The Rise of International Parliaments: Strategic Legitimation in International Organizations 9780198864974

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The Rise of International Parliaments Strategic Legitimation in International Organizations FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG THOMAS WINZEN TOBIAS LENZ JOFRE ROCABERT LORIANA CRASNIC CRISTINA GHERASIMOV JANA LIPPS DENSUA MUMFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD UNlVBRSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford., lt furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Frank Schimmelfennig, Thomas Winzen, Tobias Lenz, Jofre Rocabert, Loriana Crasnic, Cristina

Gherasimov, Jana Lipps, and Densua Mumford 2020 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2020 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2020949374 ISBN 978-0-19-886497-4 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198864974.001.000l Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Ekograf S.p.A. Links to third party websites are provided b Oxt d . for information only. Oxford disclaims an y . ~r. _m good faith and contained in any third party web } r~ponsibil~ty fo~ the materials si e re1erenced 10 this work.

Prefaoe and Acknowledgements This book started as a research project, co-directed by Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen at ETH Zurich, in the context of the National Center for Competence in Research (NCCR) 'Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century', funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). We gratefully acknowledge the financial and intellectual support we received from this research collaboration. In this project, Jofre Rocabert was in charge of collecting and analysing our dataset on international parliamentary institutions (IPis) from the beginning, supported by Loriana Crasnic, Jana Lipps, Kata Szab6, Siyana Timcheva, Marc Weber, and- more recently-Geraldine Alvarez. On various occasions, we received valuable comments from colleagues and external experts of the NCCR Democracy, in particular Arthur Benz, Daniel Bochsler, Daniele Caramani, and Stefaan Walgrave. Leonardo Bandarra and Natasha Wunsch read and made useful suggestions for the QCA analysis in Chapter 16. We first presented our theoretical approach and statistical analysis in a series of workshops organized by Jonas Tallberg and Michael Zurn on the authority, legitimacy, and legitimation of international organizations at WZB Berlin and the University of Stockholm. We are highly indebted to Jonas and Michael as well as the colleagues participating in these workshops. Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks were kind enough to provide us with a pre-publication version of their data on IO authority. In addition, we wish to thank Tim Biithe, Jeff Checkel, Robert Keohane, and Thomas Plumper for comments on our paper at various conferences. It is now published in the Review of International Organizations (Rocabert et al. 2019) and has benefited from comments by three anonymous reviewers and the editor, Axel Dreher. Moving from the paper to the book project, Cristina Gherasimov, Tobias Lenz, Jana Lipps, and Densua Mumford joined the research group with their expertise on !Pis and individual world regions. We thank the NCCR Democracy for funding our research trips to regional organizations and IPis from Latin America to the South Pacific and our book workshops. In addition, Frank Schimmelfennig was able to work on the completion of the book as a Robert Schuman Fellow at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute. Tobias Lenz thanks the Daimler and Benz Foundation for supporting financially some of the research for this book, and the European University Institute, which hosted Tobias as a Max Weber fellow in the year 2015/16 and provided a stimulating environment in which his thinking on legitimacy and IOs germinated. Jana Lipps thanks the Researcher-in-Residence

vi

PRBPACB AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Program at the OSCE Secretariat Prague Office, where Alice Nemcova has kindly hosted and supported Jana in her research. Densua Mumford wishes to thank the Leverhulme Trust for financial support in carrying out research on the EAC case and to thank the United Kingdom's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for financial support in carrying out research for the ECOWAS case. We are all indebted to three anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press and to Dominic Byatt who provided helpful comments and advice on the first version of the book manuscript. In addition, we wish to thank Buket Buse Demirci for preparing the index. The book represents a truly collective effort and achievement. Theory building, research design, and data collection have resulted from numerous meetings and discussions. Except for Tobias Lenz, all authors worked together at ETH Zurich for extensive time periods during the preparation of the book manuscript. At the same time, the book reflects a division of labour. Jofre Rocabert and Thomas Winzen were responsible for the data collection and the statistical analysis; Tobias Lenz and Frank Schimmelfennig focused on the theory; and while the case studies follow a common design and template, they are based on individual research. Cristina Gherasimov worked on the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union; Tobias Lenz wrote the chapters on Mercosur and ASEAN; and Densua Mumford did the case studies of ECOWAS and the East African Community. Loriana Crasnic, Jana Lipps, and Thomas Winzen contributed case studies on the Pacific Islands Forum, the OSCE, and NAFTA, respectively. Finally, Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen co-authored the EU chapter. The authors

August 2020

Table of Contents xi

List of Figures and Tables List of Abbreviations List of Authors

xv xvii

PART I 1. Introduction Why international parliamentary institutions? Strategic democratic legitimation in international organizations The structure of the book 2. International parliamentary institutions The rise of IPis IPis and !Os Autonomy and authority IPI Autonomy IP! Authority Conclusion 3. Strategic democratic legitimation: Why international organizations establish parliamentary institutions IPis and functional delegation IPis and norm internalization IPis and strategic legitimation Legitimacy and legitimation Legitimation and IPis Legitimation and decoupling Conditions of international parliamentarization Authority Purpose Scope Democracy Governance failure Diffusion 4. The emergence of international parliamentary institutions: A quantitative analysis Operationalization of the variables The outcome: IPis in international organizations Explanatory variables Bivariate relationships

3 3 6 9 14 15 18 21 21 26 28 31 32 35 38 39 41 43

44 45 47 48 49 51 51 54 55 55 56 60

viii

'fAD LB OP CONTE NTS

Stntisticnl analysis

63

IP£ existence IPI empowerment Conclusion

64 67

70

PART II 5. Introduction to the case studies Case selection Selection strategy: Diverse cases Cases Structure of chapters Sources

75 76

6. The European Union The origins of the European Parliament Regionalism in post-war Western Europe: Conditions of parliamentarization Negotiating parliarnentarization: The process of creating the Common Assembly The development of legislative powers The initial creation of legislative powers in the Single European Act The re-negotiation of existing legislative competences and the Treaty of Amsterdam The extension of legislative competences to sensitive areas and the Lisbon Treaty Conclusions

83 85

7. The Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe Democratization and diffusion: The conditions of parliamentarization and the OSCE PA From democratization to IPI creation: Tracing the establishment of the OSCE PA Conclusions 8. The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union Conditions of international parliamentarization in comparison Origins of CIS and CIS IPA Explaining the failed attempt at a Eurasian Parliament Conclusions 9. The Andean Community From the Andean Pact to the Andean Parliament The creation of the Andean Pact The Cartagena Mandate and the creation of the Andean Parliament Conditions of the creation of the Andean Parliament Process evidence on the creation of the Andean Parliament The creation of the Andean Community Conclusions

76 78

80 81

85 88

92 93

96 99

102 104 105 109 114 116

118 123 126 135 137

138 142 143 143 146

151 154

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ix

10. Mercosur Creation of the Joint Parliamentary Commission: 1991- 94 Conditions of the establishment of tlhe Mercosur Joint Parliamentary Commission Democracy and diffusion: Creating the Joint Parliamentary Committee Establishment of the Mercosur Parliament: 1994-2005 Conditions of the empowerment of the Mercosur Parliament Governance failure and diffusion: From the JPC to the Mercosur Parliament Conclusions

156

11. The North American Free Trade Agreement Conditions for the absence of a NAFTA parliament The creation and contestation of NAFTA Conclusions

178 179 181 186

12. The Economic Community of West African States

187

Conditions of the parliamentarization of the ECOWAS Process-tracing the establishment of the ECOWAS Parliament Conclusions 13. The East African Community

Conditions of the parliamentarization of the EAC Process tracing the establishment of EALA Conclusions 14. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Institutionalization of AIPO: 1977- 2000

Conditions of non-parliamentarization Low authority in a non-democratic and non-crisis context Association of AIPA with the ASEAN Charter: 2000-08/2010 Conditions of AIPA association From governance failure to parliamentarization Conclusions 15. The Pacific Islands Forum 19 71-2000: Initial institutionalization Conditions of parliamentarization during the initial period Process tracing proposals for IPI creation 2000-17: Deepening integration Conditions of parliamentarization in the recent development of PIF Process tracing the failure to establish an IPI Conclusions

157 159 161

166 169

170 177

190 194 201 204 206 209 221 223 225 225 228 231

231 233 239

241 244

244 244 247 247 248 254

16. Comparative case study analysis: Varieties of international

parliamentarization

256

Congruence and effectiveness of individual conditions Comparative analysis of congruence

257 258

X

TABLB OF CONTENTS

Comparative analysis of effectiveness Conclusions 17. The Rise of International Parliaments: Conclusions Conditions of international parliamentarization Strategic legitimation in international organizations Theoretical implications International institutional design Comparative regionalism

Prospects of international parliamentarization Appendix List of International Parliamentary Institutions Appendix to Statistical Analysis Case study documentation Appendix to Qualitative Comparative Analysis

References Index

264 267

269 271

276 279 279 283

285

289 289 290 296 301 305

329

Figures and Tables Figures 4

1.1 The rise of IPis 2.1 Number of IPls across time

16

2.2 Number of IPis by region

17

2.3 Number of IPis by region across time

17

2.4 Number of members of !Pis and 1Os

19

2.5 Number of !Pis across time by affiliation with !Os

20

2.6 Time between IO and IPI creation

20

2.7 Time between IPI creation and operation

22

2.8 IPI institutional designs

23

2.9 IPI self-organization over time

25

2.10 IPI authority over time

26

2.11 IPI authority in 2017

27

2.12 Number of amendments of IO treaties and IPI basic documents

28

2.13 Institutional change of IPis

29

4.1 !Os by purpose and policy scope

58

4.2 Mean of delegation in !Os with and without IPis

60

4.3 IOs with and without IPls by purpose and scope

61

4.4 Democratic membership of IOs with and without IPis

62

4.5 Governance failure and IPis

63

4.6 Diffusion and IPis

63

4.7 Correlates ofIPis in IOs

65

4.8 Correlates of !Pis in IOs, diffusion

66

4.9 Legislative authority

68

4.10 Correlates of parliamentary empowerment

69

Tables 2.1 Indicators of IPI autonomy and authority

22

4.1 Variables expected to encourage the creation and empowerment of IPis

55

4.2 Operationalization of independent variables

57

xii

PIGURBS ANO TABLES

5.1 Oulcomes ond coses 5.2 Example of summary table of conditions 6.1 Conditions of International parliamentarizalion in the EU 7.1 Conditions of International parliamentarization in the OSCE 8.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in CIS and EAEU 9.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the Andean Community 10.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in Mercosur 11.l CondiUons of international parliamentarization in the NAFTA case 12.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in the ECOWAS 13.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in the EAC 14.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in ASEAN 15.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in the South Pacific 16.l Congruence and effectiveness of the conditions of parliamentarization 16.2 Truth table of congruent conditions 16.3 Intermediate QCA solution for parliamentarization (congruence) 16.4 Parsimonious QCA solution for parliamentarization (congruence) 16.5 Intermediate QCA solution for cases of non-parliamentarization (congruence) 16.6 Truth table of effective conditions 16.7 Intermediate (and complex) QCA solution for parliamentarization (effectiveness) AI International parliamentary institutions A2 Composition of the self-organization index A3 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables in the IO-treaty reform sample A4 Coefficients from logistic regressions, standard errors clustered by IO AS Coefficients from logistic regressions, alternative models (with IO purpose) A6 Coefficients from logistic regressions, alternative models (with IO scope) A7 Ordinal logistic regressions of IO empowerment AB Coefficients from linear regressions of IO empowerment, standard errors clustered by IO A9 Complex QCA solution for congruent conditions AlO Test of necessity for positive outcomes

xii

PIGURBS AND TAD LBS

5.1 Outcomes and cases

79

5.2 Example of sun1mary table of conditions

81

6.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the EU

85

7.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the OSCE

105

8.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in CIS and EAEU

117

9.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the Andean Community

138

10.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in Mercosur

157

11.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the NAFTA case

179

12.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in the ECOWAS

189

13.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the EAC

206

14.l Conditions of international parliamentarization in ASEAN

225

15.1 Conditions of international parliamentarization in the South Pacific

243

16.1 Congruence and effectiveness of the conditions of parliamentarization

257

16.2 Truth table of congruent conditions

259

16.3 Intermediate QCA solution for parliamentarization (congruence)

260

16.4 Parsimonious QCA solution for parliamentarization (congruence)

261

16.5 Intermediate QCA solution for cases of non-parliamentarization (congruence)

263

16.6 Truth table of effective conditions

265

16.7 Intermediate (and complex) QCA solution for parliamentarization (effectiveness)

266

Al International parliamentary institutions

289

A2 Composition of the self-organization index

291

A3 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables in the IO-treaty reform sample

292

A4 Coefficients from logistic regressions, standard errors clustered by IO

292

AS Coefficients from logistic regressions, alternative models (with IO purpose)

293

A6 Coefficients from logistic regressions, alternative models (with IO scope)

294

A7 Ordinal logistic regressions of IO empowerment

295

AB Coefficients from linear regressions of IO empowerment, standard

errors clustered by IO A9 Complex QCA solution for congruent conditions AlO Test of necessity for positive outcomes

295 301 302

FI GURES AND TABLES

xiii

A 11 Complex QCA solution for cases of non-parliamentarization (congruence)

302

Al2 Parsimonious QCA solution for cases of non-parliamentarization (congruence)

302

Al3 Parsimonious QCA solution for parliamentarization (effectiveness)

303

Al4 Complex QCA solution for cases of non-parliamentarization (effectiveness)

303

List of Abbreviations AEC AFTA AIPA AIPO APEC ASEAN AU CA CAN CELAC CEMAC CHG CHS CIS CIS IPA CLA COMESA CROP CSCE EAC EAEU EAHC EALA EACSO ECCAS ECOWAS ECSC EEC EFTA EP EPG EU EurAsEC FAPED FOC FPOC GOPAC IDEP IMF

African Economic Community ASEAN Free Trade Agreement ASEAN Interparliamentary Assembly ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Common Assembly (of the ECSC) Andean Community Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Central African Economic and Currency Community Council of Heads of Governments (of the CIS) Council of Heads of States (of the CIS) Commonwealth of Independent States Commonwealth of Independent States International Parliamentary Assembly Central Legislative Assembly (of EACSO) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe East African Community Eurasian Economic Union East African High Commission East African Legislative Assembly East African Common Services Organization Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States European Coal and Steel Community European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Parliament Eminent Persons Group (of the PIF) European Union Eurasian Economic Community The Forum of African Parliamentarians for Education Forum Officials' Committee (of the PIF) Forum Presiding Officers Conference (of the PIF) Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption African Institute for Economic Development and Planning International Monetary Fund

xvi

ro

LIST OP ABBREVIATIONS

International organization international parliamentary institution IPI Inter-ParUamentary Union JPU Joint Parliamentary Committee (of Mercosur) JPC Latin American Free Trade Association LAFTA Member of the European Parliament MEP North-American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO NATO PA North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly NGO non-governmental organization OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ODIHR Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE OSCE PA Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PIF Pacific Islands Forum PTC Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-Operation RO regional organization QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis QMV qualified majority voting SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SADC Southern African Development Community SAJ Andean Integration System (Sistema Andino de Integraci6n) sco Shanghai Cooperation Organization SEA Single European Act SICA Central American Integration System SPC South Pacific Commission TEU Treaty on European Union UNASUR Union of South American Nations UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

List of Authors Loriana Crasn.ic is a post-doctoral researcher at the Chair of International Relations and International Political Economy, University of Zurich, Switzerland. Cristina Gherasimov is a post-doctoral researcher in the European Politics Group at ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Center for Comparative and International Studies, and a research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia Tobias Lenz is professor of international relations at Leuphana University Liineburg, Germany, Jana Lipps is a PhD candidate in the European Politics Research Group at ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Center for Comparative and International Studies. Densua Mumford is assistant professor of international relations at Leiden University, the Netherlands, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs. Jofre Rocabert is a post-doctoral researcher at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel and the Free University of Berlin, Germany. Frank Schimmelfennig is professor of .European politics at ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Center for Comparative and International Studies.

Thomas Winzen is a lecturer in government at the University of Essex, Department of Government.

1 Introduction Why international parliamentary institutions? Once a month, the European Parliament (EP) is a parliament on the move. Chartered trains bring its members (the MEPs), 705 individuals from twentyseven member states, from its premises in Brussels to Strasbourg, in the east of France, its second seat. In parallel, a handful of trucks full of plastic boxes drive 440 kilometres to transport the MEPs' documents. After four days of plenary sessions in Strasbourg, the MEPs and their boxes make the return trip to Brussels where the core work of the EP takes place during the other three weeks of the month. In addition, the General Secretariat of the EP is located in Luxembourg. The three institutional seats of the EP are a legacy of national rivalries and institutional uncertainties of the founding period of the European Communities when the EP was merely a consultative assembly of part-time delegates from national parliaments. Until the end of the 1990s, the EP even convened on the Strasbourg premises of the Council of Europe, a different regional organization. Whereas the EP's regular travels may appear incomprehensible to outsiders and annoying to many EU citizens and parliamentarians alike, its other activities feel familiar. MEPs have been directly elected for a period of five years since 1979. They are at the EP full time and organize into political groups by party family. In 2014, EP elections decided about the president of the European Commission, the EU's main executive body. MEPs also scrutinize and confirm the other members of the European Commission. They vote on the EU budget of around 150 billion euros a year. Most of their day-to-day work is legislative, however. In the EU's 'ordinary legislative procedure', the EP processes legislative proposals presented by the Commission. It assigns them to committees, appoints rapporteurs, negotiates with the Commission and the Council, the other chamber of the EU legislature, in informal 'trilogues', and possibly formulates formal amendments. With a few exceptions, no legislative proposal in the EU becomes law without the consent of the EP. Today, the EP is the best-known exemplar of a peculiar species of international bodies: the international parliamentary institution- in short, IPL We define IPis as collegial transnational organizations composed of individuals who are either delegated by national parliaments from their ranks or directly elected by member

The Rise of International Parllaments: Str:ategic Legitimation In International Organizations. Frank Schimmelfennlg, Thomas Wlnzen, Tobias Lenz, Jofre Rocabert, Loriana Crasnic, Cristina Gherasimov, Jana Lipps, and Densua Mumford, Oxford University Press (2020). © Frank Schlmmelfennig, Thomas Winzen, Tobias Lenz, Jofre Rocabert, Lorlana Crasnic, Cristina Gherasimov, Jana Lipps, and Densua Mumford. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198864974.003.0001

4

THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

state citizens. IPis thus share many organizational features with national parliaments-except that their collegial members are nationals and representa­

tives of a variety of states and, for the most part, indirectly elected. IPis provide a channel for member-state representation that is different from the intergovernmental bodies of international organizations (!Os). Unlike the General Assembly of the United Nations, or the Council of the EU, their members are not members or delegates of national governments, but members of national parliaments or delegates of citizens. Unlike international bureaucracies or courts, their members are not appointed by member-state governments or recruited on the open job market. Unlike international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with access to !Os, they are public bodies, not private organizations. And unlike hundreds of interparliamentary networks and associations that bring 1 members of national parliaments together, they are formal organizations. IPis have been on the rise recently. Today, they can be found in a third of the world's relevant 10s (Figure 1.1). 2 This has not always been the case. In the

25

40

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20 -0 .:::I

0

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30

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15

-

20 .!3 "'

10

10

5

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'i"'

0

0 1940

1960

1980

2000

2020

Year

Figure 1. 1 The rise of IP Is

Note: Number oflPis affiliated with the world's most relevant IOs (Hooghe and Marks 2015: 314) (solid

line) and percentage of the most relevant !Os that have affiliated or established an IPI (dashed line). Source: Adapted from Rocabert et al. (2019).

1

By using an organizational definition of IPis, we depart from the more widespread use of functional definitions of 'parliaments', which use the legislative function as a defining feature. As we will explain in more detail in Chapter 2, IPis often do not have a legislative function. We prefer to leave the function of IPis open to theory and empirical analysis. 2 We focus on functioning [Os rather than the thousands of niche, dormant, or defunct organiza­ tions around the world in which one would not even expect the possibility of the emergence of an IPI. As Hooghe et al. (2017: 15-17) we understand r.eJevant IOs as composed of three or more states, having a formal structure, a physical location or website, noteworthy permanent staff, a written treaty, and a decision-making organ that meets at !east once a year.

INTRODUCTION

5

immediate post-World War II period, less than five IOs (representing less than IO per cent) had an international parliamentary body- whereas none of them lacked a secretariat and an organ representing the member-state governments. Since the late 1980s, however, the nwnber has reached twenty-five (representing a third) in a period of twenty years. In the past decade, the dynamic growth of international parliamentarization has ended, and the IPI landscape has consolidated. Yet this quantitative increase in IPis should not be mistaken for a qualitative shift in international authority. Indeed, the extensive literature on the institutional development and empowerment of the EP (such as Hix et al. 2007; Kreppel 2002; Rittberger 2005) is a poor guide to understanding the larger population of IPis. While the EP has become a powerful institutional player,. other IPis have remained much less influential and less busy. Only a few Latin American IPis consist of directly elected members; all others delegate members of national parliaments. The Legislative Assembly of the East African Community is the only other IPI, alongside the EP, to share legislative power with governments. All other IPis are consultative bodies, some with the right to suggest legislation, others with the right to be informed about decisions, and others again with no rights at all. Only a small minority of !Pis have any voice in the appointment of key positions in the bureaucracy or decision-making bodies of the IO, and only the EP and the Central American Parliament hold vetoes over governmental decisions adopted by intergovernmental IO bodies. As we show in more detail in Chapter 2, as the nwnber of IPis has risen since the 1990s, their average authority has failed to keep pace and IPis have become increasingly dissimilar to national parliaments in design and powers (see also Cofelice 2019). Thus, in using the term 'international parliamentary institution' instead of the simpler term 'international parliament', we not only follow the most widespread usage in existing studies (established by Klebes 1990), but also signal that, whereas IPis share many organizational features with national parliaments, the vast majority of them is not nearly 'functionally equivalent'. Whether all or most of them will ever match democratic national parliaments in representation and authority is an open and empirical question-but this is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future given current trends. Quantitative without qualitative parliamentarization of international organizations is the major empirical puzzle that this book seeks to explain. Why have IOs increasingly established or adopted IPis as part of their institutional set-up without vesting them with relevant institutional powers? 3 In addition, however, !Pis are also puzzling theoretically because they are difficult to reconcile with

3

When we speak of IOs establishing IP Is, this is a convenient shortcut. More precisely, the relevant actors are the governments of the member states of the international organizations. They take the decisions to set up IPis as part of the IO's institutional design or to integrate existing IPis into the IO's institutional structure.

8

THE RI SE OF INT ERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

international parliatnentarization, which exhibit different conditions, mechan.

isms, time periods, and regions, is a central finding of our research. Both pathways have contributed to the conspicuous rise of international parliamentarization. T he main contribution of our book to the literature is a systematic, theory. oriented, and empirically broad analysis of 'international parliamentarization': the establishment and proliferation of IPis. Despite their recent rise, IPis are much less studied and more poorly understood than the inter-state decision-making bodies, the bureaucracies, and the dispute-settlement bodies and courts of 10s. Whereas the EP has inspired a large theory-guided and data-rich analytical literature since the 2000s, work on other IPis has continued to focus on case studies and descriptive comparative analysis (see, e.g. Cofelice 2012, Costa et al. 2013, Kissling 2011 , and Kissling 2014). This state of the art has started to change fundamentally recently. Grigorescu (2015) analyses IPis as a case for how democratic normative pressures affect and change IO decision-making rules. Both Lenz et al. (2019) and Rocabert et al. (2019) put forward theoretical accounts of international parliamentarization based on legitimation and conduct statistical analyses (combined with case studies). Cofelice (2019) provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of IPI functions and powers, and examines the conditions of IPI empowerment in a Qualitative Comparative Analysis. In spite of their varying theoretical approaches, outcomes of interest, and empirical coverage, these recent contributions support a legitimacy-based account of international parliamentarization and suggest IO authority growth and international diffusion as complementary pathways of IPI creation and empowerment. Our book consolidates these findings in elaborating the explanation of international parliamentarization as strategic legitimation, in expanding the comparative descriptive and inferential analysis of IPis, in conducting detailed case studies of I Os, and in combining a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods. While the focus of our book is on explaining international parliamentarization, we also seek to make a contribution to the wider literature on international institutions. First, we direct attention to an understudied class of international bodies that appears to defy mainstream explanations of why states establish international institutions. Studying IPis in comparison to other types of international institutions not only provides for a more complete appraisal of the universe of institutions. It also broadens our understanding of the diversity of motivations and conditions for international institution-building. Second, we engage general theories of (international) organizations, which have been applied to a large variety of institutional phenomena in international relations. Applying these theories to IP!s potentially adds to our knowledge of their theoretical scope and limits. Third, legitimacy and legitimation have become an increasingly important concern in the study of international institutions (in addition to the traditional focus on their efficiency) (Tallberg and Zurn 2019). Our book makes

INTRODUCTION

9

an argument on how states are affected by and respond to legitimacy concerns in IOs, and it examines IPis as an important institutional legitimation strategy. Finally, the Rise of International Parliaments contributes to the study of whether and how democratic norms and demands affect the institutions of global and regional governance (e.g. Grigorescu 2015; Tallberg et al. 2013). Even after learning about our research puzzle, theoretical argument, empirical findings, and contributions to the literature, the reader might still wonder why we should care to study an international institution that is most often powerless, does not improve the efficiency of international governance, and serves as a democratic fig leaf. For one, to observe the spread of an institution that does not seem to 'make sense', because it defies the dominant functional logic of international institution building and is unlikely to make a difference in the outcomes of international governance, arouses intellectual curiosity and calls for an explanation. Our argument about strategic democratic legitimation helps to close this gap in understanding. Moreover, our study of IPis serves a critical purpose. Parliaments are institutional centrepieces of democratic political systems but also big institutional losers of the shift of policymaking from the nation-state to !Os. The disempowerment of national parliaments features prominently in diagnoses of the 'democratic deficit' of governance beyond the state (see F0llesdal and Hix 2006; Keohane et al. 2009; Winzen 2017). Trying to understand the conditions under which parliaments emerge and develop in the international domain is therefore of high importance in a democratic theory and democratization perspective. It is equally important, however, to uncover the deficits of international parliamentarization, look behind the Potemkin villages that IPis often erect, and question the legitimation strategies of IO members. Finally, IPis have potential. It may often take a long time before !Os establish IPis or recognize and integrate existing ones. It sometimes takes even more time before they are operational and before their declared powers are put into practice. Once they are up and running, IPis tend to be sticky-like all organizations. Under favourable conditions, they may be able to expand their autonomy and authority in the future. After all, the EP-now a powerful player in the institutional system of the EU-started out as an indirectly elected assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 without any legislative competences, and it remained a predominantly consultative body until the late 1980s.

The structure of the book The book has two main parts. In Part I, we provide the 'big picture'. In Chapter 2, we describe the universe of IPIs. We show that, while the first IPI dates from the nineteenth century, they have only emerged in larger numbers after World War II

10

THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

and, in particular, during the post-Cold War period. In addition, !Pis have become increasingly affiliated with IOs. Chapter 2 also assesses the autonomy and authority of IPis. Whereas IPis have retained or gained considerable organ. izational autonomy, their authority and capacity to affect IO constitutional and policy decisions as well as appointments have remained weak. Chapter 2 thus provides detailed evidence for the rise of IPis in numbers, but not in powers, and thus motivates the research puzzle of our study. In Chapter 3, we lay out the theoretical framework for our inquiry. We proceed in four steps. First, we argue that !Pis display few of the functional benefits that are commonly associated with the delegation of competences to international institutions. Second, we claim that the assumption of normatively committed IO member states does not explain either the weakness of IPis, their appearance in many !Os composed of non-democratic states, or their absence from !Os with a solid democratic membership. Third, we suggest that the creation and empowerment of IPis is better understood as a legitimation strategy that governments employ strategically in response to challenges to the legitimacy of the organization. Maintaining or improving the legitimacy of an IO is important because it enhances the stability of cooperation and prevents the disruption of its operation, and international parliamentarization is specifically useful when democratic legitimacy is the standard by which relevant audiences judge an IO. Finally, we identify six structural conditions that generate variation in the normative calculus of governments. These relate to institutional characteristics of the IO itself (authority, purpose, and scope), as well as its domestic and international environment (democracy, governance failure, and diffusion). Our study employs a multi-method design to probe these conditions of international parliamentarization and to balance the strengths and weakness of statistical analyses, case studies, and qualitative comparisons. In Chapter 4, we start with a quantitative analysis of IPI establishment in the most relevant IOs. Our analysis relies on a data set of seventy-three IOs with (standing in international politics' (Hooghe and Marks 2015: 314). We examine these !Os at their foundation and at moments of treaty reforms, observe whether an IPI was established, maintained, or discarded at these points in time, and analyse whether IPI establishment was systematically associated with the conditions of parliamentarization. Across the sample of relevant IOs, we find robust and strong positive associations for general purpose and policy scope and robust but somewhat weaker positive correlations for diffusion. By contrast, neither authority nor democracy are systematically associated with the existence of IPis, even though the direction of the relationship is in line with our hypotheses. Depending on how we measure it, governance failure is either insignificant or has a negative effect on IPI creation. Finally, we explore the correlation of the conditions of parliamentarization with IPI power, and find a robust association of IO authority with IPI legislative competencies.

INTRODU CTION

11

Part II shifts the analysis from the 'big picturl to case studies. Chapter 5 introduces the case studies. It describes the rationale for the case studies, our case selection, and the structure of the case study chapters. The case studies offer an opportunity to exa1nine the conditions under which !Os establish IPis in more detail, take into account alternative configurations of conditions for IPI establishment, and trace the processes of strategic democratic legitimation. In addition, we study some of the rare cases of empowerment, in which IPis increase their authority over time. We select a diverse set of cases representing positive and negative cases of IPI establishment, a variety of world regions and historical periods, and stark variation across the conditions of parliamentarization. Chapters 6 to 15 present twenty-one case studies from nine !Os (and their predecessors). We start with the development of the European Parliament from the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) to the most recent general EU treaty reform in 2009 (Chapter 6). In our case study sample, the EP is the earliest case of IPI establishment and the most successful case of IPI empowerment. Even though the effective conditions for IPI establishment and empowerment in the EP have varied over time, parliamentarization in the EU has generally resulted from strategic democratic legitimation in an IO characterized by a configuration of high and increasing authority, general purpose, and democratic membership. The case study on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reveals a different context and rationale of democratic legitimation through parliamentarization (Chapter 7). The establishment of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly took place in the context of the post-Cold War democratization wave in Eastern Europe and the active diffusion efforts of the Council of Europe. Whereas the establishment of the EP was designed to democratize an IO with supranational authority and community-building purpose, parliamentarization in the OSCE served to promote democracy among the membership. Chapter 8 examines two Eurasian !Os in comparison, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the more recent Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a project of more advanced economic integration. Interestingly, the CIS established an IPI, whereas the EAEU did not, in spite of higher authority. The CIS IPA is best explained by international diffusion, as an attempt to strengthen the international legitimacy of newly independent states. By contrast, international diffusion backfired in the EAEU case. The adoption of the EP model in the Russian proposal for a Eurasian Parliament was opposed by the smaller member states, who feared that it would put EAEU on a track towards a general-purpose IO, which would undermine their sovereignty in a Russia-dominated political union. Democracy and democratization, two important conditions in the EU and OSCE contexts, were not present in the Eurasian context. Chapters 9 and 10 feature Latin American regional organizations. Andean integration (Chapter 9) has seen, first, the creation of the Andean Pact without an IPI in 1969, followed by the establishment of the Andean Parliament in 1979

12 THE RISE OP INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

and a slight IPI empowerment in conjunction with the foundation of the Andean Commw1ity in 1996. The Andean Parliament was created in the context of democratization in the region and a shift of the Andean Pact from a task-specific to a general-purpose organization. Whereas the conditions of parliamentarization continued to be favourable during the reform process leading to the Andean Con1munity, none of them improved strongly enough to give a boost to parliamentary empowerment. Rather, institutional entrepreneurship was able to secure modest authority gains. Chapter 10 examines the evolution of the parliamentary dimension in Mercosur, from its modest beginnings with the Joint Parliamentary Commission to the establishment of the consultative Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) in 2005. The context for the establishment and empowerment of an IPI is favourable in Mercosur because most of the conditions are present in both cases. In terms of effective conditions, however, we find that the organization's initial parliamentarization reflects the combination of international diffusion from the EU and the democratization of member states, while the transition to Parlasur is best explained by a combination of diffusion from the EU and the financial crisis in the region that occurred around the turn of the century. Chapter 11 presents a case study of the NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA is a case of 'non-parliamentarization' in a democratic, albeit task-specific organization with low authority and narrow scope, created after a momentous governance success-the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union-in an environment without relevant IPI examples. NAFTA is not a surprising case but, read together with our analysis of the European Union, it illustrates that absent of certain organizational characteristics that make IPis a convincing strategy, even intense contestation focuses on other concernsNAFTA's narrow trade policy priorities in this case. The analysis also shows that democracy alone does not suffice to trigger the creation of !Pis. Chapters 12 and 13 examine the establishment of IPis in two African organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC). In the case of ECOWAS, an IPI was created in 1993 in the context of general treaty reform. In particular, the democratization process in the region, the promotion of pan-African community building and the example of other successful regional organizations motivated the initiative for an ECOWAS Parliament. The EAC (Chapter 13) was established in 1967, abolished ten years later and reestablished in 1999. In both cases, it included an IPI, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), with comparatively far-reaching legislative competencies. The EALA is best explained by a combination of diffusion and purpose. The EAC builds on colonial institutions for the region, which were oriented towards establishing a federation and had always featured a legislative assembly.

INTRODUCTION

13

Chapter 14 analyses the reasons why governments rejected a formal recognition of the ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization/Assembly for a long time, but finally established an official affiliation during the Charter-making process in 2008/10. Until today, ASEAN provides a comparatively unfavourable context for parliamentarization because the organization has little authority and the membership is largely non-democratic. Yet, when the Asian financial crisis hit the region in 1997/98 a demand for re-legitimation emerged, which was supplied as a result of the combination of a subsequent change in the purpose of the organization, which created affinities with other 'parliamentarized' organizations and diffusion from the EU. Our final case study chapter (Chapter 15) examines why the Pacific Islands Forum has never established an !PI in spite of several favourable conditions, such as an increase in authority, a large scope, predominantly democratic member states, a legitimacy crisis in regional governance, and improving conditions for international diffusion. Our explanation points to the absence of and contestation about general purpose. In striking similarity to the EAEU case, small and recently independent island states blocked region-building and occasional !PI proposals by dominant member states to protect their sovereignty. Chapter 16 concludes the case study part of the book by presenting the results of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of our case studies. This analysis compares the explanations of the individual cases, looks for patterns in the necessary and sufficient conditions of international parliamentarization, and-as a value-added to the statistical analysis in Chapter 4-checks our cases for distinct and multiple configurations of conditions favouring, generating, and preventing international parliamentarization. The QCA suggests that there are two contexts of and pathways to !PI creation-one starting from general-purpose and high-authority IOs, the other one driven by international diffusion of IO parliamentarization. At the same time, we find that the task-specificity of IOs is the major obstacle to IPI creation. The book's conclusion in Chapter 17 revisits our theoretical argument about IPls as instruments of strategic IO legitimation and summarizes the main empirical findings from the statistical analysis and the case study comparison. In addition, we highlight the implications of our research for the study of institutional design in international organizations and for the research area of comparative regionalism. Finally, we discuss the promises and limits of international parliamentarization as a strategy of democratization in global governance.

2 Interinational parliamentary institutions This chapter describes how international parliamentary institutions have developed and how they work. We detail the emergence of IP Is over time, across world regions, and in relation to international organizations. Subsequently, we examine IPis according to their main organizational features: autonomy and authority. For the descriptions presented in this chapter, we draw on our own dataset comprising fifty-four IPis from their creation to 2017. We started our efforts to sample IPis relying on a well-known overview by Kissling (2014) and earlier mappings of networks and institutions that parliamentarians have established around the world (De Puig 2004; Marschall 2007). Today, hundreds of interparliamentary networks, forums, and other associations connect members of parliaments from around the world (Costa, Dri, and Stavridis 2013; Kissling 2014), but most do not fit our definition. We discarded entities because they are not constituted exclusively by parliamentarians, are not collegial, or because they are not sufficiently institutionalized to be labelled an 'institution'. As a whole, the universe of cases that has been considered in existing studies is vast and diverse, comprised mostly of non-governmental organizations and recurring meetings of parliamentarians. At times, these entities discuss specific problems with a regional basis, like climate change or extreme poverty. The African Parliamentary Poverty Reduction Network is a good example. Others engage in global efforts of international cooperation, like the Global Committee of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (Kissling 2014). All of these forms of international relations of parliaments and parliamentarians, which some have labelled 'parliamentary diplomacy' (Malamud and Stavridis 2011; Stavridis and Irrera 2015), contribute to the parliamentarization of the international sphere. Most of these networks and forums, however, do not qualify as IPis. Even though they are transnational and composed of parliamentarians, some have voluntary membership, rather than members that are elected by their parliaments or directly by citizens. In most cases, moreover, they lack institutionalization as organizations, one of the criteria we established in our definition of IPis. IPis generally possess a bureau or secretariat, formal founding documents and rules of procedure, and permanent headquarters. Interparliamentary networks or forums do not have most of these characteristics. There is a continuum of institutionalization in these entities which runs from irregularly recurring meetings, which are scarcely institutionalized, to full-fledged

INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

15

bodies of the most prominent international organizations. On one end, entities such as the Forum of African Parliamentarians for Education (F APED), an initiative fostered by UNESCO, have had irregular meetings, in itinerating venues or on the occasion of intergovernmental events. This particular example, FAPED, was founded in 2002 but has held only a few meetings since then, for example within the 2013 sessions of the Pan-African Parliament (UNESCO 2009, 2013). On the other end, some initiatives reach considerable levels of institutionalization, but cannot be considered IPis because their members include more than parliamentarians. One such entity is the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption, which despite having a secretariat and other institutional elements, is not an IPI in our sample because it has a membership that combines 'former Parliamentarians, and democratically elected Parliamentarians who have been denied their right to take office; as well as Parliaments as Institutions' (GOPAC 2019). In most of these organizations, moreover, attending members are not elected by their parliaments or directly by citizens, which is a requirement of our definition, but rather sign up at their own initiative as individuals. Once we consolidated our list of fifty-four !Pis we set out to collect data. All information in Chapters 2 and 4 comes from open sources and established databases, as well as from requests for information we directed at IPis. Most institutions provide access to legal documents and some basic history, but most fail to give any detail on other aspects of the institution, such as activities, budgets, or voting outcomes. In many cases, information is extremely scarce. The Appendix gives further detail on the construction of the database and the gathering of IPI information.

The rise of IPis As soon as national parliaments had become a regular feature of democratic nation-states during the nineteenth century, parliamentarians started to establish transnational relationships more or less independently from intergovernmental channels. The first IPI arose when William Randal Cremer and Frederic Passy convened the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in 1889. The Conference, later institutionalized as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), was an early comer. The IPU, whose founding fathers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1903, was an expression of pre-World War I global idealism (Evans 1928). It is not institutionally affiliated with any particular IO, but an independent IPI active in the diplomatic circles of Geneva, and it currently holds observer status in the United Nations. The second generation of IPis, with the European Parliamentary Union and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), appeared only decades later, and were set up in a very different context. After World War II, the Council of Europe in 1949 and the European Coal and Steel

16

THB RISB OF INTBRNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

50 40

~ z

30

\w

0

20 10 0

1940

1960

1980 Year

2000

2020

Figure 2.1 Number of !Pis across time

Community (ECSC) in 1951 inaugurated the rise of IPis as parliamentary bodies attached to 1Os. The speed at which !Pis emerged increased dramatically between 1990 and 2005 (Figure 2.1). After a gradual post-World War II increase, the number ofIOaffiliated IPis and IPis without IO affiliation had already reached nine at the end of the 1960s. Yet the post-Cold War period saw the steepest rise, from below twenty to fifty-four !Pis in 2017 (see the full list in Table Al in the Appendix). However, since the end of the 2000s, the proliferation of IPis has slowed down markedly. While the first half of the decade witnessed the creation of thirteen new IPis, only five fewer than during the entire 1990s, in the second half only seven new IPis appeared. The three youngest IPis were institutionalized in 2008 and 2010: the parliament of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the assembly of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, and the IPI of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (which only commenced in practice in 2012). Since then, what had been a prevalent phenomenon in the institutional evolution of many I Os has stopped altogether. Indeed, some of the !Pis formally created during the latter years of the 2000s have not even started to function. Members of UNASUR still have not agreed on a treaty for the parliament (MERCOSUR 2010; Los Tiempos 2018), and the parliament headquarters that Bolivia built in the city of Cochabamba remain unused. The parliamentary bodies of the two Central African IOs, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Central African Economic and Currency Community (CEMAC), have not had any political activity since their inaugural sessions in the late 2000s. Despite this cutback in its growth, older generation IPis remain active and some, like the Andean Parliament, maintain institutional efforts to improve both their powers within their !Os and their public image. Other IPis have kept evolving, such as the

INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMBNTARY INSTITUTIONS

17

Arab Parliament, which had been interim from its creation in 2005 to 2012 when it became permanent. IPis have emerged worldwide, in global/interr,egional and regional contexts (Figure 2.2), but in geographically and temporally diverse patterns (Figure 2.3). Before the creation of the African Parliamentary Union in 1976 and the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in 1977, Europe was the only continent with functioning regional IPis. The Latin American Parliament, conceived a decade earlier, did not come into being until 1987. Latin American !Pis during the 1980s and African IPis during the 1990s and 2000s were the main drivers of IPI growth. The post-Soviet 'Eurasian' region has also seen a significant rise of IPis in the 2000s. By contrast, IPis have emerged more slowly in Asia, including the Pacific region.

Figure 2.2 Nwnber of !Pis by region

-

15 , - - - - - -----, Europe --- Africa • •• •• East Asia & Pacific 10 - - - Americas ----- Global ...."'

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Figure 2.3 Nwnber of IPis by region across time

2000

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18

THE RI SE OF IN TE RNATI ONAL PARLIAM ENTS

Even though regional growth of IPis occurred at different times and speeds, today their geographical distribution does not have extreme inequalities (Figure 2.2). There are twenty-three IPis in Europe and the Americas, and twelve in Africa. Within these regions, Eastern Europe (the post-Soviet space) and Western Asia (mostly the Arabic world) have a smaller number of institutions, five and three respectively. East Asia and the Pacific, a region that created international parliaments at a slower rate than average at only one per decade, has ended up with four. The Americas concentrate their IPis in Latin America, a political region with a rich history of integration projects. The remaining IPis belong to groups of countries that are not geographically organized, but follow linguistic or historical lines like the Francophonie or the Portuguese-speaking countries. Other entities concentrate around territorial groupings that cut across world regions. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, for instance, unites countries from both shores in Europe and Northern Africa. Similarly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has members on both sides of the Atlantic. Although global !Pis are the largest single group, they represent only one-third of the existing institutions. Most are tightly related to regional institutional dynamics. The waves of political support for integration in Latin America in the 1960s and 1990s, for instance, are reflected in the evolution of the region's parliamentary institutions. Whether IPis are structured regionally or following geopolitical links of their members, they are organizations with much smaller membership than the average intergovernmental organization. The average IPI has only fifteen members, while the typical IO has fifty-eight. However, these statistics are the product of the inexistence ofIPis in the largest IOs (by the number of members), which are mostly technical or standard-setting organizations and average almost a hundred members. There are also non-technical universal IOs, but few outside of the UN system. Only one interparliamentary institution has a universal calling, the International Parliamentary Union. If only regional-based organizations are counted, then both IOs and !Pis have rather similar memberships. Figure 2.4 visualizes the difference between the distributions of IPI and IO membership. As a by-product of this, the membership of IPis is on average more homogenous than that of IOs, in terms of population size and economic power, but the difference also fades if compared to IOs with a regional-or cross-regional but geopolitical-basis.

IPis and 10s To answer our research question on the conditions under which IOs establish !Pis, we need to distinguish !Pis that are affiliated with an IO and those that are not. Whereas there are multiple ways in which IOs and !Pis interact, we identify two broad types of formal relationships between parliamentary and

INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

19

lo!Pis D !Os I .08 .06

t--~ .04 0

Number of members

Figure 2.4 Number of members of !Pis and IOs intergovernmental institutions: formal independence and formal affiliation .1 Among the independent IPis, some have no connection with IOs whatsoever. The Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas, which reunites the speakers of most American parliaments, is a case in point. There are also independent IPis, which are formally disconnected from but follow closely the policy and geographic focus of one particular organization, acting as shadow organs. The Latin American Parliament is a noteworthy example. Since the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2010, it has tried to constitute itself as its parliament, followed its development and aligned its policy objectives to those of the IO. Affiliated IPis either are a formal part of the institutional structure of an IO, e.g. referred to as an organ of the IO, or are at least officially recognized by the IO. The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are examples of recognition without integration. Of our fifty-four IPis, only six are formally recognized IPis. A much bigger group, more than half of the fifty-four IPis we study, are integrated into IOs, typically as one of their organs. As Figure 2.5 shows, affiliated IPis have always been more numerous than independent IPis. In addition, affiliated IPis have most strongly contributed to the rise ofIPis in the postCold War period. While none of our defining conditions requires IPis to be part of international organizations, IO-affiliated IPls are the pertinent IPis for answering our research question; and they also represent the most relevant type of IPI in terms of numbers and growth. In most cases, IOs establish IPis at their foundation, at the initiative of either the governments or the parliaments of the member states (see Figure 2.6). It is not uncommon, however, that !Pis move from independence to affiliation. In these cases, national parliamentarians establish an IPI to follow the objectives or work of an IO, before the IPI ends up being recognized by the IO or even integrated into its 1

See Kissling (2011) and Cofelice (2013) for a similar classification of !Pis.

20

THB RISB OP INTBRNATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

40 lntegrote