ruling party as the defender of

Islam and the faithful.

Maududi’s previous opposition to the involvement of women in the

affairs of the state was now held against him. He was accused of trying

to change the Koran and the sunnah for his own convenience. Monem. Khan asserted that the Koran was timeless and dynamic and could not

352

The Sacred and The Secular

be interpreted differently according to changing circumstances.” The

state began

to project an Islamic image of itself. On 30 November

1964, it was announced that compulsory religious education had been

introduced up to the matriculation level and that a Jamia Millia was

being established.”

On 14 December Ayub Khan stated in Multan that his aim and effort was to ensure an Islamic way of life in the country, if elected.

It was for this purpose that he had set up an Islamic Advisory Body

and an Islamic Research Institute to conduct research into the legal and philosophical elements of Islamic precepts and principles.” Clearly, Ayub was appealing to people’s religious sentiments, but in the process he too was using Islam for political advantage. It was ironical that Ayub Khan, who was responsible for enacting the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance in 1961, which allowed women

a fairer legal treatment particularly regarding inheritance and mar-

Tiage rights, should now preach against Maududi’s ‘exploitation’ of Islam because the latter saw nothing un-Islamic in a woman becoming head of state. He even allowed his men, such as Monem Khan,

to appeal to the ulama to ‘preach the gospel of Islam’ and support the view that a woman

‘under no circumstances’ could be head of

state.” On 30 November 1964, Monem Khan addressed the ulama

from Darussunnat Alia Madrasah at Sarsina in Barisal, the renowned seat of Islamic learning in East Pakistan, asking them not to ‘remain silent spectators to the drama being enacted on the political scene in the name of democracy’. He said that ‘it would be the greatest

misfortune for Pakistan to elect a woman as the chief of the state’

as it was against the shariat. He cited fatwas given by the learned

ulama of Pakistan and sought further moral support by referring to

fatwas from other Islamic countries to this effect.” This effort to drag Islam into the election campaign only reveals the ruling party’s

sense of insecurity and desire for legitimacy. A letter to the editor

of The Pakistan Observer stated that if the rulers had known that a woman would be a rival ‘they would have tried to amend the

Constitution to debar a woman from such a contest’.”

A few theologians and religious leaders were made to issue fatwas

to the effect that a woman was not entitled to become head of state. In answer, about two thousand ulama of East Pakistan assembled on 18 December 1964 at Dacca Paltan Maidan and gave their verdict on

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

353

the subject: they saw no bar to a woman occupying the position of

head of state. In a letter dated 23 December 1964 to the editor of The Pakistan Observer, two of them noted in response to popular demand

that the views of the theologian Hakimjul Ummat Hazrat Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, were based on the Koran ard Hadith. In Chapter 19 of the Koran, in Sura Saba, there is a reference to a woman, Bilquis, who used to run the affairs of state through consultation. While negotiating the treaty of Hudaibiya, Prophet Muhammad consulted his wife

Umme Sahna with good results. These instances were cited to establish that there was no bar in Islam on a woman becoming the head of a democratic state provided the administration is run with the help of a

consultative body (such as a parliament). They suggested that the particular Hadith cited by the rival ulama had been misinterpreted to suit the government, for it referred to one possessing supreme authority.

This Hadith could not apply to a democratic country whose affairs

were controlled by Parliament. They felt that it would be a ‘betrayal of the country’ to vote for Ayub Khan, for he had deprived the people of their fundamental rights, imposed martial law, abrogated the Con-

stitution, ‘deprived the people of their franchise, curbed the powers of

the Court and established dictatorship by introducing laws which run

counter to the Koran and sunnah’."

The election was held under the system of Basic Democracies

founded

by

elected Basic

Ayub

Khan,

Democrats

were

whereby,

to

elect

in

the

each

wing,

President.

80,000

Under

the circumstances, a massive victory for Ayub Khan might have

been expected given the stake the Basic Democrats had in the sys-

tem. It was also clear that Fatima Jinnah, if she won, would dismantle Basic Democracy and introduce a democratic system. Fatima

won 46.6 per cent of the votes in East Pakistan and 37 per cent in West Pakistan. She was most popular in the urban centres of Dacca

and Karachi. In Dacca alone, she won in 13 out of 19 centres.” In East Bengal, she lost much of the rural vote to Ayub. The reasons

for her defeat may be ascribed to several factors: a successful propa-

ganda by the state; people’s lack of confidence in a woman head of state; and their fear of acting contrary to Islamic injunctions by electing a woman

president. It is attributable to the form of indirect

elections in operation where the electoral college of Basic Democrats

was also largely packed with Ayub’s men who wielded considerable

354

The Sacred and The Secular

influence in rural society. It was also alleged that the results were

rigged.

Bengali Discontent and the Rise Of Mujib The presidential election of 1956 was one of the focal points of Bengali agitation. A very clear line of division had emerged between the interests of the East and West Pakistani intelligentsia. One wanted liberal

democracy while the other, autocracy; one fought for parity in eco-

nomic and political life while the other was determined to dominate at

whatever cost. Even Monem Khan complained, before he became

Governor of East Bengal, that the Eastern wing was getting a poor

deal. He pointed out that in 1951 East Pakistan accounted for 56 per

cent of the country’s population and had 34,837 educational institu-

tions, while the respective figures for West Pakistan were 44 per cent

and 11,396. But in the allocation of educational funds, West Pakistan received Rs 5.50 crore whereas East Pakistan was alloted less than half the amount — only Rs 2.50 crore. He commented

:

Whenever anybody wants to impress upon the Government that East Bengal is not getting a fair deal, some of our friends from the Wester zone start sermonizing about Islamic brotherhood without themselves practising the same.”

The West had shown its opposition to any possibility of Bengali domi-

nation. The Combined Opposition Party faced the same type of criticisms as the United Front before it and the Awami League after. Each

in turn was accused of standing against the ideology and integrity of Pakistan : of being infiltrated by communists and Indian agents, and

of being un-Islamic. The political culture was clearly geared towards belittling the opposition in an attempt to deny it respect and credibility.

The motive was not different from that of colonial regimes in undivided

India which ridiculed Bengali baboos and nationalists. Significantly,

the Combined Opposition Party defeat precluded the possibility of reprisals by the Centre which followed upon United Front and Awami

League victories in 1954 and 1970. The logical conclusion is that the

non-vernacular ashraf-dominated central government was adamantly

against any sharing of decision-making power or resources with East

Bengal. The existence of a unified national party might have resolved

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

355

the political dilemma of Pakistan, but mutual mistrust and divergence of interests made this impossible.

‘The United Front and Awami League victories reflected the growing

Bengali discontent with the Centre. This was the result of several fac-

tors: the unconstitutional dismissals of Bengali Prime Ministers; the realization that Bengal Muslim leaders of ashraf origin at the Centre,

like

Nazimuddin,

Mohammad

Ali

and

Liaquat

Ali

could

not

really serve their interests; the awareness that East Pakistan was being exploited like a colony by West Pakistan; and a feeling that Bengalis

were being deprived socially, culturally, politically and economically

because they were Bengalis.”

The discontent manifested itself in 1950-52 in the strong reaction

to the First Report of the Basic Principles Committee.“* This document

aimed at providing the fundamental structure of the constitution on

which Pakistan was to be based. However, Bengalis saw the report as

a threat to their interests — as a blueprint for crippling Bengal and

establishing a form of legitimate dictatorship, for it envisaged a head of state with unlimited powers, like the authoritarian ruler prescribed by Maududi. Their frustrations were mobilized around the language

issue. Every year, 21 February, which came to be known as shahid

dibas or martyrs’ day, and more popularly as ekushe became the focal point of political agitation. On this day, economic and political griev-

ances were voiced. It was no wonder that both the Muslim League

leadership and Ayub Khan banned the remembrace of martyrs’ day

through rituals and ceremonies. The annual observance of ekushe, 21 February, also marked the

gradual heightening of a Bengali ethnic consciousness which was different from the religion-based Pakistani consciousness.

Its emergence

and growth were rooted in the cumulative impact of a number of fac-

tors: the realization that they were exploited as Bengalis in the name

of Islamic brotherhood; of being subjugated culturally and linguistically ostensibly for the sake of national integration, but in reality to establish

non-Bengali cultural domination; and of being deprived economically and politically without being allowed to challenge such developments

on the ground that ‘regionalism’ was disintegrative and therefore un-

Islamic.

Bengali discontent culminated in a secular movement for regional

autonomy. Though limited to a few people in 1954, by 1969 it was

356

The Sacred and The Secular

transformed into a mass movement drawing the allegiance of students,

intellectuals and labourers. Among the immediate causes was a basic

dissatisfaction with Ayub’s political, economic and cultural policies.

Most.of Ayub’s ministers were Muslim Leaguers who were defeated

in the 1954 elections and as such did not enjoy people’s confidence.

Ayub replased the popular Pathan, Lt. General Azam Khan by the

repressive Monem Khan as Governor of East Bengal. He slandered the much revered Suhrawardy, who was jailed for more than six months without substantial charges. The 1962 Constitution imposed by Ayub

Khan was declared undemocratic by Bengalis as it was seen to deny

, their fundamental rights. It was believed that his Basic Democracies only created a class of vested interests. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan

war, East Bengal was left virtually undefended.

All these factors

made East Bengalis feel that they were dispensable. In addition, Ayub’s

Policies of national integration through the Bureau of National Reconstruction which sought to foster one culture were found suspect.

Though Ayub’s policies on economic growth helped build a Bengali bourgeoisie, statistics of disparity made widely available by the

Awami

League

further

alienated

the

Bengalis

from the Cen-

tre.” For example, while the cost of coarse rice in East Pakistan prior to 1971 was Rs 40-50 a maund, it was only Rs 18-28 in West Pakistan.

The disparity in per capita income rose from 18 per cent in 1949-50

to 75 per cent in 1967-68 with Bengalis getting the smaller share. Health statistics showed that in 1966 there were 393 hospitals in West

Pakistan, but only 76 in East Pakistan. The share of the latter in de-

velopment expenditure was only 20 per cent of the total in the First

Five Year Plan period 1950-51—1954-55 and rose to just 36 per cent in the Third

Plan period

1965-66—1969-70." The

few

industrial

houses which had sprung up in East Bengal were mostly owned

by non-Bengali entrepreneurs from West Pakistan. Among the top industrial houses only two were Bengali. East Pakistan had become a captive market of West Pakistan and bought 40 per cent of all its ex-

ports on an average.”

‘The deaths of A. K. Fazlul Hug and Suhrawardy in 1962 and ‘1963,

respectively, left a vacuum in the leadership of East Bengal. After the

Indo-Pakistan war, Mujib felt that the time was ripe for a nationalist

movement. On 5 February 1966, while addressing a meeting of opposition leaders in Lahore,

Mujib presented his six-point programme,

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

357

which later came to be known as Amader bachar dabi, or, Our Right

to Live. In most respects it was similar to the United Front manifesto. It advocated regional autonomy, land reform, nationalization of industries, a free press, etc. It received no response from other opposition

leaders of the time such as Maududi, Nurul Amin, Daulatana, Chaudhri Muhammad

Ali,

Fazlul Quadar Chowdhury,

Golam Azam,

Khwaja

Khairuddin, Farid Ahmed, Mahmud Ali, Abdus Salam Khan, Abdus Sabur Khan and even Maulana Bhashani.” However, it envisaged a plan for an exploitation-free society where only defence and foreign affairs would be central concerns and all other matters including taxa-

tion and currency would be provincial subjects, which generated some

interest among the people of Bengal. Ayub’s threat that this was a civil

war situation and that Mujib was a traitor carried no weight with the people who had got used to such accusations against the opposition

since partition. Mujib’s arrest on 8 May 1966 and that of his colleagues,

gave rise to protest meetings and demonstrations which drew the support of students, workers and the lumpen proletariat. The movement,

so far peaceful, got radicalized and there were clashes with the police.

On 7 June 1966, 13 people were killed in demonstrations and at least

800 students and workers arrested. The opposition daily, Dainik Ittefaq,

was banned. In January 1968 the Agartala Conspiracy Case was initi-

ated by the Ayub government. Mujib was the prime accused. There were 34 others accused of treachery, of whom 24 were army officers.

They were all charged with conspiring with India for the secession of

East Pakistan.” This development was seen by East Bengalis as just

another ploy by which West Pakistan sought to impose its will to deny them legitimate access to political participation and economic

well-being. By

1969 the autonomy

movement

had become

so powerful

that

Mujib had to be released and a date for general elections announced.

Unfortunately for the Punjabi-dominated central government, the elec-

tion results of 1970 revealed that Mujib was the undisputed leader of Bengali aspirations (see Table 6.1). The Awami League won the ma-

jority of the Assembly seats and became the single largest party in the whole of Pakistan.” Mujib thus had the mandate to become the Prime

Minister of Pakistan. Significantly, the Awami League and the Pakistan

People’s Party, though the largest parties in East and West Pakistan

358

The Sacred and The Secular

respectively, won no seats in the opposite wings. The scene was clearly set for a major conflict.

In Pakistani politics, as in the pre-partition period, the influence

of tradition and religious injunction was felt equally strongly, not only in the method of seeking legitimacy, but also in that of mo-

bilization, as for example, in election campaigns.” However, while

everyone canvassed in the name of Islam during the movement for Pakistan, in 1970 some parties like the Awami League, canvassed mainly along political, cultural and economic lines. However, as had

become customary, during the election campaigns Mujib made sure

to project himself as a practicing Muslim, for example, by offering. munajat, prayers, for martyrs of the language movement before de:

livering his public speeches. Such acts had the multiple effect of appealing to people’s religious, cultural and political sentiments.™ In

this election, ethnic identity became the central issue while in 1946,

religious identity had been emphasized.

Table 6.1 : THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES POLLED BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONTESTED CONSTITUENCIES OF EAST PAKISTAN IN THE 1970 ELECTIONS

Political Party ‘Awami League Pakistan People’s Party Pakistan Muslim League (Quaiyum) Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) Pakistan Muslim League (Council) Pakistan Democratic Party

Votes Polled 10,616,143 2311 167,641 533,231 "184,541 298,876

Per cent 70.45 0.02 Mu 3.54 122 1.98

Jama ‘at-i-Islami Jama ‘at-i-Ulama-i-Islam (W. Pak.) Jamiat-i-Ulame-i-islam & Nizam-e-lslam Others Independent Total

678,159 76,135 223,634 174,101 1,621,555 15,069,773

4.50 051 1.48 1.16 10.76 100.00

National Awami Party (Wali)

492,846

3.27

Source : Report on General Elections. Pakistan, 1970-71, vol. 1. Election Commission, Manager of Publications, Karachi, 1972, pp. 216-17.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

359

The belief that the weight of religion and tradition would carry

them through, persisted among some political parties which united to form the ‘Islam-pasand’ coalition. In the group were the Jama’ati-Islami, the Nizam-e-Islam and the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP, which hoped to fill the need for a national

party, like the Awami League before it, tried to re-enact the struggle

for Pakistan, not only by recalling past sacrifices, but also by invoking the same idioms and symbols, for example, that Islam alone

could unite the people of Pakistan. While such sentiments sufficed

in 1946, in 1970 the mood of the people had changed. The majority voted for economic

rather than religious emancipation. This was an

indictment of the policies pursued in Pakistan rather than a commentary on religion itself.

The

vernacular

intelligentsia

who

led

and

supported

the East

Bengal autonomy movement were also on the vanguard of what could

be called a secular ideology. They came by and large from the middle classes which emerged in the first quarter of the twentieth century in

Bengal and were therefore primarily of rural origin. Out of 445 Mem-

bers of Parliament elected in 1970, 46 per cent had a rural base, 27.2 per cent had dual residence in town and village and only 26.7 per cent

were exclusively urban-based.”* Thus about 73-74 per cent of them had

connections with the countryside. Out of 20 cabinet ministers of East

Pakistan who were elected in 1970, 13 were born in villages and only

7 in towns.” Thirty-four per cent of the MPs had fathers who were

farmers — though they themselves were engaged in middle-class professions such as law, business or medicine — and 12.68 per cent were

themselves farmers.” In

rural

areas

of East Bengal, there has been a tradition of co-

existence among people of different communities. Agrarian communi-

ties, irrespective of religious background have faced similar hardships. They

have

shared the same extra-rational beliefs and invoked the

supernatural to help them through life.” Rural East Bengal has wit-

nessed little or no large-scale organized communal violence although

some areas like Kishorejang did experience communal riots as a result of socio-economic pressures.” However the people of East Bengal tended to be far less communal than the Punjabis of West Pakistan,

the non-Bengali refugees who had settled in East Bengal or the old

guard Muslim Leaguers who came from conflict-ridden urban back-

360

The Sacred and The Secular

grounds. However, rural background alone does not ensure a tolerant world-view. Fanatics, ready to kill in the name of religion, have also

come from rural backgrounds in the form of recruits to fascist groups

such as the Al-Badrs and Razakars — people who believed that even fratricide could be a form of jihad.'° 6.4

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the

Secular State: 1972-1975

The Awami League President, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, fought the 1970 elections on his six-point secular programme enunciating the demand for parity and regional autonomy, but his party manifesto could not ignore the appeal of Islam. It announced, like other contesting par-

ties, that no law repugnant to the Holy Koran and sunnah would be

enacted." He belonged to that brand of politicians who wanted to secure separate spheres for religion and politics. In such a context,

religion would be a matter of personal choice; the state would neither interfere with such choices nor promote one religion to the detriment

of another. The idea was totally opposed to Maududi’s vision of the theological state as discussed already but had a significant following

in East Bengal. It would be pertinent here to discuss what Mujib meant by a secular state and whether his vision found general acceptance.

Article 12 of the 1972 Constitution given by Mujib, noted a list of

abuses, the elimination of which would secure secularism in the state. These are :

a) ‘Communalism’ in all its forms b) The granting by the state of political status in favour of any re-

ligion c) The abuse of religion for political purposes

d) Any discrimination against, or persecution of, persons practising

a particular religion.

Article 38 specifically prohibited the abuse of religion for political purposes:

Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or Unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or public order: provided that no person shall have the right to form, or be a member of, any communal or other association or union which in the name of, or on the

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

361

basis of, any religion has for its object, or pursues, a political purpose.

Importantly it prohibited the establishment of communal or religion-

based political organizations and outlawed existing ones such as the

Jama’ at-i-Islami. Another article guaranteed minority rights.

No individual of a minority community will be required to pay taxes for the preaching of any religion but his own." Mujib’s view of the secular state reflected the deep discontent of the vernacular intelligentsia over the communalization of politics and poli-

ticization of religion by previous regimes. It epitomized the rejection of all that the Muslim League stood for — separate electorates, two-

nation theory, and flirtation with the idea of a theological state. Mujib was aware of the religiosity of his people, and that recruits

of the Jama’at-i-Islami, the Razakars and Al-Badrs, who had killed

Progressive teachers, intellectuals and students during the war of lib-

eration, were still around trying to gather support against the secular

state. Although his pre-1971 speeches contained few references to Islam, after 1971, he felt compelled to reassure those who had not understood his concept of the secular state :

Secularism does not mean the absence of religion. You are a Mussalmaan, you perform your religious rites. There is no irreligiousness on the soil of Bangladesh but there is secularism. This sentence has a meaning and that meaning is that none would be allowed to exploit the people in the name of religion, or create such fascist organisations as the Al-Badr, Razakars etc. No communal politics will be allowed in the country."® Mujib was thus equating secularism with non-communalism, and at the

same time distinguishing between irreligiosity and secularism, contrary

to the popular understanding of the term. In other words, a person

could be religious in his personal life and yet be secular in relation to other communities and in his political decisions. However, Mujib was

not understood clearly by all segments of society. The notion of a religious person living in a secular state was not clear even to many university teachers and graduates. A participant's comment at a

conference in 1973 at Rajshahi University typified the popular misconception :

362

The Sacred and The Secular Our state is secular, true, but our prime minister is not. He is a Muslim; will he forget how to say Inshallah? When he dies will there be no ‘Janaja’? Or will he go to any secular heaven?™

It was inconceivable for many that personal religiosity could be com-

bined with secular politics at the national level. The assumption was that the two terms were mutually exclusive and incompatible; therefore,

a Muslim could not be secular. Consequently, Mujib’s idea of a secular

State created some misgivings. Should a religious person change his religious frames of references? Should he not observe religious rites?

Should he use a different, secular vocabulary? The distinction between

the spheres of personal beliefs and affairs of the state were not obvious to some. It is possible that they subscribed to those tenets of Islamic

political thought which saw no duality in the roles of the state and religion.

Some believed that a state without religion was one without order. Even Kamruddin Ahmed, a member of the vernacular intelli-

gentsia

with

a long

political

career

to his credit,

a man

who apparently believed in a secular state and was non-communal in his personal life to the extent that he wanted a united, though sovereign,

Bengal,

wrote early in the seventies :

‘Without the chains of religion, the illiterate, ignorant masses cannot be brought into the folds of social order by civil law

10s

The question of social order aside, for all those who understood secu-

larism to mean the absence of religion, the conception of a secular state seemed impossible, even absurd — especially as long as there was a psychological need for some kind of faith or belief.’ For another thing,

there was a doubt about the possibility of realizing a secular state : an individual practicing the injunctions of his faith in private had the right

to form associations with co-believers and exercise pressure on the state; the state in turn could be forced to pay heed to these

pressures.'”

Mujib tried to ward off fears that Bangladesh would become a godless state. In 1974, he instituted a Madrasah Education (Qudrat-i Khuda) Commission to look into the defects of the madrasah system

and suggest improvements.'® In March 1975, the Islamic Foundation

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

363

Act was passed. The purpose of the foundation was to found, assist

and manage mosques, Islamic centres, academies and institutes; to undertake research on the contribution of Islam to culture, science and civilization; to propagate the basic Islamic ideals of universal brotherhood,

tolerance and justice;

and to promote

studies and re-

search in Islamic history, philosophy, law and jurisprudence.'”

A conference at Rajshahi University in late 1973 discussed and

debated the nature of secularism or dharamanirapekshata defined as

religious tolerance." There was no consensus about the concept. This

is quite remarkable considering that secularism was one of the four

“pillars of state’ and that it was an issue in the 1970 election campaign. The Awami League, the party which had popularized the idea of secularism, had won by an absolute majority both in the 1970 and 1973 elections. Clearly, the electorate may have voted for other issues in the manifesto which held hopes of economic emancipation. Two definitions of the term secularism emerged from the conference; one in relation to personal life decisions and the other in relation

to political decisions. In the context of personal life decisions the term

‘secular’ implied opposition to religiosity, and in the case of political

decisions, it was interpreted as non-communalism or religious tolerance

(see Figure A). In fact the Bengali meaning of dharmanipekshata as used in the Constitution is religious neutrality. This is well understood. But the English term raises concern because it is defined as in the

figure below :

FIGURE A

DEFINITIONS OF SECULARISM PERSONAL LIFE DECISIONS : A POLITICAL DECISIONS :

B

RELIGIOSITY # SECULAR (1)

c

D

COMMUNALISM #SECULAR (2)

The emergent meanings of the term secularism imply that a person could be A and C, or religious in his personal life, and communal in

a political sense. He could be A and D, that is, religious personally

and non-communal, politically. One could be B and C, that is, nonreligious in personal life and communal in political belief. Finally, one

364

The Sacred and The Secular

could be B and D, both, non-religious and non-communal, or, secular

(1) and secular (2).

Each of these possible person types had its representatives in the

politics of East Pakistan and Bangladesh (see Appendix 6.A). Types A and C were represented by Maulana Maududi and the academic

Ruhul Quddus. Types A and D included a large number of the vernacular intelligentsia; examples are Kamruddin Ahmed and Abul

Mansur Ahmed. Representatives of types B and C would be Liaquat Ali

Khan,

Jinnah

and Ayub

Khan.

Examples

of types B and D

would be Professor Abdur Razzak and Comrade Muzaffar Ahmed. It must be noted that individuals do not conform to one particular

person type forever. A number of Bengal Muslims went through periods when they were politically non-secular, indulged in communal politics during

non-communal

colonial rule but later assumed

political stance.

Suhrawardy,

Abul

a secular (2) or

Hashim,

Abul

Mansur Ahmed, Fazlul Huq etc. provide examples of such change.

So long as they were interested only in their own community rather than the combined welfare of both Hindus and Muslims, they were

communal. But faced with the reality of partition in 1946-47 they

began to work for non-communal politics. With the exception of Suhrawardy and Fazlul Hug, all the others I have noted were religious in their personal life or believed in the essential role of religion in such matters. Bhashani exemplifies a difficult case that cannot be fitted neatly into this pattern. His political career presents a complicated picture.

In his personal life he was always religious in outlook and a devout Muslim. In politics he adopted communal and non-communa! positions depending on exigencies. At the same time he accepted communism out of his concern for the downtrodden. He was castigated both as a fanatic mullah and a staunch atheist. Because of his con-

stant inclination to be in the opposition, he never emerged as a person with a consistent vision of the world. Late in life, he resolved

his religious and communist beliefs by focussing on the idea of an Islamic welfare state.

While the mass movement

was at its height between December

1968 and March 1969, the Jama’at-i-Islami and other right-wing par-

ties stepped up their campaign against Bhashani and left-wing parties like the National Awami

Party. Bhashani was branded as a heretic

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

365

and a deserter from the faith. As already noted, Bhashani, though

a secular politician was a deeply religious person. His denunciation

by the Jama’at as a kafir stirred him into action. In order to prove

himself a correct Muslim, he declared that he stood for Islamic so-

cialism. He also drew up a complex plan for an Islamic University at Santosh and in 1974 established an organization called Hukumat-

e-Rabbaniya which

aimed

based on God’s design."

to propagate an egalitarian

social order

‘The state could be of the following types : (1) aggressively athe-

istic/agnostic (2) tolerant-atheistic/agnostic, (3) tolerant-religious, and

(4) aggressively orthodox (See Appendix 6B). In the aggressively

atheistic state, the ruling elite is personally atheistic and forces oth-

ers to be so. Such a state has not been realized anywhere. The Nearest approximation is the communist state. In the aggressively

orthodox state, rulers are believers in their personal lives and wish

to force others either to believe or relinquish their rights. This is a

theocratic state, the type desired by Maududi. In state types (2) and

(3), others are allowed to believe or be agnostics/atheists irrespective of the personal

life decisions of the rulers. Such

states could be

considered secular and these represent Sheikh Mujib’s desirable approximation.

In March 1973, two years after the emergence of Bangladesh, Mujib

called for fresh elections. He regarded them as a referendum on the four principles of state policy enunciated in the 1972 Constitution —

nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism. The massive Awami

League victory gave him the desired mandate. It won 73.17 per cent

of the votes cast and 292 of the 300 seats contested. The NAP (pro-

Moscow) and NAP (Bhashani) did not win any seats though they polled

8.59 per cent and 5.42 per cent of the votes respectively. The Jatiya Samajtantric Dal (JSD - National Socialist Party) won only 1 seat and

the independents, 6. They polled 6.48 per cent and 6.34 per cent of

the votes respectively.'"”

However, Mujib faced strong opposition from two fronts : the frag-

mented left, and the Islamic right. Neither recognized the basis of the new state. While the Islamic right was banned and most of the proChinese factions of the Communist Party had gone underground, they

continued a campaign of political violence. There were secret killings

of Awami Leaguers and liberal intellectuals, raids on police stations,

366

The Sacred and The Secular

looting of banks, and elimination of ‘class enemies’. In 1973 alone,

there were 5,200 dacoities, 4,400 robberies, 2,500 murders and 26 bank

loots.'? The Awami League government also retaliated. Siraj Sikdar

of the underground communist party was captured. He was allegedly shot in jail when attempting to escape. by

‘The Islamic right had already challenged the reality of Bangladesh the

assassination

of

intellectuals

like

Munier

Chowdhury

on

14 December 1971, two days before the Pakistan Army surrendered to

the Combined Forces.'"* Several others like Altaf Mahmood and Shahidullah Kaiser were assassinated after liberation by Jama’at members. It may be assumed that the ‘Islamic’ parties still had some support

among the people despite their reactionary role during the liberation war. Between the Jama’at-i-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League (Council), Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), the Pakistan Democratic Party,

and the Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam and Nizam-e-Islam parties, the Islamic right won 12.72 per cent of the votes cast in the 1970 elections in East Bengal (see Table 6.1). Besides, the Awami League had non-secular

members as well. They were likely to be uneasy about the idea of a secular state. But no one came out with it in a forthright manner at

the time.

It is no wonder that a ‘Muslim Bengal’ movement emerged shortly

after liberation. Surprisingly, it was supported by some of the underground

Awami

communist League

groups

feelings.

because The

of shared anti-Indian and anti-

East

Pakistan

Communist

Party

(Marxist-Leninist) claimed ‘Muslim Bengal’ as its ally in their under-

ground paper Janayuddha."* Several factions of the pro-Chinese

Communist Party—which either did not support the liberation war or continued a dual war against the Pakistan Army and the Mukti Bahini — insisted that colonialism and exploitation persisted, that Bangladesh

was a Client state of India, and therefore the need for struggle continued.

They refused to recognize Bangladesh and called her ‘East Bengal’ or “Bast Pakistan’ "6

Mojib’s assassination on 15 August 1975 was one in a

series of

events that was to lead to the adoption of Islam in state parlance once again and a possible return to the theocratic folds of Pakistan. Osten-

sibly Mujib was killed so that Bangladesh could be an Islamic repub-

lic.""” But facts prove that he was the target of vengeance by a group

of disgruntled army Majors, some of whom had been dismissed.'* One

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

367

of them, Dalim, wished to avenge the insult to his wife by the sons of

Mujib’s political associate, Ghazi Gulam Mustafa, widely suspected of

corruption. Among other reasons was the widespread disaffection in the army because of the Rakshi Bahini build up at the cost of the

regular forces. It was widely believed that the Bahini was to be Mujib’s

private army, though it was meant to be a paramilitary body. Mujib’s

move towards a single party state, the allegations of corruption and smuggling against Awami Leaguers and Mujib’s family members,"

and the strongly anti-Indian feeling in the army were also responsible

factors. Incidentally, none of the ‘real reasons’ behind the coup had a

strong basis in religiosity or communalism. It has been argued quite incorrectly, that Mujib’s secular experiment failed because he had underestimated people’s religiosity.'” Maniruz-

zaman cites the findings of the 1974 Education Commission to show

that a vast majority of the educated elite—whom he calls ‘active westernized’ because only 5.5 per cent of them were madrasah educated— wanted ‘religious education as an integral part of general education’

(75 per cent) and that they were in favour of ‘modernized’ rather than madrasah type of religious education (71 per cent). This is not too different from the educational aspirations of the pre-1947 intelli-

gentsia. However, Maniruzzaman suggests that this ‘revealed the yawn-

ing gap between the Bangladesh society and Sheikh Mujib’s secular

polity’. But Mujib advocated the Indian type of non-discriminatory secularism, sarbadharma

sama

bhaba. In this context, religious edu-

cation would fall within the personal sphere while the state would prac-

tice religious neutrality within the political sphere. Maniruzzaman argues that sensing the backlash, Mujib engaged in symbol manipula-

tion by invoking ‘Allah’ in public speeches and using other religious

idioms like ‘Inshallah’, which he says was ‘too little’ and ‘came too

late’. But Mujib used such vocabulary all along, e.g. in his famous

speech of 7 March 1971. Khan writes without proof that Mujib’s secularist politics ‘caused a Muslim backlash in Bangladesh’s majorityminority ... relations when the Indian desire to treat Bangladesh as a

client state became apparent’.'”' The propaganda that Bangladesh would become a client state of India came largely from those quarters which

were opposed to its emergence — the extreme left and right. It also

found support among sections of the army which were trained as part of the Pakistan army and were indoctrinated to be fiercely anti-Indian.

368

The Sacred and The Secular

‘The backlash had nothing to do with antagonism to secularist politics or notions of a secular state. Khan suggests that Zia succeeded where Mujib failed because he adjusted his secularist position to meet conservative demands at home and abroad. Indeed this comment could be applied to Mujib. He sanctioned the establishment of Islamic centres of learning and attended the 1974 Islamic Summit in an attempt

to gain acceptance in the Islamic world. Mujib’s murder was due to disaffection within segments of the army which felt threatened with cuts, and an international atmosphere which found secular nationalist leaders suspect.

6.5

The Post-Mujib Period

The coup against Mujib was immediately followed by recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan, the United States and China. All three countries had strongly opposed Bengali aspirations during the war of liberation. India was the thirty-ninth nation to offer recognition. The coup

thus marked a change in the foreign relations of Bangladesh — for she

immediately joined the US-China-Pakistan axis, and edged away from India. During the period 1947 to 1971, Bangladesh witnessed a tendency

towards secularization of the polity. This was marked by a growing

Bengali ethnic consciousness. Between 1972-1975, a secular state ide-

ology was presented with the assurance that there would be no state interference in matters of belief, that faith would be treated as a private

affair. However, this trend was halted by state interference after Mujib’s

assassination. Military segimes, in their concern for legitimacy and sup-

port from Islamic states, again adopted the Islamic ideology. The reemergence of communal-religious concerns induced an effort to prove that the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was based, still persisted.

Deteriorating relations with India was one of its outward manifestations. A strong indicator of the move towards accepting an Islamic

ideology at the state level was the dropping of the word ‘secularism’ from the 1972 Constitution the Constitution read :

in

1977.

Instead,

the preamble

Pledging that the high ideals of absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy, and socialism meaning economic and social justice, which inspired our heroic people

to

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism to dedicate themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives in, the national independence, shall be the funda-

369

mental principles of the Constitution.’

Ziaur Rahman came to power after a series of coups, the first of which

overthrew Mujib. He failed to win over Mujib’s followers in his search for legitimacy. He was therefore compelled to seek allies indiscrimi-

nately among the extreme left and the extreme right, neither of which

had believed in Bangladesh."* Among the extreme left were Marxist groups like the Samyabadi Dal (Marxist-Leninist). Among the orthodox

religious groups were elements from the Jama’at-i-Islami, Al-Badr and

Al-Shams. Other allies were pardoned ‘collaborators’, : men who stood against the liberation war, such as Shafiul Azam; those who opposed

Mujib’s six points, such as Sabur Khan; and men who were against Bengali as a state language for Pakistan, such as Shah Azizur

Rahman. Zia resorted to Islamization policies not only to seek support from these elements but also to please the Arab bloc which had great sympathy

Among

for Pakistan

the Islamization

and from

which much

money

policies were the enactment

flowed.

of Islamic

Universities Act 1980, and Islamic Education and Research Act 1980."

Zia’s policy of wooing the Islamic world was determined by sound

economic reasons. In exchange for a religious posture it was possible

to obtain Arab aid, find employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled

as migrant labourers and through them earn foreign exchange. The increasing importance of Saudi Arabia may be surmized from the

following figures. In 1977, one out of 15 immigrant workers went to Saudi Arabia; in 1981, one in four; and in 1985, one in every two who

immigrated went there."

The new ruling ideology could be noticed in the new political and

cultural vocabulary. The slogan of Jai Bangla, which is linguistically of Bengali origin, was replaced by Bangladesh Zindabad where

Zindabad is of Urdu and Persian origin. The de-emphasization of the Bengali language was carried further by referring to Bangladesh Betar

as ‘Radio Bangladesh’. Shah Azizur Rahman went so far as to refer

to the Bengali language as ‘Bangladeshi language’ during a Jatiya Samsad (Parliament) session.'”

370

‘The Sacred and The Secular

Conclusion

The ruling ideology in the context of Bangladesh politics was determined

by the party in power and its sense of legitimacy rather than by any strong

ideological conviction. Mujib, perhaps, was an exception. But he too had to submit to the religious challenge in order not to be misunderstood or be branded as a kafir. This concern indicates an awareness of popular

preferences. These and the heritage of the region's political history,

especially since 1905, guaranteed religion an important role in the Politics of Bangladesh. But the basic interests of the rulers were secular—

a desire to remain in power and maintain stability. Foreign relations too

were a constraining factor in the choice of ideology, especially after 1975. Religion and politics do not necessarily come together only when

political

institutions

are

weak,

but

when

dominant

authoritarian

regimes feel threatened.'™ In the absence of credible socio-economic

Programmes they seek religious sanction and moral support from the religious populace. Such a ploy is also used when there is such

precedence in the history of a nation. More importantly, inspiration is

derived from the fact that political thought in Islam vests the dual

functions of religious and temporal leadership in the head of state, although in practical terms a duality has at times existed.'”

‘The general trend in politics has been a struggle for power between

men who differed on methods of political mobilization. Under the Gen-

erals, a strongly anti-Indian stance combined with a degree of communalism contrasted

sharply

with the brief interludes of civilian

governments emphasizing the composite identity of Bengal Muslims.

At another level, the orthodox alliance with the military added a di-

mension of complexity. While both were contenders for power, they

were united in their anti-Indian position. The ambiguous position of

the army regarding religion was counterpoised to the orthodox demand

for a religious polity. While political Islam was kept under check by Ayub

Khan, sections of the orthodoxy were content to confine their

role to that of moral and social guardians, while building grass roots

support through welfare-related activities and biding their time to enter

politics. When the opportunity came under Yahya Khan and Ziaur

Rahman, the orthodoxy, represented mainly by the Jama’at-i-Islam, took on the garb of militant Islam as in Iran and elsewhere and began a jihad to establish itself in power.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

an

Per

aw

-

Notes

1.

T. V. Sathyamurthy, ‘Language, Religion and Political Economy : The Case of Bangladesh’, in D. Taylor and M. Yapp (eds.) Political Identity in South Asia, (London : Curzon Press, 1979), pp. 231-32. Matiur Rahman (ed.), Bangladesh Today, an Indictment and a Lament (London, 1978); Matiur Rahman (ed.), Second Thoughts on Bangladesh (London, 1979). These books are claimed to be written anonymouslyby ex-freedom fighters. The contents, however, reflect totally the official Pakistani point of view. It is doubtful whether a true freedom fighter could have all the prejudices these books portray. Particularly objectionable is the branding of liberal intellectuals and university teachers as ‘traitorous’ with exceptions such as Syed Sajjad Husain and Mohar Ali, both of whom were tried by Dacca University on charges of collaboration with the Pakistan Army and dismissed in 1972-73. They were found guilty of three out of five charges: travelling to Europe to counter any propaganda of atrocities on Bengalis; addressing a meeting supporting the army at the Teacher-Student Centre, University of Dacca; and acts of collaboration. Dacca University Records; ‘Proceedings of Trial’ P/File of Syed Sajjad Husain and Mohar Ali. Rao Farman Ali, Bhutto, sheikh mujib, bangladesh, translated from Urdu to Bengali by Mustafa Harun (Dacca, 1978), pp. 56-61. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan has been less than generous in apportioning blame to politicians, particularly Mujib and Bhutto in an effort to restore credibility to the army, see Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, (Karachi : OUP, 1993), pp. 240-45, 256-67, 270-72, 302 Ibid,, p. 56; Mahmud Ali, Nation and Nationality (Lahore, 1976), p. 12; for a biographical note on the author see pp. 7-12. Rao Farman Ali, op. cit., p. 4. CAP Debates, 21 Feb., 1956, pp. 3394-95; 3362-63; 3410-11. Rao Farman Ali, op. cit., p. 6. Memoirs of Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 272-73 Speech by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, CAP Debates, 21 Feb. 1956, pp. 3374-77. For the political party manifestos of the 1970 elections, see Bangladesh Contemporary Events and Documents (Govt. of Bangladesh, n. d.), pp. 67-75. Thus Spoke the Father, Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948)

372

12. 13. 14,

15.

16.

17,

18,

21.

22.

23.

The Sacred and The Secular

—Acode of Political Conduct as Prescribed by the Quaid-i-Azam (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad, nd.) pp. 22, 28. Tbid,, pp. 35-36. See Khwaja Shahabuddin’s statement, CAP Debates, 23 March 1951, p. 73. Speech by L. A. Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, at the first session of the Pakistan Muslim League Council held on 20 Feb. 1949 in Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi (English translation from Urdu speech, Govt. of Pakistan Publications, Karachi, n.d.). Pre-1947 contributions of the Muslim League to Muslim welfare had, as it were, acquired the weight of religious sanction. Speechby L. A. Khan at Khaligdina Hall in Feb. 1949. Howard Schuman, ‘A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism in East Pakistan’, American Journal of Sociology vol. 78, no. 2 (1972).

Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, South Asian Religion and Politics, D. B. Smith ed., p. 408. The sample of East Pakistanis was very small. The defect was corrected by a further interview of students, teachers and civil servants. Speech by Suhrawardy at the Consituent Assembly of Pakistan, CAP Debates, 6 March, 1948, p. 262. Ibid. Popular stories recount the surprise of West Pakistani jawans, on finding Korans in the Bengali homes they raided. They had been indoctrinated to expect only kafirs, or unbelievers. Aziz Ahmad, ‘Islam and Democracy in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent’, Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia, Robert F. Spencer (ed.), (Minneapolis, 1971), p. 137. See speech by Zaheeruddin Chowdhury Moazzam Hossain (Lalmian), an East Bengal Muslim Leaguer, at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 9 April 1952, CAP Debates 9 April 1952, p. 1294. For example, Syed Sajjad Husain, Mahmud Ali and Shah Azizur Rahman. In 1990 a popular civil disobedience movement forced General Ershad to step down from the Presidentship of Bangladesh. Subsequently, citizens’ groups have challenged the state to live up to its promises. Secular-oriented groups demanded the trial of Golam Azam, the amir of the Jama‘at-i-lslami, He was found guilty of war crimes in the ‘name of religion’ against the people of Bangladesh by a people's court in 1992. See Surma, London, May 1992.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

323

For detailed studies of the parliamentary period see Shamsul Huda Harun, Parliamentary Behaviour in a Multi-National State, 1947-58: Bangladesh

Experience (Dhaka, 1984), see particularly pp. 179-97; and Md. Abdul

‘Wadud Bhuiyan Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League

(Dacca, 1982), pp. 27-42; Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Politics of Development : The Case of Pakistan (Dacca, 1972); Keith Callard, Pakistan, a Political Study (London, 1957), Mushtaque Ahmed, Politics

Without Social Change (Karachi, 1971), pp. 27-54; Ayub Khan, Friends

Not Masters — A

Political Biography

(London, 1967), pp. 48-69;

Richard S. Wheeler, The Politics of Pakistan — A Constitutional Quest (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 108-31. On the 1954 elections in East Pakistan and

various ideological positions of political parties contesting the elections, see M. Bhaskaran Nair, 27.

‘Politics in East Pakistan:

A Study of 1954

Elections’, South Asian Studies, vol. 17, Jan.-June 1982, pp. 36-69. View of Zakir Hussain, see Pakistan Observer (Pak. Obs), 21 Aug. 1951.

Indian integrity, derived from its culture and plurality, has been threat-

ened by the rise of the western idea of democratic nation-states and the

notion of a ‘Hindu’ majority identity. This is the basis of a well argued article on the explanation of contemporary communalism in India and the role of the BJP. See Rajni Kothari, ‘Cultural Context of Communalism in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, (hereafter, EPW), 14 Jan., 1989, pp. 81-85.

‘This is implicit in Jinnah’s speech in the Constituent Assembly on

11 Aug. 1947 in Karachi: “You may belong to any religion, caste, or

creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state ... We are

starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens of one

state. Now I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political

sense, as citizens of the state.’ CAP Debates, 11 Aug. 1947, quoted by

29.

T. Ali, Can Pakistan Survive (London, 1983), p. 42.

Objectives Resolution, reprinted in Z. A. Suleri, Politicians and Ayub (Rawalpindi, 1965), pp. 35-37. Also see the memorandum on Human

Rights in Pakistan submitted by the Committee on Fundamental Rights

of Citizens of Pakistan and on matters relating to minorities.

CAP Debates, 7 March, 1949. ‘The Jama’at-i-Islami was formed in India in 1941. In 1949, Maududi

came to Pakistan hoping to organize Pakistan into an Islamic state. In the mid-1950s, total Jama’at membership was about 1,000. It was then far less active in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. In 1952, for ex-

374

31. 32. 33.

41. 42.

43.

45.

The Sacred and The Secular

ample, out of 50 dispensaries serving 130 centres, only five were in East Pakistan. Yet the 1970 elections showed the Jama’at to be the second ‘most popular party in East Pakistan, although it polled only 4.5 per cent of all votes as against 70.45 per cent votes polled by the Awami League, the most popular party. The Jama’at polled 678,159 valid votes and the Awami League polled 10,616,143. See Freeland Abbott, ‘The Jama’atislam’, The Middle East Journal vol. XI, no. 1 (Winter 1957), pp. 4546; Election Commission, Report on General Elections, Pakistan, 1970-71, vol. 1 (Karachi, 1972), pp. 216-17. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit, pp. 137-39. Charles J. Adams, ‘The ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi’, South Asian Religion and Politics, D. E. Smith, ed. (Princeton, NJ, 1966), p. 192. Speech by Suhrawardy on 6 March 1948 in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, CAP Debates, 6 March 1948, p. 262; Joint Electorates in Pakistan, Speech by Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan in the National Assembly on 22 April 1957 (Karachi, 1957). Joint Electorate in Pakistan, pp. 2,46. Speech by Liaquat Ali Khan, CAP Debates, 6 March 1948, pp. 274-76. Speech by Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, 6 March 1948,p. 268. Speech by Professor Raj Kumar Chakravarty, 6 March 1948, pp. 269-71. Speech by Peter Paul Gomez, 21 Feb. 1956, pp. 3372-73; also see Nazimuddin’s statement on 29 March 1952, p. 799. Speech by Khwaja Nazimuddin on 29 March 1952 at the Constituent Assembly, CAP Debates, 29 March 1952, pp. 793-94; for the association of Hindus with communism, see the question put by Abdul Monem Khan, ibid., 26 March 1952, p. 485. Speech by Khwaja Nazimuddin, CAP Debates, 29 March 1952, p. 777. Speech by B. K. Dutta, CAP Debates 29 March 1952, p. 777. Speech by Bhabesh Chandra Nandy in the Constituent Asembly of Pakistan on 18 March 1954, CAP Debates, p. 102; Speech by Mohammad Abul Quasem in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 20 March 1954, ibid., 20 March 1954, p. 277. Speech by Mohammad Abul Quasem, ibid., p. 276. See CAP Debates of 6 March 1948, pp. 260-78. Suhrawardy had spent some time in India taking care of the interests of Indian Muslims, another minority community. Suhrawardy’s own view was that Naziumuddin served an expulsion order on him because of the success af his missions for inter-communal harmony. See Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, pp. 110-11. The Principle of Electorate, a pamphlet containing a speech by H.S.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

Si. 52. 53.

57.

58.

375

Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan, in the National Assembly ‘of Pakistan, Dacca, on 10 Oct. 1956. Joint Electorates in Pakistan, p. 2. Ibid, pp. 4,68. Keesing’s Research Report, Pakistan: from 1947 to Bangladesh, p. 66 (New York, 1973). Speech in the Constituent Assembly, see CAP Debates, 6 March 1948. Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca, 1980), table 3, p. 32. Kalim Bahadur, The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan — Political Thought and Political Action (New Delhi, n.d.), p. 165. C.J. Adams, op. cit., p. 390-95. Mohammad Ali, who replaced Fazlul Huq as Chief Minister of Bengal in 1954, held that Islam was a positive ideology against communism. New York Times Index, 1954, p. 815; New York Times, 18 July 1954, p. 4, column 1. Independents won three seats and Abul Hashim’s Khilafat-e-Rabbani party won one seat only. Within the United Front, EPAML won 143 seats, Krishak Sramik Party 48, Nizam-e-Islam 19, and Mahmud Ali's Ganatantri Dal 13 seats. See Morning News, 4 April 1954: Dawn, 20 Oct. 1954. Of the 72 non-Muslim seats, Congress took 24, the minority United Front 10, Ganatantri Dal3, Communist Party of East Pakistan 4, Scheduled Cast Federation 27, Christian 1, Buddhist 2 and Independent (Caste Hindu) 1. The 1954 provincial elections were held under the system of separate electorates. See Report on the General Election to the East Bengal Legislative Assembly held in 1954 (Dacca, 1954), p. 31. Keesing’s Research Report, op. cit., pp. 31, 35. ‘The charge was made by Nurul Amin, who was Governor of East Bengal in 1952 when students demanding national status for the Bengali lan‘guage were shot by police. He was a member of the counter-vernacular intelligentsia and shared the attitudes of the upper ashraf which exercised power in the Muslim League. This group asserted that the aim of the United Front was to form a United Bengal which would be part of ‘Bharat’ or India. See Morning News, 5 Jan. 1954 and 2 March 1954. For a detailed study of the elections of 1954, see M. Bhaskaran Navi, ‘Politics in East Pakistan: A Study of 1954 Elections’, op. cit., pp. 36-69. Speech by Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 28 June 1954, CAP Debates, 28 March 1954, pp. 1360-69. Also see the New York Times Index for the period. For a discussion on Faziul Huq’s Calcutta trip, see Biswas, Bangabandhu Mujibur Rahman (Calcutta, 1971), pp. 31-37.

376

The Sacred and The Secular

61. 62.

63.

65.

peace’. ‘These parties, for example, differed on the issue of One Unit in West Pakistan. The East Pakistan National Awami Party wanted it dismembered; the Council League and the Nizam-e-Islam party preferred to remain silent, while the Awami League was embarrassed because it was responsible for instituting One Unit. Pak. Obs., 13 Sept. 1964. Pak. Obs., 13 and 17 Sept. 1964, 15 Dec. 1964. Pak. Obs., 13 Sept. 1964. Bhashani thrived in opposition politics. After the creation of Bangladesh, when the state ideology was secular, Bhashani insisted on a more religious order and set up his Hukumat-e-Rabbaniyat Samiti in 1974. On Bhashani’s politics, ie. non-communalism, religiosity as well as communist views see Syed Abul Maksud, Bhashani, maulana abdul hamid Khan bhashanir jiban, karmakanda, rajniti o darsan, vol. 1 (Dhaka, 1986), pp. 26-35, 499-517. Pak. Obs., 29 Sept. 1964. Pak. Obs., 1 Dec. 1964. Pak. Obs., 3 Oct. 1964. Pak. Obs. ibid. Pak. Obs., 3, 24 Oct. 1964. Fatima was described as a weak person who *had no knowledge of the circumstances prevailing in the country’, and who was a venerable person only as the sister of the Quaid-i-Azam. Nazimuddin, a former Prime Minister, was described as ‘incompetent’ and ‘unable to take decisions’. General Azam Khan, a former Governor of East Bengal was criticized for siding with politicians he had himself blamed earlier for making a mess of the country. The Jama’at-i-Islami was accused of twisting Islam for its own ends, and Ayub in tum was accused of the same offence by the Jama’at. See also Pak. Obs., 30 Nov. 1964, Pak. Obs., 19 Oct. 1964. Pak. Obs., 24 Oct. 1964. Pak, Obs. 30 Nov. 1964; 1 Dec. 1964. Speech by Abdul Monem Khan

338

67.

na. 72.

73. 74. 75.

Jyoti Sen Gupta, op. cit., p. 39. CAP Debates, 12 April 1954, pp. 1209-10. Keesing's Research Report, p. 66. Sylvia A. Chipp, ‘The Role of Women Elites in a Modernizing Country: The All Pakistan Women’s Association’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1970), pp. 176-83. Pakistan Times, 18 June, 1964; Freeland Abbott, ‘Pakistan and the Secular State’, South Asian Religion and Politics, DE Smith ed., p. 362. Ayub considered Maududi to be ‘a danger to the public

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

377

to members of the Darussunnat Alia Madrasah, Sarsina, Barisal on 30 Nov. 1964.

Pak. Obs. In fact such education was not imparted in non-government

6.

schools. Pak. Obs., 15 Dec. 1964. Pak. Obs., 24 Oct. and 1 Dec. 1964, Pak. Obs., 1 Dec. 1964. In 1954, 31 leading ulama of Pakistan had

B.

already given their verdict and Monem Khan cited their example in sup-

port of his stand. Letter to the editor, Pak. Obs., 7 Oct. 1964, Letter, ‘Woman as Head of State’ by Mohsenuddin Ahmed (Dudu Mia) and Mohiuddin Ahmed (Dadan Mia) of Dacca, to the editor of Pakistan Observer, 23 Dec. 1964, Presidential Election Result, 1965, Election Commission, Govt. of

£8

Pakistan, pp. 1-11.

CAP Debates, 24 March 1951.

Liaquat Ali, for example, was supposed to represent Bengali interests at

the centre. Being a migrant from Uttar Pradesh, after partition his con-

stituency shifted to East Bengal. Very few resolutions representing East

Bengal interests were passed at the Centre at the time. A peculiar phenomenon in 1954 was that the United Front victory was followed

by large-scale riots between Bengalis and non-Bengalis, particularly

at Adamjee Jute Mills in Narayanganj. The United Front believed that the Muslim League was responsible for the lawlessness as it hoped to invite intervention by the Centre. The Centre, on the other hand, blamed

communists and Indian agents; CAP Debates, 28 June 1954, pp. 1360-99;

3 July 1954, pp. 1400-95.

Keesing’s Research Report, op. cit, p. 19; Pak. Obs., October issues of 1951.

Hasanaujjaman, Chheshattir svayatvasasan andolan (Autonomy Movement of 1966: A Turing Point of Bengali Nationalism by Hasanuz87.

zaman) (Dacca, 1979), pp. 9, 17-18, 14-16, 18-19. For a study of Ayub’s growth policies, see G. Papanek, Pakistan’s

Development — Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). On Berigali discontent over their economic interests see Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston, 1967),

p. 213. Government of Bangladesh, Contemporary Events, tables I, V and VII,

Pp. 6, 9-10; A. N. M. Mahmood, ‘Regional Allocation of Resources in the First Five Year Plan’, Pak. Obs., 25 Nov., 1956; also see D. R. Mankekar, Pak Colonialism in East Bengal (Delhi, 1971), p. 16.

378

The Sacred and The Secular

38

D. R. Mankekar, op. cit., p. 18. Hasanujjaman, op. cit., pp. 20, 26. 91. Ibid., pp. 29-30. On the army view about the Agartala Conspiracy Case are the Memoirs of Lt, Gen. Gul Hassan Khan,, op. cit., pp. 240-41. 92. Report on General Elections, Pakistan, 1970-71, vol. 1, Election Commission (Karachi, 1972), pp. 198, 201, 216-17. The Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats contested and 70.45 per cent of the votes. 93. Tradition had come to acquire the weight of religious sanction. Thus legitimacy would be sought in past pronouncements such as Jinnah’s opinions, the pre-1947 Muslim League policies and statements. Speech by Mujib in Nov. 1970, The Bangladesh Papers (Calcutta, 1979), p. 105. 95. Govt. of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Ganaparishad, March 1972. On the social origins of the Bangladesh power elite, also see T. K. Barua, The Political Elite of Bangladesh (Bern, 1978), pp. 25-26; R. Sobhan and M. Ahmed, Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime (Dacca, 1980), annexure III. 6; M. Rashiduzzaman, ‘Leadership, Organisation, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement’, Asian Survey vol. XI, no. 3 (March 1972), tables I, Il, Ill, pp. 187-89. T. K. Barua, op. cit,, p. 43. Raunag Jahan, ‘Members of Parliament in Bangladesh’, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, Emajuddin, ed. (Dacca, 1980), p. 142. For a discussion of the influence of local customs see chapter 1; also see Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton, N. J., 1983), pp. 69, 75-76, 81-83, 87-110. For the relative weakness of communal tension even in the urban areas of Bast Bengal like Dacca, see A. K. Chanda, Ninth Q. R. 1932-1937 (Alipore, 1939), p. 82. Hindu and Muslim students of Dacca Intermediate College lived in harmony. The May 1930 riots were believed to have been instigated by outsiders, mainly non-Muslims. The worst riots occurred in Calcutta particularly in 1946, For discussions of communal riots see S. Bose, Agrarian Bengal and S. Das, Communal Riots. 100. ‘The Jama’at-i-Islami collaborated most actively in the 1971 genocide and provided most of the Al-Badr recruits, See Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive (London, 1980), p. 92. The terms Al-Badr and Razakar were taken from highly regarded events in Islamic history such as the Battle of Badr. 101. ‘Basic Features of the Constitution’, The Bangladesh Papers, pp. 67-68. 102. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, Thursday, 14 Dec. 1972. 103. English translation of speech by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Dacca,

104, 105.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism 379 Extemal Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Govt. of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972, pp. 16-17. Ali Anwar (ed), Dharmanirapekshata (Secularism) (Dacca, 1973), pp. 86-87. Kamruddin Ahmed, Banglar madhyabitter atmabikas, p. 13, author's translation.

Such an attitude was held by Dr Ibn-Golam Samad, a university professor in Bangladesh, See Ali Anwar, Dharmanirapekshata, p. 34. 107. This view was expressed by Prof. Shah Muhammad Habibur Rahman of the economics department of Rajshahi University. ibid., pp. 31-32. 108. Bangladesh Siksha Commission (Qudrat-e-Khuda) Report, 1974, cited by A. Ali, History of Traditional Islamic Education in Bangladesh (Dacca, 1983), p. 194. 109. Act no. XVII of 1975, an Act to Establish an Islamic Foundation, Bangladesh Acts for the Year 1975, Ministry of Law, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dacca, p. 104. 110. See Ali Anwar, Dharmanirapekshata for the proceedings of the conference. 111, B. Umar, ‘The Political Cycle of Maulana Bhashani’, Holiday, special supplement on Maulana Bhashani, 18 Jan. 1970; Syed Abul Maksud, Bhashani, pp. 499-517. 112. For the election results, see The Bangladesh Observer, 8-10 March, 1973. 113. Abul Fazi Hug, ‘The Problem of National Identity in Bangladesh’, The Journal of Social Studies, no. 24, April 1984, p. 55. 114. New York Times, 26 Dec. 1972, p. 12, column 3. The Al-Badr, the action front of the Jama’at-i-Islami, was responsible for a mass murder in Muhammadpur. The only survivor D. Hossain recounted the events. 115. Janayuddha, May-June 1973, p. 33, cited by Faz] Hug, op. cit., p. 52. 116. For a detailed discussion of the role of the left in the Liberation War and in Bangladesh, see T. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca, 1980), pp. 141-153, 169-79; A. Faz Hug, op. cit,, pp. 49-55. 117. ‘Among the self-confessed killers of Mujib were Majors Dalim, Farouk, Rashid, Noor and Shahriar. On 15 Aug. 1975, Dalim announced over Radio Dacca, ‘Sheikh Mujib has been killed. Praise God, Bangladesh is now an Islamic Republic’. Rashid and Farouk claimed on Independent Television, London current affairs programme World in Action, broadcast on 2 Aug. 1976 that they had killed Mujib because they wished to establish an Islamic Republic. 106.

380

The Sacred and The Secular

Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh : The Unifinished Revolution (London, 1979); also see The Eclipse of Secular Bangladesh, a Radical Asia Publication (London, 1981), pp. 8-9, (henceforth Eclipse of Secular Bangladesh); T. Maniruzzaman, op. cit., pp. 186-87. 119. For a refutation of the charges of corruption against Mujib, see P. Addy, G. Rizvi and A. Matin, Bangladesh: Distortions Challenged (London, 118.

1986).

120. Talukder Maniruzzaman,

‘Bangladesh Politics : Secular and Islamic

Trends’ in S. R. Chakravarty and V. Narain (eds.) Bangladesh : History

and Culture,

vol.1 (New Delhi : South

Asian

Publishers,

1986)

pp. 47-54, 121. Zillur R. Khan, ‘Islam and Bengali Nationalism’, Asian Study, vol. XXV, no. 8, August 1985, pp. 845-48. 122. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (as modified up to 28 February 1979), Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Govt. of Bangladesh, Dacca, 1979.

123,

For a recent study of Zia’s rise to power and his policies, see Golam

124.

of a Military Regime (Dhaka, 1988). In April 1979, Shah Azizur Rahman was made Prime Minister of BangIadesh. See Eclipse of Secular Bangladesh, p. 17.

Hossain, General Ziaur Rahman and the BNP, Political Transformation

125. See Acts no. XXXI, XXXVII, A Collection of Acts and Ordinances,

1980, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Govt. of Bangladesh

126.

(Dacca, 1980).

The World Bank, Bangladesh Economic and Social Development Prospects, Report no. 5409 (1985), vol. IV, p. 11; The World Bank, Promoting Higher Growth and Human Development (1987), Report no. 1616 BD, vol. II, p. 6; and Monthly Statistical Bulletin of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics (Dhaka, 1991), p. 8.

Eclipse of Secular Bangladesh, p. 13. ‘The view that religion and politics come together where political institutions are weak has been argued by Emajuddin Ahmed and D. R. J. A. Nazneen. See their ‘Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics’, Asian Survey, vol. XXX, no. 8, Aug., 1990, p. 795. 129. For example, a duality in temporal and spiritual roles has been conceded in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Historically such daulity was also exercised during the period of Mu’tazilities. See E. Mortimer, Faith and Power, the Politics of Islam, op. cit., pp. 50-53, 60-64.

127, 128.

Faith, Authority and the Challenge of Secularism

Appendix 6.A PERSON TYPES

Person Types A&C Religious & Communal A&D Religious & Non-communal or secular (2) B&C — Non-eligious & Communal or B&D

‘Secular (1)

Example ‘Maududi, Raul Quddus Kamruddin Ahmed, Abul Mansur ‘Ahmed Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan

— Non-religious & non-communal or Prof. Abdur Razak, Muzaffar secular (1) and secular (2)

Ahmed

Appendix 6.B @

‘Aggressive Atheismy jcism PoA o7A®M

@

STATE TYPOLOGIES

Tolerant Atheism/ni PoA

O>BO

Atheistic State

@

Tolerant Religions PB

O7AO

Secular State

P O

— Personal choice — Choice for others

B F C

— Believer — Forces others — Allows others to be what they want

A — Albeist/A gnostic

(4)

Aggressive Orthodox PoB

O>-B®

‘Theocratic State

381

CHAPTER

7

RELIGION, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS

Introduction

While the interplay of religion and politics has at times been confron-

tational, the social sphere has been relatively free of conflict. The guardians of social control, the religious intelligentsia, continued to maintain their influence on areas of legislation such as the right to

property and inheritance since the colonial period. This dominance has

only been periodically challenged, for example, by women’s groups,

which, with the rise of a women’s movement, were increasingly aware

that Islamic justice was being denied to them. A certain degree of

tension was inevitable due to differences in interpretation of religious

injunctions, but this was confined largely to intellectual circles and did not usually affect common people who were disinterested in the finer

nuances of meaning. Not only religious beliefs but also institutions and

practices perceived to be derived from these were traditionally central

to the social existence of many Muslims. The extent of change notice-

able in the observance of religious rituals or in the belief structures of

the East Bengal intelligentsia in particular, has not been assessed so

far.' The ideals and values upheld in the fifties underwent further mutation in the seventies. The encroachment of liberal western ideas as well as modern educational and technological needs has inevitably in-

duced a measure of social change which affected the centrality of re-

ligious concerns for many of them. Perceptions of correct behaviour,

ethics and morality have changed correspondingly. This chapter will

deal with the views of the intelligentsia on matters of social concern

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

383

and highlight some of the debates they engaged in. These areas of concern are, for example, the role of religion in social life, religious institutions established by the state, the social role of the ulama as against its political role, the Islamic way of life, ritual conduct, contraception, fine arts, education, family laws and the position of women.

7.1. Role of Religion in Social Life Since the inception of Pakistan there was considerable debate and dis-

cussion on the role of Islam, not merely at the state level but also in

social life. The failure to recreate the age of the first four rightly-guided Khalifas, the Khulafa-i-Rashidun, drew attention to the need to purify

social life. The process, however, was accompanied by intense discus-

sion of Islam itself : the object was to understand and discover its laws

and determine the correct way to apply them to social life. No one

challenged the underlying notion ofa pure and underived Islam, the basic source of which was perceived to be the Koran.

One influential school of thought interpreted Islam in the spirit of

modern democracy. A major exponent, the north Indian scholar and

publicist, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, wrote in 1949:

Islam envisages the Muslims as a secular society believing in the principles of Islam and therefore acting on its precepts. ... Islam seeks to establish complete harmony among the real sovereign, the political sovereign and the legal sovereign.” He understood legal sovereign to be identical with Muslim law which was to be defined by the legislature representing the will of the people.

The political sovereign was the people who could elect and dismiss

their legislatures and governments. The real sovereign was embodied

in the principles of Islam, which were to be discussed at full length in

public fora. This view was popular with East Pakistani intellectuals whose nationalism underlined Islamic heritage and identity, but em-

phasized selectively the democratic traditions of early Islam.

‘The parliamentarian and editor of the daily, Azad, Maulana Akram Khan, held views which were diametrically opposed to such liberal

democratic interpretations. He believed that the fundamental civil law of Islam was contained in the Koran. As the Koran provided for every-

thing concerning Muslim lives, in the Islamic state there was neither

384

The Sacred and The Secular

‘scope nor necessity for people to express their ‘general will’ to be

transformed into law. In this authoritarian structure, both the legal and the political sovereign of the State would be located outside the legis-

latures and the people.

Others, however, declared that Islam was much more than a collection of formulae; it represented a particular attitude to life, an attitude which did not exclude dynamism. Abdus Salam, a contributor to the daily The Pakistan Observer, argued that Islam had to ‘conform, keep-

ing within the fundamental philosophy, to the changing needs of the

times’. He drew upon the history of Islam in support : the Koran, for instance, gave explicit injunctions on social and religious behaviour, but was silent on the question of election to the Caliphate. Salam con-

cluded that ‘perhaps God wanted us to learn through the experience of history’.’ Contributors to the debate generally agreed that Islam upheld

the values of equality, tolerance, and democratic spirit. However, there was less agreement regarding the essential basis of Islam.

The orthodox belief that Islam caters to every sphere of

life —

social, political and religious, and that it offers a complete code of

conduct for living was not without negative potential. Periodic attempts by reformists to interpret Koranic laws in the spirit of changing times have met with severe criticism. Maududi held that Islamic Law or Divine Law was derived from two sources: one, the Koran containing God’s commandments; and two, the ideal conduct of Prophet Muhammad. He thus quoted from the Koran : Tt is not for the faithful, man or woman, to decide for them-

selves a matter that has been decided by Allah or His mes-

senger, and whosoever commits an affront to Allah and His

messenger is certainly on the wrong path. (Sura Ahzab,

xxiii : 36)

This injunction, if followed to the letter, means that the Koran cannot be interpreted. Maududi conceded that there was scope for limited human legislation subject to the supremacy of Divine Law. This was the

realm of ijtihad implying maximum effort to ascertain the correct mean-

ing; but he hoped to confine this right to the ulama alone. Human

legislation was permissible in the following areas. Firstly, by interpre-

tation : where categorical injunctions and prescribed rules of conduct

were given in the sunnah and Koran, even the ummah as a whole could

not alter the injunctions of the shariah. Human legislation was allowed

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

385

in the following matters : (a) to find out exactly what the law was, its nature and extent; (b) to determine its meaning and intent; (c) to in-

vestigate the conditions for which it was intended and the way it was

to be applied in practical problems; (d) to work out minor details in the case of such laws as were too brief for application in actual life;

(€) to determine the extent of applicability in cases of exceptional cir-

cumstances. Secondly, by analogy

: for cases where no injunction was

laid down by the shariah, analogous situations could be used as models.

‘Thirdly, by inference : where no specific guidance was provided, the

intention of the lawgiver was to be inferred; the legislature was to understand and act on these inferences in formulating laws for practical situations. Fourthly, through the province of independent legislation:

this was confined to those situations for which the shariah offered no solutions. The laws formulated for this sphere should be according to

the spirit of Islam and its ideology.

In ‘The Sunnah and Ijtihad : Some Doubts Clarified’, Maududi

affirmed the validity of the sunnah 2s a source of law.‘ Since the

Prophet’s death, Muslims have tried to ascertain exactly what the established sunnah was and whether any novel factor, bid’a, was ‘entering the system through forged means: The results admittedly

represented no uniform consensus. According to Maududi, no one had the authority to change the injunctions of the Koran and the

sunnah, but in exceptional circumstances ijtihad could be utilized to

ascertain situations justifying deviations to suit exigencies. He thus

contradicted his earlier stance which precluded any deviation whatsoever from the Koran and sunnah. The generally accepted sources of Islamic law were the Koran

and Hadith. The least threat of an interpretation modifying accepted Islamic laws and practices usually caused a tremendous furore. In

1955, changes in Cairo created reverberations in East Bengal. The

Pakistan Observer noted

in its editorial :

‘This citadel of Islamic orthodoxy has been going through the birth pangs of a modem orientation, a sort of reformation of the spirit, a tentative groping toward a redefinition of the basic

Pattern of religio-sociological thought.”

The rector of Al-Azhar University provoked severe criticism by recommending polygamy to males. A teacher of the university suggested

386

The Sacred and The Secular

that fasting during Ramadan was not obligatory; yet another, that con-

traception was permissible under certain circumstances. For the first time in the history of the university, a woman, Begun Zebunnisa of Karachi, was allowed to address students. The editorial saw these as examples of stirrings of doubt, a desire to reconsider the basic ideo-

logical content of religious philosophy. These were welcomed as the “most tremendously significant thing in the history of Islam since the

Mutazilites were silenced’. The editor was convinced that the Pakistani

ulama would now be forced to admit that the Muslim world could and

did change :

Our wlama can no longer afford to shut their eyes and feel secure in a world that never changes ... They are forced to take notice and in taking notice they are compelled to undertake the unpleasant, the uncomfortable, the laborious task of thinking out a fresh philosophy of religion in conformity with their basic beliefs."

The ulama, however, did nothing of the sort. An Aligarh graduate re-

siding in Dacca found the editorial ‘disgusting’ particularly because it was written by a Muslim who must surely know that the fundamentals of Islam could not be compromised. To him the modernist desire to

interpret the Koran and Hadith was ‘a malady’ because the scriptures

had already shown the ‘light’ and provided all the solutions to ‘our

social, economic and political problems’.? Another commentator

rejected the criticism that Islam thus far interpreted could not meet all the demands of modern civilization. He held that the Koran and Hadith,

if dutifully followed, could guide man through all centuries to come.'°

No explanation was offered for what had happened in Cairo. Instead,

the events were described as ‘a clear indication of the forces working

against Islam’." Such an approach offered no scope for the reappraisal of perceptions. Those who attempted it risked being declared

kafir. Within such a frame of discourse, the ulama did not feel any

need for activism : they were convinced that Islam was a dynamic and

not a static religion, and so, all needs of all ages were catered for. The faithful were thus relieved of the responsibility to explore, interpret and adjust their belief structure. The nature of the dynamism, the orthodox claimed for Islam, however, was never explained. Mafizullah

Kabir, who later became professor of history at Dacca University, offered an explanation about why learned Muslims were unable to deal

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

387

with fresh challenges to orthodox Islam. He underlined in this context

theiranxiety to prove that Islam was ‘the embodiment of all progressive

ideas’.

The tendency to explain Islam in ‘modern’ terms probably accounted for its failure to be a dynamic force in Bengali society. A

Muslim scientist was expected to believe that all progress in modern

science could be traced to the Koran; the economist was supposed to discover the principles of Islamic socialism in the same source. When

asked to be democratic, a Muslim was quick to answer that ‘in Islam

there is the fullest possible realization of democracy’.'* Such a stance

precluded any possibility of reassessing current practices and reinter-

preting Islamic doctrines. While it was thus possible to maintain belief in the supremacy of Islam as a complete code of cgnduct, it was im-

possible to derive any new codes which could be ntore appropriate in

a twentieth century setting. Such a position was aimed at proving that

for a Muslim, change in time was immaterial, that the future progress of history could hold no surprises as Islam had answers to all situ-

ations.

Kabir, however, read,a rather different meaning

in the attitude

to Islam which interpreted. the injunctions of the faith differently under different circumstances. He failed to find the true spirit of

Islam in such changing equations, and asked ‘whether Islam is true,

the modem ideas are true or the future ideas willbe true’. He concluded: Islam will be true for all time when by Islam we mean the sum

total of some broad principles creating some broad outlines within which we are to move freely.”

In 1961, Syed Sajjad Husain, also a university teacher, created a stir

by suggesting that the fundamental basis of Islam was tawhid, or belief

in the oneness of God rather than the sunnah. Much of the debate on Islam had sought to ascertain the relative weights of belief and ritual

practice. The five basic principles of Islam in order of importance according to Hussain were

:iman (faith), salaat (prayer), siyam (fasting),

zakat (religious tax) and hadj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Husain held the

view that belief which governed action was more important than mere conduct or outward conformity to a code : ‘we have tended

in the

recent past to emphasize outward conformity at the cost of real belief

388

The Sacred and The Secular

or iman’. The acceptance of iman meant to him the acceptance of

tawhid. He challenged the relevance of the sunnah in the modern world

where even the meaning of the word ‘religion’ had not changed : ‘We must inquire whether we have not created some unnecessary problems

for ourselves by identifying Islam with things which are accidental or

transient or necessarily subject to change.’ The belief that Islam is a

complete code of life which does not exclude any aspect from its pur-

view, if taken literally, would mean that the Prophet had forecast the

whole of human history in detail — something he never claimed. The

‘vision of an unchangeable and unchanging Islam’ does not ‘fit in with

the conceptions of ijma and qiyas’, held Husain; on the contrary, he

saw Islamic society as continually evolving, with Muslims facing and

solving each new problem in the spirit in which the Prophet dealt with

analogous questions. The basis of Islamic ethics lay in distinguishing

between good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, honesty and

dishonesty. An ethic emphasizing the fundamental values of truth, jus-

tice and charity along with tawhid was considered compatible with modern life."

The Pakistan Observer hailed Husain’s views as ‘provocative in

that it made such an unorthodox approach to Islam’, and that the

Muslim world required such examination of Islam in the context of

modern life.'’ Others, however, were less enthusiastic. One reader

protested that Dr Husain ‘had explained sunnah away’. Another argued that the Koran was the main source of Islam and the sunnah

its only authentic interpretation. He disagreed with Husain’s vision of the ‘evolving Islamic society’

: the sunnah could not be consid-

ered as ‘the practice of a particular time and place’ because

Muslim, time has neither beginning nor any end’."*

‘to a

The Koran, however, continued to be viewed as the basic source of Islamic law. In the seventies, Justice S.M. Murshed held that

only when the Koran was silent on a

particular issue, law was to

be discovered through precedents in the Hadith and the opinions of the learned. He believed that God clearly commanded

man to learn,

gain knowledge and propagate truth, that those who submitted them-

selves to the will of Allah would have nothing to fear." In Islam,

he argued, faith was more important than external ritual behaviour. Thus, religiosity was not determined by whether one faced the Ka’aba,

but by whether one had faith in Allah, His messenger,

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

389

the Day of Judgement, the Holy Book and the nabis (prophets); did good deeds, such as spend one’s wealth on relations, orphans and

the needy; freed slaves; performed salaat; gave the poor their dues;

and remained patient in the face of pain and danger. Murshed’s

interpretation, like that of Hasan Zaman twenty years earlier, saw

no scope for fatalism in Islam.” Each man was held responsible for

his actions and he alone was answerable for them. Thus each man

had to bear the burden of his own sins. This view is supported by Sura Sa’aba, ayat 25 which reads as follows : ‘Each man will be

responsible for what he earns’. Discussion of Islam in the seventies, particularly after the liberation war, centred around attempts to define the meaning of secularism since it was projected as a fundamental principle of state in the

1972 Constitution. Secularism was variously understood by maulanas

and mullahs as non-interference of the state in matters of religion,

as a this-worldly philosophy which could not coexist with religion which had a strong other-worldly content; and as an atheistic philosophy without any place for religion in political, social and per-

sonal life. In Bangladesh, the basic meaning of secularism has been variously projected as religious neutrality meaning non-communalism, pursuit of politics on a non-religious basis, equal treatment of

citizens irrespective of creed, and an opposition to the misuse of

religion for political purposes. The editor of Islamik Ekademi Patrika

explained the emergence of these ideas in terms of religious beliefs of the majority which held that there should be no coercion

in mat-

ters of religion.” Many, however, were uncomfortable with the no-

tion of secularism, which they equated with irreligiosity. 7.2.

Religious Institutions

The ideal in Pakistan throughout the fifties and sixties was the estab-

lishment of an Islamic social and political system. In the fifties, the major emphasis was on formulating Islamic political structures. The

orthodoxy was satisfied with the declaration in the 1956 Constitution that Pakistan would be an Islamic republic. In the sixties the emphasis

shifted towards social concerns partly because the ulama realized that

it could not change the country’s political structures without capturing

power. Throughout the period, the state undertook several projects to

390

The Sacred and The Secular

bring about Islamic social reconstruction, partly in response to orthodox pressure and partly to meet expectations raised by the partition. In December

1948,

a statutory

body

was’ set up to collect and

administer zakat funds.” In March 1951 Bid-e-Milad-un-Nabi was

declared

a state function.

In April, the Constituent Assembly

re-

solved to take measures for Islamic social reconstruction. These i

cluded broadcasting a series of talks on moral and religious topics

and commentaries based on the Koran, and preparing special arrangements for Ramzan and Bid prayers, as well as for the announcement of sehri_and iftar timings.“ There was also discussion of restoring the Prophet’s mausoleum and harem.

In 1960, Ayub Khan recognized the Darul Ulum in Dacca as the Dacca Islamic Academy which would become a branch of the Central Islamic Research Institute in Karachi. Its activities, like those of the Karachi Institute had a twofold aim : to establish the basic principles and values of Islam; and to identify current norms inconsistent with Islam that needed to be eliminated. It was to formulate social politics based on the Islamic value system and determine how these could be applied in practical life. The aim was to re-create the age of the Khulafa-i-Rashidun.*

The Islamic Academy was very active in the first few years after it was founded. Under the directorship of Abul Hashim, who once led the Muslim League left wing, it attracted contributions from university teachers, civil servants, the learned ulama, and scientists.” The doctrinaire who merely asserted their positions without being able to justify them were generally not invited to participate in the periodic seminars and conferences organized by the academy. Consequently, they were both envious and hostile : they did not hesitate to accuse the organizers of acting on purely selfish motives. In the post-71 period, despite the state’s secular objectives, an Islamic Foundation was established by the Awami League government in 1975. When the army, supported by extreme right-wing segments within the orthodoxy, seized power, it was decided to set

up two Islamic universities, one in Shantidanga, and the other at Santosh.” The concern with Islam as a referrent of social and in-

dividual existence was quite pervasive. The ulama was a major force in ensuring that this was so.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

7.3.

391

The Social Role of the Ulama

‘The ulama could be divided into several categories : one, the orthodox

variety represented by contributors to the Madina where views were not explained but asserted forcefully and simply as the true principles

of the Koran; two, the liberal or tolerant ulama whose approach was

academic and aimed at deciphering Islamic laws and values — the

Islamik Ekademi Patrika, the mouthpiece of the Islamic Academy

founded by Ayub Khan, projected the views of this group; three, the orthodox political ulama represented by the Jama’at-i-Islami, whose aim was to capture power at the state level; and the Jamiyat-i-Ulamai-Islam. The official.mouthpiece of the Jama’at-i-Islami was Al-Islam published from Karachi. None of the three journals cited above projected views pertaining to current politics. Islamic legislation and enforcement of an Islamic

code of conduct were the major preoccupations of Al-Islam. The approach of the Islamik Ekademi Patrika was analytical and academic :

it discussed Islamic ideals rather than the problems relating to the application of those ideals. The Madina group undertook to challenge

both the liberal ulama and progressive intellectuals, the ‘secularists’, in an effort to project their vision of an Islamic society. Any views other than their own were treated with contempt. One of the rare instances when it commented on current politics was in 1970. It was quick to point out that the Awami League victory was not a victory

against Islam; that the election was not a referendum on Islam; and that the Awami League manifesto promised not to enact any law re-

pugnant to the Koran and sunnah.” It did not comment on the secular -

stand of the Awami League, or on the tremendous support given to the party by the Tagore-loving liberal intellectuals and those interested

in the reinterpretation of Islam as commonly understood.”

The founders, editors and contributors of these journals were interested, however, in establishing an Islamic society. By the sixties most of the religious organizations had realized that they could not establish

an Islamic state without exercising political power. But that seemed

impossible under Ayub Khan’s dictatorship and the strong measures

he had taken against the Jama’at-i-Islami including the arrest of its leader, Maududi. By avoiding overt political alliances the religious or-

ganizations hoped to be left alone by the state. They concentrated on

392

The Sacred and The Secular

social control through their respective interpretations of Islam. The Ayub regime and some of these groups had certain attitudes and inter-

ests in common, such as a strong anti-Indian sentiment. The Madina

clearly wished to see the division of Bengali language after 1947 so

that a new East Pakistani language could emerge.” They were in accord with Ayub’s policy of banning the broadcast of Tagore’s works. Such

shared objectives allowed certain religious groups to act freely so long

as their efforts were confined to attempts at purifying society in ac-

cordance with their perceptions of Islamic principles. In October 1963,

the Anjuman-e-Ulama was set up as a central organization of the ulama

on a non-political basis, to provide Islamic solutions to social prob-

lems and formulate

Islamic

and’ thoughts of people.”'

values which would guide the attitudes

The ulama and the madrasah-educated generally felt themselves

neglected in Pakistan. They remembered the past glory and contributions of the ulama to the social and political life of Bengal Muslims,

and wished to recapture some of it. They felt economically deprived

and did not see much scope for employment. Their hope for an Islamic

university as a solution to their problems showed no signs of being

realized.” In their campaign for an Islamic society their appeal was

puritanic. The butt of their attack was the expenditure of cultural activities and institutions. For instance, they resented the founding of the Lalan Research Institute in Kushtia because they could not strictly categorize Lalan Shah as either Hindu or Muslim. His followers, variously

known as ma’arfati fakirs, bauls or nerar fakirs were not regarded as Shariati. Some were accused of singing and dancing like the

vaishnavas and engaging in ‘shereki and kufri activities’. At times they

were persecuted by the ulama. Research on the life and works of Lalan

‘Shah was considered a waste.” Similar was the attitude to any expen-

diture on music or dance performances. They argued that the money

could have been better spent on the poor, religion-loving, God-fearing,

tax-paying, hungry peasants. A particular grievance was that they were

not being given their due. In other words, their educational needs, in

the form of madrasahs and an Islamic university, were not being met. A

major justification

for their

insistence

on

an

Islamic

social

order was the claim that Pakistan was created so that Muslims could

live according to Islamic principles and experiment with the estab-

lishment of an Islamic way of life. The Madina group, like other

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

393

Islamic groups or sects, believed that it alone adhered to an uncor-

tupted form of Islam. It accused the rich of not sharing with the poor; the progressives of Hinduizing the culture; government offi-

cials and businessmen of taking pleasure in seeing their wives and

daughters sing and dance in public. Parents were accused of straying

from the correct path by allowing their daughters to wear rouge, and tight clothes which displayed their bodily contours and physical

beauty. The views of the tolerant ulama, particularly, their desire to

seek a modem interpretation of the shariat were regarded with contempt.™ No criticism was made, however, of the pir cult, perhaps

because some of them derived their influence and livelihood: from

this practice, or because many customary practices had come to ac-

quire a sacred status. Enjoyment in any form was considered a sign

of depravity and inevitably contrasted with the pitiful lives of the

‘starving majority’. The pleasures of the rich were described as ‘ani-

malistic’, and dancers were likened to prostitutes.* Every act was

seen as either un-Islamic or Islamic, good or evil, black or white.

No grey areas were allowed. There was no room for manoeuvre,

compromise or revaluation in their scheme of: things.

- The language of censure was harsh and the tone condemnatory.

They believed that all unacceptable practices had to be stopped by

force. If that bore no results, then verbal protest had to be registered.

If this too proved difficult, then the guilty had to be treated with con-

tempt. In 1963, the East Pakistan Legislative Council passed a bill

banning public dancing by women. Quite rightly, the women protested

against this as an interference with their fundamental rights. Orthodox reaction was lacerating. The women were portrayed in vulgar

language as disreputable, to be shunned by society. They were invited

to join the ranks of prostitutes who lived outside the pale of society

-and did what they liked. In 1967, liberal intellectuals accused the

ulama of failing to meet the needs of the times. This immediately pro-

voked a strong rejoinder from the orthodoxy in a language both defensive and offensive. What were those needs and problems of the times?

asked the editor of Madina. He argued that Islam was a complete guide, that the ulama could never compromise on the basic principles of Islam

or agree to the modernization of the shariat. He asserted that Muslims

had never faced problems, the solutions to which gave rise to doubts

or conflicts. The liberals were then attacked as possessing vile motives,

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The Sacred and The Secular

of desiring to charge interest, eat pork, copy the West, mix freely with

women, dance with them and fornicate. They were also accused of seeking religious sanction for such ‘unholy practices’.”

The ulama perceived their role to include undertaking social wel-

fare activities, securing freedom for the oppressed and underprivi-

leged, waging war against the spread of undesirable influences such as westernization and corrupt values, caring for the needs of the soul, and challenging anti-God activities throughout the world.*

An ulama conference held in Dacca on 2 October 1963

took note of and resolved to protest against the rise in un-Islamic social

practices,

the activism of bate! dharmis

(outcast religious

groups) and the ‘corrupted’ explanations of Islam.” The Jamiyat-i-

Ulama-i-Islam set up in 1966 to publicize Islamic values, obstruct anti-Islamic tendencies, and fight social degradation, encouraged the ulama to come out of their madrasahs and assume an active social

role. At a meeting in Dacca on 15 May the Jamiyat passed several

resolutions protesting against existing practices perceived to be un-

Islamic, such as gambling, trade in alcohol, theft, fornication, birth control, singing and dancing. Some parts of the 1961 Family Laws

Ordinance, were challenged as anti-Islamic.” The Jamiyat, however,

was a political party with a strong belief in a religious social order

and

sought

its support base among the madrasah-educated ortho-

doxy. With the liberalization of political activities, a section of the ulama was again preparing for a bid for power, but keeping a grasp

over its base by appealing to emotive social issues. 7.4

The Islamic Way of Life

In the immediate post-partition period, there was considerable debate on Islam. Much of this focussed on an attempt to discover the ‘true’ Islamic way of life, to distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable, right from wrong and good from evil. Along with this there was an emphasis on correct, socially acceptable froms of behaviour.

There were 72 Islamic sects in Pakistan and each considered the others kafir. In East Bengal, opinions varied greatly between varigus sects particularly because there was no concensus about who was a Muslim. Some Hanafis considered Muhammadis to be non-Muslim and some Sunni mullahs even issued a fatwa declaring Shias to be

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

395

non-Muslim. Moreover, the 1953 Punjab riots had aroused the spectre

of ulama rule, particularly when no two alim could agree on the definition ofa Muslim.' These indicate that there was no consensus about any religious institution. It is in this context of differences in opinion,

perception and interpretation that one can comprehend the proposition

made by the Syrian scholar, Al-Azmeh, that there must be many Islams

and, that the Islamic way of life must necessarily differ from people

to people.”

It is difficult to ascertain whether there was heightened religious

activity right after partition in East Bengal. The following letter, how-

ever, indicates that there was at least an expectation that this should be so:

Sir, the ideals of Islam are little known nowadays and much less practised. To give religious independence to Musalmans and to safeguard their culture and civilization Pakistan has come into being. But to what extent have we followed the path of Islam 7°

Even in October 1965, a dark future for the country was predicted

because children were not taught the bare essentials of Islam such as

the Kalima. The sons and daughters of rich parents were oblivious of

the Islamic way of life.“ The ‘moral guardians’ of society were up in arms against the evil influences of industrialism, materialism and eman-

cipation of women. Al-Islam, the mouthpiece of orthodox Islam, found

it ‘impossible to reconcile Islam with the materialistic spirit of the twentieth century’ and declared : All means including the mass media, should be employed to

arouse among the people of the Muslim world sufficient resis-

tance to anti-Islamic laws and policies so that they refuse to co-operate in the spread of evil.”

Others, however, were less extreme in their criticism of western civilization, although their objective was to prove that Islam was superior.

Maulvi Abul Husain Akand held that western civilization could not

solve the problems of daily life as it emphasized physical, not mental,

needs and it took tare of the body, not the soul. Islam, on the other

hand, looked after both physical and spiritual needs. One was not required to be a sanyasi or a celibate; both family life and spirituality

were encouraged.“

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The Sacred and The Secular

Islamic thinkers, ideologues and theologians felt the challenge of

modem, western values as a crisis in Islam.” Sir Syed Ahmad Khan

had tried to adapt Islamic principles to the needs and conditions of

time and place in the nineteenth century. Twentieth century thinkers tried to prove that

Scientific attitude is not a monopoly of Secularists and Materialists. It has been given to the world by the Quran. The scientific method of analysis was applied to society first by Hazrat Umar (R) and afterwards by Ibn Khaldun in his ‘Muqaddima’. Grave concern was expressed at the ‘tremendous upheavals in values,

attitudes and patterns of thought and conduct’ faced by Muslims. The younger generations were viewed as ‘wanderers between two worlds — the East and the West’, who were probably not strong enough to

forge a synthesis between the two but would barely grasp the externals of western culture.”

‘Throughout the period under consideration, religious thinkers feared

the loss of morality based on religion among the youth and emerging

intelligentsia. They saw the latter as skeptical of Islamic values and

looking for inspiration, in ‘foreign creeds and philosophies’ to fill their

mental vacuum. This was ascribed to ‘the absence of any Islamic lit-

erature worth the name in Bengali language’; it was suggested that

Bengali Muslims be educated through translations of original works in

Bengali.” The irreligiosity of the young was also attributed to the me-

dieval outlook of the ulama and their traditional approach to the inter-

pretations of Islam. While its essential values and ethical and Philosophical basis were not sufficiently stressed, its formal aspects

were made much of. K. M. A. Munim, a Dacca University lecturer, felt that in order to make an impression on the younger generation and

intellectuals, it was important to show that Islam was not just a ‘religion

of mere forms and dogmas’.*' It was suggested that teachers had an

important role to play in imparting the right values to pupils, but that

these teachers should be learned themselves and embody the virtues of Islam, as personal example was the best method of teaching. This no-

tion stemmed from the belief that the indifference of youth to religion

resulted from unclear notions about it.” In 1961, I. H. Qureshi echoed

Munim when discussing the roles of religion and social consciousness

in the formation of national character. He attacked the conflict between

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

397

belief and action as a prime obstacle. This conflict, he noted, was because ‘the social teachings of Islam are not emphasized either in the

press or on the pulpit’. Talks of Islamic brotherhood were not followed

by explanations of the social obligations entailed, such as the treatment

of others with a spirit of love, and willingness to serve with a readiness

to sacrifice one’s own interests. Similarly, the principle of equality was

never explained in a manner that would inspire respect for other mem-

bers of society irrespective of their socio-economic status. It was never

suggested that the principle implied a conscious effort to remove all inequalities and to raise the less fortunate to a standard commensurate

with dignity and well-being. Social justice was talked of from a political

platform, but not from the pulpit. Even when it was mentioned, its

implications, like equality of opportunity, were not. Such teaching was

provided in the classical period of Islam through free education. Infaq,

a cardinal virtue according to the Koran, emphasized the necessity of understanding the needs of fellow citizens and meeting these by reduc-

ing one’s own. There are several relevant teachings of Islam which were not mentioned anywhere : for example, injunctions against the adulteration of food, and hoarding to cause artificial shortages. Cor-

ruptions and bribery was not censured in mosques nor were the guilty persecuted by religious leaders :

We are generally led to believe that Islam consists only in

belief, prayers, and the observance of certain rites, but the spirit of this belief, these prayers and these rites is never emphasized.

There was no social censure of dishonest persons as in the days of

yore, when pious men refused to accept invitations from the corrupt, thus building up opinion against corruption.

75

Ritual Conduct

An important area of concern for the intelligentsia was ritual conduct. Although there was little disagreement on the principal rituals to be

observed as a mark of faith, differences occurred about ideas of ritual

purity and notions of halal and haram (ritually acceptable and unac-

ceptable). Islamic rituals were widely accepted as means by which to make one’s life pure and beautiful. These rituals include roza (fast),

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The Sacred and The Secular

namaz (prayer), hajj (pilgrimage) zakat (religious tax), salaam (greet-

ings) etc. Namaz was particularly recommended as a means of purifying

oneself of daily sins unwittingly committed, since ‘the human tendency

is to sin and make mistakes’. The Friday prayers of juma jama’at not

only offered the possibility of atonement for sins once a week like the Sunday confessional among Catholics but also provided a ‘training

ground of equality and brotherhood’. The other jama’at namaz with

a similar purpose occurred during Eid and hajj, but Eid is celebrated only twice a year and few can afford the hajj pilgrimage. In congre-

gational prayers no distinction was made between the rich and poor —

all prayed together as equal servants of God. Roza and zakat purified

the soul and provided inspiration to sympathize with sufferers. The payment of zakat, which was a certain proportion of one’s wealth —

one-tenth of the produce of zamindars, one-fifth of the produce of fruit growers, one-fortieth of the hard cash, ornaments, cattle etc. of busi-

nessmen — was obligatory for all Muslims. It was to be collected by men of religion and spent on purposes specifically set down in the Koran,

in the public interest and for the common good.

In the minds of the intelligentsia, ideas of purity and impurity or

halal and haram were also linked with the concept of ritual conduct.

Thus stress was laid on halal earnings and on halal food. Earning

through unfair means was haram. Prayers offered in clothes bought with haram money was considered unacceptable to God. War booty

collected by Muslims in whatever manner was halal, and so was the meat of hunted birds and beasts. Among

haram

food were included

pork, alcohol and the meat of animals slaughtered in contravention to

the rules laid down by shariat.” Between halal and haram there were uncertain areas which were difficult to tread. In the case of a hunted

bird which falls into water after being shot and is picked up dead, the

cause of death remains unclear : it could have died from drowning or from being shot. Some thought that such meat should be counted as

haram.* Here one is already in an area where ritual correctness has precedence over moral considerations. ‘There were other issues where basic values and correct observance

both appear to have been considered. Riba or interest is a case in point.

In May 1966 the Sylhet Zilla Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam protested against the Pakistan government's policy of imposing interest on belated tax

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

399

payments; they argued that every Muslim was forced to engage in an

act that was haram.®

Of course, there was no universal consensus on such matters. Certain

practices common in East Bengal, like pir adulation, and worship at

shrines were considered shirk especially by those influenced by the Wahabi tradition and disrespectful of the sufi heritage of Ben-

gal. Maulana Akram Khan stood against all forms of bedat or the incursion

of corrupt practices in Bengali Islam. For example, he objected to the

observance of social customs such as chehlum, matam or siyam. These were social gatherings where prayers were offered for the peace of de-

parted souls, but which were not based on scriptural authority. The building of mausoleums over graves, the offering of prayers by the graveside,

making manat or vows at shrines were similarly considered haram. Man’s

desire to seek intercession between himself and God through holy men like pirs and sanyasis was condemned because he believed that Islam

recognized no intermediary between man and God.* Akram Khan propa-

gated his views advocating the desirability of an uncorrupted Islam

through his journal, Masik Mohammadi, at a time when it was not safe

to criticize pirs. Even later, there was no strong opposition to the pir

cult. On the contrary, pirs have enjoyed tremendous popularity and social power. Maulana Shah Sufi Abu Bakr of Furfura, Shah

Syed

Murshid

Ali of Medinipur, and Shah Sufi Ahsanullah of Dacca, to name only

a few, had large followings in Bengal and beyond."' The pir of Sarsina was socially very active; he participated in ulama conferences and worked

hard to ‘purify’ society of corrupt influences and evil practices.” In March 1961, when the Shah Saheb of Paribagh, Shah Abdur Rahim, believed to be nearly 150 years old, passed away, 7,000 people turned up at his

janaza, or funeral prayer. Among them were the Governor of East Pakistan, Lt.Gen. Muhammad

Azam Khan, the former Prime

Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Hafizuddin, the Inspector-

General of Police, East Pakistan, and Ataur Rahman Khan, former Chief

Minister. In his lifetime, people went to the Shah Saheb with problems

of social, psychological and medical natures, expecting amulets, para

pani (blessed water) and special prayers. It was believed that he had

miraculous powers and therefore, his prayers were more likely to be

granted by God. It was claimed that the pir of Atrosi enjoyed political power as well through the influence he exercised on disciples who were

political personages.

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‘The Sacred and The Secular

Practices considered un-Islamic which were censured both at the social and at the state level included celebrations in relation to birth,

marriage and death, and superstitious beliefs regarding certain religious

institutions. Excessive spending on celebrations, the demand for exces-

sive mehr by the bride’s family, too much dependence on the ghatak

or marriage-broker, begging when not a destitute, etc. were criticized.

The observance of Shab-e-Barat, it was suggested, had superstitious

features. Particular practices which were censured included the exchange of sweets among friends, neighbours and family; playing with

firecrackers; lighting candles which was considered proper only in mosques; beliefs that Hazrat Hamza became a shahid (martyr) on that day; that the souls of the dead came to see what had been cooked

for them; and that men’s fortunes were determined that night.

Ideas of correct behaviour were linked with the concepts of halal

and haram. The liberal intelligentsia emphasized the spirit of Islam rather than the letter of Islamic law. They were unwilling to say that drinking alcohol or dancing was forbidden. Instead, they treated any form of excess, including the application of force in religious matters,

to be unacceptable. The orthodox, on the other hand, sought to main-

tain social control by force through the state machinery, verbal protest and expressions of disgust and contempt.® This process intensified with

the state-sponsored religiosity since 1975, and particularly after Ziaur Rahman lifted the ban on religious parties in 1976. This act has allowed

religious extremists to become a third force increasingly determining the balance of power in the eighties and nineties. The following two sections will deal with specific areas of social

behaviour and practices which provoked debate among the intelligentsia about their ritual rectitude. These are contraception and the fine arts.

7.6

Contraception

Specific issues on which the Islamic code was invoked in surrounding controversies involved contraception. Debate was less intense than one

might expect on whether the practice was haram because the Hadith indicates that azal or coitus interruptus was a commonly used method

of birth control at the time of Prophet Muhammad. But the Koran makes no comment on this. Some believed that until a particular revelation occurred, Muhammad tended to adhere to the views of the Jews.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

401

At one time he held that azal was child murder, but at another time

he proclaimed that the Jews were wrong in considering it to be so.”

Most of the instances cited in the Hadith were of disciples who sought

the Prophet’s opinion regarding azal with maidservants and slaves. This

may be explained in purely economic terms : a slave who bore the

child of her master could never be sold again. She became free after

the death of the master and the child acquired rights to the property

of the father. Azal with a servant-wife was not considered haram under

any circumstance. However, the free wife’s permission was essential

for such an act. It was believed that the free wife had the right to children and to the satisfaction of her sexual desires, whereas the slave

or servant did not. Thus, the former had the right to leave a husband

who could not satisfy her sexually.*

‘The section called bitarkika (debate) in the Islamik Ekademi Patrika

of April-June 1962 had articles expressing mutually opposed views on

the subject. Golam Azam, General Secretary of the Jama’at-i-Islami,

accused the West of inventing contraceptives in order to indulge in sexuality and avoid the responsibilities of childbirth and rearing. He

rejected the arguments of economic hardship as false on the ground

that God would provide : ‘Do not kill your children for fear of want.

I shall provide for all.’ (Koran, Sura Al-Nisa, IV:17\°

Abul Kalam Abdul Awwal Mumtazul Fukaha refuted this view. He

cited Allama Ibn Zarir who held that this particular verse was directed against female infanticide amongst the Arabs. Women were considered

an economic burden at the time and therefore a possible. cause of increasing poverty. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that women

often had to be given in marriage below their status and this was con-

sidered both shameful and unacceptable.” Prophet Muhammad has been quoted in the Hadith as saying that ‘when God wished to create a child no one could prevent it’, that ‘until

the Day of Judgement, all forms of life which are to be created will be created’ and that ‘this is fate’. Many who opposed birth control, therefore, saw no advantage in practising it. But this attitude was ques-

tioned by those who argued that a similar fatalism would be equally relevant to matters related to eating, health, life and death, as God

determined everything.”

Those who opposed birth control were-worried about promiscuity

through irresponsible use. of prophylactics among unmarried youths.

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The Sacred and The Secular

‘They feared the spread of ‘social evils’ like pre-marital sex and illegitimate births. Sexual mores, not necessarily Islamic, influenced such responses. Golam Azam argued that no amount of family planning would solve the population problem. He sarcastically pointed to two possible, but unacceptable, types of national planning methods. One, was to abolish marriage and family life altogether and allow the free mixing of men and women only until the required number of conceptions had occurred, after which further sexual contact would be prohibited until more children were considered necessary. The second method involved the prohibition of all sexual contact between men and women and impregnating the required number of women each year from sperm banks. But he conceded that these methods were degrading. He had not addressed other reasons for the desirability of birth control such as the exercise of choice. His purpose, it appears, was to ridicule the proposition altogether by reducing it to an absurdity. However, he

accepted that contraception was not un-Islamic if the mother’s or the

breast-fed child’s health was in danger.”

Those who supported family planning cited the conditions set by Imam Ghazzali under which contraception was permissible. These were aimed at preserving property in case there was a slave-wife; to maintain

the beauty and strength of the wife and relieve her of the danger of childbirth; and to keep the family size financially manageable so that there was no temptation towards haram earnings, especially as it was

believed that too much hardship kept one away from one’s religious duties. Contraception was acceptable if there was a fear of having female children (to keep them from being insulted by their fathers-inlaw) and if the wife was unwilling to have children, although this reason was not well regarded. Other permissible circumstances were

related to the prevention of defective births etc.”

Fukaha suggested that if birth control was acceptable because of financial considerations during the Prophet’s time, it should still be so.

Although there were no slave-wives in his contemporary society, eco-

nomic problems continued to exist.” Some believed that if one was

unable to meet one’s economic responsibilities Islam required that such a person did not marry.”>

In a 1960 Comilla Academy village survey aimed at eliciting the causes why villagers opposed birth control, it was found that religion did not appear to be a major factor. However, if the interviewer, a

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

403

more educated person than the villager, suggested the possibility of a

religious embargo, the latter tended to agree. Those women who felt that Islam did not allow birth control said that they derived their.ppin-

ions from religious books and not from maulvis.”* A 1968 survey

showed that 6.5 per cent of urban married couples and 3.6 per cent of

rural ones aged under fifty in East Pakistan used contraceptives. An

attitude survey of urban Dacca conducted in 1974 revealed that the

majority of the population (55.1 per cent) had no knowledge of contraception. Of those who did, the largest section considered it a good idea. This was 26.8 per cent of the sample. Only 1.9 per cent of the

sample considered it anti-religious and among them women formed the

majority. A 1983 study reveals a very different picture : while 51.5

per cont rural and 13 per cent urban respondents held the Jama’at view that family planning was not necessary because God would provide,

44.8 per cent and 84.5 per cent of the rural and urban population sam-

pled disagreed.” Since the eighties, however, there has been mounting

pressure from sections of the orthodoxy to prevent birth control. Intimidation and coercion has been used — people have been threatened with excommunication and denial of Muslim rites at burial.

Religious beliefs and practices which were matters of personal con-

cern in the sixties were threatened by another tendency. Without 4 continued check on militant Islam since the mid-seventies this tendency has been marked by the use of force to deal with wayward believers. In spirit at least, this was qualitatively not very different from the co-

ercive methods used by the ‘thought police’ of the erstwhile communist

states.

Table 7.1 : ATTITUDE TOWARDS FAMILY PLANNING, 1974

Opinion Good idea Bad idea Anti-religious Injurious to health Others No idea/knowledge No response Total Number

(Per cent)

Male 256 68 09 04 38 588 37 1000 754

Female 23 99 24 14 19 536 35 1000

1,800

Total % 268 90 19 rt 25 $5.1 36 100.0

2,554

Source : Family Planning Acceptance in Dacca City, 1974 — A Survey Report, prepared by the Dept. of Geography, Dacca University (Dacca, 1979), table 4.1, p. 62.

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The Sacred and The Secular

7.7 Fine Arts Notions of correct behaviour were derived from Islamic ethics and val-

ues. However, here too, there was a fairly wide divergence of opinion.

Conflicting views about the fine arts provided another important area

of controversy. East Pakistan has produced few good dancers and paint-

ers, compared to West Bengal. In Hinduism, dancing in honour of the deities is a common practice. It is one of the ways to reach God. There

is no such parallel in Islam except perhaps among sufis, who were

often viewed as having strayed from the correct path.

The popular view at the mass level in East Pakistan was close to that of the conservative ulama — the belief that Islam rejected the fine

arts such as music, singing, dancing, painting, sculpting, etc. However, according to this view, architecture, calligraphy, nature painting, ab-

stract art, and sometimes instrumental music were exempted from this

injunction. It is possible that this view gained support because most

Muslims received their early religious instructions from the conservative ulama, semi-educated maulanas, and ill-paid mullahs.

Interesting debates on the fine arts were held under the auspices of

the Islamic Academy. Two schools of thought emerged : the one in

support was promoted by Muhammad Shahidullah and the opposite

view by Muhammad Sirajul Islam. Both agreed that the basic injunction was against excess in all its forms, whether in matters of expenditure

or through loss of emotional control, whereby one could stray from the path of duty. Both sought support in the Koran and Hadith. The

point to emphasize is that no one questioned the relevance of scriptural authority, but only interpreted it in different ways. Sirajul Islam argued

that the Koran, the most important source of Islamic values, was ‘almost silent’ about the arts. The Hadith, the next most important source,

had been compiled by many people, some holding mutually contradic-

tory views. Therefore it could not be treated as an infallible source of guidance. S. Islam noted that Sura Al-Maida, ayat 93 of the Koran

which prohibited gambling, drinking and idol worship was most frequently cited as an injunction against sculpture. But sculpting and idol

worship were two different things. He referred to ayat 113 of the same sura in which God asked Jesus to make a clay bird and blow on it,

whereupon it came to life according to His will. Theologians held that this phenomenon could not be treated as a precedent by ordinary men

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

405

to sculpt; Jesus was a special messenger of God carrying out His will

in a particular time and place. But, argued S. Islam, Muslims did not

believe in the concept of the Trinity and held that Jesus was a human being.”

The Hadith is more explicit on the subject. Sculpting or painting

living beings may be interpreted as acts of audacity whereby the creative power of God is copied by men. But according to S. Islam, man’s

failure to copy God’s creative power may also be seen as a sign of

God’s greatness. While the Hadith notes the Prophet’s dislike of pic-

torial representation on a curtain, it offers no clue as to what the picture

represents. On the other hand, the Hadith clearly reveals - that the Prophet himself prevented the destruction of representations of Bibi

Mariam with Isa (Mary and Jesus) in her arms engraved on a pillar of the Ka’ aba. Nor did the Prophet object to his wife Ayesha playing with

dolls.

On the contrary,

he at times took interest in it.

Under the

Khulafa-i-Rashidun, Muslims often prayed in deserted temples of non-

Muslims and did not feel that the icons had to be destroyed for their prayers-to be acceptable to God. In fact, within a hundred years of the

Prophet’s death his picture was drawn, although while alive he refused

to let a Persian artist paint him lest his image came to be idolized. The

Abbasid and Umayyad Khalifas had icons in their palaces. S. Islam refuted the claim by many theologians including Muhammad Shahidul-

lah that the artists were all non-Arabs. The former believed that the

objectives of religion and art were mutually opposed : religion aimed

to bind one’s life within prescribed rules of conduct and belief; but the artistic expression sought freedom from all forms of control. The con-

setvative ulama feared this unbounded force in artistic creativity. They

sought to control it and protect the interest of religion. S. Islam con-

cluded that the view that Islam was against the arts was propagated in

a later period by a conservative ulama, some of whom declared that it

was a sin punishable in the afterlife.”

In support of his view Muhammad Shahidullah cited a passage from

the Hadith where Abdullah ibn Masud says : ‘I have heard from Allah’s Rasul that he who draws pictures will receive the sternest punishment

from Allah’ (Koran : Bukhari and Muslim). Shahidullah believed that

Islam did not encourage apathy to worldly interests but that the rites of this world were subservient to those of the next. Therefore, any

activity or passion, whether for music, poetry or dancing which made

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The Sacred and The Secular

one forgetful of God, or one’s duty to Him or aroused evil tendencies

such as lust, was condemnable. While many scholars opted for a principle of moderation in all things, Shahidullah and the orthodox ulama

favoured total rejection of singing and dancing. In determining the im-

pact of such pleasures on the human character, they held that the gen-

eral effect on society, rather than on the individual, had to be taken

into account. The possibility of man straying from the path of God by ‘taking shelter in boastful conversation’ (Koran : Lokman : 6) was cited as a baneful effect of music. The voice of Satan (Koran : Bani

Israil : 64) was understood to mean enticing entertainment and songs.”

Shahidullah found nothing in the Koran which was against danc-

ing. Yet he argued that dancing was closely linked to singing and that dancing

by

beautiful

girls had

sex

appeal.

He

therefore

con-

cluded that it was against Islamic principles. Koranic instructions,

he argued, clearly stated that the ‘lajjasthan’ or private parts of the

body should be protected as these were pure. From this Shahidullah

deduced that dancing women exposed these parts to danger. Dancing

by men, however, was treated as exercise or sport, like archery or horse-training. These were the only sports allowed to men

with ‘playing’ with their wives.”

along

Poetry was acceptable if it helped build character or purified the soul. The Koran did not comment on plays and drama, because this

art form did not exist during the Prophet’s time. But some held that plays were not acceptable because one had to act out roles which did

not depict the true character of the actor but of make-believe person-

alities. This argument could be countered by the fact that Muslims were named after the many names of Allah which were attributes of His

qualities and which no human being could hope to achieve in perfection. Yet this practice was not considered undesirable.

On the whole, university teachers who participated in the discussion

on the fine arts, accepted the views of Sirajul Islam rather than those of Shahidullah. Shadani pointed out that the Prophet was a great lover

and patron of poetry, and cited an example from the Koran supporting

music (Sura Lokman). Habibullah found no clear-cut Koranic injunctions against the fine arts. He differed from Shahidullah in considering that Islam was not negative to art. Hasan Zaman felt that it was most

important to keep in mind the three basic principles of Islam : that

‘Islam is the religion of nature; Islam is against perversion; and Islam

Religion, ‘Religious Institutions and Social Norms

407

does not accept extreme views’. He said that the Prophet clearly liked

music for he had appointed poets and musicians to propagate Islam.

Justice Baker who chaired the session observed that Islam was not against the fine arts. Whatever the strictures on art, these were meant

to curb sensual tendencies which could lead to perversion.“

However, a contributor to The Pakistan Observer supported Shahidullah’s argument that Lahwal Hadith — all sorts of idle tales and

talks, useless discourses, pleasurable pursuits and pastimes which bring no benefit —

led one astray from the path of Allah. Artists, he con-

sidered, lacked spirituality; people in general were ‘amusement-

minded’, going to movies, clubs and festivals; they were ‘oblivious of

the existence of God’.

‘The divide in the argument, as in some Christian churches, centred

around

the

permissible

extent

of austerity or enjoyment

of

beauty. Whatever the attitude of the protagonists in this debate, one

fact needs to be emphasized. Academies of dance and music in which

the urban intelligentsia were deeply involved have flourished in East Pakistan and later in Bangladesh. Performances have never suffered from lack of audience. Painters are highly regarded. The preferences

of common people have not been influenced by theoretical considera-

tions projected by the intellectuals. 7.8

Education

The debate on education in Pakistan and later on in Bangladesh had

little to do with ideas of ritual purity or correct behaviour, although

Islamic reconstruction was a major objective. Even earlier, under the

colonial government, Muslims had canvassed for a system of education

which would meet their religious needs and equip them for the modern

world. The post-colonial intelligentsia continued to treat education as

a means of access to resources, entry into the professions and ultimately to political power. The pressure to systematize the system of education

in order to curtail the privileges of some groups and increase those of

others came partly from the religious intelligentsia and to an extent from sections of the vernacular intelligentsia who wished to curtail the

dominance of the western-educated and the importance of the English

language. During the period under investigation there was considerable

408

The Sacred and The Secular

discussion about Islamic reconstruction through the education system. It was generally held that religious education was essential for character

building and the creation ofa strong moral and ethical basis of society.”

Certain practices, like gambling, corruption and the unrestricted mixing

of the sexes, were considered unethical, and attributed by some to poor

knowledge of Islam. Of particular concern in the post-partition period

was to establish an Islamic society which could best be done, it was believed, by educating young minds.

East Bengal inherited three types of education systems at the

time of partition. The general secondary education

system

was en-

tirely secular in orientation. The Old Scheme Madrasahs, also known

as alia madrasahs, primarily provided religious education and aimed to

produce

theologians

and the ulama.

The

Reformed (or New

Scheme) Madrasahs combined elements of these two systems. The demand

for general education

exceeded

by far that for madrasah

education because it afforded greater employment opportunities. In 1947-48, while there were 3,481

recognized middle and high sec-

ondary schools, there were only 1,452 madrasahs — 378 of the old

type, and 1,074 of the reformed variety.” Exclusively religious edu-

cation was thus not favoured. As noted in the first chapter, since the introduction of New Scheme Madrasahs in 1915, government

policy sought to assist these liberally and discourage the growth

Old Scheme Madrasahs, though Senior Madrasahs

of

were not totally

debarred from government aid. Financial stringency and inadequate

employment opportunities for old scheme graduates were the probable reasons for their apparent lack of popularity. Secular consid-

erations, of course, did influence educational choices to an extent.

The Old Scheme Madrasahs were found lacking on both religious and secular counts. Subjects like Koran, Hadith and Tafsir did not

originally find place in the curriculum. The madrasah educated lived

more in the past than in the present with unrealistic hopes for the future.

In terms of educational opportunities, the system led to a blind alley for it was not always possible to enter the university on completion of the courses offered. In addition, alia madrasah graduates received

poorer terms of employment than university graduates. Only rudi-

ments of secular learning were offered on an optional basis. It was argued that a higher standard of study for essential secular subjects, reduced

the

time

available

for

religious

subjects.

The

medium

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

409

of instruction — primarily Urdu — was likely to reduce the standard

of Islamic study. Consequently, students were not always able to com-

municate in their mother tongue. Islam was taught as a static, not a

dynamic, religion. The curriculum and ethos of these institutes differed

widely from those of general schools. Hence, there was a wide diver-

gence in the views and orientations of alia madrasah and general school students.”

The recommendations of the Madrasah Syllabus (Muaazzamuddin)

Committee of 1946-47 were introduced in the lowest classes of Old

Scheme Madrasahs of East Bengal in 1948. The primary course was

the same as in general primary schools. Arabic and Urdu were to be

taught in the final year of primary shools or primary sections attached

to madrasahs. The Junior course which extended over four years, was followed by a public examination. In addition to Islamic subjects, secular ones like Bengali, Urdu, arithmetic, history, geography and elemen-

tary science were made compulsory. In addition, either English

or Persian had to be studied. The Alim and Fazil stages made provisions

for learning secular subjects such as English, Bengali and Persian as

well as for vocational training, tailoring, soap-making and carpentry.

At the end of the Fazil course, matriculation standard was expected to

be reached in Bengali and English. The Kamil or Title stage offered no secular subjects.”

The 1949 Education Reconstruction Committee debated the extent

to which madrasah courses could be integrated with general education.

While the committee considered it beneficial to have an integrated

course at the primary stage up to Class V, the Madrasahs SubCommittee considered this detrimental to sound scholarship in

Islamic subjects. While the Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University con-

ceded that too many secular subjects would defeat the object of alia

madrasahs, which was to produce theologians, he argued that it was necessary to have an integrated system up to the Junior stage to provide pupils a better general background. Maulana Muhammad Akram

Khan, the president of the committee, supported the position of the

Madrasah Sub-Committee and noted his dissent.”’

The committee acknowledged that it would serve no purpose to

abolish alia madrasahs, however inadequate they might be in produc-

ing well-trained religious divines. If abolished, these would be set up

privately. In fact, a large number of unrecognized privately run

410

The Sacred and The Secular

madrasahs known as kharezi madrasahs existed in Bengal. They were modelled after the nizamia madrasah of Baghdad and were also known

as kaumi or national madrasahs. These provided only religious education and instruction in ancient Arabic, logic and Islamic philosophy

etc.; modern philosophy, history, logic or the sciences were not taught. Urdu was the medium of instruction. Students were taught Persian through Urdu, and Arabic through Persian. Arabic was not taught di-

rectly in Bengali perhaps because the teachers were not well versed in

Bengali or because it was still considered a kufri language. The texts

were not easily available, and funding was precarious and irregular,

dependent as it was on donations. Students however were not charged

any fees. On the contrary, they received free food and lodging. They

were generally too poor to pay for any kind of education. The kharezi

madrasahs survived because of the spirit of sacrifice of the teachers

who worked practically for no pay. Often the madrasahs consisted of a single room and one person taught at all the stages of studies (it was a seventeen-year course). Love of Islam, it was suggested, motivated

both teacher and student. However, this system was totally unsuited to

modern conditions and needs. Students had specialized knowledge but

no general education. The emphasis on Urdu rendered them inarticulate

and inhibited communication with common people. They, too, learnt

of Islam as a static, not dynamic, religion. ” This system is comparable

to the Kamil stage of alia madrasahs in terms of subject matter. Regarding Reformed Madrasahs, the Reconstruction Committee suggested further means to integrate them with the general system.

Special optional Islamic subjects were to be provided along with essential secular subjects which were taught in secondary schools.”

In 1957, the East Pakistan Education Reforms Commission, recommended that the Reformed Madrasah System, which included High Madrasahs and Islamic Intermediate Colleges, be totally

integrated with the general system. The Reformed system was abolished a year later. However, the 1958 Commission on National Edu-

cation,

which

submitted

its report

in

1959,

recommended

that

religious instruction, Islamiyat or Diniyat, be made compulsory for Muslims up to Class VIII, offered as an optional subject in Classes IX and X, and be made a component part of Islamic studies which

would be an optional subject for Classes XI and XII.” It would thus be possible for general students to specialize in Islamic studies

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

in the university. These

recommendations

were implemented

411

in

1961-62. The education system continued to face criticism for not providing sufficient religious education. Too little time was allotted to

Diniyat lessons, complained a contributor to the Isalamik Ekademi

Patrika in 1964. Middle and High schools offered three lessons a

week of half-hour each up to Class V. In Classes VI to VIII, only

two lessons a week were offered. Critics argued that at least five classes a week were needed, and that importance of Urdu in higher

Islamic studies be recognized. It was suggested that these could replace ‘unnecessary

manded

subjects like arts, craft, practical arts’. They de-

that students who failed in Diniyat in the Middle School

Certificate Examination be detained in the same class and not be

promoted until the requisite qualifications were achieved. They criti-

cized the existing resource base for religious education and pointed

out that no special teachers were employed for Diniyat lessons, and that sometimes a single teacher took all three classes. It was rec-

ommended that special facilities be created to train teachers, employ

them and offer them better pay scales. While it was possible to take Arabic and Islamic studies, which were optional subjects for hu-

manities students, it was argued that few students were attracted to

these subjects in Classes IX and X as there was no separate faculty

of Islamic studies. Hence, it was suggested that such faculties be

established at the degree and postgraduate levels. They recommended

special scholarships at the secondary stage and Dakhil level of alia

madrasahs to attract better students into Islamic studies.”

The objectives of these recommendations were both religious and

secular. It was hoped that no Muslim citizens would remain ignorant

about religion once these proposals were implemented. It was argued

that parents would no longer need to arrange for Diniyat lessons at home, thus avoiding the disadvantages of poor environmental con-

ditions in many homes.” The expectation was that experts on Islam

conversant with modern thought and scientific knowledge would be

produced. Although there could’ still be some remaining differences

between university graduates in Islamic Studies and madrasah Title

holders, this was not expected to create any friction. Because of the

standardized education for all groups of students up to Class VIII,

it was expected that there would be greater understanding between

412

‘The Sacred and The Secular

them which would help forge national unity. If Bengali was made

the medium of instruction for the first 12 years of madrasah education the difference between madrasah and university graduates would diminish and then, it was believed by some, that Bengali could be transformed into an Islamic language. They argued that the

process would allow Bengali to be more intelligible to people; as

Urdu was compulsory up to the Fazil stage it would ensure better relations between East and West Pakistan which would then share the same language. It was argued that if the recommendations were

implemented, it would be easy to establish the Islamic way of life

and social system.” The debates revealed that some wanted

to ‘Islamize’ education, while others hoped to secularize madrasahs. In the same vein, while the former saw westernization as the greatest evil, the latter attributed the rise of fanaticism and religious conflict

to the growth of seminaries and madrasahs.

The orthodoxy continued to agitate against the dual education sys-

tem in the country largely because their career prospects were limited under the existing conditions. They attacked secular educational insti-

tutions modelled after the West as indicative of state unwillingness to

pursue Islamic ideals.” These institutions were perceived to be bereft

of ethical and moral values and as upholders of secularism and individuality, both of which were considered unacceptable. Students of general institutions of learning were criticized as lacking in social

consciousness and a well-formed world view.'” The missionary edu-

cational establishment was identified as having created an influential

group of secular-minded people and thus it was the butt of strong criticism.

The New Education Policy of 1969, formulated by Air Marshal M. Nur Khan in charge of the ministry of education, recommended the nationalization of many foreign missionary shools. The state responded

to orthodox pressure whenever it was politically expedient. In the wake

of the mass upsurge in 1969 led by students, it was deemed important

to change the structure of privileges. The new policy recommended

that English no longer be a national language and the emergence of

privileged classes through cadet colleges be checked. '” This policy

was pursued in independent Bangladesh, but army officers continued

to be educated in English.

The 1974 Bangladesh Education Commission, chaired by Qudrat-

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

413

e-Khuda modified the madrasah curriculum further in order to establish it as an integral part of the national education system. It was now

possible to branch out into the sciences, medicine and engineering at the Alim stage.’

The frustrated and dissatisfied orthodoxy periodically demanded the

establishment of an Islamic university which would produce learned

graduates. They hoped to play a socially more prominent role through such a university.'” In 1963-64 an Islamic Arabic University Commis-

sion was set up but its proposals were not followed up. As discussed

in the previous chapter, before the 1965 presidential elections the then governor, Monem Khan, brought up the subject with obvious political motives. In the seventies, Bhashani drew up a detailed programme of an Islamic university in the wake of charges that he was an atheist. On 27

January 1977, a seven-member committee was set up to prepare

a detailed scheme for the establishment of an Islamic university. It was headed by M. Abdul Bari, Chairman, Department of Islamic History, Rajshahi University. The committee proposed courses of studies at the Honours, Masters and Ph.D. levels in two faculties — Islamic Studies

and Arts and Sciences. This would meet the aspirations of a large section of people committed to Islamic values and enable them to acquire ‘high positions in the various walks of life.'“ A new elite would thus

be created. The foundation stone of the Islamic University was laid by president Ziaur Rahman on 22 November 1979 at Shantidanga, Dulalpur, in Khulna division, although the Islamic University Act was not passed until 1980.'% 7.9

Muslim Family Laws

‘The areas of family laws, traditionally the sphere of influence of the ulama came under scrutiny but not due to orthodox pressure as in the

case of education. Urban, upper class women, concerned by the shabby

treatment of their gender by polygamous husbands, and by the plight

of orphans who were denied inheritance under the existing legal frame-

work, campaigned for Islamic justice. It was only after General Ayub

Khan was persuaded about the fairness of the cause that matters were redressed. The issue, however, continued to remain controversial.

The military has at times rushed in where most civilian governments have feared to tread — the most treasured domains of the orthodoxy

414

The Sacred and The Secular

— those of family laws and the position of women. The family laws

in vogue in Bast Bengal until 1961 recognized the whimsical divorce uttered by husbands in anger,’ allowed men to practice polygamy

irrespective of whether the Koranic conditions were observed or not, and permitted the disinheritance of grandchildren where the parent was

dead. There were periodic protests against these

practices both on re-

ligious and social grounds : it was argued that these practices were not sanctioned by Islam and caused immense social problems. Perhaps, the most criticized were the institutions of polygamy and the disinfieritance of orphaned grandchildren. ‘The latter was based on the principle that a person nearer in kinship excludes the remoter from inheritance. Traditionally, this would not have caused great social disturbance since in tribal society uncles took care of orphan nephews. This, however, was not always the case in the twentieth century. Conservatives argued that if a ‘grandfather does

ct look after the interests of his own grandchildren, the orphans should be considered like those suffering from a natural affliction just like any

other orphan whose father died in. poverty’.'"” The Koran laid stress

on the welfare of orphans : ... and give to the orphans their properties and do not replace their good property by a bad one and do not mix their wealth and property with your own; this is, indeed, a grave sin. (Sura Al-Nisa, 1V:2) According to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance promulagated on 2 March 1961, the right to inheritance of orphan grandchildren was recognized in Article 4 : In the event of the death of any son or daughter of the propo-

situs before the opening of succession, the children of such son or daughter, if any, living at the time the succession opens, shall per stirpes receive a share equivalent to the share which such sonor daughter, as the case may be, would have received if alive. It was argued that the Koranic term ‘father’ included the grandfather. It wag also held that if a father, when alive, excluded his children from inheritance, he removed the obstacle at his own death.'”

Polygamy was considered acceptable if the ‘express consent’ of the existing wife was obtained or if she was an invalid or barren. But men often falsely claimed that their wives were invalid and

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

415

indulged in polygamy." There were also differences in the inter-

pretation of Islamic laws which were used to justify or restrict polygamy. The Koran is quite explicit on the subject : If you fear that you cannot do justice to orphans, then marry from among women who please you, two, three or four; but if you cannot do justice then marry only one. (Sura al-Nisa Iv:3)

The Koran further states in IV:128 :

.+. and you shall never be able to do justice among women no matter how desirous of this you may be. So do not incline completely [away from one wife] leaving her suspended if air. ‘The condition for polygamy is clearly the existence of orphan (female)

children who are likely to be maltreated. It draws explicitly from the

experiences of war at the time of the Prophet.'"' Polygamy under such

circumstances was conditional, for the man was expected to treat all

his wives equally. This task was considered impossible by many: in

some Middle Eastern countries such as Morocco polygamy was con-

sequently banned.

Those in favour of polygamy in East Bengal came mainly from the

conservative ulama who accepted the existing practices as right simply

because these enjoyed the weight of tradition. They justified their stand on the grounds that it was possible to treat all wives equally in material terms. Reformists argued that the Koran surely implied equal treatment both materially and emotionally, which was not possible for ordinary

people. Whereas it was obvious that equal external treatment was pos-

sible, the Koran categorically stated that it was impossible for a man

to do justice to several wives. Some felt that it was particularly difficult

to obey ‘God’s law’ today, when women demanded to be treated as more than mere chattels." Protests against polygamy culminated into a movement led by

women in 1955, when the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali, married his social secretary without divorcing his first wife. The first

to react were the women of Karachi. On 15 April they formed a board

for action on the status of women in Pakistan. They demanded that the

official

status of First Lady

should continue

Hamida, the first wife.'” Dacca women

to belong to Begum

soon followed suit : the

416

The Sacred and The Secular

Gandaria Mahila Samiti organized a meeting which was attended by 200 women. They campaigned to ban polygamy because the Koranic condition, that a man treat all his wives equally, was frequently not met and the neglected wife led a miserable life.'" The debate intensified

after the second Begum appeared at an official dinner at the GovernorGeneral’s house. Women’s organizations protested that the first wife was being deprived of her rights. They also questioned whether a nonPakistani could become the First Lady of Pakistan, while some militant members suggested a social boycott of the second wife."

The board which affiliated itself to the All Pakistan Women’s As-

sociation (APWA) resolved to bring about changes regarding the rights

of women in the areas of family law, polygamy, and the sale of women

in marriage as practised in tribal areas. It also expected to educate

women in Islamic law in order to help them understand their legal rights

better.'"® This

last factor was

particularly

important

be-

cause women could not exercise whatever little rights they had due to the general ignorance which hampered their emancipation." On 21 February 1955, a women’s conference on inadequate protection of women’s rights in which eighteen organizations participated, submitted a report on polygamy.

It was pointed out that polygamy,

as

practised at the time, was ‘contrary to the spirit of Islam’. Members were in favour of a restricted form of polygamy : a second marriage could only be permitted if the first wife could bear no children or if she was suffering from a debilitating disease and not unless the husband submitted a written statement indicating his intention to treat the two

wives equally in all respects.'"" Among the other recommendations

were : that a new nikah nama be devised incorporating all the marriage rights of women in Islam including safeguards for their children; that all marriages and divorces be registered; female magistrates be appointed to deal with the cases of aggrieved women; and summary trials be held to ensure faster and less expensive justice than accorded through regular proceedings. The women made various proposals to help fight the social evil of polygamy : validation of marriages and divorces by a court of law; stationing of husband and wife working

for the government

at the same place; and proper education of

women." Women thus sought Islamic justice and hoped to secure their

rights through non-religious institutions. The Prime Minister was forced to appoint a Committee on Marriage

417

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

Reforms in June 1955. The report of the committee with which the

APWA concurred, was submitted in December but not implemented for fear of orthodox censure.

The maulanas considered the Prime Minister's second marriage to

be a ‘purely personal matter’ which was ‘being played up to make Political capital out of it’. They said, ‘Those who deny the plurality of

wives to Muslims are in a way denying the very concessions given by

Islam to individuals in certain circumstances’.'” Some of the men who

fek threatened argued that a problem was being created where none

existed : ‘the best way by which women could be happy with their husbands was by being ‘obedient, loyal and loving wives; this would

be in accord with our religious principles and cultural traditions’."”!

From such contentions it would appear that men had no obligation to

ensure a happy family life, that the onus of creating a happy conjugal atmosphere lay entirely on women. Only an authoritarian government could face the challenge posed

by the orthodoxy. It required a martial law administrator, General Ayub

Khan, to promulgate the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance in 1961.'” Accordingly, it became compulsory to register marriages through nikah

nama of matriage contracts to be maintained by Nikah Regis-

trars. Polygamy

was

possible

with

the

written

consent

of

the

Arbitration Council. An application had to be submitted to the council

along with reasons for the proposed marriage and consent of the existing wife or wives. If a man married without the permission of the

council, he was liable to pay the entire amount of dowry to the existing

wife or wives; he could be convicted and imprisoned for a year and fined Rs 5,000. The decision to divorce a wife had to be conveyed to the chairman of the Arbitration Council, and if no reconciliation was possible, divorce could take place after three months, or later if the ‘woman was pregnant. A man could remarry his ex-wife without her

having to marry a third person; but he could not do so more than twice.

If a husband failed to maintain his wife adequately, she could seek the

help of the Arbitration Council. Where no details about the mode of

payment of dower were specified in the nikah nama, the entire amount

had to be paid on demand. The age of marriage was raised to sixteen.

‘This was fourteen under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and fifteen in the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

418

The Sacred and The Secular

The government justified its position in both secular and religious

terms. As the custodian of social justice it recognized that socio-eco-

nomic conditions had changed considerably since the early centuries of Islam. Although the government felt that the basic principles of human relations as enunciated in the Koran were valid for all times,

it nevertheless held that the mode of implementation of these principles

had to vary with changing circumstances. The government thus as-

sumed a reformist role to overhaul the system in order to encourage

greater security and stability in family relations. Revered jurists of past

ages had interpreted the Holy Law over and over again. A duty incum-

bent on all Muslims was to reconstruct these old interpretations and accordingly make society adaptive, dynamic and progressive in the

spirit of the Koran and sunnah. Many rights envisaged by Islam had

not been enforced in early Muslim societies because ‘Human society was in an early stage of development’. Polygamy and slavery, for in-

stance, were permitted in the scriptures even though monogamy and manumission

were held as ideals. The government

felt that special

remedies were necessary to fight prevalent social abuses. Unregistered marriages and divorces created an immense amount of unnecessary liti-

gation. Therefore registration was considered desirable although this was not the established custom under pristine Islam.

No progressive legislation is possible if Muslim assemblies re-

main only interpreters and blind adherents of ancient schools of law ... All real evolution is a creative process which could

never be identical with mere repetition.”

The government thus sought to justify new legislations. It pointed out

that many ancient laws, for example, those relating to slavery, had

become obsolete. Therefore modern society could not form to past norms without the danger of decadence According to the government, Islam had given economic independence as reflected in their rights of marriage was a

civil contract, a woman

be forced to consetting in. women complete inheritance. Since

could ensure all the security

she desired. She could ask for divorce if the husband was incapable

of marital life or if he tortured her physically and emotionally; or, she could ask for divorce by partial or complete renunciation of mehr or dower. She could also claim equal justice from a husband who had

taken a second wife.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

419

But due to the rigidity of juristic orthodoxy and owing to ignorance and economic dependence of women, the liberal aspects of marriage and family laws were either relegated to the background or became impracticable because of the complexity

of procedure of our law courts.

The government held that no new rights had been conferred on women

which the Koran and sunnah had not granted them.

Most of these provisions were criticised by the ulama as un-Islamic.

They contended that certain Islamic rights were being denied to men.

The editor of The Pakistan Observer saw the ulama as a ‘vested in-

terest’ group which would be adversely affected by the ordinance be-

cause their finances depended on ‘giving fatwas on divorces’.'* Other men, however, were afraid that women would now become emanci-

pated and uncontrollable.

As a result of orthodox pressure the laws were examined by the Islamic Council of Ideology in 1962. Even burqua (veil) clad women demonstrated against this at the Assembly gates. The West Pakistan

Provincial Assembly had succumbed to pressure and recommended the repeal of these laws. On 26 November 1963 the bill to repeal the ordinance was defeated in the National Assembly after a long debate. In

December, the Fundamental Rights Bill extended somewhat the role

of courts by making the constitution’s principles of lawmaking defend-

able in court but ‘specifically excluded the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance from review’.'” The

1961 Family Laws Ordinance was rescinded in Pakistan by

General Zia-ul-Huq after the assassination of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto.

In

Bangladesh,

a

similar

threat

looms

ahead. The declaration

of Islam as the state religion through a constitution amendment in

1988 carries with it the possibility of a rigid implementation of a

literal interpretation of Islamic law of the Jama’at variety. Women’s groups have already

been

active in expressing anxiety

and voicing

their protest. They pointed out that Bengali women were raped and

molested in the name of religion in 1971 and argued that in a state where 85 per cent of the population was Muslim there was no jus-

tification to declare Islam to. be the state religion. They feared that

Islam would be used as a tool of oppression against women.

420

The Sacred and The Secular

7.10

The Position of Women

It would be pertinent to dwell briefly on the position of women in East

Bengal and Bangladesh. Women have traditionally been seen as the repositories of virtue and social and religious values. Consequently, the threat of female education and emancipation has provoked tremendous

censure from sections of the orthodoxy. In contrast, educated women often owed their education to the care and foresight of their fathers

and husbands who wished to prepare them for an increasingly competitive world,

The role of women in Bangladesh was, and continues to be, seen primarily as that of mother and wife. On this, both policy-makers and the masses appear to agree. Women also saw themselves in the same light. The curricula prescribed for women invariably included home

economics, nutrition, hygiene, child psychology etc.'* This perception

of women’s role was determined by social custom but generally attrib-

uted to religious beliefs. There was an implicit assumption that this was what Islam prescribed. Ideas about the types of employment suitable for women

were in-

fluenced by the concept of purdah or modesty. Stigma was attached to jobs

like

nursing

because

it entailed

a contact

with

men.'”

One school of religious thought advocated that purdah was a divine commandment, based on the injunction that men and women

should

lower their eyes in front of each other and that women should cover their beauty lest sexual desire be aroused." It was in deference to such

notions of purdah and possible damage to sexual morality that the Talimat-i-Islamiya, a Board of Islamic Teaching, suggested in 1948,

that women could be legislators only if they were over fifty years of age

and

publicly

observed

purdah

in

dress.

While

Maududi

of

the Jama’at-i-Islami did not favour the idea of women in public life,

considerations of secular political opportunism led him to campaign for

Fatima Jinnah

of 1964-65."

as head

of state

in the

presidential

elections

Similar prejudices existed regarding female education as well as the

abolition of purdah. Loss of chastity, acquisition of western ideas, possibility of free mixing with men, and emancipation of women were the perceived

dangers

underlying

women’s

education.’

Even

rela-

tively liberated women somehow did not wish to consider themselves

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

421

emancipated in the sixties because dependence on males was the ac-

cepted norm. The APWA is a case in point. Though its membership

consisted of upper-class, urban women, they saw their roles as subser-

vient or complementary to those of their husbands : they were helpers, social workers, and volunteers. Few were career women. Their hus-

bands, generally, did not like them to stay out of home often or for long periods. Despite all these prejudices, Bengali Muslim women have experi-

enced a profound change in their condition. This was particularly true

of urban women. While the percentage of women with any education

was small, the number of educated urban women had reached socially significant proportions. According to the 1974 census, 3.7 per cent of

urban women in the 20-24 age group had 13 or more years of schooling

compared to only 0.4 per cent in the age group of 35 and above.'”

‘This indicates that more and more women were going into higher education. Although the relevant figure of 0.1 per cent for rural women

in the 20-24 age group was not large, it was a significant achievement

considering the countervailing social and religious pressures. Notably,

there were no rural women with equivalent education in the above 35

age group.

A strong link existed between the education of women

on the

one hand, and urbanization and the level of education of fathers on the other. Not only were female university students more likely to be urban than male students, but also their fathers often tended to

be more educated." Education and urbanization thus appear to have

been factors responsible for the breakdown of prejudices against female education, which were partly religious in origin or perceived

to have the sanction of Islam. These prejudices actually had less to

do with religion and more with competition, a desire to maintain male domination and the effect of superstition.

Some men in the fifties considered educated women to be a ‘slur

to womanhood’ because they demanded larger dower and greater free-

dom, and wished to dominate their husbands. They: were accused of

having acquired the ‘ills of Western education’ and of being ‘misfits

in the Eastern social conditions’.'** A study of rural development found that women faced mounting moral criticism from males when the latter felt threatened by economic competition from females. Thus, when the

1970 cyclone wiped out most of the child population of Char Shyamraj,

422

The Sacred and The Secular

it was interpreted as divine wrath against women’s education and fam-

ily planning.’

However, social and religious prejudices against female education

and employment gave way to some extent to a secular consideration

— economic necessity. A 1974 study of Dacca city showed that wives of husbands with lower income were more motivated to work than those from a higher income bracket.'*” However, most of the urban professional women

were highly educated whereas lower in-

come groups supplied few female professionals."* This pattern was

attributed to the conservatism of lower income groups. Not only did higher income families have the means to educate their daughters, but the fathers also took a deep interest in their education. Histori-

cally, successful women in the region generally owed their success to the support of their fathers and husbands; for example, Begum Shaista Ikramullah and Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain. Fathers encouraged the education of their daughters primarily out of secular motives. Education of women had come to be a desirable value. With the growth of urbanization and emergence of the nuclear

family, a more reliable, and therefore educated, wife was necessary.

While marriage continued to be the goal wherein a suitable ‘shelter’ for the daughter could be found, an educated daughter had better chances of finding a good husband. Moreover, education provided the girl with better security against adversity. The phenomenal changes in women’s education and employment

indicate that concepts of purdah had changed. It came to refer more

to modesty in dress and appearance than to wearing the burqua. The

total female population engaged in non-agricultural occupations was 0.9 per cent in 1961 and 15.09 per cent in 1974." However, women

continued to be treated as inferior. In this, the intellectuals were far

less radical than could be expected, particularly when compared to their role in the political sphere. Like the mullahs they acquiesced in the social mores believing in the essential inferiority of women. Thus, expenditure on female education was considerably lower than for men; seats in the legislature were reserved for women, and women were

encouraged to see themselves as inferior and unequal.’ The only time

that women participated in open elections was in 1954 when two women MPs were elected — Begum Shamsur Nahar Mahmud and Begum Noor Jehan Murshid.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

423

Female inequality manifested itself on the one hand, in conservative

arguments that women could not attend congregational prayers, that it

was haram for them to go out of doors and to be seen or heard.'“' On

the other hand, numerous examples from the Hadith were cited by

reformists which projected women as ftee to move and conduct independent bysiness. Although women’s right to inheritance in Islamic

law was cited as a recognition of their economic independence, the

element of inequality implicit in the relevant provision was not ques-

tioned.

When a succession was opened the following mode of distribution

was employed :the debts of the deceased were paid off first; next his will was executed; third, the share of parents and the remaining spouse was determined; fourth, the share of children, twice as much for boys as for girls, was estimated; fifth, where there were no more sons, two-

thirds of the property went to the daughters and the remaining one-third

to the nearest male relations; if the man died childless, a quarter or

one-eighth of the share went to his widow; and finally, orphan grand-

children received the share which would have gone to the parent if

alive.'* Thus, although numerous instances may be cited where the

Koran enjoined equal rights for men and women, this was not recog-

nized in the laws of inheritance. ‘This inequality was justified by publicists on two grounds : firstly,

that the wife inherited from the husband; and, secondly, that it was the

man’s responsibility to maintain his wife." The fact remains, however,

that the husband too inherited from the wife and not all men maintained

their wives properly, particularly when polygamous. Although the involvement of women in the nationalist, massmovement of the late sixties and the 1971 war of liberation helped

emancipate them to some extent, marriage and family life remained the preferred ideal. The circumstances of the liberation war produced a painful example

of this attitude. The government

sought to reha-

bilitate the large number of raped women mainly through: marriage. Men were offered remuneration with this end in view.“ There was

little room

in society for ‘fallen’ women

: most were not welcomed

back by their families out of a sense of shame. However, the treat-

ment of such women in Bangladesh is less terrifying than in some

Middle Eastern societies where victims of rape were killed by their families to preserve family honour.

424

The Sacred and The Secular

Courageous men too were able to ignore social prejudices to give a measure of freedom to women. Ayub Khan emulated Kemal Ataturk of Turkey

at least in this respect. Ziaur Rahman

also had plans to

employ women in large numbers as policewomen and traffic wardens.

Some of the constraints on greater liberalization were imposed in the

name of Islam from outside the country. Saudis objected to the ap-

pointment of women traffic wardens on the ground that this would

expose them to the masculine gaze.'* Thus, social subjugation

of women reinforced by religion continued in the seventies, although

there was a simultaneous pull towards emancipation as a result of eco-

nomic considerations. Conclusion

The complex and numerous controversies centering around the meaning and relevance of Islam discussed here indicate the extent to which

religion plays a role in social life. It is an important referent in determining correct codes of social, moral and political conduct. The diver-

gent conclusions to the debates engaged in by the intelligentsia reveal the dynamism that underpins the faith. These jolt us into an awareness

of the possible social and political implications of a liberal or restrictive

interpretation, both of which have been jockeying to gain ground. Islam

means different things to different people, even within the intelligentsia.

However, it is clear that a deep sense of religiosity pervades every

level of society irrespective of socio-economic background,

even

though the urban population has experienced some liberalization of values. Social and moral prejudices believed to have religious sanc-

tion exist alongside secular values which inter alia envisage rights for

women. Even though the education system has seen the secular process

most at work, orthodox incursions pose a constant threat to dismantle

it. The intelligentsia, even if secular-oriented, could not ignore religion because the concerns of the vast majority had to be-taken into account.

On the other hand, the orthodoxy too could not ignore the secular

consideration of economic needs, and competition for education and

employment. The tension persists and permeates all areas of social life.

Its resolution is not in sight in the foreseeable future.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

425

Notes

However, a recent study of rural and urban Muslims in Bangladesh shows

that religious practice was well observed by both groups in 1983. The

sample included 2000 rural households from 20 villages from which there

were 3461 respondents and 2086 urban respondents from three areas of

the metropolitan city of Dhaka. The survey examined among other things,

the relationship between religious belief and social change. Banu found

that while religious practice was strong among both her samples (51 per cent rural and $0 per cent urban respondents were rated high, 48 per cent and 47 per cent medium) a very small proportion of them venerated

Hindu pirs, gods and goddesses (7 per cent rural and 2 per cent urban respondents). Observing that 81 per cent of her rural and 85 per cent urban samples did not even watch Hindu puja, she concludes that ‘ac-

cretions from Hindu beliefs and practices do not seem to be a significant

component of popular Islam in Bangladesh today’. See U.A.B. Raziz Akter Banu, Islam in Bangladesh (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1993) pp. 176-80.

»

1H. Qureshi, Pakistan, an Islamic Democracy (Lahore, 1949), pp. 25-27.

Abdus Salam, “The Islamic Way’, Pak. Obs., 13 Feb. 1951. See, for instance, statement by Liaquat Ali Khan before the National

Press Club at Washington, Pak. Obs., 6 May 1950. Some held that

since Islam was a religion of equality, poverty was a sin and procuring a decent meal and clothing, an act of piety; see Ebrahim Khan,

‘Islamic Principles-and Economic Planning’, Pak. Obs., 1 Sept. 1950.

‘Such egalitarian interpretation was popular with liberal Bengali Mus-

Per

sayw

lim intellectuals.

Al-Islam, 1 Oct. 1961. Ibid. Editorial, ‘A Revolution in the Making’, Pak. Obs., 16 June 1955. Ibid. S. M. Quaseem, ‘A Revolution in the Making’, letter to the editor, Pak.

Obs., 17 June 1955.

Osman Ghani, ‘A Revolution in the Making’, letter to the editor, Pak. 11.

Obs., 20 June 1955.

Jalil Faruqui, ‘A Revolution in the Making’, letter to the editor, Pak Obs., 21 June 1955.

12, Mafizullah Kabir, ‘Muslim Attitude Towards Life’, Pak. Obs., 25 April 1951. 13. 14.

Ibid.

Dr Muhammad Nurul Islam, ‘Reconstruction of Religious Thought’, letter to the editor, Pak. Obs., 4 April 1961.

426

The Sacred and The Secular

RREBS

15. M. Kabir, ‘Muslim Attitude Towards Life’, op. cit. 16. In an anthropological sense, religion had embraced philosophy, magic, ritual, astronomy, medicine, economics etc. Today, a priest is not a medicine man or an economist. See Syed Saajjad Husain, ‘Islam in the Modern World’, paper presented at a symposium on The Islamic Way of Life held in Curzon Hall, Dacca in March 1961. Paper reprinted in Pak. Obs., 18 March 1961. 17. Editorial, ‘Symposium on Islam’, Pak. Obs., 2 March 1961. 18. Letter to the editor, ‘Symposum on the Islamic Way of Life’, Pak. Obs., 4 March 1961; Dr Muhammad Nurul Islam, ‘Reconstruction of Religious ‘Thought’, letter to the editor, Pak, Obs., 4 April 1961. 19. S. M. Murshed, ‘Islami siner naitik bhitti’, Isalamik Ekademi Patrika, (hereafter JEP), July 1971-June 1972, p. 303. 20. Ibid, p. 304; Hasan-Zaman, Political Science and Islam, 2nd ed. (Aswinpur, 1958), p. 6. 21, ‘Dharmanirapekshata banam secularism’, Sampadakiya (editorial), IEP, Oct-Dec. 1973; Jan.-March 1974, pp. 89-92. CAP Debates, 21 Dec. 1948, pp. 222-29. Tbid., 26 March 1951, p. 336. Tbid., 10 April 1951, p. 1104, IEP, April-June 1961, pp. 5-7, 158-59. Among the contributors were: Muhammad Shahidullah, A. B. M. Habibullah, Ahmad Sharif, Syed Sajjad Husain, Anisuzzaman, Muhammad Sirajul Hug, Rehman Sobhan, Abul Hasnat, Sarwar Murshid, Abdul Maudud, Maulana Paziul Karim, Maulana Alauddin al-Azhari, Maulana Abdul Awwal, Abdur Rahman Khan etc. “Academy sangbad’, JEP, April-June 1961, p. 159; July-Sept. 1961, pp. 323-34; Oct.-Dec. 1961, p. 401. 27. Islamic University Act, Act No. XXXVII of 1980; The Santosh Islamic University (Board of Trustees) Ordinance, 1983, Ordinance no, LXV of 1983, Ministry of Law and Land Reforms, GOB. 28, ‘Nirbachaner paristhitir prekshite’, Editorial, Madina, Dec. 1970, pp. 437-39. 29. Madina had rejected Tagore as part of East Pakistan's cultural heritage and accused Tagore lovers of ‘Brahmanism’ or of possessing a “Brahmanic mentality’. ‘Ekushe februarir sapath’, editorial, ibid., Feb. 1966, pp. 5-6. 30, Muhammad Ahba Chowdhury, ‘Purba pakistani sahitya, banam, bangla sahitya’, Madina, Aug. 1965, pp. 45-47; ‘Samskritir dasatva’, editorial, ibid., Oct. 1965, p. 7. 31. ‘Anjuman-e-Ulama’, editorial, ibid., Oct. 1963.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

32. 33.

35.

37. 38.

41.

42.

af

43.

47.

49.

51. 52.

53.

427

“Madrasah sikshar bhabisyat’, editorial, Madina, Jan. 1963, pp. 8-9. * Jati aaj, kon pathe’, editorial; Madina, April 1963, pp. 39-40; Abdul Jabbar Siddiqui, ‘Smritikatha’, Madina, Sept. 1963, p. 9. ‘The Central Islamic Research Institute was set up in Karachi. It had branches in Lahore and Dacca. The Dacca branch was called Dacca Islamic Academy. The research of these institutes projected liberal interpretations of Islam which the orthodox wlama could not tolerate. JEP, April-June 1961, p. 7; Madina, April 1968, p. 8. ‘Er parinati ki’, editorial, Madina, April 1968, pp. 7-8. Salehuddin Ahmad, ‘Siksha byabastha prasange’, Madina Jan. 1963, pp. 42-44. “Thader nachite din’, editorial, Madina, June 1963, p. 6. “Yug jijnasa o alem samaj’, editorial, ibid., Nov. 1967, pp. 7-8. “Amader samaj bibartan o alem samaj’, editorial, Madina, Sept. 1963, p.6 “Dhakae aitihasik ulama samimelan’, editorial, ibid., Oct. 1963, p. 7. ‘Alem samajer awaj’, editorial, ibid., May 1966, p. 7. Speech by Ataur Rahman Khan at the Constiwent Assembly, CAP Debates, 21 Feb, 1956, pp. 3391, 3393. Khan quotes from Justice Munit’s Report on Punjab disturbances of 1953, p. 219. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, see in particular ch. 3, pp. 6062. A. E. B, Reza (BA), ‘Path to Islam’, letter to the editor, Pak. Obs., 10 Sept. 1950. ‘Samskritir dasatva’, editorial, Madina, Oct. 1965, p. 6. Marium Jameelah, ‘Should Muslims Change as Conditions Change?’, Al-Islam, 15 Oct. 1961. Maulvi Abul Husain Akand, ‘Paschatya sabhyata — Islam o Pakistan’, Madina, Sept. 1964, pp. 18-19. S. M. Murshed, ‘Islami ainer naitik, bhitti’ (The moral basis of Islamic law), JEP, July 1971-Sune 1972, p. 301; Hasan Zaman, Political Science and Islam, pamphlet (Ist ed. Dacca, 1952; 2nd ed. Aswinpur, 1958), pp. 1-2. Hasan Zaman, ibid., pp. 14, 16. Tbid., pp. 1-2. Fazlul Karim, ‘Islamic Literature in Bengali’, letter to the editor, Pak. Obs., 29 Oct. 1955. K. M.A. Munim, ‘The Islamic Symposium at Dacca’, letter to the editor, Pak. Obs., 26 Oct. 1955. ‘Ekademi sambad’, JEP, July-Sept. 1962, pp. 161-62. Ishtiag Husain Qureshi, Director, Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi, contribution to a symposium held by the Congress with the

428

The Sacred and The Secular

Bureau of National Reconstruction, Karachi, The Problem of National Integration p. 5. Qureshi’s views are discussed here because these were influential with a section of Bengali intellectuals even though he was not an East Pakistani (Lahore, 1961). Kafiluddin Ahmad, ‘Islami namajer bhumika’, ibid., Dec. 1962, p. 39. Mojibur Rahman, ‘Jumar siksha’, Madina, March 1964, p. 33. In the context of Pakistan, it was suggested that zakat funds could be used to start a training centre for missionaries for proselytization activities, and to spread the gospel of Islam; to impart Islamic education; to maintain yatim khanas (orphanages); to help the needy; for the management and maintenance of mosques and other religious institutions. Speech by Serajul Islam, CAP Debates, 21 Dec. 1948, pp. 226-27, 229. ‘The head may not be completely severed from the body. ‘Halal o haram’, Madina, Dec. 1962, pp. 14-6. “Alem samajer aawaj’, editorial, Madina, May 1966, p. 8. Muhammad Abdullah, ‘Maulana Mohammad Akram Khan’, JEP, AprilJune 1974, pp. 198-99, 201.

SB

67.

70. 7. 72. 73. 74, 75. 76. 71.

Abdul Jabbar Siddiqqui, ‘Smritikatha’, Madina, June 1963, p. 19. Editorial, ‘Dhakae aitihasik ulama sanmelan’ ibid., Oct. 1963, p. 6. Pak. Obs., 30 March 1961. Alauddin al Azhari, Niti o durniti (pamphlet published by Bureau of National Reconstruction, East Pakistan, 1969), pp. 9-19, 20-25. Muhammad Shahidullah, ‘Koraner bani’, Madina, Dec. 1962, p. 13. He wrote, ‘Dharme barabari nai’ (There may be no excess of force in religion). “Saamskritir dasatvaa’, editorial, Madina, Oct. 1965, p. 7. Tahabi and Abu Daud, vol. 1, cited by A. K. A. A. Mumtazul Fukaha, ‘Islamer drishtite janmaniyantran’, IEP, April-June 1962, p. 130. A.K.A. A. Mumtazul Fukaha, ibid., pp. 133, 138. Golam Azam, ‘Islamer drishtite janmaniyantran’, JEP, April-June 1962, pp. 116-25, 118.

A.K.A. A. Mumtazul Fukaha, op. cit, p. 127. Ibid, pp. 134-5. Golam Azam, op. cit., pp 123-24 A. K. A. A. Mumtazul Fukaha, op. cit., pp. 138-39. Ibid., p. 139. ‘Ekademi sambad’, JEP, July-Sept. 1961. Green and Y. A. Jan, ‘Family Planning Knowledge and Attitude Surveys in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review, vol. IV, 1964, pp. 339-40. S. S. Zaman and W. R. Wahid, ‘Psychological and Socio-cultural Factors as Related to Attitudes towards Family Planning among Women

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

88

2 7

SRESR

£8

38

in Bangladesh’, The Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, vol. VI, 1978, p. 339. The data was collected by the National Impact Survey of Pakistan. The sample included service-holders, businessmen, day-labourers, farmers and the unemployed. U.AB. Raziq Akter Banu, Islam in Bangladesh, table 7.5, p. 117. Muhammad Sirajul Islam, ‘Islamer drishtite lalit kala’, IEP, Oct-Dec. 1961, pp. 405-07. Tbid., pp. 407-09, 414, 442-43. Muhammad Shahidulla, ‘Islamer drishtite lalit kala’, JEP, Oct.- Dec. 1961, p. 403. Ibid, pp. 401-03. Ibid., pp. 403-04. ‘Islam's Attitude Towards Fine Arts Discussed’, Pak. Obs., 27 June 1961. R. Hasan, ‘Islam and Fine Arts’, Pak. Obs., 1 Aug. 1961. See ‘The Problem of National Character’, a symposium held: by the Congress with the Bureau of National Reconstruction, Karachi (Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1961); Syed Sajjad Husain, ‘Religion in Education’, Pak. Obs., 3, Dec. 1955. Report of the East Bengal Educational System Reconstruction Committee, hereafter R.EAR.C. (Govt. of East Bengal, Dacca, 1952), pp. 104-111; Report P.LEB., 1948-49 (Gow. of East Bengal, Dacca, 1952), p. 30. REAR, pp. 114-15. Giasuddin Ahmed Chowdhury, ‘Pakistane dharmiya siksha’, IEP, AprilJune 1964, pp. 449-50. REAR.C, pp. 102-03. Ibid, pp. 44-441. Kharezi Madrasahs existed ever since Muslim rule in India. See Giasuddin Ahmed Chowdhuty, op. cit., pp. 445-48. REAR.C,, pp. 159, 245. Ayub Ali, History of Traditional Islamic Education in Bangladesh (Dacca, 1983), pp. 170-72. See Dainik Azad, 3 Aug. 1957; IEP, April-June 1964, pp. 444-59. Giasuddin Ahmed Chowdhury, op. cit., pp. 451-56. Alia madrasahs have five stages of education within a duration of 16 years; Ibtedai — 4 years, Dakhil — 6 years, Alim — 2 years, Fazil — 2 years and Kamil — 2 years. For the practice of teaching Diniyat at home, see Muhammad Hafizuddin Sheikh, ‘Dharma siksha kon pathe’, JEP, Oct.-Dec. 1970, p..128; Ahmed Husain Dani, ‘Education and Religion’, Pak. Obs., 6 Dec. 1955. Giasuddin Ahmed Chowdhury, op. cit., pp. 456-57.

S23 95.

429

430

The Sacred and The Secular

98. Al-Islam, 1 Jan., 1962, 15 Dec., 1961; the view of Ghulam Murshid in Ali Anwar, ed., Dharmanirapekshata, p. 26. 99. Syed Ali Ashraf, ‘Danger of Secular Education’, Pak Obs., 14 May, 1955. 100. Abul Hashim, ‘Sikshaniti prasange’, editorial, JEP, July-Sept. 1969, pp. 159-161. 101. A. K. M. Ayub Ali, op. cit, pp. 176-79. 102. Bangladesh siksha commission report, Dacca, 1974, p. 57. 103. This demand was also made in pre-partition times. See editorial, Madina, Jan. 1963, p. 8; Abul Hashim, ‘Islami rashtrer siksha o sasan byabastha’, editorial, IEP, Oct.-Dec. 1966, p. 116. 104, A. K. M. Ayub Ali, op. cit, pp. 196-203. 105. ‘Act no. XXXVI of 1980, Islamic University Act’, A Collection of Acts and Ordinances, 1980 (Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, G.O.B., 1980). 106. In 1957, a man killed two maulvis who refused to offer ‘fatiha’ in his favour so that he could remarry his ex-wife. According to the ‘maulvis it was against the injunctions of Islam. Dainik Azad, 5 July 1957. 107. Fazlur Rahman, “The Controversy over the Muslim Family Laws’ in D.E. Smith, ed., South Asian Religion and Politics, p. 424. 108. ‘The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, Ordinance no. VIII of 1961", The Pakistan Code, vol. XIV, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, GOP, (Karachi, 1967), p. 68. 109, Fazlur Rahman, op. cit., p. 425. 110. Naimuddin Ahmed, ‘Polygamy’, letter to the editor, Pak, Obs., 23 Feb. 1951. 111. Begum Dil Afroze Hug, ‘Aine narir maryada’, Begum, Ida Samkhya, 23 Jan. 1966, p. 109. 112. Malos, ‘Idle Thoughts’, Pak. Obs. 23 April 1955. 113. Pak. Obs., 17 April 1955. 114, Ibid., 27 April 1955 115. The second Begum was of Lebanese stock and of Canadian nationality. See ibid., 8 April 1955, 19 May 1955. 116. Pak. Obs, 10 May 1955. 117. Pak. Obs., 23 Feb. 1951. 118. Pak. Obs., 10 May 1955, 17 Nov. 1955. 119. Pak Obs., 17 Nov. 1955. 120, Ibid, 18 April 1955. 121. Ibid, 30 May 1955. 122. ‘The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961’, pp. 68-72.

Religion, Religious Institutions and Social Norms

431

‘Government to Implement Marriage Reforms : Matrimonial Courts to be Established’, Pak. Obs., 18 March 1960. 124, Ibid. 125. ‘Dynamics of Society’, editorial, Pak. Obs., 2 March 1961. 126. Letters to the editor, Pak. Obs., 7, 14 March 1961. 127. Sylvia A. Chipp, ‘The Role of Women Elites in a Modernizing Country : The All Pakistan Women’s Association (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Syracuse University, 1970), pp. 177-83. 128. Pakistan Commission on National Education, Report (G.O.P., Karachi, 1959), pp. 187-89; Bangladesh Siksha Commission, Report, 1974, pp. 1-3, 196-97. Men saw their wives more often as mothers than women did themselves. See Noorunnahar Fyzunnesa, ‘Data on Attitudes towards 123,

Urban Girls’ Education’, Women for Women, 1978 (Dacca, 1978), tables

2 and 3 pp. 42-43. 129. A study of 1966 showed that 40 per cent of women felt that nursing jobs entailed loss of prestige and adverse public opinion. See Mahmuda Begum, Attitude of Pakistani Women towards Employment (Mimeograph,

Dacca,

1966), p. 13; Bilquis A Alum,

‘Women

in Nursing’, Women for Women, 1975 (Dacca, 1975), p. 122. 130. Muhammad Shahidullah and Abdur Rahim, for example, represented this, school of thought. See Muhammad Shahidullah, ‘Islamer drishtite lalit

kala’, p. 404; Maulana Muhammad Abdur Rahim, Nari (Women),

(Dacca, 1977). 131. Aziz Ahmad, ‘Islam and Democracy in the Pakistan Subcontinent’,

in

Robert F. Spencer, ed., Religion and Change in Contemporary

Asia (Minneapolis, 1971), pp. 133-39. In September 1955, the Chief Minister

was

threatened

with

dire consequences by the Jama’at-i-

Islami if he took a woman into his cabinet. See Pak Obs., 15 Sept. 1955.

M. Z. Huq, letter to the editor, Pak. Obs., 16 Aug., 1950. Often education for girls meant co-education, especially in rural areas, and this was considered unacceptable. It was believed that girls would wear tight clothes, make-up etc. Salehuddin Ahmed, ‘Siksha byabastha prasange’, Madina, Jan. 1963, pp. 42-43; Morning News, 16 Aug. 1961. 133, See Ellen Sattar, Socio-Economic Survey of Dacca University Students (Dacca, 1974) and the discussion in chapter 4, 134, Pak, Obs., 16 Aug., 1950. 135. Shapan Adnan and Rushidan Islam, Social Change and Rural Women: Possibilities of Participation. ‘The Village Study Group, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (Dacca, 1976), pp. 15-16. 136. Rafiqul Huda Chowdhury, Married Woman in Urban Occupations of 132.

432

The Sacred and The Secular

Bangladesh— Some Problems and Issues, Research Report : New Series no. 22, BIDS (Dacca, 1976), p. 69. 137. Mahmuda Islam, ‘Women at Work’, Women for Women, 1978, pp. 100106. 138. The 1974 Population Census of Bangladesh, Report, p. 29. 139, Rafiqul Huda Chowdhury, op. cit., p. 1. 140. The orthodoxy not only believed that women were inferior to men in terms of physical strength but also in terms of rationality and intelligence. See Maulana Abdur Rahim, op. cit., pp. 69-71. On expenditure on female education, see Report P.I.E.B., 1953-54, p. 1; Report P.LE.B., 1954-55, p. 3; Pak. Obs., 1 July 1955. There were 12 reserved seats in the East Bengal Legislature in 1956. The move to reduce it to 10 was seen as an injustice particularly as female students did better than boys in the same class. Speech by Abdul Mansur Ahmed, C.A.P. Debates, 16 Feb. 1956, p. 3221. 141. Maulana Abdur Rahim, op cit., pp. 35-36. 142. Begum Dil Afroze Huq,, op cit., p. 110. 143. Pak Obs., 4 June 1950. 144. Discussion with Begum Noor Jehan Murshid, state Minister for Social Welfare and Family Planning in 1973-74, GOB. 145, Ziaur Rahman's statement to Zillur Rahman Khan, Professor of Politics, Wisconsin University, cited in Z.R. Khan, ‘Islam and Bengali Nationalism’, Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no. 8, August 1985, p. 849.

CONCLUSION

This book has attempted to show the variations which characterize the Muslim mind in specific contexts. Colonial experience as well as the

social and political developments which followed in the postindependence era threw up challenges with which the intelligentsia was

compelled to come to terms. Their deliberations reveal only too clearly

that there is no monolithic Islamic world-view although there is general

agreement on the basic principles of Islam. The opinions of the intelligentsia reflect the influences it was subjected to,—the great traditions

of Islam and Hinduism, the small traditions of folk beliefs and customs, the impact of western rationalism, the effect of coming to terms with

what was considered to be the loss of their ‘power’ under European

domination. There was an explicit tension between the opposing pulls

of a secular, rationalist outlook on the one hand, and a communal or religious tendency on the other. Although all debates had one shared

point of reference, the sources of Islamic law — the Koran and the

sunnah — different sections of the intelligentsia had widely divergent social ideologies. Take, for example, the debates held in the

post-partition period. While democracy was the accepted goal for all groups, at least ostensibly, the perceptions of democracy varied a great

deal. The orthodox preferred a centralized government headed by a

Muslim and guided by a council of religious experts. They visualized

tule by the clergy similar to that in Iran since the eighties. The general preference, however, Westminster model.

was

for

parliamentary

democracy

after

the

Islam in South Asia experienced periods of confrontation, followed

by accommodation and tension. Tension, which is the subject of this

study, manifested itsclf through the periodic purificatory movements

434

‘The Sacred and The Secular

to weed out accretions from Bengali Islam and, through pressures from

the orthodoxy, to ‘Islamize’ the social and political order. The nostalgia

behind these movements was to recreate an imagined glorified past

through the ‘application’ of Islamic law which in reality was never a code that could be ‘applied’. Successive regimes submitted to these pressures in varying degrees; their concern being the projection of an image of a modern government which was responsive to popular de-

mand. However, so long as political Islam was kept under check as in Ayub Khan’s Pakistan, there was little scope for confrontation on re-

ligious grounds. The situation changed both prior to Pakistan’s first

general

election

and

under

Ziaur

Rahman

in

Bangladesh

when

the Islamic right was allowed political participation. Tension gave way

to confrontation in each case as militant Islam began to assert itself

striking at the eclectic traditions which came to acquire a secular con-

notation, Its objective was not only to invent tradition but also to re-

invent the collective memory in an effort to mobilize support and gain

political power.

This study has challenged a number of assumptions and stereotypes

which inform works on the social and political history of Bengal

Muslims. Though not central to the main concern of the book, these

stereotypes have had an impact on the self-identification of the intel-

ligentsia. Indeed, the struggle for political ascendancy has sought legitimacy mostly from images of the self and the other. Class societies find it acceptable to disregard people of low birth. The British, the Hindus and the Muslims were no different in this regard. One stereo-

type sees Bengal Muslims as comprised primarily of low-caste Hindu

converts to the point of excluding all other social groups which have contributed members to this community —

upper-caste Hindus, the

early conquerors including their mixed race descendants, and Buddhists

who were the predominant community in Bengal prior to the advent of Islam. A related stereotype which is based on insufficient evidence explains the backwardness of Muslims in terms of assumptions about

their low birth, poverty, and the virtual absence of education among

them.

A third area of contention relates to Suhrawardy’s role in the 1946 Calcutta riots and the extent of his communalism. The accusations

against him imply that he ‘organized’ the riots. These are rejected on

the basis of inadequate evidence, bias and lack of sound logic in the

Conclusion

435

argument. Though responsible for law and order as Chief Minister, no single person could

‘organize’ massacres of such a scale. Such a car-

nage was possible precisely because the predisposition for violence had

already been generated in the populace, for which the guilt must be

shared by all parties and law enforcing bodies — the Congress, the ‘Muslim League, the Mahasabha, the police force and the British. A

balance sheet of guilt drawn from evidence provided by some of these

groups alone to the exclusion of others would make for a partial story.

‘The evidence usually cited refers to the Spens Enquiry Committee,

particularly the statements of British officials and members of the police force , mainly Hindu. Suhrawardy’s defence before the Committee,

his efforts to convince the Governor about the need for army interven-

tion and the fact that he set up pickets between Muslim and Hindu mahallas to contain the outbreak, and other similar evidence from

Muslim officials and statesmen has been totally ignored in these stud-

ies.' Current scholarship has confused rather than clarified the issues,

particularly because it has overlooked the role of mass hysteria in all this. The role of the police force also needs thorough investigation

before any judgement can be passed.

It would be pertinent at this point to outline some of the broad

conclusions which follow from this study. The book has identified

the nature and characteristics of the ideological tensions which have

marked the life of the intelligentsia. The contrary pulls of rationalist thought and unquestioning faith often fluctuated under the influence

of political manipulation and mundane economic considerations. The

impact of their

self-perception,

community

aspirations and inter-

community relations on this have also been significant. Conversely,

changes in the self-identification of the intelligentsia and their ex-

perience of reality have had an impact on ideological debates as

well as on power relations.

‘The emergence in Bengal of a Muslim middle class — and its cru-

cial component, an intelligentsia — has been attributed partly to British policies and partly to autonomous forces at work in the pre-partition

period. Although social mobility based on competition increased under

British rule, the system was not entirely a meritocracy. Quotas in education, employment, the legislatures and the council were reserved for backward communities, including Muslims. With the exception of some

who feared that such cossetting would cripple them, most Muslims

436

The Sacred and The Secular

appreciated the system as a means by which to catch up with the rela-

tively advanced Hindu middle class. In their quest for allies, the British

were resolved to see Indians as ‘a patchwork of interests’ and therefore encouraged various religious communities to see themselves as distinct

political constituencies and vested interests. The Muslim acquiescence in this policy reflected their hope of gaining from state patronage what they could not wrest through competition.

‘The book challenges the myth projected by British officialdom that

it looked with disfavour upon denominational education, because in fact such education proliferated during colonial rule. Though apparently

uninterested in denominational education, British policies indirectly resulted in its growth particularly among Muslims. The refusal to meet

Muslim demands for religious instruction in schools — where signifi-

cantly, lessons in Christianity were offered and vernacular texts were

highly Sanskritised and hence Hindu-oriented — forced many to go to

private schools and madrasahs. Those among the Muslim intelligentsia

who tried to establish non-denominational schools found it hard to ob-

tain government grants-in-aid. The conditions for these grants were so stringent that only the relatively affluent Hindu-dominated schools managed to secure them. The madrasahs, on the other

hand, were poorly equipped. Even the government-funded Calcutta

Madrasah had

inadequate

provision

for

teaching

English.

Conse-

quently, the graduates of these institutions could not compete success-

fully with the alumni of non-denominational institutions. Even the

Islamia colleges which taught secular subjects, were constrained to offer a good education because of relatively poor facilities.

The emergent intelligentsia were heterogeneous in terms of their social base, educational and intellectual orientations and under-

standing of religious injunctions. There was no clear-cut division along

religious

and

secular lines. Their

positions

varied

according

to the issues involved. Yet some broad generalizations are possible.

‘The relatively small number of Muslims who studied at government

colleges which provided general education, tended to be liberal and

often secular in outlook. Most of the madrasah-educated tended to

be orthodox in their views. Differences between the two usually

resulted from tensions arising from their different approaches to religion and social behaviour,

as well as mutual hostility due to dif-

ferences in their socio-economic backgrounds. For, not only were

Conclusion

437

the former better educated and therefore relatively more successful,

but they also came from more affluent backgrounds. However, in

the context of the demand. for Pakistan, most of them were in favour of its creation. The Deoband school formed a third category of the intelligentsia. Educationally better endowed than madrasahs, its con-

cern was with theology and nationalist politics supportive of the Congress position. It, however, contributed fewer numbers than the other two categories. The world-view of the intelligentsia was striking in its lack of con-

sistency particularly before partition. Their political vision was vacil-

lating and ambivalent. Fazlul Huq’s career is a prime example of this attitude. Although such ambivalence resulted from political expediency,

in the long run it proved to be a mark of weakness as the intelligentsia

lost political initiative to the Punjabi-dominated elite in Pakistan.

The study notes that the backdrop to the Pakistan demand was the

absence of a non-religious, secular or neutral ethos in Indian politics.

Jinnah’s Pakistan, like Gandhi’s Ramrajya, sought legitimacy by appealing to past glory. The sources of inspiration in both cases came

from religious history, real or imagined.

In the process, that led inevitably and inexorably to the creation of Pakistan, mounting communalism was accompanied by an increasing

show of religiosity. Invariably, religiosity came to be identified with

communalism in many circles. However, Pakistan was identified with

a communal ideology while the Congress was associated with a secular ‘one, despite the fact that many nationalist politicians who supported

the Congress drew their inspiration from images of Hindu revivalism

including Bankimchandra’s ten-armed Durga.

The notions of Muslim communalism and separatism have been

examined in the context of their Hindu counterparts. It is acknowledged that exclusiveness and identity formation do not develop in a vacuum,

but derive inspiration from perceptions of the ‘other’. Indeed, historians are just beginning to take serious note of the impact of Hindu revivalism and chauvinism on the rise of an exclusive Muslim identity. However,

the emergence of an exclusive Muslim identity among

segments of the intelligentsia derived from multiple sources. It accompanied the growth of a Muslim intelligentsiain nineteenth and early

twentieth. century Bengal. Its exclusiveness was manifest as an

opposition to Hindu identity, Even the Indian national identity became

438

‘The Sacred and The Secular

secondary

and

eventually unacceptable as the movement

for Paki-

stan gained momentum. Symbol manipulation. by elites in competition

was an important factor in this process. The shared faith in Islam was

perceived by many to be the true basis of the community’s exclusive

aspirations. Culture

and language

of religious belief and function

too were depicted as subsets by some members of the

ashraf-dominated intelligentsia. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, there was a ripple of dissent among some intellectuals who

began to claim Bengali, rather than Urdu, as their mother tongue, thus

challenging the prejudice against the local language as something in-

ferior and unsuitable for Muslims. The fear of lagging behind their

Urdu-speaking co-religionists in the competition for education and em-

ployment

was a factor in this. cultural self-assertion. But a crisis of

identity—the belief that there was a basic contradiction between their Bengali and Muslim identities—persisted long after partition. This un-

certainty was reflected and exploited in the ensuing power struggle in Pakistan.

An veloped Muslim British

enhanced consciousness of exclusive communal solidarity de alongside the growth of an ethnic identity based on religion. ‘communalism’ in Bengal derived from multiple factors: the decision to treat Muslims as a separate community, a policy

whereby the latter could secure special advantages; the contemptuous

treatment of Muslims by some Hindus; the sensitive awareness of Hindu exclusiveness, the result of Hindu ritual prescriptions such as

the taboo on commensality with non-Hindus which came to be con-

sidered offensive; the post-1919 constitutional developments which rec-

ognized religious communities as distinct constituencies and created a

vested interest in the communal number game; and the construction of

an exclusively Muslim communal identity by political elites in the proc-

ess of mobilization in favour of an idea — Pakistan. The Muslim

League, a party exclusively representing Muslim interests secured the

community’s mandate by 1947. By then the Muslim communal and religious identities had become virtually conterminous creating one basic source of tension between secular and religious concerns.

Two significant findings relate to the post-1947 intelligentsia: firstly, that upward mobility was possible in the fifties and sixties

with very little education. Secondly, that recruitment to the intelli-

gentsia was occurring increasingly from rural society. Consequently,

439

Conclusion

the influence of Wahabi thought -with its pull towards puritanism was strong. But an equally strong influence came from syncretic

and eclectic tendencies in Bengali Islam. The world view of the

post-partition intelligentsia drew inspiration from these divergent fac-

tors as well as the thoughts of rationalist and religious publicists of the twenties and thirties. At one level, the intelligentsia demanded that culture be allotted a neutral or secular zone. At another level,

there was a strong body of opinion which rejected such a possibility

on the grounds that Islam incorporated every sphere and activity of

life and provided a perfect code of conduct.

The fifties and sixties were marked by deep personal piety accom-

panied by profound religious tolerance especially in rural soci-

ety. Urban society witnessed occasional communal disturbances at the

instigation of political workers. A small segment of the intelligentsia

remained wholly secular in orientation. But for the most, the ideological

attitudes and commitments of the intelligentsia remained ambivalent.

ons of attitudes, In terms of its ideological -orientati and the spectrum the intelligentsia has been classified into four categories. These cate-

gories range from the religious in personal outlook and aggressively

cally secular. Also communal in the socio-po sphereliti to the consistent included were those who were tolerant to other belief structures whatever their own ideological orientation.

The intelligentsia, however, engaged in considerab debate andle dis-

cussion on'matters relating to language, fine arts, education, literature,

position of women, inheritance, election of a woman as head of state,

etc. These clearly reveal that there was no monolithic view of what constituted correct conduct and interpretation of religious injunctions.

However, the spectrum of views at times revealed an underly-

ing political struggle for ideological domination, control of power, male

domination and support for particular group interests. For example, when the orthodoxy challenged women against polygamy, they were motivated more by the desire to preserve male domination than by any

loyalty to the confessional faith. In the

political

power

game

of the post-partition

years

the

non-vernacular ashraf intelligentsia, a major component of the power

elite, saw much advantage in keep up ing communal tension which had lost its bite with the Hindu exodus. They feared that the East Bengal Hindus and Muslims would form a joint front in politics and capture

440

‘The Sacred and The Secular

power — for the numerical superiority of East Bengal would give it an advantage vis-a-vis West Pakistan in a democratic system. The fear of loss of political dominance compelled the ashraf intelligentsia to

Tesort to undemocratic practices in the legislature. They also pursued a policy of one language, one culture and one religion — geared to-

wards better integration of the. two wings of Pakistan and building a nation distinct from the Indian variety. In this they had the support of some members of the vernacular intelligentsia who have been charac-

terized here as the counter-vernacular intelligentsia. Institutions such

as the Pakistan Council and the Bureau of National Reconstruction

were set up with this aim in view. However, the one nation policy was

also meant to deflect any expression of grievances by East

Bengal Muslims: as good Muslim brothers they were expected not to

create discord. Religion was thus used as a lever to keep East Bengal in its place. Any threat to the status quo — such as the United Front

victory in the 1954 elections and Awami League victory in 1970, were treated as threats to Pakistan and Islam and hence, ruthlessly crushed

in a manner reminiscent of the ‘irrelevant state’ in Africa” The real

motive was to maintain political domination and ensure that the Bengali nationality remained divided economically, emotionally and in other ways.

The vernacular intelligentsia challenged the dominant ideology through what became an emphasis on a secular perception of cultural and linguistic identity. This trend had begun in the twenties and thirties when some Bengal Muslims had opted to write in Bengali and de-

manded that the Koran be translated into their mother tongue. However, their commitment to Bengali was shaky. They were often lost and tom

between two worlds: the imagined ideal incorporating the ethics of

Islam represented by ashraf culture and behaviour; and the perceived

reality wherein syncretistic Bengali Islam seemed a bad imitation of that ideal. The awareness of their local origins and rural roots as well

as ashraf contempt for the ajlaf only emphasized further the sense of inferiority experienced by the emerging intelligentsia. In the post-partition period, this sense of inferiority gradually gave way to an assertion of pride in the local language and culture. Bengali became a symbol of emancipation from non-Bengali domination and all forms of exploitation — political, economic and social.

In politics, there was a constant struggle for power in which the

Conclusion

441

ashraf politicization of religion was resented by the vernacular intelli-

gentsia and their supporters. Some of the latter were of ashraf origin

and have been identified in this study as the counter-non-vernacular

intelligentsia, depending on their linguistic background. The political

positions taken by the Muslim League before 1947 had acquired the

weight of tradition’in the dominant political vocabulary and were there-

fore treated with the same respect as shown to perceived Islamic in-

junctions. Thus, separate electorate was seen to be an Islamic Tequirement whereas in reality it was merely

a ploy to render

the Hindus politically ineffective. Unlike the ashraf intelligentsia, the vernacular intelligentsia did not project themselves as defenders of the

faith. However, they did adopt the religious argument in pointing out that there was nothing Islamic in such stances.

‘The secular stand of the vernacular intelligentsia was partly a re-

action against ashraf policies, derived to some extent from a concern

for minority rights and partly the result of their particular heritage. The

roots of their secular consciousness are traceable to the eclectic traditions of rural Bengal generated in the process of cultural accommoda-

tion as Islam spread to the region, as well as the experience of

inter-communal harmony which engendered a general spirit of toler-

‘ance. At another level, a significant section of the Bengali intelligentsia shared with their Hindu counterparts the heritage of liberal humanism which characterized the nineteenth century cultural ‘renaissance’ in Bengal. This trend survived the inter-communal bitterness of the pre-partition years. The perceived threat from India and the continuous

projection by the Pakistan press of persecution of Indian Muslims

helped sustain this bitterness among some sections. As that bitterness

became irrelevant in the absence of a Hindu threat, the liberal syncretist element in Bengali Muslim culture acquired a new power in Eastern

Pakistan. A constant friction between the secular intelligentsia and the orthodoxy persisted throughout this period. However, while an avowed athe-

ist in the thirties was in grave physical danger, in the sixties he merely aroused the verbal opposition of staunch believers. The experience of

the scientist Abul Hasnat, whio claimed in 1961 that man had created

God and not vice versa, illustrates the point.’ While atheists continued to abound, the risk of violent assault increased after the eighties as

extremist Islamic organizations began to play a dominant role in their

442

The Sacred and The Secular

quest to establish an imagined state based on the application of Islamic

law. The friction partly arose out of unequal access to education,

employment and power, and partly from the mutually-conflicting pulls

of Islamization and secularization of society. These pulls characterized

every aspect of society —social mores, personal ethics, and even religious institutions. While it was generally agreed that social mores and

ethics were derived from the Koran and sunnah, differences existed over the interpretation of Islamic doctrines. The interpretations in turn

depended on the particular orientations of groups and individuals. Thus

the liberal ulama did not oppose dancing, singing or painting so long

as these did not lead one astray from the path of duty as defined by

social norms and the shariat. Only excess in all things was con-

demnable in their eyes. The orthodox ulama believed in the letter of

the law and in an interpretation whereby right and wrong were clearly

defined leaving no scope for ijtihad. Thus, they sought to prohibit all

forms of pleasurable activities lest the limit be crossed, lest sexual

desires be aroused, lest rigid social norms be broken. Hence, their opPosition to the fine arts, education of women, and contraception.

Despite the enormous

powers of social control enjoyed by the

ulama, society experienced a gradual liberalization of values, par-

ticularly in urban areas. An ever increasing number of women en-

tered the fields of education and employment defying the orthodox notion of purdah. They competed with men, despite the prejudices

against them as inferior and unequal — prejudices for which religious sanction was often sought even by the intelligentsia. In educa-

tion, the secular system

is still more

popular than

the madrasah

system despite increasing resource allocation to the latter.‘ However,

the founding of two Islamic universities may well change attitudes

to madrasah education and help create a new class of strongly or-

thodox people who may exert a greater influence towards the further Islamization of society. There is also likely to be greater conflict

between this new class and graduates of the general universities of

the country which produce the bulk of the secular intelligentsia.

However, even the secular intelligentsia of Bangladesh could not

overlook the pervasive religious concerns of the masses. Many of their members shared these concerns, thanks to their own rural origin. There-

fore, even in future, secular objectives will probably have to be placed

Conclusion

443

within a religious framework if they are to have any meaningful impact ‘on society.

The ideology of the intelligentsia was marked by violent shifts as

well as persistent ambivalence. The Islamic irredentism of East Pakistani patriots gave place to the predominantly secular concerns of

the language movement and the ethnic-cultural slogan of Jai Bangla.

‘As the new military rulers sought support among the orthodoxy and

communalists, religion was projected as an integral part of political and social ideology. Besides, even in the most secular years

of Bangladesh’s history, the ruling-elite was required to project its

Islamic bonafide.

The nature of the ruling class has determined the ruling ideology.

Political domination by the non-Bengali intelligentsia and the army was accompanied by greater emphasis on Islam at the state level. The brief

secular interlude lasted until the death of Mujib in 1975. The suddenly

heightened religious activity in the post-Mujib era is no indication of a resurgence

of Islam,

for the significance of religion

in Bengali

Muslim social life never waned. Its increased visibility in the media

and the use of loudspeakers to call the faithful to prayers only indicates

that the upholders of religious ideology have access to power and the

media. It does not necessarily mean that people have become more

religious or moral than before but that it has become important to pro-

ject such an image, that the ostentatious observance of religious rituals has become

a value in itself. The first sign of such a change was mani-

fested in 1977 when secularism ceased to be a principle of state policy.

No doubt it was a consequence of the promulgation of the Political

Parties Regulation in 1976 which allowed the erstwhile outlawed

Jama’ at-i-Islami to re-enter politics and wield its influence. In retro-

spect, it was the first step towards the unleashing of reactionary forces under state patronage although some may cite Sheikh Mujib’s general amnesty to collaborators in 1973 instead.

The implications of the state-sponsored religiosity of the intelligent-

sia is likely to be far-reaching given the ascendancy of militant Islam.

The aim of the Jama’at-i-Islami, for example, is to surreptitiously cap-

ture power in order to establish an Islamic polity based on the shariat

as interpreted by Maududi. The popularity of the Islamic right has risen

significantly in the twenty years after the 1970 elections. Not only has

the share of votes polled by the Jama’at-i-Islami increased, but it has

444

The Sacred and The Secular

also won twenty seats in the 1991 elections.’ The fact that its support

was deemed essential for the army-backed Bangladesh Nationalist Party

to form a government in 1991 has given the Islamic right a leverage

it never enjoyed before. Taking advantage of the friction between the

BNP and Awami League, and the unpopularity of the Jatiya Party, the

Jama’ at catapulted itself into playing the balance of power. The com-

munal question is likely to return to Bangladesh with a dubious role

assigned to India in the political vocabulary. The eclectic traditions of

East Bengal are likely to be threatened by methods of confrontation in which religious forces will challenge secular ones in a battle that has

little to do with religion.

Notes

1. 2.

3. 4,

5.

Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy with a Brief Account of His Life and Work, edited by Mohammad H. R. Taludar (Dhaka, 1987), pp. 23-25. ‘The term ‘irrelevant state’ has been used to identify the exploitative postcolonial state which maintains power through reliance on violence and coercion, but is unable to meet the basic needs of the populace which render it ‘irrelevant’to their existential conditions. See Julius O. Thonvbere, “The Irrelevant State : Ethnicity, and the Quest for Nationhood in Africa’, Ethnic and Rural Studies , vol. 17, no. 1, January 1994, pp. 42-60. ‘Saptahik mahfil’ JEP (July-Sept. 1961), pp. 323-24. Student enrolment, teacher recruitment in madrasahs and the number of ‘madrasahs was already increased from Tk 2.5 million in 1971 to Tk. for re7.2 millionin 1973. Ershad set aside more than Tk. 1.7 billion ligious purposes in 1984-85. See SPB, 1990, BBS, GOB, table 12.06, p. 274; B.M. Monoar Kabir, “The Politics of Religion : The Jama’at-i-Islami in Bangladesh’ in R. Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh, (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1990) pp. 124, 126. Craig Baxter and Syedur Rehman, ‘Bangladesh Votes-1991: Building Democratic Institutions’ Asian Survey, vol. xxi, no. 8, Aug 1991, pp. 687-90.

lower class occupational group

share-cropper

month of November-December in the Bengali calendar

daily morning ritual among the Hindus low born

person leamed in Islamic law, singular of ulama subordinate revenue official

movement

degraded class

month of June-July in the Bengali calendar

high-born

sky month of September-October in the Bengali calendar

low born, alternative term for ajlaf verses from suras in the Koran

coitus interruptus

call to prayer month of April-May in the Bengali calendar musician

trader, middleman

lower class occupational group

home; house; homestead

believers in forbidden religions

mystical and syncretistic folk cult

to act contrary to religious principles: heretic

to lapse from ritually correct conduct

hunter-cum-snarer; gypsy; a low caste occupational group

heaven

The Sacred and The Secular

planquin bearer/carrier not in one’s own name

month of August-September in the Bengali calendar gentlemen

syncretist religious sect (lit. worshipper of God) boiled rice Paper innovations

debate Hindu upper caste; priestly caste emancipation of the intellect slum month of March-April in the Bengali calendar funerary ritual forty days after death painter

pulses

tailor

washerman

cotton-carder

‘a sari length cloth wor as a form of trousers Musalmani Bangla; Bengali with a high mixture of Urdu/Persian words ink-pot

Muslim festival celebration of the Prophet's birthday late evening prayer — usually offered after 8 p.m. a member of the Faraizi movement, a religious cum socio-economic movement special prayers offered for someone, especially after death; also religious decree

religious decree sky spice-dealer; a Hindu caste group

martyr for a religious cause

marriage-broker bathe

tough man; hooligan

householder

sayings of the Prophet and compilation of Islamic

scriptures of his early disciples, which together form the Islamic traditions.

Glossary Mecca pilgrito mage

circumcisi who perform professi onal son

ritually pure

of Muslim a scho ollaw ritually impure tenancy right holder of an intermediate for virtuous in the hereafter female compan ion s mea breaking fast scholars) (ofnsus conse

prayers the one who leads congregational faith the Koran a cardinal virtue accortoding exercising personal preference board

Prayer for the dead before burial caste group religious war, Muslim equivalent of a crusade shoemaker weaver middleman

Friday congregation

shoe-seller month of May-June in the Bengali calendar estate office infidel, unbeliever

Paper pen ‘Muslim confession of faith

Workers’ Association

semi-educated religious divine, equivalent to a quack doctor national national traitor Hindu upper caste; warrior caste member of a Muslim paramilitary volunteer organization middleman sermon after Juma prayer

“7

The Sacred and The Secular

singers of a special kind of devotional songs qiyas

revealed book

police peasant

idolatry, heresy oil-pressers shirt

astrological chart Muslim caste-group of Dacca, originally weavers,

later hackney-carriage drivers, subsequently

businessman rent-free land not of the book, or of the mazhab or religious

order

pen

seminary for Islamic learning, secondary level and above

moneylender

residential quarter in a town or city

Muslim primary school

vow

a celebration to invoke good luck

village headman good fortune

Mughal official

mystical folk music

ink-pot

‘expression of grief during Muharram Muslim divine with expert knowledge of Islamic

theology

Muslim divine, usually a person with a degree from a madrasah: came to be used as an

equivanent for ‘Mr’, among the Muslim gentry dewer

Jow-ranking lawyer

land grants a person who gives the call to prayer

countryside

militant group (lit. fighters for the Islamic faith)

Glossary 449 low-level Muslim divine, religious functionary law officer

petty agent-cum-clerk Prophet manager Prayers untouchable

baker text on Islamic ethics and ritual duties

fishmonger indigo-dyer wholesaler

local primary school painter month of December-January in the Bengali calendar loose trousers

saint; holy man with special powers blessed water village headman tenants Hindu barber

Hindu religious worship shirt lit. book, manuscript; Bengali literary genre

seclusion of women (lit. curtain); modesty

originally a legal expert; later registrar of births and marriages arriving logically at a new resolution on the basis of the Koran and sunnah revenue-paying peasant raiyat rights; a system of land tenure

kingdom of Rama; a Hindu utopia

weapon used to slaughter animals month in the Muslim calendar when ritual fast is obligatory for Mustims interest fast Prayer lump payments in excess of rent-paid to zamindars tomb; mystical trance affluent

The Sacred and The Secular rich householder a mind free of superstition evening; Hindu prayer organization

holy man; ascetic leader religion of Satya Pir, a syncretist cult Gandhian technique of non-violent resistance Islamic law Muslim holy law respectable

heretical heresy vermilion fasting goldsmith caste conversion to Hinduism; purification mystic precedents set by the prophet Muhammad verses of the Koran self-rule petty zamindar : holder of an intermediate tenure reciting the names of God using a rosary, a form of prayer

tulsi

Ummah

Vaishnava vakil Wahabi

belief in the oneness of God replicas of coffins of the Praphet’s grandsons, taken out in procession in memory of their death during the month of Muharram jail official, custodian a familiar, sometimes rude form of addressing those of an inferior social status basil, a plant sacred to Hindus persons leamed in Islamic lore; plural of alim; experts in Muslim theology the community of the Faithful devotees of Vishnu; followers of the cult established by Chaitanya a lawyer ablution a membet of the Wahabi movement, a puritanic movement originating in Saudi Arabia.

Glossary 451 land granted for Muslim religious purposes or to support Muslim scholars obligatory charity prescrib in Islam, ed often collecte as a tax d Jong live

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PUBLISHED: PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS

BENGALI:

Al-Isalah

Al-Islam AL-Eslam Amrita Bazar Patrika Bangla Sahitye Saogat Jug Begum (Ida Samkhya) Bichitra

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Samjog Saogat Sikha

Surma

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Asian Survey Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal Bangladesh (a fortnightly journal) Bangladesh Historical Studies

Journal of the Bangladesh Economic Association Bengal Past and Present

Concept of Pakistan

Dacca University Library Bulletin

Dacca University Studies

Dacca University Studies, Arts

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Dawn

Economic and Political Weekly

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Bibliography 479 Anwar,A. ‘Renaissance in Bengal: The Question of Identity and Certain Conceptual Reconsiderations’, in D. Kopf and S. Joarder, eds., Reflections on the Bengal Renaissance Rajshahi University, 1977. Asraf, Syed Ali. ‘Danger of Secular Education’, Pak. Obs., May 14, 1955. Baxter, Craig and Syedur Rahman. ‘Bangladesh Votes-1991: Building Democratic Institutions’, Asian Survey, vol. XXXI, no. 8, August 1991. Begum, Mahmud. ‘Attitude of Pakistani Women Towards Employment’, Dacca National Institute of Public “Administration, 13, 1966, Mimeograph. Bhaduri, Amit. ‘The Evolution of Land Relations in Eastern India under British Rule’, Indian Economic and Social History Review vol. XIII, no. 1 (JanMarch 1976). Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi, ‘Notes on the Role of the Intelligentsia in Colonial Society: India from Mid-nineteenth century’, Studies in History vol. 1, no. 1 (1979). Bimbaum, Ervin. ‘Some Theoretical and Practical Aspects of the Islamic State of Pakistan’, Pakistan Historical Society Publication, no. 6 (1956). Budruddin, S.G.M., ed. ‘Bangladesh at the Islamic Conference’, Morning News, 9 July, 1974, Chekravarty, Bidyut. ‘The Communal Award of 1932 and its Implications in Bengal’, Modern Asian Studies (MAS), vol. 23, no. 3, 1989. Chatterjee, Partha. ‘Agrarian Structure in Pre-Partition Bengal’, Three Studies on the Agrarian Structure in Bengal, 1850-1947, Calcutta: 1982. Chowdhury, Binay Bhushan. “The Process of Depeasantization in Bengal and Bihar, 1885-1947’, The Indian Historical Review vol. Il, no. 1 (July 1975). Chowdhury, Rafiq Huda. ‘Married Women in Urban Occupations of Bangladesh: Some Problems and Issues’, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Research Report: New Series, no. 22 (June 1976). Dev. Bimal J. and Lahiri, Dilip Kumar. “The Line System in Assam: A Study of the Role of Maulana Bhashani’, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh vol. XXII, no, 2 (Aug. 1978). Fahmi, Salimullah. ‘Bengali Literature’, Pakistan Miscellany. vol. Il. Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1958. Fox, Richard G. ‘Gandhian Socialism, Hindu Identity and the JP Movement: Cultural Domination in the World System’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (CCP). vol. XXV, no. 3, Nov. 1987. Fyzunnesa, Noorunnahar. ‘Data on Attitudes towards Urban Girls’ Education’, Women and Education, Dacca: Women for Women, 1978. Ghaffar, Abdul. ‘Nazrui Islam — the Pied Piper of Bengal’, Concept of Pakistan, vol. 4, no. 10 (May 1968). Green, L.W. and Jan, Y.A. ‘Family Planning Knowledge and Attitude Surveys in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review vol. IV (1964). Gordon,;Leonard A. ‘Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition’, The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics vol. XVI, no. 2 (July 1978).

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Habib, Irfan. ‘Population’, in T. Raychaudhuri and I, Habib (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of India. vol. 1. c. 1200-c. 1750. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1984 (reprint). Hashmi, Tajul Islam, “The Communalisation of Class Struggle: East Bengal Peasantry, 1923-29", Indian Economic and Social History Review (IESHR). vol. XXV, no. 2, April-June 1988. Hassan, Riaz. ‘Religion, Society and the State in Pakistan: Pirg and Politics’, Asian Survey. vol. XVII, no. 5, May 1987. Houghton, Catherine. ‘East Bengali Language and Political Development in Socio-Linguistic Perspective’, in JR. McLane, Bengal in the 19th and 20th Centuries. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1975. Hug, Abul Fazl. “The Problem of National Identity in Bangladesh’, The Journal of Social Studies (Dacca), no. 24 (April 1984). Hussain, Quazi Mutahar. ‘Bengali Literature’, in Bengal in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. S.M. Tkram and Percival Spear. London: Oxford University Press, 1955, Ist ed., p. 138. Islam, Mahmuda. ‘Women at Work in Bangladesh’, Women for Women 1975, pp. 93-120. Islam, Mad. Sirajul. ‘Regional Impact of Islam’, Forum vol. 1, no. 42 (Sept. 5, 1970).

Jahan, Raunag. ‘Women in Bangladesh’, Women for Women 1975. Jahan, Raunag. ‘Women’s Education and Emancipation in a Purdah-dominated Society’, Women for Women 1978. ‘Members of Parliament in Bangladesh’, Bangladesh Politics : Problems and Issues. Dacca: University Press Ltd. 1980. Khan, Zillur Rahman. ‘Islam and Bengali Nationalism’, Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no, 8, August 1985. Kothari, Rajni. ‘Cultural Context of Communalism in India’, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), 14 January, 1989. Kozlowski, Gregory C. ‘Muslim Women and the Control of Property in North India’, IESHR, vol. XXIV, no. 2, April-June 1987. Majid, Sharif-Al. ‘Pakistan's First Presidential Election’, Asian Survey 5 (1965). Maniruzzaman, Talukdar. ‘Group Interests in Pakistan Poliitics, 1947-58", Pacific Affairs vol. 39 (1966). Also in Concept of Pakistan vol. 4 (1967-68). —— ‘Political Activism of the University Students in Pakistan’, Journal of Commionwealth Studies vol. 9, no. 3 (Aug. 1971). _—— ‘National Integration and Political Development in. Pakistan’, Concept of Pakistan vol. 3, no. 3 (Oct. 1966). Mohsin, KM. ‘Tabligh Jamat and the Faith Movement in Bangladesh’, Workshop on Bangladesh: History, Society and Culture, held on 25-27 Aug. 1984, Dhaka. Mujahid, Sharif-Ai. ‘Pakistan: The First General Election’, Asian Survey vol. XI, no. 2 (Feb. 1971).

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Murshid, Sarwar. (Editorial), ‘Contemporary Writing in East Pakistan’, New Values Publications, by K.S. Murshid. Printed by the Star Press, Dacca, 2nd Impression, 1960. Murshid, Tazeen M. ‘A House Divided: The Muslim Intelligentsia of Bengal’, in D.A. Low (ed.) The Political Inheritance of Pakistan. London, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991. Nahar, Shamsun. “The Agrarian Uprising of Titu Mir, 1831: the Economics of a Revivalist Movement’, The Journal of the Institute of Bangladesh Studies vol. I, no. 1 (1976). Nair, M. Bhaskaran. ‘Politics in East Pakistan: A Study of 1954 Blections’, South Asian Studies, vol. 17, Jan.-June 1982. Prakash, Gyan. ‘Writing Post-Orientalists History: the Historiography of India’, The Journal of Comparative Studies in History and Society, May 1990. Ray, Ratnalekha. “The Changing Fortunes of the Bengali Gentry under Colonial Rule — Pal Chaudhries of Mahesganj, ¥800-1950', MAS, vol. 21, no. 3, 1987. Qureshi, Ishtiag Hussain. “The Background of some Trends in Islamic Political Thought’; ‘Islamic Elements in the Political Thought of Pakistan’, in Braibanti, R. and Spengler, J.J., eds., Tradition, Value and Socio-Economic Development. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961. Rahman,M. Anisur. ‘East Pakistan: The Roots of Estrangement’, South Asian Review 3 (1970). Rahman, Fazlur. “The Controversy over the Muslim Family Laws’, in DE. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Sanderatne, Nimal and Zaman, M.A. ‘The Impact of the Agrarian Structure on the Political Leadership of Undivided Pakistan’, The Land Tenure Centre, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1973. Sarkar, Jagadish Narayan. ‘Islam in Bengal’, in N.K. Sinha (ed.). The History of Bengal, 1757-1905, Calcutta, 1967. Sattar, Ellen. ‘Village Women’s Work’, Women for Women (1975). Sayeed, Khalid bin. ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, in D.E. Smith, ed,, South Asian Religion and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. _— ‘Historical Origins of some of Pakistan's Persistent Political Problems’, in AJ. Wilson and D. Dalton (eds). The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration. London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982. Schuman, Howard. ‘A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism’, ‘American Journal of Sociology vol. 78, no. 2 (Sept. 1972). Sen, Asok. ‘Agrarian Structure and Tenancy Laws in Bengal, 1850-1900,in Three Studies on the Agrarian Structure in Bengal, 1850-1947. Calcutta, 1982. Sen, Shila. ‘Some Aspects of Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-46 and Fazlul Huq’, Journal of the Bangladesh Itihas Samiti, 1976.

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SUBJECT INDEX Acts

Dissolution of Muslim Marriages ‘Act, 1939, 418 Government of India Act, 1919, 1935, 86, 190, 191 Indian Councils Act, 190, 217 Islamic Education and Research Act 1980, 369 Islamic Universities Act, 1980, 369 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, 323, 348, 352, 414, 417, 430, 431 Bills 1956 Electorate Bill, 343 Fundamental Rights Bill, 348, 419 Shariat Bill, 185, 203 Census 1872 census, 28, 37, 38, 75, 89, 90, 93 1931 census, 28, 34, 41, 82, 89, 92,

95, 328 1941 census, 89 1951 census, 235 1961 census, 238, 240, 245, 247, 252 1974 census, 245, 421 Committees Basic Principles Committee, 267, 307, 309, 355 Bengal Muslim Sahitya Samiti, 173 Bangla Sahitya Sevak Samiti, 157 Dacca Disturbance Enquiry Committee, 196 Dacca University State Language Committee of Action, 302 Earle Committee, 72 Lothian Committee, 192 Pirpur Committee, 199 ‘Shamsul Huda Committee, 72 Lothian Committee, 192

Communalism Communal award, 63, 86, 102, 169, 170, 190 ——— nattio, 78, 84

riots, 53, 158, 177, 178, 179,

180, 182, 196, 197, 210, 213, 214, 219, 240, 274, 307, 308, 337, 343, 359, 377, 378, 395; see also riots communalism, 121, 127, 132, 133,

138, 156, 158, 169, 173, 177,

180, 187, 205, 206, 285, 295, 361, 367,

193, 194, 195, 197, 210, 219, 274, 284, 302, 310, 327, 360, 370, 373

Conferences Alll Bengal Praja Conference, 170 All India Hindu Yuvak Conference, 190 Round Table Conference, 190 Constituent Assembly, , 268, 274, 297,

302, 306, 317, 318, 321, 324, 328, 329, 337, 338, 341, 347, 372, 373, 374, 375,

390

Constitution 1962 Constitution, 348, 356

1972 Constitution, 360, 365, 389

Constitutional reforms, 189 Dacca

Dacca Disturbance Enquiry Committee, see Committees Dacca University, 76, 134, 240, 248, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 285, 290, 292, 299, 300, 302, 303, 305, 308, 309, 310, 311, 316,371, 386, 396, 404, 409, see also University of Dacca and Education

Subject Index 485 Dacca University State Language ‘New Education Policy of 1969, 412 Committee of Action; see ComOld Type Senior Madrasah, 73 mittees and Education pathsalas, 57, 69 public instruction, 67, 103, 257, 297, Democracy 298 Basic Democracies, 353, 356 Rajshahi College, 315, 316 Basic Democrats, 353 Reformed Madrasah Scheme, 135, Education 408 Bengal education services, 84 religious instruction, see Religion Bengal Engineering College, 65, 66, Salimullah Muslim Hall, 133, 311, B 325 Bengal Muslim Sahitya Committee; segregate institutions, 75, 194 see Committees seminaries, 412 Calcutta Madrasah, 48, 72, 97, 106, Shamsul Huda Committee, 72 107 special schools, 71, 77, 255 Comilla Academy, 402 University of Dacca, 76, 134, 371 Curzon Hall, 306, 426 Dacca University, 240, 248, 259, exodus; see Movements 260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 285, India 290, 292, 299, 300, 302, 303, Indian Councils Act, see Acts 305, 308, 309, 310, 311, 316, Indian National Congress, 198 371, 386, 396, 404, 409; see also University of Dacca Islamic Sects Deoband, 125, 129, 160, 161, 184, Ahmadiyas, 322, 337 185 Muhammadi, 124 East Pakistan Literary Association, Shia, 123, 394 201 Sunni, 121, 394 English education, 42, 43, 54, 58, 64, ‘Umayyads, 405 68, 72, 107, 164 Islamic Law Hooghly College, 77 family laws, 383, 413, 414, 419 Islamic Arabic University CommisHanafi, 121, 123 sion, 413 Hanbali, 124 Islamic Education and Research Act; Maliki, 145 . see Acts Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, Islamic Research Institute, 337, 352, 323,348, 352,414,417, 430,431 390, 427 Islamic University, 365 Jand Jagannath Hall, 78, 107 land market, 42, 44, 50, 51, 95 Krishnagar College, 77 land reforms, see reforms literacy, 265, 313 landed aristocracy, see social classes Lothian Committee; see Committees landlords, see social classes Madrasah, 48,72, 97, 106, 107;___ Madrasah Education (Qudrat-i Language Khuda) Commission, 362 Do-bhashi, 137, 138, 141, 142, 164, Maktabs, 56, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 175 74, 75, 77, 141, 147, 166, 253 Dacca University State Language Muslim Hall, 26, 78, 79, 107, 133, Committee; see Committees 266, 311 language movement; see Movement Muslim Sahitya Samaj, 125 lingua franca, 199, 302, 311

486

The Sacred and The Secular

Musalmani Bangla, 57, 58, 69, 138, 139, 164 script, 284, 287, 303, 307, 312, 313, 314,315,316,

317, 318,324, 328

Al India Muslim League, 186, 198, 200, 215 Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 202, 324 East Pakistan Democratic Youth League, 301 Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), 358 Muslim League (Council), 358 Youth League, 301, 305, 309, 319 ‘Yuba League, 284, 288, 301, 320 Legislatures

Bengal Legislative Council, 61, 190

East Pakistan Legislative Council, 393 Legislative Council, 191

Provincial Legislature, 303

Movement Arya Samaj, see religious Bhakti Movement; see religious Brahmo Samaj; see religious Buddhir Mukti Andolan, 125, 130 Civil Disobedience Movement, 176, 197,372 ‘Communist; see political parties ‘exodus, 239, 240, 247, 248, 254, 308, 337, 341, 342 Faith Movement, 122, 123, 125, 292 Faraizi movement, 50, 59, 88, 98, 122, 194, 292, 328 indigo rebellions, 53 Khilafat, 143, 189, 197, 203, 211 language movement, 285, 296, 299, 300, 302, 304, 306, 307, 309, 310,319, 321, 325, 328, 334, 358 migration, 238, 240, 247, 252, 337 ‘movement for autonomy, 296 movement of regional autonomy, 355 Quit India movement, 201 Sangathan, 29

Sepoy Mutiny, 176 Suddhi, 29 Swadeshi, 195, 217 Tabligh-i Jamant movement, 122 Unionist movement,

Wahabi movement, 87, 123, 167, 292, 328 National national anthem, 199, 320 National Defence Council, 186 nationalism, 86, 87, 88, 137, 185, 193, 194, 198, 215, 217, 296, 302, 324, 329, 345, 365, 368, 372, 377, 380, 383, 432

Occupational groups abdals, 34 bhagawania, 33 rajbansis, 32 Organizations All Pakistan Ulama Board, 350 All Pakistan Women’s Association, 416, 431 Bangla Sahitya Sevak Samiti; see Committees Bengal Muslim Sahitya Samiti, see Committees Calcutta Corporation, 189, 197, 219 Haji Mohammad Mohsin Trust, 58 Hukumat-e-Rabbaniya, 365, 376 Islamic Brotherhood, see Religion Karmi Sangh, 196 Khaksars, 200, 201 Nikhil Banga Praja Samiti, 170, 171, 221 ‘Samgram Parishad, 305, 306, 309,

Partth

313, 327

of Bengal in 1905, 63, 80,

169, 194, 218 of Bengal in 1947, 194, 195, 218, 294, 297, 299 Persons

‘Abdullah ibn Masud, 405 ‘Adamuddin, A. Q. M., 317

Subject Index

Afghans, 36, 43, ‘Ahmed Ibu Hanbal, 146 Ahad, Oli, 306, 309 ‘Ahmad, Abul Mansur, 124, 131, 139, 156, 172, 174, 202, 205, 206,

211, 299, 320, 321, 324, 325 Ahmad, Sadruddin, 300 Ahmed, A. F. Salahuddin, 155 ‘Ahmed, Kamruddin, 182, 186, 187, 206, 213, 233, 362, 364 ‘Ahmed, Nur, 307 Ahmed, Rafiuddin, 39, 91, 92 Ahmed, Shamsuddin, 179, 202, 301 Ahmed, Tajuddin, 208 Air Marshal M. Nur Khan, 412 Ali, Mahmud, 266, 273, 274, 308, 332, 333, 357, 371, 372, 375 Ali, Mohar, 371 Ali, Muhammad, 266, 324, 357

Ali, Ali, Ali, Ali, Ali,

Muhammad Dad, 143 Muhammad Shaukat, 208 Muhammad Wajed, 139, 164 Rao Farman, 332, 333, 371 S. Wajed, 126, 128, 152, 161, 164 All, Syed Amir, 233, 234, 291 Allama Tbn Zarir, 401 Allama Mashriqui, 201 Amin, Nurul, 266, 303, 304, 308, 312, 324, 351, 357, 375 Arabs, 36, 134, 401 Ashraf, Syed Ali, 26, 89, 430 Aurangzeb, 151 Ayesha, 405 Ayub, Abu Sayeed, 138 ‘Azad, Abul Kalam, 211 ‘Azam, Golam, 401, 402, 428 ‘Azam, Shafiul, 369 Bahar, Muhammad Habibullah, 318, 321 Bandyopadhyaya, Manik, 148 Bari,M. Abdul, 413 Basu, Babu Amrita, 64 Begum Noor Jehan Murshid, 423, 432 Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain, 422, Begum Shaista Ikramullah, 306, 307, 422

487

Begum Shamsur Nahar Mahmud,

423 Begum Sitara Khatun, 144, 165 Begum Zebunnisa, 386 Bose, Sarat, 179, 346 Burrows, 179 Casey, 184, 215 Chakraverty, Raj Kumar, 307, 341, 374 Chatterjee, Bankim Chandra, 139, 152, 158, 159, 173, 175 Chatterjee, Saratchandra, 126, 139, 148

Chowdhury, Ashrafuddin, 202 Chowdhury, Fazlul Quadar, 357 Chowdhury, Hamidul Hug, 308, 329, 341, 374 Chowdhury, Munier, 266, 274, 299, 327 Comrade Muzaffar Ahmed, 174, 175, 364 Das, Chittaranjan, 61, 150, 173, 177, 189, 195, 196, 203 Delawarr Hosaen Ahmed Meerza, 41, 59, 60,97. Dr Kudrat-e-Khuda, 158 Dr Muhammad Shahidullab, 133, 156, 303, 311, 404, 405, 426, 428, 431 Dudu Mian, 59, 124 Fazl, Abul, 126, 148, 164, 166 Pukaha, Abul Kalam Abdul Awwal ‘Mumtazul, 401, 428, 429 Poller, 195 General Zia-ul-Hug, 419 Ghosh, Binoy, 46, 97 Ghuznavi, 174 Gomez, Peter Paul, 341, 374 Gurmani, Mushtaq Ahmed, 307 Guznavi, A. A., 31 Habibullah, A.B.M., 406, 426 Hai, Muhammad Abdul, 292 Haji Mohammad Mohsin, 55, 100; Hakimjul Ummat Hazrat Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, 353 Hanifa, Abu, 146 Hashim, Abul, 163, 172, 174, 177, 178, 179, 186, 187, 202, 206,

488

The Sacred and The Secular

207, 208, 212, 233, 297, 299, 318, 364, 375, 390, 430 Hazrat Ibrahim, 150 Hosain, Kamal, 266, 323 Huda, Shamsul, 134, 160, 205, 305, 372 Hunter, 45, 59, 67, 96, 97, 101, 105,

108, 110, 193, Hug, AK. Fazlul, 170 ‘Hug,

Fazlul, 163, 171, 172, 174, 176,

185, 189, 190, 201, 212, 215, 219, 221, 266, 294, 311, 346, 356, 364, 375 Hug, Shamsul, 205, 208, 301 Husain, Syed Sajjad, 266, 323, 371, 372, 387, 429 Hussain, Abul, 126, 127, 130 Hussain, Mahmud, 201, 220, 311 Hussain, Rokeya Sakhawat, 144 Hussain, Tafazzal, 308 Hussain, Tasadduk, 301 Ton Khaldun, 208, 396 Ton Rushd, 208 Ton Taymiyya, 124 Tone Majuddin, 164, 165 Iftikharuddin Mian Muhammad, 347 Imam Ghazzali, 208, 402 Iqbal, 172, 182, 214, 297 Iskandar Mirza, 347 Islam, Muhammad Sirajul, 404 Islam, Sirajul, 45, 96, 404, 406, 429 Islam, Syed Nazrul, 306, 325

Jinnah, Fatima, 347, 349, 350, 351, 353, 420 Jinnah, M. A., 121, 170, 172, 177, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 198, 200, 203, 204, 206, 207, 211, 267, 268, 274, 295, 297, 306, 313, 334, 340, 349, 364 Kaiser, Shahidullah, 301, 366 Karim, Rezai, 208 Kasem, Abul, 266, 299, 304, 306, 325, 326, 327, 330 Kazi, Abdul Wadud, 291, 322 Kazi, Nazrul Islam, 126, 131, 148, 150, 166, 174, 203, 212, 221 Kemal Ataturk, 126, 143, 424 Ketabuddin, Danshil, 174

Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhury, 205

Khan, Abdus Sabur, 357 Khan, Abdus Salam, 357 Khan, Ali Ahmed, 203 Khan, Ataur Rahman, 301, 333, 399, 427 Khan, Ayub, 235, 253, 337, 345, 347, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 355,

356, 364, 370, 390, 391, 413,

417, 424 Khan, Azam, 266, 376, 399

Khan, Ebrahim, 303, 425 Khan, Liaquat Ali, 185, 203, 206,

266, 267, 297, 308, 322, 324, 335, 341, 364 Khan, Monem, 266, 351, 352, 354, 356, 374, 376, 377, 413

Khan, Raja Ghaznafar Ali, 177 Khan, Sabur, 369 Khan, Yahya, 332, 370

Khulafa-i-Rashidun, 383, 390, 405

“Khwaja Khairuddin, 357

Khwaja Nazimuddin, 130, 157, 174, 175, 177, 179, 184, 211, 303, 304, 309, 324, 374, 399 Khwaja Shahabuddin, 130, 325, 371 Lala Lajpat Rai, 196 Linlithgow, 186, 199, 215, 274 Lt, Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, 333, 371 Lt, General Azam Khan, 356 Mahmood, Altaf, 366 Malik ibn Anas, 146 ‘Mandal, Jogendranath, 267 Mary see also religion Masud, S. A., 177, 178, 213 Maududi, 288, 289, 322, 384, 385, 391, 420 Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, 349 Maulana Abullah-il-Baqui, 202 Maulana Akram Khan, 86, 137, 140, 168, 170, 172, 174, 208, 211, 301,306, 312, 324, 329, 383, 399 Maulana Ilyas, 122, 123 Maulana Malihabadi, 130 Maulana Mrududi, 129, 172, 206, 208, 340, 364 Maulana Muhammad Ali, 294

Subject Index

Maulana Nanawtawi, 161 Maulana Shamsul Haq, 350 Maulvi Abul Husain Akand, 395, ann Maulvi Shaikh Sharifuddin, 316 Maulvi Zulfigar Ali, 316 Mir Jafar, 55 Mir Musharraf Hussain, 142, 147, 148, 150, 156, 165, 174 Mirza, Iskandar, 347 ‘Momen Khan Bahadur Abdul, 170 Montagu, 63, 189, 192 Mookherjee Syama Prasad, 176, 185 Muhammad Ghulam, 346 Munim K. M. A., 396, 428 Munshi Bu Ali, 174 Munshi Emdad Ali, 150, 153, 167 Munshi Meherullah, 174 Munshi Riazuddin, 147 Murshed K.G.M., 199 Murshed S.M., 388, 426, 427 Murshid Sarwar, 290, 326, 426 Nasiruddin Muhammad, 139, 164 Nawab Abdul Latif, 60, 101, 163, 174, 233, Nawab Abdur Rahim, 174 Nawab Mosharraf Hossain Khan Bahadur, 61 Nawabzada Syed Hassan Ali, 202 Osmani Zafar Ahmad, 203 Pani Wajed Ali Khan, 174 Persians, 36 Pir Sahib of Sarsina, 313, 318 Professor Altaf Husain, 199 Professor Mahmood, 79 Prophet Muhammad, 36, 109, 123, 126, 130, 208, 289, 353, 384, 400, 401 Qadir, Abdul, 126 Qasim, Muhammad Bin, 194 Quazi Abdul Wadud, 126, 130 Quazi Mutahar Hussain, 126, 128, 160, 161, 167, 303, 325 Qureshi, Ishtiag Husain, 383, 396, 425, 428 Rahim, Shah Abdur, 399.5 Rahman, Anisur, 264, 273, 323 Rahman, Fazlur, 201, 267, 430 Rahman, Lutfur, 126, 163

489

Rahman, Shah Azizur, 305,369, 372, 380 Rahman, Ziaur, 368, 370, 380, 400, 413, 424, 432 Robinson, Francis, 194, 217, 328 Roy, Kiron Shankar, 179 Roy, M.N., 175, 292, 323 Roy, Rammohan, 126 Rubbee, Khondoker Fuzli, 31, 90 Sahna, Umme, 353 Salam, Abdus, 384, 425 Sarkar, Hiren, 179 ‘Shadani, 406 Shah Saheb of Paribagh, 399 Shah Saiyad Ahmad, 123 Shah Sufi Abu Bakr of Furfura, 399 Shah Sufi Ahsanullah of Dacca, 399 Shah Syed Murshid Ali of Medinipur, 399 Shamsuddin, Abul Kalam, 139, 164, 300 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 26, 89, 253, 295, 320, 323, 346, 360, 371, 378, 379 Siddiqui, Abdul Gafur, 138 Siddiqui, Abdur Rahman, 170, 297 Siddiqui, B. A., 177 Sikdar, Siraj, 366 Sir Stafford Cripps, 199 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, 172, 396 Siraj-ud-Daula, 43, 55, 63 Stock, A. G., 240, 270, 321, 322 Suhrawardy Shahid, 171, 174, 202, 266 Sultan, Muhammad, 301, 326, 327 Tagore, Rabindranath, 126, 173 Tayyeb, M. A., 261, 272, 273 ‘Toaha, Muhammad, 301 Vidyasagar, 154, 173 Waheed, Shams-ul-Ulama Abu Nasr, 72 Yusufzai, Abdul Hamid Khan, 144 Yusufzai, Nausher Ali Khan, 142 Zaman, Hasan, 389, 407, 426, 427 Places Aligarh, 386 Bakerganj, 50, 59, 98 Barisal, 300, 352, 376

The Sacred and The Secular

490

Bihar, 138, 163, 183, 198, 201, 234, 266, 304, 338 Bogra, 30, 31, 33, 37, 90, 92, 93,99, 266, 312, 324 Bombay, 198, 201, 215, 234;__ Presidency, 198, 201, 215, 234, Central Asia, 36, 109 Char Shyamraj, 422 China, 368 Dhanikhola, 156 Dinajpur, 45, 50, 52, 53, 99 Faridpur, 59, 95, 98, 99, 193 Fort William, 55 Hooghly, 31, 55, 57, 78, 100, 101, 221 Hossainpur, 42 India; see India Jahangimagar, 260, 261, 262 Jessore, 33, 50, 53, 59, 99, 105, 305 Kishoreganj, 42 Madras, 198, 211 Malda, 31 Mecca, 387 Middle East, 142, 286, 415, 424 Morocco, 142, 415 Murshidabad, 31, 53, 56, 90 Narayanganj, 208, 342, 377 Noakhali, 52, 53,59, 95, 99, 257, 305 Pabna, 30, 34, 50, 52, 59, 98 Pakundia, 42 Rajshahi, 31, 34, 38, 45, 50, 51, 53, 76, 85, 92, 98, 99, 101, 124, 159, 160, 162, 193, 217, 221, 260, 261, 262, 272, 301, 305, 317, 323, 328, 361, 363, 379, 413, see also Rajshahi College under education)

Rangpur, 50, 53, 255 Sandwip, 305 Saudi Arabia, 369, 380 Turkey, 424 United Bengal, 136, 172, 177, 178, 186, 187, 206, 213, 342, 375 United States, 301, 346, 368 Uttar Pradesh, 138, 234, 266, 377 Political Parties Bharatiya Janata Party, 339

Combined Opposition Party, 348, 349, 354 communist, , 285, 288, 300, 301, 304, 307, 308, 319, 321, 342, 345, 346, 349, 354, 364, 365, 366, 376, 377, 403; __ movement, 296;

communism, 203, 285, 288, 296, 300, 301, 301, 302,304, 307, 308, 319, 321, 342, 345, 346, 349, 354, 364, 365, 366, 374, 375, 376, 377, 403 East Pakistan Communist Party, 300, 375 Pakistan National Awami Party, 349, 376 Pakistan National Emarat Party, 205 Hindu Mahasabha, 176, 179, 185, 190, 342 Independent Praja Party, 204 Indian National Congress, 198 Jatiya Samajtantric Dal, 365 Krishak Praja Party, 53, 125, 132, 169, 171,210 Krishak Sramik Party, 346, 375 Nizam-e-Islam Party, 344, 349, 376 Pakistan Democratic Party, 332, 333, 359, 366 Pakistan People’s Party, 357 Rakshi Bahini, 366 Republican Party, 343, 344 ‘Swarajya Party, 61, 87, 189 United Front, 308, 309, 310, 342, 344, 346, 348, 351, 354, 355, 357, 375, 37 United Muslim Party, 132, 171, 199, 213 Religious Abbasid, 405 Arya Samaj, 29 ‘Ayodhya, 340 Bhakti, 120 Bibi Mariam, 405 Brahmo Samaj, 120 Chishtiya, 122 Christianity, 29, 38, 58, 70, 94, 128,

Subject Index

144, 145,322; Christians, 35,94, 107, 145, 177, 248, 257 Day of Judgement, 389, 401 Divine Law, 384 Hadith, 126, 127, 129, 134, 137, 140, 145, 152, 172, 292, 353, 385, 386, 388, 400, 401, 404, 405, 407, 408, 423 Hindu revivalism, 194, 217 Hukumat-e-Rabbaniya; see Organizations

Isa, 405

Islamic Brotherhood, 309, 318, 327, 354, 355, 397 rituals, 397 —__

sects, 394

socialism, 387 Islamization, 31, 92, 135, 312, 314, 369 Pan-Islamic, 31, 38; see also Education

Jama’ at-i-Islami, 172, 182, 185, 206,

288, 289, 298, 332, 337, 340, 345, 348, 349, 359, 361, 364, 366, 369, 370, 372, 373, 376, 378, 379, 391, 401, 420, 431 Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, 170, 172, 184, 188, 200 Jamiyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, 313, 318, 328, 391, 394, 366 Jesus, 405 Jews, 400, 401 Ka’aba, 388, 405 Kali, 120, 142, 150, 152 Koran, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 140, 141, 145, 152, 172, 184, 289, 291, 292, 314, 322, 334, 351, 353, 360, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 397, 398, 400, 401, 404, 406, 408, 414, 415, 418, 419, 423 Mary, 405 Mecca; see Places issionaries, 135, 142, 428 religious instruction, 58, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 105, 141, 258, 404, 410

‘Saraswati puja, 35

satya-dharma, 33

491

‘Shab-e-Barat, 400

shariah, 122, 341, 384, 385 shrines, 399 theological state religion, 360, 361 Umayyad, 405 Sylhet Zilla Jamiyat-i-Ulama-iIslam, 398 Reports ‘Adam’s Report, 54, 55 Nehru Report, 190, 216 Reforms constitutional reforms, 189 land reforms, 264, 348, 426 Resolutions Bentinck’s Resolution, 57 Lahore Resolution, 176, 182, 187, 201, 295 Lucknow Pact, 190 Macaulay's Minute, 57

185,

Objectives Resolution, 311, 340,373

Reservations, 75, 80 riots, , 53, 158, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 196, 197, 210, 213, 214, 219, 240, 274, 308, 337, 343, 377, 378, 395 communal __, , 158, 307, 378

Social Classes bhadralok, 26, 48, 51, 54, 59, 60,61, 62, 75, 82, 97, 133, 155, 156, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195, 198,268 Jotedars, 50, 171 landed aristocracy, 43, 163 landlords, 42, 49, 52, 53, 60, 81, 122, 167, 170, 195, 197,205, 250, 264 namasudras, 32, 198 nobility, 43, 46, 57 peasantry, 189, 198, 205, 207, 263, 265, 267 raiyats, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 96 rich farmers, 50 rural sheikh, 39, 41, 109 tenants, 42, 48, 49, 136, 170, 171, 195, 205, 210 under-raiyats, 53 Social norms contraception, 383, 386, 400, 402, 403

492

The Sacred and The Secular

dancing, 392, 393, 394, 400, 404, 406

divorce, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419 drama, 406 free wife, 401 inheritance, 382, 413, 414, 415, 418, 423

Poetry, 406

purdab, rituals, 260, 291, 292, 293, 355, 382, 397 392, 394, 404, 406 singing,

superstitions, 287 Social stratification ajlaf, 36, 38 arzul, 35, 36, 37

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02-013-01 csc

Sufi

ashraf, 31, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 57, 59, 60, 69, 70, 82, 87, 93, 94, 95, 101, 102, 132, 135, 136, 170, 174, 176, 202, 207, 212, 234, 235, 264, 265, 266, 267, 286, 287, 288, 296, 297, 298, 299, 305, 307, 310, 311, 312, 319, 320, 328, 332, 334, 335, 338, 341, 342, 347, 354, 355, 375 ashrafization, 41,94, 135, 194 Chishtiya, 122 sufi, 122, 212, 399 sufism, 31, 121, 123 ‘Suhrawardiya, 122, 123 Qadiriya, 122, 159