The International Politics of Africa’s Strategic Minerals 9781474290531, 9781474290555, 9781474290548

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The International Politics of Africa's Strategic Minerals

History and Politics in the 20th Century: Bloomsbury Academic Collections

The facsimile editions presented in this set all focus on the political development and conflicts of post-colonial states that shaped them as independent nations in the second half of the 20th century. The five titles were chosen from our imprints The Athlone Press, Mansell and Pinter and cover the Middle East, Africa and India. The collection is available both in e-book and print versions. Titles in History and Politics in the 20th Century are available in the following subsets: International Relations in the 20th Century Europe in the 20th Century Conflict in the 20th Century Postcolonialism in the 20th Century Multidisciplinary Approaches Other titles available in Postcolonialism include:

After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East, Anthony H. Cordesman Social Ferment in India, Alexandra George The Third World Handbook, Guy Arnold Third World Military Expenditure: Determinants and Implications, Robert D. McKinlay

The International Politics of Africa's Strategic Minerals Oye Ogunbadejo

History and Politics in the 20th Century: Postcolonialism BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC COLLECTIONS

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www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in 1985 by Pinter Publishers This edition published by Bloomsbury Academic 2016 © Oye Ogunbadejo 2016 Oye Ogunbadejo has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-9053-1 ePDF: 978-1-4742-9054-8 Set: 978-1-4742-9756-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Series: Bloomsbury Academic Collections, ISSN 2051-0012

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The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

To 'Dolapo, Oyekunle, Olubukunola and Itunu-Olu

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF AFRICA'S STRATEGIC MINERALS

Oye Ogunbadejo

Frances Pinter (Publishers), London

© Oye Ogunbadejo 1985 First published in Great Britain in 1985 by Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited 25 Floral Street, London WC2E 9DS

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Ogunbadejo, Oye The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals. 1. Mineral industries—Africa I. Title 333.8'5'096 HD9506.A382 ISBN 0-86187-528-1

Typeset by Folio Photosetting, Bristol

Contents

Preface 1 African strategic minerals in the international system Basic pointers to the politics of Africa's minerals The special case of uranium 2 The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals: some theoretical explanations revisited The role of the TNCs On the theories of the 'Matthew effect,' dependency, core-periphery, and imperialism Public ownership: the way out? Adapting to the crisis of capitalism 3 Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system Issues in the political economy The politics of Africa's strategic minerals The West and the primacy of geopolitics Capitalism and the supply and demand equation, I Sysmin and Africa's strategic minerals Impact of Africa's growing nationalism: the supply and demand equation, II External production and stockpiles of strategic minerals: implications for Africa 4 The international politics of Africa's uranium The West and southern Africa's uranium: i. Namibia ii. South Africa

vii

1 1 9 15 15 18 25 30 36 36 37 48 50 52 54 56 63 63 68

vi Contents Namibia and the international political system On the case of grand larceny Black Africa's uranium Impact of external production of uranium

69 77 83 88

5 Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace

98

The place of South African and Namibian uranium in Pretoria's nuclear drive South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty The collaboration of the West in South Africa's nuclear development Need South Africa become a nuclear power? South Africa's nuclear drive and black African states South Africa and SATO 6 Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation Nuclear proliferation and African states The South African factor Africa's uranium and nuclear proliferation The place of uranium in Nigeria's nuclear ambitions The nuclear debate revisited 7 Africa's strategic minerals in perspective Reconciling the radical and the bourgeois The West and Africa's strategic minerals Uranium and the global system Africa's strategic minerals and the future trends in international politics Index

98 101 103 115 119 123 132 132 139 146 154 159 176 176 181 186 194

Preface

This book discusses the politics of Africa's strategic minerals critically from two different, but interrelated, standpoints, namely, the politicaleconomic and strategic. In doing so, it examines the economic and strategic choices as well as the systemic constraints that shape and influence the policies of the African producers of these key commodities. And, in providing a conceptual framework for the analysis, some relevant theoretical arguments are synthesized in the context of the subject. No school is particularly favored. Indeed, the data and arguments employed in the study render it impossible to assume any passive posture, without asking many serious and probing questions. The definition of strategic minerals varies, of course, depending on the circumstances of any given country. Most states, especially the Great Powers, define the range of commodities in terms of their defense and commercial priorities, coupled with the level of availability, or otherwise, of these minerals in their own territories. It follows that certain items that could be considered as strategic by one country may not be regarded as such by others. The American strategic mineral stockpiles, for example, include such items as diamonds and jewel bearings, which many analysts would not accept as 'strategic' in any way or form.1 On the other hand, there is the tendency, among some American scholars, to ignore uranium on the ground that it is available in a few Western industrial countries — the United States, Canada, and Australia. Yet, many of the other items classified as strategic are also available in varying degrees, in some of these very countries. Be that as it may, there are others who take the view that insofar as uranium is such a crucial input in nuclear research and development, an all too important subject nowadays in international relations, it is 'strategic/ The author shares this latter position. Needless to add, the generally labelled strategic items like chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum, and vanadium are included in the analysis. The subject is approached from an Afro-centric perspective; but

viii Preface this, I hasten to add, is not to suggest that the arguments are emotive or judgemental. Rather, scholarly objectivity, as far as I can make out, pervades the issues raised and discussed. Nevertheless, if the work is found to be provocative in any way then it would have made a modest contribution to the ongoing debate on the impact of Africa's strategic minerals on world politics. In writing the book, I have benefited from many sources. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, set the ball rolling by awarding me a modest research grant, for which I am fully appreciative. Special thanks go to all my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ife, Nigeria, with whom I was able to discuss and test some of my initial ideas. By spending the 1983-4 academic year on sabbatical leave in the United States, I was able to devote some of my time to the project everywhere I went. For their cooperation in this regard, I would like to thank the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, where I was a Visiting Research Fellow during the fall semester; the Department of Political Science, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, where I spent the winter and spring terms as a Visiting Professor; and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, where I was a Visiting Fulbright Scholar in the summer and part of the 1984 fall term My program as a virtual itinerant researcher and lecturer enabled colleagues along my route to read and comment on the first draft. For this kind gesture, I especially want to thank Carl Rosberg in Berkeley, David Laitin in San Diego, and Dov Ronen in Cambridge. I would also like to thank James Coleman, Richard Sklar and Michael Lofchie, all of UCLA, for their interest in the study and for inviting me on two occasions to lecture at their beautiful campus. James Coleman read the entire first draft and gave detailed and most helpful comments. I am especially indebted to him. Although Walter Rodney has argued that it is 'sheer bourgeois subjectivism' to say 'all mistakes and shortcomings are entirely my responsibility';2 I really must aver this usual disclaimer in no uncertain terms. More so, as I did not necessarily agree with all the comments of my colleagues. Lastly, for providing me with first class and impeccable secretarial support, I am indebted to Peggy Nelson, in Berkeley, for her assistance on the first draft; and to Ann Lammers, in Cambridge, for conscientiously helping out on the final draft at a very short notice. October 1984

Oye Ogunbadejo Cambridge, Massachusetts

Preface

ix

Notes 1. 2.

For the list of the minerals currently in the United States7 strategic stockpile, see Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C: Howard University Press, 1974), p. vii.

1 African strategic minerals in the international system

Basic pointers to the politics of Africa's minerals The importance and uniqueness of some mineral resources have long been recognized by the industrialized nations. These resources, which include cobalt, chromium, platinum, titanium, manganese and uranium, are labelled as 'strategic' because they are crucial for military or industrial purposes. Specifically, to the extent that the majority of these minerals are in Africa and have become so essential to the defense systems of the Great Powers, the commodities constantly contribute towards keeping the continent in the mainstream of international politics. The fact that the majority of the minerals are available in Africa does not mean, of course, that there are no alternative sources for some of them. In the case of titanium and vermiculite, for example, other sources abound. Thus, whereas most of the world's titanium ore production is in Canada, Australia, Norway, the United States, Malaysia and Finland, the United States is the source of over half of the non-communist world's production of vermiculite, and could even supply this mineral to Europe in the event of reductions in imports from southern Africa or the Soviet Union. By and large, however, and certainly in the short run, Africa remains an important source of supplies for at least five strategic minerals: chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum and vanadium. To be sure, most of the world's production of ores of these five minerals is concentrated in southern Africa and the Soviet Union. To compound the problem for the Western powers, there are only limited known reserves elsewhere which could readily be developed at short notice.1 True, there are large known reserves of cobalt and manganese in seabed nodules, but the technology for their mining is still in its infancy. And while it is equally true that cobalt deposits are known to be abundant in several areas of the world, the richness of southern African sources has made

2

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

development of other sources uneconomical. Moreover, it would take time either to increase, or even begin, production in these other areas.2 For some of the African states, the possession of strategic minerals often serves as an important political consideration in being adjudged 'important' or 'powerful'. Evidently, the statures of Zambia and Zaire have always hinged, inter alia, on their production of cobalt and copper; just as chromium is important to Zimbabwe or uranium to South Africa when these countries are being assessed in the continent's power table. Even where strategic minerals do not significantly elevate states in the continental power hierarchy, they, nonetheless, play a crucial economic role, particularly in terms of income generation, in the local economies. This is broadly true with, say, uranium in Niger, or manganese in Gabon. In any case, many African states are courted by the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and the Great Powers largely on account of the locally available strategic minerals. True, the importance of these minerals could sometimes be exaggerated or grossly politicized by some of the Great Powers as a deliberate facade to advance their geopolitical interests. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the basic point about the usefulness of the minerals to the defense and high-technology industries in many of the industrialized countries. The growing dependence on minerals of these industrialized countries is a by-product of their respective modernizing economies in the postwar period. The United States, for instance, requires growing amounts of speciality steels and other alloys for hightechnology products and military hardware. The superpower's modern missiles use platinum in electrical contacts, and cobalt is essential for computers. The space shuttle uses more than twenty critical minerals, many of them imported, including some from sources other than Africa. The Air Force's new B-l bomber is made largely of aluminum alloys, which require Jamaican bauxite and Australian alumina. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the United States has, over the last twenty years, grown increasingly reliant on imported titanium, tungsten, cadmium, zinc, cobalt, alumina, and bauxite.3 Even worse, for American interests, the country is now a net importer of items it used to export, such as copper and vanadium. In recent times, too, the processing of raw minerals has been shifting overseas. The last American furnace producing ferrochrome shut down in 1983 and, by the following year, there was only one furnace in

African strategic minerals in the international system the country making ferromanganese. The minerals about which there is most concern are, once again, the strategic ones: cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals and chromium. Imports of all these minerals account for 85 percent or more of United States' supplies.4 It is perhaps against this background that the CBO recently argued that the American dependence on imported minerals 'creates risks for the US economy and for national preparedness in the event of war.'5 The importance of strategic minerals to the American economy has received special attention under successive administrations. Indeed, with the Reagan Administration, the point has regularly been stressed with greater accentuation than hitherto. This special emphasis is necessary if Washington is to rationalize its cozy links with Pretoria and defend its militant anti-Soviet posture in international relations. After all, major reserves of the strategic mineral ores are, as earlier indicated, concentrated in southern Africa and the region, in the opinion of the United States, is politically unstable and so constitutes a potential victim of a Soviet thrust for power.6 Since the Soviet Union is, in some cases, the only major alternative producer of these minerals and since it has even been argued that the Soviets may, in fact, be in need of some of these minerals themselves,7 the need to maintain a wary eye on both the minerals and the perceived Soviet expansionist threat in the region remains an important aspect of the American foreign policy.8 It was noteworthy that no sooner did President Reagan first assume office in 1980 than his Administration declared its engagement in a 'resource warfare' with the Soviets. To this end, southern Africa was stated to be the primary theater of the struggle.9 To add spice to the issue, many scholars have since joined the debate not only by evaluating the potential threat to the West, but also by conjuring up a worst case scenario of a Soviet strategy of 'resource denial' based on controlling, together with southern Africa, the West's supplies of these vital minerals.10 These scholars are themselves divided in their conclusions. On the one hand, there are those that argue that the United States' reliance on minerals is manageable and have, therefore, vigorously challenged the Soviet 'mineral denial' theory. In their view, there has been little or no evidence in either Moscow's statements or actions that could be regarded as positive evidence to buttress the contention. Robert Legvold, for one, maintains that it is hard to find much in Soviet writing that suggests Soviet policy makers think 'a resource-denial strategy has the remotest connection with reality.' Moreover, he further contends, the Soviet Union's

3

4

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

actions have not lent any significant support to the idea. As he sees it: 'Far from the systematic, self-possessed assertion of power that a wellintegrated strategy implies, Soviet intervention in southern Africa has been tentative, jerry-built, marked by fits and starts, and at times distinctly confused.'11 On the other side, some scholars see the United States locked in a 'resource war' that would ultimately leave her at the mercy of unstable and unfriendly mineral suppliers. They argue that the likelihood of strategic mineral denial strategy in southern Africa is an important aspect of Soviet foreign policy; and assert that the Soviet Union is attempting to obtain control over the strategic minerals in the region, precisely because it has the intention of using this control to deny critical minerals to the West.12 The debate has shown no sign of abating, with some of the more recent studies taking a middle course between the first two schools.13 At any rate, and even without the issue of strategic minerals, a cardinal principle of the United States' external relations, largely propelled by ideological considerations, demands that communism should be opposed wherever it is perceived to be making progress in the so-called free world. In this regard, the Americans are out to pay particular attention to strategic interests or installations and cultivate economic links with states where a capitalist free enterprise ethos is well established and officially endorsed. 14 So that even on the latter premise alone, South Africa qualifies for the warm embrace of Washington. The fact that strategic minerals are involved merely gives the need for cordial Pretoria-Washington relations a major fillip — at least that is the way the White House sees it. The implication of these points, of course, is that the United States, particularly with the Reagan Administration, increasingly finds itself adopting and militantly promoting policies which, to many observers, and certainly from black Africa's standpoint, are considered to be morally indefensible. The dogged determination of Washington to maintain its ground even in the face of strong political opposition by many moderate and progressive African states often generates fresh political difficulties or exacerbates old ones.15 The Soviet factor — the driving force behind Washington's globalist-regionalist perspective — has in particular on many occasions been over-stressed to the point of plain absurdity. As William Gutteridge has put it: 'the practice of trying to respond to, and specifically to forestall, an ill-defined and sometimes imagined Soviet threat in Africa is calculated to make a great power [the United States[ look weak, dithering and even absurd.' 16

African strategic minerals in the international system

5

Yet, for all the arguments of the Reagan Administration over Africa's strategic minerals, and the perceived Soviet threat to the commodities, the United States is not as heavily reliant on the minerals as its allies, particularly Japan and the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC). Thus, even, for the sake of argument, if we concede the possibility of the Soviet Union gaining control of southern Africa — a highly improbable prospect — and of forming a cartel with the latter states, the West European powers and Japan are much more vulnerable to any resultant threat to supplies than the United States. As Michael Shafer has written: Even successful cartel actions and exorbitant price increases are not going to bankrupt America. A more serious problem is the far greater dependence of US allies upon supplies of foreign raw materials. The European Economic Community imports from 70 to 100 percent of most industrial materials, including 100 percent of its chromium, cobalt, manganese, and platinum needs. The Japanese position is worse . . ,17 In the circumstances then, 'national interests' as perceived by either the Americans or the other Western powers, as far as Africa's strategic minerals are concerned, are at variance with those of the black African states. In the case of southern Africa, for example, whereas the latter are, essentially, preoccupied with the urgent need for the genuine independence of Namibia under a black majority government, and the dismantling of apartheid in southern Africa, the United States is more concerned with two main issues: curbing the communist influence in the region and ensuring adequate supplies of the strategic minerals imported from the Republic of South Africa.18 It is true that the economies of the African states have long been incorporated into the international capitalist network; but that fact also ensures that these countries contribute their own quota to the survival of capitalism by producing the required key minerals for the advanced capitalist states. Moreover, it also means that these African states are systematically being exploited, in terms of these vital resources, by the Western powers and their TNCs.19 As a result, in spite of the inherent dangers of overdependence on foreign sources for the supplies of strategic minerals, the CBO contends that there are 'significant benefits as well' The main benefit is that these minerals are imported from Africa because they are cheap, thus keeping down the prices of the end-products that utilize the commodities. The CBO bluntly states that American dependence on imported minerals is growing because of higher domestic demand and a less competitive United States' mineral industry. 20

6

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

Since it is relatively cheap to rely on Africa for strategic minerals, not only are the continent's commercial mineral resources exploited, the raw material markets are also manipulated by the TNCs in their unyielding quest to earn profits. Consequently, indigenous African labor is ruthlessly exploited, inter-company cartels and other arrangements are established to control prices and the international mining houses resort to various tactics to keep their investments 'safe.' Such measures include withholding the transfer of the appropriate technology to the host countries and keeping in power various despots who oppress their people ruthlessly.21 The crucial linkage of 'strategic dependency' between the core (Western) powers and the mineral-exporting peripheral (African) countries helps to illumine the core-periphery analysis in contemporary international political economy. In effect, when trying to understand the place of the African producers of strategic minerals in world politics, the role of economics as an explanation for foreign policy behavior is paramount.22 Several of the advanced capitalist powers have let it be known that despite the scale of the anti-apartheid demonstrations in their countries, they simply cannot afford disinvestment in South Africa nor are they inclined to look northwards to the black African states, as alternative sources for the regular supplies of some of the strategic minerals.23 It is common knowledge, of course, that some of these key minerals are also available in black Africa.24 But, the stereotyped and overused argument is that, as a source of supply, these states are not dependable because of their inherent proclivity for instability and political disorders. While the capitalist powers can argue a case for their continuing reliance on South Africa for strategic minerals, the longer can they go on rationalizing why economic circumstances necessitate their cozy political relations with the Republic and the longer will the issue continue to drive a wedge between these powers and some of the black African states. All in all, and taking Africa as a whole, while it may be difficult to state the exact estimates of the continent's mineral wealth, it is usually stated to be in the trillions, 'whether counted in dollars or rubles.'25 Huge reserves of natural resources are still undeveloped. Thus, inestimable wealth in chromium, vanadium, cobalt, platinum, natural gas, manganese, phosphates, titanium, petroleum products and many other items are yet to be fully tapped. It is widely believed that Africa possesses, at the very minimum, 30 percent of the world's known mineral resources.26

African strategic minerals in the international system 7 For all the vast reserves of the strategic minerals in Africa, however, the industrialized Western nations are still nervous about the medium- and long-term supply situation. While, as we shall see in Chapter 3, some of these countries have taken an alarmist view of the situation and approved programs designed to promote massive searches for the relevant key minerals in their own countries, and while the Reagan Administration has allocated up to $200 million to subsidize the domestic production of strategic minerals,27 more independent sources have argued that the solution lies ultimately in a huge inflow of investment to the mining sectors, including those of the Third World countries, if acute shortages of these minerals are to be avoided. Typical of this line of argument is the position of Raymond F. Mikesell. He argues, for example, that a sixfold increase in mining investment would be needed to keep pace with demand by the year 2000.28 In his assessment: 'Global investment in minerals may have to rise from $2 billion a year in recent years to an average of $12.5 billion per year from now to the end of the century, with a substantial acceleration of this needed new investment in the latter half of that period.'29 As Mikesell sees it, while a great deal of this investment would have to be in the industrialized Western nations, on the basis of the vast mineral reserves in the Third World, particularly in Africa, about 40 percent of the projected amount, that is $5 billion, should be invested annually in the developing countries. Mikesell acknowledges that this huge amount may not readily be forthcoming. Nonetheless, these countries, in order to help attract the necessary investment target, are urged to be circumspect in taking over the ownership of the mining houses. Rather, they should allow the normal capitalist framework of business operations to exist, so as to encourage foreign-controlled private enterprise. After all, he maintains, the encouragement of foreign mining investment by the developing countries would bring several advantages, especially efficiency, access to latest technology and greater resources. Simply put, according to the argument the developing countries need the finances and the expertise of the big mining TNCs if their vast mineral resources are to be made available to the world economy — a subtle euphemism for the advanced capitalist powers. A major reason advanced by Mikesell to justify the need to develop the mineral resources is that their development would contribute substantially to the welfare of the Third World countries. Surely, and as we shall see later, the international mining houses do not operate in

8

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

these states for that purpose. The advanced capitalist powers and their TNCs, particularly those that operate in southern Africa, exploit tl ?se minerals because it is highly profitable for them to do so. Moreovei as Guy Arnold has pointed out, in a world of rising demand and pressures upon resources which virtually all emanate from the advanced economies, the OECD countries have a vested interest to extract resources from the developing countries now (before they themselves will be ready to use them) so as to preserve their own resources for the future.30 Clearly then, the key mineral resources of the Third World countries, especially African states, are being mined because it has always been, and still remains, good business to do so and because, in the process, the national interests of the Western powers are safeguarded. As is to be expected, several of the African states producing strategic minerals, particularly the monocultura! ones, have developed dual economies: an expanding modern mining sector, which is tied to the needs of the advanced capitalist economies; and a stagnant agricultural sector, which, in most cases, is irrelevant to the needs of international capitalism, and consequently abandoned and ignored. Extrapolating at this stage, we can say that the political behavior of the Western advanced capitalist powers and their mining TNCs in Africa is, to a large extent, determined by the need to counteract falling profits at home (in the case of the latter) and to obtain mineral resources critical to the operation of their defense technology and economies (in the case of the former).31 Naturally, many of the African states worry about their plight and economic circumstances. And, in the bid to free themselves from the shackles of international capitalism, they embark on certain policies, including partial or total nationalization of the local mining companies; but, as we shall see later, these strategies merely replace one form of dependence and exploitation with another For example, international mining houses are usually still brought in, through the backdoor, via the need of the host countries for the relevant technology and specialized marketing expertise, and can thus indirectly still engage in some exploitative practice in these states. Our arguments so far indicate some of the major issues that we intend to examine in detail in the next two chapters. More specifically, in Chapter 2, we shall synthesize some of the theoretical arguments that can provide a framework of analysis for understanding the main

African strategic minerals in the international system

9

issues surrounding the exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals. To this end, the role of the TNCs and the theories of the 'Matthew Effect/ dependency, core-periphery and imperialism are discussed. In Chapter 3, we will consider the place of the key minerals in international politics. The main areas to be covered include the examination of some salient points on the political economy of the minerals; the various political ramifications of the Great Powers' dependence on these key minerals, including the special case of Namibia and South Africa; the impact of geopolitics on the Western powers' stance of keeping the Republic as an ally; the impact of the economic forces of 'supply and demand' of these minerals on the relations between the advanced capitalist states and the African producers; and the measures envisaged, or already implemented, to deal with the latter issue, including the Sysmin scheme of the EEC. In discussing Africa's strategic minerals, there is an apparent bias on the part of the author. While there is a general treatment or references to most of these minerals, detailed analysis is narrowed down to cobalt, copper, and uranium. And of these three minerals, the last enjoys, by far, special attention. Let us take a brief introductory look at the subject. The special case of uranium As in the case of most minerals, Africa has vast reserves of uranium. The wealth in this mineral alone would equal or surpass the gross national product of most of the developing nations. On a global basis South Africa, Namibia and Niger are all among the top five producers. 32 The continent has assured uranium ore reserves, in the usual mining industry sense, of at least 600,000 tonnes at $30 per pound and 780,000 tonnes at the $50 per pound level. These reserves are larger than those of all other continents, except North America. Estimated additional resources, on the basis of direct geological evidence, indicate a further 140,000 tonnes and 260,000 tonnes at the two levels respectively. In the case of Niger, a forecast has indicated that that country could go on enjoying a rapid increase in production, if it wanted, until about 2010, at the very minimum. 33 Of the 'world class' deposits (greater than 50,000 short tonnes reserve), four are stated to be in Niger, and the fifth is in Rossing (Namibia). In Africa as a whole, Algeria has one vein deposit of 34,000 short tonnes; the Central African Republic, one lignite deposit of 10,500 short tonnes; Gabon, five sandstone deposits of 46,500 short

10

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

tonnes; and Namibia, two granite deposits (Rossing and Langer Heinrich) of 125,000 short tonnes.34 Aside from its revenue-yielding characteristic, uranium is also an important element in nuclear technology and development. Since there are no nuclear powers as yet in black Africa,35 the bulk of the uranium mined, with the notable exception of South Africa to some degree, is exported to the nuclear and near-nuclear countries. There is clearly a power dimension to this situation, as the poor African states are kept to the low status of producing uranium which the developed countries use to perfect their nuclear technology. In effect then, the relationship as of now maintains the power chasm between the rich and the poor, the technologically advanced and the technologically backward, the militarily superior and the militarily inferior, keeping them as far apart as ever. It can be argued, of course, that given the nuclear programs of some of the Third World countries themselves, Africa's uranium, to the extent that it can be imported by these states, would, no matter how minimally, help to narrow down the power chasm between the North and the South. But, in the final analysis, given the superiority of the nuclear technology of the industrialized nations and the activities of the TNCs (that mine the uranium) in the local African economies, the superior-inferior relationship between the North and the South will persist for quite some time. Moreover, to talk about the nuclear ambition of some of the Third World countries is to touch another sensitive issue, namely, nuclear proliferation and maintenance of world order. Naturally, from the premise of ideology, national interest, and perceptions of the true or likely intentions of adversaries — be they nation-states or non-state actors like, say, liberation movements — the views of the industrialized states and their developing counterparts on non-proliferation of nuclear devices or disarmament are not likely to converge. At another level, the profitable mining of uranium in South Africa and Namibia further hardens the resolve of most of the Western powers to deny total support and commitment to the campaign by African states for radical changes in the status quo of these two countries. After all, one of the main reasons for Pretoria's confidence in outfacing the economic sanctions' threat has been the strategic importance of the minerals in the Republic and Namibia for the Western industrialized countries. Indeed, South Africa has never hesitated to threaten publicly the use of its strategic minerals as a weapon against the West, should it endorse the imposition of

African strategic minerals in the international system economic sanctions on the Republic at the United Nations.36 Moreover, Pretoria chafes at what it sees as a failure of the Western powers in not fully recognizing the huge importance of these minerals. It cannot understand why the Western countries shy away from the inclusion of South Africa in Western defense systems.37 The cold shoulder from the West has provided the Republic with one of its excuses for developing nuclear capability.38 Chapters 4 to 6 will critically examine the ramifications of the international politics surrounding Africa's uranium from, essentially, two broad, but inter-related, standpoints: the political-economic and strategic dimensions. In Chapter 4, the various aspects of the international politics of the continent's uranium are considered. In this regard, the importance of Africa's uranium to the Great Powers and the TNCs; the special position of Namibia in the international system; the political aspects of the production of uranium in black African states, including the Sahel countries and Gabon and the implications of external production of uranium for the African producers will all be discussed. In Chapter 5, we move on to the impact of uranium on South Africa's nuclear capability and the consequences of this phenomenon for world peace. Here, the major issues include: the importance of South African and Namibian uranium in the Republic's nuclear program; international investments and collaborations in the nuclear program; external sources of uranium and South Africa's nuclear drive; the arguments advanced by Pretoria for going nuclear; the implications of South Africa's nuclear drive for the black African states and for the Republic's role in the projected South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). Chapter 6 considers the ramifications of nuclear proliferation for the other African states. The impact of South Africa's nuclear capability on the other African states and the role of the continent's uranium in the nuclear programs of some African countries are discussed. And, finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the major arguments advanced in the study as a whole. Our arguments on the uranium issue will revolve around the following hypotheses: 1. The pattern of Africa's uranium exports reinforces the coreperiphery division of labor in international political economy. 2. Uranium is one of the key tools being used by some Western powers to perpetuate neo-colonial policies in Africa. 3. Uranium is an important factor behind Western and South African

11

12

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

instransigence over decolonization in Namibia and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. 4. Africa's u r a n i u m production contributes to: (i) global arms races; (ii) regional a r m s races; (iii) E n h a n c e m e n t of the nuclear capacity a n d capability of South Africa. 5. Right-wing u r a n i u m business m e n in industrial countries will resist, or assume a militantly aggressive posture against, leftist African leaders and national liberation m o v e m e n t s . 6. In the long term, Africa's u r a n i u m will facilitate the realization of the ambition of s o m e of its states to b e c o m e nuclear powers. While the main t h e m e of the study is Africa's strategic minerals, three main issues are intertwined within the confines of the subject: the role of the West in South Africa and Namibia; the Western p o w e r s ' relations with black African states and nuclear proliferation. Throughout, the c e n t e r - p e r i p h e r y relationship is highlighted in the context of these three broad issues as well as in terms of East-West rivalry in Africa. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

See William Alexander and Arthur Street, Metals in the Service of Man (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1982). Ibid. Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. Ibid. Ibid. See, among others, Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill, 'From Carter to Reagan: the Global Perspective on Africa Becomes Ascendant/ in K.A. Oye, R.J. Lieber, and D. Rothchild, eds, Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1983), pp. 33765; and Henry Bienen, 'Soviet Political Relations with Africa/ International Security, 7, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 153-73. See, for example, Robert Legvold, 'The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa/ in Jennifer Whitaker, ed., Africa and the United States (New York: New York University Press, 1979), pp. 153-96. For a different analysis of the Soviet Union's motives, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Soviet Policies in Africa,' African Affairs, 79, No. 316, July 1980, pp. 297-325. Robert M. Price, 'U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa,' in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds, International Politics in Southern Africa (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 45-88, at p. 63.

African strategic minerals in the international system 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

13

See, for instance, Michael Shafer, 'Mineral Myths/ Foreign Policy, No. 47, Summer 1982, pp. 154-71; James A. Miller, 'The Strategic Mineral Vulnerability of the West/ paper presented at the third annual World Balance of Power Conference, Leeds Castle, Kent, England, July 20-4,* 1983; and Daniel L. Bond, 'EEC Non-Fuel Mineral Imports — The Role of Soviet and Southern African Supplies/ paper presented at the NATO Colloquium on 'The Soviet Economy after Brezhnev/ Brussels, Belgium, April 11-13, 1984. Robert Legvold, 'The Strategic Implications of the Soviet Union's NonFuel Mineral Resource Policy/ Journal of Resource Management and Technology, January 1983, pp. 47-55, at p. 51. For the differing perspectives of this school, see Price, 'U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa,' especially pp. 62-3. See, for example, Bond, 'EEC Non-Fuel Mineral Imports.' See Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Diego Garcia and Africa's Security/ Third World Quarterly, 4 , No. 1, January 1982, pp. 104-20. For an extended discussion on the United States-Nigerian case, for instance, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'A New Turn in US-Nigerian Relations/ The World Today. 35, March 1979, pp. 117-26. William Gutteridge, 'When a Great Power can look absurd to Africa,' in New African, May 1982. Shafer, 'Mineral Myths/ p. 162. Cf. South Africa: Time Running Out The Report of the Study Commission on U.S Policy Toward Southern Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). Some scholars and analysts often use such terms as 'plunder' or 'pillage' in describing the activities of the Western powers and their TNCs in Africa, or the Third World in general. See, among others, Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974); G. Lanning and M. Mueller, Africa Undermined (New York: Penguin, 1979); Michael Tanzer, The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles over Minerals and Fuels (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980); and Azim Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel: a Strategic Triangle/ Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 4473.1 prefer the term 'exploitation.' The meaning of the word, as used in this study — unless the usage clearly indicates otherwise, especially as it can also be used for 'utilizing or working of a natural resource' or 'turning to economic account' — falls into the second and third meanings given to it by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1981), namely, 'an unjust or improper use of another person for one's own profit or advantage'; and 'coaction between two groups in which one is benefited at the expense of the other.' It also falls into the second meaning given to the word by the Oxford American Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980): 'to take full advantage of, to use (workers, colonial possessions, etc.) for one's own advantage and without regard for theirs/ The theoretical arguments of asymmetry in power relationship between the North and the South will be pursued in the next chapter. Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983.

14 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37.

38.

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals See Tanzer, The Race for Resources. Cf., for example, C. W. Kegley, Jr and P. McGowan, The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behaviour (London: Sage, 1981), especially the essays in Part III. See South Africa: Time Running Out. See, for instance, Ruth Butterworth, 'The Traumas of South Africa,' New Zealand International Review, 4, No. 5, September 1979, especially p. 14. William J. Liell, 'Africa and World War HI,' Africa, No. 85, September, 1978. Cf. Guy Arnold, 'Minerals: What Price Investment?' Africa Business, May 1980, p. 43. Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. Raymond F. Mikesell, New Patterns of World Mineral Development (London: British-North American Committee, 1979). Ibid. Arnold, 'Minerals: What Price Investment?' p. 43. The emphasis is in the text. For some background reading on this theme, see Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Paul Baran and Paul Sweezey, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968); Tanzer, The Race for Resources; and Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Harlow, England: Longman, 1981). The non-communist world's current top five producers are, in the order of output, the United States, Canada, South Africa, Namibia and Niger. See African Business, September, 1982, p. 27. See ibid., November 1982, p. 21. Ibid. Nigeria recently declared its intention to become a nuclear power. For an analysis of the implications of this declaration for the country's external relations, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Nuclear Capability and Nigeria's Foreign Policy,' in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-84 (New York: Africana, 1984). See, for example, 'Strategic Minerals: Running the Risk,' The Economist (London), 6-12 December, 1980. Note that several apologists for the white minority regime in South Africa have repeatedly expressed this view. For one such analysis, see LH.Gann and Peter Duignan, Why South Africa Will Survive (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 293. Cf. J.E. Spence, 'South Africa: the Nuclear Option,' African Affairs, 80, No. 321, October 1981.

2 The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals: some theoretical explanations revisited

The role of the TNCs Broadly stated, a major effect of the integration of African economies in the world capitalist system was colonialism. In turn, colonialism strongly reinforced this process of integration.1 An area which perhaps best illustrates this situation is the mining sector. In most African countries, extractive industries were initially created by the TNCs with the sanction of the colonial powers. Within time, a division of labor developed in which the indigenous labor force typically performed the arduous and poorly paid manual work while the foreign, metropolitan personnel performed the highly paid and prestigious engineering and technical functions.2 True, an important indigenous social formation emerged within a new state after independence, but the existing relationships were, in the main, preserved. Moreover, with the state apparatus and its bureaucratic staff taking over the role of a major consumer of foreign products, the comprador role soon shifted from the private to the public sector. And so the state comprador elite began to (and still does) mediate between the foreign companies and the state. In that capacity, this class, inter alia, constantly assists the foreign companies to continue their profitable operations in the African states.3 During the colonial period itself the African economies, far from being developed, were essentially exploited. The indigenous people have very limited access to wealth and the control of production. Indeed, this factor explains to a large extent why the bourgeois class was very small. At the same time, it was also weak becaue of its factionalism and comprador character. The end result was that, since the real power was international capitalism, not even the bourgeois class could muster any significant control of the economy and the means of production.4

16

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

More specifically, 'the colonial economy had a negligible share of capital formation from the mining sector, and on balance gained little more than a hole in the ground/ 5 As we shall see, the situation has scarcely altered in several of the African post-independence economies. This point has been well articulated by Michael Tanzer who insists that 'poor countries might well have been better off with no mineral development' because the TNCs have 'sucked out the profitable minerals and left little behind.' 6 Typical of these TNCs, is the role of the Anglo American Corporation, which represents one of the world's biggest concentrations of private capital. From its Johannesburg base, its companies control direct and indirect interests worth $12,000 million, with a strategic grip on the production of major minerals — including gold, uranium and diamonds — and a dominant influence over the economies of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 7 Furthermore, the group's substantial production of a number of strategic minerals also provides it with a position of dominance over the factors influencing the conditions for the whole of Africa's mining industry. While it is true that Anglo American's far-flung investments extend to North America, Australia, Brazil and Western Europe as well as Africa, 'its stake in the South African and Namibian economies, particularly the mining sector, remains the key to its fortunes.'8 The group has major interests in nine of the ten largest producing mines in South Africa, while administering three of the five biggest. In 1980, for example, Anglo American was responsible for 36 percent of the Republic's gold production, 41 percent of its uranium and 35 percent of the coal output. Although the group's issued capital and reserves totalled Rl,110 million in that year, the market value of its listed investments were R5,058 million, and the net profits of R306 million were 30 percent above the previous year's level. In all, Anglo American's holdings and direct investments amounted to Rl 1,000 million in 1980, with 85 percent of investment and group income accounted for by South Africa and Namibia, and 5 percent from the rest of Africa.9 The central core of the group's structure consists of Anglo American, De Beers, Charter Consolidated and the Bermuda-based Minerals and Resources Corporation, Minorco. Each has direct and indirect interlocking stakes of just over 30 percent, sufficient for centralized control over the whole group, without tying up huge amounts of capital and making any takeover almost impossible in view of the huge amounts of capital that would be required. In March 1980,

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 17 Anglo American had a market capitalization of R2,929 million; De Beers, R3,490 million; Charter Consolidated, £152 million; and Minorco, $5.7 million.10 Admittedly, these interlocking interests had originally been set up by Anglo American's founder, Ernest Oppenheimer (father of the recently retired chairman), and, over the last thirty years, have been expanded considerably. But, even so, the 'effective control' mechanism of strategic stakes has remained intact.11 Another TNC that readily springs to mind in the exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals is Rio Tinto-Zinc (RTZ). It operates Namibia's Rossing, reputed to be the world's biggest uranium mine, and has a majority of the boardroom seats. RTZ holds 46.3 percent of the equity; and voting control is vested in a special class of 'A' shares, owned wholly by the South African industrial development corporation. As one might expect, Rossing is a highly lucrative business, regularly contributing enormously to the profits of the TNC. In the first half of 1982, for example, Rossing contributed £13.5 million to RTZ's net profits.12 In fact, it has been so successful, since operations began in 1977, that the Rossing partners' net investment of around £200 million had been repaid by the end of 1982.13 Lonrho is another TNC that deserves a brief mention. It was founded shortly after the turn of the century in what was then Rhodesia. The company was still little more than a sleepy cattleranching and mining operation in 1961, with a turnover of less than $160,000 a year, when Tiny Rowland, the current chief executive, joined it. The headquarters were moved to London after the Ian Smith regime unilaterally declared Rhodesia to be independent in 1965. By the late 1960s, the company had developed and held interests throughout Africa. And by 1983, Lonrho had a worldwide turnover of £2.4 billion, almost £600 million of it in east and southern Africa — mainly in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Kenya. Holdings in South Africa generated more than £270 million in that year. Altogether, Lonrho's annual report for 1983 listed gross profits of £54.9 million on a turnover of £594.2 million in east and southern Africa.14 With such hefty profit, it was hardly surprising that the independent Harare weekly, the Financial Gazette, wrote: 'It's easy for Lonrho to make a profit from Africa where the main sources of income are agriculture and mining. All they do is pull resources out of the ground and sell them abroad. Little capital development is devoted to actually increasing the stock of productive wealth.'15 It is the scale of the profitable business in Africa's minerals, such as

18

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

that carried out by Anglo American, RTZ, and Lonrho over the years, that explains, in part, why the majority of the TNCs' direct investments in the continent have gone into mineral extraction. Aside from the profits that these corporations derive from their operations, the strategic nature of some of the minerals and their importance to the industrialized countries make certain African states and their mining operations indispensable to the survival of Western capitalism; at least insofar as they contribute their quota towards keeping the system alive.16 On the theories of the 'Matthew effect/ dependency, core-periphery, and imperialism If Africa's strategic minerals help to oil the wheels of international capitalism, the continent also suffers from the inconsistencies of that institution. Tanzer's thesis brings out this phenomenon and, indeed, has revived an old argument in the North-South relations. By exploiting the mineral resources of Africa, the 'periphery' of the world economy, 17 and by repatriating the profits to the rich industrialized countries, which form the 'core' or 'center' of the world economy, the TNCs have, for years, lent credence to what, nowadays, is increasingly being tagged the 'Matthew effect' in international political economy. Since religion can sometimes help us to understand some basic points in economics and politics, we can conveniently utilize a biblical analysis. According to the Book of Matthew, Jesus Christ had reasoned thus: 'For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more in abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.' 18 In other words, and in the context of our analysis, since the investments made by the foreign-controlled TNCs in Africa are very often more than offset by excessive rates of capital repatriation to the industrial core, they hinder economic growth; and so, foreign investment thus seems to remove from the periphery even that 'which it hath.' In essence, the core-periphery relationship is exploitative, at least insofar as profits earned in the periphery are transferred back to the core rather than being re-invested locally. Such economic dependency exacerbates the plight of underdevelopment of the periphery. Moreover, the external orientation of the peripheral economies, encouraged by foreign investment, generates internal distortions and contradictions which retard growth — in particular, the development of new class relations and an acceleration of social inequality in the

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 19 periphery. In sum, growth is usually slower in the periphery than it would otherwise have been.19 The above points form the plank of the Dependency School. In a nutshell, dependency theory holds that economic processes are the basic structural force of history and that over the last several centuries, international capitalism, in its various shades,20 has been history's prime mover. In other words, the economic forces which the capitalist imperialism of the United States, Western Europe and Japan generated have remained the primary determinant of historical change on the periphery. Dependence can be seen as a situation in which the rate and direction of capital accumulation are externally conditioned. Thus 'a system is dependent when the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component inside the system/ 21 Essentially, the Dependency School emphasizes the matrix set up by the advanced capitalist countries that determines the range of options available to the Third World. Since capital, organization technology and military preponderance are in the hands of the Western industrialized countries, these center states are able to set and manipulate the terms under which skill, capital, and markets will be provided to the periphery. The special advantages enable the core states to force the countries in the periphery into subservience. Consequently, the latter group has to be suppliers of raw materials, purchasers of finished goods, manufacturers of whatever the core allows them to make. And since the developing countries are unable to allocate resources effectively according to their internal needs, following some alternative vision of development, they are locked into a structure where the benefits of growth accrue disproportionately to center states.22 In Amin's case, for example, he analyzes his thesis of underdevelopment within the context of the process of capital accumulation and social/productive relations. His principal thesis is that capitalist foreign expansion into the periphery causes an extreme disarticulation of the peripheral economy, blocks autocentric accumulation and creates extraverted accumulation. The result is the blocked development of the social formations which are kept in a peripheral position in the world capitalist system. The peripheral societies are characterized by more than one mode of production, their specific forms determined by the nature of their pre-capitalist modes of production and the particular phases of capitalist development in which they were integrated into the world capitalist system.23

.20

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

As Amin sees it, the essential difference between the periphery and the core lies in the extraverted nature of the peripheral economies which subjects them to a dynamic emanating from the center. Accordingly, the periphery has been integrated into a world system to suit the center's own needs. The process of development in the periphery, he contends, is influenced by competition within the center, which determines the periphery's 'distinctive' structure. Such competition promotes three distortions in the development of peripheral capitalism, contrasting with the development in the core. The distortions are: i.

a crucial expansion of export activities, which absorb the major part of the capital arriving from the center; ii. an emphasis upon 'tertiary' or commercial, transportation, communication and service activities which arises both from the special contradictions of peripheral capitalism and from the original structures of the peripheral formations; and iii. a distortion in the choice of branches of industry, favoring the growth of light industry and the utilization of modern techniques in these branches. 24 The contemporary dependency theorists see the international division of labor and its attending class formations on the periphery as shifting substantially on the surface, while fundamentally continuing to have the same lopsided effect.25 In clarifying the dependency orientation, Caporaso argues that it seeks: to explore the process of integration of the periphery into the international capitalist system and to assess the developmental implications of this peripheral capitalism. This approach proceeds from a structuralist paradigm which focuses on the class structure and international capital, and the role of the state in shaping and managing the national, foreign, and class forces that propel development within countries.26 In this context, the role of the comprador class, which mediates between foreign business interests and home governments, readily springs back to major relevance. It must not be forgotten that Fanon, while calling for a strong state able to protect the nation from imperialist designs and able to improve the quality of life for the mass of the population, speaks of the weak governmental bodies. By this he means the servants of a new African bourgeoisie, which itself has entirely sold out to foreign interests. He develops this point further: The national middle-class which takes over power at the end of the colonial

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 21 regime is an underdeveloped middle-class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace ... Since the middle-class has neither sufficient material nor intellectual resources . . . it limits its claims to the taking-over of business offices and commercial houses formerly occupied by the settlers. From now on it will insist that all the big foreign companies should pass through its hands, whether these companies wish to keep their connections with the country, or open it up. The national middle-class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary.27 Furthermore, and in examining the implications of Caporaso's point about the role of international capital, Kwame Nkrumah has contended that, even after independence, it still serves as an important instrument for practicing neo-colonialism in Africa. In expatiating on the essence of the latter, he reminds us that while a country subject to the phenomenon is, in theory, independent and displaying all the outward trappings of international sovereignty, in reality, 'its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside/ 28 With the exploitative activities, in whatever guise or form, of many of the Great Powers and their TNCs in Africa's mining sector, particularly the monocultural economies, and with the economic and political implications of such operations, can we not buttress the late Ghanaian leader's thesis? Similarly, can Fanon be challenged on the reality of his arguments? Do they not offer a candid descriptive account of many of post-independence African regimes? There are still many scholars today who do not seem to understand the wider ramifications of the arguments advanced by Nkrumah and Fanon. Instead, they are preoccupied with the relationship between national and international capitalist forces. Attention is thus diverted from the more central relationships of capitalism — imperialism and capital accumulation on one side, and class struggle and contradiction on the other.29 It should be clear from our discussion so far that the Dependency School's analysis, especially on the activities of the advanced capitalist countries' TNCs in the periphery, is just a useful extension of the Leninist views of imperialism. In fact, Lenin argued that the center states needed to develop markets in, and acquire raw materials from, the periphery. Over time, he maintained, the core would stagnate while the periphery became a source of industrial growth.30 However, while such a thesis still holds for some countries in the Third World, for many of the African states producing strategic minerals for the

22

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

West, the opportunity of becoming a source of industrial growth of any consequence remains quite remote. These countries, even in the 1980s, have been unable to free themselves from the heavy shackles imposed on their economies by the TNCs. Their economic progress has been stifled and poverty and economic backwardness, rather than being a transitional phase as Lenin anticipated, have become conditions to which they, with white South Africa as a notable exception, are irrevocably consigned while capitalism endures. No wonder Frank spoke about economic develoment and underdevelopment being the opposite face of the same international capitalist coin.31 Some scholars disagree, in varying degrees, with the thrust of the dependency argument, including the 'Matthew Effect.' Bauer and Yamey insist that foreign investment stimulates growth through the introduction of new technology into the periphery. Besides, they continue, since foreign capital supplements or even substitutes for local capital, it has an added positive impact on economic growth. The origin of the capital, whether it is from the imperialist Western powers or not, is irrelevant. What is important, according to this modernization thesis, is that capital facilitates growth and its benefits spread throughout the economy. 32 There is, too, a growing literature using specific case studies which not only claims that dependency has fostered economic growth but also states that, by arriving at this very finding, their studies have undermined or substantially modified the school's position. Others prefer to give general criticisms about what they perceive as the tenuous line of the dependency theories. 33 In a recent study, Robert Jackman even sought to measure the 'Matthew Effect/ Claiming that, contrary to expectations, the highest growth rates are not in the industrialized West, he asserts that 'the Matthew Effect occurs primarily within the countries of the Third Word.'34 According to him, his study has come up with two results: 'First, the core has not invariably been underdeveloping the periphery in a blanket way. Second, foreign investment emanating from the industrial West has not served to depress growth rates in the Third World.'35 Finally, he contends: 'To the extent that economic growth bears on patterns of political change and development, these results suggest that many of the negative political consequences claimed for dependence on foreign capital may be substantially overstated.'36 While Jackman's study contains some interesting and colorful arguments, his central thesis as well as similar arguments by other scholars merely bring out the significance of Claude Ake's general observation. As the latter sees it:

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 23 Bourgeois economists do not see economic underdevelopment in Africa as the effect of international capitalist accumulation, even though it is hard to conceive how a continent so thoroughly pillaged, devastated, disoriented, and demoralised by the slave trade, colonialism, and imperialism, could be anything but underdeveloped.37 Instead, Ake goes on, these economists tend to explain the underdevelopment of Africa in terms of numerous deficiencies. The list of the deficiencies varies from one economic development specialist to the other. But, in general, it normally includes: 'lack of entrepreneurial skill, shortage of capital, lack of investment opportunities, low productivity of labour, insufficient savings, inefficiency, laziness, meagre natural resource endowment, lack of technology, unfavourable terms of trade.' Having armed themselves with such a view of underdevelopment, Ake further points out, these specialists then find it easy to advance or rationalize their recipes for economic development: 'the government must procure the appropriate technology, make labour more productive, create investment opportunities, mobilise more capital, and so on.'38 Indeed, to return to Jackman's study, one can even throw some of his arguments and citations back at him. If we concede for a moment that the core has not 'been underdeveloping the periphery' by repatriating handsome profits, then Bauer and Yamey's argument that he employed to buttress his case cannot stand. To be sure, they have clearly stated: 'direct investment is dictated almost exclusively by commercial considerations, so that its volume is a reliable index of independent opinions on the economic prospects of the local economy/ 39 Since the TNCs, and even the Great Powers, are not philanthropists, they are not likely to invest in the mining of strategic minerals in Africa if the 'commercial considerations' of recouping huge profits are absent. Siphoning capital, which otherwise might have been reinvested locally, naturally affects the economic well-being of the peripheral states . Chase-Dunn, however, maintains that foreign investment curtails economic growth and exacerbates inequality in the periphery.40 That stance is also shared by Stoneman who maintains that direct foreign investment is associated with structural effects that retard the economic growth of the developing countries. 41 Similarly, Ake argues in the same vein.42Equally, too, Snyder and Kick, in their own study, showed that the center states have successfully been underdeveloping the peripheral economies; so that being in the periphery curtails economic growth. Their study has thus lent strong support to the

24

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

dependency theories, in particular, as they relate to 'the sources of differential economic growth of nations/ 43 Interestingly, many of the scholars who reject the dependency arguments on the core-periphery relations, employ quantitative techniques. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that their studies often fail to use appropriate methodology in the statistical analyses. Consequently, the result of their findings are not only suspect and weak, but are also difficult to interpret. 44 Much fruitful research still needs to be done — especially in terms of dealing with the problems of inadequate or limited data, analytic methodology, and conceptual framework — before their analyses can be taken seriously.45 In any case, as Caporaso has recently argued, many of these critics have not yet understood, let alone mastered, the true strengths of dependency theory 46 Moreover, even McGowan, one of the scholars who uses such quantitative methods, 47 states that he might have arrived at his 'negative findings', in part, because of what he called the failure among specialists in African international relations to build bridges between the dependency theory and international relations theory in general, 'particularly with the "linkage politics" literature [with which it] unconsciously shares many concerns/ 48 Besides, 'the dependency theory might still be correct' (and more relevant to the African circumstances in the current decade [1980s]), when, according to him, 'economic development will slow down or cease, thereby producing a condition of underdevelopment similar to Latin America/ 49 Finally, McGowan concedes the possibility of a basic weakness of the quantitative anti-dependency scholars, which we identified earlier on, in his study. He defends himself thus: If it is objected that the reason why I have found essentially no support for the dependency theory is because I have not used 'good' indicators of dependence, I would certainly admit this as a possibility, and urge further work on the quantitative description of economic dependence.50 One point that cannot be ignored in the application of quantitative methods to test the validity of dependency theory and other writings on core-periphery relations, is the omnipresence of ideology in the research, especially in the methodological frameworks, of non-radical scholars. In considering the interplay of ideology and statistics in political inquiry, Beardsley presented four attributes of ideology — unavoidability, pervasiveness, controversy and relative untestability — and demonstrated that the current concept of rigorous political

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 25 inquiry is inadequate to deal with ideological issues, including issues of dependency and imperialism. In particular, he concludes, quantitative methods and statistics can neither test nor remove ideological bias.51 The converse point, that scholars who articulate and defend dependency theory are also ideologically biased, can be made, too. By and large, ideology cannot be totally eliminated from social sciences; at least it is impossible to be one hundred percent neutral in political science. Charles Taylor's point in 'Neutrality in Political Science' that 'it helps, rather than hinders, the cause to be aware [that] to avoid bias and achieve objectivity [is] hard, almost impossible,' comes readily to mind.52 The inability to rise beyond ideological bias, and so achieve absolute objectivity, thus applies to both radical and non-radical scholars who engage in explaining the roots of Africa's underdevelopment. This writer may well, in the circumstances, be charged with ideological bias by various conservative scholars. Be that as it may, dependency theory is certainly correct in emphasizing the relevance of economic considerations to political issues, the importance of foreign actors to the internal affairs of relatively weak states and the way global historical developments condition the range of options that the countries of the Third World may choose to follow. Furthermore, in trying to unravel the intricacies of Africa's underdevelopment, understanding the linkages between domestic socioeconomic groups, the state bureaucracies and foreign capital is essential, at least for analysis of foreign investment policies of the TNCs in the continent's strategic minerals. All these inescapable issues, coupled with the realization, if I may quote James Coleman, that 'Third World dependency, and Northern exploitation of Southern vulnerabilities in an asymmetrical world is obviously a quintessential moral issue,' influence and affect the style and analysis in this study. 53 With this caveat, we can now resume our discussion. Public ownership: the way out? From what we have so far seen about the operations of international capitalism, it is clear why the Dependency School condemns the system. Many of the dependencia theorists believe that alternatives are possible, generally in some form of socialism, which, for the purposes of our central concern in this study, includes the public ownership of the mining enterprise in the relevant African countries. In fact, many of these states have carried out, with or without socialist policies,

26

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

partial or total nationalizations of the mining companies which have previously been responsible for the extraction and marketing of the local strategic minerals, in a calculated attempt to reduce the level of exploitation by the core. However, since the circumstances, including the internal dynamics, of some of these states differ, expectations and results have varied, too. Thus, the bargaining position of the actors, the differing personalities of the TNCs, and the differences introduced by the diversity of national political cultures, ideologies and elite behavior have all affected the level of success achieved. Moreover, the intrinsic value and characteristics of the strategic minerals differ so that the politics of particular commodities are not necessarily the same. Whereas, for example, there are substitutes for copper, uranium does not quite fall into that category. It should be stated that public ownership, as the culmination of rising economic nationalism, does not necessarily guarantee the end of exploitation by the core.54 In both Zaire and Zambia, in the case of copper, nationalization does not automatically lead to the transfer of the relevant technology and expertise to the African states; and the TNCs' virtual monopoly of these items naturally gives them considerable influence in the local economies including, still, the disguised form of capital repatriation from the periphery to the core by way of loaded payments for marketing, technical consultancy services, and high-technology equipment and spare parts. 55 As part of the strategy of further reducing the level of exploitation of the Zambian economy by the core states, Lusaka announced in March 1982, the merger of the two state mining companies — Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) — as Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). With capital of well over one billion Kwacha, the new enterprise is the second largest copper mining company in the world, after Chile's Codelco. The merger program was the final step in reorganization of the mining industry in Zambia which began in 1969-70, prior to thè take-over by the government of 51 percent of the equity holdings in RCM and NCCM, respectively.56 Although Francis Kaunda, the group's executive chairman, has lauded the merger as both cost-effective and logical in terms of technical processes, it does not entirely seal the capital repatriation to the core, as various management sales and technical consultancy contracts as well as technical equipment and spare parts still have to be paid for by Zambia.57 Besides, the so-called minority shareholders still included both the American and British public as well as some TNCs like Anglo American Corporation and Amax.58

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 27 In Zaire, on the other hand, dependence on the core is at its zenith. Finance for the key projects in the strategic mining sector comes from the West and by September 1982, the country's external debt had soared to $4.1 billion.59 The interest payments on the debt reached a record level of almost $1,000 million in 1982 and this amount excluded some outstanding arrears of $175 million.60 Yet Zaire could have done much better if earnings from its strategic minerals had been steady. Indeed, the Mobutu Administration found it difficult to keep its budget deficit within prescribed limits set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of the drastic fall in earnings from its exports. For instance, receipts fell from $1.9 billion in 1980 to $1.4 billion in 1981, which was well below the forecast of $1.9 billion on which the IMF program and rescheduling measures, including the Paris Club agreement of July 1981, were based.61 The $1,000 million debt servicing figure for 1982 amounted to as much as 64 percent of the previous year's export earnings.62 With a negative real growth and an inflation rate of 60 percent, Zaire's ability to repay any of its debts now rests on IMF's standby credit. The 1982 massive facility of SDR912 million was suspended after two drawings of SDR175 million because of Kinshasa's continued failure to meet performance targets, especially the budget deficit. In all, the Zairean government must have, over the last eight years, rescheduled its debts on at least six occasions.63 When in January 1983, Zhao Ziyang, China's premier, announced, during his visit to Kinshasa, that Peking would freeze $10 million out of the total $100 million that Zaire owed China, the Mobutu Administration seized the opportunity to wage a brisk verbal war against its Western creditors. While gratefully acknowledging 'the exceptional cooperation extended by China to Zaire,' the Administration emphasized that the Chinese gesture should not only serve as a good example to be emulated but that it should also: 'impress Western creditors who are trying to recover debts of $4,000 million while the country is in the throes of acute economic crisis provoked by these same creditors and their sordid maneuvres.'64 Perhaps one of these maneuvers is the way the Western creditors practice their capitalist-oriented financing schemes in Zaire. In April 1982, for example, Kinshasa could only come up with $10 million of the $34 million in interest which it owed a group of Western banks. But, the bankers brought forward 'a rescue proposal.' They deferred capital repayments for two years; then, because the country's cobaltmining company was about to import $24 million worth of petroleum,

28

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

the banks lent the company the money at high interest rates to pay for it. That way, Zaire's Central Bank got the $24 million to balance the outstanding interest payment — and the sum went back to the Western banks. A cobalt shipment was put up as security for the loan; and as a result of the arrangement, Zaire was stated not to be in default for the next six months. 65 At another level, outputs in the Zairean copper and cobalt mines have all been affected in recent years by lack of spare parts (which come from the core countries at exhorbitant prices) for major mining equipment. Moreover, the copper concentrate output is still shipped to Belgium, the former colonial power, for further treatment. 66 And like the extraction of the strategic minerals, the finance for the major supporting projects to the mining sector still comes from the West. As a random example, in the Inga-Shaba power line, which the Mobutu Administration says is quite critical for the Tenke-Fungurume cobalt and copper project, the largest financial stake belongs to the French government agency, COGEMA, which, on the basis of its investment, is the project leader.67 In any case, as we have argued earlier, no talk of public ownership in the strategic mining sector can stop the Zairean and Zambian managerial class from being allied to foreign capital and so serving as back-door agents for the continuation of the exploitative exercise.68 In Zaire, and indeed other African states like, say, Gabon (manganese and uranium) or Niger (uranium), where the comprador classes control the governments, their primary objectives are, essentially, two-foid: power maintenance and their own economic interests, and the latter often means close collaboration with foreign business interests with all the attendant exploitative repercussions. In sum then, the political power to nationalize will not necessarily lead to the end of economic exploitation by the core, so long as the economic balance of power, no matter in whatever disguised forms, remains heavily tilted in favor of the TNCs that control the local mining companies. 69 And that is precisely why the TNCs are not worried about the nuances of legal ownership of their mining companies in Africa; since whatever changes that appear in form do not necessarily imply change in substance, nor, for that matter, do they necessarily reflect any shift in the bargaining power between a government and the companies. 70 It is not being suggested through our analysis that public ownership of the mining houses by the African producers of strategic minerals has no virtues. On the contrary, it is perhaps the lesser of two evils.

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 29 For a start, nationalization enables the state to assert some control over sectors of the economy —especially in the monocultural economies — and obtain limited economic objectives. Second, nationalization can be politically useful because of the symbolic identifications it evokes when the fever of economic nationalism grips some states. Third, the creation of enterprises is useful because of the patronage and the policy leverage that they confer on the governmental elite.71 Moreover, aside from public ownership, host governments can also employ other behavioral controls over the activities of the TNCs without threatening their ownership of productive facilities. These controls should include such measures as imposing limits on profit repatriation, labor policy, divestment to host country nationals or the host state itself and local sourcing requirements. Surprisingly, many black African states have not implemented some of these behavioral controls either on their own or even, where appropriate, used them to supplement nationalization programs. In view of the special exploitative and profit-maximizing policies of the TNCs, their Western governments and the Pretoria regime over the minerals in Namibia and South Africa, most of the behavioral controls (save the labor policy which entrenches the apartheid policy) cannot be pursued in these two countries. Indeed, such policies will be inimical to the exploitation of the strategic minerals in Namibia by the core states and South Africa. When all is said and done, however, a nationalization program, even if it is embarked upon with full vigor and supplemented with necessary behavioral controls, will not shut out the economic difficulties that normally develop as a result of the incorporation of African economies into the international capitalist system. In this regard, the exploitation of the periphery by the center is often further facilitated by the Western-dominated international financial institutions. Ordinarily, this process could take place whenever the African exporters of strategic minerals are experiencing economic difficulties and turn to these institutions for assistance. The latter then prescribe stringent economic measures as a condition for granting financial aid. On many occasions, these measures may include devaluation of national currencies. In 1981, for example, the IMF, as a condition for future loans, forced Zaire to devalue its currency by 40 percent. 72 Sometimes, the measures actually involve denationalization of mining companies in order to get short-term credit facilities. In Mauritania, for instance, financial pressures caused by the guerrilla war with Polisario forced the government to agree to turn the

30

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

state-owned Akjoujt copper mine over to private interests. 73 Interestingly, some of the Western powers have now begun to emulate the practice of the IMF. The Reagan Administration for one, recently made the application of free-market ideology an important condition for receiving American aid. The new five-year $500 million aid program announced in 1984 specifically promises additional help to African countries that retool their economies along capitalist lines. Thus, the US State Department as well as the Agency for International Development (AID) have evolved a strategy of obtaining leverage over the domestic, and indeed foreign, policies of these poor states through aid manipulation. 74 Adapting to the crisis of capitalism: We cannot conclude this chapter without a brief mention of the implications of the current crisis of capitalism, the economic recession in the Western world, on Africa's strategic minerals. The main impact, of course, has been the depression of price and demand for these minerals. There is also a policy among some of the Western powers to conserve resources, or switch, where possible, to substitutes or even synthetic materials, instead of maintaining their supplies from African sources. In both cases, the level of aggregate demand is curtailed, which in turn has affected the local buoyancy or competitiveness of the mines. And, in the absence of opportunities for long-term diversification in the affected African economies, these states are now grappling with the problems of devastating effects on government revenues, services, investment, employment and the incomes of workers and peasants. 75 This situation can generate major discontent or instability for regimes which have to operate under unstable conditions of imperfect competition at the international level but must also respond to rising demands for national development and national welfare. In some economies, strategic minerals provide the bulk of the national revenue, and thus the income for national development. In Niger, for example, uranium provides about 84 percent of the country's total foreign earnings.76 In short, the crisis of capitalism at the core has worsened the already pitiable plight of the peripheral states. We shall return to the dynamics of the forces of supply and demand in the international economy in more detail in the next chapter. The severity of the problems occasioned by the crisis of international capitalism is far greater for the black African states than it is

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals

31

for the 'white S o u t h / This is largely because the Western powers, politically at least, h e l p to cushion the impact of the p r o b l e m s for South Africa. In the case of Namibia, Pretoria, to all intents a n d purposes, still r u n s that territory as a colony, a n d so reaps the full exploitative r e w a r d s of o p e n and direct imperialism. Clearly, as long as genuine i n d e p e n d e n c e , u n d e r a black-majority rule, can be delayed, T N C s like RTZ, De Beers, and others u n d e r the Anglo American umbrella will continue to maximize their profit r e t u r n s in the mining sector. In any case, m a n y of the center states are not likely to a b a n d o n both Namibia and South Africa because of their strategic minerals or simply to advance t h e West's, particularly the United States', geopolitical interests. It is to the wider politics s u r r o u n d i n g the linkage b e t w e e n the core p o w e r s and the strategic mineral-exporting peripheral countries in Africa that w e n o w turn.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

For an analysis of the different stages of capitalist foreign expansion, see, among others, Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, 2 vols (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); and Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974). Note that this later group was aided by a subordinate class of indigenous administrative and clerical personnel. See, for example, Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Harlow, England: Longman, 1981). On the interpretative analysis of the activities of the comprador class in the Third World, see, among others, Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963); Mahfoud Bennoune, 'The Political Economy of Mauretania/ Review of African Political Economy, No. 12, May-August 1978; and Terisa Turner, 'Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian State/ Review of African Political Economy, No. 5, January-April 1976. See Ake, 'Explanatory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa/ Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, No. 1, March 1976, pp. 1-23. Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, p. 40. Tanzer, The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles over Minerals and Fuels (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), p. 25. See 'How Anglo American Manipulates Africa's Mineral Wealth/ in New African, April 1981. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See ibid.

32

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Sunday Times (London), October 24, 1982, p. 54. Ibid. African Business, June 1984. Quoted in ibid. Cf., for example, Dorothea Mezger, 'How the Mining Companies Undermine Liberation/ Review of African Political Economy, No. 12, MayAugust 1978, pp. 53-66. The author is aware of the fact that even within the entire periphery, the Third World, one can still talk of a core — the newly, and fast, industrializing developing countries — and a periphery, the very poor and the least developed ones. The Holy Bible, King James version, Matt. 13:12. See, for example, Ake, A Political Economy of Africa; Andre G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); and Baran, The Political Economy of Growth. First, in its mercantile, then in its free trade, later in its financial and, today, in its TNC guises. F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Fai etto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, translated by Marjory M. Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. xx. See, for example, Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, Unequal Development, and 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms/ in Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 50-24; R.R. Kaufman, H.I. Chernotsky, and D.S. Geller, 'A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency/ Comparative Politics, 7, No. 3, April 1975; and Peter Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics/ International Organization, 32, No. 4, Autumn 1978, pp. 8 8 1 911. Amin, Unequal Development, p. 202. Ibid, p. 288 Cf., for instance, Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 27. James Caporaso, 'Introduction: Dependence and Dependency in the Global System/ International Organization, 32, Winter 1978, p. 2. The emphasis was in the original text. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 122. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1966), p. ix. For an extended discussion on this theme, see Bjorn Beckman, 'Imperialism and Capitalist Transformation: Critique of a Kenyan Debate/ Review of African Political Economy, No. 19, September-December 1980. V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1982). Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, p. 9. Bauer and Yamey, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press, 1957). See, for instance, Tony Smith, 'The Underdevelopment of Development

17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

33

Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory/ World Politics, 31, No. 2, January 1979, pp. 247-88; and his 'The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited/ International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 75561; Aristide R. Zolberg, 'Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link/ World Politics, 33, January 1981, pp. 253-81; Peter Gourevitch, 'The International System and Regime Formation/ Comparative Politics, 10, April 1976, pp. 419-38; Ruth Milkman, 'Contradictions of Semi-peripheral Development: The South African Case/ in W.L. Goldfrank, ed., The World System of Capitalism: Past and Present (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979). Robert W. Jackman, 'Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World/ World Politics, 34, No. 2, January 1982, pp. 175-96, at p. 185. The emphasis is his. Ibid., p. 196. Again, the emphasis is not added. Ibid. Ake, 'Explanatory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa/ p. 19. Ibid. Bauer and Yamey, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, p. 143. Christopher Chase-Dunn, 'The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross-national Study/ American Sociological Review, 40, December 1975, p. 720. Colin Stoneman, 'Foreign Capital and Economic Growth/ World Development, 3, January 1975, pp. 11-26. Ake, A Political Economy of Africa. David Snyder .and Edward L Kick, 'Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 1955-1970: A Multiple Network Analysis of Transnational Interactions/ American Journal of Sociology, 84, March 1979, p. 1123. See, in particular, Philip L Beardsley, Redefining Rigor: Ideology and Statistics in Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1980); and 'Substantive Significance vs. Quantitative Rigor in Political Inquiry: Are the Two Compatible?/ International Interactions, 1, January 1974, pp. 2740. Cf., for example, Ronald T. Libby and James H. Cobbe, 'Regime Change in Third World Extractive Industries: A Critique/ International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 725-44, at p. 730; and James A. Caporaso, 'Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence, and Exploitation/ in S. Rosen and J.R. Kurth, eds, Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism (Lexington,Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974), pp. 87-114. James A. Caporaso, 'Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development Studies/ International Organization, 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, pp. 605-28. See Patrick J. McGowan, 'Economic Dependence and Economic Performance in Black Africa/ in Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, No. 1, March 1976, pp. 25-40. Ibid., pp. 38-9. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 38.

34

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

51. 52.

Beardsley, Redefining Rigor. Charles Taylor, 'Neutrality in Political Science/ in P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, eds, Philosophy, Politics, and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 25-57, at p. 39. Also reprinted in W.R. Connolly and G. Gordon, eds, Social Structure and Political Theory (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974). Coleman in a letter dated June 22, 1984, to the author. See James Cobbe, Governments and Mining Companies in Developing Countries (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979). This situation is not peculiar to Africa alone. Rather, it is a common experience in other parts of the Third World. For the situation with copper in Chile, for example, see Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). Note, however, that the Zambian government's holdings in these two companies steadily increased from 51 percent over the years and by April 1982, when the new enterprise took off, minority share holding had been reduced to 39.38 percent in RCM, and 39.97 percent in NCCM, respectively. See 'Zambia's Minerals Giants Finally Merge/ in African Business, February 1982. Note that in the case of the latter, pressing financial constraint contributed to the shortage of equipment and spares which, in turn, forced production down despite higher targets. See Africa Economic Digest, 3, No. 50, 17 December 1982, p. 36. African Business, February 1982. Ibid., September 1982, p. 95. See 'Zaire's Interest Nears $l,000m./ in West Africa (1982), p. 2242. African Business, September 1982, p. 95. West Africa (1982), p. 2242. See, for example, New African, December 1982, p. 51. See 'China Freezes $10 Million Debt/ in Africa Economic Digest, January 21 1983, p. 14. See 'Third World Debt Crunch/ in Newsweek, June 7, 1982, p. 42. See 'Zaire Copper Output Prospects/ in African Business, February 1982. Note, however, that the Mobutu Administration's point about the IngaShaba power line being critical for the Tenke-Fungurume cobalt and copper project is quite controversial. There is a substantial body of opinion that argues quite convincingly that among the negative aspects of the Inga-Shaba venture is that it was entirely gratuitous to Shaba's industrial development. After all, there is plenty of hydroelectric power existent or potential in Shaba itself at a fraction of the cost of what IngaShaba electricity will be. In any event, the latter is totally uneconomic apart from the issue of its essentiality. See, in particular, for the case of Zambia, the interesting study of Richard L Sklar, Corporate Power in an African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Also, consult Ronald T. Libby, 'Transnational Class Alliances in Zambia,' Comparative Politics, 15, No. 4, July 1983, pp. 379-400.

53. 54. 55.

56.

57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

The exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

35

Cf. Ake, A Political Economy of Africa. Cf. Libby and Cobbe, 'Regime Change in Third World Extractive Industries/ As long as we bear in mind that this factor also facilitates the emergence of the state comprador class with, as we have shown, its attendant repercussions for the local economy. Newsweek, August 1, 1981. For a more recent series of devaluations by other African states, in response to orders from the IMF, see African Business, June 1984. See Libby and Cobbe, 'Regime Change in Third World Extractive Industries/ See 'Aid, but only if you're capitalist/ in The Economist (London), May 19, 1984. For a detailed recent account of these problems, see the special issue of Time (January 16, 1984) entitled 'Africa's Woes,' passim. The Economist (London), June 19, 1982, p. 98.

3 Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system Issues in the political economy We have seen that strategic minerals have, over the years, made certain African states and their mining operations an essential component of international capitalism with the result that the bulk of the TNCs' direct investments in Africa has been in mineral extraction. Equally, a good part of the indirect (portfolio) investment, foreign loans and official aid, has been geared towards developing the infrastructure for mining ventures or obtained against future minerals.1 In an attempt to exploit and consolidate the production of these mineral resources, the local economies often exhibit the characteristics and peculiarities of international capitalism. To begin with, some of the mining economies — like those of Niger, Zambia and Mauritania — become monocultures; the attendant ills often culminating in 'immeasurably deeper crises than afflict the advanced capitalist countries themselves/ 2 The most notable of these crises results from the economic and political repercussions of price fluctuations. Declining world prices help the Western industrialized states to maximize their economic interest. Admittedly, the more a host government acquires experience in dealing with foreign investors and establishes a bureaucracy capable of overseeing and managing its extractive industry, the more will it be in a position to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the foreign investor.3 Nevertheless, a sharp decline in the world market price for minerals tends to undermine the bargaining ability of the host government and, in the process, shift the balance of power in favor of the foreign investor, especially where foreign investments are high.4 Moreover, the mining activities of the TNCs encourage and perpetuate dependency. For, apart from the fact that African states depend on access to the international market, which is often monopolized, they are also dependent on the outside capitalist world

Africa;s strategie minerals and the North-South system

37

(usually on the specific TNCs that operate the mine) for the supply of the essential mining equipment, including the vital spare parts, and the so-called technological 'know how.' 5 At another level, these mines seriously contribute towards lopsided economic development insofar as they constitute economic and social enclaves. The overall 'enclave' effect, in particular the extreme underdevelopment of the rest of society, is usually the outcome of the labor requirements of the mines. In this regard, it is important to note that where: mining has been longer estabished and on a significant scale, and not only in the 'White South', the imperatives of labour recruitment typically meant the deliberate curtailment of commercial opportunities for peasant agriculture, and with the usual patterns of migrant labour and the absence of males, this meant the impoverishment even of subsistence agriculture and of course further determined the monocultural nature of the economy.6 Besides, the tendency for the mining TNCs to create a limited, skilled proletariat has often led to the generation of unemployment in some of the African states, particularly the black ones. 7 In any case, with the capital-intensive characteristic of the investments in the mining sector, only limited job opportunities can be created, even at the unskilled level, at any given point.8 Consequently, insofar as mining has usually meant rural stagnation, it has Ted to peasant pauperisation with almost no employment outlet.'9 Lastly, many of the African states are targets for the strategies of the big mining TNCs. The alliance between the states and the international mining houses is strong in the white South, where there is a common interest in keeping the black, and supposedly Communist orientated, nationalists from assuming effective power either in South Africa itself or in Namibia. The state-TNCs alliance is also strong in other parts of Africa. Partial or total nationalization has not put an end to such an alliance. Consequently, in spite of full or partial public ownership of local mining companies, the Anglo-American Corporation and Lonrho still have powerful capitalist interests in places like Zambia and Zaire; just as MIFERMA and Mauritania as well as Liberia and the European steel cartel are good allies.10 The politics of Africa's strategic minerals Insofar as most of the leading Western powers depend on some of Africa's strategic minerals for their well being, the minerals cannot

38

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

escape being subjected to the forces of international politics; especially since some of the Great Powers often rationalize their involvement in African affairs on account, inter alia, of their dependence on the continent for strategic minerals. Yet, for many of these Great Powers and their TNCs, the business dealings in these minerals facilitate the process through which Africa's key resources are consistently being exploited by the Western industrialized countries. 11 To mention this inherent capitalistic quest for profit maximization, however, is not to deny the extent to which some of the Western powers are genuinely dependent on African strategic minerals. The level of dependence on the minerals varies from one industrialized country to another. France, for one, has always relied, in varying degrees, on many of the continent's vast minerals, including those from the white South. Interestingly, at the time of President Mitterrand's election, there was talk in many international and African circles that a French socialist regime would scale down the volume of trade with South Africa as a sign of disapprobation. In the event, the expectations were misplaced, as Franco-South African trade reached an all-time high in 1981. To be sure, French exports to the Republic rose by 43.5 percent to FF5.8 billion and gave Paris a trade surplus, for the first time in three years, of FF413 million.12 The rise in the volume of trade between the two countries in that year was largely due to the shipment of parts for the Koeberg nuclear power plant being built at the time by a consortium of French companies, including Spie Batignolles, Alsthom and Framatome. 13 France relies on South Africa for a number of key mineral products. In 1981, for instance, about 40 percent of France's manganese imports came from the Republic, as did 30 percent of its titanium, 31 percent of its coal and 20 percent of its uranium. 14 True, by boosting purchases of chrome from Zimbabwe, Paris has somewhat reduced its dependence on South Africa, but, even so, this is exceptional. The French economy is also dependent on other parts of Africa for mineral supplies: Morocco, Togo and Senegal provide 85 percent of its phosphates, while Guinea furnishes 42 percent of its bauxite. Mauritania and Liberia account for 30 percent of French imports of iron ore, with Zaire and Zambia supplying 30 percent of its copper. Gabon, Niger and South Africa sell France virtually all its uranium, while Morocco, Zambia and Zaire account for 40 percent of its cobalt requirement.15 Aside from all these minerals, Africa stands to produce more oil for France in the future. In 1981, around 16 percent of French oil imports

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

39

came from Africa. And, with Paris's growing efforts to diversify its sources of oil supplies, at least to diminish its dependence on the Middle East suppliers, the figure could well rise to about 30 percent in the early 1990s. As it is, French oil companies are actively engaged in several African states. Elf Aquitaine, the state-controlled oil company, for example, produced almost 85 percent of its oil from Africa in 1981, mainly from Tunisia, Gabon, Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroun. 16 Other Western powers are as equally dependent on Africa's natural resources. West Germany gets one-third of its chromium and uranium ore, and half of its unrefined copper from South Africa.17 With such high dependence on the Republic's strategic minerals, it is little wonder that Bonn-Pretoria economic and political relations have waxed strong over the years. Virtually all the West German regimes have given political and diplomatic support in major international organizations to the South African administration over the latter's apartheid policies, most especially at the United Nations. Furthermore, both countries have continued to benefit from buoyant trade flows. Indeed, by 1974, it was clear that West Germany had overtaken all the other Western powers to become South Africa's biggest trading partner, with a volume of trade which totalled over $620 million.18 Besides, more than 300 German firms have subsidiaries in South Africa. The West Germans have also assisted the Republic to sharpen its defense teeth. Let us take some random examples. West German firms have, since 1975, been actively involved in the production of battle tanks for the country. Equally, too, West German companies have provided a military radar surveillance installation at Silvermine. The radar, which has a range far across the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, was supplied at a cost of £16.2 million. In 1976, Bonn gave an export credit guarantee of DM515 million for steam-generating equipment for the Sasol II project. Then in August 1981, a FrancoGerman consortium, comprising Stein Industries and EVT, got a major contract of R700 million (£406 million) for commissioning a 3,600 megawatt coal-fired power station in South Africa.19 Furthermore, West Germany has readily joined hands with Britain, in using their weight and connections in the European Economic Community (EEC), to ensure closer economic ties between the Republic and the organization. In this regard, trade and investment flows are quite considerable. The EEC accounts for 43 percent of South Africa's total imports, 39 percent of exports and 64 percent of direct

40

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

foreign investment in the Republic.20 Specifically, the volume of foreign loans to the country increased dramatically from $295.7 million in 1979 to $794.5 million in 1981. Without gainsaying it, and by virtue of the heavy servicing rates, the lenders enrich themselves through the returns on their loans. In 1979-80, for example, the largest lenders were the German and Swiss banks; and, naturally, they took the lion's share in the returns. The Americans and the British are by no means left out in the various financial transactions. While Britain provided 57 percent of South Africa's foreign investment, the United States provides 14 percent. 21 As expected, Some of the loans have been vital to the maintenance of white minorityrule because they came primarily during the periods in which South Africa faced serious economic and political instability as, for example, after the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres, when there was a massive flight of foreign capital. Also the recipients of these loans were generally prominent institutions of the apartheid government.22 If the United States TNCs, like their West German counterparts, invest in South Africa, it is partly because they have been behaving true to form as strong pillars and agents of capitalism; and partly, too, because their parent countries rely on the Republic for some minerals. This is not to suggest, of course, that the Americans are not dependent on other African states for these minerals. Indeed, as a continent, Africa provides an impressive percentage of US imports of key minerals. Seventy-eight percent of the American ferrochrome comes from South Africa and Zimbabwe, which between them account for 98 percent of known non-Communist world reserves. Forty percent of the United States manganese supply comes from Gabon, which, with South Africa and the Soviet Union, controls most of the known reserves. In terms of platinum, the international market is dominated by South Africa and the Soviet Union; and largely for ideological reasons, the Americans prefer to get their supplies from the former. Forty-two percent of US cobalt comes from Zaire, which, along with Zambia, possesses nearly half of the world reserves. 29 Let us now consider, in more detail, the case of one of these strategic minerals: cobalt. In June 1981, the United States national strategic stockpile bought over 2,300 tonnes of Zairean cobalt. It was the stockpile's first purchase of any material over the past twenty years and 'reflects the critical nature of the metal for military uses.' 24 It is essential, among

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

41

other things, for the manufacture of alloys in the jet engines of advanced fighter aircraft, and for magnets. The aquisition of cobalt by the stockpile was seen by the Americans as a priority because of the insecurity of supplies and the considerable variation in prices over the previous five years. In the late 1970s, cobalt's producer price rose by 500 percent in under two years to $25 a pound. 25 This was primarily the result of unusually high demand and the lack of efficient recovery, but was also influenced by the guerilla attacks in Zaire's mining region of Shaba in 1977 and 1978, which restricted supply. Indeed, during the latter two crises, when Shaba was invaded by rebels of the Front National Pour la Liberation du Congo and the copper and cobalt mines were threatened in the process, the importance of Western investments in the region as well as its vital cobalt supplies encouraged the United States to give full support to Belgium and France in their intervention on behalf of the Zairean government. 26 Since the 1977 crisis, in particular, had affected the production of cobalt, it became a popular example for many Western analysts who consistently argue that there is a growing war between the West and the Soviet Union over Africa's natural resources. 27 The competitiveness of the Zairean cobalt derives from its lack of impurities; and this factor explains why it is of such tremendous importance to European and North American industries. Throughout the 1970s, Zaire unquestionably remained the world's major supplier of the metal, as it accounted on average for about 65 percent of total output. 28 However, the insecurity of supplies has encouraged Western industry to develop alternative sources, as a result of which its contribution to world production fell from about 65 percent in 1970 to around 14,500 tonnes, or 55 percent, in 1980.29 The insecurity of supplies from Zaire has also arisen because of the difficulties of transportation from land-locked Shaba, in the center of Africa, as well as political events. In 1976, the civil strife in Angola blocked the Benguela railway line from Shaba to Lobito on the Atlantic coast, cutting cobalt exports through this route from 13,300 tonnes (95 percent) in 1975 to 500 tonnes (4 percent) in the following year.30 These difficulties continued over the next four years with the Zimbabwe war of independence frequently blocking the rail link to the south. In fact, in 1978 and 1979, when prices were high, a substantial proportion of the cobalt was flown out, usually to Belgium. While this practice has not been entirely stopped because of recent lower prices of the mineral in world markets, much of the metal is now

42

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

freighted out through South Africa. This dependence on the Republic for the evacuation of some of Zaire's exports has increased, in recent years, the Mobutu Administration's sense of indebtedness and close rapport with Pretoria, in contrast to the militantly antagonistic posture often assumed by some of the other front-line states in the region. The import of cobalt and other strategic minerals from Zaire is usually cited by Washington as a major reason for backing and propping up the Mobutu Administration to the hilt. This posture has been maintained over the years by successive American regimes, despite reports of gross abuse and repression of human rights as well as the colossal corruption and misappropriation of funds by the ruling elite in Kinshasa.31 The United States and some of the Western powers, particularly France and Belgium, contend that Mobutu, for all his faults, best guarantees the maintenance of stability in the country. The alternative to the President, they maintain, would be utter chaos. Thus, in their view, the choice in Zaire has always been between Mobutu and chaos. After all, 'Mobutu, in their opinion, guarantees a certain kind of stability that ensures the continuing exploitation of Zaire's rich mineral resources (cobalt, copper, uranium, diamonds, etc.) which they need badly to maintain the high-level prosperity of their own people.' 32 In essence, therefore, 'stability' in this context merely refers to a convenient regime that can wink at the exploitation of its country's strategic minerals by the Western powers and their TNCs. The Western powers' interest in Zaire can also be analyzed from another standpoint. There is an element of competition between these capitalist nations for access to the Zairean minerals. In this context, Mobutu has succeeded in playing one power against the other in maximizing foreign aid opportunities. Specifically, France's aid to this African state, in recent years, has been systematically geared towards the object of supplanting the Belgians as the major collaborator in the exploitation of Zaire's minerals. 33 The exploitative exercise is greatly facilitated by the fact that the Mobutu regime has always been ideologically compatible with the interests of international capitalism. Insofar as Mobutu is prepared to cooperate with the big-business interests of the West, he is adjudged to be a good and stable ally by the Americans. This is understandable, given the extent of Zaire's production of some strategic minerals. (See Table 3.1 below.) Furthermore, one of the major overriding principles of the United States' foreign policy since the Second World War has been geared towards securing cheaply priced raw materials from the Third

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

43

Table 3.1 Selected data on Zaire's economy, 1975-80 1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

450.9 10.2 51.0

391.3 13.1 43.5

369.8 14.0 43.7

425.7 14.5 43.8

Index of Manufacturers (1970 = 100) 120.8 113.5 112.6

98.0

90.1

88.7

Gross National Product (1970 prices) 1,054.1 998.8 1,006.4 GNP Exports 467.2 437.9 436.6 Imports 527.5 436.3 616.1

958.7 442.5 317.5

927.1 349.4 389.1

950.1 427.7 604.7

Production (thousands of tonnes) Copper 463.4 407.7 Cobalt 13.6 10.7 Zinc 66.9 60.6

Source: New African, January 1983, p. 12.

World states while, at the same time, keeping these developing countries' markets quite open to the high-priced finished products of American industry. To achieve these dual objectives, Washington has made it a point of duty to oppose consistently all progressive national liberation and socialist movements and encourage corrupt, reactionary and oppressive regimes, like President Mobutu's, that can only remain in power through external economic and military support, which is provided by the capitalist West. In appreciation of this support, and as a measure of insurance for remaining in power, these regimes, including the Mobutu Administration, gladly open up their countries to satisfy the predatory needs and the ever gluttonous appetites of the United States big business establishment.34 In other words, then, a regime like Mobutu's helps to protect — through the strategic minerals available in Zaire — and he, in turn, is protected by, the American capitalist system. Clearly, in the circumstances, the international capitalist economy can be viewed as a single system, comprising a linked chain that stretches from the center states in North America and Europe to the peripheral countries located in such developing areas as Asia, Latin America and Africa. And as Frank tells us, this system of'satellization' has dominated economic relationships at the national and international level.35 As far as Zaire is concerned, a crucial factor in this process is the development of a thriving alliance between domestic

44

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

political elites, under the leadership of Mobutu, and the Western exploiters, which effectively precludes resistance to imperialism from the genuine nationalist elements. It goes without saying that the TNCs that cooperate with the local State mining companies in the extraction of the relevant strategic minerals serve as one of the chief agents of the 'satellization' process. At the end of the day, as Nguza maintains,36 while Mobutu continues to remain as one of the wealthiest African leaders, the masses in his country are increasingly marginalized, barely managing to subsist: a classic example of the unequal wealth distribution method of capitalism in action. Aside from Zaire's cobalt, the United States is equally dependent on other African states for strategic minerals. By far the most important of these areas is the 'white South.' Here, there is broad reciprocal economic and political cooperation between Pretoria and Washington. For its stability, strength and security, South Africa has always needed the advanced technologies of the West, which it gets by opening up its economy to massive Western penetration and by rewarding these countries handsomely, through huge profits. In this cooperative and mutually advantageous arrangement, the West maintains a constant vested interest in the Republic, while Pretoria, in return, has a corresponding stake in the strength, stability and support of these powers. Simply put, the United States, in close collaboration with the West European powers, operates as the metropolitan power in relation to richly mineralized South Africa. The Republic is reputed to be the greatest mineral producing area in the world after the Soviet Union and the USA.37 The magnitude of the American and the West European exploitative activities in South Africa can be visualized from the range and vastness of minerals available in the Republic. It is estimated that the country has 48 percent of the world's manganese resources, 49 percent of gold, 52 percent of cobalt, 64 percent of vanadium, 83 percent of chromium, and 86 percent of world's platinum reserves. 38 In addition, with the recent discovery of massive deposits of tungsten near Upington, in the Northwest of Cape Province, the proposed mine there could become the biggest of its kind in Africa when it eventually comes into operation. 39 Altogether, there are about 900 working mines and quarries in South Africa; and between them, they extract nearly every leading and many minor minerals.40 No wonder the Republic's economy has increasingly become more dependent on mining over the past five years. The value of the strategic mineral exports, in particular, has

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

45

steadily moved upward in recent years. By 1980, it had almost equalled that of gold. As the leading producer of gold South Africa is responsible for 80 percent of the capitalist world's gold output. The mineral's contribution to the Republic's total exports has risen particularly fast: from only 37 percent in 1970, to 41 percent in 1975 and 51 percent in 1980.41 It was significant that the latter year was the first time 'since Hitler's war, that gold alone has earned more for South Africa than all other visible exports.' 42 In other words, the West's exploitation in both precious and strategic metals has been at its zenith for quite some time. This is so because international capitalism has been able to take advantage of the existing apartheid policy in the Republic to further enhance the richness of its profits from the white South, and the earnings of the white labor. As Husain has put it: The high rate of return for the U.S. and the West, and the high standard of living of South African whites is the result of South Africa's apartheid and cheap black labour policy under which black workers are directed to their place of work, they have no bargaining strength, there is no provision for housing them and their families in urban areas, and wages make no provision for families because they are supposed to be in their homelands.43 To help entrench the apartheid policy, and so maintain, if not increase still further, the level of profits, the United States' and Britain's TNCs have supplied at least 1,000 computers to South Africa which, apart from their utility in coping with the demands of banking and other requirements of an advanced economy, are also quite useful in imposing limitations on the employment of non-whites and in checking and monitoring their movements. Computerization ensures that 'the authorities have "Book of Life" information about millions of people at their fingertips. Four million whites are thus able to coerce 22 million non-whites through a highly organised state security apparatus of the police, the prisons, and the armed forces.'44 With such repressive strategy, virtually all Western TNCs operating in South Africa benefit from the cheap labor policy. As for the Americans, their TNCs generate in the Republic three times the average rate of profit on their investments as in the rest of Africa. Even at the international level, the returns on the United States' investments in South Africa are still higher than anywhere else in the world. Thus, for example, while the American subsidiaries in the Republic earned an average rate of return of 18.6 percent between 1960 and 1970,

46

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

United States' direct investments worldwide had a considerably lower 11 percent average rate of return. Besides, it had become increasingly clear by 1975 that, with a per capita personal income of about $3,000 in that year, the average white South African had almost reached the top of the world income rankings. 45 The handsome rate of return also extends to Namibia, seen, essentially, by the key Western powers and their TNCs as an extension of South Africa. These TNCs stretch themselves to the limit to maximize the profit opportunities open to them. And to facilitate this process, all the minerals extracted in the territory are usually exported. Admittedly, uranium has been receiving star attention at the international level for quite some time. Yet, Namibia had already attained the status of the fourth largest African mineral producer, 46 even before uranium production began at Rossing in 1976. Namibia achieved this feat on the strength of the development of its deposit of alluvial gemstones and a variety of base minerals. The latter group includes such items as vanadium, lead, zinc, silver, copper, lithium and tin; in terms of the former, Namibia remains the world's richest source of diamonds. All in all, 'over one-third, perhaps as much as half, of Namibia's GNP is creamed-off each year by outside interests.' 47 That is how severe the level of exploitation of Namibia's natural resources has been. Granted, Pretoria's mandate for running the affairs of Namibia had been revoked in 1966 and, in 1971, the International Court of Justice had similarly ruled that both the West and South Africa possess no lawful mineral rights in Namibia and so cannot export the minerals, since they do not have the title to them in the first place. Nevertheless, the Western powers and their TNCs have refused to take 'no' for an answer and so have been vigorously pursuing their profit maximization interests at such leading mines as Rossing (uranium), Oamites and Otjihase (copper), to name just a few. This display of apparent lawlessness would seem to show that the TNCs are prepared to steal Namibia's resources with no sense of remorse. 48 Although Pretoria has a penchant for keeping strategic industries under its wing, the mining industry in Namibia and the Republic is left almost entirely in the hands of the private sector. In South Africa itself, the industry is dominated by a half dozen diversified mining houses — Anglo American Corporation, General Mining-Union Corporation (Gencor), Gold Fields of South Africa (CFSA), Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investments (Anglovaal), Johannesburg Consolidated Investment (JO) and Rand Mines. Some of the six mining companies

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

47

have links with one another. Anglo American has a controlling stake in JCI and also has an indirect interest in GFSA. General Mining took over Union Corporation in 1980 and also owns about a quarter of Anglovaal's shares. Aside from these big six mining houses, there are a number of smaller, more specialized, producers. The latter include Samacor (manganese and chrome), Lonrho (coal and platinum), Palabora Mining (copper) and Rand London (coal, iron ore and manganese). It may not be widely known that South Africa has been using the granting of prospecting rights for minerals as a convenient bargaining tool with many international oil companies, to circumvent the imposition of an oil embargo on the Republic by OPEC And so, in return for undertaking to keep crude oil flowing through South African ports, Shell, British Petroleum (BP) and Total (the local subsidiary of France's CFP) are allowed to export up to 13.5 million tonnes of coal a year between them. These three international oil companies are also partners in recently established mines and have continued to prospect for minerals, mainly in the eastern Transvaal and northern Orange Free State. In addition, other oil companies, notably Esso and Caltex (jointly owned by America's Standard Oil of California and Texaco), are among several companies prospecting for strategic minerals in the Karoo desert where a large number of lowgrade deposits of uranium have been found.49 In terms of the level of Western participation in the joint exercise of the exploitation of South Africa's strategic minerals, the foreign mining investors have generally not been deterred by southern Africa's political problems, 'reasoning that returns are high.'50 Britain's Rio Tinto-Zinc, for example, owns 39 percent of Palabora Mining and 74 percent of the Namibian Rossing uranium mine. Phelps Dodge (United States) has 49 percent of the Black Mountain silver, lead and zinc mine in the northwest Cape. Similarly, the American Newmont Mining has 43 percent of the nearby Gamesberg zinc and lead deposits; and it is also the biggest shareholder in the O'Kiep copper mine on the Republic's west coast and in Namibia's Tsumeb lead and copper mine. The New York-based Union Carbide owns a chrome mine in the northeastern Transvaal, is a partner (with General Mining) in the Tubatse ferrochrome plant and has completed extensions to a vanadium plant near Pretoria. Furthermore, United States Steel has a stake in the Prieska copper mine, Associated Manganese, and in a number of ferro-alloy plants. Equally, too, Texasgulf, an American natural resources outfit, owns rights to valuable chrome and platinum

48

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

deposits in the central Transvaal,51 and also has a gold deposit adjoining GFSA's East Driefontein Mine.52 Other Western companies with mining investments in South Africa include West Germany's Bayer (chrome) and Otavi Minen AG (chrome and vanadium), France's PUK (chrome), Canada's Quebec Iron and Titanium (mineral sands) and International Minerals and Chemicals Corporation of the United States (chrome). 53 One of Pretoria's major strategies has constantly been to consolidate and retain the dependence of the advanced capitalist states on the Republic's minerals. To this end, it has, inter alia, granted tax allowances to the mining houses to encourage local processing. True, this policy may, in part, be geared towards further industrialization of the country, nonetheless, its central objective seems to be to heighten the West's dependence on South Africa. As a result of the tax concessions, processed mineral exports now earn as much as all exports of raw materials excluding gold (compared with less than half as much in the early 1960s). Ferro-alloy production, for instance, rose from 429,000 tonnes in 1970 to 1.6 million tonnes in 1979. Although weakening demand had pushed it down the following year, all the same, at 1.4 million tonnes, the figure was still impressive. 54 Samancor has now emerged as the world's biggest producer, with an annual capacity of some 1 million tonnes of manganese, chrome and silicon alloys.55 The correct extent of the West's dependence on South Africa's minerals depends on whose figures one wants to believe. Estimates from the US Bureau of Mines and the South African Minerals Bureau differ. (See Table 3.2 below.) The Republic says it is the world's leading exporter of platinum group metals, gold, vanadium, chrome ore, and alusite and manganese ore. It ranks second in exports of vermiculite, antimony, diamonds, fluorspar and asbestos, and third in titanium, uranium and zirconium. 56 The West and the primacy of geopolitics Apart from the profit motive, some of the Western powers, particularly the United States, value the strategic location of South Africa and Namibia. In the case of the former, leading conservative circles in the West repeatedly stress the usefulness and importance of continuous access to the shipping route around the Cape of Good Hope. After all, the bulk of NATO's oil and strategic minerals pass through the route. This factor, like the profitability of the West's

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

49

Table 3.2 South Africa's production and reserves of selected Minerals Reserves as percentage of world total (1979)

Chrome Manganese Vanadium Platinum group Gold

Production aspercentage of world total (1979)

American estimate

South African estimate

American estimate

South African estimate

68 37 19 73 48

81 78 49 75 51

34 23 39 46 58

36 22 45 51 53

Source: The Economist (London), May 16, 1981.

dealings in strategic minerals, has further reinforced the determination, and provides an additional convenient reason, for backing Pretoria heavily. It also serves as a motive to ensure that genuine black African nationalists, not likely to support the status quo of unequal economic exchange or of automatic political alliance with the West, are kept from assuming the mantle of power in both Namibia and South Africa. Indeed, in rationalizing the Reagan Administration's steadfast and blissful flirtation with the Republic, Chester Crocker, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, regularly emphasizes that in the event of war breaking out elsewhere, the ability of the Western Powers to maintain the flow of their supplies through the Cape route remains paramount. In his view, it is clearly 'more than a mere convenience that South Africa's excellent port and air facilities not be in the hands of a potential adversary (or be made available to such an adversary) at such a time.' 57 Clearly then, with South Africa's strategic location, there are powerful elements in western countries who: wish to develop South Africa as a regional power in the southern hemisphere and around the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and to integrate it into the overall western defence strategy and to build, either formally or informally, a close alliance of NATO with South Africa.58 And bearing in mind that about 60 percent of South Africa's Atlantic coast belongs to Namibia, the foot-dragging of the Western powers and Pretoria over any peaceful settlement that would genuinely transfer effective power to SWAPO, can easily be understood.

50

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

In any case, the Reagan Administration stated bluntly in March 1981 that the importance of South Africa as an ally — a euphemism for the strategic location of the country — and the continued United States' access to the Republic's strategic minerals overrode its commitment to the independence of Namibia. Significantly, this statement came with the joint declaration by the Western Contact Group, 59 involved in the Namibian negotiations, that they would veto, in the Security Council, any resolutions passed by the General Assembly which called for the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions on South Africa for its refusal to implement the UN plan for a peaceful settlement in Namibia.60 The West's preoccupation with geopolitics in Southern Africa is not new. Britain's Conservative party has maintained such posture for years. Left to the powerful right-wing members of the party, they would evidently prefer Britain to close its eyes completely to the arguments of apartheid and concern itself more with the geopolitical advantage of having South Africa as a close ally. Similarly, in the case of the United States, Henry Kissinger, for one, spent all his years as Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, trying firmly to inject what he calls the 'geopolitical tradition' into the American foreign policy.61 Kissinger's concern for geographical factors in international politics has always been firmly entrenched in the conviction that the Soviet Union ought to be held in check globally: primarily, to ensure that adequate attention is paid 'to the requirements of equilibrium.' After all, as Kissinger contends, 'if history teaches anything, it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint.'62 Admittedly, the Carter Administration did not pay as much overt attention to the geopolitical perspective and, instead, emphasized the human rights issue.63 Nevertheless, as Crocker's earlier statement demonstrated, the Reagan Administration's posture shows a return to the Kissinger orthodoxy of geopolitics in world affairs. Capitalism and the supply and demand equation, I Even if one is prepared to agree with Kissinger that geopolitics can be an important factor in international relations, the historical and continuing Western connection with Africa's natural resources is an equally vital issue. Therefore, one cannot move too far away from considering the prime engine of the exercise — capitalism. That

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

51

means, for example, that these African states have to cope with problems occasioned by the current crisis of capitalism — which first erupted in full force in the early 1980s — of which the most manifest characteristic has been the depressing state of the price and demand for raw materials, including the strategic minerals. Take copper as an example. By June 1982, its prices on the London Metal Exchange had fallen to the lowest level, in real terms, since the Second World War.64 And the major reason for this development was the state of the depressed market in the Western industrialized countries, particularly in copper's main outlets: the electrical, construction and motor industries. 65 Low copper prices have had serious repercussions on the economies of Zambia and Zaire, which are, in varying degrees, heavily dependent on copper exports for foreign exchange and national revenues for whatever low-level economic development they might wish to execute. It was the magnitude of the debilitating effects of the low prices that made these two countries join with the other members of the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) in seeking ways to defend the mineral's world prices throughout 1982. In the event, there was little that CIPEC could do by way of significantly increasing the international copper price level. Member states realized that they were victims of the cyclical contradictions and crises of Western capitalism. With the low price level drastically reducing the revenues of the member states, the desperation for foreign exchange was rendered more acute. As a result, most Third World producers discovered that they simply had no alternative but to keep on selling copper, no matter what the price, if only to ensure economic survival. Several members of CIPEC opposed the organization's most easily adopted solution — an acrossthe-board production cutback.66 To help illustrate how the peculiarities of international capitalism have a major effect on the prices that African producers receive for their strategic minerals, the price outlook of copper was said to depend on United States' interest rates. It was generally argued that if they continue to fall and revive the economy, prices of copper 'may rebound dramatically.'67 In addition to the effect of low interest rates on copper's international price level, large-scale restrocking by the Western states, fuelled by fears over medium-term supplies could also help to raise prices significantly. However, with signs of full economic recovery in the West — particularly in Europe — still hesitant at the time of writing, most analysts tend to favor a cautious scenario.

52

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

Sysmin and Africa's strategic minerals Many of the Western powers naturally became nervous about the likely impact of falling prices on the strategic minerals. Some believe that such a phenomenon could have damaging repercussions on production, especially in forcing the African producers to cut back supplies, in not investing in new mining machinery, and, perhaps, as the last stage, in closing down some of the leading mines. To tackle the problem, the members of the EEC took steps to deal with the economic consequences of the Western recession on the production of key minerals. In the end, they came up with a support scheme. Known in the EEC parlance as 'Sysmin/ the scheme is intended to help countries with short-term difficulties to maintain their production of certain strategic minerals by granting loans to improve production and export facilities. The arrangement covers copper and cobalt, phosphates, manganese, bauxite and alumina, tin and iron ore. The new agreement, which was signed on October 31,1979, and came into force on January 1, 1981, is expected to run until February 28, 1985.68 Unlike the EEC's sister arrangement, the Stabilization of Export Earnings Scheme for agricultural products, Stabex, Sysmin does not compensate mineral-producing states for losses in export earnings. It is this characteristic that exposes the neo-colonial aspect of the arrangement. For, if the EEC had really wanted to grant effective economic assistance to the strategic mineral producers, the instability in export revenues should have been adequately tackled. For what it is worth, however, the scheme applies to products which accounted, over the preceding four years, for at least 15 percent of a country's export earnings to all destinations. In the case of the least developed, landlocked and island countries, the dependence threshold is reduced to 10 percent. Let us take a random example of two regions in Africa where several of the continent's supposed beneficiaries are located. In Central and West Africa, seven states are expected to benefit from the scheme. Zaire is covered for copper; Togo and Senegal for phosphates; Guinea for bauxite; Gabon for manganese; and Liberia and Mauritania for iron ore. The details are given in Table 3.3 below. It is clear from the table that virtually all the countries affected in the region have a history of thriving and healthy trade relations with the EEC. One could argue, therefore, that the named strategic minerals were singled out for the Sysmin scheme precisely to ensure that the existing trade relations are maintained. In any case, the scheme is bound to perpetuate the

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

53

Table 3.3 Central and West Africa's minerals that fall within the Sysmin Scheme

Mineral Copper Phosphates Bauxite Manganese Iron Ore

Country Zaire Togo Senegal Guinea Gabon Liberia Mauritania

Main mineral exports as percentage of total EEC share of exports exports 1972-9 in percentage average (average) 55 59 18 90 15 69 71

91 92 54 34 32 74 75

Source: EEC Statistics

traditional pattern of African production of raw materials and the Western powers' production of industrial goods, further reinforcing the neo-colonial aspect of the arrangement. To qualify for assistance, a country must comply with three basic conditions. First, it has to prove that due to circumstances beyond its control, it has experienced (or is expected to experience) a substantial fall in the capacity to produce or to export from 'an otherwise viable and economic line of production.' Second, that the fall in production or export capacity has occurred due to 'accidents, serious techncal mishaps or grave political events either internal or external.' And, third, that there has been a fall in production or export capacity of at least 10 percent. 69 Once these conditions have been met, an African state that is covered under the scheme can apply for assistance, which is available in the form of loans on special terms repayable over forty years at an interest rate of 1 percent (0.75 percent for the least developed). The aid then has to be used to finance specific projects or programs: schemes to improve transport facilities for exporting the minerals, purchasing spare parts for the mines, and so on. The EEC Commission normally fixes the level of assistance on the basis of a project presented by the affected African government. Altogether, the Sysmin scheme has ECU 280 million ($368 million) available, over a five-year period, to states in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) that are signatories to the Lome II Convention. No single ACP state can benefit from more than

54

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

50 percent of the funds available under an annual instalment. The two main beneficiaries of the scheme in Africa are likely to be Zambia and Zaire. Let us now take a brief look at these two countries in turn. First, Zambia. In the Spring of 1982, it became the first recipient of EEC assistance under the Sysmin arrangement by receiving a soft loan of ECU 55 million (about $60 million) to help finance a series of projects aimed at improving production in the copper and cobalt industries. The aim is to increase production of copper by 19,000 tonnes by 1985 and at the same time reduce costs by over $3 million. Equipment will be replaced at the Chambishi, Chingola, Chibuluma, Mufulira and Rokana sites. The total cost of the improvements is estimated at some $93 million. As indicated earlier, the EEC loan is repayable over forty years and carries an interest rate of 1 percent.70 In the case of Zaire, the neo-colonial aspect of Sysmin was even more clearly emphasized. The Mobutu Administration, which had imposed an export tax on copper and cobalt exports as a fiscal measure to generate funds before approaching the EEC for assistance, was told in no uncertain terms that it would have to cancel the tax — and so deprive itself of a valuable source of revenue and, indirectly, subsidize the exports of these minerals to the EEC — before Zaire's application could be entertained. At first, Kinshasa had wanted to brazen it out by refusing to obey the EEC's order. But, as is usually the case with very poor African states desperately in need of economic assistance, the Mobutu Administration had, in the end, its arm twisted into accepting the EEC directive. With Zaire now dancing to Brussels' tune, the mining corporation, Gecamines, secured an ECU 40 million ($38 million) loan under Sysmin, which it will use for the rehabilitation of the country's mines. 71 Zaire does not rely on copper for foreign exchange earnings to the same extent as Zambia; all the same, Gecamines still accounts for some two-thirds of export receipts. Impact of Africa's growing nationalism: the supply and demand equation, II We have already seen that CIPEC found, in spite of its militant economic nationalism at the height of copper's falling prices in 1982, that it was unable to devise a price support scheme that was acceptable to all its members, including Zaire and Zambia. Simply put, when the full impact of the crisis of international capitalism spills over to Africa, these states are often unable to free themselves from the smothering embrace of the Western industrialized countries. With their own

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

55

economies incorporated into the international capitalist network, the African states simply have to obey the rules of the game, including the laws of supply and demand, which are epitomized in the Western economic system. To be sure, a general price war is often declared in times of economic recession, especially once mining companies realize that there is going to be a long wait before an upturn in demand mops up their spare capacity. More often than not, as indeed happened in 1981-2, the upturn is usually farther off than the producers can accurately anticipate. In essence, militant political and economic nationalism on the part of African states may have to bow before the harsh economic forces of international capitalism. Copper is governed by the economic growth circle in the Western industrialized countries, in particular, the United States, France, West Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The demand for copper cannot increase appreciably unless the economic sector expands in these states. Similarly, the demand for the mineral will decline if the economic growth in the industrialized countries stabilizes or decreases. Consequently, while it is true that the variable of supply can be partially manipulated by CIPEC, nevertheless, the cartel's member states are unable to control the demand for copper, given its dependence, to a very large extent, upon the economic growth cycle in the industrialized societies.72 In any event, the advanced capitalist powers are themselves determined consistently to take actions which would make the realization of CIPEC's strategy of indirectly influencing the price level, through a price-fixing program, a difficult objective to achieve.73 Indeed, as C. Jay Parkinson, the former Chairman of Anaconda Copper Company, has pointed out to the copper producers: The more developed countries of the world whose industry is owned, controlled, and operated largely in the private sector and under a free enterprise economy cannot afford to sit idly by while some less-developed or developing countries control markets, price, and the use of raw materials to the detriment of the consuming public. The reaction of the consuming nations will be, and is, to develop ore bodies, including low-grade deposits, at an earlier date than would otherwise have been the case.74 By serving notice to CIPEC members that the advanced capitalist powers would not watch the organization's tactics complacently, these industrialized countries are saying what the African and other Third World producers of raw materials have always known, namely, that these powers would stop at nothing to frustrate the price support

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The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

strategies of the developing countries, especially those that have grouped themselves together in commodity-specific cartels. At any rate, the African producers of strategic minerals cannot, on their own, form commodity-specific cartels. In practice, as in the case of CIPEC, they have to team up with other producers in the Third World and, sometimes, this weakens their positions and interests even more, since they have to consider and respect the economic and political interests of the other non-African producers. 75 Aside from CIPEC, other OPEC-style cartels, which have African states as members, have not, on balance, been spectacularly successful.76 In the case of bauxite, for example, they have failed.77 Even the celebrated initial success of OPEC with oil has recently become problematic, 78 particularly in the wake of the massive international oil glut, with recurrent crises among the member states as to what ought to constitute best foolproof pricing strategy.79 The often quoted essential economic and political requirements that can enable African producers of strategic minerals to alter or regulate a particular commodity's international market are well beyond these states' reach and control.80 The availability of substitutes and national stockpiles can modify the supplies of strategic minerals without producer consent or control. In the circumstances then, the economic and political nationalism of African states cannot, by itself, free these countries from the huge burden of international capitalism which they are forced to bear.

External production and stockpiles of strategic minerals: implications for Africa One of the interesting points about the minerals classified as 'strategic' is that while several of them are only available in Africa, others are available there and in the industrialized countries. Copper is one of the latter. The CIPEC producers, including Zambia and Zaire, account for only 40 percent of world production; although, it must be emphasized, they are responsible for 80 percent of the world's export copper. 81 This is because the copper producers in the industrialized countries, which can be tagged non-CIPEC producers, consume their output domestically. To the degree that this is the position, the number of countries producing copper tends to limit the potential for any organized collusion by CIPEC. In cases where the desired strategic minerals are not produced on any significant scale by the industrialized countries, two steps have usually been followed. First, some of these countries, especially the

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system

57

United States, have called for the opening up of public lands for mineral development. In other words, the governments of some of these countries believe that if there are massive searches for minerals, they might discover the required strategic minerals in their own territories. They could then become self-sufficient and so able to be totally independent of African producers. So far, however, there has not been any reported success in that direction. Indeed, in the case of the United States, the Reagan Administration unwittingly initiated a national debate as to the best solution for obtaining the strategic minerals. It was even argued that: 'The Administration has the responsibility of proving that the need for strategic minerals cannot be met by reliable overseas suppliers before turning private enterprises loose in public lands . . ,'82 In short, the Administration's call for opening up public lands usefully spurs a debate that has been long overdue. But until such time as a comprehensive minerals program is put in place, 'Congress should take all necessary steps to ensure that the public interest — which means public land — is protected from premature and unwise exploitation.'83 The second step has been what we referred to earlier in the case of the United States and Zairean cobalt, the idea of stockpiling the needed strategic minerals. To be sure, the United States government has been stockpiling various minerals since the 1950s. Known as the national defense stockpile, the reserve contains some ninety-three commodities, eighty of which are of mineral origin. The minerals range from diamonds and jewel bearings to the strategic ones. They are stockpiled as ore, as processed metal or as an alloy with other metals. Altogether, it will cost $11 billion to stock these minerals fully.84 As far as the strategic minerals are concerned, there is no mechanism for dealing with supply disruptions that fall short of a wartime situation. And, for such an eventuality, the present goal of the national defense stockpile is to have 'enough stocks to wage a threeyear war.'85 Apart from the United States, the other Western countries pursuing a serious stockpile policy are France and West Germany. France began to create an emergency reserve of a number of minerals — including vanadium, manganese and cobalt — about eight years ago with an initial government capital injection of FF 250 million ($63 million). Within the next few years the French hope to increase the value of their emergency reserves to FF 3,000 million ($750 million).86 As for the West Germans, Bonn launched its stockpiling program in 1979 by

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The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

assisting industry to build up a one-year reserve of manganese, vanadium, chromium, cobalt and blue asbestos with the help of a DM600 million ($343 million) credit from the Bundesbank. 87 In Britain, there is a mounting public debate over the need to establish a strategic stockpile of minerals. Steven J. Warnecke, in a special report prepared for the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs, argued that the British government ought to start stockpiling and set up an emergency reserve of ten minerals in an upgraded form. These minerals should include vanadium, chromium and high carbon, refined and silico manganese, all of which, he says, are produced in vast quantities by South Africa, plus others such as nickel and molybdenum. The only strictly black African mineral on the list is cobalt, the bulk of which, as we saw earlier, comes from Zaire. Warnecke calculates that, on the basis of Britain's 1978 consumption of these metals and the prices ruling that year, the cost of setting up a stockpile geared to creating sufficient reserves for one year's industrial demand would be around £160 million. He suggests that Britain should proceed with strategic stockpiling as a matter of 'urgency,' given the vulnerability of British industry to supply disruptions. 88 A stockpiling strategy will not make the industrialized nations totally independent of the African producers of strategic minerals. Even so, depending on the quantities stockpiled, a sense of temporary independence can be achieved. The fact that this sense of independence is only for a short term, still makes these industrialized countries dependent on the African producers. To circumvent this problem of dependence the governments of the leading advanced states are being urged to support 'greater research in the minerals areas, including programs geared to synthetics, education of new minerals scientists, and better recycling of used minerals.' 89 Pending new major research breakthroughs, it seems that the Western powers will continue to be dependent on the strategic minerals of Africa for the maintenance of an advanced industrial economy and the manufacture of sophisticated weapons systems. Notes 1. 2. 3.

See the special issue of Review of African Political Economy, No. 12, MayAugust 1978, devoted, in the main, to mining in Africa. Ibid., p. 2. Cf. Ronald T. Libby and James H. Cobbe, 'Regime Change in Third World Extractive Industries/ International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 725-44.

Africa's strategic minerals and the North-South system 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

59

For an extended discussion of this theme, see James Cobbe, Governments and Mining Companies in Developing Countries (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1979). See Chapter 2. The editorial, 'Mining Companies and Mining Economies/ Review of African Political Economy, No. 12, May-August 1978. See, for example, Geoffrey Hodges, 'Zambia: Opening the Gates and Tightening the Belts/ in ibid., pp. 87-98. See, for instance, Mahfoud Bennoune, 'The Political Economy of Mauritania: Imperialism and Class Struggle/ and Kadallah Khafre, 'Towards a Political Economy of Liberia/ both in ibid. 'Mining Companies and Mining Economies/ See Bennoune, 'The Political Economy of Mauritania/ and Khafre, 'Towards a Political Economy of Liberia/ Cf. Michael Tanzer, The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles over Minerals and Fuels (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980). African Business, July 1982. South Africa's nuclear drive is fully discussed in Chapter 5. African Business, July 1982. Ibid. Ibid. New African, September 1982. See Azim Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel: A Strategic Triangle', Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 44-73, at p. 48. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. For a detailed analysis of American investments in South Africa, see Lawrence Litvak, Robert DeGrasse, and Kathleen McTigue, South Africa: Foreign Investment in Apartheid (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978). Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel.' These figures are taken from William Gutteridge's 'Strategic Minerals: Much US Ado About Nothing?/ in New African, October 1982, p. 55. Africa Now, March 1982, p. 110. Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the international ramifications of the 1977 Shaba crisis, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Conflict in Africa: A Case Study of the Shaba Crisis, 1977/ World Affairs, 141, No. 3, Winter 1979, pp. 219-34. See, for example, Africa Now, March 1982, p. 110. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. For an extended discussion on these points, see Ogunbadejo, 'Conflict in Africa'; Nguza Karl I Bond, Mobutu ou Vincarnation du mal Zairois (London: Rex Collings, 1982); and the Erwin Blumenthal Report in New African, January 1983, pp. 11-14. Ladipo Adamolekun, 'Zaire: Mobutu or Chaos?', West Africa (1982), pp. 1884-5.

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33.

Note that this competition between the industrialized countries is not limited to Zaire alone. It extends to other parts of Africa and, indeed, the Third World at large. See, for instance, Michael Tanzer, The Race for Resources. Cf. Dorothea Mezger, 'How the Mining Companies Undermine Liberation/ Review of African Political Economy, No. 12, May-August 1978, pp. 53-66, and Copper in the World Economy (London: Heinemann, 1980); Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971,2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1972); William A. Williams, ed., From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Relations (New York: John Wiley, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: World Publishing, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 2nd ed., (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). Nguza, Mobutu ou Vincarnation du mal Zairois. See, for example, Greg Lanning, 'Role of Transnational Mining Corporations in the plunder of South Africa's mineral resources/ UN Centre Against Apartheid - Sem 3/79, No. 79, p. 4. Ibid. The provisional estimate of the deposits has been fixed at 2 million tonnes. See African Business, February 1982, p. 94. Bauxite, soda ash, molybdenum and potash are among the few exceptions. The Economist (London), May 16, 1981. Ibid. All in all, gold, uranium, platinum, diamonds, coal, iron ore and copper are the seven major foreign-currency earners and account for almost 96 percent of the country's total mineral exports. For more details, see ibid. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel' Ibid. Ibid. The first three producers, in the order of output, were South Africa, Zaire and Zambia. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel.' Also, see the various essays in the special issue of Africa Today (1st and 2nd quarters, 1983) devoted to Namibia. We shall examine this issue in greater detail in Chapter 4. See 'King Solomon's other Mines/ in The Economist (London), May 16, 1981. Ibid. This is close to Western Platinum Mine also owned by Western interests: Lonrho, Falconbridge and Superior Oil. For more details on these American interests in South Africa's mining sector, see The Economist (London), May 16, 1981.

34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

Africa's strategic minerals and the north-south system 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75.

61

See ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Crocker et al, 'Southern Africa: A US Policy for the 1980s7, Freedom at Issue, November-December 1980, p. 16. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel/ p. 50. Cf. Ogunbadejo, 'Diego Garcia and Africa's Security.' That is, Canada, France, United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. See New African, April 1981, p. 61. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 914. Ibid., p. 195. For an incisive analysis of the role of human rights in the Carter Administration's African policy, see Adele Jinadu, Human Rights and USAfrican Policy under President Carter (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1980). See 'Copper prices at record lows,' in Africa Economic Digest, June 4, 1982, p. 27. Cf. ibid. Cf. ibid., December 17, 1982. Ibid., June 4, 1982. Note that the Sysmin scheme is part of the Lome Convention. For some background readings on the latter subject, see Cecil Rajana, 'The Lome Convention: An Evaluation of EEC Economic Assistance to the ACP States,' Journal of Modern African Studies, 20, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 179220; Adrian Hewitt and Christopher Stevens, 'The Second Lome Convention,' in Christopher Stevens, ed., EEC and the Third World: A Survey, Vol. 1 (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 30-59; and Michael Dolan, 'The Lome Convention and Europe's Relations with the Third World: A Critical Analysis,' Revue d'integration européène (Montreal), 1, No. 3, 1978, pp. 369-94. See 'New Minerals Support Scheme,' in West Africa (1981), pp. 6 9 1 2. See 'EEC Supports Zambia Copper Industry,' African Business, May 1982, pp. 8-9; and South (London), May 1983, pp. 74-5. See Africa Economic Digest, December 17, 1982, p. 29. Cf. Karen A. Mingst, 'Cooperation or Illusion: An Examination of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries,' International Organization, 30, No. 2, Spring 1976, pp. 263-87. Note that aside from price controls, OPEC has also dealt with nationalization and technical price arrangements. For the impact on the individual member states and the international copper market, see ibid. Parkinson, quoted in ibid. For a discussion of a clash of interests between Zaire and Zambia (over copper) and the other members of CIPEC see ibid., especially p. 282.

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76.

See 'The Commodity Chimera/ in The Economist (London), October 4, 1980. Ibid. Note that OPEC's initial success story stimulted CIPEC members. They believed, as Mingst has pointed out, 'that they, too, could be effective, particularly since individual CIPEC members now controlled metal marketing operations/ Mingst, 'Cooperation or Illusion/ p. 286. Prior to OPECs recent problems in fixing the price of oil, most analysts felt that the case of the commodity was unique and was safely beyond the reach of the advanced capitalist powers. See Karl W. Deutsch, 'On Inequality and Limited Growth: Some World Political Effects/ International Studies Quarterly, 19, No. 4, December 1975, pp. 381-98; Stephen D. Krasner, 'Oil is the Exception/ and Zuhayr Mikdashi, 'Collusion Could Work/ both in Foreign Policy, No. 14, Spring 1974. See Deutsch, ibid.; Mingst, 'Cooperation or Illusion7; and Trade in Primary Commodities: Conflict or Cooperation? A Tripartite Report (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974). Also, see the recent analysis by Gamani Corea, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, entitled 'Why an OPEC-Style Commodity Cartel Never Came to Pass/ in Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1984, pp. 11-12. See Mingst, 'Cooperation or Illusion/ p. 266. See the editorial entitled 'Save Minerals — And Land/ in Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1982, p. 34. Ibid. Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. Ibid. Ibid. African Business, July 1980, p. 25. Ibid. Warnecke, Stockpiling of Critical Raw Materials (London: RIIA, 1980). Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1982, p. 34.

77. 78.

79

80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

4 The international politics of Africa's uranium In the last three chapters, we gave a general analysis of different aspects of Africa's strategic minerals. In this chapter, our focus is on uranium. Specifically, we will examine the politics of the commodity.

The West and southern Africa's uranium i Namibia Of all the African strategic minerals, the most exploited by the advanced capitalist countries and their TNCs is uranium. This is true for Namibia and South Africa as it is for the black African states. Let us turn first to Southern Africa and examine the situation in Namibia. Here, Britain and its TNC, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation (RTZ), play a dominant role over the Rossing mine. True, RTZ's assets in Namibia, at £179 million, represent only a mere 5 percent of its worldwide investments; and its turnover of £158 million, again, constitutes 5 percent of the corporation's international turnover. But, even so, the profit from the mine averages about 20 percent of RTZ's total global profits.1 In 1979, for example, Rossing uranium earned $5.2 million in pre-tax profits for the TNC. By 1981, when the mine produced 5,160 tonnes of uranium oxide, RTZ realized a profit of £20.2 million from its stake in the mining enterprise. 2 And, as we saw in the last chapter, the profit for the first six months of 1982 stood at £13.5 million, thus portraying the upward trend in the lucrative returns constantly accruing to RTZ from Rossing. Since the RTZ headquarters is London-based, it is not surprising that Britain has close interests in, and relations with, the corporation's activities in Namibia. Indeed, the British government has, for years, been importing uranium from the territory through contracts with the RTZ. To be sure, it was the supposedly liberal Labour Party administration under Harold Wilson that negotiated and subsequently signed the first contract in 1968 with the British mining company for

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the delivery of 7,500 tonnes of uranium to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). At that time, when the news was leaked to the press, the Wilson government found itself in an embarrassing situation, in trying to justify the need for the contract to the black African states. It claimed that it had been misled by the TNC and the British civil servants into believing that the supplies would come from Rio Algom, an RTZ subsidiary which produces uranium in Canada. For its part, the TNC insisted that the British government knew all along that Rossing would definitely be the source of supply.3 RTZ's version gained full credibility later on when, in spite of repeated promises to stop uranium supplies from Rossing, the 1974-9 Labour administration still maintained the flow. Furthermore, the UKAEA came out into the open to endorse the TNC's account. In any case, to develop Rossing, RTZ had to convince potential investors of the future demand for uranium from the mine. And since this meant a substantial long-term contract, the British government promised to produce precisely that.4 In rationalizing the retention of the Namibian uranium deal, the Labour administration later argued that it had the long-term interests of SWAPO at heart. According to David Ennals, then Minister of State at the Foreign Office: 'If Namibia achieves independence in the near future then the economic value of the UKAEA-RTZ contract will be of enormous importance to the new nation... it is our view that on balance the UKAEA-RTZ contract is in the interest of both Namibia and Britain/ 5 As could be expected, the rightist Conservative administration that succeeded the Labour government maintained the momentum of Britain's uranium supplies from Rossing. Indeed, the incoming Thatcher regime would have been hard put to do otherwise once it had taken the step of appointing Lord Carrington, RTZ's director of many years standing, as its Foreign Secretary. True, Lord Carrington had subsequently resigned his membership of the TNC's Board of Directors; nevertheless, continuing British patronage was assured. In any event, with Lord Charteris being brought in as a replacement for Lord Carrington, RTZ's Chairman, Mark Turner, gladly confirmed that the newly appointed director 'can also be of great value to us,' especially, 'in his capacity as Private Secretary to the Queen.' 6 RTZ's contract to maintain the uranium supplies to the UKAEA has been running ever since and it will continue to the end of 1984. It seems highly probable it will be renewed again. After all, the current

The international politics of Africa's uranium

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Namibian situation still enables RTZ and Britain to exploit the mining of the territory's uranium to the ultimate. Thanks to the apartheid system there is cheap labor. South Africa maintains an occupation force in the territory which, among other things, keeps a wary eye on the Rossing labor force, to ensure that they remain docile and subservient workers. There is also a set of favorable tax concessions. And there are no occupational health and environmental regulations to govern the mining activities of the TNCs.7 The regular extension of the RTZ-UKAEA contracts renders any pressure that Britain might wish to exert on South Africa, to end its occupation of Namibia, quite meaningless. For, as Sonny Ramphul, Mauritius Ambassador to the UN, has pointed out, the uranium supplies give Britain a vested interest in South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia.8 For its part, the British government insists that there is no international obligation for it to interfere in any way with the contracts. Naturally, most of the black African states do not share this view. As Amon Nsekela, Tanzania's High Commissioner to Britain, sees it: 'The whole saga is morally outrageous. There are many in Africa and elsewhere who would say that the men who made the Rossing contracts have blood on their hands.' 10 Britain, as a consumer of Rossing's uranium, is by no means alone. Part of the mine's annual production of 5,000 tonnes of uranium oxide are regularly clandestinely air-freighted to other Western consumers. In the case of France, while it is true that Paris has refused to disclose any information about the Rossing contracts, it is common knowledge that Minatome has been having contracts for Namibian uranium, on a regular basis, for several years. West Germany, too, imports uranium from Namibia, notably under its stockpiling program. Currently, the West Germans have an equivalent of 12,000 tonnes of uranium stockpiled for future use. 11 The Western powers have consistently embraced the Rossing project with warm enthusiasm, to gain an access to, and considerable control over, a major source of uranium for use in the future. Other factors include, as we have just indicated, the point that Rossing uranium is cheaper to produce because of the discriminatory wages system, freedom from environmental and health regulations and the very generous tax concessions. Finally, the Rossing project may be viewed 'as part of an overall strategy of expanding South African control of Southern Africa by encouraging North American and European immigration into Namibia, and committing powerful transnational and international capital to Southern Africa.'12

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Table 4.1 Uranium Projects on Stream in Southern Africa Country

Companies

Namibia

Rossing Uranium Ltd. Rossing Ltd. "United Kingdom 46.5 RTZ France Minatone Belgium 10 Rio Algom (RTZ Canada) 10 West Germany Japan 6.8 General Mining 13.2 -Switzerland IDC

Shares Mines %

Customers

Langer Heinrich Uranium Langer (Pty) Ltd.: Heinrich General Mining 100 Trekkopje Exploration & Mining Co. (Pty) Ltd.: Trekkopje Gold Fields 100 South Africa

Source:

Anglo American

Transvaal

EEC

Gold Fields General Mining

Gold Fields

Japan

African Business, April 1980, p. 13.

To some extent, the pattern of the West's consumption of Rossing's uranium is reflected in the ownership of the mine Thus, the mine's equity holders are: RTZ, for Britain with 46.5 percent ownership; the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC), 13.2 percent; Total Compagnie Minière et Nucléire of France (Total), 10 percent; General Mining and Finance Corporation of South Africa (GMFC), 6.8 percent; and Rio Algom of Canada, 10 percent. (See Table 4.1 above.) Other western shareholders collectively hold the balance of 13.5 percent. Total, which is wholly owned by CFP — a French conglomerate of which the French government controls 40 percent of the voting rights — owns its shares of Rossing through its subsidiary, Minatome, South Africa. South Africa's investment plays an important policy role at Rossing; and the Republic includes the mines in the planning of its uranium industry. As IDC and GMFC own some of the voting shares at the mine, they excercise influence over policy and overall company decisions. IDC, for one, has stated that it views Rossing as an

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integral part of South Africa's plans to expand its uranium production and become involved in the commercial enrichment of uranium in the 1980s.13 Apart from the mine, there are several other large uranium ore bodies, all in the vicinity of Rossing, which are still awaiting full development. These include General Mining's Langer Heinrich deposit, the Trekkopje deposit of Gold Fields of South Africa and two deposits at Tubas and Assinanis, in which the French oil company, Elf Aquitaine, has a joint interest with South Africa's Anglo American.14 Considerable pre-production work has already taken place at Langer Heinrich and Trekkopje and the deposits are scheduled to be brought on stream in the near future. Admittedly, the deposits have smaller reserves; but, they are reputed to have a higher grade than Rossing, and could add another 2,000 tonnes a year to Namibia's total output. 15 Since the various new deposits are all in the process of being developed by Western and South African mining TNCs and their interests, it is clear that when eventually uranium is fully available to be sold in commercial quality and quantity at international markets, it will, once again, help the advanced capitalist states and South Africa to maximize their profits and further tighten their exploitative grip on this vital resource. With such prospects, coupled with the existing situation in Namibia's uranium sector, it was hardly surprising that Eric Lang, a prominent Namibian farmer and businessman, attacked South Africa and the major mining TNCs as 'destructive manipulators of the Namibian economy.' He accuses them of either knowingly or unknowingly conspiring to deprive the Namibians of a healthy economy and political stability. In his view, the Namibian economy is a 'slave economy, an economic buffer, a pantry of the South African economy'; and the situation at the Rossing mine, including its 'massive preferential tax treatment,' helps to ensure this process. 16 Lang's position is firmly demonstrated by South Africa's activities in Namibia, at least to the degree that the Republic has passed several Acts that have given it a free hand over the import and export of all Namibian uranium. The Republic earns as much as $500 million per year from the exportation of the mineral. 17 Such additional income provides South Africa with a large portion of its valuable foreign exchange, and also provides money to fund all the different strategies that would help Pretoria to maintain a cast-iron control on the apartheid policy. Besides, by controlling Namibia's uranium, South Africa not only has greater economic leverage to control the price and

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supply of uranium, it also has, in the process, an additional political leverage to influence the foreign policies of the advanced capitalist powers that are involved in the exploitation of Namibian uranium. ii. South Africa For a long time, uranium in South Africa was extracted mostly as a byproduct of the country's widespread gold mines, with the bulk of production accounted for by Anglo American, Gold Fields and General Mining. (See Table 4.1.) However, the first ore body to concentrate production on uranium — the Beisa mine in the central Orange Free State — was commissioned in 1981. Uranium output (excluding RTZ's Rossing mine in Namibia) totalled just over 7,000 tonnes in 1980 (5,539 tonnes in 1979).18 Altogether, South Africa is expected to be the second largest producer among the capitalist countries by the mid-1980s. In terms of sales, the Republic sells uranium on long-term contracts at premium prices; and the major customers are the Western powers, in particular, Britain and other EEC countries. It was these long-term contracts that enabled South Africa to withstand some of the economic difficulties which came with the downturn in demand for uranium at the international level during the early 1980s. As far as Pretoria is concerned, it considers uranium as a strategic raw material on the same footing with, if not better than, oil. With such a stance, the Republic has constantly been developing uranium extraction and enrichment with a sharp eye on the possibility of using it as a counter weapon against any threat of oil sanctions. And since there has not been any effective use of an oil weapon against it so far, South Africa continues to use its uranium as one of the major tools for buying off some of the international pressure against it. To strengthen the South African tactics in this regard, the Western powers and their TNCs have given the Republic the maximum assistance in exploiting and developing its uranium resources as well as the technology for the commodity's enrichment. Insofar as Pretoria has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there is no external limitation on the quantity of uranium it can enrich or to those it may wish to supply. This situation gives South Africa a strong bargaining power 'and makes the Western powers dependent on the apartheid regime for a highly strategic commodity.' 19 The Western powers' interests in South Africa's uranium is not a new phenomenon. The United States began purchasing the mineral as far back as 1953. Between that year and 1971, the Americans imported

The international politics of Africa's uranium

69

43,260 tonnes of uranium oxide and, thereafter, 20 percent of their requirements continued to come from South Africa.20 Britain is another good customer; indeed, the UKAEA was so heavily dependent on South Africa's uranium in the 1950s that it could not have survived without it.21 And, even now, the British government continues to import as much as 50 percent of its annual requirement of 5,000 tonnes from South Africa.22 France is another major market for the commodity. In return for uranium at less than market prices, the French financed a uranium extraction plant in South Africa with a loan of $103 million from nationalized banks. 23 Arrangements like this enable the advanced capitalist powers to keep the exploitation of the uranium resources in southern Africa, with the close collaboration of Pretoria, fully alive. Apart from all the Western powers so far named, South Africa exports uranium to Belgium, West Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. 24 Most of these capitalist powers also import the commodity from Namibia. Japan, for example, had originally intended to purchase uranium from both South Africa and Namibia to the tune of 83,000 tonnes; that is, 43 percent of its project supplies for the period 1975 to 1985. However, largely as a result of the heavy criticism received at home and abroad, the Japanese government was forced to suspend the deal. Even then, Canada's federal crown corporation, Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., 'is presently refining Namibian uranium for export to Japan, and has been doing so for five years now.725 In its external trade in the commodity, South Africa also uses Namibia's uranium to supplement its own direct exports to the Western powers. Here, we have to remind ourselves of the point made earlier on, namely, the stake of these powers in Rossing and how much they rely on uranium supplies from the mine. Yet, given the special and peculiar position of Namibia in world politics, such dealings as well as the mining operations in the country are illegal and contrary to international law. Let us now find out why this is so.

Namibia and the international political system It is common knowledge that the Namibian question has been before the United Nations since its inception; indeed the matter pre-dates the UN itself. Namibia first came into the limelight in international politics, under its former name of South West Africa. It was under this name that it gained its legal status under the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1918. It was this treaty, it will be recalled, which, after the defeat of

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Germany in World War I, placed the country's overseas possessions under mandate. Accordingly, by a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on December 17,1920, the mandate for South West Africa was conferred upon the then Union of South Africa. Ordinarily, as world trustee, Pretoria should have protected Namibia and its people for independence. But, right from the outset of its mandate, the Union had, on several occasions, claimed sovereignty over the territory. True, these attempts were resisted by the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations: nonetheless, South Africa never gave up that interest. It was not surprising that South Africa took such a posture. After all, the irony of asking a racist regime to be responsible for a black population has not gone unnoticed by the world community. For, as Singham has pointed out, 'it was like asking Adolf Hitler to preserve and protect the Jewish populations of the world/ 26 With the demise of the League of Nations and its subsequent replacement by the UN in 1946, the new international organization's Charter, by virtue of Article 77, introduced international trusteeship which applied to the territories then held under mandate. It was this provision that has made Namibia a subject of dispute between South Africa and the UN; since the Republic has refused to enter into a trusteeship agreement with the international organization and has continued to administer the territory according to its own interpretation of the original League mandate. Such ill-conceived interpretation has led to a posture of militant defiance towards any UN efforts to bring the territory under the international trusteeship system. Some sections of the international community, particularly the black African states, have wanted to see the termination of the South African presence in South West Africa. And with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) being asked on many occasions to rule on several aspects of the territory's legal status, and the UN General Assembly repeatedly challenging the legality of Pretoria's presence in the country, it soon became clear that no other international legal issue in contemporary international relations has received as much publicity as the question of South Africa's mandate over Namibia. It is no exaggeration to say that of all the cases considered by the ICJ, no other one has occupied more of its time or more space in its records as the Namibian dispute. 27 In spite of all the international interest and the strong feelings of black African states over the matter, South Africa has remained

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undeterred in its dogged determination to retain the territory. To this end, Pretoria systematically resisted all efforts by both the League of Nations and the UN to assume any responsibilities for the people of that territory and has successfully transformed the country into an appendage of its own territory. Yet, for what it has been worth, the black nationalist movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), ever since its inception in 1960 by Sam Nujoma, has never relented its efforts to wrest independence for the territory.28 By October 1966, Nujoma recognized that Pretoria was intent on frustrating any peaceful constitutional change in Namibia that would result in a black-majority rule. Accordingly, the SWAPO leader left the country and announced that, given the prevailing circumstances, his only honorable option was to seek the liberation of the territory by force. As the liberation movement's campaigns intensified, the tone of its language became increasingly strident and Marxist-orientated. It is clear that 'SWAPO enjoys considerable, if not majority, support among the "non-white" population as the major historic nationalist movement.' 29 In October 1966, too, the UN General Assembly had realized that it must take positive steps to deal with the intractable problem. Consequently, it voted to terminate South Africa's mandate and to vest responsibility for administering the territory in the United Nations. The adopted resolution declared that any further occupation by South Africa constituted 'a grave threat to international peace and security.' Then, on May 19, 1967, the organization created a UN Council for South West Africa as the sole legal administering authority for Namibia until independence, and asked the Council to direct the nationhood program in consultation with SWAPO. In June of the following year, the name of the territory was changed by the UN to Namibia. And in 1974, the General Assembly took a step further and established the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Namibia, with Sean McBride, an Irish diplomat, as its first incumbent. Two years later, the General Assembly granted SWAPO a full Observer Status at the UN; and, by virtue of Resolution 31/146 of 1976, upheld the liberation movement's claim to be 'the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.' 30 The hard slog of wanting the world body to take effective control of Namibia was not limited to the General Assembly alone. The Security Council also played an important role in the exercise. In a calculated attempt to strengthen its legal authority over the territory, the latter UN body, in March 1969, called on South Africa to withdraw from

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Namibia. Then, on July 29, 1970, it took the matter to the ICJ for an opinion on the legal consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. In giving its advisory opinion, the Court, on June 21,1971, reached two conclusions. First, that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal, and the Republic was under obligation to withdraw its administration from the territory at once. And, second, that the member states of the UN were, similarly, under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in the said disputed territory and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of, or concerning, Namibia. The member states were, therefore, asked to refrain from any act and, in particular, from any dealing with Pretoria which might imply the recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration. 31 Furthermore, the world court condemned all the foreign economic, financial and other interests that have collaborated with South Africa in its exploitation of the human and natural resources of Namibia. Specifically, it made special mention of certain Western states and of the exploitation and trade of Namibia's uranium. 32 In October 1971, on the basis of its earlier advisory opinion, the ICJ emphatically declared South Africa's continued occupation of the territory as illegal. Characteristically, the Republic bluntly refused to implement the Court's ruling, and, in spite of the changed status of Namibia under international law, continued to administer the territory as before. Incensed by the recalcitrant behavior of Pretoria, the General Assembly, on November 28, 1973, adopted a resolution which not only asked for the termination of the contacts between the UN and the South African government, but also reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia against 'illegal occupation by South Africa.' Then, on December 13,1974, the Security Council adopted a resolution which gave the Republic six months within which to recognize the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation and take necessary steps to transfer the powers in the territory to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the UN. It took Pretoria five and a half months to react to the resolution. When it did so, the South African government dashed all hopes of an early independence. It argued, rather disingenuously, that South Africa was not occupying Namibia: 'we are there because the people of the territory want us to be there.' On the issue of Namibia's future, the Vorster Administration stated that this would be decided by the leaders of the various ethnic groups at a constitutional conference.33 The promised constitutional conference finally took place in

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September 1975 and the summer of the following year, under the Republic's ever watchful eyes and skillful machinations. Eventually, the final draft of Pretoria's blueprint for the Constitution of Namibia was 'approved' by the plenary session of the Turnhalle constitutional conference on March 18, 1977. Borrowing a leaf from South Africa's own apartheid policy, the structure of the government, under the new constitution, applied the so-called 'homelands' policy by being based on the governments of eleven ethnic groups. With an eye on SWAPO, which was excluded from all the constitutional talks, political parties or groups with a 'Marxist-Leninist ideology' were prohibited as 'being enemies of the State.'34 The fact that SWAPO had been left out of the constitutional talks meant, of course, that the liberation movement could not be expected to endorse the new South African apartheid-inspired constitution for Namibia, nor could the black African states endorse such a policy. Indeed, the practical difficulties and the obvious injustice of imposing a racist system of government in a predominantly black society worried even the Great Powers. The support which these countries had been giving Pretoria over its own policy of apartheid in the Republic had already generated various diplomatic problems between these advanced capitalist states and many of the more progressive and militant African countries. To that extent, some of the former states were not prepared to compound these problems on any major scale by openly endorsing a similar obnoxious policy in Namibia. In the circumstance, the Western powers took a fresh initiative on the matter. On April 7, 1977, the ambassadors of the then five Western members of the Security Council — the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada, otherwise known as the Contact Group — swung into action. They met Vorster in Cape Town and told him that the Turnhalle constitution proposals were unacceptable and should be abandoned. They then offered to negotiate an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem. By early February 1978, the Five had tabled a set of proposals which, inter alia, provided for free and fair elections, to be held under UN supervision and control; a Constituent Assembly which would draw up an independence Constitution; the appointment of a UN Special Representative, together with a UN Transition Assistance Group, to ensure the establishment of conditions that would allow elections as required by Resolution 385 (1976). The proposals also called for the repeal of all discriminatory or restrictive laws; the release of all

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Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities; the return of all Namibians from outside the territory; the cessation of all hostile acts, with restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to bases under UN monitoring; the phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops and the demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces; and the maintenance of law and order. 35 After some modifications, the Security Council accepted these proposals on July 27, 1978, as the UN settlement plan, and asked the then UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, to report on the implementation. Although the Security Council had subsequently, through Resolution 435, approved the Secretary-General's detailed implementation recommendations on September 29, 1978, South Africa gave various excuses for not finding the plan acceptable. Accordingly, on May 7, 1979, it rejected Dr Waldheim's report. 36 A year of intensive talks between Pretoria and the Contact Group then followed. At the end of it all, the South Africans were able to give a qualified acceptance to the UN plan. However, this gesture was more or less cancelled out when they later raised the issue of UN 'bias' as a major issue which would impede a Namibian settlement. 37 Apart from South Africa's protracted intransigence on the Namibian question, it seemed that some of the western powers involved were reluctant, too, to have a genuine settlement. A high level of duplicity has always been a part of the western posture over Namibia. That is why Pretoria — in spite of repeated 'pleas' by these powers and the various resolutions on Namibia by the General Assembly and the Security Council, coupled with the fact that Vorster had ostensibly agreed to set the new constitutional provisions aside — has never really abandoned the underlying principle of Turnhalle Constitution plans. In the circumstances, a majority at the UN saw the Contact Group's initiative for what it has always been, namely, 'an attempt to bail out South Africa and help it set up a neo-colonialist regime so as to preserve the West's own considerable interests in the territory.'38 To complicate the Namibian issue further, and for largely strategic reasons, South Africa has let it be known that it is intent, with the connivance of the Western powers, on permanently depriving the territory of its only deep water port, Walvis Bay, by effectively retaining control over it. The Reagan Administration, for example, sees this posture as a sensible one and supports it fully. After all, Walvis Bay dominates the western approaches of the Cape sea routes and NATO circles regard it as the most strategic port between Lobito

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and Cape Town. It is clear to many observers that Walvis Bay is, as SWAPO has repeatedly pointed out, an integral part of Namibia. True, it was originally annexed by Britain in 1878; but, in 1922, its administration was included in South West Africa under the League of Nations mandate system.39 As the only deep-water port on Namibia's 1,000-mile coast, handling 90 percent of its overall export trade, it is of great strategic and economic importance to the territory. In other words, South Africa's retention of Walvis Bay 'would provide a stranglehold over an independent Namibia.'40 That is precisely why, in any case, 'economic logic seemed to dictate that the port be part of an independent Namibia.'41 Aside from the strategic arguments about Walvis Bay,42 Western interests in Namibia are to a large extent determined by a desire to secure access to Namibia's uranium wealth at Rossing. True, some of the Western powers may be willing to exert some gentle pressure on South Africa to devise an internationally acceptable independence deal for the territory. That would help keep these powers in SWAPO's good books and so guarantee continued access to Rossing if independence has to come in the end. It is this point that has prompted a country like West Germany, for example, 'to persuade the other Western powers to look for a solution which would sufficiently appease SWAPO for SWAPO to allow them to have their share in exploiting Namibia's mineral (of which uranium is believed to be only a tip of an iceberg).' 43 In the case of the United States, it is no exaggeration to say that Washington sees Namibia as an extension of South Africa and would only approve of a peaceful settlement that allowed the Republic to continue to have a free hand in the affairs of the territory, even after its independence. In spite of hostile international public opinion, Pretoria has steadily been promoting its own policies in Namibia. It had, in 1978, gone ahead with the so-called 'internal settlement' plan which implemented some of the Turnhalle constitutional provisions. Elections took place at the end of that year, and by May 1979, an interim government had been established in Windhoek with the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Then, on July 1, 1980, some constitutional changes were promulgated which created a pyramidal structure of institutions, with Pretoria retaining control of constitutional questions, foreign affairs, defense and internal security.44 Dirk Mudge, who has since been forced to resign from the post by South Africa, became the Prime Minister of the newly appointed twelve-man Council of Ministers.45 To highlight the duplicity of South Africa on the Namibian

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question, at the same time that the Republic was busy floating these new measures, it still continued normal talks with the Contact Group to find an internationally acceptable solution to the territory's problem. After three and a half years of negotiations, South Africa introduced a major complication to the talks. As we have earlier hinted, Pretoria, in August 1980, questioned the non-partisan character of the UN Secretary-General and his staff because the General Assembly had recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia. South Africa, therefore, demanded that all General Assembly resolutions that had accorded such recognition to SWAPO should be declared as inoperative; and that financial assistance being given to the liberation movement should cease at once. In addition, the Republic wanted the UN to treat all the parties to the Namibian dispute — including the DTA, which was not recognized by SWAPO or even the Contact Group — on an equal basis. The accusation of a UN bias was yet another fashionable ploy, if not 'a convenient excuse for delay/ 46 And so, South Africa, with the tacit support of the Contact Group, began to use the allegation as a fresh basis for 'extracting one concession after another without committing itself to an agreement.' This new strategy thus confirms what most African and other members of the UN have been sayig all along: that South Africa was employing delaying tactics and never had any intention of proceeding with an internationally acceptable settlement; and that negotiations must be supported with economic sanctions.47 Yet, in spite of the constant pressures by the African bloc at the UN, the idea of the imposition of economic sanctions on the Republic, to force its hands on the Namibian and apartheid issues, has always been resisted by the Western powers. For example, in April 1981, the Reagan Administration vetoed a resolution in the Security Council which would have invoked economic sanctions against South Africa. And worse still, the Administration confused the Namibian issue further by assisting Pretoria to advance the celebrated 'linkage' argument about southern Africa — that is, to make a Namibian settlement contingent on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. In effect, Washington is anxious to use a Namibian settlement to 'get the Soviets out of Angola.' As the Reagan Administration sees the southern Africa situation, 'there is an empirical relationship between the ultimate independence of Namibia and the continuing Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola.'48

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Like all the ploys before it, the 'linkage7 argument was aimed at further delaying the Namibian settlement. This has since become quite obvious to the international community. Indeed, the 'linkage' argument normally 'comes to prominence every time negotiations seem to be on the brink of decisively moving forward.'49 South Africa retains the Cuban ploy as the ace up its sleeve whenever it wants to stall any major Namibian peace breakthrough, since Pretoria knows full well that neither Angola nor several of the black African frontline states would ever accept the 'linkage' thesis. For now, both South Africa and the advanced capitalist powers maintain their broad collaboration by using Namibia to play a 'hide and seek' game with the moderate and progressive black African states as well as some sections of the international public opinion. While it is true that some of the more moderate Western powers would like to see a peaceful Namibian settlement, there is a limit to how far the Republic can be pushed. After all, Pretoria sees a link between the apartheid issue in South Africa itself and the Namibian problem. In this context, a settlement which guarantees a prospective victory for SWAPO would, according to some Western scholars, affect the credibility and standing of the South African government at home, particularly among the conservative sections of the ruling Nationalist Party.50 At the economic level, many of the advanced capitalist powers see a settlement of the Namibian problem that would guarantee power to SWAPO as signifying an end to the highly lucrative exploitation of Namibia's national resources, especially the Rossing uranium. Yet, these powers and their TNCs, are more or less stealing these resources. To be able to understand why this is so, the latter subject deserves some attention; at least, insofar as one of the major issues on which the Namibian problem has consistently revolved has been the central place of uranium in the international politics surrounding the territory. On the case of grand larceny We saw earlier that the General Assembly rescinded, back in 1966, South Africa's mandate over Namibia; and that in 1968 it established a UN Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence. In 1970, the Security Council, too, declared the continued presence of the South African government, as well as all its acts and activities in that territory, illegal and invalid. Following the termination of the

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mandate, the Security Council asked all its member states to ensure that their state-controlled companies and enterprises stop all dealings with companies or enterprises in Namibia, and, equally, cease all further investment activities in the territory. These member states were further asked to withhold government loans, credit guarantees, and other financial forms of support that could be used to facilitate trade or commerce with Namibia by companies outside state control in these countries. And finally, all member states were urged to refrain from any relationship with South Africa which might entrench the Republic's authority over Namibia. Then on September 27, 1974, the UN Council for Namibia, in the exercise of its administering authority over Namibia, enacted Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. The Decree covers all natural resources, animal and mineral. Its key provisions fall within three categories, namely: (1) The right to exploit natural resources: the United Nations Council for Namibia is alone competent to authorize the exploitation of the country's natural resources (para. 1). Any permission, concession or license previously granted, including any granted on behalf of the Republic of South Africa, is null, void and of no effect (para. 2). (2) Ownership of goods exported from Namibia: no natural resources emanating from Namibia may be exported without the permission of the United Nations Council (para. 3). Any animal or other natural resource emanating from Namibia and taken from that country without the permission of the United Nations Council may be seized and shall be forfeited on behalf of the Council for the benefit of the people of Namibia (para. 4). The same measure shall be taken with respect to any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying such animal or other natural resource emanating from Namibia (para. 5). (3) Damages payable to the future government of Namibia: any contravention of the Decree entails damages payable to the future government of an independent Namibia (para. 6). 51 From the above provisions, it is clear that the Decree states, in no uncertain terms, that any uranium removed from Namibia without Council approval would be treated as stolen property; and, accordingly, it could be seized and damages demanded for such brazen theft by the future independent government of Namibia. The central aim and objective of the Decree is quite straightforward. As Gay J. Mcdougall has put it:

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The natural resources of Namibia are the inviolable heritage of the Namibian people and the depletion of the natural resources of the territory as a result of the systematic plunder by foreign economic interests in collusion with the illegal South African administration is a grave threat to the integrity and prosperity of an independent Namibia. The Decree is a legislative act of the Council for Namibia aimed at protecting this natural heritage of the Namibian people.52 Apart from Decree No. 1, under the terms of the 1971 International Court of Justice ruling, to which we referred earlier, the continuing exploitation of the vast mineral resources of Namibia by Western and South Africa's TNCs and interests, constitutes nothing short of outright larceny. The offense is further compounded when the provisions of Decree No. 1 are taken into account. At the time of its enactment, the Decree was seen as a means of exerting pressure on South Africa to terminate its control over Namibia by denying the Republic essential attributes to its economic control over the territory. Furthermore, it was hoped that if faced with the risk of seizure, companies might prefer to terminate their operations in Namibia altogether. In the event, many of the largest mining companies are still mining, and even prospecting for, minerals in Namibia, in open contravention of the various relevant legal provisions and rulings. The list of these mining houses includes Canada's Falconbridge Nickel Mines; Union Carbide of the United States; Gold Fields of South Africa; the South African giant, Anglo American Corporation; Minatome and Aquitaine of France; and South Africa's General Mining. All these companies, as well as those involved in the Rossing uranium mine, 'are seeking to maximize their profits while the South African administration and military maintains an economic climate in Namibia that allows them to rape the country and exploit its people.' 53 The cooperation between South Africa and the Western TNCs operating in Namibia also extends to joint para-military efforts. The so-called 'security schemes' effectively contain the predominantly black workers working in the territory. At Rossing, for example, a paramilitary unit, fully equipped with automatic rifles and sub-machine guns, keeps a sharp eye on the workers and protects the mine. Reportedly, some of the TNCs operating in Namibia are cooperating militarily with the South African administration to directly combat SWAPO's activities. The RTZ security forces act in close collaboration with the South African police and army. In any case, Rossing security officers, the South African police and armed white employees usually

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form a united force against black workers during any periods of industrial unrest. Furthermore, in the case of RTZ, the TNC constantly uses informers to vet its black labor force.54 The official backing for Rossing security forces was demonstrated in November 1976 when South African police reinforcements were called in to deal with workers striking over Rossing's deplorable working conditions. Since then, industrial commandos, like those at Rossing, have become commonplace in Namibia. Pretoria encourages private armed units, whether they be extreme right-wing vigilante groups or the so-called security guard forces of large private companies such as RTZ. Although the current size of the TNC's private army and its inventory of arms is not known, in the past its armory has included various types of automatic rifles and shotguns, pistols, teargas shells, gas pistols, gas launchers and tear gas grenades. 55 To the extent that France, Britain, Germany and Japan remain the major importers of Namibia's uranium, these western powers have openly showed their contempt for the UN Decree No. 1. Let us take a brief look at the case of Britain, a country which has continued to receive and use what amounts to stolen property. The country has been importing uranium illegally from Namibia, through contracts with the RTZ, for years. Considering that Britain is a member of the Contact Group and the close connections between Whitehall circles and RTZ, the likely posture of this Great Power towards the achievement of black majority rule in Namibia can easily be guessed. It is significant that successive British governments have consistently disregarded every UN resolution on Namibia since the termination of South Africa's mandate by the international organization in 1966 and have, equally, dismissed the representative views of the Namibian people and steadfastly continued with their uranium contracts. While Britain has argued over and over again that its uranium contracts would ensure that 'any successor state in Namibia' would 'start with a distinct advantage on the basis of arrangements between Namibia and UK companies', SWAPO has let it be known that the British government's contracts were 'one of the major factors contributing to the continuing presence of South Africa's illegal occupying forces' in that territory.56 Apart from the issue of theft, it seems that the British government misrepresented the facts when rationalizing its importation of uranium. In January 1975, for example, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, after meeting with the representative of SWAPO and members of the Zambian government in Lusaka,

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reported on his return to London that SWAPO had wanted the uranium contracts to continue. But, sources who saw the official record of the meeting insisted that Callaghan's account of the SWAPO position was completely unfounded since, 'nowhere in the record was there any suggestion that the contracts should be continued/ 57 RTZ, like the British government, is determined to keep the flow of uranium supplies from Rossing to Britain. Interestingly, at the time that the UN Decree No. 1 was established, some optimistic analysts thought that the corporation would determine its activities. After all, the message of the decree, as earlier indicated, was quite clear: not only were the RTZ's Rossing operations illegal, but they were, and are, liable to claims for damages from a future internationally recognized Namibian government. But while in 1975 four United States' oil companies abandoned their exploration leases and American Metal Climax, one of the largest mining operators in the territory, reportedly sold its holdings as a result of 'the threat of action by the UN,' RTZ doggedly continued its operations and ignored the decree completely. It is not hard to fathom why successive Labour and Conservative governments have failed to make any conscious effort to terminate the RTZ uranium contract. Simply put, it would not be good business to do so; such a move would be contrary to the inherent quest for profit maximization by the advanced capitalist states. The British government can obtain 1,250 tonnes (25 percent of Rossing's output and 65 percent of the British requirement) of cheap uranium oxide at $13 a pound against a world market price of $40 a pound, simultaneously enabling RTZ to make a profit of $224 million. No wonder then, the TNC is in such a hurry to extract the maximum amount of uranium. In that quest, the 'British government has a vested interest in the continuation of South African control over Namibia for as long as possible.' 58 The high level of profits accruing to RTZ as a result of its operations in Rossing has made some analysts argue that the mere payment of damages, for stripping Namibia of its resources, to any future independent government of the territory may not be enough. At at UN Council for Namibia seminar that took place in June 1982, the point was discussed exhaustively and participants felt that since TNCs like RTZ were also giving material support to South Africa's unlawful occupation of Namibia,59 they ought to be made to pay reparations to the people of the territory through a future independent government. 60

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Apart from deliberately ignoring all UN directives and steadfastly carrying on its exploitative exercise, RTZ, like all the other TNCs operating in Namibia, pays little or no attention to the welfare of its black workers or the protection of the territory's environment. The UN Council for Namibia's special hearings on 'the plunder of Namibian uranium' of July 1980 highlighted these points. Dr Joseph Wagoner, a former United States Public Health Official for example, related the adverse health defects and ecological effects associated with all phases of the uranium industry, from the commodity's mining and refining stages right through to its waste disposal. Similarly, Dr Helen Caldicott described how plutonium, a product of the nuclear industry, enters the body and permanently alters the gene structure. According to this pediatrician, most genetic diseases cannot be cured and the world can expect to see in the very near future, a rise in birth defects as well as epidemic forms of cancer.61 Admittedly, lung and skin cancer, increased mortality rates and genetic damage are the actual dangers often associated with uranium mining anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, in the case of Rossing mine, largely because of the total lack of precautions, all these dangers are greater to the workers and the community in general. The Namibian workers are exposed to the long-lived radioactive decay products during the extraction of uranium oxide from the rock. Moreover, the vast piles of tailings containing these radioactive products are left exposed to the elements where the contaminants are spread by air, water and erosion.62 The sulphuric fumes as well as the fumes from the tailings constitute a major hazard to health. And, even worse for the black Namibian miners, they are housed in a township downwind of the tailings, in crowded, unsanitary units. The white miners, on the other hand, are housed in good living quarters, 50 kilometers away from the mine. Furthermore, since wages, housing and medical services at Rossing are all organized in accordance with the apartheid system, regular health checks for workers, normally required in the rest of the world, are not available to the blacks. This is a serious issue, if we bear in mind that in spite of massive legislation designed by the advanced capitalist countries, such as the United States and Canada, to protect their own uranium miners, experience has shown that it remains an exceptionally hazardous undertaking, with its genetic consequences still unknown. This is why Wagoner posed this question at the special hearings: 'Will we learn from history, or will history once again repeat itself, and especially so as a result of the exploitation of the natural and human resources of Namibia?' 63

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The members of the UN Council for Namibia were thus forced to reflect on the health and safety of the black workers, especially since, as Singham has reminded us, it was the responsibility of an apartheid regime to protect these workers. 64 Other testimonies at the special hearings confirmed the fears of many knowledgeable Africanists about the correct situation in Namibia, namely, that the entire mining operation in that territory has been organized very much like a military camp. A member of the Council made the following remark: 'I wonder whether this rush to mine Namibian uranium may be an experiment, an experiment to see how human beings are affected by radioactivity. I wonder whether these Namibians are the experimental rat population for the nuclear industry/ 65 In effect then, while the situation in the Namibian uranium industry is very attractive and lucrative to the Western advanced capitalist powers and South Africa as well as their TNCs, it is destructive to the future economy and wellbeing of Namibia and its people. Black Africa's uranium Aside from South Africa, there are also uranium deposits in black African states north of the Limpopo River. Of all these states, Niger is easily the largest producer. Indeed, it is the world's fifth largest uranium producer (behind the United States, Canada, South Africa and Namibia), and is reputed to have deposits estimated at about 150,000 to 200,000 tonnes. 66 Niger's current output of 4,128 tonnes a year has the capacity to rise to 8,000 to 11,000 tonnes per annum by the end of this decade. 67 Recently uranium production capacity has steadily increased, with output jumping from 2,061 tonnes in 1978 to some 4,300 tonnes in 1981. (See Table 4.2 below.) Although Niger's state mining coordinator, Office National Nigerien de Ressources Minières (Onarem), has a stake in the country's mining investments, nonetheless, the mines are mainly controlled by French interests. The latter are assisted in the exercise by other capitalist powers like Italy and West Germany who find Niger's uranium quite important in their respective nuclear development programs. In fact, it was the desire to have a dependable supply source of uranium for France's nuclear program that led the French to start prospecting for the commodity in Niger. The discovery of the Arlit deposit in 1966 further stimulated France's interests in Niger. Two years later, yellowcake was discovered. Encouraged by a fourfold increase in uranium prices, which reached a

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Table 4.2 Niger's uranium production and exports (tonnes) Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982*

Production

Exports

1,114 1,306 1,459 1,441 2,061 3,615 4,200 4,300 4,400

1,200 1,548 1,498 1,446 2,249 3,422 n.a. n.a.

—

* Projection. Source: Ministre du plan, Niger.

peak of $50 a pound in 1978, the French were sufficiently motivated to cooperate with Niger in opening up a second mining complex near Arlit, 200 miles from the nearest ocean terminal. In the latter project, another capitalist power, Japan, joined France as a partner. As a result of the initial craze for uranium supplies among the Western powers, Niger soon became a monocultural economy — with the uranium accounting for 84 percent of its foreign earnings by 1982.68 Let us take a brief look at the extent of foreign interests in Niger's mining sector. The country's first uranium mine at Arlit, in the heart of the rugged Air mountain range, is operated by the Société des Mines d'Air (SOMAIR) consortium, in which Onarem has a 33 percent equity holding; France's COGEMA, Compagnie Franchise des Matières Nucléaires, an affiliate of the French Atomic energy Agency, 37 percent; other French companies 27 percent; Urangesellschaft of West Germany, 6.5 percent; and Italy's Agip Nucléaire, 6.5 percent. The second uranium mine at Akouta, which came on-stream in 1978, is owned by the Compagnie Minière d'Akouta (COMINAK) consortium, made up of Onarem, COGEMA, Japan's OURD and ENUSA of Spain,with 31, 34, 25 and 10 percent of equity respectively.69 The ongoing crisis of international capitalism, in particular the depressed world market, has delayed the operation of Niger's third mine. The new mine is owned by Société Minière de Tassa N'Tahalgue (SMTT), whose capital is split equally between Onarem, COGEMA and the Kuwait Foreign Trading Company. With an expected output of 1,500 tonnes per annum, the mine, originally set to start production

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in 1983, is now not expected to go on-stream until sometime in 1985.70 Finally, a fourth mining consortium was recently set up to study the possibility of exploiting the rich Imouraren deposit, about 90 kilometers south of Arlit. Reportedly, this is the largest uranium deposit in Africa.71 A feasibility study is at present being carried out by Flour of the United States and France's Creps. Even if the green light is finally given, mining is not expected to get under way before the 1990s. All in all, Niger's uranium reserves could well exceed the estimated figure of 200,000 tonnes, possibly even more, if one bears in mind that much of the Air region still remains to be explored.72 From the above details, it is clear that the mining companies from the advanced capitalist economies of the west are having a field day in Niger. The consumption patterns of the commodity also reflect the involvement of these capitalist powers. Of the 4,128 tonnes of uranium which Niger sold in 1982, for example, 2,539 tonnes went to France. This is easily understandable, bearing in mind that COGEMA has substantial equity interests in the two Niger uranium mining companies, COMINAK and SOMAIR. Japan was the second biggest buyer of Niger's uranium in 1982, it imported 1,039 tonnes. Spain took 200 tonnes, West Germany and Italy took 125 tonnes each and the Netherlands, 100 tonnes. 73 France tries hard to preserve its dominant position in Niger's economy through various neo-colonial tactics, including regular state visits by the French presidents, a supposedly generous aid program and long-term price fixing for uranium purchases. In 1981, for instance, France emerged as a prime donor, having provided more than 25 percent of all the aid that Niger received. Admittedly, through the long-term pricing arrangement, France paid $30 per pound (a price above that prevailing internationally) for Niger's uranium in 1982.74 All the same, 'the deal is tolerable for the French because of Niger's strategic importance as a supplier for France's nuclear power programme.' 75 In effect then, through the payment of what has been labelled as 'political prices' for its uranium, Niger guarantees the supplies of this vital commodity to France. Another advantage of a long-term pricing arrangement is that France stands to buy on the cheap when the international price levels are high. Gabon is another black African state where France has a deeply entrenched interest in uranium production. Uranium supplies from this central African country are equally crucial to France's independent nuclear strategy. The Mounana deposit in the Franceville basin was first discovered in 1956 by the French Atomic Energy Commission,

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CEA. Two years later, Compagnie des Mines d'Uranium de Franceville (COMUF), which currently has a share capital of $11 million, was set up. It holds a 1,100 kilometer concession area but is not producing uranium from Mounana and Oklo.76 COMUF attained its annual production target of 1,047 tonnes of uranium concentrate, containing 72 percent of metal, in 1980. By 1981, it had embarked on the development of a third deposit at Okelobondo and subsequently increased its production to a total of 1,500 tonnes of uranium metal. The mining company has also been involved in a major drilling program and the construction of a new plant at an estimated cost of $32 million. In addition, COMUF has gone ahead with exploration at the Ikoye uranium prospect in the N'djole, the Kaya-Kaya prospect at Mounana and in various parts of the Booue Lastourville region. Significantly, all these exploration projects involved France's COGEMA. But, two of them are on a joint venture basis with the Gabonese government. Ordinarily, the uranium is processed in Gabon into a preconcentrate containing about 50 percent uranium, with impurities of iron and silica, and is subsequently refined in France. To this end, the commodity is flown out of the country by UT A, the French airline which has since been exposed for its involvement in a joint weekly air-lift of uranium with South African Airlines from Namibia's Rossing mine, via Windhoek, to Paris.77 Table 4.3 Some of the major interests in Gabon's uranium Companies COMUF: Mokta COGEMA Minatome Gabon Government

Shares 28 15 13 25

Mines Mounana Oklo Okelobondo

Customers France

Source: African Business, April 1980, p. 13. As far as COMUF is concerned, it has steadily been carrying out an expansion program over the years. The exercise, which was completed on June 9, 1982, when President Bongo opened the company's new uranium processing plant, was first embarked upon in August 1975, on COMUF's twentieth anniversary. The first stage involved opening up and equipping more underground mines in August 1979. A sulphuric acid wing was then built and commissioned in January 1982.

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The new CFAl 5,000 million ($47.6 million) processing plant marked the plan's third and final stage. It will increase processing capacity by 50 percent, from 300,000 tonnes of ore a year to 450,000 tonnes, with an annual output of 1,500 tonnes of uranium metal.78 Aside from France, South Korea is another capitalist-orientated country that has vested interests in Gabon's uranium. In 1980, South Korea's state-run electric company (KECO) began a joint venture with France's COGEMA to mine uranium in the Lordelyon region of Gabon. Under the agreement, KECO took 41 percent of the shares and would have priority when uranium is being sold to a third country. While COGEMA was allocated 43 percent of the shares; the host country, Gabon, 'seems content with a little over 10 per cent of the deal.'79 Undoubtedly, such a lopsided arrangement was not in the best national interests of Gabon. If anything, it merely helped to strengthen the foreign exploitation of the country's natural resources. All in all, in 1979, the four African producers (Namibia, South Africa, Niger and Gabon) produced 13,800 tonnes of uranium, just under 35 percent of total capitalist world's production of 41,000 tonnes. By the year 1990, African production is expected to double to approximately 28,500 tonnes a year with the expansion of existing productive capacity and commissioning of several new mines. 80 Meanwhile, the advanced capitalist powers and their TNCs have been actively exploring for uranium in other areas where the deposits are likely to prove economically viable. In Togo, for example, despite earlier prospecting efforts by the French CEA, uranium exploration is now being conducted by the German company, Uranerzbergbau, and uranium mineralization has been located at Naimtougou. The deposit is thought to be viable. Similarly, in Guinea, substantial uranium deposits estimated at five million tonnes have been found, and plans are currently in order to start mining eight recently discovered veins. Mauritania is another country of interest. Here, near-surface calerete-type deposits are being investigated in the northern Ghallaman area by a consortium comprising COGEMA, PUK and Japan's Tokyo Uranium Development company. 81 Botswana and Zambia are two other countries believed to have major uranium potential. In the case of the former, where uranium deposits were located during an aero-magnetic survey of the Kgalagadi region of the Kalahari, Canada's Falconbridge Nickel Mines is expanding its activities through a wholly-owned exploration company. It has concentrated its exploration work on several uranium

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deposits, the most significant of which is the Mokobaesi deposit, with 1.2 million tonnes of uranium-bearing calerete. Aside from Falconbridge, there are other Western TNCs that have deep commercial interests in Botswana's uranium. Urangesellschaft is prospecting for uranium and thorium in parts of south-eastern Botswana, Union Carbide of the United States has obtained four prospecting licenses for radioactive minerals in the Ghanzi district, and American Steel is sampling conglomerate in south-eastern Botswana for uranium and gold.82 As for Zambia, where uranium deposits had been located some years ago in sedimentary formations in the Siavongo area of the Zambezi river valley, exploration has gone a stage further than in Botswana. Apart from AGIP, which had commenced drilling in the Grembo valley in October 1979, under the terms of an agreement signed earlier in the year, Urangesellschaft and Japanese companies have been active in prospecting. All the same, even if viable deposits are discovered in both Botswana and Zambia, 'commercial production would be unlikely to begin much before 1990/ 83 The Ivory Coast is another country which has promising potential for uranium, along with many other strategic minerals.84 Here, again, the Western TNCs are actively engaged in prospecting for these commodities. 85 In sum then, the Western TNCs are not only engaging in the current exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals, they are also casting a covetous eye on other African countries that could be useful additions to their list.

Impact of external production of uranium Aside from all the African states so far mentioned, there are other major non-Communist bloc uranium producers. The most notable of the latter producers include the United States, Canada and Australia. In other words, the North American and Australian markets are closed to the exports of Africa's uranium. To the extent that these advanced capitalist producers are in competition with the African producers, they have, over the years, resorted to various protectionist measures to hold their ground and maintain their handsome profit levels in the commodity's international trade. In 1964, for example, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) banned the use of American-enriched foreign uranium in domestic reactors, 'thereby eliminating access for foreign producers to 70 percent of the world market.'86 Three years later, the AEC began to compete aggressively

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for the remaining 30 percent of the world market by offering enriched uranium at a special price of $8.00 per pound. The American protectionist stance was further heightened when, by the late 1960s, the supply problem of uranium was aggravated by large discoveries of the commodity in Australia. Consequently, 'the competitive threat posed by abundant, low-cost, foreign uranium supplies to the American domestic market strengthened the resolution of American domestic producers and the AEC not to allow the use of foreign uranium in American reactors/ 87 Throughout the 1960s, Canada and South Africa were the only major producers of uranium outside the United States. Since the Canadian uranium industry had been created by, and has always been dependent upon the demand generated for uranium within the United States, it was seriously affected by the changes in the American policy. On the other hand, the South African companies were not as severely affected. After all, their total annual production of uranium was less than that of Canada; and the commodity was a by-product of the gold mining operation, requiring little capital investment and no increase in the labor force.88 All the same, confronted with damaging United States' policies and bleak prospects for uranium, Canada and South Africa — along with the other major uranium producers, excluding the Americans — turned to the covert manipulation of the world market to resolve their difficulties. Some meetings were held in Paris in February 1972, under the pretense of forming a 'joint market research organization,' to explore the possibility of creating an international cartel to control uranium prices. At the meetings were representatives from Canada, South Africa, Australia, France and RTZ.89 From the African standpoint, the Paris meetings were to prove important for the future of the development of Namibian uranium. Indeed, it has been argued that RTZ was the driving force behind these meetings precisely because the TNC had sought to push world uranium prices high enough to develop its Rossing uranium project.90 Such a move is understandable, given the TNC's quest for the maintenance of profitable operations in Africa and the world in general. In the main, the participants concentrated their discussions on the methods that would ensure a satisfactory price for uranium, stabilize prices, and eliminate 'cut-throat' competition. At a further meeting in Johannesburg in June 1972, the details of the international price-fixing and market sharing arrangement were finalized. And with that development the uranium cartel was formally established. For

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purposes of secrecy, the uranium cartel was referred to as the Société d'Etudes de Récherches d'Uranium (SERU). It consisted of an Operating and Policy Committee, and a one-man secretariat. The latter, whose main task was to review all contracts to ensure compliance with the cartel's guidelines, was housed in the large CEA headquarters building in Paris. Through the cartel, Australia, Canada, France, South Africa and Britain's RTZ were able, for a while, to control the world price and supply of uranium through a complex scheme of price-fixing, bidrigging and the allocation of markets. 91 The cartel operated effectively in secrecy until the summer of 1976 when hundreds of pages of documents detailing its activities were covertly removed from the files of Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd., an Australian-based uranium producer, and publicly exposed by the Australian Friends of the Earth, an internationally affiliated conservationist group. 92 Although it has long folded up, the effects of the cartel's impact on prices will still extend for a few more years, since 'most of the uranium to be used by utilities until the 1980s was purchased at prices set before 1975 by the cartel.'93 It was significant that South Africa was a member of the cartel. Equally significant, too, was that Canada — which had a history of consistently rejecting membership in Third World producer associations,94 as well as maintaining a publicly critical and hostile posture towards South Africa's apartheid system — could join the Republic in a common cartel. Moreover, South Africa's uranium interests were not in any way adversely affected by the United States' protectionist policies. No wonder, Stewart insisted that: 'Canada must have made some political concessions to South Africa in order to acquire its support, for uranium mining in South Africa was never as seriously affected by American protectionist policies as it was in Canada.' 95 And one of such political concessions might have been an undertaking by the Trudeau Administration to reduce Canada's open criticisms of the Republic's apartheid laws.96 In more recent times, the cyclical crisis of capitalism, which has prominently manifested itself through low price levels for raw materials, has also affected uranium production output in developed and developing countries. As we have just shown, some of the western industrialized states have resorted to cut-throat competition technique so as to be able to survive in the market. Naturally, these strategies have had adverse effects on the local economies of many of the African producers. Take Niger as an example. With a slow down in demand for

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uranium in the early 1980s, the country has been left with substantial amounts to sell.97 While Niger has been anxiously looking for new customers, the search has been made harder by a big increase in lowcost uranium exports from Australia.98 By the end of 1982, the spot price for uranium on the world market had dropped to an all time low of $17 per pound. 99 Such a price is below the cost of production at Niger's mines. Admittedly, the fact that France has been paying 'political' prices for the commodity, because of the strategic importance of Niger to the French nuclear industry, has helped to cushion some of the adverse effects of low international prices on the local economy. Nevertheless, the mounting losses have forced both SOMAIR and COMINAK to cut uranium production at their respective mines. This has resulted in a sharp decline in Niger's output — which fell from 4,200 tonnes a year in 1982 to 3,400 tonnes in 1984.100 The weakening demand seems also to have blocked the third mining project near Arlit. Moreover, while several American TNCs like Conoco (a subsidiary of Du Pont) and Marathon Oil have prospecting concessions for uranium in Niger, they have not been as enthusiastic as they were originally, when high profit returns were great incentives for a ruthless exploitation of the country. 101 All in all then, the much earlier prospects of raising production over 10,000 tonnes by the end of this decade have definitely receded, although estimates of total uranium reserves of the Air district alone are said to range between 100,000 to 500,000 tonnes. 102 As far as Gabon is concerned, while the government had originally planned to increase output by 50 percent to 1,500 tonnes a year, since 1979, both production and exports, all to France, have declined by 10 percent. 103 On the other hand, thanks to the exploitative activities and the Great Power connections and protection of the TNCs involved, the uranium mines in both South Africa and Namibia still continue to operate with wide margins of profit. And as long as the profit rates remain quite handsome, the exploitation of the resource in these two countries will continue. In the case of Namibia, for example, the bulk of Rossing's production is sold under long-term contracts to power utilities in the Western industrial capitalist states, namely, France, Japan, Spain, UK and West Germany, and sales have not been affected by the market downturn for uranium. 104 Consequently, Namibia's uranium industry is now the world's most profitable. As for South Africa, in 1981, it produced just over 6,000 tonnes of uranium oxide, but for the first half

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of 1982, production was 10 percent less than for the first half of the previous year, with production at all the Witwatersrand gold/uranium mines except one, below the level of 1981. The drop in production, however, had nothing to do with the profitability of the mining operations or the international price level. Rather, in most cases, the drop in output was due to less ore being processed, or decreases in recovery grades. This is why, for example, the largest South African producer,Val Reefs, which accounts for just under 25 percent of the Republic's output, placed its new uranium mine in the Afrikander Lease area on a care and maintenance basis on its completion at the end of 1982.105 Meanwhile, Australia continues to compete aggressively with black African uranium producers. Indeed, in spite of the weakness in world markets, Australia has contracts for sales of'yellow cake,' well into the 1980s with Japan, Germany, South Korea and Finland. Other possible customers for Australian low-cost uranium are France, Spain and Sweden. The Australian factor is not likely to be a short-term affair, since the country has huge reserves. In any case, the revenue forecasts show that official planners expect a steady growth in the revenues from uranium from now until the 1990s.106 (See Table 4.4 below.) And, no doubt, to sustain such a program, the Australians would keep up with their international competition in the commodity. Table 4.4 Export forecasts at 1979-80 prices for Australia's uranium Years

1979-80 1980-81 1984-85 1989-90

Expected revenues (Australian $ millions)

(actual) (estimated) (forecast) (forecast)

150 200 400 550

Source: National Westminster Quarterly Review, November 1981, p. 18.

It is not being suggested that the effect of low uranium prices and the current world overproduction or, for that matter, the special phenomenon of Australia's low-cost uranium only affect the African producers. On the contrary, the world's foremost producer, the United States is also experiencing the shock waves. In 1981, for example, there were closures and deferrals at sixty uranium mines and twentytwo mills in the United States. Production has been cut to minimal

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levels at many of the American plants which remain in operation. As a result, a 'reverse' market for uranium has developed with many utilities seeking to reduce their stocks and outstanding commitments by selling on the spot market. Uranium producers have, in turn, been buying on the spot market to fulfill delivery commitments, as in many instances this is now cheaper than producing the commodity. 107 Low prices and the discovery of major high-grade uranium deposits outside the United States, particularly in Australia, have made much of the existing American uranium industry uneconomic. Thus, whereas United States' producers could only mine about four million pounds at a forward cost of less than $20 per pound, non-American sources could produce more than fifty million pounds at this cost.108 In sum then, the problems of international capitalism as they affect the African uranium producers also apply, in varying degrees, to some of the western powers. Nevertheless, uranium still continues to play an important role in the nuclear development programs of the industrialized capitalist states as well as the developing countries. In this regard, the central issue of the place of uranium in nuclear proliferation and the international politics surrounding such a phenomenon are of major significance, at least from the concern of this study. It is this broad aspect of the subject that will now engage our attention in the next two chapters.

Notes 1. Martin Bailey, 'Rossing Helps Profits but Fuels Protests/ African Business, July 1982, pp. 32-3. 2. Ibid. 3. New African, April 1980, p. 6; and 'Namibian Uranium: The Hand of Whitehall/ in Africa, No. 104, April, 1980. 4. 'Namibian Uranium/ p. 52. 5. Ibid., p. 58. Emphasis added. 6. Ibid., p. 57. Note that there is 'a reported holding of RTZ shares by the Monarchy/ See Uranium: South Africa's Gain: A Report by the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) (Toronto: TCLSAC, 1982); hereafter referred to as TCLSAC Report. 7. See, for example, African Business, July 1982, p. 22. 8. 'Namibian Uranium/ p. 58. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. TCLSAC Report, p. 13.

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12. Ibid. 13. We shall return to the wider ramifications of this point in the next chapter. 14. See New African, April 1980, p. 2. 15. African Business, April 1980, p. 13. 16. Ibid., July 1982, p. 23. 17. See TCLSAC Report. 18. The Economist (London), May 16, 1981, p. 114. 19. Azim Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel: a Strategic Triangle/ Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 44-73, at p. 61. 20. Ibid. 21. See, for example, Geoff Beridge, Economic Power in Anglo-South African Diplomacy (London: Macmillan, 1981). 22. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel/ p. 61. 23. TCLSAC Report, p. 13. 24. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel/ p. 61. 25. TCLSAC Report, p. 4. 26. A.W. Singham, 'Namibia and Nuclear Proliferation/ Third World Quarterly, 3, No. 2, April 1981, pp. 277-86, at p. 278. 27. See Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (New York: Africana, 1977), Chapter VIII. For some analyses of the legal and political ramifications of the dispute, see various articles in the special issue of Africa Today (30, Nos. 1 and 2,1983) devoted to Namibia; Itse Sagay, The Legal Aspects of the Namibian Dispute (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1975); Gerhard Totomeyer, South West Africa/ Namibia (Randburg: Fokus Suid, 1977); Solomon Slonin, South-West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Kenneth Grundy, 'Namibia in International Politics/ Current History, 81, No. 473, April 1982, pp. 101-5 and 131-2; and John Dugard, ed., The South West Africa/ Namibia Dispute (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973). 28. Note that Nujoma formed SWAPO by converting the existing labororientated Ovamboland People's Party into a nationalist movement. 29. Michael Spicer, 'Namibia — Elusive Independence/ The World Today, 36, No. 10, October 1980, pp. 406-14, at p. 407. 30. See ibid. 31. See 1C] Reports (Hague), June 21, 1971. 32. Ibid. 33. See Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 34. Ibid. 35. See Spicer, 'Namibia — Elusive Independence,' p. 412. 36. Ibid. 37. The issue of 'UN bias' is expanded later on in this section. 38. Spicer, 'Namibia — Elusive Independence/ p. 408. 39. Note that apologists for South Africa's cause usually give a different version of this issue. They accept the point about the original annexation of Walvis Bay by Britain in 1878; but then, they contend, the port was incorporated into the Cape in 1884 and the Union of South Africa in

The international politics of Africa's uranium 95

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

1910. And, according to them, Walvis Bay had been excluded from both the League Mandate and South West Africa as an international territory. Therefore, the argument goes on, South Africa's right to continued control of the port is legally incontestable. See, for example, ibid., p. 409. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel,' p. 52. Spicer, 'Namibia — Elusive Independence,' p. 409. The geopolitical arguments about Southern Africa have been dealt with in the last chapter. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity, p. 155. See Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel.' Note that by the time that Dirk Mudge finally resigned as the chairman of Namibia's Council of Ministers on January 10,1983, the membership of the Council had risen to fifteen. Under the South African-framed constitution for Namibia, Mudge's resignation automatically results in the dissolution of the fifteen-man Council and brings the territory under direct South African rule through the Administrator-General's office. Meanwhile, Mudge said he had to resign after four frustrating years as head of an interim government. According to him, he and his party, the DTA, had tried, over the period of four years, 'to build up a moderate front based on cooperation between white and black to ensure that radical elements (i.e. SWAPO) do not take over after independence, and to prevent racist tendencies asserting themselves.' Even this extremely reactionary posture seems to be too radical for Pretoria's comfort. See 'Mudge Resignation Leaves a Vacuum,' in African Economic Digest, 4, No. 2, 14-20, January 1983. Spicer, 'Namibia — Elusive Independence,' p. 408. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel,' p. 54. See 'Crocker and the Testy Polecats,' The Economist (London), June 6, 1981, p. 39. 'The Obsession with Linkage,' West Africa (1981), p. 2199. Cf., for example, Samuel P. Huntington, 'Reform and Stability in South Africa/ International Security, 6, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 3-25. For a detailed analysis of all these provisions see Francois Rigaux, 'The Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia Adopted on September 27, 1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia,' paper presented at the United Nations Seminar on Legal Issues Concerning Namibia (The Hague, 1981). McDougall, 'The Council for Namibia's Decree No. 1: Enforcement Possibilities,' in Africa Today, 30, Nos. 1 and 2, 1983, pp. 7-16, at p. 7. TCLSAC Report, p. 4. See Jane Robins, 'Private Army, Public Nuisance,' Africa, No. 132, August 1982. Ibid. See 'Namibian Uranium: The Hand of Whitehall,' in Africa, No. 104, April 1980. Ibid., p. 58. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel,' p. 61.

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59. Participants at the Vienna seminar hear, for example, of how RTZ, through its Rossing mine, pays non-residents' shareholder tax, income tax, and sales tax to South Africa. In short, revenues for Rossing have facilitated Pretoria's ability to wage its war in Namibia and environs. See Robins, 'Private Army, Public Nuisance.' 60. Ibid. 61. See Singham, 'Namibia and Nuclear Proliferation.' 62. See Robins, 'Private Army, Public Nuisance.' Note that tailings are a sand-like material that remains after uranium has been extracted from ore. They contain small concentrations of the radioactive elements radium and thorium. 63. Singham, 'Namibia and Nuclear Proliferation,' p. 279. 64. Ibid. 65. Quoted in ibid., p. 280. 66. ,See West Africa (1981), p. 270; and African Business, September 1982, p. 26. 67. African Business, September 1982, p. 26. 68. See 'Niger's Uranium,' in The Economist (London), June 19, 1982. 69. African Business, September 1982, p. 26. 70. Ibid. 71. West Africa (1982), p. 3002. 72. See African Business, September 1982, p. 26. 73. West Africa (1983), p. 906. 74. The Economist (London), June 19, 1982. 75. Ibid. 76. See 'Uranium: the Search Continues,' African Business, April 1980. 77. Ibid. 78. Africa Economic Digest, June 18, 1982, p. 22. 79. See 'Gabon: Uranium Partners,' in Africa, No. 105, May 1980, p. 100; and 'Uranium Deal,' in West Africa (1980), p. 625. 80. African Business, April 1980. 81. Ibid., and New African, May 1982. 82. African Business, April 1980. 83. Ibid. 84. See 'Ivory Coast's Mineral Search,' in ibid., September 1982, p. 41. 85. For details, see ibid. 86. Larry R. Stewart, 'Canada's Role in the International Uranium Cartel,' International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 657-89, at p. 659. 87. Ibid., p. 660. 88. Cf. ibid. 89. For details, see ibid. Note that the Canadian mining companies represented were Rio Algom Ltd.; Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd. (GMCL), the Canadian subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation; Uranerz Canada Ltd. (UCL), a West German company involved in a joint venture development with GMCL at Rabbit Lake, Saskatchewan; Denison Mines Ltd,; and Eldorado Nuclear and Uranium Canada, both Crown Corporations. France was represented by Uranex, which acts as a marketing agency for French uranium companies; South Africa by its

The international politics of Africa's uranium

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

96. 97. 98.

99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

97

Nuclear Fuels Corporation (NUFCOR). Although Australian companies were not present at the initial Paris meetings, they later included Queensland Mines Ltd., Pancontinental Mining Ltd., Peko-Wallsend Ltd., Electrolytic Zinc and Ranger Mining Ltd. Finally, while government officials from Britain and West Germany did not attend these exploratory meetings, they were kept informed of developments. See ibid. See Bruce Stannard, 'How the Uranium Club Began/ National Times, August 16-21, 1976. For a detailed analysis of these points see Stewart, 'Canada's Role in the International Uranium Cartel/ For details see ibid. Ibid., p. 67. Throughout the first half of the 1970s, Canada had rejected membership in Third World producer associations for iron ore, copper, mercury, silver and tungsten. Stewart, 'Canada's Role in the International Uranium Cartel,' p. 670. Note that while South Africa and Canada appeared to be strange bed fellows, the same thing could also be said for Canada and France, whose relations were at a very low level at the time. Cf. ibid. See The Economist (London), June 19, 1982, p. 98. See ibid. For some background information on Australia's international uranium policy see, for example, Keith D. Stutter, 'The Uranium Debate in Australia,' The World Today, 34, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 22-35; Uranium — Australia's Decision (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, August 1977); and Juliet Lodge, 'Australia and the European Community/ The World Today, 36, No. 7, July 1980, pp. 272-8. African Business, November 1982, p. 48. Ibid., July 1984, p. 26. Cf. The Economist (London), June 19, 1982. African Business, November 1982. Ibid. See ibid. Ibid. See J.S.H. Hunter and J.C. Wood, 'Australian Resource Development in the 1980s,' National Westminster Quarterly Review, November 1981, pp. 17-26, especially p. 18. See 'Supply Glut Threat to Uranium Industry/ in African Business, November 1982, p. 48. Ibid.

5 Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace

The place of South African and Namibian uranium in Pretoria's nuclear drive Apart from the usefulness of uranium in the nuclear development programs of the advanced industrialized countries, the commodity has equally been vital in South Africa's own nuclear development. It was largely because of the early realization of the strategic importance of uranium that the Republic adopted policies which gave Pretoria a free hand over the uranium resources in both Namibia and South Africa. Thus, the South African Atomic Energy Act was passed as far back as 1948. It gave the Republic the sole rights to prospect, mine, process, sell and transport the country's uranium. In 1967, section 36 was added to the Act. It declared that the Act's provisions also applied to South West Africa. In that same year, and to maintain a cloak of secrecy around Pretoria's use of uranium for its nuclear program, the so-called Terrorism Act was passed. It imposes heavy fines and imprisonment for the disclosure of information relating to the production or use of uranium in South Africa or Namibia. Then in 1974, the Uranium Enrichment Act was passed. It states in no uncertain terms that any amount of uranium from South Africa and Namibia could be obtained and used as required by the South African government. And bearing in mind that the Rossing mine alone has an estimated life span of twenty-five years with a projected output of 100,000 tonnes of uranium oxide, Namibia's uranium resource is an important asset in the Republic's nuclear drive.1 South Africa's original entry into the periphery of the nuclear world itself dates back to the 1940s. It was during this period that the Combined Development Agency (CDA), organized by the governments of the United States and Britain, conducted a worldwide search for uranium reserves. In the process, South Africa's vast reserves were

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 99 discovered. Within time, these two foremost capitalist powers had begun negotiations with South Africa for uranium supplies for their nuclear weapons development. By 1945, the three countries had jointly organized a nuclear research program. And by the 1950s, both the United States and Britain had become established regular buyers of South Africa's uranium. American access to the South African uranium, in particular, was an important factor in the rapid build-up of its nuclear arsenal during the most frosty phase of the Cold War. Altogether, the Americans bought 43,000 tonnes of the commodity for their nuclear weapons' program at a cost of $1,000 million.2 The magnitude of South Africa's uranium supplies to both Britain and the United States had, by 1977, made the Republic the third largest supplier of this vital commodity in the western world. 3 Looking critically at the case of South Africa, it is difficult to rationalize the country's nuclear program; at least in terms of peaceful purposes. To the extent that the Republic is served principally by thermal power stations based on large coal reserves, as well as by hydroelectric power stations, one can say that nuclear power is not critical to South Africa's electricity requirements. True, the Republic lacks any major natural deposits of petroleum, but, the lack of the resource is being met by the production of oil from coal by the South African Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL). All the Corporation's plants (SASOL I, II and III), which have recently attained full operational capacity, were built by Fluor, an American construction company at a cost of R3.3 billion. It is envisaged that by 1985, these three plants will provide 47 percent of the country's liquid fuel requirements at the 1978 level of consumption. 4 Even if one is willing to concede that South Africa wants nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (which certainly is not the case), that, in itself, highlights the cornerstone of the contemporary nuclear dilemma, namely, the indivisibility of the peaceful and military uses of atomic energy. Admittedly, this dilemma applies to other nations. But, it is of major relevance in the case of South Africa; since, the Republic can 'by "peaceful" exploitation of nuclear technology, through deals with multinational companies desperate for profit, reasonably acquire the means to inflict their own "Hiroshimas" and "Nagasakis." ' 5 The fact that some outsiders take the view that South Africa's nuclear quest cannot be fully justified has not slowed or dampened the Republic's enthusiasm to become a nuclear power. Nor is South Africa's nuclear ambition a recent one. Indeed, no sooner was the South African Atomic Energy Board formed in 1957 than Washington

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signed a separate agreement for nuclear cooperation with Pretoria. The agreement was reviewed, amended and renewed in 1962, 1967 and 1974, respectively, so as to extend its scope and duration till 2007. It was in pursuance of the terms of the agreement, and to enable South Africa to gain nuclear technological expertise, that the Americans constructed Safari I, a light-water research reactor, at Pelindaba in 1961. By 1965, the reactor had become operational. While Britain and the United States supplied the required enriched uranium, West Germany and France provided the equipment. The other research reactor, Safari II, locally designed and built by the South Africans themselves, became operational in 1967. As in the case of the former, the enriched uranium was supplied from the West — this time solely from the United States, fabricated into fuel elements by Britain.6 Although South Africa had relied on foreign powers for the supply of enriched uranium for Safari I and II, it was also preoccupied with ways of enriching uranium locally. By 1970, Prime Minister Vorster was able to announce triumphantly in parliament that the South African Atomic Energy Board had successfully pioneered a new process for enriching uranium which was quite 'unique in its concept';7 and that the government proposed to invest £28 million in a pilot plant for its development. 8 The 'unique' discovery led to the establishment of Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) to process uranium, with the objective of turning Pretoria into an independent manufacturer of nuclear fuels. Similarly, the promised pilot plant for enriching uranium was established at Valindaba, next to Pelindaba. It started operating in 1975, and by 1980 it had begun producing fifty tonnes of commercial grade uranium a year. It was this initial success story that led the South Africans to seriously toy, at one stage, with the idea of having a much larger plant that could produce as much as 5,000 to 6,000 tonnes per annum, and so launch the Republic as a major exporter of enriched uranium. However, the anticipated costs, as well as the difficulty in raising sufficient capital for the purpose, led to a substantial modification of the plan. But, even so, the initial plant was expanded on a relatively small scale to satisfy the fuel load requirements of South Africa's nuclear program. Equally, too and with the assistance of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), a new plant had been established at Pelindaba to manufacture uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous form of uranium needed for the enrichment process. While it may seem that the Republic's earlier hopes of becoming a major international supplier of enrichment services have, for the time

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 101 being, been disappointed, there is, as Richard Betts has put it, 'no physical barrier to indigenous production of substantial amounts of fissionable bomb-making material.'9 This aspect is quite important from the point of view of South Africa's military and nuclear interests; especially as that regime already possesses such delivery systems as Canberra B(l)12 and Buccaneer S-50 bombers, as well as a variety of Mirage aircraft which have the necessary range for operations in virtually all parts of southern Africa.10 Pretoria has been jealously guarding its new enrichment process, claiming that it is relatively cheap and simple. Even though South Africa has several plants for manufacturing the materials necessary to transform raw uranium into nuclear fuels or explosives, its ability to enrich uranium is most significant. Admittedly, and as we have amply demonstrated in the last chapter, South Africa is a major producer of natural uranium, with known and exploitable reserves in Namibia and the Republic estimated to be at least 300,000 tonnes; all the same, it had hitherto lacked the means to enrich the commodity and so make the production of weapon-grade material possible. Even though the idea has been temporarily shelved, South Africa still nurses the ambition to have a full-scale commercial enrichment plant at Valindaba that could produce between 5,000 to 6,000 tonnes of enriched uranium per year. To be able to meet this production target, South Africa will require a throughput of 20,000 tonnes of uranium oxide per year, which could be obtained only with the inclusion of Rossing or other Namibian uranium. Meanwhile, the Republic has energetically been stockpiling the commodity for its enrichment program, while it continues to draw up long-term contracts for Rossing uranium. As far as Pretoria is concerned, the uranium enrichment process has its obvious advantages. First, militarily, the possession of an enrichment facility prevents unnecessary reliance on foreign suppliers for any domestic nuclear program. Second, the facility enhances the value of the uranium reserves by giving South Africa the capacity to export this commodity in enriched form. Third, it will enable the Republic to increase its income from uranium exports.11 And, lastly, the long-term contracts for enriched uranium stand to draw the affected western countries still closer, both diplomatically and politically, to the Republic. South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty A major reason for South Africa being able to push ahead with its

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nuclear ambitions is not unconnected with Pretoria's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The Republic is therefore not obliged to observe the internationally-prescribed safeguards to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Simply put, South Africa is not prepared to give an NPT pledge to renounce nuclear weapons. The fact that the country can enrich enough uranium each year for use in its two nuclear power stations, coupled with the fact that there are abundant uranium reserves in Namibia and South Africa, should frighten lovers of world peace in general, and advocates of non-proliferation in particular. Despite its clear superiority over its neighbors in conventional weapons, South Africa has maintained a special interest in developing nuclear arms and several experts believe that it has already put together a bomb. In any case, South Africa is increasingly classified as a suspected nuclear weapons state, 'widely reputed to have constructed or to be able to construct within a very few hours several nuclear weapons.' 12 Besides, the Republic has an impressive arsenal of the world's most deadly artillery systems, including a 155-mm cannon capable of firing 'nuclear bullets' that can pack a 3-kiloton payload.13 Whatever doubts the international community might have had about South Africa's nuclear prowess disappeared in September 1979, when American and Soviet spy satellites detected a double flash of light in the South Atlantic. Many experts realized that the blip was a South African nuclear test. What, perhaps, many analysts did not know at the time, or even now, was that the exercise was a joint effort of the Israelis and the South Africans. As Amos Perlmutter and others have since pointed out, 'the explosion in September 1979 was a joint experiment by the RSA [i.e. Republic of South Africa] and Israel in one of the most advanced tactical nuclear systems known to be used anywhere in the world.'14 Naturally, Pretoria, which is well used to making robust diplomatic statements, denied that the blast was a nuclear test.15 Barely a year after the nuclear test, it was announced that the Republic had become the fifth country in the world to succeed in heating material to temperatures found in the interior of the sun and holding the resultant 'plasma' stable for a period. The nuclear fusion process took place in a tokamak device designed and built in Pelindaba. As Cervenka has reminded us, once the process has been perfected, it will be possible to use deuterium fuel obtainable from seawater. The extent of the usefulness of this approach can be

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 103 visualized when one realizes that 'the fusion energy content of 1 g of deuterium is equal to that of 8,000 litres of petrol.' South Africa demonstrated its deep interest in the system when, in 1981, it commissioned the '3.5m gamma irradiation plant' at Isondo near Johannesburg. 16 The collaboration of the West in South Africa's nuclear development An important characteristic of South Africa's nuclear development program is the impact of the collaboration of some of the Western powers in the project. This is visible in all aspects of the program. Even the so-called breakthrough in devising an indigenous method for enriching uranium has some foreign content. The technique was developed by South Africa with the close collaboration and help of West Germany, following a 1962 cultural agreement. And prior to the setting up of UCOR in 1970, four South Africans had been trained in the necessary jet-nozzle techniques at Karlsruhe. 17 Moreover, it was STEAG, a West German parastatal agency, that helped UCOR to establish the pilot enrichment process at Valindaba, 'and in return, held the right to process uranium through the plant and use it for fuel elsewhere in its commercial activities.' Although the Germans withdrew in 1976, 'the technology of enrichment had already been "licensed" to South Africa.'18 STEAG's collaboration with Pretoria in the development of nuclear weapons represents an evasion of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty signed after World War II, which stipulates that West Germany cannot acquire a nuclear capability.19 The West's cooperation and assistance to South Africa's nuclear program and development is not limited to the Valindaba project nor confined to the West Germans. In addition to Britain and the United States supplying enriched uranium to Safari I and II, there are still other areas of cooperation. The two large nuclear power reactors at Koeberg, for example, each capable of generating 920 megawatts, were recently completed by a French consortium at an estimated cost of $2,000 million. While the enriched uranium for these reactors will be supplied by the Americans under a long-term agreement with South Africa, fabrication into fuel rods will be carried out by Eurofuel, a Belgian-French company. 20 Apart from the fact that the bulk of the required finance for the Koeberg project was provided by a group of Paris banks, France has, in addition, trained the 100 South African technicians who will operate

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the installation. At the 1983 UN conference on Namibia which took place in Paris, France was heavily criticized over its nuclear cooperation with South Africa in building the Koeberg power station. Such was the level of the hostility displayed against France that Paul Lusaka, Chairman of the UN Council on Namibia, showed some embarrassment when delegates, one after the other, spoke angrily about France's other extensive links with the Republic. In particular, delegates stressed France's trade relations with South Africa and its imports of Namibian uranium. In reply to a question from a French journalist, at a press conference later, Chairman Lusaka could only say that it was up to individual French citizens to exert pressure on their government. 21 Yet, on the eve of his election as President in May 1981, Mitterrand had actually advocated a two-pronged policy of economic sanctions against South Africa, including a halt to public investment and aid for private investment in that country, linked with development aid to the frontline states and political support for liberation movements. But so far the Mitterrand Administration has shown reluctance to live up to all its initial promises concerning South Africa. True, the Administration has allowed SWAPO and ANC to open offices in Paris and has increased contacts with the frontline states; nevertheless, ParisPretoria economic and military ties have continued to blossom. South Africa still ranks third among France's trading partners in Africa;22 French nationalized banks still make loans to the Republic; the stateowned Renault car company recently invested $40 million in its South African subsidiary to start manufacturing the R9 Saloon, and new industrial contracts continue to be signed frequently.23 One of the most glaring French inconsistencies, and seriously worrying in relation to nuclear proliferation, was the recent revelation by France's active anti-apartheid movement, the MA A, that Paris was seriously considering the idea of approving a $1 billion deal to build a second nuclear power station in South Africa. Admittedly, a letter from President Mitterrand's special adviser on Africa, Guy Penne, had later stated that the evaluation by ministers of the implications of the contract had been suspended. All the same, this was only because the South Africans had given no date at which tenders would be invited, even though they had approached the Framatome consortium, which built Koeberg.24 The MAA has now launched a campaign designed to make the French government live up to its principles. To this end, it published a twelve-point Charter, based on the final resolution of the May 1981

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 105 Paris conference on sanctions against apartheid at which France's newly-elected Socialist Party raised hopes which are yet to be fulfilled. The Charter demands the withdrawal of French licenses to manufacture South Africa's Mirage jets and other weapons, an oil embargo, a move towards ending unnecessary dependence on imported South African coal and the ending of nuclear collaboration, imports of Namibian uranium and investments, including state-backed export credit guarantees. 25 However, for all the calls of the MAA and in spite of the socialist rhetoric of the Mitterrand Administration, it is doubtful if Paris seriously contemplates severing economic, political and military ties with South Africa. In fact, it is extremely doubtful if any of the core capitalist powers can afford to do so. South African contracts still offer a major avenue through which the West can constantly cooperate or collaborate. Let us take the Koeberg project, again. Here, even Britain played a role; its contribution came via a £600 million loan by Barclays Bank. The impact of the West's collaboration over Koeberg can roughly be surmised from the project's operations. When fully operational, the nuclear power reactors could produce 400 kilograms of plutonium per year, 'which is enough to produce a Nagasaki-type bomb every week.'26 No wonder, therefore, that a number of analysts have concluded that the Republic's capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons has been enhanced considerably by the Koeberg reactors and that military use could be made of their plutonium byproduct. 27 The plutonium element cannot be brushed aside lightly. Even if the Koeberg plant only diverts a mere 5 percent of the plutonium which it generates as a by-product to military use, it could provide enough weapons-grade material to build a bomb a year. Three recently available techniques could speed up the timetable for South Africa. First, centrifuge high-enrichment equipment makes it easier to boost the 3 percent uranium used in power stations to the 93 percent enriched uranium used for weapons-grade. Second, the fast breeder technology produces a greater quantity of plutonium than the uranium it burns. The third breakthrough is the 'reprocessing' method. It is significant that France, which is the Western power most involved in the Koeberg plant, is one of the few countries that have so far mastered the last technology. The French, mindful of the wider ramifications of the plutonium byproduct at the Koeberg plant, and in a bold attempt to stem hostile

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international public opinion, have stated that South Africa would not be allowed to have access to it. According to the explanation, the spent fuel from the reactors would be returned to France for reprocessing and the plutonium would not be sent back to the Republic.28 Needless to add, the French government has merely given a convenient diplomatic explanation of the circumstances; and critical analysts are not easily fooled. With advanced technologies available to South Africa, thanks to France, it is clear that the ostensibly peaceful nuclear program at Koeberg can easily be 'weaponized.' France, like West Germany, has also been involved in the transfer of uranium enrichment process technology to South Africa.29 Furthermore, France has collaborated with the Republic in jointly developing the 'Crotale' missiles. These deadly missiles are now manufactured under license in South Africa.30 Paris's defense for all these extensive ties with South Africa is that the Mitterrand Administration would increase France's diplomatic and political support to African liberation movements; at least, that is how Claude Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister, has put it.31 It is clear that economics has always been a deciding factor in the French collaboration with the South Africans. Certainly, the influence of uranium cannot be ignored. France imports 4,000 tonnes of uranium oxide a year from the Republic and Namibia. This figure has been projected to rise by an extra 1,000 tonnes a year by the end of 1984.32 Apart from uranium, French imports from South Africa include gold and other minerals as well as textiles and agricultural produce, mainly fruit. In 1981, for example, France's imports stood at FF5 billion. On the other hand, its exports to the Republic, including machine tools, electrical equipment and spare parts, stood at an annual FF4 billion. In spite of the importance of its exports, the role of uranium, especially its exploitation in Namibia, is of paramount importance to Paris; both in terms of the profit yields and as a strategic input for France's nuclear technology and development. This is especially true when we bear in mind that, at the aggregate level, the country's trade with South Africa amounts to less than one percent of its total foreign trade; and that black Africa's trade with France amounts to 10 percent of total French foreign trade. 33 The United States has been intimately involved in South Africa's defense and nuclear development too. The American cooperation dates back, in more recent times, to the time of the Nixon presidency (1968-73). During this period, the South Africans received helicopters and executive jet aircraft which were easily convertible to internal

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 107 security use; spare parts for C-130 transport planes; four IBM computers for the South African Defense Department and 'two Foxboro computers for a secret uranium enrichment plant/ 34 Since then, the United States, under successive administrations, has been supplying enriched uranium to the Republic. The Americans have also supplied Pretoria with modern artillery delivery systems, including the 155mm cannon series, to which we referred earlier. Indeed, South Africa has since been manufacturing this type of G5 howitzer, described as the world's best, most accurate, and destructive cannon. 35 Some analysts have even suggested that the 1979 South African nuclear blast must have been fired from one of these howitzers. Cervenka, for one, shares this view. He contends that: 'the height of the explosion — eight kilometres — was also commensurate with the capabilities of a howitzer. This could have been placed on one of South African warships which had been sighted in the South Atlantic on the night of the explosion.'36 While it is true that a howitzer had been used for the South African nuclear test, it was of a special type and the 155mm cannon 'was built by an American company called Space Research.' 'This special cannon,' Perlmutter et al tell us, 'was purchased by Israel and the Republic of South Africa which succeeded in by-passing American, British and Canadian control systems.' 37 Apart from howitzers, the Americans also supplied the Republic with 300,000 shell casings — enough for delivering a two-to-three kiloton nuclear device — which might have been used for the South African blast, since the device fell within the estimated yield of the explosion. The South Africans obtained the shell casings, and the parts as well as the technological know-how for the local manufacture of howitzers, from Space Research Corporation, between October 1976 and September 1977. The close collaboration between Space Research and South Africa was facilitated by the fact that the Republic had secretly obtained 20 percent of the shares in the Corporation through a Dutchbased front organization. Similarly, by virtue of its investment in Space Research, South Africa had also gained access to its nuclear know-how. Exposure led to the Corporation being fined for violating the UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa, and to the top executives being jailed.38 Reportedly, the deal with Space Research had been set up by the CIA, with the connivance of the United States' State Department and the Pentagon, in an attempt to give South Africa military superiority in the 1975 war with Angola. As for the casings, Washington gave the

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necessary permission to have shells forged at an American army munitions plant, ostensibly for a contract with Israel. The State Department insisted that the incomplete shells were not weapons as such and, therefore, did not need an export license. The shells were subsequently finished-off in Canada and exported to Antigua, where they were picked up by the South African ship Tugelaland. When the whole exercise was exposed, the next shipment was routed through Spain.39 As with France, South Africa's uranium has been an important factor in Pretoria-Washington collaboration. Indeed, uranium was at the heart of the 1957 United States-South African nuclear cooperation agreement, which has been repeatedly renewed and is now valid until the year 2007. Basically, the United States, 'in return for an assured uranium supply, developed a uranium mining and nuclear processing industry in South Africa.'40 The most notable American contribution to South Africa's nuclear development is the first research reactor, the Safari I. Modelled on the Oak Ridge reactor in Tennessee, and acquired in 1961 from the American company, Allis- Chambers, the reactor became operational in 1965. Although it is fuelled by highly enriched weapons-grade uranium, American cooperation did not include the transfer of enrichment technology, But this, as we have already seen, proved a minor handicap, since the West Germans assisted Pretoria in that direction. It is necessary, at this stage, to explain why South Africa still imports enriched uranium when it has the facilities to produce the material at home. A major reason is that the Valindaba enrichment plant is a pilot facility and can only enrich small amounts of uranium up to 45 percent; whereas, for weapons-grade material, 93 percent enrichment is needed. To reduce this partial dependence on foreign powers, South Africa plans to have a full-scale nuclear enrichment plant operating by the mid-1980s.41 Even if the plant should produce sufficient fuel to meet the Republic's needs, Pretoria's foreign dependence on Western powers cannot be totally eliminated since it still lacks the capability to fabricate the enriched uranium into fuel rods for insertion into the reactor core.42 Meanwhile, the United States exports enriched uranium to South Africa in the form of fabricated fuel elements. On some occasions, however, Britain has also assisted in the fabrication process, usually at Harwell with the consent of UKAEA.43 Admittedly, the United States under Jimmy Carter had taken the lead among the industrialized

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 109 states in criticizing nuclear sales to Third World countries and restricted the sale of enriched uranium to South Africa until it signs the NPT and opens up its plants to inspection. For obvious reasons, Pretoria refused to do both of these. Theoretically, the Reagan Administration endorses the Carter line. In reality, the policy has been quietly reversed. Defending the apparent change in policy, Washington argued that the move was essential if only 'to open a new chapter in relations with South Africa' and 'to end South Africa's polecat status in the world/ 44 The Americans have been careful not to supply the enriched uranium openly and directly to the Republic but do so surreptitiously through some key Western powers. These powers normally manufacture the enriched uranium into fuel rods before sending them to South Africa.45 The Reagan Administration has been known to have exerted pressures on some of the Western powers to ensure that the Republic is not deprived of essential enriched uranium. Sometimes, too, the Americans resort to shady deals with some Western TNCs to get the commodity to South Africa. The South African Atomic Energy Board recently confirmed, for example, that its Koeberg reactor would, in spite of the purported ban on sales by the United States, 'be using a supply of enriched uranium bought from a Swiss firm through an American one in a notably devious transaction/46 The case of France possibly epitomizes the application of American pressure on some of the Western powers. Here, the Reagan Administration did what it could to prevail on the French to manufacture the enriched uranium into fuel rods for the Koeberg nuclear reactors. Since Framatome, the French company, was to carry out the fabrication, and since the company was one-third government owned, the Mitterrand Administration could have cancelled the contract. In the event, France went ahead with the deal. Certainly, 'the French move came, admit State Department sources, after discussions on the matter between Washington and Paris/ 47 A secret South African memorandum on nuclear ties with the United Stated obtained by Transafrica, the Washington-based black lobby group on Africa, gave some valuable insight into the background of the American intervention. The relevant part of the memorandum entitled 'What South Africa Requests/ demands that: 'If the US feels it cannot supply the enriched uranium through France timeously for the Koeberg reactors . . . that the US make it known to France that it would not insist on the conditions imposed unilaterally on South Africa after the signature of the original supply contract/ 48

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As the South Africans have often reminded the United States and France, the Koeberg nuclear power station was built on the assurance that these two Western powers would provide the necessary enriched uranium fuel.49 Washington has confirmed the South African statement, pointing out that the United States, together with France, has commitments under contracts with Pretoria: while the French assist in building nuclear reactors, the Americans help to maintain them. In a sense, the Reagan Administration's posture should not come as a surprise. In fact, in May 1982, the United States Commerce Secretary, Malcolm Baldrige, stated quite openly that, although there could be no nuclear 'cooperation' with South Africa until it accepted the NPT, 'a more flexible policy' had been adopted on certain sales to it; and that five sales of sophisticated equipment had been approved in the previous two years. It is an open secret that 'some of the items sold could clearly be used for military nuclear development.' 50 One such sale took place in April 1982, when the Commerce Department, with no public announcement, approved Pretoria's purchase of a Cyber 750 computer from the Control Data Corporation, despite objections by critics that the sophisticated system would certainly be used to advance a South African nuclear-weapons program. A bipartisan group of congressmen that included Howard Wolpe, Bill Gray, Paul Tsongas and Rudy Boschwitz fought energetically, though without any success, to sponsor legislation to block the sale. Equally, there was internal debate within the Reagan Administration over the wisdom of the sale. President Reagan and the powerful South African supporters in the Administration held their ground to the very end. Even the argument that the computer could be used to help the South Africans decipher United States intelligence cryptography failed to stop the American sale.51 It is clear from our analysis thus far that, in an attempt to further solidify Washington's alliance with Pretoria, the Reagan Administration has, by issuing licenses for the sale of advanced modern sophisticated computers and devices for testing ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, strengthened the Republic's military might and nuclear capability. In rationalizing these sales, and to camouflage the direct assistance to South Africa's nuclear potential, the Reagan Administration has argued that all the equipment has 'double-purpose/ and, therefore, they could also be used for peaceful purposes. 52 Whatever may be the arguments of Washington for collaborating with Pretoria, most analysts understand the wider ramifications of

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 111 such a policy. Just as they know, too, the implications of the West's regular supplies of enriched uranium for South Africa's nuclear reactors. Indeed, in this latter case, to the extent that the Western powers have supplied enough enriched uranium to South Africa until such a time as it could conveniently provide all its requirements at home, these powers have dealt a serious blow to the idea of nuclear non-proliferation. This observation has serious implications for mankind, if we bear in mind that the Western powers have nursed South Africa's growth in the production of enriched uranium to such an extent that it could easily become, as Manning has put it, an 'outlaw' nuclear supplier to any country that wanted to buy the material for peaceful or military purposes. 53 It is pertinent to mention that when eventually South Africa's own full-scale commercial uranium enrichment plant becomes fully operational, the country would have to find a market for up to 6,000 tonnes of enriched uranium a year. With the Republic's refusal to require safeguards, countries unable or unwilling to meet the restrictions imposed by present uranium suppliers could easily find a supplier in South Africa. In such an eventuality, Pretoria would become a major agent in the destruction of effective control on the spread of nuclear weapons. In other words then, the West has granted adequate nuclear collaboration to South Africa to make the Republic a major threat to international peace and security. We cannot conclude this section without mentioning the role of Israel, especially as it has ably assisted South Africa in developing its nuclear and military capability. As far back as 1968, the United States, according to Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, has assumed in its Middle East policy that 'Israel either possesses an atomic bomb or has component parts available for quick assembly.'54 By late 1973, Senator Adlai Stevenson, as a congressional authority on nuclear reactors, confirmed that Israel had become a member of the nuclear club. Three years later, the CIA claimed that Israel had ten to twenty bombs. 55 Since then Israel has perfected its nuclear technology and has been able to assist South Africa very effectively. Israel's spectacular success was specially highlighted in 1982 when CIA sources stated that the Jewish state had already stockpiled 200 operational nuclear warheads. 56 Several of these warheads are for tactical purposes, with a destruction power of less than 20 kilotons. Israel also has a variety of launching systems. The Phantom F-4E, the Israeli-made Kfir C2, or the F-15 and the F-16 are all fighters which can deliver the bomb. Aside from these, the Israelis have:

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at least three surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. There are two types of the Israeli-French-made Jericho: the MD660 with a range of 450 km; and the MD620 with a longer range and better navigation system. Israel also has the American-made Lance SS missile which was supplied after the Yom Kippur War. Its range is about 110 km, but American experts believe that it can carry a tactical nuclear 11 kg warhead of 1 kiloton to a range of 118 km. By using inertial navigation systems it is very accurate and can hit a target within a range of 70 km in CEP of 100 metres.57 In addition, Israel will have two other launching systems by the end of the 1980s. One of them will be a nuclear gun; the other is the Cruise mièsile58 Such a development would bring with it a second-strike capability for Israel. Bearing in mind that Israel has limited territorial space and manpower resources, the new launching systems would radically enhance her nuclear capability. Under these conditions then, one can fairly assume that Israel will move from a "bomb in the basement" strategy to an open and declared nuclear doctrine/ 59 It should be mentioned, in passing, that aside from its nuclear prowess and potential, Israel's stature in the field of conventional weapons has also been growing. Overall, by 1983, Israel had become the world's seventh largest armaments exporter (after the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, West Germany and Italy). Its arms and military software sales have doubled in five years, and, in 1982, exceeded $1.2 billion.60 The Israeli collaboration with South Africa has been rationalized by apologists of the Tel Aviv-Pretoria axis who argue that Israel and the Republic have so much in common. According to their explanation, both countries are engaged in a struggle for existence: and both are in constant clash with the decisive majorities in the UN. Both are reliable foci of strength within the region, which would, without them, fall into anti-western anarchy. It is in South Africa's interest that Israel is successful in containing her enemies, and Israel would have all the world against it if the navigation route around the Cape of Good Hope should be out of operation because South Africa's control is undermined. The antiwestern powers have driven Israel and South Africa in a community of interests which should be utilised rather than denied.61 Apart from the very strong economic ties between Israel and South Africa, there is also strong military cooperation. The military aspect gained added momentum when, as a result of the demise of the Portuguese empire, the then United States Secetary of State, Kissinger,

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 113 Israel's Defense Minister Allon, and the Prime Minister Vorster all met in Bavaria in 1976 to assess what they saw as a changed balance of power in southern Africa. From that point onwards, Israel's military collaboration with the Republic was intensified. Indeed, in that year, Marcia Freeman, an opposition member in the Knesset, revealed that hundreds of Israeli soldiers were attached to South African army units as instructors and participated in training maneuvers. 62 Israel's assistance to the South Africans also included the building of six long-range fast warships equipped with Gabriel sea-to-sea missiles, two dozen Kaffir jet planes and highly advanced electronic equipment. 63 Furthermore, the Israelis were said to have helped Pretoria in the planning of its Angolan campaigns and in teaching South African soldiers the techniques for evacuation and treatment of front-line casualties. Similarly, Israeli soldiers have, reportedly, also fought against SWAPO forces.64 Collaboration has been quite extensive, too, on the nuclear level. For example, Israel and South Africa are developing a Cruise missile with a range of 2,400 kilometers (1,500 miles), a neutron bomb and various nuclear delivery systems.65 In spite of the extent of Israel's involvement in South Africa's nuclear program, Tel Aviv still, for largely diplomatic reasons, denies any such cooperation. This denial is quite understandable especially as the military aspects are internationally embarrassing for Israel, not only because they represent defiance of the Security Council's arms embargo against South Africa but also because they involve the highly sensitive field of nuclear technology. While Israeli-South African agreements are veiled in secrecy, the importance of uranium as a crucial factor in the deals cannot be denied. It has even been suggested that Israel is exchanging its nuclear knowhow for regular supplies of uranium from South Africa and Namibia.66 Another critical factor in Tel Aviv's close military collaboration with Pretoria is the role of the Americans. Indeed, some United States State Department officials have openly admitted the need for close strategic ties between the three countries. Furthermore, these officials have also admitted that Israel tends to make life a lot easier for the United States by supplying arms in abundance to regimes that the Reagan Administration feels it cannot support so strongly or so openly.67 After all, as the Americans themselves realize, Israel operates in the international political system without all the 'restrictions' imposed on them. Most importantly, from the South African context, Israel does not have to explore the savage abuse of human rights by Pretoria.68

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The Israeli military assistance to South Africa has, for good measure, been extended to some of the so-called 'independent homelands/ The most recent case is that of Ciskei. After the visit of that territory's President, Chief Lennox Sebe, to Israel in March 1983, he announced that Israel would provide weapons and training to Ciskei's small 'Combined Forces/ which include an army, a central intelligence service and police force. Apart from helping to train the nucleus of a future Ciskeian air force, Israel will, in addition, establish a pilot training school in the 'homeland/ 69 It should be emphasized that whatever military aid Israel may grant to Ciskei will fall strictly within the confines of conventional weapons. Finally, it has been claimed that the People's Republic of China is an additional source of enriched uranium for South Africa. Chinese officials, for their part, have denied ever selling such material to Pretoria. It is possible, of course, that any purchase of the enriched uranium might have gone through an advanced capitalist state's agent. For example, South African diplomatic sources admit that there is significant trade between Pretoria and Beijing that goes on through Hong Kong.70 And these sources have not denied that China, in return for the supplies of enriched uranium, might be interested in South Africa's advanced coal-gasification technology for its own massive coal reserves. 71 It is also possible that, given the apparent state of the confidential relations between the United States and China in the early 1980s, the Chinese might have been approached for the favor by the Americans. In other words, the deliveries of enriched uranium to South Africa might have been assigned to China by the United States.72 However, for now at least, there has been no hard evidence to buttress the allegation of a clandestine deal between Washington and Beijing. Looked at more critically, and given South Africa's stated aversion for communism, Pretoria may not be too comfortable in maintaining any significant military collaboration with China. This line of argument is strengthened by the fact that there is a measure of nuclear collaboration between the Republic and Taiwan73 which would not endear South Africa to China; Taiwan regularly uses the Republic's uranium to fuel its nuclear power stations. Besides, during a recent visit to Taiwan, Prime Minister Botha used the opportunity to engage in a brisk indirect propaganda war against China. The South African leader, who had warmly spoken about military cooperation and nuclear collaboration between Formosa and his country maintained that the two states were determined to fight communist expansionism

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 115 and domination. 74 Given China's well-known ambitions regarding Taiwan, the object of such an attack is quite clear. In sum, the advanced capitalist states are firmly behind the transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa, and of assisting the Republic to perfect the deadly art. To this end, each of these Western powers cooperates with Pretoria in flagrant violation of the NPT, which expressly prohibits a state with nuclear weapon capability from assisting or aiding any non-nuclear weapon country to attain such a status.75 The market potential of South Africa's rapidly growing defense budget as well as the other economic and military benefits that have steadily accrued to them over the years are deemed to be stronger considerations than the threat which Pretoria's nuclear arsenal and capability poses to world peace. Need South Africa become a nuclear power? A pertinent question to ask at this stage is: does South Africa need to become a nuclear power? From Pretoria's standpoint, the arguments are compelling. First, to the extent that South Africa has never been a party to the NPT, it is not duty bounol to respect the norms prescribed by the treaty. Second, South Africa has made such phenomenal progress in the manufacture of conventional weapons that it seems logical to cap it with nuclear power. There has been, for well over five years, a UN embargo which banned military sales to the apartheid regime; and, by 1982, the Republic had emerged as the noncommunist world's tenth-ranked weapons producer. 76 Third, the attainment of black majority rule in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola introduced a new dimension to South Africa's immediate external environment, by posing a security threat to the Republic — at least, until the celebrated 1983 Nkomati Accord was concluded between Maputo and Pretoria. The availability of a nuclear bomb, therefore, would clearly show the superiority of the security machine of the Pretoria regime. Similarly, and fourth, the domestic and external implications of the conflict with SWAPO in Namibia and the activities of the African National Congress in the Republic, highlight the 'advantages' of possessing a nuclear device safely tucked away in the basement. Closely allied to the latter point is the fifth factor: the nuclear option would offer a solid base for the maintenance of apartheid by providing a major leverage for restraining internal dissent and external pressure. Sixth, is the impact of the 'Communist threat' in Africa and

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elsewhere. In this regard, Cuban and Soviet assistance to both Ethiopia and Angola, as well as the increased presence of the Russians in the gulf region and the Indian Ocean demonstrate the need, once again, for Pretoria to carry the 'big stick/ Seventh, and last, given the Republic's phobia for communism, and the apparent lack of total commitment to the South African cause by the West, in particular the failure of the industrial democracies to integrate South Africa openly into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Pretoria has clearly realized the need to possess the ultimate weapon in a 'hostile' world, where the leading Eastern and Western powers all have sophisticated nuclear arsenals. In spite of these factors being so compelling from South Africa's perspective, Pretoria has so far been reluctant to admit openly that it is already a nuclear power. Nevertheless, this caution has not been total, and often additional meanings could be read into the pronouncements of South African leaders. A brief glance at some of these statements illustrates this point. In 1976, Prime Minister Vorster pointed out that although the Republic was interested in the peaceful applications of nuclear power, it could enrich uranium and 'we did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.'77 A year later, Connie Mulder, the Minister for Information, argued that 'if we are attacked, no rules apply at all if it comes to the question of our existence. We will use all means at our disposal, whatever they may be.' 78 Then in October 1980, a senior South African naval officer reiterated more or less the same theme when he argued that the Republic reserved the right, should the need arise, to put to practical use her undoubted nuclear expertise.79 Similarly, Senator Horwood, as South Africa's Finance Minister, declared that if Pretoria 'wishes to use its nuclear potential for other than peaceful purposes, it will jolly well do it according to our decision and our judgement.' 80 Thus, while the Republic has consistently denied that it has made any nuclear tests, it has continued, nevertheless, to make veiled threats about its possible course of action in the future. It could well be that Pretoria, by openly denying that it has a forbidden arsenal, was adopting the stereotyped strategy of a budding nuclear power. As Thomas Schelling has put it, the announcement of a nuclear capability by denial, 'is a believable tactic.'81 That is, by conducting nuclear tests and subsequently denying them, South Africa has succeeded in letting everybody know that it has, in fact, become a nuclear power. After all, 'there is nothing about "mere" announcement that precludes becoming more explicit later.'82 In other

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 117 words, the South Africans could, when they feel that they are ready, still fully acknowledge their nuclear capability in spite of any previous repeated denials. In any event, such South African denials are essentially geared towards stemming the magnitude of the hostility of the liberal medium powers as well as the Third World countries. The leading Great Powers have, as we have seen, collaborated with Pretoria in its nuclear program; so, evidently they know the real truth. While some of these powers have openly 'criticized' the Republic's nuclear activities, others prefer to turn a blind eye and still cooperate fully with the South Africans. Reagan's United States, for instance, falls into the latter category. A convenient excuse that is acceptable to both Washington and Pretoria for embarking on such a policy is the Soviet factor, or, rather, the perceived 'Communist threat' in southern Africa and the Indian Ocean.83 On this score alone, the Republic thinks that it ought to pursue fully a comprehensive nuclear program. Such a policy is even necessary, in Washington's calculations, to complement the American strategic installations and policies in Africa and the Indian Ocean.84 The Reagan Administration accepts in toto whatever propaganda the Pretoria authorities may care to give about the Soviets. As we saw in the last chapter, Washington and South Africa have even made the 'Communist threat' argument an important aspect of the Namibian issue. Simply put, they have advanced the thesis that any meaningful Namibian settlement must be contingent upon the Cuban troops leaving Angola. This posture fails to address itself to the central issue. And that is precisely why Gutteridge argues that the Reagan Administration has been obsessed by the communist threat, 'focussing on the symptom of Cuban presence rather than tackling the cause of its continuance.' 85 Insofar as both South Africa and the United States continue to provide political and material support to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA's operations in Angola, the MPLA administration will be committing political suicide to ask the internationalist forces of Cuba to quit Angola. In fact, to ask the Cubans to leave the country while UNITA still continues with its destabilization operations, with the active backing of Pretoria and Washington, is to give Savimbi an invitation to assume power in Luanda on a platter of gold. No wonder the Santos government says it can only agree to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops when Namibia (where UNITA sometimes retreats) attains genuine independence and the South African threat to Angola's security ceases.86

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At any rate, the so-called 'linkage' argument about the Namibian settlement and the Cuban presence in Angola is nothing but a ruse. Botha has stated over and over again that Pretoria would rather go to war than allow SWAPO to assume power in Namibia. He insists that the South Africans 'want an anti-Soviet black government' 87 — a Westernlooking regime that would not only sanction apartheid policies in Namibia and the Republic but that would also uphold the exploitation of the strategic minerals in these two countries by the Western powers and South Africa as well as their profit-hungry TNCs. Indeed, from Pretoria's perspective, the Soviet/Cuban factor is to be repelled largely because it may assist the leading liberation movements (SWAPO and ANC) to assume power in Namibia and the Republic. Such an eventuality, it is thought, would be fundamentally against the politico-economic interests of the Afrikaners and the West. This is a major reason why South Africa has gone nuclear. In this regard, and to woo the conservative elements and regimes in the advanced capitalist * countries, South Africa repeatedly emphasizes in the open that it is totally against any communist presence in Africa and constantly recycles its own, as well as the West's, propaganda about Moscow being committed to extending the Soviet influence over southern Africa as a means of denying strategic minerals to the West and of weakening, if not ultimately eliminating, the latter's position in the region. Given the construction of such a worst case scenario, the acquisition of nuclear capability could conveniently be rationalized; at least to the extent that 'a nuclear capability might seem attractive both as a deterrent and defense against an extension of Soviet power by military means.' 88 This argument cannot be fully sustained, however, in terms of the special circumstances of the Republic. By the nature of Pretoria's close links with the West, it would be foolhardy in the extreme, on the part of the Soviets, to expect that the leading Western powers would not readily come to the aid of South Africa should the USSR commit its conventional forces to the cause of ANC. In essence, the effective deterrent against any major Soviet military intervention would not be a tactical nuclear force, but the possibility — in the eyes of the Soviets — that the West would come to the aid of a beleagured white community with all that such a scenario implies in terms of escalation beyond the confines of the southern African region. Being good marxists, the Russians might well reason that a Western capitalist system could hardly fail to go to the aid of a state perceived as an integral part of that system.89

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 119 It could be argued, of course, that since some Western regimes sometimes pursue a not-too-friendly relationship with the Republic,90 the Botha regime might well have calculated that the worst could happen. In which case, the country might be deserted by even its most trusted allies in the West. In such an eventuality, a nuclear capability could, as Betts has argued, be a 'proportional deterrent, a tactical force de frappe: tactical to the Soviets, strategic to the South Africans.'91 However, it is extremely doubtful that all the leading Western allies of the Republic would be prepared to jettison it in the face of a serious external threat nor is it feasible to contemplate that Moscow would be determined to engage in a major risk-taking exercise of a type it has not so far demonstrated anywhere in Africa by physically committing its full military might in direct confrontation with Pretoria.92 This is not to suggest that the 'apartheid bomb' has no useful functions to perform in terms of the pursuit of the Republic's policies in Africa. Evidently, the rewards of a nuclear deterrent are much higher and more intimidating than the hitherto formidable conventional arms arsenal. Let us now turn to this aspect of the subject. South Africa's nuclear drive and black African states For obvious reasons, several black African countries see themselves as possible targets for South Africa's nuclear weapons. Their governments have watched over the years how successive regimes in Pretoria have continued to acquire arms on a massive scale, and indeed, some have experienced the Republic's raids, ostensibly in pursuit of the two liberation movements, SWAPO and the ANC. Given the history of such interventionist policies, particularly in the frontline states, some African leaders take the view that South Africa's nuclear weapons are meant to supplement, if not strengthen, whatever future pre-emptive action may be considered necessary by Pretoria. Another aspect is the consequence for South Africa's apartheid policy. Apart from nuclear power's utility in persuading the Western powers to accept the Republic fully as a dominant regional power and ally, it could be used, together with the existing military apparatus, to strengthen the apartheid regime. This would be both in terms of suppressing any internal resistance to apartheid policy and of demoralizing and restraining independent African states from pursuing militant anti-South African foreign policies. In this context, a nuclear blackmail, Pretoria hopes, would coerce African countries, especially the frontline ones whose capitals are all within the reach of

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its nuclear weapons, to stop supporting the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa itself. While, by 1984, South Africa had succeeded in using its obvious military strength and past destabilization policies in southern Africa to force the hands of some of the governments in the region — notably Mozambique and Swaziland — from allowing their territories to be used as the preparatory bases for the liberation movements' campaigns in the Republic; nonetheless, this argument still applies to other states that are hesitant to conclude any 'peace' accord with Pretoria. Also important is the point that nuclear might would boost the morale of some of the white South Africans who have been worried by the threat from the liberation movements and the international isolation of the country in world affairs. Nor must we forget that nuclear power stands to increase South Africa's bargaining strength in the Namibian talks, especially among the Western powers or, rather, the 'Contact Group.' To the extent that nuclear capability would strengthen Pretoria's hand of aggression against the black African states that cannot passively accept the status quo in Namibia and South Africa, it poses a major danger to African stability and peace. Certainly, the prospects of Pretoria's ability to threaten African states with nuclear weapons pose a grave danger to the national security of several African nations. It is noteworthy that many Western powers, which ought to recognize this point, still readily lend a helping hand to the implementation of South Africa's nuclear development program. Of course, the level of each Western power's collaboration with Pretoria has varied. Even among the NATO countries, there is no universal position on South Africa. Although there is a broad support and sympathy for the Republic, these powers are divided on what ought to be the organization's best policy in southern Africa. Some of these powers, for example, see the growth of national liberation movements as the greatest single threat to security in the region. Through this conservative prism, they consider South Africa as the only reliable ally in the region. In recent times the Nixon, Ford and Reagan Administrations have all assumed this posture. Other NATO powers, albeit just a handful, view national liberation movements as indigenous movements. They contend that South Africa's nuclear standing coupled with the Republic's other belligerent policies, will only drive these nationalist movements into the communist camp, the very situation which the former powers want to prevent and their rationale for warmly embracing the South African cause.

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 121 Interestingly, at the UN Council on Namibia's 1980 hearings, many individuals saw the clear linkage between the role of Western TNCs, the uranium rush in Namibia and the military strategy of certain NATO powers. Sean MacBride contended that once the Western powers, through tacit approval and effective collaboration, allow the Republic to become a nuclear power, it would constitute a threat to world peace. He also criticized, in particular, the growing contradiction in the United States policy which, while militantly arguing against nuclear proliferation in different international forums, also, with a similar intense interest, allows its TNCs to provide nuclear assistance to South Africa.93 When the UN Council on Namibia published its report on the 1980 hearings, it pointed out what everybody familiar with events in southern Africa already knew. It stated that Pretoria's principal collaborators, 'in particular the Western permanent members of the Security Council, are themselves displaying extreme cynicism' not only towards the decision of the General Assembly and the Security Council as they relate to Namibia and South Africa, but also, and perhaps more importantly, 'towards their responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security.'94 A chief culprit in this latter context is, once again, the United States. Its contradictory posture on preaching nuclear non-proliferation on the one hand and effectively collaborating with other states to ensure nuclear proliferation, on the other, is not limited to South Africa. Argentina is another example. In 1982, Buenos Aires was permitted to buy American and Swiss equipment that would help it to make nuclear weapons. The Reagan Administration approved the sale by a Massachusetts firm of a computerized control system for a large heavy-water plant. The sale, which would otherwise have been banned under the American 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, was approved because the control system was ostensibly being sold to the Swiss firm, Sulzer, which, in turn, was supplying Argentina with the complete heavy-water plant.95 Admittedly, in President Jimmy Carter's time, the Americans tried to stop the Sulzer deal. But the Swiss government had rejected Washington's argument that 'sensitive' equipment should not be sold to countries which, like Argentina and South Africa, refuse to allow inspection of all their nuclear facilities and reject the 1968 NPT. The Reagan Administration, instead of exerting maximum pressures on United States' treaty partners (such as Switzerland, for example) to respect the NPT, 'seems more interested in ensuring that American firms will get a piece of the pie.'96

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Theoretically, the 1978 Act not only bars the Americans from exporting certain sensitive items, but it also requires the United States to apply sanctions against any other states that export them. Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration's departure from President Carter's policies has led it towards encouraging American exports of a supremely sensitive technology. As the Washington Post pointed out at the time of the sale to Argentina this puts the United States in the position of'having a law on its books requiring sanctions against other nations for doing what it is proposing to do itself.'97 The existing nuclear-armed powers' failure to stop all weapons testing is often cited as one of the things that make it harder to induce other states, especially Third World countries like South Africa and Argentina, to renounce these weapons. And that is why the United States, along with the other advanced capitalist powers that assist these two states to build their nuclear arsenals, threaten world peace by helping to undermine the national security of many states in both Africa and Latin America. It should quickly be pointed out, however, that the danger that South Africa poses to world peace is greater than that of Argentina. This is because South Africa — like India, Israel or Pakistan — is much more securely placed on the nuclear ladder than Argentina. Argentina's nuclear ambitions, which have been visible ever since its original rejection of the NPT, have been spurred by its disastrous failure to annex the Falklands. When General Galtieri's junta collapsed and both the Navy and Air Force refused to fill posts in the new military regime, the Navy made one major exception; since it was responsible for running the National Atomic Energy Commission, it held on to it. Indeed, Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, Chairman of the Commission, had seized on Britain's use of nuclear-powered submarines in the Falklands conflict as a justification for openly admitting that he would no longer feel bound by any past pledges about Argentina's nuclear activities remaining strictly non-military.98 True, the Admiral said that Argentina would continue to comply with the limited bilateral safeguards agreements which it had had to sign in order to obtain various nuclear materials. But, he quickly added that these commitments would hardly inhibit his country once it ceases to depend on foreign supplies.99 Even as it is, Argentina has already been mining uranium and it expects to be producing heavy water — the moderator needed in its reactors — by 1984. Besides, the Latin American country is even building an unsafeguarded reprocessing plant which would extract plutonium from used reactor fuel.100

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 123 The chances of ever inducing Argentina to adhere to the NPT are thus dwindling, even under the civilian administration of President Alfonsin, 'all the faster because of other countries' eagerness to make sales that will speed Argentina on its way to nuclear independence/ 101 Apart from the United States and Switzerland, Argentina's major suppliers include Canada, West Germany, and the Soviet Union (which had recently put through a new sale of enriched uranium to Buenos Aires). Yet, all these are NPT signatories who do not seem unduly anxious to promote the treaty's aims, at least 'not if it means losing a lucrative deal.'102

South Africa and SATO The danger posed by South Africa to the stability of the international political system extends beyond Africa itself. This point was clearly driven home during the Falklands conflict between Britain and Argentina when, after an initial period of vacillation, during which Pretoria claimed that it was neutral in the crisis, the Republic supported Buenos Aires in the spirit of South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). SATO, as the acronym itself suggests, is the South Atlantic's equivalent of NATO. The idea of SATO first arose in the early 1960s, and South African and Argentinian military links can be traced back to at least 1967. The desirability for a treaty grew in 1968-9 when the Suez Canal was closed. It was thought that SATO would be used to protect the Cape route for oil tankers sailing through the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Through the 1970s there followed exchanges of military personnel between South Africa and Argentina and cooperation in naval exercises. Indeed, during this period and the early 1980s, several members of the Argentinian defense force underwent intelligence and military training in South Africa. To be sure, several Argentinian soldiers and seamen have passed through South African Defense Force training installations as part of the exchange program that is also believed to include other South American countries. While the troops underwent commando training at a naval college at Muizenberg near the gigantic Silvermine Maritime Command in the Cape Peninsula, others were instructed at Voortrekkerhoogte, the army and air force base in Pretoria. 103 The implementation of SATO was again promoted after the victory of the MPLA in Angola by those who feared the Cuban presence there and suggested that there would be increased Soviet maritime activity

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in the South Atlantic. In April 1976, the United States held talks with the Argentinians and Brazilians; and in September of that year, the Americans sent vessels based in Puerto Rico to the South Atlantic to hold joint exercises with the navies of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia and Uruguay. Vice-Admiral James Johnson, head of the South African navy, was prominent among visitors in Buenos Aires to these annual joint maneuvers. 104 However, when Jimmy Carter became president, his Administration took the view that there was no direct threat to the United States from the new marxist countries in southern Africa. In part, this stance was influenced by Brazil's support of the MPLA. Moreover, some sectors within the Argentinian regime had let it be known that they also valued their country's links with black Africa. This posture was taken by the country's army in particular, which, at the time, had been able to exert greater influence than the navy for whom SATO has more attractions. And without Argentinian and Brazililan support, SATO would almost certainly not exist. By October 1977, however, Argentina's position on SATO seemed to have modified. The country's Foreign Minister, Oscar Montes, admitted at a press interview that Argentina and other countries of the Southern Cone had been holding conversations with South Africa on how best to defend the South Atlantic. Although the Minister claimed that no concrete steps had been taken towards signing an alliance or a military treaty between the interested countries, nonetheless, he said there were good intentions of doing so. Montes specifically mentioned the conversations when asked about the position of Argentina in relation to the concern shown by South Africa and some countries of the Southern Cone of South America about the security of the maritime routes in the South Atlantic. He emphasized that to Buenos Aires, 'the security of the South Atlantic is very important.' 105 Other reports have suggested that SATO was indeed set up in 1977 with South Africa, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay as members. 106 Naturally, South Africa, mindful of the Carter Administration's opposition, 107 denied the organization's existence throughout the late 1970s.108 However, ever since the Reagan Administration came to power, Washington has seemed to have tacitly accepted SATO's existence. In fact, General Vernon Walters, the former deputy director of the CIA, reportedly attended the meeting of the member countries in June 1981 at Buenos Aires.109 If ever there was any recent major incident that practically demonstrated the level of cooperation envisaged among some of the

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 125 SATO member states, it was the 1982 Falklands conflict between Britain and Argentina. Indeed, the more recent military and diplomatic ties between the two countries before the outbreak of open hostilities 'point to specific South African knowledge of the impending invasion of the Falkland Islands and Argentinian desire for at least the passive support of South Africa/110 And once the war got into full gear, the Botha administration, in spite of whatever historical and economic links that have existed between Britain and the Republic, mobilized its weight behind Buenos Aires. The South Africans supplied the Argentinians with various weapons, including such sophisticated ones as the highly lethal air-toair 'Matra' missiles. Although these missiles were originally Frenchdesigned, they have since been regularly manufactured, under license, in the Republic as 'Magic/ The average Matra R550 model has a rocket motor made by Hotchkiss-Brandt, a 60-pound warhead with a proximity fuse, a range of more than seven miles and a velocity of 2.7 times the speed of sound. Other items provided by Pretoria included surface-to-air Crotale missiles, the sea-skimming Israeli-designed Gabriel missiles (locally known in South Africa as 'Scorpion' sea-tosea missiles) and spare parts for Argentina's Mirage fighter-bomber squadron. 111 These arms were loaded in May 1982 aboard Uruguayan air freighters in a remote corner of South Africa's D.F. Malan airport. Although the crates were boldly labelled, with obvious intent to mislead the international public, as 'tractor spares/ it was quite clear from the shapes of the crates that they were special packages for missiles and spare parts for Mirage fighters.112 The British government was naturally angered by being unceremoniously jilted by South Africa during the Falklands conflict and, even worse , by Pretoria cultivating an intense affair with Buenos Aires. The Thatcher Administration bitterly denounced the South African role. The angry British posture led the Botha Administration to coin what to many was an obvious monstrous lie againt Whitehall. Pretoria alleged that Britain, in turn, had stabbed the Republic in the back by arming SWAPO and ANC. The influential Afrikaans newspaper Beeld maintained: 'It is known that British Claymore mines are used by SWAPO in Angola and South West Africa (Namibia) to kill South African soldiers. The ANC is also known to be in possession of British weaponry. Britain must give a satisfactory explanation.' 113 It is difficult for anybody to sympathize with Britain over the South African allegation. After all, this Western power has in the past ably assisted in Pretoria's nuclear efforts and in its arms manufactures and

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purchases. Indeed, by claiming that it was needed for civilian air-traffic control and despite the fact that the British government had classified the item as having military uses, South Africa was still able, soon after the Falklands conflict, to purchase Britain's Plessy AR-3d mobile radar system.114 However the British government, still angered by the shipment of South African arms to Argentina during the Falklands war reportedly was, in late 1982, studying a confidential report prepared by the Anti-Apartheid Movement 'that details the involvement of more than 80 British companies in aiding Pretoria's defense production/ 115 In the event, the Thatcher Administration took no positive measures to halt the collaboration of these British companies with South Africa. By its intervention in the Falklands conflict on the side of Argentina, South Africa has clearly demonstrated to the world, once again, that it is a major threat to international peace. It seems that if the Argentinians had made adequate progress in their nuclear quest, Pretoria would not have hesitated to throw its nuclear arsenals open to Buenos Aires. That would have escalated the conflict and might have, in the process, provoked greater intervention by other outside powers, including, for example, the United States on the side of its staunch NATO ally, Britain. The threat posed by South Africa's nuclear capability goes far beyond Africa itself. To the extent that Pretoria engages in nuclear collaboration with many diplomatic 'outcast' states like Israel, Chile, Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, and, of course, (pre-Alfonsin's) Argentina,116 the scale of the threat posed to world peace is not likely to diminish in the years ahead. Meanwhile, many of the states that voted, in 1977, at the UN General Assembly for the Declaration of Denuclearization of Africa117 must be alarmed as they witness South Africa's conscious policy of nuclearizing its military strength and of its ambition to achieve total military supremacy in the continent through nuclear dominance.

Notes 1. Note that from about 1979 onwards, Rossing had started producing 120,000 tonnes of ore, yielding 5,000 tonnes of uranium oxide per year. See Alan Roberts, The Rossing File (London: Campaign Against the Uranium Contract, 1980), p. 34. 2. See Zdenek Cervenka, 'The Conspiracy of Silence/ Africa, No. 125, January 1982, pp. 12-15. 3. Ibid.

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace 127 4. See Azim Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel: Strategic Triangle/ in Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 44-73, at p. 60. 5. Cervenka, T h e Conspiracy of Silence/ p. 12. 6. Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel/ 7. Quoted in J.E. Spence, 'South Africa: the Nuclear Option/ Afri can Affairs, 80, No. 321, October 1981, pp. 441-52, at p. 441. 8. Cervenka, 'The Conspiracy of Silence/ 9. Richard K. Betts, 'A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?' International Security, 3, No. 4, Spring 1979, p. 96. 10. For detailed information about the Republic's various delivery-systems and brands of aircraft fighters, see the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1983-84 (London, 1982), especially pp. 73-4. 11. See the Report of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) (Toronto: TCLSAC, 1982); hereafter referred to simply as the TCLSAC Report. 12. M. Kidron and R. Segal, The State of the World Atlas (London: Pan Books, 1981), p. 9. 13. See, for example, 'The Global Race for Nuclear Arms,' in Newsweek, September 15, 1980. 14. Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad (London: Corgi, 1982), p. 51. 15. Apart from ibid., for other incisive analyses and well-documented evidence that confirms the nuclear test, see Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa' especially pp. 58-9; and Zdenek Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb/ in Africa, January 1982, pp. 18-19. 16. Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb.' 17. See Husain, 'The West, South Africa and Israel/ p. 60. 18. Ibid. 19. Bonn is, of course, one of the chief agents of nuclear proliferation. Aside from its nuclear collaboration with Pretoria, West Germany, in 1976, also secured a DM 2 billion nuclear 'package' deal with Brazil. The deal, described as 'the biggest in nuclear business history,' involved the sale of a complete nuclear fuel and incorporated the jet nozzle process. See Cervenka, 'The Conspiracy of Silence.' 20. See West Africa (1981), p. 857. 21. See 'France's South African Dilemma,' in Africa Now, June 1983. 22. The first two, Algeria and Nigeria, have an important oil and natural gas element. 23. See 'France's South African Dilemma.' 24. See ibid., p. 45. 25. Ibid. The Charter also seeks wider dissemination in France of information on apartheid, a halt to organized tours to South Africa, an end to sporting links, the refusal of visas to South Africans participating in scientific congresses and cultural events, ratification of the international convention on suppression of apartheid and discouragement of emigration to South Africa. 26. Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa,' p. 60.

128 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

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See Spence, 'South Africa: the Nuclear Option/ p. 442. See, for example, Betts, 'A Diplomatic Bomb,' p. 95. See Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa/ p. 47. See Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb,' p. 18. See New African, July 1981, p. 14. Ibid. See ibid. Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa/ p. 62. Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb/ p. 18. Ibid. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, pp. 50-1. 38. Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb.' 39. For details, see ibid. 40. TCLSAC Report, p. 3. 41. See Robert Manning, 'The Pretoria-Washington Axis/ Africa, January 1982. 42. Cf., for example, the analysis of Dr Wynand de Villiers, the Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board, entitled: 'We need nuclear fuel for plants, not bombs/ in Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 1980. 43. See Cervenka, 'The Conspiracy of Silence.' 44. See The Economist (London), June 6, 1981, p. 39. 45. See Manning, 'The Pretoria-Washington Axis.' 46. See 'Nuclear Proliferation: Death from a Salesman/ in The Economist (London), July 24, 1982, p. 37. The emphasis is added. 47. Manning, 'The Pretoria-Washington Axis/ p. 16. 48. Ibid. 49. See, for example, Villiers, 'We need nuclear fuel for plants.' 50. The Economist (London), July 24, 1982. 51. See 'The South African Computer Deal/ Newsweek, April 12, 1982, p. 7. 52. See, for example, Sunday Times, July 18, 1982, p. 2. 53. Manning, 'The Pretoria-Washington Axis/ p. 17. 54. Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa,' p. 68. 55. New York Times, March 16, 1976. 56. See 'Israel has Nuclear Stockpile/ in Sunday Star (Toronto), May 16,1982, A14. 57. Perlmutter, Handel and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, pp. 51-2. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. See 'Israeli Arms for Sale/ Time, March 28, 1983, p. 18. 61. Bernard Magubane, 'Israel and South Africa: the Nature of the Unholy Alliance/ quoted in Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa,' p. 70. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. See ibid. 65. Perlmutter, Handel and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, especially p. 51.

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129

66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

TCLSAC Report, p. 4. See Time, March 28, 1983, p. 18. Cf. ibid. Africa Now, June 1983, p. 8. Manning, The Pretoria-Washington Axis/ p. 17. Cf. ibid. Washington Post (quoted in New Nigerian issue of December 17,1981) has endorsed this possibility. 73. Perlmutter, Handel and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, p. 51. 74. See 'Alliance Against Africa/ in Sunday Times, July 18, 1982, p. 2. 75. According to Article I of the NPT: Each nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or control such weapon or explosive devices. 76. For instance, at the Greek international arms fair in Athens in October 1982, Armscor, South Africa's state-owned weapons company, offered 'battle tested' lines in most items, from high-speed armoured troop carriers to frequency-hopping field radios that defy interception. So confident was the Republic about the marketability of all its weapons that it has boldly projected annual sales of as much as $500 million within the next decade. See 'South Africa: Making Weapons for Export,' in Newsweek, November 29, 1982. 77. Betts, 'A Diplomatic Bomb/ p. 92. 78. See Spence, 'South Africa: the Nuclear Option/ p. 442. 79. Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb.' 80. TCLSAC Report, p. 3. 81. Thomas C. Schelling, 'Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism/ International Security, 6, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 61-77, at p. 70. 82. Ibid. 83. For some background reading on the United States perceptions and reactions to Soviet policies in Africa, see, among others, Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Soviet Policies in Africa,' African Affairs, 79, No 316, July 1980, pp. 297325; Henry Bienen, 'Soviet Political Relations with Africa,' International Security, 6, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 153-73; and 'Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa,' Political Science Quarterly, 95, No. 1, Spring 1980, pp. 29-42; and Kenneth Grundy, 'Moscow, Havana, and Africa,' in Problems of Communism, July-August 1981, XXX, No. 4, pp. 63-8. 84. For an extended discussion of this theme and the implications of such a policy for superpower rivalry in the area, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Diego Garcia and Africa's Security/ Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 104-20. 85. William Gutteridge, 'When a Great Power Can Look Absurd to Africa,' New African, May 1982, p. 54. 86. See Africa, January 1982, p. 18. 87. New African, October 1981, p. 37.

130 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103.

104. 105. 106. 107.

108.

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals Spence, 'South Africa: The Nuclear Option/ p. 446. Ibid. In 1975 the United States withdrew its support to South Africa at the height of Pretoria's campaigns in Angola despite the fact that the Americans had originally winked at the operations. Indeed, according to Botha, South Africa had gone into Angola with Washington's full support; but the support soon evaporated when the United States voted to condemn the Republic in the United Nations and critically censured Pretoria for the campaigns. See New African, October 1981, p. 37; and John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: a CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978). Betts, 'A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?' Cf. Spence, 'South Africa: the Nuclear Option.' See A.W. Singham, 'Namibia and Nuclear Proliferation,' Third World Quarterly, 3, No. 2, April 1981, pp. 277-86. Report of the UN Council for Namibia A/35/24 UNGA, November 24, 1980. See 'Nuclear Proliferation: Death from a Salesman/ in The Economist (London), July 24, 1982. Ibid. Quoted in ibid. See The Economist (London), July 24, 1982. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the various training programs, see New African, No. 177, June 1982. One of the military personnel trained in the Republic was Lieutenant-Commander Alfred Astiz, a former torturer in an Argentinian death camp. Significantly, during the Falklands conflict, Astiz was held for questioning in connection with his role in the death camp before being released by the British invading forces, following his surrender of the South Georgia garrison. Note, too, that General Mario Benjamin Menendez, the Commanding Officer of the Falklands campaign before the Argentinian surrender, had visited South Africa several times in recent years. See ibid. See Mike Osborne, 'Falklands Conflict Highlights SATO and South Africa Link/ Africa Now, June 1982. Ibid. See for instance, ibid. For some analyses on certain aspects of the Carter Administration's African policies and the implications for Washington-Pretoria relations, see, among others, Coral Bell, 'Virtue Unrewarded: Carter's Foreign Policy at Mid-Term/ International Affairs, 54, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 559-72; and Oye Ogunbadejo, 'A New Turn in U.S.-Nigerian Relations,' The World Today, 35, No. 3, March 1979, pp. 117-26. Similarly, NATO denied any knowledge of an official military agreement between Pretoria and Buenos Aires. At any rate, even if such agreement did not exist, the political similarity of their right-wing

Uranium, South Africa's nuclear capability and world peace

109. 110. 111.

112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

131

regimes at the time added to the plausibility of an unofficial agreement between the two countries. Cf., for instance, New African, No. 178, July 1982, p. 16. Osborne, Talklands Conflict Highlights SATO and South Africa Link/ Ibid., p. 69. See 'To Galtieri, With Love from Botha: a Lethal Bouquet of Air-to-Air Missiles/ New African, No. 178, July 1982, p. 16; and The Star, Johannesburg's leading evening newspaper, quoted extensively in Daily Sketch, May 25, 1982, p. 12. See 'To Galtieri, With Love from Botha/ Beeld, quoted in New African, July 1982, p. 16. See Newsweek, November 29, 1982, p. 22. Ibid. See, for example, the TCLSAC Report; Husain, 'The West, Israel and South Africa'; and Singham, 'Namibia and Nuclear Proliferation/ The Declaration, inter alia, condemned not only the attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into Africa, but also Pretoria's persistent refusal to comply with the safeguard standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

6 Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation

Nuclear proliferation and African states Throughout the first decade of the mass independence era of African states, 1960 to 1970, it was fashionable among these countries to insist on keeping their continent as a nuclear free zone. Several of these governments demonstrated their militancy on the issue by taking drastic steps against any of the Great Powers that carried out nuclear activities in Africa. Thus, for example, while Balewa's Nigeria severed diplomatic links with France over its tests in the Sahara desert during 1961, Nkrumah's Ghana froze French assets altogether.1 It was hardly surprising, therefore, that by the time the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was concluded in 1968 and went into effect in 1970, the majority of African states acceded to it. To them, the treaty not only provided a form of insulation from the dangers of radio-active contamination, particularly if it prevented the Great Powers from using Africa as a convenient testing ground for their nuclear devices, it would also check ambitious and restive governments on the continent from embarking on nuclear programs. Moreover, most of the African states saw the accession to the NPT as compatible with the principle of 'non-alignment/ the central guiding theme of their foreign policies which, inter alia, had sought to free them from being drawn into the ideological politics of the Great Powers, especially their cold war wranglings.2 Many of the African signatories of the NPT did not at this early stage ponder over, let alone question, the logic or sincerity of the Great Powers in preaching nuclear non-proliferation when they themselves had, in varying degrees, growing nuclear arsenals. Since, at that time, all the nuclear powers were in the First World of advanced capitalist states and the Second World of advanced socialist countries, both in the northern hemisphere, with no single nuclear power in the Third

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 133 World of the developing states, in the southern hemisphere, it seemed that the NPT took the posture that the 'nuclear sauce is only for northern geese, and not for southern ganders/ 3 In other words then, the initial anxiety to keep the continent as a nuclear-free zone led many African governments to embrace the whole concept of the treaty warmly without looking in detail at the implicit discrimination, that it was designed to minimize the number of countries that have a nuclear capabiity and ultimately intended to discourage, in the main, Third World countries from becoming nuclearized. How else could one describe a situation whereby the Great Powers, having developed a healthy nuclear capability, assume the role of dissuading the less fortunate states from aspiring to that status, while they themselves retain and continue to perfect their own nuclear technology? By the 1970s and the early 1980s, some of the African countries that had thought that they would effectively keep from treading on the dangerous lawn of nuclear installations, gradually began to reassess their respective positions. With the abundant uranium reserves in the continent, and with the growing oil wealth of some of the states, a handful of them started thinking seriously about the advantages of nuclear power. In addition, a number of political problems — like the perennial Middle East crisis, exacerbated by the implications of the growing military and nuclear prowess of Israel — convinced Libya and, originally, Egypt to embark on the nuclear path. Economically, the arguments for nuclear energy, especially after the price of oil had quadrupled in 1973, became quite persuasive to a handful of the other states. At another level, some countries found the nuclear option to be attractive for 'prestige' reasons. Gabon, for one, would tend to fall into the last category. And, perhaps, most importantly, we must not forget to mention the importance of continental problems in the nuclear reckonings of some states. Here, the issues of apartheid and Namibia in southern Africa as well as the impressive nuclear progress of South Africa itself, have heightened the enthusiasm of a few African states for nuclear installations. Nigeria, in particular, falls into this group. Most of the African states that have so far embarked on a nuclear program, or have signified their intention to do so, have carefully stressed the peaceful aspects and advantages, in spite of any secret military ambitions that they may be nursing. One reason for this emphasis is the need to acknowledge their responsibilities openly under the NPT. Another, is that these states know only too well that the open admission of an interest in the military aspects of a nuclear installation could lead to political and diplomatic reprehension on the

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part of other countries that are opposed to such a project. Third, it is dangerous and strategically foolhardy for any state to stress the military aspects of a nuclear program while such an exercise is still in its infancy. In any case, since a great deal of secret work would have to be undertaken before the creation of a credible military option, it is wise to harp on the peaceful purposes of the project from the very beginning. Finally, African states — aside from South Africa — lacking any indigenous nuclear technological know-how worth mentioning — have to rely on foreign powers, many of whom insist on prior assurances that any nuclear plants sold by them would be used strictly for peaceful purposes. In effect, African states have no choice but to respect such injunctions, even as a public relations exercise. The greatest two constraints against making an early declaration about nuclear pursuit for military purposes are: the acquisition of the appropriate engineering technology and the safeguards enforcement policy of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Let us consider these two points in greater detail. The crucial requirement for a bomb is a stock of nuclear explosive, the fissible materials: uranium235 (U-235) or plutonium. Whereas the bulk of raw uranium is uranium-238, containing a mere 0.7 percent of U-235, and fuel-grade uranium contains 3 percent of U-235, weapons-grade uranium must be 93 percent U-235. It follows that if weapons-grade material is to be obtained from low-grade uranium, the latter must be enriched to bring the proportion of U-235 to the required 93 percent. For straightforward power-plant fuel purposes, therefore, the raw uranium's 0.7 percent of U-235 only needs to be enriched to the level of 3 percent. It is much easier to justify the possession of an enrichment plant for this commercial purpose than it is for the weapons-grade uranium. Given their present level of development, any uranium enrichment could be a difficult exercise for many African states. This is largely because uranium enrichment can be a complex and energy-consuming process when the conventional gas-diffusion technology is employed. However, there are three other enrichment methods available. One of them is the jet-nozzle process, developed by the West Germans, and, as we saw in the last chapter, much of this technological know-how went into South Africa's Valindaba enrichment plant. Although this technique is easier to establish than the gaseous diffusion process, it is just as expensive as the latter. A cheaper option would be a gas-centrifuge plant. Admittedly, the capital costs involved are, again, high, but this technology uses only about 5 percent of the power required for gaseous diffusion. A potential

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 135 worrying point for African states interested in this approach is the complex and tricky engineering involved. It'would not be easy to get a do-it-yourself plant to operate reliably/ 4 In any case, while the technique is being commercialized by a European consortium, URENCO, aside from its member countries (Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany), the consortium only plans, for the present, to sell a plant to Australia. The last technique is called the laser-isotope separation. This new process was developed by the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Using this method, a very small plant could, potentially, produce weapons-grade uranium in just one step, and very cheaply too. Superficially, this technique would seem especially suitable for African states. However, looked at closely, this is not the case. For one thing, the technology is extremely sophisticated; it took Lawrence Livermore over eight years and $100 million to develop. For another, only the United States, Japan, the European powers and Israel are thought to be capable of exploiting it.5 If the direct uranium enrichment route appears to be so rugged for African states, what about the plutonium alternative? Here, an essential component is the possession or availability of a reprocessing plant to extract plutonium from spent uranium fuel.6 On its own, the facility consists of fairly ordinary chemical plant, but its operators must be protected against radiation and toxic by-products. While the technology remains, essentially, that of France, Britain, the United States, West Germany, Belgium, the Soviet Union, Japan, Italy and Israel, the monopoly of its ownership has been broken by such ambitious Third World countries as India and Argentina. There are civil justifications for having a plant of this nature. First, it is a convenient way to deal with spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants. A state using the method needs to deal only with small volumes of concentrated ash rather than having to store large volumes of radioactive material in ponds of water. Second, the plutonium produced can be used as a substitute for enrichment, that is, it can be added to raw uranium to turn it into fuel-grade material. Admittedly, the economics of this approach may still be quite dubious, nevertheless, countries like West Germany, Italy and Belgium are already using the technique. Lastly, any state trying to develop plutonium-burning fast breeders needs a reprocessing plant. By far the easiest route to a nuclear device is to produce plutonium in a purpose-built reactor with a reprocessing plant next door to it. Ordinarily, and if nothing goes wrong with the program, the system

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would require 'just a few dozen trained people, four years and about $50 million to produce a bomb.' 7 In spite of this apparent simplicity, it is difficult for any interested state to use the technique to produce a nuclear device surreptitiously without being detected. Therefore, to the extent that nuclear-ambitious countries do not always like to flaunt their intentions, and bearing in mind, too, that many states like to present a facade to the outside world that they do not want to break treaty or contractual obligations on the use of nuclear technology, any African government interested in this method has to conceal its military program behind a legitimate commercial one. To compound the problems further, since the combination of a reactor and a reprocessing plant is such a potent proliferation brew, few countries possessing the technology have ever exported it without imposing strict conditions on its use and without insisting on practical checks to see that those conditions are met. The second major constraint is the safeguards enforcement policy of the IAEA. Since the advent of the NPT in 1968, the body has become the chief agent for safeguards enforcement. Specifically, the treaty pledges countries not to develop nuclear weapons and to allow the IAEA to carry out regular inspections in all their civil nuclear installations. The main tool used by the Agency is called material accounting. Each operator of a nuclear facility is expected to keep detailed records of the flow of nuclear materials into and out of particular areas of his plant. Every few months an IAEA inspector calls to audit the accounts and to check the actual inventory of material within each controlled area. Since the nuclear fuel for a power plant normally comes in easy-tocount rods, each with its own serial number, the exercise is fairly straightforward. Similarly, this checking technique is relevant to research reactors, too, even though some of them use 93 percentenriched nuclear fuel. However, in the case of installations not using rods, indirect checks on samples of material must be deployed. Such checks are important in enrichment and reprocessing plants. The checks involve measuring certain tell-tale indicators of fissile material; and these could range from things like the number and energy levels of neutrons produced to the electromagnetic radiation given off by the decay of plutonium and uranium or, when enrichment plants are involved, the amount of uranium that had condensed inside pipework. It is important to mention that while all these checking techniques might be effective when the problem is simply to keep track of the use of legitimate and known supplies of nuclear material,

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 137 there is still a risk that secret material could be slipped into a civil facility or that loopholes in the accountancy system might even be exploited. One such loophole involves the research reactors that are used to irradiate materials for medical, scientific and industrial purposes. 8 While it is true that the IAEA inspectors can watch a reactor, check the amounts of fuel it uses and count the number of containers of samples fed to it, they cannot check what is in the containers or go into the laboratories that prepare them. For all these inspectors know, the containers could be filled up with uranium-238, to be converted into plutonium. 9 To facilitate the process of detecting illicit activities, the IAEA uses containment and closed-circuit camera surveillance systems. The containment strategy relies on seals. Thus, for instance, when a reactor has been fuelled and its lid put back, an IAEA inspector clips a seal onto the top. Meanwhile, research is going on in the United States and West Germany to develop new types of tamper-proof seals which are made of glass fiber. While some fiber in the seals would carry light, others would not. Since the particular pattern of light and dark would be unique to a given seal, any tampering could be immediately detectable. The Americans have also been working on an entire system of radiation monitors, tamper detectors and cameras, all linked directly to the IAEA's Vienna headquarters. The system has undergone preliminary tests.10 In effect then, the IAEA's checking techniques are steadily being perfected and tightened to render the illicit conversion of reactors for military purposes almost impossible without being detected. To the degree that this observation is true, African states that are signatories to the NPT, and the majority of them are, would find it very difficult not to be found out if they tried to implement any secret ambitions they might have for the production of nuclear devices to strengthen their military capability. In this sense, the NPT as well as the IAEA's efforts to uphold its provisions, represent some bureaucratic barriers in Africa, and, indeed, in the Third World in general, against uncontrolled nuclear proliferation.11 In spite of the constraints we have identified, however, the NPT has never been an effective foolproof check against nuclear proliferation. Not surprisingly, many analysts of strategy have long pointed out the weaknesses of the international nuclear agreement. Such is the level of pessimism that Thomas Schelling has asserted that: Sometime in the 1980s an organizaton that is not a national government

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may acquire a few nuclear weapons. If not in the 1980s then in the 1990s. The likelihood will grow as more and more national governments acquire fissionable material from their own weapon programs, their research programs, their reactor-fuel programs, or from the waste products of their electric power reactors.12 Apart from this non-governmental possibility, a number of spokesmen have stated openly that the major African states needed to go nuclear. In this context, the enforcement safeguards policy of IAEA is not considered to be a serious problem. Indeed, some African scholars have even argued that the NPT is irrelevant to the needs of the developing countries. Take Ali Mazrui for example. He contends: 'From a Third World point of view, I do not believe the treaty is worth the paper it is written on. And if I were to become president of a Third World country, I would not hesitate to withdraw from it. Imperialism in the nuclear age is the monopoly stage of nuclear technology.' 13 He forcefully queried why African states should engage 'in a form of military renunciation which the big powers themselves were not eager to embrace for themselves.' 14 As Mazrui sees it, the major African powers — by which he means Nigeria, Zaire and a black-ruled South Africa — would have to become nuclearized if the gap between the continent's physical centrality and political and military marginality in world affairs is to be narrowed. In other words, Mazrui sees the question of nuclear capability for Third World states from the premise of power differentials between the North and South, the core and the periphery of world military resources, as well as economic and political statures; a relevant theme to the main thrust of our arguments in Chapter 2. Mazrui emphasizes the growing awareness of the need to correct what he called 'the paradox' of a situation whereby Africa, the most centrally and strategically located of all continents, is also the most marginal in political influence and power. Once the major black African states join the other leading powers among the developing countries in acquiring nuclear weapons, Mazrui reasons, nuclear capability would assert the adulthood of the Third World, greatly diminish the imperial monoply of warfare, as well as reduce the dependency of African countries on the defense umbrella of some Great Powers. 14 In addition, he contends that the acquisition of nuclear capability by the above-named African triumvirate is an essential recipe for saving us from the global genocide of nuclear war. Mazrui advances the point thus: 'Africa under its triumvirate of diplomatic leaders, partly

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 139 endowed with nuclear credentials, will have begun to enter the mainstream of global affairs. And the world as a whole, once it discovers the lunacy of its nuclear ways, will have learned an old lesson in a new context: the lesson that wild mushrooms are dangerous.' 15 In a somewhat different context from Mazrui's argument about African states becoming nuclearized so as to help establish world order, Bolaji Akinyemi, the former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, urged Nigeria to acquire nuclear capability to enhance the country's international status and, more importantly from his viewpoint, to be able to face up to the potential dangers posed to the black African states by Pretoria's growing nuclear arsenals. In a similar vein, the last substantive SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Edem Kodjo, caused quite a stir at the organization's nineteenth summit, during June 1983 at Addis Ababa, when he militantly urged African states to match South Africa's nuclear might. He counseled: 'It is the duty of member-states which are able to resolutely embark on the nuclear path to do so.' Since South Africa had developed nuclear weapons which could only be directed against African states, the forty-nine OAU member countries have no other honorable option, Kodjo argues, but to obtain a parallel deterrent. 16 Let us now consider the wider dimensions of this argument. The South African factor In the last chapter we saw the range of sophisticated nuclear weapons that South Africa already possesses or is developing. In particular, we indicated that Israel and South Africa are developing a cruise missile with a range of 2,400 kilometers (1,500 miles), a neutron bomb and various nuclear delivery systems. As it is, with its modern fleet of nuclear weapons' carriers and delivery systems, Pretoria can conveniently bomb targets in most parts of black Africa.17 Indeed, by early 1982, it had become clear that the armory of the South African Defense Force (SADF) included '52m missiles, which, when equipped with nuclear warheads, could wipe out cities as far away as Brazzaville in the Congo.' 18 No wonder Pretoria's nuclear capability has been the subject of several UN studies. To the extent that the Republic has the means to attack the bulk of the black African states with nuclear weapons, some of them seem intent on finding the means of protecting themselves by acquiring a similar range of weapons.

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At another level, a perennial cause of the poor relations, if not downright hostility, between Pretoria and several black African states has been the lingering issues of apartheid and Namibia. For various reasons advanced in the last chapter, there is no visible hope at present that these twin issues could be settled through peaceful means. On apartheid, the Afrikaner elite is determined to stick to its guns. True, some constitutional reforms were recently proposed by the Botha administration and subsequently approved by the white electorate in November 1983; but the provisions were strictly designed to promote the Indians and the coloreds (mixed race) to the rank of junior partners in the government of the country, by according them a limited parliamentary role. Botha has emphatically reiterated over and over again that the blacks, who make up the majority of South Africa's population, were not affected in any way or form in these constitutional reforms. Apartheid — or, rather, separate development, in the official lexicon — still remains a cornerstone of government policy:19 black Africans would continue to be treated as aliens in white South Africa. No wonder John de St. Jorre argued that the constitutional exercise was simply 'a vote to modernize Apartheid's edifice.'20 Even if, by a wave of a magic wand, Pretoria could suddenly decide to give the blacks some political redress, such changes are likely to be at the purely cosmetic level. Any commitment to internal reform in South Africa, 'does not mean an abandonment of white interests and aspirations to remain politically dominant.' 21 To show his dogged determination to stand by his word, Botha announced in April 1983 that Kwandebele, the smallest and poorest of all the so-called homelands would attain 'independence' in 1984. Of course, the territory like the four others before it,22 will go unrecognized by the international community. The homelands are seen internationally as the most obnoxious illustration of Pretoria's apartheid policy, consisting of regrouping the majority of blacks, who make up 70 percent of the population, on less than 18 percent of South African territory. In spite of this obvious injustice, Pretoria insists that the arrangement is to the advantage of the blacks in that each ethnic group in the Republic has its own land, where the inhabitants would enjoy all the civil rights which had been denied them in white South Africa. Several prominent black South African leaders, like many of the black African states north of the Limpopo, are not easily fooled by such racist propaganda. As that well-known black South African churchman, Bishop Desmond Tutu, told the general assembly of the World

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Council of C h u r c h e s in Vancouver in August 1983, violence remained the only option for the resolution of the apartheid p r o b l e m in the Republic. In his view, 'to talk of non-violence w h e n discussing South Africa is impossible because the white minority g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies of racial apartheid are the epitome of violence.' 2 3 Many analysts are also taking a similar view about the situation in Namibia. Cervenka, for one, arrived at that concluson some time ago. In his view: South Africa's intransigence over Namibia, and the lack of determination on the part of the Western powers to force South Africa to accept the conditions for Namibia's independence laid down by the OAU and the UN, have created a situation in which the independence of Namibia is almost certain to be decided by the same means as that of Zimbabwe: by gun rather than by diplomacy.24 Opinions about the inevitability of violence are not novel. Indeed, a major reason why the South Africans have been arming themselves to the teeth with large conventional and nuclear weapons is their realization that violence was inescapable in their defense of apartheid and the Namibian status quo. As for those black African states that see the Republic as a real threat to their national security and hence want to become nuclearized, they do so as a result of their militant antagonism on these two vital issues, and because they consider themselves easy targets for the possible use of Pretoria's own nuclear weapons. Nigeria, for example, sees itself as such a potential target. Lagos has consistently argued that any i m p r o v e m e n t in South Africa's military power and the d e v e l o p m e n t of its nuclear capability, with the assistance of the West, poses direct military threats to Nigeria and makes it an o p e n target of long-range nuclear attack. This point was reiterated in an address by Alhaji Bello Kirfi, a Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, at a seminar for Nigerian diplomats at Harare in September 1982. Alhaji Kirfi maintained that Nigeria was not fooled by the argument of the leading Western powers to the effect that they were supporting South Africa for purely economic and geopolitic reasons. H e d e n o u n c e d these p o w e r s for using their argument as a facade for providing energetic support for South Africa's nuclear efforts. In an address ranging from African to comprehensive global issues, Alhaji Kirfi stated that it was significant that west European and American support for South Africa was growing in strength at a time w h e n African pressures for change in South Africa w e r e mounting. 2 5

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Many Nigerian analysts have, similarly, e n d o r s e d the Lagos position on the nuclear threat issue. Bolaji Akinyemi, who, as we indicated earlier, had s u p p o r t e d the idea of a nuclear option for African states, argued that Nigeria ' w o u l d be making a mistake if it waited to be threatened before acquiring nuclear w e a p o n s / In viewing international politics t h r o u g h the conservative p o w e r capability prism, 2 6 h e contends that the possession of nuclear w e a p o n s was n o longer a luxury in an international system w h e r e p o w e r was determined by the quality of military forces at the c o m m a n d of nations. 2 7 Shehu Jobe, too, maintained the same t h e m e in his analysis. As he sees it, South Africa, in acquiring nuclear capability, definitely had Nigeria in mind — implicitly — since none of the countries in its hemisphere are of any real threat to its security (beyond the capability of its conventional forces). Further, to let South Africa's acquisition go unchallenged will only harden her position and attitude with regard to negotiated settlements on major issues, such as majority rule in Namibia and South Africa.28 Pointedly urging Lagos to follow the footsteps of Pretoria in acquiring nuclear capability, he concludes: 'Only a d e l u d e d day-dreaming pacifist will allude to a peaceful negotiation with racist South Africa without first developing, at the least, comparable military capability to be used either for cohesion, intimidation or otherwise/ 2 9 We can easily see from the above arguments that a lively debate has been going on in at least one of the major black African states, Nigeria, about the need for acquiring nuclear capability as a counter force to Pretoria's own. But, would the acquisition of nuclear w e a p o n s help to resolve the problems of apartheid and Namibia? Let us consider the case of apartheid, for example. Since a d h e r e n c e to apartheid both defines Pretoria's foreign policy imperatives and often tends to p r o d u c e something akin to siege mentality a m o n g its policymakers, 3 0 the Republic's nuclear w e a p o n s would form part and parcel of the m e a n s available to it for defending and sustaining apartheid as a conscious governmental policy Admittedly, with the cozy Washington-Pretoria relations u n d e r the Reagan Administration, the siege mentality situation may be changing somewhat, especially as South Africa's foreign policy has been shifting in recent years from one reflecting uncertainty to a relatively confident external policy, m o r e in keeping with its n e w regional prominence. Nevertheless, a nuclear arsenal would further enhance such a regional status and, equally, provide a ready-made tool in the Republic for

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 143 advancing its national and international vital interests, including defense of the apartheid system at home. And since it is some of the militant black African states that mount the most significant external campaign against apartheid, they render themselves open to South African attacks. From Pretoria's standpoint, it is important to have the means, by way of physical power, to compel or even deter the black African states; it is equally important for these states to have the reciprocal means to back up their own posture against South Africa. If we accept, as Morgenthau has put it, that politics between groups nationally and internationally is the struggle for power, then it follows that the power to persuade must be backed by the power to compel, if things must come to a head and war should erupt. 31 Equally, if it is conceded and South Africa has accepted this, that violence remains one of the possible avenues for dealing with the apartheid problem, then war cannot be ruled out altogether, in the short-term or long-term, between the black African states, who are desirous of a black-ruled South Africa, on the one hand, and Pretoria, on the other. Resolution of apartheid in South Africa is laden with politics, since apartheid itself is quite political, at least as a form of government based on racial groups; war as a possible medium of its resolution is understandable. As in the case of apartheid, the primacy of politics in war cannot be overemphasized. No wonder Lenin, like Clausewitz before him, insisted on the point. He contended? 'Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political/32 Furthermore, the acceptance of war as a tool of politics determines the relation of military strategy to politics; that relation, as Marshall Sokolovsky has elaborated, 'is based completely on the dependence of the former on the latter/ 33 This dependence can be expressed in a variety of ways, most especially in the determination of general as well as specific strategic aims and the general character of state strategy, and in the selection of forms and methods of warfare. To the degree that political considerations are of decisive importance for the conduct of military strategy, various types of warfare are possible, depending on the nature of the political aims and the objective conditions under which they are to be pursued. 34 One type of warfare, very relevant to the South African situation, involves wars of national liberation. Here, the parties directly involved, the African National Congress (ANC) and the white

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minority regime in Pretoria are intent on fighting it out to the last. Interestingly, some radical black African states, while fully endorsing the guerrilla tactics of the ANC, believe that they ought to rise well beyond the level of mere possession of conventional weapons, and include nuclear ones, if they are to have some credibility in their support for the ANC and in their efforts to force the hands of Pretoria on the apartheid issue. Although some of these key black African states, ideally, need to match the nuclear might of South Africa, it does not necessarily follow that these countries need deploy their nuclear weapons, unless the South Africans provoke such a mode of warfare. No doubt, a credible nuclear capability on the part of some black African states could deter Pretoria from having a recourse to nuclear warfare in an attempt to stem — through intimidation, blackmail or whatever — any major opposition to apartheid in these states. It might also reinforce the enthusiasm of some of the states in providing bases for the ANC on their territories. Of the best ways to combat the apartheid problem effectively, two possibilities suggest themselves. First, there could be a determined and concerted effort by African states, centrally coordinated by the OAU. For this purpose, member states would contribute professional military men to form a pan-African force; or its Liberation Committee could recruit young Africans directly and train them centrally as African Liberation Armed Forces (army, navy and the air force).35 Either way, what is envisaged is a frontal attack using conventional war patterns. In this case, the OAU could declare war on Pretoria, and its armed forces would execute such a declaration. The more trained and better equipped these forces are, with various sophisticated weapons, the more likely their chances of success. Since firepower is an important aspect of such a confrontation, the bigger the firepower is, the better are the chances of winning. As nuclear power is the ultimate in firepower, the African side as well as Pretoria would each strengthen its position if it could boast a formidable array of nuclear weapons. The Afrikaner elite envisage the possibility of this type of warfare, and are fully prepared for such an eventuality by having a formidable collection of highly lethal and sophisticated nuclear weapons. In this context, it is a sensible longterm military option for African states to aspire to have a similar armory. The other type of armed confrontation with Pretoria is the ongoing method of the ANC, namely, a guerrilla struggle. In this approach, the

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 145 burden of the struggle moves to the black South Africans. It is they who will plan the struggle and implement it by themselves. That is, the struggle will be initiated and fought from within the Republic. While the military action would, in the main, take place in the rural areas, the political and economic struggle, including strikes and acts of sabotage on key governmental and commercial institutions as well as major public utilities, would be waged in the urban areas. In guerrilla warfare, unlike the case of the first method of struggle, the lighter and simpler the military equipment is, the better it will be for general strategy; since it would enhance the chances of victory. The extent of the firepower on its own is not important. Rather, the effectiveness of a guerrilla struggle depends on the morale, ingenuity, training, resilience and perseverance of the guerrillas.36 Since this type of war is normally fought within the affected country, usually on a protracted basis, nuclear strength becomes less relevant. A welltrained and competent guerrilla gives the impression of being ubiquitous and, yet, it is hard to pin him down. And he, as in an African masquerade, sees the enemy, but the enemy cannot see his face.37 For a guerrilla struggle, black South Africa is richly blessed with the necessary manpower. Of the 22 million Africans in the Republic, at least one-third or more are potential recruits for the guerrilla army. This richness in potential recruitment has been described by one analyst as 'the most dynamic atomic and hydrogen energy the masses have in their possession/ 38 To say that nuclear might is not vital in guerrilla warfare in South Africa does not mean that African states no longer have a role to play in the ongoing struggle between the ANC and Pretoria. On the contrary, it simply means that these states need to pool and effectively coordinate the supplies of arms to the ANC and other liberation movements that may be involved in the bid to wrest power from the white minority regime in Pretoria. The liberation movements could use the supplies according to their schedules and the tempo of their campaigns in South Africa. The liberation leaders, for their part, would have to step up the training and retraining programs for the freedom fighters in the field. These fighters need to be well grounded in political organization, mobilization, leadership and the military aspects of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the liberation leaders must not only ensure the maximization of resources, they must, in addition, ensure that the freedom fighters are efficiently deployed to achieve program goals. They should not die unnecessarily at the hands of the apartheid

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regime's armed forces or be wasted in spectacular, but essentially counter-productive, actions. As Babu has put it: A guerrilla is trained to lead a military assault, an industrial strike action as well as a peasant revolt. He is trained to educate the people politically: to be a champion of their cause — any cause as long as it is not against the general interest of the people. He is trained to analyse the situation clearly in a concrete way and to synthesise the divergent appraisals by the people of the realities that confront them and to articulate those divergent views in a systematic and well-defined world outlook consistent with the revolutionary needs of the people. A guerrilla is a special asset of the people. That is why he is worth more than a hundred soldiers.39 The point that w e are making is that in terms of a frontal attack on South Africa by African states, u n d e r the aegis of the O A U or its agency — the Liberation Commission, for example — a nuclear ambition makes sense. However, in terms of its usefulness in a guerrilla warfare within the Republic itself, direct nuclear p o w e r is questionable. Since the possibility of embarking on a frontal attack seems to be quite remote, the idea of s o m e African states having nuclear ambitions and pointing to the p r o b l e m of apartheid in South Africa as the main justification for embarking on such a line of action is equally debatable. Similarly, South Africa is unlikely to use tactical nuclear devices within its b o r d e r s to p r o p u p apartheid. Pretoria is unlikely to exert its nuclear might either in the h o m e l a n d s or even in the streets of Soweto, 'without substantially accelerating the exodus of the very whites that the nuclear strategy wants to save.' 4 0 The main threat to apartheid still remains an internal revolution, actively propelled and set in motion by the various liberation movements. A n d such a revolution will not be susceptible to nuclear resistance by Pretoria. 4 1 I d o not want to be m i s u n d e r s t o o d here, of course, as saying that to the extent that the application of nuclear might is not directly relevant to the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Africa, the nuclear capability of the Republic ceases to b e a major threat to the national security of the black African states. O n the contrary, the threat posed to these states cannot be overemphasized, as indeed w e clearly indicated in the last chapter. We shall return to some aspects of this issue later on. Africa's u r a n i u m a n d nuclear proliferation Africa's u r a n i u m has a long history of being an important input into

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 147 the nuclear reactors of several countries. Prior to the discovery of nuclear fission, the commodity had little market value. But when, as a result of the development of atomic energy, the Roosevelt Administration began a uranium purchasing program in 1942, in order to satisfy the needs of the Manhattan Project for the construction of nuclear weapons and to provide fuel for government-owned experimental reactors, the market value of uranium improved. Early United States' uranium demand was filled primarily by sources in Canada and the then Belgian Congo (now Zaire). With the intensification of the Cold War, the market for uranium grew, as both the Americans and the British increased their production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the United States Atomic energy Commission (AEC), which was established to assume management of the government's program, encouraged the growth of an American uranium industry and accelerated its purchasing of uranium from Africa.42 In more recent times, and apart from the cases of Namibia and South Africa considered at length in the last chapter, Niger easily towers above the other producers in black Africa in fostering nuclear proliferation through its uranium supplies to budding nuclear aspirants. Since the place of Niger's uranium in the nuclear program of the advanced capitalist countries has been considered in previous chapters, we will limit our discussion here to the Third World states. In this regard, Niger has long-term supplies contracts with Egypt and Pakistan. In the case of the latter, Niamey recently stepped up its cooperation with that country in the nuclear field, a euphemism for increased uranium supplies under the long-standing contracts between the two sides. 43 As Pakistan has developed nuclear capability, and given its deeprooted hostility towards India (another nuclear power in the region), the wider ramifications of the issue of Niger's uranium supplies are evident. No wonder Alo lamented the situation. 'It is very sad,' he observed/that uranium dug up in Niger has ended up in Pakistan for what is obviously not peaceful purposes.' He speculated that the nuclear capability 'could spark off yet another dispute in an already volatile area.'44 This point can best be understood when it is realized that Pakistan did not scramble to get its own bomb until India had tested an atomic device in 1974. At the time, Prime Minister Bhutto made his country's priorities clear. 'The Hindus have got the Bomb,' he contended, 'that means we will have to build a bomb, too — even if we have to eat grass.'45 Egypt is another Third World customer for Niger's uranium. Its

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nuclear ambitions first came into the limelight in 1974, when the Nixon Administration offered to sell two 600-MW power reactors to the country as part of a linked arrangement to sell the same type of reactor to the Israelis. Although a purchase agreement with Egypt was signed in 1976, the Americans did not conclude the sale until after the Camp David accord. Egypt has also been involved in a deal with Westinghouse for the supply of a 622-MW power reactor to be sited at Sidi Krier. Originally scheduled for 1983, it has been delayed until 1988.46 Altogether, Egypt plans to have eight nuclear power stations by the year 2000.47 To have a guaranteed source of uranium, Egypt's Energy Minister, Maher Abaza, and Niger's Mining and Industry Minister, Omar Diallo, concluded a protocol in 1983 under which Niger would supply this mineral for use in all the reactors.48 Libya is, by far, the most important customer of Niger's uranium. Tripoli's quest for nuclear weapons first began in 1971 when Qaddafi sent Major Abdul Salam Jalloud, then Prime Minister, to Peking with orders to buy an atomic device. The Chinese proved unwilling to make the sale. Two years later, Libya established an atomic energy Commission, and on July 30,1974, a secret agreement was signed with Argentina for the prospecting of uranium. At the end of that same year, Qaddafi made an important statement about his nuclear ambitions. According to the Colonel: 'The future will be for the atom, and this is no secret. In the future, atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. And we in Libya, as one of these states, will have our share of this new '49

weapon. As Tripoli sees it, for prestige purposes, a nuclearized Libya would be a major power in world affairs. More important than the issue of prestige, however, is the consideration of Libya's own security. At the about 3 million in relation to its vast physical size of 1,759,40 kilometers, its territory could easily be overrun. To forestall such a possibility, Tripoli believes that a nuclear arsenal would be a credible deterrent, believes that a nuclear arsenal would be a credible deterrent. Moreover, from the standpoint of the Middle East conflict, such a nuclear arsenal is deemed to be an important Arab asset. Indeed, it is an open secret that Qaddafi has, for a long time, been one of the foremost and most militant Arab apostles of producing an 'Islamic Bomb' that would be able to face up to the nuclear threat posed by Tel Aviv. Libya's initial search for the purchase of a reactor did not produce fruitful dividends until May 1975, when Tripoli and Moscow

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 149 concluded a nine-article agreement which provided for 'co-operation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.' More importantly, the Soviet Union agreed to build an 'atomic centre' that would include a nuclear reactor.50 In line with this agreement, the Soviets constructed a 10-MW research reactor at Fateh University, on the outskirts of Tripoli. The Soviets also supplied the Libyans, through Atomenergoexport, with a 440-MW VVER power reactor. In view of the stringent conditions often imposed by the Soviets whenever they sell a reactor, it may be impossible, for the time being, for the Libyans to abuse the use of the installation. Even so, this eventuality cannot be ruled out in the long term. For one thing, the Soviet Union, by virtue of the 1975 agreement, is committed to train Libyan scientists; and they may eventually be employed on work that would be much more sinister than research.51 The second factor to bear in mind is that Tripoli has always been anxious to attract Arab scientists. Indeed, a law for the encouragement of Arab expertise was passed in 1975; and a special department at the Foreign Ministry was set up to encourage the arrival of scientists. Therefore, the possibility remains that Libya might be able to secure the services of first-class Arab scientists who would facilitate the realization of Qaddafi's nuclear ambition. Finally, Libya has, in recent years, sent a number of students to Europe and the United States to study nuclear engineering.52 Such a pool of future engineers could also assist Tripoli, in the long term, to attain the nuclear arsenal it so badly wants. To facilitate its movement along the nuclear path, Libya made an early bid to secure dependable sources of uranium supplies. At first, it thought it could provide the required uranium itself. Qaddafi was optimistic that the uranium deposits discovered earlier in the Murzuk basin would perform this function. Before long, however, it became clear that the deposits were neither as large nor as rich as initially estimated. Still anxious to secure a guaranteed uranium source for its future reactors, Libya then annexed the Aozou strip in northern Chad.53 Again, Qaddafi's hopes miscarried. Admittedly, Aozou's deposits were much larger and richer than Libya's; but, on balance, they were still of low-grade quality. It was Niger that, in the end, fulfilled the role of supplying uranium to Libya. Not only does Libya get its supplies from Niger, it also serves as a second-stage source of supply to Pakistan and Iraq, for their respective reactors. To retain the Niger source, Tripoli has often paid higher than the prevailing prices for the commodity. Libya has even paid higher prices than France; hence Niamey's readiness to do business with a

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Saharan neighbor it fears so much.54 In 1979, for example, Niger sold 500 tonnes of yellow cake to Libya at well above market prices.55 Then in 1981, Niger improved on this record when it sold 850 tonnes of uranium, most of its own share from Arlit, to Qaddafi. From Libya, some of the commodity found its way to Iraq and Pakistan, both of whom also made small direct purchases. Without gainsaying it 'the neighbours of all three countries have ants in their pants about the risks of the uranium ending up in atom bombs.'56 And in 1982, Niger's uranium holding company, Onarem, 'admitted to selling at least 2,000 tonnes to Libya at a price higher than the market price.'57 Once again, and given Qaddafi's nuclear ambition, much fear was generated over the possiblity that this tranche of yellow cake might not have been used solely to power steam turbines. Apart from diverting some of its uranium purchases from Niger to Pakistan, Tripoli has also provided financial support to the Pakistani nuclear program. Since a research reactor, especially a Soviet one, though good for prestige purposes, will not provide Libya with a short route to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Qaddafi had elected to have an informal alliance with Pakistan, a fellow Islamic state, to hasten the drive towards the possession of an 'Islamic Bomb' in the Arab world. And so, with Libya's financial assistance, Pakistan was able to buy parts from various sources to build its own gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The vital parts were bought through a number of companies scattered throughout Europe and the United States. The knowledge of what to buy was made possible by Abdul Qadir Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, who had worked at the Almelo high-security research establishment in the Netherlands between 1974 and 1975. During that time, Khan obtained the secret technology and design for parts of an advanced pilot centrifuge. Experts have since claimed that Pakistan's own pilot centrifuge could easily produce enough weapons-grade U235 in one year for a single thermonuclear explosion.58 Libya is not the only financial backer of Pakistan's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia has been another major source of financial support for the program. To the extent that Libya, Pakistan and Iraq use Niger's uranium in their respective reactors, the implications of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East are quite obvious. In June 1981, Israel — itself a nuclear power in the volatile area — in a calculated attempt to stop the Iraqis from coming up with a bomb and so defuse the nuclear threat to the region, bombed Iraq's Osirak research reactor.59 Tel Aviv argued that it was essential to carry out such a mission, which left the reactor badly

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 151 damaged, since Baghdad would have the wherewithal to manufacture nuclear weapons by the end of that year's summer. Although President Saddam Hussein had somewhat startled his neighbors when, in the very month that the Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor, he openly called for the production of an 'Islamic Bomb,' Iraq was probably some distance from acquiring a nuclear capability at the time. The French, who had originally supplied the damaged reactor, sold a replacement to the Iraqis, insisting on tighter safeguards than before.60 On the present showing, the chances of persuading President Hussein and Colonel Qaddafi to forge their atomic swords into plowshares seem rather dim, not least because of Israel's own nuclear arsenal. It should be mentioned, however, that the Begin Administration has, in spite of the formidable nuclear capability of Israel, advocated that the entire Middle East region be turned into a nuclearfree zone. The Administration reiterated the proposal after the attack on Iraq's reactor, Originally, the Israeli bomb had been viewed as a weapon of last resort, to guarantee the survival of a small state hemmed in by what Tel Aviv clearly considers as enemies. But, as the less inhibited of Israel's Arab foes — in particular, Hussein and Qaddafi — have inched towards acquiring their own nuclear capability, Israel has seemed willing to trade its obvious advantage in the enterprise for the reassurance that there will be no itchy fingers nearby on the nuclear trigger. And, with the Osirak example before them, the Arab states can be in little doubt of the lengths to which the Israelis would go in order to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear capability. As far as the Islamic world is concerned, the Pakistani reactors seem to be reasonably out of the Israeli threat. It is possible, of course, that the past record of the Libyan connection could render them vulnerable in the future. In particular, it is extremely doubtful that Pakistan would subscribe to the idea of a nuclear non-proliferation policy east of the Gulf. For one thing, the Americans have reserved the right to station nuclear weapons at their base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.61 For another, Pakistan still insists that IAEA's inspection of its facilities would be allowed only if India, which has already tested 'peaceful' nuclear devices, would throw open its installations. India has refused to be party to such an agreement or understanding. At another level, since Pakistan's nuclear program had been largely financed by the Arab countries, any resultant bomb from the exercise could be made available to them in an emergency. And, to that extent,

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Israel is unlikely to strip down its nuclear defenses unless all its potential enemies do that too. Nearer home, the unpredictable Libyan regime, with access to as much of Niger's uranium as Qaddafi wants, represents not only another serious complicating factor in the eyes of Tel Aviv, but has also regularly sent tremors through North Africa.62 For its part, Niger sees its sales of uranium to Arab states as an essential aspect of Afro-Arab cooperation. The Arabs have reciprocated the Niger gesture by granting generous aid to Niamey. Between 1973 and mid-1981, they committed nearly $300 million in aid to a country with little more than 6 million. In 1980 alone, the commitment exceeded $80 million, at least a third of it coming from Saudi Arabia.63 True, Colonel Kountche might have had some reservations about the Arabs, nevertheless, he has been able to establish a singularly close rapport with Saudi Arabia which he visited in both 1981 and 1982. Among the projects being actively considered for Arab financial assistance is the Kandadji dam on the River Niger, to irrigate some 140,000 hectares. Niger is naturally anxious to maximize whatever Arab aid avenues that may be open. This is understandable when one bears in mind that the country intends to spend no less than $16 billion of foreign aid for economic development in 1981-5. 64 Although Niger-Arab relations seem to be in a cozy state, Niamey has always been rather uneasy about one of its major customers, Qaddafi's Libya. True, Niamey-Tripoli links had been very cordial in the late 1970s. But, by 1980, relations had begun to deteriorate; so much so that they were formally broken off at the diplomatic level in January 1981. The reason seems to have been a suspicion, not uncommon for countries having dealings with Libya, of Colonel Qaddafi's ultimate intentions. 65 Tripoli's 1980 intervention in Chad was a major contributing factor to the fears aroused in Niger.66 Furthermore, apart from the case of the reports of Libyan attempts to indoctrinate Niger pilgrims on the Mecca route, Tripoli was also reported to have engaged in recruiting dissident students and of trying to win the favor of the Tuareg and Toubou tribesmen, who inhabit northern Niger, in order to use them as destabilizing agents. Finally, mention must be made of the territorial dispute between the two countries over the Libyan occupation of the Toummo oasis and its surrounding area. This relatively insignificant dispute could assume more serious proportions in the future if it should turn out that the area contains uranium, as Qaddafi suspects it does. 67 All these problems and suspicions lost much of their sting in 1981,

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 153 a lull which lasted into early 1983, when Qaddafi in the quest for OAU legitimacy realized that he must not overplay his hand if he wished to gain and keep friends in Africa.68 While uranium trade actually grew between the two countries in spite of the various political difficulties, Niamey has been taking no chances. When President Seyni Kountche visited Washington in October 1981, for example, he mentioned the Qaddafi factor to his American counterpart. Soon afterwards, the Reagan Administration announced that it was making $2.3 million available in credits to Niger for defense equipment sales as well as pledging facilities for military training.69 Apart from Niger, another black African state that produces uranium and deserves a brief mention is Gabon. But, unlike Niger, which helps to fuel nuclear proliferation in the Third World, the bulk of Gabon's uranium supplies, as we indicated in an earlier chapter, go to the advanced capitalist states. To that degree, Gabon does not contribute to the international anxiety over the issue of nuclear proliferation in the Third World. However, President Bongo caused a stir when, in January 1983, during the visit of President Mitterrand to Libreville, he demanded a nuclear power station from the French. The call seemed rather frivolous at the time. A member of OPEC, with immense oil and mineral wealth and a population of just a million, it was not clear to most analysts why Gabon should embark on the nuclear quest. On the other hand, considering the traditionally close relations between the two countries, Libreville was well placed to make such a demand on Paris. Some of the Western powers are, in fact, envious of the French presence in Gabon which had, by 1983, increased sixfold in size since independence, guaranteeing oil, uranium and other mineral supplies for French industry.70 To say that Gabon's request for a nuclear station, given the country's characteristics, is frivolous is not to be taken as suggesting that it cannot afford a modest plant. Compared to many other states in Africa and elsewhere in the world where corruption is at the expense of the people, Gabon has cash to spare. The country's oil sales, after steadily falling for five years, had, by 1983, steadied; and have also gained from high dollar rates. In 1982, while oil revenues jumped from 271 billion CFA to 293 billion CFA, international investment in that sector increased by 11 percent. 71 The continued development of the transGabon railway, financed entirely out of state funds, is a pointer to the economic muscle Gabon can wield. So, financially, it can certainly pay for a nuclear power station. Looked at critically, it would appear that Gabon is interested in

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embarking on a nuclear program for prestige purposes. And if President Mitterrand should ever agree to provide Libreville with a nuclear power station, 'he will be criticized by his party for encouraging prestige projects at the expense of more fundamental development programmes/ 72 Even so, President Bongo seems so determined in his application, he would turn to other advanced capitalist powers, in particular either the United States or West Germany. 73 With such deep interest in the nuclear program in Gabon, we should now consider the case of another black African state, Nigeria, which shares that same interest. The place of uranium in Nigeria's nuclear ambitions We indicated much earlier some of the healthy debate going on in Nigeria about the need for the country to become nuclearized. Such debate, as we saw, was based on the need to catch up with South Africa in the nuclear field. The argument here is that since Nigeria is very much opposed to the status quo in South Africa and Namibia, and since Pretoria believes that a nuclear arsenal can contribute towards helping it to maintain its policies in these two countries, then Lagos, to be able to give some credibility to its opposition, ought to have a measure of nuclear might. It is true that Nigeria is still very far from the stage of actually manufcturing a nuclear device, but, since Lagos has openly committed itself to the nuclear path, the issue deserves some consideration. A major inducement that led to Nigeria's decision was, no doubt, the country's uranium reserves. This point was well articulated as a press interview in 1980 by the then Defense Minister, Professor Iya Abubakar. After strongly stressing the need for Lagos to embark on a nuclear program, he used the availability of uranium deposits in the country to buttress his position. He maintained: The presence of uranium in Nigeria will guarantee a regular supply of uranium to Nigeria's nuclear industry, provide her with an additional source of funds for acquiring the other components for nuclear technology and facilitate her negotiations with other nuclear powers for co-operation in the development of nuclear capability.74 In fact, even before the minister highlighted the importance of uranium, the Federal Nigerian Government had taken a special interest in the commodity. In 1976-7, the government in close collaboration with the Nigerian Mining Corporation, had carried out a

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 155 feasibility survey in the Gombe area of Bauchi state. Then in 1978, in partnership with a French company, Minatome, it formed the Nigerian Uranium Mining Company (NUMCO) for uranium exploration, exploitation, processing and marketing. Under the partnership agreement, the federal Nigerian government took 60 percent of the shares, and Minatome the remaining 40 percent. Similarly, the membership of the board of the company reflected the level of participation of the two sides. Thus, while Nigeria appointed five of the company's eight directors, including the chairman, Minatome provided the other three. 75 By June 1982, Alhaji Mohammed Hassan, the Nigerian minister of Mines and Power, announced, during a visit to the company's headquarters in Gombe, that NUMCO had geared up its exploration work in recent times, and would start drilling for uranium in 1984.76 In seizing the opportunity of his visit to make Nigeria's uranium policy known, the minister stressed that Lagos was committed to gathering relevant materials for nuclear development before the setting up of any nuclear project. To this end, he pointed out that Nigeria had made up its mind that no part of NUMCO's uranium production would be exported; all the production would be retained in the country to sustain Nigeria's nuclear program. To highlight the need for guaranteed supplies of uranium, the minister revealed that Nigeria had even acquired shares in foreign uranium companies in Guinea and the Niger Republic so as to have access to additional sources of uranium. 77 In August 1983, the federal government guaranteed a loan of 25 million naira to NUMCO to carry out vital development projects. In particular, the money would enable the company to continue with its activities for the next three years and to build its permanent headquarters and other essential structures in Gombe. 78 In addition to the activities of NUMCO in the northeastern part of the country — which have covered parts of Bauchi, Borno and Gongola states — other areas being seriously considered for uranium exploration are the Ugep area of the Cross River State and the Middle Belt. Alhaji Hassan had repeatedly stressed the government's readiness not to restrict activities to these areas alone, but to keep on examining other parts of the country, since, in his view, 'uranium potentials in Nigeria are good.'79 The fact that uranium is a radioactive metallic material which can be used for both peaceful purposes and the production of nuclear weapons means the Nigerians could also give the former justification

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for their nuclear interest. At the first international energy conference in Nigeria, which the University of Ife hosted in July 1983, scholars as well as government spokesmen seemed to be as equally interested in utilizing nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes. 80 Indeed, Alhaji Hassan, who represented President Shagari at the conference, in his address stated that insofar as Nigeria was a signatory to the NPT, it must 'embrace nuclear science for peaceful applications in such areas as agriculture, health and industry.' 81 Similarly, the Federal Minister of Science and Technology, Ademola Thomas, stressed the need for Nigeria to plan ahead for alternative energy sources other than oil since, he argued, the latter is depletable. According to the minister, the expectation for increasingly higher standards of living among the growing population of Nigeria calls for a five-to-sixfold increase in energy consumption by the year 2000. If, by that time, Nigeria still depends on the sale of crude oil to earn foreign currency to pay for some of the country's imports, then, he went on, the total demand on Nigeria's crude reserves would leave little room for national economic security and comfort. Hence, the minister concluded, nuclear-based electric power production could be one of the additional sources on which Nigeria would depend to resolve the impending shortfalls in the country's energy supply.82 In a sense, Lagos had demonstrated its interest in the peaceful application of nuclear technology even before the 1983 energy conference. The search for a diversified future energy option was highlighted in the 1970s when the federal government created mini energy reseach centers at four of the country's higher educational institutions. While the universities of Nigeria (at Nsukka) and Sokoto were assigned the responsibility of studying the country's solar energy potential, Ahmadu Bello University (in Zaria) as well as the University of Ife became responsible for exploring nuclear science and technology. These four centers are still grappling with the most basic of their requirements, namely, training the required manpower. And, even here, the emphasis is to gear the manpower development for peacetime applications of nuclear energy. This has to be so, in any case, given the current high-level involvement of the IAEA in the activities of these centers, including the provision of technical assistance to meet training and retraining needs. Apart from the Agency's financial support, some Western industrial countries (notably the governments of Canada, France and West Germany) and

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 157 their universities also support and train Nigerian scientists. In terms of solid research work, there has been no significant development as yet. In fact, all the centers are almost at the infancy stage. Take the Centre for Energy Research and Development (CERD) at the University of Ife, the most advanced of the four, as an example. While it has already acquired such things as a neutron generator transmission electron microscope, a gamma irradiator, a mass spectrometer, data acquisition equipment and an analyser, etc., the small laboratory to house them is still under construction. And while a Tandem Accelerator has been purchased, the building that would house it is, again, still under construction and the earliest time that it could be installed would be mid-1985. Admittedly, CERD has an eye on the purchase of a nuclear reactor. But, apart from the fact that what is envisaged is modest, no firm decision has so far been taken on its purchase. According to the director of the center, no practical research can take place without the reactor.83 The purchase of the reactor is, therefore, important to the future of CERD, since, apart from training purposes, no major research can be embarked upon without it.84 In other words, CERD and the other three centers in the country are, right now, primarily engaged in manpower training and development. Apparently, the federal government has taken the view that it is only when there is an abundant pool of trained scientists that any meaningful research could ever take place. That reasoning might well have been responsible for the slowness of the defunct Shagari administration in formally establishing the legal instrument that created all the centers. It was not until March 1983 that the relevant act came into being.85 Thus far, we have examined Nigeria's interest in nuclear development for energy purposes. It is noteworthy, in this context, that even Ali Mazrui's reasons for strongly urging Lagos to go nuclear were based in large part on its peaceful applications and had 'nothing to do with making Nigeria militarily stronger.'86 The other main reason is basically to enhance the country's international status and, in the process, to boost Africa's place in world affairs. As Mazrui has put it, 'the development of a nuclear capacity by Africa's largest country is probably a necessary precondition if Africa's diplomatic marginality is to be ended.' 87 In other words, Nigeria needs to 'follow the example of its fellow giants, Brazil in Latin America and China and India in Asia, and pursue the goal of a modest nuclear capability.'88 From the point of view of the more hawkish elements in Lagos and the radical foreign policy scholars in Nigeria's universities, however,

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the need for going nuclear is based, in the main, on the need for the country to develop its own big muscle if it wants to engage actively in a major political wrestling bout with Pretoria over southern Africa's most burning issues: apartheid and Namibia. As indicated earlier, even President Shagari had argued that Nigeria needed to be nuclearized, if only as a response to South Africa's own nuclear capability. But, be that as it may, Lagos currently lacks the formidable nuclear teeth with which it can ferociously threaten Pretoria. At best, and for a long time to come, the Nigerian leaders can only soothe themselves, in view of their grossly disadvantaged military weight relative to South Africa, by engaging in some vibrant nuclear rhetoric. This is not to suggest that the Nigerians are not planning ahead so that, in the long term, they would be able to give a semblance of credibility to their rhetoric. To this end, Nigeria, apart from its four mini nuclear energy research centers, plans to set up a full-fledged National Institute for Nuclear Research at a future date. But, to the extent that the IAEA would still be playing an active role in the projected new institution, Lagos would be hard put to pursue overt nuclear activities that might lead to the production of weapons and other devices. Technically, therefore, any major program of nuclear research in Nigeria that was supported by the IAEA could only be geared towards the energy sector and to help industry, hospitals and agricultural projects. In any event, even if Nigeria decided to break with the IAEA, and begin to undertake the necessary development work on the production of nuclear weapons, nothing significant could emerge until, say, the 1990s. And, by that time, if apartheid is still unresolved, South Africa's own nuclear capability, given the present level of achievements, would have become so advanced that the nuclear weapons of Nigeria would, in relative terms, be viewed by Pretoria as toys. While Nigeria's nuclear drive is essentially at the primary stages, the country's conventional might has moved beyond that level. Indeed, the federal government has recently been trying to modernize its armed forces to ensure that they do not become obsolete. Significantly, Nigeria's reasons for carrying out the modernization program also include South Africa. Thus, in June 1983, President Shagari, in rationalizing the exercise, argued that Nigeria has continued to note, with disquiet, the threats posed to African states by South Africa's well-equipped armed forces. In particular, the President went on, Pretoria's harassment of neighboring African states at the time, could

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 159 not be ignored by Nigeria, at least to the extent that Nigeria sees itself as an African leader. Such leadership, he maintained, calls for a virile army. That was precisely why, President Shagari insisted, the country would continue to make it a priority to have strong and sophisticated armed forces that would not only back its foreign policy objectives and interests but would also take care of international security and defend Nigeria's territorial integrity.89 As if to give some substance to President Shagari's contention, two months after his speech, Lagos signed an agreement with British Aerospace for the purchase of eighteen Anglo-French Jaguar ground attack fighter aircraft, as part of the modernization program for the air force. The Anglo-French military venture is capable of providing Nigeria with an effective air defense system, can carry air-to-air missiles and the fighters are equipped with in-flight refueling facilities. The deal, which included the provision of spares, training of pilots and ground crew, is said to be worth about £100 million, and it could double if the Nigerians take the other eighteen fighters which they are believed to want.90 The delivery of the fighters is expected to be completed in 1985.91 Nigeria's determination to bolster its conventional weapons strength does not mean that its nuclear enthusiasm has subsided. On the contrary, the nuclear drive is, as we have shown, going to be a longterm exercise. This is even more so now that Nigeria, under the Buhari Administration, is still desperately trying to free itself from some of the serious economic difficulties inherited from the Shagari Administration. Since the bulk of African states, including Nigeria, lack, in the interim, any credible nuclear might, their perceived enemy, South Africa, is in a position to pursue its own African policy, ignoring the ambitions of the black African states. Given this situation, are these states to look on in silent agony while South Africa further burnishes and flexes its military strength? This is an issue that we must now consider.

The nuclear debate revisited We have indicated some of the factors militating against the rapid nuclearization of African states emphasizing the point that for a long time to come these states would remain unable to produce nuclear weapons. Yet, for as long as African states remain powerless on the nuclear level the more vulnerable their security is, at least in terms of dealing with South Africa. This then raises the fundamental question

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of what the African countries can do to free themselves from this quagmire since they do not possess the nuclear muscle to face up to South Africa? First, the OAU and its members must mobilize themselves into more cohesive, purposeful and forceful international pressure groups at the various centers of multilateral diplomacy in which Africa plays an integral part, especially at the United Nations. Here, the goal of African states is straightforward: to persuade all the more powerful nations to give a firm pledge that the slightest use of, or indication of an intention to use, nuclear weapons by Pretoria against the African states should be taken for what it is, namely, a grave threat to international peace and security. As such, it should be punishable by the relevant sections of the UN charter, including the instant declaration of total economic sanctions against South Africa by these powers and their TNCs as well as the various leading international financial institutions. True, experience has shown so far that the imposition of economic sanctions on recalcitrant states has been largely negative and unsuccessful; in particular, the anticipated deterrent and coercive force of the exercise has always been quite weak.92 Equally true, and in a similar vein, is that highly publicized cases of economic sanctions — such as those of the leading international organizations, especially the UN — often fail in their political purpose because they help to stimulate nationalism and resistance in the target-state.93 Nevertheless, African states and the OAU should not take a defeatist stance regarding the results of international economic sanctions on South Africa. Is it not common knowledge that these sanctions usually fail — whether in, say, the case of the League of Nations over Italy; or, more recently, with the UN over Ian Smith's Rhodesia94 — because those Great Powers having the economic and political leverage to effect a change have been the very ones to have indulged in circumventing the imposition of sanctions? The African states could start from the premise that they are out to declare total diplomatic war on the most notorious of these Great Powers, and would not hesitate to blacklist them, if need be, through outright economic and political sanctions. It is not enough for African states to recognize South Africa as an enemy; all the foreign powers that give succor to the Republic must also be recognized as such. Unfortunately, the African states will be unable to achieve political results until they themselves are genuinely committed to make the necessary sacrifices, no matter how painful in

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 161 the short run, to ensure that a sharp eye is kept on the increasingly ferocious Pretoria's nuclear dog which, if peace and political stability is required on the continent, needs to be kept firmly chained to its kennel. It needs to be emphasized at once, of course, that if it became necessary to impose economic sanctions on South Africa as a means of dissuading the Republic from mobilizing its nuclear arsenal against African states, efforts need not be limited to the highly public and formally legislated ones — whether bilateral or decreed by an international organization like the UN. Rather, efforts should, with an equal vigor, be similarly directed at the more subtle forms of economic coercion. This is largely because the relatively covert, subtle economic sanctions could ultimately be politically effective with only moderate, purely economic repercussions. Given South Africa's huge economic links with the Western powers, African states could redouble their efforts to get these industrial countries to get tough with the Republic without necessarily coming out into the open to say they are doing that. Such an avenue is not likely to prove as diplomatically embarrassing for the relations of Pretoria with the West as when sanctions are publicly imposed. Equally, the application of economic sanctions through subtle methods may not generate as widespread national response in the target-country as when these sanctions are imposed under the full glare of world publicity. Indeed, some scholars insist that high-profile public sanctions should be avoided if the target's compliance is the goal.95 The list of the subtle economic weapons that could be applied against South Africa by the West is long. It may include such things as the drying up, or outright elimination, of credit lines (or even just changing the 'risk category' of the Republic) by private bank consortia; delays in the delivery of spare parts and in other areas of trade; refusals to re-finance existing debts; declines in investment, either in new funds or for expansion; dwindling bilateral and multilateral loans and grants; and deliberate imposition of snags in licensing or other technology transfers. All these measures can create serious economic difficulties for South Africa without providing much in the way of a nationalism-generating scapegoat.96 The extent of Pretoria's dependence on many of the Western powers for markets in strategic minerals, nuclear collaboration, foreign direct investments, and higher-technology transfers allows effective economic coercion to be applied without necessarily arousing much publicity. Were it to be

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possible for all the Western powers to embark on these measures energetically and conscientiously, South Africa would wake up one morning to find itself in an invisible economic blockade. The full repercussions of such a blockade on the Republic's economy cannot be overstated. For now, however, those who subscribe to the idea that more open and public economic sanctions can force Pretoria's hands on Namibia and apartheid continue to demand their imposition. In 1982, for example, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, while at The Hague on the final leg of a West European tour, appealed to the Dutch Prime Minister, Dries Van Agt, to support the official economic sanctions against Pretoria. Admittedly, on that occasion, the President's sentiments were received with only cautious sympathy and he returned home after three days without any Dutch commitment to real action.97 All the same, the fact that Mugabe advocates such a strategy highlights his belief in its efficacy. Also, at the Paris 1983 special UN conference on Namibia, a call for the imposition of all-embracing economic sanctions on Pretoria was made. The conference condemned some Western countries for their continued economic, financial, commercial and military relations with South Africa.98 True, previous calls for mandatory economic sanctions against Pretoria had been met with the immediate veto of the United States and there was no reason to believe that the situation, given President Ronald Reagan's so-called policy of 'constructive engagement' with South Africa, might have changed in 1984. Even so, the fact tnat the imposition of sanctions was demanded by the conference, once again, brought out the high hopes pinned on the potential power of the measure to force South Africa to readjust its postures on Namibia and apartheid. Another factor that can save some of the African states from becoming an easy target for South Africa's nuclear blackmail is the ability of these countries to be able to stand on their own economically, without seeing the Republic as an important economic entity in their daily lives. It is significant that the black African states geographically close to South Africa, having realized this issue, came together and formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).99 Specifically, the SADCC was set up to consider and implement ways of ending economic dependence on South Africa, in view of that country's policy of apartheid and its continuing and constant efforts to sabotage attempts at autonomous economic development in black Africa.

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 163 This latter South African strategy is important to our analysis to the extent that Pretoria has deliberately engaged in destabilization exercises, particularly in the front-line states to ensure that efforts to end or minimize the dependence on South Africa are not successful. If these states could be made perpetually dependent on the Republic, then the leverage of using nuclear capability to harass the African countries into accepting South Africa's policies in the continent would have been considerably enhanced. This is why Pretoria has been so ruthless in its destabilization policies. In recent times, these policies have included acts of sabotage and commercial blackmail over the Cabora Bassa scheme, and the attacks on the Lomaum hydroelectric power station in Angola,100 as well as the fuel storage areas at Beira and in Lesotho, the constant damaging of transport networks, electricity grid, pipelines and railways and the South African insistence on energy policy solutions which increase the front-line states' collective dependence on the Republic. As Pedro van-Dunem, Angola's Energy Minister, has pointed out at a recent meeting of SADCC Energy Ministers in Maputo the various South African destabilizing tactics have gingered some of these frontline states into making more conscious and determined efforts to free themselves from their South African dependence. The Angolan Minister, who is the coordinator of SADCC's energy programs, took the view that the region had shown 'the steadfast and mature will to achieve its goals both firmly and cautiously.'101 One area in which this firmness and caution is perhaps best shown relates to the issue of hydroelectric power. In 1981, production capacity exceeded consumption by 17 percent; but, new investments would have to be made if this figure is not to fall to 8 percent by 1990. Furthermore, while countries like Zambia and Tanzania would continue to have large reserves in 1990, others, like Lesotho, Swaziland and southern Mozambique ran the risk of having to import more and more electricity from South Africa. It was the latter realization that led VanDunem to point out to his colleagues that there was an urgent need 'to consider in a co-ordinated way how to make rational use of our hydroelectric resources, particularly the Zambesi River.'102 Apart from hydroelectric power, transport and communications have also been taking the attention of the member states of SADCC. Clearly, better links between these nine countries will make some of their other economic difficulties easier to solve, especially the clogged channels of food distribution from countries customarily in surplus (for example, Zimbabwe in maize, Botswana in beef) to those in

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chronic deficit (Zambia and Zaire). Moreover, better links will also make it relatively easier for them to develop a manufacturing base to permit regional import substitution. At present, and like their sister states to the north, their trade lines, drawn during a colonial past, are directed toward doing business with overseas industrial countries rather than with one another. Thus, for instance, while three-fifths of Tanzania's exports go to industrial countries, less than 3 percent go to African countries. For Zambia, the breakdown is 80 and 2 percent, respectively.103 To the extent that this trading pattern applies to many of the SADCC member states, too, improved transport and communications networks will help expand both regional and external trade. It is pertinent to mention here that when SADCC was established on April 1, 1980, the member states in setting out 'to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa/ concluded that the 'key to this strategy is transport and communications [because] the dominance of South Africa has been reinforced and strengthened by its transport system.'104 Thus, the initial SADCC projects presented to donors in December 1980 were transport and communications rehabilitation and upgrading. More than 40 percent of the money received from these donors was to be spent in Mozambique whose ports serve, or could be made to serve, seven of the nine SADCC states. Pretoria clearly agrees with the importance that SADCC attaches to Mozambique's transport links; the South African-backed 'Mozambique National Resistance' has concentrated its attacks on these links. In a deliberate attempt to show South Africa's hostility and contempt for SADCC's objectives, the road, railway and pipeline linking Maputo to Zimbabwe have been frequently attacked; and major attacks have usually been reserved for the month before important SADCC meetings. 105 For example, prior to the SADCC meeting in Blantyre in November 1981, the road and rail bridges and pipeline linking Beira and Zimbabwe were sabotaged, and marker buoys in Beira port destroyed. In the month before the July 1982 meeting in Gaborone, the Beira-Zimbabwe railway and pipeline, as well as the power line serving Beira, were attacked, as was the Beira-Malawi railway.106 And in December, that is a month before the SADCC meeting which took place in Lesotho, the fuel storage facilities at Beira were destroyed. On the same day, too, a South African commando raid on Maseru killed forty-two people. Indeed, in the case of the attacks on Lesotho, these went on right through January and even included the bombing of a

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 165 Danish-funded water supply project on the outskirts of Maseru, just a few hours before the meeting took place.107 At another level, these raids give the Western shippers to some of the front-line states an excuse to continue to use South African ports. Consequently, in the case of Zimbabwe, for instance, the country's traffic has continued to remain well below expectations, and well under the percentage that went through Mozambique in colonial times.108 In short, it is clear that, in trying to wrest their economic independence from South Africa, the SADCC member states need to display a resolute and firm determination. Otherwise Pretoria will wreck their efforts, making them more dependent on the Republic, with the corresponding vulnerability to South Africa's nuclear blackmail to achieve and maintain its African policy goals. In the pre-1984 years, member states of SADCC had consistently refused to be intimidated by South Africa. At an important meeting with its leading international political and economic backers, held in Lesotho in January 1983 for example, the SADCC member states, along with these backers, bitterly denounced Pretoria's policies in the area. Thus, while noting that South Africa had been systematically waging a regional war to destabilize its neighbors and create a buffer of chaos and poverty around its northern borders, twenty-nine governments from the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa and twenty-three world aid organizations and development agencies joined the SADCC in calling on South Africa to stop undermining its neighbors. In a final communique, the conference 'strongly condemned deliberate interference by South Africa' in the affairs of these states and called 'for the immediate cessation of such interference.'109 Equally, many of the SADCC member states have refused to be intimidated on Namibia. At a different forum, a summit of the six black 'front-line' states (which are also members of SADCC) in September 1982 in Lusaka, these countries refused to accept Pretoria's 'linkage' agreement — examined at length in the last chapter — over Angola and Namibia. The meeting totally rejected any linkage between Namibian independence and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. In the communique issued after the summit, the front-line states 'unequivocally emphasized the importance of separating the two issues.' The South African insistence on linking them was said to be 'against the letter and spirit of UN Resolution 435 and can only impede the process of negotiations.' Furthermore, such an insistence, they maintain, 'also constitutes interference in the affairs of Angola.'110 Then, in February 1983, at another summit in Harare, leaders of the

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front-line states demanded the immediate withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and called on other states to isolate the Pretoria government for its policies.111 Some pessimists have argued that the SADCC member states could never end their economic dependence on South Africa or even achieve any major success in their quest for increasing regional autonomy and self-reliance; and so, by implication, they would continue to remain a potentially easy prey for any future nuclear harassment. These pessimists point to the fact that the years since the founding of SADCC have been of deepening economic crisis inside the region. While the latter observation clearly has some weight, the economic crisis of the early 1980s was not limited to the black states of southern Africa alone, the recession was worldwide. Indeed, many of the causes of crisis in SADCC member states' economies were external. And they highlight some aspects of our main arguments in the previous chapters, including our theoretical analysis in Chapter 2. While falling international prices hit several of the region's exports — Zambia's copper; Zimbabwe's iron and steel; Botswana's diamonds; Tanzania's coffee; Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Swaziland's sugar and even Angola's oil — the prices that these poor states have had to pay for their imports from industrial countries as well as the interest paid on their foreign loans rose. Then, there was South Africa's role. Its own direct aggression as well as its support for dissident guerrilla activities in the region had, as we have shown, disrupted transport and production, particularly in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho.112 Furthermore, drought contributed to the economic woes of the region. It devastated crops and herds in Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Agreed, some of the causes of the economic crisis lie within the region, in particular the point that resources have not always been used as efficiently as possible,113 but, SADCC is boldly tackling this problem.114 In any case, five years is just too short in the life of such a regional organization to make definitive statements about its failure or even success. Moreover, SADCC is energetically addressing itself to all the key economic problems in the region. Apart from the energy, transport and communications issues just examined, these range from the issue of effective distribution of adequate food supplies to effective industrial strategy in the area.115 In other words, the SADCC member states should be encouraged in their objectives, not savagely criticized before they have even had time to execute their policies.

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 167 By 1984, the crippling effects of South Africa's economic blackmail and destabilization raids had forced a few of the SADCC members into a smothering embrace with the Republic. Mozambique, for one, had to conclude the famous Nkomati non-aggression treaty with Pretoria. Swaziland, too, had to agree to a shot-gun wedding with the neighbor it most fears. In spite of these developments, however, both countries have not withdrawn from SADCC. In the long term, their economic prosperity as well as their personal pride and political respectability among the progressive African states in general lies in the organization, rather than in any temporary understanding with the Botha administration. Another issue that urgently merits the attention of African states, and without any prejudice to the guerrilla warfare option that we examined earlier, is how best to forge the continent's defense policy so that there is, inter alia, a common standing army. This is particularly relevant if we bear in mind that, for now, South Africa's campaigns employ conventional weapons. The existence of a common army under the aegis of the OAU would deter some of the adventurist policies of Pretoria, particularly in southern Africa. It is extremely doubtful, although not absolutely impossible, that the South Africans would want to take on a pan-African force before the eyes of the whole world. Such an act could be politically and diplomatically embarrassing for Pretoria; and might even have unprecedented military repercussions. The latter situation could easily arise if a conflict between South Africa and an OAU force became internationalized. In such an eventuality, some of the foreign powers that have so far been cautious not to get directly involved in African affairs might want to do so on the side of the African states. In this context, the Communist powers readily spring to mind. When, for example, in the late 1960s, the Soviets became involved with massive arms supplies to Nigeria during that country's civil war, Moscow quickly rationalized such a policy on the grounds that such a posture tallied with the broad proFederal OAU consensus on the conflict.116 Might not the Communist powers, in a similar vein, justify any deep intervention on the side of an OAU-sponsored pan-African force?117 If only the incidence of petty political wranglings could be drastically curtailed, the African states might develop the will to mobilize their forces under a common continental umbrella that could then be standardized under an OAU flag. The huge amount of money that these states waste every year in fighting one another in

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unnecessary wars could, therefore, be put to better use. As it is, the annual defense budgets of many African states are quite staggering. In 1979, Somalia spent 598 million shillings ($95 million), Kenya, 1.4 billion shillings ($218 million), Madagascar $101.9 million, Zambia 48.8 million kwacha ($387.9 million), and Zaire, 92 million zaires ($50.5 million). In 1980, while Nigeria spent 987 million naira ($1.7 billion), Zimbabwe incurred $Z308 million ($444 million), and Ethiopia spent 1.1 billion biss ($385 million). In 1981, Mozambique spent 5.6 billion metica ($198 million), and Ghana, as poor as it was, expended 394 cedi ($140 million). It has been estimated that Africa spends as much as $14 billion every year on armed struggle or in preparing for it.119 Such a hefty annual expenditure could be better utilized in defending the common African position against South Africa rather than in being supposedly used to advance national interests or the objectives of the warmongering states. Again, by way of illustration, let us pick just two examples. As a result of the Ethiopia/Somalia war of 1977-8 it was estimated that the damage caused to Ethiopia by the Somalis was $500 million. In the case of the Tanzania/Uganda war, which lasted from October 1978 until April 1979, its direct cost to Tanzania was estimated at the same figure, $500 million.120 There is no reason to doubt that the Great Powers would readily sell sophisticated conventional weapons to a pan-African force, once they could be sure of being paid in hard currency for their wares. Indeed, many of the arms manufacturers in these industrial countries attract clients in Africa by going out of their way to offer 'discounts/ 'rebates' or excessive commissions — euphemisms for bribery.121 In other words, sources of arms supplies would not constitute a major problem. What is required on the part of the African states is to have a united force that can impress the weight of African conventional might on South Africa. Apart from its likely usefulness in deterring Pretoria from engaging in a reckless spree of nuclear adventures, the mere existence of such a force might even help to reduce the scale of the superpower rivalry and intervention in Africa, providing, always, that the force has some teeth and credibility by way of its ability to intervene with a measure of success in African conflicts. Meanwhile, for as long as Africa continues to lack a wellcoordinated and effective joint continental defense force, and as long as they lack any nuclear capability that could serve as a deterrent, the easier it is for South Africa to carry out its adventures in any of its

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neighboring states without caring about the impact of such exercises on the level of international public opinion. O n e of the latest victims of u n p r o v o k e d South African attack was Lesotho. While Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan had, during a visit to North Korea in May 1983, got together with Prime Minister Li Jong-Ok to d e n o u n c e jointly what they called, 'the m o v e s of aggression and intervention of the South African racists againt the people of Lesotho/ 1 2 2 Chief Jonathan's avowed 'will to resist apartheid/ 1 2 3 cannot be taken quite seriously by Pretoria as long as Lesotho and the other states n o r t h of the Limpopo River remain militarily and economically weak. Indeed, to buttress this point, barely three months after Chief Jonathan's celebrated statement, South Africa seized military e q u i p m e n t which Lesotho had ordered for its internal security and used it to arm the exiled opposition, the Basuto Congress Party. 124 The message was clear. In Lesotho, as in Angola and m a n y of the other front-line states, South Africa, for its own selfish reasons, would like to see a p u p p e t - t y p e regime installed which would wink at Pretoria's internal and external policies. In the years ahead, the need for the African states to have a m u c h m o r e vigorous joint policy towards South Africa, in spite of the Republic's nuclear capability, will b e c o m e m o r e and m o r e imperative as Pretoria harasses some of its neighbors with greater savagery and callousness than hitherto. The African states will have to rise b e y o n d routine rhetorical c o n d e m n a t i o n of South Africa's attacks; 125 concrete policies have to be evolved.

Notes 1. For detailed analyses of these postures in the foreign policies of Nigeria and Ghana, see, among others, Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960-1966 (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973); A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: the Nigerian Experience (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1974); and W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969). 2. For an analysis on the place of non-alignment in Africa's external relations, see, for example, Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Non-alignment in Africa's International Relations/ Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 5, No. 2,1981, pp. 16-45. For an interpretational analysis of the concept as both an ideology and a foreign policy issue, see G. Aforka Nweke, Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955-1975 (Boston, Mass.: Boston University — African Studies Center, 1980). 3. Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 120.

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4. See 'How to Prevent a Mushrooming of Nuclear Bombs,' The Economist (London), August 21, 1982. 5. See ibid., and Joseph A. Yager, International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1981). 6. Note that fuel-grade uranium could simply be 'cooked' in a nuclear reactor to convert part of the abundant uranium-238 it contains into plutonium. Thereafter, the latter can be extracted through reprocessing, a chemical procedure. 7. See 'How to Prevent a Mushrooming of Nuclear Bombs.' 8. For instance, to create radioactive isotopes. 9. Israel, for example, bombed Osirak reactor, largely in the conviction that Iraq might be using this dodge. See 'How to Prevent a Mushrooming of Nuclear Bombs.' However, the IAEA, whose inspectors regularly visited the installation, found no evidence that Iraq meant to use the reactor for anything other than non-military research. Even so, this conclusion cannot be taken as a full answer to the widespread suspicion that the Iraqis might do so in the future, especially when we bear in mind that the bombed reactor was to be fuelled with uranium enriched to the same high degree (93 percent U-235) that is needed to make a uranium bomb. See, in particular, Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad (London: Corgi, 1982); and 'Nearer a Multi-Nuclear World,' in The Economist (London), June 13, 1981. 10. See 'How to Prevent a Mushrooming of Nuclear Bombs.' 11. Cf. Ashok Kapur, 'The Nuclear Spread: A Third World View,' Third World Quarterly, 2, No. 1, January 1980, pp. 59-75. 12. Thomas C. Schelling, 'Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism,' International Security, 6, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 61-77, at p. 61. 13. Mazrui, The African Condition, p. 122. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., p. 138. 16. See, for example, 'Kodjo Urges African States to Acquire Nuclear Arms,' New Nigerian, June 10, 1983, p. 8. 17. See, for example, The Report of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) (Toronto: TCLSAC, 1982); hereinafter cited as TCLSAC Report. 18. Zdenek Cervenka, 'The West and the Apartheid Bomb,' Africa, No. 125, January 1982. 19. Note that even though the South African government's proposals for the Colored and Indian peoples were far short of what most black leaders and international critics of apartheid constantly demanded, the reforms sparked instant outrage from the verkrampte, or hardline, white opposition. In the circumstances, Botha took immediate steps to reassure all the Afrikaners that apartheid was to be a permanent institution in South Africa and could never be abandoned, no matter how great the force of the international pressures. See 'Breaking Away from Botha,' Newsweek, July 18, 1983, p. 91. 20. New York Times, November 7, 1983. 21. J.E. Spence, 'South Africa: Reform versus Reaction,' The World Today, 37, No. 12, December 1981, pp. 461-8, at p. 465.

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22. These are: Transkei, which was created in 1976, Bophutatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981). 23. See 'Non-Violence is Impossible in South Africa/ The Guardian, August 8, 1983. 24. Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (New York: Africana, 1977), p. 155. 25. See 'South Africa Poses Military Threat/ New Nigerian, September 7, 1982, p. 1. 26. For a detailed analysis of this approach, see the classic work of the high priest of that school, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1978), fifth edition, revised. 27. See Africa, No. 114, February 1981, p. 39. 28. Jobe, 'Africa and Nuclear Progress/ Daily Times (Lagos), February 11, 1982, p. 15. 29. Ibid. 30. Cf., for example, James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 31. See Mortenthau, Politics Among Nations. 32. Quoted in V.D. Sokolovsky, editor, Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 17. Note that Lenin derived one of his major inspirations on warfare from the writings of the Prussian strategist, Carl Von Clausewitz. Stefan T. Possony stated in his book, Century of Conflict (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), that when, for example, Lenin went briefly into hiding in July 1917, he took with him two books: Clausewitz's On War and Marx's The Civil War in France. Clausewitz himself saw war as the continuation of politics by other (that is, forcible) means. For the most recent translation of Clausewitz's classic, see Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds, Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 33. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy. 34. See ibid., pp. 18-19. 35. For some background reading on the Liberation Committee of the OAU, see Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity. 36. A clear example that readily springs to mind is that of the Vietnam struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. Here, even though the Vietcongs were only armed with simple rifles and sub-machine guns, they were still able, in the end, to overwhelm both France and the United States, in spite of these Great Powers' most advanced and superior firepower. 37. For some background reading on guerrilla warfare see Peter Paret and J.W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960s, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1965); Michael Elliott-Bateman, ed., The Fourth Dimension of Warfare: I, Intelligence, Subversion and Resistance (New York: Praeger, 1970); Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa (New York: Grossman, 1971); and a special issue oiORBIS (XVIII, No. 1, Spring 1974) on 'Wars of National Liberation.' 38. Abdul R.M. Babu, 'Africa and the Nuclear Bomb,' in Africa Now, July 1983.

172 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals Ibid. The emphasis is added. Mazrui, The African Condition, p. 129. Cf., ibid. See Larry R. Stewart, 'Canada's Role in the International Uranium Cartel/ International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 65789. See African Business, June 1983, p. 35. West Africa (1980), p. 255. Quoted in Newsweek, September 15,1980, p. 22. For a detailed analysis of Pakistan's nuclear drive, see B.M. Kaushik and O.N. Mehrotra, Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Sopan, 1980). See 'The Third World Goes Nuclear,' in South, December 1980. African Business, June 1983, p. 35. Ibid. Quoted in Terence Mirabelli, 'Nuclear Quest in Libya: Gadaffi's HBomb Ambition,' New African, February 1980. See ibid. Ibid. Note that in 1983, in the wake of strong anti-Libyanism in the United States, these students were expelled by the Reagan administration. Libya justified the annexation on the grounds that it has never recognized two agreements which settled the Libya-Chad border question. The relevant agreements were: (i) an exchange of notes between Italy and France on September 12, 1919, which settled the Niger and Chad frontiers; and (ii)a 1956 Franco-Libyan agreement which modified the border with Chad.

See Mirabelli, 'Nuclear Quest in Libya.' 54. For a detailed analysis on Libya's ambitions and foreign policies in the Sahel area in general, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Qaddafi's North African Design,' International Security, 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 154-78. 55. The Economist (London), November 29, 1980, p. 41. 56. See 'Niger's Uranium,' in ibid., June 19, 1982. 57. West Africa (1982), p. 3002. 58. See, for example, Mirabelli, 'Nuclear Quest in Libya.' 59. For a detailed account of the Israeli raid, see Perlmutter et al, Two Minutes Over Baghdad. 60. See 'Nuclear Proliferation,' The Economist (London), August 22, 1981. 61. For an analysis of the wider ramifications of the American installations on Diego Garcia for Africa's security, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Diego Garcia and Africa's Security,' Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, pp. 104-20. 62. For an analysis of the implications of Qaddaffi's nuclear quest for the Sahel states, see Ogunbadejo, 'Qaddafi's North African Design.' 63. See New African, May 1982, p. 26. 64. See ibid. 65. For a detailed explanation as to why several Sahel states are fearful of Libya's intentions in general see Ogunbadejo, 'Qaddafi's North African Design.'

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 173 66. For a detailed analysis of the international politics of the intervention, see ibid. 67. It is pertinent to mention here that one of Qaddafi's ambitions in the Sahel is to be able to have a firm physical control over, and so an assured source of, uranium in the area. See ibid. 68. Note that soon after June 1983, when Qaddafi finally failed to secure the OAU chairmanship that he had long coveted, and despite the fact that a fellow radical, Ethiopia's Mengistu, got the job, the Libyan leader reverted to his old self. By July 1983, he had resumed adventurist policies in the Sahel. His first port of call was Libya's immediate neighbor, Chad, where he backed dissident forces on a massive scale, including direct military actions, in an attempt to return Oueddei to power in Ndjaemena and, of course, oust the incumbent leader, Habre, in the process. 69. See New African, May 1982. 70. See Africa, No. 138, February 1983. 71. Ibid. 72. See 'Bongo's Nuclear Ultimatum to France,' in ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. See Enukora J. Okoli, 'Nigeria's Hope of Nuclear Weapons,' West Africa (1980), pp. 872-4, at p. 873. 75. See 'Uranium Company Established,' ibid., pp. 415-16. 76. See 'Uranium Company Gears Up for 1984/ in New Nigerian, June 3, 1982, p. 14. 77. Ibid. 78. Daily Times (Lagos), August 5, 1983, p. 5. 79. Ibid. 80. The four day conference, which was simply titled 'ENERCON '83' by the organizers, had as its theme: 'The Role and Potential of Nuclear Energy in Nigeria.' It was attended by several scientists, including those from the IAEA, Canada, Pakistan, Britain, France, West Germany, Ghana, Zambia and various Nigerian universities. Participants at the conference discussed the problems of training and manpower development that were deemed to be peculiar to Nigeria, the policy and sociopolitical issues, the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the safety problems and the science and technology of nuclear energy. 81. See 'Nigeria Explores Nuclear Energy Potentials,' Business Times, July 25, 1983, p. 1. 82. See ibid. 83. See 'Rhetorics at Ife Energy Conference,' National Concord (Lagos), August 5, 1983, p. 5. 84. Ibid. 85. See 'Nuclear Energy Research: Four Centres Established,' in New Nigerian, March 18, 1983. 86. Mazrui, The African Condition, p. 135. 87. Ibid., p. 134. 88. Ibid. 89. See 'Nigeria Needs a Virile Army to Lead Africa,' Daily Times (Lagos), June 27, 1983, p. 1.

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90. The order was originally for thirty-six Jaguar jets; but in view of Nigeria's pressing economic circumstances, it was slashed by half. See Tact for Jaguar Jets Now Signed/ National Concord, August 24, 1983, p. 1. 91. See ibid., and West Africa (1983), p. 1834. 92. See Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); Margaret Doxey, 'International Sanctions: a Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa/ International Organization, 26, Summer 1972, pp. 527-50, and Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Johan Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,' World Politics, 19, April 1967, pp. 378-416; Peter Wallensteen, 'Characteristics of Economic Sanctions,' Journal of Peace Research, 111 (1968), pp. 248-67; Klaus Knorr, 'International Economic Leverage and Its Uses/ in Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds, Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1977), pp. 99-126; and Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975). 93. Cf. Knorr, 'International Economic Leverage and Its Uses/ and The Power of Nations; and Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions.' 94. For detailed analyses of these two cases, see George W. Baer, 'Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936/ International Organization, 27, Spring 1973, pp. 165-79; and Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions.' 95. See R.S. Olson, 'Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations,' World Politics, 31, No. 4, July 1979, pp. 4 7 1 94. 96. Cf. Ibid. 97. See New African, September 1982, p. 32. 98. See 'Call for Sanctions Against South Africa/ in Daily Times (Lagos), May 3, 1983, p. 9. 99. The members are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 100. For an analysis on the impact of South Africa's destabilization strategy on Angola's foreign policy, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Angola: Ideology and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy,' International Affairs (London), 57, No. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 254-69. 101. See 'SADCC: Energy and the Enemy,' in West Africa (1983), p. 1834. 102. Ibid. 103 See 'Small Leap Forward in Africa,' The Economist (London), November 22, 1980. 104. Joseph Hanlon, 'A Sub-continent's transport battle/ African Business, September 1982. 105. See ibid. 106. Note that while traffic to Malawi is not normally interrupted, in the premeeting raids there is always one attack on Malawi traffic too. Hanlon

Uranium, African states and nuclear proliferation 175

107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

argues that such attacks are meant 'to remind South Africa's only friend in the nine what would happen if it shifted more into the SADCC camp/ See ibid. See New Nigerian, January 31, 1983. See ibid. Ibid. Daily Times (Lagos), September 7, 1982, p. 9. See 'Frontline Leaders Want Racist Troops out of Angola/ New Nigerian, February 22, 1983, p. 8. For a recent detailed and up-to-date analysis of these campaigns, see the special issue of The Economist (London), July 16, 1983, entitled 'Destabilisation in Southern Africa/ See the special supplement entitled 'SADCC: Maseru/ in Africa Economic Digest, January 21, 1983. See ibid. For details, see ibid. For more details of this Soviet stance, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Ideology and Pragmatism: the Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-1977/ ORBIS, 21, No. 4, Winter 1978, pp. 803-30. For the construction of such scenarios, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Soviet Policies in Africa/ African Affairs, 79, No. 316, July 1980, pp. 297-325; and 'Diego Garcia and Africa's Security/ Third World Quarterly, 4, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 104-20. See 'What Price the African Soldier/ in Africa Now, July 1982, especially the column entitled, 'Africa's big armed forces/ Ibid. Ibid., pp. 22-3. See ibid. See 'Lesotho Premier Appeals for Help Against South Africa/ in New Nigerian, May 10, 1983, p. 8. Ibid. See 'Lesotho's Military Equipment Seized in South Africa/ The Guardian, August 24, 1983, p. 2. For instance, in the case of the 1983 attack on Lesotho, President Arap Moi, in his capacity as the then chairman of the O AU, condemned South Africa's action. He stated that Pretoria's attacks were aimed at destabilizing the country with a view to making it economically and politically dependent on the racist regime (quoted in New Nigerian, March 29, 1983, p. 8). Accepted, but what is the OAU doing about it then? For an analysis of the organization's largely negative attempts at conflict resolution in the past, see, among others, Amadu Sesay, 'The OAU and Continental Order/ in T.M. Shaw and S. Ojo, eds., Africa and the International Political System (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 168-225.

7. Africa's strategic minerals in perspective

Reconciling the radical and the bourgeois The forces of international politics that surround African strategic minerals manifest themselves in different shades and complexities. An important aspect is the issue of unequal exchange, in itself a further manifestation of the phenomenon of asymmetry in power relationships. Here, the process is greatly facilitated by the inherited and continuing imbalance and dependence of the African mineral producing countries, and, with it, the vulnerability and limited options of primary producers of highly valued exhaustible resources. As the ongoing international economic recession has amply demonstrated, these African producers, even though they have always been victims of perennial unequal exchange, are powerless to influence effectively the economic laws of supply and demand. Since they have to survive and meet some of the basic needs of government and society in general, they are forced to keep on selling their commodities at the prevailing world prices. The Western industrial democracies and their TNCs, for their part, are obviously, for their own self-serving reasons, just as anxious to buy. From their standpoint, the lower the prices of these minerals are, the better it is for their inherent profit maximization quest; and, of course, the worse it is, economically, for the affected African countries. Thus, these poor countries continually find themselves in a quagmire, with no easy prospects in the offing as to how best they can extricate themselves. Furthermore, poor demand for the strategic minerals further reinforces the will and ability of Western powers and their TNCs to resort to various maneuvering tactics and strategies to guarantee supplies and keep the price level down. The United States, for example, buys more of these strategic minerals when the prices are low, to meet its stockpile's target which, officially, is designed for

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 177 military emergencies. In reality, while the military aspect cannot be denied, minerals from these reserves are often used to reduce the federal budget and, more importantly from the standpoint of our analysis, to keep prices low when, otherwise, they would have moved upwards to the benefit of the African producers. 1 In essence, the stockpiling strategy of the Great Powers, among other things, is a subtle form of further exploitation of the relevant African producers. In discussing the plight of the black African producers, we noted that the various measures devised — including the nationalization of the international mining houses, as the culmination of rising economic nationalism — have not effectively helped to redress the problem. Equally, we considered the economic and class contradictions in these states, in particular the alliance of the governing elite with international capital. In general, TNCs, whether formally owned in whole or in part by the host government, tend to be allies of the ruling elite. What is important to grasp about regime change for extractive industries in the African milieu is not just the relative bargaining positions of African governments and the TNCs, but rather the nature of the political elite that operates in collaboration with extractive TNCs in the country.2 It is common knowledge that many officials misuse their powerful positions in the public sector to acquire private wealth and property, thereby transforming themselves into 'rentier capitalists.' Self-enrichment of public officials has become one of the most notorious characteristics of the African economic and political systems. Even where governments profess plain socialist, or 'scientific revolutionary,' views, officials are not averse to 'earning' vast sums of money in this manner. 3 Sure enough, the African set-up fits well into the core-periphery analysis. All the same, it is pertinent to mention that given the inept economic policies and the kleptopcracy of some of the governing elites — witness, for instance, Mobutu's notoriety in this regard — which, apart from benefiting these so-called 'statesmen,' also significantly benefit the advanced capitalist states, most African governing elites have not, in any significant way, helped to achieve a productive appropriation of surplus, in large part because of the inefficiency and illegitimacy of the state.4 While most of the African governments are usually long on rhetoric, they are short on action. A strong state that is legitimate would have been able to carry out effective social organization and to turn wages into capital. Admittedly, the TNCs have played a role in ensuring that African mineral-producing states remain weak; but that is also because some

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African leaders readily cooperate with them. To that degree, the African governing elites that consciously cooperate with international capitalism to foster the economic rip-off of their countries reduce the burden of guilt of the TNCs. The plight of black Africa's future has been made much more difficult by the fact that the various depletable crucial resources, which would have fostered economic development, have not been allowed to lay the essential foundations for economic take-off. Consequently, in terms of narrowing the chasm between the core and periphery, the African situation remains quite critical, and the goal of any possible industrial revolution is as distant as ever. True, the industrial revolution, when it came in Europe, was unprecedented in world history, in that it made a small region of Europe far more powerful than any other region in the world. But, Africa shows no signs of ever experiencing such a gigantic industrial feat, nor are its leaders preparing conscientiously for such a development. In any case, 'catching-up' with the center states would require enormous state power and social organization, which is not assured in the African setting. Part of the problem, as we have shown in this study, has been the massive exploitation of African resources by the TNCs and their home advanced capitalist states. The other factor is that the 'catching-up' challenge has been so unprecedented in the circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century, with various complicating factors; not least, the seemingly perennial drought disasters, and debt-servicing indebtedness. The latter has, indeed, become a major millstone round the necks of several African states. All across black Africa, from Ghana to Zambia, foreign-exchange starved businessmen are getting increasingly nervous about the future of their industries following the inability of most of the central banks to allocate them foreign exchange with which to import essential industrial raw materials and spare parts. In the case of Zambia, for instance, a typical show-case of a monocultural mineral economy, its external financial position deteriorated further in 1984, as copper prices stood well below the levels forecast internationally as recently as the latter part of the previous year. The biggest challenge facing the Kaunda Administration, in view of the country's persistent economic difficulties, is the management of Zambia's foreign debt which, by August 1984, had reached $3.8 billion in long-term and short-term commitments. Of this amount, $667 million represents use of IMF resources (that is, special drawing facilities), while $537 million is owed to other international financial institutions, $1.5 billion is owed

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 179 to foreign government, $570 million represents medium-term debts to foreign banks and suppliers and $540 million is in short-term debts to foreign banks. 5 It was with such hefty debt figures like those of Zambia in mind that Professor René Dumont, a senior French development expert, argued that no meaningful economic development can take place in Africa's debt-owing countries unless Western powers realize that they have a moral obligation to write off all the debts.6 Ironically, with the debt and drought problems as well as the debilitating effects of the exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals, economic development has slowed considerably, producing, in the process, an acute state of underdevelopment — the very hallmark of dependence analysis. In this sense, the basic principles of dependencia, the 'Matthew Effect,' and other allied theories will remain relevant analytical tools for some time to come; at least to the extent that severe underdevelopment further reinforces dependency. Some of the affected states are so frustrated that they have come to accept dependence as an inescapable stage of development. As Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere has ruefully observed: There are still countries in the Third World which regard dependence as an essential stage in the process of economic growth. There is a perception that dependence is part of development. It will take time before we recognise that dependence is essentially undignified and that we must not accept this position. Today, we are all dependent — Tanzania is dependent, Brazil is dependent, India is dependent, and we have got to put our heads together and fight against this dependence. But it will take time.7 In the case of Namibia and South Africa, the massive exploitation of strategic minerals, in close collaboration with South Africa and the Western powers and their TNCs, is pursued as a deliberate policy by Pretoria. We have already indicated the high profit rates that have steadily accrued to all the TNCs in the two countries. With such high profit returns, it is doubtful if Pretoria and all its Western friends can meaningfully call for a genuine and far reaching solution to the independence of Namibia issue — unless a puppet regime can be installed — or that of apartheid in the Republic itself. True, some of the Western governments occasionally condemn South Africa's intransigence over these twin issues. All the same, these condemnations are merely cosmetic, designed to calm the nerves of black African states. Deep down, they all secretly wink at the continuation of the profitable operations of their TNCs in the mining of the minerals in the Republic and Namibia, with a close working relationship with the Botha administration, of course.

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Indeed, as with Mobutu's Zaire, international capitalism is far more interested in working closely with the various regimes so as to ensure 'stability/ which in turn will guarantee the continuous process of siphoning off profits from the local mineral-dependent economies. In other words, the internal situations or political set-ups in these states — call it gross violation of human rights, apartheid or what have you — do not disturb the peace of mind of the TNCs and their chief backers, the major Western industrial democracies. 'Stability' has to be maintained at all costs, be it in Zaire, Namibia or South Africa. In this regard, David Laitin was stating the obvious when he argued that 'international capitalism can work with either Mobutu or Botha, as long as there is stability in Zaire, South Africa and Namibia.'8 Yet, the agonizing point about Namibia is that, as we have shown in Chapter 4, 'stability' is not the key word. Given the fact that the United Nations and its legal organ, the International Court of Justice, have both declared the continued presence of South Africa as well as all its activities in that territory to be illegal and invalid, and given the provisions of the UN Council for Namibia's Decree No. 1 — in particular, the point that minerals removed from Namibia without Council approval would be treated as stolen property — the Western and South African TNCs that have continued with the exploitation of the minerals, in defiance of all these rulings and provisions are all guilty of grand larceny. In other words, all the major Western powers that skillfully cooperate in either buying Namibian minerals or receiving profits from their TNCs in the field have all been steadily engaging in outright pillage. The use of the word pillage or plunder in the Namibian context now needs some clarification, in view of our remarks on the issue in Chapter 1. The Namibian case ought to be differentiated from the situation of the independent black African mineral producing states like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Niger or Gabon, in the analytical use of either of these terms. Whereas in the latter group the key problem has been that of unequal exchange, with the rich powerful core North exploiting (taking advantage of) the weaker vulnerable South; in the former, it is a case of plunder, for which there is a legal basis for the usage. The blanket use of the latter term to cover the two categories, as several radical scholars and analysts have been doing, seems analytically inappropriate. To the degree that the use of appropriate terminologies could strengthen the impact of scholarly arguments and analyses, the distinction is important. The only qualification to my position on this issue relates to Zaire,

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 181 where President Mobutu has unashamedly emerged as an energetic plunderer of the Zairean economy. It is well reported that strategic minerals, particularly cobalt, are often loaded on CI 30 planes, on direct flights to Europe, with proceeds going into Mobutu's personal accounts.9 Of course, as we have indicated in Chapter 3, behind Mobutu and propping him up, and for many years subsidizing him, has been the United States government, with France and Belgium close behind. In this context, it may be apposite to speak of a consortium of plunderers of varying complicity.

The West and Africa's strategic minerals Rhetoric aside, Africa's strategic minerals are important to the economies of many of the leading Western powers. In general, the United States, the EEC member states and Japan are highly dependent on several African non-fuel minerals, especially chromium, cobalt, diamonds, gold, manganese, platinum group metals, titanium, vanadium and vermiculite. The importance of these minerals was brought home quite vividly to West Germany in 1978 when a study sponsored by its government concluded that a 30 percent shortfall in deliveries of chromium — the bulk of which normally comes from southern Africa — would result in a 25 percent reduction in GNP and put 2.5 million out of work.10 Admittedly, the study took little account of alleviating measures such as rationing, substitution, recycling and alternative routes to many end-uses. Even so, the study gives a rough gauge of the general vulnerability of the Western powers to any major cut-off by the African producers. To take some random examples briefly, whereas Zimbabwe alone is responsible for 23 percent of EEC's direct imports of chromium, the equivalent figure for Mozambique's vanadium is 38 percent. And these are just single countries. Altogether, as much as 83 percent of the EEC's vanadium ore imports come primarily from southern Africa.11 In any case, the community imports from 70 to 100 percent of most industrial materials, including, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, 100 percent of its chromium, cobalt, manganese and platinum needs. The Japanese dependence is total. No wonder Shafer argues that this sort of vulnerability 'is the greatest strategic minerals threat facing America.' He contends: A major or even potentially major supply interruption could trigger a rash of panic buying that would bid up prices and strain inter-allied relations.

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Moreover, as the threat of damage to their economies mounted, Western Europe and Japan would pressure the United States to share its mineral stocks. And in a crisis, the United States would find its allies unwilling to take tough, unified action because of their high vulnerability.12 To the extent that the ability to substitute for the strategic minerals is limited in most cases, and even w h e r e possible costly and timeconsuming, the African p r o d u c e r s of these essential commodities would continue to remain important sources of supply to the major advanced capitalist powers. Such a prospect n e e d not occasion any fear. Geologically, there is not m u c h likelihood that the African reserves of 'strategic' minerals will be exhausted in the foreseeable future. In any event, the mineral threat to national security in the West is a long-term, rather than a short-term, possibility. 13 Even this apparent long-term threat can be s t e m m e d if the West takes a bold and energetic step to invest heavily in the mining sector of the leading black African p r o d u c e r countries. The security of the West, in terms of both supply and the stability of southern Africa, d e p e n d s not on ignoring these black states in mining investment. Rather, it d e p e n d s on their willingness to p r o m o t e effective economic development. At present, the majority of the European powers, led by Reagan's United States, are allowing shortsighted anti-communist ideological considerations and short-term mineral security to put at risk their longer-term foreign policy goals and interests in the states north of the Limpopo. As William Gutteridge has pointed out: To base an anti-Soviet strategy in the region negatively — on more overt cooperation with South Africa — at the expense of a more constructive policy towards the rest of Africa will almost certainly prove self-defeating, especially in the light of the apparently limited character of the Soviet threat. 14 For now, some of the key minerals are, as w e have indicated in the early chapters, available from non-African sources. Moreover, the world economic recession has led to excess supplies of the minerals in the affected African states. O n e of these commodities is copper. However, while the recession has forced a decline in c o n s u m e r copper d e m a n d , it is expected that by 1990 world consumption of the metal will increase from the current level of 6 million t o n n e s per year to 10.4 million tonnes. This is largely because of the anticipated rise in industrial d e m a n d as well as the o p e n i n g u p of n e w markets — such as

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 183 the solar heating industry, electric vehicles, sprinkling systems and nuclear-waste storage.15 In the long term, copper's key qualities of high electrical and thermal conductivity, allied to corrosion resistance, should regain its previous healthy demand, especially as a vital commodity for the construction, power and transport industries. 16 Indeed, the Third World's leading producers are so optimistic about the long-term recovery of copper that they are busy planning for future expansion. While, fof example, Zambia took a $56 million Sysmin loan in 1983 and a $70 million World Bank loan in 1984 to modernize and increase production, Chile's nationalized copper company, Codelco, intends to invest nearly $600 million over the next three years to try to raise output by 25 percent. 17 A country like Zambia cannot but plan ahead. True, some copperbelt and Kabwe mines are likely to be depleted soon. Nevertheless, there are undeveloped copper reserves around Lumwana in North-Western province. These reserves are understood to be among the largest undeveloped proven copper reserves in the world. 18 Some of the advanced capitalist powers are copper producers themselves, and have not been able to face up to the forces of the global economic recession as have the African producers. Take the United States, the foremost capitalist power as an example. By March 1984, sixteen of its twenty-seven copper mines had shut down. Arizona, which produces two-thirds of the nation's copper, is working at about 70 percent capacity, with half the work force it employed in 1981. 19 Interestingly, and this makes a healthy change, American copper companies still in business, blame the continuation of the recession in the mineral's trade on the Third World producers. They argue that whereas under the old market conditions, American copper companies could slow production when demand fell to keep prices at a profitable level, nowadays, the United States companies no longer exercise that control of the market. This, the argument goes on, is largely because: 'Government-owned mines in Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia keep producing at full tilt, regardless of copper prices, to create jobs and keep much-needed foreign currency flowing in, [but] American businessmen lament.'20 The other side of the story is that the United States' copper companies produce at higher costs than the developing countries. With prices at a record low level, the Americans could no longer compete effectively. At the time of writing, for instance, the price of copper stubbornly stayed around 60 to 65 cents a pound. According to Peter L. Anker, a copper analyst at the First Boston Corporation, the

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United States domestic industry needs a price of 80 to 85 cents to begin to eke out a profit.21 Since this price range is not yet forthcoming, the Americans prefer to close some of their mines and import the required balance from abroad. In 1983, for instance, the United States imported 498,000 tonnes of copper, nearly one-third of what Americans used. The Arizona Mining Association was so disturbed by this trend that it urged the United States government to limit imports to around 350,000 tonnes on the grounds that — wait for it — 'the foreign producers are subsidized and not realistic competitors/ 22 In the event, President Reagan declined to endorse such a policy. We should note that the decision was based not on the premise that the Administration had the interests of the Third World producers at heart, but, more fundamentally, because the 1984 presidential election was just two months away and also because of the anticipated domestic economic repercussions. To be sure, a decision in favor of restraining imports would have hurt American manufacturers, since protection would mean higher prices for makers of radiators, transformers, telephone wires, pots and pans and other products made with copper. Moreover, it would have damaged the Administration's supposedly free-trade image and would have hurt it politically in the Midwest and Northeast where the manufacturers have their factories.23 In any event, and as the Administration's economic advisers had pointed out to the President, domestic copper protection would cause the loss of more jobs in the manufacturing sector than it would save in the mining sector.24 Prudent capitalism in Western industrial countries dictates effective cost and benefit analysis of any economic policy, especially when it involves center-periphery trade relations. It is significant that in spite of the glut in mineral supplies, occasioned by the economic recession, some of the Western TNCs are still prospecting for minerals in Africa.25 It is tempting to argue that a major reason why these TNCs are still vigorously looking for additions to their list is not primarily because they want to increase their total output from the continent — though that may conceivably be a factor in the quest — but to be in a better position to manipulate the international price level of any given relevant strategic mineral to their advantage. After all, given the capitalist order, the more sellers there are, the worse will be the bargaining strength of any particular seller. While Western TNCs are busy exploring further opportunities for future exploitation of Africa's strategic minerals, some of their home

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 185 governments do not appear to be overly concerned in embracing the idea of comprehensive support systems for the key minerals in these countries. The United States, for example, has yet to ratify the 1980 treaty of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that established a Common Fund for commodities. The Fund would have provided the facility to stabilize commodities, including strategic ones, at levels remunerative and just to producers as well as equitable to consumers. It was envisaged that the scheme would even do away with the need for compensatory financing. Rather, it would operate on commercial banking principles in financing buffer stocks maintained and operated by commodity organizations to ensure stability of prices and supplies. 26 Admittedly, and as we saw in Chapter 3, the EEC has the Sysmin arrangement. Nonetheless, the strategic minerals covered are by no means total. For example, Niger and Botswana, which are both heavily mineral-dependent, having missed the 'threshold' by a small margin under the Lome II framework, failed to qualify for Sysmin support, since their key export, uranium, was excluded. Similarly, countries like Zimbabwe, with an already diversified mining sector, have failed to benefit from Sysmin. Granted, advance payments are available under the scheme as a means of pre-financing projects and rehabilitation programs, and the funds have to be invested in the mining sector which triggers off the transfer. All the same, Sysmin is far from being a complete insurance or guarantee mechanism for mineral producers. An important drawback of the scheme is that it cannot compensate directly for price falls. The actual allocations awarded to Zaire and Zambia, for example, bear only a remote relationship to the production downturns. Zambia's $56 million loan, which covered two years of losses, was simply fixed at the maximum figure available — 50 percent of any annual instalment for the five-year Sysmin scheme — and was not based on a higher calculation of earnings shortfalls for those years. In a similar vein, Zaire's $41 million loan was determined by reference to the pre-established Zambia payment and not as a means of meeting Zaire's immense financing needs. The EEC took the view that the country's dependence on copper was less crucial — since it has agricultural exports, diamonds and cobalt along with copper — and that the technical conditions of mining were easier than in Zambia and Zaire's ore was of a higher grade. 27 The ACP demands to make the Sysmin a much more comprehensive system, during the 1984 negotiations for the Lome III agreement,

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has met with the cynicism of the Community's member states.28 The ACP states are anxious to reduce the scope for the EEC to impose conditions on use of funds and also want a direct compensation scheme which would pay out in free foreign exchange. Besides, these developing countries want thirteen new products — including ferrochrome and cupro-nickel —to be included under the scheme, and the thresholds governing eligibility reduced, to enable countries like Botswana and Zimbabwe to benefit.29 So far, the tortuous negotiations are yet to be amicably resolved.30 As we have pointed out in Chapter 3, the EEC enjoys special advantages under Sysmin. It is important to stress this point so that our analysis here will not be misunderstood. Indeed, Edgard Pisani, the EEC's Development Commissioner, concedes that the entire Lome convention's trade arrangements have tended to favor the Community by, among other things, creating jobs in Europe. Even if the ACP countries do become rivals in certain commodities, 'we shouldn't forget,' he points out, 'that they will buy more European machinery and equipment' and force 'Europe to catch up with Japan and the United States.'31 This line of argument further reinforces the neocolonial aspects of the EEC-ACP relationship; let Europe provide the machinery and equipment, while the African states keep on exporting the needed commodities to the Community. What an interesting international division of labor!32 Evidently, the ghost of coreperiphery analysis keeps haunting our discussion at every stage. For good measure, Pisani contends that Europe only has a limited global strategic role. Therefore, he goes on, while the United States and the Soviet Union quarrel over arms, 'we can contribute to world peace by trying to eliminate hunger and poverty in the world.' 33 Uranium and the global system Uranium, like the other strategic minerals, has, in recent years, been equally affected by the forces of international economic recession. Cancellations of nuclear reactors, especially in the United States, have continued to outstrip new orders, and spot price for uranium has continued to fall despite cuts in output in mines and mills. To be sure, prices of uranium oxide fell from over $40 a pound in 1980 to only $17.50 in 1984.34 The recent fall in demand has accelerated a shift from older, underground mines to new, open-cast ones, often costing only half as much to operate. The beneficiaries of the shift include some of the Western industrial countries, especially Canada,

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 187 where big new deposits have been located is Saskatchewan, and Australia. The big loser, as in the case of copper, is, once again, the United States. Its uranium output declined from 14,000 tonnes in 1978 to 5,000 tonnes in 1983. Correspondingly, the American share of the world market fell from 40 percent in 1978 to less than 25 percent in 1982, and is currently smaller than Canada's and South Africa's.35 The United States problem revolves around the small size of most of its mines, with the attendant high-cost operations. Moreover, American electricity utilities rely on the spot market for buying their uranium. While this method may be suitable for the miners when the prices are rising, the slump in prices means lower earnings almost immediately. In other countries, including Namibia and South Africa, uranium producers commonly have ten-year contracts to supply utilities at fixed prices. This guarantees a measure of financial stability. In the short term, Australia is expected to account for the biggest slice (10 percent) of the 50,000 tonnes of capacity that might be added to world uranium production over the next five years. Given the fact that the mineral is already in an unparalleled glut — between four and five years worth of supplies are now stacked up at power stations around the world — it is clear that Australia's new mines 'are a nightmare for the world uranium market.'36 As indicated in Chapter 4, the country's planners expect a steady growth in the revenues from uranium from now until the 1990s. As far as Africa is concerned, on balance, the continent seems to be in a reasonable shape. 37 Save for Gabon, every major African producer increased its percentage in the share of world output from the total of 34,000 tonnes in 1978 to 42,000 tonnes in 1982. In percentage terms, Niger moved from 6 to 11; Namibia 8 to 9; and South Africa 12 to 14. Specifically, South Africa set a production record of 7,000 tonnes in 1983; and, of course, RTZ's giant Rossing mine in Namibia held on to its full capacity production. 38 In essence, Namibia's and South Africa's uranium are still selling like the proverbial 'hot cakes.' Yet, given the protracted and perennial problems of effective decolonization in the former territory and apartheid in the Republic, the Western powers and their TNCs could, if they wanted, show their solidarity with the black African states as well as with enlightened international public opinion, by using uranium as one of the most effective political and economic weapons for forcing the hands of Pretoria on these two issues.39 After all, there are more than enough uranium supplies in Niger and Gabon; and this

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development would not necessarily alter the importance of Westernbased TNCs in the production process, nor the significance of their marketing links with the Western consuming nations. In any case, neither the Soviet Union nor any other East European country has yet shown any interest in the development of Africa's uranium resources. I may be accused here of going back on my basic point about the exploitation of African mineral resources. The exploitation issue is beyond question, at least if we extrapolate from all the data provided in this study. If Africa must be exploited by ravenous Wetern TNCs and their home governments, then black African states might as well improve on their revenue-yielding capability, through the corresponding increase in production of uranium, occasioned in this case by a change from the Namibian and South African sources. Uranium-rich black African states could, therefore, go some way, even if only partially, to alleviate some of the hardships imposed by the ongoing problem of international capitalism, namely, the worldwide economic recession. Of course, a switch to black Africa's uranium — if ever such a concerted move can come from the West — does not mean that these states would cease to be pawns in the game of global uranium politics. On the contrary. It is necessary evil that they would have to live with as long as they remain appendages to international capitalism. All the same, a change to black African uranium would, by boosting demand, enable other states that are known to have some deposits of the commodity to go fully commercial. These states include Zambia, the Central African Republic and, lately, Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta) and Guinea. Namibia's uranium continues to arouse a major international interest, not least because of the various rulings and resolutions of the UN as well as the International Court of Justice, considered in great detail in Chapter 4. Western TNCs and their home governments still continue to ignore these rulings and resolutions. No doubt, when genuine independence is attained for Namibia by SWAPO, the new Nujoma Administration would have to examine carefully the role of the TNCs in the country. In the immediate period after independence, however, when the quest for consolidation of political power bases is often strong, the new Administration might be hesitant to embark upon far-reaching and radical policies. In other words, it might follow in the footsteps of Robert Mugabe when ZANU first assumed power in Zimbabwe. Indeed, Sam Nujoma has let it be known that foreign-owned mining

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 189 companies that are prepared to cooperate with SWAPO would be able to continue their operations after independence provided they implemented non-racial employment policies, increased the training of black unskilled workers, and, perhaps most importantly, reinvested a substantial proportion of their profits inside Namibia.40 SWAPO recognizes the importance of mineral revenues to its plans, and Nujoma has clearly indicated that all the TNCs operating in the country would definitely have to pay appropriate taxes. True, the tax holidays of some of the TNCs began to come to an end in 1983. Even then, the tax payments of the affected TNCs are relatively little. De Beers, for example, pays as much as 60 percent below what it pays in neighboring Botswana.41 A SWAPO government would also want a stake in all new mining ventures; and would want to reserve the right to reallocate mining and prospecting rights to new holders — but it might not necessarily bring about immediate changes in the rules covering existing mines. Understandably, SWAPO has pointed some threatening fingers at RTZ. It resents the way the TNC went into Namibia after 1966, when the UN's General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate over the territory and called for a halt to further foreign investment. Perhaps a deal that included a comfortable equity allocation to the Namibian government as well as the handing over of the South African Industrial Development Corporation's 13 percent stake in Rossing to the new regime, coupled with the imposition of a levy on all RTZ's uranium exports might resolve the issue. In the interim, some of the TNCs operating in Namibia have been trying to make friendly overtures to SWAPO, no doubt in anticipation of the inevitability of its government in the future. In July 1984, it was reported that RTZ, for example, had agreed to transfer 46.5 percent of the Rossing equity to the Namibian government after independence so that it could be excused from paying reparations for uranium that had been illegally exported from the mine. 42 Until effective independence is attained, however, Rossing and the British transnational would remain the biggest foreign exchange earners for South Africa in Namibia. Officially, negotiations on the independence issue for the territory continue to be bogged down over the linkage thesis; that is, to make the settlement of Namibian independence issue dependent on the Cuban withdrawal from Angola.43 Yet, as we have shown in Chapter 5, most of the leading Western powers — the United States, Britain, West Germany, France and Canada (the Western Contact Group that is supposedly playing a key role in the negotiating process) as well as

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Japan — are deeply involved in South Africa's nuclear industry. Beyond that, security of their uranium supplies is helped by the continued illegal occupation of Namibia, or by a facade of political and economic independence that essentially, leaves the Republic in control. In any case, to the degree that Namibia's resource exploitation is such an integral part of the South Africa's nuclear program, support for the program means support for the continued illegal occupation of Namibia. Evidently, in real terms, all these Western powers have a shared interest and bias over the territory's independence issue, namely, 'a bias in favour of South Africa's continued control, a bias against a truly independent State of Namibia.'44 The issue of guaranteed uranium supplies for nuclear projects is by no means limited to Namibia or South Africa. In black Africa, there are guaranteed supplies from Niger and Gabon to the nuclear programs of France; and from Niger to Libya, Egypt, Pakistan and Iraq. In June 1984, Nigeria's Minister of Mines, Power and Steel announced that the country's preliminary uranium exploitation surveys in Gombe, Bauchi state, had been 'favorable'; and that Gongola, Borno and other parts of Bauchi state would be added to the exploration exercise.45 The favorable results can be taken as a further encouragement to Nigeria's nuclear quest, given, as we saw in Chapter 6, the emphasis that Lagos placed on its uranium deposits when it announced its plans to go nuclear. Gabon, too, has had some encouraging news in its own nuclear quest. In April 1984, French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy's visit to Libreville culminated in the announcement that France and Gabon had reached 'an agreement in principle' for the construction of a nuclear reactor in Gabon. 46 With this new understanding, the Mitterrand Administration has apparently backed down from its earlier uncompromising stance on the issue, which, inter alia, had bedeviled President Bongo's relations with France since late 1982. The reason for France's volte-face is not hard to fathom. Gabon is one of its richest exploitation 'mines' in Africa. For one thing, the Franco-Gabonese relationship still represents the classic form of core-periphery dealings, with French TNCs regularly siphoning huge profits back to France. For another, France uses Gabon as a cheap and dependable source of supplies of large amounts of oil, manganese, uranium and timber. Finally, France, for obvious good capitalistic reasons, was sensitive to Bongo's scarcely veiled threats against the French expatriates, coupled with fears that he might move to nationalize Elf-Gabon, the

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 191 extremely lucrative oil corporation in which France has a 70 percent interest. All in all, therefore, the Mitterrand Administration, anxious to appease Bongo, had to approve his request for the nuclear reactor: especially as he had made the reactor an 'essential precondition for the improvement of Franco-Gabonese relations.' 47 The somber point to bear in mind is that the envisioned nuclear project will produce more electricity than Gabon needs, at a cost three times greater than hydroelectric power. 48 And that is for a country which has abundant oil reserves and is a full-fledged member of OPEC, with a population of barely one million. In Arab Africa, Qaddafi is still intent on producing an 'Islamic Bomb' and, as we have just indicated, Niger, for a good price, readily supplies the Libyans with all their required uranium. As of now, there is still no major breakthrough in Qaddaft's nuclear quest, and it is unlikely, on the face of things, that Libya can produce a nuclear bomb independently before the next decade. 49 As for Egypt, the other major nuclear aspirant in the region, its Minister of Electricity, Mohammad Osman Abaza, announced in September 1984 that the country's original plan to build eight nuclear power plants by the year 2000 had been slowed down by financial constraints.50 Egypt had planned to generate 40 percent of its electricity needs in 2000 from the eight plants. Abaza now stated that only four or five plants are expected to be ready by then, with the rest following by 2005.51 According to the minister, the first plant would be on-stream in 1991 at El Dabaa, ninety-four miles west of the Mediterranean port of Alexandria.52 This takes us to the final word on the nuclear proliferation issue. In spite of the ambitions and/or ongoing nuclear programs of other African states, the greatest threat to the international nuclear regime continues to be South Africa. Apart from the fact that the Koeberg nuclear plant has recently started functioning,53 the range of South Africa's nuclear weapons as well as the Republic's close nuclear collaboration with Israel — a nuclear power that is now developing second-strike capability54 — pose a grave threat to some of the black African states, particularly the strong critics of Pretoria's internal and Namibian policies. Admittedly, South Africa, without the overt use of any nuclear threat, has, for the moment, through consistent destabilization raids and the resultant economic havoc, forced neighboring states like Swaziland and Mozambique to conclude 'non-aggression' accords with Pretoria. In the process, these two states have closed their borders to the activities of the A N C Without gainsaying it, the two accords, along with the February 1984 Lusaka accord between Luanda

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and Pretoria, are a form of 'Finlandization' of the black states in the southern cone. While in the short term, the development is a significant geopolitical shift, effectively, as Sanford J. Ungar has put it, 'the region remains a tinderbox/ 55 At any rate, in the long run, South Africa cannot expect to neutralize all the black African states that oppose its policies through a series of non-aggression treaties. And this is where the nuclear question comes up again. As a long-term option, a few black African states who respect the dignity and freedom of their fellow brothers in Namibia and South Africa should aspire to having some bombs tucked away in the basement as well as the essential delivery systems. In this context, Nigeria and one other key African state have to put on appropriate technical wetsuits and take a decisive nuclear plunge. Ali Mazrui's suggestion of Zaire probably did not take into account the concomitant and obdurate realities. Granted, the country probably has the potential for nuclear development; but, militarily, Zaire is a virtual zero at present. One of Mobutu's key stratagems of survival is the calculated policy of deinstitutionalization of his military establishment, by making it as ineffectual and weak as possible. Although Gabon has made its nuclear ambitions quite clear, it is too small to be the black African representative that would confront South Africa. Besides, its relations with the Republic are so cordial that it would be inconceivable for Libreville to contemplate a direct dangerous confrontation with Pretoria. Perhaps, a suitable candidate might be Kenya, under a progressive leadership, or even Mugabe's Zimbabwe. At the continental level, it is doubtful, at least for now, whether the OAU can sponsor a major nuclear research project. The main constraint, evidently, is finance. The organization has, in the past few years, remained in serious financial straits.56 In the light of this situation, the organization would be hard put either to establish an institutional army or to initiate a nuclear project. Therefore the burden of a nuclear program would have to fall on Nigeria and either Kenya or Zimbabwe. My point here is that this nuclear option remains the logical and idealistic long-term plan for the black African states. Of course, this long-term strategy is purely a defensive recipe and it does not imply in any way or form that these black African states would need to deploy the nuclear weapons. After all, dropping a bomb on Johannesburg, for example, would, on balance, kill more blacks than whites. The only condition for a nuclear attack would be if the South Africans themselves provoke such a mode of warfare. A credible and a highly

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 193 effective nuclear capability on the part of some black African states might deter Pretoria from nuclear warfare in a calculated attempt to stem major opposition to apartheid in these states. Furthermore, it could also reinforce the enthusiasm of some of the states to provide, or to reconsider their previous hardline stance on the provision of, operating bases on their territories for the ANC. In this sense, effective nuclear strength on the part of the black African states would have an indirect relevance to the effectiveness of the guerrilla war efforts of the ANC. As the Botha Administration is increasingly discovering, with or without 'non-aggression' pacts with Swaziland and Mozambique, and in spite of the so-called elevation of the coloreds and the Indians as junior partners in the white minority-dominated government, the ANC problem will just not go away. Recent headlines like: — Guerrilla Bomb Lights Fuse to South African White Fears' 57 — 'Sporadic Strife in South Africa'58 — 'South African Rebel Leader Pledges to Intensify Struggle'59 — 'Rebels Attack South African Refinery'60 — '5 Hurt by Bomb in Johannesburg' 61 easily point to the fact that the ANC still intends to slog it out with the Afrikaner elite, even if it is literally going to take a thousand years. It should be mentioned, too, that aside from the nuclear strategy, the key black African states that see themselves as likely targets of possible South African military attack need to build up their conventional arms; at least, this is a pure commonsensical strategy, both for the short and long term. In this respect, South Africa should provide some obvious cues to these countries. In spite of all its recent diplomatic gains in the front-line states, the Republic is still planning for a massive military build-up because of its perceived enemies — the black states north of the Limpopo. 62 In the 1984 budget, for example, the South African Defense Force (SADF) was granted a 21 percent increase in funding, amid the Republic's worst recession since World War II.63 It is clear then, how South Africa perceives its future role in the continent. The ball is in the court of the black African states. They may find that at a future date — even though they may not want to take on the South Africans — the latter will be itching to engage them in some gruesome contests. This is so because, given the past records of the callousness and ruthlessness of South Africa's destabilization raids in the front-line states, the white-minority regime in Pretoria leaves no one in doubt as to its military choices and strategy. As an outcast state, white South Africa cares little about international public opinion; and,

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in any case, the Western powers, under the leadership of the Reagan Administration, have shown no positive signs as yet of wanting to jettison their ally in the rough oceans of international politics. We cannot conclude this section without a brief word on the prospects of nuclear proliferation in Africa. To a large extent, the tempo depends on the Western powers' readiness to cooperate or kick against the NPT regime. On balance, even the most critical of the Soviet Union's foes agree that Moscow is hardly an easy agent of nuclear proliferation. Interestingly, the five groups currently bidding to build Egypt's first two reactors, which are expected to cost a total of $2.5 billion are: West Germany's Kràftwerk Union; a Franco-Italian consortium led by France's Framatome; West Germany's Brown, Boveri & Compagnie; and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and the Bechtel Group Inc., both of the United States.64 Equally, we need to add a footnote to France's decision to supply a nuclear reactor to Gabon, which, incidentally, will be the first — unless Nigeria, in the interim, accelerates the pace of its nuclear program — of its kind in black Africa. In the years ahead, other French-speaking countries in the continent could well demand their own nuclear reactors; and France may be obliged, out of a sense of fairness and the urge not to lose its capitalist stranglehold on these countries, to provide them. The United States, for its part, especially under the Reagan Administration, is obviously not anxious to exert maximum pressures on its Western allies to soft-pedal on the nuclear proliferation issue. Indeed, rather than provide any anti-proliferation leadership to the West, the American firms are anxious to pick up the fat returns in the international nuclear trade. David Laitin, in response to the author's analysis in Chapter 5, on the efforts of the Carter Administration to limit western collaboration with non-NPT signatories like South Africa and Argentina, corroborated this profit-motive. He avers: 'Carter failed to stop the French and the West Germans. So the Reaganites concluded that as long as Brazil and Argentina were going to get reactors, the U.S. might as well get the profits.'65 In essence, rather than cooperating to limit the dangers of nuclear proliferation to the world, the major western powers are behaving true to form as advanced capitalist states, placing the quest for profits above a more stable world order. Africa's strategic minerals and the future trends in international politics As long as East-West rivalry remains an integral part of international

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 195 relations, the major Western industrial countries will continue to dwell on a possible future resource denial strategy of the Soviets and the key black African producers. The resource denial theory is quite debatable. In the first place, while it is true that the Soviet Union is a leading producer of many strategic minerals, it is also a major consumer of these commodities and, in many cases, has little left over to export Most of the Soviet Union's output of strategic minerals is used to fulfill domestic demand and/or to meet the needs of its East European allies.66 Second, as we have shown over and over again in this study, the trade in strategic minerals is quite vital to the economies of the exporting African countries. This is even more true for southern Africa, which consists of relatively underdeveloped economies that are heavily dependent on mineral exports to earn the cash they need for food, machinery and various development programs. Therefore, any denial of the key commodities to the Western industrial countries, also implies denying vital income from trade to the domestic economy. Moreover, save in the case of Angola and Mozambique, the majority of the countries in southern Africa are pro-West, at least in trade patterns, so the likelihood that they would readily succumb to the idea of joining hands with the Soviets seems to be fairly remote, if not out of the question. Fourth, for a resource denial strategy to be successful, there would have to be a highly organized and effective cartel system which, under the present trends in the international marketing of these commodities, would not be easy to achieve.67 Fifth, the possibility of Western economic retaliation against the southern African states would be carefully considered by all the various governments concerned. Given the fact that they would be vulnerable to such a response, again, because of their high degree of dependency on trade with these advanced capitalist states, they would all be fairly hesitant to team up with the Soviets. In any case, a Soviet-southern Africa resource denial strategy cannot totally eliminate indirect trade, which is an important aspect of the international trade in strategic minerals. Thus, for example, Britain imports chromium from 'neutral' Sweden, while the latter, in turn, obtains its chromium ore from South Africa, the Soviet Union and other countries.68 In sum, we can say that the idea of an effective resource denial strategy by the Soviet and the black states in southern Africa is neither feasible nor assured, at least on the present showing. In reality, the Western powers use the resource denial theory to justify their cozy relations with Pretoria. In the case of Reagan's United States, the obsession with a perceived global Soviet threat and the urge to stop

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the Soviets at all costs gives the theory an added spice. The Reagan Administration is rather unique in its policy towards Moscow. Its recent Republican predecessors, including such key advisers as Henry Kissinger are devoted believers in the 'Atlanticisf school of diplomacy. This insists that the United States must always try to act in concert with its European allies and favor a carefully calibrated mixture of carrots and sticks in dealing with the Soviet Union. The Reaganites instinctively tend to follow a hard, unyielding posture toward Moscow, backed up by military muscle, whether United States allies agree or not. Specifically, as far as southern Africa is concerned, Ronald Reagan sees the Soviet threat everywhere. The President recoils at the idea of an independent Namibia under SWAPO administration because of what he sees as an automatic Marxist regime there existing side by side with another, stronger, Marxist state next door in Angola — not far from a third in Mozambique, with Zimbabwe, of which he is still deeply suspicious, in the middle. In this scenario, the West loses its grip on southern Africa, South Africa soon falls prey to the same Marxist contagion and the entire region becomes engulfed with an uncontrollable communist flame. Or so, it looks to Reagan's White House. While most of the states in the region, including all the specially branded ones like Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, take exception to this characterization and with one voice proclaim their commitment to genuine regional and national independence, Washington remains blind to such considerations. And so the Reagan Administration must encourage Pretoria, and support the Botha Administration to stem the tide of communism in the region through various means, including funnelling massive military aid to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and of linking the issue of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola. Yet, as William J. Foltz has contended, if, instead of repeatedly vetoing Security Council resolutions condemning South African raids, while increasing the level of cooperation with the South African military, the Reagan Administration had made it clear that no cooperation was possible while the Republic actively destabilized Angola, all the Cubans in Angola 'might by now have set sail for Havana.'69 It is noteworthy that throughout his first term, President Reagan's policy in Africa was, in the main, monopolized by the efforts of the Administration's top African specialists simultaneously to negotiate the removal of the Cuban military presence from Angola and to bring

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 197 about Namibia's transition from South African rule to independence under Security Council Resolution 435, in a clumsily entangled linkage set-up — to the near exclusion of creative initiatives on the rest of the continent. The short-sighted policy assumptions as well as the ideological mythologies about the Soviets are routinely defended by the standard familiar lines (discussed in detail in previous chapters), such as the need for global containment of the Soviet threat, protection of sea lanes, and, of course, the dependence upon strategic minerals. It is these same arguments, alas, that have provided the Reagan Administration with the mechanics of its 'constructive engagement' policy with Pretoria. Others include the need for 'rebuilding stability in southern Africa' — a subtle euphemism for ascendant Western dominance in the region — as well as using the Republic's central economic role in the area as the foundation for regional economic development. 70 In real terms, Washington's constructive engagement policy has not resolved either of the two major problems in the region: decolonization in Namibia and elimination of apartheid in South Africa. If anything, the policy has merely strengthened the determination of Pretoria to promote and defend its interests in the region with the assurance that the United States would be there to lend a helping hand, whether in providing the political and diplomatic shield against any censure for its actions at the UN or by toughening up Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. In effect, 'constructive engagement' has encouraged instability in the region and, by so doing, prolonged the Soviet/Cuban presence. 71 No wonder, Ungar recently concluded that Reagan's African policy has been a total failure. As he sees it: 'America is "constructively engaged" with only a small, privileged stratum of South African society. Rather, it should promote genuine participation in government by all South Africans.'72 The United States' pontification about the importance of South Africa's strategic minerals has alerted Pretoria into using the same argument to threaten the Western powers, should they ever contemplate the imposition of economic sanctions on the Republic as a result of its Namibian and apartheid policies. 'America, Western Europe and Japan are highly dependent on strategic mineral imports from South Africa,' says President Pieter Botha. 'If economic sanctions are applied against us,' he goes on, 'we shall take steps which will demonstrate the folly of sanctions against South Africa.'73The country's Finance Minister, Owen Horwood, has also argued in similar terms by stressing the 'unique' nature of the Republic as a supplier. According to him, South Africa's strategic mineral resources

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are 'physically and economically accessible/ leading to efficient infrastructure, positive official attitudes towards foreign investment, well-developed manpower resources, and a 'favourable social climate/ These factors, the Minister claims, could not be taken for granted in all other supplier countries. 74 In point of fact, there is a limit to how far the Afrikaner elite can use the strategic minerals as a weapon against the West. Any major interruption of South Africa's mineral exports would have severe internal repercussions since, as we have seen in this study, the mining sector is the flywheel of the economy. Besides, using the minerals as a weapon against the West would dent the Republic's reputation as a reliable and stable source of minerals. More seriously, it could undermine what political standing South Africa still has in these advanced capitalist states. Such a move might also speed up the search for substitutes and alternative suppliers. In any event, whether or not Pretoria seriously intends to use the Republic's key minerals as a weapon against the West, it appears that some of the latter countries have begun to reflect on Pretoria's threats. It is possible, therefore, for new or alternative sources of supply to pose some threats to the position of South Africa in the league table of key commodity exporters. As it is, the Republic's hitherto influential position is being slowly eroded. As Ted Pavitt, executive chairman of Gencor — South Africa's second largest mining finance house — has pointed out, the country's relative importance as a mineral supplier has declined progressively over the past ten years and could still continue to do so.75 Take its chrome ore output as an example. It dropped from 3.8 million tonnes in 1980 to little more than 2 million in 1983, and other producers like India, Albania, Greece and the Philippines plan to boost their respective outputs. 76 True, South Africa is still the main world exporter of manganese ore and ferro-manganese, but other competitors are vying to capture world markets. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that Gabon, Australia and Brazil each produced about one-third as much ore as South Africa in 1983. China, too, like other competitors, has recently begun to increase vanadium production. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the West's dependence on South African supplies of platinum group metals could be reduced if large-scale recycling of spent vehicle catalysts becomes viable. Indeed, in Pavitt's estimation, technological advances could cause world demand for primary platinum to fall by more than 10 percent. 77 Nor must we fail to mention the likely impact of the stockpiling

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 199 policy of several of the Western powers on South Africa's production. The stockpiling strategy is well advanced and it could enable major industrial countries to cope with tactical disengagement from the Republic, if necessary for international diplomacy or because of domestic strategic planning — at least, in the short term. The United States stockpile objective, for example, is still to see the country through a three-year emergency. The major EEC member states are steadily building up their strategic stockpiles, too. Other Western countries, including Sweden, Switzerland and Japan maintain 'economic' stockpiles of these essential minerals.78 The case of Japan is striking, since it is easily the most vulnerable of the Western powers to any threat of the South African stoppage of the exports of strategic minerals. As part of the efforts to reduce the dependence on South Africa, Nippon Steel, Japan's major steel manufacturer recently bought some shipments of ferrochrome from Brazil and India.79 Clearly then, the days of the West's absolute dependence on the Republic's strategic minerals may gradually be slipping away, so that, ultimately, these industrial democracies could be in a position to call Pretoria's bluff on the key commodities. Meanwhile, as we have shown, some of the Great Powers are working hard to reduce their level of dependence. In the case of the United States, for instance, the Reagan Administration is even planning to subsidize domestic production of certain minerals, a policy that has never been implemented, with one minor exception, since the Korean war. To this end, $200 million was set aside for the program in the 1984 fiscal year.80 The top priority in the program would be a demonstration project for producing cobalt, with an eye toward possible future subsidization. The necessary funds are to be allocated under the Defense Production Act, which was renewed in Congress early in 1984. Other policy options that the Americans are toying with include: increasing the range and level of the stockpile of the strategic minerals; pumping more funds into mineral substitution research and development; encouraging new sources of minerals, through the opening up of more federal lands for exploration, extensive subsidization of production, or encouraging, through tax laws, foreign investment in new areas of the world that are not considered to be unstable or unreliable; encouraging major consumers of strategic minerals in the private sector to have their own 'economic' stockpile programs; and preparation of contingency plans for the sharing of the limited supplies that might be available at any given point in time. 81

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Many of these ideas are increasingly being floated by different interest groups and key public figures. Some have even convinced themselves that South Africa's embargo threat could be implemented. In October 1982, for example, Robert McNamara, the former United States Defense Secretary and World Bank president, in an important address in Johannesburg, assumed this posture. In his view, the United States would not support Pretoria if it was confronted by militant opposition from opponents of apartheid. In such a situation, he reasoned, South Africa's official reaction might well be to terminate its exports of strategic minerals to the West. To deal with such retaliatory action, McNamara recommends that: the United States and the other Western nations should begin now to increase their stockpiles, to develop alternative sources of supply, and to prepare contingency plans to share such limited supplies as would be available. Such a programme would minimise the impact on the West of South Africa's potential denial of these minerals.82 It is doubtful, given our various arguments, whether the Reagan Administration shares McNamara's posture on the United States ever abandoning the Botha Administration in the event of an upsurge in the militant opposition from opponents of apartheid. Furthermore, official and conservative scholarly arguments constantly support and stress the significance and importance of South Africa's strategic minerals to the Western capitalist states. To lend even more weight to the position of the Republic in world affairs, the arguments about the strategic minerals have been extended to South Africa's precious metals. Even on the strength of gold alone, it is often argued that the Western industrialized nations would have to sink or die with Pretoria, since the mineral is the bedrock of money and banking under the capitalist system.83 Thus, it is contended that the call by the radical African states for the elimination of Western dependence on South African gold supplies, for instance, is, in effect, a call for the abandonment of the current role of gold in the international monetary system. The argument continues: even if the major capitalist economies must abandon gold, it would have to be for many complex reasons, few of which would have anything to do with the promotion of justice for blacks in South Africa.84 In other words, even if the dependence of the Western capitalist economies on South African strategic minerals could by a wave of a magic wand be ended overnight, the importance of gold to international capitalism would still make these Western nations pursue foreign policies which are, on balance, favorable to the

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 201 West, and so militate against the foreign policy objectives of the progressive black African states. In resolving the problems of southern Africa, the United States, as well as the other Western powers would have to reconsider their military and economic links with the Republic. The level of the latter, for example, is quite phenomenal. The sale of Kruggerand and other South African gold coins in the United States alone, amounted to $363 million in 1982. In the same year, the Americans gave the Republic various loans that totaled $623 million.85 True, there is no direct United States foreign aid to South Africa. But, as we saw in Chapter 5, there is technical assistance in the nuclear field; and that is one of the major resources that have toughened up Pretoria on its domestic as well as regional policies. While available evidence suggests that British investors may be withdrawing from the Republic, Britain still accounts for about 34 percent of foreign investment and long-term loans to South Africa. And of all the Western powers, it still has the biggest economic stake. The United States, on the other hand, has been building up its South African holdings in recent years, as has West Germany — they each account for 25 percent of the total stock of foreign investment in the Republic. Of the two Great Powers, however, the former seems to be showing the more rapidly increasing involvement in the South African economy. According to the United States embassy in Johannesburg, the American investment totalled $15 billion in 1983, about 28 percent more than in 1981. 86 Granted, more neutral estimates have made the rise much larger; even that notwithstanding, the official figures show that the increase in the United States investment easily neutralizes the impact of any withdrawal of funds by Britain and some other investors. 87 Effective tightening of Western economic screws on Pretoria remains another important option for forcing the hands of the Botha Administration on the leading burning issues of decolonization in Namibia and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration sticks to its globalistregionalist foreign policy, which relies on the Soviet threat as its driving force.88 African states that are willing to reach a 'peace' accord with South Africa are compensated through the provision of official aid. Not surprisingly, the Nkomati accord has elevated Mozambique into the good books of Washington. Accordingly, the United States has lifted its ban — imposed in the late 1970s when the Americans concluded that President Samora Machel had been irretrievably lost to the Russians — on bilateral aid to Maputo. 89

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Furthermore, the Reagan Administration has let it be known that henceforth aid would only go to African countries with capitalistorientated economies. In other words, the free-market ideology is to be the prime mover of American foreign policy.90 Under the new policy right-wing exporters of strategic minerals would receive Washington's golden handshake, not necessarily because of the importance of their commodities to the United States economy, but, more fundamentally, because they are capitalists. In Zaire, for example, where Congress is trying to reduce aid on grounds of corruption and human rights violations, the Administration could theoretically make up for any shortfalls by drawing on the new $500 million set aside in 1984 for a five-year economic initiative in Africa, in the guise of respect for President Mobutu's capitalism. Such is the illogical inconsistency that could well arise in the American foreign policy of the mid- and late-1980s. In conclusion, we should perhaps reflect on a quotation from a major speech by Ronald Reagan, during his 1984 presidential electioneering campaign, at Salt Lake City. He jubilantly spoke on his future foreign policy orientation in this manner: 'We must continue our forward strategy for freedom . .. We Americans cannot turn our backs on what history has asked of us. Keeping alive the hope of human freedom is America's mission, and we cannot shrink from that task or falter in the call to duty.' 91 Is this pure electioneering rhetoric? Or, does the statement really apply to the black masses of Namibia and South Africa? Hopefully, the President's African policy during his second term in the White House (1985-8) would enable us to answer these questions objectively.

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4.

See, for example, Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. Cf. Ronald T. Libby and James H. Cobbe, 'Regime Change in Third World Extractive Industries: a Critique/ International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 725-44; and Robert Curry and Donald Rothschild, 'On Economic Bargaining Between African Governments and Multi-national Companies/ Journal of Modern African Studies, 12, No. 1, March 1974, pp. 173-89. See John Iliffe, The Emergence of African Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1983). Cf. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: the Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," in World Politics, 35, No. 1, October 1982, pp. 1-24; and Personal Rule in Black Africa

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 203

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982). Specifically on Zaire, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Conflict in Africa: a Case Study of the Shaba Crisis, 1977/ in World Affairs, 141, No. 3, Winter 1979, pp. 219-34; and Janet MacGaffey, 'How to Survive and Become Rich Amidst Devastation: the Second Economy in Zaire/ African Affairs, 82, No. 328, July 1983, pp. 351-66. African Business, August 1984. See 'Call to Cancel Africa's Foreign Debt/ in Africa, No. 133, September 1982. See 'Throwing off the Silken Chains/ in South (London), August 1984. Written comments to the author, May 10, 1984. For the latest on the issue, see African Business, September 1984, especially pp. 47-8. James A. Miller, 'The Strategic Mineral Vulnerability of the West: a Soviet Perspective/ a paper delivered at the Third Annual World Balance of Power Conference, Leeds Castle, Kent, England, July 20-4, 1983. See Daniel L Bond, 'EEC Non-Fuel Mineral Imports: the Role of Soviet and Southern African Supplies/ a paper presented at the 1984 NATO colloquium on 'The Soviet Economy After Brezhnev/ Brussels, Belgium, April 11-13, especially the appendix tables. Michael Shafer, 'Mineral Myths/ Foreign Policy, No. 47, Summer 1982, pp. 154-71. Cf. Bond, 'EEC Non-Fuel Mineral Imports.' See New African, October 1982. Also, for a detailed analysis on this theme, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Soviet Policies in Africa/ African Affairs, 79, No. 316, July 1980, pp. 297-325. See Africa, No. 233, September 1982; and Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1984. As C.J. Hansen, president of the Arizona Mining Association, has summed it up: 'The long-term outlook [for copper] is good, but it's going to be tough to survive in the short term.' Quoted in Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1984. See ibid.; The Economist (London), August 11,1984; and African Business, June 1983. African Business, July 1984. Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1984. Ibid. The emphasis is added. See 'Troubled Time for U.S. Copper Industry/ in New York Times, September 7, 1984. Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1984. Note that Chile accounts for about 30 percent of world copper output. The other major foreign producers are Canada, Peru, Zaire, Zambia, Papua New Guinea and Australia. See New York Times, September 7, 1984. Ibid. See, for example, African Business, June 1984. Note that the Fund's concept had its roots in a commodity control

204

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals organization proposed by John Maynard Keynes at Bretton Woods as the third post-World War II institution, along with the World Bank and the IMF, to help maintain international economic and financial stability. See 'Safety Net for Minerals/ in South (London), May 1983. See the account of Thomas Okello-Odongo, the Secretary-General of ACP, in Africa Now, August 1984, pp. 62-5. African Business, August 1984. For details of the various issues at stake, see ibid. South (London), June 1983. For two interesting, but contrasting, analyses of this sort of situation, see Tony Smith, 'The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited/ International Organization, 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 755-61; and Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976). South (London) June 1983. Also, see 'Third World Casts a Shadow/ The Times (London), May 30, 1983. The Economist (London), May 19, 1984. Ibid. Ibid. For a comparative country-by-country production for the world's leading uranium producers for both the late-1970s and early 1980s, see ibid. All these figures are from ibid. Cf., for example, Africa Report, 29, No. 3, May-June 1984; and 'American Business in South Africa Can Be a Force for Change,' in New York Times, July 13, 1984. The Economist (London), January 17, 1981. Ibid. See 'Eyeing the Prizes in Namibia/ in South (London), July 1984. For a detailed account of a recent failure to reach an acceptable peace accord, see New York Times and Christian Science Monitor, both of the same date — July 27, 1984. The Report of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) (Toronto: TCLSAC, 1982); hereafter referred to as the TCLSAC Report. West Africa (1984), p. 1273. See 'French Woo Bongo with Nuclear Reactor,' in Africa Report, MayJune 1984. Note that the long saga of Omar Bongo's irritation with France also has other causes. The President had been specially enraged by French press reports of corruption and decadence in his Administration. Among the reports were charges that the Bongo regime had contributed illegally to the campaigns of Mitterrand's right-wing opponents. For his part, the Gabonese President accused the French government of officially financing the publication of Pierre Péan's book, Affaires africaines, which, among numerous other scandals, claimed that Bongo had arranged the murder of his wife's lover, a French citizen. Accusing Paris of 'destabilizing his administration, Bongo threatened with increasing vehemence to expel all French expatriates from Gabon and to restrict or

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective 205

48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53.

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

end trade with France in reprisal for the negative publicity/ See Africa Report, May-June 1984. Ibid. Cf., for example, 'Middle East Seen as Unable to Develop Nuclear Arms Soon/ Christian Science Monitor, September 10, 1984, p. 2. See 'Egypt Delays Nuclear Plan/ New York Times, September 4, 1984. The Egyptians were originally supposed to get $500 million a year from the oil industry to finance the nuclear plan. Disappointedly, explains Abaza, 'we received $700 million and that's all we're getting. Now we have to look for loans from the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development.' See ibid. Ibid. West Africa (1984), p. 857. The announcement was made by Denis Steyn, South African Minister of Mines and Energy. As we indicated in Chapter 5, the nuclear power station has two reactors, each capable of generating 920 MW of electric power. See Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad (London: Corgi, 1982). New York Times, September 17, 1984. In 1984, it was widely reported that the OAU was in serious financial problems, largely because members have not been cooperating with the organization in the regular payments of their annual dues. Ever since the OAU was founded in 1963, only 40 percent of the annual budget has ever been contributed at any one time. This situation has led to outstanding contributions totalling almost $35 million. Indeed, only five members have contributed fully; ten have done so partly and thirty-five are yet to pay their 1983-4 contributions. Even worse, there are some members that have not paid any contributions since 1970. As Peter Onu, the interim Secretary-General, recently told the fortieth session of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa: 'This state of affairs has obviously affected the work of the general secretariat which lives literally from hand to mouth. Oftentimes we are faced with the anxiety of whether we will be able to pay the salaries of our staff and meet all compulsory overhead expenditures in a given month.' See 'OAU Cash Crisis/ in Africa Now, July 1984. Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1984. New York Times, September 6, 1984. Ibid., April 5, 1984. Ibid., May 15, 1984. Ibid., August 25, 1984. As Paul Van Slambrouck has summed it up: 'Despite the success of regional peace initiatives, South African military thinking remains as rigid as the brick walls that ensconce the top brass at their Pretoria headquarters.' Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 1984. Ibid. See New York Times, September 4, 1984. David Laitin, in written comments to the author, May 10, 1984. See Bond, 'EEC Non-Fuel Mineral Imports.' For an extended discussion of this point, see ibid.

206 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88.

89. 90.

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals Ibid. Foltz, 'How to Help Angola Get Rid of the Cubans,' New York Times, February 1, 1984. See Robert Price, 'Pretoria's Southern African Strategy,' African Affairs, 83, No. 330, January 1984, pp. 11-32. Cf. ibid. Stanford J. Ungar, 'Reagan's South African Policy is a Failure,' in New York Times, September 17, 1984. South (London), July 1984. Ibid. See ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. South (London), July 1984. Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1983. Ibid. South (London), July 1984. See, for example, South Africa: Time Running Out. The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1981). Ibid. New York Times, September 24, 1983. South (London), July 1984. Note, however, that even though the Reagan Administration is resolutely determined to maintain its 'constructive engagement' policy with the Botha Administration, some United States cities and states have begun to pass divestment legislation. Although some progress has been made, there is still a long, long way to go. Cities and states that have so far passed such legislation are: Nebraska, Michigan, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Maryland; and Cotati (Calif.), Newark (New Jersey), Cambridge (Mass.), Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Philadelphia (Penn.), New York (N.Y.), Boston (Mass.), Wilmington (Del), Hartford (Conn.), Berkeley (Calif.), Davis (Calif.), Santa Cruz (Calif.), and Washington, D.C. A state and cities that have passed nonbinding legislation are: Kansas, Atlanta (Geo.), Portland (Ore.), East Lansing (Mich.), Grand Rapids (Mich.), and Multnomah County (Mich.). States where legislation is pending are: New York, New Jersey, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania. See Christian Science Monitor, September 20, 1984. See Price, 'Pretoria's Southern African Strategy'; and Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill, 'From Carter to Reagan: the Global Perspective on Africa Becomes Ascendant,' in K.A. Oye, R.J. Lieber and D. Rothchild, eds, Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1983), pp. 337-65. Lois Browne, 'U.S. Lifts Ban on Bilateral Aid,' African Business, August 1984, p. 48. See 'Aid, But Only if You're Capitalist,' in The Economist (London), May 19, 1984, p. 20; and the article by Senator Robert W. Kasten Jr

Africa's strategic minerals in perspective

91.

207

(Republican) of Wisconsin, who chairs the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, entitled 'U.S. Should Get Tough With UN Hypocrites/ Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1984. Time, September 17, 1984, p. 24.

Index

African National Congress (ANC) and Britain, 125 office in Paris, 104 struggle against South Africa, 115,118, 119, 143-5; effect of nuclear capability, 193; in Mozambique and Swaziland, 191 Anglo American Corporation, 16, 17, 37, 46-7, 79 Angola attacked by South Africa, 163, 164 vicil war blocks rail links, 41 Cuban troops, 6-7, 116, 117-18, 1234, 189, 196 Israeli role in, 113 SADCC calls for South African withdrawal, 166 threat to South Africa, 115 Apartheid policy and nuclear policies; of Black Africa, 142-6; of South Africa, 115, 11920 and uranium, 12, 67 Canada's attitudes, 90 effect on Black African/South African relations, 140-1 effect on Black African/Western relations, 73 supported by the West, 45, 65 Argentina, 121, 122-6, 148 Australia, 1, 89, 91, 92, 187, 198 Black African states economic problems, 30, 177-8 instability, 6 nuclear programs, 133-4, 138-9, 144, 168, 192 relations with South Africa, 119-23, 140-6; future options, 160-9 uranium resources, 10, 83-8, 188

see also Organization for African Unity, and under individual countries Botswana, 16, 87-8, 185, 186 Britain chromium imports, 195 Falklands conflict, 122, 123, 125-6 relations with South Africa, 50, 65; dependence on uranium, 69, 99; investments in, 40,201; nuclear cooperation, 105, 108 role in Namibia, 63-5, 80-1 stockpiling policy, 58 Canada relations with South Africa, 90 titanium production, 1 uranium: Namibian supplies refined, 69; production, 89-90, 186, 187; supplies to Argentina, 123 Capitalism as condition of foreign aid, 30 economic theories, 21, 22 importance in United States foreign policy, 202 integration of African economies, 5, 36,43 see also Dependency theory, Recession Cartels, 6, 195 Central African Republic, 9, 188 China aid to Zaire, 27 relations with South Africa, 114-15 vanadium production, 198 Chromium, 1, 2, 3, 5, 181, 198 Cobalt African resources, 1, 40 importance to the West, 5, 181 importance to Zambia and Zaire, 2 United States production, 199 United States imports, 2, 3

Index 209 European Economic Community Cobalt (continued) and Africa, 5, 53, 181, 186 Zairean production, 40-2 and South Africa, 39-40 Communism stockpiling policy, 199 threat to South Africa, 115-16, 118, see also Sysmin scheme, and under 167 individual countries United States attitudes, 4, 5, 117, 182 Compagnie Francaise des Matières Nucléaires Falklands war, 122, 123, 125-6 (COGEMA), 84, 85, 86, 87 Foreign debt, 178-9 Comprador class, 15, 20, 28 'Contact Group' proposals, 73-4, 76, France aid to Zaire, 42 120, 189 Copper and South Africa, 38; co-operation with nuclear program, 103-6,109African production affected by reces10 sion, 51, 182 dependence on African minerals, 38 alternatives, 26 market for South African and Namiimportance to Zambia and Zaire, 2 price-fixing, 55-6 bian uranium, 65, 69, 106 projected demand for, 182-3 nuclear aid programs, 151, 153, 190Sysmin scheme, 54, 185 1, 194 United States imports, 2 role in African uranium production, United States production, 183-4 83-6, 91, 155 Zairean production, 28 stockpiling policies, 57 Core-periphery relations, 6, 9, 11, 18-25, 30-1, 177 Gabon and nuclear capabilities, 138 control by comprador class, 28 Council of Copper Exporting Countries manganese production, 2, 198 (CIPEC), 51, 54-6 nuclear program, 133, 153-4, 190-1, Cuban troops in Angola, 76-7, 117-18, 192, 194 189, 196 Sysmin scheme, 52 uranium production, 9, 11, 86-7, 91, De Beers, 16-17, 31 187; exports to France, 38, 85-6 Defence expenditure, 167-8 Geopolitics, 48-50 Dependency theory, 9, 19-25, 36-7, 179 Germany Destabilization policies, 163, 191, 193 and African chromium, 181 Developing countries and South Africa, 39-40; investment need for investment, 7 in, 201; nuclear co-operation, 103 theories of development, 19-25 imports Namibian uranium, 65 see also Black African states nuclear technology, 134 Drought, 166, 178 stockpiling policies, 57-8 supplies enriched uranium to ArgenEgypt, nuclear program in, 133, 147-8, tina, 123 Ghana, 132, 168 191, 194 Gold, 16, 45, 106, 181, 200-1 Enriched uranium Guerrilla warfare, 144-6 South African production, 68, 100-1, Guinea, 38, 52, 87, 155, 188 105, 108, 111 supplies to South Africa, 107 technology of, 103, 134-5 Homelands policy, 140 Ethiopia, 116, 168 Hydroelectric power, 163

210

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

Ideology, effect on political research, 24-5 India, nuclear capability, 147, 151 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nigerian reserarch, 156, 158 safeguards enforcement policy, 134, 136-8 International Court of Justice, rulings on Namibia, 70, 72 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 178 Iraq, nuclear program, 149, 150-1 Israel and South Africa, 111-14; nuclear tests, 102, 107 attack on Iraq, 150-1 nuclear capability, 111, 133, 139, 191 Japan, 5, 69, 181, 199 Kenya, 17, 168, 192 Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant, 38, 103-4, 105, 109, 191 Labor policies, 37 Namibia, 65, 80, 82-3 South Africa, 45 Lesotho, 163, 164-5, 169 Liberation movements, 43,120,143-6; see also African National Congress, South West Africa People's Organization Libya, nuclear program, 133, 148-53, 191 Linkage politics, 24, 31 applied to Namibia and Angola, 76-7, 117-18, 165, 189, 196-7 Lonrho, 17, 37, 47 Manganese, 1, 2, 3, 5, 38, 181 South African resources, 198 'Matthew effect', 9, 18-19, 22, 79 Mauritania, 30, 37, 38, 52, 87 Mazrui, Ali, 138-9, 157, 192 Middle East, 133, 151 see also Egypt, Iraq, Israel Minerals, see Strategic minerals Minorco, 16-17 Mitterrand, Francois, 104

Mouvement Anti-Apartheid (MAA), 104-5 Mozambique and South Africa, 115, 120, 163, 164, 167, 191 and the United States, 201 defence budget, 168 vanadium production, 181 Namibia British role in, 63-5, 80-1 importance of mineral production, 46 independence linked to Angolan situation, 76-7,117-18,189,196-7 inevitability of violence, 141 lack of control exploitation, 29 origins, 69-70 resources protected by United Nations decree, 78-9 South African role in, 31,67,70-7,162, 165; Western support for, 46-50, 179, 180, 190 uranium production, 9, 10, 11, 12, 66, 187,188-9; protected by long-term contracts, 91-2; South African nuclear development, 98, 101 Nationalization policies, 8, 25-30, 177 Niger and Arab states, 152 control by comprador class, 28 supplies uranium to nuclear aspirants, 147, 149-50, 153 uranium production, 187; decline in output, 90-1; excluded from Sysmin scheme, 185; exports to France, 38, 190; foreign interests in, 83-5; importance to economy, 2,9,30,36,84; Nigerian interests in 155 Nigeria defence budget, 168 nuclear program, 133, 138, 139, 142, 154-9, 190, 192 opposes French nuclear tests, 132 threatened by South African nuclear development, 141-2 Non-proliferation treaties, 10, 194 ineffectiveness, 137-8 Nigeria's position, 156

Index 211 Non-proliferation treaties (continued) rejected by Argentina, 122, 123 role of the United States, 121 South African attitudes, 68,101-3,115 supported by African states, 132-3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 49, 116, 120, 121 Nuclear programs Africa and Asia, 10,133-4,138-9,142, 144, 146-59, 168, 190-4 Israel, 111-14, 133, 139, 191 South Africa, 98,101, 102, 139, 142-3, 144, 191-2; attitudes of Black African states, 119-23, 133; collaboration of the West, 103-13; reasons for development, 99-101; supported by the United States, 107, 110 Western countries, 98-9 Nuclear technology, 134-6 Oil 38-9, 47, 56, 156 Organization for African Unity (OAU) pan-African force, 144, 146, 167 role against South Africa, 160, 192 Pakistan, 147, 149, 150, 151 Platinum, 1, 2, 3, 5, 181, 198 Plutonium, 105, 106, 122, 135-6 Public ownership see Nationalization Recession effect on Africa, 30-1, 51, 166, 182 effect on uranium production, 90-1, 188 'Resource denial' strategy, 3-4, 195 Rio Tinto-Zinc (RTZ), 17, 47, 63-6, 7983, 189 Rossing mine employment conditions, 82-3 importance to Britain, 63-4, 80-1 ownership and control, 66-7, 69 security measures, 79-80 uranium production, 9, 46, 65, 98, 187 Sanctions, 122, 160-2, 197 Saudi Arabia, 152

South Africa and transnational corporations, 16,17, 29,37 cobalt resources, 1-2 control over Namibia, 66-8, 70-80, 141, 197 foreign relations: Argentina, 123-6; Black African states, 120, 140-1, 160-9,192; Britain, 40, 50, 65,105, 108, 201; Canada, 90; France, 38, 103-6, 109-10; Germany, 39-40, 103, 201; Israel 102, 107, 111-14; Nigeria, 141-2, 154, 158 military policy, 193-4 mineral resources and production, 6, 9, 44-8, 179, 197-9 nuclear program, 11, 98-131, 139, 142-3, 144, 191-2 strategic importance to the West 48-50 threat from OAU forces, 144 uranium production, 66, 68-9, 187; affected by protectionism, 89; affected by stockpiling, 199; importance for nuclear development, 98-101; political importance, 1011; protected by long-term contracts, 91-2 see also Apartheid policy South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO),ll, 123-5 South Korea, 87 South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), 71, 73, 75, 76, 77 attacked by South Africa, 119 attitudes to transnational corporations, 188-9 British government attitudes, 64,80-1; criticized by South Africa, 125, 126 Israeli involvement, 113 Office in Paris, 104 threat to South Africa, 115, 118 South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), 162, 163-6 Soviet Union and Africa; military support for Black Africa, 167; threat to South Africa, 118-19; threat to the West, 195,

212

The international politics of Africa's strategic minerals

Soviet Union (continued) 196, 201; uranium interests, 188 in Angola, 76-7 mineral resources, 1 nuclear role, 123, 149, 194 threat to United States mineral supplies, 3-4, 5 Stability in Africa, 180, 197 Stabilization of Export Earnings Scheme (STABEX), 52 Stockpiling cobalt, 40 South African policies, 101 Western policies, 57-8, 176-7; effect on South Africa, 198-9; encouraged by the United States, 200 Strategic minerals definition, 1 effect of recession, 30-1, 51, 166, 182 effect on foreign policies, 3-4, 196-7 importance to African states, 2, 8, 195 importance to Western states, 2, 5, 7, 198; alternative supplies, 56-8, 182-3; dependence on Africa, 6, 8, 37-49,181,182,188; domestic production, 7, 56-7, 199 size of African resources, 6 theories of exploitation, 18-35 see also under individual minerals Swaziland, 120, 163, 167, 191 Sweden, 195 Switzerland, 121, 123 Sysmin scheme, 9, 52-4, 185-6 Taiwan, 114-15 Tanzania, 163, 164, 168 Titanium, 1, 2, 181 Togo, 38, 52, 87 Transnational corporations (TNCs) after nationalization, 28, 29 alliances with African states, 2, 37, 177 and developing countries, 7, 8 declining interest in uranium prospecting, 91 exploitation of minerals, 6, 36, 178, 184 profit motive, 8, 23

role of, 15-18; in Namibia and South Africa, 45-6, 47-8,121,179,189; in Zaire, 44 see also Anglo American Corporation, Rio Tinto-Zinc Transport and communications in Southern Africa, 163-4 Tungsten, 2, 44 Turnhalle Constitution proposals, 73, 74 Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), 117, 196-7 United Nations clashes with Israel and South Africa, 162 militant role proposed, 160 role in Namibia, 70-2, 73-4, 76, 77-8, 121, 188 sanctions proposed, 162 United States of America accepts SATO, 124 cobalt imports, 40-2 copper production, 183-4 foreign aid conditions, 30 minerals, 1; dependence on imports, 2-3, 5; domestic production, 7, 57, 199; importance of, 2, 3-4, 44, 181 nuclear proliferation, 122, 123, 148, 194 opposition to communism, 4, 5, 117, 182, 196 relations with South Africa, 3, 40, 4450,196-7,201; nuclear co-operation, 100, 103, 106-10, 113, 114, 117, 121; sanctions vetoed, 162 relations with Soviet Union, 196, 201 role in Namibia, 49-50, 75, 76, 197 stockpiling policies, 57, 200 supports corrupt regimes, 43 uranium imports, 147; from South Africa, 68-9, 99 uranium production, 88-9; cutbacks, 92-3, 187 uranium supplies to South Africa, 109-10 Uranium and nuclear proliferation, 10, 146-59 importance to South Africa, 2, 10-11,

Index 213 Uranium (continued) 68-9, 187-8; for nuclear development, 98-101 in international politics, 9-12; Israeli/ South African relations, 113; United States/South African relations, 108 lack of substitutes, 26 production: affected by recession, 186-7; Black African states, 2, 8 3 8; Namibian, 63-8, 97; outside Africa, 88-93, 122 size of reserves, 9 Sysmin scheme, 185 Valindaba Enrichment Plant, 100-1, 103, 108, 134 Vanadium, 1, 2, 181 Vermiculite, 1, 181 Walvis Bay, 74-5 Weapons Nigerian, 159 South African supplies to Argentina, 125 Western powers mineral supply policies, 7, 81, 199 policies on Namibia, 73-9 relations with Black Africa, 176, 178 relations with South Africa, 6, 44-8, 120-1, 161, 194; importance of uranium, 68-9; nuclear co-operation, 103-15; sanctions, 76, 160-2; strategic importance, 48-50 threatened by Soviet Union, 195, 196 see also European Economic Community, and under individual countries

Zaire alliance with transnational corporations, 37, 43-4 cobalt production, 40-2 defence budget, 168 dependence on the West, 27-8 dependence on South Africa, 42 devaluation, 29 economy, 43 affected by recession, 51 inept policies, 177, 181 importance of mineral production, 2 nuclear program, 138, 192 Sysmin scheme, 52, 54, 185 United States aid, 202 Zambia alliance with transnational corporations, 16, 17, 37 copper production, 183 defence budget, 168 economy, 36; affected by recession, 51 foreign debt, 178-9 hydroelectric power, 163 importance of mineral production, 2 nationalization of mines, 26 Sysmin scheme, 54, 185 trading patterns, 164 uranium prospecting, 88, 188 Zimbabwe chromium production, 2, 38, 181 defence budget, 168 nuclear program, 192 role of transnational corporations, 16, 17 Sysmin scheme, 185, 186 threat to South Africa, 115 transport links attacked, 164, 165 war blocks Zaire's rail links, 41