The "Mother of All Trades": The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century 9004125469, 9789004125469

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THE 'MOT HER OF ALL TRADES'

THE NORTHERN WORLD North Europe and the Baltic c. 400-1700 AD Peoples, Economies and Cultures

EDITORS

BARBARA CRAWFORD (St. Andrews) DAVID KIRBY (London) jON-VIDAR SIGURDSSON (O slo) I NGVILD 0YE (Bergen) PRZEMYSLAW URBANCZYK (Warsaw)

VOLUME 3

THE 'MOTHER OF ALL TRADES' The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century

BY

MIL]A VAN TIELHOF

BRILL LEIDEN ' BOSTO N' KOLN 2002

Illustration on thecover: Silver escutcheon of the Amsterdam guild of the grai n carriers, 1650. Courtesy Amsterdams Historisch M useum, Amsterdam. T his book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ticlhof, M. van (Milja van), 1963T he 'mother of all trades' : the Baltic gra in trade in Amsterdam from the late 16th to the early 19th century / by Milja van Tielhof p. em . - (Northern world; v. 3) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9004 125469 (pbk.) I. Grain trade -Netherlands- History 2. Grain trade- Baltic States-History. 3. Netherlands-Commerce-Baltic States. 4. Baltic StatesCommerce-Netherlands . I, Ti tle. II. Series. H D9045.N42 '1'535 2002 382' .4 131'009479-dc2 1 2002019146

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune Tielhof, Milja van: The 'mother of all trades' / by Milja van Ticlhof. -- Leiden ; Boston ; Kaln : Brill, 2002 (The northern world ; Vol. 3) ISBN 90-04- 12546-9

ISSN ISBN

1569- 1462 9004 125469

© Copyright 2002 by Koninkli;ke BrillNV, Leiden, TheNetherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in anyfirm or by arry means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording orotherwise, without prior written permissionfrom thepublisher. Authorization tophotocopy itemsfir internal orpersonal use isgranted by Brillprovided that the appropriatefees are paiddirectly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite910 Danvers M4 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS List of illustrations Lists of tab les, graphs, figures, and maps Preface

IX Xlll

XVI I

INTRO DUCTIO N I . The 'mother of all trades' 2. A globa l chronology of the Baltic grain trade 3. The approach used in this study: the role of tran saction costs 4. Structure of the boo k

8 13

CHAPTER ONE Comelis Pietersz Hooft (1 547- 1626): booming business in an age of expansion I. A chronicle of his life 2. The busin ess of Cornelis Pietersz Hooft 3. H ooft's ideas about economic policy.... ............................ Conclusion .

15 16 21 34 38

CHAPTER TWO The great waves in the history of Baltic grain exports I. The Sound Toll Tables: the Baltic historian's Bible 2. An age of expansion (1540- 1650) 3. A period of contraction (1650- 1760) 4. R enewed growth (1 760- 1800) 5. Marginalization (1800- 1860) Conclusion

40 40 43 50 58 62 64

CHAPTER T H REE The Amsterdam entrepot I . Amsterdam as an entrepot for Baltic grain 2. Bread consumption in the Dutch Republic 3. The importance of Baltic grain to the Dutch food supply. ................................................................................. 4. Politics favouring the entrepot Conclu sion

1 5

67 68 81 91 97 113

vi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER FOUR Market organization and enterp rises 1. A free mark et 2. Number and size of the enterprises involved in Baltic trade 3. A characterization of the enterp rises 4. The role of foreign enterprises Conclusion CHAPTER FIVE Information and agency 1. Amsterdam as a centre of information and decision making 2. Post between Holland and the Baltic 3. The Dutch mercantile communities overseas Conclusion CHAPTER SIX The Dutch mercantil e marine and tran sport costs .. 1. Size and composition of the Dutch merchant fleet 2. Competitiveness and profitability of Dutch shipping 3. Determinants of freight costs in th e long run: the charac ter of the Baltic trade as an 'inner trade' 4. Determinants of freight costs in th e short run 5. War and peace as determinants of freight costs 6. The weight of transport costs on profit margins Conclusion CHAPTER SEVEN Risks at sea and the Board of Baltic Trade and Shipping 1. Maritime insurance and other ways to deal with risks at sea 2. A permanent institution to support Baltic trad e and shipping 3. Activities of the Board 4. The directors Conclusion

116 117 120 128 136 140

143 144 156 166 179

182 183 192 197 208 213 215 218

220 221 232 242 248 252

CONTENTS

CHAPTER EIGHT The service sector in Amsterdam 1. The grain lightermen 2. The grain carriers 3. The grain measurers and setters 4. Storage and maintenance of grain Conclusion

VIi

255 256 265 277 283 287

CHAPTER NINE Willem de Clercq (1795-1844): commission business in heavy weath er 291 1. A chronicle of his life 292 302 2. An analysis of the firm of S & P de Clercq 3. Willem de Clercq's ideas about trade 312 Conclusion 321 CONCLUSION

324

Appendices A. Total Baltic grain exports divided according to sort of grain , 1562-1795 B. Baltic rye and wheat export s divided according to port of departure, 1562-1795 C. Freight costs

337 337 338 340

Abbr eviations

347

Primary sources

348

Bibliography

349

Index

365

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Part A (figures

] -11

can be found between pages ] 02-] 03)

1. Bird's-eye view of the Sound, with Dutch ships in the foreground. Drawing from the workshop of Gerard van K eu1en and son, Am sterdam, 1726. Courtesy Ned erlands Sch eepvaartmuseum Amsterdam. 2. Bird's-eye view of Amsterdam in 1544 . Drawin g by Comelis Anthoniszoon, reprodu ced in th e Atlas Sp1itgerber. Courtesy Historisch-topografische Atlas van het Gemeentearchief Amsterdam. 3. Amsterdam between 1636 and 1646. Co mpa rison with the situation in 1544 shows the enormous growth of the town. Co urtesy Historisch-topografische Atlas van het Gemeentearchief Amsterdam. 4. Co m elis Pietersz H ooft (1547- 1626). Painting by Co melis van der Voo rt, 1622. Courtesy Rijksmu seum, Amsterda m. 5. Anna J acobsdr Blaeu (1 547- 1627), wife of Comelis Hooft. Painting by Comelis van der Voort, 1622. Co urtesy Amsterdams Historisch Mu seum, Amsterda m. 6. The Amsterda m Excha nge, with a poem of Pieter Comelisz H ooft. Engraving by C J. Visscher, 1612. Co urtesy Stichting Atlas van Sto1k, Rotterd am . 7. Part of the Sound T oll Registers in the Danish Na tional Archives in Copenhagen . Co urtesy Erik Gobel, Co penhage n. 8. The Leiden bak er Arent O ostwaard and his wife, Catharina K eizer swaard. Pa inting by J an Steen (1626- 1679). Cour tesy Rijksmuseum Amsterd am . 9. Dutch warships leaving the Netherlands for Denm ark in 1645. Pen-drawing by Willem van de Velde the Elder (circa 1611-1693). Co urtesy Stedelijk Museum D e Lak enh a1, Leiden . 10. Silver rijksdaa/der (1625), head and obverse. Courtesy Het Koninklijk Penningkabin et, Leiden . 11. Archa ngel. Detail of a map of Ru ssia by C1aes J ansz Visscher and Nico1aas Vissche r, Amsterdam 1651. Co urtesy Nederlands Scheepvaartm useum Amsterda m.

x

LIST O F ILL USTRATIONS

Part B (figures 12-21 can be found between pages 246-247) 12. The old Grain Exchange. Courtesy Gemeentearchief Amsterd am. 13. Portrait of an unid entified grain merchant or, more likely, of a broker, with measures on the ground, a sample-bag hanging on the door , and a small booklet with tariffs lying on the table. Paintin g by J an Stolker, circa 1755. Courtesy Historisch Mu seum Rotterdam. 14. The postman Roelof Meulena er (engraving after a medal to commemorate that he had been a post-master for fifty years, 1688). Courtesy Museum voor Communicati e, The H agu e. 15. Port of Danzig . Engraving by Aegidius Dickman, 1617. Courtesy Rijksmuseum Amsterdam. 16. A fiuyt ship . Painting ascribed to Jan Theunisz Blanckerhoff, mid-seventeenth century. Courtesy Nederlands Scheepvaartmuseum Amsterdam. 17. A fiuyt ship. Engravin g by Salomon Saverij, mid-sevent eenth century. Courtesy Nede rlands Scheepvaartmuscum Amsterd am . 18. Fluyt ships. Etching by W. H ollar, 1647. Courtesy Stichtin g Atlas van Stolk, Rotterd am . 19. A ship, wrecked on a beach by a storm . Etchin g by Siewert van der Meulen, circa 1725. Courtesy Nederlands Scheepvaartm useum Amsterda m. 20. Matthij s Maten Jr (1689- 1758). Painting by H endrik van Limborch, 1726. Courtesy H aags Historisch Museum, T he Hague. 21. The new Grain Exchan ge, Amsterdam, front and back. Etching by W. Writs, 1770, printed in Atlas van de waereldberoemde koopstad Amsteldam (J- B. Elwe, Amsterdam 1804). Courtesy Stichting Atlas van Stolk, R otterd am. 22. J an van Vollenhoven (1703- 1784), director of the Board of Baltic Trade and Shipping from 1727 till 1774. Painting by H. Pothoven. Photo Rijk sbureau voor Kunsthistori sche Documentatie, The Hague. Part C (figures 22- 29 can be found between pages 310-311) 23. Grain lighters in the Damrak in Am sterdam. Drawing by J-M.A. Rieke (185 1-1899) after an early nin eteenth-century drawing. Courtesy Gemeent earchief Amsterdam . 24. A porter carrying grain from a lighter to a warehouse. Escutcheon

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

Xl

of the Rotterdam guild of porters, by Rudolph Sondag. Courtesy Historisch Museum, Rotterdam. The Guildhall of the grain measurers. Painting by P. van Liender (1731-1797). Courtesy Gemeentearchief Amsterdam. Amsterdam grain measure, containing 1/2 bushel. Courtesy Amsterdams Historisch Museum, Amsterdam. Pages from the diary Willem de Clercq made during his journey to the Baltic in 1816, showing a map of St Petersburg. Amsterdam University Library, Collection Reoei! Archiif, Hs. F LXV, dl. 2. Courtesy Amsterdam University Library. Willem de C1ercq (1795- 1844). Picture by P. Velijn, printed in the Nederlandsche muzen-almanak 12 (1830). Amsterdam University Library, Collection Rioeil Archie], 398 F 12, frontispiece. Courtesy Amsterdam University Library. Herman Rahusen (1766-1839), Willem de Clercq's uncle and one of his benefactors, who helped him twice to prevent a bankruptcy of the firm . Drawing by Chr. P. van Eeghen. Photo Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague.

LISTS OF TABLES, GRAPHS, FIGURES, AND MAPS

TABLES 1. The greatest year-to-year fluctuations in the Sound trade, 1562-1650 2. Grain trade through the Sound, 1562-1650. In yearly averages per decade 3. The great est year-to-year fluctuations in the Sound trade, 1650-1 760 4. Comparison of English and Baltic gra in exports, 1700-1 760. In last, yearly averages per decade 5. Grain trade through the Sound, 1650-1 760. In yearly averages per decade 6. The great est year-to-year fluctuations in the Sound trade, 1760-1795 7. Grain trade through the Sound, 1760-1 795. In yearly averages per decade 8. Grain exports from Danzig, 175 1- 1850. In yearly averages per decade, in last 9. Sorts of grain exported from Danzig, 1816- 1850 10. Contracts stipulating a voyage with grain from the Baltic directly to the west or south of Europe, 1593-1 622 ...... 11. T he Netherlands as a destination for Baltic grain exports, 1671-1783. In yearly averages per decade ........ 12. Taxes due when importing rye/wheat from the Baltic into Amsterdam, in guilders, stuivers and penningen per last, 1581- 18 10 13. Brokerage tariffs for wheat/rye, in stuiver per last, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries 14. Mail between Delft and Danzig in the 1580s, der ived from the correspondence of Claes Adriaensz van Adrichem with his agents 15. Number of Dutch people buying citizenship in Danzig, 1558-1793 16. Approximate size of the Dutch merchant fleet. Number of ships and tonnage

44 49 52 53 55 59 61 63 64 71 73

101 155

158 172 184

XIV

LIST OF TABLES, GRAPHS, F IG URES, AND MAPS

17. Transport through the Sound of wheat and rye by ships of different nationality, 1845. In last 18. Freight for the voyage RevaliDanzig to Amsterdam, compared to the rye price in Utrecht. In Dutch guilders per last of rye 19. Freight for the voyage from Danzig to Holland (Delft, R otterdam, Amsterdam), as contained in the Van Ad richem papers, 1578-1595. In Dutch guilders 20. Freight rates for the voyage from Danzig to Amsterdam: fluctuations in the years 1583-1 585. In Dutch guilders 2 1. Development of the freight for the voyage AmsterdamPrussia-Amsterdam in the course of the year 1728. In Dutch guilders .. 22. Extent to which the average freight ate into the trade margin, sevent eenth to eighteenth century 23. Standard of living of the directors of the Board of Baltic Trade and Shipping in 1742 24. Number of active memb ers of the grain lightermen's guild, 1690- 1815 25. Tariff for the measuring of grain, in stuiver per last, sixteenth to eighteenth century 26. Freight on Dutch ships for the voyage AmsterdamPrussia-Amsterdam, in Dutch guilders per last GRAPHS I . Baltic grain exports in the age of expansion, 1562-1650 2. Baltic grain exports in the period of contraction, 1650- 1760 3. Baltic grain exports in the age of renewed growth, 1760-1795 4. Amsterdam imports and Baltic exports, 1636-1662 5. Amsterdam overseas grain imports, seventeenth to nin eteenth century 6. Amst erdam overall grain imports, seventeenth to nin eteenth century 7. Grain imports in Amst erdam and Rotterdam compared, 1659- 1805

195

198

203

209

2 10 217 251 259 282 342

43 51 59 70 79 80 92

LIST OF TABLES, GRAPHS, FIGURES, AND MAPS

8. Rye prices in Amsterdam and Danzig compared, 1580-1 808 9. Time taken by letters from Danzig to arrive in H olland, the sixteent h and the eighteenth century compared 10. Dutc h share in total Baltic grain exports, 1562- 1783 .... 11. Average freight for the voyage Amsterdam-PrussiaAmsterdam, only even years 1592-1758 12. Insurance premiums for the voyage Prussia-Amsterdam, 1688-1 746 13. Rise of insurance premiums in the course of the shipping season 14. Grain ligh termen's guild and trade development, 1685- 1815

XV

94 163 193 202 230 23 1 261

FIGURE a. Family relations of Comelis Pietersz Hooft (selected)

24

MAPS 1. The Hooft trading network 2. The Baltic Sea region

26 45

PREFACE

The Dutch grain trade on the Baltic has always fascinated historians because it profoundly influenced the economic development of the Northern Netherlands for centuries. Quite a number of publications about different aspects of the subject have appeared but a general overview has never been written. The desire to provide such a general history of the Amsterdam Baltic grain trade and to present it to an international readership to whom many of the existing publications are not or not easily available is the foundation of the present book. In response to a trend in recent historical literature to focus attention on the efficiency and the costs of early-modern trade and transport, this study concentrates particularly on the development of transaction costs. In 1996 Professor A. Knotter and Professor J.L. van Zanden took the initiative to organize this research project, which was carried out at the University of Utrecht. Additional financial resources were provided by the Directie der Oostersche Handel en Reederijen, Cargill B.V ., and the Koninklijke Vereniging Het Cornite van Graanhandelaren. I am grateful to them for their generous support and for the interest they showed in the project from the very start. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful commentary offered by the members of the committee to which I presented my research in different stages: W .A. de Clercq, F.C. Baron van der Feltz (L.L.M .), Dr J.Th. Lindblad, Professor L. Noordegraaf, and K.K. Vervelde (M .Sc.). In addition I would like to mention several colleagues who have read parts of the book and provided me with important criticisms and suggestions: Dr P j.E.M . van Dam, Dr H . Deceulaer, Dr O . Gelderblom, Dr J. Jonker, Dr C. Lesger, Dr P.C. van Royen, Dr L.HJ. Sicking, and Dr J.W. Veluwenkamp. In particular, I would like to thank Professor R .W. Unger, who read the entire manuscript. Innumerable improvements followed in the wake of his careful criticism. In the course of the last few years I have been able to profit several times from the results of the work of others. W.A. de Clercq and D. de Clercq (M .A.) unhesitatingly let me use the mass of information they had collected about their ancestors, Dr DJ. Ormrod

XVlll

PREFACE

sent me his data on English grain exports, and Professor P. J eannin, Professor M . Aymard, and Dr P.C. van Royen allowed me to profit from the data they had assembled on Dutch shipping. Their generosity saved me much time. I would also like to take the opportunity to express my gratitude to R.L. Robson (FRAS, BA (hons.)), who greatly improved my uncertain English, and the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek CNW O ) for providing a grant to make this possible. Finally, it is a pleasure to dedicate this book to J ero en Joustra whom I cannot thank enough for the unst inting support he gave me in every stage of the work.

INTRODUCTION

1. The 'mother

if all trades'

In the early modern period, for the population of the Northern Netherlands the trade with the Baltic Sea virtually represented what was literally a lifeline. Huge quantities of grain for bread were imported, usually in bulk large enough to bake bread sufficient to feed half a million people. This amount should be seen from the perspective of the relatively small number of inhabitants of the Dutch Republic, growing from circa 1.5 million around 1600, to 2 million around 1650, and remaining at about this level until 1800, and it demonstrates unequivocally that imports of Baltic rye and wheat were absolutely essential to the Dutch bread supply. Apart from grain for bread, barley, which was used as a raw material for brewing beer, another basic foodstuff, was imported from the Baltic in that period. The annual 'invasion' of Baltic grain was a major factor in keeping the grain prices in the Netherlands relatively low and stable. Grain was a strategic commodity at a time when the spectre of hunger was always lurking just around the corner. The intensive commercial relations with the Baltic countries and the ensuing role of the Netherlands as a European entrepot for grain explain why subsistence crises were rare in the Republic of the Seven Provinces. So encompassing was the Baltic grain trade, it was also a major source of employment for the Dutch population. The handling of a heavy and voluminous commodity like grain required the presence of many workers in every phase of transport and storage. Most shipmasters and seamen working on the Dutch fleet in Europe were natives of the provinces of Holland and Friesland, and numerous villages and towns in those regions profited from the wages earned with Baltic shipping. In striking contrast to sailors working on the East India fleet, the thousands of seamen on the Baltic run enjoyed a certain degree of status and were able to achieve a decent standard of living. Ashore the grain trade generated another range of jobs, for example, for those workers who were employed in unloading and carrying the grain, measuring the quantities, and loading part of it for re-export to other towns. Others were engaged in regularly

2

INTRODUCTION

turning grain lying in the warehouses to prevent it from getting overheated. There was employment for brokers who specialized in bringing buyers and sellers of grain together, notaries devoted to drawing up freight contracts etcetera. Apart from its direct significance for the Dutch food supply and labour market, the grain trade influenced a wider economic sphere and created possibilities for Dutch merchants to invest large sums of money, from which they earned profits. R.W. Unger estimated that during the seventeenth century approximately some 6,000,000 guilders were invested in it annually, which was more than the investments in the peat trade, in land reclamation, windmills, ships, and, for most of the century, also more than the investments made in the East Indies trade. Although not as important as they were to become in the seventeenth century, investments in the Baltic grain trade had been already considerable in the sixteenth century and they still continued to be important during the eighteenth century. I Normally the profits made in this branch could not compare with the dazzling returns that could be made on investments in the commerce in luxuries, nevertheless they were important because they were relatively steady: they flowed in year after year, for one generation of merchants after another. The grain trade offered many investors the possibility to make money and it did so over the longish period of a few hundred years . Given its all-pervasive influence the grain trade can rightly be considered to have been the backbone of the Dutch economy in the early modern period, even if it was only for this reason. The Baltic trade, and at its core the grain trade, was by no means less essential to the Dutch Golden Age than the more exotic trades like that organized by the East India Company (the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or voq, if not from a cultural than at least from an economic point of view. In recent debates the importance of the so-called 'bulk trades' to the commercial development of the Dutch Republic has been opposed to that of the 'rich trades': trades in spices, sugar, textiles, luxury articles and other items that were relatively expensive compared to their volume or weight, with profit margins which were larger than was the case with bulky

I

Unger , 'The trade in rye', 131-137 .

INTROD UCTION

3

commodities. These 'rich trad es' were mainly found outside the Baltic, dominatin g, for instan ce, the trad es to the Ea st and "Vest Indies. The discussions showed that the economic imp ortan ce of the rich trad es notwith standing, most historian s still consider the Baltic trade in bulk commo dities, among which grain figures prominently, to have been the main spring or at least an essential condition for the fact tha t the Dutch were able to acquire hegem ony in world trad e in the seventeenth ce ntury." Last but certainly not least, the Baltic trad e was a great stimulator of oth er econo mic activities. Outward bound, the Dutch ships which would bring cereals from Baltic ports were the ideal carriers of import commodities to the region. Most popul ar among the imports were salt and wines from Fran ce and Portugal. These salt and wine trades show that the comme rcial relations with the Baltic region stimulated Dutch mercantile exchanges with western Europe. Yet another spin-off of the salt trad e was the rise of salt refineries in the Ne therlands. Baltic markets were int erested not only in goods from western European countries other than the Ne therlands, they wer e also keen to have No rth Sea herring, a dem and which stimulated the Dutch herring fisheries, and textiles, which were supplied by the Dutch and English cloth industries. A very imp ortant economic side effect of the Baltic trad e was the great dem and for ships, which stimulated a flour ishing shipbuilding industry . This industry, in its turn, needed sails, ropes, and nails which were all manufactured in the Nethe rlands, and it needed hu ge qu antities of timber , which led to a sizeable timb er tra de with No rway and, aga in, with the Baltic. In short, the economic significance of the Baltic gra in trad e stretched far beyond its direct effects. It stimulated trad e on other routes and also othe r economic sectors, from the fisheri es to salt refineries, from the shipbuilding to th e textile industry, from sailmaking to ro pemakin g. This corne rstone of the Dutch econo my could not have been removed without enormous consequences.

2 T he publi cation in 1989 of Dutch primacy by j.I, Israel gave rise to this rather heated discussion. See the articles in the BMGN 106 (199 1) by Van Zan den, 'De "nieuwe visic" van Israel'; Noord egraa f, 'Vooruit en achteruir'; Israel, 'T he "New H istory" versus "traditional history'" . The journal Leidschrifl devoted an issue to the discussion in 1992 (number 9), with, among other articles: Gaastra , 'Co nj unctuur of structuur?'; Lindb lad, 'Structuur en conj unctuur' ; Noord egraaf, 'De nijverheid'. In 1997 a relevant review ar ticle written by Israel appeared, 'T he Du tch Bulk Ca rrying Traffic' accompa nied by Lindb lad 's counter-plea: ' Repliek'.

4

INTRODUCTION

Given the se facts, it is not surp rising that contempo rary politician s attached the greatest imp ortan ce to the Baltic trad e, viewing it as the backbone of the Dutch economy. Commerce on the Baltic was referred to as the basis or the source of all other tra de an d shippin g, or even the vital nerve, or ind eed the soul of all trad e. The most popul ar nicknam e was moedemegotie, moth ertrad e, which was explain ed-if it ever were explained- in a number of ways and probably meant mo st of these int erpretations at one and the same tim e: I) the moth ertrad e was the oldest, histori cally the first tr ad e; 2) it was the most sub stantial in respect to the ships, the sailors, and the commodities involved; and 3) it was organically the most important becau se it gave rise to shipping and trade on othe r routes and to the fisheries and manufacturing industries. We could add a fourth point: symbolically th e mother of all trades supplied bread grain for the population of Am sterd am and oth er Dutch town s, like a moth er feedin g her childre n. The imp ortan ce of the Baltic trade, and of the gra in trad e at its heart, was never qu estioned ." The ea rliest reference to the nickname moedemegotie dates from the seventeenth century, alth ough the trad e itself dates back to the Middle Ages. The explana tion for the late appeara nce of the exp ression is th at it was mostly, or even always, used in a defensive context. People used the word moedemegotie when they wanted to emphasize the importance of the Baltic trad e in compa rison with othe r economic activities. Before the seventee nt h century, there seems to have been little need for this kind of spec ial pleading. The idea that the Baltic tr ad e was the pre-eminent foundation of the economy of the province of H olland and ma ybe even of the Low Countries in general, was then generally accept ed. The othe r overseas activities found in H olland at the tim e were ind eed for the most part also connec ted with the Baltic trad e, but in the course of the Dutch Golden Age, the period from the late sixteenth century to the third qu arter of the seventeenth, new comme rcial ventures developed . M an y of these new br an ch es, like the Archan gel trad e, the whaling fisheries, and the trad e with th e Ea st and West Indies were less, or even not at all dependent on th e Baltic tr ad e. These new fields of economic expansion all had to compe te with the Baltic trad e for the political and finan cial support of th e govern me nt.

3

Chris tensen, Dutch trade, 20, 424.

INTRODUCTION

5

The most famous document presenting the Baltic trade as the mother of all trades might well be the so-called Deductie of J ohan de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland. He wrote this text in 1671 and its purpose was political: to prevent a proposed rise of the grain tax. De Witt predicted that increasing the tax would drive the Baltic grain trade from the country, and as this trade, the mothertrade, was the source and root of most of the trade and shipping in the Netherlands, the loss would be much more than only the grain trade. De Witt sketches the whole complex of economic activities linked to each other. In a direct way, the grain trade generated profits for merchants, freights for shipowners, taxes for the government, wages for workers in the ports, rents for the owners of warehouses, and just as importantly in an indirect way stimulated the trade with the west, urban industries, and herring fisheries. Conscious of its vital importance, Johan de Witt presents the Baltic grain trade as an important motor for all of these branches."

2. A global chronology

if the

Baltic grain trade

This book concentrates on the period from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth century. There is a practical reason for this emphasis, related to the source material,' but it would also be true to state that these were the years during which the mother of all trades was most voluminous and the role of Amsterdam as a European entrepot for grain most significant . The history of the Dutch grain trade with the Baltic naturally was by no means confined to the period just mentioned. To make the situation more comprehensible, it may be helpful to give a global characterization and distinguish the following periods: a medieval period (ru nning from the fourteenth to the second quarter of the sixteenth century); subsequently a period of about hundred years characterized by expansion (from the second quarter of the

'Deductie', especially 123, 130. Many relevant sources are available for this core period but not much beyond : the Sound Toll Tables start to give information on grain transports from 1562 and continue to 1795, the notarial archives contain freight costs from the 1590s till around the middle of the eighteenth century, and the Danzig rye prices are available from the 1530s until the 181Os. 4

5

6

INTRODUCTION

sixteenth century till around 1650); a period of again some hundred years, characterized by contraction (circa 1650- circa 1760); a short period of renewed growth for the Baltic grain trade as a whole , but of a relative declin e in the Dutch share (circa 1760- circa 1800) and finally a period of marginalization (circa l800-circa 1860). In the late Middle Ages a far-reaching change occurred in the economic structure of Holl and, turning the province from being largely self-sufficient into a region heavily dependent on gr ain imports. D eterioration of agri cultural land in the fourte enth century was the catalyst for this development, as most land becam e too wet to cultivate rye or wheat. Whil e grain production declin ed, other sectors expanded: cattle-breeding which was still possible on relatively wet lands, herring fisheries, trade, shipping, shipbuilding, and a number of export-oriented industries like beer-brewing and the textile industry. This shift in the economic structure took place between about 1350 and 1450. Besides changes in the natural environme nt, among the reasons for the shift were the typical socio-economic and demographic structures in th e countryside, which made significant demographic growth possible, and a strong tendency towards urbanization. Exogenous factors were important too . Wages in Holl and were then relatively low compared to those in the surrounding region s. The industries, trade, and shipping that developed were heavy users of labour and their products could be exported under favorable condition s. This contrasted with th e fact that grains that were relativel y expe nsive in Holland, were-at that time-relatively abundant in nearby region s in Germany, the Southern Ne the rlands and the north of France." A remarkably low degree of self-sufficiency in ba sic foodstuffs was the result, at the same time as trade played a very crucial role. We might say that the foundations for the economic structure of the United Provinces during the Golden Age had already been laid in the fifteenth century. At this point in history, the role of Baltic grain in this transformation process was probably small. In the fourt eenth and fifteenth centuries the Baltic was only on e of many regions exporting grain to Holland, and it had not yet achieved the overwhelming significance it did later. In exceptional circumstances the quantities of foodstuffs 6 See for the tran sform ation process of the Dut ch econo my in the late Middl e Ages: Va n Zanden, TI e Rise and Decline, chap ter 2; Blockman s, 'Der hollandi sche Durchb ruch '; Blockman s, 'T he Econo mic Expansion '.

INTRODUCTION

7

brought from the Baltic to Dutch ports could be substantial, but they were mostly still modest in quantity. It was only from about 1470 that the role of Baltic cereals began to show a marked increase.' From the second quarter of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century, the importance of Baltic cereals for Holland, and for the Netherlands as a whole, experienced a marked upswing as many of the traditional grain suppliers found themselves less able to produce surpluses for export. The growing population in the Southern Netherlands, France, England, and the German regions adjoining the Dutch provinces, absorbed growing quantities of foodstuffs. Demographic growth exerted an upward effect on grain prices, making imports from relatively farther afield worthwhile. The 'price revolution' of the sixteenth century created a considerable gap in prices between the Baltic and western Europe, making it worthwhile for merchants to incur all the expense involved in bulk trade over long distances. The export of grain from the Baltic region to the west expanded quickly, rising from about 30,000 to 40,000 last annually in the 1550s to 58,000 last in the 1590s and 95,000 last in the 1640s, a peak period (1 last = 30.1 hl). After a concentration process had been completed around 1540, during which the other Dutch ports like Antwerp in Brabant and Veere in Zeeland lost most of their Baltic grain trade, Baltic grains were mostly imported into Amsterdam." From about 1540 Amsterdam began to function as an international entrepot of some importance, and from the 1590s, when the Mediterranean turned to Amsterdam for relief from famines, even of great importance," at times re-exporting important quantities to other western countries. In the hundred years from the middle of the seventeenth century, the trend in grain prices reversed. Population growth came to a standstill, in some regions sooner rather than later. In the Netherlands the grain prices reached a peak in the early l660s, and then started to decline. Although there were temporary recoveries, the period from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century was on the whole characterized by a depression in grain prices, and a contraction in the trade in Baltic cereals . The volumes

Van Tielhof, De Holtandse graanhandel, 120-121. See about this concentration process : Van Tielhof, De Holtandse graanhandel, chapter 6. 9 Noordegraaf, 'Crisis ', 47. 7

8

8

INTRODUCTION

of grain registered by Danish customs officers based at Elsinore in the Sound were on the whole much less than they had been in the preceding hundred years, and showed great volatility. Only 46,000 lasts were registered annually during the 1670s, followed by a recovery to almost double during the 1680s (84,000 last), a subsequent decline to the lowest point in the 171Os (26,000 last), and a new but still not very convincing recovery (31,000 in the 1730s and I 740s). From the middle of the eighteenth century trade showed a recovery because population growth picked up again and the grain prices started to rise once more. Grain exports from the Baltic reached 37,000 last annually during the 1750s, 71,000 during the I 770s, and even as high as 91,000 in the early 1790s. Amsterdam profited from the flourishing of the Baltic trade in the second half of the eighteenth century, but only to a limited extent. From about the second quarter of the eighteenth century, growing numbers of grain shipments were directed to countries like France, Italy, and Portugal, at the cost of Amsterdam, while during the nineteenth century England became the most favoured destination. Also detrimental to Amsterdam's importance as an entrepot was the spread of alternatives to Baltic grain, especially grain from the Ukraine which began to make a mark in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century Amsterdam was reduced to the status of a minor entrepot, where the surpluses of years of plenty were stored. It was only during major subsistence crises like that in 1817 and those in the 1840s that the Baltic again played a crucial role in the food supply of western Europe, and the Amsterdam market was of vital importance again.

3. TIe approach used in this study: the role

if transaction

costs

Although this work aims to present a general history of the Baltic grain trade in relation to the Amsterdam market, its focus is on the role of transaction costs. In recent years more and more attention has been devoted to the role of these costs in economic history, including the history of early modern trade. Douglass North is the scholar who has done a great deal to focus attention on their importance. In a number of studies he has argued that the prevalence of low transaction costs was one of the most important conditions for the successful development of long-distance trade in Europe in the

INTRODU CTION

9

ea rly modern period. " No rth invited economic historian s to develop empirical data on tran saction costs systema tically and, having don e so, to study th eir role in th e evolution of early modern Eu rop e. I I The Amsterda m gra in tra de with the Baltic is a perfect case with which to test his theory th at tran saction costs were of fund am ental imp ortan ce to commercial development. The moth ert rad e stood out for its durability and size: it was a large trad e in terms of the ships, people, goods, and capital involved, and it lasted as such for the whole of th e ea rly modern period. In the pr esent study tran saction costs ar e defined as including all the expe nses a merch ant has to incur in buying goods in one part of the world (in this case gra in in the Baltic) and selling them in anothe r (in this case grain in Amst erdam). Som e of these expe nses can actually be qu antified : the costs of chartering ships, of insuring commo dities at sea, of hirin g workers in the port of Amsterdam, and of paying customs du ties. They are perfectly measurable and their development can be followed from yea r to yea r. T his is certainly most welcome in the case of freight costs, as these were fairly high compared to the othe r costs and to the investments merchants had to make. All of th ese expe nses had a bearing on the eventual finan cial success, or failure, of specific tr an sactions. The role of the different expe nses can be estimated by comparing them to the tr ad e margins. In th e case of the Baltic grain tra de profits were greatly dependent on th ose margins: the differen ce between the low pri ces in the Baltic and the high pri ces in western Eu rop e. This difference persisted for hundreds of years, despite a considera ble degree of market int egration. Ho w did tran saction costs compa re to these trade mar gins? M ercantil e success was not only a function of 'buying low' and 'selling high ', but definitely also of 'paying little' for protection , insur an ce, transport, taxes, and local services. Despite what the concept ma y suggest transaction costs also include many kind s of costs that can hardly be measured, if at all, 12 and these are among the most imp ortant. An exa mple of a category of tran saction costs which is difficult to measure is the costs involved

10

II 12

For example: Structure and Change; 'Institutions'; Institutions. For example: North, ' Institutions', 40. North, Institutions, 62, 68.

10

INfROD UCTION

in acqurnng information. To have reliabl e and rece nt information at one's disposal was-and still is- a fund am ent al necessity when carrying on overseas tra de, and it was no easy matter to come by such inform ation in ea rly modern tim es. M erchan ts needed to know the best place and the best time to bu y or sell, at a time whe n informa tion abo ut markets tr avelled no faster than the spee d of a horse or the rate of knots of a sailing ship. They needed to know the exac t quantity and qu ality of the goods they were buying, which presented specific problem s in a period whe n the standardization of litres and kilogram s was still unknown and each town had its own weights and measures of capac ity, and wh en a commo dity like gra in could be delivered in dozen s of different qu alities. T hey also needed a mean s by which to know if their deputies in overseas places were perfo rm ing adequa tely. The latt er phenomen on is a specific variant of the problem of acquiring information and is called the 'age ncy probl em': the difficulty of measuring th e performan ce of an agent, like a factor based in one of the Baltic ports. It was inevitabl e that a merchant had to delegate some author ity to his agent, so he had to know to wha t extent the agent worked in the best interests of his principal." H ow mu ch work had he don e for his principal, like buying and selling goods, cha rtering ships, paying off debts, keepin g the boo ks in a certain tim e spa n, an d had he done these tasks to the best of his abilities, or not? T heoretically, the tim e devoted by merchan ts to the searc h for information abo ut the best place and the best tim e to buy or sell certain goods can be measured , but this is not practicable in actual historical research. Nevertheless, it is obvious that merchants could profit greatly from instituti onal improvem ent s like the setting up of an Exch an ge, where buyers and sellers met each other at specific hours and where man y specialized broker s were pr esen t. Another instituti on highly relevant to the efficiency with which merch ants could work was the post system between various Baltic cities and Amsterdam . The crea tion of a well-organiz ed Exchan ge and the setting up of a goo d post system would indubitably have helped to lower the costs of information searching altho ugh at such a distan ce we cannot qu antify these kinds of improvem ents. To lower tran saction costs often just mean s to create more efficient markets. 14 13

It

North, Structure and Change, 202-204. North, Institutions, 64.

INTRODUCTION

11

Another category of transaction costs, the costs of reducing uncertainty, has many aspects , some of which can be quantified, others cannot. The risk of losing merchandise at sea always had to be reckoned with. Naturally, if the chances of losing commodities at sea are disproportionately large , the incentive to invest money in seaborne commerce disappears. This means that in unsafe times costs had to be made to ensure that heavily laden ships were not captured by pirates or taken as prizes by enemies at sea. Among the precautions which could be taken, for example, was the placement of guns on board or the organization of convoys to protect the merchant fleet. The risk of financial losses caused by damages incurred by ships on the high seas could be completely eliminated by taking out marine insurance. This, of course, involved an extra expense in the form of a premium but the risk of much greater damages was eliminated. Another way of reducing uncertainty in business involved ways to make sure that business partners would honour agreements. In the absence of a truly effective enforcement of agreements by a third party (the state), inspiring trust in people and inquiring after the reputation of a merchant or firm were great means of reducing uncertainties in business." How did the merchants engaged in the Baltic grain trade reduce the risk of swindles by or the incompetence of their business partners, their agents overseas, and their clients? Transaction costs that lend themselves to quantification are often simultaneously imbued with characteristics which are impossible to measure. There is much more to hiring a grain carrier in the port than paying his wage: the man must not only do his job at no outrageous cost, he also had to be reliable, and it was important that there be no shortage of labour, and that the workers could easily be found, preferably at a fixed spot in the port. Most of the services related to trade, like the grain carriers and the boatmen, were organized in a guild, which may seem an old-fashioned and rigid way of organization in the early modern hub of world trade. It is therefore interesting not only to discover whether costs were low, but also whether the organization was efficient. The central themes of the book are therefore the efficiency and costs of the Baltic grain trade in Amsterdam. More precisely, two questions are formulated. The first conc erns explanations for the way

IS

North, Institutions, 55; North, 'Institutions', 30.

12

INTRODUCTION

transaction costs developed: what causes transaction costs to fall, or to fail to do so? It is now being acknowledged to a growing degree that even inefficient institutions are not doomed to disappear quickly from the historical stage. As Davids has observed, North too recognizes this fact in his recent publications-in contrast to his older work. He argues that there is no reason to think that only optimal institutions, that is those which reduce transaction costs, endure. 16 How should we explain the fall, stagnation, or rise of the different categories of transaction costs which played a role in the grain trade in Amsterdam? The second question which serves as a guideline for the research presented in this book is: to what extent did transaction costs, and which of them in particular, contribute to the success of the Dutch entrepot for Baltic grain? Analogous to North's general assertion that transaction costs play a crucial role in the performance of economies in general, we want to know the role of these costs in the performance of Amsterdam as an entrepot for Baltic grain. Were low transaction costs the decisive factor in Amsterdam becoming a central European entrepot for Baltic grain in the sixteenth century, and subsequently reinforcing this function in the seventeenth century? And if so, was a rise of transaction costs responsible for the loss of this central position from the eighteenth century? Various of the themes treated in this book are relevant to transaction costs, like the organization of the market, the character of the enterprises, solutions to the 'agency problem', freight costs, customs duties, the organization of convoys to protect ships at sea and so on. Nevertheless, not all elements relevant to efficiency and costs could be researched, because of a lack of sources or a dearth of earlier studies. For instance, not much systematic research has yet been done about the functioning of the Dutch judicial system in cases relevant to long-distance trade and given the scope of this book it was impossible to uncover the details about mercantile jurisdiction. Methods of bookkeeping simply had to be neglected as account books, as well as other documents originating from private archives, are almost non-existent when it comes to Amsterdam grain merchants.

16

Davids , 'De macht der gewoonte?', 5.

INTROD UCTION

4. Structure

13

if the book

T he boo k ope ns and closes with two case studies of me rchants, one at the beginning of the period and the othe r at the end. Chapter 1 treats the case of Co rne lis Pietersz H ooft (1547- 1626). Hi s trading caree r gives a good idea of the oppo rtunities ava ilable to Dutch mercha nts in th e second half of the sixteenth and the first qu arter of the seventeenth century, a period of rapid expa nsion in the trad e in Baltic grain. The cha pter analyses the ways in which he organized his activities and indicates some of the characteristic features of Dutch comme rce of the time. H ooft, as well as Willem de Clercq who is the subject of the cha pte r closing the bo ok, have been selected because comparatively good source material exists to shed light on their activities, but also becau se they are in many ways representative examples of the Amsterd am mercantil e community as a whole. C ha pter 2 cha rac terizes the great waves in the expo rts of grain from th e Baltic in general and tries to explain these fluctu ations by changing conditions on the sides of dem and and supply. The subject here is Baltic exports to the west in gene ral, irrespective of the role of Dutch ships, Dutch capital, or the Amster da m market. T he third cha pte r focuses on the role of Amsterda m as Euro pean entre pot for Baltic gra in. Central qu estion s are the extent to which, in successive periods, Baltic grain was act ually destined for Amsterdam itself, the imp ortan ce of re-exports, and the role of Baltic grains in the Dutch food supply. Dutch trade policy is also trea ted here, including the amount of the customs duti es and the general conditions for trad e. The fourth cha pter is devoted to the way the market was organized a nd describes th e ente rp rises in Am sterd am which wer e engaged in excha nges with the Baltic region . This cha pter gives an impression of the number , size, and nature of the merchant houses, and shows how bu sinessmen tried to redu ce the risk of choosing unreliable or incompetent partners in business. Chapt er 5 is about inform ation and age ncy: the subjects are the unique role of Amsterda m as a centre of mercantil e informa tion, the communication by post with the Baltic markets, and the way Dutch merchants tried to solve the agency probl em . T his cha pter vividly illustrates the practical problem s of ea rly modern trade. The subject of Cha pte r 6 is the Dutch mercan tile marine and the development of freight costs. T he grow th in the size and composition

14

INTRODUCTION

of the merchant fleet is presented, and the factors determining freight costs are evaluated. Among these are the role of technological change in shipbuilding, the shipping season, and the safety of the seas. Chapter 7 is about protection costs. It describes the way shipowners and merchants tried to reduce risk by making use of marine insurance and comparable techniques. It also shows that the Baltic Sea was practically 100 per cent safe for Dutch ships for most of the seventeenth century and how this changed later on. Merchants and shipowners organized themselves to ensure that warships protected the Dutch fleet sailing to the Baltic. Chapter 8 is concerned with the logistics of trade in Amsterdam: the transport of grain on small boats from the port into the town, carrying it from the quays into the warehouses, measuring it, and finally turning the grain while it was lying in warehouses. Central questions here are the expenses incurred by the merchants and the improvements in organization in the course of time . Finally, Chapter 9 treats the case of the nineteenth-century merchant, Willem de Clercq (1795-1844). The description of his commission business reveals many big differences with the organization which had prevailed in the Golden Age, as illustrated by the case of Cornelis Pietersz Hooft in Chapter I . The difficulties Willem de Clercq encountered in trying to make a living from the grain trade make clear to what a sorry state the Dutch Baltic trade had been reduced by the first half of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER ONE

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT (1547-1626): BOOMING BUSINESS IN AN AGE OF EXPANSION

In Dutch historiography Cornelis Pietersz Hooft (1547- 1626) is best known as on e of Amsterdam's most extraordinary burgomasters. He was particularly influential during the l580s and l590s and, although he gradually had to cede mu ch of his influence afterwards, he never left the political stage altogeth er. H e was re-elected burgomaster for the last time in 1610, but remained on the City Council until his death in 1626. Cornelis Hooft was respected becau se of his high moral standa rds, his reputation of being incorruptible, and for the fact that more than once he turned against colleagues in city politics who took advantage of their position to furth er their personal interests. This man had a son who was at least as remarkable, and who is perhaps even better known in the history of the Netherlands: Pieter Cornelisz Hooft (158 1- 1647). His many poems, plays, and historical works have had a great imp act on Dutch literature and made him famous, and for this reason the most prestigious literary award in the Netherlands is called after him: the P.G. Hoofi prijs. This chapter is not about the extraordinary accomplishm ents in politics and the arts of these two men, it is con cern ed more prosaically with the members of the Hooft family as merchants. Cornelis Hooft's ancestors had made their living as shipmasters, and he was an important merchant himself. The central theme of this chapter is how Cornelis Hooft organized his trade. T o set the scene it begins with a description of Cornelis' life, then goes on to give an analysis of his busin ess, and ends with a charac terization of his ideas about econom ic policy. In a sense Comelis Hooft embodies the spirit of enterprise which pervaded in the grain trade in those years. The details of his life as a merchant are as fascinating as his role in politics, and they pro vide a perfect illustration of the great chances lying within the grasp of merchants at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century.

16

CHAPTER O NE

1. A chronicle

if his life

Co rnelis Pietersz H ooft was born in Am sterd am in 1547. H e was the son of a shipmaster who was active in the shipping to the Baltic and to Fran ce. Hi s fathe r, Pieter W illem sz H ooft, mad e a good living from his work. In the course of the sixtee nt h cent ury, the Dutch Baltic trad e was booming, having really taken off in the 1540s, and consequently dem and for ships and competent shipmas ters was conco mitantly large. As well as his salary, Pieter Willemsz undoub tedly mad e money tra ding on his own accoun t, as it was usual at the time for shipmas ters to suppleme nt their incom e by acting as sma ll-scale traders. I H e destined his son Co rnelis for a caree r as a merchant, which was a step upwards from the tough and dangerous work of a shipmaster. 2 Although the dan gers of the sea are easily exagge ra ted, and studies abo ut Dutch fishing and mercantile shipping in European waters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggest that the risk of perishing at sea was mu ch less than one per cent per voyage," most seame n had expe rienced the loss of shipmates or relati ves at sea and were aware of the dan gers of spe nding the greater part of one's life at sea. The H ooft fam ily had suffered losses too. In August 1562 the ship comma nded by Co rnelis' gra ndfather was wrecked and grandfathe r was lost, taking with him one of his sons, Camelis' Uncle Broer. La ter in the sixties, two other un cles, J an and Quirij n, shipmasters too, lost their lives at sea, one of them poign antl y repeating the tragedy of taking his own son with him.' A career as a merchant was not only safer, it also offered more status and more cha nces to make a fortune. Somet imes shipmas ters ea rned eno ugh to be able to withdraw from shipping and conce ntrate on trading or to allow their sons to go int o trading. App ar ently fath er Pieter Willem sz H ooft had been fortunate enough to be able to give Comelis an education until he was about sixteen yea rs old, and th en to find him a place in the service of a merchant. " We know practically nothing about this period . For example, it is not Va n Tielhof, De Hollandse graanhandel, 170-1 72. Dudok van Heel, ' Hooft', 94-95. 3 Boon, Bouwers, 176- 177. t Dudok van Heel, 'De familie', 71-72, 103- 104. Grandfather was named Willem J ansz Hooft. 5 Van Gelde r, De levensbeschouwing, 3. I

2

COIU·lELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(1547-1626)

17

clear if this arrangement was like a formal apprenticeship, for which his fath er had to pa y, or whether Cornelis was a servant earning his own money. Whatever his status , for three or four years Cornelis sailed regularly to the Baltic, and so familiarized himself with the searoutes, the ports, the local customs, the laws regarding strangers, th e kinds of money that were used in the different towns etcetera. Perhaps the most important thing he was able to achieve was to build up relationships with local merchants. These relationships turned out to be very useful ind eed during the prelude to and the first years of th e Dutch Revolt. Cornelis sympathized with those dissidents who had been pejoratively called Beggars (G ueux) ever since the y had demanded the Brussels regim e abol ish the Inquisition in 1566 . He belonged to those (mostly mercha nts) who took th e lead in establishing Protestant worship in Amsterdam in 1566 .6 Alarmed by the success achieved by Protestant idea s in th e Dutch provinces, and by th e growing political resistan ce in this recalcitrant northern part of his realm , the Spani sh king, Philip II , sent a large army under the command of the duke of Alba to the north to restore law and order and, more cogently, th e Roman Catholic faith . The duke pursued a cour se of very harsh repression against political and religious dissenters." To save his life, like so many oth ers in tho se years , Cornelis decided to leave the Netherlands. His exile from Amst erd am lasted about nin e years : it started in 1569, when he was 22 and only came to an end when he was over 30 . The first five years wer e spent in Danzig and K onigsb erg. Referring to this long soj ourn in the Baltic he lat er wrote that he had been very well treat ed, especially by Lutherans who made no distinction whatever between the adherents of different religious persuasions." Indubitably, his inclination towards religiou s toler an ce was strengthened during the period of banishment. In 1573 so man y plac es in th e province of Holland had j oined the Revolt, that most refugees could return, albeit not yet to Amsterdam as this town still remained loyal to Philip II. In 1574 the time was ripe for Cornelis to go back home to Holl and, undoubtedly hoping that the conservative magi stracy of Amsterdam would soon give up its rather lonely stand against the Beggars. Four years were

6

7 8

Israel, The Dutch Republic, 158-1 59. Schaffer, Van der Wee and Born ewasser eds., De lage landen, 110. Van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing, 4- 5.

18

CHAPTER ONE

to pa ss before this happen ed , years that Cornelis spe nt mostly in H oorn. Finally, in 1578, Amsterdam, besieged by the rebel armies, j oined the Revolt. The Rom an Catholic regent s fled the town and the Prot estants assumed power with a coup known as the Alteratie.? Cornelis Pietersz H ooft could now return to his place of birth. The expe rience of bein g banned from Amst erd am for so many years, simply becaus e of loyalty to his ideas, made a profound impression on his character. It convinced him of the importan ce of freedom of thought. This is certainly what he felt about his expe riences him self: in 1618, then an old man and caught up in the midst of heated religiou s conflicts splittin g up the Calvinists into two rival parties , he referred back to this expe rience of exile. He and oth ers of his generation, his fellow Beggars, had known what it meant to be denied freedom of thought. The young people of 1618, by contrast, had been raised in easy circumstances and had no idea how important toleran ce was. 10 In November 1578, not long after his return to Amsterdam, Comelis married. His wife wa s Anna Jacobsdr Blaeu , a woman of the M ennonite faith. Cornelis him self chose not to join anyone particular Prot estant group as he was Libertarian. Becau se of his conviction he would have preferred to marry in the town hall, not in the public (C alvinist) churc h, a feeling shared by his wife and Mennonites in gene ral. C onscious of the potential damage of such a move , friends of Cornelis persuad ed him to marry in churc h just to make sure that a political future would still be open to him should he so desire. Cornelis followed this advice but without retr eating an inch from his Libertarian views. Anna Blaeu remained M ennonite and their children were probably raised in the M ennonite tradition. II The married couple settled in a hous e on the Nieuwendijk , near the port. Relatively large numbers of people professing Prot estant ideas, including M ennonites, wer e to be found in the vicinity . Since long before the Revolt, this neighbourhood had been known as a gathering place of dissenters and Comelis was not the only one here who had returned from exile in 1578. Anna and Cornelis both had a host of relatives living nearby as well."

!l

10 II

12

Israel, 'The Dutch Republic, 179-1 93. Van Geld er, De levensbeschouwing, 4-5. Dudok van Heel, 'Hooft', 97-98. Dudok van H eel, ' He! Emb der ofte Co ndees Hoeckgen', 25-26, 34-38.

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(1547-1626)

19

Cornelis earned his living mainly by trading in bulk commodities in northern and western Europe. At the heart of his business lay Baltic grain, while salt and other goods that could be exchanged for grain in Baltic cities wer e sought in France and Portugal. Closer to home, from Holland, he exported herring and oil to the Baltic. In the 1590s, when the markets in Italy were crying out for Baltic grain, Cornelis instantly responded and extended his trading network to the M editerranean. But his activities were more extensive than his mer cantile pursuits. Like most merch ants, Cornelis did not confine him self strictly to trade, but was also involved in shipping" and lending credit, " as well as in those industrial activities which were strongly connec ted with tr ad e: for instance, he owned a her ringpacking factory. H e also invested money in the East India Compan y. Wh en the Company was set up in 1602, he applied for shares worth 9600 guilders ." Nevertheless, his mo st secure investme nts wer e certainl y those in landed property like an estate in the countryside, and a dwelling hou se, a warehouse and a bu ilding for herring-packing in Amsterdam. Cornelis was not only a bu sinessman , he also forged a career in the city govern me nt. He was appointed alderman (schepen) in 1582 and was re-elected twice (in 1583 and 1586). In 1584 he becam e a memb er of the City Council (Vroedschap) a seat which in principle was given for life and Cornelis did indeed remain on the Council until his death in 1626. Among the minor offices he held were those of city treasurer (tresaurier, 1589 and 1606), delegated councillor to the Stat es G en eral (gecommitteerde raad, from 1599 to 1601 ) and Commissioner of the Bank of Amsterdam (commissaris van de Wisselbank) in 1614. But this was not all: during th e 1580s, he so quickly distinguish ed himself that as early as in 1588, at the minimum age of forty, the high est office, th at of burgom aster , was within his reach . 13 GAA NA 10/65 (13 April 1598): this notarial deed shows that Co rnelis owned part of the ship De Engel Gabriel thereby proving tha t Van Gelder was wrong in asserting that Cornelis did not own ships or shares in ships. De levensbeschouwing, 24. I, For example GM NA 32/ 346 v. (10 O ctober 1595): a merchan t declared he owed the sum of 6,000 guilders to Co rnelis Pietersz Ho oft and company, which sum he will pay back within half a year against 10 per cent interest. On p. 402 an extension of time for payment. 15 Van Dillen , Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister, 200. Hooft later bought and sold East India Company shares . For example he sold a share of 1800 guilders to Philip Metsue and J acques Merchijs in 1612 (GM NA 2 1/36 v.) and bought a share of 1500 guilders in 1613 (GAA NA 21-8/1 ).

20

CHAPTER ONE

He was re-elected in 1591 and another ten times, the last time in 1610. 16 So for almost a quarter of a century he moved in the most powerful circles in Amsterdam. He seems to have had a daily routine of devoting most of the morning to political duties, and the rest of the day to his commercial tasks. These latter activities would start with a visit to the Bourse from 11 o'clock till noon, while the afternoon was spent in his office occupied with book-keeping and letter writing and, if necessary, with a visit to a notary. He made no bones about the fact that the two tasks were difficult to combine and his political duties took up so much time that he had to sacrifice much more profitable activities." Although a process of aristocratization would eventually create a separate class of patricians in the course of the seventeenth century, in earlier times it was common practice to find burgomasters and other officials fully engaged in trade in Amsterdam. This was one of the things that most struck a French diplomat visiting the Netherlands in 1636. At the Amsterdam Exchange (apart from the Spanish and Portuguese Jews and the many other foreigners , speaking all sorts of languages), the variety of people doing business, among them not only merchants, shipmasters and innkeepers, but 'even burgomasters', struck him forcibly . IS For over twenty years, from the time Amsterdam joined the Revolt, in 1578, until the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Libertarian faction dominated the city government. The men belonging to this faction, including Hooft, were tolerant towards Mennonites and Roman Catholics, but in the first decade of the seventeenth century, this tolerant situation came under increasing pressure. The orthodox Calvinists steadily gained a more powerful position at the expense of the Libertarians and Hooft was eventually forced to take a back seat . The last time that he was elected burgomaster was 1610. He gave up his political ambitions, except for his place on the Council, in 1614. When the conflict between orthodox Calvinists and their more liberal opponents got out of hand in 1618 and the stadholder, Maurice, replaced the members of the city government by orthodox Calvinists, he allowed Cornelis to keep his place in the

Dudok van Heel , 'Hooft', 99; Dudok van Heel , 'De familie', 86. Van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing, 12, 7. 18 Jacobsen Jensen, ' Hoe een Franschman', 105-106. 16

17

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(r547- r626)

21

Council, but only because of his venerable age and the respect people had for him ." Cornelis died in 1626, leaving a fortune worth more than 300,000 guilders. This makes him one of the richest men in Amsterdam at that time ." Among the properties he left was on e of the largest hous es in the town , complete with grounds, a war ehouse, and oil storage containe rs. Cornelis had been living at this address, at Singel 132, ever since he left the Nieuwendijk in 1592 or 1593. Apart from this large residence, Cornelis left a country hous e with some land in th e countryside north of Amsterdam." In 1622, towards the end of their lives, Cornelis and his wife Anna had their portraits painted (see figures 4 and 5). He was then at th e advanced age of 76 and she was 66 years old . Indubitabl y, th ese paintings testify to th e modesty of the two , inspired by M ennonite ideas : th e ruffs are extremely narrow and simple, in stark contrast to th e exube rant, elaborate ruffs which wer e fashion able at the tim e. Yet there are some signs of human frailty, th e abundant use of fur was meant to hint at the great wealth that burgomaster Cornelis Pietersz Hooft and Anna Jacobsdr Blaeu had at their disposal."

2. The business

if Comelis

Pieters: Hoqft

As we have seen , as a teenager Cornelis had travelled to the Baltic in the service of a merchant. Given the circumstances, it is very mu ch on the cards that he subsequ ently began to trad e on his own account and continu ed doing so during his exile in Danzig and Konigsberg and after 1574 in Hoorn. From his return to Amsterdam in 1578 until his death, he conducted his trad e from that city. H e often work ed purely on his own account but also parti cipated in Dudok van Heel, ' Hooft' , 109-110. We have some idea of the wealth in Amsterdam five years after Cornelis' death , in 1631. A tax was levied on all fortun es exceeding 1,000 guilders. On ly 24 persons were taxed for pro pe rties worth more tha n 200,000 guilders (Van Dillen, Brannen II, X L). Althou gh we have to allow for serious tax evasion (ibidem, XU) and may assume that Corn elis, had he lived until 1631, would have succeeded in having his fortune assessed at much less than 300,000 guilders, he would still have belonged to the top bracket of the tax payers. 21 About the fortune he left: Van Gelder , De levensbeschauwing, 7; date of move to Singel 132: Dud ok van Heel, 'H et Embd er ofte Condees Hoeckgen', 34. 22 Van Kretschmar, 'Aan tekcningen', 109. 19

20

22

CHAPTE R ONE

venture s with third parties but deta ils about these companies have largely been lost. In 1584 he launched a trading company in herring, oil, and grain , in partnership with his brother , Willern, but it is not clear how long this co-operation lasted .23 Trad ing companies could be established for the trading of one specific lot of goods, or for one or more yea rs, and, once established, could be prol onged. In the case of th e br oth ers H ooft, it is possible that the company was prolonged many times and lasted until the death of Willem in 1605, in tot al more th an twenty yea rs. Whatever the situa tion, the two brothers were still (or: aga in?) co-ope rating in the summer of 1595.24 Possibly, a third brother, Gerrit, who had been living in Danzig until the end of 1595 , joined the compa ny after his return. P After Gerrit and Willem had died (respectively in 1600 and 1605), Cornelis launched a company with their widows in 160 7. This trading compa ny lasted for about four years only, until 1611.26 The fact th at C ornelis worked togeth er with his brother , and later maybe with two broth ers in a trading company, and still later with his two widowed sisters-in-law, does not exclude th e possibility that he coopera ted with oth ers at the same time or on other occasions. At the end of the 1590s he was involved in ship-owning with Corn elis ]ansz Gheelvinck: they were j oint owners of a ship." Nor does it mean tha t he never undert ook bu siness ventures on his own. In 1586, for example, he is nam ed alone as party in a letter of exchange" and in 1591 he sent rye to Italy for no one oth er than him self.P During the partnership with his two sisters-in-law, from 1607 to 16 11, the three partners had no common account with the Bank of Amsterdam, but there were sepa ra te accounts for Cornelis Pietersz Hooft and for the widow of Willern Pietersz Ho oft.l" The compa nies only testify to

Van Gelder , De levensbeschouwing, 5-6. They are nam ed jointly as party in a letter of excha nge dated July 1595 . Winkelman , Bronnen III , no. 639 . 25 Van Geld er, De levensbeschouwing, 6. 26 Elias, De vroedschap I, 147. 27 GAA NA 10/ 65 (13 April 1598). 28 Van Gelder, 'Zestiende-eeuwsche koopm ansbrieven ', 185. In a letter of exchange of 1588, broth er Willem Hooft is named as part y, also alone. Winkelman , Bronnen III , pp . 484-485. 29 H eerin ga, Bronnen I, 12-1 4. 30 T he ad ministration of the acco unts for this ea rly period has been lost, bu t there a re a few lists of the accountholde rs. O n the lists for 1609 a nd 16 1I, Comelis Pietersz Hooft and the widow of \ Villem Pietersz Hooft have sepa rate accounts. 23

2t

CO RN ELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(1547- 1626)

23

the fact that Cornelis invested part of his money togeth er with his partner(s), and shar ed the risk with th em-the profits or the losses. One of the factors that might explain Cornelis' success in his trading career is his family tics. As we have seen, he was born into a famil y of shipmasters. Hi s grandfathe r, his fath er , and his seven uncl es were shipmas ters sailing to the north and west of Europe." Skills were passed on from one gene ration to the next and co-operation between family memb ers, for example the sha ring the command of a ship , was commo n. Generations later the story was still told in Amst erd am tha t at one time , somewhere aro und the middl e of the sixteenth century, Willem J ansz Hooft (Com elis' grandfather) arrived in the Sound at the same time as five of his sons, all of them commanding a big ship. The Danish king, Christian III , happened to be in Elsinore and heard about this remarkable coincidenc e. He liked the thought of the six sailing to the Baltic together so mu ch that he invited them to be his guests. H e also gave them exemption from th e Sound toll." We even come across this appealing story in a pamphlet datin g from as late as 1780, but the an ecdote was recounted less accurately by then, as the details had apparently becom e blurred over the yea rs. The pamphleteer writes that among the ancestors of one of the burgom asters' families, a fath er and his seven sons had found them selves togeth er in a Dutch fleet in the Sound, and that each one of them was own er of the ship in which he sailed. The writer mad e a mistake in the number of sons as this was actually five, not seven, and another in asserting that the fath er and his sons sailed th rou gh the Sound togeth er in the seventeenth century, which of course mu st be: the sixteenth. Besides, it is very unlikely that each one owned the ship in which he sailed, as shipmasters usually own ed at mo st only a part of the ship, and not the whole ship." Despite its lap ses in accuracy, the story still serves to underlin e the close co-op eration betwe en the fath er and his sons as shipmasters. Cornelis and his brothers and cousins continued this family tradition of working togeth er , not as shipmasters but as merchants. It

GAA Archief 5077, Naa mklappers op de groo tboeken van de Amsterd amse wisselbank, A-6 (1609) and C-7 (16 11). 3 1 Dud ok van Heel, 'De familie'. 32 Elias, De vroedschap I, 148; Dudok van Heel, ' Hooft', 95. 33 Boxer, 'Sedentary Workers', 165.

24

CHAPTER ONE

Willem Jansz Hooft (1480/ 1490?- 1562)

Cornelius

Claes

Jan

Pieter Broer (15 10/1 5 15?after 1586) x

J anne0e Hendricks

I

Quirijn

Jan

x

x

Alydt Pietersdr

?

I

~

Pieter Crijn Crijnsz Crijnsz

Hendri ck (1535- 1596)

Jan (1543-1602)

Camelis (1547- 1626)

Gerrit

Pieter J ansz

Willem Gerrit (1549- 1605) (155 1- 1600)

x

Anna Jacobsdr Blaeu

Pieter 1581-1647

Aegje 1587-1 65 1?

Grietj e 1590- 1639

Figure a. Family relations

Jacob 1593-1640

Janne0e 1595-1639

of Comelis Pieters; Hoof! (selected)

Hendrick 1599-1627

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(r547- r626)

25

seems that, in this respect, some important decisions were made in 1578. It was at the end of this year that the political situation enabled merchants to return to Amsterdam from their exiles, an opportunity seized upon by Cornelis, as we have seen. Willem did so too and, just like Cornelis, he married in Amsterdam in November 1578,34 which shows that both of them seem to have int ended to settle in the town . Two of their rem ainin g brothers continued to live in Danzig, and it seems that this was part of a collective stra tegy, designed in the winter of 1578-1 579. Not only Cornelis and Willem, but also J an, their older brother , were in Amsterdam in that wint er." The Alteratie of Amsterdam made it necessary to reth ink the commercial strategy of the family . Apparently the three decided that J an and the youngest brother , Gerrit, would remain in Dan zig and raise their families th ere , while Cornelis and Willem would represent the fam ily interests in Am sterdam. Father Pieter Willemsz Hooft had had five sons (and strangely enough, like his own fath er , Willem Jansz Hooft, no dau ghters), and four of them now co-operated closely in their business affairs: two in Amsterdam, two in D anzig. Only the oldest son , H endrick, was not involved in the trading activities of his four younger brothers; at least there is no indi cation of any such co-operation. H e lived in Amsterdam in the early 1580s, but bought citizenship in Alkmaar in 1585. 36 The sources leave very few traces of the situation at that time , but it seems that five or six years later the ambitions of the four Hooft brothers expanded. The trading company that was set up in Amsterdam in 1584 by Comelis and his brother Willem did not only look for support to Jan and Gerrit, the oldest and the youngest brothers, who still lived in Dan zig, but also to three cousins of the four settled in Norway , Fran ce, and Portugal. It is now impossible to prove the supposition with hard evide nce but there is a strong impression tha t this was also the upshot of some consciously mad e collective decision. The first of these cousins, Pieter Crijnsz Hooft, obt ain ed the citizenship of Bergen in Norway in 1584 and it is hard to imagine that th is was a coincidence: he must have gone there to represent the new trading compa ny. Another cousin, Pieter J an sz Hooft, went to La Ro ch elle, probably in the same year (in any case,

34

35 3G

Dud ok van Heel, 'De familie', 94. Dudok van Heel, 'Hooft', 100. Dudok van Heel, 'De familie', 81.

"'~

'(j>b\::.

l;;:-- .Torun )

Map I. T he Baltic Sea Region

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

c-=="

sr Petersburg

~

\ ~

o ~

:>:l

o

O'l

f'o.;>

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(1547- 1626)

27

the last trace of him in Amsterdam dates from 1584, and he was living in La Ro chelle from the beginning of 1589 at the latest, and rem ain ed there until his death in 1598). A third cousin, Crijn Crijnsz Hooft, was found to be living in Aveiro in Portugal in 1599,37 again perhaps resident there since the 1580s. If the three cousins did in fact emigrate in respon se to a well thought out family strategy, designed in 1584, the most cogent qu estion this elicits is why this strategy was designed at that particular moment? Just as in 1578 , there had been an important political development: the siege of Antwerp was begun in th e summer of 1584 . It was detrimental to some trade, but it is difficult to see how this would have affected the bu siness of the Hooft brothers. Their activities were conce ntrated on , even confined to, bulk tr ad e and Antwerp was not important for this kind of trade. It would seem therefore that the reason for setting up a new and more ambitious compa ny in 1584 was probably simply th e flourishing growth of their bu siness affairs. The business of the brothers had probably been going from success to success since 1578 , a view which is supported by a tax register of 1585 suggesting that by that tim e both Cornelis and Willem belonged to the wealthiest 200 people in Am sterdam." M aybe by th at tim e the scale of the bu siness in Norway, France and Portugal had become large enough to consider sending fam ily members overseas. For the three cousins, it mu st have seemed the best way to make a living. Personal considera tions must also have con tributed to the decision of the three cousins to emigrate, and earlier the same sort of considerations mu st ha ve prompted the two brothers J an and Gerrit to stay in Danzig after 1578 , even though they could have returned to Amsterdam . Their actual motivation has to remain a mystery, but religious preferen ces are likely to have played a part in determining which members of th e Hooft family lived where. Cornelis' broth ers 37 Dudok van H eel, 'Houft', 101; Pieter J ansz Hooft is mentioned in a freight contract of 1589 as living in La Rochelle: Winkelman, Bronnen III , no. 343. T he last sign of him in Amsterdam sources dates from 1584: Dudok van H eel, 'Hooft', 101. 38 In the summer of 1535 a tax was levied, the yield of which was meant for hiring riders and foot-soldiers for the relief of Antwerp. In Amsterd am , only some 3000 people (the richest inhabitants) contributed. T he total number of inhabitants was about 30,000 (Nusteling, Welvaart, 234). Camelis H ooft paid 30 guilders, which put him among the 174 people who paid 30 guilders or more. H is broth er Willem H ooft paid 24 guilders. Van Dillen, Amsterdam in 1585, XXXIII, XXXVI, 91, 93.

28

CHAPTER ONE

and cousins did not share his Libertarian views, although tolerance was a characteristic of the family.l? Some-but remarkably few of them-became Calvinist and some chose to become Mennonite, yet others remained Roman Catholic. The Calvinist cousin, Pieter J ansz went to the Huguenot stronghold La Rochelle. Crijn Crijnsz, the Roman Catholic, chose to live in Portugal. Cornelis' two brothers who lived in Danzig were Mennonite. Brother Willem, who lived in Amsterdam, belonged to the Calvinist church. Cousin Pieter Crijnsz who immigrated to Bergen was Roman Catholic but that does not seem to have generated problems in Lutheran Norway." The brothers and cousins of Cornelis living abroad did not spend all their time and energy in looking after the interests of the company of Willem and Cornelis. They traded on their own account too, and we can be sure that Willem and Cornelis represented them in Holland in return. Besides, the Hoofts overseas acted as factors for other Dutch merchants who did not have family members abroad. In Danzig, Jan and Gerrit Hooft for example, represented Gillis de Greve, a Hamburg merchant originally from Antwerp." Pieter Jansz Hooft in La Rochelle acted as agent for merchants from Amsterdam and from Hoorn." He also kept an inn for travelling merchants and factors . Steven van der Haghen, one of the better known shipmasters in Dutch historiography-not only because he made a remarkably successful career sailing the Baltic and the North Sea , along the Atlantic coast, on the Mediterranean and many times to the East Indies, but also because he wrote down his experiences so that we can follow his long and interesting career- , lodged at the inn of Pieter Jansz Hooft in La Rochelle in 1591. He met many young merchants there." The bonds between the expatriates and Holland remained strong for decades, and the members of the younger generation, often born Dudok van Heel, 'H ooft', Ill. Dudok van Heel, 'H ooft', 97-98, 10 I. 41 Brulez, 'De diaspo ra' , 290. 42 This is apparent from a freight contract dated 5 March 1589, made up by two Hoorn merchants, who name Pieter Jansz Hooft as their agent in La Roch elle (Winkelman, Brannen III, no. 343) and a declaration of a merchant from Hoorn that he paid his factor Picter Jansz Hooft for salt, delivered in France in July 1589 (Archiefdienst Westfriese Gemeenten, Notarieel archief 2036 , 220 v.); and a deed of 31 July 1597 in which Pieter is named as the agent of an Amsterdam merchant (Winkelman, Brannen II, no. 471). 43 Tiele, 'Steven van der Hagh en's avonturen', 414 . 39

.0

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(r547- r626)

29

and raised abroad, mostly conside red themselves as Dutch but were prepared to move to another part of Europe if this should prove desirable from an economic point of view. This must be the explanation of why the son of Crijn Crijnsz (who, to make things complicat ed , was also named Crijn Crijnsz), born in Portugal, went to Bergen in Norway in 1609.44 H e succeeded his uncl e, Pieter Crijnsz, who had died shortly before without leavin g a son to follow in his footsteps. Crijn Crijn sz the Younger obtained the citizenship of Bergen in 1611. 45 The brothers J an and Gerrit in Danzi g returned to Amsterda m in 1595 to spend their remaining years in Holland." J an's son, Pieter , then rem ained behind to represent the Hooft merchants as a factor. Although Pieter had been born in Danzig (in 1575) and had probably lived there all his life, he preferred to live in Holland and remigrated, or should we say emigrated, to the Netherlands around 1602.4 7 Cornelis was more or less specialized in the old establish ed hulk trades: most details about his activities refer to grain." The trading compa ny with his brother Willem was established in 1584 for the trad e in oil, herring, and grain, but was not exclusively conce rne d with these products, as a refer ence to trade in ash was also found .' ? Throughout his life, the grain trade lay at the core of the bu siness of Cornelis Hooft, and the grain export from the Baltic was complement ed by the import of western European commodities, of which herring and salt were most in demand. The need for goods to be exchanged against Baltic products explains why representatives of the Hooft merchants were stra tegically located in La Rochelle, Aveiro , and Bergen and not somewhere else. La Rochelle was th e centre of the French salt exports, and Aveiro had the same function for Portugal. Bergen was a port for the export of herring and other fish.50 The marriages concluded by th e Hooft merchants testify to a strategy designed to bind herring merchants to the family. After

J orgensen, 'Crij n Cr ijnsz Hooft', 8- 9. Dudok van Heel, 'Hooft', 108. 46 Dud ok van Heel, 'De familie' , 83 (Ja n Pietersz) and 100 (Gerrit Pietersz). 47 Dudok van Heel, 'De familie', 83. 4B GAA NA 42/1 22 v.-1 23, 125 v.- 126; Heeringa, Bronnen I, 12-14. 49 Come lis and Willem Hooft have to pay 260 guilders to a shipmaster for the freight of 40 last of ash, September 1584. Th e text is printed in Dudok van Heel, 'De familic', 88. 50 J orgensen, 'Crij n Crijnsz Hooft', 8. H

45

30

CHAPTER ONE

Cornelis' mother died, his father remarried the widow Maria Egb erts Guldenknecht. She brought no less than ten children with her from her former marriages. This gave Cornelis a whole group of stepbrothers and -sisters, among them many merchants and wives of merchants. The herring trade was especially well represented among the children of Maria Guldenknecht, as one of her former husbands had been a herring merchant." Cornelis himself and his brothers also mostly married into merchant families: his own wife, Anna Blaeu, for example, was th e daughter of a herring merchant. The close connections with herring merchants made it easy to lay their hands on export commodities. We can take it for granted that Cornelis' fath er-in-law procured him herring to send to the Baltic. When his father-in-law died, Cornelis bought his house with its grounds, including th e factory where the herring-barrels were filled. One of Anna's nephews, Willem Jansz Blaeu , worked as an apprentic e in the office of Cornelis for some tim e around 1594 and occup ied himself with the herring trade. He soon left the office as he was more int erested in mathematics and astronomy, and eventually becam e a book printer and cartographer.F The books , maps and atla ses which he published were famous alre ady in his own time and he and his descendants would dominate Dutch mapmaking throughout th e seventeenth century. At the end of the sixteenth century, some Dutch merchants extended their trading network to the M editerranean , in response to the great demand for grain that was then generated in Italy. Cornelis wasted no tim e in embracing th ese new business opportunities. Embarrassingly enough, his sending a ship full of rye to Italy in October 1591 is well documented as a result of the lawsuit that was filed becau se the export tax had not been paid. The ship left T exel without paying, put into port some whe re in Z eeland to escap e adverse wind, and was checked there by the officers of the Admiralty, who discovered the fraud . The shipmaster was held responsibl e and, after a long- drawn out lawsuit, the Admiralty Court sentenced him to a fifty guild er fine and payment of the legal costs.P A close reading of the sources conveys the strong impression that Cornelis him-

Dudok van H eel, 'De familie', 81-82. Donker sloot-de Vrij, Drie generaties Blaeu, 19, 75. 53 Kernkamp, De handel II, 93. The lawsuit is to be found in: H eeringa, Bronnen, 12-14. 51

52

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(1547- 1626)

31

self, and not the shipm aster, was respon sible for the tax evasion , but by that time he was burgomaster of Amsterdam and a very influential man . H e seems to ha ve used his relations with persons in power to evade conviction." At first sight, this is difficult to reconcil e with the picture of a man who was known for his high moral standards.f This is th e only documented case in which Camelis Hooft used his influence to further his person al intere sts, if we leave aside the appointment of his son Pieter to a nicely paid high administrative function in 1609, an appointment Pieter very likely owed to his fath er 's influence." Apparently it was no problem for him to accept favouritism in a matt er of tax fraud. Perhaps this may be partly explained by his opinion about this tax, of which he mad e no secret that he considered it far too high." We should also bear in mind that tax fraud occurred very frequ ently and covering up the tax evasion of influe ntial persons was pretty common as well.58 This problematic export of rye was not the only grain traded to Ital y in 1591, as Comelis and his brother and partner Willem also exported wheat there in th e same year. The wheat was transported in bags and two grain carriers wer e hired to fill the bags. This manner of transportation was unusual, as grain was mostly transported loose in the hold of th e ship, but during the first yea rs of the tr ad e to Italy, this bagging method was adopted by several merchants." The reason was probably un cert ain ty about how to handle grain on such long voyages. The bags were poor quality and needed to be repaired. Comelis and Willem ordered two sailmak ers to repair them and they later recalled that they did this job shortly before Christmas 1591. 60 From 1592, or even earlier, Camelis had also acted as representative for Itali ans who bought grain in Amsterd am to send it to Italy. H e claimed damages from Amsterd am insurers in the

Van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing, 12, 30. Ho oft att acked some colleagues who used foreknowledge of the extension of Amsterd am in 1612 to buy up plots of land outside the old town walls. T he value of the land rose enormously after it had been incorpo rated in the city and the buyers could sell at a huge p rofit. Van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing, 13-1 5. 56 Van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing, II. Pieter was appointed bailiff ('drost') of Mu iden , 57 See Section 3. 58 Bruijn, Varend verleden, 49 -50; Kernkamp, 'Sc heepvaart- en handclsbetrekkingen' , 214. 59 Hart, 'De Italievaart', 52. 60 GAA NA 42/1 22 v.-1 23, 125 v.- 126. 54 55

32

CHAPTER ONE

name of the Italian merchants when their ship was damaged." and also chartered ships for th ern.P The trade to the Mediterran ean was still in its infan cy in the years aro und 1590, but within a few years, it had becom e part of the lives of the Dutch traders and shipmasters. Although shipping from the Ne therlands to Italy and back had been the rule in the first years, later on the Dutch ships took more complicat ed routes, also taking up the transportation of commodities within the M editerranean. For instance, in February 1598 the ship De Engel Gabriel, owned by Comelis Hooft and Comelis Jansz Gheelvinck, was cha rtered for a voyage from Pisa to Leghorn and Sicily. The own ers were paid for the freightage in Amsterdam in April of that year. 63 This is a clue that Comelis considered the M editerranean not only an interesting area for trading activities but also as an arena for expanding his shipping bu siness. Comelis attached so mu ch importance to the trad e to Italy, that, in 1598 , he sent his seventeen-year-old son, whom he had destined for a mercantile caree r, not to the Baltic but to Fran ce and Italy. Obviously, the young Pieter Comclisz had to learn French and Italian as the new interests of the family were to be found in those parts.&l Pieter work ed more than half a year in La Roch elle as a comme rcial servant or an apprentice and subsequ ently mad e a journey lasting more than two years through Fran ce and Italy, a real Grand Tour. 65 His period in La Rochelle was not without significance, as Comelis' cousin Pieter J an sz Hooft, who had been keeping an inn and repre senting the Hooft merchants there since the 1580s, had just died. Comelis mu st have hoped to ba se his son more permanently in France as the successor to his uncl e. Neith er this idea nor ind eed plans for Italy prospered. Pieter travelled around Italy for years , visiting the important trade cities and meeting his father 's business relations. He spent a relatively long time in Venice, at the home of Francesco Vrients, a rich merchant of Dutch origin and probably a business friend of his fath er's . He worked in the office of Francesco Vrients for a few months in 1599, and then , after having

61

62

63

6~ 65

GM NA 32/65 v. (April 1592). GM NA 66/ 64- 65. GM NA 10/ 65. Dudok van Heel, 'Hooft', 103, 11 3. For details about this journey, see: De Lange, P.e. Hoofls teis-heuchenis.

CORNELIS PI ETERSZ HOOFT

(1547- 1626)

33

travelled around Italy, again for almost half a year from O ctob er 1600 .66 Unfortunately for his fath er , Pieter's preference for cultur e, especi ally literature, and his dislike of bu siness grew all the more pronounced during this trip planned to gro om him for a career in comme rce and Pieter did not become a successful merchant but a famous writ er and po et. The six children of Cornelis Hooft were not all as whol eheartedly devoted to business as was th e generation of th eir fath er . Of his three daughters, two married merchants, the third a lawyer. Of his three sons, only the middl e one , Jacob, became a m erchant." The oldest and th e youngest sons went qu ite different ways. As we have just seen , the oldest son, Pieter , turned to writing. As said earlier, he is famous in th e history of Dutch literature becaus e of his historical work, his po em s, and his plays. H is magnum opus, th e Neederlandsche Historien, describ es the history of the Netherlands in the crucial period from 1555 to 1584 and is in fact a history of th e Dutch R evolt against Philip 11. 68 H e also wrote po em s to comme morate memorable events, like the op ening of th e first Exchange of Amsterdam in 1611 (see figur e 6). This building was symbolic of th e important role Amsterdam had acquired by then in international trad e, and when th e decision to build it had been taken in 1607 it had surely be en supported by fath er Cornelis, who was burgomaster at that tim c/" The son' s choice of a literary caree r do es not mean th at he was totally disinterested in trade, as he invested some money in a trading partnership with his brother H endrick first and lat er with both his broth ers, H endrick and j acob. ?" Given his tempe rame nt, he has probably devoted little tim e and energy to th ese trading activities and left th e actual management of th e firm to his brothers. The youngest son, H endrick, was apparently a problem child. As a nin e-year-old, in 1608, he had th e honour of laying th e first brick of th e new Exchan ge as he was th e youngest son of the burgomaster ," but th is thrust into th e limelight was clearly not sufficient to

De Lange, P. C. Hoqfts reis-heuchenis, 27; Dudok van Heel, 'Hooft', 103-104. Aegje, Gr ietjc, J ann ctie, J acob: Dudok van H eel, 'De familie', 92- 93. 68 Winkler Prins Lexicon van de Nederlandse Letterkunde, 194. 69 T he poem is prin ted on an engraving of the new building, made and distribu ted in 1612 by C J. Visscher. 70 Elias, De oroedschap I, 147. H ow far these investments brou ght returns, remains a mystery. 7\ Wagenaar, Amsterdam, Tweede stuk, 29. 66 67

34

CHAPTER ONE

inspire him to take up a successful trading career. As mentioned above, he did form a trading partnership for a while with his brother Pieter and lat er with his two brothers , Pieter and Jacob, but it is now impossibl e to tra ce who managed the firm and in how far it was profitable. H e studi ed at the university of Leid en in his teens and in France (O rlea ns) lat er . H ere he spe nt a disproportionate amount of money, prompting his fath er to write in his last will in 1624 that H endrick was a good-for-nothing. He was sent to the Ea st Indies in the hope that he would have more success there and return rich , but he never came home. H e died in Batavia within a few years after his arrival, in 1627.72

3. Hoeft's ideas about economic policy From 1582, when he was in his thirties, Cornelis Hooft com bined his activities as a merchant with a politi cal caree r. This combination of economic and public service activities mak es it interesting to inquire into his views on economic poli cy. The picture which is obtained is incomplete and blurred. Although many treatises he wrot e are still extant, they deal with reli giou s and political problems. Economics is only seldom mentioned in passing." Even so, these passages do tell us som ething about what his thoughts were, as do some resolutions of the State s Gen eral , to which Hooft was delegat ed in the years around 1600. Cornelis Hooft was convinced th at the power and prosperity of Holland depend ed on the Imperium Maris: dominion of the seas, and on foreign trade. Every oth er factor was of minor importan ce, and had to be subordinated to the int erests of overseas trade . This meant it was imp erative to maintain good relati ons with foreign countries in order to facilitate business conduc ted by Dutchmen ab road . Strangers in Holland should be tr eat ed well, not as a matter of courtesy but in order no t to irritate foreign powers. At first sight this seems to contradi ct the fierce criticism of the immigrants from the 72 Du dok van Heel, ' Hooft', 105. During his stay in the East Indies, aro und 1625, he had mon ey invested in a trading compa ny with his brother-in-law, Pictcr H asselacr, and his great neph ew, Simon de Rijck. (Van Dillen, Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister, 169). He probably only provided mon ey, was not involved in the management of the compa ny. 73 Van Gelder, De levensbeschauwing, 40.

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFr

(r547-r626)

35

Southern Netherlands for which Hooft is noted." The main object of his hostility was the merchants who had left Antwerp and other places in the Southern Netherlands in the wake of religious disturbances to settle in Amsterdam. He was convinced that they should be denied the right to assume all political and religious functions. He reproached them for what he saw as their unfair competition with the indigenous merchants. As a reason he cited his belief that they could more easily find business partners in the Southern Netherlands because of their connections with family, friends and colleagues who had remained behind." Given this bias, Hooft's propagation of the good treatment of foreigners was probably quite opportunistic. It should plausibly be interpreted as affecting people from Germany, France and other countries important to Dutch trade, where Dutch people like Hooft's brothers and cousins lived. Such Dutchmen abroad were easy prey to retaliatory measures were their fellow countrymen to be badly treated in Amsterdam. In Hooft's pragmatic opinion, it was also in the interests of foreign trade and of other sectors in the economy to have moderation prevail in politics and religion and to prevent discord between factions , cities, or provinces in the Netherlands. Despite his own involvement in local government, in principle, Cornelis Hooft was against any government intervention in the economy, but nevertheless he saw it as the task of the government to check abuses in the economic sphere. A very concrete point he made in this regard concerned the tax on foreign trade: this tax, called the convooien en licenten (which we saw he fraudulently did not pay in 159 I), was a national tax, established by the States General and collected in all the Dutch provinces. It was meant to generate income for the Admiralties, that used it for warships to protect the Netherlands and the Dutch fleets. Hooft considered the provinces to be sovereign and thought that the other provinces should have nothing to do with the taxes collected in Holland. He argued that the tariffs were too high. At the commencement of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609, the tax was lowered because the Admiralties needed less money than they had done in a state of war, and this adjustment of the tariffs was approved with all his heart by Hoofi."

H

75 76

Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden, 175-176. Van Gelder , De levensbeschouwing, 45, 167-168. About the ideas on economics : Van Gelder, De levensbeschouwing, 40-46.

36

CHAPTER ONE

Hooft was delegated to the States General in 1596, 1597, and from 1599 to 1601.77 The 1596 resolutions document his efforts to shape Dutch trade policy according to the interests of the overseas merchants." The major issues about which disagreement existed in the Netherlands were whether shipping and trade to Spain, Portugal, and Italy should be free or prohibited, and whether the export of grain should be totally banned. Amsterdam was dead set against the prohibition, and it is perfectly clear why: many Amsterdam merchants were involved in the trade to southern Europe and probably had grain and other goods in warehouses waiting to be shipped or even ships already laden waiting to sail. A prohibition would translate into sure and certain damage for them. In the case of those merchants acting as agents for Italian merchants it was also ineluctably clear that the interests of their superiors were best served by no prohibition. Conversely, remembering the high grain prices during the winter of 1595-1596, most members of the States General supported the ban on grain export, which had been prompted by fear of scarcity. This difference of opinion must be understood against the background of the general contemporary socio-economic situation . Even a brief glance at conditions show it is justifiable to call the period 1594-1599 a period of crisis for the Northern Netherlands. Dearth and scarcity of foodstuffs, the threat of famine, the decline of the standard of living, the spread of poverty, extremely cold winters, and breaches in the dikes all contributed to this state of crisis." Where the issue of trade and shipping to Spain and Portugal was concerned, many towns in the province of Holland, unlike Amsterdam, strongly favoured prohibition. The most feasible explanation lies in the fact that the merchants in these towns were not as dominant as those in Amsterdam. The interests of two other groups, the shipowners and the sailors, weighed more heavily . If Dutch ships sailed to the south, there was a big risk that they would be taken by the Spanish, and the crews would be sent to the galleys. The memory of what had happened in 1591, when 26 Dutch ships on their way home from Italy had been captured by the Spanish and the seamen had been forced to become galley slaves was still very much alive."

77 78 79

80

Japikse, Resolutien, IX-XI. Hccringa, Bronnen I, 17-27. Noordegraaf, 'Crisis' . Hart, 'De Italievaart', 44.

CORNELIS PIETERSZ HOOFT

(r547-r626)

37

The risk of a similar fate again overtaking sailors was much greater and therefore the towns thought it better to suspend all shipping in the unsafe zone until relations with Spain improved. Seeing that it held a minority view, Amsterdam agreed to a prohibition on trade and shipping to Spain and Portugal, but would not consent to including Italy under this ban and selfishly demanded that grain exports be free. It was to be disappointed. In October 1596 the States General, in accordance with the wish of the majority of its members, announced a prohibition on all shipping and trade to Spain, Portugal, and Italy. This announcement, aimed at paralysing all trade to the south, marks the moment at which Cornelis Hooft came to the fore. As a delegate to the States General he had informed the Amsterdam city government about the prohibition, and the city council now asked him to elucidate the point of view of Amsterdam in a meeting of the States General, in an effort to disembarrass the trade to Italy of all restrictions. Hooft had the task of making clear that, if the States adhered to its general prohibition, Amsterdam would simply feel forced to ignore it." As Cornelis had probably one or more ships already loaded with grain to send to Italy himself, it does not take much stretch of the imagination to assume that he fulfilled this task with vigour. His efforts were to no direct avail , but continued resistance from Amsterdam and pressing demands from the duke of Tuscany and the Republic of Venice to have permission to export grain from the Netherlands, as the harvest in Italy had been bad, eventually meant that within a few months the Italian trade was exempted from the ban." The restrictions that had been enforced in the winter of 1595-1596 were exceptional in the history of trade policy of the Republic. The prevailing rule was freedom of trade, even when scarcity threatened its own population." The power struggle between Amsterdam and the States General in 1596 shows that the interests of the Amsterdam grain traders could be quite sharply opposed to those of others: the governments of other less commercially oriented cities wanting to prevent famine and disorder in their towns, and the governments of harbour cities,

8\ 82

83

Heeringa , Bronnen, 17-27 . Van Dillen, Rijkdom, 70. Noordcgraaf, 'Crisis', 49.

38

CHAPTER ONE

kean to protect their seafaring popul ation ene mies. In Am sterd am , power was vested cha nts like Cornelis H ooft who wanted to aga inst possible profits and did not want po litical restrictions at all.

from the depredations of in the hands of rich merbe free to weigh up risks to be hamp ered by any

Conclusion Compa red to the lives of other merchants, Co rnelis' life was extraordinary in many respects. H e enjoyed a rapid rise in the hurl yburl y of city politics, while most othe r merchants had no direct access to political power. His Libert arian views, which meant that he was not a member of any churc h, were not commonly held. In fact they were qui te exceptional. T o ensure proper organization of his trade abroad he lean ed heavily on family m embers: he had reliable agents in Dan zig - two of his broth ers- and in Norway, Fra nce and Portugal-three of his cousins. T he solidarity between the mem bers of the family mu st have been very stro ng, perh ap s stro nger than that in most families. In another respect, this specific form of co-operation of family members mu st have bee n even mor e un usual. Without studyi ng the lives of othe r me rcha nts in detail, we can safely assume that a trading network base d on two brothers in Amste rdam, two brothe rs in D anzig, an d th ree cousins based elsew he re in por t cities in Euro pe was exceptiona l. Anyone who has ever looked int o a boo k on dem ography in ea rly modem tim es knows that fam ilies in which more than a few sons reac hed adulthoo d were rare. The b roth ers H ooft (H endrick, J an , Co rnelis, Willem, and Ge rrit) all reached the age of at least 49. T he physical stamina of the family H ooft was also strikingly appa rent in th e generation before them , the shipmas ters. T he re were eight brother s (again, stra ngely enough, no sisters) who all reach ed adulthoo d, seven of whom becam e shipmasters. This mu st have been a family blessed with extraordina rily good health! Alth ough most merch an ts did not becom e alderman, city councillor, and burgom aster , like Cornelis, their int erests were very well looked after as the city magistrates were all merch an ts themselves or belo nged to tr ading families, which entailed that they gave pri ority to mercantil e inte rests. Overseas trad e was always high on the agenda in Dutch politics. Fur thermo re, although the Libertarian views held

CORNELIS P1ETERSZ HOOFT (15 4 7 - 16 2 6)

39

by Cornelis were uncommon, his religious tolerance was shared by many merchants and was perhaps a condition for successful trading in a network connecting Protestant with Roman Catholic regions. Comelis' exile in the Baltic during the beginnings of the Dutch Revolt was also an expe rience found in th e lives of many more Amsterdam merchants, although mo st of them seemed to have fled to German inst ead of Prussian cities . Finally, th e importan ce of Cornelis' relatives to his trade was perhaps unrivalled in the specific form it assum ed but the fact that Dutch agents , most often but not nece ssarily relat ed to the head of the firm , went abroad to settle permanently in Danzig and oth er core cities in the trading system, was a fairly gen eral ph enomenon. This assertion is un equivocally attested to by the growth of the Dutch communities in Europe in this period. Marriage strategies motiv ated by economic interests were also not an exception but rather the rule among merchants. Comelis' marriage into a real 'herring fam ily' ties in beautifull y with the prevailing pattern of mat rimonial alliances. Leaving all these cogent examples aside, the best reason to present Cornelis Hooft here as an example of Dutch trade in the second half of the sixteenth century is the nature of his trade. The grain trade to the Baltic lay at th e cor e of his activities and not unnaturally stimulated the trad e in commodities to be exported to the Baltic, like herring and oil from th e Neth erlands and salt fetched in France and Portugal. During the 1590s the trading network was expanded to include the Mediterranean to meet the rising Italian demand for foodstuffs. In the long run and in general, Camelis' business was very profitable. It ensure d that he, who was born as the son of a shipmaster , died a very rich man. All of these aspectsgra in as core product, the trading network extending from the Baltic to th e M editerran ean , the profitability of the trade-were not uncommon among many oth er Amsterd am merchants.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GREAT WAVES IN THE HISTORY OF BALTIC GRAIN EXPORTS

It has been customary for historians to single out a few 'great waves' in the history of the Baltic grain trade. In this book we distinguish four phases: I) a period of expansion starting in the second quarter of the sixteenth century and ending about the middle of the seventeenth (1540- 1650); 2) a period of contraction that lasted until the middle of the eighteenth century (1650-1760); 3) a period of renewed growth (1760- 1800); followed by 4) a period of marginalization (1800-1860). How the grain trade developed and what factors emanating from either supply or demand were mainly responsible for the specific development during each period, are the subjects of this chapter (Sections 2-5). At this juncture, we shall be concerned with the Baltic trade in general and ignore the specific role of the Dutch, which will be the subject of subsequent chapters. In this wider framework, Section I introduces the Sound Toll Tables which are the most important source for our knowledge about the great waves.

1. TIe Sound Toll Tables: the Baltic historian's Bible

For almost hundred years now, the study of Baltic trade has been based on a famous publication: the Sound Toll Tables. I The Tables, summarizing the data about sea traffic paying toll in the Danish Sound, are unparallelled as a source for trade history in the early modern period. The importance of the Sound toll is obvious from the fact that all, or nearly all, ships sailing between the Baltic and western Europe took this sea route: it was the gateway to the Baltic. The strait is so narrow that, when a large fleet arrived the Sound was like a bottle-neck, causing delay. Even under more fortunate circumstances, practically speaking ships could not escape the toll.

I

Bang and Karst, Tabeller.

THE GREAT WAVES

41

The D anish monarchs, in control of both shores of the Sound, founded the toll at the beginning of th e fifteenth century. Thereafter , shipmasters sailing through had to pay toll on their ships to customs officers based at Elsinore, where the strait is narrowest. Commodities on board wer e still free at the time , and so the early registers give only information about the number of ships, but not about their load s. This changed in th e course of the sixteenth century, and most commodities eventually were made subject to toll. From 1561 on , du es had to be paid on nearly every commodity." For a very long tim e the Sound Dues form ed an important source of revenu e for the Danish monarchy. In the process of collecting the money, clerks meticulou sly recorded ships and goods in the Sound Toll Accounts, and- notwithstanding some serious problems conce rn ing the completeness and reliability of these registers, and interpretation of their contents- in doing so they created a wonderful source about shipping and trade between western Europe and the Baltic. To make matters even better , mo st registers have been preserved. Sadly mo st of the earliest accounts, from the fifteenth and ea rly sixteenth cent ury, have been lost. It seem s that they were destroy ed around the middle of the sixteenth century, and th at a toll collector trying to conceal the fraud committed by a predecessor (his fath er) had something to do with th is.' From about the middle of the sixteenth century, however, the majority of the registers is still extant. The toll was aboli shed in 1857, under pressure from the Americans who had become more deeply involved in Baltic trad e. So the Sound Toll Accounts constitute a sourc e for Baltic shipp ing and trade for about 300 years, from about the middl e of the sixteenth to the middle of the nin eteenth century." The publ ication of the Sound Toll T ables is the result of a gigantic project, which started in th e nin eteenth century. This proj ect set out to summarize the data in the Sound Toll Accounts in tabl es. Between 1906 and 1953, the Danish historian s, Nina Ellinger Ban g and Knud Korst, produced six impressive volumes covering the whole

Van Ticlh of, De Hollandse graanhandel, 253-254. Christensen, Dutch trade, 49 foot note I. ~ For critical evaluations of the Sound T oll Accoun ts as a source for the history of trade and shipping see: Christensen, 'Der hand elsgeschichtliche Wert der Sundzollregister'; Christensen, Dutch trade; J eannin , 'Lcs comptes du Sund' ; Va n T ielhof, De Hollandse graanhandel, Appendix C , 251- 256. 2

3

42

CHAPTER TWO

period from the earliest accounts available up to 1783. A more recent proj ect to cover the following period ha s produced summaries for twelve years: 1784-1795.5 As far as the remaining accounts are concerne d, only for th e yea r 1845 does a detailed study exist, analysing the tr ad e in a westerly direction ." U nfortuna tely, the rest of the period 1796-1856 still has to be covered and the obstacles to be overcome in studying the original accounts ar e just too large and too man y for mo st historians: the difficult handwritin g, the Danish lan guage, the differ ent measures and qualities of goods, and, not least, th e enormous number of pages-the volumes occupy sixty metres of shelf space (see figure 7).7 The origin al accounts, which are in Copenhagen and films of which ar e also kept in Amsterdam, are therefore not used as often as the Tables. In contrast to this, the Tables are seldom ignored in studies about Baltic trade, and the data from the Tables are often even used as the very basis of the resear ch . This effectively means that not the origin al registers themselves, but the Sound T oll Tables are th e Baltic historian's Bible. In using a source like this, it always ha s to be born e in mind that registration in the customs house was always ope n to fraud, but in the case of bulky commo dities like grain, fraud was not as serious a probl em as it was, for example, in the case of spices or other relatively small and precious goo ds. Only in the period 1580-161 7 mu st considerable fraud have been committed with cereals, and the biggest culprits were Dutch shipmasters. For exa mple, they made the toll-collectors believe tha t they had clapboard instead of gra in on board because of the lower toll tariff on this commo dity, or simply pretend ed that they were transporting a sma ller qu antity of cereals th an was actually the case. According to J eannin, in some years, notably 1581, 1582, and 1583, barely half of the actual amounts of gra in shipped were declared by the shipmasters who were intent on cheating and smuggling. Finally, in 1618, a radi cal reform ushered in a strict control of the toll declarations and after this measure was 5 J oh ansen , Shipping. J oh ansen 's project has also pr odu ced samples, taken at random , over the years 1796-1 807. Of these data, the numb er of ships sailing between the Net herla nd and the Baltic has been used by Fab er in his 'S hipping to the Nethe rlands'. 6 Yam am oto, 'Baltic grai n exports'. In fact, this article also contains inform ation abo ut other produ cts expor ted from the Baltic. A detailed database (named 'Baltic trade 1845') of the complete tra ffic from the Baltic to the West in 1845 is ava ilable on the inte rne t: http:/ / www.niwi.knaw.nll . 7 Gobel, ' Dc Sonttolregisters'.

43

THE GREAT WAVES

taken declarations became fairly reliabl e. So we shall have to bear in mind th at in the period 1580 -1617 trade was in fact more extensive than it would appear to hav e been from the accounts of the Sound Dues. For the rest of the seventeenth and for the eighteenth century as well declarations rem ain fairly trustworthy, at least as far as grain cargoes are conce rned."

2. An age

if expansion

(1540 -1650)

A general view of th e grain trad e th rough the Sound from 1562 (the ea rliest year for which amounts of grain ar e specified) to 1650 is given in Graph I. The upward tendency is obvious? as is the large size of transports. At least for th e period 1590-1650, on avera ge shipma sters declared more than 50,000 last a year at the customs hou se at Elsinore. This situation, in which such high levels of tr ad e persisted over such a long time , was unique for the whol e early modern period. 140000 . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , 120000 10000 80000 60000 40000 20000

Gr aph l. Baltic grain exports in the age of expa nsion, Source : Bang and Korst, Tabeller.

156 2~ 1650.

J eannin, 'Les comptes du Sund' , 96- 100, 307, 3 1 4 ~3 15. The equation of the long-term trend for the period 1 5 62~ 1649 (there are no dat a before 1562, and no data for the year 1650) is: y = 464.55 x + 36,603. 8

9

44

CHAPTER 1WO

The grain trade was not only large and expanding all the tim e, it was, as ]eannin emphasized long ago ," also relatively stable in this period. Of course, the volumes fluctuated from year to year, but not as much as they did in later periods. I I Between 1562 and 1650, extr em e fluctuations, defined as those cases in which volumes at least doubled from one year to the next (a rise of 100 per cent or more), or plummeted to ha lf (a fall of 50 per cent or more), occurred only four times . These fluctuations are found in the following years : Table 1. The greatest year-to-year fluctuations in the Sound trade, 1562-1650

a rise of > 100 per cent 1585- 1586 1617-16 18 1630-163 1

a fall by > 50 per cent 1608- 1609

Perhaps in reality there were only three cases of extreme fluctuations from one year to the next , as the leap from 1617 to 16 18 (from 44,812 lasts to 121,311 lasts) was caused at least partially by the tax reform of the latter year. The toll-collectors tighten ed up their lax attitude, becoming stricter and registering the actual trade more com pletely than ever before. The most extreme increase from one year to the next was found in 1630-1631 . Whereas in 1630 only a very small quantity of grain (11, 13 1 lasts) was registered in the Sound, the following year more than three tim es as much passed through (38,728 lasts). This upsurge can be attributed to the elimination of some enormous problems in the form of war and bad harvests which had made terrible inroads into the grain supply in the southern Baltic from the late 1620s on . We shall return to these problems later. Narrowing down our field of research geographically, the next question we have to ask is whi ch Baltic countries or ports were most involved in grain export? This is ineluctably linked to the fact that ]eannin, 'Les comptes du Sund', 322~323 . To compare the steadiness of the Sound trade in on e period with that in another, I have calculated the co-efficient of variation for the volumes of grain declared for eac h decade . The higher the co-efficient, the more severe the year-toyear fluctu ation s ar e in the ten years involved. For the period 1550-1650 there is only on e decad e in which the co-efficient of variation is over 0.5, and that is in the twent ies (162 1- 1630: 0.66 ). It was very low in the forties (164 1-1650: 0. 19). This means that the 1640s were not only the period with the biggest volum es tran sported, but also with the greatest stead iness in tho se volum es. 10

II

45

T HE GREAT W AVE S

Bergen

....... ./' /

,.,

.» V~

Map 2. T he H ooft tradi ng network

--f

46

CHAPTER TWO

only a limited part of the Baltic Sea region was able to export large surpluses. Most grain was loaded in ports along the southern coast. Everywhere in ports along this coast : in Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, Stettin, Danzig, Elbing, and Konigsberg cereals were traded regularly. The lion's share, however, was shipped in the Prussian cities of Danzig and, to a lesser degree, Konigsberg. In the period 15701649, 71 per cent of rye transports and 63 per cent of wheat transports declared in the Sound were shipped from Danzig, and 12 per cent of rye transports and 9 per cent of wheat transports from Konigsberg. Thriving on this trade these cities attracted many foreigners who settled in them to pursue careers as merchants or factors, representing foreign companies and occupying themselves with the export of various produce, but with grain in prime position. The Dutch community in Danzig grew very fast at the end of the sixteenth and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and consisted then of at least several hundreds of people. The main cause for the growth of the Polish grain export during the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century must be sought from the side of demand rather than that of supply. The increasing demand in the west and the high prices to be earned induced Polish landowners to devote as much land as possible to the cultivation of cereals. Land was abundant, but labour was scarce , and most of the grain that was eventually exported was produced using a workforce comprised of serfs. This kind of labour was often indispensable if the manorial estates were to be profitable.F Productivity was low, with yield ratios for rye, wheat, and barley not exceeding fOUL I 3 From 1466 to 1793 Danzig belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian state and was its principal port. The city owned this position primarily to its geographical location at the mouth of the River Vistula. The Vistula, along with its navigable tributaries such as the Bug, the Narew, and the San, played a major role as a trade route connecting Danzig with an enormous hinterland. The Vistula basin itself is larger than that of the Rhine, and, thanks to the tributary rivers, the grainsupplying districts associated with the Vistula trade are even substantially bigger." Hundreds, even thousands, of small boats floated down

12 13 14

Wyrobisz , 'Economic Landscapes', 38; Zytkowicz, 'Trends', 59, 62 and 81. Van Zanden, 'The development', 77-78. Cieslak and Biernat, History, 107-109 and Glamann, ' European Trade', 458.

THE GREAT WAVES

47

the Vistula to Danzig every year. The existence of connections between districts in Poland-Lithuania and Danzig or other Baltic ports like K onigsberg or Riga was largely decisive for the evolution of cerea l production for export. The fertility of the soil and climatic conditions wer e less important than transportation routes. That is why , for example, most parts of the extremely fertile Ukraine did not export grain to western markets in th e period under consideration : they lacked the essential infrastructure of waterways." Looking at developments in the medium term (see Table 2), it appears that trade was very lively in the 1560s, when the grain pric es in several western European countries wer e very high. Portugal, Spain, France, Irel and, England, and Scotland had to import grain from the Netherlands , grain th at doubtless partially originated from the Baltic." Trade declined during the 1570s, which was a time beset by problems. The situation during the 1580s was certainly mu ch better than suggested by the official declarations of grain in the Sound, because the extensive smuggling during this decade reduc es the figure in reality to a minimum rather than being a reliabl e indication for the actual trade. Setting up their company in 1584 (see Chapter 1), the Hooft brothers were probably responding to quickly expanding mercantile opportunities. Trade expande d very fast in the 1590s, the decad e during which dem and in southern Europe, especially in Italy, was large. The Sound trad e remained extensive until about 1620, when grain prices in Italy and th e rest of southe rn Europe started to fall. The 1620s were also the period when problems arose on the side of supply. From this point of view, they were nothing short of disastrous. A boom in the corn trad e in the years 1618-1622, thanks to abundant crops in the Baltic, was followed by crop failures in the following yea rs. The gap between supply and dem and quickly widened. Whil e prices in Amsterdam were rising, transports through the Sound fell from over I 00,000 last (1 6 18- 1621) via circa 80,000 last (1 622) to circa 60,000 last (1 623), and finally just over 30,000 last (16241625).1 7 The ramification s of such a redu ction in mercantile activities were enormous. The grain lightermen in Amsterd am , for example,

Wyrobisz, 'Economic Landscapes', 38. Van Tielh of, De Hollandse graanhandel, 159. i 7 J eannin , 'Les comptes du Sund ', 320-3 22. Figures from Ban g and Korst, Tabeller. i5

iii

48

CHAPTER TWO

who earned their living by bringing grain from the port to the warehouses, were faced with a shortage of work. In 1624 the Amsterdam magistrates felt they had to protect the lightermen and decided that the number of boats had to be reduced." Trade had hardly recovered when the next blow fell. At the end of the l620s, crop failures coincided with war between Poland and Sweden. From 1626 to 1629 the Swedish navy blockaded the port of Danzig and controlled all trade. The Swedes had gained control of large parts of the Baltic coast and of its hinterland. Trade along the Vistula was seriously disrupted, consequently the grain trade suffered badly. From July 1626 until late in 1629, the grain trade in Danzig had practically ground to a standstill. In 1629 a six-year truce was negotiated but for several reasons this still did not induce a quick recovery. In the first place, during the six years the truce lasted, Sweden continued to collect heavy customs duties in Danzig. Trade could only fully recover when the customs duties were abolished. This happened in 1635, when a twenty-year truce was signed between Poland and Sweden. 19 In the second place , the consequences of the disruption of economic life during the war were still being heavily felt in the year after the truce. As the truce was signed at the end of the summer (the 29th September), there was not enough time to make up for the lost season. The granaries in Danzig were empty for the most part and remained so in the winter of 1629-1630. Normally, in winter the granaries were full, waiting for the Dutch and other ships that would come in the spring and load a huge amount of grain. Under these exceptional circumstances, aggravated even more by a bad harvest in 1630, Danzig restricted the grain export to prevent scarcity and price rises. This is an important reason why the transports through the Sound were still so unusually small in 1630, only recovering a bit in 1631. One final deleterious effect of the Swedish-Polish War was the devastation of many fields in the north of Poland, especially in the Danziger Werder and the Marienburger Werder, regions that usually produced abundant quantities of grain for export. It took years before agriculture had recovered and grain surpluses had regained their old level.20 This situation,

See Chapter 8, Section I. Cieslak and Biernat , History , 155-161 ; Glamann, 'European Trade', 462. ' 0 Kr annhals , Danzig, 61-62 . 18

19

49

THE GREAT WAVES

exacerbated by protracted serious failures of Baltic grain supplies, was completely unusual. The resulting high grain pric es in western Europe was the reason for Dutch merch ants to turn to the Russian port of Archangel for grain. Cereal exports from th e White Sea were exceptional, but the emergency situation at the end of the l 620s and the early l630s made investments in the Arch angel grain trade worthwhile." The rest of the l630s brought som e recovery. The l640s witnessed an enormous and unprecedented expansion, and the Baltic grain trade reach ed its great est extent ever. One of the consequences was a shorta ge of boats in the canals of Amsterdam. Som e of the most important merchants of that city petitioned the magistrates for an increase in th e number of boats in town , because the existing flotilla was completely insufficient for the tran sport of cereals between port and warehouses. In 1649, the local and national taxes collected in Amsterdam yielded high er returns than ever before. Fine though the situation seem ed, th is year also marked the turningpoint. C ereal transports th rough the Sound diminished from then on and in non e of the later decad es of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was an average annual transport of more than 94,000 last, as in the l640s, ever realized. Table 2. Grain trade through the Sound, 1562-1650. In yearlY averages per decade 22

decade 1562-69 1570- 79 1580 -89 1590 - 99 1600 -09 1610 -19 1620 -29 1630- 39 1640 -49

last grain 54 ,230 36, 197 37,6 13 57, 76 1 55, 782 63,582 54,879 57 ,272 94 ,804

21 Klein, De Trippen, 153-1 61. Israel, Dutdi primacy , 145; Hart, 'Amsterdam Shipping', 28. See about the grain trade with Russia also Chapter 4, Section I . 22 Source: Bang and Korst, Tabeller. 'Grain' is the aggregate amount of rye, wheat, barley and malt.

50

C HAPTER TWO

The mo st important cerea l exported from the Baltic in this period was rye. About 80 per cent of total Baltic expo rts consisted of rye.23 It was mainly used to bake bread , the ba sic human nutritional mainstay in Europe during the whole ea rly modern period . The more expe nsive wheat, which was used for th e same purpose , formed only about 10 per cent of Baltic exports. Alth ough the possibility cannot be excluded th at the Sound T oll Accounts and T able s overrepresent rye at the expe nse of whea t because of the structure of toll tariffs (the tariff for rye was lower), the predominan ce of rye is confirmed by many othe r sources. The sha re of rye mu st ha ve been overwhelming th roughout the whol e of the sixteenth and seventeenth ce ntu ries .r' Becau se of the expa nsionist nature of the trade, its relative steadiness and the enormous volumes involved, the late sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century are genera lly considere d to hav e been the heyday of th e Baltic grain trad e.

3. A period of contraction (1650 -1 760)

Between 1650 and 1760, the Baltic grain trade went th rou gh a drastic decline." We can divide the period from 1650 to 1760 int o four shorter periods eac h mark ed by its own character: a protracted depression from th e 1650s up to and including the 1670s, an expa nsion of tr ad e during the 1680s and early 1690s, a new depression from the later 1690s until about 1720, a nd finally stag na tion acco mpani ed by great instability from 1720. The more favourable developmcnts in the 1680s and ea rly 1690s were relatively sho rt-lived and are therefore conside red to be the exception proving the rule (the rule being contraction, which dominated from 1650), rathe r than an indication that the sixteenth a nd early sevent eenth century expansion continued until th e end of the sevent eenth century." Around

23 See Appendix A. 2, For exa mple the portbooks of Da nzig, Riga and Tallinn (Reval), in which the

sorts of gra in arc record ed sepa rately: Krannhals, Danzig, 64, 65, 70; Soom, Der baltische Getreidehandel, 273 (Riga), 275 (T allinn). 25 T he eq uatio n of the long-term trend for the period 1654- 1760 (there arc no data for the years 1650- 1653) is: y = - 265.24 x + 58, I 17. 26 The annual fluctuations which a re so characteristic of the gra in trade make it difficu lt to determine the reversal of trends unam biguously. Klein, 'Kwantitatievc aspec ten', 80-8\.

51

THE GREAT WAVES

1720 a period of what was stagnation rather tha n decline set in, further characterized by extraordinarily great volatility." O nly abo ut 1760 did a new and stable expansion begin . In many of the years after 1700, the Sound toll was paid on less than 40,000 lasts. 120000 100000 80000

]

60000 40000 20000 0

0 ""' ""'""'

CD

CD

0

CD CD

""'

CD CD

0

.o

0

CD

CD

CD

r-,

r--. 00

""'

00 CD

0

0> CD

""'

0> CD

0 0

""'

0

r--. r--.

0

r--.

""'

r-,

0

N

r--.

""'r--. "" ""'cor--.

N

0

0

r-,

r-,

-e-

""'r--. ""'""' 0

r-,

0

CD r-,

Graph 2. Baltic grain exports in the period of contraction, 1650-1 760. Source: Bang and Korst, Tabeller.

Trade was relatively unstable." Extr eme fluct uations-defined as cases in which the volumes involved at least doubled from one year to the next , or fell to half of what they had been-occurred in every deca de except the 1650s an d the 1680s (see Table 3). In a period of 110 years , there were no fewer than twenty cases of such violent fluctuations , against only four in the periode 1562-1650. The instability was especially pronounced during the 1720s, 1730s, 1740s, and 1750s. In these decades the investments merchants were willing to make in cereals often varied significantly from year to year. At some moment around the middle of the seventeenth century , the tendency of grain prices to rise came to an end and a long

27 It would very well be possible to subdivide this period into two shorter ones: 1720-1740 and 1740- 1760. Series pr esented by De Buck and Lindblad unequivocally show expansion of the Amsterdam trad e on the Baltic from 1722, culminating in th e peak year 1740, followed by contraction until 1757. (De Buck and Lindblad, 'De scheepvaart en handel ', 547). The choice to treat the period 1720- 1760 as a whole is motivated by the fact that in these years the most characteristic aspect of the grain trade seems to be the great instability. 28 In many decades in this period, the co-efficient of variation is higher than 0.5: in the 1660s, the 171Os, the 1720s, the 1730s, the 17405and the 1750s (see foo note 11).

52

C H APTER lWO

Table 3. The greatest year-to-year fluctuations in the Sound trade, 1650-1 760

a rise with > 100 per cent 1667- 1668 1673-1 674 1697- 1698 1727- 1728 1728- 1729 1737-1 738 1738-1 739 1746-17 47 1756-17 57 1759-1 760

a fall by > 50 per cent 1671 -1 672 1695- 1696 1702-1703 171 4-1 71 5 1726-1 727 1735-1 736 1741- 1742 1744- 1745 1755-1 756 1757-1 758

agr icultural depression began . This blow did not fall everywhere at one and the same tim e. In Italy, for exa mple, prices were rising until about 1620, and then the tendency reversed . On the Amsterdam G ra in Exchan ge, on the other hand, the highest price for rye was only recorded in 1662, after which yea r a decline set in. 29 Popul ation growt h began to slow down in many regions in Euro pe, or sometimes even turned into a decline, while grain cultivation was intensified. In the Me dite rra nean region, for in stan ce, the food supply was increased by the sprea d of the production of maizc.P In Germany agri culture was recovering from the disastrous effects of the Thirty Years' ,,yar. In Brabant and in the eastern Dutch provi nces, the cultivation of bu ckwheat spread." The growing importance of domestic grain to th e Dutch food supply is indicated by th e fact th at Brab an t rye and buckwheat began to be trad ed regularly on the Ams te rdam Ex ch ange.F In Eng la n d th e producti on of cereals increased , which redu ced the need for imp orts in the second half of the seventeenth century. Eventually, at the end of tha t cent ury, England turned into a gra in-exporting country. Fro m about 1700 up to about 1760, En gland was an altern ative bread basket for western Europe, Engl ish gra ins ousting their Baltic counte rparts from the mark et. Fr om the 171Os, more cere als were exported fro m England than came through the Sound.

29

30 31 32

Posthumus, Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis. Van Zan den, 'T he developm ent ', 78-79. Faber, 'The decline' , 45- 5 1. Kappelhof, 'Noord-Braba nt', 201- 202.

53

THE GREAT WAVES

Table 4. Comparison

1700-1709 1710-1719 1720-1729 1730-1739 1740-1749 1750-1759

of English

and Baltic grain exports, 1700-1760. In last, yearly averages per decade'? English exports

Baltic exports

28,242 36,874 41,573 53,435 66,576 65,740

29,409 26,394 40,179 31,295 31,369 36,548

In the discussion about the decline of the Baltic grain trade after the middle of the seventeenth century most attention has always been paid to factors on the side of demand. Faber's well-known article, 'The Decline of the Baltic Grain Trade in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century', is an unequivocal example of this somewhat one-sided view. Notwithstanding the great influence diminishing western demand undoubtedly had, other underlying factors deserve our attention too . Trade fluctuations are of course better explained by taking both demand and supply conditions into consideration.r' After the middle of the seventeenth century the Baltic countries were beset by serious problems, not only of a political but also of an economic nature. Poland, the most important country as far as the grain trade is concerned, suffered most . The Swedish-Polish War of 1655-1660 (also called th e First Northern War) and the Great Northern War of 1700-1721 had devastating effects on the grain trade, lasting long after peace was concluded. Both wars caused terrible demographic losses. In the Swedish-Polish War, Poland lost at least 25 per cent of its population, in certain regions perhaps even more than 60 per cent." Much of the land that had been under cultivation was now abandoned because of the shortage of labour. Many grain fields in the Vistula basin had been laid waste by the Swedish and Polish 33 English exports include rye, wheat, oatmeal, barley , and malt. Baltic exports are transports through the Sound of rye, wheat, barley and malt. Source for Baltic exports: Bang and Korst, Tabeller. Source for English exports : these data were generously given to me by David Ormrod. Round figures of annual exports are published in Ormrod, English Grain Exports, 96-97 . The English exports are orginally in 'quarter', and are converted into lasts (ten quarter = one last). 3+ Hogberg showed the importance of supply conditions in the Baltic grain trade in the eighteenth century and remarked that historians of the 1960s had worked in a true Malthusian spirit, concentrating on que stions around demand conditions. 'Baltic Grain Trade', 126. 35 Wyrobisz , ' Economic Landscapes', 36.

54

CH AP TER TWO

armies. The devastation inflicted on towns and countryside alike in the period 1655-1660 bears comparison with that of the hard-hit districts of Germany during the Thirty Years' War. 36 Recovery was slow. A comparison of average yield ratios in Poland in the period 1650-1750 with those in the period 1500-1650 shows that productivity declin ed and there can be no doubt that the wars were the main cause for this decline." The Great Northern War (1700- 1721) was espec ially disastrous for agriculture in the Swedish po ssessions in the eastern Baltic : Estonia, Livonia, and Kurland. These provinces wer e plundered by Russian armies and saw their grain export decimated. The picture in Poland was different becaus e there agri culture suffered not only as a result of wars, but also from soil exhaustion and from the fragm ent ation of peasant holdings." After 1660, and again after 1721, it would have taken huge investments in large pa rts of Poland to regain the level of grain exports that prevailed before the war. Only then could desert ed land have again been put under cultivation and villages and gran ari es rebuilt. Given the unfavourable circumstances of the time (slackening demand from the west), these investme nts were not likely to have been mad e. As a merchant from Dan zig remarked in a pamphlet in 1660: "Es hab en die Holl ander schon 5. Jahr lan g ohne Pohlnische Getreyde beholfen " ." T he Dutch could do without Polish grain. That is why grain production recovered so slowly. The depression in the Baltic grain trade in the period 1650-1760 appears to have been caused first and foremo st by a decline in the rye trade through Danzig. Although for th e tim e being Danzig ret ain ed its pride of place among the Baltic ports, the town definitely had to cede some of its predominan ce. Exports from oth er places were more enduring. Broadly speaking, the trade shifted a little further eastwards, away from Danzig to Konigsb erg and Riga." Riga was situated at th e mouth of the Dvina and its hinterland was genero us. It encompassed th e river networks connected with the Dvina:

Glamann, ' European Trad e', 465. Van Zanden, 'The development ', 77-78. 38 Ormrod , English Grain Exports, 47. 39 Kr annhals, Danzig, 126. ~o In the period 1651-1750 52 per cent of the rye transpo rts throu gh the Sound originated from Danzig, 18 per cent from Konigsberg and 8 per cent from Riga. For wheat the figures are 75 per cent for Danzig and 15 per cent for Konigsberg. 36

37

THE GREAT WAVES

55

covering Livonia, Lithuania, and White Russia." The situation was also cha nging in Ru ssia where, after th e foundation of St Petersburg, Rus sian grain did not have to travel the long route via Archangel and the White Sea, but had an outlet on the Baltic. The grain export via St Petersburg, Russia 's window on the west, increased. In the medium term, grain transports varied considerably. Table 5 specifies transports per decade. Table 5. Grain trade through the Sound, 1650-1760. In yearlY averages per decade"

decade 1650- 59 1660-69 1670- 79 1680- 89 1690-99 1700- 09 1710 ~19

1720-29 1730- 39 1740-49 1750- 59

last grain 53,347 38,542 46,106 84,460 54,554 29,409 26,394 40,179 31,295 31,369 36,548

The booming 1640s gave way to the turbulent 1650s. The data of the only four years in th is decad e for which we have the Sound T oll T ables (1 654 to 1657) suggest that trade was mu ch less important than during the preceding decad e. The reasons that the Tables fail to yield dat a, a rare occurrenc e, were of a political nature. The Danish king, Frederick, newly elected in 1648, wanted to elimin ate growing ten sions between the Dutch Provinces and Denmark , and a defensive alliance for 36 years between the two states was concluded in 1649 . It was accompanied by a so-call ed R ed emption Treaty, also conclude d in 1649 for 36 years, but abrogated in 1653, by which Denmark accepted a single payment of 140,000 rigsda1er annually instead of levying tolls on individual Dutch ships. So from 1650 to 1653, Dutch shipmasters had unhampered passage through the Sound, and consequently th e Sound T oll Tables are useless in an

{!

{2

Soom , Der baltische Getreidehandel, 282. Source: Bang and Korst, Tabeller. Gr ain includes rye, wheat, barley, and malt.

56

CHAPTER TWO

attempt to measure grain transports.P From 1658 till 1660, customs records are completely non-existent as Denmark had lost control of the Sound. In their attempt to extend their influence over as much of the Baltic as possible, the Swedes had launched some successful attacks on Denmark and for a few years managed to hold both shores of the Sound. The sixties were a bad time. The grain supply was seriously jeopardized during the Swedish-Polish War of 1655-1660. Enormous parts of Poland, including the capital Warsaw and the most important cities, fell into Swedish hands. The Swedes blockaded the port of Danzig and made traffic on the Vistula virtually impossible. Exports from Danzig were practically cut off: the annual average grain exports in the period 1656-1660 amounted to only 4,000 last (against 44,500 last in the period 1651-1655).44 Other grain-producing regions suffered from this war too : Russian troops occupied most of Lithuania in 1655 and, after having secured a truce with Poland and declared war on Sweden in 1656, proceeded to occupy parts of Livonia. Grain exports from Riga fell to practically nothing in 1656 and they only recovered in 1662, one year after peace was concluded between Sweden and Russia." During the war and in the years immediately following, when Baltic supplies still fell short but prices in Amsterdam were high, grain was exported to western countries from Archangel. 46 During the last decades of the century the grain trade suffered from generally low prices, and was also affected by wars which often meant that sea routes were unsafe for Dutch ships. The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) and the Nine Years' War (1688- 1697), for example, endangered shipping on the North Sea. The Baltic could also be risky. Sometimes, when there was too much trouble in the Baltic to take risks, merchants turned to the White Sea for grainY Fear of grain shortages in Holland intensified the grain trade enormously in 1698 and 1699.

Kirby, Northern Europe, 181-182. Cieslak and Biernat, History , 189. n Oakley , War and Peace, 85-86 and Dunsdorfs , 'Riga Grain Trade', 35. • 6 Van Dillen, Rijkdom, 346 (1658- 1663). H So during the war between Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia and Denmark (1675- 1677), Archangel exported grain to the west (Van Dillen, Rijkdom, 346; Raptschinsky, 'Het gezantschap', 183-186). H

+l

THE GREAT WAVES

57

The first quarter of the eighteenth century witnessed a severe and protracted depression, and, as a consequence of this, can be considered the nadir of the Baltic grain trade, compared to the zenith of the l640s, which had been its heyday. During the Great Northern War (1700-1721 ), Russian armies plundered the grain fields in the eastern Baltic causing enormous damage. The grain export from Estonia, Livonia, and Kurland was decimated. During some years of the Great Northern War (1703, 1709), exports from the White Sea via Archangel somewhat compensated for the insufficiency of Baltic supplies, although it seems that they never exceeded a few thousand last per year. 48 From the 1nos to the 1750s, Baltic exports were more important than they had been at the beginning of the century, at least when considering average volumes per decade, but annual differences were enormous. Demand for Baltic grains was anything but stable. Bad harvests in western Europe caused immediate and enormous peaks in demand for Baltic cereals, for example in 1729 and 1740. In these years almost 100,000 last of grain were declared at the customs house at Elsinore . In Amsterdam, business was exceptionally lively during the summer of 1729 and the workers in the port profited from the situation by asking extremely high wages for carrying grain in sacks from the ships to the warehouses." The overwhelming predominance of rye in Baltic exports started to decline around the middle of the seventeenth century. From then on, not only did wheat become marginally more important, barley and malt really began to capture the market. Barley was widely used as cattle fodder, and (raw or in its fermented form -malt) as the raw material for beer and spirits. While wine was the most common basis for the production of liquors in southern and western Europe, the basic ingredient in the north and north-west was grain. So barley was the main raw material for English gin and Dutch jeneoer. These strong drinks became increasingly popular in the second half of the seventeenth century. According to Braudel, in London at the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was right and proper among all layers of society to get drunk on gin." In the Netherlands drinking jeneoer became popular at the beginning of the eighteenth ,8 De Buck, 'De Russische uitvoer', 139-141 (1703, 1709). ,9

50

See Chapter 8, Section 2. Braudcl, De structuur, 238.

58

C HAPTER TWO

century ." This is show n by a ra pid expansion of Dutch distilleries in the early eight eenth century , especially in the towns Schiedam, Rott erd am , and Delfshaven ." The new industry literally devoured gra in. In 1691 it was estimated th at distillers in H olland used almost 14,000 last each year. 53 The distilleries probably more tha n compe nsated for the decline in dem and for barley and malt to make beer, a decline which set in at th e end of the seventeenth century as a consequence of the rise in popul ari ty of coffee and tea." In the cargoes of Dutch ships arriving from the Baltic, the trad ition al predominan ce of rye gave way to a more balan ced ran ge, which may partially explain the relatively big sha re of the Dutch merchan t fleet in Baltic gra in exports when total expo rts contracted after the middl e of the seventeenth century.55 A substantial part of English gra in exports to the Neth erlands also consisted of barl ey and malt." In short, th e period from the middle of the seventeenth to th e middl e of the eight eenth century can be charac terized as a tim e of troubl es: troubl es of an economic nature of which the most serious was the tenden cy of prices to decline, a nd troubl es of a political nature, often gene rating some kind of threat to imp ort ant sea routes and causing devastation of fields.

4. Renewed growth (1760- 1800)

In the 1760s tr ad e emba rked on a process of fairly rapid expa nsion, as is obvious from the steep rise of the long-term trend" in Graph 3. On the whole, the trade was relatively stea dy." Only in the 1780s was trade volatile. One of the reasons for th is great instability was Burema, De voeding, 176. O rmrod, English. Grain Exports, 67-68. 53 Unger, 'Brewing', 437. 5~ For the Dut ch Republic this is assumed by Faber, 'The decline', 44. Unger later confirmed Fab er's belief that the decline of brewing in H ollan d was not among the principal explana tions for the decline of the Baltic grain trade. He did this by analysing the correlation between Baltic gra in exports and the contraction of brewing in Holland from 1650 to 1805. Unger, 'Brewing', 44 1-442 . 55 Lindblad, 'Foreign T rade', 237. 56 Data on English exports were given to me by David Ormrod (cf. footno te 33). 5] T he equation for the long-term trend for th e period 1760-1795 (there are no data for the year s after 1795) is: y = 842 .53 x + 53,097. 58 Only in the I 780s was the co-efficient of var iation higher than 0.5 (see footnote I I). T he lack of data ma kes any calculation for the 1790s impossible. 51 52

59

THE GREAT WAVES

140000 -.-- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - --, 120000 100000 80000

]

60000 40000 20000 0 0

~

..;-

0>

~

Graph 3. Baltic grain exports in the age of renewed growth, 1760-1795. Source : Bang and Korst, Tabeller; Johansen, Shipping.

the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780- 1784), which was the source of great disruption. Another factor undermining instability was crop failures in France in 1788 and following years, resulting in a huge deman d for Baltic grai ns in this cou ntry. 59 T herefore the most volatile short-term fluct uations, defined as cases in which the volumes transported through the Sound at least doubled from one year to the next or were halved in the same pe riod, can thus mainly be pinpointed to the 1780s (three cases). Table 6. The greatest year-to-year fluctuations in the Sound trade, 1760-1 795

a rise with > 100 per cent

1782- 1783 1788-1 789

a fall by > 50 per cent

1775-1 776 1785- 1786

Weare now ab le to compare the Baltic gra in trade of the second half of the eighteenth century with that in the sixteenth and seventeenth cent uries. T he revival which began to make its prese nce felt abo ut 1760 brought this trade bac k to the level where it had bee n in its heyday, at least whe n speaking of the volumes involved. T he amounts of cereals passing the Sou nd between 1760 and 1790 are

59 Faber, 'Shipping to the Netherlands ', 100; De Vries and Van der Woude , Nederland, 487.

60

CHAPTER TWO

of the same order of magnitude as those in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, namely on average over 50,000 last a year. In absolute terms, therefore, the Baltic grain trade was as important in the second half of the eighteenth century as it had been some 150 or 200 years earlier. Only the decade 1640-1649, with more than 94,000 last, remains unrivalled for quantities shipped. Interestingly enough, the year 1649, the peak year of the seventeenth century, is 'beaten' by 1783. These were both years with extraordinarily large amounts of 132,990 and 135,434 last respectively. The main reason for the eighteenth century expansion was that, around the middle of the century, grain prices in western Europe started to rise again as a consequence of renewed population growth. This presented the Baltic region, the granary for the west for centuries, with new opportunities. Supply-wise, it is remarkable that the grain trade shifted definitively from the southern to the eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea. This shift away from Danzig and other Prussian cities had already begun during the Swedish-Polish War (1655- 1660), when agriculture in the basin of the Vistula and its tributaries had suffered so much. Grain production was very slow to recover and productivity remained low. Despite the destruction of their own hinterland during the Great Northern War (1700- 172 1), in the long run the Livonian and Estonian ports like Riga, Pernau, and Reval fared better. In the eighteenth century these ports profited from the fact that Muscovite Russia began to produce grain surpluses on a regular basis. One of the reasons for the breakthrough in Russian agriculture was the use of highly fertile land in newly settled regions (the northern steppe and the provinces to the east of the Volga first, the southern steppe later on). Russian grain exports to the west began to achieve major importance in the second half of the eighteenth century." Cereals from Muscovite Russia were predominantly exported from Riga, but St Petersburg also profited." and in some years Archangel too had its fair share of the profits."

Newman, 'International Price Levels', 56. In the years 1771-1780 on average more than 2,000 last grain per year that had been loaded in St Petersburg was sent westwards through the Sound. Unger, 'De publikatie', Appendix X. See also Newman, 'The Russian Grain Trade', 55-59. 61 In 1773 about 17,000 last of grain was exported from Archangel. Abel, 60

61

Massenarmut, 219.

THE GREAT WAVES

61

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century trade through Danzig plummeted temporarily. From the first partition of Poland in 1772 till the second partition in 1793, the Prussian policy of strangling the city economically was successful. Very high customs duties and the isolation of Danzig from its hinterland caused many foreign merchants to give the city a wide berth and a big part of the Vistula trade was diverted to Elbing.P In the 1770s and 1780s, only 15 per cent of total Baltic rye exports and 37 per cent of total wheat exports originated from Danzig. Never before had the role of Danzig been so unimportant. When speaking about supply, it is imperative to mention a new phenomenon. Whereas in earlier times, the lion's share of Baltic surpluses had been directed westwards, through the Sound, in the course of the eighteenth century this pattern began to change. Sweden emerged as a grain-importing country. By the time grain prices in western Europe were on the rise again, Swedish imports were considerable: over the period 1738-1800 they averaged 440 ,000 barrels, which is about 24,000 last, annually." Sweden procured its cereals mostly from Swedish Pomerania and from the Baltic provinces of Russia. The import of Russian grain was favoured by a privilege Sweden had held since the Peace of Nystad of 1721. At the end of the Great Northern War Sweden had been forced to surrender its Baltic provinces Estonia and Livonia, but had obtained the right to import duty-free grains from Russian ports, especially Riga, to a maximum sum of 50,000 roubles (in 1745 raised to 100,000 roublesj/" Grain imports in Sweden remained essential until the 1830s.66 Obviously the Swedish imports reduced the surpluses available for export out of the Baltic Sea region. Table 7. Grain trade through the Sound, 1760-1795. In yearlY averages per decade

decade

1760-69 1770-79 1780-89 1790-95

63

last grain

54,659 71,244 66,471 91,477

Cieslak and Biernat, History, 190, 263-265 .

6" Lindblad , 'Sweden's Grain Trade', 66. A barrel equalled 164.9 liter and a last

3010 liter. 65 Lindblad , 'Sweden's Grain Trade', 66-68. See also Cieslak, 'Aspects'. 66 Jorberg, 'The Nordic Countries', 382-383, 438.

62

CHAPTER TWO

In the medium term (Table 7) we see a virtually uninterrupted rise, only temporarily halted during the 1780s. During the first half of the 1790s, commerce was exceptionally lively. Considerable qu antities of Baltic gra ins were then exported to the Neth erlands, and, directly or via a Dutch port, to France, England, and Portugal." Compared to th e oth er grains, wheat rapidly gained in importance in th e cour se of the eighteenth century. Whereas in the years around 1600, this more expe nsive among the bread grain s form ed only about 10 per cent of the total transports through the Sound, and in the years around 1700 usually some 20 per cent, in the course of the eighteenth century its share climbed to 30 and occasionally even 40 per cent."

5. Marginalization (1800- 1860)

In the nin eteenth century, the Baltic region as a whole saw mu ch of its importan ce for th e food supply of western Europe eclipsed. Alternative suppliers like the Ukraine and America had appeared on the scene. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Ukraine becam e a major supplier of wheat to th e world market. The bulk of this wheat, trad ed via Odessa, went to M editerranean countries like Italy and southe rn France, and a small part was shipped to England and the Ne the rlands." Its appearan ce on the market had an unfavourable effect on western demand for Baltic grain . American expor ts to Europe also began to pick up in the first half of th e nin eteen th cen tury , but th ey were not yet of overwhelming importance. In 1850 the main imp orter of American wheat, England , obtained less th an one-fifth of her total grain imports from the USA.70 A real turning-point in the Eur opean gra in trad e came after the end of the American Civil War (1 865). A stream of immigra nts settled in the western parts of the US A and the cultivation of wheat qu ickly expanded. At about the same time, the American railway system was expa nded and th e fares on ocea n steame rs to Europe dropped

67

68 69 70

J ohan sen , Shipping, 104; Van Nicrop, 'Uit de bakerm at', I, appendix. See Appendix A. Herlihy, Odessa, 97, 105, 107. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, 34 1.

63

THE GREAT WAVES

drastically. As a result, in th e 1870s Am erican exports increased enormously and pric es in Europe collapsed." Nineteenth-century developments are not as easy to follow as their earlier counterparts, as we cannot use the Sound Toll T ables . Although the toll was collected until 1856, summaries of the accounts have only been mad e up to and including the year 1795 . Although Baltic exports lost importance relatively, in ab solute terms they must have rem ain ed substantial, j udging from the dat a on exports from Danz ig. This city was able to overcome the disaster of the years 1772-1793, and grain exports recovered." This is shown in Table 8. Table 8. Grain exports.from Danzig, 1751-1850. In yearly averages per decade, in last" 1751-1760 1761-1770 1771-1780 1781-1 790 1791-1800

30,350 40,600 17,150 18,600 29,340

1801-1805 1816-1 820 1821-1 830 1831-1 840 1841-1850

59,130 33,300 27,400 26,080 46,980

(1 806- 18 15: no data)

The figures unequivocally show that, in the first years of the nin eteenth century, exports from Danzig were even mu ch higher than they had ever been during the whol e eighteenth century. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century th ey were comparable to averages from about on e hundred yea rs ea rlier, th e pe riod of great instab ility. In the 'hungry forties', when potato blight and rye crop failure created extreme scarcity in most of Europe, exports from Danzig were compara ble to tho se in th e Golden Age of that city, the beginn ing of the seventeenth century. The crisis of 1845- 1847 was the last trad ition al food crisis." At Elsinore, in 1845, the Sound toll was paid on nearly 100,000 last of grain heading westwards."

Abel, Agrarkrisen, 258- 259. In the nineteenth cent ury, most of the exports from Danzig went westward s and only a few per cent was directed to places in the Baltic itself. Cieslak and Bierna t, History, 339, 340. Before the first partition of Poland , this had been different. See Cieslak, 'Aspects', 262. 73 Cieslak and Biern at, History, 189, 300, 339. Figures have been rounded off to the nea rest ten. H Kriedte, Peasants, 101. 75 T ha t is 65,200 last of wheat , II ,I 00 last of rye, 15,300 last of barley, 4,900 last of oats. Yamamo to, 'Baltic grain exports'. 71

72

64

CHAPTER TWO

In the nineteenth century wheat finally assumed first place among Baltic exports. The stru cture of the grain export from Danz ig is a clear indication of this development. Table 9. Sorts qf grain exported from Danzig, 1816-185076

1816-1820 1821-1830 1831-1840 1841-1 850

wheat

0/0

21,372 18,129 19,418 37,3 15

64 66 74 79

rye

%

barley

7,267 22 6,007 22 1,697 7 6,141 13

2,816 974 1,293 1,378

0/0

8 4 5 3

other grains % 6 8 14 5

European consume rs showed a growing preferen ce for br ead mad e from wheat flour. In the long run, whe at displaced oth er types of cere als and becam e the standard grain in mo st European countries." In northern Europe this gradual spread of wheaten bread appears to have taken plac e earl iest in England. Around the middle of the eighteenth century more than on e half of English bread is supposed to have been baked with wheat flour and one hundred years later , almost all of it, as rye br ead was then virtually a thing of the past." At that time, wheat was the major food grain not only in England, but also in Fran ce and in many M edit erranean countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey)." The situation in the Neth erlands was still very different, but, by then , this country was no longer the main destination of Baltic grain.

Conclusion

For more than 300 years the Baltic Sea region exported massive quantities of cereals to the west. Brilliant source material in the form of the Sound Toll Accounts docum ents the up s and downs in this trade flow, and reveals many interesting details . The docum entation of trade through the Sound is incomparable with the records of any oth er trade in early modern tim es. In controvertibly, this must be 76

77 78 79

Cieslak and Biernat, History, 339. Collins, 'Why Wheat?', 12. Minchinton, 'Patterns', 126-1 27. Collins, 'Why Wheat?', 9, 21.

THE GREAT WAVES

65

attributed to the publication of the Sound Toll Tables, summarizing the data contained in the Accounts. This is the reason that the Baltic trade has attracted so much attention from economic historians . The Tables have been used in this chapter as the basis by which the main developments of grain exports can be followed. We have distinguished three periods each of about hundred years: a period when trade was expanding, and exports were sizeable and also relatively stable . This period was the 'long sixteenth century', when prices were rising and western and southern European countries were experiencing increasing problems with the supply of basic foodstuffs. It was a worthwhile proposition for merchants to incur high expenses in organizing trade and transport from one part of Europe to another. The end of this period also marked the heyday of the Baltic grain trade: the booming forties were followed by the beginning of a trend reversal. The next period saw Baltic exports decline, as a consequence of falling demand in the west and major supply problems in the Baltic itself. On the whole, exports were lower than in the first period, and the year-to-year fluctuations were also much larger. The first two decades of the eighteenth century were the lowest point. The devastation of grain fields in the Baltic region during the seemingly endless wars, the disturbance to shipping traffic, also a consequence of the machinations of politics, and the fact that the cultivation of foodstuffs in western countries increased and was better able to meet requirements there, all contributed in threatening to marginalize the Baltic grain trade. After a few decades of stagnation during which exports were generally low, but from time to time extraordinary high, for example during the crisis of 1740, an age of renewed growth hove on the horizon about 1760. Population growth and an accompanying price rise ended the agricultural depression of the preceding hundred years and forced the west again to turn increasingly to Baltic cereals . Consequently in the second half of the eighteenth century, Baltic exports expanded and were relatively stable, keeping about as extensive as they had been in the first half of the seventeenth century. The rising trend probably gave way to some stagnation around the turn of the century, followed by some recovery. During the first half of the nineteenth century Baltic grain exports were not unimportant in an absolute sense, but their importance to the European food supply was far less than it had been in earlier times. The crucial role of the supplier of large quantities of food the Baltic region had fulfilled from the fifteenth century, which

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CHAPTER TWO

it had had to sha re only with England in the first half of th e eighteenth century, was sealed down to a modest role. A marginalization of Baltic gr ain took pla ce as other regions began to export large qu antities of food. The major product exported in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was rye, th e cheapest bread grain . In the eours e of th e seventeenth century, a mark ed prefer ence for wh eat began to appear. The process of th e adva nce me nt of wh eat was fairly long dr awn out but was irreversible, and reflected th e rise in th e standard of living of th e Europe an population. Finally, by th e nin ete enth century wheat had becom e the most important Baltic cereal. The history of the Baltic grain trade is intertwined with th e history of the Neth erlands. The cere als were often bought and sold by Dutch merchants , shipped on Dutch ships, sto red in Dutch warehouses, sold on th e Amst erdam Exchange, and eate n by Dutch consume rs. Of cour se, this was no t always th e case, and a closer inspection reveals great differences between th e successive periods and, at this po int , it is impe ra tive to examine th e role of th e Am sterdam entrepo t,

C HAPTER T HREE

TH E N\JISTERDAlvI ENTREPOT

Recentl y, th e tradition al view of ea rly mod ern Amsterdam functionin g as a world staple, a central reservoir where goods were brought in from all over the world , stored, and ultim ately redistributed to all the points of th e compass, has been qu estion ed by Lesger , who laun ched a three-pronged attack on the old model.' Firstly, he emphasized th at even trade over long distan ces did not necessarily make use of a concrete marketplace located somewhere in between the region of produ ction and the region of consumption. Sales could be, and often were, mad e without the actual commodities being pr esent , and tra de flows often passed by the coastline of the Ne the rlands. M erchants, sitting in their offices in the Ne therlands, directed substantial tra de flows to all parts of Euro pe without the goods ever touching Dutch soil. Seco ndly, the traditi onal model implied tha t markets were linked to each other in a hierarchical system, in which Amste rda m stood at the top , dominating othe r smaller markets. Lesger, associating him self with earl ier critics of this highly theoretical model, postulated that , in reality, in ea rly modern tim es for most produ cts (and he mention s gra in as one of them) more tha n one imp ortant market seems to have existed. Finally, Lesger suggested that the traditional interpretation of the imp ressive conce ntrat ion of goods in the Ne the rlands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in Amsterdam be altered. Rath er than ascribing it to stockpiling in expec tation of re-export, he attributed it mainly to the function of the Dutch ports as gateways to an extensive hinterland including parts of G ermany and th e Southern Netherl ands. International distribution, although imp ortant especially in the case of gra in and the products from the East Indies, was not the main incen tive for the stupe ndous developmen t of overseas trad e. In stead of being the distribution centre of surpluses from all over the world, the Dutch I Lesger , 'De mythe'. See also his book on trade in Amsterdam that will be published in 2002: Cle Lesger, Handel in Amsterdam ten tijde van de Opstand (Hilversum 2002).

68

CHAPTER THREE

entrepot owed its unique function more to the presence of a very large merchant community maintaining con tacts with agents all over the world, aided and abetted by highly developed financial services, and making full use of its strong position as a centre of information. In this chapter, this view of the cntrcpot or staple (stapelmarkt in Dutch literature) as a whole will serve as the point of departure for an analysis of the function of Amsterdam in respect to the Baltic grain trade. In it, we shall focus on trade flows, the crucial element in the traditional view on the entrepot, and deal with the mercantile organization in later chapters. Was Amsterdam the natural destination for cereals being exported from the Baltic, the place from which those grains were normally distributed to the rest of Europe? Was the existence of a central entrepot between east and west Europe necessary or could the early modern grain trade have functioned effectively without (a market like) Amsterdam? To what extent was Amsterdam just a gateway to the Dutch provinces, and to what extent did it act as a central entrepot for countries outside the Netherlands? What was, in short, the function of Amsterdam for the European trade in Baltic grain during the different phases of its development? (Section I). The best way to throw this into sharp relief is to focus on the importance of Baltic grains for Dutch consumers: the bread consumption in the Republic and the changing importance of Baltic grains to the Dutch food supply (Sections 2 and 3). Finally, in Section 4 the thorny matter of politics will be tackled : how did political decisions make or contributed to making Amsterdam an attractive place for grain merchants to ply their trade, and what political choices had an influence on transaction costs?

I. Amsterdam as an entrepOt for Baltic grain Without denying the existence of other markets, nobody can fail to recognize the outstanding importance of Amsterdam as market for Baltic grain during the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century. All evidence suggests that at least threequarters of the grain leaving the Sound was bound for Amsterdam. Although any Amsterdam trade statistics dating from before the 1770s are virtually non-existent, there are other sources which ineluctably reveal the massive influx of grain from the Baltic into Amsterdam. In the 1560s, for example, an Italian diplomat travelling in the

THE AMSTERDAM ENTREPOT

69

Netherlands, Ludovico Guicciardini, estimated annual grain imports into Holland from the Baltic and from the cities in northern Germany at 60,000 last, an amount approximately equal to the total Baltic exports." According to a pamphlet of 1630, the import of Baltic grain into Amsterdam averaged 40,000 last per year for the period 1560-1630 as a whole, and this quantity could be raised to 70,000 last in years of shortage." In the Sound in this period (1560-1630) on average about 51,000 last of grain was declared," and even taking into account the considerable fraud in the declaring of goods during many of these years,' there is no doubt that the bulk of Baltic exports was actually shipped to Amsterdam. Other evidence comes from the harbour records of the Baltic town of Reval from 1620-1648, showing that not less than 81 per cent of total rye-exports to western Europe was bound for Holland." We also know that from June to November 1645, 369 ships with grain passed the Sound, of which 73 per cent (271 ships), were bound for Amsterdam. Another 10 per cent (37 ships) were bound for other towns in Holland.' On the basis of these figures it would seem safe to claim that shipments to places outside Holland were insignificant. The close relationship between Baltic exports and Amsterdam imports can be demonstrated quite clearly for the period 1636-1662. For these years the proceeds from the local grain excise are known, an important-albeit rather short-series because it is one of the very few quantitative sources for the Amsterdam trade in this early period. Graph 4 shows the quantities of grain on which excise was paid and the amounts of grain declared in the Sound. The graph shows that Amsterdam imports and Baltic exports developed along roughly the same lines. The correlation (r) between the two series was found to be as high as 0.8,8 which shows that at that

2 It was even bigger than the quantities officially declared in the Sound at the time, and only a bit smaller than those that were probably actually transported, taking into account the fraud committed by the shipmasters concealing parts of their loads. Van Tielhof, De Hollandse graanhandel, 97-98. 3 Vlessing, 'The Portuguese-jewish Merchant Community', 239-240. t See Appendix A. 5 See Chapter II, Section I. 6 According to the harbour records of Reval: 22,324 last out of a total of 27,441 last. Soom , Der baltische Getreidehandel, 286-288. Soom does not specify which towns in Holland were involved, but remarks that this was mostly Amsterdam (p. 297). 7 Calculated from Appendix I in Kernkamp, De sleutels van de Sont. a This strong connection is all the more remarkable since the excise was a local

70

CHAPTER T HREE

160000 140000 120000 100000 ~

80000 60000 40000 /

20000

/

0